Opinion ID: 2053313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: motion to vacate the default judgment

Text: [6, 7] Kaishian's motion to vacate the judgment was governed by sec. 269.46(1), Stats. 1973: 269.46 Relief from judgments, orders and stipulations; review of judgments and orders. (1) The court may, upon notice and just terms, at any time within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a judgment, order, stipulation or other proceeding against him obtained, through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect and may supply an omission in any proceeding. In addition to the required affidavits, all motions to vacate a judgment entered upon default or cognovit and to obtain a trial upon the merits shall be accompanied by a proposed verified answer disclosing a defense. It has been repeatedly stated that this statute confers a wide discretion upon trial courts which will not be disturbed on appeal except in the case of clear abuse. Buchen v. Wisconsin Tobacco Co., 59 Wis.2d 461, 465, 208 N.W.2d 373 (1973); Collings v. Phillips, 54 Wis.2d 204, 210, 194 N.W.2d 677 (1972); Wagner v. Springaire Corp., 50 Wis.2d 212, 219, 184 N.W.2d 88 (1971). Before a party may be entitled to relief, two distinct requirements must be met: First, a showing must be made that the judgment or order from which relief is sought was the product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect on the part of the moving party. Second, it must be shown that a meritorious defense to the action exists. Wagner v. Springaire Corp., supra, 50 Wis.2d at 220; Bloor v. Smith, 112 Wis. 340, 346, 87 N.W. 870 (1901). [8] In this case the trial court found that the answer submitted by Kaishian disclosed a meritorious defense in the nature of an estoppel, and this finding is not in dispute. The question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that no mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect were shown. The burden was upon Kaishian to show that one of the requisite conditions existed. Padek v. Thornton, 3 Wis.2d 334, 338, 88 N.W.2d 316 (1958). [9] The fact that Kaishian had made some contact with the attorney for the plaintiff, while perhaps relevant as to excusable neglect, did not require the conclusion that relief should be granted. In Glassner v. Medical Realty Inc., 22 Wis.2d 344, 126 N.W.2d 68 (1964), this court affirmed denial of a motion to vacate a judgment notwithstanding the fact that negotiations between the parties were going on concerning the matter at the time, where it did not appear that the plaintiffs had induced the defendant's default. In Williams v. Miles, 268 Wis. 632, 68 N.W.2d 451 (1955), it was held not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to reopen a judgment where the defendant alleged in her affidavits that she had called upon the plaintiff's attorney and objected to the action, and that she had believed this was sufficient. Kaishian's argument in this court purports not to dispute the trial court's finding that no inadvertence or excusable neglect as contemplated by the statute were demonstrated. Rather, he argues that relief should have been granted on the theory that Kaishian's default was due to a mistake of lawthe mistake of law being that he believed that his letter of December 5, 1974 would suffice as an answer to the complaint. [10] In Paschong v. Hollenbeck, 13 Wis.2d 415, 422, 108 N.W.2d 668 (1961), this court relaxed the position taken in several earlier cases which purported to limit the mistakes that might justify relief under the statute to mistakes of fact. In Paschong the court held that relief was not precluded by the fact that a party's mistake was one of law and that the nature of a mistake of law might properly be considered together with other facts of the case in passing on the motion. However, not every mistake, be it of fact or of law, is sufficient to require that relief be granted. The matter remains one for the discretion of the court. Trilling v. Nippersink Management Corp., 54 Wis.2d 406, 413, 195 N.W.2d 833 (1972). [11] The statute speaks of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Only the word neglect is expressly qualified by the adjective excusable. However, the decisions of this court under the statute reflect quite clearly that whichever of the enumerated grounds are relied upon in a particular case, the primary question is whether the conduct of the moving party was excusable under the circumstances. In Padek v. Thornton, supra, 3 Wis.2d at 338, it was said that the cases indicate that the phrase `excusable neglect' is taken as embodying the meaning of mistake, inadvertence, and surprise. Indeed, if it were not generally required that the moving party's conduct be excusable under the circumstances, default judgments could be vacated or reopened for the asking, since nearly any pattern of conduct resulting in default could alternatively be cast as due to mistake or inadvertence or neglect. [12] In Wagner v. Springaire, supra, 50 Wis.2d at 217, this court defined excusable neglect in the following terms: `Excusable neglect' is that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. While the court was speaking of the use of the phrase in sec. 269.45(2), Stats., relating to extension of the time to file an answer, it is apparent that the same definition was considered appropriate with respect to sec. 269.46 as well. Id., at 219, 220. A reasonable degree of prudence should be required whichever of the statutory grounds are relied upon to justify relief. The record indicates that the trial court was aware of the scope of its discretion and that it applied the standards for the exercise of discretion announced in this court's decisions. It had before it a college-educated man with twenty years in business who had previously undergone an experience with a default judgment almost identical to his experience in the instant case. The trial court was entitled to consider Kaishian's age, education and experience on the question. The court considered and rejected the protestations of unfamiliarity with court proceedings contained in Kaishian's affidavits, as well as his explanation that he believed the only reason his letter had not sufficed as an answer in the earlier proceeding was the fact that he wrote it too late. In connection with vacating the earlier default judgment Kaishian had signed affidavits similar to those submitted here and had verified a proposed answer. The trial court found that in this case Kaishian could not possibly have believed his letter to have been a proper answer to the complaint. This was implicitly a finding that Kaishian's mistake was unreasonable and inexcusable under the circumstances. [13] As Northern Motors points out in its brief, Kaishian's most potent argument here is that he acted promptly to vacate the judgment once he learned of its existence. The judgment was entered on January 14, 1975 and the order to show cause why it should not be set aside was issued on February 3, 1975. Promptness of action to seek relief is a material factor bearing on whether relief should be granted. Collings v. Phillips, supra, 54 Wis.2d at 210. However, promptness does not of itself require an affirmative result; the matter remains in the trial court's discretion, to be exercised upon the totality of the circumstances. Cruis Along Boats, Inc. v. Standard Steel Products Mfg. Co., 22 Wis.2d 403, 410, 126 N.W.2d 85 (1964). [14] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief in the case at bar. Northern Motors has requested that this court impose additional or double costs. The court in its discretion has determined not to do so. By the Court. Order affirmed.