Opinion ID: 2516066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Battered-Woman-Syndrome Testimony

Text: [¶ 25] In its case-in-chief, the state called an expert witness to testify regarding the battered woman syndrome. Mr. Skinner argues a portion of the testimony was inadmissible because the expert referenced patterns in domestic violence situations and how a batterer's anger and violence often escalates. Mr. Skinner complains this testimony implied to the jury that he had acted in conformity with the profile of a batterer and, in fact, held a knife to his wife's throat. Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence. This court will generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion. Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo.1999) (citation omitted); see also Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo.2000). We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001). Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination. Id. The burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse. Trujillo, 2 P.3d at 571. If the trial court erred by admitting evidence, we then must ascertain whether the error affects any substantial rights of the accused, providing grounds for reversal, or whether it is harmless. The harmless error standard is set out in W.R.A.P. 9.04: Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing court. See also W.R.Cr.P. 52. An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred. To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo.1990). Solis, 981 P.2d at 36 (some citations omitted); see also Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 52-53 (Wyo.1999). [¶ 26] In Ryan, this court addressed the propriety of allowing an expert to testify, under the scope of the battered woman syndrome, as to the characteristics of batterers and the type of conduct they tend to exhibit. In particular, the expert explained to the jury the concept of separation violence, in which an escalation of violence occurs because perpetrators of domestic violence feel a loss of power and control over their partners when the partners are planning to leave or have left the relationship. 988 P.2d at 53. In Ryan, the expert then testified about the common characteristics of batterers. Id. The court recognized the expert did not specifically state that, because the defendant was violent, he acted in conformity therewith on the night of the murder; rather, the expert subtly and impliedly invited the jury to group the defendant among other batterers to determine his conduct. 988 P.2d at 55. [¶ 27] Although battered-woman-syndrome testimony is admissible and helpful to the jury, it must not run afoul of W.R.E. 404(a) which provides in pertinent part: Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. When battered-woman-syndrome testimony is raised by the state in its case-in-chief and relates to a defendant, as it did in the instant case, the testimony `draws close to commenting directly on what likely happened' and `looks like character evidence after all.' Ryan, 988 P.2d at 55 (quoting Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal Evidence § 637 (2d ed.1994)). Evidence concerning a defendant's involvement demands close scrutiny under the character evidence rules. Id. This is so even if reference to the defendant may only be inferred from the testimony. Id. [¶ 28] The expert in the instant case testified as to the general characteristics and conduct of batterers, with particular focus on the tendency for violence to escalate over time. We discussed this concept in Ryan and stated: Finding guilt by reference to common characteristics of a class of individuals to which one belongs raises the specter of profile evidence. Profile or syndrome evidence is developed through expert testimony and tends to classify people by their shared physical, emotional, or mental characteristics.... Translated into the battering spouse context, a profile is a compilation of characteristics repeatedly seen in those who batter their spouses. Id. We continued: While our research has not disclosed any case dealing specifically with battering spouses, other jurisdictions in different contexts have dealt with similar attempts to construct a criminal profile for the purpose of proving conduct in conformity therewith. Those jurisdictions that have considered profiles of battering parents, pedophiles, rapists, and drug couriers unanimously agree that the prosecution may not offer such evidence in its case-in-chief as substantive evidence of guilt. These cases generally articulate three evidentiary bases for excluding evidence tending to establish that the defendant fits a particular profile: 1) relevancy; 2) probative value substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect; and 3) impermissible character evidence. Id. We recognized that, although profile evidence may be relevant, the danger of unfair prejudice has generally been found to outweigh the probative value, and the profile evidence is often an impermissible attack on the defendant's character. 988 P.2d at 56. Therefore, in Ryan we held the expert's testimony regarding separation violence was inadmissible because it was introduced for the purpose of proving the defendant committed the act in contrast to his assertion that the victim committed suicide. Id. [¶ 29] The expert in the instant case did not directly reference the particular character traits of Mr. Skinner. He did, however, explore the general cycle of violence, the shortened period of remorse, the escalation of violence, and the patterns of control. The use of profile testimony has been examined in the following way: Strictly speaking, the data offered to create a social framework are not character evidence, since they do not pertain to a person's character or a trait of his character. Rather, the research describes the behavior of groups or other persons. Yet the purpose of offering character evidence is similar to the purpose of introducing social frameworks: to provethat is, to make more probable or less probable that an individual acted in conformity with an established pattern. By definition, knowledge of the general pattern of an individual's behavior (i.e., his or her character)like knowledge of the general pattern of behavior in persons in the groups to which he or she belongsallows one to recalculate the probabilities that the person acted in a certain way on a given occasion. The policy concern that gave rise to a rule barring the admissibility of evidence of an individual's characteristic behavior applies with equal force to the use of information on behavior characteristic of the groups to which he or she belongs: individuals should be accountable for their specific acts and not for their general proclivities. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 Va. L.Rev. 559, 581 (1987). The following aptly describes the most appropriate guideline: However firm the libertarian values barring the admission of character evidence, modern evidence law, as exemplified by the Federal Rules, contains several important exceptions allowing the introduction of character evidence. In criminal proceedings, the defendant may offer evidence of his or her own character and, if this occurs, the prosecution may offer character evidence in rebuttal. The defendant also may offer evidence of the victim's character, and if this occurs, the prosecution again may offer character evidence in rebuttal. In either civil or criminal proceedings, any party may offer evidence of the character of a witness. In addition, the prohibition against character evidence operates only when that evidence is used to prove that a person acted in conformity with his or her character on a particular occasion. Character evidence may be admissible for many other purposes such as proof of knowledge, intent, or preparation. The rule against character evidence, therefore, suggests a bar to some, but by no means all, applications of social frameworks. Where traditional forms of character evidence are prohibited, social frameworks also should be barred; where traditional forms of character evidence are allowed, there is no reason to prohibit social frameworks. Id. at 581-82. The introduction of the battered woman syndrome should not be a prosecutorial tool to covertly allow expert testimony regarding the dynamics and propensities of batterers intended to show a defendant acted in conformity therewith during the incident at issue. [¶ 30] In this case, the assault itself was undisputed. Mr. Skinner did not first open the door to character testimony, and the testimony did not have an alternate proper evidentiary purpose such as intent or motive. Mr. Skinner argues the only purpose of the expert testimony regarding the behavior of a batterer was to leave the implication that, because he had a history of battering his wife, he had, in fact, threatened his wife with a knife, thus constituting aggravated assault. Under these circumstances, the profile testimony is inadmissible. [¶ 31] Applying the harmless error analysis, we cannot discern from the record a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to Mr. Skinner if the error had never occurred. The expert's testimony, while discussing the pattern of escalating violence, did not suggest the escalation would typically include the use of a deadly weapon, such as a knife. The victim ultimately testified, confirming her initial statement to the police at the time of the assault, that Mr. Skinner had threatened her with a knife. The jury also heard about Mr. Skinner's additional assault on his wife after his arrest and the threats he made against her if she testified at trial that he had used a knifea fact that most likely persuaded the jury he had done so. The knife was also found in his pocket. There was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude the knife was used without drawing any indirect inference from the expert's profile testimony which covered only seven pages of the more than 530 pages of transcript. In closing argument, the state did not unduly reference the objectionable testimony. See Ryan, 988 P.2d at 57. Instead, the prosecutor made only two brief remarks regarding the expert's testimony, and neither referenced the profile-of-batterers testimony. Rather, the remarks were directed at the victim's behavior which is entirely appropriate. See 988 P.2d at 55, 57. We conclude the error did not affect Mr. Skinner's substantial rights and, therefore, was harmless.