Opinion ID: 2994823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Visit from Attorney

Text: Ms. Huerta also maintains that the police never told her that her lawyer had arrived at the station to see her. The Government explains that the lawyer, tired of waiting, left the station and that the detectives did not know the lawyer had arrived until after the first interview had been completed and the lawyer already had departed. Furthermore, the police did not mislead the attorney or make any statements of any kind to the attorney. Although we are troubled by the police’s behavior, a close examination of the record does not reveal a basis that warrants, under settled precedent, a reversal on this ground. In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the failure to inform a defendant of an attorney’s presence does not invalidate an otherwise valid waiver of the right to counsel. See id. at 422. An attorney, who had been retained by the accused’s sister, contacted the police station where the accused was being held. Although the attorney received assurances that the accused would not be questioned until the next day, the interrogation that yielded the inculpatory statements began later that evening. Moreover, the police did not tell the accused about the attorney’s call. The Supreme Court found no violations of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments in the police’s conduct, explaining that: Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right. . . . No doubt the additional information would have been useful to respondent; perhaps even it might have affected his decision to confess. But we have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights. . . . Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law. Id. at 422-23. Ms. Huerta relies, specifically, on the due process component of Moran. The Supreme Court recognized in Moran the constitutional protection of canons fundamental to the traditions and conscience of our people. Id. at 432 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Although the Court determined that the police misconduct in Moran did not rise to the level of a due process violation, it noted that a violation may be found when such behavior so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society. Id. at 433-34. Based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Moran, we do not believe that the Michigan City Police Department has conducted itself in a manner violative of due process. In Moran, the police actually misled the attorney by telling him that his client would not be interrogated that day, yet this act did not constitute a due process violation. See also Matney v. Armontrout, 956 F.2d 824, 825-26 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that police failure to inform the accused of his attorney’s attempts to contact him and misstatements to the attorney as to whether the accused was at the police station did not violate the accused’s due process rights). In Ms. Huerta’s case, there is no evidence that the police misled her attorney. Rather, the record shows only a lack of knowledge. The investigating detectives did not know that Ms. Huerta’s attorney had arrived until after the attorney had departed and the interrogation had been concluded. The detectives never relayed this information to Ms. Huerta, but, as Detective Bush explained, he did not think he would be talking with her again. These circumstances, taken alone or together, are not as egregious as the facts in Moran and Armontrout and, therefore, do not shock the sensibilities of civilized society./5