Opinion ID: 888660
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construction of Article II, Section 4

Text: ¶ 74 Article II, Section 4 of Montana's 1972 Constitution provides: Individual dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. While there are differing interpretations of this language, which I note below, it is my view that the first clause of Article II, Section 4 (the Dignity Clause) is a stand-alone, fundamental constitutional right. See Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, ¶¶ 74, 82, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872 (explaining that the rights found in Article II are fundamental and that the plain meaning of the Dignity Clause commands that the intrinsic worth and the basic humanity of persons may not be violated). ¶ 75 First, I categorically reject the notion that the Dignity Clause is merely some aspirational introduction to the equal protection and nondiscrimination rights which follow ita proposition for which there is no authority. Our Constitution is a limitation upon the powers of government, Cruse v. Fischl, 55 Mont. 258, 263, 175 P. 878, 880 (1918), and in construing a constitutional provision, we are required to give meaning to every word, phrase, clause and sentence therein, if it is possible so to do, State ex rel. Diederichs v. State Highway Commn., 89 Mont. 205, 211, 296 P. 1033, 1035 (1931). Accordingly, the command that [t]he dignity of the human being is inviolable must be acknowledged as the freestanding limitation it is on the power of the governmentmuch in the same way we recognize that trial by jury, which is similarly inviolate (Mont. Const. art. II, § 26), is not merely aspirational but is in fact a concrete right guaranteed by the Constitution. ¶ 76 Second, I likewise reject the notion that the right of dignity is fully implemented by the Equal Protection and Nondiscrimination Clauses or that these clauses are the sole operative vehicles for achieving dignity. In other words, I cannot agree that the inviolable dignity of a human being is infringed only when the person is denied equal protection of the laws or suffers discrimination for exercising his or her civil or political rights. Indeed, such an interpretation of Article II, Section 4 attributes an implausibly narrow meaning to the term dignity. As the Dissent notes, the Dignity Clause can be traced to West Germany's 1949 Constitution, which was developed in response to the Nazi regime's treatment of the Jewish people (as well as homosexuals, Gypsies, persons with disabilities, and political opponents). Dissent, ¶ 116 n. 4. These inferior people (so-called useless eaters [4] ) were not merely denied equal protection of the laws. The government placed them in concentration camps and used them for slave labor. Medical experiments were performed on them. They were persecuted and killed. They were viewed and treated as subhuman, without any dignity. The West German Constitution and its command that [t]he dignity of man shall be inviolable must be understood in this context. Doing so, it simply cannot be maintained that Article II, Section 4 prohibits only discrimination and the denial of equal protection. The Dignity Clause broadly prohibits any law or act that infringes upon our inviolable dignity as human beings. This is not some vague, lurking right as the Dissent suggests. Dissent, ¶ 116. Rather, it is an imperative; an affirmative and unambiguous constitutional mandate. ¶ 77 This interpretation is supported by the structure of Article II, Section 4. In this connection, I agree with the construction proffered by Matthew O. Clifford and Thomas P. Huff in their article Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution's Dignity Clause with Possible Applications, 61 Mont. L.Rev. 301, 305-07 (2000). They point out that the language of Article II, Section 4 (which is titled Individual Dignity) moves in a logical progression from the general to the specific. The first sentence (the Dignity Clause) declares that human dignity is inviolable. The second sentence (the Equal Protection Clause) goes on to declare one way in which human dignity can be violated: by denying someone the equal protection of the laws based on some sort of arbitrary classification. They observe that our legal tradition has long recognized such classifications as affronts to the dignity of persons (citing as an example of this Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954)). Finally, the third sentence (the Nondiscrimination Clause) fleshes out the meaning of the equal protection right by enumerating certain types of classifications which the framers of Article II, Section 4 believed to be arbitrary: race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, and political or religious ideas. ¶ 78 Clifford and Huff note that the classifications identified in the Nondiscrimination Clause cannot be read as an exhaustive list of all possible arbitrary classifications. Otherwise, if the list were exhaustive, the Equal Protection Clause would be surplusage. The more reasonable interpretation, they conclude, is that by including the separate and more general Equal Protection Clause, the framers intended to leave open the possibility that there are other prohibited classifications beyond those which were recognized at that point in history (i.e., in 1972). And by the same logic, the inclusion of a more general prohibition against the violation of human dignity leaves open the possibility that human dignity can be violated in ways that do not involve some sort of arbitrary classification. Indeed, they argue, and I agree, that in order to give distinct and independent meaning to the Dignity Clause, avoiding redundancy, this clause should be applied separately when there is a violation of the dignity of persons that does not reflect the forms of unequal treatment or invidious discrimination prohibited by the two subsequent clauses. Presumably anyone could experience such a violation of dignity, not just persons who are members of protected classes. [5] Clifford and Huff, 61 Mont. L.Rev. at 306-07. ¶ 79 This interpretation is consistent with the debate on Article II, Section 4 at the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention. [6] During the debate, Delegate Jerome T. Loendorf inquired whether the express prohibition against discrimination was necessary, given that the right of equal protection already prohibits discrimination. Delegate Wade J. Dahood (chair of the Bill of Rights Committee) acknowledged that the Nondiscrimination Clause was subsumed in the Equal Protection Clause, but he explained that when we're dealing with this type of right, Delegate Loendorf, and we are dealing with something that is this basic, to an orderly and progressive society perhaps sometimes the sermon that can be given by constitution, as well as the right, becomes necessary. Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, Mar. 7, 1972, pp. 1643-44. Thus, the delegates decided that it was preferable to include the additional language making certain facets of the equal protection right explicit. This same principle supports the notion that denying someone the equal protection of the laws is but one way in which human dignity can be violated, as discussed above. ¶ 80 In arguing against this interpretation of Article II, Section 4, the Dissent points to Delegate Dahood's statement that [t]here is no intent within this particular section to do anything other than to remove the apparent type of discrimination that all of us object to with respect to employment, to rental practices, to actual associationship in matters that are public or matters that tend to be somewhat quasi-public. Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, Mar. 7, 1972, p. 1643. This statement, however, must be understood in context. Dahood was not purporting to limit the scope of Article II, Section 4. In fact, he was trying to keep the provision broad. Delegate Otto T. Habedank had voiced a concern that the language any person, firm, corporation, or institution in the Nondiscrimination Clause would prohibit private organizations from limiting their membership and would force individuals to associate with people they otherwise would choose not to associate with. See Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, Mar. 7, 1972, p. 1643. Habedank therefore had moved to delete the any person, firm, corporation, or institution language from the Nondiscrimination Clause, thereby rendering the clause applicable to only the state. See Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, Mar. 7, 1972, p. 1642. Dahood, in turn, argued against this amendment (which ultimately was defeated 76 to 13) and in favor of applying the nondiscrimination prohibition to entities other than the state, such as employers, landlords, and public or quasi-public associations. Dahood made no remarks about the Dignity Clause itself. ¶ 81 In contrast, Delegate Proposal No. 33 specifically recognized an independent right of individual dignity. It stated: The rights of individual dignity, privacy, and free expression being essential to the well-being of a free society, the state shall not infringe upon these rights without the showing of a compelling state interest. See Montana Constitutional Convention, Delegate Proposals, Jan. 26, 1972, p. 127. This proposal was referred to the Bill of Rights Committee, which adopted the proposal in its entirety. See Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, Feb. 23, 1972, p. 647. The right of individual dignity, the right of privacy, and the right of free expression were then incorporated, respectively, into Sections 4, 10, and 7 of Article II. [7] ¶ 82 In sum, given the plain language of Article II, Section 4 and the structure of this provision, I conclude that the Dignity Clausestating that the dignity of the human being is inviolableis a stand-alone, fundamental constitutional right. This conclusion is supported by the record from the Constitutional Convention. I now turn to the substance of this right.