Opinion ID: 517426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Want of a Cross-Appeal

Text: 5 Before proceeding to an examination of each of the separate claims, we first address a procedural argument raised by Stone. A number of the arguments raised by the IBT before this court as grounds for affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment on the RICO and public policy claims and of a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim were originally urged before the district court in various motions to dismiss, all of which the district court denied. Stone contends that the IBT's failure to cross-appeal the court's rulings on these motions bars the IBT from relying before this court on any arguments presented in the motions. This point is not well taken. 6 As Stone recognizes, this court may affirm a decision of the district court if it is correct regardless of whether the district court relied on an incorrect ground in making its ruling. See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 720 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C.Cir.1983). Stone claims, however, that the general rule is inapplicable here under Grimes v. District of Columbia, 836 F.2d 647 (D.C.Cir.1988). In Grimes, the plaintiff won a money judgment in the district court and appealed, arguing that the amount had been improperly calculated. The defendant did not cross-appeal, but urged as a ground for affirming the district court's determination of damages that the defendant was not liable for any damages at all. This court refused to consider the argument, stating that where the rationale of the argument upon which the appellee sought to rely would suggest reversal rather than affirmance, that argument could not be raised as a ground on which to affirm absent a cross-appeal. 836 F.2d at 651. 7 Stone attempts to apply Grimes to this case with the claim that if this court affirms the district court on an issue raised in the motions to dismiss, the IBT will arguably be entitled to go back to the district court to request sanctions, per Rule 11, for the filing of those motions. Thus, argues Stone, to affirm on a ground raised in the motion to dismiss would be to modify substantially the judgment below rather than merely to affirm it. 8 Accepting Stone's factual premise for the purposes of argument, his theory still fails. Although Stone seeks to emphasize (out of context) the statement in Grimes that a cross-appeal must be taken where the argument sought to be raised would entitle a party to more than [affirmance], 836 F.2d at 651 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted), the rationale of Grimes is that a party cannot, as a ground for affirmance, rely on an argument the logic of which dictates reversal; rather, the party must take a cross-appeal. Here, the logic of the arguments raised by the IBT dictate affirmance. Grimes is therefore irrelevant.