Opinion ID: 1457352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the case should be remanded to the district court to apply its discretion under Kimbrough v. United States to consider the 100:1 disparity in the sentencing guidelines for crack and powder cocaine.

Text: House's next contention is that the district court did not exercise the discretion that the Supreme Court granted to district courts in sentencing proceedings to adjust the calculation of a defendant's sentencing range in Kimbrough v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007). The Court's decision in Kimbrough acknowledged the sentencing guidelines contained a disparity between sentences of persons charged with trafficking powder cocaine and those charged with trafficking crack cocaine: a trafficker dealing in crack cocaine is subject to the same sentence as one dealing in 100 times more powder cocaine. Id. at 564, 128 S.Ct. 558. Concluding that district courts did not need to reflect this disparity in their sentencing decisions, the Court held that it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence `greater than necessary' to achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes, even in a mine-run case. Id. at 575. In evaluating the district court's sentencing decision, this court reviews both findings of fact and applications of the Sentencing Guidelines for clear error. United States v. Stitman, 472 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir.2007). When a defendant alleges that the district court made a procedural error in sentencing, such as a legal error in interpreting the guidelines or a failure to appreciate the advisory nature of sentencing guidelines, this court reviews the sentencing procedure de novo. Id. The district court held the sentencing hearing in this case shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Kimbrough. Before imposing sentence, the district court acknowledged its authority to adjust House's sentencing range because of his conviction for trafficking crack cocaine. And I'm sure you're both aware of the Supreme Court case law that came down in the last two days ... which enables me to take into account all the different characteristics under 3553 to move lower than these crack guidelines, if necessary. Sen. Tr. at 34. House argues, however, that this statement from the district court was inadequate because it did not consider the 100:1 disparity between the guideline sentences for crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses, and thus was not a proper application of the core holding of Kimbrough. In support of his argument that this court should remand the case to the district court for resentencing, House cites several cases that this circuit remanded to the district court for resentencing because Kimbrough might have affected the district court's sentencing decision. See United States v. Adefumi, 279 Fed.Appx. 401 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. Padilla, 520 F.3d 766 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. Smith, 276 Fed.Appx. 497 (7th Cir.2008). The sentencing proceedings in those cases, however, occurred before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Kimbrough, and the district court was thus unaware of its new discretion. This circuit established a procedure for remanding sentencing decisions in light of Kimbrough in United States v. Taylor, 520 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.2008). In Taylor, this court determined that a limited remand would be appropriate where an appeal from a sentencing decision was pending when Kimbrough was decided and the district court did not have an opportunity to consider its holding. Id. at 747. Taylor also holds, however, that remand is not appropriate where the district court was aware of its power under Kimbrough but simply chose not to apply it. Id. at 747-48. The government argues that the district court's statement during the sentencing hearing indicated an awareness of its authority under Kimbrough to consider a lower sentencing range, but that the district court declined to exercise this discretion when imposing the sentence. This is correct. While the district court could have gone into more detail about Kimbrough, the statement from the record shows that it was aware of its discretion in light of that decision. The district court followed the correct sentencing procedure, and thus House's sentence will be overturned only if the decision not to adjust the sentencing range downward was clear error. Because the sentence that the district court imposed is ultimately within the guidelines range and the court acknowledged its discretion to impose a lower sentence if it chose to do so, it was not clear error for the district court to decline to exercise that discretion.