Opinion ID: 179005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of an Interstate Compact Begins with the Compact Itself

Text: The district court erred in looking only to the 1980 and 1985 Acts to determine congressional authorization for the burdening of interstate commerce. Instead, the proper place to begin this analysis is in the Compact itself. Congressional approval of the Northwest Compact, through the Consent Act, transformed it from mere agreement into federal law. [W]here Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States' agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). Therefore, we treat the Northwest Compact like any other federal statute, and interpret it accordingly. And we must also bear in mind that a compact when approved by Congress becomes a law of the United States, but a Compact is, after all, a contract. It remains a legal document that must be construed and applied in accordance with its terms. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128, 107 S.Ct. 2279, 96 L.Ed.2d 105 (1987) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In applying these principles, the district court ran afoul in several ways. First, it erred in concluding the 1980 Act has any ongoing application to the grant of congressional authority under the regional compacts. Unlike the 1985 Act, the 1980 Act did contain an express grant of permission for states to exclude out-of-region waste. [8] But the 1985 Act replaced the 1980 Act entirely. [9] The 1980 Act consists of only four sections, and the 1985 Act begins by stating it is amending the 1980 Act by striking out sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 [of the 1980 Act] and inserting in lieu thereof the text of the 1985 Act. 1985 Act § 102. Since the 1985 Act has completely replaced it, the 1980 Act is no longer in effect, and the district court's legal analysis began in the wrong place when it centered on the earlier, now abrogated, legislation. The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text, and not the predecessor statutes. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (internal citation omitted). Second, the district court assumed the Consent Act could only grant authority already contained in the 1980 and 1985 Actsthat is, that the individual agreements consented to by Congress could not grant any additional authority. EnergySolutions urges us to adopt this interpretation. But an enabling statute, such as the 1980 or 1985 Act is not necessary for states to form an interstate compact. Congress may consent to an interstate compact by authorizing joint state action in advance [i.e., in an enabling statute,] or by giving expressed or implied approval to an agreement the States have already joined. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 441, 101 S.Ct. 703. If no enabling statute is necessary, then a congressionally approved compact need not find a statutory basis for its powers elsewhere. Thus, the district court should have credited the language of the Compact in the first instance, rather than resorting to the 1980 Act and the 1985 Act. Congress extended broad authority to member states by consenting to the Northwest Compact. By statutory grant, Congress expressly found the Compact is in furtherance of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act [the 1985 Act], ratifying the understanding that the various statutes work in harmony. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d. In further confirmation of this understanding, the consent of Congress is hereby given ... to each and every part and article [of the Compact]. Id. The Compact then goes on to provide exclusionary authority to the Northwest Committee over any site, location, stricture, or property used or to be used for the storage, treatment, or disposal of low-level waste. Id. This interpretation is reinforced by a recent Supreme Court case reviewing a regional LLRW compact. Alabama v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2295, 176 L.Ed.2d 1070 (2010). [10] In this case, the Court was faced with the task of interpreting the Southeast Compact, an LLRW compact approved at the same time as the Northwest Compact. Avoiding any linkage to the 1985 Act, the Court based its holding on the language of the compact itself and Congress's power to consent under the Compact Clause, art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Although the precise issue in our case was not raised before the Court, the holding supports our conclusion that consent to create these authorities arises from the Consent Act, not the 1985 Act. Turning to the Southeast Commission's regulatory authority, the Court underscored that [t]he terms of the Compact determine that question. Id. at 2305. Similarly in this case [t]he terms of the Compact controlnot the terms of the 1985 Act. In fact, the Court does not cite to the 1985 Act at all. Instead, the Court treats the compact much as it would any other contract, even going so far as to rely on traditional canons of construction to interpret its meaning. See id. at 2308-12 (citing, among other sources, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS). Instead of comparing the Southeast Compact with the 1985 Act, the Court compares its terms with those of other interstate compacts, approved by Congress contemporaneously. Id. at 2307 (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 565, 103 S.Ct. 2558, 77 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983)) (internal punctuation omitted). Ultimately, the Court declined to read an implied remedial power into the compact that lacked one, when Congress had explicitly approved such a power in contemporaneous compacts. Id. Although not exactly analogous to the question here, we share the Court's reluctan[ce] to read absent terms into an interstate compact given the federalism and separation-of-powers concerns that would arise were we to rewrite an agreement among sovereign States, to which the political branches consented. Id. at 2312-13. EnergySolutions' preferred interpretation effectively eliminates through misdirection the exclusionary authority of the Compact over the Clive Facility. Finally, the district court and EnergySolutions rely on the general provisions of the 1985 Act to conclude the Northwest Compact does not have exclusionary authority over the Clive Facility. As we discuss in more detail below, these provisions are ambiguous at best. For instance, EnergySolutions argues the 1985 Act is the only source of exclusionary authority but glosses over the fact the 1985 Act rejected the language in the 1980 Act that was an explicit grant of authority, and replaced it with language that merely placed conditions on the grants of authority found in a compact. See footnote 9, supra. Yet EnergySolutions insists this conditional language supercedes direct language to the contrary contained in the Compact. On that same point, EnergySolutions argues § 2021e(f)(1)(B) of the 1985 Act, which grants exclusionary authority over any non-Federal low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities within [the] borders of a compact during the transition period, is evidence Congress intended to grant this authority only during that time. With the expiration of the transition period, the Northwest Compact would no longer have any authority over the Clive Facility. We disagree with this interpretation. While some compacts may have had narrower grants of exclusionary authority in their compacts than the Northwest Compact, Congress could have determined it important to give them broader statutory authority during the transition period. This provision does not suggest in any way that Congress affirmatively withdrew its consent to the exercise of exclusionary authority over these types of facilities after the transition period ended. In fact, through the Consent Act Congress explicitly consented to each and every part and article of the Northwest Compact, including its exclusionary authority. We cannot construe vague provisions in the 1985 Act to supplant the clear specific mandate of the Compact. In sum, the district court erred in relying on the 1980 Act, and the general provisions of the 1985 Act do not prevent the Compact from exercising exclusionary authority. In the Consent Act, Congress affirmatively waived any dormant Commerce Clause objections that otherwise would have prevented the party states from complying with the terms of the Northwest Compact. [11]