Opinion ID: 217946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Erred in Rejecting the Attorney General's Westfall Act Certification.

Text: Under the Westfall Act, federal employees receive absolute immunity from suit for their `negligent or wrongful act[s] or omission[s] . . . while acting within the scope of [their] office or employment.' Green, 8 F.3d at 699 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)). The statute grants the Attorney General authority to certify that a federal employee named defendant in a tort action was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time in question, and if the Attorney General makes such a certification, then the United States must be substituted as the defendant. Osborn, 549 U.S. at 240-41, 127 S.Ct. 881 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)). The United States . . . must remain the federal defendant in the action unless and until the District Court determines that the employee, in fact, and not simply as alleged by the plaintiff, engaged in conduct beyond the scope of his employment. Id. at 231, 127 S.Ct. 881 (emphasis in original). Jackson, as the party seeking review of the Attorney General's decision to grant scope of employment certification, bears the burden of presenting evidence and disproving [that] decision . . . by a preponderance of the evidence. Kashin v. Kent, 457 F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Green, 8 F.3d at 698). Under the Westfall Act, a National Guardsman is considered a federal employee while engaged in training or duty under section 115, 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505 of title 32. 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Subsection 502(f)(1) of title 32 places a broad swath of National Guard activity within the scope of federal employment for purposes of the Westfall Act, because it covers training or other duty that a guardsman may be ordered to perform [u]nder regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or Secretary of the Air Force. . . . Tate and DeCoteau performed recruiting duties while assigned to full-time Active Guard and Reserve Program positions within the National Guard's Recruiting and Retention Command. Recruiting activities performed by service members on Active Guard and Reserve duty fall within the ambit of activities covered by 28 U.S.C. § 502(f). The Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)[ ] program [was] authorized by federal statute, see 32 U.S.C. § 502(f), and created to provide full-time military support personnel to assist in the administration of the National Guard of the various states. Bowen, 125 F.3d at 802. Subsection 101(d)(6)(A) of Title 10 clearly includes recruiting within the scope of Active Guard/Reserve duties to be performed by full-time members of the state National Guard. Furthermore, the Department of the Army has promulgated regulations that apply to Army National Guard Reserve soldiers serving on full-time duty under provisions of 32 U.S.C. § 502(f), setting policies and procedures for recruiting. National Guard Regulation 600-5, Summary, ¶ 1-1 (February 20, 1990); National Guard Regulation 601-1, 1 (April 28, 2006) (applying to Army National Guard a regulation integrat[ing] all of the recruiting and retention programs, policies and procedures necessary for developing, implementing and monitoring a successful strength maintenance program at the State/Territory level). [3] These regulations indicate that Tate and DeCoteau were acting as federal employees if they were, in fact, participating in recruiting activities as full-time members of the Washington Army National Guard on Active Guard/Reserve duty at the time of the events in question. The district court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous. This, however, is not the end of the Westfall Act inquiry in this case. As we have indicated above, the United States remains the named federal defendant unless and until the District Court determines that the employee, in fact, and not simply as alleged by the plaintiff, engaged in conduct beyond the scope of his employment. Osborn, 549 U.S. at 231, 127 S.Ct. 881. And, as we have further indicated, Jackson bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on this issue. See Kashin, 457 F.3d at 1036. This factual determination remains to be made in this case. We therefore remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED.