Opinion ID: 2588208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: washington law against discrimination

Text: The Washington law against discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW, under RCW 49.60.010 declares as a civil right the right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a disabled person. Another statute, RCW 49.44.090, prohibits age discrimination in employment, referring to an individual who is forty years of age or older. (Emphasis added.) The certified question, though, refers specifically and only to RCW 49.60.030, which states, in part, in subsections (1) and (2): (1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability ... is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to: (a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination; .... (2) Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys' fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... (Emphasis added.) Age is not included in the listing of protected classes under RCW 49.60.030(1). The statute is clear and unambiguous. Its language is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. In Marquis v. City of Spokane , this court, although only in a footnote, observed that the Legislature expressly limited its specification of protected classes in RCW 49.60.030(1) to race, creed, color, national origin, sex, and disability. [17] The Legislature refers to age discrimination in employment only in RCW 49.60.180 and RCW 49.44.090. Plaintiffs acknowledge that on its face RCW 49.60.030 does not include age in its listing of protected classes. They argue that the broad language of RCW 49.60.030(2), which provides a civil cause of action and remedy for persons injured by any act in violation of this chapter, makes RCW 49.60.030 ambiguous and subject to judicial construction by this court. Relying on the Legislature's stated purpose in RCW 49.60.010, the language in RCW 49.60.020, and this court's decision in Marquis, Plaintiffs urge this court to add age to the protected classes listed in RCW 49.60.030(1). Plaintiffs misinterpret both the statute and this court's decision in Marquis. The Legislature's broad policy statement for chapter 49.60 RCW does not, standing alone, support Plaintiffs' argument that age is included among the protected classes listed in RCW 49.60.030(1). The law against discrimination includes a policy statement proclaiming that discriminatory practices are a matter of state concern. The Legislature has made it clear that the State has an obligation to eliminate and prevent discrimination because it menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state. [18] Under the heading Purpose of chapter, RCW 49.60.010 provides, in part, that: The legislature hereby finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants because of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability ... are a matter of state concern, that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state. .... (Emphasis added.) A declaration of policy in a legislative act, however, serves only as an important guide in determining the intended effect of the operative sections. [19] In reading the applicable statutes together to determine the legislative intent and to achieve a harmonious total statutory scheme, it becomes clear that the Legislature referred to age discrimination only in RCW 49.44.090 and RCW 49.60.180 and did not intend to include it in the protected classes listed in RCW 49.60.030(1). Simply because age is included in the statement of purpose under RCW 49.60.010 does not support insertion by the court of age in the list of protected classes specified in RCW 49.60.030(1). If age is to be added to the statute, it must be added by the Legislature, which, despite numerous amendments since the statute was first enacted in 1949, has not done so. That a statutory cause of action for age discrimination is available only under RCW 49.44.090 and RCW 49.60.180 is further supported by the language in RCW 49.60.205, which provides that: No person shall be considered to have committed an unfair practice on the basis of age discrimination unless the practice violates RCW 49.44.090. It is a defense to any complaint of an unfair practice of age discrimination that the practice does not violate RCW 49.44.090. (Emphasis added.) By its language, RCW 49.60.205 expresses a limitation upon age discrimination claims. Under that statute, the Legislature created a defense to an age discrimination claim if the plaintiff cannot also establish a claim under RCW 49.44.090. In this case, Defendants argue that if the Legislature had intended to allow an age discrimination claim under RCW 49.60.030(1), it would have included a reference to RCW 49.60.030 in RCW 49.60.205. Amicus Curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Foundation asks this court to answer the certified question in the affirmative, citing gratuitous language by the court in Human Rights Commission v. Cheney School District Number 30, 97 Wash.2d 118, 641 P.2d 163 (1982) which, without discussion, stated that the petitioner could sue for damages for age discrimination under RCW 49.60.030. [20] This court in Cheney did observe that the Legislature has provided no authority for the Washington State Human Rights Commission to award damages for humiliation and mental suffering, but that [a] person who has suffered humiliation caused by discrimination may seek relief through a civil action as provided for under RCW 49.60.030. [21] The court then stated that a hearing tribunal of the Washington State Human Rights Commission has no authority to award compensation for humiliation and mental suffering caused by unlawful age discrimination. [22] In its opinion, the court discussed RCW 49.60.250 and RCW 49.60.225 at length, but stated without explanation or citation of precedent or other statute that the petitioner who suffered damages by humiliation and mental suffering caused by age discrimination is not without a remedy. She can sue for damages under RCW 49.60.030 which specifically grants a civil remedy for anyone injured by an act of discrimination. [23] The court mentioned RCW 49.60.030 only in one line of its conclusion without further reference or discussion. As the court stated in Cheney, [t]he sole issue in the ... case [was] whether a hearing tribunal of the Washington State Human Rights Commission ... has authority to award compensation for humiliation and mental suffering caused by unlawful age discrimination. We hold it has no such authority. [24] It is obvious from a reading of the case that, despite two gratuitous references to RCW 49.60.030 in the opinion, the court did not intend to add age to the protected classes identified in RCW 49.60.030 when the Legislature, despite at least 10 amendments since 1949, has chosen not to do so. Plaintiffs also contend that RCW 49.60.020 requires that RCW 49.60.030(2) be construed to provide a cause of action to an independent contractor for age discrimination. RCW 49.60.020 provides: The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of any other law of this state relating to discrimination because of race, color, creed, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, other than a law which purports to require or permit doing any act which is an unfair practice under this chapter. Nor shall anything herein contained be construed to deny the right to any person to institute any action or pursue any civil or criminal remedy based upon an alleged violation of his or her civil rights. (Emphasis added.) The Legislature has chosen to protect employees from age discrimination only under RCW 49.44.090 and RCW 49.60.180 and merely makes an incidental reference to age under RCW 49.60.020. RCW 49.60.030(2) simply provides a cause of action and remedy for a violation of the law against discrimination in consonance with the language in RCW 49.60.030(1). The legislative history of chapter 49.60 RCW does not support creation of a statutory cause of action for independent contractors for age discrimination under RCW 49.60.030. The statute was first enacted in 1949. The Legislature has since amended RCW 49.60.030 at least 10 times. [25] At none of those times did the Legislature amend the statute to add age to the protected classes listed under RCW 49.60.030(1). Plaintiffs point out that RCW 49.60.020 provides that Washington's law against discrimination is to be liberally construed to serve its purposes. In liberally construing a statute, this court will view with caution any construction that would narrow the coverage of the law. [26] Even under liberal construction of chapter 49.60 RCW, this court will not adopt a strained or unrealistic interpretation of the statutes in that chapter. [27] Adding age to the list of protected classes under RCW 49.60.030(1) would result in a strained interpretation of the statute, and the court would then be engaging in legislation. Neither the statutory scheme nor the legislative history supports reading into RCW 49.60.030 a statutory cause of action for an independent contractor claiming age discrimination when age is quite obviously not included in the list of protected classes in that statute. Plaintiffs' reliance on Marquis is misplaced because that case is readily distinguishable from this case. In Marquis, this court interpreted RCW 49.60.030(1) to recognize the civil right of an independent contractor to be free from discrimination based on sex, race, national origin, religion, or disability in the making or performing of a contract for personal services. [28] The court's decision in Marquis was limited to the protected classes listed in RCW 49.60.030(1). Age, however, is not listed as a protected class under that statute. In fact, the opinion in Marquis makes it clear that under RCW 49.60.030, an independent contractor has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case: that the plaintiff was a member of a protected class and not merely that the plaintiff was an independent contractor. [29] This court's decision in Marquis does not support creation of a cause of action for independent contractors for age discrimination under RCW 49.60.030(1) because age is not one of the protected classes listed in it.