Opinion ID: 1618265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficient Evidence of Failure to Return to Confinement

Text: For his first point on appeal, Mr. Moore argues there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of felony failure to return to confinement because he was not serving a sentence to the department of corrections when he was booked into jail and furloughed by the sentencing judge, which is an element of the felony offense under section 575.220. A person commits the crime of failure to return to confinement if ... while serving any ... type of sentence for any crime wherein he or she is temporarily permitted to go at large without guard, he or she purposely fails to return to confinement when he or she is required to do so. Section 575.220.1. Failure to return to confinement is a class C misdemeanor unless... [t]he sentence being served is to the Missouri department of corrections and human resources, in which case failure to return to confinement is a class D felony.... Section 575.220.3(1). Thus, in order to be guilty of felony failure to return to confinement, the defendant must: (1) be serving a sentence to the department of corrections for some crime; (2) be temporarily permitted to go at large without guard; and (3) purposely fail to return to confinement when required to do so. Mr. Moore claims the state failed to prove the first element of felony failure to return to confinement. He argues that under section 558.031 a sentence to the department of corrections does not commence until a person physically is received by the department and, therefore, he was not serving a sentence when he was booked into the county jail because physically he had not been received into custody by the department. The issue, therefore, is what is required under section 575.220.3 before a person is deemed to be serving a sentence. When interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute. State v. Salazar, 236 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Mo. banc 2007). When interpreting a statute, this Court must give meaning to every word or phrase of the legislative enactment. Winfrey v. State, 242 S.W.3d 723, 725 (Mo. banc 2008). Here, the legislature did not define what it means to serve a sentence for purposes of section 575.220. [2] Therefore, this Court will look to the plain and ordinary meaning of those words as defined in the dictionary. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d at 446 (In the absence of a statutory definition, words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning as derived from the dictionary.). The word serve means to put in (a term of imprisonment). WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2075 (3rd ed.1993). A sentence is the order by which a court or judge imposes punishment or penalty on a person found guilty. Id. at 2068. Accordingly, the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase serving a sentence is to put in a term of imprisonment pursuant to a court order imposing punishment upon a person found guilty of a crime. Nothing in this definition requires people to be incarcerated physically in a particular place before they can begin serving their sentence, as urged by Mr. Moore. Another word the legislature uses to define when a person can be convicted of felony failure to return to confinement must also be given consideration. The language of section 575.220 makes failing to return to confinement a class D felony if [t]he sentence being served is to the Missouri department of corrections. Section 575.220.3(1) (emphasis added). Because this Court must give meaning to every word or phrase of the legislative enactment, this Court assumes that the legislature purposefully used the word to and that its use has meaning in the statute. Winfrey, 242 S.W.3d at 725. Mr. Moore attempts to interpret section 575.220.3(1) as though it reads the sentence being served is in the department of corrections. If the legislature had intended a person to be in the physical custody of the department of corrections before the person could be charged under section 575.220, it easily could have used the word in rather than to. The legislature clearly knew how to make such a distinction, as shown by the fact that the following subsection of the statute makes failing to return to confinement a class A misdemeanor when [t]he sentence being served is one of confinement in a county jail. Section 575.220.3(2) (emphasis added). The legislature's use of different terms in different subsections of the same statute is presumed to be intentional and for a particular purpose. Armco Steel v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 883 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Mo. banc 1994). In the present case, the legislature's decision to use the word to in section 575.220.3(1), rather than in, reflects its intent that inmates sentenced to the department of corrections that are being held in a county jail while awaiting transfer to the department of corrections are still capable of being prosecuted for failing to return to confinement. As noted above, Mr. Moore disagrees with this interpretation of section 575.220.3(1) and argues that the legislature did not intend the crime of felony failure to return to confinement to encompass the circumstance where he was booked into the county jail and furloughed and physically had not been received into custody by the department of corrections. Mr. Moore relies on section 558.031.1 to support his argument that a person does not begin serving a sentence for purposes of 557.220.3(1) until they physically are received by the department of corrections. Section 558.031.1 states, in relevant part: A sentence of imprisonment shall commence when a person convicted of a crime in this state is received into the custody of the department of corrections. . . . Such person shall receive credit toward the service of a sentence of imprisonment for all time in prison, jail or custody after the offense occurred and before the commencement of the sentence. . . . Mr. Moore's argument that a criminal defendant can only be guilty of felony failure to return to confinement after the defendant physically is received by the department of corrections would require this Court to read section 558.031 into section 575.220. While statutes in different chapters of the criminal code can be considered in determining the intent of the legislature, the provisions in another section should not be utilized to alter the legislature's intent as apparent from the plain and ordinary language of a criminal statute. Section 558.031 is intended to regulate the calculation of prison time for purposes of determining prison credit, not to define when a defendant begins serving a sentence for purposes of section 575.220. If the legislature had intended the technical definition of commencement of a sentence in section 558.031.1 to apply to section 575.220.3(1), it could have incorporated the definition from 558.031.1 into sections 557.220, 556.063 or 575.010. It did not. To adopt Mr. Moore's construction would create an ambiguity in an otherwise unambiguous statute. There is no need to resort to statutory construction to create an ambiguity where none exists. State v. Burns, 978 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Mo. banc 1998) (Where the language of the statute is clear, courts must give effect to the language used by the legislature.). Under the interpretation urged by Mr. Moore, a person sentenced to the department of corrections would not be serving a sentence despite the fact that a judge had ordered the person's sentence be executed and the person was taken into custody and incarcerated by virtue of such sentence. Such a reading contravenes the plain language of the statute. A plain reading of section 575.220 shows that when a person's sentence to the department of corrections is ordered to be executed and the person is taken into custody, then that person has commenced serving his or her sentence. This is true despite the fact that the person is not physically in the department of corrections. The plain language of section 575.220 recognizes the practical reality that all prisoners sentenced to the department of corrections are held in temporary custody by local law enforcement before they are transported to the department of corrections and the person is in the custody of local law enforcement by virtue of fact that they are serving a sentence to the department of corrections. In this case, the sentencing court ordered Mr. Moore's previously imposed sentence to the department of corrections to be executed. Pursuant to that order, Mr. Moore was taken into custody, transported to a county jail and booked into custody. The plain language of section 575.220 encompasses that circumstance. Hence, there was sufficient evidence to find that Mr. Moore was serving a sentence to the department of corrections when he was booked into the Warren County jail. In connection with his first point, Mr. Moore also argues that the sentencing judge lacked authority to grant him a furlough because, under section 217.425, only the director of the department of corrections is authorized to grant furloughs. It is true that section 217.425 does not extend authority to grant furloughs to circuit judges. However, the fact that Mr. Moore's release was not authorized by that statute is irrelevant for purposes of section 575.220. Section 575.220 only requires that a defendant be temporarily permitted to go at large without guard. It does not require that the release be in conformity with a specific provision of law. Here, Mr. Moore was permitted to go temporarily at large without guard when the judge granted him what he termed a furlough. Regardless of how the release was labeled, Mr. Moore was permitted to go temporarily at large without guard, which is all that is required by section 575.220. Additionally, Mr. Moore is estopped from challenging the validity of the sentencing judge's order granting him a furlough because he accepted the benefits of that order by going temporarily at large without guard. A person who accepts the benefits of a judicial order is estopped from denying its validity or propriety. See State ex rel. York v. Daugherty, 969 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Mo. banc 1998) (applying estoppel in a civil case); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 172 (2008) (citing Rhodes v. State, 240 S.W.3d 882, 891 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (applying estoppel in a criminal case)). Because Mr. Moore failed to attack the validity of the judge's order granting him a furlough and then accepted the benefits of that order, he is estopped from attacking it now. Because Mr. Moore was serving a sentence to the department of corrections when he temporarily was permitted to go at large by the sentencing judge's order, there was sufficient evidence on which a reasonable juror could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of failure to return to confinement. As such, Mr. Moore's first point is denied.