Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Examination of Storage Facility Employee

Text: 155 Abouhalima contends that he was deprived of a fair trial when the government was allowed to use leading questions during direct examination of Blessing Igiri, and later when the court interfered during Salameh's cross-examination of Igiri. We disagree. 156 Igiri worked at the Space Station. On direct examination, he testified that Salameh, whom Igiri knew as Kamal Ibraham, had rented the Shed. Igiri added that, on the day before the bombing, he spoke with Salameh and another man at the Space Station while they were waiting for a delivery. Igiri related that a truck loaded with gas cylinders pulled into the facility and that Salameh and the other man attended to the delivery. 157 After discussing the delivery, Igiri said that he could not recall what happened next. The government then asked Igiri: Now, sir, did there come a time when you saw another vehicle approach the gate? Salameh's objection that the question was leading was overruled. Igiri answered no, he had not seen another vehicle. The trial then was adjourned for lunch. 158 When trial resumed, Igiri testified that, after the gas cylinder truck had departed, he had, in fact, observed Salameh and the other man enter the Space Station in a yellow Ryder van. 159 On cross-examination, Salameh's counsel pursued his quarry. He asked Igiri whether he had spoken to the government during the lunch recess. Igiri said no. However, in a sidebar requested by Salameh's counsel, the government commendably acknowledged that it had spoken with Igiri during the recess. At the request of Salameh's counsel, Judge Duffy asked Igiri in open court whether he had indeed spoken with the government during the recess. Igiri reiterated his denial. Judge Duffy then asked counsel for the government, in front of the jury, whether he met with Igiri. Counsel for the government confirmed that he had. 160 Judge Duffy instructed Igiri that [l]awyers are supposed to talk to witnesses before they arrive here because if they don't know what the witnesses are going to testify to, God knows what we would be listening to. It is required. If they sit down and talk to you, there is nothing wrong with that at all. All right? No defendant objected to Judge Duffy's questioning of, or comment to, Igiri. Upon further cross-examination, Igiri admitted meeting with the government during the recess and answered questions about the meeting. Abouhalima and Salameh now put forward that Judge Duffy committed reversible error by: (1) allowing the government to ask leading questions; and (2) his comments on Igiri's lunch-time meeting with the government.
161 The government notes that Abouhalima failed to raise his objections below and appellate review of these claims therefore is barred absent plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). The government forgets, however, that Judge Duffy had earlier established a ground rule that an objection by one defendant would preserve the claims of all defendants. Therefore, when Salameh's counsel objected to the leading question put to Igiri, that objection was deemed raised by Abouhalima, as well. Accordingly, we review the district court's decision to allow the government to lead the witness Igiri for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir.1995). 162 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government to ask Igiri whether he saw another vehicle approach the gate. Although leading questions generally should not be used on direct examination, a district judge may allow them as may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony. Fed.R.Evid. 611(c). The challenged question was necessary to develop Igiri's testimony and elicit information from a nervous witness. See id.
163 Abouhalima also claims that Judge Duffy's questions and comments during Igiri's cross-examination were improper and demonstrated bias in favor of the government. Because no defendant objected to Judge Duffy's questions and comments, this claim is barred absent plain error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770. However, even if there were a proper objection, Abouhalima's claim would lack merit because the court properly exercised its discretion. 164 Reversal for judicial bias is appropriate only where an examination of the entire record demonstrates that the jurors have been impressed with the trial judge's partiality to one side to the point that this became a factor in the determination of the jury. United States v. Valenti, 60 F.3d 941, 946 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court's questioning did not demonstrate bias because Salameh's counsel specifically asked Judge Duffy to question Igiri to facilitate cross-examination. The judge simply complied with this request. 165 Furthermore, although Abouhalima claims that the court's comments neutraliz[ed] the witness Igiri's lie about his mid-testimony meeting with the prosecutor, this claim is not supported by the record. Abouhalima asserts that Judge Duffy's comments to Igiri condoned the lie that Igiri told about meeting with the government. To the contrary, Judge Duffy simply explained to Igiri that it is not improper for a prosecutor to meet with a government witness regarding the witness's testimony. This comment cannot be construed as a condonation of Igiri's lie. The jury heard Igiri's lie and subsequent recantation and could be relied upon to factor this episode into its verdict. 166