Opinion ID: 516961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 26 G & W argues that the verdict is contrary to the evidence in two respects. First, G & W argues that CRI failed to prove a violation of the Virginia leases. Whether the Virginia leases were violated, however, was not the issue before the jury. The issue was the intent of the parties with regard to the Assumption of Obligations provision. 27 Second, G & W asserts that the jury's answer to the special question that the Assumption clause was intended to insure payments to CRI under the multiple was contrary to the evidence. G & W points to just one statement elicited from CRI's president, Mr. Meadows, to support its claim. The witness stated: 28 That assumption agreement was mainly for my purposes in my mind to make sure that those leases were protected and they weren't lost. (Emphasis added.) He later stated: 29 I'm sure there were other reasons for it but that was my main purpose. 30 A review of all the testimony on this point, however, reveals that there was conflicting evidence as to the intent of the Assumption of Obligations Agreement. G & W's chief negotiator, Mr. Peake, testified that the assumption agreement was for the benefit of CRI under the multiple. In reviewing civil jury verdicts to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment, we follow the traditional rule of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Calhoun v. Baylor, 646 F.2d 1158, 1160 (6th Cir.1981). Since there was testimony from which the jury could have found that the purpose of the Assumption of Obligations provision was to enable CRI to receive payments under the multiple, we are not free to upset that determination absent error requiring a new trial. That is particularly so since this court previously stated that such a determination was within the province of the fact finder.