Opinion ID: 2716736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Posture of Choice-of-Counsel Appeal

Text: ¶33 An application for an extraordinary writ was filed in this Court and review of the judge's order was sought. The application for an extraordinary writ requested relief from two adjudications made by the trial judge that were memorialized in the form of a single order. The first involved the choice of lawyers made by the wards. The second was a challenge to an order which restricted the access of the parents to certain individuals including members of their family. ¶34 Several statutes defining orders as appealable focus on the nature and substance of the order, 5 and we have stated that appealability is based upon orders defined by statute to be subject to immediate appellate scrutiny. 6 For example, appellate jurisdiction is invoked to review final orders, 7 judgments, 8 an enumerated class of interlocutory orders, 9 and a separate class of interlocutory orders where the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is discretionary. 10 Interlocutory orders that are not made subject to immediate appellate scrutiny may nevertheless obtain appellate scrutiny upon an appeal from a subsequent appealable order or judgment. 11 ¶35 In addition to the general statutes for civil procedure codified in Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the Legislature has provided for appeals in specific types of proceedings. For example, in 30 O.S.2011 § 3-106(A)(6) the Legislature provided for an appeal by an individual who is alleged to be or found to be an incapacitated person. This statute provides an appeal for this person to appeal adverse orders and judgments as provided by the rules of civil procedure. 12 In addition to 30 O.S. § 3-106, certain orders in guardianship cases are made appealable by 58 O.S.2011 § 721. 13 Application of these statutes requires examining the nature of the decisions brought for our review. ¶36 The first decision of the trial court rejected Baker and Wyers as the wards' choice of counsel, and left the wards represented by attorneys they had employed several years earlier for estate planning, the law firm of Riseling & Rhodes. In Towne v. Hubbard , 1999 OK 10, 977 P.2d 1084, we explained that an appeal from an order adjudicating a ward's choice of counsel was an appeal from an interlocutory order pursuant to § 721 as an appeal from an order affecting a substantial right: An appeal may be taken from the following judgments or orders of the district court: . . . 10. From any other judgment, decree or order of the court in a probate cause, or of the judge thereof, affecting a substantial right. 58 O.S.2011 § 721(10). ¶37 Section 721 refers to an order in a probate cause and a guardianship is one type of probate cause. 14 Additionally, in Towne we supported our conclusion on the appealability of an order adjudicating one's choice of counsel with a citation to State ex rel. Reirdon v. Marshall County Court , 15 where we explained that an order affecting a substantial right in a probate cause was appealable and that this type of probate appeal does not require a final order as in an ordinary civil appeal . 16 We expressly stated that the appeal was from an interlocutory order, and repeated this characterization of the order in the subsequent Towne opinion in 2000. 17 ¶38 We have recast an application for extraordinary relief to a petition in error when a party complained that a ward did not receive a constitutionally proper evidentiary hearing on the issue of a ward's choice of counsel, and when the application for extraordinary relief was filed within the time to commence an appeal. 18 The petition for an extraordinary writ was filed in this case within the thirty-day requirement specified in 12 O.S.2011 § 990A for commencing an appeal of an interlocutory order. 19 We thus recast the challenge to the trial court adjudication on the issue of the wards' choice of counsel as a timely appeal from an interlocutory order pursuant to 58 O.S. § 721(10) and 12 O.S.§ 990A. ¶39 The choice-of-counsel order is an interlocutory appeal made appealable by the nature of the trial court's adjudication; i.e. , a choice-of-counsel adjudication affecting a substantial right. However, appeal from an order adjudicating one's choice of counsel does not make the other unrelated issues in that order also appealable. ¶40 In Conterez v. O'Donnell , 20 we stated: All prejudicial error that stands preserved by the record through an intermediate order or proceeding that precedes any appealable decision is inchoately reviewable together with all other errors asserted to be present in the appealable disposition before the court. This common-law concept of reviewability is explicitly embodied in the terms of 12 O.S.2001 § 952(a). An aggrieved party has the unquestionable right to secure review of every preserved prejudicial error committed at nisi prius in the course of proceedings which precede an appealable decision. 2002 OK 67, ¶ 10, 58 P.3d at 762 (note and emphasis omitted). This language does not allow all issues and disputes in a cause or controversy to become part of a subsequent interlocutory appeal in the cause. The statute cited, § 952(a), expressly states that the Supreme Court may reverse, vacate or modify judgments . . . and in the reversal of such judgment may reverse, vacate or modify any intermediate order involving the merits of the action, or any portion thereof. 12 O.S.2011 § 952(a) (emphasis added and material omitted). The quoted language from Conterez refers to appellate review of orders anterior to judgment that are reviewed in an appeal from a judgment . Similar language appears in State v. One Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-seven Dollars , where the Court also relied upon § 952(a). 21 Conterez and State v. One Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-seven Dollars , are consistent with our opinions explaining that intermediate or interlocutory orders anterior to judgment may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment . 22 We have before us an appeal from an interlocutory order. We do not have an appeal from a judgment and the language in Conterez and similar opinions on the scope of appellate review does not apply to the present controversy. ¶41 If the substance of an interlocutory order contains both adjudications of issues that are immediately appealable and adjudications on other issues that are not immediately appealable, then only that part of the order adjudicating immediately appealable claims may be reviewed on an immediate appeal of the interlocutory order. For example, in Whig Syndicate, Inc. v. Keyes , the trial court stated that it was entering a judgment on five issues, one of which was whether class action relief was proper. 23 In Whig Syndicate this Court explains that an order certifying or refusing to certify an action to be maintained as a class action is appealable even though interlocutory, 24 but that the other four interlocutory issues are not immediately appealable and they are in no posture for appellate review. 25 We first focus on the choice-of-counsel issue which is construed as part of a timely and proper appeal.