Opinion ID: 1960187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the trial court err in denying APAC's motion for summary judgment?

Text: ¶ 12. Both parties agree that APAC was a subcontractor of B.A.S. Construction, and that APAC and Falco entered into a contract where Falco agreed to perform certain work that APAC had previously contracted to do for B.A.S. Under the APAC-Falco contract, Falco promised to deliver lime to the job site and to blow and spread the lime onto the area designated by APAC. ¶ 13. The parties further agree that, while touring the job site, Goodman injured his knee after walking through a patch of ground on which lime had been spread and which was wet. After Goodman was injured, another APAC employee offered to blow the lime for Goodman. However, Goodman refused, and only after completing the job, was he taken by ambulance to the hospital. Goodman sought and Falco paid workers' compensation benefits for the injury he incurred while working on the APAC work site. ¶ 14. The trial court, during the hearing on APAC's motion for summary judgment, made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, summarized as follows: A. Upon each delivery of lime to the work site, Falco issued documents entitled either Straight Bill of Lading or Shipping Order, with each document stating: Falco Lime is a material supplier. Our drivers deliver/spread this product under the customer's direction and supervision. These Bills of Lading and the language contained in them indicated that Falco considered itself to be a materialman and not a subcontractor. B. Once a Falco driver entered upon APAC's work site, APAC employees instructed him where to place the lime and to what degree of thickness the lime was to be applied. After depositing the lime onto APAC's site, the Falco truck exited the job site and all work thereafter relating to the lime was performed by APAC employees. C. Falco Lime was a materialman and that APAC was not a statutory employer, and therefore not shielded from liability under Mississippi's Workers' Compensation Act. The most efficient way to spread the lime was by using a special tanker truck. Falco possessed such a truck, and APAC did not. All of the activities required in installing the lime, i.e., preparing the soil, mixing the soil and lime, adding water, compacting the soil and lime, and grading the area, were performed by APAC. Merely driving a tanker truck across a staked-out area and delivering lime at a set degree of thickness was not enough to convert Falco Lime from a materialman to a subcontractor. To adopt any other interpretation of the law to the facts would give too broad a reach to the definition of subcontractor such that it would subsume the meaning assigned to a materialman. ¶ 15. APAC argues that the undisputed facts showed that Falco was in fact a subcontractor of APAC, pointing out that we have previously defined a subcontractor as one who enters into a contract, express or implied, for the performance of an act with a person who has already contracted for its performance, or who takes a portion of the contract from the principal or prime contractor. Vance v. Twin River Homes, Inc., 641 So.2d 1176, 1182-83 (Miss.1994) (citations omitted). ¶ 16. While we have previously held that no rule can be laid down to determine the difference between a subcontractor and a materialman, general principles have evolved to aid in differentiating between the two. [A] materialman may be distinguished from a contractor or subcontractor by the fact that he agrees only to furnish materials and not to install them or do any work in connection therewith. Frazier v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 223 So.2d 661, 664 (Miss.1969). Generally, one who not only furnishes materials, but installs them, is a contractor or a subcontractor, and not a materialman. Id. ¶ 17. Goodman testified that in his 20 plus years of experience driving lime trucks, it was his routine upon arriving at a job site to park and wait for the job supervisor to get him and instruct him on what he needed to do. He stated, The contractor will come get me and take me out there (to the job site) and show me what he wants me to do. I just can't go out there and walk out there and go to doing something. I have to wait until he (the supervisor) comes and gets me. I'm going to stay right to my truck until he come get me and show me what he want me to do, and I'll follow him. Therefore, Goodman, at least subjectively, believed that, upon arriving at a work site, he could act only under the control and direction of the job supervisor, and no longer was solely controlled by Falco. ¶ 18. Falco operated under the same impression. Joe Lambiotte, Falco's Chief Financial Officer, averred in an affidavit that, although no written contract existed between Falco and APAC, there was an oral contract between Falco and APAC that the required lime work was subcontracted out from APAC to Falco, such that Falco was responsible for supplying, delivering, blowing and spreading the lime on this particular job. He stated, We have a long-standing relationship with APAC on jobs such as the one in dispute, and often no written contract are entered into, and, It was understood that we (Falco) would be the `subcontractors,' doing the lime portion of APAC's contract. As such, we not only provide the lime, but our employees deliver, spread and blow the lime as well. ¶ 19. These statements may be considered a declaration against interest because, if Falco was determined not to be a subcontractor, it would be entitled to full reimbursement of the workers' compensation benefits paid to Goodman. ¶ 20. It is undisputed that Goodman only acted under the direction and supervision of an APAC employee, and, once instructed, actually spread the lime in accordance with APAC's specifications. This would indicate that some work, however small, was performed by Falco for APAC. We have held that one who contracts to supply materials processed especially for a contractor and in accordance with special reference to the plans and specifications, falls within the definition ascribed to a subcontractor. See O'Neal Steel Co. v. Leon C. Miles, Inc., 187 So.2d 19, 25 (Miss. 1966). ¶ 21. As conflicting evidence was offered by both APAC and Goodman as to Falco's status, genuine issues of material fact were present, and summary judgment was not appropriate.