Opinion ID: 2669163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968

Text: Mr. Daniel Maumau contends that the district court violated the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006). According to the Defendant, the court erroneously excluded “potential jurors who had indicated in a questionnaire sent by the court clerk that they would be unable to serve on a jury 68 for a six week trial.” 22 Daniel Maumau R. vol. 1, pt. 1, at 149. Mr. Daniel Maumau argues that the procedure violated the Jury Selection Act. This argument is rejected.
Under the district court’s plan for selection of petit jurors, the “Clerk [could] grant temporary excuses to prospective jurors on the grounds of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience.” Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br., attachment 2, at 4. The jury administrator carried out this plan for the trial, telling the 260 prospective jurors that if they felt service would create an undue hardship or extreme inconvenience, they should reply with their reason. Some replied by e- mail, and the jury administrator read the replies and temporarily excused those whose service would create an undue hardship.
Court’s Ruling Mr. Daniel Maumau challenged this process under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a) (2006), and the district court allowed defense counsel to review the e-mail replies. After reviewing them, defense counsel filed a sealed supplemental affidavit. There counsel asserted that “about twenty of th[e]se explanations [in the e-mails] involve[d] individuals who if subjected to personal questioning by the court may 22 Mr. Tuai and Mr. Toki join in Mr. Daniel Maumau’s jury-selection argument. Tuai’s Opening Br. at 47; Toki’s Opening Br. at 1. 69 not have qualified as hardship excuses.” Appellee Supp. App. at 2. Defense counsel then identified eight potential jurors who had been excused for subjective criteria. See id. at 2. Again, the district court conducted a conference to address defense counsel’s continued concern. After the conference, the district court found that the procedure was proper and that any possible statutory deviation would not have involved a substantial violation. The district court added that “there [was] no evidence that the venire [was] anything other than a random cross section of the community” and that “[t]he jury administrator’s excusals in no way altered or skewed the composition of the venire.” Toki R. vol. 1, pt. 4, at 711-12. Of the venirepersons summoned, 80 were selected and 15 were selected as jurors.
We review a district court’s factual determinations involving a jury-composition claim for clear error, but we engage in de novo review of the legal conclusions. See United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1265 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e review the district court’s decisions de novo to determine whether the jury selection process failed to substantially comply with the Jury Selection and Service Act.”). 70
The Jury Selection Act mandates that a petit jury be composed of a random, fair cross-section of the community. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006). Remedies become available when the procedure involves a substantial failure to comply with the statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a) (2006). A failure is considered “substantial” when it “frustrates one of the three principles underlying the Act”: (1) the random selection of jurors, (2) culling of the jury from a fair cross-section of the community, and (3) determination of disqualifications, exemptions, and exclusions based on objective criteria. United States v. Carmichael, 560 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2009). Mr. Daniel Maumau raises three arguments: (1) The jury administrator’s striking of venirepersons violated the third principle (that excusals be based on objective criteria); (2) venirepersons can be excused by the district court, but not the jury administrator; and (3) the jury was not composed of a fair cross section of the community. We reject the arguments because: (1) the dismissals were based on objective criteria satisfying the Jury Selection Act and Utah Jury Plan, (2) the Jury Selection Act and the Utah Jury Plan authorize the jury administrator to grant excusals, and (3) the excusals did not remove a distinctive group.
Mr. Daniel Maumau argues that: (1) the administrator’s excusal of potential jurors was based on subjective criteria, and (2) eight of the potential jurors’ 71 proffered bases for undue hardship warranted further questioning by the district court. We disagree. The reasons proffered by the eight witnesses were legitimate for excusal. Of the eight, four were caring for the “aged or infirm”; two would have had to drive over 100 miles each day; and the final two functioned in key business roles. Federal law defines “undue hardship or extreme inconvenience” as great distance, either in miles or traveltime, from the place of holding court, grave illness in the family or any other emergency which outweighs in immediacy and urgency the obligation to serve as a juror when summoned, or any other factor which the court determines to constitute an undue hardship or to create an extreme inconvenience to the juror. 28 U.S.C. § 1869(j) (2006). The law also allows excusal of a venireperson when the trial is expected to take more than 30 days or would result in “severe economic hardship to an employer which would result from the absence of a key employee during the period of such service.” Id. The pertinent provisions of the Utah Jury Plan excuse potential jurors from service for undue hardship when individuals are: (1) “essential to the care of aged or infirm persons” or “the operation of a business, commercial or agricultural enterprise,” or (2) “resid[e] in an area where private or public transportation to the place of holding court is not readily available.” Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br., attachment 2, at 3-4. 72 Accordingly, the eight venirepersons had legitimate reasons for excusal under the Act and the Utah Jury Plan. Mr. Daniel Maumau gives us no reason to disbelieve these reasons or to conclude that the jury administrator used subjective criteria.
Mr. Daniel Maumau also argues that a prospective juror can be excused by a district court, but not the jury administrator. Under § 1866(c), however, “any person summoned for jury service may be (1) excused by the court, or by the clerk under supervision of the court if the court’s jury selection plan so authorizes, upon a showing of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience, for such period as the court deems necessary.” 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (2006). Because the statute and the Utah Jury Plan authorized the jury administrator to grant excusals, we reject Mr. Daniel Maumau’s argument.
According to Mr. Daniel Maumau, the excusals of jurors violated the statutory requirement for the jury to comprise a fair cross section of the community. We disagree, concluding that the excusals did not remove a distinctive group that would influence Mr. Daniel Maumau’s right to an impartial jury. For this challenge, the Defendant must show: 73 (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); see United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Because the Jury Act’s fair cross section requirement parallels a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury, the defendant’s Jury Act challenge and his constitutional challenge are both evaluated under the Sixth Amendment standard.”). If the defendant shows a prima facie violation, “the government . . . bears the burden of proving that attainment of a fair cross section is incompatible with a significant state interest.” Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1271. Mr. Daniel Maumau fails to explain how the process resulted in disqualification of a “distinctive group.” In determining whether a group is “distinctive” for these purposes, we consider three factors: (1) whether the group is defined by a “limiting quality (i.e. the group has a definite composition such as race or sex)”; (2) whether “a common thread or basic similarity in attitude, idea, or experience runs through the group”; and (3) whether “a community of interests exists among members of the group such that the group’s interest cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process.” United States v. Green, 435 F.3d 1265, 1271 (10th Cir. 2006). 74 Without citing authority, Mr. Daniel Maumau asserts that the jury administrator’s excusal of prospective jurors “preclud[ed] a venire that constituted a fair cross section of the community.” Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 15. We cannot discern how excusal of individuals unable to sit for a four- to six-week jury trial would distort the jury pool. See Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that people older than 70 were not a cognizable “distinctive” group). Thus, Mr. Daniel Maumau has not satisfied the first element of his burden. In these circumstances, we reject his argument.