Opinion ID: 852396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: South Bend's Common Law Claims

Text: Cooper Industries contends that our statute of limitation, Ind.Code § 34-11-2-7, bars the instant claims because South Bend did not commence its action within six years after it discovered some ascertainable damage to the former Studebaker property. (Appellant's Br. at 12-13.) South Bend argues in reply that its common law tort claims are timely as to the property it purchased within six years from the date of commencing the action because a statute of limitation did not accrue until it purchased each parcel. (Appellees' Br. at 28-29.) The trial court agreed with South Bend.
The general six-year statute of limitation applies to South Bend's claims for negligence, trespass, and public and private nuisance. See Ind.Code § 34-11-2-7(3); cf., Pflanz v. Foster, 888 N.E.2d 756 (Ind. 2008) (applying a ten-year statute of limitation for a contribution action, rather than the six-year statute for property damage, because the statute of limitation did not begin to run until after the claimant was ordered to clean up the property). The parties dispute both when the action accrued and whether South Bend's claims were timely filed in light of the accrual date.
Statutes of limitation seek to provide security against stale claims, which in turn promotes judicial efficiency and advances the peace and welfare of society. The party pleading a statute of limitation bears the burden of proving the suit was commenced beyond the statutory time allowed. In re Paternity of K.H., 709 N.E.2d 1033, 1035 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). When application of a statute of limitation rests on questions of fact, it is generally an issue for a jury to decide. Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246 (Ind.1993). South Bend argues that its cause of action for damages to the Studebaker property did not accrue for limitation purposes until it became the owner of the property and had a right to commence the action, citing Gray v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 624 N.E.2d 49 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied. We cannot agree. Indiana adheres to the rule that third parties are usually held accountable for the time running against their predecessors in interest. Mack v. Am. Fletcher Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 510 N.E.2d 725, 734 (Ind. Ct.App.1987). [2] Accepting South Bend's argument would have the practical effect of allowing the mere transfer of property to resurrect the claims of prior landowners and predecessors-in-interests who had actual knowledge of injuries to property. It seems much more likely that the General Assembly had the opposite in mind when enacting Ind.Code § 34-11-2-7. Under Indiana's discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and the limitation period begins to run, when a claimant knows or in the exercise of ordinary diligence should have known of the injury. Wehling v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840 (Ind.1992). The determination of when a cause of action accrues is generally a question of law. Barnes v. A.H. Robins Co., 476 N.E.2d 84 (Ind.1985). For an action to accrue, it is not necessary that the full extent of the damage be known or even ascertainable, but only that some ascertainable damage has occurred. Pflanz, 888 N.E.2d at 759 ( quoting Doe v. United Methodist Church, 673 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ind.Ct.App.1996)). In addressing a recent claim for contribution based on an obligation to clean up an alleged hazardous use of real property, this Court declared the notion that the statute of limitation begins to run when all the elements of a cause of action can be shown is part of how we determine when a cause accrues. Id. at 758. Between late 1986 and March 1997, South Bend solicited and acquired numerous environmental reports analyzing hundreds of soil and groundwater samples throughout the relevant area. These reports revealed the contamination that led to this litigation. Furthermore, South Bend hired multiple environmental consultants to explain the reports and legal counsel to analyze its rights, and South Bend acknowledges that it was aware of its consultants' conclusions. South Bend summarized its environmental knowledge, reciting every main premise of this action, in an internal memorandum on October 10, 1995. Based on these facts, Cooper's theory is that South Bend knew of the contamination for well over ten years before commencing the action. (Appellant's Br. at 15.) Cooper urges consideration of the District Court's reasoning in McFarland Foods Corp. v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. IP991489CHG, 2001 WL 238084, at  (S.D.Ind. Jan.5, 2001). There, the court held that a single report demonstrating environmental contamination was sufficient to cause the plaintiff landowner's claims to accrue. ( Id. at -4.) Cooper observes that South Bend possessed significantly more knowledge than the McFarland plaintiff, knowledge acquired purposefully during the late 1980s and early 1990s. (Appellant's Br. at 15-16.) It argues that South Bend's common law claims accrued long before March 1997, that is, more than six years before they were filed. We conclude this is largely correct, representing ordinary Indiana practice as regards the common law claims filed by South Bend.