Opinion ID: 1090882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Rochelle and Falcon, Inc.

Text: We also find the district court's opinion in conflict with a persuasive line of cases from the Second District which have held that the method of evaluation applied by an appraiser should ordinarily be treated as an issue of weight, not admissibility, of the challenged testimony. In Rochelle v. State Road Department, 196 So.2d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), the Second District held that the trial court had erred in striking the testimony of an expert appraiser. The opinion explained that an appraiser-expert's evaluation method is not a matter that relates to the competency of his testimony unless the method used by the witness is so totally inadequate or improper that adoption of the method would require departing from all common sense and reason or would require adoption of an entirely new and totally unauthenticated formula in the field of appraising. Id. at 479. The opinion further held that the method of evaluation and the consideration of the comparable properties utilized to determine the assessment should be considered as matters going to the weight and not the competency of his testimony. Id. Similarly, in State Road Department v. Falcon, Inc., 157 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), the Second District held that the trial court erred by ordering a new trial based on the erroneous admission of an expert appraiser's testimony. See id. at 566. In that case, the expert witnesses testified that they had not considered a particular real estate transaction in determining the value of the condemned property. See id. at 564. The court identified two factors as relevant in determining whether the expert's testimony was properly excluded: (1) prejudice to the appellee's case and (2) the overall competence of the expert's testimony as a result of the failure to consider one transaction. See id. at 566. With respect to prejudice, the court said, Obviously, the mere fact that the testimony depreciated the recovery sought by the appellees was not a sufficient ground for excluding the testimony if it was competent, relevant and material. Id. at 566. In determining competency of the expert's testimony in Falcon, the opinion explained: Upon examination of relevant authority, both in the cases and the texts, the conclusion is inescapable that the failure of an otherwise competent expert witness to consider one of numerous factors involved in assessing compensation goes not to his competency or the competency of the testimony but only to the weight of the testimony. 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain §§ 132-133 (1953); 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain §§ 18.4[4], 18.42[1] and 18.46 (Rev. 3rd ed.1962). See e.g., Hubbard v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., Tex.Civ. App., 1956, 286 S.W.2d 285. See Falcon, 157 So.2d at 566. The Second District reversed and remanded the new trial order for a judgment consistent with the jury verdict, see id. at 566-67, because the trial court failed to make the finding that the jury was deceived as to the probative force or weight of the testimony, and because the testimony at trial was competent and susceptible of consideration. Id. at 566. We find the reasoning of these Second District opinions to be correct and their application persuasive here, and we conclude that DOT's expert appraiser's testimony was properly admitted insofar as it was relevant to determining damages and material to DOT's case. Furthermore, with respect to the overall competence of the testimony, we find that it was competent. As the Rochelle opinion makes clear, an appraiser's opinion may be subject to impeachment or to having its weight reduced because of its failure to properly consider one of the many factors that may influence an opinion as to value, but that failure should not prevent the opinion's admission, nor cause its complete exclusion from the jury's consideration. See City of Vero Beach v. Schwey, 308 So.2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (holding that differing features of a comparable sale of real property were not a sufficient basis to reject expert testimony in an eminent domain proceeding, instead the differences went to the amount of weight to be afforded by the jury); see also White v. Westlund, 624 So.2d 1148, 1151 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (holding that qualifications placed on a medical expert's opinion are matters of weight, not admissibility); Lombard v. Executive Elevator Service, Inc., 545 So.2d 453, 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding that summary judgment was improper where trial court excluded expert testimony due to expert's inability to testify as to exact cause of elevator malfunction, as the deficiency in the expert's testimony related to weight, not admissibility); H.K. Corp. v. Estate of Miller, 405 So.2d 218, 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (holding that the testimony of plaintiffs's expert witness was properly admitted into evidence on the basis that the sufficiency of the facts required to form an opinion must normally be decided by the expert himself and any deficiency relates to the weight rather than the admissibility of the expert's opinion); Rimmer v. Tesla, 201 So.2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967) (determining that argument that medical doctor's testimony regarding precise time of death was insufficiently thorough was an issue of weight, not of competency or credibility). These holdings are also consistent with provisions of the Florida Evidence Code, §§ 90.702, .705, Fla. Stat. (2002), which provide as follows concerning the admission of expert opinion testimony: 90.702 Testimony by experts.If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial. .... 90.705 Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion. (1) Unless otherwise required by the court, an expert may testify in terms of opinion or inferences and give his reasons without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data. On cross-examination the expert shall be required to specify the facts or data. Therefore, in the instant case, even had DOT's expert failed to include the arbor area in his valuation of severance damages, we conclude that this exclusion would have gone to the weight, not the admissibility of his testimony. Further, as contemplated by the Evidence Code, and, as actually occurred here, the predicate for the expert's opinion was a proper subject of cross-examination.