Opinion ID: 2517324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Hearing on Sealing the Guilt Verdicts and Excusing a Juror

Text: Late on the afternoon of June 9, 1993, the jury notified the court that it had reached a unanimous verdict on five of the six counts, but could not agree on the final count or on one special circumstance allegation. After some jurors indicated that further deliberation might be helpful, the court sent the jury back to write down any requests for clarification. While the jury was doing this, the prosecutor asked the court whether it would seal the verdicts that had been reached at the end of the day. The court said it would, if the jury was going to continue its deliberations. Otherwise, it would just go ahead and take the verdict. The jury subsequently reported that the further instructions it received from the court were helpful. Accordingly, the court told it to return the following day. Defendant was present during these proceedings. The following day, June 10, the judge was absent due to a previous engagement. By midmorning, the jury had reached an impasse on the remaining count and the special circumstance allegation. The clerk informed counsel of the situation, and telephoned the judge. By agreement of counsel and order of the court, the verdicts were sealed and the jury was excused. That afternoon, the clerk received a telephone call from a coworker of one of the jurors, reporting that the juror was discussing the verdicts and deliberations at her workplace, including which of the jurors was causing the jury to hang. The clerk reported this incident by telephone to the judge. On June 11, the court discussed the situation in chambers with counsel, apparently in defendant's absence. The court expressed no doubt that the juror had engaged in misconduct that would prevent her from sitting for the penalty phase, if there were one. It proposed questioning the juror to see if she admitted the misconduct, and if she had spoken to anyone else before the verdicts were sealed, in which case the verdicts would be tainted and the jury would have to begin again after an alternate was seated. If she had committed no misconduct before the verdicts were sealed, the court believed the verdicts would be valid. Defense counsel expressed doubt about the validity of the verdicts in any event, and urged the court to seat an alternate and commence deliberations anew. The prosecutor disagreed. The juror, R.S., was called into chambers, and readily admitted discussing the case with her coworkers. She had thought the case was over. She apologized, and assured the court repeatedly that she had not spoken about it with anyone outside the jury room until after the verdicts were sealed the previous day. The court conferred with counsel, both of whom agreed that Juror S. had been candid. The court decided the misconduct had not tainted the verdicts. With the consent of both counsel, Juror S. was excused from further service on the jury. Defendant argues that his right to be present was violated when the verdicts were sealed and then accepted by the court in his absence, and when the court discussed the misconduct of Juror S. with counsel alone and determined that she must be dismissed. As to the taking of the verdicts, defendant claims he could have objected to their sealing in the first place on June 10, or asked the court to inform the jurors that they could reconsider the verdicts. However, defendant was present on June 9 when the verdicts were sealed at the end of the day, and made no objection or request for reconsideration. The jury was clearly at an impasse on the morning of June 10, abandoning its deliberations at 10:45 a.m. The judge was absent, and there was no alternative but to seal the verdicts at that point. Regarding the dismissal of Juror S., defendant asserts that he might have asked the court to excuse the juror before the verdicts were recorded, and seat an alternate for new guilt deliberations. Defense counsel made that very request. The court rejected the idea, and it is inconceivable that defendant's presence would have made any difference. This was not a critical stage at which defendant's presence was necessary as a matter of fairness. ( Kentucky v. Stincer, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 745; People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 312 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 30, 132 P.3d 235].) (17) Nor was defendant's presence required during the discussion of Juror S.'s misconduct, which led to her excusal with the consent of counsel. The dismissal of a juror for misconduct is not a matter for which the defendant must be present. ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 17-20 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673], disapproved on another point in People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 879; People v. Abbott (1956) 47 Cal.2d 362, 371-372 [303 P.2d 730]; People v. Feagin, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1438-1439.) Defendant identifies no particular circumstance that might have required his presence. He asserts he was deprived of the chance to make his own assessment of the juror's credibility and could have objected to counsel's consent to her dismissal. However, the misconduct was clear and court's decision was an obvious one. 3. The Hearings on the Threat to Juror G.'s Family Defendant also contends he had the right to be present at the hearings during which Juror G. reported the threat against his father, and the court decided to allow G. to remain on the jury. (See pt. II.L.1., ante, at pp. 1300-1303.) Defendant argues that he himself was the subject of these hearings, and that he was entitled to be there to protect his interests, particularly since, he asserts, his counsel failed to do so effectively. The subject of the hearings was the telephone threat received by the juror's father. Juror G. was clearly concerned with the possibility that the threat might be related to defendant or someone he knew. He requested that defendant not be informed of the episode so as not to confirm that the threat had been successfully communicated, in case defendant were hypothetically involved in some way. The juror would obviously have objected to defendant's presence. Defendant had no right to attend such confidential in-chambers discussions. ( United States v. Gagnon, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 527; People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 435-436, abrogated on another point as noted in People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 263, fn. 14.) He argues that he could have objected to Juror G. remaining on the jury, or in the alternative assured the juror that he was not involved in the threat. However, as noted just above it is settled that the removal of a juror is not a matter for which a defendant is entitled to be present. Assurances from defendant were unlikely to assuage the juror's concerns, which in any event were alleviated by the investigation that showed the threat was unrelated to this case. Finally, any direct colloquy between defendant and a juror would clearly have been inappropriate.