Opinion ID: 1448782
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Intent Clause

Text: As demonstrated by our initial opinion, when reading the language of § 2246(3) in isolation, one can make a logical argument that the intent clause refers to the intent of the individual doing the touching. [8] However, the Government's new contention as to the proper interpretation of the intent clausethat the clause refers only to the intent of the defendant, regardless of whether the victim or the defendant does the actual touchingfinds substantial support in the legislative history of § 2246(3). According to the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the purpose of the Act was to modernize and reform Federal rape statutes. H.R.Rep. No. 99-594, at 6 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6186, 6186 (House Report). The House Report noted that, to accomplish this purpose, the Act defin[es] the offenses so that the focus of a trial is upon the conduct of the defendant, instead of upon the conduct or state of mind of the victim.  Id. at 10 (emphases added). Moreover, the House Report stresses that each offense set forth in [the Act] describes ... the state of mind that the defendant must have had. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). Thus, the legislative purpose was to make the victim's intent irrelevant to any prosecution for sex crimes under the Act. In a prototypal sex-crime case, the natural reading of the intent clause would not conflict with this underlying purpose because typically it is the defendant who is engaged in the prohibited touching, rather than the victim. This is likely the scenario that Congress had in mind when it drafted § 2246(3). However, as this case illustrates, prohibited sexual contact under § 2246(3) includes instances where the defendant does not actually touch the victim, but rather causes the victim to touch himself or herself in a sexual manner. In such cases, which appear to be rare, [9] the natural reading of the intent clause runs contrary to the purpose of the statute because interpreting the intent clause to require inquiry into the intent of the toucher would involve a court delving into the state of mind of the victim. H.R.Rep. No. 99-594, at 10. This would conflict with Congress's clear expression of purpose in the House Report that the defendant's intent, not the victim's intent, is the critical factor. Under these circumstances, where the text of a statute conflicts with the statute's clear purpose, the natural reading of the statute is properly informed by the underlying purpose and the overall framework of the Act. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983); see also Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982) (noting that, in rare cases [where] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, [the drafters'] intentions must be controlling); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 244, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (same). In light of the statements regarding intent contained in the House Report, we must conclude that the legislative history of § 2246(3) and the Act as a whole make clear that the intent of the victim is not a valid inquiry for the court. Instead, the intent of the criminal defendant is determinative in deciding whether sexual contact as defined in § 2246(3) has occurred. Thus, to comply with Congress's purpose in a case such as this one, where the conduct in question involves the defendant causing self-masturbation by the victim, we hold that the court should look to the intent of the defendant involved, not the intent of the victim. In this case, Shafer pleaded guilty to enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purposes of producing visual depictions of such conduct. The sexually explicit conduct in question is the self-masturbation of B.H. Applying the proper interpretation of the intent clause, to uphold the district court's imposition of the § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement, we must conclude that Shafer caused B.H. to self-masturbate with the intent of Shafer being to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of some personeither himself or B.H. or someone else. The district judge made no express findings regarding Shafer's intent. Under the facts of this case, however, it is reasonable to infer that Shafer's intent was to arouse or gratify either his own sexual desires or those of B.H. Shafer admitted that there was evidence that he had had direct physical contact with BH of a sexual nature. J.A. at 120 (Sent. Hr'g Tr. at 24). More important, Shafer is an adult who understands the implications of the sexual act he caused B.H. to perform that self-masturbation is an act meant to invoke a sexual response in the performer or a viewer. Given these facts, it is proper to infer that Shafer had the intent necessary to categorize B.H.'s self-masturbation as sexual contact, thereby supporting the § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement. [10] We, therefore, affirm Shafer's sentence.