Opinion ID: 1706978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow testimony of terry ricks.

Text: ¶ 49. Valley Gas contends that it was reversible error for the trial court not to allow its expert witness, Terry Ricks, to testify about the facts on which he based his expert opinion. Valley Gas asserts that Ricks should have been allowed to testify with respect to a written statement by Roosevelt Roach about a statement made by an unidentified man to Ricks at the scene of the fire as part of the basis for his expert opinion about the cause of the fire. The Plaintiffs, however, assert that the statements are inadmissible hearsay and that if allowed into evidence, they would be unduly prejudicial to the Plaintiffs. ¶ 50. In the instant case, the trial court judge did not allow Ricks to testify, regarding part of what he based his expert opinion that natural gas was not a cause of the accident, about a statement made by an unidentified man that there were some children playing in the abandoned house shortly before the fire broke out. On April 27, 1995, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude Ricks' expert testimony because it was based on inadmissible hearsay, i.e., the statements of the unidentified man at the scene of the fire. On May 5, 1995, the Plaintiffs filed another Motion in Limine seeking to exclude the written statement of Roach and seeking the restriction of Ricks' testimony to prevent any mention of children playing in the abandoned house at the time the fire ignited. Then, at trial, Valley Gas did not ask any questions regarding the statements used as part of the basis for Ricks' expert opinion, but the Plaintiffs attacked the credibility of Ricks' expert opinion by questioning him whether he based his opinion on talking to any witnesses. Valley Gas, after redirect examination of Ricks, inquired of the trial court judge whether he had ruled on the Motion in Limine regarding the alleged hearsay, and the trial judge effectively granted the Motion in Limine by allowing Valley Gas to enter Ricks' deposition into evidence for identification purposes only. ¶ 51. This Court has held that [t]he standard of review regarding admission [or exclusion] of evidence is abuse of discretion. Thompson Mach. Commerce Corp. v. Wallace, 687 So.2d 149, 152 (Miss.1997). Rule 705 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, allowing for the disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion, provides: The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inferences and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. Miss. R. Evid. 705. Further, Rule 703 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, regarding the basis of opinion testimony by experts, provides as follows: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Miss. R. Evid. 703. This Court has allowed into evidence as a basis of an expert's opinion evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay. See Hull v. State, 687 So.2d 708, 716-17 (Miss.1996) (holding statements that expert used to base opinion on admissible where not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted); Slay v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 511 So.2d 875, 879 (Miss.1987) (holding trial court did not err by allowing expert to testify about statements made to him in forming his opinion where statements were not offered to prove the truth of matter asserted). ¶ 52. In Morley v. Jackson Redevelopment Authority , this Court addressed the issue of whether the information relied on by an expert is admissible just by virtue of his reliance on it in reaching his expert opinion. Morley v. Jackson Redevelopment Authority, 632 So.2d 1284, 1293 (Miss.1994). In Morley, the Court held that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence hearsay statements used by an expert where the statements were used for nothing more than to bolster the expert's opinion. Morley, 632 So.2d at 1294. In making its decision, the Court relied heavily on the case of United States v. Grey Bear which held that while a witness may rely on information which is inadmissible in evidence, that does not give the witness the right to circumvent the rules of hearsay by giving statements which corroborate his view. Morley, 632 So.2d at 1294 (citing United States v. Grey Bear, 883 F.2d 1382, 1392-93 (8th Cir.1989)). ¶ 53. However, this Court, in Slay v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., held that the trial court did not err by allowing an expert to testify about statements made by employees of the Illinois Central Gulf as part of the basis for his opinion. Slay, 511 So.2d at 879. Where an objection was made that the statements were inadmissible hearsay, the trial judge overruled the objection, finding Copeland's testimony admissible, since it was `not for the purpose of proving the truth of what was told him, but for the purpose of showing that it was told to him, which led him to take certain other actions,' namely, to conduct his own test of the locomotive. Id. This Court held: Simply put, hearsay is an out-of-court statement, not made under oath and not subjected to cross-examination, which is introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. Ellis & Williams, Miss. Evidence, § 8-1 (1983). Here, the trial judge properly ruled that Copeland's testimony, relating statements made by those present at McNamara's test, was introduced not to show the manner of McNamara's examination, but to explain the basis for his own test of the locomotive. Consequently, there was no error. Id. ¶ 54. In the instant case, Valley Gas asserts that if the statements regarding the children playing in the abandoned house would have been allowed into evidence that the statements would not be hearsay because they would have been offered to further explain the basis of Ricks' expert opinion and not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the statements, if allowed, would have enabled Valley Gas to present to the jury statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. ¶ 55. We find that the trial court did not err by refusing to allow Ricks to testify about the statement made by the unidentified man about the children playing in the abandoned house before the fire because such testimony would not go to explain the basis of the expert's opinion but would be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that there were children playing in the abandoned house where the fire ignited. Therefore, the statements were inadmissible hearsay and properly excluded by the trial court. As a result, this assignment of error is without merit.