Opinion ID: 1613998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether summary judgment was granted erroneously.

Text: ¶ 17. Our appellate standard for reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is the same standard as that of the trial court under Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. We employ a de novo standard of review of a trial court's grant or denial of a summary judgment and examine all the evidentiary matters before itadmissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered for the movant. Otherwise, the motion should be denied. Bullock v. Life Ins. Co., 872 So.2d 658, 660 (Miss.2004) (citing Hurdle v. Holloway, 848 So.2d 183, 185 (Miss.2003)). Concurrently, at the trial-court level, when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials set forth in his pleadings, but his response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(e). [4]
¶ 18. The burden of proving testamentary capacity is on the proponents of the will, who can present a prima facie case simply by offering into evidence the will and the record of probate. In re Last Will and Testament and Estate of Smith, 722 So.2d 606, 610-11 (Miss.1998) (citing In re Estate of Edwards, 520 So.2d 1370, 1372-73 (Miss.1988)). Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden of going forward shifts to the contestants to overcome the prima facie case. Id. at 611. ¶ 19. Since the May will has been properly admitted to probate, Williams has presented such a prima facie case. Therefore, the burden shifts to Foster to show that Laughter lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the will. ¶ 20. Testamentary capacity is determined based on three factors: (1) whether the testator had the ability at the time of the will to understand and appreciate the effects of his act; (2) whether the testator had the ability at the time of the will to understand the natural objects or persons to receive his bounty and their relation to him; and (3) whether the testator was capable of determining at the time of the will what disposition he desired to make of his property. In re Estate of Holmes, 961 So.2d 674, 679 (Miss.2007) (citing Smith, 722 So.2d at 610). However, evidence need not fall squarely under any one of these factors in order to be pertinent. See, e.g., Smith, 722 So.2d at 611. ¶ 21. Excluding allegations based on the videotapes, Foster has raised three arguments to rebut the presumption that Laughter possessed testamentary capacity. First, Foster asserts that the letter sent on behalf of Williams by her attorney, Garner, dated March 28, 2005, admitted Laughter's lack of capacity. The Garner letter described Laughter as extremely ill and unable to handle his affairs, and it stated that Laughter was unable to remember deeding his home to Foster, as a joint tenant with himself only three weeks earlier. [5] ¶ 22. The mere fact that someone is too ill to handle his affairs does not in and of itself render him mentally incompetent or void of testamentary capacity. See Lee v. Lee, 337 So.2d 713, 715 (Miss.1976) (citing Thomas v. Hamlin, 56 Tenn.App. 13, 404 S.W.2d 569 (1964)). However, Laughter's alleged inability to remember deeding joint ownership of his home to Foster only three weeks earlier is evidence of a potential lack of capacity. The Garner letter's implication that Laughter had signed the deed only because he was extremely ill and unable to handle his affairs apparently was made to show that the deed of March 4, 2005, was invalid because of Laughter's incapacity. ¶ 23. Second, Foster points out that the May will completely changed the distribution of Laughter's assets from the March will. This Court has held that a prior will, if made at a time when the testator possessed testamentary capacity, may be admitted into evidence to show a lack of testamentary capacity at the time of a subsequent will. Perry v. Aldrich, 196 So.2d 521, 525 (Miss.1967). Prior statements by the testator may be similarly relevant. Moore v. Parks, 122 Miss. 301, 332, 84 So. 230, 237 (1920). ¶ 24. Here, Williams has not formally challenged Laughter's competency at the time he executed the March will. However, the March will was executed on the same day, March 4, as the deed of Laughter's home to Foster. As discussed above, the Garner letter implies that the deed is invalid because of Laughter's poor health at that time. Thus, it is possible that Williams impliedly challenges the validity of the March will because it was executed on the same day as the deed. ¶ 25. Any such challenge, however, would be disingenuous. Williams does not challenge Laughter's capacity to execute the quitclaim deed to Williams, done only one day before, on March 3. Presumably, any alleged inability of Laughter to appreciate the effects of his March 4 will also would invalidate the March 3 quitclaim deed to Williams. ¶ 26. Laughter's March will was entirely different from his May will. The March will devised nearly all of Laughter's property to Foster, whereas the May will, drafted only two months later, devised nearly all of Laughter's property to Williams. These changes were made even though Jack Nazary recounted that when he visited Laughter in the hospital in April of 2005, Laughter stated that nothing had changed with his relationship with Foster. ¶ 27. The differences between the March and May wills raise questions regarding Laughter's capacity. The dramatic extent of the changes to his will may indicate that Laughter did not remember the prior will or understand how the proposed changes would affect it legally. Thus, the March will, as well as other evidence of Laughter's intent, such as the Nazary affidavit and the amendment to the promissory note, create a question of material fact as to Laughter's testamentary capacity at the time he executed the May will. ¶ 28. Foster additionally argues that Laughter did not have the ability to appreciate the effects of his May will because he devised several items that she claims he did not own. Whether an attempted devise of unowned property is enough to call into question a testator's testamentary capacity is apparently an issue of first impression in Mississippi. [6] Because Foster has presented other evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, however, we need not decide this issue at this time. ¶ 29. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Foster, as we must, we find that the evidence presented is enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Laughter's testamentary capacity at the time of the May will. The chancellor's grant of summary judgment therefore was erroneous.
¶ 30. Foster argues that Laughter had a confidential relationship with Williams. If true, this could create a presumption of undue influence, which Williams would then have to rebut with clear and convincing evidence. In re Estate of Reid, 825 So.2d 1, 5 (Miss.2002) (citing In re Estate of Dabney, 740 So.2d 915, 921 (Miss.1999)). ¶ 31. A confidential relationship is a relationship between two people in which one person is in a position to exercise dominant influence upon the other because of the latter's dependency on the former arising either from weakness of mind or body, or through trust[.] Id. (quoting Hendricks v. James, 421 So.2d 1031, 1041 (Miss.1982)). Whether a confidential relationship exists is determined based on the following factors: (1) whether one person has to be taken care of by others, (2) whether one person maintains a close relationship with another, (3) whether one person is provided transportation and has their medical care provided for by another, (4) whether one person maintains joint accounts with another, (5) whether one is physically or mentally weak, (6) whether one is of advanced age or poor health, and (7) whether there exists a power of attorney between the one and another. In re Estate of Holmes, 961 So.2d 674, 680 (Miss.2007) (citing Wright v. Roberts, 797 So.2d 992, 998 (Miss.2001)). ¶ 32. Here, Williams has conceded that Laughter was cared for by others. At various times, especially during the last few months of his life, Laughter was cared for by Williams, Foster, the hospital, and the nursing home. [7] ¶ 33. Williams also had a close relationship to Laughter. Williams was Laughter's sister, and she testified that she had always looked after him because [she] was the older of the two, and he had been [her] responsibility after [their] parents passed away to help as much as [she] could. See Wright, 797 So.2d at 998 (close relationship found on the basis of being related and having had a long friendship). Williams also testified that she had brought Laughter food when he was sick prior to his entering the hospital, and that after he entered the hospital, she stayed with him there. ¶ 34. Also, there is evidence suggesting that Laughter was physically and mentally weak. The Garner letter stated that Laughter was very ill and unable to handle his affairs and had been since the time of his divorce from Foster. As discussed above, the letter also indicated that Laughter could not remember deeding a joint ownership in his home to Foster a mere twenty-four days earlier. ¶ 35. Laughter was nearly eighty years old and in poor health at the time of the May will, as well. Williams conceded as much. Laughter had been hospitalized for two months and was in the nursing home, where he would pass away two months later. It is also undisputed that Laughter had given power of attorney to Williams. ¶ 36. In this case, therefore, at least five of the seven factors used to determine whether a confidential relationship exists are present. There is evidence that Laughter was physically and/or mentally weak, of advanced age, and in poor health. He was taken care of by others, and had given power of attorney to Williams, who maintained a close relationship with him. Therefore, we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Laughter was sufficiently dependant on Williams to create a confidential relationship between them. ¶ 37. The mere existence of a confidential relationship, however, is not in itself sufficient to raise a presumption of undue influence. Wright, 797 So.2d at 999 (quoting Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 723-24, 115 So.2d 683, 686 (1959)). Such a presumption would arise only in certain circumstances. These circumstances are: where the beneficiary has been actively concerned in some way with the preparation or execution of the will[;] or where the relationship is coupled with some suspicious circumstances, such as mental infirmity of the testator; or where the beneficiary in the confidential relation was active directly in preparing the will or procuring its execution, and obtained under it a substantial benefit. Croft, 237 Miss. at 723-24, 115 So.2d at 686 (1959) (internal citations omitted). ¶ 38. In this case, Williams was not actively involved in the execution of the May will. In fact, she was not even in the room when it was executed. But this does not end the inquiry. The Garner letter's statements that Laughter was extremely ill and unable to handle his affairs and that Laughter did not remember deeding his home to Foster suggest that Laughter may have lacked mental capacity as early as March 28. This is evidence that Laughter may have had a mental infirmity. ¶ 39. Moreover, Chatham testified that he was originally contacted by Williams, via Garner, and that Williams had made the arrangements for Chatham to meet with Laughter to execute the May will. This, coupled with the extent of Williams's benefits under the May will, is consistent with what we have termed suspicious circumstances. See In re Last Will and Testament and Estate of Smith, 722 So.2d 606, 612 (Miss.1998) (citing In re Estate of Harris, 539 So.2d 1040, 1041 (Miss.1989)) (beneficiaries drove testatrix to the attorney's office). ¶ 40. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Foster, we find that sufficient evidence was presented such that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Laughter and Williams had a confidential relationship and whether Laughter was thus unduly influenced by Williams.
¶ 41. Foster claims that the chancellor erred in refusing to admit the videotapes of the sessions in which Laughter executed the March and May wills. Foster contends that these tapes demonstrate the deterioration of Laughter's health and help to prove her claim that the May will is invalid due to a lack of testamentary capacity and/or undue influence. ¶ 42. A trial judge is granted broad discretion in his evidentiary determinations. Jones v. State, 920 So.2d 465, 475 (Miss.2006). This Court will not overturn such a determination unless the judge abused his discretion to such an extent as to be prejudicial to one of the parties. Copeland v. Copeland, 904 So.2d 1066, 1073 (Miss.2004) (quoting Stewart v. Stewart, 645 So.2d 1319, 1320 (Miss.1994)). ¶ 43. Before a videotape may be admitted into evidence, the party attempting to introduce it must properly authenticate it. To do this, the proponent of the tape must prove three elements: [r]elevancy of the subject matter to the issues, identity of the subject matter, and that the moving pictures present an accurate and faithful representation of the scenes filmed. Pittman v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 368 So.2d 238, 240 (Miss.1979) (quoting Barham v. Nowell, 243 Miss. 441, 449, 138 So.2d 493, 495 (1962)). ¶ 44. We find that Foster failed to properly raise this issue on appeal. In her brief, Foster does not reference any authority in support of her contention that the tapes should have been admitted; indeed, she does not even mention their exclusion in the Argument section of her appellate brief. The only argument Foster makes as to this issue is in her reply brief, and there, her only citation to authority is for the proposition that videotapes are helpful in determining the validity of a will. Thus, we are not required to address this issue. See Shavers v. Shavers, 982 So.2d 397, 401 (Miss.2008) (citing Ellis v. Ellis, 651 So.2d 1068, 1072 (Miss. 1995)). ¶ 45. Had this issue been properly raised, it would not change the result. The chancellor indicated that he was not excluding the tapes on their merits, but rather because a proper predicate had not been laid for their introduction. Foster failed to provide any evidence that the tapes she provided were what she claimed they were. [8] Since Foster did not properly authenticate the tapes or provide any evidence that they were properly submitted, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in holding that no proper predicate had been laid for their introduction. ¶ 46. Since we are remanding this case, however, this finding does not prejudice Foster. We are remanding this cause for a determination as to whether Laughter had testamentary capacity when he executed the May will and whether Laughter was unduly influenced by Williams at the time of the May will. On remand, therefore, the admissibility of the tapes will be subject to the relevance and authentication requirements set forth in the Mississippi Rules of Evidence.
¶ 47. Foster also contends that at the hearing on summary judgment, the chancellor erred in limiting each side's argument to fifteen minutes. However, this issue was not properly preserved for appeal. It is well-established that a contemporaneous objection is required in order to preserve an issue for appeal. See Barnett v. State, 725 So.2d 797, 801 (Miss. 1998) (citing Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131, 134-5 (Miss.1988)). ¶ 48. Foster did not raise this issue until more than six months after the hearing on summary judgment. Foster stated to the chancellor many times at the hearing that she was worried about her time running out, but at no point during the proceedings did Foster object to the time limits set by the chancellor. Thus, Foster is barred from arguing this issue on appeal.