Opinion ID: 2555874
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Witnesses, Parties, and Judges.

Text: In Odyniec v. Schneider, 322 Md. 520, 588 A.2d 786 (1991), a former patient filed a medical malpractice claim before an arbitration panel. Before the proceeding, she underwent a physical examination, during which the examining doctorwho was expected to later present his expert testimony before the arbitration paneltold the patient that her previous doctor[, in fact] had performed unnecessary medical procedures on her. Offen, 402 Md. at 203, 935 A.2d 719, 726 (citing Odyniec, 322 Md. at 523-24, 588 A.2d at 787-88). After observing the public purpose and the procedural safeguards embedded in the arbitration proceeding, we concluded that the examining doctor made his statement (1) while conducting a medical examination of [the patient-plaintiff] and (2)  to [the patient], a party in the then-pending arbitration proceeding. . . . Odyniec, 322 Md. at 534, 588 A.2d at 793 (emphasis added). Based on these facts, we held that the doctor, a potential witness, made his statement during the course of his participation in th[e] pending [arbitration] proceeding; consequently, his verbal statement [wa]s accorded the same absolute privilege as if it had been made by a witness during the arbitration hearing itself. Id.; see Adams, 288 Md. at 8, 415 A.2d at 295 (extending the absolute privilege to a statement because it was published during the course of the judicial proceeding). That the defamatory statement may have been gratuitous, unsolicited, and in part irrelevant to the purpose for which [the doctor] was employed did not defeat recognition of the privilege. Odyniec, 322 Md. at 534, 588 A.2d at 793. In Sodergren v. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory., 138 Md. App. 686, 697, 773 A.2d 592, 603 (2001), the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the absolute privilege protected an employer who sent apology letters, pursuant to a settlement agreement in a pending suit, to a putative victim of sexual harassment and false plagiarism accusations. After a prodigious discussion of Maryland and foreign caselaw, the intermediate appellate court agreed that settlement is a part of a judicial proceeding. . . . Sodergren, 138 Md.App. at 701, 773 A.2d at 601. [T]here is a sufficient nexus between a judicial proceeding and the settlement of that proceeding . . . to extend the [absolute] privilege to the statements made by [the defendant] regarding [the plaintiff] and published to [parties involved in the original litigation]. Sodergren, 138 Md. App. at 705, 773 A.2d at 603 (emphasis added). In Sodergren, the Court of Special Appeals recognized also that the proceeding satisfied the Gersh test and that the employer wrote the letter as part of the settlement agreement, i.e., in the context of a judicial proceeding. Sodergren, 138 Md.App. at 701, 773 A.2d at 601 (emphasis added). The intermediate appellate court found instructive that the instrument containing the challenged statements was of a judicial nature, i.e., out-of-court settlement of a lawsuit, and the statements were published to parties involved in the original litigation. See Sodergren, 138 Md.App. at 704-05, 773 A.2d at 603-04 ([T]his case do[es] not require us to reach the issue of publication to a third person not directly involved in the case.). Therefore, the Court concluded that the letter . . . was published in the `course of a judicial proceeding'. . . . Sodergren, 138 Md.App. at 704, 773 A.2d at 603. The foregoing analyses teach us to apply an absolute privilege to out-of-court statements, made by witnesses, parties, or judges, when (1) the contemplated or ongoing proceeding fulfills Gersh, [16] and (2) the context of the statement demonstrates that it was made during the course of the proceeding ( i.e., while the putative tortfeasor was participating in the proceeding). We assess the context of the statement by asking, among other things: what was the overall or general reason for the instrument or letter (but not the motive of the challenged statement itself, see English rule) [17] ; what was the defendant doing when he or she made the statement; and to whom did he or she make the statement. If these factors are present, protection of the communication serves the ultimate purpose of the privilegeto loosen the otherwise secure floodgates of information required for the successful resolution of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. The proceeding, however, must be actually contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. . . . The bare possibility that [a] proceeding might be instituted is not to be used as a cloak to provide immunity for defamation when the possibility is not seriously considered. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 cmt. e. (2006); see also Kennedy, 229 Md. at 98, 182 A.2d at 58 ([T]he extension of this absolute privilege to statements not made in the judicial proceeding itself is limited . . . by the comments on the rule of the Restatement itself. . . .).