Opinion ID: 3194674
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Richko has satisfied Farmer’s objective prong

Text: The individual defendants argue that Richko failed to present evidence of their culpability under Farmer’s objective and subjective prongs. They first contend that there was no objective evidence in the record showing that Gillespie posed a risk of harm to anyone. But such a statement is belied by the record. All that Richko needs to show is that Horvath was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). We analyze the objective component “in the abstract.” Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280, 286-87 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that “the deprivation of water and medical care, No. 15-1524 Richko v. Wayne Cty. et al. Page 10 including psychological services, of course would be ‘sufficiently serious’ to satisfy [Farmer’s objective] requirement”); see also Williams v. McLemore, 247 F. App’x 1,  (6th Cir. 2007) (“In the abstract, one prison inmate’s threat to the health and safety of another inmate is ‘sufficiently serious’ to satisfy [the objective] requirement.”). Viewing the present case in the abstract, the risk to Horvath of being housed with and attacked by an inmate who had recently been arrested for violent assault and had a history of serious mental illness was sufficient to fulfill the objective component of this analysis. Because the analysis of the facts below establishes, for the purpose of overcoming the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, that Richko has satisfied the subjective component of Farmer’s test, the objective component is likewise satisfied based on the same factual analysis. The individual defendants next argue that the district court failed to apply the subjective component of a deliberate-indifference claim to each of them. In Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2005), the court held that “[t]his subjective component [of a deliberate-indifference claim] must be addressed for each officer individually.” Id. at 797. This holding was further discussed in Phillips v. Roane Cty., Tenn., 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008), where the court held that “general allegations” of liability, so long as they are not “broad and conclusory accusations,” can provide “sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that each individual correctional officer had an objective awareness as to the seriousness” of the risk, “and that their failure to do anything . . . amounted to deliberate indifference.” Id. at 542. Utilizing Phillips’s guidance, therefore, we next consider whether the facts construed in the light most favorable to Richko show that Cameron, Stinson, and Williams had the requisite level of culpability to satisfy Farmer’s subjective component.