Opinion ID: 1916821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Merediths

Text: In 1979 the Town conducted a reappraisal of properties within it. As a result of the reappraisal, the fair market value of plaintiffs L. Douglas and Laura J. Meredith's property was increased from $41,000 to $179,600. Plaintiffs filed a grievance with the board of listers and, from an adverse decision there, duly appealed to the board of civil authority (Board). 32 V.S.A. § 4404(a). It was at this point in the proceedings that the present controversy developed. 32 V.S.A. § 4404(c) directs the Board to meet at a time and place designated by the town clerk to hear and determine appeals from decisions of the board of listers. The date on which such appeals must be heard is established by 32 V.S.A. § 4404(b) as modified by the automatic extension provisions of 32 V.S.A. § 4341. The parties agree that these statutes, read together, required that the town clerk call a meeting of the Board on or before June 27, 1979. For reasons not apparent from the record this was not done. Instead, by letter dated October 24, 1979, the town clerk applied, purportedly pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 4342, to the Director of the Division of Property Valuation and Review for an extension of time for the hearing of appeals by the Board. On October 29, 1979, the Board went ahead and heard the plaintiffs' appeal. It was not until November 8, 1979, that the Board was notified that the Director had granted it a 150 day extension to hear appeals. Subsequently, the Board affirmed the decision of the board of listers. The plaintiffs then filed an appeal with the Franklin Superior Court pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 4461(a). Their pleadings essentially raised two claims: Count I alleged that the reappraisal exceeded fair market value, while Count II challenged the Board's decision on the ground that the appeal was not heard within the time limits established by Chapter 131 of 32 V.S.A. Upon motion by the Town, the superior court dismissed Count II of the plaintiffs' complaint. The court then granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment for the reason that the Board of Civil Authority failed to set forth and certify its findings as required by 32 V.S.A. § 4404(c), and ordered that the plaintiffs' property be set in the 1979 Swanton grand list at its 1978 list value, $41,000. The Town filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the Town first contends that the Board's findings satisfy the requirements of 32 V.S.A. § 4404(c). We disagree. In Punderson v. Town of Chittenden, 136 Vt. 221, 388 A.2d 373 (1978), we were called on to determine the sufficiency of findings made by a board of civil authority pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 4404(c). Therein we held the board's purported findings were inadequate because, inter alia, they did not meet the underlying purpose of indicating to the parties, and to an appellate court, what was decided and upon what considerations. Id. at 225, 388 A.2d at 376. The findings made by the Board in the instant case suffer from the same infirmity. In its brief the Town attempts to validate the findings by asserting that the form used by the Board was designed and prepared by the Director of Property Valuation and Review for the express purpose of meeting the requirements of 32 V.S.A. § 4404(c). Whatever the truth of this assertion, it does not mean that the Board may abdicate its statutory duty to render proper findings merely because it decides to employ the form. This is not to say that the form used by the Board is without merit. It does address some of the concerns we expressed in Punderson, i.e., review and signature by a member of the Board, official form with attestation, certification, and reference to the fact that the findings have been recorded. Nonetheless, the actual findings must also be sufficient under § 4404(c). This essential requirement is not obviated merely because under the 32 V.S.A. § 4461 appeal procedure the appellate tribunal conducts a de novo review. Potter v. Hartford Zoning Board of Adjustment, 137 Vt. 445, 446-47, 407 A.2d 170, 171-72 (1979); Punderson, supra . Turning to the document in question, we observe the notation, Detailed Findings on reverse side. On the back of the form is a heading titled Report of the Committee, evidently referring to an inspection committee of the Board. Beneath this is the purported finding: Nice looking property. Another heading, Summary of Board's discussion on issues and reasons for the actions taken, is followed by the Board's handwritten assertion that it: Discussed the land value of 140 per front foot a length [sic]. Motion was made and passed to leave assessment as is. There is no further explanation of the Board's decision. These ambiguous comments do not satisfy the essential requirements of § 4404(c). As Justice Larrow wrote for the Court in Punderson : If the requirement of [§ 4404(c)] findings has any meaning, it is to convey not only a result, but also an indication of how the result was arrived at. Id. at 225, 388 A.2d at 376 (emphasis in original). The Board's findings quoted above fail to satisfy even this minimal standard. Furthermore, we reject the Town's argument that requiring findings more detailed than those rendered by the Board in the instant case will result in the mandatory, and costly, employment of attorneys in order to assure compliance with § 4404(c). We recognize that boards of civil authority are usually composed of laypersons admirably performing their civic duty. Nevertheless, they are also under a duty to inform taxpayers of the reasons for their decisions when deciding appeals pursuant to § 4404. The Town next claims that even if the Board's findings are inadequate, reversal is nevertheless required because the plaintiffs failed to comply with the filing procedures of 32 V.S.A. § 5292. Under 32 V.S.A. § 5292(a) a taxpayer must file objections to the validity of the tax assessed against him in order to have standing to contest the same. Thus where a taxpayer claims the tax is invalid as a constitutional matter because of unequal assessment and collection he must comply with the filing requirements of 32 V.S.A. §§ 5291, 5292. Dike v. McCormick, 128 Vt. 349, 350, 264 A.2d 769, 770 (1970). And where a taxpayer asserts that the grand list is invalid because of the listers' noncompliance with relevant statutes, he must file his objections as required by § 5292(a). Swanton Village v. Town of Highgate, 128 Vt. 401, 402, 264 A.2d 804, 805 (1970). No such objections need be filed where the action is not one which questions the validity of the tax but is one questioning the assessment of property. Village of Morrisville Water & Light Department v. Town of Hyde Park, 129 Vt. 1, 7-8, 270 A.2d 584, 587-88 (1970); Braune v. Town of Rochester, 126 Vt. 527, 531, 237 A.2d 117, 120 (1967). The plaintiffs in Count I of their complaint challenged the valuation established for their property, and attacked the Board's findings as insufficient under 32 V.S.A. § 4404(c). Neither the validity of the tax nor the validity of the actions of the listers or selectmen in assessing such tax were contested in this count of the complaint. The nature of plaintiffs' action is not altered because it questioned the sufficiency of the Board's findings and sought the express sanction provided by § 4404(c). Therefore the plaintiffs were not required to comply with the filing procedure of § 5292(a). Affirmed.