Opinion ID: 2010647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Tests Used by Other Jurisdictions

Text: Courts have applied a variety of tests to grapple with the question of when it is appropriate to force a third party to reveal the identity of a defendant charged with defamation. One of the standards most easily satisfied requires only that the court be convinced that the party seeking the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of [actionable] conduct.... In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372 at , 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000), rev'd on other grounds, America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 542 S.E.2d 377 (2001). In our view, the good faith test insufficiently protects a defendant's anonymity: Plaintiffs can often initially plead sufficient facts to meet the good faith test ... even if the defamation claim is not very strong, or worse, if they do not intend to pursue the defamation action to a final decision. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457. The good faith test and the similarly lax motion to dismiss test may needlessly strip defendants of anonymity in situations where there is no substantial evidence of wrongdoing, effectively giving little or no First Amendment protection to that anonymity. [9] Toward the other end of the spectrum is the test articulated by the New Jersey Superior Court in Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 342 N.J.Super. 134, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (2001), which requires plaintiffs to produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, after which the court would balance the defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the disclosure ... to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed. The Maryland Court of Appeals recently adopted this test in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 407 Md. 415, 966 A.2d 432 (2009). There, a prominent businessman sued a local newspaper company that maintained an internet forum where the public was allowed to comment on community events. Several individuals, identified only by their internet pseudonyms, used this forum to make disparaging comments regarding Brodie's business. Id. at 435, 442-44. Brodie sued the newspaper and the anonymous participants, alleging defamation and conspiracy to defame. Id. at 442. Although the trial court dismissed the newspaper company from the suit, it granted a motion to compel the company to comply with Brodie's subpoena seeking the identities of the anonymous critics. Id. at 445. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed because Brodie had failed to sue, within the time allowed by the statute of limitations, those persons who had actually posted the allegedly defamatory comments. Id. at 449. Although dismissing on procedural grounds, the court adopted the Dendrite test for use in future internet cases: [W]hen a trial court is confronted with a defamation action in which anonymous speakers or pseudonyms are involved, it should, (1) require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, including posting a message of notification of the identity discovery request on the message board; (2) withhold action to afford the anonymous posters a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application; (3) require the plaintiff to identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster, alleged to constitute actionable speech; (4) determine whether the complaint has set forth a prima facie defamation per se or per quod action ...; and (5), if all else is satisfied, balance the anonymous poster's First Amendment right of free speech against the strength of the prima facie case of defamation presented by the plaintiff and the necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity, prior to ordering disclosure. Id. at 457 (emphasis in original). Three judges of the Maryland Court of Appeals concurred with the result, but believed that the final balancing test of the Dendrite standard is unnecessary and needlessly complicated. Id. at 458 (Adkins, J., concurring) (citing Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461). Moreover, they observed, the majority had not explained how the interests that trial courts are to balance differ from the interests that are already balanced in developing the substantive law of defamation. Id. at 459 (Adkins, J., concurring). The concurring opinion in Brodie also articulated an additional reason why we decline to adopt the standard set forth in the majority opinion: the majority is not clear whether or not a plaintiff must make [the] prima facie showing by an affidavit, deposition, or other statement under oath, or whether mere allegations of fact are sufficient. Id. at 457 (Adkins, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court of Delaware adopted a modified version of the Dendrite test in Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, holding that before a defamation plaintiff can obtain the identity of an anonymous defendant through the compulsory discovery process he must support his defamation claim with facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Id. at 460. In other words, and this is an important qualification, the defamation plaintiff, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, must introduce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact for all elements of a defamation claim within the plaintiff's control. Id. at 463 (emphasis in original). In addition, to the extent reasonably practicable under the circumstances, the plaintiff must undertake efforts to notify the anonymous poster that he is the subject of a subpoena or application for order of disclosure [and] withhold action to afford the anonymous defendant a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the discovery request. Id. at 460-61. The important feature of Dendrite and Cahill is to emphasize that the plaintiff must do more than simply plead his case.