Opinion ID: 2780748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exclusion of Mr. Kovatch

Text: The Kentucky trial judge struck Juror Kovatch from the jury even though he expressly stated that he could consider the full range of punishment — including the death penalty — after earlier expressing reservations and uncertainty about its wisdom. In reviewing his exclusion, the Supreme Court of Kentucky neither provided any details about Mr. Kovatch nor referred to No. 11-5707 Wheeler v. Simpson Page 4 Supreme Court case law on the subject. Instead, it simply stated that the trial judge “appropriately struck for cause those jurors that could not impose the death penalty.” Wheeler I, 121 S.W.3d at 179. The Kentucky trial judge conducted the initial voir dire of Mr. Kovatch before the lawyers examined him. She inquired whether he could consider the entire range of penalties, specifically asking about “[twenty] years imprisonment” and “the death penalty.” Voir Dire Tr. at 1. He replied he “probably” could consider the death penalty “after some deep reflection.” Id. Mr. Kovatch further said that he had not “formed an opinion one way or the other” regarding the death penalty and noted that there were “arguments on both sides of . . . it.” Id. at 2. Furthermore, he did not believe he had “any moral, religious, spiritual or personal beliefs that would keep [him] from considering the death penalty.” Id. The prosecutor’s voir dire questioning explained that if the jury found the defendant guilty of two homicides, “the Judge, at that point, would give [the jury] a penalty range of [twenty] years all the way up to the death penalty and all the options in between.” Id. at 6. Mr. Kovatch replied that he had never “been confronted with that situation” before and it was “difficult for [him] to judge how [he] would . . . act.” Id. The prosecutor then asked Mr. Kovatch if he was saying he was “not absolutely certain whether [he] could realistically consider [the death penalty]. . . .” Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Mr. Kovatch acknowledged he was not “absolutely certain” by saying, “I think, I think that would be the most accurate way I could answer your question.” Id. Soon after, upon examination by defense counsel, Mr. Kovatch described the death penalty as “a very philosophical topic” and “a very difficult one.” Id. at 8. He discussed getting older, understanding “a lot more things about values and [] life itself.” Id. He described himself as “a bit more contemplative on the issue of taking a life and . . . whether or not we have the right to take that life.” Id. He was then asked whether he felt he could “consider all of the options presented.” Id. at 9. He responded, “I believe I can, sir.” Id. After the trial judge excused the jurors for the evening, the prosecution moved to excuse Mr. Kovatch for cause, claiming he gave “two inconsistent answers” because “he could not say whether he could realistically consider the death penalty or not.” Id. at 9. The prosecutor No. 11-5707 Wheeler v. Simpson Page 5 suggested that the “gravamen of his testimony” provided grounds to strike him for cause under Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2000), as “a juror who can’t say if he can give the death penalty.” Voir Dire Tr. at 9-10. Responding to the prosecution’s motion, defense counsel highlighted Mr. Kovatch’s