Opinion ID: 2631046
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: General liability provision

Text: ¶ 40 The general liability provision covers bodily injury, personal injury, advertising injury, and property damage. Only the bodily injury and personal injury portions apply in this case.
¶ 41 Bodily injury is defined as bodily harm, sickness or disease, NSW at 000102, and is covered under the general liability coverage if caused by an occurrence. NSW at 000032. Occurrence is defined as [a]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions. NSW at 000045. Accident is defined as a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening that takes place and is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. NSW at 000043. ¶ 42 Woo argues that Alberts' complaint should be construed liberally in his favor as triggering a duty to defend because the complaint alleged both intentional and negligent conduct resulting in bodily injury. [8] Fireman's counters that the inclusion of negligence causes of action in Alberts' complaint did not render the complaint ambiguous regarding whether Woo's conduct was intentional. Fireman's suggests that any ambiguity must be found in the complaint's factual allegations, arguing that none of the conduct alleged in the complaint was accidental or fortuitous. ¶ 43 The Court of Appeals agreed with Fireman's and concluded that any bodily injury alleged in Alberts' complaint [9] did not result from an accident as defined in the policy because the complaint alleged exclusively intentional conduct. Woo, 128 Wash. App. at 106, 114 P.3d 681. It also concluded that even if Woo had second thoughts about giving Alberts the photographs, that fact would not render the allegations in Alberts' complaint ambiguous because the conduct related to taking the photographs was intentional. Id. ¶ 44 Alberts' complaint alleged that Woo repeatedly taunted her about her pigs and that Woo or an assistant working under his supervision ordered boar tusk flippers, placed the flippers in her mouth, pried her eyes open, took photographs of her with the flippers in her mouth, had the photographs developed, and gave the photographs to her. However, three of the claims listed in Alberts' complaint alleged negligent causes of actionmedical negligence, lack of informed consent, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. ¶ 45 The insurer's duty to defend is triggered if a complaint is ambiguous. Truck Ins., 147 Wash.2d at 760, 58 P.3d 276. The insured must be given the benefit of the doubt if it is not clear from the face of the complaint that the policy does not provide coverage. Id. at 761, 58 P.3d 276. In short, if it is not clear that the complaint does not contain allegations that are not covered by the policy, the insurer has a duty to defend. ¶ 46 Woo's policy covers bodily injury that is caused by an accident, which is defined as a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening that takes place and is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. NSW at 000043 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals limited its analysis of the bodily injury coverage to whether Alberts' complaint alleged exclusively intentional conduct. However, based on the language of Woo's policy, he had to have expected or intended the specific event or happening alleged in the complaint. Thus, he would have to have intended not only the event or happening of photographing her with the boar tusk flippers in her mouth but also the event or happening that Alberts would sustain the specific injuries she alleged in her complaint. Although Woo's conduct was likely intentional, it is conceivable that Woo did not intend that conduct to result in Alberts' injuries. ¶ 47 Moreover, Woo's policy covers continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions. NSW at 000045. Woo's taunts and the practical joke could have been part of Woo's continuous or repeated efforts to cultivate a friendly working environment in the office. NSW at 000045; Br. of Resp'ts at 4-5. ¶ 48 We conclude it is not clear that Alberts' complaint does not contain allegations that are not covered by Woo's policy and Fireman's had a duty to defend him under the bodily injury portion of the general liability provision.
¶ 49 Personal injury is defined, in pertinent part, as harm that arises out of one or more of the following offenses: assault, battery, mental anguish, mental shock or humiliation; . . . [or] invasion of an individual's right of privacy. NSW at 000105. Personal injury is covered under the general liability coverage if it is caused by an offense arising out of your business.  NSW at 000032 (emphasis added). Offense is defined as a fortuitous, inadvertent or mistaken business activity giving rise to . . . personal injury neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. NSW at 000045. Your business is defined as the trade, profession or occupation in which you are engaged and which is shown on the declarations page. NSW at 000047. ¶ 50 Our analysis of Woo's intent to cause personal injury is comparable to our analysis of his intent to cause bodily injury. Alberts' complaint alleged that Woo taunted her about her pigs and that he played an arguably offensive practical joke on her but Woo claims he did so only in an effort to create a friendly working environment in his business office. Br. of Resp'ts at 4-5. As with bodily injury, Woo's policy covers personal injury if caused by a  fortuitous, inadvertent or mistaken business activity giving rise to . . . personal injury neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. NSW at 000045 (emphasis added). Because, as we concluded above, Alberts' complaint did not clearly allege that Woo expected or intended that his taunts or the practical joke would cause personal injury to Alberts, Fireman's had a duty to defend him. ¶ 51 Woo also argues the Court of Appeals erroneously applied a Louisiana case when it concluded that any personal injury alleged in Alberts' complaint was not caused by an offense arising out of your business, NSW at 000032, because the particular activities engaged in at the time of the injury were ordinarily incident to business pursuits. Woo, 128 Wash.App. at 107, 114 P.3d 681 (citing Jackson v. Frisard, 96-0547 (La.App. 1 Cir.1996 12/20/96), 685 So.2d 622, 629). Woo disputes the court's interpretation of Jackson and argues that because there was no exception to the policy for practical jokes, it covered anything that occurred in the context of running a dental office. He claims the court's focus ignored all conduct unrelated to the core functions of the business. Fireman's counters that the mere fact that an employer plays a joke on an employee at the office does not convert it into a business activity. [10] ¶ 52 Jackson involved an injury incurred when state troopers engaged in horseplay during a defensive training session. 685 So.2d at 624. The insurance provision at issue excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of business pursuits of the insured, but the exclusion did not apply to `activities which are ordinarily incident to non-business activities.' Id. at 629 (quoting policy). Jackson held that the trooper's actions were the type of activity that were ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits, and were not subject to the policy exclusion. Id. at 631. Thus, contrary to Woo's assertion, the Court of Appeals properly interpreted the insurance policy in Jackson as providing coverage for personal injury arising from acts that were not ordinarily incident to business pursuits. It also properly concluded that the policy in this case provided coverage for personal injury arising from the business. Woo, 128 Wash.App. at 107, 114 P.3d 681. ¶ 53 We conclude the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Woo's conduct did not arise from his business. We hold Fireman's had a duty to defend him under the personal injury portion of the general liability provision. Alberts' complaint alleged that Woo's staff participated in playing a practical joke on a colleague during the course of a dental procedure that was undoubtedly part of Woo's business. Woo's policy language provides broad coverage for personal injuries arising from his business, and the definition of your business is equally broadly defined. ¶ 54 We partially reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment based on the jury's verdict. We hold that the court erred in concluding that Fireman's had no duty to defend Woo under the professional liability and general liability provisions but it did not err in concluding that Fireman's had no duty to defend under the employment practices liability provision. We also hold that the court improperly extended Blakeslee to a nonsexual assault context and Fireman's improperly relied on Blakeslee as a basis for refusing to defend Woo.