Opinion ID: 2746353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Voluntary-Manslaughter Instruction

Text: {¶ 152} In proposition of law No. XII, Thompson contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. According to Thompson, the court’s refusal to give this instruction violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 643-644, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). We review a trial 40 January Term, 2014 judge’s decision not to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Wolons, 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 68, 541 N.E.2d 443 (1989). {¶ 153} R.C. 2903.03 defines the crime of voluntary manslaughter as follows: (A) No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another   . The test for voluntary manslaughter includes both an objective and a subjective component. First—the objective factor—a fact-finder must determine whether a serious provocation occurred and whether that provocation was “sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond the power of his or her control.” State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 635, 590 N.E.2d 272 (1992). Second—the subjective factor—the fact-finder must evaluate whether “this actor, in this particular case, actually was under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage.” Id. at 634. A defendant being tried for murder must prove the elements of R.C. 2903.03(A) by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Rhodes, 63 Ohio St.3d 613, 620, 590 N.E.2d 261 (1992). {¶ 154} Thompson cites evidence that he says was sufficient to compel a voluntary-manslaughter instruction here. First, he quotes at length from his own unsworn statement. But Thompson did not give his statement until the mitigation phase. This information has no bearing on whether the trial court should have given an instruction at the trial phase of Thompson’s trial. See State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 71. 41 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 155} Second, Thompson invokes the testimony of the sole defense witness, Roberson, who testified that Miktarian was being “rude” and “unprofessional.” According to Roberson, he “kind of slammed [Thompson] down on the hood” of the police car and threatened to “let [his] dog out on [Thompson’s] ass.” At some point, Thompson ended up on the ground. Roberson said that she “feared for [Thompson’s] life” and that Thompson later told her that he had shot Miktarian because Miktarian “was trying to hurt him.” {¶ 156} Finally, Thompson cites a variety of other evidence from the state’s case-in-chief to support Roberson’s account. Witnesses testified that Miktarian had removed his Taser from his duty belt (though he had not used it) and that his DNA (though not his blood) was found on the handle and trigger of Thompson’s gun. Detective Kline testified that Miktarian’s dog was acting very aggressively when police arrived at the scene, so aggressively, in fact, that the officers did not immediately let him out of the cruiser. And Luther Norman, who instructed Thompson on Ohio’s concealed-carry law, testified that he teaches students that they each have to make a personal decision about when there is a serious enough possibility of death or serious bodily harm to justify discharging a weapon. {¶ 157} The trial court acted within its discretion by declining to give a voluntary-manslaughter instruction on the basis of this evidence. Almost all the evidence cited by Thompson speaks to his fear that Miktarian would harm him. As we have held, “[f]ear alone is insufficient to demonstrate the kind of emotional state necessary to constitute sudden passion or fit of rage.” State v. Mack, 82 Ohio St.3d 198, 201, 694 N.E.2d 1328 (1998); see also State v. Harris, 129 Ohio App.3d 527, 535, 718 N.E.2d 488 (10th Dist.1998) (“evidence    that the defendant feared for his own and other’s personal safety, does not constitute sudden passion or a fit of rage as contemplated by the voluntary manslaughter statute”). 42 January Term, 2014 {¶ 158} Roberson’s testimony that Miktarian was being “rude” and “unprofessional” likewise is not sufficient to establish a sudden passion or a fit of rage. This court has held that “words alone will not constitute reasonably sufficient provocation to incite the use of deadly force in most situations.” Mack at 201, citing Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 590 N.E.2d 272, at paragraph two of the syllabus. Here, the trial court reasonably concluded that Miktarian’s reported “rudeness” would not arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond the power of his control, even when coupled with evidence of fear. See Shane at 635. {¶ 159} Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that Thompson actually was in a fit of passion or rage on the night in question. Roberson, Thompson’s only witness, described the shooting and then simply testified that Thompson told her to get back in the car so the two could drive to Thompson’s sister’s house. Her testimony provides no insight into Thompson’s actual state of mind or level of agitation at the time of the shooting. Under these circumstances, the court did not err by refusing to give a voluntary-manslaughter instruction. {¶ 160} We therefore reject proposition of law No. XII.