Opinion ID: 2274910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: (The Death Sentence In This Case)

Text: Having exercised our constitutionally mandated proportionality review function, we conclude that the death sentence imposed upon Tichnell was neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases in Maryland, considering both the crime and the defendant. The wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder of a police officer while in the performance of his duties has long been viewed as an especially grievous crime. In Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636, 97 S.Ct. 1993, 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977), the Supreme Court said: To be sure, the fact that a murder victim was a police officer performing his regular duties may be regarded as an aggravating circumstance [in death penalty statutes]. [19] Such a killing constitutes an assault on society itself for, as stated in Roberts, at 636, There is a special interest in affording protection to these public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons and property. [20] That Tichnell had not previously been convicted of a crime of violence was a mitigating circumstance in his favor; indeed, it was the single mitigating factor found by the sentencing jury which concluded that it did not outweigh the two aggravating factors present in the case. Manifestly, the sentencing authority rejected Tichnell's self-defense version of the killing  a version given little more than lukewarm support by the testimony of Recek. The evidence showed that Tichnell was a mature man, that he was armed when he came to the crime scene, and fully expected that the deputy would respond promptly to the silent alarm. From its findings, it is readily apparent that the sentencing jury believed that the killing of Deputy Livengood was intentional and in furtherance of Tichnell's purpose to avoid apprehension. That several of the fatal shots were fired into the deputy's back may have suggested to the jury that Tichnell ambushed the officer from behind while he was in the process of apprehending Recek. Since the enactment of Maryland's death penalty statute in 1978, to the present time, forty-eight capital sentencing proceedings have been conducted in seventeen of the State's twenty-four circuit courts, involving forty-one different defendants. [21] See Appendix A. While some of the cases involved multiple aggravating circumstances, the primary aggravating factor in a number of cases was that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery. Other cases involved murders committed in the course of a rape or sexual offense in the first degree; one case involved murder committed in the performance of an arson. Two cases involved contract murders. The aggravating circumstance in still other cases was that the defendant committed more than one first degree murder arising out of the same incident. Four cases charged, as aggravating circumstances, that a police officer was murdered while in the performance of his duties and in furtherance of an escape, or attempt to escape from or evade the officer's lawful apprehension. In other cases, the aggravating circumstance was that the victim was a hostage taken in the course of a kidnapping. Of the sentencing proceedings in these cases, twenty-eight resulted in the imposition of a life sentence, either by determination of the sentencing authority, by a deadlocked jury, or because of the inability of the jury to agree on a verdict within a reasonable time. See § 413 (k). Twenty capital sentencing proceedings, involving fifteen different defendants, resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Of these, the Court has vacated the death penalty in nine proceedings because of error committed either at the trial stage of the proceedings or because of errors committed in the capital sentencing hearing; these cases were remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Of the remaining eleven cases, one was terminated by the suicide of the defendant. In another case, the trial judge vacated the death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing. In addition to Tichnell III, eight cases are now pending before us on appeal. In the process of our proportionality review in this case, we reviewed the Rule 772A trial judge's report in each of the capital sentencing proceedings and have selected five which we deem to be similar within the contemplation of § 414 (e) (4). Oscar Recek: Recek was charged with capital murder. The State relied upon the same two aggravating circumstances that were present in Tichnell's case. At his trial, Recek testified essentially as he did at Tichnell's third sentencing hearing. He also introduced Tichnell's trial testimony as well as Tichnell's confessions, all of which indicated that it was Tichnell, and not Recek, who shot and killed the deputy. [22] The jury found Recek guilty of felony murder. At the sentencing hearing the jury found one aggravating circumstance to exist  that the murder was of a police officer in the performance of his duties. § 413 (d) (1). It did not find that, as to Recek, the murder was committed in furtherance of an escape or attempt to escape or evade lawful custody or arrest by a police officer. § 413 (d) (3). The jury found one mitigating circumstance  that Recek's act was not the sole proximate cause of the deputy's death. § 413 (g) (6). The jury imposed a life sentence. Harlow Sails: The defendant, age 21 at the time of the offense, was convicted of premeditated capital murder of an off duty police officer in the course of an armed robbery. The State relied upon three aggravating circumstances: that the murder was of a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties; that it was committed in furtherance of an escape or attempt to escape from or evade the lawful apprehension of a police officer; and that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery. § 413 (d) (1), (3), and (10). The evidence indicated that the officer, who was not in uniform, attempted to apprehend Sails and several confederates in the course of an armed robbery, during which Sails shot the officer to death in an exchange of gunfire. The evidence indicated that Sails did not know that the victim was a police officer. The sentencing jury found that all three aggravating circumstances relied upon by the State had been established. By way of mitigating circumstances, it found that Sails had no previous record of committing a crime of violence; that the murder was committed while Sails' capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental disorder, emotional disturbance or intoxication; that it was unlikely that Sails would engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and that other specified mitigating circumstances existed. § 413 (g) (1), (4), (7), and (8). [23] The jury imposed a life sentence. James Calhoun: The defendant, age 28 at the time of the crime, was convicted of the premeditated first degree murder of a Montgomery County police officer who had responded to a security alarm at a mercantile establishment. The officer, in company with the assistant manager of the store, and a representative of the burglar alarm system, entered a room inside the store where Calhoun, and an accomplice, had concealed themselves. Calhoun pressed a gun against the officer's head and shot him to death. Calhoun's accomplice, Curtis Monroe, shot and killed the alarm system representative and wounded the assistant manager. Calhoun and Monroe fled after taking money from the store. The jury determined that the three aggravating circumstances charged by the State had been proved (the same aggravating circumstances as were relied upon in the Sails case). The jury found one mitigating circumstance under § 413 (g) (8), i.e., that Calhoun's background was such that he was never integrated into society and was unable to conform with its norms and moral values. The jury imposed a death sentence. Curtis Monroe: The defendant, age 24 at the time of the offense, was convicted of the premeditated murder of the burglar alarm technician. The court, as the sentencing authority, found that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery. § 413 (d) (10). As mitigating circumstances, the court found it unlikely that the defendant would engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society. § 413 (g) (7). The court also found as mitigating factors under § 413 (g) (8) that the defendant was employed, had a wife and two children, was attempting to further his education, and that his crime was not greater than that committed by other individuals who did not receive the death sentence. The court sentenced Monroe to life imprisonment. Jackie Hughes: The defendant, almost 30 years old at the time of the crime, was convicted of the premeditated murder of a restaurant employee. The employee, who was armed, was walking to a bank to make a cash deposit when Hughes approached him from behind, spun him around and shot him. Thereafter, Hughes took the victim's money. In the course of their encounter, the employee fired several shots at Hughes but Hughes escaped. The victim subsequently died. The sentencing jury determined that the aggravating factor relied upon by the State (murder in the course of a robbery) was proved; it found, by way of mitigating circumstances, that Hughes had not previously been convicted of a crime of violence and that other unspecified mitigating factors existed under § 413 (g) (8). The jury imposed a life sentence. We recognize that dissimilarities exist between Tichnell's case and those selected for comparative review. That these cases, as well as others in the inventory, are not more similar to Tichnell's case obviously does not mean that we cannot complete the comparative review process mandated by § 414 (e) (4); to so conclude would ascribe to the legislature an intention not to enact an effective or operative death penalty statute. Of the cases reviewed only Calhoun's crime resulted in a death sentence. The aggravating circumstances present in that case closely parallel those present in Tichnell's case; the single mitigating circumstance in Tichnell's case would appear to be marginally weightier than that found to exist in Calhoun's case. Monroe was not a principal in the first degree killing of the police officer; his life sentence was based on the virtually simultaneous murder of the technician in the course of the robbery. While the life of a police officer is no more precious than that of the alarm technician, Monroe's mitigating circumstances were different than those present in Tichnell's case and, arguably, more substantial. Only one aggravating circumstance was found to exist in Recek's case, and the mitigating circumstance was different than in Tichnell's case; moreover, the sentencing jury's verdict sheet makes clear that it did not believe that Recek was a first degree principal in the deputy's death. Hughes, the least similar of the cases reviewed, involved a sudden episode of premeditated murder of an unsuspecting victim by an individual without a prior record of a crime of violence, as in Tichnell's case. The mitigating circumstances found to exist in Sails' case were far weightier than those in any of the other cases, including Tichnell's. Moreover, although Sails' murder of the officer was premeditated, he did not know that the victim was a police officer. Our comparative review of these similar cases is, of course, designed to avoid caprice in the decision to inflict capital punishment. However, as pointed out in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203, the isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy does not render unconstitutional death sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced under a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice. Maryland's death penalty statute encompasses a well-defined subclass of first degree murders and, with one exception (contract murder), the death sentence may only be imposed on first degree principals. We think the Maryland statute meets the Gregg test in that its provisions do not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice in the capital sentencing process. The death sentence in Tichnell's case being neither excessive nor disproportionate under § 414 (e) (4), it must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, with costs. DEATH PENALTY CASES - APPENDIX A DATE OF TRIAL DATE OF DEFENDANT OFFENSE JURISDICTION SENTENCE William Joseph Parker 8/28/78 St. Mary's Co. 5/15/79 James Thomas Porter 11/1/78 Anne Arundel Co. 10/5/79 Dwayne T. Mayers 1/9/79 Anne Arundel Co. 10/22/80 Lawrence Johnson 1/9/79 Harford Co. 10/5/82 Roberto Oscar Recek 1/18/79 Washington Co. 1/28/80 Richard Danny Tichnell (I) 1/18/79 Wicomico Co. 8/24/79 Richard Danny Tichnell (II) 1/18/79 Wicomico Co. 8/20/80 Richard Danny Tichnell (III) 1/18/79 Calvert Co. 1/21/82 Glen Sturgis 1/25 & 26/79 Wicomico Co. 6/7/79 Theodore Scott Weiner 3/28/79 Baltimore Co. 3/17/80 Daniel Lee Chadderton 8/29/79 Garrett Co. 5/11/82 Robert Lee Myers 8/29/79 Carroll Co. 12/9/82 Bryan Keith Quickly 9/27/79 Hartford Co. 11/6/80 Timothy Clyde Poole (I) 10/22/79 Calvert Co. 6/5/80 Timothy Clyde Poole (II) 10/22/79 Charles Co. 2/26/82 Timothy Clyde Poole (III) 10/22/79 Charles Co. 5/6/83 Lawrence Johnson 2/23/80 Calvert Co. 1/30/81 Lawrence Johnson 2/23/80 Charles Co. 9/1/82 Elvis Horton 3/2/80 Baltimore City 1/3/81 Annette Louise Stebbing 4/9/80 Harford Co. 4/28/81 Eugene Sherman Colvin 9/9/80 Anne Arundel Co. 8/20/81 SENTENCING SENTENCE DEFENDANT AUTHORITY IMPOSED William Joseph Parker Jury Life James Thomas Porter Jury Life (Jury deadlocked) Dwayne T. Mayers Jury Life Lawrence Johnson Jury Death (new sentencing hearing granted by trial judge) Roberto Oscar Recek Jury Life Richard Danny Tichnell (I) Judge Death Richard Danny Tichnell (II) Jury Death Richard Danny Tichnell (III) Jury Death Glen Sturgis Jury Life (Jury deadlocked) Theodore Scott Weiner Judge Life Daniel Lee Chadderton Jury Life Robert Lee Myers Judge Life Bryan Keith Quickly Judge Life Timothy Clyde Poole (I) Jury Death Timothy Clyde Poole (II) Jury Death Timothy Clyde Poole (III) Jury Life (Jury deadlocked) Lawrence Johnson Jury Death Lawrence Johnson Judge Life Elvis Horton Jury Life (Jury deadlocked) Annette Louise Stebbing Judge Death Eugene Sherman Colvin Jury Death DEATH PENALTY CASES - APPENDIX A (Page 2) DATE OF TRIAL DATE OF DEFENDANT OFFENSE JURISDICTION SENTENCE Dean Hugh Oliver 11/22/80 Howard Co. 6/23/81 Martin Francis Scott 11/25/80 Baltimore City 11/6/81 Nathan Ray Thomas 1/10/81 Baltimore Co. 8/17/81 Doris Ann Foster 1/29/81 Cecil Co. 2/8/82 Gary Allen Miller 2/25/81 Allegany Co. 11/16/81 Jackie Hughes 3/2/81 Montgomery Co. 3/1/82 Willie Louis Green 3/20/81 Baltimore City 1/14/82 Ronald LeRoy Johnson 3/24/81 Baltimore Co. 4/8/81 James Arthur Calhoun 3/27/81 Montgomery Co. 11/6/81 Curtis Wayne Monroe 3/27/81 Montgomery Co. 9/20/82 Vincent Tito Greco, Jr. 4/17/81 Baltimore Co. 5/14/82 John Norman Huffington 5/25/81 Caroline Co. 12/2/81 James Russell Trimble 7/3/81 Baltimore Co. 3/19/82 Marselle Jerome Bowers 7/8 (or 9)/81 Charles Co. 10/22/82 Jackie K. Harris 8/9/81 Baltimore Co. 4/5/82 Jackie K. Harris 8/9/81 Baltimore Co. 7/22/83 Derrick Quinton White 8/14/81 Baltimore Co. 2/26/82 Donald Thomas 10/2/81 Baltimore Co. 12/13/82 Clinton W. Ellison 10/25/81 Baltimore City 1/19/83 Michael Spencer Allen 12/21/81 Anne Arundel Co. 2/3/83 SENTENCING SENTENCE DEFENDANT AUTHORITY IMPOSED Dean Hugh Oliver Jury Life Martin Francis Scott Jury Death Nathan Ray Thomas Jury Death Doris Ann Foster Judge Death Gary Allen Miller Judge Life Jackie Hughes Jury Life Willie Louis Green Judge Life Ronald LeRoy Johnson Judge Life James Arthur Calhoun Jury Death Curtis Wayne Monroe Judge Life Vincent Tito Greco, Jr. Judge Life John Norman Huffington Jury Death James Russell Trimble Judge Death Marselle Jerome Bowers Jury Death Jackie K. Harris Judge Death Jackie K. Harris Jury Death Derrick Quinton White Jury Death Donald Thomas Judge Death Clinton W. Ellison Jury Life Michael Spencer Allen Judge Life DEATH PENALTY CASES-APPENDIX A (page 3) DATE OF TRIAL DATE OF DEFENDANT OFFENSE JURISDICTION SENTENCE James Alexander Fields, Jr. 12/31/81 Pr. George's Co. 10/8/82 Harlow Brian Sails 2/8/82 Pr. George's Co. 3/31/83 John Kevin Johnson 2/20/82 Pr. George's Co. 11/19/82 James S. Waltermeyer 3/29/82 Baltimore Co. 3/4/83 Jack R. Jones 4/3/82 Baltimore Co. 10/14/82 Robert Lewis Brantner 9/9/82 Garrett Co. 5/3/83 Harold (NMN) Hines 6/21/79 Prince George's Co. 7/12/83 SENTENCING SENTENCE DEFENDANT AUTHORITY IMPOSED James Alexander Fields, Jr. Jury Life (Jury deadlocked) Harlow Brian Sails Jury Life John Kevin Johnson Jury Life (Jury deadlocked) James S. Waltermeyer Jury Life Jack R. Jones Jury Life Robert Lewis Brantner Jury Life Harold (NMN) Hines Jury Life Eldridge, J., concurring: I concur with the result in this case and with most of the Court's opinion. Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 414, relating to appeals in death sentence cases, provides in subsection (e) that, after reviewing the trial and sentencing hearing for errors, this Court shall consider the imposition of the death sentence and shall determine the following: (1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or court's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance under § 413 (d); (3) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or court's finding that the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances; and (4) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. The present appeal is the first to be decided, under this State's recently enacted death penalty statute, in which the Court has found no reversible error in the trial or sentencing hearing. Consequently, the Court's opinion is the first one under the statute which has reached a consideration of the death penalty. In this case, I., agree with those portions of the Court's opinion rejecting Tichnell's claims of error in his third sentencing hearing and rejecting his constitutional attack upon the sentence. I also agree with those parts of the Court's opinion holding that the sentence should not be set aside under the above-quoted paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of § 414 (e). Although concurring in the result of the Court's proportionality review under paragraph (4), I disagree with that portion of Part V (B) of Chief Judge Murphy's opinion which concludes that the legislatively intended inventory of cases from which `similar cases' are to be culled encompasses only those first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty.... The General Assembly, by mandating in § 414 (e) (4) that we determine whether the death sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and defendant, has specifically focused upon the two factors to be considered. They are the crime and the defendant. Nothing in the language of the statute supports the view that our consideration should be further limited to those cases in which the prosecutor has exercised his discretion to seek the death penalty. The crime and defendant in another case may be similar to the crime and defendant in the case under review even though the prosecuting attorney in the former case decided, for whatever reason, not to seek the death penalty. [1] Consideration of cases in which the State did not seek the death penalty permits our proportionality review to serve as a check against the aberrant actions of a prosecutor. For example, if in a particular type of murder case the State's Attorneys throughout Maryland generally do not seek the death penalty, but if the State's Attorney in one county regularly does seek and obtain the death penalty in the same type of case, the result would be an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. In appeals from that one county, we would be confronted with the imposition of the death penalty in a type of case in which the penalty is not generally imposed. Unless we were willing to consider similar cases from the other counties in which the death penalty was not sought, this aberration would not be cured by our proportionality review. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), plurality opinion of Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens, pointed out that the decision to impose capital punishment must be guided by standards (428 U.S. at 199), and that appellate proportionality review serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty (id. at 206). The concurring opinion of Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, in dealing with the petitioner's argument based upon the alleged standardless prosecutorial discretion in deciding to seek the death penalty, stated (id. at 225): Petitioner's argument that prosecutors behave in a standardless fashion in deciding which cases to try as capital felonies is unsupported by any facts. Petitioner simply asserts that since prosecutors have the power not to charge capital felonies they will exercise that power in a standardless fashion. This is untenable. Absent facts to the contrary it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decision by factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts.    If the cases really were `similar' in relevant respects it is unlikely that prosecutors would fail to prosecute them as capital cases; and I am unwilling to assume the contrary. In Maryland, however, we now have facts demonstrating that prosecutors throughout the State do not employ common standards in deciding to seek the death penalty. Unlike Justice White in Gregg, we cannot assume that prosecutors generally seek the death penalty in cases which are similar. In Calhoun v. State, No. 129, September Term, 1981, and No. 5, September Term, 1982, which was consolidated with the instant case for reargument on the matter of proportionality review, and which has not yet been decided, the Public Defender's Office made a record which convincingly demonstrated that there are no common standards guiding the prosecutors in this State. [2] Anyone who reads Baltimore city newspapers or pays attention to Baltimore city news broadcasts is fully aware of the completely divergent policies concerning capital cases adhered to by different State's Attorneys Offices in the Baltimore metropolitan area. In light of the known facts concerning the policies of Maryland State's Attorneys, proportionality review limited to those cases in which the death penalty is sought presents serious constitutional questions under the principles of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), and its progeny. It is a settled principle in this State that a construction of an enactment, which does not cast doubt upon the statute's constitutionality, is preferred. E.g., Davis v. State, 294 Md. 370, 377, 451 A.2d 107 (1982); State v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 544-545, 341 A.2d 789 (1975), cert. denied sub nom. Gasperich v. Church, 423 U.S. 1076, 96 S.Ct. 862, 47 L.Ed.2d 87 (1976); City of Gaithersburg v. Montgomery County, 271 Md. 505, 510, 318 A.2d 509 (1974); Md. St. Bd. of Barber Ex. v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 505, 312 A.2d 216 (1973); District Land v. Wash. S.S.C., 266 Md. 301, 312, 292 A.2d 695 (1972); Baltimore County v. Mo. Realty, 219 Md. 155, 159, 148 A.2d 424 (1959). Therefore, I cannot agree with the Court's construction of § 414 (e) (4), limiting the phrase similar cases to encompass only those in which prosecuting attorneys sought the death penalty. I believe that the Legislature contemplated something more flexible, focusing upon murder cases in which the crime itself was similar and the circumstances surrounding the defendant were similar. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion in this case, after setting forth its construction of § 414 (e) (4), goes on to state as follows: In so concluding, we do not preclude any defendant whose death sentence is under appellate review from presenting argument, with relevant facts, that designated noncapital murder cases are similar to the case then under scrutiny and should be taken into account in the exercise of our proportionality review function. As I understand the above-quoted language, the Court is willing to consider murder cases in which the State did not seek the death penalty, and which are brought to the Court's attention by the defendant. Thus, my disagreement with the Court's construction of § 414 (e) (4) becomes academic and of little or no practical consequence. If it is asserted that the imposition of the death sentence in a particular case is an aberration, because prosecutors in Maryland generally do not seek the death penalty in that type of case, under the Court's opinion the defendant is entitled to rely upon the similar cases in which prosecutors did not ask for the death penalty. If, after considering those cases along with the ones in which we receive trial judge reports, we agree with the defendant's argument that the death sentence is not generally imposed in the type of case before us, the sentence will be set aside. Furthermore, I agree with the procedure requiring the defendant to bring to our attention other murder cases in which the death penalty was not sought and which the defendant wishes us to consider. Contrary to the view expressed in the dissent, I do not believe that this procedure is too burdensome for the defendant or that it is the Court's responsibility to assure that all death-eligible cases in which the death penalty has not been sought be included in the inventory. I know of no workable and valid procedure by which the Court itself could maintain an inventory of all murder cases which may have been death-eligible and could select from such inventory the sufficiently similar cases for consideration in our proportionality review. The defendant's attorney, with the resources of the State Office of Public Defender, [3] is in a much better position to determine which non-capital murder cases should be called to the Court's attention for purposes of proportionality review. [4] Finally, I agree with Part VI of the Court's opinion concerning the death sentence in this case. Cole, J., concurring: I concur with the judgment of the Court in this case. I feel compelled to write separately, however, in order to emphasize what I view as an important aspect of the Court's holding as to proportionality review. Under legislative mandate, the Court must determine whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Md. Code Art. 27, § 414 (e) (4). The Court is obliged, therefore, to compare each death case with other cases to ensure that there is a rational basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980). The Court today concludes that the pool of cases from which similar cases are to be culled includes all cases in which the death penalty was sought, whether or not it was actually imposed. Simultaneously, the Court holds that: In so concluding, we do not preclude any defendant whose death sentence is under appellate review from presenting argument, with relevant facts, that designated non-capital murder cases are similar to the cases then under scrutiny, and should be taken into account in the exercise of our proportionality review function. I take this to mean that the Court, in fact, is not limiting its proportionality review to cases in which the death penalty is sought but places the onus on the defendant to expand the pool of similar cases to include cases in which the death penalty was not sought. In my view, allowing the Court to review a pool of cases which includes cases where the prosecutor chose not to seek the death penalty, because of plea agreements or because of other tactical reasons, is essential to meaningful proportionality review and fundamental to the constitutional application of the statute. Whether the responsibility for marshalling this data imposes a constitutionally impermissible burden on the defendant is a question for another day. For the present, I am willing to assume that the various prosecutors will maintain such a data bank which they will readily make available to defense counsel, public or private. The purpose of § 414 (e) (4) is to allow the Court to evaluate meaningfully the proportionality of a death sentence. This purpose is not served if § 414 (e) (4) is interpreted to restrict the availability of all information relevant to that inquiry, specifically the cases in which the death penalty is not sought. Only with a full range of information about the individual defendants potentially but not ultimately exposed to the death penalty can this Court make a sound proportionality decision and thereby be assured that it has given no quarter to disproportionality based solely on factors such as race, sex, or wealth. The death penalty's disproportionate impact on racial minorities and the poor has been documented. [1] In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), two members of the Supreme Court concluded that the state statutes at issue were unconstitutional in part because race appeared to be the only basis for selecting which offenders would be sentenced to die. See id. at 249-52 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). Discrimination in any administrative setting, including discrimination in the prosecutorial decision to seek the death penalty, is difficult to prove. Adequate information is essential; by allowing a defendant to gather and to present to this Court information about cases in which the death penalty was not sought, an informed decision as to proportionality can be made. Although I assume that the State's Attorneys in the several jurisdictions of this State approach their duties conscientiously and fairly, this assumption is no substitute for this Court being able to assure itself independently that they adhere to nondiscriminatory standards in distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty is sought from the many cases in which it is not sought. As Judge Davidson's dissenting opinion ably demonstrates, there is a wide variation among the several counties and Baltimore City in their respective administration of the death penalty due to the prosecutor's unlimited discretion. Without an evaluation of the cases in which the capital sanction is not sought, it will be virtually impossible for this Court to detect any untoward discrimination in prosecutorial discretion. I would prefer that the Court, by Rule, require each State's Attorney to maintain a file of those cases where the death penalty could have been sought, indicating the aggravating and mitigating factors present therein. This information could then be available to a defendant in a particular case. Although the Court today does not require such a procedure, it does allow a defendant to demonstrate that his sentence is disproportionate by presenting similar cases where the death penalty was not sought. How constitutionally meaningful this concession is will be left to counsel to demonstrate. Davidson, J., dissenting: The majority here determines that under Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 414 (e) (4) the legislatively intended inventory of cases from which `similar cases' are to be culled encompasses only those first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty under § 413, whether it was imposed or not. Moreover, the majority here concludes that the death sentence imposed upon Tichnell was neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases in Maryland, considering both the crime and the defendant. Consequently, the majority affirms the death sentence imposed. I do not agree. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.