Opinion ID: 27064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 329 (2001).

Text: “To obtain a COA under § 2253(c), a Thus, our determination of whether the district habeas prisoner must make a substantial show- court reached the right result on the ineffective ing of the denial of a constitutional right.” assistance of counsel claim will also settle this Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). issue. This demonstration “includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, V. for that matter, agree that) the petition should Patrick claims his counsel was have been resolved in a different manner or constitutionally ineffective for failing further to that the issues presented were ‘adequate to investigate his psychological condition and for deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” failing to introduce mitigating evidence of his Id. at 484 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 abusive childhood. Ineffective assistance U.S. 880, 894 & n.4 (1983)). claims are reviewed under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which Patrick’s application also must be filtered requires the petitioner to show both a failure through the deference owed a rule 60(b) rul- by counsel that drops below an objective ing, which is reviewed only for abuse of dis- standard of reasonableness and a resulting cretion. Aucoin v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion prejudice. Id. at 687. This prejudice must be Corp., 943 F.2d 6, 8 (5th Cir. 1991). This re- sufficient to undermine confidence in the view is narrower than in a direct appeal, be- reliability of the trial. Id. cause it is confined to the propriety of the rule 60(b) ruling, not of the underlying action. Id. Patrick attempts to show ineffectiveness on To do otherwise would eviscerate the rules for account of his attorney’s failure to make furtimely filing of appeals. Thus, to be entitled to ther investigations into his psychological health a COA, Patrick must demonstrate a denial of and abusive childhood. He claims such a constitutional right that is not only investigations would have uncovered organic substantial enough to meet the standard of brain damage or psychological problems. Slack, but also substantial enough that the There is no doubt criminal defense attorneys 4 have a duty to investigate as part of their ob- VI. ligation to provide effective assistance. Id. at Patrick alleges improper denial of funds to 691. This duty, however, is limited by the develop his claims of abuse and mental illness. same reasonableness standard applicable to A district court is authorized, on finding that other decisions of counsel. Id. investigative services are “reasonably necessary” to a habeas petitioner’s defense (to Patrick’s argument on this point is easily guilt or punishment), to pay for such services. refuted. When extensive psychological testing 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9). Patrick contends he was conducted on him more than ten years was erroneously denied these funds. We need after the initial trial, no organic brain damage not address the merits of this claim, because a was detected.5 The only psychological dis- COA is not a prerequisite to appealing the deorders discerned were depression, anxiety, and nial of § 848(q) funds. Hill v. Johnson, 210 chronic post-traumatic stress. Even with the F.3d 481, 487 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. benefit of hindsight, counsel’s decision not to denied, 532 U.S. 1039 (2001). pursue additional psychological testing was en- tirely reasonable and did not fall below the VII. threshold of objectively reasonable Patrick presents three issues regarding the competence. Furthermore, even if we were to propriety of the trial court’s handling and use assume the decision not to pursue additional of the term “deliberately” to describe and evaltesting was deficient performance, we are not uate his mens rea. Specifically, Patrick alleges convinced the result of the trial would have that (1) the trial court’s refusal to submit a been different. definition of “deliberate” to the jury violated his right to due process, (2) article 37.071 of Patrick also points to trial counsel’s the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is decision not to present mitigating evidence of unconstitutionally vague, and (3) the trial his abusive childhood and possible mental court’s refusal to define “deliberate” resulted illness. Patrick draws an analogy between his in a sentence of death in violation of the case and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 Eighth Amendment. (2000). Like the trial counsel in Williams, Patrick’s attorney failed to offer all possible All of these arguments depend on our findmitigating evidence at his disposal. Unlike the ing a constitutional infirmity in the trial court’s petitioner in Williams, however, Patrick has use of the term “deliberate” in a capital case. not uncovered significant potentially mitigating Despite Patrick’s repeated characterizations of evidence since trial that counsel should have the possible problems with the use of discovered by conducting the type of “deliberate,” our caselaw squarely denies any investigation consistent with the command of infirmities in its use. Washington. Thus, even though Patrick’s counsel may not have provided assistance in The refusal to define the term was entirely accord with Washington, this failure did not appropriate in light of our precedents noting prejudice Patrick. that “deliberate” has a common-sense meaning and need not be further elucidated. Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054, 1060 (5th Cir. 5 The physician did, however, opine that further 1987) (holding that “deliberate” is “sufficiently testing might reveal such damage. 5 clear to allow the jury to decide the special on Penry v. Johnson (“Penry II”), 532 U.S. issues on punishment”).6 The Thompson court 782 (2001), which clarified Penry v. Lynaugh also was faced with an Eighth Amendment (“Penry I”), 492 U.S. 302 (1989).8 claim raised in the context of a challenge to the use of the word “deliberate.” The court The only bar to Patrick’s raising this construed this claim as a general due process argument now is our usual rule refusing to challenge to the fairness of the trial, and denied consider arguments not raised in the district habeas relief because “deliberate” has a court. North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. common-sense meaning. Id. at 1060. Based City of San Juan, 90 F.3d 910, 916 (5th Cir. on the reasoning in Thompson, we see no 1996) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, constitutional problem with § 37.071.7 120 (1976)). We recognize an exception to this rule where “the issue involved is a pure