Opinion ID: 1267421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: C. sec. 72-201 provides in part:

Text: `Accident,' as used in this law, means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, happening suddenly and connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be definitely located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury, as defined in this law. The terms `injury' and `personal injury,' as the same are used in this law, shall be construed to include only an injury caused by an accident, as above defined, which results in violence to the physical structure of the body.   . We shall analyze the episode involved in this case in the light of the requirements of the statute as applied to the facts developed by the undisputed evidence. The statute is definitive of the event  the accident  as to certain of its outward aspects only, i. e., that it be sudden, unexpected, industrially connected, and causative of personal injury. The statute does not otherwise attempt definition of the event. Laird sustained a personal injury, i. e., the coronary attack, resulting in bodily damage; therefore the requirement of injury which results in violence to the physical structure of the body, is met. Laird's injury was caused by an event, or stated conversely, an event resulted in his injury. The event constituted the end result of stress and strain under the related circumstances,  the acceleration of the heart condition, which constituted the precipitating factor of the coronary injury. The event happened suddenly. The event is definitely located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing the injury. The event was connected with the industry in that it occurred during the course of Laird's work. The event was unexpected as to Laird and hence included within the purview of an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap or untoward event as to him. Briefly the record shows that Laird, with his existent afflicted heart, performed the work under conditions which from a medical standpoint, affected him adversely, constituting factors precipitative of the coronary attack, with sufficient resultant injury to cause death. Those adverse factors were: First, Laird's close proximity to a welder burning oxygen; second, the high altitude,  over 6,000 feet, and third, the weather, which was awfully sultry that day and hot. Particularly, the third factor standing undisputed, elicited from a workman performing his tasks in the near vicinity of Laird's work, indicated an unusual and adverse circumstance as to Laird, medically speaking, in the light of his afflicted heart. Moreover the evidence is undisputed in the regard that the effect or end result of the event  the stress and strain  to which the record shows Laird was subjected, though perhaps to be considered not unusual to a worker with a healthy heart, was most unusual, untoward, unexpected and unforeseen as to Laird, by virtue of his afflicted heart. This Court, In re Smith, 72 Idaho 8, 236 P.2d 87, 89, criticized the ruling of the Industrial Accident Board, that tipping of a tram car was an accident, and thereupon correctly analyzed the accident in the following language: Certainly the resulting heart strain under the circumstances [of the righting of the tram car] would be an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap. The legislature, in 1939, adopted the definition of accident as now appearing in I.C. sec. 72-201, as an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Law. Sess. Laws 1939, c. 161, sec. 1. Prior to such amendment the legislature had not attempted a definition. This Court in Pinson v. Minidoka Highway District, 61 Idaho 731, 739, 106 P.2d 1020, 1023, decided after the 1939 amendment, had this to say in regard to the definition of accident as now contained in the amendment, now I.C. sec. 72-201: The forepart of this definition includes nothing not essential to an accident under the earlier decisions of this court heretofore referred to. In other words, the definition of an `accident' as defined by this court in former decisions was adopted by the legislature as its definition of an `accident'. This Court then pointed to matters which the amendment additionally required, being only, that the mishap or event relied upon be definitely located as to time when and place where it occurred; it also redefined accident in accordance with its previous announcements, in language as follows: To constitute an `accident' it is not necessary that the workman slip or fall or that the machinery fail. An `accident' occurs in doing what the workman habitually does if any unexpected, undesigned, unlooked-for or untoward event or mishap, connected with or growing out of the employment, takes place. Citing in support of such definition, McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., supra; Hieronymus v. Stone's Food Stores, Inc., 60 Idaho 727, 96 P.2d 435; Cook v. Winget, 60 Idaho 561, 94 P.2d 676; In re Larson, 48 Idaho 136, 279 P. 1087, and Aldrich v. Dole, 43 Idaho 30, 249 P. 87. This Court in Lewis v. Department of Law Enforcement, 79 Idaho ___, 311 P. 2d 976, also pointed out that such definition of accident, after the 1939 amendment, was applied and followed not only in Pinson v. Minidoka Highway District, supra, but also in Aranguena v. Triumph Mining Co., 63 Idaho 769, 126 P.2d 17; Cain v. C. C. Anderson Co., 64 Idaho 389, 133 P.2d 723; Teater v. Dairymen's Cooperative Creamery, 68 Idaho 152, 190 P.2d 687; Warlick v. Driscoll, 68 Idaho 552, 200 P.2d 1014, and In re Smith, supra; it also was applied and followed in Lewis v. Department of Law Enforcement, supra. Lewis v. Department of Law Enforcement, supra, comprehensively reviews the opinions of this Court in workmen's compensation matters decided during the last thirty-five years, since McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., supra, relating to the definition of accident. It pointed to one case only, decided during that period of time which had failed to conform to the long unbroken line of decisions referred to therein. That case is Dunn v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 74 Idaho 210, 260 P.2d 398, a three to two decision. This Court in overruling that decision quoted from the dissenting opinion of the late Justice Thomas who, after exhaustively reviewing the outstanding Idaho cases, stated: It would appear that the decisions in this state until now have stood for the proposition that an accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of his health. [79 Idaho ___, 311 P.2d 980.] And then ruled that the Dunn v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., case was contrary to the many and consistent decisions of this court over a period of thirty-five years as to what constitutes an industrial accident. It would seem unwise to continue this departure from the many precedents. The evidence in the case under consideration here shows that Laird met with an industrial accident which precipitated injury of such magnitude as to cause his death. The order of the Industrial Accident Board denying compensation is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to enter an award of compensation death benefits in favor of appellant to be determined by the Board. Costs to appellant. PORTER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.