Opinion ID: 2383290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The exculpatory nature of the desired testimony.

Text: Without Brandon's testimony, the only motive provided to the jury for the murder of Gray, and for the firing of shots at Pegues, was revenge for an alleged insult to Martin. If that was in fact Brandon's motive, then an impartial trier of fact could reasonably find that the likelihood that Martin played a role in the crimes would be substantially greater than if the motive had been one which did not concern Martin. Under the scenario proffered by the prosecution, it was the real or perceived injury to Martin's feelings that was being redressed, and Martin had a reason, however inadequate that reason may appear to reasonable persons, [19] to command or otherwise participate in the commission of the crimes. If Brandon killed Gray because Gray and Pegues insulted Martin, then a jury might reasonably find it improbable that he acted independently of Martin, an older relative who had apparently felt that his manhood had been challenged. If, on the other hand, Brandon shot at the two men, and killed one of them, because they had previously robbed him, this would be none of Martin's affair. His interests and pride would not be implicated. It would be difficult indeed to conjure up a plausible motive for Martin to play any role in the matter under a scenario in which Gray and Pegues had offended Brandon but not Martin. Evidence of a lack of motive is quintessentially exculpatory. Motive is evidence of the commission of any crime. United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3543, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392 (1983); see generally 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 389, at 417 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted). But evidence about motive is a two-way street. [T]he absence of motive tends to support the presumption of innocence; it is a fact to be reckoned [with] on the side of innocence. People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal.2d 401, 423, 164 P.2d 753, 765 (1945) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As the court explained in Pollard v. State, 218 Ind. 56, 60, 29 N.E.2d 956, 957 (1940), [t]he absence of a motive for committing the crime charged is in the nature of an exculpatory circumstance which a defendant on trial is entitled to establish.... To exclude such proof would place an arbitrary limitation on the accused that would be unjust, in view of the freedom allowed the prosecution in adducing facts and circumstances pointing to his guilt. See also Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 342-43 (D.C.1990) (concurring and dissenting opinion), and authorities there cited. The government correctly notes that Brandon's statement at his plea was not conclusively exculpatory as to Martin. Indeed, it placed Martin in the car at the murder scene. Moreover, it is by no means certain that Martin would have been acquitted if Brandon had testified. That, however, is not dispositive. [20] As Judge Cardozo observed for the court in Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 224 N.Y. 18, 22, 120 N.E. 56, 57 (1918), the law contents itself with probabilities, and declines to wait for certainty before drawing its conclusions. Ordinarily, any evidence which is logically probative of some fact in issue is admissible, Ahrens v. Broyhill, 117 A.2d 452, 455-56 (D.C.1955), unless it conflicts with some settled exclusionary rule. Fowel v. Wood, 62 A.2d 636, 637 (D.C.1948). [I]f the evidence offered conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in controversy, it should go to the jury. Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 438, 440, 20 L.Ed. 197 (1870). It is enough if the item could reasonably show that a fact is slightly more probable than it would appear without that evidence. Even after the probative force of the evidence is spent, the proposition for which it is offered still can seem quite improbable. Thus, the common objection that the inference for which the fact is offered does not necessarily follow is untenable. It poses a standard of conclusiveness that very few single items of circumstantial evidence ever could meet. A brick is not a wall. EDWARD W. CLEARY, et al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 542-43 (3rd law. ed. 1984). It is difficult to disagree with the judge's view that Brandon would not have made a very compelling witness. He effectively admitted at his plea that his claims of self-defense, asserted both in his statement to the police and in his counsel's opening statement at trial, were false. He acknowledged that, contrary to his initial account, Gray did not pull a handgun on him at the crime scene. He contradicted himself during the plea proceeding as to the time and location of the shooting, and he initially either forgot or declined to mention the intervening ride in the automobile. According to counsel for Martin, Brandon even claimed in one of his statements that he had an alibi. It should be noted, however, that the principal inconsistencies between his plea and his earlier versions related to his initial self-serving claim that he was attacked at the murder scene and fought back. A defendant might well lie to conceal his own guilt, but nevertheless tell the truth with respect to other matters. Brandon has, so far as can be discerned, been consistent on the one issue of prime significance to the case against Martin, namely, that Ms. Stover set him up [21] and that Gray and Pegues robbed him. In any event, the question of Brandon's credibility was for the jury, not the judge. In King, supra, the prosecution made what we described as an impressive case for the proposition that Manning [Ms. King's codefendant] would have been a vulnerable defense witness, and perhaps a potential feast for an astute cross-examiner. 550 A.2d at 356. We added that [i]t may well be that the jury would not have believed Manning ..., but the problem is that we will never know. Id. Quoting from Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), we held that [w]e cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of the credibility of a witness, would have accepted this line of reasoning had counsel been permitted to fully present it. But we do conclude that the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on Green's testimony.... King, supra, 550 A.2d at 357. So, too, in State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310, 317, 511 A.2d 1000, 1003 (1986), the court held, in a case somewhat resembling this one, that [t]he state's claim at trial that this testimony [of the codefendant] was not true is not focal, because that issue is ultimately for the jury. [22] It may be that, in these violent times, one man would insist on the execution of two others who had not shown him enough respect, [23] and that a second man would do the first man's bidding for no better reason than that. A reasonable jury could find it to be at least as likely, however, that the killer acted to avenge himself for the travail and humiliation he suffered when he (and not someone else) was tricked and robbed. When the jury has not been told of such alternative potential motivation, the record is, in our view, insufficiently complete to permit the kind of informed determination by the trier of fact which is at the heart of our system of justice. Accordingly, we conclude that Brandon's testimony had substantial exculpatory potential.