Opinion ID: 771836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims of Tortious Interference with Contract and Conspiracy

Text: 70 Remick's remaining contention on appeal is that the District Court erred in dismissing his tortious interference with contract and conspiracy claims against D'Ancona & Pflaum. As noted earlier, the basis for Remick's tortious interference claim is that Brown, while associated with the law firm, set [Remick] up to fail in negotiations by directing him to make outlandish demands for [the Nelson] bout that Angel Manfredy was not even physically capable of fighting. Br. of Appellant at 40. Remick's conspiracy claim is predicated on the tortious interference claim. 71 To set forth a viable cause of action for tortious interference with contract under Pennsylvania law, plaintiffs must plead the following elements: 72 (1) the existence of a contractual, or prospective contractual relation between the complainant and a third party; 73 (2) purposeful action on the part of the defendant, specifically intended to harm the existing relation, or to prevent a prospective relation from occurring; 74 (3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and 75 (4) the occasioning of actual legal damage as a result of the defendant's conduct. 76 Pelagatti, 370 Pa. Super. at 434, 536 A.2d at 1343. 77 The District Court dismissed Remick's tortious interference claim because it failed to reasonably inform the adverse party of the asserted cause of action, which the court deemed to be the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The court found Remick's complaint deficient because Remick did not advise the defendant of how its employee allegedly `set up' the plaintiff to fail in fight negotiations and what false and defamatory information [Brown] is accused of disseminating and to whom. Remick, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 461. 78 Although the District Court dismissed the tortious interference with contract claim and the conspiracy claim with leave to replead, in dismissing the court imposed a pleading requirement beyond that required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the still applicable system of notice pleading, all Remick was required to do was provide a short and plain statement of [his] claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Remick satisfied this requirement, as he put the defendants on notice as to the circumstances surrounding the alleged tortious behavior. There are discovery mechanisms, such as interrogatories, for ascertaining more details regarding the complaint allegations. Therefore, we cannot affirm the District Court's dismissal of Remick's claims for tortious interference and conspiracy against D'Ancona & Pflaum.