Opinion ID: 581467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Age Discrimination in Employment Act Claim

Text: 16 Aronson next contends that the district court erred by dismissing her ADEA claim related to her termination on April 25, 1988 on grounds that the claim was time-barred under 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Although the district court also dismissed Aronson's claim of an alleged ADEA violation based on her September 9, 1987 non-selection for a lateral transfer, on appeal Aronson argues only that the ADEA claim related to her termination is not time-barred. Aronson filed a complaint, which made the allegations of unlawful age discrimination, with the EEOC on December 28, 1988--246 days after the University terminated her. 17 Section 626(d) of title 29 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent part, that 18 [n]o civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed-- 19 (1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or 20 (2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier. 21 Although the defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Aronson's EEOC filing failed to meet the 180-day time limit imposed by subsection (1) of § 626(d), on appeal both parties concur in the fact that subsection (2) of § 626(d) applies in this case because the State of Wyoming has statutorily prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of age. See Wyo.Stat. § 27-9-105. States that have adopted such laws prohibiting employment discrimination are commonly referred to as deferral states.The district court held that the 300-day limitation in § 626(d)(2) should be reduced to 240 days under the Supreme Court case of Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980). Although the court recognized that Mohasco is a Title VII case, it applied Mohasco to this ADEA claim because of the similarities between the language of Title VII and the ADEA. Because Aronson's claim was filed with the EEOC on day 246, the district court concluded that the claim was time-barred under § 626(d)(2). 2 On appeal, Aronson argues that the district court erred in imposing a 240-day time limitation on EEOC filings under § 626(d)(2). Furthermore, Aronson contends that her age discrimination claim related to her April 25, 1988 termination was filed within the 300-day time limit allowed by § 626(d)(2). Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Aronson did not file a claim with the state fair employment practices agency at the time she filed her EEOC claim and therefore cannot avail herself of the full 300-day time limit of § 626(d)(2). 22 A timely filing with the EEOC is a prerequisite to a civil suit under both the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In addition, both the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), allow 300 days for a complainant in a deferral state to file a claim with the EEOC. Mohasco establishes that under Title VII, a complainant who files an EEOC claim prior to filing a state claim may not necessarily avail himself of the full 300-day time period afforded by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Because Title VII provides that claims may not be filed with the EEOC before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), a complainant in a deferral state should file his claim with the EEOC within 240 days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice in order to insure that his federal rights will be preserved. Mohasco, 447 U.S. at 814 n. 16, 100 S.Ct. at 2491 n. 16 (emphasis added). 23 Under the ADEA, however, complainants may file with the State before or after they file with [the EEOC]. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 n. 4, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2072 n. 4, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d) & 633(b). In Oscar Mayer, the Supreme Court recognized that 24 [t]he ADEA permits concurrent rather than sequential state and federal administrative jurisdiction in order to expedite the processing of age-discrimination claims. The premise for this difference is that the delay inherent in sequential jurisdiction is particularly prejudicial to the rights of older citizens to whom, by definition, relatively few productive years are left. 113 Cong.Rec. 7076 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits). 25 441 U.S. at 757, 99 S.Ct. at 2072. In light of this difference between the ADEA and Title VII, we see no reason why the time limitations announced by the Supreme Court in Mohasco should apply to the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2). The 300-day period of § 626(d)(2) is not limited or qualified in any way except for the requirement that a complaint with the EEOC be filed within 30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law. Id. Therefore, the district court erred in ruling that Aronson's claim, which was filed with the EEOC 246 days after the occurrence of the alleged discrimination, was time-barred under § 626(d)(2). See Astacio-Sanchez v. Fundacion Educativa Ana G. Mendez, 724 F.Supp. 11, 15 (D.P.R.1989). 26 Because we reverse the district court's determination that Aronson's ADEA claim is time-barred under § 626(d)(2), we need not address Aronson's argument that the time limitation should be equitably tolled. 27 AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings.