Opinion ID: 878569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standing - registered voter

Text: The State argues that a registered voter is not sufficiently affected by the statutes because the statutes do not deprive the voter of his right to vote in the election but merely provide that a district judge or a supreme court justice cannot be one of those candidates for whom the voter can cast his ballot. To create standing in a registered voter, the State argues, three conditions must be met: (1) a sitting district judge or supreme court justice must declare that he would run for another judicial office; ( 2 ) the judge must decline to file because of the automatic resignation provisions of sections 3-1-607 and 3-1-608, MCA; and (3) the voter must declare his intent to vote for that particular person. Absent these conditions, the State argues that the injury to the registered voter is too speculative. Where the public and the electorate were so clearly intended to benefit bv a constitutional provision, we hold that a registered voter has standing to assert that public interest by contending that the constitutional pro~rision has been the victim of legislative strangulation. The 1972 constitutional delegates, in considering what is now Art. VII, 5 10, of the judicial article, were primarily motivated by the public interest to be served by permitting district judges to run for the Supreme Court and for a justice of the supreme court to run for chief justice -- without having to forfeit their judicial office. The concern of the delegates was not to confer benefits on the iudiciary nor on individual members of the judiciary. Rather, their concern was for the health of the judicial system itself -- for the public interest. At the time of the 1972 Constitutional Convention, section 3-1-607, MCA (formerly section 93-219, R.C.M. 1947) was in effect, and it appears that the delegates in charge of the judicial article favored a prohibition similar to the statute. The original proposal required district judges and supreme court justices to resign from office if they filed for any elective office other than their own. The original provision submitted to the full convention, provided in part: Filing for another elective office results in forfeiture of judicial position . . . (Tr. 1972 Constitutional Convention, Vol. I at 512.) However, several delegates immed-iately questioned the wisdom of this provision once they learned that it was intended to prevent district judges from running for the supreme court and supreme court justices from running for chief justice -- unless they resigned from office. (Tr. 1972 Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV, at 1148-1158.) Several delegates aruued that the judicial system would benefit by enabling district court judges and supreme court justices to run for judicial office other than their own without forfeiting their own office. (Tr. 1972 Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1149.) Based on these arguments, the article was amended to reflect that thinking. The first version of the amendment that was voted on was more precise but longer than the version finally adopted. The first version provided in part that Filing for another elective public office results in forfeiture of a judicial position, but a judge may file for another judicial position without forfej-ture of the judicial position he holds. (Tr. 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1149.) With no debate this version was voted on and passed by a vote of 88 to 2. This version was then sent to the style and drafting committee for final revision as to form. The final version came out of the style and drafting committee, changed as to form only, and with no further debate on the merits, the delegates voted to adopt this version, which is now part of our 1972 Constitution. The integrity and supremacy of this provision is the basis for the case now before us. It reads : Any holder of a jud-icial position forfeits that position by either filing for an elective office other than a judicial position or absenting himself from the state for more than sixty (60) consecutive days. (Art. VII, 5 lo.) This constitutional provision was motivated by the belief of the delegates that the public interest would be served by a provision that would permit jud~es to seek various levels of judicial office through the elective process without first suffering a forfeiture of their own office. We must, therefore, recognize that a public interest exists, apart from the desires of individual district judges or supreme court justices, to assert the integrity and supremacy of this constitutional provision voted on and passed by the delegates and later voted on and ratified by the people of this state. We hold that a registered voter has the standing to make this assertion. Standing questions cannot often be decided by hard and fast rules because of the varying complexity and importance of questions that come before the courts. We recognized in Stewart v. Board of County Commissioners of Big Horn County (1977), 175 Mont. 197, 573 P.2d 184, that standing questions must be viewed in part in light of discretionary doctrines aimed at prudently managing judicial review of the legality of public acts . . . 175 Mont. at 200, 573 P.2d at 186. Where discretion is involved hard and fast rules cannot be the decisive factors. The importance of the question to the public surely is an important factor, and this is why in State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick (N.M. 1974), 524 P.2d 975, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that private parties should be granted standing to contest important public issues. The Court said: [Tlhis court in its discretion, may grant standing to private parties to vindicate the public interest in cases presenting issues of great public importance. Sego, supra, 524 P.2d at 979. The Sego case involved the validity of a partial veto exercised by the governor of New Mexico. The court granted standing to petitioner, as an elector and taxpayer, to contest the legality of the governor's action. See also State ex rel. Howard v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Okla. 1980) , 614 P. 2d 45, where the Okl-ahoma Supreme Court, relying in part on the Sego case, 1-ooked mostly to private citizen petitioners to grant standing to assert that a state commission had failed to comply with an Oklahoma statute. In Howard, the petitioners sought and obtained a peremptory writ of mandamus compelling the state commission to comply with the Oklahoma statute. Nor should we ignore the rights of citizens to assert the public interest in challenging the 1-egality of legislative action that allegedly flies in the face of our state constitution. That is particularly so where the constitutional provision is intended to benefit the public as a whole rather than classes of individuals--such as judges. The constitutional provision invoked here was not intended to confer special privileges on the judiciary or on individual judges. Rather, it was intended to give the public a potentially hroader choice in exercising its constitutiona1 to vote for judicial candidates. This Court has been keenly sensitive to. the constitutional rights of voters. Although the case is not in point factually or legally, we clearly recognized in Jones v. Judge (1978), 176 Mont. 251, 577 P.2d 846, that a special interest exists in a registered voter whose vote may be denied by legislation. We said: The right to vote, however, is a personal and constitutional right. Although stature as an elector will generally not allow an individual to bring an action invoking the judicial power, an elector who is denied this right is sufficient]-y affected to invoke the judicial power to challenge the validity of the Act which denies him the right. 176 Mont. at 254, 577 P.2d at 848. In Jones the right of registered voters to vote for judicial candidates was completel-ydenied by operation of the challenged statutes. Here the registered voters would not be completely denied their right to vote for judicial candidates running for the offices that are open to the elective process this year. But the operation of the challenged statutes does deny the voters their right to vote for a class of judicial candidates that allegedly is expressly permitted by Art. VII, S 10, of our Constitution to be candidates for other judicial offices. Unlike Jones, the registered voters here, in addition to asserting their constitutional right to vote, are asserting the constitutional supremacy of a provision tha.t expressly opens the judicial elective process to all judges who would file for another office--without suffering forfeiture of their own office. At a minimum, the right of registered voters to vote for judicial candidates coming from the ranks of judges, would be diminished. Practicall-y speaking, the right would be effectively denied. Rare is the judicial candidate who would forfeit his judicial office by running for another judicial office. The constitutional delegates clearly intended the Montana electorate to be the beneficiaries of a judicial elective process permitting all judges to file for other judicial office provided they are otherwise qualified. The challenged statutes have not only chilled that process, they have essentially frozen that process by making it a virtual certainty that judges would not run for other judicial office at the risk of automatic forfeiture of their office by the mere act of filing for other iudicial office. The electorate has been effectively denied a right to a potentially broader selection of judicial candidates. Just as clearly, a registered voter must be recognized as having the standing to assert that the challenged statutes have diminished his constitutional right to vote. 11. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTIONS 3-1-607 and 3-1-608,MCA The parties differ in their interpretation of the key language of Art. VII, 5 10, which provides that Any holder of a judicial. position forfeits that position by . . . filing for an elective office other - - a judicial position. than . . (Emphasis added.) This provision applies to all judges in this state. The challenged statutes, however, (sections 3-1-607 and 3-1-608, MCA) prevent only district judges and supreme court justices from seeking other judicial office without forfeiting their office. The constitutional delegates, in drafting Art. VII, S 10, did not intend that a forfeiture of office would result if a judge filed for other judicial office. The State, however, interprets Art. VII, § 10, as creating a vacuum into which the legislature was clearly empowered to move and to enact the statutes declaring a forfeiture of judicial office when district iudges and supreme court justices file for other judicial office. The petitioners rely not only on the language of Art. VII, S 10, but also on the record of the constitutional proceedings which clearly establishes the intent of the delegates to permit judges to file for other judicial office without forfeiting their own offices. Forfeiture of office was intended as the result only when a judge filed for a legislative or executive position. (See Part I, supra.) The State concedes that the delegates had this intent, but nonetheless argues that the delegates somehow drafted a provision that did not reflect this intent. The State argues that this Court is bound by what was drafted rather than by what was intended. The State's interpretation of Art. VII, 5 10, would permit the legislature to enact the forfeiture sanctions imposed by the challenged statutes. According to the State, Art. VJI, S 10, does not declare what happens if a judge files for a judicial position--it only declares that a forfeiture results if a judge files for a nonjudicial office. Because the provision does not affirmatively declare that judges can file for other judicial office without suffering forfeiture of their own office, the State contends that the legislature may step into this vacuum and enact laws declaring what does happen when a judge files for other judicial office. With this as its premise, much of the State's brief is devoted to the theoretical basis on which it believes the legislature has the authority to enact so-called resign to run statutes. The cases cited in this analysis, however, do not apply to a situation where the question turns on the interpretation to be given to a resign to run constitutional provision. The question, of course, involves the interpretation to be given Art. VII, S 10. The State argued in its briefs that no ambiguity in the language exists and that its interpretation is the only reasonable one. Yet, jn oral . argument before this Court, the State conceded that petitioners1 interpretation of Art. VII, 10, is a reasonable one. Despite this concession of two diametrically opposed reasonable interpretations of the constitutional provision, the State refused to concede that an ambiguity exists that can be resolved only by reference to the record of the constitutional proceedings. The record, of course, supports the petitioners1 interpretation of the constitution. The constitutional prohibition against judges seeking nonjudicial offices while still holding judicial office is but part of a general constitutional scheme declaring directly or indirectly the rights of office holders in all branches of government to seek other office while still holding office. The legislative article (Art. V) does not expressly mention whether a legislator can file for another elective office without forfeiting his legislative office, but Art. V, S 9, indirectly places restrictions on other office holding. It further prohibits a member of congress or a public office holder i n this state from simultaneously . holding office as a legislator. The executive article (Art. VI, § 5 (2)) expressly provides that executive office holders . . . mav be a candidate for any public office during his term.  (Emphasis added. ) The judicial article is clearly the most restrictive--it imposes severe sanctions on office-seeking by judicial office holders. Any judge holding office in this state forfeits his office if he files for any office--other - - a judicial than position. (Art. VII, S 10, supra.) Though it does not mention filing for a legislative or an executive office, the crystal clear message of this provision requires a judge to forfeit his judicial office if he files for either a legislative or an executive office. It is equally clear, however, that the constitutional delegates did not intend a forfeiture of judicial office to result if a judge filed for other judicial office. The language, other than a judicial positi.on, shows that the delegates intentionally left the door open for judicial office holders to file for other judicial office without forfeiting their offices as a condition to seeking other judicial office through the election process. The State's position would permit the legislature to close a door which the constitutional delegates intentionally left open. The door was left open because the delegates perceived a public benefit in opening up the judicial election process to judges who desired to move from lower courts to the district court and from district court to the supreme court, or from a justice on the supreme court to a chief justice on the supreme court. (See Part I, supra.) While Art. VII, S 10, does not affirmatively declare that judicial candidates can run for other judicial office without incurring forfeiture of their own office, its intent is sufficiently clear. To say that a judge forfeits his office if he files for a non-judicial office is but another way of saying that a sitting judge can file for other judicial office without forfeiting his office. Sections 3-1-607 and 3-1-608, MCA, forbid what Art. VII, S 10, authorizes, and they are therefore in conflict with this constitutional provision. This opinion shall constitute a declaratory judgment holding that sections 3-1-607 and 3-1-608, MCA, are unconstitutional. The request for declaratory relief is granted. , / -- i