Opinion ID: 2456463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Challenge Effectiveness of Trial Counsel

Text: Holmes claims appellate counsel in Holmes II was ineffective because he failed to challenge the strategy of Holmes' trial counsel. More specifically, Holmes argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to advance a non-guilt based defense, and appellate counsel himself was ineffective by failing to brief this issue on direct appeal. Holmes' argument requires a review of the material facts. As we explained in Holmes I and II, Holmes and his girlfriend, Glenda Smith, spent March 6, 1999, together in Smith's home. Holmes did heroin, cocaine, and smoked crack in the home, while Smith injected cocaine. Because of the drugs, Smith showed signs of paranoia, looking out the window and holding a knife. While they were later in bed, Smith began to nag Holmes. Because Holmes knew she had previously armed herself when paranoid, and fearing what she might now do, he hit her in the head with a hammer. She jumped screaming from the bed and grabbed her handgun. As they struggled for control of the gun, the fight moved to the hallway. As one of them pulled the trigger, the gun clicked several times but did not discharge. Holmes pushed Smith to the floor and held her with a knee against her chest. The gun was pointed at her chest. She continued to fight, with both her hands and one of Holmes' on the gun. He threatened that he could or would kill her. She continued to fight when the gun fired, propelling a bullet into her heart. The entry was a contact wound, indicating the gun had been against Smith's skin when it discharged. Believing Smith was dead, Holmes immediately went into the bathroom and injected a combination of cocaine and heroin. Because he was going to jail, he figured, what the hell, he would go ahead and finish up the drugs. 272 Kan. at 493, 33 P.3d 856. He then went into a drug-induced seizure. When he recovered the morning of March 7, he called 911 and told the dispatcher that he had shot his girlfriend. 272 Kan. at 493, 33 P.3d 856. Holmes told both the police and the jury the shooting was an accident. Holmes' counsel's arguments during his closing included characterizing the shooting as accidental. An accident is certainly a complete defense to the crimes of first-degree murder, intentional second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter because all three require the killing be done intentionally, which is defined as conduct that is purposeful and willful and not accidental. (Emphasis added.) See PIK Crim.3d 56.04(d). Accordingly, contrary to Holmes' present appellate argument, a nonguilt-based defense was raised for three of the murder-based charges sent to the jury for decision. Cf. State v. Carter, 270 Kan. 426, 440-41, 14 P.3d 1138 (2000) (defense counsel's argument that defendant's shooting and killing the victim as an incident to the robbery, rather than a premeditated act, constitutes felony murderis a guilt-based defense to premeditated first-degree murder). Holmes' trial counsel additionally argued Holmes' drug use negated the elements of premeditation and intent required for first-degree murder. At his request, the jury was instructed on voluntary intoxication. Voluntary intoxication, while not a complete defense, may also be used to negate the intent element of specific intent crimes such as first-degree murder. State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 158, 164, 169 P.3d 1096 (2007). Holmes' trial counsel also argued during his closing that Holmes was justified in using deadly force because he acted in self-defense. Similarly, the jury received four different instructions concerning self-defense. Under the version of K.S.A. 21-3211 in effect when the shooting occurred, self-defense was a complete defense to all the homicide charges. See State v. Walters, 284 Kan. 1, 8-9, 159 P.3d 174 (2007). In sum, Holmes' trial counsel advanced alternative theories of defense: complete defenses that absolved Holmes of responsibility for any crime and incomplete defenses that negated certain elements of the crimes while still subjecting Holmes to liability for their lesser-included offenses. Given the conflicting facts surrounding the fatal shooting, we are unable to hold that trial counsel's use of alternative theories of defenseguilt based and nonguilt-based fell below an objective standard of reasonable performance to meet the first prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Chamberlain, 236 Kan. at 656-57, 694 P.2d 468, (adopting Strickland standards); see also State v. White, 284 Kan. 333, 349-50, 161 P.3d 208 (2007) (alternative theories of defense permitted, even if they are incompatible). Because under our highly deferential scrutiny we conclude Holmes' trial counsel employed a justifiable strategy, it follows that Holmes' appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to challenge that sound strategy on direct appeal.