Opinion ID: 1379313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: penalty phase jury selection issues

Text: At the outset of the guilt phase trial, before jury selection began, the court explained to defendant that the attorneys had agreed to proceed with trial of the guilt phase before one jury, and, if that jury found guilt and the truth of the special circumstances, the trial of the penalty phase would be before a different jury. The court asked defendant if he understood and consented to that procedure, and he replied that he did. The court also told defendant, We do believe that it's in your best interests that we proceed in that particular fashion. Accordingly, the issues of guilt and special circumstances were tried before a jury selected for only that purpose. After returning its verdict, the jury was discharged, and a new jury was selected for the penalty phase. (16a) Defendant now contends that the court had no jurisdiction to make a pretrial order for separate juries and, therefore, once the guilt phase jury was discharged no penalty trial could be held. Section 190.4, subdivision (c), provides: If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider ... the truth of any special circumstances which may be alleged, and the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. The court shall state facts in support of the finding of good cause upon the record and cause them to be entered into the minutes. In People v. Superior Court ( Rowland ) (1987) 194 Cal. App.3d 11 [239 Cal. Rptr. 257] ( Rowland ), it was held that under this statute, a motion for a second jury may be entertained only after the first jury has convicted the defendant of a crime for which he might be subject to the death penalty. There is no room for a court's pretrial prediction, however enlightened, that a second jury may be needed.... [¶] The trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain a pretrial motion for a second jury. ( Id. at p. 13.) Accordingly, the People were granted a pretrial writ of mandate to require the setting aside of an order granting the defendant's motion for separate juries. Relying on Rowland, defendant contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction, prior to the commencement of his trial, to adopt the stipulated arrangement for separate juries. Thus, he argues, there was no valid basis for discharging the guilt phase jury and impaneling another jury for the penalty phase, and the judgment of death must be reversed. He cites People v. Wojahn (1984) 150 Cal. App.3d 1024 [198 Cal. Rptr. 277]. In Wojahn, the trial court mistakenly discharged a jury that had found the defendant guilty of various crimes but had failed to determine the truth of an alleged prior conviction. Over defense objection, the court instituted a new proceeding in which the prior conviction was found true. On appeal, the court was ordered to amend the judgment by striking the sentence enhancement based on the prior conviction; double jeopardy considerations were held to have prohibited the impanelling of a new jury to try the issue of the prior conviction. (150 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1032-1035.) By analogy to Wojahn, defendant apparently contends that since, under Rowland, supra, 194 Cal. App.3d 11, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide, prior to the guilt phase, upon impanelment of a separate jury for the penalty phase of his trial, he is entitled to have the death penalty stricken permanently from the judgment, without any possibility of a new penalty trial. To the contrary, the pretrial arrangement for separate juries was entirely proper. Unlike the orders set aside in Rowland and Wojahn, the arrangement was agreed to, prior to trial, by both the prosecution and the defense, and implemented by order of the court pursuant to its discretion under section 190.4, subdivision (c). Nothing in the statute forbids impanelment of a new jury for the penalty trial under those circumstances. (17) Section 190.4, subdivision (c), does express a clear legislative mandate for the trial of both guilt and penalty by the same jury ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 753 [114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267]), but it does not preclude other arrangements on a showing of good cause when approved by the trial court. The preference for a single jury is by no means a one-sided matter; such a procedure may provide distinct benefits for both the prosecution and the defense. From the prosecution's point of view, the use of a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty may make it less likely that a juror's belief as to the inappropriateness of the death penalty will improperly skew the determination of guilt or innocence.... From defendant's perspective, the use of a single jury may help insure that the ultimate decision-maker in capital cases acts with full recognition of the gravity of its responsibility throughout both phases of the trial and will also guarantee that the penalty phase jury is aware of lingering doubts that may have survived the guilt phase deliberations. ( People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 352 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680] [plur. opn. of Broussard, J.]; see id. at p. 374 [conc. opn. of Kaus, J.]; Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987) 483 U.S. 402, 417 [97 L.Ed.2d 336, 107 S.Ct. 2906]; Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 180-181 [90 L.Ed.2d 137, 106 S.Ct. 1758].) Section 190.4, subdivision (c) protects the prosecution and the defense against being deprived of the benefits of a single jury against either party's will. (16b) It does not, however, require a single jury for both guilt and penalty phases when the parties agree that in their particular situation use of separate juries would be to their mutual advantage, and the trial court finds good cause to so order. (Cf. People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1075 [255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619] [use of dual juries for trial of two codefendants held a permissible practice].)
(18) Defendant complains that a 20-minute portion of the jury selection proceedings was conducted in his absence. During the 20 minutes, 10 out of the 13 prospective jurors present were excused for hardship, by stipulation of counsel. Though the clerk's transcript indicates defendant was present, the reporter's transcript indicates that defendant's presence was waived by his counsel. Defendant claims that his presence could not be waived and, even if waivable by him personally, could not be waived by counsel. As a general rule, the accused is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him, and the burden is upon him to demonstrate that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a fair and impartial trial. ( People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 573-574 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776].) In People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 846 [248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 755 P.2d 894], the capital defendant declined to be present during the first half-hour of jury selection, at which time jurors were excused for physical disability or financial hardship. We said that defendant's presence would have served little if any purpose.... ( Ibid. ) The same is true here. Defendant speculates that had he been present, he might have assisted his attorney by objecting to the excusal of one or more of the jurors. His attorney obviously felt his presence would not be beneficial. As in Grant, no error appears.
(19) Defendant claims prejudice from the denial of his challenges for cause of four prospective jurors on the ground they were unequivocally biased in favor of imposing the death penalty on defendant. We have reviewed the record of the voir dire of each of the four prospective jurors. Although all gave conflicting answers regarding their ability to consider both penalty options available to them, all stated at one time or another that they could consider the option of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court denied defendant's challenge for cause as to each. Where equivocal or conflicting responses are elicited, the trial court's determination of the prospective jurors' states of mind is binding on an appellate court. ( People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 954 [277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 103 [270 Cal. Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].) On this record, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the jurors' views on capital punishment would have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with their instructions and their oath. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852, 105 S.Ct. 844]; People v. Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 953.)
(20) Defendant claims he was deprived of an impartial jury because the prosecutor systematically used peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors who showed any lack of enthusiasm for the death penalty. We have repeatedly rejected the contention. (E.g., People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1263.)