Opinion ID: 2054238
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to object to part of the jury instructions

Text: Appellant's third argument on appeal is that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to part of the trial judge's instruction on the issue of witness credibility. The trial judge stated the Commonwealth had very frankly and forthrightly disclosed the existence of a plea agreement between the Commonwealth and a Commonwealth witness. N.T., October 9, 1984 at 21. Appellant claims that this comment improperly bolstered the credibility of the Commonwealth witness, intruded into the jury's domain, and severely prejudiced Appellant. Once again, Appellant's argument has no merit. The standard of review for the wording of a jury charge has often been stated: When evaluating jury instructions, the charge must be read as a whole to determine whether it was fair or prejudicial. The trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. Commonwealth v. Prosdocimo, 525 Pa. 147, 150, 578 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1990). Furthermore, this Court will not review a charge to the jury by focusing on one or two words taken out of the context within which they were spoken. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 532 Pa. 242, 252, 615 A.2d 704, 709 (1992). In the instant matter, Appellant has focused on a phrase taken completely out of the context in which it was spoken. The two paragraphs prior to the contested phrase discuss how to determine credibility. The paragraph containing the contested phrase reads as follows: Now, the Commonwealth says to you very frankly and forthrightly, that [it] made what is known as a plea agreement with respect to the outstanding criminal charges of robbery against [the witness]; and that, in effect, the Commonwealth is saying that, because of [the witness'] testimony in this case against [Appellant], we acknowledged the fact that we are going to recommend to the Court that in return for that, [the witness] be given certain leniency, if you will, by the Court at the time of sentence. The [Appellant] argues to you that [the witness] has sold his testimony; that [the witness] is testifying against [Appellant] only because he has made a deal with the Commonwealth; and, therefore, his testimony has a price tag attached to it and is not worthy of belief or credibility. N.T., October 9-10, 1985 at 21-22 (emphasis added). The trial judge then proceeds to discuss the propriety of plea agreements under federal and state law and the fact that sentencing has not yet been imposed on the Commonwealth witness. Finally, the trial judge states: But, from your point of view, what you have to decide is, to what extent, if any, does the making of that plea bargain affect the credibility, the believability, the truthfulness of [the witness]? N.T., October 9-10, 1985 at 23. After reading this charge in its entirety, we are convinced the trial court's instruction was presented clearly, adequately, and accurately, and did not prejudice Appellant. Consequently, Appellant's trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for not objecting to the charge and Appellant is not entitled to PCRA relief.