Opinion ID: 198984
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Rosario-Rodriguez's Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel Arguments

Text: 157 Rosario-Rodriguez raises a double jeopardy challenge to his conviction based on his acquittal in United States v. Solano-Moreta, Cr. No. 95-160 (SEC). The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. Const. amend. V. This guarantee is expressed, in pertinent part, as a prohibition against multiple prosecutions for the same offense. United States v.Booth, 673 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1982). In the First Circuit, we examine five criteria to determine whether two conspiracies are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes: (1) the time during which the activities occurred; (2) the persons involved in the conspiracies' (3) the places involved; (4) whether the same evidence was used to prove the two conspiracies; and (5) whether the same statutory provision was involved in both conspiracies. Id.; see also United States v. Hart, 933 F.2d 80, 85-6 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 860-61 (1st Cir. 1990). Once a defendant has established a non-frivolous double jeopardy claim, the burden shifts to the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the indictments charge separate offenses. See Booth, 673 F.2d at 30-31. 158 Applying the Booth test here, we are satisfied that the narcotics conspiracy prosecuted in case 95-160 and the narcotics conspiracy involved in this case are not the same offense. First, the two conspiracies involve different time periods. The indictment in this case alleges a conspiracy beginning in 1988, from which Rosario-Rodriguez withdrew by early 1993. In contrast, in case 95-160, Rosario-Rodriguez was charged with participating in a drug conspiracy that existed at divers[e] times between January 1, 1992 until on or about June 7, 1995. Second, the participants were not the same. Among the thirty-seven defendants in case 95-160 and the forty-nine defendants named in the various indictments in this case, only the Rosario-Rodriguez brothers are common to both. Third, the evidence that the government used to prove each conspiracy was substantially different. Most notable, not a single witness was common to both trials. Although the location of both conspiracies and the statutory provisions charged, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, were the same, this alone is not dispositive. See, e.g., Hart, 933 F.2d at 85-86. Accordingly, we hold that the conspiracies charged in each indictment are legally distinct and the prosecution in this case did not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause. 159 Rosario-Rodriguez also raises a collateral estoppel argument. Collateral estoppel is a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy. It provides that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). Although first developed in civil litigation, collateral estoppel is an established rule of federal criminal law. Id. at 443. Further, the Supreme Court has stated that in criminal cases collateral estoppel is to be applied with realism and rationality. Id. at 444. 160 Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to examine that record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. The inquiry must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings. Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal. 161 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990). 162 Here, Rosario-Rodriguez states that Count 1 of the indictment describes the individuals murdered after the Rosarios exited the Santiago-Lugo drug conspiracy as associates of the Rosario-Rodriguez brothers. According to appellant, his acquittal in case 95-160 barred the government from alleging that he was associated with any of the murder victims in this case. This argument is not only confusing, but meritless. 163 Quite simply, there is no evidence indicating that the jury in case 95-160 concluded that appellant was not associated with the murder victims in this case. To the contrary, as the record stands, there is nothing that even suggests that appellant's association with these individuals was at issue, let alone determined in appellant's favor, at the prior trial. Equally important, the evidence attacked by appellant was not offered against him. The government introduced evidence of Rosario-Rodriguez's association with certain murder victims to establish the motive of other defendants, who murdered those individuals because of their affiliation with the Rosario-Rodriguez brothers. Consequently, appellant has not carried his burden of proof and this argument fails. 164