Opinion ID: 770251
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lillian Turner

Text: 25 Lillian Turner and Hester worked at different locations in BIC's office and had different supervisors. During the six years she worked at BIC (1988 to 1994), she observed the interaction between Beck and Hester on only two or three occasions. Still she was allowed to testify, over BIC's objections, that based on those occasions Beck exhibited a borderline disrespect that was attributable to Hester's race. Turner heard Beck talk down to Hester, she did not observe Beck acting with condescension or disrespect to white employees, and opined that Beck was condescending towards Hester because Hester is African-American. When defense counsel tried to obtain the specifics of the conversations Turner observed, the court cut off the line of questioning. Turner also testified that there was general discrimination in the workplace at BIC; that she had her own lawsuit pending against BIC (which did not accuse any of Hester's supervisors); and that the reasons for her treatment must be attributable to race since I knew something wasn't right. The more and more I began to look at the situation, I knew it was based on my color, that I was black, because there was no other cause. 26    27 Hester argues, on analogy to Lightfoot, that all four witnesses had personal knowledge of Beck's condescending manner. We disagree. Lightfoot affirmed a ruling that allowed a witness to opine as to why plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, but Lightfoot concluded that such testimony was helpful to the trier of fact because (a) the witness had established a solid foundation of his intimate involvement with [the defendant's] operation,; (b) the witness's opinion was thus based on observations about [the defendant's] decision making process,; and (c) the district court sought to ensure that [the witness's] testimony focused on these objective facts. Id. 110 F.3d at 911-12. See also Rea, 958 F.2d at 1216 (where witness can fully testify as to his or her observation of the defendant's conduct the witnesses opinion as to ultimate issue will often not be helpful within the meaning of Rule 701 because the jury will be in as good a position as the witness to draw the inference . . . .). 28 None of Hester's four witnesses was involved in BIC's decision-making processes, or had personal knowledge of it. Nor had they any basis for knowing whether Hester was adequately performing her duties as a Group leader. Their testimony about Beck's racist motivations was not focused on objective facts, but instead consisted of the witesses' subjective impressions that Beck's condescension to Hester was attributable to Hester's race. 29 There is evidence that CSD employees (particularly former members of the former OPD) chafed under Ms. Beck's harsh managerial style, but as the district court suggested (in an understatement), it is not an automatic jump to infer that Beck is racist. One purpose of Rule 701(b) is to prevent lay witnesses from suggesting that the jury take such a jump. See Rea, 958 F.2d at 1215 (holding that [rule 701] provide[s] assurance[s] against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach). We conclude that the opinion testimony concerning Beck's racial motivation was inadmissible under the Rule. 30 A number of federal appellate decisions support this conclusion. In Mitroff v. Xomox Corp., 797 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1986) the court held admissible the lay opinion of an assistant manager that the employer engaged in patterns of age discrimination: 31 [T]he question of whether age discrimination existed or not was the ultimate issue, not just a fact in issue. Although testimony which embraces an ultimate issue is not objectionable (Fed. R. Evid. 704), seldom will be the case when a lay opinion on an ultimate issue will meet the test of being helpful to the trier of fact since the jury's opinion is as good as the witness' and the witness turns into little more than an oath helper. 32 Mitroff, 797 F.2d at 276 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). 33 Similarly, the First Circuit has held that conclusory lay opinions given at deposition--to the effect that plaintiff was ejected from a restaurant by reason of his race--were properly excluded because the depositions contained no foundation for the inference of racial animus on the part of the restaurant employees. See Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants, 67 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 1995). In that case, the deponent inferred racial animus from (variously) their observations that one of the defendants reacted angrily toward the plaintiff and with a negative tone in her voice, was unfriendly, uncooperative, high strung, impolite, and had no reason to eject the plaintiff. Id. at 347. The court concluded that such observations did not support an inference of racial animus, id. (emphasis in original), because 34 [a]lthough these observations may be entirely compatible with a race-based animus, there simply is no foundation for an inference that [defendant] harbored a racial animus toward [plaintiff] or anyone else, absent some probative evidence that [defendant's] petulance stemmed from something other than a race-neutral reaction to a stressful encounter. . . . 35 Id. (internal citation omitted). See also Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1177 (1st Cir. 1991) (lay opinion--that employer was determined to eliminate . . . senior employees--pointed to no specific facts to buttress such a broad assertion.); Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1544 (10th Cir. 1991) (determining inadmissible the lay opinion of co-worker that sexual harassment defendant had 'a problem with women who were not between the ages of 19 and 25 and who weighed more than 115 pounds'); cf Willco Kuwait (Trading) S.A.K. v. deSavary, 843 F.2d 618, 624 (1st Cir. 1988) (lay opinion testimony which does little more than tell the jury what result to reach, should not be admitted). 36 We follow the reasoning of Lightfoot, Rea and opinions in other circuits, and hold that in an employment discrimination action, Rule 701(b) bars lay opinion testimony that amounts to a naked speculation concerning the motivation for a defendant's adverse employment decision. Witnesses are free to testify fully as to their own observations of the defendant's interactions with the plaintiff or with other employees, but the witness's opinion as to the defendant's [ultimate motivations] will often not be helpful within the meaning of Rule 701 because the jury will be in as good a position as the witness to draw the inference as to whether or not the defendant was motivated by an impermissible animus. Rea, 958 F.2d at 1216. The four witnesses here testified that they observed Beck treat Hester with (variously) condescension, coldness, hostility or disregard, as compared with the three or so other Group Leaders, who were white. A jury can draw its own conclusions from observed events or communications that can be adequately described to it, such as the observed differential treatment described by Hester's witnesses. Id. at 1216. But their speculative lay opinion that this differential is attributable to race rather than anything else, is not helpful in this case because it merely tell[s] the jury what result to reach. Id. at 1215. 37 These errors were not harmless. This case was factually very close and we are especially loath to regard any error as harmless in a close case, since in such a case even the smallest error may have been enough to tilt the balance. United States v. Colombo, 909 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting 3A C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 854, at 305 (2d ed. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hester relied heavily at trial on how differently she was treated by Beck as compared to Beck's treatment of peers who were white, and asked the jury to draw from that an inference of discrimination. All four witnesses who proffered that testimony were allowed improperly to draw the inference for the jury. The prejudice to BIC caused by the district court's rulings was thus significant. 1 A. Jury Instruction 38 BIC objects to the following excerpt from the district court's charge on grounds that it does not instruct the jury that Hester had the burden of proving that she was performing at a level that met BIC's legitimate expectations and that she was subject of an adverse employment action: 39 In order to recover . . . the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her, that is, the plaintiff's race must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence to have been a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's decision to remover her. 40 A jury charge is erroneous if the instruction misled the jury as to the proper legal standard or did not adequately inform the jury of the law. See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 1997). Challenged jury instructions are reviewed de novo, but this Court will reverse only if all of the instructions, taken as a whole, caused the defendant prejudice. United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Thornley v. Penton Publ'g, Inc., 104 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless). 41 We accept BIC's position that disputed elements of a prima facie case must be submitted to a jury, see Thornley, 104 F.3d at 29-30 (proper to instruct jury on disputed element of plaintiff's qualification), but we find no error in the foregoing charge. As to meeting BIC's employment expectations, we think the charge, read as a whole, sufficiently informed the jury of this issue, and that as to the adverse employment action, the underlying facts were essentially undisputed, and there was no real factual dispute for the jury to resolve.