Opinion ID: 1356581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Glomar Doctrine

Text: As the District Court noted in its opinion, [t]he Second Circuit has never opined on the Glomar Response. Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at  n. 2. We take this opportunity now to address the availability of the Glomar doctrine to an agency when it responds to a FOIA request. The Glomar doctrine originated in a FOIA case concerning records pertaining to the Hughes Glomar Explorer, an oceanic research vessel. See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C.Cir.1976). In Phillippi, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) claimed that the existence or nonexistence of the requested records was itself a classified fact exempt from disclosure under ... FOIA. Id. at 1012. The CIA then responded to the plaintiff's FOIA request by asserting that, in the interest of national security, involvement by the U.S. government in the activities which are the subject matter of [plaintiff's] request can neither be confirmed nor denied. Id. This principlethat an agency may, pursuant to FOIA's statutory exemptions, refuse to confirm or deny the existence of certain records in response to a FOIA requesthas since become known as the Glomar doctrine. See, e.g., Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1117-18 (9th Cir.1992). The government urges us to adopt the Glomar doctrine as Circuit law, and plaintiffs do not object to our doing so. Mindful that mere stipulation by the parties, standing alone, cannot serve as the basis for our conclusions of law, we turn to that question. The Glomar doctrine and government use of the Glomar response is firmly established in other Circuits. See, e.g., Larson v. Dep't of State, 565 F.3d 857, 861-62, 870 (D.C.Cir.2009) (upholding the NSA's use of the Glomar response to plaintiffs' FOIA requests regarding past violence in Guatemala pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3); Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir.2004) (noting that the Glomar doctrine is well established); Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796, 800-02 (9th Cir.1996) (permitting the CIA to invoke the Glomar doctrine in response to a FOIA request seeking employment records of an alleged CIA operative); cf. Carpenter v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 470 F.3d 434, 436-37 (1st Cir.2006) (endorsing the Glomar doctrine though evaluating the case as an ordinary FOIA suit after assuming the existence of documents that plaintiff requested under FOIA). The Glomar doctrine is well settled as a proper response to a FOIA request because it is the only way in which an agency may assert that a particular FOIA statutory exemption covers the existence or nonexistence of the requested records in a case in which a plaintiff seeks such records. Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1012; see also Larson, 565 F.3d at 861 ([FOIA's] exemptions cover not only the content of the protected government records but also the fact of their existence or nonexistence, if that fact itself properly falls within the exemption.) We now join our sister Circuits in holding that an agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records where to answer the FOIA inquiry would cause harm cognizable under a[ ] FOIA exception. Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C.Cir.1982). To properly employ the Glomar response to a FOIA request, an agency must tether its refusal to respond, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at , to one of the nine FOIA exemptionsin other words, a government agency may ... refuse to confirm or deny the existence of certain records ... if the FOIA exemption would itself preclude the acknowledgment of such documents. Minier, 88 F.3d at 800 (emphasis added). An agency resisting disclosure of the requested records has the burden of proving the applicability of an exemption. Id. The agency may meet its burden by submitting a detailed affidavit showing that the information logically falls within the claimed exemptions. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Phillippi Court explained, a responsive affidavit should explain[ ] in as much detail as possible the basis for [the agency's] claim that it can be required neither to confirm nor to deny the existence of the requested records. Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1013. In evaluating an agency's Glomar response, a court must accord substantial weight to the agency's affidavits, provided [that] the justifications for nondisclosure are not controverted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of ... bad faith. Minier, 88 F.3d at 800 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court should attempt to create as complete a public record as is possible.... The [a]gency's arguments should then be subject to testing by [plaintiff], who should be allowed to seek appropriate discovery when necessary.... Only after the issues have been identified by this process should the District Court, if necessary, consider arguments or information [ ex parte and in camera ] which the [a]gency is unable to make public. Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1013.