Opinion ID: 43714
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence as a Matter of Law

Text: When a defendant appeals a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on an issue that was not raised in the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Hunerlach, 197 F.3d 1059, 1068 (11th Cir. 1999). Our power to review for plain error is “limited” and “circumscribed.” Id. (citation omitted). To satisfy the plain-error standard, we must find that (1) the district court committed error, (2) the error was plain or obvious, and (3) the error affected substantial rights. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002). If all three conditions are met, we may exercise our discretion to 4 Smart first argued that his conduct did not amount to illegal money laundering as a matter of law in his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal. That motion, however, was denied because it was untimely. Because the raising of an issue in an untimely motion in district court is insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal, see United States v. Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998), we consider Smart’s insufficiency as a matter of law argument as being raised for the first time on appeal. 9 correct the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. Assuming without deciding whether the district court committed error, we conclude that Smart’s claim of insufficiency as a matter of law fails under the second prong of the plain error test. As Smart correctly observes, our court has not decided whether the payment of money by a drug dealer to a drug supplier for drugs that were previously “fronted” to the dealer on consignment, as alleged in this case, constitutes money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).5 Other circuit courts addressing this issue, however, have split on whether payments to a supplier pursuant to a “fronting” arrangement can be considered laundering. Compare United States v. King, 169 F.3d 1035, 1039 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Payment for drugs may constitute ‘promotion’ for the purposes of the money laundering statute when such payment encourages further drug transactions.”); United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1494 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that paying a supplier was laundering which “promotes” the carrying on of the unlawful activity because the defendant 5 In construing § 1956, we have determined that money laundering must be punished separately from an underlying criminal offense, and therefore the underlying offense must have been completed before any act of laundering can occur. See United States v. Christo, 129 F.3d 578, 579-80 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). While we have decided that financial transactions involving illegally obtained funds which advance ongoing criminal conspiracies constitute money laundering under § 1956, see, e.g., United States v. Carcione, 272 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001), we have not decided in the context of “fronting” drugs when the underlying offense has been completed and, consequently, whether the subsequent payment of proceeds so that the dealer can continue to receive drug shipments to sell on consignment constitutes laundering. 10 “could not have continued the illegal trafficking without paying his . . . suppliers”); United States v. Torres, 53 F.3d 1129, 1137 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that using proceeds from the sale of drugs “fronted” to a dealer to buy more drugs “satis[ied] the ‘promotion’ element of 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)”), with United States v. Dovalina, 262 F.3d 472, 476 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a “promotion money laundering offense cannot be established merely by evidence of a single buyer’s repeated payments to a distributor”); United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 485 (4th Cir. 1994) (reversing a conviction for money laundering and noting that “[w]ere the payment for drugs itself held to be a transaction that promoted the unlawful activity of that same transaction[,] virtually every sale of drugs would be an automatic money laundering violation as soon as money changed hands”). We have held that, “where neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever resolved an issue, and other circuits are split on it, there can be no plain error in regard to that issue.” United States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319, 1321 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Accordingly, because it is not clear under current law whether a money laundering offense has been committed when a drug dealer gives drug sale proceeds to a drug supplier for previously “fronted” drugs so that additional shipments can be obtained, it was not plain error for the district court to deny Smart’s motions for judgment of acquittal where he failed to raise the issue before 11 the district court. Smart’s claim that there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support his money laundering conviction thus fails under the second prong of the plain error test.