Opinion ID: 77358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 55 We first examine our jurisdiction to hear Wilk's appeal from the district court's order denying his motion to strike the Death Notice. 16 Section 1291 of Title 28 grants us jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court's denial of Wilk's motion to strike is clearly a non-final, interlocutory decision. However, we have jurisdiction to hear appeals from non-final decisions that fall within the collateral order doctrine. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction over an interlocutory order if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176, 123 S.Ct. at 2182 (quotation marks and alterations omitted) (emphasis added). 56 The Fourth Circuit is the only other circuit to consider whether the denial of a motion to strike a § 3593(a) death penalty notice is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. See Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 726-30. In Ferebe, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's order denying a motion to strike the government's death notice was reviewable as a collateral order because such orders are conclusive, collateral to the merits, and if wrongly decided will irreparably deprive capital defendants of an important right[.] 17 Id. at 730; accord United States v. Breeden, 366 F.3d 369, 372-73 (4th Cir.2004). We agree with our sister circuit and conclude that we have jurisdiction over Wilk's appeal. 18