Opinion ID: 4426324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court of Special Appeals Opinion

Text: The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the Heffingtons’ motion to stay the civil case. Heffington v. Moser, 238 Md. App. at 509, 518 192 A.3d at 905. Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Mrs. Heffington did not waive her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when she gave inculpatory testimony during her deposition prior to the February 2017 indictment. Heffington, 238 Md. App. at 532, 192 A.3d at 913. The court held also that the circuit court erred when it failed to balance explicitly Mrs. Heffington’s right to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege and her right of access to the courts under the Maryland Declaration of Rights against the Mosers’ right to timely resolution of the claims against them without harm to their defense. Id. at 540, 192 A.3d at 917. The Mosers argued in the Court of Special Appeals that Mrs. Heffington waived her Fifth Amendment privilege in two ways: first, she did not take the witness stand and invoke 7 ______________________________________________________________________________ the privilege, and second, she waived her Fifth Amendment privilege by testifying to the acts at issue in her deposition before she was indicted. Id. at 527, 192 A.3d at 910. The court held that as to the procedural default, i.e., that she did not invoke her privilege properly, the Mosers did not object below, and hence, that argument was waived and not preserved for appellate review. Id. at 526, 192 A.3d at 909. As to the waiver of the privilege by testifying at the deposition, the court held Mrs. Heffington did not waive her Fifth Amendment privilege. The court held that “[i]n light of the uncertainty regarding potential criminal charges at the time of Kristi’s deposition and the change in circumstances brought about by her indictment, we hold that Kristi did not waive her Fifth Amendment privilege, for purposes of trial, by testifying before trial at her pre-indictment deposition.” Id. at 532, 192 A.3d at 913. The Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that if waived, the privilege is waived for the entire “proceeding” in which it was waived. Id. at 529–30, 192 A.3d at 911. But the court avoided addressing whether a deposition and a trial in the same case are different “proceedings” for Fifth Amendment waiver purposes. The court held that even if they were part of the same proceeding, Mrs. Heffington’s later criminal indictment was a significant change in her circumstance between her deposition testimony and her trial. Id. at 530–31, 192 A.3d at 912. The court reasoned as follows: “Although, when she filed suit, Kristi knew that criminal charges might be brought against her, she reasonably could have believed by November 2016 that that might not happen, given the passage of time. When she was indicted in February 2017, the Fifth Amendment calculus changed dramatically. She no longer faced only a possibility of being charged with crimes arising from her employment at the Practice, but the 8 ______________________________________________________________________________ absolute certainty of it. ‘[T]he potential for self-incrimination is greatest’ after an indictment is returned. And, even if Kristi’s trial testimony merely repeated her deposition testimony, ‘reiteration adds to the credibility of the statement.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). The intermediate appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Heffington’s motion because the court “did not balance her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and her Article 19 right to access to the courts against the Mosers’ right to a timely resolution of the claims against them without harm to their defense.” Id. at 541, 192 A.3d at 918. The Court of Special Appeals elaborated that because the trial court held that Mrs. Heffington did not waive her Fifth Amendment privilege, the court erred by finding that she waived the privilege “to a certain extent” in her deposition testimony. Id. at 540, 192 A.3d at 918. Finally, the intermediate appellate court held that the trial court erred in not considering whether a stay would not merely inconvenience the Mosers but actually would prejudice them. Id. at 542–43, 192 A.3d at 919. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court in favor of the Mosers. The intermediate appellate court remanded for the trial court to consider the Mosers’ motion for summary judgment1 because, while the appeal was pending but after 1 The Court of Special Appeals explained as follows: “On May 26, 2017, before the stay was requested, the Mosers filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion remained open on the first day of trial. It was not ruled upon because the Mosers and the court agreed that it [(footnote continued . . .)] 9 ______________________________________________________________________________ oral argument in the Court of Special Appeals, Mrs. Heffington entered into a plea agreement with the State that concluded the criminal case. We granted certiorari to consider the issues presented.