Opinion ID: 890131
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Tiering”

Text: ¶38 “Tiering is the process of incorporating by reference coverage of general matters in broader environmental impact statements, such as national program or policy statements, into subsequent narrower environmental analyses, such as site-specific 22 statements.” N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. ¶39 The parties agree that the EAs in question do not explicitly reference the 1989 PEIS or 2003 FEIS. Richmond indicated in his affidavit to the District Court that the checklist EAs at issue in this lawsuit were tiered to the 2003 PEIS and that the MEPA review conducted in connection with the 2003 FEIS is implicitly incorporated into the checklist EAs. He admitted, however, that it was a “big oversight” that the EAs did not explicitly state they were tiered to the 1989 PEIS or specifically reference the 2003 FEIS. ¶40 Federations argue that the EAs did not tier to the previous analyses because there is no mention of the 1989 or 2003 reviews in the EAs, that the documents are not on the same issue, and that reliance on the 1989 review is suspect because it was conducted before the vast majority of the scholarly work discussing the impacts on sage grouse by oil and gas development was completed. Federations cite S. Or. Citizens v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that agencies have a continuing duty to evaluate new information when tiering to an EIS that is more than five years old. They also argue that documentation of tiering must appear in the document being tiered from, citing Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123, 1141 (D. Alaska 1983) (“The adequacy of the environmental impact statement itself is to be judged solely by the information contained in that document. Documents not incorporated in the (EIS) by reference or contained in a supplemental (EIS) cannot be used to bolster an inadequate discussion in the (EIS).”), aff’d 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984). The court in Village of 23 False Pass proceeded to state that while an administrative record cannot be used to remedy a deficiency in an EIS, a court may look at information in the administrative record and take additional evidence to determine whether the scope of discussion in the EIS was adequate. 565 F. Supp. at 1141. ¶41 The quotation cited by Federations is not in a section of the Village of False Pass opinion discussing tiering. Instead, the section cited pertains to the adequacy of an environmental impact statement and what a court may consider in determining whether an EIS is deficient. Moreover, an EA has been described by federal courts as a “rough-cut, low-budget environmental impact statement.” Sierra Club Northstar Chapter v. Bosworth, 428 F. Supp. 2d 942, 957 (D. Minn. 2006) (quoting Cronin v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990). To the extent an EIS is judged solely by the information it contains and its references to other documents from which it is tiered—a question not presented in this case—an EA does not have the same requirements as an EIS. ¶42 Despite the checklists’ lack of explicit reference, it is clear from the record that MBOGC staff relied on these past reviews in developing the EAs at issue here. The administrative record lodged with the District Court by agreement of the parties included the 1989 PEIS and 2003 FEIS. Under the 1989 PEIS, MBOGC was required to evaluate current information and entitled to rely on FWP in assessing wildlife impacts. MBOGC fulfilled this obligation by conferring with the FWP wildlife biologist, utilizing the Heritage Tracker database, and reviewing topographic maps for designated wildlife 24 refuges, national grass lands, national parks, or other designated wildlife areas. Undoubtedly, an EA should make specific reference to MEPA documents from which it is tiered so that members of the public, not just the Board and others involved in the process, are made aware of the information utilized by MBOGC in issuing permits. Nonetheless, remand for the sole purpose of requiring MBOGC to explicitly incorporate by reference its prior EISs would accomplish little “save further expense and delay.” Nevada v. DOE, 457 F.3d 78, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Applying the standards of review governing MBOGC and MEPA determinations, particularly in light of the stipulated administrative record before the District Court, we conclude the agency implicitly tiered the EAs to the older analyses and that its failure to articulate reference to them did not render its actions arbitrary, capricious or unlawful.