Opinion ID: 66068
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District Court Acted Within Its Discretion

Text: Dr. Prellop, a radiation oncologist who completed her residency in radiation oncology in 2006, has never before provided expert testimony. She does not have a particular expertise in bladder cancer and its causes, and, in her career, has only treated three patients diagnosed with bladder cancer.19 She is also the sister-in-law of Seaman’s trial counsel (who continues to represent Seaman in the instant appeal). Dr. Prellop submitted a two-page report that concluded: 16 Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2009); see Knight, 482 F.3d at 355 (stating that if the data relied on by a party’s expert “fail[s] to provide a ‘relevant’ link with the facts at issue, his expert opinion was not based on ‘good grounds’”). 17 Knight, 482 F.3d at 354 (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Id. at 351 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593); see id. at 355 (“District courts must carefully analyze the studies on which experts rely for their opinions before admitting their testimony.”). 19 Although Seacor challenged Dr. Prellop’s qualifications to render an opinion on causation, the district court instead excluded the evidence under the Daubert standard. The district court also noted, however, that “[i]t is clear from Dr. Prellop’s deposition that she has no specific expertise in the causes or diagnosis of bladder cancer.” Seaman v. Seacor Marine LLC, 564 F. Supp. 2d 598, 601 n.2 (E.D. La. 2008). 6 No. 08-30911 Mr. Seaman’s history of occupational exposure to diesel exhaust and chemicals including aromatic hydrocarbons[, particularly a chemical called Ferox,] put him at increased risk for bladder cancer. Of course, we could never be certain that these occupational exposures were the definite cause of Mr. Seaman’s bladder cancer but I have no information suggesting that Mr. Seaman’s cancer was caused by other external agents. Dr. Prellop based her opinion on (1) her “understand[ing] that Mr. Seaman’s occupational history includes regular exposure to diesel exhaust and exposure to Ferox at least once a week, twenty-six weeks per year, over more than a decade” and (2) her determination that Mr. Seaman has no risk factor for bladder cancer, e.g., smoking, family history, or age, other than his male gender. To arrive at her conclusion, Dr. Prellop reviewed Seaman’s deposition and medical records, the material safety data sheet (“MSDS”) for Ferox,20 and two scholarly articles about the risk factors for bladder cancer. She never saw or spoke with Seaman, whose complaint and deposition testimony mentioned nothing about either Ferox or diesel exhaust. Dr. Prellop based her “understanding” of Seaman’s regular exposure to Ferox and diesel exhaust on nothing more than the suggestion to her by Seaman’s counsel that another Seacor employee said that Seaman had been exposed to the substances. The district court determined that Dr. Prellop’s assumption of regular exposure without any “facts upon which Dr. Prellop could have possibly surmised exposure levels, rendered her causation opinion mere guesswork.”21 The court also noted that Dr. Prellop never discussed, in either her report or her deposition testimony, the studies on which her two cited journal articles were 20 According to Dr. Prellop, Ferox contains the aromatic hydrocarbons benzene, xylene, and ethylbenzene. 21 Seaman, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 604. 7 No. 08-30911 based.22 In excluding Dr. Prellop’s testimony, the district court concluded that her “opinion is neither factually supported nor scientifically reliable.” 23 We agree and hold that the district court acted well within its discretion in excluding Dr. Prellop’s testimony. Here is why. First, Dr. Prellop does not establish general causation. Her Ferox-related testimony relies on no scholarly studies and merely recites her opinion that Ferox contains aromatic hydrocarbons, which are known carcinogens. Yet, Dr. Prellop makes no connection between Ferox and bladder cancer specifically.24 And, she provides no clue regarding what would be a harmful level of Ferox exposure.25 Without some showing of a “statistically significant” link between Ferox and bladder cancer, Dr. Prellop’s testimony does not establish general causation for Ferox.26 As for her opinion that diesel exhaust causes bladder cancer, Dr. Prellop cites two articles as support: An Updated Review of the Literature: Risk Factors for Bladder Cancer with Focus on Occupational Exposures (“Updated Review”),27 and Projecting Individualized Probabilities of Developing Bladder Cancer in White Individuals (“Projecting Probabilities”).28 Updated Review is an overview of bladder-cancer literature which notes that one analysis found that “[w]orkers with high exposure to diesel exhaust” (the term “high exposure” is left 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 See Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that causation evidence of cancer generally — rather than the specific cancer from which the plaintiff suffers — is insufficient). 25 See id. at 199 (making clear that such a showing is required). 26 See id. at 195. 27 Sandra M. Olfert et al., Updated Review, 99 S. MED . J. 1256 (2006). 28 Xifeng Wu et al., Projecting Probabilities, 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4974 (2007). 8 No. 08-30911 undefined) have an increased risk of bladder cancer.29 The article cautions that research of occupational bladder cancer is complicated because smoking is the main risk for bladder cancer and it is difficult to separate bladder cancer caused by smoking from that caused by occupational exposures.30 Updated Review mentions nothing about the level of exposure that over time might increase one’s risk of bladder cancer. The authors of Projecting Probabilities created a model that was “consistent with diesel exhaust exposure . . . having a strong etiologic role in [bladder cancer], with numerous studies showing an excess incidence of [bladder cancer] in truck drivers and those exposed to diesel exhausts.” 31 Like Updated Review, Projecting Possibilities is silent on the level of exposure to diesel exhaust that would be significant. These articles thus do not assist Dr. Prellop in meeting Seaman’s “minimal” burden of establishing by “[s]cientific knowledge . . . the harmful level of exposure to a chemical.”32 Without any facts that would establish the allegedly harmful level of exposure (or even some link to bladder cancer), as with her Ferox opinion, Dr. Prellop’s opinion regarding diesel exhaust does not establish general causation. Neither does Dr. Prellop establish specific causation. Seaman makes the contention — with which we disagree — that our opinion in Bocanegra v. Vicmar 29 Updated Review at 1261. 30 See id. at 1261–62. 31 Projecting Probabilities at 4979. The Projecting Probabilities model, however, still requires “validation . . . in an external population [as] an essential next step towards practical use in the clinical setting.” Id. 32 Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996); see also id. (citing Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107–08 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting an expert’s testimony that “was not based on any knowledge about what amounts of [a chemical] involve an appreciable risk of harm to human beings who breathe them”)). But see Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 354 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that not every expert must back his opinion with published studies that unequivocally support that opinion). 9 No. 08-30911 Services, Inc.33 mandates that any shortcomings in Dr. Prellop’s opinion go to its weight, not its admissibility. In that vehicle-collision case, the plaintiff used a toxicology expert to testify about the effects of marijuana on a motorist’s perception, reaction time, and overall driving ability.34 Stressing that “[t]he real world . . . does not operate like a controlled study,” we held that the expert’s testimony was admissible despite unknown variables related to the potency and quantity of the marijuana ingested by the defendant.35 In Bocanegra, the reason that these unknown variables went to the weight and not to the admissibility of the expert’s testimony is because the record also contained sufficient exposure information: It was undisputed both that (1) being high on marijuana impairs perception, viz., it generally has that effect, and (2) the defendant driver had been high within the relevant twelve-hour window, viz., the specific effect.36 We cautioned that we were “not concluding that a trial court may never exclude testimony in a . . . case based on the fact that unknown variables render the testimony unhelpful to the jury.” 37 Instead, we “simply [held] that in th[at] case, the variables d[id] not undermine the expert’s testimony to the point that it [was] of no assistance to the jury.”38 33 320 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2003). 34 Id. at 586. The plaintiff used a separate accident-reconstruction expert to connect impaired driving ability to an increased likelihood of a crash. Id. 35 Id. at 588–90. 36 Id. at 587–89. 37 Id. at 589–90 n.5. 38 Id. 10 No. 08-30911 Unlike in Bocanegra,39 the unknown variables of the instant case do render Dr. Prellop’s testimony unhelpful. Dr. Prellop’s opinion is based on nothing other than counsel for Seaman informing her that Seaman was exposed to Ferox and diesel exhaust “at least once a week, twenty-six weeks per year, over more than a decade.” Even if reliance on counsel’s suggestion were permitted, Dr. Prellop still had no information about the amount of exposure to which Seaman was subjected “at least once a week,” viz., duration, concentration, and other circumstances of the exposure. She provided nothing that would offer the fact-finder a clue as to Seaman’s exposure to the allegedly dangerous chemicals. In short, Dr. Prellop’s “background information concerning [Seaman’s] exposure . . . is so sadly lacking as to be mere guesswork. The expert[] did not rely on data concerning [Seaman’s] exposure that suffices to sustain [her] opinions” under Daubert or Rule 702.40 Dr. Prellop’s testimony does not come close to establishing either general or specific causation. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding her testimony.41 39 Our holding in Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999) is consistent with that of Bocanegra. In Curtis, although the precise level of chemical exposure was unknown, there was “sufficient information of the level” of exposure, e.g., (1) abnormally high, albeit imprecise, readings on an exposure measuring device, (2) work practices conducive to high exposure, and (3) inadequate factory design. Curtis, 174 F.3d at 671–72. Determining that the expert’s exposure testimony was supported by more than a mere “paucity of facts,” we held that it was admissible. Id. at 672 (citing Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 279 n.10 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (questioning as suspect causation testimony based on a “paucity of facts”)). 40 See Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198–99 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing the shortcoming of an expert opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which requires that if an expert relies on inadmissible facts, they be of a type “reasonably relied on by other experts in the field” (citing FED . R. EVID . 703)). 41 The reduced burden of establishing proximate cause in Jones Act cases, see, e.g., Landry v. Two R. Drilling Co., 511 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing the burden as “featherweight”), is irrelevant to our holding. The standards of reliability and credibility to determine the admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert and Rule 702 apply regardless whether a seaman’s burden on proximate causation is reduced. See Wills v. Amerada Hess 11 No. 08-30911