Opinion ID: 2551505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pendleton's Motion for a Protective Order

Text: ¶ 34 We first address the disciplinary court's denial of Pendleton's motion for a protective order. Pendleton objected to the OPC's request for admissions because the request was filed during the pendency of his appeal of the rule 18 interim suspension to this court. Pendleton claims that the disciplinary court lacked jurisdiction over the disciplinary proceeding during that time. He specifically claims that the disciplinary court incorrectly ruled that his motion was untimely. ¶ 35 We disagree with Pendleton's characterization of the disciplinary court's ruling. The disciplinary court specifically stated that its denial of Pendleton's motion was not based on the timeliness of the motion. Rather, the court explained in its order denying the motion: The Respondent's motion is so general that it in effect is asking the Court to deny the Bar its rights of discovery in preparing for the disbarment proceeding. For the Court to enter such a general and all-inclusive protective order would deny the Bar its discovery rights as set forth in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The court did not address the timeliness of Pendleton's motion or the jurisdictional issue raised by Pendleton. Nonetheless, before we can address whether the disciplinary court set forth a proper basis for denying the motion, it is necessary for us to address the jurisdictional issue raised by Pendleton. ¶ 36 Under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, when a litigant appeals from a nonfinal, interlocutory order, the appellate court's review of the appeal is discretionary. See Utah R.App. P. 5(a). Moreover, it is generally recognized that the granting of an interlocutory appeal does not normally divest the district court of jurisdiction over the underlying matter. See 16 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3921.2, at 53-64 (1996); see also, e.g., Ex Parte Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 201 U.S. 156, 162, 26 S.Ct. 404, 50 L.Ed. 707 (1906) (It was not intended that the cause as a whole should be transferred to the appellate court prior to the final decree. The case, except for the hearing on the appeal from the interlocutory order, is to proceed in the lower court as though no such appeal had been taken, unless otherwise specially ordered.); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Norris, Nos. 99-5068, 99-5089, 216 F.3d 1087, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 14680, at - (10th Cir. June 27, 2000). When the scope of the interlocutory appeal is not affected by litigation of the underlying action, the interest in expediting litigation requires that the district court proceed with the action. See 16 Wright, supra, at 54, 56. An interim suspension order, by definition, is a nonfinal order because it is entered  pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon the conduct causing the harm. RLDD 18(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the appeal of an interim suspension order is interlocutory and does not normally divest the district court of jurisdiction over the pending disciplinary proceeding. ¶ 37 In the instant case, Pendleton's earlier appeal to this court from the disciplinary court's interim suspension order was an appeal from a nonfinal, interlocutory order. Moreover, the pending proceeding to determine whether permanent disciplinary sanctions should be imposed against Pendleton was in no way dependent upon our disposition of Pendleton's interlocutory appeal. Thus, even though the disciplinary court failed to address this issue, the disciplinary court retained jurisdiction over the ongoing disciplinary proceeding, and the OPC was entitled to proceed with discovery. ¶ 38 We now examine whether the disciplinary court properly denied Pendleton's motion for a protective order. Rule 26(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part: Upon motion of a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court . . . may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that discovery not be had; . . . (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters.... Moreover, we have stated that the district court is entrusted with broad discretion in dealing with discovery matters, namely, protective orders. See R. & R. Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1079 (Utah 1997). This court will `not find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's rulings.' Id. (quoting Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996)). ¶ 39 In the instant case, Pendleton's motion sought a protective order relieving him from responding to all of the Bar's requests for admissions, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents. Pendleton set forth two grounds for the relief he requested in his motion: 1. The requested discovery is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 2. The requested discovery seeks information which has no relationship to the professional misconduct which is properly alleged and is the subject matter of these proceedings: information which would establish that of which respondent has never been accused. It is impermissible inquisition. ¶ 40 The disciplinary court correctly ruled that Pendleton's motion would have denied the OPC any further meaningful discovery in this case. The court correctly determined that the OPC's specific interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents were reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The OPC's complaint involved allegations of criminal activity, into which the OPC's requested discovery properly inquired. Moreover, the OPC's requested discovery sought to find evidence establishing certain aggravating factors, including Pendleton's addiction to methamphetamine and his failure to seek treatment, and his failure to comply with the disciplinary court's rule 18 order of interim suspension. Discovering this evidence was essential to the OPC's duty to determine whether Pendleton had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and what sanction should be imposed. ¶ 41 Furthermore, Pendleton's motion for a protective order was untimely under rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because it was not filed within thirty days of service of the request for admissions. As discussed above, Pendleton's interlocutory appeal did not prevent the OPC from requesting discovery, nor did it relieve Pendleton of his duty to respond within thirty days. Thus, the disciplinary court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Pendleton's motion for a protective order.