Opinion ID: 877465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: recusal of the sentencing judge

Text: Coleman next maintains that the district judge should have recused himself as presiding judge over his petition for post-conviction relief in light of the fact that he was the sentencing judge. Petitioner observes that in a post-conviction proceeding, the sentencing judge would likely be called to testify as to, inter alia, the propriety of the death sentence. Citing 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges, § 91 at 158, Coleman submits that a judge should excuse himself as a matter of course if it appears that he may be called as a witness. We disagree. Coleman fails to recognize the compelling purpose and policy considerations behind that portion of the statute (section 46-21-103, MCA) which directs that a petition for post-conviction relief be filed in either the court of conviction or this Court. See also section 46-21-101, MCA (may petition the court which imposed the sentence ...). Historically, having the sentencing judge preside at the subsequent proceeding has been earnestly advocated for the following reasons: (1) it reduces the burden on the District Court at the place of confinement; (2) it reduces the cost of the proceeding since most of the witnesses likely to be called are probably in the locale where the trial occurred; and, (3) the convicting court is more familiar with the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Commissioners' Comment, 11 U.L.A. Post Conviction Procedure § 3 (1974). Still another important consideration was enunciated by Idaho Supreme Court Justice Donaldson in Still v. State (1974), 95 Idaho 766, 519 P.2d 435, 437: Although it doesn't matter whether the proceeding is denominated as one for habeas corpus or for post-conviction relief, it is still necessary that the procedures of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act be followed. The Act was designed to give the district court which made the initial determinations a chance to correct any mistakes or irregularities that occurred in that court. In addition, that court has before it all the facts required to make such a determination. Therefore, the application or petition for relief must be filed in the district court where the conviction occurred. I.C. § 19-4902. (Emphasis added.) This Court is also of the view that the post-conviction court judge should only recuse himself if the petitioner shows that the judge is the source of material evidence otherwise unobtainable. A trial judge's familiarity with a case does not automatically make him a material witness in post-conviction proceedings. Bresnahan v. Luby (1966), 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 22 A.L.R.3d 1193. The Bresnahan court also emphasized the importance of the trial judge's familiarity with the criminal case which is being collaterally attacked by the civil action. The case at bar involved thousands of pages of testimony, briefs, motions and trial court records. We are mindful of the delay and burden on the efficient administration of justice which would occur if another judge were required to familiarize himself or herself with this record for the purposes of a post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Such delay can only be justified by the strongest showing of materiality and unavailability of evidence sought to be adduced from the sentencing judge. In this case, petitioner never makes it entirely clear to this Court just what testimony he hoped to elicit from the district judge. Abstract excursions into the mental processes of the sentencing judge do not justify the pro forma recusal of a judge who is fully acquainted with the case. It appears that at best petitioner was attempting to embark on a fishing trip, hoping to uncover damaging testimony about the fairness of the sentence. Such a discovery procedure would not be allowed with any witness but is especially suspect when directed at the trial judge. See Moore v. People (1971), 174 Colo. 570, 485 P.2d 114. We find, therefore, that unless some specific and compelling evidence is sought to be adduced from the testimony of the sentencing judge and such evidence can be found nowhere else, for many substantial reasons the trial judge should also preside over a petition for post-conviction relief. The Act itself lends credence to this line of reasoning, and it can be easily inferred that the legislature, in providing that a post-conviction petition should be filed in the court of conviction, intended that the sentencing judge preside over the post-conviction proceeding. The standard of proof regarding the necessity of a sentencing judge's testimony is high; only the strongest showing of materiality and unavailability warrants recusal. See In Re Continental Vending Machine Corp. (2nd Cir.1976), 543 F.2d 986. The reasons advanced by petitioner for recusal of the trial judge were simply not sufficient to justify a substitution of judges.