Opinion ID: 1095970
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Lexington Estates, Ltd. entered into a binding agreement with Sweet Home Water and Sewer District at the time the water district informed Lexington Estates about the impact fee and at the time Lexington Estates began to use the water district's services?

Text: At issue here is whether, as a matter of fact, Lexington Estates knew Sweet Home intended to charge an impact fee and whether, as a matter of law, Lexington's subsequent use of the system constituted a binding contract to pay the fee. First, as discussed above, Sweet Home lacked the statutory authority to charge an impact fee without some basis of reasonableness. Thus, the water district violated public policy. See First National Bank of Vicksburg v. Carruthers, 443 So.2d 861, 865 n. 3 (Miss. 1983). Second, Sweet Home's attempt to construe Lexington Estates' use of water as a contract fails. Parties form a contract only when the offeree accepts, Houston Dairy, Inc. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 643 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir.1981); Williams v. Favret, 161 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.1947), although the offeree may manifest acceptance by conduct, Misso v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, Memphis, Tenn., 231 Miss. 249, 255, 95 So.2d 124, 126 (1957). Sweet Home cites Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Yazoo and Mississippi Valley R.R. Co., 96 Miss. 807, 51 So. 915 (1910) for the proposition that acceptance of a service offered on particular terms amounts to acceptance of the terms. Sweet Home confuses the appellant's argument in that case with the Court's holding. In fact, the case better supports Lexington Estates: It is contended that the silence of the railroad company after receipt of the proposition for the period of eight days, and the acceptance of water after the expiration of the first contract and while this proposition was pending, and payment made for same at the [newly proposed price], renewed the contract; and appellant's counsel cite many authorities to support the proposition that an offer may be accepted by silence, as well as by positive action, so as to constitute a binding contract... . [T]he facts of this case do not fall within any such rule. The waterworks company is a public service company, under the duty by its charter to furnish water to the city and all its inhabitants for public or private use, when properly compensated therefor. The waterworks company had the right to charge reasonable rates for any water furnished to the railroad company; but if the railroad company had declined to enter into a five-year contract to pay one cent per one hundred gallons, which it did do, the waterworks company could not on this account have refused the water supply, but would still have been under the duty to furnish it water at such reasonable rates as were allowable under their charter, for it was its public duty so to do. Thus, the case supports the proposition that acceptance of a utility's services does not signify non-verbal acceptance that binds the offeree to whatever contract terms the utility proposes. In this case, Lexington Estates' use of the water system did not signify its acceptance of a contract term to pay the impact fee. The findings of a trial judge sitting without jury receive the same deference from this Court as do chancery findings. Kight v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply, Inc., 537 So.2d 1355, 1358 (Miss. 1989). Thus, where the trial court made no specific fact-finding, this Court assumes that the trial court resolved the issue in favor of the prevailing party. See Shearer v. Shearer, 540 So.2d 9, 11 (Miss. 1989). In this case, the trial court made no specific ruling on the issue of contract. Under this Court's standard of review, this Court may assume that the trial court properly found no binding contract for Lexington Estates to pay an impact fee. This issue lacks merit.