Opinion ID: 1191894
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unavailability of Barnett's Requested Remedy

Text: Moreover, Barnett failed to present a colorable claim for relief, even assuming, arguendo, that: (1) the plea agreement was for a single life term, as opposed to multiple life terms running concurrently; and (2) a single life term were materially distinguishable, for purposes of the HPA's determination of minimum terms, from multiple life terms running concurrently. Given Barnett's contention that he was not fully aware of the consequences of his plea, Barnett's proper recourse in this case is a withdrawal of his plea. Instead, he seeks an order to the circuit court to sentence him to concurrent twenty-year terms. This remedy is not available to him. With regard to the withdrawal of a guilty plea, we have previously stated that a defendant is entitled to withdraw his or her guilty plea after imposition of sentence only upon a showing of manifest injustice. State v. Nguyen, 81 Hawai`i 279, 292, 916 P.2d 689, 702 (1996) (citing State v. Cornelio, 68 Haw. 644, 646, 727 P.2d 1125, 1126-27 (1986)); see also State v. Merino, 81 Hawai`i 198, 223, 915 P.2d 672, 697 (1996). Manifest injustice occurs when a defendant makes a plea involuntarily or without knowledge of the direct consequences of the plea. Cf. Reponte [ v. State ], 57 Haw. [354,] 362, 556 P.2d [577,] 583 [ (1976)] (a plea of guilty is not constitutionally acceptable unless made voluntarily and with a full understanding of the consequences); State v. James, 176 Wis.2d 230, 500 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Wis.Ct.App.1993) (a manifest injustice) occurs when a defendant makes a plea involuntarily, or without knowledge of the charge, the consequences of the plea or that the sentence or that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed), review denied, 505 N.W.2d 138 (Wis.1993); Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 427 Pa.Super. 387, 629 A.2d 154, 158 (1993) (To establish manifest injustice, [the defendant] must show that his plea was involuntary or was given without knowledge of the charge), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 620, 637 A.2d 280 (1993). There is no manifest injustice when a trial court has made an affirmative showing through an on-the-record colloquy between the court and the defendant which shows that the defendant had a full understanding of what his or her plea connoted and its direct consequences. Cornelio, 68 Haw. at 646-47, 727 P.2d at 1127. The on-the-record colloquy ... between the circuit court and [the defendant] shows that the circuit court determined that [the defendant] made his plea voluntarily, and that [the defendant] had a full understanding of what his no contest plea connoted and its direct consequences. See supra at 282-285, 916 P.2d at 692-695. Thus, the on-the-record colloquy supports the circuit court and [the defendant] failed to demonstrate manifest injustice that would warrant granting the withdrawal of his no contest plea. Nguyen, 81 Hawai`i at 292, 916 P.2d at 702 (some brackets in original and some added). In addition, [c]ourts need not inform defendants prior to accepting their guilty or nolo contendere pleas about every conceivable collateral effect that a conviction might have. Id. at 287, 916 P.2d at 697 (citing Reponte v. State, 57 Haw. 354, 364, 556 P.2d 577, 584 (1976)). In this case, it is undisputed that Barnett knew that he was pleading guilty to fifteen separate felonies involving sexual assault. Before accepting Barnett's guilty plea, the circuit court conducted a lengthy colloquy on the record to examine the voluntariness of Barnett's plea. The circuit court asked Barnett various questions regarding any outside influence that may have been affecting his decision to plead guilty. The court then asked the prosecution read aloud in open court each charge and their respective factual bases to which Barnett would be pleading. In addition, the circuit court stated: THE COURT: ... [Y]ou will be stipulating to a single life term of imprisonment with a possibility of parole under Criminal Number 92-0196 for Counts 2, 9, 12, 16, 18, 25, 28, 31, 34 and 39. These are all class A felonies. While counts 1, 19, 21 and 36, which are all class C felonies, will carry the ordinary terms of imprisonment of an indeterminate term of five years to run concurrent to the life term imposed for the class A felonies. Based upon the circuit court's colloquy with Barnett, it is difficult to imagine that Barnett did not have knowledge of the direct consequences of his guilty plea. At the very least, Barnett knew that he was pleading guilty to fifteen separate sexual assault felonies and, given that all sentences were run concurrently, that he would be sentenced to what effectively would amount to a life term of imprisonment. In addition, a letter attached to Barnett's guilty plea form stated in relevant part: Mr. Barnett will stipulate to a single life term of imprisonment ... for counts two, Nine, Twelve, Sixteen, Eighteen, Twenty-Five, Twenty-eight, Thirty-One, thirty-Four and Thirty-Nine (all class A felonies) while Counts One, Nineteen, Twenty-One and Thirty-Six (all Class C felonies) will carry the ordinary terms of imprisonment of an indeterminate sentence of five years, to run concurrent to the life term imposed for the class A felonies. Barnett stated before his guilty plea was accepted that he had read the forms, had reviewed it with his attorney, and understood what the form contained and what it meant. The fact that Barnett expected a legally impossible certain sentence and did not receive it in precisely the expected form does not render the guilty plea involuntary. Cf. Eli v. State, 63 Haw. 474, 477, 630 P.2d 113, 116 (1981) (citing Masciola v. United States, 469 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir.1972)). In fact, the record suggests that Barnett received a minimum term of imprisonment (twenty-five years), which was much shorter than originally expected (thirty-five years). Under these circumstances, and given that Barnett received the benefit of his plea bargain, Barnett has not met his burden of demonstrating manifest injustice so as to entitle him to withdraw his plea. Therefore, Barnett has failed to present a colorable claim under HRPP Rule 40. Interestingly, however, Barnett is not seeking to withdraw his plea. In his opening brief, Barnett requests that the case be remanded with instructions to ... sentence [Barnett] ... to a maximum of 20 years. However, Barnett has not cited any authority or any basis that would allow this court to substitute a sentence of concurrent twenty-year terms in this case. The prosecution has not agreed to Barnett's proposed sentence of concurrent twenty-year terms. Indeed, if given the opportunity to renegotiate the plea, the prosecution would be free to bargain for a longer term of imprisonment than the multiple concurrent terms currently in effect or, arguably, even to refuse to bargain at all, thus forcing Barnett to trial. [9] In such a case, Barnett would face the possibility of a maximum sentence of 610 years of imprisonment, or twenty-seven life sentences, with the possibility of parole in 140 years. In addition, it is the sentencing court that is required to consider the various factors set forth in HRS § 706-606 (1993), including the presentence report and the defendant's presentation to the court at the sentencing hearing. See HRS §§ 706-606, 706-601 (1993), 706-602 (1993), and 706-604 (1993). Accordingly, this court is without power to fashion a sentence in the first instance on appeal. That being the case, we hold that the remedy being sought by Barnett is not available in this case.