Opinion ID: 177072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Daniel's Individual Speech

Text: With respect to the statement that Daniel wished to make on his own, without the assistance of the school, it did not involve drugs, was not lewd or vulgar, and could not have been perceived to be school-sponsored. The rule announced in Tinker, therefore, delineates our review of the Individual Defendants' alleged violation of Daniel's First Amendment rights. Applying Tinker, the relevant inquiry is whether the record ... demonstrate[s] ... facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514, 89 S.Ct. 733. Appellants assert that there was nothing on the face of Daniel's message which could lead to a determination that its dissemination would risk a material disruption at the school, and that the district court erred in focusing on the atmosphere at school, not the speech being prohibited. Appellants' Br. at 37, 49. Appellants misread Tinker. The Court's focus in Tinker was not on the contours of the specific message the petitioners sought to convey by wearing black arm bands  the message itself was simple and self-evident: opposition to the war in Vietnam. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Court's focus was on the extent to which the speech would be accompanied by disorder or disturbance on the part of the petitioners. Id. at 508-14, 89 S.Ct. 733. In contradistinction to the facts presented in Tinker, the Supreme Court cited Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.1966), where the Fifth Circuit upheld the enforcement of a similar ban because the students wearing freedom buttons harassed students who did not wear them and created much disturbance. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505 n. 1, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Court explained that in order for a school to suppress student speech on the grounds of preventing material disruption in the school, administrators must have more than an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance and must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Id. at 508, 509, 89 S.Ct. 733. Appellants also cite Governor Wentworth Regional School District v. Hendrickson, 421 F.Supp.2d 410 (D.N.H.2006) in support of their argument that the district court was required to undergo an in-depth review of the context of Daniel's speech. The court in Hendrickson confronted a school's prohibition on students wearing an anti-Nazi patch and struggled with the question of how (and where) to draw the line between a reasonable (and legally sufficient) fear of disturbance, and one that is merely `undifferentiated.' Hendrickson, 421 F.Supp.2d at 421. Here, however, we do not face any difficulty in line drawing. There is no question that Daniel's mere presence in the school, with or without his speech, would likely result in violence or the threat of violence and would therefore materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733; see Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir.2006) (explaining that while Tinker was not entirely clear as to what constitutes substantial interference, violence or the threat of violence would undoubtedly qualify). The record shows, inter alia, that police were assigned to protect the DeFabio home, Daniel's parents felt intimidated in their home, Daniel received death threats, and he admitted he was scared to return to school. The fact that hostility towards Daniel continued throughout the summer of 2004 also speaks to the danger that Daniel faced were he to return to school in the months following the incident. In Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir.2008), we explained that `[s]chool officials have an affirmative duty to not only ameliorate the harmful effects of disruptions, but to prevent them from happening in the first place' and that [t]he question is not whether there has been actual disruption, but whether school officials `might reasonably portend disruption' from the student expression at issue. Id. at 51 (quoting Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir.2007) (alteration in original) and LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001)). Here the school had already experienced actual disruption, and in light of, inter alia, threats heard in school that students were planning to bomb Daniel's house, the Individual Defendants could also reasonably portend disruption were Daniel readmitted to East Hampton High School. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989. Under the circumstances, therefore, it was reasonable for the Individual Defendants to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514, 89 S.Ct. 733, were Daniel permitted to return to school to speak with his classmates about his version of what transpired on April 26. Because it was objectively reasonable [for the Individual Defendants] to believe that their acts did not violate [Daniel's] clearly established rights, they were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Daniel's asserted right to return to school and communicate his explanation. Young, 160 F.3d at 903.