Opinion ID: 48995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jones's Revocation Sentence

Text: 33 As Jones was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm while serving a term of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction on the very same charge, he was subject to revocation of supervised release and reimprisonment. It was only after he was sentenced in the instant case that the district judge who had presided over Jones's first felon-in-possession conviction revoked his supervised release, imposed the statutory maximum two-year term of imprisonment, and ordered that it be served consecutively to his new firearms-possession sentence. 34 Jones insists that this revocation sentence was unreasonable, as the judge who imposed it justified exceeding the advisory Guidelines range of 6-12 months 26 for the same reasons that the district judge in the instant firearms-possession case gave for his upward variance from the Guidelines range. Jones argues that, for this reason, the non-Guidelines revocation sentence amounts to double punishment for the same conduct. We disagree.
35 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 27 the accepted standard of review for revocation sentences in this Circuit was well-established. As there were no applicable guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised release, a revocation sentence would be upheld unless it was in violation of the law or plainly unreasonable. 28 This plainly unreasonable review has its origin in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4). 29 36 Jones asserts, however, that Booker totally invalidated § 3742(e) and, by making the Sentencing Guidelines advisory in its entirety, (1) eliminated the difference between Guidelines and advisory policy statements (such as those pertaining to revocation sentences) and (2) established a reasonableness standard of review for all criminal sentences, including revocation sentences. 37 There is a division among the circuits as to whether to continue reviewing revocation sentences under the plainly unreasonable standard or to adopt Booker 's reasonableness standard across the board. 30 Other courts of appeal have held that the two standards are functionally the same. 31 These courts point out that Booker cites, as examples of reasonableness review, several cases in which courts actually applied the § 3742(e)(4) plainly unreasonable standard. 32 38 We have yet to address the issue squarely, 33 but we need not do so today to resolve this case. This is because Jones made no objection to his revocation sentence in the district court, so it is subject only to plain error review on appeal. As such, his revocation sentence must be upheld unless we conclude that there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights . . . [and] (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 34 We do not come to that conclusion.
39 The statutory maximum term of imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is ten years, 35 making that offense a Class C felony. 36 A defendant convicted of a Class C felony who subsequently violates the terms of his supervised release may be reimprisoned for no more than two years. 37 The advisory policy statements in section 7B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines, however, recommend a revocation sentence of 6-12 months for Class C felons in Jones's Criminal History Category (IV). Section 7B1.3(f) of the Guidelines states that, 40 [a]ny term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of probation or supervised release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation of probation or supervised release.
41 The record dispels any question that the re-sentencing court erred in imposing Jones's revocation sentence. As the foregoing section shows, the revocation sentence itself, its duration, and its being made to run consecutively, are explicitly authorized by law. Moreover, even before Booker, the policy statements in § 7B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines were recognized as advisory only, 38 and the record reflects that the re-sentencing judge considered but rejected those policy statements for reasons detailed in his sentencing colloquy. We are satisfied that he committed no legal error in imposing the non-Guidelines revocation sentence. 42 In fact, Jones does not allege error; he merely challenges the reasonableness of the revocation sentence, because the resentencing judge justified imposing the statutory maximum revocation sentence for some of the same reasons given by the judge in the instant case for imposing an above-Guidelines sentence. Although the re-sentencing judge does appear to have imposed the maximum revocation sentence in partial reliance on some of the same reasons verbalized by the judge who imposed an above-Guidelines sentence in the instant case, the revocation sentencing colloquy reveals numerous additional bases for the re-sentencing judge's decision. We are satisfied that the re-sentencing court did not plainly err in deciding to impose the statutory maximum revocation sentence. 43 That said, however, we recognize that our vacatur of Jones's firearm possession conviction at least arguably may have nullified the re-sentencing judge's primary basis for imposing the maximum revocation sentence that it did and for making it run consecutively to this one. The law is clear that the violative conduct warranting revocation of supervised release and reimprisonment need not be criminal and need only be found by a judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard, not by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 39 We nevertheless think it prudent to remand this matter to the court that handed down the revocation sentence based in large part on the conviction we now vacate and remand, so that the underlying basis for Jones's revocation sentence may be reconsidered and clarified.