Opinion ID: 2545785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense Motion for Modification of Death Verdict

Text: Defendant argues the trial court committed six prejudicial errors in denying his motion to modify the jury's verdict of death. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) There was no prejudicial error, as discussed below. The trial court noted that at the penalty phase the defense had offered evidence that defendant had a physically and emotionally deprived childhood; that he served, with some major exceptions, well as a soldier in the service of his country; that he had done well ... on death row; and that he has developed and shows some artistic ability. But the trial court concluded that none of these factors offered in mitigation extenuate the defendant's unexplained and totally without reason homicidal conduct as evidenced by the circumstances surrounding the killing of totally innocent children. (Italics added.) According to defendant, the trial court here erroneously believed that it could not consider his mitigating evidence because that evidence did not extenuate the murders he committed. We recently rejected a similar claim in People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710. There, the trial court, after reviewing the defendant's mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of his capital trial, commented that this evidence did not extenuate the gravity of the crime the defendant had committed. ( Id. at p. 281, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) We rejected the defendant's contention that the trial court had failed to consider his evidence in mitigation. We pointed out that the trial court had accurately instructed the jury that it could consider all of the defendant's mitigating evidence, and we concluded that the court's comments showed its consideration of that evidence in ruling on the defendant's modification motion. ( Id. at pp. 281-282, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) As in People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th 153, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710, the trial court's comments here do not demonstrate a belief that it could not consider defendant's evidence in mitigation. As in Williams, the court here instructed the jury to consider any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial, and it is reasonable to assume the court followed its own instruction when it ruled on defendant's motion for modification of the death verdict. In its ruling, the court described defendant's evidence in some detail, and it never said that it would not consider this evidence or that this evidence was not mitigating. In context, the trial court's comment that defendant's evidence in mitigation did not extenuate the murders of the two young girls merely reflected its view that the circumstances of the murders were so egregious as to warrant the death penalty notwithstanding the evidence in mitigation. Nothing before us indicates that the trial court was unaware of its duty to consider defendant's mitigating evidence. Defendant next contends the trial court double counted the two murders as both a special circumstance and as an aggravating circumstance of the crime. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 765-768, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741 [holding double counting improper]; but see People v. Millwee, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 164, fn. 35, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990 [limiting Melton 's holding].) As support, he cites this comment by the trial court: The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant stands convicted and the existence of the special circumstance found to be true substantially outweigh ... the factors in mitigation. We perceive no double counting. The trial court's comments simply expressed its view that the mitigating evidence was substantially outweighed by the evidence pertaining to a statutory aggravating factor The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true.... (§ 190.3, factor (a).) In explaining the reasons for its denial of defendant's modification motion, the trial court said that the victims were two young girls ... who constituted absolutely no threat to the defendant, who were respectively killed by beating and strangulation, which could only evidence a deliberate intent to kill in the most heinous manner. (Italics added.) Seizing on this comment, defendant argues that the trial court erred by considering the heinous nature of the crimes as a factor in aggravation. He points out that the United States Supreme Court has held that Oklahoma's especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague, as it does not offer the jury sufficient guidance in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. ( Maynard v. Cartwright (1988) 486 U.S. 356, 363-364, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372.) But the aggravating circumstance addressed in Maynard was one that determined eligibility for the death penalty, which requires greater precision than the factors that govern the sentence-selection process, at issue here. (See Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 971-975, 114 S.Ct. 2630; People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 474-78, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808.) In any event, the trial court merely used the word heinous in passing, as part of its explanation why it found the circumstances of the offense an aggravating factor. It did not find that the heinousness of the murders was a separate aggravating factor. Defendant claims the trial court did not know what standard to apply in ruling on defendant's motion to modify the death verdict. He points to this comment by the court: [T]he Court finds that the jury's finding at the trial and the verdict reached, that the aggravating circumstances substantially outweigh the mitigating circumstances, are not necessarily contrary to the law or evidence presented during this penalty trial. (Italics added.) Defendant contends this comment reflects the trial court's mistaken belief that modification was proper only if the verdict was necessarily contrary to the law or evidence. But at the outset of the modification hearing the court accurately described its statutory obligations. And at the end of the hearing the court concluded, [Considering all of the evidence, the Court's assessment is that the factors in aggravation beyond reasonable doubt outweigh those in mitigation and that the finding by the jury is neither contrary to law or evidence. This statement indicates a standard more favorable to defendant than the law required, because the trial court did not have to reach this conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. In our view, notwithstanding its imprecise language, the court applied the proper standard, independently reweighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence to determine that the weight of the evidence supported the jury's verdict of death. (See generally People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 830, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204.) The trial court, while commenting on defendant's evidence in mitigation, said that the method defendant chose to dispose of the bodies showed that he had no remorse for the crimes. Defendant argues the trial court erroneously considered his lack of remorse after the murders as a factor in aggravation. The trier of fact may properly consider remorse in determining penalty, so long as it does not treat lack of remorse as a separate aggravating factor. ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 103, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 943, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) Here, the trial court's comment shows only that it found no mitigating evidence that defendant showed remorse for killing the young girls. It did not treat lack of remorse as a separate factor in aggravation. Finally, defendant contends the trial court improperly failed to consider the cumulative weight of the factors in mitigation, instead weighing each separately against all of the evidence in aggravation. We disagree. After carefully reviewing the trial court's explanation of its reasons for its denial of defendant's modification motion, we find no evidence that the trial court considered the mitigating factors in piecemeal fashion. In sum, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for modification of the jury's death verdict.