Opinion ID: 2544410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dr. Meloy's testimony was consistent with Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833 (Colo.2000).

Text: Finally, we reject Defendant's argument that Dr. Meloy's testimony is inadmissible pursuant to Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833 (Colo.2000). Salcedo considered only the narrow issue of whether the prosecution can offer drug courier profiles as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt. Id. at 834. Even on this question we did not articulate a per se rule of exclusion. Instead, we identified certain aspects of the drug courier profile at issue in Salcedo that were inconsistent with the requirements of CRE 702, 401, 402 and 403, and therefore required the exclusion of that particular profile. Id. at 837-40. First, in contrast to a profile comprised of an objective and articulable combination of behaviors and characteristics, the Salcedo profile depended on the subjective, if not intuitive, judgment of the individual officer that was qualified as the expert. Id. at 838. We reasoned that [t]he lack of evidence indicating that [the police officer] utilized an objective, widely recognized profile seriously undermined the likelihood that his testimony and opinions would assist the jury to determine Salcedo's state of mind at the time of his arrest. Id. at 839. Second, the prosecution had not proved that the profile was reasonably reliable. Id. Accordingly, [the officer's] profile may be highly reliable or totally unreliable as a predictor of whether a person is actually a drug courier. Id. Third, and perhaps most troubling, the behavior and characteristics constituting the profile applied equally to law-abiding citizens. Id. Therefore, their presence does not tend to make it more or less probable that a person displaying those behaviors is a drug courier. Id. Accordingly, we concluded that before drug courier profile evidence can be considered logically relevant to whether a person conforming to the profile is a drug courier, the prosecution must demonstrate that the behavior and characteristics that constitute the profile are relatively unique to drug couriers. Id. at 840. And finally, because the expert testified as both a factual witness and an expert witness  at times intermingling expert testimony concerning the behavior and characteristics that constituted the drug courier profile with eyewitness testimony concerning the defendant's actions and appearance  we concluded that there was a serious danger under CRE 403 that the jury would be misled by the expert's testimony. Id. For these reasons, we held that the drug courier profile at issue in Salcedo was inadmissible. Id. We made clear, however, that [o]ur holding in no way limits the admissibility of relevant evidence of a defendant's own behavior and characteristics. Id. Evidence of a defendant's actions, demeanor, or appearance at the time he allegedly committed a crime generally is relevant to the defendant's state of mind. Evidence of the behavior and characteristics of previously observed drug couriers is not. Id. Dr. Meloy's testimony was consistent with Salcedo. At its most basic level, Salcedo held, consistent with CRE 702, that drug courier profiles are inadmissible because they are unreliable and thus not helpful to the trier of fact. In contrast, Dr. Meloy's testimony was reasonably reliable and helpful to the jury. First, unlike the police officer who testified in Salcedo, Dr. Meloy is a board-certified doctor of forensic psychology. Far from the subjective, if not intuitive, judgment of the individual officer that was qualified as the expert in Salcedo, Dr. Meloy relied on an objective, widely-recognized psychological theory, one which was founded on research and study, and one which the trial court determined was generally recognized within the forensic community. His testimony consisted of an objective, complex, and highly developed analysis of the crime scene and Defendant's productions that had been refined by years of research. As such, it was reliable and insightful information that assisted the jury by placing the crime in context and helping them to understand bizarre and deviant behavior that was unlikely to be within the knowledge of ordinary citizens; it helped the jury understand the significance of material facts in the case. Second, Salcedo made clear that its holding in no way limits the admissibility of relevant evidence of a defendant's own behavior and characteristics. See Salcedo, 999 P.2d at 840. The majority of Dr. Meloy's testimony interpreted Defendant's own drawings and writings; this testimony is therefore outside of Salcedo's purview. Third, the factors identified by Dr. Meloy as indicative of perpetrators of sexual homicide, including the role of rehearsal fantasy and trigger mechanisms, are not applicable to the average law-abiding citizen as was the drug courier profile at issue in Salcedo. On the contrary, they are relatively unique to perpetrators of sexual homicide. Finally, unlike the police officer in Salcedo, Dr. Meloy testified only as an expert, not as a factual witness as well, and he was not allowed to opine on the ultimate issue of Defendant's guilt. In fact, he was not even permitted to testify that any of Defendant's drawings or narratives reflected Ms. Hettrick's murder or that any particular occurrence was indeed a precipitating event. For these reasons, we conclude that Dr. Meloy's testimony was appropriate under CRE 702. Cf. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 694, 760 P.2d 27, 33 (1988) (If relevant, it is generally permissible for experts to testify regarding traits typically exhibited by child abusers. Likewise, evidence that [the defendant] exhibits characteristics commonly found in child abusers would generally be admissible, if relevant.... [B]oth types of evidence are beyond the common experience of most jurors, and jurors would be assisted by such expert testimony. (internal quotations and citations omitted)).