Opinion ID: 2780869
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Stash House Enhancement.

Text: We come now to the first of the defendant's claims of sentencing error: his claim that the district court erred in enhancing his offense level on the ground that he maintained the apartment as a stash house. We approach this aspect of the case mindful that the government bears the burden of proving the elements of a sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Paneto, 661 F.3d 709, 715 (1st Cir. 2011). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. See id. When the raw facts are susceptible to more than one reasonable inference, a sentencing court's choice between those competing inferences cannot be clearly erroneous. See United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 508 (1st Cir. 1990). In drug-trafficking cases, the sentencing guidelines direct a district court to increase a defendant's offense level by two levels if he maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. USSG §2D1.1(b)(12). Here, the proof — drawn largely from the suppression hearing — was something of a mixed bag. On the one hand, the evidence showed that the defendant did not own or rent the apartment (the ostensible tenant being one Crystal Croteau), did not receive mail there, did not use the address on any official forms (say, a driver's license), and did -12- not contract for any of the utilities (which were billed to Croteau). The surveillance evidence indicated that the defendant's primary residence was his girlfriend's home, not the apartment. On the other hand, the evidence showed that the defendant had ready access to the apartment. He testified that he had gotten a key from Croteau and admitted that he sometimes delivered the rent money on her behalf. He further admitted that he had given a duplicate key to Murphy, that he from time to time spent the night at the apartment (sometimes alone and sometimes with his girlfriend), that he kept clothes and a toothbrush there, and that he felt free to come and go as he pleased. There was no evidence that Croteau had ever lived in the apartment or that Murphy had ever spent the night there. Based on the facts developed during the government's surveillance and the suppression hearing, the district court found that the defendant had dominion and control over the apartment and used it principally for purposes of his drug-distribution enterprise. The court proceeded to apply the stash house enhancement, hiking the defendant's offense level by two levels. The defendant objected below, and renews his objection on appeal. The stash house enhancement was developed as a response to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which directed the Sentencing Commission to provide for a two-level enhancement when the defendant maintained an establishment for the manufacture or -13- distribution of a controlled substance, as generally described in [21 U.S.C. § 856]. Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 6(2), 124 Stat. 2372, 2373. In view of the enhancement's lineage, courts interpreting it have generally looked to case law interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 856. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699, 705-07 (8th Cir. 2012). We follow this praxis. The stash house enhancement applies when a defendant knowingly maintains a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. See USSG §2D1.1, comment. (n.17); see also United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 295-96 (10th Cir. 1995). The term maintains is not defined either in the guideline or in its statutory antecedent. The Sentencing Commission's commentary, designed to bridge this gap, instructs courts to consider, among other things, whether the defendant held a possessory interest in (e.g., owned or rented) the premises and the extent to which the defendant controlled access to, or activities at, the premises. USSG §2D1.1, comment. (n.17). In cases arising under section 856, courts have deemed relevant considerations such as [a]cts evidencing such matters as control, duration, acquisition of the site, renting or furnishing the site, repairing the site, supervising, protecting, supplying food to those at the site, and continuity. United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 1992). This is obviously a non- -14- exhaustive list; as particular cases vary, so too will the factors that may inform the question of whether a defendant maintains a premises. The use component of the stash house enhancement is likewise protean. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: for the enhancement to apply, drug distribution need not be the sole reason that a defendant maintains the premises. Rather, drug distribution must be a primary or principal use, as opposed to a use that is merely incidental or collateral. USSG §2D1.1, comment. (n.17). A defendant's purpose may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including such facts as the quantity of drugs discovered and the presence of drug paraphernalia or tools of the drug-trafficking trade. See Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 533-34; see also Verners, 53 F.3d at 296-97 (explaining that the more characteristics of a business that are present, the more likely it is that the property is being used for a prohibited purpose). One relevant consideration is frequency; that is, how often the defendant used the premises for drug-related purposes and how often he used the premises for lawful purposes. See USSG §2D1.1, comment. (n.17). Examined through this prism, the district court's deployment of the stash house enhancement passes muster. There was ample evidence that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the apartment. He had a key, came and went at will, and slept -15- there whenever he pleased. He — and no one else — kept clothes and toiletries there. In addition, he controlled the activities that took place at the apartment (by, for example, furnishing a key to his coconspirator) and ensured that the premises would remain available by delivering rent payments. The district court's finding that a sufficient nexus existed between the premises and the defendant's drug-trafficking activities is unimpugnable. Surveillance evidence showed that the defendant and Murphy sold drugs from the apartment for nearly three months. Furthermore, the DEA's search of the apartment disclosed that sizeable quantities of cocaine and numerous accouterments of the drug-trafficking trade (e.g., a digital scale, boxes of baking soda and sandwich bags, kilo wrappers bearing cocaine residue, and a pot and spoon that tested positive for cocaine) were being kept there. Viewed against this backdrop, we discern no clear error in the district court's finding that a principal use of the apartment was for activities related to the defendant's distribution of controlled substances. The defendant's efforts to resist the enhancement are unavailing. To begin, he argues that he did not maintain the apartment at all since he neither owned nor rented it. This is true as far as it goes, but it does not take the defendant very far. The enhancement does not require either ownership or a leasehold interest. See, e.g., United States v. Renteria-Saldana, -16- 755 F.3d 856, 859-60 (8th Cir. 2014); Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 532. This makes good sense: it would defy reason for a drug dealer to be able to evade application of the enhancement by the simple expedient of maintaining his stash house under someone else's name. See United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 857-58 (5th Cir. 1997). The defendant's second plaint is no more compelling. He asserts that he lacked sufficient control over the apartment because his access was non-exclusive. This is wishful thinking: the terms of the enhancement do not require that a defendant control access to the premises to the exclusion of all others. The defendant's third attack on the imposition of the enhancement is an exercise in revisionist history. He challenges the finding that a primary use of the apartment was for drug distribution on the ground that he and others used the apartment as a residence. That is pure codswallop: the court below supportably found that the apartment was not the defendant's habitual residence, and the record contains no evidence that anyone else lived there. Finally, the defendant complains that what was sauce for the goose was not sauce for the gander: when sentenced, Murphy did not receive the stash house enhancement. Building on this rickety foundation, he suggests that applying the enhancement to him results in an unwarranted sentencing disparity. This suggestion is vecordious. -17- To begin, the defendant's argument erects a false dichotomy. The issue is whether the record fairly supports the enhancement as to the defendant. Whether Murphy (who was sentenced at a different time and on what may have been a different record) deserved a similar enhancement is a different question. See, e.g., United States v. Rios, 893 F.2d 479, 481 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam). At any rate, the district court warrantably found the evidence that the defendant maintained the apartment much stronger than the evidence that Murphy maintained it. Thus, any disparate treatment was fully justified.