Opinion ID: 1202760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: habeas corpus (crim. 25303)

Text: In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Crim. 25303, defendant bases his claim to relief on three grounds. He first asserts he was not provided with effective assistance by trial and appellate counsel. (12) To establish such a point, a defendant must show that counsel (1) performed at a level below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and thereby (2) subjected the defense to prejudice, i.e., in the absence of counsel's failings a more favorable outcome was reasonably probable. ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) As we shall explain, defendant fails to make a prima facie case of entitlement to relief. (13) Defendant alleges broadly that trial counsel made various errors in strategy and tactics and, more specifically, that they feared him and treated him with distrust. Such assertions do not effectively allege either deficient performance or prejudice. He also alleges appellate counsel refused to argue that facial expressions and gestures trial counsel assertedly made during jury selection prejudiced the defense. This statement too fails to effectively allege either deficient performance or prejudice. Defendant next claims that he was denied due process because the trial judge was biased. In support of his point, he cites the following incidents: (1) in an in camera hearing the judge stated he believed trial counsel and did not believe defendant in a dispute as to whether counsel had threatened him with harm; and (2) in another in camera conference, the judge told him, You have proven yourself an unmitigated liar during the course of this whole trial. (14) But the fact that the judge made these statements  each of which is more than adequately supported by the evidence  does not amount to a prima facie showing of bias: `[W]hen the state of mind of the trial judge appears to be adverse to one of the parties but is based upon actual observance of the witnesses and evidence given during the trial of an action, it does not amount to ... prejudice....' ( People v. Yeager (1961) 55 Cal.2d 374, 391 [10 Cal. Rptr. 829, 359 P.2d 261].) Defendant's final claim is in substance as follows: he states that at the new trial that might have followed our decision in Hamilton I the court would again deny his request to represent himself. Whether or not the court would so rule in the future raises no issue cognizable on habeas corpus. In any event, because we affirm the judgment in its entirety there will be no such new trial.