Opinion ID: 2598967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does RCW 7.70.150 Violate the Separation of Powers?

Text: ¶ 8 Putman contends that RCW 7.70.150's certificate of merit requirement violates the separation of powers because it conflicts with CR 8 and 11 regarding pleading requirements and thereby encroaches on the judiciary's power to set court rules. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center argues that RCW 7.70.150 does not conflict with CR 8 and 11 and that, even if it did, CR 8 and 11 do not apply because medical malpractice claims are special proceedings. See CR 81(a) (exempting special proceedings from civil rules). ¶ 9 The Washington State Constitution does not contain a formal separation of powers clause, but `the very division of our government into different branches has been presumed throughout our state's history to give rise to a vital separation of powers doctrine.' Brown v. Owen, 165 Wash.2d 706, 718, 206 P.3d 310 (2009) (quoting Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash.2d 129, 135, 882 P.2d 173 (1994)). The doctrine of separation of powers divides power into three co-equal branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wash.2d 384, 393-94, 143 P.3d 776 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1254, 127 S.Ct. 1382, 167 L.Ed.2d 162 (2007). The doctrine `does not depend on the branches of government being hermetically sealed off from one another,' but ensures that the fundamental functions of each branch remain inviolate. Hale v. Wellpinit Sch. Dist. No. 49, 165 Wash.2d 494, 504, 198 P.3d 1021 (2009) (quoting Carrick, 125 Wash.2d at 135, 882 P.2d 173). If `the activity of one branch threatens the independence or integrity or invades the prerogatives of another,' it violates the separation of powers. Fircrest, 158 Wash.2d at 394, 143 P.3d 776 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moreno, 147 Wash.2d at 505-06, 58 P.3d 265). ¶ 10 Some fundamental functions are within the inherent power of the judicial branch, including the power to promulgate rules for its practice. Id.; In re Disbarment of Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 476, 172 P. 1152 (1918). If a statute appears to conflict with a court rule, this court will first attempt to harmonize them and give effect to both, but if they cannot be harmonized, the court rule will prevail in procedural matters and the statute will prevail in substantive matters. Fircrest, 158 Wash.2d at 394, 143 P.3d 776. ¶ 11 Thus, this court must determine whether RCW 7.70.150 can be harmonized with this court's rules. If it cannot, the court rule will prevail under the separation of powers doctrine if RCW 7.70.150 involves fundamentally procedural matters. But first, the court must determine if the civil rules even apply to medical malpractice proceedings or if, instead, medical malpractice proceedings are now special proceedings and therefore exempt from the civil rules.
¶ 12 Wenatchee Valley Medical Center contends that medical malpractice proceedings are special proceedings and therefore exempt from CR 8 and 11 under CR 81(a), which states that [ e ] xcept where inconsistent with rules or statutes applicable to special proceedings, these rules shall govern all civil proceedings. (Emphasis added.) The term special proceedings is not defined within the rule. This court has not set out a rule for determining whether a proceeding is ordinary or special, but Washington courts have identified certain actions as special proceedings, including lien foreclosures, sexually violent predator petitions, garnishment, will contests, and unlawful detainer actions. [2] ¶ 13 Wenatchee Valley Medical Center argues that medical malpractice proceedings are special proceedings because the legislature has set out statutory requirements for filing medical malpractice cases. This argument is unsustainable because it places no limits on the ability of the legislature to determine procedural rules. Under this standard, the legislature could reclassify any common law action as a special proceeding by passing statutes regulating its procedures, thereby eroding this court's power to determine its own court rules. ¶ 14 A more appropriate definition of special proceedings would include only those proceedings created or completely transformed by the legislature. This would include actions unknown to common law (such as attachment, mandamus, or certiorari), as well as those where the legislature has exercised its police power and entirely changed the remedies available (such as the workers' compensation system). Other states have adopted similar standards within their civil codes, typically defining an ordinary action as one based in common law and a special proceeding as any other action. See, e.g., Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.2d 815, 822, 279 P.2d 35 (1955); Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 520, 144 N.W. 1082 (1914). This standard protects the separation of powers because it preserves this court's abilities to set its own court rules for traditional actions but allows the legislature to set rules for newly created proceedings. ¶ 15 Medical malpractice claims are fundamentally negligence claims, rooted in the common law tradition. See, e.g., Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313, 327, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). While the legislature has made some changes to medical malpractice claims, it has not extinguished the common law action and replaced it with a statutory remedy. Cf. Lane v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 21 Wash.2d 420, 428, 151 P.2d 440 (1944) (holding that the workers' compensation act took away from the workman his common-law right of action for negligence and [i]n its place it provided for industrial insurance, thereby creating the right of the workman to compensation from the workers' compensation fund). Therefore, under the standard described above, medical malpractice suits do not qualify as special proceedings and are not exempt from the civil rules under CR 81(a).
¶ 16 RCW 7.70.150 requires plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions to file a certificate of merit with the pleadings. [3] The certificate of merit must contain a statement from an expert that, based on the information known at the time of executing the certificate of merit, ... there is a reasonable probability that the defendant's conduct did not follow the accepted standard of care. RCW 7.70.150(3). ¶ 17 This requirement directly conflicts with CR 11, which states that attorneys do not have to verify pleadings in medical malpractice actions, as well as CR 8, which details our system of notice pleading. First, RCW 7.70.150 conflicts with CR 11 because it requires the attorney to submit additional verification of the pleadings  a requirement that CR 11 explicitly limits to dissolution of marriage, separation, declarations concerning the validity of a marriage, custody, and [related modifications]. CR 11(a). Second, RCW 7.70.150 conflicts with CR 8 and our system of notice pleading, which requires only a short and plain statement of the claim and a demand for relief in order to file a lawsuit. CR 8(a). Under notice pleading, plaintiffs use the discovery process to uncover the evidence necessary to pursue their claims. Doe, 117 Wash.2d at 782, 819 P.2d 370. The certificate of merit requirement essentially requires plaintiffs to submit evidence supporting their claims before they even have an opportunity to conduct discovery and obtain such evidence. For that reason, the certificate of merit requirement fundamentally conflicts with the civil rules regarding notice pleading  one of the primary components of our justice system.
¶ 18 As noted above, if a statute appears to conflict with a court rule, this court will first attempt to harmonize them and give effect to both. Fircrest, 158 Wash.2d at 394, 143 P.3d 776. If they cannot be harmonized, the court rule will prevail in procedural matters and the statute will prevail in substantive matters. Substantive law `creates, defines, and regulates primary rights,' while procedures involve the `operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated.' Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 501, 527 P.2d 674 (1974)). ¶ 19 Several other state supreme courts have invalidated certificate and affidavit requirements for medical malpractice litigation, holding that they conflict with court rules regarding the procedures for filing lawsuits and therefore violate the separation of powers. See, e.g., Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 239, 253 S.W.3d 415 (2007) (invalidating a statute that required medical malpractice plaintiffs to submit an affidavit of reasonable cause from a medical expert within 30 days of filing); Wimley v. Reid, 991 So.2d 135, 138 (Miss.2008) (invalidating a statute that required the plaintiff's attorney to submit a certificate that he or she has consulted a medical expert prior to filing); Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, Inc., 68 Ohio St.3d 236, 237-38, 1994-Ohio-294, 626 N.E.2d 71 (invalidating a statute requiring the plaintiff's attorney in a medical malpractice action to submit an affidavit attesting that he or she had requested a copy of the medical records). But see McAlister v. Schick, 147 Ill.2d 84, 94, 588 N.E.2d 1151, 167 Ill.Dec. 1021 (1992) (upholding an affidavit statute, holding that the statute fell within the legislature's power to enact laws to determine and effectuate public policy and did not impede court's ability to control its procedures). ¶ 20 We hold that RCW 7.70.150 is procedural because it addresses how to file a claim to enforce a right provided by law. See, e.g., Hiatt, 68 Ohio St.3d at 238, 626 N.E.2d 71 (Since the conflict involves the form and content of the complaint to initiate a medical malpractice case, it is a procedural matter.). The statute does not address the primary rights of either party; it deals only with the procedures to effectuate those rights. Therefore, it is a procedural law and will not prevail over the conflicting court rules. [4]