Opinion ID: 2600307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Alleging Multiple Felony-murder Special Circumstances

Text: Defendant contends the plain language of section 190.2 prohibits the finding of more than one felony-murder special circumstance per homicide. Citing the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United State Constitution, he claims this error denied him the right to a fair penalty trial, a fair penalty determination, and the benefit of a state-created right and a sentence imposed in accordance with state law. Although we reverse one of the two special circumstances in this case, we assess the merits of the claim to determine whether defendant may again face a kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation based on his murder of Leanora Wong. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d 577, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) The indictment in this case alleged two distinct special circumstances. It alleged that defendant murdered Wong (1) during the commission or attempted commission of a kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(ii)), and (2) during the commission or attempted of an unlawful penetration with a foreign object (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(xi)). As we previously have explained, [o]nly a strained construction of the language of [section 190.2] would support a conclusion that section 190.2 [, subdivision] (a)(17) permits only one special circumstance finding regardless of the number of felonies in which a defendant was engaged at the time of a murder. Unlike the multiple-murder special circumstances considered in People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222[, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115], the felony-murder special circumstance does not rely on the same offense for each special circumstance charged. Separate special circumstance findings based on separate underlying felonies do not, therefore, create a risk of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty based on the number of special circumstances rather than the conduct underlying each. ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 682, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) The hypothetical scenarios defendant sets forth are distinguishable from his own situation because each posits a scenario in which the defendant committed a single special circumstance on multiple occasions rather than the situation here, in which the defendant was alleged to have committed two distinct special circumstances, each of which `involved violation of [a] distinct interest that society seeks to protect.' ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 529, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561.) In the latter situation, a defendant `may be deemed more culpable than a defendant who commits only one [special circumstance.' ( Id. at p. 529, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561.) Defendant's suggestion that no distinct societal interests were involved because both felonies were crimes of violence against the person ignores the distinction between crimes that violate an individual's freedom of movement and those which violate an individual's freedom from unsolicited and violent sexual invasions. We conclude the indictment properly alleged two felony-murder special circumstances.