Opinion ID: 219587
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Manaway’s Title VII and ADEA Claims

Text: Manaway’s Title VII and ADEA claims are analyzed under the burdenshifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).2 See Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to an ADEA claim). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first create a presumption of discrimination by making a prima facie case. Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578. This requires the plaintiff to prove that: (1) “she is a member of a protected class”; (2) “she was qualified for her position”; (3) “she suffered an adverse employment action”; and (4) “others similarly situated were more favorably treated.” Willis v. Coca Cola Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2006) (regarding Title VII claims) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 196 (5th Cir. 2003) (same regarding ADEA claims). Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to “produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination,” which “causes the presumption of discrimination to dissipate.” 2 Manaway hints in her brief that there is direct evidence of Smith’s age discrimination against her. Manaway has not properly briefed this argument, and we do not consider it. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(A)(9)(a); see also United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446 (5th Cir. 2010) (“It is not enough to merely mention or allude to a legal theory.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 Case: 10-41331 Document: 00511519355 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/23/2011 No. 10-41331 Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578 (citation omitted). The plaintiff may prove pretext “either through evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is false or unworthy of credence.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). With this framework in mind, we turn to Manaway’s Title VII and ADEA claims. There is no dispute in this case that Manaway has met the first three prongs of proving a prima facie case for her Title VII and ADEA claims. Manaway is a 58-year-old, African-American woman, she was qualified for her position, and she suffered an adverse employment action when she was terminated. There is a dispute, however, over whether Manaway has made a prima facie case of disparate treatment by stating that other Medical Center employees who refused assignments were not terminated. Because the burden for establishing a prima facie case is “very minimal,” see Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and because we decide Manaway’s Title VII and ADEA claims on the basis of pretext, we assume, without deciding, that Manaway has made a prima facie case of discrimination. See Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Science Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 2001). The Medical Center stated that Manaway was terminated because of her insubordination and refusal to carry out patient assignments, which satisfies its burden of providing a “legitimate, non-discriminatory” reason for Manaway’s termination. See Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. Facility Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d 164, 167–68 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The failure of a subordinate to follow the direct order of a supervisor is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging that employee.”). Manaway has failed to carry her burden of proving that there is a genuine dispute over whether the Medical Center’s proffered reason is a pretext for race or age-based animus. 6 Case: 10-41331 Document: 00511519355 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/23/2011 No. 10-41331 Manaway first argues that her termination was pretextual because she did not refuse patient assignments. However, the record undisputedly shows that Manaway was asked by supervisors to carry out patient assignments and that those assignments were not carried out. Manaway’s “assertion of innocence alone does not create a factual issue as to the falsity of [the employer’s] proffered reason for terminating [her].” Jackson, 602 F.3d at 379; see also Evans, 246 F.3d at 355 (stating that employee’s claim cannot survive summary judgment “merely because she disagrees with [her employer’s] characterization of her disciplinary history” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, Manaway does not dispute that she hung up on her supervisor in violation of the Medical Center’s policy and left a counseling session before it was completed. Manaway next argues that the Medical Center’s reason for her termination was pretextual because similarly situated employees were not terminated for similar conduct. See Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578. Proof of disparate treatment requires her to “demonstrate that the misconduct for which she was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by an employee not within her protected class whom the company retained.” Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation, internal alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Manaway points to two other employees who allegedly engaged in similar conduct but were not terminated. Manaway claims that one white employee, Marva Roan, would routinely yell at co-workers and refused assignments. Manaway claims that another white employee, Debra Vanover, would read novels and work on crossword puzzles and also refused assignments. She claims that neither of these employees was reprimanded or fired for her conduct. However, Manaway has provided no evidence, aside from her unsubstantiated assertion, to establish that Vanover or Roan refused assignments. See Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th 7 Case: 10-41331 Document: 00511519355 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/23/2011 No. 10-41331 Cir. 2007) (“[A] party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Nor has she claimed that Smith and the Medical Center’s administrators were, with the exception of Roan’s yelling, aware of Vanover and Roan’s conduct. See Wallace, 271 F.3d at 221 (stating that employees were not similarly situated, in part, because “no one in a supervisory capacity was aware” of the other employee’s actions). Finally, she has not provided any evidence that Vanover or Roan had her track record of refusing counseling for misconduct and insubordination, which the Medical Center’s employees testified as contributing to her termination. See id. (“[T]he conduct at issue is not nearly identical when the difference between the plaintiff’s conduct and that of those alleged to be similarly situated accounts for the difference in treatment[.]”). Accordingly, Manaway has not created a genuine dispute over the Medical Center’s disparate treatment of employees. Finally, Manaway argues that several comments made by Smith prior to Manaway’s termination create a genuine dispute over the reason for her termination.3 First, Manaway claims that Smith threatened to send the Ku Klux Klan to an African-American co-worker’s house. Assuming Smith actually made this statement, it was made one year prior to Manaway’s termination and was not made in the context of Smith’s decision to terminate Manaway. Therefore, it does not demonstrate that Manaway’s termination was the result of racial discrimination. See Jackson, 602 F.3d at 380 (stating that a comment 3 Because Manaway’s evidence of pretext is weak or non-existent, we apply this court’s “stray remarks” doctrine to Smith’s alleged comments. See, e.g., Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying the stray remarks doctrine where “the plaintiff has failed to produce substantial evidence of pretext”). Stray remarks are evidence of discrimination when they are (1) “related to the protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member”; (2) “proximate in time to the complained-of adverse employment decision”; (3) “made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue”; and (4) “related to the employment decision at issue.” Jackson, 602 F.3d at 380 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 8 Case: 10-41331 Document: 00511519355 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/23/2011 No. 10-41331 made one year before adverse employment action and unrelated to employment action does not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext). Next, Manaway claims that Smith made two age-related comments that create a fact issue over whether Manaway’s termination was motivated by age discrimination. Manaway alleges that, shortly before rotating the charge nurse position, Smith stated that she had heard that Manaway was retiring. Manaway also alleges that Smith stated, at a staff meeting, that “she want[ed] some younger people, new ideas, and she’s just a person that like[s] new ideas.” Smith explained that she made this comment because she enjoyed “hiring new nurses who come in with a fresh concept and a new idea.” There is no evidence in the record from which to conclude that either of Smith’s comments were made in connection with Smith’s decision to recommend Manaway for termination. See Patel v. Midland Mem’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 298 F.3d 333, 344 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that comments were “stray remarks,” in part because they did not relate to the adverse employment action). Furthermore, Smith’s comment about Manaway’s retirement was made in June 2007, almost eight months before her termination, and Manaway cannot remember when Smith stated that she liked hiring younger employees with new ideas. Therefore, these comments do not satisfy Manaway’s burden of proving a conflict in substantial evidence regarding the Medical Center’s decision for her termination, and the magistrate judge properly granted summary judgment on Manaway’s Title VII and ADEA claims. See Wallace, 271 F.3d at 222 (“Where comments are vague and remote in time they are insufficient to establish discrimination.” (citation, internal alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted)).