Opinion ID: 546263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracies as Random and Unauthorized Conduct

Text: 43 Easter House next contends that because the appellants' actions were undertaken as part of a conspiracy to deprive it of constitutionally protected rights, their conduct cannot be characterized as random under Parratt. While the Court's decision in Zinermon does not address this issue, Easter House does find support for this proposition in Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir.1985) (en banc ) and Labov v. Lalley, 809 F.2d 220 (3d Cir.1987). 44 The court in Bretz was presented with a plaintiff's allegation that certain government officials had conspired to arrest and try him upon false burglary charges. The court reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of his claim concluding that Parratt was not applicable to this allegation of conspiratorial conduct. The court stated, [b]y definition, a conspiracy ... cannot be a random act, even if it was accomplished without the endorsement of the state governmental apparatus. 773 F.2d at 1031. In like manner, the third circuit in Labov considered a complaint which pleaded a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of substantive liberty interests under the first amendment. The court agreed with the Bretz court's holding, stating that Parratt and subsequent cases do not apply to charges of intentional conspiratorial conduct under color of state law. Such conduct, if it can be proved, is not the kind of isolated, unpredictable, and thus unpreventable conduct with which the Supreme Court purports to deal in the Parratt v. Taylor line of cases. 809 F.2d at 223 (citing Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 828 (3d Cir.1984), aff'd sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986)). 45 In contrast, the Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal have rejected the Bretz court's per se conspiracy rule. In Holloway v. Walker, 790 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984, 107 S.Ct. 571, 93 L.Ed.2d 576 (1986), the court held that a conspiracy may in fact be a random act if, [f]rom the point of view of the state[,] ... the state cannot anticipate or control such conduct in advance. 790 F.2d at 1172 (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S.Ct. at 3203). The court reasoned, [o]f course, a conspiracy is not random from the point of view of the conspirators but this is to say no more than that a conspiracy is an intentional act, rather than a negligent one. The effect of the Ninth Circuit's holding is to revive the intentional/negligent act distinction, rejected in Hudson, in another form. Id. Similarly, in National Communication Sys., Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n, 789 F.2d 370, 372-73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 107 S.Ct. 182, 93 L.Ed.2d 117 (1986), the court rejected a per se conspiracy rule, reasoning that a conspiracy allegation merely raises the possibility of intentional as opposed to negligent conduct; a possibility which the Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Palmer advises is of no consequence in determining whether Parratt should apply. 46 The concern of the Court in this context since the decision in Parratt has been to determine whether the risk of deprivation was such that the state could predict when a deprivation might occur and, more importantly, protect against such an occurrence through the implementation of additional predeprivation process. These fundamental areas of concern have not been discarded in Zinermon. Indeed the Court's determination in Zinermon that Parratt was inapplicable was based, in part, on its conclusion that the deprivation which occurred was not only authorized, but also predictable and capable of being avoided in the future through the implementation of additional predeprivation procedural safeguards. In this regard, to the extent a conspiracy is intentional (as we agree it must be by definition), intentional acts are even more difficult to anticipate because one bent on intentionally depriving a person of his property might well take affirmative steps to avoid signalling his intent. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S.Ct. at 3203-04. To recognize that something is a conspiracy in this context is simply to recognize, as did the fifth and sixth circuits, that it is intentional. In light of the Court's decision in Hudson counseling that Parratt does indeed apply to intentional conduct, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary in Zinermon, we reject Easter House's reliance upon an absolute rule that a conspiracy is per se non-random conduct. 47 Nevertheless, Easter House believes that because the alleged licensing conspiracy had two separate prongs--the renewal application and the Easter House II charter application--the conspiracy involved multiple acts which, even under a traditional Parratt inquiry, take the conspiracy outside the realm of random. However, from the state's perspective, this characterization of the alleged scheme is inaccurate. Both prongs of the single conspiracy operated simultaneously. The state had no opportunity to discover that the appellants were disregarding the established state procedures for renewing licenses and granting charter applications. 48 Easter House cannot demonstrate that the appellants' actions, even if involving a conspiracy to destroy Easter House, were anything but a single instance of improper conduct involving multiple employees engaged in a single scheme for a relatively short period of time. The licensing conspiracy remains nothing more than a random decision of state employees to disregard state policy and procedure which resulted in injuries to Easter House. As a result, Easter House has failed to demonstrate how the existence of a conspiracy removes this case from the dictates of Parratt.iii. Employee Status and the Definition of Random and Unauthorized Conduct 49 Does the appellants' status as high level state employees or officials render the principles established in Parratt inapplicable? In its original presentation to this en banc court, Easter House advocated an affirmative answer to this question. We answered in the negative. Armed with Zinermon, Easter House again advocates an affirmative response. While we acknowledge that Zinermon narrowed the scope of Parratt's application in certain factual circumstances, we do not believe that Zinermon creates a per se employee-status exception to Parratt. Accordingly, we again respond in the negative. 50 Initially we note that the phrase random and unauthorized, as it has been employed since the decision in Parratt, can be interpreted both narrowly and broadly. See Matthiessen v. Board of Educ., 857 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.1988); Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.1988); Tavarez v. O'Malley, 826 F.2d 671 (7th Cir.1987). Indeed, the Court in Zinermon, --- U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 978 and n. 2, takes cognizance of the split which has developed in the circuits over this issue and seeks to resolve the conflict. The ultimate disposition of the Parratt issue in Zinermon hints that a narrow application of the Parratt rule may be the appropriate course. It is apparent from the Court's rationale, however, that the dispositive factor in determining whether Parratt will indeed apply in a given situation is still whether the state actor's conduct is random and unauthorized or, as the Court has rephrased it, whether the state actor's conduct is predictable and authorized. 51 The question of whether a state official ranks high or low in the state hierarchy, while possibly relevant as indicia of the discretion which that official exercises, cannot by itself be dispositive of this determination. The question of predictability--i.e., the question of whether a state actor's conduct can be deemed random from the point of view of the state--does not turn simply on whether that official exercises a certain degree of discretion. Rather, we believe that there must be a second ingredient in the predictability equation which focuses on the extent to which the state official's discretion is uncircumscribed. Indeed, this appears to have been a decisive factor permitting the majority in Zinermon to rule that Parratt would not preclude the imposition of Sec. 1983 liability. In Zinermon, the majority framed the plaintiff's allegation as an attempt to hold state officials accountable for their abuse of broadly delegated, uncircumscribed power to effect the deprivation at issue. --- U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 989. Concentrating on the question of predictability, we can envision a scenario where a high-ranking state official does exercise the authority and discretion to effect a deprivation, yet that discretion is circumscribed by statutory or other predeprivation procedural safeguards. In such a scenario, an abuse of that discretion, while possibly causing a deprivation of property, would not necessarily be predictable from the point of view of the state and, according to Parratt and Zinermon, not compensable under Sec. 1983. For these reasons, we reject Easter House's contention that there is a per se exception to the application of Parratt in situations where the state actor occupies a high ranking position in the state hierarchy. 52 The Court in Zinermon was presented with a Sec. 1983 claim premised upon a deprivation of liberty which resulted from the voluntary admission of the plaintiff to a mental health facility at a time when he was arguably not competent to give knowing and informed consent to his admission. In Florida, the provisions under which a person may be admitted to a mental health facility are embodied in a comprehensive statutory scheme. Not surprisingly, an incompetent person could not be admitted as a voluntary patient under those provisions. 13 The statute, however, did not direct any doctor at the mental health facility to determine whether a person being voluntarily admitted was in fact competent to give the necessary consent. Nor did the statute direct any official to initiate the involuntary admission procedure for those patients thought to be incompetent. Thus, as the Supreme Court found, the statute gave the officials at the mental health facility broad discretion in admitting patients under the provisions of the statutory scheme, but did not provide for procedural safeguards necessary to protect against any potential abuse of that discretion. --- U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 988. Based on this statutory oversight, the majority concluded that Parratt was inapplicable. Specifically, the Court found that the risk of exactly the type of liberty deprivation which occurred was entirely predictable and, more importantly, that such a deprivation would occur, if at all, at a specific predictable point during the mental health admissions process. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 989. In addition, the Court found that the case was distinguishable from Parratt in that the addition of predeprivation process was not impossible here as it was found to be in Parratt. Id. Finally, the Court concluded that the actions of the doctors could not be characterized as unauthorized in light of the authority they were given to effect the very deprivation complained of by the plaintiff. Id. 53 The Court's concern in Zinermon focused on the broadly delegated authority which the state statute gave the doctors to effect the deprivation at issue and the subsequent failure of that same statute to provide for effective pre-deprivation safeguards. It was in view of this statutory oversight that the Court concluded that the deprivation which occurred was predictable and, as such, not random. In contrast, the Illinois statutory and regulatory scheme which we readdress today does not raise these same concerns. Although the appellants did exercise a certain amount of discretion and authority over the failure or success of renewal applications, that discretion was not uncircumscribed or otherwise unregulated. Speaking in general terms, the deprivation of property which Easter House has alleged in the licensing conspiracy was not one that the state could have predicted or, more importantly, prevented through the implementation of additional predeprivation procedural safeguards. 54 To the extent Easter House was deprived of property, it was the result of a letter dated January 6, 1975, in which a DCFS official informed Easter House that it was out of compliance with DCFS licensing standards and would have to reattain minimum standards and reapply if it wished to resume operations. The content of this letter--i.e., the DCFS official's statement that Easter House would have to reapply if it wished to resume operations--was patently inconsistent with Illinois law and constituted an outright departure from the authority which the DCFS official was granted under the governing statutes and regulations. As we have previously noted, the DCFS official did not have the discretionary authority to revoke Easter House's interim operating status without proceeding through a series of procedural safeguards which included the holding of a formal predeprivation hearing. Moreover, Easter House points to nothing which would indicate that the state knew or should have known that the appellants or other state employees had disregarded, or were likely to disregard the state's established procedure for processing renewal applications. See Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204, 207 and n. 1 (2d Cir.1990) (denying Sec. 1983 liability, court distinguishes Zinermon on the fact that the deprivation alleged resulted from the defendants' violations of various laws and regulations governing their activities). In this sense, the DCFS officials' actions were not predictable; or, in contrast to the situation presented to the Court in Zinermon, the officials' actions here did not constitute an abuse of ... broadly delegated, uncircumscribed power to effect the deprivation at issue. --- U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 989. 55 Nor do we believe the actions of the DCFS official in this case were authorized as that term is construed in Zinermon. Discussing the breadth of the term unauthorized, the Zinermon Court focused on the extent to which the Florida officials were given not only the statutory power and authority to effect the deprivation complained of, but also the concomitant duty to initiate the procedural safeguards established by state law to guard against the risk of that deprivation. The Court noted that certain professionals on the staff at the Florida Mental Hospital were the only persons in a position to take notice of any misuse of the voluntary admissions process, and to ensure that the proper procedure is followed. Id. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 988 (emphasis in original). The actions of the DCFS officials were not authorized in this sense. Although certain DCFS officials did have the authority to deny renewal applications after holding a formal hearing, those same DCFS officials did not have the duty to initiate those predeprivation safeguards. Rather, the responsibility to initiate the procedural safeguards rested with the party aggrieved by the preliminary DCFS decision--in this case, Easter House. Thus, although the deprivation alleged did arguably occur at the hands of a high ranking official, it is clear that it was not the result of that official's abuse of ... broadly delegated, uncircumscribed power to effect the deprivation at issue. --- U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 989. Thus, we cannot conclude that the deprivation was authorized. 56 In sum, Justice Blackmun has articulated in Zinermon a factual circumstance under which the majority has concluded that Parratt and Hudson are inapplicable. As we have pointed out, we believe the linchpin of the Court's analysis in Zinermon is the extent to which the conduct of the Florida state actors was not only authorized, but also, under the circumstances of that case, highly predictable. In its most fundamental form, we believe Zinermon holds only that predictable deprivations of liberty or property which flow from authorized conduct are compensable under Sec. 1983. The conduct which is presented for our review does not fall into that category. 57 In a related argument, Easter House argues that the fact of employment status may be relevant in determining whether a state employee's action can be deemed an established state procedure, thus removing that action from the realm of random or unpredictable. Specifically, Easter House asserts that the single act of a sufficiently high-ranking policymaker may equate with or be deemed established state procedure.... See, e.g., Matthiessen, 857 F.2d at 407 n. 3; Tavarez, 826 F.2d at 677; see also Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 832-33 (2d Cir.1985); Stana v. School Dist. of City of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 130 (3d Cir.1985); Bretz, 773 F.2d at 1031; Fetner v. City of Roanoke, 813 F.2d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir.1987). Easter House contends that the appellants qualify as sufficiently high-placed policymakers whose alleged improper conduct constitutes an inadequate established state procedure under Logan, thereby precluding the application of Parratt, even though the conduct contravened formal state policy and procedure as expressed in written statutes, regulations, and procedural manuals. 58 We do not disagree that the acts of a state employee may be attributable to the state. However, in the Parratt analysis, this means nothing more than an employee acts under color of state law during the performance of his job-related duties. The issue is whether a single act of employee misconduct, which clearly contravenes established state policy and procedure as contained within formal rules, regulations, and statutes, automatically becomes the state's new position in all similar matters or whether the act, when viewed from the state's perspective, is merely a random and unauthorized deviation. 59 Without a doubt, the employee's position in the governmental hierarchy is relevant to this inquiry. For example, consider a variety of situations in which a state's policy and procedures in a given area are delegated to a specified policymaker, be it a single person, a committee, or the state legislature. If the policymaker establishes policy and procedure on an informal basis without the aid of formal policy and procedure guidelines--that is, decides policy on a case-by-case basis--then his pronouncement in a given case reflects the state's position. Thus, a party who suffers a loss without due process protection in his individual case may easily argue that the loss occurred as a result of an inadequate established procedure. 60 In another scenario, consider a policymaker or series of policymakers who establish policy and procedure through a deliberative, or even legislative, process which culminates in a certain concrete position expressed in a formal pronouncement. In such a situation, it is reasonable to believe that only the results of that more formal process reflect the state's established policy and procedure. If the policymaker's subordinate, or even the policymaker himself, deviates in a single instance from the more formal pronouncement, it is less likely to reflect a new trend in state policy and procedure. A shift in policy is only likely to occur in one of two situations. First, a shift occurs if the same formal steps which created the original policies and procedures are repeated and culminate in the pronouncement of new policy and procedures. Second, a state's position may change if the policymaker repeatedly deviates from the formally established policy and procedure until his practice and custom has replaced the formal policy and procedures. 61 We believe that this case more closely reflects the latter of these two possible scenarios. The State of Illinois established the DCFS's licensing procedures through the traditional legislative process, culminating in a body of concrete statutory law which established step-by-step policy and procedure for granting and renewing the licenses of child welfare agencies. In addition, the statutory law provided the framework for the DCFS's day-to-day policy and procedure manual. In effect, the policymaker was the state legislature. It is true that the state delegated some of the rulemaking power to the DCFS, but that entity likewise set its formal policies and procedures through a deliberative process which culminated in a set of formal rules and regulations. Thus, the combination of the state legislature's and the DCFS's formal pronouncements comprise the state's established procedure. 62 Because the state promulgated policy and procedure by formal means, the employment status of the state employee violating that procedure must be considered much less important in determining whether a deviation from the policy may be characterized as random and unauthorized under Parratt. Even if we assume that the appellants qualify as policymakers themselves--which we doubt given their position in the governmental hierarchy--their policy, which at absolute best may be characterized as informal, cannot be said automatically to preempt or displace otherwise adequate existing state policy and procedure. Because the state through its designated policymaking branches created its formal policies and procedures, we cannot entertain a claim that the single act of a state employee now reflects the state's established policies and procedures. 63 If, as Easter House contends, this case more closely resembles Logan than Parratt and Hudson, then we of course would be forced to find that the state's established procedure was itself inadequate to guarantee the requisite due process protection. In Logan, the state had passed a statute which required a claimant under the state's employment laws to file a claim with the state employment commission prior to filing a lawsuit. The law also required the commission to hold a hearing upon the claim within 120 days. However, the law further provided that the claimant's claim would be barred if for any reason the hearing was not held within 120 days, although the commission was required to grant the hearing automatically. The commission's failure to hold the plaintiff's hearing within 120 days resulted in a jurisdictional bar to his employment claim prompting him to file a Sec. 1983 due process action. 64 The Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff's complaint should not be characterized as challenging the high-ranking state employees' failure to grant the requisite hearing in a timely manner when they had a duty to do so. Rather, the Court noted that the procedure itself was inadequate, not because the commission failed to grant the hearing, but because the statute contained a series of provisions which would allow a deprivation to occur by operation of law under a wide variety of possible scenarios. 455 U.S. at 436, 102 S.Ct. at 1158. That is, because the law mandated that the claimant file a claim with the commission before he could proceed in court, and because it further deprived the claimant of his claim without a hearing if for any reason a hearing on the claim was not held in 120 days, the law itself was deemed to be inadequate in protecting the claimant's property interest. Thus, contrary to Easter House's assertions, the high-ranking Logan defendants' failure to perform their duties did not constitute an established state procedure; the state statute itself was the inadequate component in the deprivation process. 65 In contrast, here the State of Illinois adopted a procedure which provided adequate due process protection; it contained no loopholes which would allow a deprivation to occur without due process unless the state employees acted in an unforeseen way. For example, the state's procedure detailed the method in which renewal licenses and charter applications should be handled. The law at that time even provided that, in the case of the former, a child welfare agency could continue to operate without a current license in hand while awaiting a final decision by the state and the courts upon its application for a renewal license. See supra note 12 (discussing 1969 Ill.Laws 106 (current version as amended at Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23, p 2219(b) (1988))). Thus, the state procedure was adequate in-and-of-itself unlike the procedural scheme promulgated by the state in Logan. 66 Only when the appellants took action which went beyond the realm of the foreseeable did Easter House suffer a property deprivation. If the appellants had merely refused to follow established procedure, Easter House would have been able to continue operations pending a final determination by the courts. However, because the appellants took further steps--contacting the adoption court and responding incorrectly to inquiries by prospective parents and job applicants--Easter House arguably experienced a property deprivation. As a result, we believe that Logan is distinguishable and that Parratt provides the proper analysis. 67 For all of these reasons, we conclude that Easter House cannot maintain a Sec. 1983 action in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Parratt and Hudson. The Supreme Court has attempted to strike a balance between the competing interests of providing a remedy for injuries sustained in connection with violations of constitutional rights and avoiding the use of Sec. 1983 as just another opportunity for parties to shop between state and federal forums. The Court's decision in Zinermon does not appear to alter this balance. Accordingly, we continue to believe that Parratt must be read broadly enough to avoid turning the fourteenth amendment into a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544, 101 S.Ct. at 1917; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333-34, 106 S.Ct. 662, 666, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). 68 Section 1983 must be preserved to remedy only those deprivations which actually occur without adequate due process of law, such as those which result from a state's conscious decision to ignore the protections guaranteed by the Constitution. It should not be employed to remedy deprivations which occur at the hands of a state employee who is acting in direct contravention of the state's established policies and procedures which have been designed to guarantee the very protections which the employee now has chosen to ignore. Such a limitation upon Sec. 1983 maintains the delicate balance between the state and federal judicial systems, leaving the former to remedy individual torts and the latter to address property deprivations which occur without adequate due process protection. 69 iv. Adequate State Law Remedies 70 Having decided that the appellants' conduct may be characterized as random and unauthorized under Parratt and unpredictable under Zinermon, we must decide whether meaningful postdeprivation remedies exist under state law. The parties have not discussed this issue at much length, leading us to believe that they have little disagreement that Illinois law provides Easter House with remedies to redress its injuries. Nevertheless, we will address some of the general concerns which Easter House's briefs suggest may preclude application of Parratt. 71 Easter House apparently believes that the remedies available under Illinois law are not as substantial as those available under Sec. 1983. It also characterizes the state road to recovery as a lengthy and speculative process, especially in light of the appellants' potential qualified immunity claims. As a result, it contends that the state has not provided it with a meaningful postdeprivation procedure as contemplated by Parratt. 72 Initially, we note that Easter House may seek a wide variety of relief in state court under numerous legal theories. For example, Illinois common law provides a former employer with a remedy against a former employee who solicits key clients and improperly exploits benefits gained by his or her prior employment. See, e.g., Corroon & Black of Ill., Inc. v. Magner, 145 Ill.App.3d 151, 494 N.E.2d 785, 98 Ill.Dec. 663 (1986); Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 136 Ill.App.3d 571, 483 N.E.2d 283, 289-90, 91 Ill.Dec. 1, 5-6 (1985). In a similar vein, Illinois law recognizes a tort action which businesses may bring against parties which interfere with business relationships or their right to conduct business generally. See, e.g., American Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medicine Ass'n, 106 Ill.App.3d 626, 435 N.E.2d 1297, 62 Ill.Dec. 325 (1982); Streif v. Bovinette, 88 Ill.App.3d 1079, 411 N.E.2d 341, 44 Ill.Dec. 372 (1980). In addition, under Illinois law, an injured party may bring an action if a third party interferes with the injured party's contractual relations or if it tortiously interferes with the injured party's prospective economic advantage. See, e.g., Singh v. Curry, 667 F.Supp. 603 (N.D.Ill.1987); Williams v. Weaver, 145 Ill.App.3d 562, 495 N.E.2d 1147, 99 Ill.Dec. 412, 417 (1986); Galinski v. Kessler, 134 Ill.App.3d 602, 480 N.E.2d 1176, 89 Ill.Dec. 433, 437 (1985). 73 Illinois courts also have stated that the right to do business constitutes property, and access to one's place of business or the enjoyment of the good will attending it are incidents of property, as respects liability for interference therewith. See, e.g., Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N.E.2d 308 (1939). Thus, a business may bring an action for the tort of malicious and wrongful impairment of property if it is based upon a civil wrong. See, e.g., Nemanich v. Long Grove Country Club Estates, Inc., 119 Ill.App.2d 169, 255 N.E.2d 466 (1970). Finally, to protect its interest in exclusive use of its name, Easter House might bring a deceptive trade practice action under paragraph 313 of chapter 121 1/2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. Under this statutory provision, Easter House may seek injunctive relief as well as any other remedies otherwise available against the same conduct under the common law and other statutes of the state. 74 We believe that these potential causes of action, among others, adequately afford Easter House meaningful post-deprivation remedies sufficient to provide the requisite due process protection. 14 As for Easter House's qualified immunity concerns, we do not think that the otherwise adequate state law remedies will be curtailed by the appellants' ability to avail themselves of the immunity which public officials ordinarily enjoy. Paragraph 801 of chapter 127 of the Illinois Revised Statutes prohibits suits against the State of Illinois, unless they are brought in the Illinois Court of Claims, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 37, p 439.8. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that state employees are not granted immunity similar to that enjoyed by the state. See, e.g., Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 104 Ill.2d 169, 470 N.E.2d 1029, 1038-39, 83 Ill.Dec. 609, 618-19 (1984); see also Smith v. Jones, 113 Ill.2d 126, 497 N.E.2d 738, 740, 100 Ill.Dec. 560, 562 (1986) (An action against a state official for conduct in his official capacity will withstand a motion to dismiss the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds if the complaint alleges that the official is ... violating the law of Illinois and thus acting beyond his authority); Children's Memorial Hosp. v. Mueller, 141 Ill.App.3d 951, 491 N.E.2d 103, 96 Ill.Dec. 289 (1986) (immunity extends not only to actions where the State is named as the defendant, but also to actions against State departments, such as DCFS, and State officers acting pursuant to their lawful authority (emphasis added)); see also National Communication Sys., Inc. v. Michigan Public Serv. Comm'n, 789 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir.1986) (discussing the adequacy of state law remedies in light of potential immunity claims and the principles established by Hudson ). 75 Finally, we also must reject Easter House's characterization of the state recovery process as a lengthy and speculative process which forecloses the application of Parratt. In Hudson, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that state law relief should be deemed inadequate because it is far from certain and complete. 468 U.S. at 535, 104 S.Ct. at 3205. The Court also stated that the fact that an injured party might not be able to recover under [the state law] remedies the full amount which he might receive in a Sec. 1983 action is not ... determinative of the adequacy of the state remedies. 468 U.S. at 535, 104 S.Ct. at 3204-05 (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544, 101 S.Ct. at 1917); see also National Communication Sys., Inc., 789 F.2d at 373. 76 We note that almost all litigation, whether conducted in a state or federal forum, may be characterized as a lengthy and speculative process. Litigants often decry the speed with which courts administer justice and likewise may lament that a particular forum may yield a more favorable result depending upon the nature of the claim and the particular position they support. However, we should not reject the application of Parratt unless the remedy which an injured party may pursue in state court can readily be characterized as inadequate to the point that it is meaningless or nonexistent and, thus, in no way can be said to provide the due process relief guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, we hold that Easter House's arguments are misplaced. 77 Based upon our reading of Hudson and Parratt, we hold that adequate state remedies exist to correct any injuries which may have resulted from the appellants' improper conduct. We do not intend our decision to be read as foreclosing Sec. 1983 actions any time a state provides an alternative forum for relief. However, when alternative relief exists and the facts of a case dictate that Zinermon does not render Parratt and Hudson inapplicable, a plaintiff's due process rights are not violated and no basis for a section 1983 action exists. See Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Illinois, 852 F.2d 951, 955-56 and n. 8 (7th Cir.1988) (if a state provides an adequate means of addressing a property deprivation, the victim of the deprivation has been accorded due process of law). Any action for injuries thus must be brought in the state forum. In summary, we hold that the Parratt line of cases, culminating in Zinermon, preclude an action by Easter House pursuant to Sec. 1983 for the injuries which resulted from the alleged licensing conspiracy because it received all of the process which was due.