Opinion ID: 152256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Superfluities Must be Avoided if Possible

Text: The panel's analysis next runs afoul of the rule that, if possible, we must read statutory text to avoid superfluities. We are not at liberty to construe any statute so as to deny effect to any part of its language. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115, 25 L.Ed. 782 (1879); see also Knight v. Comm'r, 552 U.S. 181, 190, 128 S.Ct. 782, 169 L.Ed.2d 652 (2008) (Thus, accepting [a particular] approach would render part of the statute entirely superfluous, something we are loath to do. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The panel's interpretation renders subsection (ii) superfluous. Subsection (i) encompasses convictions that involve fraud or deceit and that involve a loss exceeding $10,000. Subsection (ii) encompasses tax evasion convictions where the tax revenue loss exceeds $10,000. Importantly, because all tax evasion convictions necessarily involve fraud or deceit, Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499, 63 S.Ct. 364, 87 L.Ed. 418 (1943), subsection (i) necessarily encompasses all convictions encompassed by subsection (ii). The panel's interpretation thus renders subsection (ii) meaningless. At the same time, it is easy to interpret the statute to give meaning to both subsection (i) and subsection (ii). Hoffman, 101 U.S. at 115. It is an entirely reasonable interpretation that Congress intended subsection (ii), and not subsection (i), to govern tax crimes. [2] Because it is possible to give significance and effect to all parts of the statutory text, we must do so. Hoffman, 101 U.S. at 115. We are not at liberty to construe any statute so as to deny effect to any part of its language. Id. The panel declines to apply this mandatory analysis solely because of its speculation that Congress might have intended to enact a superfluous statutory provision. The panel's reasoning misunderstands the rule against superfluities specifically and the task of statutory interpretation more generally. It is true that no method of statutory interpretation is absolute. Indeed, even when the text is indisputably plain, we sometimes hold that Congress intended something very different (for instance, when the drafters made a typographical mistake). See, e.g., Herrera v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 571 F.3d 881, 886 n. 5 (9th Cir.2009). Here, Congress indeed may have intended to enact a superfluous provision. But there must be some reason to believe that this is the case. We are not at liberty to wave away an indicator of congressional intent simply because it is conceivable that Congress intended the opposite. It is always conceivable that Congress did not mean what it said, or intended to enact a superfluous provision, or intended to raise serious questions of constitutionality, and so on. The panel's observation that, here, that possibility is not beyond the conceivable does not advance the analysis. On this point, it is extremely important that all indicators of congressional intent point in the same direction: Congress intended tax crimes to be governed only by subsection (ii), not subsection (i). The panel points to absolutely nothing that suggests that Congress did not so intend, other than the alleged plain meaning of subsection (i) when read alone. Is there any legislative history supporting the panel's view? No. Is there any statutory history supporting the panel's view? No. Is there a statutory purpose that supports the panel's view, such as a rule that the definition should be construed against the alien? No; in fact, the opposite presumption applies, as the panel acknowledges. Amended Op. at 1053 n. 6; Kawashima, 593 F.3d at 984 n. 7. Are there other canons of construction that support the panel's view? No; in fact, applicable canons of construction support the opposite view, such as the rule that the specific governs the general. See Ki Se Lee, 368 F.3d at 223-24 (explaining the application of this canon of construction). In sum, the panel's unassailable observation that the rule against superfluities is not foolproof gets the panel nowhere; there must be some indicator that, in these particular circumstances, Congress actually intended to enact a superfluous provision. Beyond its speculation, the panel points to none. In this regard, it is notable that the panel makes a point of reminding the reader no less than four times that it is following then-Judge, now-Justice, Alito's dissenting view in Ki Se Lee. The panel subscribes to, and applies, then-Judge Alito's view that the superfluities rule can be cast aside on the unsupported speculation that Congress may have intended to enact a superfluous provision. Just last year, now-Justice Alito advanced that same general view in Corley, 129 S.Ct. 1558. Unable to convince a majority of his colleagues, Justice Alito expressed his views in dissent. Id. at 1572-73 (Alito, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court majority, however, roundly rejected this proposed mode of interpretation: [T]he dissent's point that subsection (a) seems clear when read in isolation proves nothing, for `the meaningor ambiguityof certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.' When subsection (a) is read in context, there is no avoiding the question, `What could Congress have been getting at with both (a) and (c)?' Id. at 1566 n. 5 (citation and alteration omitted). Whatever validity the panel's method of interpretation may have had in the past, the Supreme Court clearly rejected it just last year. The panel does not explain how its opinion is consistent with Corley.