Opinion ID: 785756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: A. Appellate Jurisdiction 5 We generally do not have jurisdiction to review interlocutory decisions such as the denial of a motion to dismiss. Under the collateral order doctrine, 1 however, we have recognized exceptions to this rule. One well-established exception is for orders denying motions to dismiss for reasons of immunity. See, e.g., In re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d at 373 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982)). Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction over the District Court's denial of SABIC's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 6 Determining that appellate jurisdiction is proper in a case does not end our jurisdictional inquiry. We have a continuing obligation to sua sponte raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction when it is in question. Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 420 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Bracken v. Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir.2002)). We focused at oral argument on whether federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case fails under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because ExxonMobil's claims have already been litigated in state court. Aided by post-argument letter briefs submitted by the parties, we conclude the answer is yes. 7 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, derived from two Supreme Court cases — Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) — prevents lower federal courts from sit[ting] in direct review of the decisions of a state tribunal. Gulla v. North Strabane Twp., 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir.1998). Because Congress has conferred jurisdiction to review a state court's decision only on the Supreme Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257, lower federal courts lack the power to decide claims in which the relief requested ... requires determining that the state court's decision is wrong or ... void[ing] the state court's ruling. Desi's Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419 (quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir.1996)). As we recently explained, a claim is barred by Rooker-Feldman under two circumstances: first, if the claim was `actually litigated' in state court prior to the filing of the federal action or, second, if the claim is `inextricably intertwined with [the] state adjudication.' Desi's Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419 (quoting Parkview Assocs. P'ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir.2000)). 8 The state level decision need not be of its highest court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies equally to final decisions of lower state courts. FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840. 9 Here there is no dispute that ExxonMobil's claims are identical to the claims upon which the Delaware Superior Court reached a final judgment. Thus, though our Court takes a narrow view of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Parkview Assocs. P'ship, 225 F.3d at 326, litigating ExxonMobil's claims to final judgment in state court presents the paradigm situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district court from proceeding. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1090-91 (3d Cir.1997) (describing a case in which the federal court plaintiff sought an injunction directing that a state court order not be carried out). 10 ExxonMobil argues that the actually litigated circumstance does not trigger Rooker-Feldman because the March 2003 state court judgment was not reached prior to ExxonMobil's filing of the federal action in August 2000. It cites to Desi's Pizza, in which we said Rooker-Feldman bars a claim if the claim was `actually litigated' in state court prior to the filing of the federal action, 321 F.3d at 419. But we do not read this language as imposing a new requirement that, in order for the actually litigated trigger to apply, the plaintiff's federal claims must be filed after the state claims reach a final judgment. In deciding whether a claim was actually litigated in state court for Rooker-Feldman purposes, we have consistently looked to the substance of the state court's judgment compared to the plaintiff's claims in the federal action. See Parkview Assocs. P'ship, 225 F.3d at 335-36; Gulla, 146 F.3d at 173. Filing the latter before the state court judgment does not escape Rooker-Feldman 's grasp. The only timing relevant is whether the state judgment precedes a federal judgment on the same claims. Desi's Pizza itself is illustrative because there the state court reached final judgment after the plaintiff filed claims in federal court. Yet we decided that the plaintiff's claims were not actually litigated because neither its state court pleadings nor the state court's judgment discussed or referenced the claims it filed in federal court. If in Desi's Pizza we had intended to adopt a new requirement that the state court must reach a final judgment prior to the filing of the federal action in order for the actually litigated trigger to apply, we had a full opportunity to do so. Furthermore, were we to find that the Rooker-Feldman actually litigated trigger did not apply to federal actions filed prior to the state court's final judgment, we would be encouraging parties to maintain federal actions as insurance policies while their state court claims were pending. This defeats an elementary principle underpinning the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — that a party's recourse for an adverse decision in state court is an appeal to the appropriate state appellate court, and ultimately the Supreme Court under § 1257, not a separate action in federal court. Parkview Assocs. P'ship, 225 F.3d at 324. 11 ExxonMobil also argues that Rooker-Feldman should not apply in this case because it is not a party to the action in Delaware state court, in which only its subsidiaries, Yanbu and ECAI, are defendants. Indeed, we have consistently (and recently) held that Rooker-Feldman does not bar claims of plaintiffs who were not parties to the state court proceeding. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 342 F.3d 242, 257 (3d Cir.2003); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 886 n. 11 (3d Cir.1994). But we have also noted that this limiting principle of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has a close affinity to the principles embodied in the legal concepts of claim and issue preclusion. Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 297 (3d Cir.1992). Claims and issues decided against an entity bind also its parties in privity, including subsidiaries. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir.1991). Underscoring this common sense privity principle is the fact that ExxonMobil's interest in its federal claims is identical to its subsidiaries' interest in their state court claims, because its right to recover is derivative of its subsidiaries' right to recover. Indeed, both Yanbu and ECAI are co-plaintiffs with ExxonMobil in the federal action. 12 As ExxonMobil's federal claims were actually litigated in state court, we need not analyze whether, under the alternative prong of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, they were inextricably intertwined with a previous state court adjudication. Parkview Assocs. P'ship, 225 F.3d at 327. We simply note that our case presents an equally clear application of the inextricably intertwined circumstance, which exists when federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, id. at 325, or when the federal court must ... take action that would render [the state court's] judgment ineffectual, FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840. By its own admission, ExxonMobil seeks to maintain its federal action as an insurance policy in order to relitigate the overcharge issue if SABIC prevails in its efforts to overturn the state court verdict in favor of ExxonMobil. If that were to happen, ExxonMobil's federal action would squarely be seeking to invalidate a final judgment of the state court, the very situation contemplated by Rooker-Feldman 's inextricably intertwined bar. 13