Opinion ID: 805907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We review a district court’s order on cross-motions for summary judgment de novo. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Medina, 645 F.3d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 2011). We view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, that party is Scruggs. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only if Carrier demonstrates “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under the FMLA, an eligible employee is entitled to as many as twelve weeks of leave per year for a variety of reasons, including “to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). Such leave may be taken intermittently. Id. § 2612(b)(1). It is undisputed that Scruggs was an eligible employee who requested FMLA leave intermittently from 2004 to 2007 to care for his ailing mother. An employer may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].” Id. § 2615(a)(1). In addition, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against 8 No. 11-3420 any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by [the FMLA].” Id. § 2615(a)(2). Scruggs alleges that Carrier violated both of these provisions by interfering with his FMLA rights and retaliating against him for requesting and taking FMLA leave.
Scruggs alleges that Carrier’s decision to terminate him interfered with his right to reinstatement and his right to continue to take intermittent leave to care for his mother. “To prevail on a claim for FMLA interference, the employee must prove that: (1) he was eligible for FMLA protections; (2) his employer was covered by the FMLA; (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take FMLA leave; and (5) his employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.” Righi v. SMC Corp., 632 F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2011). An interference claim does not require an employee to prove discriminatory intent on the part of the employer; rather, such a claim “requires only proof that the employer denied the employee his or her entitlements under the Act.” Shaffer v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 662 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis., 604 F.3d 987, 995 (7th Cir. 2010)). An employee who takes leave under the FMLA is only entitled to reinstatement if he “takes leave under [the FMLA] for the intended purpose of the leave.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). Thus, “an employer can defeat an interference claim by showing, among other things, that the employee did not take leave ‘for the intended No. 11-3420 9 purpose.’ ” Vail v. Raybestos Prods. Co., 533 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Crouch, 447 F.3d at 986). In the Seventh Circuit, because an employee has “no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed,” 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a), an employer need only show that “it refused to reinstate the employee based on an ‘honest suspicion’ that she was abusing her leave,” Vail, 533 F.3d at 909. Accord Kariotis v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 681 (7th Cir. 1997) (“In other words, because Navistar lawfully could have terminated Kariotis after suspecting she committed fraud while on duty, the company can discharge her after suspecting she committed fraud while on leave.”). We agree with the district court that Carrier has shown that it held an “honest suspicion” that Scruggs was abusing his FMLA leave. In Vail, we found that an employer held an “honest suspicion” that an employee suffering from migraines misused her FMLA leave after an off-duty police officer hired by the employer saw the employee performing manual labor on a day she requested FMLA leave. 533 F.3d at 909-10 (“[T]he information gleaned from Sergeant Largent’s reconnaissance was sufficient to give Raybestos an ‘honest suspicion’ that Vail was not using her leave ‘for the intended purpose.’ ”). Similarly, in Kariotis, the company Navistar hired an investigator to videotape an employee recovering from knee surgery. 131 F.3d at 675. These videotapes revealed the em- ployee “walking, driving, sitting, bending, and shopping.” Id. Based solely on Navistar’s prior suspicions, 10 No. 11-3420 the videotapes, and a short conversation with the employee, Navistar chose to terminate the employee for misusing her disability leave. Id. Although Navistar never contacted the employee’s physicians, and we noted that the investigation “left something to be desired,” id., we held that Navistar had an “honest suspicion” that the employee was misusing her leave, thus foreclosing her FMLA claim, id. at 680-81. Here, Carrier suspected Scruggs was misusing his FMLA leave based upon his prior absenteeism. Accordingly, Carrier hired a private investigator to observe Scruggs on a day that he requested FMLA leave to care for his mother. The video surveillance revealed that Scruggs did not appear to leave his house that day. When Carrier questioned Scruggs, he could not recall what he did on that day, but stated that he did not misuse his FMLA leave. Although Scruggs later provided documentation from his mother’s nursing home and doctor’s office, this paperwork only raised further questions for Carrier. The documents Scruggs produced were facially inconsistent and conflicted with Carrier’s internal paperwork. Taken together, this was enough for Carrier to have an “honest suspicion” that Scruggs misused his FMLA leave on July 24, 2007. Although Carrier could have conducted a more thorough investigation, as Scruggs fervently argues, it was not required to do so. See Kariotis, 131 F.3d at 681. Accordingly, Carrier did not violate Scruggs’s FMLA rights because it honestly believed Scruggs was not using his leave for its intended purpose, see Vail, 533 F.3d at 909, and No. 11-3420 11 the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Carrier on Scruggs’s interference claim.
Scruggs also claims that Carrier retaliated against him for using his FMLA leave. “An employee who alleges that her employer retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the FMLA can proceed under the direct or indirect methods of proof familiar from employment discrimination litigation.” Smith v. Hope Sch., 560 F.3d 694, 702 (7th Cir. 2009). Scruggs is proceeding under the direct method, so he “must present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Caskey v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 535 F.3d 585, 593 (7th Cir. 2008)). “A plaintiff can prevail under the direct method by showing an admission of discrimination or by ‘constructing a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.’ ” Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr., 537 F.3d 755, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 2006)). Carrier argues that Scruggs cannot establish a causal connection between his use of FMLA leave and his termination. Carrier terminated Scruggs on August 17, 2007, for misusing his FMLA leave in violation of Plant Rule 10. This ‘materially adverse action’ occurred over three weeks after Scruggs requested leave on July 24. Scruggs’s 12 No. 11-3420 request for FMLA leave was not denied, nor was he prohibited from returning to work after taking his approved FMLA leave. It was not until August 7, when Carrier received a report from its investigator indicating that Scruggs had misused his FMLA leave on July 24, that Carrier began taking steps to terminate Scruggs. As we have already noted, Carrier held an ‘honest suspicion’ that Scruggs was misusing his FMLA leave at the time it made the decision to terminate him. We cannot conclude from these facts that Carrier intentionally discriminated against Scruggs for taking FMLA leave. If we were to hold otherwise, virtually any FMLA plaintiff fired for misusing his leave would be able to state a claim for retaliation. Scruggs likens his case to the facts presented in Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2006). In that case, Burnett gave sufficient notice to his employer over a period of four months that he was suffering from a serious medical condition, specifically, prostate cancer. Id. at 482. Burnett engaged in protected activity by requesting two weeks off because he would not be able to perform the essential functions of his job. Id. Prior to his scheduled time off, Burnett requested to leave work one day because he “felt sick.” Id. at 476. After leaving work without his supervisor’s permission, Burnett was terminated for insubordination. Id. We held that these facts “suggest a direct, causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action.” Id. at 482. We noted that the employer’s “classification of Burnett’s conduct as insubordinate stems in large measure from its mistaken belief that Burnett was not entitled to No. 11-3420 13 FMLA leave,” and “Burnett’s alleged insubordinate act was his request for FMLA leave, or at least a key component of it.” Id. Accordingly, we held that a jury question remained as to Burnett’s retaliation claim. Id. Scruggs claims that his case is similar to Burnett because Carrier’s reason for terminating him was his protected activity. But there is a key distinction between this case and Burnett. Burnett requested and was denied leave at the same time he was deemed insubordinate and terminated. In contrast, Scruggs requested and was granted leave, took his approved leave, and returned to work the following day. He was also granted FMLA leave on three additional days following July 24, 2007. It was not until after Carrier received evidence of potential misconduct that Scruggs was terminated. Therefore, the reason for Scruggs’s termination was not the same as his protected activity, and Burnett’s reasoning does not apply here. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Carrier.