Opinion ID: 1505643
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Trend Toward Comparative Fault

Text: A significant majority of the numerous commentators addressing the question have strenuously urged the implementation of comparative fault, also referred to as comparative responsibility or comparative causation, as a means of distributing accident costs among negligent plaintiffs, negligent defendants, and strictly liable defendants. See, e.g., Edgar, supra, at 44-50; Sales, supra, at 357-65; Schwartz, Strict Liability and Contributory Negligence, 42 Tenn.L.Rev. 171, 178-81 (1974); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's FaultThe Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 Mercer L.Rev. 373, 376-81 (1978). They have pointed out on the one hand that strict products liability is not absolute liability that is, product suppliers are not insurers of the safety of their products. On the other hand, all or nothing strict liability defenses are outmoded and undesirable doctrinal throwbacks resulting in unfairness to plaintiffs, to defendants, and to other product purchasers who ultimately absorb the loss through price setting. See, e.g., Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort LiabilityPrelude to Comparative Fault, 11 Tex.Tech L.Rev. 729, 776-78 (1980); Special Project, supra, at 485-94. In the absence of apportionment, some manufacturers bear the total expense of accidents for which others are partly to blame, while other manufacturers totally escape liability even though they have sold defective products. Either result is unacceptable. Unfairness, however, is not the only serious flaw of virtually ignoring plaintiff and third party misconduct in strict products liability actions. The failure to allocate accident costs in proportion to the parties' relative abilities to prevent or to reduce those costs is economically inefficient. Special Project, supra, at 485-86. An ideal tort system should impose responsibility on the parties according to their abilities to prevent the harm. Existing law, however, encourages manufacturers to make safety improvements that are not cost justified, while failing to deter the substandard conduct of other tortfeasors. Id. Thus, equitable and rational risk distribution, a fundamental policy underlying the imposition of strict products liability, logically depends on the existence of some system for comparing causation in cases involving plaintiff or third party misconduct. For these reasons, most of the courts addressing the issue have decided to adopt some form of comparative causation for strict liability in tort. These decisions have often been preceded by extensive discussions of the procedural and policy benefits of proportionate loss allocation. [7] See, e.g., Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.1977) (Federal admiralty jurisdiction); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal.3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550 (1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla.1976); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, Haw., 654 P.2d 343 (1982); Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F.Supp. 1093 (D.Mont.1981); Sandford v. Chevrolet Division of General Motors, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982); Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.1979) (Virgin Islands); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W.Va.1982); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). We agree with these courts that applying principles of comparative apportionment to strict products liability not only furthers the policy goals of § 402A, but also simplifies the submission of products cases. Courts applying comparative fault in strict liability actions have taken several valid approaches. In Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380 (1978), the California Supreme Court, unencumbered by a comparative negligence statute, extended its judicially formulated comparative negligence system to actions involving both negligence and strict liability claims because logic, justice, and fundamental fairness required it. Id. 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 390. The court observed that the fundamental and underlying purpose of [our previous decision to adopt comparative negligence] was to promote the equitable allocation of loss among all parties legally responsible in proportion to their fault. 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 387. Other jurisdictions with judicially formulated comparative negligence have also embraced comparative fault for products cases. See, e.g., Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.1975) (applying Mississippi law); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80, 90 (Fla.1976); cf. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234, 1240 (1981) (reserving judgment on the question, but favorably discussing allocation in strict liability cases). In addition, one Texas court has praised the fairness and procedural simplification achieved by the Daly rule. See Wenzel v. Rollins Motor Co., 598 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex.Civ.App.El Paso 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Several other courts have interpreted comparative negligence statutes as encompassing strict liability in tort. In the leading case of Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court characterized strict liability as negligence per se, or negligence as a matter of law, because it arises from a violation of a standard of safety and requires no showing of foreseeability of harm. It followed, then, that the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute must apply to strict liability as well. Minnesota has adopted the Wisconsin rule. See Busch v. Busch Construction Co., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn.1977); see also Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 723, 748-51 (1974); Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 1 comment (1977). In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Company, 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 145-46 (1979), the New Jersey Supreme Court also applied its comparative negligence statute to strict liability in tort. Instead of characterizing strict liability as negligence per se, however, the court determined that the New Jersey legislature intended to allow the apportioning of accident costs according to fault, a concept subsuming negligence. Id. at 145. One reason given for this conclusion was that New Jersey adopted the provisions of the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute after the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dippel had already applied its statute to strict liability. The court then observed that distributing an unsafe product is a departure from a required standard of conductin other words, fault. Accordingly, the court held that the statute required the comparison of fault between negligent and strictly liable parties. Other courts have used similar reasoning in applying comparative negligence statutes to strict liability actions. See Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F.Supp. 598, 603 (D.Idaho 1976); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788, 796-97 (1980); Baccelleri v. Hyster Company, 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351, 354-55 (1979). Finally, some courts in jurisdictions with comparative negligence statutes have declined to interpret those statutes to encompass strict products liability cases, but have nevertheless judicially adopted separate comparative causation systems for such cases. In Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978), for instance, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that its comparative negligence statute did not apply to strict liability cases because the statute referred only to actions for negligence, but judicially recognize[d] the comparative concept in strict liability cases parallel to the legislature's recognition of it in the area of negligence. 395 A.2d at 848, 850. See also Stueve v. American Honda Motors, 457 F.Supp. 740, 751-56 (D.Kan.1978) (predicting that the Kansas Supreme Court would not apply its comparative negligence statute, but would probably instead adopt a comparative system in strict liability cases as a principle of common law). We recognize that because strict liability is closely analogous to negligence per se, our comparative negligence statute, article 2212a, might reasonably be interpreted to include both types of actions. See Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d at 64-65. However, article 2212a refers only to negligence actions, even though strict products liability had been judicially adopted six years earlier. See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, 416 S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Tex.1967). Consequently, we reaffirm our observation in General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.1977), that article 2212a does not apply to actions in which strict liability is established. The legislature's decision to limit Art. 2212a to negligence cases does not, however, preclude this court from fashioning a common law comparative apportionment system for strict products liability cases. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 12.1, at 196 (1974); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault, 29 Mercer L.Rev. 373, 380 (1978); see also Stueve v. American Honda Motors, 457 F.Supp. at 751; Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d at 848. In fact, the existence of a comparative negligence statute is a persuasive reason why this court should recognize such a system as a sound principle for our developing common law. See V. Schwartz, supra (citing Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv.L. Rev. 4 (1936)). It has always been the duty of the common-law court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law principles. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1783, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (creating an action for wrongful death under federal maritime law). The older contribution statute, Art. 2212, likewise does not preclude judicial adoption of comparative loss allocation. In General Motors Corp. v. Simmons we held Art. 2212 applicable to a case involving both negligent and strictly liable defendants. Article 2212 was enacted in 1917, long before any identifiable body of strict products liability law existed. It is unlikely that the legislature intended for the statute to control in cases based the unforeseen theories of products liability, presenting unforeseen questions of loss allocation. It thus appears that our holding in Simmons was not mandated by the legislative purpose supporting Art. 2212. As a result, Simmons is an unjustified obstacle to the development of a rational and fair system of allocating losses among negligent plaintiffs, negligent defendants and strictly liable defendants. Therefore, we hold that Art. 2212 does not apply when strict products liability, including uncrashworthiness and breach of warranty, is established. To the extent it is inconsistent with our rejection of Art. 2212, General Motors Corp. v. Simmons is overruled. We agree with the analysis of the New Hampshire court in Thibault v. Sears . Judicial adoption of a comparative apportionment system, independent of statutory comparative negligence, is a feasible and desirable means of eliminating confusion and achieving efficient loss allocation in strict liability cases. Accordingly, we hereby adopt such a system. Many courts and commentators have labeled this type of loss allocation system comparative fault. We choose comparative causation instead because it is conceptually accurate in cases based on strict liability and breach of warranty theories in which the defendant's fault, in the traditional sense of culpability, is not at issue. The trier of fact is to compare the harm caused by the defective product with the harm caused by the negligence of the other defendants, any settling tortfeasors and the plaintiff. [8] The fault or conduct of the products defendant is not at issue. This important point was expressly recognized by both the majority and dissenting opinions in Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc). See also Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., 565 F.2d at 1139; Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d at 47 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 386. Our decision to adopt the term comparative causation is consistent with our focus on causation in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.1978) and General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.1977). Under comparative causation, Plaintiffs will continue to be relieved of proving that the manufacturer or distributor was negligent in the production, design, or dissemination of the article in question. Defendant's liability for injuries caused by a defective product remains strict. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d at 736-37, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 386. As a result, the product supplier's incentive to eliminate or to reduce product hazards should remain intact. Id. at 737-38, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 387. In cases not controlled by Art. 2212a, the system we adopt will allow comparison of plaintiff's conduct, whether it is characterized as assumption of risk, misuse, or failure to mitigate or avoid damages, with the conduct or product of a defendant, whether the suit combines crashworthiness or other theories of strict products liability, breach of warranty, or negligence. Cf. Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 1 (1977) (proposing similar statutory system). Assumption of risk and misuse will no longer be separate defenses, but will be subsumed under the more familiar notion of contributory negligence. Accordingly, to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion, Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.1974) and General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.1977) are overruled. Comparative causation is especially appropriate in crashworthiness cases where the product defect causes or enhances injuries but does not cause the accident. The conduct which actually causes the accident, on the other hand, would not cause the same degree of harm if there were no product defect. Rather, it is a combination of factors that causes plaintiff's injuries. The jury is asked to apportion responsibility between all whose action or products combined to cause the entirety of the plaintiff's injuries. Steuve v. American Honda Motor Co., 457 F.Supp. 740, 759-60 (D.Kan. 1978); see also Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215 (7th Cir.1978) (comparing causation in automobile crashworthiness case); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F.Supp. 1093, 1098-99 (D.Mont. 1981) (comparing fault in airplane crashworthiness case); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380 (1978) (comparing fault in automobile crashworthiness case).