Opinion ID: 853072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Right to a Fair Trial

Text: Although found in the text of no particular constitutional provision, fundamental fairness at judicial proceedings is assumed and required by the Indiana Constitution. Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 514-15 (Ind.2001). Similarly, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies in state judicial proceedings and carries with it a federal constitutional right to a fair trial in a civil case, albeit no right to a particular result. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir.1975); Bailey v. Systems Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 98 (3d Cir.1988) ([F]airness in a jury trial, whether criminal or civil in nature, is a vital constitutional right.); John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 13.8 (6th ed. 2000) (the Constitution guarantees a fair procedure, not a particular result). But this right under either the federal or state constitution does not guarantee the right to be present. Rather, it guarantees fundamental fairness to all parties. A claim of right must be evaluated in terms of its impact on others as well as vindication of the interests of the claimants. When other constitutional concerns, such as due process, cannot be infringed upon because of the factual circumstances of a particular case, the defendant should have the opportunity to convince the court that his or her right to a fair trial will be in jeopardy unless the plaintiff is barred during the liability phase of a trial. In other words, if a civil trial is bifurcated, and the plaintiff cannot meaningfully aide counsel, this same principle of fairness permits a party the opportunity to show that a fair trial requires the exclusion of an opposing party in the liability phase. II. Exclusion in This Case Here, the trial court made a determination that the presence of the plaintiff would be highly prejudicial to the Defendants and that the plaintiff could not testify about the events related to liability and could not aid in the presentation of Plaintiff[`]s case. The child has numerous physical and mental disabilities, including cerebral palsy and Erb's palsy. I do not suggest that these conditions in any way diminish her due process rights. But neither do they overcome the right of an opponent to a fair trial. In the unusual circumstance where a party cannot meaningfully assist counsel and the party's presence may impair a fair trial, a trial court judge should be vested with the discretion to exclude the party. Here, the trial court judge had the opportunity to observe the child in a videotaped deposition and assess her ability to aid counsel and the potential affect of her appearance on a jury. The child also was unable to testify about any matters concerning the liability of the defendants. I do not believe that based on these facts the trial court judge abused his discretion in determining that her appearance, though highly relevant to damages, was not a proper factor in the liability phase. In short, the trial court found that the defendant's right to a fair trial would be infringed by plaintiff's presence, and that the due process rights of the plaintiff would not be meaningfully impaired by her absence. This finding is highly fact sensitive and should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Fobar v. Vonderahe, 771 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind.2002) (trial court's application of law to a fact sensitive inquiry is reviewed for an abuse of discretion), Gage, 505 N.E.2d at 67 (trial courts have the discretion to exclude plaintiffs). Just as courts often exclude evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, courts may exclude a party when it can be demonstrated that his or her presence would be prejudicial and the absence of the litigant would not impair other constitutional guarantees because of the party's inability to assist counsel. Even if the presence of a party is significantly prejudicial, other interestsmost frequently the right to assist counselmay nevertheless require the party's presence. But in the absence of a showing of the impairment of those interests, exclusion may be ordered. That is a matter for trial court discretion and I would not find it abused in this case.