Opinion ID: 3134365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Investigate and Impeach Edward Stalder

Text: Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to properly cross-examine Edward Stalder regarding possible deals given him in return for his testimony. This claim is related to the first issue addressed in this opinion, namely, whether the prosecution failed to correct Stalder's allegedly perjurious testimony regarding the consideration he obtained for testifying. Defendant points to the affidavit of Stalder's attorney and to the investigative report kept by the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, both discussed in detail above, and asserts that these materials demonstrate that his trial counsel made no effort to adequately investigate or review these matters, or to use this information to impeach Stalder. He argues that he is entitled to a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on this claim. We do not agree with defendant that his trial counsel's performance in this regard was so deficient that he was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. A review of the record reveals that, on December 17, 1982, prior to defendant's trial, his trial counsel filed a discovery motion for disclosure of impeaching information of the State's witnesses. Therein, he requested that the State disclose, inter alia, all information regarding the following: Any and all consideration or promises of consideration given to or on behalf of the witness or expected or hoped for by the witness. By `consideration' defendant refers to absolutely anything, whether bargained for or not, which arguably could be of value or use to a witness , including but not limited to  leniency, favorable treatment or recommendations or other assistance with respect to any pending or potential criminal, parole, probation, pardon  or other dispute with [the] People or with any other authority ; and anything else which arguably could reveal an interest, motive or bias in the witness in favor of the People or against the defense or act as an inducement to testify or to color testimony. Counsel supported this request with a 17-page memorandum of law. The record further reveals that the trial court allowed this discovery motion on February 28, 1983. The investigative report attached to defendant's post- conviction petition appears to have been tendered to the defense by the State in response to this discovery request. Defendant acknowledges that his trial counsel received this report before his trial. This report indicated that Stalder was willing to cooperate with Illinois authorities in exchange for a multijurisdictional deal, but it did not state that Stalder received such a deal. Defendant argues that his trial counsel should have used this report to impeach Stalder or should have investigated the matter further on his own to determine if Stalder had indeed received such a deal. We do not agree with this assertion. The record shows that the State was under a court order to disclose any information that it had regarding Stalder's receipt of a deal. The only information that the State provided, however, was that Stalder desired a particular arrangement, not that he was given it. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we fail to see what more trial counsel should have done. In our view, trial counsel was entitled to rely on the State's response to his discovery request and assume that the State had accurately disclosed to him all the impeaching information within the knowledge of the State's agents. The affidavit of Stalder's attorney makes a substantial showing that the State was not forthcoming with all of the impeachment information relevant to Stalder. This affidavit, however, does not suggest that the performance of defendant's trial counsel was constitutionally deficient. We therefore reject this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.