Opinion ID: 437648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: alvin johnson

Text: 37 Plaintiff Johnson was an El Paso County Deputy Sheriff for approximately ten years until his resignation in August 1977. On appeal, Johnson claims the district court erred in failing to award him emotional damages for violation of section 1983 by defendants Sullivan, County of El Paso, and the Sheriff's Department. Johnson alleges he was intentionally discriminated against on the basis of race by Sullivan's failure to promote him to the position of jail captain. 24 38 Johnson joined the Sheriff's Department in 1967 as a detention officer. He was later promoted to sergeant, and in August 1975 Sullivan placed Johnson in charge of the jail on an interim basis. The district court found that Johnson was promoted to lieutenant in October 1975 notwithstanding the fact that he had failed a test for jail captain. He remained in charge of the jail until January 1, 1977, when Sullivan promoted a white male, Sergeant E.C. Riley to jail captain. 25 Johnson was reassigned as Riley's assistant and placed in charge of jail records. Neither Johnson nor Riley were tested for the position of jail captain. Sullivan testified that he promoted Riley over Johnson because the latter had not performed adequately in running the jail. 26 Sullivan denied that Johnson's race was a factor in his decision. 27 In his letter of resignation from the Sheriff's Department addressed to Sullivan, Johnson praised Sullivan as a person who is interested in human rights, and added, It has been a pleasure working under your supervision.... 28 39 We have held that when section 1983 is used as a parallel remedy with Title VII in a racial discrimination suit the elements of a cause of action are the same under both statutes, and that [s]ection 1983 actions challenging racial discrimination under the equal protection clause and Title VII disparate treatment cases both require a showing of discriminatory motive .... Lee v. Conecuh County Board of Education, 634 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir.1981). The district court found that Johnson apparently had established, in regard to Sullivan's failure to promote him to jail captain, an unrebutted prima facie case of racial discrimination under the standards enunciated in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, supra, and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra. Yet, the court also expressly found that Johnson had not proven his allegation that Sullivan was responsible for discriminatory actions which gave rise to mental anguish and emotional harm because [t]here is no proof of intentional racial discrimination by Sheriff Sullivan. 29 Because we are unable to reconcile these findings, and because we believe the district court may have misconceived the proper standards for evaluating a claim of intentional discrimination under section 1983, we remand for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. In reviewing the district court's [findings] under the clearly erroneous standard, this Court cannot be left to second guess the ... basis for the district court's conclusion. Redditt v. Mississippi Extended Care Centers, Inc., 718 F.2d 1381, 1386 (1983). 40 As it may have relevance to the further proceedings contemplated by our remand of Johnson's referenced claim, we review the appropriate order of proof and standards for establishing an employment discrimination claim. First, the plaintiff must present a prima facie case of discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 and n. 6, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94 and n. 6. The district court found that Johnson had done so in this case, and that finding is not disputed. Establishment of plaintiff's prima facie case creates a presumption of discrimination. Burdine at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. Id. 41 All the employer need do is to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. The defendant raises a factual issue by introducing into evidence a clear and reasonably specific legally sufficient explanation for the discharge of the employee. Redditt, 718 F.2d at 1385 (citation omitted). 42 Sullivan met this burden of rebuttal by stating in detail his reason--Johnson's inadequate job performance--for failing to promote Johnson in place of Riley. At that point, the burden shifted back to plaintiff Johnson to show that Sullivan's explanation was a pretext. That burden merged with Johnson's ultimate burden of persuading the district court that he had been the victim of intentional discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. At the close of the evidence, the district court was then in a position to decide the ultimate issue of fact, that of discrimination vel non. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, supra, 460 U.S. at 715, 103 S.Ct. at 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d at 410; Williams v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra, 718 F.2d at 717. 43 On remand, the district court must determine which explanation of the reasons for Johnson's nonpromotion--the employer's or employee's--is the more persuasive. Williams at 717. If the court believes Sullivan, it must enter judgment for defendants on Johnson's section 1983 claim. If the court believes Johnson, however, it must enter judgment for him and determine what damages, if any, for mental anguish and emotional distress are attributable to defendants' discriminatory action. 30