Opinion ID: 2045627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: detention orders

Text: On December 6, 1994, the county attorney filed a petition alleging that Joshua was within the meaning of §§ 43-247(3)(a) and 43-292(6). The petition was later amended to also allege that Joshua was within the meaning of § 43-292(2). The juvenile court issued a temporary custody order regarding Joshua, and he was removed from Lona's home and placed in the care of DSS. On December 15, a hearing was held regarding Joshua's detention and also addressing the detention of the other four children. The detention hearing focused on Lona's relationships and contact with Thomas and Walter, as well as the health and general behavior of the children while in Lona's care. Previously, in orders issued by the juvenile court on October 6 and November 18, 1993, and April 22 and October 19, 1994, the court repeatedly ordered Lona not to have any contact with Thomas. For example, the October 19, 1994, order directed that Lona was [n]ot [to] engage in any contact or communication or visitation in ANY FORM WHATSOEVER, (including but not limited to telephon[e] or letter) with Thomas ... and Lona F[.] shall not permit, allow, or in any manner facilitate any visitation, contact or communication in ANY FORM WHATSOEVER (including but not limited to telephone or letters) between Thomas... and any of the above-named minor children. Nevertheless, at the December 15 hearing, Lona admitted to numerous violations of these orders. Lona admitted receiving a number of letters from Thomas and sending a number as well. Lona admitted reading letters from Thomas to T.J. She admitted attempting to obtain a fake identification card in order to visit Thomas in prison and using aliases to avoid detection. At one point, Lona apparently attempted to obtain security clearance for all the children to visit Thomas in prison. Lona also admitted talking to Thomas on the telephone. Lona indicated at the December 15, 1994, hearing that she permitted Thomas to maintain contact with the children, in violation of the juvenile court's order, because she did not believe she needed to protect the children from communicating with Thomas. She claimed this despite the fact that she knew of Thomas' conviction for sexually assaulting Gloria and despite the fact that Lona admitted she thought Thomas might have done something to Tabitha as well. The evidence at the December 15, 1994, hearing also focused on Lona's homelife. Lisa Mathouser, who supervised some of Lona's visitations with Gloria and Tabitha, testified Lona and the children had told her that on some visits, Walter, Gloria's biological father, was present. According to Lona, Walter and Lona began having sexual relations when Lona was about 12 years old. Walter was 35 at the time. Mary Harris, a DSS protective services caseworker, testified that in view of Walter's history of sexual relations with Lona when she was 12 years of age, Harris was concerned because Walter was in the house with Gloria, who was approaching the age of 12. In addition, Harris testified that at the time the children were removed from Lona's home, Joshua had a severe case of diaper rash and Amanda and Joshua had diarrhea. We must address whether Joshua should remain in the custody of DSS pending final adjudication. In order to demonstrate that a pre-adjudication detention should continue, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the custody of a juvenile should remain in DSS pending adjudication. See In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991). As both the juvenile court and the Court of Appeals held, the above evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that allowing Joshua to remain in Lona's home would be contrary to his welfare. Lona argues that because the juvenile court orders that she violated were not entered in Joshua's case, but were instead entered in the other children's case, evidence of violation of those court orders cannot be considered as a basis for continuation of Joshua's detention. However, as the Court of Appeals held, the issue is not whether Lona violated a court order in Joshua's case. The issue is whether allowing Joshua to remain in her home would be contrary to his welfare. See In re Interest of R.G., supra . The above evidence of repeated and unrelenting violations of court orders forbidding Lona from maintaining contact with a person convicted of two counts of sexual assault including a sexual assault on one of Lona's own childrenis certainly sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that keeping Joshua in Lona's care would be contrary to his welfare. Cf. In re Interest of B.B. et al., 239 Neb. 952, 479 N.W.2d 787 (1992) (failure to protect children from two men whom mother had previously accused of sexually abusing her children was sufficient to justify termination of her parental rights). It was reasonable for the juvenile court to assume that Joshua would be harmed unless he was removed from Lona's care. Lona also argues that the above evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's detention order with respect to Joshua because there is no specific evidence of harm or risk of harm to Joshua. However, as the Court of Appeals in In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 4 Neb.App. 659, 678, 548 N.W.2d 348, 360 (1996), noted, there is no requirement that a juvenile court `wait until disaster has befallen a minor child before the court may acquire jurisdiction. If it is reasonable to assume that injury will occur absent action by the court, then the court may assume jurisdiction and act accordingly.' Accord In re Interest of W.C.O., 220 Neb. 417, 370 N.W.2d 151 (1985). See, also, In re Interest of M.B. and A.B., 239 Neb. 1028, 480 N.W.2d 160 (1992) (holding that State was not required to show daughters had actually been sexually abused where father had been convicted of sex crimes against other children and mother continued to leave daughters in his care). Finally, Lona points out that the last paragraph of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-254 (Reissue 1993) requires the State to show that reasonable efforts have been made to prevent the need for the children's removal. Lona argues that the State failed to show that such efforts were made. The pertinent portion of § 43-254 provides: If a juvenile has been removed from his or her parent, guardian, or custodian pursuant to subdivision (3) of section 43-248, the court may enter an order continuing detention or placement only upon a written determination that continuation of the juvenile in his or her home would be contrary to the welfare of such juvenile and that reasonable efforts were made, prior to placement, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal and to make it possible for the juvenile to return to his or her home. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the provision in § 43-254 that Lona refers to by its own terms only applies when a juvenile is taken into temporary custody without a court order under the authority of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-248(3) (Reissue 1993). Joshua was taken into custody pursuant to the juvenile court's December 6, 1994, order. Therefore, this alleged error is without merit. As a result, the juvenile court's detention order in case No. S-94-1239 should be affirmed. Lona's appeal of the detention order with respect to the remaining four children in case No. S-94-1240 raises the identical issues addressed above. In view of our analysis regarding these issues, the juvenile court's detention order in case No. S-94-1240 should also be affirmed with respect to T.J. and Amanda. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider Lona's appeal of the detention order in case No. S-94-1240 with respect to Gloria and Tabitha, and therefore, that portion of the appeal must be dismissed.