Opinion ID: 1247657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Black Prospective Jurors

Text: The first Black prospective juror discussed by the prosecutor was Serena Storey. As an objective reason for challenging her, he first said that She's had a brother-in-law who was arrested. In Wheeler we noted that one of the Black prospective jurors peremptorily challenged had a stepson who was currently incarcerated on a criminal conviction, and observed that A personal experience of this nature, suffered either by the juror or a close relative, has often been deemed to give rise to a significant potential for bias against the prosecution. (22 Cal.3d at p. 277, fn. 18.) The case at bar, however, is of an entirely different order of magnitude. Here the record shows that the charge against Ms. Storey's brother-in-law was possession of marijuana, the arrest occurred 10 or 12 years earlier, and the punishment had been a simple fine. In these circumstances it is difficult to believe the incident caused Ms. Storey to harbor a lingering bias against the prosecution a decade later. The prosecutor apparently did not believe it either: when Ms. Storey brought up the incident during the prosecutor's voir dire he did not ask her whether it would affect her ability to deliberate in this case, although he asked that question of all prospective jurors whose family members had had potentially adverse experiences with the police. [14] A similar exaggeration appears in the next objective reason offered by the prosecutor: She's known many guys who have gone to jail. The implication is that Ms. Storey  in the vernacular of a bygone era  is the moll of a gang of hardened criminals. But the reality is much different: it is simply that 20 years earlier, when she was a teenager, a number of other teenagers in her high school were held in jail or put on probation for, as she described it, little different things. Unfortunately this is not an unusual experience for a Black in the teenage years. Yet when a non-Black prospective juror described a similar experience, the prosecutor was not concerned and accepted her as a juror. [15] Next the prosecutor stated, There was a question in my mind whether she thought the courts were prejudiced against blacks. What Ms. Storey actually said, however, was that she believed the courts treated Whites more leniently than other races because Whites are the majority in this country. [16] For Wheeler purposes, of course, it is immaterial whether or not that belief is well founded; what matters is that Black prospective jurors like Ms. Storey may share the belief simply because they are Black: it is a perspective arising from their life experience in the group, i.e., a perspective gained precisely because they are members of that group. ( Rubio v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 93, 98 [154 Cal. Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595].) Accordingly, under Wheeler the belief is an impermissible ground for striking Blacks from the jury: the purpose of the representative cross-section requirement is to achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of the diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences. Manifestly if jurors are struck simply because they may hold those very beliefs, such interaction becomes impossible and the jury will be dominated by the conscious or unconscious prejudices of the majority. ( Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d at p. 276.) This is true even if the belief in question might predispose the Black prospective juror to favor Black defendants generally. As we further explained in Wheeler, quoting with approval from a cogent analysis of the issue, `Blacks may, in fact, be more inclined to acquit than whites. The tendency might stem from many factors, including sympathy for the economic or social circumstances of the defendant, a feeling that criminal sanctions are frequently too harshly applied, or simply an understandable suspicion of the operations of government.... But these tendencies do not stem from individual biases related to the peculiar facts or the particular party at trial, but from differing attitudes toward the administration of justice and the nature of criminal offenses. The representation on juries of these differences in juror attitudes is precisely what the representative cross-section standard elaborated in Taylor [v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522 (42 L.Ed.2d 690, 95 S.Ct. 692)] is designed to foster.' (22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277, fn. 17.) In any event, the record shows that in the case at bar Ms. Storey's belief that the courts were lenient towards Whites did not bias her in favor of the specific Black defendants on trial here. When the court directly asked her whether her determination of the guilt or innocence of these defendants would be affected by the fact they are Black, she replied unequivocally that it would not. [17] Apparently unsatisfied with this answer, the prosecutor engaged Ms. Storey in a line of questioning reminiscent of that he had used on the Jewish prospective juror Mr. Kirstel, again raising the specter of group bias. Saying that only you can answer this question, he asked her, what attitude do you think you would take towards the racial question in a case such as this one if you were on the jury? Defense counsel objected that Ms. Storey had already answered this same question when it was asked by the court, but the court allowed the inquiry because it had not yet been asked by the prosecutor. The prosecutor then amplified the question to add a reference to the different treatments that racial groups have experienced. Ms. Storey replied in effect that she understood prejudice because she had been exposed to it as a Black, and therefore to avoid being guilty of prejudice herself  i.e., by favoring Black defendants  I would be more inclined to try and be as fair as possible. She stressed that I would take a very good look though at the evidence. Still unsatisfied, the prosecutor asked, Well, given that maybe most people can't be dead neutral on the question of race whether they're police officers, judges, juries, whatever, I'm wondering what your own particular attitude might be that might be different if the defendants were Oriental or whites or something like that. Again Ms. Storey explained that the race of the defendants on trial was immaterial to her: As far as being black, I deal with blacks every day. I'm aware of the good and the bad in all races. [18] Yet the prosecutor pressed relentlessly on, saying, So you think that the fact that these defendants are black would make it a little harder for me to prove the case or a little bit easier to prove the case.... Because Ms. Storey did not think anything of the sort, she interrupted him to declare  one more time  that I don't think the fact that they're black in my personal situation would make any difference. Despite the firmness, clarity, and consistency of Ms. Storey's answers on this issue, it is obvious from the prosecutor's remarks at the Wheeler hearing that he continued to presume she would be biased in favor of Black defendants merely because she was herself Black. That presumption, however, violates not only our Wheeler rule but the specific command of the United States Supreme Court in Batson : the high court explicitly warned that the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption  or his intuitive judgment  that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. [Citations.] Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black persons from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as jurors [citation], so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black. The core guarantee of equal protection, insuring citizens that their State will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise solely from the jurors' race. (476 U.S. at pp. 97-98 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 88].) Shifting his ground, the prosecutor next stated that because Ms. Storey had divorced her police officer husband, he felt she was very militant anti-police officers.... The record shows this to be another gross exaggeration. Ms. Storey and her husband had been divorced for five years by the time of this trial, and she assured the prosecutor that I really had no problem with him being a police officer. Although she said that I have known policemen to lie, she explained that she meant they might lie to their wives on social occasions on which they claimed, for example, an act of bravery. She never asserted that she had known police officers to lie on the witness stand. When the court asked her if she would be inclined to give a police officer's testimony less credibility because he is an officer, she replied, No, because I did know a couple of nice policemen. When the prosecutor inquired further, Ms. Storey explained that from her marriage she learned that being a police officer you see so much of the bad side of human nature that many officers become bitter and hopeless, but that others didn't allow the environment to change their minds or make them something else that they didn't start out [being]; these police officers, she agreed, maintained their humanity. And she reiterated that she would have no problem judging police credibility by the same standards she would apply to all witnesses. There is no other discussion of the matter in the voir dire of Ms. Storey, and the record thus does not support the prosecutor's belated claim that Ms. Storey was very militant anti-police officers. [19] Nor does the record support the prosecutor's further assertion that Ms. Storey said she'd judge police credibility by vibrations. I don't know what she meant by that, but I'd have a lot of problem resting a case with a lot of police testimony on the vibrations of the police officer, those not being under my control or even being able to understand what she meant. This reason for the challenge is pure fantasy. Nowhere in the transcript of her voir dire examination does Ms. Storey say she would judge police credibility  or anything else  by vibrations. The prosecutor's final two objective reasons for striking Ms. Storey relate to even more trivial matters. First he stated that she said that it was bad luck to get on a jury.... Again this is a bald overstatement of the record. During voir dire the court asked Ms. Storey whether she could refrain from watching television news stories about this trial if she were a juror, and she replied candidly, Well, if I had the bad luck to get on this jury I guess I'd do that. As was his right, the prosecutor asked for the particular reason why she would rather not serve on this jury. He acknowledged that most people don't want to get on ... because of the amount of time that's involved, but he noted that some prospective jurors have other reasons, e.g., they don't like the idea of sitting in judgment on other people. Ms. Storey replied that her reason was purely the former: she was a planning engineer for Pacific Telephone Company, and at that moment was right in the middle of a great big reprogramming thing and there was nobody else available to do her job; accordingly, if she were to serve on this jury she would have to work late on her job after the trial adjourned each day. The prosecutor asked, In relation to this case then those are the reasons that there would be a problem. Nothing else that you can think of offhand? She replied, No. That would be the strain. There was no other discussion of the question. In these circumstances, as the prosecutor conceded, Ms. Storey's reluctance to serve was not unusual; more important, the record is devoid of evidence that her reluctance would have biased her against either party in this case, less still that it would have caused her to favor the defendant rather than the prosecution. [20] As his final objective reason the prosecutor twice said that Ms. Storey had been prosecuted for allowing her son to drive her car without a license. That prosecution, however, turns out to be nothing more than an ordinary traffic ticket. She explained that she received the citation for letting her son drive her car alone before he got his license, although he had his learner's permit at the time. The matter was resolved without even a court appearance: she paid a small fine by mail, and her son went to traffic school. Not surprisingly, the event left Ms. Storey with no resentment. The court asked her, Is there anything about that experience which creates any problem for you, anything in your mind about law enforcement ... ? She candidly replied, No, I was definitely in the wrong. The prosecutor's remaining reasons for excluding Ms. Storey were subjective. He said she had a very defensive body disposition, ... she was closing her legs and folding her arms when she was talking to me, and that when counsel were introduced to her she wouldn't even look in my direction and my sense was ... that there was some kind of hostility at that point. The prosecutor also asserted that When the court mentioned the death penalty, I counted a pulse, because I was able to with some jurors, and did it with everyone I could from jewelry bobbing or from actually seeing veins in the neck. Her throat became very fast and her pulse came up to over a 100, what I thought was somewhat unusual. Again the prosecutor did not further explain any of these remarks, and none is verifiable. Yet one point deserves a brief discussion. Even if we assume arguendo that the prosecutor seriously believed he had the power to take an accurate pulse just by looking at his subject, the record refutes his implication that Ms. Storey's alleged pulse rate meant she would be reluctant to impose the death penalty. When the court asked for her position on that penalty she replied, I'd say I'm neutral. I would have no qualms about giving a death sentence if it's warranted. On voir dire by defense counsel she reiterated, I said I'd have no problems with giving the death penalty. On voir dire by the prosecutor she returned to the subject when he asked her if she would favor Black defendants, and she volunteered the view that Since I do not have qualms about the death penalty and I think that would apply whether the defendants were white or black. And she answered twice more in the affirmative when the prosecutor asked if she could vote for death for one defendant even if that penalty was not appropriate for the other or the other turned state's evidence. The next Black prospective juror discussed by the prosecutor was Marcia Tamboura. As his first objective reason for excluding her the prosecutor said, She mentioned that she doesn't follow  she reads the newspapers daily but she reads the funnies and Ann Landers. She doesn't read the news. The prosecutor's plain implication  that Mrs. Tamboura is too unintelligent or uninformed to be a juror because she voluntarily chooses not to read the news  is both insulting and contradicted by the record. Mrs. Tamboura did not say she never reads the news; what she did say was very different, to wit, that if she were to serve as a juror in this case she would follow the court's admonition to avoid reading any news reports about the trial. [21] Whether Mrs. Tamboura's mention of Ann Landers and the comics was a modest attempt at humor or an expression of her preference for those popular features, her answers are entirely unremarkable. They certainly do not support the demeaning inference that the prosecutor sought to draw from them. On this point the record again demonstrates the prosecutor's disparate treatment of the Black prospective jurors. No less than four White jurors admitted on voir dire that they intentionally avoid reading the news  i.e., the attitude that the prosecutor tried to impute to Mrs. Tamboura. Thus Juror Judith Brown declared that she does not read the news portions of the papers, only the sports pages. [22] Juror Anna Mills said she reads the newspapers only rarely, while Juror Natalie Fleming said she does not take a newspaper at all. And Alternate Juror Tucker flatly declared I avoid the news because it upsets her. As to none of these four, however, did the prosecutor make the snide remark he made about Mrs. Tamboura, and he allowed all four to pass unchallenged and serve on the jury. Next the prosecutor charged that Mrs. Tamboura didn't approve of the death penalty. It is true that she so answered when the court asked her for her position on the penalty. But she proceeded to make it crystal clear that she would nevertheless be willing and able to vote for death in an appropriate case. First she answered in the affirmative when the court asked whether she could vote for death if the case reached the penalty phase. The prosecutor then inquired into the matter at length, and Mrs. Tamboura frankly explained her thinking as follows: Could I vote for the death penalty, you know, where I don't really like it. And I came to the conclusion, yeah, I could. If the evidence was that that's what should be called out or if that's what the law says that I have to do, I would have to say yes. I would have to because the death penalty is a fact. My not liking it doesn't change the fact. The prosecutor asked the same question in several different ways, but Mrs. Tamboura gave the same answer each time. [23] The prosecutor also complained that she said she didn't think that being black should have any bearing on the case. She didn't say it wouldn't have any, she said she didn't think it would which leaves to me the question if she sat there whether or not blackness of a defendant would make a difference in the case and that's a risk all by itself I would be very unhappy having to take. Again the prosecutor's claim is a gross exaggeration of the record. The court first asked Mrs. Tamboura its standard questions about the relevance of defendants' race, and she gave routine answers denying any bias. [24] Taken in context, her answer, I don't think so, was not an expression of uncertainty but simply a common colloquial equivalent of no. This fact was made plain when the prosecutor pressed the point in his voir dire and Mrs. Tamboura disabused him of any notion that she was uncertain on the issue. [25] On this point the record demonstrates once more the prosecutor's disparate treatment of Black prospective jurors. Virtually every one of the jurors who were allowed to serve also answered with similar affirmative (or negative) colloquialisms, viz., I think [or don't think] I could, I believe [or don't believe] so, I feel [or don't feel] I could, etc. (See, e.g., fn. 37, post. ) Yet the prosecutor challenged none on this ground. For example, Alternate Juror Travis answered in such terms far more often than Mrs. Tamboura, but the prosecutor was unperturbed. Thus when he inquired if Mrs. Travis could disregard personal feelings in deliberating on guilt, she replied, Yes, I think so. He asked for a clarification, and she explained that she meant, I would hope I can do that.... I would try my best. Even though her explanation was far more tentative than Mrs. Tamboura's, the prosecutor immediately accepted it, saying, That is the only kind of commitment I can ask. Moments later he inquired if she could vote to convict the two defendants even if a third had turned state's evidence, and she replied, I think so. He responded, Again, I assume when you say, `I think so,' it is kind of a figure of speech? Yet when Black prospective juror Tamboura said exactly the same words the prosecutor no longer took them as a figure of speech, but claimed instead they must be taken literally. The incident is revealing. The prosecutor also pointed to several occasions on which Mrs. Tamboura had had contacts with law enforcement officers; presumably he mentioned them because he inferred that they had biased her against the police. The record will not bear the inference. First he said, she had fought a traffic ticket and testified against the police officer. The record shows, however, that the incident was a routine case of Mrs. Tamboura and a police officer disagreeing over the moment at which a yellow traffic light turned red as she was driving through an intersection. Not surprisingly, Mrs. Tamboura stated that the incident left her with no bias against the honesty or credibility of police officers. [26] Even more trivial were the other incidents listed by the prosecutor. He said, She mentioned that there was some incident with the police officer, a BB gun, I think it was, the neighbor's, not her own kids. Again the prosecutor got the facts wrong: the record shows that it was Mrs. Tamboura's son who was shooting his BB gun in his own backyard, and it was the neighbor who called the police. But the affair was a nonevent at best: Mrs. Tamboura explained that the neighbor was worried about her windows, which I don't blame her [for]. The incident occurred more than a year before this trial, and did not result in any court proceedings: the officer simply told her son to shoot his BB gun in open fields rather than in the city. Both the court and the prosecutor expressly asked Mrs. Tamboura whether the incident created any problem for you as far as law enforcement is concerned, and she squarely replied to both that it had not. [27] Next the prosecutor said, She had a ticket on a Christmas Eve that she didn't like and remembered he gave her a problem. It is true Mrs. Tamboura received a ticket on Christmas Eve, but the rest of the prosecutor's statement is contradicted by the record. On voir dire by the court Mrs. Tamboura denied that she felt the ticket was unjustified or that the incident would affect her deliberations in this case. And contrary to the prosecutor's belated claim that Mrs. Tamboura remembered [the officer] gave her a problem, at the time of the voir dire even the prosecutor recognized that the incident was most trivial and probably not something she had thought about much since it had happened, and Mrs. Tamboura explained it simply made her laugh. [28] As his final objective reason for challenging Mrs. Tamboura the prosecutor said, She had been a witness in a manslaughter case and my best recollection is now that it was not in favor of the People.... Once again the prosecutor's best recollection is flatly contradicted by the record. Far from being a witness for the defendant in the manslaughter case, it was Mrs. Tamboura herself who initiated the prosecution. She had been hired as a babysitter, and found the child in a state of near-starvation. It was she who called the police, and when the child died its mother was charged with manslaughter. Mrs. Tamboura testified against her at the trial, and the mother berated her in open court. Moreover, the event occurred when Mrs. Tamboura was a teenager, 20 years before the present trial, and she assured the court that it would not affect her deliberations in the case at bar. In any event, of course, if the experience had any effect it would have tended to bias her in favor of the prosecution rather than the defense. The prosecutor's remaining reasons for excluding Mrs. Tamboura were subjective. He said he felt somewhat generally that she was an overweight person, and that her hair was poorly groomed, that her clothes were unkept [ sic ], giving me an indication of not being part of perhaps the mainstream of people's thinking. He also claimed She was very nervous about the death penalty because she was breathing very fast about it, and that he inferred she was not telling the truth or being open and candid in her answers because she kept her hand over her mouth when she talked about the penalty. Lastly he asserted that She was somewhat charming with some counsel and I felt somewhat the reverse with me, that She didn't appear to relate to me, and that I got the feeling she didn't trust me, again for reasons unknown. The prosecutor did not further explain these observations, and none is verifiable. [29]