Opinion ID: 2094772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Similarities Between Defendant's Allegations and Wilson's Allegations

Text: Next, defendant claims that counsel erred by failing to inform the court of the similarities between defendant's and Wilson's torture allegations. Counsel could be ineffective for failing to introduce this evidence only if it would have been admissible at defendant's motion to suppress. Evidence is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in dispute and if its prejudicial effect does not substantially outweigh its probative value. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill.2d 481, 487, 154 Ill.Dec. 643, 568 N.E.2d 864 (1991). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Gonzalez, 142 Ill.2d at 487-88, 154 Ill.Dec. 643, 568 N.E.2d 864. Probability is tested in the light of logic, experience, and accepted assumption as to human behavior. Marut v. Costello, 34 Ill.2d 125, 128, 214 N.E.2d 768 (1966). In past cases, this court has declined to find evidence of prior police brutality to be relevant when the defendant offered only generalized allegations of coercive activity at Area 2 ( People v. Orange, 168 Ill.2d 138, 150-51, 213 Ill.Dec. 589, 659 N.E.2d 935 (1995)) and when the allegations of brutality were not similar and occurred three years before the case at bar ( Hobley, 159 Ill.2d at 312, 202 Ill.Dec. 256, 637 N.E.2d 992). The appellate court has found evidence of prior brutality admissible when the allegations were similar and involved the same officers, the incidents occurred only 13 months apart, and both the prior allegations and the allegations in the case before the court contained evidence of injury consistent with police brutality. People v. Banks, 192 Ill.App.3d 986, 994, 140 Ill.Dec. 115, 549 N.E.2d 766 (1989). The appellate court also has found evidence of prior allegations of brutality admissible where the defendant could present evidence that the police officers who questioned him systematically tortured other suspects to obtain confessions at or near the time he was questioned. People v. Cannon, 293 Ill.App.3d 634, 640, 227 Ill. Dec. 1000, 688 N.E.2d 693 (1997). Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, has found evidence of prior allegations of brutality admissible when it involves the same officer, involves similar methods of torture, and occurs at or near the time of the current allegation. Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir.1993). Here, the State contends that the evidence of prior allegations of torture is inadmissible because defendant has failed to demonstrate that he suffered physical injuries consistent with his allegations of torture. Although we believe that this is a relevant consideration, we do not believe that the absence of physical injury, standing alone, precludes evidence of prior acts of brutality from being admissible. See Cannon, 293 Ill.App.3d at 642, 227 Ill.Dec. 1000, 688 N.E.2d 693. Here, defendant testified at his suppression hearing that, when he was being transported to Area 2, he was in a car with Marley, Pedersen, Pienta, and James Hill, a friend of defendant. During this trip, Pienta reached across defendant and slapped Hill across the face. After doing this, Pienta turned to defendant and stated that, if he had been the officer who had found defendant, defendant would now be dead. Later, when the officers were interrogating defendant at the police station, Pienta said to the other officers in the room, I don't know about the rest of you, but I am tired of listening to this bullshit, I am about ready to kick his ass. Pienta then left the room and returned with four other officers. Pienta was carrying a manila folder and a gray plastic item, later identified as a typewriter cover. Thereafter, Pienta handcuffed defendant's hands behind his back. Another officer turned off the lights, and Pienta slapped defendant across the chest and placed his hands around defendant's neck. Pedersen then grabbed the typewriter cover and placed it over defendant's face. Defendant testified that he could not breathe when the typewriter cover was over his face. Also, when the typewriter cover was over his face, the other officers hit him in the chest. After approximately one minute, the officers removed the typewriter cover and turned the lights back on. Defendant then requested to speak to an attorney. Pienta replied, No, you are not getting an m.f. attorney. The officers then asked defendant if he was ready to cooperate. He told them that he had said all that he was going to say. The officers again turned the lights off and placed the typewriter cover over defendant's face. After approximately one to two minutes, the officers removed the typewriter cover and turned the lights on. Subsequently, defendant requested something to drink, and an officer gave him a plastic cup containing a brown liquid. The officer told defendant that the cup contained bourbon. The officers then told him that he was to tell an assistant State's Attorney that he killed the victims. The officers left him alone for approximately one hour. During that time, defendant used a paper clip to scratch a statement into the bench on which he was sitting. An assistant State's Attorney then arrived with a red-haired officer, later identified as Burge. After Burge left, pursuant to defendant's request, defendant told the assistant State's Attorney that he wanted an attorney and that he had nothing to say. Thereafter, the assistant State's Attorney left. Burge then entered the room and sat across from defendant. After taking a seat, Burge told defendant, You are fucking up. Defendant did not respond, and Burge said, We told you if you didn't do itif you didn't do what we told you to do that you was going to get something worse than what you had earlier. And what you had earlier will be a snap compared to what you will get. Burge then placed his revolver on the table and asked, [Y]ou are going to cooperate now, right? Defendant's only reply was to request an attorney. Burge then said, [Y]ou know, that we [ sic ] just doing our job and this is nothing new to you, you know, the way we go about doing things around here, you know. If you decide to tell us that, it is your word against our word. And who are they going to believe you or us. Burge then holstered his revolver and left the room. After that, Troy entered the room and told defendant that he was going to write a statement that defendant was to sign. Defendant said that he would sign the statement if Troy allowed him to make a phone call. Troy agreed. Defendant called an attorney and his grandmother. Troy took him to the interview room and asked defendant to sign the statement. After defendant refused to sign the statement, Troy left. McWeeny then entered the room and told defendant that he was trying to help defendant and that defendant should cooperate because they could do something serious to defendant if he failed to cooperate. When defendant continued to refuse to sign the statement, the officers had defendant shower and they placed him in a cell. The allegations made by Wilson are similar in some respects to those made by defendant. Wilson has testified that he was punched, kicked, and smothered with a plastic bag. He has also claimed that he was electrically shocked and forced against a hot radiator. Additionally, Wilson has testified that Burge placed a revolver in Wilson's mouth when Burge was alone in the room with Wilson. Although both defendant and Wilson alleged that numerous officers were involved, the only officers that both included in their allegations were Burge and Pienta. We first note that defendant's allegations and Wilson's allegations are not closely related in time. Wilson was arrested in February 1982. Defendant was arrested in April 1986. Thus, more than four years passed between the two occurrences. We recognize, however, that both defendant and Wilson alleged that they had been punched, kicked, and suffocated with a plastic bag. Moreover, Burge, while alone with each of them, used a revolver as a threat. Notwithstanding these similarities, we do not believe that a reasonable probability exists that, had defense counsel informed the trial court of these similarities, the trial court would have found this evidence admissible or that we would have reversed this decision on appeal. As noted earlier, the Wilson incident occurred more than four years before the incident involving defendant. Additionally, at the time of defendant's trial, Wilson believed that he was tortured not because officers at Area 2 routinely tortured all suspects, but rather because the officers routinely tortured those accused of killing police officers. See Wilson, 6 F.3d at 1236. Because the information available at the time indicated that Wilson was mistreated for a reason wholly unrelated to defendant's case, and because the evidence identified only a single incident of misconduct removed in time from defendant's, we believe that the evidence is too attenuated to be relevant. Accordingly defendant's attorney was not ineffective for failing to inform the court of the similarities between defendant's and Wilson's torture allegations.