Opinion ID: 1729209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: proceedings in ferguson's initial 3.850

Text: In his initial motion for postconviction relief Ferguson moved for a stay of the proceedings based on his alleged incompetence to understand and assist counsel or, alternatively, a hearing to determine his competence. The trial court eventually ordered several physical examinations of Ferguson with regards to his competency, including an MRI, CAT scan, EEG, and blood tests. Additionally, the trial court appointed two psychiatrists, Drs. Lloyd Miller and William Corwin, and a psychologist, Dr. Leonard Haber, to examine Ferguson. [8] Thereafter, on August 24, 1988, the court held an extensive evidentiary hearing spanning three days to determine Ferguson's competence to assist counsel in the postconviction proceedings. At the hearing the defense produced the testimony of two experts, Drs. James Merkikangas and Jeffrey Elenewski. Dr. Merkikangas, an expert in psychiatry and neurology, examined Ferguson on January 30, 1988, and August 23, 1988. Merkikangas ordered a CAT scan, MRI, and EEG of Ferguson following his initial interview. Those tests, according to Merkikangas, showed no signs that Ferguson was suffering from a progressive neurological disease, but did provide some indications of organic brain damage. Merkikangas, detailing Ferguson's paranoid and delusional behavior during his interviews, diagnosed Ferguson as a paranoid schizophrenic. Based on that diagnosis, Merkikangas concluded that Ferguson was not competent to assist counsel in the postconviction proceedings. Merkikangas also opined that Ferguson was not malingering. Dr. Jeffrey Elenewski, an expert in forensic psychology, similarly testified on the strength of two examinations of Ferguson on August 10, 1978, and January 14, 1988. Elenewski testified that Ferguson was suffering from paranoia and delusions rendering him incompetent to assist counsel. Like Merkikangas, Elenewski concluded that Ferguson was not malingering. Dr. William Corwin, an expert in forensic psychiatry, examined Ferguson twice in 1974 and once in 1988. Although Corwin found Ferguson's behavior consistent with paranoid schizophrenia, he felt that Ferguson consciously exaggerated some of his behavior. Nevertheless, Corwin concluded that Ferguson's condition effectively prevented him from communicating with his attorney and assisting in his defense. Forensic psychologist Dr. Leonard Haber testified that Ferguson's condition was not credible. Specifically, Haber found Ferguson's difficulty with memory inconsistent with the negative results obtained from the neurological tests performed on Ferguson. In sum, Haber concluded that Ferguson displayed a selective memory which was consistent with a finding of malingering. Accordingly, Haber opined that Ferguson was competent to assist counsel. Dr. Lloyd Miller, a forensic psychiatrist, similarly concluded that Ferguson was malingering on the basis of his selective memory. Dr. Peritz Scheinberg, an expert in neurology, testified that Ferguson did not suffer from any neurological abnormality. In addition to this expert testimony, the State produced the testimony of five corrections officers who had opportunities to observe and interact with Ferguson. The officers all testified to observations of behavior which appeared inconsistent with the delusions Ferguson was allegedly suffering from. Further, the officers indicated that Ferguson would only act irrationally, i.e., consistent with the findings of paranoid schizophrenia, shortly before and after mental evaluations. Finally, David Clark, an institutional counselor at the Florida State Prison, and Frank Norwich, a document examiner from the Metro Dade Police Department, testified that Ferguson was the likely author of several letters directed to the trial court. Drs. Haber and Miller opined that the level of thought and organization exhibited in the letters in question were inconsistent with Ferguson's portrayal of his condition. On this record, the trial court, using the standard for competency to stand trial outlined in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), found Ferguson competent to proceed. Specifically, the court found that the credible evidence at the hearing demonstrated that Ferguson was malingering. As an alternative ground for denying Ferguson relief, the trial court, under the authority of Jackson, found that competency was not an issue for the court to address when a motion for postconviction relief is filed. On the basis of this record the State argues that Ferguson received the benefit of Carter in his initial postconviction motion. Ferguson responds by maintaining that he cannot be collaterally estopped from relitigating his competency because the trial court's competency finding was made in the alternative, and, furthermore, this Court failed to address the trial court's factual finding of competency on appeal. While we agree with the State that Ferguson received the benefit of Carter in his initial postconviction motion, the issue is complicated by our failure to address the trial court's factual determination in our review of the trial court's denial of Ferguson's initial 3.850 motion. On appeal of the trial court's denial of Ferguson's initial 3.850 motion, Ferguson appealed the trial court's alternative holdings on his competency. This Court, however, did not address the propriety of the trial court's factual determination on the record. Instead, this Court concluded that Ferguson's claim that his postconviction proceedings should be stayed pending a competency determination lacked merit and may be summarily denied. Ferguson, 593 So.2d 508, 513. Given our apparent failure to review the trial court's finding on competency and our conclusion as to Carter's retroactivity, we review the trial court's factual determination as to Ferguson's competency anew. See Dow Chemical v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 832 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.1987) (The federal decisions agree than once an appellate court has affirmed on one ground and passed over another, preclusion does not attach to the ground omitted from its decision.). To do otherwise would be unfaithful to this Court's solemn constitutional responsibility to review capital cases. As we have consistently stated with regards to our proportionality review in capital cases: [P]roportionality review in death cases rests at least in part on the recognition that death is a uniquely irrevocable penalty, requiring a more intensive level of judicial scrutiny or process than would lesser penalties.  Tillman v. State, 591 So.2d 167, 169 (Fla.1991) (emphasis added); see also Hauser v. Moore, 767 So.2d 436, 438 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, J., dissenting) ([T]he validity of the trial court's competency decision in the present case has never been subjected to appellate review. The State has cited no case where a trial court's competency decision concerning a death-sentenced inmate has not been subject to appellate review.). As noted earlier, the trial court judged Ferguson's competency under the standard applicable to the determination of whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, i.e., whether the defendant `has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' Hardy v. State, 716 So.2d 761, 763 (Fla.1998) (quoting, Dusky, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824). In Carter this Court indicated that the rules governing competency to stand trial should govern the issue of competency to proceed in postconviction: Until such time as the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure are amended to specifically address competency during capital collateral proceedings, the rules for raising and determining competency at trial should be looked to. 706 So.2d at 876 (footnote omitted). We review a trial court's findings as to a defendant's competence to stand trial under an abuse of discretion standard. See Hardy, 716 So.2d at 764; see also Medina, 690 So.2d at 1248 (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court finding that the petitioner was competent to proceed in the postconviction proceedings). Upon reviewing the record of the extensive competency hearing conducted by the trial court on Ferguson's initial postconviction motion, we find no abuse of discretion. While the testimony at the competency hearing was conflicting as to the genuineness of Ferguson's condition, the trial court's rejection of the opinions offered by the defense experts was supported by the testimony of Drs. Corwin, Haber, and Miller, all of whom opined that Ferguson was malingering and exaggerating his condition. These findings that Ferguson was exaggerating and malingering were further corroborated by the testimony of the corrections officers who indicated that Ferguson would only act irrationally shortly before and after he was scheduled to undergo mental evaluations. Finally, the neurological examinations ordered by the trial court revealed that Ferguson was not suffering from an organic brain disease. Given this record, we find no basis to quarrel with the trial court's determination. See Hardy, 716 So.2d at 764 (In situations where there is conflicting expert testimony regarding the defendant's competency, it is the trial court's responsibility to consider all the evidence relevant to competency and resolve the factual dispute.). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's summary denial of Ferguson's 3.850 motion. It is so ordered. SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. WELLS, C.J., concurs in result only with an opinion. WELLS, C.J., concurring in result only. I concur with the result in this case. I do not concur that Carter v. State, 706 So.2d 873 (Fla.1997), should be applied retroactively. First, as is stated in the majority opinion, a decision as to the retroactivity of Carter is not necessary to the resolution of this successive motion. Second, a decision that a 1997 decision is going to be applied retroactively to proceedings which have long been ongoing will simply confuse and frustrate the process, which I conclude is bad policy.