Opinion ID: 76089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the sentence issues

Text: 26 DeVegter contends that even if his conviction stands, his sentence should not because the district court erroneously applied the U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. His argument is based on the fact that he did not have the authority to make the final decision in Fulton County's awarding the underwriting business to the Lazard firm. That fact is not determinative. Fulton County hired deVegter to serve as a fair and unbiased financial advisor and put him in a position to do that. With that position came Fulton County's trust, and deVegter clearly abused it. The enhancement for abusing a position of trust was appropriate. 27 The government has cross-appealed contending that the district court: (1) applied the wrong guideline, and if not, that it incorrectly determined loss under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1), and should have imposed the § 2F1.1(b)(2) more than minimal planning enhancement; (2) should have imposed the obstruction of justice enhancement under § 3C1.1; and (3) should have imposed on Poirier an enhancement based on his leadership role under § 3B1.1.
28 In sentencing the defendants the district court applied as the base offense guideline § 2F1.1, which covers offenses involving fraud or deceit. The government contends it should have applied § 2B4.1, which covers commercial bribery and kickbacks. We review de novo the district court's application of the law to the facts. United States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448, 452 (11th Cir.1996). 29 The offense conduct in this case is § 1343 wire fraud. 6 The Statutory Index lists two possible guidelines for that offense, §§ 2C1.7 & 2F1.1. U.S.S.G. appendix A. We agree with the parties that § 2C1.7 is inapplicable, which leaves § 2F1.1. The application of § 2F1.1 leads us to yet another guideline, because Application Note 14 to § 2F1.1 specifically allows for use of other guidelines in some circumstances. It says: [i]n certain ... cases, the mail or wire fraud statutes, or other relatively broad statutes, are used primarily as jurisdictional bases for the prosecution of other offenses. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 n. 14. 7 In those cases, a court should use another guideline if the indictment or information setting forth the count of conviction ... establishes an offense more aptly covered by another guideline. Id.; see also United States v. Kurtz, 237 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir.2001) ([W]hen sentencing a defendant ... under the 2000 version of the Guidelines, the district court is to look to § 2F1.1; and that section, as explicated in Application Note 14, gives the court express authority to apply a different guideline that is `more apt[].'). 8 Thus, the question is whether defendants' conduct is more aptly covered by a guideline other than § 2F1.1, the one for fraud or deceit. 30 As we have already explained, Fulton County hired deVegter to provide fair and disinterested assistance in selecting an underwriter, and deVegter betrayed Fulton County. In exchange for payment through an intermediary, he gave confidential documents to Poirier which improperly assisted Poirier's firm in the proposal process. We conclude that the defendants' conduct more closely resembled a fraud achieved through bribery than a straight fraud, United States v. Montani, 204 F.3d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 2000), and for that reason the § 2B4.1 guideline applies. Our conclusion is supported by other decisions in which courts have applied the commercial bribery guideline to fraud convictions. See, e.g., id. (§§ 1341 and 1346 mail fraud convictions sentenced under § 2B4.1); United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796 (3d Cir. 1999) (§ 1341 mail fraud conviction sentenced under § 2B4.1); United States v. Josleyn, 99 F.3d 1182 (1st Cir.1996) (conspiracy and § 1341 convictions sentenced under § 2B4.1). 31 The defendants attempt to distinguish Montani on the basis that they, unlike the defendant in that case, were not convicted of § 1346 honest services fraud. According to deVegter, the hallmark of commercial bribery is the deprivation of honest services. It is certainly true that accepting or providing bribes is inconsistent with the delivery of honest services, but that is not to say that the commercial bribery guideline cannot also be applied to a § 1343 money and property wire fraud case. The defendants' conduct in giving and receiving money in exchange for the misappropriation of documents is more aptly covered by the commercial bribery guideline than by the fraud guideline. 32 Our decision in United States v. Saavedra, 148 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir.1998), is not to the contrary. In that case the Statutory Index to the sentencing guidelines listed only one guideline for the offense conduct. Id. at 1315. That guideline contained no applicable cross-references to other guidelines, but the sentencing court nevertheless applied a different guideline. Id. at 1313. We vacated the sentence because [t]here is no provision in the guidelines for borrowing base offense levels from other offense guidelines. Id. at 1316. 33 In contrast to Saavedra, applying § 2B4.1 in this case does not constitute unauthorized borrowing ... from other offense guidelines, because [o]nce the proper guideline section has been selected, relevant conduct is considered in determining various sentencing considerations within that guideline, including the base offense level, specific offense characteristics, and any cross-references.  Id. at 1317 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)) (emphasis added). We get to § 2B4.1 by applying § 2F1.1, which is the guideline specifically associated with the offense conduct. Application Note 14 of § 2F1.1 is essentially a cross reference that sends us to § 2B4.1. We are not improperly borrowing ... from other offense guidelines, but instead are applying the offense guideline and its Application Note. 34 For these reasons, the sentencing court should have reached and applied § 2B4.1 to determine the defendants' base offense level. We will remand for correction of that error. 35 Because we conclude that § 2F1.1 was not the correct guideline, we need not consider the government's contentions that the sentencing court incorrectly determined loss under § 2F1.1, and that it should have imposed that guideline's more than minimal planning enhancement.
36 The sentencing guidelines provide for an increased sentence if a defendant willfully obstructed or impeded ... the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The government contends that the district court erred in not enhancing defendants' sentences under this provision. 37 We review a district court's determination about whether a defendant obstructed justice only for clear error, United States v. Cain, 881 F.2d 980, 982 (11th Cir.1989), and [w]e will not find clear error unless our review of the record leaves us `with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,' Coggin v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). That high standard is met in this case. 38 The record clearly establishes that both defendants obstructed justice. They each provided false testimony to the Securities and Exchange Commission in an effort to conceal their conduct. In addition, each of them encouraged another person to provide false testimony. DeVegter tried to convince Nat Cole, a middleman in the scheme, to sign a false affidavit, and Poirier persuaded a colleague of his at the Lazard firm, Jim Eaton, to lie to the SEC. Finally, deVegter provided false testimony at trial and stubbornly maintained his incredible testimony that the money he received was for legitimate, unrelated consulting engagements. In the face of all this evidence of obstruction, the sentencing court, without further explanation, simply said: I find there is no willful attempt by either defendant to obstruct the investigation, nothing in the defendants' conduct that would warrant an obstruction adjustment, so there will be no enhancement. We are left with the definite and firm conviction that the sentencing court should have applied the enhancement for obstruction of justice to both defendants. Its inexplicable finding that the defendants did not obstruct justice is clearly erroneous, and must be corrected on remand.
39 The guidelines provide for an enhancement where a defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in the criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. A two-level increase in the offense level is required [i]f the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity and the offense did not involve[] five or more participants or was otherwise extensive (in which case a three- or four-level increase would be required). U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), (b). In this case the sentencing court declined to enhance either defendant's sentence for an aggravating role. The government accepts that decision as it involves deVegter, but contends that the enhancement should have been applied in Poirier's case. 40 We review only for clear error a sentencing court's decision about whether to impose an aggravating role enhancement. United States v. Phillips, 287 F.3d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir.2002). The evidence at trial established that Poirier supervised Jim Eaton at the Lazard firm, and that he authorized Eaton to make the corrupt payoff to a person who passed half the money on to deVegter. To qualify for an increase under § 3B1.1, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 n. 2. The evidence at trial read in light of the guilty verdict establishes that Eaton was a participant in the criminal activity as defined by the guidelines, id. n. 1, and Poirier was his superior, his supervisor, and his manager. The district court did not find to the contrary, but instead simply and inexplicably failed to apply the enhancement. That was clear error. On remand the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement must be applied to Poirier.