Opinion ID: 2995295
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attempt to Commit a Theft

Text: Offense Under the INA. We next consider whether Garcia’s conviction qualifies as an attempt to commit a theft offense under the INA. As previously noted, the INA’s definition of aggravated felony includes an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in [8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(43)]. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a) (43)(U). Attempt is not defined in the INA. Consistent with our two most recent cases dealing with this question, Solorzano-Patlan and Hernandez-Mancilla, we are bound to apply a generic definition of attempt that is unconstrained by the titles, definitions or elements assigned to it by the various states. See Solorzano-Patlan, 207 F.3d at 874. In answering this question we also rely on the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2001), in which the court recently analyzed the meaning of attempt as used in 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(43)(U). In Sui, the Second Circuit initiated its analysis of the meaning of the word attempt by holding that the label given to the offense by the charging jurisdiction is not alone determinative of its status as an aggravated felony. Sui, 250 F.3d at 114. We agree with the Second Circuit, because reliance on the varying state laws would inevitably lead to inconsistent results in the interpretation of the INA, as we made clear and condemned in Solorzano-Patlan. As previously noted, Congress obviously never intended the definitions of the INA’s predicate offenses to vary solely according to the conflicting titles applied in the criminal laws of the various states. See Solorzano-Patlan, 207 F.3d at 874; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 579-80 (1990). Accordingly, the Sui court derived a generic meaning of attempt, based on common law and the Model Penal Code, consisting of (1) the intent to commit a crime, and (2) a substantial step toward its commission. Sui, 250 F.3d at 115. This definition of attempt is frequently employed in this circuit and derived from the common law. We adopt this definition for purposes of 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(43)(U). See United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 589 (7th Cir. 1999) (An attempt requires the intent to commit a crime and a substantial step toward its commission.); United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Barnes, 230 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir. 1985) (reciting the definition after noting the absence of a comprehensive federal statutory definition of attempt.) With this definition in mind, it is clear that the conduct admitted by Garcia in his plea of guilty to Count I of the 1988 Information fits within the parameters of an attempt to commit a theft offense. The 1988 Information charged Garcia with the intent to commit a theft, and also charged him with taking a substantial step toward the commission of the theft (unlawfully entering a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent). In pleading guilty to this charge, Garcia admitted engaging in conduct which we determine to fit within the parameters of an attempt to commit a theft offense under the INA, and the district court therefore did not err in concluding that the defendant’s 1988 conviction was an aggravated felony.