Opinion ID: 1124985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cremation of the Victim's Body

Text: The defendant contends that it was constitutional error and a destruction of relevant evidence for the State to allow the victim's body to be cremated several days after an autopsy had been performed but before the defense had been given an opportunity independently to examine the body. When determining whether a defendant's due process rights have been violated by the loss or destruction of allegedly exculpatory evidence, this Court considers three factors: (1) whether the evidence was material to the question of guilt or the degree of punishment; (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the loss or destruction of the evidence; and (3) whether the government was acting in good faith when it destroyed or lost the evidence. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 487, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2533, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). In conducting this analysis, this Court engages in a case-by-case assessment of the fault of the government and the significance of the loss or destruction to the critical elements of the defendant's case. United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.1974). Initially, we note that this Court has examined the three-part Trombetta analysis within a factual context that is identical to the present case. See Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 540-42, 716 P.2d 1306, 1312-14 (1986). In Paradis, we concluded that the State did not err when it allowed the victim's body to be cremated two days after performance of the autopsy but before the defense had examined the body. Id. at 541, 716 P.2d at 1313. We reasoned that a more complete autopsy would not have produced evidence that someone else had killed the victim, and, therefore, any evidence discovered would not have been exculpatory, as it would not have related to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id., 716 P.2d at 1313. We additionally determined in Paradis that the government did not act in bad faith when it released the victim's body because I.C. § 19-4301C authorized the coroner to release the victim's body to her next of kin within twenty-four hours of death or discovery of the body. Id., 716 P.2d at 1313. Keeping Paradis in mind, we conclude that Porter also failed to satisfy the elements of the Trombetta balancing test. There was no indication of how the body could have been exculpatory, given that everyone admitted how she died and the real issue was who committed the offense. During oral argument, defense counsel argued that a determination that the victim was strangled, rather than beaten, might have been exculpatory because Porter did not have a history of strangling or attempting to strangle women. Additionally, such a determination may have impacted the admissibility of evidence of prior misconduct, as Porter's pattern of behavior may have been marginally inconsistent with the manner in which Jones was killed. However, there was no showing that cremation of the body actually prejudiced Porter, nor that the State authorized the cremation of the victim's body with a bad faith intent to destroy evidence. Thus, we find no due process violation.