Opinion ID: 359646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finding Facts

Text: 11 Townsend v. Sain 7 sets forth the standards for determining when a federal habeas court May adopt the factual findings of a state court without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Essentially the same standards have now been codified into 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) as the test for determining when a federal habeas court Must presume correct the findings of the state court. 12 Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d), where there has been a hearing on the merits of a factual issue in the state court, the determination of that factual issue, if evidenced by a written finding or other reliable and adequate written indicia, must be presumed correct unless petitioner shows, or it otherwise appears, that one of the circumstances listed in § 2254(d)(1)-(8) is present. 8 13 In the case before us, the District Court correctly concluded that the threshold conditions for establishing the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness are met. 14 (1) The requirement of an adequate written indicia of the state court's findings is met in that the District Court had before it the transcript of the entire trial, including the evidentiary hearing. 15 (2) The requirement of a hearing on the merits is also satisfied. Prior to admitting Thompson's confession and out of the presence of the jury, the Alabama trial court heard testimony and cross-examination of Stricklin, Wilkinson, and Sanders, each of whom testified regarding the circumstances leading up to the confession. Immediately following this proceeding, the trial court observed that it would admit the confession into evidence. Under these circumstances, the habeas court may assume that the decision to admit the statement was made on the merits. Townsend v. Sain, 1962, 372 U.S. 293, 314, 83 S.Ct. 745, 758, 9 L.Ed.2d 770. 16 (3) Albeit implicitly, the necessary determination of the factual issues in dispute was also made. Although no express findings of fact were made by the trial court, the habeas court could still reconstruct the findings of the state court, either because (the state trial judge's) view of the facts is plain from his opinion, or because of other indicia. Id. 9 Here, the state trial court's view of the facts is obvious. By admitting Thompson's confession into evidence, the trial court clearly demonstrated that it believed the officers' and not Thompson's version of the facts. 10 See Dempsey v. Wainwright, 5 Cir., 1973, 471 F.2d 604, 606 n. 3, Cert. denied, 411 U.S. 968, 93 S.Ct. 2158, 36 L.Ed.2d 69. 17 Thus, it can be inferred that the trial court found the following facts: the officers respected Thompson's right to remain silent until he, Thompson, asked for an interview with Stricklin; Stricklin and Sanders advised Thompson of his right to remain silent and have his lawyer with him at the interview; Thompson said that he understood his rights but wanted to tell how it was anyway. 18 Once it is established that the threshold conditions of § 2254(d) are satisfied, it then becomes necessary to determine whether there are present any of the § 2254(d)(1)-(8) factors that rebut the presumption of correctness. Thompson has not shown, and we fail to find, the presence of any of these factors. The merits of the factual dispute were resolved in the state court proceedings. § 2254(d)(1). The state court's fact finding procedure, wherein the three police officers were examined and cross-examined outside the jury's presence, provided Thompson with a full and fair hearing and an adequate opportunity to develop the material facts at issue. § 2254(d)(2), (3). The testimony of the three officers provided fair support for the state court's resolution of the factual dispute in their favor. § 2254(d)(8). 19 Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court properly adopted as correct the state court's findings of historical fact.