Opinion ID: 76049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Injury occurring during a prior unrelated custodial episode

Text: 13 Based on our finding that Napier was in custody while the harm from the mistaken arrest accrued, it follows that were Napier imprisoned based on the trespass charge, he would be prohibited under the PLRA from bringing suit while thus imprisoned unless he alleged physical injury. In this case, however, Napier is not imprisoned on the trespass charge, but instead is imprisoned on an entirely unrelated offense. It could be argued that the PLRA's limitations should not apply to this case because the harm occurred during custody unrelated to Napier's current confinement. 14 Again, we are forced to examine the meaning of the phrase in custody, which by its plain language does not provide a temporal restriction on the custodial episode to which it relates. One could argue that the phrase in custody is meant to refer to the present custody, that custody for which the prisoner is in fact currently a prisoner, or that the phrase in custody is meant to refer, without reference to the other parts of the statute, to past or present instances of custody. The first interpretation might reflect a narrow purpose of the PLRA to reduce frivolous prison condition litigation, those suits brought by prisoners to challenge what they view as unacceptable or, indeed, unconstitutional circumstances of their present confinement. 15 However, the first interpretation is not supported by the plain language of the statute, and it is that language to which we ultimately must turn. Congress could have drafted the statute to say while thus imprisoned or while in that custody or during the aforementioned confinement to specifically tie the clause in question to the antecedent in order to ensure that the first interpretation was followed. Even more simply, Congress could have used while imprisoned as it uses prisoner earlier in the statute if its intent was to limit the claims subject to the PLRA to those arising from harm accrued only in that limited venue. 16 Again, the problem with a narrow interpretation of custody is that Congress obviously knew how to limit the application of the statute to prisoners or to events occurring in prison, but did not do so, opting instead to use the common phrase while in custody. When the import of the words Congress has used is clear, as it is here, we need not resort to legislative history, and we certainly should not do so to undermine the plain meaning of the statutory language. Harris, 216 F.3d at 976. The impact of this language, which is unrestricted to present custody, is that the PLRA covers all federal civil lawsuits filed by prisoners concerning emotional or mental injury suffered while in past or present custody, even if the subject of the filed lawsuits is unrelated to the current imprisonment. 3 17 Practically, the problem of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners is not limited exclusively to those lawsuits dealing with conditions of confinement. The natural target of a prisoner's litigious aggression is the government, and, as in this case, the vectors for such aggression are not limited to lawsuits challenging prison conditions. Rather, prisoners have cause and opportunity to file frivolous complaints concerning the range of alleged slights imposed upon them by the government during their custodial episodes, both past and present, both in prison and in the back seat of a police cruiser.