Opinion ID: 1960127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Division of Marital Property

Text: The disposition of marital property is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Axtell v. Axtell, 482 A.2d 1261, 1263 (Me.1984). Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, we will overturn the trial court's decision only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument. Anderson v. Anderson, 591 A.2d 872, 874 (Me.1991) (citation omitted). The trial court awarded $185,606 in marital equity to Richard and $141,163 in marital equity to Lauris. The court also ordered Richard to make a $55,000 payment to Lauris because (1) he was awarded $44,443 more in marital property than Lauris, (2) during the couple's separation, he wrote $6,625 in checks to his girlfriend and $5,679 in checks to cash, (3) the Elm Street properties (the money makers) were awarded to him, (4) Lauris was currently unemployed, and (5) Richard earned an annual salary of $35,000. Richard first points out that as a result of the $55,000 payment, he was awarded $130,606 and Lauris was awarded $196,163. He therefore received about forty percent of the total marital equity, while Lauris received sixty percent. Although he acknowledges that the division of marital property need not be equal, it must be just. See Deditch v. Deditch, 584 A.2d 649, 652 (Me.1990). He contends that this distribution was not just because of the work he put into the various properties. Richard also argues that because the court made errors in its calculations, one of its premises for the cash award (the $44,443 difference in the parties' marital awards) was false. [4] Putting aside the court's errors, it does not appear that the court abused its discretion in making the cash award. Pursuant to 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A(1), the court must divide the marital property between the parties as it deems just. Grishman v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9, 11 (Me.1979). In making this division, the court may consider a wide range of pertinent factors. Id. at 12. Although the idea of an equal allocation may certainly be entertained by a divorce court, it carries no presumptive weight either in its favor or against it. Robinson v. Robinson, 554 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Me.1989). Moreover, we have upheld unequal divisions in the past. See, e.g., Bryant v. Bryant, 411 A.2d 391, 393 (Me.1980); Zillert v. Zillert, 395 A.2d 1152, 1155-1156 (Me.1978). Since 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A(1)(C) instructs the court to consider the economic circumstances of each spouse in dividing the marital property, and given Lauris's unemployment and earning potential, it does not appear the court abused its discretion. If, however, the trial court's errors would have affected the amount of the cash award, then the court could, in the exercise of its discretion, adjust the amount on remand. See Macdonald, 532 A.2d at 1050 (in remanding divorce judgment, we expect that the trial court will remain within the bounds of its discretion ... and will make any necessary changes in the division of marital property in accordance with the requirements of 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A(1) (1981)). Contrary to Richard's contention, the court is not required to do so. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court with directions to remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. WATHEN, C.J., ROBERTS, GLASSMAN and RUDMAN, JJ., and COLLINS, A.R.J., concurring.