Opinion ID: 4545965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Middle Ground Approach

Text: The middle ground approach reflects a compromise position adopted by those courts that believe that the broad approach protects privilege too little and the narrow approach protects it too much. Under this approach, a patient waives the privilege by alleging more than “‘“garden variety” emotional distress.’” Koch, 489 F.3d at 390 (quoting Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 225 n.8 (D.N.J. 2000)). But what is meant by “garden variety” is not entirely clear. See Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 225 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“The problem in these cases is definitional and stems from the imprecision and elasticity of the phrase ‘garden variety.’”). One court has identified five scenarios in which the claimed emotional distress is more than “garden variety.” St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 1920 (D.D.C. 2011). According to that court, a party alleges more than “garden variety” emotional distress, and thus waives privileges, if he or she (1) asserts “‘a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,’” (2) makes “‘an allegation of a specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder,’” (3) asserts “‘a claim of unusually severe emotional distress,’” (4) makes an “‘offer of expert testimony to support a claim of emotional distress,’” or (5) concedes “‘that his or her mental condition is “in controversy.”’” Id. at 19 (quoting Turner v. 14 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1995)); see also Johnson, 977 P.2d at 157 (applying similar analysis). The absence of an obvious definition of “garden variety” emotional distress, along with the required in-depth analysis that goes with it, has led some courts to reject the middle ground approach. As one court explained, “the use of a test for waiver that hinges on an after-the-fact judicial assessment of numerous qualitative factors introduces a risk of uncertainty that the Supreme Court in Jaffee sought to avoid.” Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 639. This is correct: remember that in Jaffee, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that “if the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.’” 518 U.S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1981)). Others have criticized the middle ground approach as fundamentally unfair because “[i]t depends on the individual judge’s view of what is ‘ordinary’” and is thus subject to a judge’s biases. Anderson, supra, at 119. Through this lens, the approach is seen as “a kind of discrimination in itself that tells the plaintiff that 15 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) something is wrong with her if she claims to have suffered more than what is reasonable according to the dominant group.” Id. at 141. I agree with these criticisms. This approach is impossible to apply in a principled and consistent manner, provides little to no guidance to future courts, and undermines Jaffee’s directive that privileges be clear and predictable.