Opinion ID: 4543601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Garcia’s Symptoms

Text: Next, Garcia contests the finding that his “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record,” App. Vol. II at 17. He fails to show the finding was erroneous. Credibility findings “are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact” and should be upheld “when supported by substantial evidence.” Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1140 (internal quotation marks omitted). When determining whether a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain are credible, an ALJ should consider: the levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of the attempts (medical or nonmedical) to obtain relief, the frequency of medical contacts, the nature of daily activities, subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence. Id. at 1145 (internal quotation marks omitted). An ALJ need not explicitly address each factor. See Qualls, 206 F.3d at 1372. Although Garcia does not dispute the ALJ’s finding that he “has had minimal care and treatment,” App. Vol. II at 20, he contends the ALJ failed to inquire about possible reasons for that minimal treatment, such as the possibility that he lacked the financial means to seek treatment, see App. Vol. III at 230 (note in application file dated January 12, 2016, indicating Garcia “state[d] that he ha[d] not seen a Doctor 12 since April 2010 due to lack of funds and medical insurance”). See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at  (Mar. 16, 2016) (noting an ALJ “will not find [a claimant’s] symptoms inconsistent with the evidence” due to a lack of treatment “without considering possible reasons” for not seeking treatment); see also Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating before an ALJ may base an adverse credibility determination on a “failure to pursue treatment or take medication,” the ALJ “should consider (1) whether the treatment at issue would restore claimant’s ability to work; (2) whether the treatment was prescribed; (3) whether the treatment was refused; and, if so, (4) whether the refusal was without justifiable excuse” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As an initial matter, we note the ALJ specifically addressed the dearth of medical records at the evidentiary hearing. In response, Garcia’s counsel agreed there was not “a lot of medical information” but nonetheless insisted the records were “fairly informative.” App. Vol. II at 31. We will not fault the ALJ when Garcia and his counsel had the opportunity to explain the absence of medical records and never directed the ALJ’s attention to the note in Garcia’s file.5 See Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1149 (noting “the ALJ should ordinarily be entitled to rely on the claimant’s counsel to structure and present claimant’s case in a way that the claimant’s claims are adequately explored” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 Moreover, the note itself conflicted with the record. According to the January 2016 note, Garcia stated he had not seen a doctor since April 2010. But the record contained evidence of hospital visits in July and November 2011. 13 In any event, the absence of records was not the only basis for the ALJ’s skepticism about Garcia’s symptoms. The ALJ also noted Garcia had “extreme walking and balance issues at his consultative examination in February 2016” with Dr. Fullenwider but “not at his examination” a month later with Dr. Lawton. App. Vol. II at 20. And notwithstanding his claim of disabling pain, Garcia did not take any pain medication and did not require the use of an assistive device to walk. Finally, the ALJ observed Garcia’s “daily activities . . . are not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” Id. As noted above, we reject his argument that this finding was not sufficiently specific. IV. Significant Number of Jobs in National Economy Finally, Garcia contends the ALJ erred in finding there was a significant number of jobs in the national economy that he was capable of performing, without first considering the factors listed in Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1992).6 We disagree. Because Garcia met his burden to show he could not perform his past work, the Commissioner had the burden “at step five to show that [Garcia] retains sufficient RFC to perform work in the national economy, given [his] age, education, and work experience,” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Such work must “exist[] in significant numbers either in the region where [he] lives 6 Although Garcia initially suggested the sheer number of jobs identified by the ALJ was not a significant number, he clarified that his argument was “that the ALJ failed to properly consider th[e] [Trimiar] factors before finding that 20,000 to 22,000 jobs in the national economy was significant,” Aplt. Reply Br. at 2. 14 or in several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). It is immaterial, though, “whether . . . (1) [w]ork exists in the immediate area in which [the claimant] live[s]; (2) [a] specific job vacancy exists for [the claimant]; or (3) [the claimant] would be hired if [he or she] applied for work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(a). We have declined to “draw[] a bright line establishing the number of jobs necessary to constitute a ‘significant number.’” Trimiar, 966 F.2d at 1330. Instead, “each case should be evaluated on its individual merits” and an ALJ should consider several factors, including “the level of claimant’s disability; the reliability of the vocational expert’s testimony; the distance claimant is capable of travelling to engage in the assigned work; the isolated nature of the jobs; [and] the types and availability of such work.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Garcia contends the ALJ failed consider two Trimiar factors—“the distance Garcia would have to travel” and “the isolated nature of the jobs.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 8. He argues these “are important factors” because the regulations indicate the Commissioner “‘will not deny disability benefits on the basis of the existence of . . . jobs’” “‘that exist only in very limited numbers in relatively few locations outside of the region where [the claimant] live[s].’” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b)). First, to the extent Garcia believes the record is inadequate regarding the location and geographical concentration of the occupations the VE identified, his counsel could have asked additional questions at the hearing to clarify such issues. See Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1340 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Counsel could have probed the witness about the source’s reliability and acceptance in the profession, but 15 he did not do so, and now our assessment of such matters is effectively foreclosed.” (citing Trimiar, 966 F.2d at 1330-31 & n.13)). See generally Wall, 561 F.3d at 1063 (noting that “the ALJ may reasonably rely on counsel to identify the issue or issues requiring further development” and that the claimant must raise any substantial issue he seeks to develop (internal quotation marks omitted)). In any event, we have noted that “[i]n Trimiar the focus was on jobs in the regional economy because the vocational expert in that case testified only to the number of available jobs in the regional economy.” Raymond v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 1269, 1274 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009). The court therefore “turned to the multi-factor analysis to help” in determining whether a mere “650 to 900 [regional] jobs [was] a ‘significant number.’” Id. But the ALJ in Garcia’s case made a finding only as to national jobs, consistent with our observation that “the proper focus generally must be on jobs in the national, not regional, economy.” Id. at 1274. Moreover, “Trimiar does not hold . . . that a court must engage in a factoral analysis when the number of jobs relevant available is . . . much larger” than the number of jobs at issue in Trimiar. Id. at 1274 n.2. Certainly, this case presents far fewer national jobs than the 1.3 million jobs in Raymond. See id. But the number of national jobs in the present case also far exceeds the 650 to 900 regional jobs identified in Trimiar.7 And Garcia has not established that 20,500 to 22,000 jobs is a “very limited number[]” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b). 7 Garcia contends that “[t]he easiest way to get a national perspective is to multipl[y] the numbers in Trimiar by the [49] continental states” and that “[d]oing so 16 Finally, “[o]verriding the bare numbers is the procedural fact that th[is] case[] involve[s] court review of a finding of numerical significance made by the ALJ” and not a determination “in the first instance that a particular number [is] significant under the circumstances,” Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 2004). “[N]umerical significance entails many fact-specific considerations requiring individualized evaluation” and “should ultimately be left to the ALJ’s common sense in weighing the statutory language as applied to a particular claimant’s factual situation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Harmon v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 289, 292 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting the factors identified in Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 275 (6th Cir. 1988), which served as the basis for the Trimiar factors, “[a]re suggestions only—the ALJ need not explicitly consider each factor”). The ALJ found Garcia could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, and “[w]e do not presume to interpose our judgment for that of the ALJ,” Trimiar, 966 F.2d at 1332. Accordingly, he has not shown the ALJ erred.