Opinion ID: 2459972
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: It Was An Abuse Of Discretion To Dismiss Azimi's Complaint.

Text: The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure address both voluntary and involuntary dismissal of complaints. Civil Rule 41(a) addresses voluntary dismissal at the plaintiff's request, by stipulation, or by order of court. [40] Civil Rule 41(b) provides for involuntary dismissal in cases of failure of the plaintiff to prosecute, failure of the plaintiff to ... comply with these rules or any order of court, and on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. [41] Neither Civil Rule 41(a) nor Civil Rule 41(b) provide a basis for the dismissal of the complaint in this case. After granting partial summary judgment on Azimi's wage loss claim, the superior court went on to dismiss the remainder of Azimi's complaint with prejudice. The grounds for dismissal are somewhat unclear. Although the court stated both orally and in its written order that it was granting the motion to dismissan apparent reference to Johns's written motion to dismissJohns's attorney argued on appeal to our court that the superior court acted sua sponte, dismissing the case because Azimi voluntarily chose to have it dismissed after his requested continuance was denied. This argument implies that the court acted pursuant to Civil Rule 41(a). But Johns's January 6 written motion to dismiss argued that Azimi had ignore[d] the court's pre-trial order and ha[d] no experts and no exhibits and could not meet his burden of proving his case because he did not have an expert qualified to testify about his PTSD claim. These allegations suggest a motion for involuntary dismissal under Civil Rule 41(b). Because we find that Azimi neither requested voluntary dismissal under 41(a) nor qualified for involuntary dismissal under 41(b), we conclude it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss Azimi's complaint.
Notwithstanding Johns's arguments, we find no indication in the record that Azimi requested dismissal. As Johns's attorney emphasized at oral argument before our court, Azimi did at times characterize the trial as presenting a choice between maintaining his health and following the superior court's procedural requirements. For example, at the December 29 pretrial conference, Azimi asked, Your Honor ... does my head come first or the law come first? The judge replied, That's your decision to make. At the January 21 trial call, Azimi reiterated to the court, in explanation for his lack of preparation, I don't know what to tell you except to say that my head comes first. Relying on these statements, Johns argues that Azimi communicated to the superior court that, if it refused to grant him a continuance, he would be unwilling or unable to go forward with the trial. Johns concludes from this that Azimi implicitly requested voluntary dismissal. We disagree. After the superior court denied Azimi's request for continuance, Azimi was not squarely given the choice between dismissal and going forward with the trial. Nothing Azimi said during the pretrial conference or at trial call demonstrated a preference for voluntary dismissal over the opportunity to go to trial. Azimi stated that his head [came] first in the specific context of explaining his request for continuance and explaining his lack of preparation, not as a decision to dismiss his case rather than going to trial. Because Azimi did not request voluntary dismissal, it would have been an abuse of discretion to dismiss his complaint sua sponte under Civil Rule 41(a).
Civil Rule 41(b) does not provide justification for the involuntary dismissal of Azimi's complaint. The first of 41(b)'s grounds for dismissal, failure to prosecute, has a very specific meaning. It is applicable only if the case has been pending for more than one year without any proceedings having been taken or the case has been pending for more than one year, and no trial or mandatory pretrial scheduling conference has been scheduled or held. [42] A proceeding is defined as a step, act or measure of record, by the plaintiff, which reflects the serious determination ... to bring the suit to resolution; or a step, act or measure of record, by either party, which reflects that the suit is not stagnant. [43] The various motions and oppositions filed by Azimi during the year prior to dismissal (e.g., his motion for transportation costs and his opposition to Johns's motion for partial summary judgment), regardless of their merits, are adequate to meet this definition of proceedings. At the very least, Johns's litigation steps during this period reflect that the suit [was] not stagnant, thus precluding dismissal for want of prosecution.
The second ground for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) is failure of the plaintiff to ... comply with these rules or any order of court. Johns noted in his motion to dismiss that the superior court has provided plaintiff with adequate notice of an intention to dismiss this matter if plaintiff continues to ignore the court's pre-trial order to provide exhibits and jury instructions, and cited Azimi's statement that he would not jeopardize his health in order to comply with the court's order regarding exhibits. Johns's argument implies that Azimi's actions merited involuntary dismissal as a Civil Rule 41(b) sanction for failure ... to comply with ... any order of court. We note that the bar for dismissal on the grounds of failure to comply with court orders is high: A trial court's discretion to order litigation-ending sanctions is severely limited, whether the dismissal is requested as a discovery sanction under Civil Rule 37, or for non-compliance with court orders pursuant to Civil Rule 41(b).... There must be willful noncompliance with court orders, or extreme circumstances, or gross violations of the Rules. The record must also clearly indicate a reasonable exploration of possible and meaningful alternatives to dismissal. [44] In discussing dismissal as a discovery sanction, we have described willful noncompliance as a conscious intent to impede trial proceedings, [45] distinguishable from delay, inability, or good-faith resistance. [46] Here, the superior court found that Azimi was educated and articulate, that his medical problems did not interfere with his ability to prepare for trial, and that he had not presented any other excuse for his delays. These conclusions do suggest that Azimi's non-compliance was not due to excusable delay or inability. But neither did his actions rise to the level of a willful intent to impede the trial. Azimi's testimony reflects a belief that complying with court orders would pose risks to his health and, to a lesser extent, confusion regarding what materials the court was requesting. [47] Moreover, as of the January 21 trial call, Azimi had effectively complied with the court's orders regarding witnesses and exhibits. He had provided a witness list to Johns's attorney, albeit one that included some witnesses whom he would not have been permitted to call. More importantly, Johns's own trial brief reveals that Johns was in receipt of the information that would typically be provided in at least basic discovery responses. Azimi had produced his cab trip sheets, as well as some medical records and medical releases, and other medical records had been obtained by Johns's counsel. Azimi does not appear to have provided proposed jury instructions before the trial call date, but his failure to do so did not prejudice Johns. Johns provided his own set of proposed instructions; if anything, he was advantaged by Azimi's failure to propose a set. We have never held that the failure to prepare jury instructions, alone, merits litigation-ending sanctions for a pro se litigant. In addition, we have long held that before a litigation-ending order is entered on the basis of a pro se litigant's failure to prosecute or to abide by court rules, the court must give the litigant notice and an adequate opportunity to cure the defects in his pleadings. [48] Here, the superior court did inform Azimi that if he was not prepared for trial, we'll have the jury picked and if you don't put on any evidence, I will end up having to dismiss your case. But contrary to the superior court's December 19 warning, the court dismissed the case before trial, without determining that Azimi's evidence was insufficient to prove any of his claims, and Azimi was never squarely given the choice to proceed to trial or have his complaint dismissed. If Azimi's complaint was dismissed on the basis of his alleged failure to comply with court orders, it was an abuse of discretion.