Opinion ID: 1273415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Defendant Was Subject to the Order of the Commissioner

Text: Defendant argues that there is no showing that he was responsible for placing funds in escrow after he resigned as an officer and relinquished his stock in WPCC. It is clear that he had actual knowledge of the order. The statute prohibits any person from willfully violating an order of which he has notice. Thus, he was under a duty to escrow the funds he received from Mr. Rosado. It is undisputed that he failed to escrow those sums. FAILURE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO CALL A WITNESS AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS NOT ERROR. [6] Defendant asserts that it was error when the county court at the preliminary hearing refused to permit the defendant to call Mr. Rosado as a witness. An offer of proof was made which showed that the purpose was to refute the testimony of Mrs. Cardona. The object was to show that rather than a sale of a franchise, a sale of stock had been made. The court refused to permit the witness to testify. The fact is that at the trial Mr. Rosado corroborated Mrs. Cardona's testimony that stock was never even discussed. Thus, the defendant was certainly not prejudiced by failure to call Mr. Rosado at the preliminary. In addition, the purpose of the preliminary is not to make a final judgment on the credibility of Mrs. Cardona; the court's role was simply to ascertain the plausibility of her story and whether, if believed, it would support a bindover. Wilson v. State, 59 Wis.2d 269, 294, 295, 208 N.W.2d 134 (1973). The judge at the preliminary hearing properly refused to permit the testimony pursuant to the offer of proof which the defendant made. SEC. 553.21(2) IS NEITHER VAGUE NOR OVERBROAD. The question whether Sec. 553.21(2) is vague or overbroad was not raised at trial or before trial and under Sec. 971.31 (2) the defendant has waived this challenge. However, this court may consider an issue for the first time on appeal as a matter of judicial administration and policy. Terpstra v. Soiltest, 63 Wis.2d 585, 593, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974). We consider it because it has not previously been raised with respect to this statute, which took effect in 1972. The defendant does not say in what respect this statute is overbroad, that is, in what manner its sweep is so broad that its sanctions apply to conduct protected by the Constitution. [10] Therefore, the argument on overbreadth must fail. [7] This court has stated that whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague depends on ... whether the statute taken as a whole is sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct to those who wish to avoid its penalties and to apprise the judge and jury of standards for the determination of guilt (citation omitted). ... If the statute is so obscure that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applicability, it is unconstitutional. Butala v. State, 71 Wis.2d 569, 573, 574, 239 N.W.2d 32 (1976). The defendant may not hypothesize fact situations which might raise a question as to the challenged statute's applicability where the conduct charged is so obviously within the zone of prohibited conduct that no reasonable person can doubt its criminal nature. Butala v. State, supra . The defendant's argument is that the statutory language does not specify what control means and that it is not clearly spelled out what persons would be covered. Neither does it indicate whether the act proscribed is the sale of the franchise or violation of a registration order. [8] The construction of the word control has earlier been discussed in this opinion. It is a word with a plain meaning and it is clear that the defendant had control of this corporation as far as its operations were concerned. The defendant personally received an order from the Commissioner of Securities that the proceeds from the sale of a franchise be escrowed within forty-eight hours. The obvious purpose was to protect a franchisee. Persons of common intelligence would understand in this context that a person in control of the franchisor encompasses a person who, though formally without corporate position, dictates corporate affairs, solicits the purchase of franchises, disburses the corporate money and in every manner is in a position to do the harm to the franchisee which the statute was intended to prevent. The contention that the statute does not indicate whether the proscribed act is the sale itself or the violation of the order attempts to create ambiguity where none exists. The violation is the offer or sale in violation of the order. The order sets a standard of conduct when an offer or a sale takes place. The evidence shows it was violated here. DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW BECAUSE OF TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT A CONTINUANCE TO RETAIN NEW COUNSEL. On February 10, 1975, the day of trial, the defendant personally and through his attorney stated that he now had some money and requested a continuance to obtain private counsel. At that time he was represented by an attorney with the Legal Aid Society, having been found indigent. The motion was denied. The defendant asserts as separate errors the failure to grant the continuance and the denial of counsel of his choice. Nothing in the record indicates that private counsel had actually been retained. Between the arraignment on August 28, 1974 and the date of trial, four continuances had been granted. The third one was at the request of defense counsel and the fourth was at the request of the state and the defendant raised no objection. There is no allegation here that the counsel who was appointed to represent defendant at his trial because of defendant's indigency was ineffective. On his appeal the defendant has not retained private counsel but is represented by the office of the State Public Defender. [9] An indigent does not have the right to counsel of his choice. [11] If he was not in fact indigent and was prepared to hire private counsel, his request to do so at the time the case was actually called for trial and the matter was ready to proceed, came too late and there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing this request. The case of State v. Johnson, 50 Wis.2d 280, 283, 184 N.W.2d 107 (1971) relied on by the defendant is distinguishable. In that case the order denying post conviction relief was reversed because the juvenile defendant had no counsel at all during trial. The court pointed out, however, An indigent defendant is entitled to competent counsel, but not necessarily counsel of his own choosing. [10] In the case before us, the defendant requested a continuance on the day of trial, now that I have been able to borrow some money, to go out and get private counsel... At the time the motion was made, the jury was ready to be called, the state was ready to proceed and the matter had been scheduled for trial about two months. The defendant did not indicate that he had an attorney ready to proceed but asked for a continuance in order to get counsel. We hold there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion in refusing this request for a continuance. In the case of Mulkovich v. State, 73 Wis.2d 464, 243 N.W.2d 198 (1976), this court held it was error at the time of sentencing to refuse to permit a defendant to substitute counsel of his own choice present in court at the time of sentencing; the sentencing judge had insisted that the counsel who had tried the case be the one to represent the defendant at the time of the sentencing. In an opinion by Justice Heffernan this court said at page 474: In the usual case, due process is denied when counsel is imposed upon a defendant against his will.... The right to be represented by counsel of one's own choosing applies to sentencing as well as to trial.... This right, however, is not an absolute right and may be refused where the court properly exercises its discretion. Phifer v. State (1974) 64 Wis.2d 24, 218 N.W.2d 354, stated the appropriate standards for the exercise of judicial discretion when the choice of defendant's counsel is called into question. When there is no evidence that the proposed counsel is inadequate and when there is no evidence that a change of counsel is made for the purpose of delay, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse a request for retained counsel or for substitution of counsel. We therefore conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion when he refused to permit the defendant to be represented by competent substitute counsel at a time when such substitution would not have interfered with the orderly procedures of the court. However, in that case, substitute counsel was present in court ready to proceed. The court in Mulkovich held it was not error when the trial court refused to allow substitution of counsel in a situation similar to the one before us. This court said at pages 475, 476: ... the trial judge did not err in refusing a substitution of attorney immediately before the impanelling of the jury on January 2, 1974. Although counsel and witnesses were present, and the defendant had ample opportunity before that date to have asked for substitution of counsel, no request for a trial attorney was made until the eleventh hour. While the accused has the right to select his own counsel, such choice `cannot be manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure for trials or to interfere with the administration of justice.' Phifer v. State, supra, page 30. . . . In the instant case, when the defendant requested the continuance, numerous witnesses were present in court and the jury panel was awaiting call. The trial date had been set for more than two months. Under the circumstances here, the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the last minute substitution when the request reasonably could have been made at a far earlier date... We hold that in the case at bar the refusal by the trial judge to grant a continuance was not error. THE DEFENDANT WAS FOUND GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED. The trial court did not use the word guilty in the findings that it announced from the bench. The colloquy between the judge and the prosecutor was as follows. THE COURT: What is the position of the State? MR. JACOBS: Yes, your Honor, I don't know if there's been a formal finding of guilt. THE COURT: I found beyond a reasonable doubt that he willfully circumvented the franchise law and special regulations set forth in accordance with that law with the Commissioner of Securities for the State of Wisconsin, and thereby violated Section 553.21 of the Statutes. MR. JACOBS: I'm at the point, if the Court doesn't say he's guilty it doesn't register. THE COURT: This is a business kind of a thing. It's a different kind of a finding that the Court has to make. However, the written judgment of conviction signed by the judge contains a written statement that there was a finding of guilty and contains the phrase, it is adjudged that the defendant is guilty as convicted. It is therefore clear that the trial court did in fact find and adjudge the defendant guilty of the crime charged. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT. A challenge to the adequacy of the information raised in the defendant's brief was withdrawn at the time of oral argument. All that remains for discussion is the sufficiency of the evidence. [11] The state was required to prove that the defendant was a person in control of a franchisor and that he had notice of and willfully violated the order to escrow within forty-eight hours the proceeds from the sale of a franchise. Here, the trial court as the trier of fact acting reasonably had ample evidence to be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [12] The evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant had knowledge of the order by the Commissioner, that he solicited the sale of a franchise and received money from the sale, that he knew that the sale proceeds were to be escrowed according to the order and that he willfully and intentionally failed to place the checks received from Mr. Rosado in the escrow account. The evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that the defendant controlled the franchisor in fact. By the Court. Judgment and order affirmed.