Opinion ID: 1851456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: condemnation appeal

Text: As previously stated, plaintiff also claims trial court's Ruling of May 7, 1973 is obscure, uncertain and vague. Before entertaining that issue, however, we must resolve defendant's countering assertion to the effect the instant appeal by plaintiff was impermissibly taken from an interlocutory adjudication absent requisite permission. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 331(b), 332. An orderly approach to the question put by defendant's aforesaid contention necessitates some repetition of the procedural background. At the outset, as heretofore observed, plaintiff gave notice of appeal to district court from the condemnation commission award. But plaintiff failed to file an attendant petition within the statutorily required time. Defendant thereupon moved to dismiss said appeal or affirm the commission award. Three days later, absent leave of court, plaintiff belatedly filed a petition. See Baker v. City of Cedar Falls, 185 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1971); Code § 472.22. Cf. Carmichael v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 156 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1968). May 7, 1973 trial court entered this previously quoted ruling: Motion to Dismiss or Affirm is overruled provided plaintiff delivers to defendant written surrender of possession of subject premises on or before June 7, 1973; otherwise said motion is sustained, the assessment affirmed and appeal dismissed. June 7, 1973, plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal to Supreme Court from said May 7 adjudication. So the issue to be resolved is whether that ruling was a final adjudication from which appeal could be taken as a matter of right. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 331(a). In Johnson v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 257 Iowa 810, 812, 134 N.W.2d 916, 917 (1965) we said: A final judgment or decision is one that finally adjudicates the rights of the parties. It must put it beyond the power of the court which made it to place the parties in their original position. A ruling or order is interlocutory if it is not finally decisive of the case.  (Emphasis supplied). See also Helland v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Iowa 1973); Employers Group of Ins. Cos. v. Villhauer, 254 Iowa 391, 394, 118 N.W.2d 38 (1962). Furthermore, the record reveals that on June 11, 1973, defendant filed an Application to Modify or Amend Order of May 7 because plaintiff had failed to surrender possession of the involved property. Pursuant thereto an Order Modifying and Amending Previous Order was entered June 11, 1973. Trial court thereby (1) sustained defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal from the condemnation commission award; (2) ordered plaintiff to vacate the premises by June 22, 1973; and (3) directed that in event she failed to do so a writ of possession be issued. No appeal was taken therefrom. For reasons hereafter set forth we conclude the May 7 ruling was interlocutory. In the first place it was provisional. On this subject we declared in Williams v. Bourne, 248 Iowa 189, 192, 79 N.W.2d 751, 753 (1956): [A]s a general rule final judgments must not be conditional   . See also Johann Maria Farina v. Roger & Gallet, 296 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1961); 4 Am. Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 51; 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 96. Furthermore, said May 7 ruling was not finally decisive of the case. See Johnson v. Iowa State Highway Comm.; Helland v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.; Employers Group of Ins. Cos. v. Villhauer, all supra ; Ruth & Clark, Inc. v. Emery, 235 Iowa 131, 132-133, 15 N.W.2d 896 (1944). Demonstrably, trial court entered a final adjudication June 11, 1973, by which defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal was sustained. This clearly constituted a changed matter of substance. But, as aforesaid, no appeal was then taken. Moreover, by said May 7 ruling, plaintiff was deprived of no right which could not be protected by an appeal from the June 11 final adjudication. See Wolf v. Lutheran Mut. L. Ins. Co., 236 Iowa 334, 343-344, 18 N.W.2d 804 (1945). See also Iowa R.Civ.P. 337. Under these circumstances this court is without jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's appeal from the May 7, 1973 ruling. See Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 906 (Iowa 1973). By virtue of the foregoing the appeal here attempted is dismissed. See Helland v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 204 N.W.2d at 605. Consequently, the issue raised by plaintiff as to vagueness of the order upon which notice of appeal was given is not reached. Affirmed in part, dismissed in part.