Opinion ID: 721002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Segregation and Discipline Without a Hearing

Text: 12 Kenny contends that jail officials deprived him of due process by placing him in disciplinary segregation for 48 hours and in administrative segregation for approximately five weeks without prior notice and a hearing. The district court concluded that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. We agree. 13 Law enforcement officers who raise a defense of qualified immunity in a civil rights action should prevail if, at the time of the challenged action, the right asserted by the plaintiff was not clearly established or an officer could have reasonably believed that his conduct was lawful. Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.1991). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the right in question was clearly established. Id. 14 In 1989, when the events underlying this action occurred, it was clearly established that the right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment precludes punishment of a pretrial detainee. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). It was also clear that jail officials may impose appropriate restraints and restrictions on detainees for the legitimate purpose of maintaining jail security and order. See id. at 540; see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984) (jail policy prohibiting contact visits not unconstitutional where policy was based on legitimate safety concerns). 15 Here, appellees contend that they placed Kenny in administration segregation as a security measure in response to several instances of threatening and assaultive behavior, action that is constitutionally permissible under Bell. They contend further that neither due process nor their own regulations required a hearing before placing Kenny in administrative segregation. Kenny argues that placement in ad seg is in effect punishment, because the conditions are almost the same as conditions in disciplinary segregation. 16 Resolution of the issue is unnecessary because, whether Kenny was segregated to protect staff and other inmates or because he violated jail rules, it was not clearly established that a prior hearing was required. This court recently held for the first time that a pretrial detainees may be subjected to disciplinary segregation only with a due process hearing to determine whether they have in fact violated any rule. Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir.1996) (footnote omitted); see also Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 291 & n. 5 (7th Cir.1995) (segregation of detainee without a hearing did not violate due process where it was done for legitimate security reasons, and declining to hold that every placement in ad seg of pretrial detainee constitutes punishment). Because it was not clearly established that a pretrial detainee had a right to a hearing before he could be placed in disciplinary or administrative segregation, appellees are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See Mitchell, 75 F.3d at 524. The other instances of minor discipline imposed on Kenny, such as suspension of commissary privileges, do not rise to a level that implicates constitutional protections. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n. 21. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. See Romero, 931 F.2d at 627.