Opinion ID: 181032
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tendency to Mislead the Jury or Prejudice the Jury

Text: The first factor requires us to consider whether the remarks in question were misleading or prejudicial. Carter, 236 F.3d at 783. As an initial matter, it must be noted that the defendants did not immediately object to any of the remarks. In some cases, the defendants did not object at all. That cuts in favor of a finding that the remarks were not particularly prejudicial, as anything significantly deleterious would presumably prompt a swift objection from experienced defense counsel. See United States v. Trutenko, 490 F.2d 678, 680 (7th Cir.1973) (We are inclined to believe[,] however, that if the comment were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, counsel who was present at the time either would have objected forthwith or else would have requested the trial judge to give a curative instruction.). [45] Setting aside the failure to lodge an immediate objection, it seems evident that a number of the improper remarks would tend, in isolation, to prejudice the defendants. The perceptions of the jury were surely impacted to some extent when the prosecutor suggested that he believed the defendants to be weak, greedy, and capable of criminal designs. See Bess, 593 F.2d at 755. Furthermore, it is plain that Kadon's military anecdote was likely to stir the patriotic fibers of at least several jurors, shifting their focus, if only slightly, away from the critical issue of whether the defendants were actually guilty. In addition, the defendants were surely injured when Kadon suggested that the grand jury had formed an opinion as to their guilt. See Bess, 593 F.2d at 754 (indicating that a prosecutor commits an egregious error when he opines that a defendant is guilty merely because he ... has been indicted). Thus, in a vacuum, Kadon's remarks would appear to entail a certain measure of prejudicial force. [46] However, to the sting of potential prejudice was applied the salve of forceful curative instructions. Once closing arguments were completed, and following a brief recess, the district court warned the jurors that the closing arguments were not evidence. The district court also stated, [I]t is not appropriate for the lawyers ... to express a personal opinion about the truthfulness of a witness' testimony. That is for you to decide. In addition, the district court commanded the jurors to disregard any personal opinions or personal backgrounds of counsel. The district court also touched on the issue of Kadon's references to the grand jury. In light of these ameliorative instructions, any prejudice precipitated by Kadon's comments was either extinguished entirely or diminished drastically. See Carson, 560 F.3d at 576 (holding that any prejudice resulting from the comments was `cured, or at least minimized, by curative instructions to the jury'); Carter, 236 F.3d at 787 (Ordinarily, a court should not overturn a criminal conviction on the basis of a prosecutor's comments alone, especially where the district court has given the jury an instruction that may cure the error.). [47] Accordingly, the first factor does not cut in favor of the defendants.