Opinion ID: 2622141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Crawford Error

Text: Codefendant Clark's statement to police was redacted to delete any reference to another person. Defendant contends that admission of the statement was erroneous under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ( Crawford ). In Crawford, at pages 53-54, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, and Davis v. Washington (2006) ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2276, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, the high court held that admission of testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant violates the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause when the declarant is not, and has not previously been, subject to cross-examination. This claim is waived. Defendant's counsel expressly stated his satisfaction with the redacted statement because there was no reference to [defendant] directly or indirectly. He withdrew his Aranda/Bruton [6] objection and motion to sever based on the redacted statement. Moreover, the claim lacks merit. Crawford addressed the introduction of testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant. Clark's redacted statement contained no evidence against defendant. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 39-40, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) Thus, it cannot implicate the confrontation clause. ( Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1046-1047, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277.) The same redaction that prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error. ( United States v. Chen (2d Cir.2004) 393 F.3d 139, 150.) Defendant further asserts that because Clark's redacted statement was admitted, Clark testified at trial. Had Clark not testified, defendant argues, the jury would not have heard incriminating evidence about defendant's involvement in the Noyer and Rochon murders, and there would have been no modus operandi regarding freeway murders. The Sixth Amendment confrontation clause does not bar hearsay statements of a witness who testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) Here, defendant received what the confrontation clause requires: a full opportunity to confront and cross-examine Clark.