Opinion ID: 2572739
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevancy of the testimony

Text: {23} All relevant evidence is generally admissible, unless otherwise provided by law, and evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Rule 11-402 NMRA 2004. `Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Rule 11-401 NMRA 2004 (emphasis added). Any doubt whether the evidence is relevant should be resolved in favor of admissibility. Stanley, 2001-NMSC-037, ¶ 6. {24} In reviewing the relevancy of Dr. Caplan's testimony, we first consider whether his testimony directly related to Defendant's theory of the case. See State v. Melendez, 97 N.M. 740, 742, 643 P.2d 609, 611 (Ct. App. 1981) (stating that tendered evidence of the victim's reputation for violence was relevant to the defendant's claims that occupants of a car were aggressors and that he had reasonable apprehensions for his life and safety), rev'd on other grounds, 97 N.M. 738, 643 P.2d 607 (1982); State v. Debarry, 86 N.M. 742, 743-44, 527 P.2d 505, 506-07 (Ct. App. 1974) (remanding for in-camera hearing to determine whether excluded testimony was relevant to the defendant's misidentification defense, with instructions to grant a new trial if the testimony was sufficiently relevant to defendant's theory). Defendant's theory was that he did not form the deliberate intent to kill Victim and therefore was not guilty of first-degree murder. In New Mexico, first-degree murder is defined as any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. Section 30-2-1(A)(1); see State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 25-29, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477 (outlining the legal history of first-degree murder in New Mexico and clarifying that deliberation, defined as a thinking over with calm and reflecting mind, is the defining characteristic of the requisite mental state for first-degree murder) (quoting State v. Smith, 26 N.M. 482, 491, 194 P. 869, 872 (1921)). {25} Because deliberation is an essential element of first-degree murder, evidence with any tendency to make the existence of deliberation more probable or less probable is by definition relevant to the distinction between first-and second-degree murder. See Rule 11-401. Uniform Jury Instruction 14-201, which was given to the jury in this case, defines deliberate intention as follows: A deliberate intention refers to the state of mind of the defendant. A deliberate intention may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances of the killing. The word deliberate means arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against the proposed course of action. A calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not a deliberate intention to kill. To constitute a deliberate killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and his reasons for and against such a choice. UJI 14-201 NMRA 2004 (emphasis added). {26} Defendant contends that Dr. Caplan's testimony regarding Defendant's neurological deficits was relevant because, if believed by the jury, it would tend to make less probable the State's theory that Defendant killed as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against the proposed course of action. Defendant argues that a reasonable juror could infer from Dr. Caplan's testimony that when Defendant killed Victim, he did so more likely as the result of an unconsidered and rash impulse and less likely as a result of careful thought. {27} We conclude that, had the jury been provided with Dr. Caplan's testimony regarding Defendant's neurological deficits, the jury would have had specific evidence tending, to some degree, to refute the element of deliberation necessary for first-degree murder. Dr. Caplan performed a neuropsychological forensic evaluation of Defendant, which consisted of fourteen diagnostic tests and the collection of an extensive psychosocial history. Dr. Caplan's evaluation report, which was reviewed by the trial court, describes Defendant's history of closed head injuries and a constellation of behavioral problems . . . suggestive of frontal lobe dysfunction. This neurological dysfunction results in difficulties in planning and anticipating as well as greater difficulty controlling angry impulses. Defendant told Dr. Caplan that, since the age of sixteen or seventeen, he has had blackouts and becomes unaware of what happens when he is in a rage. [1] Dr. Caplan diagnosed Defendant with impulse-control disorder, polysubstance abuse, and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Caplan concluded his report: Given this man's history and evidence of neurological deficits, there is some evidence for diminished capacity. Historically he presents with a constellation of behaviors that suggest significant problems in controlling impulses, planning and anticipating dangerous situations and the ability to postpone or discriminate in achieving his goals. During the offer of proof via telephone conference, Dr. Caplan repeated that Defendant has neurological dysfunction, which results in problems with impulse control and difficulty in planning. Dr. Caplan described Defendant's neurological dysfunction as sort of the underpinning to diminished capacity, in other words difficulty in judging, difficulty in appreciating consequences of one's actions, difficulty in planning. Dr. Caplan further indicated that substance abuse tends to further impair whatever kind of abilities [Defendant] had. {28} We conclude that Dr. Caplan's testimony was relevant, because it would assist the jury in weighing Defendant's contention that he lacked the deliberate intent necessary for first-degree murder. Dr. Caplan's testimony regarding Defendant's impulsiveness and difficulty in planning, if believed, supported Defendant's theory that he did not act with calculated judgment, but rather he came upon Victim, Bertola, and Carbajal and went off. Dr. Caplan's testimony was relevant to whether Defendant formed the intent to murder Victim as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against a proposed course of action, or whether he killed her as the result of a mere unconsidered and rash impulse. UJI 14-201. {29} In attempting to refute the relevancy of Dr. Caplan's testimony, the State correctly points out that Dr. Caplan was also prepared to testify that Defendant was capable of forming specific intent. The specific intent required for first-degree murder is a deliberate intent, which by definition involves careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against a proposed course of action, and does not describe every intentional killing. See State v. Campos, 1996-NMSC-043, ¶ 39, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266 (It is [the] deliberate intent to cause death, beyond the defendant's intentional actions, that makes premeditated first-degree murder a specific-intent crime.). {30} Defendant's theory at trial, however, was not that Defendant was incapable of forming deliberate intent, and Defendant therefore did not raise the diminished-capacity defense. [2] Defendant's strategy was to show that he did not, at the time of the killing, form the deliberate intent to kill. He sought to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the State carried its burden of proving the mental state required for first-degree murder. Dr. Caplan clearly viewed Defendant's neurological deficits, with resulting impulsiveness and difficulty in planning, as distinct from the ability to form deliberate intent. During the telephone conference Dr. Caplan clarified that Defendant's neurological dysfunction was not the same thing as an inability to form specific intent: [Defendant] impulsively acts but he does understand that his actions may be wrong. So he is able to form specific intent, but there are difficulties with his judgment, his planning, his patience. Thus, Dr. Caplan was clear in his testimony and in his report that Defendant's neurological deficits were not so severe as to wholly subvert his ability to deliberate. {31} Proof of incapacity to form the requisite deliberate intent, however, is not the only means of defending against the State's allegation that the defendant acted with the deliberate intent to take away the life of the victim. An abnormal mental condition may influence the probability that a defendant premeditated and deliberatedand so be taken into account by a jury in determining whether those states of mind existed in fact (beyond a reasonable doubt)even though it did not eliminate the capacity for premeditation. United States v. Peterson, 509 F.2d 408, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1974). [E]xpert testimony is admissible if it merely `support[s] an inference or conclusion that the defendant did or did not have the requisite mens rea.' United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 183 (3rd Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 1997)). Thus, we conclude that evidence of the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the crime may be introduced, not only for the purpose of proving the inability to deliberate, but also to prove that the conditions were such that Defendant did not in fact, at the time of the killing, form a deliberate intent to kill. See State v. Ellis, 89 N.M. 194, 548 P.2d 1212 (Ct. App. 1976) (holding it was reversible error to exclude the defendant's tendered expert testimony regarding the defendant's mental state at the time of the homicide). {32} In concluding that Dr. Caplan's testimony was relevant, we note that New Mexico courts have long allowed such expert testimony relating to a defendant's mental state at the time of the commission of the offense. See id.; see also State v. Elliot, 96 N.M. 798, 635 P.2d 1001 (Ct. App. 1981); State v. Smith, 80 N.M. 126, 452 P.2d 195 (Ct. App. 1969). {33} In Elliot, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court's exclusion of a psychologist's expert testimony that defendant lacked the intent to kill or do great bodily harm was reversible error. 96 N.M. at 800, 635 P.2d at 1003. In response to the trial court's ruling that, under Rule 11-702, the expert testimony would not assist the jury in determining the factual issue of intent, the Court of Appeals held: This may be the trial court's subjective evaluation of testimony by a psychologist, but it is not New Mexico law. The opinion of an expert, whose qualifications are not challenged, would assist the jury in deciding the intent issue, and the expert opinion was admissible. Elliot, 96 N.M. at 800, 635 P.2d at 1003; see Rule 11-702 NMRA 2004. We agree that this remains the law in New Mexico. {34} In Ellis, the defendant at trial offered the expert testimony of a clinical psychologist to show that the defendant shot the victim out of fear and therefore did not have the requisite intent for either first- or second-degree murder. The defendant expressly disclaimed she was relying on the defenses of insanity or diminished capacity. 89 N.M. at 196-97, 548 P.2d at 1214-15. On the basis that Rule 11-702 admits expert testimony if such testimony will assist the jury to determine a fact in issue, the Court of Appeals held that it was error to exclude the testimony, stating that expert testimony as to defendant's `probable state of mind' was admissible . . . [and] a properly qualified expert may testify as to a defendant's intent. Id. at 197, 548 P.2d at 1215. {35} Finally, in Smith, the trial court admitted the expert testimony of a psychologist and two psychiatrists that defendant was inclined to violent emotional eruptions, and that when in a rage he is unable to control himself. 80 N.M. at 129, 452 P.2d at 198. The defendant introduced this evidence not to establish the defense of insanity or inability to form specific intent, but rather to show that the defendant, at the time of the killing, did not possess the requisite mental state for second-degree murder. Id. at 130, 452 P.2d at 199. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals stated: The jury was not required to accept these expert opinions and disregard all other evidence bearing on the question of his mental and emotional state . . . . Id. The same is true in Defendant's case, and, although Dr. Caplan's testimony is relevant to Defendant's mental state at the time of the killing, the jury is free to give it little weight, or to reject it altogether. {36} Because we hold that Dr. Caplan's testimony was relevant to the essential element of deliberate intent, and because the testimony was not cumulative, we conclude that the trial court's exclusion on the basis that it was a waste of time was error. See Rule 11-403 NMRA 2004.