Opinion ID: 1355753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absence of need for an expanded privilege

Text: We reject the news media's contention that a negligence standard will subject them to such self-exacting scrutiny that it will have a chilling effect on the free flow of information. This argument is speculative. Its implicit premise is that if a news media business can be held responsible for falsehoods, it will be less likely to report the news. This suggests that the news media's only reason to be accurate is to avoid legal liability. We are reluctant to attribute such a self-serving motive to the news media. It is equally or more likely that the great majority of journalists strive for accuracy because they are dedicated to high standards of professional craftsmanship. Indeed, accuracy appears to be a journalistic canon of ethics. The Statement of Principles of the American Society of Newspaper Editors states, Every effort must be made to assure that the news content is accurate.... (Swain, Reporters' Ethics (1978) p. 112.) The Code of Ethics of Sigma Delta Chi, the Society of Professional Journalists, states the principle more strongly, There is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of thoroughness. ( Id., at p. 115.) We reject the notion that the news media are careful only to avoid liability. A negligence standard is far different from strict liability. A journalist need act only with reasonable care to avoid liability under a negligence standard. Defendants and their amici curiae have not even attempted to make any factual showing that a requirement of reasonable care unduly restricts their ability to report the news. More specifically, they have not identified a single instance in which they have declined to report the news for fear that section 47(3) is not as broad as they would like. (See Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corporation, supra, 543 P.2d 1356, 1366 [noting the absence of any evidence of self-censorship].) Nor have the media attempted to show that the free flow of information has been restricted even in the slightest degree in the overwhelming number of states that have adopted a negligence standard for private-figure plaintiffs. ( Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, supra, 398 N.W.2d 245, 265 [noting the absence of any deleterious effect on journalism in the states that have adopted a negligence standard]; Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal (1983) 18 U.S.F.L.Rev. 1, 15-16 (hereafter Franklin) [noting little evidence of self-censorship]; McDonald, Should Punitive Damage Awards in Defamation Suits Be Abolished?, supra, National L.J. (Nov. 19, 1984) p. 22 [noting empirical evidence of no self-censorship].) The high court in Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. 323, and the overwhelming majority of state courts considering this issue have concluded that no undue chilling effect or self-censorship would result from a negligence standard for private-figure plaintiffs. ( Memphis Pub. Co. v. Nichols, supra, 569 S.W.2d at p. 418; Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., supra, 546 P.2d at p. 86.) Aside from the lack of evidence of self-censorship, we doubt that a negligence standard results in substantial self-censorship to avoid possible legal liability for false reporting. As we have explained, the news media likely seek accuracy for professional reasons, not legal ones. Moreover, the theory of self-censorship suggests the typical news organization subjects a significant portion of its reporting to predissemination review for analysis of possible liability. The realities of news reporting  severe time demands, the number of stories, the cost of legal review, journalists' desire for peer recognition, and competition  may effectively preclude such review in most cases. The raison d'etre of the media is to report news  as much and as quickly as possible. It is not likely that the exercise of such responsibility would shrink in the face of a reasonable-person standard of care. ( Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, supra, 398 N.W.2d 245, 265.) The more reasonable assumption is that the standard of fault is not often a factor in deciding whether to publish information. Although the standard may have an effect on whether a defendant can obtain summary judgment and on the ultimate outcome of a suit, the actual decision whether to publish a story is probably not based on such contingencies. In fact, there is considerable evidence the media are not unduly hampered in their reporting by defamation actions. [I]t is difficult to argue that the United States did not have a free and vigorous press before the rule in New York Times was announced. ( Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 772 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 611] (conc. opn. of White, J.).) A 1947 study financed by Henry Luce of Time, Inc. found prominent newspaper lawyers and executives basically satisfied with American defamation law. (Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men (1986) p. 226.) That same year, the American Civil Liberties Union concluded that there were no pressing problems with libel law. ( Id., at pp. 324-325, fn. 44.) These conclusions are especially significant in light of the strict liability standard that was then prevalent. In view of the numerous constitutional limitations on recovery that have been imposed since New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. 254, the news media have substantial protection, and they presumably are now equally or more vigorous than before. Under the New York Times standard of fault and related restrictions, a victim of defamation, as a practical matter, seldom recovers damages. In rejecting a public-interest test for private-figure plaintiffs, the Gertz court acknowledged that, Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test. ( Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 342 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 807], italics added.) Justice White explained why plaintiffs rarely prevail: This will recurringly happen because the putative plaintiff's burden is so exceedingly difficult to satisfy and can be discharged only by expensive litigation. Even if the plaintiff sues, he frequently loses on summary judgment or never gets to the jury because of insufficient proof of malice. If he wins before the jury, verdicts are often overturned by appellate courts for failure to prove malice. ( Dun & Bradstreet, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 768 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 608].) Justice White's observations appear to be well supported by the facts. According to the American Newspaper Publishers Association, only about 10 percent of all libel suits against newspapers are pursued seriously, and according to the Libel Resource Defense Center, a news media-sponsored organization, Upwards of 90 percent of all seriously litigated cases never go to trial. (Stille, Libel Law Takes on a New Look, National L.J. (Oct. 24, 1988) p. 32, col. 3 (hereafter Stille).) If these statistics are accurate, only about 1 percent of libel cases are tried. As to those few, it is generally agreed that nearly 70 percent of libel awards are overturned on appeal. ( Ibid. ; see also Eldredge, supra, § 52, p. 287 and Franklin, supra, 18 U.S.F.L.Rev. 1, 4.) [35] In short, a defamation victim faces almost insurmountable obstacles to recovery within the constitutional limitations. As one plaintiffs' lawyer put it, It's like going up a greased pole at a 90-degree angle. (Stille, supra, at p. 32, col. 3.) Because public officials and public figures are already subject to the constitutional malice standard, expanding section 47(3) to create a public-interest privilege would impose new restrictions only on private persons. Publications regarding such persons may be the least likely to involve a matter of public interest. Imposing a malice requirement on private persons might therefore be of marginal benefit to increasing the free flow of information on public issues. Moreover, it appears that most libel actions are filed by public officials or figures. One study has shown that more than 60 percent of libel cases against the news media are brought by public status plaintiffs. (Bezanson et al., Libel Law and the Press (1987) p. 10 (hereafter Bezanson).) Thus, the news media apparently already have the benefit of a malice standard in the majority of actions. Apart from legal protections, the news media already have available to themselves the most powerful defense to a defamation action  the ability to correct error. A recent survey of defamation plaintiffs indicates that their prime objective is generally to set the record straight, not to recover money damages. News editors in the same study were more inclined to attribute a money motive to plaintiffs but agreed that vindication is important to them. (Bezanson, supra, pp. 51-52.) The Iowa Libel Research Project also recently observed: The Libel Research Project was initiated to determine the feasibility of developing non-litigation methods to deal with libel complaints. The findings lead to the conclusion that an alternative to litigation already exists  in the nation's newsrooms. More editors need to recognize that how they deal with complaints has an important bearing on whether they ultimately are sued for libel. ( Id., at p. 52, italics added.) In light of the protections already enjoyed by the news media and the doubtful benefit that would result from further restrictions on private persons, we see no need to impose further limitations under the guise of a statutory privilege. As we have explained, the news media's policy arguments in favor of an expanded privilege are speculative. We think it inappropriate to construe section 47(3) expansively based on mere intuition as to whether the news media need additional protection. ( Time, Inc. v. Firestone, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 456 [47 L.Ed.2d at p. 164] [declining to expand news media protection without convincing assurance that it was needed].) Perhaps the media's arguments are well founded, and there may be ample empirical evidence that warrants a broad public-interest privilege. But, if so, such evidence should be presented to the Legislature. (See discussion at pp. 739-740, ante. )