Opinion ID: 202331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenge to Sentence

Text: 22 Cotto challenges his sentence on the felon-in-possession count. His objection is twofold: first, that his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines was increased based on judicial factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence, and second, that the district court was unable to take full account of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As we have explained, the error under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), is not that a judge (by a preponderance of the evidence) determined facts under the Guidelines which increased a sentence beyond that authorized by the jury verdict or an admission by the defendant; the error is only that the judge did so in a mandatory Guidelines system. United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir.2005). 23 Cotto concedes that the Booker error is unpreserved, so we apply plain error review. 7 Id. Cotto must point to circumstances creating a reasonable probability that the district court would impose a different sentence more favorable to [him] under the new `advisory Guidelines' Booker regime. Id. This test is not met by the mere assertion that the court might have given the defendant a more favorable sentence. Id. at 80. 24 Cotto points to two specific factors here that, he says, warrant a remand for resentencing. First, the district judge said that the double-counting issue bothers me. The court was merely explaining why it chose not to impose a particular enhancement sought by the government, not indicating that it would have imposed a lesser sentence if not for the mandatory Guidelines. Indeed, the court could have sentenced Cotto more leniently by selecting a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range; instead it chose a middle-of-the-range sentence on the felon-in-possession count. Second, Cotto argues, there is a newly available sentencing consideration: his drug addiction. The court took this factor into account at sentencing 8 and, where it easily could have selected a lower sentence within the range but chose not to, we are not persuaded that there is a reasonable probability that it would impose a more lenient sentence on remand. As to Cotto's general argument that he is entitled to a Booker remand so that the district court can take greater account of the § 3553(a) factors, it is not enough merely to suggest that the § 3553(a) factors might well have persuaded the court to impose a lower sentence. See Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d at 80.