Opinion ID: 391168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Union's Claim against the Secretaries of Labor and

Text: 54 Transportation. 55 We begin our discussion of this final issue by pointing out that the threshold inquiry is whether either Secretary has a statutory duty to enforce Section 13(c) agreements on behalf of transit employees. If no such duty exists, our analysis need go no further. 56 The Act makes only two references to the role of the Secretary of Labor. Sections 3(e) 1 and 13(c) require the Secretary, as part of the grant approval process, to certify that labor protective arrangements are fair and equitable. Neither section intimates that the Secretary is expected to supervise the conduct of the parties after an acceptable agreement is reached and the grant disbursed. According to the Union, however, it stands to reason that the Secretary should also bear continuing responsibility for enforcing the terms of Section 13(c) agreements. Whether or not we agree with the policy behind the Union's position, we decline to substitute our judgment on the issue for that of Congress. 57 The legislative history affords the Union no more support than does the statute itself. In the course of the Senate and House Hearings on the bill, then-Secretary of Labor Wirtz referred to the administration of Section 13(c). On each occasion, however, his remarks were made in the context of formulating guidelines for fair and equitable arrangements. Senate Hearings on S.6, 88th Congress, 1st Sess. at p. 309. See also S.Rep. # 82, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 28; H.R.Rep. # 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16. 58 Unlike the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Transportation does have several specific enforcement obligations under the Act. Section 3(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1602(f), for example, explicitly requires him to supervise and enforce protective arrangements which ensure that federal grants will not be used to force private charter bus operators out of the competitive market. Similarly, Section 3(g), 49 U.S.C. § 1602(g) requires an agreement by grant recipients not to engage in school bus operations except under limited circumstances. Again, the Secretary of Transportation has specific enforcement duties. To administer his responsibilities in the areas of school and charter bus operations, the Secretary has promulgated extensive regulations which include provisions for judicial review of agency action in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. 49 C.F.R. 604.1 et seq.; 49 C.F.R. 605.1 et seq. See also Bradford School Bus Transit, Inc. v. Chicago Transit Authority, supra. 59 With respect to Section 13(c), however, we are unable to conclude that Congress has imposed mandatory enforcement duties on the Secretary of Transportation. In the first place, the only administrative official even mentioned in that section is the Secretary of Labor, whose limited role we have already discussed. It would be unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to require the Department of Transportation to resolve labor relations disputes, yet neglected to say so despite its explicit mandate under other sections of the statute. Furthermore, we have discovered nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress contemplated the result the Union seeks here. This statute was enacted eighteen years ago, yet nothing in the record before us suggests that the Secretary of Transportation has ever assumed responsibility for enforcing the terms of labor protective agreements. This factor alone is scarcely dispositive of the issue. However, it is not unlikely that Congress would have amended Section 13(c) had it perceived a need for active enforcement by the Department of Transportation. Indeed, Congress did respond to just such a need when it added Section 3(f), discussed above, to the Act in 1974. 60 We are aware that the First Circuit has indicated a belief that the Secretary of Transportation has at least discretionary authority to enforce labor protective arrangements by virtue of Section 12(e) of the Act. (49 U.S.C. § 1608(e)). Local Division 714 v. Greater Portland Transit District, supra. It stopped short of deciding that transit employees can compel the Department of Transportation to take action, although it characterized that possibility as plausible. 589 F.2d at 14. It is impossible to determine from Greater Portland whether our decision here actually conflicts with the law in the First Circuit, since that court's analysis was purely hypothetical. The Secretary of Transportation was not a party to that case, and the question of administrative enforcement of Section 13(c) was not at issue. Instead, the First Circuit offered its interpretation of the Secretary's statutory role as one of several arguments in favor of inferring a private federal cause of action on behalf of the plaintiff union. 61 In any event, the Union has failed to demonstrate a sufficient reason to compel the Secretary of Transportation to take action in this controversy. In the absence of a clear Congressional mandate, we decline to force the Department of Transportation to supervise labor-management relations. 62 The judgment of the District Court dismissing the Union's claim against Jackson is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment dismissing the claim against the Secretaries for lack of jurisdiction is reversed with instructions to enter a judgment dismissing the claim for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 63