Opinion ID: 3052302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Flexibility of Cause in the School Setting

Text: In T.L.O., the Court recognized that an exceptional rule was required for a singular context and held that “the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.” 469 U.S. at 340. The majority accurately recites the reasonableness inquiry, but fails in my view to acknowledge the impetus behind the novel standard: the need for school officials to act flexibly and swiftly in their efforts to maintain orderly and safe educational environments. Because this concern ought to guide a student search analysis, a review of the T.L.O. Court’s reasoning will enhance the ultimate inquiry. 8458 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 In crafting a reasonableness standard for student searches, the T.L.O. Court did not simply extend the extant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence governing law enforcement searches. Instead, it recognized that “what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place,” which requires “ ‘balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.’ ” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)). The Court rejected the argument that children lack any legitimate expectations of privacy on campus, T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338–39, but explained that “[a]gainst the child’s interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds,” id. at 339. Although the Court took note of the recent rise in drug use and violent crime, it made clear that “[e]ven in schools that have been spared the most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.” Id. Of course, the preservation of order is an important goal outside of schools, but the school environment presents unique challenges. “Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action,” and, therefore, “maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures.” Id. at 339–40 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court set out to craft a standard that would “preserv[e] the informality of the student-teacher relationship.” Id. Based on this reasoning, T.L.O. held that the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is ill-suited for school searches, for it would “unduly interfere with the maintenance REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8459 of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” 469 U.S. at 340. The Court did not stop there, however. Over a spirited dissent, id. at 353–70 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the Court concluded that “the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause,” id. at 341 (majority opinion). The Court believed that “the reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.” Id. at 343. The newly-minted reasonableness standard was to govern all school searches, even those that resulted from students’ infractions of seemingly trivial rules. We are unwilling to adopt a standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules. The maintenance of discipline in the schools requires not only that students be restrained from assaulting one another, abusing drugs and alcohol, and committing other crimes, but also that students conform themselves to the standards of conduct prescribed by school authorities. . . . Absent any suggestion that the [rule forbidding specified conduct] violates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter, defer to that judgment and refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are important to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not. Id. at 342 n.9. This review of the Court’s thinking should inform our understanding of the reasonableness standard. The normal 8460 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 Fourth Amendment balancing has been tipped to be more favorable to school officials; children maintain their right to a legitimate expectation of privacy, but school officials do not need probable cause to invade that right. This recalibration of the Fourth Amendment scales has a purpose: allowing school officials to respond swiftly and informally to effect their “substantial interest” in maintaining order in schools, including schools with no significant history of disciplinary problems. Further, the standard implicitly recognizes that school officials deserve deference to their policy judgments, as courts are expressly forbidden from deciding which school rules are too trivial to trigger searches under the reasonableness standard. In light of this, it is important that our school search decisions have a forward-looking element. We must keep an eye on the consequences of our rulings so that we do not inadvertently formalize a setting that the Supreme Court has insisted remain informal. Similarly, we must manage the ever-present risk of impeding school officials’ ability to respond quickly to disciplinary infractions, even if we think such infractions relatively benign. “A teacher’s focus is, and should be, on teaching and helping students, rather than on developing evidence against a particular troublemaker.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). This is not to say that we must rubber stamp every school search. While “unblinking deference,” Majority at 8434, is certainly not called for, we should recognize that our normal, healthy skepticism of government authority must be reconciled with the realities of the school environment. “[T]eachers have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring). Whereas “[l]aw enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects,” “[r]arely does this type of adversarial relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. . . . The attitude REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8461 of the typical teacher is one of personal responsibility for the student’s welfare as well as for his education.” Id. at 349–50. T.L.O.’s emphasis on these aspects of the school environment has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a school district’s policy of conducting random urinalysis drug testing on student athletes, which required those students to urinate under teacher supervision. 515 U.S. 646, 648, 650, 664–65 (1995). In doing so, it noted that T.L.O. emphasized that “the State’s power over schoolchildren” is “custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.” Id. at 655. In Acton, the school’s role as a “guardian and tutor” was the “most significant element” in the Court’s decision. Id. at 665. Considering the government’s interest in “[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren,” the Court opined that “the nature of the concern is important—indeed, perhaps compelling—[which] can hardly be doubted.” Id. at 661. Students are the most susceptible to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs, id., and “of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted,” id. at 662. Acknowledging that there was a less intrusive means of deterring drug abuse—“ ‘drug testing on suspicion of drug use’ ”—Acton reiterated that there is no “least intrusive” requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 663. The suspicion-of-drug-use requirement was undesirable because it would “add[ ] to the ever-expanding diversionary duties of schoolteachers the new function of spotting and bringing to account drug abuse, a task for which they are ill prepared, and which is not readily compatible with their vocation.” Id. at 664. 8462 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 More recently, the Supreme Court upheld a similar urinalysis drug testing policy that applied not only to student athletes, but also to all students who participated in competitive extracurricular activities. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002). The Court explained that “[a] student’s privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety,” and cited as examples policies that require students to routinely “submit to physical examinations and vaccinations against disease.” Id. at 830–31. Reiterating the problems of adolescent drug abuse in schools discussed in Acton, the Earls Court stated that “the nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.” Id. at 834; see also id. at 835 (“[T]his Court has not required a particularized or pervasive drug problem before allowing the government to conduct suspicionless drug testing.”). And, once again, the Court rejected the argument that the Constitution requires individualized suspicion before testing. Id. at 837. In addition to the reasons discussed in Acton, the Court offered an additional concern: “The fear of lawsuits resulting from such targeted searches may chill enforcement of the program, rendering it ineffective in combating drug use.” Id. Finally, just one year ago, the Supreme Court held that schools can “restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.” Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007). Drawing on the three Fourth Amendment school search cases, it restated that “ ‘the nature of [schoolchildren’s] rights is what is appropriate for children in school,’ ” and that “deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest.” Id. at 2627, 2628 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 656, 661). Twenty-three years after it was decided, T.L.O. remains good law. Students still have reduced expectations of privacy on campus, and school officials are still entitled to promptly REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8463 and informally confront threats to school order. Not only has the Court failed to strike down any searches under T.L.O., it has gone even further, holding that schools can require students to provide urine samples under teacher supervision without any suspicion of drug use, and without any history of drug problems at the school. It is against this background that we must evaluate this search.