Opinion ID: 3010248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Uniform Code of Military Justice

Text: The UCMJ provides:
chapter:
the armed forces . . . and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or order to obey it. . . . . (3) Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty . . . . 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1) & (3) (1988). Those falling into one of the categories of persons listed above are said to be in a status subject to the Code. In the present case, there is no 6 dispute that Plaintiff was in a status subject to the Code at the time of the alleged offenses. In order to satisfy the second element, i.e., personal jurisdiction, Defendants called Plaintiff into active duty, a status subject to the Code, pursuant to the following statutory authority: (1) A member of a reserve component who is not on active duty and who is made the subject of proceedings under section 815 (article 15) or section 830 (article 30) with respect to an offense against this chapter may be ordered to active duty involuntarily for the purpose of-- (A) investigation under section 832 (article 32) of this title; (B) trial by court martial; or (C) nonjudicial punishment under section 815 of this title.
be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) except with respect to an offense committed while the member was-- (A) on active duty; or (B) on inactive duty training . . . . 10 U.S.C. § 802(d)(1) & (2) (1988) (emphasis added). Under this section, Defendants posit that Plaintiff, as a reserve officer, was properly recalled to active duty to face court-martial for the offenses committed while he was a member of the regular component. They contend that § 802(d) expressly authorizes the recall of reservists for investigation and court-martial with respect to offenses committed on active duty even if such periods of active duty occurred in the regular component. In Defendants' view, because the term active duty is not qualified in any way it should be given its plain meaning and be applicable 7 to any period of active duty. Thus, Defendants invoked 10 U.S.C. § 802(d) as the statutory authority for personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff, and, by implication, the authority to order him to stand trial by court-martial. Contrary to Defendants' position, Plaintiff initially argues that the term active duty in § 802(d)(2)(A) refers only to those periods of active duty served while a reservist. As such, it has no application to situations where the offense was committed while on active duty in the regular component. The result, Plaintiff argues, is that § 802(d) cannot be used to effect personal jurisdiction. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the third element of court-martial jurisdiction, amenability to trial by courtmartial, cannot be met. Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction over him for past offenses committed during his prior period of service was lost after his discharge from the regular component of the Marines. He asserts that to have continuing jurisdiction over him for such past offenses requires the application of an earlier version of 10 U.S.C. § 803(a), which provided continuing jurisdiction over discharged military personnel when certain conditions were met.3 Because § 803(a) could not apply, Plaintiff argues he is not amenable to jurisdiction. 3 Section 803(a) as applied to Plaintiff provided: Subject to section 843 of this title, no person charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this chapter, an offense against this chapter, punishable by confinement for five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried 8 Defendants do not rely on the applicability § 803(a). Instead, they argue jurisdiction was never lost over Plaintiff upon his honorable discharge from the regular component because his discharge was handled simultaneously with his acceptance of a reserve commission. As such, they assert there was no break in service. We undertake our review beginning with the historical development of modern court-martial jurisdiction.