Opinion ID: 6325455
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: r.c. 2953.21(k)

Text: {¶ 42} R.C. 2953.21 authorizes a convicted person to challenge his conviction or sentence by filing a petition for postconviction relief. R.C. 2953.21(K) provides that except for an appeal, “the remedy set forth in [R.C. 2953.21] is the exclusive remedy by which a person may bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case.” The state argues that a motion for a new trial is a “collateral challenge,” so Bethel’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial is improper and must be treated as a successive postconviction petition— which as just discussed, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain. {¶ 43} The state argues that the issue is whether a motion for a new trial filed under Crim.R. 33 is a “collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case,” R.C. 2953.21(K). The term “collateral challenge” is not defined by statute, so we must determine what that term meant when the exclusive-remedy provision was enacted. See State v. Black, 142 Ohio St.3d 332, 2015-Ohio-513, 30 N.E.3d 918, ¶ 39 (“In the absence of a definition of a word or phrase used in a statute, words are to be given their common, ordinary, and accepted meaning”). The exclusive-remedy provision of R.C. 2953.21 was first enacted in 1995. See former R.C. 2953.21(I), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 4, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7815, 7825. {¶ 44} Black’s Law Dictionary 261 (6th Ed.1990) defined a similar term, “collateral attack”: With respect to a judicial proceeding, an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it. May v. Casker, 188 Okla. 446, 110 P.2d 287, 289. An attack on a 15 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO judgment in any manner other than by action or proceeding, whose very purpose is to impeach or overturn the judgment; or, stated affirmatively, a collateral attack on a judgment is an attack made by or in an action or proceeding that has an independent purpose other than impeaching or overturning the judgment. Travis v. Travis’ Estate, 79 Wyo. 329, 344 P.2d 508, 510. By comparison, “direct attack” was defined as an attempt, for sufficient cause, to have it annulled, reversed, vacated, corrected, declared void, or enjoined, in a proceeding instituted for that specific purpose, such as an appeal, writ of error, bill of review, or injunction to restrain its execution; distinguished from a collateral attack, which is an attempt to impeach the validity or binding force of the judgment or decree as a side issue or in a proceeding instituted for some other purpose. Ernell v. O’Fiel, Tex.Civ.App., 441 S.W.2d 653, 655. A direct attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to void or correct it in some manner provided by law. Id. at 459. These definitions show that a motion for a new trial is not a collateral challenge—a motion for a new trial is an attempt to void or correct the judgment as provided by law under Crim.R. 33. Bethel’s motion for leave, which Bethel filed in his criminal case, is not prohibited under R.C. 2953.21(K) and is permitted under Crim.R. 33. See State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 2002-Ohio-3993, 773 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 13 (stating that a motion to withdraw a plea filed under Crim.R. 32.1 is not a collateral challenge, because it is filed in the underlying criminal case and attacks the withdrawal of the plea). The state’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. 16 January Term, 2022 {¶ 45} The state first suggests that Bethel’s motion constitutes a collateral challenge simply because it was filed many years after his conviction and sentence. The state points to State v. Frase, 87 Ohio St.3d 1412, 717 N.E.2d 345 (1999), in which this court referred to a motion for leave to file an untimely motion for a new trial as “a civil, post-conviction matter.” And it points to State v. Cowan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108394, 2020-Ohio-666, ¶ 9, citing State v. McConnell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24315, 2011-Ohio-5555, ¶ 18, in which the court described a delayed new-trial motion as a collateral attack. Frase was not a decision on the merits analyzing R.C. 2953.21(K); it was a dismissal entry explaining why an appellant had no right to seek to file a delayed appeal. And the use of the word “collateral” to describe the new-trial motion in Cowan was similarly unsupported. These lone references, therefore, are unpersuasive. {¶ 46} The state next argues that we should follow State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997), in which this court treated a convicted defendant’s motion to “Correct or Vacate Sentence” as a postconviction petition. We held that that motion—which was not filed under a specific criminal rule—should have been analyzed as a postconviction petition because it had the characteristics of a request for relief under R.C. 2953.21. Id. at 160. The state argues that Bethel’s new-trial motion also fits the R.C. 2953.21 mold, so it too should be analyzed as a collateral challenge under the statute. But in Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 2002-Ohio3993, 773 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 10, we explained that Reynolds was unique because it involved an “irregular ‘no name’ motion[]” in search of an identity. We determined that it was proper to categorize the motion as a postconviction petition in the absence of any other obvious standard for analyzing it. Id. at ¶ 10. We thus limited Reynolds to its facts. Id. at ¶ 10-11. {¶ 47} The state, in turn, argues that Bush was wrongly decided. Primarily, the state contends that the different-proceeding/same-proceeding distinction breaks down because a postconviction petition—which clearly is a collateral challenge— 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO also is filed within an existing criminal case. The state misinterprets the significance of this filing practice. It is well settled that a postconviction petition initiates a separate civil proceeding notwithstanding the use of an existing criminal-case number. See State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). See also former R.C. 2309.04 (when R.C. 2953.21 was enacted in 1965, a case-initiating pleading was called a “petition”); Am.H.B. 1201, 133 Ohio Laws 3017, 3020 (repealing former R.C. 2309.04 in 1971 following the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure). {¶ 48} The state also relies on Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, ¶ 17, in which we held that an application for reopening an appeal under App.R. 26(B) is “a distinct collateral postconviction process separate from the original appeal.” Here again, the state tries to undermine the differentproceeding/same-proceeding distinction by pointing to a collateral challenge that is filed under an existing case number. But the state again overstates the significance of the filing mechanics. Morgan involved a special type of postconviction relief (a claim alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel) that does not fall under R.C. 2953.21. Id. at ¶ 6. See State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). App.R. 26(B) establishes by rule what the statute does not provide. Morgan at ¶ 6-9. Morgan therefore is consistent with the above analysis: A request for postconviction relief may be filed under an existing case number and yet be a separate proceeding. {¶ 49} Finally, the state argues that we should look to People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo.1993), for guidance. But there is no need for us to do so because Wiedemer did not involve a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and it is clear that under Ohio law, a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial is not a collateral challenge under R.C. 2953.21(K). {¶ 50} Bethel’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial is not barred under R.C. 2953.21(K). 18 January Term, 2022