Opinion ID: 1791715
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Hall Offered Substantial Evidence of Subsequent Termination of Employment Based Solely Upon the Employee's On-the-Job Injury and the Filing of A Workers' Compensation Claim.

Text: Flint insists that Hall was not discharged because he had filed a workers' compensation claim, but that he was discharged because his absences were excessive and had become a problem for Flint. Flint maintains that the evidence showed that Hall worked far fewer hours than the other men working on the job in Bastrop, that some of Hall's absences could have been attributable to Hall's being at a gambling casino when he should have been working, and that his absences from work had been a problem during 1996, the year before he was discharged. Therefore, Flint concludes, Hall has not established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge because, it argues, retaliation was not the sole basis for Hall's discharge. Hall argues, however, that the facts are disputed as to whether Flint discharged him because he filed a workers' compensation claim or for some other reason. Circumstantial evidence of a causal connection between a workers' compensation claim and an employee's discharge is appropriate in a retaliatory-discharge action. Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co., 599 So.2d 1120 (Ala.1992). This Court identified in Aldridge certain factors that can be considered as circumstantial evidence of a causal connection between an employee's filing a workers' compensation claim and that employee's discharge. `1) knowledge of the compensation claim by those making the decision on termination, 2) expression of a negative attitude toward the employee's injured condition, 3) failure to adhere to established company policy, 4) discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly situated employees, 5) sudden changes in an employee's work performance evaluations following a workers' compensation claim, and 6) evidence that the stated reason for the discharge was false.' 854 So.2d at 564-65 (quoting Chhim v. University of Houston, 76 S.W.3d 210, 218 (Tex.Ct.App.2002)). Furthermore, we observed that [m]any states also consider `[p]roximity in time between the filing of the workers' compensation claim and discharge' a persuasive factor in establishing a causal connection. Aldridge, 854 So.2d at 565 (quoting Rebarchek v. Farmers Coop. Elevator & Mercantile Ass'n, 272 Kan. 546, 555, 35 P.3d 892, 899 (2001)). Several of the foregoing elements are present in this case. Hall was injured on April 7, 1997, and filed a worker's compensation claim shortly thereafter; he was discharged approximately two months later on June 4, 1997. As previously discussed, whether the decision-makers knew that Hall had injured his back at work was a jury question that the jury resolved in Hall's favor. In addition, Hall presented evidence the jury could have interpreted as indicating a negative attitude on the part of the decision-makers toward his injured condition. Hall testified that Grams had pointed out to him how much money his knee injuries had cost Flint. Hall also testified that he had experienced difficulty in obtaining authorization from Grams for both an appointment with a doctor and for medical tests requested by that doctor in an effort to diagnose the specific injury to his back so that appropriate treatment could be started. Whether Flint's stated reason for Hall's discharge was false was also a jury question that the jury resolved in Hall's favor. The jury had before it not only contradictory testimony from witnesses who testified, but also the evidence about the various reasons Flint proffered for Hall's discharge. A review of the record reflects not only that the evidence concerning the critical issue of why Hall was discharged is far from clear, but also that Flint's reasons shifted and changed with time, especially after Hall instituted this litigation. Initially, Flint told both Hall and the Georgia Department of Labor that Hall was discharged because it had no work for him to do, despite the fact that the Bastrop project had not been completed when Hall was discharged. After Hall initiated this action against Flint, the decision-makers testified in depositions. In their depositions, Good, Fuller, and James Eaves all said that Hall was discharged for two reasons because he had expressed a preference for construction work over installing plastic pipe and no construction work was available, and because of his poor attendance on the job. Good stated that he did not recall giving Hall permission in January 1996 to take some time off while work was slow in order to allow his knee to heal. The decision-makers all testified that they did not know the reasons for Hall's extended absence during the early part of 1996, that his attendance had been a problem for Flint for some time, and that his leaving work early and missing work on the Bastrop project created morale problems with the other employees on that job, many of whom were working seven days a week. James Eaves testified at length about the problems he said were caused by what he described as Hall's unexplained absences from job sites, stating that Hall often left a job site without telling anyone where he was going or why he was leaving. During their trial testimony, all three men insisted that during the meeting in which they decided to discharge Hall, they talked not only about his absences, but also his visiting a gambling casino while he should have been at work. James Eaves specifically stated that the last straw was when we found out that he was at the casino when he was supposed to be at work. On cross-examination, the decision-makers acknowledged that no one ever asked Hall whether he would be willing to work installing plastic pipe, as he had done in the past, if the construction work he said he preferred was not available. As previously noted, Good, Fuller, and James Eaves never mentioned in their depositions the issue of Hall's allegedly visiting a gambling casino while he should have been at work, even though they had been asked to state all the reasons that motivated his discharge. All continued to insist at trial that they had discussed the casino at the time of Hall's discharge and that Hall's presence there had been a factor in the decision to discharge him. Even though the decision-makers testified about the problems Hall's absences from job sites had caused, it is undisputed that there is no documentary evidence criticizing his work and that the only documentary evidence criticizing his attendance consists of the letters from Good and James Eaves written in 1996 and the memo from Kenneth Eaves written shortly before Hall was discharged in 1997. Indeed, the decision-makers testified that Hall did excellent work, although they qualified that description by adding when he was on the job, and confirmed that his work had not been criticized in any of his performance evaluations. In insisting that Hall had been discharged because Flint did not have any work [Hall] wanted to do and because of his poor attendance record, the decision-makers disavowed and thereby contradicted the reason Flint gave to the Georgia Department of Labor for Hall's dismissal that Hall had been discharged because of a lack of work. Good testified that the form had probably been completed by a clerical employee who was unaware of the actual reason for Hall's discharge, and that although most of the employees Flint discharged were discharged because of a lack of work, that was not true in Hall's case. It is axiomatic that it is the jury's province to resolve conflicts in testimony, Wright v. Mills, 590 So.2d 177 (Ala. 1991), and to judge the credibility of witnesses, Floyd v. Broughton, 664 So.2d 897 (Ala.1995). On proper instruction, a jury concluding that any witness was willfully not truthful about one material aspect of his or her testimony is free to disregard all or any part of the testimony. See Franklin v. Cannon, 565 So.2d 119, 121 (Ala. 1990). The trial court here charged the jury as follows: Now, you will be the sole and exclusive judges of the facts in this case. It will be your duty to attempt to reconcile the testimony of all the witnesses so as to make them all speak the truth, if this can be done reasonably. If you cannot reasonably reconcile all the testimony, it is then your duty to consider the testimony with the view of determining what the true facts are. Now, in determining what the true facts are from the evidence, you may take into consideration any natural interest or bias a witness may have as a result of any connection with the case. You may take into consideration the interest or bias a witness may have shown while testifying. You may take into consideration the demeanor of any witness, as to whether that witness has apparently testified frankly or evasively.... Now, you will be the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses. You may accept or reject any part of the testimony of any witness and you should accept only the testimony you consider worthy of belief. Now, if you find that any witness has willfully sworn falsely as to any material fact in the case, you may disregard the testimony of that witness in its entirety.  (Emphasis added.) If the jury believed that the decision-makers knew about Hall's back injury, then the jury also could have concluded that Flint discharged Hall from his employment because of that injury and because he had filed a workers' compensation claim and thereafter gave varying reasons for Hall's discharge in an effort to establish that his back injury and the fact that he had filed a workers' compensation claim either were not the reasons or were not the only reasons he was discharged.