Opinion ID: 42481
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hillsborough County

Text: In Quinn, we noted the distinction between a “decisionmaker,” as discussed above, and a “policymaker,” “who takes actions that may cause the [governmental entity] to be held liable for a custom or policy.” Quinn, 330 F.3d at 1326. Such an inquiry exists because governmental entities cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior, but rather may be held liable only for the execution of a governmental policy or custom. Id. at 1325. This liability “may arise with regards to an employment decision, such as a termination, provided that the decisionmaker ‘possesses final authority to establish . . . policy with respect to the action ordered.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). “Only those . . . officers who have final policymaking authority may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability.” Matthews, 294 F.3d at 1297. 4 A governmental employee is considered a “final policymaker” for governmental liability purposes “only if his decisions have legal effect without further action by the governing body, and if the governing body lacks the power to reverse the . . . employee’s decision.” Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1292 (internal citation omitted). “To determine if someone is a final policy maker, we look not only to ‘state and local positive law,’ but also to ‘custom and usage having the force of law.’” Id. (citations omitted). The evidence demonstrated Dean, by definition, was not the “final policymaker” over Kamensky’s termination. Dean’s reorganization plan had no legal effect without further action by Kleman, and Kleman had the power to reject Dean’s plan. See id. Kamensky, however, asserts Kleman merely “rubber stamped” Dean’s recommendation, and that, absent meaningful review, the County may be held liable. In Quinn, we cited a Fifth Circuit case for the proposition a final policymaker may serve as the conduit of a subordinate’s improper motive if he merely “rubber stamps” the subordinate’s recommendation. Quinn, 330 F.3d at 1327 (citation omitted). In Quinn, however, we noted the plaintiff neither pointed to a cognizable defect in the proceedings, nor provided evidence the reviewing board approved any improper motive. Id. at 1326. More recently, we looked “to 5 whether there is an actual ‘opportunity’ for ‘meaningful’ review” in determining whether a governmental decisionmaker is a final policymaker. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1292 (emphasis added). In Holloman, we found no opportunity for a meaningful review by a school board in light of the practical difficulties of administering a multi-step appellate process. Id. at 1293 (emphasis added). Here, as in Quinn, Kamensky does not point to any cognizable defect in the proceedings, nor does she provide evidence Kleman, or anyone else, approved an improper motive. And, unlike in Holloman, in this case, there was an opportunity for meaningful review. Indeed, Kleman testified that, when he approved Dean’s reorganization plan, he was aware of the reorganization plan and its proposed adverse affects on Kamensky’s position. Thus, Kamensky failed to introduce sufficient evidence to show Dean was the “final policymaker” regarding her termination. See Quinn, 330 F.3d at 1326.