Opinion ID: 69601
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discipline for Safety Violation

Text: Bouvier also contends that she suffered an adverse employment action when Northrop suspended her for two days and temporarily reassigned her to crane rigger with a conditional opportunity for reinstatement as crane operator after the February 6, 2007 incident. It is not readily apparent that this was an adverse employment action because crane operator and rigger are similar jobs and she had an opportunity for reinstatement as crane operator. Cf. Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 614 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[D]enial of a transfer may be the objective equivalent of the denial of a promotion, and thus qualify as an adverse employment action . . . if the position sought was objectively better . . . 2 The Supreme Court has held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions prohibit more conduct than its anti-discrimination provisions. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). Expressly limiting its holding to retaliation claims, the Supreme Court abrogated the “ultimate employment test” and held that employees much show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse. Id. at 67. However, the “ultimate employment test” still applies to cases alleging discrimination. See McCoy, 492 F.3d at 559–60 (“In Burlington Northern, the Court expressly limited its holding to Title VII retaliation claims . . . .”) (emphasis in original). 7 .”) (emphasis in original); Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 378 (finding temporary delay in promotion insufficient to support a discrimination claim). However, due to Bouvier’s testimony and declarations of her coworkers, we conclude that Bouvier put forward sufficient evidence that the transfer to crane rigger involved a loss of prestige and responsibility. The training required to become a crane operator also demonstrates that employees coveted the operator position and considered it a promotion from crane rigger. See Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 614–15 (listing several factors for determining whether a denial of a transfer is an adverse employment action including how the respective positions are viewed among employees and the skills and training required to transfer). We now ask whether Bouvier has put forward sufficient evidence that similarly situated males were treated more favorably under the “nearly identical” standard. Perez v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Inst’l Div., 395 F.3d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 2004) (“We . . . have explained consistently that for employees to be similarly situated those employees’ circumstances, including their misconduct, must have been ‘nearly identical.’”). “[N]early identical” is not synonymous with “identical,” and whether similarly situated males were treated more favorably turns on whether the violations were of “‘comparable seriousness.’” Lee, 574 F.3d at 260–61 (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.11 (1976)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bouvier, she has produced sufficient evidence to create a factual issue as to whether Northrop treated similarly situated males more favorably. Although Bouvier received the same discipline as Henderson, the male crane rigger involved in the incident, Northrop demoted only Bouvier. Bouvier also points to sufficiently similar safety violations involving male crane operators that Northrop may have treated more favorably. Although none of the other incidents in the record involved a 8 crane swinging a load over an occupied guard tower, the law does not require that the incident be “identical,” but only of “comparable seriousness.” Lee, 574 F.3d at 260–61. Bouvier presents evidence that a crane operated by a male began rolling toward another crane and the operator did not respond to repeated attempts to stop the crane, which included radioing his crane, blowing a whistle, and the other crane sounding its horn. The crane stopped only after other operators threw the emergency switch. Northrop did not discipline the male operator in question after the investigation revealed that his travel gear “stuck a little.” While not overwhelmingly similar, this incident, combined with other serious incidents for which male operators received little discipline, sufficiently establishes the fourth McDonnell Douglas prong for purposes of summary judgment. We find that Bouvier introduced sufficient evidence to make her prima facie case with respect to Northrop’s discipline for the alleged safety violation. D. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason Once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut the defendant’s explanation either by showing that the reason given is pretext for unlawful discrimination, or the proffered reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff’s protected characteristic. Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Group, Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411–12 (5th Cir. 2007). In this case, Northrop articulates a legitimate reason: the February 6, 2007 safety violation witnessed by Norman. Bouvier argues she has put forth sufficient evidence of pretext by alleging 9 Norman fabricated the safety violation. However, the plaintiff has not necessarily proven pretext by showing the facts underlying the employer’s reason for the adverse employment action are factually incorrect. See Little v. Republic Ref. Co., Ltd., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The existence of competing evidence about the objective correctness of a fact underlying a defendant’s proffered explanation does not in itself make reasonable an inference that the defendant was not truly motivated by its proffered justification.”) (citing Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1507 (5th Cir. 1988). Bouvier’s testimony is consistent with an honest mistake by Norman, namely that he misperceived the crane in relation to the guard tower and cited Bouvier when the crane had not in fact passed over the guard tower. Bouvier puts forth no evidence to discredit Northrop’s assertion that Norman’s perception of the incident motivated the reprimand. The evidence shows Northrop reasonably believed Norman had witnessed a safety violation and Northrop acted in good faith. See Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The real issue is whether the employer reasonably believed the employee’s allegation and acted on it in good faith . . . .”). To find that Northrop’s proffered reason was mere pretext, a jury could only speculate as to Norman’s and Northrop’s motives. See Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 267–68 (“Reviewing the entire record, we find that [plaintiff] has introduced no evidence which would support a reasonable jury finding of retaliatory motive without engaging in impermissible speculation.”). We find that Bouvier failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.