Opinion ID: 215949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plausibility of the Prosecution's Race-Neutral Reasons

Text: Despite saying that it would not reconsider its conclusion regarding the validity of the prosecution's race neutral explanations offered at step two of the Batson inquiry, see id. at  n. 2, the district court went on to reconsider this issue and once again rejected Barnette's assertion that the government's race neutral reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Id. at . Instead, the court concluded that the government's race-neutral explanations for their strikes were justifiable, probable, and reasonable and had a basis in accepted trial strategy. Id. The district court began by considering the reasons given for striking prospective jurors Bryson and R. Sanders, both of whom had been in the first group of 12 jurors called forward during voir dire. Id. The government had explained that Bryson was struck because she noted that her personal view of the death penalty waivered, that she was not sure if she favored abolishing the death penalty, and that she was uncertain as to how she felt about the death penalty; and that prospective juror R. Sanders was struck because of her uncertainty about whether she could be fair in light of her belief that the death penalty was applied based upon socioeconomic, race, and age factors. Id. At the time of voir dire, the trial court had found that these reasons were race neutral. Id. Similarly, the district court below found that the record supported both of the government's explanations and that both were constitutionally permissible. Id. at -13. The district court next considered the plausibility of the government's race neutral reasons for striking prospective juror Moore. Id. at 13. The government had explained that Moore was struck because she hesitated when asked whether she could put the government on an equal playing field with the defendant, and also based on her religious beliefs. Id. During jury selection the district court had accepted this reason as race neutral, based on Moore's religious bent against the death penalty or throwing in the question whether she could apply it in view of those beliefs and her overall demeanor. Id. On further review, the district court accepted this reasoning, noting that a prosecutor may use a peremptory strike against a venireman who has reservations about the death penalty, [. . .] on the basis of a prospective juror's demeanor, [. . .] [or against] a prospective juror who has raised doubts about her ability to be fair. Id. (internal citations omitted). Noting that Barnette did not dispute Moore's hesitation, the court also observed that, while it could not recall Moore's demeanor at the time, one of the reasons it had cited at the time of jury selection for upholding the plausibility of the government's race neutral reasons was Moore's demeanor. Id. at . In light of this finding, Moore's responses reflecting her religious beliefs, and her lack of clarity regarding whether she could consider the death penalty as a punishment, the court again found that these reasons were race-neutral and supported by the record. Id. The district court next reviewed its conclusion regarding prospective juror K. Sanders. Id. The government explained that it struck K. Sanders because she hesitated before answering questions as to whether she would consider the death penalty and because she was somewhat uncommunicative with the government. Id. The court at the time found that the government's reasons were race neutral in light of her demeanor and the overall context of her answers. Id. at . Noting again that the government may exercise peremptory strikes against prospective jurors who have reservations about the death penalty, and also based on their demeanor, the district court again found that the government's reasons were supported by the record. Id. In so concluding, the court reflected that its decision during voir dire was based on Sanders' demeanor and the overall tenor of her responses. Id. Finally, the district court again reviewed its conclusion that the government's race neutral reasons for striking prospective juror Blakeney were plausible. Id. The government explained that it struck Blakeney because he was hesitant in his answers during voir dire, that his views on the death penalty were not very strong, and that he stated during voir dire that he did not want to sentence anyone to death. Id. Finding that the government may strike jurors based on their reservations about the death penalty, especially where the juror demonstrates an unwillingness to impose the death penalty, and noting evidence in the transcript to support the government's characterization of Blakeney, the court again found that these reasons were valid and not pretextual. Id. at .