Opinion ID: 3201361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Fairness

Text: In addition to his Batson claim, Mr. Morgan also moved for a new trial on the basis of what he believed to be seven dis‐ tinct errors committed by the district court. Mr. Morgan now 58 raises for our review only five of these issues. We review the district court’s denial of Mr. Morgan’s motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2012). We will reverse only if Mr. Morgan can establish that the errors he alleges rendered his trial un‐ fair. See id.
Mr. Morgan first contends that he was denied a fair trial because, after the parties filed a joint pretrial order along with several dozen motions in limine, the district court failed either 58 The district court found that Mr. Morgan had waived four of the seven alleged trial errors by failing to provide supporting authority and there‐ fore declined to address them. “Ordinarily, arguments not made in the district court are waived on appeal.” Riemer, 148 F.3d at 804 n.4. However, the defendants again have not argued that Mr. Morgan waived these is‐ sues by failing to develop them in the district court; rather, the defendants address each of the five errors set forth in Mr. Morgan’s opening brief. We therefore address these issues on their merits. See id.; supra note 50. No. 14‐3307 39 to hold a pretrial conference or to rule on the pending mo‐ tions; the court instead chose to rule on the motions “during 59 the course of the trial … as they are made.” Mr. Morgan ar‐ gues that, in doing so, the court “created the expectation in the parties that its subsequent failure to address resulted in 60 prejudice.” There is no requirement that a district court hold a pretrial conference, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a), and courts have “broad powers to determine the proper method of preparing a case for trial,” Mizwicki v. Helwig, 196 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that a “court’s discretionary order should not be dis‐ turbed on review unless it is clear that no reasonable person would rule as the district court judge did”). We see no basis in the record for questioning the court’s decision to forego a pretrial conference. With regard to the court’s deferral of its motions in limine rulings until trial, we cannot accept Mr. Morgan’s argument that this decision created an atmos‐ 61 phere of “trial by surprise.” Indeed, a district court has con‐ tinuing discretion throughout the proceedings to alter earlier rulings even when it rules on motions in limine before trial. See Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court’s resolution of these pretrial issues fits com‐ fortably within its broad discretion on such matters and did not render Mr. Morgan’s trial unfair. 59 R.115‐1 at 3–4. 60 Appellant’s Br. 27. 61 Id. at 28. 40 No. 14‐3307
Mr. Morgan asks us to review two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. These rulings are entitled to “special def‐ erence,” and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Faruki, 803 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2015) (quot‐ ing Young v. James Green Mgmt., Inc., 327 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Mr. Morgan first asserts that the district court abused its discretion in allowing testimony regarding “the criminal character of the neighborhood” in which Mr. Morgan was ar‐ 62 rested. During trial, defense counsel sought to elicit testi‐ mony from one of the defendant officers, Sgt. Schulz, about his familiarity with the location of Mr. Morgan’s arrest and 63 the “sorts of experiences [the officer had] had in that block.” Mr. Morgan’s counsel objected, and the district court over‐ ruled, stating that “[w]hat the officers reasonably believed 64 under the circumstances is relevant.” At a sidebar, Mr. Mor‐ gan’s counsel argued that such testimony was irrelevant, prej‐ udicial, and would be used by the jury to draw an impermis‐ sible propensity inference. The court again overruled the ob‐ jection and allowed Sgt. Schulz to testify as follows: Q. Sergeant, I think when we took that break I was asking you what your general knowledge 62 Id. at 25. 63 R.115‐1 at 382. 64 Id. No. 14‐3307 41 or experience is relating to 7700 South Green‐ wood. So if you could please just tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury? A. In my ten‐plus years in the 6th District as a sergeant of police, my experiences with the block, numerous … narcotics calls, numerous men with a gun or person with a gun calls, foot chases, search warrants. Things of that nature. Q. So it’s fair to say that your previous experi‐ ences were relatively similar to the events that occurred on May 2nd, 2011, is that correct? [Mr. Morgan’s counsel]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. BY THE WITNESS: A. Yes, sir.[65] Because his brief does not cite specific rules of evidence, it is not clear whether Mr. Morgan believes that the district court should have excluded Sgt. Schulz’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 404, or both. We need not define the precise contours of Mr. Morgan’s argument, however, be‐ cause we conclude that the officer’s testimony was admissible 66 under both Rules 403 and 404. 65 Id. at 384. 66 Cf. United States v. Faruki, 803 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting appel‐ lant’s argument that evidence “was unduly prejudicial because [it] impli‐ cate[d] propensity evidence concerns” but limiting its analysis to Rule 403 framework because appellant “d[id] not make an explicit Rule 404 argu‐ ment”). 42 No. 14‐3307 Under Rule 403, a “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Here, Sgt. Schulz’s testimony about his own decade of experience policing the block in which Mr. Morgan was arrested had clear probative value in understanding the officer’s evaluation of the specific facts available to him at the time of the encounter with Mr. Morgan. See, e.g., United States v. Zambrana, 428 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Police officers are entitled to make assess‐ ments of situations ‘in light [of their] specialized training and familiarity with customs of the area’s inhabitants.’” (altera‐ tion in original) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276 (2002))); see also United States v. Flood, 965 F.2d 505, 510–11 (7th Cir. 1992) (“In establishing that probable cause existed for an arrest or a search, law‐enforcement officers commonly tes‐ tify that their experience indicates a certain behavior pattern or a particular combination of circumstances is indicative of— as opposed to proof of—criminal activity.”). The question before us then is whether the court’s admis‐ sion of Sgt. Schulz’s testimony unfairly prejudiced Mr. Mor‐ gan. “Evidence is unduly prejudicial if it creates a genuine risk that the emotions of the jury will be excited to irrational behavior, and the risk is disproportionate to the probative value of the offered evidence.” United States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 974 (7th Cir. 2011). The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Sgt. Schulz’s testimony would not have such an effect here; there was nothing “inher‐ ently emotional or incendiary” about the officer’s summation of his own experiences policing the block. United States v. Strong, 485 F.3d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 2007). By contrast, this in‐ formation was central to evaluating the lawfulness of the stop under the Fourth Amendment. See Venson v. Altamirano, 749 No. 14‐3307 43 F.3d 641, 656 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding officer’s testimony re‐ garding experience in neighborhood not prejudicial “to the extent it addressed how [the arresting officers] would have perceived Venson’s behavior at the time of his arrest”). Similarly, Sgt. Schulz’s testimony certainly did not consti‐ tute impermissible character evidence. Rule 404(a) “estab‐ lishes the general proposition that evidence of a person’s character or a trait of a character is not admissible for the pur‐ pose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” United States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 2000). This prohibition, however, applies only to “evi‐ dence … offered ‘to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.’” United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 293 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1)). Here, Sgt. Schulz’s testi‐ mony was not offered to establish that Mr. Morgan was acting in conformity with a personal character trait. Instead, it was introduced so that the jurors would understand the legally relevant experience through which the officer would have fil‐ tered the facts available at the time he encountered Mr. Mor‐ gan. See id. (holding that testimony was not propensity evi‐ dence because it was introduced to show “subjective state of mind”).
Mr. Morgan also submits that the district court permitted the defendants to “intentionally violate[] their own motion in limine … regarding probable cause,” thereby depriving him 44 No. 14‐3307 67 of a fair trial. Prior to trial, the defendants filed a motion in limine requesting that the district court bar evidence that the state court had found “no probable cause” to prosecute Mr. Morgan on the charge of possession of a controlled sub‐ 68 stance. During trial, Mr. Morgan called the watch com‐ mander on the night of the arrest, CPD Cpt. Ruth Wedster, to testify. On cross‐examination, Cpt. Wedster referenced “prob‐ able cause,” and Mr. Morgan’s counsel immediately objected on the ground that “probable cause” was the subject of de‐ 69 fendants’ pending motion in limine. Mr. Morgan’s counsel moved to strike Cpt. Wedster’s statement, and the district court sustained the motion and instructed the jury to “disre‐ 70 gard the last statement.” The court exercised sound judg‐ ment in its response to Mr. Morgan’s objection. Nothing more was required. See United States v. Bonner, 302 F.3d 776, 782 (7th Cir. 2002) (“There is a very strong presumption that a jury has understood and followed the trial court’s limiting instruction, erasing the improper influence that might have been caused by the stricken statement.”).
Mr. Morgan next urges that the district court committed multiple errors related to instructing the jury. First, he argues 67 Appellant’s Br. 29–30. 68 R.57 at 10. 69 R.115‐1 at 478–79. 70 Id. No. 14‐3307 45 that the court abused its discretion when it allowed the de‐ fendants to offer new jury instructions after the close of evi‐ dence. At the conclusion of trial, the court directed the parties to confer before the next court date and then provide a set of agreed instructions and jury forms. When the court recon‐ vened, the parties had reached agreement on roughly thirty instructions but had remaining disputes on another fifteen, and the court heard arguments on the disputed instructions. During argument, Mr. Morgan objected to one of the defend‐ ants’ proposed instructions on the ground that it “was just proposed last night,” to which the court responded, “you’ve … had months to work on this,” and overruled the 71 objection. Mr. Morgan argues only that the defendants’ proposed in‐ struction was untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(a)(1), which states: “At the close of the evidence or at any earlier reasonable time that the court orders, a party may file and furnish to every other party written requests for the jury instructions it wants the court to give.” Because the proposed instruction was submitted after the close of evidence, Mr. Mor‐ gan contends that the defendants were limited to “fil[ing] re‐ quests for instructions on issues that could not reasonably have been anticipated by an earlier time that the court set for requests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(a)(2)(A). Mr. Morgan’s timeliness argument, however, ignores Rule 51(a)(2)(B), which allows a party, “with the court’s permission,” to submit “untimely re‐ quests for instructions on any issue.” Id. 51(a)(2)(B). In any event, Mr. Morgan does not explain how the court’s ruling caused him prejudice. See Johnson v. General Bd. of Pension & 71 Id. at 551–52. 46 No. 14‐3307 Health Benefits of United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 722, 732 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that Rule 51(b) error was harmless where appellant “ha[d] not argued, let alone shown, that the … error caused her independent prejudice”). Mr. Morgan next asserts that the district court wrongly de‐ clined to give the parties’ agreed upon response to a question posed by the jury. During the second day of jury delibera‐ tions, the jury sent a note asking whether, in the context of an investigatory stop, it is necessary for an officer to reasonably suspect an individual of “being connected with a crime or misdemeanor … having committed a crime or misde‐ meanor … having information regarding a crime or misde‐ meanor [or] … intending to commit a crime or misde‐ 72 meanor[.]” The parties submitted to the court an agreed‐upon answer: “With respect to reasonable suspicion, you must find that the defendant … had reasonable suspicion that the plaintiff had committed or was about to commit a 73 crime.” The court, however, believed that the response was not an accurate expression of the law and declined to give it. The court instead gave the following instruction: An investigative stop is a brief detention which gives police officers a chance to verify or dispel well‐founded suspicions that a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Permissible encounters between police officers and citizens are not limited to situations involv‐ ing possible criminal activity, but also include 72 Id. at 666. 73 Id. at 667. No. 14‐3307 47 situations in which persons may need help or are in danger of harming themselves or others. … In determining whether particular cir‐ cumstances rise to the level of a reasonable sus‐ picion, courts must look—must take into con‐ sideration the modes or patterns of operations of certain kinds of law‐breakers which allow trained officers to draw inferences and make de‐ ductions that might well elude an untrained person.[74] Mr. Morgan’s counsel objected that the jury had already been instructed on reasonable suspicion and that the court’s in‐ struction “elaborates on things that aren’t really pertinent to the question that the jury asked” and “goes far beyond what 75 they have already been instructed on.” The court overruled the objection and gave its own response. In his brief, Mr. Mor‐ gan submits that the court’s supplemental instruction “was overly broad, biased, and unnecessary” and that “[t]his was a 76 close case.” We review the court’s response to the jury’s question for abuse of discretion. United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2005). In so doing, we ask: “(1) whether the instructions as a whole fairly and adequately treat the is‐ sues; (2) whether the supplemental instruction is a correct statement of the law; and (3) whether the district court an‐ swered the jury’s questions specifically.” Id. at 688. 74 Id. at 668. 75 Id. at 670. 76 Appellant’s Br. 33. 48 No. 14‐3307 The district court’s supplemental instruction accurately stated the law and addressed directly the jury’s questions. When read in conjunction with the original jury instruction 77 regarding investigatory stops and reasonable suspicion, the court’s response fairly and adequately treated the issue. We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in giving its supplemental instruction in lieu of the parties’ agreed upon response.
Finally, Mr. Morgan urges that the cumulative effect of the errors that he alleges deprived him of a fair trial. Because we believe that the district court exercised sound judgment in its rulings on all of these matters, we similarly conclude that Mr. Morgan’s cumulative error argument is without 77 The original instruction stated: An investigatory stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion. Police officers are justified in conducting a brief investigatory stop if an officer is able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the stop. Reasonable suspicion is a common sense, nontech‐ nical concept that deals with the factual and practical con‐ siderations of everyday life on which reasonable men, not legal technicians, act. It involves probabilities and does not always involve hard certainties, and therefore the to‐ tality of the circumstances must be taken into account. A reasonable, articulable suspicion requires more than a hunch but less than probable cause. R.115‐1 at 644–45. No. 14‐3307 49 merit. See United States v. LeShore, 543 F.3d 935, 942 (7th Cir. 2008).