Opinion ID: 2639447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: meaning and effect of utah code section 10-9-1001(3) and the springville citizens case

Text: ¶ 16 The Plaintiffs do not dispute the existence of the traditional distinction between the standard of review applicable to legislative as opposed to administrative and quasi-judicial land use decisions. Rather, they claim that since the Utah Legislature's adoption of Utah Code section 10-9-1001 and this court's decision in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332, the substantial evidence test is now applicable to all municipal land use decisions, whether legislative, administrative, or quasi-judicial. ¶ 17 The starting point for the Plaintiffs' one-size-fits-all approach to the standard of review for municipal land use decisions is the Utah Legislature's 1991 enactment of Utah Code section 10-9-1001. That provision codified the procedures for appealing municipal land use decisions. Section 10-9-1001(3) addresses the judicial standard of review for such decisions, stating: (3) The courts shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary and capricious, or illegal. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1999). The Plaintiffs argue that section 10-9-1001(3) was intended to create a single standard of review for all municipal land use decisions and that it impliedly overrules this court's earlier decisions applying different interpretations of the arbitrary and capricious standard to different exercises of municipal power. ¶ 18 When construing statutory language which is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent. Cole v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 899 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1995). The plain language of section 10-9-1001(3) clearly states that the arbitrary and capricious standard is applicable to all municipal land use decisions. However, the statute does not address the distinct applications of the arbitrary and capricious standard to legislative, administrative, and quasi-judicial decisions that we have recognized for more than half a century. In the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, we do not presume that the legislature, in enacting section 10-9-1001(3), intended to overrule the prior decisions of this court and impose a uniform interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard for all municipal land use decisions, regardless of whether those decisions are legislative, administrative, or quasi-judicial. See id. (noting that in the absence of express statutory language the court will not assume the legislature intended to overrule an earlier decision of this court when it enacted a statutory amendment). [1] ¶ 19 To support their claim that section 10-9-1001(3) does indeed apply to all three kinds of municipal land use decisions, the Plaintiffs rely on our opinion in Springville Citizens. In that case we stated, [a] municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence. Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25 at ¶ 24, 979 P.2d 332. The Plaintiffs interpret this language as a sweeping statement that the court had, without reservation, unanimously accepted the legislature's plain language in section 10-9-1001(3). We disagree. ¶ 20 The dispute in Springville Citizens arose out of Springville City's approval of a planned unit development (PUD) pursuant to city ordinances. Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25 at ¶¶ 1, 2, 979 P.2d 332. A developer sought approval of a PUD pursuant to those ordinances and the procedures contained therein. Id. at ¶ 2. The plaintiff's action alleged that Springville City's approval of the PUD was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal because Springville City had failed to follow its own mandatory ordinances in approving the PUD. Id. at ¶ 12. ¶ 21 In holding that Springville City's decision was not arbitrary and capricious, we did not discuss whether the decision was legislative, administrative, or quasi-judicial: we stated simply that [a] municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at ¶ 24. The Plaintiffs read this language as announcing a uniform standard of review for all municipal land use decisions. Nothing in Springville Citizens, however, evidences this court's intent to abandon the traditional distinction between the standard of review for legislative, administrative or quasi-judicial decisions. Furthermore, nothing in Springville Citizens suggests, as the Plaintiffs argue, that the legislature's 1991 enactment of section 10-9-1001(3) affected our application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to different exercises of municipal power. The essence of the Plaintiffs' argument is that Springville Citizens overruled the cases recognizing the legislative/administrative distinction by implication. ¶ 22 For its part, Payson City has tried to reconcile Springville Citizens with this court's prior municipal land use cases by explaining that the decision in that case was an administrative one that required application of the substantial evidence test. Payson City argues that all of the issues we addressed in Springville Citizens arose from the administrative processing of the PUD application pursuant to the standards set forth in city ordinances. Specifically, they note that the court focused on the certification of drawings by an irrigation company, Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 15, 979 P.2d 332, whether the planning commission had reviewed the final plat, engineering drawings and documents as required by city ordinance, id. at ¶ 16, whether modification required by the city council to the final subdivision plat had been referred to the planning commission as required by city ordinance, id. at ¶ 17, and others examples. Each of these examples prove, Payson City argues, that the focus was on compliance with procedural requirements, not with any basic policy decisions involving the exercise of legislative discretion. A more direct explanation for our statement of the standard of review in that case, however, is found in Springville City's assertion in its brief in that case that the challenged decision was an administrative one that was subject to the substantial evidence test. Brief for Appellee, at 19, Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332 (No. 980028). Given that the municipality itself acknowledged both the administrative nature of the decision and the applicability of the heightened substantial evidence test, it is not surprising that we stated municipal land use decisions were subject to the substantial evidence test; the municipality conceded as much. ¶ 23 Thus, what the Plaintiffs describe as a sweeping statement of a new one-size-fits-all standard of review in Springville Citizens was nothing more than a recognition that both the parties and the court agreed that the challenged action was administrative and should be subject to the substantial evidence test. The absence of an acknowledgment of the distinction between legislative and administrative decisions in Springville Citizens stemmed solely from the fact that the standard of review was not a contested issue in that case. Therefore, we decline the invitation to treat Springville Citizens as a deviation from our traditional application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to different types of municipal land use decisions. [2]