Opinion ID: 697321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to conduct a reasonable investigation into

Text: 14 background and mental health 15 Jones asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally defective in failing to adequately investigate Jones's mental state and present an insanity or diminished capacity defense. Because of this deficiency, Jones claims, the jury was denied essential information about his mental illness that would have swayed the result of this case. To succeed on his ineffective assistance claims, Jones must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel's errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. We find that counsel made no such errors in this instance. 16 The record makes clear that counsel did not overlook the possibility of a diminished capacity defense. Indeed, counsel sought out competency and capacity examinations for Jones. Doctor Daniel's pre-trial psychological report noted that although Jones was emotionally unstable, he displayed no symptoms of a psychotic disorder. This report further indicated that Jones refused to cooperate with additional psychological testing that could further develop and explain the extent of any intellectual deficiencies. Doctor Daniel found it difficult to render an opinion as to mens rea because Jones vehemently denied the alleged conduct, but stated that Jones did not suffer from a mental disease or defect that would prevent him from appreciating the nature of his conduct. Counsel then sought an additional psychological examination from Dr. Bassett. Jones claims that this examination was insufficient because Dr. Bassett was not aware of all the relevant circumstances of the crime when he evaluated Jones. 17 As an initial matter, we note that counsel in this instance would not have been required to seek an additional examination had he not retained legitimate concerns about Jones's mental capacity. See Sidebottom, 46 F.3d at 753; O'Neal v. Delo, 44 F.3d 655, 660 (8th Cir.1995). That portion of the barred claim that can be construed as relating to the conviction itself must fail on the merits. Trial counsel stated that he made a strategic decision to limit Bassett's knowledge of the crime because the communications would not be in confidence and would lose any potential privileged status. 18 Jones's ineffective assistance claim is directly rejected by our recent decision in LaRette. Most damaging to Jones's claim is the fact that Jones himself insisted that trial counsel not submit an insanity or diminished capacity defense. See LaRette, 44 F.3d at 685-86. Jones also refused to testify, further thwarting counsel's efforts to present any such defense. Id. Rather than a competency defense, Jones wanted to propose the theory that the crime was committed by Latin drug dealers, who threatened his life if he told the truth about the crime. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066 (noting that counsel's conduct must be viewed in light of information provided by client). There is also nothing in the record indicating that Jones did not appreciate the nature of the charges and was incapable of assisting in his own defense. See O'Neal, 44 F.3d at 660. The facts of the crime further attest to a strong inference of deliberation. Jones stalked Fienhold for several days, murdered her in a secluded area far from home, mutilated and hid the body, and disposed of the murder weapon. In the face of these facts and all the other relevant circumstances, we cannot say that trial counsel's investigation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, and that any additional effort on that issue would have changed the jury's ultimate disposition of the case.