Opinion ID: 6334217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The March 27, 2018 Work Stoppage

Text: On the morning of March 27, 2018, five days after the parties’ first bargaining session, approximately twenty workers gathered in Noah’s Ark’s cafeteria rather than starting their shift on the production line. They asked to speak with their supervisor, seeking answers about rumors that Noah’s Ark was paying newer workers higher wages than senior workers, in violation of the holdover CBA’s pay scale.3 Operations Manager Paul Hernandez met with the workers. Bilingual Union Steward Guadalupe Ortiz spoke for the workers. Hernandez told the workers “you guys either go to work, 3 Rates of pay are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Like most mandatory subjects of bargaining, the rates of pay in an expired CBA are among “the terms and conditions of employment [that] are not subject to unilateral change [by the employer after expiration], in order to protect the statutory right to bargain.” Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 206 (1991); see NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). However, of significance here, “in recognition of the statutory right to strike, no-strike clauses are excluded from the unilateral change doctrine.” Litton, 501 U.S. at 199. Thus, the employees in question were not contractually bound not to engage in a strike or work stoppage. -5- leave now, or you’re terminated.” Some returned to work. Ten went to the parking lot, where plant manager Mike Helzer told them they could work the rest of their shift and discuss their concerns with him at the end of the day. The workers refused to return to work. Helzer threatened to call the police and Hernandez asked them to turn in their ID badges. Some workers went to the Union hall and filed a grievance, which the Union supported. Three days later, Noah’s Ark submitted separation notices for the ten employees, citing voluntary resignation (“Job Abandonment”) and involuntary termination (“Violation of company policy”) as reasons for separation. Citing Atlantic Scaffolding Co., 356 N.L.R.B. 835 (2011), a case involving a work stoppage by employees not represented by a union, as “directly on point,” the ALJ found that the ten employees’ “concerted work stoppage to protest wage disparities and demand increases to address the disparities” was protected activity, and therefore Noah’s Ark violated Section 8(a)(1) when it threatened and then terminated them. In its exceptions to the ALJ’s finding, Noah’s Ark proffered three alternative arguments, two of which are briefly repeated in opposing the Board’s Application to Enforce. Those two arguments require little discussion. First, Noah’s Ark argues the workers were not fired at all; they voluntarily abandoned their jobs. However, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding the workers were fired. Noah’s Ark managers told the employees to go home if they would not work, required them to turn in their ID badges, and threatened to call the police if they did not leave. “It is sufficient if the words or action of the employer would logically lead a prudent person to believe his or her tenure has been terminated.” Nations Rent, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 179, 179-80 (2004) (cleaned up), quoting NLRB v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., 327 F.3d 841, 843 (8th Cir. 1964). There is no evidence the employees intended to abandon their employment. Second, Noah’s Ark argues that, even if the employees were fired, there was no Section § 8(a)(1) violation because the Board’s General Counsel failed to prove -6- that the terminations were motivated by protected activity (typically anti-union animus), applying the Board’s test when an employer’s motive is at issue. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced on other grounds, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); see generally Tschiggfrie Properties, Ltd. v. NLRB, 896 F.3d 880, 885-87 (8th Cir. 2018). We agree with the Board that, where “employees are terminated for engaging in a protected concerted work stoppage, Wright Line is not the appropriate analysis, as the existence of the 8(a)(1) violation does not turn on the employer’s motive.” Atlantic Scaffolding Co., 356 N.L.R.B. at 838. Discharging employees for participating in a lawful strike violates Section 8(a)(1) regardless of the employer’s motive. Here, it is undisputed that the ten employees were terminated because of their unauthorized work stoppage. This conclusion brings us to Noah’s Ark’s third argument, which is the nub of whether to enforce this portion of the Board’s order -- was the unauthorized work stoppage concerted activity protected by Section 7 of the NLRA? As a general matter, the NLRA protects strikes,4 recognizing that a strike is one collective way for employees not represented by a union to pressure their employer to bargain collectively. As the Supreme Court said in NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960), “the use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute . . . is part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining.” Thus, if the employees in question had not been represented by the Union, their collective work stoppage to protest Noah’s Ark’s failure to abide by its wage rate promises in the holdover CBA would be lawful protected activity, absent violence or a contractual obligation not to strike. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (work stoppage protesting cold work conditions protected); JCR Hotel, Inc. v. NLRB, 342 F.3d 837, 840-41 (8th Cir. 2003) (walkout to protest work conditions). 4 Section 13 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 163, provides that “[n]othing in this [Act] . . . except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.” -7- In this case, however, the employees were represented by a Union that was engaged in collective bargaining for a successor CBA and which did not authorize the employees’ spontaneous work stoppage. In its Brief in Support of Exceptions to the ALJ’s Decision, Noah’s Ark argued: [W]hen employees designate and join a union, the union is given the exclusive right to collectively bargain with their employer concerning the terms and conditions of work. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Therefore, when employees go on strike without union authorization, they are engaging in an illegal, unauthorized work stoppage under the NLRA. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (holding that wildcat strikers are bargaining separately and are therefore not protected by the NLRA). In rejecting this argument, the Board majority concluded, applying its prior decision in Silver State: “Unlike in Emporium Capwell, the strikers here did not seek to circumvent the Union and bargain separately with [Noah’s Ark], and the Union did not oppose the strikers’ work stoppage.” Dec. & Order p.2 n.8. The dissenting member argued, “my colleagues have misapplied the Silver State test.” Dec. & Order p.9. Noah’s Ark urges us to adopt the dissenting member’s analysis.5 The Supreme Court’s decision in Emporium Capwell confirmed that collective strikes or work stoppages by employees without their union’s prior authorization must be analyzed in the context of Section 9 of the NLRA, which provides that a 5 We reject as clearly contrary to the administrative record the Board’s assertion that Noah’s Ark failed to preserve this issue under Section 10(e). Its Exceptions to the ALJ’s decision relied on Emporium Capwell to argue the work stoppage was unprotected by Section 7. The Board responded to this argument with an analysis based on its Silver State decision, which the General Counsel had not even cited in responding to the Exceptions. Noah’s Ark plainly “apprised the Board that it intended to press the question now presented to us.” NLRB v. Monson Trucking, Inc., 204 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). -8- properly-elected union serves as the “exclusive representative[]” of the employees in negotiating the terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). In Emporium Capwell, a group of unionized department store workers picketed the store, demanding to bargain with their employer regarding issues of racial discrimination the union preferred to address through CBA grievance procedures. The union’s secretary-treasurer urged the employees to rely on the grievance process, and the employer warned the employees they might be fired if their picketing and public statements continued. When the employees repeated these activities, two were fired. 420 U.S. at 52-56. The Board’s General Counsel filed a Section 8(a)(1) complaint, which the Board rejected, concluding the employees actions were not concerted activity protected by Section 7 because “protection of such an attempt to bargain would undermine the statutory system of bargaining through an exclusive, elected representative.” Id. at 58. The court of appeals reversed because “concerted activity directed against racial discrimination enjoys a ‘unique status’ by virtue of” Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. It first noted that the rights guaranteed by Section 7 are collective rights, “protected not for their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.” Id. at 62 (quotations omitted). Both the employer and the union as exclusive bargaining representative “have strong and legitimate objections to bargaining on several fronts over the implementation of the right to be free of [racial] discrimination.” Id. at 70. Accordingly, the dissident employees’ actions demanding to bargain separately from their union were not protected by Section 7, and their termination did not violate Section 8(a)(1). In the nearly fifty years since Emporium Capwell was decided, the Board and reviewing courts have agreed that decision did not “strip the NLRA’s protection from all wildcat strikes.” CC1 Ltd. P’ship v. NLRB, 898 F.3d 26, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2018). -9- Rather, a case-by-case analysis is needed to determine whether a particular concerted work stoppage is protected by Section 7. See, e.g., E. Chicago Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 397, 400-03 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1065 (1984); NLRB v. Bridgeport Ambulance Serv., 966 F.2d 725, 729 (2d Cir. 1992). The Board addressed this issue in Silver State, though only the concurring member discussed Emporium Capwell in detail. 326 N.L.R.B. at 85 n.8, 103-104. Silver State involved a work stoppage that allegedly violated the no-strike clause of an unexpired CBA, but its analysis has been extended to other contexts, including unauthorized work stoppages. See, e.g., CC1 Ltd. P’ship, 898 F.3d at 30. In Silver State, the employer terminated a garbage truck driver who had served as president of an employee committee that picketed the employer’s headquarters to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the employer and their union. A few days later, the truck driver arrived to pick up his last paycheck and began speaking about his termination. A crowd of employees gathered outside the facility, refused to begin their shift, and gathered in a nearby vacant lot when police arrived and directed them to leave the facility. When a supervisor appealed to them to return to work, the employees attempted to comply but were turned away by the employer’s security staff; 71 were then terminated for an unauthorized work stoppage. The employees grieved their termination; the union met with the employer to urge their reinstatement. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded that Emporium Capwell did not apply because, while the committee’s earlier picketing was inconsistent with the union’s exclusive representation, the later work stoppage was “exclusively related to the termination of Crockett and the processing of his grievance.” 326 NLRB at 104. The ALJ found the work stoppage unprotected under the CBA’s no-strike clause but condoned by the employer. Therefore, the termination violated Section 8(a)(1). Reaching the same result by a different path, the Board found that the employer “has not established that the work stoppage violated the no-strike clause” and therefore “the employees did not lose the protection of the Act.” Id. at 85. The panel majority -10- adopted the ALJ’s Emporium Capwell analysis in a footnote. Id. at 85 n.8. Chairman Gould, concurring, addressed this issue at length: [Prior Board decisions] proceed on the assumption that, if there is an identity or similarity of objectives between the union and individual employees, an unauthorized stoppage is protected under the Act. . . . This approach . . . is both naive and misguided.