Opinion ID: 1784340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Final Step: Did Holland validly waive his rights?

Text: If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the [State] to prove [8] the validity of a defendant's waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286, 291-92 (1979) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706). Specifically, Miranda requires proof that the waiver [was] made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707, quoted in Nash, 597 F.2d at 518; see Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d at 385 ([W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but also must constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.); Gotay, 844 F.2d at 976 (same) (citing Smith, 469 U.S. at 95, 105 S.Ct. at 492-93, 83 L.Ed.2d at 1494). In short, [a] waiver is voluntary if it is `the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception.' Moreover, [a] waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is `made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' Grooms v. Keeney, 826 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting and citing cases) (emphasis added). In the case sub judice, the trial judge concluded that the State met its burden  i.e., Holland voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights. Whether this conclusion is correct is a mixed issue of law and fact. Norman, 871 F.2d at 1486; Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir.1988). In other words: (1) if the judge based his finding upon appropriate principles of law; (2) and the finding is supported by the facts ( i.e., by substantial evidence); (3) then this Court may not reverse. Schmitt v. State, 560 So.2d 148, 151 (Miss. 1990); cf. State v. Whitaker, 578 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Conn. 1990) (Where the trial court makes specific factual findings regarding [this issue], those findings are entitled to deference so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, but where, as here, the trial court has made no specific findings, we must review the evidence and make our own determination of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's waiver of his constitutional rights). Perusal of the judge's written OPINION AND ORDER reveals that the correct principles of law were applied. Whether the judge's finding is supported by substantial evidence is another matter. To resolve this question, this Court must conduct an independent review of the entire record. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d at 385 (review should focus on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)); Whitaker, 578 A.2d at 1039 (review should focus on defendant's experience with the police and familiarity with warnings; intelligence, including I.Q.; age; education; vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given; intoxication; emotional state; mental disease, disorder or retardation). First, the evidence gleaned from the record which arguably discredits the judge's fact-finding is summarized: 1. Holland had been drinking up until his arrest. See State v. Williams, 208 So.2d 172, 175 (Miss. 1968) (holding that, if defendant was in an acute, rampant state of intoxication equivalent to mania, a waiver cannot be considered valid). 2. Holland had not slept for nearly 24 hours prior to waiving his rights. See Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520-21, 88 S.Ct. 1152, 1153-54, 20 L.Ed.2d 77, 79-80 (1968) (Court considered lack of sleep a factor in its determination that confession not the product of his free and rational choice); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192 (1944) (same); Neal, 451 So.2d at 756 (where this Court deemed significant the evidence at the suppression hearing [which] reflect[ed] that Neal was fresh on the afternoon ... when he gave his confession (emphasis added)). 3. Holland's periodic bouts of crying may be reflective of emotional instability, which could have impaired his ability to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights. This point is not raised by Holland; nonetheless, it is relevant to the analysis of the validity of the waiver. Compare State v. Williams, 208 So.2d 172, 175 (Miss. 1968) (where this Court deemed the waiver invalid in view of the defendant's mental imbalance and maniacal behavior), with Kniep v. State, 525 So.2d 385, 389 (Miss. 1988) (where this Court considered, but rejected without comment, defendant's claim that she was so emotionally distraught and in such a confused mental state that her ability to intelligently waive her rights was impaired.); see also Whitaker, 578 A.2d at 1039 (emotional state deemed relevant). The following is a summary of the evidence which supports the conclusion that Holland did have the requisite state of mind  despite his drinking and lack of sleep: 1. Holland repeatedly acknowledged that he understood his Miranda rights; he expressed this acknowledgement both orally and in writing (by signing the form). See Butler, 441 U.S. at 372-73, 99 S.Ct. at 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d at 291-92 (An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right . .. is usually strong proof of the validity of the waiver. (emphasis added)); see also Neal, 451 So.2d at 753 ([T]he mere giving of the Miranda warnings, no matter how meticulous, no matter how often repeated, does not [automatically] render admissible any inculpatory statement thereafter given by the accused.). 2. He was 49 years old, has a high school and vocational education, and considers himself to be a very intelligent person. See Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640, 644 (Miss. 1979) (Upon noting that [a]ge and intelligence level are factors to be considered, the Court concluded that a 16-year-old with a fourth-grade education could properly waive his rights.); Jones, 461 So.2d at 696 (educational background considered as a factor) (citing cases); cf. Williamson v. State, 330 So.2d 272, 276 (Miss. 1976) ([T]he will of a person who is of weak intellect may be more easily overcome than that of one who is more intelligent.). 3. His criminal past provides him with some experience and knowledge about a suspect's Miranda rights. See Hovland v. Blodgett, 914 F.2d 262 (9th Cir.1990) WESTLAW, Allfeds database) (defendant's past experience with the judicial system factored into the court's decision that he knew how to request counsel and knowingly waived his Miranda rights). 4. Holland's intoxication nor lack of sleep impaired his ability to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights: Five witnesses testified that Holland did not appear to be impaired by alcohol and did not slur his speech. [9] See Kniep, 525 So.2d at 389 (Rejecting the defendant's claim that intoxication (and other specified factors) affected the voluntariness of her waiver, this Court cited the testimony of one witness who noticed an odor of alcohol on [the defendant's] breath but felt the defendant appeared to know what she was doing and what she was talking about.); Stevens, 458 So.2d at 728-29 (same); see also United States v. D'Antoni, 856 F.2d 975, 981 (7th Cir.1988) (The defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana during the past twenty-four hours... . The defendant himself, however, testified that he had had no alcohol in the five or six hours prior to the interview, and that he understood the detectives' questions... . We agree ... that the defendant's statements to the detectives were made voluntarily.). Holland testified that he had been a chronic drinker. See Stevens v. State, 458 So.2d 726, 728 (Miss. 1984) (Rejecting the defendant's claim that his blood alcohol content of .16 prevented a proper waiver, this Court cited an expert's opinion that chronic drinking increases the body's ability to degrade alcohol in the blood.). Periodic bouts of crying aside, Holland was calm and cooperative at all phases of the investigation  particularly at the moment when he waived his rights. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at 3. This is an important point since this Court once held that a defendant's waiver could not have been made rationally, voluntarily and intentionally because the evidence evinces an acute, rampant state of intoxication equivalent to mania and a deranged and psychotic mental imbalance. Williams, 208 So.2d at 175. Holland's meticulous post-murder scheming aimed at covering his tracks to avoid arrest reflects a coherent, unimpaired state of mind. See generally Sections I(A)(4) & (5) of this opinion, supra; see also Vol. XIV, at 2489-90 (Holland's testimony). 5. Holland's lack of sleep did not impair his ability to waive his rights in view of the facts. Accord D'Antoni, 856 F.2d at 981 (defendant's lack of sleep for 24 hours preceding interrogation did not render waiver invalid  particularly since the defendant testified that he understood the detectives' questions and the interrogation was not lengthy or arduous [ i.e., 30 minutes]). 6. Holland's evidence of coercion or involuntariness is either unsubstantiated [10] or insufficient [11] and is contradicted by his taped confession containing the admission that no one has threatened, intimidated, or promised [him] anything. State's Exhs. 8 & 56. Based upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused, this Court affirms the trial judge's finding that Holland knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023, 82 L.Ed. at 1466. (c) Disposition In view of the foregoing, this Court concludes: (1) Holland's utterance about exercising his right to have an attorney present was ambiguous; (2) the detectives properly clarified the ambiguity; (3) Holland knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights; (4) Therefore, the trial judge properly admitted the confession.

This issue involves three alleged errors; they are addressed individually.
During cross-examination of Douglas, Holland asked: Did you [Douglas] ever tell [Lester Thompson, a polygrapher] that it was on [his] mind to have sex with Krystal? Douglas emphatically and repeatedly said, No. For impeachment purposes, Holland requested that he be allowed to call to the stand Lester Thompson, who allegedly would testify that Douglas had once told him that he thought it would be nice to have sex with Krystal. The State objected on the basis of irrelevancy, and the trial judge after much debate denied Holland's request. See generally Vol. IX, at 1503-13; Vol. XIII, at 2265-70. Holland now questions this denial. This Court has held that in laying the predicate to introduce prior inconsistent statements ... the statement made in court [must be] relevant to the issue in the case and therefore not collateral. Carlisle v. State, 348 So.2d 765, 766 (Miss. 1977) (citing cases); accord Harrison v. State, 534 So.2d 175, 178 (Miss. 1988). Clearly, Douglas' alleged sexual fantasies about Krystal have no relevance to the issue of whether Holland raped Krystal. In sum, Holland was on trial  not Douglas. The testimony which Holland attempted to elicit was irrelevant to proving or disproving guilt and, therefore, the judge properly sustained the State's objection.
Later in the trial, Holland asked Boyer during cross-examination whether Krystal and her former boyfriend, Bryan Anderson, had had sexual relations ... on a regular basis. The State objected on the basis of Miss.R.Evid. 412. Under Rule 412, evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim is not admissible in a criminal case in which a person is accused of a sexual assault. The trial judge sustained the objection. Holland now questions this decision. Vol. X at 1608-09. Holland contends that Rule 412 has nothing to do with relevancy because it was designed [solely] to protect the privacy of a [ living ] victim  not a dead victim like Krystal. Appellant's Brief at 53-54 (citing Rule 412's comment (a)). Common sense dictates that Holland's contention is meritless. At the very least, Holland needs to look at the title of the rule: Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Victim's Past Behavior. Holland does nonetheless contend that the testimony about Krystal's past sexual behavior is relevant: Anderson certainly could have had sex with [Krystal] before Boyer saw her at the arcade on the night of the murder. Id. at 54. Maybe so. But as the State aptly notes, Holland is merely grasping at straws. Appellee's Brief at 39. Whether Krystal and a former boyfriend regularly engaged in sexual relations is a frivolous inquiry having no relevance to the issue of Holland's guilt. See MISS.R.EVID. 401-03. In sum, the judge properly sustained the State's objection to Holland's question about Krystal's past sexual behavior.
Finally, Holland asked Boyer to testify about a wager which Anderson allegedly made with a friend known as Louie. Anderson allegedly bet that he would sleep with Krystal before Louie would sleep with a girl known as Deedee. Holland asked this question because he again wanted to raise the possibility that Anderson (and not Holland) may have had sex with Krystal on the night of the murder. The State objected. The judge sustained the objection after characterizing the testimony which Holland attempted to elicit as inadmissible hearsay. Vol. X, at 1610-14. Whether the testimony would constitute inadmissible hearsay is an issue which this Court need not address. The judge's decision is affirmed on the bases discussed in the preceding sections. In other words, the testimony would have been irrelevant pursuant to Rule 401 and common sense.
The State proposed to introduce into evidence a videotape of the exhumation of Krystal's body from the site where Holland buried it and a foul-smelling wash cloth which the police found near the burial site.

The video shows: (1) the road leading to the burial site, (2) the area surrounding the site, and (3) the exhumation. Holland challenges the introduction of the video because it doesn't tend to prove [his] guilt ... in any way, and it would tend to inflame the jury because of the gruesome nature of the film. Holland adds: There is nothing there that could not or has not been testified to and has not been supported by still photo[s]. (Photos of the grave site were admitted into evidence.) In sum, Holland contends that any probative value the video might have would be outweighed by the prejudicial effect. Id. at 1694; see also Appellant's Brief at 48. At trial, the State countered that the video's admissibility was necessary: (1) to show the landscape of the burial site about which two witnesses had testified; (2) to show that Krystal's body was wrapped in a sheet which was similar to Holland's bed linen; and (3) to show more than that which the still photos show. Vol. X, at 1699-1700 & 1723. And on appeal, the State provides several more reasons for admitting the video: (1) it depicted the scene where the body was found and those matters found along side the body, (2) it shows the physical condition of the burial scene and the ability of a truck to turn in that area, (3) it added to the jury's understanding of what occurred at the site and completed the prosecution's picture of the events of those early morning hours, (4) it corroborate[d] the condition of the body of the victim and the testimony of the officers who unearthed the body, and (5) it tie[d] evidence found at the grave site to evidence found at appellant's home. Appellant's Brief at 35. The trial judge allowed the State to introduce the video but on the condition that the audio be turned off. He ordered the elimination of audio to prevent the jury from hearing prejudicial comments which may have been made during the taping. Vol. X, at 1725.
Both parties support their contentions regarding admissibility of the gruesome video by citing analogous law governing admissibility of gruesome, inflammatory photos. See Appellant's Brief at 49-50; Appellee's Brief at 34. In Williams v. State, Justice Sullivan summarized this law: [G]enerally, the admissibility of photo[s] is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and the admission is proper, so long as their introduction serves some useful evidentiary purpose... . [Accordingly, w]e have repeatedly admitted photo[s] of every description with the explanation that some probative value is present... . Abuse of discretion is sometimes explained to be admission of photo[s] when a killing is not contradicted or denied or the corpus delicti and the identity of the deceased have been established... . A review of our case law indicates that the discretion of the trial judge runs toward almost unlimited admissibility regardless of gruesomeness, repetitiveness, and the extenuation of probative value. At this point ..., no meaningful limits exist in these so-called balance of probative/prejudicial effect of photo[s] test. 544 So.2d 782, 785 (Miss. 1987) (citations omitted). A few years later, this Court finally established a line of demarcation. In McNeal v. State, gruesome photos depicting a maggot-infested body were deemed devoid of any evidentiary purpose. The Court held: [W]e believe that the probative value of the photos is outweighed by their tendency to inflame and prejudice the jury; therefore, the trial [judge] abused [his] discretion ... in allowing the[ir] introduction. 551 So.2d 151, 159 (Miss. 1989) (citing MISS.R.EVID. 403 [12] ). At that point, the Court delineated a guideline for future cases: When deciding on the admissibility of gruesome photos, trial judges must consider: (1) whether the proof is absolute or in doubt as to identity of the guilty party, [and] (2) whether the photos are necessary evidence or simply a ploy on the part of the prosecutor to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury. Id.
This Court must decide whether the probative value, if any, of admitting the video outweighed any prejudicial effect. In other words, did the trial judge abuse his discretion by admitting the video? As discussed, the State contended that the video should be deemed admissible for various reasons. In short, the State explains that the video reveals more than that which is revealed through the photographic evidence and that the video provides substantiation for several witnesses' testimony regarding the burial site. The State's contention, which lacks specificity, is unpersuasive. The video does not reveal more than that which is revealed through the photos; indeed, this Court holds the video was of no probative value to the State's case. This does not mean, however, that the video was prejudicial or inadmissible. In view of the video's content as well as all the horrific and overwhelming evidence presented in this case, this Court holds that the video was not prejudicial. In sum, the video should not have been admitted on grounds of repetition, redundancy and cumulativeness. Hansen v. State, No. 87-DP-0823, slip op. at 49, 1991 WL 280025, []29 (Miss. December 18, 1991). However, in view of a lack of prejudicial effect, the video's erroneous admission does not warrant reversal. Id.
Holland objected to the introduction of a white wash cloth not only because of its appearance, but because of the ... odor coming from the article. Holland explains that the odor is so strong and pungent that it would [`adversely'] effect [ sic ] the jury; that is, it's probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. The State countered by simply stating that: [It's an item] found in the grave site with the victim [and is p]robative for many reasons, including just the fact that it is another item found in her grave site. The trial judge admitted the cloth after concurring in the State's rationale. The law relevant to admissibility of the video is also relevant to the disposition of whether the wash cloth should have been admitted. In other words, this Court must determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion in deciding that the probative value, if any, of the smelly, stained cloth outweighed its tendency, if any, to inflame and prejudice the jury. The State contends that it was probative for many reasons; the State declares that it was found at the grave site. The cloth would have been relevant had it been identified as belonging to Holland or as deriving from Holland's home. Absent a sufficient connection between the cloth and Holland and/or the crime, the judge should have excluded it. To conclude otherwise would mean admitting anything found at the scene of a crime  notwithstanding its irrelevance. All this aside, this Court deems the error harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence presented in this case. Moreover, any prejudicial effect of admitting the cloth dims in view of the numerous items found at the grave site which were admitted without challenge. These items include a sample of soil that covered the victim in the grave site, a pair of white corduroy shorts, a pair of panties, a black towel, a bag of concrete, a woman's black purse, a pair of white rubber gloves, a brown towel, a lace bra, white shoes, notes from a note-pad, and make-up. The State also introduced a bloody pillow case, which police investigators found at the grave site; Holland challenged the admissibility of this item on the ground that it contained an excessive amount of blood stain. [13] The trial judge overruled the objection, and Holland did not challenge this decision on appeal. In sum, this Court concludes that admitting the cloth constituted an erroneous, albeit harmless, decision.

Prior to trial, Holland filed a Rule 4.06 motion requesting disclosure of: The name, address and qualifications of any expert witness intended to be called by the State. The substances of their testimony and the facts that [ sic ] relies upon in support of same are also requested. Vol. I, at 42. Judge Vincent Sherry granted the motion. Id. at 53. In response, the State provided Holland with various documents: (1) a letter from Dr. Paul McGarry to the State discussing his opinion about instruments which could have caused Krystal's injuries; (2) a letter from the State informing Holland of its intention to seek[] the opinion of Dr. Paul McGarry as to the percentage of alleged rape cases wherein seminal fluid or spermatozoa are not present; (3) a copy of McGarry's Curriculum Vitae; and (4) an autopsy report prepared by Dr. Paul McGarry. At trial, the State called McGarry to testify about the autopsy he performed on Krystal. At one point, after testifying about Krystal's injuries and bruises, the State asked McGarry: Doctor, do you have an opinion about the amount of time it would take for such bruising to form? Vol. XII, at 2058; see also id. at 2186-87 (further related questioning). Holland objected to this question on the ground that: the [substance of the] doctor's opinions as to the time when [Krystal's] bruises began to form, which would lead to the doctor's opinions as to the time when the injuries must have been inflicted, were never disclosed [during] discovery. [14] Holland contended that the State had known about McGarry's opinion regarding time (and sequence) of bruises and injuries for at least a week prior to trial, and that its failure to disclose this information constituted trial by ambush. Holland consequently moved for a mistrial or exclusion of such testimony. Id. at 2059-60 & 2065. The State did not deny that it had known about McGarry's opinion; however, the State contended that McGarry's opinion is based on facts discoverable in the autopsy report  a copy of which Holland was provided. After extensively debating this issue outside the jury's presence, the judge halted the trial and granted Holland an unlimited opportunity to interview McGarry. The interview transpired overnight. Vol. XII, at 2059-88. The next morning, after the interview, the debate continued. The judge ultimately overruled Holland's motion  after which the following exchange transpired: JUDGE VLAHOS: You will agree for the motion for mistrial or exclude the evidence, that on yesterday evening you were given ample opportunity to interview with Dr. McGarry... . [Y]ou visited with him for about ten or fifteen minutes; is that correct? HOLLAND: That is correct. We did have an opportunity to talk with him. JUDGE: And an unlimited opportunity; is that correct? HOLLAND: Yes. Id. at 2095-98. In this appeal, Holland challenges the judge's decision to overrule his motion.

When confronted with an alleged Rule 4.06 violation, this Court must review the record to determine whether the judge followed the guideline enunciated in Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 22-26 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., specially concurring) (now codified in Rule 4.06(i)): 1. Upon defense objection, the trial court should give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to become familiar with the undisclosed evidence by interviewing the witness, inspecting the physical evidence, etc. 2. If, after this opportunity for familiarization, the defendant believes he may be prejudiced by lack of opportunity to prepare to meet the evidence, he must request a continuance. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the issue. 3. If the defendant does request a continuance the State may choose to proceed with trial and forego using the undisclosed evidence. If the State is not willing to proceed without the evidence, the trial court must grant the requested continuance. Quoted in Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365, 367-68 (Miss. 1987), and Kelly v. State, 553 So.2d 517, 520 (Miss. 1989). [15] Rule 4.06 and the Box guideline are designed to avoid ambush or unfair surprise to either party at trial. Harris v. State, 446 So.2d 585, 589 (Miss. 1984); Ford v. State, 444 So.2d 841, 843 (Miss. 1984). The question presented here brings into direct conflict two important interests. First there is prosecution's interest in presenting to the jury all relevant, probative evidence. On the other hand, there is the accused's interest in knowing reasonably well in advance of trial what the prosecution will try to prove and how it will attempt to make its proof which, of course, includes the names of persons the state expects to call as witnesses. This state is committed to the proposition that these conflicting interests are best accommodated and that justice is more nearly achieved when, well in advance of trial, each side has reasonable access to the evidence of the other. See Rule 4.06 supra; Rules 26-37, Miss. R.Civ.P. Box, 437 So.2d at 21. Of critical import, remedies available for a discovery violation are not self-executing. Middlebrook v. State, 555 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Miss. 1990) (citing cases).
Applying the law to facts, this Court concludes that Holland's contention is devoid of merit. The State provided Holland with McGarry's autopsy report and disclosed that McGarry would be called to testify. This should have sufficed to place Holland on notice of potential line of questioning by the State. Indeed, in the section of the report entitled Provisional Autopsy Diagnosis, McGarry revealed his opinion on the general time of injuries ( i.e.,  Recently stretched lacerated abraded vaginal orifice, recently stretched abraded anus [and r ] ecent mutilating cuts of the genital region, postmortem ). Notably, Holland conceded during the hearing on his motion that the autopsy report does mention a time element. Vol. XII, at 2087-88. It would seem to go without saying that the State might delve into this matter at trial and ask McGarry to expound upon this time element in a more specific manner. Albeit Holland was not duty-bound to interview or interrogate McGarry prior to trial, his failure to do so is somewhat surprising  particularly in view of the fact that a pathologist's testimony in a case like this one would be critical to the State's case and detrimental to the defense's. Cf. Whittington v. State, 523 So.2d 966, 976 (Miss. 1988) (defense was given complete access prior to trial to Dr. McCormick, the pathologist who performed an autopsy on the victim). In sum, Holland seems to have expected too much from the State. Accord Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972) (We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all ... investigatory work on a case.). This Court's rejection of Holland's contention is also based, in part, on his failure to take advantage of the trial judge's willingness to provide him with an unlimited opportunity to interview McGarry. That is, the judge had complied with the Box guideline by granting Holland a reasonable opportunity to interview the witness and to familiarize himself with the evidence. But the record indicates that Holland declined to interview McGarry about his opinions. [16] An interview or examination might have lent credence to Holland's claim upon which he based his motion; it might have yielded information supportive of his own case; or it might have led him to conclude that McGarry's testimony would not be prejudicial as originally thought. Holland's failure flies in the face of the Box guideline. Holland chose not to exercise this opportunity for reasons not made known and, thus, he rendered himself less informed or uninformed about what he was and is now claiming. This Court therefore holds him to that choice. Finally, the record reveals that Holland waited too long before raising an objection. On the seventh day of trial between 3:27 and 4:10 p.m., the State announced its intention to question McGarry about the time and sequence when Krystal's injuries occurred: Judge, we are going to have in evidence from Dr. McGarry as to when, in his opinion as a forensic pathologist, these wounds occurred. [17] Holland did not raise an objection until the eighth day of trial at approximately 5:07 p.m. when the State fulfilled its intention and asked McGarry the question. Vol. XII, at 2058-59. Thus, Holland's failure to raise an objection when he first learned of the State's intention is deemed a waiver. In sum, this Court affirms on this issue. [18]
In this case, investigators employed a so-called sexual assault kit to collect samples of Krystal's body fluids. Holland filed a motion requesting preservation of these samples for future testing by his expert. The trial judge granted Holland's request and ordered the State's expert, Larry Turner, to use no more than half the samples in his testing and to preserve the remaining half for testing by Holland's forensic expert. Turner complied with the judge's order and conducted various serological tests. The testing revealed the presence of acid phosphate, an enzyme which is a strong indicator of the presence of semen. About a year later, Holland received the samples after his proposed expert, Dr. Dennis Canfield, was adjudged qualified to conduct the testing. Canfield's testing revealed the presence of no acid phosphate  a result which contradicts Turner's test results. Holland then filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that he was prejudiced because his receipt of the samples was untimely  untimely because he did not receive them until almost one year after Turner conducted his testing. This, he says, resulted in a degradation of the samples which left him unable to accurately and conclusively test them for the presence of semen. For support, he cites the inconsistent test results reached by Turner and Canfield. Holland conceded that he believed neither the State nor Turner is guilty of any misconduct. Upon completion of a lengthy hearing, the judge overruled Holland's motion, and Holland appealed. Id. at 2153.
In this appeal, Holland contends: It is unconscionable that the State's delay in producing th[e samples] result [ sic ] in such a gross prejudice to [his] ability to examine and test this evidence  a prejudice that was all too obvious during the cross-examination of [his] expert [Canfield]. Appellant's Brief at 44-45. Holland adds: [D]ue process requires that a criminal defendant have access to physical evidence for independent testing. Id. at 43. The State counters that Holland's contention is unequivocally contrary to dispositive constitutional law  i.e., his due process rights were not violated. Appellee's Brief at 29-32.
The record is simply devoid of any evidence to substantiate Holland's contention that his untimely receipt of the samples was due to the State's employment of dilatory tactics which resulted in a prejudicial degradation of potentially-exculpatory evidence. The record reveals the State fully complied with the judge's order to preserve half the samples. Indeed, Holland conceded during the hearing:  We are not saying there was any misconduct certainly by Mr. Turner or by the State.  Vol. XII, at 2114. And Holland's own expert, Canfield, disputes his degradation theory. Id. at 2130-31. Any delay in receiving the samples was due to (1) Holland's inaction  i.e., his failure to simply go and get the samples from Turner who had properly preserved and stored them for him and (2) his mistaken belief that Turner had used up all the samples. Id. at 2114-16. Because the record reveals no evidence of bad faith on the part of the State, no constitutional violation has been committed. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S.Ct. 455, 466, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 481 (1971) (no constitutional violation committed because there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage); see Knapp, Prosecution's Failure to Preserve Potentially Exculpatory Evidence As Violating Criminal Defendant's Due Process Rights Under Federal Constitution  Supreme Court Cases, 102 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1989). In sum, this Court affirms on this issue.
The trial judge granted Holland's instruction on the lesser-included offense of murder. Vol. I, at 143. But he refused Holland's three manslaughter instructions. Id. at 153-56; Vol. XIII, at 2310-12. These instructions refer to Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-47 (1972): Every other killing of a human being, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, and without authority of law, not provided for in this title, shall be manslaughter.
Holland contends that his instructions should have been granted because a legally-sufficient evidentiary basis existed. He contends that a manslaughter instruction was tantamount to resolving the conflict between his theory that Krystal's death was accidental and the State's theory that Krystal's death could not have been accidental. Appellant's Brief at 37-40. The State counters that, in view of the evidence, it cannot agree that a jury could have ever found that Holland did not intend to murder Krystal. The State contends that the least crime that [Holland] could have been found guilty of ... is that of murder  on which the trial judge instructed. Appellee's Brief at 26-29.
Mississippi law on granting instructions on lesser-included offenses is clear. Trial judges should be mindful of the disparity in maximum punishments which may be imposed upon conviction of the principal offense or upon the lesser[-included] offense. Boyd v. State, 557 So.2d 1178, 1181 (Miss. 1989). As a general rule, where the disparity is great this Court has required lesser included instructions to be given. Id. (citing Griffin v. State, 533 So.2d 444, 447 (Miss. 1988)). This general rule is tempered somewhat; trial judges cannot indiscriminately give a lesser included offense instruction. Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 22 (Miss. 1990) (citing Boyd, 557 So.2d at 1181). Basically, a lesser-included-offense instruction should be granted if, in view of the evidence, a reasonable juror `could find the defendant not guilty of the principal offense charged in the indictment yet guilty of the lesser included offense.' Mease v. State, 539 So.2d 1324, 1330 (Miss. 1989) (quoting Monroe v. State, 515 So.2d 860, 863 (Miss. 1987)); see Stringer v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1108, 1115 (5th Cir.1988) (rejecting Stringer's new complaint that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of non-capital murder or manslaughter, the Fifth Circuit held that he introduced no evidence on which the jury rationally could have found him guilty of a lesser offense and acquitted him of the greater offense); Swanier v. State, 473 So.2d 180, 188 (Miss. 1985) (where the evidence does not warrant a manslaughter instruction, one should not be given); Fairckild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 799-802 (Miss. 1984) (defendant entitled to simple murder instruction, but not to manslaughter instruction). Conversely, [o]nly where the evidence could only justify a conviction of the principal charge should a lesser[-included] offense instruction be refused. Mease, 539 So.2d at 1330. In sum, a lesser included offense instruction must be granted where a reasonable juror could not on the evidence exclude the lesser-included offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Boyd, 557 So.2d at 1182 (citation omitted).
Holland contends that the record contains evidence that the injuries Krystal sustained were the consequence of an unfortunate accident. For support, Holland cites statements he had made about an accidental stabbing to his roommate, Douglas, and to detectives during his taped confession. Holland believes that these statements warranted a manslaughter instruction. Holland is mistaken. The statements he had made to Douglas were not even consistent: DOUGLAS: [He] gave me two different stories ... about what happened. Q.: You said it was about five minutes between [his telling you] the first story and ... the second . ..? Douglas: Right. ... . [According to the first story, h]e said that they [were in the bedroom and] she was playing around with a knife and that she accidentally scratched him across his belly or chest ... with the tip of the knife. ... . He said that he went to take the knife away from her and some how it wound up in her chest. ... . [According to the second story,] they were wrestling around on the bed, playing around, and she rolled off the bed and fell onto the knife. Vol. IX, at 1543-51; State's Exh. 1, at 4. During his taped confession, Holland related yet another story: I grabbed [Krystal's] wrist and I was going to take [the knife] away from her ... and I bumped into her chest and she says `I'm dead.' State's Exh. 8, at 3. Clearly, these inconsistent statements do not constitute a legally sufficient evidentiary predicate for a Section 97-3-[47] manslaughter instruction. Mease, 539 So.2d at 1324. Conversely, the State successfully repudiated Holland's accident theory. Of all the evidence discoverable in the record the most damaging derives from the unrebutted testimony of McGarry, whose autopsy revealed that the stab wound could not have been inflicted under any one of the inconsistent scenarios related by Holland to Douglas and the detectives. McGARRY: [T]he wound produced in Krystal King's body was one [caused] by a violent thrust of the knife against ... her chest with enough violence to indent the front of her chest. This would not happen if she were struck by an accidental movement or casual movement by the knife. Vol. XII, at 2177-80. The evidence in this case could only justify a conviction of the principal charge (capital murder) or the lesser-included offense (murder) and, therefore, the even lesser-included offense (manslaughter) was properly deleted from the instructions. Id. at 1330. See this Court's opinion in Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803 (Miss. 1987). [19] Assume arguendo that Holland's unsubstantiated theory were true. Assume, for example, that Krystal had been waving the knife around in a playful manner; that Holland prudently but unsuccessfully attempted to take the knife from her to avert potential injury; and that Krystal died when she rolled off the bed and onto the knife. This scenario alone would not constitute evidence of the crime of manslaughter; rather, it would constitute evidence of innocence of any crime. Holland wouldn't even be guilty of simple negligence. [20] In sum, the record contains no evidence of absence of malice  the principle element of manslaughter. The evidence, however, only supports a conviction of the greater offense. Mackbee, 575 So.2d at 23. Restated, Holland failed to compose a convincing argument evincing a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a rational or a reasonable juror `could find the defendant not guilty of the principal offense charged in the indictment yet guilty of the lesser included offense.' Mease, 539 So.2d at 1330 (quoting Monroe v. State, 515 So.2d 860, 863 (Miss. 1987)). The trial judge did grant an instruction on the lesser-included offense of murder; he could have acted cautiously and granted the manslaughter instruction. In view of the evidence, however, the judge's refusal should be deemed proper. See Boyd, 557 So.2d at 1178 (For some unknown reason, our competent and able trial judges continue to refuse instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence warrants them. This in essence allows the jury to hear the defendant's side of the story... . [However,] the trial judge cannot indiscriminately give the instructions.).
Under objection by Holland, the trial judge granted the following instruction: Instruction S-2 The Court instructs the jury that malice aforethought as charged in the indictment in this cause and as referred to in other instructions of the Court is a state of mind and does not have to exist in the mind of the slayer for any given length of time, and if the defendant, at the very moment of the fatal blow did so with the deliberate design to take the life of the deceased, Krystal D. King, then it was malice aforethought as if the deliberate design had existed in the mind of the defendant for minutes, hours, days, or weeks or even years. Vol. I, at 133. Holland contends that this instruction should not have been granted because it rules out manslaughter[] and is in hopeless conflict with [a] manslaughter instruction. Appellant's Brief at 40-43 (quoting Windham v. State, 520 So.2d 123, 126 (Miss. 1987)). Because the trial judge properly denied the manslaughter instruction, this Court affirms on the issue.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court holds that the evidence presented was sufficient to convince a rational factfinder of Holland's guilt of capital murder and the underlying crime of rape beyond a reasonable doubt.

Upon conclusion of the guilt phase, at 2:49 p.m., the judge excused the jury while he and the attorneys discussed some preliminary matters regarding the sentencing phase. Vol. XIV, at 2403-04. At 3:11 p.m., the judge received a note from the jury. The note read: We, the jury, sentence Gerald James Holland to death. Holland immediately moved for a mistrial, which the judge overruled. Id. at 2407-09. Instead, the judge summoned the jury to the courtroom and instructed it accordingly: Ladies and gentlemen, I have received your note and I want to let you know that the guilt stage of the trial is over with. There are certain administrative matters that the Court has to dispose of before we get to the second phase, which is the sentencing phase. At that stage there will be, of course, some testimony and I will instruct you as to the law that will govern the deliberations at that stage. Until we get to that point, I instruct you to refrain from any further deliberations. I can't tell you the exact time, but it will be shortly and the Court will bring you back out here and the Court will begin the sentencing phase, the second stage of the  Jury go to the jury room. Id. at 2411. The sentencing phase eventually commenced and, after approximately 2 hours and 43 minutes of testimony and argument, the phase concluded. The jury then deliberated for approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes before returning a sentence of death. Id. at 2439-513. Holland now questions the judge's decision to overrule his motion for a mistrial.
Holland contends that a mistrial should have been granted because the jurors not only deliberated prior to the presentation of evidence and instructions, they arrived at a verdict, and thereby abandoned any pretense of impartiality going into the sentencing phase. Appellant's Brief at 5-6 (citing cases). The State counters that: It is clear that the jury deliberated some two hours and ten minutes after receiving the instructions of the court at the end of testimony and arguments in the sentence phase of the trial. Clearly the jury followed the instructions of the Court and made the proper findings prior to imposing the sentence of death. The length of time that the jury took to arrive at its verdict demonstrates that it did not simply walk in the jury room and copy the verdict of death down. That would have only taken minutes. The length of time clearly shows that the jury seriously considered the aggravating and mitigating factors prior to arriving at their verdict. Appellee's Brief at 9. The State adds that jurors are presumed to follow the instructions of the court. Id. (citing cases). Alternatively, the State contends that, assuming that the judge erred, the error at most should be deemed harmless: It cannot be said, after considering all the evidence presented, that the jury would not have found that the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances and sentenced the defendant to death. Id. at 10 (citing cases).

The Sixth Amendment, in part, guarantees the criminal defendant the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) (applying the sixth-amendment right to states through the fourteenth amendment); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 402 (1977) (sentencing process ... must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause); Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 670 (Miss. 1990) (constitutional guarantees which are applicable to guilt phase are also applicable to sentencing phase); Dycus v. State, 440 So.2d 246, 257-58 (Miss. 1983) (same). Jurors must not discuss a case among themselves until all the evidence has been presented, counsel have made final arguments, and the case has been submitted to them after final instructions by the trial court. State v. Washington, 182 Conn. 419, 438 A.2d 1144, 1147 (1980) (citing several treatises); accord State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 253 S.E.2d 103 (1979); State v. Drake, 31 N.C. App. 187, 229 S.E.2d 51 (1976). In short, each juror [must] keep an open mind until the case has been submitted to the jury. United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.1974). An open mind is critical because: [A]n opinion [prematurely] formed could only be removed, if at all, by evidence. This in effect shift[s] the burden of proof and place[s] upon the defendants the burden of changing by evidence the opinion thus formed. A juror having in discussion not only formed but expressed his view as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, his inclination thereafter would be to give special attention to such testimony as to his mind strengthened, confirmed or vindicated the views which he had already expressed to his fellow jurors, whereas, had there been no discussion and no expression of tentative opinion, he would not be confronted with embarrassment before his fellow jurors should he change the tentative opinion which he might entertain from hearing evidence. Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir.1945); accord United States v. Aaron Burr, 25 F.Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.Va. 1807) (Such a person may believe that he will be regulated by testimony, but the law suspects him, and certainly not without reason. He will listen with more favor to that testimony which confirms, than to that which would change his opinion; it is not to be expected that he will weigh evidence or argument as fairly as a man whose judgment is not made up in the case.); Washington, 438 A.2d at 1148 (Once a juror has expressed an opinion ... the die may well have been cast.). Admittedly, not every incident of juror misconduct requires a new trial. Klee, 494 F.2d at 396. A new trial may be unwarranted if the misconduct is proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be harmless. Washington, 438 A.2d at 1149 (Inasmuch as the error was one of constitutional dimension, it is incumbent upon the state to show that it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.) (citing Aillon v. State, 168 Conn. 541, 363 A.2d 49 (1975)). Meeting this burden has generally been a formidable task because, [a]lmost without exception, where the issue has been properly raised, every court has held that ... [mere] discuss[ion by jurors of] the case before its submission to them constitutes reversible error. Id. at 1148 (citing numerous cases from various jurisdictions); see, e.g., State v. Gill, 273 S.C. 190, 255 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1979) (an oft-cited, capital-murder case which the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed because jurors prematurely commenced deliberations).
Applying the law to the facts, this Court concludes that the jury's premature deliberations prejudiced Holland's right to a fair hearing during the sentencing phase. A different conclusion may have been reached had the trial judge questioned the jurors in order to determine whether each of them could have remained impartial. See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir.1984) (mistrial unwarranted because the trial judge removed two jurors who prematurely deliberated and questioned each of the remaining jurors and determined each was not influenced); United States v. Anello, 765 F.2d 253 (1st Cir.1985) (same); People v. Castillo, 144 A.D.2d 376, 534 N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d Dep't 1988) (same); see also Jones, 461 So.2d at 692 (trial court is certainly free to employ a second jury if it wishes). In some jurisdictions, trial judges are required or advised to conduct a thorough inquiry when a juror or jurors prematurely deliberated or formed an opinion. In the case sub judice, the judge merely instructed the jurors to refrain from further deliberations. This instruction was insufficient to insure that Holland's right to a fair hearing was not prejudiced. The case must be remanded for re-sentencing by an impartial jury.
In view of this Court's holding that this case must be remanded for re-sentencing, the remaining issues will not be reached. Before concluding, this Court feels compelled to place the State on notice regarding a matter relating to the evidentiary sufficiency of the aggravating circumstance  previously convicted of ... a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(5)(b) (1990 Supp.). To prove that Holland had previously committed a felony involving the use or threat of violence, the State introduced a county court JUDGMENT in Texas involving a 1974 criminal conviction for raping a child. This may not constitute sufficient evidence of involvement of violence. This Court recognizes that, generally, rape is a crime inhering the element of violence. However, this Court also recognizes that consensual, non-violent intercourse with an individual under 18 years of age may constitute a violation of this and other states' statutory-rape statute. See, e.g., id. § 97-3-67 (1990 Supp.); see also State v. Gill, 273 S.C. 190, 255 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1979). Although a trial court is not required to examine the underlying legal validity of the prior conviction, Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1099 (Miss. 1987); Phillips v. State, 421 So.2d 476, 481 (Miss. 1982), determining whether a defendant's prior conviction was a felony involving the use or threat of violence requires that this state's statutes be construed and applied. Where as here the conviction occurred in a sister state, this Court does not look to how that state characterizes the question of whether the crime was one of violence, rather, the analysis must be done under Mississippi law. For a conviction to qualify as predicate for an aggravating circumstance under this state's statutes, the conviction from the sister state must have been acquired under a statute which has as an element the use or threat of violence against the person or, by necessity, must involve conduct that is inherently violent or presents a serious potential risk of physical violence to another. United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1010-11 (9th Cir.1988). The State has this burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of each aggravating circumstance. Nixon, 533 So.2d at 1099. On retrial, the trial court should examine the evidentiary sufficiency of this aggravating circumstance. The Court also notes that the aggravating circumstance of especially heinous, atrocious or cruel offense was submitted for jury consideration. The limiting instruction proposed in Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss. 1979), to channel the jury's discretion in considering this aggravating circumstance, was also granted. The limiting instruction should again be granted if the same aggravating circumstance is submitted. Berry v. State, 575 So.2d 1 (Miss. 1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988).