Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was there a Conflict?

Text: 182 As described above, the district court found that Beets demonstrated two actual conflicts of interest in this case, the media rights conflict and the witness/advocate conflict. I will address these two conflicts separately, turning first to the media rights conflict.
183 A conflict of interest between Beets and Andrews existed not later than the point at which the formal contract giving Andrews's son the media rights to the Betty Lou Beets story was executed, and perhaps earlier. The majority joins other courts, scholars and organizations of the bar who have uniformly denounced the execution of literary and media rights fee arrangements between attorneys and their clients during the pendency of a representation. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1273. What the majority fails to acknowledge is the reason for such uniform condemnation--the extraordinarily high probability that a media rights contract between counsel and client will create a conflict of interest. When Andrews began his representation of Beets on her murder charge, Texas's rules of ethics provided that [p]rior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a client ... by which he acquires an interest in publication rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment. State Bar Rules, art. X, Sec. 9, DR 5-104(B) (Texas Code of Professional Responsibility) (1984). 5 184 The reason for the rule is clear. Despite the majority's assertions, media rights contracts are not prohibited primarily because they encourage counsel to misuse the judicial process for the sake of his [own] enrichment and publicity seeking or because they necessarily trade[ ] on the misery of the victim and his family. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1273. While ensuring that the judicial process is not misused and discouraging manipulation of the suffering of others for profit are important goals, commentators uniformly agree that the reason media contracts are frowned upon is because [a]n agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:702 (1984) (emphasis added); see also John Wesley Hall, Jr., Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Lawyer Sec. 12.13, at 414 (1987) (A grave conflict of interest can arise from a [media rights contract].... (internal quotation omitted)); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Susan P. Koniak, The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 498 (1990) (The reason for prohibiting such arrangements is that what makes 'good copy' does not necessarily make a good defense.); Robert P. Schuwerk & John F. Sutton, Jr., A Guide to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 27A Hous.L.Rev. 133 (1990) (The lawyer's acquisition from a client of publication rights to portrayals or accounts of the subject of the representation will probably create a conflict of interests.); Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics Sec. 9.3.3, at 525 (1986) (The problems [with media rights contracts] are two--conflict of interests and the revelation of client information....). 185 The rules against media rights contracts are designed to prevent the specific conflict resonating in this case; simply put, a lawyer in a criminal case who obtains from his client television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other publication rights with respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of his publication rights to the prejudice of his client. State Bar Rules, art. X, Sec. 9, EC 5-4 (Texas Code of Professional Responsibility) (1984) (emphasis added). Plainly, a media rights contract  'may place the lawyer under temptation to conduct the defense with an eye on the literary aspects and its dramatic potential. If such an arrangement or contract is part of the fee, in lieu of the fee, or a condition of accepting the employment, it is especially reprehensible.'  Hall, supra, Sec. 12.12, at 414 n. 19 (quoting ABA Standards, The Defense Function Std 4-3.4, Commentary). 6 In fact, a media rights contract is so rife with conflict that under Texas's rules client consent will not cure a violation of [the prohibitions of media contracts]. Schuwerk & Sutton, supra, at 134. 186 In the instant case, the media contract weighed on Andrews's mind from the beginning of his representation. At the very least, the contract placed him in a situation of divided interests. Before the advent of the media rights contract, Beets's interest lay in having Andrews withdraw as her counsel and testify at her trial that he had initiated the idea of searching for Jimmy Don's insurance and pension benefits. As her attorney, this was also Andrews's interest because he was obligated to see to it that his client's best defense was put forward. After the media rights contract was confected, the interests of Beets and Andrews sharply diverged. While Beets's interest remained in having Andrews withdraw and testify, Andrews's interest now squarely lay in remaining as her counsel because only then would he be entitled to the potentially lucrative media rights. The record makes clear that the district court did not err in finding that Beets demonstrated that Andrews had an actual conflict of interest in regard to the media rights contract.
187 The district court also recognized a second conflict of interest, Andrews's advocate/witness conflict. The district court and the majority treat this conflict separately from the media rights conflict. In a situation where a lawyer can provide favorable testimony material to his client's case, his failure to withdraw and testify may or may not stem from an actual conflict--i.e., from a divergence of interests between the lawyer and his client. If the failure to withdraw is caused, for example, by a desire to stay in the case for the fee involved, a conflict of interest may exist. As one commentator has suggested, when a lawyer has a duty to withdraw and testify in favor of his client, but does not do so, [s]uch a decision would raise serious questions about either the lawyer's competence or about the effect of a conflict of interest. Wolfram, supra, Sec. 7.5.2, at 381 (emphasis added). According to this commentator: 188 The conflict is between the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client, which urges the lawyer to give the needed testimony, and the lawyer's economic instincts, which may lead the lawyer to remain in the case as advocate in order to continue earning a fee that otherwise would have to be abandoned. 189 Id. (emphasis added). In my view, while Andrews's role as both an advocate and a potential witness may well have violated the applicable ethical rules, 7 its significance for this case lies not in its possible status as an independent conflict, but rather in its relationship to the media rights conflict. That is, as the district court recognized but did not explicitly resolve, the question remaining in this case is whether the media rights contract is what caused Andrews to remain in the case as counsel. 8 190