Opinion ID: 2829694
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Kentucky Tort Law

Text: Over the course of this litigation, Plaintiffs have advanced three distinct theories supporting the origin of the duty of reasonable care that the Army purportedly owed Tracy and Comer under Kentucky law: (1) that the Army voluntarily assumed a duty to Tracy; (2) that a statutory duty governing mental health professionals applies; and (3) that a duty arose out of a special relationship between Tracy and the Army. We discuss each of the three in turn. -6- No. 14-5732 Wilburn v. United States
Plaintiffs argue that the Government voluntarily assumed a duty to Tracy and Comer by undertaking to protect members of the military community in three ways: through the passage and implementation of Policy 7 and other regulations concerning firearms on base; through Tracy’s interactions with Burke’s command; and through Sgt. Dean’s confiscation of Burke’s pistol. When determining whether a defendant has voluntarily assumed a duty to a plaintiff, Kentucky courts apply § 323 of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts. Horn v. Horn, 630 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Ky. 1982) (Stephenson, J., dissenting); Murphy v. Second St. Corp., 48 S.W.3d 571, 575 n.16 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). Section 323 provides that: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965).1 When considering whether a defendant “increased the risk” of harm to the plaintiff under § 323(a), the pertinent question is not whether the risk was increased by the defendant’s failure to adhere to an internal policy compared to what the risk would have been had it adhered to the policy. Rather, the correct question is whether the defendant’s adoption of and subsequent failure to adhere to the policy increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff over the risk the plaintiff would have faced had the policy never been adopted at all. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323, 1 Rather than citing Restatement § 323, Plaintiffs reference Restatement § 324A, which governs voluntarilyassumed duties to third parties. At argument the Government noted that § 323 is more applicable because Plaintiffs are asserting a duty that flows directly from the Army to Tracy, not through Burke. We agree. This does not alter our analysis, however, as the pertinent requirements of both are identical: subsections (a) and (b) of § 323 correspond exactly to subsections (a) and (c) of § 324A, and subsection (b) of § 324A has no application here. -7- No. 14-5732 Wilburn v. United States cmt. c; see also Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622, 632-33 (Ky. 2009). Here, Plaintiffs argue that the Army assumed a duty to Tracy because Tracy relied upon Policy 7 and Burke’s command to protect her. Policy 7 contains a “Domestic Violence Checklist,” which lists the “minimum actions required of Commanders” in domestic violence situations. The checklist’s protective measures “are designed to safeguard members of the military community while the case is assessed by Social Work Services and investigated by the Fort Campbell Police.” It directs Unit Commanders to, among other things, “Order the soldier to move into the barracks for a minimum of seventy-two (72) hours,” “Order the soldier to immediately turn in all privately owned firearms to the unit arms room,” and “Contact the Family Advocacy Victim Advocate Program . . . to ensure the victim is aware of the programs and policies that provide support and protection.” Unit Commanders are further directed to “issue a Military Protective Order [MPO] . . . to safeguard victims, quell disturbances, and maintain good order and discipline providing victims time to pursue protective orders through civilian courts, or to support existing civilian orders of protection.” Unit Commanders must then “[r]eassess the situation at the end of the forty-eight hour period, and determine if the above restrictions should be modified, or canceled.” Here, Plaintiffs note that “it is reasonable to infer that Tracy relied upon” the Army’s inquiry into the location of Burke’s privately owned weapons “because Policy 7 expressly requires that the Domestic Violence Checklist be forwarded to the victim.” Furthermore, their complaint alleges that after the May 26 incident, Tracy informed Burke’s command that she feared Burke and his access to his weapons, and that she requested a protective order to keep Burke away from her. At oral argument, Plaintiffs represented that Tracy had multiple -8- No. 14-5732 Wilburn v. United States conversations with members of Burke’s command about her fear of Burke during the summer leading up to her murder. Plaintiffs also note that when Burke moved into the barracks during the separation from Tracey, Fort Campbell Regulation 190-1 and Army Regulation 190-11 required that his privately-owned weapons be registered and stored in the unit arms room, and point out that Sgt. Dean took Burke’s pistol from him of Dean’s own volition, then returned it to Burke a week before the murders. Each bare fact—that the Army did not follow its own regulations, that Sgt. Dean took and then returned Burke’s gun, or that Tracy told Burke’s command that she feared Burke—is not sufficient to show that the Army assumed a duty to warn or protect her. Tracy must also show that the army took some action upon which she relied. Here, Plaintiffs have asserted that Tracy discussed her fear of Burke with Burke’s command multiple times in the months leading up to her murder, and that Policy 7 requires that a Military Protective Order be implemented and forwarded to Tracy. It is plausible that representations Burke’s commanding officer made in those conversations or actions mandated in an MPO caused Tracy to reasonably rely on Burke’s command to enforce its rules and protect her. We therefore conclude that she has stated a claim under Kentucky law based on a reliance theory. At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs will have to present evidence sufficient to enable a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Tracy reasonably relied on some action taken by the Army. But it would be premature to dismiss the complaint without first affording Plaintiffs the opportunity to take discovery to explore what was said to Tracy during her interactions with Burke’s command and whether she was given a basis to believe that Policy 7, a Military -9- No. 14-5732 Wilburn v. United States Protective Order, the confiscation of Burke’s weapon, or some other action would be implemented by the Army to provide for her protection. 2. Mental health professionals’ duty under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) § 202A.400 Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts that the Government had a duty to warn Tracy and Comer under the Kentucky statute codifying a mental health care providers’ duty to warn potential victims of their patients. The duty is created once “the patient has communicated to the mental health professional an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 202A.400(1),(2). The statute defines a “mental health professional” to include psychiatrists and physicians engaged in mental health services, registered nurses, and various other professional therapists and counselors. Id. § 202A.400(4). The district court noted that the amended complaint alleges that Burke communicated threats to his fellow officers and those in his chain of command as opposed to mental health professionals. In their response to the Government’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs argued that without the benefit of discovery, they could not determine whether Burke communicated a threat to the Army’s medical officers. The district court, however, found this unconvincing because paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that there was “no indication that the Army took any steps to assess, counsel or treat Burke’s long history of psychological disorders[.]” The complaint, however, places this allegation in a fuller context: that sentence continues with “— which include depression, anger management issues, and explosive personality disorder—when he was referred to counseling following the May 26, 2007 incident.” And the preceding paragraph in the complaint states that “the Army ordered Burke to attend counseling and social services.” Read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, these paragraphs allege that though Burke was ordered to attend counseling, there is no sign that he was treated for his longstanding -10- No. 14-5732 Wilburn v. United States psychological disorders during those sessions. Given that Burke repeatedly made statements about killing Tracy to various members of the military community, Plaintiffs’ assertions concerning Burke’s interactions with mental health professionals are at least plausible. Accordingly, we find that it is appropriate for Plaintiffs to have the opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue. 3. A tort duty arising from a special relationship between the Army and Tracy Plaintiffs also argue that simply by implementing Policy 7 the Army created a special relationship with Tracy and thereby assumed an ongoing duty to warn Tracy about Burke’s comments and ensure that Burke’s weapons were secured. A Kentucky Supreme Court case surveying the state of the law pertaining to duties to prevent harm directly caused by a third party notes that “[a]s a general rule” under Kentucky law, “an actor whose conduct has not created a risk of harm has no duty to control the conduct of a third person to prevent him from causing harm to another.” Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 849 (Ky. 2005). A duty to exercise “reasonable care to prevent harm by controlling a third person’s conduct” can, however, arise where: “(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives rise to a right of protection.” Id. at 849 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315)). Though Plaintiffs assert that a special relationship existed between Tracy and the Army, they fail to explain how Kentucky law makes this so. Grand Aerie mentions that courts outside of Kentucky have found special relationships rooted in the defendant’s failure to warn potential victims of impending harm in certain situations, but the examples it provides point only to state/parolee and psychotherapist/patient -11- No. 14-5732 Wilburn v. United States relationships. Grand Aerie, 169 S.W.3d at 851-52. Plaintiffs have provided no legal support indicating that the Kentucky Supreme Court would hold that such a duty would apply in the instant case outside the context of Burke making a statement to a mental health professional. Such statements are covered by statute in Kentucky as discussed above, and are unrelated to Policy 7 or the confiscation of Burke’s firearm. Grand Aerie further acknowledged that the Second and Third Restatements of Torts have found a special relationship to exist between master and servant that could give rise to a duty of reasonable care based on the exercise of control—such a duty arising only if “the servant is using an instrumentality of the employment relationship to cause the harm” (Second Restatement) or “the employment facilitates the employee’s causing harm to third parties” (Third Restatement). 169 S.W.3d at 852. Because Burke committed the tort outside of the employment relationship and without the assistance of the Army’s equipment or facilitation, finding that the Army had a duty to control him based on the employment relationship would require an expansion of the principles of Grand Aerie. Plaintiffs have not made a legal argument that such an expansion is appropriate, or that the Kentucky Supreme Court would extend the law in that manner if presented with the issue. Plaintiffs have also failed to provide any other legal support for the concept that the mere existence or implementation of Policy 7 or the cited regulations created a special relationship with Tracy that would require it to warn or protect her absent the additional requirements voiced in Restatement § 323, discussed above. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated that the Army had any duty to Tracy independent of the requirements of Restatement § 323 or the obligations of a mental health professional duty expressed in KRS § 202A.400. -12- No. 14-5732 Wilburn v. United States