Opinion ID: 2300635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alimony Statute

Text: Title 13, section 1512(g) of the Delaware Code governs court orders for alimony awards. While this provision does not apply to voluntary alimony agreements, here it informed the Family Court's conclusion that the contract was unconscionable. The provision provides a default rule that alimony will terminate when the recipient cohabitates, but expressly states that the parties may agree to other terms: Unless the parties agree otherwise in writing, the obligation to pay future alimony is terminated upon . . . cohabitation of the party receiving alimony. [14] Section 1519(b) similarly states: [u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing and expressly provided in the [divorce] decree, the obligation to pay future alimony is terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. [15] When faced with alimony agreement provisions similar to those at issue here, the Family Court has found the provisions to be unconscionable and subject to reformation. In S.E.S. v. L.P., the Family Court found the parties agreement for Husband to pay alimony for the rest of [Wife's] life to be unconscionable and reformed the alimony provision accordingly. [16] In S.E.S., both parties lacked counsel. [17] The Family Court explained that [t]he parties' lack of knowledge about Delaware alimony law prevented them from making a well-informed, meaningful decision with the result being an unreasonably favorable provision to [Wife]. This is especially true in light of the later fact that [Wife] cohabited with an unrelated male. . . . [18] In M.C.S. v. R.C.S., Jr., the Family Court also determined a lifetime alimony provision with no modification or termination clause to be unconscionable. [19] In M.C.S., the Family Court reformed the alimony provision to include termination of alimony upon the remarriage or cohabitation of the Wife. [20] In reaching that conclusion, the M.C.S. Court noted that [t]he failure of the [alimony] provision to include termination of alimony at Wife's cohabitation, remarriage, or even Husband's death illustrates the degree to which it unreasonably favors Wife. [21] In support of its holding, the Family Court cited both S.E.S. v. L.P. and M.C.S. v. R.C.S., Jr. It also relied upon Marseno v. Marseno. [22] In Marseno, the Family Court declined to order specific enforcement of an unfair separation agreement against an unrepresented party where the record reflected that the overreaching opposing party had been represented by counsel at the time the unfair agreement was executed. [23] The following excerpt from the Marseno decision is equally applicable to the facts in this case: In good conscience a court should be repelled by the prospect of making its powers available for the enforcement of a contract that is patently unfair and the result of overreaching. It is, of course, no answer to the victim of an unfair contract to say you made your contractual bed now go lie in it. Such an approach would not only be terribly destructive of human spirit but would actually make the court an accessory to overreaching and unfairness. The problem is immeasurably compounded when the victimized spouse was unrepresented while the other spouse had counsel who prepared the contract and, perhaps, supervised its negotiation and/or execution. [24] In this proceeding, the Husband entered the Agreement shortly after dismissing his counsel on belief that reconciliation was near. The goal of reconciliation was reflected in the Agreement itself, which states WHEREAS, the parties hereto are attempting reconciliation at the time of the execution of this Agreement. The Agreement then provided that the Wife would be entitled to the alimony payments [s]hould reconciliation fail. The Wife's counsel represented the Wife throughout the proceedings, drafted the Agreement, and hosted the meeting at which the Agreement was executed. The record supports the Family Court's factual findings of overreaching and unfairness. Accordingly, it properly held that the Agreement was unconscionable and subject to reformation.