Opinion ID: 2517324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Defective Special Circumstance Instruction

Text: The court gave the following version of CALJIC No. 8.81.17: To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder in the commission of robbery, is true, it must be proved: 1. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery or 2. The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of robbery. In other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the robbery or attempted robbery was merely incidental to the commission of the murder. (Italics added.) Defendant correctly observes that use of the disjunctive or between the enumerated paragraphs was erroneous. [11] ( People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 256 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123].) The court replaced and with or at the prosecutor's request, and with defense counsel's agreement. The Attorney General contends counsel's acquiescence forfeited defendant's claim on appeal. However, [t]he invited error doctrine will not preclude appellate review if the record fails to show counsel had a tactical reason for requesting or acquiescing in the instruction. [Citations.] ( People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 28 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591].) Here, as in Moon, the record shows no tactical reason, and therefore we do not apply the invited error doctrine. ( Ibid. ) (13) The error is reversible unless it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 256-257.) Defendant contends the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 is a required element of the felony-murder special circumstance, which must be found true by the jury. We have rejected that view. The second paragraph of the instruction does not set out a separate element of the special circumstance; it merely clarifies the scope of the requirement that the murder must have taken place during the commission of a felony. ( People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 766-767 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956]; People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803].) Thus, unless the evidence supports an inference that the defendant might have intended to murder the victim without having an independent intent to commit the specified felony, there is no duty to include CALJIC No. 8.81.17's second paragraph. [Citations.] ( Monterroso, at p. 767.) Here, of course, the second paragraph was presented to the jury as an alternative, not as a clarification of the first paragraph. Defendant notes this permitted the jury to find the special circumstance true based only on a finding that the murder occurred while he was engaged in the commission of a robbery, without making the further finding that the murder was committed to carry out or advance the robbery. Relying on the same evidence underlying the lesser included offense argument discussed in part II.J., ante, at pages 1296-1298, defendant claims the record supports an inference that he intended to murder Contreras without intending to steal from him until after the shooting occurred. However, neither paragraph of the instruction reflected defendant's after-acquired-intent theory. If the murder were committed while he was engaged in robbery, under the first paragraph, the intent to rob would already have been formed, just as it would have been if the murder were committed to carry out the robbery under the second paragraph. In any event, the evidence did not support defendant's theory, as discussed above in part J. The defect in the instruction clearly did not affect the verdict. In addition to returning a true finding on the felony-murder special circumstance, the jury found defendant guilty of robbing Contreras. The evidence simply did not support the notion that the robbery was somehow incidental to the murder. Defendant makes much of the fact that he tried to shoot Calleros before any robbery attempt was made. However, by all accounts a robbery or robberies were being committed when he shot Contreras. By most accounts, Contreras was shot after he resisted. In addition to the eyewitness testimony, three witnesses (James, Noble, and King) testified or gave statements to the police to the effect that defendant told them he shot a Mexican who resisted when defendant tried to take his money. On this record, the failure to give CALJIC No. 8.81.17 in the conjunctive was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.