Opinion ID: 2123059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Receipt of Summons.

Text: The next question that necessarily follows is whether the summons to duty must be heard or received by the volunteer firefighter. This issue could arise on remand, as illustrated by the deputy workers' compensation commissioner's determination that Justin was in the course of employment because the page would have reached him prior to his death. At this point in the analysis, there are few interpretive aids available to guide us. Yet, those that exist remain important. We presume the legislature intended for the statute to yield reasonable results. W.P. Barber Lumber Co. v. Celania, 674 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 2003). We therefore give this statute its plain meaning and avoid creating impractical or absurd results. Heartland Express v. Gardner, 675 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Iowa 2003). We also keep the entire statute in mind in interpreting the particular provision at issue. Iowa Ass'n of Sch. Bds. v. Iowa Dep't of Educ., 739 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Iowa 2007). In the end, we strive to interpret the statute consistent with its purpose. IBP, Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001). On one hand, it is conceivable the legislature could have considered receipt of the summons to be unnecessary for a volunteer firefighter. Yet, our rules of interpretation do not lead to such a result. The statute specifically refers to the time the volunteer fire fighter is summoned to duty. Iowa Code § 85.61(7)(a). It does not refer to the time the chief or the chief's designee summoned the volunteer firefighter to duty. See id. The language used by the legislature in enacting the statute clearly focuses on whether the particular injured volunteer firefighter was summoned, not whether a summons was sent. Additionally, the statute could produce absurd results if it were interpreted not to require receipt of the summons. Such an interpretation would mean an injury sustained by a volunteer firefighter in the course of an activity unrelated to the duties of a volunteer firefighter would be an injury that occurs in the course of employment as a volunteer firefighter. For example, if a volunteer firefighter was injured after being struck by a speeding boat while water skiing on a lake and it was later discovered that his or her pager left behind on the dock had activated with a call to duty just prior to the accident, it would be absurd to conclude the volunteer firefighter was in the course of employment at the time of the injury under the statute. The receipt requirement is also consistent with the overall purpose of the workers' compensation statute to provide compensation for injuries that arise out of and in the course of employment. Workers' compensation was not intended to provide compensation for injuries in the course of activities detached from employment. More specifically, section 85.61(7)(a) was enacted to provide coverage for volunteer firefighters while responding to the call to duty. Clearly, a volunteer firefighter cannot respond to the call of duty until the volunteer firefighter learns of the call. Thus, the receipt requirement is consistent with the purpose of the statute. At the same time, we recognize the statute expresses no requirement that the official summons be received by the volunteer firefighter. Instead, to fulfill the purpose of the statute defining in the course of employment, it is only important that the employer send the summons and the volunteer firefighter acquire knowledge that a summons to duty has been issued. This approach provides a reasonable interpretation of the statute, is consistent with the entire statute, and meets our goal of interpreting workers' compensation statutes consistently with the humanitarian objective of providing compensation for injured workers.