Opinion ID: 2249712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: General Problems

Text: As a general problem, defendant first argues that the strength of the expert's opinion on the similarity between the shoe and the test print is subject to doubt because, unlike fingerprint, bitemark or ballistics evidence, shoeprints lack original uniqueness and their characteristics change over a period of time. These problems, defendant maintains, lead to a general distrust of shoeprint evidence. By his argument, defendant appears to seek a finding that shoeprint evidence is unreliable, as a matter of law. We decline to so find. We believe that where there are significant general and individual characteristics, such as would provide a basis for a positive identification, shoeprint evidence may be as reliable and as trustworthy as any other evidence. Indeed, our review of the relevant case law lends no support to defendant's argument that shoeprint evidence is generally distrusted. We note that in Illinois, correspondence of footprints found at the scene of a crime with the sole of one accused of the crime has long been admissible as competent evidence in an attempt to identify the accused as the guilty person. (See, e.g., Schoolcraft v. People (1886), 117 Ill. 271, 7 N.E. 649; Carlton v. People (1894), 150 Ill. 181, 37 N.E. 244; People v. Zammuto (1917), 280 Ill. 225, 117 N.E. 454; People v. Hanson (1964), 31 Ill.2d 31, 198 N.E.2d 815; People v. Diaz (1988), 169 Ill.App.3d 66, 119 Ill.Dec. 527, 522 N.E.2d 1386; People v. Henne (1988), 165 Ill.App.3d 315, 116 Ill.Dec. 296, 518 N.E.2d 1276; People v. Howard (1985), 130 Ill.App.3d 967, 86 Ill. Dec. 148, 474 N.E.2d 1345; People v. Ricketts (1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 992, 65 Ill.Dec. 471, 441 N.E.2d 384; People v. Lomas (1981), 92 Ill.App.3d 957, 48 Ill.Dec. 377, 416 N.E.2d 408; People v. Robbins (1974), 21 Ill.App.3d 317, 315 N.E.2d 198; People v. Kozlowski (1968), 95 Ill.App.2d 464, 238 N.E.2d 156; see also 1 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 132, at 547-54 (14th ed. 1985); Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 856 (1954).) It simply does not follow that since, as defendant concludes, shoeprint evidence lacks the original uniqueness of certain other types of demonstrative evidence it is untrustworthy. Defendant further attempts to support his untrustworthiness argument with reliance upon People v. Zismer (1969), 275 Cal.App.2d 660, 665, 80 Cal.Rptr. 184, 188, which cites 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 415 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). He asserts, quoting Wigmore, that the identity inference to be drawn in shoeprint comparison is `apt to be especially weak' because of the lack of uniqueness in shoe features. Defendant neglects to permit us the full benefit of Professor Wigmore's wisdom on this subject. Wigmore, in concluding his discussion about the weakness of such evidence, states: This is because the features usually taken as the basis of inferencesize, depth, contour, etc.may not be distinctive and fixed in type for every individual, but may apply, even in combination, to many individuals. Hence their probative significance is apt to be small.    No doubt a witness to identity of footmarks should be required to specify the features on which he bases his judgment of identity, and then the strength of the inference should depend on the degree of accurate detail to be ascribed to each feature and of the unique distinctiveness to be predicated of the total combination. Testimony not based on such data of appreciable significance should be given no weight. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 415, at 488-89 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). See also Zismer, 275 Cal.App.2d at 665-68, 80 Cal.Rptr. at 188-90. We would acknowledge that general problems with the probative value of shoeprint evidence may arise in a particular case where an attempt is made at positive identification of an accused in the absence of sufficient unique, distinctive characteristics. However, we find no general problems with shoeprint evidence such as would support a conclusion of unreliability as a matter of law.