Opinion ID: 1249059
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expert Witnesses and Related Documents

Text: Although the government cannot be compelled to disclose its nonexpert witnesses before trial, Rule 16 establishes a different regime for expert witnesses and certain categories of documents and scientific tests. Relevant here, upon a defendant's request the government is required to disclose the expert witnesses it intends to use in its case-in-chief, as well as a summary of these experts' expected testimony and the bases and reasons for [their] opinions. [7] Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(G); see also 16(a)(1)(E) (documents within the government's possession, custody or control material to the defense or that the government intends to use in its case-in-chief), 16(a)(1)(F) (scientific reports). Once triggered by the defendant, these discovery obligations are reciprocal. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b)(1)(A)-(C). Although Rule 16(a)(1)(G) does not specify a timeline for such disclosures, the advisory committee notes state the expectation that the parties will make their requests and disclosures in a timely fashion. Thus, unlike the disclosure of nonexpert witnesses, once the parties have triggered Rule 16(a)(1)(G)'s reciprocal disclosure requirements, the district court has the authority to regulate such disclosures under Rule 16(d)(2), which gives the court wide latitude to ensure compliance with Rule 16 discovery obligations. Because Rule 16(a)(1)(G) specifically refers to the disclosure of the bases and reasons for expert witnesses' opinions, the district court's authority also includes the power to regulate disclosure of documents upon which a party's expert witnesses will rely during its case-in-chief. Accordingly, we hold that the district court here acted within its authority in requiring the government to disclose in advance of trial a list of its intended expert witnesses and the documents upon which those expert witnesses would rely. [8]
The district court's December 2005 and February 2006 orders limiting the government's case-in-chief to those witnesses disclosed as of December 5, 2005 appear to preclude the addition of expert as well as nonexpert witnesses (other than as rebuttal witnesses). Rule 16(d)(2) expressly authorizes as one sanction for noncompliance the exclusion of undisclosed evidence. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(2)(C). [9] Nonetheless, as with the exclusion of nonexpert witnesses, completely precluding use of an expert witness is an extreme sanction. See Finley, 301 F.3d at 1018 (addressing the exclusion of an expert witness' testimony as a sanction for the defendant's alleged failure to give proper notice under Rule 16(b)(1)(C)). As we held in Finley, assuming there was an omission of some sort [with respect to the mandated disclosures regarding expert witnesses], it was not willfully done to gain a tactical advantage and thus the severe sanction of total exclusion of the testimony was disproportionate to the alleged harm. Id. Here, in discussing the government's compliance with the court's discovery orders, the district court observed that the government had failed to comply fully with certain discovery deadlines and that it was the court's impression that the delay is due largely to the government's practice of adopting aggressive legal positions in defense of non-disclosure and waiting for an order of this Court to sort out the dispute. As a remedy, it imposed a monitoring requirement on the government's compliance. Turning to alleged shortcomings in the government's expert disclosures, it required the government to supplement those disclosures with specific information about the bases for the experts' testimony. The court did not, however, clearly find that the government willfully defied any of its expert disclosure obligations in order to gain a tactical advantage. The district court thus has not yet articulated a basis on which it could impose the severe sanction of preemptively excluding any additional expert witnesses as part of the government's case-in-chief. On the other hand, the government has not identified any expert witness it believes is foreclosed by the court's December 2005 and February 2006 orders that it wishes to add at this late date. Should the government seek leave to add such a witness, we leave it to the district court to address the request in accordance with the principles we have set forth above.
The government does express concern that under the December 2005 and February 2006 orders, its previously identified experts will not be able to rely on three scientific studies dealing with asbestos-related exposure levels and diseases because these studies were not disclosed prior to December 5, 2005. To the extent that the district court's orders would preclude these studies because the government committed a discovery violation by failing to disclose them earlier, the orders currently lack the proper foundation for such a sanction. As with the preclusion of expert witnesses, the district court has not made a finding that the government willfully failed to disclose these studies earlier in order to gain a tactical advantage. See Finley, 301 F.3d at 1018. On the other hand, there is a difference between restricting what an expert may introduce in support of his testimony and excluding his testimony altogether, as Finley recognizes. See id. at 1018 (noting that [t]he severe sanction of total exclusion of the testimony was disproportionate to the alleged harm) (emphasis added). Thus, the district court may be able to articulate legitimate reasons to restrict the use of the studies when it addresses the specifics of the government's failure to disclose the studies earlier. Whether there is any basis for exclusion of these documents is unclear on the record before us. It appears these studies were not in existenceat least in their final formuntil after December 2005; all of the studies were finalized or published after the disclosure deadline imposed by the district court. Because the government has not yet presented these studies to the district court, the court has not yet had a chance to determine whether there is a proper basis for exclusion, oreven if there is such a basiswhether it would allow the studies' use as a matter of discretion. We therefore remand the question to the district court for resolution.