Opinion ID: 4535523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of the “Misrepresentation” Under

Text: Ross While the District Court assumed that only a “clear misrepresentation” by prison staff can render remedies unavailable, our precedent says otherwise. We have long recognized that misleading as well as clearly erroneous statements can render a grievance process unavailable, beginning with our 2002 decision in Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2002). There, we held that an inmate who failed to file a formal grievance had nonetheless sufficiently complied with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement because he had received “misleading” instructions from prison staff: “security officials told [him] to wait for the termination of [an internal] investigation before commencing a formal 11 claim” and then “never informed [him] that the investigation was completed.” Id. at 112, 113. Because it was technically correct that the inmate could have waited until after the resolution of the internal investigation to file a grievance, see id. at 111 (noting that the inmate “could have filed a grievance” regardless of the status of the internal investigation), these instructions did not clearly misrepresent the grievance process. Yet we found that Brown was “entitled to rely” on these “misleading” instructions and that by giving the inmate advice “at odds” with the grievance process (to wait until the investigation was concluded) and then omitting crucial information from him (whether the investigation had concluded), the prison staff so misled him that they thwarted his ability to pursue relief through the grievance process, rendering it unavailable. Id. at 112. We most recently reiterated this legal standard in Rinaldi v. United States, where we characterized Brown as finding an inmate’s use of the grievance process thwarted when “he was given misleading filing instructions.” 904 F.3d at 267; see also Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2016) (relying on Brown to define when a grievance process is unavailable); Small, 728 F.3d at 271 (same). Our sister circuits, too, have uniformly found that instructions that are merely misleading but not necessarily clear misrepresentations can thwart an inmate’s use of a grievance process. For example, in Davis v. Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit held that administrative remedies were unavailable to an inmate who was told that the prison’s grievance process involved only a single step when it in fact involved two, applying the rule that “[g]rievance procedures 12 are unavailable to an inmate if the correctional facility’s staff misled the inmate as to the existence or rules of the grievance process so as to cause the inmate to fail to exhaust such process.” 798 F.3d 290, 291, 295 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted). The Eighth Circuit too has explicitly held that misleading instructions by prison staff can thwart an inmate’s use of a grievance process, concluding that administrative remedies were not available to an inmate who was “misled” by a prison official’s advice to wait to file a formal grievance until the prisoner received a response to his informal complaint, when in fact the inmate was required to file an appeal without awaiting a response. Townsend v. Murphy, 898 F.3d 780, 783– 84 (8th Cir. 2018). And other circuits are in accord. 6 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly defined what qualifies as a “misrepresentation” that “thwart[s] inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process,” its reasoning in 6 See, e.g., Swisher v. Porter Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 769 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (citing Brown for the proposition that “[w]hen jail personnel mislead inmates about how to invoke the procedure the inmates can’t be blamed for failing to invoke it”); Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2011) (relying on Brown to find that remedies are unavailable when “prison officials misle[a]d” a prisoner into thinking that “the remedy does not exist or inaccurately describe the steps he needs to take to pursue it”); Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding a grievance process unavailable to an inmate “misled” about the steps of that process); cf. Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding remedies unavailable to an inmate who relied on a prison official’s misleading advice). 13 Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1860, is consistent with the expansive definition adopted by the Courts of Appeals. The critical test under Ross is not whether a misrepresentation is “clear” but whether that misrepresentation amounts to “interference with an inmate’s pursuit of relief [that] renders the administrative process unavailable.” Id. Thus, in explaining that a grievance process is unavailable “when prison administrators thwart inmates . . . through . . . misrepresentation,” the Court looked to appellate court cases “address[ing] a variety of instances in which officials misled . . . individual inmates so as to prevent their use of otherwise proper procedures” and held that “such interference with an inmate’s pursuit of relief renders the administrative process unavailable.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court also cited approvingly to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Davis v. Hernandez and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pavey v. Conley, quoting language from both about prison staff “misleading” inmates. Id. at 1860 n.3 (citing Davis, 798 F.3d at 295, and Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir 2011)). This approach is also consistent with the statutory purposes of the PLRA exhaustion requirement. That requirement was intended to “return control of the inmate grievance process to prison administrators”; to “encourage development of an administrative record, and perhaps settlements, within the inmate grievance process”; and to “reduce the burden on the federal courts by erecting barriers to frivolous prisoner lawsuits.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004). But those benefits cannot be realized unless the grievance process to be exhausted is actually available to inmates and faithfully followed by the prisons. That is why we require prisons to “reasonably communicate[]” remedies to prisoners, Small, 728 F.3d at 271, and—recognizing that just as 14 “prisoners [must] comply with the procedural demands of a system created by their jailors[,]” “[n]o less must prisons comply with the demands of the system they created”—we require “strict compliance by prison officials with their own policies,” Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365, 367 (3d Cir. 2019). That is also why it is imperative that prisons refrain from not only clear misrepresentations, but also misleading statements. If prisoners conclude they cannot trust prison staff to give them reliable advice and instructions about the grievance process, they “will be more likely either to bypass internal procedures entirely and file a complaint in federal court or use a federal lawsuit to prod prison officials into a response, thus taxing the judicial resources that Congress meant to conserve by passing the PLRA.” Robinson, 831 F.3d at 155. Accurate advice, in contrast, allows for “grievance systems that provide—and that are perceived by prisoners as providing—a meaningful opportunity for prisoners to raise meritorious grievances.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102 (2006). In sum, based on both precedent and the purposes of the PLRA, it was error for the District Court to premise exhaustion on a “clear misrepresentation.” Misleading or deceptive instructions from a prison official can also render a grievance process unavailable. B. The Showing Required to Establish Thwarting of the Grievance Process Having established that a misleading instruction may qualify as a “misrepresentation” under Ross, we now consider 15 what an inmate must show to establish that the misrepresentation “thwart[ed] [him] from taking advantage of a grievance process.” 136 S. Ct. at 1860. As we explained in Rinaldi, the burden to plead and prove that he was thwarted rests on the inmate: “once the defendant has established that the inmate failed to resort to administrative remedies, the onus falls on the inmate to show that such remedies were unavailable to him.” 904 F.3d at 268 (citation omitted). But while the burden of proof may be clear, the showing required to meet it is not. To date, no Court of Appeals has articulated a clear test for when an inmate has established that a grievance process is unavailable to him because a misrepresentation thwarted his use of that process. Here again, however, Rinaldi paves our way. In that case, we fashioned a test to establish when another type of prison conduct identified in Ross—“intimidation”—so thwarted an inmate’s use of the grievance process as to render it “unavailable.” Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268–69. The inquiry, we explained, must include an objective and subjective component. Id. We described “[t]he objective component [as] of chief importance because it maintains the exhaustion requirement for the vast majority of claims and allows otherwise unexhausted claims to proceed only in the exceptional circumstance where the facts alleged would reasonably give rise to a substantial fear of serious harm.” Id. at 268. The subjective requirement, on the other hand, ensures that an inmate seeking to be relieved of the exhaustion requirement actually has been thwarted from using the grievance process. Id. at 269. Thus, we concluded, an inmate must show both “that the threat was sufficiently serious that it 16 would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance” and “that the threat actually did deter this particular inmate.” Id. These same considerations lead us to adopt an analogous two-part test for when an inmate’s use of a grievance process is thwarted by misrepresentation. As an objective matter, taking account of the speaker and context, the instruction must be of the sort that a reasonable inmate would be “entitled to rely on,” even though it is “at odds with the wording” of the grievance process. Brown, 312 F.3d at 112; see also Davis, 798 F.3d at 296 (finding “no reason that [the inmate] should not be entitled to rely on the representations of his jailers”). It also must be so misleading to a reasonable inmate as to interfere with his use of the grievance process. Brown, 312 F.3d at 113; see also Townsend, 898 F.3d at 783–84; Davis, 798 F.3d at 296. These requirements will ensure that “otherwise unexhausted claims . . . proceed only in . . . exceptional circumstance[s].” Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268. As a subjective matter, the inmate must persuade the district court that he in fact did rely on the misrepresentation to his detriment. As in the threat context, Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268–69, objectively misleading instructions can be circumstantial evidence that an inmate’s use of the grievance process has been thwarted, but a further showing—such as “documents, affidavits, or live testimony if deemed warranted,” id. at 269—will typically be required. And in any event, that circumstantial evidence can be overcome by evidence that an inmate actually knew how to navigate the grievance process despite the misleading instructions. Id.; cf. Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (“When a 17 prisoner has no means of verifying prison officials’ claims about the administrative grievance process, incorrect statements by officials may indeed make remedies unavailable.”). This test for assessing misrepresentations not only provides an administrable and consistent framework for the third category of “unavailability” under Ross: It also promotes Congress’s goals in requiring exhaustion under the PLRA.7 If the objective prong is the stick, discouraging prison staff from misleading inmates about the grievance process, the subjective prong is the carrot, encouraging prisons to impart knowledge of their grievance process by “reasonably communicat[ing]” 7 Our focus here has been on the third category under Ross, namely, “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” 136 S.Ct. at 1860. But we would not want, by our silence with respect to the first Ross factor, to suggest that the misleading comment from Hardy’s counselor was the only troubling aspect of the prison grievance process brought to light by this case. It bears emphasizing that the first Ross category, which deems exhaustion satisfied when the remedy in question “operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates[,]” is aimed at preventing grievance procedures from becoming a needlessly difficult obstacle to inmates receiving needed relief. Here, in the face of confusing and evolving grounds for rejection, Hardy repeatedly requested relief for a manifestly serious medical complaint. To put it mildly, the present record does not reflect well on the prison’s handling of it. 18 grievance procedures to inmates. Small, 728 F.3d at 271. And the result will be to encourage resolution of disputes “within the inmate grievance process,” to weed out “frivolous prisoner lawsuits,” and ultimately to “reduce the burden [of such lawsuits] on the federal courts.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230. C. Application to Hardy As we have established today, to defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense based on a misrepresentation by prison staff, an inmate must show (1) that the misrepresentation is one which a reasonable inmate would be entitled to rely on and sufficiently misleading to interfere with a reasonable inmate’s use of the grievance process, and (2) that the inmate was actually misled by the misrepresentation. Applying that test here, Hardy has met his burden on both prongs. First, the prison counselor’s instruction that Hardy respond to his rejected grievances by “fill[ing] out another one and send[ing] it in,” App. 187, satisfies the objective prong. It was made to him by his assigned counselor, the prison staff member to whom inmates were encouraged to make such inquiries and who was expected to have accurate information about the grievance process. It was also sufficiently misleading to interfere with a reasonable inmate’s ability to navigate the grievance process. In effect, the counselor advised—just as in Davis—that the grievance process contained only a single step when it in fact required more. See 798 F.3d at 296 & n.2 (finding the appeals step of a grievance process unavailable when “there were [no] factual circumstances such that [the prisoner] reasonably should have known—despite the jail staff’s misrepresentation otherwise—that the grievance process had a second step” (emphasis omitted)). And, while 19 not a “clear misrepresentation” because as the District Court noted, Hardy, 2019 WL 1756535, at , it was technically true that Hardy could have submitted an appeal on the same grievance form as his original grievance, it was a misrepresentation nonetheless for it omitted a key piece of information: that Hardy was required to write the word “appeal” somewhere on the form. See Brown, 312 F.3d at 111– 12 (finding prison staff’s instructions misleading not only because they told a prisoner to wait for an investigation to be completed before filing his grievance, but also because they withheld the critical information that this investigation had been completed.) Second, Hardy made the requisite showing under the subjective prong. According to his testimony at the evidentiary hearing—credited by the District Court—he was “clearly aware a grievance process existed at Camp Hill,” App. 11, but he was unaware that this grievance process required him to file an appeal. As Hardy explained in his testimony, he did not receive a handbook when he first entered Camp Hill because he spent his first week in the infirmary where he was not permitted personal belongings, and he only signed the acknowledgment that he received the handbook because he was told it would be left in his prison block. As it turned out, it was not there; his subsequent requests for it went unanswered; and his attempts to go to the library, the only place he could read a copy of the grievance manual, were rebuffed— twice.8 Accord Townsend, 898 F.3d at 783–84 (noting that a 8 Even if Hardy had managed to get his hands on the grievance manual, this may only have added to his confusion: 20 misrepresentation was “magnified” because the prisoner was denied access to the library and thus had no way to “verify” the official’s misstatements). On the flip side, the defendants produced no evidence that Hardy was aware of the appeal requirement. The defendants conceded at oral argument that they have no basis to dispute Hardy’s representation that Camp Hill does not permit inmates to have personal belongings in the infirmary and that Hardy did not receive the handbook when admitted. So unable to impute knowledge based on Hardy’s access to the handbook or the grievance manual, defendants instead argue that Hardy should have known of the appeals requirement because he received rejections and because he had a duty “to take affirmative action to ascertain his rights and responsibilities under the grievance policy” by consulting other inmates and prison staff. Gov’t Defs.’ Br. 17. Whether viewed as relevant to the objective or subjective prongs, these arguments only lend further support to Hardy.9 The manual states that rejected grievances must be appealed, but also allows for rejected grievances to be resubmitted. 9 As presented, these arguments seem to pertain to the objective, not the subjective, prong. There are of course cases where it is so obvious what a reasonable person “should have known” as to support the inference of actual knowledge, i.e., that this party must have known. See Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 440, 441–42 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)). The defendants, however, do not articulate that argument. Instead, they appear to be arguing only as an objective matter that a reasonable inmate should 21 The grievance rejections provided an array of explanations, none of which was the failure to appeal, and they included no information or instruction about the next step an inmate should take; indeed, they did not even mention the word “appeal.” In addition, Hardy did take “affirmative action to ascertain his rights”: he asked his counselor, who misled him. It is no answer—where a prison has refused to provide an inmate with access to written information about the grievance process, provided no guidance in its rejections, and affirmatively misled the inmate—that the inmate should have sought advice from fellow prisoners. We will not “allow[] jails and prisons to play hide-and-seek with administrative remedies” in this manner, “keep[ing] all remedies under wraps until after a lawsuit is filed and then uncover[ing] them and proclaim[ing] that the remedies were available all along.” Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007). In short, the prison had the duty in the first instance to “reasonably communicate[]” its policies to Hardy. Small, 728 F.3d at 271. Instead, it provided misleading instructions on which a reasonable inmate would rely and on which the undisputed record shows Hardy did rely to his detriment. All “available” remedies were exhausted. have divined the appeals requirement from the rejections or from discussions with other inmates and thus would not have been misled. These arguments do not support an inference of actual knowledge on this record nor, for the reasons we explain, do they alter the objectively misleading nature of the counselor’s statement. 22