Opinion ID: 615944
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether congress intended njp to be criminal

Text: Reveles argues that Congress intended NJP to be criminal in nature. This argument fails. The UCMJ provides four methods for disposing of cases involving offenses committed by servicemen: the general, special, and summary courts-martial, and disciplinary punishment administered by the commanding officer pursuant to Art. 15 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 815. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 31, 96 S.Ct. 1281, 47 L.Ed.2d 556 (1976). Unlike courts-martial, which resemble judicial proceedings, NJP is an administrative method of dealing with the most minor offenses. Id. at 31-32, 96 S.Ct. 1281 (internal citations omitted). When interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain language of the statute, construing the provisions of the entire law, including its object and policy, to ascertain the intent of Congress. Zuress v. Donley, 606 F.3d 1249, 1252-53 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir.1996)). A review of the NJP statute's plain language reveals that Congress intended it to be noncriminal in nature. The text of the statute shows an intent to distinguish minor NJP disciplinary proceedings from criminal proceedings. See 10 U.S.C. § 815. According to the statute, NJPs are disciplinary punishments for minor offenses without the intervention of a court-martial.... Id. at § 815(b). The title of the statute, Commanding officer's non-judicial punishment, confirms Congress' intent to distinguish NJP from traditional criminal proceedings. Id. (emphasis added); but see State v. Ivie, 136 Wash.2d 173, 961 P.2d 941, 945 (1998) (state court holding that the statute's title indicated NJP was criminal, rather than civil, in nature). Thus, the language of the NJP statute indicates that Congress intended NJP to be noncriminal in nature. Legislative history confirms Congress' intent to make NJP noncriminal. The Senate Armed Services Committee commented that NJPs deal with minor infractions of discipline without resorting to criminal law processes.  S.Rep. No. 87-1911, at 2 (1962), 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2379, 2380 (emphasis added). It further stated that these punishments are non-judicial and are not considered as a conviction of a crime and in this sense ha[ve] no connection with the military court-martial system. Id. (emphasis added). The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) and the Manual of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy (JAGMAN), are also helpful in determining the intended nature of NJP. Although neither of these documents is technically legislative history, each of them confirms an intent to make NJP a noncriminal sanction. Specifically, the MCM states that NJP's purpose is to promote[ ] positive behavior changes in servicemembers without the stigma of a court-martial conviction. MCM, pt. V, ¶ 1c (2008). And the JAGMAN's description of Captain's Mast proceedingsan alternate name for modern-day NJP proceedings corroborates this purpose: Captain's mast/office hours that results in nonjudicial punishment is not a criminal trial; it is a disciplinary proceeding .... Such punishment is designed for minor misconduct in a nonjudicial forum, without the permanent stigma of a record of Federal conviction. As such, the standard of proof by which facts must be established at mast or office hours is a preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, as it is at courts-martial. JAGMAN § 0110(b) (emphasis added). To support his argument that the MCM indicates that NJP is criminal in nature, Reveles notes that the MCM defines a criminal proceeding to include nonjudicial punishment proceedings. MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 96c. Reveles also cites a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, United States v. Arriaga, 49 M.J. 9, 12 (C.A.A.F.1998), that refers to this definition. But the MCM section and case Reveles cites both concern obstruction of justice charges. The MCM section states that [f]or purposes of this paragraph [concerning obstruction of justice], `criminal proceedings' includes nonjudicial punishment proceedings.... MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 96c (emphasis added). Thus, while the MCM appears to extend obstruction of justice charges to conduct concerning NJP proceedings, it never indicates that NJP is criminal in nature. Reveles' argument that this narrow provision has greater applicability is unpersuasive. Numerous courts have also recognized that Congress intended NJP to be noncriminal. For example, the Armed Forces Court of Appeals has stated that the title of the [NJP] legislation`Commanding officer's non-judicial punishment'underscores the legislative intent to separate NJP from the judicial procedures of the military's criminal law forum, the court-martial. United States v. Gammons, 51 M.J. 169, 177 (C.A.A.F.1999). Similarly, the United States Court of Claims has held that nonjudicial punishment, unlike the general and special court-martial, is not a formal adversary criminal proceeding, but is regarded as noncriminal in nature. Wales v. United States, 14 Cl.Ct. 580, 587 (1988) (citing Fairchild v. Lehman, 814 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed.Cir.1987)); see also Cochran v. United States, 1 Cl.Ct. 759, 764 (1983); Dumas v. United States, 620 F.2d 247, 251-52 (Ct.Cl.1980); United States v. Trogden, 476 F.Supp.2d 564, 568 (E.D.Va. 2007); State v. Myers, 100 Hawai`i 132, 58 P.3d 643, 646 (2002); but see United States v. Volpe, 986 F.Supp. 122 (N.D.N.Y.1997); Arriaga, 49 M.J. at 12; Ivie, 961 P.2d at 945. Reveles argues that Volpe and Arriaga expose a split among federal courts concerning the categorization of NJP. But Volpe is distinguishable because the magistrate judge in that case did not conduct a Hudson/Rivera analysis when considering defendant's Double Jeopardy arguments. Volpe, 986 F.Supp. at 124-26. And Arriaga does not support Reveles' argument because that case involved NJP in an obstruction of justice context. Although Ivie is largely on point, it is a state-law case with a dissent that conforms to the majority of federal case law on this issue. Ivie, 961 P.2d at 948. Reveles' contention that federal and military courts are split on this issue is unpersuasive. Reveles makes several other arguments seeking to show that Congress actually intended NJP to be criminal. Reveles argues, for example, that the MCM prohibits internal double punishment, and that NJP may not be imposed for the same offense more than once. See MCM, pt. V, ¶ 1f.(1). Reveles also argues that the MCM prohibits the imposition of NJP for an offense tried by a federal court. See id., pt. V, ¶ 1f.(5). But Reveles overstates his arguments concerning multiple prosecutions and punishments. Although MCM regulations generally forbid imposing NJP on a servicemember after he has been prosecuted civilly, they do not preclude prosecution in a civilian court after NJP has been imposed. See MCM, pt. V, ¶ 1f.(5). Further, in the military setting, nonjudicial punishment for an offense other than a minor offense (even though thought by the commander to be minor) is not a bar to trial by court-martial for the same offense. MCM, pt. V, ¶ 1e (citing R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(D)(iv))(but recognizing that the MCM allows an accused at a court-martial to show previous imposition of NJP to mitigate a possible court-martial sentence). Reveles separately argues that NJP proceedings contain due process safeguards traditionally associated with criminal proceedings. Reveles is correct that some of these safeguards exist, including the right of the accused to receive notice of charges and to be present at NJP proceedings. But the presence of these procedural safeguards does not negate Congress' intent to create an essential and prompt means of maintaining good order and discipline in the military. MCM, pt. V, ¶ 1c. In fact, other rules typically included in criminal proceedings, such as formal rules of evidence, are absent from NJP proceedings. MCM, pt. V, ¶ 4c.(3). Moreover, at least one military branchthe Navyuses a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard that is the hallmark of criminal trials. Turner v. Dep't of Navy, 325 F.3d 310, 313 (D.C.Cir.2003); JAGMAN § 0110(b). The preponderance of the evidence standard indicates that NJP proceedings were not intended to be criminal. Because we hold that Congress intended NJP to be noncriminal in nature, we now consider whether NJP is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Rivera, 194 F.3d at 1068.