Opinion ID: 891686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court of Appeals Analysis of Myers II

Text: {10} Concluding that our Myers II opinion was unforeseeable, the Court of Appeals held that we had rendered the Act unconstitutional as applied to Defendant. See Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, ¶ 18, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673. The Court did so primarily by relying on a U.S. Supreme Court opinion, Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), which we will address momentarily. See Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, ¶ 15, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673. To support its analysis, the Court of Appeals also cited two New Mexico cases, State v. Alderette, 111 N.M. 297, 804 P.2d 1116 (Ct.App.1990), and State v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233, that previously had discussed or applied Bouie. See Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, ¶¶ 16-18, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673. {11} In Alderette, our Court of Appeals correctly concluded, citing Bouie, that its construction of a criminal statute (escape from jail) to include a new class of inmates (those civilly committed to jail) could not be applied retroactively to the defendant (who escaped while civilly incarcerated for failure to pay child support) when the Court of Appeals had previously held the opposite: that the escape statute only applied to those in custody under criminal charges. Alderette, 111 N.M. at 298-300, 804 P.2d at 1117-19. The new and completely contrary construction of the escape statute could not be applied to the defendant's escape without raising due process concerns. Id. at 300, 804 P.2d at 1119. {12} In Johnson, this Court in a footnote recognized Bouie as an extreme example of a [c]ourt engag[ing] in an impermissible interpretation of a statute, that was so unexpected, [and] so outlandish, that no reasonable person could have expected it, thus one that creates a due process problem when applied to an unsuspecting accused. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 14 n. 4, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Correctly, Johnson concluded that the first-time construction of DWI laws in that case, so as to reach intoxication on private property as well as public property, was altogether foreseeable in light of statutory language and the intended purpose of the statute. Id. ¶¶ 13-21. Significantly, and unlike the situation in Alderete, our courts had never held the opposite in previous opinions: that DWI laws did not apply to private property. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233. {13} Accordingly, the principle we glean from these two prior opinions is that it is fundamentally unfair to apply a criminal statute to the accused in a way that contradicts binding precedent on the same question, upon which the accused could have relied. Before examining our own opinion in Myers II in that same light, we turn to Bouie, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894. {14} Bouie arose when, in 1960, two African-American college students, protesting South Carolina's oppressive Jim Crow segregation practices, entered a whites-only restaurant and awaited service. Id. at 348-49, 84 S.Ct. 1697. Upon being denied and told to leave, the two students refused to leave, whereupon they were arrested and prosecuted for criminal trespass. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the trespass convictions on due process grounds, because the convictions were based on a novel interpretation of that trespass statute that flatly contradicted clear precedent in the students' favor and effectively amounted to an ex-post facto law. Id. at 362-63, 84 S.Ct. 1697. {15} Importantly, the South Carolina Supreme Court had previously applied the criminal trespass statute many times over the years, uniformly requiring notice to the trespassing party before entry, something that was conspicuously absent in the present case. See City of Columbia v. Bouie, 239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E.2d 332 (1962), rev'd, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that in the 95 years between the enactment of the statute in 1866 and the 1961 decision in the [first case to support a conviction for remaining on the premises upon receiving notice after entry], the South Carolina cases construing the statute uniformly emphasized the notice-before-entry requirement, and gave not the slightest indication that that requirement could be satisfied by proof of the different act of remaining on the land after being told to leave. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 356-57, 84 S.Ct. 1697 (emphasis added) (referencing prior cases such as State v. Mays, 24 S.C. 190, ___ S.E. ___ (1886); State v. Green, 35 S.C. 266, 14 S.E. 619 (1892); State v. Tenny, 58 S.C. 215, 36 S.E. 555 (1900); State v. Olasov, 133 S.C. 139, 130 S.E. 514 (1925); City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 239 S.C. 376, 123 S.E.2d 512 (1961), rev'd, 378 U.S. 551, 84 S.Ct. 1901, 12 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1964)); see also id. at 350 n. 2, 84 S.Ct. 1697. {16} South Carolina's novel statutory interpretation resulted despite the admirably narrow and precise language of the statute, specifically stating the temporal relationship between elements of the crimefirst warning, then illegal entry. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 351-52, 84 S.Ct. 1697. The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that, unlike a broad or vague statute, [w]hen a statute on its face is narrow and precise . . . it lulls the potential defendant into a false sense of security, giving him no reason even to suspect that conduct clearly outside the scope of the statute as written will be retroactively brought within it by an act of judicial construction. Id. at 352, 84 S.Ct. 1697. If an unexpected and indefensible  construction of a statute is given retroactive effect, id. at 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), a criminal defendant is deprived of due process of law in the sense of [not receiving a] fair warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime, id. at 355, 84 S.Ct. 1697. {17} How do these important due process principles of Bouie apply to our opinion in Myers II ? We are at a loss to say. Unlike Defendant in the present case, the students in Bouie fell clearly outside the scope of the criminal trespass statute according to its own narrow and precise language, as confirmed by nearly a century of case law. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 351, 84 S.Ct. 1697. The students in Bouie were undisputedly on the property of another before they were warned, while the statute specifically prohibited entry occurring after a warning to not enter. Id. at 350, 84 S.Ct. 1697. By contrast, the dispute in the present case centers on the meaning of the word lewd, a term from an Act that this Court had never applied or interpreted, much less interpreted in a fashion that would have comforted Defendant and lulled him into a sense of security, as was the case for the students in Bouie. See Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, ¶ 22, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673. {18} Unlike the simple task of determining whether a warning occurred before entry or after entry, lewdness is considered on a case-by-case basis, given an evaluation of many factors; it is not narrow and precise in its meaning. See United States v. Dost, 636 F.Supp. 828, 832 (S.D.Cal.1986), affd, United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir.1987); Rendleman, 2003-NMCA-150, ¶ 43, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554 ([M]ost courts have adopted the 'Dost factors' to help determine whether a photograph involving a child is lewd.); see also Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, ¶ 20, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105 (applying the same factors, but emphasizing that `these factors are neither comprehensive nor necessarily applicable in every situation', . . . `there may be other factors that are equally if not more important in determining whether a photograph contains a [lewd] exhibition,' and `[t]he inquiry will always be case-specific' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir.1999))); Myers I, 2008-NMCA-047, ¶ 12, 143 N.M. 710, 181 P.3d 702 (applying the same factors). {19} Notably, our Court of Appeals in Rendleman acknowledged that it could be difficult . . . to articulate the meaning of certain elements of the Act. 2003-NMCA-150, ¶ 46. The Court quoted and applied a case describing certain of the Dost factors as confusing and contentious. Id. We find Rendleman's assessment persuasive. Divining the meaning of certain elements of the Act and applying the elements to differing fact situations will challenge our courts for years to come. {20} In short, a determination of lewdness is vastly different from an evaluation of whether conduct falls into a category described by narrow and precise language, as was the situation in Bouie. Equally important, this Court had never previously applied lewd in a manner opposite to our application in Myers II, such that Defendant might have believed his conduct was not lewd. Any parallel between the persecuted students in Bouie and the actions of Defendant in this case is simply unpersuasive. [2] {21} Despite these obvious differences, our Court of Appeals asserted only one reason why Myers II is an unforeseeable interpretation of the Act: namely, that our Myers II opinion was based upon the `voyeuristic quality' of the offensive images at a time when voyeurism was not a crime in New Mexico. Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, ¶ 20, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673 (quoting Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, ¶ 24, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105). According to the Court of Appeals, the Myers II test for determining what is `lewd' under the child pornography statute was unforeseeable because we adopted reasoning used in a 2006 Illinois case, People v. Sven, 365 Ill.App.3d 226, 302 Ill.Dec. 228, 848 N.E.2d 228 (2006), and because New Mexico's own voyeurism statute was not enacted until 2007, long after Defendant created the offensive images in this case. Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, ¶¶ 21-22, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673. In addition, the Court of Appeals mentions that in Myers II we overruled a small part of the Court of Appeals opinion in Rendleman. See Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, ¶ 23, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673. In light of all this, the Court of Appeals concluded that we had effectively rewritten the Act, crafting an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the statute, which operates like an ex post facto law. Id. Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, it was unreasonable to expect a person of ordinary intelligence [Defendant] to be on notice of what conduct was within the scope of [the Act], and therefore applying the new Myers II interpretation . . . to Defendant's conduct . . . offends due process. Id. ¶ 24. {22} We take these points one at a time. Obviously, we did not hold that Defendant was guilty of the non-existent crime of voyeurism. Similarly, the Sven reasoning that we found persuasive in Myers II was not hinged upon ideas that had only developed since Defendant's exploitive conduct. Thus, the dates of the enactment of the New Mexico voyeurism statute and the writing of the Sven opinion, relative to our Myers II opinion, have no bearing on the constitutionality of the Act as applied to Defendant's conduct. {23} Voyeurism is and has been an activity defined by observing naked bodies from a covert perspective for sexual gratification. Images that convey a voyeuristic perspective therefore, by definition, fulfill several of the Dost factors that our courts use to ascertain when an image can fairly be described as lewd within the meaning of the Act. Compare The American Heritage Dictionary 1930 (4th ed. 2000) (A voyeur is a person who derives sexual gratification from observing the naked bodies or sexual acts of others, especially from a secret vantage point.), with Myers I, 2008-NMCA-047, ¶ 12, 143 N.M. 710, 181 P.3d 702, and Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105 (citing Dost, 636 F.Supp. at 832, which offers factors for determining if an image is lewd, including a focus on the pubic area, a sexually suggestive setting, unnatural poses, partial clothing, and designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer). In addition, lewd is commonly defined as either [p]reoccupied with sex and sexual desire; lustful or [o]bscene; indecent. The American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 1007. Compare that definition with our description of the images in Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, ¶ 24, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105: [T]he private nature of the setting, the intimate bodily function in which the victims are engaged, and the voyeuristic quality of the images all combine to transform th[e] otherwise prosaic setting into a fetishistic and sexualized one. {24} Thus, it was hardly novel, much less unforeseeable, that we would arrive at our conclusion in Myers II that lewdness could be assessed through the prism of an image's voyeuristic character. As an idea, voyeurism has been around for a long time; this Court did little more than recognize its defining characteristics. It is true that, before Defendant took his offensive images, this Court had never had the opportunity to address whether images conveying a voyeuristic perspective were lewd. But the mere absence of judicial authority on a point of law is hardly the test for a Bouie -type, unexpected and indefensible interpretation of a criminal statute. More to the point, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals had ever rejected the characteristics of voyeurism as a possible aspect of lewdness; the subject simply never came up in Rendleman. As this Court had never created precedent upon which Defendant could rely, and the language of the Act clearly circumscribes certain images due to qualities that are shared with voyeuristic images, Defendant has no legitimate complaint against applying our ruling in Myers II to his conduct. {25} Similarly, applying our few modifications of Rendleman in the Myers II opinion to Defendant does not provide any claim of unfairness or unforeseeability. Rendleman an exemplary opinion in many ways and the seminal opinion in this area of the lawis nonetheless not an opinion of this Court, and before Myers II, this Court had never interpreted the Act one way or the other. Our denial of certiorari in Rendleman did not indicate any affirmation or adoption of law. See Rule 12-405 NMRA (specifying that only formal opinions involve new points of law, making the decision of value as a precedent); State v. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 13, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792 ([A] denial of [certiorari] review carries no implication that the decision or the opinion of the Court of Appeals was correct.); see also Hagan v. Caspari, 50 F.3d 542, 547 (8th Cir.1995) (We have some doubt whether a state supreme court's overruling of an intermediate appellate court decision ever can constitute a change in state law for due process purposes. In fact, we are strongly inclined to agree with the state that until the state's highest court has spoken on a particular point of state law, the law of the state necessarily must be regarded as unsettled.). Additionally, obvious differences between the facts of Rendleman and those in the present case make Defendant's reliance on the former perilous to say the least. {26} Rendleman placed photographs into two categories: those that a reasonable jury could find portrayed a prohibited sexual act under the Act, and those that a jury could not. 2003-NMCA-150, ¶¶ 29-31, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554 ([T]he district court may dismiss the charges where, on the undisputed face of the materials before the court, a jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the material meets the elements of the offense as defined by the Act.). The Court of Appeals did not consider whether images focusing on underage females' pubic areas from a secret vantage point were lewd. Rather, the reasons certain images were not lewd in Rendleman included: (1) some of the images lacked both nudity and `simulated' sexual behavior, id. ¶ 70; (2) some of the images did not clearly exhibit the minors' genitals or pubic areas, id. ¶¶ 71, 80; and (3) the obvious purpose or theme of some images was not sexual, but rather, were artistic, familial, documentary, or examples of adolescent spontaneity, id. ¶¶ 73, 81-82. {27} Defendant's images, in contrast, focused relentlessly on exposed pubic areas of minor girls; Defendant made no argument of any innocent or artistic theme. To the contrary, Defendant conceded that the images were made for his own sexual gratification, something conspicuously absent from Rendleman, and he stored them among similar commercial materials, Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 3, 33, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105. Further, we found that the covert angle, and other elements of the setting, contributed to making the theme voyeuristic and therefore sexual. Id. ¶ 23 (This feeling of voyeurism is enhanced by the quality of the images, which are slightly unfocused and grainy, the perspective of the images, the victims are viewed from the floor adjacent to the toilet, and the shadows that border the images, which lend the sense that the viewer is peering at the female victims through a peep hole on the floor.). {28} The portions of Rendleman that might apply to Defendant suggest that his images were lewd. In Rendleman, an unusual focus on the girls' genitalia weighed in favor of sending the photographs to the jury. 2003-NMCA-150, ¶¶ 72-73, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554. Photographs that focused on the minors' genitalia without any discernable reasontheir purpose and predominant theme were not obviouscould foreseeably be found lewd by a jury. Id. ¶¶ 77, 82 (Given the questionable focus of these photos, a rational juror might find they were designed to appeal to prurient interests or that they are patently offensive and that the other photos were merely a pretext or cover for obscene material.). Rendleman, if anything, should have forecast our categorization of Defendant's images as lewd, rather than not lewd.