Opinion ID: 2747279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The General Duty of a Host to Social Guests

Text: We review the trial court's rulings de novo, as [t]he issue whether a legal duty in tort exists is a pure question of 1 The circuit court did not make a separate finding regarding whether the facts supported a claim for gross negligence, apparently concluding that only simple negligence was implicated. 4 law. Kellermann v. McDonough, 278 Va. 478, 487, 684 S.E.2d 786, 790 (2009). As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute that Tabitha and her family were Hylton's social guests at the cookout. Virginia law imposes a duty upon a host to conduct his or her activities with reasonable care under the circumstances. Bradshaw v. Minter, 206 Va. 450, 453, 143 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1965). Bradshaw is instructive though distinguishable, as explained in Part II.D. In Bradshaw, the host permitted his guest to ride one of his horses, which he knew was spirited and liked to run. Id. at 451-52, 143 S.E.2d at 828. He had no knowledge of his guest's riding experience, and he failed to adequately disclose the horse's propensities to her. Almost immediately, the horse threw the guest to the ground, causing her injuries. Id. This Court held that [w]here the activities of the host are involved, the test should be one of reasonable care under the circumstances. Id. at 453, 143 S.E.2d at 829. However, a host is not subject to liability if the guest knew or should have known of the host's activities and any accompanying risk. Id. Consequently, as a general rule a host has a duty to social guests for his or her activities. But when the risk is open and obvious, as Hylton asserts in the present case, the host is not liable. See Smith v. Lamar, 212 Va. 820, 823, 188 S.E.2d 72, 74 5 (1972) (quoting Perlin v. Chappell, 198 Va. 861, 864, 96 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1957)) ('Reasonable care' or 'ordinary care' is a relative term, and varies with the nature and character of the situation to which it is applied. . . . The test is that degree of care which an ordinary prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances to avoid injury to another.') B. The Host's Specific Duty to a Child Who Is Supervised by a Parent Before we reach the question of whether the ATV constituted an open and obvious risk, the facts of this case present an issue of first impression for this Court. We have never articulated the duty that a host owes to a child social guest when the parent is present and supervising. The parties do not dispute that Tabitha's father, Moseley, was present and supervising her activities. Lasley urges us to find that this fact is irrelevant, arguing that Moseley's presence did not circumscribe Hylton's duty to Tabitha to conduct his activities with reasonable care. In effect, Lasley argues that Hylton had an absolute duty to prohibit Tabitha from driving the ATV or at least to discuss the danger with Moseley before she did. We disagree. In Ingle, the Court held that the operators of a train had no legal duty to a child accompanied by, and under the supervision of, her mother. 169 Va. at 139-40, 192 S.E. at 785- 6 86. In that case, a mother and her three children were walking along a path parallel to, and approximately four feet from, the end of the rail ties underlying the tracks. The path was in the railroad company's right-of-way, and pedestrians made sufficient use of it to charge the company with notice of its use. Consequently, the Court concluded that the mother and her children were the railroad's licensees. The evidence showed that the daughter was walking about 150 feet in front of her mother; the mother heard the train approaching; and the mother called to the daughter to stop. Inexplicably, the daughter stepped onto the ties and was struck by the train. Id. at 13437, 192 S.E. at 783-84. The Court noted that cases holding that train operators must take notice of an unattended small child on the right of way and anticipate that from childish impulses it may run in front of the train were inapposite, because the daughter was attended by her mother. Id. at 139, 192 S.E. at 785. The Court reasoned that if the mother saw no peril in taking them down the pathway which was four feet from the end of the ties, it would be demanding too much of the railroad company to require that it should have . . . foreseen peril in the situation. Id. at 140, 192 S.E. 785-86. Ingle alone does not control the outcome of this case though, for reasons asserted by Lasley on brief: Hylton's 7 active and direct commission of negligence . . . placed Tabitha in peril. Under the rule in Bradshaw, Hylton had a duty to his guests to exercise reasonable care while carrying on his activities. Consequently, we must determine under what circumstances a host is liable for harm to a child social guest, when that harm is attributable to his alleged active negligence and the child's parent is present and supervising. C. Case Law from Other States Virginia recognizes that a parent has a general duty to supervise and care for a child's safety though, as noted, we have yet to reconcile it with the duties of a social host. See Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach, 252 Va. 186, 193, 475 S.E.2d 798, 803 (1996) (A parent has a duty to exercise ordinary care for the child's safety . . . .). Although this is a question of first impression in Virginia, other courts have considered it and ruled that the parent's duty is superior to the duty of a social host when the parent is supervising and knows or should know of an obvious danger. Two decisions that are particularly instructive, due to their factual similarity with the present case, are Vares v. Vares, 571 S.E.2d 612 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) and Kay v. Ludwick, 230 N.E.2d 494 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967). In Vares, the host invited his extended family to his home for a regular family gathering, known as Farm Day, during which the family members performed 8 various chores intended to maintain the fifty-acre property. Vares was assigned the task of cutting down a tree. Initially, he permitted his son to help clear some brush. Then, Vares directed his son to stand back before he and two other men felled the tree. Nonetheless, the child moved into the path of the falling tree, which struck and injured him. Vares, 571 S.E.2d at 614. The court began by noting that a landowner has a general duty to exercise ordinary care for the protection of one of tender years, after his presence in a dangerous situation is or should have been known. Id. at 616 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court also noted that this duty does not apply when the minor child is being actively supervised by a parent who has full knowledge of the condition of the premises and appreciation of the danger thereby presented. Id. Because Vares was present and supervising the child when he was injured, the court concluded that the duty of care belonged to Vares and not to the host. Id. In Kay, a four-year old girl and her mother were guests at Ludwick's home. During their visit, Ludwick permitted someone to mow her lawn with a riding-type rotary power mower as the child played outside. The child attempted to climb onto the rear of the mower, and her foot fell into the path of the blade, which severed her heel. The mother and child alleged that 9 Ludwick was negligent in permitting the mower to be operated while the child played outside, failing to warn the child, and failing to supervise or protect the child. Kay, 230 N.E.2d at 496. The court rejected their arguments, concluding that [t]he primary responsibility for the safety of this minor child rested with its mother who was present and apparently supervising the child. Id. at 497. The court noted that the mother observed no apparent harm in permitting her child to play in the yard while the mower was in operation and to require more from the host would be to impose a duty superior to the one the parent here owed to the child. Id. at 497-98. D. The ATV Presented Open and Obvious Risks The fact that Moseley was present and actively supervising Tabitha is not in dispute. The evidence adduced at trial also demonstrated that the danger to Tabitha was open and obvious. Moseley therefore knew or should have known of the risk of injury. In Bradshaw, the guest had no way of knowing about the horse's spirit or propensity to run unless the host disclosed those risks. 206 Va. at 452, 143 S.E.2d at 828. Consequently, the Court concluded that it was for the jury to determine whether the host was negligent in permitting the guest to ride without informing her of the horse's characteristics. Id. at 455, 143 S.E.2d at 830. 10 Here, however, Moseley had ample opportunity to observe the variety of warnings clearly affixed to the ATV. There were four warnings on the ATV itself: one on the visible, top side of the left-front wheel well; one on the visible, top side of the right-front wheel well; one on the visible, top side of the left-rear wheel well; and one on the passenger seat. One explicitly warned against allowing children under 12 to operate the ATV. Furthermore, Moseley witnessed firsthand that his twelve-year old daughter had difficulty controlling the ATV, as she struck him while attempting to stop. Moseley had every right and opportunity to refuse to give eight-year old Tabitha permission to ride the ATV. He had every reason to know of the risks involved. The prominently displayed warnings, which were pertinent to the very circumstances that increased the likelihood of Tabitha's injury, distinguish this case from those where we have held that the question of whether a danger is open and obvious is for the jury. See, e.g., Volpe v. City of Lexington, 281 Va. 630, 638-39, 708 S.E.2d 824, 828 (2011) (holding that a jury should decide whether an artificial hydraulic created by a low-head dam was open and obvious). Where the danger is open and obvious, the law places the primary duty to inform, advise, and protect a child on the child's parents. Washabaugh v. 11 Northern Va. Construction Co., 187 Va. 767, 773, 48 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1948). Lasley, relying on Evans v. Evans, 280 Va. 76, 695 S.E.2d 173 (2010), contends that a rule subordinating a host's duty under these circumstances effectively imputes the negligence of the parent to the child. Her reliance on Evans is unavailing, since that case merely states a narrow exception to the intrafamily immunity rule, whereby a child has the right to recover from a negligent parent for a motor vehicle accident. See id. at 78 n.1, 695 S.E.2d at 174 n.1. Whether an ATV could be considered a motor vehicle is a question that is not presented in this case. 2 Finally, we note that this rule is consistent with social norms. When a person invites neighbors, friends, or family to his or her home, that person does not expect to stand in loco parentis to child guests that accompany their parents. Rather, that person justifiably should expect his or her guests to exercise the same care and responsibility towards their children as they would in their own home. An invitation to a social 2 Further, this rule does not mean that a host does not owe a duty to a child social guest. If it is reasonably foreseeable that the parent will not or cannot realize the risks involved with a host's activity, then the host's duty would remain to conduct activities with reasonable care for the benefit of child social guests. Similarly, if the host is supervising the child, then the host would also have such a duty. 12 event is not an invitation to relinquish parental responsibility.