Opinion ID: 482093
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statement to the Jury

Text: 8 Appellants contend that the trial judge unfairly prejudiced the jury while instructing them on the law governing federal civil rights claims. Appellants did not comply with the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 that a party must make its objections to jury instructions before the jury retires to consider its verdict. Failure to do so ordinarily precludes assigning error on this basis on appeal. The reason for requiring that objections to instructions be made after the charge and that they state distinctly the matter to which a party objects and the grounds of the objection is to give the trial judge an opportunity to correct any errors before it is too late. McGrath v. Spirito, 733 F.2d 967, 968 (1st Cir.1984); see Campana v. Eller, 755 F.2d 212, 216 (1st Cir.1985); Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 757 F.2d 399, 411 (1st Cir.1985). We will reverse a judgment in the absence of the required objection only if there is plain error in exceptional cases or under peculiar circumstances to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice. Nimrod v. Sylvester, 369 F.2d 870, 873 (1st Cir.1966); see Morris v. Travisono, 528 F.2d 856, 859 (1st Cir.1976). 9 The allegedly prejudicial statement, made by the court while explaining to the jury what constitutes compensable discriminatory treatment, was: Unfortunately, it has to be differential treatment. I say unfortunately, because I don't think anybody likes to see it. According to appellants, these two sentences could easily lead the jury to believe that the defendants did something wrong, that the mere discharge of employees by an employer is what the trial judge doesn't think 'anybody likes to see.'  Therefore, appellants argue, the jury might have held defendants liable simply because they fired plaintiffs. Appellants also argue that the jury could infer from this statement that the judge was disapproving of the requirement that the discharge must have been on the basis of race for the defendants to be held liable. 10 We do not think these two sentences are so misleading that they constitute plain error. We interpret the statement as saying that differential treatment is the basis of liability for discriminatory employment practices, and when there is such treatment, it is unfortunate. Furthermore, a judgment will not be reversed for error in the jury instructions unless the error is determined to have been prejudicial after review of the record as a whole. Accordingly, we must look to the entire jury charge to determine whether the jury was properly apprised of the legal principles to be applied in this case. Almonte v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 787 F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir.1986). The district court gave clear instructions on the applicable law. It told the jury that for plaintiffs to prevail they must have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants intentionally discriminated against them on account of race with regard to their employment termination. It instructed the jury that as long as the reasons for discharging these individuals are nondiscriminatory, you must find for the defendants even if you don't like what happened. Additionally, the court said that this is not a wrongful termination case. You may, even if you think this was not fair, that it was wrong to do that, that it was not nice, you cannot base your decision on that. It must be race. It must be that blacks get treated differently from whites. Even if the statement were interpreted as appellants urge, the court's detailed and accurate instructions would have cleared up any doubt the jury might have had about the appropriate basis for liability. 11