Opinion ID: 28205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: requests for certificates of appealability

Text: Although Foster apparently requests that this court issue COAs on all five of the other claims that he asserted in his federal habeas petition, he briefs only two of those claims on 35 appeal. We consider the unbriefed claims abandoned. Johnson v. Puckett, 176 F.3d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 1999). The two briefed claims, which we will address in turn, are: (1) that Farrow rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to transfer Foster’s case to youth court because Foster was a “child” under Mississippi law at the time of the offense (the “ineffective-assistance/transfer claim”), and (2) that Foster’s death sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments because the trial court did not make particularized findings regarding his maturity and moral culpability before he was tried and sentenced as an adult for a capital offense (the “Eighth Amendment claim”). In their district-court filings and in their briefs for this appeal, both Foster and the state treat the ineffectiveassistance/transfer claim together with the Eighth Amendment claim. Specifically, Foster claims that the Eighth Amendment violation is a result of either “systematic failure” of Mississippi’s procedures or ineffective assistance of counsel. Likely in response to the parties’ approach, the district court also treated these two claims together and did not fully distinguish between them. We thus pause briefly in our analysis to clarify that, in light of the state court proceedings, these two claims must be treated separately for purposes of federal habeas review. 36 Given that Farrow was still representing Foster in Foster’s direct appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, it is not surprising that Foster did not raise the ineffectiveassistance/transfer claim on direct appeal; rather, he raised only the Eighth Amendment claim, challenging Mississippi’s failure to require particularized findings before minor defendants are tried as adults for a capital offense. In his state application for leave to file a motion for post-conviction relief, Foster asserted the ineffective-assistance/transfer claim for the first time and the Eighth Amendment claim for the second time. The Mississippi Supreme Court declined to reach the Eighth Amendment claim on post-conviction review on the ground that the court had already adjudicated that claim in Foster’s direct appeal. Foster, 687 So. 2d at 1135. The court did, however, address the ineffective-assistance/transfer claim. See id. Accordingly, we must treat the two claims separately on federal habeas review, looking to the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision on Foster’s application for post-conviction relief (the “post-conviction decision”) in evaluating the ineffectiveassistance/transfer claim, and looking to that court’s decision on direct appeal (the “direct-appeal decision”) in evaluating the Eighth Amendment claim.11 11 Because the district court tended to merge Foster’s ineffective-assistance/transfer claim and his Eighth Amendment claim, that court, after recognizing that the post-conviction decision deemed the Eighth Amendment claim to be procedurally 37
We may grant a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (Supp. V 1999). “A ‘substantial showing’ requires the applicant to demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues (in a different manner); or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Styron v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 438, 444 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted). If the habeas petitioner seeks a COA on a claim that the state court denied on a state procedural ground, the petitioner must also show that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether the state procedural ground bars federal habeas review. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In determining whether Foster has met the COA standard, we resolve all doubts in his favor, and we may consider the severity of his death sentence in our determination. Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2000). Both the direct-appeal decision denying Foster’s Eighth Amendment claim and the post-conviction decision denying his ineffective-assistance/transfer claim rely on both state procedural grounds and federal-law grounds. While the district barred, proceeded to review the post-conviction decision’s denial of Foster’s ineffective-assistance/transfer claim on the merits as if it were an alternative ground for the state court’s denial of the Eighth Amendment claim. 38 court recognized that the Mississippi Supreme Court invoked both state law and federal law, the district court apparently based its denial of habeas relief only on the merits of these claims, not on the purported state procedural bar. In this appeal, the state raises the procedural bar as a basis for denial of relief on these claims in addition to arguing that the district court correctly denied these claims on their merits. Because federal courts must “honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court’s judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law,” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989), we first address the “procedural” prong of the COA standard. Accordingly, we begin our analysis of each claim by determining whether reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether the state-law ground is a constitutionally sufficient basis to preclude federal review (i.e., whether the state-law ground is “independent and adequate”). B. The “Independent and Adequate State Ground” Doctrine Federal courts are precluded from reviewing a federal claim that the state court denied on state-law grounds only if: (1) the state-law ground relied on by the state court is both “independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment,” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (emphases added), and (2) the petitioner is not able to demonstrate either that there is “cause for the default and 39 actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or . . . that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,” id. at 750. Where, as in the instant case, the state court relied both on a state procedural rule and on federal law in denying the federal claim, we “will presume that there is no independent and adequate state ground for [the] state court decision [if it] ‘fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.’” Id. at 735 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)). This presumption may be rebutted, and thus federal review precluded, only if the state court “clearly and expressly” stated that the state procedural ground was a basis for its decision independent of the federal-law ground. Id.; Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 1995). In addition to being “independent,” a state procedural ground for denial of a federal claim must be “adequate” to preclude federal habeas review of that claim. The Supreme Court recently reiterated the meaning of “adequate” for purposes of the “independent and adequate state ground” doctrine: “Ordinarily, violation of firmly established and regularly followed state rules . . . will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim. There are, however, exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground 40 inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.” Lee v. Kemna, 122 S. Ct. 877, 885 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to File a Motion to Transfer Foster’s Case to Youth Court Foster requests a COA from this court on his claim that Farrow rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to transfer Foster’s case to the youth court. As noted above, Foster did not raise this ineffective-assistance/transfer claim in his direct appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court (as he was still represented by Farrow at that point), but rather in his application for leave to file a motion for post-conviction relief to that court. In its post-conviction decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court clearly denied Foster’s ineffectiveassistance/transfer claim on its merits by applying the twopronged Strickland analysis: “[W]e must analyze the [claim] in terms of whether Farrow was reasonable for not requesting [a transfer] motion, and whether such failure resulted in prejudicing Foster’s defense.” Foster, 687 So. 2d at 1135. The court also, however, made reference to a purported state procedural ground in denying this claim. Specifically, the court stated that “[t]he true color of Foster’s (ineffectiveassistance/transfer) claim is that his death sentence is unconstitutional because he was placed in adult court without particularized findings.” Id. at 1136. According to the court, 41 it had already adjudicated this claim in Foster’s direct appeal and thus the claim was barred from reconsideration under the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 1137. While in this portion of its opinion the Mississippi Supreme Court appears to equate Foster’s ineffective-assistance/transfer claim with his Eighth Amendment claim (and thus to subject both claims to the state procedural bar), the court appears to recognize that the two claims are different and separate from each other elsewhere in the opinion, stating: [T]he issue of whether the death penalty is unconstitutional due to a lack of particularized finding in the youth court is a procedurally barred issue. We cannot consider the merits of this issue, as it was already dealt with on the direct appeal. . . . For the purposes of this petition, the only question that Foster could pose is whether Foster’s trial attorney was ineffective by failing to request a transfer proceeding from circuit court to youth court, and if ineffective, whether this error prejudiced his defense. Id. at 1135. The court then proceeded to adjudicate the ineffective-assistance/transfer claim on its merits under Strickland. See id. at 1135-36. Thus, at least in a substantial portion of its discussion of the two claims, the Mississippi Supreme Court apparently barred on res-judicata grounds only the Eighth Amendment claim (which Foster raised on direct appeal and again in the post-conviction proceedings) and deemed the ineffective-assistance/transfer claim cognizable on postconviction review. 42 As a result of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s equivocation about the basis for its decision to deny Foster’s ineffectiveassistance/transfer claim, that decision “fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law,” or, at the very least, “to be interwoven with federal law.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1040). As the Supreme Court has instructed, in such circumstances it is for the state court, not the reviewing federal court, to disentangle the federal-law ground from any state-law ground by a clear and express statement indicating that the state-law ground was a separate basis for the court’s decision independent of the federal-law ground. See, e.g., id.; Harris, 489 U.S. at 263. Because there is no such statement in the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion, federal review of Foster’s ineffective-assistance/transfer claim is not barred under the “independent and adequate state ground doctrine.12 12 The Mississippi Supreme Court invoked another state procedural rule (in addition to the doctrine of res judicata) in denying Foster’s ineffective-assistance/transfer claim, but the importance of this rule to the court’s decision is even less clear. The court noted that although “[n]o true new issues have been raised” by Foster’s ineffective-assistance/transfer claim, “any attempt to raise a new legal theory or ground at this point would be procedurally barred” under subsection 99-39-21(2) of the Mississippi Code. Foster, 687 So. 2d at 1136. Subsection 99-3921(2) provides, in pertinent part: “The litigation of a factual issue at trial and on direct appeal of a specific state or federal legal theory or theories shall constitute a waiver of all other state or federal legal theories which could have been raised under said factual issue.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-21(2) (2000). The subsection 99-39-21(2) procedural bar does not preclude federal review in this case for the same reason that the resjudicata bar does not preclude review, i.e., the Mississippi 43 We now turn to the question whether reasonable jurists would find the merits of Foster’s ineffective-assistance/transfer claim debatable. As noted above, the Mississippi youth courts generally have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal cases brought against anyone under eighteen years of age. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-105(d), 43-21-151(1). If a child is at least thirteen years old, the youth court “may, in its discretion, transfer jurisdiction of the alleged offense described in the petition or a lesser included offense to the criminal court which would have trial jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult.” Id. § 43-21-157(1). However, under section 43-21-151, “[a]ny act attempted or committed by a child, which if committed by an adult would be punishable under state or federal law by life imprisonment or death, will be in the original jurisdiction of the circuit court” rather than of the youth court. Id. § 43-21151(1)(a). In such cases, “the circuit judge, upon a finding that it would be in the best interest of such child and in the interest of justice, may at any stage of the proceedings prior to the attachment of jeopardy transfer such proceedings to the youth court.” Id. § 43-21-159(4). As the Mississippi Supreme Court pointed out, based on this statutory provision, “Mississippi law Supreme Court’s decision fairly appears to have rested primarily on federal law (or, at the very least, to be interwoven with federal law), and the court did not clearly and expressly state that the procedural bar provided a basis for the decision independent of the federal-law grounds. 44 clearly allows a person under the age of eighteen years, charged with a capital offense, to request by proper motion that the circuit court conduct a special hearing, considering the person’s age, lack of prior offenses, likelihood of successful rehabilitation and other factors which favor sending the case to the youth court rather than continuing in the circuit court.” Foster, 687 So. 2d at 1135 (quoting Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1297 (Miss. 1994)). In reviewing Foster’s application for leave to file a motion for post-conviction relief, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that Foster “cites no authority stating that it is ineffective for counsel to not request a special hearing to determine transfer to youth court,” but rather “merely states that trial counsel must not have known that this procedure was available to him, and that failure to know this constitutes a failure to know the law, and thus, is a textbook example of deficiency.” Id. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the record did not indicate that Farrow was unaware of the availability of the transfer procedure and that “the issue of whether a capital case juvenile is transferred back to a youth court is within the sound discretion of the circuit judge.” Id. The court further concluded that even assuming that Farrow’s failure to file a transfer motion was constitutionally deficient, that failure did not prejudice Foster. Id. at 1136. Reiterating that the decision whether “to transfer from circuit court to youth court 45 is within the sound discretion of the trial judge,” the Mississippi Supreme Court determined: Had Farrow requested such a finding, the trial judge would have found that Foster was seventeen and one-half years old, on the brink of eighteen years of age, and while he did not have any significant criminal history, he had a violent, selfish nature, exhibited uncooperative tendencies and according to the Whitfield Report, had the maturity to know right from wrong. . . . These elements will hardly send a case back to youth court. Id. The district court determined that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s denial of Foster’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on Farrow’s failure to file a transfer motion did not warrant federal habeas relief under § 2254(d). As stated above in Part III, deficient performance is established if it is shown that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s representation is objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The Strickland Court recognized that “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like are guides to determining what is reasonable.” Id. at 688 (internal citations omitted). The American Bar Association’s standards regarding transfer from juvenile court to adult court are based on a recognition of the “critical nature of the transfer decision.” A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS § 8.2(b) cmt. (1990). For example, the standards provide that “[i]n any case where transfer (from juvenile court to adult court) is likely, counsel should seek to discover at the 46 earliest opportunity whether transfer will be sought and, if so, the procedure and criteria according to which that determination will be made.” Id. § 8.2(a). Further, counsel “should promptly investigate all circumstances of the case bearing on the appropriateness of transfer,” including, “[w]here circumstances warrant, [the filing of a] prompt[] mo[tion] for appointment of an investigator or expert witness to aid in the preparation of the defense [against transfer].” Id. § 8.2(b); see also id. § 8.2(b) cmt. (“As at adjudication and disposition, a lawyer cannot provide effective assistance on the basis of brief familiarity with the case and the client’s circumstances.”). Although the American Bar Association’s standards directly address only the situation where a minor defendant must be prepared to argue that a transfer from juvenile court to an adult court is inappropriate, the concerns underlying these standards are equally relevant in the situation where a minor defendant in adult court has the opportunity to argue that transfer to juvenile court is appropriate. Cf. Girtman v. Lockhart, 942 F.2d 468, 476 (8th Cir. 1991) (“If transferring an offender to adult court without a hearing or a statement of reasons violates due process, it logically follows that keeping a juvenile offender in adult court without holding a transfer hearing or making oral or written findings also violates due process.”). Just as it is clearly in the minor’s best interest that counsel make every effort to prevent a transfer from juvenile court to adult court, 47 it is clearly in the minor’s best interest that counsel make every effort to secure a transfer from adult court to juvenile court. At least in the circumstances of the instant case, there is no conceivable strategic justification for forgoing available procedures for obtaining a transfer to juvenile court, and thus this omission is not entitled to Strickland deference. In light of the foregoing and of the severity of the death penalty, we resolve any doubts in favor of Foster and grant his request for a COA on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on Farrow’s failure to file a motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. Further, given the American Bar Association’s Juvenile Justice Standards and our conclusion that Farrow’s decision not to file a motion to transfer to the youth court was not strategic, we have some concern about the reasonableness of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s determination that Farrow’s performance was not deficient. However, we need not decide the deficient-performance issue because we cannot say that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s determination that Foster was not prejudiced by Farrow’s failure to file the motion involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the available evidence. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”). 48 The Mississippi Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland or any other clearly established Supreme Court law in determining that, given Foster’s age and the Whitfield report’s findings, it was not reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different (i.e., that the trial court would have granted a transfer motion) if Farrow had filed a transfer motion. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of relief on the ineffective-assistance/transfer claim. D. Claim That the Eighth Amendment Requires That Particularized Findings Be Made Before Juveniles May Be Tried as an Adult for a Capital Offense Foster also requests a COA from this court on his claim that his death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the trial court did not make a particularized finding that he was sufficiently mature and morally culpable before he was tried and sentenced as an adult for a capital offense. In affirming his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied this claim as procedurally barred on the ground that Foster had failed to raise it in the trial court. Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1295 (Miss. 1994). In the alternative, the court denied the claim on its merits. Id. at 1297-98 (“Even if Foster’s claim[] [that ‘it was unconstitutional not to have a certification procedure in death cases under Mississippi law for persons under 18 years of age’] were not barred because of his 49 failure to raise [it] in the trial court . . ., we would still find th[is] issue[] to be totally without merit.”). We conclude that the language in the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion indicating that Foster’s Eighth Amendment claim “is procedurally barred and, alternatively, found to be without merit,” id. at 1298, constitutes a sufficiently “clear and express” statement that the procedural ground was an independent basis for that court’s decision. Corwin v. Johnson, 150 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 1998) (“It is clear in this Circuit that alternative rulings do not operate to vitiate the validity of a [state] procedural bar that constitutes the [state court’s] primary holding.”); cf. Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 534 (1992) (holding that the state court had expressed the independence of the state procedural ground with the “requisite clarity” by stating that “[n]one of the complained-of jury instructions were objected to at trial, and, thus, they are not preserved for appeal,” even though the state court also noted that “[i]n any event, [the] claims . . . have no merit”). Foster does not argue that the procedural rule applied by the Mississippi Supreme Court to his Eighth Amendment claim —— i.e., the requirement that a defendant must raise claims in the trial court in order to preserve them for appellate review —— is inadequate. Nor do we find this preservation rule to be inadequate —— either as a general matter or as applied in Foster’s case. A review of Mississippi appellate cases indicates 50 that the preservation rule is firmly established and regularly applied to claims alleging a violation of the “Cruel and Unusual Punishments” Clause of the Eighth Amendment (via the Fourteenth Amendment). See, e.g., Wilcher v. State, 697 So. 2d 1087, 1108 (Miss. 1997); Holly v. State, 716 So. 2d 979, 985 (Miss. 1993); Taylor v. State, 452 So. 2d 441, 450 (Miss. 1984); McCormick v. State, 802 So. 2d 157, 161-62 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); Coleman v. State, 788 So. 2d 788, 793 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Thus, the state preservation rule is an independent and adequate state ground for the Mississippi Supreme Court’s denial of Foster’s Eighth Amendment claim. Foster argues that federal review is nevertheless proper on grounds of “cause and prejudice.” Specifically, he maintains that we should not recognize the state procedural bar because his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to file a motion to transfer his case to youth court. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court based its denial of Foster’s Eighth Amendment claim on his counsel’s failure to raise the claim in the trial court, not on his counsel’s failure to file a transfer motion. See Foster, 639 So. 2d at 1295. Foster does not argue that federal habeas review is appropriate notwithstanding his procedural default because his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise the Eighth Amendment claim in the trial court. Thus, we conclude that reasonable jurists would agree that federal review of Foster’s Eighth Amendment claim is precluded 51 under the “independent and adequate state ground” doctrine. Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to address whether reasonable jurists would find the merits of the claim debatable. Cf. Dowthitt, 230 F.3d at 753 n.30 (“As we find that the first prong of the Slack inquiry for procedural claims has not been met, we do not need to address the second prong.”). We thus deny Foster’s request for a COA on his Eighth Amendment claim.