Opinion ID: 867991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: A nonpermanent resident alien may receive cancellation of removal if she: (A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; (B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title [except in a case described in section 1227(a)(7) of this title where the Attorney General exercises discretion to grant a waiver]; and (D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). As noted, the BIA determined that Ms. Gurrola failed to establish the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” required under the statute. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), this court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary finding that an alien “has failed to demonstrate that removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Sabido Valdivia v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1144, 1148 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).1 Consequently, this court may not review the BIA’s discretionary hardship decision. This court does, however, have jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law” presented in a petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). To 1 This court ordered the parties to brief the jurisdictional issue. -3- obtain review of the BIA’s denial of her application for cancellation of removal, Ms. Gurrola must present a “substantial constitutional issue” for our review. Alvarez-Delmuro v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). In an attempt to circumvent the jurisdictional bar of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), Ms. Gurrola argues that the BIA violated her due-process rights by failing to follow its own precedential decisions.2 But she argues merely that her circumstances demonstrated exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as compared to other BIA cases, and that if the agency had correctly evaluated the evidence, it would have granted her application for cancellation of removal. This does not state a due-process claim. “In order to make out a claim for a violation of due process, a claimant must have a liberty or property interest in the outcome of the proceedings. But in immigration proceedings, a petitioner has no liberty or property interest in obtaining purely discretionary relief.” Arambula-Medina v. Holder, 572 F.3d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Aliens are entitled only to “the minimal procedural due process rights [of] an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. at 828 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Gurrola “has not argued that [she] was deprived of these minimal procedural safeguards. Thus, [she] has not asserted a non-frivolous constitutional claim sufficient to give [this court] jurisdiction.” 2 Ms. Gurrola also mentions “equal protection” together with her due-process claim. See, e.g., Aplt. Jurisdictional Br. at 6, 11. She has not presented an argument to support an equal protection claim, so we do not address such a claim. -4- Salgado-Toribio v. Holder, __ F.3d __, No. 12-9578, 2013 WL 1731220, at  (10th Cir. Apr. 23, 2013).