Opinion ID: 2525113
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Medicaid evidence and jury concerns about double recovery

Text: There was potential for prejudice against Loncar because the jury heard a reference to her Medicaid coverage, but never learned that Loncar had to repay some benefits out of her recovery in this case. [18] However, the court issued a jury instruction to cure this prejudice, and Loncar did not request any other appropriate relief. Therefore, we will not reverse on these grounds. The collateral source rule exclud[es] evidence of other compensation on the theory that such evidence would affect the jury's judgment unfavorably to the plaintiff on the issues of liability and damages. [19] Under this rule, the superior court appropriately excluded Medicaid evidence at the beginning of the trial. The jury learned of Loncar's Medicaid coverage, however, when Gray asked one of Loncar's doctors about outstanding bills, and the witness mentioned that Medicaid covered some of them. Loncar's concern is that the jury's exposure to incomplete information about her Medicaid benefits led it to believe that her bills were already covered and that her damages should be reduced accordingly. But Loncar failed to object when the witness testified. Instead she requested two possible cures, which we discuss below, shortly thereafter. The superior court denied one request and granted the other. We find no error in its actions. At trial, Loncar argued that Gray had opened the door to further Medicaid evidence, and that she should be permitted to question the witness further on the subject in order to correct any jury misimpressions. She renews the argument in this appeal. But the superior court found that the door was not open to this evidence, and we agree. Gray did not open the door, because he did not make insurance coverage an issue in the case: [20] He neither directly questioned any witnesses about Loncar's insurance [21] nor hinted to the jury that Loncar had another source of funding for her medical bills. Instead, Loncar's witness mentioned Medicaid sua sponte. Given that it was not the defense that brought the Medicaid issue into the trial, we cannot conclude that the superior court abused its discretion in continuing to exclude Medicaid evidence. At trial, Loncar also requested that the superior court explain in the jury instructions that Loncar was obliged to repay Medicaid. The court agreed that a curative instruction was warranted, and instructed the jury to award the full amount of necessary medical expenses ... regardless of whether they have been paid or who actually paid the bill. Following the trial, the law provides procedures to ensure that this issue is properly addressed. The instruction did not explicitly detail Loncar's repayment obligations, but Loncar did not object to the form of this instruction at the time that it was proposed. Nor did she propose any alternative instruction. Thus, to the extent that her appeal complains of this instruction, we reject her argument. We see no abuse of discretion in the superior court's treatment of the Medicaid evidence, and therefore decline to overturn these evidentiary decisions.