Opinion ID: 2507697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Judge's Use of an Illustration in Charge

Text: In concluding that the trial judge properly submitted the charge of voluntary manslaughter to the jury, the analysis turns to the substance of the judge's instruction. Dickey argues the Court of Appeals erred in finding the trial judge's illustration during the voluntary manslaughter portion of his charge was not an improper comment on the facts of the case. Specifically, Dickey challenged the following language in the judge's charge: By way of illustration and I would point out this is by illustration alone, that if an unjustifiable assault is made with violence with the circumstances of indignity upon a man's person and the party so assaulted kills the aggressor the crime will be reduced to manslaughter. Dickey claims the illustration was an unconstitutional [10] comment on the facts of the case given the undisputed nature of the facts and the judge's directive that the exact facts of the case `will be' manslaughter. The Court of Appeals rejected Dickey's challenge. In so ruling, the court found the charge, taken as a whole, was not erroneous as it was unlikely that a reasonable juror would have singled out the illustration portion of the charge and interpreted it as the court's opinion on the facts of this case or as an instruction on the weight to be given to the evidence. Dickey, 380 S.C. at 402-03, 669 S.E.2d at 927. For several reasons, I agree with the Court of Appeals' finding that the judge's illustration did not constitute reversible error. First, the judge was extremely thorough in his instructions and emphasized to the jurors that they were the arbiters of the facts. Secondly, the judge clearly instructed the jury that his instruction was by illustration alone. Finally, the judge did not impermissibly indicate his opinion as to the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, Dickey's guilt, or any fact in controversy. Significantly, the judge instructed the jury that he was not permitted to have any opinions regarding the facts of the case and that the jury should not construe anything he said during trial as an opinion regarding the facts. See State v. Jackson 297 S.C. 523, 526, 377 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1989) (Under South Carolina law, it is a general rule that a trial judge should refrain from all comment which tends to indicate to the jury his opinion on the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the evidence, or the guilt of the accused.). Based on the foregoing, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.