Opinion ID: 2634909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: an order setting a goal of individualized permanency is final and appealable

Text: ¶ 25 Next we consider whether the order changing K.F.'s permanency goal from reunification with her mother to individualized permanency is a final appealable order. We hold that an order of individualized permanency is a final appealable order and is appropriate in situations where there is a compelling reason to rule out goals of reunification, adoption, guardianship, and kinship placements. We reach this conclusion after a two-fold analysis: first, we analyze why individualized permanency is a legitimate permanency goal, then we turn to why an order setting a goal of individualized permanency is final and appealable.
¶ 26 While the mother and the State agree that the order ending reunification services and setting K.F.'s permanency goal as individualized permanency is final and appealable, the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) argues that the order is not final and appealable, but rather interlocutory, because it didn't even define what [K.F.'s] permanent status would be. The GAL further states that the goal of individualized permanency is not a permanent goal but rather one that must be narrowed down to a specific permanent status. The GAL further describes individualized permanency as foster care drift. ¶ 27 The term foster care drift describes situations wherein the temporary solution of foster care inadvertently becomes a permanent solution. [17] In these situations, a permanent goal for the child is never properly established. [18] But foster care drift, with all that the term implies, is not an appropriate way to describe all goals that effectuate long-term foster care. The Utah Legislature and the United States Congress have jointly provided guidelines for the rare circumstances wherein a permanency goal of long-term foster care, in this case labeled individualized permanency, is in the best interest of the child. ¶ 28 Recognizing there are circumstances in which more traditional goals of permanency are not appropriate, our legislature has stated that when there is a compelling reason that adoption, reunification, guardianship, or a kinship placement are not in the child's best interest, then the court may order another planned permanent living arrangement in accordance with federal law. [19] ¶ 29 Federal law, in turn, recognizes the need for individualized permanency: (3) If the State concludes, after considering reunification, adoption, legal guardianship, or permanent placement with a fit and willing relative, that the most appropriate permanency plan for a child is placement in another planned permanent living arrangement, the State must document to the court the compelling reason for the alternate plan. Examples of a compelling reason for establishing such a permanency plan may include: ... (ii) The case of a parent and child who have a significant bond but the parent is unable to care for the child because of an emotional or physical disability and the child's foster parents have committed to raising him/her to the age of majority and to facilitate visitation with the disabled parent.... [20] Thus, a goal of individualized permanency is in accordance with federal law when the court seeking to establish the goal (1) determines that reunification, adoption, guardianship, and a kinship placement are not available options, and (2) articulates a compelling reason for setting the goal of individualized permanency. ¶ 30 In this case, the juvenile court met these requirements. The court first ruled out the statutorily preferred permanency goals, beginning with reunification. After finding that the mother had not complied with her service plan, the court was statutorily required to rule out reunification, [21] which the court clearly did when it changed K.F.'s permanency goal and stated that its focus would no longer be on reunification. The court then determined that adoption was not an option because K.F. was 13 years old, she desired a relationship with her mother, and, based on expert testimony, K.F.'s mental health required a relationship with her mother. ¶ 31 The court then articulated a compelling reason to establish a goal of individualized permanency for K.F. K.F. was residing with a foster care family with whom she had spent considerable time. She not only lived with them for the year prior to the permanency hearing, but she also lived with the family at a previous time when she was in state custody. Assessing K.F.'s need to maintain a relationship with her mother despite the fact that the court could not reunite K.F. with her mother, the juvenile court established a goal of individualized permanency wherein K.F. will remain with her foster family and DCFS will continue engaging the mother in family therapy with K.F. [22] ¶ 32 These facts closely resemble the federal regulation's example of a situation wherein long-term foster care is in the child's best interestthe parent and child have a significant bond but reunification is impossible, and the child is living with a foster family that is committed to raising the child to majority and facilitating visitation between the parent and child. [23] For these reasons, we hold that the juvenile court's oral findings sufficiently stated a compelling reason to make individualized permanency a permanent goal for K.F. ¶ 33 Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. California, reviewing similar facts, has held that long-term, potentially-permanent foster care complies with federal regulations: Congress did not intend to dispense with long-term foster care as a placement when reunification efforts had failed but to encourage regular review of the status of foster children and permit creative solutions for safe, permanent living arrangements for minors who could no longer reside with their parents. Of course, the periodic review of the foster care placement permits the state to adapt as circumstances change and consider permanent plans which might not have been available at the time reunification services were terminated. [24] Vermont has also found that long-term foster care is appropriate when a child has a strong bond with a parent who is unable to raise the child. [25] ¶ 34 Having determined that individualized permanency is a legitimate permanent status and was properly ordered in this case, we turn to whether an order setting a goal for individualized permanency is a final order.
¶ 35 An order is appealable as a matter of right if it is final. [26] All other orders may be appealed at the discretion of the appellate court as interlocutory appeals. [27] ¶ 36 To be final, a juvenile court order must end[] the current juvenile proceedings, leaving no question open for further judicial action. [28] [O]ur inquiry into whether an order leaves a question open for further judicial action is often unconcerned with the question of whether the juvenile court's jurisdiction over a minor continues beyond its entry of the order. Because considerations regarding a child's welfare are rarely, if ever, static and because the child's environment is constantly evolving, the juvenile court frequently retains jurisdiction over cases after some of the issues have been finally resolved. [29] Therefore, the determining factor in deciding if an order is final and appealable is whether it effects a change in the permanent status of the child. [30] A permanent change in the child's status vis-a-vis the child's parent is sufficient. [31] Juvenile court orders that we have held are final and appealable include orders terminating parental rights; [32] orders that simultaneously end reunification services, terminate DCFS's custody, and return the children to their parents; [33] and orders entered upon disposition of an adjudicated petition of abuse, neglect or dependency. [34] ¶ 37 Juvenile court orders that we have held are not final include shelter orders, which make an interim determination pending additional proceedings, [35] and orders that merely terminate reunification services and change the child's permanency goal to adoption [36] a goal that cannot be accomplished without further judicial action. ¶ 38 This case provides us the first opportunity to address whether an order resulting from a permanency hearing is final and appealable if the order terminates reunification services and changes a child's permanency goal to individualized permanency. At issue is whether individualized permanency requires additional proceedings before the goal may be accomplished; that is, we must determine whether setting a goal of individualized permanency effectuates a permanent change in the child's status. We hold that it does. ¶ 39 K.F.'s mother argues that the goal of individualized permanency set by the juvenile court at the permanency hearing effectively transferred permanent custody from her. Unlike a goal of adoption, further proceedings would not be necessary to effectuate the goal because the court specifically ordered that parental rights would not be terminated. Thus, the individualized permanency order is the only order from which she will be able to appeal the juvenile court's decision to terminate reunification efforts and keep K.F. in state custody. ¶ 40 The State agrees. It contends that the juvenile court's order effected a permanent change in K.F.'s status by potentially denying the mother custody of K.F. for the rest of K.F.'s minority. Further, the State observes that there likely is not another order from which the mother may appeal the juvenile court's decision to end reunification efforts in favor of long-term state custody of K.F. ¶ 41 The GAL, on the other hand, argues that individualized permanency is not a final order because it is subject to revision. Although the GAL is correct in saying that by its very nature individualized permanency is subject to revision, the GAL is incorrect in assuming that the goal will necessarily be revised. Its revision depends upon whether the relationship between the parent and the child substantially changes, leaving open the very real possibility that the relationship will not substantially change. Therefore, individualized permanency may remain the child's permanency goal throughout the child's minority when such a goal is in the best interest of the child. ¶ 42 As such, it is possible that the mother will not have another opportunity to appeal the court's order if we do not allow her to do so now. Perhaps in time, K.F.'s relationship with her mother will change in such a way to enable the juvenile court to re-examine the options of reunification or adoption. Certainly, considerations regarding a child's welfare are rarely, if ever static because the child's environment is constantly evolving. [37] But considering the very real possibility that the relationship between the mother and K.F. may not substantially change, this order must be considered final for matters of appealability; otherwise, the mother may never have an opportunity to appeal this order.