Opinion ID: 2098887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Content based or content neutral

Text: ¶ 29 The State, relying on the court of appeals' decision in this case, argues that the statute is content neutral because it does not impose any cognizable burden on political speech. Baron, on the other hand, argues that the statute regulates speech based on the ideas or message expressed, and as a result, it is content based. ¶ 30 At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal. Id. ¶ 31 As a result, government action that regulates speech is appropriately limited. However, if speech is being regulated, the regulation must survive strict scrutiny if it is content based or intermediate scrutiny if it is content neutral. Id. at 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445. ¶ 32 Determining when the regulation of speech is content based or content neutral can prove difficult. Id. As a general rule, laws that distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based. Id. at 643, 114 S.Ct. 2445. However, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are generally content neutral. Id. A review of, primarily, United States Supreme Court precedent is helpful in delineating between content-based and content-neutral regulations. ¶ 33 For example, in Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988), the Court concluded that the statute at issue was content based. The governing statute provided that `[i]t shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted to ... bring into public odium any foreign government ... within 500 feet of any ... embassy....' Id. at 316, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Protestors claimed the statute prohibited them from engaging in expressive activities that were critical of the Soviet Union and Nicaragua. Id. at 315-16, 108 S.Ct. 1157. The Court concluded the statute was content based by reasoning that [w]hether individuals may picket in front of a foreign embassy depends entirely upon whether their picket signs are critical of the foreign government. Id. at 318-19, 108 S.Ct. 1157. While favorable speech is permitted, [o]ne category of speech has been completely prohibited. Id. at 319, 108 S.Ct. 1157. ¶ 34 In Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992), the Court concluded that the relevant statute was content based. The governing statute provided that `[w]ithin ... 100 feet from the entrances, and the building in which the polling place is located, the display of campaign posters, signs or other campaign materials, distribution of campaign materials, and solicitation of votes ... are prohibited.' Id. at 193-94, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (emphasis added) (internal brackets and citation omitted). A campaign official challenged the statute because it limited her ability to communicate with voters. Id. at 194, 112 S.Ct. 1846. The Court concluded that the statute was content based. It reasoned that [w]hether individuals may exercise their free speech rights near polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign. Id. at 197, 112 S.Ct. 1846. ¶ 35 On the other hand, in Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), the Court concluded the ordinance at issue was content neutral. The governing ordinance provided that `[n]o person shall paint, mark or write on, or post or otherwise affix, any hand-bill or sign to or upon any ... electric light or power or telephone or telegraph or trolley wire pole....' Id. at 792 n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2118 (citation omitted). A group supporting a candidate for public office attached cardboard signs to various utility poles. Id. at 792-93, 104 S.Ct. 2118. Pursuant to the ordinance, city employees removed the signs, which resulted in the group seeking an injunction against enforcing the ordinance. Id. at 793, 104 S.Ct. 2118. The Court concluded the ordinance was content neutral. It reasoned that there is not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's enactment or enforcement of this ordinance, and [t]here is no claim that the ordinance was designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds distasteful. Id. at 804, 104 S.Ct. 2118. The Court further stated that the text of the ordinance is neutralindeed it is silent concerning any speaker's point of view. Id. ¶ 36 Similarly, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), the Court concluded that the ordinance at issue was content neutral. The applicable ordinance prohibited any `adult motion picture theater' from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any school. Id. at 44, 106 S.Ct. 925. The Court acknowledged that the ordinance did not appear to fit neatly into either the `content-based' or the `content-neutral' category, but it ultimately concluded the ordinance was content neutral. Id. at 47-48, 106 S.Ct. 925. The Court reasoned that [t]he ordinance by its terms [wa]s designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally `protect and preserve the quality of the city's neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,' not to suppress the expression of unpopular views. Id. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 925 citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n. 4, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (brackets omitted). The Court further stated that `if the city had been concerned with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to location.' Id. (brackets omitted). ¶ 37 In United States v. Brock, 863 F.Supp. 851 (E.D.Wis.1994) affirmed by United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.1996), the applicable statute provided that anyone who by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services. Id. at 856 (citing in relevant part 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)). The district court concluded that the statute was content neutral because it sought to protect[ ] ingress to and egress from clinics, id. at 861, and it was `justified without reference to the content of' any regulated speech. Id. at 865 (citation omitted). ¶ 38 In the case at hand, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) is content based because whether Baron's conduct is prohibited depends entirely upon whether Baron's speech, i.e., the content of the e-mails, was intended to be reputation-harming speech, which is similar to the content-based provisions in Boos and Burson where the prohibition was dependent upon whether signs were critical of foreign governments or related to political campaigns. However, we do not decide today whether subsection (c) of Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2) must always be deemed content based under all circumstances as we do not address potential situations where something other than speech is used with the intent to harm another's reputation. ¶ 39 Unlike Taxpayers for Vincent, Renton, or Brock where the statutes were not designed to suppress certain ideas, this statute under the facts of this case, suppresses reputation-harming speech when it is accompanied by intentionally using another's identity. There is no identity theft in this case unless the trier of fact determines that Baron used Fisher's personal identifying information with the intent to harm Fisher's reputation. Therefore, Baron is prohibited from disseminating speech that is intended to be harmful to Fisher's reputation when that speech occurs through the unauthorized use of Fisher's personal identifying information. As a result, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c), as applied to Baron, is content based. ¶ 40 The State, in effect, argues that the justification behind the identity theft statute is to punish people for using another individual's identity without consent, and therefore, the statute does not regulate a specific category of speech. While the State may be correct with respect to the application of the identity theft statute to other factual scenarios, under the facts of this case and as charged here, the content of the e-mails was critical to the charge in that Baron must have used Fisher's personal identifying information with the intent to harm Fisher's reputation. ¶ 41 In Boos, 485 U.S. at 320, 108 S.Ct. 1157, the United States Supreme Court stated that regulations are content neutral when they `are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' (Citation omitted.) For example, [s]o long as the justifications for regulation have nothing to do with content, i.e., the desire to suppress crime has nothing to do with the actual films being shown inside adult movie theaters, the regulation can be analyzed as content neutral. Id. ¶ 42 The district attorney's justification for charging Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) is based upon the content of the e-mails because that is what is intended to be harmful to Fisher's reputation, and thus, the e-mails, i.e., speech, is necessary proof of an element of the crime. When the Wisconsin legislature included intending to harm another's reputation as an element of Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c), the justification, in part, and under the facts of this case became based on the content of the speech. ¶ 43. We conclude that, under facts of this case, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) is content based and regulates speech in addition to conduct. However, this may not be the case under all circumstances given that one may be able to intend to harm the reputation of another without using speech. ¶ 44 Accordingly, the State bears the burden of showing that the statute overcomes strict scrutiny in order to survive Baron's as-applied challenge.