Opinion ID: 3009543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 1. We turn first to the exclusion of the period

Text: from October 6, 1992, when the district court granted the defense motion for an extension of time to file pretrial motions, until October 26, 1992, when those motions were due. The defendant contends that this period could not properly be excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) because the district court did not comply with the procedural requirement that it set[] forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of [the] continuance outweigh[ed] the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(8)(A). We do not agree. In granting the extension, the court stated that it [found] that the additional period [was] necessary to enable counsel for the defendant adequately to investigate and prepare pretrial motions. A9. Moreover, in denying the defendant's motion to reconsider his motion for dismissal of the indictment, the district court elaborated that defense counsel needed time to decide what to do, to examine the tape recording for example, or to investigate the birthdate of the alleged minor and perhaps try to suppress both. A5. We have held that the statement of reasons required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) need not be placed on the record at the time when the continuance is granted. United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 522 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073 (1983). See also United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d at 877; United States v. Brenna, 878 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Rivera Construction Co., 863 F.2d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 1988). Consequently, the explanation provided by the district court in denying reconsideration may also be properly considered. Viewing the order granting the continuance and the order denying reconsideration together, we are convinced that the district court provided a sufficient statement of reasons to satisfy 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(8)(A). While acknowledging our prior holdings that the requisite statement of reasons need not be made when the continuance is granted, the defendant contends that the explanation given by the district court in denying reconsideration cannot properly be taken into account under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) because this explanation may not correspond with the actual reasons for granting the continuance. See Appellant's Br. at 29. However, we see no factual support for this argument in the record. In granting the continuance, the court expressly relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) and stated that defense counsel needed more time to investigate and prepare pretrial motions. In denying reconsideration, the court mentioned some of the avenues of investigation that defense counsel might have wished to pursue. Thus, the reason for the finding -- that defense counsel's need to explore possible pretrial motions outweighed the countervailing speedy trial interests -- remained the same throughout. 2. The defendant next suggests that, even if the district court made the finding required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A), that finding was wrong because defense counsel's need for extra time to work on possible pretrial motions did not outweigh the interests that would have been served by a speedier trial. Characterizing this case as one involving a non-complex, single drug transaction, Appellant's Br. at 29, the defendant suggests that his attorney should have been able to investigate and prepare any pretrial motions without the need for an extension. We reject this argument as well. First, we hold that in appropriate circumstances an ends of justice continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) may be granted to permit the preparation of pretrial motions.3 In 3 . Courts of Appeals have disagreed on whether delay attributable to the preparation of pretrial motions is excludable under the general language of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), which applies to periods of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant. Many circuits have held such delays excludable. See United States v. Hoslett, 998 F.2d 648, 654-57 determining whether to grant an ends of justice continuance, a court is required to consider the following factors: (ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by this section. . . . (iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii) and (iv) (emphasis added). Because subsection (ii) refers expressly to preparation for pretrial proceedings, it seems plain that an ends of justice continuance may be granted for the purpose of giving counsel additional time to prepare motions in unusual or complex (..continued) (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d 902, 913-14 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), opinion supplemented on rehearing, 881 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1043 (1990); United States v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 1440, 1444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Montoya, 827 F.2d 143, 153 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Jodoin, 672 F.2d 232, 238 (1st Cir. 1982). The Sixth Circuit, however, disagrees. See United States v. Moran, 998 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (6th Cir. 1993). In light of our holding with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8), we need not address this issue. cases. Moreover, we conclude that a continuance for the preparation of pretrial motions is also permissible under some circumstances in cases that are not unusual or complex. Subsection (iv) makes it clear that a continuance necessary for effective preparation is allowed in such cases,4 and we think it is natural to interpret the phrase effective preparation in subsection (iv) as having the same meaning as the longer phrase - - adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself -- in subsection (ii). Consequently, whether or not a case is unusual or complex, an ends of justice continuance may in appropriate circumstances be granted in order to provide adequate time for the preparation of pretrial motions. Second, we see no basis for reversing the district court's conclusion that such a continuance was appropriate in this case. Our inquiry is limited to the question whether the district court abused its discretion in granting this continuance, Brooks, 697 F.2d at 522, and we hold that it did not. 3. The defendant's final argument regarding the exclusion of the period covered by the extension of time for the preparation of pretrial motions is based on Rule 12.1(B) of the 4 . See United States v. Dota, F.3d. (9th Cir. 1994) (An ends-of-justice continuance may be justified on grounds that one side needs more time to prepare for trial[,] 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(b)(iv)[, even though a case is] not `complex' as that term is defined in § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii) . . . .); United States v. Monroe, 833 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1987). Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.5 The defendant argues that the order granting defense counsel's motion for an extension was void ab initio because the motion was not filed within ten days after arraignment, as required by this local rule. We do not accept this argument. First, the defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a motion filed in violation of a local rule is void ab initio for Speedy Trial Act purposes, and we are aware of no such authority. Second, it does not appear that the local rule was violated. As the district court noted in denying reconsideration, the rule provides that the court, in its discretion for good cause shown, may permit a motion to be made and heard at a later time. By entertaining and granting the extension request, the district court appears to have implicitly granted an extension of the time period specified in the local rule. 5 . This provision states: Motions under Rule 12 and Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shall be made either before a plea is entered or within ten days after arraignment, unless the court extends the time either at arraignment, or upon written application made within the said ten-day period. Such application shall set forth the grounds upon which it is made and shall be served on the United States attorney. The court, in its discretion, may, however, for good cause shown, permit a motion to be made and heard at a later date. We therefore hold that the district court was correct in excluding, for Speedy Trial purposes, the period from the granting of defense counsel's request for an extension of time to file pretrial motions until that extension expired. B. We next consider the defendant's argument that the district court erroneously excluded the period covered by his attorney's request for a continuance so that plea negotiations could be pursued. The defendant seems to suggest that 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) cannot apply to a continuance granted for this purpose, but we do not agree. Nothing in the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) suggests that an ends of justice continuance may not be granted for this purpose.6 Instead, the statutory language refers broadly to [a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance granted to serve the ends of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). In current federal practice, plea negotiations play a vital role. We therefore see no reason why an ends of justice continuance may not be granted in appropriate circumstances to permit plea negotiations to 6 . Congress specifically provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(I) for the exclusion of delay resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and the attorney for the Government. This provision does not suggest, however, that Congress meant to preclude an ends of justice continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) for the purpose of permitting plea negotiations to continue. Ends of justice continuances under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) were obviously intended for use in situations that do not fall within one of the exclusions specifically set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(7). continue.7 See United States v. Williams, 12 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1994). Cf. United States v. Montoya, 827 F.2d 143, 150 (7th Cir. 1987) (delay caused by plea bargaining excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D)). While we believe that such continuances should be granted sparingly, we hold that the district court's exercise of discretion in this case was proper. Defense counsel strongly urged the court to grant the continuance, noting that his client 7 . Our holding is consistent with the decision in United States v. Perez-Reveles, 715 F.2d 1348, 1350-53 (9th Cir. 1983). In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had erred in excluding a certain period of time under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) because the district court's rulings did not include the explicit findings required by that provision. 715 F.2d at 1353. See also United States v. Lewis, 980 F.2d 555, 563 n.13 (9th Cir. 1992)(summarizing holding of Perez-Reveles). Because the findings in this case were more extensive and better supported than those in Perez-Reveles, we see no conflict between the two decisions. We recognize, however, that there may be tension between our decision and the dictum in Perez-Reveles that [n]egotiation of a plea bargain is not one of the factors supporting exclusion provided in section 3161(h)(8)(B). 715 F.2d at 1352 (footnote omitted). While it is certainly true that the need for more time in order to conduct plea negotiations is not among the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(i)-(iv), it does not follow that a district court cannot consider this factor. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B) (emphasis added) states that: [T]he factors, among others, which a judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance . . . [are those set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(i)-(iv)]. Thus, it is clear that a judge may (and, indeed, shall) consider other factors as well. If the Perez-Reveles court reasoned to the contrary, we must disagree. was offering to provide information that could be helpful in other drug investigations and that such cooperation could enable his client to obtain a more favorable sentence. A33-34, 37-38. The prosecution informed the court that the defendant had made a very good and very thorough proffer and that the parties were making progress in reaching an agreement. A29, 34. The court was aware that negotiations had been hampered due to the illness and hospitalization of the DEA agent who was knowledgeable about drug dealing in the area of Pittsburgh with which the defendant was familiar. A 38. The court questioned the defendant himself and verified that he preferred to continue plea negotiations rather than going to trial immediately. A40-47. Under all of these circumstances, the ends of justice continuance was properly granted. We thus hold that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated in this case.8