Opinion ID: 1941856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Evidence and Rulings at the Suppression Hearing

Text: Sergeant Scott, the leader of the Emergency Response Team, testified at the suppression hearing that he had based his decision to make a forced entry on several factors. First, Scott believed that someone should have heard a knock and there should have been some sort of response within five seconds. Second, Scott noted that he had been told that the suspect had been involved in numerous armed robberies of beauty salons committed with display of weapons and had previously been charged with assaulting a police officer with a weapon. Scott observed, further, that since a weapon was displayed in these offenses and a weapon had not been recovered ... there was a possibility of this weapon being inside and it would give someone a chance toto prepare themselves to deal with the police.... Based on this information, Scott concluded that a longer wait after the announcement would have been detrimental to [his] team's health. After the hearing, the trial court found that about ten seconds in all had elapsed between the ERT team's announcement and the actual forced entry into the apartment. The trial court found, further, that given the supposed size of the apartment one or two bedroomsit was reasonable for Scott to assume that if anyone had been inside they would have heard the loud knock and the loud announcement. The trial court also found that, given that Scott heard no response, and bearing in mind the nature of the offenses at issue and the prior use of a weapon, it was not unreasonable for him to believe that there was a danger. The trial court then concluded that, considering the situation in context and from Sergeant Scott's perspective, the ERT team had waited a reasonable amount of time and had not violated the knock and announce statute. Thus, it appears the trial court was convinced that the forced entry was justified under both the constructive refusal and the exigent circumstances exceptions to D.C.Code § 23-524. This court must defer to the trial court's findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, and must accept all inferences drawn by the trial court as long as they are supportable under any reasonable view of the evidence. See Griffin v. United States, 618 A.2d 114, 117 (D.C.1992). However, we review de novo the ultimate legal determination as to whether these facts and inferences support a conclusion that the police did not violate the statute. See id. at 117-18.
In Griffin, this court recently held that a thirty-second delay between a police announcement and a forced entry into a home at 1:40 a.m. was too short for the police reasonably to conclude that they had been constructively refused admittance. At that time of the night, we noted, many, if not most, people are asleep in bed, semi-dressed, and unlikely to react quickly or rationally to a sudden knock at the door. 618 A.2d at 121-22. In the case before us, the period of delaya mere ten secondswas considerably shorter than in Griffin. Admittedly, the forced entry in this case took place at a somewhat more civilized hour: 8:15 a.m. But it was also on a Saturday morning, a time when the factors we cited in Griffin are still largely applicable. At 8:15 on a Saturday morning many people will still be relatively inactive or otherwise indisposed, or even completely asleep, such that it will probably take them more than ten seconds to respond to a knock at the door. Furthermore, in this case there was no evidence that the police heard or saw anything that would have led them to believe that the occupants were awake. They did not hear the television, nor did they hear any movement. Under these circumstances, we conclude as a matter of law, from these facts, that the police could not have reasonably believed that they had been constructively refused admittance. The cases cited to us by the government, in which courts have upheld forced entries after similarly brief delays, are all distinguishable because they involved some other factor, not evident in this case, contributing to the conclusion that there had been a constructive refusal of admittance. In several of these cases, for instance, the police heard some movement suggesting that the occupant was alert and deliberately not responding. See United States v. Bonner, 277 U.S.App.D.C. 271, 874 F.2d 822 (1989) (police heard retreating footsteps after they had twice announced themselves); United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381 (10th Cir.1986) (officers at bedroom window had seen figure run out of the room after police announcement); United States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.1973) (entry only ten seconds after knock not unlawful where officers also heard scampering sounds after knock), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958, 94 S.Ct. 1973, 40 L.Ed.2d 308 (1974); Jackson v. United States, 354 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.1965) (applying knock-and-announce requirement as matter of common law, ten second delay, though an exceedingly short time under most circumstances, not unlawfully brief where police, before knocking, had heard defendant moving about, followed by silence). In the one remaining case cited by the government, United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 873 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891, 110 S.Ct. 236, 107 L.Ed.2d 187 (1989), a multi-unit dwelling was approached by three police teams, one of which had already been knocking at another entrance for some time before a member of another team entered the building through a side door, knocked at the door to the defendant's apartment, waited five to ten seconds, and then attempted a forced entry. Thus, the actual period of delay between the initial announcement and the forced entry was longer than the five to ten seconds that the second team member waited himself. Moreover, in that case, as in Bonner, the police had probable cause to believe that the occupants possessed cocaine, which is easily disposable. [11]
Alternatively, the government contends that exigent circumstances justified the forced entry. Specifically, the government argues that the police had reason to fear for their safety, because Poole was a suspect in a string of armed robberies and was known to have been previously arrested for assault on a police officer. Judicial determinations of the lawfulness of a forced entry are highly contextual and must be based upon a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. See Griffin, 618 A.2d at 120. Consequently, it is difficult to establish an absolute and unvarying test for reviewing alleged violations of the knock and announce statutes. As a general rule, however, when the government invokes concerns for police safety, based upon the possible presence of weapons, to justify a forced entry, the government must show that the police had concrete, particularized evidence that reasonably led them to believe that (1) there were weapons on the premises and (2) there was a realistic possibility that the occupant or occupants would use the weapons against them. [A] concern for police safety must be based upon prior knowledge or direct observation that the subject of the search keeps weapons and that such person has a known propensity to use them. State v. Jeter, 30 Wash.App. 360, 634 P.2d 312, 314 (1981), review denied, 96 Wash.2d 1027 (1982). Police knowledge of the existence of a firearm excuses compliance with announcement requirements only where the officers reasonably believe the weapon will be used against them if they proceed with the ordinary announcements. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal.3d 871, 109 Cal.Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208, 1213 (1973) (en banc), quoted in ( Craig) Williams, 576 A.2d at 706. Thus, evidence that the suspect merely possesses a weapon is insufficient to justify a forced entry. [12] Moreover, the belief that a weapon is on the premises and may well be used must be based upon particularized information or specific prior incidents. [13] An unjustified but sincere fear by an officer cannot excuse noncompliance or the protection of the occupants' privacy interest would depend on no more than an officer's anxiety. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). But where the government can satisfy both prongs of the test set forth above, courts have regularly held that the police may attempt a forced entry, even when they have not initially knocked and announced their purpose. [14] We also note, however, that where the police are attempting to execute a warrant related to a violent crime, a lesser degree of exigency is required if the police have at least knocked and announced themselves before making a forced entry, rather than entirely disregarding the knock and announce requirement. [15] This policy is sensible because, even under exigent circumstances, police announcement will usually help to ensure the safety of both the police and citizens by reducing the danger that the police will be confused with an unknown intruder. As the California Supreme Court has observed: [O]ne of the primary purposes of [the knock and announce requirement], in addition to the protection of individual privacy, is to prevent possible violent responses that might be aroused in a startled and fearful householder suddenly confronted with unknown persons breaking into his [or her] home for unannounced reasons. The danger that such a confrontation will result in serious injury or death to the occupant, police officers, or innocent bystanders is obviously intensified when the householder is in possession of a firearm. Thus, where the police are aware of such a weapon, the case for requiring them to give notice of their authority and purpose becomes more rather than less compelling. Dumas, 512 P.2d at 1213 (citation omitted). [16] Two of our own recent cases, (Craig) Williams and Culp, illustrate these principles. In both of these cases, we concluded that exigent circumstances justified forced entries, attempted after the police had knocked and announced their presence, where there was clear and direct evidence that the suspects possessed automatic weapons on the premises to be searched and that there was a realistic possibility that the suspects would use these weapons against the police. In (Craig) Williams, ERT officers executing a search warrant rammed open a door about three to five seconds after knocking and announcing themselves. In concluding that the forced entry was justified, we took note of the following factors. First, an informant who had made a drug buy on the premises five days before the execution of a search warrant had told police that there were weapons on the premises and that a guard with an automatic gun was seated in the living room next to the front window. Second, when the police parked outside the house on the day of the search, a man leaving the house saw them and ran back inside yelling police officers. Third, the occupants were suspected drug dealers. Finally, after the police had announced their presence at the door of the house, they heard people running inside. We also noted that these facts distinguished the situation from a case where the police know only that the suspect possesses a weapon: The limitation that police knowledge of the existence of firearms excuses compliance with announcement requirements only where the officers reasonably believe the weapon will be used against them if they proceed, is of no avail to appellant where the police have reliable information that someone is guarding the front door with an automatic gun. A police officer could reasonably perceive a meaningful distinction between someone who is generally known to keep a gun and someone who is known to be guarding a door with an automatic gun, particularly where the latter has been forewarned that the police are coming. 576 A.2d at 706 (quoting Dumas, 512 P.2d at 1213). More recently, in Culp, we also concluded that exigent circumstances justified a forced entry to execute a warrant to search the home of a man suspected of committing as many as twelve robberies using an Uzi machine gun. In that case, an informant reported having seen such a weapon at the suspect's home within the previous twenty-four hours. The informant also told police that the suspect had spoken of committing another robbery. Furthermore, in two of the previous robberies, the suspect had wielded the Uzi in an especially threatening manner: in one incident he had taken a person hostage as a human shield; in another, he had racked the gun action in preparation to shoot. Finally, the suspect had a record of violence and PCP use and was known to be using PCP at the time. Id., 624 A.2d at 463-64. The case before us is much closer than either (Craig) Williams or Culp. The gun that Poole had allegedly used in the robberies was a revolver; while still deadly, it posed less of a danger to the police than the automatic weapons possessed by the suspects in (Craig) Williams and Culp. [17] Also, in this case the police had no direct information showing that this gun would be on the premises, as they had in (Craig) Williams and Culp. However, on careful consideration of the information known to the police at the time of the raid on 510 Ridge Road, we conclude that the police acted reasonably in making a forced entry after they had announced their presence. First, it was reasonable for the police to believe that a weapon was on the premises. As Sergeant Scott observed, the evidence available to the police indicated that Poole had brandished a pistol in several armed robberies, including the January 25, 1990, robbery of Nina's Beauty Salon. No weapon had been recovered. Hence, the police could reasonably conclude that Poole might still possess this weapon. See United States v. (Mark) Harris, 629 A.2d 481, 490 (D.C.1993) (police had reason to believe suspect still armed where he had used handgun in murder and no weapon had been recovered); Commonwealth v. (James) Williams, 316 Pa.Super. 100, 462 A.2d 813, 816 (1983). Furthermore, the police could reasonably think that Poole would likely be present in the Ridge Road apartment, since they had information strongly suggesting that 510 Ridge Road was indeed Poole's home address and the raid took place relatively early on a Saturday morning. See ( Mark) Harris, 629 A.2d at 490. Second, the ERT officers possessed information that could reasonably lead them to believe that Poole might well use a weapon to resist arrest. They knew that Poole was a suspect in several armed robberies, during which he had brandished a gun to threaten his victims. They also knew that Poole had been charged with assault on a police officer (though not necessarily convicted). Like the evidence in Culp of the suspect's record for violence and PCP use and his threatening behavior in a string of armed robberies, this information gave the police a reasonable basis for fearing that Poole might use deadly force against them. See Culp, 624 A.2d at 463-64; see also United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697, 700-01 (9th Cir.1975) (no announcement required where police officers had probable cause to suspect that armed robbers, who had wielded sawed-off shotgun and revolvers during robbery, were in apartment), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056, 96 S.Ct. 788, 46 L.Ed.2d 645 (1976); United States v. McShane, 462 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1972) (failure to announce before entering was nevertheless lawful where Treasury agents knew that suspect was armed with sawed-off shotgun and had been convicted previously for armed assault against a police officer); Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 137, 415 N.E.2d 172, 178 (1980) (trial court's finding that announcement would have endangered police amply supported where defendant was suspect in armed robbery involving handguns and sawed-off shotgun), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 2054, 68 L.Ed.2d 353 (1981). The fact that appellant had reacted peacefully when a police officer approached him on the street several days after the robberies (and merely admonished him about repairing cars on the street) did not dispel the legitimate concern the police had in a much more dangerous context: that there was a realistic possibility he would respond violently to the arrival in force of police announcing their intent to search his apartment. Finally, we bear in mind that the officers had partially complied with the statute by knocking and announcing their identity and purpose, and additional delay would have increased their peril. See Bonner, 277 U.S.App.D.C. at 276, 874 F.2d at 827. Consequently, the degree of exigency required to justify their forced entry is less than it would be had they failed to make any announcement whatsoever. Accordingly, taking into account all these factors, we conclude that there were exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the forced entry after the police had knocked and announced their identity and purpose. Appellants' arguments do not dissuade us from that conclusion. This is not a case, as appellants contend, where the police themselves created the potential for violence. Because the police had a search warrant for the apartment, it was not enough for them merely to wait to encounter Poole outside the apartment; sooner or later, the police had to enter the apartment to execute the warrant. Thus, this case is readily distinguishable from McKnight v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 183 F.2d 977 (1950), where the police deliberately passed up an opportunity to execute an arrest warrant outside the suspect's residence so that they would have a pretext for entering and searching his home without a search warrant. Moreover, given the fact that Poole had acted with a confederate, the police still would have faced potential danger even if they had maintained 510 Ridge Road under surveillance and waited for Poole to leave the apartment before attempting to execute the search warrant. Nor do we accept appellants' contention that [w]here nothing suspicious arises during the course of executing the warrant, the exigent circumstances exception does not apply. Appellant Showell's Brief at 20. Exigent circumstances are not limited to last minute surprises that are discovered by the police only after they have arrived on the scene. For instance, all of the information justifying the forced entry in Culp was known to the police well before they executed the warrant. [18] Having reached this conclusion, we must be clear about what we are not holding. We do not hold that exigent circumstances sufficient to excuse a forced entry exist anytime that the search is related to a violent crime. To adopt such a generalized exception to the knock and announce requirement would amount to virtually rewriting D.C.Code § 23-524. [19] Failure to observe the statutory requirement that the police knock, announce their purpose and identity, and wait to be refused admittance before attempting a forced entry, cannot be justified by a general assumption that certain classes of persons subject to arrest are more likely than others to resist arrest, attempt to escape, or destroy evidence. People v. Rosales, 68 Cal.2d 299, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5, 437 P.2d 489, 493 (1968). [20] Where the government alleges that exigent circumstances excused compliance with the statute, that claim must be supported by specific evidence particular to the facts of the individual case. In this case, the police reasonably believed that appellant was on the premises, had a gun, and would use it if confronted. More specifically, because the police had information that appellant had brandished a weapon in several armed robberies and had been charged with assaulting a police officer, they reasonably feared that appellant would use a gun to resist arrest and thus were justified in making entry after partial compliance with the statute.