Opinion ID: 164321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count 3: Possession of Marijuana

Text: 29 Colonna argues that the district court erred in (1) not granting his motion to dismiss Count 3 of the superceding indictment for preindictment delay, and (2) not granting his motion to sever Count 3.
30 We review a denial of a motion to dismiss for preindictment delay for abuse of discretion. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir.1998). Preindictment delay is a violation of due process where (1) the defendant suffered actual prejudice resulting from the delay, and (2) the delay was purposefully designed to gain tactical advantage or to harass. Id. 31 To constitute a showing of actual prejudice, the defendant must show that he has suffered definite and not speculative prejudice. United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 855 (10th Cir.1983), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Thus, [v]ague and conclusory allegations of prejudice resulting from the passage of time... are insufficient to constitute a showing of actual prejudice for the purposes of preindictment delay. Id. 32 Mr. Colonna claims that the actual prejudice to him is the fact that such a small amount of marijuana is typically never charged in federal court, but in State court as a Class B Misdemeanor, that the state statute of limitations had expired, and that the government seeks to file such a charge only to taint Appellant's character. Aplt. Br. at 43-44. Although it is highly unusual for the government to postpone additional charges until just five days before trial, much more is required for a finding of actual prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1235 (10th Cir.2000) (four-year preindictment delay was not prejudicial, even though body of victim was putrefied, and defendant's ability to refute autopsy's findings was lost); United States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343, 1351 (10th Cir.1998) (three year, nine month delay did not violate due process clause even though two witnesses had died, where defendant did not specifically allege how the witnesses' testimony would have been of benefit to his case). Mr. Colonna has not explained, for example, how the delay prejudiced him in his defense. 33 Nor has Mr. Colonna demonstrated that the government purposefully delayed joining Count 3 in order to gain a tactical advantage. As the government explained, Count 3 was added immediately after it had learned that state prosecutors had failed to charge Mr. Colonna with possession of marijuana prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Aple. Br. at 39-40 (citing I Supp. R. at 10). Mr. Colonna has not rebutted this explanation.
34 Mr. Colonna argues that his motion to sever should have been granted based upon Rules 8(a) (misjoinder) and 14 (prejudicial joinder) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 35 Misjoinder raises an issue of law; we therefore review a denial of a motion to sever under Rule 8 de novo. United States v. Janus Indus., 48 F.3d 1548, 1557 (10th Cir.1995). According to Rule 8(a), joinder of offenses is proper if the offenses are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a). On appeal, Mr. Colonna simply states that his motion to sever should have been granted based upon Rule[] 8. Aplt. Br. at 46. As Mr. Colonna has failed to support this contention with any authority or argument, we deem the issue waived. Eateries, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 346 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir.2003). Even were we not to find waiver here, the Rule plainly allows the joinder of the offenses for which Mr. Colonna was tried. 36 As for Mr. Colonna's claim of prejudicial joinder, we review a denial of a motion to sever under Rule 14 for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones, 213 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir.2000). Ordinarily, the district court's decision will not be reversed absent a strong showing of prejudice. Id. [A] mere allegation that defendant would have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial is not sufficient to warrant severance. United States v. Powell, 982 F.2d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 870 (10th Cir.1986)). Consequently, [t]he burden of a defendant to show an abuse of discretion in this context is a difficult one. Jones, 213 F.3d at 1260. 37 Mr. Colonna's claim that the mere mention of drug possession in determining the outcome of the firearm and ammunition charges necessarily prejudices the jury is unavailing, Aplt. Br. at 48, and his case is distinguishable from the one case he cites for support, United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50 (D.C.Cir.1992). In Dockery, the defendant had been charged with four drug counts, a weapons count, and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. The government refused to stipulate that the defendant had been convicted of a felony and instead introduced live testimony that the defendant had been convicted of an unspecified qualifying felony and ultimately sentenced to five years probation. See id. at 51-52. The government referred to the conviction six times during the trial. The trial judge, moreover, failed to instruct the jury that it could not use the felony conviction to infer propensity to commit the other charged crimes. See id. at 55. Finally, the evidence on the weapons charge was extraordinarily weak, and the defendant was ultimately acquitted of that charge. Id. at 56. The combination of these factors caused the court to conclude, unlike this case, that prejudice had been shown. Id. 38 In refusing to sever drug charges from firearms charges, this court has held that there is no essential unfairness when the relationship of the charges grew out of the defendant's own conduct. United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 290 (10th Cir.1983); see also Jones, 213 F.3d at 1260-61 (refusing to sever robbery and firearms charges). Here, the relationship of the charges clearly grew out of Mr. Colonna's own conduct, and the district court's refusal to sever the charges was not an abuse of discretion. 39