Opinion ID: 795515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether there was sufficient evidence of an effect on interstate commerce

Text: 44 Davila's next set of arguments focuses on the jurisdictional element of section 2332a, which provides that a threat to use a weapon of mass destruction is only punishable if the threatened use would have affected interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a. Davila argues that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy this element. He also argues that because the statute seeks to regulate conduct with only a theoretical or imaginary effect on commerce, it exceeds Congress's power under the Constitution's Commerce Clause. 45
46 Because the instant case involves a hoax anthrax mailing, the proper inquiry, as the district court recognized, is whether commerce would have been affected if the letter had actually contained anthrax. 1 Davila contends that the government presented insufficient evidence on this issue. In his view, the testimony from the postal employee and the FBI official regarding the likely impact on the mail and the use of the federal drug stockpile amounted to no more than speculation and fell short of demonstrating that commerce would actually have been affected. 47 For statutes that contain a jurisdictional element—a category that includes section 2332a as well as the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951—evidence of even a de minimis effect on interstate commerce will satisfy that element. See United States v. Fabian, 312 F.3d 550, 554-55 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that because the Hobbs Act requir[es] a particularized showing of federal jurisdiction, the government need only prove a minimal effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Farrish, 122 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir.1997) (same); see also Slaughter, 116 F.Supp.2d at 691 (Because [18 U.S.C. § 2332a] includes such a jurisdictional element, the government need only show a minimal effect on interstate commerce.). 48 Applying this standard, we are satisfied that the evidence in this case was sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional element. The postal employee's testimony, which was based on experience from an actual anthrax mailing, established that a postal facility would be shut down, requiring interstate mail to be delayed and rerouted. The FBI witness testified that drugs would have to be transported to Connecticut using trucks traveling on the interstate highway system. From this testimony, a reasonable jury could find at least a minimal effect on interstate commerce. 49 Davila argues that this case is comparable to Slaughter, an anthrax hoax case in which the district court found that the limited set of facts presented by the government provided insufficient evidence of an impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 693. The evidence in this case is considerably more developed than what the government presented in Slaughter, however. There, the government established only that if the defendant had actually sent anthrax, military doctors and scientists would have traveled from Maryland to Virginia to assist and investigate; the court noted that there was no evidence that the military personnel would have had to bring or use supplies that had traveled in interstate commerce, or that they would have traveled in commercial carriers, lodged in hotels, or eaten at restaurants that engage in interstate commerce. Id. Here, by contrast, the government relied not on testimony about a military response, but rather on evidence of direct effects on interstate mail and interstate trucking, two areas that are inextricably connected to commerce. 50 2. Whether the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate conduct with only a theoretical effect on commerce 51 Davila also argues that applying section 2332a to his conduct would violate the Commerce Clause because Congress may not regulate conduct whose only effect on interstate commerce is purely theoretical. It would be proper to consider whether his actions actually affected interstate commerce, he argues, but it is inappropriate to base the exercise of jurisdiction on speculation about would have happened in an alternate scenario. 52 Davila's argument is unavailing. It is well established that the Commerce Clause permits Congress to criminalize activity that threatens to affect interstate commerce, even if that threat does not materialize in every case. Congress can constitutionally reach inchoate offenses because these offenses pose a potential threat to interstate commerce; the existence of such a threat ties `the proscribed conduct to the area of federal concern delineated by the statute.' United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 592 (3d Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 695, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975)); accord United States v. Curcio, 759 F.2d 237, 241-42 (2d Cir.1985). We see no material distinction between Congress's authority to criminalize the inchoate offenses of attempt or conspiracy, on one hand, and the perpetration of a hoax, on the other. All of these activities purport to pose a threat to interstate commerce, regardless of whether they are actually capable of being carried out. See United States v. Clemente, 22 F.3d 477, 480-81 (2d Cir.1994) (`Factual impossibility' is no defense to the inchoate offense of conspiracy under the Hobbs Act.). 53 Davila argues that in light of United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), the Commerce Clause must be read as imposing a requirement of something beyond a minimal or theoretical effect on interstate commerce. His reliance on these cases is misplaced. Both Morrison and Lopez were concerned with statutes that lacked an explicit jurisdictional element. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez, § 13981 contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.). We have repeatedly recognized that neither Morrison nor Lopez affects the government's burden with respect to statutes that contain a jurisdictional element. See, e.g., Fabian, 312 F.3d at 555 (As the Hobbs Act requires a particularized jurisdictional showing, we find Morrison does not affect our requirement that the Government need only show a minimal effect on interstate commerce to support Hobbs Act jurisdiction.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Farrish, 122 F.3d at 149 (finding that Lopez did not affect the Hobbs Act analysis); United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir.1997) (concluding that  Lopez did not elevate the government's burden under the money laundering statute). Because section 2332a, like the Hobbs Act and the money laundering statute, contains a jurisdictional element, Morrison and Lopez do not require the government to make a heightened showing of an effect on interstate commerce. 54 D. Whether the indictment sufficiently alleged that Davila's letter was addressed to a person, as required by section 876(c) 55 Finally, Davila argues that the indictment failed to allege that his letter was addressed to a person, as required by section 876(c). Because he failed to raise this argument below, we consider only whether this constituted plain error. See United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 666 (2d Cir.2001) (en banc) (holding that plain error review applies to a challenge to an indictment that is raised for the first time on appeal). To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 138 (2d Cir.2006). If all three of these conditions are met, we may exercise our discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 56 Section 876(c) prohibits mailing any communication ... addressed to any other person and containing ... any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another[.] 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (emphasis added). Here, the indictment alleged that Davila did cause to be delivered by the U.S. Postal Service to the Connecticut State's Attorney's Office in Bridgeport, an envelope containing a white powdery substance represented to be anthrax, and a letter, which together threatened to injure the person of another. He argues that this language is devoid of any allegation that his letter was addressed to a person. 57 The government first suggests that Davila has waived this argument by failing to raise it before trial. It is true that in general, a motion alleging a defect in the indictment or information must be raised before trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(B). However, Rule 12(b)(3)(B) goes on to state that at any time while the case is pending, the court may hear a claim that the indictment or information fails to invoke the court's jurisdiction or to state an offense. Id. An argument that an indictment fails to allege an element of the crime falls into the latter category. See United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d 476, 478-79 (4th Cir.1992) (A defense or objection based on the failure of an indictment to allege an essential element of a crime may be raised at any time during the proceedings.). Accordingly, Davila cannot be deemed to have waived his argument. 58 At the same time, however, when a challenge is urged for the first time on appeal, indictments and informations are construed more liberally . . . and every intendment is then indulged in support of the sufficiency. Id. at 479 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also United States v. Watkins, 709 F.2d 475, 478 n. 2 (7th Cir.1983) (noting that the interest in judicial efficiency requires that tardily challenged indictments be construed liberally in favor of validity). Applying this rule of construction, Davila's argument is easily rejected. 59 It is implicit in the indictment that Davila's envelope was addressed to the Connecticut State's Attorney's Office in Bridgeport; otherwise, he could not have caused the Postal Service to deliver it there. We reject Davila's contention that this address is not a reference to a specific person. While Connecticut State's Attorney's Office may be used to refer to an institution, at the same time, the Connecticut State's Attorney is a person, and the words Connecticut State's Attorney's Office are reasonably understood to indicate that person's office. 60 Moreover, even if we were to read the words Connecticut State's Attorney's Office as referring solely to an institution, there is a lack of precedent from which to conclude that this would qualify as plain error. As we observed in United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155 (2d Cir.2004): 61 For an error to be plain, it must, at a minimum, be clear under current law. We typically will not find such error where the operative legal question is unsettled, including where there is no binding precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court . . . . It may be appropriate for this Court to find an error plain, even in the absence of binding precedent from the Supreme Court or this Circuit, where other circuits have uniformly taken a position on an issue that has never been squarely presented to this Court. We emphasize, however, that such cases are bound to be exceedingly rare. 62 Id. at 158 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In this circuit, there is no binding precedent as to whether an institution qualifies as a person under section 876, and courts elsewhere are split on the issue. Compare, e.g., United States v. Bly, No. 3:04CR00011, 2005 WL 2621996,  (W.D.Va. Oct.14, 2005) (holding that a letter addressed to the University of Virginia was addressed to a person within the meaning of section 876), with United States v. Brownfield, 130 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1184 (C.D.Cal.2001) (concluding that an agency of the U.S. government was not a person under the statute). In light of the unclear state of the law, there would be no basis for concluding that Davila suffered plain error even if the indictment failed to allege that his letter was addressed to a specific individual.