Opinion ID: 1489800
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State proved only two prior intoxication-related traffic offenses

Text: It is the State's burden to prove prior intoxication-related traffic offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 577.023.7(2). The standard of review in a court-tried case is the same as in a jury-tried case. State v. McKinney, 253 S.W.3d 110, 113 (Mo.App.2008). In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction, this court accepts as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the finding. Id. As previously noted, a judgment that, on its face, shows a guilty plea or a finding of guilt of an intoxication-related traffic offense can be treated as a prior conviction for purposes of enhancement under § 577.023. Quinn, 594 S.W.2d at 602. The first exhibit shows beyond a reasonable doubt an intoxication-related traffic offense. This exhibit is a certified judgment that demonstrates that, on or about March 6, 2002, in the circuit court of Clay County, Smithville municipal division, Craig pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated. This is a valid judgment on its face and contains specific language that Defendant is found guilty upon the plea of guilty to the charge of DWI. The second exhibit also shows beyond a reasonable doubt an intoxication-related traffic offense. This exhibit is a certified judgment that demonstrates that, on or about September 15, 1999, in Clay County circuit court, Craig pleaded guilty to driving with excessive blood alcohol content. This is a valid judgment on its face and contains specific language that Defendant enters plea of guilty to reduced charge of Oper. M/V with BAC of .10 or more. The third exhibit does not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that an intoxication-related traffic offense occurred. The exhibit is a certified judgment but is not a valid judgment on its face. Allegedly, this exhibit shows that on January 30, 1992, in Clay County circuit court, Craig pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated, received a suspended imposition of sentence, and in 1994 completed probation. This document, however, is facially deficient and cannot be used as the sole evidence to enhance Craig's conviction. Notably, the exhibit (judgment form) is blank in the space to mark whether Craig pleaded not guilty or guilty and blank in the space to mark whether Craig was found not guilty or guilty. The clear and unambiguous language of § 577.023, dealing with the use of a suspended imposition of sentence to be treated as a conviction and used to enhance punishment, requires a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt followed by a suspended imposition of sentence. The State's exhibit does not indicate a finding of guilt or plea of guilty as required by the plain language of this statute. Accordingly, the State proved only two prior intoxication-related traffic offenses beyond any reasonable doubt and Craig's sentence was subject to enhancement as a persistent offender. Section 577.023. l(4)(a) (A persistent offender is [a] person who has pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of two or more intoxication-related traffic offenses ...). A persistent offender is sentenced as a class D felon to a maximum of four years imprisonment. Sections 577.023.3 and 558.011, RSMo Supp.2008.