Opinion ID: 1708005
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Heading: Probable Cause to Search as Affected by Omissions From the Affidavit

Text: Probable cause to search the Johnson residence is affected by material omissions from the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant. See State v. Brings Plenty, 459 N.W.2d 390, 401 (S.D.1990). A review of pertinent facts and omissions is in order. On Saturday, November 9, 1991, law enforcement officials did not have a search warrant for the Johnson's residence in Beresford, nor had they attempted to obtain one. Nevertheless, on November 9, the DCI agents attempted two controlled deliveries of the Express Mail package holding two doctored bindles, one containing an unknown amount of the methamphetamine found in the original Express Mail package intercepted via the Citibank mailroom. Both attempts at delivery failed. Dalziel left a notice indicating the package would be delivered shortly before 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, November 12, 1991. In the interim, a decision was made to obtain a search warrant. On Monday evening, November 11, 1991, Dalziel typed a search warrant for the Beresford residence. At about 8:30 a.m. on Tuesday, November 12, Dalziel went to Magistrate Mary Dell Cody in Vermillion to obtain a signature for the warrant. Dalziel testified that Magistrate Cody said she would not sign it until after the delivery was made. At 9:50 a.m. on the same day, Dalziel made the third attempt to deliver the Express Mail package to the Johnson residence, did hand it to Christine outside the residence, and immediately arrested her for possession of methamphetamine. Dalziel took the package back from Christine, placed it in the locked trunk of his car, and returned to Vermillion to obtain a search warrant from Magistrate Cody. Dalziel testified that upon his arrival in Vermillion, he just drove to the court, went in, she signed it, and came back out. Dalziel's affidavit stated that Christine did receive the Express Mail package and that it was delivered to her residence by the DCI. The affidavit omitted certain facts, i.e., that the package was never opened or taken into the residence by Christine, and that it was presently locked in the trunk of Dalziel's car. Magistrate Cody was not told that Christine had already been arrested and taken to the Beresford police station. Nor was Magistrate Cody told that as Dalziel stood before her, a DCI agent and Beresford police were inside the Johnson home, guarding Brent and securing the premises due to exigent circumstances. Basically, the affidavit alleged that because Christine had been sent an Express Mail package containing 2.1 grams of a white, powdery substance consisting of some unknown quantity of methamphetamine, there must be other controlled substances and marijuana in her residence. No facts were contained in the affidavit to show that law enforcement officials possessed other evidence indicative of probable cause that a crime had been committed. [1] A search warrant is only valid if probable cause has been shown to the magistrate. State v. Robinette, 270 N.W.2d 573, 578 (S.D. 1978). Probable cause is generally defined as the existence of facts and circumstances as would warrant an honest belief in the mind of a reasonable, prudent man acting on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate that the offense has been, or is being committed and that the property sought exists at the place designated. Id. at 577. This court has previously reviewed the existence of probable cause in conjunction with a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine. State v. Engel, 465 N.W.2d 787 (S.D.1991). See also State v. Baysinger, 470 N.W.2d 840, 842 (S.D.1991) (detailing the procedure used for a controlled delivery of a package of cocaine). In Engel, an anticipatory search warrant was issued, ordering the officers to search not only for the cocaine, but also for other illegal drugs, paraphernalia, or other evidence. [2] 465 N.W.2d at 789. The judge that signed the anticipatory search warrant orally admonished the officer not to execute the warrant until after the package was delivered. Id. at 788. An officer made a controlled delivery of a package, dressed as a UPS agent. After waiting thirty minutes, the warrant was executed. This court stated: Reading this affidavit in context and looking at the circumstances realistically with a view toward upholding the probable cause determination if possible, it is apparent that once [the defendant] had possession of the cocaine for half an hour, officers had probable cause not only to believe that the delivered cocaine was on the premises, but also to believe that the delivery was no mistake and that other items associated with drug use might be found there as well. Id. at 790 (emphasis added). We also noted that, Probable cause to search the entire premises for other drug-related items cannot be artificially separated from probable cause to search for the cocaine which was the subject of the controlled delivery. Id. The facts of Engel are materially distinguishable from the present case. In Engel, the delivered package was still on the premises at the time the search warrant was executed. Under the facts presented here, the delivered package was never opened by Christine, was held by her only momentarily, and was taken into and removed from the residence by Dalziel. The package was not on the premises either when the search warrant was obtained, or when it was executed. Since the subject of the controlled delivery was not present on the premises, the probable cause to search the entire premises for other drug-related items must be separated from the probable cause to search for the packagewhich was safely in Dalziel's trunk. Whether an omission from an affidavit is material to a finding of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact and is reviewed de novo. United States v. Condo, 782 F.2d 1502, 1506 (9th Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.1985)). It is my opinion that the omission of the above-mentioned facts from Dalziel's affidavit casts doubt on the existence of probable cause. Brings Plenty, 459 N.W.2d at 401. Clearly, it was important to the magistrate that the package be delivered and on the premises before a search of the Johnson residence took place. If it were not, she would have signed the warrant when it was first presented to her. Note should be taken of the statements of the high courts of other states in regard to omissions from affidavits as this affects the existence of probable cause: [T]he constitutional protection against warrantless invasions of privacy is endangered by the concealment of relevant facts from the district court issuing the warrant. Warrants issue ex parte and the issuing court must rely upon the trustworthiness of the affidavit before it. We believe the court must have all the pertinent facts before it in order to determine whether there is sufficient, properly obtained evidence providing probable cause for a warrant to issue. Police and prosecutors owe a duty of candor to the court, particularly in light of the ex parte nature of these proceedings, and must not withhold information which may taint the source of the probable cause they put forth. Cruse v. Alaska, 584 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Alaska 1978) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court stated: [T]he fact that an officer-affiant's statements in a warrant affidavit are not false does not necessarily end judicial scrutiny of the contents of the affidavit.... Because the decision of a judicial officer asked to issue a warrant is the cornerstone of our constitutional protections against unlawful governmental invasions of privacy, it is of paramount importance that the decision be based on a complete factual predicate. Probable cause determinations are invariably based on inferences drawn from the language appearing in warrant affidavits.... It has, therefore, been recognized that in some circumstances statements of officer-affiants may be so misleading because of the omission of material facts known to the affiant at the time the affidavit was executed that a finding of probable cause based on such statements may be deemed erroneous. Colorado v. Winden, 689 P.2d 578, 582-83 (Colo.1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also California v. Kurland, 28 Cal.3d 376, 168 Cal.Rptr. 667, 671-72, 618 P.2d 213, 217-18 (1980) (stating that the crucial, inference-drawing powers of the magistrate are hindered as much by omissions as by outright misstatements in an affidavit). The affidavit presented to the magistrate in this case withheld the fact that the package was no longer on the premises. The magistrate, when told that the package had been delivered, could reasonably infer from that language that the package was on the premises. In light of her earlier refusal to sign the warrant, it is likely that is exactly what she did infer. Complete candor on the part of law enforcement officials would direct that the magistrate should have been provided with the whole set of facts regarding the morning's events. The omission of these facts from the affidavit affects the finding of probable cause to search the residence. For this reason, I dissent on the probable cause determination.