Opinion ID: 1325306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Refusing to Sequester the Jury.

Text: At the beginning of the trial, Gray moved for the sequestration of the jury, based on the anticipated length of the trial and the publicity it was receiving. The trial court denied the motion. After the jury returned its verdict finding Gray guilty of capital murder, Gray again moved for sequestration of the jury until the penalty phase of the trial commenced the following day. The court also denied this motion. Although Gray makes no specific allegation that failure to sequester the jury adversely affected the trial, he argues that as a matter of policy, sequestration of a jury in a capital murder case, especially after a guilty verdict has been returned, should be the norm rather than the exception. A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to sequester a jury. Its discretion extends to capital murder cases. Boggs, 229 Va. at 513-14, 331 S.E.2d at 417; Stockton, 227 Va. at 138, 314 S.E.2d at 380; Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 677, 283 S.E.2d 905, 910-11 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1491, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982); Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 524-25, 273 S.E.2d 36, 43 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011, 101 S.Ct. 2347, 68 L.Ed.2d 863 (1981). In the present case, the trial court admonished the jury twice each day during the five-day trial not to discuss the case with others and to refrain from having any contact with any news media accounts of the trial. Nothing in the record suggests that the jury disregarded the trial court's admonitions. From the record before us, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sequester the jury.