Opinion ID: 780969
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Juror Bias/Misconduct

Text: 128 The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). Under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, a defendant who alleges implied juror bias is entitled to a hearing in which he has the opportunity to prove actual bias. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72, 70 S.Ct. 519, 94 L.Ed. 734 (1950). However, pursuant to Ohio Rule of Evidence 606(B), evidence of statements made during the course of jury deliberations is not admissible, a rule in keeping with the general theory that jurors are incompetent witnesses of their own misconduct. A juror may testify about extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence. Id. We recently held that the Ohio courts' application of this statute to dispose of biased jury claims violated clearly established Supreme Court precedent that recognizes the fundamental importance of a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Doan v. Brigano, 237 F.3d 722, 732 (6th Cir.2001). In Doan, we concluded that a juror's presentation of an out-of-court experiment to other jurors was constitutional error, but that this error was harmless. Id. at 739. 129 In this case, Mason alleges that juror bias or misconduct resulted when various jurors (1) made racial slurs, (2) presumed Mason's guilt, (3) slept during trial, and (4) conducted and then presented an out-of-court investigation. The first three involve internal influences, and under Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987), testimony on those subjects should have been barred by the evidentiary rule prohibiting juror impeachment of a jury verdict. Id. at 121, 107 S.Ct. 2739; cf. United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 380 n. 2 (6th Cir.) (recognizing the difference in how the Doan and Logan panels framed the issue), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 895, 122 S.Ct. 216, 151 L.Ed.2d 154 (2001). However, under Doan, the question is whether Mason received a fair trial. Mason did have an opportunity to prove actual bias when the trial court heard oral arguments on his motion for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the jurors' conduct did not impair Mason's ability to receive a fair trial. We must presume that the trial court's factual determinations are correct unless Mason rebuts that presumption with clear and convincing evidence.
130 Mason argues that he was denied a fair trial because of the racial prejudice of an all-white jury, which manifested itself through generalizations about race 16 and the use of black slang. 17 Individual jurors were disturbed by the racist comments but apparently did not understand that they could do anything about it. After reviewing the affidavits of all twelve jurors 18 and hearing testimony from the court bailiff, three jurors, and an alternate juror, the trial court found that [a]t no time during the trial did any of the jurors participate in any acts of racism which could have impaired [Mason's] ability to receive a fair trial. J.A. at 1487. 131 The question on habeas is whether Mason can rebut the presumption that the state court's factual findings are correct. Alternate juror Mary Beckholt (Beckholt) testified that the racist comments, in her opinion, could have violated Mason's right to a fair trial: I felt it was unfair. I felt it was wrong, and I felt that people were making — if they were judging — making judgmental comments of that sort, how could they fairly judge the case? J.A. at 1401. Beckholt, however, did not participate in the jury's deliberations. Because Mason does not offer any evidence other than that which the trial court had at the time it made its factual finding, we deny habeas relief with respect to this claim.
132 Mason alleges that juror Russell L. Dennis expressed belief in Mason's guilt before formal deliberations began. When questioned about such a statement, the juror acknowledged saying, Maybe he's pleading guilty, J.A. at 1378, but testified that he really ... hadn't formed an opinion. It was just wishful thinking because it was late in the day and everybody was tired. J.A. at 1380. The trial court found no substantial evidence that any juror made any comment during the trial which demonstrated that he or she had failed to keep an open mind so as to be able to fairly decide the evidence in this case. J.A. at 1487. Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, we must defer to the state court's factual finding, and therefore deny habeas relief with respect to this claim.
133 Mason alleges that juror Wanda Straub (Straub) fell asleep during the trial. The record is unclear as to whether the juror slept during proceedings in the courtroom or during breaks in the jury room. However, Straub averred that she was awake and attentive during all proceedings of the trial. J.A. at 1479 (Straub Aff. at ¶ 2). The trial court made the same finding with respect to all twelve jurors. Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, we must defer to the state court's factual finding, and therefore deny habeas relief with respect to this claim.
134 This case involves an out-of-court investigation similar to the one in Doan, in which a juror put lipstick on her arm to simulate a bruise and then determined that such a bruise could be seen in a darkened room. Doan, 237 F.3d at 727. In this case, juror Mary Downs (Downs) disassembled her husband's revolver to see whether the grip looked like the one shown in court. The juror stated that she conducted this experiment and informed other jurors after the jury had returned a guilty verdict. However, Beckholt, who did not participate in the jury's deliberations, testified that Downs reported her results during the trial. The trial court found that Downs's actions did not influence the verdict in this case and as such, [Mason] was not prejudiced by this conduct. J.A. at 1487-88. 135 We review constitutional errors at trial such as Sixth Amendment violations under a harmless error standard. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Doan, 237 F.3d at 736. The habeas petitioner must show that the trial error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Doan, 237 F.3d at 736 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710). Although Downs's presentation of her out-of-court findings may have been constitutional error, Mason cannot demonstrate that it substantially affected or influenced the jury's verdict. The evidence at trial was more extensive than the gun grip that was the subject of Downs's experiment; in fact, the alleged murder weapon was the wooden board with nails attached to it. We therefore deny habeas relief with respect to this claim.