Opinion ID: 2547502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the district court properly dismissed oman's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

Text: ¶ 50 Relying upon its dismissal of Oman's first four causes of action, the district court concluded that as a matter of law, there is no longer any basis in this case for the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and dismissed the claim. On appeal, Oman argues that summary judgment was inappropriate and that he should have been allowed to present this claim to a jury. We disagree. ¶ 51 In order to properly state a claim for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead facts that demonstrate that the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ¶ 58, 70 P.3d 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). Due to the highly subjective and volatile nature of emotional distress and the variability of its causations, the courts have historically been wary of dangers in opening the door to recovery therefor. Id. ¶ 59 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 52 If the trial court determines that a defendant's conduct was not outrageous as a matter of law, then the plaintiff's claim fails, and a court may properly grant the defendant summary judgment on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶ 38, 56 P.3d 524 (citations omitted). It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Gygi v. Storch, 28 Utah 2d 399, 503 P.2d 449, 450 (1972) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. h (1965)). ¶ 53 To be considered outrageous, the conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, ¶ 28, 21 P.3d 198 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the employment context, as in other factual settings, liability under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress... may be found only where the conduct complained of has been so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, so as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. 45 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts 261 (1986). ¶ 54 The District's conduct in this case does not even approach atrocious and intolerable conduct. This is especially true in light of our holdings that the District properly followed the procedures of both the Classified Agreement and UOSTPA when it terminated Oman for cause. No reasonable person could conclude that firing an employee under the terms of an employment contract and according to the procedures provided by law is so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that the District's actions were not outrageous. ¶ 55 Because the actions of the District and the District Employees were not outrageous as a matter of law, the district court properly held that Oman could not sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We therefore hold that the district court properly dismissed Oman's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.