Opinion ID: 1202753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Point 1. Retroactive Effect of Regulations

Text: VECO makes two contentions concerning this point. First, it complains that the superior court relied on a regulation, 2 AAC 50.314(a)(1) (eff. 1/4/86), [8] defining the word group, which was not in effect until after the case was decided by the Commission. VECO argues that this amounts to an unconstitutional ex post facto law application. Second, VECO argues that the post decision repeal of a regulation which required the reporting of any informal gathering of twenty-five or more people in a private home, 2 AAC 50.325(f)(4) (repealed 1/4/86), should not have been considered by the superior court to moot VECO's argument that the Act violates the right to privacy. These arguments reflect a misunderstanding of the standard of review which we employ in reviewing administrative appeals. On appeal from an administrative appeal to the superior court we review the merits of the administrative determination directly, except to the extent that supplemental evidentiary proceedings have taken place in the superior court. Oceanview Homeowners Ass'n v. Quadrant Constr. & Eng'g, 680 P.2d 793, 798-99 (Alaska 1984); Dresser Industries, Inc./Atlas Div. v. Hiestand, 702 P.2d 244, 246 n. 3 (Alaska 1985); National Bank of Alaska v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 642 P.2d 811, 816 (Alaska 1982). What VECO must demonstrate is error on the part of the Commission, not the superior court. These arguments do not speak to Commission error and thus do not require review.