Opinion ID: 1999321
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Additional instructions to jury.

Text: After the jury had retired for deliberations, the foreman returned to ask whether the arresting officers had used a red light on their squad car while they were following the Volkswagen. Appellants and their counsel were not present in court at the time. The record reveals that the following exchange took place: The Court: One moment. If you recall, there is a stipulation that the stopping and the arrest was with probable cause. So actually this is not a material fact. The Foreman: Well, it was a question in one of the juror's mind about when the red light was flashed. The Court: It doesn't make any difference because there is a stipulation here that it was a lawful The Foreman: He mentioned that, too, but we just wanted to clear that up. The Court: Don't say any more than that, sir. All I am saying is that the issue is not whether the arrest was proper. The Foreman: I understand that. The Court: The only question is, as I instructed you as to whether there was resisting, and that's as far as I wish to go. The Foreman: Okay. The Court: Now you will go back and deliberate on those terms. The Foreman: Very well. Clearly, counsel has a right, and a duty, to be present when additional instructions are requested by the jury. State v. Russell (1958), 5 Wis. 2d 196, 200, 92 N. W. 2d 210. However, this right may be waived by the absence  of counsel from the courtroom during the regular session of the court. State v. Ritchie (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 47, 54, 174 N. W. 2d 504. As stated in State v. Russell, supra, at page 200: . . . If counsel is absent the judge may presume it is voluntarily and a waiver unless he knows to the contrary or personally has taken the responsibility to see that counsel is notified or there are court rules governing the situation. Responsibility cannot be placed upon the court by counsel to be called or searched out when he knows the court is in session. Moreover, appellants fail to show how the communication between the judge and the jury resulted in prejudice to them. In Seitz v. Seitz (1967), 35 Wis. 2d 282, 306, 151 N. W. 2d 86, this court reviewed the contention that appellants were entitled to a new trial because of a brief communication between a bailiff and one of the jurors. This court stated at page 306: . . . [I]t is difficult to perceive how this innocuous occurrence could in any manner have resulted in prejudice to plaintiff. Since Wegner v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. [(1952), 262 Wis. 402, 55 N. W. 2d 420, 41 A. L. R. 2d 279], this court has stood by the rule that a communication with the jury is not sufficient to warrant a new trial in the absence of prejudice. . . .