Opinion ID: 759498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Verdict on Denial of Raise and Subsequent Discharge

Text: 7 The first issue raised on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Farmers' motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial on the claim that Denesha's denied raise and subsequent discharge were products of intentional age discrimination. Farmers contends that because Denesha's poor performance was well documented and because it treated him no differently than similarly situated employees, the district court committed clear error by sustaining the jury's verdict. Denesha, for his part, argues that even where the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in support of its actions, the plaintiff may prevail by presenting sufficient evidence for a jury to infer the ultimate fact of unlawful discrimination. 8 This court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standard as the trial court. See Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1066 (8th Cir.1998); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 554 (8th Cir.1998). The standard of review for sufficiency of proof in an age discrimination suit embraces the fundamental issue of whether [the plaintiff] produced sufficient evidence to allow a jury reasonably to find that [the employer] intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his age. Newhouse, 110 F.3d at 639 (quoting Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2510, 138 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1997) (alteration in original)). Appellate review of a jury verdict is extremely deferential. Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, 139 F.3d 631, 634 (8th Cir.1998). We will not reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence unless after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that no reasonable juror could have returned a verdict for the non-moving party. Ryther, 108 F.3d at 836. In reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we must (1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Denesha, (2) assume that all conflicts were resolved in favor of Denesha, (3) assume as proved all facts that Denesha's evidence tended to prove, (4) give Denesha the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the proved facts, and (5) deny the motion unless all the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inferences sustaining Denesha's position. See Nelson v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir.1994); Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 649 (8th Cir.1990). A motion for a new trial, by contrast, should only be granted if the jury's verdict were against the great weight of the evidence so as to constitute a miscarriage of justice. Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 656 (8th Cir.1995). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. See id. 9 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer ... to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Protection under the ADEA extends to persons age forty and older. 29 U.S.C. § 631. A plaintiff may meet his burden of establishing intentional age discrimination by relying on either direct or indirect evidence. See Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 (8th Cir.1991) (citation omitted). Analysis under the MHRA follows that of the ADEA. See Hanebrink v. Brown Shoe Co., 110 F.3d 644, 646 (8th Cir.1997); McMullin v. McRaven, 882 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Mo.Ct.App.1994). 10 Farmers strenuously argues that no reasonable jury could find both that the [employer's proffered] reason [for the action taken against him] was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. Ryther, 108 F.3d at 838 n. 5 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)) (emphases in original). Contrary to defendant's contentions, however, the fact that Farmers can offer legitimate reasons for plaintiff's denial of a salary increase and subsequent dismissal does not automatically entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. While Farmers offers a host of facially benign reasons for denial of the raise and the subsequent events leading up to and including Denesha's discharge, our review indicates that the record likewise amply supports the jury's conclusion that the offered reasons were merely a pretext for underlying age discrimination. 11 Substantial evidence in the record demonstrates that White and Wilfong did in fact judge Denesha's work by criteria different in both kind and quantum from that of other employees. In September 1992, in his last performance evaluation prior to the merger, Denesha received a rating of very good. Clark, Denesha's supervisor at the time, recommended him for a program in which FCRs with a demonstrated ability to work without supervision were permitted to operate out of their homes. Clark also recommended a 4% salary increase based on her day-to-day supervision of his work through October of 1992. On December 4, 1992, at a time when Clark was out of the office on vacation, John White altered the performance review completed by Clark and signed both his and Clark's name to the document. 3 While Clark's portion of the evaluation had presented a complimentary picture of Denesha's achievements during 1992, White noted deficiencies in his performance 4 and wrote that [y]ou need considerable improvement to assist the BCO in meeting it's [sic] service and cost goals. (Pl.'s Ex. 5.) White testified that he assumed Clark would meet with Denesha to explain the performance review, despite the fact that he had not informed her of nor explained the basis for the alterations made to her evaluation. Clark only became aware of the alteration when she received a letter from Denesha. Only Denesha and one other employee, also over fifty years of age, at the Kansas City BCO were denied raises in 1992. 12 When questioned in a deposition as to the negative information added to Clark's performance review, White could not identify the source of the complaints. At trial he contended that he, along with other managers, had received complaints about Denesha. However, none of the managers allegedly receiving complaints about Denesha documented them, and Farmers was unable to produce alternative sources of documentation. Neither Wilfong nor Clark, his direct supervisors during 1992, documented any complaints about Denesha prior to the December salary review. Subsequently, White admitted that there was no documentation to support his allegation of complaints. 13 Prior to being denied a salary increase, Denesha had no indication that his new supervisors were dissatisfied with his work. During his November case review with his new direct supervisor, Joe Wilfong, Denesha was not informed of any complaints. Wilfong did tell Denesha, however, that younger employees [are] running circles around older employees. (Tr. at 1216.) Wilfong repeated this view during Denesha's December 1992 case review and to another FCR, Vyck Shanes. When Wilfong later told White that he had used a poor choice of words, White suggested that in the future he use the term newer employees instead of younger. (Tr. at 797-99.) At a meeting in the spring of 1993, White stated that the only way to improve things would be to get rid of the old heads around the office. 14 Other evidence also suggested that White and Wilfong treated Denesha in a disparate manner. For example, Denesha was placed on progressive discipline in June 1993 even though his performance was comparable to that of other FCRs 5 and despite the fact that he led the office in reduction of bodily injury (BI) costs. Additionally, Denesha received more assignments than other FCRs. Both White and Wilfong refused to review records Denesha had compiled that showed his caseload to be significantly higher than other FCRs. 6 White dismissed these complaints as bogus and the product of a chronic complainer. When Wilfong began recording complaints in January 1993, he told Denesha that he was recording complaints received about all employees and that he should not let it bother him. The younger CRs testified, however, that they received verbal warnings before their supervisors recorded complaints made against them. Wilfong also failed to do a field ride along with Denesha during the eleven months that he supervised him. The ride along is intended to improve the efficiency of CRs, and it is company policy to do a minimum of one per quarter, more if the CR is having problems. White admitted that he would be shocked to learn that a supervisor failed to do the ride along. Wilfong did ride along with other employees and testified at trial that he consciously decided not to follow procedures with Denesha because he did not think it would help him. 15 After placing Denesha on formal discipline, Wilfong created goals for Denesha that were unattainable as measured by the accomplishments of other employees. Both White and Terry Lee, Farmers' Regional Liability Claims Manager, testified that it would be unreasonable to expect an FCR to settle more than 100 BI units in a month. In August 1994 White wrote to FCR Shanes to congratulate him on settling 158 BI units in a six-month period, and White testified that during the summer of 1993 anything more than thirty units in a month would have been satisfactory. Nonetheless, Denesha would have had to complete over 100 units in July 1993 to achieve the goal Wilfong set for him. This goal was in addition to catching up on all his status reports, a requirement that other CRs were given extra time to achieve. 16 At a September 1993 meeting, Wilfong told Denesha that his probationary period would end on October 7 and that his performance would be reviewed at that time. During September, Denesha settled the most bodily injury units in the Kansas City BCO. Nonetheless, he was demoted on October 7, 1993 to an entry level OCR position. White indicated that he did not respect the OCR position and that he did not intend to continue it. In addition to handling property damage claims and subrogation files as an OCR, Denesha continued to handle most of his remaining bodily injury files. On November 15, 1993, the subrogation and bodily injury files were taken away from Denesha, and on November 24, 1993, he again was placed on formal discipline. White characterized the workload at the Kansas City BCO during this entire time period as horrendous. Nonetheless, a regional auditor observed in March of 1994 that Denesha had made 24-hour contact with claimants 100% of the time. This finding conflicted with the claims of White and Wilfong, who characterized Denesha as consistently below the required 90% goal for 24-hour contact. These facts support the jury's conclusion that Farmers' actions were the product of discriminatory animus with respect to Denesha's age. 17 Farmers next argues that regardless of what happened during Denesha's tenure as an FCR, the company cannot be held liable for discharging Denesha based on his work performance as an OCR. Farmers would have us treat each alleged discriminatory act as an isolated event to be kept distinct from each other unlawful act. Such an argument finds no support in our precedent. The district court correctly stated that a jury in assessing whether an employer's proffered reasons for the adverse employment action constitute pretext and whether there was intentional discrimination may consider the employer's conduct throughout the employee's tenure with the company. See Denesha, 976 F.Supp. at 1285 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)); see also Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145 F.3d 986, 993 n. 26 (8th Cir.1998) (three-year-old statements, even if not themselves actionable, may be relevant as background evidence in proving ultimate issue of age discrimination); Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262, 266 (8th Cir.1995) (statements remote in time can be used to meet additional showing requirement); Clements v. General Accident Ins. Co., 821 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1987) (statements remote in time relevant to showing of general intent or inclination to discriminate). Farmers' argument that Denesha could not create an inference of discrimination by raising issues stemming from his work as an FCR confuses relevance with direct causation. See Neufeld v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 335, 340 (8th Cir.1989). 18 Here, however, Denesha was not limited to using the statements as background evidence. It is well settled that a plaintiff can meet his burden of proving intentional discrimination by providing evidence of remarks by decision makers reflecting a discriminatory attitude. See White v. Honeywell, 141 F.3d 1270, 1275-76 (8th Cir.1998); Madel v. FCI Marketing, Inc., 116 F.3d 1247, 1252 (8th Cir.1997); Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir.1991). While it is true that prior evaluations establishing competent performance do not render more recent negative evaluations inherently untrustworthy, Rose-Maston v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1109, 1998 WL 11051, at  4 (8th Cir.1998), direct evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of decision makers is relevant not only to the issue of pretext but may itself form the basis for a finding of intentional discrimination. See Madel v. FCI Marketing, Inc., 116 F.3d 1247, 1252 (8th Cir.1997) (use of age-based epithets by sales manager sufficient to constitute evidence of discriminatory intent); Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir.1992) (comment of shop foreman asking supervisor why he had an old man carrying the boxes constitutes direct evidence in support of jury's finding of pretext). 19 Both Wilfong's statements that the younger employees were running circles around the older employees and White's assertions that the office needed to rid itself of old heads occurred contemporaneously with events that form the basis of this litigation. Wilfong made his statements on several occasions near the time that Farmers denied Denesha's raise in December 1992. White made his statements in June 1993, at approximately the same time that plaintiff was placed on formal warning after White characterized him as a chronic complainer due to his attempts to receive a workload comparable to other employees. As the Supreme Court has noted, '[i]t is the very essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer believes that productivity and competence decline with old age.'  Parrish v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 92 F.3d 727, 733-34 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993)). A reasonable jury could conclude from these facts that White and Wilfong's decisions regarding Denesha were informed by a discriminatory animus and that their workload and disciplinary decisions concerning Denesha were designed to elicit failure. 20 Similarly, Farmers' effort to characterize the comments of White and Wilfong as stray remarks, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decision makers unrelated to the decisional process lacks persuasive force. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir.1991) (adopting O'Connor's distinction between comments that demonstrate a discriminatory animus and stray or nondecisional remarks). Because Wilfong's and White's remarks concerning the performance of older employees were made during the same period as their decisions impacting Denesha's workload and job security, [a] reasonable person could infer ... that [the ultimate decision] to terminate [p]laintiff[ ] was based on age. Madel, 116 F.3d at 1252. 21 Farmers next argues that the record lacks substantial evidence establishing that its reasons for denying Denesha's 1992 raise rose to the level of intentional age discrimination. We disagree. To make his prima facie case, Denesha was required to show that he was a member of a protected group, he qualified for the raise, despite qualifying he was denied the raise, and other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the protected group in fact received raises. See Winbush v. State of Iowa, 66 F.3d 1471, 1479 n. 13 (8th Cir.1995). Denesha was over forty, his supervisor submitted a highly complimentary review that was later altered by his manager on the basis of irrelevant and perhaps contrived information, he was denied the raise, and all other employees except one other individual over the age of fifty received raises. This showing, coupled with direct evidence of White's discriminatory bias, amply supported the jury's determination that the denial of Denesha's 1992 raise was due to intentional age discrimination. See id. at 1479.