Opinion ID: 405364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 11 Section 921(c) of the LHWCA provides that (a)ny party adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred.... 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (emphasis supplied). Although none of the parties has raised the issue of whether the Board's action in this case constitutes a final order, it is our threshold duty to determine whether we have subject-matter jurisdiction of this petition for review. Accordingly, we must inquire whether Ingalls' petition for review from a remand order of the Benefits Review Board is final under § 921(c). 12 The final order requirement of § 921(c) furthers the same policies as the finality rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Thus, finality under both statutes holds the same meaning. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Brodka, 643 F.2d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 1981). It is a well-established rule of appellate jurisdiction that a remand order to an administrative agency is ordinarily not treated as a final order. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 626 F.2d 106, 108 (9th Cir. 1980). 1 This circuit has followed the rule of other circuits in holding that this general rule mandates dismissal of a petition for review from a remand order of the Benefits Review Board if the court finds that the Board's decision is not a final order. United Fruit Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 546 F.2d 1224, 1225 (5th Cir. 1977). 2 13 Like every rule, however, this principle of appellate jurisdiction has exceptions. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., supra, 626 F.2d at 108. We hold that the appeal in this case falls within the exception to the final judgment rule as stated in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-54, 85 S.Ct. 308, 311, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964). In Gillespie, the administratrix of the estate of her son, Daniel, brought actions against the vessel owner-employer to recover damages for Daniel's death for herself and on behalf of Daniel's brother and sisters under the Jones Act and the Ohio wrongful death statute. The vessel owner moved to dismiss all reference to the laws of Ohio and the claims of Daniel's brother and sisters. The trial court granted the motion. Gillespie appealed for herself, joined by the brother and sisters. The vessel owner moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the rulings appealed from were not final decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Sixth Circuit reached the merits of the controversy without deciding the question of appealability. The Supreme Court reversed on the merits, but held that the decision of the trial court was final for purposes of § 1291. 14 The Court recognized that the question of finality was frequently so close that it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming within what might well be called the 'twilight zone' of finality. 379 U.S. at 152, 85 S.Ct. at 311. The requirement of finality, therefore, is to be given a 'practical rather than a technical construction.'  Id., quoting from Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). This practical assessment involves two competing considerations:  'the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.'  Id. at 152-53, 85 S.Ct. at 311. Finding that the eventual costs would be less if it reached the merits and that to do otherwise would unnecessarily delay recovery, the Supreme Court held that a practical interpretation of § 1291 justified its maintaining jurisdiction of the appeal. 3 15 We conclude that a decision on the merits of this appeal does not raise the spector of piecemeal review before the court. The only issue presented that is directly related to the remand order is whether the ALJ made the appropriate findings in his original order approving settlement. The remaining issues, which involve the standing of the Director and the authority of the ALJ to approve lump-sum settlements, are purely matters of law and are final in that they have been litigated and decided by the Benefits Review Board. The question of whether the ALJ's order approving settlement conformed with Clefstad does not undermine finality in this instance for the following reasons. 16 If we were to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction to allow the ALJ to reconsider the settlement and if we were to find on a later appeal that the ALJ lacked authority to approve lump-sum settlements, a dismissal at this stage in the proceedings would be entirely purposeless, for the ALJ's power to reconsider the settlement depends completely on our interpretation of the relevant enabling statute. This result would create much greater cost and inconvenience than would an immediate decision on the merits. Moreover, a dismissal with the threat of reversal on future appeal ultimately could work a harsh injustice on the claimant, since the delay caused by dismissal could put him that much further off from the recovery to which he unquestionably is entitled. Failure to dismiss, by contrast, poses no similar potential for prejudice to Ingalls. 17 Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S. A. Panama, 564 F.2d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1977), supports our consideration of these consequences. Wescott sued Impresas for injuries he sustained while working as a longshoreman employed by Brady Hamilton Stevedore Company aboard a ship owned by Impresas. Brady intervened to deny its negligence and to recover against Impresas any monies paid to Wescott for workmen's compensation. The jury decided the special issues in favor of the longshoreman, and the district court denied Impresas' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In denying the motion, the district judge did not address the intervening employer's counterclaim against Impresas. Applying the practical test of Gillespie, the Ninth Circuit refused to dismiss the appeal to permit the district court to resolve the dispute as to the intervenor's rights against Impresas for two reasons, both of which are compelling in the instant appeal. First, the intervenor's rights turned solely on matters of law. See also Lockwood v. Wolf Corp., 629 F.2d 603, 608 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Harris, 578 F.2d 52, 54 n.1 (3d Cir. 1978). Second, the court recognized that if it held that the district court should have granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict, then a dismissal to the trial court would be futile because the intervenor's rights were dependent on a judgment in favor of the plaintiff-just as the ALJ's authority in this case is dependent on a decision in favor of Ingalls. 18 Upon balancing the competing considerations above, we find that the facts here fall within the unique situation that is established as an exception to technical finality in Gillespie. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 478 n.30, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2462 n.30, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). We, therefore, hold that the decision of the Benefits Review Board is a final order within the meaning of § 921(c), and that we may properly entertain jurisdiction of the appeal.