Opinion ID: 770933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rutledge's Letter as an Amendment to his sec. 2255 Motion

Text: 29 Rutledge claims that his September 20, 1998 letter, which described the testimony of witnesses, including Bolen, that neither his trial nor sec. 2255 counsel had interviewed, was sent before the district court's decision and should be treated as an amendment to his habeas petition. Rutledge claims that the mailbox rule applies, and so the letter should have been considered received by the court whenever he handed it to the prison authorities, rather than October 2, 1998, after the district court's ruling, which is the date the letter was docketed by the clerk. Rutledge asks that we remand the case so that the lower court can determine when the letter was given to prison authorities and address Rutledge's additional claims. 30 Until a final ruling has been issued, a district court must consider a petitioner's request to amend his sec. 2255 motion, though the court need not grant the requested amendments. See Johnson v. United States, 196 F.3d 802, 805- 06 (7th Cir. 1999). A district court can refuse to let the defendant amend the petition for reasons such as delay or because a defendant represented by counsel is not filing the proposed amendments through his or her attorney. Id. at 805. The district court in this case did not consider amending the sec. 2255 motion based on Rutledge's letter. However, we find that it was not required to do so. Rutledge's arguments suffer from two defects: the mailbox rule does not apply in his case, and his letter was not a motion to amend. 31 Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) establishes that certain notices or motions of pro se prisoners should be considered filed when these are given to prison authorities, rather than when received by the court; this is known as the mailbox rule. Houston applied the rule to a notice of appeal, id. at 276, and it has been extended to cover various other filings, see Jones v. Bertrand, 171 F.3d 499, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1999). We have not extended the rule to motions to amend, and we need not reach that issue because the mailbox rule does not apply for another reason: Rutledge was not pro se when he mailed the letter. In adopting the mailbox rule, the opinion in Houston emphasizes the special difficulties faced by pro se prisoners. See 487 U.S. at 270 (The situation of prisoners seeking to appeal without the aid of counsel is unique.), 271 (Pro se prisoners cannot take any of these precautions [to ensure timely filing]; nor, by definition, do they have lawyers who can take these precautions for them.). The opinion also repeatedly stresses the possible unfairness of forcing prisoners to rely on prison authorities to deliver their legal papers in a timely manner. Id. at 271, 273-76. However, a prisoner represented by counsel can have that attorney file whatever motions or notices the prisoner desires, and so does not need to rely on prison authorities. Therefore, we hold that the mailbox rule does not apply to prisoners who are represented by counsel. See Nichols v. Bowersox, 172 F.3d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 1999) (The prison mailbox rule traditionally and appropriately applies only to pro se inmates who may have no means to file legal documents except through the prison mail system.). 32 Because Rutledge's letter was docketed by the clerk on October 2, the court probably received the letter either that day or the day before. Even if Rutledge's mailing reached the courthouse on October 1, this was several days after the district court's ruling. Rutledge's habeas counsel was still representing him at this time, and so the mailbox rule does not apply. Therefore, Rutledge's letter was not timely filed, and the district court was under no duty to consider whether this correspondence amended his sec. 2255 motion. 33 Rutledge's claim also fails for an independent reason: the letter in question is only a letter, and not a motion to amend. According to its own language, this correspondence was sent as an attempt to shame Rutledge's appointed sec. 2255 counsel into complying with Rutledge's requests and apparently to create a record to claim that the sec. 2255 counsel was ineffective. The letter is not titled as a motion, and nowhere does it state that Rutledge was seeking to amend his sec. 2255 motion. Furthermore, the letter was copied not only to the district court judge but also to the chief judge of this circuit, which would be improper if this correspondence were intended as an amendment. The rule that pro se pleadings are to be interpreted liberally, see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993), cannot help Rutledge since he was represented by counsel at the time he sent the letter. Further, Rutledge is a veteran of pro se litigation, having filed (so far) roughly fourteen pleadings in this case without the aid of counsel. Rutledge knows how to file a proper motion, and he should have done so if he intended to amend his sec. 2255 petition. 34 For these two reasons, we find that Rutledge has not made a substantial showing that he was deprived of a constitutional right when the district court did not consider his untimely letter as a motion to amend, and thus do not issue a certificate of appealability for this question.