Opinion ID: 2576428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony relating to Sampson's invocation of Fourth Amendment rights

Text: Sampson argues that the district court erred by permitting the State to present testimony that discussed Sampson's invocation of his Fourth Amendment right to refuse to consent to a search of his residence. The testimony at issue was elicited by the State from two LVMPD officers who testified that they asked Sampson if they could enter his residence to retrieve the victim's clothing, and Sampson replied that he did not want them to enter his home. Sampson did not object to this testimony and therefore has the burden of establishing that plain error affecting his substantial rights occurred. [7] We conclude that he fails to do so. Whether it is constitutional error for a prosecutor to elicit testimony or comment on a defendant's refusal to consent to a warrantless search to support an inference of guilt is an issue of first impression in Nevada. This proposition has been assumed by many courts, [8] and today we adopt this rule in Nevada. As one court has stated, [A]n individual should be able to invoke his Fourth Amendment rights without having his refusal used against him at trial. [9] Courts addressing this issue recognize that there are similarities between exercising Fourth Amendment rights and exercising other constitutional rights, and they determine that it is improper for the State to effectively punish a defendant for asserting her constitutional rights. [10] One court has stated, Just as a criminal suspect may validly invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in an effort to shield himself from criminal liability, so one may withhold consent to a warrantless search, even though one's purpose be to conceal evidence of wrongdoing. [11] This court has previously addressed references made during trial to a defendant's exercise of her Fifth Amendment rights, and in Morris v. State, [12] we set forth the test to determine whether such a comment results in reversible error. In Morris, we held that references to a defendant's exercise of her Fifth Amendment rights are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and do not require reversal of a conviction if, (1) at trial there was only a mere passing reference, without more, to an accused's post-arrest silence, or (2) there is overwhelming evidence of guilt. [13] Today we adopt this test for comments on a defendant's exercise of Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, where there is only a mere passing reference, without more, to an accused's invocation of Fourth Amendment rights, there is harmless error. [14] Based on the test set forth in Morris, we conclude that in the instant case the district court erred in allowing this testimony. But even assuming that the error was plain, it did not prejudice Sampson's substantial rights. The testimony of the police officers regarding Sampson's refusal to consent to the warrantless search of his residence was no more than a mere passing reference. The officers were asked if they spoke with the defendant, and if so, what the defendant said to them. This was not questioning that was aimed at discussing Sampson's refusal to consent to the warrantless search of his residence. Thus, although the district court erred by allowing this testimony, the error was not prejudicial and does not require reversal of Sampson's conviction.