Opinion ID: 931073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: In 2002 and 2003, Musser had unprotected sexual intercourse with four women. At that time, Musser knew himself to be HIV-positive and was receiving treatment for the condition, but either withheld or misrepresented his HIV status to the women.2 Musser was subsequently convicted in four separate trials of violating Iowa Code § 709C.1 (the statute), which provides as follows: A person commits criminal transmission of [HIV] if the person, knowing that the person's [HIV] status is positive . . . [e]ngages in intimate contact with another person. Iowa Code § 709C.1(1)(a). The statute defines intimate contact as the intentional exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could result in the transmission of [HIV]. Id. § 709C.1(2)(b). It is not an element of the offense that a victim actually become infected with HIV. Id. § 709C.1(4). In separate direct appeals, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed each of Musser's convictions and fifty-year aggregate prison sentence. See State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 741 & n.3 (Iowa 2006). Musser subsequently petitioned the district court for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Musser did not dispute the facts underlying his convictions, but claimed that the convictions and representation by his 1 The Honorable James E. Gritzner, Chief United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. 2 Musser sometimes used a condom, but in at least one instance his condom failed. Three of the four women were confirmed as having not been infected with HIV, and the record does not indicate the HIV status of Musser's fourth victim. -2- counsel were unconstitutional for various reasons. The district court denied Musser's petition on all grounds, Musser v. Mapes, 854 F. Supp. 2d 652 (S.D. Iowa 2012), and this Court granted a certificate of appealability limited to the issue of whether [the statute] violated the due process clause because it is vague and overbroad. On appeal, Musser renews his arguments regarding the statute's alleged unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth. Specifically, Musser claims that the statute does not provide fair notice of what acts are prohibited because the phrases intimate contact and in a manner that could result in the transmission of [HIV] are vague and sweep too broadly. See Iowa Code § 709C.1(1)(a), (2)(b). Musser argues that the statute unconstitutionally prohibits certain activities—e.g., accidentally bleeding on another individual after an automobile accident or during a sporting competition, kissing, and breast-feeding—where there is reasonable scientific debate as to whether the mode of transmission actually spreads [HIV] because all the state needs to do is find an expert to say that such contact 'could' transmit [HIV]. (Emphases added.)