Opinion ID: 555115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: collective grounds

Text: 23
24 It is argued by Stephenson, Gohagen and Ebanks that the trial court erred in overruling appellants' objections to certain exhibits and testimony concerning, inter alia, the nationality of appellants, who are all Jamaican nationals. Appellants contend that references to their nationality created a bias against them on the part of the jury and deprived them of a fair trial. While it is indeed true that appellants were entitled to a trial free of racial bias, see United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16 (D.C.Cir.1990), appellants have failed on this appeal to specifically identify any statements of the prosecutor or any government witness which prejudiced the jury against appellants on account of their Jamaican nationality. 25 The scant discussion given this point by appellants reveals the lack of merit therein. The admissibility of evidence, as well as rulings governing examination of witnesses, are subject to review under the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. LeAmous, 754 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1139, 105 S.Ct. 2684, 86 L.Ed.2d 701 (1985). We cannot say upon the arguments presented that the district court abused its discretion in any of its rulings on motions related to evidence of appellants' nationality. 26
27 Stephenson and Gohagen contend that the district court erred in admitting into evidence at trial certain drugs, guns, cash and other items which were seized outside the time frame of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Specifically, they assert that the court erred in permitting the government to introduce various drug paraphernalia, weapons and cash seized from one to three months after the close of the period of the conspiracy as alleged in the indictment. Stephenson also contends that he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of the drugs and cash found on Swaby's person when he was arrested on March 17, 1987 in Kansas City, Kansas. Appellants contend that these items were evidence of other bad acts and, as such, their admissibility was governed by Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Appellants argue that admission of this evidence was improper under Rule 404(b) and that, inasmuch as it was seized outside the period of time alleged, its admission resulted in an improper variance of the charge set out in the indictment. 28 In response, the government notes that the vast majority of the challenged exhibits were obtained between May 27, 1987 and August 23, 1988, the fifteen month period of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. The government also points out that of the evidence seized after August 23, 1988--weapons, ammunition, scales, photographs, identification cards, and scraps of paper--none was per se illegal, and appellants have never articulated how this evidence and accompanying testimony constituted the other crimes, wrongs, or acts addressed by Rule 404(b). Thus, the government argues that Rule 404(b) was inapplicable to these items of evidence because they served as proof of the very charge for which these appellants were on trial, not of some other unrelated crime or act committed either prior or subsequent to the stated period of the conspiracy. 29 The facts relevant to this issue are not really in question. It is undisputed that a relatively small portion of the physical evidence introduced at trial was obtained by law enforcement officers on November 21 and 22, 1988, one week after the return of the indictment and three months subsequent to the end date of the conspiracy period alleged. However, some of that evidence may very well have been, and in all likelihood was, utilized by appellants or their unindicted coconspirators during the conspiracy period. The facts being generally undisputed here, our task is merely to determine whether the district court abused its considerable discretion in permitting the government to introduce this evidence at trial. See United States v. LeAmous, supra. 30 We simply are not convinced that the admission of this evidence was governed by Rule 404(b). Evidence is not subject to the provisions of Rule 404(b) if its possession is not a federal crime. United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir.1986), partially vacated on other ground, cert. denied on remaining grounds, 481 U.S. 1034, 107 S.Ct. 1968, 95 L.Ed.2d 810 (1987). There was no showing made that mere possession of the evidence with which we are concerned here was or is, by itself, illegal under federal law. 31 Similarly, we do not agree that this was evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts. We think this evidence can be more accurately described as evidence plainly relevant to the existence of and appellants' participation in the conspiracy charged, and, thus, was properly admissible. See United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 68 (2nd Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 134, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983); see also United States v. Westbrook, supra. Evidence of a conspirator's post conspiracy activity is admissible if probative of the existence of a conspiracy or the participation of an alleged conspirator, 'even though they might have occurred after the conspiracy ended.'  United States v. Fields, 871 F.2d 188, 197 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 369, 107 L.Ed.2d 355 (1989), quoting Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974). Because we find that the challenged evidence was indeed probative of the existence of the conspiracy and appellants' participation therein, we agree with the district court that this evidence was properly admissible. 32
33 Stephenson, Gohagen and Ebanks all contend that the district court erred in determining that this conspiracy involved the distribution of more than 500 grams of cocaine base and, thus, that for Guidelines Sentencing purposes the applicable base offense level for appellants' crime was level 36. The district court concluded, after considering the $112,867 in cash seized and the testimony that crack was routinely sold for $120 per gram, that this conspiracy involved the distribution of 1,173.88 grams of cocaine base. The Guidelines provide that level 36 is the appropriate base offense level for a conspiracy involving the distribution of more than 500 grams of cocaine base. 34 Appellants argue that the quantity of cash seized was insufficient evidence for the purposes of determining the base offense level, and that the district court's reliance upon it was unreasonable and irrational. Appellants suggest that the district court deprived them of certain due process rights in applying level 36 for sentencing purposes. They contend that the base offense level should be determined strictly by the amount of cocaine base either purchased or seized during the conspiracy period--some 233 grams, and that the proper base offense level was, therefore, level 34. 35 The government replies that the Guidelines provide for the sentencing judge to approximate the quantity of drugs involved in an offense where the amount of drugs seized does not reflect the scale of the offense. The government asserts that the district court quite properly calculated, in light of the testimony that cocaine base sold for $120 per gram, that the $112,867 in cash was the monetary equivalent of 940 grams. Further, the government points out that even if the amount of cash seized outside the conspiracy period is omitted from the calculation, the remaining $56,669 yields 472 grams of cocaine base, which when added to the 233.88 grams of drugs seized during the conspiracy still results in a total quantity of 705.88 grams, far in excess of the amount required for application of level 36. 36 The Sentencing Guidelines provide that where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the sentencing judge shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance ... [and] may consider ... the price generally obtained for the controlled substance. Guidelines Manual Sec. 2D1.4, Commentary Note 2; United States v. Gohagen, 886 F.2d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir.1989). The commentary, although not binding, is persuasive. 37 As noted, the district court considered the amount of cocaine base purchased or seized from the conspirators and the amount of cash recovered in determining the minimum amount of drugs involved in this conspiracy. The court concluded that minimum amount was 1,173.88 grams of cocaine base, and in so doing declared that the government had made a clear and convincing case on this point. 38 The use of cash and money order receipts in calculating the amount of controlled substance involved in an offense for sentencing purposes has previously been approved. See United States v. Johnson, 906 F.2d 1285, 1290-91 (8th Cir.1990). Further, we must accept the district court's findings of fact in the sentencing proceeding unless they are clearly erroneous. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e); United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 322, 107 L.Ed.2d 312 (1989). After careful review, we cannot say that the district court erred in determining the quantity of cocaine base involved in this conspiracy. 39 The judgments of conviction are affirmed.