Opinion ID: 629163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Has Black stated a claim?

Text: 19 Black does not complain about his administrative segregation assignments at KSP or KSR that were made to protect his own safety. Instead, Black complains about his later segregation assignments when, pending his transfer to an out-of-state institution, he was retained as a hold ticket inmate in lock-down at KSR from October of 1986 until January 12, 1987; from March 13, 1987, to June 4, 1987; and from April 13, 1988, until July 22, 1988. 20 In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), the Supreme Court held that although the Due Process Clause does not confer the right to be part of the general prison population, state regulations may create a liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 469, 103 S.Ct. at 870. A regulation confers this right when it constitutes more than a simple procedural guideline and uses language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must' be employed ... and that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates--viz., 'the need for control,' or 'the threat of a serious disturbance.'  Id. at 471, 103 S.Ct. at 871. See also, Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (state regulations must use mandatory language and put substantive limits on official); Dell'Orfano v. Romano, 962 F.2d 199, 203 (2d Cir.1992) (mandatory procedures for administrative segregation create liberty interest). 21 Kentucky's Corrections Policies and Procedures 10.2 (CPP 10.2) covers special management programs for the prisons, including administrative segregation. CPP 10.2(IV)(B) defines administrative segregation as follows: 22 Administrative segregation is segregation from the general population for relatively short periods of time. It may consist of confinement to a cell, room or highly controlled area to ensure the safety and security of the institution, the staff or general inmate population or pending investigation of a serious felony where the inmate is a suspect. Prior to housing an inmate in administrative segregation, there must be a hearing at which due process is afforded in accordance with CPP 15.6. 23 CPP 10.2(IV)(B) (emphasis added). The criteria for assignment to a special segregation program are set out in CPP 10.2(VI)(A)(1), which reads: A. Criteria for Assignment 1. General 24 a. With the exception of the Special Security Unit, all inmates will be afforded a due process hearing before the Classification or Adjustment Committee before being assigned to any special management program. This, however, does not preclude placing the inmate in administrative segregation and/or pre-hearing detention pending a hearing before the Classification or Adjustment Committee when it is determined that he constitutes a threat to other inmates, staff members or himself. In these cases, a pre-detention hearing must be ordered in writing by the shift supervisor in accordance with CPP 15.6. 25 CPP 10.2(VI)(A)(1) (emphasis added). 26 The length of stay for, and release from, special management programs is covered by CPP 10.2(VI)(F)(4): 4. Administrative Segregation 27 a. Inmates may be initially assigned to administrative segregation for a maximum period of seven days at the end of which time the inmate's status shall be reviewed by the Classification Committee. Depending upon the circumstances at that time, the committee may release the inmate to the general population, assign [the inmate] to an appropriate special management unit or retain the inmate in administrative segregation an additional seven days. The committee shall review the inmate every seven days for the first sixty days. If at the end of the first thirty days, the Classification Committee determines that additional time in administrative segregation is necessary, the inmate concerned shall have psychological assessment including an interview with the psychologist to ensure the mental health of inmate so assigned. At the end of a total of sixty days in administrative segregation, the inmate shall either be released to the general population or assigned by the Adjustment Committee to the Administrative Control Unit or other special management unit. 28 b. Criteria for Release from Administrative Segregation. 29 An inmate shall be released from administrative segregation when: 30
31 (2) An investigation, which requires the assignment, is completed or indicates that such continued assignment serves no valid purpose. 32 (3) Mental health assessments indicate that continued assignment to the unit will have a serious adverse psychological impact on the inmate concerned.... 33 CPP 10.2(VI)(F)(4) (emphasis added). 34 As the district court correctly found, these state prison regulations create a liberty interest in being placed in the general prison population. The regulations use the mandatory language required in Hewitt by using the words shall and must in describing the procedural requirements for administrative segregation. They also provide the substantive limits required in Hewitt by stating that inmates shall have due process hearings and that inmates shall be released from segregation when certain circumstances have been met. 35 In addition, as the district court correctly found, hold-ticket inmates such as Black are covered by these segregation procedures because the broad prison regulations do not exclude those on hold ticket status. This finding is buttressed by a December 3, 1986, memo to the warden from prison officials discussing Black's grievance about his segregation and responding to the warden's request that the procedure for administrative segregation of hold-ticket inmates be clarified. The memo indicates that hold-ticket inmates are covered by the general administrative segregation procedures: 36 [E]xisting policy and procedure ... already addresses any inmate assigned to the Special Management Unit which would include inmates on hold tickets from in-state, out-of-state, and federal institutions ... [A]ll inmates are covered by the fact that all inmates assigned to the Special Management unit are afforded certain privileges regardless of their status.... 37 Therefore, plaintiff Black clearly had a liberty interest created by the state prison regulations.
38 Because Black had a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population, prison officials had to afford him due process in order to deprive him of that right. Hewitt makes it clear, however, that the procedural due process required before one may be deprived of a liberty interest is governed by federal constitutional law and not state law, and that minimal process is required for segregation in the prison context because prison officials must be accorded  'wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order....'  459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 872 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). Prison officials are obligated to engage only in an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting respondent's administrative confinement, including whatever statement respondent wished to submit, within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation. Id. 39 The Hewitt Court held that an inmate need only receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views either in writing or in person to the prison official, and a review by the decisionmaker of the charges and the available evidence. Id. at 476, 103 S.Ct. at 874. This process must occur within a reasonable time following an inmate's transfer, judged from the view of the insubstantial private interest of the inmate and the traditionally broad discretion of prison officials. Id. at 476 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 874 n. 8. However, administrative segregation may not be used as pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Id. at 477 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 874 n. 9. Therefore, [p]rison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates. This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the submission of any additional evidence or statements. Id. Thus, although Hewitt involved segregation of an inmate for his role in a prison riot, the case holds that regardless of the reason for the segregation, inmates in segregation are entitled only to minimal procedural process, so long as that process is not pretextual. 40 In contrast to Hewitt where the Pennsylvania prison regulations apparently did not set out in detail what process must be given segregated inmates, here Kentucky's Corrections Policies and Procedures set out regulations in mandatory language governing the specific procedures prison officials are required to use in reviewing segregation decisions. However, Black did not have a liberty interest in these more stringent state-created procedures. There is no constitutional violation when state actors fail to meet their own regulations, so long as the minimum constitutional requirements have been met. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (adequacy of procedures is matter of federal constitutional law); Russell v. Coughlin, 910 F.2d 75, 78 n. 1 (2d Cir.1990) (procedures for confinement in segregation governed by federal law); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1252 (5th Cir.1989) (violation of rules alone may be state law violations but not necessarily constitutional violations). Thus, while the prison's own internal regulations required the officials to provide Black with this state-created process, the constitution required only that the officials meet the Hewitt procedural requirements. Accordingly, Black was entitled to 1) an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting his segregation within a reasonable time, 2) an opportunity to respond in writing or in person, and 3) periodic review of his confinement to assure that the confinement was not pretextual. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472-77, 103 S.Ct. at 872-74. 41
42 The question then is whether Black received the constitutionally mandated process due him before being deprived of his liberty interest. We find that plaintiff Black has raised a genuine issue of material fact in that regard. 43 Black is proceeding pro se, and accordingly we must construe his complaint liberally. Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179-80 (6th Cir.1985) (pro se complaints must be read liberally). Nevertheless, on summary judgment, the non-moving party has the burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party has no obligation to file affidavits or other materials negating a claim on which his opponent bears the burden so long as the movant relies upon the absence of an essential element in the pleadings, depositions, or answers to interrogatories. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 44 As they do in their brief, defendants claim in their responses to plaintiff's interrogatories that they provided Black with all the process required by CPP 10.2: 45 Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, Plaintiff was afforded the process outlined in CPP 10.2, VI., A., 1., a. 46 Mr. Black was afforded the process outlined in CPP 10.2 Section VI., A., 1., a. Mr. Black was placed in Administrative Segregation due to his being received on hold ticket from another correctional facility. Due to his hold ticket status a Pre-Hearing detention form was prepared upon his arrival with a Pre-Hearing review conducted by the Adjustment Committee within the prescribed time limits as per policy and procedure CPP 10.2 All documents relative to his Pre-Hearing Detentions have been provided Mr. Black in previous responses to his claims. 47 Answer 11 and Response 11 to Plaintiff's Request for Supplementation of Discovery Responses Re: Fourth Set of Interrogatories and Attendant Request for Production of Documents. 48 This response, however, is not supported factually by any materials included in the record on appeal. The record's only evidence of a hearing is the partial transcript of the April 15, 1988, Adjustment Committee hearing. There is no other evidence in the record of what review Black received or whether he was given an opportunity to challenge his segregation. 4 49 The defendants' legal conclusion that Black received all the process due him is countered by Black's affidavit attached to his response to defendants' motion for summary judgment. In it, Black asserts that he was told by prison official Kevin Shake in his cell on October 7, 1986, the day after he arrived back at KSR, that he was in segregation because he was on hold from an out-of-state institution. Black claims, Beyond this proffered rationale, I was not afforded any due process protection. He goes on to say that he was not given any opportunity to challenge their purported justification for my segregation after he filed his grievance and defendants stated their reasons for the lock-down. He states that he was not afforded an opportunity to challenge the decision to resume my administrative segregation assignment under 'lock down'  after he returned to KSR in March of 1987. He does admit that there was an April 15, 1988, Adjustment Committee hearing concerning his segregation, but states that [b]eyond this hearing, I was not afforded any opportunity to challenge my segregation assignment. I was confined under 'lock down' for 100 days during this period, and for 281 days total. 50 The process described in Black's affidavit would not suffice under Hewitt. Thus, Black, through his affidavit, has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he received the process due him, and defendants have failed to counter Black's affidavit with anything but a legal conclusion that Black did receive all the process that was due. 5 51