Opinion ID: 1788913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lookout Issue.

Text: The trial court set aside the jury's finding of causal negligence with respect to lookout on the part of the Railroad Company on the ground that such negligence was not causal as a matter of law. This determination was grounded upon this court's decision in Hynek v. Kewaunee, G. B. & W. R. Co. (1947), 251 Wis. 319, 29 N. W. (2d) 45. Richard Dombeck testified in part as follows: He was driving at a speed of five to eight miles per hour as he approached the crossing. When he first looked to the south and became aware that a train was approaching, the car bumper was close to the west rail of the railroad track and that from his position in the car he was nine to 10 feet from the crossing. His excuse for not looking sooner was that a high bank along the right-of-way obscured his vision up to that point. He figured because of the slippery condition of the roadway that if he attempted to stop he would skid onto the track. Therefore, he accelerated the car in an attempt to get across the track ahead of the train. At the time, the diesel locomotive of the train was being operated by the fireman who was seated in the engineer's seat on the right or east side of the cab. The engineer was seated on the left side which was the side from which the Dombeck car approached the crossing. While the fireman was afforded a good view of the crossing when the train was some distance south of it, the hood of the locomotive obscured his view to the west as the train came closer to the crossing. The engineer died prior to trial and we do not know when he first saw the approaching Dombeck car. The fireman testified that when the locomotive was about 50 feet from the crossing the engineer shouted, Plug her! In railroad parlance this means to set the emergency brakes immediately, which the fireman did. The fireman did not himself see the Dombeck car until the locomotive was approximately 30 feet from the crossing at which time the car was already on the track. Richard Dombeck's testimony that his view of the approaching train was obscured by the bank along the west side of the right-of-way is disputed by the photographs taken of the crossing taken two days after the accident. These pictures clearly indicate that the locomotive would have been visible to Richard, if he had looked, long before he reached the point when he testified he made his first observation. This is because the height of the locomotive was 14 feet, six inches above the track and the bottom of the headlight was 11 feet, three inches above the track. Likewise the Dombeck car could have been seen by the engineer before the train reached a point 50 feet from the crossing. In considering the evidence bearing on the Railroad Company's negligence as to lookout, independent of the element of causation, it is rather difficult to sustain the jury's finding in that respect. This issue is confined to the lookout of only two railroad employees, the fireman and the engineer. The train may well have been in such proximity to the crossing when the Dombeck car first came into view that the forward part of the locomotive entirely obscured the view of the fireman. The engineer may have seen the car prior to shouting, Plug her!, but it was not until he so shouted that it would be obvious to anyone that the car proceeding at its very slow speed was not going to stop. Furthermore, the engineer being deceased at time of trial, a presumption arises that he exercised due care. Ray v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co. (1939), 230 Wis. 323, 327, 283 N. W. 799; Henthorn v. M. T. C. Corp. (1957), 1 Wis. (2d) 180, 187, 83 N. W. (2d) 759, 79 A. L. R. (2d) 142. While this presumption did not in itself constitute evidence, and might be rebutted by any evidence in the case from which could be reasonably drawn an inference of negligent lookout on the part of the engineer, appellants have pointed to no such evidence. However, even assuming that the finding of negligent lookout against the Railroad Company is supported by credible evidence, it could not be causal under our holding in Hynek v. Kewaunee, G. B. & W. R. Co., supra . In the Hynek Case the collision occurred at a city crossing, at 7 o'clock in the evening. It was dark and snowing. The Hyneks were familiar with the crossing and reduced their speed to seven or eight miles per hour as they approached it. They testified that they looked and saw no train, neither did they hear one. Mr. Hynek increased his speed to cross the tracks, and was struck on the right side while crossing. On the issue of the train's lookout the testimony of the fireman was that he saw the headlights of the Hynek car when it was 25 to 50 feet from the track, at which time he called for the application of the emergency brakes. The train traveled about 339 feet before it was brought to a full stop. The jury found the railroad company guilty of negligence lookout and apportioned 27½ percent of the aggregate negligence to it. On appeal this court reversed and made the following pertinent statements (pp. 323, 324): Even if the fireman had seen, or in the exercise of due care ought to have seen the Hynek car sooner, the evidence discloses no facts that would create a legal duty in him to do any more than he did. There was nothing at the crossing to obstruct the automobile driver's view of the tracks. The Hynek car at all times was moving at a rate of speed which would enable the driver to stop at a point where he would be free from danger. If the fireman had observed the approach of the car back of its twenty-five to thirty-foot position from the track, he would have seen nothing to indicate a probability that the car would proceed over the tracks while the train was moving. Indeed, the driver of the car testified that when he was about thirty to thirty-five feet from the track he reduced his speed to seven or eight miles per hour. This would indicate to anyone seeing him that he was preparing to stop to let the train go by. Instead, when he was an estimated twelve to fifteen feet away he accelerated his speed and the collision occurred. When all of these facts are considered in connection with the rule that those in the engine of a train have the right to assume that a person approaching the track will reasonably exercise his senses of sight and hearing and act appropriately, it is evident that the engine crew of this particular train, prior to the time of applying the emergency brake, would have had no occasion to assume that danger of a collision was developing. Nothing calling for an effort to stop the train happened before the fireman called for the emergency stop. In the present case, as in Hynek, the collision occurred at a familiar city crossing, on a dark, wintry evening. Similarly, Richard reduced his speed as he approached the crossing, but accelerated upon seeing the train. With respect to lookout, Richard testified that at the time he looked and saw the train it was too late to attempt to stop. On the question of the train's lookout, the fireman, who operated the train, testified that he first saw the Dombeck car when it was on the tracks and when the train was 30 feet from the crossing. At this time the emergency brakes had already been applied. There was also testimony that the engineer must have seen the Dombeck car when the train was 50 feet from the crossing because he at that point shouted, Plug her! In view of the great similarities between Hynek and the present case, the court holds that there is no evidence of causal negligence with respect to lookout. Therefore, the trial court properly held that any failure of lookout on the part of the Railroad Company was not causal as a matter of law.