Opinion ID: 4514949
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliability of LaRosa's Testimony

Text: Before admitting expert testimony, a trial court must qualify the expert and determine whether the subject matter of the expert's proposed testimony is reliable, as required by Rule 702, SCRE. See Tapp, 398 S.C. at 388-89, 728 S.E.2d at 47475; see also White, 382 S.C. at 273, 676 S.E.2d at 688 (Nonscientific expert testimony must satisfy Rule 702, both in terms of expert qualifications and reliability of the subject matter.). In Tapp, the trial court determined a witness was qualified in the field of crime scene analysis, but we held the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to resolve the question of whether his testimony was reliable. 398 S.C. at 389, 728 S.E.2d at 475. As noted above, even though we concluded the trial court erred in admitting the testimony without first resolving the threshold reliability issue, we held this error was harmless because the witness's testimony could not have contributed to the verdict. Id. at 390, 728 S.E.2d at 476. We have not had the occasion to review a trial court's finding that a crime scene analysis expert's testimony was reliable. The trial court found LaRosa's testimony to be sufficiently reliable to be admitted, as required by Rule 702, SCRE, and Tapp. However, the court of appeals' majority found expert testimony that speculates on the motives and mindset of a perpetrator to be suspect, particularly when based on crime scene photographs, instead of viewing the crime scene in person, 'some' of a codefendant's prior statements, and none of the mental health histories of the parties. Prather, 422 S.C. at 110 n.5, 810 S.E.2d at 426 n.5. As noted, LaRosa testified as to the phases of staging and undoing and the purposes of those acts. This type of testimony has been admitted as reliable crime scene analysis testimony in other jurisdictions. See Stevens, 78 S.W.3d at 829, 831, 835 (upholding the trial court's decision to limit an FBI expert's testimony to his analysis of the evidence found at the crime scene, including testimony regarding the staging of the crime scene and the possibility that the homicides were committed by more than one offender); People v. Jackson, 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 70, 75, 83-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (holding an FBI agent's testimony was an indisputably admissible class of evidence, where the agent performed a crime scene assessment that was irrespective of who committed the crime, and [t]he purpose of his analysis was to behaviorally and forensically assess the crime and crime scene dynamics through the interaction of the offender or offenders, [the victim], and the location, in order to determine whether the crime scene had been staged, to focus on why the homicide occurred, and if an opinion could be rendered as to the offender's motive). Prather argues LaRosa's testimony amounted to a criminal profile and that criminal profiling is useful only as an investigative tool and is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted as expert testimony. A criminal profile is a collection of conduct and characteristics commonly displayed by those who commit a certain crime. People v. Robbie, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). A profile is simply an investigative technique. It is nothing more than a listing of characteristics that in the opinion of law enforcement officers are typical of a person engaged in a specific illegal activity. United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991). [T]he syllogism underlying profile evidence [is that] criminals act in a certain way; the defendant acted that way; therefore, the defendant is a criminal. Robbie, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485. An example of a criminal profile can be found in State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 513 S.E.2d 98 (1999). In Spann, an expert in crime scene analysis and criminal personality profiling testified on behalf of the defendant and profiled the killer of [ ] three women as a white male in his mid-20's to mid-30's with a history of mental illness, who was either single or had a dysfunctional marriage, a person with bizarre fantasies, a history of child abuse, and knowledge of the area. Id. at 621, 513 S.E.2d at 100. We did not approve profiling testimony in Spann; we simply noted in Spann that the defendant did not fit the expert's criminal profile. LaRosa did not examine the mental health histories of either Prather or Phillips, nor did he create criminal profiles for them. He also did not offer an opinion as to what either man did or did not do at the scene. LaRosa's testimony cannot be construed as drawing conclusions regarding the type of person(s) who committed the murder or the type of persons who carved on Victim's back and covered his body. Such testimony has been excluded in other jurisdictions as unreliable. See Stevens, 78 S.W.3d at 835 (holding the portion of the crime scene analysis expert's conclusions as to the type of individual who committed the crime based on the physical evidence found at the scene was unreliable and therefore inadmissible). LaRosa testified in general terms regarding the number of persons in there after the crime and never mentioned Prather's, Phillips', or Rabon's names. His testimony demonstrated the conflicting personalities of someone who staged the crime scene (carving and placement of the dildo) and someone who undid the crime scene (covering Victim). Importantly, LaRosa acknowledged he could not tell who participated in the killing of Victim. We conclude LaRosa's testimony did not rise to the level of criminal profiling. Unlike the court of appeals, we do not consider vital the fact that LaRosa did not visit the crime scene, reviewed only a portion of Phillips' statements to law enforcement, and did not review anyone's mental health history. The photographs and other information the State provided to LaRosa evidenced the superficial carving, the murdered Victim, and the placement of the pillow, blanket, and dildo— the pertinent information LaRosa needed to render his opinions. As we have stated several times, LaRosa's opinions went only to the number of personalities in there after the crime. LaRosa did not offer an opinion as to whether either personality murdered Victim, and he did not offer an opinion as to whether Rabon, Prather, or Phillips were involved in the staging or undoing. The mental health histories of Rabon, Prather, and Phillips were of no consequence to LaRosa's testimony on this point. We hold the trial court did not err in finding LaRosa's crime scene analysis testimony reliable. We share the reluctance of many courts to admit expert testimony in a criminal trial that rises to the level of a criminal profile of the perpetrator. We are also mindful that '[p]rofile' testimony and permissible expert opinion overlap, which underscores the necessity of objecting to questionable testimony during trial so that the trial court can limit any objectionable 'profile' aspect and channel the testimony toward admissible expert opinion instead. State v. Avendano-Lopez, 904 P.2d 324, 327 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). Our holding shall in no way be considered as our approval of criminal profiling evidence in the courts of this State.