Opinion ID: 1610450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unintended Consequences

Text: In addition to the foregoing, I am concerned that the holding of the main opinion will result in unintended consequences that have heretofore not been an issue because of our courts' and our legislature's understanding of the state of the law as discussed above. For example: A. The decision of the main opinion is not limited temporally, and thus appears to be applicable retroactively. Should we not expect a substantial increase in child-support-arrearage filings in light of the newfound rights established by the main opinion? B. If the position of the main opinion is correct, i.e., that the termination of parental rights does not terminate parental obligations or the child's rights vis-a-vis the parent, what other parental obligations and/or children's rights remain in place after termination? What about the child's right to associate with the parent? May a child now sue to establish his right to associate with his parent even if a final judgment terminating parental rights was entered years earlier? What about the parent's obligation to provide for the proper education of the child, including post-secondary education, and who is to decide what proper education entails? What about the parent's obligation to provide for the health-care needs of the child and who is decide what that entails? What about the parent's obligation to provide social, moral, and religious guidance for the child, and how is that to be addressed? On what principled ground are we to conclude that such obligations, or a child's right of inheritance, do not likewise continue beyond the termination of a parent's parental rights? C. The position of the main opinion reduces a risk that has heretofore been understood as being part of the balancing of risks and benefits relating to the issue of termination of parental rights (i.e., the loss of support from the other parent), and therefore will likely increase the use of termination proceedings by parents against one another. It might also increase the incentive for DHR to seek to terminate parental rights even in the absence of a reasonably foreseeable adoptive placement. [14] D. The position of the main opinion could increase contested termination proceedings and create additional delay in adoption proceedings. For example, some deadbeat parents who would otherwise not be inclined to fight the termination of their parental rights because the termination would also eliminate their child-support obligation, will now fight termination of their parental rights. [15] The foregoing list is not exhaustive. It demonstrates, however, that the position adopted by the main opinion will entail a fundamental change of course that has not been anticipated by our courts or by the legislature and that may have unknown consequences in both termination proceedings and adoption proceedings. Under the circumstances, I submit that if such a change of course is to be had, the legislature is the deliberative body that should balance the various interests at issue and make the determination of how best to proceed, rather than this Court. See Berdeaux v. City Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 424 So.2d 594, 595 (Ala.1982). Compare Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.001(a-1) (explicitly providing that a parent continues to have certain obligations toward his or her child after that parent's parental rights are terminated.).