Opinion ID: 1251693
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Determination as a Matter of Law

Text: This Court has consistently dealt with the determination of intervening cause within the framework of the proximate cause analysis and has relegated the task of resolution of these matters to the jury unless the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom are clear as a matter of law. Evans v. Farmer, 148 W.Va. 142, 133 S.E.2d 710 (1963). In syllabus point two of Evans, this Court explained: The questions of negligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, intervening cause and concurrent negligence are questions of fact for the jury where the evidence is conflicting or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men draw different conclusion from them. Id. at 143, 133 S.E.2d at 711, syl. pt. 2. In syllabus point six of Cullip ex rel. Pitts v. Domann, 266 Kan. 550, 972 P.2d 776 (1999), the court likewise clearly explained the distinction between issues of negligence to be decided by the jury and those to be determined as a matter of law: Ordinarily, questions of negligence including proximate cause are questions of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. However, where all the evidence relied upon by a party is undisputed and susceptible of only one inference, the question of proximate cause becomes a question of law. Id. at 779. Similarly, in George v. Breising, 206 Kan. 221, 477 P.2d 983 (1970), a case involving the theft of a vehicle left with a private garage for repairs, the court concluded as a matter of law that although the act of leaving the keys in the ignition was negligent, the intervening act of negligence of the car thief was the direct and proximate cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff. Id. at 988-89; see also Rodriguez v. Pro Cable Serv. Co., 266 A.D.2d 894, 697 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441 (N.Y.App. Div. 4 1999) (concluding that the issue of legal cause may be determined as a matter of law where the facts lead to only one rational conclusion); Stephenson ex rel. Coley v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 168 Misc.2d 528, 638 N.Y.S.2d 889, 894 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1996) (discussing breaking the chain of causation where intervening acts are extraordinary, not foreseeable, or independent). The lower court discerned no conflicting evidence regarding the firing of the gun; nor did the lower court conclude that the facts were such that reasonable men could draw different conclusions therefrom. The individuals present at the time of the discharge of the gun all indicate in their statements, affidavits, and depositions that Mr. Cool pulled the trigger twice, firing the fatal shot on the second attempt. The witnesses further indicate that Mr. Cool fired the shots with no assistance or encouragement from other individuals. Mr. Cool made a conscious decision to remove the bullet from the gun, place it back into the cylinder, and fire the gun. When that first attempt did not produce a bullet, Mr. Cool spun the cylinder again and fired the gun a second time, killing himself. The lower court consequently found that the decedent's act, whether characterized as intentional suicide or a tragic consequence of playing Russian Roulette, constitutes an intervening cause as a matter of law. Upon review of the record, briefs, and arguments of counsel, we agree with the lower court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the self-inflicted gunshot wound, that the decedent's act constituted an intervening cause, and that summary judgment was appropriate. We therefore affirm the decision of the lower court. Affirmed.