Opinion ID: 2586480
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: California's Death Penalty Statute

Text: Defendant argues that various California death penalty provisions violate the federal Constitution. As he acknowledges, we have previously rejected these arguments. Defendant provides no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior decisions. We therefore affirm our prior decisions, as follows. California's death penalty statute (§ 190.2) adequately performs the constitutionally mandated narrowing function. ( People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 630 [88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 199 P.3d 535]; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 154-156.) The jury's consideration of the circumstances of the crime under factor (a), does not result in arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 703.) [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution [do not] require that the jury find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one aggravating factor, or that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 221 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717].) Neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt nor jury unanimity as to the existence of particular sentencing facts is required. ( Ibid. ) This conclusion is not altered by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny. . . . Nor . . . is a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof required at the penalty phase in the event we reject a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof. ( People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 860-861 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 200 P.3d 879], citation omitted.) California's death penalty law is not unconstitutional in failing to require written jury findings regarding the aggravating factors ( People v. San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 676) and failing to require intercase proportionality review. ( Id. at p. 677.) The jury may properly consider unadjudicated criminal activity at the penalty phase and need not make a unanimous finding on each instance of such activity. ( People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 488 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968].) Apprendi and its progeny do not demand a different result. ( People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 861.) The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments are not violated by the use of the adjectives `extreme' and `substantial' in connection with section 190.3, factors (g) and (d). ( People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 861.) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation. ( People v. Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th 652, 704.) Capital defendants are not denied equal protection of the law because California's death penalty scheme does not provide intercase proportionality review. ( People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 861; People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 360 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 160 P.3d 84].) We have repeatedly rejected the claim that the death penalty is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates international norms of humanity and decency. ( People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 500.) `International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.' ( Id. at p. 500.)