Opinion ID: 1934979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Press Accounts of the Trial

Text: Monsanto argues finally that Judge Laird's statements concerning this case in ex parte print and broadcast media interviews require his recusal because, it argues, those statements create the impression that Judge Laird is biased. In support of this claim, Monsanto has submitted as exhibits photocopies of 27 print or Internet newspaper articles [25] and videotapes of what Monsanto represents to be television news stories during which Judge Laird was interviewed about this case. In its petition, Monsanto quotes directly from several articles and television news stories and argues that the quoted material demonstrates that Judge Laird appears to be biased. Monsanto's supporting exhibits are properly before this Court because they are part of the record below. [26] See Rule 21(a), Ala. R.App. P. (The petition shall contain ... copies of any order or opinion or parts of the record that would be essential to an understanding of the matters set forth in the petition.). See also Ex parte Singleton, 475 So.2d 186, 188 (Ala.1985) (`On review by mandamus, we must look at only those facts before the [court below].' (quoting Ex parte Baker, 459 So.2d 873, 876 (Ala.1984))). This does not, however, end our analysis of the media exhibits; we must also consider the reliability and the weight of the exhibits to determine whether they constitute sufficient evidence that Judge Laird has demonstrated the appearance of bias. Rule 902(6), Ala. R. Evid., treats newspaper articles as self-authenticating for the purpose of admitting them into evidence; that is, the Alabama Rules of Evidence do not require extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admitting a newspaper article into evidence. [27] Rule 902, Ala. R. Evid. The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 902 explain that newspaper articles are self-authenticating because the likelihood of forgery of such materials is slight. The Advisory Committee's Notes caution, however: Accepting such materials as authentic, under this paragraph, does not necessarily answer other evidentiary concerns, such as materiality, relevancy, hearsay, etc. Likewise, accepting the authenticity of a newspaper or periodical does not resolve issues of authority and responsibility for items contained therein. The plaintiffs argue that Monsanto's exhibits provide unreliable evidence in support of the proposition that Judge Laird appears biased. The State of Alabama and ADEM argue that [t]he print comment, reported in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch on March 15, may be summarily dismissed as hearsay. (State and ADEM's Brief at 18.) The State and ADEM also argue that the Wall Street Journal article is an example of hearsay piled upon hearsay ... [28] (State and ADEM's Brief at 19.) ADEM argued before Judge Cardwell that it had never heard [of] a judge's action being described as being biased merely based on the impressions of a reporter ... [Judge Laird] ought to be judged based on the hard evidence, not on hearsay and not on a reporter's impressions. (Transcript of the recusal hearing at 125-26.) All of the media exhibits Monsanto submitted in support of its petition are likely hearsay. [29] See Persons v. Summers 274 Ala. 673, 678, 151 So.2d 210, 212 (1963)(The court also erred in permitting a newspaper article which described the judicial actions of appellant into evidence. The article was hearsay and objection to its introduction should have been sustained.); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 391-92 (5th Cir.1961)(Of course a newspaper article is hearsay, and in almost all circumstances is inadmissible. (footnote omitted)); Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1165 (D.C.Cir.1995)(We seriously question whether a New York Times article is admissible evidence of the truthfulness of its contents.). Moreover, even were the newspaper articles admissible into evidence under a hearsay exception, this Court still would have to consider the weight of the admitted hearsay evidence in support of any conclusion. Because the newspaper articles are hearsay, they presumptively do not themselves provide sufficiently reliable evidence to support our granting Monsanto's petition for a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Laird to recuse himself. An affidavit in support of a motion to disqualify a judge is generally insufficient when it is supported merely by hearsay.... [That does not mean] that an affidavit in support of a motion to disqualify a judge can never rely upon hearsay. However, an affidavit which relies upon hearsay must have some indicia of reliability. In re Farman, 841 P.2d 99, 102 (Wyo. 1992). In this case the Court has no reliable means of knowing whether the quotations attributed to Judge Laird in the newspaper articles accurately reflect his words or whether newspaper interviews attributed to Judge Laird actually even took place. We lack sufficient indicia of reliability to take from the newspaper articles anything more than the fact that the articles speak about Judge Laird. While on their face, videotapes of television news interviews would appear to possess greater indicia of reliability than do newspaper accountsbecause the viewer can see Judge Laird speaking in the videosthis Court can reasonably conclude from viewing the videotapes only that Judge Laird spoke with television reporters. The television news packages are edited accounts of Judge Laird's remarks; because the edited segments may not present Judge Laird's remarks in their proper context, those television accounts are not a sufficiently reliable basis for concluding what specific statements Judge Laird may have made. [30] Moreover, Monsanto did not submit the original broadcast tapes from the television stations as an exhibit with its petition; Monsanto, instead, submitted as an exhibit copies of unknown provenance that purport to be television news stories broadcast on specific dates. [31] Because the television accounts are videotapes made, and conceivably even edited, from the edited remarks originally broadcast by the television stations, they present a reliability problem and a hearsay problem as to any specific remarks that Judge Laird may have made. In United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir.2001), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered this very issue. Microsoft introduced newspaper accounts as exhibits in support of its argument on appeal that the trial judge was biased and should be required to recuse himself. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it would assume the truth of the press accounts and not send the case back for an evidentiary hearing on the subject. [It, however, would] reach no judgment on whether the details of the interviews were accurately recounted. 253 F.3d at 108. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals took this approach because it found in [its] analysis of the arguments presented by the parties, the specifics of particular conversations are less important than their cumulative effect. 253 F.3d at 109. Further, in Microsoft, the plaintiffs admitted to the truth of what the trial judge had said in the published interviews and the plaintiffs chose not to defend any of the trial judge's public remarks. See 253 F.3d at 108. This Court follows the approach taken by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Microsoft. This Court declines to find that any of the articles submitted as exhibits accurately recount the specifics of what Judge Laird may have said in any interview, and this Court will consider only whether Judge Laird's conduct in responding to a series of media inquiries about this case indicates that Judge Laird has exhibited bias in a manner that justifies recusal. The videotape exhibits, we conclude, indicate that Judge Laird spoke with television reporters about this case. In Microsoft, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' ultimate decision that the trial judge must recuse himself was based not on what the District Judge said, but to whom he said it and when. 253 F.3d at 115. [32] The Microsoft court held: Rather than manifesting neutrality and impartiality, the reports of the interviews with the District Judge convey the impression of a judge posturing for posterity, trying to please reporters with colorful analogies and observations bound to wind up in the stories they write. 253 F.3d at 115. In Microsoft, the trial judge had conducted secret interviews with members of the press intended for publication at the conclusion of the trial. The Microsoft court found that the appearance that the trial judge coveted favorable publicity and perhaps a place in history created the appearance of bias. 253 F.3d at 115. Conversely, Judge Laird's actions in this case, answering a few questions posed by local reporters in a high-profile case, do not create the appearance of a judge coveting publicity or seeking a place in history. The press accounts, considered in their totality, are quite benign. We hold, therefore, that Monsanto has not demonstrated a clear legal right to have Judge Laird recuse himself based on comments attributed to Judge Laird in press accounts of the trial. Monsanto argues, however, that this Court should consider the substance of the remarks attributed to Judge Laird in press accounts of the trial as evidence indicating that Judge Laird appears biased because, it argues, the substance of the remarks attributed to Judge Laird by the press demonstrate an appearance of bias. In its petition, Monsanto quotes from four television news stories and one newspaper article to demonstrate its contention that Judge Laird appears biased. Monsanto quotes Judge Laird from a purported March 13, 2002, WBRC-TV news broadcast, as saying: When you have a jury that's already found one party liable in a case, well, that ought to give that party incentive to try to settle. (Petition at 28.) Monsanto quotes Judge Laird from what it states to be a later point in the same WBRC news story: I simply said that I expect you to negotiate in good faith and if I find that you are not making an attempt to even negotiate in good faith, then that is contempt and you may go to jail. But I never said that they would go to jail if they didn't settle this case. (Petition at 28-29.) Monsanto quotes Judge Laird from a purported WCFT news story that it states aired on March 14, 2002: No, I never once told anybody that I would send them to jail if they did not settle this case. But I did tell them that I will use my contempt powers and possibly send someone to jail if they did not make a good-faith effort to comply with my order and try to work this case out. (Petition at 29.) Monsanto quotes a segment from a news package it states ran on WVTM-TV on March 26, 2002: Reporter: Now the short-term cleanup has already begun in Anniston. Right now Solutia is cleaning up property that has the highest levels of PCBs in the soil, but some residents say a lot more work still needs to be done. The judge says this new motion could jeopardize part of the cleanup process. Judge Laird: The defendants are asserting that I should just turn it over to [the United States Environmental Protection Agency] and not compete with EPA. So, really that's just something I have to weigh and look at all the caselaw and weigh what I should do or am required to do in this case. (Petition at 30.) Monsanto also quotes from a news package it states aired on WCFT on March 28, 2002: Judge Laird: I have that motion under advisement at this time. Reporter: Even Judge Joel Laird has accused Solutia's lawyers of using underhanded tactics during the trial. He's refusing to let the EPA's decision affect this case. Judge Laird: I'm moving forward until someone tells me I need to stop, or until we finish this one. (Petition at 30.) Monsanto also quotes material from newspaper articles to support its claim that Judge Laird appears biased. In its Petitioner's Notice of Filing of Ruling, Monsanto argues: The [ Wall Street Journal ] article concludes with Judge Laird's indication, which obviously took place during an ex parte media interview, that he was actually referring to petitioners in his remarks: `Was he really talking about Solutia, he [Judge Laird] is asked later. He nods yes.' (Petitioner's Notice at 5.) In its petition, Monsanto states that in an article that appeared in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch on March 15, 2002, [33] Judge Laird said: I wish I had handled it differently. But what's a frustrated father to do when he can't get an unruly teenager to cooperate? [34] (Petition at 33.) Monsanto argues that this case is directly analogous to other cases in which appellate courts have held that trial judges were required to recuse themselves because they appeared to be biased. Monsanto cites Microsoft, supra, In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir.2001), and United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir.1993), as examples of cases in which other courts have ordered recusal under what it argues are circumstances similar to, or even less egregious than, the circumstances in this case. The plaintiffs argue that even if this Court was to consider the substance of Judge Laird's remarks, and not merely treat the remarks as unreliable hearsay, Judge Laird's public comments do not violate Alabama's Canons of Judicial Ethics. The plaintiffs argue that the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, while discouraging commentary on the merits of a pending action, nevertheless permit a judge to make public comments that help the public understand the proceedings. Canon 3 A(6) specifically states that it `does not prohibit judges ... from explaining for public information the procedures of the court.' In re Sheffield, 465 So.2d at 355 (ellipses in original) (citations omitted). The Court in In re Sheffield, went on to say that [j]udges should encourage representatives of the news media [to] inquire of them for background information relating to the operation of the court system. While judges may not comment on the merits of a pending case, a judge may and should explain legal terms, and concepts, procedures, and the issues involved in that case so as to permit the news representatives to cover the case more intelligently.... Often there is no one other than the judge who is in a position to give a detailed and impartial explanation of the case to the news media. In re Sheffield, 465 So.2d at 355 (quoting National Conference of State Trial Judges Committee on News Reporting and Fair Trial, Judicial Guidelines for Dealing with News Media Inquiries and Criticism (5th Draft, June 5, 1984)). Judge Laird's remarks, considered in their totality, the plaintiffs argue, simply explain the proceedings in the case and do not raise, to an objective observer, questions of partiality. The plaintiffs question, for example, how any observer could see bias in the following comment by Judge Laird to a television reporter: The defendants are asserting that I should just turn it over to [the United States Environmental Protection Agency] and not compete with EPA. So, really that's just something I have to weigh and look at all the caselaw and weigh what I should do or am required to do in this case. (State and ADEM's Brief at 19, quoting Petition at 30.) The plaintiffs argue that [e]xplaining to the interested public that a motion made by the petitioners will receive careful analysis is hardly suggestive of a trial judge with a personal bias. (State and ADEM's Brief at 19.) The plaintiffs argue that all of the remarks Monsanto cites offer only explanation, and to the extent that any of the remarks offer judgment or opinion, Judge Laird's remarks are properly derived from what he has learned in the proceedings and do not address the merits of any pending or prospective issues. We agree that even if the remarks attributed to Judge Laird by the press reflect what Judge Laird actually said, they either explained factual and procedural aspects of the case or were based on what Judge Laird had observed in court during the course of this litigation. [35] Other courts that have considered similar kinds of public remarks by trial judges have found no basis for recusal. [R]emarks reflecting even strong views about a defendant will not call for a judge's recusal so long as those views are based on his own observations during the performance of his judicial duties. United States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C.Cir.1992)(holding that a judge's remarks that he believ[ed] four jurors were determined to acquit Barry from the start and misled the court during jury selection about their objectivity, 961 F.2d at 262, did not require the judge to recuse himself from sentencing the defendant); United States v. Fortier, 242 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir.2001)(holding that the judge's comments to the press that [w]e haven't sat down and re-evaluated the guidelines yet in view of the opinion. I suppose I could do a lot of things. I guess I don't know... That's a matter I haven't researched yet, did not require the judge to recuse himself from resentencing the defendant on remand from appeal); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 180, 184-85 (2d Cir.1991)(holding that the trial judge's comments in an interview did not require him to recuse himself because he only restated what he had been saying in open court for the past few years and did not discuss the details of remedy implementation); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 34-36 (D.C.Cir.1976)(a judge's comments in a televised interview that he was confident that the defendants could get as fair a trial in the District of Columbia as anywhere in the United States did not prejudge any motion for a change of venue and require the judge's recusal; the comments, instead, fairly expressed the judge's confidence in the quality of the judiciary in Washington, D.C.); United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1559-60 (9th Cir.1996)(a judge's comments in three newspaper articles indicating that he thought marijuana distribution to be a serious and pervasive social problem did not require him to recuse himself in a criminal prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute marijuana); State ex rel. Bardacke v. Welsh, 102 N.M. 592, 605-06, 698 P.2d 462, 475-76 (Ct.App.1985)(a judge's comments quoted in a newspaper that there's a natural bias against a pro se pleading, and that Welsh was simply taking too much of his time, forcing him to read cases that not only were meritless but `scandalous,' did not require the judge to recuse himself); Roatch v. Puera, 534 N.W.2d 560, 563-64 (Minn.Ct.App.1995)(a judge's comments in a newspaper interview that a pending case might set a precedent did not require the judge to recuse himself from that case); State v. City of Breezy Point, 394 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. Ct.App.1986)(a judge's comments in a newspaper interview, made after the issuance of an injunction and the award of attorney fees, but before the filing of posttrial motions, did not require recusal; the comments merely described the effect of the decision on the community and the judge's belief that no issues remained pending in the case); Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 143-44, 661 A.2d 352, 369-70 (1995)(a judge's numerous comments in newspaper interviews, including the comment that he was shocked that it takes 11 years in our judicial system to find an excuse to avoid the death penalty and that [i]f anyone deserves to die, these two individuals (Appellant and Lesko) do for killing four people for fun, did not require the judge's recusal from a collateral proceeding attacking the defendant's conviction and sentence); Wayne County Prosecutor v. Parole Board, 210 Mich.App. 148, 154-55, 532 N.W.2d 899, 902 (1995)(a judge's comments to a television reporter that, Once I was acquainted with the facts, the brutal nature of the crime, the amount of timehe had only served some five years for this horrible crimehis poor prison adjustment, plus the psychological reports, it seemed clear-cut to me that he should not be released early, though reflecting an erroneous perception of the relevant law, were sufficiently tied to the facts of the case so as not to warrant the judge's recusal); Oates v. State, 619 So.2d 23, 25-26 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1993) (stating that while it would have been far better if the trial judge had not spoken to the press in the middle of a trial, the judge's comment in a newspaper interview that the defendant was just being an obstinate jerk, did not warrant the judge's recusal because [n]o reasonable person could conclude, on reading the transcript in this case, that this defendant was not being an obstinate jerk); State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 442-45, 687 P.2d 1180, 1197-1200 (1984)(a trial judge's comments to members of the media that the defendant had been sentenced twice before and that the judge was uncertain whether he could impose a different sentence, and that he felt the jury verdict could have gone either way, were not sufficient to demonstrate bias warranting the judge's recusal; instead, the remarks indicated that the judge was not biased and had not prejudged the case). The cases Monsanto cites in support of its position are inapposite and distinguishable. Monsanto's citation to Microsoft is unpersuasive because the trial judge in Microsoft had conducted secret interviews with members of the press that were intended for publication at the conclusion of the trial; it was that conduct that created an appearance of bias. 253 F.3d at 115. Monsanto's citation to United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir.1993), is similarly unpersuasive. In Cooley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that comments attributed to the trial judge that appeared in a number of newspaper articles did not constitute grounds for recusal. 1 F.3d at 995. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held: The judge's appearance on Nightline [ [36] ] is another matter, however. 1 F.3d at 995. Because the trial judge insisted on Nightline that he would see to it that his injunction was enforced, he unavoidably created the appearance that [he] had become an active participant in bringing law and order to bear on the protestors, rather than remaining as a detached adjudicator. 1 F.3d at 995 (footnote omitted). On that basis, the court in Cooley held that the trial judge appeared biased and this appearance of bias warranted recusal. 1 F.3d at 995. Moreover, in Cooley, it is clear that the trial judge's remarks were wholly extrajudicial; the judge was commenting on events taking place on the streets of Wichita, Kansasnot on facts he had learned during the course of a trial. Nowhere does Monsanto offer facts in this case that indicate that Judge Laird has become an active participant on the plaintiffs' side of the case. Judge Laird's comments, if we were to accept the newspaper reports as accurately reflecting them, would indicate merely that Judge Laird will consider the issues, research the law, and issue rulings in accordance with the law. Finally, Monsanto's citation to In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir.2001), is similarly unpersuasive. In Boston's Children First, the judge wrote a letter to a newspaper explaining her decision in the case and making comments on the merits that provided defendants with a ready-made argument with which to distinguish the instant case from Mack [ v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (2000)]. 244 F.3d at 167 (footnote omitted). The court in Boston's Children First found that recusal was warranted because the judge's comments did more than correct[ ] [the plaintiff's] misrepresentations and creat[ed] an appearance of partiality. 244 F.3d at 171. The court held that it would have been perfectly acceptable for the trial judge to explain the procedures of her court, or to correct factual misrepresentations. 244 F.3d at 170. Monsanto's petition in this case, however, is devoid of evidence indicating that Judge Laird has done anything in media interviews but repeat statements he has made on the record in court or describe the procedures being used in the litigation. Because this Court concludes that Monsanto has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief it seeks, we deny its petition for the writ of mandamus requiring Judge Laird's recusal from this case. PETITION DENIED. HOUSTON, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur. MOORE, C.J., concurs in the result.