Opinion ID: 2534195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether defendant may invoke the doctrine

Text: The Attorney General, relying on Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th 768, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574, contends defendant is not entitled to invoke the doctrine of imperfect defense of others because he created the circumstances leading to the killing. In Christian S., we observed, It is well established that the ordinary self-defense doctrineapplicable when a defendant reasonably believes that his safety is endangeredmay not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created the circumstances under which his adversary's attack or pursuit is legally justified. [Citations.] It follows, a fortiori, that the imperfect self-defense doctrine cannot be invoked in such circumstances. For example, the imperfect self-defense doctrine would not permit a fleeing felon who shoots a pursuing police officer to escape a murder conviction even if the felon killed his pursuer with an actual belief in the need for self-defense. ( Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574.) Defendant contends the Attorney General is barred from raising this argument because he did not raise it in the Court of Appeal. The Attorney General responds the argument was implicit in his Court of Appeal brief. We disagree. Fairly read, the Attorney General's brief in the Court of Appeal is limited to the argument we discussed earlier, that contrary to Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th 486, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032, California has rejected the doctrine of imperfect defense of others, and has, instead, adopted the alter ego rule. However, this issue, whether defendant is precluded from invoking the doctrine of defense of others because he created the circumstances leading to the killing, was squarely raised in the Attorney General's petition for review, which we granted. We may decide any issue raised or fairly included in the petition or answer. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1).) The Attorney General urges us to exercise our discretion to decide this issue. As a matter of policy, we generally will not consider on review any issue which could have been, but was not, timely raised in the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 28(c)(1); Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1265, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 793, 90 P.3d 752.) However, [i]n a number of cases, this court has decided issues raised for the first time before us, where those issues were pure questions of law, not turning upon disputed facts, and were pertinent to a proper disposition of the cause or involved matters of particular public importance. (E.g., Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 464, 469, fn. 2, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d 223; Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 7-8, fn. 2, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511; Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1118, 245 Cal.Rptr. 658, 751 P.2d 923; Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 654 & fn. 3, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261.) ( People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 901, fn. 5, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949, italics added.) The facts underlying the Attorney General's argument were undisputed. Defendant admitted arming himself with a pistol when he and Byron set out to burglarize cars, and he admitted using the weapon when Robinson surprised him in the act of burglarizing Lambert's car. Therefore, we conclude the Attorney General is not barred, by his failure to raise it below, from arguing that defendant is not entitled to invoke the doctrine of imperfect defense of others because he created the circumstances leading to the killing. Turning to the merits, we agree with defendant. The Attorney General's argument fails because although defendant's criminal conduct certainly set in motion the series of events that led to the fatal shooting of Robinson, the retreat of defendant and Byron and the subsequent recovery of the stolen equipment from Byron extinguished the legal justification for Robinson's attack on Byron. (See Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574.) The record supports the conclusion that Robinson was taking the law into his own hands, meting out the punishment he thought Byron deserved, and not making a citizen's arrest as the Attorney General claims. [5] While Robinson may well have had a right to pursue Byron for the purpose of recovering Lambert's stolen property, and to use reasonable force to retrieve it, [6] the beating of Byron by Robinson and Lambert went well beyond any force they were entitled to use. Moreover, after they recovered the stolen stereo equipment and returned to their truck, Robinson jumped out of the truck and began beating Byron again. At that point Robinson's use of force was completely unjustified, and it was at that point, or shortly thereafter, that defendant shot Robinson. While we hold defendant's conduct did not create circumstances legally justifying Robinson's attack on Byron, we should not be understood as condoning it in any respect. By making two fateful choices defendant triggered an escalating series of events that transformed the most mundane of property crimes into a fatal shooting. When he set out to burglarize cars, defendant chose to arm himself. When he was surprised in the act of burglary, defendant chose to use the weapon. Whether, during that initial confrontation, he fired the pistol at Robinson, or fired in the air, as he variously testified, he raised the stakes enormously.