Opinion ID: 2267947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Respondent's Exception

Text: Respondent argues, first, that the charge that she violated Rules 1.15(d) and 1.16(d) in the Roberson matter should be dismissed because Bar Counsel failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she violated those rules in her representation of Ms. Roberson. She also claims that the charges are duplicative as they are based on the same conduct. Second, respondent argues that the Board's findings that she violated Rule 1.4(a) in her handling of the Franklin and Patterson matters are not supported by sufficient evidence of record. Finally, respondent contends that the Board's recommendation that she be suspended for ninety days with proof of fitness before reinstatement is inconsistent with sanctions imposed for similar violations.
Rule 1.16(d) states that: [i]n connection with any termination of representation, a lawyer shall take timely steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by Rule 1.8(i). Respondent argues that the rule requires the return of unearned portions of fees advanced to a client upon termination of representation, and that she performed services for Roberson valued in excess of $1,000. As the Board correctly noted, that argument ignores that respondent agreed, in writing, to provide her services for a flat fee, not on an hourly basis, for the performance of two discrete tasks: to appear at a hearing on April 5, 1996, and to prepare a motion to dismiss the proceeding. Although respondent and Roberson disagree as to why respondent did not prepare the motion to dismiss, it is undisputed that Roberson paid respondent $1,000 pursuant to their agreement; that respondent did not prepare and file a motion to dismiss and that respondent never returned any portion of the $1,000 fee to Roberson. Even assuming that respondent was entitled to withhold a portion of the retainer fee in compensation for appearing before the court, this does not justify the withholding of the entire fee amount as it is clear that she performed only part of the work. Thus, there is substantial evidence to support the Board's findings and conclusion that respondent violated Rule 1.16(d) in the Roberson matter. [6]
Respondent also contests the Board's findings that her conduct in the Franklin and Patterson cases violated Rule 1.4(a), which provides that [a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. Respondent contends that the hearing committee could not have found, by clear and convincing evidence, that she had not reasonably communicated with either Mr. Franklin or Ms. Patterson concerning their cases. We disagree. [7] As to the Franklin matter, the hearing committee found that respondent had violated Rule 1.4(a) by failing to respond to Mr. Franklin's calls regarding the status of his medical malpractice case. Mr. Franklin testified that between September 1995 and March 1996 he had attempted to communicate with respondent, but found that the telephone number he had for respondent had been disconnected and, although he eventually located a new telephone number for her, did not receive any response to a number of messages that he left inquiring about his case. Respondent denied that she had failed to keep Mr. Franklin reasonably informed of the status of his case. According to respondent, after consulting with a medical expert in January of 1996 and determining there was no evidence of medical malpractice as alleged by Mr. Franklin, she discussed with him in either late January or early February 1996 that there were problems with the proposed lawsuit. She then met with Mr. Franklin at her office in March of 1996 and reiterated her belief that she could not go forward with his case. In its report, the Hearing Committee said it believed Mr. Franklin's testimony that respondent did receive [phone] messages and communications from her client and, for whatever reason, simply did not respond, and concluded that by her own testimony, [respondent] conferred with the examining expert in January 1996, but did not respond to her client until at least late March or April 1996. In its Report, the Board based its finding that respondent had violated Rule 1.4(a) on her failure to communicate to her client that she would not be filing suit on his behalf until late March or April 1996, and on her delay in responding until the following year, to the client's request for a return of the fee. [8] Assessing the credibility of witnesses is a matter left to the factfinder, which in disciplinary proceedings is the hearing committee. See In re Asher, 772 A.2d 1161, 1172 (D.C.2001). Lawyers have an obligation not only to reasonably communicate with their clients about pending matters but also to let them know if they cannot or will no longer continue to pursue their cases. See In re Santana, 583 A.2d 1011-13 (D.C.1990) (per curiam). Respondent failed to meet this important obligation, warranting a finding of a violation of Rule 1.4(a) in her representation of Mr. Franklin. In the Patterson case, respondent contends that the hearing committee and the Board wrongfully rejected her testimony regarding the communications she had with Ms. Patterson, without reason or explanation. Again, we cannot agree with respondent that the hearing committee's findings were not supported by substantial evidence of record. Ms. Patterson had retained respondent in April of 1995 to represent her in an attempt to expunge a misdemeanor conviction. In finding that respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) in her representation of Ms. Patterson, the committee found no evidence that respondent communicated to her client anything about the actions she was taking on her behalf, or the status of the matter, until August 1996, nearly a year and a half after her engagement by complainant. Upon our review of the record, including the hearing transcript containing respondent's testimony, we too cannot find any indication that respondent presented any explanation, excuse or even an attempt to deny her failure to communicate with Ms. Patterson concerning the status of a motion to expunge the conviction between the time the motion was filed and August of 1996, when respondent met Ms. Patterson on a street comer and told her that the matter was done. Respondent did claim at the hearing before the committee that she had tried to contact Ms. Patterson from September of 1996 through January of 1997, after she received a judicial order denying the motion to expunge, and had left a message at Ms. Patterson's last known number to no avail. However, this is not the time frame that concerned the Hearing Committee, whose determination that Rule 1.4(a) had been violated rested specifically on respondent's undisputed failure to communicate with her client for a year and a half, before August of 1996. The guiding principle for evaluating conduct under Rule 1.4(a) is whether the lawyer fulfilled the client's `reasonable... expectations for information.' In re Schoeneman, 777 A.2d 259, 264 (D.C.2001) (citations omitted). To meet that expectation, a lawyer not only must respond to client inquiries but also must initiate communications to provide information when needed. See Rule 1.4(a) cmt. 1. Based on the evidence presented, we agree that respondent's failure to communicate with Ms. Patterson about the status of her case over a span of a year and a half did not fulfill the client's reasonable expectations for information, and constituted a violation of Rule 1.4(a).