Opinion ID: 200493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discrimination Under Title VII and Chapter 151B

Text: 22 Benoit first contends that the district court erred in awarding TMC summary judgment on his discrimination claims. Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, 1 we apply the well-established McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks burden-shifting framework. See Straughn, 250 F.3d at 33; Feliciano, 218 F.3d at 5; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Although created for use in Title VII cases, this framework is also applied when evaluating discrimination claims under Chapter 151B. Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 699 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Lewis v. City of Boston, 321 F.3d 207, 213-14 (1st Cir.2003)(employing the framework in analyzing a discrimination claim under Chapter 151B). Under this rubric, Benoit carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. 23 To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, Benoit must show that (1) he belonged to a protected class, a racial minority; (2) he was performing his job at a level that rules out the possibility that he was fired for job performance; (3) he suffered an adverse job action by his employer; and (4) his employer sought a replacement for him with roughly equivalent qualifications. Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.1994); see also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. This initial burden is not an onerous one, Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, and we shall assume arguendo that Benoit has satisfied it. 2 24 Having made this assumption, we take the second step in our inquiry: whether TMC has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. Straughn, 250 F.3d at 33 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817). TMC claims that it discharged Benoit because of his persistent tardiness and frequent absences, and because of his unwillingness to work cooperatively with his supervisor. This explanation satisfies TMC's burden of providing a non-discriminatory reason for its conduct. 25 Where, as here, the employer proffers a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason was a coverup for a discriminatory decision. Straughn, 250 F.3d at 34 (internal quotations omitted). In assessing pretext, the court must look at the total package of proof offered by the plaintiff. See Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 824 (1st Cir.1991). 26 Here, Benoit has not provided sufficient evidence for a jury to disbelieve TMC's stated reasons for termination, let alone that those reasons masked racial discrimination. Benoit has not shown that any other similarly situated employee was treated differently. Cf. Perkins v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 78 F.3d 747, 751 (1st Cir.1996)(holding that the individuals with whom a plaintiff seeks to be compared must have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it). Nor has he established that TMC failed to fire other employees despite habitual or frequent absences, tardiness, or conflicts with their supervisors. To the contrary, the record shows that TMC discharged seven employees for excessive absenteeism between 1995 and 1999, five of whom were white. 27 It is true that Benoit's attendance improved somewhat during the last six months of his employment. But one performance review stating that Benoit's attendance was better but still needs improvement is insufficient to create a trialworthy issue as to pretext, especially since attendance issues were not the only reasons given by TMC for firing Benoit. In any event, Benoit was late or absent during eight out of his last twelve weeks of work. No rational factfinder could find for Benoit on the pretext evidence that has been adduced. Cf. Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1032 (1st Cir.1995)(deeming insufficient plaintiff's evidence of one favorable performance review 15 months prior to termination, mixed performance evaluations later in that year, and two performance bonuses).