Opinion ID: 1805283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Survival of the Estate's Other Tort Claims

Text: In their summary-judgment motion, the Cadaret defendants argued that the estate's tort claims were barred by § 6-5-462, Ala.Code 1975, because, according to them, those claims accrued before Rowena died. Section 6-5-462 provides: In all proceedings not of an equitable nature, all claims upon which an action has been filed and all claims upon which no action has been filed on a contract, express or implied, and all personal claims upon which an action has been filed, except for injuries to the reputation, survive in favor of and against personal representatives; and all personal claims upon which no action has been filed survive against the personal representative of a deceased tortfeasor. Thus, as to tort claims accruing before the death of the would-be plaintiff, [t]he general rule is that under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-462, an unfiled tort claim does not survive the death of the person with the claim. Malcolm v. King, 686 So.2d 231, 236 (Ala.1996). Gaynell contends that the tort claims she filed on behalf of Rowena's estate with regard to the Lord Abbett IRA survived Rowena's death because, she says, injury did not occur, and thus the claims did not accrue ( see City of Birmingham v. Leberte, 773 So.2d 440, 444 n. 1 (Ala.2000)), during Rowena's life. Instead, according to Gaynell, actual injury occurred after Rowena's death when Mrs. Van Hoof made her claim as the beneficiary of the account in February 2003 and the account was transferred to her, and again when, following Mrs. Van Hoof's eventual disclaimer of the proceeds of the account, Lord Abbett for a period of time refused to transfer the [Lord Abbett] IRA or allow Gaynell to access the funds. In the trial court, however, Gaynell asserted in response to the Cadaret defendants' summary-judgment motion that injury from naming Mrs. Van Hoof as the beneficiary of the Lord Abbett IRA via the forged designation-of-beneficiary form occurred, at least in part, at the time of the forged beneficiary designation, before the death of Rowena A. Van Hoof. (Gaynell argued to the trial court that additional injuries regarding the Lord Abbett IRA occurred after Rowena's death as well.) A cause of action accrues at the time the complained-of action first gives rise to injury, even if the full extent of the injury is not apparent at the time. See Leberte, 773 So.2d at 444 n. 1. Because Gaynell's representations to the trial court indicated that the tort claims she filed on behalf of the estate with regard to the Lord Abbett IRA accrued before Rowena died, she invited the trial court to conclude that those claims did not survive Rowena's death but, instead, were barred by § 6-5-462. Gaynell cannot now argue that those claims related to the Lord Abbett IRA accrued only after Rowena died and therefore survived her death. See Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So.2d 801, 808 (Ala.2003) (The law is well settled that a party may not induce an error by the trial court and then attempt to win a reversal based on that error. `A party may not predicate an argument for reversal on invited error, that is, error into which he has led or lulled the trial court.'). As to the Scudder account, however, we conclude that the trial court did err to reversal in entering a summary judgment against the estate on its non-Securities-Act tort claims. Summary judgment was not appropriate on the basis of § 6-5-462 with regard to those claims as they relate to the Scudder account. Although the record reflects that two checks representing the entire amount of the Scudder account were drawn on the Scudder account before Rowena's death, the record is not clear as to when those checks were paid and the funds they represented actually withdrawn from the Scudder account, such that Rowena or her estate actually suffered injury. See Blair v. Davis, 281 So.2d 247, 248-49 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1973). Thus, the record does not disclose whether the Cadaret defendants' actions regarding the Scudder account resulted in injury before or after Rowena's death, and, as a result, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the causes of action related to the Scudder account accrued before or after Rowena's death. The bar contained in § 6-5-462 is an affirmative defense because it is a defense that raises a new matter and that would be a defense even if the relevant allegations in the plaintiff's complaint were true. See Patterson v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 903 So.2d 769, 779 (Ala.2004). Because it was an affirmative defense, the Cadaret defendants were required to present substantial evidence in support of it in order to be entitled to a summary judgment based thereon. See Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d 903, 909 (Ala. 1999). The fact that the record does not disclose when the cause of action related to the Scudder account accrued indicates that the Cadaret defendants failed to do so. The summary judgment therefore was not appropriate as to the causes of action related to the Scudder account on the basis of the Cadaret defendants' § 6-5-462 argument.