Opinion ID: 2831571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marshall’s Testimony

Text: STABL argues that Marshall, an EPA compliance officer and one of the government’s witnesses at the bench trial, was not disclosed or qualified as an expert witness, yet offered an opinion based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” in contravention of Federal Rule of Evidence 701. The government argues that Marshall was properly characterized as a lay witness. We review the district court’s decision to admit Marshall’s testimony for abuse of discretion. See US Salt, Inc. v. Broken Arrow, Inc., 563 F.3d 687, 689-90 (8th Cir. 2009). Determining whether a witness is offering an expert or lay opinion requires a case-by-case analysis of both the witness and the witness’s opinion. United States v. Smith, 591 F.3d 974, 982-83 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Air Crash at Little Rock Ark. on June 1, 1999, 291 F.3d 503, 515-16 (8th Cir. 2002)). Although lay witnesses may not testify about scientific knowledge within the scope of Federal Rule of -13- Evidence 702, “[p]erceptions based on industry experience [are] a sufficient foundation for lay opinion testimony.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting US Salt, Inc., 563 F.3d at 690). Although Marshall testified on a number of subjects, a substantial portion of his testimony offered background information that was irrelevant to the district court’s determination of the number of effluent-limitation and failure-to-monitor violations. The number of violations could be determined by a review and comparison of STABL’s DMRs, its permit limitations and obligations, and the city’s sampling data contained in the monitoring records. Marshall’s relevant testimony established that, although STABL’s discharge was tested weekly, the monthly DMRs reflected the highest daily-maximum and highest weekly-average readings from each month. He further testified that one must therefore review the city’s sampling data to determine the additional number of effluent-limitation violations in any month in which the DMRs reflected one or more exceedances of the daily-maximum or weekly-average limits for any parameter. Marshall then testified as to the number of violations he counted in the city’s monitoring records and the number of weeks for which oil and grease monitoring results were missing from the records. In addition, Marshall testified regarding the EPA’s investigation of STABL and the treatment plant. This testimony may properly be viewed as primarily related to Marshall’s industry experience as an EPA compliance officer rather than expert knowledge. Furthermore, mere tabulation does not require scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Marshall’s testimony as lay testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701.