Opinion ID: 2443659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiving the Right to Testify

Text: [¶ 15] A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be heard in his own defense. State v. Tuplin, 2006 ME 83, ¶¶ 9-11, 901 A.2d 792, 795-96. And, as with other constitutional rights, a defendant may relinquish the right to testify through a voluntary and knowing waiver. Id. ¶ 14, 901 A.2d at 796. In deciding whether a right has been waived, we apply a bifurcated review. Id. ¶ 13, 901 A.2d at 796. The factual findings made by the trial court are reviewed for clear error, while the ultimate issue of waiver is reviewed de novo. Id. (quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Watson, 2006 ME 80, ¶ 31, 900 A.2d 702, 713. [¶ 16] Waiver, or the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, may be shown by the totality of the circumstances. Tuplin, ¶¶ 14, 15, 901 A.2d at 796 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is possible to infer waiver from a defendant's conduct. Id. ¶ 15, 901 A.2d at 796. For example, we have concluded that the totality of the circumstances were sufficient to imply intentional waiver of the right to testify when a defendant willfully absconded on the last day of trial and consequently missed his opportunity to testify. State v. Chasse, 2000 ME 90, ¶¶ 9-10, 750 A.2d 586, 589-90. [¶ 17] Just as a defendant who intentionally absconds from trial may relinquish the right to be heard, see id., or a disruptive defendant may waive the right to be present in the courtroom, see State v. Murphy, 2010 ME 140, ¶ 17, 10 A.3d 697, 701-02, a defendant who refuses to testify in a manner that is consistent with the direction of the court may waive the right to testify, see United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1475, 1478 (10th Cir.1989) (stating that a defendant may waive the right to testify by contumacious conduct). The right to testify does not relieve a defendant from compliance with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 & n. 11, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). [¶ 18] Here, Ericson continued to testify to inadmissible evidence after the court instructed him to stop, forcing the court to excuse the jury. The court warned both Ericson and his attorney that Ericson could waive his right to testify through his conduct, but Ericson refused to agree to confine his testimony to matters admissible under the rules of evidence. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court could properly infer that Ericson had intentionally waived his right to testify.