Opinion ID: 4556341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence Relating to Other Murders

Text: {¶ 88} In his fourth proposition of law, Kirkland contends that the state violated Evid.R. 404(B) by introducing evidence relating to the murders of Mary Jo Newton and Kimya Rolison, because the resentencing hearing was not for those two murders—it was for only the aggravated murders of Esme and Casonya. {¶ 89} This proposition is meritless. Evid.R 404(B) provides: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” (Emphasis added.) At the guilt phase of Kirkland’s original trial, the jury found Kirkland guilty of murdering Esme and Casonya as part of a course of conduct including two or more intentional killings. The Newton and Rolison murders were part of that course of conduct, and the jury was required to weigh the course-of-conduct specification in recommending a sentence. Thus, for purposes of the resentencing hearing that is the subject of this appeal, the Newton and Rolison murders were not “other crimes, wrongs, or acts.” {¶ 90} Nor were the Newton and Rolison murders introduced to prove Kirkland’s character in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. That is, they were not introduced to show that he was guilty of murdering Esme and Casonya. He had already been found guilty of those murders; guilt was not at issue in this resentencing hearing. {¶ 91} Kirkland also contends that evidence relating to the Newton and Rolison murders should have been excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, Evid.R. 403(A). This assertion has even less merit. Again, the Newton and Rolison murders were part 23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO of Kirkland’s course of conduct, which was one of the aggravating circumstances the jury was required to weigh against the mitigating factors. As such, they were central to the sentencing determination the jury had to make and could not be unfairly prejudicial.
{¶ 92} Kirkland also contends that during the cross-examination of a defense mitigation witness, the prosecutor introduced evidence that Kirkland had been convicted of a 1987 homicide, a homicide that was not part of the course of conduct. {¶ 93} The 1987 homicide first came up on cross-examination during the video deposition of defense medical expert Joseph Wu. On direct examination, Dr. Wu had testified that damage to the brain’s frontal lobe can impair the brain’s ability to regulate aggression and cause significant changes in personality. Dr. Wu further testified that Kirkland had a history of multiple traumatic brain injuries, including one in 2004, after which, according to Dr. Wu, a friend of Kirkland’s “reported that he became a completely different person,” and another in 2006. {¶ 94} On cross-examination, the prosecution asked Dr. Wu whether Kirkland “was exhibiting extremely violent behavior    well before 2004.” And Dr. Wu admitted that he was. The prosecution then called his attention to a presentence investigation report “for a homicide [Kirkland] committed in    May 1987 when he killed his uncle’s girlfriend and set the house on fire to cover that up.” {¶ 95} The defense objected, arguing that the 1987 homicide was irrelevant and that its probative value was significantly outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect. During the resentencing hearing, the trial judge overruled this objection; Dr. Wu’s video deposition was then played for the jury. Kirkland makes no claim that the trial court erred by overruling that objection. 24 January Term, 2020 {¶ 96} After the jury heard Dr. Wu’s deposition, the defense presented another expert, psychologist Patti van Eys. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. van Eys whether she had received a presentence report indicating that “the defendant basically did the same thing to another woman when he was 18 years old.” Dr. van Eys acknowledged that she had received the report. The prosecutor then asked: And    the defendant and the victim    engaged in a verbal altercation. According to the defendant, she    threatened to tell his uncle, who was her boyfriend, that they had been having sexual intercourse. And at that point the defendant became angry, choked her to death and then poured lighter fluid on her and set her on fire; is that correct? {¶ 97} Later, the prosecutor asked Dr. van Eys two other questions about the 1987 murder. Explaining her belief that Kirkland did not display antisocial personality disorder, Dr. van Eys testified that Kirkland did not “externalize all the blame” for his actions. The prosecutor asked: “Leola Douglas, the first victim, back in 1987, he killed her because she threatened to rat him out.    Isn’t that externalizing the blame?” Finally, the prosecutor asked Dr. van Eys whether she knew that Kirkland had been suspected of the murders of Newton and Casonya in 2006 “because the police saw he had done something very similar years ago.” {¶ 98} The defense did not object to any of these references to the 1987 murder. Kirkland’s failure to object forfeits this issue, absent plain error. We find no plain error here because the jury already knew about the 1987 murder. That murder was properly introduced during Dr. Wu’s cross-examination, as the trial court ruled and as Kirkland does not dispute. Thus, Kirkland cannot show a reasonable probability that mentioning it during the cross-examination of Dr. van 25 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Eys resulted in prejudice. See Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, at ¶ 22. {¶ 99} We overrule Kirkland’s fourth proposition of law.