Opinion ID: 1859626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Engaging in the Defense of Persons in Criminal Matters and Prosecuting Persons Who Were Clients.

Text: A. Butler representation. In count II, the Board alleged that Zenor prosecuted a speeding case against Robert Merrell Butler while representing Butler on the same speeding case and on a divorce case in another county. The Board alleged this conduct violated several provisions of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility. These included DR 8-101(B) (County attorneys and assistant county attorneys shall not engage in the defense of an accused in any criminal matter during the time they are holding this public office.); DR 5-101(A) (Except with the consent of the client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of the client will be or reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own financial, business, property, or personal interests.); DR 5-105(B) (A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment....), (C) (A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the representation of another client....); DR 9-101(B) (A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which the lawyer had substantial responsibility while a public employee.); and DR 1-102(A)(1), (5). In early 2000 Butler came to Zenor for legal services concerning Butler's divorce case. It was a long and difficult case that was dismissed at one point and refiled later. At the time of the hearing before the Commission, a modification was pending in the divorce case. Zenor worked on matters in the divorce case as they arose and billed Butler for the work. In 2002 Butler was charged with a federal firearms charge. Another attorney represented Butler on this charge. However, Zenor did some research on the case and billed Butler for the work. In November 2002 the State filed a bad check charge against Butler in Jefferson County, Iowa. On Butler's behalf, Zenor called the prosecutor on the case to inquire about that office's standard deal for this type of charge and relayed this information to Butler. In November 2002 Butler was charged in Clay County with speeding. The Clay County Attorney's office prosecuted the charge. On December 9, 2002, Zenor had a meeting with Dean Jalas, the state trooper who ticketed Butler. Zenor billed Butler for this meeting, but testified he later refunded the money. On December 11, 2002, Zenor entered a not guilty plea on Butler's behalf on the Clay County charge. On March 6, 2003, Butler pleaded guilty to an amended charge of cowl-lamp violation. Zenor testified that he was at a meeting in Minnesota on that date and did not appear in court. On March 17, 2003, Zenor wrote a letter to the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) on behalf of Butler, appealing the suspension of Butler's driver's license. Later, Zenor withdrew the request for a contested hearing concerning the suspension. From early 2003 through August 2004, Zenor provided legal assistance to Butler on various charged violations of the Iowa Department of Natural Resources rules. Butler was billed for the time Zenor worked on the charges. The Commission found that Zenor violated DR 8-101(B); DR 9-101(B); DR 5-101(A); DR 5-105(B, C); and DR 1-102(A)(1), (5). For reasons that follow we agree. Zenor's representation of Butler while Zenor prosecuted Butler's speeding ticket violated DR 8-101(B), which prohibits a county attorney from engaging in the defense of an accused in any criminal matter. Zenor met with the ticketing officer, presumably to get the officer's agreement to amend the speeding charge to a cowl-lamp violation. Thereafter Zenor entered a not guilty plea for Butler. Later, Zenor involved himself in the process of amending the speeding charge to a cowl-lamp violation. The fact that Zenor refunded money to Butler for the meeting with the officer fails to convince us that Zenor did not represent Butler on the speeding charge. Additionally, Zenor's participation in both the prosecution and defense of the speeding ticket is a violation of DR 5-105(B), which requires a lawyer to decline proffered employment if the exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of proffered employment and DR 5-105(C), which prohibits a lawyer from continuing multiple employment if the exercise of professional independent judgment on behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the representation of another client. Zenor could not have rendered independent professional judgment on behalf of either client when representing opposing sides with opposing interests. See Howe, 706 N.W.2d at 373 (finding that city attorney violated DR 5-105(B) by prosecuting defendant on city charges while at the same time he was seeking to have the identical charges dismissed on behalf of defendant). Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility concerns a lawyer's duty to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client and states in part: The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of the client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute a lawyer's loyalty to a client. EC 5-1 (emphasis added). Even though the ethical considerations are aspirational and not mandatory, Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Carty, 515 N.W.2d 32, 34-35 (Iowa 1994), Canon 5 does get to the heart of conflict-of-interests violations. It is inconceivable to us that in representing both the State and the criminal defendant on the same charge that one could be free of compromising influences and loyalties, EC 5-1. Nor does it seem possible that in engaging in this practice that the interests of other clients, EC 5-1, would not influence the attorney. The principle underlying Ethical Canon 5 is that a lawyer should not represent parties with differing interests. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Wagner, 599 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Iowa 1999). Differing interests is defined as includ[ing] every interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest. Iowa Code of Prof'l Responsibility for Lawyers, Definition 2. Furthermore, the mere possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment prevents a lawyer from representing clients with opposing interests. Wagner, 599 N.W.2d at 726. Zenor's clientsthe State and Butlerhad differing interests and undertaking representation of both at the same time did more than raise the mere possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment. Id.