Opinion ID: 2238109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interference with the Judicial Function

Text: The juvenile court found that the LCC statute imposes an unconstitutional legislative restraint on the functioning of the judicial branch of government, thus violative of two provisions of the Indiana Constitution: Art. 3, § 1, the separation of powers clause, and Art. 7, § 1, which provides that [t]he judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts and such other courts as the General Assembly may establish. The crucial provision of the LCC statute is I.C. XX-X-XX-XX: Except as provided in section 13 of this chapter, the committee shall review the restrictive placement proposed by a referring agency and make recommendations concerning less restrictive alternatives, if appropriate, to the referring agency before: (1) that placement may be made; or (2) the referring agency may submit its placement recommendation to the person authorized to make the placement. Appellants argue that the LCC statute is not an attempt on the part of the legislature to supersede the power of the judiciary, but rather is a statutory device which enables courts to execute their duties more effectively. Appellees argue that the LCC statute preempts the inherent power of juvenile court judges to control the conduct of business in their courts and cite State ex rel. Kostas v. Johnson (1946), 224 Ind. 540, 69 N.E.2d 592, as authority for this position. At issue in Kostas was a statute which expressly divested a trial court of jurisdiction for failure to rule on an issue more than sixty days after that issue had been taken under advisement. This Court found that statute to be a violation of the separation of powers clause of the Indiana Constitution and held it unconstitutional. That statute purported to pace the flow of judicial business through trial courts by statutory mandate by rescinding the jurisdiction of a court which had issued rulings legislatively deemed to be tardy and lodging it in another court which would, presumably, comply with the statutory deadline. The Kostas Court cited cases from other jurisdictions in which similar legislative enactments imposing procedural time limitations on the operation of trial courts were found to be constitutionally infirm and found the sixty-day limit in which Indiana courts were to rule on matters taken under advisement to be likewise infirm. The Court held that the statute involved constitute[d] legislative interference with the judiciary and to the extent that it require[d] action by courts within specified times and deprive[d] the courts of jurisdiction for failure to act within such time, [was] unconstitutional and void. Id. at 550, 69 N.E.2d at 596. Appellees urge this Court to find that the LCC statute, like the statute in Kostas, constitutes undue legislative interference in the judicial arena and to uphold the ruling of the trial court. We find, however, that the LCC statute is distinguishable from the statute at issue in Kostas, as it neither seeks to impose time limitations within which a court must act, nor purports to divest jurisdiction from courts not in compliance with its terms. The LCC statute is most analogous, both in purpose and operation, to the presentence report statute from the criminal code. [7] I.C. XX-XX-X-X states: (a) A defendant convicted of a felony may not be sentenced before a written presentence report is prepared by a probation officer and considered by the sentencing court. Delay of sentence until a presentence report is prepared does not constitute an indefinite postponement or suspension of sentence. Like the LCC statute, the presentence statute acts to forestall the entry of the court's final decision until it receives and considers input from the professionals having the most complete, accurate, and up-to-date information available as to the subject of the court's inquiry. The purpose for requiring submission of the presentence report by the probation office and the consideration of the report by the sentencing court prior to the imposition of sentence is to enable the court to structure an individualized sentence for the defendant then before the court. Yates v. State (1982), Ind. App., 429 N.E.2d 992. This point was made in a separate opinion in the context of the proper construction of § 9-2252 (Burns 1956), a predecessor statute to I.C. XX-XX-X-X: The whole point of the requirement that the trial court consider the ... report is to have the facts contained therein affect the trial court's exercise of discretion in determining the amount of fine or term of imprisonment, in deciding whether the sentence should be suspended, and in setting realistic terms of probation. Robb v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 448, 454, 255 N.E.2d 96, 100 (DeBruler, J., concurring in result) (emphasis in original). The similarities both in purpose and operation between the presentence statute and the LCC statute are apparent. The goal of the two statutes is the imposition of appropriate, individualized criminal sentences and juvenile dispositions and, in order to advance that goal, each statute requires that the trial court be made fully cognizant of the unique characteristics of the individual whose fate is being determined as well as the particular circumstances which brought him before the court. Neither the probation office nor the LCC is required to act within a statutorily prescribed time, yet clearly both are expected to fulfill their duties to the court as efficiently as their resources allow. Compliance with either statute may temporarily delay the determination of the final outcome of a case, but the outcome ultimately reached will be better reasoned and better tailored to the individual before the court by virtue of that delay. Rather than interfering with or hampering the judicial decisionmaking process, both statutes complement and enhance that process by ensuring that the decision rendered by the court is fully informed. We find that the LCC statute does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Indiana Constitution. Both appellant and appellees cite the case of Hightower v. State (1976), 168 Ind. App. 194, 343 N.E.2d 300, in support of their respective arguments that the LCC statute is and is not in accord with Art. 7, § 1, of the Indiana Constitution. In Hightower, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of § 9-4001 et seq. (Burns 1971) (repealed 1979), the criminal sexual deviancy statute. Under that statute, upon the motion of any party or the court, the court was required to set in motion a procedure which resulted in the determination of whether a defendant convicted of certain sexual offenses would be treated in a psychiatric facility or incarcerated in a penal facility. This procedure included the examination of the defendant by two physicians, one of whom having special expertise in the field of mental disorders, and the filing of reports reflecting the conclusions of the physicians with the court. If both physicians were of the opinion that the defendant was a probable criminal sexual deviant, the court was then required to schedule a hearing at which time evidence and arguments would be heard and the court would determine whether the defendant was probably a criminal sexual deviant and, if so, move him on to the next stage of the procedure. Because the physicians who examined Hightower reached no agreement as to whether he was a probable criminal sexual deviant, the trial court terminated the procedure, as required by the terms of the statute. Appellant correctly points out that § 9-4001 withstood Hightower's challenge that it constituted a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Hightower argued that the statutorily mandated recommendations of the physicians usurped the fact-finding function of the court. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeals because [t]he court at all times had complete control of the case and under the statute the final determination [of whether or not the defendant was a treatable criminal sexual deviant within the meaning of the statute was] left to the trial court... . [T]he judge made an independent finding under the statute on the evidence before him and the medical reports did not usurp this function. Id. at 200, 201, 343 N.E.2d at 304, 305 (citation omitted). Appellees attempt to distinguish the criminal sexual deviancy statute and the LCC statute by citing the following language from the Hightower opinion: [I]t was wholly within the trial court's discretion and power to discontinue further hearings on the matter of Defendant's criminal sexual deviancy[.] Id. at 199, 343 N.E.2d at 304. They argue that, whereas the trial court in Hightower could have stopped the operation of § 9-4001 at any point in the proceedings, the LCC statute leaves no such room for the exercise of the juvenile court's discretion to discontinue the LCC process. The quotation cited by appellees, however, is taken out of context. That passage appears, not in the section regarding the constitutionality of the criminal sexual deviancy statute, but in the section addressing whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion for additional examinations or for a hearing after the trial court had fully complied with the statute's provisions. Contrary to appellee's contentions, the trial court in Hightower could not exercise its discretion to halt the evaluative process once it had begun; the court was empowered, however, to proceed to the next stage or to terminate the process at precise junctures and upon specified conditions identified in the statute itself. Appellees also argue that the LCC statute violates the separation of powers doctrine because the director of the county welfare department, a member of the executive branch of government, is one of the voting members of the LCC. Appellees rely on Rush v. Carter (1984), Ind. App., 468 N.E.2d 236, wherein the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that a county police officer could not contemporaneously serve as an elected member of the county council. The Court of Appeals found that the separation of powers clause of the Indiana Constitution would be violated should Rush be allowed to simultaneously occupy these dual roles in government, stating: The object of the separation of powers is to preclude a commingling of three essentially different powers in the same hands in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by or subjected directly or indirectly to the coercive influence of either of the others. The obvious constitutional frailty under the facts of this case is that Rush as a county council member (a member of the legislative branch) would have, in some degree, fiscal control over, Rush the county policeman, (a member of the executive branch) as well as the rest of the county police department. Id. at 238 (citation omitted). We find the situtation in Rush to be distinguishable from the situation at hand. As a member of the county council, Rush would have been a member of a body which exercised actual decisionmaking power, and he could have influenced the other council members such that actions taken by that body accrued to his own personal benefit or to the benefit of his department of the executive branch of government and to the detriment of other departments. The LCC has absolutely no decisionmaking power; it is authorized only to make a recommendation to the juvenile court, which the court is obligated only to consider. The proceedings below illustrate plainly that juvenile courts are impervious to the kind of coercive influence which the Rush Court warned against. Only in the case of appellee Michael R. did the recommendation of the LCC differ from the placement advocated by the MCDPW and the child's guardian ad litem. After receiving and considering the LCC's recommendation, the juvenile court rejected its proposed placement in favor of the one suggested by the MCDPW and the guardian and entered its order accordingly. The presence of one member of the executive branch of government on a multi-member committee which serves a purely advisory role to the judicial branch does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Appellees argue that the postponement of the entry of a final dispositional order pending the LCC's recommendation violates Article 1, § 12, of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that [j]ustice shall be administered ... speedily, and without delay. Appellees correctly note that this constitutional provision is equally applicable in the criminal and civil contexts, citing State v. Taylor (1956), 235 Ind. 632, 137 N.E.2d 537. Again, reference to the operation of the presentence report statute is dispositive of appellees' argument. The degree of importance attached to the presentence report is reflected by the fact that a trial court's failure to comply with the presentence report statute has been found by this Court to constitute reversible error. Hinton v. State (1979), 272 Ind. 297, 397 N.E.2d 282; Ware v. State (1963), 243 Ind. 639, 189 N.E.2d 704. The legislature has also indicated the crucial nature of I.C. XX-XX-X-X by including a provision in the text of the statute itself which provides that delay in pronouncing sentence occasioned by compliance with its terms does not constitute an indefinite postponement or suspension of sentence. Both by statute and by rule of this Court, criminal sentencing courts are under a duty to sentence persons convicted of a felony within thirty days of the finding of guilt unless good cause is shown for an extension. I.C. XX-XX-X-X(b); Ind.Crim. Rule 11. [8] That a person convicted of a crime has an interest in the speedy imposition of sentence is clear. Equally clear, however, is that he has an even greater interest in having an appropriate sentence imposed on him and that this interest is advanced by the filing of a complete and accurate presentence report and the serious consideration of that report by the sentencing court such that it may properly exercise its sentencing discretion. Therefore, the time during which a presentence report is compiled and considered constitutes good cause to delay sentencing under the exception expressly provided by both Criminal Rule 11 and I.C. XX-XX-X-X. In response to an argument that a trial court committed reversible error by rescheduling a sentencing date well after the thirty-day limit had expired because the presentence report had not yet been filed, this Court stated, While courts should be prompt in pronouncing sentence ... the court need not show exact compliance [with the thirty-day limit] where defendant or the court needs additional time to complete procedural steps mandated by statute or the practice of the court. Dudley v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 881, 905. Likewise, in the context of juvenile dispositions, the juvenile has an undeniable interest in the speedy entry of a final order. However, his interest in being placed appropriately is paramount. Having the placement decision made soon must yield to having it made well, and the input from the members of the LCC is invaluable to the proper exercise of the juvenile court's discretion as the recommendation represents the collective opinion of the welfare, mental health and educational professionals most closely associated with the child. Juvenile courts are not subject to the thirty-day rule which governs criminal sentencing courts. Like criminal courts, however, they should be prompt and should enter their final dispositions within a reasonable time. Just as criminal courts are excused from exact compliance from the thirty-day rule in order to comply with the presentence report statute, the reasonable time within which juvenile courts are to enter their orders includes time to comply with the LCC statute. In Dudley, 480 N.E.2d 881, and Long v. State (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 284, this Court found that the passage of fifty-seven days and thirty-six days, respectively, between the finding of guilt and the imposition of sentence did not require reversal or modification of the defendants' sentences because the delay was for the purpose of affording time for the probation officer to file the presentence report and the sentencing court to consider that report. Likewise, we find that the juvenile court entered its final dispositions in the cases of the three named plaintiffs here within a reasonable time, which included the time spent to comply with the LCC statute. The LCC statute does not impose unconstitutional delay on the function of the judicial system in contravention of the speedy justice clause of the Indiana Constitution. Appellees argue that any delay in making a final disposition which results by virtue of compliance with the LCC statute is particularly serious in a delinquency case where the ultimate disposition is commitment to the Boys School or Girls School. Because the commitment is until the age of 21, unless earlier relese [sic] is obtained from the Department, there is no `good time credit.' This argument is without merit. First, if serious consequences accrue to a ward upon the commitment to Boys or Girls School, it is the more crucial that the juvenile court make a sound decision based upon the fullest information possible; compliance with the LCC statute will contribute significantly to the court's ability to do so. Second, there is no need for good time credit in the juvenile context. Unlike the criminal justice system, where a defendant serves a finite sentence and can anticipate release upon a day certain, a ward of the juvenile court remains under the court's continuing jurisdiction until he reaches the age of majority, the court discharges the ward in the exercise of its discretion, or guardianship is awarded by the court to the Department of Corrections. I.C. 31-6-2-3. Rather than a determinate term of imprisonment which can be shortened by good time credit, the continuous judicial oversight of a ward under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court extends over a variety of settings and can be terminated at any point at which the court determines that it is no longer necessary or appropriate. Even if the ward is committed to Boys or Girls School and guardianship is awarded to the Department of Corrections, appellees themselves point out that such commitment does not necessarily extend until the juvenile reaches the age of majority, but may be terminated upon the determination of the DOC that a less restrictive placement has become appropriate. Accumulating a specific number of days for good time served in order to earn an earlier release from incarceration simply has no applicability here. Finally, both appellant and appellees have advanced arguments concerning the constitutionality of the LCC statute based on case law from other jurisdictions. Because we have resolved this issue by reference to existing Indiana law, we need not address these arguments. Suffice it to say that there is persuasive authority on both sides of the issue, and we consider that which supports upholding the constitutionality of the LCC statute to be the more persuasive.