Opinion ID: 2218649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: The Court must find the facts upon which an aggravating circumstance relies beyond a reasonable doubt (Assignments # 34 and # 35).

Text: In these two assignments defendant again makes general statements without specifying what action of the trial court constituted error. We, of course, agree that the facts upon which the applicability of an aggravating factor depends must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977). As we understand the thrust of defendant's assignment of error No. 34, defendant contends that in considering the applicability of ง 29-2523(1)(d), the court made a finding in subsection (i) of paragraph 4 of its sentencing that [t]here is also some evidence that Michael W. Ryan either removed or amputated James Thimm's penis and testicles or directed that this be done by others and that this finding, by its own terms, has found this fact by less than the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. We fully agree with defendant's statement that this finding, if it was a finding, was not supported by sufficient evidence and should not have been made. The trial court itself did note, however, that there was only some evidence, and apparently did not consider this factor in its ultimate determination. We cannot agree with defendant's conclusion, however, that [i]f the Court on this one identifiable instance found facts by the wrong standards, it must be assumed that the Court was using the wrong standard on all or a part of the other findings of fact throughout the Order. Brief for appellant at 76. Such a leap in logic is not required as a matter of law by this court. The particular statement of fact referred to above is not supported by the evidence; the trial court so stated; and we have so stated. The reference to possible penis amputation was made by the State's pathologist in his testimony concerning the autopsy, but that same pathologist, in other testimony, argues that the disfiguration is probably the result of decomposition. That does not control the outcome of this particular assignment of error. The ultimate finding made in connection with this particular challenged finding was that [t]he court concludes and finds beyond a reasonable doubt this aggravating circumstance [the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence. ง 29-2523(1)(d) ] exists in this case. In support of that finding, the court lists 10 other specific acts which the court found had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Among those specific findings were: a) The death of James Thimm occurred over several days while James Thimm was tied and chained in a hog confinement shed; b) Michael W. Ryan on numerous occasions sodomized James Thimm with a shovel handle and directed others to do the same; .... e) Michael W. Ryan skinned James Thimm while he was alive.... Our examination of the record shows that all of the other specific facts related by the trial court were established by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant does not specifically challenge any of the other findings on this issue. The findings of the trial court in this regard do not constitute prejudicial error to defendant. In his 35th assignment of error defendant contends that [b]y the Court inventing its own aggravating circumstances, defendant has been deprived of various constitutional rights. Defendant's brief seems to contend that ordering other people, subject to defendant's full control as in this case, to do evil acts is somehow different from defendant's performing the evil acts himself. That cannot be. Defendant's assignments Nos. 34 and 35 are without merit. XXI.  Double counting of the facts supporting aggravating circumstances is impermissible (Assignment # 36).  Defendant also contends that the sentencing court counted certain factors twice in determining aggravating circumstances found in ง 29-2523(1)(a) and (d). We held in State v. Rust, supra at 538, 250 N.W.2d at 874: We think it is not reasonable to construe the definitions [of the aggravating circumstances in ง 29-2523] in such a manner as to make them overlap and make the same identical facts constitute two aggravating circumstances. We believe the Legislature intended by each definition to convey a different concept, at least to the extent that some added different and important element ... is included in each separate definition even though some fact or facts in a particular case may pertain to more than one of the definitions.... This standard was complied with by the sentencing court. In his brief, the defendant contends the following facts were used to support a finding of both aggravating factors (1)(a) and (1)(d). In support of (1)(a) the court noted that the defendant assaulted both Richard Stice and James Thimm leading up to, and prior to the time of, the events involving the death of James Thimm. In support of (1)(d) the sentencing court noted that the defendant caused James Thimm to suffer further humiliation by directing him to perform homosexual acts with another member of the group. There is evidence in the record to support both of these statements. The record shows that the defendant struck and beat both Stice and Thimm. There was also evidence that the defendant forced James Thimm to engage in homosexual activity. These incidents were distinct and involved different testimony. The ruling in State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977), prevents a sentencing court from using the same evidence to support different aggravating factors. It does not prevent a sentencing court from considering evidence of distinct incidents to support different aggravating factors. Defendant's assignment No. 36 is without merit. XXII.  Circumstance 1(a) is vague and overbroad and thus unconstitutional (Assignments # 37 and # 38).  Section 29-2523(1)(a) provides as follows: The offender was previously convicted of another murder or a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person, or has a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity. We have narrowed our interpretation of this statute as this court has been required to review its application. In State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977), we held that aggravating circumstance (1)(a) did not exist where the defendant has no prior criminal record. We stated in Stewart that (1)(a) should be applied only to criminal activity conducted prior to the events out of which the charge of murder arose. Id. at 520, 250 N.W.2d at 863. In State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977), we determined that aggravating circumstances (1)(a) applied where the defendant had a prior conviction for assault with intent to inflict great bodily harm, and we stated: We interpret ` substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity' to refer to events and incidents prior to and not part of the events out of which the current charge arises. The use of the term `history' clearly implies earlier events. (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 535, 250 N.W.2d at 872-73. In State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977), we found the existence of circumstance (1)(a) where the defendant had convictions for armed robbery and first-degree assault and three convictions for bank robbery. We stated in Holtan: The words serious, assaultive, and terrorizing are words in common usage with meanings well-fixed and generally clearly understood. The term substantial history is likewise reasonably clear. History refers to the individual's past acts preceding the incident for which he is on trial and substantial, as here used, refers to an actual, material, and important history of acts of terror of a criminal nature. It does not refer to the particular incident involving the homicide for which he is subject to sentence. Id. at 546, 250 N.W.2d at 879. In State v. Peery, 199 Neb. 656, 261 N.W.2d 95 (1977), we upheld a finding of aggravating circumstance (1)(a) where the defendant had the following record: (1) felony escape involving forcible detainer and robbery of a jailer, (2) armed robbery of a service station, (3) burglary of a home, (4) auto theft, (5) three armed robberies in the State of Ohio, (6) armed robbery and rape of a 7ฝ-month pregnant woman in her home, and (7) assault of a librarian in an attempted escape. In State v. Moore, 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982), defendant was charged with two murders of cabdrivers occurring 4 days apart. We upheld the sentencing panel's finding of (1)(a) with regard to the second murder and held that a substantial history of serious assaultive or criminal activity included the first premeditated murder. We also stated that the aggravating circumstances in ง 29-2523 were to be given a narrow construction and application. In State v. Jones, 213 Neb. 1, 328 N.W.2d 166 (1982), we refused to apply (1)(a) where the facts supporting the circumstance had been shown through the defendant's immunized testimony concerning an Iowa murder. In State v. Rust, 223 Neb. 150, 388 N.W.2d 483 (1986), on appeal to this court for postconviction relief, we affirmed our finding of circumstance (1)(a). See State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977). In State v. Joubert, 224 Neb. 411, 399 N.W.2d 237 (1986), we held that any serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity committed by the accused prior to the time of the offense charged may properly be considered in order to determine the applicability of aggravating circumstance (1)(a). In State v. Bird Head, 225 Neb. 822, 408 N.W.2d 309 (1987), the defendant had been convicted of two charges of assault and of an attempted second degree assault prior to his first degree murder conviction. We narrowed our interpretation of (1)(a) further in Bird Head: The State elected not to adduce any evidence concerning the factual circumstances surrounding the assaults in question. We agree with the sentencing panel's conclusion that there are two aspects to aggravating circumstance (1)(a), one of which may be proved by establishing prior convictions for another murder or crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person and the other of which may be proved by showing that the offender has a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity, irrespective of whether the offender was convicted for the conduct creating the history. Id. at 836, 408 N.W.2d at 319. We must first determine whether the sentencing court correctly applied our interpretation of aggravating circumstance (1)(a). As noted before, the sentencing judge did not consider the Luke Stice murder in applying this circumstance. The sentencing judge did, however, consider certain other factors which he considered demonstrative of the defendant's history of assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity. In the sentencing judge's written order he stated: The evidence submitted to the sentencing court establishes that the defendant did not have, prior to the death of James Thimm, a prior conviction of another murder or a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person. However, the facts surrounding the death of Luke Stice actually predated the death of James Thimm by approximately one month. Although, the first clause of this aggravating circumstance is not applicable, the Court feels that the second clause of the aggravating circumstance is applicable. The Court finds from the evidence that the following facts, which facts are not all inclusive, support the finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Michael W. Ryan had a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity: a) Michael W. Ryan either spanked and beat Luke Stice, or directed others to do this; b) Michael W. Ryan either administered cold showers to Luke and held him under cold water or directed that this be done to Luke; c) Michael W. Ryan directed others to sexually abuse Luke Stice; d) Michael W. Ryan used Luke Stice as an ashtray; e) Michael W. Ryan rolled Luke around in the snow without any clothes on or directed others to do this to Luke; f) Michael W. Ryan spit in the mouth of Luke Stice; g) Michael W. Ryan shot chickens in the presence of Luke Stice to create in him a fear of guns or directed that this be done to Luke; h) Michael W. Ryan terrorized Luke Stice by placing a gun in his mouth and also by shooting him in the arm; i) Michael W. Ryan either shoved Luke against the wall on three different occasions or directed others to shove Luke against the wall, which acts ultimately resulted in the death of Luke Stice; j) Michael W. Ryan either held Luke off the ground with a belt around his neck or directed others to do this to Luke; k) Michael W. Ryan either shot cigarettes himself from Luke's mouth or directed others to do this; and l) Michael W. Ryan told Luke that he would be castrated, and that he would be placed on a brush pile and burned alive by him. The evidence further shows that the defendant assaulted both Richard Stice and James Thimm leading up to, and prior to the time of, the events involving the death of James Thimm. These acts would further support the finding that the defendant had a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal acts prior to the death of James Thimm. Other facts taken from the evidence which would support finding that the defendant had a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity are the following: a) Shortly before Michael W. Ryan left high school, he assaulted a teacher; b) According to Michael W. Ryan's own testimony, he assaulted a principal at his high school; c) According to Michael W. Ryan's accounting to Dr. Logan, he was discharged from the military as a result of fighting with six [military police officers]. We note first of all that the defendant's murder of Luke Stice could have been considered by the court in light of our decisions in State v. Moore, 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982), and State v. Joubert, 224 Neb. 411, 399 N.W.2d 237 (1986). However, it might have been error for the court to have considered this murder as an aggravating circumstance after having met with members of the Stice family prior to the defendant's sentencing on the James Thimm murder. In this case, the trial court did not consider defendant's plea of nolo contendere and sentence in connection with the murder of Luke Stice as a prior conviction of second degree murder. The court, however, did consider the admitted murder of Luke Stice as evidence of a previous substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity. We feel that the evidentiary facts cited by the sentencing judge rise to the level of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity, considering that that conduct eventually resulted in the death of Luke Stice. There is sufficient evidence, some of it from defendant, that these events took place, and they are supported beyond a reasonable doubt by the record. We are satisfied that aggravating circumstance (1)(a) was established beyond a reasonable doubt in that the defendant's conduct in causing Luke Stice to be sexually abused, shooting Luke Stice in the arm, hanging Luke Stice by the neck with a belt, shoving Luke Stice against a wall, and shooting cigarettes out of Luke Stice's mouth together all show a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity. Aggravating circumstance (1)(a) was also shown by the defendant's chainings and beatings of both Rick Stice and James Thimm. The record clearly supports a finding of circumstance (1)(a). We must now determine whether this court's narrow interpretation and application of ง 29-2523(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Under the rationale of Furman, statutory aggravating circumstances must be clearly defined and applied by a court so as to prevent a sentencing body from exercising discretion that may lead to arbitrary or inconsistent results. The standard laid down in Furman is met by our interpretation and application of (1)(a). Defendant's assignments Nos. 37 and 38 are without merit. XXIII.  Circumstance 1(d) is vague and overbroad and thus unconstitutional (Assignments # 39 and # 40).  Section 29-2523(1)(d) is an aggravating circumstance and provides as follows: The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence. In State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 538, 250 N.W.2d 867, 874 (1977), we adopted the following statement made by the sentencing panel: We recognize that all first degree murder crimes are capable of being accurately characterized by one or more of the descriptive adjectives employed [in ง 29-2523(1)(d) ], but by the use of the words `especially' and `exceptional' the legislature has required a much greater degree of these characteristics than is usually present in a murder. This category of aggravating circumstances would include murders involving torture, sadism, sexual abuse, or the imposition of extreme suffering.... Defendant argues that ง 29-2523(1)(d) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We have held in State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984), that ง 29-2523(1)(d) is not unconstitutionally vague. We note that the defendant tortured and sexually abused James Thimm and thus imposed extreme suffering on him. Section 29-2523(1)(d) was properly applied by the sentencing judge. In State v. Moore, 210 Neb. 457, 470, 316 N.W.2d 33, 41 (1982), we held: Aggravating circumstance (1)(d) of ง 29-2523 literally, and as interpreted by this court, describes in the disjunctive two separate circumstances which may operate in conjunction with or independent of one another. The first circumstance is that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. We have said that this circumstance is directed to the pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim and to cases where torture, sadism, or the imposition of extreme suffering exists.... The second circumstance pertains to the state of mind of the actor. In State v. Stewart, [197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977) ], we said the second instance indicates a situation where depravity is apparent to such an extent as to obviously offend all standards of morality and intelligence (syllabus of the court), and in State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977), it indicates a state of mind totally and senselessly bereft of any regard for human life (syllabus of the court). In State v. Joubert, 224 Neb. 411, 399 N.W.2d 237 (1986), we held that exceptional depravity [as used in ง 29-2523(1)(d) ] exists when the act is totally and senselessly bereft of any regard for human life as shown by the presence of the following circumstances, either separately or collectively: (1) apparent relishing of the murder by the killer; (2) infliction of gratuitous violence on the victim; (3) needless mutilation of the victim; (4) senselessness of the crime; or (5) helplessness of the victim. Consequently, where one or more of those five factors are present, there may be a finding of exceptional depravity. (Syllabus of the court.) In State v. Hunt, 220 Neb. 707, 725, 371 N.W.2d 708, 721 (1985), we stated: [F]orcing items into the victim's throat and the strangulation itself were cruel, but not especially so, for any forcible killing entails some violence toward the victim. There is no evidence the acts were performed for the satisfaction of inflicting either mental or physical pain or that pain existed for any prolonged period of time. In order for aggravating circumstance (1)(d) to be present, the method of killing must entail something more than the ordinary circumstances which attend any death-dealing violence. Thus it can be seen that this court has adopted a limiting construction on aggravating circumstance (1)(d), as shown in cases extending from 1977 to 1986. We have held that especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel is limited to cases where torture, sadism, or the imposition of extreme suffering exists, State v. Moore, supra 210 Neb. at 470, 316 N.W.2d at 41, or where the murder was preceded by acts performed for the satisfaction of inflicting either mental or physical pain or that pain existed for any prolonged period of time, State v. Hunt, supra 220 Neb. at 725, 371 N.W.2d at 721. Similarly we have sharply limited the circumstance of exceptional depravity sufficient to constitute an aggravating circumstance to circumstances showing relishing of the murder by the killer, infliction of gratuitous violence on the victim, needless mutilation of the victim, senselessness of the crime, or helplessness of the victim. State v. Joubert, supra . In this case, the sentencing court relied on both parts of ง 29-2523(1)(d). The court found facts that showed torture, sadism, and the inflicting of extreme suffering and the fact that the pain existed for a prolonged period of time. The court also found facts showing that defendant relished the murder, that defendant inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim, that defendant needlessly mutilated the victim, and that the victim was helpless. The findings of the trial court fit squarely with the statutory definition of ง 29-2523(1)(d), as that subsection has been limited by this court's decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), holding that heinous, atrocious, and cruel, as used in the Oklahoma murder sentencing statute, were unconstitutionally vague under the eighth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court noted, in making that ruling, that the Oklahoma courts had not adopted a limiting construction that cured the infirmity in the Oklahoma statute. See, also, Lindsey v. Thigpen, 875 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir.1989) (The heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating factor in Alabama's death penalty statute had been narrowed to those homicides that are unnecessarily torturous to the victim for purposes of determining whether imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutionally wanton or freakish). We hold that Nebraska has adopted such a limiting construction as to render the Nebraska statute sound and in full compliance with the U.S. Constitution. We note also that the trial court, in its order of sentence, set out a list of the Nebraska Supreme Court cases it relied on in entering its order and that some of our cases referred to above are on that list. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the death penalty may only be imposed under sentencing procedures that do not create a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the Court held: [W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. We agree with the court below that the evidence supported a finding of the existence of the exceptional depravity circumstance of (1)(d) in that the defendant apparently relished the murder, inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim, and needlessly mutilated the victim. The defendant had the victim tied and chained, and then repeatedly sodomized the victim with a shovel handle thrust some 2 feet into his body, rupturing his colon and damaging his liver. He also whipped, beat, shot, and skinned him, and then assisted in breaking the victim's legs. The defendant also directed others to inflict extreme suffering on the victim. This evidence alone is sufficient to find the existence of circumstance (1)(d). Section 29-2523(1)(d), as applied, meets the standards set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court and this court. The balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not merely a matter of number counting but, rather, requires a careful weighing and examination of the various factors. State v. Joubert, 224 Neb. 411, 399 N.W.2d 237 (1986). Additionally, this court's automatic review of capital cases does not require it to set aside a death penalty where certain aggravating factors found to exist below are determined here to be unsupported by the evidence. See Neb.Rev.Stat. ง 29-2528 (Reissue 1985). A finding of a single aggravating circumstance on appeal may be sufficient to support a death sentence. The sentencing court correctly found that sufficient evidence existed to support a finding that both prongs of circumstance (1)(d) existed beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's assignments Nos. 39 and 40 are without merit. XXIV.  The state should have the burden at sentencing to prove mitigating circumstances do not exist (Assignment # 41).  Aside from the fact that the defendant would have the State prove a negativeโalways a difficult choreโdefendant misses the point when he states, The United States Supreme Court has continually stated that it is impermissible to shift the burden of proof on elements of the crime to the Defendant. Brief for appellant at 88. We agree with that statement, but suffice it to say that the presence or absence of mitigating factors is not, in any way, an element of the crime of murder. (See the discussion under argument VII above, concerning the burden of proof on the insanity issue.) Defendant's assignment No. 41 is frivolous. XXV.  Refusal of trial court to specifically deal with non-statutory mitigating circumstances (Assignments # 42, # 43, # 44, # 45, and # 46).  The gist of these assignments of error is that the court erred in failing to deal specifically with the mitigating factors numbered 5 through 16 of defendant's `Requested Mitigating Factors'.... We held in State v. Joubert, supra , that a defendant may offer any evidence on the issue of mitigation. Prior to the sentencing hearing in this case, defendant requested that the court consider the following mitigating factors: 5. For 34 years of his life [the defendant] was a law abiding citizen, committed no anti-social acts, and no crimes. 6. It was only after exposure to Jim Wickstrom [sic] teachings that [the defendant's] life changed and anti-social acts were committed. 7. [The defendant] was a very good father and loved by children. 8. [The defendant] had a normal childhood (with exception of beatings by his mother), was well-behaved, attended church, fished and hunted with his father. 9. The disparity of treatment of co-defendants, who did everything defendant did in the matter of the death of James Thimm, compels a life term of imprisonment. 10. Defendant offered to plead guilty to the offenses of second degree murder and kidnapping with harm to the victim (life imprisonment with no minimum term), so that he could have received two life sentences on such pleas; and in addition he offered to plead no contest to a charge of manslaughter insofar as the death of Luke Stice was concerned, all of which could have led to terms of imprisonment of life consecutiive [sic] to life consecutive to 20 years imprisonment. But such offers of pleas to the county attorney were rejected. 11. Defendant is already serving sentence of life imprisonment and no legitimate interest of the State will be served by imposing the sentence of death. 12. Letter from the Director of Nebraskans Against the Death Penalty. 13. Letter from juror Short. 14. The court extended mercy to codefendant Tim Haverkamp when it allowed the State to amend its charges to second degree murder, thus making him a witnessโalthough not a truthful oneโagainst defendant, and the Court can extend and should extend mercy to this defendant. 15. Defendant cooperated with the authorities by assisting in the identification of the stolen property on the Rulo farmโmost of it stolen by Co-defendants. 16. Dave Andreas does not want defendant to be executed. The sentencing court considered these factors, as may be seen in the following excerpt from the court's sentencing order: In addition to the statutory circumstances set forth in Section 29-2523 ... the terms of Section 29-2521 provide, in part, as follows:  In the proceeding for determination of sentence, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence,.... Any such evidence which the Court deems to have probative value may be received .... The court is also aware of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), and the direction of [the Nebraska] Supreme Court to apply the rule of that case permitting the introduction of any mitigating evidence offered by the defendant which the Court deems to have probative value, even though such evidence may not specifically come within the scope of the statutory mitigating circumstances. Keeping that direction and guidance in mind, the Court has considered additional mitigating factors [requested by the defendant]. The trial court clearly considered the mitigating circumstances presented by defendant. The defendant argues that Nebraska statutes, Section [sic] 29-2521, 29-2522, and 29-2523 are unconstitutional and void, brief for appellant at 90, since they do not require the sentencing court to make specific findings concerning a defendant's proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. The defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the sentencing court's refusal to make specific findings concerning the defendant's proposed mitigating circumstances. The trial court considered the defendant's request. Some of defendant's proposed mitigating circumstances (e.g., Nos. 7 and 8) were not supported by the record. Others (e.g., Nos. 10, 11, and 12) are immaterial. Still others were the same as statutory circumstances. The sentencing court fairly considered the defendant's proposed mitigating circumstances prior to rendering its decision. The Nebraska capital sentencing procedure fully complies in this regard with the requirements set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court. See, Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 107 S.Ct. 2716, 97 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Defendant's assignments Nos. 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46 are without merit. XXVI.  Equally culpable Co-defendants should be sentenced as uniformly as possible to prevent the appearance of impropriety (Assignments # 48 and # 48).  Defendant argues that his sentence was excessive in that equally culpable co-defendants were given much less severe sentences. We first note that the only codefendant was Dennis Ryan, who was also convicted. While it is true that others were involved in James Thimm's murder, the record shows that the defendant was the leader of the group and that the victim was tortured and killed on the defendant's orders. The actions of defendant and the others were not equally culpable. See, also, State v. Anderson and Hochstein, 207 Neb. 51, 296 N.W.2d 440 (1980) (where only two of the three coperpetrators were charged with first degree murder). Defendant also argues that the only reason which could account for this extreme disparity in sentence is that Michael W. Ryan had a lengthy and expensive trial and the Co-defendants plead [sic] guilty.... Brief for appellant at 92. Defendant's assertion is unwarranted, unsupported by law or logic, and without merit. The record shows that James Thimm would not have suffered death absent the defendant's leadership. Defendant's assignments Nos. 47 and 48 are without merit. XXVII.  Defendant's sentence was excessive (Assignments # 49, # 50, # 51, and # 52).  The defendant argues that his sentence was excessive. It is hard for this court to conceive of a more senseless and brutal murder. We have reviewed all criminal homicide cases pursuant to Neb.Rev. Stat. งง 29-2521.01 et seq. (Reissue 1985) and find that the defendant's death sentence is justified when compared to all other homicide cases. State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 (1986). XXVIII.  The trial court erred in denying Defendant's showing to Court in addition to Defendant's motion to exclude death penalty, motion to exclude the death penalty, and specific objections to imposition of death penalty (Assignments # 53, # 54, # 55, # 56, # 57, and # 58).  In defendant's 60 assignments of error, the defendant has assigned the above-numbered six general statements, contending the trial court erred in its failure to review the motions made by the defendant in the court below, including defendant's motion to exclude the death penalty, defendant's additional motion to exclude the death penalty, and defendant's specific objections to imposition of the death penalty. The sum and substance of these general statements is contained in various other assignments of error and have been discussed above. We have reviewed these motions and the arguments made in support thereof, and conclude that the trial court's decisions denying these motions were not an abuse of discretion. These assignments are without merit. XXIX.  Cumulative effect of errors at guilt-innocence and life-death portions of trial deprived Defendant of a fair trial (Assignment # 59).  In the defendant's 59th assignment of error the defendant contends that the combined effect of the errors assigned rendered the proceedings against him fundamentally unfair. He makes no real argument, nor does he cite any cases, to support such assertion. It is without merit. Of more controlling effect is the doctrine of harmless error. We held in State v. Watkins, 227 Neb. 677, 686, 419 N.W.2d 660, 666 (1988): Harmless error exists in a jury trial of a criminal case when there is some incorrect conduct by the trial court which, on review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury in a verdict adverse to a substantial right of the defendant. This comports to the rule found in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court stated: All of these [harmless error] rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. The Court in Chapman further held that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3105, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court stated: In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705] (1967), this Court rejected the argument that errors of constitutional dimension necessarily require reversal of criminal convictions. And since Chapman, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of all of the evidence before the jury, we conclude that the combined effect of the errors defendant alleged occurred at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant was not prejudiced by these alleged errors. This conclusion is supported by the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, including the defendant's own testimony as to his part in the murder of James Thimm. The cumulative effect of these alleged errors did not have a material effect on the jury in reaching its verdict. A defendant is not constitutionally entitled to receive a perfect trial, only a fair and constitutional trial. State v. Hochstein, 216 Neb. 515, 344 N.W.2d 469 (1984). XXX.  The Nebraska Supreme Court should not limit brief size in a capital case (Assignment # 60).  Defendant has a fundamental problem with the meaning of the word brief. The defendant filed a motion requesting leave to file a 191-page brief with this court. This motion was denied, and the defendant was allowed to file a 100-page brief with 60 assignments of error. The defendant's case has been argued zealously in all stages of the proceedings. We also note that the Attorney General only addressed 15 of the 60 assignments made by the defendant. The defendant cannot predicate error on this court's denial of his motion requesting leave to file a 191-page brief. As stated before, this court is charged with the automatic review of all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. ง 29-2525. This court has separately reviewed each of defendant's assignments of error. The decision of the Richardson County District Court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.