Opinion ID: 2570523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of other acts by appellant

Text: Collman claims that evidence that he had been transferred at work was improperly admitted as character evidence. To reiterate, in order to admit evidence of a person's other crimes, wrongs, or acts, the district court must determine that the other act is relevant for an admissible purpose, that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that the probative value of the act is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. NRS 48.045(2); Tinch, 113 Nev. at 1176, 946 P.2d at 1064-65. This court will not overturn a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Daly, 99 Nev. at 567, 665 P.2d at 801. The State presented testimony that in December 1995, Collman felt stress from working in the lockdown unit of the prison, Unit 2, a difficult and dangerous section also known as the prison within the prison. Collman mentioned to a coworker that he also felt stress at home because Damian was getting into things, was out of control, and did not listen to Collman. For his benefit, Collman transferred to a less stressful unit for two weeks before returning to his original post in Unit 2. Prior to admitting this testimony, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined that the temporary transfer was relevant to show that Collman was under stress shortly before Damian's death. The court also determined that the probative value of the evidence of the nondisciplinary transfer was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We conclude that based on the district court's reasoning and the record as a whole, the court did not abuse its discretion.