Opinion ID: 1749075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.

Text: Likewise, we do not believe our nearly two-decade old decision in James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co . [30] compels us to affirm the Court of Appeals. Again, that case is markedly factually distinguishable from the case at hand. James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc . involved a question of whether a CGL policy purchased for a wood treatment facility provided coverage for a federally mandated environmental cleanup. We held that the trial court erred by finding on summary judgment that there was no occurrence under the CGL policy. [31] In the course of explaining our decision, we made some expansive statements about CGL policies. Specifically, we opined that the term occurrence is to be broadly and liberally construed and that a CGL policy's very nature suggests an expectation of maximum coverage. [32] Furthermore, we held that if injury was not actually and subjectively intended or expected by the insured, coverage is provided even though the action giving rise to the injury itself was intentional and the injury foreseeable. [33] Perhaps some of our language in James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc . could lead to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. But a close examination of the different definition of occurrence in that case and this one reveals that our decision in James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc . does not compel affirming the Court of Appeals in this case. The CGL policies in James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc . defined occurrence as [a]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which result in bodily injury or property damage, neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. [34] The language referencing the expectations and intentions of the insured led us to adopt a broad, subjective standard of policy construction. The policy at hand, however, in accordance with modern CGL policies, completely omits from the definition of occurrence any language referencing the expectations or intent of the insured. [35] The policy at issue in Bituminous Cas. Corp. contained the same definition of occurrence as does the policy in the case at hand. [36] In Bituminous Cas. Corp., therefore, we likely should not have quoted and relied upon much of the sweeping language of James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc . without acknowledging that the policy to be interpreted in Bituminous Cas. Corp. contained a definition of occurrence materially different from that found in James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc . [37] Upon reflection, we now recognize the crucial, materially different definition of occurrence in this case renders James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc . of, at most, limited value in determining whether there is an occurrence in the case at hand. [38] Even if we broadly construed the term, however, faulty construction would not constitute an occurrence because, as previously explained, the poor workmanship was not an accident. [39] Because the allegedly poor workmanship at issue cannot reasonably be construed to fall within the policy's definition of occurrence, then Elite (and, by extension, Motorists) cannot reasonably expect coverage for the acts at issue. [40] To the contrary, we believe the policy's requirement that its coverage extends only to an occurrence, combined with the policy's definition of occurrence, is an unequivocal, conspicuous and plain and clear manifestation of the company's intent to exclude coverage. . . . [41] As Justice David Souter noted in an opinion he wrote while serving on the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, defective workmanship does not meet the definition of fortuity; and, thus, [d]espite proper deference, then, to the reasonable expectations of the policyholder, we are unable to find in the quoted policy language a reasonable basis to expect coverage for defective workmanship. [42]