Opinion ID: 1155426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the parties intended the oral settlement to be binding or whether the written release was to be the binding agreement.

Text: Thompson asserts that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment dismissing Count Two of the complaint on the ground that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations contained in I.C. § 5-219(4). We agree. The trial court concluded that the settlement agreement between Pike and Vangas' attorney on July 31, 1987, was binding and, therefore, that the statute of limitations for Thompson's malpractice action began running on that date. The court ruled that the two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice actions contained in I.C. § 5-219(4) barred Count Two of the complaint. We first note that Thompson conceded in the trial court and concedes on appeal that if there was a binding settlement agreement on July 31, 1987, any suit against Pike for professional negligence should have been filed within two years of that date. By this concession, Thompson has not distinguished between the claim alleged in Count One of the complaint (negligent advice) and the claim alleged in Count Two (wrongful misrepresentation). Thompson characterizes his claim against Pike in Count Two as a claim for professional negligence. Although we question whether the words used in Count Two to assert Pike's liability (Pike wrongfully misrepresented to [Thompson] that she had entered into a binding settlement with Vangas.) are correctly characterized as professional negligence, we accept Thompson's characterization, because both the trial court in its decision and Pike in her briefs on appeal accept it. In resolving a statute of limitations issue in a professional malpractice case, our focus is usually on the question of when some damage occurred. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991). In this case, the parties have proceeded with the implicit agreement that if a binding oral settlement was reached on July 31, 1987, Thompson suffered damage at that time. Although we question whether Thompson necessarily suffered damage on July 31, 1987, even if the oral settlement was binding, for the purposes of this case, we accept the implicit agreement of the parties on this point and address the issue of whether there was a binding oral settlement on that date. The formation of a contract requires mutual assent. Haener v. Ada County Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170, 173, 697 P.2d 1184, 1187 (1985). A distinct understanding common to both parties is necessary in order for a contract to exist. Hoffman v. S V Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 189, 628 P.2d 218, 220 (1981). It is a question of fact whether mutual assent exists. Glenn v. Gotzinger, 106 Idaho 109, 110, 675 P.2d 824, 825 (1984). The parties' intent determines whether an oral contract was formed when the parties agree to reduce their agreement to a writing. Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396, 400, 582 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978). An oral agreement is valid if the written draft is viewed by the parties as a mere record; the oral agreement is not valid if the parties view the written draft as a consummation of the negotiation. Elliott v. Pope, 42 Idaho 505, 510-11, 247 P. 796, 797 (1926). The intent to have a written contract is shown by factors such as: (1) whether the contract is one usually put in writing, (2) whether there are few or many details, (3) whether the amount involved is large or small, (4) whether it requires a formal writing for a full expression of the covenants and promises, and (5) whether the negotiations indicate that a written draft is contemplated as the final conclusion of negotiations. The burden of proof is on the party asserting that the contract was binding before the written draft was signed. Id. In this case, the evidence is conflicting as to whether the parties intended the oral settlement to be binding or whether they intended the written release to be the binding settlement. During the discussion between Pike and Vangas' attorney on July 31, 1987, Vangas' attorney said he would send Pike an appropriate release for Thompson's signature. Letters written by Pike and Vangas indicate that the parties contemplated a written contract: 1. In Pike's letter to Vangas' attorney confirming the discussions they had on July 31, 1987, Pike stated: I further understand that Mr. Thompson will execute a release in return for payment of said sum. 2. When Vangas' attorney forwarded the written release on August 4, 1987, the attorney included a letter to Pike stating: I would ask you to contact me in the interim to indicate acceptance of the enclosed or discuss any questions you have. 3. Vangas' attorney sent the $15,000 check to Pike and told her to hold it in escrow until the execution of the Full Release and Settlement Agreement by your client. In our view, these statements raise as genuine issue of material fact whether the parties intended the oral settlement of July 31, 1987, to be a binding contract or whether they intended that the written release would be the binding contract. Therefore, the trial court should not have granted summary judgment on the basis of I.C. § 5-219(4).