Opinion ID: 785028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Range

Text: 22 Although our conclusion that Emezuo's proffer was not entirely truthful is dispositive of his appeal, the government's second argument why Emezuo was not prejudiced also merits discussion because it was apparently accepted by the district court, yet it is not supported by the law of this circuit. The government argues that Emezuo cannot demonstrate prejudice because his sentence is already within the Guidelines range Emezuo argues should have applied, and he cannot prove that the judge would have given him a shorter sentence than the one he received. The district court appears to have accepted this argument in finding that Emezuo could not establish prejudice, stating that his sentence still falls within the allowable range. (Pet'r Br. at B9-B10.) 23 But we have held that where two Guidelines ranges overlap ..., the technical dispute over which range to apply may be left unresolved ... [a]s long as it is reasonable to conclude that the same sentence would have been imposed regardless of the outcome of the dispute over which range to apply. United States v. Howard, 179 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir.1999). We had previously found it reasonable to conclude that the same sentence would have been imposed regardless of which Guidelines range applied when the sentencing judge had specifically said as much at the sentencing hearing, see id., and when the district court indicated that, if a lower sentencing range had applied, he would have sentenced the defendant to the high end of that range, see United States v. Utecht, 238 F.3d 882, 890 (7th Cir.2001). Other circuits have found it unreasonable to conclude the same sentence would have been imposed [w]here it appears ... that the district court chose a sentence because it was at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 921, 923 (C.A.D.C. 1989), citing United States v. Vasquez, 874 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989). We, too, have held that 24 [a] sentence based on an incorrect guideline range constitutes an error affecting substantial rights and can thus constitute plain error. Although the sentence that the district court selected in this case is within the correct as well as the incorrect Guidelines range, we must remand unless we have reason to believe that the error did not affect the district court's selection of a particular sentence. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1120-21, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992); United States v. Panadero, 7 F.3d 691, 698 n. 4 (7th Cir.1993). Here, the district court chose the lowest possible sentence within the erroneous range. We have no reason to believe that it would not have selected an even lower sentence if given the opportunity to do so. 25 United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 1171, 1174-75 (7th Cir.1994). 26 Here, too, the district court selected the lowest possible sentence within the erroneous range and then departed downward by an additional six months. Although there was no statement of reasons given at sentencing why the lowest end of the range was the appropriate starting point, the district court characterized Emezuo's sentence as a very, very long sentence to begin with and noted that Emezuo was getting as minimal a sentence as I legally can give you. (Sentc'g Tr. at 14, 17.) Thus, although the district court noted in denying Emezuo's § 2255 motion that it could have imposed the same sentence even in the lower sentencing range, we cannot conclude that it would have reimposed the same sentence, rather than, as Emezuo argues, adopting the same reasoning as earlier and imposing a sentence at the bottom of the lower range. If sentencing within the lower range had been warranted, the mere fact that Emezuo's earlier sentence was already within that range would not have supported a finding that Emezuo did not suffer prejudice.