Opinion ID: 780379
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Force Claims Against Supervisory Officials

Text: 41 The district court held that the supervisory officials are entitled to summary judgment because they had no personal involvement in the alleged use of excessive force against Combs. On appeal, defendants contend that Skatzes's and Robb's supervisory liability claims fail for the same reason. Plaintiffs respond that the Use of Force Committee Report indicates misconduct by supervisory defendants in five areas: (1) inadequate briefing, (2) failure to wear identifying name tags, (3) excessive use of gas, (4) questionable use of force in cell extractions, and (5) failure to videotape. 42 [S]imple negligence is insufficient to support liability of [supervisory officials] for inadequate training, supervision, and control of individual officers. Hays, 668 F.2d at 872. A supervisory official may not be held liable under § 1983 for the misconduct of those the official supervises unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1984). At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers. Hays, 668 F.2d at 874. Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be based upon a mere failure to act but must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Bass, 167 F.3d at 1048. 43
44 Plaintiffs allege that as director of the ODRC on September 5, 1997, Wilkinson was ultimately responsible for the ODRC SRT. Plaintiffs contend that it is reasonable to infer that Wilkinson saw and approved the tactical plan when it was faxed to the Central Office; however, they concede that the plan was consistent with constitutional standards. Because plaintiffs fail to present any evidence that Wilkinson, who was not even present at ManCI on the evening of the disturbance, engaged in active unconstitutional behavior, we affirm the summary judgment in his favor. 45
46 Hills was the North Region Director of the ODRC on September 5, 1997, and was present when the SRT went into DR-4. Plaintiffs allege that Hills viewed the extraction of at least twelve prisoners from their cells, including plaintiff Robb. In his answer, Hills admits being in the complex during the extractions, but claims to have witnessed no police brutality, a claim plaintiffs do not rebut. Simply viewing the extractions without evidence of more involvement is insufficient to demonstrate that Hills implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the use of excessive force against plaintiffs. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment for Hills. 47
48 Coyle was the warden of ManCI on September 5, 1997. Coyle, the incident commander, asked Lieutenant Moroney to prepare a tactical plan and approved that plan, which plaintiffs concede was consistent with constitutional standards. The Use of Force Committee Report offered by plaintiffs does not indicate that Coyle encouraged any misconduct or directly participated in it. Rather, the report demonstrates that Warden Coyle gave instructions not to use excessive force, ordering that there would be no free-lancing and no Rambos and stressing that there would be no deadly force unless absolutely necessary. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Warden Coyle. 49
50 Lieutenant Moroney commanded the SRT that entered DR-4 and developed the tactical plan to retake the unit. Plaintiffs allege that Moroney was present during the extraction of inmates and did not intervene to prevent the use of excessive force. However, plaintiffs offer no evidence that Moroney personally witnessed the use of excessive force against plaintiffs or any other inmate. 51 The use of force committee found that Moroney inadequately briefed the SRT members prior to their entry into DR-4. Only a portion of the SRT members involved in the incident received a briefing, and no instructions were given concerning the extraction of inmates from their cells. The committee determined that [t]his led to SRT members `free lancing' as they encountered a situation, and the onsite supervisors losing control of the SRT members['] actions. 52 The committee further found that at least four explosive distraction devices, 113 explosive gas devices, and six canisters of pepper mace were used to quell the disturbance. The committee stated that [b]ased on the documented use of gas and the physical investigative interviews, it is believed that the air concentration level could have reached a lethal level. The committee found that Lieutenant Moroney, the on-site SRT commander, failed to maintain fundamental control of the operation and that the SRT's use of gas, mace, and distraction control devices was excessive, uncontrolled, and clearly compromised the safety of staff and inmates. 53 Finally, the use of force committee found that SRT members used questionable force in restraining the inmates, extracting them from their cells, and escorting them from DR-4. The committee concluded that [a] general loss of control existed in the manner in which inmates were controlled, restrained, and escorted from the cell block and that [t]he on-site Commander of all of the Teams [Moroney] and/or the specific Commander of each Team failed to control the conduct of the assault force. 54 The Use of Force Committee Report, if admissible, creates genuine issues of material fact as to Moroney's liability. Based on the committee's findings that he inadequately briefed the SRT members, failed to control the use of chemical agents, and failed to control the SRT members in the extraction of inmates, a reasonable jury could find that Moroney implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the use of excessive force against plaintiffs and other inmates. As such, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in his favor. 55
56 Lieutenant Moroney designated Sergeant Berry as the SRT's tactical commander. Plaintiffs allege that Berry led the SRT into DR-4 and was present during the cell extractions. Although he did not observe any officer using excessive force on an inmate, Berry did witness three SRT members making comments such as this is the guy I want and I want to beat his ass near the cell of a prisoner who is not a plaintiff. Berry did not admonish the officers. Plaintiffs have not submitted proof that [Berry had] a culpable state of mind — that the action or failure to act was to some degree deliberate rather than inadvertent. Hays, 668 F.2d at 873. On the basis of the evidence that he witnessed SRT members making comments about another inmate, a reasonable jury could, at most, conclude that Berry was negligent. Absent a showing that he encouraged or directly participated in the use of excessive force against plaintiffs, Berry was entitled to summary judgment.