Opinion ID: 1532443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Individual Cases Decided Under Judicial Power

Text: Turning to the issue in this case, the constitutionality of House Bill No. 31, we start with the proposition that the doctrine of separation of powers is integral to the fabric of the Delaware Constitution. [42] The history of Delaware admits of no doubt that from the beginning our state government has been divided into the three departments, legislative, executive and judicial. It is likewise true that, generally speaking, one department may not encroach on the field of either of the others. [43] In Marbury v. Madison , Chief Justice John Marshall observed that the United States Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. [44] Similarly, the Delaware Constitution vests the entire judicial power of our government exclusively in the judiciary. Article IV, § 1 of the Delaware Constitution provides: The judicial power of this State shall be vested in a Supreme Court ... and such other courts as from time to time by law [be] established. The judicial function is to interpret the law and apply its remedies and penalties in particular cases. [45] The judiciary has the power, not merely to rule on cases but to decide them... with an understanding, in short, that `a judgment conclusively resolves the case' because `a judicial power is one to render dispositive judgments.' [46] In that regard, the Delaware Constitution specifically vests this Court with jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Superior Court in criminal causes and to determine all matters finally. Del. Const. Art. IV, § 11 so provides: The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction ... [t]o receive appeals from the Superior Court in criminal causes, upon application of the accused in all cases in which the sentence shall be death, imprisonment exceeding one month, or fine exceeding One Hundred Dollars, and in such other cases as shall be provided by law; and to determine finally all matters of appeal on the judgments and proceedings of said Superior Court in criminal causes . . . . [47] The United States Supreme Court has held that the principal effect to be accomplished by the separation of legislative from judicial power is that `[a] legislature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases.' [48] In 1868, the eminent constitutional scholar Thomas Cooley addressed precisely the question presented by House Bill No. 31: If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by setting aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. [49] Summarizing the separation of powers principles in the United States, Professor Bernard Schwartz concludes: [D]eclaratory acts seeking to interpret earlier legislation and to give such interpretation retroactive effect are generally condemned. The legislature cannot set aside a construction of the law already applied by the courts in actual cases. As the high bench once put it, To declare what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power; to declare what the law shall be, is legislative. One of the fundamental principles of all our governments is, that the legislative power shall be separated from the judicial. Similarly, the legislature cannot interfere directly in litigation. Thus, it cannot annul, set aside, vacate, reverse, modify, or impair the judgment of a competent court. It cannot compel the courts to grant new trials, order the discharge of offenders, or direct what particular steps shall be taken in a particular judicial proceeding. [50] Every decision of the United States Supreme Court since its 1792 opinion in Hayburn's Case has uniformly held that such a legislative act exceeds the power of the legislature. [51] House Bill No. 31 declares this Court's November 23, 2004 decision in this very proceeding ( Evans v. State ) is null and void. Where retroactive legislation  such as House Bill No. 31  requires its own application in a case already adjudicated, it reverse[s] a determination once made, in a particular case. [52] That is constitutionally impermissible, because only the Delaware judiciary has the power, province and duty... to say what the law is in particular cases and controversies. [53] The provision in section 5402 of House Bill No. 31, that declares this Court's decision in Evans v. State null and void, is a legislative act that purports to exercise judicial power in a specific case. As such, that provision in House Bill No. 31 violates Article IV, §§ 1 and 11 of the Delaware Constitution. [54]