Opinion ID: 1136922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the tribunal committed reversible error in their evidentiary rulings.

Text: The four errors assigned by Emil in evidentiary rulings will be discussed separately.
In the course of the hearing on the merits, the Tribunal allowed the Bar to introduce the testimony of Gwendolyn Catchings. The document offered into evidence by the Bar was the transcript of Catchings's testimony from the investigatory hearing in July 1989. Ergo, the statement was taken under oath and Emil had opportunity to cross-examine Catchings at that time. The Bar sought to present Catchings's testimony pursuant to Rule 32(a)(1) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure rather than calling her as a live witness. Further, the Bar argued that Catchings's testimony was admissible under subsection (a)(3)(B) of Rule 32 which states: The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: ... that the witness is at a greater distance than one hundred miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the state, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition. M.R.C.P. Rule 32(a)(3)(B) (1995). The comment to Rule 32 states that: Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) permits the introduction of the deposition testimony of an unavailable witness. Though the deposition of the unavailable witness need not have been taken in the same proceedings as that in which it is offered, the party against whom the deposition is offered ... must have had both an opportunity and a similar motive for cross-examination. See 4 J. Weinstein & Miss. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 801(D)(01) [01] (1985). M.R.C.P. Rule 32 cmt. (1995). Emil argued below that Catchings's testimony was not admissible under Rule 32 and Rule 804. He contended that he did not have a similar motive for cross-examination when Catchings's testified at the investigatory hearing. The investigatory hearing was not an adversary proceeding and Emil argued that he would have conducted his cross-examination entirely differently had he known that the testimony was going to be admitted into evidence at the hearing on the merits. Emil objected to the use of the deposition testimony on the ground that there was no evidence presented before the Tribunal which would authorize the use of the deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(a)(3) or Rule 804(b)(1). The question before this Court is whether the testimony was properly admitted under Rule 32(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure which refers to Rule 804(b)(1) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The only reason that the testimony might be inadmissible under Rule 32 is that it is not a deposition, but earlier sworn testimony. This is a question of form over substance; it does not hinder the introduction of Catchings's testimony. The query then becomes whether it was properly admitted under Rule 804(b)(1) as an exception to hearsay. Under Rule 804, this Court must first determine if Catchings was unavailable. This concept in relevant part is defined by Rule 804(a)(5) as being absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance ... by process or other reasonable means. M.R.E. 804(a)(5) (1995). The proponent of the hearsay must carry the burden of proving unavailability. See Mitchell v. State, 572 So.2d 865, 869 (Miss. 1990). This Court has described this burden as that of a `diligent effort.' Stoop v. State, 531 So.2d 1215, 1220 (Miss. 1988). Mitchell, 572 So.2d at 869. If this burden is met and unavailability is proven, the statements must still fit one of the hearsay exceptions in Rule 804(b) in order to be admitted into evidence. Id. Thus, the first step is to determine if Catchings was unavailable to testify at the hearing on the merits. Second, this Court must determine if it falls into an exception listed in subsection (b)(1). Upon Emil's objection, the Tribunal requested the Bar to present testimony regarding its efforts to locate Catchings. The Bar stated that it called directory information to no avail. It contacted two attorneys with past connections with Catchings by telephone with no success. One of the attorneys stated that she had moved to California. The testimony also showed that an acquaintance of Catchings (Earline Mitchell) was called, and she said Catchings had moved to California three or four years ago, but she didn't know her whereabouts. On cross-examination, the witnesses offered by the bar admitted that they didn't contact law enforcement personnel about Catchings's last known location, did not send a certified letter to her last known address, and, in fact, did not talk to Earline Mitchell about the witness's location until only two days before the date the testimony was attempted to be offered into evidence. It was further developed that the Bar had encountered problems several months before the hearing in locating the witness, but notwithstanding this knowledge, no further efforts were made to locate her until the waning days before the hearing, and no notice was given to Emil's attorneys that the Bar had not located her until only two days before the hearing. It is a close call on whether or not the effort by the Bar constitutes a diligent effort. A review of the relevant case law provides a guideline for determining when a witness is unavailable. In Mitchell v. State, 572 So.2d 865 (Miss. 1990), this Court held that the prosecution had met its burden of proof and that the witness was unavailable. In an effort to locate the witness, the prosecution made the following diligent efforts: (1) Contact of the F.B.I. office in Jackson. (2) Contact of the police department in Cleveland, Ohio. (3) Contact of the welfare department in Cleveland, Ohio. (4) Recent notification by [the witness] that he had no address or phone number and that he was living in the streets. (5) Reports that [the witness] was periodically in Cleveland. (6) A lack of friends or relatives, including a brother who served as a deputy sheriff, that knew of [the witness's] whereabouts. (7) A one year search by Deputy Ellis that proved unsuccessful. (8) Relatives in Cleveland who were contacted and stated that they did not know of [the witness's] location. (9) Strong resistance by [the witness] when asked to reveal his location. Mitchell, 572 So.2d at 869. The Bar's attempts to locate Catchings come nowhere near the efforts in the Mitchell case. In Stoop v. State, 531 So.2d 1215 (Miss. 1988), the prosecution sought to introduce the transcript of one of its witnesses from a previous trial in the same case at the retrial of Stoop. In an effort to locate the witness, a subpoena was issued, but not to the witness's current residence. A call was made to the witness's estranged husband, but he was out-of-town and the prosecution never called back. Instead they called the witness's friend who told them she did not know where the witness was. Stoop, 531 So.2d at 1220. Although the estranged husband knew of the witness's whereabouts, the prosecution never found out because it was satisfied with the effort in calling the witness's friend. This Court held that the prosecution had not made a diligent effort to locate the witness, and therefore, the requirement of unavailability was not met. Id. The Bar did not even make the efforts made in Stoop. In Stoop a subpoena was issued even though it was no longer the current address. Id. The Bar did not ever contact law enforcement officers or attempt to obtain a subpoena. In the final analysis, the Bar neither made a credible showing that the witness was unavailable nor showed that she was out of state or located further than 100 miles from the hearing site. The evidence offered by the Bar totally failed to establish that the witness was unavailable for Rule 804(a)(5) and (b)(1) purposes, or that her deposition testimony was available for use under Rule 32(a)(3). Therefore, we find that the Tribunal erroneously admitted Catchings's testimony.

Subsections (B) and (C) shall be addressed together because they are essentially the same argument. Emil contends that it was error for the Tribunal to allow hearsay testimony about what Fountain said. The out-of-court statements of Fountain were introduced through the testimony of Catchings, Donald Bourgeois, Otis Kaufman, and Peter Quave. This issue is moot as to Catchings's testimony because we find it to be inadmissable. Emil asserts that none of these statements should have been allowed into evidence. The Tribunal ruled that the statements were admissible under rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence because the statements were made by a party opponent. Rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) reads in pertinent part as follows: (d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: (2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is ... (C) a statement made by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. M.R.E. Rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) (1995). The comment to Rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) read as follows: (C) The general principle survives that a statement by an agent authorized to speak by a party is tantamount to an admission by a party. The rule covers statements made by the agent to third persons as well as statements made by the agent to the principal. The essence of this is that a party's own records are admissible against him, even where there has been no intent to disclose the information therein to third persons. (D) The common law required that the agent's statement be uttered as part of his duties, i.e., within the scope of his agency. 801(d)(2)(D) regards this rigid requirement and admits a statement concerning a matter within the scope of his agency provided it was uttered during the existence of the employment relationship. Rule 801(d)(2) cmt. (1995) (emphasis in original). The rule and comment provide that the statements of an agent may be admitted under certain circumstances. However, the first question that must be answered is whether the Bar proved that Fountain was Emil's agent in order to have the statements admitted under a theory of agency. An agent is [a] person authorized by another (principal) to act for or in place of him; one intrusted with another's business... . A business representative, whose function is to bring about, modify, affect, accept performance of, or terminate contractual obligations between principal and third persons. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 63 (6th ed. 1990). [T]he burden of proving an agency relationship is upon the party asserting it. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Murphree, 653 So.2d 857, 872 (Miss. 1994) (citations omitted). Emil makes the blanket assertion that [t]he Bar totally failed to establish the relationship between Fountain and Emil necessary to constitute Fountain's alleged solicitation efforts an admissible admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(C) or (D), M.R.E.  The Bar counters that it proved agency through Fountain's own testimony. Emil did point to a few specific facts he believed supported the claim that Fountain was not an agent of Emil's. Emil contends that Fountain was not his agent and points to the following facts to support his contention: (1) Fountain was a self-employed investigator. (2) Fountain worked for a number of lawyers in 1984. (3) Fountain listed Emil's office number as his own for only a short time, and that was after the dates in the formal complaint except possibly count seven. (4) Moran first contacted Fountain, not vice versa. (5) Fountain never worked out of Emil's office building. (6) Bourgeois' mother asked Fountain's niece to ask him to go see Bourgeois. (7) Fountain did not tell Bourgeois that he was visiting him on behalf of any law firm. (8) Catchings instigated the contact between herself and Fountain. (9) Fountain was never employed as a regular employee for Emil, but worked on a case by case basis. (10) Emil knew nothing about Fountain's contacts with Bourgeois, and Catchings and Fountain never mentioned it to Emil until two years later. The Bar points to the following facts to support its assertion that Fountain was Emil's agent: (1) Fountain had no name for his investigative business. (2) He started his investigative business in the early 1980's. (3) He performed investigative work for various lawyers including Emil during 1984. (4) He used a business card for his investigative business that had Emil's office telephone number on it. (5) Fountain had a sign outside of Emil's office building that advertised Fountain's investigative services. (6) Fountain's relationship with Emil changed in 1988. (7) Fountain did investigate work for Emil in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. (8) Fountain received approximately $18,430.00 from Emil in 1988. (9) Fountain listed Emil's name and address on Schedule C of his 1988 income tax return as being his employer. (10) Fountain listed Emil's employer identification number as being his employer's identification number on Schedule C. (11) Fountain didn't know if he worked for any law firm other than Emil in 1988. (12) Fountain did not receive any Form 1099's from any law firm in 1987. (13) Fountain received $1,525.00 from Emil for working on the Rudy Moran case in 1984. (14) Fountain referred Rudy Moran's brother, Roland Moran, to Emil after the accident. (15) Fountain was compensated for the work he performed on the Moran case at a rate different than what he testified to. (16) Fountain investigated the Bourgeois cases on his own, but he tried to get Bourgeois to call Emil for Emil to represent him. (17) Fountain didn't know Bourgeois when he went to see him in the hospital. (18) Fountain denied that he recommended Emil to Bourgeois, but Bourgeois testified that he did. (19) Fountain had conversations with Ms. Catchings, whose interest were adverse to Don Bourgeois. (20) Emil asked Fountain to go see William Buckley in January of 1986. (21) Emil employed Fountain to render investigative services for all clients listed on Exhibit 15 except Moran. (22) Fountain told Quave that he made between $80,000.00 and $100,000.00 from working for Emil but said he was joking around and that such statement wasn't true. (23) Exhibit 14 reflects that Emil paid Fountain $1,525.00 in 1984, $500.00 in 1985, and $2,403.34 in 1987, and Exhibit 16 shows that in 1988, Emil paid Fountain $7,048.00 for work on twenty-three (23) cases. (Fountain's income tax return, Schedule C, for 1988 reflects that he received $18,430.00 from Emil instead of the aforesaid $7,048.00). Emil paid Fountain $4,920 in 1984, $963.00 in 1985, and $2,888 in 1987. (24) A significant portion of Fountain's income from 1984-1988 came from doing investigative work for Emil. Based upon the testimony of Fountain, the Tribunal held that a principal/agent relationship existed between Emil and Fountain. In First Jackson Securities Corp. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 253 Miss. 519, 176 So.2d 272 (1965), this Court held that: An agent is one who acts for or in the place of another by authority from him; one who undertakes to transact some business or manage some affairs for another by an authority and on account of the latter, and to render an account of it. He is a substitute, a deputy, appointed by the principal, with power to do the things which the principal may or can do. The most characteristic feature of an agent's employment, is that he is employed primarily to bring about business relations between his principal and third persons, and this power is perhaps the most distinctive mark on the agent as contrasted with others, not agents, who act in representative capacities. Id. 176 So.2d at 278 (quoting 2 C.J.S. Agency § 1 c., p. 1024 (1936))(emphasis added). It is a fact question as to whether the testimony showed that an agent/principal relationship existed between Emil and Fountain. There was ample testimony that Fountain had the characteristic feature of an agent. His job was to find prospective clients for Emil. The Bar called Fountain as its first witness and after establishing an agency relationship called further witnesses from whom it elicited testimony concerning Fountain's actions and statements pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(D). This is the proper procedure to be followed under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence in order to have the testimony admitted. There was no error by the Tribunal in allowing the introduction of Fountain's statements through the hearsay testimony of Donald Bourgeois, Otis Kaufman, and Peter Quave.
Roger Wilder was called upon to testify during the Bar's rebuttal case. He testified as to Emil's general reputation as to truth and veracity in the community. Emil propounded nineteen interrogatories to the Bar pursuant to Rule 33 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Interrogatory No. 5 requested the names and addresses of each and every person who has discoverable knowledge of the allegations. In its initial response, the Bar responded with a list of approximately 20-22 names. Later, the Bar supplemented these answers with another list of four names. Nowhere in any of the responses to the interrogatories or in any other discovery disclosure in the course of this case did the Bar disclose that Wilder was a person responsive to Interrogatory No. 5 or that might be called as a prospective witness. When Wilder was called to testify during the Bar's rebuttal, Emil objected on the ground that he had not been identified pursuant to Emil's Interrogatory No. 5. The Bar contended that the purpose for calling Wilder was for rebuttal and aggravation. The Tribunal overruled Emil's objection stating that the Bar was not required to disclose Wilder's identity if the purported testimony of this witness is as counsel of the Bar states it is to be. The question before this Court is whether the Bar had a duty to disclose Wilder to Emil in the first place. Emil cites to Harris v. General Host Corp., 503 So.2d 795 (Miss. 1986) in support of his argument that the Bar had such a duty. Emil directs this Court to the following portion of the Harris opinion: We have effectively dispatched the rebuttal witness ruse for non-disclosure of witnesses in the context of criminal cases. Coates v. State, 495 So.2d 464, 466 (Miss. 1986); Johnson v. State, 491 So.2d 834, 836-37 (Miss. 1986); Tolbert v. State, 441 So.2d 1374, 1375 (Miss. 1983). We ascertain no reason on principle why we should credit such a ploy in the context of a civil action. Harris, 503 So.2d at 797. It is Emil's contention that this case squarely controls the case at hand, and thus, the Tribunal erred in allowing Wilder to testify. We agree. In Harris, the defense called an expert witness in their case-in-chief that had not been disclosed during discovery. Harris, 503 So.2d at 796. The plaintiff immediately objected and the court allowed the testimony anyway. The court held that the expert witness was a rebuttal witness and therefore, the defense had no obligation to testify. Thus, the testimony was allowed. Id. This Court, on appeal, held that the defense's claim that the witness was a rebuttal witness profits it nothing. There is nothing in our rules of procedure that authorizes a party to withhold the names of likely expert witnesses on such grounds, except only for the circumstance where the party had no reasonable means of anticipating in advance of trial the need for calling the witness. Id. at 797. The Bar would distinguish this case on the facts. It notes that the interrogatory asked for the disclosure of expert witnesses, not the general interrogatory of any person with knowledge. Harris, 503 So.2d at 797. Further, the Bar notes that the witness in the Harris case actually testified for the defense during their case-in-chief. The Bar relies upon this Court's interpretation that the witness was no more a rebuttal witness than any other witness who testified different from other witnesses (the ruse this Court referred to in its holding). The Bar is correct in its distinctions. However, this does not mean that it did not have to disclose a witness that it planned to call for testimony concerning truth and veracity of Emil. Furthermore, this Court held in Harris that: We have long been committed to the proposition that trial by ambush should be abolished, the experienced lawyer's nostalgia to the contrary notwithstanding. We have sought procedural justice through a set of rules designed to assure to the maximum extent practicable that cases are decided on their merits, not the fact that one party calls a surprise witness and catches the other with his pants down. One of the most obviously desirable and rigidly enforced of these rules is that requiring pretrial disclosure of witnesses. Harris, 503 So.2d at 796-97. The Bar had a duty to disclose its witnesses that it was going to call and those it may call during trial. To guise them as rebuttal witnesses does not remove them from the requirements of this Court and rules of procedure. The Bar relies upon Kern v. Gulf Coast Nursing Home of Moss Point, 502 So.2d 1198 (Miss. 1987) which can be distinguished. In Kern, witnesses that were not disclosed were called in the case-in-chief. The lower court held that because they had not been disclosed they could only be called on rebuttal, not because that was allowable, but to give the opposing side time to prepare. This Court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions. Kern, 502 So.2d at 1200. This is not the situation that we have here. The Bar attempted to call for the first time on rebuttal a witness that had not been disclosed during discovery. We find that there is a distinction. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party may obtain discovery which includes the identity and location of persons ... having knowledge of any discoverable matter. M.R.C.P. Rule 26(b)(1) (1995). This rule imposes a duty upon the Bar to disclose Wilder. The Bar did have such a duty and that the Tribunal erred in allowing Wilder to testify as a rebuttal witness. Nonetheless, the Bar submits that said error is harmless. Wilder and Chancellor Randall testified about Emil's reputation for truth and veracity in the community in which he lives and practices law. Both said it was bad. There was no objection to Randall's testimony at the hearing, nor is it appealed now. Thus, Randall's testimony (although improperly admitted) now renders Wilder's cumulative. Moreover, the Bar notes that the Tribunal relied upon Randall's testimony in determining Emil's character and reputation. In its opinion and judgment, the Tribunal found the following: (g) Character and reputation His reputation for truth and veracity in the community in which he lives is bad. Indeed, it is a sad day when your local chancellor, not knowing you personally, knows that your reputation in the community for truth and veracity is bad. Emil notes in his reply brief that it is difficult to consider Wilder's testimony cumulative or harmless error. Randall and Wilder were the Bar's witnesses as to the truth and veracity of Emil. Emil presented testimony from four persons who would vouch for his truthfulness and honesty. It is not as if Wilder were one of many, but he is one of two. So, it is difficult for us to say that the admission of his testimony was harmless error. Emil also notes that he submitted letters of recommendation from two other chancery court judges who are both senior to Randall. Therefore, either Randall's testimony has a tremendous amount of weight, or the Tribunal relied upon Randall's testimony because it was bolstered by Wilder's. In the end, we cannot say with all confidence that the testimony of Wilder was cumulative and therefore harmless.