Opinion ID: 894521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cohesiveness v. Predominance and Superiority

Text: We now turn to whether parties may evade Bernal by seeking (b)(2) certification. Put simply, they may not. Although (b)(2) does not explicitly require predominance and superiority as (b)(3) does, (b)(2) does require a rigorous analysis of cohesiveness. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir.1998)(noting that [w]hile 23(b)(2) class actions have no predominance or superiority requirements, it is well established that the class claims must be cohesive). Generally, (b)(2) classes are premised on an assumption of homogeneity. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 413 ([B]ecause of the group nature of the harm alleged and the broad character of the relief sought, the (b)(2) class is, by its very nature, assumed to be a homogeneous and cohesive group with few conflicting interests among its members.). They are presumed to be cohesive, hence notice and opt-out are not mandated by the rules. See Holmes v. Cont'l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1155 n. 8 (11th Cir.1983) (At base, the (b)(2) class is distinguished from the (b)(3) class by class cohesiveness.... Injuries remedied through (b)(2) actions are really group, as opposed to individual injuries. The members of a (b)(2) class are generally bound together through `preexisting or continuing legal relationships' or by some significant common trait such as race or gender.) (quoting Note, Notice in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions for Monetary Relief: Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 128 U. PA. L.REV. 1236, 1252-53 (1980) (footnotes omitted)). [T]he predomination requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) serves essentially the same functions as the procedural safeguards and efficiency and manageability standards mandated in (b)(3) class actions. Allison, 151 F.3d at 414-15; see also Coleman, 296 F.3d at 448; Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F.Supp.2d 942, 955 (E.D.Tex.2000) (predomination protects absent plaintiffs' rights to due process by showing that a class is cohesive). We disagree, therefore, with the trial court's statement that [n]amed Plaintiffs are not required to show predominance, superiority, or manageability in order to certify a class under TRCP 42(b)(2). (Emphasis in original.) Similarly, parties cannot evade the rigorous analysis requirement by seeking (b)(2) certification. In Bernal, we held that [c]ourts must perform a `rigorous analysis' before ruling on class certification to determine whether all prerequisites to certification have been met. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740(1982)) (emphasis added). All prerequisites means all prerequisites. This includes all four elements of rule 42(a) as well as one of several elements of rule 42(b). If (b)(2) certification is sought, therefore, the trial court must rigorously analyze cohesiveness. We recognize that [c]lass cohesion is not a self-defining concept. How much cohesion is needed logically should depend on whether the class member has a right to exit. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L.REV. 370, 435 (2000). In many cases, this analysis will be identical to the predominance and superiority directive undertaken by trial courts certifying (b)(3) classes. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) (predominance tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation) (emphasis added). However, a more rigorous definition of class cohesion should apply in the case of the mandatory class action where the class member is essentially being coerced into participation. Coffee, supra, at 435. As the Third Circuit has noted, in such cases a (b)(2) class may require more cohesiveness than [a] (b)(3) class. This is so because in [a] (b)(2) action, unnamed members are bound by the action without the opportunity to opt out. Barnes, 161 F.3d at 142-43; see also Coffee, supra, at 435 (noting that the Barnes court's cohesiveness logic not only makes good normative sense, but it supplies the necessary deterrent to prevent the misuse of Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions as a means of evading the greater procedural protections built into Rule 23(b)(3)). Of course, if a trial court determines that notice and opt-out should be provided in the (b)(2) setting, the cohesiveness required in a (b)(2) class need not be greater than the predominance and superiority necessary for a class certified under (b)(3). In this case, in addition to the notice and opt-out issues identified above, the trial court did not rigorously analyze cohesiveness. For these reasons, we reverse that part of the court of appeals' judgment affirming certification of the (b)(2) class. Because the court of appeals also affirmed certification under (b)(3), we now turn to those allegations.