Opinion ID: 897489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: use of seatbelt

Text: Evidence was presented from which you could find that the plaintiff was not using an available seatbelt and shoulder harness at the time of the accident. If you find (1) that it was unreasonable for the plaintiff not to use the seatbelt and shoulder harness and (2) that the plaintiff would not have received some or all of her injuries had she worn a seat belt and shoulder harness, then (3) the amount of damages awarded the plaintiff for the injuries she sustained, if any, must be reduced in proportion to the amount of injury she would have avoided by the use of a seatbelt and shoulder harness. The burden of proof on both (1) and (2) rests with the defendant. [¶9] In Halvorson v. Voeller, we examined helmet use while riding a motorcycle, a situation similar to wearing a seatbelt while riding in a car. 336 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1983). We specifically held that helmet use is relevant to the issue of damages but has no relevance to the issue of liability for causing the accident. Id. at 119. We stated that if damages are capable of reasonable apportionment to separate causes, it should make no difference whether the plaintiff's negligence in aggravating his injuries preceded or succeeded the defendant's negligence. Id. at 120. In Halvorson, we gave an example jury instruction, which we held a trial court is warranted in giving: If you find (1) it was unreasonable for the plaintiff to not wear a helmet, and (2) the plaintiff would not have received some or all of his injuries had he worn a helmet, then (3) the amount of damages awarded the plaintiff for the injuries he sustained must be reduced in proportion to the amount of injury he would have avoided by the use of a helmet. The burden of proof on both (1) and (2) rests with the defendant. Id. at 121 (footnote omitted). [¶10] The unopposed jury instruction for the use of a seatbelt in the present case is essentially identical to our suggested jury instruction on use of a helmet in Halvorson. As in Halvorson, Duma's failure to wear a seatbelt, while not the cause of the accident, is relevant to her damages according to the use of seatbelt instruction. Therefore, the jury was instructed to treat the use of a seatbelt as a mitigating factor to reduce damages, and that instruction is the law of the case.
[¶11] Duma points to language in Halvorson calling helmet nonuse antecedent negligence and argues that based on the special verdict form, the jury possibly addressed Duma's negligence for failing to wear a seatbelt in its answer to Question 6. Duma also argues the special verdict form could be read to find that the jury took Duma's failure to wear a seatbelt into consideration in Question 7 when it determined what percentage of fault to attribute to her. Further, Duma argues it is possible the jury meant to award her $15,000, regardless of its answers to the seatbelt questions. [¶12] The jury should not have answered Question 6. It was instructed to skip Question 6 if it answered no to Question 5. Question 6 asked if the fault of Sandra Duma was a proximate cause of her injuries, rather than the proximate cause of the accident. The jury answered Question 6 no. However, a special verdict question cannot be examined in a vacuum. We must look to the entire special verdict form and the jury instructions to determine whether an inconsistency exists. Moszer, 2001 ND 30, ¶ 11, 622 N.W.2d 223. [¶13] In this case, Question 6 is clearly linked to Question 5. It is logical and probable, based on the jury instructions, that the jury concluded Questions 5 and 6 asked it to determine Duma's fault for causing the accident, not her fault for failing to mitigate her injuries by wearing a seatbelt. The jury's question to the trial judge during deliberations supports our conclusion that the jury found Questions 5 through 7 asked them strictly about the negligence and damages relating to the accident, not about the effect Duma's failure to wear a seatbelt had on her recovery for her injuries. The jury wrote, [p]lease clarify question 5[.] Does question 5 ask if Sandra Duma is at fault for the accident or at fault for her injuries[?] The trial judge responded that [q]uestion 5 asks if Sandra Duma is at fault for the accident. It is also logical and probable, based on the record, that the jury found Question 7 asked it to determine Duma's percentage of fault for the accident, not fault for failure to wear a seatbelt. The use of seatbelt instruction given in this case without objection requires the jury to reduce the damages they previously determined in proportion to the injury Duma could have avoided if she had been wearing a seatbelt. A jury is generally presumed to follow instructions given by the trial court, . . . . State v. Ellis, 2001 ND 84, ¶ 23, 625 N.W.2d 544. The jury followed the instruction and found in answer to Questions 9-A and 9 that Duma was not wearing a seatbelt and could have avoided 100 percent of her injuries if she had been wearing one. [¶14] We conclude the jury's special verdict was not perverse or clearly contrary to the evidence based on the jury instructions which became the law of the case. It is logical and probable that the jury found Duma was not at fault for the accident but that had she worn a seatbelt, 100 percent of her injuries could have been avoided.