Opinion ID: 1134497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The legislative history of RCW 9A.88.030 and .080 give rise to vagueness in the statutory definition of prostitution.

Text: As mentioned above, the majority studiously avoided the legislative history of RCW 9A.88.030 which gives rise to the current definition of prostitution as sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee. Similarly it has brushed aside any real consideration of RCW 9A.88.080 which depends for its definition, and thus its validity, upon RCW 9A.88.030. A resolution of the constitutional issues involved, without a consideration of the statutes' background, is unfortunate in light of the peculiar setting in which the historical background leaves the challenged statutes. It is insufficient to merely compare the words of our statutes with those of New York. The legislative background of RCW 9A.88.030 and .080 places them in a unique setting not reflected by a word for word comparison. Defendants Zuanich, Hansen and Bohenstiel were charged with prostitution under RCW 9A.88.030(1): A person is guilty of prostitution if such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee. (Italics mine.) Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.88.030. Defendants Brandes, Wardell, Ross, Fecteau, O'Neill and French were charged with promoting prostitution under RCW 9A.88.010(1): A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree if he knowingly: (a) Profits from prostitution; (b) Advances prostitution. (Italics mine.) Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.88.080. The terms advances prostitution and profits from prostitution are further defined in RCW 9A.88.060. [1] However, the offense of promoting prostitution charged under RCW 9A.88.080 necessarily involves conduct constituting prostitution under RCW 9A.88.030. Thus, if the offense of prostitution is impermissibly vague, the offense of promoting prostitution is equally vague. Consequently, it is necessary for one to direct his inquiry to the offense of prostitution under RCW 9A.88.030. The question of whether RCW 9A.88.030 is unconstitutionally vague requires an examination of the history of the offense of prostitution. Prior to the enactment of RCW 9A.88.030 in 1975, it was not a crime to be a prostitute. Rather, all criminal penalties attendant upon the vice of prostitution were aimed at those persons who were responsible for placing one in a house of prostitution or at those who profited therefrom. See, e.g., Laws of 1909, ch. 249, § 188; Laws of 1927, ch. 186, § 1; Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 154, § 127. Moreover, prior to 1973, even these statutory penalties applied only if the person convicted was responsible for placing females in a house of prostitution or profited therefrom. See Laws of 1909, ch. 249, § 188; Laws of 1927, ch. 186, § 1. Prior to 1975 it was a crime to accept the earnings of a common prostitute. Although the term common prostitute was never defined by the legislature, this court interpreted the term to mean a woman who offered her body for indiscriminate sexual intercourse with more than one man. State v. Chemeres, 20 Wn.2d 712, 147 P.2d 815, 150 P.2d 1012 (1944); State v. Thuna, 59 Wash. 689, 109 P. 331, 111 P. 768 (1910). See State v. Emerson, 10 Wn. App. 235, 517 P.2d 245 (1973). Under our interpretation, the female need not have received a fee for such intercourse to be a common prostitute. State v. Thuna, supra ; State v. Emerson, supra . Also clear from our interpretation was the fact that the conduct of the prostitute warranting conviction of the procurer or pimp was limited to heterosexual intercourse. In 1973, the legislature for the first time specified the conduct of the prostitute which was required to sustain a conviction of the procurer or pimp. Still prostitution itself was not made a crime. Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 154, § 124 (RCW 9.79.030) provided: The word prostitution as used in this chapter and title means any sexual conduct engaged in for a fee or agreed or offered to be engaged in for a fee between persons not married to each other. Sexual conduct means either or both sexual intercourse or any conduct involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. The conduct considered to be prostitution also was extended beyond heterosexual intercourse for the first time to include other conduct involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth and anus of another. Further, as defined in the 1973 act, prostitution involved sexual conduct wherein a fee was expected or received. The 1973 definition clearly altered this court's common-law interpretation which had limited the conduct, that would support conviction of a procurer or pimp, solely to sexual intercourse by the prostitute regardless of whether a fee was expected or received. In 1975, the legislature repealed both its 1973 definition of prostitution and all former criminal penalties applicable to persons responsible for placing one in a house of prostitution or applicable to those who profited from such prostitution. Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 14, § 10(3); Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.92(205). Thereafter, the legislature enacted the new offense of prostitution at issue here. Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. sess., ch. 260, § 9A.88.030-.050. The code now provides: RCW 9A.88.030(1): A person is guilty of prostitution if such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee. RCW 9A.88.050: In any prosecution for prostitution, the sex of the two parties or prospective parties to the sexual conduct engaged in, contemplated, or solicited is immaterial, and it is no defense that: (1) Such persons were of the same sex; or (2) The person who received, agreed to receive, or solicited a fee was a male and the person who paid or agreed or offered to pay such fee was female. (Italics mine.) The 1975 legislation makes it clear that the sex of the participants involved in sexual conduct is irrelevant. Contrary to both our former common-law interpretation and the 1973 legislative definition, prostitution now may involve conduct between persons of the same sex, i.e., homosexual prostitution. Expected or actual receipt of a fee for such sexual conduct is also an element of the offense. Defendants' complaint is that uncertainty of constitutional dimensions arises from the type of conduct now proscribed. The mere term sexual conduct is said to be too indefinite to provide fair notice of the conduct intended to be prohibited. Thus, they assert, the trial courts correctly determined that RCW 9A.88.030 and .080 are unconstitutionally void for vagueness. The requirement that criminal legislation must use definite language is premised upon two considerations. First, the statute must provide fair notice, measured by common practice and understanding, of that conduct which is prohibited, so that persons of reasonable understanding are not required to guess at the meaning of the enactment. State v. Carter, supra at 240; Bellevue v. Miller, supra at 542-44; Blondheim v. State, 84 Wn.2d 874, 878, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975). Second, the statute must contain ascertainable standards for adjudication so that police, prosecuting attorneys, judges, and juries are not free to decide what is and what is not prohibited based upon their own personal predilections and the facts in each particular case. State v. Carter, supra at 240; Bellevue v. Miller, supra at 542-44; Blondheim v. State, supra at 878. See Grant County v. Bohne, 89 Wn.2d 953, 577 P.2d 138 (1978). If sexual conduct is viewed in a vacuum, the array of possible conduct intended to be proscribed is vast. However, even in the context of the 1975 prostitution statute, the possible activities proscribed are many. Whether the term sexual conduct provides fair notice of which conduct is forbidden is what must now be determined. Prior to the 1973 legislative specific definition of sexual conduct, this court assumed that the prostitute's conduct referred exclusively to heterosexual intercourse. Our limited interpretation was rejected by the legislature in 1973, when the conduct constituting prostitution was expanded to include both heterosexual and homosexual intercourse and other sexual conduct involving the mouth or anus. However, the 1973 legislative definition was repealed by the 1975 legislature. At this time the legislature again defined prostitution by reference to sexual conduct but did not specify just what conduct was proscribed. Understandably, some uncertainty might arise over the meaning attributable to sexual conduct when considered in light of this court's earlier view and the legislature's differing view of the matter. This is particularly true since both heterosexual and homosexual conduct may now give rise to a charge of prostitution if engaged in with another person for a fee. The uncertainty arising from judicial and legislative changes in the precise conduct constituting prostitution is further compounded by uncertainty of the prosecuting attorneys herein. Even they could not agree on just what conduct is proscribed. The King County prosecuting attorney suggested the following conduct is included within the phrase sexual conduct: (1) acts of homosexual or heterosexual intercourse, oral sex, and masturbation; or (2) conduct proscribed by the 1973 legislative definition (although obviously repealed). The King County prosecuting attorney's brief also asserts that common sense indicates the following, somewhat obtuse, behavior is sexual conduct: sex, straight lay, screw, blow job, acts of prostitution, or disposal of rubber. The Whatcom County prosecuting attorney goes further and in addition to masturbation, oral sex and sexual intercourse suggests that four types of conduct may be included within the definition of sexual conduct: (1) behavior involving the contact by one person done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party; [2] (2) any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party; [3] (3) masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse or physical contact of the person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic areas, buttocks, or, if the person be female, the breasts; or (4) ultimate sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, or which involve acts of masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of the genitals and sexual relations between humans and animals. [4] I cannot believe reasonable persons would be put on fair notice by the words sexual conduct that physical contact of persons' clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic areas, buttocks or female breasts fall within the offense of prostitution. None of the foregoing definitions of sexual conduct suggested by the prosecuting attorneys can be said to provide the fair notice required by the due process clause. In fact the prosecuting attorneys cannot agree between themselves. Certainly fair notice cannot be obtained by reference to the 1973 legislative definition of sexual conduct since one cannot be said to have received notice of a current statutory prohibition by reference to a repealed enactment. Although the State appears to suggest it, fair notice is not provided by reference to the element of sexual contact required by the offense of indecent liberties. See RCW 9A.88.100. RCW 9A.88.100(2) provides: For purposes of this section [indecent liberties], sexual contact means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. (Italics mine.) Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.88.100. One cannot be said to have received fair notice that sexual conduct means sexual contact as specifically defined in the same chapter, and by its own terms refers to a separate and distinct criminal offense. In light of the breadth of possible conduct that logically could fall within sexual conduct as proscribed by RCW 9A.88.030, I have no hesitation in agreeing with defendants that RCW 9A.88.030 and .080 are vague and thus unconstitutionally infirm. Neither this court, the legislature nor the prosecuting attorneys in these cases agree on the precise conduct prohibited by the current prostitution statute. That the conduct must be sexual may be conceded. Yet which of the various types of suggested sexual conduct are prohibited so as to put a reasonable person on notice? Further, for which of the various types of sexual conduct may prosecuting attorneys charge a person with prostitution? This guesswork is precisely what the due process clause forbids: i.e., failure to provide fair notice of proscribed acts and the arbitrary enforcement of the law depending upon the facts of each particular case and the predilections of prosecuting attorneys, judges, and law enforcement personnel.