Opinion ID: 1382112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Comparability and Proportionality

Text: Price argues that because Judge Lessenberry's findings clearly lack the required comparability and proportionality analysis in determining the appropriate sanctions, this court should reject the recommendations. However, neither Price's abstract nor his addendum contain any mention of comparability or proportionality analysis. This court does not consider issues lacking citation of authority. Cambiano v. Arkansas State Board of Law Examiners, 357 Ark. 336, 167 S.W.3d 649 (2004); Holcombe v. Marts, 352 Ark. 201, 99 S.W.3d 401 (2003). Neither the petitioner nor this court is required to search the record to find where Price might have raised the issue at trial. Judge Lessenberry effectively analyzed the thirty-five factors that lent themselves to consideration of comparability and proportionality. Section 17 of the Procedures divides violations of the Model Rules into two separate categories of misconduct: serious misconduct and lesser misconduct. Procedures 17(B) and (C). Serious misconduct warrants a sanction of terminating or restricting a lawyer's license to practice law, whereas the lesser misconduct does not. Neal v. Hollingsworth, 338 Ark. 251, 992 S.W.2d 771 (1999). Conduct will be considered serious misconduct if any of the following considerations set forth in Procedure Section 17(B) apply: (1) The misconduct involves the misappropriation of funds; (2) The misconduct results in or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client or other person; (3) The misconduct involves dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation by the lawyer; (4) The misconduct is part of a pattern of similar misconduct; (5) The lawyer's prior record of public sanctions demonstrates a substantial disregard of the lawyer's professional duties and responsibilities; or, (6) The misconduct constitutes a Serious Crime as defined in these Procedures. When Model Rules have been violated by either serious or lesser misconduct, a penalty phase proceeds where the defendant attorney and the Committee's Executive Director are allowed to present evidence and arguments regarding aggravating and mitigating factors to assist in determining the appropriate sanction. Neal, supra . Aggravating factors developed by the American Bar Association Joint Committee on Professional Standards and adopted by this court in Wilson v. Neal, 341 Ark. 282, 16 S.W.3d 228 (2000), are: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with [the] rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge [the] wrongful nature of [the] conduct; (h) vulnerability of [the] victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law; (j) indifference to making restitution; and, (k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances. Mitigating factors include: (a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify [the] consequences of [the] misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to [the] disciplinary board or cooperative attitude towards [the] proceedings; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g) character or reputation; (h) physical disability; (i) mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse when; (1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (3) the respondent's recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and, (4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely. (j) delay in [the] disciplinary proceedings; (k) impositions of other penalties or sanctions; ( l ) remorse; and, (m) remoteness of prior offenses. Wilson v. Neal, supra ; Model Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions §§ 9.22 and 9.32 (1992). Judge Lessenberry specifically discussed the mitigation offered by Price, and the aggravating factors he found in the record, before arriving at a recommendation of disbarment. Price claims his disabilities combined with some comparability and proportionality analyses, should result in either his transfer to inactive status until his disability no longer exists or a sanction considerably less than disbarment. In In Re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 409 A.2d 1153 (1979), the New Jersey court held that the misappropriation of client or law firm funds will almost invariably result in disbarment. The New Jersey court later established the Jacob Standard, holding disbarment is all but certain in misappropriation cases unless there had been a demonstration by competent medical proofs that respondent suffered a loss of competency, comprehensive or will of such magnitude that could excuse egregious misconduct that was clearly knowing, volitional and purposeful. In Re Greenberg, 155 N.J. 138, 714 A.2d 243 (1998). Here, Price admittedly failed to maintain an attorney trust account and failed to refund monies owed clients. Price has offered no medical evidence of his mental or physical conditions in mitigation, nor any significant support for his character from the community or legal profession. Therefore, the analysis of Judge Lessenberry is not clearly erroneous.