Opinion ID: 2370767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Possession

Text: The Court holds that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for title and possession of the .8 acre in question because they have proven prior possession. The trial court found that plaintiffs had failed to prove prior possession. The Court holds that a deed from La Blanca to Hester, in defendants' chain of title, only conveyed to Hester an easement for canal purposes. I contend that the deed conveyed a fee simple title, instead of an easement. If I am correct, then the question of prior possession is not in the case. In order to clarify my position, I start by setting out portions of the 1904 Hester deed: Know all men by these presents; That the La Blanca Agricultural Company    has granted, sold and conveyed and by these presents does grant, sell and convey unto the said A. F. Hester, Trustee, of the County of Cameron and State of Texas, all those certain tracts or parcels of land situated in the County of Hidalgo, State of Texas, with the improvements thereon, and more particularly described as follows: 1) [Then follows the description of a 10-acre tract.] 2) Also the canal, laterals and flumes, and rights-of-way therefor now existing on the following lands, and also any further rights-of-way that may be required for the purpose of building, extending and maintaining canals, laterals and flumes for the purpose of irrigation, on, across, along and around the following described tracts or parcels of land to wit:   . [Then follows the description of several tracts.] 3) And also along and over the following described tracts or parcels of land which were conveyed to `La Blanca Agricultural Company' by the following named persons to wit: [Then follows the description of land which includes the land in dispute.] The principal question on this point is the same as that which was presented to this court for decision in the case of Texas Electric Ry. Co. v. Neale, 151 Tex. 526, 252 S.W.2d 451 (1952). Did the deed convey to the grantee merely an easement, that is, the right to use the land for a right of way, or did it convey the title in fee? In the Neale case, this court recognized that there are two lines of authorities, but clearly distinguished the two and then held that the Neale case was in harmony with the line of cases holding that the deed under consideration conveyed the title in fee rather than a mere easement. What was said in the Neale case in 1952 is equally applicable to this case. In Neale, the Court after stating that the question of whether a deed conveyed merely an easement or a fee title had been before the Court many times, said: There are two lines of authorities, the one represented by Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil etc., Co., 106 Tex. 94, 157 S.W. 737, 51 L.R.A., N.S., 268, and the other by Calcasieu Lumber Co. v. Harris, 77 Tex. 18, 13 S.W. 453, and Brightwell v. International-Great Northern R. Co., 121 Tex. 338, 49 S.W.2d 437, 84 A.L.R. 265. Generally stated, the rules announced by these decisions are: First, that, as in the Right of Way Oil Company case, [106 Tex. 94, 157 S.W. 739] a deed which by the terms of the granting clause grants, sells and conveys to the grantee a `right of way' in or over a tract of land conveys only an easement; and second, that, as in the Calcasieu Lumber Company case and in the Brightwell case, a deed which in the granting clause grants, sells and conveys a tract or strip of land conveys the title in fee, even though in a subsequent clause or paragraph of the deed the land conveyed is referred to as a right of way. It is our opinion, after careful consideration of the deed and the decisions, that the case is ruled by Calcasieu Lumber Co. v. Harris, 77 Tex. 18, 13 S.W. 453, and Brightwell v. International-Great Northern R. Co., 121 Tex. 338, 49 S.W.2d 437, 84 A.L.R. 265, rather than by the Right of Way Oil Company case. In the case last mentioned the granting clause of the deed granted and conveyed `the right of way, two hundred feet in width, over and upon the above-described tract of land', whereas the granting clause in the deed here under construction grants, sells and conveys to the grantee `the following described piece or parcel of land'. It does not purport to convey merely a right of way or merely an easement. There do appear in the deed words which show the purpose for which the grant is made, but those words do not undertake to reduce or debase what has been granted from a fee title to a mere easement. The Court should recognize, as it did in the Brightwell case, supra, that the decision made in the Calcasieu Lumber Company case has become a rule of property under which title and securities of immense value have been acquired in this state, and it should not now be disturbed or changed. This is especially true where, as here, the plaintiffs have wholly failed to prove a record title. The argument that the defendants abandoned the canal has no basis in fact. The failure to have water in the canal at a certain time cannot have the effect of destroying the provisions of the La Blanca-Hester deed which clearly show that a tract or parcel of land was conveyed upon which to build a canal. In the present case, as in the Neale case, supra, La Blanca granted, sold and conveyed all those certain tracts or parcels of land, which are described therein. The La Blanca-Hester deed does not purport to convey merely a right of way or an easement. The tracts or parcels of land described in the deed include not only the land described as acreage, but also land described as canals. A canal for carrying water is real estate. Mudge v. Hughes, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W. 819 (1919) no wr. hist. That part of the granting clause in the above deed which refers to future rights of way that may be required for the purpose of irrigation on, across, along and around the following described tracts or parcels of land was a conveyance of an equitable title to such lands as might later be required and selected to be used as a canal. Upon such selection being made by Hester or his successors (defendants), legal title to such property became vested in them, superior to the rights of any subsequent purchasers of said land after the deed was recorded in 1904. See Turner v. Hunt, 131 Tex. 492, 116 S.W.2d 688, 117 A.L.R. 1066 (1938). This case, in principle, stands for the proposition that where a grantor conveys to a grantee the right to select smaller tracts out of a larger definitely described boundary, the grantee becomes the equitable owner of such tracts, and upon exercise of his right of selection, he becomes vested with legal title to the selected parcels. Where the instrument granting such right of selection has been recorded, as here, then all subsequent purchasers of tracts out of the described lands are charged with constructive notice of such right of selection in the first grantee, and take subject thereto. In the present case, La Blanca intended to give to Hester the right to specific tracts for canal purposes, such tracts to be selected out of the larger, definitely described boundaries as the need for such canals arose. Inasmuch as defendants' predecessor acquired fee title, rather than just an easement for canal purposes, plaintiffs cannot recover said land by proving prior possession, and that the possession had not been abandoned. In trespass to try title the plaintiff has the burden of proving prior actual possession of the property in litigation, which possession is exclusive and peaceable, to initiate prior possession. In the light of the record in this case it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs' predecessor T. L. Humble, acquired such exclusive use of the .8 acre in dispute. The testimony raised an issue of fact as to prior possession and the trial court resolved the issue against the plaintiffs. This being so, it is unnecessary to unduly lengthen this dissent with a discussion of the Court's position that a break in plaintiffs' paper chain of title leaving an apparent outstanding title in a third party does not destroy plaintiffs' case under the doctrine of prior possession. My silence as to this matter in no respect is to be construed as implying consent to the Court's position in this regard.