Opinion ID: 151784
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Failure to timely serve Korb was excused for good cause

Text: The Gerenas' efforts to serve Korb stand in contrast to their lack of effort to serve Yale. Given the record before this court and the facts as they stood before the district court, we cannot agree with its conclusion that the Gerenas' service on Korb was also defective as untimely. In his May 2009 opinion, Judge Eginton explained that service on Korb was defective because Korb was untimely served and there is no indication that plaintiffs sought an extension of time to perfect service or that Korb did evade service upon his return to the United States. This statement, however, is not supported by the record. To the contrary, the record indicates that plaintiffs sought an extension of time to perfect service on Korb, and that Judge Sand granted it. Specifically, Judge Sand's July 2008 order directing service by United States marshals on Korb operated as an extension of time to serve for good cause. During a June 2008 telephone conference, Judge Sand said the following to Korb's counsel about defendant Korb's avoidance of service: [T]here have been efforts to serve Mr. Korb at his parents' home [and] ... to invoke the Sheriff's Office.... I don't think I can, on the papers before me, conclude that plaintiffs' counsel has taken such ineffective means to effect service that on that ground, ... his motion [for service by marshal] should be denied.... [Y]our letter which points out that Mr. Korb has been within the jurisdiction on a number of occasions and has not been served is a little bit ... like the little child sticking out his or her tongue and saying, Nah, nah, you can't catch me. Mr. Korb has been fully aware... that the plaintiff is seeking to serve him.... Shortly thereafter, on July 8, 2008, Judge Sand granted plaintiffs' ex parte Motion Appointing Marshal to Serve Defendant Korb, noting that good cause has been shown in support of the application that the defendant Korb has made himself unavailable for service by other means.... Korb argues that service was nevertheless untimely because although Judge Sand's order may have included a finding that good cause had been shown for service by marshal, this does not equate to a good cause finding that the Rule 4(m) service time should be extended. Brief of Def.-Appellee Gregory Korb at 10. This argument, however, is implausible. It makes no sense that Judge Sand would order service by marshal almost a year after service originally should have been accomplished while not also intending to extend the time to serve. A decision to allow service by marshal at this point in the litigation implicitly included a decision to allow late service. Moreover, the good cause language used in Judge Sand's order likely references Rule 4(m), regarding timeliness of service, not Rule 4(c)(3), permitting service by marshal. Rule 4(c)(3) does not use the phrase good cause, but rather simply provides: At the plaintiff's request, the court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed by the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3). In contrast, Rule 4(m) specifically states that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure [to serve], the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Accordingly, Judge Sand's order stating that good cause had been shown is best read as a finding that the plaintiffs' failed attempts at service warranted an extension of time to serve, as well as a grant of permission to use the alternative method of service by marshal. And once this good cause finding was made, an extension of time to serve was mandatory, not discretionary. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 4(m); see also Blessinger v. United States, 174 F.R.D. 29, 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (If the plaintiff has shown good cause, the extension is mandatory.). We note that Judge Sand's extension on time to serve did not specify a time by which service was to be completed, despite Rule 4(m)'s instruction that extensions on time to serve should be made for an appropriate period. It would have avoided an unnecessary issue had the time been specified. In this case, the appropriate period by which to extend time to serve likely would have been the time it took the marshals to serve. However, no argument has been raised that Judge Sand abused his discretion by not setting an appropriate period for service. Accordingly, we need not consider at this point the necessity of a district court explicitly defining an appropriate period when extending time to serve. Cf. In re Wireless Data, Inc., 547 F.3d 484, 491-92 (2d Cir.2008) (finding argument not raised on appeal to be waived). Based on the record in this case prior to transfer, we conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that no extension of time to serve had previously been sought by plaintiffs; one had been sought and had been granted by Judge Sand, along with an order for United States marshals to effect service. We thus reverse the district court's determination that Korb was not timely served.