Opinion ID: 2086297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dorsey v. State

Text: The Circuit Court for Cecil County in March 1994 ordered the petitioner, Paul Alva Dorsey, to pay child support in the amount of $63.00 per week. A new order was entered by the circuit court in August 1995, providing that Dorsey must pay child support of $66.00 per week beginning August 21, 1995. In late July 1997, a petition was filed in the Circuit Court for Cecil County entitled Petition For Civil/Criminal Contempt and captioned State of Maryland Or Katrina Lee Dorsey, Plaintiff vs. Paul Dorsey, Defendant. The petition had both a civil number and a different criminal number. Paragraph one of the petition stated that the Cecil County Child Support Enforcement records indicate that Paul Dorsey has not complied with the support order and/or decree, a copy of which is annexed hereto and made a part hereof in the above captioned case, and is in arrears in the amount of $6,609.34 as of 7/28/97. [1] Paragraph two of the petition consisted of two subparagraphs as follows: (2) [] (Criminal) A. It is alleged herein that the aforesaid DEFENDANT has intentionally, unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully and in bad faith, with the intent to frustrate the aforesaid Court Order and/or Decree and to defraud and to deprive the party or parties entitled to support under said order and/or decree by unlawfully failing to pay the aforesaid arrearages during the aforesaid period. [ ] (Civil) B. It is alleged herein that the aforesaid DEFENDANT has intentionally and unlawfully failed to pay the aforesaid arrearages during the aforesaid period. Neither box was checked or otherwise marked. Paragraph three of the petition stated: (3) The maximum penalty to be imposed in this cause shall not exceed 179 days or_______. Nothing was written into paragraph three's blank space. The petition went on, inter alia, to advise the defendant of the right to counsel and the right, if indigent, to be represented by the Public Defender's Office. The petition was signed by Sharon Black, CSE Agent and E. D.E. Rollins, Jr., Judge. [2] Paul Dorsey appeared before the circuit court on July 29, 1997, without an attorney. He stated that he wanted to be represented by an attorney, and the court postponed the case until August 20, 1997. When the case was called for trial on August 20, 1997, the assistant public defender representing Dorsey initially asked if the action was a criminal prosecution or if it was a civil case. The following colloquy occurred: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, before we take any testimony, are we here for criminal or civil contempt? THE COURT: Both. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We are here for both? THE COURT: They are all charged both now. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When did that start? THE COURT: A while ago. I don't know, six months ago. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Because apparently THE COURT: What do you have? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I have a form that doesn't indicate either one, first of all.    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Today we are here for both? THE COURT: Let me back up. We are here on civil contempt, which can be converted to criminal contempt. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand that. My client needs to know what he is facing. THE COURT: He is facing 179 days, and we could convert this to criminal. The only witness for the plaintiff/prosecution was Sharon Black of the Cecil County Bureau of Child Support Enforcement. Her entire direct testimony at the civil phase of the trial was as follows: THE COURT: What's the order, Ms. Black? MS. BLACK: The order is for $66 a week. The arrears are $6807.34. The last date of payment was March 26th of `96, and it was for $1,837.66. THE COURT: Was that MS. BLACK: It came from another state, so I imagine it was probably income tax [refund] money. THE COURT: Any questions you have of Ms. Black? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. Upon cross-examination, Sharon Black stated that the defendant was working at the Food Bank of Delaware in August 1995, that there was a wage attachment for support for $82.50, $66 current and $16.50 on the arrears in September 1995, and that he stopped working for the Food Bank on January 30, 1996, and that she had no information as to why he stopped working then. She also testified that she had no information about any employment since that time, and that she did not know whether he is capable of working or not capable of working. The defendant Dorsey testified that he was not then employed, that he had been incarcerated at the Cecil County Detention Center since June 10, 1997, and that he was not eligible for work release because there were criminal charges pending against him. Dorsey testified that his last full time employment was for two months of last year for the Allen Trucking Company in Virginia, that he cleaned out trailers for the company, and that this employment ceased when the company folded. Dorsey further testified, and Sharon Black confirmed, that his last support payment was in February 1996 when payment of $165.00 through a wage attachment was made, that he was then working as a driver for the Blood Bank of Delaware, and that this employment in Delaware terminated when his driver's license was suspended. He stated that his only other employment over the past year was that he worked at Wendy's for a couple of weeks. Dorsey further testified that, during the remainder of the time period between the initial support order and the August 20, 1997, trial, he was either incarcerated in Delaware or Maryland or, when not incarcerated, he was unable to find work. After the above-summarized testimony, the following colloquy occurred: THE COURT: What kind of support did you have to pay at Wendy's? THE DEFENDANT: None. I had to take care of my five kids. Not that much money at Wendy's. THE COURT: What about the kid you have here? THE DEFENDANT: I understand, sir. THE COURT: What did you do from August of `96 until June of `97? That's 10 months. THE DEFENDANT: Nothing basically. THE COURT: Nothing? THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: What kind of money do you have on you? THE DEFENDANT: I have none. THE COURT: I am going to convert this. I think there is probable cause to believe, especially for 10 months doing nothing, I am going to convert this to a criminal case. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, before you do that, have theyhas it been proven he has a present ability to pay today? That's what civil contempt is about? THE COURT: I am going to dismiss the civil contempt and convert it to a criminal case. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When are we trying that? THE COURT: I will try it today on a 179 day hold. Dorsey's attorney then raised a question about the adequacy of notice when we are doing these things and about Dorsey's entitlement to a jury trial. The trial judge ruled that Dorsey was not entitled to a jury trial because I will limit [the sentence] to 179 days. The judge also indicated that he would grant a postponement, although Dorsey would have to remain in jail unless he could post bail. When defense counsel raised a question about the absence of a prosecutor, the judge stated that he would go ahead and let it proceed without a prosecutor. In response to the defense attorney's inquiry about a purge amount, the trial judge stated: You handle the purge by doing a motion for reduction of sentence, at which point the court can grant or not grant, or the court can do its own motion on that. You can argue for a purge. There is even a provision, I can dismiss charges prior to trial if so much is paid. Dorsey himself then decided against a postponement. Immediately thereafter, the court advised Dorsey of his right to counsel, stated again that Dorsey had no right to a jury trial, informed him that the maximum sentence would be 179 days, informed him of his right to testify ... after the state presents its evidence or not testify, advised him that, if he decided to testify, he would be subject to cross-examination by the judge, and told him that his failure to testify would not be used against him. Following the court's advice to Dorsey, Sharon Black was again called as a witness. She stated that the support order was for current support of $66.00 per week plus $16.50 per week for arrears, that the arrears at this time are $6807.34, that the last date of payment was March 26th of `96, and [the] payment was $1837.66, and that there was a payment of $165.00 in February 1996 from a wage attachment. Sharon Black also testified that her records indicated that Dorsey worked for a trucking company in February and March 1996. In response to a question by the court, Sharon Black stated that her records contained no evidence that he was disabled or unable to work. Upon cross-examination, Sharon Black stated that the agency's records contained no information concerning Dorsey between March 1996 and his appearance in court pursuant to a bench warrant in July 1997. She said that mail sent to the addresses listed for Dorsey was returned by the Post Office. Other than the records indicating no support payments after March 1996 and Dorsey's alleged failure to inform the agency of a change of address, Sharon Black said that she had no knowledge as to whether his failure to pay child support was willful on his part. Finally, she testified that she did not know whether the agency took any steps, beyond sending letters that were returned, to locate Dorsey or to determine why no child support had been paid between March 1996 and July 1997. At the conclusion of Sharon Black's testimony, defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show that Dorsey willfully refused to pay child support or that he had the ability to pay child support. The court denied the motion, stating that [a]ll they have to prove [is that] he failed to pay his child support. The court further stated that I can assume he was able to pay child support. In response to defense counsel's further argument that there was no evidence of willfulness or criminal intent, and that the defendant need not establish a lack of willfulness or an inability to pay, the court reiterated: All the state has to show to get a prima facie case [is that] he was supposed to pay support, he didn't pay support, and they are not aware of any reason why he didn't pay support. Dorsey elected not to testify, and defense counsel again moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show either willfulness or that Dorsey had the ability to pay. The court then found that, for the tenmonth period between August 1996 and Dorsey's incarceration in June 1997, there was sufficient evidence of Dorsey's willful refusal to pay child support. The court based this finding upon the lack of any support payments during this period, the lack of employment information in the agency's records for the period, and Dorsey's apparent failure to notify the agency of a change of address. The court found Dorsey guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to 179 days in the Cecil County Detention Center, live-in/work-out, with credit for the time he was incarcerated from July 29, 1997. The court continued: Note for the record, the docket entries, the Court, on its own motion makes a motion for reduction of sentence and will reduce the sentence to zero or release him from imprisonment upon payment of $2300. So that in effect is the criminal purge amount. So you don't have to file for reduction of sentence, it's on the record. Dorsey noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to any proceeding in the intermediate appellate court, Dorsey filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted. Dorsey v. State, 348 Md. 334, 703 A.2d 1265 (1998). The questions presented by Dorsey are whether he was entitled to a jury trial, whether the charging document violated the requirements of due process and the Maryland Rules of Procedure, whether the court erred by `converting' the case from civil to criminal contempt in the middle of the hearing, whether the court, by assum[ing] that Dorsey had the ability to pay, improperly placed the burden on Dorsey to prove an inability to pay child support during the pertinent ten-month period, and whether the court's findings of willfulness and ability to pay during the pertinent period were clearly erroneous in light of the evidence.