Opinion ID: 1034416
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: using any other means which creates a

Text: substantial risk of causing bodily injury to such police officer or another. (emphasis supplied). -22- Therefore, we conclude that the district court acted correctly in finding that Carrigan's conviction for resisting arrest could be considered, along with his conviction for armed robbery, as a crime of violence for purposes of sentencing under the ACCA. We must now determine whether Carrigan's conviction for assault and battery with a deadly weapon and assault and battery of a police officer also count as violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA. In Hart, we held that assault and battery with a deadly weapon under Massachusetts law categorically qualifies as an ACCA predicate under the ACCA's residual clause. 674 F.3d at 41-44. We reasoned that the offense in question clearly poses a serious potential risk of injury, comparable to the degree of risk posed by the enumerated offenses [of the residual clause]. Id. at 42. In Hart, we also found that even if a conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon under Massachusetts law may sometimes rest on a recklessness theory, our analysis under the residual clause is explicitly, and necessarily, limited to the 'ordinary case.' Id. at 43 (citing James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007)); see also id. at 43 n.7 (explaining that [r]egardless of the underlying theory, [assault and battery with a deadly weapon] requires 'general intent to do the act causing injury.' (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 308 (1979))). Prior to issuing Hart, we had ruled that assault and -23- battery with a deadly weapon under Massachusetts law is a violent felony under the career offender guidelines. See United States v. Glover, 558 F.3d 71, 79-82 (1st Cir. 2009). Finally, Carrigan argues that the ACCA's residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. He acknowledges, however, that his arguments may be foreclosed by this circuit's rulings in Weeks, Hart and United States v. Dancy, 640 F.3d 455 (1st Cir. 2011). He does not offer any new authority and he has not reformulated the vagueness argument in any way that would prompt us to revisit our previous rulings.4