Opinion ID: 1197692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: else's self-representation

Text: This court and the United States Supreme Court have recently held that a defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself in a criminal proceeding. McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Both courts, however, recognized that the right to self-representation is not absolute. In McCracken we stated: In order to prevent a perversion of the judicial process, the trial judge should first ascertain whether a prisoner is capable of presenting his allegations in a rational and coherent manner before allowing him to proceed pro se. Second, the trial judge should satisfy himself that the prisoner understands precisely what he is giving up by declining the assistance of counsel. 518 P.2d at 91. [3] Applying these standards to the case at bar, the record shows that prior to the hearing, the trial judge had read a very recent psychiatric report on Else which indicated that Else's thought content seemed adequately organized with no evidence of delusions or other psychotic indicators. Else's responses to the trial court's questions were rational and showed no confusion. There was nothing in the record which suggested that Else was incapable of presenting his allegations rationally and coherently. The record also shows that the trial court urged Else to accept an attorney at public expense, and continued the hearing to provide Else an opportunity to consult with the public defender who was assigned to his case, in spite of Else's threatened refusal to talk to him. The trial court told Else: In all the cases I've seen you're always better off with an attorney. The trial court also determined that Else had quite recently been through the same procedure in Kodiak where he had entered guilty pleas to three counts of stealing property, appearing pro se in spite of another judge's recommendation that he accept counsel. The instant case is distinguishable from the recent case of Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374 (Alaska 1976). In that case, this court held that the defendant's guilty plea was invalid because he was not informed of the advantages of legal representation before he waived his right to the assistance of counsel. Gregory was an Eskimo, whose native language was Yupik. The plea proceeding was conducted mainly in English, and Gregory showed confusion at the hearing before the superior court with respect to legal terminology, particularly the terms lawyer, attorney, and public defender. The record here does not reveal any lack of understanding of the role of an attorney on Else's part. We find that the trial court adequately informed Else of the advantages of legal counsel and made a good faith effort to convince him to accept representation. We hold that Else knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and exercised his constitutional right to self-representation. Despite the judge's highly competent handling of this aspect of the plea, we find that we must reverse for the reasons set forth below.