Opinion ID: 778180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Challenges to the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Convictions

Text: 56 Count three of the superseding indictment charged Bruce, Carf, and Grimes with 57 engag[ing] in a continuing criminal enterprise, in that they committed felony violations of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and 846, which violations were part of a continuing series of violations of those statutes undertaken by the above-referenced defendants in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom the above-referenced defendants occupied positions of organizer, supervisor and manager, and from which continuing series of violations the above-referenced defendants obtained substantial income and resources. 58 Bruce, Carf, and Grimes contend that the indictment was deficient because it failed to specify the violations that constituted the series necessary for a conviction of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE). In addition, Bruce challenges the sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence to show that he received substantial income from the enterprise. We reject all of these challenges. 59
60 A continuing criminal enterprise, as proscribed by 21 U.S.C. § 848, is defined in part as a continuing series of felony drug violations of any of the provisions in the subchapters comprising §§ 801-971 of Title 21. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). We have interpreted a continuing series to mean at least three felony drug violations committed over a definite period of time. See, e.g., United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 264 (2d Cir.1988). 61 In Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999), the Supreme Court held that in order to find a defendant guilty of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, the jury may not simply agree that the defendant committed three underlying crimes but must unanimously agree on which of the (three or more) individual violations constituted the continuing series. See id. at 824, 119 S.Ct. 1707. Although Richardson requires that the jury be unanimous on each of the constituent felonies, we have held that an indictment that does not identify which of many alleged felonies constituted the series is not thereby defective. In Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133 (2d Cir.2001) ( Santana-Madera ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 817, 151 L.Ed.2d 701 (2002), we noted the lack of specificity in the indictment: 62 [L]ike nearly all pre- Richardson CCE indictments, Santana-Madera's indictment did not specify which offenses constituted the continuing series of violations. The CCE count simply alleged that Santana-Madera organized or managed at least five other persons in connection with three or more of the nine federal drug law violations alleged in the indictment. 63 260 F.3d at 136. However, we rejected the contention that the lack of specificity meant that the CCE count failed to charge an offense. We concluded that in alleg[ing] that Santana-Madera supervised five or more people in the commission of three or more of the nine violations of the drug laws listed in the indictment[, t]he indictment thus alleged all the elements of the CCE offense, ... even after Richardson.  Santana-Madera, 260 F.3d at 140 n. 3. 64 Count three of the superseding indictment in the present case was less informative than the indictment in Santana-Madera as to the felonies constituting the series, for count three referred only to felony violations of ... Sections 841(a)(1) and 846, and counts one and two simply charged § 846 conspiracies to violate §§ 841(a)(1) and 860; but we cannot conclude that the superseding indictment thereby failed to allege an offense. In order to state an offense, [a]n indictment need only track the language of the statute and, if necessary to apprise the defendant `of the nature of the accusation against him,' ... state time and place in approximate terms. United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 61 (2d Cir.) (quoting Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 766, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 134, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994). Count three here closely tracked the language of § 848(c), and it alleged that the continuing series of felonies were violations of §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and that the enterprise was conducted [i]n or about and between 1992 and April 1998 ... within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere. We thus conclude that count three did not fail to charge an offense. 65 Finally, we note that the jury was properly instructed, in accordance with Richardson, that it must be unanimous as to each constituent felony in order to find defendants guilty of continuing criminal enterprise: 66 I must emphasize that if you do find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did commit a series of drug crimes as claimed by the government, you must unanimously agree among yourselves on at least three of the acts in the series in order to find [the continuing series of violations] element of the CCE count to be established. In short, as I mentioned before, it can't be the case that some of you agree as to some, others of you agree as to others. You must all unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt as to three or more narcotics related offenses before you can find the defendant you are considering guilty of the CCE count charged in Count Three. 67 In sum, we see no lack of notice in the superseding indictment and no error in the submission of the CCE count to the jury. 68
69 Bruce also challenges the admissibility and the sufficiency of the government's evidence to show that he derived substantial income from the enterprise, as required by 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(B). His admissibility challenge is meritless; his sufficiency challenge is frivolous. 70 Bruce argues that the government's evidence of his income was inadmissible because it consisted of impermissible hearsay and lay opinion. He concedes that these objections are largely unpreserved; but he argues that the admission of the testimony constituted plain error. (Bruce brief on appeal at 25.) We are unpersuaded. 71 Virtually all of the evidence as to the level of Bruce's earnings during the conspiracy period came from the testimony of Hamilton. Hamilton was present in Far Rockaway during most of the conspiratorial period, was essentially Bruce's partner in the drug enterprise even though they divided the weeks, had personal knowledge of the quantities of drugs being sold and the money grossed from those sales, and testified based on that personal knowledge. It was well within the bounds of discretion for the court to allow Hamilton to estimate the amount of income received by the respective coconspirators. See generally Fed.R.Evid. 701; United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 434-35 (2d Cir.1994); Brady v. Chemical Construction Corp., 740 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir.1984). 72 Hamilton testified that from mid-1993 through 1997, Bruce controlled one out of every three weeks on the block, selling crack cocaine and marijuana every day of his week, 24 hours a day. During the earlier part of that period, Hamilton likewise controlled one week, and in their respective weeks, Hamilton and Bruce sold an average of some 10-18 ounces of crack cocaine and 5-8 pounds of marijuana. Hamilton's own average weekly gross intake was about $14,000 to $16,000 and was sometimes as high as $20,000; and from a gross of between $16,000 and $20,000, Hamilton's profit was between $8,000 and $12,000. Hamilton testified that from mid 1993 to 1995, Bruce's average gross income was about $15,000 a week. 73 During the latter part of the conspiracy period, Hamilton controlled two of every three weeks, while Bruce still controlled one week. They each continued to sell 24 hours a day, every day during their respective weeks. Hamilton testified that from 1995 until late 1997, he and Bruce averaged weekly sales of about nine ounces of crack cocaine and grossed about $8,000 to $12,000 a week. Bruce interposed no objection to Hamilton's testimony as to Bruce's income prior to the middle of 1996, and that testimony indicated that just from 1993 through mid 1996, Bruce, in the weeks he controlled, grossed at least $598,000. Bruce's contention that the evidence was insufficient to show that he received substantial income from the enterprise is thus frivolous, even without considering his sales from mid-1996 to April 1998. 74 Hamilton testified that beginning in the summer of 1996, he was not always present to oversee his Beach 26th Street sales, and in late 1997 he left New York. Grimes took over Hamilton's weeks; but Hamilton retained an interest in the level of sales in the Beach 26th Street operation, for Hamilton (and his mother) shared in Grimes's profits. Hamilton testified that Grimes sold about 4-4½ ounces of crack cocaine a week and grossed about $3,000 to $4,000. When Hamilton was asked how much Bruce grossed during that period, Bruce made his first objection to Hamilton's testimony. The court sustained the objection, instructing the government that it needed to lay a proper foundation. Hamilton then provided a foundation, testifying, without further objection by Bruce, that he had knowledge as to the amount Bruce was making in an average week during the 1997-98 period. He stated that he knew because he usually talked to them and was told that Bruce was making approximately $2,000 to $2,500 a week. Bruce now argues that this testimony was hearsay. 75 In order to meet the plain-error standard with respect to this contention, Bruce must demonstrate that the district court committed an error in admitting Hamilton's testimony, that the error was plain, that it prejudicially affected Bruce's substantial rights, and that it seriously affected the fairness of the trial. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. He has not met any part of this standard. 76 First, it is not clear that Hamilton's testimony that, as to the 1997-98 period, the[y] told him how much money Bruce was earning was hearsay. Obviously the statement was objectionable for lack of specificity; but no objection was made, and Hamilton was not asked to clarify who the[y] were. It is possible that one person to whom Hamilton referred was Bruce himself; to the extent that Hamilton's testimony repeated what Bruce had told him, it would not have been hearsay because the statement of a party, when offered against him, is defined as nonhearsay, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). It is also possible that the[y] included Alberto, Carf, or any of several other coconspirators who worked for both Hamilton and Bruce, and that the court, if the issue had been raised, would have found that the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. To that extent, those statements would have been nonhearsay as defined by Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Thus, we cannot say that the admission of Hamilton's testimony as to Bruce's income was error; or that, if error, the error was plain; or that it prejudiced Bruce's substantial rights. Further, in light of the facts (a) that Bruce refrained from making the obvious objection to Hamilton's reference to them and sought no clarification of that reference, and (b) that a clarification might well have been adverse to Bruce's interests by showing that the[y] were none other than Bruce and his agents and coconspirators, we cannot conclude that the admission of that testimony adversely affected the fairness of the trial. 77 In sum, the government proved that Bruce received substantial income from the continuing criminal enterprise, and its reliance on the testimony of Hamilton to prove that element provides no basis for reversal.