Opinion ID: 2559615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: defendant's intention is a required element of the constructive possession jury instruction when a defendant is charged with PDW

Text: Title 11, section 1444 of the Delaware Code relevantly provides that [a] person is guilty of [PDW] when the person... has possession of a ... sawed-off shotgun.... PDW is broader than CCDW because, unlike CCDW, PDW may occur in the context of being in the same proximity of where a weapon is found, even though the weapon is not on or about the person or belongings of the defendant. [6] An example would be a residence with multiple occupants, as occurred in Eley v. State. [7] Consequently, we have defined constructive possession in that context differently. Possession under section 1444 may be actual or constructive. [8] In Lecates v. State , we articulated the State's burden in proving constructive possession for the crime of possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited (PDWPP) as follows: [T]he State need[s] to present sufficient evidence that [a defendant]: (1) knew the location of the gun; (2) had the ability to exercise dominion and control over the gun; and (3) intended to guide the destiny of the gun. Although mere proximity to, or awareness of [the deadly weapon] is not sufficient to establish constructive possession, it is well established that circumstantial evidence may prove constructive possession. [9] Thereafter, in State v. Clayton, [10] we clarified our holding in Lecates as follows: The phrase intended to guide the destiny of the gun is not a required element of the constructive possession jury instruction when a defendant is charged with [PDWPP]. That phrase is properly regarded as one way to explain how the State can establish the defendant's intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion and control over a deadly weapon. [11] In Eley, the trial judge gave the jury an instruction on the law of constructive possession in the PDWPP context as follows: Constructive possession means that the deadly weapon was within the defendant's reasonable control. That is, it was about his person, premises, belongings, or vehicle. In other words, the defendant had constructive possession over the deadly weapon if he had both the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise control over the deadly weapon, either directly or through another person. [12] With the principles of Lecates and Clayton in mind, we concluded that the trial judge's instruction was an accurate statement of the law. [13] A similar instruction was not given in this case. Gallman argues that the trial judge's instruction on constructive possession undermined her defense to PDW, which was to show that even if the jury believed that she knew the weapon was present, she had no intention to exercise control over it. We agree. The rationale and holdings of Lecates, Clayton, and Eley which addressed the constructive possession element of PDWPPapply to the crime of PDW. Thus, Gallman had constructive possession over the destructive weapon if she had both the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise control over it either directly or through another person. In the trial judge's instruction on the constructive possession element of the PDW count, the trial judge focused on Gallman's knowledge of the weapon's presence and her power at that time to exercise control over it. Despite defense counsel's specific request, the trial judge did not inform the jury that to convict Gallman of PDW it was required to find that she intended to exercise dominion and control over the destructive weapon. A defendant's intention is a required element of the constructive possession jury instruction when a defendant is charged with PDW. In that respect, Gallman's unqualified right to a correct statement of the law was violated. [14] Because the trial judge's instruction on the constructive possession component of the PDW count omitted the state of mind required for guilt, it did not correctly state the law so that the jury could perform its duty. [15] We must reverse the PDW conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge.