Opinion ID: 1132525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether a pre-divorce will containing provisions inconsistent with a subsequent property settlement agreement in a divorce proceeding is revoked automatically, or by implication.

Text: ¶ 12. We quickly put to rest the issue regarding automatic revocation. In their brief before the Court of Appeals, the heirs-at-law stated that many states have adopted the rule of revocation by divorce, either by statute or case law. However, Mississippi has no such statute, and based on our existing statutes concerning revocation of wills, as well as the current case law, it would be judicially imprudent to consider revocation by divorce. For the same reasons, it would be inappropriate to hold that a pre-divorce will is automatically revoked by a divorce accompanied by a property settlement agreement with provisions inconsistent with the terms of the pre-divorce will. Instead the issue quickly becomes whether a pre-divorce will is impliedly revoked by a subsequent divorce accompanied by a property settlement agreement containing provisions inconsistent with the terms of the pre-divorce will. On this issue, the Court of Appeals correctly points out: Rather than treat that factual situation as an automatic revocation, the Mississippi Supreme Court has simply weighed those facts, along with others deemed relevant by the court, to discern whether there was an implied revocation of the will. Rasco v. Estate of Rasco, 501 So.2d 421, 423 (Miss.1987). Hinders v. Hinders, No.2000-CA-01779-COA, 2002 WL 18272 at (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App. Jan.8, 2002). ¶ 13. Not surprisingly, all parties rely on our decision in Rasco, in support of their respective positions. A recitation of the facts in Rasco is necessary here. Kay Leigh Rasco (Kay) and Richard Rasco (Richard) married. Kay had three children by a previous marriage. In his will dated June 29, 1981, Richard made certain bequests to Kay's three children, but devised the bulk of his estate to Kay, who was also named in the will as executrix. On April 13, 1982, the DeSoto County Chancery Court granted a divorce to Kay and Richard on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and there was also a property agreement. This agreement was to be: a full, final and complete settlement of all their property rights, and ... full and complete settlement of the controversy over the property rights of the parties, and save the right of either party to prosecute his or her suit for complete divorce, this settlement and agreement is and forever after shall be a bar to any suit at law or otherwise for anything growing out of the marriage relation of the parties as well as the property rights of the one against the other. Rasco, 501 So.2d at 422. The terms of the Rascos' property agreement are not important to our discussion here, but there is an interesting twist in Rasco which does not exist in the case sub judice. Richard died on November 24, 1982; however, notwithstanding the divorce and property agreement, from the date of the divorce until the date of Richard's death, Kay and Richard continued to live together, even sleeping in the same bed, and failed to carry out the terms of the property agreement. In finding no intent by Richard to justify an implied revocation of his pre-divorce will, this Court referred to a Tennessee case and stated: In a recent Tennessee case, In Re Estate of Perigen, 653 S.W.2d 717 (Tenn. 1983), the lower court held a will was revoked by implication, due to a subsequent divorce accompanied by a property settlement. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that provisions of the property settlement agreement had not been carried out and that the spouses had cohabitated [sic] until the husband's death. The Tennessee Court ruled: [G]enerally a divorce accompanied by a property settlement agreement which is fully carried out according to its terms should have the effect of revoking a prior will in favor of a former spouse, especially where the parties thereafter sever all ties, .... Where the property settlement agreement is not carried out or even attempted to be implemented, as in the present case, however, we do not think that the rule of the [implied revocation] is necessarily controlling. 653 S.W.2d at 720. Rasco, 501 So.2d at 424. ¶ 14. Armed with this pronouncement from this Court, the heirs-at-law in the case sub judice deduce that when confronted with the divorced parties' severance of all ties and fulfillment of the property agreement, this Court would conversely hold that there was an implied revocation of any pre-divorce will. In fact, in their petition for writ of certiorari before this Court, the heirs-at-law state: When addressing the issue of implied revocation, this Court's decision in Rasco presents three (3) requirements for a finding of implied revocation: (1) a divorce; (2) a property settlement agreement; and (3) a fulfillment of the terms of the property settlement agreement. According to this Court, the presence of these three (3) elements ... should have the effect of revoking a prior will in favor of a former spouse ... Rasco, 501 So.2d at 423-24 (quoting In Re Estate of Perigen, 653 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tenn. 1983))..... The Rasco Court went on to say that implied revocation is clear  especially where the parties sever all ties. Id. (emphasis added). But, as indicated by the word especially, this Court offered the severing of ties not as a required element, but rather an enhancing factor, the absence of which does not preclude a finding of implied revocation. It is apparent from this argument that the heirs-at-law posit that the law in Rasco provides that in a will contest, once there is proof of a divorce, a property settlement agreement, and a fulfillment of the terms of the property settlement agreement, the assured result, as a matter of law, is that there is an implied revocation of the pre-divorce will. However, the heirs-at-law misconstrue our holding in Rasco. ¶ 15. In Rasco, this Court, inter alia, (1) acknowledged that revocation of wills in Mississippi is governed by statute (Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-3); (2) acknowledged that in certain cases the facts may bring about an implied revocation by operation of law; [6] acknowledged that this Court had held that revocation of a will must be accomplished in some competent manner by the testator, or someone acting for him in his presence ...; [7] and, acknowledged that prior pronouncements from this Court held that a divorce with a property settlement agreement would not operate to impliedly revoke a prior will unless the settlement evidenced the testator's intent to do so. [8] Rasco, 501 So.2d at 423. The Rasco Court quoted from McKnight v. McKnight, 267 So.2d 315 (Miss.1972): A reading of the cases from the jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine will reveal that most of the courts hold that implicit in the determination of whether the property settlement shall impliedly revoke the will (at least as to legacies to the divorced spouse) is the question of whether the testator intended that the settlement should operate as a fulfillment of support rights or as an ademption of a prior-created legacy and release by the divorced spouse of all rights in the deceased's estate. 267 So.2d at 317. Rasco, 501 So.2d at 423. Additionally this Court stated in Rasco that it reviewed the Rasco will and settlement agreement in light of the surrounding circumstances and noted that any document presented as a subsequent declaration must reveal by `clear and unequivocable' [sic, unequivocal] evidence, an intention to revoke the will. Id. at 424. This Court further stated: Looking to the facts and circumstances of this case, the terms of the will itself, the divorce decree and the property settlement, and the conduct of the parties, this Court finds no intent to warrant the implied revocation of Rasco's will. Id. at 424 (emphasis added). ¶ 16. The heirs-at-law argue that the severing all ties factor found in Rasco is not an added (fourth) element required to prove implied revocation, but rather an enhancing factor, the absence of which does not preclude a finding of implied revocation. The heirs-at-law further argue that the Court of Appeals erroneously elevated this enhancing factor to the tantamount element required for a finding of implied revocation. ¶ 17. However, the Court of Appeals correctly applied Rasco to the facts in the case sub judice, and the heirs-at-law again misconstrue the pronouncements in Rasco. ¶ 18. While we correctly relied on the Tennessee case of In Re Estate of Perigen in reaching our decision in Rasco, such reliance does not, as the heirs-at-law suggest, bring us to the conclusion that there is an implied revocation of John's will because of fulfillment of the terms of the property settlement agreement and severance of all ties by John and Joy. [9] First of all, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Perigen acknowledged the Tennessee rule that a divorce and property settlement between spouses operated as a matter of law to revoke provisions in a pre-existing will of one spouse in favor of the other was one of judicial fiat, 653 S.W.2d at 719 (citing Rankin v. McDearmon, 38 Tenn. App. 160, 270 S.W.2d 660 (1953), a Tennessee Court of Appeals case), inasmuch as Tennessee has no general statute governing the revocation of wills. A testamentary instrument may be revoked by the testator in various ways, such as destruction, mutilation, or the execution of a later will. See Price v. Price, 37 Tenn.App. 690, 694, 269 S.W.2d 920, 921-22 (1954). Perigen, 653 S.W.2d at 719. ¶ 19. Mississippi has a statute governing revocation of wills. Miss.Code Ann. § 91-5-3 (1994) provides in pertinent part: A devise so made, or any clause thereof, shall not be revocable but by the testator or testatrix destroying, canceling, or obliterating the same, or causing it to be done in his or her presence, or by subsequent will, codicil, or declaration, in writing, made and executed. ¶ 20. In Rasco, we acknowledged that this statute was not an exclusive statement on the ways in which a will could be revoked in this state. 501 So.2d at 423. However, certainly, this statute represents a clear legislative mandate which must be followed in conjunction with our judicially created factors concerning revocation of wills. ¶ 21. We turn to the facts of the case before us today. John and Joy executed their property settlement agreement on August 11, 1995, and they were divorced on August 25, 1995. The property agreement provided, inter alia, that John would pay Joy $5,000 per month in permanent periodic alimony, to be reduced to $2,500 per month if Joy re-married; that if John or his estate sold any of the McDonald's franchises, Joy would receive no sum from the sale of the Pearl franchise, $75,000 upon the sale of the Brandon franchise, and $75,000 upon the sale of the Flowood franchise; that John and Joy would each receive one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of the marital domicile, and would be responsible for their respective federal and state income taxes if a replacement residence were not purchased by either; that there was a confirmation of a satisfactory division of household goods and furnishings; that John would cause Joy to remain as an insured under a health insurance policy by meeting certain conditions; that John would keep in force a $50,000 life insurance policy with Joy has the named beneficiary; that John would transfer to Joy, free and clear of all liens, the Chevrolet Suburban being driven by her; that Joy would relinquish any claim to John's Mercedes SEL Sports coupe; that Joy would transfer to John any interest or title she had in a Sea Ray boat, with John assuming all liability; that John would transfer to Joy any interest he had in Joy's horse and horse trailer; that John and Joy would each own their respective IRA accounts, disclaiming any interest in the other's IRA account; that John would indemnify Joy from any liability on any McDonald's franchise or lease agreements; that John would receive the monthly payments on a promissory note executed by two individuals, but with John and Joy equally dividing the balloon payment or any early re-payment of the promissory note; that John would pay Joy's attorneys' fees incurred concerning the divorce and property agreement; and, that John would be responsible for any additional federal or state income taxes imposed against John and Joy as a result of subsequent audits by the IRS or the State Tax Commission. ¶ 22. There is no dispute that John basically complied with the property agreement, with the exception of the life insurance policy, which John assigned to the bank as collateral when he was refinancing the McDonald's restaurants. On the other hand, Joy admits that notwithstanding the provisions of the property agreement concerning the IRA accounts, she did in fact, shortly after John's death, withdraw $13,000 from John's IRA account (she was still the named beneficiary), and Joy also withdrew $22,000 from John's checking account (again, Joy was still listed also on that account). ¶ 23. After the divorce, John and Joy never thereafter lived together, and in fact, after the divorce, both John and Joy commenced long-term live-in relationships with others. ¶ 24. It is obvious that in the case of John and Joy, there was (1) a divorce (2) a property settlement agreement, and (3) a fulfillment of the terms of the property settlement agreement. Also, John and Joy never lived together after the divorce. Accordingly, the heirs-at-law would have us stop here and declare an implied revocation of John's pre-divorce will, and further declare that John, therefore, died intestate thereby meaning that John's heirs-at-law would inherit John's estate, with Joy being limited to the provisions of the property agreement concerning what she would receive. In fact, the heirs-atlaw state that Joy is precluded by the terms of the property agreement from receiving anything other than what is provided for in the property agreement, based on the following provisions in the property agreement: