Opinion ID: 1200380
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board Erred in Assuming the Impermissibility of Successive Settlements.

Text: The board determined that Lindekugel's settlement with Fluor barred his claim. In doing so, the board assumed that a PTD settlement automatically disqualifies any future claims: `Permanent means lasting the rest of claimant's life.' In this case, given that the employee has accepted a [Compromise & Release] payment from Fluor covering the rest of his life, we find he cannot expect to receive payment for a second lifetime from a second employer. [7] The board misinterpreted the concept of permanent disability as it is understood under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act. [8] In Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, [9] we implicitly read the Act to encompass a classification of PTD that is subject to change. [10] We there rejected the board's conclusion that a second employer could not be held liable for an injury based in part on its finding that the employee was permanently and totally disabled prior to his employment. [11] We held that the board's reasoning misinterprets the concept of disability in Alaska worker's compensation law. [12] We noted that the Act defines disability as incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment. [13] Accordingly, we recognized that the primary consideration is not the degree of the worker's physical impairment, but rather the loss of earning capacity related to that impairment. [14] Based on loss of earning capacity, disability under the Act further includes an educational component; we have held that an employee who suffers a physical impairment can overcome a concomitant loss of earning capacity through education or vocational rehabilitation. [15] In fact, the Act expressly provides for training and education of permanently impaired employees to facilitate their reemployment. [16] Although an employee will not be classified as PTD unless his or her injury appears permanent, [17] this classification is not immutable. To hold otherwise would be to conflict with the language of the Act, [18] with this court's precedent, [19] and with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Alaska Industrial Board v. Chugach Electric Ass'n. [20] Furthermore, prohibiting successive settlements would undermine Alaska's policy of promoting reemployment of disabled workers. This policy is reflected in the creation of the second-injury fund, which reimburses employers for compensation payments made to previously injured workers. [21]