Opinion ID: 2214390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the purpose of exclusion

Text: ¶ 86 The majority justifies applying the remedy of exclusion here on the grounds of judicial integrity. Majority op., ¶¶ 63-67. But time and time again, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated that exclusion is not only unnecessary but inappropriate unless it will serve to deter knowing constitutional violations by police:  [T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 [104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677] (1984).  [E]vidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 [104 S.Ct. 3405] (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 [95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374] (1975)) (emphasis added).  [W]here the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, `excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way.' Id. at 919-20 [129 S.Ct. 695] (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 [96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067] (1976) (White, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).  [A]pplication of the exclusionary rule properly has been restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively advanced. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 [107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364] (1987) (emphasis added).  Where `the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted. ' Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 [115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34] (1995) (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 [96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046] (1976)) (emphasis added).  `[M]arginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.' Id. at 12 [115 S.Ct. 1185] (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 [104 S.Ct. 3405]) (emphasis added).  [The exclusionary rule is] applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its `substantial social costs.' Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 [104 S.Ct. 3405]) (emphasis added). [4] ¶ 87 Accordingly, evidence seized in violation of a defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures should not be excluded if the police were acting in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the constitution. [5] See Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (no exclusion when police act in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant later deemed invalid); Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160 (no exclusion when police act in objectively reasonable reliance on binding law later deemed unconstitutional). ¶ 88 The exclusionary rule applies, then, only when there is: (1) police conduct that the police knew or should have known was in violation of the Fourth Amendment (for simplicity's sake, police misconduct); and (2) sufficient capability of deterring that conduct [6] worth the substantial societal cost of exclusion. Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 702. Furthermore, the police conduct cannot be merely negligent, but must be deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent or part of a pattern of recurring or systemic negligence. Id. ¶ 89 The majority rejects these rules from the United States Supreme Court and embraces the judicial integrity purpose for exclusiona purpose long-since abandoned by our highest Court. See majority op., ¶ 3. The United States Supreme Court has explained judicial integrity as follows: The primary meaning of judicial integrity in the context of evidentiary rules is that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the Constitution. In the Fourth Amendment area, however, the evidence is unquestionably accurate, and the violation is complete by the time the evidence is presented to the court. The focus therefore must be on the question whether the admission of the evidence encourages violations of Fourth Amendment rights. As the Court has noted in recent cases, this inquiry is essentially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose. The analysis showing that exclusion in this case has no demonstrated deterrent effect and is unlikely to have any significant such effect shows, by the same reasoning, that the admission of the evidence is unlikely to encourage violations of the Fourth Amendment. Janis, 428 U.S. at 458 n. 35, 96 S.Ct. 3021 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). ¶ 90 Thus, while early exclusion cases did discuss judicial integrity as a secondary purpose of the exclusionary rule, judicial integrity for Fourth Amendment violations has effectively been subsumed under the main goal of deterring police misconduct. [7] See id. at 456 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. 3021. This explains why judicial integrity has received little treatment in the case law. Notably, in the five United States Supreme Court cases addressing the good-faith exception since Leon ( Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984); Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004); Herring, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009)), not one of them even mentions judicial integrity; [8] each focuses solely on whether exclusion would deter the police conduct giving rise to the constitutional violation. The majority now breathes new life into a legal theory put to rest long ago. [9]