Opinion ID: 1357432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: closing argument comment

Text: In referring to appellee in his closing argument, appellee's counsel noted that she had disclaimed a bequest under the will and then he said:    Mrs. Watson could not testify as a competent witness if she was going to be a beneficiary under the will, okay. I learned that in the last week or two. That's why I prepared the disclaimer and had her sign it. Therefore, her testimony is competent concerning the signing  or no, concerning the viewing Marty Fernau and Gemila Stetson were Verlie's   At that point, appellants' counsel interrupted, and the following was said: Excuse me, your Honor. I am very reluctant to interrupt counsel, but I believe that is an improper statement of the law. THE COURT: I believe it is correct as far as what he has stated now. Appellants argue that the jury could assume from counsel's remarks that Mrs. Watson could qualify as the second subscribing witness to the will in place of Fernau, or that the jury could gather therefrom that her testimony was entitled to more credibility than other witnesses. We think the trial court was correct. Counsel's statement had not reached the point of suggesting that appellee was a substitute for a subscribing witness. Her testimony was proper with reference to the presence of the subscribing witnesses and to the facts observed by her concerning the execution of the will. The trial court properly and adequately instructed the jury relative to the necessity for it to weigh and consider all evidence presented to it, relative to evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, relative to the meaning and effect of a disclaimer, and relative to the necessity to render a verdict based on the evidence and not on any statement of counsel in explanation or argument concerning the facts of the case. The exercise of discretion by the trial court with reference to the arguments and conduct of counsel will not be reviewed absent abuse thereof. Pullman Co. v. Finley, 20 Wyo. 456, 125 P. 380 (1912). There is no abuse of discretion in this instance. Appellants also contend that reversible error results from the fact that appellee's counsel and appellee were talking with witness Stetson in the hall during a recess inasmuch as the following had occurred at the conclusion of the testimony of witness Stetson on a previous day. MR. J. FAGAN: Judge Sawyer, I wonder if as a matter of procedure we might ask the Court's permission to exclude this witness subject to recall, and let Mr. Kaufman call what other witnesses he has to prove the will. THE COURT: All right. Rule 615, W.R.E., provides in pertinent part: At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion.    The record reflects that the conversation complained about was outside of the courtroom and during a period in which no witness was testifying. We need not here address the scope of a sequester order inasmuch as the record before us does not reflect the making of an objection premised on the incident or the making of a motion for a mistrial or for other relief. Appellants only requested that:    the record show that Mrs. Stetson has been conferring with Minerva Watson and after Mr. Kaufman left has been conferring with Mrs. Stetson, has now been conferring with Mrs. Stetson, and the Court has ordered her not to do so. The record does not reflect any effort at, or consideration of, a contempt of court. We are not directed to any court ruling, order or action upon which error is alleged. Unless they go to jurisdiction or are of a fundamental nature, we will not consider on appeal questions not properly raised in the district court. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981); Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1352 (1979). Affirmed.