Opinion ID: 35610
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fundamental Alteration of the Case

Text: 16 In this context, we must determine whether the proposed amendment (1) was merely proposing alternative legal theories for recovery on the same underlying facts or (2) would fundamentally alter the nature of the case. 16 Amendments that fall into the former category generally should be permitted, as they advance Rule 15(a)'s policy of promoting litigation on the merits rather than on procedural technicalities. Amendments that fall into the latter category, however, may be denied if the circumstances warrant. Here, they clearly do. 17 The Plaintiffs' so-called Restated Complaint — an unabashed attempt to avoid ERISA preemption and defeat federal court jurisdiction — essentially pleaded a fundamentally different case with new causes of action and different parties. As stated by the Eighth Circuit, when late tendered amendments involve new theories of recovery and impose additional discovery requirements, courts [of appeal] are less likely to find an abuse of discretion due to the prejudice involved. 17 In their Restated Complaint, the Plaintiffs were effectively reconstructing the case anew, after it had been pending in the district court for years and was nearing the close of extensive discovery. Indeed, the Plaintiffs were proposing to abandon Mayeux's claim for medical benefits under the ERISA Plan — the claim that had been at the core of the Plaintiffs' case from the outset. We conclude that permitting the amendment would have unduly prejudiced BCBS and Dr. Gengelbach, the new defendant whom the Plaintiffs proposed to add to the suit. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by denying the Plaintiffs leave to amend. 18