Opinion ID: 2570544
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Concealment on Voir Dire

Text: We address first the trial court's conclusion that Juror No. 5 concealed his racial bias on voir dire. As we explain, any concealment was unintentional and was insufficient to justify excusing him from the jury in the middle of penalty phase deliberations.
Juror No. 5 filled out his written jury questionnaire; it did not ask him whether he would treat defendant differently because of their shared racial heritage, although the juror did indicate there was nothing about defendant's appearance that would bias him one way or the other. On voir dire, the following took place: THE COURT: Okay. Obviously the defendant is African-American. So are you. Do you think that's going to affect you in any way? [] JUROR No. 5: No. THE COURT: Are you going to cut himas one juror said to me when I was struggling to find words to express this thought, `She means are you going to cut him slack.' Are you going to cut him slack? [] JUROR No. 5: No. THE COURT: Okay. Are you going to be harder on him because he's African-American? [] JUROR No. 5: No. THE COURT: You'll treat him the same as anyone else? [] JUROR No. 5: That is correct. It was during this interaction that the trial court, when it later excused Juror No. 5, said that the juror's body language and demeanor and his questionnaire were somewhat evasive. I remember him crossing his arms and glaring under follow-up questioning quite clearly. During the investigation the trial court undertook in the middle of the penalty phase deliberations, the court asked Juror No. 5 to recall the questioning on voir dire before trial when he had been asked whether the fact that the defendant was African-American, black, would affect [him] in any way, and he had answered in the negative. He affirmed that he had not changed his mind since that time. He explained his position: My son has had everything that an individual would need to . . . come up in this society. He's had a mom and a dad, theall the schools provided, all of the nurturing that a person should have, and if he would make the kind of mistake that was made, I would have no idea as to what decision I would make. He affirmed that he had promised before trial that he would not treat defendant differently due to his race and had not made any statements in the jury room indicating he had gone back on that promise. He agreed that he could follow an instruction that he must set aside bias and prejudice based on race, racial stereotypes and generalizations based on conjecture.
(19) A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to an impartial jury, and the pretrial voir dire process is important because it enables the trial court and the parties to determine whether a prospective juror is unbiased and both can and will follow the law. But the voir dire process works only if jurors answer questions truthfully. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, `Voir dire examination serves to protect [a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial] by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a juror's being excused for cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may assist parties in exercising their peremptory challenges. The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is obvious.' [Citation.] [¶] A juror who conceals relevant facts or gives false answers during the voir dire examination thus undermines the jury selection process and commits misconduct. ( In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 110-111 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466], fn. omitted.) Although intentional concealment of material information by a potential juror may constitute implied bias justifying his or her disqualification or removal [citations], mere inadvertent or unintentional failures to disclose are not accorded the same effect. `[T]he proper test to be applied to unintentional concealment is whether the juror is sufficiently biased to constitute good cause for the court to find under Penal Code sections 1089 and [former] 1123 that he is unable to perform his duty.' ( People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1175 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146]; see People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 644 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509] [quoting McPeters with approval].) The record fails to demonstrate that Juror No. 5 concealed anything. He was never asked whether he would interpret evidence of any abuse defendant may have suffered as a child through the prism of his own experiences; indeed, we expect jurors to use their own life experiences when evaluating the evidence. (See People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 564 [262 Cal.Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129] [`[I]n our heterogeneous society jurors will inevitably belong to diverse and often overlapping groups defined by race, religion, ethnic or national origin, sex, age, education, occupation, economic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation; . . . it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be devoid of opinions, preconceptions, or even deep-rooted biases derived from their life experiences in such groups . . . .'].) Juror No. 5 affirmed during voir dire that he would not consider defendant's race to benefit or disadvantage him and that he would treat him like he would anyone else. When questioned during the penalty phase, he affirmed his views, explaining that he viewed the mitigating evidence favorably because defendant came from a broken, disadvantaged family, not simply because he was African-American. He suggested that had defendant enjoyed the benefits his own son had growing up, he would consider death as a possible penalty for defendant's crimes. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see what Juror No. 5 concealed. The trial court apparently concluded that Juror No. 5 had concealed certain race-based assumptions regarding the nature of family dynamics in African-American families, especially with regard to young men who grow up without strong positive male role models. But Juror No. 5 was never asked about that subject. Moreover, failure to express his views about African-American family dynamics is not the kind of concealment that would justify Juror No. 5's removal from the jury under section 1089, i.e., something showing good cause he was unable to perform his . . . duty [as a juror]. (Italics added.) To conclude otherwise would require accepting the notion that the other jurors were unable to perform their duty because they concealed their unstated assumption that the family dynamics in African-American families were no different from those occurring in non-African-American families, or that young males who grow up fatherless in Black families have exactly the same problems as young men raised without fathers in White, Hispanic or Asian families. We do not purport to resolve these questions, which are more in the realm of sociology and psychology, but we can and do conclude that Juror No. 5 did not conceal his views on the subject because he was never asked about them. Even were we to assume Juror No. 5 concealed his intention to consider his own personal knowledge and experience of African-American families when evaluating the mitigating evidence, any such concealment was clearly unintentional. The trial court plainly found Juror No. 5 was himself unaware of his own allegedly race-based assumptions and thus would be unable to disentangle those allegedly impermissible views from those that he could properly consider. If Juror No. 5 was unaware of his own views, he certainly cannot be held to have intentionally concealed them. Would such unintentional concealment constitute good cause to believe Juror No. 5 was unable to perform his duty under section 1089? ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175.) We conclude not. Although the decision to remove a juror on such grounds is committed to the discretion of trial courts in the first instance, as noted, we review such decisions by asking whether the grounds for such removal appear in the record as a demonstrable reality. ( People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1052.) (20) Considering all the circumstances, any unintentional concealment here does not establish a demonstrable reality that Juror No. 5 was unable to perform his duty as a juror. The circumstance that a juror does not deliberate well or relies upon faulty logic or analysis does not constitute a refusal to deliberate and is not a ground for discharge. Similarly, the circumstance that a juror disagrees with the majority of the jury as to what the evidence shows, or how the law should be applied to the facts . . . does not constitute a refusal to deliberate and is not a ground for discharge. ( People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 485.) It appears that Juror No. 5 simply viewed the evidence differently from the way the rest of the jury viewed it. ( Id. at p. 486.) Juror No. 5's particular view of the evidence, refracted through the prism of his own experience as an African-American man who had raised a son, showed neither a refusal to deliberate nor an inability to perform his duty as a juror to a demonstrable reality. ( People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1052.) Accordingly, to the extent the trial court relied on an alleged unintentional concealment during voir dire as a ground to dismiss Juror No. 5 in the middle of the penalty phase deliberations, it erred.