Opinion ID: 1989584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Purported vagueness.

Text: Finally, Judge Glickman argues that we should adopt Nationwide's plain meaning construction of the exclusion because, he says, the majority's interpretation of the clause is too vague. He cites Doerr, 774 So.2d at 134-36, in which the court indicated that a number of different factors should be considered in the determination whether an insured is a polluter. This approach, according to our dissenting colleague, denies the exclusion its requisite clarity. [43] But it is the court's duty to determine whether or not the situation before ithere Ms. Richardson's inhalation of carbon monoxide fumes from an apartment house furnacefalls within the absolute pollution exclusion in REO's policy. [44] We must make that determination on the basis of the language of the exclusion and the circumstances surrounding its adoption. Merriam, 107 U.S. at 441, 2 S.Ct. 536. If we conclude, as we believe that we must, that the case before us falls outside the exclusion because it does not involve the kind of situation for which the exclusion was designed, we are not free to hold otherwise because of the possibility that other, different cases may be more difficult to decide. In other words, it would be impermissible for the court to deny coverage to which an insured is entitled on the merits in order to avoid potential complexities in hypothetical future litigation. We note, in any event, that our dissenting colleague has also recognized a limiting principle to the language of the exclusionit must be given its ordinary meaning in common parlance, see page 344, post and that the clarity and certainty of result which he claims for his approach, if adopted, might very well in the end also prove somewhat ephemeral.