Opinion ID: 2086504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Conduct Two-Step Hearing.

Text: The Supreme Court of the United States has addressed this matter in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760, 36 L.Ed.2d 656, 664 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-80, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2599, 33 L.Ed. 484, 496-99 (1972). In Gagnon the court said: In Morrissey, we recognized that the revocation decision has two analytically distinct components: The first step in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospective factual question: whether the parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined that the parolee did violate the condition does the second question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation? Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at 479-480, 92 S.Ct. at 2599, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. We have held these two matters could be combined in one hearing. State v. Tech, 240 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 1976); Rheuport v. State, 238 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Iowa 1976). This procedure has now been statutorily approved unless prejudice would result therefrom. See section 908.11, The Code 1979. The record discloses no prejudice in this case and petitioner has shown no right to relief because the two factual determinations mandated by Morrissey commission of the acts violating probation and determination that the original sentence should be servedwere made at one rather than two hearings. II. However, petitioner raises another protest concerning the revocation hearing. He asserts he was not informed of the purpose and effect of the hearing. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488, 490, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2603, 2604, 33 L.Ed. 484, 498-99 (1972); § 908.5, The Code 1979. Although Morrissey was a parole revocation case, the same principles apply to probation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759, 36 L.Ed.2d 656, 661-62 (1973). Morrissey set the minimum standards of due process, leaving it to the individual states to establish appropriate rules of procedure. 408 U.S. at 488-489, 92 S.Ct. at 2608, 2609, 33 L.Ed.2d at 498-99. Iowa has done so by enactment of ch. 908, The Code. Morrissey also includes this statement at 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d 499: We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation [at which disposition of the case is determined] to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial. Petitioner raises numerous objections to the revocation hearing. Subject to his claim he did not understand what was being done, (which is separately discussed in Division IV), none has any merit. He was represented by counsel; he waived notice and consented to the hearing; he consented to reception of the violation report; and he declined to offer any evidence to refute the written report. We agree with the trial court that petitioner was not deprived of any due process right nor any right conferred under ch. 908, The Code. Petitioner further complains because the court did not make factual findings of its reasons for revoking probation. See section 908.7, The Code 1979. Rheuport v. State, 238 N.W.2d 777, 23 considered a similar complaint concerning the absence of findings in a postconviction hearing. As in our statute concerning revocation hearings, section 663A.7, The Code, requires specific findings of fact. However, we said the trial court could not be faulted for having failed to find facts which were not in dispute. That rationale applies here. The only evidence was the violation report. It was not contested. No evidence was introduced to refute it. Under the circumstances, the trial court's statement that probation was being revoked based on the evidence and information before it was sufficient. We do not say it would be enough if there were conflicting evidence to be evaluated. We find no grounds for reversal in the matters so far discussed. This brings us to the remaining issue concerning the trial court's refusal to permit petitioner to testify at the postconviction hearing.