Opinion ID: 2636938
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to quash petit jury panel.

Text: On August 31, 1990, less than one month before the penalty retrial was then scheduled to begin, defendant moved to quash the petit jury panel on grounds that, in violation of constitutional guarantees of equal protection and a fair trial, the panel failed to represent a fair cross-section of the community. Attached to the motion was the declaration of Dr. Edgar W. Butler, who stated that his 1988 study of superior court jury venires in the Indio/Palm Springs area indicated significant underrepresentation by several groups, including Blacks. At the same time, defendant moved to continue the trial on grounds that new studies of Indio/Palm Springs venires, using not-yet-published 1990 census data, were needed. The trial court heard the motion to quash on September 14, 1990. Dr. Butler testified as follows: During an eight-week period in October, November, and December 1987, he conducted a comparative ethnic and demographic survey of persons who appeared at the Indio/Palm Springs courthouse in response to superior court jury summons. 1980 census data indicated that Blacks constituted 3.2 percent of the population of the geographic area from which Indio/Palm Springs juries were drawn. After reviewing preliminary data from the 1990 census, he expected that the new census would show no substantial change in this percentage. Moreover, the master list from which Indio/Palm Springs jurors were summoned at random in 1987โa list generated by merging voter registration and Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) listsโappeared to fairly parallel the raw census figures for particular groups. [5] However, only 2.1 percent of the persons who actually appeared for jury duty at the Indio/Palm Springs courthouse during the survey period were Black. This represented an absolute disparity of 1.1 percent from the census figures and a comparative disparity of 34 percent. [6] Dr. Butler opined that the disparity arose because, for reasons about which he could only speculate, some persons summoned for jury duty were not responding. In arriving at this opinion, Dr. Butler had considered testimony by the Riverside County Jury Commissioner in another case indicating that, in 1987, the commissioner's representative in the Indio/Palm Springs area was not carrying out ... follow-up procedures to obtain the appearance of persons who failed to respond to the summons. On cross-examination, Dr. Butler explained his understanding that while there was no follow-up of summons returned to the court as nondeliverable, persons who simply failed to respond received two follow-up mailings before they were dropped from the jury rolls. Testimony was also received from Robert Gulley, the supervisor of jury services for the Indio/Palm Springs area. Gulley testified as follows: Jurors were summoned at random from the master list, derived from voter registration and DMV registration records. Only about 10 percent of the persons summoned appeared. If a person failed to respond to the initial summons, another summons was sent in the same manner. If the person still failed to respond, a notice was sent by certified mail. By September 1990, work had begun on implementing a bench warrant system for those who did not respond to the certified notice, but the system was not yet operational. Gulley, who assumed his duties after 1987, had no knowledge whether such a program had begun by then. To Gulley's knowledge, nobody from the court system had ever gone into the field to find and bring in nonresponding persons. On September 17, 1990, the court denied the motion to quash. The court ruled that defendant had failed in two respects to demonstrate a case of constitutional underrepresentation. First, the court determined, the disparity shownโthat, of 32 Blacks who should appear for every 1,000 panelists, only 21 doโwas not so great as to render the representation of Blacks on Indio/Palm Springs superior court juries less than fair and reasonable in relation to their number in the general population. Second, the court explained, defendant had failed to show, beyond Dr. Butler's speculation unsupported by any study of the subject, that the cause of the disparity was the failure of jury officials to conduct greater follow-up of persons who failed to respond to the random jury summons. The next day, September 18, 1990, the trial court heard defendant's motion to continue the trial pending further study of the underrepresentation issue. Defendant's counsel abandoned any attempt to argue for delay until final 1990 census figures were available. However, counsel urged that perhaps it was the appropriate time to study further whether jury selection procedures, in particular the limited follow-up of those who failed to respond to summons, were the cause of the disparity. Counsel suggested such a study could probably be completed in a couple of months. The trial court denied the motion, pointing out that it had already found the disparity was not mathematically unreasonable. Defendant argues the trial court erred under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by denying the motion to quash. Under the federal and state Constitutions, an accused is entitled to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, ง 16; Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 358-367, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1159, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) That guarantee mandates that the pools from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. ( People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 842, 268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983.) `In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.' ( Duren v. Missouri supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364, 99 S.Ct. 664; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1159, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) ... If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of systematic underrepresentation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d 471, 491, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561.) ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1087-1088, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478 ( Horton. )) As to the third element of the Duren test, a defendant does not meet the burden of demonstrating that the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion, by establishing only statistical evidence of a disparity. A defendant must show, in addition, that the disparity is the result of an improper feature of the jury selection process. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th [1132,] 1160 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315]; People v. Bell, supra, (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 530 [262 Cal.Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129].) When a county's jury selection criteria are neutral with respect to race, ethnicity, sex, and religion, the defendant must identify some aspect of the manner in which those criteria are applied (the probable cause of the disparity) that is constitutionally impermissible. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d [471,] 492 [273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561]; People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 524, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129.) ( Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1088, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478, italics in original.) No party disputes that Blacks are a distinctive group in the community for purposes of Duren analysis, and that the first prong of Duren is therefore satisfied. [7] Defendant focuses his argument on the second prong of Duren, the issue of significant statistical disparity. Defendant contends at length that under comparative disparity analysis, the disparity he demonstrated (34 percent) was significant, and that the absolute disparity mode of analysis (yielding only a 1.1 percent disparity in his case) is unfair where, as here, the underrepresented group is but a small fraction of the overall population. `[T]he [United States] Supreme Court has not yet spoken definitively on either the means by which disparity may be measured or the constitutional limit of permissible disparity.' ( Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d [502,] 527-528 [262 Cal.Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129].) ( Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d 471, 492, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561.) However, here, as in Bell (Blacks constituted 8 percent of Contra Costa County population, but only 3 percent of prospective jurors, yielding absolute disparity of 5 percent and comparative disparity of 62.5 percent) and Sanders (adult Hispanic citizens constituted 16.3 percent of Kern County population, but only 8.3 percent of those appearing for jury duty, yielding absolute disparity of 8 percent and comparative disparity of 49 percent), we need not resolve the issue, because, as the trial court ruled, defendant failed to establish a prima facie case under Duren 's third prong by showing that the disparity was caused by the systematic exclusion of Blacks from Indio/Palm Springs juries. In Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1068, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478, the same expert witness, Dr. Butler, identified a disparity between the percentages of Blacks and Hispanics who served on Norwalk jury venires and the percentages of presumptively eligible such persons living within a 20-mile radius of the Norwalk courthouse. As here, the master list, compiled from voter and DMV lists, was not underrepresentative, and there was no evidence that the process of summoning jurors from the master list was improperly selective. As here, Dr. Butler could only speculate that the large number of nonresponders might tip disproportionately toward minority populations, and that the conceded lack of follow-up on nonresponders might account for the underrepresentation on the venires. The Horton trial court denied the motion to quash, reasoning that the selection process was race neutral, and that Dr. Butler's speculation about the cause of the underrepresentation was insufficient to satisfy the third prong of Duren. ( Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1089, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478.) We agreed that this finding was supported by the record, in that there was an insufficient showing that any discrepancy in the jury pool was attributable to `systematic exclusion'โbecause the procedures employed by the jury commissioner were, on their face, race-neutral, and the opinion of Dr. Butler as to the cause of any disparity was not supported by empirical evidence, but, rather, amounted to no more than speculation. [Citation.] ( Id., at p. 1090, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478; see also Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d 502, 528-531, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129 [where master list is representative, speculation that hardship deferrals weeded out minorities is insufficient to establish systematic exclusion; such systematic exclusion also cannot be shown solely by a consistent pattern of underrepresentation].) We reach the same result here. We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to continue the trial pending defendant's further study of local jury procedures. The court below based its ruling on its determination, as a matter of law, that defendant had failed to demonstrate a significant disparity, an issue we do not decide. Nonetheless, the court's denial of a continuance was amply justified under all the circumstances. Defendant's challenge to the jury venire, and his motion to continue the trial for that purpose, were presented a scarce month before trial was scheduled to begin. At least since our Bell decision, announced almost a full year earlier, it had been clear that a Duren challenge required the defendant to prove specific, constitutionally impermissible jury selection procedures that were the systematic cause of any disparity, and that speculation on these matters would not suffice. Defendant's belated request for further delay to explore this issue, based solely on Dr. Butler's unsupported speculation that it might be the cause of the discrepancy, was properly rejected.