Opinion ID: 1243165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This, as stated by Chatterson, is his first assigned error:

Text: That the court erred in overruling defendant's motion for mistrial and motion to exclude witness, Dr. Nordin, for the reason it was cumulative and prejudicial and inflammatory in nature as to outweigh its probative value in that ample evidence consisting of testimony by two doctors and movies and photos as to the child's injury had been given. Defendant's composite supportive argument will accordingly be entertained, albeit briefly. In sequential order, Dr. Stoner examined Rose at the hospital in Clinton and testified as to the child's semi-comatose condition. Suspecting brain damage Dr. Stoner referred the child to University Hospitals at Iowa City. There Rose was initially examined by Dr. McDonnell, whose testimony focused upon the Battered Child Syndrome as related to observed bruises, bite marks and the girl's listless condition. The next professional called, over defendant's pretestimonial cumulative and inflammatory motion to exclude and subsequent objection, was Dr. Nordin who, with Dr. McDonnell, had treated the child. Both of these experts described the multiple manifestations of injury found on Rose's entire body. Moreover, Dr. Nordin opined the child had sustained head injuries which were permanent and caused some mild damage to her intellect. All this was buttressed by a movie of Rose taken on March 22, 1976, which revealed a disfunction of the child's left side. The movie was displayed to the jury over Chatterson's irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial objection. Discussion will serve no useful purpose. The present assignment affords defendant no basis for appellate relief. See generally State v. Burrell, 255 N.W.2d 119, 123 (Iowa 1977) (opinion evidence); Doe v. Ray, 251 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Iowa 1977) (opinion evidence); State v. Fryer, 243 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1976) (photographs); State v. Hummell, 228 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Iowa 1975) (photographs); State v. Maxwell, 222 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Iowa 1974) (cumulative evidence); State v. Youngbear, 202 N.W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1972) (cumulative evidence and photographs); People v. La Vergne, 64 Cal.2d 265, 49 Cal.Rptr. 557, 411 P.2d 309, 313 (1966) (motion pictures); 3 Jones on Evidence, § 17:52, at 359-361 (Gard. 6th ed. 1972) (movies); McCormick on Evidence, § 214, at 530 (2d ed. 1972) (photographs and movies); cf. State v. Proulx, 252 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Iowa 1977) (video tape and repetitive evidence on rebuttal). No abuse of discretion attended trial court's admission of the above described evidence. II. Next, did trial court err in overruling Chatterson's directed verdict motion? As to this issue defendant avers the State failed to prove: (1) the alleged assault occurred on or about November 21, 1975, and (2) commission of an act sufficiently severe to constitute the crime charged. The first above stated claim is utterly devoid of merit. See State v. Bell, 223 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Iowa 1974). So we proceed to the second contention. Our scope of review as to alleged error in overruling a directed verdict motion is articulated in State v. Watson, 242 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Iowa 1976). It need not be here repeated. Section 694.7 makes it a felony to assault another with intent to maim, the elements thereof being: (1) an assault, with (2) specific intent to maim. Cf. State v. Bell, supra ; State v. Gillespie, 163 N.W.2d 922, 923-924 (Iowa 1969); State v. Jones, 70 Iowa 505, 508, 30 N.W. 750, 751 (1886). It is not, however, necessary to prove an injury actually resulted from the assault. Cf. State v. Gillespie, 163 N.W.2d at 924; State v. Bell, 223 N.W.2d at 184. The gist of the crime is specific intent. Even so, prior cases suggest that, in order to establish the specific intent required by § 694.7, the State must prove some act which if carried to fruition could result in maiming. Illustratively, this court said in State v. Akin, 94 Iowa 50, 52, 62 N.W. 667, 668 (1895): [T]o constitute the crime of maiming or disfiguring as here defined the accused must have done to another person some one of the acts specified, with intent to maim or disfigure. Trial court, by instruction 13, defined maiming by use of this pertinent phrase from § 693.1:    cut off or disable a limb or any member of another person   . Noticeably, the State does not contend Chatterson tried to cut off a limb or member of the victim's body. This means the prosecution was required to prove defendant intended to disable a limb or member when he committed the alleged assault. Such intent is seldom capable of direct proof, but may be shown by reasonable inferences drawn from facts established. E. g., State v. Bell, 223 N.W.2d at 184. Also brought into play is the presumption that a person intends the natural consequences of his intentional acts. E. g., State v. Ochoa, 244 N.W.2d 773, 777 (Iowa 1976); State v. Bell, supra . Therefore, the nature of acts proved did provide a basis upon which the jury could determine whether requisite intent existed. However, defendant submits the use of his fist or open hand does not support a finding of intent to maim. He attendantly suggests Rose's injuries do not come within the above definition, i. e., no member or limb was disabled. Chatterson's first argument might, arguendo, merit extended discussion if his victim had not been an infant. But as this court said in State v. Tornquist, 254 Iowa 1135, 1147, 120 N.W.2d 483, 491 (1963): Little discernment is required to conclude that the fist, or indeed the hand, of a strong man may readily kill a small    child. See also State v. Bell, supra . A fortiori, the fist or open hand of an adult could disable an infant such as Rose. Correlatively, disabled means incapacitated by    injury, or wounds: crippled. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, at 642 (1961). Further in this regard, substantial evidence was adduced which would sustain a finding that Rose suffered assault-related permanent brain injury and like damage to her left side. Although, as aforesaid, the State is not required to prove any injuries resulted from the assault in a prosecution under § 694.7, the extent of Rose's actual injuries is relevant as related to specific intent. State v. Bell, supra . Whether the injuries inflicted upon Rose were such as to disable a limb or any member of her body was a question for the jury. In like vein it could also resolve the intent element. Defendant's directed verdict motion was properly overruled.