Opinion ID: 703200
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inadequate Representation By Existing Party

Text: 72 The third requirement for intervention is that the interest must not be adequately protected by the existing parties. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997. 7 This court has noted that [t]ypically, persons seeking intervention need only carry a 'minimal' burden of showing that their interests are inadequately represented by the existing parties. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 999 (citing Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 630, 636 n. 10, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972), and Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc., 558 F.2d at 869); Little Rock Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d at 84 (burden on prospective intervenor to show that interest is not adequately represented is minimal, citing Flight Transp., 699 F.2d at 948, and Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. at 636 n. 10); see also Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d at 1308 (This requirement is met by a minimal showing that representation 'may be' inadequate, citing Trbovich and Mille Lacs ); Arrow, 55 F.3d at 409. In Little Rock Sch. Dist., this court found the minimal burden more than met where school districts, as employers, could hardly be expected to litigate with the interests of their employees uppermost in their minds in desegregation litigation. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d at 84. 73 Although the burden to show inadequate representation is generally minimal, this court has recognized that the applicant for intervention bears a heavier burden on this factor when a party already in the suit has an obligation to represent the interests of the party seeking to intervene. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 1000. For example, where the state is a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, the state is presumed to represent the interests of all of its citizens. Id. at 1000; see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 631 F.2d 738 (D.C.Cir.1979) (applying presumption of adequate representation where water districts seeking intervention, like existing governmental parties, sought to avoid requirement that federal officials prepare an environmental impact statement analyzing federal water resource projects); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir.) (presumption of adequate representation of citizens by governmental body or officer), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921, 96 S.Ct. 2628, 49 L.Ed.2d 375 (1976); but see Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614-15, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1388-89, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1982) (United States held not adequate representative of interests of five Indian Tribes concerning water rights critical to their welfare, because Tribes are entitled to take their place as independent qualified members of the modern body politic). 8 74 Even where such a presumption of adequate representation arises on this basis, however, it may be rebutted by a showing that the applicant's interest cannot be subsumed within the shared interest of the citizens of the state. Id. at 1000-1001 (citing Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 192-93 (D.C.Cir.1986)). For example, in Dimond, the court found that the citizen, an insurance company, could not be adequately represented by the governmental entity already participating in the litigation. Dimond, 792 F.2d at 192-93. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that while the governmental entity was charged by law with representing the public interest, the insurance company 75 on the other hand, [was] seeking to protect a more narrow and parochial financial interest not shared by the citizens of the District of Columbia. The District would be shirking its duty were it to advance this narrower interest at the expense of its representation of the general public interest. Since [the insurance company's] interest cannot be subsumed within the shared interest of the citizens of the District of Columbia, no presumption exists that the District will adequately represent its interests. 76 Id. (citations omitted). This court found that the presumption did not apply in Mille Lacs, because the applicants to intervene, certain counties, owned some property outright from which they derived specific benefits, and that these interests were narrower than and not subsumed by the general interest of the State of Minnesota in protecting fish and game. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 1001. 77 The EPA and the settling PRPs appear to argue that the non-settling PRPs' interests have been adequately protected in the present litigation, because of the extensive negotiations and public comment procedures that preceded the drafting of the Consent Decree the EPA seeks to impose in this litigation. The suggestion that the intervenors had the opportunity to protect their interests in the comment procedures prior to filing of the proposed Consent Decree simply misses the point. The question is not whether the intervenors had any other way of protecting their interests, but whether those interests are protected in this litigation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2); Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997-99. They are not. 78 The court must compare the interests of proposed intervenors with the interests of current parties. Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d at 1308-09; Arrow, 55 F.3d at 409-410 (finding a presumption of adequate representation where the proposed intervenor's interests are identical to those of an existing party). However, [w]here those interests are disparate, even though directed at a common legal goal, ... intervention is appropriate. Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d at 1308-09. In this case, the settling PRPs have interests contrary to those of the non-settling PRPs, because they desire to cut-off the contribution interests of the intervenors. The EPA has already disregarded the interest of the non-settling PRPs by offering the Consent Decree to which the non-settling PRPs objected during the comment procedures. Both the existing plaintiffs and existing defendants have an interest in entry of the Consent Decree that is contrary to the interest of the intervenors who oppose entry of the Consent Decree on the ground that it is unfair to them. 79 Nor can it be argued here that the EPA, either through its comment procedures or by its participation in this litigation, is a representative of the sovereign who will adequately represent the interests of the non-settling PRPs as citizens. Here, the interests of the prospective intervenors cannot be subsumed within the shared interest of the citizens of the United States. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 1000-1001. The interests of the prospective intervenors are narrower and not subsumed by the general interest of the United States in providing for the clean up of polluted sites. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 1001. Because of this difference in interests, the EPA can hardly be expected to litigate with the interests of the non-settling PRPs uppermost in its mind. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d at 84. The prospective intervenors are seeking to protect a more parochial financial interest not shared by other citizens in not losing a right to seek contribution from other PRPs and in not being subjected to excessive liability for the clean up. Accord, Dimond, 792 F.2d at 192-93. As in Dimond, the EPA would be shirking its duty were it to advance this narrower interest at the expense of its representation of the general public interest. Id. There is no existing party to this litigation who can adequately represent the identified interests of the applicants for intervention. 80 The non-settling PRPs therefore meet the requirements for intervention as of right articulated in both Rule 24(a)(2) and CERCLA Sec. 113(i). We hold that the district court erred in denying the non-settling PRPs' motion to intervene.