Opinion ID: 448149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Constitutionality of the New York Provisions

Text: 45 We turn, therefore, to the merits of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the New York provisions, which are in some ways like, and some ways unlike, the Alaska statute struck down in Zobel. They are like the Alaska scheme in that, as applied, they are plainly retrospective, focusing on the veteran's New York residence at the time he entered the armed services. The veteran's ability to satisfy the New York residence requirement is thus fixed. He either was a New York resident at the time of his initial induction or he was not; he cannot earn a change in status. 46 On the other hand, the New York provisions are different from the Alaska scheme in that those who met the New York residence requirement at the time they entered the armed services are given the right to enjoy the bonus only once. If a veteran is awarded the bonus points, thereby has his rank improved on two civil service eligibility lists, and is thereafter appointed to a position from one of those lists, he is not permitted to use the bonus points on the second list; and he will not be granted bonus points for any other civil service eligibility list. Thereafter, the veteran who once enjoyed a bonus must compete on an equal footing with other veterans. Thus, the distinction created by the New York provisions, though fixed, is not immutable. 47 Notwithstanding the fact that the veteran bonus is capable of being used up, we conclude that plaintiffs' constitutional challenges have merit because the distinction drawn between those otherwise qualifying veterans who were New York residents when inducted and those who were not does not rationally further a compelling, or even a legitimate, interest of the State.
48 The State advances four purposes in support of the challenged distinction: (a) compensating veterans for the service they have performed, (b) lessening the burden imposed by military service, (c) encouraging veterans to settle in New York and enter the State's civil service at the end of their military service, and (d) encouraging service in the armed forces. Each of these purposes can be framed neutrally, as we have stated it, focusing only on the veteran's nonresidential attributes; or it can be framed in terms of a desire to compensate or encourage only those who were New York residents at a given time in the past. Framed neutrally, without regard to the residence of the veteran to be compensated or encouraged, the purposes advanced have no rational relationship to the distinction drawn by the New York provisions. Framed strictly in terms of a desire to compensate or encourage only veterans who were New York residents at a given time in the past, the claimed purposes are not legitimate. 49 We note at the outset that we are not concerned here with the distinction the statutory scheme draws between veterans and nonveterans, see Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 2003, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983); Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n. 25, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296 n. 25, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979), or between wartime veterans and peacetime veterans, see Russell v. Hodges, 470 F.2d 212, or between current residents and current nonresidents. The universe on which we must focus is simply the universe of honorably discharged wartime veterans who are now residents of New York and who have passed a New York civil service examination. Our task is to determine whether, within that universe, the distinction between those who were New York residents at the time of induction and those who were not is one that rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. Conducting our analysis within this universe, we cannot see that any legitimate purpose advanced by the State has any rational relationship to the exclusion of those veterans who were not residents of the State when they entered the armed services. 50 A state's purpose of recognizing that wartime veterans have performed valuable service and of compensating them for such service is a legitimate state purpose. There can be no question that a state receives a benefit from the service of individuals in the armed forces. Having no armies of their own, states depend on the national military to protect them from invasion or attack; the national armed forces defend state political and economic interests both in the United States and abroad. Receiving such benefits from military service, a state has a legitimate interest in compensating those who render it. Yet while this purpose thus supports the existence of a veteran preference in general, it is not rationally related to the distinction drawn between time-of-induction New York residents and time-of-induction nonresidents. When an individual enters the armed forces, he joins the national armed forces, not the armed forces of a particular state. The benefits that accrue to a state from an individual's military service come by virtue of the state's membership in the nation. The benefits do not depend on the residence of the provider of the services. There would be no rational basis for suggesting that a soldier from New York performs more valuable service for his country--or for New York--than does a soldier from another state. 51 Similarly, there is nothing in the goal of lessening the burden imposed by military service that provides a basis for distinguishing between time-of-induction New York residents and nonresidents. There is no question that wartime military service can impose substantial burdens on an individual. 52 Veterans have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation, Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 [63 S.Ct. 1223, 1231, 87 L.Ed. 1587] (1943),  'subjecting themselves to the mental and physical hazards as well as the economic and family detriments which are peculiar to military service and which do not exist in normal civil life.'  Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 380 [94 S.Ct. 1160, 1172, 39 L.Ed.2d 389] (1974) (emphasis deleted). 53 Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 550-51, 103 S.Ct. at 2003-04. Given the benefits that a state receives from an individual's military service, it has a legitimate interest in attempting to lighten the burden of that service. The existence of a veteran preference, with its promise of an enhanced opportunity for the steady income, high job security, and valuable fringe benefits that usually accompany a civil service position, can serve to lighten the burdens and compensate for the dislocations that frequently accompany wartime military service. But again, while this purpose is served by granting a preference to veterans in general, there appears to be no rational relationship between this purpose and the distinction between timeof-induction New York residents and nonresidents. Entry into the military occasions as much disruption for the Californian as it does for the New Yorker; each bears the burden of defending his country; each may be as much at risk. The personal burdens resulting from military service simply are not related to the state from which an individual entered the armed forces. 54 Likewise, the desire of New York to encourage veterans to settle in New York and join its civil service after concluding their military service seems entirely unrelated to the matter of their time-of-induction residence. If veterans are desirable residents, if their demonstrated patriotism, loyalty, discipline, and experience make them valuable as civil servants, there is nonetheless no basis for supposing that this desirability is linked to the fact that, prior to their military service, they lived in New York. Indeed, if a veteran had lived in New York most of his life but was a resident of another state at the time of his induction, he would not, even if he moved back to New York at the end of his military service, qualify for the veteran bonus points at issue here. Presumably both that veteran and a veteran who had never lived in New York would exhibit the same patriotism and loyalty and have gained the same experience and discipline as one who had been a New York resident at the moment of induction. The requirement of New York residence at the moment of induction thus eliminates the great majority of those whom, by hypothesis, the State considers desirable and is an entirely arbitrary basis on which to distinguish among the veterans whom New York wishes to attract to its civil service. 55 Finally, the goal of encouraging service in the armed forces is likewise a legitimate state interest that bears no rational relationship to a distinction based on residency. Since, as we have noted above, a state gains important benefits from service performed by individuals in the armed forces, it has a legitimate interest in encouraging individuals to perform such service. The benefits accruing to a state from the individual's service in the national armed forces, however, do not depend on the state in which the individual resided when he was inducted. Nor can the state's desire to express its own patriotism by encouraging its residents to serve the nation in time of need justify the challenged favoritism toward its own residents, for the nation could not survive on the strength of services of individuals from a single state. Thus, while a state's patriotism is exhibited by its encouragement of its residents to do their part, patriotism also requires recognition that their part is not the whole. The State thus does not have a legitimate interest in encouraging only its own residents to perform military service. 56 Each of the State's four purposes, therefore, framed neutrally without respect to the residence of the person to be rewarded or encouraged, is without rational relationship to the distinction drawn by the New York provisions in terms of the veteran's residence at the time of induction. Viewed in this light, the provisions run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause because the distinction bears no rational relationship to the veterans' relevant characteristics. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 70, 102 S.Ct. at 2318 (Brennan, J., concurring (emphasis in original)). 57 When we view the four stated purposes as designed to benefit or encourage only former New Yorkers, they fare no better, for the State's interest in favoring those who were residents at some former time over those who became residents at a later time is not legitimate. If the State's purpose is to compensate only prior New York resident veterans for their past services while leaving its newer resident veterans uncompensated, to lessen the burden of military service only on longer-term New Yorkers while leaving newer residents of New York unrelieved, to encourage New Yorkers to return to New York by placing newcomers at a disadvantage, or to encourage only New Yorkers to enter the armed services, the statutory scheme must fail in light of Zobel v. Williams's ruling that a purpose of  'favoring established residents over new residents,' is constitutionally unacceptable. 457 U.S. at 65, 102 S.Ct. at 2315 (quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 450, 93 S.Ct. at 2235). 58 Accordingly, we conclude that the State has shown no valid interests that are rationally served by the New York provisions challenged here. Since the only apparent justification for the distinction between veterans who were and veterans who were not New York residents at the time of their induction is the favoring of those who are longer-term residents over newer residents, we conclude that the New York provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause.
59 We also conclude that the distinction drawn by New York's statutory scheme violates the constitutionally protected right to travel. The textual source in the Constitution for such a right has been called obscure, Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. at 2312-13 n. 6, with the basis for it being ascribed in different cases to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178, 62 S.Ct. 164, 169, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 182-84, 62 S.Ct. at 171-72 (Jackson, J., concurring); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, 29 S.Ct. 14, 18, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908), to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Sec. 2, see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 78-81, 102 S.Ct. at 2322-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430, 20 L.Ed. 449 (1871); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1869); to the Commerce Clause, see Edwards v. California; The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849), or to the essence of the Constitution that transformed a loose confederation of States into one Nation, Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 67, 102 S.Ct. 2316 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 630, 89 S.Ct. at 1329; The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 491-92 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. at 2312-13 n. 6 (In reality, right to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular application of equal protection analysis.); id. at 66 n. 1, 102 S.Ct. at 2316 n. 1 (Brennan, J., concurring: [W]here the 'right to travel' is involved, our cases leave no doubt that it will trigger intensified equal protection scrutiny.). 60 Whatever the origin, it is now indisputable that 61 [t]he constitutional right to travel from one State to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized. 62 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 630, 89 S.Ct. at 1329 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1178, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966)); accord Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 67, 102 S.Ct. at 2316 (Brennan, J., concurring); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 338, 92 S.Ct. at 1001; see also The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting: For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.). 63 Merely having an effect on travel is not sufficient to raise an issue of constitutional dimension. For example, a statute that encourages travel does not burden the right. 64 A State clearly may undertake to enhance the advantages of industry, economy, and resources that make it a desirable place in which to live. In addition, a State may make residence within its boundaries more attractive by offering direct benefits to its citizens in the form of public services, lower taxes than other States offer, or direct distributions of its munificence. Through these means, one State may attract citizens of other States to join the numbers of its citizenry. That is a healthy form of rivalry: It inheres in the very idea of maintaining the States as independent sovereigns within a larger framework, and it is fully--indeed, necessarily--consistent with the Framers' further idea of joining these independent sovereigns into a single Nation. 65 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 67-68, 102 S.Ct. at 2316-17 (Brennan, J., concurring). Rather, a statute implicates the constitutional right to travel when it actually deters such travel, see Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 46, 18 L.Ed. 744 (1868); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 629, 89 S.Ct. at 1328, or when impedance of travel is its primary objective, see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 62 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. at 2313-14 n. 9; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 628-31, 89 S.Ct. at 1328-30, or when it uses  'any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right,'  Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 340, 92 S.Ct. at 1002 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634, 89 S.Ct. at 1331 (emphasis added)); accord Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1082, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238, 91 S.Ct. 260, 321, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970) (separate opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.). Where a classification is found to implicate the right to travel, it will be upheld only if it is found to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634, 89 S.Ct. at 1331 (emphasis in original); accord Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 258, 262, 94 S.Ct. at 1082, 1084; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 339, 341, 92 S.Ct. at 1001, 1002; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 238, 91 S.Ct. at 321 (separate opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.). 66 In Zobel v. Williams, the court noted that the right to travel, when applied to residency requirements, protects new residents of a state from being disadvantaged because of their recent migration or from otherwise being treated differently from longer term residents. 457 U.S. at 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. at 2312-13 n. 6. In the present case, while New York's veteran preference scheme does not contain a numerically defined durational residency requirement such as those found unconstitutional in Shapiro v. Thompson, Dunn v. Blumstein, and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, it plainly creates distinctions between newcomers and longer term residents. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. at 2312-13 n. 6. Veterans who choose to migrate to New York after they have entered the armed services are treated differently from those who migrated to the State before their induction or who are lifelong residents of the State. 67 Nor is it difficult to realize that the difference in treatment constitutes a penalty, for veterans who were not residents of New York at the time of their induction are told that if they wish to enter the civil service in New York, they may compete only at a disadvantage vis-a-vis veterans who were residents at that prior time. While the disadvantage may, over time, be lessened by the fact that veteran bonus points may be used only once, the fact remains that the veteran denied a preference by New York's scheme is disadvantaged each time a competitor uses a bonus; and the veteran denied the preference can never become entitled to bonus points, no matter how long he remains a New York resident. We are compelled to conclude, therefore, that veterans who did not enter the armed forces from New York are in effect penalized for traveling to New York. 68 Moreover, the fundamental detriment of the New York provisions is plain when we view the right to travel as a federal interest in free interstate migration. As the court in August v. Bronstein pointed out, other states accord benefits to their own resident veterans while denying them to others. 369 F.Supp. at 193. See, e.g., Del.Code Ann. tit. 29, Sec. 5935 (1983) (requiring time-of-induction residence for entitlement to veteran preference for civil service employment); R.I.Gen.Laws Secs. 36-3-3(10), 36-4-19 (1984) (requiring 6-month preinduction residence for entitlement to veteran preference for civil service employment). And we must recognize that, as intimated by the four concurring Justices in Zobel, if each state were free to grant benefits only to time-of-induction resident veterans while denying them to other veterans, the effect would be to discourage any veteran from moving from his home state, thereby lessening the mobility so essential to the economic progress of our Nation, and so commonly accepted as a fundamental aspect of our social order. 457 U.S. at 68, 102 S.Ct. at 2317 (Brennan, J., concurring). Therefore, we hold that New York's veteran preference scheme burdens the right to travel and may be upheld only if necessary to promote a compelling state interest. 69 In light of our discussion in Part II.D.1. above, it is readily apparent that the New York scheme fails to satisfy the compelling-state-interest test. We have shown that to the extent that any of the purposes claimed by the State is legitimate, it is not rationally related to the distinction drawn between time-of-induction New York residents and non-residents. It follows a fortiori that even if any of these purposes, when framed so as to be legitimate, could be considered compelling, the distinction drawn by the statute, which is not rationally related to the purpose, could hardly be deemed necessary to its achievement. 70 We hold, therefore, that the New York scheme impermissibly infringes the right to travel and, for this reason as well, must be declared unconstitutional.