Opinion ID: 177263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wallace Concurrences

Text: As explained above, this case is entirely different from the situation facing the Court in Wallace. Moreover, the facts in this case mirror the scenarios presented by Justices O'Connor and Powell in separate concurrences of moment of silence laws which would pass constitutional muster. We find these concurrences persuasive. In their concurrences, both Justice O'Connor and Justice Powell first stressed the unique facts presented in Wallace  and the utter lack of any secular purpose behind Alabama's moment of silence law. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that she was writ[ing] separately to identify the peculiar features of the Alabama law that render it invalid ...); id. at 66, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that he would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a clear secular purpose[,] [but that] [n]othing in the record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to identify any nonreligious reason for the statute's enactment). Both justices then stressed that, contrary to the law at issue in Wallace, moment of silence laws of many states would satisfy the Establishment Clause. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 62, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor elaborated on this point, explaining that [a] moment of silence law that is clearly drafted and implemented so as to permit prayer, meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period, without endorsing one alternative over the others, should pass constitutional muster. She added that [e]ven if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray silently during a quiet moment, the State has not thereby encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 73, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor further stressed the need for courts to defer to the legislature's stated purpose: Where a legislature expresses a plausible secular purpose for a moment of silence statute in either the text or the legislative history, or [where] the statute disclaims an intent to encourage prayer over alternatives during a moment of silence, ... courts should generally defer to that stated intent. Id. at 74-75, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This case fits the scenarios Justices Powell and O'Connor foresaw. [5] In this case, Section 1 identified a clearly secular purpose of establishing a period of silence, and nothing in the record indicates that the statute was motivated, even in part, by a religious purpose (although a law need not be premised solely on secular purposes). Moreover, Section 1 disclaims an intent to encourage prayer over alternatives during a moment of silence, id., by stating that the period of silence shall not be used as a religious exercise. 105 ILCS 20/1. In short, Section 1 provides a fitting illustration of a moment of silence law which protects every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school day. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59, 105 S.Ct. 2479.