Opinion ID: 2740909
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mendon's traffic concerns

Text: Avoiding traffic congestion along Route 16 is another stated justification for the size, height, and operating hours restrictions of the amended bylaws. Mendon asserts that it has a substantial interest in combating the neutral, secondary effect of increased traffic caused by patrons traveling to and from the Adult-Entertainment Overlay District. Specifically, restricting the opening hours for adult-entertainment businesses to 4:30 p.m. is justified as a means of allowing all local school buses to complete their routes absent increased traffic. Multiple studies, Mendon argues, suggest that traffic congestion is created by adultentertainment businesses, such that a town may choose to regulate the operating hours and size of those businesses to curb the effect. Showtime counters this argument, pointing to the fact that 9 The distances referenced in the studies range from 200 to roughly 3,000 feet. -25- to receive an entertainment license under Massachusetts law, a business must already prove that its operations would not cause an unreasonable increase in traffic levels. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 183A. It also presents the Greenman Study as proof that any traffic effect would be, at most, negligible. Careful scrutiny reveals that the bylaws are equally underinclusive as related to traffic concerns as they are to Mendon's rural aesthetic. We are thus convinced that Mendon, on this record, has not set forth evidence that the bylaws actually further its substantial interest in curbing traffic congestion in a manner sufficient to survive intermediate scrutiny. For one, Mendon fails to clarify how the traffic effects of adultentertainment businesses along Route 16 are in any way distinct from the traffic effects that would be caused by any other large, commercial business that might choose to locate along the same stretch of highway. For example, Mendon makes no suggestion that these bylaws would apply to a large restaurant, clothing retailer, or car dealership (all businesses at which we would expect daytime traffic) operating within the Adult-Entertainment Overlay District prior to 4:30 p.m. The record also gives no indication as to how the daytime traffic effects of an adult-entertainment business operating on Showtime's lot would be in any way distinct from, or less severe than, the effects caused by the business it would replace: a 2,600-square-foot, 1.9-story tall landscaping business. -26- Mendon's reliance on the studies of other municipalities does nothing to render us less dubious of its proffered interest. Having conducted an independent review of these studies, we find that the vast majority make no mention of traffic effects at all. Even those that do discuss traffic do so in a tellingly dissimilar manner relative to Mendon's suggested concern. The sum of these references are provided below: • A 1979 study conducted by the Planning Department of Phoenix, Arizona states, as a hypothesis, that adultentertainment business might cause possible traffic congestion, unusual hours of operation, litter, noise, and criminal activity. The study then goes on to investigate the link between criminal activity and sexually oriented businesses. It never again references traffic concerns. • A 1980 study by the Minnesota Crime Prevention Center concludes that bars without separate parking facilities, that instead rely on street parking to serve their patrons, are more often nuisance bars than those with separate parking facilities. • A 1991 study commissioned by the City of Garden Grove, California included a survey completed by real-estate agents and city residents. Both groups indicated their belief that adult-entertainment businesses located within 200 feet of a residential area would increase traffic. A majority of respondents also felt traffic would be increased in a commercial zone. • A 1993 report by the St. Croix County, Wisconsin Planning Department found that [d]uring night time operation hours there could be problems related to traffic congestion. • A 1996 report by the ERG/Environmental Research Group stated, generally, that in small towns with limited downtown commercial retail space, the likelihood of a cruising circuit for cars in the vicinity of the sex oriented business increases. The report cited -27- concerns that a sex oriented business will have the impact of drawing a regional . . . adult, male population . . . that has interests and activities that are at odds with those of families and the elderly. • A 1997 law review article cited a concern . . . with drivers who rush out of the parking lots of the business while children are nearby. It continued on to say that at the core of this concern is the fear of the kind of people a nude dance club attracts. These references are largely anecdotal, rely nearly exclusively on personal perceptions rather than verifiable data, and include significant hedging language, such as indicating that increased traffic is merely a hypothesis. In several cases, they also make apparent that the true, primary concern is not traffic, but the type of patrons thought to visit adult-entertainment businesses. Also of note is that the studies wholly fail to suggest that patronage at an adult-entertainment business would have any distinct effect when located in already commercialized zones, such as the Adult-Entertainment Overlay District. Even observing these studies in the light most favorable to Mendon, as we must when considering Showtime's cross-motion for summary judgment, we fail to see how they sufficiently establish that an adult-entertainment business located along a highway, in a commercially zoned area, and with off-street parking accommodations, would have a secondary effect on traffic patterns different from, or worse than, other commercial business of like size and capacity that might open in the same location. See Schad -28- v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 73 (1981) (The Borough has presented no evidence, and it is not immediately apparent as a matter of experience, that live entertainment poses problems . . . more significant than those associated with various permitted uses; nor does it appear that the Borough's zoning authority has arrived at a defensible conclusion that unusual problems are presented by live entertainment.). Similarly, although members of Speak Out Mendon referenced heavy pre-existing traffic on Route 16, even a traffic regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless there are clear reasons for the distinction[]. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 215. This anecdotal reporting does perhaps even less than the studies entered into evidence to substantiate Mendon's claim that increased traffic from an adult-entertainment business is more problematic -- or more likely -- than increased traffic from any other new commercial enterprise choosing to operating within the Adult-Entertainment Overlay District. Nonetheless, it is uncontested that if Showtime chose instead to operate a ballet studio, movie theater, or grocery store, those businesses would not be subject to the bylaws. Schad, 452 U.S. at 73-74 (We do not find it self-evident that a theater, for example, would create greater parking problems than would a restaurant.). We note before closing that Mendon does make a limited attempt to argue that adult-entertainment businesses attract a -29- higher percentage of out-of-town patrons, less concerned with Mendon's quality of life, than other types of commercial activity, resulting in traffic effects unique from that of other businesses.10 Even if the residency of a driver had some cognizable effect on traffic flow, we find it beyond improbable that Mendon could substantiate any such distinction here, in light of the fact that Route 16 is a state highway running East-West through much of Massachusetts.11 By way of hypothetical, we can only presume that a large, roadside restaurant offering an early-bird dinner special to patrons as they travel through Mendon along Route 16 headed East towards Boston would likely create the exact same amount of out-oftown traffic at 4:00 p.m., half an hour before any adultentertainment business is allowed to operate, as Showtime's 10 Because we find this argument to be unavailing for other reasons, we do not address the possibility -- albeit never raised by Showtime -- that a municipality claiming a substantial interest in curbing the frequency at which non-residents visit its city limits could run afoul of a right to intrastate travel. Commonwealth v. Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 32-33, 913 N.E.2d 832, 840 (2009) ([T]he Massachusetts Declaration of Rights guarantees a fundamental right to move freely within the Commonwealth.); see also King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hosp. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971) (describing as meaningless the right to interstate travel unless a correlative right to intrastate travel exists). But see Mem. Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974) (leaving open the question of whether the U.S. Constitution recognizes a fundamental right to intrastate travel). 11 A number of other businesses, including the nearby drive-in theater at 35 Milford Street, seem to cater specifically to out-oftown patrons. See www.mendondrivein.com (providing directions to the theater from neighboring cities and states). -30- preferred building, yet would not find its size or operating hours curtailed in any way. We therefore find Mendon's reliance on traffic concerns to be tellingly underinclusive, see, e.g., Carey, 447 U.S. at 45556; Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540, revealing that Mendon's allegedly substantial interest is not actually furthered by its bylaws, a fact fatal to its claim under intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 4. The zoning bylaws support no substantial interest We find the zoning bylaws to be tellingly underinclusive, highlighting that Mendon has failed to prove that it has a substantial interest in regulating the secondary effects of adultentertainment businesses that is actually furthered by its bylaws. The narrow application of these bylaws -- passed in the aftermath of Showtime's initial application for an adult-entertainment license -- to only the four-plot Adult Entertainment Overlay District belies Mendon's proffered interest in traffic safety and rural aesthetics. We believe that the record makes clear that these interests, although theoretically substantial in their own right, are not what prompted Mendon's amendments to the bylaws. See, e.g., Auburn Police Union, 8 F.3d at 897 & n.15 (collecting cases finding that patent underinclusiveness may prove the lack of a substantial governmental interest). Accordingly, we find that it -31- is Showtime, not Mendon, that ought to have been awarded summary judgment on these claims. B. The restriction on sale and consumption of alcohol Showtime also challenges an amendment to Mendon's general bylaws that forbids the sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages at any adult-entertainment business within the Adult-Entertainment Overlay District. Showtime does not bring this challenge under the First Amendment, but rather asserts that Article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides more expansive protection for adult entertainment than does its federal counterpart.12 Citing cases in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has held bans on non-obscene nude dancing in bars unconstitutional, Showtime asks us to find that Mendon's total ban on such activity is clearly impermissible under Article 16. In the alternative, it requests that we certify this question of law to the SJC. Mendon argues to the contrary, asserting that any distinction between the scope of Article 16 and the First Amendment need not concern us; under either the state or federal 12 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has made clear that there is no practical distinction between a regulation prohibiting the service of alcohol by businesses that provide adult entertainment and a regulation prohibiting adult entertainment in establishments that serve alcohol. See Cabaret Enters., Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 393 Mass. 13, 17-18, 468 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1984) (rejecting the argument that an ordinance banning alcohol sales in the presence of nude dancing was only a licensing restriction, not a regulation of expressive activity). -32- constitution the ban on adult-entertainment occurring in conjunction with alcohol service is clearly constitutional. As a federal court sitting in diversity over an issue of state law, we are generally tasked with making an informed prophecy of how the highest state court would rule on this question. See Ambrose v. New Engl. Ass'n of Sch. & Colls., Inc., 252 F.3d 488, 497-98 (1st Cir. 2001); see also In re Bos. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 410 F.3d 100, 108 (1st Cir. 2005). However, where our court determines that the path of state law is sufficiently undeveloped, or the correct answer to the question before us sufficiently unclear, so as to make such prophetic action unwise, we may instead choose to certify such questions to the highest court of the state. In re Hundley, 603 F.3d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 2010); Fischer v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 857 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (holding that the decision to certify a case a question is within the sound discretion of federal courts). For issues of Massachusetts law, we may appropriately certify to the SJC questions of law . . . which may be determinative of the cause then pending . . . and as to which it appears . . . there is no controlling precedent in the decision of [the SJC]. Mass. S.J.C. R. 1.03; see also In re Engage, Inc., 544 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2008). This case meets both requirements for certification. -33- We need not spill much ink on the first requirement: Showtime challenges the restriction on providing adultentertainment in conjunction with the service of alcohol solely under Article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Accordingly, there is no question that proper interpretation of state constitutional law is determinative of this action. The second requirement for certification is that there be no controlling precedent from the SJC. See Mass. S.J.C. R. 1.03. Our case law has interpreted no controlling precedent to mean that certification is inappropriate where the course the state court would take is reasonably clear. In re Engage, 544 F.3d at 53 (alterations and citation omitted). Where a case presents close and difficult legal issues, however, we may often be unable to say that the course that the SJC would take is reasonably clear. Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, 736 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2013); see also In re Engage, 544 F.3d at 53. As explained below, this is one such case, and we therefore believe that certification to the SJC is appropriate. 1. Article 16's protection of adult entertainment As Showtime recognizes, Article 16 protects a wider swath of expressive conduct in the form of adult entertainment than does the First Amendment. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Licensing Bd. of Fall River, 444 Mass. 188, 201, 827 N.E.2d 180, 191 (2005) ([T]he Federal rule does not adequately protect the rights of the citizens -34- of Massachusetts under art. 16.). Although nude dancing, as a form of expressive activity, falls only just within the ambit of First Amendment protections, Article 16 draws no distinction between such adult-entertainment and its less prurient expressive counterparts. Cabaret Enters., Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 393 Mass. 13, 17, 468 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1984) (refusing to distinguish between barroom-type nude dancing and performances of greater artistic or socially redeeming significance); see also Mendoza, 827 N.E.2d at 196 (Although the Supreme Court has said that nude dancing is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment . . . this court has rejected such qualification under art. 16. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Similarly, the SJC has made clear that Article 16 offers robust protection to expressive activity occurring in conjunction with the sale or purchase of alcohol. While the Twenty-First Amendment's grant of regulatory power over alcohol sales to the states has historically been read to limit the First Amendment's protection of expressive conduct in establishments licensed to serve alcohol,13 no provision of [the Massachusetts Declaration of 13 The Supreme Court has since limited the Twenty-First Amendment's restriction on First Amendment protections. See California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972) (recognizing that the Twenty-First Amendment granted states the power to regulate nude dancing where liquor is sold), overruled in part by 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (We now disavow [LaRue's] reasoning insofar as it relied upon the Twenty-First Amendment.). -35- Rights] gives a preferred position to regulation of alcoholic beverages. Commonwealth v. Sees, 374 Mass. 532, 536-37, 373 N.E.2d 1151, 1155 (1978). Therefore, unlike its federal counterpart, Article 16 makes no distinction between 'free speech in a bar and free speech on a stage.' Mendoza, 827 N.E.2d at 190 n.15 (citing Sees, 373 N.E.2d at 1155); see also Aristocratic Rest. of Mass, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n (No. 1), 374 Mass. 547, 554, 374 N.E.2d 1181, 1186 (1978) (Because our State Constitution has no special provision like the Twenty-first Amendment concerning the regulation of alcoholic beverages, the right of free speech guaranteed by art. 16 has no parallel limited status in premises where alcoholic beverages are served.). In accordance with these strong protections, the SJC has consistently held that adult-entertainment occurring in bars is considered constitutionally protected expressive conduct that may not be abridged in the absence of a demonstrated countervailing State interest. Cabaret Enters., 468 N.E.2d at 614; see id. (holding unconstitutional a ban on nude dancing in bars given the absence of evidence that [the adult-entertainment facilities have] been the source of crime such as drug distribution or disorderly conduct or assaults or sexual improprieties); Sees, 373 N.E.2d at 1156 (concluding that a restriction on nude dancing in bars was The SJC has not had an opportunity to speak to whether a distinction between Article 16 and the First Amendment remains post-LaRue. -36- unconstitutional where the dancer did not mingle with other employees or with patrons, and there is no contention that the performance was obscene). But see Mendoza, 827 N.E.2d at 188-89 (applying intermediate scrutiny to an ordinance banning all public nudity where the city at least advanced and attempted to document a governmental interest in crime deterrence, although withholding judgment as to the ordinance's true content neutrality). 2. Article 16's application to the general bylaws Naturally, the parties draw from this precedent sharply contrasting inferences about the constitutionality of Mendon's amended bylaws. Showtime styles the amendment as a total ban on the presentation of adult entertainment in conjunction with the sale or consumption of alcohol, which it claims is a clear violation of the protection offered by Article 16. Mendon, in contrast, argues that the restriction is wholly permissible; unlike the towns in Sees and Cabaret Enters., it has set forth a governmental interest and has crafted the amendment to narrowly target only those businesses most likely to cause the identified secondary effects. Neither argument wholly convinces. For its part, Showtime fails to acknowledge that Cabaret Enters. and Sees were decided in the absence of any governmental justification for their proposed restrictions on expressive activity. See Mendoza, 827 N.E.2d at 188 (The records in both [Cabaret Enters. and Sees] -37- 'fail[ed] to demonstrate [any] justification for the imposition of a restraint on the exercise of a right guaranteed by art. 16. (alterations in original) (quoting Cabaret Enters., 468 N.E.2d at 614)). Here, in contrast, Mendon has at least set forth an interest in deterring an increase in criminal activity which it believes will arise if adult entertainment is presented in conjunction with the service of alcohol. Under intermediate scrutiny,14 however, Mendon must also show that its interest in crime deterrence is substantial, and that its restriction on expressive activity is 'narrowly tailored' to advance . . . [that] interest 'without at the same time banning or significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech that does not create the . . . evils [the city seeks to eliminate]. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting City of Bos. v. Back Bay Cultural Ass'n, 418 Mass. 175, 183, 635 N.E.2d at 1179, 1180 (1994)); see also Commonwealth v. Ora, 451 Mass. 125, 129, 883 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (2008) (stating that under intermediate scrutiny a restriction on speech must be no greater than is essential to 14 Although Showtime argued that the zoning bylaws were appropriately subject to strict scrutiny, it did not similarly suggest that strict scrutiny should apply to the alcohol ban. Cf. Mendoza, 827 N.E.2d at 188 (considering Mendoza's argument that strict scrutiny should apply despite the proffer of a facially content-neutral interest in combating crime). Therefore, although acknowledging that the alcohol ban was passed concurrently with the zoning bylaw amendments -- the underinclusiveness of which betrays their asserted content-neutral purpose -- we do not consider the application of strict-scrutiny to this claim. -38- the furtherance of the government interest). In Mendoza the answer to the second of these inquiries was simple: the ordinance banned any public nudity within city limits, making it tantamount to censorship. 827 N.E.2d at 189. Given that the ordinance in Mendoza so clearly failed the test for narrow tailoring, the SJC did not engage in significant analysis of what evidence is required of a city to prove the validity and substantiality of its stated interest. Neither does Mendoza provide significant guidance on how the SJC would apply the test for narrow tailoring in a case, like that now before us, presenting a much closer question than the citywide ban on public nudity considered in Mendoza. Cf. id. (No matter what the formulation of the [narrow tailoring] test, . . . a complete ban is not 'narrowly tailored' . . . .). In consequence, the SJC's precedents may reasonably be conceived of as staking out two poles of scrutiny, with most cases falling somewhere in between. On one end, absent any justification, protected adult entertainment in the presence of alcohol service may not be constitutionally abridged. On the other end, no matter what justification is provided, a total ban on protected activity will not survive narrow tailoring. Between these poles, however, there are significant open questions regarding Article 16's proper application. This case, which falls somewhere near the middle of the rules set forth in guiding precedent, thus presents a close issue of constitutional law, the -39- proper resolution of which is difficult to predict, and suitable for certification to the SJC. 3. Certification to the SJC Although the legal standards to [be applied in this case] are relatively apparent, the application of those standards is difficult, and the outcome far from certain. See Easthampton Sav. Bank, 736 F.3d at 51. Moreover, the claim rests solely on issues of state constitutional law, implicates a fundamental right of Massachusetts citizens, and may have far-reaching impact on municipalities throughout Massachusetts in their construction of local ordinances. See In re Engage, 544 F.3d at 57 (explaining that the mere difficulty of a legal issue is generally insufficient to warrant certification, but deeming certification appropriate where additional factors weigh in favor of having the state court decide such complex questions of state law (citing Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 529 F.3d 8, 15 (2008)). For these reasons, we believe certification is warranted.15 15 On appeal, Showtime also challenges the amended bylaws as overbroad. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 (finding that a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional . . . .); Aristocratic Rest., 374 N.E.2d 1181, at 1187 (describing the overbreadth analysis under Article 16 as similar to the overbreadth analysis under the First Amendment). Having closely reviewed the record, however, we find no indication that Showtime sought to challenge the restriction on these grounds before the district court, and we cannot reasonably read its arguments therein as setting forth a prima facie argument for overbreadth. Aristocratic Rest., 374 N.E.2d at 1187 ([A] party must demonstrate both that the challenged governmental regulation is not susceptible of a construction which limits its -40-