Opinion ID: 1942822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimonial evidence of prior conviction

Text: On direct examination of the defendant's younger brother, Joseph R. Samson, the defendant's counsel asked the witness: Do you know what Mr. Samson's reputation for truth and veracity is in the community? To this inquiry the younger Samson replied: Well, he has always been truthful with me. As far as I know, he is a good worker. He may have his faults, but molesting young girls, I don't believe, is one of them. Although this evidence was unresponsive and more in the nature of a character reference rather than evidence of the witness' brother's reputation in the community for truth and veracity, the State did not object, nor did it move to strike. Instead, the prosecutor, on cross-examination, sought from the witness an amplification of the faults which the witness said his brother had. The following colloquy took place: Q. . . . What kind of faults does he have? A. Oh, he's a rascal, just like anyone. Q. Well, a rascal includes a great deal. Is there anything specific you can give me in relation to his rascality? A. Oh, he's a joker; he may take a few drinks. Q. Are you aware of anything that would blemish his reputation in the community? A. No. Q. You know of nothing that your brother has ever done that could blemish his reputation? A. Other than his past record once upon a time, which I don't hold that against any man. Q. Your brother has a record? A. Yes, he does. Q. What kind of a record? The defendant's objection at this point was overruled, and the witness disclosed his brother's previous record of a conviction of manslaughter. The presiding Justice stated for the record that the evidence was being received, not as substantive evidence to prove the truth of this testimonial information, but solely to show the younger brother's knowledge of the defendant and to affect the younger brother's credibility as a witness. In this, there was no error. The witness had vouched, on direct examination, for the defendant's character of being a truthful person. Even though such evidence was unresponsive and incompetent in the form presented and could have been stricken upon motion of the State, when it remained in the record by consent, it became subject to contradictory exploration as any other evidence in the case. State v. Ernst, 150 Me. 449, 114 A.2d 369 (1955), where rebuttal testimony of a State witness was deemed properly allowed to show the tone of voice of a defense witness to contradict her previous testimony that she was very calm, cool, and collected. See also United States v. Jewett, 520 F.2d 581, 584 (1st Cir. 1975); State v. Armstrong, Me., 344 A.2d 42 (1975); State v. Gervais, Me., 317 A.2d 796, 803 (1974). Furthermore, when the presiding Justice limited the purpose for which he would consider this evidence to impeachment of the younger brother's credibility, such as regards the witness' opinion that molesting young girls was not one of the defendant's faults, no prejudice resulted to the defendant. Moreover, the scope of cross-examination is a matter for the discretion of the trial court and the question for our determination as a reviewing court is to see whether or not there was an abuse of discretion. State v. Ryder, Me., 348 A.2d 1, 4 (1975); State v. Gervais, supra. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding Justice.