Opinion ID: 163083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the legal framework applied by the district court

Text: 66 The district court began its examination of the City's evidence with the disparity studies conducted by BBC and NERA. The court criticized the studies because they did not answer the following six questions posed by the court for the first time in its memorandum and order: 67 (1) Is there pervasive race, ethnic and gender discrimination throughout all aspects of the construction and professional design industry in the six county Denver MSA? (2) Does such discrimination equally affect all of the racial and ethnic groups designated for preference by Denver and all women? (3) Does such discrimination result from policies and practices intentionally used by business firms for the purpose of disadvantaging those firms because of race, ethnicity and gender? (4) Would Denver's use of those discriminating firms without requiring them to give work to certified MBEs and WBEs in the required percentages on each project make Denver guilty of prohibited discrimination? (5) Is the compelled use of certified MBEs and WBEs in the prescribed percentages on particular projects likely to change the discriminatory policies and programs that taint the industry? (6) Is the burden of compliance with Denver's preferential program a reasonable one fairly placed on those who are justly accountable for the proven discrimination? 68 Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1066-67. 69 Believing that its six questions set the proper legal framework for analyzing the City's evidence, the district court criticized Denver's disparity studies and refused to give weight to much of Denver's evidence because it did almost nothing to answer those questions and because the methodology used in the studies was not designed to answer the relevant questions. Id. at 1067, 1071. The court's questions, however, misstate controlling precedent and Denver's burden at trial. 70 Read in context with the other five questions and the record, it is clear from the first question that the district court believed Denver was required to prove the existence of discrimination. Instead of asking whether Denver had demonstrated strong evidence from which an inference of past or present discrimination could be drawn, the question asks whether Denver's evidence shows that there is pervasive discrimination. See id. at 1066. The second and third questions then refer to  such discrimination and the sixth question asks whether the burden of compliance is placed on those firms accountable for the  proven discrimination. Id. (emphasis added). It appears the district court may have been persuaded by CWC's erroneous and unsupported statement in its written closing argument that Denver had the burden of establishing by a preponderance that not only were there inferences of discrimination, but in fact that the inferences were correct. 11 Denver, however, bore no such burden. 71 In Concrete Works II, this court clearly stated that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a court to make an ultimate finding of discrimination before a municipality may take affirmative steps to eradicate discrimination. 36 F.3d at 1522. Denver's initial burden was to demonstrate that strong evidence of discrimination supported its conclusion that remedial measures were necessary. Strong evidence is that approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation, not irrefutable or definitive proof of discrimination. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, 109 S.Ct. 706. The burden of proof at all times remained with CWC to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Denver's evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and thus a remedial purpose. Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1176 (quotation omitted). 72 Consistent with its second question, the district court concluded that the aggregation of [all racial and ethnic groups] as equally victimized by discrimination and equally entitled to the preferential remedies is particularly problematic for Fourteenth Amendment equality analysis. Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1069 (emphasis added). In Croson, a majority of the Court noted that Richmond's affirmative action program included racial groups that, as a practical matter, may never have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond. 488 U.S. at 506, 109 S.Ct. 706. Consequently, the Court questioned whether Richmond could justify the program as an attempt to remedy past discrimination. See id. Denver, however, did introduce evidence of discrimination against each group included in the ordinances. Thus, Denver's evidence does not suffer from the problem discussed by the Court in Croson. The district court, however, apparently believed Denver could not satisfy its burden of introducing strong evidence unless it was able to show that each group suffered equally from discrimination. Croson imposes no such requirement. 73 The district court's third question also misstates the applicable law. 12 Underlying that question is the district court's conclusion that Denver must demonstrate that the private firms directly engaged in any discrimination in which Denver passively participates do so intentionally, with the purpose of disadvantaging minorities and women. The district court provided no support for its conclusion and this court could find none. The Croson majority concluded that a city would have a compelling interest in preventing its tax dollars from assisting [local trade] organizations in maintaining a racially segregated construction market. 488 U.S. at 503, 109 S.Ct. 706. Thus, Denver's only burden was to introduce evidence which raised the inference of discriminatory exclusion in the local construction industry and linked its spending to that discrimination. 74 The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the inference of discriminatory exclusion can arise from statistical disparities. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that Denver can meet its burden through the introduction of statistical and anecdotal evidence alone. To the extent the district court required Denver to introduce additional evidence to show discriminatory motive or intent on the part of private construction firms, the court erred. Denver was under no burden to identify any specific practice or policy that resulted in discrimination. Neither was Denver required to demonstrate that the purpose of any such practice or policy was to disadvantage women or minorities. To impose such a burden on a municipality would be tantamount to requiring direct proof of discrimination and would eviscerate any reliance the municipality could place on statistical studies and anecdotal evidence. Accord Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equal., 950 F.2d 1401, 1416 n. 11 (9th Cir.1991). 75 Guided by the erroneous third question, the court concluded that Denver's disparity studies were flawed because they do not generate a fair inference that there are discriminatory barriers to participation in the construction industry that are different from societal discrimination.  Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1071 (emphasis added). The district court provided no authority for its conclusion that the City must demonstrate that any identified discrimination in the construction industry is not a reflection of societal discrimination. Denver, in fact, is not required to show that the discriminatory practices in the construction industry were unique to that industry or differed from societal discrimination. Under the district court's approach, a municipality is without the power to remedy even proven discrimination in the construction industry as long as that discrimination merely reflects general societal discrimination. Denver offers the persuasive hypothesis that the district court's position arose from a misinterpretation of Croson 's admonition against reliance on general societal discrimination to support affirmative action programs. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 497, 109 S.Ct. 706 (plurality opinion). We are not suggesting that societal discrimination without more would suffice. Indeed, the converse is true. The Croson plurality's statements, however, have no application when, as in this case, the municipality presents specific evidence of discrimination in the local construction industry. If such evidence is presented, it is immaterial for constitutional purposes whether the industry discrimination springs from widespread discriminatory attitudes shared by society or is the product of policies, practices, and attitudes unique to the industry. Denver's statistical and anecdotal evidence is relevant because it identifies discrimination in the local construction industry, not simply discrimination in society. The genesis of the identified discrimination is irrelevant and the district court erred when it discounted Denver's evidence on that basis. 76 The district court's erroneous view of the law affected its analysis of Denver's evidence. After considering the anecdotal evidence, the court found that the evidence supported the conclusion that women and minority groups are disadvantaged in trying to compete in the construction industry because of the prevalence of negative views about them. Id. at 1074; see also id. (In summary, the anecdotal evidence shows that race, ethnicity and gender affect the construction industry and those who work in it.). Notwithstanding that finding, the court deemed the anecdotal evidence unpersuasive because it did not show that the negative views prevalent in the construction industry were different than any societal views. Id.; see also id. at 1073 (It cannot be determined whether these [incidents involving harassment at work sites] are manifestations of societal prejudices or fairly attributable to employers as a business policy.). The district court's erroneous belief that Denver was required to show the existence of specific discriminatory policies and that those policies were more than a reflection of societal discrimination resulted in the court improperly discounting much of Denver's statistical and anecdotal evidence. 77 The district court's fourth question appears to be the basis upon which the court rejected the evidence Denver presented on marketplace discrimination. See § VI.A.1., infra. The question expresses the erroneous legal conclusion that a municipality may only remedy its own discrimination. This conclusion is contrary to both our holding in Concrete Works II and the plurality opinion in Croson. It appears to be a reflection of the erroneous statement made by CWC in its closing argument. See supra n. 12. This court recognized in this very case that a municipality has a compelling interest in taking affirmative steps to remedy both public and private discrimination specifically identified in its area. Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1529 (emphasis added). In Concrete Works II, we remanded this case for trial and stated, The record before us does not explain the Denver government's role in contributing to the underutilization of MBEs and WBEs in the private construction market in the Denver MSA, and this may well be a fruitful issue to explore at trial. Id. at 1529-30. We also stated that we do not read Croson as requiring the municipality to identify an exact linkage between its award of public contracts and private discrimination. Id. at 1529. Our comments indicate that Denver can meet it burden of demonstrating its compelling interest with evidence of private discrimination in the local construction industry coupled with evidence that it has become a passive participant in that discrimination. See id. Thus, contrary to the wording of question four, Denver was clearly not required to demonstrate that it is guilty of prohibited discrimination to meet its initial burden. 78 Likewise, the district court's fifth question manifests the erroneous conclusion that Denver was required to demonstrate the ordinances will change discriminatory practices and policies in the local construction industry. Denver's program can survive the equal protection challenge brought by CWC if Denver can show that the ordinances are narrowly tailored to remedy Denver's participation in the identified discrimination; there is no requirement that the ordinances must also eliminate the discrimination. In fact, any such requirement would be illogical. If firms persisted in their discrimination, they could effectively defeat all affirmative action legislation. 79 Finally, contrary to the district court's sixth question, the ordinances do not have to be tailored to place the burden of compliance only on those firms accountable for the discrimination. A plurality of the Supreme Court has stated that [a]s part of this Nation's dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy.... [S]uch a sharing of the burden by innocent parties is not impermissible. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-81, 106 S.Ct. 1842 (quotations omitted). The proper focus is on whether the burden on third parties is too intrusive or unacceptable. See id. at 283, 106 S.Ct. 1842; United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 182, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (plurality opinion). 80 The sixth question also appears to be implicated in the district court's statement rejecting Denver's disparity studies: While statistical studies may suggest that some showings of disparity may create an inference of discrimination, they say nothing about who is responsible for such discrimination. Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1070. The district court then intimated that it would be illogical to assume that male Caucasian contractors will only do business with other male Caucasians even where that is contrary to their economic interests. Id. Such an assumption, while perhaps economically illogical, nonetheless is consistent with the district court's own observation that, [d]iscriminating behavior ... is irrational and not subject to the often used legal standard of conduct—a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances. Id. at 1064. Additionally, this court has previously concluded that Denver's statistical studies which compare utilization of M/WBEs to availability, support the inference that local prime contractors are engaged in racial and gender discrimination. Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1529. Thus, Denver's disparity studies should not have been discounted because they fail to specifically identify those individuals or firms responsible for the discrimination. 81 The six questions posed by the district court as its aggregate litmus test contain misstatements or misapplications of the legal principles that govern equal protection cases like the one before the court. Not only did the district court analyze the ordinances and Denver's evidence supporting them through an incorrect legal framework, it also discounted Denver's studies as biased because they failed to address the six questions. See Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1071. According to the court, this bias was evident when the articulated purposes of the studies were contrasted with the court's questions. See id. Because the court's six questions incorrectly state Denver's burden, however, the studies cannot be criticized as biased on that basis. We conclude the district court's framework imposed a greater burden on Denver than that required by applicable law. Accordingly, the court failed to give sufficient weight to Denver's evidence. See id. (criticizing Denver's disparity studies because the methodology was not designed to answer the relevant questions); id. at 1074 (discounting Denver's anecdotal evidence because it does not answer the six questions considered in the court's evaluation of the statistical evidence.).