Opinion ID: 220347
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Suppress Henness's Statements to the Police

Text: Henness contends that the police obtained a statement from him in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Because he raised this claim on direct appeal, there is no procedural default issue. The state court reached the merits and AEDPA deference applies. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007). When detectives first interviewed Henness, they advised him of his rights, and he executed a standard waiver form. They questioned him about forgeries of checks and credit cards belonging to Myers. For three hours, Henness freely answered questions. When the detectives began to question him about the murder, however, Henness stated, I think I need a lawyer because if I tell everything I know, how do I know I'm not going to wind up with a complicity charge? A detective responded, If you don't talk to us, you're going to get a lot more than a complicity charge. At that time, the detectives terminated the interview. While incarcerated after his arrest, Henness periodically made phone calls to a friend, Teresa Thomas. Thomas recorded the conversations and provided them to police. During one of these conversations, Henness stated that, if detectives would come and see [me], [I] would tell them all about it. Based on this statement, detectives interviewed Henness a second time. Prior to the interview, the police gave Henness Miranda warnings and Henness waived his constitutional rights. He then acknowledged that Fair was not involved in Myers's murders, as Henness had previously indicated. Henness also admitted being with Myers on the day of his death, but claimed that a group of Cubans were to blame for the murder. He suggested that the Cubans targeted Henness to settle a drug score, but killed Myers instead. The Ohio Supreme Court found that Henness's statement, I think I need a lawyer, was not an unambiguous request for counsel. It found the statement similar to the one in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 455, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), and held that the first written waiver remained effective when the officers resumed their interrogation of Henness six days later. The court did not rule on the question of whether the second interrogation was initiated by Henness. Henness challenges the Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion, and maintains that his statement to police was a clear invocation of his right to counsel. He argues that he terminated the first interview by making that request, and did not reinitiate the second interview during his telephone conversations with Thomas. The decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), requires the police to immediately cease questioning a suspect if he invokes the right to counsel at any time. However, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350. Thus, a suspect invoking his right to counsel during custodial interrogation must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Id. In Davis, the phrase, Maybe I should talk to a lawyer, was not an unambiguous request for counsel. Id. at 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350 ([W]e are unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer.). Pursuant to Davis, the Fourth Circuit held that the statement, I think I need a lawyer, was not an unequivocal request for counsel. Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 198 (4th Cir.2000). The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion with the similar phrase, I think I would like to talk to a lawyer. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069-72 (9th Cir. 2003). Under Davis and its progeny, the Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion that Henness failed to unambiguously invoke his right to counsel is not an unreasonable application of federal law. See Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933. Even if Henness's statement is construed as an unambiguous request for counsel, the police properly interrogated Henness because he reinitiated the conversation. An Edwards reinitiation occurs when, without influence by the authorities, the suspect shows a willingness and a desire to talk about his case. United States v. Whaley, 13 F.3d 963, 967 (6th Cir.1994). In Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411 (6th Cir.2007) (en banc), we examined how Edwards applies to third-party communications. We determined that a suspect's willingness to speak to the authorities is not restricted to direct communication only, and a suspect can communicate a willingness and a desire to talk with police through a third person. Id. at 418; see also Owens v. Bowersox, 290 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir.2002) (It was not unreasonable for the state court to hold that a defendant may evince a willingness and desire to discuss the crime by communicating with the police through a third party, especially a close relative.); United States v. Michaud, 268 F.3d 728, 737-38 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that officers had the right to inquire whether a suspect was reinitiating communication when her cell-mate told a deputy she wanted to talk); United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315, 1323-24 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that the suspect initiated discussions with police through his wife). Henness's statement to Thomas reflected a willingness to further discuss the case with the police. As a result, the officers did not violate Henness's Fifth Amendment rights by interviewing him a second time. [2]