Opinion ID: 1657574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing the previous testimony of witnesses smith, womber, and hawkins to be read to the jury.

Text: Russell argues that the trial judge erred in allowing the State to introduce a transcript of three witnesses' testimony from the guilt phase of his trial when the prosecution failed to take the steps necessary under Mitchell v. State, 572 So.2d 865 (Miss. 1990), to obtain the unavailable witnesses' attendance at his trial. This error, Russell contends, warrants the reversal of his death sentence. In the case at bar, the trial judge found, for purposes of Miss.R.Evid. 804, that A.J. Smith, Christopher Womber and Willie Hawkins were unavailable to testify and therefore, the trio's sworn testimony from the guilt phase could be used to show that Russell killed Cotton. Miss.R.Evid. 804(a) provides in pertinent part: (a) Definition of Unavailability. Unavailability as a witness includes situations in which the declarant: ... . (4) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or (5) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means;... In order to use the witnesses' former testimony, the prosecution must prove the unavailability of the witness(es) by diligent effort. Mitchell v. State, 572 So.2d 865 (Miss. 1990) (citing Stoop v. State, 531 So.2d 1215, 1220 (Miss. 1988)). The trial judge's determination that the prosecution has employed diligent effort in attempting to obtain the attendance of a witness will not be disturbed on appeal unless this Court finds that the trial judge abused his discretion in determining that a witness was unavailable. See Lamar v. State, 578 So.2d 1382 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991); Kuchel v. State, 570 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. 1991); Johnston v. State, 517 N.E.2d 397 (Ind. 1988); State v. Carter, 226 Neb. 636, 413 N.W.2d 901 (1987); United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1378 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 259, 102 L.Ed.2d 248 (1988). At trial, the State called Sandy Sanders to testify as to the efforts she employed to obtain the unavailable witnesses' attendance. Sanders testified that she was employed as a secretary at the Sunflower County District Attorney's office and that it was her job to subpoena all witnesses for trials. Sanders testified to the following efforts that the district attorney's office made to subpoena A.J. Smith: (1) Issued a subpoena for A.J. Smith to Parchman. [3] (2) Upon being informed that Smith had been transferred to South Mississippi Correctional facility in Greene County, issued subpoena to Greene County facility for Smith. (3) Greene County Informed State that Smith had been discharged on July 10, 1992, to Hinds County. (4) Sanders contacted Hinds County Sheriff's Office to determine if they knew Smith. (5) Sent subpoena to Hinds County for Smith. (6) Hinds County Sheriff's Office had an old address on Smith but was unable to locate him. As to Christopher Womber, Sanders testified that she: (1) Issued a couple of subpoenas to Parchman for Womber. [4] (2) Parchman informed Sanders that Womber had been discharged to Washington County. (3) Sanders contacted Washington County and inquired as to Womber's whereabouts and was told that Washington County was also looking for Womber but they thought he was in Peoria, Illinois. On cross-examination, Sanders testified that she had not personally contacted the authorities in Peoria, Illinois, regarding Womber because the Washington County Sheriff's Office was searching for Womber and they told her that they would contact her if they were successful in locating Womber. Furthermore, Sanders testified that both of these men were discharged from prison and not released on parole, therefore, neither man had a probation officer that she could check with as to their addresses. As to Willie Hawkins, the testimony indicated that he had been at court the day prior to the start of this trial. However, at some point later that same day, Hawkins was involved in a serious car accident. Hawkins' daughter was killed and Hawkins suffered two broken legs. As a result of this accident, Hawkins was not available to testify at the resentencing hearing. The comments to Rule 804 state: [d]eath and sickness render a witness unavailable. The comment cites to two early Mississippi cases for this proposition, i.e., Paulk v. Housing Authority of Tupelo, 228 So.2d 871 (Miss. 1969), and Home Ins. Co. v. Gerlach, 220 Miss. 732, 71 So.2d 787 (1954). In Mitchell, this Court stated that the prosecution's burden is to demonstrate diligent effort, not to do everything conceivable. 572 So.2d at 869. In the case sub judice, the district attorney was charged with locating two discharged convicts, i.e., Smith and Womber. Neither man had a parole officer and apparently neither man was required to keep in contact with Mississippi Department of Corrections Officials upon discharge. Likewise, neither could be located in the county where they were discharged. The Hinds County Sheriff's Office had an address on Smith but could not locate him. Womber, who was also sought by the Washington County Sheriff's Office, was thought to be in Peoria, Illinois. After hearing Sanders' testimony and the accompanying cross-examination, the trial judge ruled that Smith, Womber and Hawkins were unavailable for purposes of Miss.R.Evid. 804. Although the prosecution in the case at bar did not go as far as the prosecution did in Mitchell to find the unavailable witness, we find that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it held that the prosecution had established Smith, Womber and Hawkins' unavailability. In Mitchell, unlike the case sub judice, the district attorney's office had some possible information from the missing witness' brother as to his whereabouts. 572 So.2d at 868-69. Also, in Mitchell, the absent witness had contacted the Sheriff and told him of his whereabouts. Here, the prosecution was without such inside information as to Smith and Womber's location. As to Hawkins' unavailability, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that Hawkins was unavailable for purposes of Rule 804. Campbell, 845 F.2d at 1378. Having found that Smith, Womber and Hawkins were unavailable, the trio's testimony must still fit one of the exceptions of Miss.R.Evid. 804(b). Mitchell, 572 So.2d at 869 (citing Ponthieux v. State, 532 So.2d 1239, 1246 (Miss. 1988)). Rule 804(b)(1) provides: Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. The former testimony exception expressed in our Rule 804(b)(1) is a firmly rooted hearsay exception, Mitchell, 572 So.2d at 870 (quoting United States v. McClellan, 868 F.2d 210, 214-15 (7th Cir.1989)), and therefore, testimony admitted under Miss.R.Evid. 804(b)(1) does not violate the Confrontation Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Smith, Womber and Hawkins' former testimony was given under oath and was subject to thorough cross-examination. Accordingly, we find the former testimony falls into the definition of Rule 804(b)(1). Finally, Russell argues that Smith, Womber and Hawkins' former testimony is inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(1) because the prosecution failed to show that the party against whom the testimony was offered had a similar motive and opportunity to develop the testimony on the previous occasion. We disagree. In the case at bar, the unavailable witnesses' testimony was not offered at the resentencing to prove any of the aggravators offered by the State. Instead, the testimony was offered by the prosecution to satisfy the Enmund factors, i.e., that Russell: actually killed; attempted to kill; intended that a killing take place; contemplated that lethal force be employed. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7). At the guilt phase of the trial, Womber, Smith and Hawkins' testimony was offered to establish that Russell stabbed and killed Argentra Cotton. It was certainly in Russell's interest during the guilt phase of the trial to fully cross-examine the witnesses as to the specifics of the murder. In fact, the transcript indicates that Russell thoroughly examined the witnesses as to the events leading up to Cotton's murder. Accordingly, under the facts of this case we find that Russell warrants no relief on this assignment of error.