Opinion ID: 654644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Fires Evidence

Text: 67 Over defendants' objections to the admission of any references to prior fires, the jury learned of two previous fires (one in the early 1970's and one in 1985) on Veltmann-owned property. This evidence came in through 1) a firefighter's testimony, 2) audiotapes of defendants' interviews with an investigator for one of the insurers, 3) the audiotape of Chris' interview with a police sergeant, 4) the police sergeant's testimony, and 5) excerpts from Carl's deposition in a civil case against insurers arising from this fire. Defendants believed the government would introduce evidence of these fires pursuant to Rule 404(b). 21 Defendants objected at a hearing on December 16, 1991, and filed pretrial motions arguing that the fires were remote, dissimilar, extrinsic acts introduced solely to show propensity to commit arson. Ruling on their motions was deferred to the trial judge. 68 At trial, defendants objected on the basis of Rule 404(b) each time the fires were mentioned. The court sustained the objection to the firefighter's testimony, but overruled each subsequent objection. At no time prior to the introduction of Carl's civil deposition did the government argue for admissibility under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). The district court agreed that the civil deposition was admissible as an admission. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Each source of prior fire evidence is discussed separately; rationale supporting their inadmissibility necessarily overlaps to some degree. 69
70 A firefighter was asked if he was familiar with the layout of the Veltmann house prior to responding to the fire. He answered, Yes. Years earlier we had a fire next-door to theirs. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, apparently based on rule 404(b). 22 71
72 An investigator working on behalf of one of the insurers inspected the Veltmann home on January 10th, and on January 11th conducted tape recorded interviews with Carl and Chris. The recordings were played for the jury. Chris answered the question Have your parents ever had a fire in any property that they've owned in the past? by discussing a fire in the 1970's to a vacant house owned by the Veltmanns. Chris believed that fire was caused by a lightning strike. Appropriate objections based on Rule 404(b) were made during the playing of Chris' tape. 23 73 Carl's statement to the investigator was also played to the jury over objection. 24 Carl responded to a question about previous fires by first discussing the 1985 fire at the cottage next-door to the current Veltmann residence. Chris apparently owned the cottage in trust provided by his parents. There was no known origin for the fire; Carl inferred that the origin may have been electrical. The insurance policy paid $40,000. 74 Carl next described the fire which occurred in a vacant house in Illinois (the same one mentioned by Chris), which took place in the early 1970's. Carl related that fire investigators told him that fire was set, perhaps by transients. 25 75
76 On January 8, Chris was interviewed by a police sergeant. The audiotape of the interview was played for the jury. 26 Chris was questioned about any enemies of his parents who might have had a motive to set the fire; in response, Chris mentioned the 1985 next-door fire, and said the tenant believed it was started by his parents.
77 On January 9th, after being advised of his Constitutional rights under Miranda, Carl was interviewed by the sergeant. The tape of this interview was not introduced into evidence at trial. When asked if he knew of anyone with a motive to set the fire, Carl discussed the 1985 next-door fire. The sergeant then testified over objection 27 that he disagreed with Carl's assessment that the 1985 next-door fire was caused by electrical problems, but stated that determination of the cause was never made. 78
79 Just prior to his indictment, Carl Veltmann gave a deposition in a bad-faith insurance suit he initiated against insurers regarding payment of claims arising out of the January 7th fire. Portions of his deposition testimony were read into evidence over defendants' objections. 28 At this point, the government suggested that Carl's deposition was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2), as an admission. During a lengthy sidebar, Carl's counsel urged, to no avail, that rule 801(d)(2) was being used to sidestep analysis under Rules 404(b) and 403. The court determined that rule 404(b) was inapplicable, and allowed portions of the deposition to be read to the jury. Rule 403 balancing was never conducted. 80 In his deposition, Carl responded to a question regarding his theory of what took place by stating that a former housekeeper might be responsible for the Veltmann house fire because she had both access and possible motivation. Her motivation related to the 1985 fire; she was a tenant in the cottage that was destroyed, and told fire investigators that the Veltmanns were responsible. 29 The Applicability of Rule 404(b): 81 Because all of the previous fire evidence except the civil deposition was admitted over Rule 404(b) objections, we begin with that rule. Evidence of extrinsic offenses is inadmissible to prove that the accused has the propensity to commit the crime charged. Fed.R.Evid. 404(a). Nonetheless, extrinsic act evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). 82 The government maintains on appeal that the statements about prior fires were admissible not as 404(b) evidence, but as statements made in furtherance of the present crime. Evidence of criminal activity other than the offense charged is not extrinsic under Rule 404(b) if it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense. United States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir.1983) (citations omitted). See alsoUnited States v. Leavitt, 878 F.2d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,Garces v. United States, 493 U.S. 968, 110 S.Ct. 415, 107 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989); United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 877 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,Sawyer v. United States, 474 U.S. 1024, 106 S.Ct. 579, 88 L.Ed.2d 562 (1985). 83 Unquestionably, the fires set in the 1970's and 1985 did not arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense. Defendants are charged solely with setting fire to the Veltmann home, not to decades of conspiracy to defraud insurers. Nor is evidence of the previous fires necessary to complete the story of this crime. There is nothing linking the previous and present fires; no thread of evidence extends from the 1970's to the night of January 7, 1990, when the Veltmann home was destroyed. The more difficult issue is whether the defendants' suggestion that their tenant in the 1985 next-door fire was a possible suspect in this crime inextricably intertwines the two fires. 84 When the police sergeant asked Chris and Carl if they knew of anyone with a motive to set Veltmann home fire both responded by bringing up the 1985 fire and the disgruntled former housekeeper who was their tenant. Thus, facts surrounding the 1985 fire became linked with the present offense. By directing the investigation toward the housekeeper, defendants could have been engaging in activity in furtherance of the charged offense; to wit, naming another suspect in an attempt to exculpate themselves. We find that Chris' taped statement to the police, and the sergeant's testimony about the 1985 fire were inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged offense, made in furtherance of the crime charged, and properly admitted into evidence. 85 In contrast, defendants' statements to the insurance investigator were made in response to questioning about any previous fires on property owned by the Veltmanns. This inquiry springs from an altogether different well. The question did not direct defendants to the present fire at all; specifically, they were asked to focus on previous events. By its nature, this question does not give rise to an answer invoking furtherance of the charged offense. We find that the statements made to the insurance investigator were not made in furtherance of the charged offenses, and proceed with Rule 404(b) analysis of those statements. 86 In United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979), the court described a two-step test required for admission of 404(b) evidence. The court must first assure that the evidence is relevant to an issue other than defendant's character and then be persuaded that the evidence's probative value is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. Extrinsic act evidence should be admitted only if both prongs of the test are satisfied. 87 Nothing on this record reflects that the district court conducted the Beechum analysis. It appears that defense counsel was never fully heard on its 404(b) pretrial motion, although the rule was mentioned in each quoted sidebar. 30 Accordingly, our inquiry proceeds with the relevance prong under Beechum. 88 For extrinsic offenses to be relevant to an issue other than character, they must be shown to be offenses, and must also be similar to the charged offense. United States v. Guerrero, 650 F.2d 728, 733 (5th Cir.1981). SeeBeechum, 582 F.2d at 912 (Obviously, the line of reasoning that deems an extrinsic offense relevant ... is valid only if an offense was in fact committed and the defendant in fact committed it.). Proof that defendants committed other relevant offenses prior to the charged act must be sufficient to permit a jury, acting reasonably, to find the preliminary facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). 89 To meet the threshold requirement for relevancy of the statements to the insurance investigator, the government had to demonstrate that (1) Carl or Chris Veltmann committed arson in the 1970's Illinois fire and 1985 next-door fire, and (2) the fires were similar to that set in the Veltmann home. There is nothing in the record showing by a preponderance of the evidence that either defendant set the previous fires. At most, the evidence suggests that the Illinois fire was possibly set by transients, and that the next-door fire had an undetermined cause. Because the genesis of these fires is unknown, no assertion can be made that the fires were similar. Indeed, the only parallel between the three fires is that they were on property owned by the Veltmanns. Neither defendant was charged with arson before this incident. Carl's recovery of $40,000 in insurance proceeds for the 1985 fire is surely not proof by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed arson. There is not even a scintilla of evidence implicating Chris as an arsonist in either previous fire. Accordingly, we find that defendants' statements to the insurance investigator about both the 1970's and 1985 fires failed to meet the threshold level of relevance for admissibility under Rule 404(b). We need not, therefore, engage in Rule 403 balancing 31 or assess whether the fires were relevant to some issue other than propensity. The Applicability of Rule 801(d)(2): 90 Rule 801 was not brought up until sidebar discussion about admission of Carl's civil deposition. The government argued that the deposition was admissible under subsections 801(d)(2)(A) or (E), which provide that a statement is not hearsay if: 91 The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity or ... (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 92 Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). 93 Because it appears that the trial court admitted the civil deposition as an admission for use against Carl alone, we begin with that part of the rule. Statements made in a civil deposition arising out of the same facts as a criminal prosecution are admissible as admissions when offered against the declarant. United States v. Jenkins, 785 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom.,Prock v. United States, 479 U.S. 855, 107 S.Ct. 192, 93 L.Ed.2d 125 (1986), and cert. denied sub nom.,White v. United States, 479 U.S. 889, 107 S.Ct. 288, 93 L.Ed.2d 262 (1986). Unquestionably, the deposition at issue was given in proceedings arising from the fire at the Veltmann home on January 7th. Although the trial court correctly held that the deposition contained admissions which were admissible under rule 801(d)(2)(A), it apparently failed to conduct a Rule 403 analysis as required in this circumstance. United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1506 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom.,Leavitt v. United States, 479 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 961, 93 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1987). The exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be applied sparingly. United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 766 (11th Cir.1985). The major function [of Rule 403] is limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect. United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862, 100 S.Ct. 128, 62 L.Ed.2d 83 (1979). 94 We must determine if those portions of the civil deposition pertaining to the 1985 next-door fire were dragged in by the heels solely for prejudicial impact. Carl mentioned the fire in response to the insurer's query about his theory of what happened. This is a similar inquiry to that undertaken by the police sergeant, supra, leading the deponent directly to explanation of circumstances surrounding the charged crime. Indeed, Carl's response closely tracked that given to the sergeant when he asked if anyone had a motive to set the fire. We find the query legitimate and its answer admissible. As with the sergeant's testimony, Carl's deposition answers are undoubtedly prejudicial, but not so unfairly prejudicial as to warrant exclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling on admissibility of those portions of Carl Veltmann's civil deposition that were read to the jury.