Opinion ID: 770602
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contrary to precedent

Text: 67 A state court decision is contrary to existing Supreme Court precedent (i) when it applies a rule of law that contradicts the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases, Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. at 1519, or (ii) when it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme Court's] precedent, id. at 1519-20. Accord Clark, 214 F.3d at 320; Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 2000). 68 In either event, a state court ruling is contrary to Supreme Court precedent only if it is 'diametrically different,' 'opposite in character or nature,' or 'mutually opposed' to the precedential holding. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. at 1519 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 495 (1976)). 69 The wrinkle here is that Lurie was not charged with a violation of the statute (§ 352-e(2)) as to which he claims notice was unfair. Lurie claims that the introduction of DiStephan's testimony regarding sponsors' obligations, as informed by §352-e(2), was contrary to the Supreme Court's fair-notice caselaw. The district court agreed with Lurie that DiStephan's testimony allowed the jury to convict Lurie without finding that he had the requisite mens rea for the crime: 70 Here, there is substantial evidence that the jury convicted petitioner not by finding the requisite intent but based solely on DiStephan's ... interpretation of section 352-e(2) .... The statute did not adequately put sponsors on notice that they must cease sales or face criminal liability. ... [S]ection 352-e(2) arguably formed the predicate for petitioner's conviction .... Lurie v. Wittner, No. 98 Civ. 7697, 1999 WL 246809, at  (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1999) (Lurie I). 71 None of the Supreme Court cases cited by Lurie presents a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from the facts presented on this appeal. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. at 1519-20. All of them involved the applicability of the fair-notice requirement (sometimes via the rule of lenity) to the very statute that defined the charged crime. See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 261, 264-72, 117 S.Ct. at 1222, 1224-28; Liparota, 471 U.S. at 421-33, 105 S.Ct. at 2086-92; Kolender, 461 U.S. at 354, 357-62, 103 S.Ct. at 1856, 1858-60; Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 314-16, 92 S.Ct. 993, 993-94 (1972) (per curiam); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 337, 339-47, 92 S.Ct. 515, 517, 518-22 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 809, 811-12, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1058-60 (1971); Bouie, 378 U.S. at 349, 355-61, 84 S.Ct. at 1700, 1703-06; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 613, 617-624, 74 S.Ct. 808, 810, 812-15 (1954); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 218-26, 73 S.Ct. 227, 228-31 (1952); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 452-58, 59 S.Ct. 618, 618-21 (1939); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 25-27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 340-41 (1931); Connally, 269 U.S. at 388-95, 46 S.Ct. at 126-29; cf. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413, 422, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 1981, 1985 (1990) (adopting the narrower of two possible interpretations of a provision governing restitution remedies); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1001-02 (1990) (applying the rule of lenity in a civil suit where the standard for liability was set forth in a criminal statute); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92, 97 S.Ct. 990, 992-93 (1977) (justifying the non-retroactivity of a judicial precedent by reference to the requirement of fair warning). 72 The other way a state court decision could be contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as recognized by the Supreme Court, is for the court to apply a rule of law that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. at 1519. The only way the New York courts could have applied a rule of law that contradicts the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's fair-notice precedents would have been to uphold a defendant's conviction for a crime where the defendant could not have discerned the scope of the convicting law's prohibitions even by searching the statutory and other laws defining the alleged crime. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 465 (1990). On this appeal, however, Lurie does not even assert that the statutes under which he was charged were ambiguous. It therefore cannot be said that the New York courts applied a rule of law that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. at 1519. 73 Accordingly, the state court's decision was not contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). 74