Opinion ID: 797216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of the Waiver of Appellate Rights

Text: 8 Waivers of appellate rights are generally enforceable. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1318. Consequently, before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must determine whether such review is precluded by the waiver. First, we must determine whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights. Id. at 1325. If the appeal does not fall within the scope of the waiver, our analysis ends and we may proceed to the merits. If the appeal is within the scope of the waiver, we must next determine whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived [her] appellate rights, and whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. . . . Id. 9 Plea agreements are governed by contract principles. United States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 124 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir.1997). One key principle is the doctrine of contra proferentem; that ambiguities in agreements are to be construed against the drafter. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981). Thus, in determining the scope of a waiver, the court must strictly construe any ambiguities in the agreement against the government (the drafter) and in favor of the defendant. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. This means waivers should be narrowly construed. Id. Ms. Gordon's plea agreement contains the following waiver of appellate rights: 10 Defendant understands that a sentencing guideline range for her case will be determined by the Court under the guidelines issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Defendant also understands that the Court has jurisdiction and authority to impose any sentence within the statutory maximum for the offense(s) to which she is pleading guilty. Defendant further understands that Title 28, United States Code, Section 1291, and Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 give her the right to appeal the judgment and sentence imposed by the Court. Acknowledging all this, defendant in exchange for the promises and concessions made by the United States in this plea agreement, knowingly and voluntarily waives her right to: 11 (a) Appeal or collaterally challenge her guilty plea and any other aspect of her conviction, including but not limited to any rulings on pretrial suppression motions or any other pretrial dispositions of motions and issues; 12 (b) Appeal, collaterally challenge, or move to modify under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) or some other ground, her sentence as imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined, provided the sentence is within or below the applicable guideline range determined by the Court to apply to this case. . . . 13 (c) It is provided that (i) defendant specifically does not waive the right to appeal an upward departure from the sentencing guideline range determined by the Court to apply to this case, and (ii) her waiver of rights to appeal and to bring collateral challenges shall not apply to appeals or challenges based on changes in the law reflected in Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court cases decided after the date of this agreement that are held by the Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court to have retroactive effect. 14 R. Doc. 8, at 5-6 (emphasis added). 15 Other relevant provisions of the plea agreement stated: (1) [t]his agreement applies only to the criminal violations described and does not apply to any civil matter or any civil forfeiture proceeding except as specifically set forth, id. at 1, and (2) the Court must order the payment of restitution to the victim(s) of the offense, id. at 2. 16 Ms. Gordon's petition to enter a plea of guilty further stated: 17 If you plead GUILTY the judge may require you to make restitution to any victim of the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3579 [for pre-Guidelines violations], 3663, and 3664). If you plead GUILTY to an offense that occurred on or after April 24, 1996, and the offense falls into certain categories of offenses, including property offenses and crimes of violence, ordinarily the judge is required to order you to pay restitution to any victim of the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3663A). 18 R. Doc. 9, at 4 (emphasis added) (bracketed text in original) 19 Because Ms. Gordon argues that the restitution order is unlawful under the MVRA, our task is discrete: we need only determine whether Ms. Gordon waived the right to challenge an unlawful restitution order. 3 In this regard, we think it clear that Ms. Gordon preserved her right to appeal such an order. 20 Analysis of the scope of a waiver of appellate rights must extend beyond discrete clauses. A contract must be interpreted as a whole, and [w]ords and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances. Restatement, supra, at § 202(1),(2). Furthermore, if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight. Id. § 202(1). In this case, the plea agreement, read in its totality, suggests the parties only intended that Ms. Gordon would waive the right to appeal aspects of her sentence and restitution that were imposed within the authority granted to the district court by the relevant statutes. 4 For example, the first paragraph of the waiver states: Defendant also understands that the Court has jurisdiction and authority to impose any sentence within the statutory maximum for the offense(s) to which she is pleading guilty. R. Doc. 8, at 5 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Ms. Gordon only waived the right to collaterally attack her sentence provided the sentence is within or below the applicable guideline range determined by the Court. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). These clauses suggest, at the very least, that Ms. Gordon did not waive the right to appeal a sentence of imprisonment beyond that which could be lawfully imposed. More broadly, they also suggest Ms. Gordon did not intend to waive the right to appeal an unlawful restitution order. See United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.2004) (A restitution order which exceeds its authority under MVRA is equivalent to an illegal sentence. Such a restitution order is in excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute and, therefore, the waiver of appeal is inapplicable to it.) (internal citations, alterations, and quotations omitted); United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1147 (4th Cir.1995) (Because a restitution order imposed when it is not authorized . . . is no less `illegal' than a sentence of imprisonment that exceeds the statutory maximum [such] appeals . . . are similarly outside the scope of a defendant's otherwise valid appeal waiver.). 21 Moreover, we question whether Ms. Gordon could have waived her right to appeal an unlawful restitution order, even if she wanted to do so. A plea agreement permitting a court to impose a restitution order beyond that authorized by statute might well be unenforceable on grounds of public policy. See Richard A. Lord, 6 Williston on Contracts, § 12:4 (4th ed.2006). In fact, several reported cases have suggested a defendant cannot waive the right to appeal an unlawful sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir.2001); DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir.1996). The same reasoning applies to cases involving an unlawful restitution order. Indeed, Hahn implies this rule, because an otherwise valid waiver of appellate rights may be invalidated if it results in a miscarriage of justice and an unlawful sentence or an unlawful restitution order results in a miscarriage of justice. See 359 F.3d at 1327. Nevertheless, the language of the plea agreement itself suggests Ms. Gordon did not intend to waive the right to appeal any aspect of her sentence or restitution that was beyond that authorized by the pertinent statutes. 22 Furthermore, we must construe the plea agreement against a general backdrop of legality. See United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559 (2d Cir.1996). This means that we should presume that all promises made were legal, and that the non-contracting `party' who implements the agreement (the district judge) will act legally in executing the agreement. Id. (citing Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977)). Surely then, Ms. Gordon was also entitled to presume, when she entered the plea agreement, that the judge would order restitution in a legal manner. See E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 9.2 (3d ed.2004) (noting that existing law is part of the state of facts at the time of agreement and that a mistake of fact is grounds for relief). Indeed, this would seem to be an implied term of the agreement. Accordingly, Ms. Gordon's challenge to the lawfulness of the restitution order is beyond the scope of the waiver of appellate rights.