Opinion ID: 2586441
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Substantive Errors by Superior Court in Dismissing Case as Moot

Text: The crux of Mullins's appeal is that it was error to dismiss her administrative appeal as moot because questions of the legality of the LBC's conduct and the election remain unadjudicated. In Mullins's administrative appeal to the superior court, she alleged that the LBC made the following errors in approving the petition: (1) improperly finding that the proposed borough satisfied the regulatory requirements for incorporation; (2) excluding Slavic and Native populations from the incorporation process; (3) failing to adequately distribute informational materials to the public; and (4) violating the Open Meetings Act by using information gathered during a private tour of the proposed borough in making its decision. She also challenged the incorporation election procedures, including the use of a mail-in ballot, the proposed schedule for counting ballots, the combining of the vote on borough incorporation with the vote for borough officials in the same election, and the combining of the vote on the Pogo PILOT agreement and the vote on taxes in the same ballot question. Mullins requested that the superior court stay the election, order that the incorporation vote be conducted separately from and prior to the election of borough officials, order that the vote on the Pogo PILOT agreement and taxes be presented as separate questions, and direct the LBC to begin the incorporation process from scratch. The superior court initially dismissed Mullins's appeal in a summary order. After Mullins filed two additional briefs with the superior court, the court issued a two-paragraph Order of Clarification stating, in its entirety: The court was assigned to hear an appeal of the Local Boundary Commission decision. Although multiple defects in the underlying proceedings were alleged, the end result of the vote of the community was to frustrate any effect of the Local Boundary Commission decision. Because the court was assigned as an appeals court, it was not acting as a trial court. Any complaints about the underlying proceedings would only be considered on the question as to whether the decision should be reversed. The court would not, as an appeal court, hear new evidence or make decisions on any matter except whether to reverse or affirm the decision. Accordingly, the appeal was not the place to consider complaints, except as they would affect the appeal. Because there is no need to reverse the decision, which no longer has any effect, and is moot, the case has been dismissed. New filings will not be addressed. We apply our independent judgment in determining whether Mullins's appeal of the LBC's approval of the petition was properly dismissed as moot. [9] A court will generally not consider questions where events have rendered the legal issue moot. [10] A claim is moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy or if the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any relief even if it prevails. [11]
It is clear that Mullins's complaints against the LBC were mooted by the election. Mullins appealed the LBC's decision to approve the petition, seeking to have the superior court overturn the decision based on various alleged defects in the approval process. The vote against incorporation voided the approval decision and provided the principal relief that Mullins sought in her appeal to the superior court. [12] Even if claims are moot, a court may still hear them if they fall within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. In determining whether the public interest exception applies, a court considers: (1) whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied, may repeatedly circumvent review of the issues, and (3) whether the issues presented are so important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine. [13] None of these factors is dispositive; each is an aspect of the question of whether the public interest dictates that a court review a moot issue. [14] The proper inquiry in this case is not only whether the LBC's challenged approval decision falls under the public interest exception, but also whether the underlying wrongful conduct alleged by Mullins does. [15] The LBC's approval of the petition, and its allegedly arbitrary finding that the petition satisfied regulatory requirements for incorporation, do not fall under the public interest exception because it is unlikely that a similar petition will be filed with and approved by the LBC, and such approval decisions can be, and often are, the subject of legal review. First, regulations prevent the LBC from accepting a substantially similar petition for two years after such a petition is rejected by voters. [16] And as a practical matter, the LBC is highly unlikely to approve the same petition after it was so overwhelmingly rejected by voters. If and when another petition is submitted, even tracing the same boundaries as the petition submitted in January 2006, the LBC must again review whether the petition satisfies the criteria for incorporation, a highly fact-specific inquiry. [17] It is unlikely that the allegedly erroneous findings and approval decision will be repeated. Second, citizens have the right to appeal decisions of the LBC under the Administrative Procedure Act. [18] These decisions, including the LBC's interpretation and application of regulations concerning incorporation, are regularly challenged in court and do not evade review. [19] Therefore, even accepting that they are issues of public importance, the approval of the petition by the LBC, and any errors in applying regulatory criteria for incorporation, are moot and will not be considered under the public interest exception. Mullins's remaining complaints regarding the LBC's conduct relate to public participation: exclusion of minority groups from the incorporation process, insufficient distribution of informational documents, and reliance on a meeting closed to the public in making its decision. Such problems are arguably capable of repetition, although the facts in each instance may vary slightly. [20] Moreover, failure to adequately inform and include the public in decision-making is a matter of public importance. But complaints regarding public participation do not repeatedly evade judicial review. We analyze this prong of the public interest exception test by comparing the time it takes to bring the appeal with the time it takes for the appeal to become moot. [21] There is no reason to believe that the time between the approval of a petition by the LBC based on inadequate public participation and the incorporation election is insufficient to permit judicial review. [22] Even when it is, public participation claims remain live and can be adjudicated where the public votes for incorporation. In Lake and Peninsula Borough v. Local Boundary Commission, for example, certain villages appealed the LBC's approval of an incorporation petition subsequently approved by voters in part on the grounds that the LBC provided inadequate notice during the incorporation process. [23] The superior court found that notice was defective, a ruling we affirmed, and the LBC was directed to remedy its notice violations. [24] We thus find that Mullins's public participation claims are moot and do not fall within the public interest exception. Mullins specifically alleges that the LBC violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) by using information gathered during a private tour of the proposed borough in making its decision. [25] She argues that this claim is not moot, relying on our statement in Alaska Community Colleges' Federation of Teachers, Local No. 2404 v. University of Alaska ( ACCFT ) that [t]he mootness bar is especially inappropriate in OMA cases. [26] In ACCFT, the plaintiff sought to void a governmental decision on the grounds that it had been reached at a private meeting. [27] At the superior court's direction, the decision-making body held a properly noticed open meeting at which it affirmed its previous decision. [28] The court then dismissed the lawsuit without ruling on whether the original meeting violated the OMA, finding that any violation had been remedied. [29] We reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the superior court to determine whether a violation of the OMA occurred and if so, whether the subsequent meeting remedied the violation. [30] Unlike in ACCFT, the LBC's approval decision was not reaffirmed at a curative meeting, and it is not still in effect. Mullins, unlike the plaintiff in ACCFT, cannot obtain the substantive relief she seeks because the LBC's decision allegedly made in violation of the OMA has been voided by subsequent events. Where a decision is still in effect when an OMA claim is brought, the holding in ACCFT requires that a court review the alleged OMA violation even if a curative meeting was held. Where a decision is no longer in effect, as is the case here, a court should conduct a standard mootness analysis to determine whether to address the OMA claim. In this case, for the reasons described above, Mullins's public participation challenge to LBC's private car tour as a violation of the OMA is moot and we will not consider it. [31]
Mullins's initial pleading in her administrative appeal of the LBC's approval decision included allegations of wrongdoing by the Division of Elections in structuring the incorporation election. Mullins later attempted to amend her pleading to add a complaint against the Director of Elections as a defendant and request changes to the upcoming election as relief, titling her amended pleadings an Amended Notice of Appeal & Complaint. The superior court never accepted Mullins's addition of a complaint against the Director of Elections  its final Order of Clarification continued to list the LBC as the only party adverse to Mullins and noted that Mullins's appeal was not the place to consider complaints. A party may not unilaterally add a complaint against a third party to a pending administrative appeal by amending the pleadings, as Mullins attempted to do in this case. The superior court is operating under the authority of different statutory provisions when it acts as an appellate court [32] and a trial court of general jurisdiction [33] and these roles are not generally combined in the same lawsuit. [34] The superior court, acting in its capacity as an intermediate court of appeal to review an administrative decision, [35] properly declined to review Mullins's claims against the Division of Elections regarding the incorporation election, as they were unrelated to the LBC's decision that was under review. Because the claims regarding the incorporation election were not properly before the superior court, they are not properly before us; the only claims properly before us on appeal are those relating to the LBC's decision to approve the petition. If Mullins wished to sue the Division of Elections, she should have filed an independent lawsuit. Now that the election has passed, it is highly likely that such a lawsuit would be moot. [36] A superior court can no longer direct the Division of Elections to change the format and procedures of the incorporation election, as requested by Mullins in her improper amended pleadings. Nor does Mullins seek to void the results of the election. The only relief available to Mullins for alleged errors in the election would be a declaratory judgment  there are no live issues. Moreover, these alleged errors are unlikely to evade judicial review. There is no reason to assume that courts cannot decide challenges related to an election before election day. [37] Even where final judgment is not rendered prior to the election, election procedures can still be challenged by anyone opposing the outcome. [38] In this case, Mullins does not oppose the election results and her challenges to the incorporation election, even if filed as an independent lawsuit, would almost certainly be moot. [39]