Opinion ID: 766078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objectively Reasonable Expectation

Text: 20 Even if Kyllo could demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emissions from his residence, he has not established that this privacy expectation would be accepted by society as objectively reasonable.  [T]he correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83. 21 While a heightened privacy expectation in the home has been recognized for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, see Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237 n.4, activities within a residence are not protected from outside, non-intrusive,government observation, simply because they are within the home or its curtilage. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (plurality opinion); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. The use of technology to enhance government surveillance does not necessarily turn permissible non-intrusive observation into impermissible search. See id.; Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238-39. Much like the Fifth Circuit, we believe that, in evaluating whether technology has been used to aid in permissible observation or to perform an impermissible warrantless search, the crucial inquiry, as in any search and seizure analysis, is whether the technology reveals `intimate details.'  Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855 (quoting Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238). 22 The thermal emission scan performed on Kyllo's residence, and the other houses in the triplex, while giving information unavailable to the naked eye, did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life. The scan merely indicated amorphous hot spots on the roof and exterior wall and not the detailed images of private activity that Kyllo suggests the technology could expose. Such information is neither sensitive nor personal, nor does it reveal the specific activities within the... home. Ford, 34 F.3d at 997; see also Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059. Like the Court in Dow Chemical, we reject Kyllo's attempt to rely on extravagant generalizations about the potential invasions of privacy that this sort of advanced technology may someday present. See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239. 23 Considering the facts of this case, and the district court's findings on the technology used, we cannot conclude that this surveillance was so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. Id. While this technology may, in other circumstances, be or become advanced to the point that its use will step over the edge from permissible non-intrusive observation into impermissible warrantless search, we find no violation of the Fourth Amendment on these facts. See id. at 239 and n.5; Myers, 46 F.3d at 670 n.1.