Opinion ID: 2545530
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does RCW 41.40.170(3) require active federal service?

Text: ¶ 14 DRS interprets the phrase service in the armed forces, which appears in RCW 41.40.170(3), to require active federal service, just as subsection (1) of that statute does. Because of this interpretation, it provides credit under subsection (3) only for noninterruptive active federal service. ¶ 15 Where a statute is clear on its face, its meaning [should] be derived from the language of the statute alone. Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wash.2d 16, 20, 50 P.3d 638 (2002) (citing State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001)); see also BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004). Courts should assume the Legislature means exactly what it says in a statute and apply it as written. Keller, 143 Wash.2d at 276, 19 P.3d 1030; see also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash.2d 614, 625, 106 P.3d 196 (2005). Statutory construction cannot be used to read additional words into the statute. State v. Chester, 133 Wash.2d 15, 21, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997). Neither should different language be read to mean the same thing. When the legislature uses two different terms in the same statute, courts presume the legislature intends the terms to have different meanings. Koenig v. City of Des Moines, 158 Wash.2d 173, 182, 142 P.3d 162 (2006) (citing Roggenkamp, 153 Wash.2d at 625, 106 P.3d 196); see also State v. Beaver, 148 Wash.2d 338, 343, 60 P.3d 586 (2002) (When the legislature uses different words within the same statute, we recognize that a different meaning is intended.); Simpson Inv. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 141 Wash.2d 139, 160, 3 P.3d 741 (2000) (It is well established that when `different words are used in the same statute, it is presumed that a different meaning was intended to attach to each word.' (quoting State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Rains, 87 Wash.2d 626, 634, 555 P.2d 1368 (1976))). ¶ 16 In RCW 41.40.170, the legislature used different terms in subsections (1) and (3) to describe the service which may be credited: active federal service in the military or naval forces and service in the armed forces. One clearly appears broader than the other. Applying the aforementioned rule of statutory interpretation, we will presume that the legislature intended these two phrases to have different meanings. ¶ 17 This conclusion is supported by other words in subsection (3). The subsection begins with the phrase [i]n any event, suggesting that credit may be given under the third subsection even if conditions in the first or second subsections are not met. That subsection goes on to say that  any member may have service in the armed forces credited after 25 years of service. (Emphasis added.) Other wording in the subsection confirms that the phrase any member at least removes one of the restrictions placed in subsection (1): a member need not have left public employment to serve in the military. In our view, the word any in subsection (3) is broad and suggests that none of the restrictions from subsection (1) apply. ¶ 18 Our conclusion that the legislature intended different meanings to attach to the two phrases is also supported by the absence in subsection (3) of any words referring back to antecedent requirements. In subsection (1), the legislature used the words such service to indicate that the service it was referring to was that previously discussed: active federal service. (Emphasis added.) In subsection (2), the legislature not only repeated the phrase such service, but also began the subsection by saying, If he or she has applied and went on to say, within one year from termination of the military service, indicating that the reader should look back to the previous subsection to determine to whom and to what military service subsection (2) refers. (Emphasis added.) By contrast, subsection (3) does not use pronouns or adjectives to qualify its subject matter. Instead, it is directed at any member and any service in the armed forces. RCW 41.40.170(3). ¶ 19 Notwithstanding the clear language of RCW 41.40.170(3), DRS contends that the statute is ambiguous. Consequently, DRS asks us to look to the statute's legislative history and to give deference to DRS' own interpretation of the statute. When a statute is ambiguous, legislative history may be helpful in construing its meaning. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash.2d at 621, 106 P.3d 196. The interpretation given an ambiguous statute by the agency or department charged with its application may also provide useful guidance. Accordingly, this court gives `great weight' to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute within its area of `special expertise.' Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 151 Wash.2d 568, 593, 90 P.3d 659 (2004) (quoting Postema, 142 Wash.2d at 77, 11 P.3d 726). ¶ 20 However, such deference is not afforded when the statute in question is unambiguous. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 151 Wash.2d at 593, 90 P.3d 659. Only statutes that are ambiguous require judicial construction, and statutes are not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable. Keller, 143 Wash.2d at 276, 19 P.3d 1030. Constructions that would yield `unlikely or `absurd' results should be avoided. Id. at 277, 19 P.3d 1030 (quoting State v. Contreras, 124 Wash.2d 741, 747, 880 P.2d 1000 (1994)). ¶ 21 We find RCW 41.40.170(3) to be plain and unambiguous. Hence, we decline to look beyond the language of the statute itself. Instead, we hold that RCW 41.40.170(3) expressly and unambiguously entitles 25-year members of PERS 1 to retirement service credit for all service in the armed forces not otherwise credited, whether or not that service amounts to active federal service.