Opinion ID: 1161742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: post-twenty-one compensatory education when sufficiency of the prior education is contested

Text: Intrinsic to the decision that educational responsibilities end at age twenty-one is the correlative inquiry whether, despite statute and constitution, continued eligibility can be obtained as compensatory to pre-age twenty-one challenged level of attainment. This is generically designated as the right to post-period compensatory education. As essentially resolved by Ryan, it is our conclusion that the State Board of Education lacked authority by statute or constitution which would authorize acceptance by negotiation for a residual liability against the School District to require it to violate statute and to extend the constitution in order to provide for educational services past age twenty-one. We recognize the stated argument that the federal statutory system could include a condition precedent for benefits which might invoke a compensatory contingent post-age twenty-one obligation. However, we find that no authority now exists for Wyoming to enter into this contractual requirement or any as might evolve from the federal programs by either implied agreement or adopted regulation. The hearing officer, likewise, as Monahan and Deist would teach, had no authority to order compensatory education, since the School District has no authority to provide the service. We are also concerned since if Wyoming, by policy, embarks upon theories of educational malpractice, which buttress claims for compensatory educational services, that it, under equal protection and due process, can properly confine relief to a subcategory of the handicapped. The system, consequently, would be faced with failed expectation complaints applicable to all graduating students or at least for those students who do not become Rhodes Scholars. This court is not presently willing to embrace a general theory of educational malpractice which would serve as a foundational premise from which compensatory education for those who have not reached desired limits of achievement by age twenty-one might opportunistically continue in the public educational system, and particularly so, if the predicate functions of special training or habilitation might be added. Comment, Educational Malpractice  Does the Cause of Action Exist?, 49 Mont. L.Rev. 140 (1988); Comment, Education Malpractice: A Cause of Action that Failed to Pass the Test, 90 W.Va.L.Rev. 499 (1987); Note, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Need of a Call for Action, 22 Val.U.L.Rev. 427 (1988). Premised on constitutional definition and defined by statutory limitations, we will not extend educational responsibility by whatever theory beyond age twenty-one at least in the absence of peculiar circumstances that are not considered here as factually established whether characterized as egregious and unremitted bad faith or otherwise. Cf. Comment, Compensatory Educational Services and the Education For All Handicapped Children Act, 1984 Wis. L.Rev. 1469 (1984). Normalized public education in Wyoming ends about age eighteen or nineteen and the additional two years generally available as compensatory to the underachiever or the handicapped should be sufficient. Obligation of general public education must end at some point and other state responsibilities of higher education, vocational rehabilitation or habilitation should commence as the succeeding state responsibility to be conceptually provided in conjunction with whatever federal programs might, by authorization of the state legislature, be available. It is unquestioned that since 1975, the EHA has transferred the personal responsibility of exceptional school age individuals from social services and state domiciliary facilities to the financing obligation of public education. What may have been the unmet responsibility in prior times is not ignored. [9] The specific subject of compensatory education to be provided past the public education age limitation authorized in statutes and constitution has developed a checkered pathway as in part inflicted by consideration of the United States Supreme Court discussion in Burlington, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996 and last raised by reference in majority opinion in Honig, 108 S.Ct. 592. Intertwined in application of this aspect of the individual's education is the applicability of statutes of limitation, since otherwise, a potential exposure would continue during the nineteen years when the student might be exposed to public education as finitely and finally reassessed at the limitation age which, in Wyoming, is the twenty-first birthday. [10] This court will follow that application of the Wyoming Constitution and statutes for denial of compensatory education past the foreclosing age which is buttressed by well-reasoned and persuasive consideration of the Nebraska Supreme Court. See Monahan, 425 N.W.2d 624 and Deist, 334 N.W.2d 775. See also on state law application, although not specifically addressing upper age limitations, Levine, 418 A.2d 229. The Nebraska Supreme Court in last reference in Monahan, 425 N.W.2d at 628 (quoting Deist, 334 N.W.2d at 786), stated: Turning to the issue of compensatory education, we find no support for the findings of the hearing officer in the relevant law. The [Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (1976)], by its clear and unambiguous language, limits eligibility to children ages 3 to 21. § 1412(2)(B). There is no authority under this statutory scheme by which the hearing officer could grant free appropriate public educational benefits to David beyond his 21st birthday. We do not interpret Honig, 108 S.Ct. 592 and Burlington, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996 to require contrary results when the application would require this court to use an administrative agreement to vitiate state statute and constitution. This posture is supported in comment by majority opinion of now Chief Justice Rehnquist in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1544, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981), where in considering the accepted facets of federal fund receipt by the state, he surmised in another context: [I]t is unlikely that a State would have accepted federal funds had it known it would be bound to provide such treatment. The crucial inquiry, however, is not whether a State would knowingly undertake that obligation, but whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can fairly say that the State could make an informed choice. Without legislative approval, it is apparent that the state did not intend to assume conjecturally an indefinite educational responsibility beyond the statutorily established and constitutionally defined age of twenty-one. We would note that singular discussion and significant dispute in precedent is available. White v. State, 195 Cal. App.3d 452, 240 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736-37 (1987), where the court additionally found systemic exclusion from the EHA while resident in a state hospital as the systemic denial of a free appropriate public education    caused by the illegal allocation of EHA funds; Stock v. Massachusetts Hosp. School, 392 Mass. 205, 467 N.E.2d 448 (1984), cert. denied 474 U.S. 844, 106 S.Ct. 132, 88 L.Ed.2d 109 (1985), where supporting state law to afford continued educational eligibility was found. The variant results achieved with diversified factual situations when the federal court forum was chosen does not alter our application of controlling principles for Wyoming law. [11] This decision does not leave the student and parents without remedy. The handicapped educational system by federal persuasion and state regulation contemplates a bilateral right for discussion and an empirical right to hearing and judicial review in case of the absence of mutual agreement or acceptability as to the level of education being provided. Essentially, this is what occurred in this case as resulting in the 1981 hearing and subsequent decision, which was accepted by all parties. Whatever rights for corrective opportunity may exist under the Wyoming Constitution and public education statutes, compensatory education past age twenty-one is not included in substance, text or by construction of what the legislative branch of state government has authorized or what the judicial branch of this state may provide.