Opinion ID: 590349
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutorily-based property right

Text: 14 The appellants argue that state law provided them with a property right in continued employment. Specifically, the appellants rely on an Oklahoma statute, which provides in relevant part: 15 A support employee who has been employed by a local board of education for more than one (1) year shall be subject to suspension, demotion or termination only for cause, as designated by the policy of the local board of education.... This section shall not be construed to prevent layoffs for lack of funds or work. 16 Okla.Stat. tit. 70, § 6-101.40 (formerly codified as Okla.Stat. tit. 70, § 24-133). Thus, under the explicit terms of the statute, a covered support employee may be terminated only for (1) cause, (2) lack of funds, or (3) lack of ... work. 17 We construed the former codification of section 6-101.40 in Goudeau v. Independent School District No. 37, 823 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir.1987). The plaintiff in Goudeau worked as a preschool aide in an Oklahoma school district. Two weeks into a new school year, the plaintiff's supervisor notified her of the termination of her employment. Id. at 1430 & n. 1. We held that the former codification of section 6-101.40 provided the plaintiff with a property interest in her employment and entitled the plaintiff to a pretermination hearing. Id. at 1430-31. 18 In the instant case, the school board did not terminate the appellants' contracts during the term, as the school district in Goudeau attempted to do. Rather, the school board here elected simply not to renew the appellants' contracts after they expired. We hold that in the context of the language of section 6-101.40, failure to renew is not the equivalent of an affirmative act of termination. Cf. Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 947 F.2d 903, 904 n. 1 (10th Cir.1991) (distinguishing discharge from nonrenewal); Moore v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 871 F.2d 545, 550 (5th Cir.1989) (plaintiffs were not fired as such, rather their contracts were not renewed). 19 Although the appellants' employment did end upon the expiration of their contracts, we read termination as used in the statute to require termination under an extant contract. In this case, given that (1) the contract stated explicitly that its term ended in June unless renewal occurred and (2) an individual cannot claim a property right in renewal of a contract based only on previous renewals of it, see Burris, 713 F.2d at 1090-91, we cannot view the school board's failure to offer new contracts to the appellants as acts of termination within the meaning of section 6-101.40. Therefore, the school board did not deprive the appellants of the property right explicated in Goudeau.