Opinion ID: 1268390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The district court's denial of Zambrana's and Ervin's motions for new trial

Text: Next, Zambrana and Ervin both challenge the district court's denial of their motions for new triala decision that also rested within the court's discretion. See United States v. Palivos, 486 F.3d 250, 254 (7th Cir.2007). Zambrana and Ervin each assert that the district court abused that discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing (in Ervin's case) and by holding an inadequate evidentiary hearing (in Zambrana's case) before denying their motions for new trial. As both men put it, the district court failed to inform its discretion when concluding that the evidence of Arreola's misconduct and the government's alleged suppression of that evidence did not justify a new trial, and thus its denial of their motions should be reversed. However, Zambrana and Ervin have waived any challenge to the manner in which the district court weighed the evidence in support of their motions by failing to object to the court itself regarding the way in which it considered the evidence. See United States v. Haskins, 511 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.2007); United States v. Charles, 476 F.3d 492, 495-96 (7th Cir.2007); United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d 595, 598 (7th Cir.2003) (The general rule within the Seventh Circuit is that if a party fails to file an objection with the district court, he or she `waives the right to appeal all issues, both factual and legal.' (quoting United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1499, 1503 (7th Cir. 1996))). Even more, Ervin did not request an evidentiary hearing on his motion, and further accepted the government's representations regarding Arreola's misconduct and the government's lack of knowledge of the misconduct. Similarly, the district court granted Zambrana's request for an evidentiary hearing, and at that hearing he was allowed to present nine witnesses in support of his motion. The district court never attempted to limit the scope of the hearing, and Zambrana never objected to the manner in which the district court held the hearing. And because both men failed to challenge the manner in which the district court considered the evidence related to their motions for new trial, we will not address the issue here. See Haskins, 511 F.3d at 693; Charles, 476 F.3d at 495-96; Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d at 598. But even if Zambrana and Ervin had preserved their challenges as to how the district court informed its discretion, the arguments would have failed. Because their substantive arguments in support of their motions for new trial are meritless, any purported procedural deficiency in the manner in which the district court weighed the evidence would have been harmless. See United States v. Kelly, 337 F.3d 897, 901-02 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that district court's failure to hold evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether defendant breached plea agreement was harmless when it was clear defendant breached agreement); see also Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 764 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that any error the district court may have committed at evidentiary hearing addressing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was harmless because defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged shortcomings); Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1225-26 (10th Cir.2006) (stating that district court's failure to hold evidentiary hearing on issue of removal was harmless where evidence clearly supported removal: In our view, to reverse and remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing (on nothing), as the State requests, would be a colossal waste of time and resources). Specifically, the evidence of Arreola's misconduct did not justify a new trial as newly discovered evidence. To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show, among other things, that the evidence in question is material and not merely impeaching or cumulative, and that it probably would lead to an acquittal in the event of a new trial. United States v. Hodges, 315 F.3d 794, 801 (7th Cir.2003). And yet the evidence of Arreola's misconduct is both impeaching and cumulative. The evidence did not show, as Zambrana contended before the district court, that Arreola took advantage of his unmonitored telephone calls and visits in jail to discuss with Ripoll and Clinton how to testify. The most that the evidence shows in that regard is that Arreola could have made an unmonitored telephone call to contact Ripoll or Clinton somehow, and that the three men had opportunities to discuss their testimony while they were detained together, such as when Arreola and Clinton were being transferred from the MCC with Cruz. But there is no evidence that suggests that the three men actually coordinated their testimony. To the contrary, at the evidentiary hearing on Zambrana's motion, Ripoll, Arreola, and Clinton each testified that they did not discuss their trial testimony beyond the discussions that they had already described at trial. If anything, then, the evidence of Arreola's misconduct would have been relevant to show that he was an untrustworthy, criminal-minded, and manipulative individual who had the propensity for deception and a willingness to break the law. But at trial, Zambrana and Ervin thoroughly impeached Arreola as to his drug-trafficking past, his gang affiliation, his role in Hurtado's and Nevarez's murders, the lies he previously told to the police investigating the murders, and his misconduct at the MCC. Both men even called character witnesses to impugn Arreola's credibility further. It therefore is unlikely that more evidence describing Arreola's criminal naturethat is, his misconduct at the Hammond City Jailcould sway a new jury to such an extent as to lead it to acquit Zambrana or Ervin. This is particularly so when Arreola was not the only witness to testify that Zambrana and Ervin had helped scheme to rob and to murder Hurtado and Nevarez. See United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201, 1217 (7th Cir.1993) (relying on United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 415 (7th Cir.1991), to determine that newly discovered impeachment evidence did not warrant new trial because conviction was not premised on the demonstrably dubious testimony of a single witness). And because the proof of Arreola's misconduct was merely cumulative impeachment evidence, Zambrana's and Ervin's Brady claims necessarily fail. Brady does not extend to [e]vidence that impeaches an already thoroughly impeached witness. United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 819 (7th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Bailey, 510 F.3d 726, 736 (7th Cir.2007). Although Brady prohibits the government from suppressing evidence that could be used to impeach a government witness, see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); United States v. Dabney, 498 F.3d 455, 459 (7th Cir. 2007), the evidence must be for `more than cumulative impeachment,' Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 819 (quoting United States v. Dweck, 913 F.2d 365, 371 (7th Cir.1990)); see also Bailey, 510 F.3d at 736; United States v. Senn, 129 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir.1997) (Because the defendants did impeach [the witness] on a number of issues, they can't really make a convincing argument that additional impeachment had a reasonable probability of changing the outcome of the trial.). And because Arreola was thoroughly impeached at trial, even if the government had suppressed the evidence of Arreola's misconduct at the Hammond City Jail (which, given the government's explanations, we do not believe to be the case), Zambrana's and Ervin's Brady claims would still fail. See Bailey, 510 F.3d at 736; Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 819. We thus cannot fault the district court for denying Zambrana's and Ervin's motions for new trial.