Opinion ID: 2459828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proffered instructions on imperfect self-defense

Text: Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing his proffered instructions on what he terms imperfect self-defense. Neither of appellant's proffered instructions is an AMCI Instruction. We can easily dispose of appellant's argument as to one of these instructions, which reads as follows: When a person believes that the use of force is necessary in defense of himself but that person is reckless or negligent either in forming that belief or in employing an excessive degree of physical force, the defense of justificationuse of deadly physical force in self-defenseis unavailable as a defense to any offense for which recklessness or negligence suffices to establish culpability. Source: Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-614. While appellant contends that this instruction is an accurate statement of the law as found in Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-614 (Repl.(1993), the instruction omits the phrase is necessary for any of the purposes justifying that use of force under this subchapter, which appears in § 5-2-614(a). Thus, because appellant's proffered instruction did not correctly state the law, the trial court did not err in refusing to give it. See Pickett v. State, 321 Ark. 224, 902 S.W.2d 208 (1995). Appellant also proffered the following instruction based on Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-206(d) (Repl.1993), regarding ignorance or mistake: It is a defense to a prosecution that Timothy Wayne Kemp acted under a mistaken belief of fact that he was justified in using deadly physical force in self defense. Although mistake of fact would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the mistake of fact of the defendant shall reduce the class or degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense he would be guilty of had the situation been as he supposed. Source: Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-206. While the trial court did instruct the jury as to self-defense, appellant asserts that his federal and state due process rights were violated as a result of the trial court's refusal to give his proffered imperfect self-defense instruction. We do not agree. Appellant's proffered instruction merely emphasizes his theory of the case that his intoxication should be considered as diminishing his capacity to form the requisite intent to commit capital murder. See Caldwell v. State, supra . Yet the trial court's refusal to give appellant's requested instruction did not eliminate the State's burden to prove premeditated and deliberated murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed in this respect, and was also instructed on the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter. In short, the evidence relating to the element of premeditated and deliberated murder was for the jury to weigh and evaluate in light of the State's burden to prove that intent beyond a reasonable doubt. As it is clear that this burden remained with the State, we cannot agree that the trial court's refusal to give appellant's proffered instruction violated his due process rights.