Opinion ID: 795972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victor Hugo Guel-Contreras's Conviction

Text: 10 Where a district court denies a motion to suppress statements, we review its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Black Bear, 422 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir.2005). Guel-Contreras contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to Agent Vail because Guel-Contreras's testimony at the suppression hearing was credible and Agent Vail's was not. 11 At the suppression hearing, Agent Vail testified that he read Guel-Contreras his Miranda rights in Spanish, that Guel-Contreras signed a Spanish-language Justice Department Advisory of Rights form, and then Guel-Contreras made his statements. Agent Vail was unable to produce the signed waiver form because he had left it with Guel-Contreras on the night of the arrest, which he admitted was a mistake. Guel-Contreras testified that he did not receive Miranda rights or sign a waiver before making the incriminating statements. 12 After the suppression hearing, the district court found that Agent Vail's testimony was credible and defendant's was not. Guel-Contreras challenges this finding but does not point to any reason why the district court's credibility finding amounts to clear error. He merely argues that his own self-serving testimony was more credible than Agent Vail's. [C]redibility is a determination for the trier-of-fact, and its assessment is virtually unassailable on appeal. United States v. Rodriguez, 414 F.3d 837, 845 (8th Cir.2005). Without judging the credibility of the witnesses who testified at the suppression hearing, a task best left to the district court, we believe that the district court's findings are supported by the record and thus are not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the denial of Guel-Contreras's motion to suppress. 13 We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 892 (8th Cir. 2006). We will overturn a jury verdict based upon insufficiency of the evidence only if it is clear that no reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In evaluating the evidence's sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the Government and accepting all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that support the jury's verdict. Id. Under this stringent standard, a verdict will only be overturned in rare cases. Id. 14 Guel-Contreras contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. To convict a defendant on a conspiracy charge, the jury is required to find that: (1) an agreement existed among two or more people to accomplish an illegal purpose; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly joined and participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Hayes, 391 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir.2004). The defendant need not have expressly agreed to join the conspiracy, but rather tacit agreement is sufficient. Id. At trial, beyond establishing that Guel-Contreras was present at the scene of a drug deal, testimony also established that he associated and lived with his uncle, a drug dealer, and was an admitted cocaine user. Most importantly, the Government presented evidence that Ramirez-Gomez told law enforcement officers that his nephew was paid with cocaine to serve as a lookout during the drug deal. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Guel-Contreras conspired to distribute cocaine. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Guel-Contreras's motion for judgment of acquittal. 15 We also affirm the district court's denial of Guel-Contreras's motion for a new trial. We review a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Rice, 449 F.3d at 893. Motions for new trials are generally disfavored and will be granted only where a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Id. In his brief, Guel-Contreras does not allege how a miscarriage of justice occurred. Because he combines his arguments for judgment of acquittal and new trial, we assume Guel-Contreras claims that a new trial is warranted because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We have addressed those arguments above, and likewise find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Guel-Contreras's motion for a new trial.