Opinion ID: 78000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of Request for Interpretation on Statute of Limitations

Text: BLET alternatively argues that, even if its cause of action accrued on July 3, 2007, the district judge still erred in dismissing the case because BLET's request for an interpretation from the Board as to whether CSX had to pay back wages tolled the running of the statute of limitations. Equitable tolling is a form of extraordinary relief that courts have extended only sparingly. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). It is `appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.' Arce, 434 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam)); see Outler v. United States, 485 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (Equitable tolling is only available if the petitioner establishes (1) extraordinary circumstances and (2) due diligence.). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that such extraordinary circumstances exist. Arce, 434 F.3d at 1261. The district judge explained that BLET fails to allege any extraordinary circumstances beyond its control and unavoidable with diligence that prevented it from filing its action within the limitations period. Instead, BLET relies on the argument that the filing of a request for interpretation tolls the statute of limitations. R1-19 at 10. Requests for interpretations are not uncommon in RLA arbitration proceedings. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m). Significantly, BLET could have sought an interpretation when CSX showed that it did not intend to pay Pitzen back wages by not doing so by July 2, 2004, the date of compliance specified in the award. Additionally, CSX clarified that it did not believe that the award required it to make a payment of back wages in the October 6, 2004, letter that it sent to BLET. Nonetheless, BLET waited until February 9, 2006, to request interpretation. Even when the arbitrator issued an interpretation on April 7, 2006, BLET waited until August 1, 2006, to file its petition for enforcement. These delays show BLET's lack of diligence and such lack of diligence is inimical to a request for tolling. Arce, 434 F.3d at 1261, Sandvik, 177 F.3d at 1271; Outler, 485 F.3d at 1280. [F]or statute of limitations purposes[,] a plaintiff's ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact of his injury or its cause should [not] receive identical treatment. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122, 100 S.Ct. at 359; Lekas, 282 F.3d at 300. The determinative fact is whether the plaintiff had knowledge of the harm incurred. BLET knew when Pitzen did not receive back wages to which he was entitled within the time that the award established for compliance. BLET could have pursued an interpretation while it sought to enforce the award. Enforcement and interpretation proceedings should proceed separately and simultaneously. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. National R.R. Adjustment Bd., First Div., 422 F.2d 1187, 1194 (7th Cir.1970); accord TCIU, 30 F.3d at 907 n. 2. The Seventh Circuit explained that the two procedures [enforcement and interpretation] should proceed independently of, and simultaneously with, each other. Great Northern, 422 F.2d at 1194. When these two actions proceed together, the § 153 First (m) proceedings will result in an interpretation of the award which the parties can make available to the court in the enforcement action, which is precisely what the statute contemplates by not dismissing the enforcement action despite the § 153 First (m) interpretation request. Id. The fact that [the carrier] may have been seeking clarification from the Board to support its position does not amount to evidence that [the carrier] either concealed [plaintiff's] cause of action or caused [plaintiff] to miss a filing deadline, and, consequently, does not justify equitable tolling. Lekas, 282 F.3d at 301. Because BLET sought an award interpretation did not prevent it from simultaneously filing an enforcement action to protect its rights. Therefore, BLET's request for interpretation did not justify equitable tolling, because it had not met its burden of showing that extraordinary circumstances existed. Arce, 434 F.3d at 1261. To determine whether equitable tolling is appropriate, [t]he basic question ... is one `of legislative intent whether the right shall be enforceable ... after the prescribed time.' Id. (quoting Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 426, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 1053, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965)) (second omission in original); see Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 320 U.S. 356, 360, 64 S.Ct. 128, 130, 88 L.Ed. 96 (1943) (It does not follow ... that Congress did not intend the limitation [period] to be absolute.). Therefore, federal courts have refused to toll the statute-of-limitations period established by § 153 First (r). [4] The RLA should be literally applied in the absence of a clear showing of a contrary or qualified intention of Congress. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 35, 77 S.Ct. 635, 637, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957). Under a strict interpretation of § 153(r), the Second Circuit concluded: This is a part of the [RLA] setting up a specially constituted board to deal with the so-called minor disputes of the industry  grievances in the interpretation or application of employment agreements. As an integral part of this system, Congress gave the employees a special and favorable statutory remedy, to be exercised within two years and not after, a period of enforced inaction for the employer, during which he cannot obtain even a declaration of his rights under the original agreement. We think, therefore, that a court is not justified in finding any exception to, or extension of, this period. Joint Council, 157 F.2d at 420 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § First 153(r)) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In the context of Adjustment Board awards, the former Fifth Circuit concluded that while Congress did not foresee this extrastatutory mode of review, it was its intention that all methods of reviewing NRAB awards be barred unless `begun within two years from the time the cause of action accrues under the award ..., and not after.' Gibson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 441 F.2d 784, 788 (5th Cir.1971) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 153(r) (emphasis added)). After reviewing the overall scheme of the RLA, the Seventh Circuit specifically determined that there was a policy in favor of the finality for arbitration awards and decline[d] the Union's invitation to create an exception to finality where a request for interpretation is made during the limitations period before a plaintiff files an enforcement action. TCIU, 30 F.3d at 907. Using this highly persuasive reasoning, the district judge properly concluded that the two-year statute of limitations found in U.S.C. § 153 First (r) is not tolled by a request for interpretation. [5] R1-19 at 11 (quoting TCIU, 30 F.3d at 907). Section 153 First (m) states unequivocally that RLA arbitration awards are final when issued by the arbitrator. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m); TCIU, 30 F.3d at 906. Requests for interpretation pursuant to § 153 First (m) do not affect that finality. While subsection (m) provides arbitrators the power to interpret final awards, it does not give them the power to alter or modify them whatsoever. See id. (citing United Trans. Union v. Soo Line R. Co., 457 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir.1972)). Consequently, an interpretation request does not affect the enforceability of an award and does not hinder the pursuit of an enforcement action under § 153 First (p). BLET should have filed its enforcement action prior to or simultaneous with its request for interpretation. Its delay in seeking an enforcement action barred BLET's action under the two-year statute of limitations and is fatal to its case.