Opinion ID: 200328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Assistance Departure (Romero)

Text: Romero pled guilty and presents one issue, a sentencing issue, on his appeal. He argues that the sole reason the government failed to move that he be given a Section 5K1.1 sentence reduction for substantial assistance was an impermissible one: it was in -73- retaliation for his telling the truth in his third debriefing, a truth which was exculpatory as to codefendant Ortiz. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 provides: Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.). Romero's plea agreement stated that [t]he United States reserves its option to seek any departure from the applicable sentencing guidelines, pursuant to Section 5K1.1 . . . if in its discretion the United States determines that such a departure is appropriate. The agreement further specified that [t]he defendant agrees that the decision whether to file such motion rests in the sole discretion of the United States. The district court, after hearing proffers from both counsel, rejected the argument and declined to take testimony from Agent Plichta, who conducted the debriefings at issue here. Romero argued that there was error in not holding an evidentiary hearing and in not compelling the government to file such a motion. Our review of questions of law is de novo; our review of the -74- fact-based conclusion of the district court as to the substantial assistance question is for clear error. See United States v. Doe, 233 F.3d 642, 643-44 (1st Cir 2000). Implicit in the question presented is an issue of law: assuming Romero's claims were true, whether it is permissible for the government to decline to seek a substantial assistance departure in retaliation for a cooperating defendant's truthful disclosure of exculpatory information about codefendants. In this area, the government acts under two constraints. First, the law is clear that the government may not base its decision on an unconstitutional motive, such as racial prejudice. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992). Second, because the government entered into a plea agreement with Romero, it had to carry out in good faith the obligations it assumed under the agreement. See United States v. Alegria, 192 F.3d 179, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Davis, 247 F.3d 322, 325 (1st Cir. 2001). This good-faith requirement applies even though the plea agreement specifies that the government retains absolute discretion with respect to the filing of a section 5K1.1 motion. Alegria, 192 F.3d at 186-87. Whether viewed as part of the Wade obligation or the Alegria obligation, the government may not base its refusal to seek a substantial assistance departure on a defendant's truthful disclosure of exculpatory information. We can think of few things -75- more corrosive to the criminal justice system than prosecutorial retaliation against a witness for telling the truth. If these were the government's grounds, they would both be impermissible and have no rational relationship to a legitimate government end. Cf. Davis, 247 F.3d at 326. The district court held that Romero had not made a threshold showing of improper motivation by the government. See Alegria, 192 F.3d at 187. In explaining to the district court its reasons for not filing a Section 5K1.1 motion, the government used language that was likely to arouse suspicion. It complained that, because of Romero's statements and writings produced at the third of his four debriefings, the prosecution was forced to provide defense counsel with Brady and Jencks material. Appropriately concerned by these statements, the district judge investigated further and took proffers from both counsel. In the end, the district court was satisfied that the government had reason to think Romero was not truthful at the last two debriefings and, while he had given assistance, he had not given substantial assistance. Romero's untruthfulness was shown by the fact that he did not disclose certain information helpful to Ortiz and Nelson until his third debriefing, and that this newlydisclosed information appeared to be inconsistent with information provided by another cooperating witness. As the trial judge noted, the government had told the court it intended to use Romero as a -76- prosecution witness at trial but then did not do so. This decision not to call Romero as a witness was entirely consistent with the government's view, expressed at sentencing, that Romero was not truthful. And, as the district court aptly noted, substantial assistance is a higher standard for a defendant to meet than mere cooperation. Romero's failure to be forthcoming in earlier debriefings evidenced his failure to meet this higher standard. When faced with such Section 5K1.1 claims where there is a plea agreement, the government bears the modest burden of production, not persuasion. Alegria, 192 F.3d at 187. The government must offer facially adequate reasons. Id. at 188. It did so here. The judge, who sat through a lengthy trial and inquired into this matter, found nothing impermissible about the government's reasons for declining to seek a substantial assistance departure. Given the judge's extensive exploration of the issue with counsel, no separate evidentiary hearing was required. J. Supervised Release Terms (Bonet and Rodriguez) Bonet and Rodriguez challenge the length of their terms of supervised release. The district judge sentenced Bonet to twenty years of supervised release and Rodriguez to fifteen years. Both defendants claim that these terms were invalid because they were disproportionately longer as a percentage of their total years of imprisonment than their codefendants' terms. This argument is foreclosed by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), which establishes the limited -77- circumstances in which a defendant can seek review of his sentence. As the Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Rios-Calderon, 80 F.3d 194, 198 (7th Cir. 1996), nothing in § 3742(a) allows review of a sentence imposed in conformity with the Guidelines on the ground that a codefendant was treated differently. See also United States v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d 349, 356 (10th Cir. 1993) (Sentencing differences due to individual conduct as considered by the Sentencing Guidelines does not make a sentence disproportionate.). Rodriguez also argues that his supervised release term is barred by U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2. We note at the outset that this claim was nearly forfeited because of the skeletal manner in which it was raised. See Mass. Sch. of Law v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 43 (1st Cir. 1998) (claim is forfeited if it is raised in a perfunctory manner unaccompanied by developed argumentation). But we will give Rodriguez the benefit of the doubt and find that the claim was not forfeited. Rodriguez's counsel also failed to object to the length of the supervised release term at sentencing, which would normally mean that his claim could be reviewed only for plain error. But we will again give Rodriguez the benefit of the doubt because he was not given advance notice in the presentence report or by the judge or prosecutor that he could be sentenced to more than five years of supervised release, the maximum term specified in the guidelines. -78- We now turn to the merits of Rodriguez's claim. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2 states that supervised release terms for Class A or B felonies shall be at least three years but not more than five years. The relevant statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), provides that the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of supervised release of at least five years. This court's recent decision in United States v. Cortes-Claudio held that these provisions should be read together to mean that a defendant convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) can be sentenced to only five years of supervised release unless the judge makes a permissible upward departure from the guidelines. 312 F.3d 17, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002). The judge can make such a departure if he finds that there are aggravating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission, and if the parties are given advance notice that the judge is contemplating making such a departure and of the grounds on which the judge is contemplating departing. Id. at 24; see also United States v. Burns, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1991). The district judge in this case did not anticipate this court's decision in Cortes-Claudio and mistakenly concluded that the guidelines did not apply to the length of a supervised release term imposed under 21 U.S.C. § 841. Thus he did not give the parties notice of a possible upward departure or make the required findings of aggravating circumstances to support the departure. We -79- accordingly vacate Rodriguez's fifteen-year supervised release term and remand to the district court for re-sentencing as to the length of the term of supervised release. On remand, should the district court find that there are aggravating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission, it must still give the parties advance notice that it is contemplating departing and the grounds of the possible departure and give them an opportunity to respond. K. Other Sentencing Guidelines Issues 1. Drug quantities (Caribe, Bonet, Valle, Chevere, Arroyo, Nelson, Rodriguez) In sentencing, the district court took into account the amount of drugs that could be attributed to each defendant. Several defendants challenge these determinations, which are distinct from claims that the determination of quantity by the judge rather than the jury violated Apprendi.15 We review the trial court's factual determinations at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Damon, 127 F.3d 139, 141 (1st Cir. 1997). Legal interpretations of the sentencing guidelines are reviewed de novo. United States v. 15 As we noted above, Apprendi only requires the jury to determine the drug type and quantity involved in the conspiracy. After the jury has made this determination, the judge can make individualized determinations about the amount of drugs attributable to each defendant. Even though the jury did not make its initial determination, we found no reversible error as to any defendant, so that the judge could still determine the amount of drug attributable to each defendant. -80- Ranney, 298 F.3d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 2002). a. Caribe Caribe argues that the court erred in setting his base offense level at 38, which is applicable to a quantity of 150 kilograms or more of cocaine. The court set the base offense level after determining that 745 kilograms of cocaine could be attributed to Caribe. The court held that Caribe was directly involved in the conspiracy to import 700 kilograms of cocaine in the fall of 1997. This determination was consistent with the testimony of CI Diaz, who testified that Caribe was a key player in several meetings to plan the details of this importation. It also attributed to Caribe 45 kilograms of cocaine out of the successful 250 kilogram importation, which he sent to his brother-in-law in New York for distribution. Torres had testified that Caribe was in charge of moving some amount of cocaine up to New York, and that he believed the amount to be about forty-five kilograms. It was not clear error for the court to conclude that Caribe was responsible, at least in part, for distributing 45 kilograms of cocaine. This total quantity of 745 kilograms of cocaine supports the court's decision to set Caribe's base offense level at 38. b. Bonet The court found Bonet responsible for at least 150 kilograms of cocaine, based on Bonet's involvement with the planned importation of 700 kilograms of cocaine. This determination was -81- not clear error considering Bonet's role in planning this importation. Bonet argues that the court should have reduced the amount of cocaine attributed to the defendants because of the intensive involvement of CIS Hernandez and Diaz in the conspiracy. This is a type of improper sentencing factor manipulation argument, for which Bonet has the burden. As stated in United States v. Montoya, garden variety manipulation claims are largely a waste of time. 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995). It is insufficient to say that the idea of the conspiracy originated with undercover agents, or that conduct was encouraged by the government, or that the crime exceeded in degree or kind what the defendant had done before. Instead the defendant must show that elements like these were so extensive that the government's conduct must be viewed as extraordinary misconduct. Id. (internal quotations omitted). This standard is high in part because the defendant has the opportunity to raise an entrapment defense at trial. Bonet has fallen far short of this standard; he offers nothing more than conclusory allegations. Furthermore, Hernandez testified that the Colombians, not he or Diaz, set the amount involved in the cocaine importations. For example, in the 700 kilogram importation, Hernandez testified that the Colombians wanted the organization to import 700 kilograms of cocaine as a test to determine whether its members had the capability to import larger -82- quantities of drugs in the future. Bonet also bragged to Diaz that he and his team had been drug trafficking for years. It is unlikely, therefore, that government agents encouraged Bonet or his coconspirators to engage in conduct in which they would otherwise have been unwilling to participate. c. Valle Valle argues that the judge erred in attributing at least 150 kilograms of cocaine to him. He did not raise this claim at sentencing, and therefore it is waived. United States v. Shattuck, 961 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir. 1992) (We do not review sentencing guideline disputes which were not preserved before the district court.). We have discretion to review waived guidelines claims in horrendous cases where a gross miscarriage of justice would occur. United States v. Haggert, 980 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1992). This is not one of those cases. The evidence overwhelmingly tied Valle to the planned importation of 1,100 kilograms of drugs. CI Hernandez testified extensively about Valle's involvement in this transaction and the amount and type of drugs involved. d. Chevere Chevere argues that the district court erred in finding that he was involved in the importation of 250 kilograms of cocaine. Torres testified that Chevere was in charge of security for this successful transaction. Chevere argues that the district court should not have used this transaction to set Chevere's base offense -83- level, because an FBI agent who was watching the delivery location testified that he did not actually see the drugs being delivered. Whether the FBI agent saw it or not, there was ample additional evidence at trial that the transaction took place, and that Chevere was involved in it. There was no clear error. e. Arroyo Arroyo argues error in the attribution of 1,200 kilograms of cocaine to him because the government did not show that he had the capability to transport such a large amount of cocaine. Arroyo argues that the government never proved that Arroyo owned a boat that could be used to bring the cocaine to Puerto Rico. Under the sentencing guidelines, if a planned drug transaction does not take place, the sentencing court should base the defendant's drugquantity finding on the negotiated amount of drugs, in this case 1,200 kilograms. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.12. However, the court can use a lower amount if the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide, or was not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance. Id. Thus the burden is on Arroyo to show that he was not capable of transporting 1,200 kilograms of cocaine. Arroyo has not met his burden in this case and there was no clear error. f. Nelson Nelson argues that the district court erred in attributing 99.5 kilograms of cocaine to him. The court found that he was -84- involved in the successful importation of 250 kilograms of cocaine and had a role in distributing 50 kilograms from that shipment. Torres testified that Rivera gave Nelson some unknown percentage of Rivera's own share of the cocaine from this shipment. Rivera also gave a percentage of his share to Caribe and to Chevere, but Torres did not know exactly how much each of the three defendants received; he only knew that together they received 50 kilograms. Nelson and Rivera, in recorded conversations, discussed the price at which they would be able to sell the cocaine. The court also found that he had a role in the attempted importation of 36 kilograms of cocaine and the transaction involving 6,000 pounds of marijuana. It also could have based its overall findings on Nelson's more general involvement in distributing Rivera's share of the cocaine. We see no clear error in the court's conclusion. g. Rodriguez Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in determining that his base offense level was 34, which is applicable when the judge attributes at least 15 kilograms of cocaine to the defendant. The government alleged that Rodriguez was involved in delivering to Figueroa in New York approximately 45 kilograms of cocaine from the 250 kilogram shipment. The government introduced taped conversations in which Rivera told Figueroa that he had arranged for someone to deliver the cocaine to Figueroa. The day before, Rodriguez had flown to New York from San Juan. The government also -85- introduced a recording of a conversation in which Rodriguez and Rivera discussed the price of cocaine. At trial, Rodriguez disputed that he had been involved in the cocaine delivery, but the jury could not have convicted Rodriguez otherwise. The only remaining issue is the amount of drugs that Rodriguez brought to New York; Torres testified that Rivera sent about 45 kilograms there. It was not clear error for the judge to attribute at least fifteen of those kilograms of cocaine to Rodriguez. 2. Minor Participant Adjustment (Bonet) Bonet argues that the court erred in not granting him a twolevel reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) for being a minor participant in the conspiracy. The commentary to this section states that a minor participant means any participant who is less capable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) cmt. n.5. In seeking a § 3B1.2 adjustment, a defendant has the burden of proving that he is both less culpable than most others involved in the offense of conviction and less culpable than most other miscreants convicted of comparable crimes. United States v. Ortiz-Santiago, 211 F.3d 146, 149 (1st Cir. 2000). The court did not err in refusing to grant this adjustment. The testimony at trial showed that Bonet participated in several of the meetings in which the conspirators planned the importation of 700 kilograms of cocaine. Bonet was also responsible for testing the radio equipment that -86- would be used. Finally, Bonet told CI Diaz that he had been part of Rivera's drug trafficking team for many years. It was entirely reasonable to conclude that Bonet was no minor participant. 3. Special Skills Enhancements (Valle and Bonet) Section 3B1.3 of the sentencing guidelines provides that the district court can increase the offense level two levels if the defendant used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. The commentary to this section states, 'Special skill' refers to a skill not possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring substantial education, training or licensing. Examples would include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, chemists, and demolition experts. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.3. We review the district court's legal interpretation of the term special skill de novo and its factual application for clear error. United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 499 (1st Cir. 1997). The district court increased Valle's offense level by two levels because it found that Valle was going to be the boat captain for the first planned importation of 1,100 kilograms of cocaine, thus exercising a special skill. Valle did not object to this enhancement at his sentencing hearing, and therefore he waived the claim. Haggert, 980 F.2d at 10-11. Even if this claim were not waived, the record amply supports the determination. The district court enhanced Bonet's offense level by two -87- levels because it found that his coconspirators were counting on his skills as a person knowledgeable with communication equipment. The record establishes that Bonet had a special skill. CI Diaz testified that on October 30, 1997, Bonet conducted a test of the 20/40 radio that the conspirators were planning to use to communicate with the Colombians in order to complete the planned importation of 700 kilograms of cocaine. A 20/40 radio is one that can be used to communicate with any part of the world. Bonet showed Diaz the antenna he had put on a tree outside his house. Bonet then set up the radio and tried to contact the Colombians; unbeknownst to him, the transmission was intercepted by the FBI. Bonet conducted the test over high and low frequency channels and had given the Colombians the same list of frequencies so that the two groups could communicate. This evidence shows that Bonet had a special skill within the meaning of § 3B1.3. Accord United States v. Malgoza, 2 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993) (term special skills applies to an advanced level of radio operating ability). A defendant does not need to have formal education or professional stature to have a special skill within the meaning of § 3B1.3. Noah, 130 F.3d at 500. Instead a special skill can be derived from experience or from self-tutelage. Id. Nonetheless, the defendant must possess skills that members of the general public would not have. Bonet's knowledge was more extensive than -88- merely turning on a radio and speaking; he also knew how to assemble the radio and its antenna and understood how to determine and locate the frequencies necessary to communicate with the Colombians. The issue remains whether Bonet's skill significantly facilitated the commission . . . of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. Diaz did not testify that Bonet would be the person operating the radios on the day the shipment was delivered. Two reasonable inferences support a determination that Bonet's special skill substantially facilitated commission of the crime. We review both possible determinations for clear error. First, Bonet's radio test in and of itself aided the conspiracy. He was responsible for making sure that Rivera's organization had the necessary radio equipment to handle such a large importation of drugs. The Colombians would not be willing to entrust Rivera's organization with the shipment if it could not make this showing. Even though Bonet was unable to contact the Colombians during his radio test, it did show Diaz (who, as an intermediary, acted as the Colombians' representative) that Rivera's organization had at least some of the necessary equipment and skills. Second, an inference that Bonet would be the one operating the radios the day of the shipment could not be clear error. Bonet played an integral part in the meetings. He told Diaz that he was -89- skilled as a boat captain, but that he would not be the boat captain for this shipment. Bonet argues that he never got a chance to use his special skills to the full extent contemplated by his conspirators. However, U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a) also covers intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty. It was not clear error to conclude with reasonable certainty that Bonet intended to use his special skill to facilitate the crime. See United States v. Downing, 297 F.3d 52, 65 (2d Cir. 2002). 4. Firearm Enhancement (Caribe) The district court increased Caribe's offense level by two levels because the court determined that Rivera had a weapon in Caribe's presence during part of the planning of the 700 kilogram importation. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) provides that the judge can increase the offense level by two levels if a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed. The comment to this section states that the enhancement applies if a weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3. The judge found that Caribe was present when Rivera gave CI Diaz a gun to give to CI Hernandez. Diaz testified that he met with Caribe and Rivera on August 16, 1997. At the end of the meeting, Rivera gave Diaz a gun that he asked Diaz to give to Hernandez. Rivera told Diaz that Hernandez could use the gun if he -90- had to because it was clean. Caribe claims that he left the meeting before Rivera gave Diaz the gun, but this claim is not supported by the record. Caribe was the last person to arrive at the meeting, but Rivera gave Diaz the gun at the end of the meeting as they were saying good-bye. It was not clear error for the judge to determine that Caribe remained at the meeting at this point. Caribe next argues that the government did not establish the required nexus between the gun and the conspiracy. The prosecution must show that the defendant (or in a conspiracy case, one of his coconspirators) possessed a weapon during the offense. United States v. McDonald, 121 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Thornton, 306 F.3d 1355, 1358 (3rd Cir. 2002). The prosecution does not have to show that the defendant or his coconspirators actually used the gun in perpetrating the offense or intended to do so. McDonald, 121 F.3d at 10. Once the prosecution has made this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that a connection between the weapon and the crime was clearly improbable. Id. Caribe argues that the prosecution did not make its required showing because it relied on the uncorroborated testimony of CI Diaz. It is routine, and certainly not clear error, for the trial judge to credit a witness's testimony in making sentencing determinations, even if the testimony is not corroborated by other evidence. Nor did the judge err in determining that Caribe's coconspirator possessed the gun in connection with the conspiracy. -91- 5. Leadership Enhancement (Caribe) Caribe next argues that the court erred in increasing his offense level by three levels after determining that Caribe was a manager or supervisor in the organization. Section 3B1.1(b) permits the court to enhance the sentence if the defendant was manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. The court based its determination on CI Diaz's testimony about Caribe's role in planning the importation of 700 kilograms of cocaine in the fall of 1997. For example, Diaz testified that Caribe controlled all of the beaches and the group from Humacao, including the captain and the boats. Caribe also told Diaz that Ortiz, who was supposed to captain the boat that would bring the drugs into Puerto Rico, worked for him. According to Diaz, Caribe said that they [Rivera and Caribe] had the captains, the boats, and the personnel that was needed to carry out the job. This evidence is sufficient to support the court's determination. 6. Downward Departure Requests (Valle and Nelson) The district court denied motions by Valle and Nelson for downward departures in their sentences. Valle argues that the district judge abused his discretion by failing to depart from the sentencing guidelines because of a claimed disparity between his sentence and the sentence of some of his coconspirators. The -92- argument fails; a court cannot depart from the sentencing guidelines in order to correct a disparity between the sentences of coconspirators. See United States v. Ortiz-Santiago, 211 F.3d 146, 150 (1st Cir. 2000) (Disparity in sentencing amongst coconspirators, without more, is not enough to justify a downward departure.).16 Nelson argues for a downward departure based on his necessity defense that he participated in the conspiracy only to save his kidnapped nephew. This was committed to the nonreviewable discretion of the district court. See United States v. Romero, 32 F.3d 641, 653 (1st Cir. 1994). L. Procedural Errors at Sentencing (Caribe) 1. Right to Speedy Sentencing Caribe claims that his right to a fair trial was violated because of excessive delay in his sentencing. Caribe was convicted on October 1, 1999. All objections to the Presentence Investigation Report were submitted by April 25, 2000, but he was not sentenced until December 15, 2000. Thus, over fourteen months passed between the date of conviction and the date of sentencing. The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has not 16 It is far from clear that there was any disparity. Valle's sentence of 360 months was greater than four coconspirators' sentences and equal to or less than four other coconspirators' sentences. -93- definitively held that this right extends to the sentencing phase. See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (assuming without deciding that the sentence is part of the trial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment). However, most circuits that have addressed this issue have held that the right to a speedy trial extends to this phase. See, e.g., United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531, 535-39 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1220 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Reese, 568 F.2d 1246, 1252-53 (6th Cir. 1977). Several other circuits, including this one, have assumed without deciding that the right extends to sentencing. See, e.g., Katz v. King, 627 F.2d 568, 576 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Rothrock, 20 F.3d 709, 711 (7th Cir. 1994). No circuit has held that the right to a speedy trial does not apply at this phase.17 We assume for the purposes of this appeal that the right to a speedy trial extends to sentencing. We analyze the defendant's claim under the four factors that the Supreme Court set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972): the length of the delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to the defendant. None of these factors is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation 17 A judge is also required under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a) to sentence a defendant without unnecessary delay. Caribe has not argued that the delay in his case violated this rule, and therefore we do not address whether he would have a possible claim thereunder. -94- of the right to a speedy sentencing. See id. at 533. Applying these factors to the case at hand, we conclude that any right to speedy sentencing was not violated. A fourteen-month delay between the date of conviction and the date of sentencing is long enough to trigger an inquiry into the other Barker factors. See Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding a fifteen-month delay long enough to provoke an inquiry into the remaining three factors); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance); Katz, 627 F.2d at 577 (finding that a four-month delay is not unreasonable and certainly not of constitutional dimensions). Caribe does not make a persuasive showing on any of the other factors. It took approximately seven months for the probation officer to complete the presentence report and for the parties to submit their objections. This time was not excessive given the length of the trial, the number of defendants, and the complexity of the evidence, and indeed Caribe has not challenged this portion of the delay. Much of the later delay can be attributed to Caribe's own motions. He filed a series of motions to continue his sentencing: the first such motions were filed on December 17, 1999 and February 1, 2000 and were denied on January 13, 2000 and February 4, 2000, respectively; the court acceded to later requests -95- from Caribe's counsel to postpone the sentencing, which had been scheduled for February 25, 2000; the court eventually denied Caribe's December 6, 2000 motion to continue his sentencing on December 13, 2000 and sentenced Caribe on December 15, 2000. Caribe also filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied on December 15, 2000. Finally, and most importantly, Caribe has not shown he suffered any prejudice as a result of the fourteen-month delay. The prejudice resulting from a delay between indictment and trial is obvious: the accused must live with the anxiety and concern of facing trial; he may have to spend an extended length of time in custody; and his defense may be impaired if witnesses' memories fade. However, [m]ost of those interests diminish or disappear altogether once there has been a conviction. Perez, 793 F.2d at 256. Thus, the courts have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no substantial and demonstrable prejudice. Id. Caribe argues that the delay made it more difficult for him to challenge the contested factual allegations in the presentence report, but he does not explain which allegations or how he was prejudiced. He also claims that the delay gave the government more time to persuade the probation officer to include unwarranted enhancements in the presentence report, but as discussed below, Caribe was not prejudiced by these communications. Caribe may have been anxious about the length of the sentence the -96- judge would impose, but such anxiety is present in every sentencing and cannot be sufficient to meet the prejudice requirement. 2. Ex Parte Communications Between Prosecution and Probation Officer Caribe also argues that the prosecution violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(B) by having ex parte communications with the probation officer who wrote the presentence report. Caribe apparently wants this court to eliminate the two enhancements added to his offense level and remand the case to the district judge for re-sentencing. Rule 32(b)(6)(B) provides: Within 14 days after receiving the presentence report, the parties shall communicate in writing to the probation officer, and to each other, any objections to any material information, sentencing classifications, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy statements contained in or omitted from the presentence report. After receiving objections, the probation officer may meet with the defendant, the defendant's counsel, and the attorney for the Government to discuss those objections. The probation officer may also conduct a further investigation and revise the presentence report as appropriate. The probation officer issued her initial presentence report to both parties on February 3, 2000. This report did not recommend an enhancement for Caribe's leadership role in the conspiracy or possession of a gun during the conspiracy. Caribe alleges that Agent Plichta then met with the probation officer and reviewed the evidence about Caribe's role in the conspiracy. The probation officer then amended her report to recommend a four-level enhancement for a leadership role and a two-level enhancement for firearm possession. Caribe's counsel was not given a chance to -97- rebut Agent Plichta's statements before the amended report was released, although he was able to file formal objections pursuant to Rule 32 and to raise his objections directly to the district court during the sentencing hearing. Caribe filed a motion objecting to the ex parte communications and demanding disclosure of all documents that the probation officer used in preparing the presentence report. The defendant also asked to be able to call the probation officer as a witness at the sentencing hearing to examine the extent of the communications. In a published opinion, United States v. Caribe Garcia, 125 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.P.R. 2000), the district judge denied the motion. The court held that there was no prosecutorial misconduct because disclosing information to the probation officer [is] the functional equivalent of disclosing information to the court itself. Id. at 21. The court also stated that Caribe failed to show that he was entitled to a downward departure given that the presentence report only recommends a sentence and the final sentencing determination is made after the Court hears arguments and objections to the presentence report in open court. Id. We agree with the second basis for the court's opinion but not the first. The first issue is difficult because of the discrepancy between the fairly formal procedure contemplated by Rule 32 and the more informal reality. It is common for one side to speak with the -98- probation officer, either before or after the report is released. One district court has stated that, in that court's experience, ex parte communications between the government and the probation officer preparing the report are appropriate and regular. Roccisano v. United States, 936 F. Supp. 96, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But we could not fully embrace such informality without reading Rule 32(b) out of the Federal Rules; Rule 32(b) does require a more structured process, at least in the fourteen-day period following the release of the presentence report. Rule 32(b) is literally read as permitting ex parte communications initiated by either party both before and after this fourteen-day period. During the fourteen-day period, however, while the parties are preparing their written objections to the presentence report, the parties, under the rule, should communicate with the probation officer only in writing, and all communications must be disclosed to the other party. This reading of the rule permits most of the present informality, while allowing both sides to know the scope of the objections. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(B) advisory committee notes to 1994 Amendments (the parties should have a fair opportunity . . . to review, object to, and comment upon, the probation officer's report in advance of the sentencing hearing). There are benefits to informality, but the parties should at least know what issues are on the table concerning the presentence report so they can present counter- -99- arguments if they desire. Even if contact with Agent Plichta did inadvertently violate Rule 32, Caribe has failed to show that he has suffered any harm as a result. First, he does not explain what he hoped to accomplish by additional discovery or by calling the probation officer to testify at the sentencing hearing. The revised presentence report apparently sets forth the additional evidence the probation officer relied upon in amending her recommendations, and all other facts appear to be undisputed. Second, as the district court noted, the report is only a recommendation to the court; the court is not bound to accept these recommendations. The district court in this case had notice that the second report was prepared after the prosecution's alleged ex parte contact and gave Caribe's counsel ample opportunity at sentencing to dispute the report's recommendations. The court then found that the enhancements were appropriate and sentenced the defendant accordingly. Thus Caribe fails to show what harm he suffered as a result of the ex parte communications. See, e.g., Montoya, 62 F.3d at 3 (1st Cir. 1995) ([T]he sentencing court has ample power to deal with [prosecutorial misconduct impacting the judge's sentencing options] by excluding the tainted transaction from the computation of relevant conduct or by departing from the [recommendation].). -100- M. Conclusion We affirm the judgments and the sentences and reject each of the defendant's claims, except that we remand, in accordance with this opinion, the issue of the term of supervised release for Rodriguez and vacate that aspect only of his sentence. So ordered. -101-