Opinion ID: 1436778
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commercial Nature of the Speech

Text: Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized a commonsense distinction between commercial speech and other varieties of speech, see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of NY, 447 U.S. 557, 562, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980) (quoting Ohralik v. OH State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978)), this case exemplifies the lack of clarity in such a distinction. Even in Central Hudson, the Court first equated commercial speech with expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience. Id. at 561, 100 S.Ct. 2343. Immediately after that seemingly straightforward description, however, the Court continued by explaining that [c]ommercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information. Id. at 561-62, 100 S.Ct. 2343. Thus, according to the Court's own words, commercial speech does not involve solely the economic interests of the speaker; certain societal benefits also spring from the sharing of ideas and information that necessarily accompanies any such communication. Prior to its decision in Central Hudson, the Supreme Court embraced an even more restrictive view of commercial speech, equating it simply with speech proposing a commercial transaction. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56, 98 S.Ct. 1912; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983). It is this line of cases upon which BellSouth now appears to rely, arguing that placement of the tax line-item on a consumer's bill cannot be considered commercial speech because the communication also serves the additional purpose of informing the consumer exactly who is responsible for the increase in costs passed on to the end-user. I find BellSouth's argument in this regard unhelpful in light of Central Hudson 's refinement of the Court's earlier commercial speech analyses. Indeed, even in instances involving what is typically considered classic commercial speech, a potentially broader underlying concern could be uncovered such that the speech might otherwise merit the stricter protections now reserved for non-commercial communication. For example, a newspaper advertisement of a sale on gas-guzzling Hummers could be construed not as a strategy to sell motor vehicles, but as a political statement that the country need not concern itself with the two-headed monster of environmental degradation and destructive self-aggrandizement. Likewise, a circular announcing drastic pre-fall price cuts on camouflage outerwear might not be seen as simply an effort to boost lagging clothing sales in a crippled economy, but rather as the outward expression of support for the sport of hunting or even a subtle method of demonstrating contempt for the role of government in the regulation of firearms. Despite the political accouterments that might thus be attached to the plaintiff's proposed communications, at its core BellSouth's desire to include a line-item on its invoices indicating the existence of a required 1.3% tax on the corporation's gross receipts is simply a commercially-savvy gambit to deflect from itself ultimate responsibility for a price increase that could encourage consumers to seek telecommunications service from another company. The speech thus has a predominant commercial value, with any political or other protected aspect being not only speculative but tangential and de minimis. I thus conclude that the speech at issue in this case is commercial in nature and that any restrictions on it must satisfy only the less-stringent analytical test of Central Hudson set forth in the majority opinion.