Opinion ID: 2537276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Preclude the Death Penalty

Text: After the jury in this case recommended sentences of death in both murders by a vote of eleven to one, Wade filed a motion to preclude the imposition of the death sentences. In his motion and accompanying memorandum, he argued that Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it fails to preclude problems of arbitrariness in capital sentencing and thus does not comply with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). The defendant's argument was based on the Capital Jury Project (CJP) study, a research initiative that attempted to analyze jurors' understanding of their role and the exercise of their discretion in capital sentencing cases through post-sentencing juror interviews. See Capital Jury Project, http://albany.edu/ scj/CJPhome.htm. Wade argued that the fourteen-state study demonstrated, for example, that a large percentage of jurors make premature determinations regarding sentencing during the guilt phase and believe that they are required to recommend death under certain circumstances. The trial court orally denied an evidentiary hearing at which Wade proposed to present testimony regarding the CJP study and denied the motion to preclude imposition of a death sentence. On appeal, Wade uses the CJP study to challenge the constitutionality of the jury selection process in his case. Comparing the results of the CJP study with answers to voir dire questioning in his own case, Wade concludes that the jury selection process resulted in the seating of a panel of pro death-biased jurors after the State was permitted to use peremptory and cause challenges to strike jurors who showed a lack of support for the death penalty. Further, Wade claims he was wrongly forced to use two peremptory challenges to strike jurors who strongly supported the death penalty. Finally, Wade argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to preclude imposition of a death sentence without hearing legal testimony that Florida's use of the same jury in the guilt and penalty phases of trial violates Furman. As explained below, we hold that Wade is entitled to no relief. First, we have previously rejected the contention that potential jurors should not be subject to removal for cause or by peremptory challenge for expressing hesitancy concerning the recommendation of a death sentence. In San Martin v. State, 705 So.2d 1337, 1343 (Fla.1997), we explained as follows: [W]e find no merit to this claim as the Constitution does not prohibit the States from `death qualifying' juries in capital cases. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1764, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). Indeed, any group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a particular case [ ] may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair-cross-section requirement. Id. at 176-77, 106 S.Ct. at 1766-67. As the Supreme Court further noted in Lockhart, not all individuals who oppose the death penalty are subject to removal for cause in capital cases; only those who cannot and will not conscientiously obey the law with respect to one of the issues in a capital case. Id. at 176, 106 S.Ct. at 1766. Moreover, the State may properly exercise its peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors who are opposed to the death penalty, but not subject to challenge for cause. Under Florida law, a party's use of peremptory challenges is limited only by the rule that the challenges may not be used to exclude members of a distinctive group. See State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984) (holding that race-based peremptory challenges violate the defendant's right to an impartial jury); State v. Alen, 616 So.2d 452 (Fla.1993) (same as to ethnicity); Abshire v. State, 642 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1994) (same as to gender). Both parties have the right to peremptorily strike persons thought to be inclined against their interests. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480, 110 S.Ct. 803, 807, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990). Thus, we find no constitutional infirmity in Florida's jury selection process in general. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 180, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986) (stating that jurors may be struck for cause when their opposition to the death penalty would preclude them from impartially following the law). In a related argument, Wade contends that he was wrongly forced to use peremptory challenges to remove two prospective jurors (Ms. Cue and Mr. Meyers) who expressed strong support for the death penalty. This claim, however, is not preserved for review. In order to demonstrate that the use of a peremptory challenge to cure the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause was reversible error, a defendant must exhaust all remaining peremptory challenges and show that an objectionable juror served as a juror. Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 96-97 (Fla. 2004). That is, Wade must prove prejudice by showing that a person actually sat on the jury whom Wade challenged for cause, attempted to strike peremptorily, or otherwise challenged after his peremptory challenges had been exhausted. Id. at 97 (citing Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1990)). First, Wade never sought Ms. Cue's dismissal for cause, and Wade's cause challenge to Mr. Meyers was based on Meyers' availability. Thus, Wade did not seek to disqualify either juror based on voir dire statements regarding the death penalty. Second, although defense counsel struck these two prospective jurors with peremptories and timely requested additional peremptories after exhausting his allotted challenges, counsel failed to identify any juror he would have stricken if the court had granted his request. Accordingly, Wade has neither preserved nor demonstrated reversible error. Further, Wade states that the CJP study shows that many jurors prematurely make a sentencing decision during the guilt phase of trial. As a result, he argues that the Federal Constitution requires that Florida use two separate juries in death penalty casesone to adjudicate guilt and one to recommend a sentence. Although Wade argued in his trial court motion that jurors' premature determination that death is the appropriate penalty is unconstitutional, he did not argueas he does in this appealthat this alleged Furman violation can be remedied through the use of separate guilt- and penalty-phase juries. Further, although on appeal he requests that a new penalty phase be held, he did not request such relief below. Accordingly, this claim is not preserved for review. See Doorbal v. State, 983 So.2d 464, 492 (Fla.2008) (For an issue to be preserved for appeal, it must be presented to the lower court, and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation.). On its merits, the argument collides with United States Supreme Court precedent. Florida adopted a single-jury bifurcated trial scheme in 1972. See ch. 72-72, § 1, Laws of Fla. Since then, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the United States Supreme Court has approved bifurcated guilt and penalty proceedings before a single jury in death penalty cases. In Gregg, the Court stated that the concerns it expressed in Furman are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (plurality opinion). Subsequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the States' interests in using a unitary jury were sufficient to serve as a proper, neutral justification for excluding jurors from the guilt phase who could not impartially serve during the penalty phase. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 182, 106 S.Ct. 1758. Moreover, the Court found that the use of two different juries would be highly inefficient: Finally, it seems obvious to us that in most, if not all, capital cases much of the evidence adduced at the guilt phase of the trial will also have a bearing on the penalty phase; if two different juries were to be required, such testimony would have to be presented twice, once to each jury. As the Arkansas Supreme Court has noted, [s]uch repetitive trials could not be consistently fair to the State and perhaps not even to the accused. Id. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 1758 (quoting Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (1983)).