Opinion ID: 2978893
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impeachment of Ms. Elwood

Text: Powers contends that the district court improperly limited examination of Ms. Elwood in violation of his right to confront his accusers. During cross-examination, Powers’ counsel attempted to question Ms. Elwood about her marijuana use. The Government objected to this line of questioning, and the judge sustained the objection. The judge dismissed the jury, and a voir dire was conducted on this issue. Ms. Elwood admitted that she had smoked marijuana since she was 16, and that she had smoked marijuana with Powers between five and ten times while her children were home. Furthermore, in response to a question related to her ability to recall events, she stated, “I have no problem with remembering things.” Evidentiary rulings, even constitutional challenges to those rulings, are considered under the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Davis, 577 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 564 (6th Cir. 2003)). The Supreme Court has remarked that “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). See also Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 736 (6th Cir. 2000). A Confrontation Clause issue only emerges when the 6 limitations have “emasculate[d] the right of cross-examination itself.” Hargrave v. McKee, 248 F. App'x 718, 726 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985)).2 In this case, the judge properly exercised his discretionary powers in refusing to allow the questions on drug use. Drug use may be used to attack a witness’s “ability to perceive the underlying events and testify lucidly at trial.” United States v. Martinez, 59 F. App'x 638, 646 (6th Cir. 2003). But, “a district court may refuse cross-examination on the issue where memory or mental capacity is not legitimately at issue and the evidence is offered solely as a general character attack.” United States v. Mojica, 185 F.3d 780, 789 (7th Cir. 1999). See also United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d 698, 703 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the district court properly limited impeachment of a witness about past drug treatment that was a general attack on the witness’s credibility). The main thrust of Ms. Elwood’s testimony was that Powers often used the family computer during the two months that he lived in her home. The use of marijuana five or ten times would not have influenced her ability to perceive how often Powers used the computer. Thus, her ability to testify lucidly at trial was not legitimately at issue, and the judge appropriately ruled that the prejudicial impact of the drug use outweighed its probative value.