Opinion ID: 1152402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Remoteness Analysis

Text: We now turn to the question whether the Plan constitutes compensation, perquisite or allowance in violation of the Constitution. It is important to note that, although the terms compensation, perquisite or allowance, as used in our constitutional provision are not necessarily identical to the terms allowance or emolument, as used in Brown, Reeves, and Campbell, we do not need to specifically define each of these terms to determine the validity of the Plan. It is sufficient that we agree with the conclusions of the other courts and hold that these terms as used in Article IV, Section 10 do not encompass remote and contingent benefits. [5] See Brown, 787 S.W.2d at 45; Reeves, 82 P.2d at 175; Campbell, 202 S.E.2d at 375-76. Applying this construction, we find that the benefits for which legislators may be eligible under the Plan are too remote and contingent to constitute compensation, perquisites, or allowances in violation of the Constitution. In order to be eligible to receive any benefits under the Plan, a legislator must agree to participate in the program, allowing for a deduction from his or her per diem allowance. The legislator must also accumulate the requisite number of years of credited service before any benefits will vest. Under the challenged plan, in order to become vested, a legislator not only must serve a full term, but also must win re-election at least once. Finally, the legislator must remain alive until the earliest time that the benefits vest. We therefore conclude that the legislative retirement benefits paid out under the Plan are not included within the terms compensation, allowance or perquisite as used in Article IV, Section 10 of our Constitution. Our holding today is further supported by this Court's decision in State ex rel. Hudgins v. Public Employees Retirement Board, 58 N.M. 543, 548, 273 P.2d 743, 746 (1954), in which we rejected a claim that payment of increased benefits to state-employee retirees in exchange for a lump-sum payment violated the constitutional prohibition against paying any extra compensation for services already performed. See also N.M. Const. art. IV, § 27. In rejecting the claim that additional retirement benefits constituted extra compensation under the Constitution, we implicitly acknowledged that retirement benefits do not constitute compensation under Article IV, Section 10 of the Constitution.