Opinion ID: 155684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States as Indispensable Party

Text: 13 The Tribe argues the United States and/or the Secretary of the Interior are indispensable parties, in whose absence the State's counterclaim seeking a declaration of Compact invalidity must be dismissed. The Tribe concedes that it did not raise this issue in the district court, but asserts that it can properly be raised anytime. We agree that the issue of indispensability can be raised at any time. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 104 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir.1997) ([T]he issue of indispensability is one which the court has an independent duty to raise sua sponte....). However, we note that the Tribe raises the claim of indispensability only after receiving an unfavorable ruling in the district court. See Keweenaw Bay Indian Comm. v. United States, 940 F.Supp. 1139, 1143 (W.D.Mich.1996) (observing that the federal defendants elected ... to wait for a decision, and now seek to claim that the State is essential after receiving a construction of the Compact with which they disagree). We nonetheless consider the issue, and reject the Tribe's argument that the United States is indispensable. As we have recently observed: 14 Determining whether an absent party is indispensable requires a two-part analysis. The court must first determine under Rule 19(a) whether the party is necessary to the suit and must therefore be joined if joinder is feasible. If the absent party is necessary but cannot be joined, the court must then determine under Rule 19(b) whether the party is indispensable. 15 Rishell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Mem'l Med. Ctr., 94 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir.1996) (citations omitted), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1331, 137 L.Ed.2d 491 (1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1427, 137 L.Ed.2d 536 (1997). To determine whether a party is necessary, we consider three factors: 16 (1) whether complete relief would be available to the parties already in the suit, (2) whether the absent party has an interest related to the suit which as a practical matter would be impaired, and (3) whether a party already in the suit would be subjected to a substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations. 17 Id. Assuming the United States is necessary, and cannot be joined, since it cannot be sued without consenting, we would only dismiss the State's counterclaim, as the Tribe urges us to do, if we find that the United States is also indispensable. 18 Rule 19(b) sets out factors for determining whether a person or entity is indispensable: 19 [F]irst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 20 Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b). We have recognized that: 21 [T]he Supreme Court requires a court addressing the issue for the first time on appeal to view the Rule 19 factors entirely from an appellate perspective, considering a victorious plaintiff's interest in preserving his judgment, the defendant's failure to assert his interest, the interest of the outsider, and the interest of the courts and society in judicial efficiency. 22 Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 890, 894 (10th Cir.1989) (citing Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-11, 88 S.Ct. 733, 737-39, 19 L.Ed.2d 936 (1968)); see also 7 Charles Alan Wright, et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1609 (2d ed.1986). 23 The Tribe's argument is that the United States is indispensable to a determination of the validity of a compact purportedly entered into by the State and the Tribe. We disagree. The United States is not a party to the Compact; while Secretary Babbitt approved the Compact, that approval, as we held in Pueblo of Santa Ana, did not and, under IGRA, could not, alter its validity or non-validity under state law. If we affirm the district court's determination that the Compact is invalid under state law, the United States cannot later challenge that conclusion. We perceive no prejudice to anyone from the absence of the United States, and the subject of the counterclaim--the validity of the Compact--was fully and fairly presented without the presence of the United States as a party. Moreover, viewed from the appellate perspective, the State has won on the issue of the Compact's validity, neither the Tribe nor the United States heretofore indicated that the presence of the United States was necessary in this case, and the interests of judicial efficiency counsel strongly against dismissing this action at this point. Accordingly, the absence of the United States as a party does not require dismissal of the State's counterclaim.