Opinion ID: 2243544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Third Affidavit was Substantively Sufficient

Text: Finally, the Jordans urge that the trial court erred in ruling that the third affidavit was substantively insufficient to create a question of fact necessary to defeat the summary judgment motions. Defendants counter that the affidavit was insufficient for several reasons. Citing Ellis v. Smith (1988), Ind. App., 528 N.E.2d 826, defendants argue that the affidavit fails to show Dr. McCullough was familiar with the standard of care at hospitals in communities like South Bend and Plymouth and, therefore, she was incompetent to offer an expert opinion. We do not agree. The affidavit, along with a copy of her curriculum vitae which was attached to it, indicates Dr. McCullough attended medical school in Indiana, was licensed to practice medicine in Indiana, and currently practices in Gary. In addition, she stated that she was familiar with the standard of care at hospitals in South Bend and Plymouth. Such a bare assertion is adequate for summary judgment purposes. Yang v. Stafford (1987), Ind. App., 515 N.E.2d 1157, 1162. Next, defendants assert that Dr. McCullough impermissibly based her opinions on Shelamiah's medical records from the defendant hospitals. To support their claim, defendants rely on In re Paternity of K.G. (1989), Ind., 545 N.E.2d 564, adopting the opinion at Ind. App., 536 N.E.2d 1033, 1035. Defendants argue that she is not competent to offer expert testimony because nothing in the evidence establishes that (1) Dr. McCullough had sufficient expertise to evaluate the reliability and accuracy of the medical records, (2) the records are of a type normally found reliable, and (3) the records are of a type customarily relied upon by medical experts. We do not agree. First, the three-step test contained in K.G. was applied to testimony offered at trial, and we continue to agree that it was correctly decided. This case, however, involves expert opinion in the context of summary judgment proceedings. Dr. McCullough's affidavit recites that she reviewed the medical records pertaining to the prenatal care, labor and delivery provided on December 9 and 10, 1986. Obviously, these are the records from the defendant hospital. Indiana courts have long recognized that such records are of the kind normally relied upon by physicians in forming expert opinions. See e.g. Wilber v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 142, 143 (testimony reflecting content of medical records not in evidence was admissible in conjunction with establishing basis for expert's medical conclusions). Defendants next argue that before Dr. McCullough is competent to express the opinion that defendants breached the standard of care, she must first describe that standard. Defendants' argument is the same one presented in Kopec v. Memorial Hosp. of South Bend, 557 N.E.2d 1367. The Kopec defendants contended that the opinion of the expert expressed in an affidavit was inadequate because it stated conclusions rather than facts. In rejecting that claim, the Court of Appeals stated: While the affidavit certainly lacks desirable richness from its failure to recite more factual data, that is not the controlling question. It is expert medical opinion concerning breach of duty and causation that plaintiff must possess to demonstrate the existence of an issue for trial. Such an opinion, albeit a conclusion, is admissible in evidence when a proper foundation has been laid. In other words, we are here dealing with an instance in terms of T.R. 56 where conclusions may properly be testified to at trial.       Of course, these opinions would be greatly enhanced by detailing the factual circumstances upon which they were based. Numerous cases, however, have treated such detailing as affecting the weight and credibility to be given the opinion rather than its admissibility. 557 N.E.2d at 1369 (citations omitted). Dr. McCullough's third affidavit is similar to the one at issue in Kopec. The affidavit established Dr. McCullough's credentials as a medical expert and recited that she had reviewed the medical records pertaining to the labor and delivery. The affidavit set forth her conclusion that the defendants violated the standard of care in their treatment of the child and that such treatment caused the complained-of injuries. Although not informative in any way as to the nature of the deviation, the lack of detail in the affidavit goes to the weight and credibility to be assigned to it, not to whether it is adequate to create a question of fact. See Martin v. Roberts (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 896, 899 (expert witness's specific knowledge is neither determinative of the witness's qualifications as an expert nor of the admission of his opinion into evidence); Dahlberg v. Ogle (1978), 268 Ind. 30, 37, 373 N.E.2d 159, 163 (failure of hypothetical question to contain all material facts not fatal; such omission affects weight not admissibility). A more prudent drafter would have prepared a more detailed affidavit because, among other things, such a practice would have eliminated the waste of time and expense involved in this appeal. Nonetheless, we reluctantly conclude that under the facts of this case, the affidavit succeeds in demonstrating the existence of a material fact and, therefore, summary judgment was inappropriately entered on Shelamiah's claim.