Opinion ID: 2634583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Double jeopardy protections

Text: The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantee that a person may not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. (See Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 660, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354.) The double jeopardy bar protects against a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal or conviction, and also protects against multiple punishment for the same offense. [Citations.] ( Ibid. ) In addition, because greater and lesser included offenses constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes ( ibid. ), a conviction of a lesser included offense bars subsequent prosecution of the greater offense. [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 661, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354.) As noted above, the same protections generally do not extend to noncapital sentencing proceedings, or at least not to those involving prior conviction allegations. ( Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 728, 730, 118 S.Ct. 2246; Monge I, supra, 16 Cal.4th 826, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 941 P.2d 1121; but see People v. Hernandez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 835, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 968 P.2d 465 ( Hernandez ) [hearing on an enhancement is not a court trial].) For purposes of double jeopardy, the high court recognized in Monge II that an appellate finding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction was comparable to an acquittal and thus barred a second trial. ( Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 729, 118 S.Ct. 2246, citing Burks, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 16, 98 S.Ct. 2141.) However, it also concluded that [w]here a similar failure of proof occurs in a sentencing proceeding ... the analogy is inapt. ( Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 729, 118 S.Ct. 2246; see also People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 241, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 83 P.3d 480.) In reaching this conclusion, the high court emphasized that sentencing determinations do not place a defendant in jeopardy for an `offense,' [citation]. Nor have sentence enhancements been construed as additional punishment for the previous offense; rather, they act to increase a sentence `because of the manner in which [the defendant] committed the crime of conviction.' [Citations.] An enhanced sentence imposed on a persistent offender thus `is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes' but as `a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.' [Citations.] ( Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 728, 118 S.Ct. 2246; but see id. at pp. 737-741, 118 S.Ct. 2246 (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.) [arguing recidivism enhancement constitutes an element of the offense].) The Double Jeopardy Clause `does not provide the defendant with the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be.' [Citation.] Consequently, it is a `well-established part of our constitutional jurisprudence' that the guarantee against double jeopardy neither prevents the prosecution from seeking review of a sentence nor restricts the length of a sentence imposed upon retrial after a defendant's successful appeal. [Citations.] ( Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 730, 118 S.Ct. 2246.) As discussed above, in 1996 we held that the double jeopardy prohibition did not bar retrial of an allegation that an attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated under section 664(a). ( Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 671, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354; see also id. at pp. 671-683, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at pp. 683-693, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) In arguing that double jeopardy protections bar retrial on the section 664(a) allegation in his case, defendant here contends that Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354, is distinguishable and that Burks, supra, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1, controls. He also maintains that Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, is relevant here, even though it did not involve double jeopardy principles, because the penalty of life imprisonment prescribed by section 664(a) increased his sentence beyond the statutory maximum. We discuss these cases below.