Opinion ID: 4539109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: [3] All of Grutell’s assignments of error turn on the central premise that the provisions of § 60-6,108(1) are an essential element of the crime of DUI which the State must, in every case, prove beyond a reasonable doubt. To determine the elements of a crime, we look to the text of the enacting statute. 14 Material Elements of DUI The crime of DUI is defined in § 60-6,196, one of many statutes in the Nebraska Rules of the Road. That statute provides: (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or be in the actual physical control of any motor vehicle: (a) While under the influence of alcoholic liquor or of any drug; 12 State v. Munoz, 303 Neb. 69, 927 N.W.2d 25 (2019). 13 State v. Brye, 304 Neb. 498, 935 N.W.2d 438 (2019). 14 State v. Mann, 302 Neb. 804, 925 N.W.2d 324 (2019). - 852 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRUTELL Cite as 305 Neb. 843 (b) When such person has a concentration of eight- hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of his or her blood; or (c) When such person has a concentration of eight- hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his or her breath. 15 [4-6] We have explained that under § 60-6,196, a DUI violation is a single offense that can be proved in more than one way. 16 Based on the text of § 60-6,196, the essential elements the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are (1) that the defendant was operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle and (2) that at the time the defendant did so, he or she was either (a) under the influence of alcoholic liquor or of any drug, or (b) had a concentration of .08 of 1 gram or more by weight of alcohol per 100 milliliters of his or her blood, or (c) had a concentration of .08 of 1 gram or more by weight of alcohol per 210 liters of his or her breath. 17 And where, as here, the State has charged an aggravated offense, 18 alleging as part of the DUI offense that the defendant also had a breath alcohol concentration of .15 or more, that allegation is also considered an essential element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 19 But none of the statutes defining the offense of DUI, or establishing the penalties for DUI, contain any geographic limitations or exceptions. It is another statute contained within the Nebraska Rules of the Road, § 60-6,108(1), that limits the applicability of the DUI statutes by providing in relevant part: (1) The provisions of the Nebraska Rules of the Road relating to operation of vehicles refer exclusively to 15 § 60-6,196. 16 State v. Kuhl, 276 Neb. 497, 755 N.W.2d 389 (2008). 17 See id. 18 See § 60-6,197.03. 19 See State v. Dinslage, 280 Neb. 659, 789 N.W.2d 29 (2010). - 853 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRUTELL Cite as 305 Neb. 843 operation of vehicles upon highways except where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section, but sections 60-6,196 [(defining crime of DUI)], 60-6,197 [(addressing chemical tests for DUI)], [and] 60-6,197.04 [(addressing preliminary breath test for DUI)] shall apply upon highways and anywhere throughout the state except private property which is not open to public access. (Emphasis supplied.) [7] The plain language of § 60-6,108(1) shows the Legislature intends the DUI statutes to apply not just on Nebraska’s highways as that term is defined, 20 but everywhere in Nebraska except private property not open to public access. Stated differently, the only place in Nebraska where the DUI statutes do not apply to the operation or control of a motor vehicle is on private property which is not open to public access. 21 As such, the provisions of § 60-6,108(1) are best understood as creating a geographical exception to the DUI statutes for private property not open to public access. Is Exception in § 60-6,108(1) Material Element of DUI? The central question presented in this appeal is whether the exception set out in § 60-6,108(1) is a material element of the crime of DUI, such that the State must always disprove the exception in order to prove the crime of DUI. It is significant to our analysis that the exception at issue does not appear in the statute defining the crime, but, rather, in a separate statute. Sometimes, when enacting a separate statutory exception to a criminal offense, the Legislature has been clear that the State is not required to negate the exception to prove the offense and the burden of proving the exception is on the person claiming 20 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-624 (Reissue 2010). 21 Matit, supra note 5. - 854 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRUTELL Cite as 305 Neb. 843 its benefit. 22 The exception found in § 60-6,108(1) contains no such language. But that does not mean the State is required, in every DUI case, to negate the exception in § 60-6,108(1). As a general rule, most jurisdictions hold that when a statutory exception appears in the statute defining the crime, the prosecution is required to plead and prove the defendant does not fall within the exception, but when the exception appears in a separate statute, it is considered a matter of defense. 23 Cases in Nebraska have followed this general rule. 24 [8] In Nebraska, a criminal complaint or information does not need to affirmatively negate any statutory exceptions which are not descriptive of the offense. 25 Thirty years ago, in State v. Golgert, 26 we applied this rule in DUI cases. [9] In Golgert, we considered whether an earlier codification of § 60-6,108(1) 27 required the State to affirmatively allege in the complaint that the crime of DUI occurred on a “highway.” At the time, the earlier codification of § 60-6,108(1) provided that the statutes related to the crimes of careless driving 22 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 8-1121 (Reissue 2012) (“[i]n any proceeding under the Securities Act of Nebraska, the burden of proving an exemption or an exception from a definition shall be upon the person claiming it”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-432(1) (Reissue 2016) (State need not negate exemptions or exceptions set out in Uniform Controlled Substances Act; burden of proving exemption or exception shall be upon person claiming its benefit). 23 See Annot., 153 A.L.R. 1218 (1944) (cases cited therein). 24 Compare, e.g., Mann, supra note 14 (exception appearing in statute defining offense is material element State must prove); State v. Hind, 143 Neb. 479, 10 N.W.2d 258 (1943) (State required to plead and prove exception contained within statute defining crime); Roberts v. State, 110 Neb. 759, 195 N.W. 114 (1923) (exception not contained in statute defining offense is matter of defense); Holmes v. State, 82 Neb. 406, 118 N.W. 99 (1908) (State required to plead and prove exception contained within statute defining crime). 25 See Jacox v. State, 154 Neb. 416, 48 N.W.2d 390 (1951). 26 State v. Golgert, 223 Neb. 950, 395 N.W.2d 520 (1986). 27 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-603(1) (Reissue 1984). - 855 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRUTELL Cite as 305 Neb. 843 and reckless driving applied “upon highways and anywhere throughout the state,” but that another series of statutes in the Nebraska Rules of the Road, including the DUI statutes, applied only on “highways” as that term was then defined. 28 Golgert noted the well-established rule that an information is sufficient if it alleges the crime in the language of the enacting statute, and it observed that the text of the statute defining DUI did not address highways. Because the DUI enacting statute did not include the limitation that the offense must occur on a highway, we held that being on a highway was “not an element of the crime which must be alleged in the complaint.” 29 We pause to acknowledge that even after Golgert, it is a relatively common practice for prosecutors, when charging DUI, to include allegations in the complaint or information that at the time the defendant was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, he or she was not on private property not open to public access. Similarly, the DUI records we see on appeal show it is a common practice, in DUI trials, for courts to routinely instruct the jury on the requirements of § 60-6,108(1), either through the elements instruction or through definitional instructions. While the better practice may be to routinely instruct the jury on the requirements of § 60-6,108(1), the question here is whether it was plain error for the trial court to not address the exception at all. Like the Court of Appeals, we can find no plain error in that regard. [10] We agree with the Court of Appeals that the exception in § 60-6,108(1) is not a material element of the offense of DUI which the State must plead and prove in every case. 30 28 See id. 29 Golgert, supra note 26, 223 Neb. at 955, 395 N.W.2d at 523. Accord State v. Wagner, 295 Neb. 132, 888 N.W.2d 357 (2016) (information charging refusal of chemical test is sufficient if it alleges facts or elements necessary to constitute offense described in statute and intended to be punished). 30 See Golgert, supra note 26. - 856 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRUTELL Cite as 305 Neb. 843 Instead, the exception in § 60-6,108(1) creates an affirmative defense to the crime of DUI, and that important distinction impacts the burden of proof. § 60-6,108(1) and Burden of Proof [11,12] In State v. Edwards, 31 we recognized that courts in some jurisdictions require criminal defendants to bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense. But in Nebraska, we have adopted the rule that in the absence of a statute placing the burden of proving an affirmative defense on the defendant in a criminal case, 32 the nature of an affirmative defense is such that the defendant has the initial burden of going forward with evidence of the defense, and once the defendant has produced sufficient evidence to raise the defense, the issue becomes one which the State must disprove. 33 The evidence necessary to raise an affirmative defense may be adduced either by the defendant’s witnesses or in the State’s case in chief without the necessity of the defendant’s presenting evidence. 34 A defendant need only adduce a slight amount of evidence to satisfy this initial burden of raising an affirmative defense. 35 As several of our prior cases addressing § 60-6,108(1) demonstrate, it is common for a defendant to raise the applicability of § 60-6,108(1) in pretrial motions and during trial. 36 When 31 State v. Edwards, 286 Neb. 404, 837 N.W.2d 81 (2013). 32 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-202 and 29-2203 (Reissue 2016). 33 Edwards, supra note 31; State v. Kinser, 252 Neb. 600, 567 N.W.2d 287 (1997). 34 See Kinser, supra note 33. 35 Id. 36 See, e.g., State v. Pester, 294 Neb. 995, 885 N.W.2d 713 (2016) (§ 60-6,108(1) raised in motion to quash, motion to suppress, and motion for directed verdict); Matit, supra note 5 (§ 60-6,108(1) raised in motion to suppress and at trial); State v. Garcia, 281 Neb. 1, 792 N.W.2d 882 (2011) (raising § 60-6,108(1) in motion to suppress, at trial, and at enhancement hearing); State v. Prater, 268 Neb. 655, 686 N.W.2d 896 (2004) (raising § 60-6,108(1) at trial). - 857 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRUTELL Cite as 305 Neb. 843 cases have presented a question whether a vehicle was on private property not open to public access, it has generally been treated as a fact question for the fact finder to determine. 37 And our prior cases show that when § 60-6,108(1) was raised in a case involving a jury, the jury was instructed in a way that required the State to disprove the applicability of the defense. 38 As such, while our prior cases did not expressly characterize the exception in § 60-6,108(1) as an affirmative defense, we have consistently treated it as such. With this framework in mind, we address Grutell’s assignments of error on further review. No Plain Error In his brief on further review, Grutell first argues that the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting his claim that the district court prevented him from raising § 60-6,108(1). This argument focuses on the trial court’s remark, made outside the presence of the jury, that the State was not required to prove that the DUI offense occurred on a public highway. The trial court’s remark was a correct statement of the law, and we agree with the Court of Appeals that this remark did not preclude Grutell from raising the defense that his vehicle was on private property not open to public access. Next, Grutell argues the Court of Appeals erred when it found that his failure to invoke § 60-6,108(1) prevented a finding of plain error by the trial court in not addressing that statute. Grutell argues that the Court of Appeals’ analysis improperly shifted the burden of proof on § 60-6,108(1) from the State to the defense. We disagree. 37 See, Hoppens v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 288 Neb. 857, 852 N.W.2d 331 (2014); Matit, supra note 5; Prater, supra note 36. But see State v. McCave, 282 Neb. 500, 805 N.W.2d 290 (2011) (whether residential driveway was private property not open to public access was question of statutory interpretation and thus matter of law, since Legislature defined “[p]rivate road or driveway” in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-649 (Reissue 2010)). 38 See, e.g., Pester, supra note 36; Matit, supra note 5. - 858 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRUTELL Cite as 305 Neb. 843 As we have already explained, the exception in § 60-6,108(1) is not a material element of DUI. Rather, it is a separate statutory exception to the criminal offense of DUI, and as such, it is a matter to be raised initially as an affirmative defense. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that in this court’s prior opinions addressing § 60-6,108(1), the issue of whether the defendant was on private property not open to public access was raised by the defense through pretrial motions and through the introduction of evidence at trial. 39 Because Grutell never raised the affirmative defense of § 60-6,108(1), the Court of Appeals correctly rejected his claim that the trial court plainly erred in not addressing it. Finally, Grutell argues the Court of Appeals erred in failing to address, as a matter of law, whether § 60-6,108(1) applies to a ditch next to a gravel road. Again we disagree. As stated earlier, the issue of whether a vehicle was being operated or controlled on private property not open to public access is ordinarily a fact question to be determined by the fact finder, and not an issue to be determined as a matter of law. For the sake of completeness, we note that in State v. Thelen, 40 we recently held as a matter of statutory interpretation that the ditch area within the county’s right-of-way is part of the “public road” for purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-301 (Reissue 2016). We express no opinion regarding the applicability, if any, of the holding in Thelen to questions under § 60-6,108(1). Instead, we emphasize that, on this record, it was not necessary for either the trial court or the Court of Appeals to address whether § 60-6,108(1) applies to a roadside ditch, because Grutell did not raise that affirmative defense in the trial court. Instead, Grutell pursued an entirely different defense theory. Based on his testimony that he had not become intoxicated until after his vehicle got stuck in the ditch, he argued 39 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 36. 40 State v. Thelen, ante p. 334, 940 N.W.2d 259 (2020). - 859 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRUTELL Cite as 305 Neb. 843 the State could not show he had actual physical control over a “movable” vehicle while intoxicated. The jury rejected this theory. On this record, Grutell did nothing to invoke the provisions of § 60-6,108(1) and there was no evidence adduced at trial by either party to create a fact issue regarding the applicability of § 60-6,108(1). The Court of Appeals correctly rejected Grutell’s claims of plain error.