Opinion ID: 2972190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant-Appellant Makki

Text: Makki challenges his conviction, arguing that the district court should have granted his motion for a mistrial in light of certain testimony by Officer Kieffer. We review district court decisions to deny a mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Forrest, 17 F.3d 916, 919 (6th Cir. 1994). In Forrest, this Court outlined four factors for evaluating whether a mistrial was warranted: (1) whether the government’s line of questioning was reasonable; (2) whether the limiting instruction was immediate, clear, and forceful; (3) whether any bad faith was evidenced by the government; and (4) whether the testimony at issue amounted to only a small portion of the government’s case. Forrest, 17 F.3d at 920. With these factors in mind, we turn to the testimony challenged by Makki. On cross-examination, Makki’s attorney repeatedly questioned Officer Kieffer regarding the contents of reports he submitted to the DEA regarding his conversations with Saad. On redirect, the prosecutor referred Officer Kieffer to a paragraph of the report which said: Chami then had Saad take the prayer rug containing the heroin to Chami’s cousin’s residence located at 7338 Miller Road in Dearborn, Michigan. Saad stated Chami’s cousin’s name is Sam Makki, and that Makki would then take the money to his aunt’s residence located at 7400 Oakman Boulevard in Dearborn, Michigan. The prosecutor then asked “Did you understand that to mean what about 7338 Miller Road?” Id. In response, Kieffer said: When he told me that, knowing that I obtained a search warrant for 7338 Miller Road in – in May of – May 30th of 1997, where the other -5- Nos. 02-1738, 02-2214 United States v. Makki/Boudreau two informants basically corroborated the same thing, saying that 7338 Miller Road is a stash house. Id. At this point, Makki’s attorney immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. Both parties agreed that the prosecutor had not intended, with his question, to elicit testimony regarding the confidential informants, nor had he intended to elicit Officer Kieffer’s personal belief that Makki’s house was a “stash house” for heroin. Makki’s attorney protested that he did not know the identity of the informants, nor could he examine them in any way. The prosecutor then offered to produce the informants, but Makki’s attorney never responded to this offer. The judge immediately determined that a curative instruction, rather than a mistrial, was warranted, and agreed to include in the instruction Makki’s requested admonishment that the jury should only rely on evidence heard and seen in the courtroom. The judge then instructed the jury as follows: Ladies and gentlemen, the Court has heard an objection at side-bar, and I’ve sustained the objection presented by [Makki’s attorney]. You are to disregard the witness’s reference to two confidential informants that was made in his last answer. Also, you are to disregard the witness’s opinion that the residency served as a stash house for drugs. That conclusion, if – or any conclusion concerning the – the residence is one for you to make, not – not the proper subject of opinion testimony from this witness. And as a general matter, of course, you are to base your conclusions on the evidence that you hear and see in the courtroom. So, with that instruction, we’ll continue the [examination]. -6- Nos. 02-1738, 02-2214 United States v. Makki/Boudreau Neither party disputes that the jury should not have heard the objected-to testimony. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970). But a brief review of this interchange in light of the Forrest factors shows that a mistrial was not warranted here. First, neither party disputes that the line of questioning was reasonable nor that the prosecutor was acting in good faith when he asked Officer Kieffer what he inferred about Makki’s house from Saad’s statement.1 Further, the limiting instruction was quite clear, immediate, and forceful, speaking directly to the testimony that Makki challenges. Juries, of course, are presumed to understand and follow such instructions, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1112 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 1997), and unless the evidence is “so prejudicial that a jury could not be trusted to disregard it.” United States v. Ursery, 109 F.3d 1129, 1133-34 (6th Cir. 1997). The evidence here is not highly prejudicial, especially in light of the fact that Makki’s own prior cross-examination of Officer Kieffer had already established that Officer Kieffer was working with informants when he obtained a warrant to search Makki’s house. Finally, Saad, Chedid, and Chami all testified against Makki, stating that his house was used to store heroin, and that he had been knowingly involved in both transporting and processing the heroin. Their testimony was a much greater portion of the evidence against Makki than was the brief 1 Note that the situation would be different had the prosecutor referred to these reports, which contained numerous instances of hearsay, on direct examination. However, Makki’s own attorney raised the issue of the contents of the reports (and related conversations) in detail on crossexamination, and so could not dispute the propriety of the government’s exploration of these same conversations on redirect. -7- Nos. 02-1738, 02-2214 United States v. Makki/Boudreau statement by Officer Kieffer as to the informants and as to his opinion that Makki’s residence was a stash house. The testimony of the three co-conspirators, in conjunction with the fact that Makki’s own cross examination of Officer Kieffer had already revealed the existence of the confidential informants, provided ample additional evidence of guilt besides the challenged statement, and thus, under the Forrest factors, a mistrial was clearly not warranted. Makki further argues that, given the lack of physical evidence in this case, the only evidence that corroborates the statements of the co-conspirators is the stricken testimony at issue. But this Court has held that the testimony of co-conspirators alone can be sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy. United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 600 (6th Cir. 2003). Makki had the opportunity to cross-examine the three co-conspirators, and the jury had the opportunity to evaluate their credibility. Accordingly, under Forrest, there was sufficient additional evidence of Makki’s guilt such that a mistrial was not warranted here.