Opinion ID: 6105749
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Heading: Arbuckle 's General Principle Relating to Plea Bargains

Text: Plea negotiations and agreements are an accepted and 'integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts.' [Citations.] Plea agreements benefit that system by promoting speed, economy, and the finality of judgments. ( People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921 , 929, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 715 , 188 P.3d 649 ; see People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68 , 79-80, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 913 P.2d 1061 .) The same is true in proceedings involving juvenile offenders. Plea bargaining is a common feature in juvenile delinquency proceedings, just as it is  in criminal proceedings in adult court. Similar principles apply in both settings. ( In re Ricardo C. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 688 , 698, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 369 ; accord, In re Jermaine B. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 634 , 639, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 734 [plea bargaining is an accepted practice in juvenile delinquency proceedings].) A plea agreement 'is a tripartite agreement which requires the consent of the defendant, the People and the court.' [Citations.] 'Acceptance  of the agreement binds the court and the parties to the agreement.'  ( People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426 , 436-437, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 518 , 226 P.3d 998 .) Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent sentencing discretion, 'a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain.'  ( People v. Segura, supra , 44 Cal.4th at p. 931, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 715 , 188 P.3d 649 .)  'Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly.'  ( Ibid . ; see People v. Blount (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 992 , 997, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 684 .) [A] negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract and is interpreted according to general contract principles. ( Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64 , 69, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 290 , 302 P.3d 598 .) When enforcing such an agreement, courts will apply general contract principles  'to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.'  ( People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759 , 767, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 354 , 125 P.3d 290 .) Not all contract terms, however, are expressly stated in a contract. Experience and practice can, in some circumstances, lead courts to recognize the incorporation of implied terms to a contractual agreement. ( Retired Employees Assn. of Orange County, Inc. v. County of Orange (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1171 , 1178-1179, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 779 , 266 P.3d 287 .) One such implied term of a plea agreement was recognized in  People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 , 159 Cal.Rptr. 696 , 602 P.2d 396 . In Harvey , the defendant complained the trial court improperly sentenced him to the upper term for robbery by relying on the facts underlying a dismissed count to establish a circumstance in aggravation. We agreed. [I]t would be improper and unfair to permit the sentencing court to consider any of the facts underlying the dismissed count three for purposes of aggravating or enhancing defendant's sentence. Count three was dismissed in consideration of defendant's agreement to plead guilty to counts one and two. Implicit in such a plea bargain , we think, is the understanding (in the absence of any contrary agreement) that defendant will suffer no adverse sentencing consequences by reason of the facts underlying, and solely pertaining to, the dismissed count. ( Id. , at p. 758, 159 Cal.Rptr. 696 , 602 P.2d 396 , italics added.) In other words, the pleading defendant need make no showing he subjectively intended, before entering his plea, to prohibit the trial judge from considering the facts of dismissed counts. We recently cited Harvey with approval in People v. Martin (2010) 51 Cal.4th 75 , 81, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 99 , 244 P.3d 496 . Where the parties anticipate the trial court will consider the facts underlying a dismissed count when sentencing, it is now routine procedure for the prosecutor to extract what is known as a  Harvey waiver from the pleading defendant. (See, e.g.,  People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304 , 1307, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 658 [pleading defendant executed a Harvey waiver].) We recognized a different implied term for all plea agreements in Arbuckle, supra , 22 Cal.3d 749 , 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 , holding that a defendant's negotiated plea agreement necessarily included an implied term that the same judge who accepted his plea would preside at sentencing. Although Arbuckle began its analysis by noting the plea bargain in that particular case was entered in expectation of and in reliance upon sentence being imposed by the same judge ( id. at p. 756, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 ), we then explained that [a]s a general principle , moreover, whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge. Because of the range of dispositions available to a sentencing judge, the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an  inherently significant factor in the defendant's decision to enter a guilty plea. ( Id. at pp. 756-757, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 , italics added.) Because the defendant in that case was denied that aspect of his plea bargain, Arbuckle reversed and remanded, explaining that he should be sentenced by the same judge who accepted his plea, or if internal court administrative practices render that impossible, then in the alternative defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea. ( Id. at p. 757, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 .) 2 We later applied the Arbuckle rule to a plea before a commissioner in juvenile court, where the parties impliedly stipulated that the judicial officer could act as a temporary  judge. ( Mark L. , supra , 34 Cal.3d 171 , 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 .) The rule has since been extended to juvenile proceedings generally. (See In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 , 917, 212 Cal.Rptr. 61 ; In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 [whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge].) Like the Harvey rule, the Arbuckle rule has entered the standard lexicon of California criminal procedure, and has been routinely applied in the courts. ( People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 , 837, 203 Cal.Rptr. 856 [noting the appellate courts had consistently applied the rule of People v. Arbuckle ]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 [calling the point settled]; In re Ray O. , supra , 97 Cal.App.3d at pp. 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 [the Arbuckle rule applies to pleas in juvenile court].) In the years following our Arbuckle decision, many secondary sources and criminal  practice guides echoed this view, 3 as did a bench guide for trial judges 4 and a leading treatise on practice in the juvenile courts. 5 Even after Arbuckle , however, parties to a plea agreement-i.e., the pleading defendant and the prosecuting attorney-remained free to chart a different course by making explicit on the record that the defendant did not care if the same judge pronounced sentence. To do so, the prosecutor need only secure, at the time the plea is accepted, what has come to be known as an  Arbuckle waiver. (See People v. Martinez (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1156 , 1160, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 [defendant waived his Arbuckle rights]; People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1320, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ( Letteer ) [the prosecution can protect  itself in advance from the withdrawal of a plea by requiring an Arbuckle waiver as a condition of the [plea] bargain]; 6 People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360 , 1363, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 [trial judge directed the clerk of the court to '[n]ote in the minutes there's an Arbuckle waiver' ].)  B. The Continuing Vitality of Arbuckle Following this court's decision in Mark L. , supra , 34 Cal.3d 171 , 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 , some intermediate appellate courts began questioning the continued vitality of Arbuckle 's holding that the same-judge guarantee was a term implied in every plea agreement. The genesis of this reevaluation was a renewed focus on language in Arbuckle itself, where the court began its analysis by noting  that the plea bargain herein was entered in expectation of and in reliance upon sentence being imposed by the same judge ( Arbuckle , supra , 22 Cal.3d at p. 756, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 , italics added), an observation that might suggest the same-judge guarantee was dependent on the particular facts surrounding the plea bargain in that case. Subsequently, in Mark L. , this court reasoned that, as in Arbuckle , the record indicates an actual assumption by the court and parties that the officer taking the plea would have final and exclusive dispositional authority. ( Mark L. , supra , at p. 177, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 , italics added.) Further, [i]f any doubt on that score remained, [the judge] laid it to rest by announcing Mark's right to have 'the same judicial officer' who took the plea handle the disposition. That was an obvious reference to Arbuckle , and the deputy district attorney did not object. Despite [the judge's] usual assignment elsewhere, considerable effort was expended to ensure that he, rather than some other judge or referee, would act at the dispositional phase. There seems ample basis to conclude 'that the plea bargain herein was entered in expectation of and reliance upon [disposition] being imposed by the same [judicial officer].'  ( Ibid. , quoting Arbuckle , supra , at p. 756, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 .) Accordingly, a number of post- Mark L. appellate courts declined to apply Arbuckle 's same-judge rule as a categorical presumption, and instead began examining the trial record for evidence of the parties' actual intent. For example, in In re James H., supra , 165 Cal.App.3d 911 , 212 Cal.Rptr. 61 ( James H. ), the appellate court focused on this court's individualized examination of the records in both Arbuckle and Mark L. to conclude that we did not mean that it is always an implied term of a plea bargain that the judge who accepts the admission or plea will impose the sentence; instead, Arbuckle stated that such was 'a general principle.'  ( James H., supra, at p. 919, 212 Cal.Rptr. 61 .) The James H. court held the trial record must be examined for the type of factors relied on in Arbuckle and In re Mark L. to support the assumption that the admission was entered in expectation of and reliance upon disposition being imposed by the same judge. ( James H., supra , at p. 920, 212 Cal.Rptr. 61 .) Similarly, in People v. Ruhl (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 311 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 93 , the appellate court agreed with James H. and concluded, after examining the record before it, that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation he would be sentenced by the same judicial officer who accepted his negotiated plea. ( Ruhl, supra , at p. 315, 214 Cal.Rptr. 93 ; see also People v. McIntosh (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 534 , 542-543, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 901 [same-judge guarantee not an implied term in all pleas]; People v. Hsu (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 397 , 409, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 566 [ Arbuckle does not stand for the blanket proposition that under all circumstances, a defendant is entitled to assert his or her right to have the same judge who presided over the plea hearing also preside over the sentencing hearing]; People v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1540 , 1543, 274 Cal.Rptr. 629 [In order for an Arbuckle right to arise, the record  must affirmatively show the defendant had a reasonable expectation of sentencing  by the judge who took the plea.]; cf. People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761 , 764, 247 Cal.Rptr. 322 [under the specific  circumstances shown by the record, defendant had a reasonable expectation of sentencing by the same judge].) And in People v. Horn, supra , 213 Cal.App.3d 701 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 814 , the court agreed with Ruhl and James H. , finding that not every plea includes an implied term that the same judge who accepts a plea will be the sentencing judge, disapproving its previous decisions that had held otherwise. ( Horn , supra , at pp. 707-708, 261 Cal.Rptr. 814 , disapproving People v. Rosaia , supra , 157 Cal.App.3d 832 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 856 , and In re Ray O. , supra , 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 .) This purported modification of the rule in Arbuckle by some intermediate appellate courts has begun to creep into secondary sources as well. (See 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Pretrial Proceedings, § 363, pp. 657-658 [It is not always an implied term of a plea bargain that the judge who accepts the plea will impose the sentence; rather the record must affirmatively show some basis on which a defendant may reasonably expect the same judge to do the sentencing.] 7 ; Levenson, Cal. Criminal Procedure, supra , Plea Bargaining, ¶ 14:18, p. 14-20 [ Arbuckle right depends on whether the defendant's plea bargain carried with it an implied or expressed promise to be sentence[d] by a particular judge.] 8 ; Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure, supra , Delinquency Proceedings, Disposition of Ward, § 3.92[1], p. 3-159 [ Arbuckle right to the same judge is enforceable only if the record affirmatively demonstrates a basis for the defendant's reasonable expectation that the same judge will retain sentencing discretion] 9 .) The Court of Appeal below followed this new interpretation of Arbuckle . Of course, it is established that a holding of the Supreme Court binds all of the lower courts in the state, including an intermediate appellate court. ( Wall v. Sonora Union High School Dist. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 870 , 872, 50 Cal.Rptr. 178 ; see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 , 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 [Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court.].) Nevertheless, legal doctrine evolves over time, and appellate courts have the  capability and the responsibility to recognize and explain such changes when they occur. Have these several intermediate appellate courts accurately perceived a shift in doctrine? With all respect, we conclude they have not. Despite the belt-and-suspenders approach in both Arbuckle , supra , 22 Cal.3d 749 , 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 , and Mark L. , supra , 34 Cal.3d 171 , 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 , in which this court applied a general rule recognizing an implied term in all plea agreements but also  found the facts of those individual cases supported the same result, the language in Arbuckle is plain: It sets forth a general principle that  whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge. ( Arbuckle , supra , at pp. 756-757, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 , italics added.) The clear import of Arbuckle 's holding is thus contrary to the notion that the implied term of the plea is somehow dependent on a defendant's pointing to evidence in the record of his or her expectation regarding the identity of the sentencing judge. Our conclusion is buttressed by the two dissenting justices' understanding of the opinion. Justice Frank Richardson, who dissented in part, explained his position: I respectfully dissent ... from that portion of  the majority opinion which holds that, as a general principle , whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain one of the implied and enforceable terms of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by the particular judge who accepts the plea. In my opinion no express promise should be made by a court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel; nor should such a condition in the usual case be routinely implied . ( Arbuckle , supra , 22 Cal.3d at p. 758, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 , conc. & dis. opn. of Richardson, J., italics added.) Justice William Clark, also dissenting in part, expressly joined that part of Justice Richardson's separate opinion disagreeing with the majority's general rule that all plea agreements would  'routinely impl[y]'  such a term. ( Id. at p. 758, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 , conc. & dis. opn. of Clark, J.) Although reliance on the views of a dissenting justice when interpreting a majority opinion can be of questionable value (see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 , 271, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 , 282 P.3d 291 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.)), Arbuckle is not a case in which the dissenters attempted to overstate the reach of, or to place an interpretive gloss on, the majority opinion. Instead, the Arbuckle dissenters simply read the majority opinion at face value, consistently with its plain meaning, and disagreed with the majority's holding that implied in every plea bargain is the understanding that the judge accepting the plea would be the sentencing judge. Nor did we modify that position in Mark L. , supra , 34 Cal.3d 171 , 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 . We addressed in that case a double variation of the standard Arbuckle plea bargain situation: (1) The plea was by a minor in juvenile court and not by an adult offender in superior court; and (2) the plea was taken by a court  commissioner, not a regular judge. We made short work of the first point, agreeing with the weight of appellate authority that Arbuckle applied to pleas in juvenile court. ( Mark L. , supra , at p. 177, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 .) That is still the law and not at issue here. On the second point, Mark L. held that because the actions of the parties constituted an implied stipulation that the commissioner could act as a temporary judge, his dispositional order thus had the same force as that of any other juvenile judge [and therefore] could not be reheard in the juvenile court, and [the presiding judge's] subsequent order on rehearing [modifying the original sentence] is therefore void. ( Id. at pp. 179-180, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 .) In support of its conclusion that the commissioner's dispositional order had the same force as that of any juvenile court judge, a conclusion in contravention of statute, the Mark L. court examined the actual facts of the case, stating that the record indicates an actual assumption by the court and the parties that the officer taking the plea would have final and exclusive  dispositional authority. ( Mark L ., supra , 34 Cal.3d at p. 177, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 .) Observing that commissioners may, if the parties properly stipulate, act as temporary judges ( id. at p. 178, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 ), the court concluded that the parties' conduct in the case constituted a sufficient stipulation that the commissioner was acting as a temporary judge. ( Ibid . ) Yet after Mark L ., intermediate appellate courts, relying on the court's perceived reliance on the facts of the case, began holding that contrary to the previous understanding, Arbuckle did not state or establish a general default rule. In so doing, the courts went astray. As explained above, Mark L . addressed and resolved a particular double variation of the standard Arbuckle situation: a juvenile offender instead of an adult, and a court commissioner instead of a judge. The court's remarks about the juvenile's intent related solely to the authority of the commissioner. That the court did not purport to undermine or recharacterize the basic Arbuckle premise is clear from its citation to and copious quotation from the Arbuckle opinion. Thus, before evaluating the actual assumption of the parties when the court received the minor's admissions, the Mark L. court said: In [ Arbuckle ] this court held that 'whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge. Because of the range of dispositions available to a sentencing judge, the propensity in sentencing  demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant's decision to enter a guilty plea. [Citations.]' Thus, the sentence imposed by a judge other than the one who took the plea 'cannot be allowed to stand.'  ( Mark L. , supra , 34 Cal.3d at pp. 176-177, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 .) We reject the notion that Mark L. changed the law. Finally, we note that this court recently cited with apparent approval Arbuckle 's general rule of a term implied in all plea bargains, albeit in a  slightly different context. In People v. Rodriguez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 676 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 377 P.3d 832 ( Rodriguez ), the People sought to relitigate a suppression motion they had initially lost by dismissing the complaint and refiling a new complaint alleging the same charges. Under such circumstances, a defendant has a statutory right to have the same judge who initially granted his first suppression motion hear the new motion if the judge is available. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (p).) Focusing on whether the first trial judge is available within the meaning of Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (p), we held that to adequately protect a defendant's statutory right under section 1538.5(p), ... a trial court must take reasonable steps in good faith to ensure that the same judge who granted the previous suppression motion is assigned to hear the relitigated motion. Only if the trial court has done so may it make a finding of unavailability. And the trial court must make such a finding on the record, so appellate review proves meaningful. [Citations.] Such a finding, unsupported by record evidence demonstrating the reasonable measures a trial court has taken to honor a defendant's section 1538.5(p) right, is an abuse of discretion. ( Rodriguez , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 691, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 377 P.3d 832 .) In reaching this conclusion, we observed our conclusion in Rodriguez was in line with that reached in Arbuckle ( Rodriguez , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 691, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 377 P.3d 832 ), recognizing Arbuckle , supra , 22 Cal.3d 749 , 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 as a case in which we  stat[ed] generally that 'whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge.'  ( Rodriguez , supra , at p. 692, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 377 P.3d 832 , quoting Arbuckle , supra , at pp. 756-757, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 .) We then analogized to Arbuckle to explain that a showing of more than mere inconvenience is necessary before a judge can be deemed unavailable under Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (p). ( Rodriguez , supra , at p. 692, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 377 P.3d 832 .) Had we believed Arbuckle had been overtaken by current circumstances and subject to a new understanding, we would not just a few months ago have quoted Arbuckle 's key language establishing a general rule applicable to all plea bargains, and approved of Arbuckle 's handling of administrative concerns. In sum, because of the plain meaning of the Arbuckle opinion, the contemporaneous understanding of that opinion by the Arbuckle dissenters, the understanding by the intermediate appellate courts and legal commentators in the years immediately following the case, this court's citation of Arbuckle with approval in both Mark L. , supra , 34 Cal.3d 171 , 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 , and Rodriguez , supra , 1 Cal.5th 676 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 377 P.3d 832 , and Mark L. 's failure to question or undermine the basic reasoning of Arbuckle , we reject the appellate court's position below that it has been settled law for more than 25 years that an Arbuckle right to be sentenced by the judge who accepted a negotiated plea arises not as a  matter of general principle, but only when the specific facts of a given case show that the plea was given 'in expectation of and in reliance upon sentence being imposed by the same judge.'  Instead, we adhere to the plain and original understanding of Arbuckle that in every plea in both adult and juvenile court, an implied term is that the judge who accepts the plea will be the judge who pronounces sentence. Should the People wish to allow a different judge to preside at sentencing (or, in juvenile cases, disposition), they should seek to obtain a waiver from the pleading defendant or juvenile. In light of our conclusion today, the People's argument that the record does  not indicate K.R. subjectively intended to retain his right to sentencing before Judge Sapunor is rendered moot. But the People also argue that even if the original understanding of Arbuckle is retained, K.R. is not entitled to relief because Judge Sapunor did not retain discretion over sentencing when he took the plea, as required by Arbuckle . It does not appear the People raised this argument below (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(1) ; People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798 , 809, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 46 , 101 P.3d 994 ), but assuming without deciding the issue is properly before us, we reject it. As a rule, trial courts accepting a plea always retain discretion over sentencing. Should the court later decide not to impose the negotiated sentence, the court can withdraw its prior approval of the bargain and allow the pleading defendant (or juvenile) to withdraw his or her plea. Moreover, the facts of this case show Judge Sapunor was ready to impose the disposition to which defense counsel, K.R., and the deputy district attorney had agreed: time served plus a transfer of jurisdiction to Clark County, Nevada. It was only when the probation officer interjected and sought to coordinate sentencing with the purchase of an airplane ticket for K.R. to fly to Las Vegas that the matter was put over for one week. Defense counsel agreed to the plan, and Judge Sapunor ruled: [K.R. is] to be deemed time served  on June 4th at 8:30. All the other conditions [remain in effect], [and] this case would be transferred to Clark County, Nevada, for final disposition, and then he will be released to go to Las Vegas. [¶] Okay. So come back, then, on the 4th at 8:30. As seems clear, Judge Sapunor fully expected to be sentencing K.R. the next week in accordance with the bargain worked out by the parties. The People further argue a pleading defendant (or juvenile) can protect their Arbuckle rights by striking an express agreement to have the same judge preside at both change of plea (admissions) and sentencing (disposition). Such a rule, the People argue, would encourage defendants to specifically negotiate an Arbuckle term and ensure it is placed on the record, and will foster greater accuracy in the enforcement of plea agreements. But so long as parties to a plea agreement understand the same-judge guarantee is implied in every plea agreement (absent an Arbuckle waiver), the terms of the plea should be clear to all. To the extent the People seek to place the burden on a pleading defendant or juvenile to make his or her preferences explicit on pain  of forfeiting the right to the same judge at sentencing, the People would turn Arbuckle on its head. Under the law as proposed by the People, the Arbuckle rule will have morphed from one in which courts should assume the same judge will be the sentencer unless the prosecution can show otherwise , to one in which courts will find the same judge will be the sentencer only if the defendant can show that the parties so intended . Were we to accept the People's argument, instead of opting out with an Arbuckle waiver , pleading defendants (and juveniles) would have to affirmatively opt in by providing an Arbuckle invocation . Considerations of stare decisis aside, the People have provided no persuasive reason to abandon the original meaning of Arbuckle .