Opinion ID: 2629455
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The majority misinterprets the statutes

Text: ¶ 33 The majority is uncomfortable with the fact that operation of the statutes in this case results in denial of exoneration of the bond. To reach a different result, the majority distorts the language of RCW 10.19.100 and .105. The result is a new bright-line test that dangerously alters the balanced incentives for sureties by giving them a 60-day window in which they are relieved of all obligations to facilitate the return of missing defendants. ¶ 34 Sureties have three different avenues for relief: RCW 10.19.105, .140, and the trial court's equitable powers, discussed below. The plain language of the statute indicates that relief under RCW 10.19.105 is conditioned on posting a stay bond under RCW 10.19.100. RCW 10.19.105 (If a bond be given and execution stayed, as provided in RCW 10.19.100....). The majority asserts that the clear condition imposed by RCW 10.19.105 is contradicted by the language of RCW 10.19.100. Majority at 703-04. The majority interprets RCW 10.19.100 to mean a surety `may stay said execution ... by giving a bond ... unless [the default judgment] shall be vacated before the expiration of that time. ' Majority at 703-04 (alterations in original). This interpretation of RCW 10.19.100 suggests that a court can vacate judgment before a stay bond has been posted. In light of its interpretation of RCW 10.19.100, the majority concludes that relief under RCW 10.19.105 is not conditioned on posting a stay bond and seeking a stay. ¶ 35 However, the majority's interpretation gives rise to the bizarre implication that a surety may not stay execution of the judgment if the judgment will be vacated before the stay period ends. This result is absurd not only because it would prevent the most deserving sureties from receiving a stay, but also because there is no method for determining what judgments will and will not be vacated within the stay period. The majority even admits that its interpretation may require that a bond be filed, and a stay granted, only after 60 days have passed from the date of forfeiture. Majority at 706 n. 2. ¶ 36 The statute is amenable to a much more reasonable interpretation. The majority's error is in asserting that the language unless the same shall be vacated before the expiration of that time applies to the language may stay said execution. RCW 10.19.100 provides for the giving of a bond conditioned for the payment of such judgment at the expiration of sixty days, unless the same shall be vacated before the expiration of that time. If we interpret unless the same shall be vacated before the expiration of that time to apply to the clause that immediately precedes it, then the language simply becomes part of the condition of the stay bond. Consequently, RCW 10.19.100 would simply mean that a surety may stay execution of a judgment by posting a stay bond, and the stay bond will be used to satisfy the judgment after the stay ends if the judgment is not vacated during the stay, but the stay bond will not be used to satisfy the judgment if the judgment is vacated during the stay. Not only does this interpretation have the benefit of avoiding absurd results, it also has the benefit of allowing RCW 10.19.100 to work in harmony with RCW 10.19.105. Because this interpretation of RCW 10.19.100 envisions that any vacation of a judgment will take place during the stay, it is consistent with the interpretation that relief under RCW 10.19.105 is available only when a bond be given and execution stayed. ¶ 37 The majority attempts to bolster its interpretation of RCW 10.19.105 by quoting heavily from the Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Hampton, 42 Wash.App. 130, 709 P.2d 1221 (1985), rev'd, 107 Wash.2d 403, 728 P.2d 1049 (1986). However, Hampton does not stand for the proposition that relief is available under RCW 10.19.105, even when a stay bond has not been posted. Hampton stands for the proposition that failure to meet the requirements of RCW 10.19.105 does not foreclose relief under a court's inherent equitable power. Id. at 135-36, 709 P.2d 1221. ¶ 38 The majority correctly asserts that a surety may skip seeking a stay and may file directly for vacation of a judgment outright. Majority at 703-04. However, a surety that does so is proceeding under RCW 10.19.140 or appealing to the equitable powers of the trial court, not proceeding under RCW 10.19.105, which, as explained above, is available only in cases where the surety posts a stay bond under RCW 10.19.100. All City already dropped its appeal of its eligibility for relief under RCW 10.19.140. The majority should focus on the court's inherent equitable authority instead of stretching RCW 10.19.105 to reach its result. ¶ 39 The majority's new rule reduces the financial incentives our legislature provided to sureties by giving them a 60-day window in which they are relieved of all obligations to facilitate the return of missing defendants. This kind of reduction in the financial incentives facing sureties is the same kind of dangerous reduction in balanced incentives that was vetoed in the 1986 legislative session. In 1986, the legislature attempted to amend RCW 10.19.090 to allow trial courts to reduce the amount of the bond at the time of forfeiture. LAWS OF 1986, ch. 322, § 2. The governor vetoed this provision stating that [r]educing the face value of the bond when the defendant fails to appear could undermine the incentive to bring defendants to justice, thereby weakening the criminal justice process. Id. (governor's explanation of partial vetoes). ¶ 40 Our bail bond statutes, as written, do not provide the relief the majority seeks in this case. If the majority believes All City is entitled to relief under the unique facts of this case, it should address its arguments to the trial court's inherent equitable powers to facilitate bail, and not needlessly reinterpret our bail bond statutes.