Opinion ID: 662165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Marvin Harris appeal--92-10699

Text: 11 Marvin and Calles join in Raquel's argument about dual juries. But nothing even arguably prejudicial to them occurred because of the use of dual juries. It follows that they cannot prevail on this claim. Marvin also joins Raquel's argument on the permissive inference jury instruction. Our discussion above applies to him as well. 12 Marvin argues that the court erred by instructing the jury that it could find knowledge if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability that cocaine or some prohibited drug was in the vehicle and deliberately avoided learning the truth, but not if the defendant believed there was no contraband in the vehicle or was simply careless. Marvin did not object to this instruction below, and does not explain why he claims on appeal that the instruction should not have been given. We reject Marvin's argument that the failure to object amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. This case involved a drug smuggler using a secret compartment, with a defense that the Harrises were blind mules. This is the circumstance in which the instruction was approved in United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 698-99 (9th Cir.) (en banc) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). The Strickland standard would not require an objection in these circumstances, nor is it plain that, had an objection been made, it would have or should have been sustained. 13 Marvin also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not object to the permissive inference instruction. The record is adequate for us to review this claim now, even though this case is the direct appeal. We reject it. Rubio-Villareal had not yet come down, so Marvin's attorney could not be expected to anticipate it. In a long and complex trial, it is not possible, nor is it usually effective, for a lawyer to object to everything which may conceivably be objectionable--he may make the wise tactical decision to refrain from objecting so that when he does object, the judge pays attention to what he says. Morris v. California, 945 F.2d 1456, 1463 (9th Cir.1991). 14 We also reject Marvin's argument that the district court should have suppressed the evidence obtained in the search of his home in Alabama, the recreational vehicle there, and his safety deposit box. The lawfulness of a search and seizure is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo. United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir.1992). The probable cause finding is reviewed de novo, while findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Nance, 962 F.2d 860, 862 (9th Cir.1992). 15 The warrant for the search of the house and motor home was supported by an affidavit that the daughter-in-law had received a phone call telling her to flee from the house immediately, take the motor home away with her, and abandon it. The DEA had told the officer that another motor home had been used by the Harrises to smuggle a large amount of cocaine across the border in secret compartments. The son again called the daughter-in-law and told her to get the key to Marvin's safe deposit boxes and hold it for him, so that he could clean the box out later. This information amply supported the issuance of the warrant. The warrant itself was reasonably specific, albeit hard to read because of the run-on sentence. United States v. Rodriguez, 869 F.2d 479, 486 (9th Cir.1989). The subsequent examinations of the cocaine smudges apparently were not put at issue below, so cannot be grounds for reversal here. United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1086 n. 17. 16 The safe deposit boxes were searched on a separate federal warrant. The record provided to us does not show whether the federal district court which issued the search warrant for the safe deposit box had the affidavit submitted to the state court about the telephone call, in which Marvin's son told his wife to get the key so he could clean the box out. The DEA agent's affidavit, which the record shows was attached to the application for the warrant, said that in his experience and training, he had learned that large scale drug traffickers often hid large amounts of currency obtained from drug sales in their safe deposit boxes. If the federal court had both affidavits, probable cause was amply established. If the federal issuing officer had only the DEA agent's affidavit, then whether probable cause was established would be a closer question. We need not resolve it, though, because the warrant was sufficient on its face and not plainly defective, so suppression would be barred under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 17 A violation of Alabama law (if there was any) in the execution of the warrant by city police rather than county sheriffs is immaterial. No federal constitutional right was violated which would require suppression. Nor, for the same reason, does it matter whether the state warrant violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 41. 18 AFFIRMED.