Opinion ID: 772102
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unconstitutionally Vague

Text: 30 A law is unconstitutionally vague when it does not afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972), or when it authorizes or encouragers arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, see Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Put more specifically, a statute is vague when the state has fail[ed] to provide such minimal guidelines that would prevent a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smithv. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)) (alterations in the original). The ordinance is such a law, plaintiffs contend, because the meanings of the terms solicitor, canvasser, and cause are not clear. They offer no explanation for why solicitor and canvasser are vague; but contend that the Supreme Court has found the term cause to be vague. 31 We find no merit in any of these assertions. Only the last assertion requires any explanation. According to plaintiffs, the Supreme Court's decision in Hynes v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976), established that the word 'cause' is unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, they point to footnote five of the opinion which states, In the circumstances of this case these allegations are enough to put in issue the precision or lack of precision with which the ordinance defines the categories of 'causes' it covers. Hynes, 425 U.S. at 621 n.5 (emphasis added). The language plaintiffs quote defeats their argument. As the language indicates, in finding the ordinance vague, the Supreme Court did not criticize the use of the word cause, rather it criticized the ordinance's modification of the word with the phrases recognized charitable and Federal, State, County or Municipal. Specifically, the Court stated that the ordinance does not explain, for example, whether 'Recognized charitable cause' means one recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as tax exempt, or one recognized by some community agency . . . [and] it is not clear what is meant by a 'Federal, State, County, or Municipal' cause. Id. at 621. Because Stratton's ordinance does not modify the term cause but includes all causes, the holding of and the reasoning in Hynes is not applicable. 32