Opinion ID: 763759
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Length and Complexity of Trial

Text: 158 Roman argues that, because of the length of trial, the complexity of factual and legal issues, and the large number of defendants, witnesses and crimes charged, the jury was prevented from adequately remembering and evaluating the evidence and failed to give individual consideration to each defendant. Thus, Roman claims that the district court's refusal to sever the Millet Trial caused significant jury confusion and thereby deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree. 159 First, Roman fails to make a showing that the issues were actually beyond the jury's competence. DiNome, 954 F.2d at 842. Although the jury had to evaluate an extensive amount of evidence, the nature of the evidence and legal issues involved in this case could be understood without difficulty. See, e.g., Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1150 (holding that the jury had no difficulty in grasping the legal significance of shipment of narcotics, sales of narcotics, and transfer of money.). The conclusion that the jury comprehended the case is supported by several factors, including jurors taking notes during trial, the requests for readbacks of testimony and the length of the deliberations. See, e.g., DiNome, 954 F.2d at 843. In addition, the district court carefully instructed the jury to consider the evidence against each defendant independently. Finally, the jury verdict itself, where Millet was acquitted on one of the VICAR counts, is a clear indication that the jury was able to sift through voluminous evidence and differentiate among various defendants. Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1150. We therefore conclude that Roman's allegation of jury confusion has no merit. B. Denial of Roman's Motion for a New Trial 160 On March 24, 1997, the government received a copy of a March 12, 1997, affidavit of Carmen Miranda, that was submitted in an unrelated case, United States v. Cintron, Crim. No. 3:95cr135(PCD). The government disclosed the affidavit to defense counsel in this case immediately thereafter. In her affidavit, Miranda alleged (1) that M. Soto committed perjury when she testified during the Millet Trial; and (2) that Rafael Segarra, a New Haven police detective who allegedly participated in the investigation of the Latin Kings, knew of this fact. Specifically, Miranda claimed in her affidavit that she was present when M. Soto told Detective Segarra that she would not reveal at trial that L. Rodriguez participated in the murder of Jonathan Thomas, a murder not charged in Roman's case. 12 Miranda also alleges in her affidavit that Detective Segarra knowingly suborned M. Soto's perjured testimony and that he had developed a sexual relationship with M. Soto during Roman's trial. In addition, Miranda testified during the Cintron case that she heard M. Soto state that, although she knew L. Rodriguez had something to do with the murder of Thomas, she did not give out the information to law enforcement; rather, M. Soto only told the government what was convenient in response to questions about L. Rodriguez during the Millet Trial. Miranda also testified that M. Soto withheld information on L. Rodriguez because she was dating him at the time. 161 Relying on Miranda's affidavit, Roman moved for a new trial in April 1997 under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. First, Roman asserted that because Detective Segarra knew about M. Soto's perjury and that he was part of the prosecution team, his knowledge of the perjury was therefore imputed to the prosecution. Thus, Roman claimed that the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony during his trial, but failed to inform him or the court about it. This failure denied him the opportunity to cross-examine M. Soto, a key government witness against him regarding the Robinson murder, 13 thereby warranting a new trial. Second, Roman claimed that the government violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), for it failed to disclose exculpatory information to him regarding Detective Segarra's contacts and relationship with M. Soto. 162 For purposes of considering Roman's motion for a new trial, the district court assumed that Miranda's affidavit constituted newly discovered evidence and that it showed M. Soto committed perjury at trial. Roman contends that the court erroneously denied his motion by finding (1) that there was no basis for imputing Detective Segarra's purported knowledge to the government because he only had an incidental role in the prosecution; (2) that evidence of M. Soto's perjury was cumulative and immaterial; (3) that M. Soto's testimony about Roman's role in the Robinson murder was fully corroborated; and (4) that the prosecution had not violated its Brady obligations. We disagree. 1. Newly Discovered Evidence 163 A motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is not favored, and a district court must exercise great caution ... and may grant the motion only in the most extraordinary circumstances, United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), where it is required in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. We will not reverse a district court's findings of fact concerning a motion for a new trial unless they are clearly erroneous; nor will we overturn the denial of such a motion unless there has been an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Diaz, 922 F.2d 998, 1006-07 (2d Cir.1990). 164 Newly discovered evidence does not warrant a new trial unless the defendant shows that: (1) the  'newly discovered evidence' could not with due diligence have been discovered before or during trial; (2) where the claim is that the evidence shows perjury by a prosecution witness, the evidence demonstrates that the witness in fact committed perjury; (3) the evidence is material to the jury's verdict, that is, relevant to the merits of the case; (4) the evidence is not cumulative of other evidence introduced at trial as to a fact; and (5) the evidence could have affected the jury's verdict if it had been introduced at trial. United States v. White, 972 F.2d 16, 20-21 (2d Cir.1992). If the newly discovered evidence indicates that perjured testimony was given at trial, the affect of such evidence on the verdict depends on whether the prosecution was aware of that perjury. See id. at 21; United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir.1991). 165 There are two standards of review on whether the prosecution was aware of the perjury. See White, 972 F.2d at 21. First, if the prosecution knew or should have known of that perjury, a new trial must be granted if the court determines that new evidence 'might' alter the verdict of the jury. Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 225 (2d Cir.1988). The test is whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the perjured testimony could have influenced the jury. See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 456. Second, [i]f the prosecution was unaware of the perjury, a new trial is warranted if the court is left with a firm belief that but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been convicted. See White, 972 F.2d at 21 (internal quotation marks and alternation omitted). 166 On appeal, Roman argues that because the district court erroneously rejected his contention that Detective Segarra's knowledge of M. Soto's perjury should be imputed to the prosecution, it applied the wrong standard of review in denying his motion, that is, the court incorrectly employed the standard applicable when the prosecution is not aware of alleged perjury. We find this claim is without merit. 167 First, the only evidence that support's Roman's claim that Detective Segarra knew of M. Soto's perjury is Miranda's affidavit. In his own affidavit, however, Detective Segarra (1) denied that M. Soto told him anything about the substance of her testimony either before or after the Millet Trial; and (2) denied having a sexual relationship with M. Soto until after Roman's trial. 168 Even if we assume that Detective Segarra knew of M. Soto's perjury, there is no basis to impute his knowledge to the prosecution. Based on affidavits submitted by two FBI agents who were in charge of the federal, state and local Task Force that investigated the Connecticut Latin Kings, the district court found (1) that Detective Segarra was not a member of the Task Force; (2) as a local police officer assigned to assist the Task Force, Detective Segarra monitored wiretaps in April, May, and June, 1994, participated in arrests made in June 1994, and conducted surveillance during the investigation; and (3) that after Roman's arrest in June 1994, he returned to his role as a local police officer and had no other role in the investigation leading up to the indictment and subsequent prosecution of Roman. The court also found that after Detective Segarra informed the FBI that M. Soto wanted to talk to them in April 1994, he did not become involved in M. Soto's subsequent cooperation with the government nor was he assigned to her in connection with the investigation and prosecution of the Latin Kings. The court further noted that Detective Segarra did not act as a witness for or assist the prosecution during Roman's trial. Therefore, based on the limited scope of his actions, the district court concluded that Detective Segarra's purported awareness of M. Soto's perjury, if any, could not be imputed to the prosecution. 169 Additionally, the district court found that M. Soto's alleged perjury was unrelated to any of the crimes with which Roman or his co-defendants were charged; rather, her purportedly false testimony only concerned L. Rodriguez's supposed murder of Thomas, a crime which had no connection to the merits of Roman's case. Because this alleged newly discovered evidence failed to refute any of M. Soto's testimony against Roman, the district court found that it was immaterial. See Spencer, 4 F.3d at 119 (noting that [t]he discovery of new evidence which merely discredits a government witness and does not directly contradict the government's case ordinarily does not justify the grant of a new trial.) (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration in original). 170 Next, the district court concluded that M. Soto's alleged perjury relating to the Thomas murder was merely additional impeachment material against her credibility. The impeachment evidence presented at trial, inter alia, included (1) the testimony of her brother, Mike Soto, that L. Rodriguez killed Thomas; and (2) defense counsels' extensive cross-examinations of M. Soto, during which she (a) acknowledged her relationship with L. Rodriguez, and (b) was portrayed by defense counsel as cooperating with the government to protect L. Rodriguez from liability for his alleged role in the Robinson and Thomas murders. In addition, Roman's summation attacked the credibility of M. Soto and the court also carefully instructed the jury on examining a witness' credibility where there is a grant of immunity. See United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 72 (2d Cir.1992) (affirming denial of Rule 33 motion where impeachment evidence was cumulative). 171 Finally, the district court concluded that, although M. Soto was the only government witness in a position to testify that Roman ordered the Robinson murder, there was an abundance of evidence that corroborated M. Soto's description of these events. In sum, the district court found that the newly discovered evidence of M. Soto's alleged perjury (1) could not be imputed to the prosecution; (2) was immaterial and cumulative; and (3) was fully corroborated in connection with the Robinson murder. 172 Having reviewed the record, we find that the district court's factual findings were supported by the evidence and were not clearly erroneous. We agree with the court's finding that Detective Segarra's purported knowledge of M. Soto's perjury could not be imputed to the prosecution. We do not believe that but for M. Soto's perjured testimony, Roman would most likely not have been convicted. On the contrary, the record supports the court's conclusion that there was an abundance of independent evidence of Roman's guilt, including his participation in the Robinson murder. See United States v. Wong, 78 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir.1996) (recognizing that where independent evidence supports a defendant's conviction, the subsequent discovery that a witness's testimony at trial was perjured will not warrant a new trial.). Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roman's first claim for a new trial. 2. Alleged Brady Violations 173 Roman asserts that the government violated the disclosure requirements of Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, by failing to disclose the following three items of information that could have been used to impeach M. Soto: (1) the fact that it was Detective Segarra, not M. Soto herself, who made the first contact between his then 'neighbor' M. Soto and the FBI; (2) Detective Segarra's alleged presence at an FBI de-briefing of M. Soto in April 1994; and (3) the time period when a sexual relationship developed between Detective Segarra and M. Soto. On appeal, Roman argues that non-disclosure of these items warrants a new trial. Again, we disagree. 174 In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. Thus, a new trial is warranted under Brady where the government suppressed favorable evidence, see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), including favorable impeachment evidence, and the suppressed evidence was material, see United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 144-45 (2d Cir.1996). Suppressed evidence is material generally if  'there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). A 'reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). Suppressed impeachment evidence is material if the witness whose testimony is attacked supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime, or where the likely impact on the witness's credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution's case. Wong, 78 F.3d at 79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1210 (2d Cir.1995)). However, suppressed impeachment evidence is not material where the new evidence merely constitutes an additional basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable. Payne, 63 F.3d at 1210. 175 With respect to Roman's first claim, we need not decide whether Detective Segarra's referral of M. Soto to the FBI was suppressed evidence because the mere referral of a witness to authorities does not constitute favorable impeachment evidence under Bradyand, therefore, is immaterial. See United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 366-67 (2d Cir.1995) (holding where evidence is not material, court need not address whether or not the evidence was suppressed). Even if we assume this evidence was of some impeachment value, it merely constituted cumulative impeachment material because Roman was able to cross-examine M. Soto extensively about the timing of her decision to cooperate and her reasons for such cooperation. See Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949-50 (affirming denial of a new-trial motion without an evidentiary hearing where newly discovered reports would merely have been cumulative impeachment material against a witness' credibility). 176 Roman's second claim--that Detective Segarra was purportedly present at an FBI interview of M. Soto--does not constitute a Brady violation at all because the record clearly reflects that Detective Segarra was not present at any government debriefing of M. Soto and, therefore, there was no such information to suppress. Similarly, failure to disclose Detective Segarra's romantic relationship with M. Soto was not a Brady violation because the relationship did not occur until after Roman's trial; thus, the evidence could not have been suppressed by the prosecution during trial. Since only Roman's first claim raised a possible issue under Brady, which we found to be immaterial, our confidence in the outcome of the trial is not undermined. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Roman's Bradyclaims and denying him a new trial. 177 C. Denial of Roman's Motion to Suppress Wiretap Evidence 178 Prior to trial, Roman moved to suppress evidence obtained through use of court-authorized wiretaps, contending that the application and supporting affidavits (collectively the Affidavit) (1) contained stale information; (2) failed to establish probable cause; and (3) failed to establish the inadequacy of other investigative procedures. The district court referred his motion to United States District Judge T.F. Gilroy Daly, who denied it. Roman argues that the district judge erred in denying his motion. We disagree. 179 In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress wiretap evidence, we accord deference to the district court. Miller, 116 F.3d at 663 (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 231). Our role in reviewing the issuance of a wiretap order is not to make a de novo determination of the sufficiency of the application, but to decide if the facts set forth in the application were minimally adequate to support the determination that was made. Id. Here, we find that the Affidavit adequately supported the district judge's denial of Roman's motion. 1. Affidavit's Information 180 Roman argues that the Affidavit contained stale information and did not make the necessary connection between his home phone and the offenses under investigation. We previously have held that  'the principal factors in assessing whether or not the supporting facts have become stale are the age of those facts and the nature of the conduct alleged to have violated the law.'  United States v. Gallo, 863 F.2d 185, 192 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 867 (2d Cir.1981)). Where a supporting affidavit presents a picture of continuing conduct as opposed to an isolated instance of wrongdoing. Thus, the passage of time between the last described act and the presentation of the application become less significant. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This is especially true in a case involving an ongoing narcotics operation, where intervals of weeks or months between the last described act and the application for a wiretap do not necessarily make the information stale. Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 602 (2d Cir.1991) (dealing with search warrants) (citing United States v. Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that gap of 18 months did not render information stale); Martino, 664 F.2d at 867 (3 weeks); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (5 weeks)). 181 Here, the district judge properly concluded that the Affidavit did not contain stale information. First, the Affidavit stated that Roman and other members of the Latin Kings (1) were involved in drug trafficking activities as late as March 1994, within one month of the wiretap application; (2) used telephones to conduct their illegal drug activities; and (3) that Roman's phone was used to make calls to and receive calls from these individuals until March 1994. Moreover, as the district judge found, to the extent that there are acts of past criminal activity that in and of themselves might be stale, such acts can be sufficient if [an] affidavit also establishes a pattern of continuing criminal activity so there is reason to believe that the cited activity was probably not a one-time occurrence. United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir.1993). 2. Probable Cause 182 Roman further argues that the Affidavit failed to establish probable cause that particular communications concerning criminal activity would be obtained by tapping his home phone. Again, the Affidavit belies this contention. 183 To the extent pertinent here, a federal court may issue a wiretap order under 18 U.S.C. § 2518 if it determines, on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant, that there is probable cause to believe (1) that an individual was committing, had committed, or is about to commit a crime; (2) that communications concerning that crime will be obtained through the wiretap; and (3) that the premises to be wiretapped were being used for criminal purposes or are about to be used or owned by the target of the wiretap. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(i), (3)(a), (b), (d) (1988). The standard for probable cause applicable to § 2518 is the same as the standard for a regular search warrant. United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 530 (2d Cir.1977). Under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), probable cause for a search warrant is established if the totality-of-the-circumstances indicate a probability of criminal activity. See id. at 230-32, 103 S.Ct. 2317. On appellate review, a determination of probable cause is accorded great deference, and will be upheld so long as the magistrate or judge had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Id. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (alteration in original); see Wagner, 989 F.2d at 72. 184 In the case before us, there existed a substantial basis that wiretaps of Roman's home phone would uncover evidence of unlawful activity. The Affidavit stated, and Roman does not dispute, that he and other members of the Latin Kings were engaged in drug trafficking within Bridgeport and New Haven. Moreover, the Affidavit contained a detailed account of how Roman and the key Latin King members conducted their illegal activities over the target phones, and set forth specific instances where Roman used his home phone in this regard. Further, the district judge found that contrary to Roman's claim of no unusual criminal pattern, the pen register 14 analysis showed that, exclusive of calls to known family members or social acquaintances, Roman's home phone was used extensively to call other Latin Kings whom the Affidavit listed as engaged in drug trafficking and related criminal activities. Considering the totality of these circumstances, the issuance of the wiretap order was certainly justified. Accordingly, the district judge properly found probable cause. 185 3. Inadequacy of Other Investigative Procedures 186 Roman also contends that the Affidavit failed to establish another prerequisite for the issuance of a wiretap order, to wit, that other investigative techniques had been tried and failed or appeared too dangerous or unlikely to succeed. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). Specifically, Roman asserts that because the government had access to the Lompoc prison tape recordings and had ample confidential informants, the government failed to make the requisite statutory showing that it exhausted other investigative procedures. We disagree. 187 The purpose of the statutory requirements of § 2518 is not to preclude the government's resort to wiretapping  'until after all other possible means of investigation have been exhausted by investigative agents; rather, [the statute] only require[s] that the agents inform the authorizing judicial officer of the nature and progress of the investigation and of the difficulties inherent in the use of normal law enforcement methods.'  Torres, 901 F.2d at 231 (quoting United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1282 (2d Cir.1979) (quoting, in turn, United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir.1976))). The issue of whether a normal investigative method has been exhausted must be tested in a practical and common sense manner. See id. at 232. 188 Here, contrary to Roman's claim, neither the Lompoc prison tape recordings nor informant information were adequate means of investigation. With respect to the Lompoc tapes, the Affidavit stated that although the tapes were helpful in identifying criminal participants and in determining the organizational structure of the Latin Kings, the overall value of the tapes was limited without the ability to monitor calls that follow the carefully coded directives of Millet on the prison tapes. Moreover, the government explained that information sought through its requested wire interceptions, such as the sources of drug supply and the location of drug proceeds, could not adequately be obtained through its informants, who were street dealers or individuals not operating at the core of the racketeering and drug conspiracies. 189 Further, the Affidavit detailed the exhaustion of other investigative techniques, including the limitations or ineffectiveness of physical surveillance, grand jury subpoenas, confidential informants and cooperating sources, undercover police officers and agents, interviews of subjects or associates, search warrants and pen registers. In particular, the Affidavit noted that alternative techniques were unavailing in light of the Latin King's coordination of drug trafficking and organized sanctioning of assaults and killings, together with the secretive manner in which the illegal activities were carried out. We conclude that the district court properly found that conventional investigative techniques had been exhausted and that alternatives to wire interception would be unlikely to succeed or would be too dangerous. Thus, the motion to suppress was properly denied. D. Roman's Motion for Recusal 190 Roman claims that Judge Nevas should have recused himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). Prior to trial, Roman moved for recusal, arguing that the district court pre-determined that all of the defendants and unindicted cooperating witnesses were part of one large conspiracy. Roman did not base his motion on any bias shown by the judge. Rather, his assertion of prejudice is based on two grounds: (1) the court's ruling on co-defendant Vidro's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, in which the court stated that Vidro is an alleged leader of the Latin Kings, a violent criminal organization that is active in the Connecticut prison system; and (2) that in reviewing and authorizing wire intercepts in the case, the court heard and credited inadmissible hearsay evidence of a conspiracy. Roman asserts that Judge Nevas would not have been able to make open-minded and impartial determinations at trial regarding whether the government proved the existence of a conspiracy, which is a prerequisite to ruling on the admissibility of co-conspirator statements. Judge Nevas denied the motion to recuse himself, finding that judicial rulings are generally an insufficient predicate under § 455 for recusal, and that he did not have personal knowledge of the facts concerning this case as required under § 455(b)(1). On appeal, Roman argues that his conviction should be reversed because Judge Nevas erred in denying his motion for recusal. We disagree. 191 Under § 455(a), a federal judge must recuse himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In deciding whether or not to affirm a judge's denial of a recusal motion, a court of appeals must ask the following question: ... would an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts, entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal? United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir.1992) (citing DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 427, 428-29 (2d Cir.1988)). A federal judge shall also recuse himself [w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. § 455(b)(1). 192 We review a district judge's denial of a recusal motion only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 48 (2d Cir.1998). No abuse of discretion occurred here. In Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994), the Supreme Court held that judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. Id. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. The Court further stated that opinions formed by a judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of judicial proceedings do not constitute a basis for recusal unless they indicate that the judge has a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Id.; In re Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 45 F.3d 641, 644 (2d Cir.1995). 193 Roman's motion for recusal relied on the judicial rulings on wiretap applications and a co-defendant's motion to suppress that were issued by the district court in the exercise of its judicial duties. Since the court's rulings were events that occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, and neither (1) relied upon knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible, Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556, 114 S.Ct. 1147; see United States v. Conte, 99 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir.1996), Roman's motion failed to show that there was an objectively reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality under § 455(a), see United States v. Colon, 961 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir.1992) (stating that earlier adverse rulings, without more, do not provide a reasonable basis for questioning a judge's impartiality.). Moreover, Judge Nevas noted that since he did not have any personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts of the case, his recusal was not warranted under § 455(b)(1). Under these circumstances, Judge Nevas did not abuse his discretion in declining to recuse himself. E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 194 Burgos and G. Rivera claim that their respective trial counsels' performance was so deficient and prejudicial that it constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, G. Rivera argues that his conviction should be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial because his counsel was ineffective by failing to (1) offer evidence of his brain damage and present a defense of mental incapacity; and (2) object to the admission of certain co-conspirator statements as hearsay. Burgos asserts, for the first time on direct appeal, that his counsel was also ineffective because he failed to conduct a proper pre-trial investigation and, therefore, that his case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to explore the issue. These contentions are without merit. 1. G. Rivera 195 A defendant challenging his conviction and sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel bears a heavy burden. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court adopted a strong presumption that trial counsel provides effective assistance. To overcome this presumption, a defendant must show both (1) deficient performance, that is, that his trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052; and (2) prejudice, that is, that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Here, G. Rivera has met neither prong of the Strickland test. 196 First, G. Rivera argues that because his trial counsel knew of facts which would have supported a diminished capacity defense, he was ineffective for not presenting that defense at trial. In particular, G. Rivera's appellate counsel cites several mental health reports from 1992 through 1993, concluding that G. Rivera was incompetent to stand trial and that he had brain damage from several serious head injuries. Because of this alleged brain damage, appellate counsel also asserts that G. Rivera did not have the ability to participate in the drug conspiracy or did not have the specific intent to distribute drugs. In addition, appellate counsel points out that a doctor who examined G. Rivera and determined that he was incompetent in a 1993 report, again determined in a 1996 report that G. Rivera remained totally incompetent. 197 Irrespective of such evidence, trial counsel was aware of at least five other diagnoses, reached on five different occasions from 1992 through 1995, that G. Rivera was either: (1) malingering his mental problems; (2) was not suffering from significant organic brain damage or severe mental disease or defect during the time of his drug conspiracy offense; or (3) was competent to stand trial. Since there was ample evidence that G. Rivera was possibly faking his mental illness, we find that trial counsel's decision not to present any of the mental reports or testimony of the doctor was a sound trial strategy that falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir.) (finding that the tactical decision of whether to call specific witnesses--even ones that might offer exculpatory evidence--is ordinarily not viewed as a lapse in professional representation.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 130, 139 L.Ed.2d 80 (1997); Kieser v. New York, 56 F.3d 16, 18 (2d Cir.1995) (per curiam) (Actions or omissions by counsel that might be considered sound trial strategy do not constitute ineffective assistance.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 198 Furthermore, we find that trial counsel's failure to object to the testimony of co-conspirators as alleged hearsay does not amount to deficient performance. As noted above, there were sound evidentiary bases for the admission of the challenged co-conspirator statements and, therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. See United States v. Brooks, 82 F.3d 50, 53-54 (2d Cir.1996) (finding that trial counsel acted properly in not objecting to testimony that was admissible against his client as an admission by a co-conspirator); United States v. Boothe, 994 F.2d 63, 68-69 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to co-conspirator statements as hearsay when such statements were admissible as non-hearsay under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)). 199 Finally, trial counsel's performance did not result in prejudice to G. Rivera. Here, there is no reason to believe that had trial counsel presented a diminished mental capacity defense, or objected and succeeded in excluding co-conspirator statements, that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The wiretap evidence where G. Rivera is heard speaking clearly to his co-conspirators about drug transactions provided strong proof that G. Rivera participated in the drug conspiracy. Thus, regardless of the possible impact of reports or testimony about his mental condition, the wiretap evidence provides a reasonable probability that the jury would have concluded, as did several professionals and the district court, that G. Rivera had malingered his mental illness to avoid being held responsible for his drug trafficking activities. Moreover, there was other evidence, aside from the co-conspirator statements, sufficient to convict G. Rivera. Therefore, we conclude that G. Rivera did not suffer prejudice. Hence, G. Rivera fails under both prongs of Strickland to overcome the strong presumption that his trial counsel provided effective assistance. 2. Burgos 200 Burgos claims, for the first time on appeal, that his trial counsel was ineffective, asserting that if his counsel had conducted a proper pre-trial investigation, Burgos would have made a different decision regarding his guilty plea. Citing Billy-Eko v. United States, 8 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.1993), Burgos submits that his claim is based on facts outside the record and requests that the issue be remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. 201 In Billy-Eko, we stated that appellate counsel are encouraged to err on the side of including an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, even if there is a need for further extrinsic evidence, to preclude the possibility of procedural forfeiture. See id. at 116. We further stated in Billy-Eko that inclusion of such an ineffective assistance claim gives us the opportunity to either remand the claim to the district court or leave the defendant to his post-conviction remedies by declining to rule on the claim. Id. Nevertheless, we have clarified that the Billy-Eko doctrine is discretionary, Salameh, 152 F.3d at 160-61, and that remand is not  'a mandatory requirement, and [as] such claims are ordinarily pursued by a subsequent § 2255 petition.'  United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 701 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Riascos-Prado v. United States, 66 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir.1995)). Given our disinclination to grant direct review of such a claim, and since there is an insufficient factual record and Burgos failed to explain why we should hear his ineffective assistance claim at this point, we decline to address his claim further and conclude that it would be more properly raised in a § 2255 petition. F. Burgos' Alleged Involuntary Guilty Plea 202 Burgos argues, for the first time on appeal, that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because it was made involuntarily. Specifically, Burgos claims that his plea of guilty was the result of a threat made by one of the jurors who had decided his guilt before hearing the evidence. Burgos asserts that during trial he became aware that a juror's son was incarcerated, but that the juror lied about it during voir dire because he wanted to ensure that all the Latin Kings went to jail like his son had. Burgos further claims that he told his counsel about it, but that counsel failed to act on this information. Burgos concedes this issue of an involuntary guilty plea presents facts which are outside of the record and, therefore, requests that the issue be remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing where it may be more fully developed. 203 We decline to remand this issue for there is nothing in the record to substantiate Burgos' claim. In fact, Burgos' sworn statements during his plea hearing directly contradict an involuntary guilty plea for he stated under oath, inter alia, that (1) he was satisfied with his counsel's representation of him; (2) the plea was of his own free will; (3) he was guilty and stated that he understood that the court would not accept his plea if he claimed to be innocent; and (4) he had no questions regarding the sentencing proceeding after the plea was entered. We find that these statements undermine Burgos' claim that his guilty plea was involuntary. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding that sworn statements made during allocution are presumptively valid); United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1530 (2d Cir.1997) (same). G. Denial of Defense Witness Immunity 204 Vidro requested that the government grant immunity to defense witness Edwin Ortiz, a Latin King member incarcerated for his role in the Council murder, as described above. When the government refused, Vidro requested that the district court order the government to grant such immunity, but it denied her request. Vidro argues that this denial resulted in an unfair trial and deprivation of her due process rights. This claim lacks merit. 205 Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Due Process Clause imposes no requirement that defense witness immunity be ordered 'whenever it seems fair to grant it.'  Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 441 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir.1980)). We apply a three-part test for determining whether there are exceptional circumstances warranting a directive that the government grant immunity to a defense witness. See United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827, 837 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir.1992). First, the district court must find that the government, through its own overreaching, has forced the witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment or, that the government has engaged in discriminatory use of grants of immunity to gain a tactical advantage; second, the witness' testimony must be material, exculpatory and not cumulative; and third, the defendant has no other source to obtain the evidence. See Bahadar, 954 F.2d at 826. The defendant bears the burden of showing that each of these elements is present. See United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir.1988). 206 With respect to the first prong, Vidro points to the government's granting of immunity to Torres, a Latin King member who, like Ortiz, was involved in the Council murder. Vidro claims that this granting of immunity to Torres, but not to Ortiz, gave the government a tactical advantage. We have rejected the argument that immunity must be granted to defense witnesses in order to redress a supposed government 'advantage' over the defense. Blissett, 924 F.2d at 442 (citing Turkish, 623 F.2d at 774). Only when a prosecutor has abused the government's ability to grant immunity by using it in a discriminatory fashion for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage does due process require a grant of immunity for a defense witness. Id. Nothing in the record indicates such a discriminatory use of immunity. In fact, when Vidro requested the district court to order immunity, she stated that she was not claiming that there was any prosecutorial misconduct. Since Vidro has not satisfied the first prong of the test requiring prosecutorial misconduct or overreaching, we need not address the issues of the materiality of Ortiz' testimony and Vidro's access to such evidence. We conclude that the court properly declined to order the government to grant immunity to Ortiz. H. Zapata's Double Jeopardy Claim 207 The jury found that Zapata committed the following six predicate acts of racketeering under both the RICO and RICO conspiracy counts:(1) conspiracy to deal drugs; (2) conspiracy to murder Reyes; (3) murder of Council; (4) conspiracy to murder and murder of Valedon; (5) murder of Calo; and (6) murder of Villafane. On appeal, Zapata assumes that the racketeering acts of murder alleged against him under the RICO counts will be dismissed based on his sufficiency of the evidence claims, and thereby, the remaining racketeering acts only consist of conspiracies. Under this assumption, Zapata asserts that, because the district court allegedly charged the jury that proof of the elements of these conspiracies under the RICO count did not require proving elements different than those needed to convict under the RICO conspiracy count, he was charged with the same offense twice. Zapata therefore argues that the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, which protects against both multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense, was violated. We disagree. 208 First, in United States v. Sessa, 125 F.3d 68, 71-73 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied sub nom. Scarpa v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 731, 139 L.Ed.2d 669 (1998), we rejected an argument similar to the one Zapata raises and concluded that there is no double jeopardy violation where a defendant is charged and convicted of a substantive RICO offense based upon predicate acts which are themselves conspiracies and is subsequently charged with RICO conspiracy. Second, as noted above, we find no basis for reversing the jury's conclusions with respect to Zapata's predicate acts of murder. Accordingly, we find no double jeopardy violation here.