Opinion ID: 1111189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court erroneously permitted the state to present to the jury the background of the deceased, and the effect of the crime on the family of the deceased, both through the introduction of evidence and in opening and closing, in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution and section 28 of the mississippi constitution.

Text: Pinkney contends that the district attorney used a victim advocacy strategy which this Court prohibited in Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 52-53 (Miss. 1985). Pinkney also challenges this strategy on the basis of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), which held that a Maryland statute requiring a victim impact statement violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when such a statement was introduced into evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. Specifically, Pinkney challenges the prosecutor's opening statement, the victim's mother's testimony during the guilt phase, Dr. Galvez' testimony during the sentencing phase, and the prosecutor's closing arguments. During her opening statement the prosecutor made the following comments: And at this point, ladies and gentlemen, comes the good part of my job  if you call it a good part  because this is when I begin to scratch the surface of asking you people for some justice for Betty Thompkins. I will ask you to return a verdict of guilty for the people of the State of Mississippi, but I am asking you to return a verdict of capital murder. Capital murder being murder in the commission of another felony, in this case, burglary. I'm not concerned with your ability to do that. I am not concerned one small bit. As I said, that will be when I scratch the surface of asking you to give that family some justice, because at that point we will bring you further evidence, evidence that no one should ever have to see. And I do not envy your responsibility. It is not a pretty sight. And at that point, after you have seen the heinousness, the atrociousness, and the cruelty of what happened that night and you compare it with what you have heard from this defendant's mouth, then I will ask you to scratch a little further in the surface of bringing justice to this family. No one can every bring them complete justice. No one can every bring them Tracey back. No one can give those children their mother. No one can give Betty Thompkins her baby. But I will ask you to do your best to give her the justice that's available, not just because it's the oath that you took when you said you believed in the death penalty if we proved that it fit the crime; and it does. I will ask you to do so because it's the least we can do. Thank you. No contemporaneous objection was made to the statement of the prosecutor and the prosecution therefore contends that this assignment is procedurally barred. See Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365 (Miss. 1987). The issue of procedural bar appears frequently in this record. In Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss. 1984), we said, We have in death penalty cases the prerogative of relaxing out contemporaneous objection and plain error rules when the interest of justice so requires. Williams, 445 So.2d at 810. Citing Culberson v. State, 379 So.2d 499, 506 (Miss. 1980); Bell v. State, 360 So.2d 1206, 1215 (Miss. 1978). Because the death penalty is a different sort of punishment with more severe consequences than other sentences, this Court's scrutiny of such cases is correspondingly heightened. Williams, 445 So.2d at 810; see also, Laney v. State, 421 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Miss. 1982); Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360, 1363 (Miss. 1978). However, there are many instances in which this Court has invoked procedural bars against capital defendants. See Jones v. State, 517 So.2d 1295, 1310 (Miss. 1987); Booker v. State, 511 So.2d 1329 (Miss. 1987); Hill v. State, 432 So.2d 427 (Miss. 1983). Additionally, this Court has a statutory obligation to review death penalty cases to determine whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of arbitrary or extraneous influences. Section 99-19-105(3)(a), Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp. 1987). In capital cases, the procedural bar is sometimes relaxed because of the nature of the right asserted. See West v. State, 485 So.2d 681, 687-88 (Miss. 1985). Also, this Court has relaxed its procedural bar to consider serious, cumulative errors. See Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss. 1984). Even in capital cases procedural bars appear to be applied, based on a number of factors, on a case by case basis. We find that this assignment of error is procedurally barred. Reviewing the assignment on its merits, however, we find that it is without merit. The conduct of the prosecutor in this case no way resembles Fuselier, in which the daughter of the victim was permitted to sit within the rail of the courtroom and confer with the district attorney throughout the trial. Nor does the statement by the prosecutor remotely resemble the introduction of statements to the jury as was done in Booth v. Maryland, supra . The prosecutor's comments do not require reversal of this conviction or sentence. Under the same heading Pinkney next argues that Betty Thompkins, the mother of the deceased, impermissibly testified as to the background of her daughter and her reaction at finding her daughter's body the morning after the murder. No objection was made to this testimony and the prosecution again contends that the assignment is procedurally barred under the authority of Cole v. State, supra . The prosecution further argues that Thompkins' testimony was relevant and necessary as she was the witness who first saw the body. While this assignment is procedurally barred if we look beyond the bar to the merits of the assignment we find that no error was committed as Thompkins' testimony was necessary to establish the identity of the deceased, the ownership of the house, and the facts and circumstances surrounding her discovery of Tracey Hickman's body. This testimony was properly admitted. The difficult issue under Booth arises out of the testimony of Dr. Galvez during the sentencing phase. The record reads, in pertinent part, as follows: Q. Dr. Galvez, what effect would this have on a young child who saw this type of crime? A. I could quote you books after books and author after author who wrote extensively about this type of situation. A child about three or four years of age watching either mother or father being killed, especially in their very  MR. STRIBLING: Just a minute, now. I want to make an objection here. Unless he testified that he actually talked to and examined this child, we will object to any guesswork, or any opinion, medical opinion as to what this child may have thought. THE COURT: Well, he been qualified as an expert and I will allow him to testify within that framework. The objection will be overruled. MR. PETERS: Thank you. Q. Go ahead, Dr. Galvez.       She was gone, but the children will be alive and will remember the rest of their lives what they saw there for at least twelve hours they were with their mother. Are you asking me what the consequence will be for the children? Q. Yes. A. I can guarantee you they will have emotional scars the rest of their lives. The prosecution contends that this issue is procedurally barred as the proper objection was not made and that the testimony was permissible because it was directly related to the circumstances surrounding the crime. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507, 107 S.Ct. at 2535, 96 L.Ed.2d at 457 (footnote 10). In Booth v. Maryland , the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a Maryland statute which required that a formal Victim Impact Statement (VIS) be compiled and considered as evidence at a sentencing proceeding. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. at 2530, 96 L.Ed.2d at 446 (footnote 2). The VIS was compiled by the State Division of Parole and Probation from interviews from the victim's families. The VIS (which is appended to the majority opinion) contained comments about the void which resulted from the murders. Also, ... the VIS described the emotional and personal problems the family members have faced as a result of the crimes. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. at 2530, 96 L.Ed.2d at 446. The VIS was introduced into evidence over objection and on appeal it was held that the admission of this report was not error. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment issues raised by the VIS. In a five  four decision that Court held that the introduction of the VIS during a capital sentencing trial violated the Eighth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell stated: It is well-settled that a jury's discretion to impose the death sentence must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 [96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859] (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 [103 S.Ct. 3446, 3452, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171] (1983). Although this Court normally will defer to a state legislature's determination of what factors are relevant to the sentencing decision, the Constitution places some limits on this discretion. See, e.g., id., at 1000-1001 [103 S.Ct. at 3452-53]. Specifically, we have said that a jury must make an  individualized determination of whether the defendant in question should be executed, based on the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 [103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743, 77 L.Ed.2d 235] (1983) (emphasis in original). See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 [102 S.Ct. 869, 875, 71 L.Ed.2d 1] (1982). And while this Court has never said that the defendant's record, characteristics, and the circumstances of the crime are the only permissible sentencing considerations, a state statute that requires consideration of other factors must be scrutinized to ensure that the evidence has some bearing on the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 [102 S.Ct. 3368, 3378, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140] (1982). To do otherwise would create the risk that a death sentence will be based on considerations that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process. See Zant v. Stephens, supra, [462 U.S.], at 885 [103 S.Ct. at 2747]. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03, 107 S.Ct. at 2532-33, 96 L.Ed.2d at 448. Further the court addressed the relationship between the moral blameworthiness of the defendant and the VIS: The focus of a VIS, however, is not on the defendant, but on the character and reputation of the victim and the effect on his family. These factors may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant. As our cases have shown, the defendant often will not know the victim, and therefore will have no knowledge about the existence or characteristics of the victim's family... . It is true that in certain cases some of the information contained in a VIS will have been known to the defendant before he committed the offense. As we have recognized, a defendant's degree of knowledge of the probable consequences of his actions may increase his moral culpability in a constitutionally significant manner. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 1687, 95 L.Ed.2d 127] (1987). We nevertheless find that because of the nature of the information contained in a VIS, it creates an impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be made in an arbitrary manner. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05, 107 S.Ct. at 2533-35, 96 L.Ed.2d at 449-450. The opinion in Booth may contain the seeds of its own destruction. The State relies primarily on a footnote which provides in part: Our disapproval of victim impact statements at the sentencing phase of a capital case does not mean, however, that this type of information will never be relevant in any context. Similar types of information may well be admissible because they relate directly to the circumstances of the crime. Facts about the victim and family also may be relevant in a non-capital criminal trial. Moreover, there may be times that the victim's personal characteristics are relevant to rebut an argument offered by the defendant. See, e.g., Fed.Rule Evid. 404(a)(2) . .. 482 U.S. at 507-08, 107 S.Ct. at 2535, 96 L.Ed.2d at 451 (Footnote 10). The testimony of Dr. Galvez is not as egregious or voluminous as that contained in the VIS in Booth. Also the children's condition is much more closely related to the actual murder (they were there) than were the comments put forward in Booth. It should be noted that Booth had not been decided at the time Pinkney was tried and we cannot say that Pinkney's counsel should have been able to anticipate the Booth holding. However, Fuselier had been decided by this Court and more to the point, there existed at common law the basic rule of evidence on relevance. The relevance objection in this instance was obvious and was not made by defense counsel. It therefore was not error to allow this testimony at the sentencing phase by Dr. Galvez. Addressing the closing arguments of the prosecution, Pinkney also argues that they violate Booth. Once again the prosecution relies upon procedural bar and further argues that the proper analysis is whether the prosecutor's remarks denied the defendant a fundamentally fair trial. Lockett v. State (I), 517 So.2d 1317, 1333 (Miss. 1987). In Lockett, this Court invoked a procedural bar on a similar assignment of error stating: This Court on numerous occasions has refused to consider the issue of prosecutorial misconduct where the defendant did not raise it at trial and we so refuse to do so today. See, e.g., Dufour v. State, 483 So.2d 307, 311 (Miss. 1985); Billiot v. State, 478 So.2d 1043, 1045 (Miss. 1985); In re Hill, 460 So.2d 792, 799 (Miss. 1984); Smith v. State, 434 So.2d 212, 216 (Miss. 1983); Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 836 (Miss. 1983). Alternatively reaching the merits, however, Lockett's claim fails. The question for this Court is whether the prosecutor's remarks denied the defendant a fundamentally fair trial. Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 939 (Miss. 1986); see also, United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 13 (1985); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 40 L.Ed.2d 431, 438 (1974). Lockett (I), 517 So.2d at 1333. We are of the opinion that all of the assignments taken together do not merit reversal of the guilt phase or the sentencing phase. Under our holding in McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 135 (Miss. 1987), these instances did not substantially impair the right of the defendant to a fair trial.