Opinion ID: 1125584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cost of Uncertain Future Operation.

Text: Appellant argues that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow argument on the cost of a future operation and pain and suffering incident thereto, where the need for the future operation was not clear to a reasonable medical certainty. Reasonable medical certainty is not required for future expenses. All that is required is probability. Bachran v. Morishige, Haw., 469 P.2d 808, May 22, 1970. Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Lum, testified that he would not presently recommend the operation, that he should observe plaintiff's finger twice a month for an indefinite period and if atrophy or gangrene developed he would then recommend sympathectomy. Dr. Lum did not testify that it was probable that atrophy or gangrene would develop. Plaintiff's consulting physician, Dr. Chock, also testified: Q Doctor, in this patient itself with reasonable medical certainty, what is the probability of that condition worsening in the future? A This will depend on the patient's personality. Q And what do you mean by that?       A (Continuing) If she is restless, irritable, unable to obtain sleep, she will be more subject to exacerbation of pain. This is a possibility that may happen in the future.       Q Is there a possibility or probability of atrophy setting in on those fingers? A Atrophy? Q. Yes. A Yes, atrophy of muscles, bones and skin is associated with causalgia. Q That, could you say with reasonable medical certainty, sir? A Yes. This testimony shows a remarkable muddying of the distinctions between possibility, probability and reasonable medical certainty. Hopefully, our opinion in Bachran will eliminate one element (reasonable medical certainty) that added to the confusion here. The standard which Bachran mandates is probability. In order for a jury to properly consider as damages the cost of a future operation, there must be evidence that the operation is more probable than not. The operation in this case would be performed only if plaintiff's condition worsened, and there was no testimony whether worsening of her condition was a probability or merely a possibility. The plaintiff's answering brief quotes the testimony of Dr. Chock as follows: Q And this particular treatment  what would it contemplate or what would it be? A This treatment will be primarily surgical, which means you will have to do a sympathectomy.          Q If she were your patient, you would have performed one? A If the patient was agreeable. If Dr. Chock had so testified, it would demonstrate that he thought a sympathectomy was warranted and this would be enough to get the issue of the future sympathectomy to the jury. But Dr. Chock did not so testify. The quotation above shows the unfortunate distortion that results from the taking of a quotation out of context. The first part of the quotation deals with sympathectomy. The second part, in context, does not deal with sympathectomy at all, it deals with Dr. Chock's recommendation that a sympathetic block be performed. A sympathetic block is an injection which temporarily blocks nerves, whereas a sympathectomy is a permanent surgical cutting of nerves. See Chapman, 4A Courtroom Medicine §§ 26.40 and 27.10. In short, Dr. Chock did not recommend a sympathectomy. There is no evidence in the record that a sympathectomy will probably be appropriate for plaintiff's condition. The parties are in dispute as to the amount which the jury may have awarded plaintiff for this part of her damages. Therefore it seems to us impossible to rationally reduce the damages awarded. These two errors compel reversal and remand. It is not necessary to consider the other eight grounds of the appeal. Because the case will be retried, however, we will indicate our views on two of these issues. 1. The fact that Higa was acquitted in the criminal proceedings (brought against him in connection with the accident) is not admissible in evidence, nor should it be mentioned by counsel to the jury. United States v. Gramer, 191 F.2d 741 (9th Cir.1951); Massey v. Meurer, 25 A.D.2d 729, 268 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1st Dept. 1966); 10 St. Louis L.J. 393 (1966); III Jones on Evidence § 639 at 1219 (5th ed. 1958). 2. It was improper for plaintiff's counsel in argument to ask the jury to put themselves in plaintiff's place. Texas Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Lovejoy, 112 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.Civ.App. 1937). Reversed and remanded for new trial.