Opinion ID: 1450597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Default of Beuke's Brady Claim

Text: Beuke next asserts that the prosecution violated his due process rights by failing to provide him with exculpatory evidence as mandated by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Brady requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence that is material either to guilt or to punishment. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194). The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). A Brady violation includes three elements: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Beuke first raised his Brady claim in his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the prosecution failed to produce (1) a list of individuals suspected of involvement in the mad hitchhiker shootings and (2) evidence showing that the prosecution's witness, Michael Cahill, changed his story several times. The Ohio appellate court held that this claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it could have been raised on direct appeal and was inappropriate in a post-conviction proceeding. See Beuke, 1991 WL 155219, at . Beuke again asserted a Brady claim in his habeas petition, identifying numerous pieces of favorable evidence that the government did not disclose prior to trial, including the list of other suspects and inconsistent statements by Michael Cahill. After filing his petition, Beuke claimed that he had discovered more suppressed evidence, so he filed two motions to expand the record and a motion for leave to conduct further discovery. In these motions, Beuke sought to compel the production of, among other things, all Michael Cahill's recorded statements. The district court denied Beuke's request to expand the record or compel discovery because Beuke should have made this evidence part of the record in state court and, in any event, none of the proffered evidence involved a fact that was material to his conviction. Despite denying Beuke's motions, the district court admitted four documents that Beuke proffered to the court: (1) a transcript of David Pierce's interview with the police (which allegedly contradicted Cahill's testimony), (2) a transcript of Rick Polly's interview with the police (which allegedly contradicted Cahill's testimony), (3) a written summary of an interview between FBI agents and Michael Cahill, and (4) documents showing Robert Craig's criminal history. In a subsequent order, the district court held that Beuke procedurally defaulted his Brady claim because he failed to raise it on direct appeal. On appeal, Beuke argues that the prosecution's failure to disclose this favorable evidence constitutes the cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default of his Brady claim. A habeas petitioner can show cause where he failed to raise a constitutional issue because it was reasonably unknown to him at the time. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 100 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). Because the State does not directly dispute cause, we will assume, without deciding, that the prosecution's withholding of exculpatory or impeachment evidence caused Beuke to default his Brady claim. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (finding that the government's withholding of exculpatory evidence, combined with two other factors not present here, were sufficient to constitute cause). Our analysis, therefore, turns on the issue of prejudice. Prejudice, for purposes of procedural default analysis, requires a showing that the default of the claim not merely created a possibility of prejudice to the defendant, but that it worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimensions. Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380, 388 (6th Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170-71, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). Procedural default analysis on the issue of prejudice mirrors Brady materiality analysis, see id., so in determining whether Beuke has procedurally defaulted his Brady claim, we will follow the Supreme Court's example and proceed under a Brady materiality analysis. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936. When engaging in Brady materiality analysis, we find that [t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. A `reasonable probability' of a different result is . . . shown when the government's evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). In reviewing for materiality, we consider the cumulative effect of the undisclosed evidence, not each item in isolation. Id. at 436, 105 S.Ct. 3375. On appeal, Beuke presents nine pieces of evidence that he alleges the prosecution failed to disclose in violation of Brady : (1) inconsistent statements that Cahill made to the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department and to the grand jury; [3] (2) inconsistent statements that Cahill made to the FBI; (3) FBI documents indicating that one of the prosecution's witnesses (who Beuke believes to be Cahill) was a paid informant; (4) FBI documents showing that Cahill was under investigation for child pornography offenses; (5) Rick Polly's statements that contradicted Cahill's testimony; (6) Wahoff's and Graham's initial description of their assailants, neither of which matched Beuke's physical appearance; (7) a list of other criminal suspects investigated by the police; (8) an investigating officer's handwritten notes suggesting that Wahoff was shot by a gun different from that used to shoot Craig and Graham; and (9) records disclosing Craig's criminal history. [4] Beuke contends that the first five pieces of undisclosed evidence could have impeached the credibility of Michael Cahill, that Wahoff's and Graham's initial description of their assailants could have impeached their in-court identifications of Beuke, and that Craig's criminal history could have contradicted the angelic picture the prosecution painted of the victim. But Beuke does not indicate how the prosecution's failure to disclose the list of other criminal suspects or the investigating officer's handwritten notes caused him prejudice at trial. We begin with the heart of Beuke's Brady claim, which is the undisclosed evidence that would have been useful for impeaching Michael Cahill. Cahill testified that Beuke told him the story of how he killed Robert Craig, and Cahill relayed the details of this story to the jury. Beuke contends that Cahill's inconsistent statements could have been used to impeach his testimony, but he does not highlight any inconsistencies between Cahill's prior statements and his testimony at trial. Importantly, Beuke does not allege that Cahill presented inconsistent testimony on an important issue of guilt, such as Beuke's confession to killing Craig, but merely that Cahill's inconsistencies on tangential issues  as well as other evidence such as the FBI's investigation of Cahill for child pornography  undermine his overall credibility. We doubt that this evidence would do much to undermine Cahill's testimony relating Beuke's confession. But even if we were to assume that this undisclosed evidence would have tarnished Cahill's credibility beyond repair, it does not negate or even diminish the substantial objective evidence of Beuke's guilt. Beuke emphasizes the importance of Cahill's testimony by asserting that the prosecution's proof of Craig's murder was dependent upon the credibility of Cahill's testimony. The record discloses a different story, however, because it is clear that the prosecution presented other concrete evidence, in addition to Cahill's testimony, linking Beuke to Craig's murder. This objective evidence includes the officers' discovery of Beuke's fingerprints in Craig's car and forensic evidence indicating that the bullets removed from Craig's body were fired from Beuke's gun. Thus, contrary to Beuke's assertions, Cahill's testimony was not the central piece of evidence holding together an otherwise feeble case, but was merely one piece of a cumulative evidentiary puzzle. We find that because the objective evidence sufficiently linked Beuke to Craig's murder, the suppressed evidence undermining Cahill's credibility does not tend to undermine our confidence in the jury's verdict. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 293-94, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (refusing to find prejudice where the record contained considerable forensic and other physical evidence linking petitioner to the crime, because this objective evidence indicated that the petitioner would have been convicted . . ., even if [the witness] had been severely impeached by the undisclosed evidence). Cf. Jamison, 291 F.3d at 391 (finding prejudice where, unlike here, the undisclosed evidence would have impeached vital prosecution testimony, leaving only one piece of highly suspect physical evidence upon which to base the conviction); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (finding Brady materiality satisfied where, unlike here, `the essence of the State's case' was the testimony of eyewitnesses). The other undisclosed evidence does not bolster Beuke's claim of materiality under Brady. Beuke does not provide this court with Wahoff's and Graham's initial descriptions of their assailants, and we cannot determine how far afield their descriptions may have been. In any event, we are hard-pressed to believe that an inaccurate sketch or physical description would undermine an in-court identification by victims who had lengthy exposures to their assailant, during which each of them endured a prolonged car ride with a gun pointed directly at him. Moreover, Beuke does not establish, and we do not see, how the outcome of his trial was prejudiced by the prosecution's failure to disclose a list of other criminal suspects, Craig's criminal record, or the investigating officer's handwritten notes. Considering as we must the cumulative effect of all nine pieces of undisclosed evidence, we find that Beuke has failed to establish a reasonable probability that the disclosure of this evidence would have altered the result of this proceeding. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Because this evidence is not material under Brady, Beuke cannot show prejudice to excuse procedural default. See Jamison, 291 F.3d at 388. And because Beuke cannot establish prejudice to excuse his procedurally defaulted Brady claim, we affirm the district court's dismissal of that claim.