Opinion ID: 2971931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Unlawful Search

Text: “Constitutional objections ‘that appear for the first time on appeal are conclusively deemed to be waived, with the effect that [the appellate court] is deprived of jurisdiction.’” United States v. Scarborough, 43 F.3d 1021, 1025 (6th Cir. 1994). FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(E) states that such objections must be raised prior to trial or are deemed waived. Rule 12(f) states that a party’s failure to make motions which must be made prior to trial “shall constitute waiver of the objection” that should have been raised in such a motion. United States v. Obiukwu, 17 F.3d 816, 820 (6th Cir. 1994). Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), however, purely legal issues affecting substantial rights may be raised although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. Rule 52(b) states that there must be a finding of “plain error that affects substantial rights”; if so, the court then decides whether there has been serious effect upon the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217, 1227 (6th Cir. 1995). Larry does not dispute that he did not challenge the legality of the search during proceedings in the trial court. He argues, however, that this issue is nonetheless reviewable under the plain error doctrine, relying on Buchanon. Larry’s reliance on Buchanon is misplaced. There, two co-defendants were convicted of 4 various drug and firearm offenses. The defendants moved to suppress evidence resulting from the search and seizures, although each defendant invoked different aspects of the Fourth Amendment. Buchanon, 72 F.3d at 1218. Only defendant Reed, and not Buchanon, argued with specificity in his motion to suppress that a seizure occurring prior to a dog sniff was illegal. Id. at 1226-27. On appeal, this court reviewed Buchanon’s pre-sniff seizure argument under the plain error test, concluding that the district court “had the opportunity to fully consider the seizure issue as it pertained to both defendants, even though Buchanon did not raise the issue, because Buchanon and Reed were treated identically by the troopers.” Id. at 1227-28. Here, the illegal search argument Larry raises on appeal was not presented below in any form, and the district court thus had no opportunity to consider it. Buchanon thus does not aid Larry. Moreover, even assuming that this issue had not been waived, Larry does not have standing to challenge the search of his mother’s home. To have standing to challenge a warrantless search, a person must have a legitimate expectation of privacy. United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 293 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). A legitimate expectation of privacy incorporates two elements: first, whether the defendant exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, whether the defendant’s subjective expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). A defendant bears the burden of showing that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item or area searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1 (1978). Testimony from various witnesses in this matter established that Jimmie Larry did not live at 934 N. Hollywood. His mother testified at trial that he was not an overnight guest nor a permitted social visitor on the day in question. In fact, she testified that Larry was supposed to stay outside 5 of her apartment when she was not home. Therefore, Larry failed to show he had an actual and subjective expectation of privacy in his mother’s home, because he was aware that she did not permit him there. See Knox, 839 F.2d at 293 (“When a defendant is aggrieved by an allegedly illegal search of a third party’s property, the Fourth Amendment rights of that defendant have not been infringed.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, the officers could reasonably have inferred from Larry’s request that they secure the apartment his implied consent to their entrance into the residence. See United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 742-44 (7th Cir. 1976); Robbins v. MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1966); United States v. Tragash, 691 F. Supp. 1066, 1072 (S.D. Ohio 1988). Once inside, the officers secured the gun that Larry had told them was there and conducted no further “search.” Under these circumstances, we find the officers’ conduct to be constitutional. See United States v. Biggs, 70 F.3d 913, 916 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing constitutionality of “protective sweep” incident to arrest where officers have reasonable belief of danger posed by other individuals that may pose danger to those on the arrest scene).