Opinion ID: 2508191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Refusing to Instruct the Jury on the Lesser Included Offenses of Reckless Second-Degree Murder, Voluntary Manslaughter, and Involuntary Manslaughter?

Text: Drennan was charged with first-degree premeditated murder. The trial court instructed the jury on that offense and on the lesser included offense of second-degree intentional murder. The court also instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication could be a defense to either first-degree or second-degree murder if the evidence showed that intoxication impaired Drennan's mental faculties to the extent he was incapable of forming the necessary state of mind of premeditation or the necessary intent to kill. Drennan argues that the trial court denied him a fair trial when it refused to instruct on the lesser included offenses of reckless second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. The record is not clear as to whether Drennan requested an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. During the instruction conference, defense counsel stated, I'm not going to argue the voluntary manslaughter. We can't say, I think  based on the evidence that we put forth that there's any evidence of a sudden quarrel or argument with the exception of, I would say just once again the video taped testimony that said we got into it, then just kind of ended there. Where a defendant does not object to the giving of or failure to give a lesser included offense instruction, stating distinctly the matter to which he or she objects and the grounds of the objection, this court will find reversible error only if the giving of the instruction or the failure to give the instruction was clearly erroneous. See State v. Evans, 270 Kan. 585, 588, 17 P.3d 340 (2001); K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3414(3). Instructions are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced that there is a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the trial error had not occurred. Evans, 270 Kan. 585, Syl. ¶ 3. In addition, Drennan's appellate brief mentions voluntary manslaughter only in the heading of an issue; he does not make any argument as to voluntary manslaughter in the substance of the brief. Rather, Drennan focuses on whether there was evidence that his behavior might have been reckless rather than intentional. An issue incidentally raised but not briefed may be considered abandoned. State v. Hunt, 275 Kan. 811, 821, 69 P.3d 571 (2003). Thus, Drennan failed to preserve the issue of whether the trial court erred when it did not give a lesser included offense instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The record does reflect that during the instruction conference Drennan's counsel clearly requested instructions on the lesser included offenses of reckless second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. Drennan's appellate counsel suggests that trial counsel's remarks were also sufficient to preserve a request on voluntary manslaughter. A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of the lesser offense. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3414(3). If the defendant requests the instructions, the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury regarding all lesser included crimes that are established by the evidence, regardless of whether the evidence is weak or inconclusive. State v. Hoge, 276 Kan. 801, 805, 80 P.3d 52 (2003). On review, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. McClanahan, 254 Kan. 104, 109, 865 P.2d 1021 (1993). However, the duty to so instruct arises only where there is evidence supporting the lesser crime. State v. Spry, 266 Kan. 523, 528, 973 P.2d 783 (1999). An instruction on a lesser included offense is not required if the jury could not reasonably convict the defendant of the lesser included offense based on the evidence presented. Hoge, 276 Kan. at 805. Even if we consider counsel's ambiguous statements at the instruction conference as sufficient to preserve the issue of whether an instruction on voluntary manslaughter should have been given, there was no evidence to support the elements of that crime. At most, Drennan points to evidence that he and Shelbree were involved in some kind of struggle or altercation when she was killed. Voluntary manslaughter includes the intentional killing of a human being upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. K.S.A. 21-3403(a). However, to constitute voluntary manslaughter, the killing must have resulted from severe provocation. The test for whether severe provocation exists is objective, and the provocation must be sufficient to cause an ordinary person to lose control of his or her actions or reason. State v. Bell, 266 Kan. 896, 918, 975 P.2d 239, cert. denied 528 U.S. 905 (1999). There was no evidence presented that Drennan was severely provoked; thus, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter was not error, much less clear error as is the standard since the instruction on voluntary manslaughter was not clearly requested. Drennan did clearly preserve his request for instructions on reckless second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. However, the trial court determined there was no factual basis to support the element of recklessness and refused to give instructions on reckless second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. Specifically, the trial court ruled: On the issues of second degree reckless, involuntary manslaughter, I don't find that there is any factual basis to submit the issue of recklessness to the jury. On both cases, the evidence of ligature and/or manual strangulation in the time frame given by Dr. Dudley to cause the mechanism of irreversible brain death, I think she said four or more minutes, at least four minutes, in no way could equate to reckless conduct. It had to be more than that. That the conduct is more than reckless conduct. In addition, the testimony of Mr. Drennan doesn't give me any factual foundation upon which to find any basis in the evidence to render to the jury the issue of reckless conduct. On that basis I'm not going to give the defense's requested instruction of second degree reckless or unintentional. Nor am I going to give the defense's requested involuntary manslaughter instruction. The State relies primarily upon State v. Jones, 267 Kan. 627, 984 P.2d 132 (1999), in support of its argument that the evidence in this case excluded a theory of reckless murder as required for both second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. See K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-3402(b) (defining reckless second-degree murder, or depraved heart murder, as the killing of a human being committed unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life); K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-3404 (defining involuntary manslaughter, as applicable to this case, as the unintentional killing of a human being committed recklessly). The facts of Jones were similar to the facts in this case. In Jones, the defendant manually strangled the victim to death. The coroner testified it would have taken approximately 4 to 6 minutes for the victim to die. The defendant claimed he did not intend to kill the victim but that he had just snapped. 267 Kan. at 633. Jones was charged with premeditated first-degree murder, and the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of intentional second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. On appeal, Jones argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction on reckless second-degree murder. The court rejected Jones' argument, stating: When the evidence in this case is viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, as it must be on a question of instructing on lesser included offenses, it does not support an instruction on reckless second-degree murder. Jones told police that he killed Bagby when he threw her to the floor. His statement, however, cannot be reconciled with the autopsy results and the coroner's conclusion that her death was the result of manual strangulation, which took 4 to 6 minutes. Jones' self-serving statement is the only evidence that would tend to support an instruction on reckless second-degree murder. In light of all the other evidence, in particular the objective findings of the pathologist, defendant's statement is insubstantial and insufficient to support a theory of unintentional killing. [Citation omitted.] All the other evidence excludes a theory of reckless second-degree murder. Bagby died when Jones used his hands to grip her neck hard enough to break pliable bone and cartilage structures and long enough  4 to 6 minutes  to fatally deprive her of oxygen. His actions were intentional and not reckless. Jones' self-serving statement does not support a reckless second-degree murder instruction. His conduct is indistinguishable from a defendant's action in pointing a gun at a victim and pulling the trigger, which is intentional rather than reckless conduct. [Citation omitted.] In State v. Rupe, 226 Kan. 474, 477-78, 601 P.2d 675 (1979), where defendant argued that his use of hands was `insufficient to prove an intent to kill,' the court referred to strangulation as `a most effective means of killing.' 267 Kan. at 633. Jones further argued that he was incapable of forming the intent to kill the victim because of his use of alcohol and cocaine. The court rejected this argument as follows: What Jones' argument does not take into account is that an intoxicated defendant's being incapable of forming the intent to kill does not transform his or her conduct into conduct so reckless in the circumstances as to manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life. In other words, intoxication can eliminate intent to kill so that the killing is unintentional under the law, but it may not supply the extreme recklessness element of unintentional second-degree murder. Thus, evidence of voluntary intoxication alone will not justify an instruction on reckless second-degree murder as a lesser offense of premeditated first-degree murder. 267 Kan. at 634. Drennan argues that this case is factually distinguishable from Jones because Jones involved manual strangulation while, in this case, Drennan placed Shelbree in a choke hold from behind during a physical confrontation between them. Drennan contends a reasonable jury could have found that he recklessly choked Shelbree by attempting to restrain her in too aggressive a manner and by keeping her in the choke hold too forcefully and for too long. Drennan also argues a reasonable jury could have found that his intoxication impaired his judgment and caused him to act recklessly. Instead, because the jury was instructed only on first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder, Drennan contends the jury was unfairly forced to either convict Drennan of intentional murder or acquit him. Drennan's argument ignores some crucial facts, all of which point to intentional rather than reckless behavior. Shelbree was found with an electric cord around her neck; her fingers were bruised from trying to pull that cord away from her neck. Her injuries were consistent with a combination of manual and ligature strangulation. Furthermore, even accepting Drennan's version of the facts as true, placing someone in a choke hold with such force that it breaks the hyoid bone and causes hemorrhaging of the neck muscles and for such a length of time (at least 4 minutes) that blood and oxygen to the brain are cut off cannot be deemed anything but intentional behavior. Drennan's attempt to differentiate between a choke hold and manual strangulation is not convincing. This case cannot be distinguished from Jones. As in Jones, the trial court's refusal to give instructions based upon reckless rather than intentional behavior was not error.