Opinion ID: 2824353
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bases for joinder

Text: A proper basis for joinder exists when the charges are [biased on the same act or transaction; or, . . [biased on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. NRS 173.115. Here, the abuse charges and the death charges are not based on the same act or transaction and the facts do not demonstrate that Rimer had a single scheme or plan encompassing the abuse of his children and the death of his four-year-old son. Consequently, the charges are only properly joined if they are connected together. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 14 (0) 1947A 4e1so
In Weber, we clarified that for two charged crimes to be 'connected together' under NRS 173.115(2), a court must determine that evidence of either crime would be admissible in a separate trial regarding the other crime. 121 Nev. at 573, 119 P.3d at 120. We also stated that evidence of a crime may be admissible in a trial for another crime if it is admissible under NRS 48.045(2) and satisfies the requirements in Tinch by being relevant, .. . proven by clear and convincing evidence, and [having] probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Id. (citing Tinch v. State, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1997)). However, in stating this test for the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, we failed to consider the difference between the procedural issue of joinder of offenses and the evidentiary issue of admitting evidence of other crimes. See Solomon v. State, 646 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (observing that the procedural issues of joinder and severance are not the same as the evidentiary issue of other crimes evidence and they call for different analyses). The admissibility of evidence of 'other crimes, wrongs or acts' is an evidentiary issue that may arise at any time during the course of a trial, and the district court's evaluation of that evidence's relevance, reliability, and risk of unfair prejudice is necessary to ensure that the evidence is subjected to some form of procedural safeguard before it has a chance to influence the jury. See Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 51 n.3, 51-52, 692 P.2d 503, 507 n.3, 507-08 (1985) (quoting MRS 48.045(2)), superseded in part by statute as stated in Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 45, 83 P.3d 818, 823 (2004). In contrast, the joinder of offenses is a procedural issue that is decided before a trial and does not compel the same SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 15 (0) 1947A )94D4(4 safeguards as evidence that is introduced after a trial has started. See generally Brown v. State, 114 Nev. 1118, 1126, 967 P.2d 1126, 1131 (1998) (recognizing joinder as a procedural rule). In a joinder decision there is no need to prove a defendant's participation in the charged crimes by clear and convincing evidence because [aill crimes charged, and, therefore, amenable to the possible joinder, are the considered products of grand jury indictments or criminal informations and therefore are of equal stature. Solomon, 646 A.2d at 1070; accord State v. Cutro, 618 S.E.2d 890, 894 (S.C. 2005). Similarly, weighing the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice does not provide a meaningful safeguard against improper joinder because it fails to account for the public's weighty interest in judicial economy, see Tabish, 119 Nev. at 304, 72 P.3d at 591; Solomon, 646 A.2d at 1071, and the question of unfair prejudice can be addressed separately through the prejudicial joinder statute, NRS 174.165(1). However, the district court must still consider whether the evidence of either charge would be admissible for a relevant, nonpropensity purpose in a separate trial for the other charge, see generally Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 10, 270 P.3d 1244, 1249-50 (2012) (modifying the first Tinch factor to reflect the narrow limits of the general rule of exclusion), but we conclude that this is the only Tinch factor that the district court must consider when deciding whether charges are connected together for purposes of joinder.
The admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to establish intent and an absence of mistake or accident is well established, particularly in child abuse cases, United States v. Harris, 661 F.2d 138, 142 (10th Cir. 1981), where the State must often prove its case, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 16 (0) I947A .4040 if at all, with circumstantial evidence amidst a background of a pattern of abuse, United States v. Merri weather, 22 M.J. 657, 663 (A.C.M.R. 1986) (Naughton, J., concurring). See Bludsworth v. State, 98 Nev. 289, 291, 646 P.2d 558, 559 (1982) (evidence of prior injuries is admissible as independent, relevant circumstantial evidence tending to show that the child was intentionally, rather than accidently, injured on the day in question); Ashford v. State, 603 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (evidence of past injuries [is] admissible to counter any claim that the latest injury happened through accident or simple negligence. The pattern of abuse is relevant to show the intent of the act.); State v. Widdison, 4 P.3d 100, 108 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (Evidence of prior child abuse, both against the victim and other children, is admissible to show identity, intent, or lack of accident or mistake.); see also State v. Taylor, 701 A.2d 389, 395-96 (Md. 1997) (gathering cases). Here, the abuse charges and the death charges were connected together because evidence from these charges demonstrated a pattern of abuse and neglect that would have been relevant and admissible in separate trials for each of the charges. Accordingly, we conclude that the joinder of these charges was permissible under NRS 173.115.