Opinion ID: 2391818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Arbitrary, Capricious, and Abuse of Discretion

Text: [¶ 37] CLF and the Gagnebins contend that Rule 13 is invalid because it is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. They argue that the arbitrariness is apparent from the lack of competent support, in the rule-making record, for the BEP's determination that the activity will have no significant impact on the environment and that the standards will insure no unreasonable interference with existing uses. They contend, for example, that there is no evidence in the record that a dock that extends up to twenty-five percent of the channel will not unreasonably interfere with existing navigational uses. They also note the lack of evidence in the rule-making record as to the potential number of projects that could be permitted by rule and the lack of a study on the cumulative impacts to navigation or recreation that might occur under the rule. [¶ 38] In asserting that the BEP acted arbitrarily and capriciously, CLF and the Gagnebins have the burden to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the BEP in enacting Rule 13. Regularity of the action of an administrative agency in enacting rules is presumed. See Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 281 A.2d 233, 242 (Me.1971). The agency is assumed to have acted with full knowledge of material facts and in justification thereof. Id. To overcome the presumption of regularity and demonstrate arbitrariness, CLF and the Gagnebins must show that Rule 13 is unreasonable, lacks a factual basis, or lacks support in an evidentiary record. Id. [¶ 39] CLF and the Gagnebins argue that they have met their burden because the BEP did not explain why each standard in Rule 13 was useful for or necessary to its determination that the statutory requirements of NRPA could be met through a permit by rule. In making this argument CLF and the Gagnebins misconstrue their burden. It is not up to the BEP to explain the reasonableness of its action. Neither the APA nor the rule-making statutes applicable to the BEP require an explanation in the record. Therefore, the lack of such an explanation does not itself demonstrate unreasonableness. [¶ 40] We are not persuaded that the BEP acted unreasonably in promulgating Rule 13. As we have already noted, Rule 13 comports with NRPA and is not otherwise contrary to law. It simply provides a more expedient method of obtaining permits for the construction of piers and wharves than the individual permitting process. The permit by rule process is one supported and encouraged by the Legislature as is seen in the requirement in section 344(7) for the DEP to annually review activities to see if more can be added to the permit by rule process. A rule that is authorized by statute, encouraged by the Legislature, does not violate other laws, and provides a simpler and more efficient means to obtain permits is not unreasonable. [¶ 41] We also conclude that CLF and the Gagnebins have failed to demonstrate that the record lacks a factual basis for its findings that the Rule 13 piers and wharves will have no significant impact on the environment and will not unreasonably interfere with existing uses. CLF and the Gagnebins specifically argue that the rule-making record lacks a factual basis for the BEP's conclusion that dock structures extending into twenty-five percent of a channel will have no significant impact. However, the record demonstrates that the twenty-five percent limitation was based on requirements of the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Thus, there is a factual basis in the record for this particular length limitation. The only other factual inadequacy of the record specifically argued by CLF and the Gagnebins is the lack of any study demonstrating the cumulative effect on the environment and existing uses of the number of piers and wharves expected to be built pursuant to Rule 13. However, there is no requirement that such a study be done before a rule can be promulgated. If the rule had an unintended consequence, the DEP or interested citizens could initiate a rule-making proceeding to change the rule. [¶ 42] For reasons that we have already stated, the BEP was entitled to rely upon its knowledge of piers and wharves and existing uses to fashion standards that would allow construction with no significant impact or unreasonable interference. Furthermore, the regulation allows for a denial of a permit in those instances in which the DEP determines that the proposed dock will violate NRPA in spite of complying with the Rule 13 standards. Thus, we conclude that the BEP did not act arbitrarily or capriciously or abuse its discretion.