Opinion ID: 2298184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adverse Consequences of Disclosure

Text: Because the Fire Marshal satisfied the threshold requirement, we next consider whether the Fire Marshal proved that one of the six adverse consequences would follow from disclosure. This case involves prong (A) of the Murray exemption: interference with enforcement proceedings. To show that this adverse consequence would result from disclosure, an agency must show that enforcement proceedings are pending or reasonably anticipated and that disclosure of the requested documents could reasonably be expected to interfere with those proceedings. Murray, 154 N.H. at 582-83, 913 A.2d 737. The petitioner argues that the Fire Marshal did not provide sufficient evidence that enforcement proceedings are pending or reasonably anticipated, and that disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with those proceedings. We review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of law and uphold the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are lacking in evidentiary support or tainted by error of law. Wyle v. Lees, 162 N.H. 406, 413 (2011). The petitioner first claims that other than bald assertions, the Fire Marshal provides no evidence that enforcement proceedings could be reasonably expected. According to the petitioner, the Fire Marshal did not establish that proceedings were reasonably anticipated because the affidavit of Fire Investigator William Clark does not provide the basis for when or why the charges might arise or by whom or where. However, the Murray exemption does not require that the agency explain when, where, or by whom charges might arise. See Murray, 154 N.H. at 583-84, 913 A.2d 737. It does not even require that the agency establish that law enforcement proceedings are a certainty. Id. at 583, 913 A.2d 737. It merely requires the agency to demonstrate that law enforcement proceedings are reasonably anticipated. Id. In this case, the Fire Marshal provided the affidavit from Investigator Clark as evidence that proceedings are reasonably anticipated. In the affidavit, Investigator Clark specifically stated that [t]he [f]ire investigation is open and ongoing ... [and] I have a reasonable belief that this investigation will lead to criminal charges. Investigator Clark also explained how disclosure would interfere with the ongoing investigation and any future prosecution, and he set forth particular categories of documents. For example, Investigator Clark explained: a. Revealing ... information publicly would 1.) alert person(s) of interest to our interest and make it harder to gain her or his cooperation; 2.) enable person(s) of interest to use what other witnesses have said to cover their tracks or to muddy the waters; ... and 8.) ... taint the credibility of witnesses that become aware of the other witnesses statements by bringing into question whether what they recall is their own recollection or has been tainted by what they have heard that someone else reported. b. Revealing contacts and interviews related to leads that are not believed to be involved in any possible criminal activity at this time would also damage our investigative ability and ultimately the ability to prosecute any case because 1.) this information could be used by anyone that was a legitimate suspect to divert attention from themselves, and 2.) revealing what other witnesses have said can taint the credibility of witnesses that become aware of the other witnesses statements by bringing into question whether what they recall is their own recollection or has been tainted by what they have heard that someone else reported. c. ... Depending on [the defendant's claims or defenses against charges] information or evidence that seemed unimportant at an earlier time could become very important during the prosecution phase of the case. Federal courts have recognized that the disclosure of information may interfere with enforcement proceedings by [resulting] in destruction of evidence, chilling and intimidation of witnesses, and revelation of the scope and nature of the Government's investigation. Solar Sources, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998); accord Barney v. I.R.S., 618 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir.1980) (explaining that one of the primary purposes of exemption 7 of the FOIA is to prevent harm to the government's case in court by not allowing litigants earlier or greater access to agency ... files than they would otherwise have (quotations omitted)). Investigator Clark's affidavit fairly describe[s] the content of the material withheld and adequately [states the] grounds for nondisclosure, and those grounds are reasonable and consistent with the applicable law. Barney, 618 F.2d at 1274 (quotation omitted). As the Fire Marshal points out, the trial court was entitled to credit this affidavit. See id. at 1274; Lewis v. I.R.S., 823 F.2d 375, 378-79 (9th Cir.1987). The petitioner's remaining arguments that enforcement proceedings cannot be reasonably anticipated are either inadequately developed, see In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 64, 944 A.2d 575 (2008), or based upon a mischaracterization of the affidavit. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the affidavit avers to the potential of an investigation as opposed to the required potential of a proceeding.  However, this is not accurate. The affidavit specifically says that the [f]ire investigation is open and ongoing,  and explains that it is important to protect the integrity of [the] investigation and the viability of any potential prosecution by maintaining the secrecy of the ongoing investigation.  (Emphasis added.) The affidavit submitted by the Fire Marshal contain[s] reasonably detailed descriptions of the documents and allege[s] facts sufficient to establish [the] exemption. Lewis, 823 F.2d at 378. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling that the Fire Marshal demonstrated that disclosure of the requested records could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings was not error. Because both prongs of the two-part inquiry required to invoke the Murray exemption are satisfied, we affirm the trial court's ruling that the requested records are exempt from disclosure.