Opinion ID: 222432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Conspiracy to Unlawfully Transport Firearms

Text: In addition to the substantive trafficking counts discussed above, Count One of the indictment charged Tyson and Morrell, along with persons known and unknown, with conspiracy to unlawfully transport firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. To sustain Tyson's conviction under this count, the evidence must be sufficient to show that (1) the alleged conspirators shared a common goal or purpose, viz. to traffic firearms illegally, (2) Tyson knew of that purpose and intended to achieve it, and (3) Tyson reached an agreement with his alleged co-conspirators to achieve the conspiracy's aims. United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir.2006); United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir.2001); see also Boria, 592 F.3d at 481 (explaining that the conspiracy's common goal or purpose must be illegal). This Court has characterized the third factor set forth above  an agreement between the defendant and another individual  as the essence of the [conspiracy] offense. Pressler, 256 F.3d at 147. It is, in other words, the sine qua non of the crime itself. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir.1999) (stating that `a conspiracy requires an agreement to commit some other crime beyond the crime constituted by the agreement itself' (quoting United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808 (7th Cir.1994))). When a conspiracy conviction is at issue, we must closely scrutinize the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Schramm, 75 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir.1996) (`[T]he sufficiency of the evidence in a conspiracy prosecution requires close scrutiny.' (quoting United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir.1987))). The reason is self-evident: a defendant's guilt must always remain individual and personal. Boria, 592 F.3d at 480; United States v. Samuels, 741 F.2d 570, 575 (3d Cir.1984). `[S]light evidence of a defendant's connection with a conspiracy is insufficient to support a guilty verdict.' Brodie, 403 F.3d at 134 (quoting Coleman, 811 F.2d at 808). Furthermore, a conspiracy may not be proved merely `by piling inference upon inference' where those inferences do not logically support the ultimate finding of guilt. Id. (quoting Coleman, 811 F.2d at 808). In the instant matter, the District Court held that there was not substantial evidence to prove that Tyson entered into an illicit agreement to traffic firearms with at least one other individual. The government disputes this finding and contends that a reasonable jury could have inferred that Tyson and Morrell entered into an illegal agreement based upon their unusual and suspicious activity in Tennessee and the Virgin Islands. For his part, Tyson argues that the District Court's disposition should be affirmed. Moreover, he claims that his criminal liability is foreclosed as a matter of law by the jury's acquittal of Morrell  Tyson's only alleged co-conspirator. To support this assertion, Tyson invokes the common law rule of consistency, which requires the reversal of a conspiracy conviction when all of a defendant's alleged co-conspirators are acquitted of the same conspiracy charge in the same trial. We begin by addressing Tyson's rule of consistency argument before evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence adduced by the government in its case-in-chief.