Opinion ID: 2001513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: As to Equal Protection Guarantees:

Text: The Fire Company contends § 8127 violates the Equal Protection Clause in that there is no rational relationship between the explicit purpose of the Statute and the exclusion from its protection of other classifications such as owners and tenants of the improvement and suppliers who do not perform or furnish construction. See 10 Del.C. § 8127(d) at 462 A.2d at 420, n. 6; Becker v. Hamada, supra . The Equal Protection Clause requires that, in the absence of a suspect classification or fundamental right, legislative classification must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982). Although a state legislature has broad discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently from others, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961), such classification is prohibited when it arbitrarily or irrationally discriminates among similarly situated persons. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949). It is well settled, however, that in the area of socioeconomic legislation, rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude. Legislatures may implement their program step by step, ..., it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-4, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-7, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). When reviewing economic legislation, we do not sit as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or desireability of legislative policy determinations.... Id. For a number of reasons, the Legislature could have rationally concluded that it was proper to place different time limits on the liability of builders from those placed on persons in possession or control as owner, tenant or otherwise. Klein v. Catalano, supra, at 524. The Supreme Court of Louisiana explained that, after the owner accepts the work: there exists the possibility of neglect, abuse, poor maintenance, mishandling, improper modification, or unskilled repair of an improvement to immovable property by the owner, lessor or tenant. It is difficult for the architect or contractor to guard against such occurrences because, after the acceptance by the owner, the architect or contractor ordinarily neither has control of the improvement nor the right to enter or inspect the improvement. Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2 of the Parish of St. Charles, La.Supr., 366 So.2d 1381, 1385 (1978). In addition, the Legislature could rationally have concluded that the limitations on liability should be different for builders and materialmen because the conditions under which they work are sufficiently different. Klein v. Catalano, supra, at 524. As the Burmaster Court noted: Suppliers and manufacturers who typically supply and produce components in large quantities, make standard goods and develop standard processes. They can thus maintain high quality control standards in the controlled environment of the factory. On the other hand, the architect or contractor can pre-test and standardize construction designs and plans only in a limited fashion. In addition, the inspection, supervision and observation of construction by architects and contractors involves individual expertise not susceptible of the quality control standards of the factory. Burmaster, supra, at 1386. Moreover, the Legislature could have reasonably determined that architects, engineers and other design professionals need special limitations on liability in order to stimulate the experimentation with new techniques and materials that is often not unaccompanied by increased risk. Klein v. Catalano, supra, at 524.