Opinion ID: 2411808
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appealability of order denying intervention as a matter of right

Text: PCA argues that Farms' appeal is from an interlocutory order that did not resolve all of the issues among all of the parties. While issues involving the parties remain to be decided in this case, the circuit court's order denying intervention to Farms as a matter of right precludes any other avenue for a Farms appeal. Farms moved to intervene under Ark. R.Civ.P. 24(a): Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Farms now urges that intervention is the only practical and effective means for it to protect its claimed interest in the litigation. This view was espoused in a recent Pennsylvania case. See Van Den Heuval v. Wallace, 382 Pa.Super. 242, 555 A.2d 162 (1989), where an insurance company petitioned to intervene in a workers compensation case and to be subrogated to the employee's tort claim against a third party. The trial court denied intervention. The Superior Court held that the order was appealable and reversed on the basis that there was no other way for the denied petitioner to appeal from that order. The court stated: It is unrealistic to suggest that [the carrier's] interest can be protected by a subsequent action against [the employee]. If the third party action is settled without notice to [the carrier], its subrogation claim is at the mercy of the employee who, having received payment, can dispose of the settlement proceeds as he chooses. The order of the trial court which denied intervention, therefore, has the practical effect of denying relief to [the carrier], which cannot fully protect its subrogation interests in any other way. 555 A.2d at 163. Other jurisdictions agree that an order denying intervention as a matter of right is appealable. See, e.g., Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1976); New York Public Interest Research Group v. Regents, 516 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1975); Ashland Public Library Board v. Scott, 610 S.W.2d 895 (Ky.1981); but see United States v. United States Steel Corp, 548 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir.1977) (denial order not appealable when intervention petition filed after judgment). We are aware that this view on the appealability of an intervention-of-right order is not unanimous. An alternative view maintains that the potential intervenor should have a legal right in fact to intervene as opposed to claiming a legal right to intervene. See, e.g., Brotherhood of RR Trainmen v. B & O R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947). But that requires a merits determination, and our rule is clear in stating that the movant need only claim a legitimate interest to warrant review. Additionally, it appears somewhat self-defeating to grant review conditioned on whether the movant has an actual claim and then undertake a fullblown analysis of whether the claim is valid in order to determine appealability. This same point was made in the Editorial Comment to an ALR annotation: As a matter of procedural economy, it seems incongruous to condition the permissibility of an appeal upon the same facts upon which its merits depend. Since in any event the court has to examine the two fundamental questions above stated [whether intervention is a matter of law or whether denial is an abuse of discretion], it is believed the better view [is] to hold that orders denying the right of intervention are appealable. Appealability of Order Granting or Denying Right of Intervention, 15 A.L.R.2d § 2, pp. 342-343. Moreover, this court and the Arkansas Court of Appeals, while not confronting the issue of appealability directly, have entertained an appeal in several cases from the denial of a motion to intervene. See, e.g., Polnac-Hartman & Assoc. v. First National Bank in Albuquerque, 292 Ark. 501, 731 S.W.2d 202 (1987); Billabong Products, Inc. v. Orange City Bank, 278 Ark. 206, 644 S.W.2d 594 (1983); Bank of Quitman v. Phillips, 270 Ark. 53, 603 S.W.2d 450 (1980). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals is of like mind. That court held in a suit interpreting intervention of right under Federal Rule 24(a), which is identical to our rule, that an order denying intervention of right is final and appealable. Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.1976). In so holding, the Third Circuit rejected the older rule that hinged appealability on whether the intervenor, in fact, did have a right to intervene and stated: It is sufficient that intervention of right was sought and denied to render the denial appealable. 530 F.2d at 504. We agree. The fact that Farms claimed an interest in the litigation Which was found wanting by the circuit court does not undercut appealability. We hold that the denial of an intervention of right based on a claimed interest in the litigation which may be unprotected, such as we have here, constitutes an appealable order under Ark. R.App.P. 2(a)(2).