Opinion ID: 2831443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Chad’s Qualified Privilege Claim

Text: The common law provides a qualified privilege against defamation liability when “communication is made in good faith and the author, the recipient or a third person, or one of their family members, has an interest that is sufficiently affected by the communication.” Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex. 1994). We have recognized that defamation actions necessarily inhibit free speech and, thus, the qualified privilege offers an additional safeguard, even in cases of private, non-political speech. See id. The privilege operates as an affirmative defense in the nature of confession and avoidance; the defendant bears the burden of proving privileged publication unless the plaintiff’s petition affirmatively demonstrates privilege. Denton Pub. Co. v. Boyd, 460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1970). If a defendant establishes the privilege, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant made the statements with actual malice. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. O’Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. 1970). Actual malice, in the defamation context, means “the making of a statement with knowledge that it is false, or with reckless disregard of whether it is true.” Hagler