Opinion ID: 2397130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The District argues the court of appeals erred in failing to affirm summary judgment as to the due process claim. We agree. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the Stinneys' due process claim because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as to that claim. This was legal error. [1] Regardless, we find that the Stinneys were afforded all process that was constitutionally due and affirm the grant of summary judgment. The United States Supreme Court has said the fundamental touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be heard. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 739, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). The Supreme Court further stated that the type of hearing required to be provided will depend upon the nature of the case. Id. at 579, 95 S.Ct. at 738. For example, in Goss, the Supreme Court held a public school student facing a short-term suspension need only be provided with notice of the claims against him and an opportunity to explain his side of the facts, and was not constitutionally guaranteed a full adversarial hearing. Id. at 581, 95 S.Ct. at 740. Expulsion is a more serious disciplinary action than is suspension. Accordingly, the procedures and protections given to the accused student should be greater than the informal, immediate hearing that was authorized in Goss. Without deciding the constitutional minimum that must be given in these circumstances, we find those procedures and protections outlined in section 59-63-240 to be constitutionally sufficient. The statute reads, in pertinent part: If procedures for expulsion are initiated, the parents or legal guardian of the pupil shall be notified in writing of the time and the place of a hearing either before the board or a person or committee designated by the board. At the hearing the parents or legal guardian shall have the right to legal counsel and to all other regular legal rights including the right to question all witnesses. S.C.Code Ann. § 59-63-240 (2004). This statute affords notice, the opportunity to be heard, the right to be represented by counsel, and the right to present evidence and question witnesses. The record shows the Stinneys were provided with the process established in the statute. The Stinneys chose not to be represented by counsel during the initial hearing, and the fact that they did not present evidence or exercise their statutory right to question witnesses does not create a procedural due process violation.