Opinion ID: 852345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Incurred Risk

Text: The notion of incurred or assumed risk has largely become obsolete in an era of comparative fault. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 2 Reporters' Note cmt. i (2000) (This Section abandons the traditional doctrine of implied, voluntary assumption of risk....). In Indiana this has been accomplished by the Comparative Fault Act as construed in Heck v. Robey, 659 N.E.2d 498, 504-05 (Ind.1995). See also Smith v. Baxter, 796 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 2003). Contributory negligence has been said to remain a complete defense in medical malpractice actions. Cavens v. Zaberdac, 849 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Ind.2006). The parties assume that because medical malpractice is not subject to the Comparative Fault Act, the traditional doctrine of incurred or assumed risk remains intact in that arena, and we decide the case on that basis. The term assumption of risk, [1] as it is known in most jurisdictions, has been used in at least four different senses: 1. Express, in which the plaintiff has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation to exercise care ..., and agrees to take his chances as to injury from a known or possible risk. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A cmt. c (1965). 2. Implied primary, in which the plaintiff has entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which he knows to involve the risk, and is deemed to have impliedly agreed to relieve the defendant of responsibility, and to take his own chances. A spectator at a baseball game consents to the game's proceeding without precautions to protect from being hit by the ball. Id. 3. Implied secondary, in which the plaintiff, aware of a risk created by the negligence of the defendant, proceeds or continues voluntarily to encounter it. An example is an independent contractor who knows that he has been furnished by his principal with a machine in dangerous condition but reasonably continues to work with it. Id. 4. Unreasonable, in which the plaintiffs conduct in voluntarily encountering a known risk is itself unreasonable, and amounts to contributory negligence. Id. See also Keeton, supra, § 68, at 480-81, 496-97. The first three categories of assumption of risk are predicated on the plaintiff's expressed or implied consent. 57B Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 759 (2004) (citing Reddell v. Johnson, 942 P.2d 200, 203 (Okla.1997); Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203, 206 (Ala.1998); Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 751 A.2d 481, 488 (2000)). They prevent one who consents to a known risk from suing for damages arising from that risk. Under Indiana precedent, the consent must be based on actual knowledge of the risk, not merely general awareness of a potential for mishap. Clark v. Wiegand, 617 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Ind.1993) (quoting Beckett v. Clinton Prairie Sch. Corp., 504 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind.1987)). Assumption of risk is often described as an affirmative defense, see, e.g., Get-N-Go, Inc. v. Markins, 544 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ind. 1989), aff'd on reh'g, 550 N.E.2d 748 (Ind. 1990), but that depends on the category of incurred risk. A defense of express or implied primary assumption of risk negates the duty or breach required for a negligence claim. In other words, under express or implied primary assumption of risk, a defendant is relieved of the duty of care or the defendant's conduct is not negligent with respect to the plaintiff. See Keeton, supra, § 68, at 480-81. If the defendant has no duty of care, or is not negligent, an element necessary to the plaintiff's prima facie case is missing. When assumed risk means that the plaintiff's consent has shifted responsibility in this way, then it does not look much like an orthodox affirmative defense. It is rather an assertion that the plaintiff has not proved duty or negligence. 1 Dobbs, supra, § 212. These forms of assumption of risk may not require pleading as an affirmative defense under Trial Rule 8, because they negate an element of the claim. Express and implied primary assumption of risk nevertheless bar recovery in the face of what would otherwise be negligent conduct, and the burden of proof to establish the plaintiff's consent is on the defendant. Id. § 212 n. 4; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496G cmt. c (Assumption of risk ... comes into question only where there would otherwise be a breach of some duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. It is then a defense, which relieves the defendant of the liability to which he would otherwise be subject. The burden of proof is therefore upon the defendant). Implied secondary assumption of risk does not negate the defendant's duty or breach. It asserts the plaintiff's conduct as a defense to the defendant's negligence or breach and therefore is a classic affirmative defense. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287, 290 (Fla.1977); see also Gyuriak v. Millice, 775 N.E.2d 391, 394-95 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (noting the difference between implied primary and secondary assumption of risk). Finally, assumed risk and contributory negligence may in some cases be supported by the same facts, Keeton, supra, § 68, at 481, but they are separate defenses. Richardson v. Marrell's, Inc., 539 N.E.2d 485, 486 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), trans. denied. [A]ssumption of risk rests upon the voluntary consent of the plaintiff to encounter the risk and take his chances, while contributory negligence rests upon his failure to exercise the care of a reasonable man for his own protection. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A cmt. d. Similarly, lack of informed consent and incurred risk are distinct tort concepts. As explained above, failure to obtain informed consent is a cause of action based on negligent failure to disclose matters that the standard of care demands the physician make known to the patient. Incurred risk, on the other hand, is a defense to negligence claims premised on the plaintiff's express or implied consent to relieve the defendant of the duty of care, or on the plaintiff's choice to voluntarily encounter a risk already created by the defendant's negligence. See Faile v. Bycura, 297 S.C. 58, 374 S.E.2d 687, 688 (Ct.App.1988) (noting the distinction between the two doctrines).