Opinion ID: 2598891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the district court commit plain error in responding to questions submitted by the jury?

Text: [¶ 22] During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge asking the following questions: Question: Whether or not you can tell us  does the stalking charge stem from the violations of the protection orders or from actions of following her, etc. When was Daniel Snow actually cited for the stalking charge? [¶ 23] With the agreement of counsel, the court responded to the questions as follows: INSTRUCTION NO. ___ The charge of stalking, as the instructions indicate, alleges a course of conduct over the time stated, July 14 to November 24, 2006. The following: violation of protection order, telephone calls and other incidentsthe state alleges, all together amount to the course of conduct that constitutes, if you believe they did occur, the offense charge of stalking. Keep in mind that the violation of the protective order is not a charge in this case and you should consider it only to the extent, if any, that you decide that the conduct which may have violated the protective order together with all of the other incidents combine to constitute the required course of conduct. Remember that the state carries the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these incidents did occur and that they do amount to the required course of conduct to constitute stalking under the definitions given in the instructions. When Mr. Snow was cited for the stalking is not material to your deliberations. (Emphasis in original). [¶ 24] In support of its contention that the district court committed reversible error by the way in which it responded to the jury`s questions, the appellant cites United States v. Duran, 133 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 1998) and Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 44, 193 P.3d 228, 244 (Wyo. 2008), for the proposition that it is the court`s duty to clear up jury confusion about the instructions or applicable law. The appellant then concedes that, given his failure to object below, this Court`s review should be for plain error. Substantively, the appellant argues that the response to the jury`s questions constituted prejudicial error because the judge itemized for the jury those portions of the evidence that the judge believed could support the stalking charge. [¶ 25] In response, the State presents three separate standards of review. First, the State cites Luedtke v. State, 2005 WY 98, ¶ 28, 117 P.3d 1227, 1232 (Wyo. 2005), for its holding that this Court reviews jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standard. Next, the State cites Leyva v. State, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 9, 106 P.3d 873, 876 (Wyo. 2005), as requiring plain error analysis due to the lack of an objection below. Finally, the State quotes Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 34, 157 P.3d 923, 930-31 (Wyo. 2007), where, in a case involving the failure to object to a limiting instruction, we said: Furthermore, the doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from raising error on appeal that was induced by the party`s own actions. Then, without citation to any authority, the State contends that it was appropriate for the district court to clarify for the jury what facts were alleged to have constituted stalking. The State`s interesting conclusion is that [b]ecause Appellant has failed to meet his burden under the plain error standard, the district court cannot be said to have abused its discretion when responding to the jury`s questions. [¶ 26] We agree that Martin says what the State says it says. But Martin goes on, in the same paragraph, to say that there will be no grounds for reversal unless the instruction was prejudicial. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Leyva, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 9, 106 P.3d at 876, we held that, where a defendant fails to object to an instruction, our review is for plain error, which, of course, involves a search for prejudice. Even where a defendant has not only not objected, but has actually offered the offending instruction, the invited error doctrine allows for review where the instruction is necessarily prejudicial. Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d 1202, 1213 (Wyo. 2007). These cases reflect the confluence of W.R.Cr.P. 30(a), which states in part that [n]o party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection[,] and W.R.Cr.P. 52(b), which states that [p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. We have followed this rule for a long time. See, e.g., Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1009 (Wyo. 1989); Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888, 891 (Wyo. 1983); and Britton v. State, 643 P.2d 935, 937 (Wyo. 1982). [¶ 27] Plain error analysis begins with the question of whether the record clearly reflects the alleged error. Somewhat hesitantly, we answer that question in the affirmative. We hesitate because, while there is a piece of paper in the exhibits folder that appears to be the jury question, it bears no identification other than Snow trial 12-12-07. It bears no signature and no indication of having been received from the jury by the judge. But it looks like a jury question, and the parties have treated it as such, so we will, too. There is also in the record a transcript of a brief discussion in chambers where the court and counsel discussed the court`s receipt of a question from the jury, and its proposed response. Neither the substance of the question nor the substance of the response are mentioned. Finally, although the original response appears nowhere in the record, the parties agree that a copy attached to the appellant`s brief as an exhibit is a copy of the response. [11] [¶ 28] The second question is whether a clear and unequivocal rule of law exists in relation to the issue at hand. Here, that rule of law is, indeed, clear and unequivocal: criminal defendants are entitled to a jury trial with the jury as the sole fact-finder. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 9 (The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases); W.R.Cr.P. 23(a) (Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried . . .); Garay v. State, 2007 WY 130, ¶ 2, 165 P.3d 99, 100 (Wyo. 2007) (jury as fact-finder resolves conflicts in the evidence); Leyo v. State, 2005 WY 92, ¶ 11, 116 P.3d 1113, 1116-17 (Wyo. 2005) (Supreme Court must preserve the jury`s role as fact-finder); Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 21, 34 P.3d 271, 276 (Wyo. 2001) (jury`s function to resolve factual issues); Walston v. State, 954 P.2d 987, 988 (Wyo. 1998) (role of jury as fact-finder to evaluate evidence); 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 15-16 (2006) (province of jury to determine controverted issues of fact). [¶ 29] The sanctity of the jury`s role as fact-finder has always been honored in this State. In Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Wyo. 1980), we recognized the significance of the right by quoting 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, 379 as follows: Upon these accounts the trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law . . . [I]t is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals. . . . [¶ 30] In a case published just a month after Taylor, we reiterated our view of the significance of the jury trial: The aim of the guarantee of the right to trial by jury is to preserve the substance of the right of trial by jury as distinguished from mere matters of form or procedure, particularly to retain the concept that issues of law are to be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions by the court. . . . The essential elements of a trial by jury are that there be impartial jurors, who unanimously decide the facts in controversy under the direction of a judge. Lapp v. City of Worland, 612 P.2d 868, 873 (Wyo. 1980) (internal citations omitted). [¶ 31] It is within this context that we must decide whether the district court in the case sub judice usurped the fact-finding role of the jury by identifying for it the evidence that the State contended amounted to the course of conduct underlying the stalking charge. The parties have not directed us to any cases specifically on point, but we believe the following excerpts from the concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Tatel in United States v. Ayeni, 374 F.3d 1313, 1317, 1319-21 (D.C. Cir. 2004), provide useful guidance: It goes without saying that few institutions are as venerable as that of trial by jury, enshrined at the Founding in the Bill of Rights and hallowed by an enormous body of English and American law that commands judges . . . not to invade the province of judgment by the people. Stacey v. Allied Stores Corp., 768 F.2d 402, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . Two bedrock characteristics of our system of trial by jury, a system the Supreme Court has labeled fundamental to the American scheme of justice, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), are that jury deliberations occur in seclusion and that the jury serves as the sole finder of fact. Regarding the first characteristic, not only is the sanctity of jury deliberations. . . a basic tenet of our system of criminal justice, United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 97 (2d Cir. 2002), but courts go to great lengths to protect that sanctity. . . . . . . . No less fundamental than jury seclusion is the principle that the jurynot the trial judge and not the attorneysserves as the trier of fact. As the Supreme Court has said: Of course, . . . in a jury trial the primary finders of fact are the jurors. Their overriding responsibility is to stand between the accused and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government that is in command of the criminal sanction. For this reason, a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict, regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction. The trial judge is thereby barred from attempting to override or interfere with the jurors` independent judgment in a manner contrary to the interests of the accused. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1355, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977) (citations omitted). This court has also emphasized the importance of the jury as fact-finder. Indeed, our opinions have repeatedly emphasized our conviction that the jury`s role as fact-finder is. . . central to our jurisprudence. United States v. Comer, 421 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Belton v. United States, 382 F.2d 150, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ([T]he principle that the jury should be permitted to find the facts is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence. . . .). Underscoring the importance of that role, this court, sitting en banc, has declared that [a]ny undue intrusion by the trial judge into this exclusive province of the jury is error of the first magnitude. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc). . . . Of course, no one told the jury which facts to find, but the jury`s role as factfinder can be invaded without being completely usurped. . . . . . . Juries` legal questions, which are what usually prompt supplemental instructions, differ fundamentally from their factual questions for an obvious reason: juries do not serve as the triers of law. They are not expected to divine the law for themselves the way they are expected to find the facts. Rather, the trial judge, aided by counsel, provides the jury with the proper legal standard. See, e.g., Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 256, 122 S.Ct. 726, 733, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (A trial judge`s duty is to give instructions sufficient to explain the law. . . .). Indeed, [w]hen a jury makes explicit its [legal] difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946). By contrast, where a jury`s questions relate to a factual matter, a substantive reply (whether by the judge or the attorneys) risks interfering with the jury`s exclusive responsibility for resolving factual questions. For this reason, several circuits have upheld district courts that refused to answer juries` factual questions. In one case, for example, the district court told jurors who submitted factual questions, [m]embers of the jury: The Court cannot answer your questions. It is for you as fact finders to interpret the evidence, weigh it and evaluate it without further directions from the Court. Please proceed with your deliberations. United States v. Aubin, 961 F.2d 980, 983 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting the district court) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sustaining the district court`s actions, the First Circuit explained that [t]he jury questions sought to resolve a conflict among the jurors as to what the testimony had been; such a conflict must be resolved by the trier of fact. Id.; see also United States v. Blumberg, 961 F.2d 787, 790 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no abuse of discretion where the district court, having received a factual question from the jury and [b]elieving further instruction would invade the province of the jury as the ultimate fact finder, . . . told the jurors they should answer the question for themselves by examining the evidence). Courts have also warned trial judges against usurping the jury`s fact-finding role even as they carry out their obligation to clear up the jury`s legal difficulties. For instance, after explaining the importance of answering a jury`s legal questions, the Fourth Circuit cautioned that the court must be careful not to invade the jury`s province as fact finder.` Such a distinction is consistent with our fundamental belief that it is the court that provides the legal yardstick and the jury that measures the evidence. United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 925 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Blumberg, 961 F.2d at 790) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Nunez, 889 F.2d 1564, 1569 (6th Cir. 1989) (Questions from a deliberating jury present a dilemma for a trial court. The court must be careful not to invade the jury`s province as fact-finder. Nevertheless, the court must respond to questions concerning important legal issues.); United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J.) (Because the jury may not enlist the court as its partner in the fact-finding process, the trial judge must proceed circumspectly in responding to inquiries from the jury.). [¶ 32] Because we so revere the fact-finding role of the jury in America`s and Wyoming`s legal system, we are anxious to defend and protect that right with utmost care and attention. In the instant case, the principles just enunciated require us to recognize that the district court`s response to the first jury question was not a response to a question of law. Rather, the response directed the jury to particular evidence that the jury should, or at least could, consider. The response went too far because, using the oft-repeated phrase, it invaded the province of the jury. Once a jury begins to deliberate, its deliberations are guided by the evidence presented in open court, the arguments of counsel, and the legal instructions presented by the court. If the State has presented the evidence in such a fashion, or has argued in such a fashion, as to leave doubt as to what evidence is meant to prove what crime, it is not appropriate for the court to correct that deficiency. [¶ 33] This case is nothing like Heywood v. State, 2007 WY 149, ¶ 30, 170 P.3d 1227, 1235 (Wyo. 2007), where we reversed because the district court failed to provide a substantive answer to a jury question. The jury there did not ask what evidence should be considered in regard to each crime charged, but asked which crime it was to deliberate upon under each count. Id. at ¶ 25, 170 P.3d at 1234. The failure in Heywood was a legal one; the verdict form was inadequate. In the instant case, the given instructions and the verdict form were appropriate. It should have been left at that. [12] [¶ 34] The final prong of the plain error test is the determination of whether the appellant was prejudiced by the error. To establish prejudice, the appellant must show a reasonable probability that she would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of the error. Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 11, 180 P.3d 212, 216 (Wyo. 2008). We have also said that, to show prejudice, an appellant must show circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 11, 169 P.3d 512, 520 (Wyo. 2007); see also Orona-Rangal v. State, 2002 WY 134, ¶ 16, 53 P.3d 1080, 1085 (Wyo. 2002). In other cases, we have characterized prejudice as conduct which so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)); see also Page v. State, 2003 WY 23, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 904, 908-09 (Wyo. 2003). In other words, focusing solely on an outcome determination is insufficient; the Court must also look at whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 35, 43 P.3d 551, 563 (Wyo. 2002). Perhaps the ultimate question is whether the appellant was denied his right to a fair trial. Teniente, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 12, 169 P.3d at 521. [¶ 35] We cannot find the district court`s error in this case to be harmless. The appellant had a constitutional right to have the facts of the case determined solely by the jury. The court`s intrusion into that role denied the defendant that fundamental protection. Two circumstances support this conclusion. First, one jury had already failed to convict the appellant of stalking based upon the same evidence. Second, this jury indicated by its question that it was unsure of what facts made up the course of conduct necessary to find the appellant guilty of stalking. There is a reasonable probability that, without the judge`s inappropriate evidentiary guidance, the jury would not have reached the verdict that it did.