Opinion ID: 77393
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preemption by the CDA

Text: 14 First, we address the district court's conclusion that the CDA preempts the subject matter of Almeida's right of publicity claim. Subsection 230(c) of the CDA provides: (c) Protection for Good Samaritan blocking and screening of offensive material 15
16 No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. 17
18 No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). 19 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 2 The CDA preempts state law that is contrary to this subsection. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.) 20 The majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 3 In this case, the district court adopted this approach, but even this broad statutory immunity does not apply without limitation. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (providing that [n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal criminal statute); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (providing that [n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (providing that [n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4) (providing that [n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 . . . or any similar State law). Here, the district court did not consider whether immunizing Amazon from liability under the right of publicity would limit any law pertaining to intellectual property. 21 Whether the CDA immunizes an interactive service provider from a state law right of publicity claim is an issue of first impression for this Court. Few federal courts have considered the effect of § 230(e)(2) on the CDA's grant of immunity, although it is clear that any law pertaining to intellectual property at least refers to the three traditional forms of intellectual property: copyright, patent, and trademark. See Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (11th Cir.1998) (stating that the three principal forms of intellectual property are copyright, patent, and trademark). Thus, federal district courts have held that § 230(e)(2) unambiguously precludes applying the CDA to immunize interactive service providers from trademark claims. See Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2D 1446 (E.D.Mich.2001) (construing § 230(e)(2) to preclude application of CDA immunity to claims based on the violation of federal trademark laws); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F.Supp.2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (recognizing that immunizing trademark infringement claims would limit laws pertaining to intellectual property). 22 Almeida contends that the CDA does not preempt section 540.08 because it is a quintessential right of publicity claim, and the right of publicity is a widely recognized intellectual property right. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir.2003) (stating that [t]he right of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin which has been defined as the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or identity); Allison, 136 F.3d at 1448 (concluding that the common law right of publicity is an intellectual property right for purposes of the first-sale doctrine); J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer & the Rights of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 1703, 1712 (1987) (stating that the right of publicity has matured into a distinctive legal category occupying an important place in the law of intellectual property); Black's Law Dictionary 813 (7th ed.1999) (defining intellectual property as follows: A category of intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of the human intellect. The category comprises primarily trademark, copyright, and patent rights, but also includes trade-secret rights, publicity rights, moral rights, and rights against unfair competition.). 23 Further, Almeida argues that § 230(e)(2) extends to all intellectual property rights, even non-traditional state-law intellectual property rights. See Perfect 10, 340 F.Supp.2d at 1108-09 (holding that based on § 230(e)(2) the CDA does not apply to California's statutory and common law right of publicity claims). Indeed, courts have held that intellectual property is not a static concept for purposes of the CDA. Gucci, 135 F.Supp.2d at 414 (noting that nowhere does Section 230 state that the laws to which it refers are . . . limited to the intellectual property laws as they existed [when enacted]). Almeida contends that extending the meaning of § 230(e)(2) makes sense because the purpose served by publicity rights is similar to that of traditional intellectual property rights. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) (explaining that the State's interest in providing a right of publicity is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation). 24 Amazon responds that even if the right of publicity protects a type of intellectual property right, Congress did not intend for § 230(e)(2) to apply to publicity rights. First, Amazon argues that Congress did not intend by the CDA to protect state-law claims. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.); but see Perfect 10, 340 F.Supp.2d at 1107-09 (holding that § 230(e)(2) applies to California's wrongful use of registered mark law, Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 14335, and California's right of publicity law, Cal. Civ.Code § 3344). 25 Second, Amazon argues that Almeida's right of publicity action is a tort-based suit, and Congress did not intend to limit the CDA's immunity with respect to tort-based suits. Amazon points to the Sixth Circuit's description of the CDA's purpose in Zeran, 26 Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability on service providers for the communications of others represented, for Congress, simply another form of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum. 27 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 928 (The right of publicity is a creature of state law and its violation gives rise to a cause of action for the commercial tort of unfair competition.). 4 28 Thus, while there appears to be no dispute that the right of publicity is a type of intellectual property right, Almeida argues that it is not clear from the statute that any law pertaining to intellectual property includes claims based upon state intellectual property rights. Moreover, neither party points to any legislative history indicating Congress' intent as to the effect of § 230(e)(2). See Gucci, 135 F.Supp.2d at 414 n. 11 (stating that section 230's legislative history provides no clues as to the meaning of [section 230(e)(2)]). 29 While we agree with Almeida that the district court should have addressed § 230(e)(2) before invoking the CDA's grant of immunity, we believe that regardless of the answer to this question, the district court did not need to address the difficult issues of application of the CDA under the facts of this case. In Gucci, the court described the initial § 230(e)(2) issue as, whether Plaintiff's complaint would withstand a motion to dismiss even in the absence of § 230. Gucci, 135 F.Supp.2d at 412; Ford Motor Co., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2D 1446 (stating that a motion to dismiss a federal trademark claim against a service provider must turn on whether Plaintiffs' Complaint successfully states a claim for violation of the trademark laws without regard to the CDA). In this case, we ask whether an internet retailer, such as Amazon, could be held liable under Florida's right of publicity statute for displaying a book's cover image in furtherance of the book's sale. As we explain below, Almeida's right of publicity claim based on Fla. Stat. § 540.08 would not withstand a motion to dismiss under the law. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the district court to determine whether the CDA preempts Almeida's state law right of publicity claim, and we do not reach any of Almeida's challenges to the district court's application of the CDA here.