Opinion ID: 1239218
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: buffer-zone regulations

Text: Initially, we determine whether the Pesticide Board erroneously interpreted the term deposited as it is used in rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005. Meads argues that the Pesticide Board improperly equated the term deposited with the term detected when concluding that he unlawfully deposited Pounce within the restricted buffer zones. Rule 2 NCAC 9L .1005 contains the term deposited in three pertinent areas. First, 2 NCAC 9L .1005(b) provides that [n]o pesticide shall be deposited by aircraft within 300 feet of the premises of ... any building (other than a residence) which is used for business or social activities if either the premises or the building is occupied by people. Further, 2 NCAC 9L .1005(c) provides that [n]o pesticide shall be deposited by aircraft on the right-of-way of a public road or within 25 feet of the road, whichever is the greater distance. Lastly, 2 NCAC 9L.1005(e) provides that [n]o pesticide shall be deposited within 100 feet of any residence. In conjunction, these areas constitute buffer zones where it is unlawful to deposit pesticides. Meads argues that the term deposited, as utilized in the preceding rules, requires a finding that Meads himself deposited Pounce within the restricted buffer zone. According to Meads, the only evidence that he deposited Pounce within these zones was samples taken from those areas which indicated traces of Permethrin. Meads contends that this evidence shows that Pounce was detected in those zones, not deposited there. When a term is not defined or provided a technical meaning, this Court will construe it in accordance with its ordinary meaning. See State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 435, 323 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1984). According to Webster's Dictionary, the term deposit is defined as to let fall (as sediment). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 310 (10th ed.1993). Using this definition in the context of aerial pesticide application, we conclude that the term deposit refers to any action which results in either the direct or indirect (e.g., drift) falling or placement of pesticide within a restricted buffer zone. We find further support for this conclusion by using the well-settled principle that provisions should be construed in a manner which tends to prevent them from being circumvented. See Friends of Hatter as, 117 N.C.App. at 573, 452 S.E.2d at 348. In the case sub judice, Meads argues that we should construe the term deposited to include only intentional aerial applications of pesticides in a restricted buffer zone. Meads' construction, however, encourages contravention of this rule by allowing aerial applicators to defend their actions based upon an almost unascertainable mental intent. That is, an applicator can simply plead ignorance to a zone's restricted status or to the principles of drift. This, in turn, could allow aerial applicators to carelessly apply pesticides by granting them the I didn't mean for the pesticides to deposit there defense. In summation, we conclude that the trial court correctly concluded that the term deposited, as set forth in rule 2 NCAC 9L.1005, means to let fall. Accordingly, an aerial pesticide applicator violates this rule whenever he takes any action which results in either the direct or indirect (e.g., drift) falling or placement of pesticide within a restricted buffer zone.