Opinion ID: 3049890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the Certificate of Appealability

Text: [1] The district court certified only the issue whether Busch’s plea was involuntary in light of the fact he was allowed only two hours to accept or reject it. In his opening brief, the petitioner also raised the other issue in his habeas petition under the heading of “Uncertified Issue.” We construe this inclusion and designation as a motion to expand the Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). 9th Cir. R. 22-1(e). [2] “The required showing for originally obtaining a COA on a claim remains the standard by which this court reviews BUSCH v. WOODFORD 10889 the broadening of a COA. A habeas petitioner’s assertion of a claim must make a ‘substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’ ” Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). In order to make this showing, a petitioner “must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983) (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted); accord Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The uncertified issue here involves ineffective assistance of counsel. Busch posits two grounds for the appeal of this issue. First, Busch argues that his attorneys were deficient in failing to investigate potential mental defenses. Second, Busch contends that his attorneys’ decision to allow him to be interviewed by the Lake County Sheriff’s Office constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. He further argues that he was prejudiced by the ineffectiveness of counsel since he would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty. The district court denied relief as to the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument and also declined to certify this issue. We agree with the district court that the petitioner has failed to “make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” (see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)) and therefore decline to expand the COA to consider the merits of this issue. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Busch must demonstrate (1) that the defense attorney’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that the attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). In a guilty-plea case, like the present case, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, 10890 BUSCH v. WOODFORD the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).3 [3] Petitioner’s argument that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate mental state defenses is a far fetch. “Trial counsel has a duty to investigate a defendant’s mental state if there is evidence to suggest that the defendant is impaired.” Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). In the present case, there was no evidence to suggest that the petitioner was impaired. The two pre-trial psychiatric evaluations of Busch by Drs. Drury and Rossoff not only determined that he was competent to stand trial, but also concluded that the petitioner did not suffer from mental disorders. Busch points to the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Drury, who examined Busch prior to trial. (Petitioner’s ER at 1-6.) That evaluation describes Busch’s prior medical history, including his suicidal thoughts as a young teenager, his abuse of methamphetamines and prescription drugs for several years before the crime and head injuries Busch suffered in an auto accident in early 1996 and a motorcycle accident in December 1996. (Id. at 4.) After considering this and the other information contained in his evaluation, Dr. Drury concluded that “[b]ased upon personal information, it is my opinion that he is essentially free of major signs of mental disorder, mental 3 The district court, at times in its opinion, does not rely on the correct standard for demonstrating prejudice in a plea bargain case. See Busch v. Woodford, No. C 04-4157-MJJ, 2005 WL 1926618, at  (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005). (“Petitioner has not established a reasonable probability that such information would have led to a different verdict (had the case gone to trial).”); id. at  (“Given this evidence, it is unlikely that a reasonable jury would have found Petitioner less culpable or returned a verdict less stringent than first degree murder.”). However, the district court found, and we agree, that Busch has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” — the first prong of the Strickland test — and therefore, this apparent error is harmless. BUSCH v. WOODFORD 10891 diseases or psychiatric disease.” (Id. at 6.) In addition, Dr. Thomson — the expert psychiatrist who testified at the evidentiary hearing on Busch’s state court habeas petition — agreed that he had no doubt that Busch was competent to stand trial. (Respondent’s ER at 141.) Although Dr. Thomson testified that Busch experienced some symptoms of “classical drug induced paranoia” as a result of his prior substance abuse (id. at 73) and that he thought Busch may have suffered from some form of organic brain injury due to his prior head injuries (id. at 135-38, 144-45), he testified that Busch did not possess any “major” of “full blown” mental illness or mental disorder (id. at 74-75, 89). [4] The petitioner draws a distinction between competency evaluations and investigating mental defenses, arguing that a psychiatric evaluation that concludes that an individual is competent to stand trial is not the same as investigating mental defenses. Although this might be true, the duty to investigate mental defenses is only triggered “if there is evidence to suggest the defendant is impaired.” Douglas, 316 F.3d at 1085. The defendant fails to point to any credible evidence of mental incapacity which would have triggered a duty on the part of his counsel to investigate for possible defenses. Moreover, petitioner’s trial counsel made a reasonable strategic choice to rely on petitioner’s claims of innocence and decided not to pursue further investigations into petitioner’s mental state since he testified that a mental state defense “would have been inconsistent” with the theory of the case. (Petitioner’s ER at 167.) See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that “[w]here the attorney has consciously decided not to conduct further investigation because of reasonable tactical evaluations, the attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient”). Therefore, Busch has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right based on his trial counsel’s performance. [5] Busch also fails to show that his trial counsel’s decision to allow him to make a statement to police detectives on 10892 BUSCH v. WOODFORD March 17 fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The record supports a finding that the decision was strategic. As his counsel explained at the evidentiary hearing, without the statement, there would have been no reason for the prosecutor to participate in further plea bargain negotiations. (See Respondent’s ER at 324.) Moreover, the present case is distinguishable from Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1995), a case relied on by the petitioner, in which we found the trial counsel’s performance to be deficient in allowing the defendant to give a statement to police. Importantly, unlike the statement in Harris ex rel. Ramseyer, here there were certain restrictions placed on the use of Busch’s statement. Namely, it could not be used in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief. (See Petitioner’s ER at 9.) And, perhaps even more importantly, Busch’s statement was also not directly incriminating since he did not confess to murdering the victim; rather, he explained that Donovan Williams killed the victim. [6] Because the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised by the petitioner are not “debatable among jurists of reason,” we decline to expand the COA and, therefore, dismiss the petitioner’s uncertified issue for lack of jurisdiction.