Opinion ID: 2318487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judgment as Matter of Law on Kumar's Discrimination Claims

Text: Kumar next challenges the trial court's entry of judgment as a matter of law for appellees on his race or national origin discrimination claims. At the close of Kumar's evidence, appellees moved for judgment as a matter of law arguing that Kumar had not put forth a prima facie case of discrimination and, even if he had, his evidence revealed legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for appellees' actions that Kumar could not show to be pretextual. The trial court agreed and granted appellees' motion. We review the grant of judgment as a matter of law by applying the same standard as the trial court. McFarland v. George Washington Univ., 935 A.2d 337, 355 (D.C.2007). A court should render judgment as a matter of law when a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). This is an exacting standard, and it is only in the unusual case, in which only one conclusion could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, that the court may properly grant judgment as a matter of law. Brown v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 844 A.2d 1113, 1118 (D.C.2004). The District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) prohibits employers from discriminating with regard to the terms and conditions of employment based on an employee's protected traits, e.g., race or national origin. D.C.Code § 2-1402.11(a)(1) (2006). In interpreting the DCHRA, we customarily look to federal anti-discrimination jurisprudence, specifically that interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361 n. 17 (D.C.1993). We apply the familiar burden-shifting framework in evaluating an employment discrimination claim that does not involve direct evidence of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Arthur Young, supra, 631 A.2d at 361. Under that framework, the employee must first put forth a prima facie case, which raises a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. Arthur Young, supra, 631 A.2d at 361. To establish a prima facie case, the employee must show: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 3) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145, 350 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 310 (2002). If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer bears the burden to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). If the employer carries this burden, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer's stated reason is a mere pretext for discrimination. Id. Though the burdens shift, it is the employee who at all times bears the ultimate burden to persuade the trier of fact that the employer took adverse action against him because of his protected trait. Id. The parties do not dispute that Kumar is a member of a protected class. The question before us is whether WASA's decisions 1) denying his training request, 2) preventing him from competing for the Director of Procurement position, and 3) separating him from his employment were adverse employment actions motivated by his race or national origin. See id. We deal in turn with each allegedly discriminatory action and, where appropriate, appellees' alleged legitimate reason for its action, in order to determine whether judgment as a matter of law was proper.
Kumar claimed that appellees' denial of his request to attend an out-of-town training conference was an adverse employment action based on his race or national origin. Analogizing to Santa Cruz v. Snow, 402 F.Supp.2d 113, 127 (D.D.C. 2005), the trial court found that Kumar had not alleged an adverse employment action because the denial of the training request did not materially affect his employment. We agree with the trial court. It is well-established that an adverse employment action must involve a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). Although courts have recognized that a denial of training may rise to the level of an adverse employment action, in order to prevail a plaintiff must show legally cognizable adversity flowing from the denial.... Everson v. Medlantic Healthcare Grp., 414 F.Supp.2d 77, 85 (D.D.C.2006); Santa Cruz, supra, 402 F.Supp.2d at 127 (Denial of a training opportunity on allegedly discriminatory grounds can constitute an adverse employment action, [ ] but only if the denial materially affects the plaintiff's pay, hours, job title, responsibilities, promotional opportunities, and the like.) (citing Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 574 (7th Cir.2001) (other citation omitted)). Kumar's evidence did not show that he lost pay or status as a result of the denial. Rather, far from providing proof of adversity, Kumar's evidence showed that he received an increase in salary in the months to follow. Without more, we cannot find that the trial court erred in finding Kumar's claim insufficient under Burlington Industries to survive judgment as a matter of law. See Burlington Indus., supra, 524 U.S. at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (quotations omitted) (stating that [a] materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, ... decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, [or] a material loss of benefits, but not a bruised ego).
Kumar next claimed that he was discriminated against when WASA denied him the opportunity to compete for the position of Director of Procurement. The trial court agreed with appellees that Kumar failed to put forth a prima facie case on this issue because he presented no evidence as to what action WASA took with respect his application. The only evidence on record was that he applied for the position, emailed a confirmation of his application to the human resources manager, and when he was called in to Carter's office to resign or be terminated two hours later, the human resources manager was in the hallway near Carter's office. Though Kumar spends much of his brief discussing his qualifications for the position and Carter's alleged animus towards him, he failed to present any evidence that Carter even knew of his application at the time of his termination. Because Kumar presented no evidence of a decision not to consider his application independent of the decision to terminate him, he has failed to provide the jury with a sufficient basis upon which to determine whether appellees' actions with respect to his application were based on the characteristic that placed [him] in a protected class. Brown, supra, 844 A.2d at 1120-23 (holding that judgment as a matter of law was proper where plaintiff failed to put on evidence of who made the decision[,] ... what it was based on, and whether it was for an impermissible purpose....). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law on this claim.
Kumar's final claim is that appellees' decision to separate him from his employment was based on his race or national origin. The trial court agreed with the appellees that Kumar had failed to provide evidence from which to infer discriminatory animus sufficient for a prima facie case, and, alternatively, that WASA had legitimate reasons for its actions that Kumar could not show to be pretextual. In so ruling, the trial court found that the only evidence that could be construed as ethnically-based was Mr. Carter's alleged greasehead comment in reference to Kumar. The trial court ultimately concluded that Kumar could not show that WASA's assertion that its decision to terminate Kumar was based on his failure to send the filters out on time and his execution of a contract he was not authorized to sign was a pretext for discrimination. Even were we to agree with Kumar that the term greasehead was derogatory in terms of race or national origin, we would be satisfied that the trial court did not err in concluding that Kumar could not show that WASA's proffered reason for his termination was pretextual. Ultimately, despite the animus Kumar perceived on Carter's part, Kumar's evidence raised no inference of pretext to rebut appellees' proffered reasons for terminating him. His own testimony established that WASA's rationale for terminating him was the issue on the filters, and also that the general manager never delegated to him the authority to sign the contracts that he signed. Though he argues that the filter incident was not in fact his fault, this is insufficient to establish pretext because he could not show that appellees could not reasonably believe that it was his fault, such that their proffered reason would seem phony. Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dept. of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183, 318 U.S.App.D.C. 186, 189 (1996); see also Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 124 F.Supp.2d 1, 10 (D.D.C.2000) (While plaintiff's argument that the failure... was not her fault may constitute a possible explanation for appellees' criticism of her job performance, it does not constitute evidence that appellees' reasons for her termination were either false or pretextual.). The Supreme Court has stated that: an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred. Reeves, supra, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Accordingly, we see no error in the trial court's finding that Kumar could not establish that the reasons appellees proffered for terminating him were pretextual. Having determined that the trial court did not err with regard to any of the grounds that Kumar alleged in support of his discrimination claim, we affirm the trial court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to appellees.