Opinion ID: 776967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue Presented to this Court

Text: 4 In this case, we are faced with a delicate interplay between the date of the criminal conviction of Petitioner, and the revamping of the statutory immigration scheme of Congress through the passage of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA. Petitioner was convicted of an aggravated felony on July 25, 1995, with a term of imprisonment of less than five years. Thus, at this time, discretionary relief from deportation under § 212(c) was available. However, when deportation proceedings began on April 9, 1998, the status of the law had changed. Thus, neither § 212(c) relief was available to Petitioner, nor was the newly fashioned cancellation of removal. 4 Hence, the question the parties present to us is whether the repeal of § 212(c) relief has an impermissible retroactive effect when applied to an individual convicted prior to the enactment of AEDPA § 440(d) and IIRIRA § 304(b). Embodied within this question is whether Petitioner's substantial constitutional Sixth Amendment and Equal Protection rights are violated by such a retroactive effect. However, before addressing the merits of Brooks' appeal, we must first decide whether we have jurisdiction to hear his petition. Because we find we are divested from jurisdiction by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), and find no merit in the constitutional questions Petitioner raises, we do not reach a decision here today on the propriety of the retroactivity of AEDPA and IIRIRA to Mr. Brooks.