Opinion ID: 690283
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether DiBiase adequately has raised this issue

Text: 43 An amicus, the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), urges us to affirm the district court's judgment on the alternative theory of disparate impact. In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff claims that the employment practice has a disproportionate effect on older workers [and thus] violates the ADEA. Hazen, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1710 (Kennedy, J. concurring). While the district court indicated that it need not determine whether the policy also constitutes disparate impact, DiBiase, 847 F.Supp. at 348 n. 13, it nevertheless went on to say: 44 Disparate impact cases typically focus on statistical disparities between members of the protected and unprotected classes. In this case, however, no statistics are necessary because all members of the age-protected class must surrender potential age discrimination claims, whereas no member of the non-protected class has potential age discrimination claims to surrender. Thus, a disparate impact analysis in this case involves arguments identical to those involved in the disparate treatment inquiry, and results in the same conclusion: SmithKline's policy causes a disparate impact because it specifies different treatment. 45 Id. (citation omitted; emphasis in original). The district court's observation about disparate impact assumes that older workers signing the release gave up more than younger workers solely because the ADEA protects only older workers. In light of our discussion above, that analysis is flawed fundamentally. Moreover, the district court's reasoning is somewhat circular--in explaining why there is disparate impact liability, the court assumed the conclusion of its disparate treatment analysis. That logical flaw makes the disparate impact analysis redundant: To say that there is disparate impact because there is disparate treatment is to say nothing at all. Of course, if a policy is facially discriminatory, it has a disparate impact on the discriminated-against individuals. Therefore, we reject the district court's disparate impact conclusion for the reasons detailed above. 14 46 But the question remains--should we still remand the matter for further proceedings (and perhaps further discovery) on a different type of disparate impact theory. After all, to conduct a disparate impact analysis properly in this context, the court should have assumed that the release did not treat employees disparately, and then asked whether, in reality, the policy had a disproportionate effect on older employees. Such an inquiry, of course, would have required use of sophisticated statistical data, and DiBiase apparently was not inclined to take this path, as he produced no such evidence. 47 DiBiase does not urge us to reach this conclusion as an alternative way to uphold the district court's judgment if we reject the court's disparate treatment analysis. Only the amicus argues that DiBiase's ADEA claims are actionable under a disparate impact theory, NELA Br. at 7, but an amicus may not frame the issues for appeal. Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1581 n. 9 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 479, 130 L.Ed.2d 393 (1994)). Absent the existence of substantial public interests calling us to depart from the general rule, we consider only issues argued in the briefs filed by the parties and not those argued in the briefs filed by interested nonparties. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 977, 984 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821, 109 S.Ct. 66, 102 L.Ed.2d 43 (1988); Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 862 (9th Cir.1982). 15 Therefore, because DiBiase is not pursuing a disparate impact claim, the issue is not before us. 48