Opinion ID: 1889517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's Responsibility to Assert the Right

Text: The third Barker factor is defendant's demand for a speedy trial. While the defendant has a right to a speedy trial regardless of whether he makes a demand, assertion of the right is a factor to consider. See Id. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117. It appears from the record before us that Dunaway asserted his right to speedy trial. Because the Commonwealth does not dispute this fact, we do not discuss the propriety of defendant's separate assertions of the right. Such assertions are entitled to strong evidentiary weight in deciding whether the defendant's rights were violated. Id. This factor weighs in favor of the defendant. However, as the Sixth Circuit has noted, a defendant's assertions must be viewed in light of [defendant's] other conduct. United States v. O'Dell, 247 F.3d 655, 671 (6th Cir.2001), quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314, 106 S.Ct. 648, 656, 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 654 (1986). In that case, the court found that six months of frivolous petitions by the defendant reduced the sincerity of defendant's assertion of his right. In the present case, Dunaway refers to delays at the trial court, but never mentions voicing a single objection. As we stated in Gabow: If a defendant acquiesces in a delay, he cannot be heard to complain about the delay. Gabow, 34 S.W.3d at 70. Also, Appellant repeatedly asserts in his brief that he was ready for trial by March 17, 1999. But by April he requested a continuance, and in June he requested another. Appellant's two requested continuances belie his claim of being prepared and further deflate his speedy trial claim. For these reasons, we conclude that Dunaway's assertion of his right weighs in his favor, but not as heavily as it might.