Opinion ID: 2609747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: bailiff-juror communications

Text: Finally, appellants allege that they were denied a fair trial as a result of a comment made by the bailiff of the court to one of the jurors. The record shows that the bailiff who had charge of the jury made the following comment to one of the jurors as the jury suspended their deliberation of the verdict to go to lunch: If you would put down your knitting, you might be able to do your job. As a result of this remark, the juror (Mrs. Baugh) sent to the court the following note: Message to the court. I have been accused by the bailiff of not doing my job properly. Therefore, I ask to be excused from jury duty. The trial court denied the juror's request to be excused, and further, denied a motion by the appellants for mistrial based in part on the bailiff's remark to the juror. Subsequent to the return of the verdict by the jury and after all the jurors had been polled affirming their verdict, the trial court excused all the jurors with the exception of juror Baugh, whom the court asked to remain. Over appellants' objection, the court called juror Baugh to the witness stand and placed her under oath. After some preliminary questions, the court asked the following question of juror Baugh: Q. Mrs. Baugh, the Court would like to at this time inquire whether anything that is contained  the subject matter of what is contained in this message, did it in any way prevent you from being able to continue as a fair and impartial juror in this case? A. No. It did not. The court then afforded each counsel, both the prosecution and the appellants, the opportunity to question the juror on his own. In Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), the court stated: In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. (Citations omitted.) In the instant case the trial court, in the presence of all the parties, conducted a proceeding to determine whether the said communication by the bailiff was harmful to appellants and concluded it was not harmful. I am of the opinion that, though the bailiff's comment to the juror was presumptively prejudicial, the appellants' right to a fair trial was not compromised. And though Remmer states that the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish ... that such contact ... was harmless to the defendant Remmer does not preclude the trial court from conducting its own inquiry to determine whether or not appellants were prejudiced by the bailiff's contact with the juror. And since the record on the hearing of juror Baugh shows that the appellants were not prejudiced the presumption of prejudice no longer exists, notwithstanding the initiation of the inquiry at the hearing by the trial court rather than the prosecution. I would therefore hold that the trial court's refusal to excuse the juror and the court's denial of the motion for mistrial do not constitute reversible errors. Thus, I would affirm.