Opinion ID: 1752771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the characteristics of each class are so far different from those of other classes as to reasonably suggest the propriety of substantially different legislation.

Text: The classifications contained in the ordinance, which are based upon employment as of the contract inception date in Zilavy and the contract execution date in Bence, reflect substantially different characteristics of the members of each class. In Zilavy, members of one class were employed on the date on which the period of the contract began, and members of the other class were not. The common characteristic of being employed during the period covered by the contract is a significant one in light of the purpose of the ordinance, which was to enact into law provisions of that contract. Differentiating between employees employed during the period of the contract and others is also clearly pertinent to the goal of harmonious labor relations which underlies laws pertaining to municipal employment relations. It would create utter chaos in collective bargaining if this court were to rule that retired employees are still members of the bargaining unit for purposes of pension negotiations. Similarly, the members of the classes in Bence are distinguished from each other by virtue of their employment status as of the execution date of the agreement. For the same reason that the difference between members of the classes at issue in Zilavy is a substantial one, we hold that there is a substantial difference among the members of the classes at issue in Bence. The nine plaintiffs in Bence who were members of the bargaining unit at the beginning of the contract period but had retired before October 5, 1973, are in no different position than they would be if wage increases had been granted every two months during the course of the contract period and they had quit before the period was over. They could hardly be heard to complain that they did not get the wage increases granted after they left. So too, the members who were no longer part of the collective bargaining unit on October 5, 1973, cannot complain that they were denied pension increases which were granted after that date. It was for the arbitrator to determine when the particular benefit should start. The plaintiffs who were not members of the bargaining unit when the contract period commenced are in the same position as the plaintiffs in Zilavy. Consistent with the above analysis, we conclude that Charter Ordinances 378 and 410 do not unconstitutionally violate plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the laws. Our conclusion is supported by the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). In that case the court held that pension benefit changes enacted by Congress in the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 did not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, even though the changes actually diminished the benefits to which certain persons were entitled. The court upheld the cutback in benefits for previous retirees even though the act provided for a simultaneous increase in pension benefits for current employees. While the issue of disturbing vested pension benefit rights is not before us in this case, and we explicitly do not rule on it, the Fritz decision clearly supports the constitutionality of classifying employees according to employment as of a certain date for pension benefit purposes. [8] Plaintiffs in Bence argued to the trial court that the classification contained in Charter Ordinance 410 constituted a denial of their constitutional right to procedural due process because they were not represented in the contract negotiations culminating in the arbitrator's award enacted into law by the ordinance. There is no requirement in Wisconsin law that former employees or retired employees are entitled to be represented in the negotiations between present employees, represented by their union, and the City. The trial court and the court of appeals did not reach the due process issue. We hold that Charter Ordinance 410 did not violate plaintiffs' rights to due process. Section 111.70(1) (a), Stats. 1971, defines municipal employe as any individual employed by a municipal employer. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs in Bence were no longer employed as of the execution date of the agreement. Plaintiffs do not suggest, nor have we found any authority to support the proposition that all of the benefits arrived at through a collective bargain process accrue to all employees who worked during any part of the contract period. Certainly a wage increase which was to go into effect in the middle of a contract period would not have to be provided to an employee who worked during part of the contract period, but terminated his employment before the effective date of that increase. The United States Supreme Court recognized the problems inherent in including retired employees in a collective bargaining unit in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 173 (1971): Pensioners' interests extend only to retirement benefits, to the exclusion of wage rates, hours, working conditions, and all other terms of active employment. Incorporation of such a limited-purpose constituency in the bargaining unit would create the potential for severe internal conflicts that would impair the unit's ability to function and would disrupt the processes of collective bargaining. Moreover, the risk cannot be overlooked that union representatives on occasion might see fit to bargain for improved wages or other conditions favoring active employees at the expense of retirees' benefits. The fact that all of the plaintiffs in Zilavy and the majority of plaintiffs in Bence were not represented in the contract negotiations does not amount to a constitutional denial of procedural due process. Because of our decision that the ordinances are not unconstitutional, we need not reach other issues raised by the parties which are predicated upon a holding that the ordinances violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights, entitling them to relief. By the Court  Case No. 80-1815. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to issue a declaratory judgment that Charter Ordinance 410 does not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Case No. 81-1574. The decision and order of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to issue a declaratory judgment that Charter Ordinance 378 does not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights. CALLOW and CECI, JJ., took no part.