Opinion ID: 509546
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Supreme Court's Opinion in Rowley

Text: 32 We begin our discussion of the substantive protections of the EHA with the Supreme Court's opinion in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), because the parties' arguments are so closely tied to that case; only in the context of Rowley can we intelligently present the parties' contentions and the district court's opinion. 33 Rowley concerned an eight year old deaf child, Amy Rowley, whose parents requested a full-time interpreter to assist her in school. The school district's refusal to provide this service under the EHA generated the dispute. Amy possessed some residual hearing and was an excellent lip reader. She was an above average student who performed at the level of her grade and was advancing from grade to grade in her regular public school classroom. Because of her hearing disability, she could only understand about 60% of what transpired in class. Nevertheless, she performed impressively in a mainstreamed classroom. 34 The school had made substantial efforts to assist Amy. Before her arrival at school, a number of administrators learned sign language to communicate with her. At the time of her request for a full time interpreter, the school was already providing Amy with a special FM hearing aid, speech therapy, and tutoring for the deaf. In addition, Amy's parents, who also were deaf, could communicate with the school by a teletype machine specifically installed in the principal's office for that purpose. 35 The Supreme Court held that Amy was not entitled to a private interpreter as part of her IEP under the EHA even though she could not follow 100% of the class' activities without such extra assistance. The Court analyzed the EHA and held that if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a 'free appropriate public education' as defined by the Act. 458 U.S. at 189, 102 S.Ct. 3042. 11 The Court thus explained that the purpose of the Act was to provide a basic level of educational opportunity, not to provide the best education money can buy. See id. (certainly the language of the statute contains no requirement ... that states maximize the potential of handicapped children); id. at 197 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. at 3046 n. 21 (Whatever Congress meant by an 'appropriate' education, it is clear that it did not mean a potential-maximizing education.); Muth v. Central Bucks Schools Dist., 839 F.2d 113, 119 (3d Cir.1988) (citing Rowley ). However desirable the goal of maximizing each child's potential may be in terms of individuals, the Court obviously recognized that achieving such a goal would be beyond the fiscal capacity of state and local governments, and that Congress had realized that fact as well. 36 Furthermore, the Court cautioned against too much judicial interference in the substance of the child's education. It concluded that, where a handicapped child is receiving an appropriate education, it is not the job of this court or any other to dictate educational methods to special education experts. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208, 102 S.Ct. at 3052 (once a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States) (citations and footnotes omitted); Rettig v. Kent City School Dist., 720 F.2d 463, 465-66 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1201, 104 S.Ct. 2379, 81 L.Ed.2d 339 (1984). Instead, the Court focused on access to special education rather than the content of that education. It quoted at length the legislative history of the EHA, holding that its sponsors emphasized receipt of educational services rather than any specific form or level of educational benefit. Id. 458 U.S. at 195-97, 102 S.Ct. at 3045-46; see id. at 200, 102 S.Ct. at 3047-48 (neither the Act nor its history persuasively demonstrates that Congress thought that equal protection required anything more than equal access). Adverting to the legislative history, the Court concluded that the intent of the Act was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside. Id. at 192, 102 S.Ct. at 3043. 37 Although the tenor of the Rowley opinion reflects the Court's reluctance to involve the courts in substantive determinations of appropriate education and its emphasis on the procedural protection of the IEP process, it is clear that the Court was not espousing an entirely toothless standard of substantive review. Rather, the Rowley Court described the level of benefit conferred by the Act as meaningful. 458 U.S. at 192, 102 S.Ct. at 3043. As the Court explained: 38 By passing the Act, Congress sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped children. But in seeking to provide such access to public education, Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful. 39 Id. (emphasis added). After noting the deference due to states on questions of education and the theme of access rather than a guarantee of any particular standard of benefit, the Court acknowledged that: 40 Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a free appropriate public education is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child. It would do little good for Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing access to a public education only to have the handicapped child receive no benefit from that education. The statutory definition of free appropriate public education, in addition to requiring that States provide each child with specially designed instruction, expressly requires the provision of such ... supportive services ... as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education. Sec. 1401(17). We therefore conclude that the basic floor of opportunity provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child. 41 Id. at 200-01, 102 S.Ct. at 3048 (emphasis in original). 42 The preceding quotation demonstrates that the Supreme Court in Rowley did not abdicate responsibility for monitoring the substantive quality of education under the EHA. Instead, it held that the education must provide educational benefit. The Court thus recognized that the substantive, independent judicial review envisioned by the EHA was not a hollow gesture. Instead, courts must ensure a basic floor of opportunity that is defined by an individualized program that confers benefit. 43 Finally, it is important to note that, notwithstanding Rowley 's broad language, the Court indicated that its holding might not cover every case brought under the EHA. Indeed, Rowley was an avowedly narrow opinion that relied significantly on the fact that Amy Rowley progressed successfully from grade to grade in a mainstreamed classroom. The Court self-consciously limited its opinion to the facts before it: 44 We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act. Because in this case we are presented with a handicapped child who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who is performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system, we confine our analysis to that situation. Id. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 3049. 12 45 Although we do not argue that Rowley contradicts itself, id. at 212, 102 S.Ct. at 3053 (White, J., dissenting), we nevertheless note the tension in the Rowley majority opinion between its emphasis on procedural protection (almost to the exclusion of substantive inquiry) and its substantive component quoted and discussed supra at 179. 13 This tension is unresolved in the Rowley case itself because the facts of the case (including Amy Rowley's quite substantial benefit from her education) did not force the Court to confront squarely the fact that Congress cared about the quality of special education. In the case sub judice, however, the question of how much benefit is sufficient to be meaningful is inescapable. Therefore we must examine the Act's notion of benefit and apply a standard that is faithful to congressional intent and consistent with Rowley. 46