Opinion ID: 2214324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Dispositional Orders

Text: ¶ 19 The parties dispute whether the dispositional orders contained specific services as that term is used in Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. Accordingly, our inquiry is driven by our interpretation of § 48.355(2)(b)1.
¶ 20 Because the parties offer competing interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1., it is instructive to examine each party's argument.
¶ 21 After the parties submitted their briefs to this court, the Department filed a Supplemental Authority Letter, which raised a new argument. The Department pointed out that Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. was amended in 2007 by 2007 Wisconsin Act 20, § 1248. Accordingly, § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2003-04), [7] which was in existence at the time the dispositional orders were entered, and § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007-08), [8] which was the version in effect at the time of trial, contain different language. ¶ 22 First, the Department contends that the 2003-04 statute has a less exacting standard that should apply here because the 2003-04 statute was in effect when the court entered the dispositional orders and for the majority of the CHIPS proceedings. The Department argues that the dispositional orders were sufficient under Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2003-04) because the term if any limited a judge's obligation to order services. ¶ 23 Second, the Department contends that even if the court interprets and applies Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007-08), the dispositional orders were sufficient under that version of the statute. It argues that the directive in the dispositional orders that the Department provide supervision, services and case management coupled with the services implicitly needed to assist the parents in meeting the conditions for the return of their children enumerate the specific services to be provided to Tanya, William and their children. [9] ¶ 24 Third, the Department argues that the parents forfeited their right to object to the sufficiency of the dispositional orders due to their failure to object in the nearly four years since the orders were entered.
¶ 25 The parents assert that the differing language between the 2003-04 version and the 2007-08 version of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. is inconsequential. This is so, they assert, because the court order shall contain specific services under both versions, a standard that the parents contend was not satisfied here. ¶ 26 The parents argue that the dispositional orders were insufficient under Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. [10] because they did not separately list the specific services to be provided by the Department. The parents assert that in order to be sufficient, the box next to item six on the form used for the dispositional orders, indicating [s]ervices to be provided to child and family, must have been checked and a separate report that listed the specific services to be provided must have been attached. This was not done here. On this basis, the parents argue that the petitions to terminate their parental rights must be dismissed.
¶ 27 Because [w]e assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language, statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 44-45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. If the meaning of the statute is plain, and therefore unambiguous, our inquiry goes no further and we apply the statute according to our ascertainment of its plain meaning. Id., ¶ 45. ¶ 28 In ascertaining the plain meaning of a statute, we give the statutory language its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning. Id. The scope, context and purpose of a statute assist us in a plain-meaning interpretation. Id., ¶ 48. [S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes.... Id., ¶ 46. We interpret statutes to promote, rather than contravene, their stated purpose. See id., ¶ 49; McNeil, 300 Wis.2d 358, ¶ 16, 731 N.W.2d 273 ([T]he purpose of a statute informs our interpretation of it.). A statute may contain [an] explicit statement[] of legislative purpose or its purpose may be readily apparent from its plain language. Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 49, 681 N.W.2d 110.
¶ 29 We assume without deciding that the parents did not forfeit their objection to the sufficiency of the dispositional orders. Therefore, we turn to the merits of the parties' arguments. ¶ 30 We first address the issue regarding which version of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. controls in this case, either the 2003-04 version, which was in effect when the dispositional orders were entered, or the 2007-08 version, which was in effect at the time of trial. ¶ 31 Both versions of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b) state that the court order shall contain followed by a list of 13 directives to the circuit court. Our focus is on subd. (2)(b)1., which states that the order shall contain [t]he specific services that are to be provided to the child and family. § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2003-04); § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007-08) (fully set out in footnotes 7 and 8, supra ). However, the 2003-04 statute contained the additional language that the order shall contain the specific services or continuum of services if any, which terms are not present in the current statute. Compare § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2003-04) with § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007-08). The Department argues that the continuum of services language in the 2003-04 statute is a less exacting standard than specific services. It further argues that the if any language in the 2003-04 statute should be interpreted to mean that the order must list specific services only if any are so ordered. ¶ 32 The 2007-08 version of the statute eliminates the language that the Department posits is less exacting. Therefore, any order that is sufficient under the 2007-08 statute is necessarily sufficient under the 2003-04 statute as well. Because we conclude that the orders are sufficient under the 2007-08 statute, and therefore under the 2003-04 statute as well, it is not necessary for us to determine which version of the statute controls here. The dispositional orders are sufficient under either version. ¶ 33 As stated, we conclude that the dispositional orders contained specific services, as required by Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. [11] We so conclude because § 48.355(2)(b)1. does not require a CHIPS dispositional order to separately list each individual service that the Department is to provide so long as the Department is ordered to provide supervision, services and case management and the order also provides detailed conditions that the parents must complete in compliance with the dispositional order. ¶ 34 The detailed conditions directed at changing the parents' conduct establish the specific services that the Department is to provide, either directly or through arrangements with others. For example, one condition states: Tanya and William will go to any parenting or nurturing program set up by the [social] worker and attend any community-based programs recommended by their [social] worker. Implicit in this condition is an order that the Department arrange for a parenting or nurturing program for the parents to attend, i.e., a specific service. The Department did arrange for a parenting program, but Tanya and William did not complete it. ¶ 35 The dispositional orders also directed the Department to assist the parents in completing certain programs, which the Department may recommend in order to enable them to be reunited with their children. These included alcohol or drug abuse programs, an [Alcohol or Other Drug] assessment, Psychological and/or a Psychosocial Evaluation, treatment and/or counseling programs and individual or family counseling. ¶ 36 The detailed conditions of return set out specific case management services the Department was to provide. The conditions required Tanya and William to stay in touch and cooperate with their [social] worker, meet with the [social] worker when asked, allow the [social] worker into the home and to be available to their [social] worker to make any necessary appointments. Implicit in such conditions is the requirement that the Department provide services to the parents by providing a social worker who will be available to William and Tanya; who will set up appointments with them; and regularly stay in touch. ¶ 37 The dispositional orders set out specific services that the Department was to provide to or arrange for the entire family, including the three children. These services were to assist William and Tanya in: provid[ing] their children with a safe, suitable, and stable home; learning to care for and control their children; understand[ing] their children's needs; and obtaining appropriate child care for their children in their absence. ¶ 38 The two conditions of return that were added in November 2004 required the Department to assist William and Tanya, upon release from prison, in obtaining and maintaining an appropriate residence for themselves and their children and in obtaining and maintaining full-time employment. ¶ 39 Furthermore, the responses of counsel for Tanya, William and the Department to the circuit court's answer to the first jury question demonstrates that for almost four years all parties had been interpreting the dispositional orders as requiring the Department to arrange the services necessary to assist Tanya and William in meeting the court ordered conditions for the return of their children. This further supports our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. in light of the facts of this case. ¶ 40 Finally, our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. is consistent with the purpose of § 48.355(2)(b)1., which is readily apparent from its plain language, coupled with the explicit ... legislative purpose of the Children's Code. Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 49, 681 N.W.2d 110. The apparent purpose of § 48.355(2)(b)1. is to assure that the Department will arrange those services that are necessary to assist the parents in meeting the court ordered conditions for the return of their children. However, how best to assist parents in meeting those conditions may change as the parents make progress or encounter difficulty in changing their behavior. For example, when Tanya and William were incarcerated, it would have made little sense for the circuit court to require the Department to visit in their homes on a weekly basis or to assist them in finding current employment. However, the Department could, and did, facilitate parenting classes and alcohol and drug treatment at the locations where Tanya and William were confined. In that way, the Department continued to provide services to the parents, as the court had ordered, albeit with the flexibility that Tanya and William's current circumstances required. ¶ 41 Our conclusion that the CHIPS dispositional orders are statutorily sufficient is consistent with the explicit legislative purpose of the Children's Code. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01 states in relevant part: (1) ... In construing this chapter, the best interests of the child or unborn child shall always be of paramount consideration. This chapter shall be liberally construed to effectuate the following express legislative purposes: (a) ... The courts and agencies responsible for child welfare should also recognize that instability and impermanence in family relationships are contrary to the welfare of children and should therefore recognize the importance of eliminating the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions that prevent their safe return to the family. ... (gr) To allow for the termination of parental rights at the earliest possible time after rehabilitation and reunification efforts are discontinued ... is in the best interest of the child. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 42 The Children's Code focuses on the best interests of the child. Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1). The legislature has stated that the best interests of the child are furthered by a permanent and stable home for the child. § 48.01(1)(a). Tanya and William could establish a permanent and stable home for their children only if they could change their conduct in ways that would permit them to meet the court ordered conditions for the return of the children. Affording the Department flexibility in the manner in which it provides services to the parents, permits the Department to accommodate the parents' changing needs. This, in turn, affords the parents the best opportunity for reunification of their family. Accordingly, both the apparent purpose underlying Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. and the explicit purpose of the Children's Code support our conclusion that the CHIPS dispositional orders were in compliance with § 48.355(2)(b)1. ¶ 43 Tanya and William also contend that F.T. v. State, 150 Wis.2d 216, 441 N.W.2d 322 (Ct.App.1989), requires dismissal of the petitions to terminate their parental rights. The court of appeals relied on F.T. in its decision. Sheboygan County, No. 2008AP3065, 2009 WL 1139338, unpublished slip op., ¶ 9 & n. 6. ¶ 44 Tanya and Williams' reliance on F.T. is misplaced. In F.T., the court of appeals addressed whether the circuit court properly imposed sanctions for violation of the conditions of an order in a delinquency proceeding where the order did not contain `[a] statement of the conditions with which the child [was] required to comply' ... and where the court failed to `explain[] the conditions to the child' at the dispositional hearing. F.T., 150 Wis.2d at 218, 441 N.W.2d 322 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)7. and (6)(a) (1987-88)). The sanctions that the circuit court had ordered were reversed by the court of appeals because the circuit court had not provided a full explanation of what is necessary for compliance, and what conduct must be eschewed in order to avoid the sanctions which may be imposed for violation when the legislature said the court shall so provide. Id. at 227, 441 N.W.2d 322. ¶ 45 F.T. involved the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)7. and (6)(a) (1987-88). Id. at 218, 441 N.W.2d 322. Those statutes served a very different purpose in regard to the interests of a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding, as compared with the purpose § 48.355(2)(b)1. serves in a CHIPS order. The apparent purpose of § 48.355(2)(b)7. and (6)(a) is to give notice to the juvenile of the conduct that the circuit court requires and the conduct the juvenile must avoid. ¶ 46 The reversal of the circuit court decision in F.T. came about because the lack of notice in the order contravened the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)7. and (6)(a) (1987-88). Stated otherwise, the decision in F.T. was driven by the failure of the circuit court to give notice to a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding, which failure of notice affected the juvenile's right to know of the conditions he must meet and the conduct he must eschew to avoid court sanctions. See id. at 227-28, 441 N.W.2d 322. ¶ 47 In contrast, the apparent purpose of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. is to assure that the Department will provide those services necessary to assist parents in meeting the court ordered conditions for the return of their children. Tanya and William do not claim that the CHIPS dispositional orders were insufficient to cause the Department to provide the necessary services, nor is there any proof that the Department was not diligent in doing so. See section II.C. infra. Accordingly, F.T. does not support William and Tanya's claim that the termination of their parental rights should be reversed. ¶ 48 Furthermore, to accept the parents' argument and conclude that the dispositional orders are insufficient because the court failed to check a box on a form that the court used for the dispositional orders and to separately list how the Department was to provide each individual service necessary for the return of the children to the parents, would be to elevate form over substance. See State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶ 41, 255 Wis.2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263 (The process we require should not elevate form over substance.). This is so because William and Tanya do not contend that the Department failed to provide them the services that were necessary for them to meet the detailed conditions for return of their children and because the conditions under which the Department attempted to assist William and Tanya changed over the four years of supervision. Accordingly, we will not elevate form over substance in our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1., and we conclude that the CHIPS dispositional orders are sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.