Opinion ID: 4585823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: application of gustke

Text: In Gustke, the Court addressed whether a DUI indictment was properly dismissed where the arresting law enforcement officer was outside of his jurisdiction. A City of Parkersburg officer was on his way home from his shift when he observed a vehicle which was outside of city limits, driving erratically, and weaving from lane to lane. 205 W. Va. at 75, 516 S.E.2d at 286. He telephoned the Wood County Sheriff’s office to inquire if there was a sheriff’s deputy in the vicinity who could stop the vehicle but was advised there was not. Id. He then requested permission to stop the vehicle and detain the driver until such time as a deputy could arrive. Id. The court dismissed the indictment due to the officer’s initial stop being outside of his jurisdiction; the State sought a writ of prohibition to preclude the dismissal, arguing that even if the arresting officer was outside of his jurisdiction, he executed a proper citizen’s arrest. Id. at 76, 516 S.E.2d at 287. The Court found that “[b]ecause the arrest was not made in connection with a matter that arose within the territorial boundaries of [the officer’s] jurisdiction, and did not come within the scope of his official duties, he did not have official authority as a police officer to make the arrest.” Id. at 78, 516 S.E.2d at 289. Joining many other jurisdictions, however, the Court concluded that the officer nonetheless had authority to make a citizen’s arrest for misdemeanors that constitute a breach of the peace, which were committed in his presence. The Court issued the following syllabus points: A law enforcement officer acting outside of his or her territorial jurisdiction has the same authority to arrest as does a private citizen and may make an extraterritorial arrest under those circumstances in which a private citizen would be authorized to make an arrest. Under the common law, a private citizen is authorized to arrest another who commits a misdemeanor in his or her presence when that misdemeanor constitutes a breach of the peace. 4 DMV spends a considerable portion of the outset of its brief discussing the distinction between a valid vehicle stop and a valid arrest. This Court has indeed found that a defective initial stop is fatal to a lawful arrest. See Reed v. Pettit, 235 W. Va. 447, 451, 774 S.E.2d 528, 532 (2015) (“Under this Court’s precedent, a person cannot be considered lawfully arrested for DUI, as a prerequisite to the administrative revocation of the person's driver’s license, unless the underlying traffic stop was legally valid.”). However, the deficiency in the arrest at issue is Officer Billie’s lack of authority to effectuate such an arrest outside of the city limits. DMV’s insistence that Officer Billie had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to engage with respondent and thereafter developed probable cause for his arrest is immaterial to whether Officer Billie was lawfully authorized to execute an arrest at all. 4 Driving while under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance or drugs, as prohibited by W. Va. Code § 17C–5–2(d) (1996) (Repl.Vol.1996), constitutes a breach of the peace. Consequently, it is a misdemeanor offense for which a private citizen may arrest. Syl. Pts. 2, 3, and 4, Id. (emphasis added). Recognizing that Officer Billie did not actually observe respondent driving while intoxicated and therefore fails the “committed in his presence” element of a Gustke arrest, DMV attempts to bootstrap our holding that an officer need not actually observe driving to justify a lawful DUI arrest. DMV cites to Syllabus Point 3 of Carte v. Cline, 200 W. Va. 162, 488 S.E.2d 437 (1997) which holds: W. Va. Code § 17C–5A–1a (a) (1994) does not require that a police officer actually see or observe a person move, drive, or operate a motor vehicle while the officer is physically present before the officer can charge that person with DUI under this statute, so long as all the surrounding circumstances indicate the vehicle could not otherwise be located where it is unless it was driven there by that person. (emphasis added). The cases cited by DMV illustrate the “surrounding circumstances” which this Court has found sufficiently corroborative of driving while intoxicated, where the officer did not actually observe the driver operating the vehicle. See Carte, 200 W. Va. at 167, 488 S.E.2d at 442 (finding running engine and engaged transmission, along with admission of driving sufficient to establish driving); Dale v. Ciccone, 233 W. Va. 652, 662, 760 S.E.2d 466, 476 (2014) (finding admission of alcohol consumption and driving prior to stop was sufficient to find driving under the influence); Dale v. Reynolds, No. 13-0266, 2014 WL 1407375, at  (W. Va. Apr. 10, 2014) (memorandum decision) (finding driver’s admission as to where he began drinking, admitted movement of car to location of stop, and discovering driver “unresponsive, in the vehicle with the engine running, lights on, and not parked in a parking spot” sufficient to establish driving); Cain v. W. Va. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 225 W. Va. 467, 472, 694 S.E.2d 309, 314 (2010) (finding that when driver “awakened from his drunken stupor” stating “‘he was just trying to get home,’” and absence of vehicle from location less than thirty minutes prior was sufficient to establish driving); see also Montgomery v. W. Va. State Police, 215 W. Va. 511, 517, 600 S.E.2d 223, 229 (2004) (finding sufficient evidence of driving while intoxicated to substantiate discharge where driver was found asleep in vehicle with lights on and engine running). In the instant case, however, Officer Billie did not see respondent’s vehicle arrive and therefore did not know how long respondent may have been sitting, parked, in the 7-Eleven parking lot. See Cain, 225 W.Va. at 470 n.7, 694 S.E.2d at 312 n.7 (“By implication, the trial court was recognizing the possibility that Appellee did not begin drinking until he parked his vehicle.”). Officer Billie further conceded that he did not know if someone else drove the vehicle to the 7-Eleven or dropped respondent off to pick up the vehicle. Respondent did not admit to driving just prior to his encounter with Officer Billie or indicate how long he had been at the 7- 5 Eleven. Officer Billie did not testify that the vehicle was running or bore any indicia of having recently been operated. In that regard, this case is more akin to the factual scenario in Reed v. McGrath, No. 15-1147, 2017 WL 227870 (W. Va. Jan. 19, 2017) (memorandum decision). In McGrath, this Court upheld the circuit court’s reversal of a revocation where the officer did not observe driving and there was insufficient evidence that the driver operated his vehicle while he was intoxicated. The Court noted that [t]here is no evidence in the record that Officer Logie tried to determine when Mr. McGrath started drinking as compared to when he moved his truck within his private driveway, that Mr. McGrath divulged this information on the night of his arrest, or that the night’s timeline established that he drove his truck while under the influence. Id. at . Similarly, here it appears that Officer Billie merely presumed that respondent’s vehicle had recently arrived at the 7-Eleven and, having concluded respondent was drunk, that he had therefore been driving while intoxicated. As we observed in McGrath, it is required that “the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the accused individual had been driving his or her vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs.” Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Cain v. W.Va. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 225 W.Va. 467, 694 S.E.2d 309 (2010) (emphasis added). Under West Virginia Code § 17C–5C–4(d) [2010], DMV, not the accused, carries the burden of proving these facts. 2017 WL 227870, at  (emphasis in original). Therefore, even if this Court were to apply the standard outlined in Gustke to cure Officer Billie’s extra-territorial arrest, it is plain that no misdemeanor occurred in his presence as required in Gustke, nor were there sufficient surrounding circumstances to establish respondent had actually driven while intoxicated. 5 5 Further, we caution that the attempt to circumvent the “committed in his presence” requirement of a Gutske arrest, by utilizing our caselaw which does not require an officer to actually observe driving, is untenable. Officer Billie cannot, at once, both cloak himself with “color of office” to avoid the requirement of having observed the breach of peace, yet purport to act merely as a private citizen to remedy his lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, we caution against attempts to expand Gustke beyond its holding to permit the types of extra-territorial investigatory acts undertaken by Officer Billie. Forecasting this possibility, the Gustke Court discussed the “under color of office” doctrine which “prohibits a law enforcement officer from using the indicia of his or her official position to collect evidence that a private citizen would be unable [to] gather.” Id. at 81, 516 S.E.2d at 292 (emphasis removed). While the Gustke Court did not expressly adopt this doctrine, in affirming the arrest, it noted that 6