Opinion ID: 2815768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Padilla and Background Immigration Law

Text: ¶37 The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the last 90 years. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. Id. ¶38 By passing the Immigration Act of 1917, [f]or the first time in our [nation's] history, Congress made classes of noncitizens deportable based on conduct committed on American soil. Id. at 361 (citation omitted). Although the Act authorized deportation as a consequence of certain convictions, it included a procedure, known as a judicial recommendation against deportation (JRAD), which allowed a sentencing judge in a state or federal prosecution to make a recommendation that a noncitizen defendant not be deported. Id. A JRAD forbade deportation and was binding on the executive branch. Id. at 361-62. Thus, from 1917 forward, there was no such creature as an automatically deportable offense. Even as the class of deportable offenses expanded, judges retained discretion to ameliorate unjust results on a case-by-case 20 No. 2013AP1437-CR basis. Id. at 362. Although narcotics offenses . . . provided a distinct basis for deportation as early as 1922, the JRAD procedure was generally available to avoid deportation in narcotics convictions. Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). ¶39 However, the JRAD procedure is no longer part of our law. Congress first circumscribed the JRAD provision in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and in 1990 Congress entirely eliminated it[.] Id. at 363 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation[.] Id. (citation omitted). Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the 1996 effective date of these amendments, his removal is practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses. Id. at 363-64 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b). Subject to limited exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available for an offense related to trafficking in a controlled substance. Id. at 364 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1228). ¶40 The Supreme Court in Padilla stated that [t]hese changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. Id. at 364. Accordingly, the Court conclude[d] that advice regarding deportation is not 21 No. 2013AP1437-CR categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 366. ¶41 Before determining the scope of an attorney's duty to give advice regarding deportation, the Court explained that the deficient-performance prong of Strickland is necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community: 'The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.' Id. at 366 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). The Court noted that [t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation. Id. at 367-68 (collecting authorities). ¶42 The Court also noted that [i]mmigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in it. Id. at 369. There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. Id. ¶43 The Court then explained the scope of an attorney's duty to give advice regarding deportation. When the law is not succinct and straightforward . . . , a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. Id. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct 22 No. 2013AP1437-CR advice is equally clear. Id. Ultimately, the Court [held] that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Id. at 374. ¶44 In Padilla Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras who had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than 40 years, pled guilty to transporting a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer in Kentucky. Id. at 359. His offense made him deportable from the United States. Id. at 359 & n.1. Padilla filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.12 Id. at 359. He claimed that his trial counsel told him that he would not be deported because he had lived in the United States for such a long time. Id. ¶45 The Supreme Court determined that [t]his is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect. Id. at 368-69. The Court reasoned that the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's conviction. Id. at 368 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)). ¶46 The relevant federal statute provided: 12 It appears that Padilla moved to withdraw his plea postsentencing. See Com. v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev'd and remanded sub nom, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 23 No. 2013AP1437-CR Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Any alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is convicted of such an offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (intro.). ¶47 The Court explained that Padilla's counsel could have easily determined that his plea would make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically commands removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368. Instead, Padilla's counsel provided him false assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this country. Id.