Opinion ID: 2056377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Thompson's Confession

Text: Both the State and the postconviction court make much of Thompson's confessions. The State argued: By his own confession, his possession of the murder weapon, and his knowledge of details about the crime not known to the general public, it is plain that Thompson was being truthful when he stated that he broke into Williar's house at night intending to steal her possessions. It is unreasonable to determine that the jury would have found him guilty of participating in the break-in and not found him to be an accessory to the ensuing rape, after he confessed to having been an accomplice to the crime. Thompson, in response, points out that the DNA evidence disproves aspects of his testimony. Specifically, Thompson testified that he witnessed Owens raping the victim and that the blood on his pants came from the victim. As Thompson put it, the DNA evidence refuted both of these facts. Even though the postconviction court acknowledged that there is countless case law where people have confessed to things for which they did not commit or professed their innocence and have DNA evidence exculpate them from the crime they were accused[,] the court nevertheless appeared to give significant weight to Thompson's confession in denying his motion for a new trial. Other courts have evaluated confessions in the face of new DNA evidence. One such example is In re Bradford, 140 Wash. App. 124, 165 P.3d 31 (2007). [11] Bradford was convicted of rape and burglary because a jury found he was the man in a nylon stocking mask who broke into the victim's house and sexually assaulted her. Id. at 32. The State's primary evidence against Bradford was a confession which began, `I probably did it.' Id. at 32. Like the instant case, Bradford's statement presented reliability problems from the beginning: his statement varied substantially with the details given by the victim and required consideration of its reliability and weight in light of numerous disagreements between the description and details given by Mr. Bradford and the victim. Id. After DNA testing revealed that Bradford's was not the DNA found on the mask, the State argued that the evidence of another male's DNA on the side of the tape placed against the mask does not exclude Mr. Bradford as the perpetrator. Thus, it is not evidence that would `probably change the result of the trial,' when taken with Mr. Bradford's confession. Id. at 34. Both the referring judge and the Court of Appeals disagreed and granted Bradford a new trial: The most persuasive evidence against Mr. Bradford at trial was his confession. The jury chose to believe the confession, even though the defense at trial attacked its reliability based upon the circumstances in which it was given and its factual inconsistencies with the victim's statement about what happened. Again, the reference judge determined that the jury probably would have decided differently on the issue of the confession's reliability had it known about the DNA evidence.    The factual disputes regarding Mr. Bradford's confession and alibi, like the other factual disputes noted by the parties, remain open questions for a jury to resolve upon retrial and in the context of the new DNA evidence. Id. at 34-35. The appellate court affirmed the granting of a new trial even though the DNA evidence did not positively exclude Bradford, because the new evidence, if fully accepted by a jury, would probably change the guilty verdict. Id. at 31. DNA evidence is an even stronger factor in favor of a new trial for Thompson on the rape conviction and the felony-murder conviction flowing from that because, unlike Bradford, it exculpated him from the rape. It does not, however, exculpate him from the burglary and weapons convictions. The DNA evidence in Thompson's case is not as infused with the evidence supporting the burglary and weapons convictions. Although Thompson's various out-of-court inculpatory statements, i.e., confessions, were all over the lot as to the rape and murder, his statements essentially are consistent with his convictions on the burglary and weapons charges. If, on remand, a new trial were ordered on the rape and felony murder counts, but the burglary conviction left intact, the parties would be free at such new trial to develop further whether the burglary conviction alone satisfies the requirements of serving as a predicate felony for felony murder (should the rape count fall by the wayside). Further, while scientific tests are obviously important in this case, if Thompson's statements to the investigators included information about the crime scene (e.g. how entry was gained, where the victim's body ended up, etc.) that would be unknown to anyone other than a perpetrator or an eyewitness, the Circuit Court should give appropriate weight to such evidence.