Opinion ID: 184872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Three-Strikes Determination

Text: 5 Because Smith has not paid the required fees in this court, our first question is whether he is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis here. The District claims that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prevents Smith from proceeding in forma pauperis. Under that section, prisoners with three or more so- called strikes may proceed in forma pauperis only in very limited circumstances: 6 In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In the government's view, the three dismissals cited by the district court all count as strikes under this provision, since they were all for failure to state a claim. 1 However, amicus argues that none of these three dismissals should count as strikes. In amicus's view, this result follows from two propositions, both of which amicus urges us to adopt. First, amicus asserts that we should recognize that the three-strikes determination must be based on the situation at the time an appeal or complaint is filed, even if, as here, the decision regarding in forma pauperis status is actually made some time later. Second, amicus urges that dismissals should not count as strikes until appeal has been exhausted or waived. Amicus claims that if these two propositions are accepted, the three cited dismissals do not count as strikes. 8 However, we conclude that even assuming that we accepted amicus's two propositions as a general matter, each of the three cited dismissals here would nonetheless count as strikes, because the time for appeal of those dismissals had expired when this appeal was filed. The first two of the dismissals in question occurred on August 29, 1997, while the third occurred on October 16, 1997. Under F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1), the notice of appeal in a civil action must be filed within 30 days of the challenged order or judgment. A notice of appeal by an inmate is treated as timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. F.R.A.P. 4(c)(1). The 30-day time limit is  'mandato-ry and jurisdictional.'  Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Here, the notice of appeal of the three dismissals and the present case was dated December 6, 1997, and was received by the district court on December 11, 1997. Amicus argues that we cannot determine whether the appeals from the three earlier dismissals were timely because it is not apparent from the record on what date Smith mailed the notice of appeal. But even if it is unclear precisely when the notice of appeal was placed in the mail, it is clear that it could not have been before December 6, the date Smith completed the notice. Amicus also points out that the record does not indicate whether any motions were filed which would have tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal under F.R.A.P. 4(a)(4). Amicus Br. at 12 n.3. But given that the docket contains no mention of any such motions, it is not clear what other indication amicus would want. Thus December 6 is the earliest possible effective date of filing, which places Smith's attempted appeals of the three earlier dismissals well outside the 30-day period provided by F.R.A.P. 4(a). 2 9 Despite the fact that Smith did not appeal the three dismissals at issue within the time period provided by F.R.A.P. 4(a), amicus urges that the dismissals should not count as strikes given that Smith filed notices of appeal of those dismissals at the same time he filed his notice of appeal in this case. In amicus's view, those dismissals should not count as strikes because their appeal was pending when the present appeal was filed. In other words, amicus would have us allow a prisoner to convert what would otherwise have been a strike into a non-strike by filing an untimely notice of appeal. Clearly, to accept this argument would provide an avenue for prisoners to effectively circumvent the three- strikes provision. A prisoner barred from proceeding in forma pauperis by the existence of previous strikes could avoid the intended consequences of § 1915(g) by filing untimely appeals of the dismissals constituting strikes. Amicus offers no statutory justification for this view, and we decline to adopt it. Even if district court dismissals do not count as strikes while appeal is available, once the time for appeal has expired, that is the end of the matter, and untimely attempts to appeal do not change the situation. At the time this appeal was filed, Smith had at least three previous dismissals in the district court for failure to state a claim, and the time for appeal of those dismissals had expired. It is of no import that the appeals of the three dismissals at issue were actually dismissed for nonprosecution rather than untimeliness. The district court dismissals should not fail to count as strikes simply because the untimely appeals of those dismissals suffered from other flaws as well. Thus even if amicus is correct that we must assess the situation at the time of filing, and that strikes do not count as long as appeal is available, these propositions are of no help to Smith.