Opinion ID: 1935599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cause of action limited to ch. 31.

Text: The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether ch. 31 of the statutes, specifically sec. 31.25, provides the appropriate remedy under law for injury, if any, suffered by an individual as a result of the maintenance of a municipal bridge alleged to be an obstruction and hazard to the free use of a navigable stream. On appeal, considerable argument has been expended as to whether the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently states a common-law cause of action in nuisance. This court has repeatedly held that the purpose of summary judgment is to prevent sham pleadings and delay and not as a substitute to the demurrer or judgment on the pleadings. Balcom v. Royal Ins. Co. (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 351, 161 N. W. 2d 918; Schandelmeier v. Brown (1968), 37 Wis. 2d 656, 155 N. W. 2d 659; Voysey v. Labisky (1960), 10 Wis. 2d 274, 103 N. W. 2d 9. However, this court must initially examine the pleadings to determine the controlling issue or issues of law in order to determine whether the facts in dispute, if any, are material. Marshall v. Miles (1972), 54 Wis. 2d 155, 194 N. W. 2d 630; Younger v. Rosenow Paper & Supply Co. (1971), 51 Wis. 2d 619, 188 N. W. 2d 507; Fuller v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. (1937), 224 Wis. 603, 272 N. W. 839. In such an examination the pleadings are to be given a reasonable and liberal construction. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Central Contracting Co. (1949), 254 Wis. 480, 37 N. W. 2d 24; Welch v. Corrigan (1949), 255 Wis. 58, 38 N. W. 2d 148. Where there is no issue of fact that should be tried or where there is an issue of law that can be determined so as to conclude the case, summary judgment should be used. Bolen v. Bolen (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 91, 158 N. W. 2d 316; Hardscrabble Ski Area v. First Nat. Bank (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 334, 166 N. W. 2d 191. Plaintiff's complaint is narrowly drawn and as drawn is limited to a cause of action pursuant to sec. 31.25, Stats. The complaint, in part, provides: 5. That the said bridge, on information and belief, has never been authorized to be constructed and maintained as provided by law; specifically, that no approval therefor had ever been secured by the defendant from the state as provided by sec. 31.23 (3) (b) of the Wisconsin Statutes and the predecessors of that statute; further, that the said bridge constitutes an obstruction which impairs and impedes the free use of said navigable water in that the span is but 8½, approximately, above the surface of the water at the normal water level and that in periods of higher water, commercial boats are unable to pass under said bridge and that the same also constitutes a hazard because the abutments extend into said water, narrowing the channel to such an extent that even small crafts, such as private boats, are in danger of colliding when entering and passing under the bridge from opposite directions. Plaintiff now contends that some of the general language used in the latter portion of the above-quoted paragraph 5 sets forth a common-law nuisance action. However, such an argument is without merit because of the specific language of paragraph 7 and the prayer for relief, which read as follows: 7. That this action, which is brought in order to abate the maintenance of said bridge by the defendant, is authorized in section 31.25 of the Wisconsin Statutes. Wherefore, the plaintiff demands judgment enjoining and abating the maintenance thereof as a public nuisance as provided by said section 31.25; for the costs, attorney's fees and disbursements of this action and for such other judgment provision or order to be contained therein as may be agreeable to equity. (Emphasis added.) Although the pleadings are to be viewed liberally, we cannot read into a complaint a cause of action not intended by the complainant to be contained therein. The trial court correctly determined that plaintiff's cause of action is confined to that provided in sec. 31.25, Stats.