Opinion ID: 1131517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the jury's verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

Text: ¶ 12. In Lewis' fourth, ninth, and tenth assignments of error, [3] he argues that the verdict was contrary to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence presented at trial. ¶ 13. In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, this Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the trial court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 957 (Miss.1997). Only in those cases where the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice will this Court disturb it on appeal. Id. ¶ 14. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court considers all of the evidence in the light most consistent with the verdict, giving the State the benefit of all inferences favorable to the verdict. When the evidence before the jury is such that reasonable jurors could have found the defendant guilty, the verdict is beyond our authority to disturb. Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246, 1255 (Miss.1996). ¶ 15. The State is required to prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 843 (Miss.1991). As can be seen by the statute under which Lewis was charged, the State was required to prove that Lewis (1) was 21 years of age or older, (2) when he transferred or sold, (3) during any twelve consecutive month period, (4) two or more ounces of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine as described in § 41-29-105(s). See Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139(f) (1999). ¶ 16. The record indicates that the two forensic scientists examined the substances from each transaction and determined that each contained cocaine and that the substances combined weight was 7.1 ounces. However, as Lewis points out, the witnesses could not testify as to the total weight of cocaine in each of the substances. Thus, Lewis argues, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he transferred two or more ounces of cocaine or any mixture of cocaine as described in § 41-29-105(s). That section, in pertinent part, states the following: Narcotic drug means any of the following, whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:    (4) Cocaine, coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative or preparation of cocaine, coca leaves, and any salt, compound, isomer, derivative or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, but not including decocainized coca leaves or extractions of coca leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-105(s) (1999). ¶ 17. We find that by the terms of § 41-29-139(f), where cocaine is incorporated into some other substance, the Legislature intended that the weight of the entire mixture be taken as the weight for purposes of criminal liability. Indeed, cocaine is one of the substances listed in § 41-29-105(s). Neither that section nor § 41-29-139(f) requires the State to identify the substance into which the cocaine or other substances listed in § 41-29-105(s) was mixed. ¶ 18. In most states where there is a statute specifically criminalizing the possession of a controlled substance or any mixture containing it, the courts have generally permitted the aggregation of the weights of the controlled substance and the other substance to satisfy the statutory weight requirement. See Lyons v. State, 455 So.2d 295 (Ala.Cr.App.1984) (Defendant was properly charged with trafficking in cocaine, despite the fact that only 80% of the powder he was carrying, or 27.2 grams, was cocaine, and the remaining 20% was some other substance, in view of the fact that the trafficking statute provides that any person who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine, described in section 20-2-25(1), is guilty of trafficking in cocaine). See also Belcher v. State, 161 Ga.App. 442, 288 S.E.2d 299 (1982); Grogg v. State, 417 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind.App.1981); People v. Kidd, 121 Mich.App. 92, 328 N.W.2d 394 (1982); State v. Tyndall, 55 N.C.App. 57, 284 S.E.2d 575 (1981). ¶ 19. Considering the testimony of the forensic scientists that the aggregate weight of the substances was 7.1 ounces, the State provided sufficient evidence to support the statutory weight requirement. ¶ 20. As to the other elements of the crime, the uncontradicted testimony from Maxwell shows the following: 1. Lewis was born on March 10, 1951, making him older than twenty-one years of age; 2. All the transactions at issue occurred within a twelve consecutive month period; 3. Maxwell never engaged in a transaction with Lewis' son without first contacting Lewis; 4. Lewis quoted prices to Maxwell and brought up the fact of an underpayment on one occasion to Maxwell's attention; 5. Each of the transactions occurred within Lewis' home; 6. Each transaction took place when Lewis was standing near Terrance and Maxwell or at least present in the house; and 7. During one transaction, Lewis actually handed the cocaine directly to Maxwell. In Johnson v. State, 642 So.2d 924, 927 (Miss.1994) (citing Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 1340, 1342 (Miss.1990)), we held that one who aids and abets a sale of cocaine is guilty as a principal, regardless of whether he personally profited from the sale. See also Minor v. State, 482 So.2d 1107, 1111-12 (Miss.1986) (quoting Williams v. State, 463 So.2d 1064, 1066 (Miss.1985)) ([S]ubstantial knowing participation in the consummation of a sale or in arranging for the sale is sufficient to support a conviction for sale of a controlled substance pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139 (1972)). ¶ 21. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State the evidence is sufficient proof of substantial knowing participation in the consummation of a sale or in arranging for the sale of cocaine. This is not a case where reasonable jurors could only find Lewis not guilty. Further, we cannot say that the verdict is so contrary to the weight of the evidence in the record that a new trial is warranted. Accordingly, Lewis's fourth, ninth, and tenth assignments of error are without merit.