Opinion ID: 169924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Breach of Contract Issue Actually Litigated and Decided?

Text: In this case, then, the question becomes whether the parties litigated and the district court actually decided the breach of contract issue. Assessing the precise state of the record and what the earlier federal order actually said, Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148, 108 S.Ct. 1684, we conclude that it did. Wyatt included a breach of contract claim in his amended complaint. When Weyerhaeuser moved for partial summary judgment on some of Wyatt's claims, the district court ordered Weyerhaeuser to file an additional summary judgment motion encompassing the issues of breach of contract [and several other issues] App. 49. Weyerhaeuser filed a supplemental brief, expanding its motion for summary judgment to include Plaintiff's contract claim, Plaintiff's alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Plaintiff's invasion of privacy claims. App. 51. Wyatt responded, arguing that factual issues precluded summary judgment. Thus, the parties actually litigated the contract claim. Whether the district court actually decided the contract claim presents a closer question. Although the district court's order stated that it was dismissing all claims asserted against Defendant in this action, App. 254, the order explicitly discussed only some of the claims brought against Weyerhaeuser while conspicuously failing to mention the breach of contract claim, and mentioning once but then failing to discuss the negligence claim or the invasion of privacy claim. In our view, this creates sufficient ambiguity regarding the reach of the decision that we must consult the surrounding context for clarification. We note first that the district court specifically requested briefing on the contract issue, stating that this briefing would enable it to render[]a decision on all pending motions. App. 49. This makes it more likely that the court meant precisely what it saidthat it was dismissing all claims asserted by Wyatt. This conclusion is strengthened by the conduct of the parties. If there had been any doubt that all of the litigated claims were included by the court's dismissal of all claims, Wyatt could have asked the district court to reconsider the scope of its order dismissing all claims to exclude the contract claim. But Wyatt does not appear to have regarded the order as ambiguous. Instead, he appealed, representing to this court that [t]he Circuit's jurisdiction is an appeal from final order entered March 28, 2005 disposing of all parties' claims. Aplt. Br. at 6, Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 05-7037 (10th Cir. June 21, 2005). He thus construed the district court's order as a final judgment under Rule 54(a), which necessarily means the district court's order resolved all the claims before it. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (directing that an order is not final and appealable if it adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties). If the district court's order had left one of Wyatt's claims undecided, Wyatt could not have appealed that order without first seeking certification under Rule 54(b). Because Wyatt took the position that the district court's order resolved all claims and successfully invoked the jurisdiction of the appellate court on the basis of that interpretation of the order, we are inclined to resolve any ambiguity against his new and contradictory interpretation. Wyatt claims that he treated the previous order as final because the court had declined pendent jurisdiction and thus dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. This is not the best reading of the record. Our duty is to examine what the earlier federal order actually said, Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148, 108 S.Ct. 1684, and it does not give any reason to suspect that the court declined pendent jurisdiction over the contract claim. After all, the court decided other state law claims by Wyatt, such as his claim for false imprisonment. Wyatt also appealed to us (and therefore treated as decided) his state law claim for invasion of privacy even though that claim was in a similar procedural posture: both claims arose under state law, both were added to the expanded motion for summary judgment, and both were dismissed by the court's order to dismiss all claims, even though the court did not discuss either claim separately in the order. [8] On the basis of the text of the district court's order, the conduct of the parties, and an examination of the record, we conclude that the parties litigated, and the court decided, Wyatt's claim for breach of contract. It follows that the Anti-Injunction Act permits the district court to enjoin the relitigation of that claim in state court.