Opinion ID: 1983165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Agreement Exception

Text: Although Copeland characterizes his second alternative theory as one in implied contract, he argues in fact that an express agreement existed that revelations by him of wrongdoing by others would not result in retaliation. In so arguing he relies upon our opinion in Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, supra , discussed earlier. The opinion does indicate that compliance with the written grievance procedure was promised prior to the oral agreement of employment and that the procedure therefore imposed substantive limits to the termination-at-will rule. Morris failed because she did not allege a material fact relating to the procedure as applied to her discharge. Thus, Copeland correctly argues that under some circumstances the termination-at-will rule is subject to modification by promises outside the employment agreement itself. Neither assurances given to others nor assurances given to Copeland after he made revelations can form the basis of his express agreement theory. However, the allegation that Copeland was assured by those investigating the allegations of wrongdoing that he need not fear retaliation, in reliance upon which he acted, brings into play an enforceable promise to vary the termination-at-will rule to the extent that liability for damages may be imposed for the breach of that promise. Unlike the question of Brittenham's authority to solicit funds for political candidates, the fact that employees of the railroad were investigating wrongdoing implies their authority to promise that revelations of wrongdoing by others would not result in retaliatory action. Apparent authority is such authority as the agent seems to have by reason of the authority he actually has. See Stewart v. Spade Township, 157 Neb. 93, 58 N.W.2d 841 (1953). A principal is bound by, and liable for, the acts which an agent does within his or her actual or apparent authority. See Bury v. Action Enterprises, Inc., 197 Neb. 38, 246 N.W.2d 724 (1976). Thus, it must be concluded that Copeland has stated a cause of action against the railroad on his express agreement theory, and the trial court's dismissal of that theory as to the plaintiff Copeland against the railroad was erroneous.