Opinion ID: 219133
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority's Same Case Dictum

Text: The majority suggests, without expressly holding, that the law of the case doctrine does not apply here because each of Alaimalo's petitions were separate and were not part of the same case. See Majority Op. at 1049-50. The idea that repeated attacks on the same judgment of conviction seeking identical relief are not part of the same case is simply wrong. See, e.g., DiGuglielmo v. Smith, 366 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2004); Shore v. Warden, Stateville Prison, 942 F.2d 1117, 1123 (7th Cir.1991); Raulerson v. Wainwright, 753 F.2d 869, 875 (11th Cir.1985). Indeed, the savings clause in § 2255(e) on which the majority relies to permit the filing of a petition pursuant to § 2241 is simply a way of avoiding the limitations on petitions pursuant to § 2255 in very narrow circumstances. The scope of the remedies provided by these two statutes is the same. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); see Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir.2000); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999). And § 2255 petitions have always been regarded as part of the underlying criminal case. See United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1047 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000); Grady v. United States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir.1990). There is no logical reason for treating § 2241 petitions differently. Nevertheless, the majority claims to find support in Ninth Circuit caselaw for the proposition that the law of the case doctrine has not been applied to claims in successive habeas petitions. Majority Op. at 1049. What the majority does not, and cannot, say is that we have held that the law of the case doctrine cannot apply to such claims. On the contrary, the only cases it cites are those in which we have applied the law of the case doctrine to habeas corpus petitions following a panel's review of the case on direct appeal. See id. (citing Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1140 n. 23 (9th Cir.2009), and United States v. Garcia, 77 F.3d 274, 276 (9th Cir.1996)). The reason that we have not applied it to claims in successive petitions is that we have had no occasion to do so. Indeed, two of the cases that the majority cites for the proposition that this circuit has not applied [the law of the case doctrine] to claims in successive habeas petitions did not even involve the law of the case doctrine. See id. at 1049 (citing Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1110-12 (9th Cir.2000), and Farmer v. McDaniel, 98 F.3d 1548, 1557-58 (9th Cir.1996)). Moreover, there is no basis for the majority's suggestion that there is a split among out sister circuits as to whether to apply the law of the case to successive habeas petitions. Majority Op. at 1050. While the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have applied the law of the case doctrine to successive habeas petitions, Di-Guglielmo v. Smith, 366 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2004); Shore v. Warden, Stateville Prison, 942 F.2d 1117, 1123 (7th Cir.1991); Raulerson v. Wainwright, 753 F.2d 869, 875 (11th Cir.1985), the two cases that the majority cites as holding to the contrary contain language that barely rises to the level of dictum. Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 398 n. 11 (6th Cir.2003) (en banc) (Whether successive habeas petitions constitute stages in a single, continuing lawsuit is a question that should be carefully considered[, a]lthough we do not decide the question. . . .) (internal citation omitted); Lacy v. Gardino, 791 F.2d 980, 985 (1st Cir.1986) (We need not decide. . . whether the two habeas petitions are the same or different cases requiring the application of either the law of the case doctrine or stare decisis. ). Thus, while there does not presently exist a circuit split on the issue, the majority opinion goes a long way towards creating one.