Opinion ID: 289589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: free transcripts for indigent civil litigants

Text: 21 Since we hold that the appeal should not have been dismissed for the late filing, the DCCA's ruling that it was without power to authorize a free transcript must be faced. We first consider the practical importance of a transcript to an appellant; next we consider whether there might be equal protection objections to denying transcripts to those who cannot afford them. Finally, we examine the applicable statutes to see whether there presently exists authority for allowing a court to order a free transcript for an indigent civil litigant on appeal.
22 There can never be effective appellate review if the reviewing court is not able to obtain a clear picture of the precise nature of the alleged errors in the court below. At the same time in an adversary system — and especially in civil cases — we must rely on counsel to weed out extraneous matter and present only the relevant portions of the proceedings below on appeal. The detail in which the proceedings below must be recounted varies, of course, with the nature of the case and the claims on appeal. The rules of the DCCA, as do the rules of all appellate courts, allow some flexibility in this regard. According to Rule 26, an agreed statement on appeal can be utilized whenever the questions presented by an appeal can be determined without an examination of all the pleadings, evidence and proceedings in the trial court. 14 In the usual case a statement of proceedings and evidence must be presented on appeal. This document must include such portion of the proceedings and evidence as is necessary fully and clearly to present the rulings of the trial court in which error is claimed. 15 The rule explicitly requires the appellant to include the complete charge of the judge to the jury whenever any part of that charge is challenged. 23 The DCCA has repeatedly emphasized in its decisions as well as in its rules that in some instances at least a detailed record of the proceedings below is essential if the reviewing court is to be able to perform its assigned tasks. The appellant bears the burden of providing a record which will amply illustrate all of the alleged errors which he wishes to press upon the reviewing court. The DCCA's predecessor, in Brown v. Plant, dismissed an indigent's appeal, holding that adequate review of the case was impossible without a transcript. The court said: 16 24    We have repeatedly held that in order for this court to pass upon the alleged errors of law, a proper record must be presented and this responsbility cannot be shifted to either the trial court or this court. 25 It is clear, of course, that in some cases almost no record of the proceedings below will be required. If, for example, the only issue on appeal is the proper construction of a statute in light of the facts as stipulated by the parties and found by the trial court, we would not need to have a complete statement of all the lower court proceedings. But procedures adequate for one case will be found lacking under other circumstances. Often the result on appeal will depend on a precise analysis of the testimony presented at trial. 17 This is especially so when we are asked to judge the sufficiency of the evidence. 26 There are, then, two alternatives. The appellate court can be presented with either a transcript or a statement of evidence based on the notes of counsel and the court. Such notes, however, are not inherently reliable, no matter how complete they may appear. 18 In addition, reconstructions of the events from such notes cannot convey subtle nuances of meaning which may be very important in the analysis of the available testimony. We have already recognized in a criminal appeal that this substitute for a transcript will in many cases prove to be inadequate. 19 We conclude, therefore, that in some civil cases as well a verbatim transcript of the portions of the trial alleged to contain error will be required if the appellant is to receive a full measure of justice. In some cases there simply can be no effective substitute for the transcript of all or part of the actual proceedings in the trial court. 27 Unfortunately, many litigants, in civil as well as criminal cases, who attempt to attack the proceedings below in some detail are unable to afford the transcript which is necessary for their appeal. Therefore, we cannot escape the conclusion that those who are able to purchase transcripts on appeal will, in some cases, receive a more meaningful review of the actions of the court below than will those who cannot afford it. The question arises whether this discrimination based on the civil litigant's ability to pay affronts the concept of equal protection in the constitutional sense. While we do not have occasion to decide that issue in the context of this litigation, we feel it important to illuminate the obvious constitutional difficulties in order to lay a groundwork for the proper construction of the federal and municipal statutes involved in this case.
28 Over the past two decades one of the most important trends in both judicial and legislative decisions has been the enormous thrust to equalize the treatment of rich and poor in the courts. Spurred on by Supreme Court decisions dealing with the right to counsel, federal and privately sponsored legal service organizations have sprung up in increasing numbers, both to implement the Court's mandate in criminal cases and to extend effectively the protection of the legal system for the first time to large numbers of poor civil litigants. 20 29 The constitutional mandate that all citizens be accorded the equal protection of the laws 21 has formed the basis of many of these Supreme Court opinions. The seminal case, of course, is Griffin v. Illinois. 22 There the Court stated the broad egalitarian principle encompassed by the equal protection clause: There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. 23 30 In Griffin the Court vacated the denial by the Illinois Supreme Court of a petition for post-conviction relief because the state had not provided the indigent defendants with a free copy of the trial transcript, which was deemed necessary for an effective appeal. Although the state could be said to have treated all parties equally in one respect — it had a single scale of fees which it charged to all who ordered transcripts 24 — the Court noted that only the rich could afford transcripts on appeal. The Court held that the practical unavailability of transcripts to the poor on appeal which resulted from this uniform fee scale amounted to a denial of equal protection to the indigent. As a result the Court required the state to act affirmatively to equalize the burdens of the adversary process by furnishing transcripts to those who could not afford to pay for them. 25 31 This same constitutional requirement that the state act affirmatively to equalize the conditions of the adversary process for the poor also stands behind the landmark decision requiring the courts to provide counsel for indigent defendants at trial. In Gideon v. Wainwright the Court recognize[d] that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. 26 32 Emerging case law makes it clear that provision of unaided counsel at trial cannot, of itself, erase the inequalities stemming from the defendant's poverty. 27 Additional funds are necessary to make the defendant's representation more nearly equal to that of the government. The state must, therefore, provide funds to pay for defense counsel's trips to investigate the case and interview key witnesses. 28 Expert witnesses may have to be provided to testify on behalf of the defendant at trial on crucial issues. 29 33 This concept of equal protection is equally viable in appellate courts. Griffin itself involved procedures on appeal. Douglas v. California 30 relied heavily on the language and principles of Griffin in holding that the states must provide counsel for indigent defendants on appeal. A few years later the Court held that appointed counsel must act just as if he were a paid advocate in order to assure penniless defendants the same rights and opportunities on appeal — as nearly as is practicable — as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel. 31 34 Other roadblocks to appellate review for the poor have also been held unconstitutional. Court rules which condition the bringing of a direct appeal 32 from or a collateral attack 33 on a conviction upon the payment of a filing fee, however small, 34 deny equal protection to the indigent. 35 Expenses which do not totally preclude review, but which block effective access 36 to the courts for the poor may deny equal protection. 37 If a state hears all paid appeals, it may not screen the in forma pauperis cases, furnishing transcripts only after a trial judge's determination that there are issues worth appealing. 38 Nor has the Court limited its transcript requirement to serious offenses. Last term the Court announced that a state could not deny a free transcript to a defendant who wanted to appeal a conviction of violating a municipal ordinance. 39 The Court also struck down a New Jersey statute requiring indigents who appealed criminal convictions, lost, and subsequently went to prison, to repay the cost of state-provided transcripts. As the Court said: [I]t is now fundamental that, once [avenues of appellate review are] established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts. 40 35 The limits of a state's duty affirmatively to equalize a defendant's ability to participate meaningfully in the judicial process are only now being sketched out in the cases. The picture is far from complete, but recent cases dealing with costs in divorce cases 41 and transcripts on appeal from proceedings involving determination of parental rights, 42 coupled with the expansive readings being given to in forma pauperis statutes, 43 all suggest that the trend seems to be toward more, not less, affirmative action. Thus, while most of the cases extending equal protection to the judicial process have involved criminal proceedings, the constitutional mandate that there be no invidious discrimination between indigent and rich litigants is being recognized in civil cases as well. 36 The equal protection clause applies to both civil and criminal cases; the Constitution protects life, liberty and property. It is the importance of the right to the individual, not the technical distinction between civil and criminal, which should be of importance to a court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally required in each case. 44 Often a poor litigant will have more at stake in a civil case than in a criminal case. The struggling employee    may well find a wage attachment or confiscation of his tools as onerous in securing employment as a criminal conviction. Moreover, the citizen who permanently loses his home, a government job, a required license, or unemployment benefits may    receive a more crippling blow that the criminal who serves a jail sentence. 45 37 The Supreme Court has not considered itself bound by formal distinctions. It has not hesitated to apply these notions of equal protection in some proceedings traditionally considered civil; the right to a free transcript extends to coram nobis 46 and habeas corpus 47 proceedings. Although these types of cases might fairly be characterized as criminal, they do show that the civil-criminal distinction is not the touchstone of equal protection. 38 In at least one overtly civil case the Court has applied an analysis similar to that used in Griffin and the filing fee cases in holding that a state may not condition the exercise of an important right on the payment of a fee. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections 48 the Court held that a state could not condition the right to vote on the payment of a uniform and relatively insignificant ($1.50) poll tax. The Court said: 39 We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax.   49 40 The right of all to have free access to the courts is basic to our democratic system. It too cannot be conditioned on the payment of a fee where such a condition precludes the exercise of the right. Just as the poll tax bears no relation to voter qualification, a litigant's ability to pay for a transcript bears no relation to the justice of his position in a suit against him for eviction. 41 Civil cases, of course, are different from criminal cases in that the state is not always the moving party. But this difference does not establish that the underlying principle of Griffin is completely inapplicable to civil cases. None of the equal protection cases discussed above has focused on the state's direct involvement in the criminal proceeding. Instead, the Court focused on the deficiencies of procedures whereby rich litigants received more thorough consideration of their appeals than did poor litigants. Court procedures which of themselves invidiously discriminate between rich and poor impair guarantees of equal justice which the Constitution was designed to protect. As Shelley v. Kraemer 50 teaches, the courts themselves may not be vehicles of discrimination. There the Court barred judicial enforcement of discriminatory private agreements, in spite of the fact that these agreements were legal between the parties. 51 In the instant case the DCCA held that its own rules mean that appellant was unable to obtain the transcript even though this was necessary for determination by the court of the merits of a substantial question raised by appellant, whereas a rich litigant could have obtained such review simply by ordering the transcript. 42 While a government may have some affirmative obligations to aid poor litigants in civil cases, it is unnecessary that we determine the extent to which the Constitution requires it to end all distinctions between rich and poor in the courts, or to provide indigent civil litigants with transcripts on appeal. Moreover, despite the compelling arguments which can be marshalled to show that transcripts are constitutionally required for civil appeals presenting substantial issues, our holding today is not such a ruling. Instead, mindful of our obligation to avoid reaching the constitutional issues whenever possible, 52 we proceed to consider the applicable federal and District of Columbia statutes, impelled — if not compelled — to equalize the opportunities of rich and poor to obtain appellate review. 43
44 The basic statute governing the Court of General Sessions reporters is 11 D.C. Code § 935 (1967). It provides: 45 In addition to their annual salaries, official reporters for the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions may charge and collect from parties, including the United States and the District of Columbia, who request transcripts of the original records of proceedings, only such fees as may be prescribed from time to time by the court. The official reporters shall furnish all supplies at their own expense. The court shall prescribe such rules, practice, and procedure pertaining to fees for transcripts as it deems necessary, conforming as nearly as practicable to the rules, practice, and procedure established for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A fee may not be charged or taxed for a copy of a transcript delivered to a judge at his request or for copies of a transcript delivered to the clerk of the court for the records of the court. Except as to transcripts that are to be paid for by the United States or the District of Columbia, the reporters may require a party requesting a transcript to prepay the estimated fee therefor in advance of delivery of the transcript. 46 (Emphasis added.) 47 Appellant has argued forcefully that the statute would allow the Court of General Sessions to establish a new fee schedule under which court reporters could charge for transcripts only for non-indigent litigants. Appellant further argues that such a schedule should be established in order to avoid possible constitutional difficulties. While we agree that the Court of General Sessions may have statutory authority to establish such a fee schedule, for reasons already stated we hesitate to hold that General Sessions has a constitutional obligation to do so. 48 Reading Section 935 as authorizing the proposed fee schedule also presents problems. In the absence of further congressional enactment, such a fee schedule would put the burden of providing transcripts for indigent civil litigants exclusively on the court reporters. Appellant counters this objection by arguing that court reporters are officers of the court, citing Oswald v. United States, 9 Cir., 96 F.2d 10 (1938), and that a court may ask its officers to perform their official duties without fee, just as attorneys are often asked to represent indigent defendants without charge. Moreover, the reporters do receive salaries from the District, and appellant suggests that these salaries were designed to compensate them for all official duties which do not otherwise result in fees. Providing transcripts for the indigent might be one of those otherwise uncompensated official duties. 49 The difficulty with this argument is that the reporters must bear all of their own expenses. They must provide all their own equipment and supplies and contract for any needed secretarial help. There is no indication in the statute that these expenses are intended to be paid out of the reporters' salaries. Presumably these expenses are to be paid out of the transcript fees they collect. Therefore, we shy away from requiring such a broad revision of the court fees without further knowledge of the costs of transcribing and the likely number of in forma pauperis appeals which would be generated by such a holding. 50 We find appellant's argument based on the interrelation of 11 D.C.Code § 935 and 28 U.S.C. § 753 (1964 and Supp. IV 1965-1968) more persuasive. Section 935 imposes a duty on the court to equate the rules, practice, and procedure relating to fees for transcripts in the Court of General Sessions as nearly as practicable to those in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Section 753 determines the litigant's eligibility for a free transcript in the District Court. It requires the United States to pay transcript costs for civil litigants under certain circumstances: Fees for transcripts furnished in [civil] proceedings to persons permitted to appeal in forma pauperis shall also be paid by the United States if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous (but presents a substantial question). 53 51 We have already considered the interrelationship between these two statutes in some detail in Tate v. United States. 54 In Tate we held that these same statutes require the United States to pay for transcripts for indigents in criminal cases appealed from the Court of General Sessions. The court explained its holding: 55 52    Although [28 U.S.C. § 753(f)] does not apply in and of itself, and in all its terms, to the Court of General Sessions, this fee provision in subsection (f) is made applicable to the Court of General Sessions reporters by virtue of the mandate of D.C. Code § 11-935. It may be that the immediate purpose of § 11-935 when passed in 1947 was to equalize compensation of reporters in the then Municipal Court with that of reporters in the District Court. However, it is plainly no bar to interpretation of a statute as applicable that `the question raised was not considered by the legislature,' at least where the construction flows naturally from the statutory language. These considerations are all the more compelling in a case like that under discussion, where a contrary construction would force us to face constitutional questions of a serious nature   .    53 This construction of D.C.Code § 11-935 comports with the general objective of Congress that the procedures and rights of parties in the Court of General Sessions parallel those in the District Court as closely as practicable. D.C.Code § 13-101 (Supp. V, 1966).    54 (Footnotes omitted.) 55 We find the statutory interpretation of Tate to be applicable here. As in Tate, we find that construing these two statutes to provide a right to a free transcript on appeal from the Court of General Sessions in a congressionally limited class of civil cases comports with the general objective of Congress that the procedures and rights of parties in the Court of General Sessions parallel those in the District Court as closely as practicable. 56 56 Although not necessary for our disposition here, an additional factor compels the result in this case. A landlord seeking to oust a tenant who is delinquent in his rent payments has a choice of remedies. He can either sue in the District Court seeking the traditional remedy of ejectment, or he can do as Habib did here: sue in the Court of General Sessions seeking the summary remedy of possession. 57 If the landlord had sued in the District Court, Lee would have been able to apply for a free transcript. 58 We question whether Congress could constitutionally deprive him of that right because his landlord chose to proceed against him in the Court of General Sessions. Our construction of the applicable statutes precludes any necessity to explore further this possible difference in treatment of litigants.