Opinion ID: 2168121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the landlord's duty

Text: The first question certified by the trial court, and the only issue (other than the retailer's motion to dismiss) discussed by the parties in their briefs and during oral arguments, is the landlord's common law duty to the appellees. An examination of the principles of landlord and tenant law will resolve this issue. It is an established principle in Illinois that if a landlord retains control of a portion of the premises leased to the tenant, the landlord has the duty, as the party in control, to use ordinary care in maintaining that part of the premises in a reasonably safe condition. ( Rowe v. State Bank (1988), 125 Ill.2d 203, 220, 126 Ill.Dec. 519, 531 N.E.2d 1358; Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 345, 247 N.E.2d 877; Murphy v. Illinois State Trust Co. (1940), 375 Ill. 310, 31 N.E.2d 305.) Conversely, where a defective condition exists on premises leased to a tenant and under the tenant's control, a landlord is not liable for injuries caused by the condition. ( Rowe, 125 Ill.2d at 220-21, 126 Ill. Dec. 519, 531 N.E.2d 1358; Wright v. Mr. Quick, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill.2d 236, 238, 93 Ill.Dec. 375, 486 N.E.2d 908; Wagner v. Kepler (1951), 411 Ill. 368, 371, 104 N.E.2d 231.) As this court noted in Rowe: `[t]he lessee acquires an estate in the land, and becomes for the time being both owner and occupier, subject to all of the responsibilities of one in possession, to those who enter upon the land and those outside of its boundaries.' Rowe, 125 Ill.2d at 221 [126 Ill.Dec. 519, 531 N.E.2d 1358], quoting W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 63, at 434 (5th ed. 1984). An exception to the general rule is where the landlord contracts to keep the property under the tenant's control in repair. ( Mr. Quick, 109 Ill.2d at 239, 93 Ill.Dec. 375, 486 N.E.2d 908.) Having assumed a duty, otherwise absent, to maintain the property in a certain condition, common law liability may arise from the negligent performance of this voluntary undertaking. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp. (1964), 31 Ill.2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769; see also Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority (1979), 78 Ill.2d 204, 35 Ill.Dec. 530, 399 N.E.2d 596 (holding that the Chicago Housing Authority, which owed no duty by statute or common law to protect its tenants from criminal acts, may incur liability when it voluntarily undertakes to hire a firm to provide security services). In light of these decisions, we conclude that without evidence of the landlord's control of appellees' premises, there is no common law liability for appellees' injuries. (See Drewick, 42 Ill.2d at 350, 247 N.E.2d 877 (It has long been the law of this State that [the] lessor is liable for injuries which are sustained on premises, or portions thereof, retained in the lessor's control).) The leases for appellees' tenancies, which may provide evidence as to the scope of control, if any, retained by the landlord when he leased appellees' apartments, are absent from the record. Moreover, no evidence has been presented by appellees to suggest that the landlord contracted to keep the property under appellees' control in repair. Absent any evidence to the contrary, therefore, we conclude that the landlord relinquished all control of the leased premises in executing the leases for appellees' tenancies and, with it, any potential common law liability for appellees' injuries. We recognize that our decision on this single issue is in conformity with a series of Illinois appellate opinions holding that, as a matter of law, there is no duty on the part of a landlord to maintain in any window of an apartment he leases to tenants a screen sufficiently strong to support the weight of a tenant's minor child leaning against the screen. See Laster v. Chicago Housing Authority (1982), 104 Ill.App.3d 540, 543, 60 Ill.Dec. 286, 432 N.E.2d 1185 (landlord had no duty to repair allegedly defective window screens or otherwise make them safe against the possibility of children falling out of the window); Scheffler v. Ringhofer (1966), 67 Ill.App.2d 222, 214 N.E.2d 575 (landlord had no duty to furnish screens that were suitable for anything other than keeping out insects); Gasquoine v. Bornstein (1956), 10 Ill.App.2d 423, 135 N.E.2d 121 (no duty on the part of landlord to maintain a window screen sufficient to support the weight of a minor leaning against it, even if the screen was insecure, defective and likely to fall out when slight pressure was exerted); Rogers v. Sins (1953), 349 Ill.App. 353, 110 N.E.2d 643 (landlord had no duty to provide screens which a child could not push out or dislodge); Crawford v. Orner & Shayne, Inc. (1947), 331 Ill.App. 568, 73 N.E.2d 615 (no duty on the part of landlords to maintain a window screen sufficient to support the weight of a minor leaning against it, even where minor's parents notified the landlords and their agents that the screen was loose, defective and dangerous and did not fit the window properly). Our decision on this issue is also consistent with the majority of authority in other jurisdictions. Courts considering injuries sustained by a minor who has fallen through a window screen have generally attached no liability to the landlord, finding no duty on the landlord's part to maintain screens capable of withstanding the weight of a minor leaning against it. Two cases have been before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and, in both instances, no duty was imposed upon the landlords. ( Markarian v. Simonian (1977), 373 Mass. 669, 369 N.E.2d 718; Chelefou v. Springfield Institution for Savings (1937), 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E.2d 769.) The New York Court of Appeals has also considered the issue and declined to impose a duty on the landlord ( Miller v. Woodhead (1887), 104 N.Y. 471, 11 N.E. 57), as have reviewing courts in New Jersey ( Egan v. Krueger (1927), 103 N.J.L. 474, 135 A. 811), California ( Gustin v. Williams (1967), 255 Cal. App.2d Supp. 929, 62 Cal.Rptr. 838 (memorandum decision)) and Ohio ( Riley v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority (1973), 36 Ohio App.2d 44, 301 N.E.2d 884). The only court that has concluded that a landlord is liable for injuries a child sustains after falling through a window screen has been the Missouri Supreme Court in Shaw v. Butterworth (1931), 327 Mo. 622, 38 S.W.2d 57. Liability was premised on the landlords' agreement to install screens in the plaintiff's apartment that would prevent the children [from] falling thereout. ( Shaw, 327 Mo. at 629, 38 S.W.2d at 61.) The Shaw court premised liability on the landlords' voluntary assumption of a duty, otherwise absent, and the negligent fulfillment of that duty: Clearly in this case plaintiff's mother during the rental negotiations advised the defendants that she had small children, and demanded the placing of screens in the windows to prevent the children falling thereout. The defendants promised to put them in and this promise became a covenant of the rental contract. ( Shaw, 327 Mo. at 629-30, 38 S.W.2d at 61.) Appellees quote extensively from the Shaw decision in their briefs to this court but fail to make the critical distinction between the circumstances surrounding the Shaw decision and the circumstances surrounding the instant cases. The independent covenant in Shaw, which became part of the rental contract, created a duty on the part of the landlords; where no covenant existed, no duty was created. The distinction was essential to the Shaw opinion: As plaintiff's mother advised the defendants that she desired the screen to protect her little ones against falling out, and as defendants placed the screen in the window pursuant to their promise, we think the evidence tends to show that defendant's [ sic ] contract comprised the inclusion of a screen ordinarily fit for that purpose.  (Emphasis added.) ( Shaw, 327 Mo. at 630, 38 S.W.2d at 61.) Shaw then is consistent with our earlier observation that where a landlord assumes a duty, otherwise absent, common law liability may arise where the duty is negligently fulfilled. As the instant cases do not present these circumstances, no duty has been undertaken and no liability can therefore be imposed.