Opinion ID: 2255082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Trial Record

Text: In addition to being conclusory, the petitioner's claim of unfitness to stand trial is belied by the record. See, e.g., Torres, 228 Ill.2d at 396, 320 Ill.Dec. 874, 888 N.E.2d 91 (noting that postconviction petitioner abandoned his claim that he had not understood the consequence of his guilty plea because the claim was belied by the record of the guilty-plea proceeding and is therefore frivolous and patently without merit). Before the bench trial began, defense counsel presented a signed jury waiver. The trial court asked petitioner if he had signed the document. He answered, Yes, sir. The trial court asked if he understood that he was giving up his right to a jury trial. He responded, Yes. The trial court explained that if he had a jury trial, the jurors would be selected by defense counsel and the prosecutor and that the function of the jury would be to decide whether he was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further explained that he could not be found guilty unless all 12 jury members concluded, after considering the evidence, that he was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also noted that in a bench trial, the same reasonable doubt standard would apply. The court then asked petitioner if he understood the distinction between a bench trial and a jury trial. He responded, Yes, sir. Finally, the court asked petitioner if it was still his decision and desire to give up his right to a jury trial. He answered, Yes. Petitioner's intent to commit suicide by police was brought out on cross-examination of one of the State's witnesses, Elei Romero, who testified that when the police told petitioner to drop the object he was holding, which they then believed was a screwdriver, he said only, `Come. Shoot me. Come. Shoot me.' Defense counsel asked this witness how far away petitioner was from the officer when he said Shoot me. The witness stated that defendant was within about 15 feet of the officer. In his argument on the motion for a verdict of not guilty at the close of the State's case, counsel noted that his client was standing in front of several armed officers with their guns drawn, holding a knife, saying shoot me. He argued that not only was petitioner not in a position to kill any of the officers, suggesting he lacked the intent to kill, but that his actions guaranteed that he was going to get shot and he knew it. After denial of the defense motion for a verdict of not guilty, defense counsel informed the court that petitioner did not intend to testify. The trial court explained the significance of the denial of the defense motion. The trial court informed petitioner, You have the right to testify. You have the right to call witnesses. Do you have witnesses? Are there witnesses that are available that you wanted called in this case? Petitioner responded: Your honor, I don't have any witnesses. My witness was Gloria Flores, but the State somehow obtained her on their side now. I have letters and stuff that she wrote me. At the beginning she was on my side. The following exchange then occurred: COURT: You understand you have a right to testify, too, and you have a right to take the witness stand, to be sworn to tell your side off the story under oath  BROWN: Yes, sir. COURT: To be examined by your lawyer as well as by the State's Attorneys and to tell whatever you can recall about what occurred that evening. Do you understand that? BROWN: Yes, sir. COURT: And from what your lawyer has indicated, you've told him you don't wish to testify? BROWN: Yes, sir. COURT: Has anybody promised you anything to cause you to make that decision? BROWN: No, sir. No, sir. COURT: Has anybody threatened you to make you not want to testify? BROWN: No, sir. In his final closing argument, defense counsel argued that if petitioner wanted anybody killed, it was himself and that his intent to provoke the officers to shoot him created a reasonable doubt of his intent to kill. The trial court found petitioner guilty, concluding that his advancing toward the officer while brandishing a knife, along with his announced intention to kill a police officer, provided a sufficient basis to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on the evidence and the arguments of defense counsel, the trial court was aware that the defense theory of the case was that petitioner was acting out of his own wish to die and that he lacked intent to kill the police officer. Thus, the court was aware that the petitioner was potentially suicidal. Clearly, the court found that a desire to commit suicide by police and intent to kill a police officer are not mutually exclusive states of mind. The court then ordered a presentence report. Petitioner cooperated with the presentence investigation. He gave a detailed social history. In addition to the three children he has with Gloria Flores, he reported having four other children with two other women. He stated that he dropped out of high school as a freshman because his girlfriend was pregnant. He stated a goal of obtaining his GED certificate. Petitioner described working as a security officer prior to his arrest and a previous job as a forklift operator. He reported taking pain medication for his gunshot wounds. He also reported having been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and depression in 2000 and taking daily doses of three prescribed psychotropic medications. He described his drinking habits, including having consumed beer and a bottle of tequila on the day of his arrest, and his former drug addiction. He denied any former gang affiliation and reported spending his free time playing chess and reading the Bible. He specifically declined to comment on his version of the offense of which he was convicted. Nothing in this report suggests that petitioner was confused or otherwise unable to fully participate in the interview process. The interviewer did not report observing any deficit in attention, communication, or understanding. On January 31, 2004, a hearing was held on the defense motion for a new trial. Again, defense counsel argued that the evidence did not prove intent to kill. The motion was denied and the matter proceeded to sentencing. The court ascertained that both attorneys had read the presentence report and asked defense counsel if there were any modifications or corrections to be made to the report. Defense counsel said there were not. After hearing from both attorneys on sentencing, the court asked petitioner if he wanted to take the opportunity to speak on his own behalf. He read a statement that he had written: To the judge or to whoever it may concern, on October 8th '02, I got mad at Gloria and I left the house. She followed me, yelling at me and me at her. I got mad because I felt that she was cheating on me. We had this problem for some time. At the time I felt very depressed. I did not know why, but I felt like this a lot. I was going through depression. I even tried to kill myself more than one time. So when I left, I went by my mother's house and sat in my van and drank about three-and-a-half six packs. And I was feeling depressed. When I came back home, I threw the keys on the floor at the front door and left. Gloria picked them up and I went back, knocked on the window and Gloria opened the door. We were talking. Me, Gloria, and Maria. I opened the bottle of tequila and drank it. At some time I took a nap. I got up and me and Gloria started arguing again. I got mad and threw a glass of tequila. Gloria ran upstairs, and I told her to go ahead and call the police because I was going to kill myself and the police. Now, I went to the kitchen and grabbed some knives. I think I even grabbed a fork too. And I went out into the  stood in the doorway. Gloria's sister came out her door upstairs, and I told her I was going to kill myself and the police. And I waited for the police. Now, at the moment that Gloria ran upstairs, I remembered that I had seen on the news about two to three weeks ago that a man was shot and killed by police because he had a big knife, a machete. He was waiving it like a crazy man and the police killed him. So I thought by me grabbing the knife, that the police will kill me. At around that  okay. Grabbing a small knife, I believe waiving it around the police would kill me. Now, I could have stabbed the police at any time, but I did not. The police shot me in my leg, so I knew that they were not going to kill me. I tried to walk to my van that was on the corner at the time. I was walking on the fence with my right hand on the fence and I did not have the knife. The police shot me in my back. When I fell on the floor and grabbed my side, I still wanted to die. So when the paramedics came, I pushed them away and when I was in the hospital, I still wanted to die. I told the doctor to leave me alone. I was not going to sign anything. I did not want to kill anyone, and I did not plan to kill anyone. And I did not plan to kill the police. If I would have planned to kill anyone, I would have grabbed my rifle that I had at the time. But I did not because I did not plan to do anything that day. I just got mad and I wanted to die. Now, I did not do anything to hurt Gloria for her to call the police and threw a glass. When she ran upstairs, I knew that she was going to call the police. So I told her to go ahead and I threw some furniture. I was upset. I wanted to die that night or should I say that morning. I was not thinking of the consequences. I just wanted to die. Now, since I came to Cook County jail, ten months ago, I had two choices, one to join a gang or to open a bible. I opened the bible. And I am  I made a friend Martin. He's a born again Christian, and he helped me a lot to get through this time in jail. Now I am a born again Christian, and I know I have a reason to live. That is for my kids, all of them, and my stepdaughter. There are so many things I need to teach them, so they do not do the same mistakes I have. And this is the first time I have been in jail longer than a week and the experience was good for me. I am not drinking any more. I do not want to kill myself. I want to live. I take the medicine I need which I stopped taking in the world. I know that I need this medicine, so I do not feel depressed. I have to deal with my problems and stop trying to kill myself. Now, I still have all the problems in the world. And I  and a thousand more. But I have to deal with them, and I know that I will not try to kill myself or act crazy with anyone or the police in here or outside because I am taking my medication. I know that I have to deal with my problems. And when I feel bad or down, I open my bible to help me with my problems in my life. I am not the same person that I was before. Now since I went to trial, some people have told me because I take medication, psych medication that I was supposed to have a psych evaluation and that I could not have gone to trial. I do not know if this is true. I will find out. But I know that I am not happy with the decision that happened on the last court date. I think my lawyer should have brought up all these things about me. Now I made a statement at the police  at the hospital to a woman who told  I told her that I had  that I  that I  I told her that I had a small knife that I pulled out of my pocket, and I wouldn't put it down. The police shot me in my leg and in my back. And I got up and they shot me again. I did not have the knife. Now my lawyer did not bring up all these things of what happened to the statement. All my lawyer did was promise that I will go home. Now my mother tells me that I'm looking at one to 20 for something I did not do. Instead of taking the three years that state's attorney offered me that I wanted to, but my lawyer told me that I was going home. There should be something I could do about these things. I can  I do not want to hurt anyone. I just wanted  went about things the wrong way because I wanted to die that day. Even on my last court date, I felt like I wanted to die. I know I have to deal with this problem. I am sorry for my mistake. I have been here ten months. I do not know how much longer or if or when I get out. I know I need to do three things. One, I need my medication. And I have to take it every day to get better, so I do not  so I could get better and get through the day. Two, get in some kind of inpatient or outpatient program and never drink any kind of alcohol. Three, find good church. If you need to find out more, you can ask my mother, and Gloria, the paramedics, the doctor, the woman that took my statements, they know that these things I say are true. Now everything I say in this letter is what I feel and know is the truth. And I feel if you ask the police or Gloria if I could have stabbed the police at any time, they will say yes. But I did not stab or injure the police because I did not want to hurt anyone. I just wanted to  wanted the police to kill me. And if you ask the police or Gloria if this is more than just an assault on police because I pushed the officer's gun, I will guess  I guess  just scared them and they will say, yes. Now, I got what I asked for because I wanted them to kill me and shoot me and kill me. Your honor, these are  I've been taking psych medication since I came in here. These are proof and I was taking psych medication before I came. This is from the world [referring to documents]. At this point, the trial court interrupted petitioner to ask if he had anything to say in mitigation before sentencing. Defense counsel informed the court that petitioner was mistaken about the existence of a plea offer. The court then remarked that it was more interested in something else that now crops up for the first time  the fact that petitioner had been taking psychotropic medication. Defense counsel stated that he had not been aware that his client was taking medication. The court asked: You had no reason to have any bona fide doubt as to the defendant's fitness to stand trial? Counsel responded that the petitioner spoke very coherently to me, seemed fine, and that he had no problem communicating with him. The trial court also questioned the prosecutor, who stated that he had no knowledge of it. The court then concluded: Nothing the court has observed in the conduct and appearance of Mr. Brown over the months would indicate to me that I would have any bona fide doubt as to his fitness. So the fact that he was receiving psychotropic drugs, I believe is of no consequence standing alone and of itself, and the court will treat it as such. Viewing the record as a whole, there was no indication during trial that the petitioner lacked understanding of the proceedings or was unable to communicate with counsel or assist in his defense. Yet, the majority dismisses petitioner's waiver of his right to a jury trial and his right to testify as essentially brief exchanges with the trial court that do not positively rebut the allegations in his postconviction petition and that do not conclusively demonstrate an ability to understand the proceedings or assist in the defense. 236 Ill.2d at 190-91, 337 Ill.Dec. at 906, 923 N.E.2d at 757. This court has never required that the record positively rebut a postconviction claim that a bona fide doubt existed of fitness or that the record conclusively demonstrate fitness. The requirement is that the petitioner allege facts which, if known to the trial court at the time of trial, along with all other facts that the record demonstrates were known to the trial court at that time, would have created a bona fide doubt. Petitioner has alleged no facts that create an arguable question of fact on this point. He has made a bare assertion that he did not understand the proceedings. The majority does not mention the presentence report, which describes an individual who is fully capable of communicating and of understanding his situation. Indeed, he chose to reveal facts about his education, his family, his work history, and his past drug and alcohol use, but declined to discuss the crime itself. The record is clear that the court was aware of the contents of the report, including petitioner's history of mental illness, at the onset of the sentencing hearing, before petitioner raised the question of a fitness hearing. I have quoted petitioner's lengthy statement at his sentencing hearing in its entirety because it clearly reveals a competent individual, arguing to the court that he lacked the mental state necessary to sustain a conviction of attempted murder. He focused on his previous depression and desire to end his own life. The court, however, had already considered and rejected this defense, finding that petitioner's repeated statements that he intended to kill police officers who responded to the domestic violence call were sufficient evidence of his state of mind and were not negated by his own willingness to die in the attempt. His statement regarding what he had been told by others suggests that he believed, incorrectly, that the mere fact of his taking medication might have enabled him to avoid trial. He did not claim to have been confused during any of the pretrial proceedings or during his bench trial. He did not say that he had not understood his right to a jury trial or his right to choose whether to testify. He did not claim that he had difficulty understanding what counsel told him or communicating with counsel. In fact, he repeatedly stated that the medication had improved his mental state and that he needed to continue taking it. The majority finds his detailed statement to be of limited significance because it was made more than one month after the trial.    Thus any indication that petitioner was lucid in making the statement or understood the trial proceedings at that time does not necessarily establish his condition at the time of trial. The statement does not positively rebut any of petitioner's allegations tending to indicate a bona fide doubt of his fitness. In particular, the statement does not contradict petitioner's allegation that his psychotropic medication prevented him from understanding the trial proceedings. 236 Ill.2d at 190, 337 Ill.Dec. at 906, 923 N.E.2d at 757. I disagree. The fact that he wrote and delivered this statement stands in stark contrast to his new allegation of confusion, lack of understanding, and inability to talk or question. The record reveals a defendant who was fully capable of understanding the proceedings and assisting in his own defense, and whose own attorney observed no signs of unfitness. The trial court, on the record, stated that his conduct and appearance did not raise a bona fide doubt of his fitness. A review of the record reveals that none of the Eddmonds factors were present at the time of trial. His demeanor at trial was unremarkable. He did not engage in irrational behavior. There are no prior medical opinions regarding his competence. Defense counsel, on the record, stated that his client was cooperative and communicative. The petition and accompanying documents do not allege any new facts regarding these factors. In similar circumstances, our appellate court has affirmed the summary dismissal of postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that the claims were belied by the record. In Swamynathan, the petitioner's claims were not only conclusory, as noted above, they were plainly refuted by the record, which reflect[ed] that no bona fide doubt regarding defendant's fitness existed at the time he entered his guilty plea. Swamynathan, 385 Ill.App.3d at 441, 324 Ill.Dec. 174, 895 N.E.2d 669. Similarly, in People v. Williams, 364 Ill.App.3d 1017, 302 Ill.Dec. 254, 848 N.E.2d 254 (2006), the petitioner claimed that he had been unfit to plead guilty because he suffered from several forms of mental illness and had an extremely low IQ. He stated in his accompanying affidavit that he had been taking psychotropic medications during his incarceration and that at the time he pleaded guilty he was not thinking rationally. Williams, 364 Ill. App.3d at 1020, 302 Ill.Dec. 254, 848 N.E.2d 254. He argued that summary dismissal of his petition was error because it raised a bona fide doubt of his fitness to plead guilty. Williams, 364 Ill.App.3d at 1023, 302 Ill.Dec. 254, 848 N.E.2d 254. Taking the factual allegations as true, the appellate court rejected the claim because the record of the guilty plea proceeding clearly showed that he understood the nature and purpose of the proceedings. Williams, 364 Ill.App.3d at 1025, 302 Ill. Dec. 254, 848 N.E.2d 254. In the present case, taking the factual allegations in the petition as true, the record nevertheless belies his claim of a bona fide doubt of his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and assist in his defense. 236 Ill.2d at 191, 337 Ill.Dec. at 907, 923 N.E.2d at 758.