Opinion ID: 2287155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: coconspiracy statements

Text: Finally defendant St. Pierre claims error in the trial justice's instructions to the jury with respect to threats defendant Burke made to Cole subsequent to the robbery. Cole testified that when she first spoke to the police concerning the events that occurred on June 15, 1985, she did not tell the complete truth. Her reason for the lack of veracity resulted from the fear of reprisal from defendant Burke. The defendant Burke, she stated, told [her] to keep [her] mouth shut. In his final charge the trial justice stated in the event that you find that there was a conspiracy between these two gentlemen, any statements made by Mr. Burke following the robbery may be attributed also to Mr. St. Pierre. That is the nature of the crime of conspiracy. Defense counsel for St. Pierre accordingly noted his objection to such a charge, asserting that the statements in question were made during the concealment phase and were, therefore, not attributable to his client. We agree. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides that statements made by a coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy are not inadmissible hearsay. The rule, however, does not mandate the admission of all statements against each coconspirator. The statements must be made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which became effective in 1987, is identical to its Federal counterpart and codifies our own common law. See State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 308 A.2d 300 (1973). In Patriarca we considered the admissibility of statements made by a coconspirator after completion of the conspiracy. We held that declarations of a co-conspirator made after the termination of the conspiracy are admissible only against the declarant. We, like the federal courts, tend to look with disfavor on attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecution. 112 R.I. at 40, 308 A.2d at 316. The statements before us clearly fall outside the reach of the nets of conspiracy prosecution as codified in Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Burke's threats to Cole were made a couple of days after the robbery, the object of the conspiracy. The record is devoid of evidence linking St. Pierre to these threats, and therefore, the trial justice's instructions were patently incorrect. Attributing threats of this nature to defendant St. Pierre operates as a substantial injustice that requires a reversal of his conviction. In view of our holding that the admission of these statements constitutes reversible error, we need not address the defendant St. Pierre's additional claims of error. [6] For the foregoing reasons the appeal of the defendant Burke is denied and dismissed and his conviction affirmed. The appeal of the defendant St. Pierre is sustained, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.