Opinion ID: 2592797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: did the trial court err in setting defendant's criminal history as category f?

Text: In the case before us, Arnett was convicted of three counts of forgery based on the same complaint or information, and she was also convicted of three additional counts of forgery in case No. 07 CR 319 earlier that same day. If Arnett's three current forgery convictions in the case before uscase No. 07 CR 404triggered the 45 days of imprisonment as a condition of her probation (as required by K.S.A. 21-3710[b][4]), then all of her three prior forgery convictions in case No. 07 CR 319 could be used to calculate her criminal history. The Court of Appeals came to this conclusion in its decision in this case. Arnett, slip op. at 5. As we noted in Gilley, the progressive sentencing scheme for forgery convictions does not make any reference to prior convictions. Compare K.S.A. 21-3710(b) (referencing a first conviction, second conviction, and third or subsequent conviction) with K.S.A. 21-4710(a) (defining prior conviction as any conviction other than that included in the same information or complaint or joined for trial). Instead, K.S.A. 21-3710(b) simply references the number of forgery convictions of a particular defendant. We explained in Gilley what is clearly applicable here: Because K.S.A. 21-3710(b) does not limit progressive sentencing to prior forgery convictions but rather focuses on the number of forgery convictions incurred by a defendant, any forgery conviction can be used to heighten the defendant's conditions of probation. Had the district court treated Gilley's Count 1 as a first conviction, Count 2 as a second conviction, and Count 3 as a third conviction under the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3710(b), all three prior forgery convictions would have been available to be counted for criminal history purposes. Gilley, slip op. at 10, ___ Kan. at ___, 223 P.3d 779. Instead, as the record clearly establishes, Arnett's plea to Count 1 in the instant case was treated as a third forgery conviction under K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4). At the time she entered her plea to Count 1, she was charged with two additional counts of forgery in the same complaint, but these charges were not convictions. Thus, the district court could not and did not rely upon such charges but only upon her prior forgery convictions to establish a third conviction for Count 1 in the present case. It is quite clear from the record that the district court properly relied upon two of Arnett's prior forgery convictions in case No. 07 CR 319 to increase the mandatory minimum sentence for the crime of conviction in the progressive sentencing scheme in K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4), thus enhancing the applicable penalty for the primary forgery offense. Therefore, the plain language of K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) precludes two of those prior forgery convictions from being used again to calculate the defendant's criminal history score. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it reduced Arnett's criminal history score to F (two nonperson felonies). The plain language of K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) states that all other prior convictions [not used to enhance severity level or applicable sentencing penalties] will be considered and scored for criminal history purposes. As a result, only one of the prior forgery convictions in case No. 07 CR 319 was then still available to enhance Arnett's criminal history score. When combined with the only other felony disclosed on her criminal history worksheetthe nonperson felony of attempted theft in Saline County in 2006 in case No. 06 CR 1423, the score of F (two nonperson felonies) was the correct criminal history score. There was no error by the district court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. The judgment of the Reno County District Court is affirmed.