Opinion ID: 2514211
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the April 3, 1995 search warrant (and therefore the three subsequently issued warrants) lack probable cause?

Text: The affidavit in support of the telephonic warrant issued by Judge Fisher on April 3, 1995, set forth: Roxanne Doll was reported missing by her mother, Doll-Iffrig, at about 10:00 a.m. on April 1, 1995; Doll-Iffrig last definitely saw Roxanne alive at about 8:30 p.m. the previous night upon putting Roxanne and her siblings to bed; Clark and Roxanne's father, Iffrig, were drinking at that time at the next-door neighbors' house while Doll-Iffrig left with a friend to see a movie; Doll-Iffrig returned home about midnight to find her husband passed out on a living room sofa; Doll-Iffrig thought but was not certain she saw Roxanne in bed with the latter's sister in the top bunk of their bunkbed at midnight; that Clark returned to the Iffrig house around 1:00 a.m. that morning; Clark was at the Iffrig house earlier that evening and was seen driving his van to and from the residence; Clark has a 1988 conviction for unlawful imprisonment when he restrained a four-year-old girl and sexually molested her; a polygraph test was administered on Clark by an agent of the FBI on April 2 during which Clark denied knowledge of and responsibility for Roxanne's disappearance; in the FBI agent's opinion, Clark was clearly deceptive in his denials during the polygraph examination; had the victim been removed from her house in the van she would have left trace evidence behind in the van; and that when questioned after the polygraph examination Clark stated he had not hurt Roxanne. The trial court found that although the affiant, Detective Herndon, did not use the word kidnap during the telephone conversation with Judge Fisher, the latter knew the crime with which he was dealing. The police knew that they were restricted to searching for trace evidence left behind after a kidnapping. 5 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 993. Clark contends that his presence near the victim's house on the night she disappeared, his prior conviction, and his purported failure of a polygraph examination are insufficient bases for probable cause. However [p]rior convictions of a suspect are a factor which can be considered in determining whether probable cause exists. State v. Stone, 56 Wash.App. 153, 158, 782 P.2d 1093 (1989). Here Clark's prior conviction was for unlawful imprisonment of a young girl for ostensibly sexual purposes (the affidavit set forth that after binding her in his garage with a pair of socks, Clark groped this girl's vaginal area outside her clothing). This was a crime of the same general nature as that in which Detective Herndon was attempting to uncover evidence, and therefore was not only proper but helpful in establishing probable cause. Greenstreet v. County of San Bernardino, 41 F.3d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1207 (3d Cir.1993)). Further, although polygraph results are not admissible at trial unless stringent conditions have been met, see State v. Renfro, 96 Wash.2d 902, 905-08, 639 P.2d 737 (1982), such evidence may be considered in a magistrate's probable cause determination. State v. Cherry, 61 Wash.App. 301, 305, 810 P.2d 940 (1991). Here Clark's polygraph performance was deemed deceptive by the administering FBI agent. Clark challenges the conclusion of the FBI agent in that his qualifications and indicia of reliability were not set forth in Detective Herndon's affidavit. However in State v. Lair, 95 Wash.2d 706, 712, 630 P.2d 427 (1981), we noted that information from a reliable informant has corroborative value even if the informant's basis of knowledge is not specified. Here the FBI agent's basis of knowledge is the administration of the polygraph and his clinical and common-sense observation of Clark's performance. Clark seems to be claiming that no foundation is laid in the supporting affidavit to support the agent's qualifications. But the agent need not submit a curriculum vitae to the affiant for his conclusions developed during the administration of the polygraph to be probative and corroborative as the magistrate makes his probable cause determination. The state compares the affidavit in this case to that in State v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995), where the challenged affidavit set forth that a young girl had been sexually assaulted and murdered; that the hair of a black person was found on her shirt; that Gentry, a black man, was seen near the time of the murder within a mile of where the body was found; and that Gentry had been previously charged (in an unrelated event) with the rape of a young girl. The facts in this case are similar in that a young girl had been kidnapped; Clark had a previous conviction for the restraint of a young girl; Clark was undisputedly in and around the victim's house around the time of her suspected abduction. While Clark may be correct that no single one of these evidentiary bases may have been enough to establish probable cause per se, there is no basis for believing that, taking this information on the whole, the issuing magistrate could form no reasonable belief that Clark was probably involved in the criminal activity under investigation.
Clark claimed under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), that Detective Herndon made two material omissions or misstatements to the issuing magistrate, viz., failing to mention that he had made a brief but inconclusive search of the van prior to applying for the search warrant and failing to mention that Doll-Iffrig told him she thought she saw Roxanne in bed with her sister when she returned at midnight of April 1, 1995. Clark contends that had these facts been included in the affidavit, no reasonable magistrate could have found probable cause to issue the search warrant. In order to invalidate the warrant on this ground Clark must show evidence of deliberate material omission or statements made in reckless disregard of the truth. State v. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d 870, 872, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992). `[A]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.' Id. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674). As the court noted in O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. at 117-18, 692 P.2d 208, Franks and the relevant Washington decisions do not illuminate what constitutes reckless disregard for the truth. However O'Connor applied the test of United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C.Cir.1979), where the court deemed recklessness shown where the affiant `in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth' of facts or statements in the affidavit. O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. at 117, 692 P.2d 208 (quoting United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C.Cir.1979) (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968))). Such serious doubts are shown by (1) actual deliberation on the part of the affiant, or (2) the existence of obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports. O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. at 117, 692 P.2d 208 (citing Davis, 617 F.2d at 694). If these requirements are not met the inquiry ends. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388. At Clark's Franks hearing, the trial court found the following with respect to Detective Herndon's affidavit: [T]he omission of details regarding Ms. Doll-Iffrig's statement of her observations is not material. The statement in the affidavit that Ms. Doll-Iffrig was unsure of whether she saw Roxanne is truthful. This was the substance of oral statements made to Det. Herndon by Ms. Doll-Iffrig; the progression of Gail's thought processes was indicated by the fact that her second written statement is more vague than her first statement. The court finds that the failure to recite all of Ms. Doll-Iffrig's statements or comments was neither an intentional nor a reckless attempt to mislead Judge Fisher. The omission of a statement describing Det. Herndon's cursory search of the van on April 2, 1995 was not relevant or material. The purpose of the April 3, 1995 search warrant was for trace evidence. During his initial cursory search on April 2, Det. Herndon did not see anything remarkable; this does not mean that there would not be trace evidence in the van. This was not an intentional nor a reckless misleading omission. Since there were no misleading misrepresentations or omissions contained in any of the affidavits, no portions of the affidavits will be excised. 5 CP at 995-96. The trial court found no actual deliberation or effort to omit material information by Detective Herndon, or obvious reasons to doubt his veracity in making the affidavit. A trial court's finding on whether an affiant deliberately excluded material facts is a factual determination, upheld unless clearly erroneous. State v. Cord, 103 Wash.2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 (1985) (citing In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wash.2d 736, 513 P.2d 831 (1973)). With respect to Detective Herndon's statement that Doll-Iffrig was unsure whether Roxanne was in bed at midnight on April 1, 1995, this would seem to be an accurate summary of Doll-Iffrig's statements on the matter. Doll-Iffrig turned the light on in her daughter's room only momentarily, and was unsure whether she saw Roxanne or a large doll, which she testified her daughters often slept with. With respect to Detective Herndon's April 2, 1995, consensual search of Clark's van, he testified he was merely looking for something obvious that would connect with Roxanne Doll and not for trace evidence of Doll. RP (Jan. 29, 1996) at 23 (3.6 hearing). Herndon further testified at the Franks hearing he neither intentionally omitted information from his affidavit nor had he lied. The trial court had the latitude to believe Herndon's testimony, and nothing else in the record would support the conclusion that the trial court's findings on this issue were clearly erroneous. Assuming the trial court clearly erred in that the failure to include information about the prior consensual search was a material omission, and that Detective Herndon materially misstated what Doll-Iffrig saw in her daughter's bed on April 1, 1995, the test is to add the omitted facts to the affidavit and subtract the misstatements. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388; Kinder v. Mangan, 57 Wash.App. 840, 846, 790 P.2d 652 (1990). If probable cause nevertheless exists the warrant stands. Given the difference between the search for trace evidence contemplated by the search warrant and the cursory search Detective Herndon performed the day before, and given Doll-Iffrig's numerous statements as to her uncertainty whether she saw Roxanne in bed, we would uphold the probable cause determination even under the Garrison test.