Opinion ID: 2641099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Prosecution History Estoppel

Text: As originally filed, claim 1 recited in relevant part only “a window with a flat surface contacted by said probe tip.” The Examiner rejected the original claim as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2, and anticipated under § 102(b) by U.S. Patent No. 4,757,256 (Sato). J.A. 10637, 10640. ITC responded by amending the claim to also recite “in a first state where said probe tip is driven in contact with said window with a first force.” J.A. 10648–49, 10653–56. The district court concluded that prosecution history estoppel does not preclude a finding of infringement by equivalence. It determined that the original and issued claims “both required contact between the plate and the probe tip,” and therefore held that ITC did not make a narrowing amendment. Integrated Tech. Corp. v. Rudolph Techs., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-2182, ECF No. 546, slip op. at 5 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2012). Rudolph argues that the court erred as a matter of law by concluding that the amendment was not narrowing. It contends that the equivalent was literally within the scope of the original claim. Rudolph argues that the amendment narrowed the scope of the claim by reciting that the probe tip must be “driven in contact with said window” in both recited states. It argues that prosecution history estoppel presumptively applies because the narrowing amendment was in response to patentability rejections. Rudolph also argues that ITC cannot satisfy its burden to rebut the presumption of prosecution history estoppel. First, Rudolph argues that the equivalent bears a direct—as opposed to tangential—relationship to the amendment. It contends that, even if ITC did not need to distinguish the prior art on the basis of whether the probe tip and window are in physical contact, it chose to do so. Rudolph argues that the prosecution history does not provide a discernible tangential rationale for the amendment because ITC relied on the difference between the 6 INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. equivalent and the amended limitation to obtain claim 1’s allowance. Second, Rudolph argues that the equivalent was objectively foreseeable at the time of the amendment because the original claim literally covered the equivalent. Rudolph also contends that the equivalent was not technically unforeseeable at the time of the amendment. It argues that the redesign of its pre-2007 product involved a straightforward software change to regulate the placement of the probe tip above the viewing window when obtaining the image in a first state. ITC responds that the doctrine of equivalents applies. It argues that the court correctly held that the amendment was not narrowing. ITC contends that the original claim implied measuring the probe tip at two different points of actual physical contact with the viewing window. It argues that the amendment merely expressed that implication, and relies on the specification’s reference to the probe tip’s first position as the location where the tip “would initially contact the video window.” ’894 patent, col. 15 l. 4. Even if its amendment was narrowing, ITC argues that it rebutted any presumption that prosecution history estoppel applies. First, it contends that the amendment bore only a tangential relationship to the equivalent. ITC argues that the prior art cited during prosecution failed to disclose either taking two images of the probe tip or taking an image of the probe tip at the point where it would initially contact the viewing window. It contends that the amendment therefore distinguished the prior art solely on the basis of obtaining two images of the probe tip at different positions. ITC thus argues that it did not distinguish the prior art based on the invention requiring physical contact between the probe tip and the viewing window. Second, ITC argues that the equivalent was objectively unforeseeable at the time of the amendment. It contends that Rudolph developed its own commercial notouch technology after considerable effort and expense. In support, ITC argues that Rudolph obtained a patent on its no-touch technology based on an application that was INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, 7 INC. filed seven years after the amendment. It also contends that the district court found that the specification of the ’894 patent does not disclose the no-touch equivalent, and therefore ITC could not have originally claimed the equivalent. As an initial matter, we agree with Rudolph that prosecution history estoppel presumptively applies because the amendment narrowed the scope of the original claim in response to patentability rejections. By its plain language, the amendment added that there must be two different forces that drive the probe tip in contact with the viewing window in two separate states. Accordingly, we hold that ITC surrendered the territory between the original and issued claims, including the equivalent. The remaining question is whether ITC met its bur- den of proving that an exception to prosecution history estoppel applies. We hold that it has not, and therefore prosecution history estoppel bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents.
The tangential relation exception is “very narrow.” Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 480 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We ask “whether the reason for the narrowing amendment was peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the alleged equivalent.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc). “[A]n amendment made to avoid prior art that contains the equivalent in question is not tangential.” Chimie, 402 F.3d at 1383 (quoting Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369). “It does not follow, however, that equivalents not within the prior art must be tangential to the amendment.” Id. The tangential relation inquiry “focuses on the patentee’s objectively apparent reason for the narrowing amendment,” which “should be discernible from the prosecution history record.” Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369 (internal citations omitted). For example, in Felix v. American Honda Motor Co., we rejected the patentee’s argument that a limitation was tangential because he had expressly relied on a second limitation to distinguish prior art during prosecution. 562 F.3d 1167, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 8 INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 2009). We found that the patentee “could easily have simply amended” the original claim to recite only the nontangential limitation, yet he chose to recite both. Id. Here, a tangential rationale for the amendment is not objectively apparent from the prosecution history. As the Examiner observed when rejecting the original claim, Sato discloses “a surface contacted by a probe.” J.A. 10640. It may be that ITC did not need to surrender a lack of physical contact between the probe tip and window in either state to overcome Sato. The dispositive fact is that ITC chose to do so. In response to the Examiner’s patentability rejections, ITC explained that the invention generally included a preferred embodiment in which “a video camera . . . inspects the position of each probe tip as the probes are engaged in contact with the flat surface of a window.” J.A. 10652 (emphasis added). It also stated that, “[i]n another embodiment, the video camera provides a digital image of a probe contacting the surface of the window in [a first and second state] where the probe tip is driven in contact [with two different forces].” Id. (emphases added). ITC expressly stated that the prior art did not “teach or suggest such features,” without limiting which features it meant. J.A. 10653. To distinguish the amended claim, in particular, from Sato, ITC stated that the claim “calls for the viewing system to obtain a digital image of the probe tip . . . in [first and second states in which] said probe tip is driven in contact with said window.” J.A. 10656 (emphasis added). ITC also told the Examiner that the aspect of the invention at issue was “best exemplified” by Figure 6(a), id., which discloses an embodiment where the probe tip is in the “zero overdrive position,” ’894 patent, col. 15 ll. 5–6. That statement, however, does not establish a tangential rationale because “zero overdrive” still encompasses physical contact between the probe tip and the window. ITC again relied on contact between the probe tip and window in responding to a subsequent rejection based on different prior art. It stated that “[t]he claims of the present invention are directed towards predicting . . . the movement . . . of probe tips . . . after initial contact with INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, 9 INC. the bonding pad.” J.A. 10815 (emphasis in original). ITC reiterated that “[i]n the context of the specific language of the claims, [the claims] each recite that the probe tip is driven at two different forces or overdrives . . . after contacting a window . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). ITC’s representations convey to the public that it was relying on physical contact to overcome the prior art. The public is entitled to rely on those representations. Whether ITC’s interpretation of the prosecution history is plausible is irrelevant. It must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, based on the prosecution history, the “objectively apparent reason for the narrowing amendment” was only tangentially related to the equivalent. Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369. We hold that it has not met that burden.
The patentee may rebut the application of prosecution history estoppel by establishing that the equivalent would have been objectively unforeseeable to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the amendment. Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369; Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 523 F.3d 1304, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Technology developed after an amendment is not necessarily objectively unforeseeable. Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369. We agree with Rudolph that ITC has not proven that the equivalent was objectively unforeseeable. The notouch products obtain an image in a first state when the probe tip is five microns above the viewing window, and in a second state when the probe tip touches the window. Accordingly, the no-touch products literally satisfy the original claim’s limitation of “a window with a flat surface contacted by said probe tip.” When the patentee “originally claimed the subject matter alleged to infringe but then narrowed the claim in response to a rejection, he may not argue that the surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject matter.” Festo, 535 U.S. at 733–34. That principle controls in this case regardless of when Rudolph developed its no-touch products. Moreover, the record does not demonstrate that the equivalent is the innovative aspect of Rudolph’s patented 10 INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. no-touch products. We hold that ITC did not prove that the equivalent was objectively unforeseeable. ITC’s argument that literal infringement by the notouch products is an alternative basis to affirm the judgment is without merit. Substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of no literal infringement by these products. See, e.g., J.A. A9879–80, 9676, 9894–95, 9903 (testimony by Rudolph witnesses that probe tips in the no-touch products do not physically contact the viewing window in the first state); J.A. 14310 (product manual stating that “[s]ystem . . . captures images at both the no touch and overtravel positions”). We will not upset that verdict.