Opinion ID: 71274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearsay Statements of Sara

Text: The government introduced through several witnesses statements made by Sara regarding her state of mind and the course of conduct with respect to certain documents. The government offered each of the contested statements under one of two theories: (1) to demonstrate the state of mind of Sara Tokars, over the course of an approximately three-year period, as to her intent to divorce Tokars and to show how the evolution of her state of mind over that period provided a motive for Tokars to scheme to murder her; and (2) to demonstrate a course of conduct, most often that of various persons relating to copies of certain documents found by Sara Tokars that were incriminating as to Tokars and that eventually were turned over to both state and federal law enforcement officials after the death of Ms. Tokars. Government's Br. at 69. The government argues that, with respect to the first theory, the statements fall within Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3),9 and, pursuant to the 8 Tokars also argues that the district court erred in not allowing him to introduce the entire statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 106 (rule of completeness) and 806 (impeachment of declarant). However, after the district court refused, Tokars's counsel asked instead to introduce only certain portions of the statement, which the court allowed. After reviewing the record, we are persuaded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the introduction of the remainder of the statement. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the district court erred, any error was harmless. 9 Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) states as follows: The following [is] not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, second theory, the statements are not hearsay as defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c).10 Regarding the first theory, we conclude that, at least when relevant to the motive to kill, evidence of the victim's state of mind is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3). See United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 846 (2d Cir.) (statements about victims' existing and ongoing suspicions concerning defendant's exportation business relevant to show motive to kill), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 830, 113 S.Ct. 94, 121 L.Ed.2d 56 (1992); United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 738 (3d Cir.1989) (statements showing that victim intended to move out of military apartment and separate from defendant), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1058, 110 S.Ct. 1528, 108 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990). Tokars claims that a homicide victim's state of mind is not sufficiently relevant to admit out-of-court statements of fear unless the defense is self-defense, suicide, or accidental death, citing for this proposition; United States v. Kaplan, 510 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.1974). However, Kaplan involved possession with intent to distribute and distribution of heroin, not homicide, and the declarant's state of mind was not an issue. Tokars knew of the change in Sara's state of mind when he asked Lawrence to kill her. The fact that she and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 10 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) provides:  Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. wanted to divorce him and take all of his money is what apparently prompted him to have her killed. Consequently, Sara's state of mind was extremely relevant to Tokars's motive to kill. With respect to the second theory, we agree with the government that the challenged statements do not constitute hearsay at all. They were offered to explain the course of conduct that occurred when Sara informed Taylor of the existence of the documents, delivered them to Ambrusko, and directed that they be turned over to the police if anything happened to her. Because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, these statements were not hearsay. Moreover, establishing the course of conduct between the deposit of the documents with Ambrusko and their eventual submission to the police was relevant to this case. For the foregoing reasons, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court's admission of Sara's statements.