Opinion ID: 867266
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Allegations of Uncharged Prior Acts

Text: ¶ 34 Chappell argues the trial court erred by admitting, over objection, evidence of prior injuries Devon suffered while in Chappell's care as rebuttal to Chappell's mitigation evidence. Chappell also argues that the admission of e-mails and statements from Shackleford about Devon's prior abuse violated his due process and Confrontation Clause rights. ¶ 35 Admission of evidence during the penalty stage of a capital case is not governed by the Arizona Rules of Evidence. A.R.S. §§ 13-751(C) (At the penalty phase... the prosecution or the defendant may present any information that is relevant to any of the mitigating circumstances ... regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials.), 13-752(G) (At the penalty phase... the state may present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of whether there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency ... [and] any evidence that demonstrates that the defendant should not be shown leniency.). We give deference to a trial judge's determination of whether rebuttal evidence offered during the penalty phase is `relevant' within the meaning of the statute. McGill, 213 Ariz. at 156-57 ¶ 40, 140 P.3d at 939-40. ¶ 36 Chappell first argues the trial court erred by finding inapplicable at the penalty phase Arizona Rule of Evidence 403 and the standards articulated in State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 584, 944 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1997) ([B]efore admitting evidence of prior bad acts [under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) ], trial judges must find that there is clear and convincing proof both as to the commission of the other bad act and that the defendant committed the act.). In McGill, we noted that, although admission of evidence during the penalty phase is controlled by the relevance standard articulated in §§ 13-751(C) and 13-752(G), [a] judge's analysis in determining relevance [under § 13-751(C) ] involves fundamentally the same considerations as does a relevancy determination under Arizona Rule of Evidence 401 or 403. 213 Ariz. at 156-57 ¶ 40, 140 P.3d at 939-40; see also State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 180 ¶ 51, 140 P.3d 950, 963 (2006) (cautioning trial courts to exclude evidence that is either irrelevant to the thrust of the defendant's mitigation or otherwise unfairly prejudicial); State v. Pandeli, 215 Ariz. 514, 527-30 ¶¶ 41-59, 161 P.3d 557, 570-73 (2007) (considering relevance of the challenged penalty phase evidence and whether the evidence was unfairly prejudicial). ¶ 37 Despite these cautionary statements, we have explicitly rejected the argument that Rule 404(b) ... and this Court's related case law govern the admission of other acts evidence during the penalty phase. Martinez, 218 Ariz. at 431 n. 11, 189 P.3d at 358 n. 11. But the trial court nonetheless considered Rules 403 and 404(b) in its ruling, stating: [B]ecause other acts evidence is often very harmful ... the court has kept in mind the mandates of Terrazas [ ] and Rule 403. Accordingly, the record does not establish the error of which Chappell complains. ¶ 38 Chappell next argues that admission of Shackleford's e-mails and police interviews violated his due process rights. [D]ue process requires that a capital defendant receive notice of any hearsay statements to be introduced ... and have `an opportunity to either explain or deny them.' Hampton, 213 Ariz. at 179 ¶ 49, 140 P.3d at 962 (quoting State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 161, 823 P.2d 22, 28 (1991)). Hearsay statements must also contain sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. (citing McGill, 213 Ariz. at 160 ¶ 56, 140 P.3d at 943). Chappell does not contest that he received notice and an opportunity to deny or explain Shackleford's statements. He argues, however, that the evidence lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, noting that Shackleford repeatedly lied to police, was a suspect in Devon's murder, was not under oath when she made the statements, and had a strong incentive to lie in order to deflect attention from herself. [9] ¶ 39 The State presented direct and circumstantial evidence of Devon's prior injuries and their surrounding circumstances, including photographs and testimony from lay and expert witnesses, which supported an inference that Chappell was responsible for those injuries and corroborated Shackleford's statements. See McGill, 213 Ariz. at 160-61 ¶ 58, 140 P.3d at 943-44. Therefore, although Chappell attacked Shackleford's credibility, her statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability. ¶ 40 Finally, Chappell argues that admission of Shackleford's statements violated the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). As Chappell acknowledges, we have previously rejected this argument, finding the Confrontation Clause inapplicable to penalty phase rebuttal evidence. See, e.g., McGill, 213 Ariz. at 158 ¶ 49, 140 P.3d at 941. Chappell urges us to revisit our holding in light of United States v. Mills, 446 F.Supp.2d 1115 (C.D.Cal.2006) and several recent law review articles. ¶ 41 Contrary to Chappell's contention, however, Mills does not conflict with McGill. Mills specifically declined to resolve ... whether the jury's task of weighing aggravating against mitigating factors is entitled to Confrontation Clause protection, limiting its holding only to the aggravation phase. 446 F.Supp.2d at 1135 n. 23. We have distinguished hearsay used to establish aggravating factors from hearsay used as rebuttal evidence in the penalty phase, concluding that the former was entitled to Confrontation Clause protections and the latter was not. See McGill, 213 Ariz. at 159 ¶ 51, 140 P.3d at 942.