Opinion ID: 1058303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unanimity Regarding Aggravating Factors

Text: The circuit court also denied Prieto's request for a sentencing verdict form that informed the jury that it had to be unanimous in the finding of one or both of the aggravating factors. Verdict forms two and three utilized by the jury in its findings, provided, in pertinent part: [A]fter consideration of [the defendant's] prior history ... there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or his conduct in committing the offense is outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture or depravity of mind, and having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unanimously fix his punishment at death. (Emphasis added). Specifically, Prieto argued that the two aggravating factors are elements of the offense that must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury, pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Prieto's proposed verdict form, which was not granted by the circuit court, included the phrase unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt in the finding of each aggravator. [6] Prieto also raised this issue post-trial in a motion to set aside the death sentences and for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. On appeal, Prieto argues that the verdict forms were defective under Ring because they did not require the jury to unanimously find at least one of the aggravating factors to impose a death sentence. Prieto contends that the aggravating factors are elements of the offense because they are facts that increase the maximum punishment from life imprisonment to death. According to Prieto, it is not clear from the verdict forms whether the jury unanimously found either or both of the aggravating factors as required by Ring. The Commonwealth responds that neither of the aggravating factors is an element, but rather, they are alternate means of proof. The Commonwealth argues that Code § 19.2-264.4 only requires that the vote for imposing a death sentence be unanimous. The Commonwealth asserts that our decisions in Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049, 100 S.Ct. 741, 62 L.Ed.2d 736 (1980), and Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 377 S.E.2d 595, cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3201, 105 L.Ed.2d 709 (1989), support its position that the jury need not make a unanimous finding regarding individual aggravating factors. We disagree with the Commonwealth on this issue. [T]he death penalty may not be imposed unless the trier of fact finds one or both of the two aggravating factors that we have referred to as `vileness' and `future dangerousness.' Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 149, 547 S.E.2d 186, 201 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094, 122 S.Ct. 840, 151 L.Ed.2d 719 (2002). The issue in this case is whether the two aggravating factors are elements of capital murder that must be found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. Code § 19.2-264.4(C) provides: The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim. Likewise, Code § 19.2-264.2 provides: In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death penalty may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be imposed. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). In Apprendi, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 469, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The factual determination at issue in Apprendi was addressed in the context of the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that provided for an extended term of imprisonment if the trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity. Id. at 468-69, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The decision in Apprendi was expounded upon two years later, in Ring, when the Supreme Court of the United States held that [c]apital defendants ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. 536 U.S. at 588, 122 S.Ct. 2428. In Ring, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Arizona's death penalty scheme, which allowed the trial judge, sitting alone and after a jury adjudication of a defendant's guilt, to determine the presence or absence of aggravating factors that allow imposition of the death penalty. The Court held that this scheme was unconstitutional, stating: If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact  no matter how the State labels it  must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Justice Scalia, concurring, noted: [T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives  whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane  must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 610, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Thus, our inquiry must focus on whether the aggravating factors in Virginia's death penalty statute are facts that increase the maximum punishment for a defendant. Clearly, they are. The death penalty may not be imposed unless the jury finds either or both of the aggravating factors of vileness or future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. Code §§ 19.2-264.2, -264.4. As such, the aggravating factors must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, because this Court has recognized that there are two distinct aggravating factors, one or both of the aggravating factors must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury before a death sentence may be imposed. Furthermore, Article I, § 8 of the Constitution of Virginia provides that a jury's verdict in a criminal case must be unanimous. The Commonwealth's reliance on Clark v. Commonwealth is misplaced. In Clark, the defendant argued that the verdict form authorized the jury to impose a penalty of death if it found the defendant's conduct involved depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim, which is a challenge that the form should reflect unanimity regarding which sub-factor of the vileness aggravating factor on which the jury based its verdict, not whether unanimity was required for the vileness factor. 220 Va. at 213, 257 S.E.2d at 791. We rejected the defendant's argument, holding that the verdict returned by the jury complie[d] with the language of the statute. Id. Thus, Clark stands only for the proposition that the jury's finding regarding the various sub-factors of the vileness aggravating factor need not be unanimous. Clark was decided prior to Apprendi and Ring, and we did not address whether the jury's verdict regarding the two aggravating factors of future dangerousness or vileness must be unanimous. The Commonwealth's reliance on Hoke v. Commonwealth is also misplaced. In Hoke, the defendant argued that his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was violated because a jury instruction, to which he did not object, was ambiguous and vague and therefore violated [his] constitutional rights to a unanimous verdict. 237 Va. at 315, 377 S.E.2d at 602 (internal quotation marks omitted). He argued that the instruction did not delineate between the vileness and future dangerousness aggravating factors. Id. However, the defendant conceded that the death sentence was unanimous. Id. Moreover, the circuit court polled the jury, and each juror affirmed that his or her verdict was based on both aggravating factors. Id. Because there was an independent basis to affirm the jury's finding regarding both aggravating factors, and because the defendant conceded that the verdict was unanimous, we did not address the merits of the defendant's unanimity argument. Unlike Prieto's proffered verdict form, there is no language in verdict forms two and three requiring the jury to find one or both aggravating factors unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, it is impossible to discern from the verdict forms whether the jury unanimously found either or both aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. This presents the troubling possibility that six or more of the jurors based their decision on the future dangerousness factor, while the other six or fewer based their decision on the vileness factor. This hypothetical result, which is permissible according to the language in the verdict forms, would result in the jury sentencing Prieto to death based on a non-unanimous verdict in violation of the Virginia Constitution. Therefore, we hold that in the penalty phase of capital murder trials the death penalty may not be imposed unless the jury unanimously finds either one or both of the aggravating factors of vileness or future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. We further hold that the verdict form in Prieto II is defective in failing to explicitly set out the unanimity required in the jury finding of one or both of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Based upon the insufficiency of the verdict forms to provide the jury the specific option to impose a life sentence even if the jury finds both aggravating factors proven, and based upon the insufficiency of the verdict forms to require the jury to unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt one or both aggravating factors to impose a sentence of death, we will set aside the death sentences imposed by the jury and remand this case to the circuit court for a new sentencing proceeding.