Opinion ID: 2581100
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Code section 352 and Payne v. Tennessee

Text: In addition to objecting to victim impact evidence on ex post facto grounds, defendant argued the evidence should be excluded as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352, as well as outside the scope of Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, thus violating his right to due process and a reliable penalty determination. In Payne v. Tennessee , the United States Supreme Court partially overruled Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 and South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876, which had categorically foreclosed both evidence and argument regarding victim impact. Instead, the court held that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. ( Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597.) [A] State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant. `[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597.) In People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, this court explained the effect of this reversal on California death penalty law. Although victim impact is not expressly enumerated as a statutory aggravating factor, we concluded such evidence was generally admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a). [3] ( Edwards, at p. 833, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) The word `circumstances' as used in factor (a) of section 190.3 does not mean merely the immediate temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime. Rather it extends to `[t]hat which surrounds materially, morally, or logically' the crime. [Citation.] The specific harm caused by the defendant does surround the crime `materially, morally, or logically.' ( Ibid. ) `[A]t the penalty phase the jury decides a question the resolution of which turns not only on the facts, but on the jury's moral assessment of those facts as they reflect on whether defendant should be put to death. It is not only appropriate, but necessary, that the jury weigh the sympathetic elements of defendant's background against those that may offend the conscience. [Citations.]' ( Id. at p. 834, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 863-864, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) In sum, the injury inflicted is generally a circumstance of the crime as that phrase is commonly understood. We need not divorce the injury from the acts. ( Edwards, at p. 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) This holding was not without limits, however, and only encompasses evidence that logically shows the harm caused by the defendant. ( Ibid.; see also Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597 [due process prohibits the introduction of victim impact evidence so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair].) With these guiding considerations in mind, we turn to the specific evidence at issue, keeping in mind that at the penalty phase defendant offered section 190.3, factor (k) testimony describing an abusive and troubled childhood, in addition to a psychiatrist's opinion he suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder and other mental disorders, and guilt phase evidence he acted under the influence of drugs. The prosecution's evidence generally fell into two categories: testimony by the surviving assault victims, John Terezia, Officer Henninger, and Officer Overly and testimony from Officer Reed's family members. With regard to the assault victims' own injuries, we have held such evidence admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1172, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937; see People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 795-797, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.) If victim impact evidence is permitted under factor (b), it should certainly be permitted under factor (a). ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) Defendant objects, however, that because the retrial occurred 20 years after the crimes, the additional testimony as to how the witnesses were coping with what happened the night of the murder and were still suffering from their injuries was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Defendant cites no authority or rationale for temporally circumscribing the scope of victim impact evidence as he proposes. (See id. at p. 833, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) Indeed, it is only logical that the effects, both psychological and physical, of a violent and murderous assault such as defendant's would be enduring. As a direct result of defendant's crimes, such effects are plainly relevant ( People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1062-1063, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277); and we find nothing in the particular testimony unduly inflammatory or otherwise prejudicial. ( Ibid.; see People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 573, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137; see also People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 235-236, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222.) Moreover, Henninger testified that the incident had had a positive effect on his day-to-day living and that he had moved forward with what was important to me and to the community and to my family. Overly similarly felt that it had actually helped me to become a better police officer because I realize through the activity that night things that I needed to do that ... enhanced my abilities to be a better police officer. Also in a positive vein, Terezia, who had been shot between the eyes and required several years of rehabilitation to relearn basic functions, had been assisted in the process by his wife, who would not let him feel sorry for himself. Defendant contends testimony by Terezia's wife was irrelevant because she herself had not been a crime victim. While not a direct victim of the assault, she was a witness to the impact on Terezia, and her testimony was limited to giving additional details about his rehabilitation. With regard to testimony by Reed's surviving family members, we find nothing in their testimony that went beyond the scope of admissible victim impact testimony under People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436. For the most part, their testimony concerned either the immediate effects of the murder  such as Linda Reed's description of the circumstances the night of the killing when she was informed of the death of her husband and Randell Novell's recounting the next day seeing newspaper headlines of the incident  or the residual and lasting impact they continued to experience  such as Novell's feelings when passing his brother's grave. (See People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1182, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 444-445, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) To the extent they also recollected past incidents or activities they shared with Reed, their testimony simply served to explain why they continued to be affected by his loss and to show the victim's `uniqueness as an individual human being,' whatever the jury might think the loss to the community resulting from his death might be. ( Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 823, 111 S.Ct. 2597.) In this regard, the United States Supreme Court in Payne acknowledged that just as the defendant is entitled to be humanized, so too is the victim: `[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.' ( Id. at p. 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597 quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 122, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (maj. opn. of Cardozo, J.); see also Pollock, at p. 1182, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353.) Defendant contends Novell's testimony about his custom of saluting his brother's grave every time he drives past the cemetery and Reed's father's testimony he has not gone fishing since his son's death constituted inadmissible evidence. We consider these simply manifestations of the psychological impact experienced by the victims, in no way inconsistent with our prior decisions nor fundamentally unfair within the meaning of Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at page 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597. Each in its own respect, these responses are understandable human reactions, particularly Novell's given the circumstances of the crime  a police officer deliberately killed in the line of duty. Defendant further argues that the Reed family members were not direct witnesses to the crime and for that reason should not have been permitted to testify. We find no authority for such a rule, which would eliminate the vast majority of victim impact evidence in murder cases  a result inconsistent with the underlying rationale of Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 819, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, that the assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged has understandably been an important concern of the criminal law.... In the case of murder, the harm caused will first and foremost be suffered by surviving family members.