Opinion ID: 2270874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Terry Frisk

Text: We disagree with the Circuit Court's conclusion that the search and seizure of the petitioner was an investigatory stop and protective frisk pursuant to Terry. [5] The purpose of a protective Terry frisk is not to discover evidence, but rather to protect the police officer and bystanders from harm. Longshore, 399 Md. at 508, 924 A.2d at 1141 (quoting State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 465, 693 A.2d 749, 751 (1997)). Pat-down frisks are proper when the officer has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. Longshore, 399 Md. at 508-09, 924 A.2d at 1141 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909). The officer has reason to believe that an individual is armed and dangerous if a reasonably prudent person, under the circumstances, would have felt that he was in danger, based on reasonable inferences from particularized facts in light of the officer's experience. Longshore, 399 Md. at 509, 924 A.2d at 1141-42. Even if we were to assume that the encounter with the Officer Lewis was a Terry stop, [t]he reasonableness of a Terry stop is determined by considering `[w]hether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' Longshore, 399 Md. at 506, 924 A.2d at 1140 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905). Further, assuming arguendo that Officer Lewis had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot and, accordingly, detain the petitioner, he still lacked the basis for a protective Terry frisk. At the suppression hearing, Officer Lewis indicated that he searched the petitioner to [c]heck for weapons, but did not provide any basis for his suspicion that the petitioner was armed and dangerous. Officer Lewis did not testify as to any factors that would lead to a suspicion that the petitioner was carrying a weapon. Further, there are no objective factors in the record that indicate that the petitioner was armed and dangerous. Although the encounter took place at nighttime, the petitioner was alone and the officer could visibly see his hands, which, presumably because the officer did not indicate otherwise, were empty. There is no indication in the record that the petitioner made any threatening movements, or any movements at all, nor is there any indication that Officer Lewis suspected that the petitioner was dealing drugs. Thus, we concur with the Court of Special Appeals, and hold that Officer Lewis had no basis to conduct a protective frisk. [6] Even if Officer Lewis had reasonably believed that the petitioner was armed and dangerous, therefore providing the basis for a proper Terry frisk, the search in the present case exceeded the scope of a proper protective frisk. A proper Terry frisk is limited to a pat-down of the outer clothing not to discover evidence of a crime, but rather to protect the police officer and bystanders from harm by checking for weapons. In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 544, 789 A.2d 607, 619 (2002). If during a lawful pat-down an officer feels an object which obviously is not a weapon, further patting of it is not permissible. The Supreme Court has made it clear that if the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed. On the other hand, [i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Generally, a pat down is ... a proper, minimally intrusive means of determining whether a suspect is armed. State v. Smith, 345 Md. at 465-66, 693 A.2d at 751. The officer may not exceed the limited scope of a patdown for weapons to search for contraband. General exploratory searches are not permitted [pursuant to Terry], and police officers must distinguish between the need to protect themselves and the desire to uncover incriminating evidence. In re David S., 367 Md. at 545, 789 A.2d at 619 (quoting State v. Smith, 345 Md. at 465, 693 A.2d at 751) (holding that the officer exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry frisk when he opened a bag found in the individual's waistband after realizing the bag did not contain a weapon). If the pat-down uncovered an object that is not a weapon and the incriminating character of the object was not immediately apparent ... [but] [r]ather, the officer determined that the item was contraband only after conducting a further search, then the further search exceeded the permissible scope of Terry. Smith, 345 Md. at 470, 693 A.2d at 754 (quoting Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 379, 113 S.Ct. at 2139, 124 L.Ed.2d at 347-48 (citation omitted)). In the present case, Officer Lewis testified that he patted down the petitioner's right front pocket and that he did not manipulate the object contained therein. Officer Lewis testified that he felt and recognized a glass vial in [the petitioner's] pocket. He further testified that generally, in his experience, PCP is [c]ontained in a glass vial. Based on Officer Lewis's testimony, however, the incriminating nature of the object in the defendant's pocket was not immediately apparent upon his initial touch of the object in the pat-down. Rather, Officer Lewis testified that he field-tested the liquid contained in the vial after removing it from the petitioner's pocket, thereby determining that the liquid contained PCP. The removal of the vial from the petitioner's pocket and field test of the liquid contained in the vial constituted a general exploratory search exceeding the permissible scope of a protective Terry frisk. Accordingly, we hold that Officer Lewis lacked the proper basis for a Terry frisk at the inception of the search, and that the search was a general exploratory search that exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry frisk, which serves as a basis to exclude the evidence seized from the petitioner's pocket.