Opinion ID: 2055856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the radiographic scanning a Fourth Amendment search?

Text: The keystone of this case is the issue of whether the radiographic scanning under Customs' authority in Wakefield, Massachusetts was lawful conduct under the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches. This area of the law delineating the legality of searches has seen a thorough overhauling in recent years, from which has evolved a clearer and more intellectually satisfying understanding of the nature of a search. The issue of whether government action does or does not constitute a search is now understood to depend less upon the designation of an areathat is, home, office, car or telephonethan upon a determination of whether the examination is a violation of privacy on which the individual justifiably relied as secure from invasion. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 583 (1967). Similarly, the means of intrusion has become subordinate to the issue of justified expectation of privacy. . . . [I]t becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. (Emphasis supplied) Katz v. United States, supra. Thus, to discover whether the questioned conduct before us now is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment or whether it is only an authorized Customs border examination of material being introduced into the country but conduct less intrusive than a search, we must determine whether the person who forwarded the mail from Viet Nam to the Defendant justifiably relied on the privacy of his letter. [3] & [4] What security from invasion of privacy can the person bringing or mailing material into this Country reasonably believe he has? Our examination of the federal decisions convinces us that the right of the government to examine persons and containers entering the country from foreign areasbased, in part, as it is, upon the inherent power of the nation to exclude materials which threaten the public safetyis very broad. The necessity of excluding harmful materials has restricted the rights of privacy of persons entering the country. The action of the Customs officer here in examining Defendant's envelopes is based upon the authority granted by 19 U. S.C.A. § 482. § 482. Search of vehicles and persons Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop, search, and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law; and if any such officer or other person so authorized shall find any merchandise on or about any such vehicle, beast, or person, or in any such trunk or envelope, which he shall have reasonable cause to believe is subject to duty, or to have been unlawfully introduced into the United States, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle, beast, or otherwise, he shall seize and secure the same for trial. R.S. § 3061. (Emphasis added.) The federal courts appear to agree that this section authorizes a search of the broadest possible character. Landau v. United States Attorney for Southern District, 82 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 665, 56 S.Ct. 747, 80 L.Ed. 1389. It appears to us that it also authorizes an examination of imported material which may be less intrusive than a Fourth Amendment search. It seems to us that the person entering this Country does so with the expectation that he will probably be required at the border to submit articles which he brings with him to at least an examination sufficient to satisfy the Customs officers that there is nothing suspicious in their nature. How much greater immunity from limited Customs inspection can he reasonably expect by sending his merchandise home by mail rather than by bringing it in his automobile or in his pocket? [5] Unquestionably the person sending or receiving sealed domestic first class mail has strong expectations of the security of the contents. This was recognized long ago in Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L. Ed. 877, 879 (1877): . . . Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. . . . But Jackson was dealing with domestic mail and it is well established that the policy considerations involved in inspection of mail of foreign origin are not the same. This distinction was emphasized in United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, 985 (2d Cir. 1973) in speaking of fourth class packages: Both Congress and the courts have deemed examination of international mail to be on a different footing from that applied to mail moving entirely within the country. . . . Such a distinction was also made in United States v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1964): . . . [F]ourth Amendment standards applicable to mail matter moving entirely within the country are not applicable to mail matter coming in from outside the country at least where it appears that a customs determination must be made. . . . It seems to us unlikely that the authority of Customs officers to protect the public interest from the introduction of contraband into the country is any less in the case of international first class mail than in fourth class mail. We doubt that greater immunity from border inspection for contraband can be purchased by a few additional cents cost of postage. While it appears to us that a person sending first class mail into the country may have a reasonable expectation of greater immunity as to his First Amendment rights of privacy in the communication of his thoughts and ideas than a person bringing in merchandise, we do not believe he enjoys a more favorable status regarding immunity from limited examination of the contents of his envelopes by methods which neither open the envelope nor disclose his written communications. [6] We understand the radiographic examination in question to be one in which electronic emanations are projected through the envelope revealing in picture form, by virtue of the density of the resistance they encounter, the shape and, apparently, by movement of the object, the general structure of its bulk. Except for the fact that its operation causes a certain penetration of the fabric of the envelope (as contrasted, for example, with odors recognized while coming out of the package), the procedure differs little from those involving a scrutiny of the unopened envelope by use of the physical senses alone. [7] The device requires no opening of the envelope or exposure of any written communications contained within it and no injury to the contents. We are convinced that the sender and receiver of first class letter mail of foreign origin have no reasonable or justified expectation that such mail will not be subjected to some such limited scrutiny for forbidden merchandise as may be had without opening the sealed envelope or disclosing the private thoughts communicated therein. In our opinion the use of the device in question by this Customs officer stopped short of being the kind of invasion which must properly be considered a search. [8]