Opinion ID: 1852379
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Make a Closing Argument

Text: The trial court below denied an evidentiary hearing on this claim, reasoning that this issue had already been resolved by this Court on direct appeal. The particular issue addressed by us on direct appeal was whether Waterhouse was denied the right to counsel based on defense counsel's failure to make a closing argument. See Waterhouse, 596 So.2d at 1011. We concluded that he was not. See id. at 1014. Although Waterhouse now frames the issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant is merely trying to relitigate the same issue using different words. See, e.g., Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla.1995) (finding it inappropriate to use a different argument to relitigate the same issue); Turner v. Dugger, 614 So.2d 1075, 1077 (Fla.1992) (same). In any event, our ultimate conclusion (i.e., that Waterhouse was not denied the effective assistance of counsel) and reasoning on direct appeal are totally dispositive of whether defense counsel was ineffective in not making a closing argument. Specifically, in addressing this issue on direct appeal, we noted: An awareness of the events preceding the closing argument is necessary to an understanding of this claim. At the outset, it should be noted that several lawyers had previously withdrawn from representing Waterhouse because of his refusal to cooperate with them. During the proceedings below, Waterhouse and his counsel, Mr. Hoffman, began to differ about trial strategy. Prior to the resentencing hearing, Hoffman sought to withdraw because Waterhouse did not wish him to put on any evidence in mitigation and insisted that he present a lingering doubt defense. Because this Court has held that lingering doubt is not an appropriate nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, Hoffman recognized that he could not ethically pursue this course of action. Hoffman protected the record to make clear that Waterhouse desired to present such a defense. During the resentencing hearing, Waterhouse made various complaints about Hoffman, but it was clear that he was not seeking to represent himself. The court found Waterhouse's accusations against Hoffman to be unfounded and observed: THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to let him control this case by discharging a lawyer that's appointed for him on the eve of the trial. It is obvious to me that he has been doing this over the years purely for the purpose of delay, and I'm not going to let that happen. As far as I'm concerned, Mr. Hoffman, you're on the case. I know it's tough for you. If he wants to dictate the terms of your representation and make it impossible for you to present a defense in mitigation, that's his choice. If he's done that, he has only himself to blame. In the middle of the resentencing hearing, Hoffman advised the court that Waterhouse once again was complaining about his representation because he had not gone far enough in trying to relitigate the guilt issue. The court observed that Hoffman was providing effective representation. However, the court stated that if Waterhouse insisted, he would permit him to take over the trial but would keep Hoffman present so as to provide legal advice if requested. The court then asked Waterhouse whether or not he was discharging Hoffman and proceeding on his own: THE DEFENDANT: Will he remain as advisory counsel? THE COURT: What? THE DEFENDANT: Will he remain as advisory counsel? That will be all? THE COURT: That's right. But he won't be participating. If you have a question, you'll take it up with him, but you're on your own. MR. CROW [Prosecutor]: I think what he's trying to indicate is he doesn't want Mr. Hoffman in an advisory capacity. THE COURT: I'll have him here available. He doesn't have to consult with him. He doesn't have to talk to him. If he doesn't have any questions to ask him, then obviously his advisory capacity is for naught; but he will be available to him. He will not be participating in the trial and Mr. Waterhouse will be handling the rest of this case on his own. THE DEFENDANT: What I'm actually trying to get at is will he have to be present in the courtroom? THE COURT: Doesn't have to be if you don't want him. We can have him sit outside. That's kind of a stupid place to put him if he's going to try and advise you on what he heard in here. THE DEFENDANT: Doesn't seem to matter where he is. We'll let it go. THE COURT: I'm sorry? THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me. Let it go. THE COURT: Let it go. In other words, he will continue as your lawyer? THE DEFENDANT: The railroad train is running, your Honor. THE COURT: I take it that you are accepting him as your lawyer? THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me? THE COURT: Pardon? THE DEFENDANT: I didn't hear what you said. THE COURT: He is your lawyer, is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Not by much. THE COURT: Over your objection. THE DEFENDANT: On paper. He's doing nothing, your Honor. THE COURT: I didn't ask you that. Answer the question, please. THE DEFENDANT: I would respectfully refuse. THE COURT: Okay. Bring in the jury. Mr. Hoffman continues to remain as the lawyer. At the close of the State's testimony, Hoffman made clear that Waterhouse refused to allow him to put on any mitigating evidence. Hoffman also indicated that Waterhouse wanted to address the jury in closing argument. The judge advised Waterhouse that this would not be a good idea because much of what he proposed to say would probably be stricken on objection. However, the judge said that if Waterhouse wished to do so, he would permit him to make the closing statement, even though Hoffman remained in the case. This is reflected in the following colloquy: THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for a minute. Here's what I'm going to do. Just so he'll have no complaint. You're still in the case. He can say anything he wants. I'll rule on the objections. MR. HOFFMAN: I think that's fair, Judge. THE COURT: It's my observation that he is not best served by doing that, but if the result is adverse to him, he can't be heard to complain I didn't allow him to make a statement. MR. HOFFMAN: It may take a little preparation time, I would assume. THE COURT: You can come back at one o'clock. We've still got to resolve the instructions. After the recess and the jury charge conference, Hoffman announced that Waterhouse would be making the closing argument. The prosecutor then presented his closing argument. Thereafter, the court took a ten-minute recess. When the trial resumed, Waterhouse stated that he would like Hoffman to make the closing argument. Hoffman responded that Waterhouse was still insisting that he make a lingering doubt argument and that he felt that he could not do this because it would be unethical. The following colloquy then occurred: MR. HOFFMAN: The posture I've decided to take on this, right or wrong, is that he can't now force me to make what I feel is an ineffective representation in closing argument by reneging on his previous statements. And in light of the fact that he's not allowed me to put on any mitigation case, he's absolutely not allowed any mitigation case. So, there really isn't much to talk about. And rather than do that and make a half hearted attempt and skirt the issue of ethical bounds with regard to whether or not I can talk about the guilt issue, I would rather leave him to do what he said he wants to do. And if that turns out to be wrong and he turns out to get another trial THE COURT: Well, you can always talk about the seriousness of the recommendation and it requires not taking it light. That certainly is a matter that can be argued to the jury. I mean, that's MR. HOFFMAN: That's about the only thing; I mean, just get up and ask the jury what I did in opening statement; I can reiterate everything I said in opening. THE COURT: The question to you, Mr. Waterhouse, is do you want Mr. Hoffman to make the closing argument within the confines of the penalty, not the guilt or innocence of a homicide? MR. WATERHOUSE: Well, your Honor, Mr. Hoffman, as you know, and I have had a veryyou can't even call it a rocky relationship, it's not even that good. He's been to see me once THE COURT: Well, I'm notI've heard this for the last year. MR. WATERHOUSE: I have not had a chance to sit down with him and explain to him the things that I want to put forth in mitigation at the closing. He's only been over there once, and all we discussed THE COURT: Well, the description of your relationship with Mr. Hoffman is one of your own doing, not of his. MR. HOFFMAN: Judge, what he's doing now is back to what we already talked about, that I didn't want mitigating things put before the jury. I mean, people were here to do it. The four items that were in the previous case THE COURT: Well, I'm going to ask this question one last time. If I don't get an answer, you're proceeding on your own, Mr. Waterhouse. Do you want Mr. Hoffman to make the closing statement for you within the confines of the recommendation of either death or life imprisonment or not, and not make an argument on your guilt or innocence of the homicide; yes or no? MR. WATERHOUSE: Your Honor, the problem issee, I am not an attorney, I do not know the law fully, what you're talking about. That's why I need to get together THE COURT: Yes or no? MR. WATERHOUSE:with Mr. Hoffman in order so we could prepare for this, so he could tell me that this is admissible and this is not. We haven't got together on it. THE COURT: Yes or no? MR. WATERHOUSE: No. THE COURT: Bring in the jury. (Emphasis added.) We do not find that Waterhouse was denied his right to counsel by these actions. Waterhouse initially indicated on the record that he wished to make the closing argument. He reneged on that at the last possible minute. At that point, Hoffman did not refuse to make closing argument. He was simply unwilling to make the argument that Waterhouse demanded because he felt it would be unethical. Waterhouse rejected the choice of a closing argument by counsel confined to the appropriate issues. Under the facts of this case we do not find that Waterhouse was denied his right to counsel. [A] defendant may not manipulate the proceedings by willynilly leaping back and forth between the choices [of self-representation and appointed counsel]. Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253, 259 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893, 105 S.Ct. 269, 83 L.Ed.2d 205 (1984). We refuse to permit an intransigent defendant to completely thwart the orderly processes of justice. Waterhouse, 596 So.2d at 1011-14 (alterations in original). It is axiomatic that the right to counsel necessarily involves the right to effective counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) ([T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.)). Thus, implicit in a finding that a defendant was not denied the right to counsel by his attorney's failure to present a closing argument based on inappropriate factors is that counsel was not ineffective in failing to make such argument. Based on our determinations on direct appeal, we conclude that counsel was not ineffective in failing to present a closing argument on Waterhouse's behalf under these circumstances, and that the trial court correctly denied an evidentiary hearing on this claim.