Opinion ID: 1856206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right to Call Witnesses at a Disciplinary Hearing.

Text: In Fichtner v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 285 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1979), we discussed in detail prisoners' due process rights at a disciplinary hearing. These rights are mandated by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). `In sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.'... `Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.' Fichtner, 285 N.W.2d at 756 (quoting Wolff ). But we went on to say that [o]n the other hand, occupants of penal institutions, although prisoners, are persons, and they are not beyond the pale of the Constitution. Prison officials must not permit a disciplinary proceeding against such a person to be a mere gesture or a sham. The person has a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Id. Specifically, a prisoner has a due process right at a disciplinary hearing to call witnesses and present written evidence. Id. at 757. This right, however, is not unlimited. The prisoner should be allowed to `call witnesses ... in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.' Id. (quoting Wolff ). Following the Supreme Court's suggestion in Wolff, we have recommended, without actually requiring, that the authorities offer reasons for refusing a prisoner's request to call witnesses: If the officers refuse to call witnesses, they would be well advised to indicate their reason in their decision; otherwise they run increased risk that their refusal may appear unjustified under the particular circumstances. Id. at 759. Under Wolff, however, the prisoner does not have a due process right to confront or cross-examine witnesses. Fichtner, 285 N.W.2d at 758 (citing Wolff ). The Supreme Court reasoned that `[c]onfrontation and cross-examination present greater hazards to institutional interests. If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence against the inmate were allowed as a matter of course, as in criminal trials, there would be considerable havoc inside the prison walls.' Fichtner, 285 N.W.2d at 758 (quoting Wolff ). We explained in Fichtner that a prisoner may question the evidence against him to the extent that he may personally respond to the contents of the report and produce evidence in support of his position. Id. at 759. We recognized, however, that Wolff does not give a prisoner the right to be confronted by opposing witnesses. Id. Hence, an inmate has a due process right under some circumstances to call witnesses. In addition, prison rule III(D)(6) provides that an inmate shall be permitted to offer evidence supporting his case, including... the calling of witnesses. This rule was clearly intended to effectuate the rights of prisoners mandated by Wolff and Fichtner. We think the key to resolving the witness issues in these cases is the status of the requested witness. In Wolff the Supreme Court said that a prisoner should be allowed to call witnesses `in his defense.' Fichtner, 285 N.W.2d at 757 (emphasis added) (quoting Wolff ). The prison rule in question uses a similar phrase: the inmate shall be permitted to offer evidence supporting his case.  (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, concerning the lack of a right of confrontation, we have spoken in terms of  opposing witnesses. Fichtner, 285 N.W.2d at 759 (emphasis added). In their arguments on the witness issue, both inmates recognize that they have no due process rights to confront or cross-examine witnesses and that the authorities may refuse to call witnesses for reasons such as safety or irrelevance. In the case of Mahers, who wanted to call other inmates as witnesses, the limited nature of the evidence against himonly the officer's reportmade the possible testimony of his witnesses relevant. Such witnesses, in expanding on their written statements while testifying, might clarify what Mahers was doing at the time of the fire. Their statements do not touch on that time period. No security problem was cited by the authorities. In addition, the inmates in question had not been used to present evidence against Mahers, so no potential for cross-examination existed. We think the circumstances in Mahers' case justified his request for the witnesses. Accordingly, we must reverse the district court's denial of postconviction relief. As to Leonard's claim, the case for allowing the requested witnesses to be called is considerably weaker. He wanted to call prison employees who had prepared disciplinary reports against him. Hence, calling them as witnesses would present the possibility that Leonard would try to cross-examine them, which he has no right to do. Leonard claims, however, that he wanted to elicit new information from them, instead of merely discrediting their written statements. He offers a plausible suggestion regarding the prevention of cross-examination: the district court could simply halt the witnesses' testimony if cross-examination occurred. In addition, he argues that under the district court's reasoning, the authorities could completely eliminate a prisoner's right to call witnesses by simply treating all potential witnesses as their own. For example, he suggests that the authorities might take statements from all potential witnesses before a request from the prisoner to use them. Leonard's arguments present the drawbacks of using witness status as a bright line, as well as a plausible solution to the problem of potential cross-examination of an opposing witness. It might indeed be beneficial for the authorities to have more rather than less information on which to base their decisions concerning disciplinary action. But, as the Supreme Court said in Wolff, the greater hazards to institutional interests that are present when an accused prisoner is brought together with the accuser may counsel in favor of denying a prisoner the right to call a witness who has given information against the prisoner. It would not necessarily violate the Wolff rule against cross-examination to allow a prisoner to call a witness who has testified against that prisoner; there might be times when a prisoner could legitimately use an opposing witness to elicit entirely new and valuable information. The determination of whether an opposing witness could be used in such a way is a judgment call that should be left to the discretion of the prison authorities. We will not disturb their exercise of that discretion unless they have abused it. Here, Leonard has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion. He does not give any clear description of the new information he wanted to elicit from these witnesses. According to his testimony, he wanted to call the food service workers merely to clarify what [he] was doing and where [his] position was in the back room at the time. Unlike the witnesses in Mahers' case, Leonard's requested witnesses do not seem to have much to do with presenting his defense. Cross-examination was more likely his purpose in calling them. In view of these circumstances, we think the district court made the correct decision on this issue.