Opinion ID: 2559012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to object to in-court competency examination of child witness

Text: Appellant next claims that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to object to the trial court conducting the competency examination of the victim's daughter, N.M., in the presence of the jury. [7] Appellant argues that at the time of his trial, it was accepted practice to hold competency inquiries outside the presence of the jury, citing Commonwealth v. Repyneck, 181 Pa.Super. 630, 124 A.2d 693, 696 (1956) ([T]he jury was withdrawn from the court room and the court below heard testimony relative to the competency of the witness. This was proper and in accordance with accepted practice.). Appellant further argues that since competency to testify is a legal determination that is irrelevant to the jury's role as factfinder, conducting the competency inquiry in the jury's presence likely led the jury to confuse competency with credibility. In particular, appellant contends that, by declaring N.M. competent in the jury's presence after the conclusion of the examination, the trial court unfairly bolstered the child's credibility. Appellant asserts that a claim based upon trial counsel's failure to object was raised in the nunc pro tunc post-sentencing motions filed by appellate counsel, but counsel then abandoned the claim on appeal. Appellant further relies upon Commonwealth v. Washington, 554 Pa. 559, 722 A.2d 643, 647 (1998), where this Court established a per se rule requiring that child witness competency hearings be conducted outside the presence of the jury. Washington was handed down on the same day this Court's opinion was filed in appellant's direct appeal. In appellant's view, if direct appeal counsel had pursued this ineffectiveness claim, there is a reasonable probability that appellant could have benefited from the new per se rule in Washington, even though Washington involved a preserved claim, not a collateral Strickland attack. Appellant argues in the alternative that trial counsel should have requested a special jury instruction distinguishing between competency and credibility and emphasizing the jury's role in the latter circumstance. Appellant adds that trial counsel's ineffectiveness in this regard should also have been pursued on appeal. Appellant speculates that without this specific instruction, the jury likely construed the trial court's ruling that N.M. was competent as approval of her credibility and veracity. The Commonwealth responds, inter alia, that appellant's claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness fails because at the time of trial, there was no requirement that child witness competency hearings be conducted outside the presence of the jury. The Commonwealth adds that the court's general instructions to the jury as to witness credibility were sufficient and that appellant has not established what a specific instruction as to N.M.'s competency would or should have said, by which authority such an instruction was required, or how such an instruction would likely have resulted in a different overall verdict. In rejecting this layered claim, the PCRA court noted that the law at the time of appellant's trial did not prohibit holding competency hearings in the jury's presence, and thus appellant's underlying claim was meritless. The PCRA court added that even assuming there was a legal basis upon which to object, appellant failed to prove that the outcome of the trial would have been different if counsel had acted otherwise, in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt and the fact that N.M.'s testimony coincided with her prior implication of appellant, as well as the physical evidence and the autopsy results. The PCRA court also concluded that the trial court's competency finding did not bolster N.M.'s credibility, particularly because the trial court said nothing to influence the jury's consideration of her veracity. In the PCRA court's estimation, the competency examination was conducted in accordance with governing legal requirements: both counsel questioned N.M. concerning her duty to tell the truth and her answers to those questions showed that she possessed the requisite degree of awareness and ability to recall past events and ability to recount them accurately to be declared competent. The PCRA court did not separately address appellant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a special instruction concerning the distinction between competence and credibility. PCRA Ct. Op. at 8-13. Washington involved a direct appeal where the defendant specifically preserved an objection at trial to competency examinations of the two child witnesses being conducted in the presence of the jury; the witnesses were also the victims of the sexual assaults with which the defendant was charged. The Court majority noted first that competency is a legal issue to be decided by a judge, but expressed concern that, because assessing the truthfulness of a witness during trial is a function of the jury as factfinder, conducting competency proceedings in the jury's presence invariably could influence the jury's credibility determination. The majority expressed particular concern that the trial judge's in-court ruling on competency could be viewed as a judicial endorsement of the witness's credibility. In addition, the majority noted, questions relevant to a competency examination, i.e., respecting the witness's appreciation for the importance of telling the truth, might be improper during trial before the jury because they would be irrelevant, call for hearsay, or violate evidentiary rules and statutes and thus, conducting the hearing in the presence of the jury also gives rise to the risk that the jury may hear inadmissible testimony. 722 A.2d at 646. Following these preliminary observations, the Washington majority noted that the issue before it was one of first impression and surveyed the approach of other jurisdictions, which revealed a division of authority. Id. at 646. The Washington majority further acknowledged support for the contrary view that there are valid reasons to allow a jury to observe voir dire of a child witness. Id. at 647. The opinion quoted an unreported decision from the Ohio Court of Appeals that relied upon commentators who had addressed this issue and stated that: There are occasions when no harm will result from the jury hearing foundational matters[, and] in such cases, convenience and time considerations are better served by not excusing the jury. Moreover, in many instances, the same evidence which is relevant to the foundation requirements is also relevant to weight and credibility. Allowing the jury to hear such foundational evidence avoids duplication and waste of time. Id. (quoting State v. Harris, 1988 WL 38034 (Ohio App. 5 Dist.1988)). [8] The Washington majority went on to note that the Harris court, while stating that it is not plain error to conduct a competency examination in the presence of the jury as long as the defendant does not object and the jury is properly charged, nevertheless believed the better practice was to excuse the jury. Id. The Washington majority ultimately agreed with the Harris court that the better practice is to excuse the jury, and then decided to go a step further and create a per se rule requiring the trial court to conduct a [child] competency hearing in the absence of a jury. Id. The majority opined that its prophylactic rule was warranted because conducting child witness competency hearings in the presence of the jury could improperly influence the jury's ability to determine the child witness's credibility, expose the jury to otherwise inadmissible testimony such as hearsay, and suggest the trial judge's endorsement of the child witness's credibility if the witness was deemed competent. The majority also opined that a cautionary charge could be insufficient because a competency proceeding in the presence of the jury inevitably permeates into the veracity assessment assigned exclusively to the jury. Id. at 647. [9] The Washington case does not support appellant's claim that, if his appeal counsel had claimed trial counsel ineffectiveness in failing to object to the competency examination being conducted in front of the jury, there is a reasonable probability that a new trial would have been granted on direct appeal. In Washington, this Court decided a preserved question of first impression seven years after appellant's trial and adopted what amounted to a prophylactic rule. Nor can trial counsel be faulted for failing to forward a request for the per se rule that the Washington majority ultimately devised. On the other hand, there was a basis in the law in 1991 for trial counsel to request that the court, in its discretion, conduct the competency examination outside the presence of the jury, see Repyneck, supra , and there was nothing to prevent counsel from requesting an explanatory charge. [10] For purposes of decision, then, we will assume arguable merit in this underlying layered claim; we agree with the PCRA court, however, that appellant has not proven Strickland prejudice. At trial, the competency examination of N.M. was brief. The prosecutor first asked N.M. whether she knew who the judge was; N.M. answered that she did. The prosecutor asked N.M. to state her age, what grade she was in at school, and what school she attended; she answered these questions. The prosecutor next asked N.M. whether she could tell the difference between the truth and lies, giving examples such as statements that it was snowing inside the room and that N.M.'s dress was a different color than it really was. N.M. answered that she knew such statements would be lies; that she understood that it was bad to tell a lie and good to tell the truth; and that she promised to tell the truth and what she remembered. Defense counsel then asked N.M. if she knew the difference between a lie and a fairy tale and that a story is not real. N.M. indicated that she did know the difference. The court then stated: I find that [N.M.] is competent and she is capable of having the intelligence and understands the obligation of telling the truth. The competency examination was then concluded and the prosecutor immediately began direct examination of N.M. See N.T., 11/7/91, at 7-11. On direct examination, N.M. testified that she recognized appellant in the courtroom because he had previously been at the apartment where she lived with her mother; she then described the night of the murder. N.M. testified that she had been sleeping when she was awakened by Manny hitting her mother with a radio, that Manny put an iron on her mother's head and that her mother had hollered. N.M. testified that she tried to stop Manny by hitting him, but he hit her, choked her, and put a pillow over her face, after which she was laying down for a time. She also saw Manny hit her mother and put her mother in the bathtub with blood. She went to her neighbor Madeline's after Manny left and told Madeline what she had seen. She recalled telling both the doctor at the emergency room and the police that Manny had hurt her mother; she also remembered that she had recognized Manny in the pictures the police showed her. See N.T., 11/7/91, at 11-20. On cross-examination, counsel impeached N.M. with a prior statement in which she had indicated, in counsel's words, that she did not see what Manny hit mommy with whereas she now testified that she had seen Manny hit her mother with both a radio and an iron. Counsel also questioned N.M. about her recollection of the night of the murder and noted other inconsistencies between N.M.'s testimony on direct examination and earlier statements, such as whether Manny had a knife and whether her mother was in bed when Manny entered the apartment. Counsel emphasized prior statements by N.M. indicating that after Manny had pulled her mother off the bed, he closed the door to the bedroom, so that N.M. could not have seen what was going on; and that N.M. had gone back to sleep while the bedroom door was closed, had not seen any of the altercation that led to her mother's death, and had not heard her mother crying or screaming. See N.T., 11/7/91, at 20-32. On re-direct, the prosecutor attempted to clarify N.M.'s testimony that she had in fact seen appellant hit her mother. When defense counsel objected, the court asked N.M., Did you see Manny hit mommy? and You did not see Manny hit mommy? N.M. answered No to both questions. When the prosecutor resumed re-direct examination, he elicited testimony from N.M. that she had seen Manny and mommy in the room and that Manny had a radio and an iron in his hands. N.M. also testified that she remembered telling the detective after the murder that she had seen Manny hit her mother with an iron and pull her mother's hair out. On re-cross examination, defense counsel attempted to further probe whether N.M. actually saw her mother get hit in the head with an iron, but the trial court sustained prosecution objections that the question form was inappropriate and defense counsel declined to pursue the matter any further. See N.T., 11/7/91, at 32-37. Preliminarily, we note that the fact that a child competency examination is conducted in front of the jury is not inherently prejudicialand certainly not in a heightened Strickland sense. The Washington Court recognized as much; its per se rule was adopted as a prophylactic measure. Nor does appellant claim that there was anything particularly prejudicial about the substance of the brief in-court competency examination and ruling in this case, beyond the bare fact that both the examination, and the court's finding of competency, were placed before the jury. Appellant also does not challenge the court's ruling, i.e., he does not dispute that N.M. in fact was competent to testify. What remains, then, is the fact of the brief examination and the court's finding that N.M. was competent, i.e., that she was capable of having the intelligence and understands the obligation of telling the truth. This record does not support a finding that actual prejudice inured to appellant, i.e., that if N.M.'s competency examination and determination had not occurred in front of the jury, the result of the trial would have been different. All witnesses swear or affirm an oath before testifying in front of a jury; the same promise is made by those who are unfailingly honest, and by those who intend to observe their promise only in the breach. Only certain witnesses, including the young, are subject to some additional screening and probing beyond the mere oath or affirmation. [11] It is difficult to see how neutral questions implicating competency, if otherwise admissible at trial questions probing the ability to perceive and relate events, the awareness of the duty to speak the truthsuch as were posed here, could be deemed prejudicial in the Strickland sense. A court's in-court statement of its finding of competency, of course, can be another matter. But, in this case, the court's ruling was stated in neutral terms: the court spoke only of the child being capable of having the intelligence and understands the obligation of telling the truth. This ruling did not suggest that the court believed that the childwho had not yet testifiedwould, in fact, accurately relate events and would tell the truth; rather, the court spoke narrowly of capacity and obligation. Although it is from the mouth of the judge, in substance, this is what adult witnesses convey when they take an oatheven if they intend to violate it. Furthermore, the actual examination of N.M. plainly conveyed to the jury that her account was subject to question, the same as that of any other witness permitted to testify. Defense counsel cross-examined the child and exposed inconsistencies in her statements and her memory. The trial court itself elicited contradictory answers from the child concerning whether she had seen appellant strike her mother. On this record, it is difficult to discern any prejudice from the in-court competency examination alone, given that these inconsistencies in N.M.'s testimony were exposed immediately after she, unlike other witnesses, was specifically questioned before the jury about her ability to recall and relate the truth. In assessing the prospect of prejudice, we note also that the trial court made clear to the jury in its general introductory instructions that the jury was the sole judge of witness credibility: You are the judge of the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the testimony of witnesses. By credibility of testimony or other evidence, I mean its truthfulness and accuracy.... You are not bound by any opinion you might think counsel or I have expressed concerning guilt or innocence, credibility of witnesses, weight of evidence, facts proven by the evidence or inferences to be drawn from the facts. N.T., 11/6/91, at 18, 20. The trial court's closing instructions to the jury reiterated these points and added a list of suggestions the jury might consider in deciding witness credibility, including general references that obviously accounted for child witnesses, such as that the jury consider the witnesses' ages, their ability to have observed events, their ability to recollect events, and the extent to which a witness's testimony was contradicted or supported by other testimony and evidence. N.T., 11/12/91, at 60-62. In addition to the fact that trial counsel could rely on these instructions to dispel any possible spillover of prejudice from the in-court competency examination of N.M., the instructions square well with the modest nature of the court's finding on competency which, again, spoke in terms of N.M.'s capacity and obligation, and not her credibility. Finally, in assessing prejudice and considering whether a different outcome might have ensued, had N.M.'s competency examination taken place outside the presence of the jury, we note that while N.M. was an important eyewitness at trial, her identification of appellant as the killer and her general account of the killing were echoed by adult witnesses who testified as to what N.M. told them shortly after the murder. Madeline Dickerson, the victim's neighbor, testified that the morning after the murder, N.M. came to her door and told her that Manny had hit her mother in the head with an iron and put her in the bathtub; N.M. also described to Ms. Dickerson all the blood at the scene. The emergency room doctor who treated the injuries appellant inflicted on N.M. testified from her own notes that N.M. told her: Manny took me and put me on the bed. He hit mommy. He hit her with a knife, a big knife from the kitchen. He put my mommy in the bathtub. There was blood all over my mommy. There was blood in her mouth. Manny hit me here [N.M. pointed to her own face]. He hit me this morning. Finally, Detective Paul Rich of the Homicide Division, who interviewed N.M. later that same day, testified that N.M. selected appellant's photograph from a photo array and identified appellant as the one who attacked her mother. N.T., 11/7/91, at 39-41, 57-58, 68-72. Viewed in light of this testimony, appellant's particular assertion that the trial court finding N.M. competent in the jury's presence in some way bolstered N.M.'s credibility to a prejudicial extent is unpersuasive. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that appellant has not established a reasonable probability that, if only the competency examination and ruling had occurred outside the presence of the jury, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Therefore, appellant's underlying claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness fails and, as such, his derivative claim that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue that claim necessarily fails as well. Appellant's alternative layered claim concerning trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction distinguishing between competency and credibility fails for the same inability to prove prejudice. As we have noted above, the court's ruling on competency was modest and narrow; the jury was separately and strongly instructed on credibility, including concerns obviously particular to child witnesses; inconsistencies in the child's testimony were highlighted for the jury; and other evidence corroborated the child's in-court account. Moreover, appellant fails to explain how a specific and additional instruction distinguishing between competence and credibility would have improved his prospects for a different result at trial. And, finally, the cases appellant cites do not support this claim. In Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959), this Court set forth the standard for child witness competency and held that the determination was within the trial court's discretion, but did not suggest a need for specific instructions to the jury, much less did the Court outline what such an instruction should say. In Commonwealth v. Roldan, 524 Pa. 366, 572 A.2d 1214 (1990), which was not a competency case, this Court held that remarks and questions by the trial court to either witnesses or counsel were acceptable when they served the limited purpose of clarification. Notably, in Roldan, the trial court instructed the jury both before and at the close of evidence of its role as primary arbiter of credibilitythe trial court here did so as well. The Roldan Court, declining to find reversible error, held: These instructions served to stress to the jurors that it was their opinion and their opinion alone that mattered. That they resolved the credibility of the appellant's theories of defense against him was not the result of questioning from the bench but rather due to the fact that the evidence against this appellant was both overwhelming and credible. Id. at 1216. Roldan does not support appellant's claim here. [12]