Opinion ID: 2300815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Previously Litigated Ineffectiveness Assistance of Counsel Claims

Text: On direct appeal, appellant raised three claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He alleged trial counsel was ineffective for: failing to investigate, develop, and present evidence of appellant's alibi witness, Hans Schneider; relieving the prosecution of its burden of proving appellant had the specific intent to kill; and allowing the trial court to improperly admit preliminary hearing testimony of Commonwealth witness Neville Bobby Hill. Wayne, at 462, 465, 470. Regarding appellant's ineffectiveness claim for failure to investigate, develop, and present evidence of alibi witness, Hans Schneider, appellant raised the identical claim on direct appeal but now raises it as a layered ineffective assistance of counsel claim. On direct appeal, we found appellant satisfied three of the four elements required for finding trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Schneider as a witness. Id., at 470. However, appellant failed to prove trial counsel knew or should have known of Schneider's existence. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Morris, 546 Pa. 296, 684 A.2d 1037, 1044 (1996) (defendant must prove witness existed and was available; counsel was aware of, or had duty to know of witness; witness was willing and able to appear; and proposed testimony was necessary to avoid prejudice to defendant). Prior to trial, appellant requested a continuance. The trial court denied the request because appellant merely requested more time in general and failed to specify any missing discovery or witnesses. Wayne, at 470 (citing N.T., 5/23/95, at 70-73). Further, during the penalty phase, trial counsel made clear on the record his attempts to secure witnesses for appellant, to the extent that counsel personally offered to pay the airfare and arrange free lodging for appellant's mother to come from Florida and testify, which she declined. Id. (citing N.T., 5/26/95, at 3-5). Additionally, while Schneider stated he was willing and able to testify to appellant's alibi [6] and unsuccessfully attempted to contact counsel, he could not recall trial counsel's name or any details regarding his phone call to an office where he thought counsel could be reached. [7] Id. Therefore, given the statements of record regarding pre-trial preparation and trial counsel's extensive efforts to secure witnesses on behalf of appellant, we found Schneider's vague statements as to his attempt to contact trial counsel were suspicious, and thus held appellant's claim was meritless. Id. The dissenting opinion believes appellate counsel deficiently represented appellant; and would not deem this claim previously litigated. The dissent reasons that because it was not appellate counsel's general practice to conduct an investigation of extra-record claims and he did not pursue an interview with appellant's purported alibi witness, we should remand for a full hearing, and requests our acknowledgement that appellate counsel inappropriately represented appellant on direct appeal. See Dissenting Op., at 25-26. In fact, appellate counsel did not testify he did not reinvestigate or interview appellant's alibi witness. Rather, appellate counsel stated the following: [Appellate Counsel]: I don't ordinarily investigate claims, other thantrial claims, other than when I'm appointed as appellate counsel or retained as appellate counsel. But I did recall this particular case. I had, in fact, filed this affidavit, which had been brought to my attention. I'm sure I had that conversation with whoever called me. Whoever called me told me that they would send me an affidavit. They told me what basically the affidavit would be.    [Appellate Counsel]: I never really would reinvestigate a case unless it was something like that, where somebody sent me an affidavit and I now had an opportunity to reinvestigate.    [Appellate Counsel]: I may have done something to try to get in touch with whoever sent me this affidavit. I'm not sure. I told you that earlier today. I'm just not sure if this was the case. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 9/19/07, at 37, 38, 43. After reviewing the record, it appears appellate counsel cannot recall with certainty whether he spoke with appellant's alibi witness but is sure that he did. Furthermore, appellate counsel focused on the claim involving the trial court's erroneous jury instruction because he believed it was an absolutely dead-bang winner. Id., at 30, 36 (every once in a while I take a look at that brief ... because I can't believe that he lost that issue.). It was a reasonable strategy for appellate counsel to spend more of his time analyzing claims he believed would be successful rather than those that, in his professional opinion, are barely beyond the threshold of arguable merit. See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 597 Pa. 240, 951 A.2d 267, 277 (2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Miller, 572 Pa. 623, 819 A.2d 504, 517 (2002)) (Generally, where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he chose a particular course that had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, in the absence of concrete evidence that appellate counsel failed to interview the alibi witness and because appellate counsel's strategy was reasonable, appellant fails to satisfy the Pierce test; furthermore, this was previously litigated. On direct appeal, appellant also claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the court's improper statement of law when instructing the jury on co-conspirator liability for first degree murder. Appellant specifically contended the erroneous jury instruction relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving he had the specific intent to kill. See Wayne, at 462. We held appellant did not suffer prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to object because: [t]he conspiracy had only one object, the deliberate decision to take a life[, and] [o]nce this jury determined that appellant was guilty of conspiracy, given the sole object of that conspiracy, the only logical conclusion to reach is that this jury also determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant possessed the specific intent to kill. Id., at 465. Appellant again raises the same claim, and presents the same arguments; accordingly, this claim has been previously litigated. See Brief of Appellant, at 37. Appellant additionally raised an ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct appeal, contending the admittance of Neville Bobby Hill's preliminary hearing testimony deprived him of his right to confront and cross-examine this witness. He specifically alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Hill while cross-examining him at the preliminary hearing. Wayne, at 465-66. We found appellant was provided a full opportunity to cross-examine Hill; thus, his claim was without merit. Id., at 466. Similarly, appellant now contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly seek the preclusion of Hill's preliminary hearing testimony. See Brief of Appellant, at 46-47. Notably, on direct appeal, appellant argued counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Hill with his prior statement and criminal record; he now contends counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Hill with another witness's police statement. [8] Appellant merely offers an alternative theory for trial counsel's ineffectiveness; thus, it has been previously litigated. See Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 596 Pa. 398, 943 A.2d 940, 944-45 (2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 888 A.2d 564, 570 (2005)) (ineffectiveness claim is previously litigated if it is `merely an alternative theory in support of the same underlying issue that was raised on direct appeal.'). Accordingly, this claim was previously litigated.