Opinion ID: 183943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: montana's interpretation of its statutory scheme

Text: The Supreme Court of Montana has not specifically determined the effect of § 33-1-601 on personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Nonetheless, in Reed v. Woodmen of the World, 94 Mont. 374, 22 P.2d 819 (1933), the state supreme court construed an earlier, similar statute that also required foreign corporations to maintain an agent within the state upon whom service of process may be made. Id. at 822. Specifically, the statute provided that the corporation shall agree that any lawful process against it which is served upon such attorney shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served upon the society, and that the authority shall continue in force so long as any liability remains outstanding in this state. Mont.Code Ann. § 6322 (1921). Although liability . . . outstanding in this state could be read quite broadly, the Montana Supreme Court restricted the reach of the statute, stating that [t]he object of statutes of this nature is to provide for the collection of debts due from foreign corporations from its citizens and to enforce the contracts made here by foreign corporations though its agents. Reed, 22 P.2d at 822 (emphasis added). [8] Reed counsels that Montana's statutory scheme governing the appointment of an agent for the service of process was not meant to initiate a jurisdictional free-for-all by expanding personal jurisdiction to companies that have not transacted any business in Montana. To the extent that Reed is not dispositive, the default rule in Robert Mitchell applieswe should not construe [the state statute] to extend to suits in respect of business transacted by the foreign corporation outside Montana. Robert Mitchell, 257 U.S. at 216, 42 S.Ct. 84. Thus, under either Reed or Robert Mitchell, the appointment of an agent for the service of process in Montana does not confer personal jurisdiction over the Companies. We note that the Kings' insurance policies provide coverage for any accident that occurs anywhere in the United States. This scope of coverage does not, however, mean that the Kings may hale the Companies into any court in this nation, see, e.g., Carter v. Miss. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 326 Mont. 350, 109 P.3d 735, 739 (2005) ([I]t is important to emphasize that this appeal is not about whether Carter and Schmidt are covered by Carter's [insurance] policy; rather, the question is whether or not they can litigate the coverage dispute in Montana. ), and it does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Companies. The Montana statute does not say that personal jurisdiction is proper so long as a contract is in force in Montana. Rather, it says that the appointment of an agent for service of process is effective as long as that condition holds. And, as Reed and Robert Mitchell illustrate, there is an important difference between the appointment of an agent and the extension of wide-ranging personal jurisdiction over a corporation. In other words, this case is not about whether an insurance policy might cover an incident in Montana but whether there is an insurance contract or insurance business conducted in Montana. In sum, the Montana law regarding appointment of an agent for service of process does not, standing alone, subject foreign corporations to jurisdiction in Montana for acts performed outside of Montana, at least when the corporations transact no business in the state. Here, the Companies merely contemplated doing business in Montana; they are not amenable to suit in that state simply because they appointed the Commissioner of Insurance as their agent for service of process.