Opinion ID: 530736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Merger of Convictions on Substantive Counts

Text: 47 Escruceria was convicted on six counts of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and six counts of distribution of cocaine. He argues that if the evidence was sufficient to sustain all twelve of these convictions, this court must nonetheless vacate the convictions on the possession counts and merge them with the distribution counts for sentencing purposes. 48 Escruceria bases this argument on United States v. Atkinson, 512 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir.1975). Atkinson held that where the defendant's possession of narcotics was not shown to exist separately from the moment at which the heroin was distributed, the possession and distribution counts had to merge. 512 F.2d at 1240. Atkinson, however, limited its ruling to the limited factual situation present in that case, and the court specifically declined to reach the question of multiple sentencing under other situations which may or may not arise. Id. Clearly, Atkinson, did nothing more than establish a rule that consecutive sentences for possession and distribution may not be imposed where the only evidence of possession is possession at the time of distribution. See United States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256, 1259 (5th Cir.1985). 49 The evidence produced at trial demonstrated that Gutierrez took possession of one kilo of cocaine on six separate occasions. Each time he stashed the kilo for a period of time before distributing it. The distribution of the cocaine was made in small amounts, to a number of people, over a period of time. Because the possession of the drug was in fact separate from the subsequent acts of distribution, each of these acts was properly subject to consecutive sentences.