Opinion ID: 1251736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Theft by Deception Instructions.

Text: Ross asked the district court to give the following marshaling instruction on theft by deception: To assist you in determining whether there was an agreement or understanding to commit theft by deception, you are advised that the elements of the crime of theft by deception which must be established beyond a reasonable doubt are: 1. On or about the _____ day of September, 1993, the defendant did obtain money or the transfer of possession or control of money from Rita Hierstein [and/or others]. 2. The defendant voluntarily and intentionally deceived Rita Hierstein in one or more of the following ways: a. ___________ b. ___________ 3. The defendant knowingly and intentionally obtained transfer or possession, control or ownership of money from Rita Hierstein by the deception. 4. That the deception involved in paragraph 2 of this instruction was of a material nature. Keep in mind that Count I of the Trial Information charges defendant Adam Ross with engaging in a conspiracy to commit theft by deception. No defendant is charged with the crime of theft by deception; the theft by deception is a conspiracy charge. (Emphasis added.) Ross also asked the court to give the following instruction on the definition of material: A statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the decision of the decision making body to which it is addressed. The district court refused to give these proposed instructions. Instead the court instructed the jury as follows: INSTRUCTION No. 19 With regard to the conspiracy charge, the State must show an agreement to commit the crime of theft by deception. A person commits the crime of theft by deception if the person intentionally obtains the transfer of possession, control or ownership of money or property from another by deception. INSTRUCTION No. 20 As used in these instructions, deception consists of knowingly doing any one of the following: 1. Creating or confirming another's belief or impression as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact or condition which is false and which the actor does not believe to be true. 2. Failing to correct a false belief or impression as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact or condition which the actor previously has created or confirmed. 3. Promising payment, the delivery of goods, or other performance which the actor does not ... intend to perform or knows the actor will not be able to perform. Failure to perform, standing alone, is not evidence that the actor did not intend to perform. Instruction No. 19 defines the offense of theft by deception in the language of the theft by deception statute. See Iowa Code § 714.1(3). Instruction No. 20 defines deception in the language of subsections (1), (2), and (5) of Iowa Code section 702.9, which provides six definitions of deception. Iowa Code chapter 702 is the definitional chapter for terms, words, or phrases used in the criminal code. See id. § 702.1 (Wherever a term, word or phrase is defined in the criminal code, such meaning shall be given wherever it appears in the Code, unless it is being specially defined for a special purpose.). None of the court's instructions defined deception to include the element of materiality. Ross contends the court erred by not including the element of materiality in these instructions. In support of his contention, he relies on the definition of deception in Iowa Code section 714.16(1)( f ). This provision defines deception for purposes of consumer frauds covered in Iowa Code section 714.16. Section 714.16(1)( f ) defines deception as an act or practice which has the tendency or capacity to mislead a substantial number of consumers as to a material fact or facts. We agree with the State that the general criminal code definition of deception in section 702.9 controls here rather than the definition of deception in section 714.16(1)( f ). This is because the State charged Ross with conspiracy to commit theft by deception in violation of section 714.1(3). The State did not charge Ross with conspiracy to commit a consumer fraud in violation of section 714.16. See State v. White, 563 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa 1997) (holding that where the State elects to proceed under only one part of the statute, then what the State charges is the statute for the purposes of the case). None of the definitions of deception found in subsections 1, 2, and 5 of section 702.9 mentions the word materiality. Ross would therefore have us read the word materiality into those definitions. In State v. Hogrefe, we noted that [i]n enacting section 714.1(3), theft by deception, the legislaturefor the most partfollowed the lead of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code. 557 N.W.2d 871, 877 (Iowa 1996). Compare Iowa Code § 714.1(3), with Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 223.3, at 179 (1980). So we considered the Model Penal Code and Commentaries persuasive authority. Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d at 877. With respect to theft by deception, the Commentaries pertinently provide: [Section 223.3] adopts a comprehensive definition of criminal fraud. The term deception has been substituted for false pretense or representation. The substituted term includes misrepresentations of value, law, opinion, intention, or other state of mind, as well as certain cases where the actor knowingly takes advantage of another's misinformation, though he may not be responsible for it. There is no requirement that the deception be material.... It suffices for conviction that the deception was effective, whether alone or with other influences, in securing the property for the actor. Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 223.3 cmt. 1, at 181 (emphasis added). We likewise hold that materiality is not an element of theft by deception in Iowa Code section 714.1(3). Accordingly, the district court did not err when it refused Ross's proffered jury instructions on theft by deception.