Opinion ID: 1106337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Resolution of Conflict

Text: We conclude that we should resolve the conflict. We frame the conflict issue to be: Whether evidence seized in a search incident to an arrest based upon an outstanding arrest warrant should be suppressed because of the illegality of the stop which led to the discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant. In a specially concurring opinion in the present case, Judge Gross set forth an in-depth analysis of the issue. Judge Gross concurred in the majority opinion because of the Fourth District's precedent but wrote: [W]ere we writing on a clean slate, I would affirm the ruling of the trial court that `the existence of a valid outstanding warrant discovered in the course of an illegal traffic stop' sufficiently attenuated the connection between the illegal stop and the search incident to the arrest so as to render the firearm found during the search admissible in evidence. Frierson, 851 So.2d at 300-01 (Gross, J., concurring specially). The analysis by Judge Gross stated that while the proper decision on the conflict issue was rooted in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the structure for the proper application of Wong Sun is found in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and that a proper application of Wong Sun using the Brown analysis structure is in United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir.1997). We agree with Judge Gross. Wong Sun is, of course, the seminal case from the Supreme Court in respect to the issue of whether statements and other evidence obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded. The Court in Wong Sun ruled that a defendant's statement and contraband taken from another defendant were the fruits of a law enforcement officer's illegal action and should have been excluded. The Court, however, declined to adopt a but for or per se rule, holding: We need not hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959). Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407 (emphasis added). It is this question which must be answered in this case to resolve the conflict issue. To properly undertake the inquiry mandated by Wong Sun, we must consider three factors: (1) the time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Green, 111 F.3d at 521 (relying on the factors explicitly set forth in Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254). In Green, police officers stopped a vehicle without legal justification and, during the stop, discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for the passenger, Avery Green. 111 F.3d at 517. After they arrested Avery, the officers obtained permission from the driver, David Green, to search the car, whereby they found drugs and a gun, which in turn led to criminal charges against David Green. The trial court denied David Green's motion to suppress, and after he was convicted, he appealed this ruling. The Seventh Circuit accepted, as we do in the present case, that the initial stop was not justified. Id. at 520. To determine whether the causal chain of events was sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal stop, the court then applied the above three factors. First, the Green court found that only about five minutes had elapsed between the illegal stop of the Greens and the search of the car. Id. at 521. Thus, the court held that the first of the Brown factors weighed against finding the search attenuated but that this factor was not dispositive. The court next considered the presence of intervening circumstances, which, as in the present case, included an outstanding arrest warrant. The intervening circumstances of this case, because they are not outweighed by flagrant official misconduct, dissipate any taint caused by the illegal stop of the Greens. Specifically, after stopping the Green brothers, the officers discovered there was a warrant for Avery [Green]. Accordingly, the officers arrested Avery. With the right to arrest Avery came the right to conduct a search incident to an arrest. . . . . . . Because the arrest is lawful, a search incident to the arrest is also lawful. The lawful arrest of Avery constituted an intervening circumstance sufficient to dissipate any taint caused by the illegal automobile stop. Green, 111 F.3d at 521. As stated, the Green court weighed the third factor, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, against the intervening circumstance. The court found that while the stop of the Green vehicle did not meet constitutional standards, there was no bad faith on the part of the police, and the police action was not flagrant. The court found important that the police did not exploit the stop in order to search the automobile. Rather the search came only after they learned that Avery was wanted on a warrant and arrested him. Id. at 523. Applying the Brown factors in the present case, we reach the same result that the court reached in Green. The brief amount of time that elapsed between the illegal stop and the arrest of respondent weighs against finding the search attenuated, but this factor is not dispositive. In turning to the next factor, the outstanding arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance that weighs in favor of the firearm found in a search incident to the outstanding arrest warrant being sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal stop to be purged of the primary taint of the illegal stop. Crucially, the search was incident to the outstanding warrant and not incident to the illegal stop. The outstanding arrest warrant was a judicial order directing the arrest of respondent whenever the respondent was located. As Judge Gross noted, A warrant indicates the existence of criminal conduct separate from the conduct that occurred at the time of the illegal traffic stop. Frierson, 851 So.2d at 302 (Gross, J., concurring specially). The illegality of the stop does not affect the continuing required enforcement of the court's order that respondent be arrested. We believe to be very significant the third factor in the Brown analysis, which is whether the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct in making the illegal stop outweighs the intervening cause of the outstanding arrest warrant so that the taint of the illegal stop is so onerous that any evidence discovered following the stop must be suppressed. In this case, we do not find that the purpose and flagrancy of misconduct in illegally stopping respondent was such that the taint of the illegal stop required that the evidence seized incident to the outstanding arrest warrant should be suppressed. The law enforcement officer made a mistake in respect to the enforcement of the traffic law, but there was no evidence that the stop was pretextual or in bad faith. Our decision is further supported by numerous other state supreme court decisions which have reached similar holdings in similar circumstances. For example, in State v. Hill, 725 So.2d 1282 (La.1998), after an arguably unjustified stop, a computer search returned reliable information that the defendant was wanted on an outstanding arrest warrant. In a search incident to the arrest, the officers discovered on the defendant a crack pipe that tested positive for cocaine residue. The court concluded that the discovery of the existence of outstanding arrest warrants gives an officer probable cause to arrest, and may constitute an intervening circumstance within the meaning of Brown, which may dissipate the taint caused by prior police misconduct. Id. at 1286. The Kansas Supreme Court reached a similar result in State v. Jones, 270 Kan. 526, 17 P.3d 359, 361 (2001) (relying on Green and holding that in light of the fact that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the officer, once the officer learned of the outstanding warrant, he had a right and duty to arrest Jones. Subsequent to the arrest, [the officer] had the right to search Jones). See also State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454, 455 (2004) (adopting Green and holding that based on facts presented, the discovery of an outstanding warrant for Page's arrest constituted an intervening event, dissipating any possible taint of unlawful law enforcement conduct). Respondent contends that our decisions in Moody v. State, 842 So.2d 754 (Fla. 2003), and State v. Diaz, 850 So.2d 435 (Fla.2003), should control this decision. We do not agree. In neither case were we dealing with the suppression of evidence seized in a search incident to an outstanding arrest warrant.