Opinion ID: 2517801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cumulative prejudice from misconduct

Text: Defendant asserts he suffered cumulative prejudice from the multiple instances of alleged misconduct by the prosecutor in his closing penalty argument. But we have identified only one possible such instance of misconduct, the prosecutor's discussion of biblical themes (see discussion, ante ), and have concluded that, if error, these remarks were clearly harmless. We therefore reject defendant's claim of cumulative prejudice.

Defendant urges that admission, as aggravating evidence, of the unadjudicated sexual assault against Alexandra M. violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, a fair and impartial jury, and a reliable penalty verdict. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) [38] He asserts that jurors who had found him guilty of capital offenses could not impartially judge his guilt of the aggravating crime, and that he was denied the protection of a unanimous jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject the contention, as we have many times before. (E.g., Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 913, 962, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 584-585, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 1054, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 863, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2; Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480.) Defendant also claims his federal and state due process rights were violated by virtue of the preaccusation delay in prosecuting the 1982 sexual assault on Alexandra M. But we have consistently held that the prosecution may offer in aggravation the defendant's violent criminal activity that occurred at any time. Absent demonstrable prejudice, the remote time at which that activity occurred does not violate the defendant's due process, speedy trial, or fair trial rights. (E.g., People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 136-138, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166; People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1088, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 585-586, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th 694, 772, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Though defendant claims prejudice, he demonstrates none except the damaging nature of the evidence. The evidence was admissible. [39]
At the outset of the penalty trial, defendant moved for permission to allocute before the penalty jury, i.e., to make a personal statement immune from cross-examination. Counsel's attached declaration stated that, if permitted to do so, defendant would speak about the constructive worth and value of his life even as it may exist in prison, the artistic and vocational activities he might wish to undertake behind bars, his opportunity to teach other inmates based on his experience and knowledge, his love for his children, and [h]is promise of good behavior while serving out the remainder of his life in prison. The motion was denied. [40] Defendant now urges the denial of allocution was error. The consequence, he insists, was a violation of his federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and a reliable penalty verdict. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) In particular, he asserts, he was treated unequally compared to noncapital defendants, who do have a right of allocution at sentencing. As defendant concedes, we have repeatedly rejected similar arguments. (E.g., People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1276, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544; Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th 692, 717, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1036-1037, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [summarily dismissing equal protection argument]; Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 511, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081; People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 888-890, 248 Cal.Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355 ( Robbins ).) We have held generally that capital and noncapital sentences are not similarly situated for purposes of equal protection. (E.g., People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 488, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968; People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1330, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221.) With regard to allocution specifically, we have explained that noncapital sentencees have no other right to express themselves about the appropriate sentence, while capital defendants may take the stand and testify on that issue. ( Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d 867, 889, 248 Cal.Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355.) In the latter context, a right of allocution immune from cross-examination contravenes the capital sentencing law's purpose to provide the sentencer with all relevant information bearing on the appropriate penalty. ( Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 511, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081.) Defendant urges that because he did not intend to discuss facts in his statement, cross-examination would be irrelevant. But his promises to behave well and be a constructive presence in prison would be a legitimate subject for cross-examination to test their sincerity based on past conduct. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
On September 8, 1993, the trial court denied defendant's automatic motion for modification of the death verdict (§ 190.4(e)). Defendant claims the ruling was improper, in that the court disregarded all mitigating evidence. Defendant did not object below to any aspect of the court's recitation of its reasons for denying the automatic modification motion. He has therefore forfeited his claim. ( Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1064, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775, citing People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1220, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969 [applying the forfeiture rule to hearings on such motions following the finality of People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984].) As we hereafter explain, the contention lacks merit in any event. Section 190.4(e) requires that, in ruling on the motion, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in [s]ection 190.3, and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings. `On appeal, we subject a ruling on such an application to independent review: the decision resolves a mixed question of law and fact; a determination of this kind is generally examined de novo [citation]. Of course, when we conduct such scrutiny, we simply review that trial court's determination after independently considering the record; we do not make a de novo determination of penalty.' ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1211, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476, quoting Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d 612, 703-704, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) The trial court began its ruling by correctly stating its statutory obligation. Indicating it had carefully reviewed the guilt and penalty phase evidence, the court said it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the truth of the guilt and special circumstance findings, and that defendant had raped Alexandra M. Assessing the circumstances of the capital crimethe killing of a witness, and the decapitation and dismemberment of the corpse to hamper identificationthe court found them totally repulsive, heinous, and a grave threat to our society, committed by a man with a base, antisocial personality who had little regret for his conduct or the injury caused to innocent people. The court indicated it had considered potential factors in mitigation, including any circumstances which extenuate the gravity of the crime even though not a legal excuse for the crime. In this regard, the court stated, it had examined all the testimony of defendant's neighbors, associates, his children's teachers and co-workers, and of his prison adjustment expert, as well as the evidence of his participation in civic organizations and his assistance to jail inmates, but found nothing mitigating in his character or background. On the contrary, said the court, defendant's privileged background and adult success weighed against mitigation. Indeed, said the court, defendant's life has been a life of egocentricity with total disregard for any human being. Though it had considered sympathy and compassion, the court asserted, in light of the evidence, these considerations are not sufficient or do not in any way serve as the basis of a sentence less than death. In sum, the court ruled, considering all the evidence and by independent review, the Court's personal assessment is that the factors in aggravation beyond all reasonable doubt outweigh those in mitigation, and further the court independently finds that the evidence of aggravation is so substantial when compared to the evidence of mitigation that it warrants death and not life without possibility of parole. Thus, the court fully considered all the proffered mitigating evidence and simply deemed it insufficient to warrant a sentence less than death. On review, we cannot say that ruling is contrary to law or the evidence. No error occurred.