Opinion ID: 1126207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Other Guilt Phase Claims

Text: In his second claim, Lukehart contends that the trial court erred by limiting cross-examination of Deputy Gardner as to whether police had provided a lawyer for Lukehart after his request for counsel. Lukehart argues that the refusal of the trial court to allow the cross-examination, which was intended to cast doubt upon the voluntariness of Lukehart's statements to police, violated his rights of confrontation, due process, and fair trial under the United States and Florida Constitutions. The relevant exchange during cross-examination of Deputy Gardner was as follows: Q He also told you he wanted a lawyer, didn't he? A Yes, he did. Q Was one provided him by you? [Prosecutor]: Objection, that's not relevant to the trial. That's already been determined by this Court. THE COURT: Sustained. While trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant, Moore v. State, 701 So.2d 545, 549 (Fla.1997), we believe that, in this case, the trial court erred in restricting the cross-examination because Lukehart should have been allowed to inform the jury of his lack of counsel at that point. However, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the totality of the evidence, which demonstrated that the statements were voluntarily made and that Lukehart was without counsel at the time he was talking to Detective Goff, Detective Reddish, and Lieutenant Redmond. In his third claim, Lukehart contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal after the trial because (1) the evidence did not prove premeditated murder, and (2) Lukehart's dual convictions violate double jeopardy principles and thus the felony murder conviction cannot stand because it is based on the underlying felony conviction for aggravated child abuse. As to premeditation, the first subissue within this claim, Lukehart argues that no eyewitnesses saw the murder and that evidence of physical injuries to the baby is insufficient, in view of the other evidence, to sustain the charge that the murder was premeditated. In support of his argument, he cites Kirkland v. State, 684 So.2d 732 (Fla.1996), in which this Court held that the State did not prove premeditation based on evidence of a severe neck wound caused by many slashes with a knife. Id. at 735. The State counters that Lukehart's testimony that he knew the baby was hurt because she cried after the first blow is evidence of premeditation, citing Sired v. State, 399 So.2d 964 (Fla.1981), for the proposition that premeditation may occur a moment before the act. Id. at 967. A premeditated design to take the life of the person killed is an essential element of premeditated murder. Forehand v. State, 126 Fla. 464, 171 So. 241, 242 (1936). This Court has recently defined premeditation: Premeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully formed conscious purpose to kill. This purpose to kill may be formed a moment before the act but must also exist for a sufficient length of time to permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the probable result of that act. Evidence from which premeditation may be inferred includes such matters as the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted. Green v. State, 715 So.2d 940, 943-44 (Fla. 1998) (citations omitted) (quoting Wilson v. State, 493 So.2d 1019, 1021 (Fla.1986), and Holton v. State, 573 So.2d 284, 289 (Fla. 1990)). Here, Rhue, her father, and her uncle all testified that Lukehart had been an affectionate father figure to the baby. Although Lukehart gave various accounts of what occurred with the baby and stated that he killed the baby, there was a lack of evidence from which it could reasonably be concluded that Lukehart ever intended the baby's death. Thus, we find that the State did not prove premeditated first-degree murder. However, although we have found that the evidence in this case does not support premeditation, reversal is not warranted because there was an alternate theory of guilt, first-degree felony murder, for which evidence was sufficient. See San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071, 119 S.Ct. 1468, 143 L.Ed.2d 553 (1999). Here, the record indicates that the trial court instructed the jury that it could return a guilty verdict for first-degree murder if it found that the prosecution had proven either premeditated murder or first-degree felony murder. [7] For a first-degree felony murder conviction, the jury was instructed, pursuant to the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, that it was not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated design or intent to kill. Rather, the court told the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following felony murder elements: One, Gabrielle Hanshaw is dead, two, that death occurred as a consequence of and while Andrew Richard Lukehart was engaged in the commission of aggravated child abuse, three, Andrew Richard Lukehart was the person who actually killed Gabrielle Hanshaw. As to the commission of aggravated child abuse, the jury was instructed, pursuant to the standard jury instructions, that it had to find Lukehart guilty of battery by finding that Lukehart had intentionally or knowingly caused great bodily harm to the child and that the child was under eighteen years of age. In addition to returning a general verdict of first-degree murder, based on either premeditated or felony murder, the jury convicted Lukehart on a separate charge of aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). [8] The Duval County grand jury indictment charged that the aggravated child abuse was by inflicting blunt trauma to the head of the [baby]. The jury was instructed that, in order to return a guilty verdict, it had to find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lukehart committed an aggravated battery. [9] Our review of the record supports the jury's finding that Lukehart is guilty of aggravated child abuse. According to Lukehart's own testimony, Lukehart was six-feet one-inch tall and weighed 225 pounds at the time of the baby's death. He forcibly pushed the baby down on the floor. The jury could have reasonably concluded that Lukehart was frustrated by the baby's need for a clean diaper and by the baby's movement as he tried to change her diaper. The jury's verdict is also supported by the medical examiner's testimony that the baby died of injuries caused by blunt trauma from five blows to her head, two of which caused fractures, that the baby had bruises on her hand and arm that occurred shortly before her death, and that these injuries could have resulted only from the use of substantial force. The medical examiner explained that if you use your fist it will be that force [equal to the force of dropping a child from a height greater than four to five feet] that you need to fracture the skull. Thus, because of the felony murder conviction, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Lukehart's motion for judgment of acquittal. As to the second subissue within this claim, we find Lukehart's argument that double jeopardy principles prohibit the dual convictions of felony murder and aggravated child abuse to be without merit. Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides the test for determining double jeopardy violations, does not prohibit a defendant from being separately convicted and sentenced for felony murder and the qualifying felony. This issue was recently addressed by the Third District Court of Appeal in Green v. State, 680 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), in an opinion which we approve. Judge Cope wrote for the court: Simply put, defendant can be convicted of both felony murder and the qualifying felony because the felony murder statute says so. The Florida Supreme Court recently so held in Boler v. State, 678 So.2d 319, 322 (Fla.1996).... 680 So.2d at 1068. We further agree with Judge Cope's analysis set forth in Footnote 2 of that opinion: Finally, in aggravated child abuse cases there is ordinarily overt physical violence which is directed towards a child. By specifically including the category of aggravated child abuse within the felony murder statute, the legislature clearly contemplated that both charges can be made where violence directed at the child results in the death of the child. 680 So.2d at 1069 n. 2. Our affirmance of the convictions for both felony murder and aggravated child abuse is in accord with this Court's decision in Boler. However, Lukehart argues that our decision in Mills v. State, 476 So.2d 172 (Fla.1985), should control. In that decision, we held that we did not believe it proper to convict a defendant for aggravated battery and simultaneously for homicide as a result of one shotgun blast. Id. at 177. We stated that we did not believe that the Legislature intended convictions on both charges. Id. Subsequent to Mills, the Legislature amended section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes, [10] and in State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613 (Fla.1989), this Court recognized the effect of the amendment by stating: Multiple punishment shall be imposed for separate offenses even if only one act is involved. Id. at 616. The statutory amendment also led this Court to our conclusion in Boler, which controls in this case. Boler, 678 So.2d at 322. See also Cardona v. State, 641 So.2d 361, 364 n. 2 (Fla.1994); Valdes v. State, 626 So.2d 1316, 1322 n. 8 (Fla. 1993); Dingle v. State, 699 So.2d 834, 835 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Therefore, we find no merit in this claim. In his fourth claim, Lukehart contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to waive the jury instructions on the defense of justifiable and excusable homicide. Lukehart provides no relevant support in statute or caselaw for this argument, and we find no merit in the claim. Accordingly, we affirm Lukehart's convictions.