Opinion ID: 1165064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Work search as requisite of availability under section 1253, subdivision (c).

Text: (5a) The board next says the trial court erred by concluding that, even if Carroll did follow seek-work instructions under section 1253, subdivision (e), he remains ineligible under section 1253, subdivision (c) because he failed to make a diligent search on his own initiative for all suitable work. That seems correct. The trial court's interpretation contravenes the established meaning of availability for work. In Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 55 [141 Cal. Rptr. 146, 569 P.2d 740], this court rejected a contention that claimant's selfimposed time restrictions rendered her unavailable even though it materially reduced her chance for reemployment and prevented her from working at times normal in her usual occupation. ... `Availability for work' within the meaning of section 1253, subdivision (c), said the court, requires no more than (1) that an individual claimant be willing to accept suitable work which he has no good cause for refusing and (2) that the claimant thereby make himself available to a substantial field of employment. [Fn. omitted.] (P. 67; see also Glick v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 493, 499 [153 Cal. Rptr. 1, 591 P.2d 24].) In other words, availability reflects a concern not as to the search for work but as to the restrictions claimant imposes on the work he will accept. That view is accepted in states with similar statutes. ( Sanchez, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 64.) Settled principles of statutory construction also support the board's position. (6) Wherever reasonable, interpretations which produce internal harmony, avoid redundancy, and accord significance to each word and phrase are preferred. ( Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230-231 [110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224].) Subdivision (e) sets forth specific work-search requirements and is the only portion of section 1253 which makes express references to the claimant's seek-work responsibilities. To infer from the availability language of subdivision (c) a seek-work obligation broader than that stated in subdivision (e) would strain the former and render the latter pointless. (5b) The specification of availability and seek work requirements in separate sections implies that the Legislature considered them discrete tests. Early versions of the California statute included sections dealing with availability and registration but contained no seek-work language. (See, e.g., Stats. 1939, ch. 674, § 13, p. 2150; Stats. 1935, ch. 352, § 56, p. 1238.) That language was added in 1947 as subdivision (f) of section 57. (Stats. 1947, ch. 651, § 1, pp. 1692-1693, supra. ) It couched the requirement in terms of compliance with all regulations. (See discussion ante. ) In 1953 the law was revised and enacted as the Unemployment Insurance Code. The seek-work requirement, still focusing on regulations, was combined with the availability requirement in new section 1253, subd. (c). (Stats. 1953, ch. 308, § 1253, subd. (c), p. 1501, supra. ) The 1961 amendment rephrased availability and seek work in separate subdivisions. The requirement of a job search in compliance with regulations gave way to the more limited command that claimant follow specific and reasonable [seek-work] instructions from the local employment office. (Stats. 1961, ch. 2208, § 1, p. 4553.) For at least three reasons that legislative history compels the conclusion that subdivision (e) states completely claimants' obligation to seek work. First, it shows that the Legislature has consistently considered availability and seek work requirements to be separate tests for eligibility. Second, it suggests development of a policy that the department tell each claimant in detail what reasonable, job-seeking efforts the law demands in his case. (See discussion ante. ) Third, the earlier versions of subdivision (e), by their broad expressions that claimant must meet all seek-work regulations, suggest that the Legislature uses that subdivision to express the limits of its policy. Plaintiff argues that section 1253 must be read in light of section 100, enacted in 1953, which expresses the intent that unemployed persons claiming unemployment insurance benefits shall be required to make all reasonable effort to secure employment on their own behalf.  (Italics added.) But nothing in section 100 contravenes a conclusion that section 1253, subdivision (e) circumscribes claimants' duty to seek work. Section 1253, subdivision (e) simply implements the policy of section 100. In effect it defines all reasonable effort in terms of compliance with specific and reasonable instructions from the employment office. [6] (7) Even if section 100 did indicate a work-search standard inconsistent with that stated in section 1253, subdivision (e), the specific and more recent section would seem to control the general and less recent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1859; Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1, 7 [128 Cal. Rptr. 673, 547 P.2d 449].) We conclude that section 100 does not imply greater seek-work responsibilities than section 1253, subdivision (e) prescribes. (5c) Plaintiff says the Legislature has acquiesced in rulings by the EDD, the board and the courts that availability for work includes a distinct seek-work requirement. These rulings, it contends, are administrative constructions of the statute to which we should defer. We disagree. The courts have suggested that a claimant may be unavailable under subdivision (c) when there is evidence that his lack of diligence caused the loss of an actual employment opportunity (e.g., Swaby v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1978) 85 Cal. App.3d 264, 270 [149 Cal. Rptr. 336] [refusal to apply for seasonal farm work in area where work was available]; [7] Spangler v. California Unemp. Ins. App. Bd. (1971) 14 Cal. App.3d 284, 288 [92 Cal. Rptr. 266] [no showing, as required, that failure to spruce up lost actual job opportunity]; Ashdown v. State of California (1955) 135 Cal. App.2d 291, 299-300 [287 P.2d 176] [refusal to call central casting office when employment as extra actor would have been obtained]; Loew's, Inc. v. California Emp. etc. Com. (1946) 76 Cal. App.2d 231, 241-242 [172 P.2d 938] [same]) or where his actions have precluded any possibility that he could accept work if offered it. ( International Union of United Auto etc. Workers v. Department of Human Resources Dev. (1976) 58 Cal. App.3d 924, 931 [130 Cal. Rptr. 368] [unexcused absence from state].) None holds that subdivision (c) imposes an open-ended job search requirement. Several board decisions are cited for the principle that the law imposes a duty to seek all suitable work. (See, e.g., P-B-260 (Gosha) (1976); P-B-170 (Anderson) (1976); P-B-61 (Miller) (1969); P-B-17 (Griggsby) (1968); P-B-1 (Anderson) (1967); Benefit Dec. Nos. 5989 (Warford) (1953); 5733 (O'Gatty) (1951); 5718 (Daum) (1951).) None clearly rules, though, that the current wording of subdivisions (c) and (e) invokes a seek-work duty beyond that imposed by the department in its instructions to claimant. Indeed, in P-B-196 (Hudson) (1976) the board affirmed that seek-work issues are to be resolved under subdivision (e), not subdivision (c). P-B-196 is a republication under section 409 of the previously issued Benefit Decision No. 5641 (1950), indicating that this has been the board's consistent policy. [8] Finally, plaintiff points to section 1253, subdivision (c)-2 of the Regulations, which purports to implement subdivision (c) of the statute. That section now provides that a claimant ruled ineligible for any week because he is not able or available will remain ineligible until he shows he is able, available, and ... pursuing a course of action reasonably designed to result in prompt reemployment in suitable work. Recent changes in the Regulations, however, evidence once more the department's recognition that seek-work requirements should be considered under subdivision (e) rather than subdivision (c). Before March 1979 (and during the benefit weeks here at issue), section 1253, subdivision (c)-1 contained many of the department's detailed rules for seeking work. At the same time, section 1253, subdivision (c)-2 provided that the requirements for reestablishing lost eligibility (see our preceding paragraph) applied to any claimant ruled ineligible because he was not able or available or [had] not made a reasonable effort to secure work in his own behalf. The 1979 amendments then repealed section 1253, subdivision (c)-1; and its substance was moved to a new section, 1253, subdivision (e)-1, adopted under authority of subdivision (e) of the statute. Contemporaneously, the first reference in section 1253, subdivision (c)-2 to persons ruled ineligible for failure to seek work was deleted. [9] (8) In any event, administrative construction of a statute, while entitled to weight, cannot prevail when a contrary legislative purpose is apparent. ( Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 20 Cal.3d 55, 67; Wilkinson v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 491, 501 [138 Cal. Rptr. 696, 564 P.2d 848]; Rivera v. City of Fresno, supra, 6 Cal.3d 132, 140.) We think section 1253, subdivision (c)-2 of the Regulations, insofar as it suggests a separate seek-work requirement under subdivision (c) of the statute, is contrary to persuasive evidence of the Legislature's intent. We therefore conclude that an applicant for benefits fulfills his duty to seek work if he follows with reasonable diligence the specific and reasonable [seek-work] instructions of a public employment office. (§ 1253, subd. (e).) The board's holding to that effect was proper. Thus the judgment should be reversed.