Opinion ID: 1196731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the prior inculpatory acts

Text: Appellant argues that even if admissible as non hearsay, evidence linking him to the April fire must be excluded under NRS 48.045(2). [1] However, evidence of a prior act of misconduct is admissible under the plan exception of this statute; the evidence must ... tend to prove the defendant's commission of the charged crime by showing that the defendant planned to commit it. Cirillo v. State, 96 Nev. 489, 492, 611 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1980). Appellant's inculpatory statement to Pinckney satisfies the evidentiary standard of Tucker v. State, 82 Nev. 127, 412 P.2d 970 (1966). Since the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal. Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 590 P.2d 1152 (1979). It was error to admit evidence of the other two prior acts of misconduct. Taking ten dollars from Andrea Powe's purse over a year before the fire is not relevant to the charge of arson; testimony indicated the money belonged to appellant. While the harassing phone calls indicate appellant's illwill toward the Powes, the impermissible effect was to portray appellant as one likely to commit other offenses. Nester v. State of Nevada, 75 Nev. 41, 334 P.2d 524 (1959). However, since the evidence against appellant was overwhelming, we deem the error harmless. Coffman v. State, 93 Nev. 32, 559 P.2d 828 (1977); Drummond v. State, 86 Nev. 4, 462 P.2d 1012 (1970).