Opinion ID: 1830567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count IAustin Matter

Text: In May 1996, Jimmy Willard Austin, II (Jimmy) was charged with first degree murder in the 27th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Landry, along with three other individuals. After determining Jimmy was indigent, the trial court appointed respondent, a private attorney who contracted with the local Indigent Defender Board (IDB), to represent him. Because this matter was a capital case, respondent received from the IDB a one-time payment of $5,000, $25 per hour for out of court appearances and $35 per hour for court appearances, in addition to receiving his regular monthly stipend from the IDB. In May 1997, Jimmy's parents, Jimmy and Debra Austin, paid respondent $10,000. The initial purpose of the payment is in dispute. Jimmy and his parents assert respondent advised that he needed $20,000 to make deals with the district attorney's office to arrange for Jimmy's release on bond and a reduced plea. In contrast, respondent alleges the payment was specifically unrelated to the plea negotiations. He maintains Jimmy insisted he did not want a court-appointed lawyer, but rather wanted to retain respondent on a private basis because he considered respondent to be the best criminal defense attorney in the area. In any event, it is undisputed that, upon receiving the fee payment, respondent no longer accepted funds from the IDB for his representation of Jimmy. Respondent entered into discussions with the district attorney's office about a possible reduced plea to accessory after the fact. However, several months later, a grand jury returned a superceding criminal indictment charging Jimmy with aggravated kidnaping, armed robbery and second degree murder on the basis that evidence from the first degree murder trial of one of his co-defendants indicated Jimmy was more culpable than it originally appeared. [1] Thereafter, respondent met with Jimmy and his parents to advise the district attorney's office had withdrawn its plea offer, and that Jimmy was going to trial on the superceding indictment. At this point, respondent offered to return the $10,000 fee to the Austins. The Austins told respondent to retain the money, although their reasons for doing so are disputed. The Austins maintain that they wanted respondent to keep the money because respondent promised to obtain another plea arrangement with the district attorney where Jimmy would plead guilty to second degree murder and be incarcerated for no more than three years of a twenty year sentence and, in the event the case went to trial, respondent would act as lead counsel. By contrast, respondent asserts the Austins asked him to keep the $10,000 to supplement his income and to proceed with the case to its conclusion. He alleges he would never have promised that Jimmy would only serve three years, despite his being a first offender, because of the overwhelming evidence against him. Following jury selection in Jimmy's trial, respondent became ill for a prolonged period of time. As a result, the trial court declared a mistrial. Being unaware that the Austins had retained respondent on a private basis to represent their son, the trial court removed respondent as indigent counsel and appointed other counsel for Jimmy, although respondent was permitted to remain on the case on a voluntary basis. Several months later, jury selection began in Jimmy's new trial. The court permitted respondent to enroll as counsel in the proceedings, but specifically barred him from acting as lead counsel. Respondent still fully participated in the four-day trial, with the exception of his absence for one-half day due to another court appearance. [2] During respondent's absence, one of Jimmy's co-defendants, a critical witness to the case, testified on behalf of the prosecution. Ultimately, Jimmy was found guilty as charged and sentenced to serve two concurrent life terms, without benefit of probation or parole, plus thirty years. Shortly after sentencing, Jimmy and Mr. Austin filed complaints against respondent with the ODC, seeking a return of the $10,000 fee. In support, they alleged that they paid the $10,000 attorney's fee to respondent because he promised results in the case, but did not obtain that result. Moreover, they alleged that respondent had failed to advise them that he was barred from acting as lead counsel at the criminal trial. They questioned why respondent could request payment of a legal fee when he was already receiving compensation from the IDB.