Opinion ID: 739142
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Decision to Remove Ms. Hollingsworth's Children

Text: 39 Ms. Hollingsworth argues that the decision to remove her children was the official policy of McCurtain County. Where a plaintiff seeks to impose municipal liability on the basis of a single incident, the plaintiff must show that the particular illegal course of action was taken pursuant to a decision made by a person with authority to make policy decisions on behalf of the entity being sued. Jenkins, 81 F.3d at 994 (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-85, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299-1301, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)). Ms. Hollingsworth does not argue that Deputy Hill was authorized to make Sheriff's Department policy. Neither does she maintain that Sheriff McPeak directed the removal of her children or ratified Deputy Hill's decision to remove them. Rather, Hollingsworth identifies Assistant District Attorney Driesel as the final policymaker relevant to the decision to remove her children in violation of her due process rights. 40 Whether an individual possesses final policymaking authority is a legal issue to be determined by the court based on state and local law. Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 447 (10th Cir.1995). Under Pembaur and its progeny, Driesel could become the County's final policymaker with respect to the events at issue in two ways. First, Driesel could possess explicit final policymaking authority pursuant to Oklahoma statutory or local government law. See Randle, 69 F.3d at 447 (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124, 108 S.Ct. 915, 924-25, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)); Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 630 (10th Cir.1992). Second, Sheriff McPeak could delegate final policymaking authority to Driesel. See Randle, 69 F.3d at 448; Ware v. Unified Sch. Dist., 902 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir.1990). 41 Assistant District Attorneys in Oklahoma possess explicit statutory authority to render legal advice to county officers such as sheriffs: 42 The District Attorney or his assistants shall give opinion and advice to ... civil officers of his counties when requested by such officers ... upon all matters in which any of the counties of his district are interested, or relating to the duties of such ... officers in which the state or counties may have an interest. 43 Okla.Stat. tit. 19, § 215.5. This language is similar to the relevant Ohio statutory language discussed in Pembaur. 4 Ms. Hollingsworth's reliance upon this similarity, however, is misplaced. In Oklahoma, the Assistant District Attorney is not a county officer like the Ohio County Prosecutor in Pembaur. The statutory authority of the Assistant District Attorney does not encompass the right to instruct[ ] sheriff's deputies how to accomplish their task, but only to render advice and opinion. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 485, 106 S.Ct. at 1301. Assistant District Attorney Driesel is an officer of the State, Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1389 (10th Cir.1990), and is not vested with authority over the conduct of McCurtain County sheriff's deputies or the service and execution of protective orders issued by Oklahoma courts. Rather, Sheriff McPeak is vested with the final policymaking authority over the Sheriff's Department, including the conduct of deputy sheriffs and the service and execution of orders issued by Oklahoma courts. Okla.Stat. tit. 19, §§ 514, 516, 547(A). Thus, we must determine whether Sheriff McPeak, as part of his standing policy to request legal opinion and advice from the District Attorney, delegated his authority over the service and execution of court orders to Driesel. 44 Ms. Hollingsworth bases her contention that Sheriff McPeak delegated his final policymaking authority to Driesel on the similar, but distinguishable, reliance of the Pembaur defendants on the Ohio County Prosecutor for legal direction. Whether a policymaker has delegated his authority depends upon (1) whether the official is meaningfully constrained 'by policies not of that official's own making'[, and] (2) whether the official's decision[s] are final--i.e., are they subject to any meaningful review. Randle, 69 F.3d at 448 (citing Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926 and Ware, 902 F.2d at 818 (Delegation does not occur when a subordinate's decisions are constrained by policies not of his making or when those decisions are subject to review by the authorized policymaker.)). 45 In Pembaur, the Sheriff's Office had a policy of referring legal questions to the County Prosecutor and strictly following his advice. There, the deputies' supervisor told them to call Assistant Prosecutor Whalen and to follow his instructions. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 473, 106 S.Ct. at 1295 (emphasis added). The Sheriff directed his deputies to seek and follow the instructions of the County Prosecutor, transforming the County Prosecutor's advice into a clear command that constituted county policy. Id. at 485, 106 S.Ct. at 1301. 46 In the case at bar, undisputed facts establish that Sheriff McPeak and his deputies usually followed the advice of the District Attorney. This necessarily implies that the Sheriff's Department sometimes did not follow the advice of the District Attorney. No evidence, however, supports the inference that the Sheriff required his deputies to follow that advice. Sheriff McPeak and his deputies retained the authority and discretion to reject the advice of the District Attorney--that is, they retained the authority to conduct a meaningful review of the District Attorney's opinion. The record contains no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that Sheriff McPeak delegated to Driesel the decision of whether or not to remove Ms. Hollingsworth's children from her custody. 47 Thus, neither Driesel nor Sheriff McPeak was responsible for the policy decision to remove Ms. Hollingsworth's children without notice and a hearing. Further, although Deputy Hill was responsible for the decision, he is not a final policymaker for the purposes of local government liability. The authority to make policy and the decision to act did not reside with Driesel, McPeak, or Hill at any one time. Therefore, Ms. Hollingsworth may not base her claim of local government liability upon the decision to remove her children as an official policy of McCurtain County.