Opinion ID: 3012797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The McDonnell Douglas Presumption

Text: The Koorns allege, with respect to their FHA, §§ 1981, 1982 claims, that they are entitled to the burden-shifting presumption of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case for discriminatory effect can shift the burden to defendants for justification of acts with discriminatory effects. Resident Advisory Board, 564 F.2d at 149. A prima facie case consists of proof that (1) plaintiffs are in a protected class, (2) they applied for and were qualified to rent or purchase housing, (3) they were rejected, and (4) the housing opportunity remained available. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979). While the Koorns establish that they are racial minorities and that they are qualified for the ownership of their home, they admit that the third and fourth elements have not been satisfied. (J.A. at 348). The Ordinance limiting the number of dogs they may keep does not reject them from their dwelling. And even if it did, there is no way the Koorns could predict that their house would “remain available.” Accordingly, the Koorns cannot rely on the McDonnell Douglas presumption to establish a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act or 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982.