Opinion ID: 2980063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rodriguez’s civil rights action

Text: On July 1, 2008, Rodriguez filed a complaint against the City of Cleveland, Lieutenant Miller, Detectives Hall and Davis, and other named defendants, in the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio, alleging, among other 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, illegal search and seizure, malicious prosecution and continued unlawful detention, and municipal liability for failure to train. Rodriguez also brought a number of state-law claims. In August 2008, the defendants removed the action to federal district court. In April 2009, the district court granted Rodriguez leave to file a Third Amended Complaint—the complaint at the heart of this appeal. In that complaint, Rodriguez asserted the following claims: (1) Count I: unreasonable searches and seizures of person and property, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) Count II: failure to intercede/intervene; (3) Count III: conscience-shocking and outrageous conduct, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) Count IV: false arrest and false imprisonment, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (5) Count V: intentional omission of exculpatory information to secure indictments, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; (6) Count VI: absence of qualified immunity and good faith; (7) Count VII: municipal liability for failure to train and supervise police officers in the proper execution of an -9- Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland administrative inspection; (8) Count VIII: municipal liability for failure to investigate and discipline police officers/ratification of illegal actions; (9) Count IX: retaliation and harassment, in violation of the First Amendment; (10) Count X: malicious prosecution and continued unlawful detention without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (11) Count XI: supervisory liability for Fourth Amendment violations; and various state-law claims. Following preliminary discovery, Rodriguez moved for summary judgment on his claim for unreasonable seizure of property in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez asserted that the state trial court judge who had dismissed the felony charges against him had “rul[ed] that the arrests carried out by CPD officers were without probable cause as was their seizure of Rodriguez’s personal and business property in July, 2006.” As to whether reasonable suspicion (as opposed to probable cause) justified the defendants’ seizure and continued detention of his property, Rodriguez contended that the “seizure and extended detention of [his] property from M & M, which ultimately lasted until February 27, 2007, based solely upon an ‘anonymous tip’ about one unrelated vehicle (the white dump truck) not involved in M & M business, was unreasonable in duration as a matter of law and well established police regulations.” Rodriguez concluded that “[i]n the absence of a legitimate administrative inspection and/or probable cause, the CPD detectives needed a warrant to search M & M, and they had no basis to seize any of the nine (9) tow truck vehicles and tools in July, 2006.” The defendants jointly opposed Rodriguez’s motion for summary judgment, contending that Rodriguez’s motion was “premised entirely on mischaracterizations of fact, mischaracterizations as - 10 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland to the basis for impounding certain vehicles used by M & M, and mischaracterizations regarding the underlying criminal case.” According to the defendants, “[t]he undisputed facts establish a constitutionally sound basis for taking each of these items such that Rodriguez suffered no Fourth Amendment violation.” After Rodriguez moved for summary judgment on his seizure of property claim, the defendants jointly moved for summary judgment on the ground that “[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact to refute that none of the Defendants violated any of the Plaintiffs’ federally protected civil rights, and the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”16 More specifically, the defendants contended that they had developed “probable cause to arrest Jose Rodriguez, and there was no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” Moreover, the defendants maintained that they had “impounded Rodriguez’s vehicles pursuant to a facially valid City ordinance that provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy, and, therefore, resulted in no Fourth Amendment violation.” Rodriguez opposed the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment. He argued that the individual defendants had “used warrantless searches and seizures under the pretext of an administrative C.C.O. § 601.15 inspection;” indeed, in initiating the search of M & M, the individual defendants’ “primary stated objective was to search and gather evidence of a stolen dump truck.” Rodriguez also maintained that he had been “both unlawfully arrested and detained by CPD 16 Although the defendants filed their joint motion for summary judgment before Rodriguez had officially filed his Third Amended Complaint, the district court denied the defendants’ joint motion to file a revised motion for summary judgment in response to Rodriguez’s filing of the Third Amended Complaint. - 11 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland detectives on two (2) separate occasions without a warrant, court order or probable cause.” In support of this contention, Rodriguez asserted that, “[g]iven the M & M receipt hand delivered to defendant Hall on July 7, 2006, there is ample evidence in the record that the CPD detectives, as Rodriguez’s accusers, had no probable cause to believe that he was actually guilty of ‘receiving stolen property’ or in ‘possession of criminal tools’ because they had no witnesses to the alleged crimes, and they did not observe any of the alleged crimes.” The district court denied qualified immunity as to all of Rodriguez’s federal constitutional claims and granted Rodriguez’s motion for summary judgment as to his seizure of property claim. In finding that the individual defendants lacked probable cause to seize Rodriguez’s property, the district court relied upon its perception that the state trial court judge dismissed the felony charges against Rodriguez on the basis of just such a finding.17 Rodriguez, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 477. Moreover, from the district court’s perspective, there was no evidence to suggest that Rodriguez “had cause to believe that the stolen truck in question had been obtained through a theft offense.” Id. at 477-78. And, although the defendants claimed that they had impounded M & M’s tow trucks 17 The record instead appears to show that the state trial court judge granted Rodriguez’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the state had not presented sufficient evidence to convict him on any of the charges against him. Indeed, Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(A) provides that a state trial court, “on motion of a defendant . . . after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” (Emphasis added.) It does not appear that the state trial court judge, in granting Rodriguez’s Rule 29 motion, addressed the issue of probable cause at all. - 12 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland pursuant to C.C.O. § 677A, the district court concluded that C.C.O. § 677A “does not authorize the towing of vehicles.” Id. at 478. Furthermore, the district court found that the defendants could not resort to reasonable suspicion (as opposed to probable cause) as a justification for their detention of Rodriguez’s property because the anonymous tip about the stolen dump truck had lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. Even if the anonymous tip had been reliable, however, and had “provid[ed] reasonable suspicion for the temporary detention of the allegedly stolen dump truck,” the district court held that “the seizure of all the remaining M & M vehicles was certainly not the least intrusive means of conducting the investigation in this case; neither was the detention of all of those vehicles for approximately seven months and for nearly a month following the dismissal of the claims against [Rodriguez].” Id. Nor could the defendants seek shelter under the administrative inspection exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, according to the district court, because an “administrative inspection may not be used to gather evidence as part of what is, in actuality, a criminal investigation.” Id. at 479 (citing New York v. Burger, 582 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987)). The district court concluded that “[b]ecause the Defendants should have obtained a search warrant prior to conducting this type of inspection, and because they had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to seize and subsequently retain the M & M tow trucks, the seizure of the tow trucks violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Adding insult to constitutional injury, after the defendants had arrested Rodriguez and “seiz[ed] half of his property on July 7, 2006,” the defendants had “c[o]me - 13 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland back a week later, again without a warrant, and arrested the Plaintiff again, while seizing the remainder of his property.” Id. Having found a violation of Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights, the district court determined that “[t]he requirement that government officials must obtain a search warrant before making an unwelcome intrusion onto private property has been clearly established law for over 20 years.” Id. Furthermore, “the notion that either probable cause or reasonable suspicion (depending on the circumstances of the search) is required for a constitutional seizure of persons or property has been clearly established law for over 20 years.” Id. at 480. Accordingly, the defendants’ violation of Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights “was objectively unreasonable.” Id. The district court, therefore, denied qualified immunity. Id. Because there were “no genuine issue[s] of material fact with respect to [Rodriguez’s] claim of a Fourth Amendment violation based on an unreasonable search and seizure,” the district court granted summary judgment in Rodriguez’s favor. Id. With respect to defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Rodriguez’s claims premised on failures to investigate, train, and supervise, the district court denied qualified immunity because “genuine issues of material fact remain[] that must be resolved at trial.” Id. at 481-82. The district court similarly denied defendants summary judgment on Rodriguez’s First Amendment retaliation and harassment claim on the ground that genuine issues of material fact remain “regarding the involvement of the Defendants” in the allegedly retaliatory incidents and because “[t]he defense of qualified immunity has generally been rejected by the courts in conjunction with retaliation claims.” Id. at 483-84. The district court determined that Rodriguez’s claim of malicious prosecution and - 14 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland unlawful detention without probable cause required the same analysis as Rodriguez’s claim premised on the intentional omission of exculpatory evidence to secure indictments. Id. at 484 n.21. The district court denied qualified immunity as to both claims because “there exist genuine issues of material fact about whether some or all of the Defendants withheld exculpatory information in order to indict Plaintiff Rodriguez, arrest him, and seize (and continue the detention of) his property.” Id. at 484. Defendants now appeal, asserting that they are entitled to qualified immunity.