Opinion ID: 2314363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Declaring the Webber Deed a Nullity

Text: We have stated that the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to provide a more adequate and flexible remedy in cases where jurisdiction already exists. Hodgdon v. Campbell, 411 A.2d 667, 669 (Me.1980). Furthermore, we have stated that the declaratory judgment remedy should be liberally construed to provide a simple and effective means by which parties may secure a binding judicial determination of their legal rights, status, or relations pursuant to statutes and written instruments. Id. An action for declaratory judgment is appropriate for the determination of the validity... of a deed. 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 71 (1956); but see Town of Nags Head v. Tillett, 314 N.C. 627, 336 S.E.2d 394, 396 (1985) (determination that deed was void as a matter of law was beyond scope of declaratory judgment act). In the present case, the court found that to counteract the frivolous deed filed by Webber on March 23, 1989, it was necessary to have the deed, and subsequent deeds modifying the original deed, marked as null and void. The court further required that the judgment nullifying the deeds be filed in the registry of deeds, and that the nullified deeds reference the judgment. The judgment stated in pertinent part: The deed dated March 23, 1989, from the defendant Helen Webber to each and every citizen of the United States and recorded in the Lincoln County registry of Deeds in Book 1538, Page 266, and subsequent deeds modifying that deed recorded in said Registry in Book 1588, Page 64 and in Book 1676, Page 303, and any other deed which may relate to the March 23, 1989 deed noted above are void ab initio and of no effect, legal equitable or otherwise. The Registrar of Deed of Lincoln County shall record this judgment in the Registry and so mark the above deed to reference this judgment; moreover, the Registrar is also ordered to stamp the above referenced deeds as NULL AND VOID on each page of said deeds. Contrary to Webber's contention, this judgment is not overly broad: it simply declares the March 23, 1989, deed and all subsequent related deeds void ab initio. Thus, this portion of the court's declaratory judgment should not be disturbed. Webber next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees in the amount of $44,913.68 to the Colquhouns on their trespass claim, Count I of the Colquhouns' complaint, and that the trial court erred in its award of special damages consisting of the costs incurred in prosecuting the slander of title claim, Count II of the Colquhouns' complaint. The Colquhouns counter that the court neither erred nor exceeded its discretion with respect to its determination of amounts owed to the Colquhouns.