Opinion ID: 885241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Bartsch and Indendi reconsidered

Text: ถ 71 Until fairly recently, Montana's open range doctrine, pursuant to all relevant statutes discussed thus far, applied exclusively to the legal relationship between landowners in actions involving the accidental trespass of livestock that lawfully run at large on the open range. ถ 72 This course was altered, however, by two of this Court's decisions, Bartsch v. Irvine Co. (1967), 149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302, and Indendi v. Workman (1995), 272 Mont. 64, 899 P.2d 1085. Bartsch was the first decision that looked to the open range doctrine to determine whether or not a livestock owner owed a legal duty to a motorist driving on highways passing through open range, after a motorist brought an action for negligence following a fatal vehicle accident involving the defendant's horse. Likewise, Indendi considered whether the open range doctrine statutes governing a legal fence could be applied to livestock owners under a theory of negligence per se, in a case that also involved an accident between a vehicle and a horse. ถ 73 We conclude that in light of the foregoing discussion, as well as the arguments set forth by the parties and amici, both decisions must be reconsidered.
ถ 74 The Court in Bartsch accurately recounted the history of open range trespass case law. See Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 407-409, 427 P.2d at 304-305. The Bartsch Court first cited the 1874 decision Smith v. Williams , and stated that the action was brought for damages due to the trespass of cattle on plaintiff's land. Next, the Court cited the 1902 decision Beinhorn v. Griswold , and stated that in that case the doctrine of open range was further discussed and explained in another trespass action . The Court then cited to the 1923 case, Schreiner v. Deep Creek Stock Ass'n , and referred to it as another trespass action. Next, a 1959 case, Thompson v. Mattuschek , was cited for the proposition that in range country [livestock] may wander. Thompson was a trespass action brought after the defendant's cattle damaged the plaintiff's barley crop. Finally, the Court cited Montgomery v. Gehring , a 1965 decision involving a boundary dispute between private landowners where the open range doctrine was raised. The excerpted quote from Montgomery included the open range doctrine rule that [o]ne releasing his livestock onto lands where he has a right to do so is under no duty to restrain them from entering another's unenclosed land.  Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 409, 427 P.2d at 305 (quoting Montgomery v. Gehring (1965), 145 Mont. 278, 283, 400 P.2d 403, 406) (emphasis added). ถ 75 Omitting the operative terms another's unenclosed land, the Bartsch Court then reasoned that because the owner of livestock owed no general duty to prevent the livestock from wandering .... he cannot be said to be negligent if the livestock do wander โ even if such wandering takes them onto a highway right of way which runs through open range. Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 409, 427 P.2d at 305. In reaching this conclusion, not once did the Court refer to any of the open range doctrine statutes. Further, the Court did not cite to any other western-state jurisdiction's case law that had similarly extended the open range trespass doctrine to the legal relationship between livestock owners and motorists, under similar state laws. See, e.g., Kendall v. Curl (1960), 222 Or. 329, 353 P.2d 227, 231 (concluding that [i]f cattle and horses have a right to be on the road [in open range areas], their owner is not negligent in allowing them on the road). ถ 76 Subsequently, a series of decisions addressing and applying the open range doctrine to the legal relationship between livestock owners and motorists followed. See Jenkins v. Valley Garden Ranch, Inc. (1968), 151 Mont. 463, 443 P.2d 753; Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co. (1972), 160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397; Ambrogini v. Todd (1982), 197 Mont. 111, 642 P.2d 1013; Siegfried v. Atchison (1985), 219 Mont. 14, 709 P.2d 1006; State ex rel. Martin v. Finley (1987), 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497; Williams v. Selstad (1988), 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247; Yager v. Deane (1993), 258 Mont. 453, 853 P.2d 1214; Indendi v.. Workman (1995), 272 Mont. 64, 899 P.2d 1085. But see Williams, 235 Mont. at 141, 766 P.2d at 249 (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (stating that for their purposes, livestock containment laws have a valid application; for torts not related to their purposes, the livestock containment laws should be disregarded and the ordinary rules of negligence laws should apply). ถ 77 Amicus Montana Stock Growers Association urges this Court to recognize the rule that this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of Legislature. See Bay v. State Department of Admin. (1984), 212 Mont. 258, 265, 688 P.2d 1, 4 (stating that it is the province of courts to construe and apply the law as they find it and to maintain its integrity as it has been written by a coordinate branch of the state government). ถ 78 We agree. Substituting its judgment for that of the Legislature is precisely what the Court in Bartsch accomplished by ignoring the fundamental purpose of Montana's open range doctrine by taking a statutory body of law that pertains to one particular legal relationship and applying it to another that the statutes involved simply do not address, and, consequently, inserting an expansive no-duty rule that, to this date, has been omitted from any legislation. See ง 1-2-101, MCA (stating that [i]n the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted). ถ 79 We therefore overrule our decision in Bartsch โ as well as subsequent decisions that followed Bartsch โ to the extent that it holds that a livestock owner, pursuant to Montana's open range doctrine, owes absolutely no duty to motorists driving on public highways in open range areas. See Yager, 258 Mont. at 458, 853 P.2d at 1217; Williams, 235 Mont. at 139-40, 766 P.2d at 248; State ex rel. Martin, 227 Mont. at 245, 738 P.2d at 499; Siegfried, 219 Mont. at 16, 709 P.2d at 1007; Ambrogini, 197 Mont. at 119, 642 P.2d at 1018; Jenkins, 151 Mont. at 465, 443 P.2d at 755.
ถ 80 In our 1995 decision, Indendi v. Workman , the injured driver, Indendi, brought a negligence claim against the owners of a horse with which she had collided. It was undisputed that the highway in question was part of the federal-aid primary system, and therefore subject to ง 60-7-201, MCA, as well as our decision in Ambrogini. ถ 81 The district court had determined that the owners of the horse, the Workmans, fell under the statutory exclusion, ง 60-7-202(2), MCA, which provides that the general proscription of permitting livestock to occupy such highways does not apply to the parts of fenced highways adjacent to open range where a highway device has not been installed to exclude range livestock. The court concluded that although the Workmans' horse had been confined within a fenced pasture, their ranch nevertheless was open range, and therefore they owed no duty to prevent the horse from occupying the highway. See Indendi, 272 Mont. at 67, 899 P.2d at 1087. ถ 82 We concluded that the factual statements in the court's memorandum and order were not substantiated by the record. See Indendi, 272 Mont. at 69, 899 P.2d at 1088. We concluded that the directed verdict entered in favor of the Workmans was therefore inappropriate because pursuant to the exception under subsection (2) of ง 60-7-202, MCA, there was no evidence that the highway in question was fenced, and that the area adjacent to the highway was, as a matter of law, open range. Indendi, 272 Mont. at 69-70, 899 P.2d at 1088-89. ถ 83 After properly reaching this conclusion, and requiring a remand, we then moved into a negligence per se analysis based on Indendi's contention that the Workmans had not constructed a legal fence around their property in accordance with ง 81-4-101, MCA. As explained by the Court, one of the key criteria for establishing a negligence per se claim based on the violation of a statute is that the statute was enacted to protect a specific class of persons, and the plaintiff is a member of that class. See Indendi, 272 Mont. at 72, 899 P.2d at 1090 (quoting negligence per se test from VanLuchene v. State (1990), 244 Mont. 397, 401, 797 P.2d 932, 935). We stated: It is apparent that the whole purpose for the legislature's requiring fences to be constructed in a certain manner is to insure, to the extent possible, that livestock not on open range are adequately confined and are not free to roam and to cause harm to persons and property or to breed with the livestock of others. There could be no other purpose for that sort of legislation. Indendi, 272 Mont. at 72, 899 P.2d at 1090 (emphasis added). Based on this assumption, we then stated that it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature ... recognizes the reality that one of the purposes of a legal fence is to keep livestock off the roadways of this state. Indendi, 272 Mont. at 72, 899 P.2d at 1090 (addressing ง 81-4-102, MCA, a 1933 amendment, which allows a cattle guard exemption to the legal fence requirement of ง 81-4-101, MCA). But see Ambrogini, 197 Mont. at 118, 642 P.2d at 1017 (stating that ง 81-4-102, MCA, merely provides that an auto pass will not make an otherwise legal fence illegal). We reasoned that because  ง 81-4-101, MCA, was enacted to require the containment of livestock by means of a `legal fence' and, thereby, to prevent, among other harm, livestock/vehicle accidents, Indendi presented evidence that the Workmans violated the statute by failing to construct a legal fence. Indendi, 272 Mont. at 73, 899 P.2d at 1090. ถ 84 As addressed above, the purpose of the legal fence statutes, as indicated by ง 81-4-215, MCA, was to exclude not confine livestock, and applies strictly to the legal relationship between livestock owners and landowners who wish to establish the condition precedent necessary to sustain a trespass action. Based on a clearly erroneous premise, we again substituted our judgment for that of the Legislature by inserting a statutory duty that simply did not exist, and by further establishing that the legal fence statutes established motorists as a class of person that the statutes supposedly were enacted to protect. ถ 85 Thus, we conclude that ง 81-4-101, MCA, which defines a legal fence, and งง 81-4-103 and 104, MCA, which establish liability for defective fences, do not mandate any statutory duty on the part of livestock owners in this state to fence-in their animals or otherwise maintain fences, and thus overrule Indendi v. Workman to the extent it holds that a violation of ง 81-4-101, MCA, may serve as a basis for a finding of negligence per se with regard to an injury to a motorist or passenger traveling on a highway. Thus, Larson-Murphy's argument to the District Court and here that Zancanella's fence, which the Steiners were obligated to maintain, was legally defective due to the fact it violated the legal fence statute is without merit.