Opinion ID: 2994197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Brown’s Arguments

Text: Even though this Court has gone out of its way to define what constitutes a single common scheme or plan, the defendant in his arguments has ignored the ruling caselaw. Specifically, Brown does not argue that he intended from the outset to commit the robberies or that one of the robberies necessarily involved committing the others; instead, he maintains that a similar modus operandi in each of the crimes will support a finding of relatedness. However, as we have previously and explicitly stated, [c]rimes are not related just because they have similar modus operandi, or because they were part of a crime spree. See United States v. Sexton, 2 F.3d 218, 219 (7th Cir. 1993). Committing like crimes that were close in time and similar in style is not enough to establish a singular common scheme or plan. See id./9 The defendant also argues that these crimes were committed within a month and a half of each other and in the same general area, and were thus connected by a specific common purpose--to fund his drug addition. Crimes are not considered related under sec. 4A1.2(a)(2), however, merely because each of the offenses were committed with the same general purpose. See Carroll, 110 F.3d at 460; United States v. Brown, 962 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1992). In fact, this Court has made clear that under sec. 4A1.2 (a)(2), crimes will not be deemed related simply because they are committed to achieve a singular objective--such as support of a drug habit. Brown, 962 F.2d at 564; see United States v. Woods, 976 F.2d 1096, 1100 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Rivers, 929 F.2d 136, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1991)). Further, despite whatever factual similarities the defendant’s robberies may have, he is required to present sufficient evidence that establishes a singular common scheme or plan. We have held on several occasions that merely similar, seriatim robberies fall far short of qualifying as a single common scheme or plan. In Sexton, we held that even a crime spree involving four burglaries within a three-week time frame, at the same time of day, taking the same types of property from rural residences, using the same get-away car, and with the same motive to make money, does not satisfy the relatedness standard. Sexton, 2 F.3d at 219. Likewise, we ruled in Woods that three robberies committed eight days apart, with the defendant planning to rob as many places as he could, was not the type of common scheme or plan contemplated by the guidelines. See Woods, 976 F.2d at 1099-1100. This Court similarly held in Brown that two bank robberies committed eight days apart also did not evidence a common scheme or plan. See Brown, 962 F.2d at 565. [A] relatedness finding requires more than mere similarity of crimes. A common criminal motive or modus operandi will not cause separate crimes to be related within the meaning of the Guidelines commentary. Nor will crimes be deemed related simply because they are committed to achieve a singular objective--such as support of a drug habit or debt collection. Brown, 962 F.2d at 564 (citations omitted). To his detriment, Brown fails to establish, or even argue, that he intended from the outset to commit the March 23, April 30 and May 9 robberies, or that one of the robberies necessarily involved committing the others. Indeed, the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s crimes suggest that he is a recidivist who was on a crime spree during a ten day period from April 30 through May 9 of 1998. See, e.g., Ali, 951 at 828 (We must keep in mind the purpose of the ’related’ test. It is to identify the less dangerous criminal. A criminal is not less dangerous because his crime is part of a spree.). There is no evidence that Brown either jointly planned the robberies, that is, intended to commit the robberies from the outset, or that he intended to commit one of the robberies which necessarily involved committing the others. See Carroll, 110 F.3d at 460. Thus, we conclude that the defendant has not carried his burden of showing that the prior offenses were part of a single common scheme or plan as defined under the holdings of this Court in Joy, Carroll and Ali. See Joy, 192 F.3d at 771; Carroll, 110 F.3d at 460; Ali, 951 F.2d at 828. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not commit clear error when it found that the defendant’s March 23, April 30 and May 9, 1998 robberies were not related, and properly counted the prior convictions separately for purposes of computing Brown’s criminal history. We AFFIRM. /1 As discussed later in detail, Brown has three Illinois state convictions for aggravated robbery as well as one Illinois conviction for armed robbery. In sum, he received a nine-year term of imprisonment on each conviction with the sentences ordered to run concurrently. /2 Brown pled guilty in Illinois state court to onecount of aggravated robbery for each offense, which were later consolidated for purposes of sentencing only. /3 The defendant pled guilty in Illinois state court to one-count of armed robbery. /4 Brown pled guilty in Illinois state court to onecount of aggravated robbery. /5 Also, at the time of his arrest, the defendant was wearing clothing and carrying a bag similar to the clothing worn and the bag carried by the LaSalle Bank bank robber. /6 The Presentence Investigation Report does not indicate whether these two eyewitnesses were bank customers or employees, or if they could have also identified Brown by his voice. /7 Brown also received three criminal history points for three other prior state convictions (criminal damage to property, domestic battery and battery), bringing his total criminal history points to thirteen and placing him in criminal history category VI. /8 Neither party challenges this sentencing determination. /9 Under Application note 9 to sec. 1B1.3, [f]or two or more offenses to constitute part of a common scheme or plan, they must be substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi. As we stated in Joy, however, the common scheme or plan concept under sec. 1B1.3 is used for ascertaining relevant offense conduct and adjustments, and is inapplicable for purposes of our review under sec. 4A1.2(a)(2). See Joy, 192 F.3d at 771 n.7; U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(b) (Factors in Chapters Four and Five that establish the guideline range shall be determined on the basis of the conduct and information specified in the respective guidelines.).