Opinion ID: 1176393
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: counsel issues

Text: Defendant represented himself at the preliminary hearing and at trial without the assistance or advice of counsel. He contends he was forced to undertake self-representation as a result of the failings of his appointed attorney and a series of improper rulings on his requests for competent legal assistance. Although the trial court's failure to exercise discretion on defendant's request for appointment of advisory counsel was error under People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731 [209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994, 64 A.L.R.4th 723], we have concluded it was harmless under the facts of this case. The other counsel issues, for the reasons which will appear, are without merit.
Defendant moved in superior court under section 995 to set aside the information on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing. The motion was denied and defendant now contends that this ruling was erroneous. This contention requires a review of the proceedings in municipal court.
The public defender was appointed to represent defendant on July 9, 1980. The deputy assigned to the case was Sam Gordon. In early September, defendant filed motions in propria persona (pro. per.) for discovery, for allocation of trial preparation funds, and for appointment of an investigator. In the motion papers defendant cited Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525]. On September 19, 1980, before the preliminary hearing which ultimately commenced on January 5, 1981, defendant told the court he had not seen Mr. Gordon since July 21 and had received no response to two letters and a telephone message. Defendant had been moved to the pro. per. tank at the jail, apparently by mistake, and had assumed this meant Mr. Gordon was no longer representing him. Referring to Mr. Gordon, defendant stated: I do waive him as a legal representative of any kind because he has put up no defense at all for me, none whatsoever, won't even communicate with me. The court set a hearing on the issue of representation for September 22. In the interim, defendant filed a written notice of motion for appointment of cocounsel. In the moving papers defendant cited section 1095 (two counsel may argue a death penalty case), former section 13 of article I of the California Constitution (a person accused of crime has the right to defend in person and with counsel), and Evidence Code section 730 (providing for court appointment of experts). At the hearing on September 22, the court handed these motion papers to Deputy Public Defender Gordon as attorney of record. Defendant interjected: Your Honor, I waive Mr. Gordon and the Public Defender as counsel. I want to proceed in pro. per. The court reminded defendant it was a capital case and it might not be too prudent for him to represent himself. The court stated it could not appoint cocounsel for defendant because the court's powers are limited and this court can only appoint ... the Los Angeles County Public Defender, and that has already occurred. Defendant replied: Then I prefer to remain in pro. per. I waive the Public Defender.... I have given you the reasons already. Asked to state the reasons again, defendant said Gordon had not communicated with him and had made no efforts to research the case or to prepare a defense. A recess was then taken to give Mr. Gordon an opportunity to discuss the matter with defendant. After the recess, defendant again stated he wanted to waive the Public Defender and to be granted pro. per. status. The court reminded defendant that the prosecutor was an experienced lawyer, that self-representation was almost always a bad decision, that defendant would receive no special treatment and would be required to follow the normal rules, and that defendant would not have the advice of an experienced criminal lawyer. Defendant stated he understood and the court then granted the motion for self-representation, finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. Defendant asked whether lack of funds was the only reason why the court would not appoint a lawyer other than the public defender. Mr. Gordon stated there was no conflict of interest and the court agreed none had been shown. Mr. Gordon then explained that another attorney could be appointed if there were a conflict of interest but not at the defendant's whim. The court stated that defendant's motion for appointment of cocounsel was denied for the reasons indicated, that this court cannot afford to appoint an independent lawyer to defend you.... This court can only appoint a private lawyer if the Public Defender cannot defend you, and that does not exist in this case. On October 14, defendant filed a motion for dismissal, arguing that failure to appoint cocounsel to assist him constituted invidious discrimination on the basis of indigency. This motion was denied. The question of representation was again raised on November 18 when defendant orally renewed his motion for cocounsel or an advisory counsel. The renewed motion was denied. The preliminary hearing commenced on January 5, 1981. At the outset, the magistrate asked defendant whether he wanted to be represented by the public defender. Defendant replied: I asked for co-counsel before and I accept co-counsel or advisory counsel. The magistrate stated: I didn't offer you co-counsel. I offered you counsel to represent you. Defendant answered: No, I don't want counsel to represent me. The magistrate advised defendant of the dangers of self-representation, after which defendant stated: I reject the public defender but I do accept co-counsel and advisory counsel. The magistrate commented that the attorneys working for the public defender were fine lawyers. Defendant stated: I had the public defender and his opening statement to me was to plead guilty and offered no defense. And I didn't see him for two months, so I rejected him. A recess was taken to permit defendant to discuss the case with Mr. Winckler, another deputy public defender, who stated after the recess that he had explained to defendant the policy of the public defender's office against allowing its attorneys to act as advisory counsel. The magistrate replied: I had indicated to the defendant I was not going to appoint co-counsel at this stage of the proceeding, that is, just in an advisory capacity, which he seemed to be interested in; but I would offer him the opportunity of having a lawyer represent him. Defendant then reaffirmed his decision to represent himself, stating he intended to call the public defender to ask him to make an exception to the rule. [3]
(1) A criminal defendant lacking the means to employ private counsel has a constitutional right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel ( Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 342-345 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 804-806, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]) and this assistance must satisfy certain minimum standards of competence ( United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 654-655 [80 L.Ed.2d 657, 664-665, 104 S.Ct. 2039]; McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 [25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773, 90 S.Ct. 1441]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839]). (2) When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 124 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44].) A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation ( In re Banks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 337, 342 [93 Cal. Rptr. 591, 482 P.2d 215]) or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result ( People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 93-94 [184 Cal. Rptr. 611, 648 P.2d 578, 23 A.L.R.4th 476]; cf. People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 812-814 [218 Cal. Rptr. 73, 705 P.2d 396]). (3a) Relying on these principles, defendant contends that his first assertion of inadequate representation triggered a duty by the court to inquire into the adequacy of counsel's performance and, ultimately, to appoint a different attorney. Defendant further contends that the court should have conducted a more thorough inquiry and should have appointed counsel other than the public defender. During the municipal court proceedings defendant asserted inadequate representation by counsel only as an explanation for his decision to act as his own attorney. (I do waive [Deputy Public Defender Gordon] as a legal representative of any kind because he has put up no defense at all for me.) A request for advisory counsel (referred to as co-counsel in defendant's written motion but apparently intended to act primarily or solely in an advisory capacity) was soon added to the request for self-representation but defendant did not at any time during the municipal court proceedings seek the appointment of substitute counsel to assume control of his defense. Aside from indicating he would accept advisory counsel, defendant requested only that he be permitted to represent himself. (4) A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to choose self-representation instead of representation by counsel. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 807, 819-821 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 566, 572-574].) The only determination a trial court must make when presented with a timely Faretta motion is whether the defendant has the mental capacity to waive his constitutional right to representation by an attorney with a realization of the probable risks and consequences. ( People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 943 [196 Cal. Rptr. 339, 671 P.2d 843].) A request for self-representation does not trigger a duty to conduct a Marsden inquiry ( supra, 2 Cal.3d 118) or to suggest substitution of counsel as an alternative. ( People v. Wright (1977) 72 Cal. App.3d 328, 338-341 [140 Cal. Rptr. 98].) (3b) Defendant was fully advised of the dangers of self-representation and he unquestionably had the mental capacity to waive his right to representation by an attorney. Accordingly, the motion for self-representation was properly granted. As no request for substitute counsel was made in municipal court, the Marsden procedures were not required. Defendant has failed to demonstrate denial of the right to counsel during the municipal court proceedings.
(5) Defendant contends that his requests in municipal court for appointment of advisory counsel should have been granted. It is doubtful that this issue is preserved for review as it was not expressly raised in defendant's motion under section 995 to dismiss the information. (See § 996; People v. Harris (1967) 67 Cal.2d 866, 870 [64 Cal. Rptr. 313, 434 P.2d 609]; People v. White (1981) 118 Cal. App.3d 767, 773 [173 Cal. Rptr. 575].) Assuming arguendo that the grounds of the motion may be construed to encompass this issue, there is yet another reason making it unnecessary to review the merits of this claim. We have held that after trial and conviction, error in judicial rulings at or before the preliminary hearing is grounds for reversal only if the defendant demonstrates that the error resulted in denial of a fair trial or otherwise affected the judgment. ( People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [165 Cal. Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941].) Application of the rule here makes it unnecessary to decide whether failure to appoint advisory counsel in municipal court was error because defendant makes no showing of prejudice flowing directly from these rulings. [4] Rather than attempting to demonstrate prejudice, defendant argues that the rule of Pompa-Ortiz is unfairly invoked against a pro se defendant who properly challenges municipal court rulings by a section 995 motion to set aside the information but then ignorantly fails to seek review by writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeal. This argument is based on an assumption that the purpose of the Pompa-Ortiz rule is to induce counsel to apply for a pre-trial writ. That assumption is incorrect: the rule of Pompa-Ortiz has no purpose other than obedience to the mandate of section 13 of article VI of the California Constitution that a judgment shall not be set aside for error not resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Defendant's argument also assumes that a self-represented defendant's presumed lack of legal acumen may justify exceptions to the normal rules of appellate review. (6) There is no authority for this position; on the contrary, it is settled that a pro se defendant may not claim incompetent representation as a basis for reversal on appeal. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581].) Application of the Pompa-Ortiz rule ( supra, 27 Cal.3d 519) is not unfair in this situation. Finally, defendant argues that application of the Pompa-Ortiz rule will effectively preclude appellate review of municipal court rulings on advisory counsel requests because of the impossibility of assessing prejudice, as recognized in Bigelow. ( People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 745.) This argument is simply incorrect. Rulings of the magistrate at the preliminary hearing are reviewable in the superior court on a motion pursuant to section 995 and pretrial appellate review by petition for writ of prohibition is statutorily available (§ 999a).
During proceedings in superior court defendant for the first time requested substitute counsel. After much inquiry and discussion the court denied the request for appointment of substitute counsel, as well as defendant's requests for appointment of advisory counsel. Defendant contends that the requirements of People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, were not satisfied, that he did not receive adequate warnings about the dangers of self-representation, that the court erred in not appointing advisory counsel, and that his ejection from a pretrial hearing made it an improper ex parte proceeding.
At his first superior court appearance, on January 22, 1981, defendant requested appointment of Irving Kanarek, an attorney who was then present and willing to accept appointment. The court stated it would appoint the public defender with the understanding that Sam Gordon had been assigned the case. Defendant said he had a terrific conflict of interest with the public defender but Mr. McAllister, a deputy public defender appearing on behalf of Mr. Gordon, denied there was any conflict of interest. On January 28, defendant again requested appointment of Mr. Kanarek. The court asked defendant to explain why he believed there was a conflict of interest with the public defender. Defendant said Mr. Gordon had done absolutely nothing, had advised defendant to plead guilty without investigating the case, and had not answered defendant's phone calls or letters. The prosecutor recounted the municipal court proceedings, noting that defendant had requested advisory counsel. The court stated: No, there is no such thing. The court agreed to set a hearing at which Mr. Gordon would be present but declined to appoint Mr. Kanarek for the limited purpose of representing defendant at the hearing. At the hearing on February 4, with Deputy Public Defender Gordon present, defendant said Mr. Gordon had provided ineffective counsel. Mr. Gordon stated there was nothing in the case that would prevent him from doing his best and there was no conflict of interest. Defendant said Mr. Gordon had told him to plead guilty, had conducted no investigation, and had failed to communicate with him. Mr. Gordon assured the court he would take the case to trial if defendant wanted him to do so. The court stated there appeared to be a personality conflict rather than a conflict of interest. The prosecutor suggested further inquiry be made of Mr. Gordon regarding defendant's specific charges of inadequate representation. Mr. Gordon denied recommending that a certain plea bargain might be possible. He admitted there was a period of a couple of months when he did not see defendant, after having seen him three times, but he said he believed he was prepared to try the preliminary hearing on the morning when defendant elected self-representation. A hearing in chambers without the prosecutor was held on the following day. Asked to be as specific as possible, defendant said the policy of the public defender's office seemed to be to plead guilty before you even find out the facts of the case. Defendant said he began representing himself after he had been placed in the pro. per. section of the jail and after Mr. Gordon failed to meet with him for three weeks. Defendant said that Gordon later explained that defendant had been placed in the pro. per. section of the jail by accident through a mix-up. Defendant said Gordon admitted he had done nothing on the case. Defendant maintained that Gordon should have requested discovery and should have taken steps to challenge a search warrant. Defendant conceded Gordon had not specifically stated he would not take the case to trial. Asked to respond, Deputy Public Defender Gordon said he had prepared for the preliminary hearing and had seen defendant three times during which they had discussed both trial and alternatives to trial and the fact that the trial itself may be very far down the line. Referring to defendant's assertion that Gordon had advised him to plead guilty, Gordon stated: I can categorically deny that that conversation ever took place. Gordon said he had discussed with defendant diminished capacity and other possible defenses. He said there was definitely a disagreement as to tactics, which related to the fact situation that [defendant] proposed to defend himself on. Asked if he had anything to add, defendant stated: Well, I just refuse to plead guilty when he tells me that is the thing to do. The court repeated that defendant's only choices, based on what had been presented at the hearing, were representation by the public defender and self-representation. In open court, with the prosecutor present, defendant said he had asked Deputy Public Defender Winckler to serve as advisory counsel but Winckler had stated it would be against the policy of his office. The court commented: I wouldn't appoint that kind of counsel anyway. Defendant was again advised at length of the dangers of self-representation, after which he reaffirmed his decision to represent himself. When the case was called for trial, the court asked defendant whether there was any additional need for the court to try to talk defendant out of self-representation. Defendant said there was no additional need and remarked that he had been trying for over a year to have private counsel appointed. The court asked whether defendant intended to represent himself and defendant answered: Yes. I have no alternative. Defendant represented himself throughout the trial.
(7) (See fn. 5.) When the case first came before the superior court, defendant had been representing himself for some time. [5] He requested appointment of a private attorney, Mr. Kanarek, and stated he would accept appointment of other private counsel but he insisted he would rather represent himself than be represented by Deputy Public Defender Gordon. [6] What ensued was in the nature of a delayed Marsden proceeding ( supra, 2 Cal.3d 118) to determine whether Mr. Gordon had provided adequate representation while serving as defendant's counsel. Only by establishing grounds not to reappoint Deputy Public Defender Gordon could defendant obtain the appointment of other counsel. As specific instances of deficient performance, defendant stated that Gordon had failed to conduct an investigation, had advised defendant to plead guilty, and had failed to communicate with defendant. Gordon categorically denied pressuring defendant to plead guilty. Gordon said that he had met with defendant on three occasions, that they had discussed the case and the range of possible defenses, that Gordon had been prepared to try the preliminary hearing which was not then imminent in any event, that there was a disagreement concerning tactics, and that Gordon would take the case to trial if defendant wanted him to do so. (8) Once the defendant is afforded an opportunity to state the reasons for discharging an appointed attorney, the decision to allow a substitution of attorney is within the discretion of the trial judge unless defendant has made a substantial showing that failure to order substitution is likely to result in constitutionally inadequate representation. ( People v. Smith (1985) 38 Cal.3d 945, 956 [216 Cal. Rptr. 98, 702 P.2d 180]; People v. Walker (1976) 18 Cal.3d 232, 238 [133 Cal. Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306]; People v. Carr (1972) 8 Cal.3d 287, 299 [104 Cal. Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513].) (9a) Defendant was given ample opportunity, on several occasions, to state the reasons for his dissatisfaction with Mr. Gordon, and was urged to be as specific as possible. Defendant's statements, considered with Gordon's responses, did not constitute a substantial showing that Gordon had not provided or would likely not provide constitutionally adequate representation. The lack of communication during a period of several weeks, after three consultations, did not establish inadequate representation (see People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 231 [207 Cal. Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]; People v. Walker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 237-238), and, given the function and purpose of a preliminary hearing, the court could accept counsel's representation that he was prepared to try the preliminary hearing. (10) A disagreement concerning tactics is likewise insufficient to compel the discharge of appointed counsel, unless it signals a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. ( Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, 935 [106 Cal. Rptr. 631, 506 P.2d 1007, 66 A.L.R.3d 984]; People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905-906 [88 Cal. Rptr. 208, 471 P.2d 1008].) In determining whether defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result, trial courts properly recognize that if a defendant's claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel, defendants effectively would have a veto power over any appointment and by a process of elimination could obtain appointment of their preferred attorneys, which is certainly not the law. A trial court is not required to conclude that an irreconcilable conflict exists if the defendant has not made a sustained good faith effort to work out any disagreements with counsel and has not given counsel a fair opportunity to demonstrate trustworthiness. (9b) Given the early stage of the proceeding at which defendant rejected Mr. Gordon's assistance, the trial court could reasonably conclude that defendant had not made sufficient efforts to resolve his differences with Mr. Gordon or given Gordon sufficient time to demonstrate he was worthy of defendant's trust. At oral argument before this court, defendant contended for the first time that in fact a conflict of interest did exist that would have precluded the public defender from representing him in the superior court. The court should have inferred from defendant's statements, he argues, an intention to bring a motion under section 995 to set aside the information on grounds which included incompetent representation by Deputy Public Defender Gordon in the municipal court proceedings. Appointing the public defender, it is now urged, would have required the public defender's office to argue the incompetence of one of its own deputies, and thus placed the public defender in a position of conflict. Defendant argues that the court was therefore required to grant his request for appointment of counsel other than the public defender, especially Deputy Gordon. Defendant's argument is constructed on erroneous assumptions. (11) First, a defendant represented by counsel cannot, as defendant's argument assumes, dictate what motions counsel will bring on his behalf; with a few exceptions, none of which apply here, counsel has authority to control court proceedings. ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 314 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]; People v. Kirkpatrick (1972) 7 Cal.3d 480, 486 [102 Cal. Rptr. 744, 498 P.2d 992].) (12) Second, a bare assertion that inadequate representation should be urged as a ground for invalidating prior proceedings is insufficient to require appointment of different counsel  a defendant must make at least a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 388, 396 [217 Cal. Rptr. 306] [new trial motion].) (9c) Here the court inquired into defendant's complaints against Gordon in compliance with Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, and found them baseless. Given this conclusion, the court was not obliged to anticipate a section 995 motion raising the same meritless issue. Finally, of course, our review of the denial of defendant's section 995 motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel has established the lack of merit in any such motion. We conclude that there was no conflict of interest barring appointment of the public defender and that the decision not to appoint private counsel was not an abuse of discretion. (13a) After denial of the motion to appoint private counsel, defendant was again advised of the dangers of self-representation and, upon defendant's insistence, he was permitted to represent himself. Defendant's waiver of counsel was properly determined to be voluntary.
(14) California courts have discretion to appoint advisory counsel to assist an indigent defendant who elects self-representation. ( People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731, 742.) When a defendant requests appointment of advisory counsel, a court's failure to exercise its discretion is serious error and its denial of a request for advisory counsel in a capital case may constitute an abuse of discretion. ( Id. at p. 743.) We held in Bigelow that failure to exercise discretion on a request for advisory counsel in circumstances where a refusal to grant the request would be an abuse of discretion requires automatic reversal of a resulting conviction because of the inherent difficulty in assessing prejudice. ( Id. at pp. 744-746.) The trial court's discretion to appoint advisory counsel had been acknowledged before Bigelow in People v. Mattson (1959) 51 Cal.2d 777 [336 P.2d 937], but Mattson provided little guidance on the exercise of that discretion and, indeed, strongly intimated that appointment of advisory counsel was generally inadvisable. Mattson stated that an attorney was a member of an ancient, honorable and deservingly honored profession, and entitled to fair consideration, that a trial court should not appoint counsel  whether to defend an indigent or otherwise  and require of him that in so doing he surrender any of the substantial prerogatives traditionally or by statute attached to his office, and that a defendant had no right to the services of an attorney as a mere subservient helper under the direction of the accused. ( People v. Mattson, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 793.) Mattson concluded that appointment of advisory counsel was not required by the California Constitution and bolstered this conclusion with a reference to the duty of the court to safeguard and promote the orderly and expeditious conduct of its business and to guard against inept procedures and unnecessary indulgences which would tend to hinder, hamper or delay the conduct and dispatch of its proceedings (p. 792). Given these disparaging references to the role of advisory counsel, it is hardly surprising that many judges rejected out of hand requests for appointment of counsel in an advisory capacity. The concern of Mattson that appointment of advisory counsel would demean the profession was unfounded, as is now generally recognized. (15) The role of an attorney rendering expert legal advice to a pro se defendant is similar to, and no more demeaning than, that of an expert appointed under Evidence Code section 730 to render advice in fields such as medicine, psychiatry, or ballistics. [7] A defendant seeking appointment of an expert under Evidence Code section 730 must make a showing of need and the decision to grant or deny the request rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 514, 521 [167 Cal. Rptr. 402]; Collins v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal. App.3d 47, 52 [141 Cal. Rptr. 273].) These same principles govern a request for appointment of advisory counsel. (16) Defendant in this case voiced on several occasions a request for appointment of cocounsel or advisory counsel. These requests were summarily denied. On one occasion, when told of defendant's request for advisory counsel, the court stated: No, there is no such thing. On another occasion, when informed the public defender's office would not accept appointment in an advisory capacity, the court stated: I wouldn't appoint that kind of counsel anyway. None of the judges who considered the matter expressly acknowledged the existence of discretion to appoint advisory counsel for defendant, and there is no evidence that any judge engaged in a reasoned exercise of judgment based on an examination of the particular circumstances of this case. The failure to exercise discretion was error. ( People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 743.) In Bigelow, we concluded that the trial court's error in failing to exercise discretion gained in significance because on the record in that case it would have been an abuse of discretion to deny the request for advisory counsel. ( People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 743.) (17a) The Attorney General maintains that the reasons for appointment of advisory counsel were much more compelling in Bigelow than in the present case, and that in this case it would not have been an abuse of discretion to deny the request for appointment of advisory counsel. We agree. Our recognition of trial court discretion in ruling on a motion for advisory counsel necessarily implies the existence of discretion to deny as well as to grant. A discretion which can be exercised in one way only, or which is shackled by rigid rules regarding its exercise, is no discretion at all. (18) `Judicial discretion is that power of decision exercised to the necessary end of awarding justice based upon reason and law but for which decision there is no special governing statute or rule. Discretion implies that in the absence of positive law or fixed rule the judge is to decide a question by his view of expediency or of the demand of equity and justice.' ( Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786, 796 [140 Cal. Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750], quoting People v. Surplice (1962) 203 Cal. App.2d 784, 791 [21 Cal. Rptr. 826].) (19) Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731, did not establish a fixed rule that advisory counsel must be appointed for every pro se defendant in a capital case, and thus the question whether denial of a request for advisory counsel would have been an abuse of discretion must be determined on a case-by-case basis. As with all actions by a trial court within the exercise of its discretion, as long as there exists `a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification, under the law, for the action taken, such action will not be here set aside, even if, as a question of first impression, we might feel inclined to take a different view from that of the court below as to the propriety of its action.' ( Gonzales v. Nork (1978) 20 Cal.3d 500, 507 [143 Cal. Rptr. 240, 573 P.2d 458], quoting Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry. Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 156, 161 [47 P. 1019].) The factors which a court may consider in exercising its discretion on a motion for advisory counsel include the defendant's demonstrated legal abilities and the reasons for seeking appointment of advisory counsel. Where a defendant represented by the public defender has undertaken self-representation only after seeking appointment of private counsel and after having failed to demonstrate proper grounds for appointment of substitute counsel, a request to have private counsel appointed in an advisory capacity might evidence a manipulative endeavor to obtain the appointment of private counsel without a showing of conflict or inadequacy sufficient to remove the public defender in the first instance. Where the record supports an inference of such a manipulative purpose, a court might be justified in denying a request for advisory counsel. [8] (17b) As the Attorney General notes, the defendant in Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731, was a Canadian with only a ninth-grade education and no familiarity with California law, whereas defendant in the present case was born in California and had an eleventh-grade education. Also, the defendant in Bigelow was charged with four special circumstances under the 1978 death penalty initiative, two of which had never been judicially construed and were arguably inapplicable to the defendant's act, while in the present case the defendant was charged only with the multiple-murder special circumstances, which presented no significant construction problems on the facts of this case. While these distinctions are relatively slight, an additional factor sets this case apart from Bigelow  defendant in this case demonstrated substantial competence in the municipal court proceedings. Defendant appeared before the superior court as an obviously intelligent, literate, and articulate advocate in his own cause who had acquitted himself well at the preliminary hearing. He had brought discovery and numerous other motions, had subpoenaed witnesses, and had engaged in skillful examination and cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. Defendant had demonstrated in his motion papers an ability to research the law, to cite applicable precedent, and to engage in reasoned argument. The same judge who dismissed defendant's request for advisory counsel with the remark that there is no such thing, stated to defendant: I am well aware how smart you are and how good you are [at] handling your case, so you are not the typical illiterate defendant. Because this record does not demonstrate that denial of defendant's request for advisory counsel would have been an abuse of discretion, Bigelow is distinguishable and its rule of per se reversal does not govern. The Faretta court noted that a State may  even over objection by the accused  appoint a `standby counsel' to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835, fn. 46 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581]. See also, McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 184 [79 L.Ed.2d 122, 137, 104 S.Ct. 944].) But the right to the assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions, has never been held to include a right to the appointment of advisory counsel to assist a defendant who voluntarily and knowingly elects self-representation. ( People v. Mattson, supra, 51 Cal.2d 777, 795-796.) The trial court erred in failing to exercise its discretion on defendant's request for advisory counsel, but where as here a refusal to grant the request would not have been an abuse of discretion, a rule of per se reversal is unnecessary and unwarranted. (Cf. People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 348-349 [161 Cal. Rptr. 762, 605 P.2d 401] [abuse of discretion in failing to appoint particular attorneys held harmless error].) No federal constitutional right being implicated, the consequences of the error are properly assessed by employing the Watson harmless error standard. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Defendant proved to be an aggressive, thorough, and skillful advocate in superior court. He brought pretrial motions to dismiss the information (§ 995) and to suppress evidence (§ 1538.5). At the hearing on the latter motion, defendant called and examined six witnesses in detail. In preparing for trial defendant used the services of an investigator as well as experts in the fields of pathology, fingerprints, and firearms. Defendant engaged in extensive and relevant voir dire of the prospective jurors, successfully exercising two challenges for cause. Defendant used all of his peremptory challenges, as did the prosecution. During the trial defendant may have made some tactical decisions that with hindsight appear to have been unwise, but he also engaged in skillful cross-examination of witnesses. During his cross-examination of Marie she confirmed that her father, Ernest, had a history of starting arguments when he drank, that he became a different person when he drank and sometimes became violent, that he had once attacked Marie's mother, that the police had been called to the house a lot when Ernest was arguing with Marie's mother, and that Ernest was abusive and loud on the night of his death. Defendant also impeached Marie with evidence of prior inconsistent statements. Similar instances of skillful use of cross-examination could be cited in regard to many other witnesses. In denying defendant's motion for new trial, the trial judge remarked: Mr. Crandell did a job which absolutely astounded me. And I have been here for as long as I have indicated and I have seen the best come and go. The level of his performance was totally surprising to me. Now, whether it was due to the fact that he had a long time to prepare for his case, and since he was the one on the line, that he paid great attention to it, I am sure that's part of it, or whatever else the sources of his information were, he gave [the prosecutor] Mr. Weisberg a run for his money in this department as far as this Court is concerned. And Mr. Weisberg is a heavyweight. His level of questioning I would compare to a seasoned trial lawyer with at least first degree homicides under his belt by way of defense. That's the kind of job he did here. I don't know what his IQ is and I don't care, because his performance here would put many defense lawyers to shame. His formation of questions on his feet was outstanding. He got the medical examiner in this case to admit he was wrong in his opinions 50 percent of the time. That was a new one for me. I have never seen a skilled lawyer be able to do that. His argument on the theory of how blood was on the feet of one of the two deceased was well-put and logical in its formation. And that's the kind of job he did[.] [I]n this mental appraisal and analysis which I underwent every day to decide if he was continuously receiving a fair trial[,] [t]he answer was always yes. Defendant managed to place his version of events before the jury without subjecting himself to cross-examination by relying on his tape-recorded police interview and his other out-of-court statements. Defendant's summation at the guilt and special circumstances phase was lucid and comprehensive. On this record it does not appear reasonably probable that different verdicts would have been returned had defendant received the assistance of advisory counsel.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence (§ 1538.5), the parties stipulated to consideration of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing. In addition, defendant proposed to call several witnesses, including a magistrate who had issued a search warrant. The hearing judge remarked that the magistrate was a personal friend and offered to recuse himself but defendant stated it was unnecessary. The prosecutor remarked that the magistrate who had issued the search warrant had testified twice at the preliminary hearing and the court questioned why additional testimony was needed. Another proposed witness was Mr. Daniels, a former deputy district attorney who had resigned and moved out of state after having been assigned to defendant's case during its early stages. The court questioned both the relevance of Daniels's proposed testimony and whether he had been subpoenaed. Seven witnesses were called and examined by defendant, after which defendant requested that the magistrate and Mr. Daniels be brought to testify. When the request was denied, defendant accused the court of bias and moved for disqualification, insisting the motion be heard by another judge. The court denied the belated disqualification motion and instructed defendant to proceed. Defendant responded only by challenging the court's jurisdiction. The prosecutor called a witness, after which the court invited rebuttal and argument. Defendant replied by again asserting lack of jurisdiction. The court began reciting its findings on the suppression issues but was repeatedly interrupted by defendant, who was finally removed from the courtroom after disregarding a warning that this would be the consequence of further disruptive behavior. The hearing was concluded in defendant's absence by the recitation of the court's findings. (20) Defendant contends that conducting any part of the hearing while he was neither present nor represented by counsel was a denial of his right to counsel and automatic reversible error. Defendant does not challenge the ruling on the disqualification motion, the rulings declining to compel the attendance of witnesses, or the ruling on the merits of the suppression motion, nor does defendant challenge the action of the court in ejecting him for disruptive behavior. Defendant contends only that the court was powerless to proceed with the hearing in defendant's absence without appointing counsel to represent him. We find no error. Both the evidentiary and argument phases of the hearing were concluded in defendant's presence. Nothing remained but announcement of the court's ruling. Absent a showing of at least a possibility of prejudice, reversal is not required where a defendant is unrepresented at a pretrial proceeding during which nothing occurs other than the announcement of a ruling. ( People v. Tahtinen (1958) 50 Cal.2d 127, 135 [323 P.2d 442] [setting of date for retrial]; People v. Rice (1887) 73 Cal. 220, 221-222 [14 P. 851] [ruling on demurrer].)