Opinion ID: 2520371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: On November 20, 2003, the Chaffee County District Attorney brought two domestic violence charges of assault and harassment against Robert Turner, Jr., stemming from allegations that he battered his girlfriend, M.P. During pretrial discovery, defense counsel discovered that M.P. had contacted the Alliance, a private, non-profit domestic violence victim advocacy center located in Salida, Colorado, in connection with the charges. On April 14 and 16, 2004, defense counsel served the Alliance with two separate subpoenas duces tecum demanding production of records of M.P.'s contact with the Alliance. The first subpoena required the Alliance to produce any and all records, notes and files regarding any and all assistance provided to [M.P.]. The second requested the same information pursuant to [M.P.'s] reports of domestic violence/abuse on or about November 20, 2003 and thereafter. [1] On April 20, relying on section 13-90-107, the Alliance noted its refusal to comply with the subpoena in a letter to defense counsel. In response, defense counsel filed a Motion to Compel with the county court, arguing that records of assistance provided by the Alliance to M.P. were properly discoverable because the victim-advocate privilege only applies to communications made by a victim of domestic abuse, and not to assistance provided by the organization. On April 29, 2004, contending that the plain language and underlying purpose of the statute attaches the privilege to records of assistance provided, the Alliance moved to quash the subpoena. The county court conducted an evidentiary hearing on May 5, 2004, taking arguments from the defendant and the Alliance on the question of whether the defendant's request for records or reports of the kinds of assistance the Alliance provided M.P. fell within statutorily privileged communications made to victim advocates by a victim of domestic violence. The court agreed with the defendant that the victim-advocate privilege was not intended to protect records of assistance provided by a domestic abuse agency. The court held that although evidence of housing assistance had marginal relevance, it was nonetheless not protected by the privilege and was therefore discoverable. Although the court did deny the defendant full access to all records of M.P.'s contact with the agency, it nonetheless ordered the Alliance to provide a broad outline as to the type of assistance, provided to M.P., including for example, emergency financial assistance. The Alliance petitioned from that decision and we accepted original jurisdiction.