Opinion ID: 1032019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Department’s Cross-Appeal is Moot

Text: We must consider whether CMS’s approval of the SPA following the entry of judgment below renders the Department’s cross-appeal moot. It does. “Article III of the Constitution requires that there be a live case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case; it is not enough that there may have been a live case or controversy when the case was decided by the court whose judgment we are reviewing.” Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, CAL. ASS’N OF RURAL HEALTH CLINICS V . DOUGLAS 21 363 (1987) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975) and Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969)). “If an action or a claim loses its character as a live controversy, then the action or claim becomes ‘moot,’ and we lack jurisdiction to resolve the underlying dispute.” Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 797–98 (9th Cir. 1999). The Department seeks reversal of the injunctive and declaratory relief granted below. The district court enjoined the Department from implementing § 14131.10 pending CMS’s approval of the SPA. Thus, the injunction is no longer in place. The district court also granted declaratory relief to the Clinics, finding that the Department was required to obtain approval of the SPA before implementing changes to the state plan. Again, however, CMS has since approved the SPA. Thus, absent an exception, CMS’s approval of the SPA renders moot the Department’s cross-appeal as to injunctive and declaratory relief. Oregon v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 636 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding the mootness doctrine helps “‘avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law’”) (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam)). “Issues that are capable of repetition, yet evading review present an exception to the mootness doctrine.” Doe, 177 F.3d at 798 (citations and quotations omitted). “That exception, however, is limited to extraordinary cases in which (1) the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before it ceases, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs will be subjected to the same action again.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). The nature of the SPA process satisfies the first prong of this test. An SPA is deemed approved within 90 days unless 22 CAL. ASS’N OF RURAL HEALTH CLINICS V . DOUGLAS CMS sends written notice that the plan or amendment was rejected, or requests additional information within that timeframe. 42 C.F.R. § 430.16. This 90-day period will be too short for full litigation to take place. Doe v. Reed, 697 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Cases that qualify under prong one present controversies of inherently limited duration.”). “Turning to the second prong, the challenged conduct is capable of repetition where there is evidence that it has occurred in the past, or there is a reasonable expectation that the petitioner would again face the same alleged invasion of rights.” Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin, 698 F.3d 774, 787 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Before our decision in Developmental Services Network, there may have been a reasonable expectation that the Department would attempt to implement changes to a state plan prior to receiving CMS’s approval; Developmental Services Network forecloses that possibility. 666 F.3d at 544–46. In that case, we considered whether a different Medi-Cal provision violated the Medicaid Act. We held, unambiguously, that “the State [is] obligated to submit and obtain approval of its SPA before implementation.” Id. at 546. We cannot reasonably expect that the Department will ignore our explicit requirement to obtain CMS approval before implementation of any future amendments to its state plan. Thus, the Department’s cross-appeal is moot.