Opinion ID: 1118951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant contends that there was evidence before the court showing that it accepted appellees' offer to terminate the lease and that consequently it was reversible error to find otherwise. We agree with appellant that there was some evidence of acceptance of the offer to terminate the lease; however, we hold that such does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. In this case, there is conflicting evidence as to whether or not the lease was terminated. The evidence presented by appellant was that, during February 1985, Mr. Innes orally advised Mr. Baeder that appellant accepted the offer to terminate the lease. The evidence presented by appellees is that they did not receive an acceptance of their offer; they continued to receive lease payments through May 1985; and they deducted the June lease payment from other moneys inadvertently sent to them, without objection by appellant. This Court has frequently stated its standard for appellate review of conflicting evidence to be: On appeal, we accept the evidence presented by the prevailing party as true, leaving out of consideration entirely conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, giving every favorable inference that may fairly and reasonably be drawn from the successful party's evidence. Wangler v. Federer, Wyo., 714 P.2d 1209, 1216-17 (1986), citing Matter of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985), and Stockton v. Sowerwine, Wyo., 690 P.2d 1202 (1984). We are, therefore, obliged in this case to disregard appellant's conflicting evidence that it accepted appellees' offer to terminate the lease. Giving every favorable inference that may be fairly and reasonably drawn from appellees' evidence, we must accept the finding of the trial court that there was no termination of the lease agreement and that appellees were entitled to the unpaid lease payments. Appellant also contends that the court erred by requiring it to pay for the new price of the computer and lease payments after the lease terminated. This contention is without merit. In the absence of a sale to appellant, appellees, pursuant to the terms of the lease, were the owners and entitled to possession of the leased equipment upon termination of the lease, regardless of how or when termination took place. In any event, judgment was entered against appellant for payment of the value of the equipment which defendant failed to return, not the new price of the computer.