Opinion ID: 2518040
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The History of the Tort of Spoliation of Evidence

Text: ¶ 16 Spoliation is defined as [t]he intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, or concealment of evidence. Black's Law Dictionary 1437 (8th ed. 2004). Spoliation can be either negligent or intentional and may be carried out by a first or third party. See Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 1128 (Miss.2002). A first-party spoliator is a party to the underlying action (or the party's attorney) who spoliates evidence necessary or relevant to the plaintiff's claims against that party. See id. A third-party spoliator is often a stranger to the underlying action or a party not alleged to have committed the underlying tort as to which the lost or destroyed evidence related. Id. at 1129 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 17 The tort of spoliation of evidence was first recognized in 1984 by the California Court of Appeals. See Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829, 832 (1984). The tort enjoyed a short life span in California. Fourteen years later, in 1998, the California Supreme Court reversed course and extinguished the tort of first-party spoliation. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511, 521 & n. 4 (1998). One year later, the court also extinguished the tort of third-party spoliation. See Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 464, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d 223, 225 (1999). Because most jurisdictions have looked to the California line of cases for guidance when faced with the question of whether to adopt a tort of spoliation, we briefly review California's experience with the tort. See, e.g., Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., 342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d 387, 389 (2000) (We find it instructive that California, the first state to adopt spoliation as an independent tort, has changed course and, more recently, [California's] highest court has held specifically that the tort would no longer be recognized.). ¶ 18 The California Court of Appeals first recognized the tort of spoliation in Smith v. Superior Court. 198 Cal.Rptr. at 837. In Smith, the plaintiff was permanently blinded when a wheel came off another motorist's van and crashed into her windshield. Id. at 831. After the accident, the van was towed to the repair shop that had customized the wheels. Id. Even though the repair shop agreed to preserve parts of the van for investigation, it destroyed, lost or transferred said physical evidence, making it impossible for the [plaintiff's] experts to inspect and test those parts in order to pinpoint the cause of the failure of the wheel assembly on the van. Id. The plaintiff sued the repair shop for Tortious Interference with Prospective Civil Action By Spoliation of Evidence. Id. The district court dismissed the complaint because California did not recognize a tort of spoliation. Id. at 832. The court of appeals reversed, noting that California has long recognized [for] every wrong there is a remedy, and has allowed for new torts through the legislative and judicial process. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court crafted a tort of intentional spoliation of evidence by analogy to the already recognized tort of intentional interference with prospective business advantage. Id. at 836. The court reasoned that a prospective civil action in a product liability case is a valuable `probable expectancy' that the court must protect from the kind of interference alleged herein. [1] Id. at 837. Shortly after Smith, the California Court of Appeals also adopted a tort of negligent spoliation of evidence. Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 169 Cal. App.3d 874, 215 Cal.Rptr. 504, 506 (1985). ¶ 19 Fourteen years after Smith, the California Supreme Court reversed course and extinguished the tort of first-party spoliation of evidence. In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court , the plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital had intentionally destroyed medical records to prevent the plaintiff from prevailing in his medical malpractice claim against the hospital. 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d at 512. Although the California Supreme Court acknowledged that the intentional destruction of evidence should be condemned, it concluded that any benefits created by the tort were outweighed by the costs and burdens it would impose. Id., 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d at 515. The court identified three particular concerns: the conflict between a tort remedy for intentional first party spoliation and the policy against creating derivative tort remedies for litigation-related misconduct; the strength of existing nontort remedies for spoliation; and the uncertainty of the fact of harm in spoliation cases. Id. ¶ 20 The court first noted that it favored remedying litigation-related misconduct by sanctions imposed within the underlying lawsuit rather than by creating new derivative torts. Id. The court explained that derivative-tort liability for spoliation of evidence would subvert the court's interest in moving matters expeditiously toward final judgment and could possibly create endless litigation that would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice. Id., 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also analogized evidence spoliation to perjury, explaining that even though both undermine[ ] the search for truth and fairness by creating a false picture of the evidence before the trier of fact ... there is no civil remedy in damages against a witness who commits perjury when testifying. Id., 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d at 516. ¶ 21 Similarly, the Cedars-Sinai court noted the existence of effective nontort remedies, explaining that courts have at their disposal various discovery sanctions, criminal penalties, negative evidentiary inferences, and attorney discipline procedures. Id., 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d at 517-18. Finally, the court expressed concern that in a substantial proportion of spoliation cases the fact of harm will be irreducibly uncertain and the jury would be forced to speculate as to how the spoliated evidence might have affected the underlying litigation. Id., 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d at 518. Due to this risk of erroneous liability, the court was also worried that recognition of the tort would have a perverse over-deterrence effect, causing persons or entities to pursue costly measures to preserve otherwise irrelevant documents and equipment. Id., 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d at 519-21. ¶ 22 One year after Cedars-Sinai, the California Supreme Court also rejected the tort of intentional third-party spoliation. In Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court , the plaintiff was badly burned during facial surgery. 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d at 225. She claimed that a surgical tool produced a flame that ignited oxygen in the anesthesia and severely burned her face. Id. Because the hospital did not retain important evidenceeven though the plaintiff's lawyer had expressly requested it to do sothe plaintiff claimed that the hospital had interfered with her potential products-liability action against the tool manufacturer and obstructed her ability to recover damages for her injuries. Id., 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d at 225-26. As in Cedars-Sinai, the court expressed concern that third-party spoliation claims would produce endless round[s] of litigation. Id., 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d at 229. The court also found that the uncertainty of the fact of harm arising from [first party] spoliationis equally applicable in third party spoliation. Id., 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d at 230. ¶ 23 The Temple Community court recognized, however, that the salient distinction between first- and third-party spoliation of evidence is the disparity in sanctions available within the confines of the underlying litigation. Id., 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d at 232. The court further acknowledged that [t]he evidentiary inference ... as well as most discovery sanctions ... are not available when a person who is not a party to the litigation and who is not an agent of a party intentionally has destroyed evidence. Id. Conversely, the court explained that criminal sanctions and limited discovery sanctions still existed, the legislature could devise effective sanctions for spoliation, and the parties could contractually create obligations to preserve evidence. Id. The court concluded: [T]he benefits of recognizing a tort cause of action, in order to deter third party spoliation of evidence and compensate victims of such misconduct, are outweighed by the burden to litigants, witnesses, and the judicial system that would be imposed by potentially endless litigation over a speculative loss, and by the cost to society of promoting onerous record and evidence retention policies. Id., 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d at 233. ¶ 24 Relying on Cedars-Sinai and Temple Community, the California Court of Appeals later held that California does not recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence because it would be ... anomalous to impose tort liability upon a negligent spoliator whose conduct is not near so egregious as that of an intentional spoliator. Lueter v. State, 94 Cal.App.4th 1285, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 68, 76 (2002).