Opinion ID: 148501
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Reliance on State Law

Text: Aruanno contends that the District Court relied so heavily upon decisions issued by New Jersey’s state courts that it effectively abdicated its responsibility as the “primary and final arbiter of federal rights.” 6 Kovats v. Rutgers, 749 F.2d 1041, 1046 n.5 (3d Cir. 1984). Aruanno is incorrect. The District Court made appropriate references to statecourt decisions in order to explain the judicial interpretation and application of the statute whose constitutionality the Court was evaluating—the SVPA. Moreover, the District Court was entitled to look to state-court decisions, even on federal constitutional issues, and rely on them for their persuasive value. See Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350, 357 (2d Cir. 2000) (“State court decisions . . . are relevant and often persuasive.”). C. Constitutionality of the SVPA Commitment Procedure Aruanno argues that since the procedure used by the State to civilly commit him pursuant to the SVPA violated his constitutional right to due process, the District Court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).7 6 The question of whether the District Court improperly relied upon the decisions of New Jersey courts is a matter of law over which we exercise plenary review. See United States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 462 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010). 7 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision to dismiss Aruanno’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009), accepting as true the facts as pled in the complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Aruanno’s favor. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 7 According to Aruanno, the process afforded to him under the SVPA was constitutionally deficient in four respects: (1) the State was permitted to obtain an ex parte temporary order of detention against Aruanno without appointing counsel to advise him and without holding a hearing at which Aruanno could contest the detention; (2) the State was permitted to use information elicited from Aruanno to support its case for Aruanno’s commitment, even though Aruanno had not been warned or given an opportunity to consult with or be represented by counsel; (3) the State was only required to satisfy a “clear and convincing” standard of evidence in order to obtain Aruanno’s commitment, rather than the more demanding “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard; and (4) the State was permitted to civilly commit Aruanno without the protections afforded by a jury trial. The validity of Aruanno’s constitutional claims turns on whether the SVPA’s commitment hearing process is truly civil and regulatory in nature, or whether it is actually a criminal proceeding masquerading as civil commitment. We conclude that the state action prescribed by the SVPA is genuinely civil in nature, Aruanno’s claims regarding the act’s constitutionality are unavailing, and the District Court did not err in dismissing them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).8 (3d Cir. 2008). 8 In fact, the SVPA is a civil, not criminal, statute. The SVPA allows a court to authorize temporary commitment based on an ex parte submission made by the Attorney General, N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.28(g), but requires that any person so committed be afforded 8
In determining whether the SVPA should be properly categorized civil or criminal in nature, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). In Hendricks, the Supreme Court considered various constitutional challenges to a statute enacted by the State of Kansas which provided for the involuntary confinement of persons classified as “sexually violent predators.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5929a01 et seq. (2009).9 The Hendricks Court began its analysis of the Kansas statute at issue (hereinafter a hearing within twenty days of the commitment order. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.29(a). The maximum length of commitment that may result before a hearing and the participation of the offender/defendant is therefore twenty days. Moreover, in the case of an inmate scheduled for release, like Aruanno, the temporary commitment is accomplished by the submission of two statements prepared by medical professionals, one of whom must be a psychiatrist, certifying that he is a sexually violent predator in need of involuntary commitment. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.28(c). Indeed, In re Commitment of M.M., 894 A.2d 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), cited by the dissent, is largely inapposite and in any event acknowledges that the twenty-day statutory period is constitutionally reasonable. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), is not apposite either. Vitek merely held that a prisoner is entitled to due process protections before being transferred to a psychiatric facility. As noted in text, we have followed Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), holding that the Kansas SVPA does not violate constitutional guarantees of due process, and we have therefore concluded that the New Jersey SVPA is similarly constitutional. 9 The Hendricks analysis is of particular significance to the instant case, since New Jersey’s SVPA “is virtually identical to the language of the Kansas SVPA challenged in Hendricks . . . .” In re Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 211 (N.J. 2002); compare N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.24 et seq. with Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 et seq. 9 “K-SVPA”) with an examination of “whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” 521 U.S. at 361. The Court observed the K-SVPA’s placement in the Kansas probate code rather than the criminal code, and the Kansas legislature’s own reference to the legislation as creating a “civil commitment procedure.” Id. The Court suggested that the statute served neither of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment – not retribution because the statute did not “affix culpability for prior criminal conduct” or require a finding of scienter – and not deterrence because by definition, committees suffered from “mental abnormality” which prevented them from controlling their behavior. Id. at 362. Next, the Court rejected Hendricks’ contentions that the potentially indefinite length of his commitment and the presence of certain procedural protections more typically found in criminal statutes rendered the proceedings essentially criminal. Id. at 363-65. Finally, the Court was unpersuaded by Hendricks’ argument that the statute’s failure to provide treatment for committed offenders revealed its criminal character. The Court concluded: Where the State has disavowed any punitive intent; limited confinement to a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals; provided strict procedural safeguards; directed that confined persons be segregated from the general prison population and afforded the same status as others who have been civilly committed; recommended treatment if such is possible; and permitted immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired, we cannot say that it acted with punitive intent. We therefore hold that the Act does not establish criminal proceedings and that involuntary confinement under the Act is not punitive. 10 Id. at 368-69. Like the K-SVPA, the SVPA is not part of New Jersey’s criminal code,10 and the language of the statute describes its procedure as a civil commitment process which recognizes “the need for commitment of those sexually violent predators who pose a danger to others should they be returned to society.” N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.25(c). Although this label is not entirely dispositive, it places the burden on Aruanno to provide “the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)) (alterations and internal quotations omitted). Aruanno cannot meet this burden. Although facilities housing committed sex offenders are managed by the Department of Corrections, the SVPA requires that offenders subject to civil commitment be housed separately from offenders under the general supervision of the Department of Corrections. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.34(a). The SVPA also requires that the Department of Human Services provide treatment that is “appropriately tailored to address the specific needs of sexually violent predators.” N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.34(b). Finally, like the K-SVPA, the SVPA provides for reevaluation of involuntarily committed persons every year. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.35. Committees may also be 10 Title 30 of the New Jersey Statutes is captioned “Institutions and Agencies.” 11 authorized by members of the treatment staff to file a petition for discharge from involuntary commitment. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.36. Under the framework established in Hendricks, we hold that the New Jersey SVPA serves an essentially regulatory civil function. Having thus established the proper context in which to evaluate the constitutionality of the SVPA, we now proceed to analyze the merits of Aruanno’s four challenges to its procedures.
Aruanno argues that his rights were violated when the court entered a temporary detention order pending his final commitment hearing without first appointing counsel for Aruanno, and without holding a hearing in which Aruanno might challenge the temporary detention. The SVPA provides that the subject of a temporary commitment order is entitled to a hearing within twenty days of entry of the order, and that the person subject to commitment must be represented by counsel at that hearing. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.29; see Greenfield v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 888 A.2d 507, 510 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). Aruanno does not cite any authority for the proposition that he is entitled to an earlier hearing, notice of the temporary commitment order, or to counsel before the 20day preliminary hearing. As the New Jersey Superior Court has reasoned: “The twentyday period for pre-hearing detention is deemed constitutionally reasonable because of the urgency at its inception and in order to permit time for preparations essential to a fair and 12 meaningful hearing. Those essential preparations include testing and observation adequate to permit a diagnosis, notice to the patient, assignment of counsel, opportunity to prepare the case and court scheduling.” In re Commitment of M.M., 894 A.2d 1158, 1167 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, we have previously noted the Supreme Court’s implicit rejection of a constitutional challenge to a statute which permitted emergency confinement for fifteen days without prior notice or a hearing. See Reese v. Nelson, 598 F.2d 822, 826-27 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973)). Accordingly, this claim fails.
Aruanno complains that his constitutional rights were violated when the State used information elicited from him to support its case for Aruanno’s commitment, even though Aruanno had not been warned that the information could be used against him at the commitment hearing, and he had not been given an opportunity to consult with or be represented by counsel before the information was elicited. Though Aruanno’s brief does not expressly reference the Fifth Amendment, the substance of his argument indicates that he believes the SVPA violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and we will analyze his claim on that basis. The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, by its own terms, applies only to criminal cases. See U.S. Const. amdt. V. In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), the Supreme Court considered the very issue Aruanno raises here: whether the right against 13 self-incrimination applies to civil commitment proceedings. The Court held that the right against self-incrimination only applies to protect individuals subject to commitment proceedings labeled as “civil” by a state if “the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention that the proceeding be civil . . . .” Id. at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)) (alterations omitted). Accordingly, this claim fails.
Aruanno argues that the SVPA is constitutionally flawed because it permits the State to involuntarily commit sex offenders upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence that the offender is a “sexually violent predator.” N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.32. According to Aruanno, the constitutional right to due process requires that the State prove the fitness of offenders for commitment beyond a reasonable doubt. Aruanno’s position is flatly inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent governing traditional civil commitment statutes, which holds that a State need only prove the dangerousness of a potential committee by clear and convincing evidence. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). Indeed, in Addington the Supreme Court considered and expressly rejected the argument that the “beyond the reasonable doubt” standard applicable to criminal cases governs in civil commitment proceedings. Id. at 427-31. Accordingly, this claim fails.
14 Aruanno argues that the SVPA violates the requirements of constitutional due process in that it fails to require that a jury trial be held in order for the State to effect commitment. Although Aruanno’s brief insists that a sex offender must be afforded the right to a jury trial before his involuntary commitment, many of our sister circuits have held to the contrary. For example, in United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2010), the First Circuit noted that “the claim to a jury trial right in civil commitments has been rejected under not only the Due Process Clause, but also the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.” Id. at 43 (internal citations omitted). Accord Poole v. Goodno, 335 F.3d 705, 710-11 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1205-07 (9th Cir.1990).11 Cf. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding administrative interpretation of statute regarding detention of certain aliens that did not provide for right to jury trial). The SVPA serves a regulatory—rather than penal—purpose, because it seeks to protect the public from possible future harm rather than to punish for criminal acts committed in the past. We therefore join our sister circuits in holding that the 11 It should be noted that the federal analogue authorizing the commitment of “sexually dangerous persons” does not provide for a jury trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248; United States v. Veltman, 9 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1993) (observing this feature of the federal statute). We further note that the Supreme Court has recently affirmed Congress’ authority to enact § 4248 under the Necessary and Proper Clause, although the decision did not address the claims asserted by Aruanno here. See United States v. Comstock, – U.S. – , – S.Ct. – , 2010 WL 1946729 (May 17, 2010). 15 Constitution does not demand that a jury trial be provided before an individual is involuntarily committed by the state as a sexually dangerous person.