Opinion ID: 2979184
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limits on Cross Examination

Text: Defendants contest the limitations that the district court imposed on the crossexamination of Sydnor, including the prohibition of questions concerning certain details of Sydnor’s cooperation agreement with the government. Trial counsel failed to object to the limitations on the cross-examination imposed by the district court that appellate counsel now challenges. Where trial counsel fails to object to a trial error raised on appeal, the plain error standard applies. See United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2005). To find that there was plain error, this Court must find that: 1) an error occurred in the district court; 2) the error was plain, i.e. obvious or clear; 3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and 4) this adverse impact seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. See United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946, 949 (6th Cir. 1998).
At trial, the district court stated that, “the parties would be able to certainly ask questions about the defendant [Sydnor] entering a plea guilty in exchange for hoping to receive a lesser punishment [but] if it goes much beyond that, it may become objectionable.” (R. 90, Tr. at 7.) Consequently, the jury was prevented from knowing the length of Sydnor’s potential sentence, and Defendants’ sentences as well. Defendants claim that their trial attorneys limited their questioning of Sydnor because of the court’s order. “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant an opportunity to impeach the credibility of a witness against him because impeachment is Nos. 08-6504/6506; 09-5094/5095 United States v. Lanham, et al. Page 11 fundamental to effective cross-examination.” United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d 698, 704 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974)). Trial courts “retain great discretion to impose reasonable limits on the cross-examination of witnesses . . . .” United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 360 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In determining whether a district court has abused its discretion in limiting cross-examination, this Court “must decide whether, despite the limitation of cross-examination, the jury was otherwise in possession of sufficient information . . . to make a ‘discriminating appraisal’ of a witness’ motives and bias.” United States v. Kone, 307 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). Because defense counsel failed to object to the limitation at trial, the plain error standard applies. There is a circuit split on the issue of whether defendants should be prohibited from asking cooperating witnesses, and former co-conspirators, details about their sentences and sentencing agreements with the government to expose the witnesses’ bias, and the Sixth Circuit has not considered this issue in a published decision. Compare United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 218-24 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court abused its discretion when it limited defendants’ ability to crossexamine co-conspirators about their sentences) with United States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 358-59 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding the opposite). Where there are conflicting authorities, the district court could not have committed plain error. See United States v. Williams, 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[A] circuit split precludes a finding of clear error.”). “At a minimum, court of appeals cannot correct an error . . . unless the error is clear under current law.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Because the law on this issue is not clear, the district court did not commit plain error. Accordingly, the district court’s determination is AFFIRMED. Nos. 08-6504/6506; 09-5094/5095 United States v. Lanham, et al. Page 12