Opinion ID: 1952770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction over Divorce from Bed and Board

Text: An analysis of the origin and legal basis of the statutory authority to grant bed and board divorces demonstrates that defendant's assertion that Rhode Island does not have jurisdiction over this matter is incorrect. The practice of granting divorces from bed and board originated in the English ecclesiastical courts, where it was known by the Latin term mensa et thoro. See Hamel v. Hamel, 426 A.2d 259, 260 (R.I.1981). This limited divorce was effectively a legal separation  it authorized husband and wife to live apart but did not free them from the marital bond. Id. The divorce from bed and board, while existing at common law in this state, was not enacted in statutory form in Rhode Island until 1896 (G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 8). See Hamel, 426 A.2d at 261. That statute provided in part that [d]ivorces from bed, board and future cohabitation, until the parties be reconciled, may be granted for any of the causes for which by law a divorce from the bond of marriage may be decreed, and for such other causes as may seem to require the same. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 8. The general laws at that time also provided that [n]o petition for divorce shall be granted unless the petitioner shall, at the time of preferring such petition, be a domiciled inhabitant of this state   . Id. at § 10. While this language, standing alone, did not clarify whether the jurisdictional requirement was the same for both absolute divorces and divorces from bed and board, this Court held in Crow v. Crow, 41 R.I. 258, 260-63, 103 A. 739, 740-41 (1918), that the jurisdiction requirement in G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 10 applied to both absolute divorces and divorces from bed and board. Thus, jurisdiction of Rhode Island courts in cases of divorce, whether an absolute divorce or a divorce from bed and board, depended solely on the residence of the petitioner. See Crow, 41 R.I. at 261, 103 A. at 741. Since our decision in Crow, the divorce from bed and board statute has been amended several times. The jurisdictional requirement, however, remains the same. The statute provides, in relevant part: Divorces from bed, board, and future cohabitation, until the parties are reconciled, may be granted for any of the causes for which by law a divorce from the bond of marriage may be decreed, and for other causes which may seem to require a divorce from bed and board; provided, the petitioner is a domiciled inhabitant of this state and has resided in this state for a length of time that the court in its discretion seems to warrant the exercise of the conferred powers in this section. G.L. 1956 § 15-5-9. The motion justice in the case at bar interpreted § 15-5-9 to only require the petitioner to be domiciled in Rhode Island for the purposes of granting a divorce from bed and board. The defendant argues, however, that this interpretation was incorrect and that jurisdiction is proper only in Missouri. This Court reviews de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Pier House Inn, Inc. v. 421 Corporation, Inc., 812 A.2d 799, 804 (R.I.2002). When a question is a matter of statutory construction, the reviewing court first must look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. See Fleet National Bank v. Clark, 714 A.2d 1172, 1177 (R.I.1998). `If the language is clear on its face, then the plain meaning of the statute must be given effect' and this Court should not look elsewhere to discern the legislative intent. Id. (quoting Gilbane Co. v. Poulas, 576 A.2d 1195, 1196 (R.I.1990)). The jurisdictional requirement in § 15-5-9 is quite clear in that the only requirement for exercising jurisdiction over a divorce from bed and board is that the petitioner be domiciled in Rhode Island. Furthermore, because the jurisdictional requirement has remained the same since our interpretation in Crow, we see no reason to disagree with the decision of our brethren in that case  that jurisdiction depends solely on the domicile of the petitioner. See Crow, 41 R.I. at 261, 103 A. at 741. Therefore, as long as the motion justice, in his discretion, determined that plaintiff has resided in Rhode Island for a sufficient amount of time to warrant the exercise of powers in § 15-5-9, this Court will not disturb that finding unless it is clearly wrong or fail[s] to do justice between the parties. Parker v. Parker, 103 R.I. 435, 444, 238 A.2d 57, 62 (1968). In this case, the motion justice determined that plaintiff had resided in Rhode Island for close to a year before bringing this action and thus, should be able to petition the Family Court to make determinations about his marital status. This finding does not seem to be clearly wrong nor does it fail to do justice. Accordingly, we uphold the motion justice's determination that Rhode Island has jurisdiction over this petition for a divorce from bed and board. The defendant also argues, however, that such an exercise of jurisdiction would violate her due process rights because she does not have sufficient minimum contacts with Rhode Island as is required by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and Rhode Island's long arm statute, G.L. 1956 § 9-5-33. The defendant, however, fails to recognize that jurisdiction over divorce is considered quasi in rem, see Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87, 101-09 (1856), and is grounded in the rationale that states have the power, consistent with the due process clause, to exercise jurisdiction over cases concerning the legal status of its citizens, regardless of whether the other spouse has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 1216, 92 L.Ed. 1561, 1566 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99, 63 S.Ct. 207, 213, 87 L.Ed. 279, 286 (1942); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 209, 8 S.Ct. 723, 728, 31 L.Ed. 654, 658 (1888); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35, 24 L.Ed. 565, 573 (1877). [4] Therefore, because this petition for a divorce from bed and board clearly relates to plaintiff's marital and parental status, it is constitutionally proper for Rhode Island to exercise jurisdiction over defendant, despite her lack of minimum contacts with Rhode Island.