Opinion ID: 902614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Paskauskiene’s Complaint

Text: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of an action, for failure to comply with a court order or failure to appear at a properly-noticed deposition. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2), (d); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). Dismissal of an action with prejudice is permitted only upon a showing of a “‘clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff . . . and when lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.’” Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t, 757 F.2d 1513, 1519 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1982)). Because dismissal is an “extreme sanction,” dismissals with prejudice usually involve the presence of one or more of the following aggravating factors: “(1) delay attributable directly to the plaintiff, rather than [the] attorney; (2) actual prejudice to the defendant; and (3) delay caused by intentional conduct.” Id. The record reflects that Paskauskiene engaged in contumacious conduct by repeatedly failing to comply in good faith with court orders, acting in an evasive and purposefully disruptive manner during her court-ordered deposition, and ultimately terminating her deposition after repeatedly attempting to introduce a document rather than respond to counsel’s questions. This type of behavior persisted throughout the litigation despite the court’s repeated warnings that failure to cooperate could result in dismissal. Furthermore, given Paskauskiene’s financial circumstances and her persistent refusal to comply with Alcor’s requests despite strong warnings, it is clear that lesser sanctions (including additional warnings or monetary sanctions) would not serve the interests of justice. 7 Case: 12-11243 Document: 00512274732 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/14/2013 No. 12-11243 Considering the potential “aggravating factors,” Callip, 757 F.2d at 1519, it is notable that (1) given her pro se status, Paskauskiene’s conduct was attributable to no one but herself, and (2) the repetitive nature of her actions in light of repeated court warnings strongly indicates that she did not act unintentionally. More fundamentally, however, without the ability to take Paskauskiene’s deposition, Alcor faced substantial prejudice in defending itself in this litigation. As the district court explained, having filed this action, Paskauskiene had a duty to cooperate with Alcor and the court in its prosecution. Her failure to do so is determinative of this issue. The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Paskauskiene “engaged in conduct of the kind warranting dismissal by repeatedly attempting to circumvent, delay, or disrupt the taking of her deposition.” The dismissal of Paskauskiene’s complaint was not in error.