Opinion ID: 6498740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantiation

Text: ¶ 11. “[W]e defer to the Board’s decision regarding substantiation on appeal.” In re R.H., 2010 VT 95, ¶ 21, 189 Vt. 15, 14 A.3d 267. “Our review is thus limited to determining whether the Board applied the proper legal standard, whether the evidence before the Board reasonably supports its findings, and whether the Board’s findings reasonably support its conclusions.” In re E.C., 2010 VT 50, ¶ 6, 188 Vt. 546, 1 A.3d 1007 (mem.).
¶ 12. The question presented is whether the statutes governing substantiation require DCF to identify child victims of pornography and the existence of a caretaking relationship between petitioner and each child. Chapter 49 of Title 33 is divided into two subchapters: the first sets out “General Provisions”; the second governs “Reporting Abuse of Children.” 33 V.S.A. ch. 49. Subchapter 2 provides two definitions of what constitutes “an abused or neglected child”: “An abused or neglected child” is a child whose physical health, psychological growth and development, or welfare is harmed or is at substantial risk of harm by the acts or omissions of his or her parent or other person responsible for the child’s welfare. An “abused or neglected child” also means a child who is sexually abused or at substantial risk of sexual abuse by any person and a child who has died as a result of abuse or neglect. 33 V.S.A. § 4912(1). The Legislature subsequently defines sexual abuse as consisting “of any act or acts by any person involving sexual molestation or exploitation of a child, including . . . viewing, possessing, or transmitting child pornography . . . .” Id. § 4912(15)(G). ¶ 13. Separately, § 4916a lays out the process by which persons alleged to have abused or neglected a child can challenge their placement on the registry, including providing for an administrative-review conference conducted by “a neutral and independent arbiter who has no prior involvement in the original investigation.” Id. § 4916a(f). To prevail at this stage (and on appeal before the Board), DCF bears “the burden of proving that it has accurately and reliably 5 concluded that a reasonable person would believe that the child has been abused and neglected by that person.” Id. § 4916a(e). ¶ 14. Petitioner’s first argument is that the Board did not apply the correct legal standard in upholding DCF’s substantiation determination. The Board, after reviewing the plain language of subchapter 2, concluded that “the legal standard regarding substantiation [in this case] is whether petitioner engaged in sexual abuse by possessing two photos of child pornography on his computer.” However, petitioner argues that DCF bears the burden of identifying the child victims in the photographs and proving he had a relationship with them because § 4916a(e) contains the terms “the child” and “that person.” He claims these terms reinforce the overarching goal of subchapter 2, which is to protect identifiable children. Petitioner asserts that the alternate definition in § 4912(1) of an abused or neglected child, which provides that “any person” who sexually abuses a child can also be substantiated for child abuse, “does not abrogate” DCF’s burden to identify a victim and establish a relationship between victim and petitioner. Therefore, according to him, the Board’s interpretation of the substantiation statutes was error because it did not require DCF to make either showing. ¶ 15. We begin with the plain language of this statutory framework. In re E.C., 2010 VT 50, ¶ 8 (“Our first recourse when interpreting a statute is to look at the plain language of the enactment.”); see also State v. A.P., 2021 VT 90, ¶ 12, __ Vt. __, 268 A.3d 58 (“If the intent of the Legislature is apparent on the face of the statute because the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we implement the statute according to that plain language.” (quotation omitted)). The Legislature provided two distinct definitions of an abused or neglected child in § 4912(1). The first sentence provides: “An ‘abused or neglected child’ means a child whose physical health, psychological growth and development, or welfare is harmed or is at substantial risk of harm by the acts or omissions of his or her parent or other person responsible for the child’s welfare.” 33 V.S.A. § 4912(1). The second sentence provides: “An ‘abused or neglected child’ 6 also means a child who is sexually abused or at substantial risk of sexual abuse by any person and a child who has died as a result of abuse or neglect.” Id. (emphasis added). The second sentence expands the definition of who is considered an abused or neglected child. In addition to those harmed by parents and persons responsible for a child’s welfare, a child who suffers sexual abuse by any person is also an abused or neglected child. ¶ 16. Petitioner concedes that mere possession of child pornography is defined as sexual abuse under § 4912(15)(G). However, he maintains that this does not automatically mean he has abused or neglected a child under § 4912(1). He asserts that § 4916a(e) requires DCF to prove he had a relationship with identifiable child victims depicted in the photographs to substantiate him. ¶ 17. Section 4916a(e) does not transform DCF’s burden in this way. The term “that person” in § 4916a(e) refers to the person being substantiated for child abuse. Here, petitioner is “that person” because he is both the subject of substantiation proceedings and because “that person” includes “any person” who sexually abuses a child under the definition set forth in § 4912(1). See State v. A.P., 2021 VT 90, ¶ 12 (“We do not read statutory language in isolation; we read and construe together the whole and every part of the statute, together with other statutes standing in pari materia with it, as parts of a unified statutory system.” (quotation omitted)). While “that person” may also refer to the parents or other persons responsible for a child’s welfare under the first definition in § 4912(1), it does not follow that the Legislature intended a relationship requirement in the second definition. See State v. Hale, 2021 VT 18, ¶ 14, __ Vt. __, 256 A.3d 595 (“It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that we will not read words into a statute that are not there, unless it is necessary in order to make the statute effective.” (quotation and alteration omitted)). ¶ 18. Petitioner likewise asserts that the term “the child” in § 4916a(e) is further evidence that DCF must prove he had a relationship with the children depicted in the two photographs. As above, we do not read words into a statute that are not there. Hale, 2021 VT 19, ¶ 14. Section 7 4916a(e) requires DCF to prove an allegation of child abuse such “that a reasonable person would believe that the child has been abused.” Here, “the child” refers to the subject of the abuse. The term is not a separate requirement to identify the child. As defined, possessing child pornography is sexual abuse. Id. § 4912(15)(F). Sexual abuse of a child by any person is child abuse. Id. § 4912(1). Accordingly, DCF must prove that a reasonable person would believe that it has accurately and reliably substantiated a report that petitioner possessed pornographic materials depicting a child.3 ¶ 19. Our conclusion is further supported by the presence of an additional provision defining sexual abuse as the production of child pornography in § 4912(15)(F). Subsection F provides that a person commits sexual abuse by “aiding, abetting, counseling, hiring, or procuring a child to perform or participate in any photograph, motion picture, exhibition, show, representation, or other presentation that, in whole or in part, depicts sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse involving a child.” Id. We have not before addressed § 4912(15)(F), and we express no opinion about it here. However, that the Legislature separately included this definition indicates it knows the difference between producing child pornography and “viewing, possessing, or transmitting” child pornography, and the resulting legal standards under each. See State v. DeRosa, 161 Vt. 78, 80, 633 A.2d 277, 279 (1993) (“[W]e presume the Legislature used the language [in the statute] advisedly.”). ¶ 20. Petitioner next contends that the Board’s legal standard is at odds with the statute’s purpose to “protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through abuse and neglect.” 33 V.S.A. § 4911(1). We discern nothing in the Board’s interpretation contravening the statute’s purpose. See In re R.H., 2010 VT 95, ¶ 21 (“[W]e defer to the Board’s decision regarding substantiation on appeal.”). The Legislature created a framework in which merely 3 A child is defined as “an individual under the age of majority.” 33 V.S.A. § 4912(3). 8 possessing child pornography is child abuse, and the consequence is placement on the child protection registry. The Legislature selected placement on the registry as one method to “protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through abuse and neglect.” 33 V.S.A. § 4911(a). Moreover, the purpose behind this framework aligns with the view held by most—if not all—jurisdictions that possession of child pornography constitutes a “direct and primary emotional harm” to the children depicted. United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases); see also Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 457 (2014) (“It is common ground the victim [depicted in child pornography] suffers continuing and grievous harm as a result of [their] knowledge that a large, indeterminate number of individuals have viewed and will in the future view images of the sexual abuse [they] endured. . . . The unlawful conduct of everyone who . . . possesses the images . . . plays a part in sustaining and aggravating this tragedy.”). ¶ 21. Finally, petitioner argues that the statutory framework is ambiguous, and therefore we should resolve any ambiguity in his favor under the rule of lenity. See State v. Hurley, 2015 VT 46, ¶ 17, 198 Vt. 552, 117 A.3d 433 (describing rule as “principle that requires that any doubts created by ambiguous legislation be resolved in favor of the defendant and construed against the [S]tate” (quotation omitted)); see also Doe v. La. Bd. of Ethics, 112 So. 3d 339, 347 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (stating rule of lenity “applies to both criminal laws and civil statues of a penal nature”). ¶ 22. Petitioner’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the statutes governing childabuse substantiation fall within DCF’s area of expertise; therefore, we and the Board must defer to DCF’s interpretation. In re R.H., 2010 VT 95, ¶ 29 (quotation omitted). Moreover, we will not find ambiguity unless we first detect a “compelling indication of . . . error” in DCF’s interpretation of the registry statutes. Shires Hous., Inc. v. Brown, 2017 VT 60, ¶ 9, 205 Vt. 186, 172 A.3d 1215 (explaining that this Court sustains interpretation of statute “by an administrative body responsible for its execution” unless interpretation “unjust or unreasonable”); see In re S-S Corp./Rooney 9 Hous. Devs., 2006 VT 8, ¶ 13, 179 Vt. 302, 896 A.2d 67 (“We will not equate a grant of agency discretion with ambiguity . . . .”). The Board has made no error, and its interpretation of these statutes aligns with DCF’s. The Board correctly interpreted subsection 2 by looking at the plain language and analyzed the undisputed facts using the legal standard for substantiating petitioner.4 ¶ 23. Second, the rule of lenity only applies where the statutory language is ambiguous. Hurley, 2015 VT 46, ¶ 17 (“The rule of lenity does not apply if the statutory language is unambiguous . . . . (quotation omitted)); La. Bd. of Ethics, 112 So. 3d at 347 (explaining rule of lenity “applies to both criminal laws and civil statutes of a penal nature”). Because this statutory framework is unambiguous, the rule of lenity is inapplicable.