Opinion ID: 1863568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conversion of a Property Deed

Text: Count IV of the plaintiffs' complaint alleged the following: that in July 1984, Virginia issued a deed to Charlie conveying certain real property (a pecan grove of approximately 34 acres); that Charlie accepted the conveyance and kept a copy of the notarized deed in his possession; that the original deed was kept by Virginia, strictly for safekeeping purposes; that Charlie assumed possession of the real property; that after Virginia's death Charlie informed Waddell of the deed and conveyance and delivered to Waddell his copy of the deed; and that Waddell, on behalf of himself, Georgia, and Virginia's estate, wrongfully exercised dominion over the deed and informed Charlie that the deed had been voided and that the property was not Charlie's. Charlie alleged that the defendants' actions constitute wrongful conversion of the deed. Charlie acknowledges that Virginia never physically delivered the original deed to him and that delivery of a deed cannot normally occur after the death of the grantor. However, he argues that the law should recognize that delivery can be made by the executor of the grantor's estate, when the deed is found by the executor in the grantor's safe deposit box. Citing Duncan v. Johnson, 338 So.2d 1243 (Ala.1976), and other cases, Charlie also argues that the law does not require actual delivery of a deed from a grantor to the grantee, but that delivery is to be determined by whether the acts of the parties to the deed manifest an intent by the grantor to divest himself of title to the property. Thus, he argues that Virginia's act of giving him the copy of the deed and telling him he could have the property [3] constituted a valid delivery of title to him and that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment as to this claim. In response, the defendants simply argue that delivery of a deed from a grantor to the grantee is an absolute necessity for a transfer of title to real property, that such delivery cannot occur after the death of the grantor, and that Virginia never delivered the deed to Charlie. They contend that the trial court correctly entered the summary judgment on this claim. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines a deed as [a] conveyance of realty; a writing signed by grantor, whereby title to realty is transferred from one to another. Generally, a deed is ineffective to transfer title if the deed is not delivered from the grantor to the grantee. West v. West, 620 So.2d 640 (Ala.1993); Williams v. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc., 457 So.2d 962 (Ala.1984). Moreover, there is no delivery where a deed was not given to the grantee during the grantor's lifetime, but was given to a third party for safekeeping. Chandler v. Chandler, 409 So.2d 780 (Ala.1981). However, Alabama law recognizes that the question of whether a deed has been delivered is a question of fact, to be ascertained from the surrounding circumstances and the actions of the parties. West, supra; Duncan, supra; and Chandler, supra. Physical delivery of the deed from the grantor to the grantee is not necessary where the facts clearly indicate that the intention of the grantor, by words or acts or both, was to transfer title of the property to the grantee. West, supra; Boohaker v. Brashier, 428 So.2d 627 (Ala.1983); Chandler, supra; Duncan, supra; and Williams v. Dent, 233 Ala. 109, 170 So. 202 (1936). Having reviewed Charlie's affidavit, along with the affidavits of his wife Lori, Irene Glover, Viola Culver, Miriam Prince, Espy Andrews, and Sam Chandler, [4] we conclude that questions of material fact exist as to whether Virginia delivered the July 1984 deed to Charlie by her words and/or acts and that Charlie supported his conversion claim with substantial evidence requiring determination by a jury. The trial court erred in entering the summary judgment as to this count.