Opinion ID: 4690769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Acevedo’s Sentence

Text: Acevedo next challenges his 45-month sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Procedurally, he contends that the district court erred in calculating the loss amount as between $40,000 and $95,000. Substantively, he 17 USCA11 Case: 19-12208 Date Filed: 05/27/2021 Page: 18 of 22 argues that the district court imposed a sentence that was unreasonably severe. As we explain below, we discern no error.
Acevedo contends that the district court erred in determining the loss amount of $46,500 because the government offered no evidence that he possessed the 93 credit card numbers. We reject Acevedo’s argument. We review a district court’s determination of the loss amount under the Sentencing Guidelines for clear error. United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1232 (11th Cir. 2015). Because the district court is in a unique position to assess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon that evidence, its loss determination is entitled to appropriate deference. United States v. Melgen, 967 F.3d 1250, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020); U.S.S.G § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(C). The Guidelines define “loss” as the greater of “actual loss”—the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense—or “intended loss”—the pecuniary harm the defendant purposefully sought to inflict. U.S.S.G § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(A)(i), (ii). The Guidelines do not require a precise determination of loss. Cavallo, 790 F.3d at 1232. Instead, the district court “need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Guidelines state that if the case involved any counterfeit or unauthorized “access device,” the loss includes “any unauthorized charges made . . . and shall be not less 18 USCA11 Case: 19-12208 Date Filed: 05/27/2021 Page: 19 of 22 than $500 per access device.” U.S.S.G § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(F)(i). Further, all relevant conduct, whether charged conduct or not, may be considered in determining the loss amount. See United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 633 (11th Cir. 2007). The district court did not clearly err in calculating the loss amount at $46,500. The court applied the lowest loss amount per access device permitted by the Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(F)(i), and Acevedo has not shown the court clearly erred by using 93 access devices—the number of credit card accounts obtained across the three skimmers—as the basis for that calculation. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err when it calculated the loss amount and assessed Acevedo a six-level enhancement.
Acevedo asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because his 45-month sentence was more than double the high end of the Guidelines range, and the district court offered only a “blanket statement” that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. We reject his argument. We review for abuse of discretion whether a sentence is substantively unreasonable by considering the totality of the circumstances, including “whether 19 USCA11 Case: 19-12208 Date Filed: 05/27/2021 Page: 20 of 22 the statutory factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.”5 United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). We will not “second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that [a district court] accorded to a given factor . . . as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We may vacate a sentence only if we firmly believe that the district court “committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing it is unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). And a sentence that is within the Guidelines range and well below the statutory maximum penalty is usually reasonable. See United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1338 (11th Cir. 2019) (“We ordinarily expect that a sentence within the Guidelines is reasonable.”); Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324 5 Under § 3553(a), the district court is required to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the statute. These purposes include the need to: reflect the seriousness of the offense; promote respect for the law; provide just punishment; deter criminal conduct; protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct; and effectively provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). 20 USCA11 Case: 19-12208 Date Filed: 05/27/2021 Page: 21 of 22 (holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Acevedo to 45 months’ imprisonment. Before imposing the sentence, the court expressed that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, the PSR, the Guidelines range, and the parties’ arguments. The district court’s statement is sufficient, as nothing “requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Acevedo argues that the sentence imposed was “problematic” given his lack of criminal history, his acknowledgment of wrongdoing, and his familial support. Appellant’s Br. at 44. But the weight the district court accords to “any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, Acevedo argues that his 45-month sentence is outside the Guidelines range, but he fails to acknowledge that the district court was required to impose a mandatory two-year sentence for the aggravated identity theft counts to run consecutively to his other sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (b); U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 cmt. n.1. Acevedo’s remaining sentence, 21 months for Counts 21 USCA11 Case: 19-12208 Date Filed: 05/27/2021 Page: 22 of 22 One to Four, was within the Guidelines range and well below the 120-month statutory maximum for possession of unauthorized access devices and the 180month statutory maximum for possession of device-making equipment, see 18 U.S.C. § 1029(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), which supports a finding of reasonableness, see Whyte, 928 F.3d at 1338; Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. We cannot conclude from this record that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a 45-month sentence.