Opinion ID: 2551099
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sengupta's 1997 Lawsuits Against UAF and Sengupta v. University of Alaska

Text: After Sengupta's appeal was dismissed, he consulted a new attorney, Robert Sparks. On January 14, 1997, Sengupta filed a complaint against UAF in superior court asserting claims relating to his termination, denial of a request for sick leave, and an alleged salary disparity. Sengupta brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that UAF had violated his freedom of speech, right to due process, and equal protection; under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 alleging discrimination on the basis of color and national origin; and under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, alleging employment discrimination. On March 29, 1997, Sengupta filed a second complaint against UAF in superior court adding a cause of action to set aside prior judgments as void because of alleged due process violations and alleged fraud, misrepresentation, and misconduct on the part of UAF. [9] Superior Court Judge Mary E. Greene granted summary judgment to UAF on all of Sengupta's claims in both lawsuits and awarded partial attorney's fees to UAF. [10] Sengupta appealed to this court. In Sengupta v. University of Alaska, we affirmed Judge Greene's grant of summary judgment because: (1) Sengupta's § 1983 claims relating to sick leave and salary level were barred by a two-year statute of limitations; [11] (2) Sengupta's § 1983 claim alleging due process violations at the Parrish hearing was barred by a two-year statute of limitations; (3) Sengupta could not object to Hearing Officer Rice's application of collateral estoppel to the findings in the Parrish hearing because Judge Hodges affirmed Rice's application of collateral estoppel and Sengupta failed to file a timely appeal of Judge Hodges's decision; [12] (4) collateral estoppel precluded Sengupta's § 1983 claims asserting due process violations at the Rice hearing because Judge Hodges determined that Sengupta had been afforded due process and Sengupta failed to file a timely appeal of Judge Hodges's decision; [13] (5) res judicata precluded Sengupta from asserting his First Amendment claims in a separate § 1983 action because he could have asserted them at either the Parrish hearing or the Rice hearing but did not, and because he did not appeal Judge Hodges's decision; [14] (6) Sengupta did not produce any evidence to support his § 1983 equal protection claim; [15] (7) Sengupta did not produce any evidence to support his claim that UAF had fraudulently concealed documents from him; [16] (8) UAF regulations did not entitle him to a pre-termination hearing before a faculty panel; [17] and (9) Sengupta did not meet his threshold burden to produce circumstantial evidence supporting his mixed motive discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981. [18]