Opinion ID: 2191641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Admission of evidence as to Kerpelman's further[ing] fraud on the Court

Text: This exception in its entirety reads: Levin erroneously admitted evidence concerning Respondent's further(ing) fraud on the Court (See page 67 of Levin's opinion) although the Respondent was not charged with this. This was the material relating to Malcomb having committed perjury in obtaining his original divorce by stating that the separation took place before the date when it actually did. This was another side issue brought in by Levin, it obviously colored his decision although he did not make a finding of guilty on this matter, but the admission of this evidence must have been prejudicial. See Bar Association v. Cockrell, 270 Md. 686, 313 A.2d 816 (1974) holding that the charges must be sufficiently clear and specific so as to make the attorney aware of what he is compelled to answer for and defend against. At no time prior to the admission of this evidence by Levin had Kerpelman been charged with anything having to do with this backdating, which occurred long before Kerpelman was representing Malcomb. It was sprung on Kerpelman for the first time in the midst of the trial. This is a false issue, to put it mildly. We have already quoted from Judge Levin's opinion (without specifying, however, that he said it on page 67) to the effect that on the issue of backdating of the separation agreement he was not convinced by clear and convincing evidence that [Kerpelman] furthered a fraud on the court. He also said in that opinion: Respondent tried to exploit the fact that Malcomb accommodated [his former wife] when she backdated their separation agreement one month. This was mendacious conduct on Malcomb's part and Respondent excoriated Malcomb. However, by the same token, Respondent too knew that the March 29, 1974 agreement was based upon a fraudulent date and he too did the same thing as Malcomb  he kept quiet. His testimony concerning this inaction is evasive and unconvincing. Apart from this, I find Malcomb's testimony truthful and credible. Kerpelman began his cross-examination of Malcomb on June 19. When court reconvened on June 21 other witnesses were put on the stand as an accommodation to various persons. Then Malcomb resumed the stand for further cross-examination. The first question propounded by Mr. Kerpelman to Malcomb was whether he had ever lied to get a desired result in an important matter. After a response that he was unaware of having done so, Kerpelman showed him a letter from Malcomb to Kerpelman dated May 5, 1976. Then the record reflects: MR. KERPELMAN: Now, if Your Honor please, I feel that, perhaps, it is incumbent on me to suggest to the witness that he has a right, I believe, not to answer under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Shall I advise him on that? A lengthy discussion then ensued. Ultimately a copy of the letter in question was made and delivered, with her husband's consent, to Mrs. Malcomb in order that she might consult an attorney on his behalf. When court resumed that afternoon it was brought out that after consultation with his attorney Malcomb had no objection to testifying. The letter in question was shown to Malcomb. After Malcomb's identification, it was admitted into evidence upon Kerpelman's motion as Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. The first paragraph of the letter states: At the time my former wife and I signed our separation agreement, she requested that I agree that the separation actually had taken place the previous February rather than in March. She seemed very anxious that I do this, so I agreed. This obtained the divorce one month sooner than would otherwise have been possible. Having himself introduced the letter into evidence, Kerpelman cannot now be heard to complain relative to its admission. Moreover, as Kerpelman concedes, the trial judge did not find clear and convincing evidence to indicate that Kerpelman had furthered a fraud on the court.