Opinion ID: 169281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exceptions to Exhaustion Requirement

Text: 32 In Romer we recognized that [e]xhaustion is not required . . . where it would be futile or fail to provide adequate relief. 992 F.2d at 1044. In that case the plaintiffs, suing under the IDEA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claimed that the CDE had denied them individualized IEPs because its policies arbitrarily predetermine[d] the duration of [extended-school-day] and ESY services and use[d] a single criterion to determine eligibility for ESY services. Id. at 1043. We held that exhaustion for these claims was not excused under the futility or inadequate-relief exceptions. We said that [a]dministrative remedies are generally inadequate or futile where plaintiffs allege structural or systemic failure and seek systemwide reforms. Id. at 1044. And we included dictum that exhaustion is not required where plaintiffs assert violations of the IDEA's due process provisions, id., apparently referring to such matters as notice and fair hearing procedures, see Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 159 (2d Cir.1992) (impartiality of hearing officer). Romer, however, declared that the claims before the court did not target structural or due process concerns, but rather the effect of a single component of CDE's educational program on individual children's IEPs. 992 F.2d at 1044. This is not, we said, the kind of systemic violation that renders the exhaustion requirement inadequate or futile . . . . Id. 33 In our view Romer requires the same conclusion here. Central to the allegations of the plaintiffs in both Romer and this case is the question of the extent of ESY services. As in Romer, Joshua's allegations focus on the effect of a single component of CDE's education program on individual children's IEPs. Id. The overriding consideration is whether it is clear at the outset that the administrative procedure under the IDEA could not provide Joshua with the FAPE to which he is entitled. Only then could we say that pursuing administrative remedies would be futile or lead to inadequate relief. Because we have no factual record on Joshua's specific condition or needs, we can hardly say that the District would inevitably deny the FAPE that it should provide him. Accordingly, neither the futility exception nor the inadequate-relief exception to the exhaustion requirement excuses the failure to exhaust administrative remedies for Joshua. 34
35 Romer also stated in dictum that there may be an exception to the exhaustion requirement when `an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law.' Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99-296, at 7 (1985)); see Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 724 (10th Cir.1996). 1 We explained that exhaustion may not be required in that circumstance if a plaintiff's challenge to a policy of general applicability raise[s] only questions of law, thereby rendering agency expertise and the factual development of an administrative record less important. Romer, 992 F.2d at 1044. By the same token, however, exhaustion is still required unless the underlying purposes of exhaustion would not be served. Id. 36 In Romer we held that both of plaintiffs' claims needed to be exhausted. Determining whether the CDE's policies have denied children with disabilities appropriately individualized IEPs, we explained, is a factually intensive inquiry into the circumstances of each individual child's case and is precisely the kind of issue the IDEA's administrative process was designed to address. Id. As to the plaintiffs' contention that the CDE's guidelines arbitrarily predetermined the duration of extended-school-day and ESY services, we acknowledged that such an argument arguably asserts a facial violation of the IDEA's individualization requirement. Id. at 1045. Nevertheless, the contention still ultimately requires a determination as to whether any individual child was denied a [FAPE]. Such a determination is enhanced by the factual details of a particular child's case. Id.; cf. Urban, 89 F.3d at 725 (general-applicability exception does not apply when party challenges particulars of a child's IEP). 37 The same analysis applies here. To be sure, Joshua contends that the CDE guidelines and the District's policy facially violate the IDEA because they allegedly prohibit teaching new skills in ESY programs. But the ultimate issue in the case — and the decisive consideration for the reimbursement claim in district court — is whether Joshua received an appropriately individualized IEP and whether he was denied a FAPE. We therefore conclude that the general-applicability exception to exhaustion does not apply.