Opinion ID: 2369367
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of evidence of uncharged violent criminal conduct

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of uncharged violent criminal conduct. Over defense objection, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to introduce evidence that defendant stabbed his uncle; threatened a neighbor; chased someone down the street while wielding a stick; and displayed a knife while others fought. (23) Jurors may consider evidence of uncharged violent criminal conduct by defendant that involved the use or attempted use of force or violence, or express or implied threat to use force or violence, but only if they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had engaged in such activity. [26] (See, e.g., People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1079 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 189 P.3d 911].) Although a trial court lacks the discretion to exclude all such evidence, it retains the traditional discretion to exclude specific evidence if it is misleading, cumulative, or unduly prejudicial. ( Ibid. ) Defendant notes other jurisdictions have prohibited or otherwise limited the introduction of uncharged violent criminal conduct. (See Cook v. State (Ala. 1978) 369 So.2d 1251, 1257; Provence v. State (Fla. 1976) 337 So.2d 783, 786-787; State v. McCormick (1979) 272 Ind. 272 [397 N.E.2d 276]; Scott v. State (1983) 297 Md. 235 [465 A.2d 1126, 1132-1134]; Commonwealth v. Hoss (1971) 445 Pa. 98 [283 A.2d 58, 68-69]; State v. Bartholomew (1984) 101 Wn.2d 631 [683 P.2d 1079, 1082-1085].) As defendant concedes, however, we repeatedly have ruled there is no prohibition against such evidence in California. [27] (E.g., People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 653-654 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].) Defendant offers no persuasive reason to reexamine these prior decisions. Defendant further contends evidence of this violent criminal activity was unduly prejudicial and misleading, and violated his constitutional rights to due process and to a fair and reliable penalty determination. Defendant fails to explain how any of the evidence was misleading, other than weakly suggesting the evidence wrongly portrayed him as a dangerous knife wielding assassin. Prejudice in the context of Evidence Code section 352 is not synonymous with damaging: it refers to evidence that poses an intolerable risk to the fairness of the proceedings or reliability of the outcome. (See People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 904-905 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 190, 235 P.3d 873].) Although the evidence of his violent criminal activity likely was damaging to defendant, he fails to demonstrate how it was unduly prejudicial the inference that he was dangerous was entirely proper. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence, and defendant's constitutional rights were not violated. Defendant finally contends the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his uncharged conduct rose to the level of violent criminal activity. We review the record for substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that violent criminal activity occurred.' [Citations.] ( People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 194 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 211 P.3d 617] ( Carrington) . ) Defendant does not dispute that he stabbed his uncle, but rather contends he did so in self-defense, which would make his use of force lawful. Although the uncle's testimony supported defendant's claim of self-defense, other evidence indicated defendant was not in imminent danger, and that he stabbed his uncle out of anger. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury with the elements of self-defense, which we presume it understood and applied. (See, e.g., People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 873 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376, 209 P.3d 596].) Defendant similarly does not dispute saying that he would kill a neighboring family, but rather contends one of the neighbors testified that he was not afraid of defendant. [28] Another neighbor, however, did feel threatened, and reported defendant's statements to the police. Defendant further does not dispute that he chased somebody down the street while wielding a stick. Although there was no evidence defendant actually struck this other person with the stick, the evidence supported the inference that he was attempting to do so. Defendant finally does not dispute that he drew his knife while others fought. Brandishing a weapon may be committed by drawing or exhibiting a weapon in a rude, angry, or threatening manner. (§ 417, subd. (a)(1); e.g., People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 542 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420].) A weapon need not be pointed at the victim to be threatening. (E.g., Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 502 [sufficient evidence when the defendant positioned a rifle at victim after a coperpetrator said, `Shoot him. Shoot him.'].) For purposes of the conduct which [section 417] is meant to deter, it is enough that the brandishing be in public, in the presence of the victim, where some third party happening along might get the idea that either the victim or brandisher need help, or might think a brawl is in the making which he might join. The thrust of the offense is to deter the public exhibition of weapons in a context of potentially volatile confrontations. ( People v. McKinzie (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 789, 794 [224 Cal.Rptr. 891] [ruling victim's awareness of the weapon not required].) Although defendant did not join in the physical altercation, sufficient evidence was introduced that he participated in the argument giving rise to the fight and that he drew his knife in the context of the confrontation.