Opinion ID: 2292380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Service/benefit to the employer exception

Text: The rule excluding injuries that occur off the employer's premises, during travel between work and home, does not apply if the journey is part of the service for which the worker is employed or otherwise benefits the employer. Factors considered under the exception include not only an employer service or benefit but also whether the injured worker is paid for travel time (e.g., for performing work on the trip, traveling to a remote site, or traveling between job sites) [10] and whether the worker is paid for the expense of travel. [11] Although payment for travel time brings the trip within the course of the employment, the lack of payment does not exclude a trip from the course of employment. [12] In most cases involving a deliberate and substantial payment for the expense of travel or the provision of a vehicle under the employee's control, the journey during which an injury occurs is viewed as being in the course of employment. [13] The Larson treatise notes that transportation is normally singled out for special consideration when it involves a considerable distance, and therefore qualifies under the rule . . . that employment should be deemed to include travel when the travel itself is a substantial part of the service performed. [14] The fact that an employer uses transportation or transportation expense as an inducement to accept or continue employment is material to supporting compensability, particularly when the journey is sizeable and when the employer pays all or substantially all of the expense. [15] We note that such an inducement benefits the worker who accepts it and places a financial burden on the employer but also that the inducement benefits the employer when its purpose is accomplished. An employer is unlikely to provide such an inducement unless it views the resulting benefit as outweighing the burden. Our predecessor court applied the service to the employer exception to find that a worker who purchased supplies for his employer while home for the weekend and was injured while taking them home for storage sustained a work-related injury. [16] The court also determined that the exception provided coverage where an employee's use of a company vehicle to drive directly between home and the job site benefited the employer by avoiding a stop at the business office. [17] Likewise, the exception provided coverage for a nursing assistant who provided home health care services and was injured on her way home from an assignment. [18] The court reasoned that travel to and from clients' homes was part of the service that her employer offered. Of particular relevance to the present facts, the exception provided coverage where an employer agreed to pay transportation costs for a worker's weekend trips home from the worksite as an inducement for him to remain employed. [19] Although the worker sometimes carried messages to the employer's home office on the trips, he carried none on the trip on which he was injured. The evidence in the present case indicated that Airtran did not pay Fortney for time spent in transit between Lexington and Atlanta, which was not conclusive under the exception. The ALJ failed, however, to consider whether the free or reduced-fare arrangement induced Fortney to accept or continue employment with Airtran. A favorable finding would have brought the trip from Lexington to Atlanta on August 27, 2006 within the course of his employment. At no time did Airtran place restrictions on where employees lived. Thus, Fortney's statement at hiring concerning his willingness to relocate would not alone support a reasonable finding that the arrangement was neither an inducement to accept the employment nor to continue it. The ALJ denied coverage under the service to the employer exception based on a finding that Airtran's free or reduced-fare arrangement with Comair benefited Fortney by allowing him to live where he chose but burdened Airtran. Airtran's arrangement existed before Fortney was hired. Together with Sarah Fortney's testimony that her husband chose to live in Lexington to be near family and evidence that the arrangement made it possible to do so financially while working for Airtran, the ALJ's finding that the arrangement enabled Fortney to live where he chose compelled legal conclusions that it was an inducement to Fortney to accept the employment and that it benefited Airtran by accomplishing its purpose. The arrangement brought within the course of Fortney's employment travel by air between Lexington and Atlanta when going to or coming home from work. His death was work-related because he was making such a trip when it occurred. We find it unnecessary under the circumstances to consider other going and coming rule exceptions. The claim must be remanded to the ALJ to consider the remaining issues. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and this claim is remanded to the ALJ for consideration of the remaining issues. All sitting. MINTON, C.J.; ABRAMSON, CUNNINGHAM, NOBLE, and SCOTT, JJ., concur. VENTERS, J., dissents by separate opinion in which SCHRODER, J., joins. VENTERS, J., Dissenting. I respectfully dissent, and would apply the going and coming rule because I do not believe the travel arrangement afforded to airline employees is of any substantial benefit or service to the employer. Schroder, J., joins.