Opinion ID: 2052595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the sixteen-year delay between the date of the alleged offense and the filing of the complaint violates the defendant's right to due process

Text: The defendant argues that his second-degree murder charge should have been dismissed because he was unfairly prejudiced and thus denied due process by the sixteen-year delay in the commencement of criminal proceedings. The defendant claims prejudice from the delay because of (1) the death of two potential witnesses, (2) the unavailability of certain medical records, and (3) the general dulling of memories over a sixteen-year period. [17] The statute of limitations is the principal device, created by the people of a state through their legislature, to protect against prejudice arising from a lapse of time between the date of an alleged offense and an arrest. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971). The statute of limitations is not, however, the sole standard by which delay between the date of an alleged offense and an arrest is measured when considering a denial of due process. State v. Rogers, 70 Wis. 2d 160, 164, 233 N.W.2d 481 (1975). [A]pplicable statutes of limitations protect against the prosecution's bringing stale criminal charges against any defendant, ... and, beyond that protection, the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice in presenting his defense. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984), citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789-90; Marion, 404 U.S. at 324. See also United States v. Rein, 848 F.2d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Marler, 756 F.2d 206, 213 (1st Cir. 1985); Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 430 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Comosona, 614 F.2d 695, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1980). But see United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659, 665 (9th Cir. 1981). [4] Where a defendant seeks to avoid prosecution based upon prosecutorial delay, it is clear that it must be shown that the defendant has suffered actual prejudice arising from the delay and that the delay arose from an improper motive or purpose such as to gain a tactical advantage over the accused. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 418. See also State v. Davis, 95 Wis. 2d 55, 58, 288 N.W.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1980). [18] In the case before this court, there is no applicable statute of limitations. Section 939.74(2)(a), Stats. 1967. Therefore, we must focus on the issue of whether the defendant has suffered actual prejudice resulting from the delay and the issue of whether the delay arose from an improper motive or purpose such as to gain a tactical advantage over the accused. Assuming without deciding that the defendant was actually prejudiced by the sixteen-year delay, we find that the defendant has not met his burden of proving that the state's delay in charging arose from an improper motive or purpose. The state asserts that the delay in charging the defendant resulted from the insufficiency of the evidence when the case was investigated in 1969 and 1973. The state maintains that prosecution was commenced in 1985 because new medical interpretation of the evidence concerning potential child abuse made a successful prosecution possible. The defendant has shown nothing to cause us to doubt the state's assertion. As the court of appeals noted: At a hearing to determine if the delay violated due process, defense counsel made no showing that the state deliberately withheld the charge to disadvantage the defendant, to harass him or to punish him in any way. See [ State v. Davis, 95 Wis. 2d 55, 62, 288 N.W.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1980)]. Indeed, in arguing his position, defense counsel stated that `if the court is looking for purposeful delay, specifically someone had an ill motive ..., then probably we fail.... Now, did the people involved purposefully delay? Yes. Why did they delay? We don't know. I can't tell you why.' A defendant's bare allegations of improper tactical purpose on the state's part are insufficient to show malevolent purpose. Id. On appeal, [the defendant] has added nothing to his argument but additional `presumptions' and further allegations. Wilson, 145 Wis. 2d at 158. Consequently, we hold that the defendant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the sixteen-year delay between the date of the alleged offense and the filing of the complaint violated his right to due process.