Opinion ID: 547645
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Factual Basis for Default

Text: 21 In their opening brief, Adriana does not dispute the facts but instead argues that their actions do not constitute discovery abuses. The district court found that Adriana, through their counsel, had violated several court orders. The court cited to the failure to produce documents as ordered by the court on March 3 and subsequently by the special master; failure to appear as ordered at deposition on July 7-10, on November 23, and on December 14-16; failure to make themselves available for deposition in June, 1987 and making misrepresentations regarding the depositions; and failure to provide accurate information about the identity of the cross-defendant AFP as ordered by the special master on March 23. 22 A determination that an order was disobeyed is entitled to considerable weight because a district judge is best equipped to assess the circumstances of the non-compliance. Halaco Engineering Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 379 (9th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). Adriana does not dispute the factual findings that they failed to produce documents and show up for depositions. Instead, they argue that their failure to comply with the discovery orders was proper because the initial discovery request served on them by Thoeren on December 31, 1986 was unsigned. However, the discovery request filed with the court on December 31 was signed by Thoeren's counsel as required by the federal rules. Adriana concedes that the original filed with the court was signed. Adriana offers no authority to support its argument that an unsigned copy of a properly signed and filed discovery request is ineffective and can be ignored. Further, Adriana did not object to the request when it was served but waited until after discovery was overdue. Therefore, the initial discovery request was proper. 23 Adriana also attempts to justify its failure to comply and appear at the depositions on account of illness of both counsel and clients. However, Lewis never sought to postpone the depositions or seek a protective order from the court despite the fact that Lewis knew in advance his clients would not appear. Instead, Lewis and his clients simply failed to appear at the July, November and December scheduled depositions and now try to justify that failure. 24 The court also found that Adriana failed to produce documents throughout the litigation. As set out in the facts, Adriana failed to produce any of the ordered documents on several occasions and, at other times, complied only partially with production orders. Adriana again tries to excuse this behavior, basically arguing that the court's orders were in error. Adriana appealed several of the court's discovery orders to this court without success. Disagreement with the court is not an excuse for failing to comply with court orders. 25 The record clearly supports the district court's findings that Adriana violated several court orders to produce documents and failed to appear at six separate depositions. Therefore, the main issue in this case is whether the court abused its discretion in finding Adriana's actions warranted a default judgment. 26 Initially, Adriana argues that all of the misconduct outlined above cannot be considered as a whole in determining whether the sanctions were proper. In evaluating the propriety of sanctions, we look at all incidents of a party's misconduct. See, e.g., Kahaluu, 857 F.2d at 601-602 (court looked to five separate acts of discovery misconduct in deciding sanctions motion). A court may consider prior misconduct when weighing a subsequent sanction motion. Halaco, 843 F.2d at 381, n. 2. Therefore, the district court properly considered all of Adriana's discovery conduct in deciding Thoeren's motion for default. 27 Adriana cites to United States v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 792 F.2d 906 (9th Cir.1986), in support of its argument. In that case, we held that the district court erred in considering three incidents of misconduct together in ordering dismissal. However, in National Medical Enterprises, the third incident that precipitated the dismissal (improper communication with the judge) was in a different context than the first two (discovery abuses). Id. at 913. Because the third incident was different in kind, the district court was not allowed to consider all three actions together for purposes of dismissal. Here, however, all the misconduct is of the same type: discovery abuses. Therefore, National Medical Enterprises is inapplicable and the district court correctly considered all of Adriana's discovery conduct.