Opinion ID: 3011704
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Length of the Delay and its Effect on Judicial

Text: Proceedings Sambolin's Registration Form was signed andfiled on December 16, 1997, approximately seven months following the May 15, 1997 registration deadline. His Pr oof of Claim form, detailing the extent of his injury and other details necessary to resolve his claim, was filed February 10, 1999, approximately two months before the initial deadline for that document, April 15, 1999, and over four months before the revised deadline of June 15, 1999. Relevant here is the seven month delay in filing the Registration For m and what effect that delay wrought on the pr oceedings. In its quixotic attempt to show that the delay was unreasonably long and substantially affected the conduct of these proceedings, the PLC argues that the early 15 registration deadline served an important purpose in settlement administration. Among the justifications proffered in support of the May 15, 1997 deadline are that it helped define the class of persons to be included in the settlement for the final fairness hearing and facilitated the efforts of the Claims Administrator in pr eparing mechanisms for the eventual distribution of the settlement fund. We have substantial doubts, however , that these factors motivated the selection of the May 15, 1997 deadline, as the District Court granted preliminary approval to the settlement before publication notice was even given.7 Furthermore, the Claims Administrator was not appointed until January 30, 1998, more than a month after Sambolin's Registration Form was filed. 8 Whatever the purpose of the May 1997 registration deadline, focus on its rationale evades the r elevant inquiry here: how Sambolin's failure to comply with that deadline will deter the expedient and just resolution of claims. It is uncontested that the PLC continued to receive and process Registration Forms throughout 1997 and 1998. Furthermore, the process of winnowing the valid claims from the invalid, and the compensable claims fr om the uncompensable, did not even begin until the 1998 appointment of the Claims Administrator and the appr oval of a Proof of Claim form thereafter . We also find it telling _________________________________________________________________ 7. We also note on this point that the date of the fairness hearing was April 23, 1997, a week before the first deadline for receipt of the Registration Form. 8. The Claims Administrator further attempts to justify the registration deadline by reasoning that the early deadline aided subrogation claimants' subsequent identification of their claims. While this may, indeed, have been a beneficial outcome of the r egistration deadline post hoc, we find interesting that the initial Settlement Agreement fixed one deadline for both bone screw recipients and subrogation claimants. Thus the fact that subrogees were later given the opportunity to piggyback their claims on those of individual claimants initially could not have justified the May 1, 1997 deadline. Nevertheless, given that the subrogees have long been aware of the identity of those bone screw recipients (like Sambolin) whose recovery was precluded by their noncompliance with the deadline, his later inclusion in the settlement class will not unduly prejudice the ability of subrogees to piggyback on those late registrants who filed timely Pr oof of Claim forms. 16 that the Claims Administrator's Proposed Plan would have included untimely registrants, with only a 20% reduction in the points used to allocate equitably the settlement fund. While we do not review the District Court's eventual rejection of that Plan provision, we cannot ignore the fact that, as of September 1998, the Claims Administrator tacitly acknowledged both that inclusion of late r egistrants was neither prohibitively difficult nor unjust to those who met the Proof of Claim deadline. The PLC contends that we should look back fr om our current vantage point in assessing the influence on the proceedings of Sambolin's seven month delay. That is, the PLC suggests that we should measure the delay's effects on the proceedings as of the present and not the delay's effects on the proceedings when that delay was ended by Sambolin's registration. As long as distribution of the limited fund settlement remains pending, we r eject this contention. Such a rule would be unfair, for the delay caused by the adjudication of the late claim, and not the lateness of the claim itself, would often give sufficient reason to reject the claim regar dless of the effect of the movant's actual delay. Moreover, consideration of the current effect of the delay on the pr oceedings would conflict with our holding that the length of the delay should be considered in absolute terms and not by r eference to the import of intervening circumstances. In r e O'Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 188 F.3d 116, 130 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the relevant time period is the delay between the date the bankruptcy claim should have been filed and the date it was filed, and that the Pioneer analysis should not be affected by the significance of the intervening approval of the reorganization plan and the debtor's expedited schedule). Even if we were to consider the length of Sambolin's delay and its effect on judicial proceedings as of today, we are unpersuaded that including Sambolin within the recovering class would cause great dislocation in the current administration of the settlement. While the PLC exhorts that myriad administrative issues would arise from the recalculation of the limited fund, this claim is unsupported. The Claims Administrator was able to 17 calculate a hypothetical recovery for Sambolin's claim quite easily in his brief to this Court. Furthermor e, as of the current process of the litigation, class members have only been told the number of points they are entitled under the Settlement Agreement and can appeal the Claims Administrator's determination of those points. Those appeals have as much potential to upset the curr ent distribution of claims as the inclusion of Sambolin and other similarly situated claimants. At oral ar gument, the Claims Administrator himself noted that distribution of the settlement had not occurred and, even if distribution began before resolution of this case, the awar ds could be structured in a manner that would allow for the inclusion of later-allowed untimely registrants. Given these facts, we believe that any hindrance in settlement fund administration caused by inclusion of Sambolin's claim is too minimal to justify exclusion of his claim on that basis.9 We conclude that where, as her e, all the equities are on the side of the claimants, the fund has not been distributed and the administration of the fund would be insignificantly hampered by allowing these few late claims, appellants should be permitted to participate in the fund. Zients, 459 F.2d at 630-31.10 In considering the effect on the proceedings, we find that cases applying excusable neglect concepts to the time limitation for opting out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action are conversely distinguishable from the cir cumstances here -- essentially opting in to a closed-end settlement fund. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., Civ. A. No. 95-0215, 1995 WL 251402 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 1995). Geor gine considered the untimely requests to opt out of the class action asbestos settlement. Relying on In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 59 F.R.D. 667, 677 (W .D. Okl. 1973), the court, _________________________________________________________________ 9. We caution that our conclusion on this point might be different had Sambolin not made a timely filing of the Pr oof of Claim. The Proof of Claim contained the bulk of the information vital to settlement administration, including the timing, nature, and severity of the injury and information necessary to the identification of interested subrogees. 10. The PLC's attempt to distinguish the Second Circuit's holding in Zients on the basis that distribution of the settlement fund is imminent is hardly convincing in this case. 18 in rejecting the excusable neglect argument of the movants, expressed its opinion that [a] too liberal application of [excusable neglect] in class actions would undermine the finality of judgments entered therein and would discourage settlement of such actions. Georgine , 1995 WL 251402, at  (quoting Four Seasons). While this r esult in Georgine had a compelling rationale in that case, Sambolin desir es the opposite result: inclusion in a settlement that will otherwise bar his remedy. As such, Sambolin's claim for inclusion in an opt-in class action lacks the potentially detrimental effect on the process of settlement fr om which a claim for exclusion from an opt-out class action suf fers.