Opinion ID: 3167560
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Past threat to life or freedom.

Text: (i) If the applicant is determined to have suffered past persecution in the proposed country of removal on account of . . . religion . . . it shall be presumed that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in the future in the country of removal on the basis of the original claim. This presumption may be rebutted if an . . . immigration judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence. (A) There has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant’s life or freedom would not be threatened on account of any of the five grounds mentioned in this paragraph upon the applicant’s removal to that country; or (B) The applicant could avoid a future threat to his or her life or freedom by relocating to another part of the proposed country of removal and, under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so. (ii) In cases in which the applicant has established past persecution, the Service shall bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the requirements of (b)(1)(i)(A) or (b)(1)(i)(B) of this section. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i)-(ii). The IJ and Board, having determined that Saed and Nancy Marouf were not credible, concluded that the adverse credibility determination was fatal to their claims to asylum and withholding of removal. A.R. 4, 75. However, those determinations were in error, supra Part II.C., and we now consider whether they are eligible for asylum. On the face of the record, the Maroufs have established eligibility for asylum and withholding under the I.N.A. Specifically, the Maroufs offered credible testimony of past No. 14-4136 Marouf, et al. v. Lynch Page 19 persecution: A Muslim mob descended upon their home and committed religiously-motived violence against Saed. A violent attack on the basis of religion amounts to past persecution, even if perpetrated by civilians. See Singh v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Discrimination, harassment, and violence by groups that the government is unwilling or unable to control can also constitute persecution.”). This past persecution creates a presumption that the Maroufs have a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). But the Maroufs have established more than a mere presumption of a well-founded fear; that presumption is supported by the State Department report indicating the existence of Muslim-onChristian violence in the area the Maroufs lived that the Palestinian Authority is unable or unwilling to control, A.R. 662-63, 667, 669. The Maroufs evidence therefore compels the conclusion that they have a sincere, well-founded fear of persecution in the West Bank. E. Discretionary Asylum Asylum is a discretionary remedy vested in the Attorney General and delegated to Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); Ljuljdjurovic v. Gonzales, 132 F. App’x 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Asylum can be granted by the Attorney General and, by delegated authority, the [Board of Immigration Appeals] and any [Immigration Judge].”). However, that discretion is subject to our review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), (b)(4)(D). Because the IJ and Board erroneously found that the Maroufs were not credible, neither considered whether the Maroufs were eligible for asylum, supra Part