Opinion ID: 1723445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Empire Iron Mining v. Orhanen

Text: The rules of statutory construction are well established. This Court begins by examining the language of the statute itself. See Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning reflects the Legislature's intent and this Court applies the statute as written. Judicial construction is not permitted. Id. Although this Court affords an agency some deference in interpreting a statute that it executes, the agency's interpretation is not binding on this Court and cannot be used to overcome the statute's plain meaning. Ludington Service Corp. v. Acting Comm'r of Ins., 444 Mich. 481, 505, 511 N.W.2d 661 (1994). Section 29(8) provides that an employee is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits during a week in which that employee is unemployed because of a labor dispute. An employee may, however, end this disqualification: An individual's disqualification imposed or imposable under this subsection is terminated if the individual performs services in employment with an employer in at least 2 consecutive weeks falling wholly within the period of the individual's total or partial unemployment due to the labor dispute, and in addition earns wages in each of those weeks in an amount equal to or greater than the individual's actual or potential weekly benefit rate with respect to those weeks based on the individual's employment with the employer involved in the labor dispute. [M.C.L. § 421.29(8)(b); M.S.A. § 17.531(8)(b) (emphasis added).] The lead opinion concludes that an employee may terminate his disqualification even if he does not work for two consecutive weeks with a single employer. Op. p. 853. The opinion concludes, without expressly stating, that the statute's language is ambiguous. I disagree with this approach because I believe that the statute, examined by itself, is unambiguous. In using the phrase with an employer, the Legislature has required that an employee work for two weeks with a single employer in order to requalify for unemployment compensation benefits during a labor strike. I see no need for judicial construction. The lead opinion relies on other sections of the act, specifically M.C.L. § 421.20; M.S.A. § 17.521 (determining how benefits shall be paid) and M.C.L. § 421.50; M.S.A. § 17.554 (defining credit week), to support its claim that an employer in § 29(8) may refer to multiple employers. See Op. pp. 852-853. However, the specific sections the lead opinion quotes, which indicate that an employee may receive benefits for a week in which he worked for multiple employers, do not govern the circumstance in which an employee attempts to terminate his disqualification under § 29(8) during a labor strike through interim work. Subsection 29(8) specifically disqualifies an employee for unemployment benefits during a labor dispute and identifies the requirements that he must meet to terminate it. The lead opinion ignores the plain language of § 29(8), which requires that the interim employment be with an employer, and instead cites other provisions of the act that do not apply in this circumstance. The lead opinion secondly examines a foreign jurisdiction's treatment of a similarly worded statute in support of its conclusion. See Op. p. 852, relying on Taminski v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 168 Conn. 324, 362 A.2d 868 (1975). Finally, the lead opinion, after its examination of the Connecticut case, relies on the Michigan statutory rule of construction, M.C.L. § 8.3b; M.S.A. § 2.212(2), for support in reading an employer to mean any number of employers. M.C.L. § 8.3b; M.S.A. § 2.212(2) provides in pertinent part: Every word importing the singular number only may extend to and embrace the plural number, and every word importing the plural number may be applied and limited to the singular number. [Emphasis added.] The lead opinion, by applying this permissive inference to this statute, renders the unambiguous language of the statute ambiguous. The purpose of the statutory rules of construction is to enhance the Court's ability to interpret the legislative intent when a statute is unclear, not to obscure what is otherwise clear. The Legislature has expressly reserved, under M.C.L. § 8.3; M.S.A. § 2.212, the application of these statutory rules to cases in which the Legislature's intent is not manifest, i.e., when the statutory language is ambiguous: In the construction of the statutes of this state, the rules stated in sections 3a to 3w shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature. [Emphasis added.] Consequently, I would limit the application of the statutory rules of construction, listed in §§ 3a to 3w, to statutes in which (1) the plain language does not make the Legislature's intent manifest, or, in other words, the statute is ambiguous or (2) the statute's language would otherwise create an absurd result. See Crowley, Milner & Co. v. Macomb Circuit Judge, 239 Mich. 605, 615-616, 215 N.W. 29 (1927) (The statute [that the singular number may embrace the plural number] is for use and has been employed to avert ridiculous situations [emphasis added]). The rule of statutory construction in M.C.L. § 8.3b; M.S.A. § 2.212(2) should not be applied to the unambiguous language of § 29(8) because the plain language does not create an absurd result. The plain meaning of the statute as written is consistent with this Court's explanation in Dow Chemical Co. v. Curtis, 431 Mich. 471, 481, n. 10, 430 N.W.2d 645 (1988), of the Legislature's intent in enacting this provision. In Dow, supra at 482, 430 N.W.2d 645, we concluded that the Legislature intended to ensure that there were objective criteria for evaluating the substantiality of `interim employment' necessary to requalify an employee for unemployment compensation benefits during a labor strike. (Emphasis added.) This Court, in Dow, was evaluating the relevant statutory language in § 29(8), which, the Court noted, had been enacted to restore the viability of the labor dispute disqualification. Id. at 480, 430 N.W.2d 645. The Legislature was attempting to remedy the deficiency created by this Court in Great Lakes Steel Corp. v. Employment Security Comm., 381 Mich. 249, 161 N.W.2d 14 (1968), when we interpreted the predecessor of § 29 to allow work of even a very short duration to end the labor dispute disqualification. See Dow, supra at 480, 430 N.W.2d 645. Hence, the Legislature adopted the objective criteria outlined in § 29(8). Id. at 481-482, 430 N.W.2d 645. [1] See also Op. pp. 848-849, for a history of the provision. In the context of the legislative history, the Legislature's decision in § 29(8) to use the phrase with an employer indicates that the Legislature intended to create an objective requirement regarding the nature of the work. The lead opinion fails to provide any explanation for the reason that this critical phrase appears in the statute. The statute also requires that the employee work two weeks with the single employer, these two weeks be consecutive, and the employee earn income equal to, or greater than, his weekly benefit rate with his previous employer during that period. By requiring that the employment of two consecutive weeks be with a single employer, this provision furthers the Legislature's wish to safeguard that any interim work be substantial[ ], see Dow, supra at 482, 430 N.W.2d 645, by ensuring that the employee obtain a stable interim position, and not just makeshift work with various employers for any duration. The requirement that there be only a single employer guarantees that the employee achieved a modest measure of stability in the interim employment before seeking unemployment benefits when that work ceased. Because there is no dispute that these three employees did not work for two weeks with a single employer, I would reinstate the referee decisions that this interim employment did not end the labor dispute disqualification. [2]