Opinion ID: 771584
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wrongful Termination under the ADA

Text: 35 Plaintiff next argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to his wrongful termination claim under the ADA. The district court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies inasmuch as it found that there was no evidence that Plaintiff had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC 2 . The district court further concluded that even if Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, there was no genuine issue of fact and Plaintiff's claim could not survive summary judgment. Although this Court finds that Plaintiff's failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter prior to commencing this action was not a jurisdictional defect, but rather a condition precedent which Plaintiff cured, we nevertheless conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment as there was no genuine issue of fact and Plaintiff failed to produce evidence on which a reasonable jury could find that he was terminated in violation of the ADA. 36 Under the ADA, a claimant who wishes to bring a lawsuit claiming a violation of the ADA must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(1); Jones v. Sumser Ret. Vill., 209 F.3d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 2000). An employee may not file a suit under the ADA if he or she does not possess a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC because he or she has not exhausted his or her remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. §12117(a) (procedures from § 2000e-5 apply to ADA claims); see also EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 456 (6th Cir. 1999). However, the failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional defect; rather the right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent. See Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the requirement of obtaining a right-to-sue letter may be waived by the parties or the court. See id. at 1031. 37 In Portis v. Ohio, 141 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 1998), a plaintiff brought suit against the state of Ohio under Title VII and Ohio state law for sexual discrimination. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim without prejudice because the plaintiff had not yet exhausted her administrative remedies because she had not obtained a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 and had not filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and 29 C.F.R. § 1601.73. See id. at 633. In Portis, the plaintiff received her right-to-sueletter one week after she filed her complaint. On appeal, the State of Ohio argued that plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies was a proper alternative ground upon which to dismiss Plaintiff's claim. See id. at 634. This Court, however, rejected the State of Ohio's contention, stating that [w]e see no reason to bar [the plaintiff's] claim solely on the grounds of a non-jurisdictional requirement whose brief absence caused Ohio no prejudice in this case. Id. The Court went further to hold that the proper time for Ohio to raise this argument was between the filing of the lawsuit and [the plaintiff's] receipt of the letter. Id. at 635. 38 Here, although Plaintiff did not apprise the district court of his right-to-sue letter until his motion for reconsideration, 3 Plaintiff had in fact received the right-to-sue letter prior to the district court's order granting summary judgment. However, as in Portis, there is no jurisdictional defect and no evidence that Defendants suffered any prejudice from Plaintiff's failure to initially satisfy this condition precedent, a defect he later cured. See Portis, 141 F.3d at 634. We therefore think it would be unduly harsh, under these circumstances, to deny Plaintiff his day in court as to his ADA claim; accordingly, we conclude that the district court improperly dismissed Plaintiff's claim on that basis. 39 Nevertheless, this Court determines that Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination under the ADA to be without merit. To state a claim under the ADA, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 209 F.3d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 2000). Once Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory legitimate reason for the termination. See id. Provided that the employer meets this burden, Plaintiff must then show that the proffered reason is but a pretext for discrimination. See id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). We conclude that Plaintiff's ADA claim must fail because he cannot establish a prima facie case. 40 To establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff must show that (1)he was disabled under the ADA, (2) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job; (3) he suffered adverse employment action; and (4) he was replaced by a nondisabled person. See Martin, 209 F.3d at 934. We find that Plaintiff has failed to establish the first and fourth elements of a prima facie case. 41 First, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he was or is disabled under the ADA. Under the ADA, a disability is defined as: 42 (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; 43 (B) a record of such an impairment; or 44 (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 45 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Plaintiff contends that he was administered a random drug test because his employer perceived him to be a drug user. The ADA provides protection for employees who are erroneously regarded as current illegal drug users.See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(3) (excluding erroneous perception of illegal drug use from being disallowed as a disability under § 12114(a)); Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 127 F.3d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated en banc on other grounds, 155 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1998); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1995). The erroneous perception of being an illegal drug user is to be treated like any other perception of adisability, and is only considered to be a qualifying disability if the employer actually perceives the disability to substantially limit a major life activity of the employee. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 611 (10th Cir. 1998); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that to prevail on a perceived disability claim, a plaintiff must show that the perceived impairment is a substantial limitation on a major life activity). 46 The term 'substantially limits' means an inability to perform or a significant restriction on the ability to perform as compared to the average person in the general population. Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)). 'Major life activities' include 'functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.' Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(i)). 47 Plaintiff has failed to allege any evidence that would lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants regarded or perceived him as having a substantially limiting disability--a drug addiction. Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that Defendants believed he was illegally using drugs to the extent that one or more of his major life activities were substantially limited. Plaintiff's contention, absent any evidence, amounts to the mere conjecture that he was fired because Defendants perceived him as having a drug addiction. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show that he is perceived as having a disability as defined under the ADA. Moreover, we conclude that Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to show that he was replaced by a person who was not disabled. Having failed to establish to all the elements of a prima faciecase, we do not consider the burden-shifting analysis under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981), 4 and, therefore, conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff's ADA claim. 48