Opinion ID: 74019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Industry's Challenge

Text: 12
13 The Industry's first challenge to the Standard is addressed to the retention of the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy from the prior standard. 3 The Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy reflects a general preference for engineering controls, which eliminate or arrest pollution at the source, over respirators in reducing employee exposure to airborne contaminants. Although it comprehensively revised those aspects of the prior standard relating to the manner and conditions of respirator use, OSHA altogether excluded the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy from the rulemaking proceeding. Consequently, the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy was not open to comment or scrutiny. In the issuing release for the Standard, OSHA explained its position in the following way: 14 By leaving paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the final rule unchanged from the corresponding paragraphs of the respiratory protection standard that has been in effect since 1971, OSHA . . . . continues the protection that employees have relied on, . . . . retains the language that employers are familiar with, . . . . [and] allows OSHA and the affected public to continue to rely on OSHA interpretations . . . . 15 . . . . 16 The unchanged language of paragraph (a)(1) was included in the language of the proposed rule only to enable interested parties to view the rule as it would ultimately appear in the Code of FederalRegulations in its entirety. Since OSHA neither proposed nor adopted modifications to proposed paragraph (a)(1), the Agency believes that it is not legally required to reconsider this issue at this time. OSHA has the authority to identify which regulatory requirements it is proposing to revise and which issues are to receive regulatory priority. Limiting this rulemaking to issues concerning respirator programs is appropriate because such programs are the exclusive focus of this rulemaking and to collect comments and data on additional issues would divert resources from the task at hand. 17 63 Fed. Reg. at 1180. The Industry, for its part, contends that this position is unsupportable because it allows OSHA selectively to insulate favored aspects of a standard from public scrutiny and judicial review. The Industry also contends that since 1971, when the original Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy was adopted, the factual circumstances have changed dramatically and now respirators may be every bit as effective as engineering controls. The Industry also notes that the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy was originally adopted as part of a 6(a) standard, which means that it has never been subject to the notice and comment procedures and scrutiny attendant to most rulemakings. 18 Thus, the legal issue for our consideration is whether OSHA, when it was comprehensively revising those aspects of the Standard relating to the manner and conditions of respirator use, could exclude the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy from the rulemaking proceeding. Logic dictates that an agency must have some discretion in setting an agenda for rulemaking and excluding some matters categorically. Otherwise rulemaking would be very difficult because an agency would be unable to concentrate its scarce resources on a particular problem. Our decision in AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992), is instructive on this issue. In AFL-CIO, this Court reviewed OSHA's Air Contaminants Standard, a comprehensive set of permissible exposure limits (PELs) for 428 toxic substances. The notice of proposed rulemaking for the Air Contaminants Standard proposed to issue new or revised PELs for a number of substances, but limited the scope of [the] rulemaking to those substances for which [a private standard-setting organization] recommended limits that were either new or more protective than the existing PELs. Id. at 969 (citing the notice of proposed rulemaking). After issuance of the Air Contaminants Standard, industry and labor unions attacked it from both sides in this Court. 19 The unions in AFL-CIO argued that by limiting the rulemaking to those substances that either (1) had no existing PEL, or (2) for which the standard-setting organization had recommended a limit more protective than the existing PEL, OSHA had violated the command of the OSH Act that it set standards  'which most adequately assure[] . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.'  Id. at 984 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5) (alterations in original)). The court rejected this argument: 20 [W]e [do not] find a requirement that OSHA include all possible substances in one rulemaking. OSHA has never claimed that the Air Contaminants Standard constituted the entire universe of substances needing regulation, and it seems reasonable that some limit needed to be set as to what substances could be considered in this rulemaking. The list of [the standard-setting organization's] recommendations is a rational choice as the source for that limitation. [Those] recommendations are well known to industry and the safety and health community. Therefore, we find that the agency's choice to so limit this rulemaking is a valid exercise of OSHA's authority to set priorities for rulemaking. 21 Id. 22 The union brought a separate challenge to a decision by OSHA to defer issuing standards for monitoring and medical surveillance of the new PELs until a laterrulemaking. Id. at 985. Under 6(b)(7) of the OSH Act, occupational safety and health standards are required to provide for monitoring or measuring employee exposure, and to prescribe medical examinations and tests, where appropriate. 29 U.S.C. 665(b)(7). The union claimed that OSHA violated this requirement by promulgating the Air Contaminants Standard without simultaneously promulgating monitoring and medical surveillance rules with respect to that standard. We also dismissed this argument, holding that this was purely a matter of regulatory priority with respect to which the agency had ample discretion. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 985. Thus, OSHA was permitted to wait and address monitoring and medical surveillance at another point. 23 While AFL-CIO suggests that the agency's chosen scope of rulemaking is a matter subject to judicial review, it also stands for the proposition that such review is rather limited and deferential in nature. With respect to avoiding consideration of substances for which the private standard-setting organization had not recommended a more protective PEL, we held that it was reasonable for OSHA to confine its rulemaking in that manner. With respect to monitoring and medical surveillance, we allowed OSHA to postpone consideration of those issues until a later date. AFL-CIO did not precisely define the standard of review of an agency's choice of scope for a particular rulemaking, and we need not do so today. It is clear, however, that the standard of review is at least as deferential as a reasonableness standard. 24 We hold that the decision to exclude the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy from revision was reasonable. The Standard deals with appropriate measures for employers to take with respect to respirator use; for example, training, maintenance, quality of device, etc., are included within its ambit. These matters are not necessarily factually intertwined with the propriety of implementing engineering controls, if feasible, rather than resorting to respirators. The Industry has presented nothing to this Court to lead us to believe that the alleged technological improvement in respirators substantially alters the comparative benefits of engineering controls versus respirators. To the contrary, it appears that the major rationale for engineering controls is that they make respiratory protection automatic, while respirators are dependent on use and constant attention and are subject to human error. Of course, technological improvement in respirators is not likely to reduce substantially the risk of human error, and in any event no such suggestion has been made in this case. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for OSHA to determine that allowing submission of evidence about the relative merits of engineering controls and respirators would have distracted attention from and clouded the essential issues before it, namely, how respirators should be used if they are used. 4 Like the AFL-CIO court, we hold that the agency's choice to so limit this rulemaking by excluding the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy from consideration is a valid exercise of OSHA's authority to set priorities for rulemaking. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 984. The Industry has failed to demonstrate that OSHA's decision was unreasonable. 25 We also conclude that the fact that the original Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy was promulgated pursuant to 6(a)'s abbreviated procedures, rather than the usual 6(b) notice-and-comment proceedings, bears no special significance in this analysis. Section 6(a), 29 U.S.C. 655(a), authorized OSHA for a limited time (through 1973) to adopt existing national consensus standards as occupational safety and health standards without the rigors of notice-and-comment proceedings. The Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy, having been originally adopted pursuant to 6(a), has thus never undergone public scrutiny, unlike most of the standards that are in effect today. The Industry makes much of the fact that the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy has eluded comment and scrutiny for 28 years in this manner. Although this situation may be undesirable from a public policy standpoint, 5 it is fully consistent with the language Congress used for 6(a). The plain language of 6(a) causes it to operate [w]ithout regard to . .. the other subsections of this section. 29 U.S.C. 655(a). Further, although OSHA's authority to promulgate standards under 6(a) expired in 1973, there is no statutory provision causing standards adopted under 6(a) themselves to expire at any time. 6 Rather, a 6(a) start-up standard continues in effect until it is modified or revoked by a new rulemaking initiated under 6(b). 7 See AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 968-69 (referring to the possibility of updating a 6(a) standard, the court pointed out that the statute provides two mechanisms to revise existing standards, i.e., a 6(b) proceeding or, in the case of a need for an emergency temporary standard, a 6(c) proceeding). Because the statute treats 6(a) standards and 6(b) standards as having equal force of law once they are promulgated, the fact that the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy originated under 6(a) rather than under 6(b) does not affect our analysis of whether OSHA was bound to reconsider it here. 26 The Industry also implies that the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy has outlived its validity under 6(a) because it no longer represents a national consensus standard. This argument is without merit because the Industry has proffered no evidence that the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy no longer represents the national consensus standard. To the contrary, the most recent national consensus standard, ANSI Standard Z88.2-1992, 4.2, retains the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy. 8 Thus, theIndustry has failed to demonstrate that OSHA's decision to limit the instant rulemaking to issues relating to the manner and conditions of respirator use was unreasonable. 27 For the foregoing reasons, we reject the Industry's challenge to the retention of the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy. 28
29 We turn next to the Industry's challenge to the conditions expressed in 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(d)(3)(iii)(B) on the use of air-purifying respirators. By way of background, there are two categories of respirators. First, there are atmosphere-supplying respirators (ASRs), which suppl[y] the respirator user with breathing air from a source independent of the ambient atmosphere, e.g., an oxygen tank. 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(b). Second, there are air-purifying respirators (APRs), which use the air from the ambient atmosphere but are equipped with a filter, cartridge, or canister designed to remove air contaminants before they reach the user and are inhaled. Id. The main shortcoming associated with APRs is that the filters, cartridges, or canisters generally have a limited lifetime and may cease to function properly without the user's knowledge, thereby exposing the user to toxic contaminants. This situation is sometimes called the breakthrough problem. Of course, the breakthrough problem is avoided entirely by the use of [ASRs]. Such respirators do not rely on filter sorbents and instead deliver clean outside air to the wearer's respirator. 63 Fed. Reg. at 1204. The Industry generally prefers APRs because they are cheaper and interfere less with workplace duties. 30 The Standard provides that in workplace atmospheres that are not immediately dangerous to life and health (non-IDLH), an APR may be used only if one of two conditions is met. 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(d)(3)(iii). First, an APR may be used if it is equipped with an end-of-service-life indicator (ESLI); the parties agree that this is very rare because there are only a few certified ESLIs. 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(d)(3)(iii)(B)(1). Second and alternatively, an APR may be used if the employer implements a change schedule for canisters and cartridges that is based on objective information or data that will ensure that canisters and cartridges are changed before their end of service life. 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(d)(3)(iii)(B)(2). The Industry's disagreement with OSHA centers on this latter condition (Change Schedule Condition), which it feels is overly stringent and unnecessarily limits the use of APRs. 31 The Change Schedule Condition approach was selected by OSHA to the exclusion of a competing approach, discussed in the proposed standard and drawn from prior informal practice. The prior practice relied on a totally different criterion: whether the substance in question had adequate warning properties. Adequate warning properties are characteristics, for example gaseous odor or skin irritation, that would alert a user to the fact that the cartridge or canister had reached the end of service life and was no longer working properly. If the user would be alerted to a malfunction, the reasoning went, there would be no risk of contamination because the user could then promptly change the cartridge or canister. The Standard abandons the reliance on adequate warning properties in favor of the more objective criteria of ESLIs and change schedules. 63 Fed. Reg. at 1204-07. As OSHA explains, there is too much variation between individuals [in perception of sensory thresholds], . . . there is no good screening mechanism to identify persons with sensory receptor problems, and ... employees [would] be overexposed to hazardous air contaminants. Id. at 1204. The new conditions are admittedly narrow because (1) ESLIs are extremely rare; and (2) the breakthrough test data upon which change schedules are generally based are notavailable for many hazardous gases and vapors. In the issuing release, OSHA conceded that breakthrough test data are scarce, and implied that to some extent the Standard is technology-forcing: [R]espirator manufacturers, chemical manufacturers, and even [the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health] must provide more information about how long respirator cartridges and canisters can be expected to provide protection for employees. Id. at 1205. The Industry argues that the Change Schedule Condition leads to an overwhelming preference for ASRs that may actually increase the risk of accidents because ASRs tend to be bulky and cumbersome, and employees in some lines of work are accustomed to using APRs. According to the Industry, these problems with ASRs represent an important aspect of the problem which OSHA entirely failed to consider. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2867, 77 L.Ed.2d 443(1983). 32 OSHA responds that the Change Schedule Condition does not automatically favor ASRs. In fact, compared to the adequate-warning-properties approach, the Change Schedule Condition in some ways permits wider use of APRs. Whereas under the prior regime APRs could be used only if the toxic substance carried adequate warning properties, now APRs can be used even if there are no warning properties, provided that a reliable change schedule is in place. Thus, the Change Schedule Condition restricts the use of APRs in some ways but expands the use of them in others. OSHA further contends that the Industry's concerns about weight and mobility problems associated with ASRs are overstated. Finally, OSHA notes that even if breakthrough data are not widely available, employers may rely on other information, for example, change schedule recommendations from respirator manufacturers, as long as that information is reliable. OSHA also calls on the respirator industry to disseminate change schedule information more widely and effectively. 63 Fed. Reg. at 1205. 33 Because the Industry's challenge to the Change Schedule Condition is exclusively factual in nature, our review is limited to whether OSHA's determinations are supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. 29 U.S.C. 655(f). After reviewing the record, we conclude that OSHA's decision to replace the subjective adequate-warning-properties approach with the Change Schedule Condition is supported by substantial evidence. There was a consensus among commentors that inherent unreliability problems exist with odor and irritation thresholds. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 1204-06. Change schedules based on objective information or data better promote worker safety by ensuring on a consistent basis that APRs are properly serviced and maintained. Moreover, the record belies the Industry's argument that OSHA entirely failed to consider the fact that ASRs tend to be bulky and cumbersome. The record reflects that OSHA did consider the uncomfortableness and mobility restrictions causedby APRs and weighed those factors in the balance. 63 Fed. Reg. at 1204 (quoting Associated Builders and Contractors' comment). Thus, the factual determinations and policy choices underlying the Change Schedule Condition are consistent with the OSH Act and supported by substantial evidence. 34
35 We turn next to the Industry's challenge to the provisions in the Standard requiring annual fit-testing and retraining of respirator-using employees. See 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(f)(2), (k)(5). With respect to the annual fit-testing requirement, a respirator cannot function properly unless it is properly fitted to the wearer's face. Accordingly, the Standard requires in paragraph (f) that an employee be fit tested with a respirator of the same make, model, style, and size as is proposed to be used, before he actually begins to use one in the course of employment. The Industry does not object to this initial-test requirement,but does object to a requirement in (f)(2) that wearers be tested at least annually following the initial test. 36 With respect to the annual retraining requirement, the Standard requires in paragraph (k) that the employer . . . provide effective training to employees who are required to use respirators. Training should address the necessity of respirators, fit, usage, maintenance, limitations and capabilities, emergency situations, malfunction, inspection, and storage. See 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(k)(1)(i)-(vii). The Industry does not object to the initial training requirement, but does object to a requirement in (k)(5) that such training be re-administered to employees annually. Like the challenge to the Change Schedule Condition, these challenges are exclusively factual and therefore this Court's review is on the deferential substantial evidence standard. 29 U.S.C. 655(f). 37 The Industry points out that some evidence indicates that annual fit-testing is unnecessary because only a tiny percentage of employees experience facial changes that necessitate changes in respirator fit, and those who do can easily be detected by physical appearance. 9 OSHA noted that [c]ommenters generally agreed that some additional fit testing beyond an initial test was necessary, but opinions varied widely on the appropriate intervals at which such tests should be performed. 63 Fed. Reg. at 1223. [A] large number of rulemaking participants supported OSHA's proposal to require the testing of respirator fit on an annual basis. Id. at 1224. We conclude that the annual fit-testing requirement is supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. 38 We find that the annual retraining requirement is also supported by substantial evidence. OSHA's compliance experience [had] demonstrated that inadequate respirator training is a common problem, and is often associated with respirator program deficiencies that could lead to employee exposures to workplace contaminants. 63 Fed. Reg. at 1261-62. OSHA stated that annual retraining is necessary so that employees know about the respiratory protection program and . . . cooperate and actively participate in the program, so that employees will be confident when using respirators, and to eliminate complacency on the part of both the employer and employees. Id. at 1261. OSHA noted that commenters requesting less frequent or no retraining submitted no data indicating that less frequent training would be sufficient for respirator users to retain information critical to the successful use of respirators on an individual basis. Id. Additionally, OSHA explained that annual retraining is the normwith respect to a number of other, substance-specific OSHA standards that involve respirators. Id. 39 While retraining at some other periodic interval might also be defensible, OSHA was entitled to require annual retraining as a precautionary measure to assure that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard. 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5). Moreover, OSHA could conclude based on the record that annual retraining is reasonably necessary to ensure that employee knowledge about respirators does not fall into obsolescence. Given that conscientiousness among employees is such a critical element in the formula for success of a respirator program, OSHA could reasonably find that the Industry's suggested alternative of screening employees to determinewho needed retesting would not serve its goal of preventing misuse and ensur[ing] a reasonable amount of recall and performance on the part of the respirator user. 63 Fed. Reg. at 1261. We see no basis for disturbing OSHA's factual conclusions and policy decisions in this regard.