Opinion ID: 2320067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Respondent's Cross-Appeal

Text: The respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it found that he agreed to waive his claim to [the] petitioner's stock in return for her agreement not to pursue his Rock 101 401(k) account. The respondent contends that this finding is based upon no evidence. The trial transcript refutes this assertion. At trial, the petitioner offered to play a tape of a discussion between the parties in which she agreed to sign off on a 401 K that [the respondent] has and he said Jennifer, I will relinquish my rights, any rights I may have to your stock and your 401k. The petitioner asserted that because of the respondent's offer to sign off on her stock[,] she signed off on Valentine's Day of 2005 on his 401k. The trial court ruled that it would accept these assertions unless the respondent disputed them. If the respondent disputed them, the court would allow the tape to be played in rebuttal. The respondent told the court that it was unnecessary to play the tape. To the extent that the respondent now disputes the petitioner's version of the parties' conversation, he has failed to demonstrate that he preserved this argument for our review. See Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250, 855 A.2d 564 (2004). The respondent next asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded each party the personal effects in their possession. He contends, While that might sound fair, [the respondent] had virtually no personal[]ty in his possession. . . . [He] was reduced to not even having pots and pans. The petitioner testified, however, that the respondent took approximately $60,000 worth of personal property from the marital home after she filed for divorce. Having found the respondent to be one of the least credible witnesses the trial court had ever encountered, the court was entitled to disregard his testimony on this subject. See Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780, 829 A.2d 1059 (2003) (court defers to trial court's judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in testimony, measuring credibility of witnesses, and determining weight to be given evidence).

The respondent contends that the trial court erred when it imputed income to him for child support purposes after finding that he was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court found that the respondent was voluntarily underemployed because: (1) he was fired from a series of well-paying jobs as a result of his drug abuse; and (2) he walked away from employment compensating him at the rate of $52,000 a year. See RSA 458-C:2, IV(a) (2004). The respondent first argues that the evidence does not support these findings. We disagree. In addition to the petitioner's testimony that the respondent was fired from radio station WLNH, the record demonstrates that the respondent was also fired from radio station WKXL in April 2004, after the station received complaints that he was obviously drunk or medicated at client meetings. One complainant told the station that the respondent was nodding off during his sales call [and] was drooling. The record further showed that the respondent was fired from radio station WNNH in January 2004 because of his pattern of poor service, dishonesty, and losing clients for the station due to prescription drug abuse. This evidence supports the trial court's finding that the respondent was fired from several jobs because of his prescription drug abuse. There was evidence in the record as well to support the trial court's finding that the respondent walked away from employment for which he received an annual salary of $52,000. The respondent testified that before his current employment, he worked for two radio stations, WNEX in Rochester and another station in Nashua. When he worked for these stations, he earned approximately $1,000 per week. He testified that he left these positions in October, when I came back from Vermont and I lost everything I ever dreamed of and just didn't go back to work, I didn't even feel like it was worth it at the time. He also testified that he did not resume working in the radio industry until the end of January 2005. Based upon this testimony, the trial court reasonably could have found that the respondent walked away from the Rochester and Nashua radio positions. The respondent next asserts that because he did not intend to lose his jobs, his alleged underemployment was not voluntary. RSA 458-C:2, IV(a) authorizes [t]he court, in its discretion, [to] consider as gross income the difference between the amount a parent is earning and the amount a parent has earned in cases where the parent voluntarily becomes unemployed or underemployed, unless the parent is physically or mentally incapacitated. We have held that this statute permit[s], rather than require[s] a court to impute income based upon a voluntarily unemployed or underemployed parent's prior earnings. In the Matter of Bazemore & Jack, 153 N.H. 351, 355-56, 899 A.2d 225 (2006). Whether a party is underemployed is a question for the fact finder, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by evidence in the record. In the Matter of Donovan & Donovan, 152 N.H. 55, 58-59, 871 A.2d 30 (2005). In finding that the respondent was voluntarily underemployed and in imputing income to him based upon this finding, the trial court relied upon our decision in Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 455 A.2d 1051 (1983). In that case, we held that, in the context of a post-divorce request for modification of an existing child support order, the child support obligation should not be reduced where the obligor's wrongdoing resulted in the loss of high-earning employment and the obligor owned an asset that could be applied to meet his or her obligations. Noddin, 123 N.H. at 76, 455 A.2d 1051. In In the Matter of Rossino & Rossino, 153 N.H. 367, 370, 899 A.2d 233 (2006), we recently clarified that RSA 458-C:2, IV(a) supersedes our decision in Noddin. In Rossino, the obligor moved to modify his child support obligation after his annual income was reduced because he involuntarily resigned from his employment with the Hudson Police Department and, thereafter, while working as an electrician's apprentice, was electrocuted. Rossino, 153 N.H. at 368-69, 899 A.2d 233. Applying Noddin, the trial court attributed the higher earnings from the Hudson Police Department to the obligor. Id. at 369, 899 A.2d 233. Specifically the court found that it was a result of [the obligor's] own inappropriate conduct and voluntary actions that brought about his loss of employment with the Hudson Police Department. Id. We held that the court erred when it ruled that Noddin applied and imputed the obligor's higher earnings as a police officer to him without first determining whether the obligor was physically or mentally incapacitated. Id. at 370-71, 899 A.2d 233. We noted that were we to conclude that Noddin survived the enactment of RSA 458-C:2, IV(a), we would circumvent the stated purpose of RSA chapter 458-C to establish uniformity in child support determinations and modifications. Id. at 370, 899 A.2d 233. In this case, to the extent that the trial court found the respondent to be voluntarily underemployed because he lost his job(s) due to his own wrongdoing, we hold that it erred as a matter of law. RSA 458-C:2, IV(a) permits a trial court to impute income to a parent who voluntarily becomes unemployed or underemployed. A parent who is involuntarily terminated from his or her employment, or, as in the case of the obligor in Rossino, 153 N.H. at 368, 899 A.2d 233, involuntarily resigns from that employment, did not voluntarily become unemployed or underemployed. Our task is to interpret legislative intent from the statute as written. Donovan, 152 N.H. at 58, 871 A.2d 30. We will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. Accordingly, we will not graft Noddin onto the statutory scheme as written. We leave to the legislature to decide whether to revive Noddin by amending RSA 458-C:2, IV(a). We therefore vacate the trial court's finding that the respondent was voluntarily underemployed and its decision to impute income to him, to the extent that the court did so because it found that he was fired from several jobs. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and with our decision in Rossino.
Finally, the respondent argues that the court erred when it ordered that his share of the proceeds of the marital home be held in escrow until he is compensated at the level of his previous employment and is able to pay [the] petitioner the amount of child support he owes under the Guidelines. See RSA 458:21 (2004). While the respondent concedes that [t]rial courts clearly have the authority to provide for security for the payment of child support, he asserts that such security is restricted to those cases where there has been egregious non-payment, or misleading reporting of substantial amounts of income. (Citations omitted.) He contends, [T]here is no basis for the escrow the court required here. RSA 458:21 authorizes the trial court, in its discretion, to require security for payment of child support [i]n all cases where alimony or an allowance shall be decreed for a spouse or children. See In the Matter of Feddersen & Cannon, 149 N.H. 194, 200-01, 816 A.2d 1033 (2003). Although the respondent argues that the court may exercise its discretion in this regard only where there has been egregious non-payment, or misleading reporting of substantial amounts of income, RSA 458:21 contains no such limitation. Id. at 201, 816 A.2d 1033. In this case, the trial court required the escrow after finding that the respondent had presented no persuasive evidence that he is not still abusing prescription drugs. . . . As such, given the history of the case, and [his] demeanor and attitude at trial, the Court is not persuaded he will pay as ordered. In light of this finding, we cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by ordering that the respondent's share of the proceeds of the marital home be held in escrow to secure child support payments. Affirmed in part; vacated in part; and remanded.