Opinion ID: 770705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence Regarding the Attempted Murder of Glenn Gilbert

Text: 19 The government here renews the five Rule 404(b)-based arguments made below in support of admitting the evidence of Gilbert's attempt on her husband's life: (1) the similarities inhering in the modus operandi Gilbert employed in this attempt and that she employed in the crimes charged tends to identify Gilbert as the perpetrator of the crimes charged; (2) the evidence tends to show that Gilbert at all times acted intentionally; (3) the evidence tends to show that Gilbert had the knowledge necessary to commit the crimes charged; (4) the evidence tends to show that Gilbert had the opportunity to commit the crimes charged; and (5) the evidence tends to refute Gilbert's defense that natural causes, or VAMC physician negligence, led to the four deaths and three near-deaths cited in the indictment. 20 In denying the government's motion, the district court briefly addressed the first three of these five arguments within the context of Rule 404(b)'s special relevance prong. Stating that other acts evidence is admissible to prove identity under Rule 404(b) when the shared characteristics of the other act and the charged offense are sufficiently idiosyncratic that a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that the same person performed them both, Trenkler, 61 F.3d at 53, the court first explained that there was little to link the attempt on Glenn Gilbert to the crimes charged other than that the attempt on the life of [Gilbert's] husband [was] by use of an injection. In the court's view, this shared characteristic is insufficiently idiosyncratic in a hospital setting to render the attempt on Glenn Gilbert specially relevant on the issue of identity. 21 The court also quickly dismissed the notion that the attempt on Glenn Gilbert is specially relevant on the issue of intent, reasoning that Gilbert is not defending this case on the theory that she administered fatal and near fatal doses of medicine but did so without the requisite intent. Finally, the court stated in a sentence that the government did not need this evidence to show Gilbert's specialized knowledge, as Gilbert was concededly a trained nurse. 22 The district court then went on to describe at some length what it appears to regard as the heart of the matter: whether the evidence, even if having significant relevance on some non-forbidden avenue of inquiry, should come in under Rule 403. The court stated: 23 Even if the Government could show some significant degree of special relevance of the evidence related to the attempt on Glenn Gilbert, the second prong of the 404(b) analysis would render this evidence inadmissible. The potential unfair prejudice generated by this evidence overwhelmingly outweighs any probative value. 24 The obvious fact can be simply put. If the court permits the Government to put on evidence of the purported attempted murder of Glenn Gilbert, then the ensuing trial will be as much about the Glenn Gilbert episode as it will be about the charged murders and attempted murders. This is because no reasonable juror, even with the most thorough and forceful instructions, could avoid the temptation to conclude that, if the defendant could bring herself to kill her husband, then she must be the sort of person who would kill the victims of the charged crimes. To defend their client, defense counsel would simply have to convince the jury that the attack on Glenn Gilbert never occurred. The force of the improper propensity evidence would be too powerful for any juror to ignore, any attorney to leave unanswered, or any judge to guard against. 25 In other words, by proving the uncharged conduct, the Government would dramatically increase its chances of obtaining a conviction with regard to the charged conduct - not because the evidence of the uncharged crime would be applied on the issues of identity, motive, or specialized knowledge, but because of the inferences of propensity that would inevitably be drawn by the jury. In this evidentiary environment, the defendant simply could not get a fair trial on the charges that have actually been brought against her. 26 On appeal, the government directs most of its fire on the district court's reasoning as to whether the evidence of the alleged attempt on Glenn Gilbert's life might be regarded as specially relevant on one or more of the factors argued by the government in support of its in limine motion. The government contends that the court gave short shrift to its identity argument, particularly its argument that there were a number of relatively non-unique but nonetheless identifying similarities between the Glenn Gilbert episode and the charged crimes. See Trenkler, 61 F.3d at 54 (a number of common features of lesser uniqueness, although insufficient to generate a strong inference of identity if considered separately, may be of significant probative value when considered together). The government also argues that the court erred in failing to recognize that Gilbert has not stipulated the issue of intent out of the case, and that she appears prepared to defend one of the attempted murder charges by conceding that she gave a harm-causing injection but asserting that she did so without malicious intent. Finally, the government points out that the court did not specifically address each of the government's five Rule 404(b) arguments. 27 But Rule 404(b)'s special relevance prong was not the principal basis of the district court's ruling. The remarks excerpted above make it clear that, even if the district court considered the evidence regarding the attempted murder of Glenn Gilbert as having a significant degree of special relevance as to identity, intent, knowledge, opportunity, or causation, the court still would have excluded the evidence because, in its view, the evidence was overwhelmingly likely to confuse the issues and mislead the jury. And on this point, the government has failed to persuade us that the court committed a palpable error in judgment in calibrating the decisional scales. See Roberts, 978 F.2d at 21. We thus proceed directly to a review of the court's Rule 403 ruling. 28 In challenging the district court's balancing of probative value against the danger of issue confusion and jury inflammation, the government builds from its argument that the court underestimated the special relevance of the evidence. The government further contends that the court ignored its need for the evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319, 1327 (1st Cir. 1988) (suggesting that the government's need for evidence helps determine its probative value), and that the court underestimated the jury's ability to follow limiting instructions as to how to use the evidence. Finally, the government suggests that the court erred in predicting that this evidence would dominate the proceedings because introduction of the evidence would take between two and four hours of what will be a two- to three-month trial. 29 Although the non-comprehensive nature of the district court's written remarks on the matter leaves us less than entirely confident in its conclusion that the Glenn Gilbert evidence would be unlikely to have any probative value, 5 we are not convinced that relevant matters deserving of significant weight have been overlooked in the course of the court's Rule 403 balancing. Roberts, 978 F.2d at 21 (emphasis supplied). Five factors lead us to this conclusion; the first four bear on the overall probative value of the evidence, the fifth relates to its potential for being misused by the jury. 30 First, regardless whether the evidence of the methodology allegedly used in the attempt on Glenn Gilbert is sufficiently similar to the evidence of the methodology allegedly used in the crimes charged, we regard the inherent reliability of the evidence, and thus its overall probative value, as very much open to question. Although the district court appears to have assumed arguendo that the evidence passes the threshold admissibility hurdle of Rule 104(b), see supra note 5 (summarizing how district courts initially must decide whether to admit conditional facts), this determination strikes us as being far from a foregone conclusion. The evidence, after all, consists almost entirely of allegations made by a hostile witness months after the event in question. 31 Second, even without regard to the explosive nature of the evidence itself, we think that the court was warranted in having concerns about the extent to which the attempt on Glenn Gilbert would have to be litigated during the course of the trial. This is not a situation where the extrinsic act is conceded by all to have taken place. Indeed, Gilbert vehemently denies having attempted to murder her husband. Cf. Trenkler, 61 F.3d at 51-56 (concluding that evidence of a prior bombing conceded by all to have occurred and similar in many respects to a charged bombing had probative value on the issue of identity). It is thus nearly certain that there would be a mini-trial on whether the attempt actually took place. And in the course of the mini-trial, Gilbert likely would find herself obliged to introduce into evidence the tawdry details leading to the bitter divorce and child custody proceedings to explain Glenn Gilbert's hostility and thus attempt to undermine his credibility. We think that the potential for confusion of the issues and for unfair prejudice in such a scenario is manifest. 32 Third, four of the five issues adduced by the government in support of admitting the Glenn Gilbert evidence do not appear to be much in dispute in this case. As we have observed, Gilbert's defense theory, at least with respect to six of the seven charged events underlying the murder and attempted murder charges, is that no murder or attempted murder took place. In other words, Gilbert does not appear to be preparing to defend this case by acknowledging that crimes took place but arguing that the government has misidentified the perpetrator; or that she killed or nearly killed without intent (except with respect to the diabetic victim); or that she lacked the knowledge or opportunity to commit the crimes. And with respect to the fifth issue to which the government points - causation - we simply do not see how the jury could regard the Glenn Gilbert evidence as specially relevant without drawing a forbidden inference of criminal propensity. So far as we can tell, the presumed fact that Gilbert attempted to poison her husband in a non-VAMC setting tends to prove that the events underlying the charged crimes were the product of malicious human agency (and not naturally occurring) only if one first indulges an assumption that the odds of poisonings having taken place at the VAMC are increased by the presence of a demonstrated poisoner. Yet this is precisely the sort of assumption that Rule 404(b)'s preclusion of character evidence is designed to guard against. 6 33 Fourth, we do not find particularly compelling the government's argument that it has a strong need for this evidence. We recognize that the government bears the burden of proving intent and causation, yet see little likelihood that these issues will prove nettlesome to the government if the jury accepts as truthful and reliable its principal evidence against Gilbert: her two admissions to Perrault and the toxicological evidence tending to establish that the deaths cited in the indictment were the result of deliberate poisoning. 34 Finally, we can find no fault with the district court's prognostication that the particularly inflammatory nature of the Glenn Gilbert evidence renders it highly susceptible of being misused by the jury in the course of its deliberations. On this point, we have nothing to add to the court's well-stated remarks other than to reiterate that, although Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, see United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1021 (1st Cir. 1993), there is always some danger that the jury will use [Rule 404(b) other act] evidence not on the narrow point for which it is offered but rather to infer that the defendant has a propensity towards criminal behavior, Trenkler, 61 F.3d at 56. Here, where the other act evidence is only marginally reliable, of marginal probative value, and so undeniably explosive, the court's decision to tread a cautious path was well within its wide discretion. 35 We therefore affirm the exclusion of this evidence. In so doing, we caution that our ruling does not foreclose a revisitation of the matter at trial should future events so warrant. See Lachman, 48 F.3d at 590, 594. 36