Opinion ID: 1930358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was the statement of the appellant Brown the fruit of an illegal arrest, requiring exclusion as evidence?

Text: Probable cause exists where the arresting officer has facts and circumstances within his knowledge which are sufficient within themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a person has committed an offense. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). Probable cause for arrest is something stronger than bare suspicion or belief of the officer. Rome v. State, 348 So.2d 1026, 1028 (Miss. 1977). See also, Hester v. State, 463 So.2d 1087 (Miss. 1985). The evidence at trial revealed that a black male with a mask robbed Seemore T.V., Inc. at gunpoint. Sandra Stribling, a pedestrian, saw the man run out of the store. Ms. Stribling later saw Brown and identified him as the man who committed the robbery. Additionally, the police received an anonymous phone call reporting that Brown had been bragging at work about pulling a robbery off in town and the police weren't smart enough to catch him. Based on this information, Officer Anderson obtained a warrant for Brown's arrest. The State asserts that the identification of Brown by Ms. Stribling, although challenged at trial, was by itself sufficient to obtain the arrest warrant and that the reliability of the anonymous caller or the information obtained should not be considered on probable cause testing. Cf. Walker v. State, 473 So.2d 435, 439 (Miss. 1985) [if reliability of statement by confidential source in affidavit is lacking, remainder of affidavit may be considered to determine if probable cause existed for issuance of a search warrant]. The appellant submits that given the totality of the circumstances under Gates v. Illinois, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), probable cause did not exist to arrest him. In Lee v. State, 435 So.2d 674 (Miss. 1983), this Court accepted the new totality of the circumstances analysis in Gates for determining whether probable cause exists. Looking to the facts and circumstances known to Officer Anderson, which he in turn relayed to the justice court judge, it appears that the information supporting Brown's involvement was more than mere suspicion and sufficient to procure a warrant for Brown's arrest. According to the testimony of three witnesses for the State, at the time of Brown's arrest, he was advised of his Miranda rights but he refused to make a statement. When asked if he wanted to make a phone call, he declined. Brown was held in the Neshoba County Detention Center overnight. At some point after he went to jail, Brown found out that Seales had confessed. Brown sent word the next morning that he wanted to see Officer Anderson. After having read to him his Miranda rights, Brown indicated he understood those rights and signed a written waiver. No threats or promises were made, no violence was committed, and no hopes of leniency or reward were offered. Applying the facts herein to the analysis in Brown, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, the lower court judge determined that Brown's confession was an act of his free will and was properly admitted at trial. Upon review of the record there exists no evidence of coercion or mistreatment on the part of the officers pursuant to Brown's arrest and confinement. This Court holds that the confession was a voluntary act and admissible during the trial. Booker v. State, 449 So.2d 209 (Miss. 1984) cert. den. 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 230, 83 L.Ed.2d 159. Palmer v. State, 427 So.2d 111 (Miss. 1983).