Opinion ID: 626146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wersal's First Amendment Challenges

Text: After concluding Wersal's challenge to Rule 4.1(A)(4) is not ripe, we proceed to consider his facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the endorsement clause and the revised solicitation clause. Under the First Amendment, made applicable to the states, see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995), Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. U.S. Const. amend. I. Because the challenged clauses are content-based restrictions on political speech, we examine Wersal's challenges under strict scrutiny. White I, 536 U.S. at 774, 122 S.Ct. 2528; see also Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 198-200 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying strict scrutiny to a solicitation clause). But see Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir.2010) (applying a balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny, to evaluate an endorsement clause). [5] Under strict scrutiny, Minnesota bears the burden of proving the endorsement and solicitation clauses (1) advance a compelling state interest and (2) are narrowly tailored to serve that interest. White I, 536 U.S. at 774-75, 122 S.Ct. 2528. We will consider each of these inquiries in turn.
As we recognized in White II, it is difficult to derive a precise definition of what constitutes a compelling interest. 416 F.3d at 750. In general, strict scrutiny is best described as an ends-and-means test that asks whether the state's purported interest is important enough to justify the restriction it has placed on the speech in question in pursuit of that interest. Id. Minnesota asserts several compelling interests, including (1) maintaining judicial impartiality, defined as the lack of bias for or against either party to a proceeding; (2) maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality; (3) promoting open-mindedness; (4) preventing candidates from abusing the prestige of judicial office; and (5) protecting the political independence of the judiciary. The first three of these asserted interests recall to mind the definitions of impartiality set forth by Justice Scalia in White I, which were expounded upon by our decision in White II. See supra Part I.B. In harmony with White I and White II, we have little difficulty concluding Minnesota's interest in preserving impartiality, defined as the lack of bias for or against a party to a proceeding, is compelling. See Siefert, 608 F.3d at 981 (Insofar as impartiality refers to `the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding,' it is a compelling state interest.) (quoting White I, 536 U.S. at 775, 122 S.Ct. 2528) (emphasis in original). It is axiomatic that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2259, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 29 L.Ed.2d 423 (1971) (per curiam) (Trial before `an unbiased judge' is essential to due process.) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 205, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968)). Indeed, in White II, we expressly recognized this meaning of impartiality constitutes a compelling state interest: It can hardly be argued that seeking to uphold a constitutional protection, such as due process, is not per se a compelling state interest. And the rule laid down in [ Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)] makes clear that the partiality of a judge as it relates to a party to a case violates due process protections: It certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a person of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case. In [ Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997)], the Court reiterated that the floor established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal, before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case. 416 F.3d at 753 (internal citation omitted). However, much in the same way White I implied . . . this meaning of impartiality describes a state interest that is compelling, id. (emphasis in original), White I and White II both implied preserving the appearance of impartiality constitutes a compelling interest, separate and distinct from the state interest in preventing actual bias. See White I, 536 U.S. at 776, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (analyzing the tailoring of the announce clause to the state's interest in impartiality or the appearance of impartiality); White II, 416 F.3d at 755, 758-59 (discussing the tailoring of the partisan-activities clause as it related to Minnesota's interest in the appearance of impartiality). [6] Nonetheless, we find it necessary to discuss the appearance of impartiality in some depth, given the interest has garnered far too little attention in White I and White II. Similar to the definition of impartiality provided in White I as the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding, 536 U.S. at 775, 122 S.Ct. 2528, the appearance of impartiality may be defined as the perception the public maintains regarding the judiciary's lack of bias for or against either party to a proceeding. See Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2266 (The ABA Model Code's test for appearance of impropriety is `whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.') (quoting ABA Annotated Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2A, Commentary). [7] As this definition suggests, there is a significant relation between actual and perceived impartiality, although the two concepts are unique. For instance, a judge who harbors a bias against a particular group, but shows no outward manifestations of the bias lacks impartiality, even though there is no appearance of bias. At the same time, a judge who uses disrespectful language to one party may be perceived as lacking impartiality, even if that judge in fact harbors no actual bias against the party. These examples highlight some important differences between the two concepts. First, actual impartiality concerns the mental state of a particular judge, whereas the appearance of impartiality arises from the public's perception of that judge. Second, the appearance of impartiality often stems from the collective awareness of the public, and thus Minnesota's interest in maintaining the appearance of impartiality is in this sense broader and qualitatively different than its interest in fostering actual impartiality. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (discussing the appearance of corruption, which stem[s] from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.). Instead of aiming to protect the due process rights of actual parties to a case, maintaining the appearance of impartiality is systemic in nature, as it is essential to protect the judiciary's reputation for fairness in the eyes of all citizens. This reputational interest is not a fanciful one; rather, public confidence in the judiciary is integral to preserving our justice system. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship.); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) ([T]o perform its high function in the best way `justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.') (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954)); Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir.2010) (The judicial system depends on its reputation for impartiality; it is public acceptance, rather than the sword or the purse, that leads decisions to be obeyed and averts vigilantism and civil strife.). [8] As Justice Kennedy stated in White I: Here, Minnesota has sought to justify its speech restriction as one necessary to maintain the integrity of its judiciary. Nothing in the Court's opinion should be read to cast doubt on the vital importance of this state interest. Courts, in our system, elaborate principles of law in the course of resolving disputes. The power and the prerogative of a court to perform this function rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments. The citizen's respect for judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court's absolute probity. Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the highest order. 536 U.S. at 793, 122 S.Ct. 2528; see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, In Defense of Appearances: What Caperton v. Massey Should Have Said, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 529, 541 (2010) (As Balzac once wrote, `To distrust the judiciary marks the beginning of the end of society.') (citation omitted). Lest there be any doubt about Minnesota's conviction in the importance of preserving the appearance of impartiality, the Minnesota Supreme Court fortified these principles directly into the Code: An independent, fair, and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system. 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble. The Code proceeds to guide judges to maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives, as well as to aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence. Id.; see also Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2266 (Almost every State . . . has adopted the American Bar Association's objective standard: `A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.') (quoting ABA Annotated Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 (2004)). In light of the foregoing, we easily conclude Minnesota's interest in preserving the appearance of impartiality is compelling, particularly when cast against other interests courts have recognized as compelling. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L.Rev. 917, 935 n. 85 (1988) (collecting cases recognizing various compelling interests). In sum, we conclude Minnesota has met its burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest in (1) maintaining judicial impartiality and (2) maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality. [9] See Siefert, 608 F.3d at 985 (Due process requires both fairness and the appearance of fairness in the tribunal.).
Having concluded Minnesota has established the above compelling interests, we proceed to consider whether the challenged provisions of the Code are narrowly tailored to serve those interests. In doing so, we must examine the relatedness between the regulation and the asserted interests: A narrowly tailored regulation is one that actually advances the state's interest (is necessary), does not sweep too broadly (is not overinclusive), does not leave significant influences bearing on the interest unregulated (is not underinclusive), and could be replaced by no other regulation that could advance the interest as well with less infringement of speech (is the least-restrictive alternative). White II, 416 F.3d at 751.
We first address the endorsement clause, which states a judge or a judicial candidate shall not publicly endorse or, except for the judge or candidate's opponent, publicly oppose another candidate for public office. 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4.1(A)(3). Wersal contends this prohibition does not serve to limit actual bias regarding parties, because while there is a slight risk a judge will become biased in the event he or she receives an endorsement, the same is not true when the judge or candidate makes an endorsement. Moreover, Wersal argues even if the judge or candidate is biased in favor of the candidate he or she endorses, the endorsement is not the cause of the bias, but mere evidence of its previous existence. Thus, Wersal asserts the justification for the endorsement clause must turn on the appearance of bias created by the endorsement, but he claims such concerns are best dealt with via recusal. For support, Wersal relies on our decision in White II, where we stated, [i]n one sense, the underlying rationale for the partisan-activities clausethat associating with a particular group will destroy a judge's impartialitydiffers only in form from that which purportedly supports the announce clausethat expressing one's self on particular issues will destroy a judge's impartiality. 416 F.3d at 754 (emphasis omitted). Recognizing the protection afforded to the right of association, we concluded the partisan-activities clause was barely tailored to any interest in impartiality toward parties to the extent it sought to keep judges from aligning with particular views on issues by keeping them from aligning with a particular political party. Id. According to Wersal, this reasoning may be extended to the endorsement clause, because a candidate's association with another candidate by way of an endorsement is no more a threat to impartiality than a candidate associating with a political party or political interest group. Similarly, in this sense, Wersal contends the endorsement clause is overbroad because Minnesota has no interest in preventing judges or candidates from associating themselves with like-minded individuals and groups. Like the district court, we conclude the endorsement clause serves the compelling interests of preserving impartiality and avoiding the appearance of impropriety. At the outset, we must refuse Wersal's attempt to liken the endorsement clause to the partisan-activities clause in White II. In White I, the Supreme Court concluded the announce clause was barely tailored because it does not restrict speech for or against particular parties, but rather speech for or against particular issues.  536 U.S. at 776, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (emphasis in original). While White II concluded the partisan-activities clause was, in one sense, merely an extension of the announce clause in White I, see White II, 416 F.3d at 754-55, the same is not true here because the endorsement clause is plainly a restriction of speech for or against particular parties, rather than for or against particular issues. See Yost v. Stout, No. 06-4122-JAR, slip op. at 12 (D.Kan. Nov. 16, 2008) (upholding a clause restrict[ing] a judge or judicial candidate from publicly endorsing other candidates for public office [because] it does not restrict speech concerning disputed political issues.). When a judge or judicial candidate endorses another candidate, it creates a risk of partiality toward the endorsed party and his or her supporters, as well as a risk of partiality against other candidates opposing the endorsed party. The endorsement clause is directly aimed at this speech about parties, as it prevents potential litigants in a case from the risk of having an unfair trial. At the very least, the clause serves the State's interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety. Namely, even if a particular endorsement does not serve to create an actual bias toward or against a particular party, the act of endorsement itself undermines the judiciary's appearance of impartiality because the public may perceive the judge to be beholden to political interests. Our conclusion is bolstered by the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Siefert, where the court rejected a judge's attempt to analogize an endorsement clause with a partisan-activities clause: While an interest in the impartiality and perceived impartiality of the judiciary does not justify forbidding judges from identifying as members of political parties, a public endorsement is not the same type of campaign speech targeted by the impermissible rule against party affiliation in this case or the impermissible rule against talking about legal issues the Supreme Court struck down in White I. As Judge Siefert notes, endorsements primarily benefit the endorsee, not the endorser and endorsements may be exchanged between political actors on a quid pro quo basis. This amounts to a concession that offering an endorsement is less a judge's communication about his qualifications and beliefs than an effort to affect a separate political campaign, or even more problematically, assume a role as political powerbroker. . . . . When judges are speaking as judges, and trading on the prestige of their office to advance other political ends, a state has an obligation to regulate their behavior. We thus see a dividing line between the party affiliation rule, which impermissibly bars protected speech about the judge's own campaign, and the public endorsement rule, which addresses a judge's entry into the political arena on behalf of his partisan comrades. 608 F.3d at 984 (citation omitted). Although the court expressed these concerns en route to applying a balancing approach, instead of strict scrutiny, we find them equally valid under the strict scrutiny approach. Under either framework, a judge who tips the outcome of a close election in a politician's favor would necessarily be a powerful political actor, and thus call into question the impartiality of the court. Id. at 986. Of course, unlike Siefert, which did not apply strict scrutiny, [t]he question under our strict scrutiny test . . . is not whether the [endorsement] clause serves this interest at all, but whether it is narrowly tailored to serve this interest. White I, 536 U.S. at 777 n. 7, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (emphasis in original). With this in mind, we must address whether the endorsement clause is overinclusive, underinclusive, or whether there is a less restrictive means of accomplishing the State's interests. We first conclude the endorsement clause is not overinclusive because it does not sweep too broadly. As noted above, unlike the announce clause struck down in White I, the endorsement clause restricts speech for or against particular parties. Although there is some merit in Wersal's argument that an endorsement would serve as a proxy for other underlying ideas, taken to its logical conclusion, such an approach would eviscerate the entire party-issue dichotomy set forth in White I. Under this reasoning, even direct statements of bias toward or against a party could be said to serve as a proxy for underlying issues, even though such statements would undeniably violate a party's due process guarantees. See id. at 775-76, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (discussing the traditional meaning of impartiality). Instead, we abide by White I's directive to analyze whether the clause restrict[s] speech for or against particular parties, . . . [or] for or against particular issues.  Id. at 776, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (emphasis in original). This approach accords with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, which analyzes content-based restrictions under strict scrutiny by reference to the content itself. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121-23, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991) (discussing the overinclusiveness of a law preventing criminals from profiting by selling books describing their crimes). Here, the endorsement clause does not regulate speech with regard to any underlying issues, and thus the candidates are free to state their positions on these issues, in line with White I. [10] Moreover, candidates are not prevented from conveying necessary information concerning their qualifications to the electorate. See Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (We have recognized repeatedly that debate on the qualifications of candidates is integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Instead, the clause only prohibits the act of endorsement itself, which, as noted above, is a direct expression of bias in favor of or against potential parties to a case, or at the very least, damages the appearance of impartiality. Therefore, the clause targets precisely that speech which most likely implicates Minnesota's compelling interests. We also conclude the endorsement clause is not underinclusive, despite the fact it only applies to endorsements for other candidate[s] for public office. In response to the charge that a judicial candidate may endorse another public official so long as the official has not yet filed for office, we find instructive another provision of the Code providing, a judge or judicial candidate shall not . . . make any statement that would reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court. . . . 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4.1(A)(10). Reading the endorsement clause in conjunction with Rule 4.1(A)(10), a judicial candidate would patently be prevented from making biased statements for or against a party or an impending party, regardless of whether the public official had officially become a candidate at the time of the statement. Nor is this a situation like the Seventh Circuit confronted in Siefert, where an endorsement clause only applied to endorsements in partisan elections. 608 F.3d at 987. Siefert recognized this underinclusiveness could be fatal to the rule's constitutionality under strict scrutiny. Id. By contrast, Minnesota's endorsement clause pertains to endorsements of any candidate for public office, regardless of whether the elections are partisan or nonpartisan, and thus the concerns articulated in Siefert do not bear fruit here. Finally, we must address whether recusal would pose a less restrictive alternative to address Minnesota's compelling interests. In White II, we discussed recusal in the context of the partisan-activities clause, including the specific situation of political cases where a judge is more personally involved, such as redistricting cases where a judge's district is at issue. 416 F.3d at 755. In these situations, we concluded recusal is the least restrictive means of accomplishing the state's interest in impartiality articulated as a lack of bias for or against parties to the case. Id. The present case presents a far different set of circumstances than those we contemplated in White II. To begin, our redistricting hypothetical in White II originated with our recognition that: [I]n a case where a political party comes before a judge who has substantially associated himself or herself with that same party, a question could conceivably arise about the potential for bias in favor of that litigant. Yet even then, any credible claim of bias would have to flow from something more than the bare fact that the judge had associated with that political party. That is because the associational activities restricted by Canon 5 are, as we have pointed out, part-and-parcel of a candidate's speech for or against particular issues embraced by the political party. And such restrictions, we have also said, do not serve the due process rights of parties. Id. (emphasis in original). Here, as discussed in depth above, an endorsement itself would be enough to create bias or the appearance of bias, because it is speech directly in favor of or against parties, rather than speech regarding particular issues. Second, our hypothetical in White II envisioned cases where recusals would be infrequent and relatively unburdensome, such that a blanket ban on the judge's conduct would be akin to `burning the house to roast the pig.' Id. (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383, 77 S.Ct. 524, 1 L.Ed.2d 412 (1957)). Under Wersal's sought-after system of open endorsements, however, recusal would be an unworkable remedy because candidates and judges would be free to endorse individuals who would become frequent litigants in future cases, such as county sheriffs and prosecutors. See Siefert, 608 F.3d at 987 (discussing the difficulty of recusal where a judge endorses a prosecutor or sheriff who frequently appears in front of the court). Or, in the case of one of Wersal's proposed endorsements, the individual could become a district court judge subject to appellate review by the endorsing Supreme Court judge. Under either circumstance, this has the potential to create an insurmountable burden for the court system. Wersal, 607 F.Supp.2d at 1023; see also Br. of Former Governor & Chief Justices as Amici Curiae 4 (Recusal is a blunt instrument, wielded differently by individual judges and in particular circumstances; and recusal motions are not infrequently only gamesmanship seeking delay.). Moreover, even if the judiciary would not be plagued by these conflicts and inefficiencies, as Wersal suggests, we find little comfort in recusal as a less restrictive means of addressing Minnesota's separate interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety. See Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2266 (recognizing the impact recusals have on the public's impression of the judiciary); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407, 109 S.Ct. 647 (While the problem of individual bias is usually cured through recusal, no such mechanism can overcome the appearance of institutional partiality that may arise from judiciary involvement in the making of policy.). In sum, we conclude Minnesota's endorsement clause is narrowly tailored to serve its compelling interests of preserving impartiality and preserving the appearance of impartiality. See In re Matter of William A. Vincent, 143 N.M. 56, 172 P.3d 605, 606, 609 (2007) (concluding a clause prohibiting candidates or judges from publicly endors[ing] or publicly oppos[ing] a candidate for public office through the news media or in campaign literature was narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling interest in a judiciary that is both impartial in fact and in appearance) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); In re Matter of Ira J. Raab, 100 N.Y.2d 305, 763 N.Y.S.2d 213, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292 (2003).
We next address the solicitation clause, which bars judges and candidates from personally solicit[ing] or accept[ing] campaign contributions other than as authorized by Rules 4.2 and 4.4. 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4.1(A)(6). As noted above, Rules 4.2 and 4.4 allow candidates to solicit funds through a campaign committee, although the committee is not to disclose the identity of contributors to the candidate. Id. at Canon 4.2(B)(1) & 4.4(B)(3). Moreover, Rule 4.2 permits a candidate to make a general request for campaign contributions when speaking to an audience of 20 or more people, and to personally solicit campaign contributions from members of the judge's family, from a person with whom the judge has an intimate relationship, or from judges over whom the judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate authority. Id. at Canon 4.2(B)(3)(a) & (B)(3)(c). Wersal contends the solicitation clause is not narrowly tailored to further Minnesota's interests in impartiality because it is not the solicitation, but the receipt of contributions that poses a risk to impartiality. Because the clause is not concerned with contributions, but with solicitation, Wersal argues it is barely tailored to Minnesota's interests in impartiality. Moreover, Wersal asserts information about who contributed to a judge's campaign is readily available via the Internet, and thus a ban on personal solicitation fails to further Minnesota's interests. To the extent the clause serves an interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety, Wersal argues recusal is once again a less restrictive alternative. Finally, Wersal challenges Minnesota's decision to permit solicitations to groups of 20 or more people, which he claims demonstrates either underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness. In considering Minnesota's old solicitation clause in White II, we began our analysis by recognizing, [k]eeping candidates, who may be elected judges, from directly soliciting money from individuals who may come before them certainly addresses a compelling state interest in impartiality as to parties to a particular case. 416 F.3d at 765. However, we determined it was unlikely a judicial candidate would be biased in favor of or against a litigant based on a contribution to the candidate's campaign, because the Code provided such contributions would be made to the candidate's committee, and the committee was barred from disclosing those who did or did not contribute to the committee. Id. Accordingly, we concluded the contested portions of the solicitation clausethose dealing with a candidate's signature or solicitations to large groupswere barely tailored to Minnesota's interests in impartiality due to the candidate's inability to decipher the source of funds in response to a solicitation in either circumstance. Id. at 765-66. As the district court correctly observed, our conclusion in White II was largely predicated on the distinction between the large group solicitation and signature bans challenged in White II, and personal solicitation, which is challenged in the present case. [11] Namely, unlike the challenged portions in White II, direct personal solicitation creates a situation where potential contributors must choose to either contribute to the candidate, or decline to contribute, with a resulting risk of retribution. See In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 351 (Me.2003) (If a contribution is made, a judge might subsequently be accused of favoring the contributor in court. If a contribution is declined, a judge might be accused of punishing a contributor in court.). In either scenario, the candidate is more likely to decipher whether the potential donor chooses to make a contribution, which gives rise to a greater risk of a quid pro quo. See Br. of Former Governor & Chief Justices as Amici Curiae 3 ([T]here is no way to have meaningful campaign solicitations where a candidate can freely solicit contributions in one-on-one meetings with prospective donors without a substantial likelihood of learning, at least in many instances, the outcome of the `ask.'). In Siefert, the Seventh Circuit similarly recognized the cumulative effect of the scenario posed above: A contribution given directly to a judge, in response to a judge's personal solicitation of that contribution, carries with it both a greater potential for a quid pro quo and a greater appearance of a quid pro quo than a contribution given to the judge's campaign committee at the request of someone other than the judge, or in response to a mass mailing sent above the judge's signature. 608 F.3d at 989. Specifically, [a] direct solicitation closely links the quidavoiding the judge's future disfavorto the quo the contribution. Id. We must emphasize once more Minnesota's separate interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety. Regardless of whether a potential donor chooses to make a contributionand whether a candidate ultimately learns of the donor's choice the appearance of impartiality is attenuated. See id. at 989-90 (We do not mean to suggest that judges who directly solicit contributions are necessarily behaving inappropriately, but the appearance of and potential for impropriety is significantly greater when judges directly solicit contributions than when they raise money by other means.). Even if judges were able to refrain from favoring donors, the mere possibility that judges' decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributions is likely to undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary. White I, 536 U.S. at 790, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Therefore, `[i]nsulating the judge from such direct solicitation eliminates the appearance (at least) of impropriety and, to that extent, preserves the judiciary's reputation for integrity.' Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Penn., 944 F.2d 137, 145 (3d Cir.1991) (quoting In re Fadeley, 310 Or. 548, 802 P.2d 31, 40 (1990)). Additionally, as we highlighted in White II, unlike the judicial codes in some states, Minnesota's Code prevents a candidate from knowing the identity of contributors or even non-contributors[.] 416 F.3d at 766. This feature serves to distinguish this case from others where the candidate was permitted to learn the identity of the contributors, and thus Wersal's argument finds little support by relying on these cases. See, e.g., Carey, 614 F.3d at 205 (The clause . . . does not bar the candidate from learning how individuals responded to the committee's solicitations. That omission suggests that the only interest at play is the impolitic interpersonal dynamics of a candidate's request for money, not the more corrosive reality of who gives and how much.); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2002) (Successful candidates will feel beholden to the people who helped them get elected regardless of who did the soliciting of support.). [12] We find Wersal's counter-argument that candidates may learn the identity of donors through the Internet unavailing. As Minnesota points out, this is true regarding a number of provisions of the Code. For instance, a judge could independently investigate the facts of a case through the Internet, despite the Code's prohibition against this activity. See 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2.9(C) (A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.). Simply because a judge or candidate may decide to violate the Code's proscriptions is not a testament to their unconstitutionality. For the foregoing reasons, the ask is precisely the speech Minnesota must regulate to maintain its interest in impartiality and the appearance of impartiality. See Siefert, 608 F.3d at 990 ([T]he personal solicitation itself presents the greatest danger to impartiality and its appearance.); see also Bauer, 620 F.3d at 710 (upholding the constitutionality of a personal solicitation clause due to the potential for actual or perceived mutual back scratching). We turn last to Wersal's renewed suggestion that recusal is a less restrictive means of preventing bias. Although we did not address recusal in White II in the context of solicitation, we are persuaded by the Seventh Circuit's analysis on the issue. In Siefert, the court concluded there was no less restrictive means available, because of the fact that judicial campaigns are often largely funded by lawyers, many of whom will appear before the candidate who wins, and thus [i]t would be unworkable for judges to recuse themselves in every case that involved a lawyer whom they had previously solicited for a contribution. 608 F.3d at 990. We are also mindful of the recent Supreme Court decision in Caperton, where the Court held the Due Process Clause required a judge to recuse himself in an appeal involving a corporation whose chief executive officer spent over $2.5 million in support of the judge during his election, whether or not actual bias exist[ed] or [could] be proved. 129 S.Ct. at 2257-58, 2265. Although the Court stressed the extreme nature of the facts leading to the recusal, we find Caperton illustrative of the unworkability of recusal in the present case. Namely, recusal serves as an after-the-fact remedy that is insufficient to cure the damage to the appearance of impartiality fashioned by personal solicitation, which is by and large complete at the time of the ask. At the very least, by the time the Due Process Clause requires recusal of a judge, the appearance of impartiality has already been impaired. In sum, we conclude recusal would not be a workable remedy to prevent bias or, in particular, the appearance of bias stemming from personal solicitations. We therefore hold the solicitation clause is narrowly tailored to serve Minnesota's interests in preserving impartiality and preserving the appearance of impartiality.