Opinion ID: 567201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: cosmair

Text: 3 In the instant case this panel held in essence that Huber's policy of withholding a former employee's distributable benefits under a qualified retirement plan when the former employee challenges termination by filing a Title VII charge and seeks reinstatement does not on its face violate Title VII's prohibition against retaliation. Despite our distinguishing discussion in Huber, the EEOC still contends that our opinion is inconsistent with Cosmair, in which we noted that if the employer stopped providing a former employee benefits to which he was otherwise entitled simply because he filed a charge, the company would be guilty of retaliation. 3 But in Huber we distinguished Cosmair on the basis that Huber did not withhold [the employee's] benefits simply because [the employee] had filed a Title VII charge--Huber contends that it withheld benefits to preserve the tax qualified status of its benefit plan under ERISA. Huber's position is supported at least facially by showing that benefits were withheld routinely from all severed employees who contested severance for any reason, not merely those whose contests were based on Title VII discrimination, if such contests could lead to reinstatement. 4 The EEOC here reiterates its argument that Huber's policy of withholding amounts due to former employees under the benefit plan is facially discriminatory, making Cosmair controlling. We disagree, remaining steadfast in our view that Cosmair is distinguishable. 4 Cosmair does not reach the question whether the employer lawfully could have suspended payments if the employee's filing of the EEOC charge breached the release executed by the employee in connection with severance. 5 We held that such a filing of charges did not breach the release because the release did not prohibit filing an EEOC claim. 6 We pointed out that EEOC charges can be filed by persons other than the employee who allegedly suffered the discrimination, that the charge filed contained no demand for relief, 7 and that the charge indeed named two co-workers who allegedly had been fired ... because of age discrimination. 8 We went on to note in Cosmair that there was evidence that the parties intended by the release--although it did not say so expressly--to prevent the filing of an EEOC charge 9 , and we held that as so construed such a provision of the release was void as against public policy. 10 5 This latter holding in Cosmair was not meant to proscribe a release provision that precluded the employee from seeking through the EEOC his own reinstatement or back wages (as distinguished from an EEOC action to stop some ongoing discriminatory practice or procuring back wages or reinstatement for others). If that were the proper interpretation of our opinion, it would have had the effect of holding a release of an ADEA claim invalid, which we did not do. Cosmair cannot be read as necessarily invalidating a release that bars the party executing it from claiming through the EEOC only relief for himself from the employer. 6 Along the same lines the EEOC would rely on our decision in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir.1969). In Pettway we held that the employer violated Title VII's anti-retaliation provision by discharging the employee who filed an EEOC claim based on allegations of malicious and false statements, regardless of the employer's underlying justification for doing so. Like Cosmair, however, Pettway is another simply because case and is distinguishable from Huber on that basis.