Opinion ID: 524680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Court's Decision Constitute Invidious Gender-Based Discrimination?

Text: 25 If the classification itself, covert or overt, is not based upon gender, the second question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274, 99 S.Ct. at 2293; see Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n. 20, 94 S.Ct. at 2492 n. 20. 26 To prevail on a sex discrimination claim under this second theory, Toomey must show that the court's consideration of her pregnancy had a discriminatory effect and that it acted with discriminatory intent or purpose. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1766-67, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274, 99 S.Ct. at 2293; De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 51 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S.Ct. 2416, 60 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1979). Discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 3 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, 99 S.Ct. at 2296 (footnote omitted). 27 We must determine whether the court intended to discriminate against Toomey because of her sex. Having reviewed the state record, the district court found absolutely no support for her claim. We agree that elements of an intentional sex discrimination claim are not present in this case. 28 Toomey contends that the court's consideration of her pregnancy was based on the state's alleged failure to accommodate pregnant juveniles. She contends that alleged failure reflects a pattern of discrimination under which Washington denies juvenile females facilities and treatment equal to those provided for juvenile males. She further argues that had the state taken minimal steps to accommodate, the juvenile court would have had no basis to decline jurisdiction over her. 29 Toomey bases those allegations on testimony presented by juvenile probation officer, David Corn, at the declination hearing. He testified that the juvenile system did not have the time to rehabilitate Toomey effectively and stated: 30 I was told by the Division of Institutions when I talked with them about Patricia's case and her particular problem with the law and trying to--in trying to ascertain what they would do with a case like this were they to get it, one of the first things they told me simply was that they were not equipped to deal with a pregnant teen-age girl. 31 Noting that Corn's testimony raised doubts about the state's ability to handle pregnant juveniles, Toomey claims that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether Washington has failed to accommodate pregnant females in its juvenile system. 32 The district court, however, found her suggestion clearly meritless in that lack of appropriate facilities has not been demonstrated anywhere in the record nor in the documents submitted to the court. It noted that express testimony demonstrated that the state's juvenile facility at Echo Glen had the facilities necessary to accommodate pregnant females. A court-appointed clinical psychologist, Barbara White Davis, testified that the state's juvenile system was accustomed and equipped to handle pregnant girls. 4 Further, Corn later clarified his testimony stating that juvenile parole officials had told him they would work with community agencies to provide those juveniles with appropriate facilities and treatment. Based on that testimony, the juvenile court found that the state's juvenile system had adequate facilities to accommodate a pregnant female. 5 There is no evidence that it declined jurisdiction even in part because of the state's alleged inability to accommodate. In its oral declination decision, the court provided: 33 It is undeniably true, and the court takes it to be true, that Echo Glen and the juvenile justice system have the facilities available to allow her to give birth to this child within the confines of the system. The court does not perceive that to be a particularly logistical problem, but once a person becomes a parent given polysubstance abuse problems, given passive/dependent personality problems and cyclothymic disorder problems, dealing with being a parent causes some problems, also.... I cannot help but conclude that what's going to happen with Patricia and this child, whether it be a termination through the juvenile court or whether it's going to be getting parenting education and skills, is going to cloud and distract from dealing with substance abuse, passive/dependent personality, and cyclothymic disorders. 34 Contrary to Toomey's contentions, the court did not consider her pregnancy because of any lack of facilities. Instead, it considered her pregnancy only in its evaluation of the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation, given her serious personality disorders and drug abuse problems. 35 We reject the suggestion that the district court must afford Toomey an evidentiary hearing on the question whether the state has failed to accommodate pregnant juveniles in its system. Because the juvenile court did not rely on that contention to decline jurisdiction, the alleged factual dispute is not crucial to the adequate consideration of the constitutional claim. 6 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317, 83 S.Ct. 745, 759, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). Any failure to accommodate would have had no discriminatory effect on the declination decision. 36 Further, the court did not rely only on the potential problems generated by Toomey's pregnancy in determining whether to waive jurisdiction. Instead, the district court found that the juvenile court took all of the Kent standards into account and concluded that its declination decision was thoughtful and well reasoned. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 270 (1966) (factors to consider in waiving juvenile jurisdiction); see also Wash.Rev.Code Ann. Secs. 13.40.110-13.40.440 (West Supp.1989) (Washington's Juvenile Justice Act of 1977). The juvenile court considered: 37 the severity of the charged offense, the degree of the petitioner's alleged involvement, the petitioner's degree of sophistication and maturity, then constancy of her home life, her emotional attitude, her life style, her lack of past criminal record, the failure of various social programs in which the petitioner had been involved, the length of time for which the juvenile court could maintain jurisdiction over the petitioner, her history of drug and alcohol abuse and personality disorder, and the likelihood of treatment and rehabilitation. 38 Our review of the record confirms that it considered the Kent criteria carefully and judiciously. Toomey's contention that the state's failure to accommodate pregnant juveniles provided the only basis for the court's declination of jurisdiction is specious. 39 Finally, we note that the record does not necessarily support the argument that the court's consideration of pregnancy had a discriminatory effect on the declination decision. It is unclear whether the court would have retained jurisdiction over a similarly situated nonpregnant juvenile. 7 This is not a case in which pregnancy mandates declination. The court here conducted an individualized analysis of the Kent factors to conclude that given all the circumstances, the public's best interests required declination. The record shows that the court waived jurisdiction for several reasons, only one of which involved Toomey's prospects for rehabilitation in light of her pregnancy. 40 We conclude that the court's consideration of pregnancy did not reflect invidious discrimination. The court's finding that the juvenile system could accommodate pregnant females and its thorough review of the Kent factors support this court's dismissal of Toomey's equal protection claim. II 41 Alternatively, Toomey contends that the declination decision violates her equal protection rights because the court's consideration of her pregnancy is not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. She argues that the district court erred in dismissing her habeas corpus petition without holding an evidentiary hearing on whether there is a rational relationship between pregnancy and rehabilitation. We disagree. 42 Toomey urges that the court's decision to decline jurisdiction based explicitly on her pregnancy was wholly irrational. She contends that the record does not suggest any rational basis for considering pregnancy in evaluating her rehabilitative prospects except for Corn's testimony that the juvenile system is not equipped to handle pregnant juveniles. 43 The juvenile court, however, did not base its decision on the lack of appropriate facilities for pregnant juveniles. Instead, it concluded that Toomey's pregnancy might complicate and hinder the therapy required by a person with her psychological and drug abuse problems. That made it less likely the state could rehabilitate her before her release at 21. 44 The state has an interest in declining juvenile jurisdiction over one who, upon release, may harm the public. The juvenile system is designed to rehabilitate those juveniles with a likelihood of success, but not those who, upon release, would likely continue to endanger public safety. During the declination hearing, Davis testified that Toomey's pregnancy would cause at least a temporary disruption of any counseling program within the juvenile system. She commented that it was possible that the pregnancy might lengthen the amount of time necessary for Toomey's rehabilitation. 45 We find that, given her other problems, the court had a rational basis for determining that Toomey's pregnancy could have hindered her rehabilitative treatment. See United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir.1976) (holding that preferential treatment based on pregnancy in sentencing decision was rational and within the sound discretion of the court); see also Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 793 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir.1986) (rational basis standard requires only that there exist plausible, arguable, or conceivable reasons for a classification), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102, 107 S.Ct. 1334, 94 L.Ed.2d 184 (1987).