Opinion ID: 1628456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Viewing the evidence as a whole, we find that it supports the special verdict of the jury and the findings of the trial court with respect to both the business relationship between the Hills and Okay and Ranta's negligent representation of the Hills and Okay. The jury and the trial court found that the transaction was, in every respect, as the Hills contended. Specifically, Okay contends that because all of the essential terms to the transaction between it and the Hills were not agreed upon, the jury could not have found that there was a valid contract of sale. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination. The test of contractual formation is an objective one, to be judged by the words and actions of the parties and not by their subjective mental intent. See, 4 Dunnell, Dig. (3d ed.) § 1742. In order for a contract to be specifically enforced, it is not necessary that the parties agree on every possible point, but rather, the law requires merely that the parties' intent as to the fundamental terms of the contract can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. Furuseth v. Olson, 297 Minn. 491, 210 N.W.2d 47 (1973); Kennedy v. Hasse, 262 Minn. 155, 114 N.W.2d 82 (1962). We have already discussed the evidence in detail. Viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, these basic terms of the agreement are ascertainable: (1) The Hills would convey to Okay all of the assets of Romans, including the building and furniture and all accounts receivable; (2) In return, Okay would pay to the Hills the sum of $30,000 and assume all of the accounts payable of Romans; (3) Roger Hill would continue to supervise the day-to-day operation of Romans, subject to the general control of Okay; however, all expenditures required specific approval of Okay; and (4) Okay would grant to the Hills an option to repurchase the business at some time in the future, for whatever amount of capital Okay had invested in the business, plus 10 percent per annum as a premium to account for the increased value of the assets of the business due to inflation. Okay seeks to establish from portions of the Hills' testimony that there was no agreement, but merely an agreement to agree which was indefinite as to certain material terms such as time for performance. However, the Hills were adamant that the basic transaction outlined above had been consummated. Additionally, the jury had for its consideration the testimony of all the other witnesses and the evidence of the conduct of the parties. While no time limitations were ever discussed, where a contract is silent as to the time of performance, the general rule is that the contract must be performed within a reasonable time. This omission alone will not defeat the formation of a contract. The law does not favor destruction of a contract for indefiniteness. King v. Dalton Motors, Inc., 260 Minn. 124, 109 N.W.2d 51 (1961); Furuseth v. Olson, supra . That maxim is especially true where, as here, there has been such extensive performance on the part of both parties. Ranta contests the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to the second and third claims at bar, namely his allegedly negligent representation of the Hills and of Okay. Specifically, he contends that there was insufficient expert testimony presented to the jury to enable it to render a competent judgment of his conduct. The record reveals that Ranta graduated from the Law School of the University of Minnesota in 1942. He worked for a number of years as a tax examiner for the Minnesota Department of Taxation, and subsequently did tax and accounting work for a firm of certified public accountants in Minneapolis. In 1948 he entered private law practice and has been practicing in Minneapolis ever since. His practice consists mainly of tax and corporate matters. The facts of his early encounters with the Hills and his existing relationship with Okay have already been stated. Ranta testified that when he first suggested to the Hills that one of his other clients (Okay) was interested in entering into a business transaction with them, he specifically asked them if they wanted the same attorney to represent them as had represented them when they purchased the Cedar Avenue property and in their attempt at incorporating the business of Romans. According to Ranta, the Hills wanted to know whether separate representation was necessary. He told them it would not be absolutely necessary and advised them in very general terms that there might be some developments with reference to it that it might be well for them to have their own counsel. According to Ranta, the Hills nonetheless consented to his dual representation. The Hills' testimony on this point differs substantially from Ranta's. Roger Hill testified that at no time did Ranta ever advise him or his wife of any possible conflicts of interest that might arise as a result of his dual representation of the Hills and Okay. He further testified that Ranta advised them that it would be convenient if Ranta represented both the Hills and Okay, because he was more familiar with both situations. Judith Hill's testimony was similar to that of her husband. She testified that sometime in June she called their former attorney to find out whether it was proper for an attorney to represent both sides. He indicated to her that it was very unusual, but declined to render any further opinion. Mrs. Hill also testified that she then went to Ranta and indicated that she and her husband wanted to be represented by another attorney. According to her testimony, Ranta told her that it was not unusual for an attorney to represent both parties to a transaction such as was being contemplated and that it would in fact be to the benefit of all the parties involved if he represented both the Hills and Okay. It was at this point, she testified, that the Hills agreed to Ranta's representing them. There is no evidence in the record to show whether Okay approved of Ranta's dual representation. Both the Hills and Kvasnicka testified that on more than one occasion they requested some written agreement or documentation from Ranta. Kvasnicka testified that he was present when Roger Hill requested a written agreement from Ranta. The Hills both testified that Ranta's response was always that an agreement would be forthcoming. No agreement or any evidence of indebtedness, however, was ever prepared. Ranta himself admitted that the Hills and Kvasnicka requested that the agreement be reduced to writing and that he assured them it would be done. Ranta, while able to explain precisely the nature of the transaction, testified that he had two reasons for not reducing the agreement to writing. First, he believed there was the possibility that a written agreement would be more accessible to any judgment creditors the Hills might have than one that was merely oral. Second, he felt that the arrangements never stabilized to the point where it was practicable to reduce the terms to writing. He did admit that Okay received no benefit from the fact that the agreement was never reduced to writing, but asserted that Okay was fully protected by virtue of holding title to the building. Kvasnicka and Ranta testified that Kvasnicka specifically requested that Okay be protected from claims of Romans' creditors, and that Ranta was instructed to ensure such protection. Kvasnicka testified that when he requested some type of legal protection so no repercussions could be suffered by the Parent Company, he had no specific steps in mind, but rather was relying on Ranta's judgment. Ranta admitted understanding that he was to protect Okay from Romans' general creditors. Nonetheless, the jury found that Ranta approved and authorized the distribution of the two financial profiles. Both the Hills and Ranta offered expert testimony from local attorneys on the issue of Ranta's negligence. The Hills' expert testified that, in his opinion, dual representation in a circumstance such as this would be likely to adversely affect the rights of the parties. Ranta's expert testified that, assuming a full disclosure of possible conflicts of interest and consent of all the parties, such dual representation would be within the standards of practice of the local legal community. Both expert witnesses gave their opinions as to whether or not Ranta conformed with the standard of conduct of the community with respect to documenting the transaction between the parties. The Hills' expert testified that the standard of care, in his opinion, required that the transaction be documented. Ranta's expert testified that the decision as to whether and when to reduce an agreement to writing was a matter of judgment for an attorney. Ranta argues that since no expert testimony was offered as to what standard of care pertained to the approval of the financial profiles by Ranta and whether or not he deviated from that standard, the jury was not competent to find that this act amounted to negligence. It is clear that this argument of insufficient expert testimony extends only to Okay's claim of negligence against Ranta. The financial profiles were not germane to the claim of negligence made by the Hills, whose allegations encompassed specifically Ranta's dual representation and failure to document the transaction. On these aspects, sufficient expert testimony was elicited. With this testimony in mind, the jury could and did evaluate Ranta's conduct. The jury was free to weigh the evidence, and that evidence fully supports the jury's finding of negligence on Ranta's part in the manner in which he represented the Hills. Central to Okay's claim of negligence was Ranta's failure to adequately insulate Okay from Romans' creditors. It is difficult to imagine how this claim could not encompass the approval of the financial profiles. None of our prior decisions in actions regarding legal malpractice have directly addressed the issue of the need for expert testimony in cases based on negligence. The cases collected in Annotation, 17 A.L.R.3d 1442, indicate some states have adopted the same standard with respect to the need for expert testimony in legal malpractice cases that they have adopted in medical malpractice casesthat expert testimony is generally necessary except where the matters in issue fall within the area of common knowledge and lay comprehension. In cases of medical malpractice, this is also the standard applied in Minnesota. Generally, the plaintiff must introduce expert testimony as to the standard of care and the defendant doctor's departure from it. Failure to do so would leave only the jury's speculation as the basis for a verdict. Lhotka v. Larson, Minn., 238 N.W.2d 870 (1976); Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 297 Minn. 419, 212 N.W.2d 361 (1973). However, such expert testimony is not necessary when the matters to be proven are within the area of common knowledge and lay comprehension. Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, supra . Logic dictates that this same standard should be adopted in cases of legal malpractice. Expert testimony should be generally required to establish the standard of care applicable to an attorney whose conduct is alleged to have been negligent and further to establish that his conduct deviated from that standard. That general rule should be subject to the exception that such expert testimony is not necessary in cases where the conduct complained of can be evaluated adequately by a jury in the absence of expert testimony. Applying this rule to the instant case, because the jury unquestionably considered Ranta's approval of the financial profiles in determining his negligence (see discussion below), and because there was no expert testimony regarding the propriety of Ranta's conduct in approving the financial profiles, in order for the jury's finding to stand we must be able to state that the jury was competent to evaluate that conduct without the aid of expert testimony. See, Raymond v. Baehr, 282 Minn. 102, 163 N.W.2d 54 (1968). In view of the evidence as a whole, we hold that the jury could properly evaluate that conduct. The jury found as fact that Ranta approved the execution and dissemination of the financial profiles. The testimony was uncontradicted, and the court found that Okay had instructed Ranta to protect it from the claims of Romans' creditors. The impact of the financial profiles is obvious to any layman. The Hills recognized, as did the suppliers who received the profiles, that the profiles meant Okay would share responsibility for the debts incurred with Romans. If that were not obvious, the profiles would not have been necessary. Expert opinion would add nothing to that conclusion. Whether Ranta's conduct in approving the profiles was nullified by Kvasnicka's subsequent personal approval is a separate question relating to causation. The parties stipulated that on that issue the jury was competent to render a finding. We note, however, that in so acting, Kvasnicka was relying on advice given him by Ranta. Ranta's further argument that there was insufficient proof of causation under the but for rule of causation of Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970); and Meagher v. Kavli, 256 Minn. 54, 97 N.W.2d 370 (1959), is not well founded. That rule was enunciated with respect to the test of causation to be applied in the case of an attorney's negligence destroying his client's cause of action. The client-plaintiff is required to establish the value of what was lost through his attorney's negligence; i. e., that he had a meritorious cause of action originally. Such a rule is only common sense. The instant case, however, deals with more traditional concepts of proximate cause. There are no underlying causes which the plaintiff must establish. In conclusion, it appears that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict as it pertained to Ranta's negligence. An attorney who undertakes to represent at the same time adverse parties in any type of legal relationship, whether contractual or otherwise, does not obligate himself to adhere to any higher duty or standard of care than if he endeavored to represent only one of those parties. On the other hand, he clearly owes no lesser duty to each of his clients, and he must protect the interests of each as zealously as if their interests were his sole responsibility. In undertaking to represent both the Hills and Okay, Ranta placed himself in a position which, by its very nature, made it more difficult for him to conform to the required standard of practice in protecting his clients' interests. In the opinion of the jury, Ranta failed both clients. We must accept that judgment.