Opinion ID: 852114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Hess

Text: Up until the first day of trial, Hess had refused to testify by asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. After the first day of trial, however, the State reentered plea negotiations with Hess and secured his testimony in exchange for a drastically lower charge in his own case. Cain claims this caused him unfair surprise and deprived him of a fair trial. We begin by noting that this is not a circumstance in which the prosecutor failed entirely to disclose material and mitigating evidence, and thus Cain’s claim does not raise the specter of a Brady violation. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); cf. Goodner v. State, 714 N.E.2d 638, 642 (Ind. 1999). Cain’s claim bears some resemblance to a discovery violation, though the State had long listed Hess and the other conspirators as witnesses against Cain. We will for sake of argument apply the same analysis. Trial courts have broad latitude with respect to matters of this sort and their rulings receive great deference on appeal. Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644 (Ind. 1999). The primary factors that a trial court should consider when addressing a discovery violation are ―whether the breach was intentional or in bad faith and whether substantial prejudice has resulted.‖ Wiseheart 5 v. State, 491 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind. 1986). We will affirm a trial court’s rulings absent ―clear error and resulting prejudice.‖ Williams, 714 N.E.2d at 649. The preferred remedy for a discovery violation is a continuance. Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000). 6 Exclusion of evidence is only appropriate if the defendant shows ―that the State’s actions were deliberate or otherwise reprehensible, and this conduct prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial.‖ Id. at 832. As a starting point, there is no evidence that the prosecutor engaged in deliberate or reprehensible conduct in obtaining Hess’s testimony.7 Prosecutors have broad discretionary power to choose the persons whom they prosecute and to enter into plea bargains with them. Corcoran v. State, 739 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 2000). It is fully within a prosecutor’s power to seek a lesser charge in exchange for a defendant’s plea of guilty. Lockhart v. State, 257 Ind. 349, 274 N.E.2d 523 (1971). Here, the prosecutor had four defendants, each being tried separately and represented by different counsel. Each defendant had provided separate statements to Detective Heffelfinger; when combined, these presented a relatively clear picture of an otherwise-muddy factual situation. However, the prosecutor was challenged by the evidentiary issues of having those statements admitted at each co-defendant’s trial. A straightforward way to address this was to seek plea agreements in which she sought lesser charges in exchange for the defendant’s 6 A defendant who fails ―to alternatively request a continuance upon moving to exclude evidence, where a continuance may be an appropriate remedy,‖ waives any claim of error. Warren, 725 N.E.2d at 832. Here, however, Cain declined a continuance after expressly indicating that he believed it was not an appropriate remedy. Though we disagree with his assessment, we do not find the issue waived. 7 Judge Kevin Wallace made the same finding. ―[E]xclusion is an extreme remedy to be used only if the State’s actions were deliberate and the conduct prevents a fair trial. . . . I also know . . . with great confidence I can say that the State’s actions were not deliberate . . . at least in the sense that they were trying to gain an unfair advantage.‖ (Tr. at 566.) 6 testimony. (Tr. at 543.) She accurately (if indelicately) described the situation as ―Let’s Make A Deal Prosecution.‖ (Tr. at 543.) Prior to Cain’s trial, the prosecutor had secured agreements with Nelson and Sanders in exchange for their testimony.8 On May 14, 2010, however, Sanders moved to withdraw the guilty plea in his case. At that point, the prosecutor knew she would have to offer a better deal to either Sanders or Hess because she believed Nelson’s testimony alone might be insufficient. However, Sanders’s plea was not formally withdrawn by the court until the first day of Cain’s trial,9 and the prosecutor thought it would be inappropriate to negotiate with Hess until that occurred. (Tr. at 203, 545–46.) Whether she based this decision in ethics or tactics is immaterial. It was her decision to make and there is no evidence that she made it with the deliberate or intentional aim to deprive Cain (or Hess) of a fair trial. Nor is there any other evidence of bad faith or otherwise-reprehensible conduct. We also conclude that Cain has failed to show evidence of unfair surprise or substantial unfair prejudice resulting from Hess’s decision to testify. 8 On February 18, 2010, Sanders agreed to plead guilty to robbery resulting in serious bodily injury in exchange for a thirty-seven year sentence and his testimony against Cain and his co-defendants. (State’s Ex. 21.) On April 19, 2010, Nelson agreed to plead guilty to assisting a criminal in exchange for his testimony. (State’s Ex. 14.) Hess was initially only offered an agreement to plead guilty to murder; he refused. (Tr. at 613.) 9 Sanders was being tried in the same court, by the same judge. (Tr. at 543.) The hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was set for September 2010 in his own case. (Tr. at 545; State’s Ex. 23.) However, following voir dire and jury selection in Cain’s case, the State moved to accelerate Sanders’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, citing a need for finality in order to begin additional negotiations with other co-defendants. (Tr. at 201–02.) 7 After all, the information charging Cain with felony murder listed Sanders, Nelson, and Hess as witnesses for the State. (App. at 9.) The three co-defendants were also listed as prospective witnesses on preliminary discovery served on Cain’s counsel on June 26, 2009. (State’s Ex. 25.) Hess provided three statements to Detective Heffelfinger, transcripts of which had been served upon defense counsel well before trial. (State’s Ex. 26A–C; Tr. at 552.) Hess agreed to plead guilty at about eight p.m. on the evening of Cain’s first day of trial. The State met with Cain’s counsel that same night and provided him a copy of Hess’s plea agreement. In that regard, ―[t]here is no error when the State provides a defendant evidence as soon as the State is in possession of requested evidence.‖10 Warren, 725 N.E.2d at 832. Further, Hess was deposed the morning of the third day of trial, and the court subsequently recessed early that day to give Cain’s lawyer adequate time to prepare for cross-examination.11 That Hess was now going to testify might have been a surprising change, but it was not an ―unfair surprise.‖ As for prejudice, Hess’s testimony undoubtedly helped the prosecution’s case. As the prosecutor acknowledged, ―If I didn’t think it’s damaging, I wouldn’t be presenting it in trial.‖ (Tr. at 555.) At most, however, Hess’s testimony helped fill in the back-story of the case or confirmed things that Nelson had already corroborated. And, as Judge Kevin Wallace noted, ―In the hands of a good attorney all evidence cuts both ways.‖ (Tr. at 567.) Thus, on crossexamination Cain’s counsel asked questions of Hess about his favorable plea agreement and his 10 The prosecutor’s behavior thus comported with the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct. Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(d) (prosecutor must ―make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense‖ (emphasis added)); Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(d) (misconduct for a lawyer to ―engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice‖). 11 Contrary to Cain’s claim, there is no evidence that a continuance was a ―wholly inadequate remedy.‖ (Tr. at 567; Appellant’s Br. at 23–24.) The purpose of a continuance when faced with a surprise witness is to allow time for the opposing party ―to depose the witness and examine the accuracy of the proposed testimony.‖ O’Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 948 (Ind. 2001). Here, Cain was able to do just that. 8 prior access to the statements of his co-defendants, questions aimed at undermining Hess’s credibility as a witness.12 (Tr. at 613–15, 617–18.) Hess’s testimony was neither the smoking gun in this case nor ―a devastating blow to Cain’s defense.‖ (Appellant’s Br. at 23.) To the extent that either of those were present, they were provided by Cain’s own confession: ―I’m the one that did it.‖13 (Tr. at 492.) Under these circumstances, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny Cain’s motion to exclude Hess’s testimony.14 12 Actually, Hess’s testimony contained one thing helpful to Cain: Hess would not admit any intent or desire to have Morrow killed by Cain or anyone else. The prosecutor acknowledged this probability before Hess testified, and, as it so happened, the only aspect of Cain’s charges that the jury did not find was the aggravating circumstance of murder for hire. 13 Cain’s confession transformed from total denial of anything related to the murder, to admitting being present at the scene but claiming that Sanders pulled the trigger, to admitting to being the triggerman but claiming that Sanders was present and ordered him to fire, to admitting that he was the only one present. His confession included corroboration as to the number of times and locations that Morrow was shot, and also explained the additional shots. He also confessed to taking ―whatever [he] could grab,‖ including Morrow’s wallet, the guns, the coins, and the moneybags. Cain then testified that he only confessed out of fear of the death penalty and that Sanders had provided him the details of the crime scene, murder weapon, and stolen goods, and also instructed him on what to say and when. (Tr. at 648–50, 656–62, 670, 678–79.) The jury’s dim view of this version of the story is reflected in their questions to Cain: ―If you thought there was a video of the flea market and you were innocent, why wouldn’t you have said the video will prove I’m innocent?‖ (Tr. at 683.) ―If Mr. Sanders instructed you on the story to tell Detective Heffelfinger, why did you change your story about Sanders being with you the day of the killing?‖ (Tr. at 685.) ―Why would Mr. Sanders ask you to tell a story that involved him being there the day of the crime?‖ (Tr. at 686.) ―How could Matt Sanders grill you on such intricate details on Friday night when you said he was stoned?‖ (Tr. at 685.) 14 Reviewing the five factors cited by the parties leads us to the same result. See Cook v. State, 675 N.E.2d 687, 691 n.3 (Ind. 1996). 9