Opinion ID: 1974893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Floyd R. Bush's Remaining Claims

Text: Appellant Bush argues that his conviction should be reversed because there was a conflict of interest created because he had been represented in a prior, unrelated case by the same trial counsel representing co-defendant Owens in this case. In the earlier case, John Williams, who was a witness for the government in this case, was also Bush's co-defendant. [10] Although Bush did not assert a conflict of interest in the trial court, he contends that the trial court should have known of the conflict and inquired because during a discussion of the plea arrangement with Mr. Williams, the attorney for appellant Bush informed the court that Owens' attorney might be able to verify the plea arrangements because she had represented Bush in the other case. The accused in a criminal case has the right to the effective assistance of counsel which necessitates that counsel have the ability and willingness to advocate effectively for his client. Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 135 (D.C.1985). To ensure this right, it is essential that defense counsel have no conflict of interest which might divide his loyalty to the accused. Id. at 136; Fitzgerald v. United States, 530 A.2d 1129, 1133 (D.C.1987). Therefore, the court has an obligation to inquire when it becomes apparent that a particular conflict exists. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Douglas, 488 A.2d at 136. Where a defendant fails to object on the basis of such conflict, a Sixth Amendment violation warranting reversal will be established if a convicted defendant demonstrates on appeal that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' Douglas, 488 A.2d at 136 (footnote omitted) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718). Where a defendant fails to object at trial, but can demonstrate that the conflict of interest `actually affected the adequacy of his representation,' that defendant need not go so far as to show that the conflict prejudiced the outcome of the case in order to obtain reversal. Douglas, 488 A.2d at 136 n. 16 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1718-19). Such conflicts occur most often when one attorney represents several defendants in a single case. Fitzgerald, 530 A.2d at 1133. The types of harm which might result in such a situation include the following: an attorney may refrain from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but favorable to another, or from emphasizing the culpability of one client in order to exculpate another, or from allowing one defendant to testify against another, or from presenting a defense that helps one client but harms another, or from entering a plea agreement for one client conditioned upon his testimony for the prosecution against another client. Id. at 1133. Here appellant Bush does not allege that the attorney who represented him in this case was ineffective or had any conflict of interest. Rather, he contends that the representation of his co-defendant in this case by an attorney that he had in another case created a conflict which resulted in potential prejudice to him. The only actual claim of prejudice which appellant cites is that when one of the witnesses in the Kovak's robbery identified him from a photograph, his former attorney stated on the record that she had no objection when the government moved the admission of the photograph into evidence. We need not decide whether the rule in Fitzgerald and Douglas extends to the type of challenge made here. Even assuming that it does, the demonstration of an actual conflict affecting his lawyer's performance has not been shown. See Douglas, supra, 488 A.2d at 136.
Appellant Bush also argues that the prosecutor's improper closing argument denied him a fair trial. First, appellant Bush contends that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify. The alleged improper comment included the rhetorical remark, Where's the defense? Appellant also challenges the following additional statement made by the prosecutor: When I say that they have given you no defense that is not quite true. It is true that [counsel] on behalf of Mr. Jackson did present a defensethis is the alibi defense he was referring to. Of course, the Fifth Amendment precludes the prosecutor from commenting on the silence of the accused. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); Watts v. United States, 449 A.2d 308, 312 (D.C. 1982). Error occurs when the prosecutor's language was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to testify. Watts, 449 A.2d at 312; (quoting Byrd v. U.S., 364 A.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C.1976)). However, appellant's Fifth Amendment right does not preclude the prosecutor from emphasizing to the jury that the government's evidence [is] uncontradicted. Boyd v. United States, 473 A.2d 828, 833 (D.C.1984). In order for such comments to result in reversible error, it must be shown that no one other than the accused could have offered contradictory evidence. Id.; Watts, 449 A.2d at 313. The reason for this rule is that such comments would naturally lead the jury to focus on defendant's silence. Boyd, 473 A.2d at 833. To determine whether the challenged comment was improper, the comments must also be viewed in context, and consideration must be given to the availability of others sources of the information. Having examined in context the challenged argument, we find no reversible error. The remarks fall within permissible limits for proper argument in that they emphasize that no contradiction has been given to the government's case or that no reason has been given not to believe the witness who testified. See id. The remarks made here are similar to those made in the Boyd case where we held that the prosecutor's query, Where is the evidence?, was not found to be error. Moreover, in this case there were numerous witnesses to these crimes, and appellant was not the only possible source of contradiction of the evidence. Id.; Watts, supra, 449 A.2d at 313. Appellant Bush also cites as misconduct the prosecutor's alleged expression of opinion about the truth of Sampson's testimony that the lineup was the fairest kind of identification procedure and that the witness, Dennis Applewhite, was a good citizen. He also contends that the prosecutor made an impermissible appeal for jury sympathy towards the prosecution for using John Williams as a government witness by stating that, [h]opefully you won't be seeing him [Williams] in the streets in the near future. In examining these arguments, we must determine whether misconduct in fact occurred and, if so, whether the misconduct resulted in substantial prejudice to appellant's right to a fair trial. Dyson v. United States, 450 A.2d 432, 437 (D.C.1982). The test for determining substantial prejudice requires us to balance the gravity of the misconduct, its relationship to innocence or guilt of the accused, and the effect of any corrective measures taken by the trial court against the weight of the evidence of appellant's guilt. Id. at 437 (citing Villacres v. United States, 357 A.2d 423, 428 (D.C.1976)). We consider the remarks which appellant claims were improper. First, the single comment, allegedly an expression of personal opinion, that the government's witness did his best to tell the truth, does not rise to the level of the type of serious misconduct which can be viewed to have swayed the jury in this lengthy trial. See Dyson, supra, 450 A.2d at 438. Next, although the prosecutor is precluded from making arguments which appeal to the sympathy or passion of the jury, see id., we do not regard the challenged remark about the witness Williams as one appealing to jury sympathy. Rather the remark tended to refute the idea that Williams' plea agreement was so advantageous that his testimony should be disbelieved solely because of it. In fact, Bush's attorney argued to the jury that John Williams received a good plea arrangement and asked rhetorically, What would you give up if you were facing sixty years to the rest of your life? Although the prosecutor's comment was somewhat speculative in implying that Williams would probably go to jail, it clearly does not rise to the level of reversible error, when its gravity is considered against the weight of the evidence of appellant's guilt. Appellant Bush also argues that the prosecutor attacked the integrity of his counsel during closing argument. This claim is based on two remarks made by the prosecutor. The first comment concerns an argument regarding the identification of Bush by Arthur Williams, a government witness. During the trial, Williams had testified that he had seen a light-skinned man in the store just prior to the robbery. In closing argument, Bush's counsel attacked Williams' identification as unreliable. In response, the prosecutor recounted the questions and answers during trial by appellant's counsel regarding Williams' identification. [11] While doing so, he queried whether defense counsel could tell whether there was a light-skinned person in the lineup. The remark, though inappropriate, did not cast aspersions on appellant's counsel. It was not so egregious as to even evoke an objection. Viewed in context, the remark was insignificant and conveyed no clear meaning. Accordingly, we find no error, and certainly no plain error. Bowler, supra, 480 A.2d at 686-87.
Finally, appellant Bush argues that the admission of other crimes evidence so prejudiced his trial that reversal is required. The evidence involved consists of testimony of Barbara Singletary that she had seen appellant Bush with a gun in late January 1984. This does not constitute other crimes evidence. An accused's prior possession of the physical means of committing a crime is admissible. Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 710, 712 (D.C. 1977). Appellant Bush also contends that the introduction of other crimes evidence during his trial counsel's cross-examination of Christopher Sampson requires reversal. During cross-examination, co-defendant Jackson's counsel elicited from Sampson that he and John Williams had committed a robbery together and that Sampson had made up the names of various individuals who helped him to rob various places. Counsel for Bush then cross-examined Mr. Sampson, including questions about the names of others with whom Sampson had committed unrelated robberies. While attempting to bring out the deceptiveness of Sampson's confession to the police about the various robberies and the people involved, the following exchange took place between the counsel for Mr. Bush and Mr. Sampson: Q: So you were trying to be a bit deceptive when you talked to police? A: Yes, sir. Q: As a matter of fact you said at Northeast Liquor's Floyd Bush had a gun and that was a lie? A: It wasn't a lie, it was more like Q: He didn't have a gun A: I committed so many robberies The court: Let him answer the question. What is the answer. A: It was more like I committed a lot of robberies me and Floyd There was an objection by an attorney for one of the other co-defendants, and a bench conference ensued during which counsel for Bush requested a mistrial. The court was of the view that appellant Bush's counsel had led the witness into the problem, and the court declined to grant a mistrial. The court then instructed the attorneys to say no more about it, and none of the attorneys requested a curative instruction. When counsel for Mr. Bush resumed questioning Sampson, he asked whether or not his statement to the police that Floyd Bush had a gun during the Northeast Liquor Store robbery was a lie. The witness denied that it was. During the next series of questions, the defense counsel was able to elicit from Sampson that he had lied when he told the police that he had sold the murder weapon for $150 and that a person named Keith was involved in the robbery. Bush's attorney was also successful in getting Sampson to admit that he had falsely told the police that Bush had robbed a beauty salon on Fourteenth Street, N.W. The government does not argue that the comment which provoked a mistrial motion was proper. Instead, it argues that any error was harmless. We agree. It has long been the rule that where a defendant does not take the stand or otherwise place his character in issue, evidence of prior criminal activity, with some exceptions, is generally inadmissible because of its prejudicial impact. Rindgo v. United States, 411 A.2d 373, 376 (D.C.1980) (quoting Jones v. United States, 385 A.2d 750, 752 (D.C.1978)). Appellant relies upon Rindgo to support his claim of reversible error. In Rindgo, the government argued that the account of one of its witnesses during the government's case in chief concerning several robberies and attempted robberies carried out before and subsequent to the felony murder and robbery for which the defendant was on trial, was reversible error. The government argued that the testimony was necessary to demonstrate the association of Rindgo and the witness and the various criminal ventures in order to prove the probability that the two would have been together on the night of the crimes involved in the trial. Id. In that case, we concluded that the evidence was so prejudicial that it denied appellant a fair trial. This case differs from Rindgo in several important respects. In Rindgo, the testimony was brought out by the government in its case-in-chief in order to prove criminal ventures between the government's witness and the defendant. In this case, the portion of the testimony which prompted the mistrial motion was a brief reference to unspecified crimes which all counsel were instructed not to mention again. Nevertheless, apparently as a matter of strategy, and in an effort to demonstrate that the witness Sampson had lied to the police before about appellant Bush's involvement in other crimes, Bush's counsel elicited further testimony regarding at least two other robberies in which Sampson had implicated appellant. As to one of them, Sampson admitted that he lied about appellant's involvement. As to the other, Sampson stated that he had told the truth. The remarks made just prior to the motion for mistrial, particularly in light of the tactic pursued by defense counsel, was not so significant during the course of a two week trial that denial of the mistrial motion was an abuse of discretion. See Austin v. United States, 433 A.2d 1081, 1085 n. 5 (D.C.1981). In Austin, the appellant had also brought out prior criminal conduct, and ample legitimate proof of appellant's guilt had been presented. Id. Therefore, we concluded in Austin that the claimed error was harmless. Id. Similarly, in this case we are persuaded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial because of the insignificance of the remark during the lengthy trial and appellant's own tactic of eliciting first Sampson's reports that Bush participated with him in other crimes and thereafter impeaching the witness. See id. Further, there was substantial proof of appellant's guilt, rendering any impropriety harmless. See id.