Opinion ID: 350232
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Brokaw interview

Text: 10 Late in the afternoon of March 15 Schuman met with Byron R. Wien and Richard J. Clancy, of the firm of Brokaw, Schaenen, Wien, Clancy & Co. (Brokaw). The day had been inauspicious for B & L stock, which had suffered a decline of 81/8 points on the New York Stock Exchange. The Brokaw analysts entered Schuman's office as Sanders was leaving and began their interview by asking Schuman to reveal Sanders's prediction of B & L's annual earnings. Without commenting on its accuracy, Schuman informed them of Sanders's $5 prediction. He then delivered a lengthy soliloquy indicating he understood analysts disagreed widely in their forecasts of B & L's earnings, and that B & L itself had no idea how Soflens would fare. Schuman further opined that analysts' predictions were placing a great deal of unnecessary pressure on the stock and magnifying the widespread publicity concerning Soflens contamination. He concluded with a heartfelt plea that analysts display more circumspection in their predictions and discussions. 11 After suffering through this gratuitous lecture, Wien and Clancy turned to the primary purpose of their visit to persuade B & L to revise its public relations techniques, which focused only on attracting the practitioner, to directly appeal to the consumer. Believing that the flak was hurting Soflens more than Schuman realized, the analysts were convinced that only a direct advertising campaign could halt the decline in Soflens sales. To bolster their argument, they suggested that B & L's earnings might drop to as little as $3 if the course they proposed were not adopted. Offended by their aggressive tactics and resolute in his determination to continue B & L's existing public relations approach, Schuman responded sarcastically by asking, in substance, why the two men had not chosen an even lower earnings figure, for example $1. 12 While admitting, as he had to Sanders, that Soflens sales, based on the warranty card return rate, appeared to have flattened out, Schuman once again warned that the figures were inherently unreliable and that optical sales were traditionally seasonal, with the peak occurring between Easter and September. Schuman further testified to informing the Brokaw analysts that the aphakic lens and minikit would not be marketed during the first quarter, although Clancy could not remember this disclosure. 13 Wien emerged from the interview disheartened by Schuman's refusal to counter declining sales with an aggressive, consumer-oriented advertising campaign, and believed that Brokaw should sell all of its B & L shares. In contrast, Clancy, who was shortly to depart for a vacation, felt that Soflens was a strong product and was inclined to sell only a third of the firm's 72,000 shares. In Clancy's absence, Wien's advice prevailed; on March 16th the entire block of Brokaw shares was sold.