Opinion ID: 2823838
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Multiple Concurrent Representation of Witnesses

Text: Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Supreme Court has never expressly limited Sullivan to cases involving only joint representation of codefendants, not even in Mickens when it plainly could have. Â¶32Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In Mickens, a Virginia jury convicted the defendant of murder and sentenced him to death. 535 U.S. at 164. Court-appointed trial counsel for Mickens had briefly been counsel for the victim in an unrelated juvenile proceeding at the time of the murder. During federal habeas proceedings, Mickens alleged that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel as a result of the conflict arising from this multiple representation. The federal district court denied Mickensâs petition. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Relying on Sullivan, the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant must show âboth an actual conflict of interest and an adverse effect even if the trial court failed to inquire into a potential conflict about which it reasonably should have known.â Id. at 165 (citing Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 355â56 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). Because Mickens failed to demonstrate adverse effect, he lost. Id. Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address âwhat a defendant must show in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably should have known.â Id. at 164. The ânubâ of this question, as Justice Scalia explained in writing for the majority, was whether Holloway and its progeny provided an automatic reversal exception to the general rule of Strickland âunder the circumstances in the present case.â See id. at 167. Mickens argued that Woodâs remand instruction established an âunambiguous ruleâ that where the trial judge neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict, the defendant, to obtain reversal of judgment, need only show a conflict of interest and not any adverse effect. Id. at 172. The Mickens Court flatly rejected this assertion. Id. In doing so, the Court observed that âthe rule applied when the trial judge is not aware of the conflict (and thus not obligated to inquire) is that prejudice will be presumed only if the conflict has significantly affected counselâs performanceâthereby rendering the verdict unreliable, even though Strickland prejudice cannot be shown.â Id. at 172â73. The Court then held: Since this was not a case in which (as in Holloway) counsel protested his inability simultaneously to represent multiple defendants; and since the trial courtâs failure to make the Sullivan -mandated inquiry does not reduce the petitionerâs burden of proof; it was at least necessary, to voidÂ the conviction, for petitioner to establish that the conflict of interestÂ adversely affected his counselâs performance. The Court of Appeals having found no such effect, the denial of habeas must be affirmed. Id. at 173â74 (emphasis added). Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Thus, in a case involving an alleged conflict of interest stemming from trial counselâs former representation of a victimânot concurrent or successive representation of a codefendantâthe Court embraced the concept of individualized inquiry into adverse effect, without requiring a showing of Strickland prejudice. Had the Court wanted to dispose of the case under Strickland, and thereby eliminate any middle ground for multiple representation cases not involving codefendants, it could have done so. It did not. 7 Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Courts have thus continued to apply Sullivan to conflicts arising from multiple concurrent representation of defendants and witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Blount, 291 F.3d 201, 210 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying Sullivan âin light of the Supreme Courtâs recent decision in Mickensâ where another member of defense counselâs law firm represented a government witness in an unrelated proceeding); see also Wilkins v. Stephens, 560 F. Appâx 299, 309 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying Sullivan where defense counsel formerly represented victim). Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Sullivan stressed âthe high probability of prejudice arising from multiple concurrent representation, and the difficulty of proving that prejudice.â Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174 (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348â49). In discussing this in Mickens, the Court reiterated, â[U]ntil a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.â Id. (second emphasis added) (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350). Because Mickens involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict resulting from representation of someone other than a codefendant, we conclude that the Supreme Court remanded for evaluation of âadverse effectâ with the thought that other forms of multiple representation could constitute the âactively conflicting interestsâ necessary to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation under Sullivan. The question left unanswered in Mickens is what test should be used to assess adverse effect. We answer that question after first examining successive representation. 8