Opinion ID: 3032241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of an intervening BIA decision to

Text: Petitioner’s case [6] Citing our decision in Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1996), Theagene argues that the Board violated his right to due process by applying an intervening en banc decision of the Board without providing him with notice and an opportunity to respond. We cannot agree. Gonzalez and CastilloVillagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992), upon which Gonzalez relied, involved the Board’s decision to take administrative notice of facts that bore on whether an alien was THEAGENE v. GONZALES 7145 deportable. In Gonzalez and Castillo-Villagra, we concluded that the Board’s decision to make legal judgments on the basis of facts of which the Board took administrative notice violated an alien’s right to due process where the Board failed to give the alien an opportunity to respond. Gonzalez, 82 F.3d at 911-12; Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1028-29. However, Theagene cites no authority for the proposition that an alien’s right to due process is similarly violated when the Board applies controlling legal authority to a pending case without informing the alien or providing an opportunity to respond. [7] The Board’s decision to apply legal principles from intervening case law is of a different character than the Board’s decision to draw legal conclusions from facts introduced through administrative notice. In the latter, the violation of due process stemmed from depriving the alien of notice and an opportunity to respond to the Board’s legal conclusion through the introduction of other facts. See Gonzalez, 82 F.3d at 911-12. Yet, Theagene does not explain why the application of intervening law without notice offends due process, given that developing an additional factual record is unnecessary when applying a pure change in law. Though a tribunal often requests supplemental briefs in such cases, applying new law to a pending case without notice does not, under any authority cited to us, offend due process. Nor does Theagene explain why publication of controlling legal authority — published a month before the Board’s decision to reconsider his case — does not provide sufficient notice and an opportunity to address the legal issues raised in that authority in a motion to reconsider or for leave to file a supplemental brief. V. Application of Matter of J-E to Petitioner’s case [8] Finally, Theagene argues that the Board’s en banc decision in Matter of J-E did not require the Board to deny his petition on his Convention Against Torture claim. We review de novo the Board’s determinations as to purely legal ques7146 THEAGENE v. GONZALES tions. Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002). The Board’s initial October 30, 2001, decision, which granted Theagene asylum on the Convention Against Torture claim, rested on legal premises that the Board repudiated in Matter of J-E. See Matter of J-E, 23 I&N at 299-304. Theagene conceded in his administrative proceedings that he had no evidence that his family had ever been persecuted or that he had personally been a victim of persecution in Haiti. As his claim under the Convention Against Torture was based on reports of prison conditions and detention, just as in Matter of J-E, the Board’s application of Matter of J-E was legally sound. Theagene fails to distinguish Matter of J-E on appeal. Insofar as Theagene challenges the BIA’s holding in Matter of J-E, we are required to defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of immigration laws. Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). The Board’s decision in Matter of J-E is not unreasonable, so we defer to the Board’s interpretation.