Opinion ID: 2632961
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The dispute fell under the terms of the arbitration agreement.

Text: Our conclusion that the superior court erred under federal and state arbitration laws when it declared the underlying contract void does not end the matter. Because arbitration is a matter of contract, parties can only be compelled to arbitrate a matter where they have agreed to do so. [45] Thus, we are required to decide whether the arbitration clause covers this dispute. Goldbelt Eagle argues the superior court correctly concluded that the dispute did not arise under the agreement and was therefore not arbitrable under the terms of the arbitration clause. We disagree. Although Goldbelt Eagle is correct that arbitration is a matter of contract and a particular dispute is not arbitrable unless the parties have agreed to arbitrate it, we hold that this dispute falls easily within the terms of the arbitration clause. Although the superior court concluded that the dispute did not arise under the contract, its ruling was predicated on its finding that the contract was void for public policy reasons. The superior court reasoned that  [s]ince the agreement for marketing services for commission was unenforceable following Gnugnoli's CP Leasing employ, no claims could `arise' under the agreement thereafter. (Emphasis added.) The court concluded that no disputes could arise under a void contract. As explained above, this conclusion is precluded under both federal and state law, which forbid courts from determining arbitrability based on the validity of the underlying contract. Lexington contends that its claim arise[s] directly under the contract and fall[s] within the disputes that are subject to the arbitration provisions. Goldbelt Eagle argues that the arbitration clause at issue is narrow and did not extend to the dispute at issue. Goldbelt Eagle suggests that the agreement is narrow because it extends only to all disputes arising under and does not include disputes as to the validity of the agreement or related to or in connection with the agreement. But Goldbelt Eagle cites no Alaska or federal cases declaring that clauses that require arbitration of all disputes or claims arising under the agreement must be narrowly read. And several federal courts have declared that clauses referring to arbitration disputes arising under or arising hereunder are broad. [46] Moreover, regardless of whether the clause is narrow or broad, as a matter of contract interpretation, the arbitration clause applies to this dispute. Goldbelt Eagle suggests that the superior court properly concluded that the parties are disputing whether the underlying contract was void. It reasons that such a dispute revolves around a collateral matter. But Lexington is seeking payment of a commission for services it contends were provided under the contract. Thus, Lexington's claim for payment arises under the contract: it is seeking payment for services it argues were provided under the terms of the agreement. Arbitration of such a claim falls squarely within the arbitration clause's agreement to submit [a]ll disputes or claims arising under this Agreement to arbitration. (Emphasis added.) In light of our strong policy favoring arbitration and our rule of construction allowing even ambiguous contract terms to be construed in favor of arbitrability, [47] this dispute would be arbitrable even if the contract term was ambiguous. Here, the contract term is not ambiguous, and arbitration is consistent with the parties' intent to arbitrate claims arising under the agreement. We therefore hold that Lexington's claim falls within the scope of the arbitration clause. Because we hold that the superior court erred in declining to order arbitration based on its finding that the underlying contract was void, we do not address Lexington's argument that the court erred in granting summary judgment because parol evidence was in conflict.