Opinion ID: 621302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Johnson’s Letter of August 2, 2007

Text: Johnson further argues that his § 2255 petition is nevertheless timely under § 2255(f)(1) because his letter of August 2, 2007, should be construed as a § 2255 petition. Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings prescribes the form of a § 2255 petition. It requires that such motions, inter alia, (1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the moving party; (2) state the facts supporting each ground; and (3) state the relief requested. See R. Governing § 2255 Proceedings 2(b)(1)–(3). Rule 2(c) provides that a § 2255 motion must “substantially follow either the form appended to these rules or a form prescribed by a local district-court rule.” R. Governing § 2255 Proceedings 2(c). Johnson’s letter undoubtedly was not filed in the form of a § 2255 motion 2 Johnson also argues that it would be unfair for the limitations period to run against him while his direct appeal was pending because he could not have filed a § 2255 motion during that period. See Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1124 (6th Cir. 1998) (refusing to consider a § 2255 petition while a direct appeal was pending in another court). But direct review of Johnson’s conviction had ended prior to his filing an untimely notice of appeal. To the extent Johnson’s argument is that the district court’s docketing of his untimely notice of appeal as a “notice of appeal” misled him into believing direct review of his conviction had not ended, we find—and Johnson cites—no support for the proposition that any unfairness resulting from such confusion would postpone the running of the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Instead, this argument goes to whether confusion over the state of the law can operate to equitably toll the statute of limitations, and is considered in the section on equitable tolling below. See infra Part III.C. 7 because it specified no grounds for relief, offered no facts to support any ground for relief, and asked only about the deadline for filing a § 2255 motion so as to “prevent [Johnson] from missing out on the opportunity to file” one. The advisory committee notes to the 2004 Amendments to Rule 2 indicate that, in light of the significant penalties imposed by AEDPA for late filings, the rules were reconfigured so that motions that are not in proper form would no longer be returned as insufficient. See R. Governing § 2255 Proceedings 2 advisory committee’s note. In revising Rule 2 to reflect the more lenient approach, “[t]he Committee believed that the better procedure was to accept the defective motion and require the moving party to submit a corrected motion that conforms to Rule 2(b).” See id. Johnson contends that the letter should be liberally construed as a defective § 2255 motion for the purposes of satisfying the statute of limitations because it “unequivocally manifested his intent to file a § 2255 petition.” The Sixth Circuit has held that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed and that in some cases active interpretation is required “to construe a pro se petition ‘to encompass any allegation stating federal relief.’” Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing White v. Wyrick, 530 F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir.1976)). In the context of a direct appeal, we have ruled that even though a district court may not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal, “where a document is filed within the [deadline] which represents a clear assertion of an intent to appeal, courts of appeals have the power to overlook irregularities where fairness and justice so require.” See United States v. Hoye, 548 F.2d 1271, 1273 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding that a motion for delayed appeal filed by defense counsel who erroneously concluded the deadline for appeal as of right had expired, and which contained most of the essential facts required of a notice of appeal, should be treated as in compliance with the deadline); but see Isert v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 756, 8 760–62 (6th Cir. 2006) (refusing to construe a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal as a notice of appeal where the motion did not specify the judgment being appealed nor otherwise convey an intent to appeal). However, these cases all arose in the context of appeals under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which explicitly provides that “[a]n appeal must not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4). The advisory committee notes further clarify that “dismissal of an appeal should not occur when it is otherwise clear from the notice that the party intended to appeal. If a court determines it is objectively clear that a party intended to appeal, there are neither administrative concerns nor fairness concerns that should prevent the appeal from going forward.” See Fed. R. App. P. 3 advisory committee’s note. Assuming that a similar clear intent standard should be applied to a § 2255 petition, Johnson’s letter in no way evidenced a clear intent to serve as a § 2255 petition. Rather, it was an inquiry regarding deadlines and revealed Johnson’s intent to file a § 2255 petition in the future. Johnson cites cases from the Third Circuit in arguing that his letter should have at least triggered an obligation on the part of the district court to provide Johnson with notice of his rights under § 2255. See United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 646 (3d Cir. 1999) (requiring district courts to provide notice of rights under §2255 “upon receipt of a pro se pleading challenging an inmate's conviction or incarceration—whether styled as a § 2255 motion or not”); see also United States v. Delgado, 363 F. App’x 853, 855 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that where a pro se criminal defendant sent a letter to the district court expressing a “present intention to seek relief potentially available under § 2255,” the letter was sufficient to trigger the obligation under Miller to provide Delgado with 9 notice of the effect of his pleadings). However, even under the Third Circuit’s approach, Johnson’s letter would not trigger a duty on the part of the district court to provide him with notice of the effect of his pleadings. Again, although Johnson’s letter expressed clearly his intent to file a § 2255 motion (“the reason why I’m asking is to prevent me from missing out on the opportunity to file the ‘2255’”), it is best characterized as an intention to file a § 2255 motion in the future, prior to the deadline, rather than a present intention to seek relief under § 2255. Accordingly we conclude that even under liberal rules of construction, Johnson’s letter cannot be construed as a § 2255 motion for the purposes of the § 2255 limitations period. Therefore, Johnson did not file his § 2255 petition within one year of the date on which his judgment of conviction became final.