Opinion ID: 1693603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: current state of law

Text: In State v. Carter, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d 763 (1994), this court discussed two reasons for continued adherence to the Frye test: (1) that the Daubert standards were relatively undeveloped and uncertain and (2) that Daubert might fail to exclude unreliable junk science. These concerns were, at the time, entirely reasonable. The experience of the intervening years, however, has put those concerns to rest. Since the U.S. Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the standards set forth in that opinion have become the majority rule in the United States in analyzing expert opinion testimony. Currently, 27 states have held that the Daubert standards are either helpful or controlling in their determinations regarding the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. See, State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999); Jones v. State, 314 Ark. 289, 862 S.W.2d 242 (1993); State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1384, 140 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998); Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69 (Del.1993); State v. Fukusaku, 85 Hawai'i 462, 946 P.2d 32 (1997); McGrew v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind.1997); Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa 1999); Mitchell v. Com., 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky.1995), overruled on other grounds, Fugate v. Com., 993 S.W.2d 931 (Ky.1999); State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116 (La.1993); State v. MacDonald, 1998 Me. 212, 718 A.2d 195 (1998); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994); State v. Moore, 268 Mont. 20, 885 P.2d 457 (1994), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Gollehon, 274 Mont. 116, 906 P.2d 697 (1995), and City of Billings v. Bruce, 290 Mont. 148, 965 P.2d 866 (1998); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110, 697 A.2d 916 (1997); State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 861 P.2d 192 (1993); State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 461 S.E.2d 631 (1995); Breding v. State, 1998 N.D. 170, 584 N.W.2d 493 (1998) (Meschke, J., concurring specially); Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 687 N.E.2d 735 (1998); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319 (Okla. Crim.App.1995); State v. O'Key, 321 Or. 285, 899 P.2d 663 (1995); State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347 (R.I.1996); State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482 (S.D.1994); McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 2296, 141 L.Ed.2d 157 (1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1995); State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996); State v. Brooks, 162 Vt. 26, 643 A.2d 226 (1993); Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39, 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993), cert. denied 511 U.S. 1129, 114 S.Ct. 2137, 128 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1993). Eleven states have specifically rejected Daubert, supra, in favor of retaining the standards enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). See, Turner v. State, No. 1952024, ___ So.2d ___, 1998 WL 12625 (Ala. Jan. 16, 1998); State v. Tankersley, 191 Ariz. 359, 956 P.2d 486 (1998); People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 882 P.2d 321 (1994); Flanagan v. State, 625 So.2d 827 (Fla.1993); Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996); Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083 (Miss.1998); Carter, supra ; State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 699 A.2d 596 (1997); People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97, 633 N.E.2d 451 (1994); Com. v. Blasioli, 552 Pa. 149, 713 A.2d 1117 (1998); State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996). Five states have rejected Daubert in favor of their own unique evidentiary standards. See, Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Baker, 237 Ga.App. 292, 514 S.E.2d 448 (1999); State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998); Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 114 Nev. 1468, 970 P.2d 98 (1998), rehearing denied 973 P.2d 842 (1999); State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999); State v. Peters, 192 Wis.2d 674, 534 N.W.2d 867 (Wis.App. 1995), review denied 537 N.W.2d 572 (Wis.). Of the seven states that have not yet decisively addressed the question, one continues to rely on its own unique standard. See Spencer v. Com., 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 759, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990). The remaining jurisdictions continue to rely on Frye, supra . See, Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105 (Colo.1999); People v. Miller, 173 Ill.2d 167, 670 N.E.2d 721, 219 Ill.Dec. 43 (1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1157, 117 S.Ct. 1338, 137 L.Ed.2d 497 (1997); State v. Chastain, 265 Kan. 16, 960 P.2d 756 (1998); People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 537 N.W.2d 857 (1995); State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577 (Minn.1994); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.1993). It is evident, then, that in the United States, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), has become the majority rule, and Frye, supra, has become an ever-shrinking minority view. Given the number of jurisdictions that have adopted the Daubert standards, and the extensive development of the Daubert/Kumho Tire standards in the state and federal courts, it can no longer be said that the nature and implications of Daubert/Kumho Tire are unknown. Compare State v. Carter, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d 763 (1994). In fact, to the extent that this consideration is still relevant, it militates in favor of adopting the Daubert/Kumho Tire standards. Nebraska courts risk losing the benefit of helpful and persuasive authority from other jurisdictions on newly presented evidentiary issues by its continued reliance on a test that is increasingly removed from the jurisprudential mainstream. The concern about junk science expressed in Carter, supra, now also weighs in favor of adopting the Daubert/Kumho Tire standards. The gatekeeper function exercised by trial courts under the Daubert/Kumho Tire analysis is, in fact, a more effective means of excluding unreliable expert testimony than is the Frye test. The experience in jurisdictions which have adopted the Daubert standards suggests that the admission of so-called junk science evidence is a minimal risk. As the Supreme Court of Alaska has stated: We are not convinced that junk science is more likely to be admitted under Daubert than under Frye. Post Daubert reported decisions suggest that courts are acting with restraint, and are giving rigorous consideration to the reliability of scientific evidence. Furthermore, Frye also potentially permits admission of unreliable scientific evidence, because a methodology that has been generally accepted might nonetheless have been discredited during a Daubert inquiry. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 397 (Alaska 1999). Furthermore, there is cause to question one of the assumptions underlying this court's decision in Carter, supra : that the Frye test provides a more critical assessment of the reliability of proffered evidence than does the Daubert analysis. See Carter, supra . As the Supreme Court of Alaska noted: Frye is potentially capricious because it excludes scientifically reliable evidence which is not yet generally accepted, and admits scientifically unreliable evidence which although generally accepted, cannot meet rigorous scientific scrutiny. Because the Frye test potentially excludes evidence that should be admitted under our rules, and also potentially admits evidence that should be excluded under our rules, we conclude that it is both unduly restrictive and unduly permissive. Coon, 974 P.2d at 393-94. In practice, in other jurisdictions, the Daubert standards have proved to be more accepting of newly developed but well-reasoned theories, but more critical of older, more well-established theories that are vulnerable to a searching inquiry. As one writer has noted: To say that Daubert is less restrictive of expert evidence, to say that it opens the door for the introduction of expert evidence that would not have been admissible under the Frye test, is not to say that Daubert's test is an easier test. It may be more lenient in that it allows moreand more novelscience into evidence, but it can be much more difficult in that the Daubert test can require a more exacting, expensive, and time consuming foundation. .... On the one hand, more science comes in. Science does not have to be generally accepted by other scientists to be admissible in court; the universe of admissible science is expanded by doing away with the general acceptance requirement. On the other hand, less science comes in. The trial judge is to act as gatekeeper and is to scrutinize carefully the proffered scientific evidence and to keep out what is not good science. The universe of science actually admitted may be contracted by the close scrutiny judges are supposed to give this evidence. While it may be that most science generally accepted in the relevant scientific community will be good science, it is not necessarily so. (Citation omitted.) G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 Creighton L.Rev. 939, 953 (1996). See, also, Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997). As Professor Fenner states, the shift from Frye to Daubert/Kumho Tire allows the admission of more expert testimonial evidence, but specifically forecloses the admission of testimony that is unreliable. Under the Daubert/Kumho Tire analysis, the question is not whether the evidence is generally accepted, but whether the evidence is, in fact, reliable. This gatekeeper function, in my opinion, provides a more effective way of ensuring that unreliable testimony is properly excluded from evidence. The gatekeeper function is particularly important in light of the inordinate weight and deference that jurors are often inclined to afford expert testimony. See, generally, Daniel W. Shuman et al., Assessing the Believability of Expert Witnesses: Science in the Jurybox, 37 Jurimetrics J. 23 (1996); Daniel W. Shuman et al., Juror Assessments of the Believability of Expert Witnesses: A Literature Review, 36 Jurimetrics J. 371 (1996). The Supreme Court of Connecticut has stated that a gatekeeping role for trial judges in relation to scientific evidence is appropriate. Although the extent to which juries give scientific evidence undue deference is uncertain, the potential risk can be greatly reduced simply by allowing the judge, as the participant in the judicial process with both the greater access and ability to gather relevant information, to exclude wholly invalid scientific testimony altogether. Moreover, a trial judge who does admit scientific evidence will be in a better position, by virtue of the knowledge gained during the preliminary assessment, to conduct the trial and instruct the jury in such away as to minimize the risk that jurors will give that evidence undue deference. State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 73, 698 A.2d 739, 749 (1997). The court in State v. Carter, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d 763 (1994), noted that one of the primary objectives of the Frye test was to shield jurors from misleading or prejudicial scientific testimony because of the weight and deference generally accorded by jurors to expert testimony. As the Supreme Court of Connecticut observed, the gatekeeper function of the trial court performing the Daubert/Kumho Tire analysis accomplishes this goal more effectively than does the Frye test. Moreover, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), this gatekeeper function for the trial court retains its utility and imperative regardless of whether the testimony at issue is scientific or otherwise. The evidentiary rationale that underlies the Daubert/Kumho Tire gatekeeping responsibility is not limited to scientific knowledge. As the Court stated, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction between scientific knowledge and technical or other specialized knowledge. There is no clear line that divides the one from the others.... Neither is there a convincing need to make such distinctions. Experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of what Judge Learned Hand called general truths derived from ... specialized experience. Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harv. L.Rev. 40, 54 (1901). And whether the specific expert testimony focuses upon specialized observations, the specialized translation of those observations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the application of such a theory in a particular case, the expert's testimony will often rest upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the jury's] own. Ibid. The trial judge's effort to assure that the specialized testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate that foreign experience, whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., 119 S.Ct. at 1174-75. Despite the evident wisdom of applying the trial court's gatekeeper function to all varieties of specialized expert testimony, Nebraska's reliance on the Frye test and the limitation of that test to scientific evidence precludes the trial court from acting as gatekeeper where technical or other specialized knowledge is concerned. Adoption of the Daubert/Kumho Tire standards, on the other hand, both encourages the trial court to act as gatekeeper and places that function in the context of a sensible and uniform scheme for the evaluation of all types of expert opinion testimony. Finally, as was noted in the Daubert opinion, Fed.R.Evid. 702, which is identical to § 27-702, does not establish `general acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility, and a rigid `general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the `liberal thrust' of the [rules of evidence] and their `general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony.' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). While the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of a federal statute is not binding with reference to a state statute, State v. Carter, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d 763 (1994), it is persuasive where the state statute is identical to the federal law at issue. In this instance, I believe that the U.S. Supreme Court was correct in noting the tension between rule 702 and the Frye test and that the Court's determination is equally applicable to the corresponding Nebraska statute. Ultimately, ensuring the relevance and reliability of expert testimony is the intent of an inquiry pursuant to Daubert/Kumho Tire or Frye, and Daubert/Kumho Tire is the better-reasoned and more effective means of accomplishing this end. I believe that we should join the vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States in adopting the standards enunciated in Daubert/Kumho Tire as the appropriate criteria for evaluating the admissibility of expert opinion testimony in the courts of Nebraska.