Opinion ID: 2982544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disability Inquiries

Text: So too with § 12112(d)(4)(A)’s prohibition on “inquiries . . . as to whether [an] employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability”—what the EEOC has termed “disability-related inquiries.” Plaintiffsappellees devote little attention to this issue in their appellate briefing, but the EEOC directs us to an example appearing in the EEOC guidance: disability-related inquiries “may include . . . asking an employee whether s/he currently is taking any prescription drugs or medications, [or did] in the past, or monitoring an employee’s taking of such No. 11-6088 Bates, et al. v. Dura Automotive Sys. Page 16 drugs or medications.” DRI&ME Guidance Part B.1. Language in our recent decision Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio—a case applying analogous provisions of the Rehabilitation Act—echoes this principle. 636 F.3d 245, 254 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Obviously, asking an employee whether he is taking prescription drugs or medication, or questions seek[ing] information about illnesses, mental conditions, or other impairments [an employee] has or had in the past[,] trigger the ADA’s (and hence the Rehabilitation Act’s) protections.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Yet, as with the medical-examination inquiry, the issue ultimately turns on contested issues of fact. For starters, the guidance’s definition of “disability-related inquiry” cuts against a broad application of the above example. The guidance defines disability-related inquiry as “a question (or series of questions) that is likely to elicit information about a disability.” DRI&ME Guidance Part B.1. Conversely, the guidance explains that “[q]uestions that are not likely to elicit information about a disability are not disabilityrelated inquiries and, therefore, are not prohibited under the ADA.” Id. Examples of permissible inquiries include asking about an employee’s general well-being, a nondisability impairment such as a broken limb, and alcohol or illegal-drug use. EEOC Guidance Part B.1. Dura denies asking employees about their general prescription-drug usage. Viewing the evidence in its favor, Dura’s third-party-administered test revealing only machine-restricted medications differs from directly asking employees about prescription-drug usage or monitoring the same, per the guidance example.6 Next, the EEOC guidance lists prescription inquiries as conduct that “may” constitute a disability-related inquiry; it does not state a categorical rule. Id.; see also id. 6 The footnote illustrating this guidance example cites cases involving more intrusive employer policies that monitored employees’ use of prescription medications. See Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 1997) (policy required employees to report all medications and permitted only supervisor-approved prescription medications); Krocka v. Bransfield, 969 F. Supp. 1073, 1079–80 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (policy utilizing blood tests monitored police officers’ use of psychotropic medication). No. 11-6088 Bates, et al. v. Dura Automotive Sys. Page 17 Question 8 (explaining that an employer “[g]enerally” may not “ask all employees what prescription medications they are taking” because such questioning “is not job-related and consistent with business necessity”). Underscoring this point, the Preemployment Guidance gives this nuanced instruction: May an employer ask applicants about their lawful drug use? No, if the question is likely to elicit information about disability. Employers should know that many questions about current or prior lawful drug use are likely to elicit information about a disability, and are therefore impermissible at the pre-offer stage. For example, questions like, “What medications are you currently taking?” or “Have you ever taken AZT?” certainly elicit information about whether an applicant has a disability. Preemployment Guidance (emphasis added). The district court emphasized this likely-effects analysis in its two previous rulings denying judgment on this claim, stating that: “[B]ecause Dura’s general focus was on the feared consequences that the drugs would have on its employees—not on the underlying malady—the [disability] inquiries prong does not appear to be a good ‘fit’ for the facts of this case.” Based on the court’s review of the record and the unique facts of this case, it remains questionable whether the evidence at trial will show that Dura’s questioning was designed to or did elicit information about disabilities. However, as discussed herein, the evidence adduced at trial will determine the ultimate applicability of these terms to each plaintiff. (R. 116, Summ. J. Order at 11 n.5 (quoting R. 97, Recons. Op. at 11 n.4).) What changed? The court’s sua sponte Rule 50 judgment for plaintiffs fails to explain the about-face (see R. 237, Trial Tr. at 622–23), and it does not appear that the evidence developed at trial obviated this genuine factual dispute. We agree with the district court’s earlier analysis: a jury could reasonably conclude that Dura implemented a drug-testing policy in a manner designed to avoid gathering information about employees’ disabilities. No. 11-6088 Bates, et al. v. Dura Automotive Sys. Page 18 The Lee dictum does not counsel otherwise. First of all, Lee did not apply these enforcement guidances to a drug test. It rejected the employees’ Rehabilitation Act claim, finding that the employer could require employees returning from sick leave to provide a doctor’s note describing the “nature of the illness.” 636 F.3d at 257–59. Further, the principal case it cites for the proposition that an employer may not request an employee’s prescription medications, Doe, held that such a demand presented an issue of fact regarding whether the employer discriminated against a job applicant who used psychotropic medications. Doe, 531 F.3d at 358–59.7 A drug test that requires positive-testing employees to disclose medications to a third party, who then relays only machine-restricted medications to the employer, need not reveal information about a disability. As noted above, plaintiffs-appellees point to no evidence showing that such a limited disclosure likely reveals information about a disability. They conclusorily state that “[c]learly, this protocol was designed to seek information on possible weaknesses in employees who were per se excluded from the workplace in violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A),” but a reasonable jury could disagree. Cf. Harrison, 593 F.3d at 1210, 1216 (finding a question of fact regarding whether the employer’s presence during a temporary employee’s drug test and questioning by an MRO “exceeded the scope of the [disability-related inquiry] likely-to-elicit standard,” where the employer overheard discussion of the applicant’s epilepsy and his use of prescription barbituates).