Opinion ID: 2330747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Statutory Right To Counsel At A Lineup

Text: When Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) made applicable to the states through the federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment that Constitution's right to counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment, the Court made known that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. Id. at 344, 83 S.Ct. at 796. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 741-742, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1398-1399, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-358, 83 S.Ct. 814, 816-817, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). In 1971, the General Assembly enacted legislation to furnish indigents with counsel in criminal proceedings. Md.Code (1957, 1983 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27 A, §§ 1-14. The announced policy was not only to provide for the realization of the constitutional guarantees of counsel in the representation of indigents ... in criminal and juvenile proceedings within the State ... but also to assure effective assistance and continuity of counsel to indigent accused taken into custody and indigent defendants in criminal and juvenile proceedings before the courts of the State of Maryland.... Art. 27 A, § 1. The Office of Public Defender was established in the executive branch of the government, § 3, and the duty of the Public Defender to provide legal representation for any eligible indigent defendant was spelled out, § 4. The extent of the representation was designated in § 4(d). It shall extend to all stages in the proceedings, including custody, interrogation, preliminary hearing, arraignment, trial, and appeal, if any, and shall continue until the final disposition of the cause, or until the assigned attorney is relieved by the Public Defender or by order of the court in which the cause is pending. Id. It is clear that legal representation by the Public Defender is not limited to those proceedings in which the Sixth Amendment demands the assistance of counsel; the statute contemplates such representation in certain areas beyond the reach of that guarantee. See, e.g., § 4(b)(2) as explicated by § 2(h)(2). The Supreme Court has recognized that a post-indictment pretrial lineup is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution, invoking the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272, 87 S.Ct. at 1956. Although under that Court's reasoning the right does not attach to a pre-indictment lineup, such a lineup is nevertheless a critical stage for the suspect, who, of course, is in custody at the time. Even though a lineup is not encompassed within the types of cases designated in § 4(b) as calling for the assistance of the Public Defender, we believe that such a confrontation, arranged by the police, at which a suspect is exhibited in order to obtain evidence that he is the criminal agent, is within the ambit of the Public Defender statute whether conducted before or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings in the contemplation of Kirby. Neither the federal nor the State Constitution provides sanctions when the rights guaranteed are infringed. But the Supreme Court has found it necessary to fashion sanctions when violations of the federal Constitution affect the administration of justice. The Public Defender statute does not set out sanctions to be imposed when its mandates are not satisfied. Of course, the sanction to be imposed with respect to the Public Defender or his representative who is delinquent in his duties is usually a matter for the executive department, but, when the delinquency adversely affects the fairness of a trial, it is encumbent upon the judiciary to assure that the defendant is not thereby prejudiced. We consider, therefore, the admissibility of identification evidence emanating from a lineup which was illegal because the Public Defender did not furnish the suspect exhibited the assistance of counsel required by the statute. We first observe that when a lineup is illegal in such circumstances, the police and the prosecutor are at fault only if they failed to notify the Public Defender of the impending lineup, and he is otherwise unaware of when and where it is to be held. If due notice of the lineup has been given to the Public Defender, his failure to respond properly cannot be laid on the law enforcement authorities, and does not call for a sanction imposed to assure that they will respect the suspect's statutory right to the presence of counsel at the lineup. Therefore, a per se exclusionary rule is to be invoked only when the police or the prosecutor has failed to inform an otherwise unaware Public Defender of a prospective lineup. In such circumstances, however, the per se exclusion attaches only to the admission of evidence of an extra-judicial identification made at the illegal lineup. The purpose of a strict rule barring evidence is to deter the law enforcement authorities from improper procedures which prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial. The per se rule is not based on the assumption that in every instance the admission of evidence at an illegal confrontation offends due process. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382. While the failure of the Public Defender to provide the assistance of counsel after due notice is not the fault of the law enforcement authorities, neither is it the fault of the suspect. Justice would not be served by simply admitting evidence tainted by a lineup which is illegal because of the absence of statutorily required counsel. Nor would it be in accord with the law of this State as it was before the Supreme Court opinions on the matter. See Part I(a) of this opinion. We have held with respect to a lineup rendered illegal by the absence of counsel representing the Public Defender, that, when the law enforcement authorities are at fault, identification evidence obtained at the lineup is per se barred. We further hold that, regardless of fault, all other identification evidence, both extra-judicial and judicial, which has as its source the illegal lineup, may be admitted if, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable. This applies the test framed by the Supreme Court for the admission of identification evidence impressed with a taint of the due process variety. To evaluate the reliability of the evidence the same factors are to be considered as those suggested by the Supreme Court in the case of a due process taint. See Part I(b)(3) of this opinion.