Opinion ID: 178658
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Text of Section 12112

Text: Section 12112 of the Act prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). [2] In pertinent part, this section provides: (a) General Rule No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual ... (b) Construction As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term discriminate includes... ... (6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.... Id. § 12112. Although non-disabled individuals may bring claims under some provisions of the Act, the plain text of subsection (b)(6) only covers individuals with disabilities. The text of subsection (a) and (b)(6) specifically refers to qualified individual[s] with disabilit[ies], and not, as discussed below, a broader class of individuals such as employees. See id. § 12112(a), (b)(6). We endeavor to read statutes and regulations with an eye to their straightforward and commonsense meanings. Henry Ford Health Sys. v. Shalala, 233 F.3d 907, 910 (6th Cir.2000). When we can discern an unambiguous and plain meaning from the language of a statute, our task is at an end. Bartlik v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 62 F.3d 163, 166 (6th Cir.1995). A straightforward reading of this statute compels the conclusion that only a qualified individual with a disability is protected from the prohibited form of discrimination described in subsection (b)(6)the use of qualification standards and other tests that tend to screen out disabled individuals. This interpretation is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's holding that individuals who are not disabled cannot pursue claims under section 12112(b). Fuzy v. S & B Eng'rs & Constructors, Ltd., 332 F.3d 301, 303 (5th Cir.2003). Although the Employees argue that subsection (b)(6) should be read in conjunction with subsection (d)(4), we do not believe that is necessary in light of the clarity of subsection (b)(6). As the Supreme Court has noted, when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992). The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (internal quotation omitted). Although other sections of the Act apply to non-disabled individuals, the Act's primary purpose is to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals. Therefore, reading the plain text of section 12112(b)(6) to only cover disabled individuals is not an absurd construction or inconsistent with the intent of the statute. Additionally, requiring that an individual be disabled to pursue claims under section 12112(b)(6) gives effect to Congress's choice of language. When Congress uses different language in different parts of the same act, we endeavor to give effect to that different language. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987). In contrast to the language used in subsection (d)(4), subsection (b) does not use the word employee, but the narrower term, qualified individual with a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b), (d)(4)(A). [3] This suggests that Congress intended subsection (b)(6) to be more limited than subsection (d)(4) and not broadly cover all employees, which may include non-disabled individuals. Although we do not decide the issue at this time because it is not part of the certified question, we note that several courts have held that non-disabled individuals can pursue claims under section 12112(d)(4). E.g., Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 969-70 (8th Cir.1999); Fredenburg v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep't of Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir.1999); Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., 160 F.3d 591, 594 (10th Cir.1998); Wice v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 07-10662, 2008 WL 5235996, at  (E.D.Mich. Dec.15, 2008); see also Boise v. Capital Area Cmty. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 506, 1999 WL 618085, at  (6th Cir.1999) (unpublished table decision) (declining to determine whether an individual must have a disability to pursue a claim under section 12112(d)). Interpreting subsection (b)(6) as being limited to individuals with disabilities better gives effect to Congress's decision not to use the word employees in this subsection. Therefore, because the plain text of the statute requires that an individual bringing such a claim be disabled, and this interpretation is not demonstrably at odds with Congress's intent, the plain meaning controls.