Opinion ID: 795316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Removal of Counsel

Text: 35 Edelmann's second argument is that the district court violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel by removing attorney Clay as her chosen trial counsel based upon the potential conflict posed by his being the subject of a fraud investigation by the same United States Attorney's office that indicted Edelmann. In response, the government contends that the district court correctly decided to remove Clay as Edelmann's counsel only after Edelmann declined to waive an actual conflict of interest. 36 We review issues regarding the disqualification of attorneys de novo. United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 399 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir.2005), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). 37 A non-indigent criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights encompass the right to be represented by the attorney selected by the defendant. Id. at 928. The general rule is that defendants are free to employ counsel of their own choice and the courts are afforded little leeway in interfering with that choice. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 38 However, the right to retain counsel of one's choice is not absolute. Id. at 929 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The right to choice of counsel must not obstruct orderly judicial procedure or deprive courts of their inherent power to control the administration of justice. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, courts must balance the defendant's right to counsel of his own choosing against the court's interest in the administration of justice. Id. 39 Additionally, [t]he right to counsel's undivided loyalty is a critical component of the right to assistance of counsel; when counsel is burdened by a conflict of interest, he deprives his client of his Sixth Amendment right as surely as if he failed to appear at trial. Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1044, 110 S.Ct. 1506, 108 L.Ed.2d 641 (1990). Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment includes the `right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.' Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981)). When an attorney has a conflict of interest, that attorney violates his duty of loyalty to his client and fails to provide effective assistance of counsel. Id. 40 [I]f a defendant establishes that her attorney has a potential conflict of interest, in order to prove that the conflict resulted in a violation of her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, she must demonstrate prejudice. However, prejudice is presumed when a defendant establishes that her attorney had an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected the attorney's performance. United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir.1994). An actual conflict occurs when, during the course of the representation, the attorney's and the defendant's interest diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action. Id. In Levy, the Second Circuit found that an attorney's prosecution on unrelated criminal charges by the same office prosecuting the defendant presented actual conflict concerns, stating: 41 [The attorney] may have believed he had an interest in tempering his defense of [the defendant] in order to curry favor with the prosecution, perhaps fearing that a spirited defense of [the defendant] would prompt the Government to pursue the case against [him] with greater vigor. Though [the attorney] was sentenced before [the defendant's] trial began, the pendency of the charges against [the attorney] created a conflict for the lawyer in properly representing [the defendant] during the pretrial stage of [the defendant's case], as the Government noted in its January 5, 1990, letter. 42 Id. at 156; see also Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir.1992) (stating that a situation in which the criminal defendant's counsel is under criminal investigation can create a conflict of interest because [i]t may induce the lawyer to pull his punches in defending his client lest the prosecutor's office be angered by an acquittal and retaliate against the lawyer). 43 Whenever the court's inquiry reveals that a criminal defendant's attorney in fact suffers from an actual or potential conflict, the court has a subsequent `disqualification/waiver' obligation. Levy, 25 F.3d at 153. If the court discovers that the attorney suffers from a severe conflict—such that no rational defendant would knowingly and intelligently desire the conflicted lawyer's representation—the court is obligated to disqualify the attorney. Id. If the conflict is only a potential conflict—such that a rational defendant could knowingly and intelligently desire the conflicted lawyer's representation— the court should obtain from the defendant a valid waiver of his right to a non-conflicted lawyer. Id. If, however, the court finds that no conflict exists at all, the court has no further obligation. Id. 44 When the court asks the defendant whether he will waive the conflict, the defendant must be aware of the conflict, realize the consequences to his defense that continuing with counsel under the onus of a conflict could have, and also be aware that he has the right to obtain other counsel. United States v. Levine, 794 F.2d 1203, 1206 (7th Cir.1986). Because a defendant may waive his right to counsel, the defendant may also waive the right to counsel free from serious conflicts of interest. Id. 45 Here, after the government advised the district court of Clay's potential conflict of interest, the court properly inquired as to whether a conflict of interest existed. The court determined that the government's investigation of Clay constituted an actual conflict of interest. This finding was reasonable and consistent with Levy and Thompkins because Clay was the subject of a fraud investigation—the same type of claim for which Edelmann was being prosecuted—by the same United States Attorney's office that prosecuted Edelmann. Under Levy and Thompkins, such an investigation would subject Clay to a conflict of interest, whether we refer to it as actual or potential. 46 After determining a conflict existed, the district court appropriately sought to obtain a waiver from Edelmann. The district court afforded Edelmann a recess to determine whether she would waive the conflict even though Edelmann had been aware of the conflict for over a week. When Edelmann refused to waive the conflict, the district court acted reasonably in removing Clay as Edelmann's counsel.