Opinion ID: 771678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing Against HUD

Text: 40 We hold that Homeowners do not have standing to sue HUD. We specifically held in Tyler II that: 41 HUD's obligation did not extend further than the terms of the Agreement because the environmental review process was complete and the plaintiffs have no quarrel with the adequacy of those reviews. At most, the plaintiffs will be able to enforce an agree ment whereby HUD is to engage in consultation. 42 Tyler II, 136 F.3d at 609 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Stipulation 8 of the MOA states that: 43 If any of the signatories to this Agreement believes that the terms of this Agreement cannot be carried out, or that an amendment to the terms of the Agreement cannot be carried out, or that an amendment to the terms of the Agreement must be made, that signatory shall immediately notify the other signatories and request consultation to amend this Agreement. 44 We conclude that the MOA alone is not an adequate basis, as a matter of law, to hold HUD liable for NEPA or NHPA violations. There is neither a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of nor is there any redressability in relation to HUD. Under Stipulation 8, only signatories to the MOA can request consultation and any consultation held would only be between the signatories. Stipulation 8 does not afford Homeowners the opportunity either to call for or to be part of any consultations. In these respects, Stipulation 8 differs from Stipulation 5 in that the latter permits the public to raise objections and, arguably, requires the City to consult with the objecting members of the public. 45 We read Tyler II to preclude our consideration of any obligation imposed upon HUD under the statutes or regulations because Tyler II explicitly limits HUD's potential liability to the terms of the MOA. See Tyler II, 136 F.3d at 609. Under 36 C.F.R. 800.6(c), [t]he Agency Official shall ensure that the undertaking is carried out in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement. Under 40 C.F.R. 1505.3, mitigation established during review of the EIS and committed as part of the decision shall be implemented by the lead agency. Even assuming that these regulations could reasonably be interpreted to impose upon HUD the duty to insure that the other signatories to the MOA meet their obligations thereunder, the law of the case bars consideration of such regulation based arguments. 11 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997) (citing Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)) (holding that under the law of the case doctrine, a court should not reopen issues decided in earlier stages of the same litigation); Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000) (Were this court addressing the issue on a `clean slate,' such an argument may have merit . . . . However, the slate is not clean.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We, therefore, conclude that the MOA alone cannot provide a basis for standing against HUD. 46 First, there simply is not an adequate causal connection between Stipulation 8 and the asserted injury. See Regents of the Univ. v. Shalala, 82 F.3d 291, 298 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the alleged injury and conduct of defendants were too attenuated to establish standing); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 504-07. Any benefit Homeowners received from consultations under Stipulation 8 would only derive from the action of another signatory in requesting consultation. See Virginia Sur., 144 F.3d at 1246 (holding that causation cannot arise from the independent action of a third party). Even if consultation were requested by a signatory under Stipulation 8, it is highly speculative that the signatories would ultimately agree to amend the MOA in a manner benefitting Homeowners. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Simon, 426 U.S. at 42-43. 47 Not only is there no standing against HUD based on Stipulation 8 under traditional Article III standing, but Stipulation 8 does not even provide a basis for procedural standing because it in no way accords Homeowners any procedural right to protect [their] concrete interest.  Churchill County, 150 F.3d at 1078. 48