Opinion ID: 4216301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Obvious Error Review

Text: [¶23] Hall argues that, by allowing the statements that his former girlfriend saw him leave the home with a gun and then saw Hall return home without a gun, after hearing shots fired, the court went beyond what was necessary to address the credibility of the officer’s statements regarding the officer’s understanding of the number of shots fired. Hall asserts that these statements, referencing his leaving the home with a gun and returning without a gun, violated his confrontation clause rights. 13 [¶24] We agree that the former girlfriend’s statements reporting that Hall left the home with a gun and returned without a gun were not relevant to the issue of the number of shots he was believed to have fired. However, Hall failed to preserve the issue. [¶25] At the trial, when the court could have addressed any problem, Hall did not object to the officer’s testimony regarding the former girlfriend’s statements, and he did not object to or suggest any amendment to the limiting instruction given by the court promptly after the officer’s rebuttal testimony. Accordingly, Hall’s arguments about these statements, first presented on appeal, must be considered by applying the obvious error standard of review. M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b); M.R. Evid. 103(e); see also State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 18, 28 A.3d 1147. [¶26] In State v. Fahnley, 2015 ME 82, ¶ 15, 119 A.3d 727, we stated: “For us to vacate a conviction based on the obvious error standard of review, ‘there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If these conditions are met, we will exercise our discretion to notice an unpreserved error only if we also conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 19, 89 A.3d 1066). 14 [¶27] We are particularly cautious in our review for error that is unpreserved in appeals from jury verdicts. “The judicial deference owed jury decisions demands an appellate standard of review more rigorous than one narrowly focused on whether it was reasonably possible that the jury would have returned a different verdict.” Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 24, 28 A.3d 1147. [¶28] When obvious error is alleged, the party asserting error bears the burden of demonstrating to us a reasonable probability that, but for the claimed error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. The evidence at trial was that the two complaining witnesses identified Hall as the individual who had fired shots at them, they later identified Hall entering the home where Hall was found, and the green van and the gun containing five spent shells were found on that property. Given this evidence, Hall has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for the unpreserved error in admitting the rebuttal testimony, the verdict would have been different, or that the unpreserved error was plain, affected his substantial rights, or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. Fahnley, 2015 ME 82, ¶ 15, 119 A.3d 727; Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶¶ 29, 34-35, 28 A.3d 1147. 15