Opinion ID: 424137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Count V

Text: 34 Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the government's proof as to his conviction under Count V of the indictment. Count V charged Rendaro with a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 474 based on the sample $10 counterfeit note he gave to Agent McMillan on October 21, 1981. Section 474, in seven different paragraphs, proscribes possession of equipment necessary to a counterfeiting operation or of counterfeit obligations themselves with intent to sell or otherwise use. The fifth paragraph, on which Rendaro's Count V indictment was based, states that persons in violation of Sec. 474 shall include: 35 Whoever has in his possession or custody, except under authority from the Secretary of the Treasury or other proper officer, any obligation or other security made or executed, in whole or in part, after the similitude of any obligation or other security issued under the authority of the United States, with intent to sell or otherwise use the same. 36 Rendaro contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that the counterfeit note he gave to McMillan was made or executed, in whole or in part, after the similitude of any obligation or other security of the United States and insufficient to prove the requisite intent. 37 The standard by which this court is to judge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction was stated in United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. Unit B) (en banc), 10 affirmed on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 638 (1983): 38 It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence. 39 Id. at 549 (footnote omitted). In assessing whether this standard is met we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Henderson, 693 F.2d 1028, 1030 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 40 The basis of appellant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the counterfeit note in question was made in the similitude of an obligation of the United States is that, prior to trial, the note had been subjected to a fingerprint analysis procedure that gave the note a purplish hue, which it did not have at the time it was given to McMillan by Rendaro. This claim is devoid of merit. 41 The standard to adjudge the issue of similitude under Sec. 474 is whether the fraudulent obligation bears such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest. United States v. Turner, 586 F.2d 395, 397 & n. 6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 926, 99 S.Ct. 1258, 59 L.Ed.2d 480 (1978). 42 At trial, contemporaneously with the admission of the note in evidence, the government elicited testimony from a government fingerprint expert, and thereafter from Special Agent Keene to whom McMillan had given the note, that the purplish hue was absent when the bill initially was received. Appellant would have us rule that admission of this testimony and any reliance thereon by the jury somehow usurped the jury's role as the ultimate finder of fact on the similitude question. 43 The presentation of evidence to the jury is a far cry from usurpation of the jury's role. The note and the testimony were introduced to provide a basis for the jury to decide whether or not the note sufficiently resembled an obligation of the United States. Appellant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and indeed was successful in bringing out what he has characterized as certain inconsistencies in the fingerprint expert's testimony as to the original color of the note. Any such inconsistencies properly were before the jury to take into account in assessing whether the note was a similitude of an obligation of the United States. Such inconsistencies go to the weight, and not the admissibility, of the evidence. Based on this evidence, the jury concluded that the note qualified as a similitude of an obligation of the United States. 44 The note in question, 11 especially in view of the testimony explaining the absence of the purplish hue overlying it, is far too similar to an authentic note for us to conclude that the jury could not have found that it satisfied the similitude standard of United States v. Turner, supra. 12 Accordingly we find that there was sufficient evidence on the similitude issue. 45 As to the sufficiency of the evidence of intent under Sec. 474, appellant argues that even though Sec. 474 explicitly requires only intent to sell or otherwise use, the meaning of this section necessarily implies an intent to defraud or pass the bills as genuine as is expressly required under 18 U.S.C. Secs. 472 and 473, respectively. He claims the government failed to prove that he had any intent to defraud in connection with the $10 note given to McMillan. He contends the note was passed as a mere sample and that all parties knew it was not to be used as genuine in the stream of commerce. 46 We disagree with appellant that the intent standard of Sec. 474 necessarily implies an intent to defraud or an intent to pass as genuine. Congress explicitly stated that an intent to sell or otherwise use  is the requirement. If Congress intended an intent to defraud or an intent to pass as genuine standard it would have said so explicitly, as in the two sections immediately preceding Sec. 474. See 18 U.S.C. Secs. 472, 473. 47 Here the evidence is undisputed that Rendaro intended to use the note to induce appellant to purchase large quantities of similar notes. 13 Such intent to use for unlawful purposes clearly falls within the scope of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 474 and properly may be proscribed by Congress. Accordingly we affirm the conviction on Count V.