Opinion ID: 4564857
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clear Legal Right and Clear Legal Duty

Text: {¶ 18} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators must establish “a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of respondents to grant it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” State ex rel. Commt. for Charter Amendment Petition v. Maple Hts., 140 Ohio St.3d 334, 2014-Ohio-4097, 18 N.E.3d 426, ¶ 17. Relators have not established the existence of a clear legal right to the requested relief or a clear legal duty on the part of the council or the board to provide it.
{¶ 19} Relators argue that (1) the council has a duty to hold an “administrative vote” on the commission’s proposed charter amendments in their original, unmodified form, (2) an administrative vote means that the council may 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO review the proposed amendments only as to their form, and (3) the council’s review of the form involves only determining whether the proposed amendments’ text fairly and accurately presents the question to be decided by the voters. Relators also allude to a purported right of the commission to have its proposed amendments reach the ballot. Relators argue that the plain language of the charter prohibits the council from modifying the commission’s proposed charter amendments or rejecting those with which it disagrees. {¶ 20} Section 20.02 of the Stow City Charter provides that the commission shall “recommend to Council such amendments, if any, to this Charter as in its judgment are conducive to the public interest.” (Emphasis added.) Section 20.03 provides, “Upon approval by two-thirds of Council, Council shall submit to the electors all such proposed amendments to this Charter in accordance, in each instance, with the provisions of the Constitution of Ohio.” (Emphasis added.) Neither the charter nor the Ohio Constitution imposes a clear legal duty on the council to submit the commission’s proposed charter amendments to the electors or grants the commission a clear legal right to determine what amendments the council submits. {¶ 21} The express language of the charter refers to the commission’s proposed amendments as “recommendations” and requires their submission to the electors only upon “approval” by two thirds of the council. The charter does not state that the council’s approval is limited to the form of the amendments or that the council must approve the recommendations without modification. Relators argue that their interpretation of the charter must prevail or else Section 19.01 of the charter, which allows the council to submit its own proposed charter amendments to the electors upon the approval of two-thirds of the council, would swallow Section 20.03. Relators further argue that the council has violated Section 4.18 of the charter, which prohibits the council from abolishing any commission that the charter has created. But nothing in Section 19.01 or Section 4.18 is 8 January Term, 2020 inconsistent with the commission serving as an advisor for the purpose of making recommendations—as Section 20.02 expressly provides—that two-thirds of the council may or may not approve under Section 20.03. {¶ 22} With respect to the Ohio Constitution, “[t]he ‘manifest object’ of Section 9 of Article XVIII ‘is to provide the procedure for the submission of a charter amendment to electors,’ and these ‘requirements are clear and complete, and are not to be added to or subtracted from.’ ” State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment, City Trash Collection v. Westlake, 97 Ohio St.3d 100, 2002Ohio-5302, 776 N.E.2d 1041, ¶ 31, quoting Billington v. Cotner, 25 Ohio St.2d 140, 146, 267 N.E.2d 410 (1971). Article XVIII, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution provides only two procedures by which proposed charter amendments may reach the ballot: “upon petitions signed by ten per centum of the electors of the municipality,” and “by a two-thirds vote of the legislative authority.” Under Section 4.01 of the charter, all legislative power in the city of Stow is vested in the council. Therefore, as the council points out in its merit brief, Article XVIII, Section 9 grants neither the mayor, the clerk, nor any other municipal officer or body the authority to approve proposed charter amendments for submission to the electors. Accordingly, the charter cannot grant the commission the authority to determine what proposed amendments will reach the electors, subject only to approval by the council as to their form, without impermissibly adding to the prescribed procedures set forth in Article XVIII, Section 9. {¶ 23} Relators’ arguments are primarily based not on the charter or the Ohio Constitution but on three of this court’s decisions, all of which are inapposite: State ex rel. Rosch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 42 Ohio St.2d 364, 328 N.E.2d 793 (1975), State ex rel. Kittel v. Bigelow, 138 Ohio St. 497, 37 N.E.2d 41 (1941), and State ex rel. Schuck v. Columbus, 152 Ohio St.3d 590, 2018-Ohio-1428, 99 N.E.3d 383. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 24} In Rosch, we held that the Broadview Heights City Council had properly submitted proposed charter amendments to the electors by way of an ordinance passed without three readings, because the council’s duty was administrative. Id. at 366. However, the Broadview Heights City Charter lacked the “upon approval by two-thirds of Council” provision at issue here. Id. at 364, fn.1. Moreover, the narrow issue in Rosch was whether the council had used a proper procedure to pass the ordinance—not whether the council had been required to pass the ordinance. {¶ 25} In Kittel, we considered a city council’s determination of the sufficiency and validity of petitions to submit a charter amendment to the electors. Kittel at 503. Our opinion in Kittel does not speak to the standard under which a council must review charter amendments proposed by a charter-review commission. See id. {¶ 26} Finally, in Schuck, we considered whether the city of Columbus had complied with a provision in its charter that specifically required an accurate summary of proposed charter amendments to be submitted to the electors. 152 Ohio St.3d 590, 2018-Ohio-1428, 99 N.E.3d 383, at ¶ 12. However, the Stow City Charter contains no similar provision. These cases are inapplicable to the facts presented here. {¶ 27} At bottom, relators’ arguments appear to rely on a misallocation of the burden of proof. Relators argue that when the Stow City Council in 2019 amended Section 20.03 of the Stow City Charter, it could have added language clearly stating that the council had the discretion to reject or modify charter amendments proposed by the commission with which it disagreed. Relators posit that because the added language does not clearly provide such discretion, the council cannot interpret Section 20.03 as granting it those powers. However, in a mandamus case, the relator has the burden to show the existence of a legal right and a legal duty that are clear. Maple Hts., 140 Ohio St.3d 334, 2014-Ohio-4097, 10 January Term, 2020 18 N.E.3d 426, at ¶ 17. Section 20.03 requires the council to act if two-thirds of council give their “approval” of the commission’s proposed charter amendments. To the extent that Section 20.03 fails to clearly specify the parameters of the required approval, it is relators’ mandamus claim—not the council’s interpretation of the charter—that we must reject.
{¶ 28} Relators concede that “[t]he Board of Elections does not have a duty to place the Commission Amendments on the ballot until Council fulfills its duty, first.” Accordingly, we reject relators’ mandamus claims against the board as unripe. See State ex rel. Dunn v. Plain Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 158 Ohio St.3d 370, 2020-Ohio-40, 143 N.E.3d 488, ¶ 18 (claim against board of elections not ripe when duty to place issue on ballot arose only after school board’s certification of the issue, which had not yet occurred).