Opinion ID: 1150904
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's low I.Q.

Text: Defendant argues that because he has an I.Q. of 72, he is not only immature and learning disabled, but is genuinely mentally retarded. He also argues that the effect of the retardation on... his ability to realize what he was doing has to be considered as a mitigating factor. We do not agree. Defendant's own expert testified that defendant was borderline functional, and not mentally retarded. Moreover, the expert testified that a person with an I.Q. of 72 is fully capable of functioning in society and that defendant was capable of making judgments with limited impairment. Defendant's former work manager testified that defendant was a responsible person, that he had been picked for promotion because he had shown an ability to supervise other people and that he handled problems without any outbreak of irrational behavior. As we stated in State v. Ceja, 126 Ariz. 35, 40, 612 P.2d 491, 496 (1980), [t]his is not the slow, dull, [retarded] individual with [a] significantly impaired mental capacity which counsel [seeks] to depict, but rather, an individual who planned two weeks in advance to rob the victims and carried out this plan. We cannot accept defendant's argument that, because he was inept at committing this crime and lacked criminal sophistication, his sentence should be reduced. We have never held that, as part of the sentencing process, the court must look at the crime itself to determine if it was carried out with criminal sophistication. We agree with the trial court that, under the facts of this case, defendant's I.Q. of 72, which places him in a borderline functioning category, was neither significant enough to qualify as a mitigating factor, nor sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. See State v. Smith (Robert), 138 Ariz. 79, 86, 673 P.2d 17, 24 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074, 104 S.Ct. 1429, 79 L.Ed.2d 753 (1984) (I.Q. of 71, troubled home life as a youth, lack of prior record of serious crime, remorse and learning difficulties in school were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency); State v. Bishop, 127 Ariz. 531, 535, 622 P.2d 478, 482 (1980) (below average intelligence, fact that defendant completed only the sixth grade and lack of prior criminal record were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency). This case can be distinguished from State v. Jimenez, 165 Ariz. 444, 799 P.2d 785 (1990), where low I.Q. was at issue as a mitigating factor. The court in Jimenez focused on two mitigating factors: (1) the defendant's age (17 years and two months at the time of the murder); and (2) his I.Q. and mental state at the time of the murder. 165 Ariz. at 456-60, 799 P.2d at 797-801. Although the defendants in both Jimenez and the instant case registered comparable I.Q.s and ages, the defendant in Jimenez offered substantial testimony to establish that he also suffered from hallucinations and delusions which compelled him to commit the murder. Id. The defendant in the present case limited expert testimony about his mental condition to his I.Q. The defendant offered no testimony to establish he suffered from hallucinations or delusions at the time he committed the murder.