Opinion ID: 4538282
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Addressed Summarily

Text: Most of Defendants’ arguments on appeal can be disposed of summarily. First, they complain that the due-process rights of Solco I and XSun Energy, entities that were “created, own[ed], and control[led]” by Mr. Johnson, RaPower-3, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 1127, were violated by an order of the district court to freeze their assets. But Defendants do not complain that their own rights were injured by the district court’s order and have made no effort to explain how they have standing to assert the rights of those entities, even after the United States raised the issue of standing in its appellate brief. We therefore decline to address the issue. Second, Defendants say that evidence obtained after trial necessitates a remand to the district court with instructions to dissolve the injunction. We understand this argument to be a challenge to the district court’s denial of their motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). In that motion they asked for an amendment or alteration of the judgment in light of new evidence that their system 13 worked to produce electricity. The alleged new evidence was expert testimony that a system involving a commercially available engine had been used, in connection with the lenses at the Delta site, to produce electricity after the trial was conducted. The court denied the motion because “[t]he expert testimony that Defendants now seek to introduce was within their control to produce before and at trial.” Order Denying Rule 59(e) and Rule 52(b) Mot., Dec. 4, 2018, ECF No. 529. Defendants do not challenge that statement or otherwise argue that there was anything preventing them from producing this evidence before or during trial. We therefore affirm the denial of their Rule 59(e) motion. See Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1369 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e affirm the district court’s dismissal of the stigma-plus due-process claim because [Appellant]’s opening brief contains nary a word to challenge the basis of the dismissal[.]”). Third, Defendants contend that the district court improperly denied them a jury trial. They filed a jury demand two months after this lawsuit was filed. On the government’s motion the magistrate judge assigned to the case struck Defendants’ jury demand on May 2, 2016, on the ground that there was no Seventh Amendment right to a jury because the United States was seeking only equitable relief. The court later set the deadline for pretrial motions at November 17, 2017. On February 9, 2018, Defendants again moved for a jury trial, relying largely on the June 5, 2017, decision of the Supreme Court in Kokesh v. S.E.C., 137 S. Ct. 1635. The district court denied Defendants’ motion on two grounds: (1) on the merits, Kokesh did not support Defendants’ jury demand; and (2) the renewed motion for a jury trial was untimely. On appeal Defendants challenge the first ground but not the second. Because they have not challenged the district court’s 14 alternative ground for its ruling, we affirm. See Starkey ex rel. A.B. v. Boulder Cty. Soc. Servs., 569 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2009) (“When an appellant does not challenge a district court’s alternate ground for its ruling, we may affirm the ruling.”). Defendants’ argument in their reply brief comes too late. See Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000) (“This court does not ordinarily review issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). Fourth, Defendants challenge the district court’s determination that they knowingly engaged in a fraudulent tax scheme. In essence, they claim there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s decision. But the challenge is wholly inadequate to preserve the issue for consideration. The case was tried over the course of 12 days. The district court’s opinion, which occupies about 82 pages in the official reports, includes 427 findings of fact. The opening brief devotes a little less than 12 pages to the issue. It recites a smattering of evidence favorable to Defendants but wholly fails to deal with the voluminous contrary evidence. It does not identify a single finding of fact by the district court that is unsupported by evidence at trial. There is some discussion of the law, but that discussion does not grapple with the specific evidence presented in this case. In this circumstance, this court has no obligation to conduct what would amount to a de novo review of the trial evidence to see whether it supports the district court’s rulings. See Nixon, 784 F.3d at 1366 (“[C]ounsel for appellant . . . tells a story of injustice and argues against positions not adopted by the district court. Counsel utterly fails, however, to explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision.”); United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1195 15 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[Appellant] purports to challenge the district court’s ruling on all of the categories of evidence it prohibited him from using to cross-examine [a witness], but fails to offer any detailed explanation of how the district court erred. Accordingly, we conclude he has failed to sufficiently place these rulings at issue.”); Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[A] brief must contain an argument consisting of more than a generalized assertion of error, . . . Yet [appellant] offers no articulable basis for disturbing the district court’s judgment.”). Moreover, the record on appeal would not permit us to conduct such a factual review. The record includes some exhibits offered at trial but only a fraction of the testimony (and that fraction appears in the appellee’s appendix, not the appellant’s appendix). Under Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), “[i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant must include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.” As we have explained: “Our appellate review is necessarily limited when . . . an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and rulings of the district court but fails to include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.” Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 969 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Brody, 705 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2013) (“By failing to file a copy of the trial transcript as part of the record on appeal, the appellant waives any claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 16