Opinion ID: 1498325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress in Negligence Cases

Text: The Jarretts first claim that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Mr. Jones because they presented facts that would permit them to recover damages for Mr. Jarrett's emotional distress as a direct victim, pursuant to Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. banc 1983). They contend, therefore, that the trial court erred in applying a zone-of-danger analysis, an analysis used to determine whether a bystander plaintiff may recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital, 799 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. banc 1990). The law applicable to recovering damages for emotional distress arising from negligence claims has developed significantly in the past quarter of a century. Prior to 1983, Missouri defendants were not liable for negligence resulting only in emotional distress unless the plaintiff suffered a contemporaneous traumatic physical injury. Trigg v. The St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Railway Co., 74 Mo. 147, 1881 WL 4742 (1881); Pretsky v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 396 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Mo.1965). The contemporaneous physical injury requirement was called the impact rule. In Bass , this Court abandoned the impact rule and adopted new and less restrictive requirements a plaintiff must establish to recover damages for emotional distress. 646 S.W.2d at 772-73. Bass held that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress provided: (1) the defendant should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, and (2) the emotional distress or mental injury is medically diagnosable and is sufficiently severe as to be medically significant. Id. The Court limited its holding to direct victims of a defendant's negligence, expressly declining to discuss the standard to be applied in bystander cases, where the plaintiff claims emotional distress solely from observing injury to a third party caused by defendant's negligence. Id. at 770 n. 3. The issue of liability for a bystander's emotional distress was addressed seven years later in Asaro . In Asaro , the Court undertook to resolve the question left open in Bass : May a plaintiff recover for emotional distress resulting solely from observing injury to a third party caused by a defendant's negligence? 799 S.W.2d at 596. The Court answered affirmatively and expanded liability for emotional distress by recognizing a new cause of action for bystander plaintiffs. 799 S.W.2d at 596. Implicitly finding that bystander claims required a more restrictive test than direct-victim claims, to help ensure the authenticity of claims, the Court limited bystander recovery to a plaintiff within the zone of danger, i.e., placed in a reasonable fear of physical injury to his or her own person. Id. at 599-600. In the case at bar, the Jarretts characterize their claim as a direct-victim claim, while Mr. Jones asserts that their cause of action is a bystander claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Neither Bass nor Asaro addresses the distinction between a direct victim and a bystander. Bass does describe bystander cases in a footnote as being where a plaintiff suffers mental or emotional distress upon observing death or injury to a third party caused by a defendant's negligence, but it is not clear whether the Court contemplated a direct participant's claim for emotional distress upon observing a third party's injury. 646 S.W.2d at 770 n. 3. Asaro states that it is addressing the question: May a plaintiff recover for emotional distress resulting solely from observing injury to a third party caused by a defendant's negligence? 799 S.W.2d at 596. Neither case expressly identifies the crucial distinction, i.e., whether the plaintiff was directly involved in the accident. Nevertheless, Asaro's inclusion of the element that the plaintiff must have been in the zone of danger would be nonsensical when applied to a direct victim who, by virtue of being a direct victim, is in the zone of danger. Direct victims are persons directly involved in the accident whose emotional distress is either caused by fear for their own safety or caused by the suffering of another. See Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Oklahoma, 916 P.2d 241, 246 (Okla. 1996). Bystanders, in contrast, are persons not directly involved in the accident, but whose emotional distress is caused solely by observing acts that result in injury to a third party, rather than from the plaintiff's own personal involvement. See id. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (8th ed.2004) ( bystander. One who is present when an event takes place, but who does not become directly involved in it). Where the plaintiff is a direct victim of the accident caused by the defendant's negligence, the defendant is liable for the foreseeable emotional distress resulting therefrom. The plaintiff's cause of action is not limited to emotional distress arising from fear for the plaintiff's own safety. See Eyrich For Eyrich v. Dam, 193 N.J.Super. 244, 473 A.2d 539, 546 (App.Div.1984) (direct victim's cause of action for emotional distress is not limited to the psychological sequelae of fear for himself but rather comprehends all of the psychological sequelae which as a matter of reasonable foreseeability result from the episode as a whole); Pieters v. B-Right Trucking, 669 F.Supp. 1463, 1470 (N.D.Ind.1987) (if plaintiff satisfies the standard for recovering emotional distress damages, Indiana courts do not back up the analysis to ask whether the distress was caused by the plaintiff's own injuries or the injuries of the person sitting next to her when the crash occurred). This Court recognizes the view that a plaintiff may suffer some emotional distress as a direct victim and some emotional distress as a bystander. See Kapoulas v. Williams Ins. Agency, Inc., 11 F.3d 1380, 1384 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plaintiff was a direct-victim for emotional distress arising from his participation in the accident that killed two children, but a bystander for emotional distress arising from his witnessing their deaths). For the reasons set forth below, however, this Court finds that where a direct victim seeks damages for emotional distress, the more restrictive standards for bystander recovery are inapplicable to any part of his claim. First, Asaro's recognition of a cause of action for bystander recovery expanded liability for emotional distress; it did not limit the scope of recovery for direct-victim plaintiffs. As discussed above, Asaro addressed an issue explicitly left out of the Bass analysiswhether a bystander may recover for emotional distress from observing injury to a third party. Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 596. The additional proof elements in Asaro for bystander recovery, therefore, apply only where Bass does not apply. More importantly, the policy concerns underlying limited recovery for bystanders, such as the worry that bystander recovery encourages fraudulent claims, are not present where the plaintiff is a direct victim of the defendant's negligence. With a direct victim ... there is little fear that her claim is fraudulent or that defendants will be saddled with liability out of proportion to the degree of fault. The circumstances of the case `guarantee' the `genuineness' of [plaintiff]'s emotional distress. Long v. PKS, Inc., 12 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1298, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 103 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.1993); See also Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass'n, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 1366, 1369 (D.Nev. 1993); Pieters, 669 F.Supp. at 1470-71. Moreover, a plaintiff's direct involvement in an accident influences the plaintiff's emotional distress because the plaintiff's mental injuries are generally inseparable from the plaintiff's role in the event. See Eyrich, 473 A.2d at 546-47. Even if it were possible to identify separate sources of a plaintiff's distress, the practical difficulties of requiring a trier of fact to apply different legal standards to produce an award of damages reasonably related to plaintiff's injuries causes [this Court] to conclude that a single standard should be applied. Binns v. Fredendall, 32 Ohio St.3d 244, 513 N.E.2d 278, 280 (1987). [4] The facts in this case demonstrate how a direct victim's emotional distress from viewing injuries or death of another person involved in the accident are inseparate from the direct victim's role in the event. In their response to Mr. Jones' motion for summary judgment, the Jarretts admitted that his emotional injuries resulted from the death of Makayla in the collision. Specifically, the Jarretts admitted that Mr. Jarrett's emotional struggles, grief, and feelings of guilt after the collision stemmed from his viewing Mr. Jones' deceased daughter: (a) The worst image for plaintiff was the the `baby' lying in the mangled car; (b) Plaintiff experienced a great deal of grief for the child who died; (c) Plaintiff experienced the paradox of knowing he had no responsibility in her death and wanting her to forgive him at the same time; and (d) Plaintiff visualize[d] the little girl being in heaven and said she's the lucky one. These admissions demonstrate that the grief and distress Mr. Jarrett experienced were a result of his participation in the accident that killed Makayla, and not simply from viewing her body. The totality of these admissions establishes that Mr. Jarrett's emotional distress arose from his direct involvement in the collision, coupled with Makayla's death. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Jarretts, shows that Mr. Jarrett was driving a vehicle that was involved in a collision caused by Mr. Jones' negligence. The collision resulted in the death of Makayla Jones. Mr. Jarrett viewed her dead body and, subsequently, suffered emotional distress. Although he is suing for emotional damages caused by seeing a third party's death, his role was not that of a passive, shocked witness. His direct involvement in the collision greatly influenced his mental and emotional injury, causing him to have strong feelings of guilt and sadness for his part bringing about Makayla's death. The fact that Mr. Jarrett got out of his truck and ran to check on the individuals in the other vehicle involved in the wreck does not render him a bystander at the time he observed the carnage of the wreck. Instead, Mr. Jarrett's viewing Makayla's body and feeling grief over her death are inseparable components of the emotional distress he suffered as a result of the whole traumatic event, caused by Mr. Jones' negligence. The direct-victim concept encompasses plaintiffs suffering emotional distress from observing the injury or death of a third party, so long as the plaintiff was directly involved in the same accident. Mr. Jarrett, therefore, seeks damages for emotional distress as a direct victim. Because Mr. Jarrett is a direct victim, the trial court erred in applying the bystander limitations to his claim of damages for emotional distress. Courts from other jurisdictions faced with similar circumstances have likewise held that the bystander limitations do not apply. See Long, 12 Cal.App.4th at 1298, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 103 (plaintiff, whose foster child died when plaintiff's car was struck from behind by a tow truck, was a direct victim, not a bystander, for purposes of determining the limits on recovery of damages for emotional distress arising out of witnessing the injury and death of foster child); Hamilton v. Nestor, 265 Neb. 757, 659 N.W.2d 321, 329 (2003) (familial relationship requirement for recovery of emotional distress damages did not apply because plaintiff was a direct victim of defendant's negligence, not a bystander, when she suffered emotional distress from a collision in which defendant and defendant's daughter was fatally injured); See also Binns, 513 N.E.2d at 281; Helsel v. Hoosier, 827 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ind.App. 2005); Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 247-48; but see Montoya v. Pearson, 140 N.M. 243, 142 P.3d 11 (App.2006) (court recognizes that direct-victim theory allows a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress suffered as a result of witnessing the death of another in the same accident, but declines to adopt direct-victim theory on policy grounds).