Opinion ID: 3134872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Board’s Ability to Delegate the Authority to Make Layoffs

Text: In the circuit court and the appellate court, plaintiffs also argued that while section 34–18(31) permits the Board to promulgate a procedure for determining layoffs, it does not permit the Board to delegate to others the responsibility for implementing that procedure. Based primarily on the provision that the “right to employ, discharge, and layoff shall be vested solely with the board,” found in section 34–8.1 (105 ILCS 5/34–8.1 (West 1998)), the appellate court agreed. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 306-08. Before this court, the parties now agree that the Board may not only promulgate a procedure for determining layoffs, but may also delegate the authority for implementing that procedure. Nevertheless, we may not reverse this portion of the appellate court’s judgment merely because the parties are in agreement that the appellate court erred. We must examine the issue ourselves. The appellate court based its conclusion that the authority to make layoffs may not be delegated on “the statute’s unequivocal language.” 325 Ill. App. 3d at 307. In an earlier case, however, a different panel of the same appellate district found this language ambiguous. See Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board , 309 Ill. App. 3d 88, 100 (1999) (finding section 34–8.1 ambiguous and interpreting it to mean that the Board “may delegate a nonexclusive power, such as the power to suspend,” but may not delegate its “absolute authority”). A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two equally reasonable and conflicting interpretations. People v. Whitney , 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1999). Only if the statutory language is ambiguous may we consider extrinsic aids for construction, such as legislative history, to determine legislative intent. In the absence of ambiguity, we must rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words chosen by the legislature. Whitney , 188 Ill. 2d at 97-98. Further, where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must give it effect as written, without reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America , 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999). We agree with the appellate court that section 34–8.1 is unambiguous and that resort to extrinsic aids of construction is not appropriate. We do, however, conclude that the appellate court read more into this provision than its plain language justifies. Our conclusion necessarily overrules the Chicago School Reform court’s finding of ambiguity. The Board argues that section 34–18(31), by empowering the Board to “promulgate rules establishing procedures governing  layoff[s]” (105 ILCS 5/34–18(31) (West 1998)), expresses a legislative intent that such rules are “obviously for the use of [the board’s] administrators.” In keeping with this reading of section 34–18(31), the policy states in its introductory sentence: “The Chief Executive Officer recommends adoption of the following policy for use by the Board and administrators.” To “promulgate” is to “declare or announce publicly; to proclaim,” or to “put (a law or decree) into force or effect.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1231 (7th ed. 1999). There is nothing inherent in the act of promulgating rules or procedures that suggests someone other than the one announcing the rules will implement them. The Board could promulgate rules and procedures either as a means of instructing its agents or employees to whom the task will be delegated, or as a means of giving notice to affected parties of the procedures and criteria that it intends to apply. By enacting this provision authorizing the Board to promulgate rules, the legislature simply did not speak to the matter of delegating authority for layoffs. We conclude that section 34–18(31), standing alone, does not reveal either a legislative intent that the Board may delegate responsibility for carrying out the layoff policy or the opposite intent. The appellate court then looked to the language of section 34–8.1: “The right to employ, discharge, and layoff shall be vested solely with the board.” 105 ILCS 5/34–8.1 (West 1998). Relying on dictionary definitions of the words “vested” and “right,” the appellate court concluded that the Board alone is allowed to make layoffs and, thus, cannot implement a policy delegating this authority. These words, however, need not be read so narrowly. A right is a power or privilege to which one is entitled (325 Ill. App. 3d at 307; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1323 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “right” as a “power, privilege, or immunity secured to a person by law”)), but such entitlement does not preclude the delegation of that power or privilege to another. The appellate court also looked to an earlier edition of Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “vested” and found “ ‘giving the rights of absolute ownership.’ ” 325 Ill. App. 3d at 307, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1563 (6th ed. 1990). Black’s, however, defines a “vested right” as a “right that so completely and definitely belongs to a person that it cannot be impaired or taken away without the person’s consent .” (Emphasis added.) Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (7th ed. 1999). One could not delegate a right or privilege to another unless one was “vested” with the right in the first place. For example, a stockholder possesses the exclusive right to vote his or her shares, but may delegate that right by granting a proxy to another. A property owner is vested with the right to exclude others from his property by virtue of ownership in fee simple, but may delegate that right to another by granting a lease. Giving the words in this sentence their plain and ordinary meaning, we can conclude only that the Board has the exclusive power to employ, discharge, or lay off employees. Section 34–8.1, however, does not address the ability of the Board to delegate any of this responsibility, with one exception. The language at issue (“The right to employ, discharge, and layoff shall be vested solely with the board”) is contained in section 34–8.1, which is the provision that defines the powers and duties of principals. This sentence is immediately followed by: “The principal shall fill positions by appointment as provided in this Section and may make recommendations to the board regarding the employment, discharge, or layoff of any individual.” 105 ILCS 5/34–8.1 (West 1998). Thus, plaintiffs assert, the “vested solely” language is intended to describe the role of a principal vis-a-vis the Board. As between the principal and the Board, the Board has the sole authority to lay off employees; the principal’s role is entirely advisory. Reading section 34–8.1 as whole, it is clear that the Board is prohibited from delegating the responsibility for making layoffs to principals. The 17 paragraphs of section 34–8.1 not only define the powers and duties of principals, but also describe in detail the relationship between principals and the Board. For example, the engineer in charge is “[u]nder the direction of and subject to the authority of” the principal, while the Board “shall” establish a system of semiannual evaluations by which the principal will evaluate the performance of the engineer in charge. Similar provisions apply to the principal’s supervision of the food service manager. Each principal must hold a valid administrative certificate, but the Board may impose additional qualifications. With regard to layoffs, the Board has the sole right to make them, but the principal “may make recommendations to the board.” 105 ILCS 5/34–8.1 (West 1996). This section is clear and unambiguous–the determinations of whether layoffs are necessary and who will be laid off may not be made by principals. The role of principals is purely advisory. This reading is consistent with the language of section 34–18(31), which authorizes the Board to establish criteria for layoffs that include, but are not limited to, “qualifications, certifications, experience, performance ratings or evaluations, and any other factors relating to an employee’s job performance.” 105 ILCS 5/34–18(31) (West 1996). The Board chose to rely entirely on seniority as the basis for determining who would be laid off. If it were to adopt a policy under which job performance is a consideration, the input of the principals would be quite relevant. Under such a policy, however, the principal could only recommend, not decide, who should be laid off. Our reading of section 34–8.1 is also supported by its title, “Principals.” “When the legislature enacts an official title or heading to accompany a statutory provision, that title or heading is considered only as a ‘short-hand reference to the general subject matter involved’ in that statutory section, and ‘cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.’ ” Michigan Avenue National Bank , 191 Ill. 2d at 505-06, quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. , 331 U.S. 519, 528-29, 91 L. Ed. 1646, 1652, 67 S. Ct. 1387, 1391 (1947). Such official headings or titles are of use “ ‘only when they shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase’ ” within the text; they “ ‘cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain.’ ” Michigan Avenue National Bank , 191 Ill. 2d at 506, quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen , 331 U.S. at 529, 91 L. Ed. at 1652, 67 S. Ct. at 1392. In this case, we do not find the provision ambiguous so our consideration of the title or heading is not for the purpose of undoing or limiting the text. Rather, we find section 34–8.1 to be silent on the question of the Board’s ability to delegate layoff decisionmaking, other than with respect to principals. The title “Principals” is, however, consistent with our conclusion that section 34–8.1 deals with the powers and duties of principals, and the relationship of principals to the Board, but does not otherwise limit the powers of the Board provided for in section 34–18. We conclude that section 34–8.1 is not intended to impose a limitation on the power of the Board to delegate its layoff authority. If that had been the intent of the legislature, this language would have been moved in 1995 when other language affecting layoffs was deleted from section 34–84 and added to section 34–18. The continued presence of these words in section 34–8.1 is a clear indication of legislative intent that this language is a limit only on the role of principals. Although we agree with plaintiffs that the plain language of section 34–8.1 prohibits delegation of the authority to make layoffs to principals, we must still decide whether the Board may delegate this authority to anyone other than a principal. The Board offers five separate arguments in support of its claim that it may delegate layoff authority. First, when the legislature intends to prohibit delegation of the Board’s authority, it does so expressly, as in section 34–19 of the School Code. See 105 ILCS 5/34–19 (West 1998). Second, when the legislature intends for the Board to take action on a given matter, it makes that requirement explicit. See 105 ILCS 5/34–18 (West 1998) (various subsections provide that the Board “shall” carry out certain duties and “may” perform others); 105 ILCS 5/34–85 (West 1998) (providing that, after a hearing, the Board “shall make a decision as to whether the teacher or principal shall be dismissed”). Third, the case law has recognized that delegation of the Board’s powers is permissible. Fourth, legislative history demonstrates intent to permit delegation. And fifth, policy considerations weigh in favor of permitting delegation. We find the Board’s first argument dispositive and, therefore, need not address the remaining arguments. The Board’s first argument is that an entirely separate section of the School Code authorizes the delegation of layoff authority. Section 34–19 is entitled “By-laws, rules and regulations; business transacted at regular meetings; voting; records” and provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision in this Article or in the School Code, the board may delegate to the general superintendent or to the attorney the authorities granted to the board in the School Code.” 105 ILCS 5/34–19 (West 1998). The delegation provision also requires that “appropriate oversight procedures” be established, and lists six nondelegable functions, none of which are relevant in this case. “[C]ourts should not, under the guise of statutory construction, add requirements or impose limitations that are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the enactment.” Nottage v. Jeka , 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). The holding of the appellate court is in direct conflict with section 34–19, which expressly authorizes the Board to delegate all but six enumerated functions to either the general superintendent or the attorney. In sum, we find no language in any applicable provision of the School Code that indicates the legislature’s intent to prohibit delegation of the authority to make layoffs to anyone other than principals, and we find express authorization of delegation to the general superintendent and attorney. We reverse that portion of the appellate court’s judgment holding that the Board is entirely prohibited from delegating its layoff authority. On the record before us, we need not determine whether the authority may be delegated to officers or administrators other than the general superintendent and attorney.