Opinion ID: 3043478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retaliation Under the FCA

Text: The FCA’s whistleblower provision provides relief to an employee who was “discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms or conditions of employment because of lawful acts done by the employee . . . in furtherance of an action under this section or other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of [the FCA].” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (emphasis added). 6 In other words, protection under this provision requires a showing that the plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct and that the employer retaliated against him “because of” that protected conduct. 7 The district court concluded that Reynolds’s evidence created a genuine factual dispute as to whether he engaged in protected activity when he raised concerns with Todd about possible false claims, 8 but Reynolds did not present evidence showing a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination. On appeal, the parties continue to dispute whether Reynolds’s conversations with Todd constituted protected activity. We need not resolve this 6 On appeal, Reynolds does not challenge the district court’s granting of summary judgment on his Title VII retaliation claim, and thus has abandoned it. See Holland, 677 F.3d at 1066. Reynolds does, however, still argue his FCA retaliation claim 7 We decline to address Reynolds’s argument, raised for the first time in this Court and only in his reply brief, that the relevant statute is the Georgia False Claims Act rather than the FCA. See Access Now, Inc. v. SW. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). 8 The district court concluded, however, that Reynolds’s report to Brabston about the missing Xanax was not protected activity under the FCA. Reynolds does not challenge this ruling on appeal, and we do not address it further. 13 Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 14 of 17 issue, however, because even assuming arguendo that Reynolds engaged in protected conduct, we agree with the district court that Reynolds did not present evidence from which a jury reasonably could find that Reynolds’s suspension and termination were “because of” that protected activity. To establish the necessary causal connection under § 3730(h)(1), the plaintiff must show that the employer was at least aware of the protected activity. See U.S. ex rel. Sanchez v. Lymphatx, Inc., 596 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the plaintiff’s allegations in her complaint that she complained to her employer about unlawful actions that would incur significant civil and criminal liability were sufficient, if proven, “to support a reasonable conclusion that the defendants were aware of the possibility of litigation under the False Claims Act”); see also U.S. ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that the “because of” language in § 3730(h)(1) requires the employee to prove that the employer had knowledge of the protected activity and was motivated to retaliate, at least in part, by the protected activity); Zahodnick v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 914 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the plaintiff must present evidence that the employer was aware of the protected activity to show the requisite causal connection). Here, Reynolds failed to establish causation because he did not present any evidence that the decision makers—Cobb, Bandy, and Fegan—knew that Reynolds 14 Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 15 of 17 had spoken to Todd about potential false claims. In fact, Reynolds admitted he only talked with Todd and their pharmacy technician about his concerns. Reynolds cannot avoid this result by relying upon a “cat’s paw” theory. This Court has not yet applied the cat’s paw theory in an FCA retaliation case. Furthermore, this Court has indicated that while the theory may be appropriate in cases in which the plaintiff is required to prove only that the protected characteristic was a motivating factor, such as in Title VII disparate treatment claims, the theory is inappropriate when the statute requires “but-for” causation. See Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that “cat’s paw” liability does not apply to Age Discrimination in Employment Act retaliation claims). Nonetheless, even if we assume arguendo that the cat’s paw theory applies to FCA retaliation claims, Reynolds did not present evidence to support the theory in his case. In other employment contexts, discriminatory animus may be imputed to a neutral decision maker under a “cat’s paw” theory if: (1) a supervisor performed an act motivated by animus that was intended to cause an adverse employment action; and (2) the act was a proximate cause of the adverse employment action. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011). A plaintiff may establish causation under this theory if the decision maker either followed another supervisor’s biased recommendation without independently 15 Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 16 of 17 investigating the complaint or conducted an independent investigation but relied on facts provided by the biased supervisor. See id. at 420-21, 131 S. Ct. at 1193; Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999). Reynolds contends that Todd may have had a retaliatory motive. In the district court, however, Reynolds offered nothing but his own conjecture that Todd was retaliating against him. Moreover, Reynolds did not present any evidence that Todd had any input in the decision to suspend and then terminate him. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that Todd played no role in the employment decisions except to initially report Reynolds’s “backdating” of the prescription to Brabston. Brabston then gathered the facts and documents, including multiple statements from Reynolds. Brabston then forwarded the evidence to Cobb, Bandy, and Fegan, who reviewed it and made their own decision. Furthermore, in his statements, Reynolds admitted changing the January 14, 2013 date of C.J.’s prescription in the computer system to December 30, 2012. Even if the decision makers wrongly believed Reynolds’s conduct was either illegal or unprofessional, Reynolds’s own admission to the conduct supports their independent determination that Reynolds should be discharged.9 9 Reynolds also contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to compel discovery related to his FCA claim. We conclude, however, that Reynolds waived this issue for appellate purposes by responding to the summary judgment motion on the merits rather than accepting the district court’s invitation to explain why he needed additional discovery as to his FCA claim. In any event, there was no abuse of discretion because none of the evidence 16 Case: 15-10503 Date Filed: 08/04/2015 Page: 17 of 17 For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Winn-Dixie on Reynolds’s Title VII gender discrimination and FCA retaliation claims. AFFIRMED. Reynolds sought would have shown that the decision makers knew of Reynolds’s protected FCA activities or that Todd manipulated the decision makers into terminating Reynolds. 17