Opinion ID: 6496578
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impracticability or Impossibility

Text: [¶34] In the proceedings below, Husband asserted the MSA was impossible to perform, and thereby asserted the doctrine of impracticability rendered the MSA void. A party to a contract may invoke the rule of impracticability to excuse his performance “when supervening circumstances render performance of one of the conditions of the contract 12 impracticable.” Star Valley Ranch Ass’n v. Daley, 2014 WY 116, ¶ 26, 334 P.3d 1207, 1213 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Mortenson v. Scheer, 957 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Wyo. 1998)). Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary. Mortenson, 957 P.2d at 1306 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 261 (1979)). We have said “[i]mpracticability of performance is a strict standard that can only be invoked when the circumstances truly dictate the impracticability.” Mortenson, 957 P.2d at 1306 (citing Barrett v. Ballard, 662 P.2d 180, 184 (Mont. 1980)). The doctrine cannot be invoked “when, under the contract, one party assumes the risk that fulfillment of a condition precedent will be prevented. The obligor is expected to provide in the contract for contingencies that are foreseeable.” Mortenson, 957 P.2d at 1306 (internal citations omitted). [¶35] Husband knew about the ownership structure of the Paris apartment, and he had the opportunity to consult with French counsel about the feasibility of transferring the apartment from the SCI to himself. The words “sole and separate property” do not appear in the MSA. Rather the document merely states Husband “shall receive” the Paris apartment. We “will not write terms into a contract under the guise of contract interpretation.” Schell v. Scallon, 2019 WY 11, 433 P.3d 879, 885 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Gumpel v. Copperleaf Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2017 WY 46, ¶ 42, 393 P.3d 1279, 1293– 94 (Wyo. 2017). [¶36] The district court found the MSA did not indicate or even suggest the performance of the agreement is contingent on any other event. There is nothing in the MSA to suggest the children’s consent was a basic assumption on which the contract was made. The parties could have made the children’s consent a prerequisite for their performance, but they did not. Therefore, Husband’s motion failed to make a prima facia showing he was entitled to relief under the doctrine of impracticability. It is not impossible or impracticable for Husband to “receive” the Paris apartment, even without the children’s consent. By signing the MSA, Wife disclaimed any interest she might have in the apartment. Husband will “receive” the Paris apartment, subject to the ownership structure he chose to create. The MSA can be performed as written, and Husband cannot use the doctrine of impossibility to void the agreement. [¶37] Husband’s motion failed to make a prima facie showing he was entitled to relief on the grounds of mutual mistake, fraud, impracticability, or impossibility. The district court 13 did not abuse its discretion when it denied Husband’s motion to vacate the MSA without a hearing.