Opinion ID: 5130370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Strickland Claims

Text: 9 Case: 20-70008 Document: 00516111570 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/30/2021 No. 20-70008 In his next claim, Aranda argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed under Strickland’s two-prong test. First, Aranda must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 687. To establish deficient performance, Aranda must show “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. This is an uphill battle, as we apply a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. As to the second prong, Aranda must demonstrate that that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. In a death penalty case, “the question is whether there was a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigation circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695. “Prejudice exists when the likelihood of a different result is ‘substantial, not just conceivable.’” Trottie v. Stephens, 720 F.3d 231, 241 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 526 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)). We are also mindful that “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). But as Aranda faces the death penalty, we continue to resolve any doubts as to whether a COA should issue in his favor. Rhoades v. Davis, 852 F.3d 422, 427 (5th Cir. 2017). On appeal, Aranda alleges deficient performance of his counsel in three ways. First, he contends that his counsel failed to adequately investigate available defenses, primarily by failing to investigate and present evidence that was admitted at his brother Juan Aranda’s trial. Second, he argues that his counsel failed to adequately investigate evidence of mitigation, such as evidence that Aranda had a difficult upbringing or a possible brain injury. Third, he presses that his counsel failed to investigate an extraneous offense. We address each argument in turn. 10 Case: 20-70008 Document: 00516111570 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/30/2021 No. 20-70008 Aranda’s argument that his counsel failed to adequately investigate defenses largely turns on the fact that his counsel did not introduce evidence that was used at Juan Aranda’s trial. “To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon uncalled witnesses, an applicant must name the witness, demonstrate that the witness would have testified, set out the content of the witness’s proposed testimony, and show that the testimony would have been favorable.” Gregory v. Thaler, 601 F.3d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 2010). These claims are disfavored. Id. Aranda contends that if his counsel had adequately investigated possible defenses, he would have called Jorge Martinez, C. D. Toler, and R. Benavides. But Aranda fails to set out exactly what those witnesses would have testified to, beyond a vague reference to “Officer Viera’s propensity for violence.” Although Aranda argues that counsel should have introduced a series of facts about Viera’s propensity for violence, it is completely unclear from Defendant’s briefing which of the three witnesses should have testified about those facts. And Aranda’s sole citation to the record is the witness list from Juan Aranda’s trial, which is insufficient. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000). Because Aranda has not demonstrated that the witnesses would have testified, set out witnesses’ proposed testimony, or shown that it would have been favorable, reasonable jurists could not debate that this claim fails. See Gregory, 601 F.3d at 352. There are other issues with this claim. First, counsel did attempt to call Martinez, but the trial court would not allow him to testify. Second, in Juan Aranda’s trial, the judge refused to allow Benavides or Toler to testify, and Petitioner offers no reason to think there would be a different result in his trial. Third, and most important, Aranda’s counsel made a strategic decision not to present this evidence. In his affidavit, Aranda’s counsel states that he chose not to introduce some available evidence from Juan Aranda’s trial because he wanted to emphasize the defense of self-defense. 11 Case: 20-70008 Document: 00516111570 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/30/2021 No. 20-70008 “Generally, counsel’s strategic decisions are afforded deference so long as they are based on counsel’s ‘professional judgment.’” Escamilla v. Stephens, 749 F.3d 380, 392 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S. at 680). Although Aranda argues we should not defer to his attorney’s decision because his claim involves a failure to investigate, see id., the record illustrates that his attorney was sufficiently informed of the circumstances of Juan Aranda’s trial. In light of these serious infirmities in this claim, reasonable jurists could not debate that it fails. Next, Aranda argues that his counsel failed to investigate and present mitigation evidence at the sentencing stage of trial. He presses that had counsel adequately investigated Aranda’s past, he would have presented evidence of Aranda’s troubled upbringing and his past violent experience with law enforcement, which resulted in a head injury. The Supreme Court has held that failure to adequately investigate available mitigating evidence may amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524–25, 537–38 (2003) (holding that a defense counsel’s failure to investigate a capital defendant’s social history and traumatic childhood constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362, 395–98 (2000) (holding that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness where counsel failed to present mitigating evidence related to a defendant’s troubled upbringing and intellectual disability). Here, Aranda’s counsel was forthright that he “did not conduct any extensive investigation of Mr. Aranda’s background for the purpose of developing specific evidence of disorders caused by his background.” Because this evidence is like that discussed by the Supreme Court in Wiggins and Williams, reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s conclusion that counsel was effective. Reasonable jurists could also conclude that the district court’s prejudice assessment was debatable or incorrect. If Aranda’s counsel had 12 Case: 20-70008 Document: 00516111570 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/30/2021 No. 20-70008 reasonably investigated Aranda’s background, the jury may have learned of Aranda’s deeply troubled upbringing, his early, violent experience with law enforcement, and the life-altering effects of his head injury. A jury presented with such evidence may not have determined that Aranda was a future danger to society or that he acted deliberately, two of the factors Texas juries had to consider at the sentencing stage. Reasonable jurists could therefore debate whether the district court’s prejudice determination was correct. At a minimum, this claim “deserves encouragement to proceed further.” Escamilla, 749 F.3d 393–94. Accordingly, we will grant a COA as to this Strickland claim. Finally, we turn to Aranda’s argument that his counsel failed to research infirmities in his aggravated rape conviction, which was an aggravating offense at his murder trial. Aranda’s briefing on this topic is perfunctory, and he cites solely to the affidavit of his trial counsel, which states that he knew about the conviction but was unaware of purported legal infirmities with the conviction. Even assuming that counsel’s performance was deficient for not investigating any legal infirmities in Aranda’s aggravated rape conviction, Aranda is unable to establish that jurists of reason would debate this issue, given the lack of any indication in the briefing that the more fulsome objection would have been any more valid than the one raised. Texas law permits broad introduction of extraneous prior convictions at the sentencing phase, and our court has sustained even consideration of non-final convictions and “extraneous offenses.” See Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. § 37.07; Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466, 478 n.9 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[n]othing in Article 37.071 . . . requires that there be a final conviction for an extraneous offense to be admissible at the punishment phase.”); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (same), cert. withdrawn, 448 U.S. 725 (1980)); see also Williams v. Lynaugh, 814 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied., 484 U.S. 935 (1987) (holding that “the admission of 13 Case: 20-70008 Document: 00516111570 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/30/2021 No. 20-70008 unadjudicated offenses in the sentencing phase of a capital trial does not violate” the Constitution because “[e]vidence of these unadjudicated crimes is clearly relevant to the jury’s task of determining whether there is a probability that [the defendant] would continue to commit acts of violence as required by” special questions); see also Harris v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 535, 541 (5th Cir. 1996) (“use of evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offenses, at the sentencing phase of Texas capital murder trials, does not implicate constitutional concerns”). Accordingly, we deny a COA as to this portion of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We find that Aranda has carried his burden to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would debate whether his counsel’s performance was ineffective in failing to investigate and introduce evidence of mitigating circumstances and such a failure was prejudicial. We therefore grant a COA as to this Strickland claim. Because Aranda has failed to demonstrate reasonable jurists could debate the viability of his other Strickland claims, we deny a COA on those claims.