Opinion ID: 2226571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions Involving Felony Murder.

Text: Liggins next argues that the district court erred in its instructions concerning the willful injury, sexual abuse, and kidnapping charges. Specifically, he contends the instructions were in violation of our holding in Liggins I that none of the elements of the forcible felonies could be proven to have occurred in Iowa. We disagree. At Liggins' retrial, evidence was admitted concerning the willful injury, sexual abuse, and kidnapping of Jennifer. Over Liggins' objection, the district court instructed the jury on both theories of guilt: premeditated murder and felony murder. In its marshaling instruction, the jury was instructed that it must find: 4. The defendant either (a) acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and with a specific intent to kill Jennifer Lewis; or (b) was participating in the offense of Willful Injury, Sexual Abuse or Kidnapping of or to Jennifer Lewis as defined in Instruction No. 23. Consistent with the felony-murder theory of guilt, the court also instructed the jury on the elements of the underlying theories. Liggins claims that, with these instructions, the district court judge essentially tried him again for willful injury, sexual abuse, and kidnapping. However, none of those instructions sought or authorized a jury determination of where those crimes had been committed. In other words, those instructions did not include a jurisdictional element, as did the murder instruction. Further, no verdict forms for the underlying felonies were issued to the jury. Liggins also argues that, based on our reversal of the convictions for the underlying felonies in Liggins I, we held that the felony-murder theory could not be pursued at his retrial. This argument is without merit. In Liggins I, we stated [t]here is substantial evidence that the perpetrator of the crime acted with malice aforethought and was either participating in a forcible felony or acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with specific intent to kill. Liggins I, 524 N.W.2d at 186. The fact that Iowa did not have jurisdiction to convict Liggins of the underlying felonies does not mean those crimes cannot be used to establish felony murder at retrial. The jury was never asked to determine where the underlying felonies were committed, and they were never asked to convict Liggins of the underlying felonies. Participation in a felony for the felony-murder rule is not the same as completion and conviction of the underlying felony. See State v. Phams, 342 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Iowa 1983) (State need only prove participation, not successful completion, of the offense). It is not necessary to prove commission of an underlying felony in order to convict a defendant of felony murder. State v. Walters, 426 N.W.2d 136, 141 (Iowa 1988). All that is required is proof that the defendant was participating in the underlying felony. Id. It is not necessary to prove that Liggins' participation in the underlying felonies occurred in Iowa. Liggins also contends that the territorial jurisdiction instruction (Instruction No. 24) allowed the jury to find that the underlying felonies occurred fully or partly in Iowa. This argument is also without merit. Instruction No. 24 clearly relates only to the marshaling instruction for murder, because that was the only instruction containing a jurisdictional element. There is no basis to conclude that the jury's finding of jurisdiction for murder was based on anything other than the presence of Jennifer's body in Iowa, which was proper. Finally, Liggins contends that submission of the instructions on the felony-murder theory violated his double jeopardy rights based on the results of Liggins I. We find no violation. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. U.S. Const. amend. V; Dressler v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 542 N.W.2d 563, 565 (Iowa 1996). Even assuming that our holding in Liggins I is an acquittal of Liggins for the underlying felonies, he was not prosecuted for those offenses in his retrial. We conclude the jury instructions are correct statements of the law and are supported by substantial evidence.