Opinion ID: 2179203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Jury Trial Waiver

Text: In light of our recent decision in Stallings regarding the adequacy of a jury trial waiver, Miranda claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Although Miranda submitted a written waiver of his right to a jury trial and the court conducted an extensive in-court colloquy with him, Miranda points out the judge who accepted his guilty plea did not inform him he (1) was waiving his right to have twelve members of the community decide his guilt and (2) would have an opportunity to take part in the jury selection process. Miranda, therefore, asks us to conclude his counsel was ineffective and presume prejudice. To establish an ineffective-assistance claim, [the defendant] must show that (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 108 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984)). Having duly considered all the arguments of the parties, we conclude Miranda was not denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not fail to perform an essential duty. As explained in two companion cases also filed today, well-settled legal doctrine, as set forth in State v. Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 1984), controls our analysis in this case. See State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Iowa 2003); State v. Spies, 672 N.W.2d 792, 799 (Iowa 2003). In Lawrence, we stated a written jury waiver taken in compliance with rule 16(1) is prima facie evidence that the waiver was voluntary and intelligent. When the defendant subsequently attacks its validity, he bears the burden of proving otherwise. 344 N.W.2d at 230. Because there is no evidence in the record, nor any allegation on appeal, that Miranda's signed, written waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, we refuse to conclude Miranda's trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty. Where the evidence establishes a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, trial counsel has no duty to preserve the issue for appeal. See Buck, 510 N.W.2d at 853. Miranda's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must, therefore, fail. Id. In State v. Liddell , a companion case filed today, we partially overrule Lawrence to require some in-court colloquy to ensure jury trial waivers are knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 672 N.W.2d at 811-14 (interpreting on the record to require an in-court colloquy). This fact, of course, does not affect our decision in this case; it would be patently unfair to adjudge Liddell's counsel ineffective for failing to foresee [that] decision, which diverges from precedent ... it is not necessary to know what the law will become in the future to provide effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 814. Counsel need not be a crystal gazer; it is not necessary to know what the law will become in the future to provide effective assistance of counsel. Spies, 672 N.W.2d at 800 (citations omitted). Even if our decision in Liddell applied retroactively, in this case the judge conducted an in-court colloquy which clearly shows Miranda's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. For in Liddell we stated [i]n conducting an in-court colloquy, it is important to recognize the ultimate standard to be complied with is whether the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. To this end, a court should ascertain whether the defendant understands the difference between jury and non-jury trials, through an in-court colloquy. This inquiry may involve informing the defendant:
2. The defendant may take part in jury selection; 3. Jury verdicts must be unanimous; 4. The court alone decides guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial; and 5. Neither the court nor the prosecution will reward the defendant for waiving a jury trial. We must point out, however, that these five subjects of inquiry are not black-letter rules nor a checklist by which all jury-trial waivers must be strictly judged. They merely point towards a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. The ultimate inquiry remains the same: whether the defendant's waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. ... Substantial compliance is acceptable. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d at 813-14 (citing, in part, Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 111) (emphasis added and citations omitted). In the present case, the judge  after making certain the defendant had filed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial  conducted an extensive in-court colloquy with Miranda. The court informed the defendant (1) by waiving his right to a jury trial, the judge would decide the case on the minutes of testimony alone; (2) if the defendant would have asserted his right to a jury trial, the State would have provided him an attorney, if he was unable to afford one; (3) the defendant would have had the opportunity to testify at his trial; (4) if the defendant had chosen not to testify, no one could force him to do so, nor use his silence against him; (5) at a jury trial, the State would have to bring witnesses in to testify, which he could cross-examine; (6) the State would have to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of twelve jurors; (7) the decision of the jurors would have to be unanimous; (8) if the defendant could not afford to bring witnesses into court, the public would pay for him to do so; (9) by waiving his right to a jury trial, the court alone would decide the case and in the same manner as a jury would; and (10) explained the maximum punishment for the crime for which he was charged and that a conviction would require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant claims trial counsel breached an essential duty when she failed to ensure that the district court inform him that at a jury trial he would (1) be permitted to take part in jury selection and (2) be entitled to a jury of twelve persons drawn from the community. On account of this failure and our decision in Stallings, the defendant urges us to find defense counsel failed to perform an essential duty. Even though Miranda's trial counsel did not ensure the court met each of the five specific exhortations of Stallings, in this case there is no question Miranda waived a jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. As we indicated in Liddell, the five subjects of inquiry listed in Stallings are not a checklist; substantial compliance is acceptable. Id. Commonsense should tell a defendant, for example, that his twelve member jury will be drawn from his community. In this case, there is overwhelming evidence that Miranda's waiver was voluntary; indeed, the decision to waive a jury trial appears wholly tactical. See State v. Combs, 316 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Iowa 1982). Miranda has not proven his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and was not, therefore, denied effective assistance of counsel.