Opinion ID: 772250
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Framework for election-law analysis

Text: 18 We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. See, e.g., Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The judge is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only when there is sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Id. at 252. 19 In determining the constitutionality of election laws, the balancing test set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), must be applied. Anderson directs courts to proceed as follows: [A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional. 20 460 U.S. at 789. The Supreme Court has subsequently recognized, however, that if a state's election law subjects the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of participants in the political process to 'severe' restrictions, the regulation must be 'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.' Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (holding that Hawaii's prohibition of write-in voting was not a severe restriction that infringed upon its citizens' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments) (citation omitted). As the district court found and the following analysis will show, the burden placed on Schrader and the Libertarian Party of Ohio was not so severe as to trigger the strict-scrutiny review as outlined in Burdick. We will therefore focus on the application of the Anderson balancing test to Schrader's challenge to Ohio Revised Code § 3505.03. 21 B.The district court failed to give sufficient weight to the state's interest in regulating elections when applying the Anderson balancing test 22 In applying the Anderson balancing test to Schrader's claim, the district court concluded that the interests put forward by Ohio were not so compelling as to override the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Schrader and other similarly situated candidates of unqualified political parties. The district court therefore declared Ohio Revised Code §3505.03 unconstitutional. Challenging this decision, Ohio contends that the district court mistakenly relied on this court's decision inRosen in assessing the extent to which the Ohio election laws deprived Schrader and the Libertarian Party of Ohio of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Furthermore, Ohio argues that the district court gave insufficient weight to the state's interest in regulating elections when evaluating the balance of interests under the Anderson test. The following analysis of the competing burdens and interests under the Anderson balancing test will assess these claims. 23 The first step of the Anderson test requires us to examine the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. No one challenges the basic principle that the United States Constitution protects the rights of those involved in the political process. As stated by the Supreme Court in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989): It is well settled that partisan political organizations enjoy freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . . Freedom of association means not only that an individual voter has the right to associate with the political party of her choice, . . . but also that a political party has a right to identify the people who constitute the association, . . . and to select a standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences. 24 Id. at 224 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the First Amendment rights of voters and political parties are protected from unequal regulatory burdens under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). 25 In the present case, the district court relied on this court's decision in Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1992), to determine that Ohio Revised Code § 3505.03 violated Schrader's and the Libertarian Party of Ohio's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court in Rosen heard testimony from two political scientists and a marketing and communications professional to the effect that party identification and the indication of a candidate's party affiliation on a ballot in the form of a voting cue play a crucial role in a voter's actions at the climactic moment of choice in an election. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 172-75. Because §3505.03 provides cues only for candidates of qualified political parties, it did not allow for the designation of Independent as a voting cue for those who gained access to the ballot through the independent-petition procedure. 26 This law, Rosen concluded, infringes upon the right of supporters of Independent candidates to meaningfully vote and meaningfully associate by providing a 'voting cue' to Democratic and Republican candidates but not to independent candidates. Id. at 176. Furthermore, the court held that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it places unequal burdens on Independent and third-party candidates and is designed to give Democrats and Republicans a decided advantage at the polls in a general election. Id. at 177-78. Expanding on Rosen's analysis, the district court determined that the associational interests of Schrader and the Libertarian Party of Ohio to obtain a ballot cue were even stronger than those of independent candidates, because Schrader actually represents a specific ideology that he would like to have conveyed through a voting cue on the ballot. 27 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that [t]o the extent that party labels provide a shorthand designation of the views of party candidates on matters of public concern, the identification of candidates with particular parties plays a role in the process by which voters inform themselves for the exercise of the franchise. Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 220 (1986). In declaring Ohio Revised Code §3505.03 unconstitutional in Rosen, this court determined that [o]nce a State admits a particular subject to the ballot and commences to manipulate the content or to legislate what shall and shall not appear, it must take into account the Federal and State Constitutions regarding freedom of speech and association, together with the provisions assuring equal protection of the laws. 970 F.2d at 175. 28 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between the role of independent candidates and that of political parties: [T]he political party and the independent candidate approaches to political activity are entirely different and neither is a satisfactory substitute for the other. A new party organization contemplates a statewide, ongoing organization with distinctive political character. Its goal is typically to gain control of the machinery of state government by electing its candidates to public office. From the standpoint of a potential supporter, affiliation with a new party would mean giving up his ties with another party or sacrificing his own independent status, even though his possible interest in the new party centers around a particular candidate for a particular office. 29 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 745 (1974) (upholding as constitutional California's requirement that an independent candidate for congressional or presidential office must be politically disaffiliated for at least one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election). The district court's heavy reliance on Rosen was therefore misplaced, particularly in light of Ohio's interests that must be balanced against the encroachment upon Schrader's and the Libertarian Party of Ohio's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 30 Moving to the second step of the Anderson balancing test, we must now identify and evaluate Ohio's interests that would justify imposing a burden on associational rights. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. No one questions the basic premise that states are entitled to regulate elections. [A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730. Ohio claims that denying party labels to candidates of unqualified political parties minimizes voter confusion, prevents voter deception, and promotes political stability. 31 The Supreme Court has acknowledged a state's strong interest in maintaining the stability of its political system. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 226; Storer, 415 U.S. at 736. Additionally, the Court has held that there is an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot - the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (upholding Georgia's system that distinguishes between candidates of political parties and unrecognized political bodies, and requires independent candidates and candidates of unrecognized political bodies to file nominating petitions containing the signatures of five percent of the eligible voters in the previous election). 32 In declaring § 3505.03 unconstitutional, the district court nevertheless maintained that [n]othing in [its] Decision should be read as casting doubt on the validity of Ohio Revised Code § 3517.01. This position, however, is untenable. By allowing a candidate who gains access to the ballot through the independent-petition procedure to choose any partisan cue that he or she desires, the district court has in effect denied Ohio the right to reasonably regulate the formation of political parties within its borders. 33 Finally, the Anderson test requires balancing the character and magnitude of the constitutional injury to Schrader and the Libertarian Party of Ohio against the state's interests. Ohio argues that its ballot-access scheme that differentiates between the party-petition procedure and the independent-petition procedure is precisely the type of reasonable regulation that requires a candidate of an unqualified party to show a significant modicum of support in order to secure a party-affiliation voting cue on the ballot. The Supreme Court is in agreement: The State surely has a valid interest in making sure that minor and third parties who are granted access to the ballot are bona fide and actually supported, on their own merits, by those who have provided the statutorily required petition or ballot support. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366 (1997). 34 Schrader, however, maintains that Timmons is factually distinguishable and should not apply to the case before us. At issue in Timmons was Minnesota's antifusion law, which the Court upheld. Under that law, a candidate on a ballot cannot appear as the candidate of more than one party. See id. at 354. Although the context of the Timmons decision is different from the Ohio law under scrutiny here, Timmons emphasizes the importance of our role under Anderson to balance Ohio's interests in regulating political parties against the constitutional rights of Schrader and the Libertarian Party of Ohio. 35 Furthermore, other circuits have engaged in similar reviews of state election laws and have concluded that the states have significant authority to regulate the formation of political parties and the identification of candidates on the ballot. See McClaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding as constitutional North Carolina's requirement that a candidate of a new political party gather signatures of 2% of voters statewide, with at least 200 signatures from registered voters residing in each of 4 congressional districts, and then requiring the new party candidate to poll at least 10% of votes in the general election for that party to remain on the ballot); Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding constitutional Oklahoma's election scheme that authorizes candidates of recognized parties to be automatically identified on the ballot by party label, but requires unrecognized parties to file petitions bearing the signatures of at least 5% of the total votes cast in the last general election to achieve similar identification); Libertarian Party v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790, 795 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding as constitutional an election law under which a minor political party may not run a candidate in a local election without first obtaining access to the state's general election ballot through the 3% statewide petitioning requirement). 36 Because the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions, Anderson, 460 U.S. 788, a party challenging Ohio Revised Code § 3505.03 bears a heavy constitutional burden. That a particular individual may not appear on the ballot as a particular party's candidate does not severely burden that party's associational rights. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 359. With or without the cue Libertarian, Schrader had gained access to appear on the general-election ballot under the independent-petition procedure as an Independent. 37 In conclusion, we acknowledge that Ohio's ballot scheme places a burden on political parties to become recognized under Ohio law before a member can appear on the general-election ballot as a candidate of that party. We hold, however, that this burden is not unreasonable in light of Ohio's legitimate interests and is not so onerous as to make the law unconstitutional under the Anderson balancing test. Even though the Ohio legislature reenacted Ohio Revised Code § 3505.03 without reflecting the effect of this court's ruling in Rosen as it pertains to independent candidates, Ohio retains the right to ensure that candidates claiming to represent a political party meet the statutory requirements necessary to establish that the putative party has obtained some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before appearing on the ballot as a candidate of that party. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442. We therefore hold that the denial of party-affiliation voting cues to candidates of unqualified political parties under § 3505.03 of the Ohio Revised Code survives constitutional challenge.