Opinion ID: 857284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deliberate Intention Claim

Text: The second issue for our review is whether the circuit court committed error in granting summary judgment on the petitioner’s “deliberate intention” claim. As a general principle, the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act provides immunity to covered employers for employee suits for “damages at common law or by statute” resulting from work-related injuries. W.Va. Code § 23-2-6 (2010); see Sias v. W-P Coal Co., 185 W.Va. 569, 574, 408 S.E.2d 321, 326 (1991). An employer’s immunity is lost, however, when it acts with “deliberate intention” to cause the employee’s injury. W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2); see Sias, 185 W.Va. at 574, 408 S.E.2d at 326. If the deliberate intention exception applies, the employee may file an action for damages in excess of workers’ compensation benefits. W.Va. Code §§ 23-4-6 and 2(c); see Sias, 185 W.Va. at 574, 408 S.E.2d at 326. This Court has recognized that “‘[a] plaintiff may establish a ‘deliberate intention’ in a civil action against an employer for a work-related injury by offering evidence to prove the five specific requirements provided in [W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) (2010)].’ Syl. Pt. 2, Mayles v. Shoneys, Inc., 185 W.Va. 88, 405 S.E.2d 15 (1990).” Syl. Pt. 3, Tolley v. ACF Industries, Inc., 212 W.Va. 548, 550, 575 S.E.2d 158, 160 (2002). Under West 10 Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii),12 a plaintiff must prove the following five elements to establish a deliberate intention cause of action: (A) That a specific unsafe working condition existed in the workplace which presented a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious injury or death; (B) That the employer, prior to the injury, had actual knowledge of the existence of the specific unsafe working condition and of the high degree of risk and the strong probability of serious injury or death presented by the specific unsafe working condition; (C) That the specific unsafe working condition was a violation of a state or federal safety statute, rule or regulation, whether cited or not, or of a commonly accepted and well-known safety standard within the industry or business of the employer, as demonstrated by competent evidence of written standards or guidelines which reflect a consensus safety standard in the industry or business, which statute, rule, regulation or standard was specifically applicable to the particular work and working condition involved, as contrasted with a statute, rule, regulation or standard generally requiring safe workplaces, equipment or working conditions; (D) That notwithstanding the existence of the facts set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (C), inclusive, of this paragraph, the 12 In addition to West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii), an alternate method of providing that an employer acted with deliberate intention is found in West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(i), which requires proof that an employer “acted with a consciously, subjectively and deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or death to an employee. This standard requires a showing of an actual, specific intent and may not be satisfied by allegation or proof of: (A) Conduct which produces a result that was not specifically intended; (B) conduct which constitutes negligence, no matter how gross or aggravated; or (C) willful, wanton or reckless misconduct[.]” Id. See Syl. Pt. 1, Mayles v. Shoneys, Inc., 185 W.Va. 88, 405 S.E.2d 15 (1990). The petitioner’s deliberate intention claim in the case sub judice alleges only a violation of West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii). 11 employer nevertheless intentionally thereafter exposed an employee to the specific unsafe working condition; and (E) That the employee exposed suffered serious compensable injury or compensable death as defined in section one, article four, chapter twenty-three whether a claim for benefits under this chapter is filed or not as a direct and proximate result of the specific unsafe working condition. W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii)(A)-(E). This Court has made clear that, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4­ 2(d)(iii)(B), a court shall dismiss a deliberate intention action “upon motion for summary judgment if it finds . . . that one or more of the facts required to be proved by the provisions of subparagraphs (A) through (E), inclusive, paragraph (ii) of this subdivision do not exist.” W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(iii)(B). Each of the five statutory factors “is an essential element of a ‘deliberate intention’ cause of action, which a plaintiff has the ultimate burden to prove. Therefore, at the summary judgment stage, if a defendant should establish that no material issue of fact is in dispute on any one of the factors, and such a finding is in favor of the defendant, summary judgment must be granted to the defendant.” Mumaw v. U.S. Silica Co., 204 W.Va. 6, 11, 511 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1998). Finally, “‘in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of dispute on each of the 12 five factors.’” Marcus v. Holley, 217 W.Va. 508, 520, 618 S.E.2d 517, 529 (2005) (quoting Mumaw, 204 W.Va. at 9, 511 S.E.2d at 120)).13 As discussed in more detail below, we conclude that although the petitioner presented prima facie evidence as to whether there was a specific unsafe working condition, West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(ii)(A), he failed to present prima facie evidence of the remaining statutory factors required to maintain a deliberate intention claim against Apex. Specific Unsafe Working Condition The petitioner alleges that a specific unsafe working condition existed on the Apex job site “which presented a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious injury or death.” W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii)(A). According to the petitioner’s liability expert, Dr. Gary S. Nelson, the specific unsafe working condition was Apex’s failure “to physically safeguard the pipe . . . in a physically positive manner, from rolling [or] otherwise falling into the adjacent excavation where Mr. Smith was present.” Dr. Nelson’s report further indicated that 13 As indicated above, the circuit court concluded that the petitioner failed to present prima facie evidence supporting four of the five statutory factors, West Virginia Code § 23­ 4-2(d)(ii)(A) through (D). The fifth factor (that the employee suffered a serious compensable injury as a proximate result of the specific unsafe working condition), set forth in subparagraph (E), was not addressed in the circuit court’s summary judgment order and, likewise, is not addressed by the parties on appeal. 13 [t]his could have been done in an easily achievable combination of safeguards by the required use of iron stacks driven into the ground at each end of every pipe on the excavation side of such pipe, and as a secondary (backup), the routine piling of excavated earth (the construction of a small mound) at the edge of all excavations behind which pipe in storage would be placed in preparation for its transfer into the excavation under controlled (stable) conditions. Special note: The routine practice and procedure established by Apex in an attempt (the key word is attempt) to secure stored pipe from rolling or otherwise prevent the pipe from falling into adjacent excavations was to ‘find a nearby rock or clump of earth’ to place at the base of the pipe to keep it from rolling. Such a haphazard method must be recognized as subject chance (high risk failure), the potential for such material to move or roll away from such pipe or otherwise crumble under the weight of the pipe, and therefore not a reliable method to secure such pipe. Special note: Unlike the relatively hidden nature of rocks (etc.) to secure the pipe in this matter that are relatively small and hidden from view in terms [sic] required inspection, the use of iron stacks to secure pipe, stacks that would appear above the pipe after being driven into the ground, would provide a readily observable method to assure that such pipe was secure. . . . Apex failed to properly train worke[rs] regarding the proper methods to secure such pipe from movement. For its part, Apex argues that the record demonstrates that securing the pipe was the petitioner’s responsibility as a laborer and that the specific unsafe working condition alleged to have existed was caused by the petitioner’s own carelessness in failing to secure the remaining pipe with the chock after the companion pipe was moved. Apex argues that it cannot be held liable for an unsafe working condition created by the petitioner’s failure to 14 perform the duties and obligations of his job. Apex relies, inter alia, on Mumaw, in which this Court recognized that “where an employee creates a specific unsafe working condition by not following expected procedures, a deliberate intention cause of action cannot be maintained against the employer.” 204 W.Va. at 12, 511 S.E.2d at 123.14 This Court agreed with the circuit court that, based upon the evidence, the employee, and not his employer, created the unsafe working condition, and thus, the plaintiff (the administrator of the deceased employee’s estate) could not sustain a deliberate intention claim under West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(ii). Id. at 12, 511 S.E.2d at 123. Apex’s argument notwithstanding, it is clear that the specific unsafe working condition is not alleged to have arisen from the petitioner’s failure to chock the remaining pipe after the companion pipe was removed. Rather, through Dr. Nelson’s report, the petitioner has presented at least prima facie evidence that the specific unsafe working condition was the manner in which Apex routinely secured its pipe. In reviewing the circuit court’s summary judgment order, this Court reviews the underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the petitioner, the non-moving party. In so doing, we conclude that the petitioner presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a specific unsafe working condition existed on the job site which presented a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious injury, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(ii)(A). 14 In Mumaw, an employee died after falling through a trap door that he failed to close even though he had been directed to do so three times. 15 Actual Knowledge We next address whether the petitioner has presented prima face evidence that, Apex, “prior to the injury, had actual knowledge of the existence of the specific unsafe working condition and of the high degree of risk and the strong probability of serious injury” it presented. West Virginia Code §23-4-2(d)(2)(ii)(B). This Court has emphasized that “[t]his is a high threshold that cannot be successfully met by speculation or conjecture.” Mumaw, 204 W.Va. at 12, 511 S.E.2d at 123; Coleman Estate ex rel. Coleman v. R.M. Logging, Inc., 226 S.E.2d 199, 207, 700 S.E.2d 168, 176 (2010). Indeed, the actual knowledge requirement “is not satisfied merely by evidence that the employer reasonably should have known of the specific unsafe working condition and of the strong probability of serious injury or death presented by that condition. Instead, it must be shown that the employer actually possessed such knowledge.” Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Blevins v. Beckley Magnetite, Inc., 185 W.Va. 633, 634, 408 S.E.2d 385, 386 (1991). We have further clarified that a determination of whether an employer had actual knowledge “requires an interpretation of the employer’s state of mind, and must ordinarily be shown by circumstantial evidence, from which conflicting inferences may often reasonably be drawn.”15 Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Nutter v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 209 W.Va. 608, 609, 550 S.E.2d 398, 399 (2001). 15 Moreover, “while a plaintiff may choose to introduce evidence of prior similar incidents or complaints to circumstantially establish that an employer has acted with deliberate intention, evidence of prior similar incidents or complaints is not mandated” under the deliberate intention statute. Nutter, 209 W.Va. at 667, 639 S.E.2d at 759, syl. pt. 2, in part. 16 Though not clearly articulated in his brief, the petitioner appears to argue that he has demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether, prior to the petitioner’s injury, Apex had actual knowledge that its workers were practicing an unsafe procedure with regard to the manner in which pipe was secured. The petitioner relies on Dr. Nelson’s report, which stated that, due to the nature of Apex’s daily work of laying pipe in excavated trenches, Apex (undeniably) knew (a) of the severe injury potential associated with the danger of heavy pipe rolling or falling into excavations from the adjacent embankment, (b) knew that such potential contains the clear risk of producing severe injury to workers working within such excavations; that is, they had a clear and reasonable subjective awareness of the high degree of risk and probability of severe injury (or death) associated with the potential for unsecured pipe rolling or falling into excavations where their workers were present, and (c) that such injury potential would dictate the focused attention on their part toward the positive elimination or control of related hazardous conditions or factors that cause such injury . . . . However, Apex argues that the facts upon which Dr. Nelson relied in rendering his report were limited to those surrounding the accident at issue and that such evidence is not sufficient to show that, prior to the petitioner’s injury, Apex had actual knowledge that a specific unsafe working condition existed and of the high degree of risk and the strong probability of serious injury it presented. W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(ii)(B). 17 It is clear from our review of Dr. Nelson’s report that he makes absolutely no reference to specific facts supporting his opinion that, before the petitioner’s injury occurred, Apex actually knew of the existence of the specific unsafe working condition, and that the unsafe condition presented a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious injury. In fact, under the “Preface to Opinions and Conclusions” section of his report, Dr. Nelson explained that the opinion section of his report intended to provide foundational opinions that enumerate various concepts, principles, and basic areas of knowledge or understandings that Apex knew about–that is, they either knew about in fact as documented in the discovery process in this matter, doubtlessly knew about as such knowledge cannot be realistically or credibly denied as being universally known by workplace managers, or they otherwise reasonably possessed a conscious awareness and understanding of by virtue of the[ir] industry position, business operation, and related circumstances–which taken as a whole, establish a basis for . . . [my] opinion and conclusions that address specific issues of causation. (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). Notwithstanding the foregoing, and although Dr. Nelson’s report listed the discovery documents reviewed in preparation of his report, the report itself makes no specific or substantive reference to any facts demonstrating that, before the petitioner’s injury occurred, Apex had actual knowledge of the specific unsafe working condition. Moreover, the petitioner does not point to any evidence tending to show that Apex had “actual knowledge” within the meaning of the deliberate intention statute. To the contrary, the petitioner’s evidence is based upon speculation that, prior to the petitioner’s injury, Apex reasonably should have known of the unsafe working condition and its attendant degree of risk and probability of injury. 18 Based upon the foregoing, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to present prima facie evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that, prior to the petitioner’s injury, Apex had actual knowledge that a specific unsafe working condition existed and of the high degree of risk and the strong probability of serious injury it presented, as required by West Virginia Code § 23-4­ 2(d)(ii)(B). Given that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Apex had actual knowledge of the specific unsafe working condition, we find that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Apex because the petitioner failed to prove all five statutory factors provided in West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(ii). Tolley, 212 W.Va. at 550, 575 S.E.2d at 160, syl. pt. 3; see W.Va. Code § 23­ 4-2(d)(iii)(B) (specifically requiring dismissal of deliberate intention action if, upon motion for summary judgment, court finds “that one or more of the facts required to be proved by the provisions of subparagraphs (A) through (E) . . . do not exist.”); Mumaw, 204 W.Va. at 11, 511 S.E.2d at 122 (stating that each of five statutory factors is essential element of deliberate intention claim; therefore, at summary judgment stage, if defendant “establish[es] that no material issue of fact is in dispute on any one of the factors, and such a finding is in favor of the defendant, summary judgment must be granted to the defendant.”). 19 Although we recognize that it is not necessary to the resolution of this appeal, we, nevertheless, proceed to address the remaining statutory factors required to prove the petitioner’s deliberate intention claim. Violation of Specific Safety Statute, Rule, Regulation or Industry Standard To withstand Apex’s motion for summary judgment, the petitioner was required to present prima facie evidence that the specific unsafe working condition was a violation of a state or federal safety statute, rule or regulation or of a commonly accepted standard within the pipeline industry and was “specifically applicable to the particular work and working condition involved, as contrasted with . . . regulation[s]. . . generally requiring safe workplaces, equipment or working conditions[.]” W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii)(C). The petitioner argues that he presented competent evidence of violations of OSHA regulations 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(2) and (k)(1), regarding “specific excavation requirements.”16 16 The petitioner also relies upon alleged violations of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.20(b)(1), (2) and (3), which are OSHA regulations identified as “General Safety and Health Provisions” and which provide as follows: (b) Accident prevention responsibilities. (1) It shall be the responsibility of the employer to initiate and 20 The provisions of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(2) state as follows: (j) Protection of employees from loose rock or soil. (2) Employees shall be protected from excavated or other materials or equipment that could pose a hazard by falling or rolling into excavations. Protection shall be provided by maintain such programs as may be necessary to comply with this part. (2) Such programs shall provide for frequent and regular inspections of the job sites, materials, and equipment to be made by competent persons designated by the employers. (3) The use of any machinery, tool, material, or equipment which is not in compliance with any applicable requirement of this part is prohibited. Such machine, tool, material, or equipment shall either be identified as unsafe by tagging or locking the controls to render them inoperable or shall be physically removed from its place of operation. 29 C.F.R. 1926.21(b)(2), states: (b) Employer responsibility. (2) The employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury. However, the petitioner fails to offer any argument or set forth any evidence demonstrating that 29 C.F.R. § 1926.20(b)(1)-(3) and 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21(b)(2) were violated. This Court has explained that “[a] skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim[.] Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” State, Dept. of Health v. Robert Morris N., 195 W.Va. 759, 765, 466 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1995). Finally, we reiterate that “[a]lthough we liberally construe briefs in determining issues presented for review, issues . . . mentioned only in passing but are not supported with pertinent authority, are not considered on appeal.” State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 303, 470 S.E.2d 613, 621 (1995). 21 placing and keeping such materials or equipment at least 2 feet (.61 m) from the edge of excavations, or by the use of retaining devices that are sufficient to prevent materials or equipment from falling or rolling into excavations, or by a combination of both if necessary. Under this regulation, protection from materials that could pose a hazard by falling or rolling into excavations shall be provided either by “placing and keeping such materials . . . at least 2 feet . . . from the edge of excavations, or by the use of retaining devices that are sufficient to prevent materials . . . from falling or rolling into excavations, or by a combination of both if necessary.” Id. (emphasis added). The petitioner states only that “[t]he pipe was unsecured and not re-secured under the job site supervisor’s direction. The pipe rolled into the excavation, striking Mr. Smith and causing serious injury.” The petitioner’s argument notwithstanding, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Apex workers had secured the pipe with a chock, which was sufficient to prevent the pipe from rolling into the trench. The pipe then became unsecured when the petitioner failed to move the chock flush to the remaining pipe after its companion pipe had been lifted with the side boom. The petitioner has failed to present prima facie evidence that 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(2) was violated by Apex. The petitioner also alleges that Apex violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(k)(1), which provides as follows: 22 (k) Inspections (1) Daily inspections of excavations, the adjacent areas, and protective systems shall be made by a competent person for evidence of a situation that could result in possible cave-ins, indications of failure of protective systems, hazardous atmospheres, or other hazardous conditions. An inspection shall be conducted by the competent person prior to the start of work and as needed throughout the shift. Inspections shall also be made after every rainstorm or other hazard increasing occurrence. These inspections are only required when employee exposure can be reasonably anticipated. The petitioner fails to set forth any evidence demonstrating that daily inspections were not performed or that this regulation was otherwise violated. In contrast, Apex points to specific testimony from Mr. Keaton indicating that he closely monitors the job site on a daily basis. The petitioner has failed to present prima facie evidence that 29