Opinion ID: 2747913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Pamphlets and Related Motions20

Text: Next, Franz turns to arguments concerning the two pamphlets that the District Court initially admitted but later excluded from evidence. Graphic pictures from the pamphlets “depict[ing] children being sexually assaulted” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 45) were displayed to the jury, using a projector that enlarged them on a screen. Franz the Nardinger Warrant, the exclusionary rule should not apply to the Herrick Warrant. The District Court’s analysis thus focused on whether suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to the Herrick Warrant would serve to deter the kind of particularity problems evident in the Nardinger Warrant as presented to Franz. The requirements of the Due Process Clause and the requirement of Rule 41 that a warrant and inventory be given “to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1)(C), do not establish that the District Court’s ruling constituted a clear error of law or a manifest injustice. We therefore cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration. 20 Franz does not frame the issues with precision in this part of his argument, but our review is for abuse of discretion, regardless of whether our focus is on the District Court’s initial evidentiary ruling, its denial of Franz’s motion for a mistrial, or its denial of Franz’s motion for a new trial. See United States v. Quinn, 728 F.3d 243, 261 (3d Cir. 2013) (new trial), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (2014); United States v. Self, 681 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2012) (mistrial); United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 537-38 (3d Cir. 2010) (evidentiary issues). 30 argues that, despite the District Court’s ultimate decision to strike the pamphlets from the record, the Court abused its discretion when it initially admitted them and allowed images from them to be published to the jury. He contends that, despite the curative instructions, the pictures displayed from the pamphlets contributed to the guilty verdict on the receipt charge because they have “highly reprehensible and offensive content which might lead a jury to convict on emotion.” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 45.) The government responds that showing the images to the jury was harmless because the District Court ultimately excluded them from evidence and “emphatically and repeatedly told the jury not to consider [them].” (Government’s Br. at 50.) The government also argues that the split verdict – guilty for receipt of child pornography but not guilty for possession, the latter being the only charge associated with the pamphlets – indicates that the jury heeded the Court’s instructions, thus proving that the admission of the pamphlets was harmless. “‘The test for harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment. This [h]igh probability requires that the court possess a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant.’” United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 540 (3d Cir. 2010)). The government bears the burden of establishing harmlessness. United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 515 (3d Cir. 2013). Regarding the curative instructions, “‘the almost invariable assumption of the law [is] that jurors follow their 31 instructions.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 (1993) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)). Therefore, “‘[we] presum[e] that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the particular language of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985)). But “[c]ases may arise in which the risk of prejudice inhering in material put before the jury may be so great that even a limiting instruction will not adequately protect a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.” Francis, 471 U.S. at 324 n.9. Such cases present “extraordinary situations.” Id.; United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 2009) (identifying the “highly unusual circumstance[]” where the improperly admitted evidence “was the missing link in the prosecution’s case”). “The risk that a jury will be unable to follow the court’s instruction to ignore information depends on a number of factors including the strength of the proper evidence against the defendant, the nature of the information, and the manner in which the information was conveyed.” Lee, 573 F.3d at 163. “Absent … extraordinary situations, however, we adhere to the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow instructions.” Francis, 471 U.S. at 324 n.9. Here, immediately after the District Court ruled on the admissibility of the pamphlets, the Court informed the jury of its ruling and stated that the pamphlets were “out of the case.” (App. at 845-46.) Furthermore, at Franz’s request, the Court gave several instructions relating to the pamphlets in its final charge to the jury. It first instructed the jury not to let the inflammatory nature of the photographic evidence stir up 32 “passion or prejudice.” (App. at 878.) The Court immediately followed that instruction with a directive to disregard the pamphlets “entirely” and not to consider them in reaching its decision. (Id.) The Court further instructed the jury that the possession-of-child-pornography charge based on the pamphlets was no longer part of the case and that it should only consider the charges of receipt and possession on the basis of the computer images: “The Defendant is on trial only for the receipt and possession of the computer images. You may consider the evidence presented in the case only as it relates to the remaining charges.”21 (Id.) The District Court’s curative instructions were thus clear, comprehensive, and direct, and, under the circumstances, sufficient to address the difficulty presented by the withdrawal of the pamphlets. We are not unmindful that child pornography cases are particularly fraught with the danger of unfair prejudice, even before evidence has been admitted, let alone after graphic depictions of abuse have been admitted and then withdrawn. “Child pornography is so odious, so obviously at odds with common decency, that there is a real risk that offenders will be subjected to indiscriminate punishment based solely on the repugnance of the crime ... .” United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 260 (3d Cir. 2007). But there is no per se rule that juries are incapable of following instructions when disturbing evidence is involved. Cf. Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 390-91 (noting that the admission of videos or images depicting child pornography is not per se improper but turns on “the nature 21 While the District Court spoke in terms of “remaining charges,” the criminal charges never changed. Only the evidence available to prove the charges was different, so, to be precise, there was no acquittal. 33 and severity of the acts depicted” (internal quotation marks omitted)). While a bell as horrifyingly loud as that represented by the pamphlet pictures in this case can never be un-rung, that does not mean that a jury cannot be trusted to focus, and be shown to have focused, on the evidence to which it is told to confine its attention. The role of the district court is always to manage the evidence with care commensurate with the rights of the public and the person being prosecuted. The Court here did just that, adjusting its ruling on the pamphlets’ admissibility as it thought necessary to protect the defendant, and instructing the jury accordingly. On the present record, it appears highly probable that the repulsive nature of the pamphlets did not undermine the efficacy of the District Court’s instructions. Cf. United States v. Finley, 726 F.3d 483, 493-94 (3d Cir. 2013) (ruling that the probative value of several videos was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, even though some of the videos were “extremely disturbing and absolutely prejudicial”). The jury’s split verdict confirms that conclusion in this instance. Whether a split verdict supports or undermines a finding of harmless error depends on the circumstances of the case. Compare United States v. Shannon, 766 F.3d 346, 352, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding, despite a split verdict, that the prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s post-arrest silence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence was “largely circumstantial,” “not ‘overwhelming,’” and turned on the credibility of the defendant, which was directly undermined by the error), United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 730-31 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that an erroneous jury instruction was not harmless regarding one defendant because the evidence, “albeit sufficient, was not overwhelming,” and noting defendant’s acquittal on the 34 substantive charge in considering the strength of the evidence supporting a defendant’s conspiracy conviction), and United States v. Riggi, 951 F.2d 1368, 1371-72, 1377 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that a split verdict did not render a Confrontation Clause violation harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the testimony “may have been dispositive on some counts”), with United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 899 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that “a discriminating acquittal on one of the counts” can constitute “evidence that the jury was able to overcome any prejudice”). Cf. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 87 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f the erroneous instruction was given in connection with an offense for which the defendant was acquitted and if the instruction had no bearing on the [lesser included] offense for which he was convicted, it would be appropriate to find the error harmless.”). Here, the pamphlets were introduced as evidence of the possession charge alone. The verdict form specifically indicated what items of evidence supported each count. The District Court struck the portions of the verdict form referencing the pamphlets, leaving only the part that referenced the 196.jpg image as support for the possession charge, and also leaving the receipt charge, which was based solely on the 202.jpg image. When the jury returned its verdict, it convicted Franz of receipt of child pornography but acquitted him of the possession charge. In other words, Franz was convicted of the charge that the pamphlets were never used to support, and he was acquitted of the charge for which they were used. The totality of the circumstances – including the manner in which the evidence and charges were presented to the jury – strongly suggests that the jury was able to keep 35 the evidence and charges separate in their minds and was not swayed by the prejudicial character of the pamphlets. Thus, when the split verdict is viewed in light of the relation between the charges and the evidence, as well as the District Court’s direct, repeated, and thorough curative instructions, we think it fair to say it is highly probable that any error in the admission of the pamphlets did not contribute to the judgment of guilt on the charge for receipt of child pornography. 36