Opinion ID: 2607866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Criticism of the Ordinary or Reasonable Man Test

Text: As originally developed, the provocation defense represented the concept that the mental state of the accused was the test for moral culpability; however, the objective test does not focus on the individual's mental state. The anomaly has been noted by several scholars. The reasonable man test, being objective in nature, is antithetical to the concept of mens rea. Like all objective standards, it is an external standard of general application that does not focus on an individual accused's mental state. Thus, from the point of view of traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence, a paradox is inherent in the use of the reasonable man standard to test criminal responsibility: the presence or absence of criminal intent is determined by a standard which ignores the mental state of the individual accused. (Footnotes omitted) [11] The common law heat of passion or provocation defense placed the jury in the conceptually awkward (to put it kindly) position of having to determine when it is reasonable for a reasonable man to act unreasonably. In an article on the subject, Granville Williams explained: In the law of contract and tort, and elsewhere in the criminal law, the test of the reasonable man indicates an ethical standard; but it seems absurd to say that the reasonable man will commit a felony the possible punishment for which is imprisonment for life. To say that the `ordinary' man will commit this felony is hardly less absurd. The reason why provoked homicide is punished is to deter people from committing the offence; and it is a curious confession of failure on the part of the law to suppose that, notwithstanding the possibility of heavy punishment, an ordinary person will commit it. If the assertion were correct, it would raise serious doubts whether the offence should continue to be punished. Surely the true view of provocation is that it is a concession to `the frailty of human nature' in those exceptional cases where the legal prohibition fails of effect. It is a compromise, neither conceding the propriety of the act nor exacting the full penalty for it. This being so, how can it be that that paragon of virtue, the reasonable man, gives way to provocation? Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 Crim.L.Rev. 740, 742. Another writer calls the conundrum of figuring out when a reasonable man will unreasonably kill an impossible question. [12] Yet another writer comments that: Abandonment of the reasonable man standard would simplify the jury's task because the inquiry into the accused's own mental state is more concretely grounded in reality than are conjectures about a mythical reasonable man. [13]