Opinion ID: 722387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the district court's detail in its findings.

Text: 54 The plaintiffs ask this Court to remand the case because the district court failed to make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by the Fifth Circuit. The plaintiffs contend that the district court had to make specific findings regarding all the factors considered by the court, especially where the factors are resolved against the plaintiffs. 55 First, the plaintiffs question the district court's failure to discuss their evidence regarding two races, in which black candidates were involved with head-to-head elections with white candidates, because the races show the improbability of a black being successful in a head-to-head race with a white. We find no merit to the plaintiffs' contention regarding the two head-to-head elections. 56 The district court presented a detailed discussion of Collins' 1992 and Beard's 1993 defeats. The discussions, however, reflect that the district court believed FBISD's theory. The district court explained that Collins was an incumbent running during a period of anti-incumbent sentiment sweeping at least the white community in FBISD. Further, the district court recounted Hal Jay's testimony that Collins did not run a very good campaign in 1992 because Collins was overconfident about his reelection and did not take the challenge from Wooten seriously. Similarly, the district court detailed the raw scores and statistics regarding the 1993 head-to-head race between Beard (a black) and Block (a white). The court even mentioned that Beard received essentially the same raw votes as Collins in 1993 yet Collins won and Beard lost. Later, the district court mentioned that [a]lthough Beard was running in a head-to-head race against a white candidate, the Hispanic community tended to vote for his Anglo opponent, Block. That the district court failed to discuss the head-to-head contests is not supported by the record. The district court simply did not discuss the races as the plaintiffs wished. 57 The plaintiffs also assert that the district court erroneously discounted the eight elections before 1986. The district court explained why it analyzed only the elections occurring after 1986. The district court found that because of the dramatic changes in population size in the FBISD, the election results before 1986 are of such limited probative value that they need not be examined here. The record supports this conclusion and also presents additional reasons that cast doubt on the reliability of pre-1986 election data. Because demographic data is not available before 1986, it is impossible to determine the proportion of minorities in the FBISD prior to 1986 and impossible to calculate the polarization demonstrated in pre-1986 elections. Additionally, FBISD used a different election system until 1972, and FBISD changed its precinct numbering system after 1986. 58 The plaintiffs also contend that the district court failed to discuss the plaintiffs' evidence when considering the totality of the circumstances. For example, the court dismissed the history of discrimination in Texas by saying that after the Jaybird party, which was organized to prevent blacks from voting and participating in local politics, was disbanded in 1953, there was no indication that barriers to voting continued to exist. We disagree with the plaintiffs' suggestion that the district court ignored the history of political problems in Texas. 59 We find that the district court adequately discussed the plaintiffs' evidence in light of the conclusions it reached. Under the circumstances, there was no need for further discussion of the history of discrimination in FBISD. First, the district court acknowledged that [t]he historical evidence presented at trial established that blacks in the FBISD were subject to official discrimination in the past. Second, the district court expressly accepted the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Stafford, supra, that FBISD had achieved unitary status. Third, plaintiff Rollins admitted that the Jaybird party was disbanded in 1953 before the school district was formed in 1959. The district court mentioned the Jaybird organization and detailed the plaintiffs' evidence regarding socio-economic factors before concluding that official barriers to voting do not exist in FBISD and that socio-economic differences between minorities and whites do not prevent meaningful participation in the political process. We find that the district court satisfied its duty to discuss the evidence and the basis for its conclusions. 60 Further, the plaintiffs question the limitation the district court placed on the probative value of the plaintiffs' statistical data. The district court, citing Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245 n. 7, complained that the plaintiffs did not distinguish the serious candidates from non-serious candidates. In Campos, this Court noted that [i]f the minority candidate is not serious and gains little support from any segment of the community, it cannot be said that the minority community 'sponsored' the candidate and that election need not be examined. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245 n. 7. The plaintiffs argue that because in every election the black candidate would have won under a single district voting scheme, the candidates were serious. However, the plaintiffs' expert, Korbel, explained that a candidate is not serious if he receives less than twenty-five percent of the vote in a precinct and then conceded that Montez, Garcia, Peterson, Woodard, and Clark were not serious candidates. The district court discussed the plaintiffs' statistical data in great detail before it explained its reservations regarding the evidence. Considering this Court's pronouncement in Campos along with the admissions of the plaintiffs' own expert, we cannot say that the district court was mistaken in the limitation it placed on the plaintiffs' statistics. Moreover, we cannot conclude that the district court inadequately discussed either the statistics or its limitation on the probative value. 61 Finally, the plaintiffs criticize the district court's consideration of the plaintiffs' evidence regarding statewide elections involving minority candidates only to the extent probative of whether the white community of FBISD votes as a bloc to defeat minority candidates. The plaintiffs contend that the evidence of statewide elections was relevant because of the consistent relationship between race and voting, which the plaintiffs' expert found. It is true that Dr. Flores testified to a very high correlation between race and voting in the exogenous elections. He specifically evaluated only FBISD precincts for the statewide and county wide elections he examined. However, when questioned by the district court, Korbel admitted that the exogenous elections that he examined did not accurately reflect the voting habits of FBISD 25 and that he had not examined endogenous elections within FBISD. Moreover, the district court specifically identified deficiencies in all of the exogenous elections, which reduced their probative value: 62 All of the elections are partisan elections, with a candidate needing a majority to win. No evidence was presented to the court regarding the number of exogenous elections held during the relevant time period, the demographic make-up of constituencies, the percentage vote received by a candidate, and/or the success of the preferred minority candidates. 63 The plaintiffs failed to furnish enough data for the district court to adequately compare and evaluate the exogenous elections. We find that the district court provided sufficient reasons for limiting its use of the exogenous elections, and we cannot say that the district court erred in limiting the probative value of the exogenous elections. 64 Even assuming that the district court did not discuss and/or should have discussed evidence which the plaintiffs identify, we note that this Court does not require the district court to expressly mention all the evidence in its opinion. We have instructed the district court to thoroughly discuss the statistics offered by making specific references to the evidence. Houston, 56 F.3d at 612. Also, we have warned the district court not to make broad and general statements which are not specifically tied to the evidence. Id. Although the district court is not required to recount every bit of evidence adduced at trial, it must discuss all substantive evidence contrary to its opinion. Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir.1984). Further, this Court has remanded cases in order for the district court to explain specifically which evidence it finds credible and which it does not, to provide reasons for its conclusions and then to evaluate the strength of that evidence[.] Westwego, 872 F.2d at 1210 n. 12. We find that the district court provided very detailed discussions regarding the Gingles and Zimmer factors, its findings, and conclusions. The plaintiffs arguments are without merit. 65