Opinion ID: 2155796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severability of Sec. 59.031, Stats.

Text: Sec. 990.001, Stats., provides: CONSTRUCTION OF LAWS; RULES FOR. In construing Wisconsin laws the following rules shall be observed unless  construction in accordance with a rule would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature: ... (11) Severability. The provisions of the statutes are severable. The provisions of any session law are severable. If any provision of the statutes or of a session law is invalid, ... such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application. In State ex rel. Broughton v. Zimmerman (1952), 261 Wis. 398, 52 N. W. (2d) 903, this court, in citing State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry (1935), 218 Wis. 302, 316, 260 N. W. 486, said (p. 409): `It is well established that the elimination of even material provisions in an act as enacted, because of the invalidity of such provisions, does not render the remaining valid provisions thereof ineffective, if the part upheld constitutes, independently of the invalid portion, a complete law in some reasonable aspect, unless it appears from the act itself that the legislature intended it to be effective only as an entirety and would not have enacted the valid part alone.' Sec. 59.031, Stats., is silent as to the intent of the legislature with respect to the severability and, therefore, the general intent of the legislature as embodied in sec. 990.001 prevails. The county executive under the rule as it now stands, after eliminating the invalid provisions thereof, can still serve as an important factor in the orderly growth and development of a county. We find the remaining provisions of ch. 327, Laws of 1959, to be a complete law, serving a reasonable purpose, and do not violate the one system of county government required in sec. 23, art. IV of the Wisconsin constitution. By the Court.  It is declared and adjudged that those portions of ch. 327, Laws of 1959, sec. 59.031 (2) (b),  Stats., which provides Such appointments shall not require the confirmation of the county board, and sec. 59.031 (5), which confers the power to veto increases or decreases in the budget, and all of sec. 59.031 (6), entitled County executive to approve or veto resolutions or ordinances; proceedings on veto, are invalid. Ch. 327, Laws of 1959, is severable and the invalidity of these portions of the chapter does not invalidate the act as a whole. The demurrer is overruled and the motion to quash denied, and the peremptory writ of mandamus granted. FAIRCHILD, J. ( dissenting in part ). I dissent from the part of the court's judgment which declares the veto provision and part of the appointment provision of ch. 327, Laws of 1959, unconstitutional. We must presume that the legislature had in mind all constitutional requirements, including sec. 23, art. IV. We should view the departures from uniformity which it provided for counties with more than 500,000 inhabitants as modifications which the legislature deemed necessary in order to make the government of a metropolitan county practicable. The legislature concluded that the special needs of a metropolitan county required not only that there be an administrative officer elected at large, but that he have the appointive and veto powers provided. The only question before the court is whether the legislative finding on practicability is so fanciful or completely unfounded in reality that it could not have been made by reasonable men. In my opinion the size and concentration of the population of the county, the size and complexity of its governmental machinery, and the multiplicity of its special problems all reasonably tend to support the conclusion that the modifications made by ch. 327, Laws of 1959, were necessary in order to provide a practicable county government in a metropolitan county. Ch. 327 should not  be viewed as the creation of a second system, but as an adaptation of the existing system to special needs. I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice MARTIN and Mr. Justice BROADFOOT join in this opinion.