Opinion ID: 2180185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claytor and Alliegro applied.

Text: The same place at the same time standard, articulated in Claytor and followed in Alliegro, provides the key to Weakley's appeal. Weakley has stated under oath that he frequently worked on boilers manufactured by each of the appellees, and that he has thus been present at the same place and at the same time, and regularly exposed to, the asbestos that he attributes to the appellees. It is true that as to two of the defendants  Foster Wheeler and Marley  Weakley has not been able to identify the time or place of any contact with those defendants' products. [6] Nevertheless, he has asserted that he has frequently been in the immediate presence of, and has worked on, these defendants' boilers. If he were to testify to that effect at trial, and if the trier of fact were to believe him, we discern no logical reason why such evidence should be deemed insufficient to satisfy the same place at the same time minimum standard. [7] Where a plaintiff remembers the identity of the manufacturer, but cannot recall, decades after the fact, where and when he came into contact with that manufacturer's product, that understandable incompleteness of recollection should not end the case for the plaintiff, at least until he has had the opportunity for discovery. Obviously, discovery may well strengthen (or weaken) Weakley's case. We do not read the same time and same place minimum standard as requiring the plaintiff to recall and specify a particular time and a particular place. Weakley must, of course, also establish that his exposure to each defendant's product was a substantial factor contributing to his having contracted asbestosis. For summary judgment purposes, however, this element is satisfied by Dr. Casolaro's expert testimony. This witness' analysis may not be without its difficulties, [8] and his diagnosis could perhaps come under adversarial fire, but such issues are for the trier of fact, and are not suitable for resolution by summary judgment. Indeed, similar testimony was cited in support of our decision in Alliegro. In their briefs, several of the defendants rely on the frequency, regularity and proximity test adopted by the court in Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1162. In Claytor, one judge wrote a concurring opinion recommending adoption of the Lohrmann standard, but the majority of the court declined to join him. 662 A.2d at 1387. We likewise do not adopt Lohrmann as the law of this jurisdiction. [9] We recognize that our disposition is not consistent with several Superior Court decisions. In Cumberland v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., CA Nos. 98-6265+ (Super.Ct.D.C.2002), for example, the trial judge, relying largely on Lohrmann and her reading of Claytor, stated that in determining whether a particular Plaintiff can defeat a motion for summary judgment, the Court will look for evidence indicating exposure to a specific Defendant's product on a regular basis over some extended period of time in proximity to where the Plaintiff worked. Specifically, Plaintiffs should identify the asbestos-containing product to which Plaintiff was exposed, the particular Defendant(s) liable for the product, and the role the Defendant played in the presence of that product at that site ( e.g., manufacturer, distributor, supplier, installer). Plaintiffs should identify the work site (including the specific buildings within work sites, if applicable), provide time periods for each work site, and discuss the frequency, duration and proximity of exposure to the asbestos-containing product. In the instant case, the trial judge, in awarding summary judgment to the various defendants, used reasoning essentially identical to that in Cumberland. With due respect to the court in Cumberland and to the trial judge in this case, we are of the opinion that this standard is too exacting, especially where, as here, the plaintiff has produced expert evidence (Dr. Casolaro's affidavit) to the effect that every encounter with an asbestos product contributes significantly to the contracting of asbestosis. Each of the defendants in this case had asbestos-containing boilers. Unlike the plaintiffs in Lohrmann and Cumberland, Weakley alleges that he frequently worked on these boilers, and not merely in the areas where the boilers were located. Asbestosis, as we have seen, may take a great many years to develop. Memories fade, particularly when, at the time, the plaintiff had no reason to recall or record the information. Under these circumstances, we conclude that adoption by this court of the trial court's approach in Cumberland would prematurely doom potentially meritorious cases brought by individuals who may well have suffered severe harm through exposure to one or more of the particular defendants' products. This is especially true where, as in this case, the plaintiff has been precluded from bolstering his memory of long ago events with any discovery at all. A plaintiff who has contracted asbestosis and who has alleged that he had frequent contacts with the defendants' asbestos-containing boilers should not be required to produce, at the outset, as a matter of course, information that in most cases is likely to be impossible to recall. Raising a separate issue, appellee Oakfabco also contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because ... plaintiff's mere naming of the maker of a boiler, not the manufacturer or supplier of the asbestos product to which he claims exposure, is insufficient. In his affidavit, however, Weakley asserted, ostensibly on personal knowledge, that [e]ach of these boilers was manufactured and delivered to the site of installation with asbestos-containing materials already incorporated. Under these circumstances, a genuine issue of material fact is presented, and summary judgment is inappropriate. One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998). Non-manufacturing sellers in the distribution chain are strictly liable. Id., cmt. a. A ... manufacturer may be held liable in damages for defective component parts manufactured by another ... if the ... manufacturer incorporated the defective component into its finished product. Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md.App. 1, 703 A.2d 1315, 1331, cert. denied, 349 Md. 494, 709 A.2d 139 (1998). [10] In further support of Oakfabco's position that it cannot be held liable to Weakley for exposure to its boilers unless Oakfabco manufactured the asbestos product (rather than the boiler), Oakfabco relies on a single sentence in our opinion in Claytor. There, we said that testimony presented by one of the plaintiffs ... identified only the maker of the pipe itself (Rick-Weld), not the maker of the asbestos product from which the pipe covering was made. 662 A.2d at 1385. This statement was not a part of our holding and does not stand for the proposition for which Oakfabco cites it. Rick-Weld, the manufacturer of the pipe in question, was not a party, and we assuredly did not hold in Claytor that if the plaintiffs had proved exposure to pipes or boilers manufactured or supplied by the four appellees  Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., Owens-Illinois, Inc., Pittsburgh Corning Corp., and GAF Corp.  they would not have been entitled to recovery if a non-party had manufactured the asbestos products in the pipes or boilers manufactured or supplied by the appellees. In fact, in reversing summary judgment which had been granted by the trial court to one of the appellees, we stated that the standard set forth in section 431 of the Restatement is clearly met by the evidence of Turner's exposure to Owens-Corning products at the White House.... Id. at 1387. This statement was not made contingent on whether Owens-Corning manufactured the specific asbestos-containing product or simply incorporated that product into its pipes or boilers. [11] Oakfabco also complains, not unreasonably, that Weakley's opposition to its motion for summary judgment contained inadmissible documents not produced during discovery, including Weakley's Revised Work History and his affidavit. Oakfabco made the same claim in the trial court. The judge did not address the issue in his order, but he did refer therein to documents provided after the close of discovery. The judge thus apparently considered these documents, and no motion was made to strike them or to obtain a ruling on Oakfabco's objection. We are not prepared to resolve an issue on which the trial court never ruled. In any event, even Weakley's original answers to interrogatories and Work History satisfied Claytor's same place at the same time standard, and although the issue would be closer, summary judgment could not stand even without the materials provided by Weakley after the close of discovery. In sum, we conclude, for all of the foregoing reasons, that summary judgment should not have been awarded to any of the moving defendants.