Opinion ID: 654260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Money Paid to Freeman

Text: 99 Freeman asserts that the district court's admission of evidence of money paid to him for his assistance in securing a loan guarantee for Gulf Shrimp from Superior Valley Small Business Development Corporation violated Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). 100 The Government maintains that the evidence was properly admitted as  'direct evidence,' used to flesh out the circumstances surrounding the crime with which the defendant [was] charged, thereby allowing the jury to make sense of the testimony in its proper context. United States v. Ramirez-Jiminez, 967 F.2d 1321, 1327 (9th Cir.1992). According to the Government, the evidence in question was inextricably intertwined with Freeman's discussions with undercover FBI Agent Brennan concerning the fictitious corporation's need for special interest legislation, and it showed how the relationship between Freeman and Brennan developed. 101 Freeman concedes that the evidence of his meeting Brennan and developing a relationship with him concerning Gulf Shrimp was arguably intertwined with the crimes charged. However, he asserts that the specific references to the $2,000 in payments easily could have been excised without preventing the Government from putting the testimony in context. Although the district court may have been able to excise the reference, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to excise it. 102 In addition, the Government contends that it offered this evidence to refute Freeman's contentions that he lacked the requisite intent to commit the Hobbs Act charges against him. Rule 404(b) permits the introduction of evidence for purposes such as proving a person's 'motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.'  Ramirez-Jiminez, 967 F.2d at 1325. Freeman's acceptance of the payments tended to prove that he knew the purpose of the payments and, thus, possessed the requisite intent. SeeUnited States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455, 459 (7th Cir.1979); see alsoUnited States v. Mundi, 892 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119, 111 S.Ct. 1072, 112 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1991). 103 Freeman objects to the Government's argument on the ground that the Government offered this evidence before he testified as to innocent explanations for his behavior. Freeman concedes, however, that his intent was a material issue at trial. Thus, this evidence of intent was appropriately introduced in the Government's case in chief.