Opinion ID: 2575997
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims of coerced testimony

Text: Defendant contends that his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial was violated by the admission into evidence of coerced testimony. He first challenges as coerced a statement to the police by Doreen Westbrook that defendant shot the victim. At trial, the prosecutor asked Sheriff Shadinger what he said to Westbrook and her response when she was arrested at the convenience store. When the defense interposed a hearsay objection, the prosecutor replied that the testimony was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but to explain the conduct of the police after Westbrook's arrest. The trial court admonished the jury to consider the testimony only for the limited purpose of showing what the officers did when they learned that Westbrook identified defendant as the person who had shot the victim. Sheriff Shadinger then testified that when he asked, [w]ho shot the guy in Maxwell? Westbrook replied Termite, defendant's nickname. The Attorney General argues that defendant may not claim on appeal that the testimony was inadmissible as coerced because he did not object at trial to its admission on that ground. (See People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 84, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) We agree. [A]s a general rule, `the failure to object to errors committed at trial relieves the reviewing court of the obligation to consider those errors on appeal.' [Citations.] This applies to claims based on statutory violations, as well as claims based on violations of fundamental constitutional rights. [Citations.] ( In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 198, 17 Cal. Rptr.3d 633, 95 P.3d 896.) This rule applies equally to any claim on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted, other than the stated ground for the objection at trial. When an objection is made to proposed evidence, the specific ground of the objection must be stated. The appellate court's review of the trial court's admission of evidence is then limited to the stated ground for the objection. (Evid. Code, ง 353.) Here, defendant objected at trial to the prosecutor's questions to Sheriff Shadinger on the ground of hearsay, not on the ground of coercion, the claim raised on appeal. Thus, the claim that Westbrook's statement to the police was coerced is not properly before us. In addition, Sheriff Shandinger's testimony was offered to explain the conduct of the police after the arrest, and the court immediately instructed the jury that the testimony was admitted not for its truth but only to show what the police did after learning that Westbrook had identified defendant as the person who shot the victim. Defendant next challenges as coerced Doreen Westbrook's trial testimony. He argues that the grant of immunity to Westbrook was conditioned on her testimony at trial being in conformity with her earlier statement to the police. Such a conditional grant of immunity to an accomplice is a denial of a defendant's right to a fair trial if the prosecution's case relies substantially on the accomplice's testimony. ( People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1179, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1251, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115.) The Attorney General correctly asserts that defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object to Westbrook's testimony at trial as coerced. (Evid.Code, ง 353.) A claim of coercion is not cognizable on appeal in the absence of an objection to the testimony at trial. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 489, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754; People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) In requiring an objection at trial, the forfeiture rule ensures that the opposing party is given an opportunity to address the objection, and it prevents a party from engaging in gamesmanship by choosing not to object, awaiting the outcome, and then claiming error. ( In re Seaton, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 198-199, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 633, 95 P.3d 896.) Here, defendant forfeited his claim of coerced testimony because of his failure to object at trial. Moreover, the claim lacks merit, as discussed below. Westbrook was granted immunity during her testimony at the preliminary hearing. When she was about to incriminate herself, the trial court admonished her of her constitutional rights to remain silent and to be represented by an attorney. When she asked for an attorney, the court appointed Attorney Lorie Ruminson, who was in the courtroom at the court's request. After a recess, Westbrook invoked her right to remain silent, and the prosecutor petitioned the court to grant Westbrook immunity. The court granted the petition. The order said: Westbrook shall not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for or on account of those facts and acts concerning her involvement with defendant, Jerry Noble Kennedy, as set forth in the accompanying petition and declaration. The accompanying declaration included as an attachment Westbrook's statement to Colusa County Sheriff's Detective Markss describing Westbrook's involvement with defendant immediately before, during, and immediately after the murder, and her identification of defendant as the killer. Westbrook's testimony at trial was consistent with her earlier statement. The prosecutor at trial described the immunity as transactional immunity. Transactional immunity protects the witness against all later prosecutions relating to matters about which [the witness] testifies. ( People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 973, fn. 4, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608.) Use immunity, on the other hand, protects a witness only against the actual use of [the witness's] compelled testimony, as well as the use of evidence derived therefrom. ( Ibid. ) Here, the immunity granted Westbrook extended to all matters that were the subject of her testimony and thus was transactional immunity. It did not require Westbrook's testimony at trial to conform to any statement given the police. In addition, the immunity order does not state that it is conditioned on conforming testimony. Neither the order granting immunity nor the record shows that the immunity granted to Westbrook at the preliminary hearing was conditioned upon Westbrook conforming her testimony to her earlier statement to Detective Markss of the Colusa County Sheriff's Department.