Opinion ID: 798617
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mester's expert opinion is admissible

Text: We review the question whether expert testimony was properly excluded for abuse of discretion. Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. Nat'l Ass'n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 588 F.3d 908, 915 (6th Cir. 2009). A district court abuses its discretion if it predicates a ruling on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Id. Each party presented expert reports and affidavits concerning whether there were any industry standards applicable to staging corrugated panel bundles on a roof. Centimark's engineer, Larry Bajek, opined that there are no national or local standards, practices, or customs governing the storage and placement of bundles on a roof. He averred that the individual installation company determines how roofing materials will be staged, depending on site conditions. V & M's expert, Daniel Mester, averred to a reasonable degree of certainty based on his forty years of experience installing metal roofs that kickers are always used to secure roofing materials when they are placed on a sloped surface, regardless of roof pitch. In his opinion, Centimark's foreman and job superintendent did not properly set up the job because kickers or some other type of restraining device should have been used to secure the perpendicular bundles staged on A-Bay. Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a) provides that [a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion if the expert's technical or other specialized knowledge will help the jury understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. Mester was qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, and training to give reliable opinion testimony about the frequency and necessity of kicker use in the metal roofing industry. See In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 528-29 (6th Cir.2008). Mester's opinion was relevant because it would assist the jury in deciding the parties' dispute regarding the existence and application of industry standards. See id. By excluding Mester's testimony in its entirety, the district court precluded V & M from supporting its claims and meeting Centimark's expert testimony. The district court next focused on Mester's statement in his report: As soon as the bands are cut, when you go to put them down they are going to want to slide down. The court ruled this testimony was not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) [2] because V & M had not produced any evidence that the metal bands around the bundle in question had been cut; instead, the evidence indicated the metal bands on the bundle were still intact. Mester's statement was not considered in its proper context. Mester explained that kickers are used when placing materials on a sloped surface because [a]s soon as the bands are cut the panels in the bundles are going to want to slide down. Mester did not state or imply that the metal bands on the bundle at issue had been cut; rather, he simply described what ordinarily occurs if metal bands are cut while the bundle sits unsecured on a sloped surface. V & M was not required to present proof that the bands had been cut on the bundle in question as a condition for the admission of Mester's expert testimony. Mester's explanation, based on his extensive knowledge and experience in the industry, would have assisted the jury in understanding the force of gravity on the roofing panels. Next, the district court excluded Mester's opinion because it has no factual basis for causation 2009 WL 5943241, at , but we disagree. Mester averred that kickers are necessary to secure bundles on the roof because metal shipping bands become weak during transportation and cannot be relied upon to prevent panels from sliding out of bundles. Mester stated: Vibration from the overhead crane, wind and precipitation all add to the constant force of gravity. The natural tendency is for the sheeting to want to move downhill. From the photos I was shown, this is exactly what happened. In other words, based on the facts made known to him, Mester concluded, based on his knowledge and experience, that the metal bands no longer resisted gravity's effect on the panels and, because they were placed perpendicular to the roof line, they slid downhill toward the gutter. Mester added: The absence of [kickers] on A Bay is what allowed the sheeting to slide off the roof and into the substation. Experts are permitted a wide latitude in their opinions, including those not based on firsthand knowledge. Jahn v. Equine Servs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir.2000). Expert opinion can also be based on an inference and can embrace an ultimate issue. Fed.R.Evid. 704(a). The district court faulted Mester's opinion because he did not take any frequency measurements from the roof during mill operations to determine the amount of vibration on the roof of A-Bay, nor did he make any calculations based on weather reports. The court further believed that Mester's statements were inadmissible because they lack any indicia of probability and are mere comments on possibility. 2009 WL 5943241, at . We do not interpret Mester's report in the same way. He was not required to develop scientific measurements to support his opinion that gravity caused the panels to slide. So long as the Earth rotates on its axis, the law of gravity is certain. While the law of gravity prevails, it is also certain that an unsupported object will fall until its travel is interrupted by some object or surface below. Busch v. Unibilt Indus., Inc., No. 18175, 2000 WL 1369891, at  (Ohio Ct.App. Sept. 22, 2000); Szotak v. Moraine Country Club, Inc., 172 Ohio App.3d 34, 872 N.E.2d 1270, 1276-77 (2007) (Until the law of gravity is repealed, standing above ground level on a ladder presents an inherent risk of injury resulting from a fall.); Holdshoe v. Whinery, 8 Ohio App.2d 305, 222 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1966) (If no restraint was put on a motor vehicle parked on an incline, gravity would cause the motor vehicle to roll down the incline at an accelerating speed.). Jurors do not need to hear expert scientific evidence to determine causation, and the court admitted as much. 2009 WL 5943241, at . But jurors must be allowed to hear relevant evidence, and they can understand from their own life experience that objects set on a slope will move downward with the force of gravity unless restrained. See Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97, 592 N.E.2d 828, 833 (1992) ([M]atters of common knowledge and experience, subjects which are within the ordinary, common and general knowledge and experience of mankind, need not be established by expert opinion testimony.). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the standard for relevance is extremely liberal. See Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir.2009). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed. R.Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. Mester's opinion helps V & M establish that, had Centimark installed kickers on A-Bay, it is more probable that the panels would not have fallen into the substation when gravity pulled them downward. Therefore, his opinion is relevant, admissible evidence. We believe the court's expressed concerns bear on the weight the jury may give Mester's opinion at trial, not on its admissibility. See Best v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 182 (6th Cir.2009). Accordingly, we conclude that the exclusion of Mester's expert opinion was an abuse of discretion.