Opinion ID: 1191793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Multiple sexual assaults, continuing offenses, and the Hawai`i Penal Code

Text: As we have indicated, the prosecution in the present case invites us to apply the continuing offense construct to HRS §§ 707-730(1)(b) and 707-732(1)(b) so as to treat them as two continuous offenses, sexual contact with a minor and sexual penetration of a minor. We cannot. HRS § 701-102(1) (1993) provides that [n]o behavior constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation under [the HPC] or another statute of this State. Accordingly, [t]here are no common-law offenses in [Hawai`i].... That all offenses should be adequately proscribed by statute seems at this point of legal development a dictate of fundamental fairness. Commentary on HRS § 701-102. See also HRS § 1-1 (1993) (The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is declared to be the common law of the State of [Hawai`i] in all cases, . . . provided that no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as provided by the written laws of the United States or of the State.); State v. Ching, 62 Haw. 656, 658, 619 P.2d 93, 94 (1980) (In this jurisdiction, there are no common law offenses[.] (Citation omitted.)). Correlatively, it is a purpose of the HPC to define and codify certain specific offenses which constitute harms to basic social interests which the [HPC] seeks to protect. HRS § 701-103 (1993). The provisions of [the HPC] cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for [t]herein; however, in order to promote justice and effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of the words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision. HRS § 701-104 (1993). See Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 45, 904 P.2d at 930. It is within the foregoing statutory context as applied to the statutory elements and general principles described in section III.A.1. of this opinion, supra that we must consider whether, as the prosecution urges in the present appeal, sexual assault in the first degree as defined by HRS § 707-730(1)(b), see supra note 2, and sexual assault in the third degree as defined by HRS § 707-732(1)(b), see supra note 1, respectively describe continuous offenses of sexual penetration of a minor and sexual contact with a minor. This court has defined a continuing offense as a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy[, or] an offense which continues day by day[, or] a breach of the criminal law, not terminated by a single act or fact, but subsisting for a definite period and intended to cover or apply to successive similar obligations or occurrences. State v. Temple, 65 Haw. 261, 267 n. 6, 650 P.2d 1358, 1362 n. 6 (1982) (citation omitted). Put differently, [t]he test to determine whether [a] defendant intended to commit more than one offense in the course of a criminal episode is whether the evidence discloses one general intent or discloses separate and distinct intents. If there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, there is but one offense. Ganal, 81 Hawai`i at 379, 917 P.2d at 391 (quoting State v. Castro, 69 Haw. 633, 653, 756 P.2d 1033, 1047 (1988)) (quotation signals omitted). The parameters of continuing offenses are circumscribed by HRS §§ 701-108(4) (1995), 701-109(1)(e) (1993), and 701-118(4) (1993), see supra at note 9. Examples of continuing offenses, within the meaning of the HPC, include: (1) first degree murder, in violation of HRS § 707-701(1)(a) (1993), whereby a person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of ... [m]ore than one person in the same or separate incident (a substantive offense apparently unique to Hawai`i); Ganal, 81 Hawai`i at 378-79 & n. 25, 384, 917 P.2d at 390-91 & n. 25, 396; (2) first degree robbery, in violation of HRS § 708-840(1)(b) (1993); Hoey, 77 Hawai`i at 38 & n. 19, 881 P.2d at 525 & n. 19; (3) under certain circumstances, kidnapping, in violation of HRS § 707-720(1)(c) (1993); id. at 38 & n. 20, 881 P.2d at 525 & n. 20; (4) theft of a firearm, in violation of HRS §§ 708-830(7) (1993) and 708-830.5(1)(b) (1993); Temple, 65 Haw. at 266-68, 650 P.2d at 1361-62; and (5) theft of state property by deception, in violation of HRS § 708-830(2) (1993); State v. Martin, 62 Haw. 364, 367-69, 616 P.2d 193, 196-97 (1980). Each of these offenses is statutorily defined as an uninterrupted and continuing course of conduct, or manifests a plain legislative purpose to be treated as such, or both. See HRS §§ 701-108(4), 701-109(1)(e), and 701-118(4), supra at note 9. The same cannot be said, however, with respect to the statutory scheme relating to sexual offenses, HRS §§ 707-730 through 707-741 (1993), which the legislature substantially reorganized in 1986. See 1986 Haw.Sess.L.Act 314 [hereinafter, Act 314], §§ 48 and 57 at 615, 617-18. When interpreting this statutory scheme, we abide by several established rules of statutory construction. First, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute[s] themselves. Mathewson v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 82 Hawai`i 57, 71, 919 P.2d 969, 983 (1996) (citation and quotation signals omitted); State v. Kwak, 80 Hawai`i 291, 295, 909 P.2d 1106, 1110 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), reconsideration granted, 80 Hawai`i 297, 909 P.2d 1112 (1995); Norton v. Administrative Director of Court, State of Hawai`i, 80 Hawai`i 197, 201, 908 P.2d 545, 549 (1995) (citation omitted); Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 80 Hawai`i 54, 67, 905 P.2d 29, 42 (1995) (citation omitted); Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i at 18, 904 P.2d at 903 (citation omitted); Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Castle, 79 Hawai`i 64, 77, 898 P.2d 576, 589 (1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Aluli, 78 Hawai`i at 320, 893 P.2d at 171 (citation omitted); State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 351, 845 P.2d 547, 551, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 849 P.2d 81 (1993) (citation omitted). Second, [l]aws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another. HRS § 1-16 (1993); Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai`i 46, 55, 868 P.2d 1193, 1202, reconsideration denied, 76 Hawai`i 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994) (citation omitted). And, third, [t]he legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction[,] and illogicality. State v. Malufau, 80 Hawai`i 126, 137, 906 P.2d 612, 623 (1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The legislature has explained the purposes underlying its reorganization of the statutory scheme governing sexual offenses, effected by Act 314, as follows: The crimes of rape and sodomy have been eliminated[,] as well as the voluntary social companion distinction between first and second degree rape and sodomy offenses. All of the sexual offenses have been incorporated into five degrees of sexual assault.[ [15] ] The creation of the intermediate level of bodily injury allows for a graduated, five-level sexual assault scheme running from class A to a petty misdemeanor[,] which provides punishment [that] reflects the seriousness of the offense committed.... Hse.Conf.Comm.Rep. No. 51-86, in 1986 House Journal, at 938; Sen.Conf.Comm.Rep. No. 51-86, in 1986 Senate Journal, at 748. In order to underscore its intent that each distinct sexual offense be subject to separate punishment, the legislature added a definition of sexual penetration to HRS § 707-700, see supra note 2, which provides, inter alia, that [f]or purposes of this chapter, each act of sexual penetration shall constitute a separate offense. Act 314, § 48 at 615. The new definition clarified that, even though rape and sodomy [were] renamed sexual assault offenses, the prosecutors [could] still multiple charge a defendant for each act of penetration. Hse. Conf.Comm.Rep. No. 51-86, in 1986 House Journal, at 938; Sen.Conf.Comm.Rep. No. 51-86, in 1986 Senate Journal, at 748. [16] Given the clear language of, and interrelationship among, the provisions of the statutory scheme governing sexual offenses, there is little wonder that the appellate courts of this state have consistently recognized that each act constituting a sexual assault is punishable as a separate and distinct offense. State v. Horswill, 75 Haw. 152, 857 P.2d 579 (1993) is a recent example. Horswill was convicted of multiple offenses, including two counts of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of sexual assault in the third degree. The evidence at trial established that, within a brief and uninterrupted period of time, Horswill ... placed his mouth on Complainant's breast [and] made her (1) place his penis in her mouth; (2) place her hands on his penis; and (3) place his penis in her vagina. Shortly thereafter, Horswill fell asleep. When Complainant attempted to leave, Horswill awoke, choked her, and placed her back in bed. They had intercourse a second time, after which Horswill again fell asleep. 75 Haw. at 155, 857 P.2d at 581. Affirming Horswill's convictions on appeal, this court ruled, inter alia, that it is possible for a defendant in the context of one criminal transaction to commit several acts independently violative of one or more statutes, and he or she may be punished for all of them if charges are properly consolidated by the prosecution in one trial. Id. at 162, 857 P.2d at 584 (citations omitted). In State v. Rulona, 71 Haw. 127, 785 P.2d 615 (1990), the defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 707-730(1)(b), and two counts of sexual assault in the third degree, in violation of HRS § 707-732(1)(b), all of the offenses being committed against the same minor. He appealed one of his first degree sexual assault convictions on the ground that there was no allegation, nor any proof of penetration of the alleged victim's vagina by his tongue. 71 Haw. at 128, 785 P.2d at 616. In support of his point of error, the defendant pointed to the fact that first degree sexual assault, against a person under 14 years of age, requires sexual penetration, while third degree sexual assault, of such a person, merely requires sexual contact. Id. This court rejected the defendant's argument:[ [17] ] Sexual penetration is defined, among other things, in HRS § 707-700 as including cunnilingus. Cunnilingus is not defined in the penal code. The word is derived from the Latin word cunnus meaning the vulva and the Latin verb linctus[,] the act of licking, and thus is defined as the stimulation of the vulva, or clitoris, with the lips or tongue. See Webster's New International Dictionary (3d ed. 1976). It may seem anomalous that touching the vulva with the penis, without physical penetration, would apparently constitute sexual contact and, hence, in the case of a child under 14, would constitute third degree sexual assault, while touching the same spot with the tongue, without physical penetration, would nevertheless constitute sexual penetration for the purposes of the [HPC], and thus be sexual assault in the first degree. Nevertheless, it is the legislature's prerogative to act anomalously, if it wishes. The language of the statute is clear and [the defendant's] point . . . is not well taken. Id. at 128-29, 785 P.2d at 616. Inasmuch as the plain language of HRS § 707-700 interposes any penetration, however slight as a precondition to sexual penetration in any of its forms, see supra note 2, the Rulona court's analytical judgment that sexual penetration of the complainant had been proved as to the count at issue before it appears questionable to us. What is not questionable, however, is the fact that the defendant was properly charged with four separate and distinctly punishable offenses against the minor victim and that his allegedly unlawful conduct did not constitute a single continuing offense. In State v. Hoopii, 68 Haw. 246, 710 P.2d 1193 (1985), a pre-Act 314 case, the defendant engaged in the following conduct, which the prosecution in the present matter would presumably characterize, inter alia, as the continuous offense of sexual penetration of a minor: [The defendant] abducted the [six-year-old] girl as she walked home from school. He first drove her to a beach area off Lagoon Drive, then to another unknown location, and then back to the original beach area. At some point, he tied the girl's wrists and ankles with rope and covered her mouth and eyes with tape. He later untied her, removed her clothing and raped and sodomized her. 68 Haw. at 247, 710 P.2d at 1194 (emphases added). Affirming the circuit court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the multiple counts pursuant to HRS § 701-109(1)(e), see supra note 9, the Hoopii court reasoned as follows: HRS § 701-109(1)(e) prohibits multiple convictions where the defendant's actions constitute an uninterrupted, continuing course of conduct. This prohibition, however, does not apply where these actions constitute separate offenses under the law. Furthermore, where a defendant in the context of one criminal scheme or transaction commits several acts independently violative of one or more statutes, he may be punished for all of them if charges are properly consolidated by the [prosecution] in one trial. State v. Pilago, 65 Haw. 22, 24, 649 P.2d 363, 365 (1982); State v. Pia, 55 Haw. 14, 19, 514 P.2d 580, 585 (1973). In this case, [the defendant] committed and completed the act of kidnapping at the moment he restrained the victim by abducting her, putting her in his van and driving away. Any restraint which continued throughout the subsequent rape and sodomy was not necessary to the perpetration of the kidnapping. State v. Decenso, 5 Haw.App. 127, 135, 681 P.2d 573, 580 (1984). [The defendant] would still be subject to prosecution for kidnapping had he not continued to restrain the victim throughout the rape and sodomy. Moreover, these later acts themselves constituted separate and independent offenses. Id. at 251-52, 710 P.2d at 1197 (footnote omitted) (emphases added). See also State v. Molitoni, 6 Haw.App. 77, 79-80, 711 P.2d 1303, 1305-06 (holding, pursuant to HRS § 701-109, that three separate criminal acts [against the complainant] occurred where, in sequence and rapid order, the defendant 1) squeezed and sucked [the complainant's] breasts; 2) touched her vagina with his hand and `put his fingers in [her]'; and 3) inserted his penis into her vagina (some brackets in original and some added)), cert. denied, 68 Haw. 692 (1985).