Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rojas's Involvement

Text: Out of the presence of the jury, the parties and the trial court discussed the evidence that would be admitted about the Spring J. incident. Defendant stated that he planned to cross-examine Rojas extensively about that incident to show that Rojas was most likely the murderer or one of the murderers, and thus raise a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt. Defendant argued that, because Rojas was involved in Spring's rape, which was executed in a manner similar to Medina's rape, and because the earlier incident occurred close in time and place to the incident for which he was currently on trial, Rojas must be guilty of Medina's rape and the murders. The court ruled the evidence that Rojas had raped and threatened Spring, as well as the evidence that he knew, when he signed a contract with the prosecution, that she had identified him as one of the men who had raped her, was admissible to impeach Rojas's credibility. Finding insufficient connection between Rojas's involvement in Spring's rape and the charged crimes, however, it ruled the evidence inadmissible to show Rojas's guilt of Medina's rape and the murders. (Evid. Code, §§ 250, 352.) The court also excluded generally any evidence on the Spring J. incident unless it was offered to rebut evidence admitted for limited purposes. Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Rojas's involvement in the Spring J. incident on grounds that it was insufficient to support defendant's third party culpability theory, and was more prejudicial than probative. Any relevant evidence that raises a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt, including evidence tending to show that a party other than the defendant committed the offense charged, is admissible. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 829, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99; see also People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 372, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34; Evid.Code, §§ 210, 350, 351.) But evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. ( People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833, 226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99.) Relevant evidence may be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 if it creates a substantial danger of undue consumption of time or of prejudicing, confusing, or misleading the jury. ( Hall, at p. 829, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99.) We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's rulings on relevance and the exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1195, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Evidence that Rojas raped Spring on the same night and in the same location where Medina was later raped might have shown Rojas had the motive or opportunity to rape Medina, but it was insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt inasmuch as the evidence in this case showed that more than one individual was responsible for the rape and murders. Moreover, defendant's argument that Rojas's involvement in the earlier rape of Spring raised an inference that he (Rojas) killed Medina and Sanchez is too speculative to raise a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt of the murders.