Opinion ID: 2037983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Re: Estate of Chris Soneff, Dec'd.

Text: We have received a receipt from George Soneff, a copy of which I am enclosing herewith, and the original of which will be filed in the probate court in Jackson. You will notice that under the terms of the assignment that he acknowledges receipt of all of his money from Mr. Douzeff, and if you will send us a statement that you are no longer interested and that Mr. Louie Douzeff is entitled to this money, we can dispose of it without taking judgment against him. If there is any other information you desire, please advise. Very truly yours, HASKELL L. NICHOLS HLN/T Enc. To the above letter, Mr. Nichols has received no reply and no appearance in the circuit court was entered as intervenor on behalf of any person objecting to the judgment (other than garnishee defendant). The trial court rendered judgment against the garnishee defendant on June 15, 1950, for $1,138.62, from which judgment the garnishee defendant appeals. It is clear that the principal defendant intended by exhibit No 4 to request the court having such matter in charge to authorize the money in question to be paid by the administrator to plaintiff. It is not to be assumed that the principal defendant, a resident of Bulgaria, was well informed as to differences of jurisdiction between the circuit court and the probate court. Exhibit No 4 clearly shows that the principal defendant has received payment in full by plaintiff of his share in the estate on an agreement to transfer such share and interest in the estate to plaintiff and exhibit No 4 is in effect a consent that the court by the judgment effectuate such transfer. With such showing the circuit court was justified in taking jurisdiction and awarding judgment for plaintiff against the principal defendant. Such action by the court was necessary in order to prevent injustice. A judgment by consent cannot ordinarily be set aside or vacated by the court without the consent of the parties thereto, since it is not the judgment of the court but the judgment of the parties. In re Estate of Meredith (syllabus 7), 275 Mich 278 (104 ALR 348). An oral agreement outside of court is sufficient consent where necessary to prevent injustice. Lee v. Rudd, 120 Misc 407 (198 NYS 628), cited in 49 CJS, p 311. In Fojtik v. Lawson, 303 Mich 568, 574, certain heirs had not been made parties in the trial court but a stipulation was filed in this Court joining certain heirs as parties and in pursuance of the stipulation a decree was entered made binding on the heirs. In the instant case, the intent of the principal defendant that the court should dispose of the matter, is clear; that defendant had no legal defense is also clear. Exhibit No 4 was signed and acknowledged before a notary 18 days after a copy of the summons and the declaration had been mailed to defendant, the receipt of which principal defendant acknowledged. For want of service of notice required by the statute, the circuit court's jurisdiction of the principal defendant depended upon the principal defendant's consent, and the judgment could not go beyond the amount of money for defendant Soneff, $1,138.62, in the hands of the administrator nor could any proceedings in this case extend beyond compelling administrator garnishee defendant to pay such moneys over to plaintiff. The judgment to the amount of $1,138.62 being valid against the principal defendant by his consent, the garnishee defendant may not object to such judgment under the disclosure. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the garnishee defendant, being in the sum of $1,138.62, is affirmed. No costs, because the judgment exhausts the funds of the principal defendant in the administrator's hands.