Opinion ID: 1807624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: introduction of testimony given at his father's trial

Text: Stringer next assigns as error the trial court's overruling of his objection to the state's introduction of his entire testimony given at a prior trial where he was a mere witness. That prior trial was the capital murder trial of his father, James R. Stringer. In fact, Jimbo's entire prior testimony was not introduced, but ninety percent of it was. Stringer concedes, as he must, that any prior testimony is admissible if it is inculpatory or if any statements are relevant to the issues in the case or if there are statements which are declarations against penal interest. Here, however, practically the entire testimony from the prior trial was introduced, and in a rather curious form. The trial judge went through the entire transcript with counsel. Portions of Stringer's testimony at the prior trial were deleted, e.g., references to Stringer having smoked the marijuana the night in question. In addition, various points where objections had been made and sustained in the prior testimony were deleted. Then the court reporter who took the testimony was called and read to the jury the edited transcript of Stringer's testimony. This edited narrative of the court reporter extends for almost 40 pages in the transcript (R. 843-871), and includes a rather extensive cross-examination by the district attorney which at times amounts to little more than a harangue. This evidence was offered below as a part of the state's case-in-chief. Had Jimbo Stringer taken the stand, and if his prior testimony had been used to impeach him, we would have a different situation. Or, if he had taken the stand and the state had offered his prior testimony as part of its rebuttal, again matters would be different. Prior to his testimony at his father's trial, Jimbo Stringer was advised of his right to remain silent by the trial judge in open court. He was expressly told that anything he said at his father's trial might be used against him in his own subsequent trial. In addition, Jimbo Stringer was represented by counsel at the time of that testimony and, indeed, it was his own counsel who questioned him on direct examination. Over objection the trial court permitted the court reporter to take the stand and state, from her transcribed notes, the questions the lawyers had asked and the answers Jimbo Stringer had given. The court reporter's testimony technically was hearsay, but the context suggests the familiar former testimony exception to the hearsay rule. See Smith v. State, 247 So.2d 705, 706 (Miss. 1971); Lee v. State, 124 Miss. 398, 416, 86 So. 856, 858 (1921). The foremost requirement of the former testimony exception, however, is that the witness or declarant be unavailable. Williams Yellow Pine Co. v. Williams, 187 Miss. 425, 432, 193 So. 1, 2 (1940); Owens v. State, 63 Miss. 450, 452-53 (1896). Dicta in some cases have suggested that in a criminal trial the out-of-court declarant must have actually died in order to be declared unavailable. Smith v. State, 247 So.2d 705, 706 (Miss. 1971). See McCormick, Evidence § 253(6), at 612 (2d Ed. Supp. 1978). Our attention has been called to Arrington v. State, 411 So.2d 779 (Miss. 1982) and Mackmasters v. State, 83 Miss. 1, 35 So. 302 (1903). In each of these cases the prior testimony offered was that given by the defendant at his own prior trial  not at the prior trial of someone else (although arising out of the same general incident). More important, Arrington and Mackmasters correctly hold that so much of a defendant's testimony at a former trial which constitutes an admission, as that concept is understood in our law of evidence, may be presented as evidence at a subsequent trial of that same defendant. Nothing in Arrington and Mackmasters holds or suggests that prior testimony that does not fit within the definition of an admission may be so used. The prior testimony of Jimbo Stringer as introduced to the jury at the trial in question is unremarkable. His description of the events of June 21, 1982, is simply that he came home from work early that day and never left the apartment that night, i.e., he did not go to the McWilliams' home. He states that he talked to his father on the telephone several times that evening. Stringer admitted that he did own a 12 gauge shortgun but stated that he sold it a few months before the McWilliams murders to someone named John who lives in Oregon. Other than the admission that he once owned a gun similar to one of the guns used in the McWilliams killing, there are no statements in the testimony which are in any way incriminating and therefore admissible as admissions. On the other hand, there is the extensive cross-examination which is pure impeachment testimony. If Jimbo Stringer had taken the stand in his own defense at the trial in question, arguably this testimony would have been admissible in rebuttal. But he did not and this previous testimony should not have been admitted. See 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 738 (Supp. 1984) (former testimony is hearsay and must fit into an exception such as admission); McCormick, Evidence, § 254, at 615-616 (2d Ed.Supp. 1978) (same). We hold that the trial court committed reversible error when it received into evidence portions of the prior testimony of Jimbo Stringer which could not fairly be characterized as admissions and when it overruled Stringer's objections thereto. The judgment of conviction of Jimmy Michael (Jimbo) Stringer of the crime of capital murder and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed pursuant thereto are vacated and reversed, and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Hinds County for a new trial on all issues, consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. ROBERTSON, PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ., specially concur. GRIFFIN, J., not participating.