Opinion ID: 4529763
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asserted State Interests

Text: We now turn to “evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” Id. at 190 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.). The Secretary puts forward four interests: “(i) protecting the integrity of the electoral process, (ii) ensuring the accuracy of voter rolls, (iii) 9 Mr. Bednasek also argues that the DPOC requirement is suspect because it applies different registration requirements to those who registered before the statute was enacted than to those who registered after. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2309(n) (“Any person who is registered in this state on the effective date of this amendment to this section is deemed to have provided satisfactory evidence of citizenship and shall not be required to resubmit evidence of citizenship.”). But Mr. Bednasek concedes that this distinction is justified in part by Kansas’s “legitimate state interest” in protecting the reliance interests of voters who were registered under the previous regime, Aplee.’s Resp. Br. at 76, and the authority he provides that found certain grandfather clauses unconstitutional in the voting context concluded that the statutes were unconstitutional because they sought to avoid the import of the Fifteenth Amendment. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 49S50 (1959); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363 (1915). No similar allegations have been made here, and so we do not base our analysis of the burden on this argument. 54 safeguarding voter confidence, and (iv) preventing voter fraud.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 33. We agree with the Secretary that each of these interests is legitimate in the abstract. However, the Secretary points to no concrete evidence that “those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights” in this case, Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789), and so—in the following section—we conclude that, on this record, these legitimate interests are insufficiently weighty to justify the limitations on the right to vote imposed by the DPOC requirement. While nominally distinct interests, three of the Secretary’s asserted interests—protecting the integrity of the electoral process, ensuring the accuracy of voter rolls, and preventing vote fraud—largely overlap. Each fundamentally can be boiled down to Kansas’s interest in making sure that only eligible voters vote in its elections. And we agree with the Secretary that “[t]here is no question about the legitimacy or importance of the State’s interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.); see id. (“[T]he interest in orderly administration and accurate recordkeeping provides a sufficient justification for carefully identifying all voters participating in the election process.”). Likewise, when put in terms of electoral integrity, “[a] State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) 55 (per curiam) (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989)). And we agree that “[t]he State’s interest is particularly strong with respect to efforts to root out fraud,” Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 197 (2010), because fraud “drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government,” id. (quoting Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4). “While the most effective method of preventing election fraud may well be debatable, the propriety of doing so is perfectly clear.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.). Thus, we agree with the Secretary that Kansas’s interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters is legitimate in the abstract, but, on this record, we do not see any evidence that such an interest made it necessary to burden voters’ rights here. The Secretary argues that—even if there is no inaccuracy or fraud to correct—the DPOC requirement furthers Kansas’s interest in increasing public confidence and participation in the democratic process. Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 35–36; see also id. at 34 (“Preventing Kansas from verifying the bedrock voter qualification of United States citizenship would undermine the integrity of the electoral process—whether widespread voter fraud exists or not.” (emphasis added)). Again, we agree with the Secretary that “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4. Such confidence is vital because “[v]oter 56 fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government.” Id. Voters “will feel disenfranchised” when they have reason to “fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones.” Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that “public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process has independent significance[] because it encourages citizen participation in the democratic process.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.). While we agree with the Secretary that Kansas has a legitimate interest in safeguarding voter confidence, we explain below why there is no evidence that the DPOC requirement furthers that interest. Thus, we agree that each of the interests asserted by the Secretary is legitimate in the abstract. However, we now turn to explain why—due to the significant burden that the DPOC requirement imposes on the right to vote and the lack of concrete evidence supporting the relevance of these interests in this case—we cannot conclude “those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).