Opinion ID: 3211934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: consciousness of guilt evidence must

Text: REASONABLY SUPPORT ALL NECESSARY INFERENCES TO CONCLUDE A DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF THE CHARGED CRIME As stated, rule 404(2) governs the admissibility of consciousness of guilt evidence.21 And it is relevant as a circumstance supporting an inference that the defendant committed the crime charged.22 In State v. Clancy,23 we considered, under rule 404(2), whether a defendant’s intimidation of a State’s witness was admissible to show his consciousness of guilt. We explained that the chain of reasoning from his threat to his guilt of the charged crime required two inferences: “‘from conduct to consciousness of guilt, and then from consciousness of guilt to the guilty deed.’”24 And we quoted Wigmore’s treatise to emphasize the strength of such evidence: “‘No one doubts that the state of mind which we call “guilty consciousness” is perhaps the strongest evidence . . . that the person is indeed the guilty doer; nothing but an hallucination or a most extraordinary mistake will otherwise explain its presence.’”25 And as the Ninth Circuit put it, evidence showing consciousness of guilt is “second only to a confession in terms of probative value.”26 21 See Clancy, supra note 3. 22 See State v. Draganescu, 276 Neb. 448, 755 N.W.2d 57 (2008); Clancy, supra note 3. 23 Clancy, supra note 3. 24 Id. at 499, 398 N.W.2d at 716, quoting 1 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 173 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). 25 Id., quoting 2 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 273(1) (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). 26 U.S. v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1557 (9th Cir. 1995). - 816 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports STATE v. OLDSON Cite as 293 Neb. 718 Our reasoning in Clancy is consistent with legal authorities who agree that under rule 404(2), consciousness of guilt evidence is logically relevant to establish a defendant’s guilty “knowledge” of the charged crime under rule 404(2). The guilty knowledge, in turn, serves as an intermediate inference to prove the defendant’s “identity” under rule 404(2). That is, guilty knowledge is an intermediate inference that the defendant is the perpetrator of the charged crime.27 The logical relevance of such evidence rests on a fact finder’s assumption that an innocent person would not have committed the act or made the statement that the prosecution holds up as “‘an expost facto indication’ of the defendant’s identity as the criminal.”28 But our statement in Clancy that “‘nothing but an hallucination or a most extraordinary mistake will otherwise explain its presence’”29 speaks to another important requirement for admitting evidence to show consciousness of guilt: The evidence should be sufficient to reasonably support the inference that the defendant had guilty knowledge of the charged crime. As Wigmore recognized, “in the process of inferring the existence of that inner consciousness from the outward conduct, there is ample room for erroneous inference; and it is in this respect chiefly that caution becomes desirable and that judicial rulings upon specific kinds of conduct become necessary.”30 So our opinions upholding consciousness of guilt evidence have generally involved conduct or statements that firmly linked the defendant’s extrinsic conduct or statement to the defendant’s guilty knowledge of the charged crime. For example, in Clancy, a fact finder could confidently 27 See, 1 Barbara E. Bergman & Nancy Hollander, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 4:36 (15th ed. 1997); 1 Imwinkelried, supra note 13, § 3:04. 28 See 1 Imwinkelried, supra note 13, § 3:04 at 10. 29 Clancy, supra note 3, 224 Neb. at 499, 398 N.W.2d at 716. 30 2 Wigmore, supra note 25, § 273(1) at 115-16. - 817 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports STATE v. OLDSON Cite as 293 Neb. 718 infer that a person innocent of a charged crime would not threaten a witness against him or her in the pending trial for that crime. Courts have found that many different types of acts are relevant to show a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. Many of these acts have involved a defendant’s flight or avoidant behavior to escape arrest or detection, or a defendant’s attempt to influence jurors or witnesses.31 But some cases dealing with a defendant’s alleged flight illustrate that consciousness of guilt evidence can be unreliable, depending on the surrounding circumstances. We have recognized this problem. In a case involving a defendant’s alleged flight from a burglary, we stated the following rule: Departure from the scene after a crime has been committed, of itself, does not warrant an inference of guilt. . . . [T]he proper rule [is] that for departure to take on the legal significance of flight, there must be circumstances present and unexplained which, in conjunction with the leaving, reasonably justify an inference that it was done with a consciousness of guilt and pursuant to an effort to avoid apprehension or prosecution based on that guilt.32 Similarly, we affirmed a court’s admission of flight evidence to show the defendant’s consciousness of guilt when the “testimony indicate[d] that [the defendant] could have only leapt out of a second-story window to avoid apprehension.”33 Accordingly, we have said that when the evidence is sufficient to justify an inference that the defendant acted with consciousness of guilt, the fact finder can consider such evidence even if the conduct could be explained in another way.34 31 See 1 Imwinkelried, supra note 13. 32 State v. Lincoln, 183 Neb. 770, 772, 164 N.W.2d 470, 472 (1969) (citations omitted). 33 State v. Freemont, 284 Neb. 179, 195, 817 N.W.2d 277, 293 (2012). 34 See Draganescu, supra note 22. - 818 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports STATE v. OLDSON Cite as 293 Neb. 718 But not all evidence will justify an inference of a defend­ ant’s guilty knowledge. There are limits to how far a trial court can allow the State to stretch inferences from circumstantial evidence that is relevant to prove the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. An inference resting on speculation or conjecture cannot support a criminal conviction.35 So if the State’s circumstantial evidence only supports an inference through speculation or only supports two equally speculative inferences, a trial court should exclude it when a party has properly invoked rule 403. Under rule 403, a court may exclude relevant evidence if it presents a danger of unfair prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury that substantially outweighs its probative value. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis.36 Courts should generally exclude speculative evidence as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under rule 403 because it encourages jurors to reach a determination on an improper basis—that is, by drawing unreasonable inferences.37 For example, we have held that a court should exclude an expert’s opinion when it gives rise to conflicting inferences of equal probability, because the choice between them is a matter of conjecture.38 Federal courts agree that evidence which requires speculation to be relevant is inadmissible under their 35 See State v. Garza, 256 Neb. 752, 592 N.W.2d 485 (1999). Accord, e.g., U.S. v. Katakis, 800 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2015); U.S. v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2011); U.S. v. Pinckney, 85 F.3d 4 (2d Cir. 1996). 36 State v. Castillas, 285 Neb. 174, 826 N.W.2d 255 (2013), disapproved in part on other grounds, State v. Lantz, 290 Neb. 757, 861 N.W.2d 728 (2015). 37 See, State v. Johnson, 290 Neb. 862, 862 N.W.2d 757 (2015); Aon Consulting v. Midlands Fin. Benefits, 275 Neb. 642, 748 N.W.2d 626 (2008). 38 See Johnson, supra note 37; State v. Kuehn, 273 Neb. 219, 728 N.W.2d 589 (2007). - 819 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports STATE v. OLDSON Cite as 293 Neb. 718 counterpart to rule 403.39 And because speculative evidence has little, if any, probative value, its potential for unfair prejudice under rule 403 will usually substantially outweigh its probative value. Regarding flight fact patterns, legal commentators and other courts have extensively discussed how circumstances unrelated to a defendant’s guilt of a charged crime can often explain a defendant’s alleged avoidance or flight from law enforcement officials.40 Because evidence of flight can be unreliable and therefore unfairly prejudicial, flight cases illustrate how courts should consider rules 403 and 404 in tandem when the State offers evidence of a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. Federal courts require “careful deliberation” in the admission of flight evidence.41 Specifically, whether evidence of flight is admissible as circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s guilt depends on how confidently it supports all four necessary inferences in the chain of logic to reach a determination of guilt from the extrinsic conduct: (1) from the defendant’s behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged.42 39 See, Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, 795 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2015); U.S. v. Iron Hawk, 612 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597 (11th Cir. 1990). 40 See, U.S. v. Williams, 33 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 1994), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); 1 Imwinkelried, supra note 13, § 3:05 (citing cases). 41 Williams, supra note 40, 33 F.3d at 879. Accord United States v. Blue Thunder, 604 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1979). 42 See, U.S. v. Carrillo, 660 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 2011); Myers, supra note 40. Accord, U.S. v. Harrison, 585 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Al-Sadawi, 432 F.3d 419 (2d Cir. 2005); Williams, supra note 40; U.S. v. Hankins, 931 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1987); Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1997), abrogated on other grounds, Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2001). - 820 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports STATE v. OLDSON Cite as 293 Neb. 718 In a seminal case, the Fifth Circuit held that the court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant’s flight because it could not support the third inference: consciousness of guilt for the charged crime. In United States v. Myers,43 the government charged the defendant with robbing a bank in Florida. Between the Florida robbery and his arrest in California—when he allegedly tried to flee arrest—he was known to have committed an armed robbery in Pennsylvania. The Fifth Circuit concluded that even assuming that the defendant had tried to flee arrest in California, the evidence did not rule out the possibility that he was fleeing arrest for the Pennsylvania robbery, his guilt of which would have been a sufficient cause for his flight in itself. Accordingly, it was error to allow the jury to infer from his flight that he was guilty of the charged robbery in Florida. And the same reasoning applies to the string of necessary inferences to conclude that the excerpts from Oldson’s journal showed his guilt. In these excerpts, Oldson did not confess to physically or sexually assaulting Beard. Nor did he confess to kidnapping or killing her. And the court did not admit any of these excerpts to show a confession. So to conclude that any excerpt was relevant to show Oldson’s guilt for Beard’s murder, a juror would need to make the following string of inferences: (1) Oldson’s statement in the excerpt referred to Beard; (2) he did not explicitly refer to Beard in the excerpt because he was trying to conceal the information in it from law enforcement officers who were still investigating her disappearance; (3) he was trying to conceal the information in the excerpt because it would show either that he had previously lied about not having a sexual relationship with Beard, or about his interactions with her on the night she disappeared, or that he had guilty knowledge about her murder; (4) if the excerpt showed that he had previously lied, he did so because 43 Myers, supra note 40. - 821 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports STATE v. OLDSON Cite as 293 Neb. 718 he was guilty of committing a crime against Beard; and (5) the crime he was guilty of was her murder. Because a chain of inferences is necessary to reach a determination of guilt, the extrinsic evidence should reasonably support each inference in the chain of logic. Especially under these circumstances, it is insufficient to conclude that the evidence supports an inference that Oldson was guilty of a crime if it does not also reasonably support an inference that he was conscious of his guilt for the charged crime. Second, although the State can show a defendant’s consciousness of guilt from the defendant’s inculpatory statements, instead of acts, such statements should also reasonably support an inference of the defendant’s guilty knowledge of the charged crime. An example would be a verbal threat to a State’s witness, as in Clancy. Our decision in State v. Ellis44 also speaks to this issue. In Ellis, the inculpatory statements made by the defendant, Roy Ellis, showed his guilty knowledge of facts specific to a child’s murder before the State charged him with the crime. We concluded that the trial court erred under rule 404 in admitting evidence that he had sexually assaulted his stepdaughters 10 years earlier to show his intent for the child’s murder. We reasoned that this evidence was relevant only through classic propensity reasoning, but we concluded that the error was harmless. In doing so, we emphasized witnesses’ testimonies about suspicious statements that the defendant made while he was in jail for unrelated crimes. We concluded the witnesses had described details that they could not have known unless they had learned them from the person who killed the child: There was no innocent explanation for how Ellis’ DNA came to be on [the victim’s] bloody clothing. Nor is there any innocent explanation for how several witnesses came forward with information before [the victim’s] body or 44 State v. Ellis, 281 Neb. 571, 799 N.W.2d 267 (2011). - 822 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports STATE v. OLDSON Cite as 293 Neb. 718 Ellis’ DNA on her clothing had been discovered linking Ellis to the killing—some of whom even accurately described [the victim’s] cause of death and the possible location of her body. This evidence can only be explained by the conclusion that Ellis was the killer.45 The reason for requiring the State’s evidence to reasonably support each inference necessary to a determination of guilt should be apparent. Consciousness of guilt evidence usually casts the defendant in an unfavorable light and always requires more than one inference to reach a determination of guilt. So unless the evidence reasonably supports each inference in the chain, the danger is high that the jurors will engage in outright conjecture or resort to propensity reasoning to conclude that a defendant is guilty. The danger exists because the court has instructed them that the evidence is relevant for a specific purpose or has allowed them to consider it for any purpose. Finding guilt based on conjectural facts or propensity reasoning is obviously unfairly prejudicial and necessarily outweighs the probative value of a weak or nonexistent chain of inferences. So under our case law, the ultimate test of admissibility should be whether a juror could reasonably conclude—i.e., without relying on speculation or propensity reasoning—that the circumstantial evidence shows a defendant’s guilt for the charged crime. Having established the relevant admissibility standard for rule 404(2) evidence generally and consciousness of guilt evidence specifically, I turn to the court’s admission of Oldson’s statements in his journal.