Opinion ID: 2639440
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Board's Decision Was Reasonably Based on Relevant and Current Information.

Text: Wendte argues that the board did not base its decision on relevant or current information. He first contends that the board did not consider his post-conviction conduct, the effect of the hearing officer's proposed sanctions on his ability to make restitution payments, and alternative lesser sanctions. In support, he cites only State, Division of Insurance v. Schnell, in which we held that an insurance agent whose license was suspended was entitled to present updated evidence regarding his professional conduct during the period of time after disciplinary proceedings had been instituted. [29] Without conducting a new hearing, the Alaska Division of Insurance took almost three years, 1992-95, to issue a decision disciplining Schnell, due in part to personnel changes at the division. [30] We held that Schnell was entitled to present updated evidence describing (1) his post-1992 conduct, (2) the current effect that the hearing officer's proposed sanctions would have, and (3) alternative supervisory controls available through his employer. [31] We concluded that this evidence was highly relevant to the issue of sanctions. [32] Schnell is inapposite. We directed the division on remand to consider updated evidence because there was a three-year delay between the hearing and the issuance of a decision disciplining Schnell. Schnell does not require licensing boards to apply particular criteria when imposing sanctions. Nor does Schnell require boards to give any particular factors a certain weight. Likewise, AS 08.87.210(2) here grants the board discretion to impose sanctions on real estate appraisers. Although the board must exercise its discretion reasonably, the statute does not require the board to consider any particular criteria when imposing sanctions. Nonetheless, the record establishes that the hearing officer did consider Wendte's post-conviction conduct and the effect of proposed sanctions on Wendte's life. The hearing officer acknowledged that Wendte's real estate appraisal business was rebounding after his incarceration. The hearing officer acknowledged that Wendte was not able to work during his incarceration, but found it significant that he had paid only $2,602.12 of the $257,594.80 in restitution he owed at the time of the January 2001 hearing. The hearing officer also considered alternative sanctions for Wendte. Taking into account that Wendte's crime was not perpetrated while conducting professional activity, the hearing officer recommended that the board suspend rather than completely revoke Wendte's license, even though the division had requested revocation. The board therefore considered the criteria that Wendte requested, but drew a different conclusion than Wendte would have liked. As Judge Collins concluded, [i]t is fairly clear that the [b]oard simply assigned different weight to the evidence than that suggested by Mr. Wendte. Wendte next argues that the board's September 2001 decision to suspend his license did not reflect any new information about his conduct since the last hearing in January 2001. He contends that because the board voted immediately after Wendte finished speaking, it did not consider the updated evidence he offered. Wendte argues that Schnell mandates that the [b]oard hear updated information relevant to the issue of sanctions before imposing sanctions. Wendte's reliance on Schnell is again misplaced. Wendte did not experience a three-year delay between his last opportunity to offer evidence and the issuance of a decision. Wendte's administrative hearing took place in January 2001. The board issued its final decision in September 2001. Less than eight months elapsed before the board imposed sanctions. This period was too short to imply the likelihood of material changes in Wendte's conduct. Although Wendte had only three minutes to address the board at the September 2001 hearing, the board was under no obligation to allow either side to make any presentation. As the superior court noted, the only updated evidence Wendte presented at the September 2001 hearing concerned his most recent restitution payment of $4,450, bringing his total payment to $7,000. At the January hearing, Wendte had already presented evidence that his business rebounded after he was released from prison, submitted letters supporting him, and offered testimony of witnesses recommending him as an honest appraiser. The additional restitution is not legally significant, given both that a large amount remained unpaid, and that restitution payments were not the only factor the board considered in sanctioning Wendte. [33] Wendte also argues that the district attorney's sentencing memorandum in the criminal case was insufficient to set forth the factual basis for Wendte's conviction. He argues that he is not attacking the validity of his no-contest plea. Instead, he argues that the board should not have used the district attorney's sentencing memorandum as a factual basis on which to sanction him administratively because [w]hether Wendte did what the district attorney's sentencing memorandum alleges was never resolved in the criminal proceedings.... The hearing officer's proposed decision relied on more than the district attorney's sentencing memorandum for its account of the details of Wendte's theft. To substantiate his findings of fact regarding the circumstances of Wendte's crime, the hearing officer cited Wendte's licensing file, the judgment and order of commitment and probation in State v. Wendte, [34] the state's sentencing memorandum and exhibits in State v. Wendte, the Division of Occupational Licensing's investigative file on Wendte, sentencing letters, and the transcript of Judge Thompson's remarks at sentencing. Moreover, Wendte did not ask the hearing officer not to consider the district attorney's sentencing memorandum. He only objected to the hearing officer using the sentencing memorandum to establish any instances of theft other than those the state advanced at Wendte's no contest hearing. Wendte did not, however, identify any particular passages in the sentencing memorandum which were unsubstantiated, nor does he do so now. He also has not demonstrated how the hearing officer's consideration of the sentencing memorandum harmed him. Wendte has therefore waived his argument that the hearing officer should not have considered the sentencing memorandum. [35]