Opinion ID: 849101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: purpose of the doctrine

Text: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is grounded in the principle of separation of powers. [12] The doctrine has been compared to the political question doctrine and the exhaustion doctrine, both of which are also concepts rooted in separation of powers principles. [13] All of the doctrines that cluster about Article IIInot only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government. [ Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (emphasis added), quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 226 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 26-27, 699 F.2d 1166 (1983) (Bork, J., concurring) .] Allen extensively discussed the principle of separation of powers and stated that the several doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that requirement are `founded in concern about the properand properly limitedrole of the courts in a democratic society.' Id., citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction also reflects practical concerns regarding respect for the agency's legislatively imposed regulatory duties. Adhering to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction reinforces the expertise of the agency to which the courts are deferring the matter, and avoids the expenditure of judicial resources for issues that can better be resolved by the agency. [14] A question of `primary jurisdiction' arises when a claim may be cognizable in a court but initial resolution of issues within the special competence of an administrative agency is required. Thompson, supra at 288. Closely related is the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies: The doctrine ... is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties. Exhaustion applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. Primary jurisdiction, on the other hand, applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views. [ United States v. Western P R Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956), (emphasis added), citing General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co, 308 U.S. 422, 433, 60 S.Ct. 325, 84 L.Ed. 361 (1940).][ [15] ] The doctrine reflects the courts' recognition that administrative agencies, created by the Legislature, are intended to be repositories of special competence and expertise uniquely equipped to examine the facts and develop public policy within a particular field. Baron, Judicial review of administrative agency rules: A question of timing, 43 Baylor L. R. 139, 158 (1991). Thus, whether judicial review will be postponed in favor of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency necessarily depends upon the agency rule at issue and the nature of the declaration being sought in the particular case. Id. at 159. No fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In every case the question is whether the reasons for existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation. [Western Pacific, supra at 64.], 77 S.Ct. 161 Several reasons have been advanced for invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. First, the doctrine underscores the notion that administrative agencies possess specialized and expert knowledge to address issues of a regulatory nature. Use of an agency's expertise is necessary in regulatory matters in which judges and juries have little familiarity. Western Pacific, supra at 64, 77 S.Ct. 161 citing Far East Conf v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574, 72 S.Ct. 492, 96 L.Ed. 576 (1952). Thus, the doctrine is principally applicable to controversies involving regulatory agencies. Jaffe, Primary jurisdiction, 77 Harvard L. R. 1037, 1039 (1964). A second consideration relates to respect for the separation of powers and the statutory purpose underlying the creation of the administrative agency, the powers granted to it by the legislature, and the powers withheld. Id. This justification includes the principle that courts are not to make adverse decisions that threaten the regulatory authority and integrity of the agency. Att'y Gen. v. Diamond Mortgage Co., 414 Mich. 603, 613, 327 N.W.2d 805 (1982). Third, the doctrine exists to promote consistent application in resolving controversies of administrative law. Texas and P R, supra at 440-441, 27 S.Ct. 350. By application of the doctrine, [u]niformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure. [ Far East Conf., supra at 574-575.], 72 S.Ct. 492 In Diamond Mortgage Co., supra, this Court explained its adoption of these justifications for primary jurisdiction. In cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. [Id. at 612-613, 327 N.W.2d 805, quoting Far East Conf., supra at 574-575.], 72 S.Ct. 492 Thus, this Court recognized application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine to all cases in which it was deemed that an administrative agency possessed superior knowledge and expertise in addressing recurring issues within the scope of their authority. Quoting Western Pacific, supra at 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161 the Court concluded that `[p]rimary jurisdiction' ... applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body.... Diamond Mortgage, supra at 613, 327 N.W.2d 805 (internal citations omitted).