Opinion ID: 76726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Claims

Text: 40 The RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that establishes a cradle-to-grave system for regulating the disposal of solid and hazardous waste. United States v. ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir.1993). Pursuant to the RCRA, the EPA has issued regulations detailing the standards for disposal of solid and hazardous waste. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 124, 260-65, 268, 270. The Act, however, also allows approved states to implement and enforce its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b). Georgia received approval in 1979 and enacted the Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA), Ga. Code Ann. §§ 12-8-60 through 12-8-83, and the Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA), Ga.Code Ann. §§ 12-8-20 through 12-8-59.2, to regulate solid and hazardous waste. The plaintiffs alleged six independent violations of state and federal RCRA regulations, standards, and prohibitions. 20 The defendants, however, only offer arguments with respect to five of these. 21 We address each of the defendants' arguments in turn.
41 Plaintiffs first claim that the defendants operated the SMP facility without obtaining a solid waste handling permit. Under Georgia law, a person generally must obtain a permit in order to handle solid waste. Ga.Code Ann. § 12-8-24 (No person shall engage in solid waste or special solid waste handling in Georgia or construct or operate a solid waste handling facility in Georgia ... without first obtaining a permit from the director authorizing such activity.). 22 It is undisputed that the defendants never had a solid waste handling permit and were, therefore, in violation of the SWMA if they handled solid waste unless an exception to the permit requirement applied. 42 Georgia has broadly defined solid waste as any garbage or refuse; sludge from a wastewater treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility; and other discarded material including solid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations and community activities. Ga.Code Ann. § 12-8-22(33) (emphasis added). The material on the defendant property, including scrap metal, junked cars, old drums, defunct USTs, and other metal objects, was solid waste because it was discarded material. See ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1131 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)). 23 Thus, the defendants were required to have a solid waste handling permit unless an exception to the permit requirement applied. 43 Defendants contend that they did not need a solid waste handling permit because the materials on their property were recovered materials 24 and SMP was a recovered materials processing facility. 25 Recovered materials are excluded from the definition of solid waste. Ga.Code Ann. § 12-8-22(33); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4-.04(7)(a). If, however, materials that would otherwise qualify as recovered materials are accumulated speculatively, they are considered solid waste and must comply with all ... regulations. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4-.04(7)(b). Thus, no permit was required if the materials on the defendant property were recovered materials, unless they were accumulated speculatively. The defendants contend that the materials in their facility fit this exception. The district court disagreed, finding that the materials on the SMP facility were accumulated speculatively and, therefore, a permit was required. We review that legal conclusion de novo. 44 We affirm the district court's determination that the materials on the SMP facility were accumulated speculatively. To show that recovered materials are not accumulated speculatively, SMP can show that there is a known use, reuse, or recycling potential for the material, that the material can be feasibly sold, used, reused, or recycled and that during the preceding 90 days the amount of material that is recycled, sold, used, or reused equals at least 60 percent by weight or volume of the material received during that 90-day period and 60 percent by weight or volume of all material proviously (sic) received and not recycled, sold, used, or reused and carried forward into that 90-day period. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4-.04(7)(c) (emphasis added). The defendants, in order to satisfy their burden, must at the least, provide proof of the volume of sales in the form of bills of sale, or other records showing adequate proof of movement of the material in question to a recognized recycling facility or for proper use or reuse from the accumulation point. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4-.04(7)(d). The defendants have not pointed to, and we could not find, any proof that is acceptable under the regulations to prove that the turnover rate of their scrap metal meets the necessary requirements. Therefore, we cannot find that the materials on the SMP facility are excluded from the definition of solid waste. On this basis, we conclude that those materials are discarded material, which is solid waste, and SMP must have a solid waste handling permit. 26
45 Second, the jury determined that Mr. Maddox and SMP violated the RCRA's prohibition on open dumping. The defendants argue only that the plaintiffs failed to prove that SMP constitutes an open dump. 46 Under the RCRA, any solid waste management practice or disposal of solid waste which constitutes the open dumping of solid waste or hazardous waste is prohibited. 42 U.S.C. § 6945(a). An open dump is defined as any facility or site where solid waste is disposed of which is not a sanitary landfill which meets the criteria promulgated under section 6944 of this title and which is not a facility for disposal of hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(14). Thus, to prove that SMP qualifies as an open dump, the Parkers must show: (1) solid waste, (2) is disposed at SMP, (3) that SMP does not qualify as a landfill under § 6944, and (4) that SMP does not qualify as a facility for the disposal of hazardous waste. As discussed above, the materials on the SMP facility are solid waste. Thus, we must only address the latter three issues. 47 The first issue is whether the solid waste is disposed of at the SMP facility. Disposal is defined broadly as the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). The defendants placed scrap metal and other materials throughout their property. There can be little doubt that, by doing so, the defendants placed solid waste on their property in such a manner that the waste could enter the environment. Therefore, the defendants disposed of solid waste under the RCRA's definition. 48 Because solid waste was disposed of at the SMP facility, the defendants operated an open dump unless the facility qualified under either of the two statutory exceptions: sanitary landfills and hazardous waste facilities. The defendants make no contention that the SMP facility was a sanitary landfill; thus, the only issue is whether SMP was a facility for the disposal of hazardous waste. 49 Under the RCRA, a facility for the disposal of hazardous waste must have a permit. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a). In order to obtain such a permit, a facility for the disposal of hazardous waste must meet many specific criteria. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-39e; Ga.Code Ann. §§ 12-8-6 through 12-8-83. Undisputedly, SMP did not satisfy these requirements and, therefore, it could not have been a facility for the disposal of hazardous waste. Thus, because the defendants disposed of solid waste at the SMP facility and because the facility was not a sanitary landfill or a facility for the disposal of solid waste, SMP was an open dump. Because SMP did not have the permit required to operate an open dump, it was in violation of the open-dumping provisions of the RCRA. Likewise, Mr. Maddox, as the owner of the property, violated the RCRA's open-dumping provisions because no person may cause, suffer, allow or permit open dumping on his property. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4-.04(4)(c).
50 The plaintiffs alleged and the jury found that the defendants violated Georgia's regulations governing scrap tire management. Under Georgia law, any person who generates scrap tires shall have a Scrap Tire Generator Identification Number (ID#) issued by the [EPD]. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4-.19(4)(a). Scrap tire generators must also initiate a manifest to transport scrap tires and must report the number of scrap tires transported and the manner of their disposition. Id. at r. 391-3-4-.19(4)(b),(e). 51 SMP was a scrap tire generator under the SWMA and, therefore, had to comply with the above requirements. The term scrap tire generator is defined broadly to include any person who generates scrap tires. Generators may include, but are not limited to, retail tire dealers, retreaders, scrap tire processors, automobile dealers, private company vehicle maintenance shops, garages, service stations, and city, county, and state governments. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4-.19(2)(i) (emphasis added). Scrap tire processing, in turn, means any method, system, or other treatment designed to change the physical form, size, or chemical content of scrap tires and includes all aspects of its management (administration, personnel, land, equipment, buildings, and other elements). Processing includes, but is not limited to, shredding, baling, recycling, or sorting of scrap tires. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4-.19(2)(j). Thus, those who sort, shred, or recycle scrap tires are scrap tire generators under Georgia law. SMP removed tires from junk cars brought to the facility. These tires were then either taken to a recycling facility or to a local dump. As such, SMP was required to have a scrap tire identification number and to comply with Georgia's record and reporting requirements. 27 SMP, however, admitted that it did not have an ID number and, thus, SMP violated Georgia's permit requirements for scrap tire generators.
52 Under Georgia law, certain materials may not be disposed of at solid waste facilities. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4-.04(6)(b). These materials include lead acid batteries, liquid waste, and PCBs. Id. Any person who accepts such waste for disposal is in violation of Georgia law. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4-.04(6)(c). 53 The defendants argue that the plaintiffs did not prove their claim that the defendants accepted prohibited waste because, according to the defendants, the plaintiffs' only evidence of prohibited waste on the SMP facility was that Maddox accepted drums of liquid waste in the early 1990s. The defendants argue that the drums were not sufficient to establish a violation of Georgia law because claims based on activities that occurred in the early 1990s are barred by the five-year statute of limitations applicable to RCRA citizen suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). See 28 U.S.C. § 2642. Assuming that the five-year statute of limitations applies, we find that other evidence supports the jury's determination that the defendants accepted prohibited waste. 54 The evidence established that SMP accepted waste containing hazardous materials. At trial, the Parkers presented photographic evidence of electrical transformers, which, according to the plaintiffs' expert, contained PCBs. No evidence contradicted the expert's assertion that this waste was accepted within the statute of limitations. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.
55 A citizen may bring suit against any person ... who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Section 6972(a)(1)(B), unlike § 6972(a)(1)(A), explicitly considers the environmental and health effects of waste disposal and authorizes suit any time there is an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. The section applies retroactively to past violations, so long as those violations are a present threat to health or the environment. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485-86, 116 S.Ct. 1251, 134 L.Ed.2d 121 (1996). To prevail on a claim under § 6972(a)(1)(B), the plaintiffs must prove: (1) that the defendant is a person, including, but not limited to, one who was or is a generator or transporter of solid or hazardous waste or one who was or is an owner or operator of a solid or hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility; (2) that the defendant has contributed to or is contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of solid or hazardous waste; and (3) that the solid or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 292 (5th Cir.2001); see 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). As shown above, the defendants disposed of solid waste, and, therefore, they contributed, or were contributing, to the handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of solid or hazardous waste. Thus, the first two elements were met. We address only the third and find that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the SMP facility may present an imminent and substantial threat. 56 The operative word in the statute is the word may. Accordingly, the plaintiffs need only demonstrate that the waste disposed of may present an imminent and substantial threat. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299. Similarly, the term endangerment means a threatened or potential harm, and does not require proof of actual harm. See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486, 116 S.Ct. 1251 (noting that there must be a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later). The endangerment must also be imminent. The Supreme Court found that [a]n endangerment can only be `imminent' if it `threatens to occur immediately.' Id. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 1251 (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary of English Language 1245 (2d ed.1934)). Because the operative word is may, however, the plaintiffs must show that there is a potential for an imminent threat of a serious harm, see Cox, 256 F.3d at 300 (noting that an `endangerment' is substantial if it is `serious'), to the environment or health. See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213-14 (3d Cir.1982) (noting that § 6972(a)(1)(B) contains `expansive language' that confers `upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risk posed by toxic wastes'); see also Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (2d Cir.1991), rev'd in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992) (quoting Price ). 57 The Parkers produced sufficient evidence to establish that the defendants' past handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes may have presented an imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment. The evidence showed that Mr. Maddox and L.B. Recycling contracted with Laurence-David, Inc. to dispose of 1,000 drums of liquid waste. The EPA detected hazardous constituents, including lead and other heavy metals, leaking from these drums onto the ground. In addition, photographic evidence showed that Jason Maddox disposed of electrical transformers and car cushion materials at the SMP facility. The plaintiffs' expert testified that these items are known sources of PCBs and lead, two substances that are defined as hazardous under the RCRA. The evidence established that the amounts of PCBs and lead found on the property were at levels that required SMP to notify the EPD. Additionally, there was testimony to the effect that materials found on the SMP facility were explosive, and that they could affect the central nervous system and cause problems in the upper respiratory system. The lead and heavy metals can affect a person's motor skills. Also, a witness testified that materials on the SMP facility spilled onto the ground, entered the soil, and killed trees. Accordingly, the defendants' disposal of hazardous waste harmed the environment and posed a threat to health. On the basis of the above evidence, this harm was substantial. Therefore, Mr. Maddox, L.B. Recycling, and SMP violated § 6972(a)(1)(B).