Opinion ID: 1749345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DJJ Correctly Applied The DNA Sampling Statutes To Juvenile Public Offenders

Text: Appellants argue that the Franklin Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals misconstrued the DNA sampling statutes. The relevant 2002 statutes are listed below. [10] KRS 17.170(1): Any person convicted on or after July 14, 1992, of a felony offense under KRS Chapter 510 [sex offenses] or KRS 530.020 [incest], shall, or who is in the custody of the Department of Corrections on July 14, 1992, under KRS Chapter 510 or KRS 530.020 may, have a sample of blood, an oral swab, or sample obtained through a noninvasive procedure taken by the Department of Corrections for DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) law enforcement identification purposes and inclusion in law enforcement identification databases. KRS 17.171: Any person convicted on or after July 15, 2002, or who is in the custody of the Department of Corrections on or after July 15, 2002, for a violation of KRS 530.064 [unlawful transaction with a minor in the first degree], 531.310 [use of a minor in a sexual performance], or 531.320 [promoting a sexual performance by a minor] or a felony attempt to commit one (1) of these offenses shall be subject to the provisions of KRS 17.170 relating to the collection and retention of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence. KRS 17.172: Any person convicted on or after July 15, 2002, or who is in the custody of the Department of Corrections on or after July 15, 2002, for a violation of KRS 511.020 [first-degree burglary] or 511.030 [second-degree burglary] or a felony attempt to commit one of these offenses shall be subject to the provisions of KRS 17.170 relating to the collection and retention of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence. KRS 17.174: KRS 17.171 and 17.172 shall apply to a public offender adjudicated a public offender or in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice on or after July 15, 2002, for any offense defined in KRS 17.170 or 17.171 or an attempt to commit one (1) of the named offenses. The Court of Appeals held that KRS 17.174 does not permit DNA sampling of juveniles adjudicated public offenders for offenses listed in KRS 17.172 (first- and second-degree burglary). KRS 17.174 contains the qualifying phrase for any offense defined in KRS 17.170 or 17.171[.] Therefore, offenses listed in KRS 17.172 are excluded. We accept and adopt this holding of the Court of Appeals, which Appellee has not challenged. Appellee argues that KRS 17.174 requires DJJ to sample the DNA of all juveniles adjudicated public offenders or in its custody on or after July 15, 2002 for the offenses listed in KRS 17.170 and 17.171. Appellants argue that the statute only authorizes DNA sampling of adults in the custody of the Department of Corrections who, while not having been convicted of a qualifying offense, nevertheless have a qualifying juvenile adjudication. We begin with general principles of statutory construction. In construing a statute, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't, 260 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Ky.2008) (citing Osborne v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Ky.2006)). To determine legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning. Richardson, 260 S.W.3d at 779 (citing Osborne, 185 S.W.3d at 648-49). We read the statute as a whole and in context with other parts of the law. Richardson, 260 S.W.3d at 779 (citing Lewis v. Jackson Energy Co-op. Corp., 189 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Ky.2005)). In addition, an act is to be read as a whole, and any language in the act is to be read in light of the whole act. Popplewell's Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d 456, 465 (Ky.2004). The construction and application of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Richardson, 260 S.W.3d at 779 (citing Osborne, 185 S.W.3d at 648). KRS 17.174 does not state that KRS 17.170 (the statute authorizing DNA sampling) applies to juveniles for certain offenses. Rather, it states that two statutes expanding DNA sampling apply to juveniles adjudicated for certain offenses. These two expanding statutes, KRS 17.171 and 17.172, cannot be read without referring back to KRS 17.170 (the authorizing statute). It is also worth noting that KRS 17.171-17.174 were all passed as part of the same bill (House Bill 4). Reading the language in light of the entire act, we believe the General Assembly intended to apply the provisions of KRS 17.170 and 17.171 to juvenile public offenders. We must also presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result. Workforce Dev. Cabinet v. Gaines, 276 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Ky.2008). It is more logical to presume that the General Assembly intended to expand the provisions of KRS 17.170 and 17.171 to juvenile public offenders. To construe the statute as Appellants suggest would mean that the Department of Corrections, upon obtaining custody of individuals for non-qualifying offenses, would be required to determine whether that person had a qualifying juvenile adjudication. KRS 17.174, when read in context with other relevant statutes, is ambiguous. Where, as here, a statute is ambiguous, we must look to outside evidence of legislative intent. AK Steel Corp. v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Ky.App.2002). The General Assembly enacted House Bill 4 at the first regular legislative session following J.D.K., in which the Court of Appeals held that KRS 17.170's plain language made it inapplicable to juvenile public offenders. 54 S.W.3d at 176. While the legislature could have more clearly stated that KRS 17.170 applies to juveniles (as it did in subsequent amendments to the statute) the enactment of House Bill 4 immediately following J.D.K. suggests an intent by the legislature to apply KRS 17.170 to juveniles. In addition, the legislature's subsequent amendment of KRS 17.170 to specifically include juvenile public offenders in DNA sampling, and to specifically authorize DJJ to conduct such testing, shows an intent to sample DNA from public offenders. Appellants also argue that the DNA sampling statutes, as applied by DJJ, are inconsistent with the purpose and language of Kentucky's Unified Juvenile Code. We have explained: It has been a principle theory of juvenile law that an individual should not be stigmatized with a criminal record for acts committed during minority. By providing young people with treatment oriented facilities rather than simple punishment, antisocial behavior can be modified and the offenders will develop as law abiding citizens. Jefferson County Dep't for Human Serv. v. Carter, 795 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky.1990). In addition, KRS 635.040 provides that [n]o adjudication by a juvenile session of District Court shall be deemed a conviction, nor shall such adjudication operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from a criminal conviction, nor shall any child be found guilty or be deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication. The General Assembly is presumed to be aware of the Juvenile Code and its purpose when it chose to enact House Bill 4. Shewmaker v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 807, 809 (Ky.App.2000) (It is presumed that the Legislature was cognizant of preexisting statutes at the time it enacted a later statute on the same subject matter.). In addition, the sampling of a juvenile public offender's DNA for inclusion in a non-public database is not equivalent to being stigmatized with a criminal record. Nor is it intended as punishment. We do not view DJJ's interpretation of the DNA sampling statutes as being inconsistent with the purpose or language of the Juvenile Code. [11] Under principles of statutory construction, we hold that the 2002 version of KRS 17.170 applies to juvenile public offenders for offenses listed in KRS 17.170 and 17.171. This is, of course, limited by the date restrictions contained in KRS 17.174.