Opinion ID: 747774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Robinson and Taylor's Sentences

Text: 25 Because both Robinson and Taylor present the same challenges to their sentences, we consider them together. First, Robinson and Taylor contend that the district court erred in enhancing their sentences pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) for abduction. Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) provides that the offense level for robbery should be increased by four levels [i]f any person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.... The application note to the Guidelines states that [t]he Guideline provides an enhancement for robberies where a victim is forced to accompany the defendant to another location.... U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, comment. (backg'd). The Guidelines also define the term abduction and provide the following example: 26 Abducted means that a victim was forced to accompany an offender to a different location. For example, a bank robber's forcing a bank teller from the bank into a getaway car would constitute an abduction. 27 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 (comment) n. 1(a). 28 In United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir.1995), we considered an abduction enhancement pursuant to 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) under very similar circumstances. In Davis, the defendant forced, at gunpoint, the Branch Supervisor for the Olin Employees Credit Union from the parking lot into the credit union. We concluded that Davis' conduct easily satisfies the Guidelines' requirement of forced accompaniment to another location. Accordingly, in Davis, we affirmed the district court's four-level sentencing enhancement made pursuant to section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). 29 Defendants attempt to distinguish Davis, arguing first that it does not control because in Davis the defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), while here Robinson and Taylor were convicted of violating §§ 2113(a) and 2113(d). While it is true that the underlying offenses are different, the Sentencing Guideline at issue is the same--U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). That the underlying conviction results from different sections of the criminal code is irrelevant. 30 Defendants also attempt to distinguish the facts in Davis. In Davis the defendant had paraded the supervisor around the credit union with a gun to her head and had ordered her into the getaway car, but when the supervisor refused, Davis left her in the bank. Here, as the defendants point out, they did not parade the tellers around the bank, or order them into a getaway car. Nonetheless, these factual differences are irrelevant. In Davis, we concluded that the abduction enhancement was appropriate because the critical fact supporting ... conviction was that Davis had forced Woodman at gunpoint to go from the parking lot into the credit union. What happened inside the credit union had no bearing on this court's decision, and accordingly cannot be used to distinguish Davis from this case. Here, one of the defendants forced bank employee Simmons at gunpoint to go from the parking lot into the bank. In short, Davis controls and the district court did not err in assessing a four-level sentencing enhancement for abduction. 31 Robinson and Taylor also object to the $50,000 restitution order the district court entered against each of them. They contend that because they stole only approximately $133,000 and because the police recovered more than $40,000, the total $100,000 restitution order is too high. What the defendants fail to recognize, however, is that the money recovered has not been returned to the bank, nor even proven to be part of the proceeds of the robbery. Once it is returned, they may seek an offset, if the government does not. Until then, they have no complaint.