Opinion ID: 6496731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: fraud on the court claims

Text: 430 Spencer has not met his burden of persuasion on appeal, and we affirm on that basis. But we believe it prudent to note a misunderstanding underlying the district court’s ruling that went unaddressed by the parties. We accordingly raise this issue sua sponte to prevent the inadvertent creation of conflict in our rule 60 case law. 431 Spencer filed a motion for relief under paragraph (b)(6), a catchall provision offering relief “for ... any other reason that justifies relief.” UTAH R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). But Spencer’s motion was wholly based on his allegation that OPC Counsel had committed fraud on the court. In In re Estate of Willey, we held that a party “cannot seek relief under rule 60(b)(6) based on an allegation of fraud on the court.”7 2016 UT 53, { 8, 391 P.3d 171. (32 In Willey, a stockholder filed a rule 60(b) motion to set aside two district court orders relating to the stockholder’s interests in a 7 Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court, “[o]n motion and upon just terms,” to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a judgment, order, or proceeding” for the reasons enumerated in paragraphs (b)(1) through (6). Rule 60(b) motions “must be filed within a reasonable time,” and, if based on paragraphs (b)(1) through (3), “not more than 90 days after entry of the judgment or order or, if there is no judgment or order, from the date of the proceeding.” UTAH R. Clv. P. 60(c). Due to “these differing times,” it is important that “we ... determine under what paragraphs [a party]’s reasons for relief fall.” In re Estate of Willey, 2016 UT 53, J 7, 391 P.3d 171. 11 Spencer v. OPC Opinion of the Court business. Id. { 1. The stockholder claimed relief under paragraphs (b)(4) and (6) of rule 60. Id. { 7. While the stockholder made several arguments that rightly invoked paragraph (b)(4), “[t]he only other basis upon which [he] sought relief was fraud on the court.” Id. 8. The Willey court concluded that the stockholder was unable to seek relief from fraud on the court under paragraph (b)(6). Id. We explained that, [A] motion seeking relief from a judgment based upon an allegation of fraud on the court necessarily falls under paragraph (b)(3), not paragraph (b)(6). Under the plain language of rule 60, a party seeking to be relieved from a judgment or order based upon an allegation of fraud on the court must do so under paragraph (b)(3). Motions under paragraph (b)(6), on the other hand, must be based on a reason other than those listed in paragraphs (b)(1) through (5). Id. 8-9 (citing UTAH R. Civ. P. 60(b)). In other words, Willey instructed courts to classify a rule 60(b) motion—and assess its timeliness — by its content, not its caption. See id. 10 (classifying the stockholder’s rule 60(b) motion into the proper subsections, (b)(3) and (4), and “proceed[ing] to determine if [he] timely filed his motion” under those subsections). 433 Under Willey, therefore, the district court should have classified Spencer’s rule 60(b)(6) motion as a rule 60(b)(3) motion and assessed its timeliness accordingly. But this does not change the outcome of the case because even if the district court had properly classified Spencer’s rule 60(b) motion, it would have reached the same conclusion —Spencer’s motion was untimely. [34 All rule 60(b) motions “must be filed within a reasonable time.” UTAH R. Civ. P. 60(c). Rule 60(b)(3) motions, moreover, “must be filed ... not more than 90 days after entry of the judgment or order.” Id. “The language of the rule is clear; a party must file a rule 60(b) motion within a reasonable time, which is within ninety days after a judgment or order is entered, if the motion is filed under paragraph|] .. . (3).” Willey, 2016 UT 53, { 12 (footnote omitted). 435 Spencer filed his rule 60(b) motion more than one year after the district court entered its final Ruling and Order. This is well past 12 Cite as: 2022 UT 28 Opinion of the Court the ninety-day limit rule 60(b) imposes. The district court thus correctly denied Spencer’s motion as untimely. § 8 The parties have not questioned Willey, and it remains good law. But as we reread Willey, we note that we seem to have interpreted our rule 60 without acknowledging the line other courts have drawn between “fraud of an adverse party” and “fraud on the court” when interpreting similarly-worded rules. See, e.g., United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d 1157, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing that “not all fraud is fraud on the court” (citation omitted)); Torres v. Bella Vista Hosp., Inc., 914 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2019) (defining fraud on the court as “fraud that seriously affects the integrity of the normal process of adjudication, defile[s] the court itself, and prevents the judicial machinery from performing its usual function” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fernandez v. Fernandez, 358 P.3d 562, 56668 (Alaska 2015) (limiting fraud on the court to fraud that “involve[s] far more than an injury to a single litigant” and “defiles the court itself” (citations omitted)); see also 12 JAMES WM Moore, Moore’s FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 60.21[4], 60.43[1] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2021) (addressing the difference between fraud by an opposing party and fraud on the court). As a result, our rule may be out of step with how those jurisdictions offer relief from a judgment procured by fraud on the court. See, e.g., McGee v. Gonyo, 140 A.3d 162, 165 (Vt. 2016) (“[A] claim of fraud ‘upon the court’ is ‘governed by the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6).’” (citation omitted)); accord Carter v. Anderson, 585 F.3d 1007, 1011 (6th Cir. 2009); Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d at 1167 (acknowledging a party’s ability to seek relief from the rendering court for fraud on the court under federal rule 60(d)(3)). We recognize that our deviation from those decisions may reflect different policy concerns. Or it may merely be an unintended consequence caused by the wording of our rule compared to that of the federal rule. Compare UTAH R. Civ. P. 60(d), with FED. R. Civ. P. 60(d); see also United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining that there are two “avenues for relief from fraud upon the court” under federal rule 60(d): “[t]he first ... is an independent action,” and “[t]he second ... is to invoke the inherent power of a court to set aside its judgment if procured by fraud upon the court”). In any event, the parties have not raised these issues, so without proper briefing, we are not in a position to address them. Rather than wait for another case to examine whether our rule 60 (continued . . .) 13 Spencer v. OPC Opinion of the Court