Opinion ID: 2686798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Dr. Thomas Hyde

Text: In 2007, Dr. Thomas Hyde, a neurologist, evaluated Mendoza in English for two hours. Mendoza described his life experiences to Dr. Hyde. Based on this description, Dr. Hyde suspected PTSD, although he was not qualified to diagnose that condition. Dr. Hyde did not identify any events in Mendoza’s background causing him to suspect brain injury. For example, Mendoza had no known “traumatic loss of consciousness, of great significance, no skull f[r]actures, no seizures, no strokes, no fainting spells, no history of meningitis or [encephalitis], no history of chronic headaches, [and] no history of brain tumors.” Mendoza’s behavioral problems caused Dr. Hyde to suspect “developmental brain problems” and “residual attention problems into adulthood and perhaps frontal lobe problems.” Mendoza had a “significant substance abuse history.” The neurological tests Dr. Hyde performed showed no abnormalities other than mild visual deficits. On cross-examination, Dr. Hyde revealed that Mendoza had told him that, although he was using marijuana and alcohol the day before the crime, he was not using cocaine. Mendoza also claimed that he “[w]as not ‘high’ or ‘drunk,’ when 39 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 40 of 58 he committed the crime.” 18 Dr. Hyde did not believe that Mendoza used alcohol to the extent that he would experience withdrawal symptoms. J. Dr. Jethro Toomer At the 3.850 hearing, Dr. Toomer, the forensic psychologist from the trial, testified again. When he evaluated Mendoza prior to the 1994 trial, Dr. Toomer did not receive any medical or school records on Mendoza, did not speak to Mendoza’s family, and expected that he would have been asked to perform additional evaluations of Mendoza’s condition. Dr. Toomer admitted, however, that he learned from Mendoza much of the information that would have been in medical records, including Mendoza’s trips to see a psychiatrist in Cuba and his history of drug use. And, thus, Dr. Toomer confirmed that he did not fail to do any specific thing due to a lack of medical records. IX. STATE COURTS’ DENIAL OF 3.850 MOTION, 2009–2011
On April 8, 2009, the 3.850 court issued a thorough, 30-page order making factual findings and denying Mendoza’s amended 3.850 motion. The 3.850 court 18 Post-conviction counsel intended to call Lionel Perez, who was Mendoza’s high school friend and who would have testified that he did a lot of drugs with Mendoza. However, Mendoza informed the 3.850 court that he did not wish for Perez to testify. Additionally, post-conviction counsel told the 3.850 court that she believed “that Mr. Mendoza [was] going to do something extremely detrimental to his case if [she went] ahead and call[ed] [Perez].” Mendoza added that if post-conviction counsel “forced [him] to put Lionel Perez [on],” he would “waive all [his] mitigation.” Therefore, post-conviction counsel “reluctantly” made the strategic decision not to call Perez. 40 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 41 of 58 discussed in detail Mendoza’s claim of ineffective trial counsel. As to evidence that Mendoza was a heavy drug user, the 3.850 court noted that Mendoza’s mother “testified about his drug use at trial,” as did Dr. Toomer. Dr. Eisenstein testified, in his deposition, about drug use during the penalty hearing before the trial court. The 3.850 court noted, “even if counsel presented no evidence on this issue, counsel cannot show prejudice since [Mendoza’s] own expert [Dr. Hyde] testified [at the 3.850 evidentiary hearing] [Mendoza] was not high” at the time of Calderon’s murder. As to Mendoza’s time in the Peruvian embassy and in Peru, the 3.850 court found that: “[Mendoza’s] mother testified at the penalty phase about the horrible conditions in the Peruvian Embassy and how family members, including [Mendoza,] were beat up. [Mendoza’s] mother testified about the trip from Cuba and the living conditions in the Peruvian camps.” The court considered Ms. Roman’s testimony cumulative of Ms. Mendoza’s testimony. The court noted that Ms. Roman did not know Mendoza and did not know of any specific incident that may have affected Mendoza. As to experts in addictionology, the 3.850 court noted, “Barry Wax testified that he asked the [trial] court to appoint Dr. Tropp, an expert in the field of addiction. That motion was denied. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for asking for and not receiving an expert in the field of addictionology.” More 41 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 42 of 58 importantly, trial counsel had both Dr. Toomer and Dr. Eisenstein appointed to evaluate Mendoza, and both experts testified. Thus, trial counsel did present mental health mitigation. 19
Mendoza appealed, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his 3.850 motion. See Mendoza v. State (“Mendoza IV”), 87 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 2011). As for Mendoza’s claim of ineffective trial counsel, the state supreme court correctly noted that the claim was governed by the two-prong standard in Strickland v. Washington. Id. at 651–52, 657 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) (requiring a petitioner alleging ineffective counsel to show both deficient performance and prejudice)). The state supreme court summarized the evidence presented at the guilt phase, the penalty phase both before the jury and judge, and during the 3.850 evidentiary hearing. Id. at 648–50, 658–59. The state supreme court made several conclusions. First, the state supreme court concluded that: “Upon careful review of both the penalty-phase transcript and the evidentiary hearing transcript, we agree with the circuit court that the jury and trial judge heard the childhood, 19 As to Mendoza’s other new experts, the 3.850 court found: (1) Dr. Rothe “did not work on cases involving adults in the 1990’s, only juveniles,” and therefore “would not have been available to evaluate [Mendoza] at the time of the trial or to have testified at the trial”; and (2) Dr. Ackerman “was a student during the years 1992-1994 and was not qualified as an expert during that time.” The Florida Supreme Court specifically affirmed the fact-finding regarding Dr. Ackerman. See Mendoza v. State, 87 So. 3d 644, 665 (Fla. 2011). 42 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 43 of 58 medical, and psychological information that Mendoza alleged counsel failed to discover and present.” Id. at 659. The court observed, “the presentation of cumulative evidence in the postconviction proceedings does not provide a basis for determining that trial counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. 20 Second, the state supreme court concluded that Mendoza took “issue with the manner in which trial counsel presented the evidence” in the penalty phase, but that was not a proper basis to establish deficient performance. Id. In so concluding, the Florida Supreme Court cited Everett v. State, and quoted its statement: “‘That there may have been more that trial counsel could have done or that new counsel in reviewing the record with hindsight would handle the case differently, does not mean that trial counsel’s performance . . . was deficient.’” Id. (quoting Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 478 (Fla. 2010)). Third, the state supreme court concluded that Mendoza had later found an expert whose testimony was more favorable “as to the degree of his mental status impairment,” but that subsequently obtaining a more favorable mental status assessment did not establish that trial counsel’s investigation was deficient. Id. 20 Generally speaking, these statements were accurate, as the jury did hear about Mendoza’s childhood, medical background, and psychological evaluations—including Dr. Toomer’s several diagnoses. As noted above, it was not until Dr. Rothe’s examination in 2007 that Mendoza was diagnosed with PTSD, and thus, we recognize that the jury in 1994 did not hear that diagnosis. However, we do not read the Florida Supreme Court to say that the two prior psychological experts’ diagnoses—i.e., Dr. Toomer’s and Dr. Eisenstein’s—about Mendoza were exactly the same as Dr. Rothe’s subsequent diagnosis, but only that the jury and trial court did hear psychological information about Mendoza and that psychological information was presented again in the 3.850 hearing. 43 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 44 of 58 Dr. Toomer was Mendoza’s mental health expert at trial, and the Florida Supreme Court noted that Mendoza’s own legal expert, Mr. Potolsky, testified that he had used Dr. Toomer as the sole mental health expert in a capital case in this time period. Id. In other words, that Mendoza had now found more favorable experts (such as Dr. Rothe and Dr. Hyde) did not make trial counsel deficient in selecting Dr. Toomer and relying on his evaluation. See id.