Opinion ID: 3134286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Ill 2d at 313. This in turn intruded upon the judiciary's inherent

Text: and essential power of contempt, a power held exclusively by the judiciary. See also Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145 (1952); Wright, 63 Ill. 2d 313. In the case at bar, as in Murneigh, the challenged legislation provides that the courts shall enter an order of compliance and further prescribes the sole sanction to be imposed if compliance is not met. Section 2--1003(a) directs that if a plaintiff fails to furnish the requested consent form within 28 days, the court, on motion, shall issue an order authorizing disclosure to the party or parties requesting said consent of all records and information mentioned herein or order the case dismissed pursuant to section 2--619(a)(9). The language of this section is mandatory rather than permissive. Therefore, section 2-- 1003(a) obligates the courts of this state to become party to the forced disclosure of confidential medical information even if such material is wholly unrelated to the lawsuit in issue, or, if the plaintiff refuses to comply, to enter an order of involuntary dismissal. Because involuntary dismissals are considered to be adjudications on the merits (134 Ill. 2d R. 273), a plaintiff injured through the fault of another would lose his or her right of action as the penalty for not consenting to the blanket disclosure of all confidential medical information, irrespective of how irrelevant to the lawsuit and however personal, sensitive, or embarrassing the confidential medical information may be to the plaintiff. Defendants rely on cases in which this court has upheld as constitutional certain legislative regulations of procedure and the filing of claims. For example, in People v. Williams, 124 Ill. 2d 300 (1988), this court held that a statute which provided for the substitution of judges did not unduly encroach on the powers of the judiciary. Similarly, defendants assert, this court has upheld statutes requiring the filing of certain materials as a prerequisite for obtaining judicial relief. See DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d 57 (1992) (requiring health care provider's affidavit certifying that plaintiff's medical malpractice claim had merit); People ex rel. County Collector v. Jeri, Ltd., 40 Ill. 2d 293 (1968) (requiring that a transcript of evidence relating to the trial court's findings be attached to the order of tax deed). We believe that the particular statutes upheld by this court in the above-cited cases withstood constitutional scrutiny for reasons not present in the instant case. In Williams, the provision allowing for a substitution of judges in certain instances caused only a minimal encroachment upon judicial authority and did not prevent the courts from deciding cases or managing their dockets. In Jeri, the requirement that a transcript of evidence be attached to the order for tax deed was part of a purely statutory proceeding and its purpose was to safeguard against fraud. The challenged provision did not impede the courts in the performance of their functions and therefore did not violate separation of powers principles. In DeLuna, the certificate of merit requirement was found, inter alia, to be reasonably related to the legislative goal of discouraging the filing of frivolous medical malpractice actions by imposing the threshold requirement that a plaintiff obtain an expert medical opinion that his or her claim had merit. DeLuna, 147 Ill. 2d at 75. Unlike the mandatory consent and disclosure requirements of section 2--1003(a), the medical malpractice certificate of merit requirement upheld in DeLuna may be viewed as directly relevant, and explicitly tailored, to the plaintiff's cause of action. The certificate of merit requirement did not extend to medical information or expert opinion relating to health conditions of the plaintiff which were unrelated to the subject matter of the medical malpractice complaint. We conclude that the cases cited by defendants are distinguishable from the circumstances of the case at bar and are therefore inapposite. Evaluating the relevance of discovery requests and limiting such requests to prevent abuse or harassment are, we believe, uniquely judicial functions. Similarly, the court's imposition of sanctions for a party's failure to comply with legitimate discovery requests in a timely fashion is an inherently judicial power. However, nothing in the express terms of section 2-- 1003(a) authorizes the circuit courts to assess the relevance of discovery or limit the scope of the defendant's demand for unlimited disclosure of all medical information in the possession of anyone who provided health care to the plaintiff at any time. To the extent that a statute unduly interferes with the exercise of inherently judicial functions or powers, the statute cannot prevail. See Gibellina, 127 Ill. 2d 122. We believe that section 2--1003(a) impermissibly interferes with the inherently judicial authority to manage the orderly discovery of information relevant to specific cases. Therefore, the statute violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. The judicial authority to limit discovery requests and to impose sanctions for discovery violations is, moreover, expressly embodied in the discovery rules of this court. Supreme Court Rule 201(a) contains the general statement that [i]nformation is obtainable as provided in these rules. 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(a). The requirement that discovery requests be relevant to the subject matter of the litigation is specified in Rule 201(b) (166