Opinion ID: 842360
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: private cause of action under mcl 15.602

Text: Having concluded that defendant's residency requirement contravenes the statute, the remaining issue is whether plaintiff may maintain a private cause of action for money damages against defendant. While the statute does not explicitly provide for a private cause of action, plaintiff claims that a cause of action should be inferred, because without it plaintiff would have no adequate mechanism to enforce the act. The Court of Appeals majority [17] stated that the rule for inferring rights of action is found in a footnote in Pompey v. Gen Motors Corp . [18] In Pompey, it was noted that where no common-law remedy existed, the remedy provided by statute was the sole remedy. In a footnote following that general proposition, the Pompey Court noted two important qualifications to this rule of exclusivity, stating that the statutory remedy is not deemed exclusive if such remedy is plainly inadequate, or unless a contrary intent clearly appears. [19] In Gardner v. Wood, [20] the issue presented was whether a civil cause of action for damages could be maintained against a premises owner for violation of the bottle club act, MCL 436.26c. Gardner held that, when a statute is silent concerning whether a private remedy is available for a statutory violation, a court may infer a private cause of action if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision. . . . [21] Utilizing a test derived from the Second Restatement of Torts, Gardner held that a cause of action could be created to redress a statutory violation where the purpose of the statute at issue was found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results. [22] While the four-factor test focused exclusively on the purpose of the statute, Gardner further observed that the purpose of the statute alone was an insufficient basis for inferring a private right of action. Rather, Gardner held that the determination [to infer a private cause of action] should not only be consistent with legislative intent, but should further the purpose of the legislative enactment. [23] Gardner held that a cause of action could not be maintained because it was inconsistent with the intent of the Legislature, indicating that the imposition of a private cause of action was a matter for legislative resolution. [24] Similarly, subsequent decisions of this Court have refused to impose a remedy for a statutory violation in the absence of evidence of legislative intent. [25] In this case, we need not consider either the factors articulated in Gardner or the footnote in Pompey because neither case may be properly extended to allow a private cause of action for money damages to be implied against a governmental entity such as defendant. [26] Without express legislative authorization, a cause of action cannot be created in contravention of the broad scope of governmental immunity. . . .  [27] Here, there is no express authorization permitting a private cause of action against a public employer for violation of MCL 15.602(2), nor is there any evidence that the Legislature intended such a remedy. Because the words of a statute provide the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent, we look there to discern it, [28] and may not speculate regarding that intent beyond those words expressed in the statute. [29] A public employer is defined under MCL 15.601(a) as a political subdivision of the state. [30] Political subdivisions such as defendant enjoy immunity from tort liability under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. [31] Under the GTLA, the defendant is immune from tort liability unless the Legislature has pulled back the veil of immunity and allowed suit by citizens against the government. [32] The GTLA permits a cause of action to be brought against a governmental agency in only six discrete areas, none of which is relevant here. [33] In addition, the Legislature has elsewhere created causes of action against political subdivisions of the state. [34] In fact, chapter 15 of the Michigan Compiled Laws is replete with instances where the Legislature has explicitly permitted actions for monetary damages against municipalities and their employees. [35] However, none of these exceptions can be interpreted to permit a suit for violation of the permitted residency requirement described in MCL 15.602(2). Rather, the fact that the Legislature has explicitly permitted damage suits in other provisions of chapter 15 provides persuasive evidence that the Legislature did not intend to create a private cause of action for violation of this particular provision. Moreover, plaintiff's claim that a private cause of action for monetary damages is the only mechanism by which the statute can be enforced is incorrect. Defendant could enforce the statute by seeking injunctive relief pursuant to MCR 3.310, or declaratory relief pursuant to MCR 2.605(A)(1). [36] A preliminary injunction may be granted under MCR 3.310(A) where plaintiff can make a particularized showing of irreparable harm that will occur before the merits of the claim are considered. [37] Moreover, an actual controversy exists for the purposes of a declaratory judgment where a plaintiff pleads and proves facts demonstrating an adverse interest necessitating a judgment to preserve the plaintiff's legal rights. [38] In this case, plaintiff's claim is that defendant's residency requirement, made a condition of plaintiff's employment, was in violation of MCL 15.602(2). Such a claim would constitute an actual controversy for the purposes of an action for a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff claims that these remedies are an illusion, because enforcing the statute by seeking declaratory or injunctive relief would likely be costly. However, plaintiff cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that would permit the creation of a cause of action for monetary damages in contravention of governmental immunity simply because other available remedies are less economically advantageous to plaintiff. It is not within the authority of the judiciary to redetermine the Legislature's choice or to independently assess what would be most fair or just or best public policy. [39] Rather, the relief that plaintiff seeks must be provided by the Legislature.