Opinion ID: 205429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: carson's petition for a writ of mandamus

Text: A court of appeals must determine its own jurisdiction and is bound to do so in every instance. Dickerson v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 251, 252 (6th Cir.1994). We have jurisdiction over this appeal if the district court had jurisdiction over this action. See Weber v. United States, 209 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C.Cir.2000). The district court effectively concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus if it determined that the Office of Special Counsel violated a non-discretionary duty to investigate Carson's allegations. We review a district court's findings as to whether it had subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Willis v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 395 (6th Cir.1991). Mandamus jurisdiction in federal courts is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. The existence of jurisdiction under section 1361 is inextricably bound with the merits of whether a writ of mandamus should issue; in order to establish either jurisdiction or entitlement to the writ, a court must find that a duty is owed to the plaintiff. Maczko v. Joyce, 814 F.2d 308, 310 (6th Cir.1987). [T]he remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980). Mandamus is available only if: (1) the plaintiff has a clear right to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available to the plaintiff. In re Medicare Reimbursement Litig., 414 F.3d 7, 10 (D.C.Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Mandamus is not an appropriate remedy if the action that the petitioner seeks to compel is discretionary. See, e.g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984). We have never decided whether a district court may issue a writ of mandamus against the Office of Special Counsel for failure to investigate a claim. See Ryon v. O'Neill, 894 F.2d 199, 205 n. 3 (6th Cir.1990) (stating that whether mandamus is available to enforce the Office of Special Counsel's investigatory duty is an open question in the Sixth Circuit). However, the District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that a district court does have subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus if it determines that the Office of Special Counsel violated a non-discretionary statutory duty to investigate an employee's allegations. See Weber, 209 F.3d at 759. The District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that because the Federal Circuit has authority to review only Merit Systems Protection Board decisions and not Office of Special Counsel decisions, if district courts lacked power to issue the writ, judicial review of [Office of Special Counsel] actions would not be available. Id. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held that federal courts have authority to ensure that the Office of Special Counsel complies with its statutory obligations. See DeLeonardis v. Weiseman, 986 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir.1993) ([A]n employee's right to obtain judicial review of the [Office of Special Counsel's] decision not to pursue a complaint is limited to [the question of] whether the [Office of Special Counsel] discharged its duty to investigate the complaint.) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Nowick v. Strickland, Nos. 98-1206, 98-1207, 98-1212, 1999 WL 282389, at  (10th Cir. Apr. 30, 1999) (noting its authority to ensure that the Office of Special Counsel complied with its statutory obligations); Hyde v. Office of Special Counsel, No. 94-1406, 1995 WL 238340, at  (10th Cir. Apr. 21, 1995) (same). We find the reasoning of our sister circuits persuasive and thus hold that a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus if it determines that the Office of Special Counsel violated a non-discretionary statutory duty to investigate an employee's allegations. However, this holding does not imply that district courts have jurisdiction to review all Office of Special Counsel determinations. Various courts have held that district courts have no jurisdiction to review the Office of Special Counsel's decision to terminate an investigation or not to petition the Merit Systems Protection Board. See DeLeonardis, 986 F.2d at 727 (We agree with our colleagues of the D.C. Circuit that when the [Office of Special Counsel] decides to terminate an investigation that it began pursuant to a complaint, the decision is not reviewable.); Wren v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 681 F.2d 867, 876 n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1982) (It is also quite clear from the statutory language and corresponding legislative history that Congress did not mean to make the [Office of Special Counsel's] decisions to terminate or conduct an investigation or bring a proceeding before the Board reviewable on the merits.). In addition, several unpublished opinions have followed this approach. See Hyde, 1995 WL 238340, at  (holding that district courts have no authority to require the Office of Special Counsel to reconsider a complaint and resolve it a certain way); DeLeonardis v. Koch, Civ. A. No. H-90-3768, 1992 WL 465474, at  (S.D.Tex. July 1, 1992) ([A] district court may not review [Office of Special Counsel's] decision to terminate its investigation, or [Office of Special Counsel's] decision not to petition the [Merit Systems Protection Board].) (citation omitted). Carson contends that this case is controlled by Weber, 209 F.3d at 759. In Weber, the plaintiff, a former Army employee, complained to the Office of Special Counsel that he had been stripped of a security clearance in retaliation for whistleblowing. Id. at 757. The Office of Special Counsel declined to investigate the plaintiff's complaint because it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to investigate the complaint. Id. at 758. The plaintiff then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Office of Special Counsel to investigate his accusation. Id. Thus, in both Weber and the present case, the Office of Special Counsel concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to investigate a complaint, and the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel it to investigate. In Weber, the district court held that there is no judicial review of the merits of the [Office of Special Counsel's] decision to dispense with an investigation. Weber v. Office of Special Counsel, No. 97-2260-LFO, slip op. at 6. (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1999). Then, the District of Columbia Circuit held that a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus if it determines that the Office of Special Counsel violated a non-discretionary statutory duty to investigate an employee's allegations. Weber, 209 F.3d at 759. Because the Office of Special Counsel declined to investigate because it believed that it lacked jurisdiction, the District of Columbia Circuit appears to have held that the Office of Special Counsel's determinations of its own jurisdiction are subject to judicial review. See id. We decline to rely on Weber to hold that district courts have authority to review the jurisdictional determinations of the Office of Special Counsel for a number of reasons. In this case the record indicates that the Office of Special Counsel conducted a preliminary investigation into Carson's claims. But it is unclear from the Weber decision whether the Office of Special Counsel initiated any investigation at all into the plaintiff's claim in that case. [1] Additionally, to the extent that Weber holds that district courts have authority to review the jurisdictional determinations of the Office of Special Counsel, we find the Fifth Circuit's reasoning to the contrary to be more persuasive. In DeLeonardis, 986 F.2d at 727, the plaintiff argued that courts are allowed to look behind the agency's decision to terminate an investigation when . . . the agency applies the incorrect legal standard in deciding to terminate the investigation. The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim and stated that the plaintiff failed to recognize, or at least to admit, that to allow him to succeed on this argument we would have to vitiate the clearly established rule that we do not look behind substantive [Office of Special Counsel] determinations to terminate investigations. Id. Jurisdiction is a legal issue similar to the legal standard in dispute in DeLeonardis. Thus, we hold that a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus only if it determines that the Office of Special Counsel has declined to investigate a complaint at all; it has no subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Office of Special Counsel's jurisdictional determinations or the merits of its investigations. Now that we have established this main point, Carson's individual claims are easily resolved.
The district court correctly concluded that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus regarding these three prohibited activity complaints. The Office of Special Counsel satisfies its statutory obligation when the Complaints Examining Unit conducts an initial investigation sufficient for it to determine whether a more thorough investigation is required. Cf. Wren, 681 F.2d at 874 (discussing statutory language governing prohibited personnel practice complaints). Here, the Office of Special Counsel conducted a preliminary investigation of Carson's allegations and concluded that further inquiry was unnecessary because he did not allege violations of civil service laws, rules, or regulations. Carson does not contend that the Office of Special Counsel failed to investigate his complaint; he contends that the investigation was inadequate. District courts may not review the Office of Special Counsel's substantive decision to discontinue an investigation for lack of cause. Thus, the district court could not order the Office of Special Counsel to conduct an additional investigation into Carson's claims after the Office of Special Counsel conducted preliminary investigations and decided to close them. Because the Office of Special Counsel discharged its statutory obligations by investigating these three complaints, Carson is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. Thus, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
5 U.S.C. § 1214(e) provides that: If, in connection with any investigation under this subchapter, the Special Counsel determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that any violation of any law, rule, or regulation has occurred other than one referred to in subsection (b) or (d), the Special Counsel shall report such violation to the head of the agency involved. Carson seeks a writ ordering the Office of Special Counsel to report the allegations that he raised in his complaints to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to section 1214(e). However, the district court correctly concluded that the Office of Special Counsel had no duty to report violations of law, rule, or regulation because the Office of Special Counsel never found that such violations had occurred. Carson asks us to resolve his disagreement with the Office of Special Counsel about the meaning of the phrase any law, rule, or regulation in section 1214(e). Carson suggests that the phrase applies to violations of law, rule, or regulation under the jurisdiction of the Office of Special Counsel. The Office of Special Counsel, on the other hand, asserts that the phrase applies to violations of law, rule, or regulation that it discovers during an investigation but over which it lacks jurisdiction under section 1214 or 1216. However, it is unnecessary for us to resolve this dispute because the Office of Special Counsel never found reasonable cause to believe that any violations of law, rule, or regulation occurred. Therefore, we have no authority to issue a purely advisory opinion on this debate. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971) ([F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.). Thus, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.