Opinion ID: 1543478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right of Allocution is Required in Resentencing.

Text: We begin our analysis with the acknowledgment that a trial judge has very broad discretion in sentencing. Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 199, 772 A.2d 273, 277 (2001); Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 516, 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996); Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 531, 671 A.2d 501, 505 (1996); Jennings v. State, 339 Md. 675, 683, 664 A.2d 903, 907 (1995); Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 265, 647 A.2d 1204, 1209 (1994); State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992); Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480, 425 A.2d 632, 642 (1981). Nonetheless, we have made clear that the trial judge should tailor the criminal sentence to fit the `facts and circumstances of the crime committed and the background of the defendant, including his or her reputation, prior offenses, health, habits, mental and moral propensities, and social background.' Jackson, 364 Md. at 199, 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting Poe, 341 Md. at 532, 671 A.2d at 505). It is well established that: `only three grounds for appellate review of sentences are recognized in this State: (1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated by ill-will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and (3) whether the sentence is within statutory limits.' Jackson, 364 Md. at 200, 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting Gary, 341 Md. at 516, 671 A.2d at 496); citing Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 370, 470 A.2d 337, 340 (1984); see generally Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632 (1981); Kaylor v. State, 285 Md. 66, 400 A.2d 419 (1979); Clark v. State, 284 Md. 260, 396 A.2d 243 (1979). This case does not involve a contention that the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment or that it was not within statutory limits. It does, however, demand a discussion under (2), particularly as it pertains to whether the trial court during sentencing was motivated by ... impermissible considerations. To be sure, the trial court correctly noted that the case was remanded for merger. This does not mean, however, that the hearing was confined simply and solely to the implementation of that mandate. To accomplish merger a new resentencing was required, and because mitigating evidence may be offered at a sentencing, the petitioner was within his right to raise the issue and the trial court should have considered such evidence as may have been offered by him. The first question that must be asked and answered is whether a resentencing or a new sentence is a sentencing. The answer is yes. Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972) is clear on this point. In Bartholomey, the decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), prompted this Court summarily [to] vacate[] death sentences imposed in 120 other cases then pending on its docket ... and remand[ ] all the cases `for further proceedings.' 267 Md. at 183, 297 A.2d at 700. In one of the cases on review in Bartholomey, Sterling v. State, 248 Md. 240, 235 A.2d 711 (1967), in which the defendant was sentenced to death for rape, Bartholomey, 267 Md. at 191, 297 A.2d at 704, the sentencing court, in error, despite the vacating of that sentence pursuant to Furman, automatically mandate[d] imposition of the next most severe penalty. Bartholomey, 267 Md. at 191, 297 A.2d at 704. We reversed. Id. at 192, 297 A.2d at 705. We stated: [o]n the contrary, in resentencing ... the sentencing court must approach its task [of sentencing] as if no sentence had ever been imposed. Id. at 193, 297 A.2d at 706. The trial court is charged, therefore, with exercising its sentencing discretion as if the sentence was occurring for the first time. Id. During resentencing, therefore, especially one where the mandate specifies, for a new sentence the Maryland courts must rely on the standard rules of sentencing. This comports with Maryland Rule 4-342(a) [2] which provides: Applicability. This Rule applies to all cases except those governed by Rule 4-343. [3]  [A]ll cases include resentencings. Before a sentence is imposed, a defendant's long-recognized right of allocution is triggered. In Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d 120 (1986), a case which concerned the right of allocution for a defendant sentenced to death, this Court confirmed the deep roots allocution has within this State's jurisprudence. It stated: The right of allocution existed in 1776 in essentially the form above outlined: it was a formal, narrowly defined right viewed as an essential part of the criminal sentencing procedure. This, therefore, was the nature of the common law right originally secured for the citizens of Maryland by Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights.    As sentencing statutes prescribing ranges of penalties rather than fixed penalties became more common, judicial discretion assumed a significant role in the sentencing process. Presumably in response to the trial courts' newly vested discretion, the scope of allocution was broadened, permitting a criminal defendant to inform the court of any mitigating factors relevant to sentencing, or simply to plead for leniency. Id. at 354-55, 509 A.2d at 125 (footnote omitted). Allocution `provides a unique opportunity for the defendant himself to face the sentencing body ... and to explain in his own words the circumstances of the crime' as well as `his feelings regarding his conduct, culpability, and sentencing.' Shifflett v. State, 315 Md. 382, 386, 554 A.2d 814, 816 (1989) (quoting Harris, 306 Md. at 358, 509 A.2d at 127). Section (f) of Rule 4-342 controls how a trial court should treat allocution. It states: (f) Allocution and information in mitigation. Before imposing sentence, the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally and through counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment. Rule 4-342(f). Case law speaks in terms of the type of information the court may consider. See Bartholomey, 267 Md. at 193, 297 A.2d at 706 ([T]he sentencing judge may inquire into the past criminal record of the defendant and hear evidence and receive reports in aggravation or mitigation of punishment; the inquiry of the judge is not limited by the strict rules of evidence and he is invested with wide discretion in determining the sentence to be imposed within the authorized statutory limits.); Purnell v. State, 241 Md. 582, 585, 217 A.2d 298, 300 (1966)(It is almost, if not universally, held that opprobrious or kindly and commendable action on the part of a convict may be considered in sentencing as a matter either of aggravation or mitigation of possible punishment.); Farrell v. State, 213 Md. 348, 131 A.2d 863 (1957). This Court has made clear, however, that the Rule itself is not permissive. See Kent v. State, 287 Md. 389, 393, 412 A.2d 1236, 1238 (1980). In Kent, the issue was the validity of a sentence imposed in violation of Rule 772 d, the predecessor of Rule 4-342. That Rule provided: `Allocution. `Before imposing sentence the court shall inform the defendant that he has the right, personally and through counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment, and the court shall afford an opportunity to exercise this right.' Kent, 287 Md. at 393, 412 A.2d at 1238. As to the effect of the Rule, we stated: Considering the language of the rule, its requirements are clearly mandatory. Brown v. State, 11 Md.App. 27, 272 A.2d 659, cert. denied, 261 Md. 722 (1971). See also In re James S., 286 Md. 702, 410 A.2d 586 (1980); State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979); Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978). Id. at 393, 412 A.2d at 1238. In a footnote the Court reasoned: The history of Rule 772 d, which was previously numbered Rule 761 a, confirms that it was intended to be mandatory. An excellent discussion of the rule and the right to allocution generally, including the history of the right and cases in other jurisdictions, is contained in Judge Thompson's opinion for the Court of Special Appeals in Brown v. State, 11 Md.App. 27, 272 A.2d 659, cert. denied, 261 Md. 722 (1971). Id. at 393 n. 3, 412 A.2d at 1238 n. 3. To be sure, in the evolution of this Rule, the trial court's responsibility has diminishedno longer is a trial court required to inform the defendant of his or her right of allocution. Under Rule 4-342, the court is required only to afford the defendant the chance to make a statement and to present information. On this point, this Court, in State v. Lyles, 308 Md. 129, 133, 517 A.2d 761, 763 (1986), stated: In our view there is simply no requirement that the court inform the accused of his right to allocute under the present rule. Rule 4-342 is somewhat different than former Rule 772(c). The former rule, by its terms, required the court to inform an accused that he has the right, personally and through counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment before sentence was imposed. The rule also required the court to afford the defendant an opportunity to exercise this right. The requirement that the court inform the accused of this right was eliminated in the present version of the rule leaving only the requirement that an opportunity to make a statement be afforded. The requirement that the petitioner have an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence was not complied with here. See Shifflett, 315 Md. at 388, 554 A.2d at 817(footnote omitted)(That rule requires that the court afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and present information in mitigation of punishment.). Indeed, the opportunity was denied even though, in the instant case, the petitioner requested the opportunity to present mitigating evidence; he was told, in effect and in fact, that he was not entitled to such an opportunity. That ruling directly violated Md. Rule 4-342(f). Affirming that the requirement that there be an opportunity to present mitigating evidence is mandated is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) [4] . Addressing the perimeters of the trial court's authority on resentencing, the Court instructed: A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in other words, from imposing a new sentence, whether greater or less than the original sentence, in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant's `life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.' Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 [69 S.Ct. 1079, 1082, 93 L.Ed. 1337, 1341 (1949) ]. Such information may come to the judge's attention from evidence adduced at the second trial itself, from a new presentence investigation, from the defendant's prison record, or possibly from other sources. The freedom of a sentencing judge to consider the defendant's conduct subsequent to the first conviction in imposing a new sentence is no more than consonant with the principle, fully approved in Williams v. New York, supra , that a State may adopt the `prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.' Id., at 247[, 69 S.Ct. at 1083, 93 L.Ed. at 1342]. Id. at 723, 89 S.Ct. at 2079-80, 23 L.Ed.2d at 668. Although, in Pearce, a conviction, rather than a sentence, had been vacated, the underlying rationale is the same. The Court of Special Appeals, relying heavily on this passage from Pearce, stresses that the petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that he had new life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities since the first trial and sentencing. Whether any burden of proof is imposed on a defendant, the petitioner, in this case, was never given the opportunity, prescribed by Rule 4-342(f), to meet it. In response to the petitioner's indication that he wanted to present mitigating evidence, the trial court stated: I don't believe there is anything to mitigate on. I think this was sent back for merger. Even if the petitioner had new information or evidence, the opportunity for him to have introduced it was foreclosed. The trial court thus treated the proceeding as being one for the limited purpose of merging two counts. It was unwilling to hear what the petitioner's defense counsel had to say, and, unfortunately, the petitioner neither pursued nor pushed the issue. The remand hearing was for the purpose of resentencing the petitioner. Therefore, the trial court was required, as with any sentencing proceeding, to listen to the evidence and to decide whether to accept, or refuse, it as mitigation. This Court does not share the Court of Special Appeals' confidence that there was no new, and possibly pertinent, information to be adduced, as the opportunity to present it was precluded by the trial court's refusal to consider the matter of mitigation. It is this Court's position that the trial judge has to consider mitigating evidence when it is offered; it may, but need not, accept it. Nor is this Court to be understood as holding that the petitioner's right to allocate is unbridled. In Harris v. State, 306 Md. at 359, 509 A.2d at 127, we made this point with clarity. There, commenting on the trial court's authority to control allocation, we said: [W]e do not suggest that the exercise of this right [of allocution] may be unlimited as to either duration or content. Although a sentencing court may not deny a defendant who elects to allocute a fair opportunity to exercise his right, the court may in its discretion curtail allocution that is irrelevant or unreasonably protracted. Id. A related issue is the extent to which the trial court's sentencing role in this case was limited by the decision of the Court of Special Appeals. Albeit involving a different judicial relationship than at issue hererather than the appellate court to trial court (law of the case), it involved judges of the same bench, one the original sentencing judge and the other, his successorthe decision of the intermediate appellate court, in Sanders v. State, 105 Md. App. 247, 659 A.2d 356, is instructive on the issue. When, at his resentencing for use of a handgun in the commission of a felony [5] , id. at 249, 659 A.2d at 357, the defendant, Sanders, attempted to introduce mitigating evidence, the trial court stifled the effort, stating, `I'm certainly impressed by your eloquence and the fact that you've made so much of your life. I'm also though, stuck with a handicap that because I was appointed to take Judge Pines's place and tried to stand in his shoes ... it's hard for me to sort of second guess what he would or would not do.' Id. at 251, 659 A.2d at 358. Not satisfied with the trial court's resolution of the issue, the Court of Special Appeals, relying on Danna v. State, 91 Md.App. 443, 605 A.2d 150 (1992), pointed out that a resentencing judge could consider matters subsequent to the original sentencing. Sanders, 105 Md.App. at 254, 659 A.2d at 360. Given the trial judge's discretion and the importance of allocution, the court concluded: It is apparent from the record that the resentencing judge felt bound by the nature of the sentence imposed by the original trial judge. Prior to hearing the evidence by Sanders's and his counsel, the judge checked with defense counsel to be sure that the earlier sentence had been imposed consecutively. Prior to announcing the sentence, the judge noted Sanders's accomplishments but then he said that he was `stuck with a handicap' and had to `stand in [Judge Pines's] shoes.' He indicated that it was hard to `second guess what [Judge Pines] would or would not do,' and then he imposed virtually the same sentence as Judge Pines had, simply reducing it to the maximum that was legally allowed. The law requires the judge to conduct his own inquiry and to reach his own sentence based upon the evidence before him. Because it appears that the judge erroneously felt constrained to follow his predecessor's decision and was therefore motivated by impermissible considerations, Sanders is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 256-57, 659 A.2d at 361. We agree with the reasoning of Sanders. In this case, under these circumstances, the trial judge's role was not as limited as the trial court portrayed it. From the trial judge's statement, I think this was sent back for merger, it can be inferred that he believed that his instructions from the Court of Special Appeals were to merge two charges, and nothing more, and for that reason, he was not permitted to consider mitigating evidence. Significantly, the mandate of the intermediate appellate court, by its express language, called for the imposition of a new sentence in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. That the Court of Special Appeals indicated that the new sentence be consistent with the views it expressed required that certain enumerated charges be merged, to be sure, but that directive did not limit the proceedings to that action alone. Neither its opinion nor its mandate precluded the trial court from hearing mitigating evidence. As we have seen, while what the trial court makes of evidence offered in mitigation is a matter entrusted to its discretion, its application of Rule 4-342(f), however, is mandatory. The trial court was required to afford the defendant the opportunity ... to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment. See Rule 4-342(f). Where there is a violation of th[is] rule, the remedy is resentencing. Kent, 287 Md. at 393-94, 412 A.2d at 1238; see Rome v. State, 236 Md. 583, 589, 204 A.2d 674, 677-78 (1964).