Opinion ID: 757097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Interstate Nexus in Money Laundering Counts

Text: 88 The Indictment charged Clark and Wadena with various counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. At the close of the government's case, Clark and Wadena filed motions for judgment of acquittal on these counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 29. They argued that during its case-in-chief, the government offered no evidence to prove the element of an interstate commerce nexus, which is an essential element of any § 1957 violation. The district court denied their motions. 89 In the present appeal, Clark and Wadena contend the district court erred in denying their Rule 29 motions. In response, the government claims the defendants waived their right to challenge the denial of their motion when they failed to renew the motion at the close of evidence, and even if this court concludes the defendants did not waive their right to appeal the denial of their motion, the government nonetheless presented sufficient evidence to prove the element of an interstate commerce nexus. We address the government's waiver argument first. 90 Generally, a defendant waives the right to appeal a denial of a motion for acquittal if the defendant fails to renew the motion at the close of all of the evidence. See Edwards v. United States, 333 F.2d 588, 589 (8th Cir.1964). Such a waiver limits the scope of appellate review to a determination of whether there was plain error or a defect affecting the substantial rights of the defendant. See id. It appears neither Wadena nor Clark renewed their motion for acquittal at the close of the evidence. Thus, it is likely they waived their right to appeal the denial of the motion. See id. Nonetheless, because the government's alleged failure to prove an essential element of the money laundering offenses would be a defect affecting the substantial rights of Clark and Wadena, we will address the issue of whether the government presented sufficient evidence to prove the element of an interstate commerce nexus. 91 It appears this court has not determined the quantum of evidence necessary to prove the element of an interstate commerce nexus in § 1957 cases. Other circuits, however, have held evidence that the transaction in question was in interstate commerce or utilized the instrumentalities of interstate commerce is sufficient proof of the element of an interstate commerce nexus. See, e.g., United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1527 (10th Cir.1995) (concluding evidence of checks drawn on federally-insured banks and services purchased from an out-of-state company is sufficient to support finding of interstate commerce nexus); United States v. Peay, 972 F.2d 71, 74-75 (4th Cir.1992) (concluding evidence that funds were deposited and withdrawn from an FDIC-insured institution provided sufficient proof of an interstate commerce nexus). The government presented evidence that the checks referenced in Counts 10 through 18 were all deposited in either the First National Bank of Detroit Lakes, Minnesota or the State Bank of Winger, Minnesota. As these institutions are FDIC-insured, the government's evidence that these checks were deposited into these institutions is sufficient proof of an interstate commerce nexus. See, e.g., Kunzman, 54 F.3d at 1527. Thus, the district court did not err when it denied Clark's and Wadena's Rule 29 motions.