Opinion ID: 2533766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the district court err in finding mckay in privity with the state of idaho and thus bound by the 1979 judgment?

Text: McKay, the respondent herein, asserts lack of privity as an additional issue on appeal and as an alternative argument to affirm the judgment. McKay seeks reversal of the district court's conclusion that McKay was bound by the 1979 Judgment. Therefore we begin by addressing McKay's challenge to the district court's finding of privity, which was an assumption made by the district court to began its analysis under the 1979 judgment. We note there is no question that the Project is bound by the 1979 judgment. We first must determine whether McKay was required to bring a cross-appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 15 or whether the issue of privity is properly raised as an additional issue on appeal. Idaho Appellate Rule 15 states: Right to cross-appeal. After an appeal has been filed, a timely cross-appeal may be filed from any interlocutory or final judgment, order or decree. If no affirmative relief is sought by way of reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment, order or decree, an issue may be presented by the respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4) without filing a cross-appeal. Thus, I.A.R. 15 requires a respondent to file a cross-appeal if affirmative relief by way of reversal, vacation or modification is sought. Miller v. Board of Trustees, 132 Idaho 244, 247-48, 970 P.2d 512, 515-16 (1998). The district court's judgment provides as follows: Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated herein it is the judgment of the Court that: (1) Plaintiffs, McKay, will be compensated for money damages in the amount of $55,939.10; and (2) A permanent injunction will issue providing as follows: Defendant may not flood the servient estate, presently leased by Plaintiffs, in filling Hubbard Reservoir except in the good faith pursuit of legitimate irrigation goals. These goals include short-term storage of water (typically less than one week up to 2,665 feet), storage of water in the event of a break in the canal system or for repair of the canal system, or for flood control on the Boise River. The Court recognizes that there may be other irrigation needs presented in the future, but the historic and present needs of the irrigation system are served by the above-listed irrigation operations. McKay is not seeking reversal of the district court's judgment. There is no mention in the district court's judgment of the 1979 judgment. The judgment is not based upon the district court's finding of fact that McKay is bound by the 1979 judgment. The 1979 judgment included the following provision: 13. That the Boise Project Board of Control, may, at any time and without any violation of this Order and without any requirement as to notice, except as hereinabove set forth utilize the reservoir below the level of 2771.00, as measured on the staff gauge, for any routine irrigation operations it may desire. The district court held that the Project's filling of the reservoir was not done as part of routine irrigation operations and it was therefore not authorized by the 1979 judgment. The district court's judgment was based upon the Project simply exercising its easement in an unreasonable manner. The district court stated: It is the finding the Court that the [Project] had a duty to exercise the easement in a reasonable manner. The Court further finds that the actions of the [Project] in filling Hubbard Reservoir in the manner it did in the spring of 1997 were not reasonable and constituted a breach of their duty. The lack of reasonableness was based upon two factors: the high level of water loss through seepage in Hubbard Reservoir and the availability of water storage in Lake Lowell. The district court summarized its basis for finding liability as follows: The Court finds that the [Project] had a duty to McKay's servient estate. That duty was clearly breached when water was stored upon the lands farmed by the McKays in violation of the 1979 Stipulation and Order and without any reasonable justification. The district court did not base its finding of liability upon the 1979 judgment. Rather, it found that the Project's conduct was not authorized by that judgment because its conduct in filling the Hubbard Reservoir did not constitute routine irrigation operations. In summary as to the issue of the application of I.A.R. 15, McKay is not seeking to reverse or vacate the judgment, nor is McKay seeking a reversal of finding upon which the judgment is based. As I.A.R. 15 presents no bar to this Court considering the issue of privity, we now consider whether McKay was in privity with the State of Idaho and thus bound by the 1979 judgment. Concerning McKay, the trial court found: [The] McKays argue that they were not bound by Judge Smith's earlier decisions because they were not privy to the action. The Court will find that the McKays' predecessors in interest were clearly privy to the litigation that occurred in the 1970s. This was property that at the time was owned by the State of Idaho. The State was directly involved in the litigation and Ms. Fleming [now Sterling], who was purchasing land from the State at the time, was privy of the State of Idaho and is bound by the 1979 stipulation. The district court's finding that McKay was bound by the 1979 judgment is clearly erroneous. The 1979 judgment arises out of a lawsuit started in 1976 between the State of Idaho and the Project. Sterling and Fleming entered into a real estate contract in 1967 to purchase the land. Obviously, the purchase occurred prior to the litigation between the State of Idaho and the Project. Neither Sterling nor Fleming was a party to the 1976 lawsuit and thus they were not bound by the 1979 judgment. Therefore, McKay as Sterling's tenant is also not bound by the 1979 judgment. We find that the district court erred in finding McKay in privity with the State of Idaho.