Opinion ID: 2284379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Witness-Juror Contact

Text: On March 10, 1989, during a bench conference, the juror in seat number one struck up a conversation with Dr. Steen, whom the judge had instructed to step down from the witness stand. The hearing-impaired juror, in seat number eight, apparently also participated in the conversation through her signing interpreters. Defense counsel observed this exchange and called it to the trial judge's attention. The judge immediately excused the jury and conducted an extensive, on-record examination of Dr. Steen, juror number one, the hearing-impaired juror, and her interpreters. With the agreement of all parties, the judge struck juror number one, who never returned to the jury room. The examination revealed that the conversation had lasted five minutes. Juror number one had begun it by asking Dr. Steen where he had attended medical school, and about the weather in California. Through her signing interpreter, juror number eight took part in the conversation, asking what country Dr. Steen was from and about his experiences in World War II. WHC's claims of prejudice principally arise from the testimony of Carla Mathers, one of the interpreters, that juror number one asked Dr. Steen if this was the first time he had been in court, and he responded that he usually gets the cases [that] settle before they get to court. In his examination, Dr. Steen did not mention the comment about settlement, but after being recalled and confronted with Ms. Mathers' statement, conceded that it was possible he had said the cases in which he had been involved usually settled. The judge questioned the hearing-impaired juror to learn whether she had seen any sign language that might impede her ability to serve impartially. Crediting the juror's statement that she did not understand Dr. Steen to have said anything about prior cases, the judge concluded she had not heard anything about settlement of cases, and had not been tainted. [7] He therefore denied the defendants' motions to strike her as a witness and for a mistrial. To decide whether action beyond striking juror number one was needed, the judge asked the rest of the jurors for a show of hands to determine whether any had seen or participated in the conversation. None had. WHC asserts that the judge's failure to strike the hearing-impaired juror or to ask any of the jurors whether, despite the conversation, they could still render an impartial verdict necessitates a new trial. We disagree. In Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892), the Supreme Court held that [p]rivate communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and ... witnesses ... are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear.  Id. at 150, 13 S.Ct. at 53 (emphasis added). Thus, although improper juror contact is presumptively harmful, Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), a party claiming prejudice from such contact is not entitled to a mistrial without more. Rather, the remedy for allegations of juror bias is a hearing to determine whether the misconduct actually resulted in prejudice. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-17, 102 S.Ct. 940, 944-46, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). See Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1213 (D.C.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 814, 102 L.Ed.2d 803 (1989); Shannon & Luchs Management Co. v. Roberts, 447 A.2d 37, 41 (D.C.App.1982). Following a proper hearing, the determination of juror bias or prejudice lies particularly within the discretion of the trial court, reversible only for a clear abuse of discretion, id. at 43, and the findings of fact underlying that determination are entitled to great deference. Brooks v. United States, 536 A.2d 1091, 1096 (D.C.1988). There was no abuse of discretion here. The trial judge heard ample testimony to rebut any inference of prejudice, and enough to support his finding that none of the jurors except juror number one had been tainted. First, the judge determined that the conversation for the most part was innocuous, in that it related to matters such as the weather, Greenland, and World War II that had no bearing on the case. Second, after striking juror number one, the judge determined that only jurors number one and eight had seen, heard or participated in any part of the conversation, thus negating any taint on the part of the other jurors, who were unaware of the conversation until the judge told them of it. [8] Finally, the judge learnedand so foundthat juror number eight had heard nothing about settlement of cases. In these circumstances, asking the hearing-impaired juror and the remaining jurors whether they could render a fair and impartial verdict would have been unnecessary at best, and at worst risked calling undue attention to the incident. See United States v. Butler, 262 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 134, 822 F.2d 1191, 1196 (1987) (trial judge has broad discretion to fix the exact procedures by balancing the need to make a sufficient inquiry against the concern that the inquiry not create prejudicial effects by unduly magnifying the importance of an insignificant occurrence). [9] The judge handled the matter sensitively and correctly.