Opinion ID: 793667
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Moore's Challenges

Text: 6 Moore first argues that certain counts of his indictment were unconstitutionally vague. In particular, Moore challenges counts such as Count Four, which alleged that he possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute [i]n or about Winter, 2000. J.A. 165. He maintains that he cannot be expected to mount a defense to a charge that does not identify a particular date. 7 An indictment meets the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). 2 Where a particular date is not a substantive element of the crime charged, strict chronological specificity or accuracy is not required. U.S. v. Kimberlin, 18 F.3d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Since time is not an element of possession with the intent to distribute and there is no argument that the statute of limitations had expired, see U.S. v. Brewer, 1 F.3d 1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1993), the indictment was not unconstitutionally vague. Accord U.S. v. Synowiec, 333 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 2003) (Where the indictment alleges that an offense allegedly occurred `on or about' a certain date, the defendant is deemed to be on notice that the charge is not limited to a specific date. He therefore cannot make the requisite showing of prejudice based simply on the fact that the government has failed to prove a specific date. (internal quotation marks omitted)).
8 Moore next asserts that the district court improperly admitted certain out-of-court statements made to Government witness William Henry Scott, IV. We conclude that Moore is not entitled to reversal of his convictions on this basis. 9 The Federal Rules of Evidence exclude from the definition of hearsay a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). To admit testimony under this rule, a court must conclude (1) that there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the party against whom admission of the evidence is sought and (2) that the statements at issue were made during the course of and in furtherance of that conspiracy. U.S. v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 905 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 Moore challenges the admission of two statements to which Scott testified. First, Scott testified that in August 2002 Gregory Bonds called him and asked him to pick up two kilograms of cocaine that were in a closet in Bonds' home. Bonds told Scott that Moore had shipped the cocaine from Arizona to Virginia. Second, Scott testified about a conversation he had with Van Beasley, an associate of Moore's. When Scott observed Beasley with a quantity of cocaine and asked how he had obtained it, Beasley stated that Moore had robbed someone who owed him money. 11 Although Moore objected to the admission of the statement made by Bonds, he failed to object to the admission of Beasley's statement. We therefore review the admission of Bonds' statement for abuse of discretion, see id., and the admission of Beasley's statement for plain error, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). With respect to Beasley's statement, Moore must establish not only that an error occurred, but also that the error was plain and that it affected his substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Even if Moore makes this three-part showing, correction of the error remains within our discretion, which we should not exercise ... unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (alteration & internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Moore maintains that the Government failed to establish that Bonds and Beasley were part of the conspiracy, noting that Bonds was not named in the indictment and that there was no testimony that Bonds ever bought drugs from Moore. We agree with the Government that the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Moore, Scott, Bonds, and Beasley were all involved in the activities of the conspiracy. 13 Moore next claims that the statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. A statement by a co-conspirator is made `in furtherance' of a conspiracy if it was intended to promote the conspiracy's objectives, whether or not it actually has that effect. U.S. v. Shores, 33 F.3d 438, 443 (4th Cir. 1994). For example, statements made by a conspirator to a non-member of the conspiracy are considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy if they are designed to induce that party either to join the conspiracy or to act in a way that will assist it in accomplishing its objectives. Id. at 444. Most courts, including the Fourth Circuit, construe the in furtherance requirement so broadly that even casual relationships to the conspiracy suffice to satisfy the exception. Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence vol. 5, §§ 801.34[5], 801-89 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed., Matthew Bender 2005). In light of the broad construction of the in furtherance requirement, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the statements by Bonds and Beasley were designed to further the conspiracy. We therefore affirm the admission of these statements.
14 Moore next contends that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Moore's son, Karl Moore, Jr. (Moore, Jr.), to testify that at age six he used to deliver drugs with DC [a friend of Moore's] on the bus to Phoenix, Arizona for my father. J.A. 667. Moore maintains that this was testimony regarding a prior bad act, in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because Moore did not object to this testimony at trial, our review is for plain error. 15 Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible when it is offered to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. This court has recognized that Rule 404(b) is primarily a rule of inclusion, not exclusion. U.S. v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1997). Evidence that is (1) relevant to an issue other than character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable is admissible under Rule 404(b). U.S. v. Wells, 163 F.3d 889, 895 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence is necessary, even if it does not relate to an element of a charged offense, when it furnishes part of the context of the crime. Id. at 896 (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 There was no violation of Rule 404(b) here. Moore, Jr.'s testimony provided part of the context of the crime and revealed the basis for Moore, Jr.'s knowledge of his father's drug operations. See U.S. v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that evidence of prior drug activity was admissible under Rule 404(b) because it was a link in a chain of events that led to the charged conduct). While Moore, Jr.'s testimony regarding his involvement in the drug trade at age six no doubt reflected poorly on Moore, this prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
17 Moore next asserts that the district court abused its discretion in excluding a witness, Shanika Simmons, on the basis that she violated an order sequestering witnesses. Moore does not dispute that Simmons violated the witness sequestration rule. He asserts, rather, that the sanction of exclusion was so disproportional to the violation as to be an abuse of discretion. See U.S. v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 363 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating standard of review). 18 Simmons is Moore's daughter and was called as a witness on his behalf. The Government moved to exclude her as a witness on the basis that she had been present in the courtroom during testimony on two different days. After questioning Simmons under oath, the district court ruled that it would allow her to testify as to Moore's character but not as to any substantive issues. Moore then proffered that Simmons would have testified regarding Moore, Jr.'s various periods of incarceration, Moore's employment, and Moore's relationship with Moore, Jr. 19 A district court has three options for addressing a violation of a sequestration order. It can sanction the witness for contempt; ensure that the jury is aware of the violation through cross-examination by counsel or through instructions by the court; or exclude all or part of the witness' testimony. U.S. v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 323 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Whatever remedy is employed must be proportional to the violation. Id. at 321. 20 Exclusion of a witness' testimony is an extreme remedy that impinges upon the right to present a defense, and thus should be employed sparingly. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the primary purpose of Simmons' testimony was to impeach the previous testimony of Moore, Jr. Although it was not clear how much time Simmons spent in the courtroom, there appears to be no dispute that she was not present—indeed, was not even in the courthouse—when Moore, Jr. testified. Therefore, it is not possible that Simmons could have tailored her testimony to Moore, Jr.'s in any way. Cf. U.S. v. Montgomery, 262 F.3d 233, 243-44 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming exclusion of witness when it was not clear which witnesses she had heard testify). We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion in altogether excluding Simmons' testimony. 21 The error was harmless, however. The parties stipulated regarding the periods of time when Moore, Jr. was in prison. And, several other witnesses testified regarding Moore's legitimate business activities and his relationship with Moore, Jr. Accordingly, Simmons' testimony would have been cumulative. See U.S. v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289, 1296 (4th Cir. 1987).
22 During its rebuttal closing argument, the Government made the following statements: 23 You know the old saying about birds of a feather. Well, the defendants chose this flock. They criticize these witnesses, but the reason they are witnesses is because they are the customers and acquaintances chosen by the defendant to associate with.... 24 ... 25 Now, all of these defendants are guilty, just as ... many of the witnesses[ ] are guilty of being drug dealers and being part of this conspiracy. It's just a matter of degree. The only difference is some who sat on that witness stand admitted it and those sitting at these two tables have not. J.A. 2241-42 (emphasis added). No objection was raised when this argument was made. Moore now argues that the emphasized comments were improper because they are a statement of a specific personal belief by the Government[ that] the Appellant is guilty of the offenses. Supp. Br. of Appellant Karl E. Moore, Sr. at 6 (Sept. 13, 2004). 3 26 In order to obtain a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, Moore must demonstrate that the Government's remarks were, in fact, improper and that the remarks prejudiced him. U.S. v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1993). An assessment of prejudice requires the court to consider 27 (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters. 28 Id. at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Moore failed to object at trial, the ordinary test for reversal based on improper argument is augmented in that Moore must also show that the impropriety of the argument was plain. And, even if Moore satisfies these requirements, the court retains discretion to decline to notice the error. 29 As a general premise, a prosecutor's repeated references to his or her personal opinion about a defendant may indeed be found improper. U.S. v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 332 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 999, 125 S.Ct. 627, 160 L.Ed.2d 456 (2004). It is permissible — although not preferable—for a prosecutor to argue his belief that the evidence proves the defendant's guilt. U.S. v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, 1240 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); cf. U.S. v. Sherrill, 388 F.3d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that statement, that man is guilty, was not improper because phrase was prefaced by the government submits to you (internal quotation marks omitted)). What the prosecutor may not do is suggest a belief in the defendant's guilt that is not explicitly tied to the strength of the evidence, because such an argument may suggest to the jury that the prosecutor has independent knowledge of the defendant's guilt. 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 634 (Westlaw 2005); see Pupo, 841 F.2d at 1240. 30 The Government's remarks here were made in response to Appellants' challenges to the witnesses' truthfulness in their closing arguments. Cf. Higgs, 353 F.3d at 332 (holding that argument about what defendant's life in prison would be like was not improper, in part because argument responded to defense claims about prison life). Nevertheless, it is arguable that the Government's assertion of guilt was improper. But cf. U.S. v. Passero, 290 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that argument that when you walk like a duck, talk like a duck, and you look like a duck, you are a duck was not improper when made in response to defense claim that prosecution was relying on guilt by association (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if the argument was improper, however, there was no prejudice. The remark was isolated, occurring at the beginning of a lengthy rebuttal argument. And, given the context in which the argument was made, it is unlikely that it had any measurable tendency to mislead the jury, nor does it appear that the prosecutor had any intention to divert the attention of the jury.