Opinion ID: 2258485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Applicable Legal Principles

Text: Respondent is charged with violating two ethical rules: D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d) and D.C. Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3). Under D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d), [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [e]ngage in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice[.] The failure of a member of the Bar to respond to Bar Counsel's inquiries or an order of the Board during the course of a disciplinary investigation has been held to constitute conduct that interferes with the administration of justice under this rule. See, e.g., In re Mattingly, 790 A.2d 579, 580 (D.C.2002); In re Wright, 702 A.2d 1251, 1255 (D.C.1997); In re Delaney, 697 A.2d 1212, 1213-14 (D.C.1997). D.C. Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3) provides that an attorney's [f]ailure to comply with any order of the Court or the Board issued pursuant to [Rule XI governing disciplinary proceedings] is misconduct. In deciding whether to accept the Board's recommended sanction for violations of the disciplinary rules, this court considers the nature of the violation, prior disciplinary sanctions, mitigating and aggravating circumstances, protection of the public, courts and the legal profession, and, to the extent it can be determined, the moral fitness of the attorney. In re Corizzi, 803 A.2d 438, 441-42 (D.C.2002) (citing In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919, 924 (D.C.1987) (en banc)) (other citation omitted). In disciplinary proceedings, this court will accept the Board's factual findings unless they are not supported by substantial evidence in the record and will adopt its recommended sanction unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g)(1); In re Hallmark, 831 A.2d 366, 371 (D.C.2003); In re Steele, 630 A.2d 196, 199 (D.C.1993). Thus, [t]he Board's recommended sanction comes to the court with a strong presumption in favor of its imposition. Hallmark, 831 A.2d at 371 (citing In re Lopes, 770 A.2d 561, 567 (D.C.2001)) (other citation omitted). Although the Board's recommended sanction is given considerable deference, the ultimate choice of sanction is for the court to decide. In re Dunietz, 687 A.2d 206, 210 (D.C.1996) (citing In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1207 (D.C.1993)) (other citations omitted). We have said that [Rule XI, § 9(g)(1)] endorses the Board's exercise of broad discretion in handing out discipline that is subject only to a general review for abuse in that discretion's exercise. The rule requires that we enforce a general sense of equality in the sanctions handed out but it otherwise commands that we should respect the Board's sense of equity in these matters unless that exercise of judgment proves to be unreasonable. Id. (quoting In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980)). The Board's recommendation and Bar Counsel's challenges must be considered applying these principles.