Opinion ID: 1057569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Existence of Statute of Limitations

Text: Notwithstanding the analysis above, Plaintiffs attempt to satisfy their burden of establishing that the legislature intended to imply a private right of action by invoking the TTPA's statute of limitations: [n]o action shall be brought by a pledgor against a title pledge lender in connection with a title pledge agreement or property pledge agreement more than one (1) year after the date of the alleged occurrence of any violation of this chapter. Tenn.Code Ann. § 45-15-104(b). In other words, Plaintiffs argue that the mere inclusion of a statute of limitations is tantamount to implied legislative intent to create a private right of action. Plaintiffs provide no case law to support the proposition that a statute of limitations provision should be alone sufficient to imply a private right of action. Indeed, Plaintiffs rely on a case involving a statutory scheme that, by their own admission, did not have a statute of limitations. In Pratt v. Smart Corp., the Court of Appeals held that the Medical Records Act of 1974 authorized a private cause of action by a patient against the independent copying service that processed the plaintiff's request for her hospital records and allegedly charged unreasonable fees. 968 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997). The Court of Appeals held that the Medical Records Act clearly contemplates private actions to remedy violations of its terms because the statute contained a provision for the recovery of `actual damages in a civil action for willful or reckless or wanton' violations of the statute. Id. at 872-73 (quoting Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-11-311(b) (1992)). Because the Medical Records Act has no statute of limitations and because the version of the TTPA in effect here had no provision for the recovery of actual damages for violations of any of its terms, Pratt is unhelpful in resolving the question before us. Additionally, Plaintiffs have not cited, and we have not independently discovered, any Tennessee decision inferring a private right of action in a statutory scheme with its own statute of limitations. Therefore, we have reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions concerning implied rights of action in statutory schemes that contain a limitations provision (or some other language prescribing the time in which suit may be brought). The results, admittedly, are mixed. Compare Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 147 Wash.App. 704, 197 P.3d 686, 691, 695 (2008) (holding that statutory provision did not confer express or implied right of action, where another provision in the statutory scheme imposed a five-year statute of limitations), cert. granted, 166 Wash.2d 1005, 208 P.3d 1124 (Wash.2009), and Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 598 (Utah 2003) (refusing to find implied private right of action for statutory violations on the basis of mere allusion to bringing a civil action in a staying provision), with Bailey v. Defenbaugh & Co. of Cleveland, Inc., 513 F.Supp. 232, 240-41 (N.D.Miss. 1981) (finding an implied right of action because the statutory scheme contained a limitations provision and, therefore, exclusive enforcement by the state would defeat legislative intent). As we stated in Premium Finance Corp., [a]lthough the decisions of our sister states are persuasive, they do not substitute for our own stated principles for determining whether a statute creates a cause of action. 978 S.W.2d at 93. We must give effect to every word, phrase, clause, and sentence in constructing a statute. Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 828 (Tenn. 1996). The legislative history is entirely silent concerning the statute of limitations provision in section 45-15-104(b). Here, instead of creating a private right of action, the TTPA's statute of limitations has the effect of modifying the general statutes of limitations that would otherwise apply to causes of action that title pledgors can bring under the common law in connection with a title pledge agreement. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 45-15-104(b). Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-101 (2000), [a]ll civil actions ... shall be commenced after the cause of action has accrued, within the periods prescribed in this chapter, unless otherwise expressly provided. (Emphasis added). Accordingly, if the TTPA did not have its own limitations provision, the statutes of limitations set forth in Title 28, Chapter 3 would control. For example, without the TTPA's statute of limitations, title pledgors would have six years after the accrual of a cause of action for breach of contract to bring suit against the title pledge lender. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-109(a)(3) (2000). Similarly, title pledgors would ordinarily have three years from accrual to bring an action for common-law fraud, see id. § 28-3-105(1) (2000), and/or conversion, see id. § 28-3-105(2). However, the TTPA otherwise expressly provide[s] the time in which title pledgors may bring their actions. Therefore, when the title pledgor brings a common law action against a title pledge lender in connection with a title pledge agreement, id. § 45-15-104(b), the specific one-year statute of limitations in the TTPA prevails over the general statutes of limitations in Title 28, Chapter 3. [13] See Dobbins v. Terrazzo Mach. & Supply Co., 479 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tenn.1972); see also Brewer v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 226, 229-30 (Tenn.1999). This construction gives effect to the TTPA's statute of limitations while respecting the legislature's decision to enforce the statute through criminal penalties and its silence concerning its intentions whether to create a private right of action. The subsequent history of the TTPA supports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to imply a private right of action in the version of the statute that was in effect when Plaintiffs filed this action. The 2005 amendments included express private rights of action in two specific circumstances. First, where the title pledge lender makes a loan without a license, that loan is void, and the statute allows the pledgor to bring an action against the lender to recover the sums paid and the property pledged, as well as attorney's fees and costs. Act of May 27, 2005, ch. 440, § 4, 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1045, 1047-48 (codified at Tenn.Code Ann. § 45-15-105(b) (2007)). Second, the 2005 amendments require an applicant for a title pledge license to obtain a surety bond or irrevocable letter of credit in specified amounts. Id. § 5, 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts at 1049 (codified at Tenn.Code Ann. § 45-15-106(d)(3) (2007)). The subparagraph then goes on to state that, in the event of the title pledge lender's non-payment, the unpaid person may sue the lender on the surety bond or irrevocable letter of credit. Id., 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts at 1049-50. Upon enacting the 2005 amendments to the TTPA, the legislature was presumptively aware of the statute of limitations that it had already enacted. See Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn.2010); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn.2008). Nonetheless, the legislature explicitly authorized pledgors to sue unlicensed lenders and unpaid persons to sue lenders on the surety bond or irrevocable letter of credit. The subsequent inclusion of certain express private rights of action in the 2005 amendments cuts against Plaintiffs' argument that, by previously including a statute of limitations, the legislature expressed its manifestly clear intent to imply a private right of action on behalf of title pledgors to enforce the TTPA's provisions.