Opinion ID: 2805588
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requisite Defamatory Sting

Text: The potential violation of an easement, referenced in Exhibit B, does not as a general principle carry the sting of a reprehensible crime. The mere implication that one might be in violation of an easement, absent more – such as inflammatory language or context to suggest that the statement causes particular harm to one's reputation – does not rise to the level of defamation. It does not so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him, 10 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559, such as by making the plaintiff appear odious, infamous, or ridiculous, or subjecting her to contempt, scorn, shame, or disgrace. Similarly, the potential violation of covenant restrictions, referenced in Exhibits D and H, does not alone carry the requisite defamatory sting. Covenant restrictions are contractual in nature, Black's Law Dictionary 443 (10th ed. 2014), and the breach of a contract does not necessarily bring with it defamatory connotation. We do not hold that accusations of violations of covenants or easements are never defamatory as a matter of law, merely that they are not inherently defamatory. Based on the neutral language of these emails and their context, even construing them in the light most supportive of the plaintiff, there is nothing to aggravate the plain language of the emails to suggest they are defamatory. As to Exhibits E and F, the legislative nature of an ordinance may carry a law-breaking implication above that inherent in a charge of breach of a covenant or easement. However, plaintiffs face the same essential challenges: the potential violation of a county ordinance by a proposed dwelling plan does not in and of itself rise to the level of defamation. An accusation of ordinance violations may in some contexts carry defamatory sting, but the ordinance at issue 11 here pertains to the requirements of a free standing dwelling unit. It is thus not apparent on the face of the document how this violation would render the plaintiffs odious, infamous, or ridiculous, or otherwise subject them to contempt, shame, scorn, or disgrace. The face of these emails does not reasonably convey defamatory sting. We thus turn to the innuendo articulated in the pleading, explaining the allegedly defamatory meaning, to consider whether the pleading guides us to a defamatory implication in the words that is not immediately apparent. Webb, 287 at 88, 752 S.E.2d at 811.