Opinion ID: 1925469
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Requested Instructions to the Jury

Text: We move now to defendant's contention that the trial justice failed to properly instruct the jury on defendant's liability for the acts of an independent contractor in performing work allegedly causing plaintiff's damages. The defendant requested that the trial justice instruct the jury as follows: You are instructed that the defendant, Four Dee Realty, is not liable for the negligent acts of Mr. DeSousa, d/b/a AAA Electric Master Rooter Co., and/or his employees in the manner and method of performing his work. This instruction was properly disallowed since its allowance in effect was a motion for a directed verdict which already had been properly denied by the trial justice. A giving of such an instruction would only mislead or confuse the jury and was therefore properly disallowed. The defendant further requested that in the event the trial justice failed to give the above instruction, he instruct the jury that it is the general rule that an employer is not liable for the negligent acts of an independent contractor, and further instruct the jury as to the definition of an independent contractor. The trial justice did not instruct as requested by defendant. He instead instructed the jury as follows: Now, on independent contractor, it is the general rule that one who hires an independent contractor is not responsible for the negligent acts of that contractor or that contractor's employees in the manner and method of performing the work for which the independent contractor was hired. Independent contractor is one who is engaged to perform services for another according to his own skill and judgment as to the manner or method of performance, free from the control and direction of the person for whom the services are being performed, in all matters connected with the manner or method of performance, except as to when and where, in general, it should be done and the results or product of the work. This general rule of non-liability for an employer of an independent contractor who negligently causes injury in the performance of his work is not without exception. The employer of an independent contractor cannot escape liability for injuries caused by the failure of an independent contractor to exercise due care in the performance of work which is inherently or intrinsically dangerous. Also, the employer of an independent contractor cannot escape liability for injuries caused to the third party person by the negligence of the independent contractor where the work to be performed by the independent contractor is of such a nature that it would reasonably be expected to cause injury to such third persons unless the employer of the independent contractor takes special precautions to see that no such injury results. It is well settled that a trial justice is required to instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the facts as the jury may be warranted in finding them, and his failure to do so, if objection be timely made, constitutes grounds for a new trial. He will not be faulted if the instruction as given states the correct rule of law and substantially conforms to instructions requested. Goldis v. Fairchild, 103 R.I. 746, 241 A.2d 298 (1968). There can be no doubt that, on the record before us, DeSousa was an independent contractor. The plaintiff concedes that it can recover only if the emptying of the drain falls within one of the exclusions referred to by the trial justice in his charge. The defendant now claims that the charge, as it related to the exclusions, was confusing. However, the transcript shows that at the conclusion of the charge, defendant's sole complaint was its belief that there was nothing inherently dangerous about the cleaning out of pipes or the fixing of backed-up toilets. At no time did it ever complain, as it does now, of any ambiguity. If defendant was concerned about such an ambiguity, it should have sought further clarification. State v. Amado, 109 R.I. 53, 280 A.2d 324 (1971). The general rule as to an employer's immunity from liability for the torts of his independent contractor has been well established. There are, however, numerous exceptions to this rule. The Restatement devotes some 20 sections to the exceptions. See 2 Restatement (Second) Torts §§ 410-429 (1965). This court has in the past recognized several of these exceptions. An employer has been held liable (1) on the ground of his being subject to a non-delegable duty. Webbier v. Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau, Inc., 105 R.I. 605, 254 A.2d 285 (1969); or (2) in respect to work that by its very nature is likely to cause harm unless proper precautions are taken, Sroka v. Halliday, 39 R.I. 119, 97 A. 965 (1916); or (3) with respect to work which is unquestionably inherently dangerous, Blount v. Fong, 48 R.I. 453, 138 A. 52 (1927); or (4) where the owner of a structure without formally accepting the contractor's work assumes practical control by appropriating it to the use for which it is built, Read v. East Providence Fire District, 20 R.I. 574, 40 A. 760 (1898). The defendant apparently looks upon the phrase inherently or intrinsically dangerous as being synonymous with extra hazardous. It has been said that this phrase is not susceptible to a precise definition and that it is easier to state the principle than to apply it. Whalen v. Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 93 N.E.2d 393 (1950). The trial justice first alluded to the inherently dangerous exception but then proceeded to embody in his charge the essential and pertinent portions of §§ 416 and 427 of the Restatement. In fact, the language he used is substantially similar to that referred to in Sroka. Sroka preceded the Restatement by 49 years. In the commentary following § 427, the authors [3] emphasize that to a considerable extent § 427 is a duplicate of § 416. They also stress that the work being done by the contractor need not be the type that is classified as ultra hazardous, but that the employer's immunization from liability is inoperative when the contractor's work involves a risk which is recognizable in advance or when the employer has special reason to contemplate such a risk under the particular circumstances under which the work is being done. Prosser observes that liability may attach to the employer even if the risk could not be classified as unavoidable, provided the contractor's proposed method of doing his job is likely to lead to a special risk. Prosser, Torts § 71 at 473-74 (4th ed. 1971). It is obvious, then, whether one uses the words inherently or imminently dangerous or a risk which is recognizable in advance or special risk, that there is no definite fixed standard which one can apply when seeking to determine if the employer is liable for his independent contractor. The answer must be supplied on a case-by-case basis. Here, the landlord can be charged with constructive notice of the third floor calendar machine, its attachment to the main drain, and its discharge capacity. The machine measured 8 feet in width and 30 feet in length. The plaintiff's engineer testified that the tie-in between the machine and the six-inch drain was clearly visible from the second floor. Given the ceiling-high position of the clean-out plug and the potential drainage from the third floor, there was a recognizable in advance or special risk that once DeSousa's rooter removed the obstruction, injury would result to the first floor tenant's property unless the defendant had taken proper precautions. It is conceded that at no time prior to rotation of the rooter did any one of the defendant's staff inform DeSousa of the potential deluge that could make its way to the lower floors. Had this been done, DeSousa would have amassed enough 55-gallon drums and the overflow been avoided. We see no error in the charge. The defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.