Opinion ID: 1313550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Joinder Prejudicial?

Text: Profit argues that if we conclude that the joined offenses are unrelated, then we must remand the case for separate trials. But the ultimate question in a severance claim    is one of prejudice. State v. Townsend, 546 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn.1996) (quoting United States v. Foote, 920 F.2d 1395, 1401 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Gardiner v. United States, 500 U.S. 946, 111 S.Ct. 2246, 114 L.Ed.2d 487 (1991)). For that reason, even though joinder was improper, remand is not required if the district court's denial of the motion to sever was not prejudicially erroneous. See Conaway, 319 N.W.2d at 42; Knight, 260 N.W.2d at 187. In Conaway, this court affirmed the district court's refusal to sever two charges, stating: While, as a matter of policy, joinder made sense in this case, it is stretching things to say that the two offenses were part of a single course of conduct. Although joinder may have been technically improper under the rule, it was not, however, prejudicial. The evidence of each offense would have been admissible Spreigl evidence in the trial of the other, and the trial court so held.    Thus, there was no prejudicial error in joinder. Conaway, 319 N.W.2d at 42 (internal citations omitted). Thus, in Conaway, we did acknowledge the value of a Spreigl analysis in determining whether joinder is unfairly prejudicial. But it is important to note that the purpose of and the concerns raised by the joinder of criminal offenses are distinct from those involved in the admission of Spreigl evidence  evidence of other crimes or bad acts by a defendant offered to show identity, plan, knowledge, or modus operandi. See generally State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965). Profit correctly points out that if evidence of the Johnson attack had been offered as Spreigl evidence, the district court would have been required to provide limiting instructions to ensure that the jury did not use the evidence in an impermissible manner. See State v. Bissell, 368 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Minn.1985); see also 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 2.01 (3d ed.1990). In Spreigl evidence cases, such limiting instructions are necessary to ensure that the jury does not convict the defendant of the uncharged Spreigl offense rather than for the crime with which the defendant was charged. But in joinder cases the defendant is actually charged with both crimes. When a defendant is charged with and may permissibly be convicted of both crimes, there is less danger that the jury will try to punish the defendant for one crime by convicting him of the other. We do, however, recognize the inherent danger of district courts proceeding directly to a Spreigl analysis after paying only marginal attention to the traditional factors limiting joinder. We therefore remind the courts that if after careful analysis they conclude the joined offenses do not constitute a single behavioral incident or course of conduct, they are to sever the charges. While on appeal we ultimately look to whether the court's decision was prejudicial, we are certainly more likely to find prejudice when the joined offenses are unrelated in time, location, or objective. We therefore caution district courts not to rely on a Spreigl analysis to circumvent the traditional joinder analysis espoused by this court. That said, we proceed with our analysis to determine if the district court's refusal to sever the Bell and Johnson charges was prejudicially erroneous. Because our purpose on the appeal of both Spreigl and joinder issues is to determine whether the introduction of evidence of other crimes at trial was prejudicial, the analysis we have developed for Spreigl evidence serves as a useful framework for evaluating the possible prejudicial effect of improperly joining offenses. See Conaway, 319 N.W.2d at 37. The admissibility of Spreigl evidence is governed by Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) and subject to Minn. R. Evid. 403. See Townsend, 546 N.W.2d at 296. While such evidence may not be used to show the defendant acted in conformity with bad character, it may be admissible to show motive, intent, identity, or a common plan. See Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Cogshell, 538 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Minn.1995). Even if offered for such legitimate purposes, however, the evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Minn. R. Evid. 403; see also Townsend, 546 N.W.2d at 296. In determining the probative value of evidence, the preferred approach is for the trial court to focus on the closeness of the relationship between the other crimes and the charged crimes in terms of time, place and modus operandi.    [T]he closer the relationship, the greater is the relevance or probative value of the evidence and the lesser is the likelihood that the evidence will be used for an improper purpose. State v. Frisinger, 484 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Minn. 1992) (internal citation omitted). While the modus operandi of the other crimes and charged crimes need not be identical, [t]his court will readily uphold the admission of so-called `signature crimes' to prove the identity of the perpetrator. State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn.1997). The record suggests that the Bell and Johnson offenses share a common modus operandi. The victims in both of the offenses were African-American women who, at least reputedly, worked as prostitutes in the same area of Minneapolis. Both victims ingested crack cocaine prior to their respective attacks. Both were transported to the same area in or near Theodore Wirth Park. Eyewitness accounts or physical evidence linked Profit to that area in both cases. Both of the victims were left naked. Given these similarities, the jury could reasonably infer that the same person committed the Johnson assault and the Bell murder. Because Profit made identity a relevant issue by presenting an alibi for both offenses, use of evidence that Profit committed one crime to imply that Profit also committed the other crime is legitimate. See State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 515 (Minn. 1984) (holding that when the defendant put his identity at issue by offering an alibi, evidence of strikingly similar prior crimes committed by the defendant was admissible to show identity in the charged crime). While using the evidence to show identity was harmful to Profit, evidence is unfairly prejudicial, and thus excludable, only if used to persuade by illegitimate means. Townsend, 546 N.W.2d at 296 (quoting State v. Cermak, 365 N.W.2d 243, 246 n. 2 (Minn. 1985)). Because, absent joinder, evidence of either crime could have been used for legitimate means in a separate trial on each charge, we hold that joinder, although improper under Minn. R. 17.03, was not prejudicially erroneous.
Profit also claims we should reverse his convictions because the district court excluded evidence of the purported serial killings and, specifically, of Paul Kelly's possible involvement in the Phothisane killing. Throughout the course of this litigation, Profit has relied on several different theories, including judicial estoppel, curative admissibility, and reverse- Spreigl, to show that this evidence was improperly excluded. While not all of these theories were briefed to the district court or to us on appeal, Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 11 gives us the power to review any matter as the interest of justice may require. Given the important liberty interests at stake in this case, we will address each of Profit's various claims.