Opinion ID: 3168141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The Court of Appeals began its analysis by determining that the district court did not lose jurisdiction over its ability to modify, extend, or revoke Hurley's probation upon its initial decision to reinstate his term for an additional 12 months. Hurley, 2014 WL 1302609, at . That declaration appears to miss the point. Under the facts presented here, the question is not whether the district court retained the jurisdictional authority to modify, extend, or revoke Hurley's reinstated probation, but rather the issue is whether 8 the court's exercise of jurisdiction comported with statutory and due process requirements. In that vein, the panel's reliance on the concept that probation is a privilege rather than a right to opine that it is appropriate for a court to summarily revoke a probation as a sanction for contempt is similarly misplaced. 2014 WL 1302609, at . Although the initial decision to impose probation is an act of grace, once the privilege of probation has been bestowed upon a defendant, he or she acquires a conditional liberty interest which is subject to substantive and procedural due process limits on its revocation. See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (quoting Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 610, 105 S. Ct. 2254, 85 L. Ed. 2d 636 [1985]). For instance, [a] probationer may not have his or her probation revoked unless it is made to appear that the probationer has failed to comply with the conditions of probation. Walker, 260 Kan. at 808. Accordingly, Hurley's contemptuous conduct would permit revocation of his probation only if it were determined to be a violation of his probation conditions. The panel attempts to circumvent this obstacle by noting that Hurley stipulated to the probation violations which prompted the probation revocation hearing and opining that the stipulation alone provided the district court adequate grounds to revoke Hurley's probation regardless of his subsequent outburst. Hurley, 2014 WL 1302609, at . The stipulation was, indeed, sufficient to support the district court's revocation of the existing probation. But after the court used the stipulation to revoke Hurley's probation, it chose the sanction of a reinstated probation for an additional 12-month term. In State v. Hymer, 27 Kan. App. 2d 1054, 1055, 11 P.3d 94 (2000), rev'd on other grounds 271 Kan. 716, 26 P.3d 63 (2001), a Court of Appeals panel relied on State v. Royse, 252 Kan. 394, 398, 845 P.2d 44 (1993), to hold that once a district court imposes a sentence of probation, it is powerless to modify or depart from the sentence, albeit the district court does have the power and jurisdiction to revoke the probation. 9 In this case, the court subsequently ordered Hurley to prison based upon his allegedly contemptuous statement to the ISO to which Hurley did not stipulate. The court's pronouncements from the bench, together with the filed journal entries, confirm that Hurley received the prison sanction for his courtroom behavior and not for the violations to which he had previously stipulated. That could not be accomplished as a modified sentence but only as a subsequent revocation. To again revoke Hurley's probation, the district court had to conform with due process. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), the United States Supreme Court established minimum due process rights for parolees and extended those rights to probationers in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973). Minimum due process includes written notice of the claimed violations of probation, disclosure to the probationer of the evidence against him or her, the opportunity to be heard in person and to present evidence and witnesses, the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses, a neutral and detached hearing body, and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation. The probationer also has a right to the assistance of counsel. State v. Billings, 30 Kan. App. 2d 236, 238, 39 P.3d 682 (2002) (citing Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612, 105 S. Ct. 2254, 85 L. Ed. 2d 636 [1985]). K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-3716, the probation revocation statute in effect during the relevant time period in this case, has been determined to satisfy all constitutional requirements set forth in Gagnon. See State v. Rasler, 216 Kan. 292, 296, 532 P.2d 1077 (1975). That statute requires the ISO to submit in writing a report showing in what manner the defendant has violated the conditions of release; requires the district court to conduct a probation revocation hearing in open court; requires the State to carry its 10 burden of establishing the violation; requires that the defendant have the right to counsel; and requires that [t]he defendant shall have the right to present the testimony of witnesses and other evidence on the defendant's behalf. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-3716(b). The panel's conclusory determination that Hurley received all of his constitutionally-guaranteed due process protections does not withstand closer scrutiny with respect to the district court's final revocation based upon the allegation of contempt. See Hurley, 2014 WL 1302609, at . Although Hurley had an attorney that argued on his behalf, both before and after the alleged contempt, his counsel was not given the opportunity to insure that Hurley was provided all of the statutory protections to which he was entitled. For instance, Hurley was not provided with written notice of the manner in which he violated the conditions of probation, i.e., what term or condition of probation prohibited the probationer from cursing at his ISO or from being held in contempt of court. Likewise, the State was not required to present testimony or evidence proving the alleged probation violation, but rather the ISO simply made an unsworn and unsolicited accusation to the judge. Because the State was not required to bear its burden of proving a probation violation, Hurley was denied any opportunity to confront and cross-examine under oath the witness against him, i.e., the ISO. Perhaps most importantly, Hurley was denied his due process right to have an opportunity to be heard prior to the final probation revocation. See Walker, 260 Kan. at 809 (At probation revocation hearing, probationer entitled to opportunity to show he or she did not violate the conditions of probation; or that there was justifiable excuse for any violation; or that revocation is not appropriate disposition.). As noted above, the defense counsel admonished Hurley to be quiet when he attempted to apologize and/or explain his conduct. The district court explicitly refused to let Hurley speak. And Hurley 11 obviously did not waive his right to be heard, as evidenced by his attempts to speak in court, as well as by his subsequent letter to the judge. In short, the revocation of Hurley's probation was not accomplished in accordance with the statutory provisions that are necessitated by due process requirements. Because the error was constitutional in nature, the burden is on the State to persuade us beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., proves there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). Here, the State makes no such argument, instead contending that no error occurred. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for a probation revocation hearing that comports with statutory and constitutional requirements. Cf. State v. Jackson, 234 Kan. 84, 88, 670 P.2d 1327 (1983) (remanding for new probation revocation hearing where defendant denied the right to present witness at original hearing). Reversed and remanded. 12