Opinion ID: 147347
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plain meaning and contemporary usage of other crime

Text: Plaintiffs' proposed route around Richardson is to argue that the affirmative sanction in Section 2 only extends to the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of common-law felonies, a category that they do not fit into. Plaintiffs identify the common-law felonies as those listed by the Supreme Court in Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 108 n. 6, 63 S.Ct. 483, 87 L.Ed. 640 (1943): murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, robbery, rape, sodomy, mayhem and larceny. Plaintiffs further posit, with no support, that treason was a common law felony of a special sort, Harvey Br. at 51, but that is inaccurate. 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 17 (Torcia ed., 2009) (At common law, there were three kinds of offenses: treason, felony, and misdemeanor.). [1] So plaintiffs' proposed reading of Section 2 as meaning except for participation in rebellion, or other [common-law felony] is off to a bad start, because it appears participation in rebellion itself would qualify not as a common-law felony, but as treason. And plaintiffs' interpretation is certainly not a plain reading of Section 2's terms, which permit disenfranchisement for participation in rebellion, or other crime without regard to whether the crime was a felony at all, much less one recognized at common law. As noted in Richardson, this language was intended by Congress to mean what it says. 418 U.S. at 43, 94 S.Ct. 2655. Plaintiffs' proposed reading also seems to be in direct conflict with Richardson, which held that California may exclude from the franchise convicted felons who have completed their sentences, 418 U.S. at 56, 94 S.Ct. 2655 (emphasis added), evincing no concern with whether any particular felony was one recognized at common law. Indeed, at least one of the three ex-felons in Richardson was convicted of a crime that was clearly not a felony at common law. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 32 n. 9, 94 S.Ct. 2655 (felony of heroin possession). Still, neither this court nor the Supreme Court has directly addressed this precise question, so we consider plaintiffs' reasons for looking beyond Section 2's plain language. Plaintiffs argue that the word crime at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's drafting and ratification commonly meant felony at common law. Contra Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 99, 24 How. 66, 16 L.Ed. 717 (1860) (The word `crime' of itself includes every offence, from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offences, and includes what are called `misdemeanors,' as well as treason and felony.). In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite a dictionary definition and William Blackstone's Commentaries, which preceded the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification by a century. Harvey Br. at 43-44. Contemporaneousness aside, neither of these sources supports plaintiffs' position that crime was commonly understood as being restricted to common-law felonies. Webster's Dictionary defined the word crime in 1867 as An act which violates a law, divine or human; ... But in a more common or restricted sense, a crime denotes violation of public law, of a deeper and more atrocious nature. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 246 (Goodrich ed., 1867) (emphasis in original). And William Blackstone observed that in common usage the word `crimes' is made to denote such offenses as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while smaller faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised under the gentler name of `misdemeanors' only. 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND  (1769). Noticeably absent from these definitions is any mention whatsoever of common-law felonies. While a litigant could use these definitions to support the proposition that the word crime in Section 2 refers only to serious crimes or felonies (such that misdemeanors would not fit within the definition), that is not plaintiffs' argument. They instead argue that in 1868 crimes meant felonies at common law, and nowhere in any of the definitions is it suggested that the word crimes was so confined. In fact, the cited definitions plainly undermine plaintiffs' argument by omitting any reference to the common law. Even if we were to assume arguendo that Section 2 is limited to serious crimes or felonies (as plaintiffs' definitions suggest), a far better reference point for determining whether a crime is serious is to look at how the crime is designated by the modern-day legislature that proscribed it, rather than indulging the anachronisms of the common law. Indeed, that is precisely the course the Supreme Court has charted in defining the contours of the right to a jury trial. The Sixth Amendment provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.... U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.). The Supreme Court has declined to extend this guarantee to petty offenses because such offenses were tried without a jury at common law. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966). But when determining what qualifies as a criminal prosecution that requires a jury trial, as opposed to the prosecution of a mere petty offense, the Supreme Court has rejected the rigid common-law categories and instead sought more `objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense.' Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989) (quoting Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969)). In that context, the Supreme Court has explained: In fixing the maximum penalty for a crime, a legislature includes within the definition of the crime itself a judgment about the seriousness of the offense. The judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of a legislature, which is far better equipped to perform the task, and is likewise more responsive to changes in attitude and more amenable to the recognition and correction of their misperceptions in this respect. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541, 109 S.Ct. 1289 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). At bottom, plaintiffs provide absolutely no support for the proposition that the word crimes meant common-law felonies at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification. At most, they have some support for the argument that Section 2 should be limited to serious offenses, a proposition which does not help their cause because they have all been convicted of crimes currently classified as felonies.