Opinion ID: 1154894
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony about Defendant's prior statements

Text: Defendant unsuccessfully moved to exclude statements he made while incarcerated in 1984 or 1985 to Arizona Department of Corrections counselor Robert Emerick. When asked whether Defendant showed any remorse for the 1981 sexual assault, Mr. Emerick stated [t]he only remorse that [Defendant] ever conveyed was that he had been caught and that there was somebody who was left behind to report him. When asked what specific language Defendant used, Mr. Emerick stated: To the best of my recollection, we had [Defendant] roleplaying or giving us an account of how he had controlled his cousin, and he had described having a knife to her and then he described, `I'll never make this mistake again,' and his pupils in his eyes were about this big around. I can just remember thinking, this, this man is very dangerous. Mr. Emerick testified that interpreting Defendant's statement as showing remorse for the assault would have been completely out of character with all the other things [Defendant] had presented in group. During cross-examination, Mr. Emerick stated that he had worked with sex offenders for nine years and could only recall people who have left memorable impressions about their sex deviance patterns, on about three people, Ricky Bible being one of them. The court admitted this testimony to show premeditation under Ariz. R.Evid. 803(3). Defendant argues that the statements were irrelevant, improper hearsay, and unduly prejudicial. In this court, the State argues a theory of admissibility not pressed in the trial court. The State contends that the statements are not hearsay and were admissible under Ariz.R.Evid. 801(d)(2) We examine the propriety of admitting the evidence under Rule 803(3)  the ground of admission advanced by the State and accepted by the trial court. We therefore assume  as did the trial court and the proponent of the evidence  that the statements were hearsay. But see Ariz.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). Hearsay may be admissible if it is a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind ... (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling). Ariz. R.Evid. 803(3). An essential element of the murder charge was that Defendant committed the act with premeditation. See A.R.S. § 13-1105(A). Although Defendant's statements could be interpreted in more than one manner, they could reasonably be interpreted to mean that if Defendant again committed a sex crime, he would not leave the victim alive to testify against him. This tends to show Defendant's state of mind and is relevant to show both premeditation and motive to kill. See State v. Dickey, 125 Ariz. 163, 167, 608 P.2d 302, 306 (1980); State v. Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389, 404-05, 636 P.2d 637, 652-53 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003, 102 S.Ct. 1638, 71 L.Ed.2d 871 (1982); State v. Saiz, 103 Ariz. 567, 568-69, 447 P.2d 541, 542-42 (1968). Contrary to Defendant's arguments, the statements did not have to refer to a specific victim and, within reason, temporal remoteness goes to weight, not admissibility. See Mincey, 130 Ariz. at 404-05, 636 P.2d at 652-53; State v. Moore, 111 Ariz. 355, 356, 529 P.2d 1172, 1173 (1974). [35] Although the statements are susceptible to varying interpretations, it was for the jury to decide their precise meaning in light of the circumstances and context. The court could have properly concluded that these statements fall within the hearsay exception of Ariz.R.Evid. 803(3). When the issue of undue prejudice is raised, we review determinations under Ariz.R.Evid. 403 for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Taylor, 169 Ariz. 121, 126, 817 P.2d 488, 493 (1991). The record indicates that the statements were made three or four years before the victim's abduction. This time lag and the fact that the statements were made about a broad group and were interpreted by Mr. Emerick all indicate that the statements' probative value was not overwhelming. The testimony also had the very real potential to be used improperly by the jury as character evidence. Ariz.R.Evid. 404(b). On the other hand, the State had available, but did not introduce, more explicit and damaging testimony from other individuals who heard Defendant make similar statements closer to the time of the victim's abduction. In sum, we cannot state that the court abused its discretion by finding that the probative value of the statements was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ariz.R.Evid. 403. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Mr. Emerick's testimony.