Opinion ID: 2586535
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statutory Deadlines Are Directory

Text: Defendant contends that the statutory deadlines were mandatory, and because they were not met, the court lost jurisdiction to try the case. This argument fails. People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1] ( Williams ) is one of many cases that have grappled with the question of whether a failure to meet a statutory deadline deprives a court of jurisdiction. It explained that the concept of jurisdiction can be used in somewhat differing ways. (5) When courts use the phrase `lack of jurisdiction,' they are usually referring to one of two different concepts, although, as one court has observed, the distinction between them is `hazy.' ( People v. Mendez (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1773, 1781 [286 Cal.Rptr. 216].) ( Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 447.) A lack of jurisdiction in its fundamental or strict sense results in `an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.' ( Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 [109 P.2d 942].) On the other hand, a court may have jurisdiction in the strict sense but nevertheless lack `jurisdiction (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.' ( Ibid. ) When a court fails to conduct itself in the manner prescribed, it is said to have acted in excess of jurisdiction. ( Ibid.; see generally 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Jurisdiction, §§ 1, 285, pp. 575-576, 891-892.) The distinction is important because the remedies are different. [F]undamental jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent. Rather, an act beyond a court's jurisdiction in the fundamental sense is null and void ab initio. ( Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.) Therefore, a claim based on a lack of ... fundamental jurisdiction[] may be raised for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 757 [170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837].) `In contrast, an act in excess of jurisdiction is valid until set aside, and parties may be precluded from setting it aside by such things as waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time. [Citations.]' ( People v. Ruiz [ (1990)] 217 Cal.App.3d [574], 584 [265 Cal.Rptr. 886]; In re Andres G. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 476, 482 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 285].) ( Ibid. ; see, e.g., People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660-661 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020].) (6) Whether the failure to follow a statute makes subsequent action void or merely voidable `has been characterized as a question of whether the statute should be accorded mandatory or directory effect. If the failure is determined to have an invalidating effect, the statute is said to be mandatory; if the failure is determined not to invalidate subsequent action, the statute is said to be directory.' ( People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 958 [140 Cal.Rptr. 657, 568 P.2d 382] ....) ( City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 923 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 483, 182 P.3d 1027] ( City of Santa Monica ).) [10] (7) Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty is a question of interpretation for the courts. ( City of Santa Monica, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 924.) Unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent, time limits are typically deemed directory. ( Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 102.) Here, the Legislature made its intent quite clear. Section 1026.5(a)(2) expressly provides that [t]he time limits of this section are not jurisdictional. (Italics added.) Defendant seeks to circumvent that clear statement by relying on the use of the term shall in various paragraphs of subdivision (b). [11] Defendant argues that, although the Legislature specifically said the time limits set out in this section are not jurisdictional, [12] it really intended to say that the time limits set out in subdivision (a) are not jurisdictional. Defendant's construction ignores the plain meaning of the statutory language, is at odds with the explicit manner in which section 1026.5 is drafted, and runs counter to accepted canons of statutory construction. (8) The Penal Code contains many thousands of numbered sections. Section 7, paragraph 20 reads: The word `section,' whenever hereinafter employed, refers to a section of this code, unless some other code or statute is expressly mentioned. [13] Defendant's construction ignores this express definition of the term section. It is also inconsistent with the internal structure of section 1026.5 and the way the Legislature precisely used the term section throughout the provision. The very first sentence of the section provides that no one may be kept in actual custody beyond the maximum term of commitment, except as provided in this section. (§ 1026.5(a)(1), italics added.) The next sentence defines the meaning of maximum term of commitment for purposes of this section. (Ibid., italics added.) The exception referred to is contained, not in subdivision (a), but in subdivision (b). The phrase maximum term of commitment, while originally defined in subdivision (a), is used a number of times throughout the entire section. Clearly, the Legislature intended to use the term section to refer to the whole of section 1026.5. (9) As the court noted in In re Johns (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 577 [175 Cal.Rptr. 443] ( Johns ): Throughout section 1026.5, the Legislature was precise in using the terms `paragraph' and `subdivision' to identify the various divisions of the lengthy and complex section. Indeed, in the sentence preceding the one under scrutiny, the Legislature singled out `paragraph (1)' and `subdivision (b)' for coverage and exclusion. ( Id. at p. 580; accord, People v. Dougherty (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 245, 247 [191 Cal.Rptr. 668] ( Dougherty ); see People v. Mitchell (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 936, 944 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 163]; People v. Fernandez (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 117, 129-130 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 469] ( Fernandez ) [mentally disordered offender statute's 180-day deadline for medical director to submit written evaluation to district attorney not mandatory].) We conclude that the Legislature's statement that [t]he time limits of this section are not jurisdictional [14] refers to all the time limits set out in Penal Code section 1026.5, not only to the limits referred to in subdivision (a). (10) With regard to defendant's reliance on the use of the word shall, it should not be assumed that every statute that uses that term is mandatory. ( Nunn v. State of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 625 [200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846]; Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901, 910-911, fn. 6 [136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606].) Neither the word `may,' nor the word `shall,' is dispositive. ( Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 102.) The context of the language, as well as other indicia of legislative intent, must be considered. ( DuBois v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523, 853 P.2d 978].) The preceding analysis demonstrates that the Legislature's clear intent was to use the term section to refer to the entirety of section 1026.5. Yet another factor supports our conclusion as to legislative intent. The Legislature's failure to include a penalty or consequence for noncompliance with the statutory procedure also indicates that the requirement is directory rather than mandatory. ( California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79] ( Correctional Peace Officers) ; Edwards v. Steele (1979) 25 Cal.3d 406, 410 [158 Cal.Rptr. 662, 599 P.2d 1365] ( Edwards ).) Section 1026.5 does not say that a trial is precluded if the statutory time limits are not met. Indeed, the statute itself provides that the time limits are not binding if good cause is shown for not having met them, [15] and also provides that a defendant may waive time to allow proceedings beyond the timeframes set out. [16] It is black letter law that fundamental jurisdiction may not be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent. (Rest.2d Judgments, § 12, com. b, p. 117; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Jurisdiction, § 13, p. 585.) Thus, the interpretation defendant urges would render the good cause and time waiver provisions nullities. Not only are statutes not ordinarily interpreted in a fashion that renders part of them void, [17] the Legislature's provision for good cause findings and time waivers is an additional demonstration of its intent that the limits were not intended as mandatory. Finally, we must ask whether the purposes of the statute would be promoted or defeated if the filing deadline were construed as mandatory. (See Correctional Peace Officers, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1145; Edwards, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 410.) Holding it to be mandatory would mean that a court, faced with a filing deadline missed for good cause, would be powerless to extend treatment under the statute no matter how great the defendant's need or the danger release might pose to the public. Such an interpretation would run counter to the very purposes of the NGI statutes and the provision for extension of commitment. It would elevate the secondary benefit to the defendant derived from the time limit over the fundamental purposes of the NGI provisions, to ensure that needed treatment is provided and the public protected. (Cf. Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 451 [construing the time limit provisions of the Mentally Disordered Offender Act].) [18] Defendant's reliance on Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th 91, is misplaced. In Allen, the district attorney filed a petition to extend the commitment of a mentally disordered offender (MDO) after the defendant's previous commitment had ended. (Id. at p. 95.) Section 2972, subdivision (e), part of the Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDO Act) permits an extension petition to be filed before the current commitment ends. We concluded that this statutory requirement of filing before the expiration of the commitment is mandatory. ( Allen, at p. 104.) Accordingly, we affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had reversed the trial court's commitment order with directions that the extension petition be dismissed. ( Id. at pp. 96, 109.) Unlike Allen, the extension petition here was filed before defendant's current commitment ended. [19]