Opinion ID: 160670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attorney Fees Under 1988(b)

Text: 13 Defendant also challenges the district court's award of attorney fees to Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). Defendant contends that Plaintiff was not the prevailing party in this litigation and therefore is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under 1988(b). We review a district court's decision to award or deny attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion. See Withiam v. Baptist Health Care of Okla., Inc., 98 F.3d 581, 584 (10th Cir. 1996). 'Although the ultimate decision to award fees rests within the district court's discretion, any statutory interpretation or other legal conclusions that provide a basis for the award are reviewable de novo.' Dalal, 182 F.3d at 759-60 (quoting Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1997)). 14 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988, provides in relevant part: In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. Id. at 1988(b). Construing the Act, the Supreme Court has stated that in order to qualify for attorney's fees under 1988, a plaintiff must be a 'prevailing party.' Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992). The Court has given an expansive definition to prevailing party. In short, a plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. Id. at 111-12. In addition, 'plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.' Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). In Phelps, we adopted Justice O'Connor's three-part test to determine whether a prevailing party achieved enough success to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees. Phelps, 120 F.3d at 1131. The 'relevant indicia of success' in such cases are: (1) the difference between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought; (2) the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed; and (3) the public purpose of the litigation. Id. at 1131 (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 15 Applying this analysis to the case at bar, Plaintiff has not achieved sufficient success to entitle her to attorney fees. Plaintiff's litigation has neither altered her legal relationship to Defendant nor modified Defendant's behavior. Plaintiff has not recovered relief, vindicated a legal issue, or served an important public purpose. We have previously held that when a claim of free speech retaliation under 1983 is reversed on the merits, the court must also reverse an award of attorney fees to the plaintiff. See Withiam, 98 F.3d at 584. We do so now.