Opinion ID: 1476430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cross-Examination of Samuel Wilson

Text: Before trial, the prosecutor informed the court that he had been given a report the previous night concerning the competency of Samuel Wilson, one of the government's principal witnesses. Because the report indicated that Wilson had been hospitalized on occasion for mental illness, the court ordered that the report be disclosed to defense counsel as Brady [10] material and also ordered that Wilson be examined by a court psychiatrist, Dr. Roy Coleman. Dr. Coleman performed the court-ordered evaluation and testified out of the presence of the jury that, despite having a severe personality disorder and a character disturbance, Wilson had no clearly definable major mental illness and was competent to testify. [11] Dr. Coleman acknowledged that Wilson had previously been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, as well as having conduct and adjustment disorders, but he stated that these mental problems would not affect Wilson's competency as a witness. Dr. Coleman specifically disagreed with the August 1996 diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and stated that, during his two interviews with Wilson in April 1997, Wilson showed no signs of that illness. The doctor said that Wilson claimed to have a clear memory of the events on the night in question and gave no indication that he had ever suffered from any hallucinations. Further, Dr. Coleman believed that Wilson was not afflicted with any mental problems that would have affected his ability to perceive in September 1995. He described Wilson's condition as a distortion of the evolution of his personality structure, so that he tends to be impulsive, to be easily frustrated ... [to] have a sense of entitlement, an inability to control his behavior when frustrated, an inability to delay gratification. In the end, Dr. Coleman concluded: I thought that he was capable of observing. He could remember that he had seen me previously.... His judgment was adequate .... [H]e understood ... that he had made a plea bargain ... [and] from a superficial point of view, he had a clear grasp and clear understanding of the events ... [and] the context within which he was testifying. As a possible reason for the misdiagnosis of schizophrenia, Dr. Coleman suggested that if Wilson had been on drugs at the time, they could have been the source of his irregular behavior. He did acknowledge, however, that if Wilson was in the midst of a schizophrenic episode, his perception of events during that time would have been affected. After hearing from Dr. Coleman, the court announced that it would permit Wilson to be cross-examined regarding his mental state on the date of the offenses and during any other time about which he might testify. All questions relating to his mental state outside of those dates, however, were barred. In so ruling, the court declared that the mere fact that Wilson was a witness did not make it open season on his entire mental history. Appellants now contend that because their ability to question Wilson was thus limited, the trial court violated their Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. [12] Appellants rely chiefly on Brown v. United States, 766 A.2d 530 (D.C.2001), and Vereen v. United States, 587 A.2d 456 (D.C.1991), for the proposition that a trial court commits reversible error when it restricts cross-examination about the credibility of a witness, either by questioning the witness directly or by interrogating an expert. See Brown, 766 A.2d at 539; Vereen, 587 A.2d at 457-458. These cases, however, depend on their particular facts and do not support appellants' argument. [13] In Brown the trial court restricted the direct examination of a psychiatrist about the mental condition of the complaining witness. This court reversed the conviction, holding that the defense was entitled to elicit from [the doctor] his expert opinion about both the nature of the witness' illness and the effects of her failure to take prescribed medication. 766 A.2d at 539-540. Similarly in Vereen, defense counsel was not allowed to present psychiatric testimony to negate the credibility of [a] rebuttal witness. 587 A.2d at 456. The witness was allowed to testify, even though she had a history of mental disorders, had recently undergone a psychiatric examination, and on the day of trial was experiencing unusual symptoms. However, because the court refused to hear expert testimony that might bear on her perception, recollection, or ability to distinguish fact from unreality  in other words, testimony that went directly to her competency to testify  we held that the trial court erred in submitting the witness to the jury ... without the benefit of hearing expert opinion as an aid in deciding competency. Id. at 458. In this case, by contrast, appellants were not restricted in inquiring about Wilson's present mental condition; rather, they were precluded only from cross-examining him about a mental illness that he might have suffered sometime before the events about which he was called to testify. See Robinson v. United States, 642 A.2d 1306, 1309-1311 (D.C.1994) (upholding trial court's refusal to allow cross-examination of complaining witness in assault case about her alcohol problems six years before the date of the offense, and noting that the only alcohol-related issue before the jury [was] whether she was intoxicated and abusive on [that date], as claimed by [the defense]). In restricting defense counsel's cross-examination, the trial court in the instant case was not, as appellants claim, preventing the jurors from being informed on all matters affecting credibility, but simply preventing them from considering evidence of limited probative value that was, at best, marginally relevant. See Grayton, 745 A.2d at 280-281. Wilson was cross-examined extensively about his statements that he never raped Thea Williams or lied to investigators. [14] Additionally, he was questioned about whether he had taken drugs or alcohol on the night of September 19-20, and what effect they might have had on his memory. He was also cross-examined about whether he experienced any hallucinations on that night. His answers to these inquiries certainly permitted the jurors to assess his credibility and decide whether he had problems with memory or perception on the night in question. [15] This court was presented with a similar scenario in Velasquez v. United States, 801 A.2d 72 (D.C.2002), and rejected an argument essentially the same as that made by appellants here. In Velasquez we held that the trial court did not err when it prevented defense counsel from exploring the victim's mental breakdown that occurred three years after an attempted rape because it was not relevant to [the victim's] perception of events at the time of the assault. Id. at 79. We went on to say that an inquiry into the victim's subsequent illness would only introduce into the case a collateral issue which would confuse the jury .... Id. In the present case, as in Velasquez, appellants sought to introduce evidence of Wilson's mental condition that was not relevant to Wilson's perception of events on the night in question, but at another time in his life unrelated to his testimony; accordingly, it was not permitted. On this record, we are satisfied that the defense had a meaningful opportunity to confront adverse witnesses. See Flores v. United States, 698 A.2d 474, 479 (D.C. 1997). We find no error.