Opinion ID: 1554807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Disqualification of Defense Counsel and State Attorney's Office

Text: Next, McWatters argues that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his defense attorneys, Robert Udell and Russell Akins, operated under a conflict of interest. With regard to Udell, McWatters argues that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry when Udell disclosed that he previously represented State witness Prevatt. With regard to Akins, McWatters argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to discharge Akins on the basis that Akins was once employed by the Public Defender's Office (PDO), which withdrew from the case due to a conflict of interest. McWatters' arguments are without merit. An actual conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance violates the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Larzelere v. State, 676 So.2d 394, 403 (Fla. 1996). Nevertheless, a defendant's fundamental right to conflict-free counsel can be waived. Id. at 403. For a waiver to be valid, the record must show that the defendant (1) was aware of the conflict of interest, (2) realized the conflict could affect the defense, and (3) knew of the right to obtain other counsel. Id. We conclude that McWatters validly waived any conflict that attorney Udell may have had as a result of his prior representation of Prevatt. The record reflects that McWatters was made aware of the potential conflict of interest. In addition, the record reflects that McWatters realized that the conflict could affect his defense. Udell explained that Prevatt would testify that he saw McWatters with Caughey on the night that she was murdered and that a conflict could arise because Udell would be forced to cross-examine Prevatt. McWatters acknowledged on the record before the trial court that he understood this concern. Finally, the record demonstrates that McWatters knew that he had the right to obtain other counsel. Attorney Udell was appointed to represent McWatters after the PDO and appointed private counsel Bob Watson withdrew due to conflicts of interest. Given this history, McWatters was aware that other counsel would be appointed for him were he to refuse to waive Udell's conflict. McWatters nonetheless expressly waived the conflict. We also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying McWatters' pro se motion to disqualify defense attorney Akins. The PDO had been appointed to represent McWatters in all three homicide cases on June 24, 2004. On October 11, 2004, the trial court granted a motion to withdraw by the appointed PDO attorney. At the hearing on McWatters' motion to disqualify, Akins testified that he resigned from the PDO on September 30, 2004, but did not become involved in McWatters' case until he was in private practice. He further testified that during his employment with the PDO, he never met with McWatters, never spoke to McWatters' prior attorney, never had any personal interaction with the witnesses named in the prior attorney's motion to withdraw, never participated in their cases, and had no confidential information about those witnesses. Based on this evidence that Akins knew nothing about the State's witnesses and had no confidential information about them, the trial court did not err in holding that Akins did not labor under an actual conflict. See, e.g., Mungin v. State, 932 So.2d 986, 1001 (Fla.2006) (concluding there was no actual conflict where nothing in record supported conclusion that assistant public defender knew that State witness had been represented by his office); Hunter v. State, 817 So.2d 786, 793 (Fla.2002) (holding there was no actual conflict where defense counsel was unaware of his public defender office's previous representation of State witness and did not know witness's criminal background). McWatters also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the State Attorney's Office (SAO) for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit. He contends that the SAO should have been disqualified because the SAO listened to phone calls McWatters made to his lawyers while he was an inmate at the Martin County Jail. This Court has stated that disqualification is proper only if specific prejudice can be demonstrated. Actual prejudice is `something more than the mere appearance of impropriety.' Disqualification of a state attorney is appropriate `only to prevent the accused from suffering prejudice that he otherwise would not bear.' Farina v. State, 680 So.2d 392, 395-96 (Fla.1996) (citations omitted) (quoting Meggs v. McClure, 538 So.2d 518, 519-20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). A ruling on a motion to disqualify is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 395. At a hearing on McWatters' motion, evidence was presented that the jail systematically recorded all calls made by inmates. A recording was played before each conversation that advised the inmate: This call is subject to monitoring and recording. After listening to the recorded calls to counsel in camera, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court found that McWatters' statements were limited in a fashion that strongly indicates his knowledge that he is being monitored or recorded and that other calls demonstrated that he clearly knows that he is subject to being recorded. The trial court concluded that [t]here was no reasonable expectation of privacy in those calls and there was a voluntary waiver of privilege by Mr. McWatters in the face of that lack of reasonable expectation of privacy. The trial court added that there was no evidence that the substance of these calls provided any benefit to the prosecution or was used to any detriment to Mr. McWatters. We agree. Section 90.502, Florida Statutes (2006), establishes a statutory privilege for communications between a client and his or her lawyer. The attorney-client privilege attaches only to confidential communications not intended to be disclosed to third persons who are not furthering the rendition of legal services. Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031, 1038 (Fla. 1982). Whether a communication is confidential depends on whether the person invoking the privilege knew or should have known that the privileged conversation was being overheard. Id. Before every call, McWatters was warned that his calls were subject to monitoring and recording. This Court has held that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone communication from jail where the inmate is warned that all calls are monitored or recorded. See Jackson v. State, 18 So.3d 1016 (Fla.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1144, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010). There was no reason for McWatters to believe that his phone calls to defense counsel would be excluded from this warning. Thus, McWatters waived his right to confidentiality. Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McWatters' motion to disqualify the SAO.