Opinion ID: 48708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: would consent to a search; Chan consented

Text: Four law enforcement agents approached and confirmed that he had no bags other than the defendants on a train platform in Fort the ones inside the room. Worth because of defendants’ suspicious itin- erary.1 Officer Gregg identified himself as an Morton entered the room to search; he later officer and asked Freeman whether he had a testified that the only things immediately visibag in the storage area on the lower end of the ble were a small leather binder and a shaving train. Freeman identified himself as “Ted kit. Behind a chair in the room, in a large Brown” and claimed an untagged bag as his pocket, Morton found a black backpack. Inside he found two large blocks of cocaine, along with airline tickets and motel receipts in 1 the name of Ted Brown. At no point did Mor- The two defendants had made a last-minute, ton ask Chan whether the backpack was his or one-way reservation of a sleeping car from San for consent to look in the backpack. Antonio to Washington, D.C., on Chan’s credit card. Because reasonable suspicion is not neces- sary for officers to approach individuals in public At the suppression hearing the district court areas, we express no opinion on whether the offi- found that Chan had given verbal consent to cers had reasonable suspicion to instigate a Terry search the room and that the officer would stop. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 have reasonably believed that this included (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 consent to search bags in the room. The (1983) (plurality). 2 court initially granted the suppression motion, consent, the next issue is whether it was volhowever, concluding that “I’ve been provided untary.4 Voluntariness is to be determined no authority by the government that consent to based on the totality of the circumstances, with search the room carried with it consent to the burden of proof on the government.5 search the backpack.” The next day, the court reversed its ruling, concluding that the proper If the government demonstrates voluntary legal test was one of “objective reasonable- consent, two issues remain: whether the search ness” and finding that it was objectively rea- was within the scope of the consent;6 and sonable for Morton to believe Chan’s consent whether the consenting individual had authorincluded consent to search the backpack, be- ity to consent.7 Unlike the first two issues, cause it was in plain sight. scope and authority are not determined based on a totality-of-the-circumstances standard,