Opinion ID: 429195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Claim

Text: 51 It is the defendant's claim that his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated under the test established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). 52 The Act is not intended to bar any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3173 (1974). It would be, however, an unusual case in which the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act have been met but the sixth amendment right to speedy trial has been violated. United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d 353, 360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918, 102 S.Ct. 1776, 72 L.Ed.2d 179 (1982). 53 Barker requires the consideration of four factors in determining whether the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated: Length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. 54 Defendant did properly assert his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. The first two prongs of the Barker test were adequately explored in our discussion of the alleged Speedy Trial violations. The only prejudice alleged by the defendant was his inability to carry out his activities free from the anxiety which is a concomitant part of being a defendant in a criminal procedure. (quoting United States v. Judge, 425 F.Supp. 499, 505 (D.Mass.1976)). Although this type of prejudice is not to be brushed off lightly, we cannot find, under the circumstances of this case, that defendant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial was violated. Delay here was both reasonable and necessary. And, as we have already pointed out, a large part of the delay might have been avoided by the defendant if he had moved for a severance as suggested by the court. 55 Defendant's final contention is that the district court should have dismissed the indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b). 9 56 Rule 48(b) is a restatement of the inherent power of the court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution. Advisory Committee Note. The invocation of the rule is within the discretion of the district court and it will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pilla, 550 F.2d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 2954, 53 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1977). We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Rule 48(b). 57 Affirmed.