Opinion ID: 2612478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preemption Doctrine

Text: Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has grouped and analyzed preemption cases in three categories. (See, e.g., English v. General Electric Company (1990) 495 U.S. ___, ___ [110 L.Ed.2d 65, 110 S.Ct. 2270].) First, Congress may expressly define the extent to which its enactments will preempt state law (express preemption). Second, in the absence of an express declaration, state law may be preempted where it is apparent that Congress intended the federal government to occupy the field exclusively (field or implied preemption). Field preemption may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive that it evinces an intent that the states should have no room to regulate, or where the federal interest in the area of concern is so dominant that states will be deemed precluded from enforcing state laws on the same subject. (See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. (1947) 331 U.S. 218, 230 [91 L.Ed. 1447, 1459, 67 S.Ct. 1146].) Third, state law may be preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law (conflict preemption). Actual conflict with federal law may be found where it is impossible to comply with both the federal and the state law ( Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 [10 L.Ed.2d 248, 256-257, 83 S.Ct. 1210]), or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ( Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67 [85 L.Ed. 581, 587, 61 S.Ct. 399].) [1] Rather than analyze the case in these traditional preemption terms, the majority focuses on an ill-defined and nebulous alternative scheme โ jurisdictional and substantive preemption. The majority generally declares that preemption cases are divided into two types โ substantive and jurisdictional โ citing Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) section 6-25, page 481, in support of its classification. Tribe, however, unlike the majority, uses the terms to correspond to the categories of conflict and field preemption. [2] The majority fails to make clear the precise meaning of these terms. A distinction has been made, in the context of federal labor law, between preemption based on federal protection of the conduct in question and that based on the need to protect the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). (See Brown v. Hotel Employees (1984) 468 U.S. 491 [82 L.Ed.2d 373, 104 S.Ct. 3179].) Although the majority does not acknowledge this specialized usage of the terms, the labels substantive and jurisdictional, respectively, actually refer to these two limited classes of cases. The difference in terminology could be dismissed as largely semantic were it not for the majority's distortion of the law governing so-called substantive preemption. Specifically, the majority relies on the following statement in Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491: If the state law regulates conduct that is actually protected by federal law,... pre-emption follows not as a matter of protecting primary jurisdiction, but as a matter of substantive right. Where ... the issue is one of an asserted substantive conflict with a federal enactment, then `[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material ...' and the federal law controls. ( Id. at p. 503 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 384]; see Free v. Bland (1962) 369 U.S. 663 [8 L.Ed.2d 180, 82 S.Ct. 1089].) The majority concludes from this that, although a balancing of state and federal interests may be appropriate to jurisdictional preemption, it is precluded with respect to substantive preemption. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1023.) Thus, the majority simply asserts, without analysis, that plaintiff's state law claims conflict substantively with the LMRDA, and must therefore be preempted by the federal statute. In essence, the substantive preemption label is used as a substitute for a proper determination of whether the purposes and effects of the federal and state laws at issue actually conflict. [3] The majority's reliance on Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491, for this facile trumping effect of so-called substantive preemption is misplaced. A careful reading of Brown shows that, if anything, preemption is more readily found in cases that the majority denominates jurisdictional rather than substantive. When there is a need to protect the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB, state laws may be preempted even if they deal with matters only arguably within the jurisdiction of the NLRB (see San Diego Unions v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236, 244-245 [3 L.Ed.2d 775, 782-783, 79 S.Ct. 773]). In contrast to the usual preemption principles, preemption in such cases may be presumed. As explained in Brown : This presumption of federal preemption, based on the primary jurisdiction rationale, properly admits to exception when unusually `deeply rooted' local interests are at stake. ( Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 502 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 384].) However, substantive preemption, as that term is used by the majority, is still subject to the ordinary rules of conflict preemption. So-called substantive preemption is really a species of conflict preemption. [4] A state law is substantively preempted when it purports to regulate particular conduct which is directly protected by federal law โ an obvious case of actual conflict. However, whether a state law actually conflicts with a federal law is essentially a question of statutory construction. The intent of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis. (See e.g., Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc. (1986) 475 U.S. 282, 290 [89 L.Ed.2d 223, 230-231, 106 S.Ct. 1057]; Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn (1963) 375 U.S. 96, 103 [11 L.Ed.2d 179, 184, 84 S.Ct. 219].) Therefore, when federal and state laws allegedly conflict, consideration of the respective federal and state interests cannot be ignored. Rather, the purpose and effect of both laws must be assessed to determine whether they actually conflict; i.e., whether the state law purports to regulate the same conduct that the federal law actually protects. ( Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 503 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 384]; see also Linn v. Plant Guard Workers (1966) 383 U.S. 53, 59-60 [15 L.Ed.2d 582, 587-589, 86 S.Ct. 657]; Free v. Bland, supra, 369 U.S. 663, 666-670 [8 L.Ed.2d at pp. 183-186].) Moreover, although state law may be preempted under a conflict analysis if it frustrates the specific objectives underlying a federal enactment, a general tension with the broad or abstract goals of federal laws or programs will not result in preemption. (See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana (1981) 453 U.S. 609, 633-634 [69 L.Ed.2d 884, 904-905, 101 S.Ct. 2946].) In addition, [p]reemption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored `in the absence of persuasive reasons either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.' ( Chicago & N.W. Tr. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co. (1981) 450 U.S. 311, 317 [67 L.Ed.2d 258, 265, 101 S.Ct. 1124].) Thus, preemption of state law is not lightly to be presumed ( Malone v. White Motor Corp. (1978) 435 U.S. 497, 504 [55 L.Ed.2d 443, 450-451, 98 S.Ct. 1185]), and the state law should not be displaced unless there is a significant conflict between the operation of the local law and concretely identifiable federal interests. ( Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988) 487 U.S. 500 [101 L.Ed.2d 442, 108 S.Ct. 2510].) With these principles in mind, I turn to an examination of the specific objectives of the LMRDA and their relation to the state claims asserted by plaintiff.