Opinion ID: 1697845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts and rulings of the lower courts

Text: The defendant, Henry Lee Leonard, was charged with the second degree murder of Kenneth LeDeaux, the boyfriend of his ex-wife, Leola Leonard. There is no factual dispute that the defendant shot and killed Mr. LeDeaux on July 20, 2003, at Leola's place of employment. The major issue at trial, as asserted in defense counsel's opening statement, was whether the defendant had acted in self-defense. On March 18, 2004, the jury necessarily concluded otherwise when it unanimously returned a verdict of guilty as charged of second degree murder. Before trial, the state had filed a notice of intent to introduce other crimes evidence in accordance with La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 720 and La.Code Evid. art. 404(B)(1). According to its notice and memorandum in support, the state sought to introduce evidence of prior physical violence committed by the defendant against his wife and daughter, to establish intent, pattern, and system, and to rebut any allegation of self-defense or sudden passion or heat of blood. Specifically, the state sought to introduce evidence that the defendant on July 19, 1998, grabbed and threw his wife, causing her to fall and break her wrist, and that she subsequently filed a petition for a protective order against the defendant, which was dismissed a month later by voluntary motion. The state also sought to introduce an affidavit executed by the defendant later that year for his then employer, the Baton Rouge Police Department, in which he agreed to a suspension and acknowledged the assault on his wife, additional acts of physical violence, and to being in need of anger management counseling and counseling for domestic violence. Additionally, the state sought to introduce evidence that on March 19, 1999, and December 13, 1999, the defendant beat his minor daughter with a weight-lifting belt, with the first incident resulting in a perforated eardrum, as well as various bruises and welts. The defendant was arrested on December 17, 1999, and charged with second degree battery. On June 1, 2001, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of simple battery, and his record was subsequently expunged on August 7, 2001. [1] On December 11, 2003, the district court held a hearing pursuant to State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973), and denied admission of the evidence pertaining to the defendant's physical assaults upon his wife and daughter, finding that the two incidents the state sought to introduce were an attempt to show bad character. It doesn't show any motive, system, intent, knowledge or anything like that. It just shows that he's a person who gets mad. R. Vol. I, p. 243. The state then applied for writs from the district court's pretrial ruling, which the First Circuit and this court both denied. See State v. Leonard, 03-2843 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/19/04), and State v. Leonard, 04-0476 (La.2/26/04), 867 So.2d 707. At trial under direct examination, the defendant admitted to his previous conviction as follows: Q. And, Henry, let's get this out right now. For the record is it fair to say that on June 1st of '01 you pled guilty to a misdemeanor simple battery charge; is that correct? A. That is correct. Q. And the judge actually sentenced you under article 894; gave you six months parish prison, suspended the sentence, and a hundred dollar fine and court cost; is that correct? A. That is true; that's true. Q. And did you plead guilty to that charge? A. Yes, I did. Q. And that's a simple battery; is that correct? A. That was simple battery, yes. Thereafter, on cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: Q. Mr. Leonard, let's start first of all talking about the conviction that you have told this jury that you [sic] for simple battery. A. Yes. I was convicted for simple battery, which I pled to. Q. And I'm going to read that. Battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another. That's what you pled guilty to; is that correct? A. That is correct. Q. That was your daughter; your fourteen-year-old daughter was the victim of that battery? At this point, defense counsel approached the bench and moved for a mistrial on the basis that the prosecutor had exceeded the scope of La.Code Evid. art. 609.1 by inquiring into the details of the conviction even though the defendant had already admitted to the fact of the conviction and sentence. [2] At the bench conference, the prosecutor argued that it was impeachment evidence and that she was merely inquiring into the complete sentence, which the defendant had not fully recited. The trial court disagreed that the identity of the victim of the prior crime was proper impeachment evidence under Article 609.1, and noted that the defendant had already admitted to the crime on the stand. The trial court then informed the prosecutor that she could go into details regarding the sentence, but that she could not inquire into any details about the facts of the crime. When defense counsel asserted it's too late, indicating the state should not be allowed to continue with the trial, the trial court responded, it's not too late. I decide whether it's too late. Thus, without expressly saying so, the trial court effectively denied the defendant's motion for mistrial. When cross-examination resumed, the state questioned the defendant as to the details of his sentence, eliciting that he had been required to produce ... proof of counseling and domestic violence, a class. . . . The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment assigning four errors. [3] By a split decision, the three-judge panel of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reversed the defendant's conviction, on grounds that the prosecutor had improperly inquired concerning other crimes evidence when defendant was on the stand. State v. Leonard, 04-1609 (La. App. 1st Cir.4/27/05), 915 So.2d 829. The court of appeal majority did not base its reversal of the defendant's conviction on a specific finding that the trial court's error was not harmless under the standard articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and later refined in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). [4] Instead, the lead opinion initially found that the prosecutor's comment fell within the scope of La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 771, because the prosecutor's reference to the victim of the earlier crime was not a per se reference to another crime, given that the other crime had already been referred to on direct examination of the defendant by his counsel. [5] Nonetheless, the lead opinion concluded that reversal of the conviction was merited in this case, because the trial court had abused its discretion in not granting a mistrial based on the prosecutor's calculated violation of the trial court's order, resulting in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. Leonard, 04-1609, p. 14, 915 So.2d at 836. Responding to the state's argument that, had it not clarified that defendant's daughter was the victim in his simple battery conviction, the jury might have assumed that his spouse was the victim because of the domestic violence counseling portion of the sentence, the lead opinion found that the distinction of whether the battery victim was defendant's ex-wife or his daughter scarcely mattered, and that the state's reasoning for exposing the one small detail that defendant beat his own child and was convicted of it was not persuasive. In reversing the conviction, the lead opinion stated: If we do not enforce a ruling designed to ensure a defendant a fair trial in a case where the prosecutor violated a specific instruction to adhere to the ruling, we cannot expect fair trials. Id. Thus, the lead opinion essentially found that reversal was merited when the state intentionally violates a pretrial ruling regarding other crimes evidence. The concurring judge agreed that reversal of the conviction was warranted. However, he reasoned that the prosecutor's identification of the victim in violation of the trial court's Prieur ruling fell within the scope of La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 770, which requires that a mistrial shall be ordered, and, therefore, no discretion was afforded the trial court in ruling upon such a request. [6] Although he considered the erroneous admission of the evidence to be harmless, he believed the trial court's refusal to grant the mandatory mistrial under Article 770(2) was not subject to harmless error review, noting that we are all of us under a duty to follow the law. Leonard, 04-1609, 915 So.2d at 837-38, Hughes, J., concurring. The dissenting judge agreed that the prosecutor's conduct was inappropriate, unnecessary, in contravention of the trial court's specific pretrial ruling, and intentionally made to show the defendant's bad character. Leonard, 04-1609, 915 So.2d at 838-39, Whipple, J., dissenting. However, the dissenting judge examined the improper admission of the evidence for harmless error, and concluded that there was no indication the defendant had not received a fair trial and that the guilty verdict was unattributable to any error in the admission of this one detail of the defendant's prior conviction. The dissenting judge was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a retrial was not warranted. Id. We granted the state's writ application seeking review of the majority's reversal of the conviction. State v. Leonard, 05-1382 (La.2/3/06), 922 So.2d 1154.