Opinion ID: 2792987
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011)

Text: Pillault’s final contention is that the district court violated Tapia v. United States, by giving significant weight to Pillault’s need for mental health and drug and alcohol treatment when choosing the given sentence. In Tapia, the Supreme Court held that “a court may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” 131 S. Ct. at 2393. Post-Tapia, this court has explained that “a sentencing court errs if a defendant’s rehabilitative needs are ‘a “dominant factor” . . . [that] inform[s] the district court’s [sentencing] decision.’” United States v. Walker, 742 F.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Garza, 706 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Wooley, 740 F.3d 359, 366 (5th. Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have held that Tapia error occurs when rehabilitation is a dominant factor in the court’s sentencing decision, and we have never required the appellant to establish that the court’s improper reliance on rehabilitation considerations was the sole factor in sentencing.”). On the other hand, the district court does not violate Tapia if 11 Case: 14-60222 Document: 00513000702 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 No. 14-60222 the need for rehabilitation is only a “secondary concern” or an “additional justification” for the sentence. Walker, 742 F.3d at 616; see also Garza, 706 F.3d at 660 (“Our limited precedent post-Tapia has described the distinction between legitimate commentary and inappropriate consideration as whether rehabilitation is a ‘secondary concern’ or an ‘additional justification’ (permissible) as opposed to a ‘dominant factor’ (impermissible) informing the district court’s decision.”). Notably, “[a] court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2392. In the present case, the district court discussed the defendant’s history, including his lack of meaningful work history, his extensive disciplinary record in school, and his self-proclaimed ability to “con [his] way back into [his] family members’ hearts.” The court then stated: . . . I have a great responsibility not to make one mistake. . . . And what I’ve seen of your history does not warrant this Court making a mistake for you. Now, the sentence to be imposed will be above the advisory guidelines range because of the nature and circumstances of this offense and the history and characteristics of this defendant pursuant to 18 USC Section 3553(a)(2) [sic]. . . . The sentence should reflect the seriousness of the offense, should promote respect for the law and provide just punishment. I also have a duty to protect the public. And in the letters that I read, which I want to make part of this proceeding, there was very little concerns about protecting the public. The public deserves to be protected. Now, I will agree it also needs to be protected from further crimes by you. You also do need any educational or vocational training or medical care that you can get. And to the extent I can get that for you while you’re incarcerated, I will. But I think a sentence above the advisory guideline range is appropriate in this case, first, to 12 Case: 14-60222 Document: 00513000702 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 No. 14-60222 protect the public from further crimes from this defendant; second, I have considered the nature and characteristics of this defendant. His mental health history is of concern to the Court. And what I read from the statement was to the effect “as long as he stays sober.” But otherwise, he is a possible high threat to someone, not necessarily school children, but to anyone who might cross his path. He has undergone multiple mental evaluations outlining his need for mental health treatment. The offense conduct in this case could have been extremely severe had he acted upon the threats. I need to address his abuse of alcohol and narcotics. So I find that a sentence above the advisory guidelines range is appropriate. The court sentenced Pillault to seventy-two months in prison and recommended that “he participate in a residential drug-abuse-treatment program while confined, if deemed appropriate by the Bureau of Prisons.” After the court announced the sentence, Pillault’s counsel objected, stating that “to the extent that Your Honor has imposed this particular sentence as a means, even in part, of affording the defendant drug treatment rehabilitation, we believe that is an improper reason to impose or determine the length of the sentence.” The court replied, explicitly stating: “I didn’t impose the length for that reason. I’m trying to protect the public. . . . I think I made that clear. But you had requested that he get treatment, so I am going along with that.” After the sentencing hearing, the court issued its written statement of reasons. The court stated: Pursuant to the factors enumerated under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a sentence above the advisory guideline range is appropriate in this case for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the need to protect the public from further crimes from the defendant. Second, the court considers the nature and 13 Case: 14-60222 Document: 00513000702 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 No. 14-60222 characteristics of the defendant. The defendant’s mental health history is of a concern to the court and the defendant [sic] need for ongoing mental health treatment. The defendant has undergone multiple mental evaluations which outline the defendant’s needs for continued mental health treatment. The offense conduct in this case could have been extremely severe had the defendant acted upon the threats he admitted making. The defendant’s abuse of alcohol and narcotics also need to be addressed and a sentence of additional custody will provide the defendant with the needed mental health, drug, and alcohol treatment. Therefore, the court finds a sentence above the advisory guideline range is appropriate in this case. The district court’s statements, both oral and written, make clear that the dominant factor motivating the court’s sentencing decision was the goal to protect the public. The court referred to this motivation, as well as, relatedly, Pillault’s potential future dangerousness, throughout its explanation for the sentence. The court began by highlighting that it had “a great responsibility not to make one mistake” and that “[t]he public deserves to be protected.” The court concluded that an above-Guidelines sentence was appropriate “to protect the public from further crimes from this defendant” and emphasized that the “offense conduct could have been extremely severe had [Pillault] acted upon the threats.” While the court acknowledged Pillault’s mental health history and the “need to address his abuse of alcohol and narcotics,” it did so immediately after referring to the testimony that it had just heard from Dr. Ross—that Pillault’s risk of future dangerous was much higher if he continued to abuse substances. Most significant, in response to Pillault’s objection, the court denied having imposed the given sentence in order to promote rehabilitation and clarified, instead, that it was “trying to protect the public.” 14 Case: 14-60222 Document: 00513000702 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 No. 14-60222 Pillault highlights that in the subsequent written statement of reasons, the court noted that “a sentence of additional custody will provide the defendant with the needed mental health, drug, and alcohol treatment.” We decline to consider this statement in isolation. 2 In light of the rest of the court’s explanation, including the court’s explicit rejection of the notion that it was motivated by a desire to give Pillault access to treatment, this written statement indicates, at most, that rehabilitation was a secondary factor or merely an additional justification that the court gave for its sentence. See 2 At oral argument, the government urged this court to disregard the written statement of reasons in light of the “unambiguous” oral pronouncement. The government cited this circuit’s “well settled law that where there is any variation between the oral and written pronouncements of sentence, the oral sentence prevails.” United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225, 1231 (5th Cir. 1991). In one of the earliest cases in which we applied that rule, this court explained that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 “requires that the defendant be present when sentence is announced by the court, and Rule 32(b) requires that the judgment of conviction shall set forth the sentence. It follows that where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment and commitment, the former must control.” Henley v. Heritage, 337 F.2d 847, 848 (5th Cir. 1964). The present case does not involve an oral pronouncement of sentence that conflicts with a written judgment and commitment, however. Instead, we are reviewing the court’s oral explanation of the chosen sentence along with its subsequent written statement of reasons. The government cites no cases that apply the oral-trumps-written rule to a statement of reasons. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), entitled “[s]tatement of reasons for imposing a sentence,” states: “The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence . . . is not of the kind, or is outside the range, described in subsection (a)(4), the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described, which reasons must also be stated with specificity in a statement of reasons form issued under section 994(w)(1)(B) of title 28 . . . .” (emphasis added). Title 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1) provides that “[t]he Chief Judge of each district court shall ensure that, within 30 days following entry of judgment in every criminal case, the sentencing court submits to the Commission . . . the judgment and commitment order [and] the written statement of reasons for the sentence imposed (which shall include the reason for any departure from the otherwise applicable guidelines range . . .)[.]” The Sixth Circuit, elaborating on this requirement, has concluded that the written statement of reasons “was not intended as a procedural safeguard for any particular defendant; rather, ‘[t]he ostensible purpose of § 994(w) is to make the courts report information and sentences and departures to ensure a measure of consistency in sentencing throughout the country.’” United States v. Denny, 653 F.3d 415, 422 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Ray, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164 (D. Mont. 2003)). The Sixth Circuit reasoned that “[b]ecause it was merely intended to serve a record-keeping function, courts’ written statement of reasons have not always been crafted with the same precision that judges heed during the oral sentence.” Id. 15 Case: 14-60222 Document: 00513000702 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 No. 14-60222 Walker, 742 F.3d at 617 (finding no Tapia error where the district court referred to rehabilitation only after addressing § 3553(a) factors that supported the sentence). Accordingly, we find that the district court did not violate Tapia.