Opinion ID: 2167084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Law Rape and Attempted Rape

Text: In Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464, 468-69, 157 A.2d 922, 924 (1960), this Court defined the crime of common law rape as the act of a man having unlawful carnal knowledge of a female over the age of ten years by force without the consent and against the will of the victim. In conformance with that definition, we observed that consent to the act at any time prior to penetration deprives the subsequent intercourse of its criminal character. Id. at 469, 157 A.2d at 925. See also Simms v. State, 52 Md.App. 448, 453, 449 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1982); Coward v. State, 10 Md.App. 127, 268 A.2d 508 (1970). Although this Court never had occasion to rule on the matter, it was an accepted part of the common law that there was, within that broad definition of the crime, an unwritten, implicit marital exemptionthat a man could not be convicted of common law rape for having sexual intercourse with his lawful-wedded wife, even if the act was committed by force, without the wife's consent, and against her will. Although there exists an historical basis for it in earlier writings and practice, the exemption, as pointed out in State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981), is commonly attributed to the brief statement by Sir Matthew Hale in his HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN that the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract. 1 SIR MATHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 628 (1st Amer. Ed. 1847). Hale himself gave no further explanation of that statement, but his proposition seems to be that (1) there is implicit in the marriage contract an irrevocable consent of the wife to sexual intercourse with her husband, (2) because such intercourse occurring during the marriage is thus, by law, consented to, it is not unlawful, and (3) because it is not unlawful, it cannot constitute rape. East, citing Hale, iterates that a husband cannot by law be guilty of ravishing his wife, on account of the matrimonial consent which she cannot retract, (EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 446 (1806)). Neither Blackstone nor Hawkins nor Coke expressly mention such a proposition, one way or the other, in their works. [1] It did, however, find its way into American judicial opinions and commentary. [2] Whatever the rationale chosen to support the exemption, generally the commentators accepted the proposition that, at common law, a husband could not be convicted of raping his wife through his own act of sexual intercourse, and, as we have indicated, that view also found recognition in court decisions. [3] See, for example, 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 279 (15th ed.1995); ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 156 (2d ed.1969); CLARK AND MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 11.01 (7th ed.1967); HYMAN GINSBERG AND ISADORE GINSBERG, MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 258 (1940); 65 AM.JUR.2D Rape, § 39 (1972); Frazier v. State, 48 Tex.Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (App. 1905); State v. Haines, 25 So. 372 (La.1899); State v. Huffman, 141 W.Va. 55, 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955); State v. Dowell, 106 N.C. 722, 11 S.E. 525 (1890). It was not uncommon, moreover, for early statutes codifying the crime of rape to include the marital exemption and to define the crime in terms of a man having unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman not his wife. See, for example, West's Ann. Cal. Pen.Code § 261 (1913); Burns' Stats. Ann. (Ind.) § 10-4201 (1956); M.S.A. (Minn.) § 617.01 (1965); Vernon's Ann. P.C. (Tex.) art. 1183 (1963). Presumably because of that recognition, we could find no appellate decisions reporting the successful prosecution of a husband for raping his wife. Until 1976, rape was entirely a common law crime in Maryland. The penalty for it was provided by statuteranging from 18 months to life imprisonmentbut not the definition of the crime. Nonetheless, the General Assembly accepted the general belief that a marital exemption did exist. We may infer that, in part, from the fact that, when, in 1898, it created the statutory crime of carnal knowledge of a female between 14 and 16 years of agei.e., of an age at which it was then lawful, under certain circumstances, for a woman to marrythe Legislature made it unlawful for a person to carnally know any female not his wife, between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years. (Emphasis added.) 1898 Md. Laws, ch. 218; Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.) § 464 of Article 27. Note, by comparison, former § 462 of Article 27, prohibiting carnal knowledge of a child under 14, for which there was no such exemption. More direct and substantial evidence of the Legislature's view appears in the history of legislation enacted in 1976 and 1989, which we shall shortly discuss in detail. By Maryland common law, the attempt to commit a crime is, itself, a separate crimea misdemeanor. [4] As we pointed out in Cox v. State, 311 Md. 326, 330-31, 534 A.2d 1333, 1335 (1988), attempt is an adjunct crime, it cannot exist by itself, but only in connection with another crime, and it thus expands and contracts and is redefined commensurately with the substantive offense. See also Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 482 A.2d 474 (1984). Subject to some exceptions, common law attempt has been held applicable to common law crimes and to a number of statutory offenses. Bruce v. State, 317 Md. 642, 645, 566 A.2d 103, 104 (1989). There are, however, at least two categories of substantive crimes, to which criminal attempt has been held inapplicable. The first consists of crimes that do not require at least a general criminal intent. Cox v. State, supra, 311 Md. at 331, 534 A.2d at 1335: There is an exception, however, to the general rule that attempt applies to all offenses. Crimes that do not involve intent to do a criminal act generally fall outside the scope of the crime of attempt. If there is no intent to do a wrongful act, then usually there is no crime of attempt. The second category consists of substantive crimes that are, themselves, in the nature of attempts. Simple assault is often cited as an example. Although we need not decide the matter here, there may be other crimes as well that may not be suitable for serving as the basis of a criminal attempt. Rape, however, is not a crime that would fall into any of those categories. Attempted rape was clearly a common law crime. Mitchell v. State, 82 Md. 527, 34 A. 246 (1896); Walker v. State, 53 Md.App. 171, 452 A.2d 1234 (1982); Gray v. State, 43 Md. App. 238, 403 A.2d 853 (1979). A person is guilty of a criminal attempt when with intent to commit a crime, he [or she] engages in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime, whether or not his [or her] intention is accomplished. Townes v. State, supra, 314 Md. at 75, 548 A.2d at 834; Grill v. State, 337 Md. 91, 94, 651 A.2d 856, 857 (1995); Cox v. State, supra, 311 Md. 326, 534 A.2d 1333; Gray v. State, 43 Md.App. 238, 403 A.2d 853 (1979). The act in furtherance of the intent must go beyond mere preparation. Cox v. State, supra, 311 Md. at 330, 534 A.2d at 1335. Although we expressly declined to decide the issue in Grill v. State, supra, 337 Md. 91, 651 A.2d 856, and need not do so in this case, we did note in Grill the widely held view that a person could not lawfully be convicted of attempting to commit a crime if, under the circumstances, it would have been legally impossible for him to be convicted of the substantive crime had his intended acts been completed. Id. at 95, 651 A.2d at 857-58. We described the defense of legal impossibility as articulated in United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188 (3d Cir.1973): Legal impossibility is said to occur where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus, legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform a physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. See also Waters v. State, 2 Md.App. 216, 226, 234 A.2d 147, 154 (1967), where the Court of Special Appeals stated, in dicta, that [l]egal impossibility to commit the intended crime may be a valid defense and where the impossibility arises by operation of law the accused cannot be convicted of an attempt and that, as a result, at common law a boy under 14 years of age cannot commit the crime of rape and thus cannot be convicted of attempted rape. See also In re Appeal No. 568 September Term 1974, 25 Md.App. 218, 333 A.2d 649 (1975). Under that view, if the proposition were accepted that a man could not lawfully have been convicted of raping his wife, by virtue of his own completed act of sexual intercourse with her, it would also have been the case that he could not lawfully have been convicted of attempting to rape her by virtue of attempting to have sexual intercourse with her. Whether that was, in fact, the common law in Maryland prior to 1976 is an open question.