Opinion ID: 1987893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exceptions To Instructions.

Text: At the close of the case, the trial court instructed the jury generally as to the law of self-defense, but even though the defendant had requested a more comprehensive instruction, the court refused to give it. The defendant does not claim that the instructions were incorrect as far as they went, but he does contend that the charge as given fell far short of adequately and fairly covering the law of self-defense. On this point, the defendant excepted to the charge because the court, on the evidence in this case, should have informed the jury: (i) That the defendant had a right to arm himself in anticipation of an assault and the privilege of going wherever he had a lawful right to go; (ii) That it (the jury) could consider evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased known to the defendant in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension of danger, as well as whether the deceased or the defendant was the aggressor; and (iii) That it (the jury) should find the defendant not guilty if, on the whole of the evidence, it had a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-defense. In further excepting to the instructions, the defendant contends that it was error for the court (iv) to instruct the jury in the language of Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 105, 95 A.2d 577 (1953), that [t]he law presumes all homicides to be committed with malice aforethought and to constitute murder, after this Court had expressly modified the statement in Davis v. State, 204 Md. 44, 51, 102 A.2d 816 (1954), and again in Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 98, 145 A.2d 428 (1958). It may be that the jury believed that the defendant had not killed his brother-in-law in self-defense, but as there was some evidence that the defendant had acted in defense of himself and that the deceased had the characteristics of a violent and dangerous person, we think it clear that the lower court should have given a more explicit instruction with respect to the law of self-defense than it did in this case, and that the failure to inform the jury more fully, as to such of the essential elements of self-defense as were applicable to the circumstances in this case, was prejudicial error.