Opinion ID: 2277764
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: exclusion of testimony regarding the minnesota multiphasic personality inventory

Text: The second issue we address is whether the trial justice erred in excluding from evidence testimony regarding the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) report upon which Dr. Seghorn relied in diagnosing defendant. The debate over the admission of testimony regarding the MMPI arose in the following context. At trial, defense counsel questioned Dr. Seghorn regarding the various psychological tests he had administered in diagnosing defendant. Doctor Seghorn testified that he had administered three tests: the Rorschach (Ink Blot) test, the Thematic Aptitude Test (TAT), and the MMPI. The trial justice allowed Dr. Seghorn to testify regarding the Rorschach test and the TAT. Doctor Seghorn described why he had chosen to administer these tests, how he had administered the tests, and the test results. Defense counsel then attempted to elicit testimony from Dr. Seghorn regarding the MMPI. Doctor Seghorn described the MMPI as an objective diagnostic test consisting of 560 True and False questions. Doctor Seghorn testified that a computer scores the test and generates a list of statements based on a profile analysis of the subject. Doctor Seghorn further testified that he had administered the MMPI several hundred times over the course of fifteen years and that the MMPI is customarily relied upon in the field of psychology. At that point the state objected to both the admission of the MMPI report and testimony regarding the results of the report on the grounds that because a computer scored the test, the results were hearsay. The trial justice correctly overruled the objection and cited Rhode Island law for the proposition that experts may rely upon tests administered by others in rendering a diagnosis. See Rule 703 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence (admitting hearsay evidence if an expert reasonably relies upon it in rendering an opinion). The prosecutor then objected to the admission of the report on the grounds that the MMPI was equivocal. The prosecutor pointed to a caveat in the MMPI report which states: This MMPI interpretation can serve as a useful source of hypotheses about clients   . The personality descriptions, inferences and recommendations contained herein need be verified by other sources of clinical information since individual clients may not fully match this prototype. The trial justice then reviewed the MMPI report and determined that the report was inadmissible because the report was equivocal and unreliable. In support of the trial justice's decision, the state argues that the trial justice correctly exercised his discretion pursuant to Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 states:  [Exclusion] of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.  Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury   . The state also relies on State v. Gomes, 604 A.2d 1249, 1256 (R.I. 1992), where we upheld the decision of a trial justice to exclude expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification on the grounds that such testimony was unreliable and misleading to the jury. We have no argument with the legal principle that a trial justice must find that expert testimony is sufficiently reliable before allowing it to go to the jury. Our review of the record reveals, however, that the trial justice reached an untrained and erroneous conclusion about the reliability of the MMPI report. We begin with the impact of the disclaimer found in the MMPI report. The trial justice determined that this disclaimer rendered the MMPI too inconclusive to be of any help to the jury. As we noted earlier in this opinion, scientific certainty is not the standard for the admission of expert-opinion evidence. State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d at 25; State v. Correra, 430 A.2d at 1254. The degree of inconclusiveness of the MMPI went to the weight to be accorded to the report, not to its admissibility. The trial justice should have allowed Dr. Seghorn to testify why he relied upon the MMPI report and then allowed the prosecutor to question Dr. Seghorn about the equivocality of the report on cross-examination. Next we consider the trial justice's finding that the MMPI was unreliable. The trial justice made his finding of unreliability on the basis of his incorrect interpretation of one of the MMPI questions. Question No. 137 asked defendant to reply True or False to the statement: I believe my homelife [ sic ] is as pleasant as most people I know. The defendant had answered False. The MMPI report placed this answer in the category Situational Stress Due to Alcoholism. The trial justice erroneously believed that defendant had answered, True, to this question. Relying on this error, the trial justice could not conceive how a happy home life could result from alcoholism. The trial justice then concluded that the MMPI report was totally unreliable and excluded testimony regarding the report from evidence. We understand that a decision of the trial justice concerning the admission of evidence is entitled to great deference. State v. Correia, 600 A.2d at 286. Nevertheless, we believe that had the trial justice not misconstrued this MMPI question, he would have reached a different conclusion regarding the reliability of the MMPI report. As Dr. Seghorn testified, the MMPI has been in existence since 1939 and is standard procedure for psychologists in diagnosing patients. In addition, the decisions of other jurisdictions concerning the reliability of the MMPI supports its admission. For example, in People v. Stoll, 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1158, 783 P.2d 698, 711, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 124 (1989), the Supreme Court of California analyzed the reliability of the MMPI and concluded that the test was standard and reliable. In light of this widespread use of the MMPI among psychologists, we conclude that the trial justice abused his discretion in excluding Dr. Seghorn's testimony regarding the MMPI report. For the foregoing reasons we sustain the defendant's appeal, reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand the case to Superior Court for a new trial.