Opinion ID: 2307522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Continuing, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Minnesota Court

Text: The term continuing, exclusive jurisdiction is used in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1992) (UIFSA) to indicate that only one tribunal has jurisdiction to modify a child support order at a time and that tribunals in jurisdictions that have enacted UIFSA (1992) have subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the one-order, provided they have personal jurisdiction over the respondent. [19] In this case only one state issued a child support order: Minnesota. [20] Mr. Linn incorrectly asserts that the Delaware Family Court should not recognize the 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order because Minnesota lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify that order when all the parties and the children moved from the state. Delaware enacted the UIFSA (1992) effective July 1, 1995. [21] The controlling section of the Act provides: Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. (a) A tribunal of this State issuing a support order consistent with the law of this State has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order: (1) As long as this State remains the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued; or (2) Until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written consents with the tribunal of this State for a tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. (b) A tribunal of this State issuing a support order consistent with the law of this State may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify the order if the order has been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to a law substantially similar to this chapter. (c) If a child support order of this State is modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to this chapter or a law substantially similar to this chapter, a tribunal of this State loses its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction with regard to prospective enforcement of the order issued in this State, and may only: (1) Enforce the order that was modified as to amounts accruing before the modification; (2) Enforce nonmodifiable aspects of that order; and (3) Provide other appropriate relief for violations of that order which occurred before the effective date of the modification. (d) A tribunal of this State shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal of another state which has issued a child support order pursuant to this chapter or a law substantially similar to this chapter. [22] The Amicus suggests that when sections 205, 206, 611, and 612 [23] of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1992) are read together the sections mean: a tribunal that enters a child support order has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the support order if that state remains the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee or the child; or a tribunal that has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order will be divested of that continuing, exclusive jurisdiction if: A) the obligor, the individual obligee, and the child leave the issuing state and another state assumes continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the child support order in accordance with the terms of §§ 609-614; or B) all the individual parties file written consents with the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of another state to assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter so that it may modify the order. [24] We agree. Although the Delaware Family Court correctly held that the Minnesota Court had jurisdiction to enter its 1995 Arrearages Order, it incorrectly relied on Section 205(a)(2) of UIFSA without considering Sections 611 and 612. We agree with the Amicus that section 205(a)(2) of UIFSA (1992) applies only if at least one of the parties or the child remains in the state and therefore the issuing state still has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, but the parties consent to have another tribunal assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, thereby divesting continuing, exclusive jurisdiction from the issuing state. The facts here are different. The purpose of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1992) is to eliminate multiple child support orders that were permitted under its predecessors, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) and the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1968) (RURESA). [25] The goal of UIFSA (1992) is to provide a system where only one child support order is in effect at any one time. [26] Under URESA and RURESA (1968) an obligor would often attempt to gain a home field advantage by refusing to pay a support order and then wait until the obligee attempted to enforce the order in the obligor's domiciliary jurisdiction. [27] The obligor would then seek a modification in the jurisdiction the obligee did not choose. [28] Under URESA, the obligor often succeeded in obtaining a more favorable support order in the obligor's domiciliary jurisdiction. [29] The intent of UIFSA (1992) was to stop this practice and to level the playing field. [30] Under UIFSA (1992), if either the obligor or obligee wants to modify the order and the issuing state no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the party seeking the modification must bring the action in the state with personal jurisdiction over the respondent, usually the respondent's domiciliary state. [31] Sections 609-614 of UIFSA (1992) provide the process for registration of a child support order for modification. After notice and a hearing, the responding tribunal must find the following requirements of Section 611(a)(1) of UIFSA (1992) exist in order for it to obtain jurisdiction to modify a child support order entered in another state: 1) that the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor no longer reside in the issuing state; 2) that the petitioner seeking modification is not a resident of the responding tribunal's state; and 3) that the responding tribunal has personal jurisdiction over the respondent. [32] Section 611(a)(2) provides an alternative basis for the responding tribunal to obtain jurisdiction to modify the order of another state if it finds that: an individual party or the child is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal and all of the individual parties have filed a written consent in the issuing tribunal providing that a tribunal of this State may modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. [33] Under UIFSA (1992), Mr. Linn could have sought modification of his then current support obligations under the 1983 Minnesota Child Support Order in Ms. Toman's then home state, but he could not have sought modification in his home state, Delaware.