Opinion ID: 109465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reserved-Water-Rights Doctrine

Text: This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation of federal lands. The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 805 (1976); United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U. S. 520, 522-523 (1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 601 (1963); FPC v. Oregon, 349 U. S. 435 (1955); United States v. Powers, 305 U. S. 527 (1939); Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564 (1908). Nevada argues that the cases establishing the doctrine of federally reserved water rights articulate an equitable doctrine calling for a balancing of competing interests. However, an examination of those cases shows they do not analyze the doctrine in terms of a balancing test. For example, in Winters v. United States, supra , the Court did not mention the use made of the water by the upstream landowners in sustaining an injunction barring their diversions of the water. The Statement of the Case in Winters notes that the upstream users were homesteaders who had invested heavily in dams to divert the water to irrigate their land, not an unimportant interest. The Court held that when the Federal Government reserves land, by implication it reserves water rights sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the reservation. [4] In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was created. See, e. g., Arizona v. California, supra, at 599-601; Winters v. United States, supra, at 576. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the 1952 Proclamation expressed an intention to reserve unappropriated water, and we agree. [5] The Proclamation discussed the pool in Devil's Hole in four of the five preambles and recited that the pool . . . should be given special protection. Since a pool is a body of water, the protection contemplated is meaningful only if the water remains; the water right reserved by the 1952 Proclamation was thus explicit, not implied. [6] Also explicit in the 1952 Proclamation is the authority of the Director of the Park Service to manage the lands of Devil's Hole Monument as provided in the act of Congress entitled `An Act to establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes,' approved August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U. S. C. 1-3) . . . . The National Park Service Act provides that the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reservations is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. 39 Stat. 535, 16 U. S. C. § 1. The implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine, however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more. Arizona v. California, supra, at 600-601. Here the purpose of reserving Devil's Hole Monument is preservation of the pool. Devil's Hole was reserved for the preservation of the unusual features of scenic, scientific, and educational interest. The Proclamation notes that the pool contains a peculiar race of desert fish . . . which is found nowhere else in the world and that the pool is of . . . outstanding scientific importance . . . . The pool need only be preserved, consistent with the intention expressed in the Proclamation, to the extent necessary to preserve its scientific interest. The fish are one of the features of scientific interest. The preamble noting the scientific interest of the pool follows the preamble describing the fish as unique; the Proclamation must be read in its entirety. Thus, as the District Court has correctly determined, the level of the pool may be permitted to drop to the extent that the drop does not impair the scientific value of the pool as the natural habitat of the species sought to be preserved. The District Court thus tailored its injunction, very appropriately, to minimal need, curtailing pumping only to the extent necessary to preserve an adequate water level at Devil's Hole, thus implementing the stated objectives of the Proclamation. Petitioners in both cases argue that even if the intent of the 1952 Proclamation were to maintain the pool, the American Antiquities Preservation Act did not give the President authority to reserve a pool. Under that Act, according to the Cappaert petitioners, the President may reserve federal lands only to protect archeologic sites. However, the language of the Act which authorizes the President to proclaim as national monuments historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government is not so limited. The pool in Devil's Hole and its rare inhabitants are objects of historic or scientific interest. See generally Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 451-456 (1920).