Opinion ID: 1738889
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Heading: Payment of the Fine

Text: Louisiana has adopted the view that the satisfaction of the sentence renders the case moot so as to preclude review of or attack on the conviction or sentence. City of Lafayette v. Trahan, 157 La. 305, 102 So. 409 (1924); State ex rel. Perilloux v. Wilder, 50 La.Ann. 388, 23 So. 203 (1898); State ex rel. Lamarque v. Burthe, 39 La.Ann. 328, 1 So. 652 (1887). This is the majority rule followed by many jurisdictions, e.g., State v. Henkel, 23 Conn. Sup. 135, 1 Conn.Cir. 156, 177 A.2d 684 (1961); People v. Pyrros, 323 Mich. 329, 35 N.W.2d 281 (1948); Stucki v. Oklahoma City, 31 Okl.Cr. 155, 236 P. 900 (1925); Thomas v. Montcalm Circuit Judge, 228 Mich. 44, 199 N.W. 610 (1924); Kitchens v. State, 4 Ga.App. 440, 61 S.E. 736 (1908). However, a growing number of courts permit review after satisfaction of the sentence if the accused will, as a result of the conviction, suffer collateral disabilities apart from the sentence. St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S. Ct. 910, 87 L.Ed. 1199 (1943); United States v. Galante, 298 F.2d 72, 100 A.L.R.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1962). Some jurisdictions have adopted the liberal view that an accused's interest in clearing his name is enough to warrant review of or attack on the conviction or sentence even though the sentence has been satisfied. State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 93 Ariz. 351, 380 P.2d 1009 (1963); Jackson v. People, 151 Colo. 171, 376 P.2d 991 (1962); People v. Shambley, 4 Ill.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954); Annotation, 9 A.L.R.3rd 462 (1966). The instant case poses squarely for the first time in Louisiana the question of whether payment of a fine, which does not satisfy the judgment, will render the case moot. In State v. Brewer, 135 La. 208, 65 So. 111 (1914) we dismissed the appeal of a defendant who had been convicted and sentenced to pay $20.00 semi-monthly for the support of his children on the ground that he had acquiesced in the order of the court by making the first $20.00 payment. However, the opinion is silent as to whether an additional sentence of imprisonment had been imposed, as in the instant case, or whether the defendant had completely complied with the court's judgment at the time his appeal was dismissed. Further ambiguity was created by language in Brewer, and in the later case of State v. Verdin, 192 La. 275, 187 So. 666 (1939), indicating that even full satisfaction of a sentence by payment of a fine would not amount to acquiescence in the judgment or abandonment of an appeal if a defendant could prove by sufficient evidence that he had a contrary intention. We think the clearer and more realistic rule is that the payment of a fine which does not satisfy the court's judgment will not render the case moot. Most criminal defendants who pay their fines probably do so to avoid incarceration. To find that an accused has acquiesced in the court's judgment from this fact alone is clearly a legal fiction. Even where a sentence of imprisonment has been suspended, the accused is under a burdensome restraint and a threat of incarceration. If he challenges the judicial determination of his guilt on grounds otherwise cognizable on appeal, review should be permitted. American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Appeals Standard § 1.3. Although there are few cases in other jurisdictions considering this precise question, our conclusion is in accord with the decisions in Perry v. State, 62 Ga.App. 115, 8 S.E.2d 425 (1940) and State v. Swikert, 65 Or. 286, 132 P. 709 (1913), and we have found no convincing authority to the contrary. Cf. State v. Massa, 90 Kan. 129, 132 P. 1182 (1913). Furthermore, although we do not reach a constitutional issue here, we note that the rule we adopt is in keeping with the requirement that there must be an intelligent waiver of the constitutional right to judicial review of a criminal conviction. La.Const. Art. 1, § 19 (1974). Accordingly, we hold that the payment of a fine by the defendant, which did not satisfy the judgment against him, did not constitute a waiver of his right to appeal or render the case moot.