Opinion ID: 1969314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: executive construction

Text: The majority's interpretation of Section 24-431(a) is contrary not only to the unambiguous language of that provision but also to its construction by the District of Columbia officials charged with its administration and enforcement. The executive branch of the District government adopted that construction less than two weeks after the enactment of the GTCA. Three different District of Columbia agencies have now consistently adhered to it for an entire decade. In conformity with a formidable array of precedents which we have already applied to the very statutes under consideration in this case, see Luck I, supra, 617 A.2d at 515, we are bound to accept the executive construction if it is a reasonable one. Here, the interpretation by the Corporation Counsel, the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC), and the District's Board of Parole (BOP) is consistent with the statutory text and eminently reasonable. Given our unambiguous decision in Luck I, my colleagues' refusal to accord appropriate weight to the interpretation of the statute by the District's officers and agencies is contrary to M.A.P. v. Ryan, supra, 285 A.2d at 312, and passing strange besides. An understanding of the background of the executive construction is important. The proposed legislation which became the GTCA had the support of the executive branch of the District of Columbia government. Hallem Williams, the Director of the DOC, testified in favor of its passage. Indeed, he proposed certain revisions which the Council subsequently adopted. [10] There is no doubt that members of the executive branch followed with some interest legislative developments relating to the proposed statute. The construction of the GTCA by District of Columbia officials must be assessed in the context of their role during and immediately after the enactment of the new law.
Less than two weeks after the GTCA became effective, the Deputy Corporation Counsel prepared a memorandum for the DOC in which she responded to various questions relating to the meaning of the new legislation. In that memorandum, Ms. Hines wrote, inter alia, as follows: [Question]. Is § 5(a) of the act [11] inconsistent with D.C.Code § 24-206 (1981)? [Answer]. Yes. Section 5(a) of the act gives a recommitted parole violator a credit on the maximum term equal to the time served on parole. At the conclusion of her answer to this question, Ms. Hines explained that the Council was apparently unaware of the inconsistent provision in Section 24-206(a) when it enacted Section 24-431(a). See page 1109, supra. On September 16, 1987, Patrick S. Glynn, the General Counsel for the USPC, wrote a letter to Corporation Counsel Frederick D. Cooke, Jr., in which he expressed his disagreement with Ms. Hines' interpretation. Mr. Glynn argued that a specific statute must always take precedence over a statute of general applicability, regardless of priority of enactment. He also expressed the view that the Councilmembers could not have intended to benefit a category of offenders that includes many of our most dangerous recidivists. On October 30, 1987, Mr. Cooke responded to Mr. Glynn's submission with a comprehensive five-page letter in which he discussed the meaning of Section 24-431(a) in considerable detail. Mr. Cooke noted, inter alia, that one of the principal purposes of the GTCA was to relieve prison overcrowding, and that construing [Section 24-431(a)] to provide for credit against the maximum sentence for time served on parole, even when parole is later revoked, accords with this principal purpose. Addressing the legislative history of the GTCA, Mr. Cooke quoted the section-by-section analysis of the statute in the Report of the Judiciary Committee. In that Report, the language that ended up as Section 5(a) was described as follows: Requires that a person be given credit for time spent in custody and time spent on parole. COMMITTEE REPORT, at 3. Mr. Cooke pointed out that the Report specified no exceptions to the foregoing requirement, and he wrote that [i]f the last sentence of D.C.Code § 24-206(a) (1981) had been brought to the Committee's attention, and the Committee had intended that sentence to remain an exception, it would likely have so indicated in the section-by-section analysis.[ [12] ] Finally, the Corporation Counsel stated: [Y]our limiting construction of the phrase or on parole in § 5(a) of the act renders that phrase superfluous. For if that phrase means only what you have construed it to mean, its elimination would not change the state of the law in any way. This is so because pre-existing law makes quite clear the general rule, namely that time served on parole is time served in fulfillment of the maximum sentence.     Of course, ... a court must, if possible, give effect to every phrase of a statute so that no part is rendered superfluous. National Insulation Transp. Committee v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.S.App. D.C. 192, 196, 683 F.2d 533, 537 (1982).
The other District of Columbia agencies concerned with the implementation of the GTCA have likewise construed Section 24-431(a) as providing for credit for street time irrespective of whether parole is subsequently revoked. On May 22, 1987, in conformity with the Hines Memorandum, the DOC issued an Order which provided as follows: Every resident returned to custody as a parole violator shall be given credit for time spent on parole after 11 April 1987 until the time that the parole violation warrant is executed. DOC Order 4340.2, quoted in Luck I, supra, 617 A.2d at 512. On February 19, 1988, the same agency adopted a regulation which states: Revocation of parole shall not result in a loss of credit, for the time spent on parole, toward service of the sentence on which parole was granted. 28 DCMR § 601.7 (1988). It appears to be undisputed that, in conformity with these regulations, the BOP has granted credit for street time to many hundreds of parolees whose parole has been revoked.
The judiciary is the final authority responsible for deciding issues of statutory construction, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781 n. 9, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), for [i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); see also Harris v. District of Columbia Office of Worker's Compensation, 660 A.2d 404, 407 (D.C.1995). Nevertheless, as we reiterated in Luck I a case in which, as here, the relationship between Sections 24-206 and 24-431(a) was at issue [t]his court accords great weight to any reasonable interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration, and ... this is particularly true where, as here, we have a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the [agency] charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion and making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new. 617 A.2d at 515 (quoting, inter alia, Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315, 53 S.Ct. 350, 358, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933) (Cardozo, J.)). I am at a loss to understand how, in light of M.A.P. v. Ryan , the majority regards itself as free to proclaim that no deference at all is due to the construction of the GTCA by the officials whose function it is to administer it. I find the explanation in the majority opinion to be quite unpersuasive. In Luck I, according to Judge Ferren, this court accorded great weight to the DOC's interpretation merely to buttress a conclusion we already had reached. Judge Ferren implies, in other words, that the great weight language was dictum and that we can disregard it at our caprice. With due respect, this is a serious misreading of our opinion in Luck I. In that case, we rejected a prisoner's contention that under the GTCA, he was entitled to credit for street time spent on parole prior to the effective date of the Act. In our unanimous opinion, which Judge Ferren joined, we stated in detail our reasons for refusing to accept the construction of the statute urged upon us by the prisoner. Luck I, 617 A.2d at 512-15. One of those reasons was that the DOC had construed the Act in a manner contrary to the prisoner's position, and that dispositive precedent required us to accord great weight to the agency's views. There is nothing in Luck I to suggest that the great weight discussion was less significant than any other portion of the opinion. Plainly, that discussion was not a mere add-on which we included just for fun. On the contrary, we explicitly factor[ed] into our calculus ... [the] administrative construction of the GTCA and its interplay with Section 24-206. Id. at 515 (emphasis added). Obviously, a point that was factored into our calculus, and was thus part of our holding, could not be dictum. It is not at all clear to me, and it cannot be clear to Judge Ferren, that in Luck I, the court would have reached the result that it did if the administrative construction had been to the contrary. [13] Judge Ferren also argues that even if Luck I requires us to give some weight to the executive construction of the GTCA, there is no reason for absolute obeisance. This is, of course, quite correct; the ultimate responsibility for construing the statute devolves upon this court. Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2781 n. 9. But great weight means great weight, not an inconsequential milligram. The question before us is whether the interpretation of the GTCA by the District of Columbia officials who enforce it is a reasonable one. Id. at 845, 104 S.Ct. at 2783. In this case, those officials have construed the act in a manner consistent with its unambiguous language, and their construction is manifestly reasonable.
[T]he deference which courts owe to the interpretation by agencies of statutes which they administer is at its zenith where the administrative construction has been consistent and of long standing. James Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 567 A.2d 43, 48 (D.C.1989) (citation omitted). The executive construction of Section 24-431(a) by District of Columbia officials has been consistent for almost a decade. In Luck I, we applied the great weight principle solely on the basis of DOC Order No. 4340.2. In the present case, the force of the DOC's position is enhanced by the BOP's practice over a period of ten years [14] and, especially, by the interpretation of the relevant provisions by the Corporation Counsel. [15] The view of the Corporation Counsel as to the meaning of local statutes, while not binding on this court, is entitled to great weight. National Org. of Women v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 274, 278 (D.C. 1987). In a context such as the present one, in which the Corporation Counsel acted in his capacity as legal adviser to District of Columbia agencies, rather than as a party to contested litigation, we should adopt the Corporation Counsel's construction unless plainly unreasonable or contrary to ascertainable legislative intent. Jordan v. District of Columbia, 362 A.2d 114, 118 (D.C.1976) (quoting Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 153 U.S.App. D.C. 183, 189, 472 F.2d 1258, 1264 (1972) (Leventhal, J.)). [16] The views of the Corporation Counsel are especially significant in this case. Corporation Counsel's responsibility to represent the interests of the District and its citizens from a law enforcement perspective often places him in an adversarial position vis-a-vis the claims of prisoners. See, e.g., Luck I, supra ; Winters v. Ridley, 596 A.2d 569, 576-79 (D.C. 1991) (per curiam); [17] Abdullah v. Roach, 668 A.2d 801 (D.C.1995); White v. Hyman, 647 A.2d 1175 (D.C.1994). Indeed, the District's position in successive cases involving Sections 24-206(a) and 24-431(a)Corporation Counsel opposed the prisoner's more extreme claim in Luck I but supported Noble's more modest one herereflects an objective and impartial approach, a circumstance that should reinforce our disposition to accord weight to the District's construction. The USPC contends that [t]he [c]ourt owes no special deference to the DOC's interpretation of Sections 24-206 and 24-431(a). It further argues that because it (the USPC) is also entrusted with administering District of Columbia parole laws, its interpretation cannot be ignored. In my view, the first of these contentions is foreclosed by our opinion in Luck I. With respect to the USPC's second point, I agree that the Commission's views should be given some consideration. I note, however, that federal appellate courts have rejected the USPC's attempt to apply federal standards to District of Columbia legislation. See, e.g., Thomas v. Brennan, 961 F.2d 612, 617 (7th Cir.1992). Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals having certified the present case to this court in order to resolve a controlling question of District of Columbia law, it would be somewhat incongruous for us to be unduly deferential to the views of a federal agency as to the proper construction of our local statutory scheme. [18]