Opinion ID: 1422450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: arguments of defendants barnes and chambers

Text: Defendants Barnes and Chambers contend in other assignments of error that the trial court erred in its peremptory instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in the capital sentencing proceeding, arguing that the instruction as given could have been interpreted to place a higher evidentiary burden on defendant than was proper. The trial court instructed the jury with respect to one of the nonstatutory mitigators that [y]ou would find this mitigating circumstance if you find that the defendant's father [or mother] abused alcohol, and all of the evidence tends to show that this is true, and if you find that this circumstance has mitigating value. Barnes and Chambers argue that this instruction could be interpreted to mean that a juror could find the circumstance only after the juror herself found that all of the evidence showed that the fact at issue was true. In State v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 235, 464 S.E.2d 414, 435 (1995), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 91, 136 L.Ed.2d 47 (1996), we noted that the peremptory instructions for nonstatutory mitigators differ from those for statutory mitigators in that a juror may consider a nonstatutory mitigator found by her to be without mitigating value. A peremptory instruction for a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance should reflect this distinction. Id. The construction offered by Barnes and Chambers is contrary to the syntax of the sentence, and the trial court explained this syntax using verbal punctuation: THE COURT: I'm saying if you find that his mother abused alcohol, comma, and all the evidence tends to show that this is true, comma. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So you're not telling them that the evidence does in fact show that? THE COURT: I'm telling them it tends to show that. I'm not telling them that's what it does show. It's for them to accept or reject. .... [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I don't feel that it is [ambiguous] either, although it's hard to get the inflection on the record. It's quite clear the Court is saying the evidence tends to show all of this is true. The peremptory instructions in this case therefore were legally correct, as they reflected the distinction between the statutory and nonstatutory mitigators, advised the jury that all of the evidence in the case tended to support the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, and allowed but did not require the jury to find the circumstance. These assignments of error are without merit. By another assignment of error, defendants Barnes and Chambers argue that the trial court erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on the N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9) aggravating circumstance, that each murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. By this assignment, Barnes and Chambers do not argue that the (e)(9) circumstance was inapplicable in this case. Rather, they contend that the instruction given by the court permitted the jury to find vicariously the aggravating circumstance for one defendant based on the actions and specific intent of another defendant. Defendants argue that the trial court should have instructed the jury that it had to consider each defendant's individual behavior and intent in determining whether the (e)(9) circumstance aggravated that defendant's culpability for the murders. While Barnes and Chambers raised a general objection to the submission of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel circumstance, neither requested a limiting instruction on the circumstance. Thus, we review this alleged instructional error under the plain error rule. State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983). We conclude that the instruction given by the trial court, based on N.C.P.I. Crim. 150.10, was neither an error that had an impact on the jury's findings nor a mistake so fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378. The instruction at issue here, which we have said to be correct as a matter of law, State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 388-91, 428 S.E.2d 118, 139-40, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 114 S.Ct. 392, 126 L.Ed.2d 341 (1993), apprised the jury with respect to what it must find for each murder to have been especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The trial court instructed the jury separately for each defendant, enumerating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances individually for each murder count. Moreover, the court premised its capital sentencing instructions to the jury with the following limiting instruction: Members of the Jury, I am now going to instruct you on the law which you are to follow as you decide what the appropriate punishment shall be in these cases. I want to once again caution you that all of these cases have been joined for trial to be tried at the same time for various reasons. However, in your consideration as to the appropriate punishment in each of these cases, you are to consider each case and each individual defendant separately. That is, you are to determine the appropriate punishment on the merits as you find them to be under the instructions which I will give you as to each individual separately. Our conclusion is also supported by the jury's factual findings relating to accomplice liability. During the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the jury determined that for both murder counts, Barnes and Chambers each (1) killed or attempted to kill the victim, (2) intended to kill the victim, (3) intended that deadly force would be used in the course of the underlying felony, or (4) was a major participant in the underlying felony and exhibited reckless indifference to human life. Furthermore, the jury failed during the sentencing proceeding to find the existence of the N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(4) mitigating circumstance, that defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor, for either Barnes or Chambers. The jury did find, however, that the (f)(4) mitigating circumstance existed with respect to Blakney. These findings tend to show that, for capital sentencing purposes, the jury adhered to the trial court's instruction to consider each defendant's involvement and culpability distinctly and that the jury did not find facts vicariously against one defendant based on the actions or intent of another. We cannot conclude that the instruction with respect to the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance was plain in error. This assignment of error is therefore overruled.