Opinion ID: 484885
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The District Court's Refusal to Allow Defense Witnesses

Text: 29 to Testify 30 Bales contends that the district court's refusal to let three of his witnesses testify is a denial of his sixth amendment rights under the confrontation clause and his fifth amendment due process rights. These witnesses are Cain, the legal assistant of Bales' attorney; Arnold, the businessman who allegedly sold Bales the Volkswagen and the Audi; and Special Agent Carroll. 31 Bales' arguments concerning the latter two witnesses may be rejected out of hand. Bales asserts that Arnold responded to his subpoena, but was so thoroughly intimidated by FBI agents who questioned him that he was afraid to testify at trial. He claims that this intimidation constituted a violation of his due process rights under the fifth amendment. In his brief, Bales relies upon United States v. Ballesteros-Acuna, 527 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.1975), to support his assertion. In that case, the court indicated that government action making a defense witness unavailable to testify may raise fifth amendment problems. Yet, the Ballesteros-Acuna court described only one instance in which such a constitutional violation might occur: the government's deportation of illegal alien witnesses. Certainly, the vaguely alleged intimidation of Arnold does not rise to this level of government activity. 32 Bales also challenged the court's refusal to let him call Agent Carroll as an adverse witness in the suppression hearing on July 13, 1986. In evaluating this challenge, we recognize the trial court's broad discretion in delineating the scope of testimony; under appropriate circumstanes, the court may refuse to allow a witness to testify. See Gajewski v. United States, 321 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 968, 84 S.Ct. 486, 11 L.Ed.2d 416 (1964). Agent Carroll's testimony was especially unnecessary in this case, since defense counsel had already extensively cross-examined Carroll in the earlier suppression hearing on May 13, 1986. See United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 792 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 2945, 64 L.Ed.2d 826 (1980) (defendant, who had meaningful opportunity to cross-examine co-defendant when co-defendant testified at suppression hearing, was not denied his confrontation rights under the sixth amendment when his co-defendant did not testify at trial). 33 The exclusion of Cain's testimony presents the only difficult issue. At the close of Bales' case, three of his witnesses, attorneys Smith and Sheffield, and Smith's legal assistant, Cain, were unavailable to testify. The court allowed Smith and Sheffield to testify the following day, since they were tied up in trials. Yet, the judge did not allow Cain, who was assisting Smith at his trial, to testify. Any error in excluding Cain's testimony, however, was harmless. Much of his testimony, including identification of the Volkswagen and the Audi, would have been merely cumulative. Additionally, Bales' sixth amendment argument is completely unfounded. He claims that the court destroyed the mission of the confrontation clause in not allowing Cain to testify. Yet, Bales' complaint concerns his ability to call Cain as his own witness, who would testify on his behalf, not to confront a witness against him.F. Application and Constitutionality Of 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 408(g)(2) 34 Bales attacks his convictions under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 408(g)(2) (West 1983), 3 which makes false representation of one's social security number a felony. Before discussing the substance of his attack, we note a procedural flaw. Bales' brief, which reaches the fifty-page maximum, see Fed.R.App.P. 28(g), discusses this issue only in outline form. The outline refers to a lengthy section of the Joint Appendix for a more detailed exposition of this argument. In similar instances, other courts have stated that arguments incorporated by reference need not be considered on appeal. See, e.g., National Aluminate Corp. v. Permutit Co., 144 F.2d 93, 94 (8th Cir.1944). In this case, it makes little difference whether or not we consider Bales' full argument, since it is wholly unconvincing. He asserts that Sec. 408(g)(2) should not be applied to commercial transactions, such as his bank deals, and that the statute violates first amendment rights to both freedom of religion and privacy. 35 Bales argues that Sec. 408(g)(2) does not apply to commercial transactions, but operates only when fraud is perpetrated on the government. He contends that Congress did not intend to reach private transactions, where just anybody might be harmed by the falsification of a social security number. Bales, however, cites no legislative history to support his speculations. He also ignores the plain language of the statute, which reaches anyone who, for the purpose of obtaining anything of value from any person or for any other purpose (emphasis added), falsely represents a number to be his social security number. 36 Bales next asks us to take judicial notice of the many Christians in our country, and asserts that Sec. 408(g)(2) violates their first amendment rights to exercise their religious beliefs freely. He quotes Revelations and various other books of the Bible which stress the glorification of God's name and the notion that numbering of individuals as a form of identification is a great sin. This free exercise argument has two fatal flaws. First, as the government points out in its brief, Bales was not prosecuted for failing to use an assigned number, but for knowingly and intentionally using false numbers for fraudulent purposes. He should not be allowed to avoid a fraud conviction by arguing that the social security numbering system should not have been imposed on him. Additionally, Bales has not demonstrated the existence of a religious belief that will sustain a free exercise claim. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). A way of life which is of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living will satisfy the Yoder test. Id. at 406 U.S. 216, 92 S.Ct. 1533. The use or nonuse of Bales' social security number on his loan applications and tax returns plainly does not fall into this category. It is more on the order of a philosophical and personal belief, which does not garner protection under the first amendment. Id. at 406 U.S. 216, 92 S.Ct. 1533. 37 As an afterthought, Bales argues that his conviction under Sec. 408(g)(2) violates his constitutional right to privacy. This argument is utterly unsubstantiated. The constitutional right to privacy does not protect the fraudulent acts which Bales committed. G. The Double Jeopardy Claim 38 The last of Bales' substantive challenges is a double jeopardy claim. Bales argues that the court improperly invoked the findings that he had used a false social security number in counts 6 and 9 to convict him of count 5 (false statement to Dominion) and count 8 (false statement to First Virginia), respectively. He cites the test set out in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932): where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger may, indeed, be applicable to this situation. The trial court used proof of the same element--falsification of Bales' social security number--to find distinct violations of Sec. 408(g)(2) and Sec. 1014. 39 Any error, however, is harmless, since proof of the same element is not essential to both convictions. See, e.g., Alabernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (defendants' convictions on conspiracy to import marijuana and conspiracy to distribute marijuana under separate statutory sections, and imposition of consecutive sentences, did not violate double jeopardy clause of fifth amendment). Where a single transaction constitutes two or more offenses but the lesser offense is not necessarily involved in the greater and the facts necessary to convict on the second prosecution would not necessarily have convicted on the first, then the first prosecution is not a bar to the second. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law Sec. 189 (1965). This principle extends to the case at bar. Here, the lesser offense, falsification of a social security number, was not necessary to a finding that Bales had violated Sec. 1014 in counts 5 and 8. In ruling that Bales submitted false statements to the two banks, the court noted that Bales presented a false contract of sale to Dominion (count 5), and presented false tax returns to the government (count 8), among other things. The trial judge easily could have found violations of these two counts without resting upon Bales' falsification of his social security number. H. Restitution 40 In his final argument, Bales attacks the district court's restitutionary award. The court ordered Bales to pay Central Fidelity $7,729.68, allegedly without proof of claim. As Bales notes, the district court must resolve disputes concerning restitution; the government bears the burden of proving the amount of the loss. See 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3664(d) (West 1985). The government clearly met this burden with respect to Central Fidelity. 41 The district court based its restitutionary award on information contained in the government's presentence report. The pertinent information appears in two places. The Victim Impact Statement reads: Central Fidelity Bank is the victim in this case. According to Security Officer Earl Rippe, the total loss to the bank is $7,729.68. The Evaluation at the close of the report repeats this figure. As a bank official, Rippe was in a position to provide verification of Central Fidelity's loss. 42 Bales was clearly aware of these statements in the presentence report before he voiced his objections. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel indicated that Bales had received and read the relevant portions of the report. Only after reviewing the report during the sentencing hearing did Bales attack the restitutionary award. Not only was his attack untimely, it was also inconsistent. Bales' counsel first asserted that there was no documentation of the figure. Later in the hearing, she acknowledged this documentation, by noting the figure which Rippe gave to the probation officer. We reject the argument that Rippe's figure does not provide adequate proof of the loss, for the reasons stated above. 43 Robert E. Bales has failed to convince us that any of the eight errors he assigns require a reversal. Bales' convictions, then, must stand. The results of Bales' dealings with the three banks are somewhat different than he expected. Instead of receiving loans and a line of credit on false information, Bales receives a jail sentence and a restitutionary order. 44 AFFIRMED.