Opinion ID: 554071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Termination of state proceedings

Text: 15 Both the Supreme Court and other circuits have addressed what constitutes termination. In EEOC v. Commercial Office Products, 486 U.S. 107, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988), the complainant filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC 290 days after the alleged misconduct. The EEOC referred the charge to the appropriate state agency, which waived its right to process initially the claim within the 300-day limit. The state agency then sent a letter to the complainant explaining that it had waived its right to initial processing, but retained jurisdiction to act on the charge after the conclusion of the EEOC proceedings. Id. at 113, 108 S.Ct. at 1670. The issue before the Court was whether the waiver constituted termination. The Court concluded that a state agency's waiver of a sixty day deferral period, pursuant to a worksharing agreement similar to the one in this case, terminated its proceedings under section 706(c), notwithstanding a provision in the worksharing agreement that permits the nonprocessing party to review the charge after the initial processing party's resolution of the case. Id. at 114-15, 108 S.Ct. at 1670-71. The Court stated that the two goals underlying the deferral provisions--deference to the states and efficient processing of claims--supported its conclusion that waiver of the sixty day deferral period was sufficient to terminate the local agency's proceeding. Id. at 116-21, 108 S.Ct. at 1671-74. 16 Commercial Office Products is not dispositive of the issue presented here: whether the waiver provision in a worksharing agreement causes the state's proceedings to be terminated and the charge to be deemed filed with the EEOC. Mr. Sofferin's position is that, pursuant to the worksharing agreement, the state proceedings were terminated on the 299th day, when the EEOC received the charge; American contends that the IDHR could not terminate its proceedings until the charge was referred to an IDHR agent on day 305. 17 All four courts of appeals that have considered the question of termination since Commercial Office Products have agreed that a waiver pursuant to a provision that a state agency hereby waives exclusive jurisdiction over charges is effective without any further action by the state agency. See Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir.1990); EEOC v. Techalloy Maryland, Inc., 894 F.2d 676, 678 (4th Cir.1990); Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472, 1479 (9th Cir.1989); Griffin v. Air Prods. & Chem., Inc., 883 F.2d 940, 943 (11th Cir.1989). As did the district court, we agree with the decisions of the other circuits. 4 18 American claims that the worksharing agreement between the EEOC and the IDHR evidences the parties' intention that termination of IDHR processing occurs when the IDHR agent acts on the charge. Appellees' Br. at 24. This argument ignores the plain language of the agreement: the worksharing agreement states that the IDHR hereby waives its exclusive processing rights to those charges assigned by the agreement to the EEOC for initial processing. It is this prospective waiver provision, executed at the time the agreement was signed, that the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held to terminate the state proceedings. 5 19 The EEOC submits 6 that, under its regulations and procedural directives, a state agency's waiver in a worksharing agreement of initial processing rights for specified categories of charges causes a charge within a waived category to be deemed filed immediately with the EEOC. The most pertinent EEOC regulation provides: 20 Where the document on its face constitutes a charge within a category of charges over which the [state] Agency has waived its rights to the period of exclusive processing referred to in paragraph (a)(3)(iii) of this section, the charge is deemed to be filed with the Commission upon receipt of the document. Such filing is timely if the charge is received [by the EEOC] within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation. 21 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1601.13(a)(4)(ii)(A). [I]t is axiomatic that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, for which it has primary enforcement responsibility, need not be the best one by grammatical or any other standards. Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 115, 108 S.Ct. at 1671. We have no difficulty in concluding that the EEOC's interpretation of the agreement and its effect under section 706 of Title VII is reasonable and accordingly should be upheld. 22 This result is fully consistent with the remedial purposes of Title VII. To hold that the waiver is not self-executing, and that it must be perfected by the agencies' strict compliance with the referral provisions of the worksharing agreement would be to exalt form over substance and preclude relief to a potentially meritorious claim simply because it was the victim of a bureaucratic mix-up. Techalloy, 894 F.2d at 679. Moreover, American's construction is inconsistent with the very purpose of worksharing agreements--to reduce red tape and to process expeditiously discrimination charges. Id.; see also Griffin, 883 F.2d at 994; Green, 883 F.2d at 1479.