Opinion ID: 381022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary judgment in antitrust actions

Text: 15 THI also urges us to reverse summary judgment on the basis of the oft-invoked language of Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) that . . . summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. Id. at 473, 82 S.Ct. at 491. While we agree that summary judgment is inappropriate under the circumstances described in Poller, we do not believe that the Supreme Court intended to ban the use of summary procedures in antitrust actions altogether. As this court noted in Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1977), Poller . . . has become a magic wand waved indiscriminately by those opposing summary judgment motions in antitrust actions. Id. at 624 as a pair of noted scholars in the antitrust field has recently said, Poller has no such magical properties: 16 The suggestion that summary procedures are less appropriate in antitrust cases may be put aside, for the Federal Rules make absolutely no distinction between antitrust and other cases. Rather, the Court spoke of those antitrust cases in which motive and intent are determinative. More generally, the Court seemed to say that complex antitrust cases frequently involve material disputes of fact that should not be resolved prematurely. 17 P. Areeda and D. Turner, Antitrust Law P 316b (1978). 2 18 The facts of this antitrust action are relatively simple. The parties have entered into a commercial lease which one side now claims to be injurious to competition. The defendants have submitted unchallenged affidavits which lay out in a straightforward manner the nature of the transaction and its impact upon the surrounding area. If there are any complicating factors relevant to this case, THI has failed to bring them to the attention of the district court. Because there is nothing before us to indicate that the use of summary judgment should be approached in this case with any greater caution than normal, we hold that on this record Poller did not bar the granting of the defendants' motion.