Opinion ID: 167974
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reduction of requested attorneys' fee award

Text: 61 Because we are remanding to allow McInnis the opportunity to reply, we do not address whether the district court abused its discretion by decreasing McInnis's attorneys' fees award. However, we note that we see nothing intrinsically wrong with the district court's current award of attorneys' fees. While the district court must articulate reasons for its fee award, Public Serv. Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1508, 1520 (10th Cir.1994), [a] general reduction of hours claimed in order to achieve what the court determines to be a reasonable number is not an erroneous method, so long as there is sufficient reason for its use, Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir.1986). Here, the district court found both the number of hours expended on this litigation and the hourly rate charged by McInnis's attorneys to be unreasonable, and it therefore reduced both. Additionally, we note that ultimately an appellate court plays [only] a `limited role' in reviewing a district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs, and deference is given to a district court's judgment on the matter, since the court is in a better position to assess the course of litigation and quality of work. Gamble, Simmons & Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 175 F.3d 762, 773-74 (10th Cir.1999). However, once the district court considers McInnis's reply brief, it will be in a better position to consider anew the matter of the award of attorneys' fees.