Opinion ID: 4458470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of Duty

Text: Kanodia also contests the district court's refusal to instruct the jury that it must find that Basu did not waive Kanodia's duty of trust and confidence to her. Kanodia's briefing is unclear whether he is asserting that this omission constitutes a failure to instruct the jury as to all the elements of the charged offense or to give a required theory-of-the-defense instruction. It appears that at trial Kanodia requested an instruction that the government had to prove that Basu did not waive Kanodia's duty as an element of the offense. On appeal, Kanodia appears to shift tactics, framing his argument at some points as a request for a theory-of-the-defense instruction and at others for an elements instruction. Whether Kanodia requested an elements or theory-of-defense instruction -- and thus regardless of whether de novo or plain error review applies -- his argument fails. McDonough, 727 F.3d at 156 (elements of offense); United States v. Peake, 804 F.3d 81, 98 (1st Cir. 2015) (theory of the defense). The failure to give a requested theory-of-the-defense instruction triggers reversal only if the instruction was (1) substantively correct as a matter of law, (2) not substantially covered by the charge as rendered, and (3) integral to an important point in the case so that the omission of the instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present his defense. United States v. Baird, 712 F.3d 623, 628 (1st Cir. 2013). - 21 - While Kanodia's duty was integral to an important point in the case, Kanodia's requested instruction was incorrect as a matter of law. Peake, 804 F.3d at 98. Kanodia does not claim that any court has required the government to prove that the insider did not explicitly waive an outsider's duty of trust and confidence in order to sustain an insider trading conviction. See McPhail, 831 F.3d at 6 (holding that an insider's disclosures to individuals other than the defendant-outsider might show the nonexistence of a duty). The insider cannot waive the duty, and, to the extent Basu's knowledge of disclosures might go to the nonexistence of a duty, the district court's instruction substantially covered the applicable theory. Kanodia, like the tipper in McPhail, could -- and did -- argue that Basu's disclosures defeated any duty of confidentiality he owed to her. Unfortunately for Kanodia, a reasonable jury could have found such a theory implausible, for, among other reasons, Kanodia received much more specific and sensitive disclosures than the outsiders who testified at trial. Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to give Kanodia's waiver instruction.