Opinion ID: 845584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attorney Licensure and Discipline in Michigan

Text: Const. 1963, art. 6, § 5 [8] and MCL 600.904 [9] give this Court the duty and responsibility to regulate and discipline the members of the bar of this state. Grievance Administrator v. Lopatin, 462 Mich. 235, 241, 612 N.W.2d 120 (2000). Most obviously, this responsibility entails concern for the competence, character, and fitness of attorneys, but historically also has included the issuance of rules regulating the manner in which lawyers communicate to the public about other participants in the legal system, primarily judges and other lawyers. While many other professions are regulated with the goal of ensuring competence and fitness, it is only the legal profession that also has imposed upon its members regulations concerning the nature of public comment. The First Amendment implications are easily understood in such a regulatory regime and this Court, like other courts of last resort including the United States Supreme Court, has attempted to appropriately draw the line between robust comment that is protected by the First Amendment and comment that undermines the integrity of the legal system. Indeed, whether this line can be drawn anywhere to take cognizance of the interests of the legal system is the central issue in this case. The proposition asserted by Mr. Fieger is that, under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, there can be no courtesy or civility rules at all of this sort and that judges and other lawyers assailed verbally, as public figures, have the same remedies any other public figures have in libel and slander law. [10] As the opinions of the ADB suggest, the absolutism of this argument is not without some allure. [11] Yet, respect for the wisdom of those who have preceded us in the judiciary in this country and the traditions of the legal process counsel that narrow and carefully tailored regulations of the sort set forth in MRPC 3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a) are necessary adjuncts to a responsible legal system and are compatible with the First Amendment. It is first necessary to outline why such regulations are necessary at all. That is, what substantial interests are these courtesy and civility rules designed to further? In particular, are there some interests that such rules further beyond merely protecting judges from the robust criticism that is sometimes a part of the give-and-take of the democratic process? Do such rules merely insulate judges from the inconvenience of being held accountable from their public actions? In establishing rules designed to deter and sanction uncivil and discourteous conduct on the part of lawyers, we believe that this Court is doing far more than protecting the sensitivities of judges; rather, we believe that we are upholding the integrity of that which is being carried out by the judicial branch of government. The performance of these responsibilities requires a process in which the public can have the highest sense of confidence, one in which the fairness and integrity of the process is not routinely called into question, one in which the ability of judges to mete out evenhanded decisions is not undermined by the fear of vulgar characterizations of their actions, one in which the public is not misled by name-calling and vulgarities from lawyers who are held to have special knowledge of the courts, one in which discourse is grounded in the traditional tools of the lawlanguage, precedents, logic, and rational analysis and debate. To disregard such interests in the pursuit of a conception of the First Amendment that has never been a part of our actual Constitution would in a real and practical sense adversely affect our rule of law, a no less indispensable foundation of our constitutional system than the First Amendment. These interests in a responsible legal process heretofore have been unquestioned and have been thought to justify a lawyer discipline system in this state that encompasses rules on courtesy and civility toward others. Accordingly, in cases such as Attorney General v. Nelson, 263 Mich. 686, 701, 249 N.W. 439 (1933), and more recently in In re Chmura, 461 Mich. 517, 535, 608 N.W.2d 31 (2000) ( Chmura I ), we have recognized that in order to preserve the integrity of our legal process, it is of utmost importance that the people have confidence in this process. We have recognized that rules of the sort at issue here have as their purpose considerably more than protecting the sensitivities of judges, but are designed to maintain public respect for a rule of law that is dependent on such public respect. In Ginger v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 366 Mich. 675, 679, 116 N.W.2d 216 (1962), we indicated that a lawyer's duty to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts is `not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' (Citation omitted.) In furtherance of this, the law has reposed special stewardship duties on lawyers on the basis of the venerable notion that lawyers are more than merely advocates who happen to carry out their duties in a courtroom environment, they are also officers of the court. In this exclusive role, lawyers have special responsibilities in their relations with other officers of the court. [12] In discussing the scope of this obligation in the 19th century, the United States Supreme Court stated that attorneys are under an implied obligation . . . to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation . . . includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their judicial acts. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335, 355, 20 L.Ed 646 (1871). More recently, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on this unique status: As an officer of the court, a member of the bar enjoys singular powers that others do not possess; by virtue of admission, members of the bar share a kind of monopoly granted only to lawyers. Admission creates a license not only to advise and counsel clients but also to appear in court and try cases; as an officer of the court, a lawyer can cause persons to drop their private affairs and be called as witnesses in court, and for depositions and other pretrial processes that, while subject to the ultimate control of the court, may be conducted outside courtrooms. The license granted by the court requires members of the bar to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the role of courts in the administration of justice. [ In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644-645, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985).] Michigan has statutorily recognized this status in MCL 600.901, which provides: The members of the state bar of Michigan are officers of the courts of this state, and have the exclusive right to designate themselves as attorneys and counselors, or attorneys at law, or lawyers. No person is authorized to practice law in this state unless he complies with the requirements of the supreme court with regard thereto. It is to this end that our bar entrance requirements look to character as well as competence, and the bar admissions process culminates in a way unprecedented in other professions with the taking of an oath pursuant to MCL 600.913. This oath provides that the lawyer will, upon being accorded the privileges provided by membership in the bar, [13] (1) maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers, (2) abstain from all offensive personality, and (3) conduct himself or herself personally and professionally in conformity with the high standards of conduct imposed on members of the bar as conditions for the privilege to practice law in Michigan. State Bar Rule 15, § 3(1). Moreover, MCR 9.103(A) provides: The license to practice law in Michigan is, among other things, a continuing proclamation by the Supreme Court that the holder is fit to be entrusted with professional and judicial matters and to aid in the administration of justice as an attorney and counselor and as an officer of the court. It is the duty of every attorney to conduct himself or herself at all times in conformity with standards imposed on members of the bar as a condition of the privilege to practice law. These standards include, but are not limited to, the rules of professional responsibility and the rules of judicial conduct that are adopted by the Supreme Court. As contemplated by this rule, this Court has promulgated the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. Of immediate interest is MRPC 3.5(c), which does not preclude criticism by a member of the legal profession, of even the most robust character, but precludes only undignified or discourteous conduct toward the tribunal. The comment on MRPC 3.5 elaborates: The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from undignified or discourteous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge, but should avoid reciprocation; the judge's default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review, and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics. Similarly, MRPC 6.5(a) provides only that [a] lawyer shall treat with courtesy and respect all persons involved in the legal process. The comment on MRPC 6.5 explains: A lawyer is an officer of the court, who has sworn to uphold the federal and state constitutions, to proceed only by means that are truthful and honorable, and to avoid offensive personality. It follows that such a professional must treat clients and third persons with courtesy and respect. For many citizens, contact with a lawyer is the first or only contact with the legal system. Respect for law and for legal institutions is diminished whenever a lawyer neglects the obligation to treat persons properly. It is increased when the obligation is met. As should be clear, these rules are designed to prohibit only undignified, discourteous, and disrespectful conduct or remarks. The rules are a call to discretion and civility, not to silence or censorship, and they do not even purport to prohibit criticism. The wisdom of such rules was recognized by United Stated Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart in his concurring opinion in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959), in which he remarked, A lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and honor, which experience has shown necessary in a calling dedicated to the accomplishment of justice. He who would follow that calling must conform to those standards. Equally pertinent is the Preamble to our Rules of Professional Conduct, A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those that serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also the lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. It is in this historical and professional context that Mr. Fieger's remarks must be reviewed.