Opinion ID: 1973387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits: The Appeal

Text: The defendants ostensibly raise nine issues for our review on appeal, but some of these have as many as eleven sub-issues. We examine these arguments in turn, to the extent necessary.
The defendants contend the district court erred when it granted a retrial of all the issues in the case. The defendants posit McElroy I only required retrial of McElroy's employment discrimination claim because the erroneous jury instruction involved solely that claim. They argue employment discrimination is distinct from retaliation and education discrimination. The parties agree our review is for errors at law. The general rule is that when a new trial is granted, all issues must be retried. See, e.g., Hawkeye Bank v. State, 515 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Iowa 1994); Sauer v. Scott, 176 N.W.2d 140, 147 (Iowa 1970); Larimer v. Platte, 243 Iowa 1167, 1175-76, 53 N.W.2d 262, 267 (1952); Woodward v. Horst, 10 Iowa 120, 123 (1859); see also 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 947 (1993). [T]he granting of partial new trials is a practice not to be commended. . . . . As a condition to the granting of a partial new trial, it should appear that the issue to be tried is distinct and separable from the other issues, and that the new trial can be had without danger of complications with other matters. . . . Nor may [only] certain issues be retried unless it appears that the other issues have been rightly settled and injustice will not be occasioned. Larimer, 243 Iowa at 1176-77, 53 N.W.2d at 267-68 (citations and internal quotations omitted); accord Woodward, 10 Iowa at 123 (holding partial retrial warranted if convenient, nonprejudicial, and not attended with too much confusion). On occasion we have limited retrial to certain issues, but when we have done so we have said so. See, e.g., Dailey v. Holiday Distrib. Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 877, 151 N.W.2d 477, 489 (1967); McCarville v. Ream, 247 Iowa 1, 10-14, 72 N.W.2d 476, 481-83 (1955); Woodward, 10 Iowa at 124. We did not limit the scope of the retrial in McElroy I. The record before us shows McElroy requested retrial of all claims in that appeal. Finding reversible error with respect to one of those claims, we ordered a new trial. McElroy I, 637 N.W.2d at 502. We did so without qualification. Id.
In the district court, the defendants objected to the trial of McElroy's retaliation claims because she had not exhausted her administrative remedies. Specifically, the defendants claimed McElroy had only notified the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) about her federal and state sex discrimination claims, not her retaliation claims. We consider the federal and state claims separately.
Title VII explicitly prohibits both sex discrimination and retaliation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. However, Title VII establishes an administrative procedure which a complaining employee must follow. . . . Exhaustion of administrative remedies is central to Title VII's statutory scheme because it provides the [administrative agency] the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to perform its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts. Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). Exhaustion of administrative remedies under Title VII requires a claimant to give notice of all claims in the initial administrative complaint. Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 630-31 (8th Cir.2000). McElroy filed her complaint with the ICRC on March 14, 1997. (The same complaint was cross-filed with the EEOC). She used the standard form, which requires complainants to identify the bases of their harassment claims by checking the applicable boxes. McElroy checked the box labeled sex but not the retaliation box. [1] When the ICRC asked McElroy to state in narrative fashion why she felt she was discriminated against, McElroy described Glass's continuing harassment. Although she indicated the defendants were not adequately addressing this ongoing harassment, she did not describe any acts of retaliation. Indeed, the reviewing officer specifically noted that the only issue is whether [the defendants] took reasonable measures to stop the harassment and keep [McElroy] from working in a hostile environment. Because McElroy did not allege retaliation, she therefore failed to exhaust her Title VII remedies with respect to alleged retaliation-in-employment. See Williams, 21 F.3d at 222-23 (arriving at similar conclusion on analogous facts; holding plaintiff not entitled to pursue sexual discrimination claim because she did not check sex box and confined her narrative discussion to retaliation). It is true the administrative complaint must be construed liberally to further the remedial purpose of the civil rights laws. Nichols v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 886-87 (8th Cir.1998). For this reason, in spite of the foregoing discussion [a] plaintiff will be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies as to allegations contained in a judicial complaint that are like or reasonably related to the substance of charges timely brought before [the administrative agency]. Williams, 21 F.3d at 222. Allegations that are not so related must be dismissed, however, because allowing a plaintiff to pursue them in court would circumvent the statutory scheme which requires the use of administrative proceedings. See Duncan v. Delta Consol. Indus., Inc., 371 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir.2004). Although at first glance one might think sex discrimination and attendant retaliation are reasonably related, it is well established that retaliation claims are not reasonably related to underlying discrimination claims. Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir.1998); see also Duncan, 371 F.3d at 1025; Russell v. TG Missouri Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 747-48 (8th Cir.2003); Graham v. Bryce Corp., 348 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1042 (E.D.Ark.2004); Nichols v. ABB DE, Inc., 324 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1045 (E.D.Mo.2004); Price v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Operating Co., 117 F.Supp.2d 919, 922 (E.D.Mo.2000); Fry v. Holmes Freight Lines, Inc., 72 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1079 (W.D.Mo.1999). An exception, however, applies when the retaliation alleged in the subsequent lawsuit was clearly the result of the filing of the administrative complaint. See Wallin, 153 F.3d at 689; accord Wentz v. Maryland Cas. Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154 (8th Cir.1989) (retaliation claim could be considered because it grew out of the discrimination charge the plaintiff filed). The timing of the retaliation is crucial in this analysis: if the alleged retaliation began before the filing of the administrative complaint, a subsequent suit for retaliation that was not brought to the attention of the administrative agency is barred. See Wallin, 153 F.3d at 689. At trial, the thrust of McElroy's retaliation claim centered around the fact that after she complained to the ISU Affirmative Action Office, in 1996 she was demoted from a temporary instructor to a graduate assistant. (The former position paid significantly more and did not require McElroy to take classes.) She also alleged her letters-of-intent were delayed. Because McElroy did not file her complaint with the ICRC until March 1997 and did not allege retaliation in it even though the alleged retaliation had begun the year before, the district court should not have allowed a Title VII retaliation claim based on the prior allegations. See Williams, 21 F.3d at 222-23 (arriving at same conclusion on similar facts); see also Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc., 378 F.3d 756, 760 (8th Cir.2004) (finding failure to exhaust administrative remedies where complainant did not check retaliation box and did not allege any facts in complaint to administrative agency to show retaliation); Duncan, 371 F.3d at 1025-26 (similar to Williams and holding same); Watson v. O'Neill, 365 F.3d 609, 614 (8th Cir.2004) (similar); Russell, 340 F.3d at 748 (holding plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to retaliation claim because retaliation began before administrative charge was filed and therefore could not be said to grow out of it); Graham, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1042 (similar); Nichols, 324 F.Supp.2d at 1045; Price, 117 F.Supp.2d at 922; Fry, 72 F.Supp.2d at 1079. [2]
Although the authorities cited in the foregoing analysis only apply to McElroy's Title VII claim, we thinkat least on the arguments presented in this casethat the same analysis should be applied to McElroy's retaliation claim brought under the ICRA. Because the ICRA is in part modeled after Title VII, we have traditionally looked to federal law for guidance in interpreting it. Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Iowa 2003). McElroy has not argued that we should apply a different analysis to the ICRA. Therefore we decline to forge new ground in the absence of briefing. See Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2004) ([I]t is prudent to delay any consideration of whether a different analysis is appropriate to a case in which this issue was thoroughly briefed and explored.); see also Pecenka, 672 N.W.2d at 803 (noting that despite consistent utilization of the federal analytical framework, Iowa courts are not bound by federal law in interpreting the ICRA). [3]
Because the district court erroneously allowed a Title VII retaliation-in-employment claim, we are obliged to reverse and remand for a new trial on all issues. Although the jury also found the defendants had violated Title VII for discrimination-in-employment, the special verdict form did not distinguish damages for retaliation; instead it lumped all damages together. We are unable therefore to divine which damages should be attributed to which acts. [4]
The defendants also argue the district court erred in a number of other respects, including eleven allegedly faulty jury instructions. Because we have already decided a new trial is necessary, we do not reach these other issues. We pause briefly to consider one of the jury instructions because it is likely to arise again on retrial. See McElroy I, 637 N.W.2d at 501-02 (similarly considering evidentiary matters); see also Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 184-85 (Iowa 2004); Greenwood v. Mitchell, 621 N.W.2d 200, 207-08 (Iowa 2001).