Opinion ID: 1835165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: written reasons

Text: Ennis complains that the trial court did not explain in writing the reasons for his resentence. Ennis stresses the statutory dictate that [a]ll sentences imposed must be accompanied by a written statement by the court setting forth the reasons for imposing the particular sentence. The statement must become part of the record of the case. NDCC 12.1-32-02(6). Ennis argues that, for probation revocation, a written explanation is also an expectation of the constitutional standard of due process. Traditionally, there has been no requirement that the judge particularize either the factual information or the criteria upon which he relied in determining the sentence, though the giving of such explanations is often said to be a desirable practice. 3 LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure § 25.2(d), at 129 (1984). See also Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 98 (1978). In most states, a sentencing judge is not expected to supply a coherent and rational judgment when he informs the defendant of his fate. Id. at 128, quoting Frankel, Criminal Sentences at 39 (1972). North Dakota has generally followed this tradition. A trial judge is ordinarily allowed the widest range of discretion in fixing a criminal sentence. State v. Wells, 265 N.W.2d 239 (N.D.1978). On appeal of a claim that a sentence is excessive or incorrect, this court has no power to review the discretion of a sentencing court in fixing a term of imprisonment within the range authorized by statute. State v. Joern, 249 N.W.2d 921, 923 (N.D.1977); State v. Holte, 87 N.W.2d 47, 50 (N.D.1957). Appellate review of a criminal sentence is confined to determining whether the judge acted within the limits prescribed by statute, or substantially relied on an impermissible factor. State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D.1986); State v. Kaufman, 310 N.W.2d 709, 714 (N.D.1981); State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533 (N.D.1979); State v. Rudolph, 260 N.W.2d 13 (N.D.1977). Our appellate review of a criminal sentence is very limited. [3] We have noted several times that the effect of noncompliance with this recent statutory direction for an explained sentence remains undecided. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D.1985); City of Riverside v. Smuda, 339 N.W.2d 768 (N.D.1983). Ennis's argument in this case positions our attention on the purpose of this statutory direction for a written statement of reasons for a sentence. We conclude that only the traditional, limited appellate review of a trial court's criminal sentence is still contemplated. In large part, our conclusion rests on the legislative context and history of NDCC 12.1-32-02(6). [4] We discern no legislative intention to authorize general appellate review of the exercise of discretion by the sentencing court in fixing a criminal sentence. [5] The direction that a judge make the reasons for a sentence a part of the record would have some usefulness in assisting the board of pardons or the parole board to determine whether to shorten or commute a sentence, or to release a prisoner on parole. See NDCC 12-55-30 and 12-59-05. Written reasons would also assure that the sentencing judge has in fact carefully considered and weighed all of the relevant factors where a person's liberty is at stake. Cf. State v. Klem, 438 N.W.2d 798, 801 (N.D.1989) (One of the reasons for written findings is to evidence that the trial court has considered and weighed competing interests and to encourage careful consideration). However, this statutory direction for written reasons by a sentencing judge does not authorize general appellate review of a sentencing judge's discretion. Ennis begins his argument seeking appellate review of his sentence by urging that the trial court failed to make written findings that his actions violated conditions of his probation. In effect, Ennis seems to challenge revocation of his probation, although he did not appeal from that order. Rather, he appealed from a later order denying correction of his sentence. [6] Ennis's argument seems to be that sending him back to prison was unlawful for lack of explicit findings. According to the testimony of his probation officer, Ennis had permission to leave North Dakota for Montana, but later relocated to another state without permission. Eventually Ennis stopped reporting to his probation officer altogether. The probation officer testified that Ennis had made no payments on his fines even though he had been employed, and that Ennis stated that he did not intend to pay his fines. Although Ennis's attorney cross-examined this witness, Ennis chose not to testify at the hearing and offered no direct evidence to refute the probation officer. Not surprisingly, the trial court deemed this uncontroverted evidence sufficient to revoke probation and to return Ennis to prison. This procedure followed that set out in NDRCrimP 32(f)(2) for revoking probation. [7] See State v. Miller, 418 N.W.2d 614 (N.D.1988). The trial court obviously concluded that Ennis's violations of probation were sufficiently serious to revoke his probation. The proceedings were recorded, as the rule requires, and were later transcribed for this appeal. In North Dakota, in a criminal case tried without a jury, a trial court usually need make only a general finding of guilty or not guilty. NDRCrimP 23(d). Compare NDRCrimP 12(e) (If factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its essential findings on the record). However, something more than a general finding is constitutionally required to revoke probation and there are some limitations that apply to any sentence. See State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D.1986); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1978). Ennis argues that these considerations apply here. The U.S. Supreme Court outlined procedural requirements of the Constitution for revocation of parole or probation in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). The Supreme Court reaffirmed those due process requirements in Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985). The probationer is entitled to written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. Id. 105 S.Ct. at 2258 (citation omitted and emphasis added). In Black, the Supreme Court elaborated on the reasons for the requirement of a written statement of the evidence and reasons for revoking probation: The procedures already afforded by Gagnon and Morrissey protect the defendant against revocation of probation in a constitutionally unfair manner. . . . The written statement required by Gagnon and Morrissey helps to insure accurate factfinding with respect to any alleged violation and provides an adequate basis for review to determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported by the evidence. Id. 105 S.Ct. at 2259 (citation omitted). Thus, a record statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for doing so is constitutionally called for in revoking probation. In this case, the trial court's written Order Revoking Probation contains no explicit statement of the evidence relied on or of the reasons for revoking probation. However, on the record at the end of the hearing, the court explained, I'm not going to turn him loose, I'll tell you that, because he's defied the Court and refused to pay his fine and costs and ... been on the run, more or less. . . . While terse, this explanation effectively found Ennis guilty of the charged violations of the conditions of his probation, that he refused to pay on his fines, that he failed to get approval before moving to another state, and that he failed to properly report to his probation officer. Following these findings, the trial court entered the written Order Revoking Probation. As in Black, [t]he memorandum prepared by the sentencing court and the transcript of the hearing provided the necessary written statement explaining the evidence relied upon and the reason for the decision to revoke probation. 105 S.Ct. at 2260. See also Pearson v. State, 308 Minn. 287, 241 N.W.2d 490 (1976) (Requirement that written statement be made by the factfinder is satisfied where trial court states its findings and reasons on record which is transcribed to permit review). Thus, the rudiments for revoking probation were fulfilled in this case. Ennis goes on to argue that there was no statement setting forth the reasons for imposing the term of incarceration ordered. Citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), Ennis insists that there were no events subsequent to the first imposition of sentence which warrant an increased penalty and the District Court did not affirmatively state any grounds for increasing the sentence, and that the trial court did not explain why it rejected alternatives to imprisoning him again. Ordinarily, where a defendant whose probation was revoked had a full opportunity to present mitigating factors to the sentencing judge and to propose alternatives to incarceration, he has been afforded the constitutional process due even though the state judge did not explain on the record his consideration and rejection of alternatives to incarceration. Black v. Romano, 105 S.Ct. at 2260. Yet, as Black recognizes, 105 S.Ct. at 2259, some circumstances call for more explanation when probation is revoked. Unless one of those additional circumstances is present, Ennis received all the consideration and explanation that the Constitution commands and that the law requires for revoking probation. One circumstance that sometimes needs further explanation is where the judge imposes a more severe sentence when resentencing. In such a case, the reasons for the increase may need elaboration to guard against a vindictive increase in the punishment. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 89 S.Ct. at 2081; Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). But, as we have seen, the trial court did not increase Ennis's sentence when his probation was revoked. The trial court simply resentenced Ennis to the time remaining that Ennis had not spent in custody or in prison on his first sentence. Since Ennis's punishment was not increased, the trial court did not need to make additional explanations for this reason. Presumably, in imposing the original sentence, now reinstated, the trial court explained its reasons. No useful purpose would be served by requiring the sentencing court to reiterate its reasons when revoking that probation. Another circumstance sometimes requires more explanation of a sentence. Where payment of a fine or restitution is a condition of probation, and the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay... yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2070-71, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983) (footnote omitted). [I]n revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2073. Framing his argument around this constitutional foundation, Ennis insists that [i]f the incarceration was based primarily upon non-payment of costs and fines the sentence is unduly excessive and is illegal under Section 12.1-32-05(3)[ ] of the North Dakota Century Code. [8] If a default in payment of a fine for a felony is not excusable, NDCC 12.1-32-05(3)(b) limits the resulting imprisonment to six months. Since the trial court said, in revoking Ennis's probation, that he defied the Court and refused to pay his fine and costs, Ennis argues that any prison sentence over six months was excessive and illegal. If Ennis willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation and sentence [him] to imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing authority. Bearden, 103 S.Ct. at 2073 (our emphasis). The problem here is that, in North Dakota, the authorized sentence for nonpayment of a fine cannot exceed six months imprisonment. NDCC 12.1-32-05(3)(b). See also North Dakota Criminal Code Hornbook, 50 N.D.L.Rev. 639, 650 (1973-1974) (In lieu of alternative sentences the New Code allows imprisonment for a short period provided the defendant fails to establish his default as excusable. The provisions of the New Code relating to fines are substantially similar to those in the Proposed Federal Code.) (footnotes omitted). Ennis was resentenced to over five years. If that resentence was based solely on nonpayment of the fines, the sentence would exceed the authorized range and would be illegal. On the other hand, Ennis's failures to get permission for his moves and to report were reasons which authorized revocation of probation and imposition of the original sentence. These were the significant factors that the trial court considered in sentencing. Most of the revocation hearing focused on Ennis's failure to keep in contact with his probation officer. Because there is nothing to indicate that the trial court relied solely on an impermissible factor, and there were proper factors which the court obviously considered in resentencing, we decline to vacate Ennis's sentence. State v. Kaufman, 310 N.W.2d 709, 714 (N.D.1981). Accordingly, we affirm. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and GIERKE, VANDE WALLE and LEVINE, JJ., concur.