Opinion ID: 697383
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Comment in Closing Argument

Text: 61
Center 62 Delgado and Hernandez request a new trial based on the following prosecutorial comment in closing argument: 63 And what is the legitimate reason? I mean, did you hear a legitimate reason for any of those four individuals to be at the Palmetto Park Square shopping center? 64 (R. 13:1736). Defense counsel immediately objected, were sustained, and the Court gave the following curative instruction: 65 Counsel are quite correct, there is no burden on the defendants to produce any evidence at all or to produce any. They don't have to testify, they don't have to produce any evidence. You must not infer in any way that they do. 66 (R. 13:1736). Immediately after the judge's curative instruction the prosecutor continued his closing argument with the following: 67 That is absolutely true. The government has the burden in this case. The government has the burden of proof in this case to prove to you what the defendants were doing at the Boca Raton shopping center. What they were doing was aiding and abetting the delivery of 600 kilograms of cocaine. 68 And when I talk to you about what they--legitimate reasons, I am talking about through the arguments of counsel, what counsel has stated in terms of what they're doing there. 69 (R. 13:1737). 70 Appellants argue the remarks were an improper comment on the assertion of their Fifth Amendment right not to testify, and an improper burden shifting suggestion to the jury that the defendants bore a burden to produce exculpatory evidence. As to each contention, we disagree. Prosecutorial misconduct requires a new trial only if we find the remarks (1) were improper and (2) prejudiced the defendants's substantive rights. United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 767 (11th Cir.1985). To judge whether each prong is met we look to United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir.1989), in which this Court found that a prosecutor's indirect reference to a defendant's failure to testify is not reversible error per se. Id. at 1364. 71 When such a reference occurs, the district judge must determine whether the statement was (1) manifestly intended or (2) of such a character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the accused's failure to testify. United States v. Herring, 955 F.2d 703, 709 (11th Cir.1992). The district judge is better able to determine this because she has the opportunity to observe the prosecutor's demeanor first hand. Id. We review the district judge's determination of prosecutorial intent or jury effect for abuse of discretion. Id. 72 In the instant case the district judge sustained the objection, gave a curative instruction, and denied the defense motions for a mistrial. The judge's actions unerringly accord with Norton, another case in which the prosecutor did not directly refer to the defendant's decision not to testify, but to defense counsel's failure to rebut the government's evidence. Norton, 867 F.2d at 1364. Norton stressed the settled Eleventh Circuit law that a defendant's fifth amendment privilege is not infringed by a comment on the failure of the defense, as opposed to the defendant, to counter or explain the testimony presented or evidence introduced. Id. (emphasis added). Such a statement is not one that the jury would naturally and necessarily construe to be a comment on the defendants's silence; it is closer to a permissible comment on the logical inferences from all the evidence than to an argument requiring negative inference from the defendant's failure to testify. See id. The statement, therefore, is neither improper nor prejudicial. 73 Even if the prosecutor's remarks were prejudicial, the district judge gave a curative instruction which, under settled Eleventh Circuit law, would render any error harmless where the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. United States v. Herring, 955 F.2d 703, 710 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Lopez, 898 F.2d 1505, 1511 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1560 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 104-05 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. Unit A. 1981). The jury convicted Delgado and Hernandez on all counts while acquitting Riverol on three of the four counts charged against him. The prosecutorial statement attacked by Delgado and Hernandez applied to Riverol as well. Their convictions, in the face of a three-count acquittal of Riverol, provide strong support that these remarks were harmless, if error. 74 Accordingly, when reviewed in context, assessing the probable jury impact, see Cannon, 41 F.3d 1462, 1469 (11th Cir.1995), we find no prejudice to either defendant's substantive rights. See id. The district court properly denied the defendants's motions for a mistrial. 75 The same analysis applies to the burden shifting argument. Even if improper, the prejudice from the comments of a prosecutor which may result in a shifting of the burden of proof can be cured by a court's instruction regarding the burden of proof. United States v. Simon, 964 F.2d 1082, 1087 (11th Cir.1992). The district judge immediately and explicitly instructed the jury that the defense bore absolutely no burden to produce evidence. In light of this curative instruction, we again find the district court properly denied the defendants's motion for a mistrial. 76
77 Riverol and Delgado request a new trial based on the following comment by the prosecutor in closing argument: 78 [W]hether you're offended or not by paying Dave Cavanaugh $218,000 over two years for what he did, you shouldn't hold that against Dave Cavanaugh. That doesn't do anything to Dave Cavanaugh's credibility. The United States of America, your government, the DEA, paid Dave Cavanaugh those amounts. They paid Dave Cavanaugh those amounts in their War on Drugs. If you have a problem with Dave Cavanaugh receiving that kind of money, your problem is with the government, it is not with Dave Cavanaugh and it shouldn't reflect on the credibility of Dave Cavanaugh as he testified in this courtroom. 79 (R. 13:1549). 80 Defense counsel objected immediately to the prosecutor's reference to the War on Drugs. The district judge overruled the objection and instructed the jury that they were to try only the issues in the case, not the War on Drugs. Id. 81 The defendants's argument lacks merit. This Court has held that [r]eference during closing argument to the drug problems of society and defendants' roles in such problems are not unduly prejudicial or excessively inflammatory. United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1461 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147, 158 (5th Cir.1979). 82 Finding no merit to any of the defendants's prosecutorial misconduct allegations, we deny their requests for a new trial. 83