Opinion ID: 2520311
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: RCW 26.09.240, Smith, and Troxel

Text: ¶ 15 This visitation statute provides: (1) A person other than a parent may petition the court for visitation with a child at any time or may intervene in a pending dissolution, legal separation, or modification of parenting plan proceeding. A person other than a parent may not petition for visitation under this section unless the child's parent or parents have commenced an action under this chapter. (2) A petition for visitation with a child by a person other than a parent must be filed in the county in which the child resides. (3) A petition for visitation or a motion to intervene pursuant to this section shall be dismissed unless the petitioner or intervenor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a significant relationship exists with the child with whom visitation is sought. If the petition or motion is dismissed for failure to establish the existence of a significant relationship, the petitioner or intervenor shall be ordered to pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the parent, parents, other custodian, or representative of the child who responds to this petition or motion. (4) The court may order visitation between the petitioner or intervenor and the child between whom a significant relationship exists upon a finding supported by the evidence that the visitation is in the child's best interests. (5)(a) Visitation with a grandparent shall be presumed to be in the child's best interests when a significant relationship has been shown to exist. This presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence showing that visitation would endanger the child's physical, mental, or emotional health. (b) If the court finds that reasonable visitation by a grandparent would be in the child's best interest except for hostilities that exist between the grandparent and one or both of the parents or person with whom the child lives, the court may set the matter for mediation under RCW 26.09.015. (6) The court may consider the following factors when making a determination of the child's best interests: (a) The strength of the relationship between the child and the petitioner; (b) The relationship between each of the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing and the petitioner; (c) The nature and reason for either parent's objection to granting the petitioner visitation; (d) The effect that granting visitation will have on the relationship between the child and the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing; (e) The residential time sharing arrangements between the parents; (f) The good faith of the petitioner; (g) Any criminal history or history of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or neglect by the petitioner; and (h) Any other factor relevant to the child's best interest. (7) The restrictions of RCW 26.09.191 that apply to parents shall be applied to a petitioner or intervenor who is not a parent. The nature and extent of visitation, subject to these restrictions, is in the discretion of the court. (8) The court may order an investigation and report concerning the proposed visitation or may appoint a guardian ad litem as provided in RCW 26.09.220. (9) Visitation granted pursuant to this section shall be incorporated into the parenting plan for the child. (10) The court may modify or terminate visitation rights granted pursuant to this section in any subsequent modification action upon a showing that the visitation is no longer in the best interest of the child. RCW 26.09.240. ¶ 16 The parent challenges this statute under both Smith and Troxel. In Smith, we held parents have a fundamental right to autonomy in child-rearing decisions, In re Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 13, 969 P.2d 21, and this liberty interest is protected as a matter of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 15, 969 P.2d 21. We held state interference with this interest must be subjected to strict scrutiny and thus is justified only if the state can show that it has a compelling interest and such interference is narrowly drawn to meet only the compelling state interest involved. Id. We recognized while in certain circumstances where a child has enjoyed a substantial relationship with a third person, arbitrarily depriving the child of the relationship could cause severe psychological harm to the child, id. at 20, 969 P.2d 21, [s]hort of preventing harm to the child, the standard of `best interest of the child' is insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's fundamental rights. Id. ¶ 17 Thus, Smith required that a grandparent (or other third party seeking visitation) must show that denial of visitation would result in harm to the child before a court could order visitation over the objections of a fit parent. It is not within the province of the state to make significant decisions concerning the custody of children merely because it could make a `better' decision [than the parent]. [5] Id. While the statute at issue here was not before the Smith court (though a precursor statute was), Smith did not limit application of constitutional requirements to the statutes challenged in that case. ¶ 18 Troxel was a plurality opinion. The parties agree the plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor is the narrowest ruling, representing the holding of the court. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977). ¶ 19 The Troxel plurality stated [t]he liberty interest in this case  the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children  is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054. While the Court cited the breadth of the visitation statute at issue in that case, the central focus of Troxel was failure of the Washington statute to afford a presumption that parents act in the best interests of their child. The Court identified the flaw in the statute: [The statute] contains no requirement that a court accord the parent's decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever. Instead, the Washington statute places the best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge. Should the judge disagree with the parent's estimation of the child's best interests, the judge's view necessarily prevails. Thus, in practical effect, in the State of Washington a court can disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best interests. Id. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054. ¶ 20 The Court further focused on the statute a few paragraphs later: Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children ( i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children. The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to Granville's determination of her daughters' best interests. More importantly, it appears that the Superior Court applied exactly the opposite presumption. .... .... In effect, the judge placed on ... the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters. Id. at 68-69, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (citations omitted). ¶ 21 The Court's holding emerges in the next paragraph: The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. In that respect, the court's presumption failed to provide any protection for Granville's fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters.... And, if a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination. Id. at 69-70, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). ¶ 22 Returning to the text of the current statute, it is clear that subsection (5)(a) directly contravenes the constitutionally required presumption that the fit parent acts in the child's best interests. Subsection 5(a) states that [v]isitation with a grandparent shall be presumed to be in the child's best interests, and provides that this presumption may be rebutted by the fit parent (who would presumably be opposing the visitation request) by a preponderance of evidence showing that visitation would endanger the child's physical, mental, or emotional health. The United States Supreme Court held that a court must accord special weight to the parent's own determination, and because subsection (5)(a) establishes a presumption antonymous to that constitutionally required special weight, the subsection must fail. [6] ¶ 23 While the nature and reason for either parent's objection to granting the petitioner visitation is a factor that the court may consider under RCW 26.09.240(6)(c), under Troxel the mere permissive consideration of such an objection is not enough. Special weight must be accorded the fit parent's determination of what is in the child's best interests. ¶ 24 Under Smith's broader holding, the statute suffers from a number of other constitutional defects. The standard in subsection (4) used to determine whether to grant visitation  the best interests of the child standard  was expressly rejected in Smith. Smith's central holding required a showing of harm to the child to overcome the presumption that a fit parent acts in the child's best interests: Short of preventing harm to the child, the standard of `best interest of the child' is insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's fundamental rights. Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 20, 969 P.2d 21. ¶ 25 The grandparent contends that the statutory requirement that a visitation petitioner establish a substantial relationship with the child preserves the statute's constitutionality under Smith. Here the Court of Appeals held the significant relationship requirement, together with the list of factors that the trial court may consider, rendered the statute constitutional under Troxel and Smith. In re Parentage of C.A.M.A., 120 Wash.App. 199, 213-14, 84 P.3d 1253 (2004). But in Smith we noted the failure of the statute to require a substantial relationship between a third party and a child in order for a visitation petition to even be heard by a court, id. at 21, 969 P.2d 21, and we discussed that requirement (1) as a threshold test, and (2) as part of the required showing of harm to the child in order to overcome the presumption that the parent acts in the child's best interests. We held that establishing a substantial relationship is a necessary, though not sufficient, component of a visitation statute that comports with due process. ¶ 26 The Court of Appeals also reversed the special factors test from Troxel. Troxel clearly treated the existence of special factors that might justify the State's interference with [a parent's] fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her two daughters as necessary, but not sufficient, to allow court to order visitation over a fit parent's objections. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054. A court may establish such special factors, but must also evaluate those factors in light of the special weight the court accords to the fit parent's wishes. Id. at 68-69, 120 S.Ct. 2054. ¶ 27 The Court of Appeals held as a matter of law that one such [special] factor is a longstanding [significant] relationship between the petitioner and the child. [7] In re C.A.M.A., 120 Wash.App. at 214, 84 P.3d 1253. While this may be, the existence of such a special factor does not bear on the constitutionality of the statute, but on whether, under a constitutional statute, a grandparent could overcome the presumption that a fit parent acts in a child's best interest. ¶ 28 The grandparent also cites several cases from other states to buttress her claims that RCW 26.09.240 is constitutional. However, the statutes considered in those out-of-state cases did not contain the constitutionally flawed presumption in favor of grandparent visitation present in Washington's statute, and those courts had not previously held that a showing of harm to the child is required to overcome the presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interest of the child, as the Washington State Supreme Court held in Smith. [8] ¶ 29 We conclude RCW 26.09.240's presumption in favor of grandparent visitation is unconstitutional under Troxel and the application of the best interests of the child standard rather than a harm to the child standard is unconstitutional under Smith.