Opinion ID: 848681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Response to Concurrence/Dissents

Text: Justice WEAVER expresses dissatisfaction with the fact that plaintiffs have been found by the majority to possess standing to pursue their MEPA claims, but not on the constitutional grounds that she would prefer. It seems that it is not enough that plaintiffs prevail, but that their victory must be predicated, not upon the resolution of a mere case or controversy, but upon the constitution itself. The majority concludes that it is unnecessary in this case to resolve a constitutional issue where the case can be fully resolved on nonconstitutional grounds. Just as respect for the requirements of standing is an essential element of the responsible exercise of the judicial power, so too is respect for the need to address constitutional issues only where necessary. Given its very different views of standing, it is understandable why Justice WEAVER, unlike this majority, would find the constitutional question here to be an easy one. However, notwithstanding the merits of our respective views on standing, constitutional issues  whether easy or difficult  are to be avoided where a case can be resolved adequately on non-constitutional grounds. [21] Several other aspects of Justice WEAVER'S opinion deserve comment, as does the opinion of Justice KELLY: (1) Justice WEAVER asserts that, despite Lee, Michigan's standing requirement is not constitutional, but rather is nothing more than judge-made law. Post at 827 n. 4. [22] It is hard to know what to make of this dismissive observation. Justice WEAVER does not explain why Lee constitutes judge-made law any more than any other interpretation of the constitution, except that she disagrees with Lee. Whatever judge-made law is, Lee does not constitute judge-made law any more than Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 5 L.Ed. 579 (1819), or Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). Some judicial opinions interpreting the Constitution, of course, may be more persuasive than others, but all are presumed to articulate the meaning of the constitution rather than the personal views of a judge. In Lee, this Court, expounding upon the constitutional status of standing in Michigan, relied upon federal and state judicial precedents, as well as historical understandings, and in the instant opinion, we elaborate upon this analysis by looking to the meaning of the judicial power under the constitution. While Justice WEAVER is certainly free to disagree with the majority's analysis, and while there is room for reasonable debate, the majority's constitutional holding is no more properly characterized as judge-made law than any other interpretation of the constitution. What constitutes the judicial power, just as what constitutes equal protection of the laws, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment, cannot be determined by some mechanical process, but must be given meaning by judges attempting in good faith to understand the intentions of those who ratified these provisions. If constitutional interpretations with which she disagrees are mere judge-made law, how would the Justice WEAVER characterize interpretations with which she agrees, perhaps even those interpretations produced by her own pen? (2) Justice WEAVER asserts that the majority discussion of standing is, by virtue of Const. 1963, art. 4, § 52, irrelevant to the important questions of Michigan law presented in this case. Post at 826 n. 1. Art. 4, § 52 states, in part, The legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction. Justice WEAVER contends that, pursuant to this provision, the people of Michigan have required that the Legislature provide for the protection of Michigan's natural resources. The Legislature properly acted in fulfillment of its constitutional responsibility through enactment of the MEPA citizen-suit provision ..., and thus any constitutional standing concerns are irrelevant where MEPA is concerned. Post at 826. What Justice WEAVER overlooks, however, is that there are many requirements that are imposed upon the Legislature by the constitution. For example:  The Legislature shall implement legislation protecting civil rights. Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2.  The Legislature shall enact laws to preserve the integrity of elections. Const. 1963, art. 2, § 4.  The Legislature shall implement the rules of initiatives and referendums in Michigan. Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9.  The Legislature shall further implement rules against conflicts-of-interests by legislators. Const. 1963, art. 4, § 10.  The Legislature shall implement the provisions of the Headlee Amendment pertaining to tax limitations. Const. 1963, art. 9, § 34. [23] While undoubtedly making clear what some of the priorities and obligations of government are, these constitutional provisions do not state that the Legislature may pursue these goals, as Justice WEAVER implies, by whatever means. Rather, it is implicit in these provisions that the Legislature is to pursue these goals by appropriate means. The Legislature cannot pursue the objects of these shall do provisions by methods that are otherwise unconstitutional. Does Justice WEAVER think that the Legislature is empowered under art. 4, § 52 to do anything at all so long as it is done ostensibly with the goal of protecting the environment? Can it disregard due process in the criminal prosecution of environmental polluters? Can it disregard the requirements of just compensation in taking property in order to construct a wilderness area? Can it ignore the prohibition against ex post facto laws by criminalizing conduct that was legal at the time it took place? Moreover, can the Legislature, under art. 1, § 2 (requiring it to implement civil rights laws), expand the judicial power by enacting laws allowing any person to sue for a civil rights violation committed against any other person, even if the actual victim chooses not to sue? Can the Legislature, under art. 9, § 34 (requiring it to implement tax-limitation provisions), expand the judicial power by authorizing any person in Monroe or Hillsdale to sue to prevent a tax increase in Marquette or Escanaba? Can the Legislature, under art. 2, § 4 (requiring it to enact election laws), expand the judicial power by authorizing any person in Kalamazoo or Battle Creek to sue over ballot disagreements in the Alpena city council race? While clearly identifying an important priority of government, art. 4, § 52 does not authorize the Legislature to ignore all other provisions of the constitution in enacting laws to protect the environment. At least to date, the judicial power in Michigan has been exercised only on behalf of plaintiffs who have suffered actual and particularized injuries. (3) Justice WEAVER repeatedly asserts that this Court, in exercising the judicial power, must act in conformity with MEPA. Post at 827-828, 834. In this assertion, she fundamentally misapprehends the duties of the judicial branch. As the Michigan Constitution makes clear, the duty of the judiciary is to exercise the judicial power, art. 6, § 1, and, in so doing, to respect the separation of powers, art. 3, § 2. While as a general proposition, the proper exercise of the judicial power will obligate the judiciary to give faithful effect to the words of the Legislature  for it is the latter that exercises the legislative power, not the judiciary  such effect cannot properly be given when to do so would contravene the constitution itself. Just as the judicial branch owes deference to the legislative branch when the legislative power is being exercised, so too does the legislative branch owe deference to the judicial branch when the exercise of the judicial power is implicated. Even with the acquiescence of the legislative and executive branches, the judicial branch cannot arrogate to itself governmental authority that is beyond the scope of the judicial power under the constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, supra . The textual approach of the concurring/dissenting justice is a caricatured textualism, in which the Legislature is empowered to act beyond its authority in conferring powers upon other branches that are also beyond their authority. [24] In the final analysis, the constitutional responsibility of the judiciary is to act in accordance with the constitution and its system of separated powers, by exercising the judicial power and only the judicial power. [25] (4) Justice WEAVER asserts that the majority's decision overrules 30 years of Michigan case law that held that the Legislature meant what it said when it allowed `any person' to bring an action in circuit court to protect natural resources from actual or likely harm. Post at 826. In support of this proposition, she cites Eyde v. Michigan, 393 Mich. 453, 454, 225 N.W.2d 1 (1975), and Ray v. Mason Co. Drain Comm'r, 393 Mich. 294, 305, 224 N.W.2d 883 (1975). However, neither of these decisions, issued in the aftermath of MEPA'S passage, offer the slightest support for the concurrence/dissent's conclusion. Unlike the present case, neither Eyde nor Ray concerned the issue of standing and neither involved plaintiffs concerning whom there was any question of standing. Rather, in Eyde and Ray, this Court did nothing more than describe, in passing, the substance of the various provisions of the new act. Such statements do not even rise to the level of dictum since in neither Eyde nor Ray did this Court even purport to comment upon the propriety of the standing provision, much less comment upon it approvingly. The statements in Eyde and Ray make no pretense of being statements of law; they are merely passing, but accurate, descriptions of what was contained in the new act. Because of what these statements constituted  mere descriptions of provisions of an act not then in dispute  it is understandable why neither Eyde nor Ray set forth any analysis of the meaning of these provisions, any analysis of their constitutional implications, any analysis of relevant judicial precedents, and even any acknowledgment of relevant judicial precedents. See Smith v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 460 Mich. 446, 461 n. 7, 597 N.W.2d 28 (1999). [26] Yet, it is on the basis of Eyde and Ray that Justice WEAVER identifies 30 years of Michigan case law in support of the proposition that matters of standing do not implicate the Constitution. [27] (5) Justice WEAVER accuses the majority of expanding the power of the judiciary at the expense of the Legislature.... Post at 827. This accusation turns reality upon its head. It is akin to saying that President Washington was expanding his own powers by turning down congressional invitations to become King. Rather than expanding its powers, this Court, by questioning the authority of the Legislature to confer broader powers upon it, and thereby to expand the judicial power, is resisting an expansion of power  not an everyday occurrence in the annals of modern government. By ensuring that the judicial power not be improperly expanded by the Legislature, and the executive power not be improperly contracted, this Court is defending the constitutional structure. In similar fashion, the United States Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, supra , concluded that a congressional grant of authority to the Court to issue writs of mandamus could not be exercised because the constitution did not allow the original jurisdiction of that Court to be expanded by mere statute. As Chief Justice MARSHALL stated, It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it. Id. at 177. The Michigan Constitution grants this Court the judicial power  nothing more and nothing less  and neither the Legislature nor this Court itself possess the authority to redefine these limits. [28] (6) In attempting to understand Justice KELLY'S opinion, it is important to recognize that she takes great care to proclaim, post at 840 n. 2, that, despite all contrary appearances, she is not  en toto  overruling Lee. The effect of this analysis on the part of the concurring justice is to allow her to enjoy the freedom to discard traditional principles of standing when it is useful to do so, as in this case, and then to reassert such principles, per Lee, when that is equally useful. The concurring justice's decisionmaking is standardless and inconsistent with a predictable rule of law. [29] (7) Justice KELLY sets forth a torrent of novel constitutional propositions in her opinion whose principal purpose apparently is to justify the abandonment of traditional principles of standing (to open wide the courthouse doors)  at least in the realm of environmental law. The people will have to wait to see whether the concurring justice is as amenable to the abolition of standing in other areas of the law. A few of the more creative propositions of constitutional law that inhabit her opinion:  The judicial power, although it may require an individualized injury in order to bring a federal lawsuit, does not require the same to bring a state lawsuit. Post at 683. Although Justice KELLY correctly remarks upon the differing nature of the federal and state governments, she fails to demonstrate why these differences have any relevance at all for her conclusion that the judicial power should be understood differently within these systems.  The subject-matter jurisdiction of state courts is plenary, and, therefore, the state judicial power is plenary. Post at 843. That there may be plenary state authority to address any social problem that threatens the public welfare does not mean that the judicial power encompasses all such authority. Id. at 844.  The people only have the power to execute the environmental laws when they are permitted to sue in court. Post at 841. One might have thought that it was the executive branch's responsibility to execute the laws, and that they did so on behalf of the people.  The gist of the separation of powers principle, rather than to limit the exercise of governmental power by allocating specific responsibilities among the three branches of government, is to ensure that one individual may not simultaneously hold office in more than one branch of government. Post at 842. Thereby, the concurring justice would transform one of the pillars of our system of limited, constitutional government into the trivial (albeit probably correct) proposition that a legislator cannot at the same time serve as Director of the Department of Community Health.  The Michigan Constitution allows the judicial power to be exercised over all disputes, and not merely cases or controversies. Post at 845-846. Aside from the fact that the concurring justice affords absolutely no guidance on what constitutes a dispute or how it differs from a case or controversy  although clearly it does, in her mind  she invokes no constitutional language, no constitutional history and no constitutional precedent for this blithe assertion. Indeed, in view of the fact that the Constitution apparently does not address standing at all from her perspective, why is even so much as a dispute required?  An effective substitute for the doctrine of standing are the doctrines of ripeness and mootness. Post at 844-845.  The state judicial power is different in kind from the federal judicial power because the latter alone applies to federal questions and diversity cases. Post at 846. This is simply one more non sequitur in the concurring opinion in search of relevance.  Federal and state standing requirements are a function of the methods by which judges are selected in these systems. Post at 844. Everything considered, it is not surprising that the qualifications for standing in state courts are broader than in federal courts. Id. We are aware of nothing in their method of selection that justifies state judges in exercising the judicial power according to different rules and constraints than federal judges.  This Court, although it is barred from viewing standing as an issue of constitutional dimension, may nonetheless, in the face of a contrary legislative provision, constrain its own power and limit standing.... Post at 846. That is, a court may not countermand the words of the Legislature on the basis of the constitution, but it may do so on the basis of its own discretion as to when words should be ignored.  An institution of government is ill-advised to curb its [own] authority under the guise of respect for another branch of government. Post at 846. Ill-advised, perhaps, in an era in which governmental institutions are expected to accrete as much power as possible; not so ill-advised if their premise is to act within the scope of their constitutional charter.  Separation of powers principles require that the judiciary respect the Legislature's decision. Post at 845. True, although only up to a point. At least since Marbury v. Madison anyway, the judiciary is also required to respect the constitution's decisions. (8) Justice KELLY argues that the separation of powers provision of the Michigan Constitution should not be read in an overly rigid fashion. This is essentially a euphemism for the proposition that this provision should not be read to mean very much of anything at all. It is hardly an overly rigid reading to suggest that, No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch means that a judge is limited to exercising the judicial power, and not the powers of another branch. This is made explicit in art. 6, § 1. [30] Moreover, Justice KELLY'S understanding of the separation of powers is confused, as reflected in her citation of the dissenting opinions in Judicial Attorneys Assoc. v. Michigan, 459 Mich. 291, 307, 586 N.W.2d 894 (1998); 228 Mich.App. 386, 427, 579 N.W.2d 378 (1998), for the proposition that the separation of powers doctrine allows limited overlap and interaction between the branches. Post at 842. Of course, in pursuit of their distinct constitutional powers, it will often be the case that the exercise of separated powers overlaps. For example, it may be that the Legislature in exercising its legislative power to enact laws and appropriate monies will sometimes come into conflict with the Governor in exercising her executive power to recommend or veto laws and appropriations. Although the separated powers of the legislative and executive branches do not overlap, their exercise often does. The separate and distinct constitutional powers of two branches may be focused on the same subject areas and the operations of state government may occasionally involve a blending of governmental operations as, for example, in the interaction between the legislative and executive branches regarding the drafting of a law or the preparation of a budget. But this is distinct from a blending of powers or functions. However much cooperation there is between the branches, the Legislature exercises only the legislative power and the executive exercises only the executive power. While the exercise of such separated powers may often overlap  this being understood generally as the realm of checks and balances  there is no sharing of the legislative or executive powers. There is only a sharing of the sum of all state governmental power. (9) Justice KELLY makes much of the concepts of citizen suits and private attorneys general, yet fails to note that the history of such suits indicates that they have been brought only by individuals who have suffered an injury. This understanding continues today. Justice KELLY correctly notes that citizen suits have a long pedigree in English history through relator and informers' actions. She fails to explain, however, that those who brought such actions were not strangers to the action, but possessed standing themselves either through a direct injury or through the assignation of the government's injury in fact. The historical use of such actions was explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 774-777, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000), using the label qui tam actions: Qui tam actions appear to have originated around the end of the 13th century, when private individuals who had suffered injury began bringing actions in the royal courts on both their own and the Crown's behalf. See, e.g., Prior of Lewes v. De Holt (1300), reprinted in 48 Selden Society 198 (1931). Suit in this dual capacity was a device for getting their private claims into the respected royal courts, which generally entertained only matters involving the Crown's interests. See Milsom, Trespass from Henry III to Edward III, Part III: More Special Writs and Conclusions, 74 L. Q. Rev. 561, 585 (1958). Starting in the 14th century, as the royal courts began to extend jurisdiction to suits involving wholly private wrongs, the common-law qui tam action gradually fell into disuse, although it seems to have remained technically available for several centuries. See 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 369 (8th ed. 1824). At about the same time, however, Parliament began enacting statutes that explicitly provided for qui tam suits [which] allowed injured parties to sue in vindication of their own interests (as well as the Crown's), see, e.g., Statute Providing a Remedy for Him Who Is Wrongfully Pursued in the Court of Admiralty, 2 Hen. IV, ch. 11 (1400). [Emphasis added.] Accordingly, the Court held that one who brings a relator suit has standing because he is the assignee of a claim and may assert the injury-in-fact suffered by the assignor, which is normally the government. Id. at 773, 120 S.Ct. 1858. In such cases, the Court concluded, the government's injury-in-fact suffices to confer standing on the individual relators bringing the suit. Id. at 774, 120 S.Ct. 1858. Similarly, a review of modern citizen suit cases almost always includes a review of standing in addition to a review of the statute that confers the right to such suits. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 65-66, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). Further, like citizen suits, suits by private attorneys general do not involve those completely divorced from an injury; rather, they involve those who have suffered an injury  generally noneconomic injuries  and who have been provided an incentive by the legislature to bring a lawsuit to advance the public interest. See Middlesex Co. Sewerage Authority v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). As the United States Supreme Court noted, the point of the doctrine is that directly injured victims can be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-270, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992) (emphasis added). Therefore, contrary to Justice KELLY'S assertions, the use of citizen suits or actions by private attorneys general does not undermine the application of traditional standing requirements. If anything, the use of such suits supports the application of those requirements, as citizen suits and actions by private attorneys general have always been grounded in a private injury, whether suffered directly or as a result of an assignment by another. (10) Justice WEAVER, referencing this Court's decision in Preserve the Dunes v. Department of Environmental Quality , 2004 WL 1724884, 471 Mich. 508, 684 N.W.2d 847 (2004), derides the majority for having unleashed an assault on MEPA this term. Post at 835-836 n. 28. [31] However, the legal issue addressed in Preserve the Dunes has utterly nothing in common with the legal issue addressed in this decision, and to rhetorically equate these decisions merely because they both implicate an environmental statute suggests less a legal analysis on the part of the concurring/dissenting justice than a political statement. It is this Court's responsibility simply to uphold the law and the constitution, not to promote or impede any particular legislative cause or interest, however popular or unpopular. Rather, the obligation of this Court is simply to say what the law is. And that is exactly what the justices in the majority have sought to do in this case, as they have each sought to do  however imperfectly  in every case coming before this Court. The majority cannot read the concurring/dissenting justice's conflation of wholly unrelated legal issues in a single derisive volley as anything other than implying that this Court has some obligation to decide environmental issues with an eye toward their results. [32] However, that the issue of standing has arisen here in the context of MEPA is, from the perspective of the majority, utterly irrelevant. The majority would be addressing this critical constitutional issue in identical terms if it had arisen in any other subject area of the law, and it would be no more of an assault upon MEPA than the present decision is an assault upon MEPA. Further, in the other case referenced, Preserve the Dunes, in which this same majority has also allegedly assaulted MEPA, this Court addressed the following specific legal question  whether MEPA authorizes a collateral action to challenge the Department of Environmental Quality's decision to issue a permit under the Sand Dune Mining Act, MCL 324.63701, enacted by the Legislature, where that collateral action seeks to challenge flaws in the permitting process unrelated to whether the conduct involved has polluted, or will likely pollute natural resources. We can only invite the reader of the instant opinion to also read Preserve the Dunes to determine whether that opinion represents an assault on MEPA, or instead an honest and impartial effort to resolve the limited question of statutory interpretation presented in that case. Justice WEAVER'S assault on MEPA rhetoric becomes even more groundless when one recognizes that she is dissatisfied with the majority for having concluded that it is unnecessary to interpret MEPA at all in resolving the present standing controversy. Instead, we conclude that plaintiffs possess standing on traditional grounds. Thus, in the end, the majority's assault upon MEPA amounts merely to the majority refraining from interpreting MEPA. [33]