Opinion ID: 1969450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Criminal Case

Text: Although defendant argues that the criminal conviction should be overturned for several reasons, his main argument is that the abuse prevention order was void because it was issued in violation of defendant's procedural due process rights. Defendant claims that the family court lacked jurisdiction over him because he was incarcerated and was denied an opportunity to attend the hearing where the final order was issued. Defendant's argument hinges on the fact that he had been provided transportation from prison to eight previous family court hearings without an affirmative request on his part. He argues that he had a reasonable expectation that the family court and prison officials would transport him to family court hearings, whether or not he requested transportation. Because he relied on the state's previous course of action, defendant argues that the state created an expectation of transportation, and then denied him the opportunity for a hearing by changing its policies without telling him. We do not generally allow a person who is under a court order to challenge it by violating it. See State v. Carlson, 133 Vt. 562, 564, 349 A.2d 237, 238 (1975). Moreover, defendant's arguments involve a collateral attack on the abuse prevention order. Although collateral attacks are generally prohibited, defendant seeks to fit within a limited exception to the prohibition authorized in State v. Putnam, 137 Vt. 410, 413, 407 A.2d 161, 163 (1979). The defendant in Putnam was charged with operating a motor vehicle after his license to operate was suspended, and he attempted to defend by challenging the legality of the suspension. We allowed a limited defense, with the following explanation: We recognize the cogency of the State's argument that litigation must cease sometime, and that there is a strong public policy favoring resistance of the license suspension when it is imposed, not later. But, on the opposite side of the scale, there is also force to the defendant's argument that he should not be bound, in any proceeding, by a suspension levied without constitutionally adequate notice, or without subject matter jurisdiction. Although the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not strictly applicable, because of the different burden of proof in criminal prosecutions and license suspensions, they furnish excellent analogy. We accordingly hold that, consistent with [ State v. ] Cady [136 Vt. 29, 383 A.2d 607 (1978)], in a prosecution for driving with license suspended, collateral attack upon the suspension is permissible for, and limited to, questions of jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter in the original suspension proceedings. Id. (citations omitted). Defendant argues primarily that the abuse prevention order was issued without an opportunity for him to be heard and, therefore, in violation of his due process rights. He asserts that Putnam allows this kind of collateral attack in the criminal proceeding based on his violation of the order. We agree that the Putnam standard applies to allow the defense that the abuse prevention order was issued in violation of defendant's due process rights. We are not convinced, however, that defendant has shown a violation of due process. Due process of law in this circumstance requires that defendant receive notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Lucas v. Hahn, 162 Vt. 456, 459, 648 A.2d 839, 842 (1994). It is undisputed that defendant received notice of the abuse prevention hearing. The question is whether he had an opportunity to be heard. We agree that preventing defendant from any meaningful access to the abuse prevention proceeding would be a denial of due process. See Whitney v. Buckner, 107 Wash.2d 861, 734 P.2d 485, 488 (1987). Meaningful access does not, however, necessarily mean a personal appearance in the family court. See In re C.G., 885 P.2d 355, 357 (Colo.Ct.App.1994); Sullivan v. Shaw, 437 Pa.Super. 534, 650 A.2d 882, 884-85 (1994); Whitney, 734 P.2d at 490; State ex rel. Taylor v. Dorsey, 81 Wash.App. 414, 914 P.2d 773, 777 (1996). Depending on the case, an incarcerated litigant might obtain meaningful access through a telephone connection to the courtroom, see Tageant v. Tageant, 909 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo.1996); through counsel, see In re C.G., 885 P.2d at 357; or possibly through written communications with the court, see Sullivan v. Shaw, 650 A.2d at 885. None of the alternatives were explored here because defendant never made a request for access. Even if this were a case where only a personal appearance would comport with due process, we are unable to find a denial of due process on this sparse record. The only evidence on which defendant relies is the testimony of a family court clerk that defendant had been transported to family court proceedings in the past and no requests for transport were in the files. From this evidence, defendant argues that he relied on the past transport policy and failed to attend the abuse prevention hearing because he was not transported. There is, however, no evidence to support this argument. Defendant never testified, and, thus, there is no evidence of reliance and no evidence that defendant would have attended the hearing had he been transported. His claim of reliance is undermined by his failure to contest the order until, many months after the order's issuance, he was criminally charged with violating it. As a result, the district court found that defendant did not intend to attend the abuse prevention hearing and concluded that defendant's position was not factually credible. Defendant had the due process right to choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). The record is silent on what choice he actually made. We also have no indication of what position defendant would have taken at the hearing to prevent imposition of the order. See Sullivan v. Shaw, 650 A.2d at 885. Specifically, there is no indication that he would have opposed restrictions on contacting plaintiff by mail. All his actions up to that point had been aimed at obtaining an order that authorized visitation with his children. Due process claims must be resolved on the facts before the court, and we must look to whether the individual asserting a denial of due process can show prejudice from the asserted denial. See Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Comm., 142 Vt. 400, 407, 409, 457 A.2d 1368, 1371-72 (1983) (no violation of due process where student was not prejudiced by lack of written notice). Defendant had the responsibility to bring his inability to obtain access to the abuse prevention proceeding to the attention of the family court, and he failed to do so. See Pella Products v. Krutak, 150 Vt. 81, 82-83, 549 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1988) (party could not raise due process challenge based on inability to hear proceedings in trial court where he never advised trial judge that he was unable to hear). We find no denial of due process. Defendant also claims that the abuse prevention order was void because (1) without statutory authorization, the emergency temporary order prohibited mail contact; (2) the abuse prevention order was issued without findings of fact; and (3) no evidence was taken on which to issue the abuse prevention order. We decline to reach the first claim. [1] Defendant was charged with violating the August 24th final abuse prevention order and not the August 14th emergency temporary order. There is explicit statutory authority for the family court to impose restrictions on mail contact in a final abuse prevention order. See 15 V.S.A. § 1103(c)(1). We recognize that the final order contained the same restriction as was imposed in the temporary order, but this does not undercut the validity of the final order. We also decline to reach whether either of the other challenges is meritorious. Even if the statute requires findings of fact as defendant argues, see 15 V.S.A. § 1103(c), (h), the failure to make the findings does not rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect as required by Putnam. Similarly, the court's procedure, treating the judgment as one issued by default based on the ex-spouse's earlier affidavit, cannot be said to involve a jurisdictional defect, assuming there was any error at all. Defendant's final attack on the order argues that the no contact provision denies his First Amendment right to free speech and interferes with his fundamental right to seek parent-child contact. Defendant has no First Amendment right to inflict unwanted and harassing contact on another person. See Rzeszutek v. Beck, 649 N.E.2d 673, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995); Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Okla.Crim.App. 1988); cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 738, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 1491, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970) (statutory prohibition on person using mail to send unwanted information is valid; [i]f this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even `good' ideas on an unwilling recipient). Nor is the prohibition overbroad because it involves communication. See People v. Blackwood, 131 Ill.App.3d 1018, 87 Ill.Dec. 40, 44, 476 N.E.2d 742, 746 (1985); State v. Hauge, 547 N.W.2d 173, 175-76 (S.D.1996). We do not agree that the prohibition prevents defendant from petitioning the court to reestablish parent-child contact. Defendant contacted his ex-spouse using a communication means she found harassing, and attempted to convince her to bring the children to the prison, despite her continuous longstanding opposition to such contact. His actions can hardly be considered protected conduct. In summary, we hold that the abuse prevention order was not unconstitutional and was not issued in violation of defendant's due process rights. Any other procedural defect cannot be raised by collateral attack.
Next, defendant argues that the jury instructions were erroneous because they failed to charge that mens rea is a necessary element of the offense. [2] The statute provides that [a] person who commits an act prohibited by a court ... in violation of an abuse prevention order ... after the person has been served notice of the contents of the order commits a crime and is subject to fines or imprisonment. 13 V.S.A. § 1030(a). The court charged that the statute involved intent and knowledge elements as follows: The intent element in this case, you will use the term as knowing. We will always use the term as knowing, which would mean that Mr. Mott understood he was contacting Ms. Lewis by mail. This wasn't a mistake, an accident, a misunderstanding. That it was a deliberate act. He was contacting her by mail. He knew he was doing that. And second, that he had knowledge of the order when he did it. Now, once we get to the order, the State has to prove the fact of the order. Was there really an order? They have to prove the contents of the order. What did the order say? They have to prove that the Defendant knew of the existence of the order. Had actual knowledge of it. Although defendant characterizes the charge as lacking in a mens rea element, his real argument is that the mens rea description was inadequate. The charge required that the jury find that defendant intended to send the letter and that defendant had actual knowledge of the order. Defendant contends that the charge should have gone further and required the jury to find that defendant intended to violate the order. Especially where a crime does not have a common-law antecedent, the determination of the requisite intent is first a question of statutory construction. See State v. Roy, 151 Vt. 17, 25, 557 A.2d 884, 889 (1989) (no scienter element in crime of eluding police officer when statutory language cuts against it). Moreover, the starting point in the search for the mental element required for conviction of any particular crime is the intent to do the deed which constitutes the actus reus of that offense. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 661 (1957). In this case, the deed was the sending of the letter. The language of the statute is entirely consistent with this starting point. The statute requires that defendant commit[] an act prohibited by a court, that the act be in violation of an abuse prevention order, and that the act occur after defendant has been served notice of the contents of the order. 13 V.S.A. § 1030(a). Nothing in the language suggests that defendant must have intended to violate the order or even that defendant must have known that the conduct would violate the order. Consistent with the Legislature's intent that it is defendant's responsibility to read the order and determine what conduct is prohibited, the Legislature provided that any order warn, in bold capital letters, that VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIME SUBJECT TO A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT OR A FINE, OR BOTH.... 15 V.S.A. § 1103(i). The purpose of the Abuse Prevention Law is to provide inexpensive and uncomplicated proceedings that allow an abused family member to obtain immediate relief. Rapp v. Dimino, 162 Vt. 1, 4, 643 A.2d 835, 837 (1993). We would not implement that purpose by holding that an abuser can escape criminal liability for violation of an order by refusing to read it and remaining unaware of its terms. We believe that we can enforce the statute only by holding that defendant has the responsibility to read and understand the order and conform his conduct to it. We hold that the trial court correctly charged on the mens rea element of the crime of violation of the abuse prevention order.
Defendant makes two final claims, which we dispose of summarily. First, he claims that the trial court erred in failing to submit to the jury the issue of the validity of the order. The statute does not make the validity of the order an element of the offense. See 13 V.S.A. § 1030(a). Thus, the validity of the order is a legal issue for resolution by the trial court and not by the jury. See State v. Pike, 143 Vt. 283, 289, 465 A.2d 1348, 1351 (1983). Next, defendant argues that the letter fit within an implied exception to the prohibition for settlement or other legal negotiations. We need not consider whether there is an implied exception to the prohibition because this letter would not fit into such an exception. Defendant's visitation rights had been terminated in June, and there was nothing before the court. The letter did not seek any action with respect to court proceedings. We cannot characterize the letter as an offer of settlement or as part of a legal negotiation.