Opinion ID: 2794497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Express Indemnification

Text: ¶ 19. Next, Frontier claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Navigant on its claim for express indemnification. To determine whether a contract contains an agreement to indemnify, we look at the language of the writing itself and interpret the language “to give effect to the intent of the parties as that intent is expressed in their writing.” Tateosian v. State , 2007 VT 136, ¶ 14, 183 Vt. 57, 945 A.2d 833 (quotation omitted). ¶ 20. Frontier argues that Navigant failed to demonstrate that there was an express indemnification agreement. In support of its motion for summary judgment, to demonstrate that an express agreement of indemnity existed Navigant submitted the following documents. First, Navigant relied on a letter dated July 23, 1999 on Navigant letterhead and signed by both parties—Victor Blanchet for “Navigant Consulting, Inc./REED,” and the Vice President of Frontier’s predecessor. The letter confirms that the utility is seeking “technical and professional support” and that Navigant will provide “engineering, project management and operations support,” and regulatory assistance before the PSB. The letter recites that Frontier’s predecessor requested Navigant employee Eugene Shlatz to provide the services. The letter states that the work will be performed “under NCI/REED’s Standard Terms and Conditions.” ¶ 21. Also attached to the motion for summary judgment was a document entitled “ Reed Consulting Group Terms and Conditions .” This document included a “Responsibility Statement,” which contained the following language: In no event shall REED, its agents, employees, or others providing materials or performing services in connection with work on this assignment be liable for any direct, consequential or special loss or damage, whether attributable to breach of contract, tort, including negligence, or otherwise; and except as herein provided, you release, indemnify, and hold REED, its agents, employees, or others providing materials or performing services in connection with work on this assignment harmless from and against any and all liability including costs of defense settlement and reasonable attorney’s fees, therefor. In a subsequent letter dated May 30, 2001, Mr. Shlatz wrote to the utility that he was pleased to offer services for technical and economic consulting for the substations in Richford, Vermont to support Frontier in obtaining a CPG. ¶ 22. Navigant also submitted two affidavits. The first was from Eugene Shlatz, averring that he performed services for Frontier while employed by Navigant pursuant to the July 23, 1999 letter, and including the terms and conditions attached as an exhibit. A second affidavit was from Dawn Cassie, an Associate General Counsel for Navigant, who stated that Navigant acquired REED Consulting Group in 1997 and occasionally did business under the name “Navigant Consulting Inc./Reed.” She also represented that Navigant had an agreement with Frontier as outlined in the July 1999 letter, and the terms and conditions were attached to that letter. ¶ 23. On appeal, Frontier claims that Navigant’s proof was insufficient to demonstrate that there was an enforceable agreement for two reasons. First, Frontier asserts that Navigant failed to show that the terms and conditions, which were attached to the motion for summary judgment, is the document to which the July 1999 letter refers. Second, Frontier argues that there is insufficient proof that the terms and conditions appended to the July 1999 letter apply to the scope of work for the Richford substation articulated in the 2001 letter. ¶ 24. In assessing the sufficiency of Navigant’s proof, we give Frontier as the nonmoving party the benefit of “all reasonable doubts and inferences,” but in contesting Navigant’s submissions Frontier “may not rest on allegations in the pleadings to rebut credible documentary evidence or affidavits.” Clayton v. Unsworth , 2010 VT 84, ¶ 16, 188 Vt. 432, 8 A.3d 1066 (quotation omitted). When the moving party supports their assertions of fact with submitted materials, including documents and affidavits, and the nonmoving party does not address the other party’s assertions, the court may consider the facts undisputed. See V.R.C.P. 56(c), (e)(2) (requiring party to support assertion with citation to record, and allowing court to consider fact undisputed for purposes of motion where opposing party fails to properly address assertion of fact). ¶ 25. Like the trial court, we reject Frontier’s argument that Navigant’s motion is supported by insufficient evidence to show that the terms and conditions it relies upon were the same terms referred to in the July 1999 letter and incorporated into the party’s agreement. Frontier points out that the July 1999 letter states that the work will be “performed under NCI/REED’s Standard Terms and Conditions,” but the terms and conditions submitted by Navigant is titled “REED CONSULTING GROUP TERMS AND CONDITIONS.” There was, nonetheless, enough support for Navigant’s assertion that those terms and conditions were attached to the parties’ original contract. The letter is signed by both parties, and refers to the terms and conditions. The Letter identifies contractor as both Navigant Consulting Group, Inc. and as NCI/REED. Further, the affidavit from Cassie states that Navigant did business as Navigant/Reed, and the affidavits from both Shlatz and Cassie aver that those were the conditions agreed to and attached to the July 1999 letter. Although Frontier disputes these facts, it does not support its assertion with any evidence or citation to the record, and its mere denial is not sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact. ¶ 26. Similarly, Frontier failed to show there was a dispute of fact over whether the indemnification provision in the terms and conditions referred to in the 1999 letter applied to the 2001 agreement for work on the Richford substation. Frontier argues that the 2001 letter controls over the 1999 letter, and because it does not include reference to terms and conditions or indemnification, no indemnification is available. The trial court correctly determined that there is no dispute of fact that the terms and conditions apply to the work at the Richford substation. Navigant asserted such and supported its assertion with the following documentary evidence. The 1999 letter refers to Navigant providing “on-going technical and professional support,” and the 2001 letter states that it “proposes to perform these tasks under Navigant’s existing services contract.” Further, the affidavit from Eugene Shlatz states that the 2001 letter setting forth the scope of work to be provided in connection with the Richford substation was intended to supplement the 1999 contract. These documents were sufficient to support Navigant’s assertions that the terms of the 1999 contract, including the incorporation of the terms and conditions, applied to the work performed on the Richford substation. Given that Frontier submitted no evidence to contradict the provisions of the letters or the statement in the affidavit, the trial court did not err in accepting as fact that the terms and conditions applied to the 2001 work agreement. ¶ 27. The undisputed facts also do not support Frontier’s assertion that the 2001 agreement supplanted the indemnification provision in the 1999 agreement. Frontier correctly states the general rule that specific contract terms control over general ones. Boston & M.R.R. v. Howard Hardware Co. , 123 Vt. 203, 213, 186 A.2d 184, 192 (1962) (concluding that specific paragraph controlled over general term in contract). This general rule does not apply here, however, where the 2001 scope-of-work letter does not contain any provision on indemnity and therefore does not contradict or supersede the 1999 agreement on indemnity. ¶ 28. Next, Frontier argues that the indemnification provision is not enforceable because it fails to clearly state that it applies to Navigant’s sole negligence. On one occasion, this Court declined to enforce an indemnification provision for failure to expressly state that it would cover the sole negligence of the indemnitee. In Tateosian v. State , we concluded that an indemnification clause in a standard contract prepared by the State in which the contractor promised to defend against claims “arising as a result of [the contractor’s] performance” of the contract did not cover the sole negligence of the State, the indemnitee. 2007 VT 136, ¶ 16. We held that because the language was ambiguous and there was a disparity in bargaining power between the two parties, the provision was insufficient to extend it to covering the indemnitee’s sole negligence. Id . ¶ 22. We emphasized that the rule in Vermont remained that “an indemnity clause covers the sole negligence of the indemnitee only where it clearly expresses that intent.” Id . ¶ 23. ¶ 29. Since then, this Court has described Tateosian as implementing the “rule of construction” that “an indemnity provision covers the sole negligence of the indemnitee only if its language clearly expresses that intent.” Southwick v. City of Rutland , 2011 VT 53, ¶ 9, 190 Vt. 106, 35 A.3d 113. Thus, we have subsequently enforced contractual-indemnity clauses where the language is “unambiguous” and part of an arm’s-length deal. Id . ¶¶ 13-14; see also State v. Prison Health Servs., Inc. , 2013 VT 119, ¶¶ 9-10, 195 Vt. 360, 88 A.3d 414 (explaining that indemnification provisions that are unambiguous are given effect and indemnity will apply if parties engaged in arm’s-length transaction). ¶ 30. For those same reasons, we conclude that the indemnity clause in this case is enforceable. Unlike Tateosian , where there was a disparity in bargaining power, the agreement in this case was made between two parties in an arm’s-length transaction. Further, the language expresses an intent to cover injuries and damages that occur as a result of either party’s negligence. The indemnity clause states that Navigant is not “liable for any direct, consequential or special loss or damage, whether attributable to breach of contract, tort, including negligence, or otherwise” and that Frontier will “release, indemnify,” and hold Navigant harmless. This result is consistent with our decisions since Tateosian , as well as decisions prior to Tateosian that were distinguished in that case. In Southwick , a the contract provision required one defendant, the Vermont Swim Association (VSA), to indemnify the City of Rutland for “all claims for bodily injury or property damage arising from or out of the presence of [VSA] . . . or [VSA]’s activities,” 2011 VT 53, ¶ 5, and we concluded that it was “deliberately broad enough to cover all injuries and damages that might occur—as a result of either party’s negligence.” Id . ¶ 13. The provision in this case is just as clear. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting Navigant summary judgment on its claim for express indemnity. ¶ 31. On a final note, we address Frontier’s motion to strike the supplemental printed case filed by Navigant, which includes the special jury verdict and subsequent stipulation by the parties to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims. Frontier argues that this is an improper expansion of the record on appeal because these documents were not before the trial court at the time of its ruling on summary judgment. In reaching our decision, we have not considered this information, and therefore we deny the motion as moot. Affirmed . FOR THE COURT: