Opinion ID: 3010427
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Process of Determining the Extent of Harm

Text: Caused by Discovery Violations The movants appeal the measure of the sanctions the court awarded to them. They argue that the process the court undertook to determine the extent of the harm caused by the sanctionable conduct was in error, first because the district court ruled that their submissions detailing their harm were inadequate, and second because the district court awarded a uniform level of sanction based on the submission of one party. It would be useful, then, to begin by briefly describing that process. Having held that the discovery violations caused harm, the court examined the papers these parties submitted that purported to describe the extent of that harm. The court believed that the papers suffer[ed] from two shortcomings. Tutu III, 166 F.R.D. at 342. First, the papers did not adequately categorize the claimed harm within the framework the court had created for addressing the sanctionable conduct. The court found it difficult to determine whether the moving parties were seeking costs and expenses from (1) discovery violations related to the search for evidence of contamination at ETSS; (2) the failure to disclose the Agrelot memo; or (3) the sanctions proceedings themselves, the three broad areas into which the court held sanctionable conduct fell. Second, the court faulted the parties for their general failure to provide it with documentation that adequately and efficiently explained to the court how those expenses could be justified as a sanction. Id. These shortcomings led the court to award only a portion of the sanctions sought. The court declined to scrutinize the voluminous submissions of the parties in order to perform the categorization it had requested the parties to perform. Instead, the court simply denied the award of sanctions arising from (1) discovery violations related to the search for evidence of contamination at ETSS; and (2) the failure to disclose the Agrelot memo. The court did, however, award sanctions arising from the sanctions proceedings themselves. The court set a uniform level of sanction award based on L'Henri's request. The court did so 42 because it believed that L'Henri's request was clear, well supported, and, in all, unassailable.
We believe that the district court was well within its discretion to deny the requested sanctions based upon the parties' submissions. Our independent review of the submissions generally confirms the district court's view that they are less than helpful. The submissions are voluminous, are not well organized, and, at bottom, are unclear. It would take an enormous effort to impress upon them the order necessary for a reasoned decision, including the making of a reasoned judgment as to the validity of the requests contained therein. Although we suspect that, had the district court chosen to undertake such an effort, the material submitted might ultimately have supported the award of additional sanctions, we do not believe that it was unreasonable or a clear error of judgment for the district court to refuse such a huge task. Engaging the submissions on their own terms would cause great delays in a complex case already delayed by discovery violations and already taxing judicial resources. In short, the district court exercised its discretion in such a manner so as to prevent a second major litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (discussing a request for attorney's fees in civil rights litigation). We do not believe that by doing so the district court abused its discretion. Instructive in this regard are cases addressing requests for attorney's fees under civil rights or other similar statutes that allow for fee shifting in certain circumstances. These cases make clear that the applicant for fees has an affirmative responsibility to assist the court in sorting through, organizing, and evaluating a fee request. The Supreme Court has stated that in such cases the fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. Id. In submitting an application, the applicant must exercise billing judgment by making a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that 43 are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Id. at 434. As we stated in Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1984), members of the bar are quasi-officers of the court and they are expected to be careful . .. in their representations to the court. Id. at 841-42. Busy district judges cannot be expected to do lawyers' work. In sum, as with requests for attorney's fees, in assessing the harm discovery violations may have caused to litigants, district courts deserve the conscientious assistance of lawyers. Although a court is free to do so, it is not incumbent upon a district court to devote its own valuable time, energy, and resources to remedy the shortcomings of movants' submissions if that assistance falls short. Nor will we require the court to do so here. We thus do not believe the district court abused its discretion in refusing to award sanctions based on the submissions of the movants.
We also believe that the district court was within its discretion to award each party a uniform level of sanction to compensate the parties for their participation in the sanctions proceedings, and to base that uniform level on the submission of L'Henri. The decision to impose a uniform level of sanction suggests that the court believed that the amount of effort appropriately expended in preparing for and participating in the sanctions proceedings was uniform across the various parties. Such a belief was not unreasonable here since the parties were similarly situated. According to the court, L'Henri's counsel, Nancy D'Anna, submitted well-reasoned, thoroughly researched, and adequately documented material to the court throughout the sanctions proceedings. What is more, the court continued, L'Henri produced such material efficiently and relatively cheaply. In deciding to base the uniform level of sanction on L'Henri's request, the district court implicitly found that each party could have produced similarly wellreasoned, thorough, and adequately documented material for no greater cost than that incurred by L'Henri. We believe that it is not an abuse of discretion for the district 44 court to assume that all parties can produce work of L'Henri's quality for approximately the same cost. In sum, we believe the district court acted within its discretion in awarding only a portion of the monetary sanctions sought by the moving parties.