Opinion ID: 4553168
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: inquiries from any victim of such

Text: juvenile delinquency, or if the victim is deceased from the immediate family of such victim, related to the final disposition of such juvenile by the court in accordance with section 5037. Unless otherwise authorized by this section, information about the juvenile record may not be released when the request for information is related to an application for employment, license, bonding, or any civil right or privilege. Responses to such inquiries shall not be different from responses made about persons who have never been involved in a delinquency proceeding. 20 ... (e) Unless a juvenile who is taken into custody is prosecuted as an adult[,] neither the name nor picture of any juvenile shall be made public in connection with a juvenile delinquency proceeding. § 5038(a), (e). In A.D., we examined whether § 5038 barred press access to juvenile proceedings and records. 28 F.3d at 1355. We concluded that § 5038 does not mandate closure of all juvenile proceedings and sealing of juvenile records because the statutory text speaks of only preventing disclosure to “unauthorized persons.”10 Id. at 1359 (quoting § 5038(a)). Thus, the language contemplates that authorized persons may have access to juvenile records. We also explained that subsections (a)(1)-(6) mandate disclosure to certain individuals, stating that such persons “have a right to access the records of the judicial proceeding on request.” Id. (citing § 5038(a)(1)-(6)) (emphasis omitted). We observed that only the last paragraph of § 5038(a) bars disclosure. Specifically, that paragraph states that “information about the juvenile record may not be released when the request for information is 10 We also rejected the interpretation that the JDA barred all disclosure of records or access to proceedings because “an across-the-board ban on access to juvenile proceedings under the Act would pose a substantial constitutional issue” under the First Amendment. A.D., 28 F.3d at 1358. 21 related to an application for employment, license, bonding, or any civil right or privilege.” Id. at 1356 (citing § 5038(a)). Reading together § 5038(a)’s opening paragraph, its listed situations in (a)(1)-(6), and its final paragraph, we concluded that “§ 5038(a) implicitly recognizes that there are situations other than those described in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6) and its concluding paragraph in which access could be authorized.” Id. at 1359-60. Outside the disclosures mandated by (a)(1)-(6) and those barred by the concluding paragraph, release of records is within the district court’s discretion, weighing “the interests of juveniles” and “objectives of the Act” against “the interests of the . . . public.” Id. at 1361.11 A.D. did not consider the interaction between the JDA and the CVRA, as it was decided prior to the latter’s enactment. Nor did A.D. identify every interest that would support disclosure or “all the factors to be weighted in determining whether access [to juvenile proceedings] is appropriate.” Id. at 1361 n.7 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978)). Rather, we held that “the decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. Thus, although A.D. dealt with a press request for access to a juvenile proceeding and the associated First Amendment interests, it did not limit disclosure to situations involving constitutional or statutory interests. Instead, we left it to the district court’s discretion to identify interests that support 11 Other Courts of Appeals agree with our interpretation of § 5038. Under Seal, 853 F.3d at 727; United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 934 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 564 U.S. 932 (2011) (per curiam); United States v. Eric B., 86 F.3d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1995). 22 disclosure and to balance them against the juvenile’s interest in confidentiality. Id. at 1360-61. Because disclosure need not be explicitly authorized by a constitutional or statutory provision, the District Court could have cited a general interest in victim notification without reference to the CVRA. See Under Seal, 853 F.3d at 714, 72728 (explaining that A.D.’s interpretation of the JDA recognized that “permissive disclosure authority . . . has the virtue of allowing district courts to accommodate disclosure requests in the event that the Constitution requires or at least arguably requires disclosure”). The victim’s interest in being notified about the proceedings is a public interest that is proper to balance against the juvenile’s interest in confidentiality and may warrant disclosure. 2 While a specific statutory or constitutional interest is not required to permit disclosure, here the notification was authorized under the CVRA. The CVRA “guarantees to the victims of federal crimes an array of substantive and participatory rights.”12 In re Rendon Galvis, 564 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009); see also § 3771(a). As relevant here, subsection (a) of the CVRA guarantees victims “[t]he right to be reasonably protected from the accused,” “[t]he right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused,” and “the right to be 12 “The term ‘crime victim’ means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense[.]” § 3771(e)(2)(A). 23 informed for the rights under this subsection.” § 3771(a)(1), (2), (10). The CVRA: (1) obliges courts, “[i]n any court proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim,” to “ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in subsection (a),” § 3771(b)(1); and (2) requires the Government “make [its] best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a),” § 3771(c)(1). The rights are enforceable by motion of the crime victim or the Government. § 3771(d)(1), (3). C.S. argues that notification was not permitted under subsection (a)(1) because it did not serve the “[t]he right to be reasonably protected from the accused.” § 3771(a)(1). However, the church was one of the targets of C.S.’s threats, and the District Court concluded that it qualified as a “crime victim.” App. 11. Thus, the Court reasonably found that notifying the church of C.S.’s threats and house arrest would serve its “right to be reasonably protected from the accused.”13 § 3771(a)(1). C.S. asserts that the District Court did not view him as a danger. He relies on a statement the Court made in evaluating conditions of release or detention pending final disposition, in which it noted that, while C.S.’s statements constituted threats, “it was clear . . . that the defendant did not have the capability nor the intent to actually carry out those threats.” App. 224. Subsection (a)(1), however, gives a crime victim the textually 13 Indeed, as the proceedings have been under seal, it would be impossible for the church to avail itself of its right to inquire about C.S.’s final disposition under § 5038(a)(6) without notification by the Government. 24 broad right to reasonable protection from the accused. The District Court’s ruling comported with that right. C.S. also argues that his proceeding was not a “public court proceeding,” so the notification order cannot serve as a “notice of any” such proceeding under subsection (a)(2). Appellant’s Br. at 25. He is mistaken for several reasons. First, whether and the degree to which a juvenile proceeding or its records are public are left to the discretion of the district court. A.D., 28 F.3d at 1359. When applying the CVRA here, the District Court here concluded that the records should be public to some degree, so a portion of this proceeding could qualify as a “public court proceeding.” See United States v. L.M., 425 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954-55, 957 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (deciding a CVRA motion filed in a juvenile proceeding by first concluding, per A.D., that the records should be made public, then concluding that they fell within the CVRA). Second, the text and structure of subsection (a)(2) indicate that crime victims have a right to notice of an accused’s release even if the accused’s proceedings were not “public court proceedings.” The subsection begins with the subject phrase “[t]he right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice” and is followed with two parallel prepositional phrases14 separated by the disjunctive (“or”): (1) “of any public 14 “A prepositional phrase is composed of ‘[a] preposition and its object and modifiers [and] may be used as a noun, an adjective, or an adverb.’” Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 107 F.3d 451, 455 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting William A. Sabin, The Gregg Reference Manual 476 25 court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime,” and (2) “of any release or escape of the accused.” § 3771(a)(2). When a subject is followed by two prepositional phrases, the phrases can each modify the subject. See Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 80 (1991) (holding that a statute permitting removal if the defendant is “[a]ny officer of the United States or [of] any agency thereof” “permits removal by anyone who is an ‘officer’ either ‘of the United States’ or of one of its agencies” (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1))). Accordingly, subsection (a)(2) provides for “notice” either “of any public court proceeding” or “of any release or escape of the accused.” Indeed, it makes sense to provide a right to notification of release or escape untethered to a public court proceeding because the victim of a criminal-at-large convicted in a sealed proceeding is in equal danger as a victim of a criminal-at-large convicted in a pubic proceeding. See United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880 F.3d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 2018) (instructing that we avoid interpretations that create inconsistency with the statute’s purpose). This interpretation of subsection (a)(2) demonstrates that the District Court properly granted the Government’s CVRA motion because it furthered the church’s “right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice . . . of any release . . . of the accused.” § 3771(a)(2). 3 Indeed, the JDA contemplates the disclosures at issue here. As stated previously, the JDA sets forth several (7th ed. 1992)). “Of” is a preposition. “Of,” Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2020). 26 circumstances in which juvenile records “shall be released to the extent necessary to meet” those circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(a). One circumstance is to respond to “inquiries from any victim of such juvenile delinquency, or if the victim is deceased from the immediate family member of such victim, related to the final disposition of such juvenile by the court in accordance with section 5037.” § 5038(a)(6). This concept, receiving an inquiry from a victim, presupposes that the victim had notice of the crime. Notice to the victim, in other words, ensures that he can make the inquiries and receive the responses envisioned under subsection (a)(6).15 The JDA itself contemplates notification to the victim, and thus supports disclosure. 4 C.S.’s argument that the notification order is overly broad also fails. C.S. asserts that the order could enable the church-leader to identify him and that the order does not restrict the leader’s ability to disseminate the information he or she receives. C.S.’s first contention, that the order could allow the church-leader to identify him, fails because the District 15 Some crimes may occur before a victim has knowledge of the offense, such as identity theft, in which a defendant commits a theft or deception using a person’s identity and the person does not learn about the crime until sometime thereafter. The fact that the person is unaware of the crime at the moment that it is committed, however, does not make him any less entitled to information about the disposition of the case. Notice to that person would ensure that he could make the inquiries necessary to obtain that dispositional information. 27 Court directed that “the Government’s notification shall not provide any information revealing [C.S.] as the source of the threats; this includes information that could allow someone to deduce that [C.S.] is the juvenile, such as identifying [where] the minor lives” in relation to the church. App. 12. Thus, the Court’s instructions protect C.S. from identification. We recognize the considerable importance of protecting the juvenile’s identity, but here C.S.’s argument that the church-leader should not be able to share the information at all makes little sense because restricting how the leader can use the information would hamper his ability to protect the church, as that protection could include sharing the information with others. The order is also appropriately circumscribed because it (1) does not allow disclosure of C.S.’s name or photo, which § 5038(e) forbids; and (2) is more limited than the Government’s request, as it did not permit disclosure to the local police, because, under the facts of this case, they were not “crime victims” entitled to notification. By focusing on the church-leader, the Court reasonably concluded that he was in the best position to determine what, if any, responses were necessitated by the information.