Opinion ID: 1036248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a duty to act

Text: We must address the ongoing problem of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. Otherwise, we ignore our duty to resolve disputes fully, fairly, and effectively and to ensure that trial procedures in this state promote justice and comply with the federal and state constitutions. In order to fully, fairly, and effectively adjudicate Saintcalle's claim we must address the presence of racial discrimination within our jury selection procedures. The primary duty of this court is to see that justice is done in the cases which come before it, which fall within its jurisdiction. 0 'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wn.2d 589, 600, 458 P.2d 154 (1969); see also RAP 1.2(a), (c); 7.3. Accordingly, this court has frequently recognized it is not constrained by the issues as framed by the parties and will reach issues not briefed by the parties if those issues are necessary for decision. City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 269, 868 P.2d 134 (1994) (citing cases); State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d 736, 740-41, 975 P.2d 512 (1999) (citing cases); Hall v. Am. Nat'l Plastics, Inc., 73 Wn.2d 203, 205, 437 P.2d 693 (1968) (noting that courts frequently decide crucial issues which the parties themselves fail to present (citing cases)). In other words, we will resolve whatever legal issues must be resolved to properly adjudicate the claims and issues raised on appeal. In this case, Saintcalle has complained that the prosecutor in his case was allowed to exercise a racially discriminatory peremptory challenge. See Suppl. Br. ofPet'r at 3. Saintcalle argues 4 State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5 GonzaJez, J. concurring that '[r]acial iniquities permeate Washington's criminal justice system,' 1 that this state has fail[ ed] to enforce the Equal Protection Clause under Batson, and that '[t]he dearth of recent cases in which courts have actually found racial discrimination in jury selection suggests not that such discrimination doesn't occur, but that the judiciary has failed to identify and remedy it. '2 !d. at 3-4. Accordingly, this case does bring into question the underlying validity of peremptory challenges and the proper framework for reviewing the use of such challenges, even if Saintcalle has not explicitly requested that we alter our court rules or jury selection process. In order to justly and properly resolve Saintcalle's claim, we must address the deeply flawed procedural and appellate framework in which it arose. Instead, today this court fails to ensure that none of our trial procedures propagate injustice. We have inherent power to govern court procedures as a necessary adjunct of the judicial function. City of Seattle v. Hesler, 98 Wn.2d 73, 80, 653 P.2d 631 (1982); see also RCW 2.04.190; State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405,42829, 269 P.3d 207 (2012); State v. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193, 212, 59 P.3d 632 (2002); Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Indus. Indem. Co., 102 Wn.2d 457, 461, 687 P.2d 202 (1984); State v. Fields, 85 Wn.2d 126, 129, 530 P.2d 284 (1975); State v. Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498,501-02,527 P.2d 674 (1974); State ex rel. Foster-Wyman 1 Quoting TASK FORCE ON RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON RACE AND WASHINGTON'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2011) (alteration in original). 2 Quoting Bidish Sarma, Commentary, When Will Race No Longer Matter in Jury Selection? 109 MICH. L. REV. First Impressions 69, 72 (2011) (alteration in original), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/sarma2.pdf. 5 State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5 Gonzalez, J. concurring Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 4-12, 267 P. 770 (1928). This wellestablished authority includes the power to create, modify, or waive court rules, see GR 90)(1); O'Connor, 76 Wn.2d at 595-97, 600, as well as the power to exercise supervisory authority over the courts of this state, see State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 317-18 & n.l1, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007). Our authority in this context is plenary and thus our procedural rules cannot be abridged or modified by the legislature, Smith, 84 Wn.2d at 502, although the legislature may supplement our procedural rules by statute, see Gresham, 173 Wn.2d at 428. In accordance with our primary duty to seek justice in the cases that come before us, and because '[n]o rule ofthis court was ever intended to be an instrument of oppression or injustice,' we have suspended the rules where justice demanded it. 0 'Connor, 76 Wn.2d at 595-96 (quoting State v. Brown, 26 Wn.2d 857, 865, 176 P.2d 293 (1947)); see, e.g., id. at 596, 600 (excepting indigents from court rule and statute imposing filing fee); cf Sackett v. Santilli, 146 Wn.2d 498, 504, 47 P.3d 948 (2002) (noting this court cannot contradict the state [or federal] constitution by court rule). The use of peremptory challenges in our courts is exactly the type of trial court practice over which we have inherent and ongoing authority. See State v. Tharp, 42 Wn.2d 494,501,256 P.2d 482 (1953) ([T]he selection ofthejury is procedural.); see also Fields, 85 Wn.2d at 129. There is no constitutional requirement that peremptory challenges be included within our trial procedures. See, e.g., Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 152, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 173 L. Ed. 2d 320 (2009); Georgia v. 6 State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5 Gonzalez, J. concurring McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1992) (citing cases); State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 365-:66,382 P.2d 497 (1963); Crandall v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 77 Wash. 37, 40, 137 P. 319 (1913). Thus, peremptory challenges continue to be used in our courts only insofar as we allow them to be used. If we truly are unsure of the appropriate way to address the ongoing racial discrimination within our jury selection procedures, we should ask for further briefing. See RAP 10.6(c), 12.1(b). But as is explained below, the need to abolish peremptory challenges is so apparent that additional briefing is unnecessary. Aha, 13 7 Wn.2d at 741 (noting that in a rare case in which briefing is not necessary to full and fair resolution of the issue we can decide the issue without additional briefing (citing cases)). Even if we might eventually be able to devise a framework that incorporates peremptory challenges in some form while adequately addressing the problems described below, we should at the very least abolish the use of peremptory challenges until that time. Again, to the extent that members of this court remain unsure, the proper course of action is to request further briefing, not to ignore the problem.