Opinion ID: 1386258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Present Wyoming Statute

Text: By the 1989 Wyoming legislature's comprehensive change of the Wyoming death penalty provisions, the weighing and burden of proof issues which are pervasive in this appeal no longer occur under the replacement provisions. A difficult instruction problem for capital penalty that existed in the old statute has been removed by the new text. Upon retrial, if Engberg is again prosecuted for capital murder, assessment of death penalty will be under the current statutes instead of the prior provisions which supplied the significant question of erroneous instructions addressed in the present appeal. There are two particularly relevant Wyoming death penalty statutes. W.S. 6-2-101 states: [46] (a) Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest or kidnapping, or by administering poison or causing the same to be done, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree. (b) A person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or life imprisonment according to law, except that no person shall be subject to the penalty of death for any murder committed before the defendant attained the age of sixteen (16) years. W.S. 6-2-101 (1991 Cum.Supp.) (1989 statute). W.S. 6-2-102 states: (d) Upon conclusion of the evidence and arguments the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions, including instructions as to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, as defined in subsections (h) and (j) of this section, or proceed as provided by paragraph (iii) of this subsection: (i) After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render a recommendation of sentence to the judge, based upon the following: (A) Whether one (1) or more sufficient aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt as set forth in subsection (h) of this section; (B) Whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as set forth in subsection (j) of this section which out weigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and (C) The mere number of aggravating or mitigating circumstances found shall have no independent significance. (C) (ii) Based upon these the considerations in paragraph (i) of this subsection, the jury shall unanimously determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances unanimously found to exist, and each individual juror may also consider any mitigating circumstances found by that juror to exist. [See, however, McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988).] (ii) (iii) In nonjury cases, the judge shall determine if any aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist and impose sentence within the limits prescribed by law, based upon the considerations enumerated in subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) of paragraph (i) of this subsection. (e) The death penalty shall not be imposed unless at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (h) of this section is found. In nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree on the punishment to be imposed, the judge shall impose a life sentence. The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation sentence of death, shall designate in writing signed by the foreman of the jury: (i) The aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree on to punishment to be imposed, the judge shall impose a life sentence.; (ii) The mitigating circumstance or circumstances which it unanimously found by a preponderance of the evidence; and (iii) The mitigating circumstance or circumstances which any individual juror found by a preponderance of the evidence.       (h) Aggravating circumstances are limited to the following: (i) The murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment: (A) Confined in a jail or correctional facility; (B) On parole or on probation for a felony; (C) After escaping detention or incarceration; or (D) Released on bail pending appeal of his conviction.       (iv) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; (v) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody; (vi) The murder was committed for compensation, the collection of insurance benefits or other similar pecuniary gain; (vii) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, being unnecessarily torturous to the victim; (viii) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney, former district attorney, or former county and prosecuting attorney, defending attorney, peace officer, juror or witness, during or because of the exercise of his official duty; (ix) The defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was less than seventeen (17) years of age or older than sixty-five (65) years of age; (x) The defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was especially vulnerable due to significant mental or physical disability; (xi) The defendant poses a substantial and continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts of criminal violence; (xii) The defendant killed another human being purposely and with premeditated malice and while engaged in, or as an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping. (j) Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:       (vii) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime; (viii) Any other fact or circumstance of the defendant's character or prior record or matter surrounding his offense which serves to mitigate his culpability. W.S. 6-2-102 (1991 Cum.Supp.) (1989 statute). In the current Wyoming Criminal Code which was enacted in 1982 and 1983, a continuity provision was inserted to retain effectiveness of prior law for the determination of the existence of a criminal offense and to separately establish penalty assessment if less onerous in the new law. The saving clause, having first retained prior statutes to govern prosecutions for crimes occurring prior to the effective date of the act, then provided for penalty: In a case pending on or after the effective date of this act, involving a crime committed prior to the effective date, if the penalty under this act for the crime is different from the penalty under prior law, the court shall impose the lesser sentence. W.S. 6-1-101(b) and (c). This application of the new code, if the changed penalty was favorable to the convicted person, was confirmed in Attletweedt v. State, 684 P.2d 812 (Wyo. 1984). Legislative enactment of Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171 (1989) relating to assessment of the death penalty following conviction of murder in the first degree now provides a more modern death penalty procedure. The new statute, in generally amending and re-enacting, included no reference to offenses committed prior to passage or for guilt determination thereafter except in Section 3: This act is effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171, § 3 (1989). Consequently, with approval March 6, 1989, the law became effective on passage. I conclude that the present law determines any future death penalty assessment procedure which would include a penalty retrial for Engberg. [47] Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1989); Reynoldson v. State, 737 P.2d 1331 (Wyo. 1987); Miller v. State, 732 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1987); Attletweedt, 684 P.2d 812.