Opinion ID: 865371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: w hether the trial court im properly denied

Text: KING’S MOTION FOR FUNDS TO OBTAIN EXPERT ASSISTANCE. ¶6. King asserts that the trial court committed error when it improperly denied his Motion For Funds To Obtain Expert Assistance without providing legal or factual reasoning. King relies on United States Supreme Court decision Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76; 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1093; 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 62 (1985) to support his assertion that the trial court’s refusal to grant his motion rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, thereby depriving him of due process of law. The State counters that King’s reliance on Ake is misplaced, as Ake requires the provision of psychiatric assistance to a capital defendant when the State is going to use psychiatric evidence against him in the sentence phase of the trial or when the insanity defense is raised, neither of which occurred in this case. ¶7. In Ake, the United States Supreme Court stated: We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense. Thus, while the Court has not held that a State must purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might buy, see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), it has often reaffirmed that fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to “an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system,” id., at 612. .... when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive 6 funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose we have discussed, and as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the States the decision on how to implement this right. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77, 83. ¶8. This Court has held that “[t]he trial court’s decision on a motion for funding for consultants or investigators for an indigent defendant is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Grayson v. State, 806 So. 2d 241, 254 (Miss. 2001) (citing Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 125 (Miss. 1991)). This Court addressed this right as implemented in Mississippi in Harrison v. State, 635 So. 2d 894, 901 (Miss. 1994), by holding that “[t]his Court weighs on a case by case basis whether the denial of expert assistance for an accused is prejudicial to the assurance of a fair trial and will grant relief only where the accused demonstrates that the trial court’s abuse of discretion is so egregious as to deny him due process and where his trial was thereby rendered fundamentally unfair.” Id., (quoting Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 577, 590 (Miss. 1988)).
¶9. King asserts that the trial court erred in denying him funds to retain an independent expert pathologist. Citing Ake with regard to whether a court is required to pay for an expert witness for an indigent defendant, King argues that he had a “uniquely compelling” private interest in the accuracy of his sentencing hearing because his life was at stake. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77. King asserts that the testimony of Dr. Ben Martin, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on Patterson, was the primary evidence offered by the State to prove the “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravation circumstance. King specifically points 7 out Dr. Martin’s testimony that Patterson may have remained conscious while she was strangled and drowned. King also cites this Court’s statement in his previous appeal that whether Patterson was conscious during the strangulation and drowning was a significant question in determining whether the crimes was heinous, atrocious or cruel. King, 784 So. 2d at 888. King argues that Dr. Riddick, an independent expert pathologist, could have provided strong competing testimony by identifying specific errors in Dr. Martin’s procedures and substantive findings, and thus due process and fundamental fairness required the trial court to allow King access to an independent pathologist. King argues that he satisfies the standard set by this Court in Harrison for relief from denial of funds, as the affidavit of Dr. Riddick gave concrete reasons that assistance would be beneficial. Harrison, 635 So. 2d at 901. Conversely, the State argues that King has not offered anything more than “unsubstantiated assertions” that he would have benefitted from expert assistance. As such, the State argues that King is not entitled to relief under Harrison because he has not shown that he has suffered any prejudice as a result of the trial court’s denial of funds. ¶10. This Court previously addressed this very issue in King’s last direct appeal. In holding that the trial court’s denial of funds did not require reversal of the death sentence, we stated: The State called an expert, Dr. Ben Martin, who testified that Patterson was conscious when she was killed. Dr. Martin testified to specific procedures used to show how he came to his conclusion that Patterson was conscious. Dr. Martin further testified that Patterson’s head injuries were the result of multiple blows to the head. King was denied his own expert to rebut this testimony. 8 A defendant is entitled to an expert to rebut expert opinion on “crucial elements.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1093, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985). A fundamental question to be answered, however, is whether King has shown a “substantial need” for expert assistance. “Mississippi case law states expert assistance should be granted upon a showing of substantial need.” Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 333 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Butler v. State, 608 So. 2d 314, 321 (Miss.1992)). “‘Undeveloped assertions’ of helpfulness to the defense are insufficient to show that need.” Id. (quoting Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 125 (Miss. 1991)). The crucial issue here was whether the crime was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Thus, whether Patterson was conscious during the strangulation and drowning becomes a significant question. Certainly, this is a “crucial issue” within the meaning we have given that term. However, King can show no substantial need for his own expert witness since, upon cross-examination, Dr. Martin testified that Patterson may have been unconscious during the strangulation and drowning. Dr. Martin’s testimony directly rebutted the State’s argument and aided King in his defense. Consequently, King suffered no prejudice by not having a pathologist testify on his behalf. The error, if present, was harmless. King v. State, 784 So. 2d 884, 888-889 (Miss. 2001) (emphasis added). At the 2003 resentencing trial, Dr. Martin testified that Patterson could have retained consciousness for ten to twenty minutes, depending on whether she was struck on the head or strangled first. However, on cross-examination, King’s counsel refreshed Dr. Martin with a copy of his 1980 testimony and extensively questioned him concerning Patterson’s consciousness and whether strangulation was the primary cause of death. Dr. Martin testified that Patterson may have retained consciousness, but it is also possible that she may have lost consciousness from the blow to the back of her head, and possibly never regained it. Further, in response to questioning by the defense concerning whether manual strangulation could render a person unconscious within a period of thirty seconds,2 Dr. Martin stated that it is possible. After 2 Dr. Martin prefaced his response by saying he did not have experience to say whether manual strangulation could render a person unconscious within 30 seconds, but he 9 reviewing Dr. Martin’s testimony, we conclude that King has not shown the required substantial need to obtain independent expert assistance because Dr. Martin’s testimony on cross-examination rebutted the State’s argument. Holland, 705 So. 2d at 333. ¶11. Additionally, in his affidavit, Dr. Riddick opined that the State’s investigation of the crime scene and the examination of Patterson are problematic for four reasons. First, Dr. Riddick stated that there appeared to be insufficient evidence of some of the victim’s injuries as well as whether she was conscious during the attack. Next, he stated that some of the procedures performed during the autopsy were not proper. Lastly, he said the investigation of the crime scene appeared to be inadequate, and could have caused post-mortem injuries to Patterson’s body. This lone paragraph offered by Dr. Riddick presents nothing in the form of concrete reasons that an independent expert would benefit King in his defense. Harrison, 635 So. 2d at 901 (stating that “[o]f course a defendant must come forth with concrete reasons, not unsubstantiated assertions that assistance would be beneficial.) Rather, this constitutes an example of “undeveloped assertions” of helpfulness that we discussed in Harrison and Holland. There is no merit to this issue.
¶12. First, King argues that the trial court’s denial of a mental health expert prevented him from proving that his mental capacity made him ineligible for the death penalty. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment restricts the state from executing a mentally retarded offender). King would assume it was very possible. 10 argues that since he could not afford an independent expert to conduct the testing using the currently accepted standards and procedures, he was not able to investigate and present definitive evidence that he is mentally retarded at his re-sentencing. Dr. Robin King and Dr. Michael Whelan testified regarding the Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) tests conducted on King in 1983, in which both concluded that King had an IQ of 71.3 However, Dr. King testified at the 2003 resentencing that he was made aware of a grading error on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) which caused King’s full scale IQ to fall from a 71 to a 69. Dr. King further testified that King tested as mentally retarded. Additionally, in his brief, King acknowledges that “the record contained substantial evidence, brought to the trial court’s attention, establishing that King may be mentally retarded.” ¶13. King offers an affidavit by Dr. Caroline Everington in support of his motion for expert funds. In this affidavit, Dr. Everington states that based on her review of the record, “it is [her] preliminary opinion that there could be a basis to conclude that King is mentally retarded.” She further points out that while King scored 71 on the WAIS intelligence tests, a complete social history and the use of the most current IQ test would enable us to more accurately ascertain whether King is, in fact, mentally retarded. After reviewing the evidence in the record and Dr. Everington’s affidavit, we find that King has not shown the “substantial need” required to obtain funds for an independent expert. Holland, 705 So. 2d at 333. 3 Dr. King testified that King’s IQ of 71 could mean that he is mentally retarded. However, Dr. Whelan disagreed. 11 ¶14. Alternatively, King argues that even if his mental condition does not bar the State from executing him, his level of mental functioning is relevant to the mitigating circumstances that a jury must consider under Mississippi law. King argues that, without expert assistance to offer opinions about his mental condition, he could not make an effective argument to the jury regarding this mitigating circumstance. Specifically, King points to extreme mental disturbance, extreme duress and substantially impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct or conform conduct to the law as the relevant mitigating circumstances listed in Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101(6)(Rev. 2000). However, a review of the record reveals that the jury was presented with mitigating evidence covering all the relevant mitigating factors that King sought to show at trial. First, Dr. King testified to King’s borderline intellectual functioning at his resentencing.4 Therefore, the jury was presented with mitigating evidence of his mental capacity. Second, King’s sister, Ethel Conner, testified to King’s childhood, which King presented for the purpose of showing mitigating evidence of mental disturbance.5 Conner also testified to King’s relationship with his uncle Willie Porter, which was offered to show extreme duress based on King’s theory that he was only a minor participant in the crime and acted under the influence of Porter. Specifically, Conner testified that Porter had a dominating relationship with King and that King had not been involved in any kind of criminal activity before Porter entered his life. Moreover, in his brief, King’s primary argument is that he was not allowed to present 4 See infra Issue II for a complete discussion of the evidence regarding King’s level of mental functioning presented to the jury by Dr. King. 5 See infra Issue II for a discussion of Conner’s testimony regarding King’s childhood. 12 mitigating evidence of his mental capacity because he was not granted independent expert assistance. However, as Dr. King testified to his mental capacity, we do not find that King was prejudiced by the denial of funds for an additional independent expert. As discussed above, King is not entitled to relief from the denial of funds for expert assistance, as he has not shown a substantial need for assistance under Harrison and Holland. ¶15. For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying King’s Motion For Funds To Obtain Expert Assistance.