Opinion ID: 2308137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. The Guilty Plea

Text: Mr. Ortiz contends that the trial court abused its discretion by pressuring him to withdraw his guilty plea, or, alternatively, by refusing to enter judgment on his guilty plea. The trial court did not exert any pressure on Mr. Ortiz to withdraw his guilty plea nor did it sua sponte vacate the plea and set a trial date. Defense counsel moved orally to withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing on May 8, 1997. Judge Walton's questions and statements demonstrated his degree of uncertainty as to what Mr. Ortiz wanted to do. At the beginning of the hearing, Judge Walton stated,  I guess we have to set a trial date because we have to set a trial date if [Mr. Ortiz is] saying he didn't do this so if Mr. Ortiz wants to go to trial, we can set this matter for a trial date. (emphasis added). Defense counsel did not refute the trial court's understanding that Mr. Ortiz wanted to go to trial and made no effort to save the guilty plea; rather, defense counsel suggested that they pick a trial date. Furthermore, when the case was transferred from Judge Walton to Judge Greene, defense counsel did not attempt to revive the plea and, to the contrary, did not object when the prosecutor stated that there have been no requests by the defense about making an additional plea offer. Then, at sentencing before Judge Greene, defense counsel again did not object to the prosecutor's statement that defense counsel had not sought to reopen plea negotiations. Taken together, these acts and omissions by defense counsel support the conclusion that defense counsel not only intended to withdraw the guilty plea in front of Judge Walton (by making an oral motion) but also intended to proceed to trial (by not raising the issue later in front of Judge Greene). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Mr. Ortiz to voluntarily withdraw his guilty plea. Even if Mr. Ortiz had not moved to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court properly refused to enter judgment on it. The decision whether to accept or reject a guilty plea is lodged in the discretion of the trial court. Hockaday v. United States, 359 A.2d 146, 148 (D.C.1976). A defendant does not have an absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). The trial judge should not enter judgment on a guilty plea unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for doing so. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 11(f). Even after a factual basis for a plea is established, a trial court may still reject a plea and refuse to enter judgment when the defendant maintains his innocence. See United States v. Rashad, 364 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 371-72, 396 F.3d 398, 401 (2005); Gooding v. United States, 529 A.2d 301, 305 n. 6 (D.C.1987) (per curiam) (en banc) (when interpreting Super. Ct.Crim. R. 11, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals looks to federal courts construing their analogous Rule 11 of Criminal Procedure). In this case, Judge Walton explained that, even though the hearing was scheduled as a sentencing hearing, Mr. Ortiz's denials to the probation officer, which were contained in the Pre-Sentence Report, meant that he could not sentence an innocent [person]. Specifically, Judge Walton noted that Mr. Ortiz told the probation officer twice that he accidentally kissed [C.E.] on the lips, that he denie[d] having done anything inappropriate, and that C.E.'s allegations are fabrications made up against him. (emphasis added). Judge Walton was appropriately concerned that these statements not only undermined the factual basis of the plea namely, that he had not either committed the necessary act of sexual contact nor possessed the specific intent necessary to constitute misdemeanor sexual abuse [4]  but they also supported the conclusion that Mr. Ortiz was professing his innocence. As such, under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 11, the trial court was properly concerned that it lacked a factual basis and that the defendant was maintaining his innocence  both conclusions which would have precluded it from entering judgment on Mr. Ortiz's guilty plea. [5] See United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 822 F.2d 1008, 1011 (11th Cir.1987) (no abuse of discretion when trial court rejected defendant's guilty plea after he cast[ ] doubt upon the validity of [it] by protesting his innocence or by making exculpatory statements in his pre-sentence report); United States v. Ray, 431 F.2d 1177, 1178 (9th Cir.1970) (no abuse of discretion when trial court rejected defendant's guilty plea after he professed his innocence in his pre-sentence report). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to enter judgment on Mr. Ortiz's guilty plea.