Opinion ID: 1373479
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The judicial function: uninsured motorists arbitration from Aetna to [] [ Van Tassel ]

Text: The statutory requirement for arbitration of uninsured motorist claims is found in subdivision (f) of section 11580.2, which states: The policy or an endorsement added thereto shall provide that the determination as to whether the insured shall be legally entitled to recover damages, and if so entitled, the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured and the insurer or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration.... (4, 5) Cases which have analyzed and construed this section have pointed out that the word damages in this section means the damages which the insured is entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist, and that the statute, read literally, requires arbitration of two issues only: (1) whether the insured is entitled to recover against the uninsured motorist and (2) if so, the amount of the damages. ( Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Superior Court (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 333 [43 Cal. Rptr. 476]; Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1966) 243 Cal. App.2d 749, 751 [52 Cal. Rptr. 721]; Commercial Ins. Co. v. Copeland (1967) 248 Cal. App.2d 561, 564 [56 Cal. Rptr. 794]; Pacific Indem. Co. v. Superior Court (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 63, 67 [54 Cal. Rptr. 470]; Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Ruiz (1967) 250 Cal. App.2d 741, 744 [59 Cal. Rptr. 13]; Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1967) 254 Cal. App.2d 407, 413 [62 Cal. Rptr. 177]; Campbell v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (1968) 260 Cal. App.2d 105, 110 [67 Cal. Rptr. 175]; Pacific Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lang (1968) 265 Cal. App.2d 837, 841 [71 Cal. Rptr. 637]; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shmitka (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 59, 62 [90 Cal. Rptr. 399]; National Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 345, 349 [103 Cal. Rptr. 606].) Where the arbitration clause in the insurance policy is broader than the statute, the arbitration of additional issues may be required. Cases involving such arbitration agreements must be distinguished from those which are concerned only with the statutory language. Cases involving those broader clauses include the following: Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra, 243 Cal. App.2d 749, 751-752; Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Ruiz, supra, 250 Cal. App.2d 741, 744-745; Esparza v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1967) 257 Cal. App.2d 496 [65 Cal. Rptr. 245]; Campbell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., supra, 260 Cal. App.2d 105, 110; American Ins. Co. v. Gernand (1968) 262 Cal. App.2d 300, 302 [68 Cal. Rptr. 810]; Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co. (1970) 6 Cal. App.3d 540, 543 [86 Cal. Rptr. 178]. An additional category of cases involved a post-controversy agreement between the parties which consented, expressly or by implication, to an arbitration going beyond the statutory requirement: Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Dennis (1964) 229 Cal. App.2d 541 [40 Cal. Rptr. 418]; Jordan v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. (1965) 232 Cal. App.2d 127, 131 [42 Cal. Rptr. 556]; Hernandez v. State Farm Ins. Co. (1969) 272 Cal. App.2d 255 [77 Cal. Rptr. 196]; Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co., supra, 6 Cal. App.3d 540, 544. Most of the Court of Appeal decisions on arbitrability are reconcilable under their facts, when consideration is given to whether the case involves construction of the statute, interpretation of an insurance policy broader than the statute, or a voluntary submission to broader arbitration. But the language of the opinions is less harmonious. Some of the opinions emphasize a legislative or judicial policy favoring arbitration as a reason for broadening the scope of the issues which the arbitrator may determine. (See, e.g., Jordan v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., supra, 232 Cal. App.2d 127, 132; Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co., supra, 6 Cal. App.3d 540, 546.) That kind of emphasis, where the court has found an agreement to arbitrate, is most appropriate. But out of context it is subject to misinterpretation. (6) There is indeed a strong policy in favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate, but there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate and which no statute has made arbitrable. [] Orpustan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 988 [103 Cal. Rptr. 919, 500 P.2d 1119], [] was an appeal from a judgment of the superior court refusing to compel arbitration. The insurer's objection to arbitration was that plaintiff had not shown any physical contact between plaintiff's vehicle and that of the uninsured motorist, whose identity was unknown. Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (b), defining uninsured motor vehicle, contains a proviso that with respect to a vehicle whose owner or operator is unknown, coverage applies only if the bodily injury has arisen out of the physical contact of the vehicles. The arbitration clause in Orpustan's policy provided that if the parties did not agree as to the amount payable hereunder, the arbitrators were to hear and determine the question or questions so in dispute. Some earlier Court of Appeal decisions had construed similar language as an agreement to arbitrate the physical contact issue. ( Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co., supra, 6 Cal. App.3d 540; American Ins. Co. v. Gernand, supra, 262 Cal. App.2d 300, 302; cf. Esparza v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra, 257 Cal. App.2d 496; contra, Pacific Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lang, supra, 265 Cal. App.2d 837.) Thus, the holding of Orpustan, based upon the language of the insurance policy, is fully consistent with the antecedent [] decisions which required the parties to arbitrate those controversies which they had agreed to arbitrate. [However, our opinion also contained certain broad, general language to the effect that the entirety of the controversy, including what we there termed jurisdictional facts, was subject to the determination of the arbitrator. (7 Cal.3d at pp. 991-992; see also Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co., supra, 6 Cal. App.3d 540, 546-547.) This language was subsequently relied upon by us in the case of Van Tassel v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 624 [116 Cal. Rptr. 505, 526 P.2d 969], where we held that the issue there in question  whether the decedent came within the policy's definition of insured  involved a determination of jurisdictional facts and should therefore be submitted to the arbitrator. Now, in the case before us, we are asked to again apply the broad language of Orpustan and hold that the application of the one-year statutory time limitation of Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i), as another issue involving jurisdictional facts, is also subject to determination by the arbitrator. This we decline to do.]