Opinion ID: 2575291
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jean Tuffley's testimony

Text: Before trial, and again shortly before Tuffley testified, defendant moved to exclude evidence of the February 1986 conversation between Tuffley and defendant in which, according to Tuffley, defendant said, if we terminated him, that his life would be over, he'd have nothing to live for, and that he had guns and he wasn't afraid to use them, and that if we terminated him, it would be over for him and he'd take people with him. Tuffley asked, Rich, are you saying that you would kill me? According to Tuffley, defendant said, `Yes, but I would take others, too.' Defendant asserted that the conversation was so remote in time that it was irrelevant and immaterial, that it was improper character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, and that under Evidence Code section 352 its minimal probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Defendant also objected to Tuffley's testimony that defendant's comments put her in fear, and led to ESL's assigning a different human resources person to deal with defendant, on the ground Tuffley's state of mind was irrelevant. The trial court denied the defense motions and overruled the objection. Defendant claims that his mental state at the time of this conversation with Tuffley was irrelevant because he did not kill or attempt to kill Tuffley, and did not kill anyone when he was terminated. Although defendant did not kill Tuffley, who was not present at M-5 on the afternoon of February 16, 1988, his threats to her anticipate the scenario ultimately played out in the crimes that later were committed. Hence the statements were powerful evidence of long-standing motive and intent. They demonstrated that defendant's 1988 assault on ESL was not a spontaneous occurrence, but a planned attack and the culmination of a grudge he nursed for at least two years. Defendant also claims Tuffley's testimony that defendant's comment made her fearful and led to ESL's transferring responsibility over defendant from Tuffley to her superior, Allen, should have been excluded because Tuffley's state of mind was not at issue and the balance of the testimony is hearsay. We disagree. Tuffley's fear demonstrated she perceived the threat as serious. Likewise, the circumstance that the personnel matter was transferred to someone else dispelled any inference that Tuffley did nothing about the problem and thus apparently did not believe defendant's threat was genuine. Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, testimony that someone else assumed responsibility for defendant's personnel matters was not an out-of-court statement and hence was not hearsay. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Tuffley's testimony. (See Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1118.) We therefore reject defendant's contention that its admission violated his rights to due process and a reliable verdict.