Opinion ID: 186817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Meaning of the Parties' Agreements

Text: 23 Interpretation of a contract, like statutory and treaty interpretation, must begin with the plain meaning of the language. See, e.g., NAGE, Local R5-136, 363 F.3d at 476 (examining the express language of a collective bargaining agreement); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 119 S.Ct. 755, 142 L.Ed.2d 881 (1999) ([I]n any case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute. And where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Iceland S.S. Co.-Eimskip v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 201 F.3d 451, 458 (D.C.Cir. 2000) (When interpreting a treaty ... we ... `must, of course, begin with the language of the Treaty itself.' (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 72 L.Ed.2d 765 (1982))). In analyzing the alleged ulp in this case, the Authority seemed not to comprehend the principle of plain meaning. 24 The Authority first noted that it is not always necessary to determine the precise meaning of [a contract] provision in order to analyze an allegation of repudiation. Davis-Monthan AFB, 60 F.L.R.A. No. 166, slip op. at 13-14 (citing Scott AFB, 51 F.L.R.A. at 862 n. 4). This proposition is drawn from Scott AFB, where the FLRA held that, [i]n those situations where the meaning of a particular agreement term is unclear, acting in accordance with a reasonable interpretation of that term, even if it is not the only reasonable interpretation, does not constitute a clear and patent breach of the terms of the agreement. 51 F.L.R.A. at 862-63. This principle has no bearing on this case, however, because it applies only in situations when the meaning of a particular agreement term is unclear. The disputed contract language in this case—[t]he Employer will retain employees in a duty or approved leave status while undergoing rehabilitation and treatment should in no way jeopardize an employee's job security—is not unclear. In concluding otherwise, the Authority followed an analytical path which suggests that, in determining whether the breach of a collective bargaining agreement is clear and patent, it need not determine whether the agreement has a plain meaning. Needless to say, this course of analysis is completely misguided and far afield from the dictates of Scott AFB. 25 Our review of the Local Drug Agreement and CBA reveals mutually reinforcing terms establishing two general principles applicable to employee drug use and addiction. First, Article 27, § 2 defines drug abuse as an illness: The Union and the Employer jointly recognize alcoholism and drug abuse as treatable illnesses; therefore, employees having these illnesses will receive the same careful consideration and offer of assistance that is extended to employees having any other illness or health problem. Second, both agreements guarantee employees help enrolling in rehabilitation and treatment programs. Article 27, § 3 provides: The ultimate objective of the drug and alcohol abuse program will be to rehabilitate the employee through counseling, referral for medical assistance, and other such means as may be available to aid in the recovery of the employee. Section 9 states that employees who test positive will be referred to Social Actions for evaluation and appropriate referral for counseling and/or rehabilitation. And § 12 provides: [T]he Employer will make reasonable accommodations for the employee's drug problem by providing him/her access to a drug treatment and rehabilitation program. 26 In service of these principles, the agreements establish a safe harbor for employees, guaranteeing that the employer will not dismiss any employee during the course of rehabilitation. Section 9(a) provides that [t]he Employer will retain employees in a duty or approved leave status while undergoing rehabilitation, and Article 27 reads, Referral for diagnosis and acceptance of treatment should in no way jeopardize an employee's job security or promotional opportunities. These provisions unambiguously create a limited window—the time period between when Davis-Monthan AFB learns of an employee's drug use and when the employee completes a rehabilitation program—during which an employee cannot be dismissed absent other cause. If an employee drops out of rehabilitation, he immediately forfeits the protection of § 9 and Article 27. 27 Not all employees who suffer from drug abuse gain the protection of the safe harbor. First, § 9 clarifies that the agreements do not protect employees who refuse rehabilitation: Employees will be informed of the consequences should they refuse counseling or rehabilitation. Article 27 likewise states: Failure to successfully complete a rehabilitation program which results in acceptable work performance, after a reasonable period of time, will result in disciplinary procedures. Second, the agreements do not shelter employees who, apart from their drug problem, are insubordinate, have unacceptable work performance, or otherwise engage in misconduct warranting dismissal. And, finally, the agreements in no way restrict the employer's right to take appropriate action short of removal, such as reassignment of an employee to a less sensitive position. 28 At oral argument, in a vain attempt to refute the plain meaning of § 9 and Article 27, counsel for the Authority argued that if the parties had meant to establish a safe harbor they would have agreed to different contractual language. According to counsel, the following language would have been a model of clarity: 29 [T]he agency employer cannot terminate an employee for illegal drug use until rehabilitation is concluded. 30 See Recording of Oral Argument at 15:31. This language mirrors what the parties' agreements say. Section 9 provides: 31 The Employer will retain employees in a duty or approved leave status while undergoing rehabilitation. And Article 27, § 3 states: 32 The ultimate objective of the drug and alcohol abuse program will be to rehabilitate the employee through counseling, referral for medical assistance, and other such means as may be available to aid in the recovery of the employee. Referral for diagnosis and acceptance of treatment should in no way jeopardize an employee's job security or promotional opportunities. 33 The language suggested by the Authority's counsel says, the employer cannot terminate. The parties' agreement says, [t]he Employer will retain employees, and [r]eferral for diagnosis and acceptance of treatment should in no way jeopardize an employee's job security or promotional opportunities. If the employer must retain employees and rehabilitation can in no way jeopardize an employee's job security, then an employee who is in rehabilitation obviously is protected from termination. No doubt, the parties could have been even clearer in expressing their intention if they had added, and we really mean what we say. But even without such a declaration, the agreements are unambiguously plain in their meaning. Therefore, the Authority was obliged to construe the parties' contracts as written. 34 In an attempt to avoid the plain meaning of the agreements, the Authority started its analysis by focusing on the testimony offered by the employer regarding the parties' bargaining history. In so doing, the Authority conjured up an ambiguity in unambiguous language by crediting self-serving parol evidence that purported to refute what the contract said. The Authority's analysis was completely backwards and totally inconsistent with the dictates of Scott AFB and other relevant precedent. 35 An agreement is only ambiguous if it[s language] is reasonably susceptible of different constructions or interpretations, not simply because the parties later disagree on its meaning. Ameren Servs. Co. v. FERC, 330 F.3d 494, 499 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Resort to parol evidence may only be had where the language of an agreement is ambiguous on its face. NTEU, 466 F.3d at 1081 ([W]here the terms of a bargaining agreement are ambiguous, we look to evidence of the parties' contemporaneous understanding.); Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Georgetown Univ., 347 F.3d 941, 946 (D.C.Cir.2003) (If the ... language is unambiguous, the court need only apply the meaning of the words. If the language is ambiguous, the court must determine the parties' intent ... in light of the circumstances surrounding [the agreement's] execution.); Ameren, 330 F.3d at 498 ([W]e first consider de novo whether the ... agreement unambiguously addresses the matter at issue. If so, the language of the agreement controls for we must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of the parties.) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In short, where the language of an agreement can bear only one interpretation, contradictory extrinsic evidence must be ignored. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 31-32, 125 S.Ct. 385, 160 L.Ed.2d 283 (2004) ([W]here the words of a law, treaty, or contract, have a plain and obvious meaning, all construction, in hostility with such meaning, is excluded. (quoting Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 89-90, 5 L.Ed. 547 (1823))); Ameren, 330 F.3d at 498 n. 7 (The [agency] may consider extrinsic evidence only if the ... agreement is ambiguous.). The Authority plainly erred in considering parol evidence that directly contradicts the unambiguous meaning of the contractual terms. 36 The agreements admit of no ambiguity. Section 9 and Article 27 create a safe harbor that protects a narrow class of employees for a limited period of time so that they may focus on treatment and rehabilitation. The Authority's decision defies precedent and commonsense, and it reaches a conclusion that is so implausible that it [cannot] be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856. Because the Authority's decision epitomizes arbitrary and capricious action, we grant the petition for review.