Opinion ID: 6112171
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Old Computers

Text: Clark argues that the district court erroneously allowed the government to present evidence of two old computers found in his home, claiming that such evidence was inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 14 During the search of Clark’s home, law enforcement seized an Acer and a Compaq computer, among other devices. When those two computers were forensically examined, Tom Bell found evidence of peer-to-peer software and deleted data that suggested the former presence of child pornography and related searches. Bell testified that “[t]hese hits were also found in a folder named ‘Mike.’” Clark moved to exclude this evidence, but the district court denied the motion, finding the evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove identity and absence of mistake or accident, and finding no unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But such evidence can be admitted for “another purpose,” such as “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). We review de novo the district court’s legal determination that the evidence was admissible for a proper 404(b) purpose.10 See United States v. Rayborn, 495 F.3d 328, 342 (6th Cir. 2007). The evidence concerning the Acer and Compaq computers is probative of a material issue other than character. It tended to show that Clark—whose given name, after all, is Michael— was the individual responsible for distributing child pornography (i.e., identity and absence of mistake) and to disprove his defenses that (1) someone else was the perpetrator, and (2) he was a technological novice. As the district court noted, these are permissible purposes under Rule 404(b). We have “overwhelmingly approved of the admission of ‘other acts’ evidence” when identity is a material issue. United States v. Perry, 438 F.3d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 2006); see, e.g., United States v. Keith, 502 F. App’x 453, 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming the admission of prior convictions to “show that [defendant] was the individual responsible for the child pornography found on the computer”). The evidence was properly admitted under 404(b). 10Our circuit appears to be split as to whether we review a district court’s 404(b) determination de novo or for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Carter, 779 F.3d 623, 625 (6th Cir. 2015). We decline to resolve that disagreement in this case, however, because Clark’s 404(b) argument fails under either standard of review. No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 15 Rule 403. Rule 403 provides a balancing test for excluding relevant evidence, but only if the evidence’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also United States v. Asher, 910 F.3d 854, 860 (6th Cir. 2018) (“The test is strongly weighted toward admission.”). We review such rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hazelwood, 979 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2020). As explained, the evidence was highly probative of material issues. And with this in mind, the evidence did not present an overwhelming danger of unfair prejudice. The district court gave a clear limiting instruction to the jury that it could use the evidence for only limited, permissible purposes. The court repeated this instruction while giving the jury charge. Given these instructions and the importance of the computer evidence, any remaining prejudice was limited and did not invite the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. United States v. Lang, 717 F. App’x 523, 539 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[Rule 403] only contemplates ‘evidence which tends to suggest a decision on an improper basis’ or which ‘hit[s] . . . below[] the belt.’” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Lattner, 385 F.3d 947, 958 (6th Cir. 2004); Keith, 502 F. App’x at 455. Because the district court properly weighed the evidence’s probative value against its limited prejudicial effect, it did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403. The Government’s Closing Argument. Clark also contends that the government improperly told the jury during closing arguments that it may use the computer evidence to prove that Clark’s distribution was “knowing.” Although Clark did not object to these statements in the district court, he now argues that they violated the district court’s limiting instruction. But, again, the government used the computer evidence for a permissible Rule 404(b) purpose: to prove that Clark knowingly, and not mistakenly, distributed child pornography. Regardless, “isolated inappropriate remarks by the prosecutor, in an otherwise fair trial, do not generally justify reversal of a criminal conviction.” United States v. Cleveland, 907 F.3d 423, 439 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206, 1213 (6th Cir. 1992)). We find no error. No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 16