Opinion ID: 201385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression Claims

Text: 24 Our review of the denial of a suppression motion is plenary. United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 529 (1st Cir.1996). [W]e will uphold a district court's decision to deny a suppression motion provided that any reasonable view of the evidence supports the decision. Id. We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Charles, 213 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir.2000). 25
26 Fox first challenges the validity of the initial stop, the order that he exit his vehicle and stand with his feet apart with his hands on the hood of the cruiser, and the frisk. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2001). Thus, at its inception, it must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, and the officer's actions must be reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 6. Accordingly, an inquiring court must ask whether the officer's actions were justified at their inception, and if so, whether the officer's subsequent actions were fairly responsive to ... the circumstances originally warranting the stop, informed by what occurred, and what the officer learned, as the stop progressed. Id. 27 Here, Bergquist encountered a vehicle that appeared to be without a working plate light, which he knew to be a violation of Maine law. Although he tried, he was unable to determine whether it had a functioning plate light. Thus, there was justification for stopping the vehicle to investigate, as the stop was supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle was traveling in violation of a traffic law. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.); Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 (A traffic stop must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.). The challenge to the initial stop fails. 6 28 The challenges to the ensuing order and frisk also fail. Before Bergquist issued the order, he: (1) saw Fox make a ducking motion, as if reaching for something under the seat or placing something under the seat; (2) realized that he had previously arrested Fox for possession of brass knuckles and a concealed firearm; and (3) noticed a large bulge in Fox's jacket pocket. Moreover, before he frisked Fox, he learned that Fox possessed brass knuckles. Under the circumstances, both the order and frisk were reasonable. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) ([O]nce a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment[ ]....); Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 ([W]hile an officer's actions must bear some relation to the purpose of the original stop, he may shift his focus and increase the scope of his investigation by degrees if his suspicions mount during the course of the detention.).
29 Fox next challenges the district court's refusal to suppress the statements he made in response to Bergquist's weapons-related questions. He claims that because he made the statements while the subject of custodial interrogation but before he was advised of his Miranda rights, they should have been suppressed. 30 Police officers are required to inform a suspect of his Miranda rights prior to custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see United States v. Ventura, 85 F.3d 708, 712 (1st Cir.1996). If the Miranda rule is violated, the prosecution cannot use statements obtained during the interrogation to establish its case-in-chief. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990). 31 There are, however, several exceptions to the Miranda rule. One such exception is that Miranda warnings need not precede questions necessary to secure [an officer's] own safety or the safety of the public for a suspect's answers to be admissible as evidence of his guilt. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); see United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.1998). This exception permits questions reasonably prompted by a concern for ... safety, which must be distinguished from those designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2626. [T]he availability of th[e] exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. Id. at 656, 104 S.Ct. 2626. 32 Here, Fox was not advised of his Miranda rights before he made the challenged statements. And, for purposes of this appeal, we assume that he was subject to custodial interrogation when he made the statements. 7 Even so, the district court did not err in refusing to suppress the statements, as they were all admissible under the public safety exception to the Miranda rule. 33 At the outset of the stop, Bergquist: (1) saw Fox make an irregular ducking motion; (2) realized that he had arrested Fox for possessing brass knuckles and a concealed firearm following a prior stop; and (3) noticed a large bulge in Fox's jacket pocket. Under the circumstances, Bergquist was permitted to ask Fox whether he possessed any weapons to ensure his own safety and the safety of any passerby. See id. at 655-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626. 34 In addition, once Bergquist had found the unused shell, he was allowed to ask Fox for the location of the gun that went with the shell and whether he had a gun or any other weapons in his vehicle. See id. Having found the live shell and realized that he had previously arrested Fox for possessing a firearm, Bergquist had ample reason to fear for his own safety and that of the public. 35 Similarly, for safety reasons, Bergquist was justified in asking Fox how to open the breech of the shotgun. See id. Bergquist had been unable to open it himself, and there was good reason to avoid transporting the gun without first ensuring that it was not loaded: The gun was fairly dilapidated, had no trigger guard, and if loaded, could have fired if inadvertently bumped or jostled. 36 Furthermore, because Bergquist was permitted to ask each of the abovementioned questions to ensure his own and the public's safety, Fox's answers to the questions were admissible. Therefore, Fox's challenge to the admission of the statements fails.