Opinion ID: 2585222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hinger

Text: Defendant Hinger asserts that the area underneath a front passenger seat is not a traditional repository of registration or identification documentation, and that pursuant to the Attorney General's proposed test, the entire car and all of its compartments might be subject to a Webster-type search for required documentation, in violation of the teaching of Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S.Ct. 484. As noted above, the dispositive question is not whether the area searched is a traditional repository for registration or identification documentation. Limited warrantless searches for required registration and identification documentation are permissible when, following the failure of a traffic offender to provide such documentation to the citing officer upon demand, the officer conducts a search for those documents in an area where such documents reasonably may be expected to be found. Under this standard, an officer may not search for such documents on pretext (cf. Class, supra, 475 U.S. 106, 122, 106 S.Ct. 960, 970, fn.  (cone. opn. of Powell, J.) [An officer may not use VIN inspection as a pretext for searching a vehicle for contraband or weapons]), or without first demanding that they be produced (see United States v. Lopez (C.D.Cal.1979) 474 F.Supp. 943, 948-949 [search was unreasonable when officer never asked driver for such documentation and ignored plainly visible registration information posted in car window]), and an officer may not search in containers or locations in which such documents are not reasonably expected to be found. [25] ( Ibid. [search of crumpled fast-food bag under seat]; State v. Acosta, supra, 166 Ariz. 254, 801 P.2d 489, 493 [search for registration in enclosed rear interior compartment].) We emphasize that the standard we reaffirm today circumscribes the scope of a Webster search for documents, and, contrary to defendant Hinger's assertion, does not threaten to condone the equivalent of the full-scale search for contraband prohibited by the high court in Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113,119 S.Ct. 484. [26] Defendant Hinger was unable to produce the required registration or license documents upon Officer Skinner's reasonable demand. Hinger appears to suggest that such documentation would not reasonably be expected to be found under a front passenger seat, but on the facts of this case Officer Skinner had reason to extend marginally his search for Hinger's wallet. As noted, the officer had seen Hinger look into the glove compartment (an area directly above the front passenger seat), and the officer reasonably might have thought that while Hinger was doing so, Hinger had managed to place the wallet under the front passenger seat. (Cf. Mallett v. Bowersox, supra, 160 F.3d 456, 457 [driver hid his wallet and identification under the front seat as officer approached vehicle].) Moreover, the cases cited ante, at pages 597-98, 38 P.3d at pages 447-48, in which wallets (which, we note, often contain a driver's license or other identification or documentation) were found under driver's seats, passenger seats, and front seats generally, suggest that the area underneath front car seats (including front passenger seats) is not an unusual place to store such items. On these facts, and in view of the circumstance that Officer Skinner was preparing to issue a traffic citation and therefore needed to learn the true identity of the person to be cited, we believe it was reasonable for the officer to conduct a limited search of the glove compartment, the area underneath the driver's seat, and the area beneath the front passenger seat. [27] ( People v. Miranda, supra, 17 Cal. App.4th 917, 927, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785.) Accordingly, we conclude in People v. Hinger (S085218) that the Court of Appeal correctly determined that the trial court properly denied the defendant's suppression motion. [28]