Opinion ID: 78347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Third Geneva Convention

Text: Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the Third Geneva Convention is self-executing and that § 5 of the MCA does not preclude Noriega's claim, we agree with the district court that the Third Geneva Convention does not prevent Noriega's extradition to France and that the United States has fully complied with its obligations under the Convention. Articles 118 and 119 of the Third Geneva Convention set forth the permissible duration for the detention of prisoners of war. Article 118 provides, in pertinent part, that [p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. Third Geneva Convention art. 118. Article 119 further qualifies that [p]risoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are pending may be detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offence. Id. at art. 119. As a result of Noriega's conviction in the United States, article 119 authorized the United States to prolong his detention for the duration of his sentencebeyond the cessation of hostilities between the United States and Panama. Nowhere, however, is it suggested that a prisoner of war may not be extradited from one party to the Convention to face criminal charges in another. Nor do the stated purposes of articles 118 and 119, as reflected by their commentary, preclude detention in these circumstances: article 118 is intended to prohibit prolong[ed] war captivity, while article 119 unambiguously reflects the intention of the drafters to permit detention of prisoners of war subject to criminal proceedings. 3 Int'l Comm. of Red Cross, Commentary: Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 541, 556 (J. Pictet ed.1960). Article 12 further supports the principle that repatriation is not automatic. Article 12 provides that [p]risoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. Third Geneva Convention art. 12. As France and the United States are both parties to the Third Geneva Convention, and the United States sought and obtained from the Republic of France specific information regarding all of the rights that the defendant will be guaranteed by France upon his extradition, Noriega III, 2007 WL 2947981, at , these conditions have been satisfied. [9] The text of article 12 imposes no further limitations on the ability to extradite prisoners of war, and nothing in article 12 implies that a contracting party cannot abide by a valid extradition treaty and extradite a prisoner of war to another contracting party simply because the person is a prisoner of war. Noriega maintains, however, that the omission of the term extradition in article 12 demonstrates that extradition is not permitted under the article, and that the district court erred in looking to article 45 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Fourth Geneva Convention), to define the term transfer as used in article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention. While article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention is silent as to extradition, article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which parallels article 12 and provides for the transfer of civilians between parties to the Convention, specifically notes that nothing in this article constitute[s] an obstacle to the extradition, in pursuance of extradition treaties concluded before the outbreak of hostilities, of protected persons accused of offences against ordinary criminal law. Fourth Geneva Convention art. 45. The district court noted the commentary's definition of the term transfer as used in article 45 as internment in the territory of another Power, repatriation, the returning of protected persons to their country of residence or their extradition. Noriega II, 2007 WL 2947572, at  (quoting 4 Int'l Comm. of Red Cross, Commentary: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 266 (J. Pictet ed.1958)). We agree with the district court that while the purposes behind the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions may be different, it is still compelling that the convening parties expressed an understanding of the term `transfer' which included extradition. Noriega II, 2007 WL 2947572, at . To conclude otherwise would mean that a country would be obligated to extradite a civilian, but not a prisoner of war, when they are facing identical criminal charges. We are hesitant to imply such an inconsistent result, particularly when both articles permit the transfer of prisoners of war or civilians under the same limited restraints. [10] Accordingly, should any doubt exist as to the principal holding here, Noriega's habeas petition would also be denied because extradition would not violate Noriega's rights under the Third Geneva Convention.