Opinion ID: 2612481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: new 301 and new 302

Text: By keeping the chief features of old 203 and old 301 in mind and by comparing them with new 301 and new 302 as enacted in 1987 by the Forty-Ninth Legislature, we can identify how old 203 was revised to become new 301 and how old 301 was revised to become new 302.
Old 203 emerged as new 301, as follows: 1. From old 203 the legislature retained the requirement that the defendant be a person who had never before been convicted of a felony and used that feature in the first line of the first sentence of new 301 to describe to whom new 301 applied. Thus, the first line of new 301 reads in relevant part, [i]f a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony   . 2. Next, from old 203 the legislature retained the requirement that a first offender be found guilty or have pleaded guilty, but then added to that the feature from old 301 relating to a defendant who had been only charged with a crime. Thus, the next part of new 301's opening line now read, [i]f a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or is found guilty of or pleads guilty to. (Emphasis added.) 3. Next, the legislature retained the felony category of crimes, with slight modification, for which the defendant may receive probation. Thus, that portion of old 203 that read any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson of a dwelling house or other human habitation in the actual occupancy of a human being emerged in new 301 as any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson in the first or second degree. As can be seen, the slight modification related to the arson offense. At this point, the legislature took from old 301 the feature relating to misdemeanors, with an exception not important to our purposes here, adding misdemeanors to the previously retained felony category in new 301. 4. Next, the legislature deleted from old 203 the following phrases that appeared in the first two sentences of old 203: a. The court shall ascertain whether the offense of which the accused is guilty is his first offense, the extent of moral turpitude involved in the act committed, and other facts and circumstances relating to the accused as he may desire to know. b. If the court is satisfied that he was a person of good reputation before the commission of the offense charged and had never before been convicted of any felony, and that if permitted to go at large would not again violate the law. 5. Next, the legislature made the change in old 203 that is at the heart of our controversy. That portion of old 203 which read, the court may in its discretion, by an order entered of record, delay passing sentence and then parole the person and permit him to go at large upon his own recognizance   , was changed to read, the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation   . In making this change the legislature borrowed from old 301 the feature contained in its last sentence, With the consent of a defendant charged with a crime    the court may suspend trial and place such defendant on probation. That borrowed feature explains where the requirement of the defendant's consent came from. It does not explain where the requirement of the state's consent came from. For that explanation, we must look elsewhere. The details of the source of the explanation are set out later in this opinion. Summarized here, the explanation is the state's consent requirement probably derives from the prosecutor's common law nolle prosequi power which in Wyoming was codified in old W.S. 7-198 (1957) and later recognized in W.R.Cr.P. 45(a). As can be seen, the portion of old 203 that read delay passing sentence and then parole the person was changed in new 301 to read without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation   . The legislature's use of the term judgment of guilt or conviction shows its proper recognition of the bright line that divides the prosecution's power to prosecute from the court's power to adjudicate and to impose sentence. As W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) informs, A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence.    The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk. In Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1349 (Wyo. 1977), this court made clear that there is only one final judgment. The final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment. Berman v. United States, 1937, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S.Ct. 164, 165, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937). This is consistent with Rule 33(b), W.R.Cr.P.   . There is no judgment against the defendant until sentence is pronounced. 6. We need not dwell on other changes in old 203 which emerged as new 301 for purposes of this opinion. Old 203's feature of a maximum five-year probation period was retained. Also retained was old 203's requirement that the probationer report to the court twice yearly. Old 203's feature that the court shall enter an order discharging the defendant and annulling the verdict or plea of guilty was retained with slight modification in new 301 which, instead of using annulling, made it clear that such discharge and dismissal shall be without adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for any purpose. By clarifying this last feature, the legislature again showed its recognition that this deferral-probation scheme was taking place in the prosecutorial phase, not the adjudicatory-sentence phase, of a criminal prosecution. Further, the legislature was recognizing that portion of W.R. Cr.P. 33(b) which provides, If the defendant    for any other reason is entitled to be discharged, judgment shall be entered accordingly. The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.
Old 301 emerged as new 302, as follows: 1. The legislature inserted the phrase and following entry of the judgment of conviction between the phrase except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment and the phrase the court may. 2. In two ways the legislature changed the phrase the court may suspend the imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and may also place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine applicable to the offense and also place the defendant on probation. First, it deleted that portion relating to suspending the execution of part of a sentence. This was done in recognition of this court's decisions in Sorenson, King, and Williams, stating that the power to suspend execution of a part of a sentence and place the defendant on probation was given by the legislature to the board of parole in the 1971 act establishing that board. The legislature then simply fit the phrase back together with a few grammatical changes. Thus, the phrase that read the court may suspend the imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and may also place the defendant on probation became the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The legislature then retained the may impose a fine applicable to the offense and place the defendant on probation language. 3. Finally, the legislature deleted the last sentence of old 301 that read with the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend trial and place such defendant on probation.