Opinion ID: 6318081
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Balancing All Factors

Text: While each of these factual considerations is distinct, none can be considered standing alone. Altogether, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, raise a triable issue as to the reasonableness of Johns’ decision to use lethal force. Defendants focus primarily on Palma’s disobedience; Palma purportedly kept walking towards Johns and refused to show his No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 26 hands. But equally important is that Johns knew Palma was mentally ill; Palma did not commit any crime before Johns arrived; he did not threaten Johns; he did not make any threatening gestures, like raising his fists; and he did not visibly brandish a weapon. Palma walked towards Johns at a normal pace—and it is the jury’s job to decide whether this was “aggressive,” as Johns said. After tasing Palma, Johns saw one of Palma’s hands, but still did not see any weapons. According to Melissa, the encounter lasted eight to ten minutes and, even while approaching Johns, Palma never got within ten to fifteen feet of Johns. Under these circumstances, Johns lacked probable cause to believe that Palma posed an imminent threat of serious bodily harm. Defendants point to an Eleventh Circuit opinion that they believe is “directly on point.” (Defs.’ Br. at 27 (citing Martinez v. City of Pembroke Pines, 648 F. App’x 888 (11th Cir. 2016).) In Martinez, multiple officers responded to a mental health emergency and found the plaintiff pacing, yelling, and waving his hands around. Martinez, 648 F. App’x at 889–90. As officers tried to handcuff him, the plaintiff swung his arms around and hit an officer in the head causing him to bleed profusely. Id. at 891. The plaintiff got away from the officers but turned around and took two steps towards the officers while he was only ten to twelve feet away. Id. Officers then shot the plaintiff once before using a taser to subdue the plaintiff as officers handcuffed him. Id. The Eleventh Circuit found the shooting reasonable and affirmed summary judgment in the officers’ favor. Id. But this case is not “directly on point” at all. While officers were similarly responding to a mental health crisis, the plaintiff in Martinez physically resisted when officers tried to restrain him, and he seriously injured one of the officers in the process. See id. at 893. If Palma had violently resisted in this manner and injured Johns before approaching him again, this would be a different case. But those are not the facts presented here. In fact, we have found triable issues as to the officer’s reasonableness even when officers faced more threatening situations. For example, in Bouggess, we held that the officer was not entitled to summary judgment because the officer “offered only a hunch, a crack deal, a hand-tohand struggle, and a ‘look in [the person’s] eyes’ to support his claim that his choice to shoot [the person] . . . was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 482 F.3d at 892. In Jones v. Sandusky County, 541 F. App’x 653, 655–56, 665–66 (6th Cir. 2013), we found a triable issue as to the officers use of deadly force when officers shot an armed suspect who had threatened to kill No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 27 his family because, just before the officers shot, they detonated a flash bang that would have made it hard to see whether the suspect was poised to use the firearm against the officers. And in Zulock, 441 F. App’x at 302, we found that officers were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds when the officers shot a man who was armed with a kitchen knife, did not respond to the officers’ orders, and repeatedly cursed at officers. Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a police officer unreasonably shot a mentally ill man who was not verbally threatening the officer, was not making any threatening movements or gestures, and gave the officer little reason to suspect that he was armed or dangerous. Thus, Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on this theory of excessive force. See Jacobs, 915 F.3d at 1041 (quoting O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 677 (6th Cir. 2011)).