Opinion ID: 2243559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of an Unrelated Murder

Text: As we noted earlier, during the guilt/innocence phase of this case the jury heard evidence of an unrelated, unadjudicated murder allegedly committed by Lockhart in Florida. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence in the guilt/innocence phase the court instructed the jury to consider the evidence of that other murder only on the issue of identity. Lockhart argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the same jury to make a sentencing recommendation when the jury already was unduly prejudiced against him by hearing the evidence of the Florida murder and by having convicted him of the instant murder. Although the State did not charge the aggravating circumstances of committing another murder at any time, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(8), appellant argues that the court's reading to the jury the list of all twelve possible aggravating circumstances, including (b)(8), may have led the jury to believe it could rely on the Florida murder in recommending imposition of the death penalty. The aggravating circumstance of commission of another murder not reduced to conviction is unconstitutional as applied when the other murder is unrelated to the instant murder. State v. McCormick (1979), 272 Ind. 272, 397 N.E.2d 276. Following are the facts pertinent to this issue. The judge read to the jury the list of twelve aggravating circumstances from the death penalty statute, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b), on three occasions during the trial. First, he instructed each of the two jury panels on the death penalty statute. He instructed the first panel: The defendant is also facing a second count and for procedural reasons that second count won't even be read to you, but it alleges facts to raise the death penalty and a separate penalty section of the statute provides that the State may seek the death penalty be imposed upon the defendant by charging the existence of at least one of the following aggravating factors: 1. The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape or robbery. 2. The defendant committed the murder by the unlawful detonation of an explosive with intent to injure person or property. 3. The defendant committed the murder by lying in wait. 4. The defendant who committed the murder was hired to kill. 5. The defendant committed the murder by hiring another person to kill. 6. The victim of the murder was a corrections employee, fireman, Judge or law enforcement officer, and either the victim was acting in the course of duty or the murder was motivated by an act the victim performed while acting in the course of duty. 7. The defendant has been convicted of another murder. 8. The defendant has committed another murder, at any time, regardless of whether he has been convicted of that other murder. 9. The defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment at the time of the murder. 10. The defendant was serving a term of imprisonment and on the date of the murder the defendant had 20 or more years remaining to be served before the earliest possible release date as defined by I.C. 35-38. 11. The defendant dismembered the victim. 12. The victim of the murder was less than 12 years of age. Now, the State must prove to you the aggravating factor or factors beyond a reasonable doubt and I'm sure you all heard this term before. (Record at 20-22) (emphasis added). The judge also instructed the first panel that the jury is not required to consider all the possible aggravating circumstances: Now, the statute requires that you consider the aggravating factors that are charged. It is not going to include all of these factors. I've just read everything in the statute that provides for the penalty, but those have not all been charged. You're to consider the mitigating circumstances and recommend to the Judge whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. (Record 24-25). The judge instructed the second jury panel on the statutory aggravating circumstances: ... in the event a verdict is returned of guilty and only in that event ... the law provides that the State may seek to have the death penalty imposed by alleging on a separate sheet from the charging information certain facts, any one of which can be one of the aggravating factors, which is listed in the statute. The first of these could be, the defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape or burglary. Secondly, they may seek the death penalty by alleging that the defendant committed the murder by the unlawful detonation of an explosive with the intent to injure person or damage property. The third ground by statute is, that the defendant committed the murder by lying in wait. The fourth ground is that the defendant who committed the murder was hired to kill. The fifth ground, the defendant committed the murder by hiring another person to kill. Sixth ground is that the victim of the murder was a corrections employee, fireman, Judge, or law enforcement officer, and either the victim was acting in the course of duty or the murder was motivated by an act the victim performed while acting in the course of duty. The seventh ground, the defendant has been convicted of another murder. The eighth ground, the defendant has committed another murder, at any time, regardless of whether he has been convicted of that other murder. Nine, the defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment at the time of the murder. Ten, the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment and on the date of the murder the defendant has twenty or more years remaining to be served before the earliest possible release date as defined by I.C. 35-3-8 [sic]. Eleven, the defendant dismembered the victim. Twelve, the victim of the murder was less than twelve years of age. Now, the State must prove one of those aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the death penalty to be imposed, but the defendant may present additional evidence relevant to the aggravating circumstances, any one of those that I've mentioned... . (Record at 583-585) (Emphasis added). The judge did not tell the second panel that it would determine only whether the charged aggravating circumstances were proven. At one point during jury selection, the prosecuting attorney explained to potential jurors that if a penalty phase occurs, the State will then have to prove that this is the type of murder that fits into one of about eleven categories that make [defendant] eligible. (Record at 657); see also (Record at 729) (explaining that State must establish the murder is a special kind of murder, falling into one of twelve categories of aggravators). After return of the guilty verdict and before presentation of evidence in the penalty phase, the court instructed the jury on the death penalty statute. The jury was informed that [t]he law provides that the State may seek the death penalty for Murder by charging the existence of at least one of the following aggravating circumstances... . (Record at 297A). The court read to the jury the twelve aggravating circumstances as defined by the statute, including: 8. The defendant has committed another murder, at any time, regardless of whether he has been convicted of that other murder. ( Id. ). The court informed the jury of the two charged aggravating factors, and that the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt one or both of the charged aggravating circumstances. The court also instructed the jury that it could consider all the evidence introduced at the trial stage of the proceedings together with any new evidence presented during the sentencing hearing. In the court's instructions at the close of the penalty phase, it again read the jury the list of twelve aggravating circumstances from the death penalty statute. The court then told the jury the elements the State must prove to establish the two charged aggravating circumstances. The court also instructed the jury: The list of aggravating circumstances which were previously read to you are the only aggravating circumstances that you may consider. You are not allowed to take account of any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case. (Record at 319A) Finally, the court told the jury: You are to consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances and recommend whether the death penalty should be imposed. You may consider all the evidence introduced at the trial resulting in the defendant's conviction of murder, together with any new evidence presented at this hearing. (Record at 324A). We agree with Lockhart that the trial court erred when it read to the jury on several occasions the list of twelve aggravating circumstances, including the unadjudicated murder provision. If the State had charged the unadjudicated Florida murder as an aggravating circumstances in this case under Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(8), use of such aggravator would have been error because the aggravator is unconstitutional when applied to a situation in which the other murder is not reduced to conviction and is unrelated to the instant murder. McCormick, 272 Ind. 272, 397 N.E.2d 276. This Court held in McCormick that subsection (b)(8) of the death penalty statute is unconstitutional when the other unadjudicated murder is unrelated to the instant murder because a defendant's due process rights are violated when he is in effect tried on the other murder claim during the penalty phase to a jury which has been undeniably prejudiced by having convicted him of an unrelated murder. 272 Ind. at 278, 397 N.E.2d at 280. The Court reasoned that proving the unrelated murder to an undeniably prejudiced jury in the penalty phase opens the door to death sentence recommendations resting upon a level of proof lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The instruction listing the twelve statutory aggravating circumstances was not necessary to convey to the jury its duties in applying the law to determine the sentence in this case, and drawing the jury's attention to aggravator (b)(8) was error when the jury had heard in the guilt/innocence phase properly-admitted evidence of the unrelated Florida murder. When a trial court errs in this respect, we reverse only if defendant establishes he was prejudiced by the court's instructions. Springer v. State (1984), Ind., 463 N.E.2d 243. On appeal, defendant bears the burden of showing prejudice to his substantial rights. See Boyd v. State (1991), Ind., 564 N.E.2d 519. Lockhart claims that the court's instructions prejudiced him to the extent the instructions allowed the jury which convicted him to consider evidence of the unrelated Florida murder as an aggravator in the penalty proceeding. He fails to demonstrate, however, how the judge's instructions in any way affected the outcome of the penalty proceeding. Although the jury was informed of all possible aggravating circumstances in the death penalty statute, it was charged to determine whether the State carried its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one of the two charged aggravators. In addition, in determining sentence, the trial judge found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lockhart killed Windy Gallagher while committing or attempting to commit a robbery and that he had a previous conviction for murder. The court further found that no mitigating circumstances were present. It held that the mitigating factors were outweighed by the aggravating circumstances and thus a death sentence was entered. Given the strength of the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances and the absence of mitigating factors in this case, we conclude that the court's erroneous instructions were harmless.