Opinion ID: 2045737
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Heading: State Farm's Policy. The omnibus uninsured motorist clause in State Farm's policy provided:

Text: Who Is an Insured Insuredmeans the person or persons covered by uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle coverage: This is: 1. the first person named in the declaration; 2. his or her spouse; 3. their relatives; and 4. any other person while occupying: a. your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly acquired car or a trailer attached to such car. Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of the consent of you or your spouse.... The district court properly focused on paragraph four as the relevant provision and framed the issue this way: whether the pickup was being used within the scope of the Hartmans' consent at the time of the accident. Finding that the pickup was not being used within the scope of the Hartmans' consent, the court reasoned: It is clear in this case that Molly would not have been an insured under the uninsured motor vehicle coverage of the State Farm Policy if she had been driving the pickup at the time of the accident. Her driving the pickup would have been directly contrary to the instructions given by [the Hartmans] to Brian. [Grinnell] contends that Molly was an insured under the State Farm policy because she let Brenda drive the pickup rather than driving it herself. That contention does not constitute a reasonable interpretation of the policy, and it is contrary to the facts in this case. [The Hartmans] did not consent to Molly's driving the pickup, and they did not consent to Molly's riding in the pickup while permitting it to be driven by Brenda. An insurance policy must be given the reasonable interpretation which is most favorable to the insured, but the court may not adopt a strained or unreasonable interpretation in order to create coverage when the policy provides none. To hold that the pickup was being used within the scope of [the Hartmans'] consent at the time of the accident in this case would be to engage in fantasy rather than to make a reasonable interpretation of the policy. The pickup was not being used within the scope of consent by either Molly or Brenda. Molly was therefore not an insured under the State Farm policy. (Citation omitted.) As it did in the district court, Grinnell contends here that Molly was a consent user of the pickup and therefore an insured under the uninsured omnibus clause of State Farm's policy. In support of its contention, Grinnell argues that Molly frequently rode in the pickup as a passenger without any objection from the Hartmans. Grinnell further argues that because Molly was a passenger rather than the driver at the time of the accident, she was using the pickup within the scope of the Hartmans' consent. Grinnell concludes that Brenda's driving without the Hartmans' consent did not deprive Molly of her status as a consent user of the pickup. Grinnell's argument is premised on an alleged difference in meaning between the term use and operate for purposes of omnibus coverage. There is some authority for making such a distinction. See, e.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 507, 166 A.2d 355 (1960). In Indemnity, an automobile owner permitted her employee to take a group of customers in her car for a tour of a brewery as part of a sales-promotion program. The owner had on past occasions told the employee that only the employee was to operate the car. On the way back from the tour, the employee permitted one of the customers to drive while the employee sat in the front passenger seat. The car left the highway and struck a tree, killing the driver and the employee and injuring the other occupants of the car. Holding that the driver's estate was an insured under the omnibus clause of the owner's policy, the court reasoned: Under the omnibus clause of its insurance contract, [the insurer] agreed to cover any person while using the automobile... provided the actual use is with ... (the named Insured's) permission. The clause says nothing about Operation of the vehicle. It is the Use which must be permitted. [The insurer] reads the word Use as synonymous with Operation, and argues that since [the owner] in effect expressly forbade [the customer-driver] from Operating her car, [the customer-driver] was not covered. We think that in this context the words Use and Operation are not synonymous. The Use of an automobile denotes its employment for some purpose of the user; the word operation denotes the manipulation of the car's controls in order to propel it as a vehicle. Use is thus broader than Operation. One who operates a car uses it, but one can use a car without operating it. An automobile is being used, for example, by one riding in it although another is driving. Since in this context the words Operation and Use have different meanings and the omnibus clause requires only that the Use of the automobile be with the permission of the named insured, any prohibition as to the Operation of the automobile is immaterial to a determination of coverage. Thus, even though a driver has been expressly prohibited from Operating the car, he is covered if the car was being Used for a purpose permitted by the named insured. .... It is undisputed in the present case that [the owner] gave [the employee and the customers] permission to Use her automobile to go to and from [the brewery]. At the time of the accident the automobile was being Used for that purpose, i.e., transporting the members of the party from the brewery to their homes. Since under the terms of the omnibus clause in [the] policy a person is an additional insured if he is Using the automobile with the named insured's permission, we hold that [the customer-driver] was an additional insured. Indemnity, 33 N.J. at 513-14, 515, 166 A.2d at 358, 359. The use versus operation theory of Indemnity was specifically rejected in Helwig v. Esterly, 205 Pa.Super. 185, 189-90, 208 A.2d 10, 12 (1965). In Helwig, the omnibus clause covered any person while using the automobile provided the actual use is by the named insured or [the insured's] spouse or with the permission of either. Helwig, 205 Pa.Super. at 187, 208 A.2d at 10. The named insured in Helwig gave his son permission to use his car. However, the father imposed a restriction that no one else was to drive the car. The father specifically instructed the son not to let his fiancee drive because she only had a learner's permit. Contrary to these instructions, the son permitted his fiancee to drive the car while the son was a passenger. The fiancee was in an accident. In Helwig the appellate court determined the omnibus provision of the father's policy did not cover the son's fiancee. In doing so the court rejected the argument that the fiancee was merely the operator while the actual use of the car was being made by the owner's son with the owner's permission. It would be unreasonable to hold that [the son] was privileged to disregard the explicit instruction of his father as to the manner in which he was to use his father's car. This is consistent with what was said [in an earlier case] ... the word `permission' is to be construed as meaning permission to use the car, or permission to use the car in a specified manner and for a specified purpose. If the restriction were imposed in this case the action of [the son] in using the automobile with [the fiancee] as the driver would be a major, not a slight, deviation from the privilege granted to him, whether it be considered as a breach of the condition imposed upon his privilege of use, thereby terminating that privilege, or as a use not intended, i.e., the use of the car to give [the son's fiancee] an opportunity to practice driving or to receive instruction. Either would be beyond the privilege granted to him. Therefore, [the fiancee] would have been operating the car without the permission of the named insured and would not be covered by the policy. She would have no express privilege granted to her by the named insured or implied by his conduct and she could not acquire an implied permission through [the son] since his privilege of use ended with his turning over the wheel of the car to her contrary to the express instruction given by his father. Id. at 190, 208 A.2d at 12 (citations omitted). The omnibus uninsured motorist clause in State Farm's policy is similar to the omnibus clauses in Indemnity and Helwig. State Farm's omnibus uninsured motorist clause provides that a person while occupying the pickup is an additional insured if the pickup is used within the scope of the consent of the Hartmans. As between the interpretations of the omnibus clauses in Indemnity and in Helwig, we think the interpretation in Helwig is more reasonable and sound. We therefore adopt it. Applying that interpretation here, we think there was substantial evidence to support the district court's finding that Molly was not using the pickup within the scope of the Hartmans' consent. She was therefore not an insured and was not covered under the omnibus uninsured motorist clause of State Farm's policy. The evidence is uncontroverted that the Hartmans explicitly told Brian no one else was to drive the pickup. The Hartmans knew that Molly was a frequent passenger in the pickup when Brian was driving. They said nothing, and therefore impliedly consented to Molly's passenger status only when Brian was driving. However, once Brian tossed the keys to Molly and she permitted Brenda to drive, any privilege Brian had to use the pickup terminated. In addition, the useBrenda driving Molly homewas not an intended use of the pickup. On this point the evidence is also uncontroverted. Brian's father testified that he would have been shocked and would not have consented to such use had he known about it. Such use was beyond the privilege the Hartmans gave Brian and therefore not within the scope of the Hartmans' consent.