Opinion ID: 1447881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jury Instruction on Scope of Jury's Sentencing Discretion

Text: (33) The trial court instructed the jury on the scope of its sentencing discretion in the terms of CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (1986 rev.) (4th ed. 1987 pocket pt., pp. 140, 141). [11] Defendant contends this instruction was erroneous, for three reasons. First, defendant contends this instruction was defective for not telling the jurors that unless they found that the factors in aggravation outweighed the factors in mitigation, they could not impose a sentence of death. We upheld the propriety of a similar instruction in People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d 955, 978, saying, The instruction clearly stated that the death penalty could be imposed only if the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating. Second, defendant argues that the instruction was flawed in that it failed to tell the jurors that if mitigation outweighed aggravation, a sentence of life without parole was required. This argument too we rejected in People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 978; we see no reason to reconsider it. Third, defendant focuses on this sentence from CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (1986 rev.) (4th ed. 1987 pocket pt., p. 141): To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it [ sic ] warrants death instead of life without parole. (Italics added.) Defendant complains that the term so substantial is impermissibly vague. We rejected a virtually identical argument in People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pages 1244-1245. Also, contrary to defendant's contention, the quoted sentence did not create a presumption in favor of [imposing] death. (See People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 920.) A fair and reasonable reading of this sentence is that if the jurors are not persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are not so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances, the jury should return a verdict of life without the possibility of parole. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood this sentence in the manner defendant suggests. (See Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 382 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 330, 110 S.Ct. 1190].)