Opinion ID: 76049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Injury suffered during arrest

Text: 8 We have not yet addressed whether the words suffered while in custody, as used in § 1997e(e), cover more than just injury occurring while confined in a correctional institution. In matters of statutory interpretation, we give overriding deference to the unambiguous language of the statute. Harris, 216 F.3d at 972-73. 9 Looking at the statute as a whole, Congress was aware of its ability to restrict the application of the statute to persons confined in a correctional institution by using the term prisoner and defining that term in the statute itself. Congress chose not to use the more restrictive prisoner language, instead opting to apply the statute to injuries occurring while in custody. Congress is presumed to know the settled legal meaning of the terms it uses in enacted statutes and to use those terms in the settled sense. Harris, 216 F.3d at 974. The common usage of custody, in the Miranda context in which the definition most often arises, reflects not just imprisonment, but, rather, any situation in which a reasonable individual would feel a restraint on his movement such that he would not feel free to leave. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir.2001). Formal arrest is considered the archetype of a situation that results in Miranda custody. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430, 104 S.Ct. at 1144 (holding that custody for Miranda purposes means formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement... associated with formal arrest). 10 Given the structure of the statute, in particular, the lack of explicit connection between the term custody and the more restrictive phrases in the statute dealing with prisoner status and incarceration, and its plain language, we find that custody should be interpreted in light of its common definition. Accordingly, we find that the PLRA should apply to prisoner lawsuits that claim injuries suffered during custodial episodes, even if such custody occurred outside prison walls. 11 Turning to the particular circumstances of this case, Napier claims that he suffered injury from his mistaken arrest by the officers. The embarrassment or emotional harm occasioned by the mistaken arrest occurred, at the earliest, when Napier was arrested — or, using the Miranda construct, at the moment that a reasonable person in his situation would feel unable to leave. Because the harm complained of by Napier occurred while he was in custody, the PLRA applies to his claim, assuming the PLRA applies to causes of action unrelated to the plaintiff's present incarceration, as we must now discuss. 12