Opinion ID: 1954603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: duty of city

Text: We thus reach the local's claim that the district court erred in finding that the city does not have a mandatory duty to provide specialized firefighting services to the authority. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a municipal corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers and no others: first, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; and third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporationnot simply convenient, but indispensable. Giger v. City of Omaha, 232 Neb. 676, 442 N.W.2d 182 (1989); Jacobs v. City of Omaha, 181 Neb. 101, 147 N.W.2d 160 (1966); Christensen v. City of Fremont, 45 Neb. 160, 63 N.W. 364 (1895). See, Briar West, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 291 N.W.2d 730 (1980); Chase v. County of Douglas, 195 Neb. 838, 241 N.W.2d 334 (1976). A municipality is a creature of the Legislature and derives its powers from that source. Obitz v. Airport Authority of the City of Red Cloud, 181 Neb. 410, 149 N.W.2d 105 (1967). The city, by virtue of its metropolitan classification, is governed by chapter 14 of the Revised Statutes. Cities of the metropolitan class have the express power (2) to purchase, lease, lease with option to buy, acquire by gift or devise, and hold real and personal property within or without the limits of the city for the use of the city, and real estate sold for taxes, (3) to sell, exchange, lease, and convey any real or personal estate owned by the city, in such manner and upon such terms as may be to the best interests of the city ... (4) to make all contracts and do all other acts in relation to the property and concerns of the city necessary to the exercise of its corporate or administrative powers, and (5) to exercise such other and further powers as may be conferred by law. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 14-101 (Reissue 1991). In addition to these general powers, metropolitan-class cities have the authority [t]o make and enforce all police regulations for the good government, general welfare, health, safety, and security of the city and the citizens thereof in addition to the police powers expressly granted herein; and in the exercise of the police power, to pass all needful and proper ordinances and impose fines, forfeitures, penalties, and imprisonment at hard labor for the violation of any ordinance, and to provide for the recovery, collection, and enforcement thereof; and in default of payment to provide for confinement in the city or county prison, workhouse, or other place of confinement with or without hard labor as may be provided by ordinance. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 14-102(25) (Cum.Supp.1992). Statutes granting powers to municipalities are to be strictly construed, and where doubt exists, such doubt must be resolved against the grant. Briar West, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, supra ; Nelson-Johnston & Doudna v. Metropolitan Utilities District, 137 Neb. 871, 291 N.W. 558 (1940). The clear import of §§ 14-101 and 14-102 is that the city has the power to provide firefighting services to the authority. In addition, Omaha Mun.Code, ch. 1, § 1.8, provides: The police power of the city is hereby extended to include all lands or property owned or leased by the city or any agency of the city and the general ordinances of the city shall be applicable on such property. In arguing that the city cannot abdicate its responsibility to provide firefighting services to the authority, the local overlooks that the city continues to provide the same regular firefighting services to the authority as it does to the rest of the city. All that the city has done is to reassign firefighters who had been providing the authority with specialized firefighting services. Claspill v. City of Springfield, 598 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.App.1980), is factually similar. Therein, the firefighters' union brought an action alleging that the municipality violated its charter by removing the firefighting responsibilities at the municipal airport from the municipality's fire department and transferring such responsibilities to the aviation board. In affirming the lower court's judgment for the municipality, the Claspill court found that the municipality had authority under its charter to assign the firefighting function to the board. Like the city in the situation at hand, the municipality in Claspill continued to provide the airport regular firefighting services. In no sense did the city in the case at hand abdicate its firefighting responsibilities to the authority. The local further contends that the city should not be permitted to allow the authority to perform its own specialized firefighting services because there is no guarantee that the authority will do so competently. This contention overlooks that the authority is required to comply with federal law regarding aviation safety. Federal Aviation Administration regulations in 14 C.F.R. part 139 (1992) establish the standards and procedures the authority must meet in this regard; the record establishes that the failure to meet them would adversely affect the authority's ability to conduct airline operations. And the local's position fails on yet another ground. The Nebraska Cities Airport Authorities Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 3-201, 3-239, and 3-501 to 3-514 (Reissue 1991 & Cum.Supp.1992), provides: Any city may create an airport authority to be managed and controlled by a board, which board, when and if appointed, shall have full and exclusive jurisdiction and control over all facilities owned or thereafter acquired by such city for the purpose of aviation operation, air navigation, and air safety operation.... Each such board shall be a body corporate and politic, constituting a public corporation and an agency of the city for which such board is established. § 3-502 (Reissue 1991). The local suggests the foregoing should be read so as to limit the authority to controlling only air safety. But in construing a statute, it is presumed that the Legislature intended a sensible rather than an absurd result. Houska v. City of Wahoo, 235 Neb. 635, 456 N.W.2d 750 (1990); Weimer v. Amen, 235 Neb. 287, 455 N.W.2d 145 (1990); Commerce Sav. Scottsbluff v. F.H. Schafer Elev., 231 Neb. 288, 436 N.W.2d 151 (1989). The reading espoused by the local would be nonsensical, for an authority's interest does not end upon the touching of an aircraft's wheels to the ground; an authority is concerned with all aspects of getting an aircraft and its occupants safely into and out of an airport. When § 3-502 is read in light of § 3-504(17) (Reissue 1991), which provides that an authority shall have the power [t]o do all things necessary or convenient to carry out the powers expressly conferred on such authorities by the act, we must conclude that the authority has the right to control more than air safety and has the right to provide itself with specialized firefighting services. Moreover, § 3-513 (Reissue 1991) provides: Insofar as the provisions of [the Cities Airport Authorities Act] are inconsistent with the provisions of any other act or of any city charter, if any, the provisions of [the Cities Airport Authorities Act] shall be controlling. Section 3-513 is, in effect, a type of supremacy clause, which nullifies any inconsistent statutory or municipal charter provisions. Therefore, § 3-513 empowers the authority to assume responsibility for specialized firefighting duties, irrespective of the city's desires in the matter.