Opinion ID: 622463
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ghost-busting

Text: Immediately after the second phone call with James, DeGree contacted Dave Groover, a private investigator. DeGree asked Groover to trace the phone number James had provided, which turned out to be registered to James E. Kimsey. Given this information, as well as the faxed motion bearing the name Kimsey and the exhibit with the file path containing James E. Kimsey, DeGree and Groover ascertained that Kimsey was likely the ghostwriter of the documents filed by Rizzolo. DeGree proceeded to file with the district court on the Henrys' behalf a Motion to Reveal Pro Se Litigant Rick Rizzolo's Ghost Writer. He attached a declaration from Groover indicating that Kimsey was the probable author of Rizzolo's pleadings. DeGree also attached records showing that Kimsey had been convicted for unauthorized practice of law in Nevada in 1987. [1] The motion requested that Rizzolo be required to reveal the identity of the person who had authored the eight documents he had filed during the previous two months. At the hearing before a magistrate judge on the Henrys' motion, Rizzolo appeared with his new counsel, Kenneth Frizzell (Frizzell). Just before the hearing began, Groover spotted Kimsey outside the courthouse. When Groover approached Kimsey to serve him with a subpoena, Kimsey refused to take the document. At the hearing, Frizzell acknowledged that Rizzolo had used Kimsey's services to prepare and file the eight documents. Addressing Kimsey's actions, the magistrate judge entered a written order finding that Rizzolo had used the services of Mr. James E. Kimsey to prepare and file pleadings with the Court. In doing so, the magistrate judge determined, Defendant Rick Rizzolo allowed a non-attorney to determine the legal sufficiency of the instruments filed with the Court and relied on Mr. Kimsey's judgment in applying legal knowledge to the specific issues pending in this action. Concluding, based on these findings, that Kimsey had engaged in unauthorized practice of law on behalf of Rizzolo, the magistrate ordered Rizzolo to cease using Kimsey's services and struck the eight documents Kimsey had prepared. Soon thereafter, the matter escalated into a criminal proceeding. The magistrate judge issued an order to Kimsey to show cause as to why he should not be held in criminal contempt. Reiterating that Kimsey appeared to have engaged in the unlawful practice of law, the magistrate judge requested that the government prosecute Kimsey pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a)(2) for the alleged contempt. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a)(2) (The court must request that the contempt be prosecuted by an attorney for the government....). In response to the request, the U.S. Attorney instigated a prosecution of Kimsey for criminal contempt. The scope of the prosecution was defined by the magistrate judge's Order to Show Cause, which constituted the sole charging document. The Order charged Kimsey with helping Rizzolo prepare and file [the] eight pleadings, stating that it appears that Mr. Kimsey's actions as a non-attorney in preparing and filing legal instruments constitutes the unauthorized practice of law on behalf of Defendant Rick Rizzolo. Based on these specific alleged actions, the order charged Kimsey with violating: [(1)] The Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada[, which] require that in order to be eligible to practice before the District Court, an attorney must be admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of Nevada or, if the attorney is appearing pro hac vice, that he or she be a member in good standing and eligible to practice before the bar of any jurisdiction in the United States ... [; and (2)] Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 7.285[, which] makes it unlawful for a person to practice law in Nevada if the person is not an active member of the State Bar of Nevada or otherwise authorized to practice law in Nevada. See D. Nev. L.R. IA 10-1, 10-2; Nev.Rev. Stat. § 7.285. [2] In his acceptance of service of the magistrate judge's order, Kimsey expressly reserved his right to a trial by jury. Nonetheless, Kimsey's criminal contempt proceedings took the form of a bench trial before the district court. The testimony at trial established that Kimsey was not an attorney, and that he did not hold himself out as an attorney to Rizzolo. There was no evidence that Rizzolo had paid Kimsey for his services. At the same time, the evidence also indicated that Kimsey had provided Rizzolo with legal assistance so substantial as to mimic those an attorney would offer. To test whether this was so, the district judge questioned Rizzolo about the substance of the pleadings he had filed under his name during July and August 2009. With respect to the motion for summary judgment, for example, the judge asked, What did you understand Rule 56 to encompass? Rizzolo replied, I don't know. I've read so many of these, your Honor. The judge then pressed, [W]hat's your understanding of the standard that would have to be met for a party to be entitled to [s]ummary [j]udgment upon a claim or a case? Rizzolo's response confirmed that he must have had little to do with the motion he had purportedly filed: I would have to read it and go back to look and see what it was.... Summary [j]udgment would be that we were asking thatyou know, we would come in here and based onI don't know what this particular one is, but that, you know, we're asking for you basically for a [s]ummary [j]udgment from you to I believe it was to dismiss the case or whatever that one was about. Similarly, when the district judge questioned Rizzolo about his motion to dismiss, which relied on the Erie and Rooker-Feldman doctrines, Rizzolo conceded that he had never read Erie, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), or District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). After hearing Rizzolo's testimony, as well as that of other witnesses, the district court noted the difficulty of defining what constitutes the practice of law: we know it when we see it or the courts know it when they see it. Nevertheless, the court concluded that this clearly is a case that crosses the line between simply providing assistance or offhand recommendations of looking at a particular case, and summarized its findings of the services that Kimsey had provided Rizzolo as follows: Mr. Rizzolo, whether it's through suggestions of others or just his own conjured up views on something, raises with Mr. Kimsey, asks Mr. Kimsey if [t]here's a case or [to] research[ ] a particular point. Mr. Kimsey conducts the research. Mr. Kimsey writes an argument, gives it to Mr. Rizzolo to analyze, review, edit, whateverfactually correct certainly. And ultimately the [eight] products that are filed [in July and August 2009] are documents the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt authored by Mr. Kimsey. In support of these findings, the court noted that the eight documents are clearly in the form of pleadings citing case authority that had been researched, that had been structured or formatted in a way to present legal arguments seeking specific relief including dismissal of the claims against Mr. Rizzolo, and that Rizzolo responded affirmatively when asked, Wasn't what you did with Mr. Kimsey what you did with your attorneys? The court had no difficulty holding that Kimsey had violated Local Rules IA 10-1 and 10-2 of the district court, as well as Nevada Revised Statute § 7.285, based on his role in preparing and filing the eight pleadings. In addition, the court relied on the following facts to find that Kimsey had willfully violated these provisions, as required for a conviction under § 402: Kimsey had been convicted of unauthorized practice of law in the past; he had failed to sign the eight pleadings; he had not identif[ied] himself; he had refused to acknowledge his status; and he had declined to receive service. [3] After concluding that the factors set forth in [the magistrate judge's] Order to Show Cause ... have been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence, the district court convicted Kimsey of criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 402.