Opinion ID: 2073549
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Constitutional Grounds

Text: In order to put the remaining issues in the instant case in proper perspective, we note that the use of the schools by these religious groups was on the same terms and at the same rates as for the other non-profit groups. Nothing in the record indicates that the religious groups' use of facilities was so time consuming as to effectively prevent other groups from the use and enjoyment of the schools at noninstructional times. In fact, at oral argument counsel for the New Jersey Council of Churches indicated that had demand for school facilities by various groups outstripped their availability, an equal distribution of available time slots would have been proper. This method was deemed superior to granting churches or any other groups all the time they wanted while totally precluding the use of facilities by other organizations. Moreover, the record indicates that on occasion several of the religious groups were preempted, or denied use of the school building in question, so that school-related activities could go on. The Rabbi for the Reform Temple indicated that on more than one occasion his group was ousted on less than 24 hours' notice. No school-related activity has ever been interfered with by religious groups. Thus, the real issue is whether the state or federal constitutions require a special treatment for religious groups, such that out of all non-profit groups only those religiously affiliated are constitutionally prohibited from the use of school premises. We start by noting that our state constitution contains a provision which, fairly read, specifically prohibits the use of tax revenues for the maintenance or support of a religious group. No person shall be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshiping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; nor under any pretense whatever be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to his faith and judgment; nor shall any person be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform. [ N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 3] This constitutional position is not carried to an extreme. In Clayton v. Kervick, 56 N.J. 523, 529 (1970), vacated and remanded 403 U.S. 945, 91 S.Ct. 2274, 29 L.Ed. 2d 854 (1971), on remand 59 N.J. 583 (1971), Chief Justice Weintraub observed that [n]o one suggests that the State must withhold such general services as police or fire protection, even though the property is exempted from general taxation because of its sectarian use, citing Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed. 2d 697, 703 (1970); Bd. of Ed. of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1060, 1065 (1968). However, the public obligation of fire protection is distinguishable from a school board's permitting a religious group to rent school property during free hours. We conclude that N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 3, prohibits any lease arrangement between a school board and religious groups under which the out-of-pocket expenses of the board directly attributable to the use by the religious body are not fully reimbursed. We affirm the holding below that this constitutional infirmity may be remedied by an upward adjustment of rentals to religious groups which would fully cover extra utility, heating, administrative and janitorial costs which result from the leasing by these groups. In view of our holding that the state constitution does require that religious organizations be singled out among nonprofit groups in general as being ineligible for certain benefits which are partly subsidized by tax-generated funds, we must go on to determine whether they are further singled out by a total prohibition on their use of school premises. The relevant constitutional provisions are the following: N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 4 4. Establishment of religious sect; religious or racial test for public office. There shall be no establishment of one religious sect in preference to another; no religious or racial test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust. U.S. Const., Amend. I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. The East Brunswick schools were open to any religious group which wished to use them. No allegation of preference of one group over another has been made. In Clayton v. Kervick, supra, 56 N.J. at 528, Chief Justice Weintraub, in comparing these two provisions, indicated that [o]ur State provision is less pervasive, literally, than the federal provision. He limited discussion of the constitutionality of the Educational Facilities Authority Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:72A-1 et seq. to the federal provision as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. We adopt his conclusion, as N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 4, does not appear to cover the instant fact situation since no one religious sect was preferred over other sects. Thus, the remainder of our discussion is directed to the validity, under the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1218 (1940), of religious groups using school property for religious instruction and services.