Opinion ID: 664075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Variance Between Proof and Indictment

Text: 33 Faulkner, Toler and Formann argue that there is a fatal variance between the single conspiracy alleged in Count 1 of the indictment and the evidence adduced at trial. Toler further argues that the jury's verdict confirms such a variance. They argue that the government never proved a single overarching conspiracy, and that they were prejudiced by being tried on such a theory. Count 1 of the indictment was brought under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371, and the indictment and jury charge alleged six categories of illegal acts of the conspiracy. 16 All four appellants were convicted on Count 1, but the jury did not find the same underlying substantive offenses as to each. The jury found that Faulkner and Toler conspired to misapply funds, that Blain conspired to obtain unlawful benefits, and that Formann conspired to inflate appraisals. Appellants claim that there was never a single conspiracy, and that the evidence at most showed the existence of several separate conspiracies. They argue that the I-30 corridor cannot in this case legitimately serve to amalgamate the various and varying theories, objectives, acts, and transactions shown by the evidence into one overall conspiracy, and that the evidence does not show the required unity of purpose or common design and understanding necessary to establish a single conspiracy. Appellants cite Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) and other cases for the proposition that it is unfair to try a defendant under a theory of a single conspiracy where none in fact exists, since there is the danger of transference of guilt, i.e., the danger that despite demonstrating his lack of involvement in the conspiracy described in the indictment, a defendant may be convicted because of his association with, or conspiracy for unrelated purposes with, codefendants who were members of the charged conspiracy. United States v. Hernandez, 962 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir.1992). 34 In reviewing a claim of fatal variance, the court should reverse only if the evidence at trial in fact varied from what the indictment alleged, and the variance prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Bruno, 809 F.2d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1057, 107 S.Ct. 2198, 95 L.Ed.2d 853 (1987). The government contends that this case is an example of a conspiracy [w]here the activities of one aspect of the scheme are necessary or advantageous to the success of another aspect of the scheme or to the overall success of the venture ... or where ... the nature of the activity is such that knowledge on the part of one member concerning the existence and function of other members of the same scheme is necessarily implied due to the overlapping nature of the various roles of the participants.... United States v. Elam, 678 F.2d 1234, 1246 (5th Cir.1982). We agree. The nature of the dealings among the appellants, Sinclair and others was such that all were integral and important participants. The scheme required real estate developers (Faulkner, Toler) to make initial land purchases and submit overvalued appraisals (Formann, Tannehill) to a savings and loan (Blain, Jensen) in order to obtain loans for intermediate buyers (Sinclair, Blain and others). Syndicators (Sinclair and Hughes) would then sell the properties to other investors at a profit, and all participants in the scheme benefitted. The evidence, summarized above in the factual background, supports the jury's finding of a single overarching agreement among appellants and others to enrich themselves through the device of fraudulent real estate loans. The jury's finding that all four appellants did not conspire to commit the same federal offense does not compel a different conclusion. 35 This court has found, in other contexts, that but a single conspiracy exists even though the agreement that constitutes it has several objectives and aims at the commission of several offenses. It is for this reason that the government need prove only that a conspirator agreed to one of the many objectives charged to hold him liable for the other objectives of the agreement.... Because one conspiracy may have many illegal objectives, it will necessarily involve a number of sub-agreements to commit each of these specified objectives. Some members may concur in only some of the many objectives, yet they are liable for all because there is but one scheme, one enterprise, one conspiratorial web. 36 United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1249 (5th Cir.1978) (citations omitted), on rehearing en banc, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.1980), affirmed, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981). We conclude that the jury found a single conspiracy. It was instructed that proof of several separate conspiracies is not proof of the single conspiracy charged in the indictment unless one of the several conspiracies which is proved is the single conspiracy which the indictment charges and that if you should find that a particular Defendant was a member of some other conspiracy, not the one charged in the indictment, then you must acquit that Defendant. In other words, to find a Defendant guilty you must unanimously find that he was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment and not a member of some other separate conspiracy. We presume that the jury followed the court's instructions, Zafiro v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 933, 939, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993), and therefore do not agree with Toler that the verdict indicates that the jury found more than one conspiracy. 37 In considering whether one or multiple conspiracies exist, the principal factors are (1) the existence of a common goal, (2) the nature of the scheme and (3) overlapping of participants in the various dealings. United States v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir.1987). Here, appellants and others shared a common goal of enriching themselves by profiting from the leveraged selling and reselling of real estate along I-30. Compare id. (the common goal driving all members of the single conspiracy in this case was their personal gain through the fraud of Pool Offshore.) The nature of the scheme was such that different participants played different but important functions necessary to its success. Compare id. at 1154 (The nature of this conspiracy was that each member had a different task and level of involvement.... The success of this conspiracy depended on the continued willingness of each member to perform his function.). Finally there was considerable overlapping of participants in the various dealings. While no two transactions were identical, Faulkner and Toler would typically make the initial purchase of the real estate and then sell it with the help of appraisers, bankers and others they knew well or had personally selected. The same small group of appraisers, bankers, closers, syndicators and brokers would share in the cash thrown off from the land flips that followed. 38 Further, even if the evidence established and the jury found the existence of separate conspiracies, we find no reversible error in trying the appellants under an indictment alleging one conspiracy. The jury plainly found in its verdict on Count 1 that all four appellants participated in a conspiracy, and the evidence is sufficient to support that verdict. 17 A variance between the offense charged in the indictment and the proof relied upon at trial constitutes reversible error only if it affects the substantial rights of the defendant. Bruno, 809 F.2d at 1103; United States v. Hernandez, 962 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir.1992), quoted with approval in United States v. Limones, 8 F.3d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir.1993). We do not find such a variance here. 39 We turn to the font of jurisprudence on this subject, Kotteakos itself, and find it distinguishable. At the outset, we note that the Supreme Court's decision turned on the particular circumstances presented to it. 18 There, the variance was such that (1) [t]he indictment charged a single conspiracy only, 328 U.S. at 772, 66 S.Ct. at 1251, (2) [t]he jury could not possibly have found, upon the evidence, that there was only one conspiracy, id. at 768, 66 S.Ct. at 1249, and (3) there was no cautionary instruction given to the jury regarding the transference of guilt. In Kotteakos, a single indictment charged thirty-two defendants with involvement in a single conspiracy. Although the evidence established as many as eight separate conspiracies, the judge failed to give a precautionary jury instruction regarding transference of guilt. United States v. Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665, 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 322, 116 L.Ed.2d 263 (1991). The circumstances here are different. The indictment most assuredly charged a single conspiracy and makes reference to the conspiracy. However, as explained above, this is not a case where the jury could not possibly have found one conspiracy. Further, in our case the court gave cautionary instructions on transference of guilt. 19 40 In addition, [w]e have long held that when the indictment alleges the conspiracy count as a single conspiracy, but the 'government proves multiple conspiracies and a defendant's involvement in at least one of them, then clearly there is no variance affecting that defendant's substantial rights.'  United States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903, 911 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147, 1155 (5th Cir.1987)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2429, 124 L.Ed.2d 649 (1993). See also Limones, 8 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Jackson with approval); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir.) (If the Government proves multiple conspiracies and defendant's involvement in at least one of them, then clearly there is no variance affecting that defendant's substantial rights.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833, 101 S.Ct. 104, 66 L.Ed.2d 39 (1980); Jolley v. United States, 232 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir.1956) (If more than one conspiracy was proved, of at least one of which the appellant was guilty, it is clear that there was no variance affecting his substantial rights.), quoted with approval in United States v. Wayman, 510 F.2d 1020, 1025 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 846, 96 S.Ct. 84, 46 L.Ed.2d 67 (1975). We do not believe that our circuit has held this rule to be absolute; 20 nor do we believe that our circuit has delineated any clear-cut exceptions to this rule. We do believe that doctrine regarding variance between an indictment alleging a single conspiracy and proof of separate conspiracies is but one subset of the general concerns of improper joinder and severance. 21 We therefore conclude that where the indictment alleges a single conspiracy and the evidence establishes each defendant's participation in at least one conspiracy a defendant's substantial rights are affected only if the defendant can establish reversible error under general principles of joinder and severance. For the reasons explained in the preceding section of this opinion, we do not conclude that joinder was improper or that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motions for severance. Hence, we would find no reversible error even if we agreed with appellants that the evidence and jury verdict established the existence of multiple conspiracies. 41