Opinion ID: 1310401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State v. Goodman

Text: In Goodman, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder by premeditation and deliberation and by the felony-murder rule. He was also found guilty of armed robbery and kidnapping. At the sentencing stage, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt these statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) Defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. G.S. 15A-2000(e)(3). (2) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. G.S. 15A-2000(e)(4). (3) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of or attempt to commit a robbery or kidnapping. G.S. 15A-2000(e)(5). (4) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of the enforcement of laws (arrest of defendant for the robbery or kidnapping offenses). (5) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. G.S. 15A-2000(e)(9). With respect to mitigating factors, the jury did not find: (1) The defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor. G.S. 15A-2000(f)(4). (2) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was impaired. G.S. 15A-2000(f)(6). The jury did deem: (3) Other circumstances arising from the evidence had mitigating value. G.S. 15A-2000(f)(9). The jury then found beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances and that the latter were sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty.
As I read it, the majority opinion in Goodman presents one narrow holding: A new sentencing hearing must be granted when the trial court improperly submits an aggravating circumstance to the jury in a sentencing hearing conducted pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000, and the jury finds that circumstance present to the prejudice of the defendant. Specifically, the majority holds that, under the facts of this case, the aggravating circumstances contemplated by G.S. 15A-2000(e)(7) and (e)(4) should not both be submitted to the jury. I would simply add that I can think of few situations in which the jury would not find, pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000(e)(7), that the capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws if that circumstance were submitted to them. In order to prevent an automatic accumulation of aggravating circumstances, which our legislature obviously did not intend. I should think that trial judges would rarely submit this circumstance to the jury. As I understand it, the majority today also attempts to establish the following guidelines: (1) Based on the facts of the particular case, prejudicial error in submitting an aggravating circumstance to the jury occurs when (a) the submission is erroneous, (b) the jury finds that circumstance to exist, and (c) there is a reasonable possibility the erroneously submitted circumstance might have contributed to the decision. (2) The aggravating circumstance provided by G.S. 15A-2000(e)(3), which provides for aggravation where defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving. . . violence to the person contemplates that (a) defendant shall have been convicted, not merely charged or indicted, of a felony as a result of conduct occurring prior to the events out of which the capital felony charge arose and (b) the felony for which defendant was convicted involved the use or threat of violence to the person, i. e., conviction for crime against property may not be submitted under this subsection. (3) The aggravating circumstance contemplated by G.S. 15A-2000(e)(5), which provides that the capital felony was committed. . . in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, . . . any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing. . . of a destructive device or bomb, may be appropriately submitted to the jury only when the defendant is convicted of first degree murder upon the theory of premeditation and deliberation. Put another way, if the defendant is convicted only on the basis of the felony-murder rule, this circumstance may not be submitted to the jury as an aggravating circumstance. (4) In order to avoid the aggravating circumstance contemplated by G.S. 15A-2000(e)(9), which provides for a crime especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, from becoming a catchall division which could always be employed in cases where there is no evidence of other aggravating circumstances, the trial judge must explain that the expression heinous, atrocious, or cruel anticipates an especially brutal murder where the brutality exceeds that normally present in any killing. Such brutality shall be limited to acts done to the victim during the commission of the capital felony itself. Here, the majority expressly approved the instructions of the trial judge with respect to this aggravating circumstance and quoted the Florida court's definition as the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla., 1973). See also Proffitt v. Florida, supra 428 U.S. at 255-56, 96 S.Ct. 2960. (5) The aggravating circumstance provided by G.S. 15A-2000(e)(4), a capital felony committed to avoid a lawful arrest, contemplates more than merely killing the victim. Before this aggravating circumstance may be submitted to the jury, the evidence must establish that at least one of the motivating factors leading to the killing was defendant's desire to avoid apprehension for his crime. Put another way, the mere fact of the victim's death will not alone invoke this factor. There must be some evidence of a manifest intent to avoid arrest and detection. (6) The legislature did not intend, in providing the mitigating circumstance contemplated by G.S. 15A-2000(f)(6), where defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired, that intoxication, however slight, should be a mitigating circumstance. When the defendant contends that his faculties are impaired by intoxication, the intoxication must be to such a degree that it affects defendant's ability to understand and control his actions. (7) Under G.S. 15A-2000(f)(9), which provides for [a]ny other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value, there can be no restriction on the jury's consideration of any factor relevant to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the defendant. However, in instructing the jury, the trial judge is not required to sift through the evidence and search out every possible circumstance which the jury might find to have mitigating value. State v. Goodman, supra 298 N.C. 1 at 34, 257 S.E.2d 569, 590 (1979). (8) The trial court should not instruct the jury that the jury might recommend a sentence of life imprisonment even though it finds aggravating circumstances to outweigh those in mitigation. To allow such discretion would be a return to the unfettered days prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). (9) The review function given to this Court by G.S. 15A-2000(d)(2) is to be employed only in those cases where both phases of the trial of a defendant have been found to be without error. While the majority has addressed the guidelines enumerated above, we are remanding for a new sentencing hearing here because of one error by the trial judge with respect to the submission of one of the aggravating circumstances found present by the jury. The Court found that error was not harmless. With this portion of the Court's holding, I do not fully agree. Practically, I consider the error a harmless one. The jury found four other aggravating circumstances present including a finding that this capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. It found only one mitigating circumstance. I would ordinarily in a situation like this probably find that the assigned error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in these first cases interpreting our death statutes and in more than an abundance of caution, I join the majority on the basis of the facts presented by this case.