Opinion ID: 2621725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Validity of the Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico

Text: {24} The State Engineer urges us to overrule Cartwright and reject the pueblo rights doctrine in New Mexico for two primary reasons. First, contrary to the analysis in Cartwright, the State Engineer contends that there is no historical basis for the pueblo rights doctrine in Spanish and Mexican law. Second, the State Engineer argues that the pueblo rights doctrine is inconsistent with fundamental precepts of New Mexico water law. We do not believe that the State Engineer's first reason provides adequate grounds to overrule Cartwright, but we need not take a definitive position on the historical validity of the pueblo rights doctrine because we agree with the State Engineer that Cartwright is based on a flawed analysis of New Mexico water law. We more fully address each of these points below. We begin, however, by reiterating the importance of stare decisis. Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts should not lightly overrule past decisions. Among these are the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise; the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; and the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970). Based on the importance of stare decisis, we require a compelling reason to overrule one of our prior cases. Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 7, 133 N.M. 661, 68 P.3d 901. We consider the State Engineer's arguments with these principles in mind.
{25} In the district court, the State Engineer tendered the expert opinion of several witnesses discussing the question of whether the pueblo rights doctrine is supported by historical evidence: Professor G. Emlen Hall, a legal historian, Dr. Iris Engstrand, a historian, Professor Guillermo F. Margadant, an expert in Spanish and Mexican legal history, Professor Hans W. Baade, a legal historian, and Professor Daniel Tyler, a historian. Each of these experts concluded that the pueblo rights doctrine lacks a historical foundation in the law of either of the two antecedent sovereigns in New Mexico, Spain and Mexico. The State Engineer's experts provided examples of other towns established by colonization grants in New Mexico and Texas for which there is no evidence of a prior and paramount right to water. See, e.g., Daniel Tyler, The Mythical Pueblo Rights Doctrine 35-44 (1990). In response to these expert opinions, the City devoted its tender on the validity of the pueblo rights doctrine to Cartwright and its authorities, which primarily consisted of the California cases recognizing the pueblo rights doctrine, see Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. 237, 39 P. 762 (1895), overruled on other grounds by Beckett v. City of Petaluma, 171 Cal. 309, 153 P. 20, 23 (1915); Lux, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674; see also City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.3d 199, 123 Cal.Rptr. 1, 537 P.2d 1250, 1277 (1975) (stating that Lux and Vernon are the key decisions on the issue), disapproved on other grounds by City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.4th 1224, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, 5 P.3d 853, 867-68 (2000). Based on the scholarly criticism of the State Engineer's experts, the Court of Appeals concluded that the pueblo rights doctrine is historically invalid. State ex rel. Martinez, 118 N.M. at 263, 880 P.2d at 874; accord In re Contests of the City of Laredo to the Adjudication of Water Rights, 675 S.W.2d 257, 259-69 (Tex. App.1984). {26} The State Engineer contends that the pueblo rights doctrine is historically invalid. However, because this Court adopted the pueblo rights doctrine in Cartwright, we do not treat the issue of the historical validity of the doctrine as we would if it were an issue of first impression. Thus, the question is not whether we agree with the State Engineer's historical view of the law of antecedent sovereigns but, instead, whether this Court's historical analysis in Cartwright is so clearly erroneous as to create a compelling reason for overruling Cartwright. Having reviewed the State Engineer's tender and the authorities upon which Cartwright relied, we do not believe that the historical evidence is sufficiently clear to justify overruling Cartwright on this basis. {27} The State Engineer's primary attack on the historical validity of the pueblo rights doctrine is its inconsistency with the Spanish and Mexican practice of equitable apportionment and common use, as stated in the Plan of Pitic and the Recopilación. However, this Court was not unaware of this view of the law of antecedent sovereigns when adopting the pueblo rights doctrine. See Cartwright, 66 N.M. at 97, 343 P.2d at 676-77 (Federici, D.J., dissenting) (quoting Section 7 of the Plan of Pitic, which states in relevant part that `[t]he residents and natives shall enjoy equally ... water privileges ... in common with the residents and natives of the adjoining and neighboring pueblos' ). Moreover, the State Engineer's reliance on equitable apportionment conflicts with this Court's longstanding interpretation of water law applicable in New Mexico under Spanish and Mexican rule outside the context of the pueblo rights doctrine. {28} Although [t]he water in the public stream belongs to the public, Snow v. Abalos, 18 N.M. 681, 693, 140 P. 1044, 1048 (1914), unappropriated water is subject to appropriation for beneficial use. N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 2. Once appropriated, [p]riority of appropriation shall give the better right. N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 2. New Mexico water law, then, stands in contrast to the State Engineer's reliance on a theory of common use, under which reasonable use and equitable sharing would control. Although the State Engineer relies on Spanish and Mexican law in support of equitable distribution, the current system of water law in New Mexico is based on this Court's interpretation of the law of antecedent sovereigns. In New Mexico, the Colorado doctrine, as it is termed, of prior appropriation prevails. Established or founded by the custom of the people, it grew out of the condition of the country and the necessities of its citizens. The common-law doctrine of riparian right was not suited to an arid region, and was never recognized by the people of this jurisdiction. When the question came before the courts for adjudication[, Albuquerque Land & Irrigation Co. v. Gutierrez, 10 N.M. 177, 240, 61 P. 357, 360-61 (1900), aff'd, 188 U.S. 545, 23 S.Ct. 338, 47 L.Ed. 588 (1903)], the doctrine of prior appropriation was recognized by the courts and became the settled law of the territory. The judicial declaration, however, did not make the law; it only recognized the law as it had been established and applied by the people, and as it had always existed from the first settlement of this portion of the country. This construction of the law by the courts has been consistently adhered to by the Legislature of the territory.... Snow, 18 N.M. at 693, 140 P. at 1048; accord State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 226, 182 P.2d 421, 433 (1945) (stating that prior appropriation has been applied in New Mexico for some two or three centuries); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 9 N.M. 292, 306, 51 P. 674, 678 (1898) (The law of prior appropriation existed under the Mexican republic at the time of the acquisition of New Mexico ....), rev'd on other grounds, 174 U.S. 690, 19 S.Ct. 770, 43 L.Ed. 1136 (1899). {29} In fact, we have previously rejected equitable apportionment as inconsistent with New Mexico's system of prior appropriation. Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1929). In Yeo, a landowner asserted rights to underlying groundwater by virtue of ownership of the land, either as absolute ownership of as much water as the landowner could capture or to the right to reasonable use of such waters correlative with similar rights of other owners. Id. at 614, 286 P. at 971-72. According to the correlative rights doctrine, each overlying owner would have the same rightthe right to use whenever he [or she] saw fit. The right does not arise from an appropriation to beneficial use, which develops the resources of the state. It is not lost or impaired by nonuse. Regardless of the improvements and investments of the pioneers, later comers and later developers may claim their rights. The exercise of those rights which have been in abeyance will frequently destroy or impair existing improvements, and may so reduce the rights of all that none are longer of practical value, and that the whole district is reduced to a condition of nonproductiveness. The preventive for such unfortunate and uneconomic results is found in the recognition of the superior rights of prior appropriators. Invested capital and improvements are thus protected. New appropriations may thus be made only from a supply not already in beneficial use. Nonuse involves forfeiture. A great natural public resource is thus both utilized and conserved. Id. at 620, 286 P. at 974. We concluded that the doctrine of prior appropriation is the rule best adapted to our condition and circumstances, id. at 621, 286 P. at 974, and that this rule applied in New Mexico under Spanish and Mexican sovereignty, compare id. at 617-18, 286 P. at 973, with id. at 630, 286 P. at 978 (Parker, J., dissenting on rehearing) (stating that Spanish and Mexican civil law was the same as the common law in regard to percolating waters). {30} Based on these authorities, we could not reject the pueblo rights doctrine through a recognition of equitable apportionment and common use without undermining the historical basis for New Mexico's adoption of the doctrine of prior appropriation as a legacy of antecedent sovereigns. In short, New Mexico does not recognize equitable distribution as the system of water law that survived the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. But cf. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183-88, 103 S.Ct. 539, 74 L.Ed.2d 348 (1982) (applying the federal common law doctrine of equitable apportionment to interstate water adjudications between prior appropriation states and rejecting priority as the sole criterion). We will not, in the limited context of the pueblo rights doctrine, reevaluate the entire historical basis for water law in this State. We thus reject the State Engineer's arguments relating to common use. {31} Moreover, we are wary of undue reliance on scholarly opinions in re-evaluating a position previously adopted by this Court. As the record in this case demonstrates, historical opinion can fluctuate based on newly found historical evidence or novel interpretations of extant sources. Unlike history as a matter of theory, however, the law, as reflected by the doctrine of stare decisis, requires a greater degree of certainty and predictability. For example, if we were to adopt the State Engineer's historical analysis, the discovery of new evidence supporting the existence of the pueblo rights doctrine in Spanish and Mexican law would remain a possibility, see State ex rel. Martinez, 118 N.M. at 265, 880 P.2d at 876 (Hartz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), which would undoubtedly lead to another dispute over the historical validity of this doctrine. For property rights in general and water rights in particular, we believe that defining these rights based on prevailing scholarship would create an intolerable degree of uncertainty. Thus, while we concede that, in light of presently available historical evidence, the pueblo rights doctrine rests... on a very narrow foundation, Wells A. Hutchins, Pueblo Water Rights in the West, 38 Tex. L.Rev. 748, 757 (1960), we are not convinced that this Court's adoption of the pueblo rights doctrine in Cartwright represents an entirely untenable view of Spanish and Mexican law. See Hans W. Baade, The Historical Background of Texas Water LawA Tribute to Jack Pope, 18 St. Mary's L.J. 1, 82 (1986) (Given the high priority of [domestic and municipal] purposes, [the pueblo water right] claim seems neither implausible nor inequitable.). As a result, we do not believe that the State Engineer's tender provides the compelling reason to overrule Cartwright that we demand in order to depart from stare decisis. {32} In any event, because we conclude, as discussed in detail below, that the pueblo rights doctrine is inconsistent with New Mexico law and not protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the historical validity of the pueblo rights doctrine is irrelevant to our determination that Cartwright must be overruled. Regardless of whether the pueblo rights doctrine has a valid historical basis in the law of antecedent sovereigns, New Mexico water law, following the Treaty, precludes its recognition. Thus, the doctrine's inconsistency with New Mexico law forecloses any future argument that the pueblo rights doctrine exists in New Mexico irrespective of its historical validity or invalidity.
{33} The State Engineer raises what we believe to be more vital concerns with the pueblo rights doctrine than its historical validity in the law of antecedent sovereigns. The State Engineer argues that the perpetually expanding nature of the pueblo right conflicts with the fundamental principle of beneficial use that lies at the heart of New Mexico water law. As a result, the State Engineer contends that the doctrine is incompatible with water law in New Mexico and violates public policy. We agree. While we are unwilling to second-guess the historical analysis in Cartwright based on the present record, we reject the notion in Cartwright that nothing in the theory of Pueblo Rights [is] inconsistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use, 66 N.M. at 80, 343 P.2d at 665, and that the reasons supporting the Pueblo Rights doctrine apply with as much force in New Mexico as they do in California, id. at 85, 343 P.2d at 668. We believe that these statements reflect a flawed analysis of New Mexico water law. {34} In New Mexico, [b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water. N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 3. We have said that this fundamental principle is applicable to all appropriations of public waters. State ex rel. State Eng'r v. Crider, 78 N.M. 312, 315, 431 P.2d 45, 48 (1967). As it is only by the application of the water to a beneficial use that the perfected right to the use is acquired, it is evident that an appropriator can only acquire a perfected right to so much water as he [or she] applies to a beneficial use. State ex rel. Cmty. Ditches v. Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 371, 143 P. 207, 213 (1914); accord Snow, 18 N.M. at 694, 140 P. at 1048 ([I]t is the application of the water, or the intent to apply, followed with due diligence toward application and ultimate application, which gives the appropriator the continued and continuous right to take the water.). The principle of beneficial use is based on imperative necessity, Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. McMurry, 16 N.M. 172, 181, 113 P. 823, 825 (1911), and aims fundamentally at definiteness and certainty. Crider, 78 N.M. at 315, 431 P.2d at 48 (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). It promotes the economical use of water, while also protecting the important interest of conservation. See Yeo, 34 N.M. at 620, 286 P. at 974. [W]ater was placed in a unique category in our Constitutionsomething that cannot be said of lumbering, coal mining, or any other element or industry. The reason for this is of course too apparent to require elaboration. Our entire state has only enough water to supply its most urgent needs. Water conservation and preservation is of utmost importance. Its utilization for maximum benefits is a requirement second to none, not only for progress, but for survival. Recognition of these facts, as well as a conviction that the doctrine of prior appropriation was better suited to accomplishing the desired ends than was the common law riparian doctrine must have been the principal reason for the adoption in this state of the prior appropriation doctrine as the law applicable to water. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 81 N.M. 414, 417, 467 P.2d 986, 989 (1970). {35} In applying these principles, we have recognized that water users have a reasonable time after an initial appropriation to put water to beneficial use, known as the doctrine of relation. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mendenhall, 68 N.M. 467, 470-71, 362 P.2d 998, 1001 (1961); Hagerman Irrigation Co., 16 N.M. at 180, 113 P. at 824-25. If the application to beneficial use is made in proper time, it relates back and completes the appropriation as of the time when it was initiated. Hagerman Irrigation Co., 16 N.M. at 180, 113 P. at 825. We have applied this principle to municipalities in order to allow for normal increase in population within a reasonable period of time. Crider, 78 N.M. at 316, 431 P.2d at 49. In addition, a municipality may be given a more substantial reasonable time for its population growth than a typical water user would have to complete an appropriation. Compare NMSA 1978, § 72-1-9 (2003) (providing, based on public welfare and the conservation of water, that municipalities have forty years to plan for the reasonable development and use of water resources and that municipal water rights can be based on reasonably projected additional needs within forty years), with NMSA 1978, § 72-5-28(A) (2002) (providing for forfeiture of water rights one year after notice of four years of nonuse). See generally Hutchins, supra, at 756 (Preferences in the application of water are granted to municipalities in various western jurisdictions.). However, even for municipalities, if the water is not applied to beneficial use within a reasonable time, such right may be lost. Crider, 78 N.M. at 316, 431 P.2d at 49. {36} The pueblo rights doctrine is inconsistent with these principles. Under the doctrine, pueblos are not limited by the reasonable time requirement for applying water to beneficial use. Instead, the pueblo right contemplates an indefinite expansion to meet the growing demands of an increased population, regardless of how small the population of the initial pueblo and how long it takes the pueblo to expand. This aspect of the pueblo water right intolerably interferes with the goals of definiteness and certainty contemplated by prior appropriation; it envisions either the total loss of use of any amount of water the pueblo might potentially use in the future or temporary appropriations by other users subject indefinitely to elimination of their rights by possible population growth or increased needs of the pueblo. This level of uncertainty could potentially paralyze others from legitimately making beneficial use of unappropriated waters on the same stream as a pueblo out of fear of potential future interference with the pueblo's expansion. Whereas, with the doctrine of relation, other water users are on notice that the law is granting them water rights that are temporary only pending a reasonable time for the senior appropriator to complete the initial appropriation, there is no reasonable notice to other water users of a pueblo's potential water needs in the future because the pueblo right neither limits the quantity of water available to the municipality nor the amount of time available to complete its initial appropriation. Hutchins, supra, at 756 (discussing the differences between prior appropriation and the pueblo rights doctrine). Our water laws, however, are designed to encourage use and discourage nonuse or waste. State ex rel. Reynolds v. S. Springs Co., 80 N.M. 144, 148, 452 P.2d 478, 482 (1969). The pueblo rights doctrine interferes with the necessity of utilizing water for the maximum benefits. {37} Additionally, unlike typical water rights, the pueblo right is not subject to forfeiture for nonuse. See City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 142 P.2d 289, 293-94 (1943). Forfeiture, however, is an essential punitive tool by which the policy of our constitution and statutes is fostered, and the waters made to do the greatest good to the greatest number. S. Springs Co., 80 N.M. at 147, 452 P.2d at 481 (citations omitted). Forfeiture prevent[s] the waste of waterour greatest natural resource. State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 272, 308 P.2d 983, 988 (1957). The pueblo right subverts these critical policies. {38} By facilitating the underutilization of essential public waters, the pueblo right prevents the efficient, economic use of water that is necessary for survival in this arid region and upon which our entire system of water law is based. We therefore agree with the dissent in Cartwright that the ever-expanding quality of the pueblo water right is as antithetical to the doctrine of prior appropriation as day is to night. Cartwright, 66 N.M. at 110, 343 P.2d at 686 (Federici, D.J., dissenting). We conclude that the pueblo rights doctrine is incompatible with New Mexico water law. {39} Moreover, we disagree with the determination in Cartwright that pueblo water rights are protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, at least with regard to the expanding nature of the right. As pointed out by the dissent in Cartwright, the Treaty did not protect inchoate rights. 66 N.M. at 113-17, 343 P.2d at 687-91 (Federici, D.J., dissenting). See generally United States v. City of Sante Fe, 165 U.S. 675, 713-16, 17 S.Ct. 472, 41 L.Ed. 874 (1897). To the extent that Spanish and Mexican law recognized a pueblo water right, the nature of the right that allowed increased water usage in response to growing needs of the pueblo would have been a matter of grace, not a matter of right; future expansion of water rights subsequent to the colonization grant would have been subject to the sovereign's power of reallocation according to a change in circumstances. See Stevens, supra, at 569 ([E]ach grant petition occasioned an official reevaluation of the adequacy of water supplies in the particular vicinity.). Thus, the expanding quality of the pueblo right, being inchoate, was not guaranteed by the Treaty. Its recognition became a matter of discretion for the new sovereign. See City of Sante Fe, 165 U.S. at 714, 17 S.Ct. 472 (stating that an inchoate claim was subject to the uncontrolled discretion of congress); see also United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 293-94, 17 S.Ct. 868, 42 L.Ed. 168 (1897) (To the extent only that congress has vested them with authority to determine and protect such rights can courts exercise jurisdiction.). By virtue of various acts of Congress, this discretion rested with New Mexico, through its control over public waters within its boundaries. See Cal.-Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 154-65, 55 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed. 1356 (1935); see also Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. at 224-25, 182 P.2d at 432 (stating that Congress's confirmation of Spanish or Mexican land grants did not restrict the State's regulation of public waters); id. at 269-74, 182 P.2d at 460-64 (on rehearing) (discussing Cal.-Or. Power Co. ). {40} We agree with the dissent in Cartwright that New Mexico has not recognized inchoate water rights granted by Mexico or Spain. See Cartwright, 66 N.M. at 117, 343 P.2d at 690-91 (Federici, D.J., dissenting). It is true that New Mexico has protected water rights in existence at the time of the Treaty and before the enactment of a comprehensive water code in 1907. See N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 1; NMSA 1978, §§ 72-1-2 (1907), -9-1 (1941). However, this protection has always been circumscribed by the principle of beneficial use and limited to vested rights. See Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 19 N.M. at 371, 143 P. at 213 (As it is only by the application of the water to a beneficial use that the perfected right to the use is acquired, it is evident that an appropriator can only acquire a perfected right to so much water as he [or she] applies to a beneficial use.); see also N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 1; § 72-9-1 (Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to impair existing vested rights ....) (emphasis added). All water within the state, whether above or beneath the surface of the ground belongs to the state, which authorizes its use, and there is no ownership in the corpus of the water but the use thereof may be acquired and the basis of such acquisition is beneficial use. The state as owner of water has the right to prescribe how it may be used. This the state has done by... provid[ing] that the beneficial use is the basis, the measure, and limit to the right to the use of water. McLean, 62 N.M. at 271, 308 P.2d at 987 (citation omitted). {41} As discussed above, the pueblo rights doctrine is inconsistent with the principle of beneficial use. Therefore, we conclude that the expanding nature of the pueblo right is not an existing right within the meaning of Article XVI, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution. Jefferson E. LeCates, Water LawThe Effect of Acts of the Sovereign on the Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico, 8 Nat. Resources J. 727, 736 (1968) (The effect of the provisions in the New Mexico Constitution was the cancellation of any rights to increase the amount of water to be appropriated in the future to satisfy the expanding needs of the growing pueblos.). We also believe that the pueblo rights doctrine unduly interferes with the State's regulation of water rights, see McLean, 62 N.M. at 272, 308 P.2d at 988 (The State is vitally concerned in every appropriation. The need for water is imperative, and often the supply is insufficient. Such conditions lead inevitably to many serious controversies, and demand from the state an exercise of its police power, not only to ascertain rights, but also to regulate and protect them.); NMSA 1978, § 72-14-3.1 (2003) (providing for the preparation and implementation of a comprehensive state water plan), with the important interest of conservation, see NMSA 1978, § 72-5-5.1 (1985) (recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering [the State's] public waters), and with this State's obligations under interstate compacts, see NMSA 1978, §§ 72-1-2.2 (1991) (recognizing a potential shortage of water on the Pecos River and declaring the shortage and the State's obligations to Texas pursuant to compact a statewide problem affecting all the citizens of the state), -14-3 (1935) (delegating to the interstate stream commission the power to investigate water supply, to develop, to conserve, to protect and to do any and all other things necessary to protect, conserve and develop the waters and stream systems of this state, interstate or otherwise). We thus conclude that pueblo water rights are not otherwise protected by New Mexico law. {42} The water right acquired by a municipality under a colonization grant from antecedent sovereigns is recognized in New Mexico in the same manner as other municipal water rights. The colonization grant establishes the date of priority, but the priority date applies only to the quantity of water put to beneficial use within a reasonable time of the initial appropriation. Thus, the City's 1835 colonization grant created a vested right only to the amount of water put to beneficial use within a reasonable time. [1] Any water not put to beneficial use within a reasonable time cannot be reserved by a municipality for future expansion; the unappropriated waters remaining after a reasonable time has elapsed from the initial appropriation belong to the public and [are] subject to appropriation for beneficial use. N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 2. {43} Because the expanding water right recognized by this Court in Cartwright directly conflicts with the doctrine of prior appropriation, we conclude that the pueblo water right is a doctrinal anachronism, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), and that it represents a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989). [T]he decision poses a direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives embodied in New Mexico water law. Id. As a result, we believe that there is a compelling reason to overrule Cartwright.
{44} Despite the existence of adequate grounds to overrule Cartwright, the City contends that we should nonetheless adhere to stare decisis because Cartwright established a rule of property that induced substantial detrimental reliance. We have said that precedent establishing property rights should not be disturbed or departed from except for the most cogent reasons, certainly not because of doubts as to their soundness. Duncan v. Brown, 18 N.M. 579, 585, 139 P. 140, 141 (1914). We have applied this principle in the context of judicial pronouncements relating to water rights. See State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 31, 225 P.2d 1007, 1019 (1950). The especial importance of stare decisis in cases involving a rule of property is twofold. First, and more generally, the anti-majoritarian nature of the judicial system makes adherence to precedent essential to promote public confidence in the law and its administration. Second, and more specific to rules affecting property or commercial transactions, adherence to precedent is necessary to the stability of land titles and commercial transactions entered into in reliance on the settled nature of the law. Bogle Farms, Inc. v. Baca, 1996-NMSC-051, ¶ 30, 122 N.M. 422, 925 P.2d 1184 (citation omitted). In determining whether to defer to a rule of property, we assess the extent to which the rule announced in prior cases has become fixed or settled and the extent to which it has induced persons to enter into transactions in actual or demonstrable reliance thereon. Id. ¶ 31. {45} We reject the City's argument that Cartwright should be upheld as a rule of property. Regardless of whether the pueblo rights doctrine could be viewed as a settled, fixed, and stable principle, we conclude, based on the doctrine's inconsistency with the goals of prior appropriation, that the evils of the principle laid down will be more injurious to the community than can possibly result from a change. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, ¶ 29, 122 N.M. 422, 925 P.2d 1184 (quoted authority omitted). This conclusion is influenced by the fact that Cartwright was not a general stream adjudication and the State Engineer, who exercises general supervision of waters of the state and of the measurement, appropriation, [and] distribution thereof, NMSA 1978, § 72-2-1 (1982), was not a party. Cf. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, ¶ 32, 122 N.M. 422, 925 P.2d 1184 (noting that there is a public-interest aspect to rejection of stare decisis). {46} In addition, we are not convinced that Cartwright induced the type of reliance that is contemplated by the rule of property. Cartwright concerned the nature of a water right that had been granted by antecedent sovereigns. Necessarily, then, all pueblo water rights implicated by Cartwright had to be in existence at the time it was decided, and there could be no issuance of new pueblo water rights based on Cartwright. Because, under Cartwright, pueblo water rights could not be sold or transferred by the municipalities possessing them, see Cartwright, 66 N.M. at 86, 343 P.2d at 669, New Mexico's recognition of the pueblo rights doctrine could not have induced new water rights transactions, by either municipalities or other water users. While municipalities, including the City, may have expended resources to capture additional water based on this Court's decision in Cartwright, we do not believe that this type of reliance implicates the rule of property. Instead, we believe that the rule of property is designed to protect the stability of land titles and commercial transactions entered into in reliance on the settled nature of the law. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, ¶ 30, 122 N.M. 422, 925 P.2d 1184; accord Duncan, 18 N.M. at 585, 139 P. at 141 (stating that the rule of property applies to judicial decisions affecting title to real estate presumptively acquired in reliance upon such decisions); see Dority, 55 N.M. at 31, 225 P.2d at 1019 (In the nineteen years since [an earlier] decision it may be assumed that many thousands of acres... have been sold to purchasers who relied on that decision as determining title to the right to use the water here involved....). {47} Moreover, we note that overruling Cartwright would not completely deprive the City of its water rights under the colonization grant. Cf. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, ¶ 32, 122 N.M. 422, 925 P.2d 1184 (discussing the consideration of whether overruling precedent would deprive anyone of title entirely). Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, the City's 1835 colonization grant created a vested water right to as much water as the pueblo put to beneficial use within a reasonable time of the initial appropriation, assuming an ability to prove such use. [2] For these reasons, we reject the City's reliance on the rule of property. Cartwright is hereby overruled.