Opinion ID: 747772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cook County Case: Other Aspects of Prosecution's Closing Argument

Text: 40 Lieberman's final contention is that other comments made by the state's attorney during closing argument in the Cook County case were improper and resulted in a denial of his due process right to a fair trial. Specifically, Lieberman points to the following two passages of the state's closing argument: 41 [State's Attorney]:    Think back about what he [defense counsel] told you about his case [during opening statements] and about what he told you he would prove. He didn't even mention to you the defendant was going to say he was with his mother on that day. He didn't even mention that. 42 Why? Because, ladies and gentlemen, that defense was made up as the case went along. He couldn't stand up here in front of you and tell you that because he wasn't quite sure exactly what he was going to do. He was going to lay in the weeds so to speak. Let's see how the State's case goes first and then we'll decide what's happening. Well, he decided in the middle of the case-- 43 [Defense Attorney]: I'm going to object as to what my motives are. 44 THE COURT: This is merely an inference. The jury understands they have a reasonable inference from the evidence and they heard the evidence. They will only consider the evidence from the witnesses in arriving at their verdict, whatever their verdict may be. Proceed. 45 Later during his summation, the state's attorney again made comments to which Lieberman's counsel objected: 46 [State's Attorney]: Ladies and gentlemen, there is one thing about the case that there is no testimony on, but it may be something you are thinking about. 47 [Defense Attorney]: Objection, your Honor. I'm going to object to any remark not in evidence. 48 THE COURT: The objection will be sustained. 49 [State's Attorney]: Ladies and gentlemen, you saw [defendant's fiancee]    testify. She is a nice young lady, apparently pregnant. There is a question. Why would this man who is apparently enjoying a sexual relationship rape anyone. That is the sublety [sic] that is supposed to flow across to you, ladies and gentlemen. 50 Well, ladies and gentlemen, there is a basic misconception about what a rape is. The basic misconception is that rape is a crime of sexual gratification. It is not true, ladies and gentlemen. That is not what rape is all about. 51 [Defense Attorney]: Objection, your Honor. 52 THE COURT: As to what rape is the objection to the last portion is sustained. 53 [State's Attorney]: Ladies and gentlemen, rape is a crime of violence. It is a crime of violence against women. It is a method of degrading women. I am sure-- 54 [Defense Attorney]: Objection, Your Honor. 55 THE COURT: You may proceed. The objection is overruled. 56 [State's Attorney]: It is an act of degrading [sic]. That is what this man did. That is what this overgrown coward did. And I call him that, ladies and gentlemen.... 57 Lieberman claims that these comments, which he characterizes as examples of improper prosecutorial conduct, challenged the very core of his alibi defense, as well as denied him his due process right to a fair trial. 58 In reviewing an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct we ask whether the misconduct 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'  Stewart v. Duckworth, 93 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)). [It] is not enough that the prosecutor's remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 2471. Rather, they must be so serious that [they] poison[ ] the entire atmosphere of the trial. United States v. Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 425 (7th Cir.1988). The fairness of the trial in its entirety is to be examined to determine whether the prosecutor's statements violated due process. Shepard v. Lane, 818 F.2d 615, 621 (7th Cir.1987) (emphasis added) (citing United States ex rel. Crist v. Lane, 745 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir.1984)).  'The most important factor to be considered in determining whether the closing statement violated [the defendant's] rights is ... the proof of ... guilt.... [S]trong evidence of guilt eliminates any lingering doubt that the prosecutor's remarks unfairly prejudiced the jury's deliberations.'  Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 431-32 (7th Cir.1991)). 59 Although Illinois law gives prosecutors considerable leeway in presenting their closing arguments to a jury, see, e.g., People v. Wright, 27 Ill.2d 497, 190 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1963), the Illinois court of appeals determined that the closing remarks at issue here concerning counsel's alleged fabrication of evidence were in fact improper, and failed to render an opinion as to the comment concerning pregnancy. Nevertheless, the court analyzed each of the allegedly objectionable passages quoted above and concluded that in light of the overwhelming evidence against Lieberman, these remarks were not prejudicial. 13 Similarly, the district court determined that the strong and compelling evidence of Lieberman's guilt (reviewed in some detail above)  'eliminate[d] any lingering doubt that the prosecutor's remarks unfairly prejudiced the jury's deliberations.'  (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 19, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1048, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). Moreover, as the district judge noted, the comparative brevity of the prosecutor's remarks made it difficult to conclude that they  'so infect[ed] the trial with unfairness' as to deny petitioner due process. (quoting Darden, 477 U.S. at 182, 106 S.Ct. at 2472 (1986)). As we discussed in the previous section, the evidence that Lieberman committed the rape was overwhelming. Thus, we agree with the district court that the petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of the prosecutor's remarks, as ill-advised and uncalled for as they may have been, during closing argument. Neither the state court nor petitioner in his brief to this Court explains how or why the pregnancy comment is objectionable. To the extent that the prosecutor may have suggested that sexual assault is motivated by sexual desire and not violence, we agree with the state court that his comments were improper. As one of our colleagues on this Court recently observed, [r]ape and sexual assault are generally understood today not as sexual acts borne of attraction, but as acts of violent aggression that stem from the perpetrator's power over and desire to harm his victim. Angoucheva v. I.N.S., 106 F.3d 781, 792 n. 2 (Rovner, J., concurring) (citing extensive authorities).