Opinion ID: 3010504
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The gravity of the danger posed by

Text: the challenged design; (2) the likelihood that such danger would occur; (3) the mechanical feasibility of a safer design; (4) the financial cost of a safer design; and (5) the adverse consequences to the product that would result from a safer design. See Dambacher, 336 Pa. Super. at 50 n.5, 485 A.2d at 423 n.5 (citing Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237, 573 P.2d at 455). The Barker factors also reflect the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's approach to strict liability. We focus on the Wade factors which are more widely accepted (in Pennsylvania and elsewhere) and are more comprehensive, including the Barker factors within their compass. At all events, it is the Wade factors that the district court applied, albeit incorrectly, and hence, we limit our discussion to those factors. 8 In the district court, Surace also argued that CMI should have provided the operator an unobstructed view of ground personnel, or added a rear guard, described as a cow catcher. At oral argument, Surace indicated that he was abandoning the cow catcher design and pursuing the lockout/tagout device as the main [but not exclusive] thrust of his argument. However, his brief is devoid of argument with respect to the district court's disposition under Azzarello of the alternative proffered designs, including the need for variable alarms. Accordingly, appellate review of these alternative arguments has been waived. United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 n.4 (3d Cir.) (failure to raise a theory as an issue on appeal constitutes a waiver), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 623, 136 L.Ed.2d 546 (1996). This case does not present extraordinary circumstances that might warrant review of any unpreserved issues. Id. 16 defective and unreasonably dangerous because of the combination of the blind spot and the phenomenon of habituation, and that this defect could have been eliminated through the use of a lockout/tagout device, which would prevent the operator from engaging the profiler in reverse until a switch is activated by ground personnel. The device would incorporate the safety engineering technique of lockout/tagout, a concept which, according to Surace's expert, although not currently in use for this specific purpose, has been proven and tested, particularly in the area of machine maintenance. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has defined a lockout device as one that utilizes a positive means such as a lock . . . to hold an energy isolating device in a safe position and prevent the energizing of a machine or equipment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(b)(1996). In this case, it would prevent the operator from inadvertently releasing the energy and reversing the profiler without affirmative action by the ground crew. Surace contends that, in rejecting this theory, the district court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to him. Barker v. Deere Co., 60 F.3d 158, 166 (3d Cir. 1995) (when performing Azzarello analysis, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff) (citing Burch, 320 Pa. Super. at 450-51, 467 A.2d at 618-19).9 In determining that the 9 We note that this conclusion is problematic. This is because the risk-utility calculus (or indeed any mode of making the social policy determination required by Azzarello) is a legal determination which should probably not be predicated upon a weighted view of the evidence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court might want to revisit this aspect of the matter if and when it definitively comes to grips with the issues we have identified in 17 profiler did not pose a grave risk of harm as currently designed (we view this as an application of Wade factor two), the district court primarily relied on its conclusion that Dr. Lambert had not stated in his report that Surace had in fact become habituated to the alarm, but had merely opined that the alarm was prone to habituation. The court also based its determination on its conclusion that Lambert had neither tested Surace for habituation nor explained in his report how, when Surace was injured shortly after the first pass of the profiler, he could have become habituated to the alarm, since habituation requires constant or repeated exposure. Lambert's report, which provided a human factors analysis of the accident, was based on collected accident reports, the results of noise measurements taken of the profiler, and human factors literature. In his deposition testimony, Lambert admitted that, although it was feasible, he had not tested Surace to determine whether or not he was habituated. He further opined that, because Mr. Surace had been around this piece of equipment for such a long period of time, for months, that he habituated to this alert. And that habituation became a long-term habituation that could carry from day to day. Thus, although he did not note it in his report, Lambert did conclude that Surace had become habituated, and he further explained how Surace could be habituated on the profiler's first pass of the evening. In view of the fact that Lambert's testimony was before the court as part this opinion. 18 of the summary judgment record, the district court was not at liberty to ignore it. Moreover, because the habituation issue will go to the jury in its determination as to whether the profiler was unsafe for its intended use, the district court could not resolve any dispute over the issue at that stage. We underscore that, in the Azzarello context, the case would not become one for the jury if the district court were able to hold as a matter of law that the risk-utility balance so favored the manufacturer that the profiler could not be deemed unreasonably dangerous. See Barker, 60 F.3d at 161. Given the considerations we have just articulated, and the fact that the profiler will from time to time cause injury and, if so, the injury will be serious given the immensity and huge weight of the machine, we do not believe that the court could properly hold, on account of disputed habituation evidence, that there was not a sufficiently grave risk of harm from the profiler to weigh in favor of Surace on the risk-utility analysis (Wade factor two). Applying the fourth Wade factor, the district court rejected Surace's contention that, because of the phenomenon of habituation, the profiler should have been equipped with a lockout/tagout device. As proffered, the lockout/tagout device would prevent the operator from engaging the profiler in reverse until a ground worker activated a switch. As currently designed, the profiler relies on horns located on the sides of the machine which must be activated by ground personnel, who, after visual inspection, signal the operator that it is clear to reverse. It is undisputed that on the night of the accident, Surace was using 19 hand signals rather than these horns to signal the operator and that the operator put the profiler in reverse without waiting for a signal from Surace. The district court concluded that there was no evidence that the profiler was defective without a lockout/tagout device. It noted that Surace's expert, Stephens, was unaware of any profiler with this device, and concluded that he could not therefore attest to the technological or economic feasibility of such a device. In his report, Stephens explained that the machine was inherently dangerous without a lockout/tagout device because of its blind spot, coupled with the fact that crew members were required to work in close proximity to it. Stephen's Report at 3 (severity of hazard and frequency of laborer exposure to the hazard dictated that [such a device] be provided on the machine). Stephens further stated that the lockout/tagout device was both technically and economically feasible. In concluding that he had not shown that the device was mechanically feasible, the district court emphasized that Stephens did not know of any currently designed construction machinery that uses the device. That conclusion, however, runs afoul of our decision in Barker, where we held that a district court, during its threshold determination, may [not] consider the nonexistence of a safety device as evidence of its nonfeasibility. Barker, 60 F.3d at 166-167; see also Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 36 F.3d 278, 286 (3d Cir. 1994) (The fact that the [safety device] did not exist . . . does not mean that it was incapable of being placed on the [profiler] if it did in fact exist.). 20 Although Stephens admitted that the device was not currently employed by construction machinery for this purpose, he repeatedly testified that such a device was used in other applications, that the concept had been tested and proven on machines comparable to the profiler, and that it could be applied to work for this specific purpose. We have previously held that expert testimony alone may be sufficient, for purposes of summary judgment, to demonstrate feasibility, see Hollinger v. Wagner Mining Equip. Co., 667 F.2d 402, 409-10 (3d Cir. 1981), and further held that, while a clear and concise diagram or verbal picture of the type of device would be helpful, it is not required to defeat a motion for summary judgment.10 Id. at 410. While it would have been preferable for Stephens to have proffered design drawings or developed a prototype of the device, his testimony was sufficient for purposes of the threshold riskutility calculus to make a showing of the feasibility of a lockout/tagout device, at least in the absence of a countervailing showing by CMI. We note that, in accordance with 10 In Hollinger, a panel of this Court noted that the district court had analyzed the question of summary judgment “under the traditional standard of sufficiency of the evidence to present a jury question,” and not as threshold matter under Azzarello. Hollinger, 667 F.2d at 410 n.11. However, in the context in which the case was decided, the panel did not pass on the propriety of the district court's action. Id. We have previously held that the threshold legal determination under Azzarello regarding the unreasonable dangerousness of the product is properly made in the context of summary judgment or directed verdict. Nowak, 32 F.3d at 758. However, the question for the court to determine is whether the evidence is sufficient, for purposes of the threshold risk-utility analysis, to conclude as a matter of law that the product was not unreasonably dangerous, not whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of fact for the jury. 21 Azzarello, the technical feasibility issue will go to the jury in determining whether the lockout/tagout device was an element necessary to make the profiler safe for its intended use. Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 588, 391 A.2d at 1026.11 Finally, the district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence from which to determine whether the profiler would be safer if equipped with a lockout/tagout device. Emphasizing that, as currently designed, the profiler relies on the crew to signal the operator that it is safe to reverse, the court concluded that the lockout/tagout device performs the same function and, because it relies on crew members to activate the device, provides no assurance that human error as occurred here would not cause another accident. Surace, 1995 WL 495123, at . However, unlike the current design, the lockout/tagout device would prevent the machine from going in reverse without affirmative action by the ground crew which, unlike the operator, have an unobstructed view of the reverse path of the machine. Stephens acknowledged that he could not state with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the device could prevent the type of accident from occurring; however, he did attest that it would cut the risk significantly. In sum, while such a design could not entirely eliminate the possibility that after the machine was put into motion a crew 11 Stephens merely stated, without explanation, that the lockout/tagout device was economically feasible. However, although we conclude that his evidence was marginal with respect to this Wade factor, the totality of the factors relevant here would require the same result. 22 worker could walk into its pathway, it would obviously render the machine safer. This conclusion is “in sync” with the Pennsylvania courts' approach to determining whether the risk of loss should be placed on the manufacturer. The court must balance the utility of the product against the seriousness and likelihood of the injury and the availability of precautions that, though not foolproof, might prevent the injury. Burch, 320 Pa. Super. at 450, 467 A.2d at 618 (emphasis added). Although a conclusion that the profiler would be made safer if equipped with a lockout/tagout device does not require a finding by the court, or even the jury, that the profiler is defective, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Surace we conclude that the district court could not, on this basis, decide that the profiler was not unreasonably dangerous. Couching this discussion in terms of the Wade factors, since it appears that the lockout/tagout device could eliminate the unsafe character of the product and since it does not appear that the lockout/tagout device would be expensive or would otherwise impair the utility of the profiler, the second and fourth Wade factors weigh in favor of Surace. Therefore, unless other factors control the balance, the case must be submitted to the jury.