Opinion ID: 170498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified Immunity Discussion

Text: To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1026 (10th Cir. 2007). -12- The Plaintiffs allege that Agent Conde violated their constitutional rights by including false information in his affidavit for a warrant to search their home. Agent Conde, in response, contends that he is protected from Plaintiffs’ claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity. When applicable, qualified immunity shields public agents not only from liability at trial, but also from the very burdens associated with trial. Beard v. City of Northglenn, Colo., 24 F.3d 110, 113 (10th Cir. 1994). This prophylactic protection is afforded governmental officials on the premise that they can act without fear of harassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages and only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated. Id. at 114. The Supreme Court adopted the current standard to determine whether qualified immunity applies in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Before Harlow, qualified immunity contained an objective and subjective component. Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir. 1988). Because the subjective component often required public officials to go to trial to defend insubstantial suits, the Supreme Court adopted an objective test for qualified immunity: a public official performing discretionary functions is shielded from liability for all civil damages so long as the official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. -13- When Agent Conde drafted his affidavit for a search warrant, the law was clearly established that an officer would violate a plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by knowingly or recklessly making a false statement in an affidavit in support of a search warrant, if the false statement were material to the finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); Bruning v. Pixler, 949 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1991). It was also a clearly established violation of a plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to knowingly or recklessly omit from an arrest affidavit information which, if included, would have vitiated probable cause. Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 582-83 (10th Cir. 1990). Although the objective test in Harlow is the general standard, the test must be modified when “the determination of the ‘objective’ reasonableness of an official’s conduct rests on establishing whether the defendant acted with an impermissible motive or intent - a highly ‘subjective’ factual element.” Lewis v. City of Fort Collins, 903 F.2d 752, 755 (10th Cir. 1990). Where, as here, the existence of a violation of the clearly established law depends on the government official's subjective intent, the Court applies a two-step analysis. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of the objective reasonableness of the challenged conduct. Id. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of objective reasonableness of his or her conduct, the plaintiff may avoid summary judgment only by pointing to specific evidence that the official's actions were -14- improperly motivated. Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc., 847 F.2d at 649; Lewis, 903 F.2d at 758. A. Prima facie showing of objective reasonableness This Court agrees with the district court that Agent Conde made a prima facie showing that he was objectively reasonable in his description of the events in the affidavit for the search warrant. Agent Conde produced evidence to show that the confidential informant, Karen Byerly, thought that she could arrange Travis Underwood “to score for her.” ROA, Vol. II, S361. Underwood obliged and purchased cocaine for Byerly and Agent Conde. Id. Agent Conde testified that Underwood indicated that he was going to the white trailer house with the green trim. Id. at S351, S354. Agent Conde did not remember the exact words Underwood used, but recalled Underwood gesturing to and describing the “house with green” (340 Heizer). Id. at S354. After Underwood left the vehicle, Agent Conde lost sight of him. When he thought he could move without raising suspicion, Agent Conde moved his vehicle. Agent Conde did not see Underwood go into any location, but he recalled seeing him emerge from 340 Heizer, the first trailer to the south of the railroad tracks. According to Agent Conde, Byerly was not looking in Underwood’s direction when Underwood walked out of the trailer. Id. at S352. Prima facie evidence is evidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced. Black's Law Dictionary (8th -15- ed. 2004). Although Plaintiffs insist that Agent Conde’s prima facie case is based solely on disputed facts, this Court finds otherwise. The undisputed facts show that Underwood walked south across the railroad tracks, that Agent Conde lost sight of him, that there may have been train cars obstructing Conde’s view of the trailers, and that the trailers were approximately 150 yards from Agent Conde’s vehicle. Underwood himself testified that Agent Conde may not have been able to see which trailer he entered, and that he walked right past the trailer at 340 Heizer on his way back to Conde’s vehicle. The Court finds that there is sufficient undisputed evidence to establish that Agent Conde was objectively reasonable in his belief, even if mistaken, that Underwood exited 340 Heizer. The Plaintiffs may therefore avoid summary judgment only by producing specific factual support for their claim of unconstitutional motive. Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc., 847 F.2d at 649. B. Knowing or reckless false statement or omission in affidavit Plaintiffs assert that Agent Conde included two material false statements in his affidavit and that he omitted critical information from the affidavit. The false statements allegedly included were that: 1) Underwood told Agent Conde he was walking to the white trailer with blue-green trim, which described 340 Heizer Street, and 2) Agent Conde saw Underwood emerge from 340 Heizer and walk directly back to Agent Conde’s vehicle. According to the Plaintiffs, the critical omission was that Karen Byerly told Agent Conde that Underwood did not exit -16- 340 Heizer but instead exited the trailer house to the south of 340 Heizer. Plaintiffs must produce specific evidence that Agent Conde acted knowingly or with reckless disregard to the truth in preparing his affidavit. To establish a reckless disregard for the truth, the Plaintiffs must prove that Agent Conde in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his allegations. Bruning, 949 F.2d at 357. Recklessness, however, may be inferred from the omission of facts which are clearly critical to a finding of probable cause. Id. Plaintiffs identify the following disputed facts which they urge show that Agent Conde knowingly or recklessly included false information or omitted critical information from his affidavit: 1) Underwood never indicated physically or verbally that he was walking to or towards 340 Heizer Street; 2) Underwood never entered the trailer at 340 Heizer Street, so Agent Conde could not have seen him exit the trailer; 3) Karen Byerly saw Underwood exit the trailer south of 340 Heizer Street and told Agent Conde what she saw; and 4) Agent Conde failed to preserve the recordings of the drug transaction. The Court initially notes that the Plaintiffs’ third asserted fact, that Karen Byerly saw Underwood exit the trailer south of 340 Heizer Street and told Agent Conde what she saw, is not supported by the record. As evidence of this assertion of fact, Plaintiffs rely on a statement made by Byerly and rely on Byerly’s deposition testimony. Byerly’s statement is in the form of a transcript of a -17- recorded conversation between Byerly and Plaintiffs’ investigator. ROA, Vol. II, R188. The transcript was not sworn to by Byerly and much of the recording was inaudible. The transcript of the recorded interview is hearsay which is not reliable and not admissible for purposes of a summary judgment motion. 2 Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Adams v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Hearsay testimony that would be inadmissible at trial cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment[.]”); Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 n.3 (D. Kan. 2002) (“A transcript of an interview is classic hearsay and, therefore, is inadmissible in ruling on a motion for summary judgment unless properly offered under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.”). Plaintiffs also rely on the deposition testimony of Byerly that she saw Underwood enter the “second” trailer on Heizer and that she told Agent Conde what she had seen. ROA, Vol I, D41h. Byerly’s deposition, however, is not part of the record in this appeal. The deposition is attached to the Plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of a motion to amend the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Agent Conde. Id. at D34. The district court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend. The district court refused to consider the deposition, 2 Byerly’s statements to the Plaintiffs’ investigator reflect the precise reason behind their inadmissibility. The investigator’s coaxing manner of questioning was extremely suggestive. For example, in asking Byerly what she recalled, the investigator told her, “Okay. Well, we didn’t want to - (inaudible) those people got injured pretty bad.” ROA, Vol. I, M115. -18- concluding that Plaintiffs had not met the criteria for amending the judgment since Byerly’s deposition was not newly discovered evidence. The court ruled that, “With respect to the [Byerly] deposition, plaintiffs do not demonstrate that counsel made a diligent effort to discover the evidence . . . . The court is not persuaded that the plaintiffs’ ‘new’ evidence requires consideration.” ROA, Vol. I, E44. The Plaintiffs did not challenge or address in their opening brief the district court’s determination that Byerly’s deposition was not newly discovered evidence which could be considered in a motion to alter or amend judgment. Because the district court’s refusal to consider the deposition was not raised by the Plaintiffs in their opening brief, the deposition is consequently not a part of the record on appeal. Tran v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, 355 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived.”) The remaining facts which Plaintiffs contend are sufficient to establish an improper motive on Agent Conde’s behalf are that Underwood never indicated that he was walking towards 340 Heizer Street, that Underwood never actually went into 340 Heizer Street, and that Agent Conde failed to preserve evidence. The Court is not persuaded, as Plaintiffs insist, that these facts show that Agent Conde knew his affidavit was false or in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his allegations. -19- In reviewing these facts, the Court is called on to strike a fair balance between the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority, and the countervailing need to provide a realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees. Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc., 847 F.2d at 648. The Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs’ assertions, that Underwood never indicated that he was walking towards 340 Heizer and never actually went into 340 Heizer, evidence that Conde was improperly motivated. It does appear that Agent Conde was mistaken in his belief that Underwood was planning to enter the first trailer and that Agent Conde saw Underwood exit the first trailer. Under the Fourth Amendment, however, our inquiry is focused neither on the existence nor the consequence of Agent Conde’s error, but on the intention behind it. Beard v. City of Northglenn, Colo., 24 F.3d at 116. The testimonies of both Agent Conde and Underwood only indicate that Agent Conde misunderstood Underwood and mistook which trailer he exited. His misunderstanding and mistake alone are insufficient to show a culpable state of mind. Plaintiffs persist that Agent Conde’s failure to preserve the audio recordings of Agent Conde’s contact with Underwood and Byerly is circumstantial evidence that Agent Conde acted knowingly or with reckless disregard to the truth in preparing the affidavit for a search warrant. The general -20- rule is that bad faith destruction of a document relevant to proof of an issue at trial gives rise to an inference that production of the document would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997). The adverse inference, however, must be predicated on the bad faith of the party destroying the records. Id. Mere negligence in losing or destroying records is not enough because it does not support an inference of consciousness of a weak case. Id. The only evidence in the record with respect to the audio recordings is that Agent Conde recorded over the micro cassette recording and that Agent Lyon said he turned the wire recording made at KBI over to Agent Conde, and Agent Conde testified he did not know where the tape was. Again, this limited evidence shows, at the most, that Agent Conde’s loss of the recordings was negligent. Negligence in losing evidence alone does not give rise to any adverse inference that the tapes were unfavorable. Id. Without an inference that the tapes were unfavorable, there can be no second inference that Agent Conde destroyed them because of a culpable state of mind. Although the Court does not find evidence of a culpable state of mind, the Court is left with grave concerns about the quality of information upon which Agent Conde’s affidavit was based and upon which the search was ultimately conducted. The district court noted that the Heizer Street area was prone to violence and familiar to members of the Great Bend Special Services Team. The -21- Court believes that Agent Conde’s conduct in failing to clarify exactly where Baudilio lived and in which trailer the drug buy had taken place was certainly careless. Such carelessness is deplorable and the Court assumes the lack of care is not characteristic of KBI investigations. The Court agrees with the district court, however, that the Plaintiffs have not presented specific facts to show that Agent Conde’s actions were more than careless. That is, the evidence does not show that he acted knowingly or with reckless disregard to the truth when he stated in his affidavit that Underwood indicated he was going to 340 Heizer and that Agent Conde saw Underwood exit 340 Heizer. Although the Plaintiffs imply that Agent Conde was motivated by a belief that a family drug enterprise existed, the implication is not supported by the evidence. We find that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Agent Conde and the judgment of the district court is accordingly AFFIRMED. Entered by the Court: Clarence A. Brimmer