Opinion ID: 2395038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Setting of Fees

Text: The challenged order, which improperly appointed appellants as counsel, further abridged established authority by setting counsel fees. In the December 19, 1988, order, the Knott Circuit Court held that DPA's $2,500.00 cap on compensation for such appointments is arbitrary and in violation of appointed counsels [sic] involuntary servitude rights, as well as the 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendment Rights of the defendant to have competent counsel. The order further directed The Department of Public Advocacy and the Kentucky State Treasury to compensate appellants at the rate of $35.00 per hour for in court time, and $25.00 per hour for out of court time, with no cap. As mentioned before, a later order found the existence of special circumstances. Neither order provides an indication of the source of authority for the court's directive awarding fees, and appellants have pointed to none which supports it. Because there is law to the contrary, the order must be reversed on this ground, as well. Once again, both case law and KRS Chapter 31 dictate the result. In Bradshaw, supra , after concluding that compensation was constitutionally mandated, this Court rejected the trial judge's ruling that the ultimate responsibility to provide for compensation for court-appointed attorneys in the concerned circumstance is a required function of the judicial department of the government. Id. at 297. We stated unambiguously, [I]t is the duty of the legislative department to appropriate sufficient funds to enforce the laws which they have enacted. Id. at 299. In a case factually similar to the present case, Department for Human Resources v. Paulson, Ky., 622 S.W.2d 508 (1981), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed this principle. Paulson involved attorneys representing indigent parents in a parental rights termination action. The Fayette Circuit Court awarded attorney's fees which exceeded the $300.00 statutory fee set by KRS 199.603(8). The attorneys made claims for $1,447.00 and $1,220.00, respectively, which the trial judge ordered the Department to pay. The Department for Human Resources appealed, relying on Bradshaw . The Court of Appeals reversed, reiterating the constitutional break-down of the government's responsibility to compensate attorneys who provide indigent representation. In language strikingly applicable to the case before us, it stated: We conclude that [the setting of fees] was the proper and appropriate function of the legislature, and that by limiting the fee to this amount, neither appellee will be unconstitutionally deprived of his property or time. Acceptance of the appointment was voluntary, and the appellees had statutory notice of the limited fee. We could not have said it better, ourselves. Similarly supportive of the outcome, as well as the theme of this case  that trial courts must operate within the scheme of the statute  is the fact that nowhere in KRS Chapter 31 is a trial judge granted authority to set fees, chargeable exclusively to the state, that fall outside the fee parameters provided therein. This is a KRS 31.065 case. This plan of representation, if properly proceeded under, looks only to DPA to orchestrate and administer the provision of counsel to needy persons. The amount of compensation for attorneys who provide services under KRS 31.065(2) is, in a sense, predetermined because DPA staff attorneys are on salary. See KRS 31.020(4). Attorneys operating under KRS 31.065(1) are under contract with DPA, the terms of which are limited by the amounts set forth in KRS 31.070. Should the unusual circumstance arise whereby a trial judge is forced to look outside the statute to appoint counsel, the maximum terms of state compensation and the procedure by which it is procured, are also dictated by KRS 31.070. It should be noted that, in keeping with the strictly DPA plan for representation, DPA must still review compensation claims submitted by judge-appointed counsel and approve or deny them. DPA also has a statutorily limited power to modify the certified request. KRS 31.070(3). Finally, and most importantly, [t]he decision of the public advocate in all matters of fee and expense compensation shall be final. Id. (Emphasis added). Thus, by setting the fees appellants were to be paid and by ordering DPA to pay them, the Knott Circuit Court clearly failed to operate within the statutory compensation procedure applicable to Knott County. From the language and substance of its orders, it is fair to suggest that the authority under which the court intended to operate lies in KRS 31.170(3) and (4), which apply to counties with fiscal court plans for indigent representation. Subsection (3) discusses judicial appointment of attorneys. Subsection (4) prescribes compensation in amounts similar to those reflected in the orders. Also in (4), we find special circumstances language that allows for fees that exceed the statutory maximum stated therein. Appellants argue that this court should uphold the trial judge's orders by analogizing to the authority given to the court under KRS 31.170 (and which the trial judge apparently thought applied.) This we cannot do. At the risk of redundancy to a fault, we again stress a guiding benchmark to the operation of Chapter 31: the particular plan under which any single representation comes about dictates the rules and terms which govern its fulfillment. KRS 31.170 is entitled: Office For Public Advocacy  Establishment by fiscal court. (Emphasis added). Since the fiscal court of Knott County has not adopted a KRS 31.160 local plan, KRS 31.170 does not and cannot apply in this case, by analogy or otherwise. Even if it could apply, the trial court would still lack the authority to order DPA to pay the fees claimed by appellants. KRS 31.240(3) is clear that counties with a local plan may compensate attorneys at the rates prescribed by KRS 31.170 or at greater rates, but in either case, the State contribution to such compensation shall not be greater than is provided for by KRS 31.070. Counties must pay from their own funds all amounts in excess of the state contribution. KRS 31.240(1). Thus, even under appellants' analogy theory, DPA would remain free of liability for any amount over the statutory maximum.