Opinion ID: 2620886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: EPCRA's citizen-suit provision states, in relevant part:

Text: [A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against . . . [a]n owner or operator of a facility for failure to do any of the following: . . . Complete and submit an inventory form under section 11022(a) of this title . . . [or] [c]omplete and submit a toxic chemical release form under section 11023(a) of this title. 42 U. S. C. §§ 11046(a)(1)(A)(iii)(iv). Unfortunately, this language is ambiguous. It could mean, as the Sixth Circuit has held, that a citizen only has the right to sue for a failure . . . to complete and submit the required forms. Under this reading, once the owner or operator has filed the forms, the district court no longer has jurisdiction. Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. United Musical, 61 F. 3d 473, 475 (1995). Alternatively, it could be, as the Seventh Circuit held, that the phrases under section 11022(a) and under section 11023(a) incorporate the requirements of those sections, including the requirement that the reports be filed by particular dates. 90 F. 3d 1237, 1243 (1996). Although the language of the citizen-suit provision is ambiguous, other sections of EPCRA indicate that Congress did not intend to confer jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations. First, EPCRA requires the private litigant to give the alleged violator notice at least 60 days before bringing suit. 42 U. S. C. § 11046(d)(1). [28] In Gwaltney, we considered the import of a substantially identical notice requirement, and concluded that it indicated a congressional intent to allow suit only for ongoing and future violations: [T]he purpose of notice to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit. If we assume, as respondents urge, that citizen suits may target wholly past violations, the requirement of notice to the alleged violator becomes gratuitous. Indeed, respondents, in propounding their interpretation of the Act, can think of no reason for Congress to require such notice other than that `it seemed right' to inform an alleged violator that it was about to be sued. Brief for Respondents 14. 484 U. S., at 60. Second, EPCRA places a ban on citizen suits once EPA has commenced an enforcement action. 42 U. S C. § 11046(e). [29] In Gwaltney, we considered a similar provision and concluded that it indicated a congressional intent to prohibit citizen suits for wholly past violations: The bar on citizen suits when governmental enforcement action is under way suggests that the citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than supplant governmental action. . .. Permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act could undermine the supplementary role envisioned for the citizen suit. This danger is best illustrated by an example. Suppose that the Administrator identified a violator of the Act and issued a compliance order . . . . Suppose further that the Administrator agreed not to assess or otherwise seek civil penalties on the condition that the violator take some extreme corrective action, such as to install particularly effective but expensive machinery, that it otherwise would not be obliged to take. If citizens could file suit, months or years later, in order to seek the civil penalties that the Administrator chose to forgo, then the Administrator's discretion to enforce the Act in the public interest would be curtailed considerably. The same might be said of the discretion of state enforcement authorities. Respondents' interpretation of the scope of the citizen suit would change the nature of the citizens' role from interstitial to potentially intrusive. 484 U. S., at 60-61. Finally, even if these two provisions did not resolve the issue, our settled policy of adopting acceptable constructions of statutory provisions in order to avoid the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questionshere, the unresolved standing questionstrongly supports a construction of the statute that does not authorize suits for wholly past violations. As we stated in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988): This cardinal principle has its roots in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804), and has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate. See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500-501 (1979); Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749-750 (1961); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22,62 (1932); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 577 (1929); Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 390 (1924); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407-408 (1909); Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448-449 (1830) (opinion of Story, J.).