Opinion ID: 1160300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Stockwell v. Morris Revisited

Text: In Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189 (1933), we accepted the right of control as being the appropriate test for determining whether one was an employee or independent contractor (we talked about agent in that case) and said: ... If, accordingly, the right of control is the test in connection with the question before us, and the courts apparently agree that it is, then, it would seem, it ought to be directed to that portion of the employment directly connected with the factor by reason of which liability is sought to be established. It would not do, we think, to pursue the shadow, leaving the substance out of consideration. [Emphasis supplied] In explaining the application of this test to the particular facts presented in Stockwell, we said: In this view, then, that the right of control of the physical movements  the automobile  is the decisive inquiry, it becomes important what the record discloses in that regard. The evidence shows that the Maytag Company furnished Morris no rules or regulations to govern him in the performance of the work but that the means and manner thereof was left to him. That, perhaps, does not definitely show that the right of control was not in the company. The fact that the company did not exercise control does not show that it did not have the right of control, though it may be some evidence thereof. It has been held that in the absence of a stipulation the existence or nonexistence of the right must be determined by reasonable inferences shown by the evidence. Press Pub. Co. v. Acc. Comm., 190 Cal. 114, 210 P. 820; May v. Farrell, 94 Cal. App. 703, 271 P. 789. As we have said previously, these matters are largely fact questions for the jury. Holly Sugar Corporation v. Perez, supra . In the instant case, as compared to Stockwell, supra, there was more than adequate evidence of the right to control the details of Boone's work, including the manner in which he operated his vehicle, when the contract of employment is contemplated in connection with all of the other facts and circumstances surrounding the relationship. We need no such stipulation as is mentioned in the rule from Stockwell, supra, to establish that the right to control the physical movements of Boone's vehicle was retained by the Company. The contract provided that he was a Sales Manager  he was in charge of a team of salespersons and the only means of carrying on the Company's business was by use of automobiles upon the highways of the territory. With respect to all of his duties, Boone was obligated to abide by the rules, regulations and instructions issued by the Company from time to time. There is no contract provision which serves to make him subject to the Company's rules and regulations except when he is driving himself and his team members upon the highways of Wyoming while in pursuit of the business of the Combined Insurance Company. Boone was under Combined's control, not only as to the results which he obtained in his sales and supervisory efforts, but, at least impliedly, he was also under appellant's control as to the means whereby he obtained them. Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 191. These contractual provisions, taken together with the other facts showing Boone to have held responsibility of a supervisory nature, distinguish the facts of this case from Stockwell. For us to say that the operational facts and the contract provisions aforesaid did not leave the company with a right to control the way Boone operated his vehicle while in the scope of his employment for Combined Insurance  and especially when he had other employees in the vehicle  would be contrary to logic and human experience.