Opinion ID: 423679
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Relief Granted by the District Court

Text: 22 1. The District Court's Authority to Order MSC to Continue Funding Plaintiffs' Education at Landmark 23 MSC challenges the fact that the district court not only rejected MSC's challenge to the Commissioner's order, but also granted plaintiffs injunctive relief under the EAHCA, even though plaintiffs were not parties aggrieved by the Commissioner's determination. Given our disposition of MSC's challenge to the impartiality of the Commissioner's designated review officer, it would not appear that MSC would gain anything by being bound only by the order of the Commissioner, as affirmed by the district court, rather than by a more limited order of the court itself. In any case, the short answer to MSC's argument is that under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), the district court had jurisdiction over MSC's challenge to the state administrative determination and authority to grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate. Although the scope of that authority is limited by the court's responsibility to accord due weight to the state administrative proceedings, see Rowley, --- U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 3051, we are aware of no authority indicating that the district court may grant relief only in favor of the party aggrieved by the state administrative process. 4 2. Least Restrictive Placement 24 MSC urges that the court erred in ordering it to continue funding plaintiffs' placement at Landmark because placement there violates the EAHCA's requirement that to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children be educated with children who are not handicapped. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5); 34 C.F.R. § 330.550-.556. 5 Although it does not appear that MSC made any effort to clarify the misunderstanding, MSC also urges that the source of the court's error was the review officer's misunderstanding that the parties had agreed to limit the possible placement alternatives to that proposed in the IEPs and Landmark. Thus, having rejected the IEPs, the review officer had no choice but to order defendants to fund plaintiffs' placement at Landmark, even though a less restrictive, third alternative would have been preferable. 25 While it may be that the review officer erred in ordering MSC to develop new IEPs which would include placement of plaintiffs at Landmark, rather than simply directing it to develop IEPs that would adequately provide for plaintiffs' educational needs and would accommodate the EAHCA's least restrictive placement requirement, the district court cannot be charged with a similar error. Having determined that the current IEPs would not provide plaintiffs with a free appropriate public education as required by the EAHCA, the court specifically declined to decide whether Landmark or some non-residential placement, but one more responsive to plaintiffs' needs than that currently proposed by MSC, would best accommodate the EAHCA's requirements. Because the court was unable to assess, on the record before it, the effect on the children of an alternative non-residential placement, and because it was satisfied that Landmark, where by the time of the court's decision, the children had been enrolled for two academic years, provided at least an appropriate special education, the court ordered MSC to continue funding plaintiffs' placement at Landmark until such time as defendants propose an alternative placement that is determined to provide a free appropriate public education. 6 26 In Rowley, the Supreme Court emphasized that [t]he primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child. --- U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. Far from being reversible error, we think the court's decision to allow MSC to determine the placement that would be most appropriate for the children, in light of its findings regarding the severity of their disability and their need for more individualized attention than MSC had offered, but to order continued placement at Landmark in the interim, reflects a sensible accommodation of the state's interest in shaping the children's educational programs and the children's interest in receiving sufficient educational attention while those programs are being developed.