Opinion ID: 1698030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims based upon carelessness, negligence, and unskillfulness

Text: In Swan, a police officer for the City of Hueytown stopped a vehicle in which the plaintiff, Michael Swan, was a passenger. During the stop, the officer radioed a police dispatcher and asked the dispatcher to check the National Crime Information Center database to determine whether the driver or Swan had any outstanding warrants. The dispatcher informed the officer that the City of Birmingham had a possible outstanding warrant on Swan. The officer then instructed the dispatcher to contact the City of Birmingham to confirm the existence of the warrant. The officer was informed by the dispatcher that the City of Birmingham had confirmed the existence of two outstanding warrants for Swan's arrest. The evidence later indicated that the outstanding warrants were for a Michael Swann rather than the plaintiff, Michael Swan. Swan was arrested, and when it was determined that he had no outstanding warrants for his arrest, he was released. Swan sued the City of Hueytown claiming that he had suffered harm as a result of the officer's failure to determine his true identity. The City of Hueytown argued that it was entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338. In affirming the summary judgment for the City of Hueytown, this Court held that under both § 6-5-338 and the standard set out in Cranman, the officer was engaged in a discretionary function requiring an exercise in judgment when he arrested Swan and, therefore, was entitled to immunity. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079. The Court also held that arrests and attempted arrests are generally classified as actions requiring an officer to exercise judgment. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079. Arnold alleges that she was falsely imprisoned and falsely arrested as the result of the negligence, carelessness, and unskillfulness of John Moon and Theodore Moon. The petitioners, on the other hand, argue that John Moon and Theodore Moon are entitled to immunity under 6-5-338(a). [5] The facts of this case are similar to the facts of Swan. John Moon and Theodore Moon were arresting or attempting to arrest Arnold when they confirmed the existence of a warrant for her arrest. Therefore, under Cranman and Swan, this action is a discretionary function involving the exercise of judgment. See Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079 (Thus, the Cranman standard answers in the affirmative the question whether arresting a person is an exercise of judgmenta `discretionary function'and therefore clothes the officer in State-agent immunity.). Once the existence of the outstanding warrant was confirmed, based on the information provided by Theodore Moon John Moon decided to pick up a copy of the warrant and to arrest Arnold. Under Swan, the arrest involved an exercise of judgment within the meaning of the Cranman test. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079. Therefore, John Moon and Theodore Moon are entitled to immunity because they were engaged in an arrest or attempted arrest, which is a discretionary function requiring the exercise of judgment. See City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So.2d 755, 762 (Ala.2002) (Allegations of negligence are not sufficient to remove the immunity the City is provided for [an officer's] performance of a discretionary function.) (citing Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d at 570). Therefore, as to the claims alleging negligence, carelessness, and unskillfulness that were brought against John Moon and Theodore Moon, we grant the petition for the writ of mandamus and order the trial court to stay discovery and direct the trial court to conduct a hearing on the summary-judgment motion as to the claims against them based on carelessness, negligence, and unskillfulness. [6]