Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: For-cause Excusals on Written Answers Alone

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excused for cause four prospective jurors based solely on their written answers to a jury questionnaire concerning their views on the death penalty, and without any opportunity for follow-up questioning during which the court and counsel might have been able to clarify the responses and determine whether, in fact, the prospective jurors should be disqualified from service. He asserts the excusals violated various provisions of the federal Constitution enumerated above. The trial court, after soliciting comment from all counsel, prepared a 24-page written questionnaire consisting of 108 questions. Several pages of the questionnaire focused on the prospective jurors' views concerning the death penalty. [23] Based on the questionnaires completed by the first 75 prospective jurors, the trial court proposed to excuse for cause 14 individuals without questioning them orally because their responses to the questionnaire very clearly indicated that either they were not death qualified  because they would always impose the death penalty or would never consider imposing the death penalty  or they had read or heard something about the case that created a strong belief in defendant's guilt. Defendant objected unsuccessfully to the excusal of four of the 14 prospective jurors: C.H., R.V., O.D., and R.W. [24] Decisions of the United States Supreme Court establish the circumstances under which a prospective juror's views on the death penalty properly may serve as the basis for a challenge for cause. In Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be sentenced to death if the jury that imposed it was chosen by excluding prospective jurors for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. In Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, the high court clarified its decision in Witherspoon and held that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment if those views would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of his or her duties as a juror in accordance with the trial court's instructions and his or her oath. (Accord, People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) But neither Witherspoon nor Witt requires that a prospective juror automatically be excused if he or she expresses a personal opposition to the death penalty. Those who firmly oppose the death penalty may nevertheless serve as jurors in a capital case as long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs and follow the law. ( Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137; accord, People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1146, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Generally, a trial court's rulings on motions to exclude for cause are afforded deference on appeal, for appellate courts recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person's responses (noting, among other things, the person's tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the record. ( People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 451, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271 ( Stewart ).) But such deference is unwarranted when, as here, the trial court's ruling is based solely on the cold record of the prospective jurors' answers on a written questionnaire, the same information that is available on appeal. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, reviewing the record de novo, we conclude the trial court did not err in excusing for cause four prospective jurors based solely upon their written responses to the jury questionnaire. [25] Stewart is distinguishable. There, we held that the trial court erred in excusing for cause five prospective jurors, over the defendant's objections, based solely upon their responses to a three-part question on the written jury questionnaire that focused on views concerning the death penalty. We therefore reversed the defendant's death sentence without an inquiry into prejudice. ( Id. at pp. 445-455, 15 Cal. Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Our concerns, however, were centered on the particular circumstances of that case. At the outset, we stressed a material flaw in the Stewart questionnaire itself. It asked whether the prospective juror had a conscientious opinion or belief about the death penalty that `would prevent or make it very difficult ' for the juror to vote for first degree murder, find a special circumstance true, or impose the death penalty. ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 442, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271, italics added.) As we observed, even one who gave a straightforward yes answer to such questions would not necessarily demonstrate disqualification under Witt, because mere difficulty in imposing the death penalty does not, per se, prevent or substantially impair the performance of a juror's duties. The prospective juror might nonetheless be able to put aside his or her personal views and deliberate fairly under the death penalty law. Yet the Stewart questionnaire did not inquire whether the prospective juror could do so. Hence, in many cases, followup questioning was essential to assess whether the juror could overcome personal reservations and properly weigh and consider the aggravating and mitigating factors. ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Each of the five prospective jurors whose excusals for cause were challenged in Stewart had answered the flawed questionnaire in ways that indicated strong reservations about the death penalty but did not negate the possibility the jurors could set aside their feelings and deliberate fairly. As a result, we held those jurors should have been subject to clarifying followup examination. ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 444-449, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) The court's failure to conduct such an examination was apparently based on its misunderstanding and misapplication of the standard necessary to excuse a prospective juror for cause based on his or her death penalty views. ( Id. at pp. 444-445, 447, 451, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) In Stewart, we noted: [W]e need not and do not hold . . . a trial court never may properly grant a motion for excusal for cause over defense objection based solely upon a prospective juror's checked answers and written responses contained in a juror questionnaire. We are, however, unaware of any authority upholding such a practice. ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 449-450, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271, fns. omitted.) Indeed, we did not criticize 17 stipulated excusals for cause, based solely upon written responses to the Stewart questionnaire, stating that many of the responses submitted in those 17 cases revealed unambiguous and entrenched support for or opposition to the death penalty. ( Id. at p. 444 & fn. 11, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Thus, nothing in Stewart indicates that an excusal without oral voir dire is improper where the prospective juror's answers to a jury questionnaire leave no doubt that his or her views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath. The question left undecided in Stewart is squarely presented here, and we now hold that a prospective juror in a capital case may be discharged for cause based solely on his or her answers to the written questionnaire if it is clear from the answers that he or she is unwilling to temporarily set aside his or her own beliefs and follow the law. (See Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758.) The questionnaire at issue here did not suffer from the defect cited in Stewart. It asked whether a prospective juror held such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence or the strength of proof, he or she automatically would refuse to return a first degree murder verdict, find a special circumstance true, or impose the death penalty. Any juror who automatically would vote in ways that precluded the death penalty would clearly be disqualified under Witt. Thus, this questionnaire format, unlike the one presented in Stewart, included more expansive and detailed questions on capital punishment and gave jurors the clear opportunity to disclose views against it so strong as to disqualify them for duty on a death penalty case. Moreover, unlike in Stewart, the death penalty-related answers given by the prospective jurors whose excusals defendant challenges here were sufficiently unambiguous to allow the court to identify disqualifying biases on the basis of their written responses alone. With respect to each of these excusals, we conclude that the trial court's determinations, based solely on the questionnaire responses, were correct. Prospective Juror R.V. indicated she strongly opposed the death penalty and would in every case automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, regardless of the evidence that might be produced during trial. She indicated she could not set aside her personal feelings and follow the law if the death penalty were involved. Her responses were clear, unequivocal, and internally consistent. The trial court did not err in excusing her for cause based solely on her responses to the jury questionnaire. Prospective Juror C.H. indicated she strongly opposed the death penalty because her religion taught her that killing was wrong. She indicated she could not set aside her personal feelings and follow the law, explaining: I would have such difficulty with the death penalty that I don't think I could weigh evidence without my beliefs influencing me. To the question inquiring whether she entertained such conscientious opinions about the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence that might be developed during trial she would in every case automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, she wrote, I couldn't vote. Although she did not simply check Yes or No to this question as directed, we understand her written response to mean that she would be unable to carry out her duties as a juror in the case because of her views about the death penalty. Her responses were internally consistent and unambiguous. The trial court did not err in excusing her for cause based solely on her responses to the jury questionnaire. Although Prospective Juror O.D. indicated he strongly opposed the death penalty, he also acknowledged that one of the duties of a juror was to follow the law and indicated he could set aside his personal feelings and follow it. Given only these two answers, we might not be able to say that O.D.'s opposition to the death penalty was clear and unequivocal. But he also indicated that he entertained such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that he would, in every case and regardless of the evidence presented, automatically vote for something other than first degree murder so as not to reach the penalty phase, automatically vote for a verdict of not true as to the special circumstances alleged so as not to reach the penalty phase, and, automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if there were a penalty phase. O.D. also strongly disagreed with the following three statements based on his religious beliefs: (1) Any person who intentionally kills another person, unless the killing was in self-defense or the defense of another, deserves the death penalty; (2) Convicted murderers should be swiftly executed once they are convicted; and (3) belief in the adage An eye for an eye. When asked to explain his answers, O.D. answered: I was taught that there should be no reason to kill and I will continue to think this way. We find that, taken together, O.D.'s answers to the jury questionnaire professed an opposition to the death penalty that would prevent him from performing his duties as a juror. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excusing him for cause based solely on his responses to the jury questionnaire. Lastly, Prospective Juror R.W. indicated he strongly opposed the death penalty based on his religious beliefs and believed the death penalty should never be used. R.W. also answered unknown to questions whether he would in every case automatically vote for something other than murder in the first degree because such a verdict would end the death penalty question once and for all; and whether he would in every case automatically vote for a verdict of not true as to the special circumstances alleged because such a verdict would end the death penalty question then and there. But he acknowledged he entertained such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence that might be developed during trial, he would in every case automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In other words, he expressed doubt he could put aside his pro-life bias even when voting on guilt and special circumstance issues, and made clear he would not be able to do so if deliberations proceeded to the issue of penalty. Thus, as with Prospective Juror O.D., we find that R.W.'s responses, taken together, reflected opposition to the death penalty that would prevent him from performing his duties as a juror. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excusing him for cause based solely on his responses to the jury questionnaire. [26]