Opinion ID: 2689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Terminate: The Merits

Text: The INA provides that a refugee is a person outside the country of his nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). A refugee may be admitted to the United States notwithstanding 1) the likelihood that he will become a public charge; 2) the absence of a labor certification; and 3) the lack of a valid visa or other entry document. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1), (3) (granting the Attorney General discretion, within numerical limits provided in other subsections, to admit refugees). Unless the alien is inadmissible because of, inter alia, his or her involvement in drug trafficking, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C), the Attorney General may also waive most other grounds for inadmissibility, see 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (allowing the Attorney General to waive any ground of inadmissibility except for subsections 1182(a)(2)(C), (3)(A)-(C), (3)(E)). Refugee status may be terminated only if the Attorney General finds that the alien did not qualify as a refugee at the time of entry. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) (providing for termination of refugee status if the Attorney General determines that the alien was not in fact a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42) . . . at the time of the alien's admission). Maiwand argues that unless his refugee status has been terminated, he may not be removed. But the BIA has recently held otherwise. In re Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec. 836, 842 (B.I.A.2005) (finding no merit to the respondent's assertion that he is immune from removal on the basis of his convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude because his refugee status has not been terminated under section 1157(c)(4)). The agency noted that the statutes providing for removal refer simply to any alien or the alien  they do not distinguish aliens who arrived as refugees from other aliens. See id. at 838 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a), 1229). Moreover, refugees must apply for adjustment to LPR status within a year of their arrival and, upon such application, may be charged with any applicable ground of inadmissibility . . . or deportability. See id. at 839 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1159, 1229a; 8 C.F.R. § 209.1). The BIA reasoned that [i]f conditional admission as a refugee does not immunize an alien from the general grounds of admissibility, it follows that a refugee admitted as a lawful permanent resident . . . is not immunized from the grounds for removal that are applicable to all other aliens. Id. at 840. It also considered it difficult to imagine that Congress intended the result urged by the petitioner  viz., a statutory framework that allowed refugees to commit crimes with impunity, or even engage in terrorist activity and remain exempt from removal as long as they were in fact refugees at the time of entry. Id. at 841. The statute is silent as to whether refugee status must be terminated prior to commencement of removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (setting forth how removal proceedings are to be conducted without reference to refugee status). We must therefore defer to the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ([I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.). Although we have not yet addressed whether the BIA's interpretation of the relevant statutes in Smriko is reasonable, the Third and Ninth Circuits have done so and both have concluded that it is. See Kaganovich v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir.2006) (citing Romanishyn, 455 F.3d at 185). We agree. As those circuits recognized, refugee status does not afford complete immunity from removal. See Romanishyn, 455 F.3d at 185 (recognizing that a refugee may under some circumstances be removed even if his refugee status has not been terminated); Kaganovich, 470 F.3d at 898 (upholding the BIA's interpretation in light of statutory text allowing removal of any alien (emphasis in original)). The fact that Maiwand's adjustment to LPR status did not terminate his refugee status is irrelevant. Even if he retained his refugee status, he would have remained subject to removal for committing a drug trafficking offense. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (requiring refugees to return or be returned to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security [within a year of their entry] for inspection and examination for admission to the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the provisions of, inter alia, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (providing that [a]n alien placed in [removal] proceedings . . . may be charged with any applicable ground of inadmissibility . . . or any applicable ground of deportability); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (making deportable [a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance).