Opinion ID: 155491
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: srs

Text: 31 SRS brought its monopolization claims both as a direct purchaser from Enterprises and as a potential competitor, although the district court did not address the latter basis for its claim. As to SRS's claim as a direct purchaser, the district court concluded it lacks antitrust injury because it could pass on the overcharges to its customers and because the defendants' monopoly power in excluding competitors actually redounded to SRS's benefit as it similarly protected SRS from competition. That reasoning is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Hanover Shoe. Hanover Shoe precludes the argument that SRS did not suffer cognizable antitrust injury merely because it passed overcharges on to its customers or otherwise was shielded from competition by the defendants' anticompetitive behavior. Moreover, the direct purchaser rule actually eliminates any speculation in determining SRS's injury from the alleged overcharge. As a direct purchaser, SRS may sue for and recover the full amount of the illegal overcharge. Kansas v. Amoco Prod. Co. (In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases), 866 F.2d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir.1989), aff'd, Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 110 S.Ct. 2807, 111 L.Ed.2d 169 (1990). Thus, to make its prima facie case, SRS need only show an illegal overcharge and the amount of the overcharge. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 489, 88 S.Ct. at 2228-29; see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 n. 14, 92 S.Ct. 885, 892 n. 14, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) ([D]amages are established by the amount of the overcharge. Under § 4, courts will not go beyond the fact of this injury to determine whether the victim of the overcharge has partially recouped its loss in some other way....). 32 SRS also claimed that defendants' control of the relevant product markets prevented it from becoming defendants' competitor in cars and parts. See Appellants' App. at 401-02 (SCCA completely foreclosed any competition in the relevant product markets in this case, therefore making it impossible for SRS or any other parts manufacturer to compete with it on the open market for drivers' business.). A potential competitor may have standing under the antitrust laws if he has manifested an intention to enter the business and has demonstrated his preparedness to do so. Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir.1982) (quotation omitted); see also Go-Video, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. (In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig.), 11 F.3d 1460, 1464-66 (9th Cir.1993). 33 The district court did not address SRS's standing as a potential competitor of cars and parts. 11 Though the record contains little if any evidence of SRS's intention and preparedness to enter the business of manufacturing and selling cars or parts, defendants did not move for summary judgment on this basis or address SRS's contention in their summary judgment reply. We therefore conclude that the district court should address on remand SRS's claimed injury as a potential competitor in addition to its claimed injury resulting from overcharges. 12