Opinion ID: 1281991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Employer's Concerns

Text: We add this final section to address a set of concerns that were raised by the circuit court in its decision and by the defendant in this appeal and that cut across both the harassment and retaliation claims. The circuit court found the plaintiff could not fit within the sexual harassment doctrine because supervisors, as agents of the employer, are responsible for preventing sexual harassment in the workplace. The circuit court feared that providing supervisors with a cause of action would subject employers to the ultimate `Catch-22'that is, as best we can understand, employers have to rely on supervisors to execute sexual harassment policies, but if a supervisor fails to execute the policy and becomes the object of harassment, to permit her recovery would make the employer liable for the supervisor's own failure. Accordingly, the defendant maintains that the Human Rights Act should not impose liability on an employer if its supervisor allows herself to be sexually harassed by her subordinates. This reasoning, if it can be called that, leads to the further argument that the defendant had a legitimate reason for discharging the plaintiff (separate from the consultant's recommendation) because when she failed to stop Mr. Embrey's sexual harassment, she failed to perform an important part of her job, i.e., the execution of the employer's policy against sexual harassment. The defendant further maintains that imposing liability in this case would discourage employers from hiring a woman as a supervisor out of a fear that she could sue him if she fails to perform her job and permits a subordinate to sexually harass her. We see no Catch 22 for employers who are told they must adopt reasonable measures to prevent and remedy sexual harassment in the workplace, including sexual harassment of supervisors. Certainly, an employer must rely on supervisors to implement policy, but, as with any other policy, where a supervisor experiences difficulty, an employer may have to do more than simply delegate responsibility. That is especially likely when the supervisor herself is a target of employee misconduct. As we made clear in Part B, supra, the nature and extent of action required of an employer will vary with the facts. We also affirmatively reject any suggestion that a supervisor who has been the object of sexual harassment has in some sense allowed it to happen. To say that she is a victim of sexual harassment states a legal conclusion: she has been required to work in a hostile environment that has deprived her of reasonable working conditions on the basis of her sex. When an employer learns that such has taken place, his alternative under the Human Rights Act is to investigate and, if need be, root out the harassment; it is not to fire the victim. We refuse to apply the Human Rights Act in such a way as to make the victim the responsible party. We do not suggest that a female supervisor has any less of a responsibility to implement policy or is to be held to a lesser standard of managerial ability. Rather, we simply ask employers to do the reasonable thing: investigate and respond appropriately to complaints about sexual harassment from whatever source. It follows, then, that a supervisor's misfortune of being a target of sexual harassment does not provide her employer with a legitimate reason for discharging her. An employer may, of course, demote or even release a supervisor who fails to abide by and execute a sexual harassment policy, including the inability to control subordinates who are engaging in harassment. When the supervisor herself is the victim, however, it would be the rare case when the particular circumstances would warrant her removal rather than the removal of the offending employee. It is the employer's responsibility to provide a work environment free of sexual hostility; if that means the employer must take affirmative measures over and above reliance on a victimized supervisor, then so be it. Finally, we also emphatically must reject the defendant's contention that we should affirm the circuit court's order because, to do otherwise, would discourage employers from hiring women as supervisors. [22] In the first place, the argument proves too much; to follow it would require us to reject all claims of sexual harassment because employers will be reluctant to hire women out of a fear of future sexual harassment suits. Second, an employer faced with the decision of whether to hire a woman supervisor has two alternatives: (1) it can forego engaging her because she is a woman and a potential sexual harassment plaintiff and thereby suffer the loss implicit in hiring a possibly less qualified person while also exposing itself to clear liability for sex discrimination in hiring under the Human Rights Act; or (2) it can hire the woman and adopt appropriate measures to prevent and remedy sexual harassment in its workplace. We think it is clear what a rational employer would do and what the Human Rights Act requires.