Opinion ID: 2190926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: disproportionality of the death sentence

Text: Szabo next contends that the death penalty cannot be imposed on him because it is an excessive and disproportionate penalty in light of the fact that his accomplice, Leatherman, received a sentence of four years' imprisonment. Szabo relies primarily on People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill.2d 145, in which this court vacated the sentence of death and remanded for imposition of a lesser penalty. In Glecker, a codefendant, Parsons, whom the court found to be the ringleader in a double murder, had been tried separately and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court expressly rejected the contention that Gleckler was more culpable than Parsons (82 Ill.2d 145, 166), and also found, in view of the evidence in mitigation presented by both men, that Gleckler's prospects for rehabilitation were not demonstrably poorer than Parsons' (82 Ill.2d 145, 171.) The court found it relevant to the issue of the proportionality of Gleckler's death sentence that Parsons, a codefendant arguably more culpable and with less rehabilitative potential than Gleckler, had not received the death penalty (82 Ill.2d 145, 167). It was also found to be relevant to the question of the appropriateness of the sentence in Gleckler's case that the death sentence of the defendant in a previous case ( People v. Walcher (1969), 42 Ill.2d 159), whose circumstances the court found to be similar to the circumstances in Gleckler's, had been vacated by this court as unduly severe and inappropriate. People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill.2d 145, 169-70. In determining whether the imposition of the death penalty is proper in a particular case, we are required not only by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court but also by the Illinois Constitution to consider the circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 11 (providing that all penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship); People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill.2d 145, 162.) A sentence does not offend the requirement of proportionality if it is commensurate with the seriousness of the crime and gives adequate consideration to the rehabilitative potential of the defendant. ( People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 587; People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill.2d 342, 380-82.) In addition, however, this court has a duty to ensure that the cases in which death is imposed are rationally distinguished from those in which it is not imposed. ( People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill.2d 145, 166.) Rationality, consistency, and evenhandedness in the imposition of the death penalty are constitutionally indispensable. People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 543; Jurek v. Texas (1976), 428 U.S. 262, 276, 49 L.Ed.2d 929, 941, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2958. We conclude that the sentence of death imposed on Szabo cannot be deemed excessive or disproportionate solely because Leatherman received a lesser sentence. Szabo and Leatherman were not similarly situated. As a statutory matter, Leatherman's age precluded the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the circumstances. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b) (providing that a defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more may be sentenced to death if an enumerated aggravating factor is found to exist.) Moreover, the evidence showed that Szabo had the leading role in the planning and execution of the crimes. The degree of culpability of Szabo and Leatherman was not the same. Consequently, we hold that the fact that Leatherman did not receive the death penalty for his part in the murders is not a bar to the imposition of the death penalty on Szabo.