Opinion ID: 1931243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Against the Appraisers

Text: The Division and Morgan each appeal two of the Circuit Court's holdings. The Division contests the Circuit Court's holding that the Division Chief could not find based only on the written record that Morgan and Almony had violated the Consumer Protection Act in their selection of comparable sales and calculation of neighborhood predominant values. Morgan appeals the Circuit Court's affirmation of the Division's finding that he had violated the Act by not reporting prior sales. Morgan also appeals the Circuit Court's holding that the Division properly ordered him to pay civil penalties. The Division appeals the Circuit Court's dismissal of the Division's charges against Almony.
The Circuit Court reversed the Division Chief's findings that Almony and Morgan violated the Act because of misrepresentations as to comparable sales and neighborhood predominant values. [29] The court ruled that the Division Chief could not make the requisite findings based only on a paper record. The Circuit Court stated as follows: What happened on exceptions to this determination by the ALJ is that the Division Chief made that demeanor based credibility assessment and that he could not legally do. Only paper recitations were before him. What the Division could have done was to say it found the ALJ to be in error on the law, and remand the case for a credibility judgment on the testimony given. What it could not do, was what it did and that was to say on the basis of testimony appearing in the written record that one appraiser's testimony over another was found as a matter of fact. The Division's decision is reversed and a remand is ordered for a decision based on eyeball to eyeball testimony. Upon that testimony a demeanor based credibility decision may be made. The Division argues that the Circuit Court erred in remanding the issues of whether the appraisers violated the Act in their selection of comparable sales and calculation of neighborhood predominant values. The Division maintains that its findings did not require a demeanor-based credibility assessment. Additionally, the Division argues that the Division Chief properly could determine that there was no direct conflict between the experts on the crucial issues and could resolve any differences based upon evidence in the record. [30] This issue revolves around whether the Division's determination of misrepresentations in comparable sales and neighborhood predominant values was a demeanor-based credibility assessment. A fact finder makes a demeanor-based credibility assessment when he or she bases a finding or decision on such factors as `the expression of [the witness or party's] countenance, how he sits or stands, whether he is inordinately nervous, his coloration during critical examination, the modulation or pace of his speech and other non-verbal communication.' Anderson v. Dep't of Public Safety, 330 Md. 187, 216, 623 A.2d 198, 212 (1993) (quoting Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 565 F.2d 1074, 1078-79 (9th Cir.1977)). In some circumstances, the Division may make findings and issue an order in reliance on the written record, without the Division Chief personally observing the witnesses as they testify. In Anderson, an ALJ conducted a hearing and proposed that a terminated correctional officer be reinstated. 330 Md. at 204, 623 A.2d at 206. The agency designee reviewed the record, made findings of fact, and reversed the ALJ's decision. [31] Id. at 205-07, 623 A.2d at 206-08. This Court stated that an agency may reverse an ALJ's findings and that the reviewing court must determine only whether the agency's final order meets the substantial evidence test. Id. at 215, 623 A.2d at 211 (relying on the Supreme Court's decisions for the parallel federal Administrative Protection Act in Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) and Fed. Commun. Com'n v. Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 75 S.Ct. 855, 99 L.Ed. 1147 (1955)). Case law addressing the federal Administrative Procedure Act supports the conclusion that an agency official may make findings and issue an order based on the written record alone. In Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S.Ct. 906, 80 L.Ed. 1288 (1936), the Supreme Court considered a challenge to an order of the United States Secretary of Agriculture fixing the maximum rates for buying and selling livestock at stockyards. An agency examiner held a hearing and heard testimony, but the Secretary rendered the order without considering the testimony. The Supreme Court reversed the Secretary's order, rejecting the position that one official may examine evidence, and another official who has not considered the evidence may make the findings and order. Id. at 481, 56 S.Ct. at 911. The Court stated, The one who decides must hear. Id. at 481, 56 S.Ct. at 912. Immediately after this statement, however, the Court made clear that an agency official could make findings after reviewing the written record of the testimony. The Court stated as follows: This necessary rule does not preclude practicable administrative procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants in the department. Assistants may prosecute inquiries. Evidence may be taken by an examiner. Evidence thus taken may be sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates. Argument may be oral or written. The requirements are not technical. But there must be a hearing in a substantial sense. And to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence, the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them. That duty undoubtedly may be an onerous one, but the performance of it in a substantial manner is inseparable from the exercise of the important authority conferred. Id. at 481-82, 56 S.Ct. at 912. Federal courts have relied on Morgan for the principle that administrative officers may rely on the written record in making quasi-judicial decisions. This Court has noted that the general rule in both the federal and state systems ... is that in the absence of specific statutory direction to the contrary the deciding member or members of an administrative or quasi-judicial agency need not hear the witnesses testify. Younkin v. Boltz, 241 Md. 339, 342, 216 A.2d 714, 715 (1966). We stated that in the federal system neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court has ever required deciding officials to hear the witnesses testify. Id. at 343, 216 A.2d at 715-16. In Guerrero v. State of New Jersey, 643 F.2d 148 (1981) (per curiam), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated as follows: It has been settled since Morgan v. United States that in administrative adjudications, deciding officers need not actually hear the witnesses' testimony. Although the Court stated that `the one who decides must actually hear,' it clarified its statement by indicating that it was permissible for a decision to be based solely on a considered review of the evidence and legal arguments. The Court held that `[e]vidence may be taken by an examiner. Evidence thus taken may be sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates....[T]he officers who make the determination must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.' This court has adhered to the principle that administrative officers charged with a decision need not personally hear testimony but may instead rely on a written record. Id. at 149 (citations omitted); see also Estate of Varian v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 396 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir.1968) (per curiam) (holding that [t]he Supreme Court's statement that `[t]he one who decides must hear,' ... means simply that the officer who makes the findings must have considered the evidence or argument); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir.1967) (citing Morgan and stating that [n]othing in this suggests that the decider must actually hear the witnesses or be furnished a report on their credibility; the thrust is quite the opposite); Southern Garment Mfrs. Ass'n v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 622, 626 (D.C.Cir.1941) (explaining that [w]hile `the one who decides must hear,' it must be remembered that `hear' is used in the artistic sense of requiring certain procedural minima to insure an informed judgment by the one who has the responsibility of making the final decision and order). State courts similarly have held that an agency official may decide a case without hearing the witnesses testify. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Beeson Plumbing and Heating, 869 P.2d 1170, 1177 (Alaska 1994) (stating that [t]hough due process requires that administrative officers `hear' the evidence presented at a hearing, they need not physically attend the presentation of the evidence, and they may `hear' the evidence by making an informed judgment on evidence received through a hearing officer); In re Fichner, 144 N.J. 459, 677 A.2d 201, 207 (1996) (citing Morgan and noting that the requirements of due process rarely require auditory perception of all the evidence by each board member who votes). See generally E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Administrative Decision by Officer Not Present When Evidence was Taken, 18 A.L.R.2d 606, 607 (1951) (noting for federal and state courts that [a]s a general proposition, due process or the concept of a fair hearing does not require that the evidence be taken before the officer who decides or participates in the decision). An exception exists when the agency decision depends necessarily upon a demeanor-based assessment. In such cases, it would be difficult for an agency designee to make findings without hearing the testimony. Thus, in Anderson, we held that evidence supporting the agency's decision `may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different' than the agency's conclusions. 330 Md. at 216, 623 A.2d at 212 (quoting Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 496, 71 S.Ct. at 469). We stated that an agency should give appropriate deference to the ALJ's demeanor-based findings, because the ALJ is in the unique position to make such judgments. Anderson, 330 Md. at 216, 623 A.2d at 212. Accordingly, we vacated the agency's judgment, because credibility was pivotal to the case, the agency gave no deference to the ALJ's assessment, and the agency provided no strong reasons for reversing the ALJ's assessment. Id. at 218-19, 623 A.2d at 213; see also Gabaldoni v. Board of Physician, 141 Md.App. 259, 263, 785 A.2d 771, 773 (2001) (upholding the agency's rejection of the ALJ's findings because, to the extent that the agency had disagreed with demeanor-based findings, the agency presented strong reasons for its position); Department v. Shrieves, 100 Md.App. 283, 296-301, 310-11, 641 A.2d 899, 906-08, 912-13 (1994) (applying Anderson and remanding because it was not clear from the agency's decision to what extent the agency had rejected the ALJ's demeanor-based findings); Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 644 (7th Cir.1985) (noting that when there is conflicting oral testimony going to the heart of the question to be decided, so that an evaluation of the witnesses' demeanor may be critical to deciding the question correctly, an appellate tribunal ... will have a hard time making responsible findings of fact). In the present case, the Division properly could determine based on the record whether Morgan and Almony had violated the Consumer Protection Act through their selection of comparable sales and calculation of neighborhood predominant values. The Division's evidence consisted primarily of reports prepared by its expert, Robert Hinton. Hinton reviewed Morgan and Almony's appraisals based on Hinton's consideration of data available at the time Morgan and Almony wrote their reports. Hinton testified before the ALJ and was subject to extensive cross-examination. Morgan relied primarily on his expert, Peter Vidi, who disputed some of Hinton's testimony about the appraising process and the resources available to appraisers. Morgan testified that he understood FHA guidelines to require different criteria for selecting comparable sales than those that Hinton described. He also generally denied any wrongdoing. Almony testified before the ALJ, and simply denied any wrongdoing. To show that appraisals vary, he presented a written appraisal of one of the properties he had appraised. This appraisal was prepared by Janice Ramsay, a respected appraiser. A conclusion based on this evidence necessarily would focus on appraisal standards, the accuracy of Morgan and Almony's appraisals, and the information available to the appraisers at the time of the appraisal. As such, the determination would focus on the experts' testimony, Hinton's reports, Ramsay's reports, Morgan's testimony about his understanding of appraisal procedures, and, most importantly, Morgan and Almony's actual appraisal reports. An assessment of the appraisers' demeanor is of minimal importance in this technical case. Ordinarily, demeanor has been held to be of little consequences in evaluating the credibility of experts who provide conflicting testimony. In New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir.1978), the court held as follows: Though credibility of the conflicting experts must play a central role in the [agency] decision, that credibility is a function of logical analysis, credentials, data base, and other factors readily discernible to one who reads the record. [The intervener] has not demonstrated that this is an issue that turns on conflicting eyewitness reports or evaluations of the witnesses' demeanor or conduct. Id. at 100; see also Citizens for Rewastico v. Comm'rs of Hebron, 67 Md.App. 466, 482-83, 508 A.2d 493, 502 (1986) (citing New England Coalition and holding that [f]or purposes of evaluating credibility, we divide the witnesses into two groups, experts and laymen, as the case law recognizes two different criteria in the evaluation); Millar v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1530, 1539 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (listing conflicting expert testimony as a category in which credibility may play a role, but demeanor may not and citing New England Coalition ); Note, Replacing Finders of FactโJudge, Juror, Administrative Hearing Officer, 68 Colum. L.Rev. 1317, 1328 n. 52 (1968) (stating that reliance on an expert's demeanor to determine credibility is dangerous). Accordingly, we hold that the Circuit Court erred in reversing the Division on the grounds that the Division Chief could not make a decision based on the written record. Neither Almony nor Morgan have shown that the resolution of the issues turned on a demeanor-based credibility assessment of the experts. The Division Chief properly could determine based on this record alone whether Morgan and Almony violated the Consumer Protection Act in their selection of comparable sales and calculation of neighborhood predominant values.
As discussed supra, the Circuit Court erroneously remanded consideration of the comparable sales and neighborhood predominant values. We now review whether the Division's findings of Consumer Protection Act violations based on the prior sales histories, comparable sales, and neighborhood predominant values were supported by substantial evidence.
Morgan appeals the Circuit Court's holding that the Division had substantial evidence to find him in violation of the statute for misrepresenting prior sales histories. The Division charged Morgan with failing to note in his appraisals when a property had been transferred within twelve months before the proposed sale. The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice requires that appraisers list all prior sales that occurred within the year. Advisory Opinion AO-1, supra. The Uniform Residential Appraisal Report form asks for prior sales of the subject property and comparable properties. The ALJ found that in all thirty-two of the subject appraisals Morgan conducted, he reported that there had been no prior sale. In actuality, thirty of the properties had been sold within the previous twelve months. Administrative Law Judge Spencer rejected Morgan's argument that the discrepancies were caused by a delay between the recording of the deed and the deed reporting service making the information available to appraisers. She based her finding that Morgan's argument was incredible on a number of facts: (1) Morgan listed Shpritz or one of his companies as the deed owner of record on the appraisals, evidence that he was aware of the prior sale transferring the property to Shpritz; (2) for at least five properties, the prior sale was at least seven months prior to the appraisal, ample time for it to be posted by the reporting service; [32] and (3) Morgan testified that he reported that there were no transfers at the suggestion of an American Skycorp employee, even when Morgan was aware of discrepancies between the owner listed on a property's deed and the seller listed on the sales contract. Finally, the ALJ rejected Morgan's argument that consumers did not rely on his appraisals because they did not review the appraisals themselves. She found that Morgan believed that the consumers would have access to his appraisals and that Morgan's failure to report the prior sales would tend to deceive a reviewer of the appraisals. We hold that the Division had substantial evidence to find that Morgan had violated ง 13-301(1) and (3) based on his failure to report the prior sales histories in his appraisals.
We first address Morgan's contention that selection of comparable sales is subjective to the extent that a fact finder cannot determine whether an appraiser misrepresented in the selection. A review of the record indicates that the Consumer Protection Division may find an appraiser to have violated the Consumer Protection Act through his or her selection of comparable sales. Simply because the selection of comparable properties may be a subjective determination does not mean a factual representation using comparables as a measure of value cannot be a misrepresentation. Not all comparables are appropriate. Even if the ALJ accepted the testimony of Morgan's expert that there is a range of acceptable valuations for appraisals, and that the generally accepted range between appraisals is five to ten percent, a fact finder could view comparables leading to a valuation outside the range as an indication of misrepresentation, with the likelihood of misrepresentation increasing as the deviation from the range increases. [33] We conclude that the Division's finding that Morgan violated ง 13-301(1) and (3) through his misrepresentation of comparable sales was supported by substantial evidence. The Division's case relied primarily on Robert Hinton, the Division's expert. Hinton's review of each appraisal was based on the appropriate data bases and records as they existed at the time of the initial appraisal. He concluded that Morgan made inaccurate statements of comparable sales in twenty-eight of the thirty-two appraisals. Hinton indicated that Morgan regularly chose comparable sales relatively far from the subject property, when much closer comparable sales were available. In many instances, Morgan ignored comparable sales on the same street โ including, in some instances, the house next door to the subject house. While Morgan's comparable sales were not far away, often within a half mile of the subject properties, they were far enough away to cause significant discrepancies. As Hinton testified, the value of properties in the Bel Air/Edison area depends upon location, and properties on one block can be worth significantly more or less than properties on the next block. By selecting comparable sales further away from the subject property, Morgan presented an inaccurate and grossly inflated valuation of the subject property. Morgan's explanation that he chose comparables based on bedroom count, bathroom count, square footage, and age, rather than location, is belied by a review of his appraisals. In a number of transactions, Morgan used dissimilar properties as comparable sales and ignored properties that were similar and closer to the subject property. Morgan's willingness to select dissimilar properties to use as comparables is evidenced most dramatically by his selection of a property containing a one-story addition used as a Knights of Columbus Hall with a bar and kitchen area. He listed that property as a comparable in three appraisals of ordinary row-houses. A close look at his appraisals illustrates Morgan's selection of comparables that violated his selection criteria. For example, in his appraisal of 2826 Pelham Avenue, Morgan selected three comparables located respectively one-quarter, one-half, and one-half miles away from the subject property. Hinton identified three comparable sales on the same street as the subject property. Hinton's comparables had the identical number of bedrooms and bathrooms as the subject property, were almost identical sizes, and were the same age. Morgan's first comparable had a modern kitchen and central air conditioning, amenities the subject property did not have. Morgan's second comparable sale was a significantly larger house than the subject property. Hinton noted that the house had an extra half story, was a corner house, had a park view, and was over 1,000 square feet larger than Morgan indicated. Even Morgan noted that the comparable had an additional bedroom and 0.1 more bathrooms. Morgan's third comparable had sold nine months before for only $29,000, but Morgan did not note this sale and valued the property at $78,700. Finally, Morgan viewed his comparables to be sufficiently different from the subject property that they required a large number of adjustments. Morgan argues that Hinton's testimony was based on comparable sales data over six months old and that Morgan adhered to FHA guidelines recommending use of sales data less than six months old. [34] The Division found Morgan's argument meritless because in his appraisals, Morgan frequently used comparable sales older than six months; out of thirty-two appraisals, Morgan chose twenty-five comparable sales older than six months. Morgan's argument that some of the comparable sales Hinton used in reviewing the appraisals might not have been available to Morgan when he conducted his appraisal is not supported by the record. First, Morgan argues that because of delays between the sale of a property and its listing in MRIS or the deed services, the sales were not available to him. This assertion is belied by Hinton's testimony that the entry dates on MRIS show that the prior sales were available to Morgan. Morgan also argues, supported by Vidi, that MRIS is composed of a number of servers, that it takes five to six hours for information inputted into one server to be transferred into the others, and, consequently, that Morgan might not have had access to information inputted into one MRIS server. This argument is unavailing, as Hinton only criticized Morgan for ignoring information inputted into MRIS days, not merely hours, before Morgan's review. Moreover, Morgan does not point to any specific instance in which a comparable sale used by Hinton was not available to him. Instead, Morgan makes a general argument that the data bases might not have posted the sales of the comparable properties in time for him to view them. Without pointing to any particular instance, Morgan has not provided any evidence to explain his failure to consider far superior comparable sales than the ones he selected. Finally, Morgan argues that he could not have misrepresented the value of the property through the comparable sales, because he did not always appraise the property at the Shpritz parties' designated sale price. Morgan points to ten properties he appraised as worth less than the sale prices and notes that under FHA guidelines, an appraisal under the purchase price provides the purchaser an opportunity to cancel or renegotiate the sale price. See HUD-91322.3. Although under-appraisals might indicate that Morgan did not rubber stamp the Shpritz parties' sale price, the mere fact that Morgan appraised some properties for less than the Shpritz parties' artificially inflated prices does not ipso facto absolve Morgan. That an appraisal may be inflated even more is not a defense to an artificially inflated appraisal. We reject Morgan's argument. Accordingly, we hold that substantial evidence existed in the record to support the Division's finding that Morgan had violated the Consumer Protection Act through his selection of comparable sales.
We hold that the Division lacked substantial evidence to find that Morgan had misrepresented neighborhood predominant values. The Division alleged that Morgan misrepresented the neighborhood predominant value in fourteen appraisals. Hinton presented only general testimony about the calculation of neighborhood predominant values. He did not produce any evidence showing how he arrived at his values for any of the properties. On cross-examination, he acknowledged that he had not brought any documents to the hearing to show how he arrived at his values. Similarly, his reports merely state his conclusion of the appropriate neighborhood predominant value. In sum, for each property, the Division's evidence consisted entirely of two numbers. One number was Morgan's calculation of the neighborhood predominant value. The other was Hinton's calculation, a smaller number. The Division's conclusion that Morgan's calculations constitute misrepresentations is not supported by substantial evidence.
Morgan appeals the Division's imposition of $34,000 in civil fines. Section ง 13-410 authorizes the Division to recover up to $1,000 in fines per violation from a first time violator of the Consumer Protection Act. The Division concedes that the fines should be reduced to $32,000, because the case only involves thirty-two of Morgan's appraisals. It defends the remaining $32,000 as an appropriate fine based on the factors that ง 13-410(d) mandates that the Division consider. Section 13-410(d) provides as follows:  Factors affecting penalty amount. โ The Consumer Protection Division shall consider the following in setting the amount of the penalty imposed in an administrative proceeding: (1) The severity of the violation for which the penalty is assessed; (2) The good faith of the violator; (3) Any history of prior violations; (4) Whether the amount of the penalty will achieve the desired deterrent purpose; and (5) Whether the issuance of a cease and desist order, including restitution, is insufficient for the protection of consumers. The Division considered the statutory factors and concluded that: (1) the violations were severe because Morgan exploited a vulnerable group of consumers and hurt communities by increasing defaults and foreclosures; (2) Morgan lacked good faith, as he intentionally misled consumers; (3) he was a first time violator; (4) high penalties were necessary for deterrence, because Morgan was motivated by financial gain; and (5) restitution would not be sufficient to protect consumers. We apply the substantial evidence test, as the Division's application of the statute's factors to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact. See Vann, 382 Md. at 296, 855 A.2d at 319. The Circuit Court affirmed the Division's Order. Substantial evidence existed to support the Division's decision to impose the full $1,000 per violation.
The Circuit Court reversed the Division's conclusions that Almony violated the Act and dismissed the charges against him. The court found that the Division was clearly erroneous in making a different judgment than that of the ALJ, who had dismissed the charges against Almony. The Circuit Court concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to determine that Almony violated the Act, as no pattern of deceit, as opposed to mistake or difference of opinion on his part is shown. The court ruled as follows: On the basis of the information presented in this case before the ALJ, it was clearly erroneous for the Division to pick misrepresentation over negligence. The ALJ found no basis to say a misrepresentation occurred and she observed and ruled as a matter of demeanor based credibility. The Division was clearly erroneous in making a different judgment. The Division appeals. The Division makes several arguments. The Division argues that ง 13-301(1) and (3) do not contain a scienter requirement and that the statute can be violated by the making of a false or deceptive statement that has the capacity to mislead the consumer. The Division also argues that the ALJ's proposed findings as to Almony were not demeanor-based and that the Division could properly overrule the ALJ's proposed findings and conclusions. Before this Court, Almony, as might be expected, asserts that the Circuit Court was correct. Almony argues that the ALJ's decision was demeanor-based, and, as such, the Division must give the ALJ's finding great deference. The Circuit Court erred in holding that there is a scienter requirement for ง 13-301(1) and (3). We decided this issue in Golt v. Phillips, 308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328 (1986), noting as follows: Furthermore, none of the applicable CPA [Consumer Protection Act] sections requires the landlord to have knowledge of the falsity or intent to deceive. Section 13-301(1) requires only a `[f]alse, falsely disparaging or misleading statement'... ง 13-301(3) prohibits a `failure to state a material fact.' Cf. ง 13-301(9) (which requires `[d]eception, fraud, false pretense, false premise, misrepresentation, or knowing concealment... with the intent that a consumer rely on the same ...'). In other words, ง 13-301(1), (2), and (3) does not require scienter on the part of the landlord; the subsections require only a false or deceptive statement that has the capacity to mislead the consumer tenant. Id. at 10-11, 517 A.2d at 332-333; cited with approval in Luskin's v. Consumer Protection, 353 Md. 335, 367, 726 A.2d 702, 718 (1999). The Circuit Court also erred in concluding that the ALJ ruled based on demeanor-based credibility assessments, and that, therefore, the Division could not overrule her proposed findings. Almony's testimony did not address the substance of the allegations; he simply denied violating the Act. The ALJ's rulings were based on documentary evidence and the testimony of the Division's expert, Mr. Hinton. There is no basis for concluding that the ALJ ruled based on demeanor. The Division concluded that Almony violated the Act with respect to two appraisalsโthe appraisal for 4106 Harris Avenue and 4230 Seidel Avenue. As to 4106 Harris Avenue, the Division found that Almony misrepresented that property's prior sale history. As to both properties, the Division concluded that Almony violated the Act based on his selection of the comparable sales he used in the appraisal report. [35] Even were we to agree with Almony with respect to his failure to list or flag the prior sale of 4106 Harris Avenue, the Division presented substantial evidence as to the violation of the Act through inappropriate use of comparable sales. Based on Hinton's testimony, the Division found significant problems in Almony's selection of comparable sales for 4106 Harris Avenue. [36] Two of Almony's comparables were a half-mile and one was one-third of a mile away from the subject property. While the distances were within the required one mile range, the properties were in a different sub-neighborhood composed of newer houses. While the subject property was a pre-World War II flat-roofed townhouse, Almony's comparables were post-World War II gable-roofed townhouses built twenty years after the subject property. According to Hinton, all three of the comparable sales were in superior condition, while Almony described them as average. The subject property was in average condition. One of Almony's comparables, located on Parkside Drive, had a view of Herring Run Park. The subject property did not overlook a park. Almony failed to consider that the sale of the property with a park view might not be indicative of the subject property's value. Almony's comparable sales had adjusted sales prices between $66,500 and $71,100, resulting in an appraisal of $67,000 for the 4106 Harris Avenue. This appraisal fit with the $68,700 sales price. Hinton located five comparable sales ranging from one block to one-quarter of a mile away from the subject property. With the exception of one property, all were built at approximately the same time as the subject property. All except for one had the same number of rooms and bathrooms. The comparables all were the same condition as the subject property, and none had park views. Hinton's comparable sales ranged in adjusted sales price from $35,300 to $45,700, resulting in a $40,000 appraisal. Hinton's appraisal is consistent with the previous listing of the property at $44,900 and Shpritz's purchase of the property for $33,100 less than three months before. The difference between Almony and Hinton's appraisals is $28,700. Almony also selected inappropriate comparable sales for 4230 Seidel Avenue. Almony's first comparable was a block away from the subject property, but it was another property flipped by Shpritz. Almony should have been alerted to the unreliability of using this property as a reference point, because he noted a prior sale of this property. The resale price of the property was 175% of the prior sale price. Almony's second comparable was two blocks away from the subject property. According to Hinton, however, this property was not comparable because it had been renovated from roof to basement. The subject property had not been renovated. [37] Almony's third comparable sale was six blocks away. Almony's selection of this property is problematic for a number of reasons. First, despite the close proximity to the subject property, this property was located outside the neighborhood boundaries Almony had noted. Second, Almony inflated the size of the property by 36.7%. Third, Almony noted a recent prior sale of the property. The property was resold for 256% of its prior price, which should have raised doubts about the sale's utility for assessing the subject property's value. Finally, Almony noted that the comparable's purchaser received $4,458 in financing concessions, but Almony did not consider that the concessions would have increased the sales price. Hinton's appraisal reveals that Almony neglected to select four comparable sales on the same block as the 4230 Seidel Avenue property. These properties were near identical in size, bedroom and bathroom count, view, and condition. There were no prior sales to raise questions about using these properties as comparables. Hinton discounted one of these properties, because it was not an FHA-financed home and was apparently under market value. The remainder had adjusted sales prices ranging from $54,101 to $56,000, resulting in an appraisal of $54,500. In comparison, Almony's comparable sales had adjusted sales prices ranging from $76,200 to $78,280, resulting in a $77,500 appraisal. The Shpritz parties sold the property for $75,500. We hold that the Division could find by substantial evidence that Almony had violated ง 13-301(1) and (3) through his misuse of comparable sales in appraising 4106 Harris Avenue and 4230 Seidel Avenue.