Opinion ID: 163773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alleged Violation of the Eighth Amendment

Text: 20 We turn first to whether Smith has established that Cochran's actions violated the Eighth Amendment. The Eight Amendment states that [e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has said that the use of excessive force against a prisoner can violate the Eighth Amendment, stating that `the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.' Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-6, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). Smith claims that Cochran violated her right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by using excessive force against her in the form of rape and sexual abuse. 21 Ordinarily, an excessive force claim involves two prongs: (1) an objective prong that asks `if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation,' and (2) a subjective prong under which the plaintiff must show that `the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.' Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America, 191 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir.1999) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. 995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). The objective component of an excessive force claim is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. 995. The subjective element of an excessive force claim `turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' Giron, 191 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078). 22 Sexual abuse is repugnant to contemporary standards of decency and allegations of sexual abuse can satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. We have expressly acknowledged that an inmate has a constitutional right to be secure in her bodily integrity and free from attack by prison guards. Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir.1993). The right to be secure in one's bodily integrity includes the right to be free from sexual abuse. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that plaintiffs' deprivations resulting from the sexual assaults are sufficiently serious to constitute a violation under the Eighth Amendment.). We find that Smith's allegation of sexual abuse by Cochran identifies acts that satisfy the objective prong of Smith's excessive force claim. She states in her deposition testimony and in an affidavit that Cochran forced her to expose herself to him and that he raped her on several occasions, including once with a salt shaker. 23 Smith's allegations also satisfy the subjective prong of an excessive force claim. In cases of sexual abuse or rape, the conduct itself constitutes sufficient evidence that force was used `maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' Giron, 191 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078). [S]exual abuse of a prisoner by a corrections officer has no legitimate penological purpose, and is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that the sexual abuse itself may be sufficient evidence of a culpable state of mind). Because there can be no legitimate purpose for the sexual abuse and rape alleged by Smith, her allegations satisfy the requirement that she show Cochran acted maliciously and sadistically. 24 Cochran contends, however, that even if we take Smith's allegations as true, his alleged rape and sexual abuse of Smith does not implicate the Eighth Amendment because the Amendment acts as a restraint only on the acts of prison guards or prison officials. He characterizes his relationship to Smith as being merely that of a co-worker to whom the Eighth Amendment does not apply. We find this line of argument unavailing. Although we do agree that the scope of the Eighth Amendment is limited, it is not so limited as to be inapplicable to a person in Cochran's position. 25 In explaining the scope of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has said that [t]he primary purpose of [the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause] . . . has always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes. . . . Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968). The purpose of the Amendment indicates that it contains a limitation on what types of state actors can violate it. The Supreme Court has instructed that the text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government.  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (emphasis added). Consistent with this teaching, we conclude that only prison officials and those to whom they delegate penological responsibilities for prisoners have Eighth Amendment duties and attendant liabilities. 26 The fact that Cochran was not a prison guard or prison official per se does not render the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to him. Important penological responsibilities were delegated to him as an employee of the DPS. One of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections's core penological functions is supervising the behavior of the inmates in the custody of its prison system, and another penological function embraced by the TCCC was to provide job experience to some of its inmates. The Department of Corrections delegated a portion of these responsibilities to the DPS by entrusting DPS personnel, pursuant to the terms of a contract, to supervise the activities of Oklahoma state prisoners who were permitted to work at DPS. We conclude that those acting under that delegated authority also bore the duty under the Eighth Amendment to refrain from using excessive force against prisoners. 27 Cochran argues that the Department of Corrections did not, in fact, delegate any supervisory authority to DPS. The works project contract did state, as Cochran emphasizes, that the Department of Corrections would retain full jurisdiction and authority over discipline and control of the prisoners. We do not, however, read this provision as saying that DPS personnel had no supervisory duties under the contract. The provision is better understood as preventing the DPS from substituting its own disciplinary standards for those of the Department of Corrections when supervising prisoners and as making clear that, even though a prisoner was off the grounds of the TCCC while at work, he or she was still subject to the control of state penal authorities. In fact, the contract invoked a state law that extends, as a legal matter, the boundaries of the prisoner's place of confinement to the site of the prisoner's public works project. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 510.1(A)(4) (The Department of Corrections may extend the limits of the place of confinement of a committed offender at any of the state correctional facilities . . . [t]o participate in public works projects.) 28 Thus, under Oklahoma law, Smith was effectively in prison even as she worked at DPS. Pursuant to Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 510.1(F), a prisoner who is away from the Department of Corrections facility where he is incarcerated is, during his absence, to be considered as in the custody of the correctional facility and the time of such absence is to be considered as part of the term of sentence. Construing the meaning of this provision in Hunt v. Oklahoma, 793 P.2d 1366 (Okla.Crim.App.1990), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals said: 29 This section clearly provides that the inmate remains in custody and is honor bound to return from his excursion outside the prison walls. The inmate is continuously restrained from exercising his liberty in any manner other than that approved by the penal institution. While outside the boundaries of the institution to which he is confined, the inmate is fully aware that he is not free to do as he pleases and that any deviation from the terms of his [absence] will result in prosecution. 30 Id. at 1368. 31 We therefore conclude that, pursuant to the terms of the contract governing the prisoner works program, DPS personnel effectively acted as agents of the Department of Corrections in monitoring Smith while she was away from the TCCC but restrained and in state custody on the DPS premises. As the district court found, [b]y reason of their significant engagement in performing the contract between [the Department of Corrections] and DPS, these DPS surrogates [i.e., DPS employees] perform the jobs for which [Department of Corrections] officers are chartered. 4 Am. Order of May 9, 2001, at 17. DPS personnel were required to enforce the Department of Corrections rules prohibiting prisoners from using alcohol or drugs, engaging in sex, receiving visitors, receiving gifts, using the telephone, or leaving the DPS facility, except to return to the TCCC. DPS personnel were required to report violations of the rules to the Department of Corrections and to cooperate with Corrections officials in monitoring the prisoners and implementing security policies. And the contract permitted Department of Corrections officials to make unannounced visits at DPS facilities to ensure that DPS personnel were complying with the terms of the contract. 32 Moreover, at the times when the sexual abuse alleged by Smith took place, Smith said that Cochran was the only supervisor present at the Northside center. Although Cochran argues that he was not authorized by his superior to act as a supervisor over Smith, Smith's allegations, which Cochran agrees we must take as true for purposes of considering his interlocutory appeal, indicate that he in fact acted as a supervisor over her. She stated that Cochran was the man running the place up there when Ed [Spencer] wasn't there. When she broke the rules of her custody by leaving the Northside center premises and by visiting with family and friends there and receiving cash and gifts from them, Smith claims she did so with Don Cochran's permission. From these alleged facts, and from Spencer's frequent absence from the Northside center and the fact that Cochran was the only DPS employee besides Spencer to be trained in prisoner supervision by the Department of Corrections, we draw the reasonable inference, as we are permitted to do, Verdecia v. Adams, 327 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir.2003), that Cochran had responsibility for administering the conditions of Smith's custody while she worked at the Northside center. 33 We conclude that the contract between the Department of Corrections and the DPS delegated to the DPS one of its core penological functions: supervising Smith's compliance with Department of Corrections disciplinary policies during extended periods of her custody. Cochran, as an employee of DPS who acted as a supervisor over Smith, exercised the authority delegated by the Department of Corrections. Because Cochran wielded authority over Smith that was delegated by the state prison authority in the state's exercise of its penological functions, we hold that the use of excessive force by him can constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that Smith has met her burden under our standard of review for summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity claims of showing that Cochran violated her constitutional right. 34