Opinion ID: 1041693
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Habeas Procedural History

Text: On December 10, 2009, Varghese filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Varghese asserted that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process were violated when the trial court conditioned the defense’s testing of Item 19 on its disclosure of the results of that test to the prosecution. A magistrate judge recommended that Varghese’s petition be denied under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The magistrate judge concluded that, at the time Varghese’s claim was decided by the state appellate court, there was no U.S. Supreme Court authority that decided the precise issue of “whether due process and the right to counsel are violated when a court orders that a criminal defendant be granted access to test a sample of prosecution evidence that will destroy the evidence and then require[s] the result of the test to be disclosed to the prosecution.” As such, the state court “cannot be said to have unreasonably applied the law as to the issue presented in the Petition.” The magistrate judge further rejected Varghese’s argument that the principles announced in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), clearly extended to the issues raised in the petition. VARGHESE V. URIBE 9 The district court substantially adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denied the petition. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that Varghese raised “nonfrivolous constitutional arguments” and granted a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). A district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reviewed de novo, Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009). Federal courts are authorized to grant habeas corpus relief to persons in state custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. AEDPA controls this case because Varghese filed his habeas petition in 2009, after that statute became effective. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326–27 (1997). Under AEDPA, Varghese can prevail on his habeas petition only if he shows the state court’s decision (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Varghese relies on the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1). A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it (i) “correctly identifies the 10 VARGHESE V. URIBE governing rule but unreasonably applies it to a new set of facts” or (ii) “fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 2003). The application must be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, our Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. AEDPA’s “highly deferential standard,” Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7, “stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings,” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). We are required to affirm the denial of Varghese’s habeas petition unless the state court’s decision was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786–87. Varghese bears the burden of proof in this appeal, and the state court decision must be accorded the benefit of the doubt. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24–25 (2002) (per curiam). State court decisions are measured against the Supreme Court’s precedent “as of the time the state court renders its decision.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011) (citation and quotes omitted). We review the last reasoned state court decision, Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 834–35 (9th Cir. 2009), which in this case is the California Court of Appeal’s May 2008 opinion. VARGHESE V. URIBE 11