Opinion ID: 1690384
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Death Penalty for Juveniles: Thompson and Stanford.

Text: 1. Thompson v. Oklahoma . In Thompson, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), the Supreme Court determined that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the execution of those who were 15 years old or younger at the time of their crimes. Using an approach similar to that which he would utilize in Atkins some fourteen years later, Justice Stevens, in the principal opinion, said that in determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, judges should be guided by the `evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' Id. at 821, 108 S.Ct. 2687, quoting, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958). Such standards cannot remain static, but must `acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice,' for `a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gives it birth.' Id. at 821 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 2687, quoting, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 378, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). To determine current standards of decency, Thompson examined: (a) relevant legislative enactments, and (b) evidence of how juries viewed the propriety of execution of the mentally retarded. It also considered (c) the views of respected national and international organizations. Finally, in light of the above and other factors, (d) the Supreme Court made its own judgment as to the propriety of such executions and explained why these indicators of contemporary standards of decency confirm our judgment that such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822-23, 108 S.Ct. 2687. a. Legislative Enactments. In reviewing statutes governing punishment of children, Thompson found that [t]he line between childhood and adulthood is drawn in different ways by various States. Id. at 824, 108 S.Ct. 2687. Fourteen state legislatures then barred capital punishment altogether. Id. at 826, 108 S.Ct. 2687. In nineteen other states, the legislature permitted capital punishment, but state statutes failed to expressly state the minimum age for its imposition. Id. at 826-27, 108 S.Ct. 2687. Eighteen remaining states set a minimum age, varying from 16 to 18. Id. at 829, 108 S.Ct. 2687. No legislature had adopted a statute explicitly permitting the execution of those under age 16. Id. b. Imposition of the Death Penalty. Thompson also found that juries rarely imposed the death penalty on those under 16, that only eighteen to twenty such persons had been executed in the 20th century, and only one since 1948. Id. at 832, 108 S.Ct. 2687. Between 1982 and 1986, only five persons age 15 or younger were sentenced to death in the United States, leading the Court to conclude that, these five young offenders have received sentences that are `cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.' Id. at 833, 108 S.Ct. 2687, quoting, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (quoting Stewart, J., concurring). c. National and International Views. As a part of its discussion of legislation, the Supreme Court considered the views of respected national religious, social, and professional organizations, including the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Law Institute, both of which it said have formally expressed their opposition to the death penalty for juveniles. Id. at 830, 108 S.Ct. 2687. And, stating that it had previously recognized the relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, id. at 830 n. 31, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (citations omitted), the Court also considered the sentencing practices of European and other countries, stating: Although the death penalty has not been entirely abolished in the United Kingdom or New Zealand (it has been abolished in Australia, except in the State of New South Wales, where it is available for treason and piracy), in neither of those countries may a juvenile be executed. The death penalty has been abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries, and is available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile executions are also prohibited in the Soviet Union. Id. at 830-31, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (footnote omitted). d. Independent Analysis. Lastly, Thompson analyzed the culpability of juveniles as compared to adults and considered whether application of the death penalty to juveniles measurably contributed to the social purposes it was intended to serve. After noting broad agreement on the proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults and the special mitigating force of youth, the Court concluded that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile. Id. at 834-35, 108 S.Ct. 2687. As to the social rationales of the death penaltyretribution and deterrenceit found them unacceptable for 15-year-old offenders because of the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender and because deterrence would not be jeopardized if the execution of those under 16 were prohibited. Id. at 836-37, 108 S.Ct. 2687. In light of all of these factors, Thompson concluded that a national consensus existed that execution of persons under 16 at the time of their crimes constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. 2. Stanford v. Kentucky . The following year, in Stanford, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306, Justice Scalia stated in the principal opinion that, by contrast, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not prohibit imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed at age 16 or 17. Id. at 370-77, 109 S.Ct. 2969. In so holding, Justice Scalia agreed that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment must be determined by current standards rather than by those in effect in 1789. Id. But, he said, current standards are almost entirely to be determined by reference to statutes passed by society's elected representatives, id. at 370, 109 S.Ct. 2969, and specifically by state legislatures. He then noted that, while the majority of states did not permit the execution of juvenile offenders, that count included the fourteen states that then barred capital punishment altogether. Id. at 370 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2969. If one considered only those states permitting capital punishment, then the majority of that subgrouping approved the execution of those who were 16 or 17 at the time of their offense. Id. at 370, 109 S.Ct. 2969. And, although Stanford recognized that juries sentence substantially fewer juveniles than adults to death, it said this did not provide a reason to prohibit such death sentences entirely. Id. at 373-74, 109 S.Ct. 2969. Stanford also rejected, as irrelevant, the many state statutes barring those under 18 years old from engaging in various activities, such as voting, drinking, or driving. Id. at 374-77, 109 S.Ct. 2969. Similarly, although a year earlier Thompson had said the views of social, professional, and religious groups, as well as the sentencing practices of other countries, were relevant to determining current standards of decency, Stanford stated that the views of national organizations were an uncertain foundation on which to base constitutional law and that international practices were simply irrelevant to whether a national consensus existed. Id. at 369 n. 1, 377, 109 S.Ct. 2969. After so limiting its inquiry, Stanford concluded that there was no national consensus against executing offenders who were 16 or 17 at the time of the offense. Id. at 370-72, 379-80, 109 S.Ct. 2969.