Opinion ID: 2515287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Propriety of Dismissal Under C.R.C.P. 41

Text: Cornelius argues the water court should not have dismissed his cases under C.R.C.P. 41 but should have instead applied C.R.C.P. 37. Under Rule 37, a party may move a trial court to impose sanctions against the opposing party for failure to make disclosures or cooperate in discovery. Cornelius did not raise this argument below, and it was accordingly not preserved for appeal. Nonetheless, in discussing the parameters of the water court's discretion to dismiss the cases under Rule 41, we find it useful to consider Rule 37. Under Rule 37, if a party fails to make disclosures required by C.R.C.P. 26(a), any affected party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. C.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). Further, if, without substantial justification, a party fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a), that party, shall not be permitted to present any evidence not so disclosed at trial. C.R.C.P. 37(c). The trial court may additionally impose other appropriate sanctions. Id. Here, there was extensive nondisclosure. Cornelius failed to provide any initial disclosures required by Rule 26(a), although he was notified several times of the need to do so. Rule 26(a) disclosures begin the discovery process and provide parties with a starting point for gathering information about the case. Under Rule 26(a), among other things, parties must disclose the names and addresses of individuals with discoverable information; copies of, or a description by category and location of all documents and tangible things in each party's possession relevant to the case; and the identity of any person who may testify as an expert at trial. With the information provided by Rule 26(a) disclosures, parties may make specific requests for information or clarification of disclosed information. Cornelius's applications required precise information about senior appropriations in the basin, whether his proposed diversion would harm senior water rights, and the replacement of source water resulting from his proposed out-of-priority diversions. The applications contained only general categories stating the proposed beneficial use of the waterdomestic, commercial, and livestockand did not identify end users or the particular manner in which the water would be used. Because the Arkansas and Cucharas Rivers are overappropriated, Cornelius's proposed plan for augmentation was crucial. However, Cornelius only proposed to augment one of the thirty wells from which he was seeking to appropriate. Accordingly, as a threshold matter, Cornelius would need to demonstrate his proposed diversions would not harm senior rightsa difficult task in an overappropriated basin when not relying on an augmentation plan. Further, Cornelius's proposed single well augmentation plan provided almost no detail with regard to the manner in which it would operate. It simply stated the well in question would be engaged and piped to the Cucharas River in an adequate amount to augment the water consumed. While not statutorily required, Cornelius failed to respond to the questions raised by the Division Engineer in its Consultation Reports as well as the assertions made by the Opposers in the statements of opposition. Cornelius did not substantively respond to a written notification from River Ridge informing him of their claim of ownership of the wells and water right Cornelius proposed to use as a replacement source in his plan for augmentation. Therefore, by the time the Opposers filed the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecutejust over one month before the scheduled dates of the trialsthe Opposers had almost no information before them with which to mount challenges to Cornelius's applications. The Opposers still did not know the correct location of many of the wells, the proposed use and location of use of the water, whether Cornelius owned any of the wells, whether their senior rights would be affected, and whether Cornelius had access rights to the wellsin many cases across property belonging to the Opposers. Without this information, the Opposers were not able to substantively assess Cornelius's claims or prepare defenses to his applications. Generally, sanctions under Rule 37 should serve to cure discovery problems; however, when faced with nondisclosure as extensive as present in this case, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in ordering dismissal under Rule 41. Cornelius's almost complete nondisclosure can be fairly characterized as a failure to prosecute the cases beyond the filing of the initial application and providing notice to interested parties. Cornelius's failure to comply with the disclosure requirements was not a mere oversight by a pro se party unfamiliar with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, the nondisclosure in this case was so extensive that the parties and the water court had virtually no specific information about Cornelius's applications. While dismissal is a drastic remedy, only to be applied in extreme circumstances, Cullen v. Phillips, 30 P.3d 828, 834 (Colo.App.2001), the water court did not abuse its discretion in ordering dismissal in this case. Here, Rule 37's suggested remedy of exclusion of the evidence Cornelius should have disclosed would be tantamount to dismissal. If Cornelius were prevented from presenting such evidence, the water court would have virtually no evidence before it with which to assess Cornelius's applications. Cornelius would not be able to present evidence establishing his proposed beneficial use for the water, his claimed ownership of the wells he proposed to use in his plan for augmentation, whether his plan for augmentation would adequately replace the depletion caused by his proposed out-of-priority diversions, whether he had access rights to the wells and surface water he claimed, and whether his claim would harm senior water rights. Without this evidence, Cornelius would be unable meet the burden of proof required for approval of his applications and plan for augmentation. Accordingly, the exclusion of all pertinent evidence would lead to the same result as dismissal with prejudice denial of Cornelius's applications and res judicata barring future pursuit of the applications. Given the large-scale nondisclosure in this case, and the effect of the nondisclosure, Rule 41 is applicable. The Opposers have shown that Cornelius unreasonably delayed prosecution of his cases by failing to file any disclosures or respond to requests for information. As an explanation for the delay, Cornelius argues that, as a pro se party, he was unaware of the disclosure requirements. He also provides three mitigating circumstances and argues that, when taken together, they outweigh any unreasonable delay in the prosecution. First, he argues no party has been harmed as a result of the delay. However, the Opposers were harmed because of the delay. Cornelius's failure to provide the Opposers with discoverable information prevented them from conducting any discovery and preparing for trial. Many of the parties retained counsel at their expense in order to oppose Cornelius's applications. All parties timely drafted and filed Statements of Opposition, some in consultation with experts. Each party attended the trial setting. One party filed its C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1) disclosures. The Division Engineer reviewed each application and issued a related Consultation Report. Many of the Opposers therefore expended considerable energy and expense in opposing Cornelius's applications. Second, Cornelius argues that, in response to the motion to dismiss he sought to reset the trial date to a later time, and with the additional time, he would have been able to comply with the disclosure requirements. Appellate courts review a trial court's denial of a motion to continue a trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Burchett v. South Denver Windustrial Co., 42 P.3d 19, 21 (Colo.2002). A unilateral resumption of prosecution should not insulate a plaintiff from dismissal for lack of prosecution. Lake Meredith Reservoir Co., 698 P.2d at 1345, n. 5. Therefore, Cornelius's assertion that, if given more time, he would comply with the disclosure requirements does not constitute a mitigating factor, and the water court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Third, Cornelius argues the delay was warranted by the complexity of the cases. However, a case's relative complexity has no bearing on whether dismissal is appropriate when there has been wholesale failure to comply with any disclosure requirements for over one year. Further, the fact Cornelius proposed to appropriate from approximately thirty wells does not establish that the cases were necessarily complex. In fact, Cornelius disclosed so little information that it is impossible to gauge the complexity of the cases. Here, a substantial quantity of water in an overappropriated basin was at stake, and Cornelius failed to provide adequate information for the court and the parties to understand the claims. In cases such as this, it is unreasonable to leave claims unexplained for over a year and a half. Accordingly, Cornelius's assertion that the case was complex and warranted delay is not a mitigating factor. Finally, Cornelius's argument that, as a pro se party, he did not know of his obligations under the Water Court Rules or the Rules of Civil Procedure does not excuse his failure to make the required disclosures. While courts may take into account the fact that a party is appearing pro se, pro se parties are bound by the same rules of civil procedure as attorneys licensed to practice law. Negron v. Golder, 111 P.3d 538, 540 (Colo.App.2004).