Opinion ID: 1951916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disqualification of Susan Vasile

Text: We are fully satisfied that Susan Vasile was properly excluded from serving on defendant's jury. After a long and searching voir dire examination, the court concluded that Vasile's extreme reluctance to acknowledge that she'd be able to vote for the death penalty ... would substantially impair her ability to function. Vasile was examined thoroughly by the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel. Defendant points out that although Vasile expressed cautious views regarding the death penalty, she did say that she would be able to follow the law as instructed. However, Vasile repeatedly equivocated on whether she could vote to impose the death penalty, frequently framing her responses to indicate that she would like to think she could vote for the death penalty but that it would depend on the facts of the case. When confronted with a fact pattern justifying imposition of the death penalty under New Jersey law, Vasile still could not say that she could impose a sentence of death. Indeed, Vasile said flatly that if she voted for a death sentence, I would feel like I'm committing a murder. In Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256, 524 A. 2d 188, we adopted the Adams/Witt test for excluding jurors for cause. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1980). That test requires a finding whether, in the court's discretion, a prospective juror's beliefs or attitudes would substantially interfere with his or her deliberative duties. This prospective juror repeatedly equivocated concerning her ability to impose the death penalty. She also volunteered the belief, without prompting from the court or counsel, that she would feel like a murderer if she voted to impose the death penalty. We therefore find the court's dismissal of Vasile to be an appropriate exercise of its discretion.