Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Torture-murder special-circumstance issues

Text: (22) Defendant, maintaining that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to establish that the murder of William involved torture, contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion (pursuant to section 995) to set aside the allegation of the torture special circumstance. [12] First, we disagree with defendant's claim that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing as to the nonfatal injuries indicative of torture did not supply probable cause to hold defendant to answer as to that allegation. Second, even an erroneous denial of a section 995 motion justifies reversal of a judgment of conviction only when a defendant is able to demonstrate prejudice at trial flowing from the purportedly inadequate evidentiary showing at the preliminary hearing. ( People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 627-628 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126]; People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [165 Cal. Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941].) Defendant has not made such a showing here. Where the evidence produced at trial amply supports the jury's finding, any question whether the evidence produced at the preliminary hearing supported the finding of probable cause is rendered moot. Even `[i]f there is insufficient evidence to support the commitment, the defendant cannot be said to be prejudiced where sufficient evidence has been introduced at ... trial' to support the jury's finding as to the charge or as to the truth of the allegation. ( People v. Moreno (1984) 158 Cal. App.3d 109, 114 [204 Cal. Rptr. 17]; People v. Moore (1987) 185 Cal. App.3d 1005, 1017-1018 [230 Cal. Rptr. 237]; People v. Hunt (1982) 133 Cal. App.3d 543, 552-553 [184 Cal. Rptr. 197]; People v. Fagalilo (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 524, 532, fn. 3 [176 Cal. Rptr. 698]; People v. Hampton (1981) 116 Cal. App.3d 193, 199 [172 Cal. Rptr. 25]; People v. Chambers (1980) 108 Cal. App.3d 985, 991 [166 Cal. Rptr. 815].) Therefore, because, as discussed, post, the evidence received at trial is sufficient to support the finding that the alleged special circumstance of murder involving torture was true, defendant's contention with regard to the section 995 motion is without merit.
(23) Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements of the torture-murder special circumstance. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court did not instruct the jury it must find that defendant did in fact inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon a living human being, because, in orally instructing the jury according to a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.81.18 offered by defendant, the court stated that  If Mr. Crittenden did in fact inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon a living human being no matter how long its duration, awareness of pain by the deceased is not a necessary element of torture. (Italics added.) The written version of the instruction provided by the trial court informed the jury as follows: To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder involving infliction of torture, is true, each of the following facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: [¶] 1. Mr. Crittenden intended to, and did kill a human being. [¶] 2. The killing did constitute murder in the first degree. [¶] 3. Separate and independent from the intent to kill, Mr. Crittenden also had the specific intent to torture the victim. [¶] 4. In this regard the intent to torture means a specific intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain upon a living human being for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic purpose. [¶] 5. Further, the specific intent to torture must be established beyond a reasonable doubt to have been a willful, deliberate and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain. In this regard, the word willful means intentional. The word deliberate means formed or arrived at as a result of careful thought and weighing the considerations for and against the proposed course of action. The word premeditated means considered beforehand. [¶] 6. Mr. Crittenden did in fact inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon a living human being no matter how long its duration. Awareness of pain by the deceased is not a necessary element of torture.  (Italics added.) As noted, in reading the instruction to the jury, the trial court added the word if before the italicized passage. The trial court's inadvertent misreading of the instruction does not appear to be error, because no reasonable juror would have understood the instruction to relieve the jury of the necessity of making a determination that defendant did in fact inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon William. First, the oral instruction did not, as suggested by defendant, omit the element that defendant did in fact inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon a living human being, but indicated, rather, that if the jury found that fact, awareness of pain was not an element of torture. Second, the jury received the correct (as modified by defendant) version of CALJIC No. 8.81.18 in its written form. (See People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 189-190 [trial court's omission of portion of CALJIC No. 3.19 held harmless because jurors received correct instruction in written form]; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 215-216 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285]; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 163-165 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]; see also People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 111, fn. 2 [249 Cal. Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569] [presumption jurors were guided by written version of instructions].) The oral and written rendering of the instruction also specifically advised the jury that specific intent to inflict extreme pain was an element of the special circumstance. In addition, we may consider whether, in light of the argument of counsel, the trial court's slight misreading of the instruction could have been prejudicial. (See People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 451-452 [285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273] [whether prosecutor's argument exploited possible ambiguities in instructions]; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 435-436 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; cf. People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1254-1255 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899] [neither counsel discussed issue that was inadequately addressed in instruction].) In the present case, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated: Finally, the jury has to find that Mr. Crittenden did, in fact, inflict extreme cruel physical pain and suffering upon a living human being no matter how long its duration and that awareness of the pain by the victim is not a necessary element of the torture. (Italics added.) The prosecutor also emphasized the evidence tending to demonstrate that William did suffer extreme pain from the neck and back injuries. Rather than exacerbating the trial court's misreading, this argument served to reinforce the correct written version of the instruction. We conclude any error was nonprejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
Defendant appears to contend that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury, over defense objection, the special circumstance allegation that William's murder involved the infliction of torture, and to contend that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding of the truth of that special circumstance. Although defendant was rendered death-eligible by the jury's having found true the other alleged special circumstances, and therefore the presence or absence of the torture special circumstance would have impact only upon the penalty phase, we proceed at this juncture to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that special circumstance finding. (24) In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court must determine from the entire record whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this determination, the reviewing court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the [conclusion of the trier of fact], not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 432, citing People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 631 [276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376]; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 575-577 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255].) [13]
(25) Defendant urges that the prosecution failed to produce evidence demonstrating that the five wounds claimed to have been torturous would have caused William extreme pain. We have observed: Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), provides a special circumstance if `[t]he murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. For the purpose of this section torture requires proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain no matter how long its duration.' ( People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 993 [244 Cal. Rptr. 905, 750 P.2d 794], italics added; see People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) [14] In the present case, during argument to the jury, the prosecutor relied upon the presence of the three knife injuries to the front of William's neck and the two injuries to his lower back to establish that William's murder involved torture. The forensic pathologist testified that each of these injuries, in addition to the other injuries (with the exception of the exit wound of the knife), would have caused William pain, but she did not testify expressly that William suffered extreme pain. Nonetheless, the forensic pathologist's testimony, considered with the photographs of the injuries themselves and of William's facial expression, amply support the determination that William suffered extreme pain. The jury instruction on this special circumstance referred to the infliction of extreme, cruel, physical pain, and it is clear a reasonable jury could determine that the cumulative pain caused by the successive premortem injuries, including these particular injuries, caused William to suffer extreme pain beyond the pain involved in incurring mortal wounds. (See People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 889.)
(26) Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that defendant intended to cause William extreme pain. Defendant relies upon the claim, frequently asserted in the context of first degree murder by torture, that the only evidence of intent to torture was derived from the condition of the victim's body, and that the severity of the victim's wounds is not necessarily determinative of intent to torture, because even the presence of severe wounds may be as consistent with an explosion of violence as with torture. (See People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 888; People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 432; People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 268.) As we have observed in evaluating similar claims made in the context of challenges to convictions for first degree murder by torture, intent is a state of mind which, unless established by the defendant's own statements (or by another witness's description of a defendant's behavior in committing the offenses), must be proved by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 531 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100], affd. in Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630]; People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 433; People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239), which include the nature and severity of the victim's wounds. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 433.) In the present case, the totality of the circumstances of the crime amply demonstrates defendant's intent to torture William and suggests neither an explosion of violence, nor, in the case of the nonfatal wounds, inadvertent infliction. The careful, even excessive, binding and gagging of the victims, involving a considerable expenditure of time and effort, such as occurred in the present case, generally is inconsistent with the theory that an explosion of violence occurred. William, having been so thoroughly incapacitated as to be unable to offer even the slightest resistance, and having been moved at some point, still bound to the chair, from the study into the bedroom, suffered several neck injuries (including puncture wounds and a longer, cutting wound) and back injuries (consisting of puncture wounds) caused by the knife. A number of these were fairly superficial cuts that clearly were not intended to be lethal (as appeared also to be the case with regard to William's fractured lower jaw), but apparently were meant instead to persuade Katherine to execute a check payable to defendant. At the same time, given their nature and placement, these wounds could not have been inflicted inadvertently. All of them appear to have preceded the fatal chest injury and head injuries. These nonfatal injuries are consistent only with an intent to inflict extreme pain, and provide substantial evidence supporting the determination that this element of the special circumstance was proved.
(27) Defendant contends the prosecution failed to establish a causal relationship between the acts of torture and death. (See People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1101-1102 [declining to decide the issue].) Defendant is mistaken as to the nature of the proof necessary to establish the presence of torture so as to justify a finding of the torture-murder special circumstance. Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), provides for this special circumstance where [t]he murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.  (Italics added.) Unlike section 189, which defines the crime of first degree torture murder as murder perpetrated by means of ... torture, thereby positing the requirement of a causal relationship between the torturous act and death ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th 499, 530; People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239; see People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 267), section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), does not by its terms require such a causal relationship. ( People v. Hoban (1985) 176 Cal. App.3d 255, 264 [221 Cal. Rptr. 626]; cf. People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239 [§ 189 requires causation, because that statute defines torture murder as murder by means of torture].) Because other types of murder, such as premeditated murder, also are defined as murder of the first degree, we believe the Legislature, by employing the broader language of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), intended to encompass (within the torture-murder special circumstance) acts of torture occurring within a larger time frame, including those that would not have caused death. ( Ibid. ) [15] We conclude the prosecution was not required to prove that the acts of torture inflicted upon William were the cause of his death. Therefore, we also reject defendant's related contention that the special circumstance instruction on torture improperly failed to require that there be a causal relationship between the torture and the victim's death.