Opinion ID: 1163470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Permissible inference as circumstantial evidence

Text: Particularly in light of the commentary on HRS § 701-117, supra at ___, 892 P.2d at 461, we agree with Professor Bowman that presumptions against the accused, within the meaning of HRE 306(a), do not impose upon a defendant the burden of persuasion of the nonexistence of a material element of a charged offense, but are rather a form of gently commended inference that has been held not to violate due process. Put differently, an HRE 306(a) presumption against the accused, whether recognized at common law or enacted by statute, see HRE 306(a)(1), merely creates a permissible inference of fact whereby the trier of fact is permitted but not compelled to draw an inference of guilt from the circumstances which constitute a prima facie case and retains the prerogative to determine whether a reasonable doubt of guilt exists despite the permitted inference, whether or not the accused has offered any evidence. See Dwyer, 57 Haw. at 529, 560 P.2d at 112. In any event, as a constitutional matter, an inference of fact is not permissible unless there is a natural and rational evidentiary relation between the fact proven and the . . . fact [inferred]. Id. And there can be no such natural and rational evidentiary relation `if the inference of one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of a lack of connection between the two in common experience.' Id. at 530, 560 P.2d at 112-13 (quoting Tot, 319 U.S. at 467-68, 63 S.Ct. at 1245). Viewed in this manner, it becomes apparent that HRE 306(a) presumptions against the accused are no more than legislatively or judicially enshrined and constitutionally circumscribed corollaries to the proposition, well settled in this jurisdiction[,] that guilt may be proved beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. State v. Simpson, 64 Haw. 363, 373 n. 7, 641 P.2d 320, 326 n. 7 (1982) (emphasis added). See also State v. Bright, 64 Haw. 226, 228, 638 P.2d 330, 332 (1981) (per curiam); State v. O'Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 528-29, 616 P.2d 1383, 1391 (1980); State v. Murphy, 59 Haw. 1, 19, 575 P.2d 448, 460 (1978). Like a jury, the trial court, as trier of fact, `may draw all reasonable and legitimate inferences and deductions from the evidence adduced....' Batson, 73 Haw. at 245-46, 831 P.2d at 930 (quoting State v. Nelson, 69 Haw. 461, 469, 748 P.2d 365, 370 (1987) (emphasis added)). And an inference is nothing more than a logical and reasonable conclusion of the existence of a fact ... from the establishment of other facts[,] from which, by the process of logic and reason, and based upon human experience, the existence of the assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of fact. State v. Emmsley, 3 Haw.App. 459, 464-65, 652 P.2d 1148, 1153, cert. denied, 65 Haw. 683 (1982) (emphasis in original).