Opinion ID: 799898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Governing Period of Limitations

Text: The action giving rise to Plaintiff’s USERRA claim was his termination on September 14, 2007. Plaintiff filed his complaint on July 5, 2010, approximately two years and ten months after the action accrued. This two-year, ten-month period is far beyond the 180 day cut-off in the employment contract clause, but it is within the four-year statute of limitations of § 1658(a). Thus, if the contractual limitations period applies, Plaintiff’s complaint would be untimely. If the statutory period applies, Plaintiff’s claim would survive. “[I]n the absence of a controlling statute to the contrary, a provision in a contract may validly limit, between the parties, the time for bringing an action on such contract to a period less than that prescribed in the general statute of limitations, provided that the shorter period itself shall be a reasonable period.” Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947); Rice v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 450, 454 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus, the narrow question before us is whether the pre-VBIA version of USERRA prohibits the contractual shortening of the statute of limitations. One provision in USERRA is relevant to this inquiry. Section 4302(b) of the statute provides: This chapter [38 USCS §§ 4301 et seq.] supersedes any State law (including any local law or ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by this chapter [38 USCS §§ 4301 et seq.], including the establishment of additional prerequisites to the exercise of any such right or the receipt of any such benefit. 7 No. 11-1119 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b).4 Section 4302(b) thereby prohibits contractual provisions which limit USERRA “right[s] or benefit[s]” or contractual provisions that require “additional prerequisites” in order for a plaintiff to exercise those rights or benefits. Section 4303 offers a definition of “rights or benefits” under USERRA: The term “benefit”, “benefit of employment”, or “rights and benefits” means the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, including any advantage, profit, privilege, gain, status, account, or interest (including wages or salary for work performed) that accrues by reason of an employment contract or agreement or an employer policy, plan, or practice and includes rights and benefits under a pension plan, a health plan, an employee stock ownership plan, insurance coverage and awards, bonuses, severance pay, supplemental unemployment benefits, vacations, and the opportunity to select work hours or location of employment. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2). Our Circuit has interpreted this definition to mean that USERRA prevents that limitation of veterans’ substantive rights, but not their procedural rights. See Wysocki v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1106–07 (6th Cir. 2010); Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 677–78 (5th Cir. 2006)). “[T]herefore, § 4302(b) does not prevent veterans from waiving their procedural rights . . . .” Wysocki, 607 F.3d at 1107. However, this Court has also determined that USERRA supercedes contracts that provide for the wholesale contractual elimination of all procedural rights, because such a waiver would result in the de facto elimination of the veteran’s substantive rights. Id. (considering 4 Plaintiff also argues that § 4302(a) prevents the contractual shortening of limitations periods. However, subsection (a) provides that nothing in USERRA shall limit contractually-obtained rights that are more beneficial to the plaintiff than those in the statute. 38 U.S.C. § 4302(a). Because Plaintiff’s situation is the opposite of that conceived in subsection (a), it is subsection (b) and not (a) that applies. 8 No. 11-1119 a waiver that “purports to preclude [the plaintiff] from advancing a USERRA claim in any forum, ever”). This Circuit generally defines a period of limitations as a procedural matter. See, e.g., Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing the issue in the choice of law context); Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 661–62 (6th Cir. 1994) (comparing choice of law and Erie contexts); Allgood v. Elyria United Methodist Home, 904 F.2d 373, 376–77 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that a limitations period for the Labor-Management and Relations Act and Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act is a procedural matter); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1370 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that a limitations period in the Age in Employment Discrimination Act is a procedural matter); Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1972); see also Aull v. McKeon-Grano Assocs., Inc., No. 06-2752, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13008, at –20 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2007) (determining that the pre-VBIA version of USERRA does not prevent a contractual shortening of the time period for filing a USERRA claim, because a limitations period is a procedural matter). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s employment contract does not eliminate all procedural rights in that it only shortens the time frame that Plaintiff can raise a USERRA claim. Because the contractual period of limitations diminished a right under USERRA that was merely procedural, § 4302(b) does not override the contractual limitations period on that basis. In addition to overriding contracts that limit “rights or benefits,” USERRA also supercedes contractual provisions that impose “additional prerequisites to the exercise of any such right or the receipt of any such benefit.” Although the statute does not define the phrase, our Court has previously considered what constitutes an “additional prerequisite” under USERRA. See Petty v. 9 No. 11-1119 Metro. Gov’t of Nashville-Davidson Cnty., 538 F.3d 431, 442 (6th Cir. 2008). In Petty, we found that an employer’s imposition of a return-to-work process, which required its veteran employees to complete new physical and psychological testing, was an impermissible “additional prerequisite” under USERRA. Id. We noted that the employer’s “procedures [we]re in addition to the requirements Congress specified for the exercise of USERRA’s reemployment rights.” Id. We also noted that the only statutory prerequisites are listed in § 4312 and require 1) advance notification of military deployment to employer, 2) military service for less than five years, 3) timely request for re-employment with specified documentation, and 4) separation under honorable conditions. Id. at 440–41. Thus, under Petty, the definition of “additional prerequisite” involves matters including but not limited to affirmative requirements related to the rehiring process, proof needed to qualify for a USERRA claim, or imposing procedures that plaintiffs must comply with prior to filing a claim in court. See Landis, 537 F.3d at 564–65 (Cole, J., concurring) (“By ‘additional prerequisites,’ Congress clearly meant to stop employers from requiring ‘additional resort to mechanisms such as grievance procedures or arbitration or similar administrative appeals.’” (citing H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, at 20 (1993))). Consent to a shorter time frame for filing a claim in court does not fall within this definition. In sum, § 4302(b) does not operate to forbid the contractual imposition of a diminished time period for bringing USERRA claims. Because Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely under the 180-day period in the contract, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendant and in denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Although we are sympathetic to Plaintiff’s situation, especially in light of the VBIA amendment that no limitations period whatsoever is to 10 No. 11-1119 apply to USERRA claims, we are bound to apply the pre-VBIA version of USERRA in deciding that the shortened filing period in Plaintiff’s employment contract was permissible.