Opinion ID: 172687
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was It Reasonable?

Text: Our conclusion that the sniff was a search does not end the analysis -13- because the Fourth Amendment commands only “that searches and seizures be reasonable.” 9 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). The Supreme Court has explained: “What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself. The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). If this were the Court’s only instruction, we would be inclined to conclude the intrusion here was reasonable. It involved only a slight encroachment into an area that is subject to Fourth Amendment protection only to a limited degree. Montes-Ramos’ vehicle was lawfully stopped at the time of the intrusion and he does not contend the intrusion prolonged the stop (the elapsed 9 The fact the intrusion was for an investigatory purpose is not relevant to our analysis. “[T]he constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [does not] depend[ ] on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved . . . . Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”). Thus, in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the customs officials’ ulterior motive for an otherwise valid warrantless boarding of a vessel might strip the officials of their legal justification. 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983). Similarly, in United States v. Robinson, the Court noted a traffic-violation arrest would not be rendered invalid by the fact it was “a mere pretext for a narcotics search” and a lawful post-arrest search of a person would not be rendered invalid by the fact it was not motivated by officer safety concerns. 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1, 236 (1973). -14- time from stop to sniff was less than one minute). Nor does he (or could he) contest the importance and legitimacy of the government interest at stake here – preventing the transportation of illegal narcotics. But the Supreme Court has also instructed that “warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32. Searches conducted without a warrant are permissible, of course, under certain well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.”). It is not the province of this Court to create a new (or expand an existing) exception to the warrant requirement. Instead, our task is limited to determining whether the government has met its burden of proving the search falls within a recognized exception. See United States v. Maestas, 2 F.3d 1485, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he government has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement applies.”). The only apparent exception applicable here is the automobile exception, pursuant to which “[t]he police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.” Calif. v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). It is tempting to find probable cause for the sniff and affirm on the basis of our independent review of the record. A legitimate argument could be made that Rodriguez had probable -15- cause for his sniff search. 10 But, in spite of a clear opportunity, the government has never made that argument. In his motion to suppress, Montes-Ramos contended the sniff was unlawful because it was conducted without his consent and without a warrant. In response, the government argued it had probable cause to search the vehicle based, in part, upon the odor of marijuana. But the odor of marijuana cannot factor into the probable cause analysis because Rodriguez did not smell marijuana until after he leaned his head into the vehicle. At the suppression hearing, the judge was alert to this problem and repeatedly invited the government to focus its attention on whether the sniff was a permissible search. The government uniformly refused the court’s invitation to address the critical issue and instead argued that Rodriguez had, prior to the sniff, acquired enough information “to proceed further with his investigation.” (R. Vol. III at 54.) The court stated it was concerned with “how that odor comes to 10 Rodriguez had knowledge of three facts and circumstances prior to his search of Montes-Ramos’ vehicle which could have contributed to probable cause: (1) Montes-Ramos was stopped forty miles from the U.S./Mexico border while traveling north on a known drug trafficking route; (2) Rodriguez observed a five-inch circular section of burlap protruding from underneath a blanket in the backseat; the blanket appeared to be covering large objects which Rodriguez testified were consistent with contraband but not produce; and (3) Rodriguez had approximately seventeen years of experience as a law enforcement officer and had been involved in approximately twelve drug-related arrests or investigations, two of which involved marijuana being transported in burlap bags. These facts and circumstances could support a finding of probable cause though, contrary to the view of the dissent, that resolution is not beyond any doubt. -16- [Rodriguez].” (Id. at 55.) The government responded by citing cases holding a defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment are not violated where an officer smells an odor from a location in which he has a right to be. In response, defense counsel argued: I think when you stick your nose in the car, that’s a search . . . . If Patrolman Rodriguez walked up to the car and out of the passenger window he smelled marijuana . . . we wouldn’t be having this conversation, because it would be an entirely different situation. And I think the cases that [the government] cites talk about situations in which the officer from a position that he was legally entitled to occupy, was able to discern some odor that he recognized as burned or raw marijuana. (Id. at 59-60.) The government offered rebuttal argument relating to the stop but, again, did not address the operative issue – whether Rodriguez had probable cause for his intrusion into the vehicle to conduct his sniff search. Ultimately, in spite of its persistent and pertinent questioning, the court abandoned its instincts and accepted the government’s argument, concluding the sniff was permissible even in the absence of probable cause. It explained: The intrusion was minimal and was substantially outweighed by concerns for officer safety in light of the reasonable suspicion that Montes was engaged in smuggling a large quantity of marijuana. Deputy Rodriguez’s actions were objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and within the range of activities that a police officer may permissibly engage in when he has reasonable suspicion to believe that a vehicle contains narcotics. (R. Vol. I, Doc. 16 at 9.) It went on to hold that after Rodriguez smelled the marijuana, “there was probable cause to arrest Montes and search the [vehicle].” -17- (Id.) Even on appeal, the government does not squarely argue the sniff was supported by probable cause. 11 It says even if the sniff was a search, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it “‘stemmed from some probable cause focusing suspicion on the individual affected by the search.’” (Appellee’s Answer Br. at 19-20 (quoting Class, 475 U.S. at 117-18 (1986).) 12 It contends that, prior to leaning into Montes-Ramos’ vehicle, Rodriguez directly observed a traffic violation and “observed evidence that led him to believe that Montes’ car contained a load of narcotics.” (Id. at 20.) The government states: “These observations provided a sufficient connection between Montes and the subsequent intrusion and support upholding the search.” (Id.) We are not sure what the government means by “sufficient connection,” but if it is less than probable 11 The government also does not argue it had probable cause to search the car independent of the sniff. 12 In Class, the Supreme Court held the officer’s search of the defendant’s vehicle to obtain the VIN did not violate the Fourth Amendment “[i]n light of the danger to the officers’ safety that would have been presented by returning respondent immediately to his car . . . .” 475 U.S. at 116. The decision appears to rest, in part, upon the “important interests served by the VIN.” See id. at 112. The Court explained: “[B]ecause of the important role played by the VIN in the pervasive governmental regulation of the automobile and the efforts by the Federal Government to ensure that the VIN is placed in plain view, we hold that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN.” Id. at 114. That unique consideration is not present here. While reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, see Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787, it is not sufficient to justify a warrantless search. To the extent Ryles, 988 F.2d at 16, can be read to require only reasonable suspicion for a search of an automobile for narcotics, we decline to follow it. -18- cause, it is not sufficient. If Rodriguez reasonably suspected Montes-Ramos was transporting illegal narcotics, he could have detained Montes-Ramos and investigated further. He could have asked if Montes-Ramos was transporting narcotics. See United States v. Karam, 496 F.3d 1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 2007). He could have asked for consent to search the vehicle. See United States v. Sanchez, 89 F.3d 715, 719 (10th Cir. 1996). He could have stood at the car door, waiting for the smell of marijuana to waft out the window. See Angelos, 433 F.3d at 748. He could have called for a drug dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle. See United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 203 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding a canine sniff on a legitimately detained automobile is not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). And if his suspicion about drug trafficking caused him to fear for his safety, he could have removed Montes-Ramos from his vehicle, 13 see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977), or looked (perhaps even slightly intruded) into the vehicle to determine whether there were weapons within Montes-Ramos’ reach, see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 13 The government contends because Rodriguez could have removed MontesRamos from his vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment, surely he could have taken the less intrusive action of leaning into Montes-Ramos’ window to sniff for drugs. We disagree. The purpose of removing a driver from a vehicle is to ensure officer safety. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. That purpose is not evident here therefore it does not matter that the sniff was a less intrusive alternative. -19- (1983). 14 He could not, however, engage in a warrantless sniff search for drugs – even a minimally intrusive one – unless he had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime. Where, as here, a defendant makes a clear argument in support of a motion to suppress and the government fails to respond to that argument, even when expressly (and repeatedly) invited by the court to do so, the argument is waived. See United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[A] party that has forfeited a right by failing to make a proper objection may obtain relief for plain error; but a party that has waived a right is not entitled to appellate relief.”); see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”); Rosewood Servs., Inc., v. Sunflower Diversified Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding argument not asserted before district court is waived on appeal). This is especially true where the government does not even argue the issue with clarity on appeal. 15 See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 14 The district court noted in passing that “[c]oncerns for officer safety may justify a limited search of a vehicle,” (R. Vol. I, Doc. 16 at 8), but there was no evidence or argument about officer safety. To his credit Rodriguez did not, post hoc, claim his search was motivated, even partially, by a concern for his safety. 15 Even if we could, charitably, construe the government’s appellate brief as arguing the sniff was supported by probable cause, we see no “compelling reasons” to depart from our general waiver jurisprudence. See Crow v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Absent compelling reasons, we do not consider arguments that were not presented to the district court.”). Nevertheless, “we are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of -20- 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.”); Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2003) (where a party does not brief an issue on appeal, the argument is waived). Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s partial denial of MontesRamos’ motion to suppress and REMAND for suppression of the fruits of the sniff search and such other necessary proceedings consistent with this Order and Judgment. Entered by the Court: Terrence L. O’Brien