Opinion ID: 774674
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consistency with Statutes and Regulations

Text: 16 We hold that the approach used by the Board in this case is indeed consistent with the statutory and regulatory criteria for LEO retirement credit. The express language of the regulations promulgated under the CSRS and FERS statutes provides support for considering the reason for the position's existence as part of the LEO-eligibility analysis. A LEO is defined in both the CSRS and the FERS statutes as one the duties of whose position are primarily the investigation, apprehension, or detention of those suspected or convicted of federal offenses. 5 U.S.C. 8331(20), 8401(17) (emphasis added). Thus, under the statutes, an employee may only receive LEO retirement credit if the position he or she occupies primarily involves certain specified duties. 17 Moreover, the Board's approach is consistent with OPM regulations. The inclusion of the conjunctive and in sections 831.902 and 842.802 clearly indicates that all three criteria must be demonstrated in order for a position to be LEO-eligible. The 6-factor Bingaman test only considered prongs (ii) and (iii) to determine whether the officers' duties occupied a substantial portion of their working time (prong (ii)), and were assigned on a regular and recurring basis (prong (iii)). 3 The approach used by the Board here affirmatively involves consideration of prong (i) of sections 831.902 and 842.802 so as to ensure that in addition to consisting of duties that occupy a substantial portion, if not 50 percent or more, of the officer's working time and that occurred on a regular and recurring basis, the position exists currently as a LEO position. 18 Placing emphasis on why the position exists is also consistent with the legislative intent in providing for the LEO retirement program: to limit LEO-eligibility to rigorous positions that retirement at an unusually early age is appropriate. A Senate Report stated that LEO positions should be composed, insofar as possible of young men and women physically capable of meeting the vigorous demands of occupations which are far more taxing physically than most in the federal service. S. Rep. No. 93-948, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3698, 3699. Accordingly, Congress established maximum retirement ages for LEO employees such as FBI Special Agents and for employees serving in other positions which are statutorily entitled to LEO retirement coverage. See 5 U.S.C. 8335, 8425. LEO employees, for instance, are often required to retire no later than between 55 and 57 years of age, or when they have accrued twenty years of creditable service if they are beyond those ages when they completed the twenty years. See id. Congress further has authorized an agency head to determine and fix minimum and maximum limits of age within which an original appointment may be made to a LEO position. See 5 U.S.C. 3307(e) (1994). For instance, all Department of Justice LEO positions have a maximum entry age of 37, which may be waived for applicants up to 40 years of age. In assessing why the position exists, factors such as an early mandatory retirement age and a maximum entry age should be considered in determining whether the basic reasons for the existence of the position consists of duties that will make the employee LEO-eligible. Examination of such factors will be quite probative in determining whether the position really exists as a LEO position, that is, its job description and actual duties consist of tasks that only a young and physically fit individual could perform. 19 The dissent concludes that the Board improperly treated the purpose of the 'existence' of the position . . . as turning on the basic reasons for the position's 'creation.' 4 Although in several places, including the concluding paragraph, the Board's opinion misstates the law as requiring that the position be created primarily for the performance of LEO duties, the Board's examination of the duties actually performed by the officers demonstrates that it knew it had to determine the reasons why the position existed at the time of application for LEO credit, not merely when it was originally created. As noted by the dissent, early in its opinion, the Board stated that under its new, position-oriented approach, if the position was not created for the purpose of investigation, apprehension, or detention, then the incumbents of the position would not be entitled to LEO credit. Watson, 86 M.S.P.R. at 321. Significantly, however, the Board did not stop there. It went on to state in the very next sentence: 20 This is not to say that the Board will not consider evidence of what duties the appellants performed from day-to-day in the GS-083 Police Officer position. Rather, the Board will consider that evidence, along with all of the other evidence of record, to ascertain whether the appellant is entitled to LEO retirement coverage. 21 Id. This statement indicates that the Board knew that even if the official documentation of the position's creation did not support an applicant's LEO eligibility, the Board still needed to inquire into the applicant's actual duties as alleged. Moreover, in describing why it was departing from the Bremby approach, the Board specifically noted that its new approach would more affirmatively take into account the basic reasons for the existence of the position. Id. (emphases added). 22 The Board's approach included consideration of both the position documentation and actual duties. First, the Board determined the purpose for the creation of the officers' position in the GS-083 series. Id. This is an altogether logical and proper place to begin. In doing so, it considered the OPM Classification Standards, the OPM Guide, and the Position Description. Id. at 323-26. It found that, as created, the position was not LEO-eligible. Id. at 326. The Board next determined whether the purpose for the position changed, i.e., whether the purpose for the position's existence was different than the purpose for its creation. Id. at 321. In doing so, it considered -- in equivalent detail and at an equivalent length of its treatment of position documents -- the testimony regarding the officers' actual, day-to-day duties. Id. It found that the basic reasons for the position's existence were not different from those for its creation, and thus, that the officers were not LEO-eligible. Id. at 328. This second step was also proper and necessary, as the Board clearly understood. In concluding its analysis, the Board stated: While an incumbent's actual duties are relevant . . . the evidence of the actual duties performed in these cases does not persuade us that -- contrary to the official documentation of the position -- 'the basic reasons for the existence of the position' was [sic] actually investigation, apprehension, or detention. Id. If the Board believed that eligibility for LEO retirement credit is determined solely by the reasons for the position's creation, it would not need to consider, much less devote equivalent treatment to, the testimony regarding the officers' day-to-day duties. Nor did it consider actual duties only as an alternative ground for decision. Indeed, the Board specifically noted that its new position-oriented approach did not foreclose other officers in the GS-083 series from showing that the basic reasons for the existence of their positions had shifted from peace-keeping to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of criminals or suspects. Id. at 330 n.7. 23 We note that footnote 7 of the Board's opinion, like the concluding paragraph, incorrectly states the law as requiring that applicants must show that the position was created as an LEO-position. Id. However, the portion of the Board's opinion explaining its analysis reflects that it correctly understood that the reasons for the position's existence, not merely its creation, are determinative. Such reasons could be shown by proof that the duties an employee performs day-to-day differ from those of the OPM classification standards, the OPM Guide, or the Position Description. Id. at 321; see also Ellis v. United States, 610 F.2d 760 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (finding that the duties actually performed by the officer were not properly set forth in their position description, and thus granting a retirement annuity under 5 U.S.C. 8331(21)). By providing this alternative way to show entitlement to LEO credit, the Board necessarily concluded that the reasons for the existence of the position can be established not only by the position papers but also by actual duties performed. Thus, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we conclude that the Board applied the correct legal standard. The Board's analysis properly included the reasons for the position's existence, and not merely its creation.