Opinion ID: 781653
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Qualified Immunity for City Officials

Text: 12 The primary issue in this case is whether Urbank, Summers, and the City of Akron violated the Bukowskis' constitutional rights through their roles in the injuries that Bukowski received at Hall's hands. In particular, the Bukowskis assert that the defendants violated Lisa Bukowski's due-process rights, as well as Stanley and Robyn Bukowski's parental rights. Since a constitutional violation against a city requires (but is not made out by) an antecedent violation on the part of its officials, we start with the roles played by defendants Urbank and Summers. 13 As governmental officials acting within the scope of their duty, Urbank and Summers can claim qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense shielding governmental officials from liability as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The key question is whether the defendant's conduct violated a right so clearly established that a reasonable official in his position would have clearly understood that he or she was under an affirmative duty to refrain from such conduct. Sheets v. Mullins, 287 F.3d 581, 586 (6th Cir.2002). The qualified-immunity inquiry has two principal parts. First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right. Davis v. Brady, 143 F.3d 1021, 1024 (6th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093, 119 S.Ct. 851, 142 L.Ed.2d 704 (1999). Then the court must discern whether the right is so clearly established that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). We start with the question of whether the officials violated Lisa Bukowski's due-process rights at all; answering that question in the negative, we do not reach the clearly-established prong. 14
15 The Bukowskis seek to hold government officials responsible for the acts of private violence Bukowski suffered at the hands of Hall, who was convicted of his crimes and imprisoned by the State. Generally, however, the Due Process Clause does not impose liability on the State for injuries inflicted by private acts of violence. Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 509. 16 The Supreme Court addressed the state-action requirement in this context in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). In DeShaney, the Court held that the Winnebago County Department of Social Services could not be held liable for the injuries inflicted on a young child by his father, even though it was the Department's general responsibility to prevent child abuse and the Department had, in fact, returned the child to his father's house after having taken temporary custody of him. While the Court in DeShaney denied relief, it took care to explain that it was not considering a case where a person suffered injuries either while in state custody or because of state acts that made him more vulnerable to private violence. Id. at 201, 109 S.Ct. 998. Instead, DeShaney involved a situation where the state's involvement placed the ultimate victim in no worse position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all. Id. 17 This court has recognized both of the above exceptions to DeShaney's general rule. We have held that the Due Process Clause makes an injury suffered in state custody constitutionally cognizable. See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 867-68 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1118, 118 S.Ct. 1796, 140 L.Ed.2d 936 (1998). We have also recognized that liability under the Due Process Clause can be predicated on affirmative acts by the state which either create or increase the risk that an individual will be exposed to private acts of violence. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir.1998); see also Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 509 (requiring an act that directly increase[s] the vulnerability of citizens to danger). The question here is whether the Bukowskis can come within the exception, elucidated in Kallstrom, for state-created (or state-heightened) dangers. 1 18 It seems difficult to characterize the actions of the officials as affirmative acts within the meaning of DeShaney. The officials arguably did nothing to increase Bukowski's vulnerability to danger. They merely returned her at her request to Hall's residence, where they originally had found her. The Bukowskis argue that the police did not merely refuse to act: instead of simply allowing her to leave the police station, they affirmatively acted by returning her to Hall's residence. 19 Whether or not the defendants acted may be a difficult question in the abstract, but DeShaney makes clear that the acts of the officials here clearly fall on the inaction side of the line. Although in DeShaney the state returned Joshua to the ultimate aggressor, the DeShaney Court explicitly rejected the idea that such acts met the state-action requirement. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201, 109 S.Ct. 998 (That the State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the analysis, for when it returned him to his father's custody, it placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all.). The Court in DeShaney was not merely assuming that state actors did not contribute to the hazards faced by Joshua, but it was also holding that the act of returning someone to the same dangers that existed status quo ante does not satisfy the state-action requirement. 20 Examining the quality of governmental involvement here, it is apparent that the government was no more involved in making Bukowski more vulnerable to private violence than it was in DeShaney — in both cases, the government was merely returning a person to a situation with a preexisting danger. The plaintiffs' argument that the officials encouraged Hall by their act of returning Bukowski is really the same as the argument that the officials encouraged Hall by their refusal to get involved. 21 In reality, the facts in DeShaney compare favorably to those the plaintiffs allege in this case. DeShaney involved a transfer of custody of a child by state actors who may have had actual knowledge of the danger faced by the child. This case, in contrast, involves an (admittedly mentally disabled) adult and governmental officials who did not have any knowledge of the dangers facing her. Additionally, while Joshua was forcibly transferred to his father's care by act of law, Bukowski was transported to Hall's residence because the officials were accommodating Bukowski's own wishes. Any attempts to distinguish DeShaney inevitably favor the defendants, not the plaintiffs. 22
23 Even if there were sufficient state action here, the Bukowskis' claim still must fail. For in addition to showing the requisite state action, the Bukowskis must show the requisite state culpability necessary for a Due Process Clause action. See Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 510 (noting that it is not sufficient that the plaintiffs show a causal connection between state action and an act of private violence, but that they also must demonstrate that the state acted with the requisite culpability to establish a substantive due process violation). 24 Plaintiffs alleging due-process violations generally must show that the challenged action was so `egregious' that it can be said to be `arbitrary in the constitutional sense.' Id. (citation omitted). This standard, however, is `no calibrated yard stick.' Id. (citation omitted). In the custodial context, we have required plaintiffs to make a showing of deliberate indifference. See Stemler, 126 F.3d at 870. We initially speculated in Stemler as to whether even deliberate indifference by state actors could give rise to a substantive due process claim by a plaintiff who was not in the custody of the state. Id. at 869. After reviewing the Supreme Court's decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), however, we have come to view the justification for a heightened standard in noncustodial cases as coming from the fact that the reasoning in noncustodial situations is often, by necessity, rushed. Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 511 n. 5. The guiding principle seems to be that a deliberate-indifference standard is appropriate in settings [that] provide the opportunity for reflection and unhurried judgments, but that a higher bar may be necessary when opportunities for reasoned deliberation are not present. Id.; see also Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that an injured bystander in a police shootout must prove not just deliberate indifference on the part of the police officers but must also show that they acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm). 25 For the case at bar, a deliberate-indifference standard is clearly the appropriate one, given the fact that the defendants not only had time to deliberate on what to do with Bukowski but actually did deliberate on this point. The plaintiffs here, however, cannot meet that standard. We have interpreted deliberate indifference, in this context, as being similar to subjective recklessness. Sperle v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 493 (6th Cir.2002) (citing Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 509). Pursuant to this definition, the official must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). Subjective recklessness can, however, be proven circumstantially by evidence showing that the risk was so obvious that the official had to have known about it. Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 513 n. 7. 26 Under this standard and under the facts as the Bukowskis allege them, the officials could not be considered deliberately indifferent to Lisa Bukowski's needs. Urbank and Summers did know that Bukowski was a nineteen-year-old mentally disabled woman who had traveled hundreds of miles to meet a man she had met on the Internet. They were ignorant, however, of many facts that are apparent now only in hindsight. They did not have any knowledge that Hall was dangerous or that he had earlier raped Bukowski. Nor, contrary to the plaintiffs' claims, did they have significant reason to believe that he was dangerous. Bukowski, both in conversation and in demeanor, gave Urbank and Summers no reason to believe that she needed to be detained for her own safety. From the moment she arrived, Bukowski spoke of Hall as her boyfriend. While this suggested some kind of romantic relationship, nothing about it suggested anything non-consensual or violent. In fact, it suggested that Bukowski was safe with Hall, which was consistent with her comments that it was not Hall, but her parents, that were abusive. Bukowski asked permission to call Hall — not her parents — and repeatedly insisted on being returned to his residence. Bukowski also never mentioned that Hall was twenty years older than she was. 27 Moreover, Urbank's knowledge of the extent of Bukowski's disability appears to have been quite limited. Urbank clearly recognized that she was a bit slow and that she had a learning disability. But Urbank also knew that she had managed to travel several hundred miles by herself, taking a series of cabs and buses, to reach Hall. Urbank knew that she had to be at least somewhat skilled with money to be able to pay for those transportation services, and he also knew from the fact that she and Hall met over the Internet that she was able to type and was at least moderately skilled with a computer. 28 Urbank clearly attempted to gauge Bukowski's level of functioning and the threats to her safety by analyzing her past actions, her current demeanor, and her account of the facts. Urbank personally interviewed Bukowski and then sent her to meet (for roughly two hours) with a representative from the Victim's Assistance Office. Operating with the facts that Bukowski gave them and with the facts they could infer from meeting her, Urbank and Summers would not have been aware of the facts from which it could be deduced that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. Nor was such harm so obvious that Urbank and Summers could be presumed to have consciously known about it. In these circumstances, Bukowski cannot make out this element of her due-process claim. 29
30 The plaintiffs do not mention the dangers that the officials would have faced if they had chosen to restrain Bukowski. For an official cannot, of course, detain a person without justification. See, e.g., Bennett v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 573 N.E.2d 633, 636 (1991) (noting that, under Ohio law, false imprisonment is established if a person confines another intentionally `without lawful privilege and against his consent') (citation omitted); Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 383 (6th Cir.1994) (noting that if there is no reason to further detain a person, he cannot lawfully be detained against his will). 31 The plaintiffs have not pointed to any legal rationale that would authorize the officials to hold Bukowski. The plaintiffs point to Ohio Juvenile Rule 6, which allows the police to take children into custody. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2151.31 (codifying Oh. St. Juv. P. Rule 6). The term child, however, is statutorily defined as a person who is under eighteen years of age. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2151.011(B)(5). Bukowski, at the time of the incident, was nineteen and not under a guardianship of any kind. The plaintiffs next suggest that Bukowski should have been held for psychiatric hospitalization. They are correct when they argue that the police are allowed to hold the mentally incapacitated against their will. Yet, Ohio law requires that there first be a showing of a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization who presents a substantial risk of physical harm to self or others if allowed to remain at liberty pending examination. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 5122.10. The plaintiffs do not even allege that Bukowski can fit such restrictive criteria. 32 The plaintiffs argue that Urbank should have stretched the boundaries of these categories, perhaps by interpreting the juvenile rules to cover mentally disabled adults or by loosely construing the psychiatric-hospitalization requirements. This argument, however, reveals the difficult situation in which the officials here found themselves. By failing to detain Bukowski, they face this lawsuit. If they had chosen to detain her, they may have faced another lawsuit based on charges of false imprisonment. Under the legal theory adopted by the plaintiffs, the defendant officials would have violated the Constitution no matter how they acted. The Supreme Court has warned specifically against our placing governmental officials in such a position. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203, 109 S.Ct. 998 (noting that if the defendants had moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the father, they would likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into the parent-child relationship, charges based on the same Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the present charge of failure to provide adequate protection). 33 Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the plaintiffs cannot show that the Akron officials here violated Lisa Bukowski's substantive right to due process. 2 This may seem at first glance to be a harsh result. The plaintiffs stress that Bukowski's mental disability made her functionally like a child. They argue that the officials simply should not have acceded to Bukowski's wishes when she requested to be returned to Hall's residence. Under the law announced in DeShaney, however, officials have a constitutional obligation only to refrain from actively increasing an individual's susceptibility to private violence. They do not have a constitutional obligation to prevent such violence, and, in fact, they did not even possess legal authority under state law to intervene by detaining Bukowski. Moreover, given the knowledge that they had at the time they made the decision to let her go, it does not seem that they were aware of facts that would suggest that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. For these reasons, we hold that the officials Urbank and Summers should have been granted qualified immunity.