Opinion ID: 903291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect on Pena’s Substantial Rights

Text: While the parties dispute whether harmless error or plain-error review applies in this case, we pretermit a determination of this issue. Even assuming arguendo that plain-error review applies, we conclude that we must exercise our discretion to reverse the district court.
19 Case: 11-50482 Document: 00512279158 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/18/2013 No. 11-50482 cons. w/ 11-50484 Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59, 62, 74 (2002) (applying plain-error review to unpreserved Rule 11 error, notwithstanding Rule 11’s provision that a variance from the requirements of the rule is harmless error if the error does not affect substantial rights (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h))); see also United States v. Davila, No. 12-167, 569 U.S. ___, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4541, at -25 (U.S. June 13, 2013) (reaffirming that plain-error review, rather than automatic vacatur, governs unpreserved Rule 11 error). “To affect the defendant’s substantial rights, the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 553 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “[A] defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004). Lastly, under the final prong of plain-error review, “[w]e will exercise our discretion to correct plain error if it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding.” Broussard, 669 F.3d at 553 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Pena contends that three things are evident from the record: 1) The district court’s condition was inherently coercive and became the focal point of the plea negotiations; 2) that condition created or revealed a conflict of interest between Pena and Stanton; and 3) neither the court’s attempt to withdraw its condition nor Pena’s guilty plea could ameliorate the harm resulting from the court’s statements. Pena points out that the district court’s request prompted 20 Case: 11-50482 Document: 00512279158 Page: 21 Date Filed: 06/18/2013 No. 11-50482 cons. w/ 11-50484 Stanton’s motion to withdraw as counsel because of the conflict. Pena argues that, although Stanton did not specify the complete nature of the conflict at that time, he intimated to the district court that he was incapable of disclosing the conflict in full. Subsequent proceedings revealed that Stanton held a portion of the disputed SDVO monies in his attorney trust account. Meanwhile, Pena continued to be debriefed by the government regarding these same monies in light of his perception that the court wanted the matter resolved prior to his sentencing and the government’s apparent interest in this information. These debriefings potentially exposed Stanton’s civil SDVO clients to criminal liability.7 The government argues that, even if the district court erred, Pena cannot show any harm because: 1) Pena had already decided to plead guilty when the court made the statement; 2) Pena’s plea colloquy demonstrates that his plea was knowing and voluntary; and 3) the court withdrew the condition relating to resolution of the “SDVO matter” soon after it made its statement to the parties. The government further asserts that the SDVO matter and the instant cases are completely unrelated, and thus any alleged conflict between Pena and Stanton is specious.
The Supreme Court recently emphasized that “[v]acatur of [a] plea is not in order if the record shows no prejudice to [a defendant]’s decision to plead guilty.” Davila, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4541, at  (emphasis added). Thus, although the primary focus of our prejudice analysis must be the period between the district court’s participation and Pena’s guilty pleas, our review is also “informed by the entire record.” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83. The district court indicated that it would not accept Pena’s pleas unless Pena also resolved the 7 The government confirmed during oral argument that it has now indicted several of Stanton’s clients, as well as Pena, for wrongdoing related to the SDVO monies. 21 Case: 11-50482 Document: 00512279158 Page: 22 Date Filed: 06/18/2013 No. 11-50482 cons. w/ 11-50484 SDVO matter; that statement amounts to a hypothetical agreement that the court preferred.8 Just five days later, Pena pled guilty—a temporal proximity that supports a finding of prejudice. See Davila, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4541, at  (contrasting a plea that follows “soon after” judicial participation with a threemonth delay). The government maintains that even if the district court impermissibly participated in Pena’s plea negotiations, that error did not affect Pena’s substantial rights, because he had already decided to plead guilty.9 As Pena notes, however, plea negotiations were merely ongoing, and the parties had disclosed no terms to the court. This distinction is crucial, as we have already discussed. See Crowell, 60 F.3d at 204 (citation omitted). Stanton’s motion to withdraw, moreover, asserted that “Defendant Pena continues to wish to enter a plea under the terms which were the subject of the general agreement of the parties prior to the declaration of the Court setting out a resolution of the SDVO claims.” That contemporaneous account indicates that there was no definite agreement in advance of the district court’s participation. In Rodriguez, we specifically rejected the government’s argument that, because the defendant had already negotiated a plea with the government before 8 Alternatively, according to the government, the district court said that it would grant Pena full credit for acceptance of responsibility if he resolved the SDVO matter before entering his plea. According to the court, it stated that Pena should resolve the civil SDVO matter before his plea in the instant proceedings. These statements would constitute a plea bargain. 9 Although the government assessed the impact of the court’s condition under a harmless-error standard, its arguments are still germane to our plain-error analysis. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (citations omitted) (clarifying that the third prong of plain-error reviewSSthat the error must “affec[t] substantial rights”SS“is the same language employed in [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 52(a) [‘Harmless Error’], and in most cases it means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.”); see also 28 Moore’s Federal Practice § 652.04[4], at 652-30 to -32 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013) (citations omitted) (“The Olano Court pointed out that [whether obvious error ‘affect[s] substantial rights’] is exactly that same standard applied in harmless error review under Rule 52(a)[.]”). 22 Case: 11-50482 Document: 00512279158 Page: 23 Date Filed: 06/18/2013 No. 11-50482 cons. w/ 11-50484 the district court’s participation in plea negotiations, the court’s error did not impact the proceedings, because we knew the precise agreement that would have resulted in the case. See Rodriguez, 197 F.3d at 160 n.15. We stated that, by making that argument, “the government ignores what we do not knowSSwhether [the defendant] would have entered the agreement at all absent the judge’s involvement.” Id. We thus concluded that the district court’s statements pressured the defendant to plead guilty, even though the statements did not alter the terms of the previously negotiated agreement, because “Rule 11 applies to all forms of participation.” Id. at 157-59, 160 n.15; see also Miles, 10 F.3d at 1141. Even though the district court told the parties that it was withdrawing the condition and that they should “disregard” it, the record evidences that the “withdrawal” did not alter Pena’s perception of the court’s desired disposition. Pena still thought that he needed to resolve the SDVO matter to the extent that he could before entering his pleas. As we observed in Rodriguez: Once the judge placed pressures on Rodriguez, their impact could not be so readily alleviated. The clear implication of the judge’s statements at the pretrial hearing was that the judge desired a plea. It is reason- able to doubt that any amount of explanation from Rodriguez’s attorney could have cured the impression likely left in Rodriguez’s mind that “refusal to accept the judge’s preferred disposition would be punished.” Rodriguez, 197 F.3d at 160 (citations omitted); see also Miles, 10 F.3d at 1141. The record also suggests that, by imposing and then quickly retracting a unilateral condition, the district court unintentionally induced Pena—who might have otherwise continued bargaining—to plead guilty quickly, lest the court change its mind again. The pre-plea proceedings before the court, therefore, illustrate one of the core concerns that Rule 11 was intended to combat, i.e., the 23 Case: 11-50482 Document: 00512279158 Page: 24 Date Filed: 06/18/2013 No. 11-50482 cons. w/ 11-50484 indeterminate effects of the court’s involvement in plea negotiations, even if only in the defendant’s mind. See Miles, 10 F.3d at 1141 (citing Barrett, 982 F.2d at 194 (“By intervening to facilitate a plea, . . . the judge communicated to the defendant that he desired a plea. He thereby raised the possibility, if only in the defendant’s mind, that a refusal to accept the judge’s preferred disposition would be punished.”)).10 Subsequent proceedings also illustrate the impact of the court’s condition on Pena’s perception of the terms of his guilty pleas: He persisted in trying to do something about the SDVO matter long after the district court had retracted its plea condition. One of Pena’s pro se filings alleged that he had attempted to include resolution of the SDVO matter in his plea agreements following the court’s withdrawal of the condition, but the attorneys did not include that term. Further, Pena’s communications with the probation officer indicate that Pena interpreted the “duty of financial candor” provision in his plea agreementSS which the district court highlighted during the plea hearingSSto include candor with respect to the SDVO matter specifically. The district court’s emphasis on this section of Pena’s plea agreement likely reaffirmed, in Pena’s mind, the court’s desired disposition relating to the SDVO matter, even if that was not the court’s actual intent.11 See Adams, 634 F.2d at 841 (citation omitted). Pena’s 10 Davila cites Miles with apparent favor. See Davila, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4541, at  n.2. 11 Again, the district court said to Pena: I need to direct your attention to the duty of financial candor section contained in both plea agreements in both of these cases . . . . I am going to instruct my probation officer within ten days of today to set up a meeting with you in which you are going to disclose the totality of your financial dealings, who have you given money to recently, say in the last year, that is out of the ordinary. 24 Case: 11-50482 Document: 00512279158 Page: 25 Date Filed: 06/18/2013 No. 11-50482 cons. w/ 11-50484 decision to proceed without counsel during most of his debriefings and in his communications with the probation officer demonstrates the far-reaching impact of the district court’s involvement in the plea negotiations. We conclude that the participation affected Pena’s substantial rights, because it was “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83 (citation omitted). Finally, “we do not view the fourth prong [of plain-error review] as automatic if the other three prongs are met.” United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 425 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citation omitted). Further, the Supreme Court recently re-emphasized the inherent “screening criteria” contained within the plain-error rule, under which a defendant’s failure to object “may well count against” the grant of relief. See Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1130 (2013). Recognizing Pena’s high burden of demonstrating prejudice on plain-error review, we nevertheless conclude that the district court’s participation in the plea negotiations warrants reversal in this case. For all of the reasons we have discussed, the district court’s error “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, [and] public reputation of the judicial proceeding.” See Broussard, 669 F.3d at 553 (citation omitted). The district court’s participation precipitated Pena’s efforts to “resolve the SDVO matter” through his pleas and debriefings, caused him to proceed pro se in most subsequent proceedings before the district court, and revealed a potential conflict of interest between Pena and Stanton and undermines confidence in the resulting plea deal. In these ways, this case presents those exceptional circumstances that warrant reversal on plain error. Adams, 634 F.2d at 836 (concluding that the fourth prong was satisfied after judicial participation in plea discussions). See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (“In exceptional circumstances, . . . appellate courts, in the 25 Case: 11-50482 Document: 00512279158 Page: 26 Date Filed: 06/18/2013 No. 11-50482 cons. w/ 11-50484 public interest, may . . . notice errors to which no exception has been taken[.]”); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1984)) (noting that the plain-error rule should be employed when “a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result”). We applaud the district judge’s recognition of his error when he attempted to ameliorate the potential effects of his statements by communicating to the parties, through his law clerk, that they were to disregard the condition. Despite the best efforts of the trial judge, however, his comments had unintended consequences. Thus, in light of our precedents, the appropriate remedy is vacatur of Pena’s guilty pleas and sentences and reassignment of his cases to a different judge on remand. See Daigle, 63 F.3d at 349 (“‘[I]n order to extend the prophylactic scheme established by Rule 11,’ this case will be assigned to a different judge on remand.” (quoting Miles, 10 F.3d at 1142)).