Opinion ID: 881995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONS Corrections Division Bureau of Probation and Parole REPORT OF VIOLATION

Text: To: Seventh Judicial District Court Sidney, Montana Date: June 2, 1982 Name: BRUNSVOLD, Milton Dean No. Docket # 1249-C, DOI# AO13 490 The foregoing report of probation set forth the details of the original sentencing, the reports of violations and the factual determinations by Bennett. It is that Report of Violation which contains the erroneous calculation which affords the basis for the suit against Bennett. That report stated as follows: It should be noted, however, that Mr. John O'Hern, Probation and Parole Agent in Missoula, Montana is now deceased and in reference to the recent Miller/Blackerby rulings, which requires good time be given while on a suspended sentence, this officer has computed this subjects discharge date as at approximately July 25, 1982. In any event, it is this officers opinion that this subject has disregarded the conditions imposed by the Court and should be located and returned to the Court of Jurisdiction for a hearing on this matter and the two (2) year suspended sentence be revoked. (Emphasis added.) Clearly Bennett was following the statutory requirements which apply to his job as a parole and probation officer. Applying the test used with Warden Risley, it appears that he clearly was discharging an official duty associated with judicial actions of the court, as the sole purpose for the Report of Violation is summed up in the last quoted paragraph where he expresses the opinion that defendant had disregarded the court imposed conditions and should be returned to the court for revocation of his two year sentence. The action of Bennett is more closely related to the District Court than was true of Warden Risley. The only purpose for the Report of Violation was to express an opinion which would result in court action. In contrast, all Risley did was to place the defendant in prison, and all actions subsequent to that were under his own administrative control and required no reporting to the District Court. I conclude that the actions of Parole and Probation Officer Bennett in submitting the Report of Violation were clearly actions of an agent of the judiciary discharging an official duty associated with judicial actions of the court and as a result that Bennett was immune under § 2-9-112, MCA. In addition, the facts of this case bring it within the holding of this Court in Knutson v. State of Montana (1984), 211 Mont. 126, 683 P.2d 488, where this Court stated: There is no need for semantics in this case, however. The immunity statute applies to judicial acts with no stated limitation. It applies to protect the state and governmental agencies whenever the judicial power of the state is put to use in a judicial action.... Knutson argues on appeal that the immunity statute does not apply here because the Department of Institutions breached its duty to determine the good time to which he was entitled and to notify the District Court accordingly. She contends that the District Court in this case acted only as a vehicle through which the harm caused by the Department of Institutions affected her. That argument is a substantial change in theory from her earlier complaint in this case, yet it avails Knutson nothing. Sentences are pronounced by courts, not by the Department of Institutions. Knutson's sentencing was the result of a judicial act. Further, the immunity statute protects any governmental agency involved in the judicial act of sentencing. (Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.) Knutson held that a computation of good time by the Department of Institutions was included as a part of the judicial act of sentencing. The Court points out that sentences are pronounced by courts and not by the Department of Institutions  that is of course applicable here because the sentence ultimately determined was not pronounced by Bennett but by the district judge. Knutson further emphasizes that the immunity statute protects any governmental agency involved in the judicial act of sentencing. The holding of Knutson applies here. I dissent from the majority conclusion that the actions of Bennett were not entitled to judicial immunity under § 2-9-112, MCA. HARRISON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissent.