Opinion ID: 2334546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lindsey's Miranda Argument

Text: First, Lindsey argues that the admission of his confession violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because Agent Haera and Detective Brigidini did not inform him of his Fifth Amendment rights, as required by Miranda, despite the fact that he was in custody at the Maryland Correctional Institution at the time the confession was taken. In Miranda, the Supreme Court established law enforcement procedures in order to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, holding that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. One of those safeguards is the well-known litany of rights set out in Miranda that must be given to a suspect who is about to undergo custodial interrogation. [2] The Court defined custodial interrogation as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Id. In determining whether a suspect is in custody, we have stated: The ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. . . . The test is whether under all of the circumstances a reasonable man innocent of any crime would have thought he was not free to leave. Griffin v. United States, 878 A.2d 1195, 1198 (D.C.2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249, 255-56 (D.C.2006) (`Custody,' for Miranda purposes, is present when there has been a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.' As the court has explained . . ., `given [the] circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.' (citations omitted)), vacating and amending 884 A.2d 611 (D.C.2005). Stated another way, The test for determining whether a person is in custody is an objective one and focuses upon how a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood [his or her] situation. The inquiry is based [upon looking at] the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Turner, 761 A.2d 845, 851 (D.C.2000) (footnote, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). When a suspect is incarcerated on other charges at the time of interrogation, the Miranda in custody analysis is somewhat different from the classic interrogation of the suspect at the police station. Although we have recognized that there is a question about whether an inmate is `in custody' for Miranda purposes merely because of his status as a prisoner, Smith v. United States, 586 A.2d 684, 685 (D.C. 1991), we have never decided this issue. Lindsey argues that Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968), established that prisoners are always considered in custody under Miranda, and that Mathis thus controls the outcome of this appeal. We do not agree. In Mathis, the Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that Miranda applies only to questioning one who is `in custody' in connection with the very case under investigation. Id. at 4, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (emphasis added). The Court found nothing in the Miranda opinion which calls for a curtailment of the warnings to be given [to] persons under interrogation by officers based on the reason why the person is in custody. Id. at 4-5, 88 S.Ct. 1503. This holding falls short of establishing that Miranda warnings must be given every time a prisoner is questioned regarding an ongoing criminal investigation or that a prisoner is per se in custody for Miranda purposes. In fact, the interpretation of Mathis espoused by Lindsey in this case has been repeatedly rejected by other state and federal courts. For example, in Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir.1978), the Ninth Circuit held: In the prison situation, [custody] necessarily implies a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement. Thus, restriction is a relative concept, one not determined exclusively by lack of freedom to leave. Rather, we look to some act which places further limitations on the prisoner. Id. at 428. In so holding, Cervantes identified four factors that are relevant to the determination of whether a prisoner is in custody for Miranda purposes: [1] the language used to summon the individual, [2] the physical surroundings of the interrogation, [3] the extent to which he is confronted with evidence of his guilt, and [4] the additional pressure exerted to detain him. Id. at 428. Most jurisdictions that have considered this issue have adopted standards similar to the one established in Cervantes. [3] Because we find the rationale of Cervantes and its progeny to be persuasive and the factors considered by those courts to be significant in determining whether an inmate being questioned is in custody for Miranda purposes, we now apply them to the facts of this case. Application of the Cervantes factors to this case leads us to conclude that Lindsey was not in custody at the time of his prison confession. With respect to the first factorthe words used to summon him Lindsey was paged to the administration building, told that he had visitors and was led by a prison employee to the conference room where Heara and Brigidini were waiting. The prison employee then left the area. Thus, the record shows that Lindsey was summoned to the meeting in the same way that all inmates are called to meet with visitors, and, therefore, there was nothing unusual that occurred in this case from which we could conclude that he was subjected to any greater restraint on his movement than any other inmate. With respect to the second factor, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the interview took place in a minimum security prison where Lindsey was free to move around with almost no restrictions. He was permitted to leave the facility daily for a work release program. The conference room where the interview took place had a window that faced outside, a long table with several chairs and the door to the room was left unlocked. Importantly, the agents instructed Lindsey that he was not under arrest, and that he did not have to speak with them. And the trial court made a specific factual finding that he was free to leave the interrogation at any time. The third factor is the extent to which Lindsey was confronted with evidence of his guilt. The agents explained that they were visiting him regarding Johnson's murder and provided him with a detailed recounting of the events before, during and after the murder, including Gayles' involvement and the motive for the murder. While they told him that it would be better if he cooperated, there was no discussion about his having an obligation to cooperate. The fourth factor we consider is whether there was any additional pressure used to detain Lindsey or whether more restrictions were put upon him. The record shows there was no such effort, nor any change in the surroundings . . . which result[ed] in an added imposition on his freedom of movement. Cervantes, supra, 589 F.2d at 428. Not only was he not shackled or restrained in any way, no physical force whatsoever was used to get him to speak with the agents, nor to prevent him from terminating the interview and leaving the conference room. Thus, there is no reason to conclude that he perceived that he was in custody or that he was not free to leave if he wished, nor that any reasonable person in his position would have perceived that he was not free to leave. Based on these factors, we are satisfied that there was no greater restriction placed on Lindsey's freedom of movement as a result of his interview than was normal under the circumstances of his incarceration and therefore, for purposes of Miranda, he was not in custody. Thus, the officers were not required to give him the Miranda warnings, and the trial court did not err in finding that his statement was admissible on these grounds.