Opinion ID: 3025452
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Post-Deprivation Procedural Safeguards

Text: Krentz argues that the district court erred in granting the defendants summary judgment on his procedural due process claims. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment by applying the same standard as the district court. See Treanor v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 200 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence — viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party — demonstrates that there are no disputed issues of material fact and -5- the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment provides that, [n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Procedural due process claims require a two-step analysis. Initially, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the state deprived him of some “life, liberty, or property” interest. If successful, the plaintiff must then establish that the state deprived him of that interest without sufficient “process.” Krentz can establish a property interest in his job as fire chief because his contract with the District anticipated a term of seven years.3 When a state deprives a public employee of a contractually-created property right to continued employment, that deprivation “must be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). Loudermill divides procedural due process claims into three stages. Initially, an employee receives notice that he will be terminated, and he is given an opportunity to respond: that is “pretermination process.” Then, the employer actually fires the employee. Finally, in the third stage, an employee has an opportunity to receive some measure of post-termination process, usually a hearing with heightened procedural safeguards. Loudermill instructs us that extensive post-termination proceedings may cure inadequate pretermination proceedings. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546-48. We have interpreted Loudermill to require only limited pretermination process, especially if post-termination proceedings are available and extensive. 3 The District protests to the contrary. The District contends that the contract’s seven-year term violated Missouri law, and was therefore void. We disagree. -6- The indispensable requirements of a pretermination hearing are notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to present his side of the story. The hearing does not have to precede the termination decision, but only must precede the termination of benefits. It does not have to be a formal hearing; informal meetings with supervisors are sufficient. The Loudermill Court emphasized that as long as there are adequate post-termination hearings available, the pre-termination hearing need not be extensive. Schleck v. Ramsey County, 939 F.2d 638, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1991) (internal punctuation and quotations altered and omitted) (internal citations omitted). In sum, although a public employee should receive a hearing, that hearing “need not be elaborate.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544. “[T]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Id. at 546. Krentz’s pretermination process was twofold. First, the board notified Krentz of its decision to terminate him by letter of November 6. That letter informed Krentz of the nature of the charges against him. The letter also announced a special meeting at which Krentz would be offered an opportunity to respond to the board’s decision. Second, the meeting itself offered Krentz an opportunity to present his side of the story.4 See id. at 546. 4 Krentz argues that the November 16 meeting was actually post-termination process, because he had been fired by the terms of the November 6 letter. We disagree. For purposes of a procedural due process claim, an employee’s termination becomes effective once the employer ceases to provide benefits. See Schleck, 939 F.2d at 641. Because the District continued to provide benefits to Krentz until November 20, Krentz was not terminated on November 6. -7- The board provided Krentz constitutionally adequate pretermination process — though barely so. The board apparently refused to answer Krentz’s questions (or those of his attorney) on the advice of its counsel. The board neglected to record or transcribe the hearing. Further, the board peevishly insisted that Krentz’s attorney could not participate in the hearing.5 Nevertheless, Krentz received notice of the charges against him. And he could have remained at the November 16 hearing to address the concerns enunciated in the November 6 letter. Ultimately, our conclusion that Krentz received adequate pretermination process depends heavily upon the fact that robust post-termination proceedings may cure superficial pretermination proceedings. See id. at 547 n.12 (“the existence of post-termination procedures is relevant to the necessary scope of pretermination procedures”). We turn now to the question of post-termination process. Missouri law demonstrates the availability and adequacy of post-termination proceedings. See id. at 545 (“Under state law, respondents were later entitled to a full administrative hearing and judicial review.”). The district court determined that fire districts, creatures of state law, are “agencies” for purposes of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 536.010 - .150.6 We agree. An “‘agency’ means any administrative officer or body existing under the constitution or by law and authorized by law or the constitution to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases.” Id. § 536.010(1). A 5 Although our cases do not establish that the board had an obligation to listen to Krentz’s attorney in place of Krentz himself, cf. Riggins v. Board of Regents, 790 F.2d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 1986), the board’s failure to conduct a hearing in which all sides could meaningfully participate detracts from its contention that its conduct satisfied the Due Process Clause. 6 The parties have not directed us to any Missouri cases that analyze whether fire districts are MAPA agencies. Our research efforts have likewise ended empty-handed. -8- “contested case” is a “proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after hearing.” Wheeler v. Board of Police Comm’rs of Kansas City, 918 S.W.2d 800, 804 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (punctuation omitted). The Missouri Supreme Court has suggested that state entities with the power to hire and fire employees effectively engage in the resolution of contested cases. See Byrd v. Board of Curators, 863 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Mo. 1993). Accordingly, such entities are “agencies.” We agree with the district court that because the Robertson Fire Protection District had the power to hire and fire employees — indeed, Krentz’s termination is but one example of its power — the District was an “agency” for MAPA purposes. Cf. Green v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 911 F.2d 65, 72 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Because we do not find that the district court’s ruling on this [MAPA] question is fundamentally deficient in analysis, without a reasonable basis, or contrary to reported state-court opinion, we affirm”). Because the District is a MAPA agency, Krentz could have instituted a “contested case” proceeding under the MAPA after his termination became effective on November 20.7 See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.063; 20 MISSOURI PRACTICE § 9.02 (West 1995) (“[M]any contested cases are initiated other than by an agency . . . . For example, a public employee may challenge his dismissal.”) (citing Bland v. City of Trenton, 618 S.W.2d 438, 439-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)). But Krentz declined to pursue the available MAPA post-termination remedy. 7 The MAPA’s “contested case” provisions contemplate extensive proceedings. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.070. A party to a contested case may call and examine witnesses under oath, introduce documents and exhibits, file supporting affidavits, and object to the introduction of evidence. See id. § 536.070(1)-(3), (5)-(12). The agency must record all proceedings and make transcripts available upon request. See id. § 536.070(4). -9- Further, the MAPA’s contested case provisions, explained in footnote 7, comport with post-termination requirements imposed by the Due Process Clause. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (“Our holding rests in part on the provisions in Ohio law for a full post-termination hearing.”) (emphasis added). The extensive procedural protections provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.070 suffice to protect the constitutional interests of aggrieved employees in post-termination proceedings. A MAPA contested case is tantamount to a “full post-termination hearing.” Id. Our cases explain that an employee waives a procedural due process claim by refusing to participate in post-termination administrative or grievance procedures made available by the state. See Riggins v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 790 F.2d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 1986); Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1441 (8th Cir. 1985). In both Riggins and Bohn, the respective plaintiffs were found to have waived their due process claims because they were aware of the available administrative procedures, yet they did not pursue relief thereunder. See Riggins, 790 F.2d at 709-10; Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1441. Krentz’s case is analogous. Krentz could have sought a contested case hearing under the MAPA, but he did not. Krentz’s contention that he was unaware that the MAPA’s provisions applied to personnel actions taken by fire districts is unavailing. His contention rests upon a legal (rather than factual) misunderstanding. And in Missouri, “[p]ersons are conclusively presumed to know the law.” Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Myers, 785 S.W.2d 70, 75 (Mo. 1990); In re Estate of Pittman, 16 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). Krentz “could have . . . ascertained” the applicability of the MAPA’s contested case provisions “from a reading of the statutes and pertinent cases.” Myers, 785 S.W.2d at 75. -10-