Opinion ID: 589625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Special Relationship Custody

Text: 18 We commence our analysis by reiterating the well-established principle that the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty upon the state to protect its citizens. Rather, it serves as a limitation on the state's power to act. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1002, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989); Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir.1990). However, when the state enters into a special relationship with a particular citizen, it may be held liable for failing to protect him or her from the private actions of third parties. Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, Ala., 880 F.2d 348, 352 (11th Cir.1989). This liability attaches under § 1983 when the state fails, under sufficiently culpable circumstances, to protect the health and safety of the citizen to whom it owes an affirmative duty. See Cornelius, 880 F.2d at 353. 19 We must decide at the outset whether the school defendants had such a special relationship with the plaintiffs during school hours that they owed plaintiffs a constitutional duty to protect them from the misconduct of the student defendants. Plaintiffs argue that one way the state can enter into a duty-producing relationship under this theory is by restraining a citizen's freedom to act on his or her own behalf. In addressing this argument, we turn to one of the seminal Supreme Court cases shedding light on § 1983 liability in this area. 20 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), the Court declined to impose a constitutional duty upon a state to protect the life, liberty or property of a citizen from deprivations by private actors absent the existence of a special relationship. DeShaney involved the state's repeated receipt of reports of abuse of a minor by his father. Notwithstanding the notice provided by the reports to the state agency, it did not remove the child from his father's custody. 10 The father subsequently beat the child resulting in permanent brain damage. The child and his mother filed a § 1983 action against state officials claiming that they deprived the minor of his liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him against a risk of violence at his father's hands of which they knew or should have known. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193, 109 S.Ct. at 1002. 21 After stating the general rule that a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause, id. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004, the Court went on to acknowledge that in certain limited circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular individuals. DeShaney at 198, 109 S.Ct. at 1004-05. The Court noted that it first recognized such an exception in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The Court in Estelle held that the state had an affirmative duty to provide adequate medical care for prisoners since incarceration prevents an inmate from caring for himself. Id. at 103-04, 97 S.Ct. at 290-91. 22 The Court extended the Estelle exception from the Eighth Amendment context to a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). According to the DeShaney court, it there held that the Constitution imposed a duty upon the state to provide involuntarily committed mental patients such services as are necessary to ensure their 'reasonable safety' from themselves and others. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199, 109 S.Ct. at 1005. The Court also pointed out in DeShaney, without editorial comment, that several appellate courts had analogized foster children to individuals who fall within the Estelle and Youngberg exceptions. Id. at 201 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. at 1006 n. 9. These courts imposed liability on the state for failing to protect children that the state placed in the care of foster parents when such placement resulted in abuse. 23 In commenting on each situation constituting a departure from the general rule, the Court noted: 24 [I]t is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-- through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty--which is the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means. 25 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at 1006 (emphasis added). Focusing primarily on physical restraint, the Court concluded that the Estelle- Youngberg exception was inapplicable to Joshua DeShaney's case since the conduct did not occur while the child was in the state's custody. 26 Although the Court decided that Joshua's situation did not amount to state custody, it left open the possibility that the duty owed by a state to prisoners and the institutionalized might also be owed to other categories of persons in custody by means of similar restraints of personal liberty. Id. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at 1006. Plaintiffs seek to bring themselves within the quoted language. 27 Plaintiffs assert that Pennsylvania's scheme of compulsory attendance and the school defendants' exercise of in loco parentis authority over their pupils so restrain school children's liberty that plaintiffs can be considered to have been in state custody during school hours for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. We consider this to be an open question in this circuit. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 882 F.2d 720, 724 (3d Cir.1989). 28 Pennsylvania law mandates that every child of compulsory school age attend a day school. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24 § 13-1327. Both children and their parents may be penalized for the child's truancy. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24 §§ 13-1333 and 13-1343. However, a child is only of compulsory school age until the age of seventeen (17) years. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24 § 13-1326 (emphasis added). At the time of the incidents alleged, D.R. was sixteen and L.H. was seventeen years old. Appendix at 336. Thus, Pennsylvania law only mandated D.R.'s attendance. To the extent that plaintiffs' argument is dependant upon the compulsion provided by section 13-1327, it is, therefore, only applicable to D.R. 29 In order to decide whether a special relationship of constitutional proportions exists between the school defendants and D.R. by virtue of the Pennsylvania statutes, we must consider the DeShaney Court's rationale for the Estelle- Youngberg exception. The Court explained its reasoning as follows: 30 [W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs--e.g. food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety--it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 31 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-06. Thus, the question presented to us is whether compulsory attendance paired with the in loco parentis authority of the school defendants resulted in such an affirmative restraint of D.R.'s liberty by the state that she was left without reasonable means of self-protection and, indeed, whether the focus should be confined to the school day. 32 Our court has read DeShaney primarily as setting out a test of physical custody. Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 167 (3d Cir.1989) (the state continues to owe an affirmative duty to protect those physically in its custody). See also, Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459 (3d Cir.1990) (deciding no Youngberg duty of care exists for mentally retarded adult voluntarily placed at institution because state has not substantially curtailed his freedom). The issue in Philadelphia Police was whether the state could be held liable for withdrawing vocational and support services provided in a daily program for mentally handicapped children. While admitting that cessation of services would be detrimental to the children, this court refused to expand the Estelle- Youngberg custody exception to these children since it was impossible to find an affirmative duty to protect the mentally retarded living at home. Id. at 168. In essence, the court did not believe that such intermittent custody gives rise to an affirmative duty on the state's part. Id. at 168 n. 9. 33 D.R. argues that, unlike the plaintiffs in Philadelphia Police who chose to receive state services, or plaintiff's decedent in Fialkowski who was voluntarily placed at the state institution, she was legally compelled to attend school and was placed under the control of state actors who were given parental authority over her as a matter of law. She therefore contends that she was in the state's custody during school hours within the rationale of the Estelle- Youngberg exception. She relies on the Supreme Court's explanation that Estelle and Youngberg together stand for the proposition that when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005. 34 The Estelle- Youngberg type custody referred to by the Court in DeShaney, however, is to be sharply contrasted with D.R.'s situation. The state's duty to prisoners and involuntarily committed patients exists because of the full time severe and continuous state restriction of liberty in both environments. Institutionalized persons are wholly dependant upon the state for food, shelter, clothing and safety. It is not within their power to provide for themselves, nor are they given the opportunity to seek outside help to meet their basic needs. Obviously, they are not free to leave. 35 Here it is the parents who decide whether that education will take place in the home, in public or private schools or, as here, in a vocational-technical school. Id. For some, the options may be limited for financial reasons. However, even when enrolled in public school parents retain the discretion to remove the child from classes as they see fit, see Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24 § 15-1546 (1962 & Supp.1991) (religious instruction); 22 Pa.Code § 11.26 (1992) (non-school sponsored educational trips and tours); Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24 § 13-1329 (1962) (healthcare), subject only to truancy penalties for continued periods of unexcused absence. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24 §§ 13-1333 and 13-1343. In the case of special education students, the parents have even greater involvement since they must approve the precise educational program developed for their child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988); 22 Pa.Code §§ 14.32, 14.61-68 (1992). Moreover, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized, even without reference to the Pennsylvania School Code or related statutes, it [cannot] be denied that a parent is justified in withdrawing his child from a school where the health and welfare of the child is threatened. Zebra v. School District of City of Pittsburgh, 449 Pa. 432, 296 A.2d 748 (1972). 36 Our view that parents remain the primary caretakers, despite their presence in school, is not affected by section 13-1317 which grants Pennsylvania teachers and principals in loco parentis status. Section 13-1317 operates in conjunction with section 5-510. Together they permit school boards to set reasonable regulations to govern students' conduct. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24 § 5-510 (1962 & Supp.1991). However, section 13-1317 invests in school officials only such control as is reasonably necessary to prevent infractions of discipline and interference with the educational process. Axtell v. Lapenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971). As the Commonwealth court concluded, section 13-1317 invests authority in public school teachers; it does not impose a duty upon them. Pennsylvania State Education Association v. Department of Public Welfare, 68 Pa.Comm. 279, 449 A.2d 89, 92 (1982) (emphasis in original) (holding that teachers are not among those persons responsible for a child's welfare under § 2203 of the Child Protective Services Law, Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 11 §§ 2201-2224 (1962), now codified at 23 P.C.S.A. § 6311 (1991)). 37 By requiring D.R. to attend assigned classes at Middle Bucks as part of her high school educational program, and authorizing officials to engage in disciplinary control over the students, the school defendants did not restrict D.R.'s freedom to the extent that she was prevented from meeting her basic needs. See Fialkowski, 921 F.2d at 465-66 (mentally retarded adult's liberty not restrained by state where the Fialkowskis were free to remove their son from [the state institution] if they wished [and] Walter Fialkowski himself enjoyed considerable freedom of movement.) Thus, the school defendants' authority over D.R. during the school day cannot be said to create the type of physical custody necessary to bring it within the special relationship noted in DeShaney, particularly when their channels for outside communication were not totally closed. 38 The analogy between school children and prisoners or the involuntarily committed is weakened further by the fact that school children remain resident in their homes. Thus, they may turn to persons unrelated to the state for help on a daily basis. D.R.'s complaint alleges an ongoing series of assaults and abuse over a period of months. Although these acts allegedly took place during the school day, D.R. could, and did, leave the school building every day. The state did nothing to restrict her liberty after school hours and thus did not deny her meaningful access to sources of help. 39 As noted previously, some courts have imposed a constitutional duty to protect foster children by analogy to involuntarily institutionalized individuals. See, Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (1981), after remand, 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983); Taylor By and Through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 1337, 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). We, of course, are not called upon to decide the foster care issue. Nevertheless, we do note that although the situation of a public school student is perhaps closer to that of a foster child than to an institutionalized person, the foster care analogy is not decisive. 40 A relationship between the state and foster children arises out of the state's affirmative act in finding the children and placing them with state-approved families. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794-97. By so doing, the state assumes an important continuing, if not immediate, responsibility for the child's well-being. In addition, the child's placement renders him or her dependent upon the state, through the foster family, to meet the child's basic needs. Id. Students, on the other hand, do not depend upon the schools to provide for their basic human needs. Public school students are required to spend only 180 six-hour days in the classroom per year. Pa.Stat.Ann., tit. 24 §§ 13-1327(b), 15-1501, 15-1504(a) (1962 & Supp.1991). Even during the school day, however, parents or others remain a child's primary caretakers and decisionmakers. See e.g., Pa.Stat.Ann., tit. 24 § 14-1406 (1962) (parents responsible for necessary medical treatment). Pennsylvania's compulsory attendance law demands only that parents ensure that their child receive an appropriate education. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24 § 13-1327. Thus, the relationship between foster children and public school students is not controlling here. 41 Our view of the public school function with respect to its students seems to be in harmony with the Supreme Court's description of that institution in the context of denying school children Eighth Amendment protection from corporal punishment. There the Court said: 42 The school child has little need for the protection of the Eighth Amendment. Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the public school remains an open institution. Except perhaps when very young, the child is not physically restrained from leaving school during school hours; and at the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment. 43 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670, 97 S.Ct. at 1412. 44 Our position that no special relationship based upon a restraint of liberty exists here is in accord with the only other appellate case to directly confront this issue to date. In J.O. v. Alton Community Unit School Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir.1990), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that compulsory attendance laws did not liken school children to prisoners and the involuntarily committed, both of whom are unable to provide for their own basic human needs. Instead, the Seventh Circuit determined that parents have primary responsibility to provide for the basic needs of their children and that both school children and parents retain substantial freedom to act. Id. at 272.