Opinion ID: 2516527
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1986 Tort Reform Act Modified the Definition of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability Actions to Include Ordinary Negligence.

Text: In 1986 the Alaska Legislature passed the Tort Reform Act. Modeled after the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, the Tort Reform Act was intended to to create a more equitable distribution of the cost and risk of injury and increase the availability and affordability of insurance. [27] The legislature hoped to reduce the costs of the tort system while still ensuring that adequate and appropriate compensation for persons injured through the fault of others remained available. [28] As part of the Act, the legislature enacted a rule of comparative fault similar to the doctrine of comparative negligence which this court had adopted a decade earlier: In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to a person or harm to property, contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionally the amount awarded as compensatory damages for the injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery. [29] The Act defined fault as acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent, reckless, or intentional toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to avoid injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault. [30] The question before us is whether these two provisions modified the existing case law on comparative negligence in products liability cases. We conclude that they did. The Act clearly applies to strict products liability cases. The Act applies to tort actions based on fault. [31] Fault is defined to include, counter-intuitively, acts or omissions... that subject a person to strict liability. [32] Products liability cases in Alaska are typically based on a strict liability theory. [33] Thus the Act applies to strict products liability actions. The Act's definition of comparative fault is broader than the comparative fault recognized in pre-1986 strict products liability cases. Our pre-1986 products liability cases limit comparative fault to instances of product misuse and unreasonable assumption of risk. [34] But, in addition to misuse of product and unreasonable assumption of risk, the Act also defines fault as including acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent [or] reckless.... [35] Thus, the Act modifies the pre-1986 products liability case law by expanding the type of conduct that will trigger a proportional reduction of damages to include ordinary negligenceacts or omissions that are in any measure negligent. The Act's modification of comparative negligence in strict products liability cases reflects a general trend occurring across the nation. [36] The recently published Third Restatement of Torts, Products Liability, observes that a strong majority of courts now apply comparative negligence principles in strict products liability cases. [37] Moreover, most of these courts do not limit comparative negligence to instances of product misuse or unreasonable and voluntary assumption of risk. Instead, they allow a plaintiff's ordinary negligence to constitute comparative fault. In addition, legislatures in other states have enacted tort reform statutes similar to the one here, incorporating a universal definition of contributory fault for all tort cases, including strict products liability cases. [38] Courts in other jurisdictions have generally interpreted these statutes as incorporating an ordinary negligence framework into the comparative fault analysis in strict liability cases. [39] Smith argues that the Alaska Legislature did not intend the Act to modify the existing products liability case law on comparative negligence. But Smith's only support for this argument is the difference between the definition of contributory fault contained in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act-the model for Alaska's tort reformand the definition actually adopted by the Alaska Legislature. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act defines contributory fault as follows: In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded under applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear chance. [40] The Alaska Legislature adopted this definition verbatim into the 1986 Tort Reform Act with the exception of the last sentence which it omitted. [41] Smith argues that this omission is significant because it indicates the legislature's desire not to change the prior existing law, including the prior existing law on comparative negligence in products liability cases. This argument has some plausibility. But we think a more likely explanation of why the legislature omitted this particular sentence is that it was simply not relevant when the Tort Reform Act was enacted. In 1986 an Alaska claimant's contributory fault was not a defense in the sense meant by this sentence, nor was last clear chance a basis for disregarding contributory fault. [42] The Uniform Comparative Fault Act was written to apply to all of the states of the United States. As of 1977, when the Uniform Act was proposed, only nine states had adopted the pure form of comparative fault proposed in the model act. [43] But Alaska was one of the nine. The sentence in question would serve no purpose here and it seems likely that this is why the legislature did not adopt it.