Opinion ID: 396311
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Promotion to Supervisory and Lead Positions

Text: 64 P&M leadmen are employees within a job classification who are selected by first level supervisors to perform certain extra duties for a small additional hourly wage. There are also several layers of supervisors: first-level supervisors, general foremen, superintendents, and unit chief managers. A Supervisory Selection Board must approve promotions to supervisor. Beginning in 1967, Boeing Vertol implemented a requirement that the Supervisory Selection Board consider black candidates whenever a supervisory position was open. Also in 1967, black management employees began participating in the Supervisory Selection Board meetings, although there were no black Board members. Nevertheless, a 1972 review conducted by Boeing Vertol concluded that Boeing Vertol's supervisory selection process permitted the use of inconsistent selection criteria, perpetuation of individual bias, and exclusion from consideration of many potential candidates. 65 The employees presented statistical evidence demonstrating, in at least some years during the actionable period, significant disparities between the percentages of black employees in the workforce and in P&M jobs and the percentages of black leadmen and supervisors. They supported this statistical evidence with individual testimony describing discriminatory denials of promotions. The employees also presented evidence that the promotion system, which operated in a subjective fashion without written standards, afforded an opportunity to discriminate. The district court found that certain individuals proved some of these claims. 66 With regard to the employees' claim of discrimination in supervisory promotions, the district court made a significant finding: 67 The percentage of black managers at Boeing Vertol has been rising steadily since 1967. The percentage of supervisory appointments offered and accepted by black employees has exceeded their representation in the workforce since 1967. From the beginning of 1967 through the summer of 1968, blacks constituted 19 percent of the appointments to P & M supervision. In P & M, blacks have constituted 16 percent of all supervisory selections since 1967. For all management positions, blacks accounted for nearly twenty percent of the increase in managers between 1970 and 1974. 68 437 F.Supp. at 1163 (Finding of Fact 105). The court determined that this evidence effectively rebutted any inference of discrimination that might otherwise be permissible from the significant disparities reflected in the employees' statistics. 69 The employees contend that the court's finding was clearly erroneous. In considering this contention, we accept the ultimate factual determination of the fact-finder unless that determination is (1) completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data. Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972); see Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 544 (3d Cir. 1980). The question is not whether we would have made the same factual finding but whether on the entire evidence we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. See Jackson v. United States Steel Corp., 624 F.2d 436, 439 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). 70 Applying this standard, we cannot declare clearly erroneous the district court's finding that since 1967 Boeing Vertol had appointed black supervisors at a rate exceeding their representation in the workforce. Ronald James, a Boeing Vertol manager who served on the Supervisory Selection Board during the actionable period, testified that during the relevant period sixteen percent of the candidates recommended by the Board for appointment as supervisors were black. A list of P&M supervisory promotions made during 1968 and 1969 showed that seventeen percent of the promotions went to black employees during this period. Although, as the district court noted, Boeing Vertol's evidence was not particularly strong, the factual finding by the district court was not without evidentiary support. Furthermore, the employees failed to offer proof that served to rebut this finding. 71 The district court also gave some probative weight to other explanations for the disparities. For example, the pattern of hiring at Boeing Vertol was such that the pool of experienced workers, the most likely candidates for supervisory positions, had a greater percentage of white employees than did the overall workforce. Additionally, a drastic reduction in the number of supervisory positions in the later 1960's and early 1970's resulted in the demotion of less senior supervisors. The formula by which the employees reached an expected number of black supervisors in a given year also tended to inflate the expectation figure because it relied on incorrect assumptions about the composition of the P&M supervisory workforce in relation to the overall supervisory workforce. These explanations served to make credible Boeing Vertol's contention that the statistical disparity did not reflect discriminatory promotions. Particularly in light of the absence of evidence directly contradicting Boeing Vertol's figures, we cannot say that we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 72 The employees also presented evidence of a statistically significant disparity between the number of black leadmen and the number of blacks in the workforce from 1966 through 1969. An analysis conducted at the end of 1967 also showed that white employees who were selected as leadmen had an average of one year less experience than black employees selected as leadmen. This study, however, like some of the other evidence revealing significant disparities, covered events occurring before the actionable period. 73 In rebuttal, Boeing Vertol presented evidence attempting to explain the disparities on the basis of hiring patterns and experience requirements. For example, Boeing Vertol presented a study purporting to show that employees generally had over six years experience when appointed to the lead position. Although the district court determined that the study was not entirely persuasive, because it was based on employees' most recent appointments rather than on their first appointments, the court was persuaded that the lack of experience of many black employees at the time in question could account for much of the apparent disparity. Thus, when the court took into account the company's written description of the lead position, requiring five or more years in an occupation before selection as a leadman, the statistical disparity essentially disappeared. 10 74 The employees challenge the district court's reliance on this five-year requirement to determine that leadmen were not selected discriminatorily. They contend that the written policy was not followed. At trial, they presented evidence that some white employees were made leadmen within one or two years of being hired. Thus, they contend, it was error to accept lack of experience as a reasonable explanation for the disparity. They contend that the experience requirement was a pretext for discrimination. 75 The district court found that the written five-year job-experience requirement was not strictly enforced, and also assigned minimal probative value to Boeing Vertol's study attempting to prove that employees assigned to lead positions had an average of six years of experience. The court, however, did not determine that experience was an irrelevant consideration. To the contrary, the court concluded that it was clear from the evidence that most leadmen and supervisors had at least several years experience when appointed. 437 F.Supp. at 1190. The employees do not suggest that this conclusion was erroneous. Nor did they at trial demonstrate that experience was an unimportant consideration in selection of leadmen. 76 The employees' statistical determination of the number of expected black leadmen in any given year was based on the number of blacks in the workforce without regard to experience. This method resulted in inflated expectation figures. For example, although the employees' leadmen statistics revealed no significant disparity in 1965, a significant disparity appeared in 1966 when the black workforce doubled while the number of black leadmen did not. 77 (S)tatistics are not irrefutable; ... their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Teamsters, 341 U.S. at 340, 97 S.Ct. at 1857. In light of all of the facts and circumstances, we find no error in the court's conclusion that the employees failed to prove more than isolated ... or sporadic discriminatory acts, and that they failed to prove that racially discriminatory denials of lead promotions were the company's standard operating procedure-the regular rather than the unusual practice. See id.