Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel

Text: Defendant contends that his counsel labored under a conflict of interest during the penalty phase and the trial court erred in failing to conduct an appropriate inquiry. The conflict arose, he asserts, because the penalty defense centered on defendant's current mental state, and counsel had testified during the second competency trial concerning the same subject matter. Counsel presented only one witness in the penalty phase, Psychiatrist George Wilkinson, but did not himself testify despite his personal knowledge of facts supporting the penalty defense. Moreover, counsel presented what defendant characterizes as an unfavorable stipulation, in lieu of his own testimony, as surrebuttal to the prosecution's rebuttal testimony. The trial court, having presided over the second competency trial, knew or should have known of the conflict, but improperly took no action. This inaction, defendant asserts, violated his constitutional right to representation by conflict-free counsel. The right to effective assistance of counsel, secured by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, includes the right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. ( People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 948, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277 ( Cox ).) `Conflicts of interest may arise in various factual settings. Broadly, they `embrace all situations in which an attorney's loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client or a third person or by his own interests. '' [Citation.] ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 673, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289.) Under the federal Constitution, when counsel suffers from an actual conflict of interest, prejudice is presumed. ( Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 349, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333.) This presumption arises, however, `only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at p. 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708.) An actual conflict of interest means `a conflict that affected counsel's performanceas opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.' ( Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, italics omitted.) ( People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 673, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289.) The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution dictates reversal if a defendant, over a timely objection, is forced to continue with conflicted counsel. ( Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426.) To obtain a reversal for this type of error, `the defendant need not demonstrate specific, outcome-determinative prejudice. [Citation.] But he must show that an actual conflict of interest existed and that that conflict adversely affected counsel's performance.' ( People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 837-838, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460; see generally Mickens v. Taylor, supra, 535 U.S. 162 [167-172], 122 S.Ct. 1237.) ( Id. at p. 674, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289.) `To show a violation of the corresponding right under our state Constitution, a defendant need only demonstrate a potential conflict, so long as the record supports an `informed speculation' that the asserted conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. [Citations.] ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 998 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183].) But `[p]ermissible speculation giving rise to a conflict of interest may be deemed an informed speculation ... only when such is grounded on a factual basis that can be found in the record.' [Citations.] `To determine whether counsel's performance was adversely affected, we have suggested that [ Cuyler v. ] Sullivan [, supra, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708,] requires an inquiry into whether counsel pulled his punches, i.e., whether counsel failed to represent defendant as vigorously as he might have, had there been no conflict. [Citation.] In undertaking such an inquiry, we are ... bound by the record. But where a conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do something, the record may not reflect such an omission. We must therefore examine the record to determine (i) whether arguments or actions omitted would likely have been made by counsel who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii) whether there may have been a tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of interest) that might have caused any such omission.' ( People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 674, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289, quoting Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 948-949, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277.) Defendant argues that counsel was ethically obligated to withdraw from representing him and to testify as a witness in the penalty phase, thus generating a conflict between the obligation and his self-interest in maintaining employment on the case. An attorney must withdraw from representation, absent the client's informed written consent, whenever he or she knows or should know he or she ought to be a material witness in the client's cause. (Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 5-210; see Comden v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 906, 911, fn. 1, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, 576 P.2d 971 [motion to disqualify opposing counsel].) The determination whether an attorney ought to testify ordinarily is based on an evaluation of all pertinent factors, including the significance of the matters to which the attorney might testify, the weight the testimony might have in resolving such matters, and the availability of other witnesses or documentary evidence by which these matters may be independently established. ( Comden, supra, at p. 913, 145 Cal.Rptr. 9, 576 P.2d 971.) An attorney should resolve any doubt in favor of preserving the integrity of his testimony and against his continued participation as trial counsel. ( Id. at p. 915, 145 Cal.Rptr. 9, 576 P.2d 971.) Applying the Comden factors in the context of this case, we conclude counsel had no duty to withdraw and testify. The essence of the case in mitigation was a description of defendant's mental state and a chronicle of its deterioration in the preceding several years. To that end, counsel presented the expert testimony of Dr. Wilkinson, who reviewed voluminous reports and records and recounted at length his own observations of defendant during the course of multiple interviews. Counsel had, as defendant states, some unique personal knowledge, to which he testified during the competency trial, of the same general subject matter. He therefore could have given relevant testimony during the penalty phase. But section 190.3, factor (k), permits the jury to consider a virtually unlimited range of mitigating evidence (e.g., People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1007, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171), and trial counsel in every case has unique personal knowledge of the defendant that conceivably might be relevant or useful in the penalty phase. We have never suggested that counsel therefore must withdraw from penalty phase representation and testify on the defendant's behalf, and we reject any such implication now. Moreover, in this context, a contrary rule would be undesirable (in that a defendant may benefit from having the same attorney both testify in competency proceedings and continue representing the defendant during a later penalty phase) and inefficient (in that it would almost certainly necessitate delays while replacement trial counsel familiarized himself or herself with the case). While other factual scenarios may give rise to an actual conflict that requires counsel to withdraw from further representation after testifying in a competency trial in order to give unique and compelling testimony again in the penalty phase, this case is not one of them. Because the fact that counsel testified during the competency phase did not create an obligation to withdraw from representation and testify about the same matters during the penalty phase, counsel did not labor under an actual conflict of interest in failing to do so. Could there, nevertheless, have existed a potential conflict requiring the trial court to conduct an inquiry, or take remedial action? We look to whether facts known to the trial court raised the possibility of a conflict of interest obliging it to inquire further. ( Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220.) Defendant contends certain actions and omissions by counsel during the penalty trial, all of which were known to the trial court, showed that his performance was adversely affected by the purported conflict, obligating the court to inquire. These included counsel's (1) failure to introduce gibberish written by defendant and medical records from defendant's hospitalizations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, (2) failure to have other competency phase witnesses testify, (3) failure to seek the appointment of associate counsel under Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108, (4) disparagement of defendant during guilt phase arguments, and (5) entering into a stipulation assertedly adverse to defendant's interests. Because the competency hearing and the penalty trial served different purposes, the circumstance that Defense Attorney Gray did not present, during the penalty phase, all of the evidence introduced in the competency hearing is unsurprising and cannot necessarily be attributed to a conflict. Among the competency phase witnesses, for example, Attorney Tom Nolan testified about the requirement that a criminal defendant be able rationally to assist his counsel in his own defense, an issue relevant only to the competency phase. We see no basis to conclude an unconflicted attorney would have called Nolan to testify in the penalty phase. Dr. Levy's competency phase testimony that defendant was incompetent was substantially similar to Dr. Wilkinson's, and an unconflicted attorney quite properly could have chosen to present only the latter in the penalty phase. Defense Attorney Gray's decision not to introduce into evidence defendant's hospital records during the penalty phase is one that unconflicted counsel quite conceivably would make for tactical reasons, given the multiple references in those records to a possible motive for malingering (defendant's expressed fear of receiving the death penalty); a reference to defendant's talking to other psychiatric patients about the `rationale' for insanity pleas; and a clinician's note theorizing that defendant's behavior was probably related to current court action regarding his mental status. We do not share defendant's view that Gray's failure to introduce defendant's word salad writings indicated he was pulling his punches, given that Gray presented other evidence, in the form of Dr. Wilkinson's testimony, regarding the occurrence and significance of loose associations in defendant's communications. What defendant characterizes as disparagement during Defense Attorney Gray's guilt phase arguments was, in context, an effort to get the jury to look skeptically at aspects of defendant's confessions that the prosecution argued pointed strongly toward a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Counsel with no conceivable conflict also might well have characterized his client as a liar and as seriously disturbed in an effort to obtain a second degree murder verdict in a case involving strong evidence of premeditation. We see nothing in Defense Attorney Gray's failure to request the appointment of a second attorney to assist him (see Keenan v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 430, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108) that suggests a conflict of interest. For all that appears on the record, this case was relatively uncomplicated, and the need for second counsel is not apparent. And although defendant insists the stipulation formulated by Defense Attorney Gray adversely affected his interests, in that it essentially told the jury he had willfully refused to cooperate with Gray, the jury could instead have interpreted it as describing defendant's increasing inability, as the case progressed, to assist his counsel in a rational manner. In sum, defendant fails to demonstrate that Defense Attorney Gray had a potential conflict of interest into which the trial court had a duty to inquire.