Opinion ID: 1249349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ski park motion for summary judgment

Text: Ski Park argues that in the grant from Winkelman to Ms. Harris, it was the parties' intent to except a fee interest in the right of way and not merely an easement and that Winkelman therefore subsequently quitclaimed to Ski Park a fee interest in the right of way. In support of its position, Ski Park argues (1) that the terms excepting and right of way except a fee interest, (2) that because Winkelman owned the right of way in fee at the time of the grant to Ms. Harris, the deed excepted a fee interest, and (3) that the doctrine of merger prevents use of the purchase and sale agreement to interpret an ambiguity in the deed. Ski Park cites an early case to define the term exception as a clause in a deed which withdraws from its operation some part of the thing granted, and which would otherwise have passed to the grantee under the general description [and] [t]he part excepted is in existence at the time of the grant, and remains ... unaffected by the conveyance. [47] Using this definition, it argues that use of the term excepting necessarily prevents the grantee, Ms. Harris, from obtaining the entire fee interest in the property conveyed because Northern Pacific reserved a right of way, within its ordinary meaning, and because, before signing, Ms. Harris and her attorney reviewed the closing documents which made no reference to an easement. An easement is a burden on the land and an interest in land. [48] The term excepting arguably could have been used by the parties to express their understanding that, although Ms. Harris was receiving a fee interest, her rights were not plenary, but subject to an easement. This would be consistent with Ms. Harris' assertion that she thought the deed was excepting only an easement and that she was in fact acquiring the underlying fee to the railroad right of way, but this assertion is not properly before us. [49] The deed from Northern Pacific to Wilkeson did not explicitly reserve a fee. The right of way thus arguably could be considered as either a fee interest or simply an easement. The deed description of the right of way (a strip of land two hundred feet wide) and its purpose (to be used for a right of way, or for other railroad purposes) would ordinarily create an easement only and not a fee simple interest. [50] This is inconsistent with Ski Park's arguments that Northern Pacific reserved a fee and that the common meaning of a right of way is a fee interest. Similarly, the fact that Ms. Harris and her attorney reviewed the closing documents and did not object to lack of reference to an easement does not necessarily support Ski Park's conclusion that a fee was excepted. Further, the deed was prepared by Winkelman's agent, Becker, who stated that if he had been instructed to reserve a fee interest, he would not have used the language used in the deed. This assertion, of course, is speculation and cannot of itself be used to establish the intent of Winkelman. [6] Burlington Northern abandoned the right of way in 1985, 2 years prior to Winkelman's conveyance to Ms. Harris. Ski Park argues that if the exception clause is interpreted as withholding only an easement, nothing would be withheld because the right of way no longer existed and Winkelman held the entire parcel in fee at the time it conveyed to Harris. The Court of Appeals, in granting summary judgment in favor of Ski Park, also focused on abandonment of the right of way. The Court of Appeals concluded that since the right of way was no longer in existence, Winkelman intended to reserve in fee the property where the right of way once existed. The court stated that its conclusion as to Winkelman's intent was necessary because to hold otherwise would make the exception language superfluous. However, that language would be superfluous only if Winkelman intended to except an easement knowing that an easement no longer existed. Since Winkelman did not know of the abandonment (and the resulting fee interest), it cannot be said with certainty that it intended to reserve the fee interest in the right of way. This court has held that the intent of the parties must prevail. The real estate contract between Winkelman and Ski Park dated April 23, 1987, which antedates the October 29, 1987, statutory warranty deed to Petitioner Harris, at least provides some support to a conclusion that Winkelman intended to reserve a fee interest in the railroad right of way, notwithstanding the confusion created by the language in the purchase and sale agreement prepared by Petitioner Harris. Ski Park finally argues that, under the doctrine of merger, the purchase and sale agreement merged into the deed. The trial court, in granting summary judgment in favor of Ms. Harris, relied on the language of the purchase and sale agreement. However, the Court of Appeals held that the purchase and sale agreement was not controlling because it merged into the deed. Both Ski Park and the Court of Appeals rely on Black v. Evergreen Land Developers. [51] However, that case recognized that there were exceptions to the merger doctrine. This court has held that where the intent of the parties is not clearly expressed in the deed, courts may consider parol evidence. [52] In order to determine the intent of the parties, extrinsic evidence is admissible as to the entire circumstances under which a contract is made. [53] [7] This court has adopted the context rule which succinctly stated is that extrinsic evidence is admissible as to the entire circumstances under which [a] contract [is] made, as an aid in ascertaining the parties' intent, specifically adopting the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 212, 214(c) (1981). [54] This court in Berg v. Hudesman [55] rejected the theory that ambiguity in the meaning of contract language must exist before evidence of the surrounding circumstances is admissible and overruled cases to the contrary. [56] The purchase and sale agreement in this case may be considered as some evidence of the circumstances of the parties at the time of the grant. Even considering, in the light most favorable to Ms. Harris, that both Winkelman and Harris signed the purchase and sale agreement, a conclusion that the parties intended to except only an easement and not a fee interest (excepting the Northern Pacific railroad right of way easement) is tenuous, at best. Applying the rules on summary judgment, the undisputed facts in this case and the law favor summary judgment for Respondent Ski Park Farms.