Opinion ID: 2341128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court's charge concerning Intoxication

Text: During his charge to the jury the Presiding Justice instructed it in substance that while voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for crime and does not make innocent an otherwise criminal act, this Defendant was charged with a crime an essential element of which was the specific intent to steal. He told the jury that it should return a verdict of Not Guilty if it found that the Defendant was so intoxicated that he had so far lost his reason and faculties that the jurors had a reasonable doubt that he was able to form and have a purpose to steal. The Defendant does not quarrel with the legal principles which the Justice explained to the jury but he complains that while he testified that he was drinking enough so that he could feel it when he first visited the victim and that he had then drunk a few beers between his first and his last visit (he and a friend consumed 9 or 10 beers on this latter occasion), the evidence fell short of demonstrating that he was, in fact, intoxicated. Therefore, the Defendant says, the Justice's reference to intoxication could only prejudice the jury as to his credibility and as to the likelihood of his being disposed to commit such a crime. The Defendant takes nothing by this objection. The statutes demand that the Presiding Justice . . . [S]hall . . . charge the jury . . . upon all matters of law arising in the case but shall not, during the trial, including the charge, express any opinion upon issues of fact arising in the case . . . 14 M.R.S.A. § 1105. The Presiding Justice correctly stated to the jury the rule of law relating to intoxication and crimes requiring a specific intent. State v. Smith, Me., 277 A.2d 481 (1971). However, mere abstract principles of law, although correct, should not be given unless they are applicable to the facts in evidence. State v. Benson and Greenlaw, 155 Me. 115, 151 A.2d 266 (1959). In Smith, which also involved a charge of burglary, there was evidence that the Defendant had consumed some intoxicating liquor before committing the offense. The Defendant objected to the Justice's instruction to the jury that the mere drinking of intoxicating liquor does not excuse or minimize the responsibility of the individual who commits a crime. On appeal, this Court found no error in the giving of this familiar instruction. The Defendant in Smith requested an instruction that the jury should find the Defendant not guilty if it found that the intoxicating liquor had impaired his ability to form the specific intent necessary in burglary. On appeal we found that this instruction was correctly refused, saying, 277 A.2d at page 492: Before a court is required or justified in giving an instruction submitting to the jury the issue, whether the defendant's condition of inebriety was such as to destroy his mental capacity of having, entertaining or formulating a particular specific intent, there must be evidence upon which to base such an instruction. Unless there was evidence which tended to prove that the mental condition of the defendant from drunkenness was such, at the time of his breaking and entering of the L.D. home, that he was not capable of having the intent to rape, then an instruction upon that subject as requested by the defendant was unauthorized, . . . The factual situation in this case is analogous to that in Smith. While the evidence concerning the Defendant's drinking justified the Court's giving the familiar explanation that the use of intoxicating liquor does not excuse an otherwise criminal act, there was no evidence indicating, or argument by Defendant's counsel claiming, that Defendant's use of intoxicating liquor had rendered him incapable of forming the specific intent to steal. In short, Defendant would not have been entitled to such a charge as to specific intent if he had requested it. Here the instruction was given over Defendant's objection. However, the Defendant's counsel had commented in argument that the Defendant had been drinking alcoholic liquor that evening in explaining the Defendant's possible inaccuracies as to minor details of the time sequence and the County Attorney had replied to this. These comments resulted in the Justice's charge on intoxication which was technical, was not inflammatory and in no way suggested bad character or testimonial unreliability on the Defendant's part. We are satisfied that it was harmless error.