Opinion ID: 2092138
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: As a threshold matter, the State argues that Lisa M. lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 1(D)(q) because she was allowed to testify regarding her efforts to achieve parental rehabilitation. As previously stated, section1(D)(q) the provision under which the State elected to proceedcontains a mandatory conclusive presumption of parental unfitness upon clear and convincing proof of conviction. No rehabilitative evidence is permitted under the statutory procedure. A confluence of rather unusual circumstances compels us to reject the State's standing argument. First, we are not convinced that the hearing which took place was of the caliber respondent would have received but for the trial court's vacillation. The State's election to proceed only under section 1 (D)(q) obviously narrowed the focus of the hearing to, essentially, proof of respondent's prior conviction. In view of the State's representation, respondent's counsel withdrew a notice to compel the minor's appearance at the fitness portion of termination proceedings, and, when the circuit court reversed itself and decided to hear evidence of rehabilitation, counsel called only respondent as a witness. While this was, of course, counsel's decision, it is not clear from the record the extent to which the procedure was affected by the uncertainty exhibited by the trial court. Second, the words and actions of the circuit court inspire little confidence that respondent actually received due consideration of the testimony that was presented. The circuit court's decision to reverse its initial ruling and hear evidence of rehabilitation seems to have been prompted, in part, by a fear that the appellate court might see things differently, and by a belief that the court could simply ignore the procedural aspects of section 1(D)(q) and hedge its rulings. We note the following statements: It is just a matter of am I going to hear [evidence of rehabilitative efforts] at the unfitness hearing or the best interest hearing. If I were to wait and hear it only at the best interest hearing, it is possible that the Appellate Court might see this case differently than they saw J.B. and say that is an equal protection problem. Therefore, reverse the finding.       The Court, assuming the statute is constitutional, noting depravity is not alleged, has not been alleged in this case, that the only allegation of unfitness that has been acted upon or prosecuted or is being prosecuted by the State in Q is going to, despite the fact that the Appellate Court has in February upheld the constitutionality of Paragraph Q, going to allow the natural mother to offer her evidence of rehabilitation   . The court obviously recognized only section 1(D)(i) (depravity) would have provided the statutory authority to hear evidence of rehabilitation during the fitness phase of termination proceedings, and that section 1(D)(q) clearly did not; yet, though the court found section 1(D)(q) to be constitutional, the court chose to proceed in a manner contravening one key procedural aspect of the statute. The court could not do so, logically or procedurally, without finding section 1(D)(q) unconstitutional. Though the court permitted and purportedly considered respondent's evidence, the court repeatedly and unequivocally stated that its ruling, finding respondent unfit, was based solely on section 1(D)(q): The Court will rule as follows: With regard to unfitness, the Court does find that the State has met their burden of proof in this case, which is clear and convincing evidence with regard to Paragraph Q. The State has proved that [respondent] was criminal [ sic ] convicted of the attempted murder of a child. There is a certified copy of conviction admitted into evidence. And [respondent] has herself testified and admitted she was convicted of that crime with regard to her child   . The court recounted respondent's testimony in a rather cursory manner and concluded, speaking to respondent, [A]ll I know is you attempted to kill one of your children. Lest there be any doubt about the basis of its finding, the court added, yet again: So, the Court is finding, so the record is clear, [respondent] unfit pursuant to Paragraph Q of the Adoption Act. By enacting section 1(D)(q), the legislature obviously did not intend to provide for or allow the introduction of evidence to rebut the statute's conclusive presumption of unfitness. Indeed, if there were any lingering doubts, they would be put to rest by a comparison of the clear language of section 1(D)(i) (specifically providing for rebuttal) and section 1(D)(q) (omitting any such reference), and by application of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning, to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative. Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed.2004). This court recently employed that maxim in an analogous situation, holding, where the legislature has expressly provided a private right of action in a specific section of a statute, the legislature did not intend to imply private rights of action to enforce other sections of the same statute. Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill.2d 30, 44, 282 Ill.Dec. 148, 805 N.E.2d 1165 (2004). By specifically providing an opportunity for rebuttal evidence in section 1(D)(i), the legislature did not intend to imply a right of rebuttal in section 1(D)(q). The circuit court's actions and words indicate the court was well aware of the differing procedural aspects of the two sections, one of which (section 1(D)(i)) was not even alleged as a ground for unfitness in the State's petition. As this court has previously stated, it is improper to terminate a parent's rights on grounds not alleged in a petition to terminate. In re D.C., 209 Ill.2d 287, 296, 282 Ill.Dec. 848, 807 N.E.2d 472 (2004). It has been held that a determination of unfitness may be made only upon consideration of evidence relevant to the grounds alleged in the petition before the court. In re V.S., 285 Ill.App.3d 372, 375, 220 Ill.Dec. 894, 674 N.E.2d 437 (1996), citing In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill.2d 255, 277, 149 Ill.Dec. 710, 562 N.E.2d 174 (1990) (trial court is to determine parental unfitness based on evidence relevant to the particular grounds of unfitness alleged). Evidence of parental rehabilitation was not relevant to the statutory ground before the court. The constitutional source of a circuit court's jurisdiction does not carry with it a license to act in ways inconsistent with controlling statutory law. In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill.2d 523, 529, 219 Ill.Dec. 32, 670 N.E.2d 710 (1996), citing In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d 53, 75, 189 Ill.Dec. 1, 619 N.E.2d 702 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.). For example, in People v. Thompson, 209 Ill.2d 19, 23, 282 Ill.Dec. 183, 805 N.E.2d 1200 (2004), this court held that a circuit court disposition not authorized by statute is void. See also In re Austin W., 214 Ill.2d 31, 56, 59, 291 Ill.Dec. 280, 823 N.E.2d 572 (2005) (this court noted the circuit court's serious error, where the circuit court knew it had no authority to review an administrative law judge's determination, but did so anyway). In this case, the circuit court lacked the statutory authorization to consider respondent's evidence of rehabilitation, and thus could not have rendered a valid judgment on her behalf based on that evidence. The circuit court had the authority to make a finding, and render judgment, based solely on the sufficiency of proof that the parent had been convicted of one of the offenses listed in section 1(D)(q). It simply had no authority to choose a statutory ground for unfitness not alleged in the petition and proceed under that section. Given the coalescence of the aforementioned circumstances, we believe Lisa M. has standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act. We now turn to the standards that govern our review. An issue concerning the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law that we review de novo. In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill.2d 253, 265, 288 Ill.Dec. 142, 817 N.E.2d 500 (2004); Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill.2d 106, 121-22, 284 Ill.Dec. 360, 810 N.E.2d 13 (2004). We begin with the presumption that the statute is constitutional. John M., 212 Ill.2d at 265, 288 Ill.Dec. 142, 817 N.E.2d 500. If reasonably possible, this court must construe the statute so as to affirm its constitutionality and validity. In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 296, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233. When confronted with a claim that a statute violates constitutional guarantees of due process or equal protection, a court must first determine the nature of the right purportedly infringed by the statute. People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 203, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004); In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 302, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233. Classification of the right affected is critical because the nature of the right dictates the level of scrutiny courts employ in determining whether the statute in question passes constitutional muster. Unless a fundamental constitutional right is implicated, the rational basis test applies, and the statute will be upheld so long as it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. John M., 212 Ill.2d at 266, 288 Ill.Dec. 142, 817 N.E.2d 500, quoting In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 302, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233. However, where the constitutional right at issue is one considered fundamental, the presumption of constitutionality is weaker, and courts must subject the statute to the more rigorous requirements of strict scrutiny analysis. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d at 204, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288; Stokovich, 211 Ill.2d at 122, 284 Ill. Dec. 360, 810 N.E.2d 13. In order to survive strict scrutiny, the measures employed by the legislature must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and must be narrowly tailored thereto, i.e., the legislature must use the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of its goal. In re H.G., 197 Ill.2d at 330, 259 Ill.Dec. 1, 757 N.E.2d 864; In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 303, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233. There is no doubt that the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children is a fundamental constitutional right. In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 303, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233. Indeed, the rights to conceive and raise one's children have been described as among the most `basic civil rights of man.' Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558 (1972), quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660 (1942). As the Supreme Court observed in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 56 (2000), [t]he liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Court. `[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2342, 105 L.Ed.2d 91, 106 (1989), quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531, 540 (1977). The liberty interest of parents in the care, custody and management of their child `does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.' In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347, 359, 289 Ill.Dec. 11, 818 N.E.2d 1214 (2004), quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982). Clearly, strict scrutiny analysis applies to statuteslike the one at issuethat are employed as part of a procedure to terminate parental rights and dissolve the bonds between parent and child. Thus, the statute at issue must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored so as to use the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of the government's goal. In re H.G., 197 Ill.2d at 330, 259 Ill.Dec. 1, 757 N.E.2d 864; In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 303, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233. With these precepts in mind, we consider the means the legislature has chosen in pursuit of what is undeniably the state's compelling interest in the safety and welfare of children. See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill.2d 299, 312, 219 Ill.Dec. 501, 671 N.E.2d 668 (1996). While section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act denies respondents like Lisa M. and Lisa Z. an opportunity to rebut its presumption of parental unfitness, based upon conviction of one of the offenses listed therein, section 1(D)(i) of the Act allows for rebuttal, though several of the criminal offenses set forth therein are at least as serious as section 1(D)(q) offenses, and in some instances more serious. For example, section 1(D)(q) lists aggravated battery, heinous battery, or attempted murder of any child. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West 2002). Among the offenses against children listed in section 1(D)(i) are first degree murder or second degree murder of any child   [,] attempt or conspiracy to commit first degree murder or second degree murder of any child   [,] solicitation to commit murder of any child, solicitation to commit murder of any child for hire, or solicitation to commit second degree murder of any child   [,] aggravated criminal sexual assault. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2000). So, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person who murders a child is an unfit parent; however, there is a mandatory conclusive ( irrebuttable ) presumption that a parent convicted of aggravated battery or attempted murder of a childoffenses no more serious than murderis an unfit parent. Had the State alleged conviction of attempted murder of a child under section 1(D)(i), Lisa M. would have had an opportunity to rebut the presumption of unfitness; however, because the State alleged conviction of attempted murder of a child under section 1(D)(q), Lisa M. was statutorily denied the right to offer evidence in rebuttal. Lisa Z. would have had an opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence of parental fitness at the fitness hearing had she been convicted of killing one of her children, because the State would have been forced to file under section 1(D)(i); however, since she had been convicted of aggravated battery, she had no statutory right of rebuttal. There is no logic to this statutory scheme, much less the use of narrowly tailored    `   least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of [the State's] goal.' In re H.G., 197 Ill.2d at 330, 259 Ill.Dec. 1, 757 N.E.2d 864, quoting In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 303, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233. As this court has observed, statutory classifications that affect a fundamental right violate the equal protection clause unless they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. In re Adoption of L.T.M., 214 Ill.2d 60, 75, 291 Ill.Dec. 645, 824 N.E.2d 221 (2005); In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 309, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection requires that the government treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. L.T.M., 214 Ill.2d at 74, 291 Ill.Dec. 645, 824 N.E.2d 221, quoting In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d 291, 309, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233 (2001). In L.T.M., this court held it was a violation of equal protection not to provide appellate counsel to an indigent parent whose parental rights had been terminated under the Adoption Act, when he certainly would have had [a right to counsel on appeal had his rights been terminated] under the Juvenile Court Act. L.T.M., 214 Ill.2d at 75, 291 Ill.Dec. 645, 824 N.E.2d 221. Thus, this court held it was an equal protection violation to accord a procedural right under one act, but to withhold it under the other. As this court noted, the consequences under either act were the same: [A] parent who stands to lose his rights under the Adoption Act if he is found unfit is in a very similar situation to a parent who stands to lose the very same constitutional right, based on the very same finding, in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act. L.T.M., 214 Ill.2d at 76, 291 Ill.Dec. 645, 824 N.E.2d 221. In L.T.M., this court defined the pertinent classification for purposes of equal protection analysis as follows: In this case, the classification is the distinction between parents who must answer a petition to terminate their parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act and those, like John, who must answer under the Adoption Act. L.T.M., 214 Ill.2d at 75, 291 Ill.Dec. 645, 214 N.E.2d 221. The right to counsel is a procedural safeguard ( In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d at 365, 289 Ill.Dec. 11, 818 N.E.2d 1214; see In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill.App.3d 1096, 1107, 273 Ill.Dec. 1, 788 N.E.2d 310 (2003)) that this court held should be afforded to similarly situated parents, facing the prospect of termination, regardless of the provision under which the State proceeded. L.T.M., 214 Ill.2d at 73-77, 291 Ill.Dec. 645, 824 N.E.2d 221. The applicability of L.T.M.'s holding to the case at bar is unmistakable; the reasoning of L.T.M. is even more compelling when applied to the circumstances of this case. This court has stated that a rebuttable presumption is a rule of procedure. First National Bank of Chicago v. King, 165 Ill.2d 533, 542, 209 Ill.Dec. 199, 651 N.E.2d 127 (1995). Thus, a respondent, like Lisa M., who is the subject of a petition alleging unfitness under section 1(D)(q) is denied the procedural right of rebuttal that is afforded to a person convicted of the same offense, but alleged to be unfit under section 1(D)(i). The offense is the same. The potential consequences are the same. The procedural safeguards provided by the statutes are different, for no apparent reason. To deny this safeguard to Lisa M. and Lisa Z., while providing it to others similarly situated is to deny them equal protection of the law. It is no answer to suggest that there is a unique moral element to section 1(D)(i) simply because that provision is entitled depravity. There is no difference between the two sections, much less a meaningful one. Sections 1(D)(i) and 1(D)(q) both base their presumptions of parental unfitness on prior convictions of the same or similar, specified offenses. Section 1(D)(i) contains the error-reducing safeguard of rebuttal; section 1(D)(q) does not. Moreover, notwithstanding any previous statements to the contrary, we believe, after our decision in In re D.T., there is little force left in the argument that a respondent who has been deprived of the opportunity to present evidence of parental fitness at a hearing purporting to address that very issue is no worse off for having to present such evidence at the best-interests hearing, after having been found unfit. Recently, in In re D.T., this court held that parents are not entitled to all of the same procedural safeguards at the best-interests hearing that they enjoy at the fitness hearing. Specifically, this court found that the clear and convincing standard of proof that applies at the fitness hearing gives way to a lesser, preponderance, standard of proof at the best-interests phase of termination proceedings. In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d at 361, 366, 289 Ill.Dec. 11, 818 N.E.2d 1214. The basis for the change in standards of proof, this court noted, is a different focus at the best-interests hearing: Following a finding of unfitness    the focus shifts to the child. The issue is no longer whether parental rights can be terminated; the issue is whether, in light of the child's needs, parental rights should be terminated. Accordingly, at a best-interests hearing, the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life. (Emphases in original.) In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d at 364, 289 Ill.Dec. 11, 818 N.E.2d 1214. This court explained why a higher standard of proof is required at the fitness hearing and a lesser standard of proof is permissible at the best-interests phase: At the unfitness stage, the interests of the parent and the child coincide to the extent that they both `share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.' Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760-61, 102 S.Ct. at 1398, 71 L.Ed.2d at 611. The alignment of these interests at the unfitness hearing favors the use of error-reducing procedures, i.e., use of a more stringent burden of proof than a preponderance. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760-61, 102 S.Ct. at 1398, 71 L.Ed.2d at 611. The same, however, is not true at the best-interests hearing. Once the State proves parental unfitness, the interests of the parent and the child diverge. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760, 102 S.Ct. at 1398, 71 L.Ed.2d at 611. Thus, at a best-interests hearing, the parent and the child may become adversaries, as the child's interest in a loving, stable and safe home environment becomes more aligned with the State's interest in terminating parental rights and freeing the child for adoption. Although the parent still possesses an interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship, the force of that interest is lessened by the court's finding that the parent is unfit to raise his or her child. In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d at 363-64, 289 Ill.Dec. 11, 818 N.E.2d 1214. Clearly, a parent found unfit at the first phase of termination proceedings enters the second phase at a disadvantage from a procedural and evidentiary standpoint. See In re C.W., 199 Ill.2d 198, 217, 262 Ill.Dec. 802, 766 N.E.2d 1105 (2002) (at the best-interests hearing, the full range of the parent's conduct must be considered, including the grounds for finding the parent unfit); In re D.L., 326 Ill.App.3d 262, 271, 260 Ill.Dec. 125, 760 N.E.2d 542 (2001) (such evidence is a crucial consideration at the best-interests hearing). A parent who is denied the opportunity to adduce evidence of fitness at the hearing where a fitness determination will be made is clearly at a disadvantage by the time of the best-interests hearinga disadvantage not faced by those who are allowed to present evidence of their fitness at the first phase of termination proceedings. The latter are accorded an error-reducing procedure that is inexplicably denied the former. To suggest that this inequity does not exist is to ignore the reality of results, and a fundamental requirement of due process, i.e., that a respondent be afforded the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32 (1976); In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d 30, 49, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424 (2004). The operative term here is meaningful. As the Supreme Court stated in Stanley, addressing another mandatory conclusive (irrebuttable) presumption, that also impacted the fundamental family relationship between parent and child: Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care    it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-57, 92 S.Ct. at 1215, 31 L.Ed.2d at 562. In L.T.M., we rejected any suggestion that controlling expenditures was a valid basis for denying equal protection to the class affected by the deprivation. L.T.M., 214 Ill.2d at 75-77, 291 Ill.Dec. 645, 824 N.E.2d 221. We do so here as well. If the argument is that the respondents can present their evidence of fitness in any event at the best-interests hearing, it makes no difference from the standpoint of cost if they are allowed to do so at the first stage of termination proceedings; however, it may well make a significant difference as to outcome. In short, there is no rational basis for treating persons subject to fitness proceedings under section 1(D)(q) differently from those facing the same proceedings under section 1(D)(i), much less a justification that would survive strict scrutiny. We need not speculate as to how section 1(D)(q) could be more narrowly tailored; the legislature has provided us the model in section 1(D)(i). Therefore, we hold section 1(D)(q) unconstitutional as violative of equal protection. Given our disposition, we need not address the parties' due process arguments. It remains for us to decide whether the remedy for this constitutional violation is to require the state to extend the benefit of timely and meaningful rebuttal to those who have been denied it under section 1(D)(q), or to withdraw the benefit from those who have been favored under section 1(D)(i). See L.T.M., 214 Ill.2d at 77, 291 Ill.Dec. 645, 824 N.E.2d 221. Given that the legislature has seen fit to extend the benefit of rebuttal to those parents who have been convicted of murdering a child, we see no reason to withhold that benefit from those convicted of the lesser offenses listed in section 1(D)(q). We believe a full and fair hearing, and an informed decision, benefits all concerned, and works to the disadvantage of no one. For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court in cause No. 98896. We reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts in cause No. 97292 and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. No. 98896 Appellate court judgment affirmed. No. 97292 Judgments reversed; cause remanded.