Opinion ID: 1057402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether a new trial is necessary

Text: ¶ 8. The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff slipped, hit her head on a concrete wall, and fell to the floor. At trial, defendant did not claim that plaintiff's later cervical fusion surgery was not reasonable and necessary treatment for her accident-related injuries. Indeed, the jury explicitly found as much when it determined that plaintiff incurred the full amount of her claimed medical expenses as a result of the accident, reduced by 50% for her own negligence. The jury also awarded plaintiff approximately 60% of her claimed lost wages. The question, then, is whether the $0 pain-and-suffering award was consistent with the rest of the verdict and was supported by the evidence, or reflected an improper compromise or decision based on prejudice or confusion. If the jury has disregarded the reasonable and substantial evidence, or found against it, through passion, prejudice, or some misconstruction of the matter, that judgment requires that the court's discretion be exercised to set aside the verdict. Weeks v. Burnor, 132 Vt. 603, 609, 326 A.2d 138, 141 (1974). ¶ 9. We faced a similar question in Nourse v. Austin, in which a jury found liability and appeared to award nearly all of the plaintiffs' claimed medical expenses but awarded no more than $110 for their pain and suffering. 140 Vt. 184, 185, 436 A.2d 738, 739 (1981). We reversed the trial court's denial of a new trial because [t]he award, while adequate to cover the medical expenses, [was] clearly inadequate to cover pain and suffering. Id. Our opinion in Nourse was brief, but its logic was sound. Here, there is no plausible explanation for a jury verdict finding defendant liable for back and neck injuries, finding defendant liable for her medical expenses, including the cost of invasive surgery, but awarding nothing for past or future pain and suffering. There was reasonable and substantial evidence at trial that, as a result of her back and neck injuries, plaintiff had surgery and suffered pain in the past, and that she would suffer pain in the future. ¶ 10. In addition to plaintiff's own testimony about her pain, the record reflects the testimony of two medical witnesses. One, a pain-management specialist, testified that he heavily suggested that plaintiff undergo cervical decompression and fusion surgery when her ongoing physical-therapy regimen failed to abate her pain. He noted that, prior to surgery, [s]he could barely tolerate simple sitting and standing. He testified that the surgery is intended both immediately to take the pressure off the nerves in the spine to relieve pain and permanently to immobilize a portion of the spine so that the nerves will not be impinged upon and cause pain again. The first objective is accomplished by cutting away some of the disk material that's putting direct pressure on the nerve. The second requires attaching a piece of metal or bone to the spine to restrict the motion so that the vertebrae don't bend up and down and don't create a pinching [e]ffect on the nerve. Plaintiff underwent the surgery, and the doctor testified that afterwards [t]here was still spasm and guarding in the muscles surrounding the neck, which were quite painful to her. Finally, the pain-management specialist testified that plaintiff showed no signs of malingering or exaggerating her pain, and that he expected her pain would last for the rest of her life. ¶ 11. The second doctor to testify, a neurosurgeon, described the decompression and fusion surgery he performed on plaintiff. The surgery, which the doctor agreed was very invasive, was intended to address neck and right arm pain caused by a disk protrusion. When asked what were the factual underpinnings of the surgery? the doctor mentioned only pain relief. The surgery, as it was performed on plaintiff, involved inserting a small titanium cage between two vertebrae in her neck to immobilize them until they eventually fused together. The fusion prevents further pinching of the nerve roots, which was the underlying cause of plaintiff's pain. The cage, in this case, was apparently inserted via an incision through plaintiff's throat. The surgeon further testified that plaintiff had probably more [post-surgery] arm pain than most people do due to the settling of her bones around the titanium cage. ¶ 12. Although our review of the jury's awardand the trial court's decision on the motion for new trialis deferential, we will not endorse a verdict that fails to compensate a plaintiff for damages proven, Nourse, 140 Vt. at 185, 436 A.2d at 739, or one that is internally inconsistent or evidences compromise. Ball, 161 Vt. at 44, 633 A.2d at 712. Where, as here, the jury has evidently disregarded the reasonable and substantial evidence, or found against it, through passion, prejudice, or some misconstruction of the matter, that judgment requires that the court's discretion be exercised to set aside the verdict. Weeks, 132 Vt. at 609, 326 A.2d at 141. See also Lombardi v. Cobb, 99 Conn.App. 705, 915 A.2d 911, 914 (2007) (Because the plaintiff s medical expenses and lost wages related to her treatment for back and shoulder pain, the jury necessarily found that she had experienced pain, and it therefore should have awarded her noneconomic damages.). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict does not cure it of its internal inconsistency. We conclude that the denial of the motion for new trial must be reversed, and turn to the question of the proper scope of the new trial on remand.