Opinion ID: 1704799
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: application of the strickland standard

Text: Having confirmed that the Strickland standard is the appropriate standard to analyze a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to timely act to disqualify the trial judge, we now apply the standard to the facts of this case. First, to establish the deficiency prong of Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We find that counsel's failure to timely file the motion to disqualify constituted deficient performance. The First District expressly held in its initial opinion that the motion to disqualify was facially sufficient and that the judge would have been legally required to disqualify himself had the motion been timely filed. Thompson I, 764 So.2d at 631. Florida law supports the district court's previous conclusion. The Florida Rules of Judicial Administration provide for the disqualification of a judge on the ground that the party fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(d)(1) (formerly Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(d)(1)). Furthermore, the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify depends on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. Livingston, 441 So.2d at 1087. In particular, judicial comments revealing a determination to rule a particular way prior to hearing any evidence or argument have been found to be sufficient grounds for disqualification. See Benson v. Tharpe, 685 So.2d 1363, 1364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). A trial judge's announced intention before a scheduled hearing to make a specific ruling, regardless of any evidence or argument to the contrary, is the paradigm of judicial bias and prejudice. Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 633 So.2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (granting a writ of prohibition where the trial court told defense counsel before a scheduled resentencing hearing that he would not listen to any mitigation evidence and intended to resentence the defendant to the maximum period allowed under the guidelines). The relevant rules require a motion to disqualify to be filed within ten days of learning of the facts constituting the grounds for disqualification. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(e) (formerly Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(e)). Here there is no dispute that the motion was filed late, beyond the time required by the rule. Furthermore, the testimony of Thompson's trial counsel at the postconviction evidentiary hearing suggests that the untimely filing was not a strategic decision. Cf. Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000) ([S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. (citing Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 223 (Fla.1998); State v. Bolender, 503 So.2d 1247, 1250 (Fla.1987))). At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that he had no recollection why the motion was untimely. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Thompson has demonstrated deficient performance. Next, however, under Strickland, Thompson must also show that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.). To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. In considering this issue, we reject the State's claim, and the First District's apparent holding, that Strickland requires a showing that the actual outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel's error. Rather, we have repeatedly held, consistent with the United States Supreme Court's explanation of the prejudice standard in Strickland, that this standard requires a demonstration that the result of the proceeding has been rendered unreliable, and our confidence in the outcome of a proceeding has been undermined by counsel's deficiency. See, e.g., Barnhill v. State, 971 So.2d 106, 109-10 (Fla.2007); Philmore v. State, 937 So.2d 578, 583 (Fla. 2006); Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 31-32 (Fla.2005); State v. Davis, 872 So.2d 250, 253 (Fla.2004); Davis v. State, 875 So.2d 359, 365 (Fla.2003); Gudinas v. State, 816 So.2d 1095, 1101 (Fla.2002); Valle v. State, 778 So.2d 960, 965-66 (Fla. 2001); State v. Riechmann, 777 So.2d 342, 350 (Fla.2000). [2] We find that Thompson has demonstrated the requisite prejudice. Thompson relies on the statements made by the judge at the hearing on counsel's motion to withdraw: With a first degree punishable by life, I don't think we need to be worrying about the guidelines; and If he's convicted . . . he will be in prison for the rest of his life. . . . He also relies on the fact that the same trial judge later imposed departure sentences of life imprisonment and life probation on counts I and II, as confirmation that the trial judge had predetermined the life sentence before hearing any evidence. We agree that the statements made by the judge in Thompson's case sufficiently evince judicial bias and predisposition so as to undermine confidence in the eventual sentence imposed. However, we reject Thompson's claim that we should also set aside his convictions, which were predicated upon a jury's determination of his guilt. While that might have been the outcome if the issue of disqualification had been properly preserved and resolved on direct appeal, we do not apply the same standard when considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel in postconviction proceedings. We find nothing in the record to undermine our confidence in the jury's determination of guilt. We reach a different conclusion, however, as to the imposition of sentence by the trial judge. Except for the limited advisory role played by jurors in capital proceedings, trial judges have virtually absolute control and exclusive discretionary authority in determining a defendant's sentence under the controlling statutory guidelines. Hence, it is absolutely essential that a judge be and remain impartial prior to the commencement of sentencing proceedings when the positions of the respective parties will be presented and considered by the court. See Benson, 685 So.2d at 1364; Gonzalez, 633 So.2d at 1184. However, the statements the trial judge made here at the hearing on the motion to withdraw suggest that that the judge had a preconceived and fixed view as to what sentence Thompson would receive if he was convicted. In light of such prejudgment expressed by the trial judge at the outset of the proceedings, we conclude that counsel's failure to timely disqualify the judge rendered the result of Thompson's sentencing unreliable, and our confidence in the sentence ultimately imposed upon Thompson has been sufficiently undermined to merit relief under Strickland. Cf. Porter v. State, 723 So.2d 191, 196 (Fla.1998) (holding that the judge's impartiality did not satisfy the constitutional requirement that the sentencer of a capital defendant be impartial and not predisposed to a sentence of either life or death).