Opinion ID: 691026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy count.

Text: 51 A conspiracy conviction requires 1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, 2) coupled with one or more acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose, and 3) the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense. United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir.1987). Once there is proof of a conspiracy, the prosecution need only show a slight connection between the defendant and the conspiracy. United States v. Foster, 985 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir.), amended, 995 F.2d 882 (1993), and amended, 17 F.3d 1256 (1994). Moreover, [c]onnection to a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Id. We believe the prosecution introduced evidence that would allow a rational factfinder to find each of the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
52 Existence of agreement: Peloche told agent Operskalski that Alonso would bring the credit cards from Miami. SER at 4. This indicates that Alonso had agreed even before arriving in Las Vegas to engage in fraud. The prosecution also introduced evidence that Alonso had repeatedly referred to the persons who would engage in the fraud as we. See, e.g., SER at 13 (And [Alonso] said, 'We can do twenty thousand (20,000) today ... and tomorrow we do twenty thousand (20,000) and so on and so on.' ) (testimony of agent Operskalski). This and other evidence would allow a rational factfinder to find the existence of an agreement to which Alonso was a party.
53 Act in furtherance: Counter-surveillance activities qualify as acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. Penagos, 823 F.2d at 348. The prosecution introduced evidence that Alonso was engaged in counter-surveillance. During a meeting between the conspirators and the agents Operskalski and Brenner, Alonso stood away at a distance, looking into vehicles, looking at people in cars, looking around at--at people and things here on the--on the sidewalks and in the streets at that corner. SER at 18. This and other evidence sufficiently supports the contention that Alonso acted in furtherance of the conspiracy by engaging in counter-surveillance. 54 Alonso cites Penagos for the proposition that merely scanning up and down the street while illegal activity is occurring is not enough. Alonso misreads Penagos. This Court in Penagos held that the prosecution had not introduced sufficient evidence to support its counter-surveillance theory: the alleged counter-surveillance in that case did not occur at a time or place where there was a high risk of detection of the illegal activity, the defendant was present at only one of three occasions in which counter-surveillance might have been helpful to the conspirators, and the prosecution had not identified any persons or activities that were objects of defendant's attention as he looked up and down the street. Penagos, 823 F.2d at 349. 2 Given the overwhelming evidence of Alonso's role as a lookout, his reliance on Penagos avails him nothing.
55 Intent to commit underlying offense: The prosecution introduced evidence that Alonso negotiated the specifics of the intended transaction with agent Operskalski. He told Operskalski that he thought it was too risky to charge $100,000 in one day, but made the following offer: We can do twenty thousand (20,000) today, twenty or thirty thousand today.... SER at 13 (testimony of agent Operskalski). This and other evidence would allow a rational jury to find that Alonso had the intent necessary actually to commit the fraud. 56 We therefore hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy charge. 57 B. Alonso has waived his sufficiency of the evidence claim with regard to the substantive count. 58 Alonso asserts at two points in his brief that the evidence was insufficient to support conviction on the substantive count. See Appellant's Br. at 25; id. at 28 (the Appellant would submit that the evidence presented by the Government to sustain his conviction for both the conspiracy and substantive charge was legally insufficient and a reversal of his convictions in the above-referenced cause is mandated by this court). Alonso does not present any argument to support this assertion, nor does he identify which elements of the substantive charge the government failed to establish. 59 These unsupported assertions violate Fed.R.App.Proc. 28(a)(5), which states in part that [t]he argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. Because Alonso's brief fails to meet these requirements, we deem Alonso's contention regarding the substantive count waived. 60 Appellate courts frequently refuse to address issues that appellants fail to develop in their briefs. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, for example, has refused to address an issue merely adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, in violation of Rule 28(a)(5). United States v. Tracy, 989 F.2d 1279, 1286 (1st Cir.) (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082, 110 S.Ct. 1814, 108 L.Ed.2d 944 (1990)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2393, 124 L.Ed.2d 294 (1993); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.1993) (It is ... well settled ... that casual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.). 61 Alonso does not state the element or elements he thinks the prosecutor failed to prove. 3 He does not cite any authority regarding what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a violation of this provision. 4 Rather, his argument goes entirely to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conspiracy count. Alonso never articulates any theory as to how the district court erred with respect to this second issue, however. Cf. Kost, 1 F.3d at 182 (They never articulate or argue anywhere in that brief the necessary contention that the district court erred....). As the Tracy court stated, [n]otice pleadings do not suffice for appellate briefs. Tracy, 989 F.2d at 1286. 62 We therefore decline to reach this contention.