Opinion ID: 1349481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: People v. Austin

Text: In this case, we granted the application for leave to appeal in order to decide: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to accept a plea agreement because it was made after the court's plea cut-off deadline, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial on the basis of juror misconduct, and (3) whether the case should be remanded to the trial court for correction of the presentence report. In regard to (1), I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for entry of defendant's negotiated plea as offered. In regard to (2), I would hold that the issue of juror misconduct is moot. In (3), I agree with the lead opinion that the letters from Sergeant Harris be deleted from the presentence report.
Defendant in this case was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. [13] The day before trial, the prosecutor and the defense counsel reached a reduced plea agreement. Under the agreement, defendant agreed to plead guilty of two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree [14] and one count of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree. [15] In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to drop the original charges and to not pursue an habitual offender charge or second offense charges. The judge refused to allow defendant to plead guilty to the lesser charge because his plea cutoff date had passed. Defense counsel objected, advancing three arguments: (1) the prosecutor did not offer defendant the plea agreement until the day before trial; (2) two prosecution witnesses' statements to the police were more damaging to the defense than earlier revealed; (3) the plea cutoff date regarding the CSC IV change had not passed. The prosecutor confirmed the accuracy of defense counsel's statements. However, the judge was unpersuaded. Defendant went to trial and was convicted as originally charged. As was discussed above in Grove, the current Michigan Court Rules provide well-defined circumstances in which a trial court is allowed to reject a plea agreement. They allow it only when the bargain had been conditioned on the court's consent or when the defendant's plea had not been understanding or voluntary, or was inaccurate. See MCR 6.301 and MCR 6.302. Subpart A of MCR 6.301 does not confer broad authority on the trial court to reject a guilty plea for a reason not specified in a court rule. MCR 6.302(A) specifies when a trial court may reject a guilty plea. Appellee's reliance on MCR 6.301(A) as a basis for the trial court's rejection of defendant's plea is misplaced. There is no authority in the current Michigan Court Rules for a court to reject a plea agreement on the basis of a plea cut-off date. [16] A trial court has no greater authority to refuse to accept a plea over a prosecutor's objection than it has to accept one. Hence, like civil litigants, a prosecutor and a defendant are free to settle a case by agreement, even on the eve of trial. To hold otherwise, I believe, violates the established rules of Genesee Prosecutor I and Genesee Prosecutor II, supra, that the trial court (1) does not enjoy supervisory control over the prosecutor, and (2) does not have authority to force the trial of a defendant on a charge over the prosecutor's objection. Id. at 683, 194 N.W.2d 693, 391 Mich. at 121, 215 N.W.2d 145.
Since this issue has not been specifically addressed by the courts in this state, federal law, as well as the law from other states, becomes instructive in fashioning a standard. Recently, in United States v. Shepherd , [17] the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a district court abused its discretion when it rejected a plea entered into during the first day of trial. Defendant Shepherd agreed to plead as charged in exchange for the government's recommendation to the departure committee for a departure from the sentencing guides. The Shepherd court began its analysis by discussing the importance of the plea-bargaining process in the administration of justice. It then listed the four reasons given by the trial court for rejecting the plea: (1) the poor timing of the request, (2) the prejudice to the codefendants, (3) the questionable value of the agreement to defendant, and (4) the likelihood that defendant would later attack the plea as coercive. The appeals court rejected each contention as insufficient to justify the rejection of the plea. It vacated the conviction with directions that the case be remanded to the trial court for entry of the plea and resentencing. [18] Id. at 165-166. In United States v. Robertson , [19] the trial court rejected as untimely a plea agreement offered shortly before trial. The court stated that the eleventh-hour agreement put the Court in a position where [it could not] schedule anything else.... On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the rejection of the plea on that basis was an abuse of discretion: While there is no doubt a district court has considerable authority in managing its docket, scheduling concerns alone are not of sufficient importance to justify the infringement of prosecutorial discretion resulting here.... While the district court has considerable leeway in rejecting the bargain based on its sentencing aspect, its discretion is more limited when its decision is based on the bargain's charging aspect. In our judgment, rejecting a plea implicating both branches of government solely out of concern for the district court's scheduling is, under the facts of this case, impermissible. Similarly, in United States v. Moore, [20] the trial court rejected as untimely a negotiated plea on the day of trial. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for a clearer statement of the reasons why the plea had been rejected. It emphasized that a defendant is entitled to plead guilty unless the district court can articulate a sound reason for rejecting the plea. The Sixth Circuit noted that the rejection of the plea under those circumstances may well constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1136, n. 11. [21] Michigan courts also have taken a skeptical view of the rigid enforcement of deadlines in civil cases. Although the efficient processing of civil and criminal cases is important, docket control is not an objective to be elevated above the substantive rights of the parties. [22] This Court paraphrased the policy behind the court rule in Higgins v. Henry Ford Hosp , [23] when citing an official committee comment: Rules of practice and procedure are exactly that. They should create no rights and should be thought of as indicating the way in which justice should be administered. They should give direction to the process of administering justice but their application should not become a fetish to the extent that justice in an individual case is not done. There is a need for guides and standards. They must be followed but they must always be thought of as guides and standards to the means of achieving justice, not the end of justice itself. [24] As these cases make clear, even if we were to assume that a trial court has discretionary authority to reject a guilty plea as untimely, the scope of that discretion is limited. In the present case, there existed no circumstances justifying the rejection of the plea. The plea offer was made by the prosecutor on the day before trial. Defendant accepted the offer the same day. There was no delay in the acceptance, only in the offer. The fact that the offer was not made by the prosecutor earlier must be considered. [25] Because the trial court's interest in docket control is secondary to the substantive rights of the parties, I reject the lead opinion's conclusion that the judge properly rejected the plea. The latter conclusion inflates the role of day-to-day procedural matters contrary to this Court's directive in Higgins, supra at 637, 186 N.W.2d 337. The maintenance of routine deadlines justifies interfering with the prosecutor's charging authority or with the parties' agreement only if the court can show it serves the interests of justice. Robertson, supra at 1434. I would vacate defendant's convictions and remand to the trial court for entry of the originally agreed upon plea and for resentencing. The trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement.
With respect to the juror misconduct issue, I disagree with the lead opinion's finding of no impropriety. Following trial, as the judge was talking with the jurors, he discovered that juror Novotny had learned of other pending charges against defendant while the trial was in progress. A newspaper article related that defendant had pleaded guilty of one count of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in an unrelated case. The juror told the judge that, after the first day of trial, his wife read him part of a newspaper article regarding defendant's other criminal sexual-conduct charges. The judge informed the prosecutor and the defense counsel. A hearing was then held on defendant's motion for a new trial. Juror Novotny and the jury foreman testified. The trial judge found that the juror had learned, during trial, of defendant's other pending criminal sexual conduct charges. However, the judge concluded that the information did not influence the juror and denied the motion, finding no prejudice to defendant. When a juror is exposed to newspaper articles regarding a case or the defendant during the course of the trial, a new trial is warranted upon a showing of prejudice. In Marshall v. United States, [26] the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Jurors had learned the contents of a newspaper article revealing the defendant's prior convictions and other inadmissible evidence. Prejudice must be determined by an analysis of the specific facts of each case. However, because I would remand to the trial court for entry of the originally agreed upon plea and sentencing, this issue becomes moot.
Regarding the letters from Sergeant Harris, defense counsel objected at the sentencing proceeding to letters attached to the presentence report from Sergeant Harris of the White Lake Township Police Department. In one, the sergeant asked the court to sentence defendant to life imprisonment. He sought to correct what he thought was a miscarriage of justice in an Oakland County case in which the jury had found defendant not guilty of criminal sexual conduct. In another letter, he discussed other unsubstantiated allegations against defendant. In response to defense counsel's objection, the judge stated that he would not consider the information contained in the letters for sentencing purposes. The letters, however, remained attached to the presentence report. I agree with the lead opinion that the letters from Sergeant Harris must be deleted from the presentence report, consistent with MCR 6.425(D)(3).