Opinion ID: 2977979
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Calculation of Remble’s Base Offense Level

Text: Remble contends that the district court erroneously calculated his base offense level to be 38. In particular Remble maintains that the district court improperly determined that he was responsible for in excess of 15 kilograms of crack. The Government responds that contrary to Remble’s argument, the testimony elicited at trial provided a sufficient basis from which the district court could conclude that Remble was responsible for the amount determined. A district court’s drug-quantity determination is a factual finding that we review for clear error. United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2004). If the exact amount of drugs is undetermined, “an estimate will suffice, but . . . a preponderance of the evidence must support the estimate.” United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 699 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Approximations are completely appropriate.”). Generally, a defendant involved in a drug-conspiracy is responsible for the drug quantities for which he is directly involved, and any quantity that is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 246 (6th Cir. 2007). However, the district court must make individualized findings for each member of the conspiracy regarding the scope of the conspiracy and the duration and nature of each conspirator’s participation. United States v. Carter, 45 F.App’x 339, 352 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, the district court did not err in determining that a preponderance of the evidence shows that Remble could reasonably foresee that Owens would convert the powder cocaine into crack for resale. At trial, Atkins testified that Remble dispatched him to Ohio to sell drugs and he described a direct buy of crack from Remble in Zanesville. Covington testified that Remble sent him to - 13 - Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson Zanesville to sell drugs, that he sold crack, and that Remble told him Zanesville was a good place to make money, implying that Remble was aware that Zanesville was a good place to sell crack. Owens also testified that although Remble was unaware that Owens was converting the powder cocaine into crack, that conversion was necessary because there was not a market for powder cocaine in Zanesville. Remble and Owens’ drug-trafficking relationship necessitated that Owens sell the drugs as fast as possible, and then deliver the profits to Remble. Given the evidence that Remble sent others to Ohio to sell crack, Atkins’s purchase of crack from Remble in Zanesville, and Remble’s statement to Covington, the district court did not err in concluding that Remble was responsible for the crack cocaine sold by Owens as the sale of crack was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of their drug conspiracy. Caver, 470 F.3d at 246. Thus, we conclude that resentencing is not proper on this basis. However, though not raised on appeal, we conclude that it is necessary to remand for resentencing in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007) and Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009). See United States v. Johnson, 553 F.3d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 2009). In Spears, the Supreme Court held “that district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those guidelines.” Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 844. According to Spears, district courts may reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines “even in a mine-run case where there are no particular circumstances that would otherwise justify a variance from the Guidelines sentencing range.” Johnson, 553 F.3d at 995 (quoting Spears, 129 S. Ct. 843) (internal quotation marks omitted). - 14 - Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson Here, the district court did not have the benefit of that authority when sentencing Remble to life imprisonment. See Johnson, 553 F.3d at 996 (vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding for resentencing in light of Spears); see also United States v. Fox, 548 F.3d 523, 533 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that it is appropriate to vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing if the defendant did not raise the crack-to-powder cocaine ratio as an issue before the district court or initially on appeal) and United States v. Taylor, 520 F.3d 746, 748-49 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). During the sentencing hearing, the district court stated: “[i]t’s the duty of the Court to impose a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the statutory goals of sentencing. The guidelines recommend a sentence of life in prison for Remble.” (Sentencing Hr’g Tr., Supplemental Joint Appendix 37 (emphasis added).) As in Johnson, we cannot determine from the record before us whether the district judge would have imposed the same sentence had she known that she had discretion to vary categorically from the crack-cocaine guidelines based on policy disagreement. Johnson, 553 F.3d at 996 n.1. Further, the district court did not specify the Guidelines used to calculate Remble’s base offense level, although we note that the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) calculated the offense level using the 2005 amendments to the Guidelines. However, the November 1, 2007 amendments to the Guidelines retroactively reduced the base offense levels for crack cocaine. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2007). Even if the district court applies the base offense level as calculated under the 2007 amendment to the Guidelines, the court may still “reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.” Johnson, 553 F.3d at 996 n.1 (quoting Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 843). - 15 - Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson