Opinion ID: 201350
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Punitive Damages Analysis

Text: 70 In its richly detailed and carefully crafted 87-page opinion, the court devoted slightly less than two pages at the end of the opinion to its punitive damages analysis. This observation is not a criticism. Rather, we make that observation to make the important point that the relatively brief punitive damages analysis at the end of the opinion unmistakably draws upon the compendious factfinding and legal analysis on the claim for compensatory damages that precedes it. 71 Based on Alexander's handwritten notes documenting her phone conversation with a colleague about the ADA, the district court concluded in part that punitive damages were authorized in this case because Alexander's notes reflect that she was aware that her actions violated federal law, and thus she `acted in the face of a perceived risk that [her] actions' would lead to that result. Id. at 152 (quoting Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118) (alteration in original). 20 However, the federal law to which Alexander's notes refer (the ADA) was not in fact the same federal law that the court found Alexander to have violated (the First Amendment right to seek redress in the courts as protected by § 1983). Indeed, Powell brought no claim under the ADA against any of the defendants, and only the City of Pittsfield was subject to his claim under the related Rehabilitation Act. 21 Id. at 122. 72 In order to recover punitive damages, a plaintiff ordinarily must establish[ ] liability for either compensatory or nominal damages. Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205, 1215 (1st Cir.1995) (plaintiff must make a timely request for nominal damages). Given the absence of a claim by Powell that Alexander violated his rights under the ADA, her subjective awareness of the risk that she might violate Powell's rights under the ADA with her retaliatory conduct is irrelevant to the propriety of an award of punitive damages for a § 1983 violation of a First Amendment right. See Iacobucci, 193 F.3d at 27 (evidence tending to show that defendant was aware of the risk of violating plaintiff's right to be free from excessive force during arrest had no bearing on defendant's subjective intent towards plaintiff's right to be free from arrest without probable cause, the right defendant actually violated under § 1983). The court's determination that Alexander perceived the risk that her actions would violate Powell's federally protected rights under the ADA, therefore, does not support an award of punitive damages for Alexander's violation of Powell's First Amendment right to petition the courts for redress. Instead, the court had to find, explicitly or implicitly, that Alexander's retaliatory actions manifested at least reckless or callous indifference to Powell's First Amendment right. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625. For the reasons we now set forth, we are satisfied that the court implicitly made such a finding, and that this finding is legally and factually supportable. 73 In its punitive damages analysis, the district court also justified its award of punitive damages because Alexander's actions in this case were both outrageous and reprehensible. Powell, 221 F.Supp.2d at 152. The court then provided a non-exhaustive list of examples of her acts and omissions, discussed in detail above in Part II.A.2, underlying that determination. In short, the district court concluded, Alexander engaged in a course of behavior that this court deems to be outrageous and worthy of condemnation. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 74 While the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad clarified that the presence (or absence) of egregious or outrageous acts does not in itself determine the propriety (or lack of propriety) of punitive damages in a given case, Iacobucci, 193 F.3d at 26 (citation omitted), such damages remain available where a defendant's egregious intentional conduct itself demonstrates her perception of a risk that [her] actions [would] violate federal law. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118. To be sure, egregious or outrageous acts may serve as evidence supporting an inference of the requisite `evil motive.' Id. at 538, 119 S.Ct. 2118. Indeed, [c]onduct warranting punitive awards has been characterized as `egregious'... because of the defendant's mental state. Id. 75 We have described the plaintiff's obligation to demonstrate a defendant's state of mind regarding the consequences of her intentional acts as a heightened burden. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 84 (1st Cir.2001) (distinguishing state law standard for punitive damages from that imposed by § 1983). This description merely reflects the dual purposes that a plaintiff's evidence must serve in a case where punitive damages are sought; it does not preclude evidence of egregious misconduct from serving, in appropriate circumstances, both as evidence of the alleged violation of a federal right and as evidence of the defendant's awareness of the risk that her actions would violate that federal right. 76 Indeed, in cases involving retaliation, a defendant's actions and the effect of those actions are closely connected in a way not necessarily present in other types of cases. Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir.2003) (remanding for jury trial on punitive damages where employer engaged in intentional discriminatory retaliation). The legal standard for a finding of liability for retaliation (the underlying liability claim in a case such as this) already entails an inquiry into a defendant's motive as well as into the legally protected nature of the plaintiff's conduct. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. 568 (plaintiff must show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a `substantial factor' or ... a `motivating factor' for the defendant's retaliatory decision to shift burden to defendant). Where a defendant engages in particularly outrageous acts of retaliation and where the right whose exercise triggers those retaliatory acts is a well-established constitutional right, a factfinder could, but need not, fairly infer that the [defendant] harbored malice or reckless indifference towards that federal right. Che, 342 F.3d at 42. 77 Although the specific intent to violate a plaintiff's federally protected right will support a punitive damages award, reckless indifference towards a plaintiff's federally protected right also suffices to authorize liability for punitive damages under § 1983. 22 See, e.g., DiMarco-Zappa, 238 F.3d at 38 (finding no abuse of discretion in award of punitive damages where [t]he extent of federal statutory and constitutional law preventing discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or race suggests that defendants had to know that such discrimination was illegal, and that [defendants' discriminatory conduct] exhibited `reckless and callous indifference' to [plaintiff's] federal rights, if not evil intent.) (citation omitted); Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 406 (5th Cir.2000) (evidence that defendant's agent retaliated against plaintiff because he `hauled colleagues into court to try to resolve differences' ... indicates a healthy disdain for [plaintiff's] rights to seek redress in the courts for perceived wrongs [and was] adequate to meet the standard of reckless indifference at least, if not outright animus, towards those rights). 78 As noted, the court found that Alexander's retaliatory actions were especially unworthy of a City Solicitor. Powell, 221 F.Supp.2d at 152-53. In our judgment, this focus by the court on conduct unworthy of an attorney reflects the district court's implicit finding that Alexander, as a former general litigator, as City Solicitor (however overburdened and inexperienced in municipal law), 23 and as the attorney who negotiated the 1993 settlement agreement, recognized and acted with reckless or callous indifference towards Powell's constitutional right to petition the courts for redress. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625. In other words, as an attorney, Alexander surely understood that Powell's filing of his 1991 lawsuit was an exercise of his First Amendment right to petition the government for redress, and that in retaliating against him for the filing of that lawsuit she risked violating his right under the Constitution. Her conduct was particularly unworthy of a City Solicitor because of her callous indifference to Powell's exercise of that right. Indeed, Alexander never argued at trial or on appeal that Powell's filing of his 1991 lawsuit was not protected by the First Amendment or that she was unaware that retaliation against Powell could violate his First Amendment right to seek redress in the courts. Moreover, there is substantial evidence in this record of Alexander's consciousness of wrongdoing, McKinnon, 83 F.3d at 509, in the form of her elaborate efforts to prevent Dr. Bird's critical July 5, 1994, letter (which the court found cleared Powell to go back to work, Powell 221 F.Supp.2d at 152), from coming to light. 79 We conclude, therefore, that the district court's detailed factual analysis of Alexander's conduct, including the examples it specifically identified as outrageous and reprehensible and especially unworthy of a City Solicitor, Powell, 221 F.Supp.2d at 152-53, supports its implied finding that Alexander acted in the face of a perceived risk that [her] actions [would] violate federal law [Powell's First Amendment right under § 1983], Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118, and thus with sufficient evil motive or reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others, Smith, 461 U.S. at 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, to meet the legal standard for punitive damages under § 1983.