Opinion ID: 1182860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Penal Code Section 1118 Mandates a Judgment of Acquittal for Insufficiency of the Evidence at the Close of the Prosecution's Case in Chief Even in the Absence of a Defendant's Motion Therefor

Text: The dissent asserts that the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of firing a shotgun at an inhabited dwelling  a vicious crime. This assertion is based on the untenable assumption that the proceedings below were all valid; that the trial judge properly denied defendant's motion for acquittal, made after the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, because of the absence of specifications regarding the insufficiency of the evidence; and that the trial judge then properly admitted the prosecution's rebuttal evidence and properly found defendant guilty based on (1) the accomplice's hearsay out-of-court statements inconsistent with his exculpatory testimony, and (2) the corroboration evidence introduced by the prosecution in rebuttal. Although I consider that the majority opinion has set forth, by rather persuasive reasoning, that defendant was not validly found guilty of the offense charged, I do not agree entirely with the majority's interpretation of Penal Code section 1118, and thus deem it appropriate to add some comments of my own. The majority opinion points out that Penal Code section 1118 authorizes the trial court to order a judgment of acquittal on its own motion as well as on a defendant's motion. It is my view, however, that Penal Code section 1118 mandates and requires the trial court to order a judgment of acquittal when, at the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the evidence is insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction. The language of section 1118 does not logically permit of an interpretation that gives the trial judge a discretion to refuse to order a judgment of acquittal in the face of insufficiency of the evidence, whether a defendant has made a motion for a judgment of acquittal or not. California's Penal Code section 1118 is substantially the same as rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and thus should receive the same construction. Rule 29(a) provides, in pertinent part for the issue before us, that [t]he court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. (Italics added.) Rule 29(a) has been interpreted to be mandatory and not discretionary if the prosecution's evidence in its case-in-chief is insufficient to sustain a defendant's conviction. In Cephus v. United States (D.C. Cir.1963) 324 F.2d 893, the trial judge erroneously denied the defendant's motion for an acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief. Thereafter, during the defense presentation, a codefendant gave testimony against the defendant and the jury convicted the defendant. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, the court rejected the prosecution's contention that, once there has been a denial of the motion for an acquittal, made after the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the appellate court is required to consider all the evidence introduced against defendant, and not just the prosecution's evidence presented in its case-in-chief, in determining whether the defendant is entitled to a reversal of the trial court's erroneous denial of the defendant's motion for an acquittal. But Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure makes it clear that the first ruling [the denial of the motion for acquittal made at the close of the prosecution's case in chief] is not discretionary in criminal cases. A judgment of acquittal is mandatory if the Government's case is insufficient. The trial judge has no discretion to reserve his ruling in the expectation that the defendant will testify. ( Cephus, supra, 324 F.2d 893, 897; fn. omitted.) It was also stated in Cephus that [a] defendant cannot be boxed out of his Rule 29(a) rights by forcing him to go to trial with a co-defendant, or by waiting hopefully for him to convict himself ( id., at p. 898) (conc. opn.), and that [i]f the denial of the motion was erroneous when made, it should be corrected on appeal. Few errors of law are as prejudicial to the defendant. Subsequent testimony cannot `cure' the error. ( Id., at p. 898; fn. 2.) (Conc. opn.) It is significant that rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has been interpreted to require a judgment of acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence even if the defendant does not make a motion for a judgment of acquittal. Further, Rule 29(a) is now so worded as to require the court `of its own motion' to order the entry of a judgment of acquittal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. [¶] In any event, there can be little or no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case tried to a court without a jury upon the defendant's plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal, and a motion to the same end is not necessary. [Citation.] In such a case, therefore, we hold that the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction should be reviewed the same as if there had been a formal motion for judgment of acquittal. ( Hall v. United States (5th Cir.1961) 286 F.2d 676, 677; fn. omitted.) The mandatory nature of the trial judge's obligation to order an acquittal under rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure comes from the use of the word shall in the rule. [T]he Rule states in terms that the court ` shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal ... if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.' ( Cephus, supra, 324 F.2d 893, 898; fn. 2.) (Italics in original.) (Conc. opn.) Penal Code section 1118 provides, in pertinent part for the issue before us: In a case tried by the court without a jury, a jury having been waived, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading after the evidence of the prosecution has been closed if the court, upon weighing the evidence then before it, finds the defendant not guilty of such offense or offenses. (Italics added.) The same mandatory language  shall  is used in Penal Code section 1118 as is found in rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no valid reason why Penal Code section 1118 should be given an interpretation different from that given the same mandatory language found in rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. I find the legislative intent to be clear and unambiguous in Penal Code section 1118. The section requires the trial court, on its own motion  irrespective of whether a defendant makes a motion for judgment of acquittal with or without a specification of grounds  to order a judgment of acquittal in a court trial when the prosecution's evidence at the close of its case-in-chief is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The language of Penal Code section 1118 does not permit of an interpretation that will allow the trial judge to exercise any discretion in the matter. Under Penal Code section 1118, the trial judge possesses no power or authority to require a defendant to make in any form a motion for judgment of acquittal, let alone to require a motion of acquittal with specification of grounds, in order to permit the prosecution to cure any defects in its evidentiary case-in-chief. In interpreting Penal Code section 1118 as requiring a defendant's motion to specify grounds for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, the dissent in the instant case relies on an analogy between Penal Code section 1118 and Code of Civil Procedure section 581c. [3] The analogy is inappropriate and inapposite. Section 581c applies to a motion for a judgment of nonsuit in a civil jury case only. Penal Code section 1118, on the contrary, applies solely to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal nonjury court trial. In addition, the language of the two sections is totally dissimilar. Section 581c does not require the trial judge to take any action in the absence of a motion by the defendant while Penal Code section 1118 does not permit the trial court, before taking appropriate action, to wait for a motion of acquittal from the defendant. Rather, section 1118 requires the trial court, on its own motion, to acquit the defendant if the prosecution's case-in-chief is insufficient to convict the defendant. Thus, in the case before us, had defendant not made any motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court was nevertheless under a mandatory duty to grant to defendant a judgment of acquittal because of insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. The language of Penal Code section 1118 is neither ambiguous nor unclear in this regard. On the contrary, it is lucidly clear and compelling. I view Penal Code section 1118 (and its companion § 1118.1) [4] and Penal Code section 1111 as expressing a legislative policy in support of our adversary system of criminal trials that has as its principal component the following principle: One of the greatest safeguards for the individual under our system of criminal justice is the requirement that the prosecution must establish a prima facie case by its own evidence before the defendant may be put to his defense. ( Cephus, supra, 324 F.2d 893, 895.) The dissent appears to label this principle a technicality which enables a defendant, proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, to go free. This position of the dissent presents an untenable and unsupportable analysis. I am unable to find any logic or plausibility that would support the notion of the dissent that the California Legislature's judgment, embodied in Penal Code section 1118, and carried out by the majority's decision in the case before us, constitutes a technicality that thwarts the criminal process to establish the guilt of those charged with crime. Rather than concluding  as does the dissent  that the rule announced today by the majority means that our judicial system has spent over three years determining that the defendant is guilty but must nevertheless go free, I would conclude that the rules announced by the majority today mean that our judicial system has unfortunately, and not to our credit, taken three years to vindicate the legislative policy that a defendant shall not be found guilty through a violation of the eminently just principle that the prosecution must establish a viable case against defendant by its own evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief and without assistance from the defendant. In the case at bench, had the trial judge followed the legislative mandates of Penal Code sections 1111 and 1118, the so-called rebuttal evidence introduced by the prosecution would never have appeared as part of the record. Statutory provisions cannot be twisted through indefensible interpretations as a means of curing the prosecution's failure, for whatever reason, to present all of its available evidence to establish a viable case against defendant as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief. The prosecution in the case at bench certainly should have been aware of Penal Code sections 1111 and 1118. The responsibility for the failure of the prosecution in the case before us cannot be shifted to any other segment of the criminal justice system. Certainly the Legislature's judgment, embodied in Penal Code sections 1111 and 1118 cannot, with any degree of logic or validity, be blamed for the prosecution's failure to introduce, as a part of its case in chief, the evidence it was permitted to introduce in rebuttal, which was not in fact rebuttal evidence at all but evidence which came within the scope of evidence required to be introduced, if at all, as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief. The position of the dissent, which seeks to shift to the majority decision the blame for the prosecution's failure to be governed by the unambiguous provisions of Penal Code sections 1111 and 1118, presents a faulty and unpersuasive point of view. CLARK, J., Dissenting. The question presented is whether a defendant must specify the grounds when moving for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118 of the Penal Code. [1] In civil practice the counterpart to Penal Code section 1118 is Code of Civil Procedure section 581c. [2] That section, like section 1118, does not expressly provide that the grounds for a motion under it must be specified. Nevertheless, [b]ecause of the possible drastic effect of the motion the courts have established rules to protect the plaintiff. In order to alert him to any deficiencies and to give him an opportunity to cure or eliminate them: (1) the motion for nonsuit must state the precise grounds upon which it is made, with the defects in the opening statement clearly and particularly indicated (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) Trial § 129); (2) `only the grounds specified [by counsel] should be considered by the lower court in its ruling, or by the appellate court on review' (2 Witkin, id., § 130); and (3) `grounds not specified in a motion for nonsuit will be considered by an appellate court only if it is clear that the defect is one which could not have been remedied had it been called to the attention of plaintiff by the motion.' ( Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal.2d 81, 94 [147 P.2d 604].) ( Timmsen v. Forest E. Olson, Inc. (1970) 6 Cal. App.3d 860, 868 [86 Cal. Rptr. 359].) The plaintiff in a criminal case is, of course, the People. What, to use the language of Timmsen, is the possible drastic effect of a section 1118 motion from which the People should be protected by a requirement that the grounds for such a motion be plainly stated? It is the granting of a judgment of acquittal in favor of a defendant who would have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him if the people had been given fair notice of the purported deficiencies in their case and an opportunity to remedy them. The evil in failing to require fair notice is illustrated by this case. Defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of firing a shotgun at an inhabited building (Pen. Code, § 246). Had defendant specified as the ground for his section 1118 motion the absence of corroboration for the accomplice's testimony, the People could have moved to reopen their case-in-chief and provided such corroboration. This is not a matter of speculation. The People did provide such corroboration on rebuttal. Had the People been unable to corroborate the accomplice's testimony, the trial court  properly apprised of the specific grounds for the motion  would have entered a judgment of acquittal, saving defendant and society the time and expense involved in subsequent proceedings in the Court of Appeal and this court. However, because of the rule announced today our judicial system has spent over three years determining that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a vicious crime but must nevertheless go scot free. [3] The majority respond that requiring a specific statement of the grounds in support of a motion for acquittal will place the defendant in a dilemma: If he specifies the defects in their case, the People have an opportunity to reopen in order to cure the defects; if he fails to specify the defects, the motion will be denied and he will be precluded from raising the point on appeal. The short answer is that a defendant is commonly and properly faced with dilemmas of this sort. For example, a defendant is required to specify the grounds for an objection to the admissibility of evidence. [It is] the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal. (See Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Welch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 114-115 [104 Cal. Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225]; People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 22 [76 Cal. Rptr. 809, 453 P.2d 353].) The contrary rule would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would `permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.' ( Coy v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 471, 473 [334 P.2d 569].) ( People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [146 Cal. Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048].) I would affirm the judgment.