Opinion ID: 2977464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: This court has jurisdiction over this appeal notwithstanding the fact that the district court’s order appears to have resolved only three of the five claims that Marck brought against Peng. As late as the period between the entry of summary judgment and the damages hearing, the claims for trademark infringement and tortious interference appeared to be still under consideration (Peng’s counsel, noting that previous counsel had never actually filed an answer to the complaint, sought and received permission to file a belated answer in which Peng addressed the trademark and tortious interference claims). While it is not clear whether the district court intended to dispose of all the issues in this case, we have jurisdiction in any event because Marck has made clear on appeal that it has abandoned the remaining claims. At oral argument, Marck’s counsel stated his belief that he had withdrawn the trademark and tortious interference claims below. Both parties claim in their supplemental briefs that Marck clearly abandoned these claims below, although Marck does not point to anything in the record showing that it explicitly abandoned those claims. Peng notes that in Marck’s Damages -6- Nos. 07-4180, 07-4251 Marck v. Peng Hearing Brief below, Marck stated that “the only remaining proceedings in this case relate to . . . damages” for the claims on which the district court had entered summary judgment. Appellate jurisdiction in these circumstances is supported by Scarbrough v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff in that case brought claims against a corporation and an individual. The individual answered and moved for summary judgment; the corporation defaulted. The district court granted summary judgment for the individual and separately found under Rule 54(b) that no just reason existed to delay that final judgment. Relying on the 54(b) finding, the plaintiff appealed as to the individual, though the claim against the corporation remained in the district court. Id. at 1081. However, we gave no deference to the district court’s Rule 54(b) determination because the district court had not provided its rationale. While we noted that normally we would dismiss an appeal in such circumstances, we heard the case because at oral argument plaintiff’s counsel explicitly abandoned the claim against the corporation that remained in the district court. Id. at 1082. This action converted the judgment for the individual into a final order regardless of whether Rule 54(b) properly applied. Marck’s statement at oral argument, together with its statement in its supplemental brief that it abandons these claims, act as an abandonment of the trademark and tortious interference claims. With those claims out of the picture, the district court’s order below is a final order, and we have appellate jurisdiction. We note, however, that this method of disposing of claims is hardly ideal, and we encourage litigants (and district courts) to make explicit the dismissal of claims that parties elect not to pursue. -7- Nos. 07-4180, 07-4251 Marck v. Peng