Opinion ID: 1821624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: borderline mental retardation

Text: Having concluded that the trial court erred in failing to consider and weigh the unrefuted evidence that Crook suffered from brain damage, we next turn to Crook's claim that the trial court failed to consider and weigh evidence that Crook was diagnosed as being borderline mentally retarded. In considering mental retardation [5] as a mitigating factor for imposing the death penalty, we have explained: This Court has not established a minimum IQ score below which an execution would violate the Florida Constitution. We have, however, elected to follow the approach suggested by the United States Supreme Court and treat low intelligence as a significant mitigating factor with the lower scores indicating the greater mitigating influence. In the instant case, the trial judge gave considerable weight to Thompson's retardation. It is apparent that the jury also gave this evidence considerable weight in view of its 7-5 vote to recommend the death penalty. Thompson v. State, 648 So.2d 692, 697 (Fla.1994). As in Thompson, the jury's vote to recommend the death penalty in this case was only seven to five. Unlike Thompson, the trial court in this case gave Crook's low intellectual functioning only slight weight. In Jones v. State, 705 So.2d 1364, 1366 (Fla.1998), the trial court rejected mitigating evidence that the defendant had organic brain damage and was borderline mentally retarded and imposed a sentence of death. This Court, on appeal, reversed the defendant's death sentence and remanded for the imposition of a life sentence, stating our review of the record reveals copious unrebutted mitigation, including evidence that the defendant was borderline mentally retarded based upon the defendant's IQ of 76, and the fact that the defendant was placed in special education classes, had first-grade reading ability, and had learning disabilities. [6] In the present case, all of Crook's prior IQ tests from childhood reveal his full-scale IQ to be as low as 62 or 69 and as high as the low 70s. Significantly, Dr. Kremper, who performed a disability evaluation two years prior to the murder, determined Crook's full scale IQ to be 66 and diagnosed Crook as borderline mentally retarded. This diagnosis was consistent with the findings of Dr. McCraney, who opined that Crook was mildly mentally retarded, and Dr. McClain, who testified that Crook's intellectual abilities were in the borderline mentally retarded range. Thus, Crook did not simply have a low IQ, as the trial court apparently concluded. As in Jones, Crook had frontal lobe brain damage, Crook's reading ability was on the first-grade level, and Crook had an IQ that fell squarely within the borderline mentally retarded range. In addition, Crook's mental retardation was substantiated before the crime in question. A social security disability evaluation performed two years before the murder not only found Crook to be mentally retarded, but also found Crook disabled and incapable of maintaining employment within a competitive work setting due to his severe cognitive, emotional and behavioral deficits. Accordingly, given the uncontroverted expert testimony that Crook was borderline mentally retarded and given the significance that borderline mental retardation may have in considering whether the death sentence is appropriate in a given case, we hold that the trial court erred in rejecting the uncontroverted evidence that Crook was borderline mentally retarded. Although we do not discount the statutory aggravators, this case highlights the importance of properly evaluating the statutory mental mitigators in light of the uncontroverted evidence of brain damage, mental retardation, and the age of the defendant. We are not certain whether, if the trial court had properly considered the brain damage and borderline mental retardation and the effect of these mental mitigators on the crime in question, the trial court would have found that the aggravation outweighed the mitigation, especially in light of the abundance of nonstatutory mitigation. See Spencer, 645 So.2d at 385; Santos, 591 So.2d at 164. Accordingly, we affirm Crook's convictions of robbery with a deadly weapon and sexual battery with great force, as well as his concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for these crimes. Moreover, we affirm Crook's conviction for first-degree murder. However, because of the errors discussed above, we vacate the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court to reconsider and reweigh all available mitigating evidence against the aggravating factors, and to determine the proper penalty in accordance with Florida law. [7] See Walker v. State, 707 So.2d 300, 319 (Fla.1997) (remanding case for reconsideration by the trial court of improperly rejected mitigating factors); Jackson v. State, 704 So.2d 500, 507-08 (Fla.1997) (remanding case to trial court to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and resentence Jackson because trial court improperly rejected unrefuted testimony of three experts regarding extreme mental or emotional disturbance statutory mitigating factor). It is so ordered. [8] SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. WELLS, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which HARDING and QUINCE, JJ., concur. WELLS, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the majority's decision to the extent that it affirms Crook's convictions. I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to vacate the death sentence because I conclude that the majority improperly invades the province of the trial court with respect to the trial court's weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. I specifically disagree with the majority's discussion relating to Crook's brain damage and intelligence. Based upon my close reading of the trial transcript, I also conclude that the majority overstates the objective testing conducted by the mental heath experts. It is well established that a trial court must consider all evidence of mitigating circumstances when determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). After considering all evidence, the trial court must determine the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and how much weight should be accorded to each circumstance. See Windom v. State, 656 So.2d 432, 440 (Fla.1995) (sentencing court must weigh mitigating and aggravating circumstances against each other); see also Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 646 (Fla.2000); Hildwin v. State, 727 So.2d 193, 198 (Fla.1998); Elledge v. State, 706 So.2d 1340, 1347 (Fla. 1997); Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 10 (Fla.1997). That is exactly what the trial court correctly did in this case. The weighing of the mitigating circumstances is vested in the sole discretion of the trial court, and this Court does not disturb the assignment of weight absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Blanco, 706 So.2d at 10. The majority asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting the uncontroverted evidence of Crook's brain damage, that is, the trial court refused to consider brain damage as mitigating evidence. See majority op. at 75. I disagree. The trial court wrote a detailed twenty-page order and in that order considered the evidence presented by the experts with respect to Crook's mental status. In context, I read the trial court's statement there was no actual proof of any brain damage to mean there was no radiological evidence in the form of brain scans or EEG studies indicating that there was damage, and that is a correct statement from my careful reading of the transcript. I do not agree with the majority's over-reliance on that statement in the trial court's order as a basis to find that the trial court erred in carrying out its role as the weigher of mitigating evidence, particularly in light of the trial court's findings with respect to mental and psychological evidence of Crook's dysfunctions. In its consideration of the two statutory mental mitigators, the trial court noted that, while there was no actual proof of brain damage, the statutory mental mitigators existed. [9] The trial court additionally found and weighed as nonstatutory mitigating factors that Crook suffered from other psychological dysfunctions, which the experts testified were symptoms of brain damage. Such dysfunctions included attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity, identifiable learning disabilities, social isolation, language confusion, left-right dominance confusion, visual focus problems, bladder and bowel control problems, fear of abandonment, and sleep disturbance with night terrors. Obviously, pursuant to the majority's reasoning, the trial court did not err in finding the two statutory mental mitigators. Also clear is the fact that the trial court found and weighed Crook's psychological dysfunctions as nonstatutory mental mitigators which were testified to as symptoms of brain damage. Thus, even if the trial court erred in not finding the existence of brain damage, that error is harmless in light of the trial court's determination that the two statutory mental mitigators existed and the trial court's evaluation of Crook's psychological dysfunctions which the trial court found to exist and accorded weight. Again, what the majority plainly disagrees with the trial court about is the weight given by the trial court to these statutory and nonstatutory mitigators. Moreover, I do not agree with the majority's construction of Robinson v. State, 761 So.2d 269, 277 (Fla.1999). The majority, relying on Robinson, stated that [c]learly the existence of brain damage is a significant mitigating factor that trial courts should consider in deciding whether a death sentence is appropriate in a particular case. Majority op. at 75 (emphasis added). Nowhere in Robinson did this Court require brain damage to be considered a significant factor. In Robinson, this Court stated the trial court gave little weight to the existence of brain damage. Id. at 277. This Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's treatment and consideration of the mitigating circumstances. Id. But again, the weight given to a mitigating factor is exclusively within the province of the trial court. See, e.g., Blanco, 706 So.2d at 10. Further, I disagree with several statements and clear inferences and impressions in the majority's opinion that the tests upon which the experts based their testimony regarding Crook's brain damage were objective. The majority asserts: The trial court apparently rejected the uncontroverted evidence of brain damage in assessing the statutory mitigator because there was no actual proof of any brain damage. Yet, all three medical experts testified to their objective testing that substantiated the existence of brain damage, specifically to the frontal lobe, which substantially impaired Crook's ability to control his impulses. Majority op. at 75. The problem with the majority's statement that the tests were objective is that the use of the word objective creates an impression that the medical experts' opinions were based upon tests such as a brain scans, which have reasonably accepted medical measurements and standards, as differentiated from the experts' subjective conclusions, resting largely upon what Crook told the experts and the experts' personal evaluations. Here, my reading of the testimony of these physicians demonstrates that there was not such a reliance on an abnormal brain scan, but, rather, the expert opinions consisted mostly of conclusions of these experts. This distinction is critical because a trial court may reject expert opinion, as differentiated from factual evidence, even if unrefuted. See Jackson v. State, 704 So.2d 500, 506-07 (Fla.1997) ([A] trial court may reject expert opinion testimony even if that testimony is unrefuted.); Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000, 1010 (Fla.1994) (same); Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381, 390-91 (Fla.1994) (same). From the record, I see that the experts were two medical doctors and one psychologist. I do not find anywhere in the record what the majority opinion refers to as their objective testing. Nowhere in the transcript of the testimony does either medical doctor or the psychologist state that any test conducted by any of them was objective. The neurologist, Dr. McCraney, testified in answer to the question, What did you do to perform an examination of Mr. Crook? There's three parts to any neurological assessment; the history, the physical and laboratory analyses. What the history means is talking to the patient trying to understand what the story is. In this case, what his life history is. It also can include a review of records. And I did have some records on him, school records and previous professional evaluations. The physical examination, in some respects, can be a lot like a physical examination that your family doctor does on you. For the neurological examination I tend to focus on the nervous system. How the muscles are working. The ability to perceive simple sensations like pain and temperature sensation. Or the ability to perceive more complex sensations like vision and hearing. I test balance and coordination. Then finally, I spend a significant amount of time testing how the brain is working. Does the patient have memory? Are they processing data correctly? Are they processing data with the right speed? The final part of the evaluation is testing. In this case I did a test of the brain waves. (Emphasis added.) In answer to the question of what he found from examining Mr. Crook, Dr. McCraney said: When I examined him he appeared, basically, healthy. He did not give me the impression of being particularly bright in terms of the simplicity of the vocabulary that he used. And just some of the naive statements he made. His memory was not all that good. I found that he was oriented. His knowledge of world events was not at all good. Which again kind of goes along with that impression of not having a real high IQ to begin with. I felt that language functioning was normal. I did find some abnormalities on one of the frontal lobe tests that I did. Now, I felt that the rest of his nervous system was essentially unremarkable. His spinal cord, nerves and muscles all seemed to be working okay. Frankly, except for the impression that he had subnormal intelligence, I felt that the rest of his brain was working okay as well. (Emphasis added.) As noted, what I would consider to be the only objective test that was part of Dr. McCraney's examination was the brain wave test (I assume that what Dr. McCraney was referring to was an EEG). I can neither find the results of that test in the record nor do I find in Dr. McCraney's testimony any reliance that he put on an abnormal brain wave test. The inference I must draw, then, is that Crook's brain wave test was normal and that the physical part of Dr. McCraney's examination was also normal. I agree that Dr. McCraney, in various parts of his testimony, said that the frontal lobe of Crook's brain was not working properly. A specific question was asked of Dr. McCraney as to his opinion of Crook's medical condition. That question and Dr. McCraney's answer were: Q After having given the tests to Donny and after reviewing the records, what opinion did you reach in regard to the medical condition, the neurological condition that Donny had at the time that you saw him? A When I examined the patient I felt that he was paranoid and impulsive. I got the feeling that he was organic. Meaning that his difficulty arose as a result of brain dysfunction as opposed to character disorder. I found certain abnormalities on examination, suggesting that his frontal lobe was not working right. I found evidence in the record going back to his early school years suggesting that he was mildly retarded, had a learning disability and suffered from impulsivity from a very early age. I believe it is also germane to the present review that the entirety of Dr. McCraney's time on Crook's evaluation was one hour, including his review of Crook's past medical records. I also believe the following question and answer from the State's cross-examination are important: Q Can you tell this jury what information have you received regarding the murder of Betty Spurlock? A At the time that I wrote my report none, other than what he said. I've had the occasion to speak with his attorney since I made my report, and so I'm familiar with some of it. Q So, you prepared a report regarding Donny Crook and his ability or inability to control his behaviors, specifically as it regards the First Degree Murder that we are considering here, without any information regarding that event? A Sort of. The issue upon referral is whether or not he had brain injury, not whether that impacted directly on the charges for which he has been convicted. Q Okay. A So, I think any questions on that would have to be posed as a hypothetical, I guess. The other medical doctor who testified was Dr. McClane, a psychiatrist. From Dr. McClane's testimony I find the following questions and answers pertinent: Q And did you have the opportunity to perform such an examination on Donny Crook? A Yes. I've seen him twice. Q And on your initial evaluation, did you refer Donny to other professionals or other specialists? A Yes. There were several reasons for that. His situation was a complex one. At times he seemed to be faking things. Clearly, from the history, he seemed to have some probable neurological brain damage, probable attention deficit disorder, and possibly other neuropsychological abnormalities. So, I wanted to get both neuropsychological testing and have a neurological evaluation by a neurologist that had an interest, specific interest in the neurology of behavior. So, that's why I asked that Dr. Dolente test him and that Dr. McCraney see him as a neurologist. I should add that's pretty unusual. I see about 120 persons accused of a crime a year. And probably one to three I refer to a neurologist. That's pretty unusual. ... The pertinence of that is that Donny Crook was an unusual case, an unusual person. Different from the run of the mill. More difficult to understand. Then, the following question and answer: Q Given all the data and your examination and your conversations with Donny, what is your overall impression regarding Donny's condition? A The overall impression is that he has brain damage of a type that's very difficult to specify exactly neurologically and neuropsychologically. There are several factors, I think, that go into the cause here. After discussion of what Dr. McClane found significant in Mr. Crook's history, he stated his opinion as: What these have led to is a person who has a, what I think, are a cluster of several diagnoses manifest by a list of symptoms. The diagnoses that I have made include the following: Number one, borderline intellectual functioning. Borderline means on the border between the low limits of normal and mental retardation. Second, he has attention deficit hyper-activity disorder. Which all of you have heard of, I'm sure. With both of these working together have made for very poor school performance, repetition of several grades. Many, many problems in school and in development. And most importantly, and most pertinently for the current situation with the horrible offense, is that this has resulted in a personality disorder, a rather severe personality disorder with mostly antisocial personality traits but other traits as well. And one can diagnose this as an antisocial personality disorder. But as I mentioned awhile ago, when you diagnose a personality disorder, you're talking about a cluster of symptoms that hang together without knowing the cause. When you have some pretty good evidence for a cause, and I think we have some here, I think it's more accurate and more plausible to diagnose him as severe personality disorder, secondary to these factors that I have described here, including, perhaps most pertinently, head trauma and substance abuse. With antisocial and other manifestations, including hyperactivity, impulsivity and anger control problems, attention problems. He has difficulty sustaining attention. Poor judgment, low self-esteem, difficulty in interpersonal relationships, manipulativeness. A manipulative sort of life-style where he sort of feels, partly because of low self-esteem, feels that everybody is against him so he is manipulating the world. And this leads to outright malingering at times when he's dealing with mental health professionals or teachers or others. And finally, this is manifest, in my opinion, if I am correct about the causes, it would render him hypersensitive to the usual negative effects of alcohol and other drugs. In answer to a direct question about injury, the transcript reflects: Q Now, you talked about brain injury. Do Donny's symptoms indicate or give you some idea which area of the brain has been injured? A Yes. We could not document that adequately with physical studies, neurological studies; although, there are some neuropsychological evidence for this. But certainly, when I first saw him, my thought was that he probably had some kind of frontal lobe damage. (Emphasis added.) In answer to a specific question about frontal lobe damage, Dr. McClane said: And with Donny, of course, you have what we think is subtleby subtle, I mean, microscopic and difficult to pick up with normal testssubtle frontal lobe changes which interact with his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and his long history of substance abuse and of history of, apparent, severe intoxication at the time of his offense. I think this testimony is appropriately read as meaning that the objective tests were normal. Dr. McClane's conclusions were really his subjective opinion based on Crook's history, which included extensive alcohol and drug abuse. It also should be mentioned that although there is evidence that Crook was involved in an automobile accident, the medical records from that accident reflect no head involvement or injury. Dr. Dolente, the neuropsychologist, testified that upon his first examination he considered that Crook malingered (faked) throughout the examination. Dr. Dolente did testify as to what he called a brain injury. His testimony in part was: In Donny's particular case, the assessment was very interesting, at least from my perspective. I found some indications that were suggestive of brain injury, brain damage, specifically frontal lobe involvement. It wasn't easy to get to but we got there. The first time I assessed Donny he essentially blew me off. Dr. Dolente then stated, in answer to the following question: Q Okay. You said that you gave him a series of tests, and in your diagnosis or your belief, you believe that he is damaged in his frontal lobe? A Yes, ma'am. Q Were there certain tests that would lead you to believe that or was it a conglomeration of records, data and the tests? A Probably primarily the testing led me to believe that Donny could not do very well on a test of verbal learning. In fact, he did very, very poorly. Much more poorly than one might expect, even given his overall intellectual ability, which I found to be very low in average. He came in very, very low on a verbal test. Which loads more heavily on frontal lobe functioning. He also did very poorly on go, no go tests. Which essentially require the patient to be ... to inhibit their performance. Go, no go tests have to do, for example, I grab the patient's hand and say when I say red, I want you to squeeze it quickly. When I say green, don't do anything. That's counter to what we know. Green means go. So, in this case grab the handand these are common bedside tests in neurology they've been around forever and say green, the person does nothing. Red, they're supposed to squeeze, you know, that sort of thing. People with frontal lobe impairment get that mixed up and have difficulty with that sort of test. They also have difficulty with coordinated motor movements such as doing this (Demonstrating). It seems pretty silly but these are well documented. They have been around for years. They have been used in neurology for 50 years, et cetera. Very common tests. So, that, along with the very poor verbal learning test. He made an error on another test which loads heavily on frontal lobe functioning. Led me to believe, and given the history, that there is a degree of organisity in here which I believe is significant and should be considered. I detail this transcript testimony because, in my view, the transcript testimony contradicts the following statement by the majority: In contrast to Robinson, the trial court in the present case did not find and weigh Crook's brain damage as a valid mitigating circumstance and rejected its connection to this crime, even though three defense experts, two of whom specialized in brain injuries, presented uncontroverted testimony that Crook suffered from frontal lobe brain damage that established a statutory mental mitigator. Perhaps most significantly, unlike the experts in Robinson, the expert testimony in this case also explained the causes and origins of Crook's frontal lobe brain damage and established that there was a causal link between Crook's brain damage and the homicide. Majority op. at 75. The actual testimony of Dr. McCraney, the neurologist, was that he formed his opinion without any information regarding the murder of Betty Spurlock. He did not testify that Crook's brain damage caused him to murder Spurlock, nor did he evaluate Crook with the purpose of making this determination. Dr. Dolente testified that he simply evaluated Crook to determine whether Crook suffered from any form of brain damage. Based on the foregoing, I find no support for the majority's stated conclusion that the trial judge's weighing of the mitigators was not based on competent, substantial evidence. HARDING and QUINCE, JJ., concur.