Opinion ID: 2806478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: [¶2] We view the facts established at trial, including all reasonable inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the State. See State v. Wyman, 2015 ME 2, ¶ 15, 107 A.3d 1134. That evidence establishes that in 2013, the State charged Clarke with driving to endanger (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. 2 § 2413(1) (2014). One of the State’s witnesses in that matter was a man who observed Clarke’s acts that gave rise to the driving to endanger charge. [¶3] On September 18, 2013, before the trial on the charge of driving to endanger, Clarke went to the auto repair shop where the witness worked. Clarke began discussing the case and the upcoming hearing date, and told the witness and others that he could go to jail and lose his license if he were convicted. He suggested that “maybe [the witness] could miss [his] court date” and that the witness “should be quiet and not say anything, [he] didn’t know anything.” The witness reported the incident to the District Attorney’s office. [¶4] Clarke was indicted for tampering with a witness (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 454(1)(A)(2), and violating a condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A), to which he pleaded not guilty. After a trial, the jury found Clarke guilty of tampering with a witness, and on that basis, the court found that Clarke had violated a condition of release by committing new criminal conduct.1 The court sentenced Clarke to twelve months in prison for tampering with a witness and four concurrent months for violating a condition of release. Clarke appeals. 1 After being charged with driving to endanger, Clarke had been placed on bail. One of the conditions of that bail was that he commit no new criminal conduct. Because Clarke’s conviction for violating a condition of release is wholly dependent on his conviction for tampering with a witness, we do not address that count separately. 3