Opinion ID: 2002049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Minimum Use Provisions and DOT Regulations

Text: When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment has been granted and review the trial court's decision for error of law. Estate of Althenn v. Althenn, 609 A.2d 711, 714 (Me.1992). Hewins argues that the minimum use requirement in the contracts violates DOT regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 255.6(b), which reads: No system vendor shall directly or indirectly prohibit a subscriber from obtaining or using any other system. 14 C.F.R. § 255.6(b) (1992) (emphasis added). Hewins asserts that the minimum use clause indirectly prohibits it from obtaining or using another system. Hewins first raised this issue in a motion for dismissal which was denied by the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Cole, J. ). Hewins renewed this defense in its answer. On a motion by United and Covia, the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Perkins, J. ) struck the defense under the law of the case doctrine. Hewins argues, as a preliminary matter, that this was error because the law of the case cannot be established on a motion to dismiss. The law of the case doctrine is based on the sound policy that in the interests of finality and intra-court comity a Superior Court justice should not, in subsequent proceedings involving the same case, overrule or reconsider the decision of another justice. Grant v. City of Saco, 436 A.2d 403, 405 (Me.1981). Although the rule does not act as a complete bar to reconsideration, we have held that a judge may decline to review an issue already determined on a motion for dismissal. Id. The court's decision to strike an issue already decided by a previous justice on a motion to dismiss provides Hewins no grounds for relief. See id. United and Covia also raise preliminary matters. First, they maintain that Hewins did not properly preserve the DOT regulation issue because they did not raise this argument in opposition to the plaintiffs' second motion for a summary judgment. This contention is meritless; Hewins is not required to continue to raise an issue struck from the case. United and Covia further argue that Hewins cannot use the violation of a DOT regulation as a defense to the contract action because the regulation provides no private cause of action. We need not reach this issue, however, because regardless of whether a private right of action exists, the minimum use clause does not violate section 255.6(b). Cf. In re Apollo Air Passenger Computer Reservation System (CRS), 720 F.Supp. 1061, 1065 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (in similar suit by United, identical minimum use provision held not to violate section 255.6(b)). The minimum use clause merely sets a benchmark for use equal to one half of the average use during the first six months of a contract. Id. Clapp was free to control its own use of the Apollo system during the first six months of the contract to establish the minimum usage requirement and Hewins assumed Clapp's liability under the contract. [2] Hewins points out that since In re Apollo was decided, the DOT has amended its rules to expressly prohibit minimum use provisions. See 57 Fed.Reg. 43,836 (1992) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 255.8). Hewins asserts that this DOT action clarified that section 255.6(b) was intended to prohibit minimum use clauses. We reject this contention. In discussing its amendments, the DOT stated that the current regulations were inadequate to prevent minimum use clauses. The fact that section 255.6(b) failed to accomplish its goals is not reason to interpret it differently than it was written and interpreted by both the DOT and the courts.