Opinion ID: 2279398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Director's Authority to Grant an Extension [13]

Text: Dr. Konits argues that the Director did not have the discretion to grant Carroll an extension of time because it was not filed within the 180-day period and good cause was not established. He argues, therefore, that this Court should not address the propriety of Dr. Simmons-Clemmons's purported Certificates of Merit. Section 3-2A-04(b)(5) states that [a]n extension of the time allowed for filing a certificate of a qualified expert under this subsection shall be granted for good cause shown. Similarly, § 3-2A-05(j), states: Except for time limitations pertaining to the filing of a claim or response, the Director or the panel chairman, for good cause shown, may lengthen or shorten the time limitations prescribed in subsections (b) and (g) of this section and § 3-2A-04 of this article. Dr. Konits contends that no extension could be granted for good cause because Carroll did not request the good cause extension within the 180-day period. We rejected that exact argument in Navarro-Monzo v. Washington Adventist Hosp., 380 Md. 195, 844 A.2d 406 (2004). There we said: Appellees present the same argument to us that they raised in the Circuit Court, namely, that § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(ii) permits but one 90-day extension and that, if any further extension is to be sought under either § 3-2A-04(b)(5) or § 3-2A-05(j), the extension must be sought before the expiration of the 90-day extension granted under § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(ii). Relying on McCready, they aver that, once [the initial 90-day] extension period expires, the claim must be dismissed. Their reliance, and the Circuit Court's reliance, on McCready is misplaced. . . . We expressly recognized . . . in McCready, [] that `there could conceivably be instances where there might be good cause to grant a request for an extension that was made after the initial ninety-day period in lieu of dismissing the claim.' McCready, 330 Md. at 506 n. 5, 624 A.2d at 1254 n. 5. Indeed, §§ 3-2A-04(b)(5) and 3-2A-05(j) would have little or no meaning unless read to permit good cause extensions over and above the mandatory extension called for in § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(ii). Navarro-Monzo, 380 Md. at 200-04, 844 A.2d at 409-11. In light of our resolution of this case, we will not resolve Dr. Konits's contention that the Director lacked good cause to grant Carroll's extension. We did state in Navarro-Monzo, 380 Md. at 205, 844 A.2d at 412, that: Although the arbitration process itself is not in the nature of an administrative remedy, [the HCADRO] is an administrative agency within the Executive Branch of the State Government (see CJP § 3-2A-03), and therefore its Director, in administering that office, acts as an administrative official. In reviewing the administrative decisions of the Director, we must afford at least the same deference that we afford to other administrative agencies in making discretionary decisions, including, in the absence of some clear indication in the record to the contrary, an assumption that the Director is aware of the law controlling his/her conduct and acts in conformance with it. Additionally, we explained in McCready, that the good cause extensions are malleable[,] again, generally, leaving room for the Director's discretion. 330 Md. at 509, 624 A.2d at 1255. While Carroll never mentioned the phrase good cause, in her request for an extension, she explained that she had filed her Certificate in a timely manner, and that its contents complied with the statutory provisions set forth in the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute. She explained further that her attesting expert was already in the process of amending the Certification to provide additional information that was already available to her. [14] Lastly, Carroll asked the Director to grant an extension based on the interests of justice. In response, the Director utilized his discretionary powers to grant the extension upon review and consideration of Claimant's Answer To Motion To Dismiss and in the interest of justice[.] In accordance with the statutory language and consistent with our prior case law, we believe that the General Assembly made it clear that the good cause extensions are discretionary and without time limitations, so long as the Claimant demonstrates good cause. As indicated earlier, we need not and do not resolve the nature of the good cause asserted in this case. [15]