Opinion ID: 167733
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Challenge Indictment

Text: 20 Finally, Mr. Taylor contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the indictment was defective when it failed to allege the plaintiff robbed the Bank of America knowingly or intentionally or by words of similar import. Id. Doc. 55 at 7. The indictment states: 21 [T]he defendant, CHARLES TAYLOR, did by force and violence or intimidation, take from the person or presence of employees of the Bank of America . . . approximately One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-seven Dollars ($1,327.00) in money belonging to and in the care, custody, control, management and possession of Bank of America, the deposits of which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 22 In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113(a). 23 Id. Doc. 10. The relevant portion of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) states: 24 Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 25 Although this statute does not specify a mens rea, the Supreme Court has stated that it requir[es] proof of general intent — that is, that the defendant possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 (2000); see United States v. Zunie, 444 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir.2006) (A specific intent crime is one in which an act was committed voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do something the law forbids. In contrast, a general intent crime is one in which an act was done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 26 Nevertheless, counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the omission from the indictment of an explicit allegation of general intent. Ample authority supports the validity of the indictment. Courts have held that when commission of the charged acts strongly implies the actor's general intent, the indictment need not specifically allege that intent. For example, when an indictment for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) fails to allege that the deported alien knowingly or voluntarily reentered the country, sister circuits have nevertheless upheld the indictment because it may be presum[ed] that a defendant who is found in the United States willfully and knowingly acted in order to enter this country. Therefore, alleging that the defendant is a deported alien subsequently found in the United States without permission suffices to allege general intent. United States v. Rivera-Sillas, 417 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); accord United States v. Berrios-Centeno, 250 F.3d 294, 299 (5th Cir.2001). Cf. United States v. Henry, 288 F.3d 657, 662-63 (5th Cir.2002) (following Berrios-Centeno but with some reservations). More than half a century ago we made essentially the same point: Where the act charged necessarily includes a general intent or is in its very nature unlawful, it need not be alleged that the act was done unlawfully. Braswell v. United States, 224 F.2d 706, 709 (10th Cir.1955) ([T]he only intent necessary is the intent to accomplish the act of transportation across a state line, and the statement of the act itself implies such intent.). This analysis would apply to Mr Taylor's offense. As the Ninth Circuit said with respect to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), the requisite criminal intent [can be inferred] from the fact that the defendant took the property of another by force and violence, or intimidation. United States v. Foppe, 993 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir.1993); see United States v. Mozee, 405 F.3d 1082, 1087 (10th Cir.2005) (As a general intent crime, aggravated assault allows the element of intent to be inferred from doing the act constituting the offense charged, such as pointing a loaded gun at a victim.). In light of this authority, Mr. Taylor's attorney did not render deficient representation by declining to challenge the indictment for failure to allege general intent explicitly, particularly when (because the government could reindict with the mens rea element explicitly included in the indictment) it is not at all clear how even a successful challenge would have ultimately benefitted Mr. Taylor. See United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir.2005) (counsel not deficient in failing to raise a claim when there is a lack of authority, especially Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit authority, to support the claim).