Opinion ID: 797603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Officer Chris Claramunt's Testimony

Text: 19 Rodriguez argues his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was violated by the admission of testimony from Officer Chris Claramunt (Officer Claramunt), a narcotics detective with the Tulsa Police Department and a task force officer with the Drug Enforcement Administration, regarding Witt's telephonic statements to Rodriguez. While cooperating with law enforcement, Witt placed a recorded telephone call to Rodriguez in the presence of Officer Claramunt and another officer. Witt testified at trial that during the call, she told Rodriguez the dope was smaller and asked whether she would still get paid the same amount. According to Witt, Rodriguez responded affirmatively and agreed to pick Witt up at the airport. 5 At trial, Officer Claramunt summarized Witt's statements to Rodriguez by testifying, Basically that [Witt] had arrived at the airport and her ride wasn't there and [she stated] I need a ride. I'm nervous. I've got 2 pounds of meth on me. You [Rodriguez] need to come get me. At the end of the government's direct examination of Officer Claramunt, counsel for Rodriguez objected, arguing the testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. The district court overruled the objection, holding the testimony was admissible to show Rodriguez's state of mind and to place into context Rodriguez's follow-up statement agreeing to come to the airport. 20 Because Rodriguez did not raise a Confrontation Clause objection to this testimony at trial, we review his claim for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpfish, 408 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 266, 163 L.Ed.2d 239 (2005) (setting forth plain error standard of review). In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court held the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Regardless whether Witt's statements to Officer Claramunt were testimonial, they do not implicate Rodriguez's right to confrontation. Officer Claramunt's testimony recounting Witt's telephonic statements was admitted to show Rodriguez's state of mind and to place Rodriguez's statement into context, that is, what caused Rodriguez to arrive at the airport, and the testimony was not offered or admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The testimony did not violate Rodriguez's rights under the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (The [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985) (holding [t]he nonhearsay aspect of [the testimony] ... raises no Confrontation Clause concerns.))); see, e.g., United States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1225-26 (10th Cir.2006) (noting the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford makes clear the [Confrontation] Clause has no role unless the challenged out-of-court statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted in the statement). 21 Furthermore, Witt testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination by Rodriguez, thereby satisfying Rodriguez's right to confront witnesses against him. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ([W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of [the declarant's] prior testimonial statements). Although Witt's testimony differed slightly from Officer Claramunt's, Rodriguez was entitled to argue those inconsistencies to the jury, and such inconsistencies go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Consequently, Rodriguez's Confrontation Clause challenge lacks merit.