Opinion ID: 1356054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prior Prison Term Findings

Text: At a bifurcated trial, the jury found true that defendant had suffered two felonies for which he served a prison term. (§ 667.5.) Defendant challenges these findings on a number of grounds. One has technical merit. The jury made two findings of a prior prison term, one for each conviction. However, the enhancement was for the prison term, not the convictions. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendant had two felony convictions, but he served only one prison term. Accordingly, we must strike the redundant second prison term finding. ( People v. Jones (1998) 63 Cal. App.4th 744, 750, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 328.) Defendant also argues the prosecution did not properly prove any prior prison term under section 667.5. His arguments revolve around the fact that the section 667.5 enhancement, although for a prior prison term, requires that the underlying conviction be for any felony. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) This enhancement applies to out-of-state prison terms only if the underlying conviction, if committed in California, is punishable by imprisonment in state prison, i.e., if it would be a felony under California law. (§ 667.5, subd. (f).) A prior conviction of a particular felony shall include a conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense which includes all of the elements of the particular felony as defined under California law.... (§ 667.5, subd. (f); see People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623, 633, 190 Cal.Rptr. 165, 660 P.2d 389.) Here, defendant's prior prison term was based on two 1982 Washington convictions, both for second degree burglary. Defendant argues that it is possible to commit burglary under Washington law without committing burglary, or any felony, in California. He is correct. At the relevant times, in Washington, a person commits the crime of burglary in the second degree when he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein. ( State v. Bergeron (1985) 105 Wash.2d 1, 711 P.2d 1000, 1003, citing Wash. Rev.Code, § 9A.52.030.) Two differences readily appear between burglary in Washington and in California. First, in California, the required intent is to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony. (§ 459.) In Washington, the intent to commit any crime suffices. (See In re Finley (1968) 68 Cal.2d 389, 391, 66 Cal. Rptr. 733, 438 P.2d 381 [noting this difference under a previous version of the Washington statute].) Second, in California, the intent must exist at the time of entry. (§ 459 [referring to [e]very person who enters with the necessary intent]; see People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903.) In Washington, the phrase, or remains, implies that the intent may be formed after entry if the person remains in the building after forming the intent. At trial, the parties were aware of these differences. The prosecution presented evidence regarding the nature of the burglaries defendant committed in Washington, and the court instructed the jury on the elements of burglary in both states. Thus, the prosecution sought to go behind the least adjudicated elements of the crimes to prove that they would have been burglaries in California as defendant actually committed them. We must decide whether doing so was permissible. In People v. Crowson, supra, 33 Cal.3d at page 632, 190 Cal.Rptr. 165, 660 P.2d 389, we conclude[d] that enhancement [under section 667.5's language] is only permissible when the elements of the foreign crime, as defined by that jurisdiction's statutory or common law, include all of the elements of the California felony. (Italics added.) Under this rule, the enhancement would not apply, for burglary, as defined in Washington, does not include all the elements of a California felony. In People v. Myers (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1193, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 911, 858 P.2d 301, we construed section 667, subdivision (a), which imposes a sentence enhancement when a person convicted of a serious felony has a prior conviction for any offense committed in another jurisdiction which includes all of the elements of any serious felony.... We held that, notwithstanding People v. Crowson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 623, 190 Cal.Rptr. 165, 660 P.2d 389, the trier of fact may consider the entire record of the proceedings leading to imposition of judgment on the prior conviction to determine whether the offense of which the defendant was previously convicted involved conduct which satisfies all of the elements of the comparable California serious felony offense. ( People v. Myers, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1195, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 911, 858 P.2d 301.) In so doing, we followed the lead of People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150. Guerrero overruled a previous decision of this court and reached a similar conclusion regarding whether a California conviction was a serious felony. Under Myers, the prosecution could go behind the statutory elements of the crime to prove that defendant's actual crime constituted a felony under California law. We must decide whether the Myers rule applies here. The Court of Appeal considered the question carefully in In re Jones (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1032, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 469. It concluded that Guerrero and Myers have impliedly overruled Crowson as to consideration of whether a prior out-of-state felony conviction qualifies as an enhancement under section 667.5(b) and section 667.5, subdivision (f). ( Id. at p. 1048, 33 Cal. Rptr.2d 469.) We agree with this conclusion. The relevant language of section 667.5, subdivision (f), is substantially similar to that of section 667, subdivision (a). Myers's interpretation of section 667 also controls section 667.5. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly allowed the prosecution to prove that defendant's actual Washington crimes constituted burglary under California law. Even so, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the finding. The record of the Washington convictions contains a brief description of the crimes that defendant made as part of his guilty pleas. As to the first burglary, he stated that in November 1981, he broke into a liquor store and took several bottles of booze. As to the second burglary, he stated that he [w]ent into Papa Joes and toke [ sic: obviously, took] some liquor after it had closed. These statements clearly show that the burglary convictions were based on the intent to commit theft rather than some other, nonfelonious, crime. Defendant argues the statements do not include evidence that he formed the necessary intent at the time of entry rather than later. Because there is only one prison term enhancement, we need find sufficient evidence only as to one of the convictions. Regarding the second conviction, the jury could reasonably have found that defendant had formed the necessary intent at the time of entry. One does not normally enter a store after it closes with innocent intent. Moreover, defendant's previous similar theft supports the inference he entered with a similar intent the second time. It is unlikely that defendant regularly entered liquor stores with innocent intent, and only thereafter formed a larcenous intent. (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 379-380, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) We find sufficient evidence supports the jury finding. Defendant makes another argument the parties below did not anticipate: that the elements of theft are broader under Washington law than under California law. Citing State v. Komok (1989) 113 Wash.2d 810, 783 P.2d 1061, defendant contends that in Washington, theft does not require an intent to deprive another of property permanently. In California, theft requires the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. ( People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 305, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d 1165.) Thus, defendant argues, he might merely have intended in his Washington burglaries to deprive the stores of their property temporarily. We disagree for two reasons, one legal, one factual. First, the Komok case does, indeed, interpret a 1975 amendment to the theft statute as eliminating the permanency requirement. ( State v. Komok, supra, 783 P.2d at pp. 1063-1064.) But it disagreed with a 1978 intermediate appellate court decision that had interpreted the same statute as retaining the permanency requirement. ( Id. at p. 1062.) Defendant suffered his Washington convictions in 1982, before Komok and after the 1978 decision. Thus, when defendant was convicted, Washington law did require the intent to deprive permanently. Second, from the record of the conviction, the jury could readily infer defendant's intent to deprive permanently even if the statute did not require it. Although defendant's descriptions of the crimes did not expressly address the question, the jury could reasonably have found he did not intend to take the liquor only temporarily. One normally takes liquor to drink or otherwise to dispose of it, not merely to possess it temporarily. In a related contention, defendant argues that he may have been sufficiently intoxicated that he did not form an intent to steal. However, defendant pleaded guilty to the crimes, thereby admitting he had the requisite intent. A jury could readily infer that a person capable of forming an intent after entry was equally capable of forming that intent before or at the time of the entry, and, even if Washington law at the time did not require the intent to deprive permanently, that a person capable of intending to deprive temporarily was also capable of intending to deprive permanently. Next, defendant argues that comparison of the elements of the Washington and California burglary statutes was for the judge, not the jury. He argues the question was purely legal. However, as discussed above, the question has a factual component: whether defendant's actual crime satisfied the elements of burglary in California. (See People v. Kelii (1999) 21 Cal.4th 452, 456, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d 518.) It is true that we recently held that the court, not the jury, decides whether a prior conviction is serious under section 667. ( People v. Kelii supra, 21 Cal.4th 452, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d 518.) Assuming, which we need not decide, that this holding would also apply to findings of prior prison terms, no court has ever held it error to give a defendant a jury trial on the question. (See, e.g., People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 460-461, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 950 P.2d 85 [reserving the question in a case in which the jury decided whether a conviction was serious].) Even assuming the trial court could have decided this question, submitting it to a jury was not error of which defendant can complain. Defendant finally argues that the court misinstructed the jury regarding the prior prison terms. We find the instructions generally adequate. The court did not instruct on the elements of theft under Washington law but, as we have seen, at the time, Washington law of theft was similar to California law. Moreover, any error would have been harmless. It is not reasonably probable the jury would have found the prior prison term allegation not true, i.e., would have found defendant intended to take the liquor only temporarily, had the court instructed on the point. ( People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 315, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77.) For these reasons, we strike the redundant second prison term finding but affirm the remaining finding.

Defendant argues that, through evidence and argument, the jury was permitted to consider improper nonstatutory aggravating factors in violation of the rule of People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 774, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782, limiting aggravating evidence to matters coming within one of the aggravating factors listed in section 190.3. As discussed below, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on how it could consider the evidence. Defendant failed either to object to any of the evidence or argument on this basis or to request an additional or different limiting instruction. Accordingly, he has not preserved this issue for appeal. ( People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 630, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 156, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561.) In response to defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we see good reason for defense counsel not to have objected or requested additional instruction. The Boyd rule does not apply to evidence presented at the guilt phase or by the defense. Rather, `It stands for the proposition that the 1978 law prevents the prosecution from introducing, in its case-in-chief, aggravating evidence not contained in the various factors listed in section 190.3.' ( People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 963 [248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917].) ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 156, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561.) But no such event occurred here.... ( People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 963, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917.) The prosecution presented no evidence whatever in its penalty phase case-in-chief. Defendant argues that this language from People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 156, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561, and People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 963, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917, is inconsistent with other cases suggesting that when evidence presented at another phase of trial would not have been admissible at the penalty phase, the court should, on request, give a limiting instruction telling the jury to disregard the evidence during the penalty phase. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1168, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 630, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788.) We see no inconsistency. Clark and Guzman correctly recognize that the Boyd rule limits evidence the prosecution can present in its penalty phase case-in-chief and does not involve evidence admitted at another phase or by the defense. Those cases do not, however, enlarge the range of evidence the jury may consider in aggravation at the penalty phase. As the other cases have recognized, the jury may still consider in aggravation only evidence coming within one of the factors listed in section 190.3. The evidence of which defendant complains was all properly admitted either at the guilt phase or by the defense as part of its penalty phase evidence. We have already considered, and rejected, defendant's arguments regarding the admissibility of the guilt phase evidence. At the penalty phase, defendant called as a witness in mitigation the former director of a special education school that defendant had attended as a teenager to testify about his good qualities. She mentioned on direct examination that he got in trouble one time at school. He stole 50 cents from a tuna fish can, apparently because he felt embarrassed that his mother had not given him money for bus fare. When another child reacted strongly to the theft, defendant broke the child's watch crystal. On cross-examination, the witness said the watch crystal cost $4.85. We see no incompetence in defense counsel's presenting this evidence (or, in response to defendant's claim that it was not responsive to any question, failing to move to strike it) or not objecting to the cross-examination. Defendant may not present evidence about his good behavior during a time period while hiding from the jury evidence of misbehavior during that same time. Moreover, defense counsel could reasonably believe that allowing the witness to describe this relatively trivial incident as defendant's only misconduct would enhance her credibility regarding defendant's general good behavior. In addition, because the witness discussed the incident in her direct testimony, the prosecution properly cross-examined her on the subject. Accordingly, no evidence was improperly admitted. Defendant's main complaint seems to be that the jury was erroneously permitted to consider this evidence in aggravation at the penalty phase. It was not. The court and parties were well aware of the limited nature of the evidence the jury could consider in aggravation. Defense counsel wanted the court not to specify the evidence of other crimes, although they wanted to guard against the jury considering in aggravation incidents such as the taking of the two quarters out of the tuna fish can. After discussion, the parties agreed the court would instruct, and the court did instruct, as follows. It told the jury to consider, take into account, and be guided by the standard statutory factors, which it listed, and told it to disregard any guilt phase instructions which conflict[ ] with this principle. Regarding evidence of other crimes, it instructed, Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant ... has been convicted of two crimes of second degree burglary prior to the offense of murder in the first degree of which he has been found guilty in this case.... You may not consider any evidence of other crime as an aggravating circumstance. (Italics added.) Telling the jury not to consider in aggravation evidence of crimes other than the two convictions was adequate. Competent counsel could reasonably believe that this instruction fully protected defendant, and that it was not in his best interest for the court additionally to list every possible crime the evidence suggested, then tell the jury not to consider those crimes. Defendant argues the jury might have considered the instruction to limit only its consideration of criminal convictions rather than criminal acts, but we see no reason to so find. The words seem reasonably clear. If defendant had wanted a clearer instruction, he could have requested one. Moreover, no one suggested in argument that the jury could consider any of this evidence in aggravation. Indeed, defense counsel expressly argued there were mitigating circumstances but no aggravating circumstances other than the two burglary convictions. Defendant correctly notes that the prosecutor discussed the theft of 50 cents and the tape-recorded conversation among defendant and his mother and sister in county jail. But the prosecutor was responding to defense argument, not suggesting that this evidence was itself aggravating.
Defendant contends his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to present the issue of lingering doubt, a relevant factor in mitigation. We have noted that the sword of the lingering doubt defense is double edged. ( People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 864, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249.) Because such an argument risks `antagonizing a jury that has already found the defendant guilty,' lingering doubt penalty defenses 'are often unwise.' ( Id. at p. 864 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249].) ( People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 951, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388.) In response, defendant argues that while empirical evidence shows that lingering doubt about a defendant's actual innocence only infrequently influences the jury's penalty decision, lingering doubt about the defendant's level of participation in the murder does play a significant role. He also argues, Since the theory of guilt was felony-murder, an argument at penalty phase concerning the limited extent of [his] culpability would not have been inconsistent with the guilt verdict and would not have run the risk of offending or antagonizing the jury. Guilt on a felony-murder theory does not necessarily impart the degree of personal moral culpability which would warrant a juror to vote for a verdict of death. Defense counsel did make this argument, and quite effectively. Counsel told the jury that the felony murder rule places liability on all parties who are concerned with something that turns out to be a killing and, therefore, the jury properly convicted him of the crimes. Counsel agreed that, under the felony-murder rule, all three participants were equal in all ways legally speaking. But then he argued that, when it came time to assess punishment, Edwards and Osborne were more culpable than defendant. He argued that it remained uncertain exactly what had happened during the crime and from a legal point of view, it doesn't technically matter who did what, because of the felony murder rule. But it's certainly of some importance to you ... to consider what the proper punishment is for [defendant]. Counsel told the jury he did not quarrel in any way with your decision on the law or the facts of this case, but he argued that the facts, including defendant's lesser culpability relative to Edwards and Osborne, warranted a verdict less than death. He went on: Who did what? Doesn't matter, I say, at least in terms of legal guilt. But it certainly matters in disparity of punishment. Counsel did not antagonize the jury by rearguing its guilt verdict, but he made clear that that verdict, based on the felony-murder rule, did not necessarily reflect the extent of defendant's personal moral culpability in the crime. Counsel did not use the precise term, lingering doubt, but there is nothing magical about those two words. He competently argued that much doubt existed as to the extent of defendant's culpability, doubt that was essentially irrelevant to the jury's actual guilt verdict, but was critical to the penalty determination. On this record, we are unprepared to fault such a seemingly sound tactical choice. ( People v. Padilla, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 951, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388.)

Defendant contends the prosecutor presented false evidence at the bifurcated trial on the prior prison term allegations. He does not claim the misconduct prejudiced him at that phase, but does claim prejudice in the penalty determination. At the bifurcated hearing, the prosecution called Edwards to establish that defendant had served a prison term for his Washington convictions. Edwards testified that he and defendant had been cellmates at McNeil Island, a prison in Washington. He did not remember exactly how long he and defendant had been cellmates but thought it was from some time in 1984 to some time in 1985, or approximately 18 months. The same morning that Edwards testified, but after the matter was submitted to the jury, defense counsel noted for the record that official Washington records that the prosecution had supplied in discovery showed that defendant and Edwards were at McNeil Island together for a much shorter time than Edwards had stated and only in 1985, not also 1984. The defense agreed that the records showed defendant had been in prison in 1984, but at a different institution, not McNeil Island. The court allowed the defense to reopen the matter and present this evidence, but the defense did not want to do so. Defense counsel stated that the discrepancy between Edwards's testimony and the official records did not prejudice defendant at that phase but claimed it might be prejudicial at the penalty phase. Eventually, the defense chose not to reopen the trial on the prison term allegation but reserved the right to present the evidence at the penalty phase. During the penalty phase, the court again stated it would allow the defense to reopen the question and would grant a continuance if needed. The defense did not want to do so; instead, it wanted the prosecution simply to stipulate to the facts the records indicated. The prosecution did not want to stipulate, stating, that is what cross-examination is for. Ultimately, the prosecution did not agree to a stipulation, and the defense declined the court's offer to present evidence itself or to call Edwards as a witness. The court noted that the defense could recall Mr. Edwards, confront him with that documentary evidence. And there is probably a good chance that might refresh his recollection. It stated that the situation was extremely regrettable. Although the defense did not present the documentary evidence, it elicited from Joseph Ross, a supervisor at McNeil Island who testified in mitigation at the penalty phase, that defendant had been at that prison less than eight months and had been Edwards's cellmate only about five months at most. In the penalty phase jury argument, defense counsel cited Ross's testimony to claim that Edwards's testimony at the prior prison term phase was [a]nother lie. The man who started off with a lie and continued with a lie right through the very end. We disagree that the prosecutor committed misconduct. He was not responsible for Edwards's testimony, even if erroneous. (See People v. Gordon, supra, 10 Cal.3d 460, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298, discussed ante, at pt. II.A.3.a.].) We do not doubt that the prosecutor was obligated to provide discovery to the defense of known evidence contradicting that testimony, but he did provide that discovery. He hid nothing from the defense or court. The court gave defendant a full opportunity to prove to the jury the discrepancy between Edwards's testimony and the official records. The defense did not want to do so, however. Instead, counsel insisted the prosecution join a stipulation, possibly so they could argue to the jury to the effect that even the prosecution agreed its witness was lying. If defendant had presented the contrary evidence, either he or the prosecution could have allowed Edwards to explain the discrepancy between his testimony and the records. The discrepancy may have been due to a simple failure of recollection. No reason appears for Edwards to have intentionally lied about such an unimportant point. It appears the defense did not want Edwards to have the chance to explain his testimony and possibly retract it in light of the records but instead wanted a stipulation. It was sufficient, however, for the prosecution to provide full discovery and for the defense to have the opportunity to present evidence contradicting the prosecution witness. The prosecution need not stipulate to that evidence rather than have it presented in a normal way. In any event, the defense effectively got what it wanted. Through defense witness Ross, the defense was able to present the evidence without Edwards's being able to explain it, and then could argue to the jury that this was one more lie. We see no misconduct, judicial error, or, should defendant so argue, ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant also argues the prosecutor committed many acts of misconduct in his argument to the jury. However, he objected to none. Because an admonition could easily have cured any harm from any misconduct, the contentions are not cognizable on appeal. ( People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1215, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199.) Citing People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, defendant argues that an objection would have been futile, thus excusing his failure. Hill, however, was an extreme case. There, defense counsel made a number of objections, although he did not continually object to pervasive misconduct. We found that the prosecutor's continual misconduct, coupled with the trial court's failure to rein in her excesses, created a trial atmosphere so poisonous that continual objections would have been futile and counterproductive to his client. ( Id. at p. 821, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; see also id. at p. 836, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Under these unusual circumstances, we concluded that defense counsel must be excused from the legal obligation to continually object, state the grounds of his objection, and ask the jury be admonished. ( Id at p. 821, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, italics added.) This case presents no such unusual circumstances. The trial atmosphere was not poisonous, defense counsel did not object at all, and the record fails to suggest that any objections would have been futile. The normal rule requiring an objection applies here, not the unusual one applied to the extreme circumstances of People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673. This issue is, accordingly, not cognizable. Defendant claims counsel were ineffective. We disagree. We have reviewed each of defendant's claims and find nothing that compelled competent counsel to object. (See ante, pt. II.A.6.) As to some of the argument that defendant challenges, for example, certain biblical references, `defense counsel did not object; rather, he countered the prosecution argument with argument of his own.' ( People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 516, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249, quoting People v. Frierson, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 749, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197.) While we reiterate that generally biblical references have no proper place at the penalty phase (see People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 194, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862), we do not find counsel's tactical decisions ineffective.
When the parties presented their penalty phase arguments and the jury began deliberating, the charges against Osborne were pending. The jury knew this. In the opening penalty phase jury argument, defense counsel stressed the plea bargain Edwards had made. Regarding Osborne, counsel said that the district attorney might still make a deal with John Osborne that will save his life.... And you [the jury] could end up with a situation where [Edwards] is out by the year two thousand ... [a]nd Osborne is alive and well ... and Charles Riel has been executed.... In the rebuttal argument counsel returned to this theme. He said, What will happen to John Osborne I don't know. He beat one homicide already, in his words, and he's going to try again. Whether it will happen or not, [is] not in my hands, not in your hands. While the jury was deliberating its penalty verdict, Osborne did in fact plead guilty to the charges in return for a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole. The prosecution and defense stipulated that the court could inform the jury of the plea. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed when the court asked, And both of you recognize that it's arguable, normally, as to whether or not this type of a factor would be under consideration, but because of the ethical considerations, both of you are agreeing to have them consider it; is that correct? Thereafter, the court informed the jury of the guilty plea. It initially forgot to mention the sentence. Defense counsel reminded the court that it had left out the most important part, in my opinion. The court apologized, informed the jury of the sentence as well, then told it, And that is a factor which the parties have agreed that you may consider in your deliberations in this matter. Defendant argues the court erred in informing the jury of the plea. He notes it is settled that [t]he punishment meted out to a codefendant is irrelevant to the decision the jury must make at the penalty phase: whether the defendant before it should be sentenced to death. ( People v. Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 343, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121; see also People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 111-112, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311.) We need not decide whether the court erred in doing what both sides requested under the unusual circumstances of this case, for defendant invited any error. ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 931-932, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) Defense counsel clearly wanted the jury to learn of Osborne's guilty plea and, most important, the sentence, and for good reason. The information meshed nicely with the defense penalty phase argument. Moreover, any error could only have benefited defendant. He speculates the jury may have considered the information aggravating because it might have felt someone should receive the death penalty for Middleton's murder, or the plea demonstrated the prosecutor's belief that defendant was the most culpable of the three perpetrators. He presents no reason, however, to believe the jury considered the information as anything but helpful to defendant. The defense argued the matter in mitigation; no one argued it might be aggravating. Defense counsel believed the information could only benefit defendant, as have defendants generally, who have long argued juries should receive and consider this kind of evidence. (E.g., People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 62-64, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224; People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1251, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 479-480, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 810-813, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310.) Contrary to defendant's claim, counsel were not ineffective for asking the court to do what defendants have long wanted done. Defendant also claims the court erred in not instructing the jury more fully or allowing the parties to reargue the matter. Defendant did not so request at trial, again for good reason. Defense counsel had already argued as mitigation the disposition Edwards had received and further argued, without rebuttal from the prosecution, the possibility of a similar plea by Osborne and its significance in mitigation. The information that the possibility of a life sentence for Osborne had become a reality consummated that argument. Defense counsel could reasonably have believed the posture of informing the jury of the disposition without further argument from the prosecution was best for defendant.
Defendant argues that the combined effect of all the errors he asserts was prejudicial at the penalty phase. However, we have found no error that, even in cumulation, was prejudicial.

Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidencetestimony from Osborne that became available only after he pleaded guilty. Defense Attorney Swartz stated in a declaration that after Osborne's conviction I received information from Mr. Osborne that he is now willing to testify on behalf of Mr. Riel and that Mr. Osborne believes that his testimony would assist Mr. Riel in presenting his defense. Defendant presented no other information regarding the expected testimony. At a later hearing on the new trial motion, the defense had not yet produced a declaration from Osborne. Both defense attorneys stated they had a conflict regarding Osborne that they could not state on the record in the presence of the district attorney and public. The court then held an in camera hearing with the public and district attorney excluded. At the in camera hearing, Swartz told the court that he and O'Connor had spoken with Osborne, and he had given `Various statements regarding what had happened in the case. Swartz did not know what Osborne would say at the time of the hearing, but he did know that he has very definitely stated that he has testimony that he is willing to give and will give that will be very favorable to Mr. Riel ... on the issue of guilt. The problem, Swartz explained, was that Mr. Osborne also told us that, in giving that statement very favorable to Mr. Riel, that, to put it delicately, he would be lying. When he realized that Mr. O'Connor and I were not particularly interested in producing perjured testimony at any hearing, I then got additional signals from him that the favorable testimony might not be a lie. At this point I am not willing to go forward with the knowledge that I have because I feel that I may very will be producing and facilitating perjured testimony to the court. By the same token if you want to believe Mr. Osborne, he might be telling the truth. O'Connor added that he had gotten the distinct impression that Mr. Osborne might be lying or might be willing to lie under oath, and that kind of raised some red flags in my thoughts about presenting evidence from someone of that state of mind. Swartz said, We have tried to deal with that and we have not found a method of dealing with it that is ethically acceptable to us except appointing an attorney that could go in and question him independently and maybe come to ... a different opinion. He explained, I've gotten these mixed signals from Mr. Osborne and they are such that I am just not willing or able ethically to go forward. When the court invited Swartz to state specifically what Osborne told him, he said, I think it would be fair to say that Mr. Osborne has indicated that in a statement to the court or in testimony to the court that his testimony would be such that it would clear Mr. Riel of involvement in this case. By the same token I have received information from the same gentleman that leads me to believe that his actual view is that Mr. Riel was appropriately involved to support the conviction. Swartz did not get more specific but said he did not feel he was in an ethical position to present the statements to the court. And Mr. O'Connor and I sweated over this one a bit before we took that position. I have refused in the past to put on witnesses when I was convinced that they were lying and had good information that they were lying. I have put on witnesses that I thought were lying because I didn't have the proof of it, but in this particular case where I have the conflict in statements by the one person I don't feel comfortable doing it. The court suggested that counsel could simply provide all of Osborne's statements. Swartz answered, I wouldn't give them all. He later elaborated, I'm sure I could go to Mr. Osborne and tell him to say the right things and he would do it. And maybe those would even be the truth for all I know. But the state of it is now that I feel if I produce that type of declaration in my own mind I believe probably to be committing a fraud and I'm not willing to do it. Ultimately, the court denied the request to appoint a new attorney, stating that it would not solve the problem. Defense counsel did not produce a declaration or other evidence supporting the new trial motion on this ground. After the in camera hearing, in open court, the court denied the new trial motion. Defendant does not argue the court erred in denying a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Because the defense did not present the court with any specific newly discovered evidence, the court did not abuse its broad discretion when it denied the motion. ( People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 529, 851 P.2d 811.) Instead, defendant claims his attorneys were ineffective in not presenting the evidence. On appeal, however, we must reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged ... unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation... ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859; see People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) Here, defense counsel explained enough to the court to try to get it to appoint new attorneys but, it appears, they were also intentionally vague about what Osborne actually told them so as not to harm their client's position affirmatively. Because we do not know exactly what Osborne told defense counsel, and we can easily hypothesize on this record that Osborne may have said something that fully justified their actions, we must reject the claim. We start with the proposition that an attorney owes no duty to offer on his client's behalf testimony which is untrue. ( In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 210, 74 Cal.Rptr. 238, 449 P.2d 174; see Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6068, subd. (d).) Stated slightly differently, an attorney, including a criminal defense attorney, has a special duty ... to prevent and disclose frauds upon the court.... ( Nix v. Whiteside (1986) 475 U.S. 157, 168-169, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123.) Defendant recognizes this duty but argues that it extends only to a duty not to cooperate with planned perjury ( id. at p. 173, 106 S.Ct. 988, italics added); it does not apply if the attorney merely suspects but does not know the evidence is false. The distinction is valid. A `lawyer should not conclude that testimony is or will be false unless there is a firm factual basis for doing so. Such a basis exists when facts known to the lawyer or the client's own statements indicate to the lawyer that the testimony or other evidence is false.' ... [Counsel's belief in their client's guilt certainly cannot create an ethical bar against introduction of exculpatory evidence. ( Lord v. Wood (9th Cir.1999) 184 F.3d 1083, 1095, fn. 9.) It is the role of the judge or jury to determine the facts, not that of the attorney. ( United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson (3d Cir.1977) 555 F.2d 115, 122.) Although attorneys may not present evidence they know to be false or assist in perpetrating known frauds on the court, they may ethically present evidence that they suspect, but do not personally know, is false. Criminal defense attorneys sometimes have to present evidence that is incredible and that, not being naive, they might personally disbelieve. Presenting incredible evidence may raise difficult tactical decisionsif counsel finds evidence incredible, the fact finder may alsobut, as long as counsel has no specific undisclosed factual knowledge of its falsity, it does not raise an ethical problem. (See also People v. Gordon, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 472-474, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298, discussed ante, at pt. II.A.3.a.) Defendant argues that this case merely involves counsel's refusing to present evidence they think is incredible or conflicting rather than a genuine ethical problem. We disagree. Although counsel stated that Osborne made conflicting statements, and at some point Osborne indicated that the statement favorable to defendant was true, counsel stated at the outset of the hearing that Osborne said that in giving the statement favorable to defendant, he would be lying. Only when counsel said they did not want perjured testimony did Osborne change his story. Counsel were not more specific, possibly because they did not want to provide additional information harmful to their client. Because of this, we do not know exactly what Osborne said. But counsel's statements indicate they understood the difference between not presenting witnesses because they had good information that they were lying and presenting witnesses who they thought were lying because [they] didn't have the proof of it. They thought this case fell within the former category. On this record, we cannot say otherwise. The trial court invited counsel to provide all of Osborne's statements and let it decide what to do. Swartz replied, I wouldn't give them all. We have no doubt that counsel could ethically have presented all the statements to the court and let it decide which to believe. Doing so would not defraud the court. But if, as counsel indicated, Osborne had made some specific statement that any testimony favorable to defendant would be a lie, counsel had to choose between presenting the favorable testimony along with the statement that it was a lie, or presenting none of the evidence at all. They could not ethically present a favorable declaration and withhold the earlier statement that it was perjurious. The record is silent on why counsel chose not to present all the statements, but counsel apparently believed it was not in their client's best interests to do so. We cannot say this belief was unreasonable. On this record, we have no basis to find that counsel acted other than as diligent advocates consistent with ethical constraints. Moreover, we would have no basis to overturn the judgment even if we were to find counsel should have acted differently. The record contains no declaration from Osborne providing newly discovered evidence favorable to defendant.
In addition to the claim of newly discovered evidence, defendant moved for a new trial due to jury misconduct. A defense investigator stated in a declaration that one of the jurors had told him that during the penalty phase she heard another juror make a statement to the effect that `If we give him the death penalty, the judge will just commute it to life in prison anyway.' At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel stated that they were unable to interview the juror who allegedly made the statement or obtain additional declarations. They requested an evidentiary hearing at which they could subpoena the jurors. The court believed that it had authority to order an evidentiary hearing, but it declined to do so and denied the new trial motion. It noted that the alleged statement was merely an opinion, an estimation, a guess, a projection of what somebody might do in the future and found that the mere expression of an opinion by one juror as to what may happen or what that person thinks will happen in the future was not misconduct. Defendant contends the court erred. He notes that the trial court's authority to commute a death verdict is discretionary, not mandatory. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) The juror's contrary implication, he argues, is legally erroneous and thus misconduct. We disagree. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new trial motion. A prediction that the court would commute a death verdict, if in fact made, was merely the kind of comment that is probably unavoidable when 12 persons of widely varied backgrounds, experiences, and life views join in the give-and-take of deliberations. Not all comments by all jurors at all times will be logical, or even rational, or, strictly speaking, correct. But such comments cannot impeach a unanimous verdict; a jury verdict is not so fragile. The introduction of much of what might strictly be labeled `extraneous law' cannot be deemed misconduct. The jury system is an institution that is legally fundamental but also fundamentally human. Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and fact that find their source in everyday life and experience. That they do so is one of the strengths of the jury system. It is also one of its weaknesses: it has the potential to undermine determinations that should be made exclusively on the evidence introduced by the parties and the instructions given by the court. Such a weakness, however, must be tolerated. `[I]t is an impossible standard to require ... [the jury] to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed from any external factors.' [Citation.] Moreover, under that `standard' few verdicts would be proof against challenge. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 950, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676; see also People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 696, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) Defendant argues that the juror who allegedly made the comment stated during jury selection that she had once worked as a nurse in county jail for two years. He asserts that [n]o doubt that experience lent credibility to her statement with the jury, thus making this case similar to People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 950, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676, where we found misconduct when a juror vouched for a misstatement of law on the strength of his `background in law enforcement.' We disagree. No indication exists that the juror in this case did anything but express a personal opinion. Defendant also asserts that defense counsel may have misled some of the jurors during jury selection about the meaning of a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole, thus exacerbating any confusion over the meaning of a death verdict. While questioning some of the jurors, counsel said that life without parole meant the person would presumably, or hopefully, or supposedly die of old age in prison. As a typical example, defense counsel referred to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, which means literally that ... the person dies, hopefully, of old age in prison. Contrary to defendant's argument, in context, counsel clearly referred to the possibility of a violent or otherwise premature death in prison before the onset of old age, not to the possibility of release from prison. We see no reason to believe the jury was confused or that counsel acted ineffectively in this regard.
Defendant contends the court made a number of errors in denying the automatic motion to modify the death verdict. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) Defendant did not object at the modification hearing. Citing People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1013, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984 ([Defendant's assertion of error fails at the threshold because he failed to object at the hearing except to challenge one specific portion of the report.), and People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1183, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950 (citing Hill to similar effect), the Attorney General argues these claims have been waived for failure to object. Those two cases do support the argument. But in both, we also considered, and rejected, the contentions on the merits. ( People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1013, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984; People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1184, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) On consideration, we do not believe that, before our decision in People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th 959, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984, became final, defense counsel had adequate notice that they were required to object at the modification hearing in order to preserve challenges to the court's ruling. (Cf. People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040.) In Scott, a noncapital case, we held that a defendant must object to a court's statement of reasons for a sentencing choice to preserve an issue for' appeal. But we did not apply the rule to cases in which the sentencing hearing was held before our decision becomes final. ( Id. at p. 358, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040.) Similar considerations cause us now to apply the objection rule for modification hearings only to cases in which the modification hearing was held after People v. Hill supra, 3 Cal.4th 959, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984, became final. Because the hearing of this case was held in 1988, we will consider the contentions on the merits. Defendant first complains the court improperly referred to personal characteristics of the victim. The court discussed the fact that Middleton offered absolutely no resistance in this case. Defendant agrees that the court could consider the absence of resistance as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a). But he complains that the discussion contained some sympathetic remarks about Middleton's general character and personality in violation of the rule we stated in People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 994-995, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475. [10] We disagree. In Jennings, the murder victim's son addressed the court before the ruling on the modification motion. We noted that at that time, such a victim impact statement was constitutionally prohibited. ( Id. at p. 994, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475, citing Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440.) We also said that this constitutional prohibition did not extend to modification hearings, but the trial court erred in considering the victim impact statement because it was not evidence presented to the jury. At the modification hearing, the evidence that the court is to review is only that which was before the jury. ( People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 995, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475.) We have repeatedly rejected] any argument that Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 ... extends to proceedings under section 190.4, subdivision (e). ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1184, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has since overruled Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440. ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720; see People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 867, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249.) The trial court properly considered the characteristics of the victim as circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a). ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1190-1192, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) [11] Defendant also complains the court erred in reading the probation report before ruling on the modification motion. The court does appear to have done so. Because the court considers only the evidence presented to the jury in ruling on the modification motion, we stated in a decision postdating the hearing of this case that the preferable procedure is to defer reading the probation report until after ruling on the automatic application for modification of verdict. ( People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 287, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) However, absent a contrary indication in the record, we assume that the court was not influenced by the report in ruling on the motion. ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 787, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297.) Here, the court did not mention the probation report in its ruling. Rather, it correctly stated its duty was to make an independent assessment and evaluation of the evidence.... (Italics added.) Defendant argues that the record does indicate the probation report influenced the court. He asserts the court obtained the information about the victim's personal characteristics from the report. However, the report said very little about the victim and did not describe him the way the court did. Moreover, the court referred to what it knew about Middleton from the evidence in this case. That evidence did support the court's description of Middleton. Defendant notes the report contained information about his own juvenile recordwhich was minorand other information about him that he argues was not proper aggravating evidence. However, with one possible exception, discussed below, the court mentioned none of this information in its detailed statement of reasons for denying the modification motion. The court strongly considered as possible mitigation the evidence of defendant's intoxication at the time of the offense, but the court found two factors weighing against its being mitigating. One was that defendant's alcoholic problem was long-standing, and I don't recall that before this particular incident that he ... had ever actively or enthusiastically sought any help for this type of problem. The trial produced some evidence of defendant's previous problems with alcohol, but so far as we can find, it was silent on whether defendant had sought help for his problem. The probation report stated, The defendant admits to problems with alcohol and was intoxicated supposedly at the time that this offense was committed. However, this knowledge of his alcoholism was known to the defendant and it appears he made no effort to curtail his alcohol abuse. Defendant argues the court must have considered the report in stating he had not sought help for his problem. It is unclear whether the court simply referred to the absence of defense evidence in mitigation that defendant had sought help or based its comment on this portion of the report. But by saying it appears defendant had not sought help, the report itself merely relied on the absence of an indication that defendant had sought help. The report provided no information not available to the court from the evidence at trial. The court properly commented on the absence of evidence that defendant had sought help for his problem with alcohol in considering the mitigating weight to give to defendant's intoxication. Finally, defendant contends the court improperly considered the absence of factor (f) of section 190.3 Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conductas aggravating. Defendant is correct that the absence of this mitigating factor is not itself aggravating. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 424, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.) Here, the court expressly recognized that the absence of mitigation in and of itself does not constitute aggravation. However, the court did consider in aggravation the fact that the motivation for the crime was financial gain. Defendant argues this reference to motive was merely a reference to the absence of factor (f) in a different guise. It was not. The court properly considered the callous motive of financial gain as a circumstance of the crime under factor (a). ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 424, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) Accordingly, we find the court did not err in stating reasons for denying the motion to modify the death verdict.

Defendant argues that his death judgment is constitutionally disproportionate both in relation to the life sentences that Edwards and Osborne received and in relation to other cases. However, the disposition of codefendants' cases is not relevant to the decision at the penalty phase, which is based on the character and record of the individual defendant and the circumstances of the offense. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 476, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388, original italics.) Moreover, intercase proportionality review is not required, and we have consistently declined to undertake it. ( Ibid. ) But we do undertake `intracase' review to determine whether the penalty is disproportionate to a defendant's personal culpability, although the disposition accomplices received is not part of that review. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 476, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388; see also People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 193, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) [12] To determine whether a sentence is cruel or unusual as applied to a particular defendant, a reviewing court must examine the circumstances of the offense, including its motive, the extent of the defendant's involvement in the crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, and the consequences of the defendant's acts. The court must also consider the personal characteristics of the defendant, including age, prior criminality, and mental capabilities. ( People v. Dillon [(1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697].) If the court concludes that the penalty imposed is `grossly disproportionate to the defendant's individual culpability' ( ibid.), or, stated another way, that the punishment ``shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity'' ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d 618, 690 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351]), the court must invalidate the sentence as unconstitutional. ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1078, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) As in Hines, the imposition of the death sentence is not cruel or unusual punishment. ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1078, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Defendant had a prior criminal record, although a relatively minor one. But, as the trial court found in denying the modification motion, the most important factors were the circumstances of the crime itself, which the court aptly described: Essentially we have a situation in which three younger, more physically able persons waited in the dark for an opportunity to catch alone an unprotected and older and less physically able man, and they were successful in doing that. And that was for the purpose of financial gain. I'm convinced that they considered their acts at least several hours before those acts occurred. I also consider very strongly the time between the actual robbery itself and the time, actual time of the killing and the time it took to drive that distance and the time that must have been spent in thinking `What are we going to do now?' That degree of premeditation and deliberation is something that I feel must be strongly considered as opposed to a much lesser degree in may other cases. More time to reflect and to consider the consequences of their act. The court also considered important, as do we, that the victim offered absolutely no resistance in this case.... [I]n essence, he left his fate totally in their hands.... [H]e took no steps to protect himself; and whatever reliance he made on the common decency of the three people he was withwell, the results are obvious. Given all of these facts, defendant's sentence is not disproportionate to his personal culpability. ( Id at p. 1079, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.)
Defendant reiterates various arguments that we have rejected. We see no reason to reconsider our previous decisions. California's death penalty law adequately distinguishes between those first degree murders that are death eligible and those that are not. ( People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1255, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) Factor (a) of section 190.3 does not improperly bias the penalty determination in favor of death. ( People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131; People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1018-1020, 258 Cal.Rptr. 821, 773 P.2d. 172.) The court need not label the factors listed in section 190.3 as either aggravating or mitigating. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1383, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Use of the word extreme in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), is permissible. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 188-189, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) The court need not delete inapplicable factors from the jury instructions. ( People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 47, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249.) The law is not invalid for failing to `guarantee that squarely contrary facts will not be given aggravating weight in different cases'.... ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 420, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The standard instruction drawn from People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516 is not invalid for failing to expressly instruct the jury that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is mandatory if the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh those in mitigation.... ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 381, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) The jury need not make written findings. ( People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 909-910, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282.) The jury need not find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, that they outweigh mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 421, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) Prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to seek the death penalty is constitutional. ( Ibid. ) Defendant makes one argument that appears to be new, although it is closely related to arguments we have rejected. Section 190.3, factor (d), directs the jury to consider whether the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. In addition to arguing that the word extreme impermissibly limited the jury's consideration of nonextreme disturbances, a contention we have often rejected ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 188-189, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980), defendant argues that the words the offense was committed while impermissibly preclude the jury from considering such a disturbance if it did not influence the actual commission of the crime. Our reasoning in rejecting the similar argument regarding the word extreme applies here. The court gave the catchall instruction under section 190.3, factor (k): the jury should consider any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he's on trial. (Italics added.) This instruction allows consideration of any mental or emotional condition, even if it did not relate to the crime. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 189, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.)