Opinion ID: 2431363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Mechanic's Lien

Text: As stated in Texas Property Code section 53.022(c), a mechanic's lien extends to the entire lot on which work is being performed. Although not defined in the statute, a lot usually refers to a parcel of land as marked on a plat or survey. See Black's Law Dictionary 946 (6th ed. 1990). Diamond Shamrock argues, however, that the term lot has a unique meaning in the context of a mechanic's lien. Diamond Shamrock asserts that the legislature did not envision that a city tract of the size here (7.9 acres) would come under the term lot; instead, a lot refers merely to the improvement and the land immediately surrounding the improvement. We disagree. This court has long acknowledged that the duty of courts [is] to construe a law as written ... and not look for extraneous reasons to be used as a basis for reading into a law an intention not expressed nor intended to be expressed therein. See Government Personnel Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wear, 251 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex.1952). Here, insofar as the legislature has not specified a maximum size for a city lot, nor given any impermissible ratio for the size of an improvement to the size of the encumbered lot, we believe the plain language of the statute indicates that an entire undivided tract is a single lot. Diamond Shamrock also argues that the 0.8-acre tract was a distinct lot as early as November 1985, when Opus entered into a loan agreement with Southwest Savings Association to help finance the construction project. In the agreement, the 0.8-acre tract was designated as a release tract, meaning that the tract could be sold separately without any penalty under the agreement. Diamond Shamrock thus contends that Opus intended that the tract be separate, and indeed treated the 7.1-acre tract and 0.8-acre tract distinctly. On the issue of intent, Diamond Shamrock's undisclosed intentions are irrelevantwhat counts are public manifestations by which potential creditors will be put on notice. See Popplewell v. City of Mission, 342 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that all matters affecting land titles must be disclosed in public records). Moreover, even on the issue of how Opus actually treated the 0.8-acre tract, Diamond Shamrock's contention fails. The financing agreement, which evidently was not included in the deed records, does not serve the same legal purposes of a duly recorded replatting, as was actually done in June of 1986. Valdez had no reason to believe anything other than that Opus owned the 7.9acre tract as an undivided lot. The most reasonable and pragmatic interpretation of the term lot, for purposes of section 53.022, is that it refers to a single tract of land as recorded in the county deed records. Accordingly, a properly perfected lien by Valdez would extend to the lot that existed when construction began [3] the entire undivided 7.9 acres.