Opinion ID: 1194959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The El Paso Case

Text: The DOC contends that, even if the Montrose order is given effect, Bullard cannot be discharged because he has not completed his El Paso sentence. We agree. The Montrose court did not address the circumstances of the El Paso plea bargain, judgment of conviction, and court sentence, nor did it have the authority to do so. We have not been presented with any order of the El Paso district court either granting or failing to grant relief to Bullard with regard to that court's judgment of conviction and sentence. The El Paso court ordered its sentence to run concurrently with the Montrose sentence. A concurrent sentence is one which runs simultaneously, in whole or in part, with another sentence. Brinklow v. Riveland, 773 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1989). Bullard argues that the Montrose sentence is the controlling sentence, as well as the longer sentence, and, if it is complete, the El Paso sentence must be as well. Bullard's understanding of concurrent sentences is mistaken. When two sentences run concurrently, it merely means that, for each day in custody while serving both sentences, the inmate receives credit toward each sentence. Concurrent sentences do not necessarily begin and end at the same timethey simply run together during the time that they overlap. Id. (citing 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1996(1) (1962)). The El Paso judgment of conviction clearly states that Bullard is sentenced to the DOC for a term of 18 months, concurrent with Montrose County case # 95CR0031, and subject to all regulations of that department. Once the Montrose court had reviewed its sentence in light of the plea bargain in that court, the El Paso sentence became the longer of the two: eighteen months of incarceration plus two years of mandatory parole under the applicable statute, the remainder of which must now be served in DOC custody because of the parole revocation and applicable DOC regulations. See § 17-22.5-303(7), 6 C.R.S. (1997). The Montrose court had no authority to construe or terminate the El Paso sentence; nor, despite Bullard's wish to the contrary, do we perceive that the Montrose court attempted to do so. [T]ermination of his first sentence had no effect on the unserved portion of his second sentence. Brinklow, 773 P.2d at 520 (Denver district court's finding that defendant's sentence had been served and order for his discharge did not affect concurrent Teller County sentence). Bullard became eligible for parole in the El Paso case on the same date as in the Montrose caseSeptember 19, 1996after serving one year, three months and seventeen days of the El Paso sentence. His parole was subsequently revoked; Bullard did not contest that revocation nor has he sought relief from the El Paso court similar to the relief which he requested of the Montrose court. Bullard's two year mandatory parole extends to September 19, 1998, and must now be served in DOC custody because of the revocation. It is apparent that Bullard has not satisfied the three part test for mandamus relief as to the outstanding El Paso sentence. See Gramiger v. Crowley, 660 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Colo.1983). First, he has not established a clear right to the relief sought because he has not demonstrated that the El Paso sentence has been served. Second, he has not proven that the DOC has a clear duty to release him; because his parole was revoked, the DOC is required to keep him in custody. Finally, another remedy appears to be available to Bullardhe could ask the El Paso court to review that court's sentence and grant appropriate relief.