Opinion ID: 166638
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authorization; jurisdiction

Text: 64 Except as provided in . . . section 1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf — 65 (1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter. . . . 66 . . . . 67 The district courts shall have jurisdiction . . . to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order,. . . and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title. 68 Id. (emphasis added). 69 The exception to this jurisdictional provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), states in the relevant part: 70 (g) Administrative penalties 71 . . . . 72 (6) Effect of order 73 (A) Limitation on actions under other sections 74 [A]ny violation — 75 . . . . 76 (ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under State law comparable to this subsection. . . 77 . . . . 78 shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under . . . section 1365 of this title. (emphasis added) As an initial matter, we note that Congress chose to use the words civil action in § 1365 authorizing citizen suits but chose the narrower term civil penalty action in the § 1319 exclusion from the § 1365 grant. Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 392 U.S. 206, 212, 88 S.Ct. 1970, 20 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1968) (jurisdictional statutes should be construed with precision and with fidelity.). Thus, Congress' choice of allowing all civil actions in § 1365 must be limited by its concurrent choice to eliminate civil penalty actions when a diligent state prosecution occurs under a comparable state law. Furthermore, the terms of the statute make clear that civil penalties are distinct from other remedies. In § 1365(a), Congress explicitly grants jurisdiction to enforce an effluent standard or limitation (by presumably issuing a declaratory judgment or an injunction) and to apply any appropriate civil penalties (by assessing the appropriate fine). A strict reading of the statute, then, indicates that while § 1365 grants jurisdiction over all types of civil remedies, the limitation in § 1319 only strips jurisdiction with regard to the district court's ability to impose civil penalties. 79 In fact, there is a separate jurisdiction-stripping provision for injunctive remedies. Under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B), no private action may be filed if a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of . . . a State to require compliance with the standard. Again, there is a difference in language between § 1365(b)(1)(B) and § 1319(g)(6). Section 1365(b)(1)(B) precludes any civil action when a state initiates judicial proceedings against a polluter. However, if a state only opts for administrative enforcement, then § 1365(b)(1)(B) will not apply. At that point, we look to § 1319, and that section says that the violation may not be the subject of a civil penalty action. 80 What results from these statutes is a two-tiered claim preclusion scheme. The broadest preclusion exists when a state commences and diligently prosecutes a court action to enforce the standard. If this happens, § 1365 indicates that no action may be commenced by a private person. A narrower preclusion exists when the state does something less than judicial enforcement, such as enter into a consent order. All that is available to a defendant in those cases is § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), which specifically excludes civil penalties from the scope of permissible private enforcement remedies, but does not preclude other equitable relief.