Opinion ID: 2982569
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements to the Jury

Text: During its closing arguments, defense counsel told the jury that Osigwe would “walk[] out the door” because “the judge” did not believe Osigwe knew about the drugs in the package or books he had received on Uwazurike’s behalf. (R. 53 at Page ID 721.) On rebuttal, the prosecutor countered: One other thing I want to make clear about Mr. Osigwe and the whole guilty plea. A lot of that is really technical sort of lawyerly stuff, and [the presiding] Judge . . . is Mr. Osigwe’s judge and I guarantee you that if you knew [the presiding judge], and everybody in his courtroom who knows him would agree with me, nobody is going to tell him what to do. (Id. at Page ID 741.) When deciding whether allegations of prosecutorial misconduct warrant a new trial, we apply a two-part test: first, we “consider whether the prosecutor’s conduct and remarks were improper,” and then we determine “whether the impropriety was flagrant and thus warrants reversal.” Cristini v. McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 899 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A prosecutor’s remark is - 15 - Case No. 13-2067 United States v. Uwazurike improper if it refers to facts not in evidence or the prosecutor’s personal opinion. See, e.g., United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding prosecutor’s remark expressing his personal opinion to the jury improper); Macias v. Makowski, 291 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding prosecutor’s statements to jury regarding facts not in evidence improper). Here, Uwazurike argues that the government’s reference to the character of the judge presiding over Osigwe’s plea hearing is the kind of personal knowledge or evidence that cannot properly be expressed to the jury. We agree that the statement was improper, relying as it does on both the prosecutor’s personal opinion and character “evidence” not established at trial. However, Uwazurike does not explain how the statement was flagrant, and to find misconduct we must find a statement both improper and flagrant. To establish if an improper remark was flagrant, we evaluate “(1) whether the conduct and remarks of the prosecutor tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the conduct or remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally made; and (4) whether the evidence against the defendant was strong.” Macias, 291 F.3d at 452 (citing Carter, 236 F.3d at 783 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Uwazurike does argue that the prosecutor’s statement was misleading regarding the status of Osigwe’s plea. As discussed above, the judge overseeing Osigwe’s plea hearing had encouraged the government to reconsider its agreement if it believed Osigwe was truthful in claiming he did not know about the drugs. This contradicts the notion that Osigwe was going to be punished for his actions in June 2007. It is well established that a jury may find a prosecutor’s statements at trial more influential than it would those of other parties. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 - 16 - Case No. 13-2067 United States v. Uwazurike (1985). Because the jury may be inclined to value the word of the prosecutor over the evidence presented to it, the jury could make its decision on an improper basis. Id. at 18-19 (“[T]he prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.”). However, the prosecutor’s statement was limited to one aspect of the overall case against Uwazurike. It was not related to his guilt or innocence, but to the potential terms of a witness’s plea agreement. Further, the statement was made in the context of a debate over that very issue. It came directly in response to defense counsel’s closing statements regarding Osigwe and his plea. The district court gave the jury instructions to weigh carefully Osigwe’s outstanding plea in evaluating his credibility as a witness. The question is not whether the statement could potentially be misleading, but whether it “tended to mislead” or “prejudice” the jury—in context, this was not the case. Even if the statement proved misleading, the other elements of the test are not in Uwazurike’s favor. The statement was isolated, not extensive. It was not deliberate, but rather an off-the-cuff observation in response to defense counsel’s closing statement. Moreover, there was ample evidence against Uwazurike that had nothing to do with the statement or its contents. Accordingly, this statement cannot form the basis of a reversal or new trial. b. Inconsistent Positions Regarding Plea Agreement Uwazurike contends that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct when it presented two competing views of Osigwe’s role in the June 2007 heroin delivery. During the opening of Uwazurike’s trial, the government stated that Osigwe “took responsibility” for his possession of the books and had pleaded guilty. (R. 92 at Page ID 530.) By closing arguments, the government “adopted the theory that Osigwe had no knowledge and had been taken - 17 - Case No. 13-2067 United States v. Uwazurike advantage of in some way” when Uwazurike “exploited Osigwe’s trust and friendship.” (Appellant Br. 41.) Uwazurike maintains that adopting these inconsistent positions was improper for various reasons, none of which is persuasive. Uwazurike first claims that the prosecution “improperly bolstered” Osigwe’s testimony by “emphasizing that he expected to serve a lengthy prison sentence for his actions,” even though the government was reconsidering his plea. (Id. at 42.) This is neither consistent with the record nor with Uwazurike’s other arguments. While the government may have opened with the statement that Osigwe would face punishment for his actions, by Uwazurike’s own description, this was debated rather extensively before the jury at trial, and was contradicted by the government in closing arguments. Uwazurike also suggests that “the government’s actions constituted an attempt to influence the jury to convict for reasons other than sufficient proof.” (Id.) He claims that presenting evidence that Osigwe faced a prison sentence for acting on Uwazurike’s requests “may have made it much more difficult for [the] jury to conduct the proper analysis of the evidence.” (Id. at 42-43.) But the jury heard ample argument and evidence from both sides regarding the reliability of Osigwe’s testimony. Further, the court instructed the jury not to base its decision on “sympathy” for Osigwe. (R. 57 at Page ID 777-78.) Uwazurike argues that the timing of the government’s disclosure of Osigwe’s plea transcript was “solely within the government’s control,” and that the government “suppressed the evidence until it was too late.” (Appellant Br. 43.) Under Brady, the motive behind a delayed disclosure of evidence is irrelevant. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. As for whether the government’s disclosure was “too late,” we have already determined that Uwazurike’s Brady claim fails for numerous reasons. - 18 - Case No. 13-2067 United States v. Uwazurike Finally, Uwazurike contends that the government’s decision to continue prosecuting Osigwe after his plea hearing “provided jurors an impression that the requisite standard of proof may have been lower than it actually [was].” (Appellant Br. 43.) Uwazurike fails to explain precisely how this is the case, but as it relates to his general argument that Osigwe’s guilt and punishment were tied into his credibility, we have already determined that the defense adequately presented this to the jury at trial. The government’s behavior and statements to the jury at Uwazurike’s trial did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. The government delayed discovery of Osigwe’s plea hearing transcript until the second day of trial, but defense counsel had adequate time to review the transcript and argue based on its contents. While the prosecutor’s statement regarding Osigwe’s plea-hearing judge was improper, it was not flagrant. It did not mislead, it was isolated, it was made accidentally, and the evidence against Uwazurike was strong. Finally, the government may present its case in the manner it wishes; there was no improper conduct in its arguments to the jury. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s actions did not prejudice the jury and the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order a new trial.