Opinion ID: 2075099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: appellants neiger and larsen

Text: We begin with the well settled rule that a judgment of conviction rendered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is wholly void and without any force or effect whatever. See, Honomichl v. State, 333 N.W.2d 797 (S.D.1983). Invalid convictions cannot be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent criminal offense under the habitual offender statutes. State v. King, 383 N.W.2d 854 (S.D.1986). This principle applies equally to DWI habitual offender proceedings. See, Petition of Brockmueller, 374 N.W.2d 135 (S.D.1985). Thus, a conviction rendered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot be used to enhance punishment for a subsequent criminal offense under either the habitual offender statutes or the DWI habitual offender provisions. A trial court in a criminal case does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction unless state files a formal and sufficient indictment or information. Brockmueller, supra ; Honomichl, supra . To be valid, an information must be signed by a, prosecuting attorney. SDCL 23A-6-4. Neiger and Larsen argue that the informations leading to their prior DWI convictions were not signed by, prosecuting attorney[s] because the deputy state's attorneys who signed them were not licensed attorneys. Therefore, they argue those convictions are invalid and were erroneously used to convict them as DWI habitual offenders. The term, prosecuting attorney, in South Dakota includes assistant state's attorneys. SDCL 23A-45-9(14). To serve as a deputy state's attorney a person must be a,  duly licensed attorney and counselor at law.... SDCL 7-16-3 (emphasis added). Further: [n]o person ... shall be permitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in any court of record within this state ... without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from the Supreme Court of this state and having become an active member in good standing of the state bar of South Dakota. (emphasis added). SDCL 16-16-1. These provisions make clear that a person cannot act as an attorney or deputy state's attorney in South Dakota without having, previously obtained, a license to practice law from this court. [3] At the time Sokoll and Miller signed the informations at issue in this appeal, they had not yet been issued their licenses to practice law. Accordingly, they could not act as attorneys or deputy state's attorneys and, thus, did not fit within the definition of a, prosecuting attorney, capable of signing an information. However, we decline to hold that this must necessarily invalidate the convictions obtained on the informations they signed. In the interest of justice, we accept state's argument that the doctrine of the de facto officer should be applied as a means of validating Sokoll's and Miller's signatures on the informations. A de facto officer, is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid, so far as they involve the interests of the public and third persons.... Merchants' Nat. Bank v. McKinney, 2 S.D. 106, 120-21, 48 N.W. 841, 845 (1891). [A] de facto officer has possession and performs the duties [of an office] under color of right, without being technically qualified in all points of the law to act. The general rule is that the acts of a de facto officer are valid as to third persons and the public until his title to office is adjudged insufficient, and such officer's authority may not be collaterally attacked or inquired into by third persons affected. State v. Smejkal, 395 N.W.2d 588, 592 (S.D.1986). The policies underlying the doctrine are, the protection of those having official business to transact, and to prevent a failure of public justice.  (emphasis added). Id. ( quoting 63A Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees § 605 (1984)). The doctrine of the de facto officer is generally applied in four different situations. See, Smejkal, supra ; Merchants' Nat. Bank, supra . One of these four situations is where the duties of an office are exercised under color of a known or valid appointment but the officer has failed to conform to some precedent, requirement, or condition such as taking an oath, giving a bond or the like. Id. A second situation where the doctrine is applied is where the duties of an office are exercised under color of a known appointment, void because the officer was not eligible. Id. We find both of these situations present in the instant case. Both Sokoll and Miller were employed as Pennington County Deputy State's Attorneys, both exercised the duties of that office by signing the informations now at issue and both had fulfilled the requirements for practicing law in this state. The only precedent, requirement or condition preventing them from validly exercising the duties of their office was the taking of an oath and/or the actual issuance of a license to practice law by this court. Both took their oaths and this court issued their licenses within a few days after signing the informations. In the interest of preventing a failure of public justice, we find this case suitable for application of the doctrine of the de facto officer. Application of the doctrine prohibits the present collateral attack on the deputy state's attorneys' authority and validates their actions in signing the informations filed against Neiger and Larsen. See Smejkal, supra ; Scirica v. State, 265 N.W.2d 893 (S.D.1978). Accordingly, we find the informations leading to Neiger's and Larsen's prior convictions sufficient as signed by de facto, prosecuting attorney[s]. It follows that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to act on the informations and that the convictions obtained thereon are valid. Accordingly, the convictions were appropriately used to convict Neiger and Larsen as habitual DWI offenders.