Opinion ID: 1429814
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Law Discrimination and Retaliation Claims

Text: Metoyer has also presented claims of discrimination and retaliation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The appellees contend that she consented to the dismissal of these state law claims. We hold that Metoyer has not consented to the dismissal of her state law claims and that judgment on the pleadings is reversed on both claims. This case was first filed in California state court. Metoyer originally pleaded only state-law discrimination claims. After the state trial judge granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, [9] the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) preempted Metoyer's FEHA claims, Metoyer added her § 1981 claims and the defendants removed the case to federal court. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending once again that the LMRDA preempts FEHA, thereby barring Metoyer's FEHA based claims. During argument on this motion, the court explained its view that the case would be won or lost on the § 1981 claims and asked Metoyer's counsel, [W]hy not just dismiss the [FEHA] claim? At the court's request, the parties then filed supplemental briefs on preemption and on whether the state trial judge's ruling was binding. In her supplemental brief, Metoyer argued against preemption. She stated, however, that: In response to the court's question during oral argument as to why Plaintiff still needs the state law claims along with the federal claims, Dr. Heisser Metoyer is prepared to dismiss her state FEHA claims and proceed to trial on the 42 U.S.C. section 1981 causes of action. (Emphasis added.) [10] Based on this statement, the district court held that Metoyer consented to dismissal of her FEHA claims. We have previously upheld an unqualified oral stipulation of dismissal made in open court as effective to consent to judgment on claims. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir.1986). However, for the dismissal to be effective, it must be unqualified and unambiguous. Here, Metoyer's statement in her brief is too ambiguous to constitute such consent. The statement is prepared to dismiss may mean something other than she is dismissing. It may reasonably mean she is awaiting some consideration for such dismissal; it may equally mean a preliminary, not final, decision. Although Metoyer's FEHA and § 1981 claims are largely parallel, the Guild asserted that 29 U.S.C. § 504 (§ 504) barred Metoyer's § 1981 claims, an assertion that does not necessarily bar Metoyer's FEHA claims. Therefore, one reasonable interpretation of Metoyer's statement was that she was prepared to dismiss the FEHA claims, if the court determined that § 504 did not bar her federal claims from proceeding to trial. Further, Metoyer requested that the court deny judgment in its entirety and argued extensively against preemption of her FEHA claims in the same brief. Thus, the district court erred in interpreting Metoyer's statement as stipulating to dismissal of her FEHA claims. California courts apply the Title VII framework to claims brought under FEHA. See Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 354, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089 (2000) (Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes.). We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on the state law discrimination and retaliation claims for the same reasons we reverse on the federal law discrimination and retaliation claims.