Opinion ID: 877065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Background and Problems Presented

Text: As I stated in the introduction, a simple problem is presented here, and it is only made more complicated by the majority opinion. The question centers around whether the trial court decided the without consent issue by application of the right law. No one knows. Because we do not know, I say that if we are going to send a man to prison, we should first be sure of what the trial court actually decided. The essence of the majority opinion is that it really doesn't matter what the trial court actually decided  we can tell from the evidence that the defendant is guilty. The question presented is not what the evidence shows as to the consent issue  the question is what the trial court decided as to the consent issue. Because it is impossible to make this determination from the record here, I believe that the assault convictions must be reversed. The problems presented can best be understood in the procedural context of how the consent issue arose  the question at trial arose as to what law should apply to the facts to determine the question of consent. At the end of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss the charges because the State failed to prove lack of consent. It appears that the State was at all times proceeding under an assumption that without consent was proved as a matter of law simply by proving the age of the defendant (65) and the age of the boy (10)  the State taking the position that the boy was legally incapable of consenting to the sexual contact. The State did prove the defendant's age and the boy's age. In response to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the State was apparently taken by surprise, and thus moved the trial court to offer additional evidence on the consent issue. This request was taken under advisement and later denied. Both sides then submitted briefs on the consent issue. The State argued that not only was lack of actual consent proved by the evidence, but that in any event the boy was legally incapable of consenting because of his age. The State urged two incapacity to consent theories upon the trial judge: First, that the statutes providing that one under the age of 16 is incapable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse (see sections 45-5-501 and 45-5-503), and that the same statutes applied to the sexual assault statute, section 45-5-502. Second, the State argued that case law justified application of the common law rule that someone of this boy's age is precluded from giving his legal consent to anything. The trial court later entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and found the defendant guilty. The majority opinion sets forth the pertinent findings and conclusions as to both assault convictions. Defendant then appealed to this Court. In defendant's opening brief to this Court, he effectively foreclosed any reliance by the State on either theory of legal incapacity to consent. The State recognized this in its reply brief by conceding that neither theory of legal incapacity to consent was the right law to apply to this case. Thus, the State confined its argument to whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a determination that the boy did not in fact consent to the sexual contact. The State ignored the obvious issue pulled into focus by its concession that neither legal incapacity to consent theory could apply here: Assuming there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to justify findings and conclusions that the boy did not consent, how do we know that the trial judge actually decided the consent issue on this basis unless he told us so in his findings and conclusions? He did not. In fact, it is impossible to tell from the findings and conclusions just what theory of consent the trial court applied in finding and concluding that without consent was proved. We are left to guess. Even the majority opinion acknowledges that it is impossible to tell from the findings and conclusions which theory of consent the trial court applied to the consent issue: ... Assuming that the evidence is sufficient (and we so find), we are confronted with a bare bones set of findings and conclusions, from which it is not apparent the precise legal basis upon which the trial court decided the issue of consent ... The majority also accurately defines the problems created by the bare bones findings and conclusions when presented to an appellate court: Our task here, however, does not end with a holding that the evidence is sufficient for sustaining a finding of guilt. We are left with a sufficient evidentiary record and with no precise basis of determining how the trial court reached its decision. ... In this appeal, the State concedes the inapplicability of either of its arguments with relation to inability to consent as a matter of law. The State thus concentrates on its first approach: which is that circumstantial evidence existing is sufficient to prove the lack of consent. We agree with this assessment. However, the findings and conclusions entered by the trial court do not tell us on what legal basis the trial court determined the issue of consent. Did the trial court determine as a matter of evidence only that the State had proved lack of consent? Or did the trial court determine that the young boy was, as a matter of law, incapable of giving consent by either of the two theories advanced by the State? Unfortunately, before deciding to affirm the convictions here, the majority does not purport to answer these questions. Why are we affirming the convictions and sending this man to prison if we do not know the answers to these questions? How can we in good conscience put our stamp of approval upon these convictions when we do not know the answers to these questions? In fact, if anything at all is to be gleaned from the pertinent findings and conclusions quoted in the majority opinion, it is that it is just as likely as not that the trial judge decided the consent issue based on the boy's legal incapacity to consent  the wrong law. At trial, the State proved both the age of the defendant (65) and the age of the boy (10). Before the trial judge entered the findings and conclusions, the State urged him to use one or the other of the legal incapacity to consent theories. In each of the pertinent findings, the trial judge recites the age of the defendant (65) and the age of the boy (10), and repeats this in each of the pertinent conclusions of law. It is from these underlying findings and conclusions that the trial judge found the defendant guilty under section 45-5-502, supra, the sexual assault statute. In any event, it cannot be stated beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial judge applied the right law. In cases that present problems such as this, there is a well-known and often-used rule that appellate courts apply in deciding what must be done with the judgment under review. Invocation and application of that rule here would require this Court to reverse the assault convictions. Unfortunately in this case, we ignored this rule.