Opinion ID: 1422884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Video Poker

Text: Appellants argue the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Respondent on the ground the Settlement Agreement and the State Act give Respondent a present and continuing right to operate video poker or other similar electronic play devices on its Reservation. We agree. The State Act provides: [Respondent] may permit on its Reservation video poker or similar electronic play devices to the same extent that the devices are authorized by state law. [Respondent] is subject to all taxes, license requirements, regulations, and fees governing electronic play devices provided by state law, except if the Reservation is located in a county or counties which prohibit the devices pursuant to state law, [Respondent] nonetheless must be permitted to operate the devices on the Reservation if the governing body of [Respondent] so authorizes, subject to all taxes, license requirements, regulations, and fees governing electronic play devices provided by state law. S.C.Code Ann. 27-16-110(G); see also Settlement Agreement § 16.8 (same). Appellants contend § 27-16-110(G) does not enable Respondent to operate video poker devices on its Reservation regardless of a statewide ban on the devices. Appellants argue the Settlement Agreement and the State Act provide Respondent with the right to permit or operate video poker devices on its Reservation only to the same extent that the devices are authorized by state law. S.C.Code Ann. § 27-16-110(G). Respondent argues the Settlement Agreement and the State Act differentiate between the terms permit and operate, such that Respondent may permit video poker devices on its Reservation to the same extent that the devices are authorized by state law. Id. (emphasis added). Respondent further argues it nonetheless must be permitted to operate the devices on the Reservation if the governing body of [Respondent] so authorizes and if the counties where the Reservation is located prohibit the video poker devices. Id. (emphasis added). Respondent contends because state law now prohibits video poker devices, Respondent may not give permission to third parties to place and maintain video poker machines on its Reservation. Respondent further contends, as a sovereign, it may now operate the devices on its Reservation if its governing body authorizes the operation because the counties where the Reservation is located prohibit them. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Burns v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 520, 522, 377 S.E.2d 569, 570 (1989). If a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning, then the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). The words of the statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 178, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1992). The language of § 27-16-110(G) is unambiguous. [5] The first sentence of § 27-16-110(G) provides that Respondent may permit video poker or similar electronic play devices on its Reservation to the same extent that the devices are authorized by state law. [P]ermit as used in the first sentence means [t]o allow. Black's Law Dictionary 1160 (7th ed.1999). Under the plain language of § 27-16-110(G), Respondent may allow video poker devices on its Reservation, either by its own operation or a third-party's operation, to the same extent state law authorizes the devices. The terms permit and operate must be interpreted as such to effectuate the intent of the legislature. [6] Furthermore, we reject Respondent's proposed construction of § 27-16-110(G) because such construction would create an absurd result, which the legislature clearly did not intend. See Kiriakides v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 275, 440 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1994) (However plain the ordinary meaning of the words used in a statute may be, the courts will reject that meaning when to accept it would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature or would defeat the plain legislative intention.... If possible, the court will construe the statute so as to escape the absurdity and carry the intention into effect.) (citing Stackhouse v. Rowland, 86 S.C. 419, 422, 68 S.E. 561, 562 (1910)). The legislative intent was to circumscribe Respondent's right to allow video poker devices on its Reservation, either by its own operation or a third-party's operation, to the extent state law allowed the devices. [7] Respondent contends unlike § 27-16-110(F), which requires its bingo license to be revoked if the game of bingo is no longer licensed by the State, § 27-16-110(G) does not include language requiring the termination of Respondent's possession or operation of video poker devices if state law bans the devices. Respondent argues if its right to operate video poker devices was contingent upon state law allowing the devices, then language similar to that used in § 27-16-110(F) would have been included in § 27-16-110(G). Respondent's argument is without merit because the rules of statutory construction are not applicable. See Lester v. S.C. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 334 S.C. 557, 561, 514 S.E.2d 751, 752 (1999) (finding a court employs the rules of statutory construction only when a statute is ambiguous). Respondent also contends it may operate video poker devices on its Reservation as a sovereign regardless of a statewide ban on the devices. The [United States Supreme] Court has consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain `attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,'..., and that `tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States....' It is clear, however, that state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1087, 94 L.Ed.2d 244, 253 (1987) (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 717, 42 L.Ed.2d 706, 716 (1975) and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 2081, 65 L.Ed.2d 10, 29 (1980)). In this case, Congress expressly provided that all laws, ordinances, and regulations of the State, and its political subdivisions, govern the regulation of gambling devices and the conduct of gambling or wagering by [Respondent] on and off the Reservation, unless the Settlement Agreement and the State Act specifically provide otherwise. 25 U.S.C.A. § 941 l (b). Generally, Respondent agreed to be subject to the civil, criminal, and regulatory jurisdiction of the State ... and [to] the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the State to the same extent as any other person, citizen, or land in the State.... S.C.Code Ann. § 27-16-40; see also Settlement Agreement § 4.3. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement and the State Act require state law to govern the conduct of gambling by Respondent, and the Federal Act requires the State Act to be complied with as if implemented by federal law. S.C.Code Ann. § 27-16-110(A); see also Settlement Agreement § 16.1; 25 U.S.C.A. § 941b(a)(2). By Congress's express approval of the State Act and by the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the State Act, Respondent relinquished any attributes of sovereignty relating to games of chance in this state. Respondent also argues because the Federal Act requires the consent of both Respondent and the State to amend the terms of the Settlement Agreement and State Act, any subsequent state legislative enactments are not applicable to Respondent unless Respondent consents to the enactments. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 941m(f). The State Act is a contract between Respondent and the State, and [i]t is a fundamental rule of contract construction that the law existing at the time and place of the making of a contract is a part of the contract. City of North Charleston v. North Charleston Dist., 289 S.C. 438, 442, 346 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1986). However, statutes and ordinances enacted subsequent to the execution of a contract, which add burdens or impair the obligations of the contract, may not be deemed to be a part of the agreement unless the language of the agreement clearly indicates this to have been the intention of the parties. 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 372 (2004). The first sentence of § 27-16-110(G) clearly binds Respondent to any subsequent state legislative enactments affecting video poker devices. The inclusion of the phrase to the same extent that the devices are authorized by state law is indicative of the parties' intent for Respondent to be subject to any future changes in state law regarding video poker devices. [8] See, e.g., Lewis v. Quality Coal Corp., 270 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir.1959) (finding the phrase to the extent and in the manner permitted by law required conformity to existing or future law); State ex rel. Ferguson v. City of Wichita, 188 Kan. 1, 360 P.2d 186, 191-92 (1961) (finding contractual phrase to the extent authorized by state law included future legislation).