Opinion ID: 2068009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Criminal Responsibility under Maryland Law

Text: Norman next contends, in the alternative, that even if the homicide in Maryland can be used as an aggravating circumstance, his lack of criminal responsibility for that conduct, if established, is a relevant mitigating circumstance. Here, the defense neither requested an instruction on Maryland law relating to lack of criminal responsibility nor objected to the instructions given by the court at the penalty phase of Norman's trial. In context, the defense did not do so after the trial court ruled that the evidence would be screened through Delaware law. In the exercise of its appellate authority, this Court will generally decline to review contentions not raised below and not fairly presented to the trial court for decision. [105] But, we may excuse a waiver if we find that the trial court committed plain error requiring review in the interests of justice. [106] Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. [107] Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice. [108] Proof of the Delaware statutory aggravator is an issue separate from whether there is legal mitigation in Maryland for the conduct which occurred there. Section 4209 allows the defendant to present evidence of any mitigating circumstance [109] and requires the jury and judge to weigh  all relevant evidence in ... mitigation which bear upon the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender.... [110] This procedure is required in capital cases by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [111] Pursuant to this mandate, when the State uses the defendant's unadjudicated conduct in another jurisdiction to establish an aggravating factor, the defendant's lack of criminal responsibility under the law of that jurisdiction is a relevant mitigating circumstance which, if offered by the defendant, must be considered by the jury and judge. [112] Just as the jury must be properly instructed on Delaware law applicable to the aggravating factor, it must also be properly instructed on the non-Delaware law applicable to any legal mitigation of conduct in another state. Here, the trial court ruled before trial and, again, before the start of the penalty phase, that [i]ssues of the Defendant's legal competency for his actions in Maryland will need to be addressed but these decisions will be filtered through the Delaware standards. [113] The State placed Norman's mental state in Maryland in issue at the penalty phase by relying upon his conduct there to prove both statutory and non-statutory aggravating circumstances. Norman responded with mitigation evidence that he lacked criminal responsibility in that jurisdiction. Evidence relevant to Norman's criminal responsibility under Maryland law was presented to the jury by stipulation. [114] The Stipulation included Dr. Mechanick's opinion that Norman would not meet the criteria for not criminally responsible under Maryland law, and also Dr. Alizai-Cowan's contrary opinion that Mr. Norman met the standard for not criminally responsible under Maryland law. Although the Stipulation purported to quote Maryland law, it did not explain how that law should be applied to determine Norman's mental state at the time of the Peters homicide or his other criminal conduct in Maryland. [115] Indeed, the Stipulation itself explicitly states that the quoted Maryland law does not provide guidance about whether Mr. Norman's psychiatric condition at the time of the conduct charged, while under the influence of substances, meets the Maryland standard for not criminally responsible. Moreover, the Stipulation contained the statement by Dr. Mechanick that [i]t is a matter for the court to determine whether Mr. Norman's delirium at the time of the current charges is allowed under this definition as an insanity defense. As a result, the Stipulation failed to provide any clear statement of Maryland law which the jury could apply to its determination of whether Norman was criminally responsible for his conduct in that state. It is undisputed that the trial judge also provided no guidance to the jury on the Maryland standard for not criminally responsible. In his Findings after Penalty Hearing, the trial judge noted the opinions of Dr. Alizai-Cowan and Dr. Mechanick, and said: If their opinions were found credible by a Maryland jury, under Maryland law, the defendant may possibly have been found to be not criminally responsible. [116] This issue of mitigation for Norman's conduct in Maryland remained relevant notwithstanding the dismissal of the charges there by Maryland prosecutors. [117] The jury at Norman's penalty hearing was unable to provide an advisory verdict on this proffered mitigation, because it was not provided guidance on the applicable Maryland law. That is a material defect which deprived Norman of a substantial right and jeopardized the fairness and integrity of the penalty hearing. We recognize that this capital case presents issues of first impression involving lack of criminal responsibility for conduct outside of Delaware. Nonetheless, Delaware law and the Eighth Amendment require that the jury consider matters relating to any mitigating circumstance. [118] This includes lack of criminal responsibility for an alleged aggravating circumstance. The absence of any guidance on Maryland law relating to Norman's lack of criminal responsibility for his conduct in Maryland made it impossible for the jury either to decide the existence of a critical mitigating circumstance relied upon by the defense or to weigh that circumstance in the determination of sentence. Where the sentencer in a capital case is prevented from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation, there is a risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. [119] Accordingly, we must reverse the death sentence imposed and remand this matter to the Superior Court for a new penalty hearing. [120]