Opinion ID: 2508357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims of Miranda Error Are Cognizable on Habeas Corpus

Text: In his petition, Waidla claims error in the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his custodial statements to police on grounds they were taken in violation of Miranda and related decisions. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.) We included the question of the cognizability of such claims on habeas corpus in our order to show cause. The Attorney General posits two reasons Miranda claims should be held non-cognizable on habeas corpus. First, he urges that since Miranda claims are based on the appellate record, they should be litigated on direct appeal, not on habeas corpus. We agree a Miranda claim presented on habeas corpus but based solely on the appellate record should generally be denied on procedural grounds. Where the claim was already raised and rejected on the direct appeal, we will ordinarily decline to examine it again. ( In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 825, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391, citing In re Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 225, 42 Cal.Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001.) When the issue could have been, but was not, raised on appeal, the unjustified failure to present it on appeal generally precludes its consideration on habeas corpus. ( In re Harris, supra, at p. 829, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391, citing In re Dixon, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 759, 264 P.2d 513.) But a Miranda claim based substantially on facts outside the appellate record would not fall within these procedural rules, as it could not have been adequately presented on direct appeal. The Attorney General's first argument, therefore, does not support a general rule of noncognizability. Second, the Attorney General maintains Miranda challenges should be limited to direct appeal because the cost to the state interest in finality of judgments incurred by allowing a collateral challenge is not balanced by any gain in assuring trustworthy evidence. The premise of this argument is that the Miranda rule, like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, serves only to deter unconstitutional government conduct and not to protect the innocent from being falsely convicted. (See In re Sterling (1965) 63 Cal.2d 486, 487, 47 Cal.Rptr. 205, 407 P.2d 5 [refusing to entertain search and seizure issue on habeas corpus, in part because `the use of illegally seized evidence carries with it no risk of convicting an innocent person']; cf. Stone v. Powell (1976) 428 U.S. 465, 489-495, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 [holding state prisoners may not raise search and seizure issues in federal habeas petitions, in part because the cost, in loss of trustworthy evidence, of applying exclusionary rule would not be balanced by slight increase in deterrence from allowing collateral attack].) We find the analogy inapt. As the Supreme Court explained in rejecting the same argument, Miranda, unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, safeguards `a fundamental trial right.' ( Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 691, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407.) By bracing against `the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation,' Miranda serves to guard against `the use of unreliable statements at trial.' ( Id. at p. 692, 113 S.Ct. 1745.) While a statement taken in violation of Miranda is not necessarily involuntary, the presence or absence of Miranda advisements and waivers is one circumstance to be considered in evaluating voluntariness. ( Id. at pp. 693-694, 113 S.Ct. 1745; see, e.g., People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 827, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) Other circumstances being equal, a custodial confession taken without Miranda advisements or despite the suspect's invocation of his or her Miranda rights is less likely to be trustworthy than one preceded by advisements and knowing waivers. The Attorney General cites People v. Hill (1973) 9 Cal.3d 784, 109 Cal.Rptr. 93, 512 P.2d 317, in which we rejected a collateral attack (presented on appeal from a penalty retrial) on the guilt judgment, made on the basis that admission of the defendant's confession violated Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (deprivation of right to counsel at interrogation). We observed, first, that the claim had already been rejected in the defendant's previous appeal. ( People v. Hill, supra, at p. 786, 109 Cal. Rptr. 93, 512 P.2d 317; see People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 552-554, 58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908.) We went on to say that where the defendant had a full opportunity to litigate the issue and the judgment was long final we would not entertain a collateral attack based upon an issue which does not relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. ( People v. Hill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 787, 109 Cal.Rptr. 93, 512 P.2d 317.) As already explained, the rule on habeas corpus is consistent with our reasoning in People v. Hill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at page 786, 109 Cal.Rptr. 93, 512 P.2d 317, in that we ordinarily will not entertain a habeas claim already raised and rejected on direct appeal. ( In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 825, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391.) To the extent our further characterization of a claim under Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, as unrelated to guilt or innocence is inconsistent with the high court's ( Withrow v. Williams, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 692, 113 S.Ct. 1745) and our own characterization of a Miranda claim as one relating to the reliability of the evidence of guilt, we disapprove our former remark. We therefore reject the Attorney General's suggestion of a blanket rule of noncognizability for Miranda claims on habeas corpus, but observe that where such claims are based on the appellate record they will ordinarily be denied on the procedural ground that they were, or could have been, presented on direct appeal. ( In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 824-829, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391.) In addition, a Miranda claim that could not be presented on appeal because the defendant did not raise it at trial would also ordinarily be barred on habeas corpus. (See In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199-200, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 633, 95 P.3d 896 [claim forfeited on appeal because it was not raised at trial is also barred on habeas corpus, unless facts essential to the claim were not and could not reasonably have been known at trial].)