Opinion ID: 2605742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the anti-trust claim

Text: The amended complaint charged that defendant has in June and July 1977, and continues to wilfully conspire to restrain trade and commerce and to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or to combine or to conspire with another person to monopolize trade or commerce, by wrongfully depriving plaintiffs of possession and the right to use a certain fish scow owned by plaintiff, Julia E. West, for the reason that said barge would be used in competition with defendant. This language charged violations of AS 45.52.010 and .020 which provide: [3] 45.52.010. Combinations in restraint of trade unlawful. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful. AS 45.52.020. Monopolies and attempted monopolies unlawful. It is unlawful for a person to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize any part of trade or commerce. Plaintiffs' claim for treble damages was authorized by AS 45.52.110(a) which provides: Suits by persons injured. (a) A person who is injured in his business or property by a violation of §§ 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 of this chapter, or a person so injured because he refuses to accede to a proposal for an arrangement which, if consummated, would be a violation of §§ 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 of this chapter, may bring a civil action (1) for damages sustained by him, and if the judgment is for the plaintiff and the trier of fact finds that the defendant's conduct was wilful, the plaintiff shall be awarded threefold the amount of damages sustained by him, plus the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorney fees; ... As previously indicated, Whitney-Fidalgo moved for judgment on the pleadings and, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment as to the claims based on AS 45.52.010 and AS 45.52.020. Plaintiffs consented to summary judgment as to the allegations made under AS 45.52.010, and their claim based on that section was eliminated from the case. Whitney-Fidalgo, in its motion for judgment on the pleadings concerning the AS 45.52.020 allegations of monopolization and attempt to monopolize, contended that the claim was deficient because it contained no allegation of the relevant market which Whitney-Fidalgo had allegedly either monopolized or attempted to monopolize, and no allegation that the attempt charged had a dangerous probability of success in bringing about a monopoly. In its alternative motion for summary judgment, Whitney-Fidalgo argued that the entire Cook Inlet should be considered the relevant market and that it did not have a monopoly in that market. Whitney-Fidalgo noted that it is a dominant buyer because it has the only cannery in Anchorage, but it has not controlled prices or excluded competition. According to Whitney-Fidalgo, for the 1976 salmon season there were eighteen purchasers of salmon in Cook Inlet; it purchased approximately twenty-one percent of the catch that year. There were twenty purchasers in 1977, and it purchased approximately thirty percent of that year's catch. Thus, Whitney-Fidalgo argued that it was undisputed that it did not have a monopoly in Cook Inlet, and further asserted that its market share for those years was not sufficient to show a dangerous probability of success in an alleged attempt to monopolize the Cook Inlet area salmon market. Plaintiffs combined their response to Whitney-Fidalgo's motions. Germane to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, they argued that an allegation of the relevant economic market and an allegation that there existed a dangerous probability of monopolization of such a market were not essential to an attempt to monopolize claim under section .020. With respect to the summary judgment motion plaintiffs argued that the relevant market was the Upper Cook Inlet area and that defendant's market power there was sufficiently shown by the fact that it has the only salmon cannery in the Upper Cook Inlet. The plaintiffs in their statement of genuine issues suggested that the following acts of Whitney-Fidalgo, in addition to holding the scow, provided evidence of an attempt to monopolize the salmon market in the Upper Cook Inlet: 1) providing in a draft of a written contract with the Cook Inlet Fishermen's Association a provision that all salmon caught by Association members would be sold exclusively to Whitney-Fidalgo; 2) inserting in the initial contract of sale for the scow with Julia West's husband, Martin, a requirement that Martin fish for the company for four years; 3) threatening representatives of the Cook Inlet Fishermen's Association that if any fisherman did not sell all his catch to Whitney-Fidalgo, it would remove its fish scow from the area fished by the Cook Inlet Fishermen's Association members and purchase no fish from them. These allegations were supported by sworn testimony in the record. The trial court largely accepted Whitney-Fidalgo's argument concerning the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded: Based upon plaintiffs' failure to properly allege either that defendant had the specific market power to come dangerously close to succeeding in their attempts to monopolize or that defendant's attempted monopolization was with respect to a specified and relevant market area, I find that plaintiffs' first cause of action is insufficient to maintain a claim under AS 45.52.020. In the alternative, the court concluded as a matter of fact that the relevant market was not Upper Cook Inlet since that market area was not sufficiently distinct in commercial reality to permit defendant to exclude competition and control prices. The court noted that the existence of alternative buyers further down the Inlet would have negated the defendant's ability to exclude competition or control prices within the defined area, thus relieving them from liability... . The court thus dismissed all of the plaintiffs' anti-trust claims. On appeal West and her partners do not claim that error was committed in dismissing their monopolization claims. They do contend, however, that their attempt and conspiracy to monopolize claims should have been presented at trial. Before the superior court, however, they did not argue that they had a valid conspiracy to monopolize claim, and thus they have waived the right to make that assertion here. [4] The upshot of this is that the only anti-trust theory that is presented to us is that of attempt to monopolize. The legislative history of the Alaska Anti-Trust Act indicates that section .020 is based on section 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. [5] The legislature intended that Alaska courts would look to Sherman Act cases in construing the Act. [6] There is a distinct disagreement among the federal circuits as to whether proof of an economic market and proof of a dangerous probability of monopolization of such a market are required elements of an attempt to monopolize. [7] In Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 25 S.Ct. 276, 49 L.Ed. 518 (1905), Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the court, stated with respect to the attempt provision of section 2 of the Sherman Act: Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent  for instance, the monopoly  but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute, like many others and like the common law in some cases, directs itself against that dangerous probability as well as against the completed result. [Citation omitted] 196 U.S. at 396, 25 S.Ct. at 279, 49 L.Ed. at 524. Not every act that may be done with intent to produce an unlawful result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt. It is a question of proximity and degree. The distinction between mere preparation and attempt is well known in the criminal law. The same distinction is recognized in cases like the present. [Citation omitted] 196 U.S. at 402, 25 S.Ct. at 281, 49 L.Ed. at 527. Most federal circuits have construed Swift to require a dangerous probability of success as a necessary element of the attempt offense in addition to specific intent. [8] Dangerous probability of success is shown by significant market power at the time of the anti-competitive conduct. [9] Identification of the relevant market is necessary in order to make a determination of the defendant's market power. [10] However, the rule in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is that proof of relevant market and of a dangerous probability that such market will be monopolized are not indispensable elements of the attempt offense. The focus is on anti-competitive intent and conduct, not the possibility of successful monopolization and therefore the relevant market is not an essential issue. [A] prima facie case of attempt to monopolize is made out by evidence of a specific intent to monopolize `any part' of commerce, plus anti-competitive conduct directed to the accomplishment of that unlawful purpose. Greyhound Computer v. International Business Machines, 559 F.2d 488, 504 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040, 98 S.Ct. 782, 54 L.Ed.2d 790 (1978); see also Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 813-14 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2977, 53 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1977); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley's, Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1276 (9th Cir.1975); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993, 84 S.Ct. 1920, 12 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1964). However, market position is not irrelevant under the Ninth Circuit rule. The more market power that exists, the more likely it is that a given course of questionable conduct will suggest the existence of intent to monopolize. Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 669 (9th Cir.1980). The Ninth Circuit has recently expressed the rationale for its rule as follows: If proof of an economic market, technically defined, and proof of a dangerous probability of a monopolization of such a market were made essential elements of an attempt to monopolize, as a practical matter the attempt offense would cease to have independent significance. A single firm that did not control something close to 50% of the entire market, would be free to indulge in any activity however unreasonable, predatory, destructive of competition and without legitimate business justification. Any concern not dangerously close to monopoly power could deliberately destroy its competitors with impunity. These are not abstract hypotheses. A market share approaching monopoly is not required to enable one concern seriously to impede the capacity of others to compete by use of abusive trade practices. A construction of the Sherman Act that would immunize such practices would be contrary to the purposes of the Act; it is not required by the Act's language or legislative history. Greyhound, 559 F.2d at 504. We find this reasoning to be both persuasive and consistent with what we regard as the soundest reading of the Swift case: Holmes was doing no more than proposing the common law of attempts as a guide, and that guide, surely, does not insist that the criminal actor be within range of success, but only that he have externalized his unlawful animus in a deliberate effort to bring it to actuality. Once he has done that, the law steps in on the ground that by deliberately trying to commit the crime, the actor has shown a serious risk that if not deterred he may persist in his efforts until he succeeds. L. Sullivan, Antitrust § 51, at 137-38 (1977). For these reasons we adopt the rule that proof of the relevant market and a probability of its monopolization are not essential elements of the offense of attempt to monopolize under §.020. [11] We believe that Whitney-Fidalgo's acts may be viewed by the trier of fact as having been motivated by a desire to obtain, or maintain, a position as a monopoly buyer of salmon from Upper Cook Inlet set netters. We therefore hold that the superior court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' attempt to monopolize claim.