Opinion ID: 2459996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act

Text: For his first argument on appeal, Wilson contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that Insurisk and Moorhead were immune from liability under the Workers' Compensation Act. Whether a safety consultant, which does not provide workers' compensation coverage to the employer, is immune from tort liability under the Workers' Compensation Act is an issue of first impression in Arkansas.
Insurisk and Moorhead contend that they are immune from Wilson's tort action under Act 796 of 1993, codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-409(e) (Repl.1996), which states that: the insurance company, the agent, servant, or employee of the insurance company or self-insured employer, or a safety consultant who performs a safety consultation under this section shall have no liability with respect to any accident based on the allegation that such accident was caused or could have been prevented by a program, inspection, or other activity or service undertaken by the insurance company or self-insured employer for the prevention of accidents in connection with operations of the employer. The emergency clause of Act 796, however, specifically states that it shall apply only to injuries which occur after July 1, 1993. 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 41. In this case, Wilson was injured on September 16, 1988, which is well before the applicable date of Act 796. In addition, Insurisk and Moorhead did not argue before the trial court that they were immune under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-409(e), and thus they are precluded from raising this issue for the first time on appeal. See, McGhee v. State, 330 Ark. 38, 954 S.W.2d 206 (1997); Ouachita Wilderness Inst., Inc. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997).
Instead of arguing that they were immune under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-409(e), Insurisk and Moorhead argued before the trial court that they were immune from Wilson's tort action under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) (Repl.1996), which states that: The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents, next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer ... on account of the injury or death, and the negligent acts of a coemployee shall not be imputed to the employer. Although Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) provides that workers' compensation is the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer, the employee may sue a third-party who negligently causes his injuries under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-410(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 1996), which provides that: The making of a claim for compensation against any employer or carrier for the injury or death of an employee shall not affect the right of the employee, or his dependents, to make a claim or maintain an action in court against any third party for the injury, but the employer or his carrier shall be entitled to reasonable notice and opportunity to join in the action. (Emphasis added.) On appeal, Wilson argues that Insurisk and Moorhead are not immune under the exclusive remedy provision of section 105 because they are third parties as defined by section 410. We agree. In Neal v. Oliver, 246 Ark. 377, 438 S.W.2d 313 (1969), we defined a third party as used in section 410 as: some person or entity other than the first and second parties involved, and the first and second parties can only mean the injured employee and the employer or one liable under the compensation act. (Emphasis added.) Relying upon this language, we reasoned in Burkett v. PPG Industries, Inc., 294 Ark. 50, 740 S.W.2d 621 (1987), that the workers' compensation carrier was not a third party under section 410 because it was the only other entity, besides the employer, that could be held liable under the workers' compensation act. Hence, we held in Burkett , that a workers' compensation carrier has the same immunity from suit as provided to the employer under section 105. Id. Likewise, in Brown v. Finney, 326 Ark. 691, 932 S.W.2d 769 (1996), we held that co-employees are immune from suit under section 105 if at the time of the injury they were performing the employer's duty to provide a safe work place. In this case, however, Insurisk was neither Arkansas Oak Flooring's workers' compensation carrier as in Burkett , nor was it Arkansas Oak Flooring's employee, as in Brown . Instead, Insurisk was an independent contractor hired by Arkansas Oak Flooring to perform safety inspections. Because we have strictly construed section 105 to extend immunity beyond the employer in only the two instances enumerated in Burkett and Brown , we hold that the trial court erred when it ruled that Insurisk was immune from Wilson's tort action under the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.