Opinion ID: 1921424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: is imposition of penalty after determination of probation violation a final judgment, order or decision?

Text: The issue in this case arises from the attempt of the defendant to claim an appeal as of right from the imposition of a penalty following determination of violation of probation. As our analysis of the constitution, legislation and court rules indicates, whether the defendant at this point can appeal as of right depends upon whether the imposition of penalty after the determination of probation violation is a final judgment, order or decision. Defendant argued that the imposition of imprisonment after violation of probation is the final judgment, order or decision. Defendant refers to People v Fisher, 237 Mich 504, 506; 212 NW 70 (1927). We quote therefrom as follows: Under the statute, an order of probation is discretionary, tentative in nature and in no sense a final disposition, for power to sentence, in case of breach, is expressly reserved by the very law itself. An ultimate or final judgment is not reached in a criminal case, following conviction, until the court pronounces a sentence, which leaves nothing to be done but enforcement. In the case at bar, the order of probation was within the letter of the law, held sentence in abeyance, and defendant's violation of the terms and conditions imposed called for revocation of the order and exercise of the power of final judgment. The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that the order imposing probation is the final judgment, relying on Calhoun v Macomb Circuit Judge, 15 Mich App 416, 422-423; 166 NW2d 657 (1968). We quote from that decision as follows: Michigan cases like People v. Fisher (1927), 237 Mich 504, and People v. Good (1938), 287 Mich 110 [282 NW 920], contain language, written in another context, that an order of probation is not a sentence nor a final judgment. However, now that a constitutional right of appeal is involved and because a person placed on probation stands `convicted' and suffers shame and other incidental consequences of that fact and always loses liberty and may be imprisoned (up to 6 months in jail or 1 year in camp), fined, required to pay restitution and costs and meet other conditions, we are persuaded by the reasoning of Korematsu and Nordstrom [People v Nordstrom, 73 Ill App 2d 168; 219 NE2d 151 (1966)], supra, that under the Michigan statutes and court rules, the time for appeal as of right to review a criminal conviction ends sixty days after the conviction is first executed by a sentence of imprisonment or fine or by a tentative sentence of probation. It is difficult to say that defendant here in receiving a prison term after the determination of his violation of probation has not suffered a final judgment, order or decision. In the words of Fisher he has reached that point where the court pronounce[d] a sentence, which leaves nothing to be done but enforcement. 237 Mich 504, 506. Incidentally, the United States Supreme Court used practically the same words in Korematsu v United States, 319 US 432, 435; 63 S Ct 1124; 87 L Ed 1497 (1943), quoting from Berman v United States, 302 US 211, 212-213; 58 S Ct 164; 82 L Ed 204 (1937) as follows: In criminal cases, as well as civil, the judgment is final for the purpose of appeal `when it terminates the litigation ... on the merits' and `leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.' The court has obviously rendered its final judgment because after sentence the prison authorities take over. We reach the conclusion, therefore, and hold that the sentence imposed after a determination of violation of probation is a final judgment and that an appeal as of right may be taken at that point.