Opinion ID: 1323858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Legal Excuse Doctrine

Text: Under the legal excuse doctrine, a defendant can be exonerated from liability for per se negligence if he proves by a preponderance of evidence he had a legal excuse. Meyer v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 107, 111 (S.D.1977). One possible excuse is an emergency not of the driver's own making by reason of which the driver fails to observe the statute. Albers v. Ottenbacher, 79 S.D. 637, 116 N.W.2d 529, 531 (1962). If the legal excuse is an emergency, then the party must prove (1) that an emergency existed, (2) that he was not engaged in prior conduct which caused or contributed to the emergency, and (3) that he was unable to comply with the statute because of the emergency. Meyer, 254 N.W.2d at 111. A trial court is to present only those instructions which are supported by competent evidence in the record. Dartt v. Berghorst, 484 N.W.2d 891, 895 n. 5 (S.D. 1992). A legal excuse instruction is inappropriate if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, contains insufficient evidence to conclude the defendant did not cause or contribute to the emergency. See id. at 895-96. In Dartt, the court explained the foreseeability of the emergency is an important factor in determining whether a defendant should get an instruction for legal excuse due to emergency, and emphasized [e]vidence of due care does not furnish an excuse or justification. Id. at 896. At the second trial, the court inserted a legal excuse instruction within its negligence per se instruction, jury instruction number six. Gaillard objected to the inclusion of the elements for legal excuse based on the authority of Dartt. Gaillard argued the legal excuse instruction was inappropriate because, by failing to drive the vehicle at the appropriate rate of speed for traffic conditions, Hoyt was engaged in prior conduct which caused or contributed to the emergency. Defendants argued because the court was instructing the jury that violating a safety statute was negligence per se, it should also instruct them there is an exception to liability for a legal excuse, including emergencies. The district court maintained it would retain the legal excuse instruction within the negligence instruction, but would not give the sudden emergency instruction Defendants had requested. [2] It relied on Meyer, in which the Supreme Court of South Dakota held the legal excuse instruction should have been given instead of the sudden emergency instruction because there was no evidence the defendant chose between two courses of action. See Meyer, 254 N.W.2d at 111. Here, the district court reasoned that in an ordinary negligence action the jury is adequately instructed on the ultimate issues by instructions on negligence, contributory negligence, burden of proof and proximate cause, Trial Tr. at 435-36, and further instruction on sudden emergency was unnecessary and would improperly emphasize the defendant's position. Id. at 437; see Carpenter, 609 N.W.2d at 764 (refusing to give a sudden emergency instruction because the jury was adequately instructed on the issues and the instruction would have served only to improperly emphasize the defendants' position.). The court noted: There's no evidence here of sudden unexpected presence of ice, a tire blowout, brake malfunction, or other mechanical failure. In their brief the defendants argue that traffic suddenly stopped, but the defendant admitted when he testified, and all the other witnesses that testified, talked about the fact that the traffic was very heavy and backed up, and the defendant admitted during this trial that he'd been warned while in Rapid City the traffic was heavy and he'd been warned about Sturgis. The defendant's testimony in this trial hasn't shown that he was confronted by a sudden and unexpected danger that was not brought about by his own negligence. In light of the Court's instructions on contributory negligence and assumption of the risk, I find that to give a further instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine would improperly emphasize the defendant's position, so I am going to refuse defendant's proposed instructions 9 and 18. ( Id. at 436-37) (emphasis added). Gaillard contends the district court found there was no evidence Hoyt was confronted by a sudden and unexpected danger not brought about by his own negligence. He argues it was, therefore, improper for the court to instruct the jury as to legal excuse because legal excuse requires the defendant be confronted by an emergency not of his own making. Gaillard misunderstands the import of the district court's comments. The court refused the sudden emergency instruction because it felt the instruction should not be given along with a contributory negligence instruction and might improperly emphasize the defendant's position  not because the court had determined Defendants were negligent as a matter of law. While we cannot explain the district court's puzzling choice of words when it ruled on the sudden emergency instruction, it was only a comment  not a legal conclusion regarding Defendants' negligence. As the district court later wrote, Evidence was presented at trial that could allow a reasonable jury to find the accident that resulted in injury to Gaillard was not the result of negligence. Hoyt testified that he slowed down when he neared the Sturgis exit, but nonetheless was unable to bring his vehicle to a stop in time to avoid the traffic backed up in front of him. Further, Hoyt testified that traffic was proceeding at a normal rate of speed until just before the accident when it slowed down near the Sturgis exit. This evidence could support a jury finding that Hoyt was not negligent. 08/13/07 Order Denying Motion for New Trial, at 15-16. Our independent review of the evidence leads us to conclude there was sufficient evidence to support either conclusion, i.e. Hoyt was negligent or he was legally excused by virtue of an emergency. Since it was question of fact, it was proper to instruct the jury that per se negligence can be legally excused by an emergency.