Opinion ID: 2518820
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Antagonistic legal duties

Text: On appeal, the Appellants contend that there is no actual controversy[,] and the County Attorney, the Mayor, the Finance Director, and the County Council are not adversaries or contending parties with antagonistic claims. (Some initial capitalization and internal quotation marks omitted.) As such, the Appellants characterize the County's first amended complaint as collusive in nature. In response, the County essentially maintains that a sufficient controversy existed based upon the antagonistic legal duties of the parties. As previously stated, a plaintiff must be adversarial to a defendant to create an actual case or controversy sufficient for a court to invoke jurisdiction. See Fields, 67 Haw. at 274, 686 P.2d at 1385. As to the controversy, this court has observed that[, alt]hough the courts of Hawai`i are not subject to a cases or controversies limitation like that imposed upon the federal judiciary by Article III, [section] 2 of the United States Constitution, [this court] nevertheless believe[s] judicial power to resolve public disputes in a system of government where there is a separation of powers should be limited to those questions capable of judicial resolution and presented in an adversary context. . . . In short, judicial intervention in a dispute is normally contingent upon the presence of a justiciable controversy. Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 171-72, 623 P.2d at 438 (citations omitted). Furthermore, an action not founded upon an actual controversy between the parties to it, and brought for the purpose of securing a determination of a point of law, is collusive and will not be entertained[.] State v. Hoang, 93 Hawai`i 333, 336, 3 P.3d 499, 502 (2000) (citing Reynolds v. Van Culin, 36 Haw. 556 (1943)). In Reynolds, two business associates, among others, were involved in an automobile accident. 36 Haw. at 556. One sent a letter to the other, stating: I want to remind you again that we do not propose to look to you for the satisfaction of any judgment. The only way that we can proceed against the insurance company under the . . . policy is to sue you, obtain judgment and then sue the insurance company under the policy, alleging and proving that you were driving the car for the [policy holders] at the time [of the accident]. Id. at 559. The defendant who received the letter offered it as evidence of collusion, urging that an action brought on pretense of a controversy which does not exist is not justiciable. Id. at 560. This court held that, despite the subjective desires of the parties, their legal interests and duties created an actual controversy. Id. The Reynolds court relied on Golden Gate Bridge & Highway District v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 5 P.2d 585 (1931), involving real property taxpayers in California who were opposed to the establishment of county districts and the resulting taxation. Id. at 588. One district adopted plans to build a bridge across the Golden Gate between San Francisco and Marin County and attempted to issue bonds to raise money for construction. Id. at 589. When the district secretary refused to sign the bonds, asserting they were invalid under state law, the district brought a suit to compel issuance of the bonds. Id. The issue at trial was the validity of the bonds. Amicus curiae briefs on behalf of taxpayers were filed as reflecting the public's interest. Id. at 589. It was conceded that the district secretary-defendant personally desired the bonds to be found valid and was thus subjectively on the side of the petitioner. Id. Moreover, the court observed that the petitioner and bridge contractors had agreed to reimburse the district secretary-defendant for his litigation expenses. Id. Thus, the amicus taxpayers argued that there was no actual controversy and that the suit was a collusive, friendly suit. Id. at 589. The California Supreme Court, however, apparently found the argument unavailing and held that [a] genuine controversy existed . . . between petitioner and [defendant] as to matters vitally affecting [their] duties. . . . The personal desires of the parties as to the result of the litigation are of no moment[.] Id. at 590. Consequently, the court in Golden Gate Bridge  as did this court in Reynolds  held that, despite the subjective desires of the parties involved, it is their legal interests and duties that are to be considered when determining whether a suit is adversarial and, thus, not collusive for purposes of justiciability. Golden Gate Bridge 5 P.2d at 590; Reynolds, 36 Haw. at 566. Here, the Appellants argue that the Defendants were not actually adversarial to the lawsuit, but in fact supported it wholeheartedly. In support of their position that no actual controversy existed, the Appellants point to the facts that (1) the County Attorney and the Defendants jointly issued a press release, expressing their serious doubts as to the Charter Amendment's validity and also placed a newspaper advertisement urging a no vote on the Charter Amendment, (2) the Defendants were themselves represented by a Deputy County Attorney, and (3) the County Attorney's duties reflected that she also represented the Defendants in their official capacities. [17] The County, on the other hand, argues that: The uncertainty [over the validity of the Charter Amendment] had the consequence to the Kaua`i County Officials in that they are legally charged with implementation of the Charter Amendment. The Kaua`i County Officials therefore had concrete interests in the validity or invalidity of the Charter Amendment. The Mayor heads the executive branch of Kaua`i County. RCCK § 6.01. He is its chief executive officer, exercises direct supervision over all departments and submits operating and capital budgets to the Council. RCCK § 7.05. The Director is the chief accounting, fiscal and budget officer of Kaua`i County; he prepares the annual budget under the direction of the Mayor, and operates and manages the real property tax functions as established by ordinance. RCCK § 10.04. The Council exercises the legislative power of Kaua`i County. RCCK § 3.01. The Council also enacts the annual budget ordinance and must finance and balance the same by ensuring sufficient revenues. RCCK § 3.10. The Kaua`i County Officials have no discretion as to their duties to implement valid laws of the jurisdiction, regardless of their personal views. Their legal interests and responsibilities were irreconcilable with the apparent invalidity of the Charter Amendment, and thus an actual controversy existed. . . . The County clearly had an interest in determining the validity of amendments to its Charter. On the other hand, the legal duties of the Kaua`i County Officials to implement the Charter Amendment, regardless of its validity, were at odds with the legal interests of the County. Given the uncertainty and controversy, it was wholly appropriate for the validity of the Charter Amendment to be judicially resolved. In United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO v. Yogi, 101 Hawai`i 46, 62 P.3d 189 (2002), this court, in deciding that the plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants' claim for declaratory relief was not moot because a substantial controversy remained in the case, stated: In the words of HRS § 632-1, the dispositive question is whether the court is satisfied also that a declaratory judgment will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. This is a question of law. In determining whether parties still retain sufficient interests and injury as to justify the award of declaratory relief, the question is whether the facts alleged, under all circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant a declaratory judgment. Id. at 57, 62 P.3d at 198 (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted) (emphasis added). [18] Yogi is consistent with the principles in Reynolds and Golden Gate Bridge, discussed supra. In other words, despite the subjective desires of the original parties to this action, it is their legal interests and duties that are to be considered when determining whether a suit is adversarial and, thus, not collusive for purposes of justiciability, i.e., standing. However, as previously discussed in section III.A.2., the presence of the County Council as a defendant in this case destroys the existence of an actual controversy because, at least as between the plaintiff-County, acting on behalf of the County Council, and the defendant-County Council itself, their legal interests and duties are identical. Had the County Council not been named as a defendant, then the legal interests and duties between the County, acting on behalf of the County Council, as plaintiff, and the Mayor and Finance Director as defendants would be adversarial. In other words, the legal duty of the plaintiff-County, acting on behalf of the County Council, to protect against the Charter Amendment's usurpation of the Council's taxing authority would be adverse to the executive branch officers' legal duties to enforce the Charter Amendment. Thus, the question arises whether it is appropriate, at this stage of the proceeding, for this court to drop, i.e., dismiss, the County Council to cure the spoiler problem, which we next examine.