Opinion ID: 4024341
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the period applicable under State

Text: law; and (ii) in the case of any tort claim, the longer of– (I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law. (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall be the later of– (i) the date of the appointment of the [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14). The Extender Statute begins by setting forth “the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent.” Id. § 1784(b)(14)(A) (emphasis added). NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 11 It further provides that the limitations period “shall be” six years for contract cases, three years for tort cases, or in either case, the respective applicable period under State law if that period is longer. Id. By expressly stating that “the” statute of limitations for “any action” brought by the NCUA as conservator or liquidating agent “shall be” as specified, Congress made clear that no other limitations period applies to the NCUA’s claims. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 764 F.3d 1199, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014) (Nomura II); Fed. Housing Finance Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2013). It is clear to us that the Extender Statute’s plain meaning “indicates that it . . . supplants all other time limits.” Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1226; see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. RBS Securities Inc., 798 F.3d 244, 254 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Interpreting the statute as excluding repose periods from its ambit would circumvent that mandatory language by providing the FDIC with less than three years from the date of its appointment as receiver to bring claims.”).