Opinion ID: 349533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admissibility of the Tape Recordings

Text: 18 Both appellants advance various arguments concerning the admissibility of the four tape recordings admitted into evidence at their trial. We find none of appellants' points persuasive. 19 At trial, the government laid the following foundation for admitting the tape recordings into evidence. On May 27, 1976, DEA agents fitted the informant Hugo with a concealed Nagra tape recorder. Hugo subsequently met with appellant Sansone under the close surveillance of several DEA agents. After this meeting was completed, the agents removed the recorder and tape from Hugo's body, placed the tape in a heat-sealed evidence envelope, and initialed and dated the envelope. On June 1, 1976, DEA personnel installed both a Nagra recorder and a Kel transmitter in an undercover vehicle for Hugo's use in future negotiations with the appellants. Hugo again met with Sansone and with agent Schnakenberg; once again, the entire meeting was conducted under the surveillance of DEA agents. When this meeting was completed these tapes were also placed in heat-sealed evidence envelopes, initialed and dated by DEA agents. In addition, a Kel receiver, tuned to the transmitter placed in Hugo's car, was located in a nearby vehicle and monitored by a member of the DEA surveillance team. On June 2 and 3, 1976, the same procedures for making and preserving the recordings as were employed on June 1 were repeated. 20 These tapes, which provided a detailed account of the narcotics negotiations between the informant Hugo, the appellants, and agent Schnakenberg, were all admitted into evidence over defense objections based on their inability to confront Hugo and the government's insufficient demonstration of Hugo's consent. 21 Fuentes now contends as his first point on this appeal that there was an insufficient showing of authenticity and general accuracy of the tape recordings and that the tapes should therefore have been excluded. Relying upon United States v. McKeever, 169 F.Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1958), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959), 3 appellant urges that because the informant Hugo did not testify at trial the government failed to lay the requisite foundation for the admission of the tape recordings. 22 The first reason for rejecting this argument is that Fuentes did not object to the adequacy of the government's foundation for admission of the tapes at the time they were introduced, although he had full opportunity to do so. This failure to make timely objection when any inadequacy might have been rectified by the prosecution or resolved by the trial judge's ruling precludes raising the claim at this time. As we recently reiterated where a party has shifted his position on appeal and advances arguments available but not pressed below . . . , and where that party has had ample opportunity to make the point in the trial court in a timely manner, . . . waiver will bar raising the issue on appeal. United States v. Braunig, 553 F.2d 777, at 780 (2d Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959, 97 S.Ct. 2686, 53 L.Ed.2d 277 (1977) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1975). 23 Secondly, even if Fuentes had interposed timely objections to the failure to call Hugo to testify as to the accuracy and reliability of the tapes, they were fully admissible. 24 Contrary to Fuentes' assertion, this Circuit has never expressly adopted a rigid standard for determining the admissibility of tape recordings. In McKeever, supra, 271 F.2d at 675-76, we cited with approval Judge Herlands' approach to the admissibility of the tape recordings on those facts, and we continue to regard the elements listed in Judge Herlands' opinion as a valuable formulation of the factors a trial judge should consider in making an initial determination whether a sufficient foundation for the admissibility of the tape recordings has been established. However, the varying circumstances of particular cases in which one or another aspect of this problem may present itself militate against our adoption of inflexible criteria applicable to all cases. 25 On the other hand, since recorded evidence is likely to have a strong impression upon a jury and is susceptible to alteration, we have adopted a general standard, namely, that the government produce clear and convincing evidence of authenticity and accuracy as a foundation for the admission of such recordings. United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427, 440 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973, 88 S.Ct. 472, 19 L.Ed.2d 465 (1967). In the case at bar, the government satisfied this burden. 26 At trial, the prosecution adduced competent and uncontroverted proof that the recording devices were capable of recording the appellants' conversations, that the agents carefully placed the devices on the informant or in his vehicle, that the agents were able to observe most, if not all, of the incriminating conversations and identify each participant, and that the agents immediately removed and sealed the tapes after each meeting. Clearly this testimony sufficiently establishes the authenticity and accuracy of the tapes. There simply is no requirement that the tapes be put in evidence through the person wearing the recorder or, for that matter, through a contemporaneous witness to the recorded conversations. See United States v. Bonanno, 487 F.2d 654, 659 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Sansone, 231 F.2d 887, 890-91 (2d Cir. 1956). 27 We similarly find Fuentes' additional and related argument that the tapes were inadmissible because Hugo may have tampered with the recording devices unpersuasive. Aside from being completely speculative, it is hard to believe that Hugo could have effectively changed the character of a running conversation, by turning the device on and off, without such attempts being immediately obvious to those present as well as to anyone listening to the tapes. In addition, because the informant would have run a substantial risk of personal harm if he had been observed reaching into his clothing, manipulating the armrest in his car, or creating a click during the appellants' incriminating conversations, it is highly unlikely that he would have made such efforts at tampering. Moreover, the June 1 tape, which most directly concerns Fuentes and is most damaging to him because it is the only one which contains his voice, was recorded by a Kel device which transmits conversations to a remote receiver where it is monitored and taped. Since the actual recording was made by a DEA agent, any argument about Hugo's tampering or selective editing of this tape must be dismissed as specious. Lastly, had Fuentes so desired he could have called an expert to examine the tapes for evidence of tampering. What arguments Fuentes now raises go only to the weight to be given to the tapes, not to their admissibility. 28 Similarly, without merit is Fuentes' separate claim that his right of confrontation was violated by the admission into evidence of a portion of the transcript of the June 1 tape recording in which Hugo addressed the DEA surveillance agents after both defendants had left Hugo's presence. In that portion of the transcript Hugo summarized the events in which he had just participated. An examination of the record reveals that this particular piece of evidence was introduced not at the request of the government but at the request of appellant Sansone. The government objected to the relevance of this evidence and specifically requested a limiting instruction that Hugo's statements on this part of the recording were not to be taken for their truth. Appellant Fuentes not only failed to raise any contemporaneous objection but, indeed, expressly asserted that he had no objection to the admission of this transcript. Clearly, then, he can hardly complain on appeal. United States v. Braunig, supra at 780-81. Any other rule would permit the defendants in a multi-defendant trial to seed the record with error at trial and reap the benefits on appeal. In any event, we are unable to discern how the non-incriminating summary remarks of the informant on this portion of transcript, even if taken for their truth, aided the government's case or prejudiced appellant Fuentes' defense. 29 Appellant Sansone makes the argument that it was error to admit the tape recordings inasmuch as there was an insufficient showing of the informant Hugo's consent. 4 After United States v. Bonanno, 487 F.2d 654, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1973), we can find no merit in this argument. In Bonanno, where this Court was presented with an identical claim on similar facts, we noted that (i)t will normally suffice (to prove consent) for the government to show that the informer went ahead with a (conversation) after knowing what the law enforcement officers were about. We further held in Bonanno, that this showing, which is considerably less stringent than that required to show consent for a physical search, may consist of circumstantial evidence, rather than direct evidence from the informant or from agents to whom the informant gave his express consent. 30 In the case at bar, the government demonstrated, at a mid-trial hearing conducted by Judge Lasker on this issue, that the informant at some personal discomfort and substantial risk, allowed himself to be fitted with a recording device. The inescapable inference from this showing is that the informant proceeded, knowing his conversations were being recorded, and therefore gave his consent. In short, the government demonstrated far more than that the informant went ahead with a (conversation) after knowing what the law enforcement officers were about. Thus, our decision in United States v. Bonanno, supra, is dispositive here; Judge Lasker's conclusion that the recordings were consensual was well-founded. 31 Accordingly, we must reject all of the appellants' challenges to the admissibility of the tape recordings.