Opinion ID: 218888
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cumulative Effect Theory

Text: The Supreme Court has noted that the language of the FPA strongly implies that Congress drew upon its full authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the statute. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. at 96, 85 S.Ct. 1253. Full authority under the Commerce Clause includes the power to reach a local activity whose effect on commerce, `taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.' Habersham, 976 F.2d at 1384 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942)); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (noting that Supreme Court case law firmly establishes Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic `class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce). Assuming there was substantial evidence supporting the Commission's factual findings, it would not be unreasonable for the Commission to regulate Starrett's dam because a small hydroelectric project that affects commerce only slightly can still be subject to congressional regulation if it is part of a class with a significant cumulative effect. Habersham, 976 F.2d at 1384. We thus turn to the second part of our analysis and ask whether the Commission's conclusion that Starrett's dam is part of a class of projects that, in the aggregate, have the required effect on interstate commerce is supported by substantial evidence. City of Centralia, 661 F.2d at 792.