Opinion ID: 325324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Current Discrimination.

Text: 12 Proof of intent. Notwithstanding the provision in Title VII allowing injunctive relief and back pay only where the respondent has intentionally engaged in unlawful practice, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e--5(g), courts have established that proof of discrimination does not require proof of intent to discriminate. All that is required is that the employment practice not be accidental. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919, 90 S.Ct. 926, 25 L.Ed.2d 100 (1970). The Supreme Court has adopted this interpretation. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432, 91 S.Ct. 849, 854, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), the Court stated that, 'Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.' See also United States v. N.L. Industries, 479 F.2d 354, 361 (8th Cir. 1973) (and cases cited therein). 13 Overt discrimination. Overt discrimination may be demonstrated by the production of qualified minority applicants for past vacancies who were rejected for a less qualified white person. If such employer conduct is established, a deliberate purpose to discriminate may be inferred and close judicial scrutiny of employment practices is warranted. In Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir. 1972), the court observed: 14 Courts have often observed that proof of overt racial discrimination in employment is seldom direct. Recognizing this, we have found 'error in limiting Title VII to present specific acts of racial discrimination,' and it is now well established that courts must also examine statistics, patterns, practices and general policies to ascertain whether racial discrimination exists. (Citations omitted.) 15 Recruitment. Evidence of discrimination by design might also be based upon a history of minimal recruitment efforts in publicizing vacancies and openings in supervisory and management positions. The passive nature of past recruitment together with the failure to undertake affirmative recruitment efforts after the passage of Title VII may justify a finding of discriminatory conduct. United States v. N.L. Industries, supra, 479 F.2d at 368; Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426--427 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 139--140 (8th Cir. 1969). 16 Examination of criteria. A final method in the assessment of present discriminatory conduct is the examination of the supervisory selection and promotion criteria employed by I.P. Such criteria are especially susceptible to employer practices which discriminate in fact under a facade of apparent neutrality. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, in holding unlawful an employer's use of a written test not shown to have been related to job performance, teaches that employee selection criteria must be scrutinized. Under Griggs, an employer must demonstrate that hiring and promotional requirements with a racially disparate effect 'have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.' Id. at 432, 91 S.Ct. at 854. 17 Where objective criteria are employed the EEOC guidelines on Employer Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607 et seq., cited with approval by the Court in Griggs, supra, 401 U.S. at 434, 91 S.Ct. 849, as expressing the will of Congress, control. They require generally that empirical evidence must demonstrate a significant correlation between the test employed and important elements of work behavior. 18 Greater possibilities for abuse, however, are inherent in subjective definitions of employment selection and promotion criteria. Yet they are not to be condemned as unlawful per se, for in all fairness to applicants and employers alike, decisions about hiring and promotion in supervisory and managerial jobs cannot realistically be made using objective standards alone. Thus, it is especially important for courts to be sensitive to possible bias in the hiring and promotion process arising from such subjective definition of employment criteria. The EEOC guidelines, 7 the Executive Order program, 8 and the courts have all established the requirement of, and in most cases a measure for, examining subjective hiring and promotion criteria. At the very least, it is necessary to identify the goals underlying the subjective criteria through a job analysis. Examination of those goals might reveal underlying personal biases or discriminatory stereotype classifications. See, e.g., EEOC Dec. No. 72--0721 (Dec. 27, 1971), 4 FEP Cases 439 (1972). It may additionally appear that subjective preference is accorded factors which are discriminatory, as for example, education accomplishment when such is not shown to be related to job performance, 9 a history of arrest records, 10 a history of wage garnishment, 11 or personal references that are nepotistic or culturally biased. 12 If there is any evidence of a discriminatory policy, courts have in the past closely circumscribed and even rejected practices of personal interviews, 13 supervisory recommendations, 14 and other subjective hiring criteria. 15 19