Opinion ID: 2807463
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Levels of Resistance and Force

Text: Satisfied that the officers had reasonable suspicion, we turn to the levels of resistance and force that were used during this encounter. Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force during an arrest or investigatory stop are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). When determining whether unreasonable force was used, courts must give “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. Courts should not allow “the 20/20 vision of hindsight” to cloud “the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97. In other words, to comport with the Fourth Amendment, the force must have been objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officers at the time it was used. Id. at 397. Courts should not consider the officers’ subjective motivations when determining whether their use of force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 397-98. Schoettle concedes that he refused to comply with the officers’ orders, repeatedly attempted to evade arrest, and even physically struggled against the arresting officers. We have previously cognized the severity of the suspected crime at issue—driving while intoxicated—and the immediate threat that impaired drivers pose to the safety of officers and others. In Janis v. Biesheuvel, we held that officers were justified in using force to remove a driver, whom they believed to be impaired, from his vehicle after he refused to comply with their orders to exit it. 428 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 2005). We approvingly quoted a Seventh Circuit case’s recognition of “the potential threat to public safety of an impaired driver in command of a running -6- vehicle.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Ball State Univ., 295 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2002)) (alterations omitted). Notably, the Seventh Circuit observed elsewhere in the same opinion that “Smith [a driver in diabetic shock] posed a threat to himself, the officers and the general public, even after Officer Foster turned off Smith’s vehicle and attempted unsuccessfully to communicate with him.” Smith, 295 F.3d at 769. Similarly, in Wertish v. Krueger, we held that when an impaired driver in diabetic shock “failed to comply with orders to get out of his vehicle, it was objectively reasonable for [the officer] to pull [the driver] from the truck and handcuff him.” 433 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). In short, all three Graham factors weigh against Schoettle and in favor of the officers in this case. 3. Officers’ Knowledge of Schoettle’s Medical Condition Schoettle argues that there is a material factual dispute with regard to whether or when the officers knew that Schoettle was experiencing a medical emergency. Schoettle reasons that if the officers learned early in the encounter that his erratic behavior was due to a medical emergency and not intoxication, then his subsequent arrest and the force used to effectuate it were unreasonable. Our prior cases supply some indirect support for this line of argument. Cf. Wertish, 433 F.3d at 1067 (“Wertish admits there was nothing visible to tell officer Krueger that he was dealing with a diabetic. Officer safety concerns made it objectively reasonable for Krueger and the Renville officers to assume they were dealing with a belligerent drunk—or perhaps a fleeing criminal—who required forcible detention.”); Janis, 428 F.3d at 800 (“At the time they pulled Richards from the car, however, the officers did not know that Richards’s actions were the result of a diabetic seizure, not intoxication.”). It is certainly true that an officer’s knowledge of an arrestee’s medical condition can be relevant to a determination of whether the officer employed excessive force. After all, Graham instructs us that we are to determine whether the level of force was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances -7- confronting the officers at time the force was used. 490 U.S. at 397. However, we are persuaded by the record before us that the level of force used by the officers against Schoettle was objectively reasonable, regardless of when they learned that he was experiencing a medical emergency. Our opinion in Carpenter v. Gage provides especially useful guidance for reaching this conclusion. 686 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2012). In Carpenter, the plaintiff’s wife called 911 when the plaintiff (Carpenter) suffered a stroke. 686 F.3d at 646-47. When a paramedic attempted to enter Carpenter’s house, Carpenter chased him out of the house with a baseball bat. Id. Several deputy sheriffs then arrived at the house in response to a call that first responders had been threatened with a baseball bat. Id. at 647. At least one of the deputies was informed upon arrival that Carpenter might have suffered a stroke. Id. Both deputies were told that there was a rifle in the house. Id. The deputies entered the house and, after Carpenter refused to comply with their orders to stop moving around, they took him to the ground and tased him several times in order to restrain and arrest him. Id. Carpenter sued the deputies, the sheriff, and the county, claiming, inter alia, that excessive force was used against him and that the deputies exhibited deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id. at 647-48. We affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all counts. See id. at 646. With regard to his excessive force claim, we observed “that Carpenter refused to offer his hands when ordered to do so, . . . that he was warned about the use of the taser,” and that “[e]ven if Carpenter’s motive was innocent, the deputies on the scene reasonably could have interpreted Carpenter’s actions as resistance and responded with an amount of force that was reasonable to effect the arrest.” Id. at 650. Later in the opinion, when analyzing Carter’s deliberate indifference claim,4 we noted that “[b]efore the deputies 4 We analyzed Carpenter’s deliberate indifference claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Eighth Amendment, because the -8- could consider responding to Carpenter’s medical needs, they had to subdue him and secure the premises.” Id. Returning to the instant facts, the record indisputably shows that even if the officers became aware at some point during their interaction with Schoettle that he was suffering a hypoglycemic episode, they were still confronted with a belligerent and impaired man who was refusing to comply with their orders to exit the vehicle and who was physically resisting their attempts to remove him from it. If the officers realized at some point that Schoettle’s impairment was not attributable to any fault of his own, that knowledge would not have made Schoettle any less dangerous to himself and others while he was impaired. Given these facts, it is difficult to conceive how Schoettle could have received appropriate medical care without first being physically subdued. Indeed, as noted above, even after he was arrested Schoettle continued to resist until the ambulance arrived and was uncooperative with EMS personnel. The district court properly determined that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on Schoettle’s excessive force claim.