Opinion ID: 160331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Drug Source Hearsay

Text: 40 Ms. Fuentez claims the trial court improperly admitted testimony by Officer Sedillo that Ms. Fuentez was Mr. Juarez's drug source. See Aplt's App. 49-56 (Trial Transcript of Officer Sedillo's testimony). Officer Sedillo testified that when he attempted to purchase cocaine from Mr. Juarez in March 1997, Mr. Juarez had none. He further testified that Mr. Juarez took him to Rosario's (Ms. Fuentez's) house and named her as his source. 41 At trial, Ms. Fuentez objected to Officer Sedillo's testimony on the basis that it was excludable hearsay. For the first time, on appeal Ms. Fuentez claims the source evidence was improper character evidence that should have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The government claims the evidence was properly admitted for a nonhearsay purpose: to demonstrate the basis for Officer Sedillo's interest in Ms. Fuentez, and that the district court provided a proper limiting instruction. The government further argues that Ms. Fuentez waived her 404(b) argument by not raising it at trial.
42 We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 780 (10th Cir. 1997). Given the fact specific nature of hearsay objections, we accord greater deference to the district court's hearsay rulings. See United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1395 (10th Cir. 1998). 43 Hearsay is a out-of-court statement . . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), excluding, of course, certain prior witness statements and admissions by party-opponents, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d). During Officer Sedillo's testimony, the government offered the statement by Mr. Juarez not to show that Ms. Fuentez was actually Mr. Juarez's drug supplier, but rather to demonstrate Officer Sedillo's reason for investigating her. See United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 563 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding a statement was not hearsay when offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a Government investigation was undertaken). We hold the district court correctly admitted the evidence for a nonhearsay purpose.
44 Because Ms. Fuentez did not object to the statement on the basis of the limitation on character evidence included in Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), we review the district court's failure to exclude the evidence on that basis for plain error. See United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 1996). Under this standard, we will reverse a district court only if we determine that admitting the statement placed the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or affected Ms. Fuentez's substantial rights. United States v. Hill, 60 F.3d 672, 675 (10th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 883 (10th Cir. 1987) (Under the plain error standard, reversal is mandated only to correct particularly egregious errors, that is, those errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of Judicial proceedings. (internal quotations omitted)). According to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b): 45 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . . 46 The grounds specified for admissibility are not exclusive; evidence of other crimes or acts relevant to any issue at trial may be admitted unless this evidence tends to prove only criminal disposition. Culpepper, 834 F.2d at 883. 47 We addressed a nearly identical allegation of error in Hill, wherein the defendant failed to object on the basis of 404(b) to a statement that he was a drug dealer. Hill, 60 F.3d at 675. We held there was no plain error because the statement was an isolated remark in the context of the entire trial, the declarant was subject to examination, and the judge properly instructed the jury regarding the use of the testimony. See id. As in Hill, the statement was isolated within the context of the trial, Ms. Fuentez called Mr. Juarez, who made the statement, to testify, and the judge provided a proper limiting instruction. We hold that admitting the statement did not constitute reversible plain error. See id.