Opinion ID: 2346556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Expert Testimony Regarding Personal Property Damage

Text: Appellant further argues that she was not allowed to prove loss of her personal property because the trial court precluded her from testifying as to the value of her personal property and did not permit her to present experts who inspected the damage to her property. The trial court excluded appellant's experts Lanny Weintraub from Structural Concepts and John Costello of the Steven A. Rosen Company from testifying because appellant's preliminary Rule 26(b)(4) statement had been inadequate. [10] As a result, at trial appellant was left with only her own knowledge of the value of her property damage, which she did not profess to have. Our cases urge trial courts to consider lesser sanctions than exclusion, see, e.g., Weiner v. Kneller, 557 A.2d 1306, 1309 (D.C.1989), and there is no indication that the trial court did so. Moreover, there is no indication that appellees would have been prejudiced if appellant's experts testified, as they had been given copies of the reports, had knowledge of the valuation by both Rosen and Structural Concepts, and knew since the filing of appellant's initial 26(b)(4) statement and motion for extension of time a year before trial, that appellant wished to present information about property damage through Rosen and Structural Concepts. See Weiner, 557 A.2d at 1312 (holding that there was no surprise or prejudice because appellees had the opportunity to depose appellant's expert and had every reason to be prepared to address the issues and did not seek a continuance). Appellees argue that although appellant's 26(b)(4) statement maintained that the facts and conclusions to which these witnesses would testify are indicated in their reports, the reports are vague and unclear as to when and how the personal property was damaged. It is true that the Structural Concepts report does not specify how Hoffman neglected its duty towards appellant besides stating that the restoration work . . . requires reworking due to poor workmanship. The report is primarily focused on damage to the roof and doors of the real property, which, as we have discussed, appellant could not claim as damages. The report does not detail the basis for the opinion nor does it indicate that the expert would testify about damages  other than real property damages  caused by Hoffman's poor workmanship. The Rosen report, however, includes an inventory of real and personal property damage. Even though it does not state the cause of the damage other than a short note indicating that the furniture was not covered by contractor, appellant  who had been living in the house and presumably was familiar with the sequence of events resulting in damage to her belongings  could have testified about which damages resulted from the fire attributable to Boyd, which were caused by Hoffman's repair work and which resulted from a combination of both. The experts' testimony on the value of the property, [11] supplemented by appellant's testimony about the cause of damage to the property, could have provided the basis for recovery for damage to these items. [12] We therefore conclude that, it was an abuse of discretion to preclude the experts from testifying about the value of the damaged personal property  a sanction that effectively terminated what was left of appellant's claims. We remand the case for a trial on this issue.