Opinion ID: 365884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: count ix materiality

Text: 123 Appellant Taylor urges that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count X. While appellant concedes that his testimony was false, he now questions the materiality of the testimony. 124 Not every false statement is perjurious. In order for a false statement to be perjurious, it must be shown to be material. The test for materiality is whether the false testimony was capable of influencing the tribunal on the issue before it. United States v. Abrams, 568 F.2d 411, 420 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brumley, 560 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1977). However, as we have recently noted, the statements need not be material to any Particular issue but may be material to any proper matter of inquiry. United States v. Abrams, 568 F.2d 411, 420 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original). This was amplified when we approved the following language from United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970): 125 A grand jury's investigation is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed. 126 Id. The grand jury testimony at issue here is: 127 Q. Did you ever tell Eddie Callahan that somebody will get Carl Caccamo? 128
129 The government's proof as to the falsity of this response was a taped conversation between appellant Taylor and Eddie Callahan, wherein they stated: 130 Callahan: Well, called his house an' wasn't there and uh he said he was gonna call my house, but he never did call my house, I haven't heard from the ______ period, the mother ______. 131 Taylor: Somebody'll get him. 132 Callahan: Huh? 133 Taylor: Somebody'll get him. 134 Callahan: Oh yeah. ______ yeah, you know there been rumbles goin' all over town. Whatever, you know. . . . 135 In addition to introducing these statements into evidence, the government presented testimony from an assistant United States attorney who participated in the grand jury investigation. He testified that the grand jury was conducting an investigation of Lopez' drug operation and possible obstruction of justice in connection with the investigation of Lopez. The questioning of Taylor specifically related to whether he had knowledge of efforts by others to obstruct both aspects of the investigation by preventing Caccamo from continuing to supply federal authorities with information. Clearly this was capable of influencing the grand jury by preventing further inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the threats to Caccamo. Taylor's motion for acquittal on Count X was, therefore, properly denied. 136 Appellant Taylor's final contention concerns the element of intent involved in false swearing. He argues that his motion for judgment of acquittal on Count X should have been granted because the government failed to prove that the false statement was knowingly and intentionally made. The issue of intent is to be decided from objective and circumstantial evidence. Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 411, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950). Simply put, the jury did not buy Taylor's explanation of the circumstances. We will not disturb that finding.