Opinion ID: 1707984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court deprive french of his constitutional and statutory rights to a trial by jury?

Text: As set forth in SDCL 22-29-1, [a]n essential element of [perjury] is that the false testimony must relate to a `material matter.' Engebritson v. Circuit Court, 69 S.D. 454, 459, 11 N.W.2d 659, 661 (1943). Citing the various constitutional and statutory provisions guaranteeing his right to trial by jury, French argues that the trial court deprived him of his right to a jury trial by removing the issue of the materiality of his testimony from the jury and ruling, as a matter of law, that the testimony he gave during the show cause hearing was material. We disagree. Although this is an issue of first impression in South Dakota, we find a majority of state jurisdictions that have recognized that the issue of materiality in a perjury prosecution is an issue of law for the trial court to decide and not an issue of fact for the jury. Williams v. State, 259 Ark. 667, 535 S.W.2d 842 (1976); People v. Pierce, 66 Cal.2d 53, 423 P.2d 969, 56 Cal.Rptr. 817 (1967); Marrs v. People, 135 Colo. 458, 312 P.2d 505 (1957); State v. Greenberg, 92 Conn. 657, 103 A. 897 (1918); State v. Barbuto, 571 So.2d 484 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990); People v. Powell, 160 Ill.App.3d 689, 112 Ill.Dec. 553, 513 N.E.2d 1162 (1987); State v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1972); State v. Frames, 213 Kan. 113, 515 P.2d 751 (1973); State v. West, 419 So.2d 868 (La.1982); State v. True, 135 Me. 96, 189 A. 831 (1937); People v. Hoag, 113 Mich.App. 789, 318 N.W.2d 579 (1982); Brewer v. State, 233 So.2d 779 (Miss. 1970); State v. Roberson, 543 S.W.2d 817 (Mo.Ct.App.1976); State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 467 A.2d 202 (1983); State v. Albin, 104 N.M. 315, 720 P.2d 1256 (1986); State v. Hanson, 302 N.W.2d 399 (N.D.1981); Soper v. State, 22 Okla.Crim. 27, 208 P. 1044 (1921); State v. Stilwell, 109 Or. 643, 221 P. 174 (1923); Com. v. Lafferty, 276 Pa.Super. 400, 419 A.2d 518 (1980); Yarbrough v. State, 617 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); State v. Strand, 720 P.2d 425 (Utah 1986); State v. Wood, 99 Vt. 490, 134 A. 697 (1926); State v. Daniels, 10 Wash.App. 780, 520 P.2d 178 (1974); Fletcher v. State, 20 Wyo. 284, 123 P. 80 (1912). The United States Courts of Appeals are also nearly unanimous in holding that the issue of materiality in a perjury prosecution is an issue of law and not an issue of fact. United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Enoch, 360 F.Supp. 572 (E.D.Pa.1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir.1973); United States v. Bailey, 769 F.2d 203 (4th Cir.1985); United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Seltzer, 794 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir.1986); United States v. Martellano, 675 F.2d 940 (7th Cir.1982); United States v. Ashby, 748 F.2d 467 (8th Cir.1984); United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Jones, 933 F.2d 807 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Paxson, 861 F.2d 730 (D.C.Cir.1988). Many of the above authorities rest their conclusion that materiality is an issue of law on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1929). The defendant in Sinclair was convicted for an offense involving the refusal to answer pertinent questions in an inquiry by a Senate committee. In its review of the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the issue of the pertinency of the questions was appropriately decided as an issue of law. In reaching that holding, the high court offered the following rationale: The question of pertinency under section 102 was rightly decided by the court as one of law. It did not depend upon the probative value of evidence. That question may be likened to those concerning relevancy at the trial of issues in court, and it is not essentially different from the question as to materiality of false testimony charged as perjury in prosecutions for that crime. Upon reasons so well known that their repetition is unnecessary it is uniformly held that relevancy is a question of law. And the materiality of what is falsely sworn, when an element in the crime of perjury, is one for the court. The reasons for holding relevancy and materiality to be questions of law in cases such as those above referred to apply with equal force to the determination of pertinency arising under section 102. The matter for determination in this case was whether the facts called for by the question were so related to the subjects covered by the Senate's resolutions that such facts reasonably could be said to be `pertinent to the question under inquiry.' It would be incongruous and contrary to well-established principles to leave the determination of such a matter to a jury. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298-99, 49 S.Ct. at 273-74, 73 L.Ed. at 700 (citations omitted). French argues that Sinclair is outdated, that its reasoning has been superseded and, therefore, its authority has been eroded. In Paxson, supra, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected an identical contention with the following reasoning: Paxson's argument that we should ignore this unbroken chain of precedent is founded on his contention that the above quoted dictum of Sinclair v. United States has been impliedly rejected by the Supreme Court's ruling that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right of trial by jury as to each essential element of an offense. In support of this unremarkable proposition, appellant cites, inter alia, Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384, 106 S.Ct. 689, 696, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1970, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The difficulty with this argument is that none of the cases cited, nor any other which we have found, includes materiality as an essential element which must be submitted to a jury... These cases already taught that essential elements are for the jury; none of them taught that materiality is anything other than a question of law for the court. Paxson, 861 F.2d at 732. More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the continuing viability of Sinclair with the following observation: Sinclair is not `out dated precedent.' The Supreme Court recently cited Sinclair with approval when considering the materiality issue in a different context. In Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988) ( Kungys ), the Court examined materiality in conjunction with a denaturalization proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). The Court ruled that under section 1451, materiality should be decided by the judge as a matter of law. Id. at 772, 108 S.Ct. at 1547. The Court relied on Sinclair and perjury cases by the courts of appeals following it. Id. Furthermore, the Court identified a rationale of general applicability which directs the judge to decide materiality in the perjury cases: `[A]lthough the materiality of a statement rests upon a factual evidentiary showing, the ultimate finding of materiality turns on an interpretation of substantive law. Since it is the court's responsibility to interpret the substantive law, we believe [it is proper to treat] the issue of materiality as a legal question.' Id. Although Kungys did not involve a criminal proceeding, its reliance on Sinclair demonstrates that Sinclair is still authoritative. Moreover, the reasoning of Kungys provides an additional reason for our conclusion. Because materiality must be determined by reference to the underlying substantive law, it involves a legal question which should be resolved by the judge. Clark, 918 F.2d at 845-46 (citations omitted). Based upon the strength of the foregoing authorities, we reject French's contention that materiality in a perjury prosecution is an issue of fact to be resolved by the jury and hold that materiality is an issue of law to be decided by the trial court. It follows from this conclusion that there was no error by the trial court in the instant case in failing to submit the issue of materiality to the jury. Moreover, since materiality is an issue of law and not an issue of fact, there was no denial of French's right to a jury trial in the failure to submit the materiality issue to the jury. See, Sands, supra (right to trial by jury does not extend to questions of law). See also, State v. Myers, 88 S.D. 378, 220 N.W.2d 535 (1974) (only fact issues are in province of jury).