Opinion ID: 202976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Special Damages

Text: In tort law, proof of causation is generally required to sustain an award of special damages. [8] See generally Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 621, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004). Accordingly, the district court instructed the jury that Galarneau had to prove that the defamatory statement play[ed] a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damages; and the injury or damages was a direct result, or a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act. Merrill Lynch argues that there was insufficient evidence that Galarneau's lost wages were caused by the defamatory statement in the U-5. Specifically, Merrill Lynch contends that there are other reasons that might explain why Galarneau was not hired by other firms, including the fact that the U-5 indicated that Galarneau engaged in price and time discretion. However, we see no reason why Galarneau was required to prove special damages in the first place. The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349, 94 S.Ct. 2997. Maine adheres to these traditional rules of defamation law in certain contexts. Under Maine law, defamatory words relating to profession, occupation or official station are libelous per se. See Saunders, 497 A.2d at 1124. When [defamation] per se is established, a plaintiff need not prove special damages or malice in order to recover a substantial award. Marston v. Newavom, 629 A.2d 587, 593 (Me.1993). There can be no doubt that the defamatory statement in the U-5 (Ms. Galarneau was terminated after the firm concluded that she had . . . engaged in inappropriate bond trading in one client's account. . . .) related to Galarneau's profession. As such, she was entitled to recover her lost wages without having to prove causation. [9] See Farrell v. Kramer, 159 Me. 387, 390, 193 A.2d 560 (1963); Saunders, 497 A.2d at 1124-25. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of judgment as a matter of law with respect to the award of special damages on the ground Galarneau was entitled to those damages without having to show causation.