Opinion ID: 4530962
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Benson’s Statements were Properly Admitted

Text: The record shows, and Benson admits, that he was advised of his Miranda rights prior to each of his police interviews and he indicated that he understood those rights and waived them. Nonetheless, Benson argues his statements should not have been admitted because: (1) his confession was tainted because he was not presented with the probable cause which supported his arrest within 48 hours as required by McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44; (2) his statements were not voluntary because he relied on the officer’s statement that there was no death penalty and the interrogations were coercive; and (3) he has mental impairments which were exacerbated by his use of drugs, necessitating the suppression of his confessions. None of Benson’s arguments merit relief.16 16 Benson also appears to advance as a separate argument that it was clear error and an abuse of discretion for the district court not to hold an evidentiary hearing. This argument fails in light of the Supreme Court direction in Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, that review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record in existence before the state court. Id. at 181. Our review of the record shows that the district court considered Benson’s evidence of mental impairment, was aware of the allegations concerning the interrogation procedures, and rejected Benson’s McLaughlin claim. Thus, it appears that all of Benson’s factual and legal allegations that were before the state courts were also before the district court, and we perceive no factual issue that required the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. Benson has not carried his burden of showing that he was denied due process by the district court declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. BENSON V. CHAPPELL 41 1. Benson is not entitled to any relief under McLaughlin
McLaughlin does not apply. Benson gave multiple detailed confessions regarding the murders. However, each of the confessions was made during the period of time between Benson’s arrest for kidnapping on January 7, 1986 and January 14, 1986, when he was arraigned and presented with the probable cause for his arrest for the first time. The Supreme Court ruled in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991) that an arrestee is entitled under the Fourth Amendment to a hearing at which he is presented with the probable cause of his arrest within forty-eight hours of the arrest. Benson argues that his confessions were tainted due to the delay in his arraignment. Benson raised his McLaughlin claim in his third state habeas petition, which was denied by the California Supreme Court on February 28, 2001. Accordingly, he is entitled to relief on this claim only if “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. A Fourth Amendment claim resulting from a McLaughlin violation would be cognizable on habeas corpus review. Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the State argues that the 48-hour rule described in McLaughlin does not apply to the Fourth Amendment rights of a parolee who is held pursuant to a “parole hold.” Generally, a parole hold authorizes a person suspected of violating his parole to be detained while authorities investigate the alleged parole violation. As we have already noted, Benson’s parole officer, 42 BENSON V. CHAPPELL Felix Martel, placed a parole hold on Benson immediately after Benson’s arrest for the kidnaping. Benson argues that evidence gathered since his trial calls into question whether a parole hold was, in fact, put in place. In particular, he asserts that as early as 2002, in connection with his third state habeas petition, the actual paper parole hold could not be located. However, Benson’s parole officer Martel testified at the initial suppression hearing in June 1986, and at his deposition on May, 2002, that he had placed a parole hold on Benson on Wednesday, January 8, 1986. Although the district court accepted the 2002 deposition of Benson’s parole officer, the information in the deposition is not properly before us. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (making clear that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted unless the State court’s adjudication on the merits “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding”) (emphasis added). We have held that Pinholster prohibits consideration of new evidence “for the purpose of determining whether the last reasoned state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of the facts.” Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2015). In other words, new evidence may not be used to determine whether the California Supreme Court’s decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts before it. Accordingly, we are precluded from considering the evidence.17 17 In any event the newly proffered evidence does not raise a material issue of fact. All the affirmative evidence in Benson’s state court proceedings shows that a parole hold was placed on Benson on BENSON V. CHAPPELL 43 The existence of a parole hold obviated the Fourth Amendment requirement that Benson be arraigned within 48 hours. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972), the Supreme Court noted that “the State has an overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual [on parole] to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial,” commended a two stage process,18 and recognized that there is “typically a substantial time lag between the arrest and the eventual determination by the parole board whether parole should be revoked.” Id. at 485. In Pierre v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Parole, 699 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1983), we upheld a preliminary probable cause determination held 21 days after parole was suspended. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has declined to require a probable cause hearing for a parolee within ten days of arrest. People v. DeLeon, 399 P.3d 13 ,26 (Cal. 2017). McLaughlin therefore does not apply to Benson’s situation, and there is no clearly established law that a parolee subject to a parole hold must be presented with the probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest. Wednesday, January 8, 1986. Indeed, multiple documents that were produced at the 2002 deposition confirm the parole hold. For example, both an incident report written by Benson’s parole officer and a teletype message sent to the sheriff’s office attest to the placing of a parole hold on Benson. Benson’s presentation does not come near showing that the California Supreme Court’s denial of relief was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 18 The Supreme Court explained: “The first stage occurs when the parolee is arrested and detained, usually at the direction of his parole officer. The second occurs when parole is formally revoked.” 408 U.S. at 485. 44 BENSON V. CHAPPELL
confessions would not be suppressed. In Anderson, 232 F.3d at 1071, we held that the appropriate remedy for a McLaughlin violation “is the exclusion of the evidence in question—if it was ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” We noted that this test “ensures that courts will not suppress evidence causally unrelated to the Fourth Amendment violation,” and “protects the arraignment right in question by barring any exploitation of the delay that causally produces a statement.” Id. Here, Benson was detained late at night on Tuesday, January 7, 1986, and he voluntarily confessed to the murders and sexual assaults in disturbing and graphic detail to the officers on January 9, 1986, within 48 hours of his detention. Thus, the “delay” of his arraignment until Monday, January 13, in no way created or influenced his first confession. In addition, Benson’s assertion that the delay in his arraignment was specifically to deny him counsel and thus violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not meritorious. Benson suggests that because his name was on the lists of individuals to be taken to court for arraignment on January 8, 9, and 10, and he was taken to the court on Friday, January 10, but not arraigned, he was held for an improper purpose. However, Officer Bolts explained that the “daily prisoner transportation list” was created every morning by the booking clerk and included the names of all those in custody who have not yet appeared in court. Officer Bolts indicated that Benson was transported to the court on Friday, January 10 and not arraigned, but did not know why. There is no evidence in the record that the delay in arraignment was designed to frustrate or prevent the provision of counsel. We BENSON V. CHAPPELL 45 need not inquire further into the reasons for Benson not being arraigned on Friday in terms of abridging his Fourth Amendment rights because it is not causally related to his prior confessions. Furthermore, as Benson points to no case law indicating that a failure to arraign an individual within 48 hours represents a per se violation of that individual’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, there is no clearly established law which compels a contrary result. 2. The California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that Benson’s confessions were voluntary Benson asserts that the confessions he made to Bolts and Hobson were not “voluntary,” and that the state court’s determinations that they were voluntary represented an unreasonable determination of the facts. In his opening brief, Benson claims that the “officers’ plan was to make Mr. Benson believe they were dealing with him, but to not do so – the exact type of ‘trickery’ that is impermissible when leading one to believe in an inducement.” The trial court held a suppression hearing regarding Benson’s confessions, and the California Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision not to suppress the confessions. Before us Benson makes two arguments regarding the voluntariness of the confessions. First, he argues that the confession was coerced because of Detective Bolts’s incorrect statement that “there is no death penalty here.” Second, Benson argues that his mental defects prevented him from being able to confess voluntarily. The Supreme Court of California, after a review of the record, determined that Benson’s confession was “voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Benson, 802 P.3d at 345. 46 BENSON V. CHAPPELL In denying the motion to suppress the statements, the trial court found that the police officers had not been coercive and that their statement regarding the death penalty did not function as an inducement. The trial court described the interview as “totally aboveboard,” and noted that there was “no mention of the degree of any charge pending . . . [or] an implied promise of a reduced charge.” The trial court further found that there had been no false promises. It found that there was no deception, as “there’s no suggestion of different treatment if Mr. Benson chose to make any confessions or admissions” and no “implied promise of leniency.” The trial court concluded that “Mr. Benson’s statements were not coerced . . . but rather were made freely and voluntarily.” The California Supreme Court, upon a full review of the record, agreed and found that there was “[n]o coercion, no harassment. To the contrary, [the police interview] was strangely cordial and somewhat light, and not at all heavyhanded in the approach that was taken.” Benson, 802 P.3d at 344. The California Supreme Court also noted that there was a “not insubstantial” period of time between Detective Bolts’s statement about the death penalty and Benson’s ultimate confession, and that Benson’s statement “it doesn’t matter” in response to Bolts’s comment “practically compels the inference that insofar as the confessions were concerned, the comment in fact ‘didn’t matter.’” Id. at 345. In the case of a coerced confession, we have observed that the “pivotal question . . . is whether the defendant’s will was overborne when the defendant confessed.” United States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1993). The California Supreme Court was presented with evidence that Benson understood the questions being asked of him and volunteered a confession. Benson stated that the existence of a death BENSON V. CHAPPELL 47 penalty “didn’t matter” and the interrogation was not coercive. Benson testified that his “primary thought was nothing was going to change the effect of the people that died. Nothing was going to bring them back.” He noted that there was “no one answer” to explain why he decided to confess, and he indicated on several occasions that he felt relieved by admitting his actions. The California Supreme Court’s conclusion that Benson’s will was not overborne by the misstatement about the law regarding the death penalty in California was neither “an unreasonable application, of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” nor “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).19 3. Benson has not shown that his mental condition rendered his confession involuntary Benson claims that he “suffers from diffuse organic brain damage and frontal lobe damage which severely affects his mental functioning.” He contends that these impairments “create irrational belief systems and behavior,” and deny him “the capacity to recall accurately the events that he recounted.” He argues that the California Supreme Court, in denying this claim, “unreasonably determined the facts, and unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent.” 19 Benson’s argument that his confession to Dr. Gordon should have been suppressed because he was misled by Dr. Gordon, or confused, also fails because it is not compelled by the evidence. Benson admits that Dr. Gordon properly introduced himself and advised him of his Miranda rights. Thus, even if Benson was confused as to the purpose of Dr. Gordon’s visit, this was not Dr. Gordon’s or the state’s fault. 48 BENSON V. CHAPPELL Benson raised this argument in his first habeas petition, which the California Supreme Court, on May 12, 1994, denied on the merits without further explanation. We review the record to determine whether “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. Benson has not met this standard. The district court carefully reviewed the evidence of Benson’s behavior during pretrial proceedings and at trial, concluded that Benson “was unusually focused and responsive, and was acutely aware of the proceedings.” This determination is a fair reading of the record of the state court proceedings. Benson was verbose and elaborate in his confession providing excruciating descriptions of how he molested the children and eventually killed them. He did not simply agree to suggestions from the police officers. Although Benson began his interview by dissembling, after becoming caught in lies, he made detailed confessions. Indeed, during the hearing on the motion to suppress, Benson’s trial attorney did not argue that Benson’s psychological state made him incapable of rendering a voluntary confession.20 Further, none of the experts presented to the California Supreme Court in Benson’s habeas filings specifically opined that Benson’s neurological defects made 20 The district court noted in reviewing Benson’s participation in the initial phases of his trial: These passages make it clear petitioner was well-aware of the nature of the proceedings against him. Significantly, in argument on the motion to suppress, petitioner’s attorney made no argument that petitioner was incompetent to render a voluntary confession, nor did counsel suggest a doubt existed as to petitioner’s competence to proceed with the hearing or with trial. BENSON V. CHAPPELL 49 it likely that his confessions were false or otherwise made Benson incapable of truthfully inculpating himself in a confession. We agree with the district court that it was reasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude that Benson was aware of the nature of the proceedings against him, and that he understood the consequences of his statements to the officers. C. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective at the Penalty Phase In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth the now well-established two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687. 50 BENSON V. CHAPPELL In addition to setting forth the Strickland two-prong test, the Supreme Court has further directed that where a federal habeas petitioner challenges his state trial counsel’s performance, the question in federal court “‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination’ under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.’” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). Thus, our review of the state court decision on ineffective assistance of counsel is “doubly deferential.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 190 (quoting Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123). The Supreme Court emphasized that federal courts should defer to the state court’s decision. “Pinholster must demonstrate that it was necessarily unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude: (1) that he had not overcome the strong presumption of competence; and (2) that he had failed to undermine confidence in the jury’s sentence of death.” 563 U.S. at 190. The Court further commented on the deference due counsel who “confronted a challenging penalty phase with an unsympathetic client,” and held that we, the Ninth Circuit, had “misapplied Strickland and overlooked ‘the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and . . . the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.’” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 193, 195 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Accordingly, “[w]hen § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. BENSON V. CHAPPELL 51 1. The record does not compel a finding that counsel was ineffective Benson argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and then present evidence of the physical, mental, and sexual abuse Benson endured at the Buchanan ranch. He also claims that counsel should have investigated whether he had an organic brain injury. a. Counsel’s “failure” to investigate further Benson’s childhood. The strategy at trial was to humanize Benson, and to point to at least one moment in time when Benson appeared happy, normal, and relatable. Benson’s counsel presented a photograph of Benson on the Buchanan farm: Benson was nine years old, smiling, and bottle-feeding a calf. Defense counsel then asked the question, “How did a little boy who got from – that darling little boy in that photograph with the bottle of milk feeding the calf – one wonders how did he get from there to where we are today?” Counsel then described the relative deprivation Benson experienced. Mitigating evidence was presented that (1) Benson’s mother was a prostitute and father an alcoholic; (2) he was placed into a foster home immediately after birth; (3) there was hope for a nice life due to his time on the Buchanan farm; (4) Benson was ripped from the farm at age nine, and within weeks was forced to endure a years-long travail of bouncing around seedy hotels, shanties (including a chicken coop) and different schools; (5) Benson experienced chronic hunger; (6) Benson was placed periodically in other foster homes; (7) Benson and his brothers turned to alcohol and drugs; (8) Benson was first arrested at age 10 and between 13 and 20 was in and out of custody; (9) Benson was diagnosed with 52 BENSON V. CHAPPELL “early-onset pedophilia,” which made it difficult for him to conform his behavior to social norms; and (10) Benson had mental impairment due to drug use. Benson now contends that the strategy used by Benson’s trial counsel was deficient. He proffers evidence that life on the Buchanan farm was far from idyllic. Evidence has come to light indicating that Marjorie Buchanan beat Benson with a rubber hose, willow tree branches, a belt, and a large shovel. She held Benson’s hand to the stove, and punished him by filling his mouth with cayenne pepper. She gave the boys enemas of hot, soapy water. Her adult son would routinely sexually abuse Benson and his brothers, and forced Benson to do unnatural acts with animals. According to Benson’s brother Bill, “[i]t happened so much that we all thought it was normal.” The abuse allegedly led to strange behavior: Benson would bang his head against the wall and eat dirt, live bugs, and beetles. Benson was also hit on the head repeatedly as a child and at one point nearly drowned. To deal with the abuse, the Benson brothers abused various substances, including drinking cough syrup and sniffing glue to the point of hallucinations. Dr. Jonathan Pincus who examined Benson well after the trial, determined that Benson evinces signs indicative of brain damage. Benson argues that counsel should have been on notice to investigate his time on the Buchanan farm. He points to a February 1994 declaration by Dorothy Ballew, a private investigator and the defense investigator for Benson in 1986–87. She stated that: (a) she was the only person on the defense team to meet regularly with Benson; (b) she “realized early on that many of his memories, especially of his childhood, were inaccurate and incomplete”; (c) she suspected trauma in Benson’s past; and (d) she had BENSON V. CHAPPELL 53 “requested trial counsel’s assistance in pursuing specific avenues of investigation and was met with no response or was rebuffed.” Ballew asserted that she told trial counsel that there “were several extremely important investigative tasks that needed to be completed before commencing [the] penalty phase,” but counsel did not request a continuance. Ballew further asserted that when she interviewed Brad Benson, “immediately after the penalty phase had begun,” he told her that Marjorie Buchanan disciplined him and his brothers “by putting red pepper in their mouths and beating them with a rubber hose,” and that from the age of nine to twelve, he (Brad) “was routinely sodomized by his older foster brother, David Buchanan.” Ballew reported what Brad had told her to trial counsel but he declined to request a continuance of the penalty phase. Benson also points to a December 1992 declaration by Terry Kellogg, “a family systems therapist and Certified Chemical Dependency Practitioner.” Kellogg stated that he was contacted by Ballew in early 1987 and was retained by trial counsel as an expert to testify at trial. Kellogg traveled to Santa Barbara in March 1987 to consult with trial counsel. He informed counsel that he “was quite certain that Mr. Benson had suffered significant physical and/or sexual abuse in his formative years and advised him that further investigation of Mr. Benson’s childhood was necessary if the jury was to be provided an accurate picture of Mr. Benson’s mental state at the time of the crimes.” Kellogg asked counsel for an opportunity to meet with Benson, but counsel denied the request, and seemed to ignore Kellogg’s suggestions. Reasonable minds could conclude that Benson’s trial counsel’s decision not to investigate Benson’s life on the 54 BENSON V. CHAPPELL farm further was reasonable. Benson himself did not recall the abuses he endured at the Buchanan ranch. Indeed, Benson’s first habeas petition to the California Supreme Court noted that Benson “[had] no memory of the torture, and sexual, psychological and emotional abuse he suffered on the Petaluma farm.” Dr. Gordon testified that Benson told him that “until [Benson] was nine and a half years of age in that first foster home (the Buchanan ranch), he had the nicest life he has ever known.” Testimony from Benson’s siblings corroborated Dr. Gordon’s report about Benson’s life on the farm. Brad testified that he and his siblings were “displaced from the farm” after their father won custody. Brad then described his father’s alcoholism, the difficulties the family experienced after their time on the farm, and his own alcoholism. He further testified that when at age 15 he left a home for boys where he was temporarily placed, “the only thing . . . . I could think of was to return to the farm, to the only woman that cared about me . . . Marjorie Buchanan.”21 Benson has provided no evidence that trial counsel was informed that Benson was seriously abused at the Buchanan ranch. The only mistreatment at the Buchanan ranch that trial counsel appears to have been aware of was that Marjorie Buchanan had disciplined the Benson boys with red pepper and a rubber hose. The California Supreme Court could reasonably have decided that such disciplinary measures did not put trial counsel on notice that Benson had been tortured during his stay on the Buchanan ranch, especially given the 21 According to Ballew’s declaration, when she spoke to Brad after the penalty phase had begun, Brad mentioned that he had been sodomized by David Buchanan, but apparently did not state that Benson also had been sodomized. BENSON V. CHAPPELL 55 countervailing evidence which indicated that his time at the ranch was positive. Furthermore, counsel had a reasonable explanation for Benson’s aberrant behavior – Benson’s traumatic experiences living with his alcoholic father after the age of nine. Thus, with no suggestion from either Benson or his siblings that Benson suffered trauma on the Buchanan ranch, counsel cannot be faulted for not investigating a suspicion of suppressed past trauma. Reasonable minds could conclude that competent trial counsel would not have investigated Benson’s treatment during his two-to-three-year stay at the Buchanan ranch.22 This is not an instance in which trial counsel did not proffer a defense at the penalty stage. Counsel called two of Benson’s brothers and his sister to establish that they all had endured horrible childhoods. Counsel called a retired high school principal to testify that in junior high school Benson was capable but misunderstood. Counsel called Benson’s uncle and a social worker to testify that Benson’s father was a secretive, unreliable alcoholic who refused to address his alcoholism. Counsel called a pharmacist who testified that Benson was “very very paranoid” and that his judgment was compromised by his addiction to methamphetamine. Several months before trial, counsel retained Dr. Abel who testified that Benson had a number of psychiatric disorders, including 22 Although the defense investigator and the family systems therapist stated in 1992 and 1994 that, in 1986, they thought “that Mr. Benson had suffered significant physical and/or sexual abuse in his formative years,” it does not appear that they focused on Benson’s two-and-a-half year stay at the Buchanan ranch. In light of Benson’s and Brad’s favorable testimony in 1986 concerning the Buchanan Ranch, there was little reason for trial counsel to investigate that period of Benson’s troubling childhood. 56 BENSON V. CHAPPELL paraphilia, that he had a drug dependency, and that he generally did not need to kill. Counsel even recalled one of the officers to support the argument that Benson was addicted to methamphetamine at the time of the murder. In sum, trial counsel presented a cogent theory supported by the testimony of several witnesses against the imposition of the death penalty This defense, although unsuccessful, was a reasonable strategy. Portraying Benson as a normal boy until he was nine or ten seems just as likely, perhaps more likely, to tug on the heart-strings of the jury as explaining that mental health problems ran in Benson’s family and that he was mistreated all his life rather than after he was nine and a half years old. Indeed, the suggestion that Benson’s perversion was a result of a traumatic period in his childhood allowed for the possibility that he could change, that he could reform. Arguing that Benson’s depravity emanated from sexual and physical abuse throughout the entirety of his childhood, while perhaps reducing a perception of his responsibility for his actions, might also make it appear less likely that Benson could change. This was a material concern in light of the admitted evidence of Benson’s multiple prior abductions of children. In addition, this approach would be slightly inconsistent with counsel’s argument, through Dr. Abel, that Benson did not need to kill and could conform his behavior to acceptable standards if incarcerated for life. Benson’s counsel’s efforts are clearly distinguishable from those cases in which defense counsel have been found ineffective at the penalty stage. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389 (2005) (“It flouts prudence to deny that a defense lawyer should try to look at a file he knows the prosecution will cull for aggravating evidence, let alone when BENSON V. CHAPPELL 57 the file is sitting in the trial courthouse, open for the asking.”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (holding that “[c]ounsel’s decision not to expand their investigation beyond [the pre-sentence report] fell short of the professional standard that prevailed in 1989”); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39–40 (2009) (per curiam) (holding that counsel’s failure to investigate any evidence of Porter’s mental impairment, family background, or military service was not a reasonable professional judgment). Similarly, in Stankewitz v. Wong, 698 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2012), relief was based, in part, on counsel’s failure to hire “an investigator or interview[ ] Stankewitz’s teachers, foster parents, psychiatrists, psychologists or anyone else who may have examined or spent significant time with him during his childhood and youth.” Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Benson’s trial counsel in 1986 investigated Benson’s background and put on a comprehensive defense to the death penalty. Perhaps different trial counsel might have employed different tactics, but on this record we agree with the district court that the “California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that ‘the egregious nature of [Benson’s] offenses’ and the sordid nature of the other evidence the prosecution proffered in aggravation were sufficient to ‘overcome any alleged prejudice resulting from counsel’s ‘failure’ to introduce mitigating evidence.’” b. Counsel’s failure to investigate organic brain injury. Benson also argues that his counsel was ineffective because he did not investigate whether Benson suffered from an organic brain injury. He points to a declaration by Terry 58 BENSON V. CHAPPELL Kellogg, the “family systems therapist” retained by Benson’s attorneys, who stated that he advised Benson’s counsel to look for symptoms of serious head injuries. Benson contends that the neurological impairments were apparent because he had difficulty in school, and his problems with concentration and attention were “apparent to teachers, social workers and probation officers.” Benson asserts that his neurological impairment has been confirmed by subsequent testing: Dr. Jonathan Pincus, a neurologist, stated in a declaration dated January 7, 1993, that testing has confirmed that Benson has organic brain injury. Benson objects that “the jury never knew . . . that [he] suffers from frontal and temporal lobe impairment [or] corresponding neurological impairment.” Benson further argues that the mitigating evidence which his trial counsel failed to present is “explanatory mitigation . . . . [it] does precisely what trial counsel in this case admitted he cannot do – it explains crimes.” According to Dr. Pincus, Benson’s “neurological damage in combination with the extreme abuse and sexual abuse to which [he] was subjected as a child were the cause of [his] bizarre sexual impulses. With the brain damage he sustained after birth, [his] ability to control these impulses is severely compromised and non-existent at times.” However, the California Supreme Court could have concluded that trial counsel was not on notice of organic brain injury, and therefore not required to investigate it. The only possible evidence of organic brain injury which was known to Benson’s trial counsel was that (1) Benson had trouble in school, and (2) a statement by Kellogg to the effect BENSON V. CHAPPELL 59 that counsel should look for a history of head injuries.23 But Benson’s trial counsel had employed the aid of a mental health expert, Dr. Gene Abel, a board certified psychiatrist. According to his trial testimony, Dr. Abel examined approximately 280 “pages of information regarding various evaluations that [Benson] has had,” and met with Benson for approximately twelve to thirteen hours. Dr. Abel also administered “a variety of paper and pencil tests that he completed when [Dr. Abel] wasn’t there talking with him.” Dr. Abel testified that he received Benson’s “medical records from Atascadero and various other institutions in California as part of [his] preparation for examining [Benson].” Dr. Abel diagnosed Benson with pedophilia and serious drug dependency. He explained that Benson’s pedophilia should have been treated with hormonal injections but was not. Dr. Abel explained that these disorders made it difficult for Benson to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Dr. Abel did not diagnose Benson with having experienced severe head trauma.24 23 Kellogg’s declaration does not indicate his education. He describes himself as a “family systems therapist and Certified Chemical Dependency Practitioner.” He asserts that over the past 23 years he had “treated literally thousands of patients, including hundreds of people convicted of sex offenses,” has “created and consulted for sexual offender treatment programs throughout the country,” and “lectured extensively at continuing education seminars for mental health professionals.” The record does not indicate that he is a neurologist, psychologist, or any other kind of board certified professional. 24 In his 1992 declaration, Dr. Abel explained that after interviewing Benson in 1986, he diagnosed Benson with depression. However, he did not state in that affidavit that, after interviewing Benson in 1986, he suspected that Benson had experienced organic brain injury. 60 BENSON V. CHAPPELL Accordingly, trial counsel was not on notice that further examination of Benson with the specific goal to uncover organic brain injury was necessary. This was not a case where counsel failed to have the defendant examined by a psychological professional. Quite the opposite. The psychological professional who examined Benson, Dr. Abel, testified for the defense, diagnosed Benson with a medical disorder, and did not opine that Benson suffered a brain injury. Indeed, trial counsel reported to Benson’s state habeas counsel that “the mental health professionals . . . retained for Mr. Benson’s trial did not report that Mr. Benson suffered from organic brain damage,” and noted that had such brain damage been reported, he “‘would have seized upon it’ and would have used the information at trial.” The California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that counsel did what investigation was necessary in terms of organic brain injury. We are aware of no clearly established law that shows otherwise. 2. The record does not compel a determination that counsel’s performance, if ineffective, was prejudicial The ultimate step in determining whether counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant at the penalty phase is reweighing the evidence in aggravation against the totality of the mitigating evidence in order to determine “whether there is a reasonable probability that absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; see also Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 956 (2010); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. Reasonable probability is a level that “undermine[s] confidence in the outcome,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; BENSON V. CHAPPELL 61 however, counsel’s deficient performance is not prejudicial just because the court cannot “rule out” the possibility that the sentencer would have imposed a life sentence instead of the death penalty. Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 20, 27 (2009). Rather, “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). Here, the record fully supports the California Supreme Court’s implicit determination that counsel’s performance, even if it were deficient, did not prejudice Benson. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 98 (commenting “[a]s every Court of Appeals to consider the issue has recognized, determining whether a state court’s decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court’s reasoning,” and holding that “[w]here a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief”). Benson’s trial counsel presented the jury with evidence that Benson’s aberrant behavior had been brought about by his horrendous childhood, that he was unable to control his pedophilia when he was high on amphetamines, and that he had taken methamphetamine during the weekend in issue. Thus, much of the proffered evidence offered in the postconviction petition was cumulative. Benson’s childhood was not just horrible after he was nine years old, but also horrible between the ages of seven and nine. His pedophilia was not just the consequence of an appalling childhood, but might be partially genetic or due to in utero trauma. 62 BENSON V. CHAPPELL The proffered evidence in Benson’s post-conviction petition included evidence of his sexual abuse while living at the Buchanan farm. We have recognized that “[c]hildhood sexual abuse can be powerful evidence in mitigation, particularly when it is not an isolated event.” Wharton v. Chappell, 765 F.3d 953, 977 (9th Cir. 2014). Absent the considerable aggravating evidence, the proffered information, including evidence of sexual abuse, might have made Benson more sympathetic to the jury, but it also might have made him seem less likely to be rehabilitated. Furthermore, the information does not explain or justify Benson’s murder of Laura and her three children, particularly as, according to Benson, she was willing to indulge his pedophilia. Moreover, the evidence in aggravation was damning. The heinous nature of Benson’s crimes was overwhelming: killing Laura, sexually abusing two little girls for a day before murdering them, and killing a two-year old boy because he cried (he could hardly have been a witness). In addition, Benson had four prior felony convictions over a ten-year period of time for abusing little girls, including two instances in which he had taken the girls from their bedrooms when they were sleeping. In this context, additional evidence of Benson’s past abuse and possible genetic make up might not have assisted his attorneys’ argument for a life sentence as the evidence tends to suggest that Benson was not able to, and never would be able to, control his pedophilia. We do not fault the California Supreme Court for denying Benson’s relief. To grant relief, we would have to conclude that the California Supreme Court’s denial of relief was unreasonable. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 190; Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123. But, on this record, in light of Benson’s horrific crimes, past felony convictions, and the mitigating BENSON V. CHAPPELL 63 evidence offered by trial counsel, we cannot conclude that there is no reasonable argument that the additional information would not have changed Benson’s conviction or sentence. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. Benson’s argument with respect to his organic brain injury is similarly unavailing. According to Dr. Pincus, the brain damage from which Benson suffers could lead to difficulty in impulse control and rational thinking. But the crime, as Benson himself described it in his confession, was for the most part not “impulsive.” Benson did not kill the Camargo family in a fit of rage. He killed Laura, and then, over the course of the next day, proceeded to molest the two daughters. He described killing the baby Sterling because he wanted to quiet him to avoid detection. Benson described hesitating before finally striking the killing blows on the two little girls. After it was all over he attempted to cover up his crime. He set the house on fire and fled. The crime was not “impulsive”: it was deliberate, and took place over approximately thirty hours. Benson has not shown that evidence of neurological damage which gave rise to problems with “impulse control” would have significantly aided his showing for mitigation. In sum, given the heinous nature of the crime and the mitigating evidence presented by trial counsel, we cannot conclude that it would have been unreasonable for the 64 BENSON V. CHAPPELL California Supreme Court to determine that the alleged deficient performance of Benson’s trial counsel at the penalty stage of his trial, did not prejudice Benson.25 D. Benson Has Not Shown that Trial Counsel Was Ineffective at the Guilt Phase of the Trial The first of Benson’s newly certified claims is that trial counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase of the trial. Benson supports his claim with a smorgasbord of assertions. He argues that trial counsel should have: (1) further investigated the officers’ conduct in soliciting his confession; (2) presented expert opinions raising factual questions as to the timing of Laura’s death, whether Stephanie was alive when the fire began, and how Sterling died; (3) presented evidence that a test performed several days after the weekend revealed methamphetamine in Benson’s urine; (4) obtained and presented evidence of the absence of semen on the girls, and that Laura may have been breathing at the time of the fire; (5) investigated whether Dr. Gordon had, in bad faith, 25 The dissent, focusing on the abuses Benson suffered during his stay at the Buchanan Ranch, concludes that “no fair-minded judge objectively reviewing the unintroduced mitigating evidence . . . could conclude, with confidence, that the outcome would have been the same.” Dissent at 82. We, of course, disagree. As noted, the jury was presented with evidence of Benson’s horrendous childhood, much of it occurring after he left the Buchanan ranch, that Benson had multiple criminal convictions, including several for kidnapping young children, that he was unable to control his pedophilia when high on amphetamines, that he had taken amphetamines during the weekend at issue, and that his abhorrent actions over that weekend could not fairly be considered impulsive. Considering all the evidence, the California Supreme Court could reasonably determine, with confidence, that evidence that a portion of Benson’s childhood was considerably more horrendous than initially presented would not have changed the outcome. BENSON V. CHAPPELL 65 intentionally destroyed exculpatory evidence in a prior case and had previously concealed evidence in violation of a court order; and (6) investigated evidence that a witness had told police she was at the Camargo residence on Sunday and that Laura was alive. In addition, Benson argues that counsel should have further investigated his impairments that rendered his statements involuntary as that would have undermined the credibility of his confession and made it less likely that the jury would have convicted him or given him the death penalty. 1. Benson has not shown that further investigation and presentation of evidence could have affected the conviction or sentence Benson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase cannot overcome the uncontroverted evidence that he arrived at the Camargo home on Saturday night when Laura and her children were alive, that nobody else was seen entering or leaving the home on Sunday, and that on Monday morning, when the home was found to be on fire and Laura and her children dead, Benson was not there. Moreover, Benson’s heavy ring mandrel, which had been used to strike Laura and her daughters, was found at the scene, along with pornography on which Benson’s fingerprints were found. Add to this Benson’s confession to sexually abusing the girls and murdering Laura and her children, and trial counsel’s decision to concentrate on the penalty phase of the trial was certainly reasonable. The assertion that trial counsel should have further investigated the officers’ conduct leading to Benson’s confession is not well taken. The matters Benson now suggests deserve further investigation—the lack of the tape 66 BENSON V. CHAPPELL recording for the first two hours of interrogation, Benson’s nine hours of equivocation, and the officers’ leading statements and questions —were all thoroughly considered in the litigation over the admission of Benson’s confessions. Even if the officers had engaged in some improprieties—and there is nothing in the record to suggest they did—the improprieties would be insignificant in light of Benson’s detailed, disturbing confessions. Furthermore, in light of the physical evidence and Benson’s confession, the actual sequence of events during the thirty hours that Benson was in the home is of little consequence. Even accepting that Benson’s experts could raise questions as to the timing of Laura’s death, whether Stephanie was alive when the fire began, and how Sterling died, those questions would not make Benson any less responsible for the murders and the sexual abuse of the girls. Indeed, such presentations may have led a jury to conclude that Laura and her children had suffered even more than as described in the state’s case. Also, the contention that there was an absence of semen on one of the daughters is not particularly probative under these circumstances. Nor would these factors necessarily undermine Benson’s narrative, which was full of contradictions and inconsistencies based on what he claimed he did, and did not, recall. Trial counsel may reasonably have determined that contesting the grisly details of the sexual abuse and murders, which would not have exonerated Benson, might have weighed against the jury sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole. Even accepting that trial counsel did not obtain the lab report indicating methamphetamine in Benson’s urine, and should have done so, Benson has failed to show that this deprived him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Trial BENSON V. CHAPPELL 67 counsel presented evidence and argued that Benson was high on methamphetamine over the weekend, that methamphetamine compromised his ability to think and control his actions, and that the use of methamphetamine had a lingering effect. Indeed, the state did not really contest that Benson used methamphetamine. The lab report would have been cumulative evidence. 2. Trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate Dr. Gordon was not prejudicial In a different case involving child molestation in the Superior Court of San Luis Obispo, Dr. Gordon was found to have participated in the destruction of evidence and to have acted in bad faith.26 Accepting that the revelation of Dr. Gordon’s prior misconduct was important information which should have been turned over to the defense by the state, it does not follow that trial counsel was ineffective. Although the evidence would have impeached Dr. Gordon’s credentials, it would not have been evidence that Dr. Gordon’s testimony as to what Benson said, or even his impressions of Benson, were not sound. Critically, Benson had already confessed his sexual abuse and the murders to the officers before he met with Dr. Gordon and did so again after his meeting with Dr. Gordon. Attempting to impeach Dr. Gordon on the basis of his misconduct in an unrelated proceeding might have been difficult and of minimal value, suggesting that even if trial counsel should have discovered Dr. Gordon’s judicial reprimand, the failure to do so was not prejudicial. Moreover, we are not aware of any case where 26 The case was People v. Nurss, No. 13655 in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Luis Obispo. The superior court’s order stating that Dr. Gordon acted in bad faith was entered on July 29, 1986. 68 BENSON V. CHAPPELL counsel was deemed ineffective for failing to conduct a thorough analysis of each of the cases in which a proffered expert had previously testified. Benson has not shown that the state courts’ refusal to entertain his ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on Dr. Gordon’s alleged bias and incompetence was unreasonable. 3. Benson’s allegation that trial counsel failed to investigate the statement of a lay witness is not persuasive Benson’s assertion that a witness had told the police that she was at the Camargo residence on Sunday and that Laura was alive is of little weight when placed in context. It appears that the alleged statement by a teenage neighbor was known to trial counsel or should have been known to trial counsel. The police had discounted the report because the girl was “an airhead or something like that.” Moreover, any trial testimony by the girl would have been undercut by testimony from others who saw no signs of activity in Laura’s residence on Sunday, the testimony of the forensic pathologist that by Monday Laura had been dead for several days, and Benson’s own statement that he had murdered Laura on Saturday night. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that “it would have served no purpose other than to diminish the defense’s credibility to attempt to inject [the girl’s] faulty memory into the proceedings to challenge the prosecution’s case that petitioner committed the crimes, a tactic defense counsel reasonably decided not to pursue in any event.” Given the murder of four persons, Benson’s confession, and the lack of any suggestion that anyone other than Benson was responsible for the murders, trial counsel reasonably BENSON V. CHAPPELL 69 could have concluded that further investigation into the details of the underlying crimes and Dr. Gordon’s credentials would not be in Benson’s best interest. Benson has not shown that the state courts’ refusal to entertain his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt stage of his trial was an unreasonable determination of fact or contrary to established federal law. E. Benson has not shown that there was a prejudicial violation of Brady Benson’s second previously uncertified claim is that the prosecution failed to disclose (1) information tending to impeach Dr. Gordon, (2) a lab report showing that Benson had methamphetamine in his urine three days after his arrest, (3) that three witnesses had their pending criminal charges reduced, and (4) officer notes showing that a teenage neighbor visited Laura on Sunday. Benson raised these claims in his first state habeas petition and the California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition on the merits without any explanation. There are three components to a true Brady violation: “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). A Brady violation is “material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 70 BENSON V. CHAPPELL 1119, 1139 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
reprimand was not prejudicial In a prior case involving child molestation,27 Dr. Gordon, as part of the Sexual Assault Response Team, interviewed a child who had allegedly been sexually assaulted. The interview was taped, but the tape was destroyed. The court determined that the tape recording had contained exculpatory statements, and declared that it was “utterly unconvinced that Dr. Gordon failed to recognize that the statement was exculpatory at the time it was made.” In an order entered approximately six months before Benson’s trial, the court ruled that “law enforcement including Dr. Gordon, acted in bad faith regarding the tape.” The minute order meets the first prong for a Brady violation. It tends to show that Dr. Gordon is an unreliable witness who may obfuscate or lie in order to convict an alleged sex criminal. On this record, we accept that the prosecution did not bring the minute order to the attention of Benson’s counsel, and that it was suppressed.28 27 See footnote 26, supra. 28 The state argues that there is “no evidence [the impeaching evidence] was not available as part of the prosecution’s open file discovery policy.” The state’s argument is not persuasive. Although the state had an open file policy, Benson’s trial counsel reported that he “made a strategic decision that [he] would not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to provide discovery by inspecting the District Attorney’s files themselves to determine whether they had been provided everything to which they were entitled.” Moreover, while the information was BENSON V. CHAPPELL 71 Nonetheless, we affirm the denial of relief on the alleged Brady violation. To set aside Benson’s conviction and sentence, there must be a “reasonable probability” that impeaching Dr. Gordon with evidence of his prior judicial reprimand would have altered the jury’s “conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. Benson has not made such a showing. The evidence both of guilt and of aggravation was so overwhelming that there is no reasonable probability of a different result had Dr. Gordon’s testimony been impeached. The evidence of guilt included not only Benson’s confessions to Bolts and Hobson but also the presence of his fingerprints at the scene and evidence that he owned the steel jeweler’s mandrel found at the home. The aggravating evidence is similarly overwhelming. Dr. Gordon was tasked with presenting forensic evidence of molestation, and he recounted Benson’s description of his acts. But Benson also admitted, in graphic detail, to the police officers his molestation of both young girls as well as his killing of all four members of the family. Thus, Dr. Gordon’s testimony was cumulative. Given the overwhelming nature of the aggravating evidence, and that Benson’s confession to Dr. Gordon was not the only evidence of molestation, it was reasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude that the conviction and sentence would have been the same had Dr. Gordon been impeached or his testimony excluded. contained in a public record, we have held that under some circumstances, this does not diminish the state’s obligation to produce documents under Brady. Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, the record indicates that the information regarding Dr. Gordon was not produced and that counsel would have used it if he had had it. 72 BENSON V. CHAPPELL 2. Benson has failed to show that the suppression of the lab report was prejudicial Benson claims that the government withheld “a lab report [which] indicated Mr. Benson had methamphetamine in his urine three days after his arrest and during the time he was being interrogated.” This is the whole of Benson’s argument. He does not explain why the report matters or how this information could have been used at trial. That Benson had been a drug addict and had used methamphetamine was not in dispute. Benson’s counsel had presented evidence and had argued at trial—without dispute by the state—that Benson was under the influence of drugs over the weekend in question. The inclusion of a lab report showing the presence of methamphetamine in Benson’s urine three days after his arrest would not have significantly added to the information that was before the jury. 3. Benson has failed to show that the reduction of pending charges against three witnesses had any effect on his conviction or sentence Benson argues that prosecutors failed to disclose criminal charges against several lay witnesses and suggests that their charges were subsequently reduced. The criminal records of the witnesses were of marginal relevance because none of the witnesses testified as to where Benson was or what he did over the weekend in question. Benson does not indicate what the defense would have accomplished with this information, how it would have aided the defense at trial, or even that the information was unknown to trial counsel. Benson has not made the requisite showing of prejudice for relief on this issue. BENSON V. CHAPPELL 73 4. Benson has not shown that the failure to disclose a statement by a lay witness was prejudicial Finally, Benson argues that the prosecution withheld notes from a police officer indicating that a teenage lay witness had stated that she visited Laura Camargo and her three children on Sunday evening. Benson’s assertion that the witness had told the police that Laura and the children were alive on Sunday is of little weight when placed in context. It appears that Benson knew of the statement because during his discussion with the officers, he described having heard that a teenage girl claimed that she had “talked to Laura about 8:15 the night before the fire.” Benson intimated to police that the girl should not be believed, because she was a “champion airhead.” Moreover, as noted, any testimony by the witness would have been undercut by testimony from others who saw no signs of activity in Laura’s residence on Sunday, the testimony of the forensic pathologist that by Monday Laura had been dead for several days, and Benson’s own statement that he murdered Laura on Saturday night. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that “it would have served no purpose other than to diminish the defense’s credibility to attempt to inject [the girl’s] faulty memory into the proceedings to challenge the prosecution’s case that petitioner committed the crimes, a tactic defense counsel reasonably decided not to pursue in any event.” In sum, on this record, even if some Brady materials were withheld, Benson’s claim must be rejected because he cannot show prejudice from the alleged non-disclosures. The Supreme Court recently explained: 74 BENSON V. CHAPPELL Petitioners and the Government, however, do contest the materiality of the undisclosed Brady information. “[E]vidence is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” “A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result” is one in which the suppressed evidence “‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” In other words, petitioners here are entitled to a new trial only if they “establis[h] the prejudice necessary to satisfy the ‘materiality’ inquiry.” Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017) (internal citations omitted). Benson has failed to show a “reasonable probability” that presentation of any or all of the alleged suppressed materials—the prior judicial reprimand of Dr. Gordon, the lab report, the witnesses’ criminal records, and the teenage girl’s statement—would have changed his conviction or sentence. Accordingly, even though the state court denied Benson’s Brady claims without explanation, a review of the record reveals sound reasons for the denial.