Opinion ID: 2041888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sex discriminationburden of proof.

Text: Code § 105A.7, the Iowa Civil Rights Act, thus prohibits unfair or discriminatory employment practices: 1. It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any : a. Person to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any applicant for employment or any employee because of the race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or religion of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation.   . (emphasis supplied). See also 14 C.J.S. Civil Rights Supplement § 8. Noticeably, there exists an exception for cases of sex discrimination where it is shown the classification resulting in different treatment for women is premised upon peculiarities of the occupation. Such is akin to the bona fide occupational qualification exception present in the federal fair employment legislation: (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer  (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;   . Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-2(a)(1). [Hereafter Title VII]. (emphasis supplied). (e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees    on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise,   . Section 703(e), 42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-2(e) of the Act. (emphasis supplied). Code § 105A.9(11) provides, in relevant part: Complainant shall bear the burden of proving the allegations in his complaint. See Wilson-Sinclair Company v. Griggs, 211 N.W.2d 133, 139 (Iowa 1973). This language clearly refers to the burden regarding existence of actual discrimination. But that does not mean complainant must additionally prove the discrimination, once established, is not based upon the nature of the occupation. Federal courts have consistently held: In order to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exemption an employer has the burden of proving he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved. Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 374 F.Supp. 238, 244-245 (N.D.Ga.1973). [O]nce the plaintiff has established a prima facie case    the burden is on the employer to sufficiently explain the disparity in hiring   . Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 372 F.Supp. 1146, 1152 (W.D.Pa.1974). See also McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company, 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969); Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Telephone & Tel. Co., 303 F.Supp. 754, 757 (M.D.Ala.1969). In effectuation of those purposes upon which our fair employment legislation is predicated, this court hereby adopts the foregoing principles. See Wilson-Sinclair Company v. Griggs, 211 N.W.2d at 140-142; Northern Natural Gas Company v. Forst, 205 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Iowa 1973); Code § 105A.11. We shall also look for guidance to those decisions wherein similar pregnancy-related regulations were tested against both the equal protection clause and fair employment legislation. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 372 F.Supp. at 1159-1160. See also Communications Wkrs., etc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., etc., 379 F.Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y.1974). See generally Hubbard v. State, 163 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Iowa 1969).