Opinion ID: 1407452
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonableness of the circuit judge's award

Text: Our analysis does not end with a determination of the proper method for calculating attorneys' fees, however. Regardless of any theoretical preference for one method of fee calculation over another, the overriding benchmark for awards of attorneys' fees under both the state action statute and the general premise of the common fund doctrine is that attorneys' fees must be reasonable. See Del. Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. at 562, 106 S.Ct. 3088. In light of the circumstances of this case, we hold that an award of $8.66 million in attorneys' fees is entirely unreasonable. From its inception in our original jurisdiction, this Court repeatedly took actions which served to narrow the focus of this litigation and minimize the associated costs to all involved. In the order granting original jurisdiction, the Court required that all contributions made by old TERI participants pursuant to Act 153 must be deposited by the Retirement System into an interest-bearing escrow account until the Court rendered a final decision. This prophylactic decree, made on the Court's own motion, acted to preserve the funds at issue with no further legal action necessary by either party. The Court's order expanded the scope of this mandate for efficiency to the sequencing and substance of the case. With no further discovery permitted, the Court instructed the parties to agree on the matters to be included in the appendix within ten days of the order granting original jurisdiction and set forth specific guidelines as to the exact materials to be submitted to the Court by each party thereafter. [7] The Court limited these materials to the parties' final briefs and the appendix, and specified that the parties would be notified if the Court finds that oral argument is necessary to resolve the issues in this matter. The Court also provided a specific timeline for submission of materials along with the admonition that [n]o continuances or extensions will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. Pursuant to this timeline, the entire process of collecting and submitting the necessary documents was to be completed within a maximum of eighty days from the Court's order. Finally, noting the named TERI participants' motion for class certification in the trial court, this Court ordered that the motion be re-filed in the Court within five days of the order. Even after the final judgment in Layman, this Court's actions were aimed at serving the parties' fiscal interests. When the State and the Retirement System informed the Court that their records contained all of the information necessary to effectuate the return of contributionsalready held in escrow pursuant to the earlier Court orderto all of the TERI participants subject to the Court's ruling, the Court decertified the class of TERI plaintiffs. Because the relief granted to the named plaintiffs applied to each and every TERI participant in the defined class, the Court determined that the Retirement System's assurances that it would fully comply with the Court's order for relief made the timeconsuming and costly formality of class notice unnecessary. Moreover, the Court rejected counsel's request for attorneys' fees to be paid out of the common fund so that the TERI participants would not ultimately bear the costs of litigation associated with enforcing their contract rights with the government. Counsel for the TERI plaintiffs claim that their efficient and expeditious efforts fully justify an $8.66 million award of attorneys' fees. Counsel claims that their good lawyering not only resulted in 100% recovery for the TERI participants, but ultimately saved tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees due to the quick result obtained in the case. Although counsel's efforts were certainly commendable, counsel is not entitled to sole credit for the overall efficiency of the case when it was also counsel's compliance with this Court's instructions that yielded this judicious result. Viewing the circuit judge's award of attorneys' fees in light of the state action statute's limitation that attorneys' fees assessed to a state agency may only be paid upon presentation of an itemized accounting of the attorney's fees, S.C.Code Ann. § 15-77-330, the circuit judge's $8.66 million award results in an hourly rate of $6,000 for each attorney and staff member involved in the litigation of the case on behalf of the TERI participants. We find this fee inconsistent with this Court's careful crafting of both the procedural and substantive path of this case aimed at minimizing costs for all involved. Accordingly, we hold that under the circumstances of this case, the circuit judge's award of $8.66 million in attorneys' fees pursuant to the state action statute was unreasonable.