Opinion ID: 521046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prison Regulations

Text: 19 We turn our attention directly to the sufficiency of Todaro's allegation that he was denied due process by reason that he did not receive either a hearing or a reason to justify his segregation. 20 The defendants assert that Todaro was not in punitive segregation, but was placed in lockup in conformity with its policy of a 24-hour medical quarantine imposed when an inmate enters the prison. 21 We have no difficulty in finding that upon his return to the Somerset County Jail Todaro was properly placed into medical quarantine. Section 2000 of the Somerset County Prison Handbook 6 outlines the admission and orientation procedures of the prison. The relevant provisions read as follows: 2002 Medical Quarantine 22 Upon leaving the reception area, you are placed in a cell, usually with other new commitments, until seen by the doctor at 8:00 A.M. on the next working weekday. It is at this point that you will be issued soap, towels, linens and a toothbrush. 2003 Cell Assignments 23 After the completion of your medical examination, you will be interviewed by a member of the Treatment Staff, issued prison clothing and assigned to one of the various levels of security within the institution. 24 According to the regulations, Todaro should have been seen by a doctor at 8:00 a.m. on March 13. 7 Either way, after 24 hours, absent a medical reason, Todaro should have been classified and assigned to one of the various levels of security within the prison. Instead, it appears that a departure from the ordinary prison procedures occurred at this point. 25 Although the magistrate opined that Todaro failed to demonstrate that his confinement was not strictly administrative, the record simply does not support this finding. There is disagreement as to the range of privileges afforded Todaro while in the holding cell, but it is undisputed that he was denied the full panoply of privileges afforded inmates in the general population. 8 We find nothing to contradict Todaro's assertions that after the initial 24-hour quarantine, his continued confinement in the holding cell assumed a different character. Moreover, he asserts it was intended to discipline him for publishing his complaints about the prison conditions. Why he actually remained in lockup for the additional two days is an unresolved question of material fact. The fact is material because if this confinement was in fact punishment, Todaro may indeed have a legitimate Sec. 1983 claim. 26 In Stephany v. Wagner, 835 F.2d 497 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2851, 101 L.Ed.2d 888 (1988), we decided that the main issue in determining whether a state rule can create a protected liberty interest is whether it places substantive limitations on official discretion. Id. at 500, quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). We then acknowledged, citing Marshall v. Kozakiewicz, and Tyler v. Rapone, 603 F.Supp. 268 (E.D.Pa.1985), that the Pennsylvania regulations governing classification of county prisoners were highly discretionary in character and did not give rise to a state-created liberty interest. 27 We conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the reason for Todaro's extended confinement. Because, however, the factfinder could believe Todaro's assertion that his segregative confinement was imposed as a disciplinary measure, we must examine the Pennsylvania regulations governing disciplinary and punishment procedures, rather than focusing exclusively on those regarding classification of prisoners. 28 37 Pa.Code Sec. 95.240 reads, in relevant part, as follows: 29 Sec. 95.240. Discipline and punishment. 30 (a) Minimum requirements. The following minimum requirements shall apply to discipline and punishment: 31 (1) A formal report shall be written if the infraction jeopardizes the security of the jail, threatens the safety or stall or prisoners, or is a violation of State law. 32 (2) The disposition of a disciplinary report, whatever the action taken, shall be documented. 33 (3) Confinement is punishment, therefore no further punishment is permitted unless the prisoner violates the rules and regulations of the prison or violates State law. 34