Opinion ID: 2537633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in refusing instruction D-64 in the jury charge.

Text: ¶ 81. Jury instruction D-64 reads as follows: You have found Ms. Fulgham guilty of capital murder. You must now decide the appropriate punishment in this case. Before I instruct you on specific matters regarding Ms. Fulgham's sentence, I will instruct you on the general principles that will govern your deliberations in this sentencing phase. In explaining your duties, I must offer as complete an explanation as possible concerning the legal matters that must govern your deliberations. I cannot stress to you enough that the focus of your deliberations during this phase is not the same as in an ordinary case. Punishment by death is a unique punishment. It is final. It is irrevocable. You must render a decision based on the evidence free from anger and prejudice. Fulgham argues the trial court erred in refusing this instruction [b]ecause this is a case where the State sought and secured death, [and] it is different from cases where the State either does not seek death or is unsuccessful in its quest. But Fulgham concedes that no caselaw mandates that the trial court grant this instruction. ¶ 82. In Thorson v. State , this Court considered a similar instruction to the one at issue in this case. [78] In Thorson, the trial court denied jury instruction DS-6, which included the following language: The death penalty is a unique punishment. It is final and irrevocable. You must render a decision based on the evidence free from passion and prejudice. [79] On appeal, this Court found the issue to be procedurally barred, since the defendant had failed to cite any relevant authority to support instruction DS-6. [80] But the Court addressed the merits, and held that the trial court properly had excluded the jury instruction, because the jury had been properly instructed that it should `consider and weigh any aggravating and mitigating circumstances . . . [but that it should not be] swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.' [81] ¶ 83. Like the issue in Thorson, this issue is procedurally barred, as Fulgham fails to cite any relevant authority in support of this instruction. Procedural bar notwithstanding, we find that our discussion in Thorson is applicable. The language rejected in Thorson closely tracks jury instruction D-64. Further, the trial court instructed the jury to objectively consider the detailed circumstances of the crime . . . as well as the character of the Defendant herself [and] not to be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, passion, sympathy, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling. The trial court also instructed the jury regarding its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We find no merit in this issue.