Opinion ID: 168528
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Mr. Bayless's testimony at the guilt stage

Text: 57 Mr. Short argues that the trial court's exclusion of Mr. Bayless's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. As the OCCA noted, Oklahoma law permits exclusion of evidence for failure to comply with discovery rules. Under Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 2002(D), [a]ll issues relating to discovery, except as otherwise provided, will be completed at least ten (10) days prior to trial. The court may specify the time, place and manner of making the discovery and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. Specifically, under Oklahoma law: 58 If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 59 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 2002(E)(2) (emphasis added); see e.g., Wilkerson v. Dist. Court of McIntosh County, 839 P.2d 659, 661 (Okla.Crim.App. 1992). Oklahoma's Code gives trial courts discretion to specify the time, place, and manner of complying with discovery requirements. Rojem v. State, 130 P.3d 287, 297 (Okla.Crim.App. 2006). However, [a]lthough the criminal discovery code provides for exclusion of evidence as a sanction for non-compliance, this Court has found in several capital cases that the exclusion of a defense witness was too severe a sanction. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 60 Under the circumstances here, the OCCA agreed that preclusion of Mr. Bayless's testimony was an appropriate sanction. 61 Based upon the record before us, we are unable to determine that the preclusion of Bayless's testimony was not an appropriate sanction. The preliminary hearing in this case was held approximately one year and a half prior to trial. Brown testified at the preliminary hearing and gave essentially the same testimony as he did at trial. [Mr. Short] has failed to explain why he did not notify the State about Bayless's testimony until the start of trial. 62 Further, Bayless was not a material witness. He was not a party to the conversations between Brown and [Mr. Short]. Therefore, he could not testify as to the truthfulness of Brown's testimony regarding [Mr. Short's] confession. At most, Bayless could impeach Brown only as to the testimony regarding who drew the pictures on the jail cell wall. Bayless was not a witness to the actual crime and therefore could not have refuted the testimony of the eyewitnesses. Because Bayless was not a material witness, and as [Mr. Short] has failed to establish that he was substantially prejudiced by the exclusion of the testimony, we find no error in the trial court's ruling. 63 Short, 980 P.2d at 1093-94 (emphasis added). In addition, the OCCA concluded that 64 under usual trial proceedings, rebuttal is an opportunity for the State to present witnesses, for whom no notice is required, to rebut the defense case-in-chief. The defense does not present rebuttal witnesses until surrebuttal. Bayless's testimony does not qualify as surrebuttal evidence. 65 Id. at 1094. Because Mr. Bayless was not a material witness, and because Mr. Short could not establish that he was substantially prejudiced by the exclusion of the testimony, the OCCA found no error in the trial court's ruling. Id. Because the OCCA applied the correct governing legal principle to Mr. Short's case, we review its ruling under the highly circumscribed constrictions of AEDPA. 66
67 The record indicates that Wesley Gibson first represented Mr. Short. Some time after the preliminary hearing (which took place on August 23 and September 5, 1995), Mr. Gibson suffered a stroke and was unable to continue as Mr. Short's attorney. Jim Rowan was assigned to the case and served as Mr. Short's counsel at trial. The record does not reveal exactly when Mr. Rowan began representing Mr. Short. Apparently, no entry of appearance was filed. The first indication of Mr. Rowan's involvement appears on a Petition for Order filed September 19, 1996, a little over six months before the trial. See Aplt's Br. at 32 n. 12 (referencing state postconviction proceedings, filed Apr. 29, 1998). 68
69 The Sixth Amendment does not confer an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410, 108 S.Ct. 646. The defendant's right to compulsory process is itself designed to vindicate the principle that the `ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.' Id. at 411, 108 S.Ct. 646 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709, 94 S.Ct. 3090). However, few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense and the preclusion of material defense witnesses from testifying is the severest sanction for discovery violations. Wilkerson, 839 P.2d at 661 (citing Taylor, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S.Ct. 646). 70 The Taylor Court noted that there is not a comprehensive set of standards to guide the exercise of discretion in every possible case. 484 U.S. at 414, 108 S.Ct. 646. However, paramount considerations are [t]he integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process. Id. at 414-15, 108 S.Ct. 646 (emphasis added). Further, if the delay was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, exclusion would be entirely consistent with the purposes of the Compulsory Process Clause. Id. at 415, 108 S.Ct. 646 (emphasis added). 71 In applying Supreme Court precedent to compulsory process challenges to a trial court's exclusion of evidence, this court has undertaken a three-part inquiry. See e.g., United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2004); Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 1997). First, we examine whether the excluded testimony was relevant. If so, we ask whether the state's interest in excluding the evidence outweighed [the defendant's] interest in its admittance. Richmond, 122 F.3d at 872. Finally, we consider whether the excluded testimony was material, whether the excluded testimony was of such an exculpatory nature that its exclusion affected the trial's outcome. Id. These three factors merely guide the district court and do not dictate the bounds of the court's discretion. United States v. Russell, 109 F.3d 1503, 1511 (10th Cir. 1997). 72
73 In determining whether the OCCA unreasonably applied federal law in rejecting Mr. Short's compulsory process claim, we must decide whether the OCCA's decision was unreasonable, not whether it was correct. See Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1045 (10th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing between these two inquiries); Watley v. Williams, 218 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2000) (observing that [r]easonable minds may disagree about the appropriateness of excluding an alibi witness whom Petitioner's counsel did not willfully omit, but under AEDPA we are limited to applying existing Supreme Court precedent and holding that the New Mexico Court of Appeals reasonably applied Taylor v. Illinois ). 74
75 Under Oklahoma law, [r]elevant evidence is that which has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2401; see Phillips v. State, 989 P.2d 1017, 1030 (Okla.Crim.App. 1999) (applying the relevance standard). In order to determine whether Mr. Bayless's testimony would have been relevant, we must first consider the testimony of Mr. Brown—the witness whose testimony defense counsel sought to impeach through Mr. Bayless. The OCCA held that the photographs of the holding cell, including the drawings and inscriptions, introduced during the testimony of Detective Easley, were properly admitted. The court's determination of the photographs' relevance was based exclusively upon Mr. Brown's testimony. According to the OCCA, the drawings corroborated Mr. Brown's testimony regarding Mr. Short's authorship of the inscriptions. Mr. Brown also testified that he observed Mr. Short draw sexually explicit pictures of a woman on the cell's walls. Mr. Brown also observed Mr. Short write die, Brenda G, and Brenda G is a slut, and burn Brenda G next to the pictures. Rec. vol. IV, at 171-72. The OCCA noted that the fact that [Mr. Short] wrote the derogatory comments next to the pictures makes it more probable that [Mr. Short] drew the pictures. 980 P.2d at 1095. Mr. Brown's testimony regarding the inscriptions supported the State's contention that Mr. Short intended to start the fire. 76 In addition, Mr. Brown testified to conversations he had with Mr. Short regarding the means of committing the crime and Mr. Short's motive. According to Mr. Brown, Mr. Short confided that, after discovering Brenda having sexual intercourse with Mr. Hines, he filled a Coke bottle with gasoline and threw it into the apartment. Mr. Brown also testified that Mr. Short's nickname in the cell was Fireball and that Mr. Short had asked him if he knew whether fingerprints could be pulled off a bottle if he had tape on his fingers. 77 The prosecution twice referred to Mr. Short's confession to Mr. Brown during its first-stage closing. Rec. vol. V, at 95, 99. Despite the State's current and contrary characterization of Mr. Brown's testimony as peripheral, Aple's Br. at 51, Mr. Brown's testimony was indeed relevant to the prosecution because it served as the only testimony from an unrelated party directly connecting Mr. Short to the crime. Further, as the record reflects, District Attorney Robert Macy has testified that he does not like to use [jailhouse informants] unless they can fulfill a critical element that you can't fill in any other way. . . . I just think if you can make your case without using an informant, you're better off. Depo. of Robert Macy, May 13, 1999, at 81 App. Ex. J. (Case. No. CIV-96-882, Romano v. Ward ). 78 Mr. Bayless's proffered testimony, if true and credible, was similarly relevant. It would have served to impeach Mr. Brown's testimony regarding who wrote the derogatory comments and threats about Brenda Gardner on the cell walls in addition to creating doubts as to who drew the pictures. We thus proceed to the second part of the compulsory process inquiry, balancing the state's interest in excluding the evidence with [Mr. Short's] interest in its admittance. Richmond, 122 F.3d at 872. 79
80 It is undisputed that the State received no notice of Mr. Bayless's status as a witness until the first day of trial. We agree that, had Mr. Bayless been allowed to testify at trial, defense counsel's failure to abide by Oklahoma's discovery code would have prejudiced the State to some extent: the prosecutor would have had only a very limited time to investigate and prepare for cross-examination. Moreover, Mr. Short has failed to explain the delay in notifying the State. Mr. Brown—the witness whose testimony Mr. Bayless would have impeached—testified at the preliminary hearing, which took place nearly eighteen months before the trial began. 81 Nevertheless, the exclusion of relevant, probative, and otherwise admissible evidence is an extreme sanction that should be used only when justified by some overriding policy consideration. United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1981); see also 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 11-4.7(a) (2d ed. 1980) (The exclusion sanction is not recommended because its results are capricious.). At trial, defense counsel contended that the appropriate remedy would be to grant the State the needed time to talk to Mr. Bayless, or to grant a recess. The trial court did not address these options, but rejected them implicitly: 82 we have our discovery rules which . . . should have some meaning. It's to prevent both sides from trial by ambush. . . . Sometimes there are exceptions where—for reasons that could not be avoided, some witness could not be secured in time to provide the other side that witness's name. I don't believe that's the case here. 83 Rec. vol. IV, at 199. 84 However, prejudice . . . could [have been] minimized by granting a continuance. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413, 108 S.Ct. 646; see United States v. Golyansky, 291 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002) (It would be a rare case where, absent bad faith, a district court should exclude evidence rather than continue the proceedings.); United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999) (suggesting lesser sanctions for the violation of a discovery order, such as censuring the government attorney); Rojem, 130 P.3d at 297 (Where the discovery violation is not willful, blatant or calculated gamesmanship, alternative sanctions are adequate and appropriate.). The state had already presented its case-in-chief, as Mr. Brown was its final witness, so a recess would not have created an unnatural break in its presentation of evidence, although a recess would have likely required holding the jury over during the delay. (Indeed, we note that the trial court did grant a continuance on the following day, Friday April 11, 1997, until Tuesday April 15, 1997, because defense expert Ms. Eddings was unavailable.) 85 In addition, the State's interest in the exclusion of Mr. Bayless's testimony is mitigated by the absence of evidence that Mr. Short or his counsel acted in bad faith. While we do not hold that bad faith is an absolute condition to exclusion, we agree with those circuits that have treated bad faith as an important factor but not a prerequisite to exclusion. United States v. Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 911 (D.C.Cir. 1992) (citing Eckert v. Tansy, 936 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1991) and Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 29-32 (1st Cir. 1988)); see Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417, n. 23, 108 S.Ct. 646 (noting Illinois state courts' use of the preclusion sanction in the exceptional case where the uncooperative party demonstrates a deliberate contumacious or unwarranted disregard of the court's authority) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there was no finding of counsel's bad faith, and no evidence of Mr. Short's complicity in the discovery violation. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417, 108 S.Ct. 646 (Whenever a lawyer makes use of the sword provided by the Compulsory Process Clause, there is some risk that he may wound his own client.) (footnote omitted); id. at 433, 108 S.Ct. 646 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that [t]he threat of disciplinary proceedings, fines, or imprisonment will likely influence attorney behavior to a far greater extent than the rather indirect penalty threatened by evidentiary exclusion). 86 As to Mr. Short's interest in offering testimony from Mr. Bayless, the fact that he was facing the death penalty is very significant. See Morgan v. Dist. Court of Woodward County, 831 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okla.Crim.App. 1992) (stating it would be inappropriate to exclude defense witnesses from testifying in a death penalty case . . . when the actions of defense counsel, and not the defendant[], have prevented compliance with the Trial Court's order); Rojem, 130 P.3d at 297 (same); Allen v. State, 944 P.2d 934, 937 (Okla.Crim.App. 1997) (exclusion too severe a sanction); Wisdom v. State, 918 P.2d 384, 396 (Okla. Crim.App. 1996) (concluding that the improper exclusion of a defense witness warranted re-sentencing); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (`Our duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case.'). Moreover, unlike other cases in which we have upheld the exclusion of evidence, we cannot say that Mr. Bayless's testimony would have been only marginally relevant. Richmond, 122 F.3d at 874; see also Wooten, 377 F.3d at 1141 (observing that an exhibit that was admitted into evidence accomplished as much (and perhaps more) for [the defendant] than if he had been permitted to call [the excluded witness] to the stand). 87 In light of these competing considerations, we conclude that the interests of the State and Mr. Short are at least in equipoise. We therefore proceed to examine the OCCA's conclusion that Mr. Bayless's testimony was not material. 88
89 Under the standard promulgated by the Supreme Court, evidence is material only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 874, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982); see also Richmond, 122 F.3d at 872 (Evidence is material if its suppression might have affected the trial's outcome.). A reasonable likelihood or reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). What might be considered insignificant evidence in a strong case might suffice to disturb an already questionable verdict. United States v. Robinson, 39 F.3d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir. 1994). 90 Here, Mr. Short proffered Mr. Bayless as an impeachment witness-one who could rebut Mr. Brown's testimony that Mr. Short wrote the derogatory comments and threats about Brenda Gardner on the walls of the holding cell. Courts have found impeachment evidence material if the witness whose testimony is attacked supplied the only evidence linking the defendant[] to the crime, or where the likely impact on the witness's credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution's case. United States v. Wong, 78 F.3d 73, 79 (2nd Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, when potential impeachment evidence merely constitutes an additional basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable, courts have concluded that the evidence is not material. Id. 91 Here, as the OCCA reasoned, Mr. Brown's testimony about Mr. Short's statements and conduct in the holding cell was by no means the only evidence linking him to the firebombing of Brenda Gardner's apartment and the murder of Mr. Yamamoto. Marjorie Long, Brenda Gardner, Janet Gardner, and Keith Partain testified that Mr. Short made threatening remarks toward Brenda and her family in the weeks before the murder. Brenda Gardner testified that she saw Mr. Short standing outside her apartment at 4:00 a.m. on the day of the murder. Additionally, the prosecution introduced evidence that Mr. Short's coat and sneakers had tested positive for gasoline and that a homicide detective had discovered lighter fluid in Mr. Short's motel room. 92 Moreover, even though Mr. Short was not able to offer testimony from Mr. Bayless to impeach Mr. Brown, he was able to challenge Mr. Brown's credibility in other ways. In particular, Mr. Short's attorney elicited through cross-examination that Mr. Brown was addicted to cocaine and had been arrested for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Mr. Brown admitted that he believed he faced a potential sentence of five to twenty-five years' imprisonment and that he negotiated a deal with the government for a deferred sentence in exchange for his testimony against Mr. Short. In closing argument, Mr. Short's attorney maintained that Mr. Brown was not credible and had marketed information to preserve [himself]. Rec. vol. V, at 110. Finally, he noted that Mr. Brown's description of Mr. Short's statement about the bombing was inconsistent with the other evidence offered by the State. According to Mr. Brown, Mr. Short said that he had opened the patio door and thrown the firebomb inside the apartment; other evidence indicated that the firebomb had crashed through the patio door. 93 Thus, evidence apart from Mr. Brown's testimony implicated Mr. Short in the murder. See Young v. Workman, 383 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus noting [g]iven the other evidence introduced at trial, we are not persuaded the [excluded] evidence . . . would be anything more than cumulative). Moreover, Mr. Short was able to challenge Mr. Brown's credibility by means other than the proffered testimony of Mr. Bayless. Accordingly, we cannot say that the OCCA unreasonably applied federal law by concluding that Mr. Bayless's testimony was not material: to find, as the OCCA implicitly did, that there was not a reasonable likelihood that [Mr. Bayless's] testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact, Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 874, 102 S.Ct. 3440, may have been a debatable proposition, see Watley, 218 F.3d at 1159 (noting that reasonable minds could disagree about the exclusion of an alibi witness); however, it was not an unreasonable one. 94
95 [T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Here, the exclusion of Mr. Bayless's testimony deprived the jury of relevant evidence. Nevertheless, given our deferential review under AEDPA, we cannot say that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established federal law. 96