Opinion ID: 1919841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Dangerous Sex Offender

Text: In order for J.R. to be considered a dangerous sex offender, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that J.R. is likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence and that he is substantially unable to control his criminal behavior. [95] Likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence means the person's propensity to commit sex offenses resulting in serious harm to others is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of the public. [96] Not being able to control criminal behavior means having serious difficulty in controlling or resisting the desire or urge to commit sex offenses. [97] The key to confinement of a mentally ill person lies in finding that the person is dangerous and that, absent confinement, the mentally ill person is likely to engage in particular acts which will result in substantial harm to himself or others. [98] J.R. argues that in order for involuntary commitment under SOCA to comply with due process, the State was required to show that he has actually been dangerous in the recent past by providing evidence of an overt act, attempt, or threat to do substantial harm to himself or others. And J.R. argues that his conviction in 2000 is insufficient to prove that he committed a recent act that is probative of whether he will be dangerous in the future. We have stated: To comply with due process, there must be a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that dangerous behavior will be engaged in unless restraints are applied. [99] In determining whether a person is dangerous, the focus must be on the person's condition at the time of the commitment hearing. [100] The actions and statements of the person prior to the commitment hearing are probative of the person's present mental condition. [101] But, for a past act to have evidentiary value, the past act must have some foundation for a prediction of future dangerousness, thus being probative of that issue. [102] In In re Interest of Blythman, [103] we considered whether a sexual assault that occurred 5 years before Theodore Blythman's commitment hearing was a recent act. Since the time of the assault, Blythman was incarcerated. Blythman argued that if we were to conclude that the assault satisfies the recent act requirement, then involuntary civil commitment, regardless of how remote in time the act, threat, or violence was, would be permitted. We rejected this argument, stating: [S]uch a result does not necessarily follow if it is kept in mind that any act that is used as evidence of dangerousness must be sufficiently probative to predict future behavior and the subject's present state of dangerousness. [104] We determined that Blythman's assault, which occurred 5 years before his commitment hearing, was probative of whether he was still dangerous and stated that [t]his is particularly true since [Blythman] did not have an opportunity to commit a more recent act in the intervening years. [105] Further, we opined that the Legislature did not intend for a sex offender to be given the opportunity to commit a more recent act once a sufficient amount of time has passed since the last act in order to meet the recent act requirement. [106] At the time In re Interest of Blythman was decided, SOCA had not been enacted. Blythman was committed under MHCA. Under MHCA, the definition of a mentally ill and dangerous person was defined as someone who is mentally ill and poses a substantial risk of harm to others as manifested by evidence of recent violent acts or threats of violence or by placing others in reasonable fear of such harm. [107] SOCA does not include § 71-908 in its definition. It is unclear whether the Legislature intended for the recent act requirement of § 71-908 to apply to SOCA. Assuming without deciding that the recent act requirement must be fulfilled for J.R. to be adjudged a dangerous sex offender, we determine that the State satisfied such a requirement in this case. The State proved that J.R.'s sexual assaults on his girlfriend's daughter were probative to the issue of whether he is still a danger. Skulsky testified that J.R. is a pedophile, suffers from cannabis dependence and depression, and has a personality disorder. Skulsky also testified that J.R. has inadequate emotional controls and that until successfully completing treatment, J.R. would have a hard time controlling his sexual urges. J.R. did not complete sex offender treatment while in prison. Considering this evidence, we believe that J.R.'s acts of sexual assaults on his girlfriend's daughter are probative on the issue of dangerousness. J.R. asserts that the sexual assault is not probative of whether he is still dangerous, because he could have taken advantage of opportunities to assault other children, [or] to further assault his victim before being sentenced, but instead, he sought voluntary therapy. [108] J.R. was charged on May 8, 2000, and was sentenced on December 15. In March 2000, J.R. had sought professional counseling. However, J.R. sexually assaulted his girlfriend's daughter for a period of at least 5 years, and J.R. never sought treatment until his victim reported the assaults. Although J.R. did not reoffend immediately before being incarcerated, the fact that his sexual offenses continued for a period of at least 5 years remains probative of whether he is still dangerous. J.R. also argues he cannot be characterized as a dangerous sex offender because his Static-99 results placed him at the lowest level to reoffend. This argument is without merit. First, we have never concluded that the results of the Static-99 are dispositive of whether a person is a dangerous sex offender. And, although J.R. scored a zero on the Static-99, the record indicates that the Static-99 may have underestimated J.R.'s risk for reoffending, because J.R.'s treatment staff still had concerns regarding that risk. Further, in Skulsky's professional opinion, despite the Static-99 results, J.R. still poses a danger to society. As such, we conclude that J.R.'s argument is without merit. J.R. also attacks the credibility of Skulsky's opinion, arguing that Skulsky did not conduct a thorough evaluation. J.R.'s basis for such argument is that Skulsky did not consider a previous evaluation of J.R. that Skulsky had conducted. Skulsky explained that he did not consider this evaluation because of an issue regarding payment. We consider the fact that the Board saw and heard Skulsky's testimony and observed his demeanor while testifying, and give great weight to the Board's judgment as to credibility. [109] Skulsky testified that despite any prior assessments or any issues regarding payment, he accurately evaluated J.R. Specifically, Skulsky stated: I wouldn't have agreed to [evaluate him] if I thought I'd be influenced about the current work. In our review, we give significant deference to the fact the Board found Skulsky's testimony credible. We also note that none of the previous evaluations that J.R. complains of were introduced into evidence. Presumably, J.R. would have introduced into evidence any previous evaluations if they were favorable. We conclude that Skulsky's evaluation was sufficient and probative of whether J.R. remains a danger to society.