Opinion ID: 1427732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentences Imposed for the Same Crime in Other States

Text: We also examine the punishment imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3010. This comparison is difficult because the offenses defendant committed are chargeable as a broad variety of crimes with varying punishments. However, we have attempted to compare penalties for the crimes closest to those committed here: consensual, nonincestuous, heterosexual intercourse with a 14-year-old. Additionally, we compare each of defendant's sentences individually, keeping in mind that the 15-year sentence was imposed for a first offense, and that the 25-year sentence was imposed for a second offense. We also consider only those sentences imposed for a defendant with no prior felony convictions, other than the first offense used as an enhancement factor for the second offense. Our focus is necessarily on the mandatory minimum sentences imposed in other jurisdictions, because that is what defendant received here. We do not consider significant the state's argument that defendant could have received maximum sentences in other jurisdictions greater than the minimums imposed in this case, because the record clearly indicates that the trial court did not find aggravating factors justifying maximum sentences under these circumstances. (1) 15-year Sentence for First Offense In 10 jurisdictions, defendant's offenses would either not be a crime or would be punishable only as a misdemeanor with a sentence of less than one year and/or a fine. [4] For a first felony offense in the remaining jurisdictions, defendant would have faced a minimum penalty of one, two, or three years, [5] with probation often available. Thus, our statute is unique among all jurisdictions in that it imposes a minimum mandatory term of 15 years, which is 5 times higher than that imposed in any other jurisdiction. In all jurisdictions but Arizona, the sentencing judge has a wide range of discretion in imposing a sentence at the bottom of the statutory range that fits the individual circumstances of the crime. Although the maximum allowable sentence in some jurisdictions would have fallen within the range of sentencing provided for a first offender under A.R.S. § 13-604.01(A), in no jurisdiction would the sentencing judge be required to impose a sentence of more than 3 years for the identical offense. Thus, our legislature has mandated a penalty potentially disproportionate to an individual criminal act or defendant. See J. Howe, Thoughts on Mandatory Sentencing, Ariz.Bar J. June-July 1985, at 24-25. Such potential disproportionality is not enough to allow us to find defendant's sentences cruel and unusual. See State v. Taylor, 160 Ariz. 415, 773 P.2d 974 (1989) (Although on the national spectrum Arizona deals with crimes against children more severely than many other states, `[t]he Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a state reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how to best administer its criminal laws.' Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3164, 82 L.Ed.2d 340, 355 (1984)). Such potential differences in sentencing are a mark of federalism, not unconstitutionality. State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 272 (Utah 1986). In this case, however, the potential disproportion between the sentences defendant received and those sentences actually imposed on other similarly situated defendants in other jurisdictions is actual. Defendant has supplied us with a myriad of examples in the published case law of other jurisdictions. A few representative citations illustrate his point: Diefenderfer v. State, 745 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1987) (defendant pleaded guilty to third degree sexual assault of a girl under 14; the execution of his sentence of 3 to 5 years suspended and 4 years probation imposed); State v. DeJesus, 10 Conn. App. 591, 524 A.2d 1156 (1987) (defendant pleaded guilty to second degree sexual assault of a 14-year old; sentence of 5 years upheld); State v. La Borde, 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958) (defendant convicted of carnal knowledge of 14-year old; sentenced to one year, 9 months); State v. Smart, 247 La. 174, 170 So.2d 365 (1965) (defendant convicted of carnal knowledge of a 13-year old; sentenced to 3 years); State v. Rodriguez, 179 N.J. Super. 129, 430 A.2d 957 (1981) (defendant convicted of sexual assault of a 13-year old; sentenced to 4 years); State v. Newell, 82 N.C. App. 707, 348 S.E.2d 158 (1986) (defendant convicted of taking indecent liberties with a consenting child between 13 and 16; sentenced to 3 years); State v. Hartman, 145 Wis.2d 1, 426 N.W.2d 320 (1988) (defendant convicted of statutory rape of a 14-year old; sentenced to a term of not more than 3 years, but suspended and defendant placed on probation with 6 months in county jail work release program). Additionally, defendant's appellate counsel has avowed to the court that he has diligently searched two centuries of case law of each of our 50 sister states. This required the review of just over 2,600 cases. Not one case was found where a similarly situated defendant received an aggravated sentence remotely comparable to that imposed as a mandatory minimum upon Mr. Bartlett. Given this authority, we conclude that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed on defendant for his first offense was disproportionate to sentences received by similarly situated defendants in other jurisdictions. (2) 25-year sentence for second offense A comparison of the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence defendant received for the second offense with those imposed in other jurisdictions is complicated by the enhancement of defendant's second sentence because the first count was treated as a prior predicate felony. Most jurisdictions punish repeat offenders more stringently, and enhancement of penalties on the basis of prior offenses has been consistently upheld against eighth amendment attacks. See, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276, 100 S.Ct. at 1140; Cocio v. Bramlett, 872 F.2d 889, 893 (9th Cir.1989). However, we are mindful that the legislature, in requiring a 25-year minimum sentence for a second offense, implicitly assumed that it was enhancing a constitutionally proportionate minimum sentence of 15 years for a first offense. We have already found the minimum sentence for the first offense to be disproportionate to the facts of this case. Additionally, the prior felony in this case was one for which defendant was simultaneously tried and sentenced with the second offense, a factor not existing in other jurisdictions. See A.R.S. § 13-604(H). Also complicating our analysis is the mandatory consecutive nature of the two sentences, along with the absence of the availability of parole. We have previously refused to find the consecutive nature of two sentences for two separate crimes to be a factor that would render the second sentence disproportionate. Jonas, 164 Ariz. at 249, 792 P.2d at 712. We thus do not consider that factor here. [6] Nonavailability of parole, however, is a factor in determining proportionality, although the absence of parole, in itself, does not make a sentence disproportionate. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 and n. 24, 103 S.Ct. at 1151 and n. 24; Jonas, 164 Ariz. at 249, 792 P.2d at 712. In this case, the absence of parole availability requires us to consider that defendant will serve the entire 25-year sentence for the second offense. Despite these difficulties, a comparison of what penalties defendant would face for a second offense in other jurisdictions, although not as clear as the comparison for a first offense, compels the conclusion that defendant would be subject to a much lighter minimum mandatory sentence for his second offense in all but one state. In Nebraska, defendant would be subject to a statutory range of 25 to 50 years for a second conviction of sexual assault involving a consenting child less than 16 years old, and would not be eligible for parole. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1)(c), (3). However, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Solem v. Helm , a finding that a defendant could have received an identically harsh sentence in one other state is also a clear indication that he could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. 463 U.S. at 299, 103 S.Ct. at 3014 (emphasis added). Furthermore, we have not been advised by the state of any defendant charged in Nebraska with offenses similar to Bartlett's actually receiving such a harsh sentence. Rather, the published cases that we have found challenging the mandatory Nebraska sentence for a second offense have involved more heinous offenses, including forcible rape with serious physical injuries to the victim. See, e.g., State v. Brand, 219 Neb. 402, 363 N.W.2d 516 (1985) (defendant received 35-year sentence for his second conviction of first-degree sexual assault involving the use of force; sentence found not disproportionate to crime). Under these circumstances, we cannot find the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for defendant's second offense to be proportionate merely on the basis of the Nebraska statute. Except for Nebraska, no other jurisdiction imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of more than 10 years for a second offense similar to defendant's. In no jurisdiction did we find the particularly harsh combination of provisions present here, including both mandatory consecutive sentencing and nonavailability of parole. We must conclude, therefore, that the 25-year mandatory minimum imposed for defendant's second offense is also disproportionate to the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants in other jurisdictions. Based on the above analysis, we hold that defendant's sentences of 15 years for the first offense and 25 years for the second offense are disproportionate to the crimes he committed under the specific facts of this case, and thus violate the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. This is a narrow holding limited to the facts and circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court has said that successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences are exceedingly rare. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90, 103 S.Ct. at 3009. This is such a rare case. 3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment under the Arizona Constitution Although this court requested additional briefing on whether defendant's sentence violated either the federal or state constitutional provisions prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, neither party analyzed the state constitutional provision separately from the federal grounds. Article 2, § 15 of the Arizona Constitution is identically worded to its federal counterpart prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment. The framers of the Arizona Constitution, in a rare case of using the federal Constitution as a model, adopted the federal wording cruel and unusual punishment over the committee's proposed wording that neither cruel nor unusual punishment should be permitted. J. Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 Ariz.St.L.J. 1, 85 and n. 524 (1988), citing Journal of the [Arizona] Constitutional Convention 463 (Con.P. Cronin Comp. 1925). This deliberate adoption of the federal wording expressed the framers' intent to give legislators wide discretion in imposing methods of capital punishment. See S. Feldman & D. Abney, The Double Security of Federalism: Protecting Individual Liberty Under the Arizona Constitution, 20 Ariz.St.L.J. 115, 122 (1988). Here, where identically worded federal and state constitutional provisions are alleged to have been violated, when the parties do not argue that the state constitution provides greater protection than does the federal analog, and when we have already found a violation of the federal counterpart, we need not address whether defendant's sentences would have violated the Arizona constitution had they not violated the eighth amendment. Having concluded that the sentences imposed in this case violate the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, we do not address whether they violate art. 2, § 15 of the Arizona Constitution. DISPOSITION In his petition for review, defendant argues that we should reduce his sentence to one more proportionate to his crime pursuant to our authority to reduce excessive sentences under A.R.S. § 13-4037(B), which provides: If, in its opinion, the conviction is proper but the punishment imposed is greater than under the circumstances of the case ought to be inflicted ... the supreme court shall impose any legal sentence, not more severe than that originally imposed, which in its opinion is proper.... The ability to impose any legal sentence necessarily implies that we are limited to reducing an excessive sentence to one within the statutory range enacted by the legislature, assuming that range is constitutional. See Wahl v. State, 39 Ariz. 62, 3 P.2d 1052 (1931); State v. Gourdin, 156 Ariz. 337, 751 P.2d 997 (App. 1988) (a sentence not authorized by law is illegal). Indeed, in prior cases in which we have reduced an excessive sentence under authority of A.R.S. § 13-4037 or its predecessor, A.R.S. § 13-1717, we have imposed a sentence within the range of sentencing provided by the legislature. See, e.g., State v. Telavera, 76 Ariz. 183, 261 P.2d 997 (1953) (excessive sentence of 10 to 20 years reduced to 7 to 10 years); State v. Seelen, 107 Ariz. 256, 485 P.2d 826 (1971); State v. Flores, 108 Ariz. 231, 495 P.2d 461 (1972); State v. Waldrip, 111 Ariz. 516, 533 P.2d 1151 (1975). In this case, however, we hold that the statutory range of sentencing under A.R.S. § 13-604.01 cannot constitutionally be applied to defendant's crimes under the facts and circumstances of this case. We therefore have no available legal sentence within the range of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 to impose on defendant. The state argues that if we find defendant's sentences unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, appellant must be set free, as he has committed a crime for which there would be no punishment. The state bases its position on the assumption that the underlying substantive offense of sexual conduct with a minor, prohibited by A.R.S. § 13-1405, is so inextricably united with the sentencing provisions of A.R.S. § 13-604.01, that sentencing defendant under any other provision of the law would undermine the intent of the entire statutory scheme. We cannot agree with this proposition. We do not invalidate defendant's convictions for two counts of sexual conduct with a minor under age 15. Such offenses have been validly designated class 2 felonies by the legislature. Neither do we hold the sentencing provisions of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 unconstitutional as applied to other defendants under different circumstances. We merely hold that the sentencing provisions of A.R.S. § 13-604.01, which are more stringent than those applied to other class 2 felons, cannot be applied constitutionally to this defendant under these facts and circumstances. The result is to bar application of those provisions to this case, leaving defendant to be sentenced the same as any other class 2 felon to whom the provisions of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 would not apply. Thus, under the remaining statutory range provided for class 2 felonies in A.R.S. §§ 13-701 and -702, defendant could be sentenced within the range that would include, for the first offense, a minimum term of 5.25 years, a presumptive term of 7 years, and a maximum term of 14 years, of which he would have to serve at least one-half before any possible release. As a first-time nondangerous offender, he would be eligible for probation. For the second offense, defendant's sentence could be enhanced by the first offense, see A.R.S. § 13-604(H), within the range that would include a minimum term of 7 years, a presumptive term of 10.5 years, and a maximum term of 21 years. See A.R.S. § 13-604(B). Defendant would not be eligible for probation for the second offense, and would have to serve at least two-thirds of any sentence imposed before release. A.R.S. § 13-604(B). Defendant's sentences would run consecutively unless the trial court stated on the record its reasons for imposing concurrent sentences. A.R.S. § 13-708. Such a sentencing scheme can be applied validly to this defendant as a class 2 felon. This wide discretionary range of sentencing will enable the trial court to proportionately tailor the harshness of the penalty to the severity of the crimes. Because we cannot discern from the record before us what sentences the trial court would have imposed had it not felt bound by the mandatory provisions of A.R.S. § 13-604.01, we remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. We also vacate that portion of the court of appeals memorandum decision that is inconsistent with this opinion. GORDON, C.J., FELDMAN, V.C.J., and CAMERON and MOELLER, JJ., concur.