Opinion ID: 1792208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Johnny's Issues

Text: As discussed in Section I of this opinion, the charges in the case sub judice stemmed from the Kings' unsuccessful attempts to influence jurors in a drug trial involving Johnny. The judge declared a mistrial in the drug trial, and a second drug trial got underway. In the second trial, the jury found Johnny not guilty of the drug charge. In the case sub judice, the State made a motion to limit and restrict [Johnny] and counsel and any of their witnesses from making any reference either direct or indirect about the acquittal of Johnny in his second trial on the drug charge. The State reasoned: We believe that the fact that he was acquitted is totally irrelevant ... to the matter being tried now. Johnny responded that his acquittal ... is clearly and definitely relevant to show the lack of motive. Restated, Johnny contended he should be permitted to reveal to the jury in the case sub judice that, having been found innocent [in the second drug trial, he] would have had no motive to be involved in any type of jury tampering scheme. The judge granted the State's motion, and Johnny appealed. Rules 401 and 402 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence are relevant to the disposition of this issue. Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See, e.g., Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Dixie Contractors, Inc., 375 So.2d 1202, 1205 (Miss. 1979). Under Rule 402, evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Judge Carlson concluded that Johnny's acquittal of the drug charge had no relevance whatsoever  i.e., the evidence had no probative value in proving or disproving the probability that Johnny attempted to influence the jury in his first drug trial. This Court agrees and affirms his decision. Sanders v. State, 429 So.2d 245, 251 (Miss. 1983).
During the course of the trial, several improper comments were uttered by the prosecutor and a State's witness. In each instance, Johnny moved for a mistrial, and Judge Carlson overruled the motion and instructed the jury to disregard the comment. Johnny appealed the judge's decisions. The trial judge is in the best position for determining the prejudicial effect of an objectionable [comment]. Alexander v. State, 520 So.2d 127, 131 (Miss. 1988). Assuming the comment is not wholly harmless, the prejudicial effect may be sufficiently alleviated if the judge instructs the jury to disregard it. See Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196, 210 (Miss. 1985). In such cases where the prejudicial effect of what the jury heard was such that no amount of subsequent admonition from the trial judge would be likely to eradicate from the jury's mind the prejudicial effect, we reverse, although such occasions are rare. Weaver v. State, 497 So.2d 1089, 1094 (Miss. 1986); see also Dennis v. State, 555 So.2d 679, 680 (Miss. 1989); McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 135-36 (Miss. 1987). Applying this law to the facts, this Court concludes that the comments do not warrant reversal. The instruction to the jury to disregard the comments sufficiently alleviated any prejudicial effect it may have had on Johnny's right to a fair trial, and the jury is deemed to have acted in good faith and to have followed the judge's instructions. Weaver, 497 So.2d at 1094; Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1142 (Miss. 1985) (same).
This issue concerns the admissibility of Moore's testimony about typing the jury list as requested by James and Johnny, and it concerns the admissibility of the list itself. Johnny objected to the admissibility of the testimony and the list on the ground that such evidence was privileged. In other words, admitting such evidence constituted a breach of the attorney-client privilege. Judge Carlson overruled the objection, and Johnny appealed. This Court's holding in Rogers v. State is dispositive of this issue: We are of the opinion the evidence was not privileged since it revealed nothing given in confidence, did not involve an attorney's advice emanating from an attorney/client relationship, and in fact, related to the preparation of two deeds, the description of which was related to the secretary of the attorney. We conclude that Randel v. Yates, 48 Miss. 685 (1873), is controlling. We there stated: As a general rule, every communication which the client makes to his legal adviser, for the purpose of professional advice or aid upon the subject of his rights or liabilities, is to be deemed confidential. But privileged communications do not extend to one acting as a mere scrivener, although of the legal profession... . An attorney who is requested to prepare a deed or mortgage, no legal advice being required, is not privileged, and may testify as to what comes to his knowledge in connection with such transaction. And when the terms of a contract have been agreed upon between the parties, and an attorney is afterwards employed as a scrivener merely to reduce the contract to writing, and no inquiry is made of him as to its legal effect, communications made to him, while thus engaged, will not be regarded as privileged... . (48 Miss. at 689). 266 So.2d 10 (Miss. 1972) (citations in original); accord MISS.R.EVID. 502 (Lawyer-Client Privilege). Applying relevant law to the facts, this Court finds no merit in Johnny's contention. The judge's decision is therefore affirmed.
As discussed in Section I(A) of this opinion, Minnie Smith (a juror in Johnny's first drug trial) testified that James and Johnny one night entered the Mr. Jiffy Convenience Food Store where she works. Johnny objected to the admissibility of this testimony on the basis that it constituted a violation of Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence ( i.e., admissibility of evidence pertaining to other crimes, wrongs, or acts). Judge Carlson overruled the objection, and Johnny appealed. In view of the facts, this Court concludes that Rule 404(b) has no application and that the decision to admit the evidence did not constitute an error. The decision is therefore affirmed.
Johnny twice moved for a directed verdict and, each time, Judge Carlson denied the motions. Johnny now asks this Court to review all the evidence  pursuant to the familiar standard  and determine whether it sufficiently supports the convictions of conspiracy and bribery. See Stubblefield v. Jesco, Inc., 464 So.2d 47, 54 (Miss. 1984); Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 652, 656-57 (Miss. 1975). With relevant law in mind, the following evidence and favorable inferences are considered in a light most favorable to the State in order to determine if the conspiracy and bribery convictions are sufficiently supported. Donna Moore, secretary for one of Johnny's attorneys, testified that Johnny did some of the talking when he and his father dropped by the office to ask her to type up a list containing the names of the twelve selected jurors and two alternates. Moore also testified that Johnny took the list from her and made photocopies of it on the office copier machine. L.B. Govan, a witness for the State, testified that Johnny drove his father, James, to his (Govan's) home where James approached him (Govan) about the scheme to bribe Irene Edwards, a juror in Johnny's first drug trial. More specifically, James provided Govan with a copy of the jury list and asked him to inform Edwards that he (James) would make it worthwhile if she would hang the jury in Johnny's trial. During the entire conversation, Johnny listened as his father schemed. Thus, Johnny knew what was going on; he fully comprehended the scheme being executed by his father. Govan added that Johnny returned with his father to check on his success with Edwards ( i.e., to find out whether Edwards would agree to hang the jury). Again, Johnny listened as James questioned Govan about Edwards' response. Minnie Smith testified that, during Johnny's drug trial, he (Johnny) and his father entered the Mr. Jiffy Convenience Food Store where she worked  albeit they left the store without speaking to her. Smith noted that her manager and another employee were present when James and Johnny entered the store and that she had never seen them in the store prior to that time (she had worked at the Mr. Jiffy for ten years). Finally, Investigator Jimmy Dees, who conducted the search of the King's residence, testified that he discovered the photocopies of the jury list under the seat of Johnny's truck. With relevant law in mind, the State's case against Johnny is, admittedly, not ironclad. This notwithstanding, this Court would be hardpressed to hold that the evidence and inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of [Johnny] that reasonable men [and women] could not have arrived at a ... verdict like the one arrived at by the jury in the case sub judice. Stubblefield, 464 So.2d at 54. Restated, the evidence and inferences should be deemed of sufficient quality and weight that reasonable and fairmindedmen [and women] in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions. Id. at 54. This being said, the verdict shall remain undisturbed. Compare with Davis, 485 So.2d at 1058 (analogous conspiracy case in which the issue concerned sufficiency of the evidence). In sum, the evidence is deemed legally sufficient. This Court therefore affirms Judge Carlson's denial of the directed-verdict motion.
Judge Carlson refused to grant a circumstantial-evidence instruction, and Johnny contends that this refusal constituted a reversible error since the State's case against him was based wholly on circumstantial evidence. The evidence presented by the State is a mixture of both direct and circumstantial  albeit mostly the latter. This Court has held that, where there is direct evidence of a crime, the circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given. Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316, 1324 (Miss. 1989). Therefore, Judge Carlson did not err in refusing a circumstantial-evidence instruction in Johnny's case.
Johnny requested an instruction designated as D-23. Judge Carlson denied the request, and Johnny appealed. This Court has examined the record, briefs, and relevant law and concludes that the judge committed no reversible error. Therefore, this Court affirms the denial.
The three remaining issues are duplicative of three issues presented by James and Hattie in their brief. Johnny did not address the issues in his brief; he simply incorporated by reference that portion of James and Hattie's brief which related to these issues. Therefore, because the issues have been addressed in Section II(A) of this opinion, further discussion is unwarranted.