Opinion ID: 202936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: NEPA, NHPA, and ESA Claims

Text: To satisfy the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing, Plaintiffs must show (1) that they have suffered an injury in fact, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the BIA's allegedly unlawful actions, and (3) that it [is] likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted). An injury in fact is an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted). In cases of alleged procedural harm, however, plaintiffs receive special treatment. Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1281 n. 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130. For example, one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be completed for many years. Id. The case before us is very similar to the above example described by the Supreme Court in Lujan. Plaintiffs allege that they have been harmed by the BIA's failure to follow the procedures required by NEPA, NHPA, and ESA before approving the Quoddy Bay lease, [10] bringing their claims within the procedural standing analysis. With immediacy concerns relaxed, to establish an injury in fact, Plaintiffs need only show that NEPA, NHPA, and ESA were designed to protect some threatened concrete interest personal to Plaintiffs. Id. at 572-73 nn. 7-8, 112 S.Ct. 2130; see also Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 938 & n. 2 (9th Cir.2005) (focusing on the question of whether the procedures at issue protect the plaintiff's concrete interest). Here, Plaintiffs' concrete and particularized interest is clear: They not only live very near Split Rock, but they also use the land and surrounding waters for a variety of ceremonial and community purposes. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ([O]ne living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement. . . .); Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1282-83 (finding sufficient interest where litigant regularly visited and engaged in recreational activities in the subject area); see also Ashley Creek Phosphate Co., 420 F.3d at 938 ([P]laintiffs who use the area threatened by a proposed action or who own land near the site of a proposed action have little difficulty establishing a concrete interest.). The now-approved lease constitutes a change in land use, which allegedly endangers the environment, the historic preservation of tribal land, and protected animal species in the area. The statutes in question were specifically designed to protect against these very dangers by requiring federal agencies, like the BIA, to consider these dangers before taking action. See Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir.1983) (discussing the purposes of NEPA). Plaintiffs have therefore alleged a sufficient injury in fact to establish standing to pursue their procedural claims under NEPA, NHPA, and ESA. The BIA focuses its arguments on the causation requirement of standing. The agency characterizes Plaintiffs' alleged injury as the harm to Split Rock, and consequently, Plaintiffs' interests in the land, resulting from the impacts of the construction of the LNG terminal. It goes on to argue that any such harms are not fairly traceable to the BIA's lease approval because the LNG terminal cannot be constructed until Quoddy Bay receives FERC approval, which is unpredictable. [11] Sea Shore Corp. v. Sullivan, 158 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir.1998) ([T]he injury is not imminent because it depends upon several tenuous contingencies.). This argument misapprehends the injury claimed by Plaintiffs. While it is true that the potential harm to Split Rock, and therefore to Plaintiffs, as a result of the construction of the LNG terminal is not certain, the procedural injury alleged by Plaintiffs has already occurred. See Watt, 716 F.2d at 952 ([W]hen a decision to which NEPA obligations attach is made without the informed environmental consideration that NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA intends to prevent has been suffered.). The procedures at issue seek to minimize the risk of future harm by influenc[ing] the decisionmaking process; [their] aim is to make government officials notice environmental [and other] considerations and take them into account. Id. The lease contemplates construction and operation of a LNG terminal, and it is the risks posed by the implementation of the lease which the BIA is required to consider under NEPA, NHPA, and ESA. As discussed above, Plaintiffs have clearly established a demonstrable risk to their interests in Split Rock as a result of the BIA's alleged failure to adequately assess the dangers associated with the lease as required by federal law. Cf. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir.1989) ([T]he [irreparable] harm consists of the added risk to the environment that takes place when governmental decisionmakers make up their minds without having before them an analysis (with prior public comment) of the likely effects of their decision upon the environment.). Finally, Plaintiffs meet the redressability requirement of Article III standing. All that is required in cases of procedural injury is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant. Massachusetts v. EPA, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1453, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007). Here, although Plaintiffs cannot establish with any certainty that the requested procedures will change the BIA's collective mind, there is at least a chance that proper consideration would convince the BIA to withhold approval of the lease. Although the BIA does not challenge Plaintiffs' prudential standing to pursue the NEPA, NHPA, and ESA claims on appeal, it is clear from our discussion above that the violations and injuries alleged in the complaint are the sort that [these statutes] were specifically designed to protect, and that Plaintiffs are asserting their own interests, rather than those of third parties. [12] Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1283 (internal quotation marks omitted). We accordingly find that Plaintiffs have established standing to pursue their procedural claims under these statutes.