Opinion ID: 204752
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is Wildflower Works a painting or sculpture?

Text: The district court held that Wildflower Works was both a painting and a sculpture but was insufficiently original to qualify for copyright. Alternatively, the court concluded that it was site-specific art and held that all site-specific art is implicitly excluded from VARA. Other argumentsin particular, whether Wildflower Works satisfies additional threshold requirements for copyright and whether VARA's public-presentation or building exceptions appliedwere not reached. On appeal Kelley contests the district court's conclusions regarding originality and site-specific art. The Park District defends these holdings and also reiterates the other arguments it made in the district court, except one: The Park District has not challenged the district court's conclusion that Wildflower Works is a painting and a sculpture. This is an astonishing omission. VARA's definition of work of visual art operates to narrow and focus the statute's coverage; only a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, or an exhibition photograph will qualify. These terms are not further defined, but the overall structure of the statutory scheme clearly illuminates the limiting effect of this definition. Copyright's broad general coverage extends to original works of authorship, and this includes pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). The use of the adjectives pictorial and sculptural suggests flexibility and breadth in application. In contrast VARA uses the specific nouns painting and sculpture. To qualify for moral-rights protection under VARA, Wildflower Works cannot just be pictorial or sculptural in some aspect or effect, it must actually be a painting or a sculpture. Not metaphorically or by analogy, but really. That Kelley considered the garden to be both a painting and a sculptureonly rendered in living materialis not dispositive. He also characterized it as an experiment in environmental theory, telling a reporter he was trying to figure out the economic and ecological impact of introducing wildflowers into cities. In promoting Wildflower Works, Kelley variously described the project as a living wildflower painting, a study on wildflower landscape and management, and a new vegetative management system that beautifies [the] landscape economically with low-maintenance wildflowers. Kelley's expert, a professor of art history, reinforced his view that Wildflower Works was both a painting and a sculpture, but the district court largely disregarded her testimony as unhelpful. [6] Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at . For its part the Park District initially marketed Wildflower Works as living art, but this adds little to the analysis. VARA plainly uses the terms painting and sculpture as words of limitation. Even assuming a generous stance on what qualifies, see 5 PATRY § 16:7 (suggesting a liberal attitude toward what may be considered a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture), the terms cannot be read coextensively with the broader categories of pictorial and sculptural works that are generally eligible for copyright under § 102(a)(5). If a living garden like Wildflower Works really counts as both a painting and a sculpture, then these terms do no limiting work at all. The district judge worried about taking too literalist an approach to determining whether a given object qualifies as a sculpture or painting. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at . His concern was the tension between the law and the evolution of ideas in modern or avant garden art; the former requires legislatures to taxonomize artistic creations, whereas the latter is occupied with expanding the definition of what we accept to be art. Id. We agree with this important insight. But there's a big difference between avoiding a literalistic approach and embracing one that is infinitely malleable. The judge appears to have come down too close to the latter extreme. [7] In short, this case raises serious questions about the meaning and application of VARA's definition of qualifying works of visual artquestions with potentially decisive consequences for this and other moral-rights claims. But the Park District has not challenged this aspect of the district court's decision, so we move directly to the question of copyrightability, which is actually where the analysis should start in the first place.