Opinion ID: 780216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

Text: 27 We review de novo the district court's ruling on Pirtle's habeas petition. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 914 n. 1 (9th Cir.2002). Because Pirtle filed his habeas petition after AEDPA's effective date, AEDPA applies. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). 28 Under AEDPA, federal courts may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court ruling resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it fails to apply the correct controlling Supreme Court authority or comes to a different conclusion when presented with a case involving materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1850, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). A decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law if the state court identifies the correct legal standard but applies it in an unreasonable manner to the facts before it. Id. 29 We have relaxed AEDPA's strict standard of review when the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion. Under such circumstances, we independently review the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of Supreme Court law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (Federal habeas review is not de novo when the state court does not supply reasoning for its decision, but an independent review of the record is required to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law.); see also, e.g., Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir.2002). That is, although we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court's ultimate decision. 30 Here, however, we know that the Washington Supreme Court did not reach the merits of Pirtle's claim that his counsel's performance was constitutionally defective when his counsel failed to request the diminished capacity instruction at the guilt phase of the trial. Thus, there is no state court decision on this issue to which to accord deference. Under these circumstances, concerns about comity and federalism that arise when a state court reaches the merits of a petition for post-conviction relief do not exist. Cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (explaining that comity is not served by saying a prisoner `has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim' where he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort). Accordingly, following our sister circuits — the Third and the Fifth — we hold that when it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a properly raised issue, we must review it de novo. 4 See Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that a federal habeas court must review de novo purely legal issues and mixed questions of law and fact when, although properly preserved by the defendant, the state court has not reached the merits of a claim thereafter presented to a federal habeas court); Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274-75 (5th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (holding that the AEDPA deference scheme outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) did not apply to the federal habeas petition because the state denied the petitioner's motion for post-conviction relief on procedural grounds and not on the merits). Nonetheless, under AEDPA, factual determinations by the state court are presumed correct and can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. See Appel, 250 F.3d at 210; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).