Opinion ID: 726050
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery Cut Off & Document Production

Text: 5 Appellants raise two discovery-related challenges on appeal. First, invoking Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), Appellants argue that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment without affording them the benefit of conducting a reasonable discovery. In support thereof, they claim they were diligent in their pursuit of discovery but that Appellees refused to comply with their requests and the district court granted summary judgment without acting upon their motions to compel discovery. Second, they claim error by the district court's denial of their February 9, 1994, request for production of certain documents. Appellees counter, asserting that the record clearly shows that the district court granted Appellants ample time to conduct discovery, and that they did not hide any information from Appellants. Thus, they contend that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their document production request as untimely. 6 It is well settled that the trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on pre-trial management matters, and we review the district court's denial of discovery for abuse of its considerable discretion. See Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 267 (1st Cir.1993); Serrano-Perez v. FMC Corp., 985 F.2d 625, 628 (1st Cir.1993). We will intervene in such matters only upon a clear showing of manifest injustice, that is, where the lower court's discovery order was plainly wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party. Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir.1989). The same abuse of discretion standard applies to a review of a district court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir.1994); Price v. General Motors, Corp., 931 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir.1991). 7 Before addressing Appellants' arguments, we detail the pertinent procedural history as revealed by the relevant docket entries: 8 1. 8/10/92: Complaint filed. 2. 5/18/93: Scheduling Order sets discovery deadline for 10/15/93. 3. 10/18/93: Appellants move to extend discovery. New deadline set for 11/30/93. 4. 11/15/93: Appellants request document production pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34. 5. 11/18/93: Appellants move again to extend discovery. New deadline set for 1/3/94. Court states this is the last extension. 6. 12/8/93: Appellants move for status conference to clarify discovery and to further extend discovery by sixty days. Denied. 7. 12/17/93: Pretrial Conference set for 2/4/93. 8. 1/3/94: Appellants move to order witnesses to attend oral deposition. Denied (see 11, below). 9. 1/10/94: Appellees move for summary judgment (SJ). 10. 1/14/94: Appellants move for extension to oppose SJ. Granted. Opposition due by 2/20/94. 11. 1/14/94: Appellants move again to clarify discovery process. Denied, citing failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c) regarding personal service of subpoena and noting that it cannot allow further disruption in the scheduling order. 12. 2/2/94: Appellees submit proposed pretrial order. 13. 2/3/94: Appellants file SJ opposition. 14. 2/4/94: Pretrial Conference. Court grants parties until 2/10/94 to prepare joint pretrial order. Court denies Appellees' motion to dismiss. 15. 2/9/94: Appellants move to supplement opposition to SJ, to compel document production, and to appoint special process server. 16. 2/10/94: Pretrial Conference. Appellants submit proposed pretrial order. Court grants pretrial order. 17. 2/17/94: Appellees file response to SJ opposition. 18. 3/11/94: Court grants SJ, denies Appellants' motion to compel document production and to appoint a special process server. Court enters partial judgment in favor of Appellees. Appellants' severance pay claim, as ordered to be amended, remains. 19. 3/21/94: Appellants move to postpone jury trial to file reconsideration motions and motion for new trial. Granted. 20. 3/28/94: Appellants move for reconsideration of grant of SJ. Denied (see 22, below). 21. 3/29/94: Appellants move for additional discovery. 22. 6/5/95: Court denies Appellants' motion for reconsideration, grants Appellees' motion to strike third amended complaint, and denies Appellants' leave to file a fourth amended complaint. 9 We turn first to Appellants' reliance on Rule 56(f). Rule 56(f) looms large when a party claims an inability to respond to an opponent's summary judgment motion because of incomplete discovery, Resolution Trust Corp., 22 F.3d at 1202, given that it is intended to safeguard against judges swinging the summary judgment axe too hastily, id. at 1203. While certainly district courts should construe Rule 56(f) motions generously, we have noted that 10 [t]his does not mean ... that [it] has no bite or that its prophylaxis extends to litigants who act lackadaisically; use of the rule not only requires meeting several benchmarks ..., but also requires due diligence both in pursuing discovery before the summary judgment initiative surfaces and in pursuing an extension of time thereafter. In other words, Rule 56(f) is designed to minister to the vigilant, not to those who slumber upon perceptible rights. 11 Id. at 1203 (emphasis added). We have also held that a party must invoke Rule 56(f) within a reasonable time following the receipt of a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1204. 12 With this rubric in mind, we find that Appellants' invocation of Rule 56(f) is misplaced for at least two reasons. First, the record shows that Appellants filed their original opposition to summary judgment without previously informing the court of their inability to properly oppose summary judgment due to incomplete discovery. In fact, Appellants never sought an additional extension of the discovery deadline before filing their opposition. 2 Moreover, both Appellants' original 3 and supplemental 4 oppositions to summary judgment are deafeningly silent as to their inability to oppose summary judgment due to incomplete discovery. The first time Appellants informed the district court about outstanding discovery was during the February 4, 1994, and February 10, 1994, pre-trial conferences, after having already filed their opposition and supplemental opposition respectively. 13 Second, we are hard-pressed to conclude that this record supports a finding that Appellants exercised due diligence or were otherwise vigilant before Appellees moved for summary judgment on January 10, 1994. After requesting and receiving two extensions, discovery concluded on January 3, 1994--almost eighteen months after Appellants filed their complaint on August 10, 1992, and almost eight months after the court's May 18, 1993, scheduling order. Appellants did not serve a request for document production until November 12, 1994, after they had received their first extension 5 and only two weeks prior to the end of the new discovery period set for November 30, 1994. 14 Furthermore, Appellants failed to meet with Appellees pursuant to Local Rule 311.11 to discuss Appellees' timely objections to their document request--as set forth in two letters, dated November 24, 1993, and December 15, 1993--prior to the conclusion of discovery on January 3, 1994. See Local Rule 311.11. Pursuant to this Rule, parties are required to meet in a good faith effort to eliminate disputes regarding discovery prior to filing any discovery-related motion or objection. The Rule also provides that, unless relieved by agreement or by order of the court upon good cause shown, counsel must meet within ten days of service of a letter requesting a Rule 311.11 conference, and that Appellants--as the movants--bore the responsibility for arranging a conference. See Local Rule 311.11. Here, the record clearly shows that Appellants failed to comply with the Rule or carry their burden thereunder. Not only is it undisputed that the parties' Local Rule 311.11 meeting was not held until February 1, 1994--more than two months after Appellees' first timely objection and more than one month after Appellees' second letter which expressly invited Appellants' counsel to meet on December 27, 1993--but there is absolutely no evidence of timely notification to the court or of good cause for the failure to meet earlier or to timely advise the court. 15 Moreover, after Appellees filed their motion for summary judgment, Appellants never filed for another discovery extension prior to filing their opposition to summary judgment on February 3, 1994. As noted above, it was not until the February 4 and February 10 pre-trial conferences that Appellants informed the district court of Appellees' failure to produce documents--almost one month after the second-extended discovery period had concluded and the day after Appellants had filed their opposition to summary judgment. 16 Attempting nonetheless to invoke the benefits of Rule 56(f), Appellants argue that in order to trigger Rule 56(f) the nonmoving party need only submit an equivalent statement, preferably in writing, of their need for additional discovery. See, e.g., St. Surin v. Virgin Islands Daily News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (3d Cir.1994); Wichita Falls Office Assoc. v. Banc One Corp., et al., 978 F.2d 915, 919 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 910, 113 S.Ct. 2340, 124 L.Ed.2d 251 (1993). Relying on these two cases, they insist that they triggered Rule 56(f), because through the whole procedure of the case [they] presented in writing and before the court more than plausible basis to believe that discoverable materials existed which were essential to their case and would raise truthworthy issues. Appellants' Brief, p. 24. Unlike Appellants here, the parties in those cases both requested Rule 56(f) extensions after the opposing party filed a motion for summary judgment, specified that discovery had not concluded, and identified the outstanding items which would be dispositive to the issues raised. More importantly, unlike the instant case, the facts in those cases indicated that the nonmovants had not been dilatory in obtaining discovery. See St. Surin, 21 F.3d at 1315 (concluding that nonmovant should not suffer from a failure of proof caused by his accommodation of the movant's requests for delay); Wichita Falls, 978 F.2d at 919 (finding that nonmovant was not dilatory because it reasonably awaited outcome of pending negotiations). In any event, we remain unpersuaded by Appellants' list of the allegedly numerous times they brought this matter to the court's attention; in fact, their list belies that they so informed the court. For example, contrary to their claim, Appellants' two-paragraph request for an extension to oppose summary judgment makes no reference whatsoever to discovery matters. Similarly, while Appellants claim that their opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment state[d] to the Court the situation about the documents and information that defendants were refusing to provide, Appellants' Brief, p. 23, a review of their opposition reveals no such statement. 17 In light of the two extensions granted, the latter stating that this was the final extension, Appellants' failure to comply with Local Rule 311.11, and what appears to us as an overall lack of due diligence, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court. Contrary to Appellants' assertion, in no way did the district court grant summary judgment without [their] benefit to [sic] a reasonable discovery. Indeed, the district court was never put in the position of granting a Rule 56(f) motion given that Appellants only informed the court about Appellees' failure to produce discovery after the conclusion of discovery, after Appellants' oppositions to summary judgment had been filed, and on the eve of the pre-trial stage. 18 For obvious reasons, we also find no abuse of discretion by the district court when it denied what was clearly Appellants' untimely motion to compel document production. We remind Appellants that Local Rule 311.11 expressly prohibits the court from entertaining any motion relating to discovery unless the moving party--here, Appellants--first advised the court, in writing, that the parties have been unable to resolve their differences or reach an agreement after counsel have held the required conference, or that counsel for respondent has refused to confer or delayed the conference without good cause. See Local Rule 311.11. The first time Appellants provided written notification was on February 9, 1994. The court informed Appellants during the February 10, 1994, pre-trial conference that, had they timely filed a written motion to compel, the court could have requested the documents and made an in camera inspection of them to assess the legitimacy of Appellees' objections. As the district court correctly noted in its order denying Appellants' post-summary judgment motion requesting additional discovery and a new trial, Appellants waited more than one month after the second extended discovery deadline had elapsed to properly request an order from the district court. Appellants' claim that Appellees were hiding information is essentially irrelevant against the backdrop of their own lack of diligence as evidenced by the lateness of the Local Rule 311.11 meeting and their untimely motion to compel document production. 19 In sum, based on our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court with respect to either of Appellants' claimed errors; indeed, in light of Appellants' lack of diligence and failure to follow the rules, we do not even find a hint of any abuse of the district court's broad discretion. As we have stated before, [s]ticking the appellate nose too readily into the district court's scope-of-discovery tent is, we think, a recipe for disaster. Mack, 871 F.2d at 187. Where, as here, the district court could have allowed further discovery, it was certainly free to call the shot the other way. Id. None of Appellants' arguments, including those not addressed, persuade us that this record warrants a disruptive nosey appearance.