Opinion ID: 898621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for New Trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)(2)

Text: [¶ 32] Tiberts argue the district court erred in denying their motion for a new trial on the basis of jury misconduct under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)(2), and in denying their alternative request for an evidentiary hearing on the allegations of jury misconduct. [¶ 33] We will not reverse a district court's denial of a new trial motion on the grounds of jury misconduct absent an abuse of discretion. See Hidanovic, 2008 ND 66, ¶ 11, 747 N.W.2d 463; Kerzmann v. Rohweder, 321 N.W.2d 84, 86-87 (N.D.1982); Keyes, 343 N.W.2d at 81. In deciding whether to grant a new trial based on jury misconduct, the district court must decide: (1) whether there was misconduct and, if so, (2) whether the misconduct could have affected the verdict of a hypothetical average juror. Hidanovic, 2008 ND 66, ¶ 12, 747 N.W.2d 463; Keyes, 343 N.W.2d at 85. In Hidanovic, at ¶ 13, we explained: Rule 606(b), N.D.R.Ev., generally prohibits a juror from testifying about matters or statements occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations. Under N.D.R.Ev. 606(b), however, jurors may testify regarding the receipt of extraneous prejudicial information by the jury or improper outside influence, but they may not testify to its subjective effect on the verdict or on their individual deliberations. Keyes, 343 N.W.2d at 85. An attempt to use juror affidavits to demonstrate how the jury arrived at its decision falls precisely within the confines of the rule prohibiting impeachment of the jury verdict. Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 719 (N.D. 1986). The purpose of N.D.R.Ev. 606(b) is to preserve the finality of verdicts, to protect the privacy and integrity of jury deliberations, and to prevent jury harassment and maintain public confidence in the jury system. Brooks, 520 N.W.2d at 799; Andrews, at 719-20. Rule 606(b), N.D.R.Ev., embodies a balance between the desire for finality and certainty on one hand and the need to achieve an acceptable level of fairness and accuracy on the other hand, and if a verdict is the result of extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence, the balance favors fairness and accuracy. Brooks, at 799. [¶ 34] In their new trial motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)(2), Tiberts alleged wrongful discussions that occurred before and during deliberations demonstrated prejudice against them by juror Linda Gillespie and other jurors. After the jury had returned its verdict, the district court received a letter from Gerald Mell, one of the jurors in the case, stating that he was convinced the defendants did not have a very impartial jury and that he found out after it was all over that Linda Gilespie [sic] could very easily have set [sic] on our jury for vengfull [sic] reasons. The court mailed copies of Mell's letter to the attorneys telling them it would be up to them to determine what, if any, further steps they would wish to take regarding the comments. Tiberts' subsequent new trial motion was supported by an affidavit from Mark Wilson, an alternate juror, and an affidavit from Alfred Narro, a juror in the case, and by Mell's letter. [¶ 35] Here, the district court said the Tiberts' motion for new trial made no allegations that the verdict was arrived at by chance or that there was a mistake in entering the verdict on the special verdict form. The district court also said the jurors were polled after the verdict was read in court and affirmed that the verdict was their true and correct verdict. In denying the Tiberts' new trial motion, the district court ruled: Wilson, the alternate juror, in his affidavit [at] paragraph 4 states: That during the course of the three weeks of trial in this case, I came to hear juror Linda Gillespie to specifically say to other members of the juryon multiple occasionsthat the Tibert defendants were `like the Mafia', that the Tiberts were dangerous, that the Tiberts were to be feared, that the Tiberts had `plenty of money', and that the Tiberts can and should `pay' in the case. Wilson continued on in his affidavit and states that other female jurors increasingly made similar statements about the Tibert defendants and the Tibert family and that Gillespie and other female jurors also made comments in the jury room about pieces of evidence, commenting negatively about this evidence as it reflected upon the Tiberts. In accordance with Rule 6.11(2) of the North Dakota Rules of Court, this Judge did prohibit predeliberation discussions among the jurors and admonished the jurors at the beginning of the trial and at adjournments not to discuss the case among themselves or anyone else and not to form an opinion until all the testimony and evidence, final argument and instructions have been given to them and they begin their deliberation. At the beginning of trial, this judge also advised the jurors to notify the bailiff or court staff if someone tries to talk to them about the case. It is emphasized that at no time during the trial did any juror advise the court of the comments allegedly made by Ms. Gillespie or any other jurors and it was not until the filing of the Wilson affidavit that this was brought to the Court's attention. These comments allegedly made by Ms. Gillespie during the trial could be based upon what she learned during the trial and are not necessarily reflecting some prejudice she had about the Tiberts at the beginning of trial or something she knew outside of the trial. Rule 6.11(a)(1) allows a court to allow predeliberation discussion in a civil case admonishing the jurors to discussing only when all jurors are present and to reserve judgment about the outcome of the case until deliberation commences. The comments allegedly made by Ms. Gillespie and other female jurors were made in and around the jury room and are characterized by Mr. Wilson as statements or comments. There is no allegation of discussion among the jurors following the making of these statements or comments. Though these comments, if they were in fact made, and the similar comments of other female jurors, if they were in fact made, are in violation of the procedural rule this Court imposed upon the jurors and should have been brought to the Court's attention during the trial rather than weeks later, this Court finds, for the reasons addressed previously in this paragraph, that these comments would not materially affect the substantial rights of the Tibert defendants. The affidavit by Mr. Narro relates only statements allegedly made during jury deliberations. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Mr. Narro's affidavit cover specific statements made by him and Ms. Gillespie occurring during the course of the jury's deliberation, their positions taken during deliberation and his own mental processes in connection with reaching a verdict. This affidavit is clearly inadmissible under Rule 606(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. None of the statements made in his affidavit relate to whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Therefore Mr. Narro cannot testify about the matters covered in his affidavit and his affidavit is inadmissible under Rule 606(b).... The only other supporting document filed by the Defendant in support of their motion was Gerald Mell's letter to the Court in which he states that he ... found out after it was over that Linda Gilespie (sic) could very easily have set (sic) on our jury for vengful (sic) reasons. This letter is not in affidavit form as required by Rule 59(b)(2) and therefore does not constitute proof of juror misconduct. There is insufficient proof of juror misconduct materially affecting the substantial rights of a party in this case. Therefore, the Defendants' Motion for New Trial on the basis of jury misconduct must be denied. [¶ 36] The district court's letter indicated it sent Mell's letter to the attorneys for informational purposes, and we are not persuaded the court was inviting the Tiberts to solicit affidavits from the jurors to establish misconduct by the jury when the court informed the parties about Mell's letter. We nonetheless agree with the court's analysis regarding the affidavits submitted with Tiberts' new trial motion and conclude the court did not err by not conducting further evidentiary hearings on this issue. We conclude that the district court's decision was the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination, was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and was not based on a misinterpretation or misapplication of the law. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tiberts' motion for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)(2).