Opinion ID: 1784340
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue: Whether a Manslaughter Instruction Was Warranted?

Text: The trial judge granted Holland's instruction on the lesser-included offense of murder. Vol. I, at 143. But he refused Holland's three manslaughter instructions. Id. at 153-56; Vol. XIII, at 2310-12. These instructions refer to Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-47 (1972): Every other killing of a human being, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, and without authority of law, not provided for in this title, shall be manslaughter.
Holland contends that his instructions should have been granted because a legally-sufficient evidentiary basis existed. He contends that a manslaughter instruction was tantamount to resolving the conflict between his theory that Krystal's death was accidental and the State's theory that Krystal's death could not have been accidental. Appellant's Brief at 37-40. The State counters that, in view of the evidence, it cannot agree that a jury could have ever found that Holland did not intend to murder Krystal. The State contends that the least crime that [Holland] could have been found guilty of ... is that of murder  on which the trial judge instructed. Appellee's Brief at 26-29.
Mississippi law on granting instructions on lesser-included offenses is clear. Trial judges should be mindful of the disparity in maximum punishments which may be imposed upon conviction of the principal offense or upon the lesser[-included] offense. Boyd v. State, 557 So.2d 1178, 1181 (Miss. 1989). As a general rule, where the disparity is great this Court has required lesser included instructions to be given. Id. (citing Griffin v. State, 533 So.2d 444, 447 (Miss. 1988)). This general rule is tempered somewhat; trial judges cannot indiscriminately give a lesser included offense instruction. Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 22 (Miss. 1990) (citing Boyd, 557 So.2d at 1181). Basically, a lesser-included-offense instruction should be granted if, in view of the evidence, a reasonable juror `could find the defendant not guilty of the principal offense charged in the indictment yet guilty of the lesser included offense.' Mease v. State, 539 So.2d 1324, 1330 (Miss. 1989) (quoting Monroe v. State, 515 So.2d 860, 863 (Miss. 1987)); see Stringer v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1108, 1115 (5th Cir.1988) (rejecting Stringer's new complaint that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of non-capital murder or manslaughter, the Fifth Circuit held that he introduced no evidence on which the jury rationally could have found him guilty of a lesser offense and acquitted him of the greater offense); Swanier v. State, 473 So.2d 180, 188 (Miss. 1985) (where the evidence does not warrant a manslaughter instruction, one should not be given); Fairckild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 799-802 (Miss. 1984) (defendant entitled to simple murder instruction, but not to manslaughter instruction). Conversely, [o]nly where the evidence could only justify a conviction of the principal charge should a lesser[-included] offense instruction be refused. Mease, 539 So.2d at 1330. In sum, a lesser included offense instruction must be granted where a reasonable juror could not on the evidence exclude the lesser-included offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Boyd, 557 So.2d at 1182 (citation omitted).
Holland contends that the record contains evidence that the injuries Krystal sustained were the consequence of an unfortunate accident. For support, Holland cites statements he had made about an accidental stabbing to his roommate, Douglas, and to detectives during his taped confession. Holland believes that these statements warranted a manslaughter instruction. Holland is mistaken. The statements he had made to Douglas were not even consistent: DOUGLAS: [He] gave me two different stories ... about what happened. Q.: You said it was about five minutes between [his telling you] the first story and ... the second . ..? Douglas: Right. ... . [According to the first story, h]e said that they [were in the bedroom and] she was playing around with a knife and that she accidentally scratched him across his belly or chest ... with the tip of the knife. ... . He said that he went to take the knife away from her and some how it wound up in her chest. ... . [According to the second story,] they were wrestling around on the bed, playing around, and she rolled off the bed and fell onto the knife. Vol. IX, at 1543-51; State's Exh. 1, at 4. During his taped confession, Holland related yet another story: I grabbed [Krystal's] wrist and I was going to take [the knife] away from her ... and I bumped into her chest and she says `I'm dead.' State's Exh. 8, at 3. Clearly, these inconsistent statements do not constitute a legally sufficient evidentiary predicate for a Section 97-3-[47] manslaughter instruction. Mease, 539 So.2d at 1324. Conversely, the State successfully repudiated Holland's accident theory. Of all the evidence discoverable in the record the most damaging derives from the unrebutted testimony of McGarry, whose autopsy revealed that the stab wound could not have been inflicted under any one of the inconsistent scenarios related by Holland to Douglas and the detectives. McGARRY: [T]he wound produced in Krystal King's body was one [caused] by a violent thrust of the knife against ... her chest with enough violence to indent the front of her chest. This would not happen if she were struck by an accidental movement or casual movement by the knife. Vol. XII, at 2177-80. The evidence in this case could only justify a conviction of the principal charge (capital murder) or the lesser-included offense (murder) and, therefore, the even lesser-included offense (manslaughter) was properly deleted from the instructions. Id. at 1330. See this Court's opinion in Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803 (Miss. 1987). [19] Assume arguendo that Holland's unsubstantiated theory were true. Assume, for example, that Krystal had been waving the knife around in a playful manner; that Holland prudently but unsuccessfully attempted to take the knife from her to avert potential injury; and that Krystal died when she rolled off the bed and onto the knife. This scenario alone would not constitute evidence of the crime of manslaughter; rather, it would constitute evidence of innocence of any crime. Holland wouldn't even be guilty of simple negligence. [20] In sum, the record contains no evidence of absence of malice  the principle element of manslaughter. The evidence, however, only supports a conviction of the greater offense. Mackbee, 575 So.2d at 23. Restated, Holland failed to compose a convincing argument evincing a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a rational or a reasonable juror `could find the defendant not guilty of the principal offense charged in the indictment yet guilty of the lesser included offense.' Mease, 539 So.2d at 1330 (quoting Monroe v. State, 515 So.2d 860, 863 (Miss. 1987)). The trial judge did grant an instruction on the lesser-included offense of murder; he could have acted cautiously and granted the manslaughter instruction. In view of the evidence, however, the judge's refusal should be deemed proper. See Boyd, 557 So.2d at 1178 (For some unknown reason, our competent and able trial judges continue to refuse instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence warrants them. This in essence allows the jury to hear the defendant's side of the story... . [However,] the trial judge cannot indiscriminately give the instructions.).