Opinion ID: 1060573
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Statements as Corroborating Evidence

Text: The appellee argues that even if the prior statements of C.S. are considered as substantive evidence, the inconsistencies between her prior statements and her trial testimony fail to sufficiently corroborate the confession so as to sustain the conviction. It is a well-established principle of law in this state that a conviction cannot be founded solely upon a defendant's confession, and our cases have long required some corroborating evidence in order to establish the corpus delicti. See Ashby v. State, 124 Tenn. 684, 697-98, 139 S.W. 872, 875 (1911). The term corpus delicti refers to the body of the crime [or] evidence that a crime was committed at the place alleged in the indictment, Van Zandt v. State, 218 Tenn. 187, 202, 402 S.W.2d 130, 136 (1966), and the state needs only slight evidence of the corpus delicti . . . to corroborate a confession and sustain a conviction. See, e.g., State v. Driver, 634 S.W.2d 601, 606 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981). Indeed, as this Court has discussed in connection with a confession supporting an arson conviction, [the corroborating] evidence is sufficient if . . . it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, although the evidence is slight, and entitled, when standing by itself, to but little consideration. Thus when we have a verdict[,] even though founded on slight evidence of corroboration connecting the defendant with the crime, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the verdict is contrary to the evidence. Ricketts v. State, 192 Tenn. 649, 654-55, 241 S.W.2d 604, 606 (1951). When the prior statements of C.S. are considered as proof of the matters stated therein, we find that the statements fully corroborate both of the appellee's confessions. C.S. admitted at trial that her original allegations contained the following facts: (1) that the incident occurred in January of 1996; (2) that it happened in the evening while her mother was at work; (3) that her brother was at home in his bedroom; (4) that she was watching T.V. in the living room with her father, who was sitting on the couch; (5) that her father asked her to sit on the couch with him; (6) that her father began to rub the inside of her leg with his hand; (7) that he ran his hand underneath her shorts and underwear; (8) that her father touched her private parts; and (9) that she told him to stop. By way of comparison, the appellee, who apparently knew nothing of the particulars of these allegations, stated the following facts in his first confession: (1) that the incident occurred in January of 1996; (2) that he rubbed his daughter's leg; (3) that he rubbed under her clothes; and (4) that he touched her in her groin area. In addition to these facts, the appellee in his written confession admitted that (1) his son was at home in his bedroom; (2) that he and his daughter were sitting on the couch at the time the incident happened; and (3) that his daughter told him to stop. When the prior statements of C.S. are considered for their substantive value, as the jury was entitled to do in the absence of an objection or limiting instruction, it is clear that there was substantial corroboration of the confession to establish the corpus delicti. In fact, the allegations that C.S. made to her mother, Ms. Gore, and Officer Vandiver, corroborate virtually every aspect of both of the appellee's confession in substantial detail. Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation in concluding that the evidence was more than sufficient to convict the appellee of aggravated sexual battery. The appellee argues that a confession cannot be corroborated by a recanted accusation. We disagree. Although the jury in this case was presented with alternative versions of the facts, it was entitled to decide and resolve for itself the inconsistencies in the evidence presented to it. It is clear from the verdict in this case that the jury chose to credit the prior statements of C.S. over her testimony at trial, and we will not re-weigh this finding. All three judges on the intermediate court agreed that if the prior statements are considered for their substantive value, then the evidence is sufficient in this case to support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with this determination and conclude that when the prior statements of C.S. are substantively considered along with the two confessions given by the appellee, the corpus delicti of the crime has been acceptably demonstrated. Accordingly, we hold that the proof is sufficient to establish the appellee's guilt of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Citing this Court's opinion in Johnston v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Railway Co., 146 Tenn. 135, 240 S.W. 429 (1922), the appellee contends that when the sole witness both affirms and denies that a particular act happened, it would be mere caprice in a jury upon such evidence to decide [the issue] either way. We agree with the appellant that if C.S.'s prior statements were the only evidence of the crime committed, then a conviction could not be sustained. Nevertheless, the prior statements in this case are needed only to corroborate the appellee's confessions, and even though the corroborative evidence may be slight, such evidence does not need to be as convincing in establishing the corpus delicti as when no confession exists. . . . State v. Jackson, 506 S.W.2d 146, 148-49 (Tenn.1974). The prior statements, as substantive evidence credited by the jury, far exceed the relatively low threshold required to corroborate a confession, and we hold that the State has met its burden in this case.