Opinion ID: 163842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of the Fair Trial Claim

Text: 26 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, [t]he reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Trial courts have considerable latitude in determining how to convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury; the constitutional requirement is only that `taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.' Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954)) (modifications in original). The question we must answer is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the [constitutional requirement]. Id. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239. 27 The leading Supreme Court cases regarding the definition of reasonable doubt are Victor and Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam). In Cage, the Court disapproved an instruction that described reasonable doubt as such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty and an actual substantial doubt, and said that the certainty required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty. 498 U.S. at 40, 111 S.Ct. 328. The Court's primary objection was to the modifiers grave and substantial, which, in conjunction with the reference to moral certainty, suggested a higher degree of doubt for acquittal than the constitutional standard requires. Id. at 41, 111 S.Ct. 328. Later, Victor made it clear that Cage was a narrow decision. The Court upheld two jury instructions with the moral certainty and substantial doubt language, and explained that the Cage instruction had been unconstitutional only because of the confluence of several damning factors, notably the juxtaposition of the grave uncertainty language with the substantial doubt language. Victor, 511 U.S. at 20, 114 S.Ct. 1239. The Victor Court also noted that Cage 's formulation of the standard of review had been disapproved. Id. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 & n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)). 28 In this case, the trial court expressly declined to provide a definition of reasonable doubt for the jury, but told a story that contained a definition based on an analogy to the doubt necessary to call off a wedding. The judge attributed the definition to a federal prosecutor and informed the jury that the definition was permissible at that time, in that federal jurisdiction. The judge quoted the prosecutor as equating reasonable doubt to the kind of serious doubt that causes you to act or not act in matters that are serious, like calling off a wedding at the last minute. The judge dwelt on certain details—reminiscent of The Philadelphia Story — including the fact that the decision to call off the wedding came at the last minute, after you've walked down the aisle and are waiting on the other party or waiting on the best man, or something like that, ... after all the announcements are out and the gifts have been received and everybody's all dressed up and sitting in church, and the minister's looking at you, and all of a sudden you walk out. The judge pointed out the imprecision in that definition. Some people might stop a wedding at the slightest bit of doubt. But others, he said, might not call off a wedding even if they thought they were absolutely going to live a life of misery and that the marriage was a terrible, bad decision. The embarrassment and inconvenience to others would be too great. They wouldn't budge. (R., supp. vol. 7, at 41-42.) 29 We agree with the OCCA that the trial judge in this case was not attempting to adopt that hypothetical interpretation as a definition of the reasonable doubt standard, and so we presume that the jury did not take him to be providing that definition. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S.Ct. 727, 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (a jury is presumed to follow its instructions and understand the judge's answers to its questions). Furthermore, we recognize that the judge recounted the weddingday standard of reasonable doubt only to criticize it — a fact upon which the State heavily relies. 30 However, not every criticism of a mistaken standard is itself correct. The judge did not go on to say that the range of standards that individuals might derive from the wedding-day analogy is far broader than is constitutionally permissible. Specifically, he did not say that the standard for acquittal employed by the second group of people — those who wouldn't budge — was unconstitutionally high. Even granting that the jury did not take the wedding analogy as a mandatory definition of reasonable doubt, the judge's discourse misleadingly suggested that they had a degree of leeway broader than the Constitution permits. 31 That suggestion was immediately confirmed by the moral of the judge's story: 32 The fact of the matter was, that reasonable doubt is a subjective matter that has to be resolved by each person, and each person in the individuality of his or her own conscience and reason. And furthermore, it's going to vary every case, because every case is different.... 33 So, Oklahoma takes the position that it's wrong to tell you what reasonable doubt is. Only you can decide what is reasonable, in the light and under the circumstances of each individual case. Because, after all, it is your reason that we rely on to decide the evidentiary issues in the case. And, so, who are we to tell you what is reasonable and what is not? That is wholly within your province. 34 (R., supp. vol. 7, at 42-43.) This summation informed the jury that attempted definitions are not only ineffective but impermissible, not just because they might be confusing, but because they are intrusions on the discretion of each juror to make his or her own subjective determination of what is reasonable doubt. 35 As we see it, the problem is not that the jurors may have thought the judge was endorsing the wedding cancellation definition. He made quite clear that he disapproved of that definition. The problem is that the reasons the trial court gave the jury for why the definition was flawed were themselves misleading. The Oklahoma courts discourage providing a definition of reasonable doubt not because the term has a broad range of meanings, or because jurors are entitled to decide the meaning for themselves, but because the term is self-explanatory. Williams, 572 P.2d at 259; Underwood v. State, 659 P.2d 948, 950 (Okla.Crim.App.1983). Some terms — like game in Wittgenstein's celebrated example — carry distinct meanings to ordinary speakers of the English language even though they defy definition. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations paras. 66-78 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed.1958). To provide a definition of reasonable doubt, the Oklahoma courts have concluded, is more likely to confuse the jury than to clarify its task. Williams, 572 P.2d at 259; Underwood, 659 P.2d at 950. The point is not that jurors should be unconstrained in their choice of meanings, but that they will be more effectually constrained by the unadorned term reasonable doubt than by any conceivable definition. 36 The judge's explanation, however, implied that there is an extraordinarily broad range of possible meanings, including some which are plainly unconstitutional, and informed the jurors that they had to resolve the definitional issue for themselves, in the individuality of their own conscience and reason. He thus subverted the self-explanatory character of the term and invited the jury to treat as reasonable doubt everything from the slightest bit of doubt to a stubborn refusal to budge even in the face of the strongest possible reasons, and suggested that any attempt to cabin their definitionary discretion is an invasion of their province. This created a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the [remarks] to allow conviction based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. Victor, 511 U.S. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (quoting Cage, 498 U.S. at 41, 111 S.Ct. 328). Furthermore, given the sweeping nature of the judge's language, it would have been unreasonable for the OCCA to conclude otherwise — especially if it did so, as appears, solely because the remarks were not technically a definition. 37 To be sure, the lack of a formal definition makes this case different from Cage and Victor. Those cases also involved formal instructions given to the jury prior to deliberation, not extemporaneous commentary during voir dire. However, nothing in their rationale turns on whether the misleading statements are properly characterized as a definition or as instructions. Rather, the central question is the substantive one: whether the jury was reasonably likely to think it could convict using an improper standard. If it was, the OCCA could not reasonably refuse to grant relief solely because the jury's misimpression was caused by a different kind of statement. 38 Differences in the timing and purpose of potentially misleading comments are undoubtedly relevant in determining the likelihood that the comments influenced the jury. But in this case, it seems beyond reasonable disagreement that the remarks were influential. Although they occurred during voir dire, the three-day trial was short enough that they would not be a distant memory when the jury went to deliberate. And although the informality of voir dire might make judicial comments during voir dire less influential than formal instructions, the circumstances of this case suggest that the remarks were delivered at a particularly potent time. The judge delivered the wedding story in direct response to a potential juror's question about the meaning of reasonable doubt. The juror's question highlighted to the entire jury pool the potential uncertainty in the standard. It is likely that the jurors were particularly receptive to the guidance they received at that time, when they were thinking about the issue and not overburdened with other issues and other instructions. Indeed, when the prosecutor asked one prospective juror whether she could assess punishment providing that we prove them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the evidence is there, the juror clarified, In my own mind. (R., supp. vol. 7, at 56.) This shows that the lesson of the judge's remarks had not been lost. Moreover, because of the Oklahoma rule, the jury instructions included no correct definition of reasonable doubt that might have dispelled the misleading impression the jury received during voir dire. 39 The judge's remarks made it reasonably likely that the jury would overestimate the amount of latitude it had in defining the reasonable doubt standard. His story, in combination with his emphasis on the subjective nature of each juror's decision regarding the meaning of the term, sent two unconstitutional messages: (1) that the reasonable doubt standard comprises as broad a range of burdens of proof as that suggested by the wedding analogy; and (2) that jurors have discretion to make their own subjective determination as to what that standard should be. We conclude that it would be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as interpreted in Cage and Victor, to uphold this conviction.