Opinion ID: 618225
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: (43)(G). Id.

Text: The Nugent court proceeded, however, to address Nugent‟s argument that his offense was an offense involving fraud or deceit under (M). It rejected the “either or” arguments of the parties and held that “Congress‟ intent was for both G and M(i) to apply to an „offense‟ involving „theft‟ and „fraud or deceit,‟ and thus the requirements of both provisions must be fulfilled for such an offense to qualify as an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA.” Id. at 176. The court reasoned that [i]t is beyond cavil that the particular or subclass Pennsylvania statute under which Nugent was convicted falls within the purview of “a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). The sole question for decision is whether Pennsylvania‟s theft by deception statute, which is subsumed in Section 1101(a)(43)(G) as a particular “theft offense,” also comes within the universal (or class) nature of “an offense” bottomed on fraud or deceit under Section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). We hold that it does. 367 F.3d at 177 (emphasis added). The court determined that in enacting § 1101(a)(43), Congress knew the distinction between the common law offense of larceny and the statutory offense of false pretenses. It concluded that “when Congress defined a particular species of aggravated felony in Section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) as „an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit‟ it had in mind, inter alia, the statutory offense of false pretenses.” Id. at 177. With that in mind, the court turned to the Pennsylvania statute for theft by 8 deception, which had been adopted word for word from the Model Penal Code, and the ALI commentaries for that offense. Id. at 178. The court concluded that the “ALI makes clear that „theft by deception‟ states the elements of the statutory offense of false pretenses.” Id. at 178. It pointed out that the statute also used “various forms of the word „deceive‟” and concluded that “[b]y its very language, the Pennsylvania statute is bottomed on „fraud‟ and „deceit.‟” Id. The Court declared that “[b]ecause the particular Pennsylvania statute is designed entirely on all-embracing concepts of fraud or deceit – various forms of the word „deceive‟ appear five times and „false impression‟ three times – it is precisely the particular type of theft contemplated in the universal class of offenses set forth in the fraud or deceit [s]ubsection[.]” Id. at 179. Based on the above, we conclude that the BIA did not err in concluding that Nugent was inapplicable. The Nugent Court analyzed the statute of conviction to determine whether it satisfied the definition of “theft offense” under subsection (G). In that case, the offense not only had the title “theft by deception,” it also required proof of a taking of, or an exercise of control over, property. The § 371 offense of conspiring to commit wire fraud, however, does not require proof that the conspirators took another‟s property or exerted control over another‟s property. Instead, the elements of the § 371 offense of conspiracy to violate federal law are: (1) an agreement to commit an offense proscribed by federal law[, here, wire fraud]; (2) the 9 defendants intentionally joining in the agreement; (3) one of the conspirators committing an overt act; and (4) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 206 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc). Thus, Minaya‟s § 371 conviction cannot be classified as a “theft offense” under subsection (a)(43)(G). Minaya‟s § 371 conviction does satisfy the criteria of subsection (M)(i). “In a conspiracy, two different types of intent are generally required – the basic intent to agree, which is necessary to establish the existence of the conspiracy, and the more traditional intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 n.20 (1978). Accordingly, in this case there had to be proof of not only the intent to agree, but also the intent to commit the offense of wire fraud in § 1343. This demonstrates that a conviction under § 371 to commit the offense of wire fraud in violation of § 1343 satisfies subsection (M)(i)‟s requirement that the offense involve fraud or deceit. In an effort to convince us that his conviction is a hybrid offense under Nugent, Minaya, contrary to the categorical approach, emphasizes the particular facts of his offense, notes that the District Court viewed Minaya‟s federal conviction as involving the same conduct as an earlier New Jersey conviction for theft by deception, and submits that § 1343 makes it a crime to obtain property by false pretenses. This argument is not persuasive. It conveniently focuses on the 10 object of the conspiracy, i.e., the wire fraud offense in § 1343, instead of Minaya‟s offense of conviction, which is the § 371 conspiracy to commit the offense of wire fraud against the United States. The elements necessary to prove a § 371 conspiracy, however, are not the same as the elements of Minaya‟s earlier New Jersey theft by deception conviction.6 In sum, Minaya‟s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, namely wire fraud in violation of § 1343, is not a theft offense. For that reason, it cannot be a hybrid offense, which would require the alien to satisfy the requirements of both subsection (G) and subsection (M)(i).