Opinion ID: 576821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: District court's refusal to hold evidentiary hearing on suppression motion.

Text: 18 Cox asserts that the refusal of the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing amounted to an abuse of discretion, since there were factual issues in need of resolution before the court could determine whether the search of the car was constitutionally permissible. 19 We note that Cox made no request for an evidentiary hearing. However, even if he had, he would not have been entitled to one as a matter of right. Rather, he would have had the burden of showing the existence of disputed material facts. Nechy v. United States, 665 F.2d 775, 776 (7th Cir.1981). To carry this burden, he would have needed to show specifically and with detail that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search [were] in question. United States v. Ledesma, 499 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1024 (1974). 20 Cox did not meet this burden. His motion to suppress merely asked the court to suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to any and all searches on or about June 10, 1990. Moreover, at the suppression hearing, when asked whether he agreed with the government's detailed statement of the facts, counsel for defendant asked to clarify the issue of Cox's location at the time the officers radioed for information regarding Cox's license and ownership of the car. After a response by the government, defense counsel stated that the defense was in agreement with the facts as presented. Additionally, at the end of the suppression hearing, the government made a proffer of the park police's general order covering the impoundment and inventorying of vehicles. No objection was made to this proffer. 21 Finally, the district court stated for the record that there really isn't any dispute in the facts of the case. Again, no objection was made. It cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion, in light of the proceedings, in not holding a full evidentiary hearing. 22 IV. District court's failure to suppress evidence obtained in alleged violation of appellant's Miranda  rights. 23 Cox claims that he was in custody and handcuffed in the rear seat of the police car when, without reading him his rights, the police officer asked Cox if he was a heroin user. He claims that the questions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from appellant. 24 This issue was not preserved for review. Cox never mentioned the alleged Miranda violation at the suppression hearing. He also failed to object when the officer testified at trial about Cox's answer to the question of his heroin use. Therefore, this is the first time the issue has been raised and should be dismissed on this ground alone. 25 Moreover, police officers need not give Miranda warnings where questions could reasonably be said to have been prompted by concern for public safety. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety exception to Miranda justified officer's failure to advise handcuffed suspect of rights before questioning him in public place, where he had just been taken into custody, as to location of gun of which officer had been informed). Once the officers discovered the drug paraphernalia, it was reasonable for them to inquire about Cox's drug use since drug users often act irrationally. One of the officers stated at trial that he posed the question to Cox for my own concern and safety. 26 Even if there was a Miranda violation, the admission into evidence of the question and Cox's response was harmless error. See United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 542-543 (9th Cir.1983) (harmless error analysis applicable to admission of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda ). The evidence against Cox was overwhelming. Moreover, the prejudicial effect of the admission of Cox's statement that he was a heroin user cannot be said to outweigh the probative value of the properly admitted evidence. Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 361 (4th Cir.1980) (case-by-case weighing of factors in harmless error inquiry). The paraphernalia found in the car sufficiently and independently supports Cox's conviction. 27