Opinion ID: 197677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the foreign deposition

Text: 14 The appellant objects in this court, as he did below, to admission at trial of the deposition testimony of the British shipping agent, Alex Redpath. His cardinal contention is that the admission of this evidence abrogated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We exercise plenary review over this claim of constitutional error. See United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir.1997). 15
16 The parties--who agree on little else--share the view that Redpath was a key witness. Initially, the prosecution gained Redpath's assurances that he would travel to the United States and testify at the trial. As the day of reckoning approached, Redpath experienced a change of heart. Because the district court lacked subpoena power over Redpath (who lived and worked in Great Britain), the government moved for leave to depose him abroad. The motion invoked a procedural rule that provides in pertinent part: 17 Whenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is in the interest of justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and preserved for use at trial, the court may upon motion of such party and notice to the parties order that testimony of such witness be taken by deposition.... 18 Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(a). 19 The government proposed to mitigate any Confrontation Clause issues by transporting the appellant and his counsel to the site of the deposition and videotaping the proceedings. This proposal proved problematic for two reasons. First, the U.S. Marshals Service lacks jurisdiction to retain custody of federal detainees on foreign soil and the Central Authority of the United Kingdom would not agree to assume temporary custody of McKeeve so that he could attend the deposition. 1 Second, British magistrates typically prohibit the videotaping and audiotaping of depositions, and made no exception in this instance. The district court nonetheless found that Redpath was an unavailable witness and that the interest of justice warranted the deposition. Working within the spare confines of the British scheme, the court directed the government to transport the appellant's attorney to the deposition and to install two telephone lines--one that would allow the appellant to monitor the deposition from his prison cell and another that would allow him to consult privately with counsel during the deposition. The court reserved a ruling on the Confrontation Clause objections until the time of trial. 20 Redpath's deposition was taken before a British magistrate in the Solihull Magistrates' Court, Birmingham, England. Lawyers for the government and for both defendants attended and questioned the deponent. A solicitor (who doubled in brass as the clerk of the Magistrates' Court) contemporaneously prepared a transcript. The appellant monitored the proceedings by means of a live telephone link. At the conclusion of the session, the solicitor certified the transcript as accurate and forwarded it to the district court. When the prosecution subsequently offered the deposition at trial, Judge Keeton overruled the appellant's objections and allowed the government to read it into evidence. 21
22 The use of deposition testimony in criminal trials is disfavored, largely because such evidence tends to diminish a defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. See, e.g., United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Mann, 590 F.2d 361, 365 (1st Cir.1978). But the shrinking size of the globe means that certain criminal activities increasingly manifest an international cachet and, because federal courts frequently lack the power to compel a foreign national's attendance at trial, Rule 15 may offer the only practicable means of procuring critical evidence. The resultant tension between the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights and the prosecution's need to obtain evidence from persons domiciled abroad, while new to this circuit, threatens to become a recurring theme. 23 The various subsections of Rule 15 govern the method and manner by which depositions in criminal cases are to be taken. The appellant tacitly concedes that the taking of Redpath's deposition did not contravene the rule's formal requirements. Nevertheless, compliance with Rule 15 is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to the use of a deposition at trial. The admissibility of the testimony is quite another matter. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(e). The appellant cloaks himself in the mantle of the Confrontation Clause and makes his stand at this juncture. 24 The Confrontation Clause's central concern ... is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3163, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). The Clause addresses that concern principally by affording a criminal defendant the right to confront appearing witnesses face to face and the right to conduct rigorous cross-examination of those witnesses. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2801, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 989, 998, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537-38, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (discussing the Confrontation Clause's preference for face-to-face confrontation). Ordinarily, then, when the government purposes to introduce a deposition at trial in lieu of live testimony, a defendant has the right to be present during the deposition so that he may confront the deponent. See Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 465 (9th Cir.1994); Don v. Nix, 886 F.2d 203, 206 (8th Cir.1989). 25 Withal, we know on the best of authority that the Confrontation Clause cannot be applied mechanically, but, rather, must be interpreted in the context of the necessities of trial and the adversary process. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850, 110 S.Ct. at 3166. In other words, the right of confrontation is not absolute. Yet, filtering constitutional concerns through a seine woven of practical necessity is a tricky business, and different situations likely will yield different accommodations. 26 When the government conducts a Rule 15 deposition in a foreign land with a view toward introducing it at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires, at a minimum, that the government undertake diligent efforts to facilitate the defendant's presence. See United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 262 (3d Cir.1989); United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir.1988). We caution, however, that although such efforts must be undertaken in good faith, they need not be heroic, and the possibility of using a deposition does not evaporate even if those efforts prove fruitless. In that event the district court must determine, on a case-specific basis, whether reasonable alternative measures can preserve adequately the values that underpin the defendant's confrontation rights. In cases where actions by, or the laws of, a foreign nation effectively preclude the defendant's presence, furnishing the defendant with the capability for live monitoring of the deposition, as well as a separate (private) telephone line for consultation with counsel, usually will satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Mueller, 74 F.3d 1152, 1156-57 (11th Cir.1996) ; Kelly, 892 F.2d at 260; Salim, 855 at 950. 27
28 In this case, the record reveals that the prosecution made reasonable and diligent efforts to secure the appellant's attendance at Redpath's deposition: it offered to defray the cost of transporting the appellant and his counsel to the deposition and requested that British authorities accept temporary custody of him to ensure his presence. Only a lack of cooperation by the host nation stymied the appellant's appearance, and the Justice Department was powerless to coerce British assistance. The appellant points to nothing more that the prosecution plausibly could have done to facilitate a face-to-face confrontation. What is more, when the British authorities balked, Judge Keeton fashioned a reasonable alternative, and the prosecution provided the requisite telephonic links between the appellant's prison cell and the Solihull Magistrates' Court. Under the prevailing circumstances, the government's efforts to secure (or, alternatively, to approximate) a face-to-face confrontation were constitutionally adequate. 29 This finding, in itself, does not defeat the appellant's constitutional challenge. Face-to-face confrontation in a courtroom setting has yet another virtue; it permits the trier of fact better to observe a witness's demeanor. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 846, 110 S.Ct. at 3163-64; Drogoul, 1 F.3d at 1552. Like the right of confrontation itself, however, this value is not absolute. Thus, even when a witness is unavailable to testify at trial, the Clause countenances the admission of certain extrajudicial statements as long as they possess sufficient indicia of reliability. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66, 100 S.Ct. at 2538-39; Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1205 (1st Cir.1987). 30 For this purpose, [r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539. So it is here: Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1) limns a hearsay exception for former testimony of an unavailable witness. This exception's roots are deeply embedded in American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44, 15 S.Ct. 337, 338-40, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). Consistent with this tradition, courts seem disinclined to find any Confrontation Clause transgression when the prosecution offers deposition testimony under this rule. See, e.g., Ecker v. Scott, 69 F.3d 69, 71 (5th Cir.1995); Kelly, 892 F.2d at 261-62; Salim, 855 F.2d at 954-55. We join these courts and hold that evidence properly within the former testimony hearsay exception is, by definition, not vulnerable to a challenge based upon the Confrontation Clause. 31 To bring Redpath's testimony within the protective embrace of this holding, the government had to make a threshold showing (1) that the witness was unavailable, and (2) that the deposition constituted former testimony. The appellant contests both points. 32 The standard test for unavailability is whether the witness's attendance could be procured by process or other reasonable means. Fed.R.Evid. 804(a)(5). In a criminal context, however, Confrontation Clause concerns color the Rule 804 availability inquiry and heighten the government's burden. See Ecker, 69 F.3d at 71-72. Thus, the prosecution must actively attempt to secure the witness's presence at trial. See Christian, 41 F.3d at 467. Here, as we noted above, the government made an assiduous effort to convince Redpath to attend the trial. We fail to discern any further action that the prosecutor reasonably could have taken to bring the witness before the jury. 33 The remaining question is whether Redpath's deposition amounted to former testimony within the purview of Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1). The appellant's objection on this score is a bare assertion that the method of transcribing the proceeding was slow and inexact. 2 We must balance this complaint against the dominant characteristics of the deposition, namely, the administration of an oath; unlimited direct and cross-examination by attorneys for all parties; the ability to lodge objections; oversight by a judicial officer; the compilation of the transcript by a trained solicitor; and the lack of a language barrier. 34 To be sure, the deposition did not comport in all respects with American practice, but that circumstance alone does not render the testimony not in compliance with law and therefore beyond the reach of Rule 804(b)(1). We agree with the Second Circuit that unless the manner of examination required by the law of the host nation is so incompatible with our fundamental principles of fairness or so prone to inaccuracy or bias as to render the testimony inherently unreliable, ... a deposition taken ... in accordance with the law of the host nation is taken 'in compliance with law' for purposes of Rule 804(b)(1). Salim, 855 F.2d at 953. The British proceeding substantially jibes with our practice and thus satisfies the rule. 35 The appellant's final plaint is that the Redpath deposition was not videotaped. History undermines this plaint. The former testimony exception to the Confrontation Clause predates the development of videotaping technology by nearly a century. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240-44, 15 S.Ct. at 338-40. Thus, the exception obviously does not envision the need to present the trier of fact with a video recording of the declarant's testimony. In a case like this one--where the host nation prohibits videotaping--the district court's refusal to condition its authorization of the deposition on the use of such a technique did not offend the Constitution. 36 We hasten to add, however, that our opinion should not be read to discourage the use of videotaped depositions in this type of situation. Having the trier of fact observe the testimonial demeanor of the witness enhances important Confrontation Clause values, including the perception of fairness in criminal trials. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 846, 110 S.Ct. at 3163-64; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1018-20, 108 S.Ct. at 2801-03. For these reasons, although videotaping is not constitutionally required, we urge the district courts, if videotaping is feasible, to give serious consideration to granting defendants' requests to employ the technique. 37 To sum up, the Redpath deposition satisfies the Rule 804(b)(1) standard. Moreover, the very characteristics which contribute to that conclusion--e.g., administration of an oath; unlimited direct and cross-examination; ability to lodge objections; oversight by a judicial officer; compilation of the transcript by a trained solicitor; and linguistic compatibility--also provide sufficient indicia of reliability to assuage any reasonable Confrontation Clause concerns. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539; Salim, 855 F.2d at 954-55. The district court did not err in admitting the deposition testimony into evidence.