Opinion ID: 1935215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the cross-examination of gordon tempest

Text: The defendant's next ground for appeal is that the trial justice erred by denying defendant's motion to pass the case on the basis of a number of alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct occurring during the cross-examination of Gordon. The defendant's initial claims of error concerning this cross-examination arose out of the following exchange: PROSECUTOR: Do you remember having a conversation in 1982 with Estelle Accord at the St. James Hotel? GORDON: No. I can't remember that far back. PROSECUTOR: In 1982, did you tell Estelle Accord that your brother Beaver had killed Doreen Picard and that Raymond Tempest, Senior, would make sure that nothing happened to Beaver? COUNSEL: Your honor, I object to this. THE COURT: Well, he said he couldn't recall that far back. Overruled. COUNSEL: I want to see the statement, Judge. I would like to see the statement. THE COURT: Show him the statement. COUNSEL: May I see the statement? PROSECUTOR: Its just impeachment purposes. THE COURT: Actually, that's right. Its a matter of courtesy. If you don't want to, you don't have to. PROSECUTOR: I only have one copy. I will be happy to share it. After sharing the document with defense counsel, the prosecutor, without objection, again asked Gordon about his alleged statements to Estelle Accord (Accord). Gordon denied making such a statement. The following morning defense counsel moved to pass the case on the basis of the above exchange. The trial justice denied the motion, stating, I'm not going to grant the motion because I think it was impeachment that was carried out. He also issued a curative instruction regarding the prosecution's use of the statement summary. On appeal, defendant contends that the motion should have been granted because the prosecutor danced around the Courtroom with a document giving the jury the impression    this was a statement from a person named Estelle Accord when it was only an unsigned summary of Accord's statements taken by an investigator of the Department of the Attorney General. The defendant also asserts that the state's failure to disclose Accord as a witness and the summary of her statements violated Rule 16(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 613(a) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Additionally defendant complains that the state failed to establish the proper foundational requirements for use of the summary as a prior inconsistent statement and that the summary was blatant hearsay. Finally defendant avers that the mere assertion that Gordon Tempest had made a statement to Accord that Raymond, Jr. killed Picard, and that Raymond, Sr. would obfuscate justice to prevent prosecution, without proof was willful conduct pro se. It was argued that as a result of these actions, defendant's right to a fair trial was so tarnished that the motion to pass should have been granted. It is well settled that a witness's testimony at trial may be impeached by the admission of prior statements made by the witness which are inconsistent with his trial testimony. State v. Cianci, 430 A.2d 756, 762 (R.I. 1981). Such statements are not hearsay when offered for such a purpose. State v. Coppola, 502 A.2d 802, 804 (R.I. 1985). Furthermore, the statement need not be admitted into evidence in order to impeach the witness. R.I.R.Evid. 613(a). However, the examiner must establish the express foundational requirements of apprising the witness of the time, place, persons present, and nature of the statement    prior to examination on the statement. Id.; State v. Vento, 533 A.2d 1161, 1164 (R.I. 1987). Additionally the witness's prior statement must be sufficiently inconsistent with the witness's in-court testimony to be admissible. State v. Pusyka, 592 A.2d 850, 853 (R.I. 1991). The determination of whether sufficient inconsistency exists lies within the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. Id. In the present case Gordon testified on direct examination that he never spoke to his father, Ray, Sr., about the homicide on the day of the murder. He also stated that other than taking a routine statement from his brother the day of the murder at the Woonsocket police station, he had never had a discussion concerning the Picard murder with defendant. The clear tenor of Gordon's testimony on direct examination was that he did nothing out of the ordinary in investigating this case. On cross-examination the prosecution asked Gordon, Do you remember having a conversation in 1982 with Estelle Accord at the St. James Hotel? After Gordon denied having any memory of the conversation, the prosecutor asked In 1982, did you tell Estelle Accord that your brother Beaver had killed Doreen Picard and that Raymond Tempest, Senior, would make sure that nothing happened to Beaver? After a brief and pointed discussion among the trial justice, prosecution and defense counsel, Gordon resumed testifying and denied that he ever had any such conversation with her. Once Gordon denied remembering the conversation, he was, for purposes of impeachment, considered as having denied having made the statement. Ashton v. Higgins, 80 R.I. 350, 357, 96 A.2d 632, 636 (1953). Given Gordon's statements on direct examination and the entire tenor of his testimony, we cannot say the trial justice was clearly wrong in determining the inconsistency of these statements. Pusyka, 592 A.2d at 853; see United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 254 (1st Cir.1976) (enough contradiction exists if witness's in-court testimony, taken as a whole, either by what it says or by what it fails to say, affords some indication that the fact was different from the testimony of the witness whom it is sought to contradict). We are therefore satisfied that these questions sufficiently satisfied the foundational requirements for the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement. We note that the prosecution had a good-faith belief as a basis for this question. When the trial justice expressed concern over the summary, the prosecutor responded that Accord would be brought in to testify to the conversation. In fact the next day the record reveals that Accord was in the courtroom, ready to testify to the conversation with Gordon. However, the trial justice refused to allow her to testify because her testimony would have been rebuttal on a collateral issue. Therefore, we are not confronted with a situation wherein counsel has made a prejudicial assertion of fact without any basis for having done so. But cf. State v. Byrnes, 433 A.2d 658, 676-77 (R.I. 1981) (defense counsel attempted to impeach witness with a prior inconsistent statement prior to establishing the proper foundational requirements and without any proof, or subsequent ability to prove, that the statement was ever made). We are, however, somewhat troubled with the prosecution's use of the summary of Accord's statements in the present case. In the cross-examination of Gordon about Accord, the prosecutor had the summary in his hand. We are mindful that when counsel cross-examines a witness about a prior inconsistent statement with a document in his or her hand, it may be argued that it is possible, though scarcely inevitable, that jurors might infer that the document contains a direct statement given by the witness. The trial justice realized this and issued a curative instruction stating: [The prosecutor] asked Mr. Tempest (Gordon) if he had told Estelle Accord in 1982 at the St. James Hotel that his brother had killed Doreen Picard. In asking that question, which Mr. Gordon Tempest denied making, [the prosecutor] was holding and apparently looking at a piece of paper which may have caused you to imply that [the prosecutor] was reading from a statement given by Miss or Mrs. Accord. A reading of that piece of paper shows clearly that it was not a statement given by Miss or Mrs. Accord. I trust you will put aside and out of your minds any implications that you derive from [the prosecutor's] questions that are contrary to the facts which I have just explained to you    [the prosecutor] did not have in his hand any statement given by Miss or Mrs. Accord. We believe that the trial justice's curative instruction removed any prejudice that may have inhered to defendant through the prosecution's use of the summary in this case. In fact it tended to create the counter-impression that Gordon never had had any such conversation with Accord. Therefore, we are of the opinion that defendant was not denied his opportunity for a fair trial. State v. Mastracchio, 612 A.2d 698, 703-04 (R.I. 1992). Indeed he may have been given more relief than the circumstances required. The defendant next contends that the failure to disclose Accord's existence and a copy of her summarized statements violated Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 613(a) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Pursuant to Rule 16(a)(6) the state is required, upon written request, to furnish defendant with a written list of the names and addresses of all persons whom the attorney for the State expects to call as witnesses at the trial in support of the State's direct case; [A]s to those persons the state expects to call as witnesses at the trial, Rule 16(a)(7) requires the state to produce all relevant recorded testimony before a grand jury, all written or recorded verbatim statements, and if no such testimony or statement of a witness is in the possession of the State, a summary of the testimony such person is expected to give at the trial. Accord had come to the attention of the Attorney General's office shortly after the trial began when her employer called to report that Accord had just told him of her conversation with Gordon at the St. James Hotel. It was the first time the state had any notice of her existence. Furthermore, the state had no intention of calling her in its case in chief. In fact her statements would have been impermissible hearsay if adduced during the state's case. R.I.R.Evid. 801(c). At best, therefore, Accord was a rebuttal witness. We need not, however, decide whether Rule 16 requires the state to previously list any rebuttal witness it expects to call to determine the issue before us. In the instant case the trial justice refused to allow Accord to testify in rebuttal of Gordon's testimony deeming that her testimony would be rebuttal on a collateral issue. We have grave doubts concerning this ruling since this issue was directly relevant to the witness's knowledge of the guilt of the accused. However, even if Accord's proposed testimony would in fact have been improper without prior disclosure, it was never put before the jury. But cf. State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1990) (state called rebuttal witness, whose identity and testimony had not been previously disclosed, to contradict statements adduced by the state's cross-examination of the defendant). Therefore, this is not a case in which a surprise rebuttal witness was improperly allowed to testify, leading to irreparable harm to the defendant. Id. at 429-30. With respect to defendant's argument based on Rule 613(a), the rule is clear that in examining a witness about a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness, the statement need not be shown to the witness at that time and on request the statement  shall be shown to opposing counsel. (Emphasis added.) We believe this language is unequivocal. When opposing counsel requests to see a prior statement or statement summary of a witness used by counsel during cross-examination of that witness, the statement must be disclosed at that time, absent a legitimate claim of privilege or confidentiality. See United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 694 (2nd Cir.1982). In the instant case defense counsel requested to see the summary of Accord's statements that the prosecutor held in his hand during cross-examination of Gordon. After initially stating that the document need not be turned over to defense counsel, the prosecutor replied that he would be happy to share his only copy with counsel. We believe this is all Rule 613(a) requires; the request was made, and after a moment of hesitation, the summary was turned over. Therefore, the trial justice was correct in his decision not to pass the case. The defendant also contends that the following questioning of Gordon during cross-examination concerning an alleged conversation with Carol Larivierre Kane (Kane) was improper: PROSECUTOR: In March of 1988 when she [Kane] was interviewed at the Attorney General's Office, did you ask her to report back to you regarding the contents of the interview? GORDON: Never. I never asked anyone that was involved in this investigation to report anything to me at any time. PROSECUTOR: Were you at the bail hearing on June 14th of 1988? GORDON: Whose bail hearing? PROSECUTOR: In this case. I'm sorry, June 14th of 1991? GORDON: Yes, I was. PROSECUTOR: And did you hear testimony on that day? DEFENSE COUNSEL: I object to that. The objection was sustained. The next day defendant moved to pass the case asserting that the prosecutor asked the question `Were you at the bail hearing,' obviously to give the jury the implication, the idea that that's what was said at the bail hearing. In fact Kane testified at the bail hearing only that she called Gordon Tempest not that he had instructed her to call him. The prosecution responded that Kane had testified under oath to the grand jury that Gordon Tempest had instructed her to report back to him after she spoke with Mr. Ryan at the Attorney General's Office. The prosecution also argued that Kane testified at defendant's bail hearing, at which Gordon was present. Therefore, the prosecution reasoned that there was a good faith basis for the question. The trial justice explained that the question created the impression that Kane so testified at the bail hearing and that was not so. Consequently, when trial resumed, the court gave the following curative instruction: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, during the cross examination of the witness Gordon Tempest yesterday afternoon    one of the prosecutors, asked Mr. Tempest if he had ever asked Carol Larivierre Kane to report back to him after she had spoken with the police about the Picard murder investigation. Mr. Tempest denied having done so. [The prosecutor] then asked Mr. Tempest if he had heard Mrs. Larivierre Kane testify at the bail hearing and the Court sustained an objection to that question. That question, while not answered, implied that Miss Larivierre Kane had in fact so testified at the bail hearing. The record of that bail hearing discloses that she did not say what was implied by the question put by [the prosecutor]. We note initially that the trial justice sustained defendant's objection to the question before the witness answered. Although the question, within the context asked, tended to imply that Kane did in fact so testify at the bail hearing, we believe the trial justice's curative instructions were sufficient to remove any resulting prejudicial taint. In fact they created the impression that the state possessed no evidence to contradict Gordon. However, Kane's grand jury testimony directly contradicted Gordon. We note that this is not a case wherein the prosecution ask[ed] the accused a question that impli[ed] the existence of a prejudicial fact and was not then prepared to prove that fact. United States v. Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 868 (10th Cir.1984); see Byrnes, 433 A.2d at 677. Here the prosecutor had a good-faith basis to ask this question as the statement of Kane was made under oath to the grand jury. It appears, rather, that the prosecutor inadvertently referred to Kane's testimony as given at the bail hearing when in fact it was given to the grand jury. This mistake was as to the proceeding in which the statement was made not as to whether the statement was in fact ever made. Therefore, given the trial justice's curative instruction, we hold that the prosecutor's inadvertence is not of such substantial magnitude as to result in a denial of a defendant's right to due process and a fair trial. See Mastracchio, 612 A.2d at 703-04.