Opinion ID: 2570511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Counting the 90 Days

Text: White argues the trial court erred in calculating the time for speedy trial purposes. The court continued the trial from the original date of July 10 to October 3, 2000, less than a 90-day continuance. However, White interprets K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c) to require the 90-day continuance to begin from the date the district court rules on the motion for continuance as opposed to the date the original trial was to begin. This argument presents an issue of statutory interpretation. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and the appellate court's review is unlimited. An appellate court is not bound by the district court's interpretation of a statute. State v. Engles, 270 Kan. 530, 532-33, 17 P.3d 355 (2001). When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the legislature as expressed will be given effect. State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001) (citing In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 [1998]). In ascertaining legislative intent, various provisions of an act must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony. State v. Thomas, 273 Kan. 750, 751, 46 P.3d 543, 544 (2002). The portion of K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c) allowing the 90-day continuance simply states that the trial may be continued if there are reasonable grounds to believe the trial can begin within the next succeeding ninety (90) days. The next sentence allows for another continuance for good cause shown if the original continuance was for less than 90 days and the trial is commenced within one hundred twenty (120) days from the original trial date. (Emphasis added.) Although not specifically addressing the issue raised by White, on previous occasions when calculating whether a defendant's right to speedy trial has been violated, this court has utilized the trial date as the beginning date for counting. See State v. Hines, 269 Kan. 698, 703, 7 P.3d 1237 (2000); State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 672, 867 P.2d 366 (1994). Further, in reading the provisions as a whole, the legislative intent is clear that the trial date is to be the date from which the continuance is calculated. We hold that the 90-day period under K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c) is counted from the date of the trial setting, not from the date on which the motion to continue was granted.