Opinion ID: 876900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence to support various awards granted to the individuals

Text: The awards granted to Holmstrom Land Company, Ward, Dean O. and Virginia Thorson (Thorsons), Walter Joyce and Elmer Hanson have been challenged by various parties to this appeal. Though we must review the propriety of each of the challenged awards, our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited. See: Luppold v. Lewis (1977), Mont., 563 P.2d 538, 540, 34 St.Rep. 227. We will begin our review with the water rights granted to Ward. The District Court awarded Ward 1,200 miners inches from Sheep Creek with priority dates in 1897, 1903 and 1906. This award is challenged by Holmstrom Land Company and the District. The challengers (appellants) claim Ward did not produce sufficient, competent evidence to support such a large award from Sheep Creek. We find that Ward produced sufficient evidence to support an award from Sheep Creek, but not to the extent granted by the District Court. Section 89-810, R.C.M. 1947 (repealed in 1973) provides:  Notice of appropriation. Any person hereafter desiring to appropriate the waters of a river, or stream, ravine, coulee, spring, lake, or other natural source of supply concerning which there has not been an adjudication of the right to use the waters, or some part thereof, must post a notice in writing in a conspicuous place at the point of intended diversion, stating therein: 1. The quantity of water claimed, measured as hereinafter provided; 2. The purpose for which it is claimed and place of intended use; 3. The means of diversion, with size of flume, ditch, pipe, or aqueduct, by which he intends to divert it; 4. The date of appropriation; 5. The name of the appropriator. Within twenty days after the date of appropriation the appropriator shall file with county clerk of the county in which such appropriation is made a notice of appropriation, which, in addition to the facts required to be stated in the posted notice, as hereinbefore prescribed, shall contain the name of the stream from which the diversion is made, if such stream have a name, and if it have not, such a description of the stream as will identify it, and an accurate description of the point of diversion of such stream, with reference to some natural object or permanent monument. The notice shall be verified by the affidavit of the appropriator or some one in his behalf, which affidavit must state that the matters and facts contained in the notice are true. The legislature has established an incentive or reward for those parties who comply with the requirements of section 89-810. Section 89-814, R.C.M. 1947 (repealed in 1973) provided:  Record prima facie evidence. The record provided for in sections 89-810 and 89-813, when duly made, shall be taken and received in all courts of this state as prima facie evidence of the statements therein contained. Based on this statute, a person who is claiming an existing water right is allowed to introduce a notice of appropriation which has been duly filed under section 89-810, R.C.M. 1947, and said notice shall be taken and received in all courts of this state as prima facie evidence of the statements therein. Relying on this statute, Ward introduced three notices of appropriation which were filed by Ward's predecessors in interest. These three notices established a prima facie case for an award of 2,500 miners inches from Sheep Creek. But, this prima facie showing did not completely discharge Ward's burden of proof. Ward still had the burden of showing that all the water claimed had been put to a beneficial use over a reasonable period of time. As we stated in Irion v. Hyde (1938), 107 Mont. 84, 95, 96, 81 P.2d 353, 358, statements made in notices of appropriation are not completely dispositive for purposes of decreeing the amount of a water right: The rights of the parties were not to be measured entirely by what they claimed in their appropriation notices. They were to be measured and gauged by their beneficial use over a reasonable period of time after they initiated the appropriations. In establishing the prior right of the plaintiffs consideration must be given to the extent and manner of their use, the character of their land, and the general necessities of the case. `To the extent of his appropriation his supply will be measured by the waters naturally flowing in the stream and its tributaries above the head of his ditch, whether those waters be furnished by the usual rains or snows, by extraordinary rain or snowfall, or by springs or seepage which directly contribute.' Beaverhead Canal Co. v. Dillon etc. Co., 34 Mont. 135, 85 P. 880, 882. It does not follow that plaintiffs were entitled to 1,000 inches because they designated that amount in their appropriation. Neither does it follow that defendants were of necessity entitled to the full amounts designated in their appropriation notices. All of these matters were subject to proof of use. See Bailey v. Tintinger, 45 Mont. 154, 122 P. 575; Peck v. Simon, 101 Mont. 12, 52 P.2d 164. The Irion decision requires that Ward, in addition to establishing a prima facie case through the notices, must also prove a beneficial use over a reasonable period of time. Inherent in this burden of proof is the responsibility to prove the amount of water beneficially used. Ward proved a beneficial use and also provided the trial court with sufficient evidence to establish the amount of water beneficially applied. However, the District Court granted rights larger than Ward's evidence would support. The evidence indicates that Ward and its predecessors have continually used Sheep Creek to irrigate Ward's property. It was established that grain crops could not be grown on Ward's land unless water was available for irrigation purposes. Ward's evidence shows that approximately 735 acres are used now, and have in the past, been used for growing crops. This is sufficient evidence to establish a beneficial use over a reasonable period of time. See Hyde, supra. But, the District Court erred in determining the extent of Wards water rights in Sheep Creek, which were set at 1,200 miners inches. The most favorable evidence in Ward's favor came in as Ward's exhibit no. 94. A portion of that exhibit states: The total direct diversion requirement from Sheep Creek is equal to 21.8 + 3.6 = 25.4 C.F.S. (cubic feet per second). This 25.4 C.F.S. figure converts into 1,016 miners inches of water. See: section 89-818, R.C.M. 1947, now section 85-2-103 MCA. Accordingly, the 1,200 miners inches awarded to Ward by the District Court must be reduced by 184 miners inches. The Ward water rights have the following priority dates: 1,000 miners inches with priority of September 10, 1897; 16 miners inches with priority date of September 29, 1903. With these modifications, the judgment in favor of Ward is affirmed. The District Court awarded Holmstrom Land Company 3,000 miners inches from Sheep Creek with a priority date of 1935. Ward asserts that this award must be reduced for two reasons: (1) the narrowest point in Holmstrom Land Company's ditch will facilitate only 808 miners inches and therefore the 3,000 miners inches granted to Holmstrom Land Company must be reduced to 808 miners inches; (2) alternatively, Ward asserts that the award to Holmstrom Land Company must be reduced from 3,000 miners inches to 1,400 miners inches because Holmstrom's diversion facility can only divert a maximum of 1,400 miners inches. Ward relies heavily on Wheat v. Cameron (1922), 64 Mont. 494, 502, 210 P. 761, where we stated: [a]n appropriator cannot acquire a right to more water than his ditch will carry, and it is manifest it cannot carry a greater amount than that permitted by the headgate capacity. The evidence supports a finding as the capacity of the ditch to carry 3,000 miners inches of water but does not support a finding that the Holmstrom Land Company diversion point is capable of diverting 3,000 miners inches of water. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the award made to Holmstrom Land Company. Roger Perkins, an expert called by Ward, testified as follows: Q. I am going to call your attention, Mr. Perkins, to Sheep Creek in the area of the by-pass, the Holmstrom diversion, and the Ward diversion. Did water going down Sheep Creek pass by the by-pass first as compared to the other installation. A. Yes. Q. And from there where does it go? A. It then flows under the highway. There are three culverts under the highway. Q. Would you also refer to the alternate place that it might flow instead of going under the highway in through the culverts? A. Yes, in times of heavier flows there is a rock masonry dam immediately adjacent to the highway where Sheep Creek can overflow and run down the borrow pit of the highway. Q. And if it runs over the masonry dam, it eventually could get down, would it not, to the Ward diversion in the Mumbrue ditch? A. That is correct. Q. Now referring to the water that goes under the dam, I mean under the highway through the culverts, the water would flow down to where first? A. It would flow to the point of the Holmstrom diversion. Q. And if it passes by there eventually where would it go thereafter? A. It then flows back under the highway and down to a point of the Mumbrue ditch diversion. Q. It flows under the highway again, is that through culverts? A. That is through culverts. Q. Does Holmstrom have a dam at the point of his diversion to raise the level of water and thus divert it into his ditch? A. Yes, he does. Q. Would you describe that dam please? A. It's just a rock dam, rock randomly placed in the stream. Q. Is it water-tight? A. No, it is not water-tight. Q. Have you made any calculations as to how much water, by use of the facility which he has there now that Mr. Holmstrom could divert into his ditch? A. Yes, I have. Q. Would you give us your calculations please? Do you have any documents or work papers which you use  you could use those and if they are necessary we'll introduce them. A. First of all, I took a look at the conditions associated with the maximum recorded flow in Sheep Creek, over 460 CFS. Of this 460 CFS approximately 90 CFS would flow under the highway. The remainder would go over the rock masonry dam and down the borrow pit adjacent to the highway. Q. That which would flow under the highway would go down to the Holmstrom diversion, that would go over the masonry dam would it not, is that correct? A. Right, this is correct. Q. All right. A. Now of that maximum flow of 90 CFS recorded, of the 90 CFS that could flow under the highway culverts during the maximum recorded flow of Sheep Creek, 35 CFS at a maximum could be diverted into the Holmstrom ditch. The remainder would flow over the rock dam and continue down its course in Sheep Creek. Q. That is because of the nature of that rock dam? A. That is because of the nature of the rock dam. Robert Wertz, one of the principal owners of Holmstrom Land Company, was the only person to contradict Perkins' testimony. Wertz testified that in 1954 or 1956, he estimated the amount of water being diverted from Sheep Creek at the Holmstrom Land Company diversion, and it was his conclusion that the diversion point could divert at least 3,200 miners inches. The District Court, relying on Wertz's testimony, awarded Holmstrom Land Company 3,000 miners inches from Sheep Creek. Implicit in this award is a finding that the Holmstrom diversion point is capable of diverting 3,000 miners inches. This Courts function is to review the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the District Court's findings and decree. As a general rule, we accept all evidence in the record as true unless that evidence is so inherently impossible or improbable as not to be entitled to belief. Strong v. Williams (1969), 154 Mont. 65, 68, 460 P.2d 90, 92. Our review of the transcript and the exhibits convinces us that it is inherently improbable that the Holmstrom Land Company diversion point is capable of diverting 3,000 miners inches of water. Accordingly, we are not bound by the District Court finding, and are entitled to review the evidence to determine the proper award to be made to Holmstrom Land Company. Strong, supra. After an independent review of the transcript, we conclude that the District Court should have granted an award of only 1,400 miners inches (40 X 35 CFS) to Holmstrom Land Company. The evidence presented by Perkins establishes this as the upward limit of Holmstrom Land Company's water right. Accordingly, the District Court must reduce the Holmstrom Land Company award in conformity with this opinion. We turn now to the award granted to Dean O. and Virginia Thorson. The District Court awarded the Thorsons 337 miners inches from Sheep Creek, with a priority date of September 20, 1900. The court decree specified that Thorson's water rights were to be diverted from [the] Mumbrue Ditch. The award to the Thorsons presents a somewhat unique question for this Court. The record indicates that Ward's predecessor in interest, D.P. Mumbrue, transferred and conveyed the right to use 337 miners inches from Sheep Creek to William Woolsey, Thorsons' predecessor in interest. This conveyance took place in 1900, and was in exchange for a right-of-way across Woolseys land. Thorson testified that neither he, nor his predecessors in interest, have ever used the full 337 miners inches for a beneficial purpose. This Court has always recognized that a valid appropriation may be sold separate from the land to which it is appurtenant: We are committed to the rule that the appropriator of a water right does not own the water, but has the ownership in its use only. Creek v. Bozeman Water Works Co., 15 Mont. 121, 38 P. 459; Allen v. Petrick, 69 Mont. 373, 222 P. 451; Verwolf v. Low Line Irr. Co., 70 Mont. 570, 227 P. 68; Tucker v. Missoula Light & Ry. Co., 77 Mont. 91, 250 P. 11; Maclay v. Missoula Irr. Dist., 90 Mont. 344, 3 P.2d 286; Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 93 Mont. 248, 17 P.2d 1074, 89 A.L.R. 200. Likewise it is settled by the decisions of this court that such a right is properly which may be disposed of apart from the land on which it has been used. Smith v. Denniff, 24 Mont. 20, 60 P. 398, 81 Am.St.Rep. 408, 50 L.R.A. 737; Lensing v. Day & Hansen Security Co., 67 Mont. 382, 215 P. 999; Maclay v. Missoula Irr. Dist., supra. Brennan v. Jones (1935), 101 Mont. 550, 567, 55 P.2d 697. When D.P. Mumbrue traded a portion of his water right to Thorsons predecessor in interest, he in effect sold 337 miners inches of his rights in Sheep Creek. But, it does not necessarily follow that these 337 inches are still vested in Thorson. Section 89-802, R.C.M. 1947, (repealed in 1973) provided:  Appropriation must be for a useful purpose  abandonment. The appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest abandons and ceases to use the water for such purpose, the right ceases; but questions of abandonment shall be questions of fact, and shall be determined as other questions of fact. (Emphasis added.) Review of the testimony convinces us that Dean O. Thorson and his predecessors abandoned a large portion of the 337 miners inches conveyed to them by D.P. Mumbrue. Thorson testified as follows: Q. How many acres of ground do you presently irrigate from the Mumbrue ditch? A. At present, according to the measurement, the Soil Conservation measurement, there are 13 acres in this tract here which we have irrigated continuously. Q. The 13 acres you are referring to on the map is that 13 acres. A. This is true. Q. Now the other ground  A. There is a 7-acre tract here which we haven't irrigated for the past three years. Q. That is out of the Mumbrue ditch? A. Yes, but if it wasn't for the ditch, it would irrigate from Woolsey. Q. A total of 20 acres, isn't it? A. Yes. Thorson also testified that there was no evidence that his predecessors in interest had irrigated any more than twenty acres from Sheep Creek. Seventy-five years of nonuse is sufficient to provide clear evidence of abandonment. This Court must therefore determine what portion of Thorson's water right remains intact. Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Thorson, we determine that all but 80 miners inches were lost through abandonment. It was established that Thorson has used Sheep Creek water to benefit 20 acres of his land. Additional testimony established that it took up to 4 miners inches per acre to properly irrigate land which is similar to Thorsons. This evidence is sufficient to allow the granting of 80 miners inches to Thorsons with a priority date of September 20, 1900. Therefore, any award granted by the District Court in excess of 80 miners inches must be reduced to conform with the evidence produced at trial. We turn next to the water rights granted to Walter Joyce and Riverside Ranch Co. (the successor to Elmer D. Hanson's rights). The awards to Riverside and Joyce are contained in the District Court's amended decree dated July 15, 1977. The amended decree gave Walter Joyce three water rights from Sheep Creek, totaling 1,000 miners inches, with priority dates in 1907, 1912 and 1949. The same decree awarded Riverside Ranch Co. the following water rights: Amount Source Priority Date 260 inches Little Sheep Cr. Sept. 1888 50 inches Coon Creek Feb. 1903 300 inches Sheep Creek Sept. 1, 1897 150 inches Sheep Creek Jan. 16, 1903 500 inches Sheep Creek Nov. 19, 1892 100 inches Sheep Creek Sept. 3, 1935 80 inches Horse Creek June 10, 1928 Ward claims that all of the water rights granted to Riverside and Joyce must be stricken because they are not supported by the evidence. Riverside and Joyce argue that Ward has no standing to challenge their water rights because their rights do not conflict with those granted to Ward, and alternatively, that the awards are supported by substantial evidence. We determine that Ward has no standing to challenge the awards from Little Sheep Creek, from Coon Creek and from Horse Creek, but that it does have standing to challenge the awards from Sheep Creek. Rule 1, Mont.R.App.Civ.P. provides that A party aggrieved may appeal from a judgment or order. To be aggrieved by an order or judgment a party must have an interest in the subject matter of the litigation which is injuriously affected by the judgment or order. Estate of Stoian (1960), 138 Mont. 384, 393, 357 P.2d 41. Although Stoian was decided before this Court adopted the new rules of civil and appellate procedure, the new rules have not changed the definition of aggrieved. Thus, Ward must be able to show an interest in the subject matter of the litigation which has been injuriously affected by the judgment or order. Ward has no interest in Little Sheep Creek, Coon Creek or Horse Creek; therefore, that portion of the District Court decree adjudicating those creeks cannot be challenged by Ward. On the other hand, that portion of the District Court decree which awards water rights from Sheep Creek to Riverside and Joyce is appealable by Ward. Ward, an appropriator from Sheep Creek, has an obvious interest in any water right granted from Sheep Creek. A water right which has a priority date earlier than Ward's water rights has a potentially injurious affect on Ward because the earlier appropriator could force Ward to forego his water until the earlier water right has been completely satisfied. Ward is equally interested in any award from Sheep Creek which has a priority date subsequent to Ward's priority dates, because these later rights deplete Sheep Creek and make it unlikely that Ward would ever be able to increase his rights in Sheep Creek. Unquestionably, Ward has an interest in this subject matter. Getting to the merits of the water rights awarded to Riverside and Joyce, we determine that some of the awards are not supported by substantial evidence. Certain evidence upon which the District Court relied, admitted over Ward's objections, was clearly not admissible. The exhibits introduced by Riverside and Joyce to support their water rights were notices of appropriation filed pursuant to section 89-810, R.C.M. 1947, which provides:  Notice of appropriation. Any person hereafter desiring to appropriate the waters of a river, or stream, ravine, coulee, spring, lake, or other natural source of supply concerning which there has not been an adjudication of the right to use the waters, or some part thereof, must post a notice in writing in a conspicuous place at the point of intended diversion, stating therein: 1. The quantity of water claimed, measured as hereinafter provided; 2. The purpose for which it is claimed and place of intended use; 3. The means of diversion, with size of flume, ditch, pipe, or aqueduct, by which he intends to divert it; 4. The date of appropriation; 5. The name of the appropriator.  Within twenty days after the date of appropriation the appropriator shall file with the county clerk of the county in which such appropriation is made a notice of appropriation, which, in addition to the facts required to be stated in the posted notice, as hereinbefore prescribed, shall contain the name of the stream from which the diversion is made, if such stream have a name, and if it have not, such a description of the stream as will identify it, and an accurate description of the point of diversion of such stream, with reference to some natural object or permanent monument. The notice shall be verified by the affidavit of the appropriator or some one in his behalf, which affidavit must state that the matters and facts contained in the notice are true. (Emphasis added.) If the notice provided for in section 89-810 is duly made and filed, then it shall be taken and received in all courts of this state as prima facie evidence of the statements therein contained. Section 89-814, R.C.M. 1947. This Court has strictly construed the provisions of section 89-814. We have held that any nonconformance with section 89-810 renders the notice of appropriation inadmissible as evidence: Many years after the use of the water through this ditch, the then present owners of these rights caused to be recorded a notice of their water rights... . It is argued that these notices were evidence, prima facie, of the extent of these rights. The notices did not comply with the statute as to the time of record (secs. 7102-7104 Rev.Codes). If the statute was complied with, such notices were prima facie evidence. Wills v. Morris, 100 Mont. 514, 50 P.(2d) 862. Since these notices did not comply with the statute as to the time of their recording, they are of no evidentiary value in proving the amount or date of an appropriation. Peck v. Simon, 101 Mont. 12, 52 P.2d 164. (Emphasis added.) Galahan et al. v. Lewis et al. (1937), 105 Mont. 294, 298, 299, 72 P.2d 1018, 1020. This Court reaffirmed Galahan in Shammel v. Vogl (1964), 144 Mont. 354, 396 P.2d 103. Under Galahan and Shammel, a party cannot rely on defective notices of appropriation to prove the extent of his water rights or their priority dates. In the present case, Ward properly objected to the introduction of many of Riverside's and Joyce's notices of appropriation because they were not filed within twenty days of the date of appropriation. The notice of appropriation contained in exhibit nos. 1, 3, 29, 30 and 36 was filed more than 20 days after the appropriator took water from Sheep Creek. This being so, each cannot be used as evidence to establish the amount or date of any water right. Without these notices, there is insufficient evidence to support several of the awards made to Riverside and Joyce. We find the following awards are not supported by the evidence and must be stricken: INADMISSIBLE PARTY AWARD SOURCE DATE EXHIBIT NO. 1 Riverside 500 in. Sheep Creek Nov. 19, 1892 3 Joyce 200 in. Sheep Creek Sept. 17, 1907 29 Riverside 300 in. Sheep Creek Sept. 1, 1897 30 Riverside 150 in. Sheep Creek Jan. 16, 1903 36 Riverside 100 in. Sheep Creek Sept. 31, 1935