Opinion ID: 172022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntariness of Ms. Wynn’s Consent to Search

Text: Mr. Eastom argues that Ms. Wynn’s consent to search Mr. Eastom’s home was not voluntary, and therefore the evidence obtained as a result of the search should have been suppressed. He first asserts that the district judge’s finding that the officers’ testimony was more credible than Ms. Wynn’s testimony is clearly erroneous. In support, he points to an affidavit that was executed by Ms. Wynn concerning the search shortly after the search. He further argues that the consent’s involuntariness is shown by the presence of five officers at the home of a young woman with a child, and by the failure to make known the right to refuse consent. We disagree. Subject to limited exceptions, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches of an individual’s home or possessions. Andrus, 483 F.3d at 716. However, the “‘Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained.’” United States v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006)). -8- Importantly, “the Fourth Amendment requires that consent be voluntary and ‘not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.’” Id. at 1133 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973)). The voluntariness of consent must be determined from the totality of the circumstances, and the government bears the burden of proof on the issue. United States v. Iribe, 11 F.3d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993). The government must show that the consent was unequivocal and specific, and that it was freely and intelligently given. Id. Voluntariness is a factual finding, and we review the district judge’s determination of voluntariness for clear error. Thompson, 524 F.3d at 1133. The presence of more than one officer increases the coerciveness of an encounter, but that alone does not render consent per se involuntary. Id. at 1134. Further, “‘knowledge of the right to refuse consent’ is not ‘a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a “voluntary” consent.’” Id. (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232–33). The district judge did not clearly err when she found that Ms. Wynn voluntarily consented to the search of Mr. Eastom’s home. First, the district judge did not clearly err when she found the officers to be credible, and found Ms. Wynn to be not credible. The fact that Mr. Eastom’s attorney prepared affidavits shortly after the events that may corroborate Ms. Wynn’s version of events does not show that her testimony is more credible than the officers’ testimony. The district judge was present during the live testimony of the witnesses. Just as the district judge was permitted to find Ms. Wynn’s testimony not credible, she was permitted to discount -9- the credibility of Ms. Wynn’s earlier affidavit. Second, Officer Ashley testified that Ms. Wynn said she didn’t care if the officers came inside and looked around. The officers also testified that during the encounter their guns were not visible, they used a normal conversation voice, and they did not threaten Ms. Wynn. While the presence of more than one officer at Mr. Eastom’s home may have increased the coerciveness of the encounter, this fact alone does not render consent per se involuntary. See Thompson, 524 F.3d at 1134. Moreover, Ms. Wynn’s knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not a necessary ingredient of a voluntary consent. See id. Therefore, the district judge did not clearly err in finding voluntary consent here.