Opinion ID: 844210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Class Certification Principles

Text: (4) Originally creatures of equity, class actions have been statutorily embraced by the Legislature whenever the question [in a case] is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court . . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 382; see Fireside Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1078 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 861, 155 P.3d 268]; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 458 [115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701].) (5) Drawing on the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and federal precedent, we have articulated clear requirements for the certification of a class. The party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives. (Code Civ. Proc., § 382; Fireside Bank, at p. 1089; Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 179, 2 P.3d 27]; City of San Jose, at p. 459.) In turn, the `community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.' ( Fireside Bank, at p. 1089, quoting Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 [174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23].) (6) Here, only a single element of class suitability, and a single aspect of the trial court's certification decision, is in dispute: whether individual questions or questions of common or general interest predominate. The ultimate question the element of predominance presents is whether the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants. ( Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238 [102 Cal.Rptr. 1, 497 P.2d 225]; accord, Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 906, 96 P.3d 194].) The answer hinges on whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certication is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment. ( Sav-On, at p. 327.) A court must examine the allegations of the complaint and supporting declarations ( ibid. ) and consider whether the legal and factual issues they present are such that their resolution in a single class proceeding would be both desirable and feasible. [5] As a general rule if the defendant's liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages. ( Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 916 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 761]; accord, Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 932, 941 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 565].) On review of a class certification order, an appellate court's inquiry is narrowly circumscribed. The decision to certify a class rests squarely within the discretion of the trial court, and we afford that decision great deference on appeal, reversing only for a manifest abuse of discretion: `Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying certification.' [Citation.] A certification order generally will not be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous legal assumptions. [Citations.] ( Fireside Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1089; see also Hamwi v. Citinational-Buckeye Inv. Co. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 462, 472 [140 Cal.Rptr. 215] [So long as [the trial] court applies proper criteria and its action is founded on a rational basis, its ruling must be upheld.].) Predominance is a factual question; accordingly, the trial court's finding that common issues predominate generally is reviewed for substantial evidence. ( Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 328-329.) We must [p]resum[e] in favor of the certification order . . . the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the record . . . . ( Id. at p. 329.) The appellate judgment reversing certification rests on two separate grounds. First, the Court of Appeal held the trial court committed error per se by ruling on certification without first resolving legal disputes over the scope of Brinker's duties to provide meal and rest periods. Second, it held that any court, upon resolving those disputes, could only have concluded certification was inappropriate. We consider the first of these grounds in part II., post, and the second of them in parts IV. through VI., post. As we shall explain, the first ground does not support the judgment, while the second supports it only partially.