Opinion ID: 703157
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bona Fide Explanation

Text: 15 Trial courts likewise should consider whether the moving party offered a bona fide explanation for failing to introduce the evidence before it finally rested its case. See, e.g., Bradford Trust Co., 805 F.2d at 52-53 (upholding denial of motion to reopen after trial court repeatedly warned that movant would need to produce evidence on key issue); Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Eliot Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir.1985) (upholding refusal to reopen where trial court forewarned movant that omitted evidence would be essential). Moreover, the courts recognize that it may amount to an abuse of discretion for a trial court to decline to reopen in circumstances where the movant has demonstrated reasonably genuine surprise. Id. There are at least four compelling reasons for finding that the good faith factor weighed heavily in favor of allowing the motion to reopen in the instant case. 16 First, the record bears out the contention that Rivera refrained from introducing the undisputed evidence of PRTC's receipt of FEMA funds, not because she lacked proof but solely because she reasonably understood that the district court's subject matter jurisdiction had been settled prior to trial. In the statement of uncontested material facts accompanying its summary judgment motion, for example, PRTC admitted receiving a $9,765 check from FEMA, dated January 10, 1986, while [Rivera] was working as a Service Representative, as well as other FEMA payments during 1987, 1989 and 1990. 17 Notwithstanding these undisputed facts, PRTC presented the magistrate judge with two alternative theories for its narrowly focused legal contention that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction: (1) FEMA fund recipients are subject to the special anti-discrimination provisions of 44 C.F.R. Secs. 7.1 to 7.949 (1994), which do not proscribe employment discrimination by the recipient, and therefore PRTC was not subject to the more comprehensive anti-discrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act; or (2) the FEMA funds must be shown to have been received during the same time period in which the alleged discriminatory acts against the recipient's employee took place. 18 Judge Laffitte had rejected both these legal theories prior to trial: 19 [PRTC's] arguments do not carry the day. First, neither party contests the fact that after various hurricanes and heavy rains in Puerto Rico, PRTC applied for Federal financial assistance to receive reimbursement for expenditures paid to repair the damage caused by the disasters. Neither party contests the fact that PRTC either was receiving Federal funding or was awaiting the receipt of funding throughout the period of the alleged discriminatory conduct. The Court finds that in the context of the Rehabilitation Act, an employer receiving Federal financial assistance includes a qualified applicant who although approved to receive the funds is awaiting the receipt of them. Consequently, because PRTC was either receiving or expecting to receive Federal financial assistance throughout the period pertinent to plaintiff's claim, the Court finds that PRTC was receiving Federal financial assistance and is subject to the Rehabilitation Act for that period of time. 20 Rivera-Flores, 840 F.Supp. at 5 (emphasis added). 21 Normally, of course, the mere denial of a defendant's summary judgment motion does not relieve a claimant of the burden of introducing evidence at trial on every element essential to her claim, even though the factual predicate was not in genuine dispute at summary judgment. However, Civil Rule 56(d) establishes a procedural mechanism whereby a district court can ensure a more enduring effect for its summary judgment ruling, and, with the acquiescence of the parties, narrow the factual issues for trial: 22 If on motion under this rule judgment is not entered upon the whole case or for all relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 23 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) (emphasis added). 24 The December 1993 order entered by Judge Laffitte fits well within the spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 56(d). Its language, see supra, belies PRTC's main contention that the district court order did not sufficiently specif[y]  the facts that were without substantial controversy. PRTC counters that an order can have no Rule 56(d) effect unless the court expressly announces its intention to enter a Rule 56(d) order, and then interrogates counsel concerning the appropriateness of such relief. 25 On the contrary, the language of the rule contemplates merely that the court, inter alia, interrogat[e] counsel [to] ascertain what material facts ... are actually and in good faith controverted.... Id. Rule 56(d) gives counsel no veto power over the decision to enter such an order. Although it is unquestionably advisable for the court to announce its intention to enter such an order, Rule 56(d) does not make it compulsory. 3 Thus, interrogation of counsel is a suggested means of determining facts not in substantial controversy, where the pleadings and other evidence before the court leave room for doubt. But it is the substance of the order that matters. 26 Second, in our view Rivera's reliance on the pretrial order seems justified in these circumstances since the fact not in substantial good faith controversy did not pertain exclusively to the merits of her claim. Unlike the three other elements of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794, receipt of federal funds also directly implicates the district court's subject matter jurisdiction over a Rehabilitation Act claim. See Bentley v. Cleveland Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 41 F.3d 600, 603-04 (10th Cir.1994). Contested factual matters relating to a court's subject matter jurisdiction are properly determined on pretrial motions to dismiss, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (court must assure its jurisdiction before reaching merits of claim), and even where the claim is set for jury trial, the court has great latitude to direct limited discovery and to make such factual findings as are necessary to determine its subject matter jurisdiction. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 1010-11, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). We need express no opinion concerning whether the Rehabilitation Act's jurisdictional element might properly be adjudicated on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. 4 Rather, we note merely that Rivera in no sense acted unreasonably in treating Judge Laffitte's pretrial order as determinative of the jurisdictional findings therein contained. 27 Third, the record indicates that PRTC may have engendered further confusion concerning the intended import of Judge Laffitte's pretrial order. In the pretrial order, PRTC represented that Rivera's prima facie case required proof of three elements, omitting any reference to the fourth--the jurisdictional element. See Pretrial Order, at 13. 5 PRTC also represented that it [wa]s not a recipient of federal financial assistance within the meaning of [the Rehabilitation Act]. Arguably at least, this connoted that PRTC continued to challenge Judge Laffitte's legal rulings interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, but that it accepted the fact that proof of receipt of FEMA funds no longer remained in bona fide dispute for trial. Thus, Rivera presented a bona fide explanation for failing to introduce her evidence before resting at trial.