Opinion ID: 3134767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Eligibility Verdict Forms: Sections 9–1(b)(6), (b)(8)

Text: Defendant next contends that each of the seven death-eligibility verdict forms set forth some, but not all, of the elements of the relevant statutory aggravating factor. Defendant does not question the propriety of the jury instructions for the death-eligibility verdicts based on sections 9–1(b)(6) and (b)(8) of the death penalty statute. Thus, we need examine only those two verdict forms. Defendant would remain eligible for the death penalty under these two statutory aggravating factors, even if the other statutory aggravating factors were invalid. See People v. Cole , 172 Ill. 2d 85, 102-03 (1996). The record shows that defendant has waived this issue for review because his trial counsel failed to offer alternative verdict forms, or at least object to the forms that defendant now challenges, or include the issue in a post-sentencing motion. Kuntu , 196 Ill. 2d at 134-35; Redd , 173 Ill. 2d at 41. However, defendant invokes the doctrine of plain error. 134 Ill. 2d R. 451(c). We hold that the verdict forms under review did not omit the required elements for death eligibility under sections 9–1(b)(6) and (b)(8). Accordingly, we find no plain error. See Williams , 193 Ill. 2d at 364, citing Keene , 169 Ill. 2d at 17. The death-eligibility verdict form for statutory aggravating factor 9–1(b)(6) stated that the jury found, inter alia , that “Joshua Evans was killed in the course of another felony as set forth in paragraph [4] of the Second Proposition concerning the First Degree Murder of Joshua Evans.” The death-eligibility verdict form for the statutory aggravating factor 9–1(b)(8) stated that the jury found, inter alia , that “Joshua Evans was killed to prevent Joshua Evans from giving material assistance to the State, as set forth in paragraph [3] of the Second Proposition concerning the First Degree Murder of Joshua Evans.” Defendant argues that each verdict form is deficient because it omits the required element of defendant’s mental state for the offense. See 720 ILCS 5/9–1(b)(6), (b)(8) (West 1994). In People v. Mack , 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), this court held that where a verdict purports to set out the elements of the offense as specific findings, it must do so completely or be held insufficient. Mack , 167 Ill. 2d at 538. The Mack court concluded that the verdict form at issue was defective because it attempted to set forth a statutory aggravating factor, but did so incompletely by omitting the mental state element under section 9–1(b)(6). See Williams , 193 Ill. 2d at 364-65 (discussing Mack ). We cannot accept defendant’s argument. The test of the sufficiency of a verdict is whether the intention of the jury can be ascertained with reasonable certainty from the language used. In determining the meaning of a verdict, all parts of the record will be searched and interpreted together. People v. McNeal , 175 Ill. 2d 335, 361 (1997), citing People v. Mack , 167 Ill. 2d 525, 537 (1995). Here, each verdict form expressly directed the jury to the form’s corresponding instruction, of which defendant does not complain, which completely and accurately sets forth all of the elements of the statutory aggravating factor. See Williams , 193 Ill. 2d at 362-68. By referring to “paragraph [4] of the Second Proposition concerning the First Degree Murder of Joshua Evans,” the felony-murder eligibility verdict form in defendant’s case incorporated the necessary elements under section 9–1(b)(6), including the required mental state and defendant’s infliction of injuries on Joshua. See Williams , 193 Ill. 2d at 368. The same applies to the eligibility verdict form for aggravating factor 9–1(b)(8). We concluded in Williams’ appeal: “As a result, unlike Mack , a conclusion in defendant’s case that the jury found the necessary elements under section 9–1(b)(6) need not be based on speculation. When we consider the verdict forms in the context of the record in defendant’s case, we can conclude with reasonable certainty that the jury found these elements. Accordingly, we hold that defendant was properly found eligible for the death penalty based on the felony-murder statutory aggravating factor premised on Joshua’s murder.” Williams , 193 Ill. 2d at 368. This conclusion applies to defendant in this case, as to both statutory aggravating factors 9–1(b)(6) and 9–1(b)(8). Since we find no error at all in these two death-eligibility verdict forms, additional contentions of defendant necessarily fail. First, defendant was independently eligible for the death penalty on the grounds that he killed Joshua in the course of another felony, and that he murdered Joshua to prevent him from giving material assistance to the State. Thus, the jury’s reliance on any other aggravating factors did not affect its finding that defendant was eligible for the death penalty. See Williams , 193 Ill. 2d at 368; Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 321; People v. Coleman , 129 Ill. 2d 321, 345-46 (1989). Second, the jury’s consideration of any other aggravating factor at the penalty phase of the death sentencing hearing did not require resentencing. See Williams , 193 Ill. 2d at 368-73; Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 321-22; Coleman , 129 Ill. 2d at 347. Third, defendant was not prejudiced in terms of Strickland . See, e.g. , People v. McCallister , 193 Ill. 2d 63, 107-08 (2000). Penalty Phase