Opinion ID: 726149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority to Enjoin Deposit of Funds for Interpleader

Text: 25 The district court, however, did not rule directly on either the motions to vacate and quash or the motion for judgment. Instead, it ordered the Banks to deposit the contested funds into the court's registry in order to begin an interpleader action. No provision of California's law on enforcement of money judgments has been cited as authorizing such an order, and we have found none upon independent review. 9 26 Hilao argues, however, that the first sentence of Rule 69(a) itself justifies the district court's order: Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise. (Emphasis added.) This court has noted that this sentence seemingly leaves open the possibility of securing payment of a money judgment through the imposition of a contempt sanction. Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir.1983). Nonetheless, we have held, we do not interpret the exception to execution to permit a federal court to 'enforce a money judgment by contempt or methods other than a writ of execution, except in cases where established principles so warrant' . Id. (quoting 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 69.03 (2d ed. 1982)) (emphasis added). 10 Thus, [t]he proper means ... to secure compliance with a money judgment is to seek a writ of execution. Id. at 1147. See also Gabovitch v. Lundy, 584 F.2d 559, 560-61 (1st Cir.1978) ([T]he legislative history and judicial application of Rule 69(a) make clear that the first sentence of the Rule expresses a limitation on the means of enforcement of money judgments and does not create a general power to issue writs of execution in disregard of the state law incorporated by the rest of the Rule.... [T]he purpose of the first sentence of Rule 69(a) is to restrict remedies on money judgments to legal process and to avoid broad invocation of in personam relief, except where established principles warrant equitable relief.). 11 27 Hilao does not argue that any established principles justify the district court's order. Instead it argues that this case presents, in the language of Shuffler, exceptional circumstances and therefore the district court was justified in entering its order. It states that various courts have found that the Marcoses engaged in a sophisticated pattern and practice of secreting the assets of the defendant Estate in foreign countries; that the Marcoses have refused to testify or produce documents about those assets; that the Banks, aided by Swiss courts, have refused to produce any documents; and that the Estate and the Republic of the Philippines have agreed to divide the Estate's assets and that both the Swiss government and the Banks, which were found to be agents and representatives of the Marcoses, are playing a supporting role in the attempt to consummate the agreement. 28 We need not determine whether all of this adds up to what Shuffler meant by the phrase exceptional circumstances, since only two of the asserted circumstances directly involve the Banks, against whom the district court's order is directed. First, Hilao states that the Banks have refused to produce documents, 12 but this is clearly inadequate to justify a departure from a writ of execution as the ordinary method to enforce a money judgment. Second, Hilao asserts that the Banks have been found to be agents and representatives of the Estate and are assisting in consummating agreements between the Estate and the Republic to divide the assets in the bank accounts. The first part of this assertion correctly states the finding of the district court in its final judgment in Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos (In Re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation), MDL No. 840 (D.Haw. Feb. 3, 1995). Even if this finding presents an exceptional circumstance, however, it is outweighed by the fact that the Banks were not parties before the court in the case in which the finding was made. Hilao has cited to no other source to support its assertion that the Banks are assisting in the consummation of agreements between the Estate and the Republic. 29 The subject matter of this case is unusual. So is the size of the judgment awarded to the plaintiffs. Some of the parties are prominent figures. The difficulty of enforcing that judgment is also no doubt greater than usual, given the location of the assets and the uncooperativeness of the judgment debtor. These facts, however, hardly constitute the kind of exceptional circumstances this court had in mind in Shuffler that would justify a federal court's use of a procedure other than a writ of execution to enforce a money judgment. Cf. Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir.1982) ([U]nder the extraordinary circumstances here where the judgment is against a state, which refuses to appropriate funds through the normal process provided by state law, the district court should not necessarily be reduced to satisfying a judgment through the cumbersome procedure of attempting to execute against state property or bank accounts. It may, instead, pursue any remedy provided in Rule 69 or Rule 70 to enforce the award, including ordering state officials to pay the claim.); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 622 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.1980) ( '[W]here a state expresses its unwillingness to comply with a valid judgment of a federal district court, the court may use any of the weapons generally at its disposal to ensure compliance.' ) (quoting Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1271 (5th Cir.1980)), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 1695, 68 L.Ed.2d 193 (1981). 30 In sum, neither California law nor Rule 69(a) gave the district court the authority to order the Banks to deposit the contested funds into the court registry.