Opinion ID: 446566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Misappropriation of a Merchandising Property; Defective Jury Instructions

Text: 35 CPI's remaining two claims need not long detain us. First, CPI argues that the district court improperly granted summary judgment dismissing its claim for misappropriation of its merchandising property. Although Texas courts have not yet determined whether such a cause of action exists independent of common law trademark infringement and unfair competition laws, we have recognized that Texas courts have consistently expanded the scope of protection afforded by the unfair competition laws. Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Productions, Inc., 628 F.2d 387, 394 (5th Cir.1980); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Industries, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162, 1168 (S.D.Tex.1982) (finding that a cause of action for misappropriation of a merchandising property exists under Texas law). To prevail on a misappropriation of a merchandising property claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant appropriated and used its property (e.g., trademark or other unique pecuniary interest) without its authority and in competition with its own licensing program. Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1981); Universal City Studios, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 1168. In this case we conclude that summary judgment should not have been granted on this claim because CPI demonstrated that a factual question existed regarding whether Conans appropriated and used its property in competition with its licensing program. Nevertheless, the improper dismissal of this claim was harmless and does not warrant reversal, even assuming the jury would have found for CPI on this claim, since the jury's findings of laches and acquiescence would have barred any recovery by CPI on this unfair competition claim. 36 This conclusion also applies to CPI's remaining claim that the jury's failure to find a violation of 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a), although it had found a violation of 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1114(1), demonstrated that the jury instructions were fatally defective. See, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Association, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.1975) (rights afforded by Sec. 1114(1) are merely a subset of the rights afforded by Sec. 1125(a)). We need not determine whether the jury instructions were deficient, since the jury's laches and acquiescence findings would have precluded any recovery by CPI even if the jury had found that Conans' conduct violated section 1125(a). Any asserted error was harmless. Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. 37 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court in part. We reverse and remand for the district court to formulate and order an injunction in accordance with this opinion. 38 AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED AND REMANDED in part. 39