Opinion ID: 78231
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective assistance of counsel on the fair-warning claim

Text: The State claims the district court erred when it concluded Magwood's attorney was constitutionally ineffective during his resentencing because he failed to argue that the retroactive application of Kyzer to Magwood's case was a violation of due process. In order for Magwood to obtain relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must show (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel's effectiveness is presumed, and [a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. [C]ounsel cannot be adjudged incompetent for performing in a particular way in a case, as long as the approach taken `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2474, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)). To overcome [the] presumption in favor of competence, the petitioner bears the heavybut not insurmountableburden of persuading the court `that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.' Haliburton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 342 F.3d 1233, 1243 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314-15). Magwood asserted the ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing on the fair-warning claim on collateral review in state court, where both the trial court and Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected it. The district court disagreed with the state courts' conclusions, and found counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to the resentencing court that the retroactive application of Kyzer to Magwood's case was a violation of the due process clause. The district court had already concluded the state trial court violated the fair-warning component of the due process clause by retroactively applying Kyzer to Magwood's case. The district court found that at the resentencing hearing, Magwood's counsel stated the court could sentence Magwood to death without finding an aggravating circumstance in § 13-11-6. Defense counsel stated: We say to Your Honor, as we did in some proposed findings that we submitted to you, that the capital offense itself is an aggravating circumstance and that this Court has every right to consider it as an aggravating circumstance. Applying Strickland, the district court concluded the combination of defense counsel misstating the law as it was clearly established by United State Supreme Court precedent in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), and failing to argue against the retroactive application of Kyzer, was deficient performance by counsel. Magwood, 481 F.Supp.2d at 1292-93. The district court relied on Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir.1992), in finding Magwood's counsel deficient. In Cave, the defendant's attorney emphasized the fact the defendant was guilty of robbery and essentially conceded the State had proven its case as to guilt. Defense counsel did not understand her client could be convicted of felony murder if he participated in a robbery, and so made the nonsensical argument to the jury that, although he committed the robbery, he was not guilty of felony murder. Id. at 1517-18. We found counsel's performance deficient. Id. The district court also concluded Magwood's counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial. If counsel had been able to successfully argue a death sentence violated the fair-warning principle of the due process clause, the district court reasoned the outcome of the case would surely have been different. Magwood, 481 F.Supp.2d at 1293. The district court then addressed whether the state court was unreasonable in rejecting Magwood's ineffectiveness claim. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rested its holding on the fact the lawyer had no substantive role in the resentencing. The district court found this conclusion unreasonable, whether regarded as a legal issue or a factual issue. The Alabama court's holding was not consistent with legal requirements, clearly established by the United States Supreme Court, that individualized consideration of the aggravating and mitigating factors is required. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). The holding was also not consistent, factually, with what actually happened at resentencing. Thus, the district court found the Alabama court's holding, that counsel's performance was adequate because the federal courts only ordered a resentencing court to find the mitigating circumstances, unreasonable and concluded habeas relief was due to be granted on this claim. Magwood, 481 F.Supp.2d at 1293-95. We conclude the district court erred in holding that counsel's performance was deficient. While there was a possible objection, Alabama's highest court had said in Kyzer that a § 13-11-2 aggravating factor could be used as an aggravating circumstance. We are not prepared to require counsel to raise an argument that has already been decided adversely to his client's position by a state's highest court in order to avoid being found ineffective. The district court relies on Cave, and in that case, counsel did not understand the felony murder rule-a much more elementary legal concept. Magwood has failed to overcome the presumption in favor of competence. Because we do not find the performance of Magwood's counsel deficient, we need not discuss the prejudice prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064 (Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.). Thus, we reverse the district court's holding that Magwood's resentencing counsel was ineffective in failing to argue the retroactive application of Kyzer was a violation of due process.