Opinion ID: 1149666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court err in permitting testimony concerning other statements?

Text: Appellant contends that the court erred in allowing improper opinion testimony concerning differences or discrepancies in the stories of the co-defendants. The State introduced the confession of Toy Coleman into evidence. Sheriff Bryan testified that he had also taken the confessions of Joey Ivy and Johnny Fowler. The following exchange occurred after this testimony: Q. Did you at any time try to influence them to include the name of the defendant in their statement or try to put anything about the defendant in the statement? A. No, sir. Q. Sheriff, have you had occasion in the past to take statements from co-defendants who were involved in the same crime? A. Hundreds of them, yes, sir. Q. And in those hundreds of cases would you tell the jury whether it's usual or unusual for there to be minor differences or discrepancies in the stories of co-defendants? A. It's usual. MR. WALKER: I object to that, sir, on the basis that he's not an expert. Also, that's hearsay. THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. A. It's not unusual. Q. Would it be unusual if there were no discrepancies in the statements between two people on the same event? MR. WALKER: I object again, Your Honor, this time on the basis of relevancy. THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. A. I would say it would be unusual. ..... Q. All right, sir. Sheriff, can you tell us what your investigation revealed with respect to the involvement of the defendant in the theft from Thermos? A. Yes, sir. Q... . A. In the entire investigation it was consistent from everybody that was involved. MR. WALKER: Your Honor, I object on the basis of hearsay. These witnesses have been here and testified as to what occurred, and anything that Sheriff Bryan says is merely hearsay. He has no firsthand knowledge of it. THE COURT: Any response, Mr. Buntin? MR. BUNTIN: Well, I'll do it this way. Q. (By Mr. Buntin) Sheriff, where the statements that you obtained from the co-defendant, Toy Coleman, Joseph Ivy and Johnny Ray Fowler, were they consistent or inconsistent with what you knew about the defendant and about your investigation? A. Consistent. The State cites Miss.R.Evid. 701, contending that this is proper opinion testimony. Rule 701 states: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to the clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. This Court's latest opinion dealing with lay opinion testimony is James Jackson v. State, 551 So.2d 132 (Miss. 1989) which cites Whittington v. State, 523 So.2d 966 (Miss. 1988). In Jackson the defendant was charged with the murder of his wife. The investigating officer testified that he had doubts about the defendant's story that a robbery had taken place and Mrs. Jackson was killed by an unknown assailant. The officer stated that he was unable to find any evidence that anyone, other than James Jackson, was present at the scene of the murder. Applying the two prong test of 701, this court concluded that the officer's opinion was (1) based on his personal perceptions, and (2) helpful to the determination of the important fact question of whether there was anyone else at the scene at the time of the murder. 551 So.2d at 142. Jackson is distinguishable from this case. In Jackson, the opinion testimony was directly related to an issue in the case  the presence of a third party at the murder scene. In the case at hand, the opinion testimony concerns the truthfulness of the prosecution's witnesses. As the majority opinion in Jackson so carefully points out, the witness' testimony was on a pertinent issue, and based on his own observations and investigation. Id. In U.S. v. Dotson, 799 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.1986), interpreting F.R.E. 701, it was held reversible error to allow government agents to offer opinions to the truthfulness of the defendant and his witnesses where those opinions were based solely on the agent's investigation. The Dotson Court stated: In the absence of some underlying basis to demonstrate that the opinions were more than bare assertions that the defendant and his witnesses were persons not to be believed, the opinion evidence should not have been admitted ..... We do not hold that government agents may never testify as to the truthfulness of a defendant or defense witnesses. Nor do we hold that a government agent's opinion of a witness's character may never be based exclusively on what the agent learned on an official investigation. But the fact that one has conducted an investigation of the defendant, has known the defendant, or has had minimal contact with defendant's witnesses is not a sufficiently reliable basis under Rules 608(a) and 701 for that witness, over objection, to put before the jury the opinion that they are liars. 799 F.2d at 193-94. In Whittington, the investigating officer expressed the opinion that, following his investigation he did not think Mrs. Whittington was killed in the wreck. This court stated that the abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not result in the admission of all opinions. It must be `helpful to a determination of the case.' Questions which would merely allow a witness to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1983). 523 So.2d at 975. The lay opinion testimony of Sheriff Bryan was inadmissible. He, in essence, told the jury that they were to believe the stories of the three co-defendants, despite discrepancies among their accounts of the theft of the compressor. There are two reasons that this type of testimony is unacceptable. First, it is more prejudicial than probative; second, it is not based on first hand knowledge. This court, in West v. State, 249 So.2d 650 (Miss. 1971), recognized the danger of allowing a jury to be presented with what appears to be the official opinion of the police department that the defendant is guilty. In this case, the sheriff was allowed to express the opinion that the prosecution's witnesses were telling the truth when they implicated Deborah Rose. There is a very real danger that, due to his position as sheriff, he might unduly influence the jury when the time came to evaluate the testimony of the co-defendants. A defendant must be allowed to point out discrepancies in witnesses' accounts of events, and to have the jury determine whether those witnesses are truthful. The admission of this lay testimony prejudiced the defendant. When added to the error earlier discussed, we are persuaded that she is entitled to a new trial.