Opinion ID: 31937
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility

Text: 23 This court reviews a district court's refusal to reduce a defendant's offense level for acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1 with a standard even more deferential than a purely clearly erroneous standard. U.S. v. Maldonado, 42 F.3d 906, 913 (5th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). The ruling `should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation.' Id. (quoting United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 610 (5th Cir.1989)).
24 Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines provides for reduction of the offense level [i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. Comment 2 to USSG § 3E1.1(a) (Comment 2) states that [t]his adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. The record shows that Washington signed a confession after his arrest and admitted to possessing the firearms. Further, he stipulated to all the evidence necessary for the conviction prior to the bench trial. The Guidelines allow for rare situations where the defendant accepts responsibility even though he precedes to trial. Comment 2 explains that [t]his may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt ( e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct). 25 The district court held that Washington did not accept responsibility since he went to trial on a motion to suppress the evidence that the government proposed to use against him and the evidence that was critical to the offense itself, that is, the possession of the firearms that he was convicted. Continuing, the court stated: 26 In this instance the defendant has not challenged the applicability of the felon in possession of firearms statute to him. He was not challenging the constitutionality of that statute. He was trying to avoid criminal liability for his conduct by putting the government to proof, which he hoped the government would not be able to establish based upon his contention that the government's proof was unconstitutionally obtained from him. This is not an acceptance of responsibility. This is an intent to walk, not accept responsibility for the criminal conduct, but exactly the opposite, that is, to avoid responsibility for the criminal conduct. It is not the kind of situation where he admits to the conduct but says the statute does not make it criminal or it is not the kind of case where he admits the conduct but he says the statute itself is unconstitutional, these kinds of examples that provide rare exceptions. 27 The district court equates Washington's attempt to suppress evidence and continue to trial with avoiding responsibility. The problem, however, is that a motion to suppress is not synonymous with putting the government to its burden of proof at trial. At issue in a suppression hearing is the admissibility of the evidence. The defendant has the burden to demonstrate why the evidence should be excluded. A trial, on the other hand, puts the burden on the government to prove the essential elements of the offense. 28 The district court creates what is tantamount to a per se prohibition against acceptance of responsibility for a defendant filing a motion to suppress and continuing to trial. Although Washington surely hoped to avoid conviction when he moved to suppress the evidence, this intent to walk does not negate a willingness to accept responsibility under the Guidelines. Comment 2 recognizes that the defendant can proceed to trial on issues not relating to factual guilt and still receive credit for acceptance of responsibility. The provided example is a constitutional challenge to the statute used for the conviction. In this situation, even though the defendant desires to avoid criminal punishment, the Guidelines allow acceptance of responsibility. The defendant's intent to walk is not the proper test for his willingness to accept responsibility. The Guidelines create a distinction between a defendant's denial of factual guilt and denial of legal guilt, allowing acceptance of responsibility for the latter. To permit a reduction when a defendant challenges the constitutionality of a statute but deny it when a defendant admits his conduct and only challenges the way the police obtained the evidence is counter-intuitive. Washington admitted to the factual conduct that formed the basis of his conviction. He argued that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when obtaining the evidence. He did not challenge the existence or credibility of the evidence itself. 29 The district court also takes issue with the fact that Washington desired to appeal the ruling denying his motion to suppress. The court's concern is evident by the following dialogue from the sentencing hearing: 30 THE COURT: Are you telling me now that the basis for your appeal is only that [constitutional challenge to possession of a firearm that affects interstate commerce statute] and not the motion to suppress and that you're no longer resisting the constitutionality of the search and seizure that produced the evidence that was critical to the Government's case? 31 MS. WILSON [Washington's attorney]: I'm not saying that. I'm only saying that even if we had not gone forward on a motion to suppress, we would have preserved the issue of both the constitutionality and the argument that the evidence in this case is insufficient even under the statute because of the government's evidence. We would have preserved that issue in any event by requesting conditional plea, which was denied by the government, and thereafter going forward with the stipulated bench trial. So, the fact that we filed a motion to suppress is not dispositive in that sense. We would have done the same thing anyway. 32 THE COURT: But the trial that was conducted was on the hearing to suppress the evidence and the government was required to call witnesses. And what you're telling me is that you — that the defendant continues here at sentencing still to contend that the evidence should have been suppressed? 33 MS. WILSON: Right. And that the search was — 34 THE COURT: And, in effect, you do not wish to waive your right to appeal that? 35 MS. WILSON: That's right. 36 THE COURT: All right. And the constitutional claim was simply with respect to constitutionality of the felon in possession of firearms, which of course has been upheld many, many times; is that correct? 37 MS. WILSON: That's right. 38 THE COURT: All right. Well, my ruling stands, then for the reasons that essentially have been stated. 39 This colloquy suggests that the court, at least in part, considered Washington's desire to appeal the suppression issue as evidence that he did not accept responsibility. By asking whether Washington would waive the right to appeal the suppression issue, the court intimated that such a waiver might influence the court's decision to deny the sentence reduction. Conditioning a sentence reduction on a waiver of the right to appeal a constitutional issue is problematic. A challenge to the legality of the police conduct is completely separate from a challenge to the factual elements of a defendant's conduct. Washington should not have to waive appeal of a constitutional issue in order to receive a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 40 The government contends United States v. Maldonado, 42 F.3d 906 (5th Cir.1995), forecloses this issue. In Maldonado, police officers stopped a suspect for speeding. When Maldonado emerged from his truck, the officer noticed a bulge in his pocket. The officer suspected Maldonado was armed and asked permission to pat him down. After conducting a full pat-down, the officer discovered a bulge in the suspect's boot. Suspecting Maldonado had a weapon, the officer reached into the boot and removed a small package containing what was later found to be heroin. Maldonado was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Maldonado unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence due to an illegal search and seizure. The district court judge refused to allow the defendant to enter a guilty plea on the condition that he could preserve his suppression claim. Maldonado, 42 F.3d at 913. Maldonado waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty. The district court denied any sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 41 On appeal, Maldonado argued that he accepted responsibility despite proceeding to trial. Maldonado contended that other than his challenge to the seizure of the evidence, he stipulated to everything that could be stipulated and waived his right to a jury trial. Maldonado, 42 F.3d at 913. Arguing that his motion to suppress was not related to factual guilt, Maldonado asserted that his case fell within the rare situation of Comment 2 where the defendant may qualify for acceptance of responsibility even after going to trial. Id. The district court determined that evidence of drugs found on Maldonado's person was both necessary and sufficient to support his conviction and that a challenge to the admissibility of the evidence is indistinguishable from a challenge to factual guilt. Id. at 913-14. This circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 42 Maldonado is distinguishable from the instant case for two reasons. First, as previously described, the district court at least partly conditioned acceptance of responsibility on waiving appeal of the suppression issue. Second, Maldonado challenged his factual guilt by arguing in the suppression hearing that he was not speeding. Maldonado, 42 F.3d at 910. Here Washington stipulated to all of the facts necessary for his conviction. He admitted to the factual guilt of his offense. Washington's decision to pursue the suppression of the evidence should not preclude him from receiving credit for accepting responsibility. To affirm the district court in this case would chill the filing of suppression motions by defendants who admit their factual guilt. Suppression hearings play a vital role in not only protecting the rights of the particular defendant, but also in protecting society from overzealous law enforcement ignoring proper procedure. In the absence of a conditional plea, the defendant would have to choose between trying to suppress the evidence and receiving credit for acceptance of responsibility. A defendant should not have to make this choice. We therefore reverse the district court and remand for re-sentencing on the issue of acceptance of responsibility. 43