Opinion ID: 195899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Likelihood Standard.

Text: 46 After convening an evidentiary hearing and bringing the likelihood standard to bear, Judge Stearns found it unlikely either that FMI disclosed legally protected information at the Waltham meeting or that BWC obtained confidences as a consequence of the meeting. See Foster-Miller, 848 F.Supp. at 276-77. FMI assigns error. Its appeal raises potentially difficult questions about the application of Boit 's likelihood standard in certain types of cases. 47 We hasten to note that the paradigm case--involving the use of Boit 's intermediate standard as a basis for exercising jurisdiction, i.e., as a basis for denying a motion to dismiss--hardly seems problematic. In such a scenario, the plaintiff is permitted to proceed in its forum of choice, yet the defendant has the consolation of having been afforded a detailed demonstration, beyond a mere prima facie showing, of why the court deems it fair to exercise jurisdiction, at least provisionally. It is only when Boit 's intermediate standard is used as a basis for declining the exercise of jurisdiction, i.e., as a basis for granting a motion to dismiss, that the prospect of mischief looms. One can easily imagine cases in which the likelihood standard might be applied to adjudicate facts that are only marginally related to jurisdiction, or are very closely related to the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claims, thus prematurely extinguishing a plaintiff's ability to present its case in a full and fair manner. 5 48 The short of it is that, whatever its merits in the abstract, Boit 's intermediate standard requires caution in its application, especially when it appears that a dismissal may result. Indeed, although Boit does, in dictum, 967 F.2d at 677-78, propose to authorize such dismissals, it is noteworthy that, apart from the opinion of the court below, there is no other reported case, Boit included, that has sanctioned a dismissal pursuant to a district court's use of the likelihood standard. 49 In general, this is as it should be. To the limited extent that dismissals under Boit 's intermediate standard are justified at all, they will happen only rarely. Even then, the exact bounds of permissible application may not always be evident. Nonetheless, we believe it is better to tolerate the inconvenience of mild doctrinal uncertainty rather than to forgo altogether the utility of an intermediate standard and method of analysis. See generally Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 Yale L.J. 821 (1985) (recognizing the impossibility of removing all uncertainty from legal doctrine); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.L.Rev. 457, 465 (1897) (warning that, in respect to judicial decisions, certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man). The bottom line, clearly, is that judges employing Boit 's intermediate standard should proceed with great care. 50 In any event, these potential difficulties are peripheral to the instant appeal. In this instance, the flaw is less Judge Stearns' initial decision to switch the signals previously given by Judge Keeton and instead apply the intermediate standard, but more his failure to apprise FMI squarely of this change of plan--a failure that was aggravated by FMI's inability to engage in appropriate discovery and then to present the totality of its evidence within the context of a likelihood analysis. 51 When judges elect on their own initiative to use innovative methods in an effort to accelerate the progress of a case, they must take pains to ensure that parties are given satisfactory notice, reasonable access to discovery, and a meaningful opportunity to present evidence. See, e.g., Stella v. Town of Tewksbury, 4 F.3d 53, 55-56 (1st Cir.1993) (stating these principles in the context of sua sponte summary judgment); Jardines Bacata, Ltd. v. Diaz-Marquez, 878 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (1st Cir.1989) (similar). While the likelihood standard has value, the latent risks associated with its use are not insignificant, and they should be ameliorated to the extent practicable. 52 Here, the lower court did not afford FMI the process that was due. To be sure, Judge Stearns advised counsel at a status conference on January 20, 1994, that he was pondering the use of the likelihood standard, but he neither eased the existing restriction on discovery nor superseded Judge Keeton's prior directives. The prima facie standard remained the default setting, and Judge Stearns' intentions remained open to conjecture until the day of the hearing. Indeed, while the court transmitted mixed signals to some degree, it closed the January 20 conference by specifically announcing that the question of misappropriation would not be subject to anything more rigorous than scrutiny under a prima facie standard. On this point, Judge Stearns' intention could not have been more explicit. He told the lawyers: I am going to, for purposes of this hearing, ... basically accept whatever [FMI] allege[s] to be true in terms of the misappropriation. 53 Following this pronouncement, the court never gave the litigants suitable forewarning of a change of heart, or of the extent to which it would apply the likelihood standard. To understand the gravity of this omission, it is important to understand the restriction imposed on discovery by Judge Keeton, and how that restriction arose. On December 15, 1993, FMI moved to examine the documents and other materials maintained by BWC which would be relevant to statements in the affidavits of Mr. St. Louis and others concerning contacts with, statements made by, and other information received from Foster-Miller.... BWC objected. The next day Judge Keeton, ruling ore tenus, restricted FMI's discovery to matters bear[ing] upon the jurisdictional issue. All other discovery, he ruled, was out of bounds for the time being. We think that this limitation, coupled with the judge's simultaneous indication that he would evaluate the motion to dismiss under the prima facie standard, effectively prevented FMI from engaging in merits-related discovery. And when Judge Stearns then shifted abruptly from the forecasted prima facie standard to the more intrusive likelihood standard, the preexisting restriction--which remained intact on Judge Stearns' watch--hamstrung FMI. 6 54 Since this imperfect communication obviously prejudiced FMI's ability fairly to meet the rigors that an across-the-board use of the likelihood standard imposed in the circumstances of this case, we must set aside the court's conclusion that FMI's suit did not arise from BWC's activities in the forum state. To that extent, then, the dismissal order succumbs.