Opinion ID: 1156814
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Awarding Attorney's Fees to Patricia for Costs Involved in Defending Against Jay Hartland's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution?

Text: On November 13, Patricia obtained a writ of execution and served it on Shearson Lehman Brothers. On November 20, Jay moved to quash the writ of execution seeking to have Patricia accept certain assets instead of a money payment. On the same day, he also moved for expedited consideration under Rule 77. Patricia opposed the motions arguing that the present motion was a not so veiled fourth attempt to obtain the same relief which plaintiff has already been denied three times. On December 1, 1987, a telephonic hearing was held on the motion to quash. Jay offered to make the motion moot by paying the $9,800 due on the judgment. On December 2, the court issued its order quashing the writ of execution conditioned on Jay's payment of $9,800. The court also stated that it would consider Patricia's motion for the attorney's fees generated by the expedited motion. The court later awarded Patricia all her fees, or $2,060.10, stating that Jay's motion was repetitive, frivolous and abuse of proper court procedure. Jay argues that the court erred in awarding Patricia fees since the motion to quash was justified and an appropriate use of court procedures. In response, Patricia argues that the court made an appropriate award of fees under Rule 77( l ). Civil Rule 77( l ) states: The presentation to the court of frivolous or unnecessary motions ... which unduly delay the course of the action proceeding ... for the purpose of delay where no reasonable ground appears therefor subjects counsel presenting or filing such, at the discretion of the court, to imposition of costs and attorney's fees to the opposing party. A pleading is `frivolous' when it is clearly insufficient on its face, and does not controvert the material points of the opposite pleading, and is presumably interposed for mere purposes of delay. Black's Law Dictionary 601 (Fifth ed. 1979). In the case at bar, Jay sought to quash Patricia's writ of execution on the grounds of financial hardship and to offer to satisfy the obligation with alternative assets. In the alternative, Jay again sought a stay of the proceedings to enforce the judgment under Rule 62(b). These are not defenses to a properly issued writ of execution. See AS 09.35.010-09.35.330; Alaska R.Civ.P. 69. Since the motion did not facially raise a valid defense, the motion to quash had no function other than as a delay tactic. As a result, Judge Craske was within his authority under Rule 77( l ) in awarding attorney's fees to Patricia for her opposition to the frivolous motion. In conclusion, we reverse the court's division of the marital estate and remand the case to allow the court to recapture any dissipated marital assets and then determine the appropriate division using the Merrill factors. We remand the issue of Jay's retirement benefits for the court's recalculation of their value using a present valuation method. The court is free to reconsider any related issue and take such further evidence as it deems appropriate. We reverse the court's exclusion of certain commissions earned by Jay but not paid until after the date of divorce because of his employer's probation program. The court should determine the exact amount of these commissions and divide them accordingly. As to the court's contempt holding, we vacate the damages award and remand the issue back to the court for its determination of the appropriate amount of damages. We affirm the court's determination as to the remaining issues. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.