Opinion ID: 798459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Alleged consideration of sexual abuse allegations

Text: As noted, the OCCA's primary basis for rejecting Thacker's claim that Judge Goodpaster improperly considered the sexual abuse allegations was that Thacker had waived the claim by failing to raise it, at a minimum, in his first application for post-conviction relief. [5] More specifically, the OCCA found that Thacker himself was aware of the lawsuit, and that, consequently, the claim was available to his trial counsel [6] , appellate counsel, and post-conviction counsel, but was not raised until his second application for post-conviction relief. In the instant appeal, Thacker does not dispute the OCCA's factual findings relevant to the waiver issue (e.g., that he was personally aware of the civil lawsuit). But he asserts there are a number of reasons why that state procedural default did not create an enforceable federal procedural bar. Aplt. Br. at 19. Among those reasons, he asserts, was that neither independence [n]or adequacy of the waiver was established, particularly in light of the rule in Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703 (Okla.Crim.App.2002), allowing full review and relief anytime the broadly defined interests of justice warrant, and the OCCA's inconsistency in defaulting second post-conviction claims. Aplt. Br. at 19-20. [F]ederal habeas review ... is barred in any case in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule[,] ... unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). If a particular claim was `defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state procedural ground,' we recognize the state courts' procedural bar ruling and do not address the claim on the merits `unless cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice is shown.' Johnson v. Champion, 288 F.3d 1215, 1223 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 979, 985 (10th Cir.1995)). To be independent, the procedural ground must be based solely on state law. English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir.1998). To be adequate, the procedural ground must be strictly or regularly followed and applied evenhandedly to all similar claims. Sherrill v. Hargett, 184 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir.1999). Although Thacker contends that the OCCA's waiver ruling was not based on an independent state procedural ground, he is clearly mistaken. In concluding that Thacker's claim was waived, the OCCA expressly discussed and applied the provisions of Oklahoma's amended Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1089, and its strict limitations on applications for post-conviction relief filed by capital prisoners. Thus, there is simply no doubt that the OCCA's waiver ruling rested exclusively on Oklahoma state law. Thacker also contends that the state procedural ground relied upon by the OCCA was inadequate because the OCCA, on one notable occasion, ignored the otherwise-applicable state procedural rules and allowed a capital defendant (specifically a Mexican citizen) to assert in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief a claim that could have been raised on direct appeal or in his first application for post-conviction relief. Valdez, 46 P.3d at 710-11 (granting subsequent application for post-conviction relief on the basis of a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations due to state's failure to notify petitioner of right to communicate with Mexican consular officials). Thacker also contends that the OCCA has been inconsisten[t] in defaulting second post-conviction claims. Aplt. Br. at 20. Valdez aside, the OCCA's actual application of the particular procedural default rule [at issue] to all similar claims has been evenhanded in the vast majority of cases. Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 979, 986 (10th Cir.1995). Only in Valdez and approximately three other cases (one of which was unpublished) has the OCCA overlooked [a] procedural default in a second or successive state post-conviction application, and thus Valdez is insufficient to overcome Oklahoma's regular and consistent application of [its] procedural-bar rule in the `vast majority of cases.' Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215, 1254-55 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting Maes, 46 F.3d at 986); see Malicoat v. State, 137 P.3d 1234, 1235 (Okla.Crim.App.2006) (treating inmate's objection to setting of an execution date, on the grounds that Oklahoma's execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment, as a subsequently filed application for capital post-conviction review and agreeing to consider it on the merits because the issue had never before been addressed); Slaughter v. State, 108 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Okla.Crim.App.2005) (considering and rejecting claims of actual innocence raised in third application for post-conviction relief). And, although Thacker asserts that there have been other cases in which the OCCA has been inconsistent in its application of the procedural bar, he fails to cite to a single such case, aside from Valdez. Moreover, assuming that Valdez created a discretionary exception to the otherwise-applicable procedural bar rule (prohibiting the assertion of certain claims in successive applications for post-conviction relief), this does not necessarily render the procedural bar rule inadequate for purposes of the adequate state ground doctrine. Beard v. Kindler, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 612, 618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). To the contrary, a discretionary rule can be `firmly established' and `regularly followed' even if the appropriate exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases but not others. Id.; see Walker v. Martin, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011) (concluding that California state rule applying time limitations to state habeas petitions, although discretionary, me[t] the `firmly established' criterion). Thus, in sum, we must recognize the OCCA's waiver ruling and treat the claim as procedurally barred for purposes of federal habeas review. As a final matter, Thacker contends that the federal district court in this case should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on his claim. Aplt. Br. at 19-20. More specifically, he contends that respondent, [b]y submitting Judge Goodpaster's affidavit, ... created a material dispute of fact, id. at 19, and [t]he appropriate course would have been to conduct an evidentiary hearing at which [he] would have [had] the opportunity to refresh Judge Goodpaster's recollection and support his claim, id. at 20. Because, however, Thacker's claim is procedurally barred, the district court did not err in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) ([I]f the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.).