Opinion ID: 1294897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: institutional considerations: separation of powers

Text: Finally, we conclude that the Dostert majority had no business intruding into an area committed to the legislative branch of government. Whether it's called judge made law or judicial legislation, the Dostert majority had no constitutional power to rewrite the judges' retirement statute. It is a fundamental constitutional law that the power to legislate belongs to the legislature. W.Va.Const. art. VI § 1. The legislature is the trustee of the state's resources. Courts can no more assume that trusteeship than they could correct legislative impolicy thereon. [28] The separation of governmental powers through a tripartite allocation of powers in both our state and federal constitutional systems is recognized as `one of the chief merits' of the American system of written constitutions and ... [it is] essential to the successful working of the system `that the persons intrusted with power in any one of these branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but that each shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other.' [29] It is for these reasons that we now strike the fatal blow to the judicial retirement system written by the Court in Dostert and DePond. As the effacers of our past mistakes, we neither point a finger nor claim credit. Justice Neely dissented in Dostert, Justice Brotherton dissented in DePond, and Circuit Court Judge Steptoe, sitting on a special panel in Oakley, dissented. Except for these judges, and one or two others, we acted more like children in a candy store than responsible public officials. Most judges planned to accept the new liberal retirements benefits, if needed, [30] and most remained quiet while the public and the media condemned the decision. We regret this chapter in our history. The people of West Virginia have been very good to their judiciary. Judges earn an income that is six times greater than the income of the average wage earner in West Virginia. Judges who qualify for the judicial retirement system are paid seventy-five percent of their judicial salary. Justices have twelve year terms and Judges need to run for reelection only every eight years. The Dostert decision was a violation of the trust reposed in us by the people of the State of West Virginia. This case [ Dostert ] has no place in the jurisprudence of our State or our nation. [31] Those words of Justice Brotherton, in his dissenting opinion in DePond, are now set forth as the conclusions of this Court. Justice Miller, in his concurring opinion in DePond, expressed concern over the retroactivity problems caused when the Court changes the direction of the law. [32] In response to those concerns, we note that W.Va.Code, 51-9-3 [1987], requires the state auditor to refund with interest all payments made by judges for credited service under the Dostert decision. In addition, the widows of Judges DePond and Kingdon now qualify for annuities under W.Va.Code, 51-9-6b [1987]. There is a gap between the time the two widows started receiving an annuity pursuant to the Dostert rules and the start of the annuity created by the legislature in 1987. After considering the reliance factors argument advanced by Justice Miller in his concurring opinion in DePond, we agree that it would be callous and unconscionable to require Mrs. DePond and Mrs. Kingdon to pay back the benefits received during that relatively short period. Regrettably, the same reliance argument does not apply to Justice Harshbarger. The appellee contends that it is patently unfair and a denial of due process to deny him his benefits when the widows of other Judges in an identical situation are receiving pension payments. But it is obvious that the situations are not identical. The difference between Justice Harshbarger's situation and that of the widows is that Justice Harshbarger was a member of the Dostert Court while Mrs. DePond and Mrs. Kingdon were innocent bystanders who happened to benefit by the Court's decision. Justice Harshbarger, as a participant in the Court's decision that made him eligible for a pension for which he was not otherwise qualified, had a direct stake in the outcome of the case. Justice Harshbarger cannot place any faith in or rely on a pension that was created by his own act. We are satisfied that it would be contrary to established law to permit Justice Harshbarger to receive a judicial pension at this time. We note that Justice Harshbarger is a member of the judges' retirement system and prior to his retirement, could have elected to enroll in the public employees retirement system. See W.Va.Code, 5-10-17 [1985] (defining the requirements for membership in the public employees retirement system). Because of the confusion surrounding the Dostert decision, this Court finds that it would be inequitable not to allow Justice Harshbarger to transfer his membership from the judges' retirement system to the public employees retirement system. We hold that the transfer of membership from the judges' retirement system to the public employees retirement system is limited to the special circumstances of this case and must be exercised within thirty days of this opinion. In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County is reversed, and judgment is entered for appellant in this Court. However, because of the extraordinary confusion caused by Dostert from the time that case was filed until today, it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that notwithstanding any other provision of law, appellee Justice Harshbarger shall be permitted to resign from the judicial retirement system and, within thirty days from the entry of the order in this case, join the public employees retirement system under terms and conditions, and receive such benefits, past and future, as would have been applicable had he elected to join said system in a timely fashion at the conclusion of his term in 1984. Reversed. Judgment entered in this Court. MILLER, McHUGH and WORKMAN, JJ., deeming themselves disqualified, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. CAPLAN, C.J. (retired), was recalled to active service, and STEPHENS and WILSON, Circuit Judges, sat by designation. STEPHENS, Circuit Judge, concurring: Although I do not agree with all the majority's reasons, I concur in the result because Justice Harshbarger should not benefit from his participation in In re Dostert, ___ W.Va.___, 324 S.E.2d 402 (1984). Dostert liberalized the judicial pension's eligibility requirements, thereby making Justice Harshbarger eligible for a pension for which he could not otherwise qualify. I agree with the majority that Justice Harshbarger cannot place any faith in, or rely on a pension that was created by his own act. Majority opinion supra at ___, 403 S.E.2d at 404. Stated more plainly, no man ought to be a judge in his own cause. Id. at ___, 403 S.E.2d at 402, 403. But for Justice Harshbarger's participation, I would have been persuaded otherwise. Justice Harshbarger's participation in Dostert makes his case philosophically and factually different from Oakley v. Gainer, ___ W.Va.___, 331 S.E.2d 846 (1985) and DePond v. Gainer, ___ W.Va. ___, 351 S.E.2d 358 (1986)a distinction that the majority fails to appreciate. In Oakley and DePond, the widows of Judge Arthur R. Kingdon and Judge Frank J. DePond, relied on what they thought the law was at that particular time and had no involvement in the Dostert decision. Thus the distinguishing factor between Justice Harshbarger and the widows is reliance. See DePond, supra at___, 351 S.E.2d at 403-04 (Miller, J., concurring). In failing to base its decision on Justice Harshbarger's participation, the majority abandons the doctrine of stare decisis as if adherence to precedent has little value in our system of jurisprudence. However the principle of stare decisis is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence. Although the principle of stare decisis admits of exception, we have long required that deviation from its application should not occur absent some urgent and compelling reason. Dailey v. Bechtel Corp., 157 W.Va. 1023, 1029, 207 S.E.2d 169, 173 (1974). See Adkins v. St. Francis Hospital of Charleston, W.Va., 149 W.Va. 705, 718, 143 S.E.2d 154, 162 (1965). The adherence to precedent is particularly important in areas of property interest, such as entitlement to judicial retirement benefits. This Court recognized the need for reliance and certainty concerning property interests, when we said: Predictability is at the heart of the doctrine of stare decisis, and regardless of what we think of the merits of this case, we must be true to a reasonable interpretation of prior law in the area of property where certainty above all else is the preeminent compelling public policy to be served. Hock v. City of Morgantown, 162 W.Va. 853, 856, 253 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1979); see also Signaigo v. N & W Ry. Co., ___ W.Va. ___, 301 S.E.2d 178, 181-82 (1982). The widows in Oakley and DePond, along with others who did not participate in Dostert, relied on the pension benefits that Dostert made available. The majority's chastisement of the judiciary, except for the righteous few it mentioned, for a lack of courage in failing to strike a fatal blow against the Dostert retirement system, fails again to recognize the judiciary's awareness of the principle of stare decisis. Although the majority attempts to show that Dostert was based on serious judicial error, most of the members of the judiciary were unaware of any error and relied on Dostert, and its progeny Oakley and DePond. This Court in Dailey, supra 157 W.Va. at 1029, 207 S.E.2d at 173, said: If the doctrine of stare decisis is to play any judicial role ... we cannot overrule a decision so recently rendered without any evidence of changing conditions or serious judicial error. See Oakley supra ___ W.Va. at ___, 331 S.E.2d at 854. Because of the need for certainty with respect to property interests, including entitlement to judicial retirement benefits, the majority should not have overruled Dostert, Oakley and DePond. The majority could have reached its decision based on Justice Harshbarger's participation and did not need to introduce uncertainty for those who rely on precedent. Whomsoever relied on what they perceived the law to be at that given time, utilized their mature judgment to do so, and stare decisis is at least one doctrine that assists one in that reliance.