Opinion ID: 1994697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Partial Compliance

Text: [¶ 9] Merrill also argues that the court's factual findings regarding Dennis's ability to comply with the divorce judgment are unsupported in the record. Specifically, Merrill asserts that the court's finding that Dennis was unable to obtain a loan to satisfy the $408,500 judgment was erroneous. Additionally, Merrill contends that the court erred by failing to consider Dennis's assets in determining his ability to pay. [¶ 10] We review the factual findings reached in a contempt proceeding for clear error. Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 13, 818 A.2d 1005, 1009. Moreover, because Merrill did not request further findings of fact pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a), we assume that the court made any necessary subsidiary findings that are supported by competent evidence in the record. See Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 2006 ME 140, ¶ 17, 910 A.2d 396, 401; D'Angelo v. McNutt, 2005 ME 31, ¶ 6, 868 A.2d 239, 242. An appellant can prevail on a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a finding that her burden has not been met only if she demonstrates that a contrary finding is compelled by the evidence. Westleigh v. Conger, 2000 ME 134, ¶ 12, 755 A.2d 518, 520. [¶ 11] For a court to find a party in contempt, the complaining party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor failed or refused to comply with a court order and presently has the ability to comply with that order. M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(D); Ellis, 2008 ME 191, ¶ 24, 962 A.2d at 334; White v. Nason, 2005 ME 73, ¶ 7, 874 A.2d 891, 893; Wells v. State, 474 A.2d 846, 851 (Me.1984). [¶ 12] After considering the evidence, the motion court found that Merrill failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that [Dennis] has the power to comply with the [divorce judgment] regarding a present ability to pay [Merrill] $408,500. In the absence of a motion for findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52, and because the court, as fact-finder and sole arbiter of witness credibility, was free to selectively accept or reject portions or all of any witness's testimony, see Dionne v. LeClerc, 2006 ME 34, ¶ 15, 896 A.2d 923, 929, we cannot say that the record compels a contrary finding as to Dennis's ability to pay the full $408,500. Certainly, there is countervailing evidence in the record, such as evidence of the fortuitous timing of The Aspinquid, Inc.'s lawsuit against Dennis, [2] the misleading financial statements Dennis offered in connection with his loan applications, [3] Dennis's payment of certain other debts since the divorce judgment, [4] and Dennis's substantial gross income ($121,784 in 2007, and $119,212 in 2008) during the relevant time period. [5] Notwithstanding this significant conflicting evidence, there is competent evidence in the record, including the testimony of the two bank representatives, that supports the court's finding that Dennis was unable to secure a loan or make the full $408,500 payment. [¶ 13] However, the ability to pay or comply with a court order is not an all or nothing proposition. The court's analysis cannot end with a finding that an alleged contemnor cannot pay the entire amount due. `[A] person subject to court order must comply to the fullest extent possible, regardless of whether such efforts result in compliance in whole or in part.' SEC v. Musella, 818 F.Supp. 600, 602 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (quoting Piambino v. Bestline Prods., Inc., 645 F.Supp. 1210, 1214 (S.D.Fla.1986)); see also Nauman v. Nauman, 320 N.W.2d 519, 520 (S.D.1982) (While it may be true that appellant did not have the funds to satisfy the full obligation imposed by the court's decree, he obviously had the ability and capacity to do better than he did.); 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 21 (1999) (When an order requires a party to pay a sum certain, a mere showing that the party was unable to pay the entire amount by the date specified is insufficient to avoid a finding of contempt.); 24A Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 922 (1998) ([A]n obligor spouse who is able to comply in part with an order . . . but who pays nothing is guilty of contempt of court.). [¶ 14] Although we cannot conclude that the court erred in finding that Dennis did not have the present ability to pay the full $408,500, the court could not have found, even assuming all subsidiary findings in a way that supports its judgment, that Dennis was unable to pay some portion of the $408,500. Dennis argues that he had neither the cash nor the assets necessary to raise $408,500. While we accept the motion court's finding that Dennis was unable to pay the total amount, no competent evidence on the record supports a finding that Dennis was unable to pay a portion of the $408,500, or that he complied with the divorce judgment to the fullest extent possible. Musella, 818 F.Supp. at 602; Piambino, 645 F.Supp. at 1214. Indeed, the record compels a finding to the contrary. See Westleigh, 2000 ME 134, ¶ 12, 755 A.2d at 520. [¶ 15] Dennis personally owned real estate with equity of roughly $125,000. In addition to paying down significant debt following the divorce judgment, Dennis received approximately $32,000 from the sale of assets and tax refunds. He earned $121,784 and $119,212 in 2007 and 2008, respectively, during which time he lived rent-free in accommodations owned by Aspinquid. The District Court judgment appears to have taken an all or nothing approach, and failed to consider Dennis's ability to pay a portion of the total amount. By failing to consider whether Dennis complied to the fullest extent possible, Piambino, 645 F.Supp. at 1214, the court erred as a matter of law. [¶ 16] On remand, the District Court is instructed to determine whether Dennis complied with the divorce judgment to the fullest extent possible. The court may, in its discretion, reopen the record to receive additional evidence.