Opinion ID: 2586200
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Clear and Convincing Requirement

Text: ¶ 32 The Colosimos also argue that the horrific nature of child sexual abuse constitutes an exceptional circumstance justifying tolling. The Colosimos urge us to follow the lead of the Nevada Supreme Court in Petersen v. Bruen [45] and eliminate the statute of limitations for all child sexual abuse cases where there is clear and convincing evidence of the abuse. Relying on the deep psychological injuries that child abuse survivors encounter as adults, the Nevada Supreme Court held that [i]n those instances where the fact of abuse is clearly and convincingly corroborated, we perceive no compelling need or policy which justifies the intervention of a period of limitations to eliminate the right of [child sexual abuse] victims to seek recovery against their abusers. [46] ¶ 33 We recognize the horrific effects of child abuse and the serious problems that victims of abuse face as adults as they attempt to understand the causal connection between their injuries and the abuse. But we nevertheless decline to adopt the Petersen rule because it is contrary to Utah's statutory scheme. In 1992, the Utah legislature passed a statute specifically addressing the limitations period in cases of child sexual abuse. [47] Although this statute does not apply retroactively and is inapplicable here, [48] it nevertheless reveals the legislature's intent that child sexual abuse cases be subject to a statute of limitations. In light of this, it would be inappropriate for us to conclude that pre-1992 claims of child sexual abuse are immune from a limitations period. [49] ¶ 34 Were we to adopt the Nevada rule, we would effectively be extending greater rights to pre-1992 victims of child sexual abuse than to those who were victimized after 1992. In other words, pre-1992 victims could bring claims indefinitely because their claims would not be subject to any statute of limitations; whereas post-1992 victims would be bound by the limitations period contained in Utah Code section 78-12-25.1. It would be unwise to create such an inconsistent result, especially where the legislature has expressed the view that events which happened decades ago should not become actionable. [50] Should the legislature wish to modify or abolish the limitations period for pre-1992 victims of child sexual abuse, it may do so, but it is not our role to judicially abrogate applicable statutory limitations. [51] ¶ 35 Moreover, it would be particularly unwise for us to abolish the limitations period in this case where the claims at issue are against institutional defendants that were not the actual perpetrators of the abuse. The assumption that the defendant is the abuser underlies the Petersen opinion and the arguments of legal scholars who advocate abolishing limitations periods in child sexual abuse cases. [52] The claims at issue on this appeal, however, have been lodged against nonperpetrator institutional defendants. Thus, rationales of punishment and allowing [child sexual abuse] victims to seek recovery against their abusers [53] apply with less force and fail to overcome the policies underlying statutes of limitation. [54] As the Rhode Island Supreme Court indicated in Kelly v. Marcantonio, a sex abuse case where a Catholic diocese was sued for the actions of some of its priests, the court was not able to find any persuasive policy justification for contravening legislative intent and disregarding the statute of limitations in cases against nonperpetrator defendants. [55] ¶ 36 We similarly can discern no persuasive justification for eliminating the statute of limitations in this case. Although we recognize that child abuse has devastating consequences, prior precedent, legislative intent, and the fact that this case involves nonperpetrator institutional defendants all counsel against eliminating the statute of limitations. [56] While this outcome may seem harsh because it allows some abuse to go uncompensated, it is the necessary result of having limitations periods and the accompanying benefit of finality for which these statutes were designed. [57] We therefore decline to follow the Nevada approach. Instead, we hold that a plaintiff's ability to establish the fact of abuse by clear and convincing evidence does not constitute an exceptional circumstance under the discovery rule.