Opinion ID: 2576334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: judicial discretion regarding plea agreements

Text: ¶ 11 We begin by noting that there is no constitutional principle that obliges a trial court to accept a defendant's guilty plea. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (There is, of course, no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted.); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court....). Indeed, [a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). ¶ 12 We generally adhere to the proposition that, subject to constitutional constraints, [t]he Executive remains the absolute judge of whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and presumptively best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir.1975); see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996). Plea bargains, however, implicate not only the ordinarily plenary executive power to indict or dismiss; they also go to the traditionally judicial function of determining what penalty to impose. United States v. Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir.1981); see also United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1997) ([W]hen the dismissal of charges or agreement not to pursue potential charges is conditioned on acceptance of a plea agreement, the court's authority to adjudicate guilt and impose sentence is implicated.). Thus, after initial charges have been filed, the vast majority of courts permit, encourage, or require some degree of judicial discretion in accepting or rejecting such arrangements. ¶ 13 Moreover, it is well established under Utah law that trial courts are not required to accept plea agreements. This principle is based on the plain language of rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly provides that [t]he court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty. Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e) (emphasis added). [4] This discretion extends to guilty pleas that are tendered as part of a plea bargain. See State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶ 14, 17 P.3d 1153; Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190; State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct.App.1989). ¶ 14 The foregoing, however, does not imply that a trial court may reject a guilty plea arbitrarily. We acknowledge that the state is usually in a better position than the court to determine whether a plea agreement is in the public interest, and we do not take lightly the role of prosecutorial discretion in this regard. We affirm that, generally speaking, courts should be wary of second-guessing prosecutorial choices. Miller, 722 F.2d at 565. Even as we acknowledge prosecutorial prerogatives regarding plea agreements, however, we also recognize that unfettered discretion invites abuse. Thus, some oversight from the bench is necessary both to protect a defendant from the power of coercion and abuse of the state, [and] also [to] protect the interests of other members of our society in living in a peaceful, orderly atmosphere. Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ind.1983). The trial court has an important role to play in assessing the appropriateness of a proffered plea agreementespecially where there is evidence of either an overzealous or a lackadaisical prosecutionand may reject a plea in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. [5] Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495.