Opinion ID: 1716842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: in the matter of the amendment of gcr 1963, 785.7

Text: On order of the Court, the need for immediate action having been found, the notice requirements of GCR 1963, 933 were dispensed with, and the following amendment of GCR 1963, 785 (by which subrule .7 is entirely superseded and replaced) was adopted by the Supreme Court on November 7, 1975, to be effective December 7, 1975. RULE 785. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. .1-.6 (Unchanged.) .7 Pleas of Guilty and Nolo Contendere. A defendant may plead guilty or nolo contendere only with the court's consent. Prior to accepting the plea, the court shall personally carry out subrules 785.7(1)-(4). (1) An Understanding Plea. Speaking directly to the defendant, the court shall tell him: (a) the name of the offense to which he is pleading; the court is not obliged to explain the elements of the offense, or possible defenses; (b) the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense; (c) if he has been previously convicted of a felony, he may be charged as a habitual offender and the maximum possible sentence may be increased; (d) the mandatory minimum prison sentence, if any, for the offense; (e) if he is on probation or parole, he may be sentenced for violating probation or parole; (f) if the plea is to murder, armed robbery or treason, he cannot be placed on probation; (g) if his plea is accepted, he will not have a trial of any kind, so he gives up the rights he would have at a trial, including the right (i) to a trial by a jury; (ii) to trial by the court if he does not want trial by a jury; (iii) to be presumed innocent until proved guilty; (iv) to have the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty; (v) to have the witnesses against him appear at the trial; (vi) to question the witnesses against him; (vii) to have the court order any witnesses he has for his defense to appear at the trial; (viii) to remain silent during the trial; (ix) to not have his silence used against him; and (x) to testify at the trial if he wants to testify. (2) A Voluntary Plea. (a) The court shall ask the prosecutor and the defendant's lawyer whether they have made a plea agreement. (b) If there is such a plea agreement, the court shall ask the prosecutor or the defendant's lawyer, what the terms of the agreement are and shall confirm the terms of the agreement with the other lawyer and the defendant. (c) The court shall ask the defendant: (i) (if there is no plea agreement) whether anyone has promised him anything, or (if there is a plea agreement) whether anyone has promised him anything beyond what is in the plea agreement; (ii) whether anyone has threatened him; and (iii) whether it is his own choice to plead guilty. (3) An Accurate Plea. (a) If the defendant pleads guilty, the court, by questioning him, shall establish support for a finding that he is guilty of the offense charged or the offense to which he is pleading. (b) If the defendant pleads nolo contendere, the court shall not question him about his participation in the crime. The court shall: (i) state why a plea of nolo contendere is appropriate; and (ii) conduct a hearing, unless there has been one, that establishes support for a finding that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged or the offense to which he is pleading. (4) Additional Inquiries and Statements by the Court. Upon completing the colloquy with the defendant, the court shall, (a) ask the prosecutor and the defendant's lawyer whether the court has complied with subrules 785.7(1)-(3). If it appears to the court that it has failed to comply, the court shall do so. (b) state whether the court has agreed upon the possibility of a plea or the possible sentence with the prosecutor or the defendant or anyone acting in the interests of either, and, if so, that to which the court has agreed. (5) Acceptance of Plea. The court shall not accept the plea unless it is convinced that the plea is understanding, voluntary and accurate. (6) Setting Aside the Plea. The court may take the plea under advisement. (a) Until the court accepts the plea on the record, the defendant may withdraw it as a matter of right. (b) After the court accepts the plea: (i) the court may set it aside on defendant's motion; or (ii) the court may sua sponte set it aside, but only with defendant's consent. .8-.13 (Unchanged.) L.B. LINDEMER, J. (concurring and dissenting). I concur in the memorandum opinion except in the following particulars: In Neal, this Court was provided with the transcripts of two pleas of guilty by the same defendant before the same judge on the same day. In the first plea, all of the factual elements were elicited from the defendant including the asportation of money. In the second plea, the transcript demonstrates:  Defendant Neal: I walked into the Sax Discount Drug Store. I waited until everyone left the store. I told the lady behind the counter, don't make no false moves, put all of the money in the paper bag. Then, I ran out of the store.  The Court: This is the same kind of a situation as the other one but in a different store?  Defendant Neal: Yes. In the brief of defendant-appellant, it is stated: The plea in the instant matter immediately followed the entry of a plea in Wayne County Circuit Court No. 73-58366-FR   . Defendant's brief, in commenting upon the transposition from one record to another, recites: [W]hile one may attempt by common sense to assume the existence of that which is missing from the record, Rule 785.7(3), (5) prohibits such an assumption. With Shekoski gone, let it no longer be said that on the facts of this case 785.7 prohibits an assumption of common sense. In this case, neither the defendant, the court nor the prosecution were misled, deceived or prejudiced in any conceivable way. The factual basis was effectively determined. I would affirm. Courtney is an attempt at sentence bargaining premised upon a plea to a nonexistent offense. Uttering and publishing of a forged instrument has been a completed crime upon proof of the attempt since the earliest days of Michigan case law. See People v Brigham, 2 Mich 550 (1853). To define a crime in terms of an attempt to attempt is contrary to reason and impossible in logic. The plea in Courtney should be vacated. It is also necessary to dissent to the finding in Pleasants. We have maintained in the memorandum opinion that Shekoski no longer applies to Rule 785.7. Subsection 3 of that rule is entitled, Determining Factual Basis for Plea. In subsection (d) thereunder, reference to the plea of nolo contendere indicates that the judge must establish substantial support for a finding that the defendant is in fact guilty of the charged offense. Subsequently, it requires that the judge shall state reasons for believing that the interests of the defendant and the proper administration of justice do not require interrogation of the defendant regarding his participation in the crime. The drafters of the rule placed emphasis on the determination of the factual basis. The record disclosed that defendant and his two attorneys (one on each of two separate charges) were present in the courtroom during the plea taking of a codefendant. We have seen few transcripts in which the plea taking was as painstaking and thorough as this. The plea of nolo contendere was made to a charge on which trial actually had been started and the prosecution's case finished. The trial court recited its conclusion that sufficient interests of the defendant and the proper administration of justice existed to support the acceptance of the plea. The record as a whole must be considered. It furnishes a sufficient basis to constitute compliance with this requirement which does not, after all, go to a matter of constitutional rights. Finally I concur with the Court's treatment of McMiller regretting only, in my judgment, it does not go far enough. Rather than leave the remains of McMiller writhing in agony, I would prefer it be given a merciful coup de grace.