Opinion ID: 2632298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court Erroneously Denied Cook's Peremptory Challenge as Untimely.

Text: Cook argues that the superior court erred when it dismissed his peremptory challenge as untimely. Litigants have a statutory right to peremptory disqualification of a judge under AS 22.20.022, [1] and Alaska Civil Rule 42(c) controls the procedure and scope of such disqualification in civil cases. [2] Because Cook filed his peremptory challenge in accord with the provisions of that rule, his challenge was proper. Rule 42(c) provides: [i]n an action pending in the Superior or District Courts, each side is entitled as a matter of right to a change of one judge and of one master. [3] The timeliness provisions for a peremptory challenge are contained in subsection (3): Timeliness. Failure to file a timely notice precludes change of judge as a matter of right. Notice of change of judge is timely if filed before the commencement of trial and within five days after notice that the case has been assigned to a specific judge. Where a party has been served or enters an action after the case has been assigned to a specific judge, a notice of change of judge shall also be timely if filed by the party before the commencement of trial and within five days after a party appears or files a pleading in the action. [4] Cook's challenge falls under the second part of the rule, because he was served ... after the case ha[d] been assigned to a specific judge. Cook was initially served on May 28, after Judge Cutler had been assigned to the case on May 27. [5] As a result, Rule 42(c)(3) required Cook to file his challenge before trial and within five days of an appearance or filing in the action. [6] The superior court ruled that Cook's motion was not timely because the normal time limits of Rule 42(c)(3) were not available when a party had not entered a timely response to the complaint. The superior court's interpretation reads Rule 42(c)(3)'s five-day window after an appearance or pleading as applying only to a timely appearance or pleading. The court said, a party must timely enter an action in order to peremptorily challenge the judge within 5 days of that entry. The superior court did not cite to the rules or case law to support its interpretation of the rule, [7] but relied upon the argument that bad policy would result from allowing peremptory challenges after a default judgment: [I]t would encourage other litigants to default, await a ruling on the merits, and then challenge the judge and move to vacate the default. Cook's peremptory challenge falls within the plain language of Rule 42(c)(3), because his challenge was filed before any trial was held in the case and on the same day as his first filing or appearance in the case. Moreover, allowing Cook to raise a peremptory challenge after entry of default does not promote bad policy. While the superior court was concerned that allowing a peremptory challenge after a default would encourage litigants to default, neither the superior court nor Rowland identified any possible advantage that might be gained by a party in allowing default to be taken against itself, and I can think of none. Cook points to our decision in Staso v. State, Department of Transportation [8] to support his position that allowing his peremptory challenge will not lead to abuse. In that case, we held that a party has the right to peremptorily challenge the judge in a new case filed after an identical case is dismissed, even if the party had exercised its peremptory challenge in the earlier, dismissed case. [9] Despite the argument by the state that allowing such challenges would encourage judge shopping by parties who simply allowed their cases to be dismissed, we observed that other civil rules provided adequate sanctions against bad faith dismissal and refiling of cases. Specifically, we noted that the threat of sanctions as provided in the Civil Rules against a party who refiles a dismissed case afford[s] courts the tools necessary to deter litigants from judge shopping. [10] Similar controls exist in the rules to protect against any theoretical abuse considered here. There are at least two ways in which the current rules would dissuade parties who might attempt, as the superior court feared, to sit by and allow a default, and then disqualify the judge. First, parties who invite a default face the additional burden of successfully moving to set aside a default judgment before earning a trial on the merits with a different judge. A peremptory challenge entered after a default judgment would not automatically nullify that judgment. [11] Instead, a defendant would have to proceed before a new judge with a motion to set aside a default judgment under the requirements contained in Civil Rule 60(b). [12] Setting aside a default judgment requires a defendant to show good cause, including a meritorious defense, [13] as well as some form of mistake, fraud, new evidence, or excusable neglect. [14] I can perceive no reason a defendant would purposefully allow a default to be taken against himself or herself when there is no advantage and the defendant would be required to make a positive showing to set aside the default. Second, if for any reason a party were to invite a default in order to subsequently exercise a peremptory challenge, that party would be guilty of bad faith and would risk losing the motion to set aside the default for that reason. A plaintiff who can establish that a defendant has intentionally defaulted as a way to engage in judge shopping can argue that the default judgment should not be set aside because the defaulting party has acted in bad faith. [15] In Melendrez v. Bode , [16] we affirmed the denial of a motion to set aside because the defendant had acted in bad faith by attempting to avoid service and then failing to respond to the summons claiming, incredibly, that he was unaware there was a suit pending against him. [17] We denied the motion to set aside primarily because of Melendrez's culpable behavior. [18] In fact, in this case, Rowland has alleged that Cook acted in bad faith. Rowland claims that Cook's failure to respond to the complaint in a timely fashion was the result of bad faith. Allowing Cook to maintain his peremptory challenge would not defeat Rowland's right to claim that the default should stand because Cook acted in bad faith. In sum, Cook's peremptory challenge satisfied the language of Civil Rule 42(c)(3) because it was filed before any trial was held and at the same time that he appeared and filed a pleading in the case. Recognizing his peremptory challenge does not promote bad policy. Our case law provides sufficient deterrent against judge shopping.