Opinion ID: 1057253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Individual Liability under the Workers' Compensation Act

Text: ¶ 22. The second issue on appeal is whether the Workers' Compensation Act allows employees to be sued as individuals for discriminating against another employee who has asserted a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Although supervisor moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the WCA, plaintiff's opposition to summary judgment raised the issue of individual liability, and the superior court granted summary judgment on the basis that the WCA does not allow employees to be sued in their individual capacities. The court did not address whether plaintiff had made a prima facie case. Accordingly, we review only the purely legal question of whether the WCA permits employees to be held individually liable and reverse summary judgment on that ground. [7] ¶ 23. Under the WCA, [n]o person shall discharge or discriminate against an employee . . . because such employee asserted a claim for benefits. 21 V.S.A. § 710(b). We decided in Murray v. St. Michael's College, 164 Vt. 205, 209-10, 667 A.2d 294, 298-99 (1995), that this statutory section provides a private right of action for damages. However, as with the VFEPA, whether the statutory term person means that employees and supervisors, as well as employers, may be held personally liable for workers' compensation discrimination has not before been addressed. ¶ 24. As we have already stated, the starting point for statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. We first look to the language of the statute and seek to construe it according to its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. LeBlanc, 171 Vt. 88, 91, 759 A.2d 991, 993 (2000). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the statute according to its terms. Id. As the term person is not defined in the WCA, we are obliged to interpret the term consistently with the rules set out in Title 1, chapter 3. 1 V.S.A. § 101. Chapter 3 defines person as including any natural person. Id. § 128. Accordingly, we find no ambiguity in the meaning of person in this statute, and we see no reason to second-guess what the Legislature meant by its use of the term. [8] The statute allows an employee to be sued as an individualwhich is consistent with the Legislature's approach to personal liability for violation of the VFEPA. ¶ 25. The superior court, in reaching the opposite conclusion, stated that [i]f the Legislature wanted to create a private right of action against supervisors, it could easily have done so clearly and directly. It is not apparent, however, why the Legislature need be more clear than to use the term person in its most plain and all-encompassing sense. This legislative language choice straightforwardly applies the nondiscrimination provision to coworkers as well as to employers. As plaintiff points out, the Legislature used the term employer throughout the WCA to specify liability and responsibilities of employers for work-related injuries. Its decision to use the term person in § 710(b) instead of employer marks a clear departure from its approach to employer-only liability in the rest of the WCA. Rather than ignore this distinction and assume the Legislature meant what it did not say, we will interpret the statute according to its plain meaning. ¶ 26. Supervisor argues that it undermines the overall structure and purpose of the WCA to interpret the nondiscrimination provision as applying to individuals. The WCA represents a public policy compromise in which the employee gives up the right to sue the employer in tort in return for which the employer assumes strict liability and the obligation to provide a speedy and certain remedy for work-related injuries. Murray, 164 Vt. at 209, 667 A.2d at 298 (quotation omitted). Prohibiting coworkers from discriminating against those who file workers' compensation claims has no bearing on this original compromise. Statutory authorization for employees to sue other employees for discrimination exposes employers to no greater risk of suit or liability than an employer could expect from suits against employers alone based on statutory or vicarious liability for discrimination by employees or supervisors. Nor does this construction interfere with injured workers securing the speedy and certain compensation intended by the enactment. The legislative choice to expose coemployees to discrimination liability is consistent with preventing workplace cultures that discourage employees from obtaining compensation to which they are entitled. Our reading of § 710(b) is fully consistent with the WCA as a whole. ¶ 27. Supervisor cites case law from Texas, Illinois, and Kansas in support of construing Vermont's WCA to exclude employees from personal liability for violating the antidiscrimination clauses of the Act. However, those cases rely on reasoning we have already rejected as inapposite or unpersuasive. Particularly unconvincing is a Texas court's overly stingy reading of the term person to exclude  any person. Stewart v. Littlefield, 982 S.W.2d 133, 136-37 (Tex.Ct.App.1998) (quoting with approval Stoker v. Furr's, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Tex.Ct.App.1991), which concluded that it was inconceivable that the Legislature would have intended person to mean any person, and [h]ad the legislature intended to create a cause of action against any person . . ., it could have easily said so). As stated above, we are content to interpret the statutory term person as it is defined by statute, rather than as meaning employera term eschewed by the Legislature. ¶ 28. Supervisor next directs us to some courts that have limited potential defendants in common-law retaliatory-discharge suits to employers alone. The basis for this limit is that only the employer . . . has a `motive' to fire an employee for seeking workers' compensation benefits. Buckner v. Atl. Plant Maint., Inc., 182 Ill.2d 12, 230 Ill.Dec. 596, 694 N.E.2d 565, 570 (1998). While this is likely true, it fails to acknowledge that Vermont's statutory provision is clearly aimed at any form of discrimination, not simply discharges. Further, it is reasonable to understand that the Legislature, in enacting 21 V.S.A. § 710(b), was as concerned with ensuring employees' access to workers' compensation benefits without fear of reprisal, in any form, as it was with removing employers' economic incentives to retaliate by discharging those employees who file claims. From the employee-protection perspective, the Legislature had good reason to prohibit fellow employees, not just employers, from creating hostile work environments for those who file workers' compensation claims. In sum, none of the authority offered by supervisor is persuasive on this point, and we reverse summary judgment on plaintiff's WCA claim. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.