Opinion ID: 6661188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Base-Level Procurements

Text: Plaintiffs claim that “[y]et another alternative available to the Government” if the ID/IQ contract options were unavailable “is the use of base level procurements.” Healing StafPs Remedy Supp. Br. at 8; see also Magnum’s Second Supp. Br. at 12 (“Magnum simply puts forth that the Air Force MTFs can procure their licensed healthcare provider services through individual base procurements posted on FedBizOpps without undue delay or expense while the Commodity Counsel works on its reprocurement.”). 27 In support of this alternative, plaintiffs submitted into evidence a chart detailing “51 separate procurements for health services issued by-individual U.S. Air Force Bases.... ” Exhibit 3 introduced by Magnum Opus at the eviden-tiary hearing on April 22, 2010 (“Ex. 3”). Mr. Mirrow explained that base level procurements such as those detailed in plaintiffs exhibit are often used when the services available under the ID/IQ contracts cannot fill a specific need of an MTF. Evid. Hearing Tr. at 61-62. For example, if an MTF wanted to hire a professional who would not work at the MTF — a “non-personal services type contract” — or it wanted to procure a healthcare professional for only a short-term or temporary period, neither of these services would be available under the ID/IQ contracts and the Air Force would be required to use a different contracting vehicle. Id. at 62. While the Air Force currently utilizes base-level procurements to some extent, plaintiffs significantly over-simplify how complicated it can be to accomplish such acquisitions. Conducting a base-level procurement through the FedBizOpps website is not as simple as purchasing a commercial product from an online website. See id. at 62. If an Air Force base decides to use a base-level procurement, the MTF has to conduct all of the acquisition planning and market research required by the FAR for the acquisition. Id. For example, during the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Mirrow testified that in one instance when Lackland Air Force Base did not use the ID/IQ contracts, the base contacting office needed 12 to 15 months to complete the necessary acquisition planning before it could finalize the decision to use the GSA/FSS to obtain the necessary medical services. 28 Evid. Hearing Tr. at 47. Passing the buck to the individual base contracting offices does not relieve the burden on the Air Force. Indeed, the ID/IQ contracts were created by the Air Force precisely to prevent Air Force bases from having to go through the acquisition planning process for each individual procurement of healthcare services, a requirement that is waived if the base procures services through the ID/IQ contracts. Id. at 52 (“No, [the individual base offices] don’t have to go through that [acquisition planning process | on the MATO LID/IQ contract]. According to the Air Force FAR Supplement, if [individual bases] follow the terms and conditions of the basic contract, and do a task order award, Lbase personnel] do not have to do that.”). In other words, plaintiffs’ proposed solution regarding base-level procurements creates the exact problems that the ID/IQ contracts were designed to remedy in the first instance. 6. Contract Extensions and Options On-Task Orders Issued During the Base Period of the ID/IQ Contracts Plaintiffs also suggest that, as a short-term solution, the Air Force could obtain medical services through task orders issued during the base period of the ID/IQ contracts. Healing Staff Supp. Remedy Br. at 4-5; Magnum’s Second Supp. Br. at 9-10. Plaintiffs note that there are more than 800 existing task orders currently in place that were issued during the base period of the ID/IQ contracts, and that some recently issued task orders will not expire for nearly a year. Magnum’s Second Supp. Br. at 8, 10; see also Evid. Hearing Trans, at 39; Mirrow Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs also contend that the Air Force could extend task orders issued during the base period of the ID/IQ contract for an additional six months pursuant to FAR § 52.217-8. Healing Staffs Supp. Remedy Br. at 4-5; Magnum’s Second Supp. Br. at 9-10; see also FAR § 52.217-8 (“The option provision may be exercised more than once, but the total extension of performance hereunder shall not exceed 6 months.”). By utilizing the existing task orders and extensions under FAR § 52.217-8, plaintiffs claim that in some instances, the Air Force will be able to obtain up to an additional 18 months of medical services. Magnum’s Remedy Resp. Br. at 8. In addition, Healing Staff suggests that the Air Force could obtain medical services even further in the future by exercising options on task orders that were issued during the base period of the ID/IQ contracts. Healing Staffs Remedy Supp. Br. at 5. Defendant responds that many of the task orders issued during the base period of the ID/IQ contracts are scheduled to expire less than a year in the future. Def.’s Remedy Resp. Br. at 6. Defendant’s analysis revealed that 96% of Magnum Opus’s existing task orders and 88% of Healing Staffs existing task orders are scheduled to expire by October 1, 2010. Id. In addition, many of plaintiffs’ existing task orders issued during the base period of the ID/IQ contract do not contain FAR § 52.217-8. Id. at 6-7. Defendant analyzed all of Magnum Opus’s current task orders, and two-thirds of Healing Staffs current task orders, and found that only 55% of Magnum Opus’s task orders and 30% of Healing Staffs task orders contained FAR § 52.217-8. Therefore, only a relatively small portion of the existing task orders could benefit from the six-month extension. However, even if all existing task orders contained FAR § 52.217-8, this proposed solution would not effectively address the prospective harm to the Air Force. As previously discussed, Mr. Mirrow testified that the Air Force would require two years to complete its re-procurement of the medical services, and a six-month extension on task orders expiring in October 2010 would still leave the Air Force with a 13.5 month gap in medical services if the Court were to issue an immediate injunction. Evid. Hearing Tr. at 74-77. Moreover, the use of existing task orders would provide the Air Force with no assistance in fulfilling new requirements that had not previously been obtained under prior task orders. Healing Staff also argues that the Air Force could continue to obtain medical services for a longer period of time by exercising options on task orders issued during the base period of the ID/IQ contracts. Healing Staffs Remedy Resp. Br. at 6-8. In response, defendant points out that the ID/IQ contracts contain ordering clauses providing that orders can only be issued between August 14, 2006 and November 14, 2009. Def.’s Remedy Resp. Br. at 7 n. 7; AR 3425-26; 3924-25. Defendant further notes the contracts contain a clause providing that the Air Force may only issue task orders during the effective period of the contract and that the contractor cannot be required to perform any task order issued or option exercised during the last year of the contract more than one year after the date that the contract expired. AR 3590; FAR 52.216-22(d). Specifically, the clause provides that: Any order issued during the effective period of this contract and not completed within that period shall be completed by the Contractor within the time specified in the order. The contract shall govern the Contractor’s and Government’s rights and obligations with respect to that order to the same extent as if the order were completed during the contract’s effective period; provided, that the Contractor shall not be required to make any deliveries under this contract after one year from the date of any task order issued or task order option period exercised during the last year of this contract. AR 3590; FAR 52.216-22(d). Thus, pursuant to these clauses, for task orders or option periods exercised between August 14, 2008 and November 14, 2009, work would cease by November 14, 2010. It therefore appears that the Air Force would not be able to obtain medical services after November 14, 2010 through options on task orders issued during the base period of the ID/IQ contracts. For these reasons, Healing Staff’s proposal regarding exercising options on existing task orders would not significantly mitigate the harm to the Air Force of an immediate injunction. 7. Bridge Contracts Plaintiffs argue that to ensure continuity of care, the Air Force could obtain the medical services in question under bridge contracts until a new competitive procurement could be conducted. Healing Staffs Remedy Supp. Br. at 6; see also Magnum’s Second Supp. Br. at 19; Evid. Hearing Tr. at 25, 120-21. However, although it might be possible for the Air Force to utilize bridge contracts, there would be several significant problems with doing so. The most significant of these problems is that the Air Force would need to be able to issue the requisite justification and approval in order to limit competition for the bridge contracts. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(c); Magnum’s Second Supp. Br. at 16; Evid. Hearing Tr. at 72. To justify other than full and open competition, the Air Force would need to establish that one of the following criteria can be satisfied: (1) only one responsible source could satisfy the agency’s requirements; (2) the agency’s need for the supplies or services is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the Government would be seriously injured unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits proposals; (3) limiting competition is necessary for industrial mobilization; (4) the terms of an international agreement allow limited competition; (5) limited competition is specifically authorized by statute; (6) national security requires that the number of sources be limited; or (7) full and open competition is not in the public interest. FAR §§ 6.302-1 through 6.302-7. A need for supplies and services of an unusual and compelling urgency, the justification that would most likely be applicable in the present case, would only permit the Air Force to award bridge contracts for a one-year period without special approval from the agency head. FAR § 6.302 — 2(d)(ii). Furthermore, even if competition for the bridge contracts could be limited, the Air Force would nevertheless be legally obligated to request offers from as many potential sources as practicable under the circumstances. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(e); FAR § 6.303-2(a)(6). During the evidentiary healing, Mr. Mirrow stated that there were approximately 200 companies that provide the type of medical services at issue in these bid protests. Evid. Hearing Tr. at 72. As Mr. Mirrow observed, it is unlikely that these companies would concede that competition for the bridge contracts should be limited to exclude them as potential competitors. Id In addition, it appears from the parties’ briefs that there is already contention regarding whether the Air Force should be obligated to issue bridge contracts to all of the original six ID/IQ contract holders. Magnum’s Second Supp. Br. at 16; Healing Staffs Remedy Supp. Br. at 6. Moreover, Mr. Mirrow explained that if the Air Force were to utilize bridge contracts, the Air Force’s limited pool of contracting staff would be required to expend their time and resources getting bridge contracts in place, instead of preparing for the new procurement. Evid. Hearing Tr. at 72; see also Mirrow Deck ¶ 8 (“Staffing constraints do not allow more than one acquisition to proceed at a time....”). In addition, Mr. Mirrow noted that bridge contracts are often more expensive than competitive awards because they are only designed to last for a short duration. Evid. Hearing Trans. at 72; see also Infrastructure Def. Techs., LLC v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 375, 401 (2008) (“A bridge contract is used to cover immediate minimum agency needs while a bid protest or other action is pending, or to cover a transition period between competitive procurements.”) (internal citations omitted). Thus, although bridge contracts are a potentially useful tool for the Air Force, they are not the cure-all that plaintiffs suggest. Some of the alternative mechanisms for obtaining health care services identified by plaintiffs, or some combination of such mechanisms, would enable the Air Force to meet some of its needs. However, plaintiffs have not identified any mechanism or combination of mechanisms that would ensure that there is no gap in health care services while the Air Force conducts a new procurement. Therefore, given the importance of these necessary medical services to the Air Force’s mission, although plaintiffs may well suffer economic injury if they are deprived of an immediate opportunity to compete in a new procurement, the harm to the Air Force from an immediate injunction is at least equally as significant.