Opinion ID: 2002541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal due to misconduct.

Text: Defendant argues that double jeopardy attaches to prevent retrial on the charge of simple trespass because the prosecutor's misconduct was not mere negligence or inadvertence. Assuming, without deciding, that such misconduct occurred, we hold that the prosecutor's conduct does not prevent retrial of the defendant. The Supreme Court recently examined the application of double jeopardy prohibitions against retrials in a similar context. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). The court stated that although generally the double jeopardy clause protects a defendant from multiple prosecutions, a narrow exception to this rule is provided where the defendant moves for the mistrial; however, this exception is not applicable when the prosecutor intends to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial so that he can subvert the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672-73, 102 S.Ct. at 2088, 72 L.Ed.2d at 425. We held these principles applicable to the Iowa Constitution as well. State v. Bell, 322 N.W.2d 93, 94 (Iowa 1982). See State v. Nelson, 234 N.W.2d 368, 374-75 (Iowa 1975); State v. Manning, 224 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa 1974). The acts of the prosecutor cited by Chase fall short of conduct intended to provoke a mistrial. The motions for mistrial complained that the prosecutor intentionally presented inadmissible evidence concerning Chase's sexual relations with Skiff and Skiff's statements that she was afraid Chase would kill her. Defendant also complains that evidentiary matters were deliberately withheld from him and that a continuance was obtained as a device to obtain further time to give notice of the testimony of a witness in order to use her testimony at trial. Regardless of the correctness of the trial court's rulings on these matters, there is no indication of a deliberate attempt by the prosecutor to sabotage the trial in order to force the defendant into requesting a mistrial. At most, the prosecutor's conduct presented grounds for the defendant to claim a mistrial. The double jeopardy clause was not triggered.
Chase also moved for a mistrial based on his claim that the trial court wrongfully interjected itself into the case by interposing its own objection to a question that defense counsel asked in the presence of the jury. Chase also raises several matters that were not included in his motion to dismiss and were not preserved for appeal. Although we need not discuss these allegations, they are generally claims that the trial court unfairly favored the prosecutor in an effort to assist an inexperienced prosecutor against an experienced defense counsel. Even if defendant's allegations are correct, they are only grounds for a mistrial, not for a dismissal of the case which would prevent retrial. A motion for a mistrial is the proper remedy for the conduct of a judge who acts in a biased or prejudiced manner during a jury trial. If the defendant's motion is granted or if an appellate court determines that it was reversible error for the trial court not to have declared a mistrial, a subsequent prosecution of a defendant for the same offense or included offense does not violate the rule against double jeopardy. The general rule that the guarantee against double jeopardy does not bar retrial of a defendant when the prior trial was terminated or reversed on the behest of the defendant comes into play. Manning, 224 N.W.2d at 235.