Opinion ID: 1043044
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consent to the Search of the Vehicle

Text: The district court found that Guevara voluntarily consented to the search of the Jeep. On appeal, Guevara does not contest that she initially consented to the search. Instead, Guevara argues that her consent was invalidated, or not voluntary, because she was deprived of an opportunity to withdraw or limit her consent by being placed in the trooper’s car during the search. A warrantless search of an automobile for contraband is allowed under the Fourth Amendment if an officer has probable cause to justify the search. See generally United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (discussing an automobile exception, which permits a warrantless search of a vehicle based on probable cause); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (finding an automobile exception). Even without probable cause, if an officer has obtained voluntary consent to search, then the officer is free to search the vehicle provided the search stays within the scope of the consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”). -7- We have not, to date, found that officers have a duty to ensure that an individual has an opportunity to withdraw or limit consent. See, e.g., United States v. Gallardo, 495 F.3d 982, 990 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting the lack of authority supporting the proposition that officers have a duty to allow an opportunity to withdraw or limit consent). Even assuming officers do have a duty to allow such an opportunity, however, the evidence supports the finding that Guevara failed to make an effort to withdraw or limit her consent in a timely manner. See id. (finding a person is “at least obligated to make some effort to communicate an intent to withdraw his consent” before a court will entertain a claim of lack of opportunity to withdraw consent); see also United States v. Braiske, No. 09-0073, 2010 WL 299482, at  (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Mayo, 627 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that defendant was in a position to communicate with officers and never attempted to do so). As Guevara points out, she did object to the search of her luggage, thus demonstrating that she knew how to limit her consent and was capable of doing so. Guevara maintains, however, that she later knocked on the window in order to speak with Trooper Lewis and to object to the search of the engine compartment. The squad car video of the traffic stop shows Guevara’s hand briefly moving in front of the camera toward the front windshield. The video does not make clear exactly what she is doing, but Guevara asserts this was a knock. What the record lacks, however, is any additional evidence to support the conclusion that (1) Guevara was knocking in an attempt to get the troopers’ attention;3 or (2) Guevara’s purpose for getting the troopers’ attention was to withdraw or limit her consent. The district court found that “[Guevara] did not object during the search,” and that “[t]he evidence does not show 3 In contrast to Guevara’s assertion, Trooper Lewis testified that Guevara had not tried to get his attention “by hitting the window” after he retrieved a drill from his squad car. Given the video from the squad car, it does appear that Guevara made some movement with her hand at one point when Trooper Lewis walked by. We have found nothing more in the record to help reconcile this discrepancy. -8- that [Guevara] revoked her consent, or that she limited the scope of her consent, at any time before or during the search.” Guevara, 2012 WL 553356, at . Given the state of the record, we cannot say the district court’s finding that Guevara made no effort to withdraw her consent is clearly erroneous. Even if we could find that Guevara was knocking, and that she was knocking in an effort to withdraw or limit her consent, the record shows the knock came too late. According to the squad car video, the troopers discovered the hidden compartment at least five or six minutes before Guevara claims to have knocked. The district court found that probable cause to conduct the destructive search existed from the point the troopers discovered the hidden compartment. Guevara, 2012 WL 553356, at  n.10, . As discussed below, we agree. Because the troopers no longer needed Guevara’s consent to continue the search once they discovered the compartment, any effort to withdraw or limit her consent at that point would have been fruitless.