Opinion ID: 1818626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The statute of limitations in wrongful-death cases.

Text: ¶ 24. We previously addressed the statute of limitations in wrongful-death cases in Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, 933 So.2d 923 (Miss.2006) wherein we stated: Recognizing that, in Thiroux, we should have specifically overruled Gentry, we do so now, and hold that the statute of limitations on bringing a wrongful death claim is subject to, and limited by, the statute of limitations associated with the claims of specific wrongful acts which allegedly led to the wrongful death. Id. at 926. It has been argued that our holding in Jenkins produced unfair results because (according to the argument), a wrongful-death claim may expire before death occurs. This argument is incorrect, and reveals a failure to review and absorb the specific provisions of the wrongful death statute. ¶ 25. The wrongful-death statute  as it relates to death caused by a negligent act  states in very specific and understandable terms: Whenever the death of any person or of any unborn quick child shall be caused by any ... negligent act or omission,... as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured or damaged thereby to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, ... and such deceased person shall have left [wrongful death beneficiaries]..., the [defendant] ... that would have been liable if death had not ensued... shall be liable for damages, notwithstanding the death.... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004). Thus, the survival claims described in the wrongful-death statute are, by specific statutory language, limited to damages which the deceased person could have pursued if death had not ensued. In other words, when a tortfeasor negligently injures someone and a claim arises, the injured party generally has three years to bring a claim. Miss.Code. Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). And if the injured party subsequently dies, the wrongful-death beneficiaries simply step into the shoes of the deceased person and may  assuming the deceased person brought no claim prior to death  bring claims the deceased person could have brought if death had not ensued. The injured person (who later died), the statutory beneficiaries, or a combination of the two, have had the entire limitation period to bring the suit, and the claim (made by the statutory beneficiaries) is no more than the same claim the injured party could have brought if death had not ensued. Stated another way, if a person who is injured through the negligence of a tortfeasor fails to file suit within the three-year statute of limitations, the right to bring the claim expires; and it does not quicken simply because the injured person later dies. ¶ 26. But cases filed pursuant to our wrongful-death statute may involve more than one kind of claim. For instance, in addition to claims the decedent could have brought if death had not ensued, [8] there may be individual claims of loss of consortium, society and companionship, estate claims, and insurance subrogation claims. While it is true that the wrongful-death statute requires that all such claims be brought in one suit, each claim is subject to its own statute of limitations. The statute of limitations on estate claims does not begin to run until all of the elements of an estate claim are present. The same is true for claims of loss of society and companionship, which may very well not arise until death. ¶ 27. One reason for the confusion over claims under our wrongful-death statute is that much of the statute's language does not relate to wrongful-death claims, but rather survival claims. [9] One who brings a claim under the wrongful-death statute to recover only damages under circumstances which, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured or damaged thereby to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, is actually bringing a survival claim, rather than a wrongful-death claim. A true wrongful-death claim  which is allowed, but not specifically discussed in the language of the wrongful-death statute  is one which is brought to recover damages (such as loss of consortium) one person's death causes to another. ¶ 28. The Louisiana wrongful-death statute, Louisiana Revised Statute Section 9:5628 (2008), also provides for survival and wrongful-death claims. The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the confusion caused thereby as follows: Although both actions arise from a common tort, survival and wrongful death actions are separate and distinct. Guidry v. Theriot, 377 So.2d 319 (La.1979). Each right arises at a different time and addresses itself to the recovery of damages for totally different injuries and losses. Id. The survival action comes into existence simultaneously with the existence of the tort and is transmitted to beneficiaries upon the victim's death and permits recovery only for the damages suffered by the victim from the time of injury to the moment of death. [10] Id. It is in the nature of a succession right. Comment, Wrongful Death: Prescription? Peremption? Confusion! 39 La. L.Rev. 1239, 1249 (1979). On the other hand, the wrongful death action does not arise until the victim dies and it compensates the beneficiaries for their own injuries which they suffer from the moment of the victim's death and thereafter. Guidry v. Theriot, supra . Wrongful death damages compensate beneficiaries for their own injuries. 39 La.L.Rev. 1239, supra at 1249. Taylor v. Giddens, 618 So.2d 834, 840 (La. 1993). ¶ 29. To summarize, the Mississippi wrongful-death statute, despite the Legislature's assigned nomenclature, encompasses all claims  including survival claims which could have been brought by the decedent, wrongful-death claims, estate claims, and other claims  resulting from a tort which proximately caused a death. And where death is not an immediate result of the tort, the limitation periods for the various kinds of claims may not begin to run at the same time. ¶ 30. In the case before us today, the wrongful-death claims of the wrongful-death beneficiaries matured  and the statute of limitations on those claims began to run  on April 17, 2000; not because that is the day Mr. Caves died, but rather because that is the first day (if death had not ensued) Mr. Caves could have brought a claim. [11] ¶ 31. If there are other claims against Dr. Yarbrough and the Hospital (such as estate claims and claims for loss of consortium) which may be subject to a different statute of limitations, such claims are not before us. We now turn to the question of whether the claims of the wrongful-death beneficiaries are subject to a discovery rule.