Opinion ID: 2185326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Reference to the Sexual Assault upon Miss Grant

Text: Miss Grant's testimony disclosed that the defendant had participated in an uncompleted sexual assault upon her and the disclosure of this incident before the jury formed the basis of a motion for mistrial by the defendant which the presiding Justice denied. We must evaluate this exercise of the Justice's discretion in the light of a careful examination of the circumstances under which the incident was revealed. Miss Grant, a 20-year-old woman, was called as a witness for the State. She testified that shortly before Christmas she had gone to the apartment of an absent friend over the Colonial Restaurant and found the defendant there. She had known the defendant for several months and her gentleman friend had acted as bondsman for Mr. Barber on several occasions. The defendant inquired if Miss Grant had any information as to the extent of official knowledge concerning the Cote robbery. He then told her that he had been the robber and he described the operation in some detail. She testified that at this point four other men entered the apartment. On January 21, Miss Grant had been questioned by the police and had given them a written statement in which she related the defendant's admission to her. On cross-examination, Miss Grant admitted that this statement was inconsistent with her trial testimony in two respects first, in her written statement to the police she had said that two of these men were present with the defendant when she arrived (and therefore presumably would have overheard her conversation with the defendant) and, secondly, in her written statement to the police she had not mentioned the presence of the other two at all. Defense counsel pressed the witness concerning this inconsistency and she explained it by saving: Well, I was just nervous and upset the day I made the statement, and that day I had to change two or three things around in the statement, and evidently I just Defense counsel continued to question Miss Grant as to the reason for these inconsistencies and this time she replied: Well, I had talked to three or four different people that day, and I had to bring up something which was a discomfort to me, and it did work me up. Still, defense counsel persisted: Q And it confused you? A Well, Yes, it did. Q Had you made this fact known to Mr. Welch? A Yes. He also knew I was very nervous and upset. Q And the reason that you were? A Yes. Finally, in answer to a leading question on cross-examination, the witness made the disclosure which she had been avoiding: Q And the reason that you were nervous and upset was because one of these gentlemen had made some sexual advances on you, is that right? A Well, more than one? Q More than one? A Yes. Q And that was the reason why you were confused as to who was there? A I was very upset. Q And you made this fact known to Mr. Welch? A Yes. Q Capt. Welch. A Yes. Everyone who had talked to me that day knew I was very nervous and upset. It is obvious that defense counsel's deliberate invasion into this dangerous area was the acceptance of a calculated risk. Counsel no doubt recognized that Miss Grant's testimony, if found credible by the jury, would result in the defendant's conviction and that a serious risk must be taken in an effort to shake her story. That he was aware of the seriousness of the risk is demonstrated by the fact that the record discloses that Miss Grant had testified to the sordid details of the incident in District Court. Counsel made a tactical decision to belittle Miss Grant's claim that the errors in her statement to the police resulted from the disturbing nature of the incident. [3] The County Attorney then took over the witness in re-direct. He refrained from making any reference to the assault in the apartment. The State then called a police officer who testified (among other things) that he took the statement from Miss Grant at the County Attorney's office. The State again avoided any reference to Miss Grant's being nervous or upset or as to the possible cause of her confusion. The State rested. The defense then presented a Mr. Sounier, one of the men who Miss Grant had testified had entered the apartment following her conversation with the defendant. Mr. Sounier said Miss Grant and the four men had all entered the apartment together and that there had been no conversation between Miss Grant and the defendant relative to the robbery. He described what the defense attorney had originally referred to as some sexual advances in this manner: And Greg was sitting next to me, and Eddie was sitting over in the other chair. Greg was drinking quite a bit. We were all sitting there. Bob [surname omitted] was wrestling with Penny on this cot. We were sitting on the couch, and as far as I know there was nothing said between Greg and Penny because throughout he had been drinking quite heavily, and they were wrestling back and forth. I guess Bob got too rough with her, and finally we all went back down to the Colonial. On cross-examination of Mr. Sounier the County Attorney made his first reference to the matter and the witness was inclined to minimize the importance of the incident: A . . . Bob, like I say, was wrestling with Penny. Q What do you mean, wrestling? A He was wrestling on the cot. Q What do you mean? A Well, I don't knowwrestling. Q Was she wrestling with him? Was this just a horsing around type of thing? A Yes. Q Did she express any objection at any time? A Well, somewhat. Q What do you mean, somewhat? A She said, Bob, leave me alone, Bob, cut it out, and finally I told Bob to take it easy, let's go, let's go back down to the Colonial. Things were getting too rough. Q Things were getting a little too rough? A Yes. They were drinking and Bob was horsing around with her. ...... Q Everybody else was just sitting around drinking beer? A Yeah. When the defense rested, the State called Miss Grant in rebuttal. She repeated her testimony that the others had entered after her conversation with the defendant. She then, for the first time, briefly described the incident, the recounting of which to the two policemen she had said had upset her so as to cause the errors in her statement. In substance, she said that one of the new arrivals had attempted to rape her, with the defendant's assistance, and that, failing that because of her resistance, they attempted to have oral sex with her but when the defendant seized her throat to force her to comply, Sounier . . . said to stop it, and he grabbed Bobby off me and he took me in the bathroom and tried to calm me down, and I just begged him to get those guys out of there, and so they left and I stayed up there and, of course, I was very upset and I was crying and stuff, and then they went back downstairs and I calmed down there for a few minutes, and then I got in my car and left. Defense counsel made no objection to this testimony, no doubt accepting the fact that the defense had introduced the subject into the trial. After consulting with his attorneys at recess, however, the defendant personally addressed the Court in the Jury's absence and moved for a mistrial. The Justice denied the motion. The defense then called in sur-rebuttal the father and mother of the defendant each of whom testified that at the probable cause hearing Miss Grant had testified about the sexual assault but had said that the defendant had had nothing to do with it. The State then called a police officer who rebutted this, saying that Miss Grant had testified at the probable cause hearing that the defendant had attempted to have oral sex with her. The testimony closed. The defendant did not testify. The introduction of this testimony concerning the assault on Miss Grant had disturbed the Justiceas it disturbs usand after the noon recess he returned to the subject in the jury's absence. He told counsel and the defendant that he had given the defendant's motion for mistrial further consideration during the noon recess and had weighed the fact that the testimony was relevant and material and that the subject was introduced by the defense against the danger that it might inflame the jury against the defendant. He said he had concluded that it was his duty to permit the case to go to the jury with cautionary instructions. He particularly invited suggestions for special cautionary instructions. The instruction he gave to the jury concerning the limited use which the jury might make of this testimony and the terrible consequences of their making any other use of it was long, thorough and understandable. He stressed the sensitive area in which the testimony fell, its very limited admissibility and its potential for prejudice. He made it clear that the jurors could consider whatever they found the true facts of the incident to be only as bearing on Miss Grant's credibility and not as evidence of bad character of the defendant. He bluntly told the jurors that the integrity of all twelve of you is really on the line to follow the law, as to their use of this evidence. There were no objections or requests for additional instructions. We are convinced that his unusually forceful instruction must have deeply impressed the jury. Our careful analysis of the record brings us to the conclusion that there was no abuse of judicial discretion. The admitted inconsistencies between Miss Grant's testimony and her earlier statement to the police offered the defense a significant opportunity to attack her credibility. The defense made a deliberate and no doubt desperategamble in attemping to belittle her explanation for the inconsistencies by suggesting that the incident which she said disturbed her recollection was in fact of a somewhat trivial nature. We note that both the witness and the County Attorney exercised commendable restraint in avoiding a disclosure of this unpleasant incident until the issue had been raised by the defense several times and until the question of whether Miss Grant had been so perturbed and distressed on recalling the incident and describing it to the two officers that she confused the time of the arrival of the man had become crucial to the acceptability of her testimony. While we do not criticize the defense tactics, we feel that the State became entitled to rebut the defense suggestion and to do so by presenting a not unnecessarily emotional explanation of the incident which the defense deliberately chose to bring to the jury's attention. State v. Hudson, Me., 325 A.2d 56, 64 (1974). Relevant evidence is not required to be excluded merely because it suggests a defendant's involvement in another crime. On the other hand, it may be excluded if it is too prejudicial in contrast to its probative value. State v. Northup, Me., 318 A. 2d 489, 493 (1974). Miss Grant's testimony as to the assault was not only relevant but also material. Towle v. Aube, Me., 310 A.2d 259, 265 (1973). The presiding Justice, who sees and hears the drama of the trial unfold before his unprejudiced observation, is allowed wide discretion in balancing the competing interests. State v. Northrup, supra at 492-494. Certainly the factors which he must consider include the responsibility for the introduction of the subject matter into evidence ( See State v. Lizotte, Me., 249 A.2d 874, 880 (1969); State v. Gervais, Me., 317 A.2d 796, 800 (1974)), the materiality of the testimony to the determination of the issue of guilt or innocence and its potential for prejudice under the circumstances. The fact that the defense opened the door to examination of the adequacy of the cause of Miss Grant's inconsistencies does not per se entitle the State to explain it by presenting any relevant and material evidence. It presents a factor the weight to be given which must lie in the discretion of the presiding Justice. We faced this basic problem in State v. Brown, 142 Me. 106, 115, 48 A.2d 242, 246 (1946) where we accepted the analysis of Chief Justice Peters in State v. Farmer, 84 Me. 436, 440, 24 A. 985, 986 (1892): That evidence properly admissible for one purpose may be so perverted in its use as to effect a different and illegitimate purpose is not altogether preventable. But such evidence cannot on that account be wholly rejected. The correction of its abuse lies in such explanation as the presiding judge may feel required to give to the jury concerning it. We cannot say that the presiding Justice's denial of the motion for mistrial was an abuse of discretion under these circumstances. The entry will be: Appeals denied.