Opinion ID: 2616316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidence to support answers to questions 3, 4 and 5 of Verdict Form C.

Text: [3] Verdict Form C is taken directly from RCW 10.77.040, which requires the jury to answer the following questions in considering whether or not a defendant should be acquitted by reason of insanity: 1. Did the defendant commit the act charged? 2. If your answer to number 1 is yes, do you acquit him because of insanity existing at the time of the act charged? 3. If your answer to number 2 is yes, is the defendant a substantial danger to other persons unless kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions? 4. If your answer to number 2 is yes, does the defendant present a substantial likelihood of committing felonious acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions? 5. If your answers to either number 3 or number 4 is yes, is it in the best interests of the defendant and others that the defendant be placed in treatment that is less restrictive than detention in a state mental hospital? The jury answered yes to the first four questions and no to the last question. Defendant asserts questions three through five should not have been submitted to the jury because there was insufficient evidence to support them. Defendant's contention must fail for two reasons. First, we need not consider this assignment of error because the instruction was not set out verbatim in appellant's brief as required by ROA I-43. [2] Secondly, there was adequate evidence to support the jury's answers. Dr. Jerzy Slobodow, a licensed psychiatrist, testified defendant was hostile, argumentative and resistive. Defendant demanded special privileges and refused routine laboratory tests. Dr. Slobodow also testified defendant had very poor insight into his condition, was divorced from reality and thought other people were after him. The doctor diagnosed defendant as a paranoid type of psychotic, and based on the above symptoms and defendant's explanation of the incident on the train, concluded defendant could not distinguish between right and wrong. Dr. Slobodow determined, based on three meetings with defendant, that this was defendant's condition at the time of the criminal act. After the third meeting the doctor noted defendant's condition was unchanged, found defendant unsafe to be at large, and diagnosed his condition as chronic. Dr. Slobodow also testified that although medication might make a patient such as defendant less hostile, he would return to his former condition if medication ceased. Dr. Phillip Westling testified similarly concerning defendant's paranoia and hostility, and mentioned a specific incident when defendant physically threatened him. Not only did Dr. Westling agree with Dr. Slobodow that defendant would return to a hostile state if off medication, but testified defendant had in fact refused medication shortly before the trial. [4] The violent nature of the crime itself is also a factor in determining if defendant is dangerous. State ex rel. Thompson v. Snell, 46 Wash. 327, 333, 89 P. 931 (1907). [5] Defendant challenges Dr. Westling's qualifications as an expert witness because he has no degree in psychiatry or psychology. Dr. Westling received his M.D. from the University of Oregon in 1949 and by the time of the trial had worked at Eastern State Hospital 5 1/2 years. For four of those years he had performed mental status examinations (psychiatric and medical), designed treatment plans and prescribed anti-psychotic medication. Practical experience in a given area can qualify a witness as an expert. See, e.g., State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 584, 597, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949, 41 L.Ed.2d 1166, 94 S.Ct. 3217 (1974); State v. Jacobsen, 78 Wn.2d 491, 497, 477 P.2d 1 (1970). Determination of whether or not a witness possesses the special skill or knowledge necessary to qualify as an expert witness is discretionary with the trial judge ( State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., supra ) and there was no abuse of discretion here.