Opinion ID: 2994895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bethany’s Motion to Amend its

Text: Complaint Although leave to amend a complaint should be freely granted when justice so requires, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), the district court need not allow an amendment when there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or when the amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Villa v. City of Chicago, 924 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 1991)). An amendment is futile if the added claim would not survive a motion for summary judgment. See Estate of Porter v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1994). We review a district court’s decision to deny leave to amend for an abuse of discretion. See Sanders v. Venture Stores, Inc., 56 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 1995). The district court determined that allowing Bethany to amend its complaint to add a promissory estoppel claim would be futile because Bethany would be unable to succeed on that claim. Bethany takes issue with this conclusion. It argues that the Janis letter constitutes an unambiguous promise by QVC to allow Bethany to appear on its broadcast and that Scott relied on this promise to Bethany’s detriment by purchasing $100,000 worth of product in order to meet the anticipated demand for Ti-Creme following the broadcast. QVC responds that the Janis letter was not an unambiguous promise, that Bethany’s reliance on the Janis letter was unreasonable, that Bethany delayed unduly in seeking the amendment, and that allowing the amendment in the face of Bethany’s undue delay would prejudice QVC. In order to succeed on its promissory estoppel claim, Bethany would have to prove that QVC made an unambiguous promise, that Bethany relied on that promise to its detriment, and that its reliance was reasonable and foreseeable by QVC. See Quake Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990, 1004 (Ill. 1990). Bethany has failed to establish that the Janis letter was an unambiguous promise or that its reliance on that letter was reasonable. The Janis letter contains no words of promise or obligation; instead, it merely states that QVC notified DCCA of the vendors it had chosen to participate in the broadcast. Such a statement does not amount to an unambiguous promise on QVC’s part to have Bethany promote Ti-Creme on its broadcast. More fundamentally, as we have discussed in the previous section, it was unreasonable for Scott to rely on the Janis letter in purchasing $100,000 worth of Ti-Creme after QVC had stated expressly to Scott and the other vendors that the sale of any product to QVC would be governed by a purchase order. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment on the grounds that it would be futile. Although the district court based its decision to deny Bethany’s request for leave to amend on the ground of futility, we believe the court also could have denied Bethany’s request on the ground of undue delay. See Sanders, 56 F.3d at 773-74 (upholding the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint on the grounds of undue delay and prejudice even though the district court did not address those issues). Bethany did not seek to add its promissory estoppel claim until after the close of discovery and after QVC had filed its motion for summary judgment./5 The factual basis of Bethany’s promissory estoppel claim is virtually identical to the factual basis of its breach of contract claim; therefore, Bethany could have brought the promissory estoppel claim at the time it filed its original complaint if it had prepared for this litigation with the appropriate foresight. Bethany has offered no explanation for waiting until it was faced with a summary judgment motion before attempting to add its promissory estoppel claim. See Kleinhans v. Lisle Savs. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 1987) (In view of [plaintiff’s] failure to adequately explain the unreasonable delay in moving to amend his complaint to state a claim for punitive damages when all of the information necessary to stating such a claim has been available to him for eighteen months, we agree with the judgment and reasoning of the district court that [plaintiff’s] motion represents an apparent attempt to avoid the effect of summary judgment [on his other claims]. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because discovery already had closed and because QVC already had briefed its summary judgment motion, allowing Bethany to add its promissory estoppel claim would have required additional delays in the resolution of the case to allow QVC to respond to a new theory of liability. We do not require a district court to tolerate such delays. See Cleveland v. Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint when they waited until after discovery had been completed and summary judgment motions had been fully briefed before filing their motion to amend); see also Perrian, 958 F.2d at 195 (stating that long delays before seeking to amend a complaint can burden the judicial system, can defeat the public’s interest in a speedy resolution of legal disputes, and can justify a district court’s denial of a motion to amend). As an alternate ground for decision, the district court rightfully could have denied Bethany’s request for leave to amend its complaint on the ground of undue delay.