Opinion ID: 524289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Threat to a Retired Public Official

Text: 37 Raymer appeals the court's refusal to dismiss counts II and IV of the indictment, 685 F.Supp. 1358, arguing that those counts do not come under the ambit of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 115 because Loper retired on December 30, 1986. The record reflects that letter 2 was sent on January 29 or 30, 1987, and letter 4 was sent on February 4, 1987. The relevant part of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 115 states that: 38 Whoever ... threatens to ... murder ... an official whose killing would be a crime under such section [18 U.S.C. Sec. 1114] with intent to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate against such official, judge, or law enforcement officer while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 18 U.S.C. Sec. 115 (Supp. V 1987). 3 39 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1114 includes any United States probation or pretrial services officer under the rubric of its protection. Neither Sec. 115 nor Sec. 1114 mentions the status of retired officers, and thus Raymer argues that the statutes do not cover his 1987 threats. This is an issue of first impression. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 115 is a relatively new statute, and the few cases in which it has been the basis of a prosecution have not addressed whether retired officials are covered. 4 Furthermore, no recorded cases decided under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1114 (a statute with a longer judicial history than Sec. 115) have addressed the issue of whether retired federal officials fall under its penumbra. 40 When interpreting statutes and regulations, the plain language of the statute or regulation controls our construction, absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary. Oliver v. United States Postal Service, 696 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir.1983). See also American Tobacco Company v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1537, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982). The legislative history of Sec. 115 indicates that the statute was originally intended only to protect the members of the families of United States officials, and the statutory language clearly reflected this limited purpose. Public Law No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3496-97. In 1986 the law was amended. Pub.L. 99-646, Secs. 37(a), 60, Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3599, 3613. The legislative history of the amendment states Section 43 of the Bill amends 18 U.S.C. 115(a) which extends protection to family members of certain federal officials to the officials themselves. Pub.L. No. 99-646, 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6139, 6153. The legislative history is therefore inconclusive on the issue of whether Sec. 115 was meant to cover retired officials as well as officials currently employed. 41 We are left with the plain language of the statute. That language prohibits threats against an official with intent to ... retaliate against such official ... on account of the performance of official duties. These words would clearly cover an official not only while he was in the performance of his duties but also against retaliation after his duties were completed. An off-duty official who was threatened or assaulted in retaliation for previous performance of his duties would be covered under the plain language of the statute. It is also reasonable, therefore, to conclude that a retired official subject to retaliation because of previous performance of duties is in the same position as an official who is currently employed by the government but is off-duty. Neither one need be currently performing his duties when experiencing retaliation. The only difference between the two is that the former is in a sense permanently off-duty. Hence it would be illogical not to extend the protection of the statute to the retired official. 42 It is noteworthy that Sec. 115(a)(2), as amended in 1988, refers to any person who formerly served as a person designated in paragraph (1), whereas Sec. 115(a)(1)(B) does not. 43 Whoever assaults, kidnaps, or murders, or attempts to kidnap or murder a member of the immediate family of any person who formerly served as a person designated in paragraph (1), with intent to retaliate against such person on account of the performance of official duties during the term of service of such person, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 44 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 115(a)(2) (West Supp.1989) (emphasis added). 5 Congress by this amendment obviously wished to make clear that a former official's family was covered by Sec. 115. This amendment is strong support for our interpretation that the applicable version of the statute included in its coverage death threats to retired officials for their official acts. Congress felt it necessary to make clear that families of retired officials were protected. We can conclude that it felt no need to state separately in the amendment that retired officials themselves were protected because Congress felt that they already were covered under the statute. The alternate interpretation would compel the irrational conclusion that Congress was concerned about protecting the families of retired officials but had no concern at all about protecting the retired officials themselves. 45 Raymer argues that the rule of lenity, which calls for strict construction of criminal statutes when they are ambiguous, precludes our interpretation. There are several restrictions, however, on the use of the rule of lenity. It only comes in at the end of the process of interpretation of a statute, Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 29, 104 S.Ct. 296, 303-04, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983); it is only an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not used to beget one, Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 S.Ct. 321, 326, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961); and it is not applied when it would conflict with the implied or expressed intent of Congress, Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 2089, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985). In sum, the rule of lenity is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose.... Nor does it demand that a statute be given the 'narrowest meaning'; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26, 68 S.Ct. 376, 380, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948). See also United States v. Levy, 579 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1243, 59 L.Ed.2d 471 (1979). 46 After reviewing all other information from which aid can be derived, we do not find Sec. 115 to be ambiguous. The wording of the statute reveals its obvious purpose, to free public officials from retaliation for their official acts. The threat of retaliation remains just as inhibiting to proper official acts even after that official retires as it is during his or her active tenure. The rule of lenity is only to be employed when a court after seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be derived ... [is] left with an ambiguous statute. United States v. Noe, 634 F.2d 860, 862 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 876, 102 S.Ct. 355, 70 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981), quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). Because we find that Congress in Sec. 115 intended to protect officials against threats incurred on account of the performance of official duties, regardless of whether such officials were retired at the time at which they received the threats, there is no justification for applying the rule of lenity.