Opinion ID: 1467920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The 2000 Recodification of the Springfield Code

Text: The defendants argue that the 2000 modification of the tax ordinance must be given some effect. Cingular contends that it provides telecommunications services and that the definitions of telephonic services and telecommunications services are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, both defendants argue that they are not subject to the tax under the telecommunications language in the ordinance because Springfield's Charter authorized it to tax only telephone companies, and not telecommunications companies, and the 2000 modification of the ordinance violated the Hancock Amendment. When the legislature amends a statute, we presume its intent was to change the existing law or to accomplish some legislative purpose. Hagan v. Dir. of Revenue, 968 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Mo.1998) (en banc); Missouri v. Rousseau, 34 S.W.3d 254, 261 (Mo.Ct.App.2000). The legislative purpose of a statutory amendment can be to clarify the law rather than change the existing law. Andresen v. Bd. of Regents of Mo. W. State Coll., 58 S.W.3d 581, 589 (Mo.Ct. App.2001) (concluding that the amendment clarified the legislature's original intent to exclude academic institutions from the State Personnel Law); Flipps Nine, Inc. v. Mo. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 941 S.W.2d 564, 568 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (concluding that the amendment to the statute was intended to clarify and particularize existing law); Carter v. Pottenger, 888 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (concluding that the amendment indicated legislative intent that personal representative under the earlier version of the statute did not mean a representative of a probate estate appointed under the time constraints of another statute). We consider the legislative act in its entirety and harmonize all of its provisions if possible. Hagan, 968 S.W.2d at 706. If the legislature amends only part of a statute, we presume that the unamended and unchanged parts of the statute are intended to remain operative and effective. Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo., 639 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo.1982). The Code contains several references to telecommunications and telecommunications services. Section 100-2.43 defines telecommunications as the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing (e.g. data, video, and voice), without change in the form or content of the information sent and received regardless of the technology used. See also The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (using substantially the same definition). The 1999 edition of Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines telecommunication as communication at a distance (as by telephone). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1211 (10th ed.1999). Telecommunication has also been defined as communication at a distance (as by cable, radio, telegraph, telephone, or television). Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2349 (1981). Given these definitions, we conclude that cell phone services could be considered both telephonic services and telecommunications services. Cell phones are telephonic, as discussed above. Cell phones may also be telecommunications devices under the definition in the Springfield Code and the ordinary definition of the term because they transmit information, including voice, data, and in the case of some newer cell phones, video. Thus, the terms used in the tax ordinance are not necessarily mutually exclusive and there is no merit to the argument that cell phones are telecommunications devices and therefore cannot be taxed as telephonic devices. This bring us to Cingular's argument that the 2000 modification must have had some purpose, to which we must give effect. See Schoemehl v. Treasurer of Mo., 217 S.W.3d 900, 902 (Mo.2007) (en banc) (noting that an entire clause of a statute should not be considered excess verbiage). We conclude that the legislative intent of the 2000 recodification that added the terms telecommunications and telecommunications services was to clarify the scope of the tax ordinance, making it clear that cell phone services are telephonic services subject to the tax, and not to expand the scope of the ordinance. See Missouri ex rel. Thomas v. Kelly, 631 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Mo.Ct.App.1982) (when a new act supersedes an old law for the purpose of repealing conflicting or inconsistent provisions, any variation in the terminology in the new law is not as meaningful for the purpose of showing legislative intent to change the effect of the statute). The record indicates that Springfield's recodification of § 70-452 in 2000 was not intended to be a substantive change to the scope of the ordinance. The modification occurred as part of a complete update of the Springfield Code, the purpose of which was to create an electronically searchable version thereof, eliminate inconsistencies or unclear provisions of the Code, and to identify ordinances of questionable enforceability, expired language, duplications and conflicts with state or federal law. The modification process was conducted by a private company and was specifically intended to create non-substantive changes in the Code unless needed to be internally consistent or consistent with state or federal law. Mary Mannix, Springfield's Assistant Director of Finance and Comptroller, testified in her deposition that We viewed [the recodification] as a modernization of the language. She testified further that Anything that was a substantial change to what the ordinances that existed at the time that this was codified would have been covered by a separate city council ordinance at that time. Nancy Yendes, a Springfield city attorney, testified that the tax ordinance was not brought before the Council separately and that no one working for Springfield was aware of the updated language in the tax ordinance until after the Council approved the recodification of the entire Code. In sum, this evidence reveals that the modification of the tax ordinance was not intended to be, and was not viewed as, a substantive change to the scope of the ordinance. The record also indicates that prior to the 2000 modification, Springfield interpreted the tax ordinance as applying to cell phone services. The original ordinance, enacted in 1944, included the phrase telephonic services, a phrase that, despite Cingular's argument to the contrary, is broader than the term telephone. As indicated by the definitions of these terms analyzed above, telephonic means something that is related to a telephone, which necessarily includes items or services that are not the physical telephone itself. The record also indicates that Springfield interpreted the tax ordinance to apply to cell phones before 2000. Yendes testified that she believed the term telephonic is broader than telecommunications, and that the new language in the tax ordinance was only included to update the ordinance with the new phraseology and clarify the scope of the ordinance. [13] Yendes also testified that she had discussions with cell phone companies, including Alltel, in the mid-tolate 90s regarding their need to comply with the tax ordinance. The fact that Springfield did not send the cell phone companies a demand letter prior to 2004 does not establish that Springfield believed that the ordinance did not apply to the defendants and, in any event, does not relieve the defendants of their obligation to pay the tax. See Med. House, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 799 S.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Mo.1990) (en banc). Thus, we conclude that the original scope of the ordinance included cell phones, and that the legislative purpose of the 2000 modification was to clarify this interpretation and not to expand the scope of the ordinance. The defendants argue that because Springfield referred to them as telecommunications companies in the original pleadings, it cannot succeed in taxing them under the original language of the ordinance. Springfield's pleadings do not, however, change the scope of the question before us. Springfield has always asserted its authority to tax the defendants as telephone companies. Furthermore, Count III of the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the Springfield Ordinance, which includes the terms `telephone' and `telephonic' applies to the Wireless Defendants' services; and that the Wireless Defendants [are] liable to pay taxes under the Ordinance. Springfield's motion for summary judgment clearly argued that CMRS is subject to taxes applicable to telephones and telephonic services. Additionally, the record indicates that the district court and the parties treated the declaratory judgment as an issue of whether the defendants provide telephones and telephonic services. The defendants also argue that Springfield's attempt to tax them exceeds the scope of Springfield's Charter. Section 18.1(3) of Springfield's Charter authorizes it to tax telephone companies. A company that provides telephones and telephonic services is a telephone company. Thus, a tax on the defendant's cell phone services, which are telephonic services, is authorized by the Charter. We need not reach the question whether the City's Charter grants it the authority to tax telecommunications companies, but we note that Springfield has the authority to tax a business and occupation that, although not specifically listed as subject to a license tax, clearly comes within the definition and meaning of the enumerated subjects or is in fact a genus of one of the named occupations. See City of St. Charles v. St. Charles Gas Co., 353 Mo. 996, 185 S.W.2d 797, 798 (1945). Whether a telecommunications company clearly comes within the definition of, or is a genus of, a telephone company is a question we leave for another day. The defendants' final argument is that the 2000 recodification of the tax ordinance violated the Hancock Amendment to the Missouri Constitution, with the result that they cannot be taxed under the language added in 2000 or under the original language of the ordinance. See Mo. Const. art. X, § 22(a). Because we are not applying the language of the ordinance that was added in 2000 to the facts of this case, we do not need to reach the question whether the 2000 recodification violated the Hancock Amendment. [14] Even if the language added in 2000 was unconstitutional, a question we do not decide, we see no reason why the original language of the ordinance cannot be severed. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.140 (allowing unconstitutional language to be severed from a statute unless the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent). The 2000 modification merely added language to the ordinance and did not affect the validity of the original decades-old language. [15] See Mo. Ass'n of Club Executives v. Missouri, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888-89 (Mo.2006) (en banc) (challenged provisions could be severed); Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 219-21 (Mo.2006) (en banc) (provisions were not severable). Therefore, even if the language added to the ordinance in 2000 was unconstitutional, because the defendants provide telephones and telephonic services within Springfield, they are subject to the tax ordinance. The judgment is affirmed.