Opinion ID: 2709146
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Hyland

Text: The bar owners first assert that the court clearly erred when it found that secondhand smoke causes disease. The court based this finding on Dr. Hyland’s testimony, which it found credible. Specifically, the bar owners challenge the court’s understanding of relative risk and the methods behind the Surgeon General’s report which Dr. Hyland used throughout his testimony. In a bench trial or hearing without a jury, the district court judge acts as both gatekeeper and factfinder. He must deter- mine both whether expert evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and whether it is credible. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000) (“soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert’s analysis and the correctness of the expert’s conclusions based on that analysis are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact.”). These determinations, though often closely related to each other, require different levels of appellate scrutiny. When reviewing a district court’s application of Rule 702, we review the court’s choice of legal framework governing expert testimony de novo, while we review its decision to admit or exclude the proffered expert testimony for abuse of discretion. 6 No. 13-1629 United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2005). Expert credibility determinations, on the other hand, are findings of fact, Smith, 215 F.3d at 718, and are thus reviewed for clear error. Furry v. United States, 712 F.3d 988, 992 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus, to properly analyze the bar owners’ claims, we must determine whether they go to Dr. Hyland’s credibility or the admissibility of his testimony under Rule 702. Rule 702 analysis focuses on the expert’s methodology and the principles upon which his research rests. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (noting that the focus of the Rule 702 inquiry is “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”). It is up to the trier of fact, however, to evaluate the “soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert’s analysis and the correctness of the expert’s conclusions based on that analysis.” Smith, 215 F.3d at 718. The challenge to the court’s understanding of relative risk is essentially a challenge to the court’s determination that Dr. Hyland was credible. Dr. Hyland’s principles and methodology—epidemiology—provided a relative risk1 value for secondhand smoke between 1.2 and 1.3. Dr. Hyland then offered the conclusion that this was sufficient to support a finding that secondhand smoke causes disease. The court 1 Relative risk is the ratio of the rate of disease in people exposed to a risk factor to the rate of disease in people not exposed to the risk factor. Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 566 (3d ed. 2011). In this case, the relative risk compares the rate of disease in those exposed to secondhand smoke to the rate of disease in those without such exposure. A relative risk of one indicates no relationship between the risk factor and the disease. Id. at 567. A relative risk of less than one indicates a negative association between the risk factor and the disease. Id. A relative risk greater than one indicates a positive association. Id. No. 13-1629 7 found this conclusion credible when it credited Dr. Hyland’s testimony. We give a district court’s credibility determinations of expert witnesses “great weight.” United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1245 (7th Cir. 1985). In this case, there is no reason to disturb the district court’s finding that Dr. Hyland was credible. He provided ample explanation for his conclusions; given the record, it cannot be stated with any certainty that the court’s conclusion was in error. The bar owners’ challenge to the substance of the Surgeon General’s report goes to the admissibility of Dr. Hyland’s testimony, as it concerns his methodology and application of epidemiological principles. Thus, it would be evaluated under the abuse of discretion standard, were it properly preserved. But the bar owners did not object to Dr. Hyland’s testimony on these grounds at trial, and the claim is forfeited. See Jiminez v. City of Chicago, – F.3d –, 2013 WL 5524787 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2013).