Opinion ID: 362346
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Second Boarding

Text: 43 We do conclude, however, that the second boarding of the La Rosa, which by stipulation occurred beyond the twelve-mile limit, was in violation of article 6 of the High Seas Convention. As we have seen, that article proclaims the exclusive jurisdiction of a nation over its vessels, subject only to treaty provision to the contrary. We find that article 6 was infracted because no treaty provision justifies the second boarding or the ultimate seizure of the La Rosa. The only arguably applicable treaty provisions that might justify the boarding and search are those of hot pursuit and the right of approach. We shall discuss them in order below. 44 Under section 1 of article 23 of the High Seas Convention, set forth above, hot pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship . . . is within the internal waters or the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. We conclude below that ample probable cause arose within the contiguous zone, by virtue of the first boarding, to believe that the La Rosa had violated customs laws. And we may assume that the pursuit of the La Rosa was uninterrupted; but the crucial question remains: When, if ever, did Hot pursuit commence? The answer is supplied by section 3 of article 23, which provides in relevant part as follows: 45 Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued (is) within the limits of the territorial sea, or as the case may be within the contiguous zone. The pursuit may only be commenced after visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship. 46 As one author who has exhaustively treated the subject of hot pursuit writes, The practical importance of these prerequisites is that if the foreign vessel succeeds in reaching the high seas before these conditions have been met, hot pursuit is not considered lawfully commenced and no continuation of the pursuit may take place on the high seas. N. Poulantzas, The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law 200 (1969). 47 As regards the first prerequisite to the commencement of hot pursuit, the determination of location, the record reflects that the Cape York took a radar fix at the time of the first boarding. Record, vol. 2, at 130. We may assume, without deciding, that such means satisfy the requirement that position be determined by such practical means as may be available, See N. Poulantzas, Supra, at 201-04, for it is clear that the second prerequisite, the giving of visual and auditory signals to stop, did not occur until immediately before the second boarding, which took place beyond the twelve-mile limit. As Dr. Poulantzas points out, the signal to stop . . . is of considerable significance since pursuit is considered to have lawfully started only at the moment when a signal to stop is clearly given to the suspected vessel. Id. at 204; See Gillam v. United States, 27 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 1928). We conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of hot pursuit is not available on these facts. 48 Turning again to article 22 of the High Seas Convention, we find it wholly inapplicable here. First, it is not available to the Coast Guard as a justification for the second boarding because there could have been no reasonable suspicion that the La Rosa was engaged in piracy or the slave trade or that she was not of Grand Cayman registry. The record discloses absolutely no evidence that would have supported any suspicion that she was pirating or slaving, and the first boarding was aborted precisely because her registry was conclusively verified. Second, article 22 is not available to the defendants as a prohibition on the boarding independent of the general prohibition of article 6 since it prohibits a warship from engaging foreign Merchant vessels unless one of the three enumerated exceptions is applicable. See United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1260 (5th Cir. 1978) (seizure of foreign freighter beyond twelve miles may violate article 22) (dictum). The article contains no express prohibition on the boarding of nonmerchant ships. The Conventions do not define merchant ship, Cf. Calmar Steamship Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446, 456, 73 S.Ct. 733, 738, 97 L.Ed. 1140 (1953) (defining merchant ship as one operated for hire for purposes of § 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970) ), but we need not define the term here, for the defendants do not claim that the La Rosa was a merchant vessel. Indeed, in their brief to this court they claim that she was merely a pleasure craft. Joint Brief for the Defendant-Appellants at 23 n.2. 49 Having determined that the second boarding of the La Rosa cannot be justified as within the hot pursuit provisions of article 23 of the Convention on the High Seas or the right of approach provisions of article 22, we find that article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas was violated. This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry; the issue remains as to the effect of the violation upon the defendants' convictions. To this important issue we now turn.