Opinion ID: 2584111
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: part i. assumption of original jurisdiction.

Text: ¶ 3 Original jurisdiction may be assumed and the extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus or prohibition is available under proper circumstances to order or prohibit the production of evidence prior to trial. Inhofe v. Wiseman, 1989 OK 41, 772 P.2d 389, 391; Ellison v. Gray, 1985 OK 35, 702 P.2d 360, 362-363. However, before appropriate relief may be granted, it must be shown that the trial court exceeded its authority or discretion in ordering or denying pretrial discovery. Ellison, 702 P.2d at 363. In other words, such extraordinary relief is available to prevent or remedy the unauthorized use of judicial force when the trial court has attempted to exercise judicial power or authority not authorized by, and contrary, to law. See Alva State Bank and Trust Co. v. Dayton, 1988 OK 44, 755 P.2d 635, 635-636. Accordingly, we will entertain original jurisdiction to control a trial court's handling of pretrial discovery matters only in rare cases. Although this is such a case, we make clear (as we did in Christian v. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 3, 65 P.3d 591, 596, concerning trial court rulings on motions in limine ) that we will not serve as a pretrial reviewing panel for trial court orders adjudicating discovery matters. ¶ 4 We assume original jurisdiction here, however, because the questions involved are primarily ones of first impression for this Court and the record shows an unauthorized use of judicial force by the trial court in its rulings regarding the depositions of the three witnesses and their fee entitlement. Though Court of Civil Appeals' decisions exist concerning issues relating to expert witness fees involving depositions of experts and this Court, on one or more occasions, has issued opinions touching the edges of such a dispute, the precise controversy has not been definitively addressed by us. [7] In our view, this opinion will promote the interest of judicial economy and act as a clarifying vehicle for courts statewide on the treatment of expert witnesses who are sought to be deposed in a situation where one or more of the parties to a lawsuit and the witness disagree on whether the deponent should receive more compensation than the $10.00 per day ordinary statutory [§ 81(A)(3)] witness fee under 1) 12 O.S.Supp.2002, § 2004.1(C)(3)(b)(2)(unretained expert) or 2) § 3226(B)(3)(a)(2) or § 3226(B)(3)(b), and § 3226(B)(3)(c)(1)[concerning discovery of facts known and opinions held by an expert a) the other party expects to call as a witness, the facts or opinions acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, or b) who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial]. PART II. FACTS, BACKGROUND AND REVIEW STANDARD. [8] ¶ 5 A fire occurred in April 1999, destroying a duplex located in Oklahoma City owned by Mr. Heffron. Mr. Dallas investigated the blaze in furtherance of the performance of his duties with the OKCFD. Mr. Heffron was charged criminally regarding the fire and at the time this matter was presented to us, the criminal case was pending. A preliminary hearing in the criminal case has been held, at which Mr. Dallas testified. [9] ¶ 6 Mr. Heffron had a policy of insurance with Emcasco covering the building and he submitted a claim to recover on it. Emcasco investigated the claim and denied it in January 2000. In essence, according to Emcasco's response to the application to assume original jurisdiction, one reason the claim was denied was its conclusion the fire was caused intentionally by or at Mr. Heffron's direction, i.e., arson. [10] ¶ 7 Mr. Dallas, in addition to being employed by the OKCFD, works for Dallas & Associates Fire & Explosion Consultants, Inc., apparently a private company specializing in fire cause and origin analysis, fire reconstruction, and other fire-related expert services. Mr. Dallas asserts he makes his living based on his expertise in this highly technical field. Both Mr. Heffron and Emcasco have listed Mr. Dallas as a trial witness in the Pretrial Conference Order (PTO) filed in the trial court. Mr. Heffron indicates in the PTO Mr. Dallas will testify to the facts and circumstances relating to investigation of the fire; Emcasco that he will testify to the fire's cause and origin investigation. ¶ 8 Neither Mr. Heffron nor Emcasco have retained Mr. Dallas to act as an expert as to any aspect of the underlying lawsuit. As noted above, he investigated the fire in the performance of his job duties with the OKCFD. Further, nothing in the materials presented to us indicates or shows Mr. Dallas investigated the fire for Dallas & Associates Fire & Explosion Consultants, Inc. The trial court order that denied Mr. Heffron's motion to compel Mr. Dallas' deposition for the ordinary witness fee also ruled he was entitled to $3,000.00 from Mr. Heffron for the taking of the deposition. The trial judge determined he is so entitled as an unretained expert witness fee. Further, as to Mr. Dallas, the order, as we read it, expressly acknowledges that Mr. Heffron is only interested in obtaining facts from him concerning what he did in relation to investigation of the fire in the performance of his duties with the OKCFD, rather than obtaining his expert opinion on the cause thereof. We note that Mr. Heffron presumably knows his opinion on the fire's cause as Mr. Dallas testified at Mr. Heffron's criminal preliminary hearing. Finally, Mr. Dallas himself seems to admit in his trial court response to Mr. Heffron's motion to compel that Mr. Heffron may depose him as to matters concerning what he did in regard to his fire investigation at the scene, i.e., what he smelled, sensed, or observed, etc., without paying him an expert witness fee. ¶ 9 Materials presented to us also show Emcasco hired Mr. Lee and Mr. Bulla to assist it in adjusting and investigating Mr. Heffron's claim for insurance benefits, i.e., prior to denial of the claim. In fact, as we read its submissions here and in the trial court, Emcasco so admits. Nothing before us shows, and Emcasco does not argue, that either Mr. Lee or Mr. Bulla were hired by it in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial. The trial court order entered as to them that denied Mr. Heffron's quest to take their depositions for the $10.00 per day ordinary statutory witness fee does not find or conclude either was hired by Emcasco in anticipation of litigation or trial preparation or that any facts known or opinions held by them were acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial; nor does the trial court order cite § 3226 as a basis for ruling either are entitled to more compensation than that provided in § 81(A)(3). ¶ 10 The trial court's rationale as to Messrs. Lee and Bulla on the compensation issue appears contained in three numbered paragraphs of its order, where the trial judge's findings are delineated. The three paragraphs, in toto, follow: 1. Mike Lee and Gordon Bulla are, and were at all times relevant and material, adjusters and/or investigators hired by [Emcasco] to adjust and investigate [Mr. Heffron's] claim for recovery for a fire loss under a policy of insurance issued to him by [Emcasco]. 2. [Emcasco's] counsel represented to the Court that the fees being requested in exchange for production of Mr. Lee and Mr. Bulla for deposition are the same fees said individuals charged [Emcasco] for their time for services rendered adjusting and investigating the relevant insurance claim made by [Mr. Heffron]. 2(sic). The witnesses, Mike Lee and Gordon Bulla, are entitled to be compensated for their time involved in giving discovery depositions in this case and should be compensated by the party requesting to take their depositions. ¶ 11 Mr. Lee is expected to be called at trial by Emcasco, but Mr. Bulla is not. Mr. Heffron has listed the latter as a witness in the PTO. Emcasco indicates in the PTO that Mr. Lee will testify at trial concerning the investigation of events and circumstances surrounding the fire and adjustment of the claim. In the PTO Mr. Heffron states that Mr. Bulla will testify concerning the facts and circumstances relating to investigation of the claim. [11] Furthermore, Emcasco admits in its response to Mr. Heffron's application to assume original jurisdiction that Mr. Heffron has been furnished with all of Mr. Bulla's reports prior to the date suit was filed[.] Response of Illinois Emcasco Insurance Company, etc., pg. 6, filed March 11, 2003. We assume said reports were furnished to Mr. Heffron by Emcasco. The materials presented to us do not conclusively show, one way or the other, whether Emcasco has similarly furnished to Mr. Heffron reports generated by Mr. Lee. ¶ 12 We deal with Messrs. Lee and Bulla first because whether they are entitled to expert witness compensation from Mr. Heffron for his taking of their depositions rather than the § 81(A)(3) ordinary witness feeis controlled by portions of § 3226. Then we turn to Mr. Dallas, as his entitlement to expert witness compensationas opposed to the ordinary witness feeis governed by § 2004.1(C)(3)(b)(2). We assume for purposes of our decision that Messrs. Lee, Bulla and Dallas are experts in their respective fields (i.e., fire investigation, claims adjustment and private investigation, the latter two relating to cause and origin fire investigation) by knowledge, skill, experience, training and/or education. [12] ¶ 13 Further, we note that § 3226 is part of our statutory discovery code, Oklahoma Discovery Code, 12 O.S.2001, § 3224 et seq., as amended. When such a statute is obtained from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P.) we may look to relevant federal case law to assist us in interpreting the pertinent State provision. Hall v. Goodwin, 1989 OK 88, 775 P.2d 291, 293. Here, we may consider relevant federal case law interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 to assist us in interpretation of pertinent subsections of § 3226, as the subsections at issue were taken from their Rule 26 federal counterparts. McCoy v. Black, 1997 OK CIV APP 78, ¶ 6, 949 P.2d 689, 692. ¶ 14 Similarly, § 2004.1(C)(3)(b)(2)(unretained expert)(part of the Oklahoma Pleading Code, 12 O.S.2001, § 2001 et seq., as amended) was taken from Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(B) and we may examine federal court decisions interpreting the latter for guidance as to the meaning and effect of our corresponding provision. Young v. Macy, 2001 OK 4, ¶ 13 and n. 8, 21 P.3d 44, 47 and n. 8. Also, we may, of course, look for guidance in any pertinent federal Advisory Committee Notes or Oklahoma Comments accompanying the involved Rules or statutes. ¶ 15 Furthermore, in that the boundaries of the trial court's authority concerning a deponent's entitlement to either the ordinary per day witness fee or, instead, an expert witness fee are statutorily delineated and, thus, involve a legal question concerning statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. A legal question involving statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review [ Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 8 and n. 5, 33 P.3d 302, 305 and n. 5], i.e., a non-deferential, plenary and independent review of the trial court's legal ruling. Id.