Opinion ID: 77450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to investigate adequately the guilt phase defenses

Text: 53 Williams argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he did not reasonably investigate Williams's guilt phase defenses that he was incapacitated at the time of the murder, and that there was reasonable doubt that Williams committed the murder because there were two other individuals involved. Both the state trial court and appellate court rejected Williams's claim under Strickland. See Williams, 783 So.2d at 123-26. Specifically, both courts found that Dr. Formby was a well qualified investigator who reasonably investigated Williams's guilt phase case, and that Williams presented no evidence at the Rule 32 hearing that would have affected the outcome of the trial. Id. 54 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated the following: 55 First, the appellant contends that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance because they allegedly did not properly investigate the case and interview potential witnesses. The circuit court made the following findings concerning this contention: 56 [Trial counsel] principally relied on Dr. Formby, who had been engaged by his predecessor counsel, to conduct the case investigation and witness interviews. Dr. Formby was well qualified for that role by virtue of many background attributes, as detailed by his testimony at the evidentiary hearing and his vitae introduced as State's Exhibit 6 to the same. During the time of his engagement on the case, he was also a co-principal with Dr. Sumrall in the forensic services firm of Veritas, Inc. . . . Dr. Formby testified that he probably put in easily 200 hours on the investigation, having commenced it in the service of [Williams's] predecessor attorneys and therefore having been on the case essentially longer than anybody else. (EH 398). Dr. Formby spent a good bit of time talking with Luther [Williams] and spent a good bit of time talking to potential witnesses in the Smithfield Apartments area of Birmingham. (EH 378). He visited with some of Williams' family members in the Titusville projects and Debra Bush in the Avondale projects. (EH 378). He went to see Margie Bush, the grandmother of Debra Bush and she admitted him to her apartment where Luther had been apprehended, showing him the bedroom. Dr. Formby spent many hours just walking around that area talking to people. (EH 380). For various reasons adequately explained in his testimony, he did not keep detailed records of everyone he interviewed or of all the time he devoted to the case. He interviewed Priscilla Jones and DeWayne Pierce. (EH 382-83). A lot of his investigation and interviewing was devoted to trying to develop connections between Williams' co-defendants and the property stolen from Mr. Kirk, and other evidence against the co-defendants. (EH 381, 384). He went to the Titusville projects and spent approximately two hours interviewing Williams' grandmother and one of his sisters. (EH 384). . . . As the District Attorney's office provided the defense with more and more discovery materials, Dr. Formby would go back to Luther and talk to him again to see if he could push me or give me leads in other directions. He talked to Williams a lot. (EH 388). Dr. Formby went to the crime scene on a couple of occasions. (EH 388-89). He attempted to follow the route that Williams and his two codefendants had traversed at different points during the incidents in question. (EH 389). He and [trial counsel] routinely would have meetings probably twice a week up until the last few weeks before trial, and then we met virtually every day. (EH 389-90). Dr. Formby would brief [trial counsel] on all that he had developed, and [trial counsel] would provide guidance in terms of things that he felt were important that Dr. Formby needed to follow up on. (EH 390). . . . For his part, [trial counsel] personally tried to locate witnesses who could corroborate Mr. Williams' claim that he was incapacitated by intoxication on the night of the murder[.] (EH 79-80). 57 The appellant also contends that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance because they did not interview and present witnesses who he alleges could have rebutted most of the circumstantial evidence presented in the case. Specifically, he asserts that there were witnesses who could have placed his codefendant in the victim's truck on the day of the murder and who could have impeached Priscilla Jones, the appellant's sister, who testified that the appellant told her that he had killed a white man. In regard to this issue, the circuit court made the following findings: 58 Williams argues in his Post-Hearing Brief that [t]o counter the damaging evidence that Mr. Williams was seen driving Mr. Kirk's truck, trial counsel could have offered testimony through Laura Williams or Sandra King that Albert Carmichael had been seen driving the red truck, that he smelled of gasoline and that Mr. Carmichael had white man's cigarettes on him Saturday evening, just hours after Mr. Kirk was murdered. (PHB, p. 12). Ms. Williams and Ms. King testified at the evidentiary hearing that they were at Ms. King's apartment house on a Saturday night when they observed Albert Carmichael in a red truck parked in the parking lot by Priscilla Jones' house. As far as the date on which that occurred, Ms. Williams was only asked if she remembered being at Ms. Kings' a few days before the time that Luther was arrested for the murder, and she identified it as a Saturday night, and Ms. King was asked if she could remember being at home with Laura visiting her January 23, I believe a Saturday night, Saturday afternoon or Saturday night. I may be wrong on the day, but I think that is the date, January 23. Do you remember being home on that date?, to which she answered in the affirmative. (EH 181). Both testified that Carmichael came into King's apartment and they were then able to notice the smell of gasoline on him. Ms. Williams testified that he had some cigarettes that he didn't smoke, which were a white man's kind of cigarettes. Asked what brand they were, she testified that they were Merit or something like that. I can't really remember what kind they were, whereas Carmichael usually smoked Kools. Ms. King testified that Carmichael usually smoked Kools or either Newport 100s and that the cigarettes he had with him on the occasion in question were not the same kind but she could not state what brand they were. (EH 175-76, 183-84). 59 . . . . 60 Considering all of the interviewing of Williams and his family members conducted by Dr. Formby, and considering all of the evidence showing the involvement of Albert Carmichael and Trosky Gregory in various critical events of the weekend in question, the court does not find that Williams has carried his burden of proving that a failure to use Laura Williams or Sandra King as defense witnesses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; or that the omission of their testimony prejudiced the defense in the way required by the Strickland test. Under Strickland, it is not enough to show that trial errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding, rather the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052 . . . . (Emphasis added)). That Albert Carmichael was observed in the red camper truck at the apartment complex during the night of Saturday, January 23rd, after Luther Williams had been observed to have been involved with it at earlier points in time that day, would not have altered the impact or implication of any of the State's critical evidence. There is no indication that either Laura Williams or Sandra King ever told anyone before Williams' trial that they had seen Albert Carmichael in the red truck. . . . 61 Williams asserts in his post-hearing brief that defense counsel should have countered the damaging testimony of Priscilla Jones by eliciting testimony from her father, Jesse Hill, that she was a big liar. Under Rule 608(a) of the Alabama Rules of Evidence . . ., a witness may impeach the credibility of a witness who has testified by offering the second witness's opinion regarding the first witness's untruthfulness. The Alabama Rules of Evidence did not become effective until January 1, 1996, however, and the law of evidence existing at the time of Williams' trial restricted the testimony of an impeaching witness to the limited fact of the other witness' general reputation in the community for untruthfulness. Before a witness can testify concerning the reputation in the community for the truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness, a predicate must be laid establishing that the impeaching witness actually has knowledge of the other witness's reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness in the first witness's community. That was the evidentiary point addressed by the court in its comments to counsel during Mr. Hill's testimony. (EH 164-66). Although the question put to Mr. Hill was rephrased so as to properly inquire as to reputation, Mr. Hill persisted in expressing the matter in terms of his own personal knowledge of her lack of veracity. His testimony as ultimately offered related to his own personal assessment or opinion of her history of untruthfulness, rather than relating it to her reputation in the community. He expressed his opinion that Priscilla had come down here and told the people out here a bunch of — to me, it is a bunch of fairy tales. (EH 166). Mr. Hill conceded, however, that he [had] no knowledge about the evidence in the case and that it was his testimony that Priscilla was telling the people in Tuscaloosa fairy tales because that is my daughter, and I know what she is capable of doing. My daughter would do anything, say anything to anybody. (EH 167). When asked how, if he did not know anything about the facts of the case, he could attack the credibility of her testimony, he answered that Priscilla was a big liar, and that she never tells the truth about a lot of things. (EH 168). Accordingly, as the record stands, there is no affirmative showing that Mr. Hill could have offered testimony that would meet the foundational requirement of showing that it related to Priscilla Jones' reputation for truthfulness/untruthfulness in her community in 1989 . . . . [Trial counsel] impeached Priscilla Jones with respect to the inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her preliminary hearing testimony, and her testimony on several important points was corroborated by that of Teresa Ann Evans. One of the critical features of Priscilla Jones' testimony was that Luther Williams told her, on the occasion that he came to her apartment building the morning of Saturday, January 23rd, in the red and white camper truck, that he had killed a white man (R.479), that I just killed a white man. (R.502). She did not believe him at the time. (R.480, 502). Immediately prior to making that statement, he had hugged her and apologized to her for the altercation between them the preceding night. (R.476, 502). He had the odor of gas on him. (R.480). When she returned to her apartment, he followed her and showed her a pistol and some bullets, with the pistol having a clear handle, meaning that it was white. (R.480). As the only other participant to that conversation, Williams was the only person who could have contradicted Jones' testimony about it, but he did not testify and the trial strategy decision in that regard is not challenged in this proceeding. The court does not consider the fact that Mr. Hill might have testified that he had knowledge of his daughter's reputation for truthfulness, and that her reputation was bad in that regard and she had a reputation for untruthfulness, would have been of such import as to impeach her as a witness to the extent that the outcome of the trial would have been different. 62 We agree with the circuit court's findings as to these claims and adopt them as part of this opinion. Because the appellant has not established that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance in these instances, he is not entitled to relief on these claims. See Strickland, supra. 63 Williams, 783 So.2d at 123-26. 64 As the state courts found and the record reflects, Bivens and Formby reasonably investigated both theories of defense. Bivens testified at the Rule 32 hearing that the incapacitation theory of defense probably came from Williams. [R. Vol. IV, Rule 32 hearing p. 63-64.] Bivens attempted to find information that could prove or support the incapacitation theory, but was unable to do so. [ Id. at 30, 80-81.] Once he could not find anything to support the incapacitation theory, Bivens was left with a reasonable doubt defense — attacking the State's case that Williams committed the murder through innuendos and assumptions. [ Id. at 62-63.] 65 Dr. Formby testified that his primary goal was to find any evidence that would develop stronger connections between the other individuals involved in the murder and the actual murder. Like Bivens, Dr. Formby twice traveled to the murder scene to see if any argument could be made concerning the trajectory of the bullet. [R. Vol. VI, Rule 32 hearing p. 25-26, 388.] He also followed the same route Williams and the other individuals took the day of the murder, and he viewed the videotaped statements of the other individuals to search for anything exculpatory to Williams. [ Id. at 389, 416-17.] Dr. Formby also visited the Smithfield project several times to talk with people in the area and to interview Williams's family members. [ Id. at 382-84.] He also viewed the scene of the arrest and interviewed the women who were present at the time of Williams's arrest. [ Id. at 384.] Moreover, when Williams's initial trial attorneys received a letter from a former client claiming that one of the other individuals involved admitted to committing the murder, Dr. Formby investigated that lead and found the letter to be false. [ Id. at 379.] When Wallace Gaskin testified concerning Williams's inculpatory statement to Danny Hubbard, Dr. Formby traveled to Taylor Hardin to search for Danny Hubbard. [ Id. at 392.] In addition, Bivens testified that he reviewed the entire State's file, viewed the State's physical evidence, and reviewed the Taylor Hardin reports to determine whether some type of mental health defense was possible. [R. Vol. IV, Rule 32 hearing p. 14-16, 19, 20, 37-39, 66.] 66 Based on the record, the state courts correctly found that Bivens and Dr. Formby performed a reasonable investigation of Williams's case and possible defenses. These findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness by our court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Williams presents nothing to rebut these findings. Therefore, Williams cannot show that the state courts unreasonably applied Strickland 's performance prong to this issue. 67 Assuming arguendo that Williams could show that his counsel was deficient for not thoroughly investigating his potential defenses for trial, he cannot show that any deficient performance prejudiced his defense. At the Rule 32 hearing, Williams presented the testimonies of Sandra King (King) and Laura Williams, both of whom testified to seeing another individual involved in the case driving Mr. Kirk's red truck on the night of the murder and smoking a white man's cigarette. [R. Vol. V, Rule 32 hearing p. 168-185.] As the state court noted, this testimony would not have altered the impact or implication of any of the State's critical evidence. Williams, 783 So.2d at 125. Nothing in these testimonies refutes the fact that Williams was seen driving the truck alone shortly after the murder and leaving in the truck later that same day. [R. Vol. 3, Trial transcript p. 457-61.] Williams also presented the testimony of Jesse Hill who testified that Priscilla Jones, a trial witness, was a big liar and told fairy tales during the trial. [R. Vol. V, Rule 32 hearing, p. 166-68.] However, Hill could not testify that he had knowledge of Jones's general reputation for truthfulness in the community, which was the standard of admissibility in Alabama at the time of Williams's trial. See Williams, 783 So.2d at 125-26. Rather, Hill's testimony was based on his personal opinion. Moreover, Hill admitted that he had no knowledge of the circumstances of the case. [ Id. at 167.] 68 Williams cannot show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 936 (11th Cir.2005), pet. for cert. filed, (No. 05-10404) (Apr. 13, 2006), by adding two witnesses who corroborate the State's theory and another witness who has no knowledge of the circumstances of the case and can only present inadmissible opinion testimony. Thus, Williams cannot demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. Accordingly, Williams cannot show that the state courts unreasonably applied Strickland 's prejudice prong in his case, and, therefore, he is not entitled to habeas relief.