Opinion ID: 1462658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Court err in permitting the Commonwealth to use evidence obtained through an allegedly unreasonable search and seizure?

Text: There was no unreasonable search and seizure. Following appellant's consent to a search of his premises and his delivery to Captain Feltman of the keys to such premises, appellant turned over to Captain Feltman a 12-gauge single barrel shotgun, while the police and the appellant were at the Tennis Club. The police also found a box of pumpkin ball shells and another box of Winchester shells. Moreover, the shotgun and the shells were admitted in evidence without objection on the part of appellant's competent counsel. Although the two papers appellant had turned over to Captain Feltman on October 31st were not admitted in evidence and played no part in the trial, [] appellant nevertheless contends that these papers as well as the gun and shells were used against him and constituted evidence obtained through unreasonable search and seizure. The Constitutionally ordained right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived, and searches and seizures conducted with the consent of the defendant in a criminal case do not come within the prohibition of the IVth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 100; Anderson v. United States, 255 F. 2d 96 (C.C.A. 5), cert. denied 358 U.S. 845; Shores v. U.S., 174 F. 2d 838 (C.C.A. 8); Ruhl v. U.S. 148 F. 2d 173, 174, (C.C.A. 10); Grice v. U.S., 146 F. 2d 849 (C.C.A. 4); Howard v. U.S., 75 F. 2d 562 (C.C.A. 7), cert. denied 295 U.S. 740; Schutte v. U.S., 21 F. 2d 830 (C.C.A. 6); U.S. v. Haas, 106 F. Supp. 295, 109 F. Supp. 443; 79 C.J.S., pages 816-818; 47 Am. Jur., page 547. The Commonwealth's evidence was amply sufficient to show consent. Furthermore, it is not a violation of the Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure for officers when making a lawful arrest with or without a search warrant, to discover and seize any evidence, articles or fruits of crime found upon the prisoner or upon the premises under his control at the time of his lawful arrest, if it is directly connected with the offense charged. This constitutes merely an incidental seizure of evidence of crime in the execution of a lawful arrest and not a wrongful invasion of the home by an unwarranted seizure of property. The maintenance of public order and the protection of society by efficient prosecution of criminals require it: Ker v. California, 31 L.W. 4611, June 10, 1963; Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 392; Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585; Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616; Commonwealth v. Stubler, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 32, 34, 35; Commonwealth v. Grasse, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 480, 484, 485; Commonwealth v. Finch, 80 Pa. Superior Ct., 386, 388. In Ker v. California, supra, the Court held that evidence is admissible which is the product of a search incident to a lawful arrest even where the officers had no search warrant and broke into a man's home having reasonable cause to believe that an offense has been or is being committed, provided the peace officers demand admittance and explain the purpose for which the admittance is desired. The Court said (pages 4616, 4617): . . . The doctrine that a search without warrant may be lawfully conducted if incident to a lawful arrest has long been recognized as consistent with the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the criminal Law, 49 Cal. L. Rev. 474, 490-493 (1961). The cases have imposed no requirement that the arrest be under authority of an arrest warrant, but only that it be lawful. See Marron v. United States, supra, at 198-199; United States v. Rabinowitz, supra, at 61; cf. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1925). . . . The search of the petitioners' apartment was well within the limits upheld in Harris v. United States, supra, which also concerned a private apartment dwelling. The evidence here, unlike that in Harris, was the instrumentality of the very crime for which petitioners were arrested [a brick of marijuana],. . .