Opinion ID: 486487
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Evading Review

Text: 64 In addition to a finding that the 1986 regulation does not eliminate the hospitals' interest in reimbursement under the pre-1979 rules, the second prong of the County of Los Angeles mootness test also suggests a rejection of the mootness argument. In this case, it cannot be said with assurance that 'there is no reasonable expectation ..' that the alleged violation will recur. 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. at 1383. This rule, in conjunction with the exception to the mootness doctrine for cases capable of evading review, supports a finding that this case is not moot. 65 The facts of this case are unlike most instances where the evasion exception is appropriate; usually the exception applies to cases with very short duration. Nevertheless, if this case is dismissed as moot, we would be creating a class of cases capable of evading judicial review by the very fact that, after years of litigation challenging an administrative regulation, an agency would be able to moot a given lawsuit by promulgating a new regulation. If we were to find this case moot, the hospitals would have to restart on a long and expensive litigation, only to be confronted again with the possibility that the Secretary could moot that litigation. The Secretary has in fact even acknowledged that such a scenario is conceivable; the Secretary suggested that this possibility should not be a cause for concern. See 51 Fed.Reg. at 11186. 66 Without at all wishing to suggest any improper motive on the part of the Secretary in this case, and realizing that the Secretary is concerned about the liquidity of the trust fund crucial to the entire Medicare program, it is still a concern that a finding of mootness could permit, in some future case, an abuse of the interaction between administrative agencies and the courts. Where a court is asked to adjudicate the legality of an agency order, it is not compelled to dismiss the case as moot whenever the order expires or is withdrawn. Nader v. Volpe, 475 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C.Cir.1973). In a review of agency action, a sufficiently live controversy may remain in a case even after a regulation or order initially giving rise to the case is no longer in effect. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 810-11 (D.C.Cir.1983); Big Rivers Electric Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16, 19 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1663, 48 L.Ed.2d 175 (1976). 67 This case presents two additional concerns that militate against a finding of mootness. First, we would be creating a situation in which an agency, if it were inclined, could avoid review of an agency action and potentially abuse the review process. The ability to moot a case by replacing a challenged regulation with a similar rule after years of litigation could be abused. Second, the ability of an agency to moot a case at will could lead to an enormous waste of judicial resources. 32 Both of these concerns, about judicial resources and abusive rulemaking, are present in the case now before the court, and lead to the conclusion that the case is not moot. 33 68 Our rejection of the Secretary's mootness arguments are further supported by equitable concerns arising from the court's and appellees' reliance on the Secretary's statements early in the litigation in this court. Nine months before the new 1986 rule became final (but well after the Secretary had begun work on it), the Secretary requested that we hold the Baptist Hospital appeal (prior to its consolidation with the Tallahassee Memorial case) in abeyance pending the disposition of a petition for rehearing in the Lloyd Noland case: 69 Appellants suggest that judicial economy would best be served by holding the briefing in this appeal in abeyance pending final disposition in Lloyd Noland. While one of the instant cases involves a jurisdictional issue not present in Lloyd Noland, that issue--[the self-disallowance question]--goes only to two hospitals. Thus, whatever the outcome of Lloyd Noland, it will be dispositive as to all but two hospitals in the instant appeal, and even the [self-disallowance] issue will be mooted as to the two hospitals if the Court disposes of the case on rehearing in the Secretary's favor. Accordingly, it seems wasteful to spend time and money at this point in briefing the instant appeal. If the Lloyd Noland outcome should leave any outstanding issues for decision, the briefing in this appeal could then be so limited. 70 Appellant's Motion to Hold This Appeal in Abeyance Pending Decision in Another Case at 2, Baptist Hospital (Aug. 14, 1985). But for the court's granting of this motion, the case of many of the appellees here would have been briefed and argued (and probably decided) before the new rule became final. A party cannot request a delay in this court and then later attempt to use that delay to tactical advantage. Had the Secretary suggested, in his motion to hold the litigation in abeyance, that the rights of the opposing parties might be compromised by a delay, this court might have hesitated to grant the delay. 34