Opinion ID: 1194925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: first causecriminal conviction

Text: The Bar's first cause of complaint alleges that, by reason of the accused's felony conviction for attempted possession of a Schedule I controlled substance, he is subject to discipline under ORS 9.527(2) and 9.460(1). ORS 9.527(5) renders a lawyer subject to discipline for a willful violation of ORS 9.460(1). ORS 9.460(1) provides: An attorney shall: (1) Support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state[.] ORS 9.527 provides: The Supreme Court may disbar, suspend or reprimand a member of the bar whenever, upon proper proceedings for that purpose, it appears to the court that: (1) The member has committed an act or carried on a course of conduct of such nature that, if the member were applying for admission to the bar, the application should be denied; (2) The member has been convicted in any jurisdiction of an offense which is a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or a felony under the laws of this state, or is punishable by death or imprisonment under the laws of the United States, in any of which cases the record of the conviction shall be conclusive evidence; (3) The member has willfully disobeyed an order of a court requiring the member to do or forbear an act connected with the legal profession; (4) The member is guilty of willful deceit or misconduct in the legal profession; (5) The member is guilty of willful violation of any of the provisions of ORS 9.460 or 9.510; (6) The member is guilty of gross or repeated negligence or incompetence in the practice of law; or (7) The member has violated any of the provisions of the rules of professional conduct adopted pursuant to ORS 9.490. (Emphasis added.)
The accused was convicted of a felony on October 4, 1994. However, pursuant to ORS 161.705, the court reduced the felony conviction to a Class A misdemeanor and, on November 1, 1995, entered an amended judgment to that effect. The parties agree that, as a result of the entry of the amended judgment before the decision of this court in the disciplinary proceeding, the Class A misdemeanor, not the felony, is the relevant crime of conviction in our analysis of the Bar's charge under ORS 9.527(2). That is correct. See In re Sonderen, 303 Or. 129, 134, 734 P.2d 348 (1987) (so holding in similar circumstances). As a consequence, the issue before the court is whether the accused is convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude within the meaning of ORS 9.527(2). The trial panel concluded that the accused's misdemeanor does not involve moral turpitude. It relied on In re Chase, 299 Or. 391, 404, 702 P.2d 1082 (1985), in which this court held that a conviction for a Class A misdemeanor of attempted possession of a Schedule II drug, cocaine, was not a crime involving moral turpitude under ORS 9.527(2). The Bar does not challenge the trial panel's conclusion regarding that charge or offer a principled basis for distinguishing Chase. We also conclude that the accused's misdemeanor conviction does not involve moral turpitude. Therefore, the accused did not violate ORS 9.527(2).
The Bar further alleged that the accused's criminal conviction violated the duty of lawyers under ORS 9.460(1) to support the    laws of this state. The trial panel found that, because he lacked the necessary mental state, the accused had not violated that statute. We agree with that conclusion, but for a different reason than that on which the trial panel relied. The parties disagree regarding the applicability of ORS 9.460(1) to this case. The Bar argues that every criminal conviction violates the duty imposed by ORS 9.460(1), as long as the lawyer acts willfully in committing the underlying crime, as required by ORS 9.527(5). The accused argues that, because the sole factual predicate for discipline under the first cause is a criminal conviction, the court's source of authority to impose discipline is ORS 9.527(2), not ORS 9.460(1) and 9.527(5). The parties' conflicting arguments raise an issue about the court's authority that our cases neither address nor decide. [3] Consequently, we must interpret the relevant statutes in context in order to discover the legislature's intention. See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 611, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993) (describing methodology for statutory interpretation). Some conclusions about the intended operation of ORS 9.527 result from a straightforward reading of its text. ORS 9.527 is a legislative authorization to this court to impose discipline on a member of the Bar for any one of a series of acts of misconduct or negligence. Only subsection (2) of that statute expressly addresses the imposition of discipline for conviction of a crime. Subsection (2), as relevant, authorizes the court to discipline lawyers for conviction of only two types of criminal offenses, i.e., felonies and misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. [4] The legislature's choice to authorize the court to discipline lawyers for conviction of only those two categories of offenses serves as a limitation on that authority under the statute. Unless the lawyer's offense crosses the threshold of crime seriousness implicit in those two categories, subsection (2) does not authorize disciplinary action. The court may impose discipline, under subsection (2), only if the record contains competent evidence of the fact of a conviction, i.e., an adjudication of guilt of a crime. Under subsection (2), once the Bar proves the predicate fact of a criminal conviction, all that remains is the legal determination whether the offense rises to the level of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude under this state's laws. See Chase, 299 Or. at 399, 702 P.2d 1082 (the category of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude is fixed with reference to the nature and elements of the crime and without consideration of the specific circumstances of a case). By contrast to the clear intendment of subsection (2), the meaning of ORS 9.460(1) is uncertain. The text of ORS 9.460(1) does not define what conduct constitutes a failure to support the laws. A dictionary defines the term support as follows: 2a(1): to uphold by aid, countenance, or adherence: actively promote the interests or cause of    (2): to uphold or defend as valid, right, just, or authoritative: ADVOCATE    (3): to argue in favor of: vote for   ; also; to advocate, endorse, vote for, or implement the policies, principles, or candidacy of    b(1): to provide means, force, or strength that is secondary to: back up    c(1): to serve as verification, corroboration, or substantiation    3a: to pay the costs of; MAINTAIN    syn SUSTAIN, PROP, BOLSTER, BUTTRESS, BRACE[.] Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2297 (unabridged ed 1993). That broad definition lends some weight to the Bar's argument that, aside from whatever else the duty to support the laws may encompass, a conviction for violating a criminal law breaches that duty. But that is not the only plausible interpretation that the statute will bear. We also reasonably may read the term support, in this context, to require lawyers, in their professional capacity, to advocate for, to defend, and to endorse the state and federal constitutions and laws as society's chosen means for establishing justice. Under that reading, ORS 9.460(1) imposes on lawyers a general obligation of professional loyalty to the constitutions and laws, a duty that requires lawyers to refrain from willfully undermining or corrupting the capacity of those laws to enforce legal rights and obligations. That view is bolstered by the dictionary definition quoted above and, to some degree, by the role of ORS 9.460(1) and 9.527(5) as the statutory basis for enforcing the lawyer's oath. See ORS 9.250, which obligates every successful applicant for bar membership, on admission, to take an oath, administered as provided by Supreme Court rule, that in the practice of law the applicant will support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state, and be of faithful and honest demeanor in office. (Emphasis added.) According to that view, ORS 9.460(1) is not designed specifically as a tool to impose discipline for a criminal conviction that falls below the threshold established in ORS 9.527(2). The requirement in ORS 9.527(5) that the lawyer's violation of ORS 9.460(1) must be willful does not clarify what conduct constitutes a failure to support the laws. Willfulness is a description of a state of mind that can accompany misconduct. It is not a definition or specification of the action or behavior that constitutes the misconduct. The foregoing discussion identifies the interpretive problem posed by ORS 9.460(1). We conclude, however, that this case does not oblige us to resolve it. The premise for the Bar's argument is the claim that ORS 9.460(1) and 9.527(5) authorize the court to impose discipline for a criminal conviction even though the crime does not rise to the threshold expressed in ORS 9.527(2), i.e., a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. In our view, that premise is flawed. The problem with the Bar's approach is that the court cannot ignore the legislature's limitation in ORS 9.527(2) on the court's disciplinary authority over a criminal conviction. Assuming, without deciding, that ORS 9.460(1) relates to the court's disciplinary authority over a criminal conviction, it is more general than, and is inconsistent with, the restriction on the court's authority expressed in ORS 9.527(2). The legislature has indicated how this court should construe inconsistent statutes. ORS 174.020 provides: In the construction of a statute the intention of the legislature is to be pursued if possible; and when a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent shall control a general one that is inconsistent with it. Our cases that apply that principle indicate that the specific statute is considered to be an exception to the general statute. See State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. M.T., 321 Or. 419, 426, 899 P.2d 1192 (1995) (applying that principle and citing other authorities). That rule of construction applies here. The particular intent reflected in the limitation in ORS 9.527(2) controls over any inconsistent general intent reflected in ORS 9.460(1) and 9.527(5). As a consequence of the foregoing, we conclude that ORS 9.460(1) and 9.527(5) do not authorize discipline against the accused, on the basis of his criminal conviction because, as we concluded above, the relevant crime of conviction here is not a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. The accused is not guilty of the Bar's charge under ORS 9.460(1) and 9.527(5). We emphasize that our conclusion concerns the court's authority to discipline a lawyer for a criminal conviction. Lawyers remain subject to discipline for proven ethical misconduct even if a criminal prosecution for the same conduct results in an acquittal.