Opinion ID: 738219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supreme Court Analysis of Preemption

Text: 15 Although there is no Supreme Court precedent that controls in the instant case, the Court has faced issues of preemption in the context of the regulation of nuclear activity. In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983), the Supreme Court ruled that by enacting the Atomic Energy Act, Congress intended that the federal government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant. Id. at 205, 103 S.Ct. at 1723. Therefore, the Court concluded that the federal government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the states. Id. at 212, 103 S.Ct. at 1726. Nonetheless, the Court held that the AEA did not preempt a California law that imposed a moratorium on construction of nuclear power plants in California until the federal government approved technology for the disposal of high level nuclear waste. Id. at 223, 103 S.Ct. at 1732. California had asserted that it would be fiscally imprudent to permit further construction without a federally-approved waste disposal method. Id. at 213-14, 103 S.Ct. at 1727-28. The Court reasoned that federal law did not preempt the California statute because it dealt with economic concerns, not safety standards. 16 In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the AEA did not preclude an award of punitive damages under state law. In Silkwood, the executor of Karen Silkwood's estate brought an action in federal court seeking relief for personal injuries and damage to her apartment resulting from Silkwood's alleged exposure to radiation during the course of her employment at the Kerr-McGee plant. Id. at 243, 104 S.Ct. at 618. The jury returned a verdict awarding Silkwood's estate compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 245, 104 S.Ct. at 619. Kerr-McGee appealed, and the Tenth Circuit held that federal regulation of nuclear safety preempted a state law awarding punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed. 5 Id. at 249-50, 104 S.Ct. at 621-22. The Court stated that state law generally could be preempted in either of two ways: 17 If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is preempted [and] If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 18 Id. at 248, 104 S.Ct. at 621 (citations omitted). Despite the preemption of state law relating to the safety aspects of nuclear development, the Supreme Court reasoned that the only congressional discussion concerning the relationship between the Atomic Energy Act and state tort remedies indicates that Congress assumed that such remedies would be available. Id. at 251, 104 S.Ct. at 623; see Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 186, 108 S.Ct. 1704, 1712, 100 L.Ed.2d 158 (1988) (characterizing Silkwood as finding that Congress was willing to accept regulatory consequences of application of state tort law to radiation hazards even though direct state regulation of safety aspects of nuclear energy was pre-empted). 19 In Goodyear Atomic, the Supreme Court again faced the issue whether federal law preempted a state law regulating the safety of nuclear power. The plaintiff was an employee at a plant owned by the United States but operated by Goodyear Atomic under a contract with the Department of Energy. The plaintiff, a maintenance mechanic, fractured his ankle when he fell from a government-owned scaffold after his glove caught on a protruding bolt. Id. at 176, 108 S.Ct. at 1707. Plaintiff applied to the Ohio Industrial Commission for a workers' compensation award and also alleged that Goodyear Atomic had failed to comply with a state safety regulation, which meant he was entitled to a supplemental award. Id. at 176-77, 108 S.Ct. at 1707-08. The Court held that a provision in the Ohio Constitution granting a supplemental workers' compensation award when an employer violates state safety standards 6 could be applied to a nuclear weapons plant because a 1936 federal statute provided for the general application of state workers' compensation laws to federal facilities. Id. at 182, 108 S.Ct. at 1710 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 290 (1988)). 7 The Court reasoned that Congress is presumed to know existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts. Id. at 184-85, 108 S.Ct. at 1711-12. Although the Court also reasoned that the Ohio provision was only incidental rather than direct regulation of a nuclear facility, the Court upheld the Ohio provision under the Supremacy Clause because of Congress's unambiguous statutory authorization in 40 U.S.C. § 290. Id. at 182, 186, 108 S.Ct. at 1710, 1712. 20 Thus, while recognizing that Congress has preempted the entire field of nuclear safety regulation, the Supreme Court has been willing to uphold the application of state law where it affects nuclear regulation only indirectly, i.e., where state law amounted to economic regulation, or where a federal statute explicitly dictated that a state law remedy applies in a particular context. Moreover, the Court has not had occasion to address § 2014(hh), a provision added in the 1988 amendments to the Price-Anderson Act, which clarified the relationship between state and federal law by explicitly incorporating state law into the Amendments Act except to the extent the state law is inconsistent with § 2210. 8 Accordingly, there is no Supreme Court precedent exactly on point.