Opinion ID: 736212
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: guideline enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon

Text: 43 We turn finally to Johnstone's challenge to the four-point enhancement to his base offense level under § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Our review of the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary. United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 451-52 (3d Cir.1992). The court applied this enhancement in connection with the aggravated assaults on Sudziarski and Perez. Johnstone contends that, in so doing, the district court engaged in impermissible double counting. This is so, Johnstone claims, because the district court enhanced his offense level to reflect that a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, after it had classified the conduct underlying the convictions as aggravated assault within the meaning of § 2A2.2 because the offenses involved a dangerous weapon. 44 Section 2A2.2 provides the framework for calculating the offense levels for aggravated assault. It sets a base offense level of fifteen for aggravated assault, which the comment defines as a felonious assault that involved ... a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm. 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, commentary, application note 1. 13 Once a court has determined that the aggravated assault, rather than the minor assault, guideline applies, § 2A2.2 requires graduated increases in the base offense level if the offense involves certain specific offense characteristics. Section 2A2.2(b)(2), for example, provides for incremental enhancements that reflect the relative level of involvement of a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense. If a firearm was discharged, the district court is directed to increase the base offense level by 5. See id. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A). If a dangerous weapon was otherwise used in the commission of the offense, the base offense level must be increased by 4 levels. See id. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). And if the dangerous weapon was brandished or its use was threatened, the court must increase the offender's base offense level by 3. See id. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(C). 45 Turning to the district court's calculation of Johnstone's sentence, the guideline for the substantive offense that most closely resembled the conduct underlying Johnstone's civil rights conviction, assault, was used to calculate Johnstone's base offense level. For the convictions for the assaults on Sudziarski and Perez, the court found that the aggravated assault guideline applied, because a dangerous weapon--a flashlight--was involved in the offenses. Accordingly, it set the base offense level for those counts at 15. The court then found that the dangerous weapon--the flashlight--had been otherwise used in the assaults, and increased the offense level by four levels under § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). 46 Johnstone contends that the district court engaged in impermissible double counting when it enhanced his offense level four points under § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). He complains that the flashlight, a dangerous weapon, was the basis of the application of the aggravated assault guideline because it was involved in the offense, and then was used again to enhance the offense level because this same dangerous weapon was otherwise used to commit the assault. Johnstone concedes that the four-level enhancement would not be double counting in all cases: for example, if a knife, an inherently dangerous weapon, was involved in the offense, it would not be double counting to enhance a defendant's offense level if that knife was actually used in the course of the assault. But he contends that the enhancement is impermissible in a case such as this in which the weapon is not inherently dangerous, but rather is a dangerous weapon that is involved in the offense, triggering the aggravated assault guideline, solely because of how it is used in the assault. 47 In other words, Johnstone's use of the flashlight was counted twice in calculating his sentence because it was the basis of both the application of the aggravated assault provision and the four-point enhancement. In so arguing, Johnstone relies on United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.1992), and United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1127, 115 S.Ct. 2288, 132 L.Ed.2d 290 (1995), in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that while the Sentencing Guidelines provide a logical framework for assaults involving inherently dangerous weapons, the Guidelines proscribe impermissible double counting where it is the use of an ordinary object as dangerous weapon that transforms a 'minor' assault into an 'aggravated' one. Hudson, 972 F.2d at 506. 48 We disagree, for several reasons. In so doing, we note that we follow the majority of circuits that have considered this issue. See United States v. Dunnaway, 88 F.3d 617, 619 (8th Cir.1996) (boots and bottle used as weapons); United States v. Sorensen, 58 F.3d 1154, 1160-61 (7th Cir.1995) (concrete block used as weapon); United States v. Garcia, 34 F.3d 6, 11-12 (1st Cir.1994) (car used as weapon); United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 894-96 & n. 32 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204, 205-08 (4th Cir.1992) (use of a metal chair); see also United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 672-75 (1st Cir.1992) (similar enhancement under § 2A2.2(b)(3) for serious bodily injury held not to be impermissible double counting). The Second Circuit is the only circuit to have held that applying § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B) can constitute double counting. 49 We begin with the observation that the four-point enhancement where a dangerous weapon is otherwise used is not double counting. The aggravated assault provision and the specific enhancements for the relative level of involvement of a dangerous weapon account for different aspects of an assault. The aggravated assault guideline is triggered if the conduct involved a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm: the court must apply it if a dangerous weapon was involved in an assault in any capacity so long as the offender had the intent to do serious bodily harm with that weapon. By contrast, the specific offense characteristic enhancements, including the enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon that is at issue here, deal with the relative level of involvement of that dangerous weapon in the offense. Because the first provision accounts for any type of involvement of a dangerous weapon in an assault if the defendant had the requisite intent, and the second accounts for the specific type of involvement of that weapon, the provisions deal with different conduct and hence there is no double counting. 50 We are not persuaded that this conclusion is any less true when the weapon is an ordinary object, such as the large flashlight used by Johnstone in the assaults against Sudziarski and Perez. There is no basis in the Guidelines or in the commentary for distinguishing between ordinary objects and inherently dangerous weapons. Moreover, the Guidelines consider a dangerous weapon to be an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. 1994 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, commentary, application note 1(d). Ordinary objects, such as large flashlights, are clearly capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury without being employed, and hence they clearly fall within the definition of aggravated assault even if they are not actually used in the offense. Thus, such an object could be involved in an offense, triggering the aggravated assault guideline, even if it is not otherwise used in the offense. 51 But even if the four-level enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon might in some cases, including this one, constitute double counting, this double counting is permissible because it is explicitly mandated by the clear and unambiguous language of § 2A2.2. See infra pp. 212-13. A court must make all applicable, mandatory adjustments unless the Guidelines specifically exempt the particular conduct at issue. See id. § 1B1.1(b) (Determine the base offense level and apply any appropriate specific offense characteristics contained in the particular guideline in Chapter Two....). 52 We have held that a court must follow this rule even if it would lead to counting a particular factor twice in calculating a defendant's sentence. We addressed the permissibility of double counting under the Guidelines in United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667 (3d Cir.1993). See also United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1315-16 (3d Cir.1996). In those cases, we noted that the Sentencing Commission was aware of the potential for double counting inherent in some of the provisions, and that, accordingly, the Guidelines specifically forbid double counting in certain, enumerated circumstances. For example, the commentary to §§ 3A1.1, 3A1.2, and 3A1.3 states explicitly that victim-related enhancements based on certain conduct are not permitted if the applicable offense guideline already accounts for the same conduct. See Wong, 3 F.3d at 670. Based on this understanding, we held that: 53 the principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies. Following these principles, we conclude that the exclusion of a double counting provision in the [certain] sections ... was by design. Accordingly, an adjustment that clearly applies to the conduct of an offense must be imposed unless the Guidelines exclude its applicability. 54 Id. at 670-71 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 14 Thus, because the Sentencing Commission has not expressly forbidden double counting in applying the aggravated assault guideline, we hold that the district court correctly granted the four-point enhancement even if doing so might in some sense constitute double counting. 15 55 To hold otherwise would frustrate the structure of the Guidelines and their goal of ensuring the proportionality of federal sentences, as the other circuits that we follow have observed. Implicit in the aggravated assault guideline is the understanding that certain aggravated assaults are more serious than others. In crafting the aggravated assault provision, the Sentencing Commission sought to take different levels of culpability into account: this guideline assumes that defendants are more culpable if they use a dangerous weapon in the commission of an offense than if they merely possess that weapon with the intent to do bodily harm. We follow the Fourth Circuit in noting that [w]e cannot ... deprive the Sentencing Commission of its authority to assign incrementally higher sentences based on important factors such as the degree of the weapon's involvement and the degree of the victim's injury. Williams, 954 F.2d at 207; Reese, 2 F.3d at 896 n. 32 (The relevant way to describe what is going on here is that the use of a weapon transformed [the defendant's] offense from a minor assault to an aggravated-assault-in-which-a-dangerous-weapon-was-otherwise-used. That we use a single sentencing factor 'twice' to trace the effects of this transformation (first to distinguish minor from aggravated assaults, then to distinguish more and less culpable aggravated assaults) is merely an accidental by-product of the mechanics of applying the Guidelines.). 56 In sum, we conclude that the district court properly interpreted Sentencing Guidelines § 2A2.2. 57 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.