Opinion ID: 1611671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: whether the district attorney acted improperly by meeting with jones, at jones's request, before counsel was provided to him.

Text: ¶ 34. In his third assignment of error, Jones alleges that the District Attorney deprived him of his right to counsel by agreeing to meet with Jones before he was represented by counsel. Jones argues that his conviction should be reversed because the District Attorney promised him lenity. At trial, Jones moved to disqualify District Attorney Frank Carlton, arguing disqualification was proper based on: his appearance at the jail to talk with Jones before he had been formally charged, the potential that Carlton would be called as a witness in the case, and the difficulty if not the impossibility for the District Attorney's office to be objective and fair-minded in its exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The motion was denied. ¶ 35. Jones cites numerous Mississippi cases where this Court has repeatedly condemned the practice whereby law enforcement interrogators, or related third parties, convey to suspects the impression, however slight, that cooperation by the suspect might be of some benefit. Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1031 (Miss.1992); Dunn v. State, 547 So.2d 42 (Miss.1989); Miller v. State, 243 So.2d 558, 559 (Miss.1971); Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671, 674 (Miss.1966); Johnson v. State, 89 Miss. 773, 777, 42 So. 606 (1907); Mitchell v. State, 24 So. 312 (Miss.1898). Long before Miranda warnings were mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court, it was well settled in Mississippi jurisprudence that a confession given after promises of leniency was incompetent as evidence. Dunn v. State, 547 So.2d 42, 44 (Miss.1989). In Mitchell v. State, this Court held that a confession given by a defendant was not voluntarily made subsequent to his being told by the sheriff that it would be best for him to tell all about it. Mitchell, 24 So. at 312 (Miss.1898). In Matthews v. State, 102 Miss. 549, 59 So. 842 (1912), a black defendant fourteen years of age accused of stealing an item of jewelry had been told by the town marshal that it would be better for him to get the pin, if he would tell the truth, it would be all right, and I don't want to put you in any trouble. This Court held that the subsequent confession was not voluntary. In Robinson v. State, 247 Miss. 609, 157 So.2d 49, 51 (1963), this Court stated: The question before the Court is whether there was a promise or an inducement offered to defendant if he confessed. The test in such cases is whether the inducement is of a nature calculated under the circumstances to induce a confession irrespective of its truth or falsity; a mere exhortation or adjuration to speak the truth will not exclude a confession, but where such adjuration is accomplished by an expression that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth, some courts have refused to admit such confession. ¶ 36. However, in each of the cases cited by Jones wherein a confession was rendered inadmissible due to promises of leniency, it was uncontradicted that the statement was made. In the case at bar, Jones and the authorities' recollection of the events leading up to his confession was in dispute, and was decided in favor of the authorities' version by the trial court after an extensive hearing. ¶ 37. Jones also relies upon Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So.2d 593 (1947), wherein this Court found that, because of the prosecution's misconduct in the investigation of the case, the evidence obtained was inadmissible and despite the obvious guilt of the defendant that the Court had to reverse the trial court's decision and discharge the appellant. However, Adams is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Adams, the district attorney secured a search warrant, traveled with the sheriff to the place to be searched, and engaged in a search of the premises without presenting the warrant of otherwise informing the accused of their purpose. At trial, the district attorney testified against the accused. This Court reversed the conviction, holding that the district attorney, by his over-zealous conduct, violated prejudicially his duty to be fair and impartial. 202 Miss. at 78, 30 So.2d at 598. In the case at bar, District Attorney Frank Carlton's brief visit with Jones, at Jones's request, can hardly be said to have risen to the same level of misconduct condemned in Adams. ¶ 38. In Mississippi, if the defendant offers testimony that a confession was involuntary due to promises, the State must offer in rebuttal the testimony of all the officers who were present when the alleged promise or threat was posed or give an adequate reason for the absence of such witnesses. This is referred to as the Agee Rule. Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671 (Miss.1966). See also Mettetal v. State, 602 So.2d 864 (Miss.1992). Non-compliance with the rule will cause reversal. Powell v. State, 483 So.2d 363 (Miss.1986). The State has the burden of proving voluntariness of the confession and it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Mettetal v. State, 602 So.2d 864 (Miss.1992); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss.1984). This burden is met by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. This makes out a prima facie case for the State on the question of voluntariness. Lee v. State, 236 Miss. 716, 112 So.2d 254 (1959). We have held that the resolution of conflicting testimony regarding voluntariness is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial judge at the suppression hearing. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 841 (Miss.1994) (quoting Smith v. State, 465 So.2d 999, 1002 (Miss.1985)). When determining voluntariness, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement. ¶ 39. In the case at bar, a suppression hearing was conducted. At the hearing the District Attorney as well as all officers present during the conversation testified. They all confirmed the District Attorney's testimony that he made no promises of lenity to Jones. After a careful review of the record, the only evidence we have found supporting his accusation that he was promised manslaughter is Jones's own testimony and the fact that immediately following this conversation he confessed. Jones's immediate confession after consistently refusing to give a statement for several days does tend to support Jones's testimony that he did so based on promises of lenity. However, beyond Jones's testimony, the record is absent proof that his decision to do so was prompted by anything the District Attorney or WCSO said or indicated to him. Moreover, Jones also testified that the District Attorney never actually promised to charge him with manslaughter. ¶ 40. Jones cites as further evidence of coercion the fact that deputies called his mother and claimed they were trying to help Jones and that it would be better for him to cooperate with them. However, she did not speak to Jones until after he had given his confessions and shown the deputies where the various items of physical evidence were located. No statements made by the deputies to Jones's mother could have acted as promises of lenity or as improper inducements to Jones, he having never been aware of them prior to the time he made his confession. Jones even told her when they did speak that he confessed because it was the right thing to do. ¶ 41. The District Attorney testified that he made no promises to Jones. Officer Sessums was also present during this meeting and testified that District Attorney Carlton told Jones the best advice he could give him ... that he was not in a position to tell him what was going to happen or to offer him any deals or anything else, the only thing he could tell him that was inthat in his position, the best thing to do was always to tell the truth. In this Court's opinion, the District Attorney's statement does not rise to the level of inducement found in the cases cited by Jones. If anything, it was a mere exhortation or adjuration to speak the truth of the type described in Robinson as being insufficient to render a confession involuntary. ¶ 42. Furthermore, in Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 118, 122 (Miss.1989), this Court held that when the circuit court expressly or implicitly resolves the issue of admissibility of a confession against a defendant, our scope of review is confined to the established limits. In Alexander v. State, 610 So.2d 320 (Miss.1992) (internal citations omitted), this Court set out the standard of review on voluntariness of confessions, finding it is essentially a fact-finding function. So long as the court applies the correct legal standards, we will not overturn a finding of fact made by a trial judge unless it be clearly erroneous. Where, on conflicting evidence, the court makes such findings this Court generally must affirm. Id. at 326. See also Veal v. State, 585 So.2d 693, 697 (Miss.1991) (this Court will not reverse trial court on conflicting testimony as to whether coercion used to obtain confession). The Circuit Court found that no offers of lenity or plea discussions took place, and that Jones's confessions were voluntary. Since this finding is based upon substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous, it must be affirmed here. ¶ 43. Jones's third assertion of error is without merit.