Opinion ID: 1720016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Referral To W.E.R.C.

Text: The trial court order transferred this case to W.E.R.C. for the purpose of making findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine how much of the plaintiffs' fair-share contributions have been used for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining or contract administration. In making the referral the trial court relied on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. [3] Where primary jurisdiction is at issue . . . a trial court can, in its discretion, either hear a case or defer to the expertise of an administrative agency . . . the question of primary jurisdiction arises only in cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction in the administrative agency and in the courts. Accordingly, the question is not one of subject matter jurisdiction, but which portion of the dispute-settling apparatus  the courts or the agencies  should, in the interests of judicial administration, first take the jurisdiction that both the agency and the court have. Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. Of School Directors, 69 Wis.2d 169, 175, 230 N.W.2d 704 (1975). [4] Where questions of primary jurisdiction are involved and the court declines to exercise its jurisdiction, the question on review is whether the court has abused its discretion. Sawejka v. Morgan, 56 Wis.2d 70, 79, 201 N.W.2d 528 (1972). The question of primary jurisdiction was first considered in Wisconsin in the case of Wisconsin Collectors Asso. Inc. v. Thorp Finance Corp., 32 Wis.2d 36, 145 N.W.2d 33 (1966). In that case the collectors claimed that Thorp was engaged in running a collection agency without having complied with the statutory licensing requirements. The trial began and immediately after the first witness was sworn, Thorp made a motion . . . in the nature of a demurrer ore tenus,  claiming that the court had no jurisdiction because the collectors' association had not exhausted its administrative remedies. The trial court reserved decision on the demurrer and proceeded to take 830 pages of testimony. At the conclusion of the trial, Thorp moved for dismissal on the ground that the Commissioner of Banks had primary jurisdiction and had failed to exercise it. At this point, the trial court determined that the Commissioner did have primary jurisdiction and transferred the case to that office for a fresh start. In determining who should have heard the case this court stated, Nonetheless, we believe it improper to couch such priority in terms of power or jurisdiction. The standard, in our opinion, should not be power but comity. The court must consider which course would best serve the ends of justice. If the issue presented to the court involves exclusively factual issues within the peculiar expertise of the commission, the obviously better course would be to decline jurisdiction and to refer the matter to the agency. On the other hand, if statutory interpretation or issues of law are significant, the court may properly choose in its discretion to entertain the proceedings. The trial court should exercise its discretion with an understanding that the legislature has created the agency in order to afford a systematic method of fact-finding and policy-making and that the agency's jurisdiction should be given priority in the absence of a valid reason for judicial intervention. Wisconsin Collectors, supra at 32 Wis.2d 44, 45. [5] In Wisconsin Collectors this court held that it would not have been an abuse of discretion to transfer the case to the agency at the beginning of trial, but that it was an abuse to do so after such an extensive hearing. To determine whether this trial court abused its discretion in transferring the case to W.E.R.C., it must first be determined what the trial court decided in granting the previous motion for partial summary judgment. The issues remaining unresolved after that decision must be mainly factual, rather than legal or constitutional. If not, the transfer was erroneous. The trial court first determined that secs. 111.70 (1) (h) and 111.70 (2), Stats. (1975) are constitutional on their face. [6] Concerning the application of the statute the court stated, Further the uncontroverted affidavits relate numerous expenses unrelated to the confines of the statute. Thus there may be an unconstitutional application of the funds collected. Since all the defendant unions receive a portion of plaintiffs' funds (albeit slight in the case of the state and national organizations) a strict accounting procedure should be instituted, if same has not already been accomplished, to ensure that any objecting nonmember is reimbursed for any of his dues which are not strictly related to the collective bargaining process or contract administration .... Perhaps it may prove less burdensome to rebate all `per capita' dues to the regional, state and national organizations but that is defendants' option. If not so exercised defendants must show what proportion of those `per capita' assessments come within the statutory confines and which do not. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court decision still leaves open questions about whether the statute is being constitutionally applied to them, but at a June 29, 1977 hearing after the opinion was issued the trial court stated that, Although the Court declared the Wisconsin Statute constitutional on its face, a further constitutional issue would normally be apparent in this case on First Amendment rights, but that issue really is moot since the statute itself indicates the expenditures by the unions of fair-share monies are limited to contract administration and collective bargaining, which gives greater rights to the plaintiffs than solely First Amendment rights. At an August 22, 1977 hearing the trial court referred to its previous decision and stated that, There is no question that the issue before the Court in the May 16th decision was solely the question of whether or not that portion of the statutes was unconstitutional on its face. The Court did make referral in its opinion to certain expenditures that would be placed in the record by the plaintiffs concerning a number of different expenditures in both the Browne and Gerleman cases, and only for purposes of guidance for any agency or referee that will be adopted when it makes its determination on findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether or not the expenditures come within the statute, which, as I have indicated on a number of occasions, is more restrictive of the union's rights than the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. (emphasis added). Based on the above statements the trial court must have determined that the issue of the as-applied constitutionality of the statute was foreclosed by the statute itself. Sec. 111.70 (1) (h), Stats. (1975), provides that fair-share employees are required to pay the costs of collective bargaining and contract administration. The trial court evidently reasoned that these costs determine the largest amount due from non-union employes and not the . . . amount of dues uniformly required of all [union] members. Sec. 111.70 (2), Stats., supra. Under this paragraph issues of constitutional application of the statute are settled because the statute is interpreted so that only money for constitutional purposes can be collected under it. [6, 7] This approach complies with the rule that when, . . . a legislative enactment . . . is attacked as being unconstitutional . . . the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to preserve a statute and to find it constitutional if it is at all possible to do so. Gottlieb v. Milwaukee, 33 Wis.2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967). `. . . the duty of this court is . . . if possible, to so construe the statute as to find it in harmony with accepted constitutional principles.' State ex rel. Harvey v. Morgan, 30 Wis.2d 1, 13, 139 N.W.2d 585 (1966). [8] We agree with the trial court's interpretation of sec. 111.70 (2), Stats. The statute itself forbids the use of fair-share funds for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining or contract administration. [7] [9] In applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to the unresolved facts and issues of this case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the case to W.E.R.C. Sec. 111.70(1) (h), Stats. is constitutional on its face, and by its terms the statute can not require the plaintiffs to contribute to political purposes in violation of their first amendment rights. The trial court correctly determined that the remaining issues involved factual issues and statutory application: What portion of the fair-share dues are being used for purposes unrelated to contract administration or collective bargaining, in contravention of the statute. [8] [10, 11] The plaintiffs raise a number of arguments to show that the referral to W.E.R.C. was erroneous. Their most significant argument is that this case does not involve an issue of primary jurisdiction because the agency did not have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutional issues raised here. Based on the previous discussion, constitutional issues are no longer apparent in this case. Nonetheless, there must be some basis for W.E.R.C. jurisdiction over the remaining issue of statutory violations or a primary jurisdiction analysis is inapplicable. An agency or board created by the legislature only has those powers which are expressly or impliedly conferred on it by statute. Such statutes are generally strictly construed to preclude the exercise of power which is not expressly granted. Racine Fire & Police Comm. v. Stanfield, 70 Wis.2d 395, 399, 234 N.W.2d 307 (1974). In City Firefighters Union v. Madison, 48 Wis.2d 262, 179 N.W.2d 800 (1970), the procedural issue was whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to decide whether certain firemen could hold union office in contravention of the fire chief's order. This court reasoned that the issue was the same as in Thorp, supra, (primary jurisdiction) because the circuit court was being asked to hear a dispute that could also have been presented to an administrative agency. The appealing union argued that W.E.R.C. could not have heard the dispute. Appellants . . . argue that they did not have a choice of forums between WERC and the circuit court. They argue that the Chief's acts constitute a breach of contract and that nowhere in sec. 111.70, Stats., is WERC given authority to hear a breach of contract action. This is true, but the very same acts, if proven, would also have served as a basis of a `prohibited practice' action which WERC is clearly empowered to hear. Thus, appellants did have a choice of forums, depending upon what label they selected for their action. City Firefighters, supra at 48 Wis.2d 268, 269. [12] Sec. 111.70 (3) (a) 1, Stats. (1975), supra, provides that it is a prohibited practice for a municipal employer, To interfere with, restrain or coerce municipal employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed . . . Under Sec. 111.70 (2), Stats., supra, we interpret the latter statute as only requiring that non-union employees pay fair-share dues for the expense of contract administration and collective bargaining. The plaintiffs are claiming that their fair-share dues have been used for political purposes, in contravention of the statute. That use of the fair-share funds interferes with their statutory rights and is a prohibited practice over which W.E.R.C. has jurisdiction. Sec. 111.70(3) (a) 1, Stats. (1975). [9] The plaintiffs also contend that the referral to W.E.R.C. contravenes the rule of this case as articulated in the previous appeal, Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors, 69 Wis.2d 169, 230 N.W.2d 704 (1975). That appeal was from an order overruling the unions' demurrer. The unions claimed that W.E.R.C. had exclusive jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative and contract remedies. This court affirmed the order overruling the demurrer and determined that W.E.R.C. did not have exclusive jurisdiction. However, that decision was based on the procedural posture of the case at that time and on issues raised by the demurrer. In the instant case, there is no substantial factual dispute. For demurrer purposes at least, it is agreed that money is deducted from the wages of the plaintiffs and some of that money is used for political purposes not related to the collective bargaining process. The issue posed by the case is the constitutionality of the statutes that authorizes those deductions under a `fair-share agreement' that conformed to the statutory prescription. Browne, supra at 69 Wis.2d 176. On this second appeal the case is not at the demurrer stage, constitutional issues have been resolved and factual issues now predominate.