Opinion ID: 793847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Likelihood of Success on the Merits of Earth Island's NEPA Challenges

Text: 39 NEPA's procedural requirements require agencies to take a hard look at the environmental consequences of their actions. A hard look includes considering all foreseeable direct and indirect impacts. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 973 (9th Cir.2002). In addition to direct and indirect impacts, NEPA also requires that agencies assess the cumulative impacts of their actions, defined as the incremental impact of the action when added to past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. 40 A hard look should involve a discussion of adverse impacts that does not improperly minimize negative side effects. Native Ecosytems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1241 (9th Cir.2005). Thus, the USFS must undertake a thorough environmental analysis before concluding that no significant environmental impact exists. Id. at 1239 (internal quotations omitted). We review whether the USFS has taken a hard look under the arbitrary and capricious standard. When reviewing the adequacy of an FEIS's hard look, we follow a rule of reason approach, which requires a pragmatic judgment whether the [FEIS's] form, content and preparation foster both informed decision-making and informed public participation. Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir.2005); see also Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767, 124 S.Ct. 2204, 159 L.Ed.2d 60 (2004). 41 Under NEPA, [a]gencies shall insure the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses in environmental impact statements. They shall identify any methodologies used and shall make explicit reference by footnote to the scientific and other sources relied upon for conclusions in the statement. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24. Agencies have wide discretion in assessing scientific evidence, but they must take a hard look at the issues and respond[ ] to reasonable opposing viewpoints. Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1301. Because analysis of scientific data requires a high level of technical expertise, courts must defer to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies. Id. When specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own experts, even if a court may find contrary views more persuasive. At the same time, courts must independently review the record in order to satisfy themselves that the agency has made a reasoned decision based on its evaluation of the evidence. Id. (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989)). If an agency has failed to make a reasoned decision based on an evaluation of the evidence, we may properly conclude that an agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Id. at 1301. 42 The primary purpose of an FEIS is to allow for informed public participation and informed decision making. See Native Ecosystems, 418 F.3d at 965. In furtherance of this purpose, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.8 requires that FEISs be written in plain language and may use appropriate graphics so that decisionmakers and the public can readily understand them. As we have interpreted this regulation, an FEIS must be organized and written so as to be readily understandable by governmental decisionmakers and by interested non-professional laypersons likely to be affected by actions taken under the [FEIS]. Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 494 (9th Cir.1987). 43
44 Earth Island challenges various aspects of the analyses of logging contained in the two FEISs. Most significantly, it challenges the analysis of tree mortality and the use of the proposed mortality guidelines contained in the Power and Freds FEISs. It also challenges the FEISs' conclusions that there is a lack of adequate soil cover in the project areas, and that the retention of large snags (dead trees) would result in a hazardous level of surface fuels. 45
46 Earth Island argues that the FEISs' guidelines for cutting burned and scorched trees substantially overpredict tree mortality, with the result that many more trees will be cut than are necessary to meet the legitimate objectives of the Power and Freds Projects. Earth Island argues that by cutting many trees that will not die, the USFS will unnecessarily destroy valuable habitat for the California spotted owl and certain MIS bird species. 47 The tree mortality guidelines contained in the FEISs are based upon the 2005 draft Hood Study. That study predicts post-fire mortality for trees burned or scorched in forest fires. The guidelines for both projects are keyed to the percentage of the tree's green crown that has been scorched by the fires. 48 Based on data contained in the Hood Study, the USFS chose two different marking guidelines, one for areas to be logged by tractor and one for areas to be logged by helicopter or skyline. Table 3-5 of both of the FEISs is entitled Mortality Guidelines for marking as applied to [various alternatives]. For simplicity of explanation, we will describe the guidelines only as they apply to yellow pine and white fir, and only as to helicopter and skyline logging. Yellow pine with 65% or more of the length of their crown scorched are considered dead, and are to be marked for cutting. The same crown length scorch percentages apply to white fir over 20 in diameter. 49 For the convenience of the reader, we reproduce Table 3-5: 50 PP/JP/SP White White [yellow Fir Fir Incense Red Douglas pine] &20 >20 Cedar Fir Fir Tractor Logging System Crown Scorch  75% 95% 80% 100% ? ? Crown Scorch + RTB or Ambrosia Beetle ? Helicopter and Skyline Logging Systems Crown Scorch  65% 85% 65% 95% ? ? Crown Scorch + RTB or Ambrosia Beetle ? 51 Table 3-6 of the FEISs is entitled Probability of Tree Mortality. Both FEISs state, Table 3-6 indicates the probability of tree mortality to individual trees meeting the Power [and Freds] Fire marking guidelines (Correctly Predicted Mortality) and the predicted survival of trees with less fire damage than the minimum requirements of the marking guidelines (Correctly Predicted Survival). According to Table 3-6, a yellow pine cut in accordance with the 65% crown length scorch guideline of Table 3-5 has a 90% Correctly Predicted Mortality. A white fir over 20 in diameter cut in accordance with the guidelines has a 87% Correctly Predicted Mortality. 52 For the convenience of the reader, we reproduce Table 3-6. We have italicized the numbers 90 and 87 to indicate the correctly predicted mortality percentages for yellow pine and white fir cut in accordance with the 65% crown length scorch guideline: 53 PP/JP/SP Incense Douglas [yellow pine] White Fir Cedar Red Fir Fir Tractor Logging System Correctly Predicted Mortality (%) 96 95 100 100 -- Correctly Predicted Survival (%) 51 63 88 -- -- Helicopter and Skyline Logging Systems Correctly Predicted Mortality (%) 90 87 85 100 -- Correctly Predicted Survival (%) 65 74 89 -- -- 54 Earth Island contends that the findings contained in the draft Hood Study, as well as in other studies, have substantially different percentage estimates of tree mortality from the percentages contained in Table 3-6. Earth Island relies upon the declaration of Dr. Edwin B. Royce in support of its contention. Royce has a Ph.D. in Botany with a specialization in Forest Plant Ecology from the University of California at Davis, and a Ph.D. in Applied Physics from Harvard University. Royce has had twelve years of experience in the characterization of forest vegetation. 55 The USFS challenges the admissibility of Royce's declaration, as well as other expert declarations offered by Earth Island, because they were not before the agency during the administrative review process. We allow extra-record materials if necessary to determine whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir.1996). Because Earth Island's expert declarations are offered for this purpose, they were properly before the district court and are properly before this court on review. 56 According to Royce, yellow pine and white fir are both thick bark trees whose bark provides significant protection of the living tissue beneath the bark. According to Royce, [c]rown kill is commonly the dominant source of fire-induced mortality in large trees having thick bark, such as white fir or yellow pine. However, [f]all fires, such as the Power and Fred's fires, are least damaging to conifers. In part this is because reserves of stored products of photosynthesis are high and because new growth throughout the trees is less vulnerable to damage then, as compared to that same growth during the summer growing season. A low-intensity surface fire commonly produces only partial crown kill and only minimal mortality in larger trees. Trees tolerate partial crown kill in a surface fire in part because only the lower part of the crown is normally killed. The lower part of the crown is less photosynthetically productive than is the upper part. 57 For yellow pine, Royce states, [t]he mortality guidelines for yellow pine (ponderosa and Jeffrey pine) will permit the harvest of trees with a substantial probability of surviving if they were not harvested. The Royce declaration contains tables showing predicted tree mortality in the Hood Study, as well as in three other studies. Those other studies were by Ryan and Reinhardt, by Stephens and Finney, and by McHugh and Kolb. Royce states as to yellow pine, [f]or helicopter and skyline logging, mortalities from the[Hood Study] models are 60% and 70%, as compared to a 90% mortality claimed in the FEIS and ROD. Mortalities predicted by the three other studies are even more at variance from the mortality predicted in the FEISs. Royce states, 58 [T]he guidelines for helicopter and skyline logging will allow the cutting of small trees that have probabilities of mortality between 12% and 57% and large trees with mortality probabilities between 11% and 32% (compared with 90% mortality claimed by the FEIS's). Even if one accepts only the largest of the probabilities of mortality—that given by the Ryan and Reinhardt paper— this still translates into a worst case probability of survival of up to 68% for trees that could be cut (meaning 68% of the trees logged would otherwise survive). (emphasis in original.) 59 In addition, Royce states that he personally evaluated 39 yellow pine that were part of the data base for the Hood Study, and found evidence of measurement errors that would lead to the development of models that over predict mortality. According to Royce, 60 I measured the average amount of crown kill on these trees to be 88%, whereas, the [Hood Study] field workers evaluated the same damage to average 64%. A small part of this difference may be due to the fact that my measurements were crown volume measurements, whereas, the [Hood Study] measurements were linear measurements. However, as discussed [earlier in my declaration], this should produce only a few percent difference between the two measurements. I suggest that at least a substantial part of the difference between the two measurements is a result of the [Hood Study] field workers underestimating crown kill. This will result in a model that over predicts mortality when correct crown kill values are used. A corrected [Hood Study] model yielding lower mortality predictions would make the proposed guidelines even less defensible. 61 For white fir, Royce states, [t]he mortality guidelines for large white fir will permit the harvest of trees with a substantial probability of surviving if they were not harvested. As he does for yellow pine, Royce presents tables showing predicted tree mortality in the Hood Study, as well as in the three other studies. He states as to white fir, [f]or the helicopter and skyline logging of large trees, mortalities from the[Hood Study] models are between 25% and 45%, as compared to an 87% mortality claimed in the FEIS and ROD. Just as with yellow pine, mortalities predicted by the three other studies are even more at variance from the mortalities predicted in the FEISs. Royce states, 62 the guidelines for helicopter or skyline logging will allow the cutting of large trees with mortality probabilities between 7% and 50%, as compared to the 87% mortality claimed in the FEIS's. Even if one accepts only the largest of these predictions of mortality—that given by the Ryan and Reinhardt paper— this still translates into a worst case probability of survival (in helicopter units) of up to 50% for trees that could be cut. (emphasis in original). 63 In response, the USFS relies on a declaration of Sheri L. Smith. Smith is one of the three co-authors of the draft Hood Study. She has B.S. and M.S. degrees in Biology and Entomology from Utah State University. She has been an USFS employee for 15 years. She has been involved in evaluating fire-injured trees in California since 1991. 64 Smith makes three points in response to the Royce declaration. First, she contends that Royce misunderstood Table 3-6. As noted above, that table is entitled Probability of Tree Mortality. Royce understood the percentages contained in that table as indicating the probability that a tree will die. For example, Table 3-6 indicates that a yellow pine with a minimum of 75% scorched crown (the guideline for tractor logging) has a correctly predicted mortality of 96%, and a correctly predicted survival of 51%. Royce understood the table to mean that 96% of yellow pine with a minimum of 75% scorched crown will die. 65 Smith responds, 66 The marking guidelines used for the Power and Freds fire are based on models that use percent crown kill.... I attach a true and correct copy of an excerpt of the models which are the basis for the Power and Freds marking guidelines (Attachment A). 67 Mr. Royce states that Table 3-6 represents that 96% of trees with 75% crown kill will die. This is simply incorrect. The 96% in Table 3-6 (classification table) shows that the marking guideline model used by the Forest Service is correct in predicting mortality 96% of the time when our individual study trees are run through the model. In other words, the 96% is an estimate of the accuracy of the model, not of the percentage of mortality as Mr. Royce states. Both FEISs accurately interpret the findings of our paper in light of the specific marking guideline model selected by the Forest Service. 68 The percentages shown in Table 3-6 (classification table) of both the Power and Freds FEIS are derived from the entire [Hood Study] dataset, which, for yellow pine, is based on measurements of 1,969 trees. The models in our paper take these percentages to arrive at a statistical probability of mortality for an individual tree. The probability of mortality (Pm) ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, with 1.0 being certain mortality. The Forest Service selected a Pm of 0.90 for all ground-based harvest units. For yellow pine, a Pm of 0.90 corresponds to a crown length kill of 75%. Using this criterion, the marking guideline model correctly predicted mortality for yellow pine trees in the [Hood Study] dataset 96% of the time and correctly predicted survival 50% of the time. In other words, using a Pm of 0.90 (75% crown kill), only 4% of the trees the model predicts will die, actually survived, but 50% of the trees predicted to survive eventually died.... 69 This means that there is a high likelihood of correctly predicting mortality, but a lower likelihood of correctly predicting survival using the 75% crown scorch model, which means that it is much more likely that the Forest Service is leaving trees behind that will later die, than it is taking trees that would have survived. This is directly contrary to Mr. Royce's assertions[.]... The same misinterpretation of the data is true for Mr. Royce's discussion of yellow pine on helicopter and skyline harvest units and all white fir, all of which misinterpret the percentages in Table 3-6 to be something other than what they are—a verification of the accuracy of the marking guideline model using the [Hood Study] dataset. 70 (emphasis in original). 71 Second, Smith responds that Royce estimated the probability that a tree will die based on the percentage volume of crown kill. By contrast, the Hood Study estimated the probability based on the percentage length of crown kill. Therefore, according to Smith, Royce's comparisons are problematic. 72 Third, Smith responds that two of the three other studies upon which Royce relies for his comparison—the studies of Stephens and Finney, and of McHugh and Kolb—are based on prescribed fires. According to Smith, [m]ost often, the objective of a prescribed fire is to limit the mortality of the overstory while reducing fuel loadings and ingrowth of smaller trees. Our model is more appropriate to the type of fire represented by the Freds and Power fires, which killed not only the ingrowth of smaller trees, but also resulted in high levels of crown kill of larger trees. 73 We analyze Smith's three points in turn. First, Smith contends Royce has misunderstood Table 3-6. According to Smith, the percentage figures given for correctly predicted mortality—such as 96% for yellow pine with a minimum of 75% crown length scorch—do not predict the percentage of trees that will die. Rather, these figures predict the accuracy of the prediction of the percentage of these trees that will die. Similarly, according to Smith, the percentage figures for correctly predicted survival—such as 51% for yellow pine with a minimum of 75% crown length scorch—do not predict the percentage of trees that will live. Rather, they predict the accuracy of the prediction of the percentage of these trees that will live. Smith may well be correct. Indeed, it appears from the face of Table 3-6 that she may be, for if the table predicted the percentage of trees that will die or live, as distinct from predicting the accuracy of the predictions of these percentages, the percentages given in the table should add up to 100%. Instead, in the example given for yellow pine with 75% crown length scorch, they add up to 147% (96% plus 51%). 74 But even if Smith is correct, this does not solve the problem. Table 3-6 is, to say the least, misleading. Its title is Probability of Tree Mortality, rather than Probability that Predictions of Probability of Tree Mortality and Survival are Correct. Second, there is no other table in the FEISs providing the probability of tree mortality. The absence of such a table is significant. The single most important aspect of the FEISs is their estimate of the likelihood that trees with certain amounts of fire damage will die. This is so for the obvious reason that the justification for cutting burned or scorched trees is the likelihood that they will die. Any reader of the FEISs will therefore look for a table providing probability of tree mortality. The only table in the FEISs that appears to provide that information is Table 3-6. It is not unforeseeable that a reader—even an expert reader such as Royce—would misunderstand the table. Further, the explanation for Table 3-6 provided by Smith's declaration in the district court is nowhere provided in the FEISs. For example, Attachment A to Smith's declaration is not provided, or even referred to, in the FEISs. The absence of such an explanation in the FEISs obviously increases the chance that the table will be misunderstood. 75 Further, the Royce declaration provides tree mortality percentages given in the draft Hood Study, and he compares those percentages to those given in Table 3-6. The Hood Study percentages provided by Royce are not contested by Smith. (This is not surprising, given that Smith is a co-author of the Hood Study.) The Hood Study mortality percentages are substantially lower than the percentages given in Table 3-6. Yet those percentages are not provided in the text of the FEISs. If the USFS had been truly interested in educating the reader as to the actual percentages of trees likely to die from scorch damage, it would have provided those percentages in the FEISs. Instead, it provided Table 3-6 (entitled Probability of Tree Mortality) giving percentages of correctly predicted mortality. Even if the USFS could properly rely on the draft Hood Study instead of other tree mortality studies—a question we do not here decide—it should have provided the mortality percentage figures in the Hood Study rather than, or in addition to, the figures in Table 3-6. 76 Second, Smith responds that the comparisons used by Royce to estimate tree mortality are based on percentage volume of crown kill rather than percentage length of crown kill. We note initially that Smith's response has no application to the comparison between the percentage numbers given in Table 3-6 and those given in the Hood Study. Both Table 3-6 and the Hood Study were based on the same methodology—correlating percentage length of crown kill with likelihood of tree death. Further, we note that with respect to studies that relied on percentage volume rather than percentage length of crown kill, Royce had explained in his declaration why the FEISs' emphasis on the difference in the two type of crown kill measurements is misleading. He wrote: 77 Tables 3-4 in both the Power and Fred's fire FEIS's show a relationship between these two measures of crown kill in which the volume measure is much larger than the linear measure for the same amount of damage. However, these tables are valid only for young trees with a tapered shape, similar to the classic conical Christmas tree shape shown in figure F-1 of the Powers FEIS or figure A-1 of the Fred's FEIS. Large, mature trees growing in a forest surrounded by other trees have a shape more like a cylinder, tapered only in the topmost branches.... It is to mature trees that the guidelines [in the FEIS's] are to be applied to determine if the trees are dying and hence subject to salvage harvest. In the context of the salvage of mature trees, the inclusion of these tables and figures in the FEIS's is completely misleading. 78 My experience measuring mature trees on the Eldorado-Star fire site ... was that, within the uncertainty with which these determinations can be made in the field, the two measures give the same numerical value for crown kill. 79 Third, Smith responds that two of the three other studies used by Royce for comparison were based on prescribed fires. According to Smith, reliance on these two studies—the Stephens and Finney study and the McHugh and Kolb study—was inappropriate because the Power and Freds Fires resulted in high levels of crown kill of larger trees compared with the levels of crown kill in the prescribed fires. It may well be that, as Smith says, the prescribed fires resulted in lower levels of crown kill in larger trees. But Smith does not explain why that makes a difference. As those two studies are described by Royce, they predict tree mortality based on the actual percentage of crown kill in particular trees. The fact that fewer trees have that degree of crown kill in a prescribed fire should not make any difference in the predicted mortality of those trees that actually have a high level of crown kill. 80 Further, Smith does not mention the third study upon which Royce relies—the Ryan and Reinhardt study. Of the three studies, this one gives the highest probability of tree mortality. Royce explicitly discusses and relies on the Ryan and Reinhardt study in his conclusion that the FEISs overpredict tree mortality. For example, as indicated above, Royce writes with respect to yellow pine, [e]ven if one accepts only the largest of these probabilities of mortality—that given by the Ryan and Reinhardt paper—this still translates into a worst case probability of survival of up to 68% for trees that could be cut[.] 81 We recognize that the FEISs discount two of the studies—those by Stephens and Finney and by Ryan and Reinhardt. The Power and Freds FEISs both discount the Stephens and Finney study on the ground that its purpose was not to provide salvage guidelines, and that some of its data were obtained pre-rather than post-fire. The Powers FEIS discounts the Ryan and Reinhardt study as involving only one of the species (Douglas fir) that occurs in the Power Fire area. The Freds FEIS discounts that study in slightly different terms, stating, [r]esults from the Ryan and Reinhardt 1988 study were obtained mostly for tree species not found in, and geographic regions not related to, the Sierra Nevada. But even if we must discount both of these studies—a question we do not decide—the McHugh and Kolb study remains. That study was not discussed, or discounted, in either of the FEISs. 82 In the end, we conclude that the USFS abused its discretion in its estimates of likely tree mortality in both the Power and Freds FEISs. We will assume, for purposes of our analysis, that the Smith declaration correctly states what the percentage numbers in Table 3-6 really mean. But even if the Smith declaration is correct, Table 3-6 is, for the reasons given above, extremely misleading. A casual, or even a careful, reader of the FEISs and of Table 3-6 could easily conclude that 96% of yellow pine with a minimum of 75% crown length scorch will die, or that 90% with a minimum of 65% crown length scorch will die. If those were, in fact, the percentages of yellow pine with that degree of fire damage that will die, it would be easy to conclude that the USFS is justified in cutting all yellow pine that satisfy those criteria. But those are not the percentages of trees that will die. 83 The Hood Study itself estimates a substantially lower tree mortality than the percentage numbers provided in Table 3-6. The other three studies estimate even lower tree mortalities. It is possible that those who prepared the FEISs, and the Forest Supervisor who signed the RODs based on the FEISs, understood Table 3-6 in the way Royce understood it. If this is so, the USFS abused its discretion, for it failed to take the requisite hard look at the data underlying their analysis and decision. Kern, 284 F.3d at 1066. It is also possible that those who prepared the FEISs, and the Forest Supervisor, understood Table 3-6 in precisely the way Smith described it in her declaration. If this is so, the USFS also abused it discretion, for it failed to reveal the actual percentages upon which it relied and it drafted highly misleading FEISs. Native Ecosystems Council, 418 F.3d at 965. Under the first alternative, the USFS misunderstood the data; under the second, it understood but concealed and misrepresented the data. Under either alternative, it abused its discretion. 84
85 Both the Power and the Freds FEISs state that a goal of the restoration projects is to provide effective ground cover as a means of reducing erosion and stream sedimentation. Both FEISs specify that the average soil cover should be between 50% to 60%. The FEISs propose to achieve this amount of soil coverage by using debris from trees that are logged according to the mortality guidelines discussed above—in their words, by using tops and limbs of dead and dying trees. 86 According to the Power FEIS, there was an average of 11% to 30% ground cover in areas of moderate-severity burns after the fire. There was an average of 0% to 10% ground cover in areas of high-severity burns. The average projected ground cover after needles scorched by the fire had fallen to the ground was estimated to be 51% to 70% in moderate-severity burn areas, and 20% to 30% in high-severity burn areas. According to the Freds FEIS, there was an average of 17% ground cover in moderate-severity burn areas, and an average of 9% in high-severity burn areas. Following needlecast, the projected ground cover was 46% in moderate-severity burn areas, and 19% in high-severity burn areas. 87 Earth Island argues that these figures for soil coverage are based on information obtained in site visits immediately after the fire, and that more recent visits show that effective soil cover already exceeds 50% to 60% in severely burned areas. In support of this argument, Earth Island offers the declaration of Jonathan J. Rhodes. Rhodes has a B.S. in Hydrology and Water Resources from the University of Arizona, and an M.S. in Hydrology and Hydrogeology from the University of Nevada-Reno. He has also finished all required academic work toward a Ph.D. in forest hydrology at the University of Washington. He has had more than twenty-two years of experience as a hydrologist. 88 Rhodes visited what he described as six high-severity burn areas within the Power Fire area on August 11, 2005. He found that needles, twigs, and branches that had fallen since the fire, as well as new vegetative growth, had increased soil cover substantially. He stated in his declaration: 89 I measured soil cover in areas where my visual estimates indicated that soil cover was lowest. Thus, my measurements include those in areas with soil cover that is well below the average within the proposed Power project area as a whole. My measurements and evaluation of soil cover conditions within the areas of the proposed Power logging project unequivocally demonstrate that as of August 11, 2005, soil cover is well-distributed and greater than 60% in the overwhelming majority of areas burned at high severity. In the areas that I measured soil cover, the lowest level of soil cover that I measured was 59%; soil cover in the other five areas measured ranged from 66-91%. Even this lowest level of measured soil cover exceeds the 50% target that Power and Freds FEIS state should be exceeded. 90 Rhodes continued, [b]ased on conditions within the area, it is unquestionable that soil cover from [conifer regeneration, and needles, branches, and logs from burned trees] will continue to steadily increase over the next several years. He concluded, there is not a pressing need to try to increase soil cover via logging in order to reduce soil erosion. This is especially true because logging always causes increased soil damage and elevated erosion. (emphasis in original). 91 The USFS responded with a declaration by Jeffrey TenPas. TenPas has a M.S. in Soil Science from the University of California, Davis. He is an employee of the USFS. He has had more than fifteen years of experience in soil science. TenPas assessed soil cover immediately after the Power Fire. He then revisited the Power Fire area on August 19, 2005, after reading the Rhodes declaration. TenPas wrote, [c]ontrary to Mr. Rhodes findings, portions of the high severity burned areas in the Power Project area have existing ground cover much less than 50%. He suggested that Rhodes might have been examining a more moderately burned area that received significant needle cast, rather than a high-severity burn area. TenPas stated: 92 The pattern of recovery [in the Power Project area] was consistent with expectations. Needle cast had provided adequate ground cover in low and moderate severity burned areas. Bear clover, where it was present, covered an estimated 0 to 70% cover at the scale of 200 transects. In high severity burned areas, bear clover was the predominant component in vegetative recovery in areas I visited. Various forbs provided a trace to 5% cover. In high severity burned areas without bear clover, ground cover was as low as 1%, that from a trace of needles. 93 He concluded, [i]n sum, my observations indicate that there remain portions of high severity burned areas where soil cover is deficient.... Timber harvest can contribute additional cover in these areas. 94 As in Earth Island, we conclude that [a]t this stage, the record does not allow us to conclude that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in relying on its own data and discounting the alternative evidence offered by the Plaintiffs. Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1302. This is especially so in light of the deference given to the reasonable opinions of [an agency's] own experts. Id. at 1301. 95
96 Both the Power and Freds FEISs state that a goal of the restoration projects is to reduce fuel loading on the ground so as to reduce the risk of future catastrophic fires, and to avoid safety hazards to workers and recreation visitors. Specifically, the Power FEIS rejected an alternative that would have retained four large snags per acre outside PACs for the California spotted owl. The Freds FEIS rejected an alternative that would have retained four to eight large snags per acre outside PACs. Earth Island challenges the FEISs' rejection of these alternatives, arguing that retaining this number of large snags would not impede the goals of reducing long-term fuel loading and safety hazards. 97 According to the Power FEIS, in areas where four large snags per acre would be retained, fuel levels 25 years after the fire would be approximately 38 to 40 tons per acre. According to the Freds FEIS, in areas where four to eight snags per acre would be retained, fuel loads would be 16 to 50 tons per acre by year 25. The USFS contends that these levels of fuel loading would provide significant fuel, contribute to severe soil heating, and impede effective fire suppression efforts. 98 As with soil cover, above, we cannot confidently discern from the present record whether Earth Island's contentions about fuel-loading have validity. We therefore cannot say, at this point, that the USFS has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting the alternatives that would have retained four snags per acre in the Power Fire area and four to eight snags per acre in the Freds Fire area. 99
100 Earth Island argues that the USFS has failed to take a hard look at the effects of the Power and Freds Projects on the California spotted owl. The California spotted owl was identified as a species at risk in the 2001 Framework. Species at risk are those with a high level of concern whose ranges are not peripheral to the Sierra Nevada and that occur in old forest ecosystems. As reported in the 2004 Supplement, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) declared in February 2003 that the California spotted owl would not be listed as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act because there was no definite evidence that the population is decreasing across its range, and various analytical results of the individual study areas are not wholly supportive of conclusions regarding declines in any given study area. 101 However, because changes in the Sierra Nevada Framework could affect the California spotted owl, the FWS has stated that it will continue to monitor the owl. Within the last year, the FWS issued a 90-day finding under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)(A), as a prelude to a possible determination that the California spotted owl should be listed under the Act. 90-Day on a Petition to List the California Spotted Owl as Threatened or Endangered, 70 Fed.Reg. 35,607 (June 21, 2005). The FWS stated that the petition presents substantial scientific or commercial evidence that listing the species may be warranted. Id. The FWS is currently engaged in a 12-month review of the California spotted owl as required by 16 U.S.C. § 4(b)(3)(B). Id. Among the factors prompting the 12 month review was the 2004 Supplement, as well as new evidence concerning the effects of fires on the owls. Id. at 35,612. 102 Under the 2004 Supplement, PACs for California spotted owls must be maintained regardless of actual occupancy by owls. After a stand-replacing event such as a major fire, habitat conditions within a 1.5-mile radius around the PAC must be evaluated in order to identify opportunities for re-mapping a destroyed or diminished PAC. Only if there is insufficient suitable habitat for designating a PAC within this 1.5-mile radius can a PAC be delisted. 103 Earth Island argues that the FEISs allow for excessive cutting of trees that would otherwise survive in areas used by California spotted owls, do not adequately take into account studies showing the owls' use of already-burned areas, allow the creation of isolated islands of habitat, and fail to retain sufficient numbers of large snags for use by owls. Earth Island relies upon the declaration of Monica Bond, who has a B.A. in Biology from Duke University and an M.S. in Wildlife Science from Oregon State University. She is the lead author of two peer reviewed studies of the California spotted owl published in 2002 and 2004. Bond contends that the Power and Fred Projects will have significant negative effects on the California spotted owl by substantially reducing the amount of potential foraging habitat within the project sites, by a) utilizing inaccurate mortality guidelines (see Declaration of Edwin Royce) which incorrectly categorize some areas withing the Power and Fred's project areas as high-severity burn (and thus unsuitable for owls) when they are in fact live tree areas available to the owl for foraging purposes; b) ignoring significant new scientific information which indicates that spotted owls actually utilize forests burned at even high severities; c) by allowing pockets of forest unburned or burned at low- to moderate severity within a severe burn area to become isolated islands of habitat and reducing their value to the spotted owl; and d) failing to maintain large snags throughout the areas designated to be logged, for recruitment as legacy trees when the forest regenerates in the future. In addition, these projects call for extensive clearcut logging of habitat elements important to spotted owls (large trees and snags) within currently occupied spotted owl Protected Activity Centers (PACs) and Home Range Core Areas (HRCAs). All of these activities will result in the loss of potentially critical foraging grounds that are necessary to maintain the population of California spotted owls in the Eldorado National Forest. 104 The USFS responds with a declaration by Chuck Loffland, a wildlife biologist employed by the USFS. Loffland does not describe his academic background. He states that he has been conducting surveys of the California spotted owl and performing analyses of effects on the owl since 1989. He concedes that it appears from the few studies cited by Ms. Bond that owls may use burned habitat to some degree, but that the scope and duration of that use are not well studied or well understood. He notes that Bond herself states that more scientific study is needed. He states further: 105 Ms. Bond claims that most or all of the PACs will be clearcut.... This is simply untrue. First, there will be no salvage activity within suitable habitat. For the non-core (unsuitable) portion of PACs within the Power project area, salvage will only remove hazard trees and trees that are dead with 100% crown kill in excess of the 4 largest size class snags per acre retained. This will leave behind 4 large snags/acre and all trees that have any green needles and even a remote chance of surviving.... Although Ms. Bond characterizes project activity in the PACs as wholly detrimental to the owl, the Forest Service decided to remove dead and hazard trees from non-core PAC areas in order to provide protection against stand-destroying fire. (emphasis in original). 106 Loffland also disputes some of Bond's characterizations of the logging that will take place within specified PACs. 107 According to the Power FEIS, there were approximately 5,880 acres of suitable owl habitat before the Power Fire; this habitat was reduced to 2,750 acres as a result of the fire. Ten PACs were in the Power Fire area before the fire. One was not affected by the fire and no treatment was proposed; one was burned at high and moderate intensity, and the USFS determined that not enough suitable habitat remained to support a PAC; and the boundaries of the remaining eight were redrawn to encompass the best remaining habitat within a 1.5 mile radius of the center of the area. Within seven of these redrawn PACs, the USFS determined that certain areas were unsuitable for spotted owl habitat (deemed non-core areas) and that salvage logging in these non-core areas could proceed, but leaving standing the four largest snags (dead trees) per acre. No logging is permitted within the core, or suitable habitat, areas of any PAC. 108 An analysis of the direct effects of the Power Project was limited to the area that currently remains suitable for nesting or foraging. Because no logging is allowed in core areas, the Power FEIS notes that any direct effects would be limited to hazard zone areas, meaning roads, power line corridors, and the fire flume. Thus, the potential direct effects were limited to the removal of roadside hazard trees on 295 acres of key habitat within PACs. In addition, the Power Project is estimated to affect 660 acres of the 10,560 total suitable HRCA acres that are within or adjacent to the Power Project area. 109 In discussing the indirect effects, the Power FEIS states that in high- and moderate-intensity burn areas in HRCAs, the largest 5.8 snags per acre will be retained, but that salvage harvesting will proceed according to the tractor-harvesting mortality guidelines. The cumulative effects analysis in the Power FEIS focused on logging activities proposed for 540 acres of private land within the Power Fire area and 873 acres of private land outside the area; on a project to thin trees in order to reduce fuel loads; and on the planned replanting of 700 acres of burned plantation areas. 110 The Power FEIS states that the effect of the Power Project may be to reduce the quality of owl habitat, but that the project would not reduce the overall amount of owl habitat. The Power FEIS predicts that to the extent the Power Project increases future fire resiliency, it may have the effect of increasing the amount of available habitat in the long run. It concludes that there would be no trend resulting in the federal listing of the California spotted owl as an endangered species. 111 In the Freds Fire area, all or portions of three spotted owl PACs were present before the fire. One PAC burned at high and moderate intensity, and the USFS determined that insufficient habitat remained to support this PAC. The boundaries of the remaining two PACs were redrawn to encompass the best 1.5 miles of habit surrounding the center of the area. The Freds FEIS proposed logging in non-core areas of the redrawn PACs. 112 According to the Freds FEIS, approximately 3,255 acres of suitable owl habitat existed on both national forest and private land before the Freds Fire. After the fire, only 285 suitable acres remained in areas of low-intensity burn, while approximately 1,848 acres remained in areas of moderate- and high-intensity burn. In addition, some 332 acres of green trees are scattered across the moderate- and high-intensity burn areas. 113 According to the direct and indirect effects analysis in the Freds FEIS, no logging would take place in core areas within the PACs; no logging would be proposed in areas of low-intensity burn; and hardwoods and green trees would not be harvested in areas of moderate- and high-intensity burn. The FEIS also notes that while the 332 acres of remaining scattered green trees provide some post-fire habitat for the owls, suitability in those 332 acres would likely be reduced over time as more fire-weakened trees die. Dead trees lose foliage and therefore would reduce canopy closure to levels below what is preferred by owls. 114 The USFS argues that it adopted a conservative approach to logging in both FEISs in order to ensure that the California spotted owl is protected. It points to the fact that it assumed the presence of owls in PACs pending the completion of surveys. It also argues that it considered the information concerning the owl's use of post-fire habitat and determined that the findings were too inconclusive to affect its impact analysis. 115 We have elsewhere interpreted the hard look requirement as entailing both a complete discussion of relevant issues as well as meaningful statements regarding the actual impact of proposed projects. In Native Ecosystems Council, we held that where an EIS used a calculation for determining the summer range of elk herd that was inconsistent with a specific requirement contained in the regional forest plan, the USFS had not taken a hard look because it did not provide a full and fair discussion of the potential effects of the project . . . and did not inform decision-makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts [to the elk at issue]. 418 F.3d at 965(internal quotations and alterations omitted). Likewise, in Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Bureau of Land Management, 387 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir.2004), we held that an environmental assessment (EA) did not take a hard look at the cumulative impacts of a proposed action where the EA had sections devoted to discussing direct, cumulative, and foreseeable actions, but gave no objective or qualified assessment of the combined environmental impacts of the information presented. Most recently, we concluded that where an EIS stated without meaningful explanation that a post-fire salvage project would have a negative impact on black-backed woodpeckers but would not result in a trend toward federal listing, this did not constitute a hard look. Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir.2005). 116 In Earth Island, Earth Island claimed that the FEIS for the Star Fire Restoration Project did not adequately analyze the cumulative impact of the project's destruction of an HRCA on the California spotted owl. Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1306-07. While the FEIS in Earth Island had acknowledged that spotted owls exhibit high site fidelity and that a pair of owls had returned to the project area, it never assessed the potential role of the remaining suitable habitat within the former HRCA for a maintained [PAC] despite the acknowledged presence of owls in the area. Id. at 1307. For this reason, we held that the omission amounts to an insufficient consideration of cumulative impact under NEPA. Id. 117 We conclude that the Power and Freds FEISs have not taken the requisite hard look at the effects of the two projects on the California spotted owl. We concluded above that the FEISs did not adequately analyze probable tree mortality. The likely consequence of the apparent overprediction of tree mortality is excessive logging. This likely excessive logging, in turn, is likely to produce adverse effects on the California spotted owl that are not adequately analyzed in the FEISs. 118 Further, it is likely that the projects will substantially reduce potential foraging habitat because the FEISs' designation of non-core areas, where logging will occur, is based upon the USFS's determination that because these areas were heavily burned they are not likely to be suitable owl habitat. According to Bond—both in her declaration and in her published work—the California spotted owl uses burned areas for foraging in the short-term, and these areas may also provide important benefits in the long-term. 119 The FEISs cannot assume that simply because the owl habitat studies are preliminary, the adverse impacts discussed therein will not occur. Rather, the FEISs must respond explicitly and directly to conflicting views in order to satisfy NEPA's procedural requirements. By removing trees that might survive in areas it assumes to be unsuitable for California spotted owl habitat, the FEISs allow logging in what could well be suitable habitat. The FEISs do not explain in any detail how their determinations that habitat was unsuitable were made, and do not investigate or analyze how redrawing the boundaries of the PACs and HRCAs might negatively impact the owls. We therefore conclude that the FEISs do not satisfy the requirement under NEPA that the agency take a hard look and that there be a full and fair discussion allowing informed public participation and informed decision-making. 120