Opinion ID: 169405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Berry is disabled or regarded as disabled under the ADA.

Text: 18 To establish a valid claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must first prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she has a disability. 4 To satisfy the ADA's definition of disability, a plaintiff must (1) have a recognized impairment, (2) identify one or more appropriate major life activities, and (3) show the impairment substantially limits one or more of those activities. Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 765 (10th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). Whether the plaintiff has an impairment within the meaning of the ADA and whether the conduct affected is a major life activity for purposes of the ADA are questions of law for the court to decide. Ascertaining whether the impairment substantially limits the major life activity is a question of fact for the jury, although a court is not precluded from deciding the issue on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at n. 1 (citation omitted).
19 The United States Supreme Court defines a substantial impairment as one that prevents or severely restricts [an] individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives and that is permanent or long term. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) (citation omitted). We must strictly interpret the term substantial to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. Id. at 197, 122 S.Ct. 681 The ADA regulations describe substantially limited as [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(I)(ii) (2001). Factors to be considered are: [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii). 5 An impairment's effects are assessed on a case-by-case basis. Holt, 433 F.3d at 766. On summary judgment, the ultimate question is whether the evidence presented could allow a jury to conclude the limitations amount to such severe restrictions in the activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives that they establish a manual task disability. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202, 122 S.Ct. 681. 20 Berry contends she is substantially limited in the life activities of caring for herself, walking and performance of manual tasks. Specifically, Berry alleges she has to rest before showering, cannot do household chores that are handled by others in the family, and essentially has to plan when things can be accomplished. She also is limited in duration in the amount of time available to her. (Appellant's Br. at 21.) She maintains the district court erred in considering only whether the impairment severely restricted Berry from performing the affected major life activities. Berry contends the district court failed to consider [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii). While Berry correctly cites the federal regulation, we need not parse the relevant considerations here. Under any of them, Berry is not currently disabled. 21 The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Berry, reveals at the time of her discharge, Berry suffered from extreme fatigue which would cause cognitive difficulties, temporary postponement of activities and, on occasion, result in a fall. However, the medical records submitted by her physician demonstrate her activities were not substantially limited and many of her symptoms could be addressed through medication. When Berry first began treatment with Dr. Frohman she would see him every six months, but eventually her appointments were extended to annual visits. In May 2002, Dr. Frohman proscribed Provigil for Berry's fatigue, an ongoing problem which was exacerbated by changes in her work schedule. During the same visit, Dr. Frohman reported Barry was doing remarkably well in her daily activities. (Appellant's App. Vol. I at 125.) She was advised, however, to use a straight cane later in the day to prevent fatigue induced falling. ( Id. ) In Dr. Frohman's 2003 report, he stated Berry had not fallen within the last six months and had benefitted from the Provigil, but still experienced cognitive dysfunction such as short-term memory problems when fatigued. Overall, the doctor reported her daily living activities remain unchanged. Dr. Frohman's 2004 report states Berry received excellent benefit from her medication regarding fatigue. ( Id. at 128.) Her condition apparently remained stable in 2005, when the doctor noted she was doing remarkably well with ... no evidence of significant change in her daily activities. ( Id. at 136.) Indeed, Berry admitted her fatigue level depended on whether she was taking her medication. If she takes the proscribed Provigil, she has a greater ability to do everything. ( Id. at 84.) Even in the event the medication did not provide complete relief, her strategy for dealing with her fatigue was to postpone her chores or allow her husband and daughter to complete them. 22 Compare these facts to those in our recent case, Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Center, Inc., 443 F.3d 762 (10th Cir.2006). There, the plaintiff had cerebral palsy. In determining whether she had a substantial disability, we observed: 23 While Holt needs help when chopping, cutting, and slicing food, the evidence is insufficient to allow a factfinder to conclude she is severely restricted in her ability to cook. It is undisputed that Holt occasionally must ask others for assistance when buttoning her clothing; Holt has introduced no evidence, however, that would permit a factfinder to conclude she is severely restricted in dressing herself. 24 ... 25 Holt also claims the limitations caused by her cerebral palsy substantially impair her ability to perform the major life activity of caring for herself. Caring for one's self encompasses normal activities of daily living; including feeding oneself, driving, grooming, and cleaning home. As discussed above, the relevant evidence shows Holt has difficulty with, or is prevented from performing, a limited number of manual tasks. It also indicates Holt sometimes has difficulty chewing and swallowing her food. These specific limitations, however, do not permit a rational factfinder to conclude Holt is prevented from caring for herself or is severely restricted in her ability to care for herself. 26 Holt, 443 F.3d at 767 (internal citation and quotation omitted). 6 Unlike Holt, Berry does not dispute she can perform all daily life activities given sufficient rest, walk with the aid of a cane, can treat her symptoms with medication, and her cognitive difficulty does not prevent her from learning and working. The district court did not err in considering her family's assistance with the household chores, as that is part of daily living in most families. Berry's condition has not significantly degenerated over the last several years, and according to her physician, she has stabilized. Thus, while Berry may have to make some adjustments in her daily routine, the district court did not err in finding Berry was not disabled as a matter of law. 7
27 In the alternative, Berry asserts the district court erred in concluding there was no issue of fact as to whether T-Mobile considered her disabled. Berry contends T-Mobile's grant of her FMLA leave request is sufficient to raise a question of fact. We disagree. 28 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations presents three different ways in which an individual may satisfy the meaning of regarded as having a disability: (1) the individual may have an impairment that is not substantially limiting but is perceived by the defendant as constituting a substantially limiting impairment; (2) the individual may have an impairment that is substantially limiting only because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment; or (3) the individual may have no impairment at all but is regarded by the defendant as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( l ). In addition, a claimant may be deemed to have a record of disability either by having a history of substantial limitation of a major life activity or by having been misclassified as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). 29 Because T-Mobile knew Berry had MS and knew of her fatigue and resulting cognitive challenges, Berry argues Kavanah's suggestion she apply for FMLA leave and the approval of her application is evidence that T-Mobile considered her disabled. Although we have found no precedent directly on point in this Circuit or others, we agree with the district court's conclusion that T-Mobile's approval of Berry's FMLA request does not establish a question of fact. 8 An employer's knowledge of an impairment alone is insufficient to establish the employer regarded the employee as disabled. Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir.2001). 30 We have often stated [d]isability is a term of art under the ADA. Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495 (10th Cir.2000); Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rwy. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir.1999). In contrast, the leave provisions of the FMLA are wholly distinct from the statutory definition of disability and an employer's reasonable accommodation obligations covered under the ADA. 9 As courts have recognized in various contexts, there may be some parallels between the ADA and FMLA, but applicable regulations explicitly state that ADA's `disability' and the FMLA's `serious health condition' are different concepts, and must be analyzed separately. Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Stekloff v. St. John's Mercy Health Sys., 218 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir.2000)); see also Hoge v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 384 F.3d 238, 249 (6th Cir.2004) (Unlike the FMLA, the finding of a disability is the key `that unlocks the storehouse of statutory protections' under the ADA.). Given the very different focus of the two statutory protections, Kavanah's suggestion to apply for FMLA leave and T-Mobile's approval of Berry's application does not demonstrate an issue of fact as to whether Berry was considered disabled under the ADA. Consequently, Berry failed to present a case of discrimination under the ADA.