Opinion ID: 165851
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction 12—Burden of Proof

Text: 70 Naylor argues the district court's reasonable doubt instruction misled the jury into believing it could convict him by only a preponderance of the evidence. Typically, [t]he appropriate standard of review for challenges to jury instructions is whether the jury, considering the instructions as a whole, was misled. United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 1421, 1424 (10th Cir.1994). Similarly, the constitutional question implicated by concerns over the adequacy of jury instructions is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (referring to In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which held that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense). Here, however, Naylor did not object to the instruction at trial. Therefore, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 901 F.2d 875, 876 (10th Cir.1990). 71 On appeal, Naylor raises three specific objections to Instruction 12, which read in part: 72 If you, as jurors view the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions — one of innocence, the other of guilt — you should of course adopt the conclusion of innocence. 9 73 The first objection is that the instruction used the term should instead of the term must. Naylor's second objection is that the instruction improperly interchanged the terms innocence and not guilty. Finally, Naylor claims the instruction unlawfully diluted the burden of proof by suggesting there is a standard below beyond a reasonable doubt on which the jury could convict. Although we disapprove of a portion of the tendered instruction, viewing the instruction in its entirety we hold that it did not compromise Naylor's right to a fair trial. 74
75 Naylor first argues that the instruction improperly used the non-mandatory term should in instructing the jury to return a not guilty verdict if the evidence reasonably permitted a finding of innocence. The penultimate sentence of the instruction, however, stated, [If] after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case, you as jurors retain a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of the charge, you must acquit. In light of this language, as a whole, the instruction made clear that the jury was only allowed to convict if it found Naylor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus discern no error. 76
77 Naylor next argues that the instruction was also misleading because it used the terms not guilty and innocent interchangeably. He relies on a First Circuit case concluding that interchanging the terms could confuse a jury and risks undercutting the government's burden by suggesting that they should find the defendant guilty if they think he is not innocent—regardless of how convincing the government's proof has been. United States v. Mendoza-Acevedo, 950 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1991). 78 We disagree with this assessment. Although the instruction used mixed terminology, in light of the instruction as a whole we do not see how the jury was misled concerning its obligation to apply the presumption of innocence. As a practical matter, in the context of this jury instruction not guilty and innocence are equivalent. Taking a step back, on this record the instruction's overall structure and language are not misleading. The two terms—not guilty and innocent—were not likely to confuse the jury in applying the proper burden of proof. 79
80 Naylor's third argument has merit. He contends that by allowing two inferences, guilt and innocence, where the evidence does not decisively favor one outcome, the instruction improperly diluted the government's burden of proof by suggesting there is a quantum of proof sufficient to convict above innocent but below beyond a reasonable doubt. 81 The Second Circuit has long disapproved of the instruction: 82 The two-inference language, that if the jury believes the evidence permits either the inference of innocence or of guilt, the jury should adopt the former, is obviously correct as far as it goes. But such an instruction by implication suggests that a preponderance of the evidence standard is relevant, when it is not. . . . It instructs the jury on how to decide when the evidence of guilt or innocence is evenly balanced, but says nothing on how to decide when the inference of guilt is stronger than the inference of innocence but no[t] strong enough to be beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Therefore, . . . the two-inference language should not be used because, standing alone, such language may mislead a jury into thinking that the government's burden is somehow less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 83 United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir.1987) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 1226 (3d Cir.1995) (disapproving use of two-inference language). 84 Our circuit has yet to address the narrow question as to the propriety of using this two-inference language. We agree with the Second and Third Circuits that, standing alone, the language is imprecise and should not be used. The mischief from the instruction comes from the risk that a jury may focus on narrow portions of the instruction and not its overall thrust. In light of this risk, we agree that the instruction should be modified to delete the two-inference language. 85 The saving grace for the instruction is that overall it adequately directed the jury to the applicable burden of proof. Applying the plain error standard, there is little doubt the jury properly understood its constitutional duty. The instructions as a whole told the jury not to convict Naylor unless the government proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, Instruction 12 explained to the jury that the government had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically defined reasonable doubt, and distinguished reasonable doubt from a preponderance of the evidence. Considered in context, we cannot conclude the jury was misled by the instruction. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239. 86 Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err when it issued this instruction.