Opinion ID: 781722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial Discretion Under Section 2332(d)

Text: 180 Yousef argues that § 2332 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, see generally J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404-06, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928), because the statute authorizes the Attorney General to define what conduct constitutes an offense. 181 Section 2332 does not represent an unconstitutional delegation of power to the Attorney General. Indeed, § 2332(d) does not delegate any legislative power to the Attorney General. Rather, it merely sets limits on how the Attorney General can exercise his discretion to prosecute. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472-74, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (holding that the Clean Air Act was not an unconstitutional delegation because it prescribed limits on how agency could exercise its authority). Section 2332(d) limits the Justice Department's prosecution of crimes under § 2332 to those crimes in which the defendant intended to target the Government or civilian population of the United States. Exercise of such prosecutorial discretion involves no rulemaking power on the part of the Executive Branch and, therefore, cannot constitute delegation of legislative power to the Attorney General — let alone an unlawful delegation of such power. 182 Even if § 2332(d) did represent a delegation of legislative power to the Attorney General, such a delegation would not be unconstitutional. It has long been the rule that Congress may delegate some of its legislative powers to the Executive Branch, so long as that delegation is made under the limitation of a prescribed standard. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 282 U.S. 311, 324, 51 S.Ct. 159, 75 L.Ed. 359 (1931). This standard need only provide an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 409, 48 S.Ct. 348; see also Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472, 121 S.Ct. 903. Moreover, this standard need not be precisely defined. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 496 n. 13, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002) (noting Congress' delegation of extremely broad regulatory authority to the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] in the Medicaid area); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475, 121 S.Ct. 903 ([E]ven in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never demanded[] ... that statutes provide a determinate criterion for saying how much of the regulated harm is too much. (Internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 183 Subsection (d) provides a clearly intelligible principle to which the Attorney General must adhere — namely, to prosecute only those cases where the intent of the offense was to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against the Government or civilian population of the United States. Cf. N.B.C., 319 U.S. at 225, 63 S.Ct. 997 (upholding statute delegating power to Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast spectrum as required by public interest, convenience, or necessity). 184 In sum, § 2332 does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the Attorney General. 185