Opinion ID: 772486
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) and the Admission of Mastrangelo Evidence

Text: 41 Dhinsa argues that the district court erred by admitting out-of-court statements of Manmohan and Satinderjit, offered through numerous prosecution witnesses, as proof of Dhinsa's involvement in the murders of the declarants. 5 The gravamen of Dhinsa's objection is that the admission of hearsay statements introduced as proof of the declarants' murders rather than about past events or offenses Dhinsa allegedly committed violated Fed. R. Evid. 403 and Fed. R. Evid. 802, and, more importantly, his right to confront the witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Thus, Dhinsa raises three related arguments under Mastrangelo and Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) on appeal: (1) Rule 804(b)(6), which codifies the Mastrangelo rationale, limits the admission of hearsay statements to past events or offenses committed by the defendant about which the declarant could testify, and not as proof of the declarant's murder; (2) the district court failed to assess independently the reliability of the declarants' statements in accordance with Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (plurality opinion); and (3) the district court failed to find, as required under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), that Dhinsa intended to procure the unavailability of Manmohan and Satinderjit. Further, Dhinsa argues that the court's admission of Mastrangelo evidence under the circumstances of this case cannot be deemed harmless error. We consider the merits of these arguments seriatim. 42
43 We begin with a brief overview of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the evolution of the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine. The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The right enjoyed by a criminal defendant to confront the witnesses against him is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965), and is designed to secure for the defendant the opportunity of cross examination. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678 ([T]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross examination. (quotation marks omitted)); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) ([A] primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross examination.); United States v. Laljie, 184 F.3d 180, 192 (2d Cir. 1999). 44 Although the confrontation right is of constitutional dimension, it is not absolute, see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48 (1990) ([W]e have repeatedly held that the Clause permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the defendant's inability to confront the declarant at trial.), and may be waived by a defendant through a knowing and intentional relinquishment. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996); cf. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For example, a defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives his rights under the Confrontation Clause. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). The Supreme Court has similarly held that a defendant's intentional misconduct can constitute a waiver of his rights under the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (defendant waives his confrontation rights and his right to be present at his trial if he engages in disruptive and disrespectful behavior requiring his removal from the courtroom); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (No doubt the privilege [to confront one's accusers and cross examine them] may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct.), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); see also Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272 (collecting cases). These cases recognize that although the right of confrontation is an essential trial right, it may be waived by the defendant's misconduct. 45 Consistent with that principle, this Court, as well as a majority of our sister circuits, have also applied the waiver-by-misconduct rule in cases where the defendant has wrongfully procured the witnesses' silence through threats, actual violence or murder. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 814-15 (10th Cir. 2000) (murder); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (murder); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (murder); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1997) (murder); Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1278-79 (murder); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir. 1994) (murder); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) (written and verbal threats); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir. 1982) (witness was under the control of the defendants who had procured her refusal to testify); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-60 (8th Cir. 1976) (threats). Recognizing that [s]imple equity and common sense justifies a defendant's forfeiture of his confrontation rights under circumstances where he wrongfully procures the witnesses' absence, the D.C. Circuit held: 46 It is hard to imagine a form of misconduct more extreme than the murder of a potential witness. Simple equity supports a forfeiture principle, as does a common sense attention to the need for fit incentives. The defendant who has removed an adverse witness is in a weak position to complain about losing the chance to cross examine him. And where a defendant has silenced a witness through the use of threats, violence or murder, admission of the victim's prior statements at least partially offsets the perpetrator's rewards for his misconduct. We have no hesitation in finding, in league with all circuits to have considered the matter, that a defendant who wrongfully procures the absence of a witness or potential witness may not assert confrontation rights as to that witness. 47 White, 116 F.3d at 911. Relying on the maxim that the law [will not] allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong, Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272 (quoting Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 (1912)), in Mastrangelo and cases following, we have reaffirmed the principle that, where a defendant wrongfully procures the silence of a witness or potential witness, he will be deemed to have waived his sixth amendment rights and, a fortiori, his hearsay objection to the admission of the declarant's statements. Id. at 272; see also Miller, 116 F.3d at 668; Thai, 29 F.3d at 814; Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47; accord White, 116 F.3d at 912; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1282. We extended that principle to situations where there was [no] ongoing proceeding in which the declarant was scheduled to testify. Miller, 116 F.3d at 668; see also Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279-80. The application of Mastrangelo under these circumstances is both logical and fair since a contrary rule would serve as a prod to the unscrupulous to accelerate the timetable and murder suspected snitches sooner rather than later. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280. 48
49 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), made effective December 1997, codified the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine as an exception to the hearsay rules by permitting the admission of hearsay statements offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); see also United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2000). Under Rule 804(b)(6), a party forfeits the right to object on hearsay grounds to the admission of a declarant's prior statement when the party's deliberate wrongdoing or acquiescence therein procured the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note to subdivision (b)(6); cf. Miller, 116 F.3d at 668 (holding that neither the existence of an ongoing proceeding nor a finding that the defendant's intention was to prevent the declarant from testifying is required to admit the declarant's out-of-court statement). 50 By its plain terms, Rule 804(b)(6) refers to the intent of a party to procure the unavailability of the witness, and does not, as Dhinsa contends, limit the subject matter of the witness' testimony to past events or offenses the witness would have testified about had he been available. See Emery, 186 F.3d at 926 ([Rule 804(b)(6)] contains no limitation on the subject matter of the statements that it exempts from the prohibition on hearsay evidence.). This interpretation is supported by the underlying purpose of the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine -- that a defendant may not benefit from his or her wrongful prevention of future testimony from a witness or potential witness. Id.; see also Cherry, 217 F.3d at 815 (To permit the defendant to profit from [wrongful] conduct would be contrary to public policy, common sense and the underlying purpose of the confrontation clause.) (quotation marks omitted); White, 116 F.3d at 911 ([W]here a defendant has silenced a witness through the use of threats, violence or murder, admission of the victim's prior statements at least partially offsets the perpetrator's rewards for his misconduct.); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272-73; Steele, 684 F.2d at 1202 (A defendant cannot prefer the law's preference and profit from it,... while repudiating that preference by creating the condition that prevents it.) (footnote omitted). Adoption of Dhinsa's proposed limitation would limit the proof against him -- the very result that the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine seeks to remedy. See Emery, 186 F.3d at 926. Further, we have declined to read in such a limitation in our pre-Rule 804(b)(6) decisions dealing with Mastrangelo evidence, permitting statements made by the declarant to be admitted where the murder of the declarant was one of the charged offenses. See, e.g., Miller, 116 F.3d at 667-69 (hearsay statement of murdered drug supplier made to his wife); Thai, 29 F.3d at 814-15 (hearsay statement of murdered store owner made to police); cf. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279 ([A] defendant who wrongfully procures a witness's absence for the purpose of denying the government that witness's testimony waives his right under the Confrontation Clause to object to the admission of the absent witness's hearsay statements.); Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47 (A defendant who procures a witness's absence waives the right of confrontation for all purposes with regard to that witness.) (emphasis added). Because Rule 804(b)(6) was intended to codify the waiver-by-misconduct rule as it was applied by the courts at that time, see Ochoa, 229 F.3d at 639; Cherry, 217 F.3d at 815; White, 116 F.3d at 913, it is reasonable to conclude that Rule 804(b)(6) did not intend to create a subject matter limitation where one did not previously exist. See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 816 (We... read the plain language of Rule 804(b)(6) to permit the admission of those hearsay statements that would be admissible under the constitutional doctrine of waiver by misconduct.); cf. Estate of Gloeckner v. C.I.R., 152 F.3d 208, 214 (2d Cir. 1998); Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 103 F.3d 637, 647 (8th Cir. 1996). 51 In sum, based on the plain language of Rule 804(b)(6) and the strong policy reasons favoring application of the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine to prevent a party from profiting from his wrongdoing, we hold that Rule 804(b)(6) places no limitation on the subject matter of the declarant's statements that can be offered against the defendant at trial to prove that the defendant murdered the declarant. 52
53 By its plain terms, Rule 804(b)(6) requires a finding that the defendant acted with the intention of making the declarant unavailable as a witness. This conclusion is not disputed by the parties. A number of cases decided after Rule 804(b)(6) became effective have also read in an intent requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2000) ([Defendant] murdered [the witness] at least in part to procure the unavailability of the only witness to his murder.); Emery, 186 F.3d at 926 ([Rule 804(b)(6)] establishes the general proposition that a defendant may not benefit from his or her wrongful prevention of future testimony from a witness or potential witness.). Thus, consistent with our pre-Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) precedent, we now hold that, prior to finding that a defendant waived his confrontation rights with respect to an out-of-court statement by an actual or potential witness admitted pursuant to Rule 804(b)(6), the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury in which the government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the defendant (or party against whom the out-of-court statement is offered) was involved in, or responsible for, procuring the unavailability of the declarant through knowledge, complicity, planning or in any other way, Miller, 116 F.3d at 668; and (2) the defendant (or party against whom the out-of-court statement is offered) acted with the intent of procuring the declarant's unavailability as an actual or potential witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) advisory committee note to subdivision (b)(6) (adopting the preponderance of the evidence standard required under Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) in light of the behavior the new Rule 804(b)(6) seeks to discourage.); accord Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280 (We... hold that when a person who eventually emerges as a defendant (1) causes a potential witness's unavailability (2) by a wrongful act (3) undertaken with the intention of preventing the potential witness from testifying at a future trial, then the defendant waives his right to object on confrontation grounds to the admission of the unavailable declarant's out of court statements at trial.). But see Emery, 186 F.3d at 926 (holding that a trial court is not required to hold a 804(b)(6) hearing outside the presence of the jury but, instead, can admit the hearsay evidence at trial in the presence of the jury contingent upon proof of the underlying murder by a preponderance of the evidence). The government need not, however, show that the defendant's sole motivation was to procure the declarant's absence; rather, it need only show that the defendant was motivated in part by a desire to silence the witness. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279; see also Johnson, 219 F.3d at 356. As Rule 804(b)(6) and our prior precedents do not require such a finding of sole motivation, we decline to read one into the rule. Further, in order to avoid the admission of facially unreliable hearsay, the district court should undertake a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect in accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 403. Miller, 116 F.3d at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court's findings after a hearing will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous, and we are particularly hesitant to disturb the court's determinations when they are based on its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. Thai, 29 F.3d at 814.
54 Dhinsa argues that the application of the waiver-by-misconduct rule to allow the admission of hearsay statements of a declarant as evidence of that declarant's murder by the defendant is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (plurality opinion). In response, the government argues that Dhinsa waived his confrontation rights by murdering the declarants and, therefore, the Mastrangelo evidence is not subject to the Lilly test. We find the government's argument persuasive. 55 Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990), it never has equated the two to suggest that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (plurality opinion). As such, the Confrontation Clause may bar[] the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814; see also Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56; United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1132 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999). Because [t]he central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact, Lilly, 527 U.S. at 123-24 (quotation marks omitted), the determination of whether an out-of-court statement violates the Confrontation Clause is linked to an evaluation of trustworthiness. United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2000). 56 In Lilly, a four justice plurality of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule summarized roughly twenty years earlier in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), that the veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to allow the untested admission of such statements against an accused when (1) the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or (2) it contains particularized guarantees of trustworthiness such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statements' reliability. 527 U.S. at 124-25 (plurality opinion of Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) (internal quotation marks omitted). The concurring opinion of Justice Thomas and the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, also referenced the Roberts dual inquiries. See id. at 144, 148-49; see also Moskowitz, 215 F.3d at 269. In determining whether a statement contains a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness sufficient to permit its admission without violating the defendant's confrontation rights, the trial court should consider the totality of those circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819; see also Bryce, 208 F.3d at 351; Mingo v. Artuz, 174 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring a court to carefully examine each instance of incriminating hearsay in the light of all the circumstances). 57 Implicit in the application of the Lilly test is a presumption that the defendant has not waived his confrontation rights with respect to the declarant's statements. However, [o]nce the confrontation right is lifted from the scales by operation of the accused's waiver of that right, Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1281, the district court is not required to assess independently the reliability of those statements under the rubric set forth in Lilly. 6 See White, 116 F.3d at 913 (rejecting defendants' claim that the trial court should have looked for the sort of indicia of trustworthiness that often support an exception to the confrontation or hearsay rules where the defendants forfeited their right under the hearsay rule); Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1281 ([Defendants'] misconduct waived not only their confrontation rights but also their hearsay objections, thus rendering a special finding of reliability superfluous.). 58 This does not, however, mean that the declarant's statements will be admitted automatically. As discussed supra, after the district court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the hearsay statement is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), it must still perform the balancing test required under Fed. R. Evid. 403 in order to avoid the admission of facially unreliable hearsay. Thai, 29 F.3d at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Miller, 116 F.3d at 668; Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47; accord White, 116 F.3d at 913 ([D]efendants were free to move for exclusion under Rule 403 based upon the lack of reliability of the agents who relayed [the declarant's] testimony.); Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1282 n.6 ([Where a defendant waives his confrontation rights], a district court still should exclude relevant but highly inflammatory evidence, misconduct notwithstanding, if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence's probative value.). Thus, while a finding that a statement may be admitted under Rule 804(b)(6) -- resulting in a waiver of the defendant's confrontation rights and hearsay objections -- renders the Lilly test inapplicable, the district court must still balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect in accordance with Rule 403. 59 5. Application of Harmless Error Analysis to Violations of the Confrontation Clause and the Present Case 60 Dhinsa argues that the district court's failure to make a finding that he intended to eliminate the declarant[s] as... witness[es] prior to the admission of the Mastrangelo statements was not harmless error. Dhinsa further argues that the admission of such evidence was not harmless under the present circumstances. We disagree. 61 A violation of a defendant's confrontation rights does not, standing alone, require reversal of a judgment of conviction. Rather, the Supreme Court has held that violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to harmless error analysis. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1991) (noting that the harmless error analysis has been applied to a wide range of constitutional errors); Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684; see also Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). We have similarly applied a harmless error analysis in evaluating violations of the Confrontation Clause, see, e.g., Moskowitz, 215 F.3d at 270; United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 1999) (Even were we to conclude that the district court erred by admitting [the] plea allocution into evidence, the record before us makes clear that any such error would have been harmless.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2220 (2000); United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1109 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Williams, 927 F.2d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1991), and, specifically, we have applied harmless error analysis where the trial court failed to hold a Mastrangelo hearing. See Miller, 116 F.3d at 669; see also Emery, 186 F.3d at 927. Thus, notwithstanding the requirement that the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing prior to the admission of the challenged witness statements, the failure to do so may constitute harmless error if the evidence presented at trial sufficiently establishes that the defendant was involved in, and intended to procure, the unavailability of the declarants as witnesses. 62 In the present case, the parties acknowledge that the district court made the requisite finding under Mastrangelo that Dhinsa was responsible for the murders of Manmohan and Satinderjit. The parties also agree that Rule 804(b)(6) requires a finding by the trial court that the defendant intended to cause the unavailability of the declarants as witnesses (although they disagree on the definition of the term witness under that Rule), but that Dhinsa failed to object to the introduction of the Mastrangelo evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). The parties part ways, however, on the effect of Dhinsa's failure to raise Rule 804(b)(6) and, specifically, his failure to object to the admission of that evidence on the ground that the government had the burden of showing that Dhinsa committed the murders for the purpose of procuring the unavailability of the declarants as witnesses. Because we find that any error by the district court in failing to make such a finding was harmless in light of the substantial evidence supporting that conclusion, we need not decide whether Dhinsa waived his objection to the admission of the Mastrangelo evidence under Rule 804(b)(6) for the purposes of the instant appeal. 63 As an initial matter, Dhinsa cannot credibly maintain that his involvement in organizing and facilitating the murders of Manmohan and Satinderjit does not establish that he engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing within the meaning of Rule 804(b)(6). See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 816. Significantly, Dhinsa does not argue that the hearsay statements were unreliable or inherently untrustworthy. On the contrary, Dhinsa acknowledges that these statements were undeniably powerful proof that he was responsible for Manmohan and Satinderjit's murders. We agree. The record amply demonstrates that Dhinsa murdered Manmohan and Satinderjit to depriv[e] the government of... potential witness[es]. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280; see also Thai, 29 F.3d at 815. 64 With respect to Manmohan, Dhinsa feared that Manmohan would go to the police regarding Dhinsa's involvement in Kulwant's disappearance. This fear was well founded in light of Manmohan's repeated confrontations with Dhinsa and other members of the Singh Enterprise in which he accused them of being responsible for his brother's disappearance. Dodson also testified that Dhinsa ordered Manmohan murdered because he had seen [Dhinsa] and Gogi shoot somebody, and the police [were] getting close to the guy. Thus, Dhinsa believed that Manmohan posed a threat to the Singh Enterprise and to Dhinsa and Gogi personally by his cooperation with the police. See, e.g., Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280-81; Thai, 29 F.3d at 815 (defendant motivated by declarant's cooperation with police). 65 With respect to Satinderjit, the evidence presented at trial established that Satinderjit was in fact cooperating with the police at the time Dhinsa ordered Dodson to kill him, providing police with information regarding Manmohan's murder, Kulwant's disappearance and the Citygas pump-rigging scheme. Satinderjit's active involvement with the police is evidenced by his presence at the May 1997 raid of the Citygas offices in Brooklyn, New York during which Dhinsa, Gogi and other members of the Singh Enterprise were arrested. Dodson testified that Dhinsa ordered Satinderjit murdered because he was a witness against his brother. Dodson also testified that Dhinsa was upset that he was taking too long to murder Satinderjit and ordered Dodson to act quickly since Satinderjit was supposed to go to see the [g]rand [j]ury. Powell and Samuels, the other members of the group of hitmen hired by Dhinsa, similarly testified that Dhinsa wanted Satinderjit murdered quickly to prevent him from testifying against Gogi and himself. Dhinsa also made threatening calls to Manmohan warning him to cease his efforts to locate his brother and similar calls to Uberoi, Satinderjit's girlfriend, warning her that they would both be shot if [Satinderjit] did not stop messing around with his case and did not stay out of his business. Thus, there was sufficient support in the record to establish that Dhinsa murdered Manmohan and Satinderjit because he believed that they both had knowledge concerning his criminal activities, as well as those of other members of the Singh Enterprise, and, therefore, could cooperate in a police investigation targeting Dhinsa and the Singh Enterprise. 7 See Thai, 29 F.3d at 815. We also find that the admission of these statements under Rule 403 did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133, 1139 (2d Cir. 1995). Further, in light of Dodson's testimony corroborating the fact that Dhinsa ordered the murders to prevent Manmohan and Satinderjit from testifying against him, his brother Gogi and other key members of the Singh Enterprise, and the cellular telephone records establishing Dhinsa's contact with Dodson on the day of the murders, we conclude that it is unlikely that [Dhinsa] would have prevailed at trial absent admission of Manmohan and Satinderjit's hearsay statements. Gallego, 191 F.3d at 165; cf. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 (The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.); Jean-Baptiste, 166 F.3d at 108. Accordingly, the district court's admission of the Mastrangelo evidence relating to statements made by Manmohan and Satinderjit should not be disturbed.