Opinion ID: 2976668
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliability of Boot-Print Analysis

Text: Turner also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to exclude based on the alleged unreliability of the government expert’s boot-print analysis. In the seminal case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court “established the standard for admissibility of scientific expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.”3 Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 907 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 975 (2005). Because Daubert requires that “‘any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted [be] not only relevant, but reliable,’” id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589), a court must first assess “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and [] whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93). Expert testimony, however, need not be “unassailable.” United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (citation omitted). Daubert provides us with a “non-exclusive checklist of factors” to employ when “assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony.” United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 528 (6th Cir. 2004). The factors include: 3 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. FED . R. EVID . 702. 12 1) whether the expert’s scientific technique or theory can be, or has been, tested; 2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; 3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; 4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and 5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community. Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95; Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 243 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir.2001)). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of the government expert regarding boot-print analysis. Turner asks us to focus on assessing the reliability of the government expert’s analysis. Both the government expert, Smith, and the defense expert, Koverman, testified that photographic analysis was recognized as a valid method of shoeprint analysis within the scientific community. In addition, Smith testified that the government lab methods were tested by an independent agency once during the year, and that he had never failed a proficiency test. Also, the government presented evidence indicating that a book entitled Footwear Impression Evidence by William J. Bodziak stated that “[p]ositive identifications may be made with as few as one random identifying characteristic.” J.A. at 185 (Smith Test. at 25:19-20). Based on the above, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the government expert’s testimony met the Daubert standard and FED . R. EVID . 702. We do not find persuasive Turner’s arguments that the electrostatic method should have been used, and that the four points of comparison used by the government expert were insufficient to conclude that the boot and the print on the glass matched. In short, the government and defense experts disagreed as to whether the photographic or the electrostatic method would be better to use on the boot print at issue—not whether the photographic method was a valid method, tested and accepted by the larger scientific community. In addition, the record reveals that the experts also 13 disagreed about the number of points of comparison necessary for a positive match between the boot and the print. These disputes go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. In sum, Turner’s arguments regarding the appropriate boot-print analysis method and the necessary number of points of comparison involve differences of opinion between the experts that the jury must weigh, not a court. See Champion, 380 F.3d at 900. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the government expert’s testimony regarding the analysis of the boot print. C. Cumulative Error: Denial of a Motion for Mistrial and Admission of Alleged Hearsay 1. Standard of Review We review the district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence and its denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 611 (6th Cir. 2008). However, we review de novo the district court’s conclusions of law and review for clear error any factual determinations. Id. “We have held that these standards ‘are not in fact inconsistent, because it is an abuse of discretion to make errors of law or clear errors of factual determination.’” Id. (internal quotation omitted). 2. Analysis Turner argues that there were several errors that, when combined, warrant vacating his sentence and retrying him. We conclude that any errors were harmless and do not, even in combination, warrant a retrial. “A constitutional error is harmless when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Esparza, 540 U.S. at 17-18 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court held in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 14 (1946), “if one cannot say, with fair assurance, . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.” Id. at 765. See Haywood, 280 F.3d at 724 (applying this standard in the criminal context). An error may be harmless if the contested evidence was already properly admitted through other witnesses. United States v. Sprouts, 282 F.3d 1037, 1044 (6th Cir. 2002). Although some errors may be harmless in isolation, a combination of such errors may be so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial for the defendant. United States v. Parker, 997 F.2d 219, 222 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hines, 398 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2005). a. Denial of Motion for Mistrial After Officer Ray’s Testimony First, Turner appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial after Ray testified that officers found marijuana in Smith-Knight’s vehicle during their search. The district court held that the information was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial, and that the situation could be ameliorated by (1) a leading question aimed at establishing that the marijuana had no relevance to the case and (2) a curative instruction by the district court. We consider five factors when determining if certain statements warrant granting a mistrial: (1) whether the remark was unsolicited, (2) whether the government's line of questioning was reasonable, (3) whether a limiting instruction was immediate, clear, and forceful, (4) whether any bad faith was evidenced by the government, and (5) whether the remark was only a small part of the evidence against the defendant. Caver, 470 F.3d at 243 (quoting Zuern v. Tate, 336 F.3d 478, 485 (6th Cir. 2003)). When engaging in this analysis, “‘the primary concern is fairness to the defendant.’” Id. (quotation omitted). To minimize any possible unfair prejudice to the defendant, the district court may give a limiting 15 instruction to the jury regarding the appropriate use of the evidence presented. United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 592 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1012 (2004). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Turner’s motion for a mistrial. The five factors laid out by Caver do not weigh in favor of granting a mistrial based on Ray’s testimony. We address each factor in turn. First, Ray could have answered the question posed by the prosecutor without mentioning marijuana. Indeed, after Ray’s answer and the defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor immediately asked for a limiting instruction. The district court found that this was “a slip on the part of this officer.” J.A. at 569 (2-199:178-19). Because our reading of the record causes us to agree with the district court that Ray’s statement was unsolicited, we conclude that the district court’s factual finding (that this was a “slip”) is not clearly erroneous. Second, the prosecutor’s line of questioning was reasonably related to discovering the relevant items found during the search. Third, the district court crafted a strategy for approaching the jury: both a leading question by the prosecutor to clarify and an immediate limiting instruction. Fourth, because the district court found this to be a “slip,” J.A. at 569 (2-199:178-19), it did not consider this to be evidence of bad faith on the part of the government. Again, because the record does not reveal the district court’s finding to be clear error, we conclude that the government did not act in bad faith. Finally, Ray’s statement regarding the marijuana was not related to this case; despite the fact that it was prejudicial to the defendant to be associated with illegal drugs, ample other evidence clearly weighed heavily against the defendant. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Turner’s motion for mistrial after Ray’s testimony connected him with an illegal substance, marijuana. 16 b. Officer McDaniel’s Testimony Next, Turner argues that the district court should have barred McDaniel’s testimony about the background of the robbery investigation under FED . R. EVID . 403; he argues that the statements made by McDaniel were “of little probative value when balanced against the obvious prejudice” to him. Appellant Br. at 29. The district court found that McDaniel’s statements were not hearsay, and that his testimony was properly admitted under Rule 403 because it was not more prejudicial than probative. Turner concedes in his brief that the district court’s determination that McDaniel’s statements did not constitute hearsay was not clearly erroroneous. See Appellant Br. at 28-29; Caver, 470 F.3d at 239. As a result of this concession, our focus turns to whether the statements were more unfairly prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. Our precedent states that “[b]ackground information that explains how law enforcement came to be involved with a particular defendant is not hearsay, because it is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted.” Caver, 470 F.3d at 239 (citation omitted); United States v. Evans, 883 F.2d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 1989). “‘When inculpatory out of court assertions name the criminal defendant in connection with ‘setting the scene’ for an investigation, the question of unfair prejudice under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence almost always arises.” United States v. Pulley, 922 F.2d 1283, 1288 (6th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted). Rule 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED . R. EVID . 403. We have previously held that “‘[t]he relevance and probative value of ‘investigative background’ is often low, but the potential for abuse is high.’” Pulley, 922 F.2d at 1288 (quotation omitted). However, “when 17 reviewing the balancing determinations required by Rule 403, this court must maximize the probative value of the challenged evidence and minimize its potential for unfair prejudice.” United States v. Lloyd, 462 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2006). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting McDaniel’s testimony because the testimony was not more unfairly prejudicial than probative and thus Rule 403 was not violated. Defense counsel’s opening statement began with a description of the bank robbery for which Turner was being tried and stated explicitly that another individual, Artie Ware (“Ware”), was responsible. Defense counsel emphasized during his opening statement that, despite all of the fingerprint evidence that was found, the police never tested to see if the prints matched those of Ware. To address the issue of whether Ware—not Turner—was the proper suspect, the government sought to introduce testimony by McDaniel about the development of the robbery investigation. In sidebar conferences with the district court during the testimony of McDaniel, the government stated that it would “gladly agree” to a limiting instruction that explained that McDaniel’s testimony was “not being offered,” J.A. at 538 (Trial Tr. at 2-168:1-7), to prove that the physical characteristics of the robber matched those of Turner; indeed, the government believed the fact that the physical characteristics of the robber matched those of Turner had been (and would be) shown by other witnesses. McDaniel testified that the initial suspect was Ware; however, because the physical description of Ware did not match the physical descriptions given by the witnesses, attention turned to Turner. As in Pulley, the testimony offered by McDaniel touched upon a key issue regarding allegedly improper investigatory methods in the case: had the police focused on the correct suspect? The fact that McDaniel testified directly that Turner matched the witnesses’ descriptions of the 18 robber’s tattoo and age is troubling; the government could have achieved its purpose by explaining how officers eliminated Ware as a suspect without mentioning that Turner matched the description provided by witnesses. However, even if we were to believe that Rule 403 were violated, any error stemming from McDaniel’s testimony was harmless because previous witnesses had testified about the robber’s tattoo and approximate age, and Turner’s tattoo and approximate age were apparent to the jury as he sat through the trial. See United States v. Powers, 500 F.3d 500, 510 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding as harmless error admission of testimony deemed more detailed than necessary to establish “context”). Two bank employees, Fisher and Kaddoura, testified that the robber had a tattoo under one eye. One of Turner’s friends, Lisa Donald (“Donald”) testified that Turner had a tattoo near his right eye; she also testified that Ware, with whom she had had a relationship, did not have facial tattoos. In addition, Angus, another bank employee, testified that the bank robber was approximately twenty years old. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting McDaniel’s testimony. Even if the scope of McDaniel’s testimony was greater than necessary to achieve the government’s purpose, any error was harmless because the jurors heard other testimony about Turner’s physical attributes from other witnesses and could observe him for themselves in the courtroom. In addition, because of the weight of the other evidence against Turner, it could not be said that McDaniel’s statements substantially swayed the jury to convict Turner. c. Bank Investigator’s Report Finally, we consider Turner’s argument that the district court erred by admitting the report of, and testimony by, the bank investigator detailing the denominations of the money missing from the bank. As we stated above, an error may be harmless if the contested evidence was already 19 properly admitted through other witnesses. Sprouts, 282 F.3d at 1044. We conclude that, even if it was error to admit the report and testimony by the bank investigator detailing the denominations of the missing money, any error was harmless because several witnesses testified as to the denominations for which Turner asked and was given. Three bank employee witnesses—Fisher, Crone, and Kaddoura—testified that Turner asked for fifty and one-hundred dollar bills. Because three witnesses gave testimony about the denominations of money demanded and received by Turner prior to that of the bank investigator, any error in admitting the bank investigator’s testimony was harmless. d. Cumulative Effect Having analyzed each of the alleged errors above, we must now consider their cumulative effect. We have held that “the cumulative effect of individual errors may result in a trial setting that is fundamentally unfair.” Hines, 398 F.3d at 719. In this case, one of the alleged errors—the denial of the motion for mistrial—was not an error, and the other alleged errors—the admission of McDaniel’s testimony and the bank investigator’s testimony and report—were at most harmless errors. We conclude that the cumulative effect of the admission of McDaniel’s testimony and the bank investigator’s testimony and report did not lead to a “fundamentally unfair” trial, Hines, 398 F.3d at 719, because the information revealed by these sources was also presented by other witnesses during the trial. The cumulative effect of these (at most) harmless errors was not “so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.” Parker, 997 F.2d at 222. 20 D. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 1. Standard of Review We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, and we affirm the district court’s decision “if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants bear a heavy burden in attempting to show that the evidence used to convict them was insufficient. United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 393 (6th Cir. 2007). 2. Analysis On appeal, Turner argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for bank robbery because none of the witnesses “clearly identif[ied] [him] as the robber.” Appellant Br. at 35. However, there is no requirement under the law that a witness see the robber and identify him or her; circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 760 (6th Cir. 2006). Thus, there is no need for a witness to have specifically identified Turner as the robber in this case in order to sustain his conviction. Accordingly, in light of the ample evidence presented by the government in this case, we hold that the district court properly denied Turner’s motion for judgment of acquittal.