Opinion ID: 2242593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion in Limine to Limit the Cross-Examination of Phillip Sallee

Text: In August, 1997, the State filed a motion in limine to bar the defense from pursuing an area of impeachment during the cross-examination of the State's DNA expert witness, Phillip Sallee. Specifically, the State sought to bar from evidence the fact that Sallee had entered into a predisciplinary agreement with his employer, the Illinois State Police, for his theft of state-owned microscopes, which occurred on or about January 7, 1995. According to the State's motion, the terms of the predisciplinary agreement required Sallee to perform a period of community service, to be suspended from work for a period of time without pay, and to forfeit vacation benefits. By August 1997, according to the motion, Sallee had completed the terms of the predisciplinary agreement and was considered an employee in good standing. After hearing brief arguments, the circuit court granted the State's motion in limine, ruling that the evidence of Sallee's misconduct was irrelevant and collateral to the ultimate issues to be decided by the jury. Before this court, defendant contends that the circuit court erred when it barred the defense from impeaching Sallee with evidence of the predisciplinary agreement, and that this error requires reversal of his convictions and a new trial. The State initially maintains that this issue is procedurally defaulted because defendant failed to preserve the objection to the motion in limine in his post-trial motion. See Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124. Defendant, in turn, responds that the circuit court's denial of his right to cross-examine Sallee rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and that this court may review the issue as plain error. For the reasons set forth below, we find no error in the trial court's granting of the State's motion in limine. Accordingly, we also find no plain error and no basis to excuse defendant's procedural default. In criminal proceedings, a defendant has the right to cross-examine a witness regarding the witness' biases, interests or motives to provide false testimony. People v. Triplett, 108 Ill.2d 463, 475, 92 Ill.Dec. 454, 485 N.E.2d 9 (1985). With this method of impeachment, `the fact that a witness has been arrested or charged with a crime may be shown or inquired into where it would reasonably tend to show that his testimony might be influenced by interest, bias or a motive to testify falsely.' Triplett, 108 Ill.2d at 475, 92 Ill.Dec. 454, 485 N.E.2d 9, citing People v. Mason, 28 Ill.2d 396, 401, 192 N.E.2d 835 (1963). [C]ross-examination is proper whenever the prosecution has sufficient `leverage' over the witness justifying the defendant's claim that the witness has an interest or bias, or that there is corruption or coercion that would tend to make the witness testify falsely. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 607.7, at 436-37 (7th ed. 1999). However, the evidence used to impeach a witness `must give rise to the inference that the witness has something to gain or lose by his testimony.' Triplett, 108 Ill.2d at 475-76, 92 Ill.Dec. 454, 485 N.E.2d 9, quoting People v. Phillips, 95 Ill.App.3d 1013, 1020, 51 Ill.Dec. 423, 420 N.E.2d 837 (1981). Therefore, the evidence used to establish bias, interest or motive should be timely, unequivocal and directly related. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 607.7, at 440 (7th ed. 1999). The evidence used must not be remote or uncertain. Triplett, 108 Ill.2d at 476, 92 Ill. Dec. 454, 485 N.E.2d 9. In People v. Bull, 185 Ill.2d 179, 235 Ill.Dec. 641, 705 N.E.2d 824 (1998), this court addressed a claim similar to that presented by defendant in the case at bar. In Bull, the State filed a motion in limine to bar the defense from cross-examining David Metzger, an employee of the Illinois State Police crime laboratory, regarding his administrative disciplinary record. Like Sallee, Metzger had been caught stealing a microscope and had been subject to various disciplinary measures by his employer. The circuit court granted the State's motion. Bull, 185 Ill.2d at 205, 235 Ill.Dec. 641, 705 N.E.2d 824. On appeal, the defendant in Bull argued that it was error to allow the motion in limine because cross-examination of Metzger regarding his disciplinary record with the State Police crime laboratory would show that Metzger had a motive to testify falsely or to embellish his testimony to please his employers. Bull, 185 Ill.2d at 206, 235 Ill.Dec. 641, 705 N.E.2d 824. This court rejected that argument, stating: The record is too speculative and remote to infer that Metzger had something to gain or lose by his testimony. As the trial court noted, the administrative charges arose approximately two years after Metzger had completed and reported his DNA analysis in this case. Further, trial occurred approximately one year after Metzger was disciplined. At trial, Metzger's testimony regarding his DNA analysis of defendant was based on the three-year-old report. (Emphasis in original.) Bull, 185 Ill.2d at 207, 235 Ill.Dec. 641, 705 N.E.2d 824. In the instant case, the State argues that Bull disposes of defendant's claim. The State maintains that the evidence which defendant wished to use to impeach Sallee in this case, like in Bull, was too speculative and remote to be admitted. Defendant, in response, attempts to distinguish Bull by focusing on the timing of the administrative action taken against Sallee. Defendant argues that, unlike Bull, in this case, Sallee was the subject of disciplinary proceedings at the precise time he was conducting DNA testing on the evidence in defendant's case. Thus, in defendant's view, at the time Sallee was conducting his DNA testing, he had a motive to curry favor with his employer by giving results favorable to the State's case. Accordingly, defendant asserts that the State's reliance on Bull is misplaced. Defendant's argument that Bull is factually distinguishable from the case at bar is not clearly supported by the record. As defendant correctly notes, the record does affirmatively show that Sallee was engaged in the testing of DNA evidence from November 1994 through March 1995. The record also shows that the microscopes were stolen on or about January 7, 1995. However, the record does not disclose when officials at the State Police crime laboratory became aware of the theft of the microscopes or when the disciplinary charges were brought. Nevertheless, even if we assume that the disciplinary proceedings were commenced prior to the completion of the DNA testing, we do not believe that Sallee's disciplinary record would have been admissible to impeach him. Defendant's contention is that Sallee had a motive to fabricate DNA results which implicated defendant because at the time of the DNA testing, Sallee was facing disciplinary proceedings in the State Police crime lab. For this contention to be correct, a number of assumptions would have to be true. For example, it would have to be assumed that, having been discovered stealing microscopes and with his livelihood in jeopardy, Sallee's immediate reaction would be to start fabricating evidence in a case which he was currently working on; that Sallee would begin fabricating evidence, with all the attendant risks of doing so, even though he did not yet know whether defendant's case would be tried, or whether some other disposition, such as defendant pleading guilty or being exonerated by other evidence, would occur; that Sallee would risk fabricating evidence even though he did not yet know if he would, in fact, be called to testify at defendant's trial; that he would risk fabricating evidence even though by doing so, he would be helping only the prosecutors in St. Clair County, who would have no control or leverage over the disciplinary proceedings in the crime lab in Springfield; and that he would risk fabricating evidence as a means of lessening his administrative discipline even though the crime lab might reasonably be expected to be concerned about its reputation and integrity, and, therefore, might not look favorably upon one of its employee's fabricating evidence. In light of the foregoing, and in the absence of any evidence other than the mere existence of the disciplinary agreement, we find any alleged incentive on Sallee's part to fabricate DNA evidence because of the disciplinary proceedings arising out of the theft of the microscopes remote and uncertain. We therefore find no error in the circuit court's granting of the State's motion in limine. Having found no error, it follows that there can be no plain error in the circuit court's granting of the State's motion. Accordingly, defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted.