Opinion ID: 1872573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Simple or Aggravated Assault?

Text: Jackson claims his indictment for aggravated assault was fatally defective because it failed to allege that a deadly weapon was used to inflict the victim's bodily injuries. Because the assault consisted largely of blows administered by hands and closed fists, Jackson contends his crime, at best, was simple assault, a misdemeanor. Specifically, he contends the trial judge, as a matter of law, should have sustained his motion to reduce the charge from aggravated assault to simple assault. We disagree. By virtue of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(1)(a) (Supp. 1991), a person is guilty of simple assault if he purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. By virtue of § 97-3-7(2)(b) (Supp. 1991), [a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if he ... purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.  [emphasis supplied] The indictment in this case charged that John Michael Jackson... on or about January 21, 1990, ... did unlawfully, feloniously, purposely and knowingly cause bodily injury to Tammy L. Jackson ... with a means likely to produce serious bodily harm, by striking the body of Tammy L. Jackson with his hands and closed fists and throwing her against a wall, thereby causing the rupturing of her left eardrum, ... . Jury instruction S-1 authorized the jury to return a verdict of guilty of aggravated assault if it believed from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt ... the defendant ... did unlawfully, feloniously, purposely and knowingly cause bodily injury to Tammy L. Jackson; and any such bodily injury was caused with a means likely to produce serious bodily harm. Jury instruction S-2, on the other hand, authorized the fact finder to return a verdict of simple assault if it found the evidence of aggravated assault lacking. S-2 instructed the jury that simple assault is distinguished from aggravated assault by the absence of proof or the failure to prove that any bodily injury was caused with a means likely to produce serious bodily injury. The centerpiece of Jackson's argument is that hands and fists can never constitute a means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm to the victim. Jackson claims that fighting with fists falls invariably into the category of simple assault. We cannot agree. While ordinarily an assault under § 97-3-7(2)(b) involves the use of a weapon, the statutory words or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm have been used with a definite purpose and meaning in mind. We hold that a violent and aggravated assault committed with one's fists may constitute a crime under § 97-3-7(2)(b). Indeed, our cases make this perfectly clear. In Blaine v. State, 196 Miss. 603, 608-09, 17 So.2d 549, 550 (1944), decided under our former law defining assault and battery with intent to kill but applicable, nevertheless, to the new law and the facts before us, the defendant argued that a battery with hands and feet was not a means or force likely to produce death. We said that [s]uch contention would be cogent only in the event (1) such means were never likely to produce death; or (2) such means as here used were not so. This Court quickly dispensed with the first alternative by observing that common knowledge, buttressed by murder convictions, shows that the use of hands and feet can likely produce death. We then noted the second alternative necessarily involved a question of fact to be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The verbiage of the statute appears not to have been selected hap-hazardly. It does not restrict the means to deadly weapons nor to an assault with intent to kill, nor does it require probability of death. The word likely borrows meaning from both possibility and probability and stands midway their respective connotations. So defined, in all cases save those bespeaking absurdity, the responsibility for adjudging likelihood remains with the jury, which may be left free to give due weight to the parties, the place, the means used, and the degree of force employed. [emphasis supplied] Similarly, in Johnson v. State, 230 So.2d 810, 811 (Miss. 1970), we said that [w]hether [a shoe clad foot] is, in a given case, a means or force likely to produce death, within the meaning of the statute, is a matter for the determination of the jury, in the light of evidence as to how and in what manner it is employed. Finally, in Pulliam v. State, 298 So.2d 711, 713 (Miss. 1974), a case also decided under our former statute, we reaffirmed the role of the jury. While the use of feet and fists ordinarily would not constitute the use of a deadly weapon, they can constitute a deadly weapon if used with means or force likely to produce death. Whether they are so used is for the jury to determine from the evidence. [emphasis supplied] It is not necessary under § 97-3-7(2)(b) that the use of hands and fists constitute the use of a deadly weapon; rather, it is enough if their use constitutes a means likely to produce [either] death or serious bodily harm. Nor is it necessary under this section for the State to prove the victim suffered serious bodily injury. Mere bodily injury is sufficient so long as it was caused with other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm. We hold that whether or not hands and closed fists constitute, under § 97-3-7(2)(b), a means likely to produce serious bodily harm involves a question of fact to be decided by the jury in light of the evidence. The responsibility for determining likelihood remains with the jury which may be left free to give due weight to the characteristics of the parties, the place, the manner in which hands and fists are used, and the degree of force employed. Accordingly, evidence of a beating with closed fists is sufficient to sustain a charge for aggravated assault. Since this is true, the indictment here was not defective, and the trial judge correctly refused to reduce the charge pending development of the evidence. In the case at bar, the evidence demonstrated an assault which was not only likely to produce serious bodily harm but actually did produce serious bodily harm. Dr. Parsons testified a ruptured ear drum can be serious in the respect that you can lose a great deal of hearing if the ear drum remains ruptured and ... does not heal or is not repaired surgically. Tammy Jackson was hospitalized for thirty-six (36) hours, and the traumatic rupture of her ear drum required surgical intervention by an ear specialist. The defendant testified he was aware that Tammy had been seriously injured and that he was sorry for what he had done. Johnson's reliance upon Brooks v. State, 360 So.2d 704 (Miss. 1978) is misplaced. In that case Brooks was indicted under § 97-3-7(2)(a) for attempting to cause serious bodily injury to another by hitting a female with hands, arms, fists, and with books. We held there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Brooks attempted to cause serious bodily injury. The victim's injuries were not serious. Brooks is important in our context only for what it did not hold. We did not say that hands and closed fists could never constitute a means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm. We simply were unable to conclude  in these particular circumstances that the book used in the attack constituted a `deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.' Moreover, we noted there could only be conjecture as to Brooks' intent because the victim's injuries were not serious. Johnson's intent, on the other hand, was clear. He was drunk and violent and pummeled the victim with hands and closed fists because she left him in Columbus and because she telephoned his daddy. He sat astraddle the victim while he hit and cursed her. He later held his hand around her neck while he repeatedly banged her head against the wall. The force exerted was sufficient to place a dent or split in the wall following impact. Because of her neuromuscular condition, the victim was too tired to resist. The jury was properly instructed and asked to determine whether or not the defendant's actions constituted aggravated or simple assault. It resolved the issue adversely to the defendant, which was their prerogative. We hold the jury's resolution of the issue in favor of a finding of aggravated assault is supported by the evidence.