Opinion ID: 2081667
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutionality of Delaware's Death-Sentence Statute

Text: Starling next contends that Delaware's death-penalty statute violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by permitting a judge, rather than a jury, to determine whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. Starling claims that because this determination may lead to increased punishment, it operates as an element of the offense and therefore must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We review a statute's constitutionality de novo. [29] The Delaware death-penalty statute requires that the jury find the existence of at least one statutorily-defined aggravating factor unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant becomes eligible for the death penalty. [30] If the jury does not find the existence of at least one statutorily defined aggravating factor unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentencing judge retains no discretionary role and the defendant may not be sentenced to death. [31] But if the jury finds at least one statutory aggravating factor, then the sentencing judge must determine if all of the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence before a death sentence can be imposed. [32] The jury makes a recommendation on the sentence, but the sentencing judge need only give such consideration as it deems appropriate to the jury's sentencing recommendation. [33] Starling's claim that the sentencing statute is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona [34] is not novel. We responded to the same argument made here in Ortiz v. State, [35] a case which reiterated our earlier holding in Brice v. State. [36] This Court has repeatedly held that the Delaware sentencing statute is constitutional under Ring. In Ring and a companion case, Apprendi v. New Jersey, [37] the United States Supreme Court forbade a sentencing judge from enhancing a statutory penalty based on specific facts without a finding by the jury that the facts underlying the enhanced penalty had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [38] In Delaware, however, the sentencing judge does not enhance the sentence under the Delaware statute. As we have stated: Although a judge cannot sentence a defendant to death without finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, it is not that determination that increases the maximum punishment. Rather, the maximum punishment is increased by the [jury's unanimous] finding [beyond a reasonable doubt] of the statutory aggravator. At that point a judge can sentence a defendant to death, but only if the judge finds that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigator [sic] factors. Therefore, the weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances does not increase the punishment. Rather, it ensures that the punishment imposed is appropriate and proportional. [39] Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment, as applied through Ring and Apprendi, permits the dual-scheme established by Delaware's sentencing statute. We therefore find Starling's claims to the contrary to be without merit.