Opinion ID: 1920351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of a Lesser-Included Offense Instruction

Text: ś 41. Spicer argues that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jurors that they could find Spicer guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder. [19] The trial judge refused two such instructions by Spicer on the basis that there was no evidence in the record that would justify the lesser-included offense of murder. [20] Thus, the only potential findings by the jury were that Spicer was guilty of capital murder or not guilty of any offense. Spicer asserts that because there was some evidence supporting his contention that he did not rob Hebert, he was entitled to a jury instruction of the lesser-included offense of murder that would allow the jury to convict him of a non-capital offense. ś 42. As support for his argument, Spicer cites Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). In Beck, the United States Supreme Court held as unconstitutional the imposition of a death sentence on a defendant convicted by a jury of a capital offense when the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser-included offense despite evidence supporting a lesser included offense. Id. at 638. An Alabama jury convicted Beck of capital murder for the robbery and murder of an 80 year-old man. Id. at 639, 100 S.Ct. 2382. As a defense, Beck asserted that he did not kill the victim or intend the victims death, but that instead his accomplice unexpectedly struck and killed the victim. Id. Under the Alabama death penalty statute at that time, the requisite intent to kill could not be supplied by the felony-murder doctrine. Thus, felony-murder could not be a lesser-included offense of the capital crime of intentional killing in the course of a robbery. Alabama law, however, specifically prohibited a trial judge from giving a jury the option of convicting a defendant of a lesser-included offense. The Supreme Court stated: when the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offense â but leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offense â the failure to give the jury the third option of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction. Id. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382. ś 43. This Court's standard of review for challenges to jury instructions is as follows: The Court does not single out any instruction or take instructions out of context; rather, the instructions are to be read together as a whole. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case. This entitlement is limited, however, in that the court is allowed to refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Parks v. State, 884 So.2d 738, 746 (Miss. 2004) (citations omitted). Furthermore, this Court has stated: Even though based on meager evidence and highly unlikely, a defendant is entitled to have every legal defense he asserts to be submitted as a factual issue for determination by the jury under proper instruction of the court. Where a defendant's proffered instruction has an evidentiary basis, properly states the law, and is the only instruction presenting his theory of the case, refusal to grant it constitutes reversible error. Hester v. State, 602 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). ś 44. This Court has articulated the following test to determine whether there is an evidentiary basis for a lesser-included offense: Lessor included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge â and ultimately this court â can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused, and considering all reasonable references which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lessor included offense (and conversely not guilty of at least one element of the principal charge). Agnew v. State, 783 So.2d 699, 702-03 (Miss.2001) (quoting Graham v. State, 582 So.2d 1014, 1017 (Miss.1991)). ś 45. The facts in Beck are distinguishable from the facts of the current case. First, Mississippi courts are not governed by the same capital sentencing law at issue in Beck. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-20 states: The judge, in cases where the offense cited in the indictment is punishable by death, may grant an instruction for the state or the defendant which instructs the jury as to their discretion to convict the accused of the commission of an offense not specifically set forth in the indictment returned against the accused. ś 46. Second, Spicer presented no evidence before the trial court or this Court that would warrant a lesser-included offense instruction of murder. The United States Supreme Court stated in a later opinion interpreting Beck: Beck held that due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction. But due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. The jury's discretion is thus channeled so that it may convict a defendant of any crime fairly supported by the evidence. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982). Spicer presented no evidence that he acted with deliberate design, a depraved heart, or in commission of any felony other than the ones listed under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2), the capital murder statute. [21] Spicer's basis for his argument that there was evidence to support a verdict of guilt of a non-capital offense is his continued assertion that he had permission to drive Hebert's truck. Spicer's argument is a defense to the charge of capital murder, not evidence of murder under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1). In addition, there is too much probative evidence in the record of the underlying felony of robbery for a reasonable juror to find Spicer guilty of simple murder beyond a reasonable doubt. There is evidence that he stole the sword because he was in possession of it after Hebert's death and it had Hebert's blood on it. There is also a lack of evidence that Spicer possessed a spare key to Hebert's truck. This strongly suggests that he not only stole the keys, but also the truck. Even if the jury believed Spicer had permission to use the truck on previous occasions, it seems unlikely that he had permission here because Hebert was deceased. ś 47. Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the accused, no reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the lesser-included offense. We find that the trial court correctly rejected the murder instruction because it was not warranted by the facts of this case.