Opinion ID: 2301227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does plaintiff have standing under this Court's existing precedent?

Text: In this particular case, our analysis requires us to resolve a fundamental preliminary question: Is this Court presented with a justiciable controversy? [12] In short, [t]he plaintiffs must have standing to bring this action, and the Superior Court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised in the complaint. McKenna, 874 A.2d at 225. Standing is an aspect of justiciability and, as such, the problem of standing is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere in justiciability. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). As Chief Justice Warren aptly noted in Flast, standing is one of the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law. Id. at 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942. In a frequently cited passage, the United States Supreme Court explained that to satisfy the standing requirement a complaining party must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions[.] Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942. In other words, as this Court said in McKenna, when standing is at issue, the focal point shifts to the claimant, not the claim, and a court must determine if the plaintiff `whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable' or, indeed, whether or not it should be litigated. McKenna, 874 A.2d at 226 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 99-100, 88 S.Ct. 1942). In Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 22, 317 A.2d 124, 128 (1974), this Court articulated the applicable test. To satisfy the standing requirement, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. Id. (quoting Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)). Our prior cases have provided some depth to this seemingly sparse prescription, recognizing that plaintiff's alleged injury must be a legally cognizable and protected interest that is `concrete and particularized    and    actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.' McKenna, 874 A.2d at 226 (quoting Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (R.I.1997)). In conducting our analysis in this case, we do not write on a blank slate; the necessity of a concrete injury has been the subject of particular emphasis in this jurisdiction. [M]ere `interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization `adversely affected' or `aggrieved'   . Blackstone Valley Chamber of Commerce v. Public Utilities Commission, 452 A.2d 931, 933 (R.I.1982) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)). This Court has held fast to the notion that a plaintiff's injury must be particularized and that he must demonstrate that he has a stake in the outcome that distinguishes his claims from the claims of the public at large. Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I.2008); see also Blackstone Valley Chamber of Commerce, 452 A.2d at 933; accord Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). In this jurisdiction, generalized claims alleging purely public harm are an insufficient basis for sustaining a private lawsuit. See In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 19 A.3d 1226, 1227-29 (R.I. 2011) (mem.); Berberian v. Solomon, 122 R.I. 259, 261, 405 A.2d 1178, 1180 (1979); McCarthy v. McAloon, 79 R.I. 55, 62, 83 A.2d 75, 78 (1951). Although this Court, unlike its federal counterparts, may entertain a request for an advisory opinion, the constitutional requirements for requesting such an opinion are strictly channeled. This [C]ourt will not render an advisory opinion except upon the written request of the Governor or (not and) of either House of the General Assembly. In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1318 (R.I.1986) (citing Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island v. Isele, 101 R.I. 734, 737, 227 A.2d 203, 206 (1967)). We are constitutionally obligated to give advisory opinions to either House of the General Assembly only when the questions propounded concern the constitutionality of pending legislation, and to the Governor only when the questions propounded concern the constitutionality of existing statutes which require implementation by the Chief Executive. Id. at 1318-19. Thus, this Court has held that the Declaratory Judgments Act was `not intended to serve as a forum for the determination of abstract questions or the rendering of advisory opinions.' McKenna, 874 A.2d at 227 (quoting Lamb v. Perry, 101 R.I. 538, 542, 225 A.2d 521, 523 (1967)). [13] We have little trouble concluding, and plaintiff nearly concedes, that if this Court's longstanding principles of standing are applied to the circumstances of this case, then his suit must fail. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment as a private taxpayer, eschewing his official position as House minority leader, and he asked the Superior Court to rule whether the General Assembly had expended public money in a manner that conflicts with the requirements of the Rhode Island Constitution. In our opinion, plaintiff has complained of no concrete, particularized harm; to the degree he can point to any injury, it is the same, indistinguishable, generalized wrong allegedly suffered by the public at large. See Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487, 43 S.Ct. 597 (describing the plaintiff's claim to Treasury funds as an interest shared with millions of others that is minute and indeterminable). Moreover, plaintiff has taken pains to assure this Court that he seeks only prospective, declaratory reliefor as the motion justice cogently described it, a shot across the bowto discourage the General Assembly from appropriating grants according to its past practices during future budget battles. Plainly, plaintiff is attempting to use the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (G.L. 1956 chapter 30 of title 9) to secure an advisory opinion that relates to hypothetical future conduct of the General Assembly. See McKenna, 874 A.2d at 226. We are resolute that this Court lacks the constitutional authority to provide such a ruling. See In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d at 1318-19. Indeed, plaintiff has been unable to evince any particularized injury that would remove this case from the realm of pure abstraction, and thus the relief that he seeks is really an advisory opinion cloaked in the garb of a request for declaratory relief. The plaintiff urges that we view this case in light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Flast. However, we agree with the majority of courts that the exception carved out in that case is exceedingly narrow in scope. [14] In Flast the Court held that certain plaintiff taxpayers had a sufficiently strong interest in ensuring that Congress did not expend public funds in a manner that contravened the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution that the case or controversy requirement was satisfied. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 105-06, 88 S.Ct. 1942. The Court held that to have standing, the taxpayer must challenge a specific congressional act made pursuant to the taxing and spending clause of Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution and demonstrate a nexus between that expenditure and a specific, constitutional limitation applicable to Congress. See Flast at 102-03, 88 S.Ct. 1942. The United States Supreme Court has cabined this exception to Establishment Clause challenges, and it does not appear poised to expand its scope. See Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 1447, 179 L.Ed.2d 523 (2011) (holding taxpayer had no standing to challenge a tax credit, as opposed to a government expenditure, provided to a religious institution); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 168 L.Ed.2d 424 (2007) (holding taxpayer had no standing to attack discretionary spending of the Executive Branch that he alleged violated the Establishment Clause). Perhaps having read the proverbial tea leaves, plaintiff zealously urges us at length to abandon our long-standing jurisprudence and join a number of other states that do recognize so-called taxpayer standing. See, e.g., Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915); Myers v. Nebraska Investment Council, 272 Neb. 669, 724 N.W.2d 776 (2006); Vette v. Childers, 102 Okla. 140, 228 P. 145 (1924). After reviewing this Court's precedent and considering the decisions of other jurisdictions, we are not persuaded that such a radical departure is appropriate. First, all the cases cited by plaintiff to support this argument are factually inapt. In all those matters, the complaining party sought either injunctive relief to prevent public money from being expended or the disgorgement of money that had been dispersed in an unconstitutional manner. See, e.g., Fergus, 110 N.E. at 133 (action seeking injunctive relief); Myers, 724 N.W.2d at 786 (action seeking disgorgement and repayment of funds); Vette, 228 P. at 145 (action seeking injunctive relief). Here, plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief and he specifically has disavowed any intention of pursuing repayment of any of the money he contends the General Assembly granted in an unconstitutional way. Moreover, in our opinion, this Court's long-standing jurisprudenceperhaps to a greater degree than that of some other jurisdictionshas had a discernable focus on the requirement of concrete and particularized harm. See Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317; McKenna, 874 A.2d at 226-27; Pontbriand, 699 A.2d at 862; Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I.1992). We will not depart from that precedent based on the facts before us here.