Opinion ID: 691082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Taped Conversation Between Coconspirators

Text: 17 Logan argues that the district court erred by excluding evidence of a taped telephone conversation between Hulett, Reed and Brown that occurred on July 5, 1993. The conversation occurred after Hulett became a government informant. Throughout the conversation, Reed makes threatening remarks to Hulett, replete with graphic and derogatory language. Logan argues that this evidence was relevant to show he did not voluntarily agree to participate in the conspiracy and to illustrate Reed's demeanor to the jury. We find the government in the unusual position of arguing that these statements made by Reed, a coconspirator, are inadmissible hearsay. 18 The district court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is admissible. We will overturn its decision only if there was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kroh, 915 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir.1990) (en banc). Furthermore, [t]he discretion accorded lower courts in determining admissibility of evidence 'is particularly broad in a conspiracy trial.'  Id. (citation omitted). We believe the district court acted within its discretion by excluding the taped conversation. 19 With respect to the issue of Logan's voluntary agreement to participate in the conspiracy, assuming that Reed's statements are not hearsay, Logan has not demonstrated the relevancy of these statements. See Fed.R.Evid. 401. The telephone conversation is between Reed, Hulett and Brown. Logan did not make an offer of proof that he was aware that the conversation took place or of its threatening nature. Accordingly, we fail to see how these statements demonstrate that Logan believed Reed would retaliate against him if he attempted to withdraw from the conspiracy. 20 With respect to Reed's demeanor, the district court stated that the taped statements would open a whole Pandora's box of collateral issues. IV Trial Tr. at 459. The district court also stated that it believed one taped statement was only minimally probative of Reed's demeanor. Id. at 457. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, a trial court may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or the evidence is cumulative. As offered to show Reed's demeanor, we believe this evidence was properly excluded under Rule 403. 21 Reed's taped statements to Hulett were replete with derogatory and explicit language. As such, they were inflammatory and prejudicial. Additionally, the conversation did not mention Logan or his position in the conspiracy. The district court found that the statements opened a Pandora's box of collateral issues. In this respect, there was a possibility of confusion of the issues. Furthermore, this taped statement was cumulative. Hulett, Anderson and Brown testified that Reed was a violent person who retaliated against business associates that crossed him. Anderson and Brown testified that they heard Reed threaten Logan, stating, if Darrell was to cross him, he would put him six feet under. III Trial Tr. at 329. Thus, evidence of Reed's demeanor was before the jury and the taped conversation was merely cumulative. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the possibility of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and the cumulative nature of the evidence substantially outweighed its minimal probative value.