Opinion ID: 769576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legality of the Searches

Text: 14 We review de novo whether a search is legal under the Fourth Amendment. See Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). We review for clear error the trial judge's findings of fact. See id. 15
16 Generally, the Fourth Amendment prohibits searching a residence without a warrant unless at the time of the search: (1) there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the residence; and (2) exigent circumstances are present. See United States v. Lai, 944 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991). It is a close question whether probable cause existed when Officers Yergler and Wasinger searched Apartment 3 4 . We need not decide thisissue, however, because we conclude that the searches were legal under another theory -the emergency doctrine. Cf. Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1441 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) ( declining to address the emergency doctrine because probable cause and exigent circumstances were present). The emergency doctrine provides that if a police officer, while investigating within the scope necessary to respond to an emergency, discovers evidence of illegal activity, that evidence is admissible even if there was not probable cause to believe that such evidence would be found. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Mich. 1993); Perez v. State, 514 S.W.2d 748, 749 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1974). 17 In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonable believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Id. at 392. The Court recognized that  `[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.'  Id. (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). The Court, however, found that a four-day search of an apartment where a homicide had occurred was not reasonable because there was no emergency threatening life or limb. Id. at 393. 18 Other circuits have adopted the emergency doctrine. In United States v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1973), officers searched two locked briefcases found in the defendant's car for information regarding his identity or physical condition after finding the defendant having a seizure and foaming at the mouth. Inside one of the briefcases the officers found money from a recent bank robbery. Finding that the search was done as a matter of rendering emergency aid to a person in a seizure, the Sixth Circuit held that the search was reasonable and the money was admissible. Id. at 203-05; cf. United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1126 (1st Cir. 1978) ([I]f exigent circumstances justify warrantless entry and seizure of evidence of arson, 5 which evidence is inevitably criminal, then an emergency certainly justifies entry [into a yacht 6 ] and seizure of a navigational chart, relevant to a possible drowning, which by happenstance later proves to be incriminating.) (footnote and citation omitted). 19 The emergency doctrine's requirements are clearly articulated in People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976), which we quoted in Murdock, 54 F.3d at 1441 n.3: 20 (1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. (2) The search must not be pri marily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evi dence. (3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emer gency with the area or place to be searched. 21 Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609. 22 This court has yet to consider whether [the Mitchell test], or something comparable, should be adopted in a case such as this one where police officers are investigatinga possible crime at the same time they might be rendering aid to a person in danger. Murdock, 54 F.3d at 1441 n.3 (recognizing the emergency doctrine's existence, but not applying it because the court found that probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search). We find justification for adopting the emergency doctrine, not under police officers' function as criminal investigators, but in their community caretaking function to respond to emergency situations. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations.). 23 The question remains, however, whether we should adopt the Mitchell test or some other formulation of the emergency doctrine. The Mitchell test's first prong requires that police officers have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609. We find that preservation of life or protection against serious bodily injury are sufficient justifications for intruding upon a person's privacy interests. 7 See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392. 24 The Mitchell test's second prong -that the search was not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence -deserves close attention. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609. The Supreme Court has, in the criminal investigation context, declined to inquire into an individual officer's motivations in determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 808, 820 (1996). In Whren, the Court held that a seizure supported by probable cause is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment regardless of the actual motivations of the law enforcement officers making the stop, and regardless of whether reasonable officers faced with the same circumstances would have made the stop in absence of some other law enforcement purpose. See id. at 811-20. The Whren court distinguished cases where probable cause is present from inventory and administrative search cases where a government actor's pretextual motivation for a search or seizure is a viable claim. See id. at 811-12. The Court noted: 25 [O]nly an undiscerning reader would regard these [inventory and administrative search] cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. In each case we were addressing the validity of a search conducted in the absence of probable cause. Our quoted statements simply explain that the exemption from the need for proba ble cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the purpose of inventory or administrative regulation, is not accorded to searches that are not made for those purposes. 26 Id., (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1987); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 671, 702-03 (1987)). 27 Whren, however, did not address whether an officer's motivation to search is relevant to the reasonableness of searches conducted under the emergency doctrine. Rather, by distinguishing between cases that require probable cause and those that do not, Whren suggests that the officer's motivation for conducting a search is still relevant where no probable cause exists,as is true in emergency doctrine cases. Cf. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, (1990) (an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence); Burger, 482 U.S. at 716-717, n. 27, (observing that in upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless administrative inspection, the search did not appear to be a `pretext' for obtaining evidence of . . . violation of . . . penal laws). As Professor LaFave has noted: 28 It is important to remember that the foundation of the Court's position in Whren is that where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause there is with rare exception no balancing to be done or rea sonableness determination to be made because the probable cause itself serves as the exclusive mea sure of the lawfulness of enforcement. This being the case, it would seem that certain pretext-type claims are still viable when, as the Court put it, the case involves police intrusion without the probable cause that is its traditional justification.    More over, in light of the way in which the Court in Whren distinguished inventory and administrative searches when discussing the Scott principle, it apparently remains open to defendants, whenever the chal lenged seizure or search is permitted without proba ble cause because of the special purpose being served, to establish a Fourth Amendment violation by showing the action was in fact undertaken for some other purpose (i.e., mainstream law enforcement). 29 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment S 1.4 (3d ed. 1996) (footnote omitted). 30 We believe that, absent probable cause, examining a government actor's motivation for conducting an emergency search provides a necessary safeguard against pretextual reliance on community caretaking interests to serve criminal investigation and law enforcement functions. We thus agree with Mitchell that, under the emergency doctrine, [a] search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. 347 N.E.2d at 609. 31 We find the third prong of the Mitchell test -requiring a reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched, id., -to be well reasoned. As the Court noted in Mincey, a warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Mincey , 437 U.S. at 393 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under the emergency doctrine, then, an officer's search must be limited to only those areas necessary to respond to the perceived emergency. 32 We thus adopt the three-part Mitchell test as a clear and soundly-crafted formulation of the emergency doctrine's requirements. 8 We now apply that test to the facts of this case. 33
34 i. Reasonable Belief That an Emergency is at Hand and That Aid is Immediately Necessary 35 Officer Yergler was faced with a terrible, sickening chemical odor coming from Apartment 3, which he could smell asmuch as 20 feet away from the apartment. Officer Yergler, as well as the firefighters who summoned him, believed that the fumes might be associated with methamphetamine production. Officer Yergler knew from his training that methamphetamine labs are volatile and therefore reasonably feared that Apartment 3 could explode at any moment. See United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1014 (9th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that methamphetamine labs create a risk of explosion). Officer Yergler also reasonably believed that lives were in danger if an explosion occurred. This fear was heightened by the fact that the odor was coming from an apartment building, possibly containing many people. Cf. United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a potential explosion within an apartment increases the likelihood of finding exigent circumstances). Moreover, Officer Yergler testified that he witnessed several children around the apartment building. One of the apartment building's tenants had left her apartment fearing harm to herself or to her infant child. Given all of these circumstances, Officer Yergler reasonably believed that an emergency was at hand and that his assistance was immediately necessary for the protection of life. 36 ii. Not Primarily Motivated by the Desire to Collect Evidence 37 Officer Yergler testified that before the first search he was not sure whether the substance he smelled was caused by methamphetamine production, but he testified that given the strong noxious chemical odor and the fact that .. . six apartments [were] there with another apartment building right across, [he] didn't want to take the chance.  The district court found that Officer Yergler was very credible  and there was no indication . . . [that he was] trying to make up a story afterwards to justify what he did. We review a district court's credibility determination for clear error. See United States v. Hanley, 190 F.3d 1017, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Oba, 978 F.2d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 1992)). Upon examining the record, we conclude the district court's credibility determination is not clearly erroneous. Officer Yergler's actions after the search provide further evidence that he was primarily motivated by his concern for the safety of the apartment building's occupants. Once he had secured the premises, Officer Yergler ordered the evacuation of the building and requested the tenants to turn off any open flames. 38 iii. Reasonable Basis for Associating the Place Searched with the Emergency 39 Officer Yergler testified that he had identified Apartment 3 as the source of the chemical odor. He had already investigated Apartment 6 and did not find the odor's source. Moreover, the odor was stronger in front of Apartment 3 than in front of any other apartment. These facts show that Officer Yergler had a reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to believe that the noxious chemical odor was coming from Apartment 3. See Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609. Furthermore, Officer Yergler did not examine Apartment 3 more thoroughly than was necessary to search for a methamphetamine lab. He simply walked through the rooms and looked at items in plain view. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393 (the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities). 9 Thus, we agree with the district court that the officers' searches of Apartment 3 were legal. 40
41 Unlike the searches conducted by Officers Yergler and Wasinger, InvestigatorReynolds' search of Apartment 3, does not satisfy the requirements of the emergency doctrine. By the time Investigator Reynolds entered the apartment, the risk of explosion had been defused. First, the police officers knew that there was neither lab equipment nor chemicals on the premises. Second, the apartment had been aired-out so there was no reasonable risk that the fumes could ignite. Third, there was no reasonable risk that the methamphetamine in the pot could explode because it was in its final stages of production, well past the volatile early stages of production. Fourth, the apartment had been secured by police presence, which eliminated any risk that someone might enter the apartment. 42 The search also was not legal under the traditional test requiring both probable cause and exigent circumstances. At the time of the fourth search, there were no exigent circumstances present. Although the risk of explosion can amount to exigent circumstances, see United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1986), that risk had been defused by the time the fourth search occurred. Therefore, the fourth search was illegal.