Opinion ID: 2571543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Failure to Vacate Womac's Convictions for Felony Murder and Assault in the First Degree Violates Double Jeopardy

Text: ¶ 12 Brian Womac was found to have committed a single offense against a single victim yet three separate convictions remain on his record. That it is unjust and oppressive to multiply punishments for a single offense is a concept which has gained recognition in the courts of this state. State v. Johnson, 92 Wash.2d 671, 678, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979) (citing State v. Maloney, 78 Wash.2d 922, 481 P.2d 1 (1971)); see also State v. Calle, 125 Wash.2d 769, 776, 888 P.2d 155 (1995) (Courts may not exceed legislative authority by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 334, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)))). ¶ 13 The double jeopardy doctrine protects defendants against prosecution oppression. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.1(b), at 630 (2d ed.1999). The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides [n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . . Article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution mirrors the federal constitution stating [n]o person shall be . . . twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Washington's double jeopardy clause offers the same scope of protection as the federal double jeopardy clause. In re Pers. Restraint of Percer, 150 Wash.2d 41, 49, 75 P.3d 488 (2003) (citing State v. Gocken, 127 Wash.2d 95, 107, 896 P.2d 1267 (1995)). Both prohibit (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense imposed in the same proceeding. Percer, 150 Wash.2d at 48-49, 75 P.3d 488 (citing State v. Bobic, 140 Wash.2d 250, 260, 996 P.2d 610 (2000); Gocken, 127 Wash.2d at 100, 896 P.2d 1267). RCW 10.43.050 also affords defendants protections against double jeopardy, providing in part: Whenever a defendant shall be acquitted or convicted upon an indictment or information charging a crime consisting of different degrees, he cannot be proceeded against or tried for the same crime in another degree, nor for an attempt to commit such crime, or any degree thereof. ¶ 14 Jeopardy means exposure to danger. 1 LINDA S. PORTNOY, WASHINGTON CRIMINAL PRACTICE IN COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION § 15.05(C), at 15-7 (3d ed.2005). Womac remains exposed to danger as three separate convictions (arising from a single offense) remain on his record after the trial court determined that sentencing on all three would violate double jeopardy. As Womac's counsel correctly asserts, it is unjust to find a double jeopardy violation and hold these convictions in a safe for a rainy day, in the event that the homicide by abuse gets reversed . . . then they can sort of rise from the dead like Jesus on the third day and bite my client, and he can be sentenced on convictions that the court already ruled violated double jeopardy. 7 VRP at 1072. ¶ 15 To permit such a practice allows the State multiple bites at the apple by labeling one crime by three different names and upholding any and all resulting convictions. And the State, with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).
¶ 16 Washington follows the same evidence rule which this court adopted in 1896. Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 777, 888 P.2d 155. [T]he defendant's double jeopardy rights are violated if he or she is convicted of offenses that are identical both in fact and in law. Id. at 777, 888 P.2d 155. The same evidence rule is sometimes referred to as the same elements' test. See Gocken, 127 Wash.2d at 101, 896 P.2d 1267 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993)). Washington's `same evidence' test is very similar to the rule set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 777-78, 888 P.2d 155. The same evidence rule controls unless there is a clear indication that the legislature did not intend to impose multiple punishment. State v. Gohl, 109 Wash.App. 817, 821, 37 P.3d 293 (2001). ¶ 17 [O]ffenses are not constitutionally the same if there is any element in one offense not included in the other and proof of one offense would not necessarily prove the other. State v. Trujillo, 112 Wash.App. 390, 410, 49 P.3d 935 (2002) (citing Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 777-78, 888 P.2d 155). Washington courts, however, have occasionally found a violation of double jeopardy despite a determination that the offenses involved clearly contained different legal elements. State v. Schwab, 98 Wash.App. 179, 184-85, 988 P.2d 1045 (1999) ( See State v. Johnson, 92 Wash.2d 671, 679-80, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979) (examining convictions for first degree rape, first degree kidnapping, and first degree assault and striking the kidnapping and assault convictions even though the offenses involve different legal elements because the kidnapping and assault were incidental to, and elements of, the first degree rape) . . .; State v. Potter, 31 Wash.App. 883, 887-88, 645 P.2d 60 (1982) (concluding that convictions for reckless endangerment and reckless driving violated double jeopardy despite differing legal elements where the reckless endangerment conviction arose out of an act of reckless driving)). See also In re Pers. Restraint of Burchfield, 111 Wash.App. 892, 899, 46 P.3d 840 (2002) (Although the offenses do not contain identical legal elements, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to punish shooting a victim both as an assault and as a homicide.). ¶ 18 In Gohl, Division One of the Court of Appeals held convictions for both assault and attempted murder violated double jeopardy even though incarceration was imposed for attempted murder only. The court concluded double jeopardy was implicated because attempted first degree murder and first degree assault convictions are the same in law and in fact. 109 Wash.App. at 822, 37 P.3d 293. Accordingly, the court vacated the assault convictions. [2] Id. ¶ 19 In State v. Read, 100 Wash.App. 776, 998 P.2d 897 (2000), Division Three of the Court of Appeals found convictions for second degree murder and first degree assault violated double jeopardy and the court vacated the assault conviction. The Read court determined the offenses were legally the same under the same evidence test since proof of second degree intentional murder necessarily also proves first degree assault. Id. at 791-92, 998 P.2d 897. The court found the offenses were the same in fact because the offenses were based on the same act directed toward the same victim. Id. at 791, 998 P.2d 897. This determination was made despite the fact that the sentencing court did not expressly find that the two crimes were the `same criminal conduct.' [3] Id. at 793 n. 7, 998 P.2d 897.
¶ 20 Here, the trial court found all three of Womac's counts constituted the same criminal conduct. 7 VRP at 1076-77. In an appendix to the judgment and sentence the trial court noted imposing separate punishments for Count I (homicide by abuse) [4] and Count II (murder in the second degree) [5] would violate constitutional double jeopardy provisions. See Clerk's Papers (CP) at 37 (App. A to J. & Sent.). The court similarly noted separate punishments for Counts I and III (assault of a child in the first degree) would also violate double jeopardy. [6] Id. The judge determined sentencing Womac on all three counts would violate double jeopardy provisions because Womac would receive multiple punishment for basically the same criminal conduct.  7 VRP at 1077 (emphasis added). The State conceded imposing separate punishments for homicide by abuse and murder in the second degree would violate double jeopardy admitting under the facts of this case [assault in the first degree and homicide by abuse] would be same criminal conduct in that they involve[d] the same victim and occurred at the same time and place. . . . 6 VRP at 1034-35. ¶ 21 However, notwithstanding double jeopardy concerns, the trial judge found Counts II and III to be valid conviction[s]. See CP at 37-38 (App. A to J. & Sent.) (Count II, murder in the second degree, is a valid conviction and the court would sentence the defendant on Count II if it were not prohibited from doing so by the double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions. . . . Count III is a valid conviction but no punishment will be imposed because of double jeopardy concerns.). ¶ 22 In State v. Schwab , Division One of the Court of Appeals found convictions for second degree felony murder and first degree manslaughter for a single homicide violated double jeopardy. First, the court determined second degree felony murder and first degree manslaughter are not the same offense in law as each offense includes an element that is not included in the other. 98 Wash.App. at 184, 988 P.2d 1045. But while application of the same evidence test is indicative of legislative intent, the test is not always dispositive as to whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes. Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 778, 780, 888 P.2d 155. The rule establishes only a presumption which may be overcome by clear evidence of contrary intent. See id. at 780, 888 P.2d 155. ¶ 23 To further discern legislative intent, the Schwab court looked to the definition of homicide which reads: the killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another, death occurring at any time, and is either (1) murder, (2) homicide by abuse, (3) manslaughter, (4) excusable homicide, or (5) justifiable homicide. RCW 9A.32.010. From the plain language of the statute, the court concluded one killing equals one homicide; one unlawful homicide equals either murder, homicide by abuse, or manslaughter. Schwab, 98 Wash.App. at 188-89, 988 P.2d 1045. Accordingly, the court found the legislature did not intend to provide multiple punishments for a single homicide. Id. at 189, 988 P.2d 1045. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree felony murder and vacated his conviction and sentence for first degree manslaughter. ¶ 24 The State agreed Womac's convictions for assault in the first degree and homicide by abuse constituted the same criminal conduct in that they involve[d] the same victim and occurred at the same time and place. 6 VRP at 1035. And Womac could not have committed felony murder in the second degree without committing assault in the first degree. Because all three convictions constitute the same criminal conduct, the proper remedy is to vacate Counts II and III. See Gohl, 109 Wash.App. at 822, 37 P.3d 293.
¶ 25 The State argues Womac's three convictions should stand since he was sentenced for homicide by abuse only. Br. of Resp't at 38. The trial judge also determined double jeopardy concerns are implicated only when a defendant receives more than one sentence. 6 VRP at 1042-43. This determination is incorrect. That Womac received only one sentence is of no matter as he still suffers the punitive consequences of his convictions. Counsel for Womac correctly asserts, if Mr. Womac were to get into some trouble in prison and be charged with a crime, these convictions for murder in the second degree and assault in the second [sic] degree would have to count in his offender score . . . because they are still alive [and] have not been vacated. . . . 7 VRP at 1071-72. ¶ 26 In Calle we held double jeopardy may be violated when a defendant receives multiple convictions for a single offense (regardless of whether concurrent sentences are imposed). Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 775, 888 P.2d 155; see also In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wash.2d 795, 100 P.3d 291 (2004). Relying on Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985), this Court found the stigma and impeachment value of multiple convictions remains despite passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A, [7] and overruled a line of cases following the concurrent sentence rule. [8] Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 775, 888 P.2d 155. In Gohl the State conceded the convictions for attempted murder and assault were based on the same acts and caused the same harm but argued lack of sentencing for the assaults avoided any double jeopardy violation. Gohl, 109 Wash.App. at 819, 37 P.3d 293. The court countered, [the State's] argument contradicts the rule that conviction, and not merely imposition of a sentence, constitutes punishment. Id. at 822, 37 P.3d 293. ¶ 27 Both federal and state courts have cited Ball for the proposition that double jeopardy concerns arise in the presence of multiple convictions, regardless of whether resulting sentences are imposed consecutively or concurrently. Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 773, 888 P.2d 155. The Supreme Court in Ball emphasized the punitive nature of a conviction, finding: The separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored. For example, the presence of two convictions on the record may delay the defendant's eligibility for parole or result in an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense. Moreover, the second conviction may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility and certainly carries the societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction. Ball, 470 U.S. at 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668. ¶ 28 As this court noted in Calle, [i]t is important to distinguish between charges and convictions  the State may properly file an information charging multiple counts under various statutory provisions where evidence supports the charges, even though convictions may not stand for all offenses where double jeopardy protections are violated. Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 777 n. 3, 888 P.2d 155 (emphasis added) (citing Ball, 470 U.S. at 860, 105 S.Ct. 1668). See also Johnson, 92 Wash.2d at 679, 600 P.2d 1249 (Conviction in itself, even without imposition of sentence, carries an unmistakable onus which has a punitive effect. . . . ).
¶ 29 The Court of Appeals' conditional dismissal of Womac's lesser charges and verdicts, allowing for reinstatement if the greater verdict and sentence are later set aside, is entirely without support. Womac, 130 Wash.App. at 458-59, 123 P.3d 528. The State may bring (and a jury may consider) multiple charges arising from the same criminal conduct in a single proceeding. State v. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d 765, 770, 108 P.3d 753 (2005) (citing State v. Michielli, 132 Wash.2d 229, 238-39, 937 P.2d 587 (1997)). Courts may not, however, enter multiple convictions for the same offense without offending double jeopardy. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d at 771, 108 P.3d 753. ¶ 30 The State declares the Court of Appeals' approach is consistent with the trial court's ruling in [Womac's] case, which was to let the jury verdict stand but not enter judgment and sentence on the conviction. Supplemental Br. of Resp't at 3. The State continues, [i]t is only when the court enters a judgment and sentence that double jeopardy issues arise and vacation is required. Id. at 3-4. But here, the trial court did enter judgment on Counts II and III declaring both convictions valid while clarifying that imposing separate punishments would violate double jeopardy provisions. See CP at 28 (J. & Sent.), 37-38 (App. A to J. & Sent.). ¶ 31 In State v. Ward, 125 Wash.App. 138, 104 P.3d 61 (2005) the jury found the defendant guilty of second degree felony murder and alternatively first degree manslaughter (a lesser included offense of second degree intentional murder). The trial court entered a judgment and sentence solely on the second degree felony murder conviction; the court denied the defendant's motion to vacate the first degree manslaughter conviction and did not mention the jury's finding of guilt on the manslaughter conviction in the judgment and sentence. The judgment and sentence for Ward's second degree felony murder was vacated. Ward argued he could not be charged, tried, or sentenced for first degree manslaughter because the manslaughter verdict should have been vacated, or was vacated by operation of law, and that once vacated, the verdict is no longer available for the court to revive. Id. at 144, 104 P.3d 61. The Court of Appeals determined convicting and sentencing a defendant for both second degree felony murder and first degree manslaughter would violate double jeopardy and found where there is a violation of double jeopardy the remedy is to vacate one of the convictions and sentences. Id. But the court found no double jeopardy violation in Ward's case as the judge entered judgment and sentenced Ward only on the second degree felony murder charge. Id. And because there was no violation of double jeopardy, reasoned the court, the trial court was not required to vacate Ward's manslaughter charge. Id. ¶ 32 Ward is distinguishable from the present case. Here, there was a double jeopardy violation because Womac's judgment included all three convictions; therefore, vacation of the convictions for Counts II and III is required. Also, Womac was never charged in the alternative; instead, he was charged with three separate offenses in a single proceeding. Womac correctly argues, a court has no authority to take a verdict on another charge . . ., find that it violates double jeopardy . . ., not sentence the defendant . . . on it[,] and just . . . hold it in abeyance for a later time. 7 VRP at 1074. ¶ 33 In Trujillo, 112 Wash.App. 390, 49 P.3d 935, a jury convicted four defendants of first degree assault, and in the alternative, first degree attempted murder. [9] The Court of Appeals stated, where the jury returns a verdict of guilty on each alternative charge, the court should enter a judgment on the greater offense only and sentence the defendant on that charge without reference to the verdict on the lesser offense. Id. at 411, 49 P.3d 935. The Court of Appeals reasoned since the verdict for first degree assault was not reduced to judgment, it does not subject the appellants to any future jeopardy. Id. The court also mentioned that if the jury's verdict on assault was in fact reduced to judgment, the trial court should enter an order vacating the assault judgment. Id. at 412 n. 15, 49 P.3d 935. ¶ 34 Again, Womac was not charged in the alternative. He was charged with homicide by abuse, murder in the second degree, and assault in the second degree, all separate counts as separate charges. And Womac's convictions were in fact reduced to judgment. Accordingly, we direct the trial court to vacate counts II and III. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668; State v. Weber, 159 Wash.2d 252, 265-66, 149 P.3d 646 (2006); Schwab, 98 Wash.App. at 180, 988 P.2d 1045 (remedy for double jeopardy violation is to vacate one of the underlying convictions).