Opinion ID: 1832816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: upon rehearing granted

Text: Mitigation factors have come to the attention of the Court for the first time upon petition for rehearing which has been granted herein. These have been carefully considered together with the entire record which supports these additional factors and justifies modification of our earlier decision insofar as the discipline to be assessed is concerned. It now appears that respondent voluntarily informed his client of the running of the statute in the one instance and tendered and paid full settlement to the client for the loss. The reference in our original opinion to the initial partial payment by personal check for $300.00 to the client, as being returned for insufficient funds and later made good by respondent, does not include the fact that, even before the client had received notification of return of the check, it was replaced by respondent with a cashier's check and that the entire amount was paid within one week of the agreement between them. In the other matter, the respondent was in the process of curing the default which had occurred but was replaced of record before a hearing thereon and in fact the client suffered no loss as a result. We accordingly, upon rehearing, modify and recede from our former opinion herein to the extent of deleting that portion of the opinion following the heading DISCUSSION and substituting instead the following: DISCUSSION The charges of professional misconduct of which the respondent has been found guilty are serious ones. In both cases, the respondent failed to fulfill the responsibilities he accepted when he undertook the representation of his clients. No principle is more fundamental to our legal system than the assumption that lawyers will competently and zealously protect the legal rights of clients who have entrusted legal matters to their care. Clearly a proper form of discipline is indicated in the circumstances; however, the disbarment recommended by one referee is too harsh. Such a punishment focuses upon retribution rather than the goal of effective discipline which is primarily to protect the public from incompetent and unethical practitioners and only secondarily to punish the offender and to act as a deterrent to others. Here the public is easily protected and these goals are accomplished by suspension of respondent. Such a course is consistent with the public interest, the respondent's interest and the administration of justice. Accordingly, it is the decision of this Court to sustain the findings of guilt by both referees, assess the costs in both cases against the respondent, and suspend the respondent for a period of 6 months, at the conclusion of which and upon all costs having been paid, respondent may thereupon resume the practice of law. The suspension shall be from September 15, 1974, and terminate automatically on March 15, 1975. It is so ordered. It is so ordered. On consideration of the Petition for Rehearing and Clarification, Petition for Rehearing and/or Modification, and Response to Petition for Rehearing and/or Modification, It is ordered that said petitions are denied, and it is further Ordered that the suspension shall be from November 1, 1974 and terminate automatically on May 1, 1975, thereby giving respondent forty-five days to close out his practice and take the necessary steps to protect his clients, and it is further Ordered that respondent shall not accept any new business. ADKINS, C.J., ROBERTS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., and SPECTOR, District Judge, concur.