Opinion ID: 203074
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of the Language of the Ordinances

Text: Looking first at the text of the parade ordinance, it requires a permit thereunder for an intended parade, march or other use of public ways within the City  precisely the events the plaintiffs intended and for which they sought, and in Sullivan's case received, parade permits. Plaintiffs never sought, nor were they advised by anyone to obtain, a MOGO permit, presumably because the parade ordinance alone referred specifically to parades and marches on the City's public ways, while the MOGO said nothing about moving events of this character. Rather, the MOGO addresses the licensing of what it calls, without further definition, a mass outdoor gathering with the intent to attract two hundred (200) or more persons. The MOGO thus addresses an undefined (except for the 200-person benchmark) generic class of mass gatherings without any limits as to type or place. In comparable circumstances  given two ordinances, one specific and the other general  Maine's courts, like federal and other state courts, have followed the interpretive rule that specific statutory provisions take precedence over general provisions. Ziegler v. American Maize-Prod. Co., 658 A.2d 219, 222 (Me. 1995) (quoted with approval in Camps Newfound/Owatonna Corp. v. Town of Harrison, 705 A.2d 1109, 1115 (Me.1998)). See also Armstrong v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2000 WL 33675379 (Me.Super., Dec.31, 2000) (applying foregoing principle to Cape Elizabeth zoning ordinance). See generally Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980) (A more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one. . . .). Under this interpretive rule, the parade ordinance, which regulates in haec verba the very type of conduct in which plaintiffs intended to engage, i.e., a march on public ways, would seem likely to be construedas in fact it has been by the City  to take precedence over the more general MOGO, which makes no particular mention of conduct of this sort. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the two ordinances would be construed in pari materia, viz. as both applying equally to plaintiffs' proposed marches and as calling for dual permits and dual fees, [3] and, in fact, no such construction has ever been advanced by anyone on behalf of the City. One can speculate, to be sure, as did the district court, that giant parades or unusually large or lengthy street marches might give rise to public health concerns similar to those upon which the MOGO focuses. Such hypothetical events, indeed, might even require fixed staging areas, in which case the MOGO might become applicable. But there are neither allegations in plaintiffs' amended complaint nor evidence in the stipulated record that plaintiffs' marches implicated gatherings of over 200 persons, that fixed staging areas or the like were contemplated, or that plaintiffs' marches were so large or of such duration as to give rise to public health considerations that might even arguably implicate a second permit under the MOGO. Sullivan's application for his march on March 20, 2004 stated it was to last only one and a half hours. Little else can be discerned from the record about the actual characteristics of plaintiffs' marches other than that, in Sullivan's case, the march occurred and that no suggestion was ever made by anyone that a MOGO permit, in addition to the parade permit, was required. Indeed, plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff [Sullivan] was not required in this instance to obtain a Mass Gathering Permit and also states, The only barrier to Sullivan exercising his right to free speech and assembly in the traditional public forum of Augusta's streets and sidewalks is his inability to pay over $2,000 for police salaries, police squad car use, and event insurance [all items connected with his application for a parade permit at the time he applied]. Dansinger's march did not occur, but, again, there is nothing whatever in the record to suggest that, in his case, anyone, including the Police Department and Dansinger himself, felt the parade ordinance was by itself insufficient to meet all the City's and the public's regulatory requirements. It is worth noting that paragraph (d) of the parade ordinance allows the Police Chief to impose reasonable conditions including, but not limited to [certain conditions spelled out in the ordinance] (emphasis supplied). Under paragraph (d), the Police Chief, without recourse to a separate MOGO permit, could presumably condition issuance of a parade permit on provision of specified facilities he thought reasonably necessary to safeguard public health should he believe the circumstances of a particular parade or march so required. Looking simply at the text of the two ordinances, therefore, we think it far less likely than did the district court that they would ever be read as requiring anything but a parade permit for the marches for which plaintiffs requested permits. [4] Significantly, the only allegation in the amended complaint regarding the MOGO's possible relevance is that it employs legally identical requirements on applicants for mass outdoor gatherings as does the parade ordinance and is subject to the same constitutional objections. No concrete facts of any kind are alleged showing how or why the MOGO, in addition to the parade ordinance, would apply to plaintiffs' street march activities so as to cause them to suffer injury-in-fact from that ordinance.