Opinion ID: 2192892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial Court's Independent Evaluation of the Existence of the Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: Smith also argues that the trial judge did not properly conduct an independent evaluation of his entitlement to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed under both Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, [6] and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. [7] See Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529, 549-50, 796 A.2d 697, 708-09 (2002); Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 526-28, 784 A.2d 1102,1106-07 (2001); Bhagwat v. State, 338 Md. 263, 270-71, 658 A.2d 244, 247 (1995); Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529, 536, 560 A.2d 1108, 1111 (1989); Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 606-07, 39 A.2d 820, 821-22 (1944); Marshall v. State, 182 Md. 379, 383, 35 A.2d 115, 117 (1943). Describing the nature of the privilege under the Fifth Amendment, we noted that the privilege is not a prohibition of inquiry, but is an option of refusal. Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443, 447, 204 A.2d 500, 502 (1964). In the present case, Smith argues that the trial judge was required to make an independent inquiry into whether his assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was valid under the circumstances of the case at bar, but that she did not do so. The State does not contest the fact that an independent inquiry was required, but rather, counters that the examination that occurred in the case sub judice was sufficient. In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951), the United States Supreme Court announced that [i]t is for the court to say whether [the defendant's] silence is justified . . . and to require him to answer if `it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.' Id. at 486, 71 S.Ct. at 818, 95 L.Ed. at 1124, quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 899 (1881). The Court further explicated that [t]he trial judge in appraising the claim `must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.' Id., quoting Ex parte Irvine, 74 F. 954, 960 (C.C.S.D.Ohio 1896). Examining what circumstances should be considered in ruling on a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, the Supreme Court stated that the court should recognize the fact that the chief occupation of some persons involves the evasion of . . . criminal law; and that one person with a police record summoned to testify. . . might be hiding or helping to hide another person of questionable repute sought as a witness. Id. at 487-88, 71 S.Ct. at 819, 95 L.Ed. at 1125. Ultimately, the Court observed that for the trial court to determine that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply, it must be ` perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such a tendency' to incriminate. Id., quoting Temple, 75 Va. at 898 (emphasis in original). We addressed the appropriate procedure for determining whether a witness's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege is proper most recently in Bhagwat, supra . We stated: And `because the privilege is not a prohibition of inquiry, but is an option of refusal,' [t]he witness should first be called to the stand and sworn. Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 289, 164 A.2d 526, 529 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853, 81 S.Ct. 819, 5 L.Ed.2d 817 (1961). Interrogation of the witness should then proceed to the point where he [or she] asserts his [or her] privilege against self-incrimination as a ground for not answering a question. Schifflett v. State, 245 Md. 169, 173-74, 225 A.2d 440, 443 (1967). If it is a jury case, the jury should then be dismissed and the trial judge should attempt to `determine whether the claim of privilege is in good faith or lacks any reasonable basis.' Midgett v. State, supra, 223 Md. at 289[, 164 A.2d at 530]. If further interrogation is pursued, then the witness should either answer the questions asked or assert his [or her] privilege, making this decision on a question by question basis. Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443, 447, 204 A.2d 500, 502 (1964). Id. at 271-72, 658 A.2d at 247-48 (alterations in original), quoting Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 265, 401 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1979). This procedure, however, need not be followed strictly where there is a clear indication, reflected on the record, that the witness intends to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination if called to the witness stand. Id. at 273, 658 A.2d at 248. In that scenario, if it is a jury trial, `[t]he mechanical procedure of first calling the witness before the jury' should be omitted. In other words, the witness should be called and sworn, but without the jury being present, and questioned before or by the court. In this way, the court is enabled to perform its function of determining whether the privilege has been invoked in good faith or has a reasonable basis. Id. at 273-74, 658 A.2d at 248-49 (alterations in original). In the present case, the trial judge, when Smith refused to respond to a question asking for his date of birth, summarily responded that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply to that information without considering the totality of the circumstances prior to making such a pronouncement as required under Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 819, 95 L.Ed. at 1125. Although ordinarily an individual's date of birth is not protected by the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, there may exist circumstances in which the revelation of a person's date of birth is incriminating. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592-93, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2645-49, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 546-51 (1990) (holding that based on the circumstances in that case the defendant's response to a question asking for the date of his sixth birthday was incriminating due to the defendant's demeanor and the content of the answer). Moreover, the trial judge in the case sub judice failed to make any inquiry of Smith regarding his invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to any other information solicited by the prosecution's questions. The trial judge should have examined each question that the prosecution and defense intended to ask of Smith with the intention of determining whether the question might elicit an incriminating answer. Moreover, the trial judge claimed to have relied solely on a proffer by the prosecutor and the legal conclusions espoused by Smith's counsel to find that Smith had no Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to any subject raised in questioning. As we determined supra, the disclosure made by Smith's counsel violated Smith's attorney-client privilege. As such, the disclosure was not admissible evidence upon which the trial judge could rely to reach her conclusion regarding the Fifth Amendment. See Newman, 384 Md. at 317, 863 A.2d at 340; Huester v. Clements, 252 Md. 641, 646, 250 A.2d 855, 859 (1969) (stating that [o]nce the relationship of attorney and client was established, a fortiori, the communication was confidential, and inadmissible in evidence); Tillinghast v. Lamp, 168 Md. 34, 42, 176 A. 629, 632 (1935) (holding that privileged communications between an attorney and her client are inadmissible). Therefore, the trial judge erred in basing her determination that Smith did not have valid grounds for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination upon the disclosures made by Smith's attorney in violation of the attorney-client privilege.