Opinion ID: 874381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Fund's Argument for Interpreting the Statute is Unpersuasive

Text: In addition to relying on the district court's reasoning, as discussed above, the Fund argues that reading I.C. § 72-915 together with I.C. § 72-902 makes clear that the Manager has the discretion to determine how to distribute the dividend. Section 72-902 reads: The board of directors ... shall appoint a manager of [the Fund], whose duties, subject to the direction and supervision of the board, shall be to conduct the business of [the Fund], and do any and all things which are necessary and convenient in the administration thereof, or in connection with the insurance business to be carried on under the provisions of this chapter. I.C. § 72-902. The Fund argues that the Manager's power to do any and all things which are necessary and convenient includes the discretion to determine how to distribute a dividend. The Fund also argues that I.C. § 72-901(3) provides that the Board has a duty to direct the policies and operation of the [Fund] to assure that the [Fund is] run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound and maintains the public purposes for which the [Fund] was created. However, sections 72-901(3) and 902 are general statutes, while section 72-915 is a specific statute. Therefore, the more specific statute controls. See Shay v. Cesler, 132 Idaho 585, 588, 977 P.2d 199, 202 (1999). As discussed above, section 72-915 sets forth a specific method for determining how the manager is to distribute dividends. Because the statute is unambiguous, there is no need to consider the plethora of evidence and testimony provided by the Fund to support its argument that the Manager acted reasonably in choosing to distribute a dividend only to those policyholders who paid more than $2,500.00 in annual premiums. The arguments, evidence, and testimony provided to this Court would be better targeted at the Legislature, which is empowered to change existing law. No matter the number and persuasiveness of the Fund's arguments, this Court's role is to interpret the law, which in this case was unambiguously established in 1917. See In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992) (stating that [t]he wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the Legislature alone) (citing Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1961)). If, in the intervening time, it has become prudent to alter the statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the proper remedy is to approach the Legislature to change the law.