Opinion ID: 2069253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Recalling of Robin.

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his numerous motions for a mistrial on the basis of the changed testimony of Robin in regard to seeing the defendant on the night in question and in allowing the state to recall her. The disclosure that Robin wished to change her story was made after her initial testimony and out of the presence of the jury. The prosecutor's disclosure of the information comported with his duty as set forth in Giglio v. United States (1972), 405 U. S. 150, 92 Sup. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104; Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U. S. 83, 83 Sup. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215; and Napue  v. Illinois (1959), 360 U. S. 264, 79 Sup. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217. In resolving this issue, the trial court determined that the defendant had not been sufficiently prejudiced to warrant a mistrial, and that if a mistrial were declared, the same problem would arise at a subsequent trial. After recalling Robin for additional examination out of the presence of the jury, the trial court determined that it was necessary that Robin be recalled to the stand. In that way, the jury would be informed of the discrepancy in Robin's story so as to permit it to correctly weigh her credibility. The option to recall Robin was offered to both the defense and the state, but when both sides refused the option, the trial court ordered the state to recall her. The fact that Robin changed her story benefited the defendant because of the potential for impeachment, but the new version of Robin's story was more favorable to the state than her former testimony. On appeal, the defendant's position, reduced to its essentials, is that the option as to how the newly discovered evidence should have been considered was solely with him. Such, of course, is not the fact. In State v. Nutley (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 527, 561, 562, 129 N. W. 2d 155, this court affirmed the trial court's exercise of discretion in examining a witness, stating As to the propriety of the court examining witnesses in order to clarify ambiguities or uncertainties, Federal Judge LEARNED HAND, speaking for the court of appeals for the Second circuit, has stated `It is permissible, though it is seldom very desirable, for a judge to call and examine a witness whom the parties do not wish to call. A judge is more than a moderator; he is charged to see that the law is properly administered, and it is a duty which he cannot discharge by remaining inert.' Under the circumstances of this case the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial  or in exercising its discretion in requiring the state to recall the witness.