Opinion ID: 2517324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: The Failure to Reinstruct at the Penalty Phase

Text: During the discussion of penalty phase instructions with counsel, the court was skeptical about the necessity of reinstructing the jury with the guilt phase instructions that were pertinent to the penalty deliberations. Ultimately, with the concurrence of counsel, the court decided not to reinstruct, but to give a general instruction telling the jury to follow those guilt phase instructions that applied to the penalty determination, excluding those prohibiting the consideration of sympathy for the defendant. The court noted that the jury would have the guilt phase instructions in written form. Accordingly, the court read the following special instruction: You are to be guided by the previous instructions given in the first phase of this case which are applicable and pertinent to the determination of penalty. However, you are to completely disregard any instructions given in the first phase which prohibited you from considering pity or sympathy for the defendant. In determining penalty, the jury may take into consideration pity and sympathy for the defendant. Immediately before reading this instruction, however, the court gave the jury the standard version of CALJIC No. 8.84.1, which included the admonishment: You must accept and follow the law as I state it to you. Disregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial. This instruction was designed to be followed by all the instructions appropriate for the penalty phase. (See People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1255-1256 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225].) (21) Defendant contends the court erred by failing to reinstruct the jury with the applicable guilt phase instructions, and by giving it contradictory directions to disregard all former instructions, on the one hand, but to follow those that were applicable, on the other. [22] The court did indeed err. As we have held, if the court tells the jury to disregard the guilt phase instructions, it must later provide it with those instructions applicable to the penalty phase. ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 37.) We reiterate that trial courts should take pains to ensure that penalty phase juries are fully and properly instructed. (See People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1222 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981]; Moon, at p. 37, fn. 7.) The Attorney General, while noting that defendant agreed to the instructional procedure below, does not contend the error was invited. But insofar as defendant claims the court should have reread the applicable guilt phase instructions, his counsel did indeed invite error. The prosecutor directly, and correctly, questioned whether the jury would be capable of modifying the written instructions from the guilt phase to fit the penalty phase issues. In particular, she noted that the circumstantial evidence instructions referred to findings of guilt, which would not be involved in the penalty deliberations. Defense counsel argued at length against reinstructing the jury, and requested that it receive only instructions on the elements of the uncharged crimes, to avoid confusion and the temptation to relitigate the issues in guilt. It is true that counsel did not ask the court to give CALJIC No. 8.84.1 in addition to the special instruction set out above. He merely acquiesced in the court's decision to give these inconsistent instructions. Thus, to the extent that error affected defendant's substantial rights, he is not barred from raising a claim of instructional error without an objection in the trial court. ( People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 111 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099]; see also People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 37.) In any event, the instructions given by the court did not prejudice defendant under the circumstances of this case, as we shall explain. While it was confusing for the jury to hear first that it was to [d]isregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial, and then that it should be guided by the previous instructions given in the first phase of this case which are applicable and pertinent to the determination of penalty, two factors operated to resolve the conflict as a practical matter. First, the jury was given the guilt phase instructions in written form, and would reasonably have understood that they could therefore consider them. Second, the prosecutor, in her closing argument, referred the jury to the original circumstantial evidence instructions as they applied to the question of whether defendant had used a knife in the 7-Eleven robbery. (See pt. II.N.5., 6., ante, at pp. 1313-1315.) She specifically mentioned the aspect of those instructions most favorable to defendant, stating: If there are two reasonable interpretations of the evidence you must accept the one that favors the defendant. While the arguments of counsel are no substitute for instructions from the court, here the jury would surely have concluded from the prosecutor's argument that these guilt phase instructions were applicable at the penalty phase. In arguing that the failure to reinstruct was prejudicial, defendant specifies only the circumstantial evidence instructions, CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02. He contends that, even if the jury did turn to the written instructions, it would not have deemed these particular instructions applicable because of their references to guilt. However, as noted, the prosecutor incorporated these instructions in her argument on defendant's use of a knife. Regarding the uncharged offenses alleged in the penalty phase, common sense would have led the jury to consider the instructions in determining whether defendant had committed those crimes. Defendant relies on our discussion in People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 717-718 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253]. There, we reasoned that the jury would not have applied the no-sympathy instruction (CALJIC No. 1.00) because it refers specifically to deciding a defendant's guilt or innocence. ( Babbitt, at p. 717.) Here, by contrast, the jury would have applied the circumstantial evidence instructions both as a matter of logic and by reference to the prosecutor's argument incorporating them. Defendant has failed to establish a reasonable possibility, or a reasonable doubt, that any instructional error involving the applicability of the guilt phase instructions affected the penalty verdict. (See People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 28; People v. Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1221-1222.)