Opinion ID: 1238237
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the licensing powers exception

Text: Department contends it is immune from suit under Section 15-78-60(12). Under that section, a governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from licensing powers or functions, including, but not limited to, the issuance, denial, suspension, renewal, or revocation of or failure to issue, deny, suspend, renew, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, registration, order, or similar authority except when the power or function is exercised in a grossly negligent manner. The trial judge instructed the jury on this exception. Department asserts the exception applies only to a licensee or potential licensee, not to a third party allegedly injured by the government's licensing decision. Nothing in the statutory language of the provision limits it as Department suggests. A potential licensee, licensee, or an injured third party may seek relief under the exception. See Parsons v. Uniroyal-Goodrich Tire Corp., 313 S.C. 394, 438 S.E.2d 238 (1993) (in construing statute, words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand statute's operation). Department also argues it could not be grossly negligent because it did not have any authority to license a bungee jumping operation in 1993. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 52-19-10 to -380 (Supp.1998) (statutes regulating bungee jumping effective in July 1994). We conclude the trial judge correctly reasoned that respondents' action pertained to modifications of the crawlevator used to carry bungee jumpers and spectatorswhich Department had licensed as an amusement devicenot to the actual jumps that were made. Department further argues there was no license for Department to revoke because the licensed crawlevator was not in use when the accident occurred. Accepting this argument would mean Department could avoid its duty simply by claiming it was powerless in the face of an unauthorized and unlicensed modification. That would subvert the clear purpose of the licensing exception, which is to hold the governmental entity liable when it is grossly negligent in failing to investigate whether it should suspend or revoke a license after learning of potentially dangerous modifications to the subject of the license. See Adams v. Texfi Industries, supra (in construing a statute, the reviewing court looks to its language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Eagle Lake and Golf Condominiums, 310 S.C. 473, 427 S.E.2d 646 (1993) (purpose of the statute and public policy are aids in construction of a statute). Finally, Department argues that respondents Steinke are barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel from asserting the winch and cable system was licensed by Department because they asserted it was not licensed in a federal lawsuit against Beach Bungee's owners. See Steinke v. Beach Bungee, Inc., 105 F.3d 192 (4th Cir.1997) (discussing verdict form in which the jury determined by special interrogatory that the winch and cable system was operated without a license from Department). The Steinkes' position in the two cases is consistent. In the federal lawsuit, the Steinkes asserted and the jury found that the winch and cable system was not licensed. In this case, the Steinkes asserted the crawlevator was licensed, and Department was grossly negligent in failing to suspend or revoke that license after learning the crawlevator may have been replaced by the unlicensed winch and cable system. We have defined gross negligence as the failure to exercise slight care. We also have defined it as the intentional, conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do. Gross negligence is a relative term, and means the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances. Hollins v. Richland County School Dist. One, 310 S.C. 486, 490, 427 S.E.2d 654, 656 (1993) (citations omitted). Under any of those definitions, the trial judge properly denied Department's directed verdict and post-trial motions when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to respondents. The record shows Department received three credible reports of a suspected problem or hazard at a licensed amusement device, yet Department gave the matter no more than a cursory glance.