Opinion ID: 4425842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Proper Scope of Doe v. Columbia

Text: In Doe v. Columbia, a male student alleged that his suspension for sexual assault was motivated, in part, by improper consideration of his sex in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 (“Title IX”).31 Similar to Title VII, Title IX prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex.”32 But unlike Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination, Title IX applies to “any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”33 We have, however, long interpreted Title IX “by looking to the . . . the caselaw interpreting Title VII,” and we have therefore held that “Title IX bars the imposition of university discipline where gender is a motivating factor in the decision to discipline.”34 The plaintiff in Doe v. Columbia advanced precisely such a claim. His complaint alleged an atmosphere of public pressure demanding that the university react more swiftly and severely to female complaints of sexual assault against males. The complaint also alleged substantial procedural irregularities in the investigation and adjudication of the accusations against the student. These irregularities included: the university’s failure “to seek out potential witnesses [he] had identified as sources of information favorable to 31 Doe v. Columbia, 831 F.3d at 48. 32 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 33 Id. 34 Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714–15 (2d Cir. 1994). 15 him,” its failure “to act in accordance with University procedures designed to protect accused students,” and its arrival at conclusions that were “incorrect and contrary to the weight of the evidence.”35 We concluded that the complaint successfully stated a claim for sex discrimination under Title IX. In so holding, we highlighted two factual allegations that plausibly supported “at least the needed minimal inference of sex bias.”36 First, we recognized that the procedural deficiencies in the university’s investigation and adjudication of the sexual assault complaint raised an inference that the university was motivated, at least in part, by bias.37 Next, we confirmed that this bias was likely a sex‐based bias by noting that the university had been criticized for “not taking seriously complaints of female students alleging sexual assault by male students.”38 We reasoned that it was plausible that the university was motivated to “favor the accusing female over the accused male” in order to 35 Doe v. Columbia, 831 F.3d at 56–57. 36 Id. at 59. 37 Id. at 57. 38 Id. (emphasis added). We emphasized that a plaintiff seeking to survive a motion to dismiss need not establish a necessary inference of sex‐based discrimination, or even that such discrimination be “the most plausible explanation of the defendant’s conduct.” Id. (emphasis in original). Rather, it is sufficient if the inference of sex‐based discriminatory intent is one of several possible inferences. 16 demonstrate its commitment to protecting female students from male sexual assailants.39 In this case, the District Court placed several unwarranted limitations on the application of Doe v. Columbia. First, the District Court interpreted Doe v. Columbia as applying only to plaintiffs accused of sexual assault, rather than those accused of sexual harassment.40 Second, the District Court limited Doe v. Columbia to student plaintiffs, to the exclusion of employee plaintiffs.41 And third, the District Court assumed that the logic of Doe v. Columbia was confined to circumstances where criticism of a university had reached a “crescendo.”42 We disagree with these overly narrow interpretations of our precedent. 39Id.; see also id. at 58 n.11 (“A defendant is not excused from liability for discrimination because the discriminatory motivation does not result from a discriminatory heart, but rather from a desire to avoid practical disadvantages that might result from unbiased action. A covered university that adopts, even temporarily, a policy of bias favoring one sex over the other in a disciplinary dispute, doing so in order to avoid liability or bad publicity, has practiced sex discrimination, notwithstanding that the motive for the discrimination did not come from ingrained or permanent bias against that particular sex.”). 40 Menaker, 2018 WL 4636818, at  (“[T]he facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Doe. First, Doe concerned accusations of . . . sexual assault, not harassment and unprofessional conduct . . . .”). 41Id. (distinguishing between accusations of “student‐on‐student” sexual misconduct and accusations of sexual misconduct “by an at‐will employee against students on his team and other teams”). 42 Id. at . 17 First, we reject the District Court’s attempt to distinguish between accusations of sexual assault on the one hand, and accusations of sexual harassment on the other. The logic of Doe v. Columbia applies equally to both sorts of accusations. The intuitive principle that universities’ reactions to accusations of sexual misconduct are often influenced by the sexes of the parties applies with equal force to both sexual assault and sexual harassment. A plaintiff may thus establish a prima facie case for sex discrimination based on adverse actions for both allegations of sexual harassment and allegations of sexual assault. Second, we emphasize that the holding of Doe v. Columbia is not limited to Title IX claims rather than Title VII claims. We apply similar principles in both Title VII and Title IX when seeking to identify discriminatory intent.43 Indeed, our holding in Doe v. Columbia was expressly based on Title VII principles.44 Nor is the logic underlying Doe v. Columbia limited to discipline meted out in response to allegations of student‐on‐student misconduct. On the contrary, the very same pressures that may drive a university to discriminate against male students accused of sexual misconduct may drive a university to discriminate against male employees accused of the same. 43 See, e.g., Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 714 (“[C]ourts have interpreted Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the caselaw interpreting Title VII.”). 44Doe v. Columbia, 831 F.3d at 55 (“[R]ules the Supreme Court established for Title VII litigation appear to apply also to such similar claims of sex discrimination under Title IX.”). 18 To be sure, an at‐will employee may have different contractual rights than a student or a tenured faculty member. And a university may well have reasons other than sex for distinct treatment of claims affecting these different sorts of members of a university community. But once a university has promised procedural protections to employees, the disregard or abuse of those procedures may raise an inference of bias.45 Third, we reject the District Court’s attempt to limit Doe v. Columbia to cases where the public pressure on a university is 45 Apart from an inference of bias, a university’s disregard of promised procedural protections may also give rise to claims for breach of contract or for violations of state law guarantees of procedural or substantive fairness. See, e.g., Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 239 Conn. 574, 592–93 (1996) (“[C]ourts will entertain a cause of action for institutional breach of a contract for educational services . . . if the educational institution failed to fulfil a specific contractual promise distinct from any overall obligation to offer a reasonable program.”); Neiman v. Yale Univ., 270 Conn. 244, 251 (2004) (concluding that “the trial court properly determined that a contract existed [based on a faculty handbook] as a matter of law”); Powers v. St. Johnʹs Univ. Sch. of Law, 25 N.Y.3d 210, 216 (2015) (permitting judicial review where a university “acts arbitrarily and not in the exercise of its honest discretion [or] fails to abide by its own rules”); Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 49 N.Y.2d 652, 660 (1980) (“[W]e hold that when a university has adopted a rule or guideline establishing the procedure to be followed in relation to suspension or expulsion that procedure must be substantially observed.”); Olsson v. Bd. of Higher Ed., 49 N.Y.2d 408, 414 (1980) (“[A]n academic institution must act in good faith in its dealings with its students.”). Because Menaker did not pursue any such claims, we do not consider them here. 19 particularly acute.46 We agree that “[p]ress coverage of sexual assault at a university does not automatically give rise to an inference that a male who is terminated because of allegations of inappropriate or unprofessional conduct is the victim of [sex] discrimination.”47 But this does not mean that the press coverage or public pressure must reach a particular level of severity. On the contrary, when combined with clear procedural irregularities in a university’s response to allegations of sexual misconduct, even minimal evidence of pressure on the university to act based on invidious stereotypes will permit a plausible inference of sex discrimination.48 To summarize: we decline to adopt each of the District Court’s proposed limitations on Doe v. Columbia. The logic of that precedent applies to both students and employees, to accusations of sexual harassment as well as sexual assault, and it does not rely on a particular quantum of criticism at a specific university. Rather, Doe v. Columbia stands for the general principle that where a university (1) takes an adverse action against a student or employee, (2) in response to allegations of sexual misconduct, (3) following a clearly irregular investigative or adjudicative process, (4) amid criticism for reacting 46Menaker, 2018 WL 4636818, at  (describing the criticism in Doe v. Columbia as “a crescendo of articles about sexual assault and harassment at Columbia University in particular”). 47 Id. 48 It is precisely because procedural irregularity alone already suggests bias that even minimal evidence of sex‐based pressure on the university is sufficient to establish bias on account of sex. See notes 37–38 and accompanying text, ante. 20 inadequately to allegations of sexual misconduct by members of one sex, these circumstances provide the requisite support for a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Here, Menaker has clearly alleged that he suffered an adverse employment action, and that this action came in response to accusations (if not an actual finding) of sexual harassment. Similarly, Menaker has plausibly alleged facts that suggest at least some pressure on Hofstra to react more forcefully to allegations of male sexual misconduct (e.g., the “Dear Colleague” Letter, a Department of Education investigation, and student criticism).49 The only remaining question, then, is whether his firing followed a sufficiently irregular process to raise an inference of bias.