Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Discharge of Juror Teresa Barragan and Alternate Juror William Ayala

Text: Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in discharging Juror Teresa Barragan during penalty phase deliberations. These are the relevant facts: Late in the afternoon of Wednesday, December 11, 1991, the trial court submitted the penalty phase case to the jury. The jury deliberated the remainder of that day and throughout the next day. On Friday December 13, before the jury had assembled, Juror Barragan asked the trial court to excuse her from further jury service. Barragan explained that her employer had stopped paying her for jury service early in November and that she had already used four weeks of vacation time to remain on the jury. When the trial court inquired of Barragan whether it would be a hardship for her to continue, she replied: I would either have to take vacation or not get paid period. Over defense objection, the trial court excused Juror Barragan for financial hardship. The trial court immediately selected one of the alternates, Henry Rufo, to replace Barragan and instructed the jury to begin its deliberations anew. On Monday December 16, the next court day, the jury asked to have the medical examiner's testimony from the guilt phase read back. After the jury heard the reading of the testimony, it resumed deliberations, and shortly thereafter reached its verdict. Section 1089 provides for the discharge of a juror before or after the final submission of the case to the jury for good cause shown. In reviewing a trial court's decision either to retain or discharge a juror, we use the deferential abuse of discretion standard. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 415, 489, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th.953, 975, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) And we will uphold the decision unless it `falls outside the bounds of reason.' ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 371, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169, quoting People v, De Santis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210.) In the past, we have upheld a trial court's decision to discharge a juror for good cause when continued jury service would force the cancellation of a juror's scheduled vacation ( People v. Lucas, supra, at pp. 488-489, 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373), would be a financial hardship on the juror (see People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 665, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84), or when a juror who anticipated starting a new job needed additional time to complete certain paperwork related to her old position ( People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1098-1099, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36). Here, Juror Barragan's employer had stopped paying her for jury service one month earlier and she had used her own vacation time during that month to continue to serve on the jury. For Barragan to remain on the jury would under the circumstances have been a financial hardship. As we observed in People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 415, 489, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373, a juror facing personal hardship might feel some pressure to bring the penalty deliberations to a speedy close. On the facts of this case, the trial court's discharge of Juror Barragan was not an abuse of discretion. Defendant also argues that Barragan's discharge from jury service seriously disrupted the penalty phase deliberative process in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Defendant did not object on these constitutional grounds in the trial court and thus has not preserved this issue for appeal. As we said in People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d 612, 664, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84: A defendant may properly raise in this court a point involving an allegedly improper excusal for undue personal hardship only if he made the same point below. The requirement of a contemporaneous and specific objection promotes the fair and correct resolution of a claim of error both at trial and on appeal, and thereby furthers the interests of reliability and finality. When a contemporaneous and specific objection is made, the parties are put on notice to characterize the claim as they think proper and to set out the law and facts as they deem necessary. With their response, the trial court is provided with a basis on which to define the claim and then determine whether it is meritorious and, if so, how any harm may be avoided or cured as promptly and completely as possible. On such a record, the appellate court may then decide whether a challenge to the trial court's ruling is sound. Also not preserved for appeal is defendant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in discharging for financial hardship one of the alternate jurors, William Ayala, on December 9, 1991, before the start of the penalty phase. In the trial court, defendant did not object to Ayala's discharge. Accordingly, we do not consider the issue.