Opinion ID: 2102321
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Review of Issues Decided.

Text: Certiorari lies when the district court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted illegally. Iowa R.Civ.P. 306; State v. West, 320 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 1982); Hadjis v. Iowa District Court, 275 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Iowa 1979). Illegality exists when the findings on which the court has based its conclusions of law do not have substantial evidentiary support or when the court has not applied the proper rule of law. Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa 1983); Hightower v. Peterson, 235 N.W.2d 313, 316-17 (Iowa 1975). The State here challenges the district court's application of the law to essentially undisputed facts. The issue of law concerns the permissible scope of discovery in a civil action in the face of a claim of privilege. Ordinarily, the district court has wide discretion in ruling upon the discoverable nature of requested information and will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Farnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 384, 389 (Iowa 1983); Pollock v. Deere and Co., 282 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1979). Consequently, here we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion and thereby acted illegally within the meaning of rule 306 in permitting the civil litigants access to privileged materials and permitting their attorneys to inspect the entire DCI file. Both here and before the district court the State has asserted a two-level governmental privilege. It first contends that it need not disclose DCI file materials by reason of an executive privilege, derived from the doctrine of separation of powers in both our State and federal constitutions. See Iowa Const. Art. III, § 1; U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1; Art. II, § 1; Art. III, § 1; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3106, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1062 (1974) ([T]he privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties.). See generally C. McCormick, Law of Evidence §§ 143-50 (1954 ed.); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2367-79 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Annot., 10 A.L.R. 4th 355 (1981) (discussion of state law of executive privilege). At a second level, the State contends that the confidential and privileged status of the DCI file is grounded on specific Iowa statutes. We first address and decide the second of these alternative theories of governmental privilege, because we prefer to address constitutional issues only when other grounds are not dispositive. George H. Wentz, Inc. v. Sabasta, 337 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Iowa 1983); Hines v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 330 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa 1983); see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6, 73 S.Ct. 528, 531, 97 L.Ed.2d 727, 732 (1952) (executive privilege, a broad proposition with constitutional overtones, need not be addressed when case can be decided on narrower ground). Because the State's statutory claim of privilege is dispositive of this appeal, we need not reach the constitutional issue of executive privilege. Consequently our review by certiorari is at law, not the de novo review which an issue of constitutional magnitude would require. See Hightower v. Peterson, 235 N.W.2d at 316-17.