Opinion ID: 1802346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Creation of the Estate

Text: ¶ 13. The Estate argues that the Defendants cannot challenge the creation of the Estate. This argument is based on two assertions (1) the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 provides the jurisdictional parameters of the chancery and circuit courts, and (2) the Defendants lack standing to challenge the creation of the Estate.
¶ 14. The Estate relies upon the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, art. 6, § 156 for its argument that the circuit court has no authority, jurisprudentially and constitutionally, to invalidate the chancery court's decisions with respect to the Estate. The Estate argues that the circuit court correctly denied the Defendants' motion for summary judgment since estate matters are not within a circuit court's jurisdiction. Therefore, a circuit court cannot declare the establishment of an estate and issuance of letters of administration void. ¶ 15. In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Mooney, 909 So.2d 1081, 1086-87 (Miss.2005), this Court set forth the jurisdictional parameters of the chancery and circuit courts in this State, stating: Jurisdiction is a question of law, and this Court reviews questions of law de novo. Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So.2d 948, 951 (Miss.2000). See also Rogers v. [Eaves], 812 So.2d 208, 211 (Miss.2002). The Mississippi Constitution of 1890 Art. 6, § 159 sets the jurisdictional parameters of the chancery court and states: The chancery court shall have full jurisdiction in the following matters and cases, viz.: (a) All matters in equity; (b) Divorce and alimony; (c) Matters testamentary and of administration; (d) Minor's business; (e) Cases of idiocy, lunacy, and persons of unsound mind; (f) All cases of which the said court had jurisdiction under the laws in force when this Constitution is put in operation. [emphasis omitted]. Miss.Code Ann. § 9-5-81 (Rev.2002) also provides jurisdiction to the chancery court and states: The chancery court in addition to the full jurisdiction in all the matters and cases expressly conferred upon it by the constitution shall have jurisdiction of all cases transferred to it by the circuit court or remanded to it by the supreme court; and such further jurisdiction, as is, in this chapter or elsewhere, provided by law. In contrast, the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, Article 6, § 156 provides that [t]he circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested by this Constitution in some other court, and such appellate jurisdiction as shall be prescribed by law. Miss. Const. of 1890 art. 6, § 156. Therefore, while chancery courts have jurisdiction of all matters in equity, circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Lawrence County Sch. Dist. v. Brister, 823 So.2d 459, 460 (Miss.2001). ¶ 16. The Estate is correct in its argument that the chancery court is vested with jurisdiction of matters testamentary and of administration, like the administration of estates, in the chancery courts of this State. See Miss. Const. art. 6, § 159. The Defendants pursued an action in the Tallahatchie County Chancery Court to declare the Estate void ab initio. The Tallahatchie County Chancery Court denied this motion and transferred the Estate to the Leflore County Chancery Court. The Defendants petitioned and were granted interlocutory appeal by this Court on the chancery court decision. The Defendants also petitioned and were granted interlocutory appeal by this Court on the circuit court's denial of their motion for summary judgment. Both these issues are before this Court on two separate interlocutory appeals which have been consolidated for appeal purposes by this Court. We will address whether the Defendants have standing to maintain their action in the standing portion of this issue.
¶ 17. The Estate argues that the Defendants lack standing to challenge the chancery court's actions regardless of the whether the Defendants choose to challenge to the chancery court actions in circuit court or chancery court. The Estate maintains that the Defendants are potential debtors and not heirs or creditors of the Estate, therefore, they lack standing to challenge the Tallahatchie County Chancery Court actions. The Estate relies on In re Estate of Johnson, 779 So.2d 164, 166 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) and M.R.C.P. 24 dealing with intervention. This case will be discussed in further detail below. ¶ 18. The Defendants argue that as to the chancery court matter, the chancellor never determined them to be without standing. Indeed, the chancellor merely denied the motion to declare the Estate void ab initio and certified the jurisdictional issue for interlocutory appeal without addressing standing. The Defendants also assert that the chancellor ratified their appearance in the chancery court by hearing oral argument and ruling on their motion challenging the opening of the Estate. The Defendants argue that the Tallahatchie County Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction to open the Estate and appoint Price as administratrix pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-63(1). This statute addresses the necessary requirements to grant letters of administration in a particular county. ¶ 19. Additionally, the Defendants argue that the Estate focuses on the wrong court in its standing argument. The Defendants assert that they have standing since they have a right to challenge the legal authority or capacity of a party plaintiff in the circuit court action pursuant to M.R.C.P. 9(a). The Defendants maintain that the motion for summary judgment filed in the Leflore County Circuit Court is not an appeal of the chancery court's decision nor a request for the circuit court to assume jurisdiction of the Estate opened in the Tallahatchie County Chancery Court. Instead, the Defendants argue that by filing a lawsuit in the Leflore County Circuit Court, the Estate subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Consequently, the Defendants can challenge the circuit court action pursuant to M.R.C.P. 9(a). The Estate is the only plaintiff in this action because Boles has no statutory wrongful death beneficiaries. Price is Boles's cousin and not a wrongful death beneficiary under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13. Therefore, in keeping with M.R.C.P. 9(a), the Defendants argue that they have been sued by an invalid and void estate via the actions of an invalidly appointed administratrix. Since the Estate is void, the Defendants argue that they are being sued by a plaintiff that is a non-entity and legal nullity by a matter of law. In other words, an estate void ab initio cannot sue a defendant in circuit court since a voided estate is not a real plaintiff, but a legal nullity. Accordingly, the Defendants argue that any of the Plaintiff's assertions that they lack standing to challenge the authority of Price to maintain the Leflore County lawsuit is without merit. ¶ 20. In Johnson, the Court of Appeals found that Colson, a doctor being sued for negligence by a putative father, lacked standing to intervene in a paternity and heirship suit in chancery court. Colson wanted to intervene in the heirship action and for all known heirs [to] be made parties to the action to determine heirs Id. The Court of Appeals found that Colson had no conditional right to intervene, nor any asserted claim that there was a common question of fact or law with either the paternity or heirship proceedings. Id. [T]here is no suggestion that Colson's defense to the claim of negligence would be in anyway impacted by the paternity or heirship actions. Id. The Court of Appeals, further held that economic interests, such as Colson's desire to intervene to avoid the cost of defending a lawsuit brought by a wrong party, in and of itself was insufficient to warrant intervention. Id. at 167. ¶ 21. The Defendants argue that the Estate's reliance on In re Johnson and M.R.C.P. 24 concerning intervention misses the point. By filing the motion in chancery court, the Defendants assert that they were attacking the jurisdictional basis of the administrative appointment of the administrator. The Defendants distinguish their claim from that of the doctor in In re Johnson. ¶ 22. Here, the Defendants argue that they are not challenging whether Price is qualified to serve as administratrix nor whether Price is a blood relative of Boles as Colson did in In re Johnson. Instead the Defendants challenge the subject matter jurisdiction based upon the statutory requirement to open an estate in Mississippi. In addition, the Defendants claim that, unlike In re Johnson, there is more than just an economic interest at stake in the lawsuit. Punitive damages were sought by the Estate, which the Defendants argue are quasi-criminal in nature. Indeed in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001), the United States Supreme Court held that punitive damages have been described as quasi-criminal in nature. The Supreme Court also held that punitive damages operate as `private fines' intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing. A jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation. Id. We agree. ¶ 23. The Defendants also rely upon M.R.C.P. 9(a) to support their position that they have standing. M.R.C.P. 9(a) states: [t]he capacity in which one sues or is sued may be stated in one's initial pleading. The comments to M.R.C.P. 9(a) state, in part: A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence, capacity, or authority of a party will be required to do so by specific negative averment. This is consistent with past procedure which held that affirmative defenses cannot be relied upon unless specifically pleaded . . . If lack of capacity appears affirmatively on the face of the complaint, the defense may be raised by a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted), Rule 12(c) (a motion for judgment on the pleadings), or Rule (f) (a motion to strike). See also East Miss. State Hosp. v. Callens, 892 So.2d 800 (Miss.2004) (complaint did not specify whether plaintiff was suing parties in their individual versus official capacity pursuant to M.R.C.P. 9(a)); Frierson v. Delta Outdoor, Inc., 794 So.2d 220, 224-25 (Miss.2001) (although the Court references a failure to plead insufficient legal capacity in the complaint, pursuant to M.R.C.P. 9(a), it was actually the defendant who failed to allege insufficient mental capacity until the appeal); Mosby v. Moore, 716 So.2d 551, 560 (Miss.1998) (Mills, J., dissenting in part) (plaintiffs required to allege capacity in their complaint). ¶ 24. We find that the Defendants have standing before the chancery and circuit courts. The Defendants have standing in the chancery court action since they challenged the Tallahatchie County Chancery Court's subject matter jurisdiction to open the Estate. Pursuant to M.R.C.P. 9, the Defendants also can challenge a party plaintiff in circuit court. The record reflects that the Defendants challenged Price's authority and capacity to maintain the lawsuit in each of their answers. Therefore, the Defendants preserved their challenge to capacity in the Leflore County Circuit Court action. Thus, the Defendants also have standing to challenge the Estate as a party plaintiff in the circuit court action.