Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conflict of Interest Jurisprudence

Text: 234 To test the majority's hypothesis that Cuyler applies only to multiple representation cases, I look first at what the Supreme Court and other courts have said about attorney conflicts. It is well-settled that [w]here a constitutional right to counsel exists ... there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflict of interest. Wood, 450 U.S. at 271, 101 S.Ct. at 1103; see also Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 335, 100 S.Ct. at 1711; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). The Supreme Court revisited Cuyler in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981), and it applied its framework to a conflict created by a third-party's payment of counsel. After examining the record, the Court noted that the defendants' employer had paid for the defendants' legal assistance, for the defendants' bond fees, and for some of the other fines that the defendants incurred, but it had failed to pay the fines which resulted in the defendants' incarceration. Wood, 450 U.S. at 267, 101 S.Ct. at 1101. The Court further observed that: 235 The fact that the employer chose to refuse payment of these fines, even as it paid other fines and paid the sums necessary to keep petitioners free on bond in this case, suggests the possibility that it was seeking--in its own interest--a resolution of the equal protection claim raised [in the case]. 236 Id. (footnote omitted). The Court recognized that because the attorney was being paid by the employer, and was therefore the employer's agent, there was a clear possibility of conflict of interest. Id. In light of this possibility, the Court remanded the case to the state court, instructing the lower court to apply the Cuyler framework and to determine whether the conflict of interest that th[e] record strongly suggests actually existed at the time of the probation revocation or earlier. Id. at 273, 101 S.Ct. at 1104. 237 The Supreme Court next discussed conflicts of interest in Strickland. In that case, the Court was called upon to determine the proper standards for judging a criminal defendant's contention that the Constitution requires a conviction ... to be set aside because counsel's assistance at the trial ... was ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671, 104 S.Ct. at 2056. 238 Notably, when describing the standard for evaluating the prejudicial effect of a counsel's failings, the Court distinguished ineffectiveness claims predicated on conflicts of interest. Specifically, the court noted that these claims warranted a limited presumption of prejudice, stating that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 345-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1716-19). When there is an actual conflict, the Court emphasized that counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Id. Additionally, the Court found that a limited presumption of prejudice was warranted because it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Id. Further, the Court reasoned that [g]iven the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. Id. (citation omitted). 239 The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether Cuyler applies to cases involving conflicts stemming from sources other than multiple representation. See Illinois v. Washington, 469 U.S. 1022, 1023, 105 S.Ct. 442, 443, 83 L.Ed.2d 367 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Nevertheless, as the majority concedes, this court, as well as every circuit court facing the issue, has applied the rule of Cuyler to many types of conflicts of interest. 14 In fact, the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied the Cuyler framework to conflicts stemming from media rights contracts. See United States v. Marrera, 768 F.2d 201, 205-09 (7th Cir.1985) (employing Cuyler framework to claim predicated on conflict of interest between [the] lawyer's financial interest in proceeds from the movie rights and [defendant's] interest in acquittal), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 1209, 89 L.Ed.2d 321 (1986); Zamora v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir.1987) (noting that [t]he standard developed in Cuyler has been applied to cases in which defendants argue that their lawyers were more interested in publicity than in obtaining an acquittal, and employing the Cuyler analysis); United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.1980) (recognizing that the conflict in Cuyler was based on multiple representation, and observing that the case before it was based on private financial interests of the lawyer, but applying Cuyler because [t]hese differences are immaterial.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 2018, 68 L.Ed.2d 325 (1981). 240 Nevertheless, the majority boldly asserts that all of these other courts have misread Cuyler and the Supreme Court's subsequent cases, stating that [o]ne cannot read Cuyler [as] analyz[ing] conflicts of interest in a context broader than that of multiple client representation. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1266. As noted above, however, the Supreme Court did just that in Wood, applying Cuyler to a conflict of interest stemming from the fact that defendants' counsel was being paid by a third party. The majority attempts to distinguish this case by stating that the lawyer was at least in the functional equivalent of a joint representation.... Both the theater and the employees expected him to advance their interests, yet to serve one might require him to fail the others, while doing nothing could harm both. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1267. The majority forces Wood into the multiple representation category by focusing on the common denominator of all conflicts: divided loyalties or divergent interests between two or more entities. 241