Opinion ID: 2600757
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discharge Because of Medical Condition.

Text: {17} Even if we were to conclude that Mr. Trujillo had a medical condition on the day of his discharge, his claim under the Human Rights Act could not succeed because no evidence was presented at trial that NORA discriminated against him because of his health. The fact that NORA was aware of Mr. Trujillo's health problems is not sufficient to show that they regarded him as having a medical condition or that he was fired for that reason. See Webb v. Mercy Hosp., 102 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir.1996) (An employer's knowledge that an employee exhibits symptoms which may be associated with an impairment does not necessarily show that the employer regarded the employee as disabled.). {18} The Human Rights Act states that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate because of a medical condition. [A]n employer cannot fire an employee `because of' a disability unless it knows of the disability. If it does not know of the disability, the employer is firing the employee `because of' some other reason. Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112). No evidence was introduced at trial that Mr. Trujillo's health was a factor in the decision to fire him. Mr. Trujillo did not testify that he thought he had been fired for health reasons. The letter placing him on administrative leave and the termination letter discussed a number of reasons NORA was dissatisfied with Mr. Trujillo's job performance; the shortcomings described by NORA predate his illness. There is no evidence that NORA regarded Mr. Trujillo as suffering from a medical condition. Neither at trial nor on appeal has Mr. Trujillo pointed to any evidence that NORA's decision to terminate him was based on anything but concerns about his work performance. {19} Mr. Trujillo contends that because NORA failed to take the necessary actions to find out about his medical condition that they should be charged with that knowledge. Under the facts of this case, this contention is without merit because it would require this Court to impute knowledge to NORA at a time when even Mr. Trujillo's doctors had not diagnosed his illness. Instead, the diagnostic testing had apparently eased the initial concerns of the treating doctor to the extent that she had cleared Mr. Trujillo to return to work. As the Court stated in Miller v. National Casualty Co., 61 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir.1995), an employer is not obligated to divine the presence of a disability from [the employee's] extended absence from work and the company's knowledge that she [or he] was in some sort of stressful ... situation. Similarly, we do not think that knowledge of a medical condition may be imputed to an employer under the Human Rights Act.