Opinion ID: 1280063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: termination of b.t.'s parental rights

Text: Concerning the termination of parental rights on account of abandonment, this court has recognized that [t]he Nebraska Juvenile Code provides that parental rights may be terminated when the best interests of a child require the termination of parental rights. See § 43-292. A juvenile's best interests are the primary considerations in determining whether parental rights should be terminated as authorized by the Nebraska Juvenile Code. In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 267, 417 N.W.2d 147, 158 (1987). In the absence of any reasonable alternative and as the last resort to dispose of an action brought pursuant to the Nebraska Juvenile Code ... termination of parental rights is permissible when the basis for such termination is proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re Interest of T.C., 226 Neb. 116, 117, 409 N.W.2d 607, 609 (1987). Among the bases for termination of parental rights, § 43-292 includes: (1) The parents have abandoned the juvenile for six months or more immediately prior to the filing of the petition.... Abandonment, for the purpose of § 43-292(1), is a parent's intentionally withholding from a child, without just cause or excuse, the parent's presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, and the opportunity for the display of parental affection for the child. See In re Interest of A.G.G., 230 Neb. 707, 433 N.W.2d 185 (1988). In re Interest of J.L.M. et al., 234 Neb. 381, 398, 451 N.W.2d 377, 388 (1990). Whether a parent has abandoned a child within the meaning of & sect; 43-292(1) is a question of fact and depends on parental intent, which may be determined by circumstantial evidence. See In re Interest of A.G.G., 230 Neb. 707, 433 N.W.2d 185 (1988). B.T. argues that she attempted to maintain physical contact with C.A. in February 1989, which would have been within the 6 months before the State filed its petition to terminate parental rights, but was denied contact by DSS and C.A.'s therapist. According to B.T., DSS felt that it was more important for [B.T.] to jump through a series of `commitment hoops' before she would be allowed to see her daughter. Brief for appellant at 11. Regarding B.T.'s claim that she was improperly prevented from visiting C.A., we note that & sect; 43-284 of the juvenile code provides: When any juvenile is adjudged to be under subdivision (3) of section 43-247, the court ... may make an order committing the juvenile to the ... (5) care and custody of the Department of Social Services.... The Department of Social Services shall have the authority to determine the care, placement, medical services, psychiatric services, training, and expenditures on behalf of each juvenile committed to it. Section 43-284 does not authorize DSS to determine or place restrictions on parental visitation rights. Parental visitation rights, as a subject within the Nebraska Juvenile Code, are matters for judicial determination. Illustrative of the need for judicial determination regarding a matter pertinent to children within a court's jurisdiction is Ensrud v. Ensrud, 230 Neb. 720, 729, 433 N.W.2d 192, 199 (1988), where the trial court, pursuant to a dissolution decree, ordered that physical custody of Ensruds' child was exercisable as directed by the child custody officer. In disapproving of the trial court's delegatory action, we stated: In Deacon v. Deacon, 207 Neb. 193, 297 N.W.2d 757 (1980), this court considered and reversed a trial court's order placing in a psychologist the authority to effectively determine visitation, and to control the extent and time of such visitation. Id. at 200, 297 N.W.2d at 762. In disapproving the judicially conferred authority for the psychologist's determination of visitation rights, this court stated: Such delegation could result in the denial of proper visitation rights of the noncustodial parent.... The responsibility of the trial court to determine questions of custody and visitation of minor children according to their best interests is an independent responsibility and cannot be controlled by the agreement or stipulation of the parties. [Citation omitted.] Id. at 200-01, 297 N.W.2d at 762. .... A decision concerning physical custody... which necessarily involves ascertaining the best interests of the child, is a matter for constitutionally authorized judicial determination. Such judicial authority cannot and shall not be delegated to administrative personnel, who assist a court charged with the responsibility of determining the best interests of a child involved in a dissolution proceeding. Ensrud, supra at 730-31, 433 N.W.2d at 199. Notwithstanding DSS' lack of authority to determine parental visitation rights, the present appeal is distinguishable from Ensrud and Deacon, since the juvenile court did not grant or delegate to DSS any authority to determine visitation rights concerning C.A. B.T., who was represented by a lawyer, could have requested that the court examine DSS' directive that B.T. obtain counseling as a condition for visiting C.A. However, B.T. chose to return to Missouri without any further contact with DSS or the court. Furthermore, we also point out that B.T.'s actions during the 6 months preceding the State's motion to terminate cannot be viewed in total isolation from B.T.'s previous conduct and absence from C.A., especially since DSS' reluctance to allow B.T. to see C.A. was the result of B.T.'s past indifference to C.A.'s well-being. B.T.'s indifference was clearly exhibited in her voluntarily delivering C.A. to the Missouri Department of Social Services; in failing to have any contact with C.A., or to make any effort to contact the child, from February 1988 to February 1989; and, without excuse or justification, in failing to appear at court hearings in 1988 and 1989 concerning C.A. We note that child custody by DSS gives the department some authority similar to a guardian's authority. See & sect; 43-285: In any case when the court shall award a juvenile to the care of [DSS], the juvenile shall, unless otherwise ordered, become a ward and be subject to the guardianship of the department.... In view of § 43-285, DSS, although lacking authority to determine parental visitation rights, was, subject to judicial review, authorized to set conditions beneficial for reestablishment of contact between C.A. and B.T. Overall, B.T. still had the ability to secure visitation rights through the juvenile court. Thus, we conclude that B.T.'s 1989 appearance for a visit with C.A. in Omaha and DSS' response do not excuse or justify B.T.'s extended absence from C.A.'s life. B.T. also contends, however, that `physical presence' is not a pivotal requirement in a determination of abandonment, and, thus, contact was maintained with C.A. throughout the six months immediately prior to the filing of the Petition because the record clearly shows that [B.T.] wrote letters and a card.... Brief for appellant at 15. `Abandonment is not an ambulatory thing the legal effects of which a parent may dissipate at will by token efforts at reclaiming a discarded child.' In re Interest of J.M.D., 233 Neb. 540, 543, 446 N.W.2d 233, 235 (1989). While we do not ignore B.T.'s letters and card to C.A., nevertheless, under the circumstances, such actions by B.T., in the context of B.T.'s past behavior, are small tokens of parental affection for a child and an inadequate substitute for parental presence in a child's life. From our de novo review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is clear and convincing that B.T. abandoned C.A. for a period of 6 months before the State filed its petition for termination of B.T.'s parental rights. It is also clear that the State has established that termination of B.T.'s parental rights is in the best interests of C.A. Thus, we conclude that the juvenile court was correct in terminating the parental rights of B.T., and, accordingly, the juvenile court's judgment is affirmed. AFFIRMED.