Opinion ID: 3134228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill 2d at 403. The details of the defendant's treatment with

Text: Thorazine could not be ascertained from the record, however, and therefore the court believed that a remand was necessary to clarify the schedule of treatment. The court noted further that there was no indication in the record regarding the possible effects of that drug. We do not agree with the defendant that Kinkead is controlling here. In contrast to Kinkead, in the present case, there is no indication in the record that the defendant was actually receiving a psychotropic drug at any point near the time of trial or sentencing in this case. The references to his earlier treatment all predate, by substantial periods, the beginning of the defendant's trial, in May 1993. Moreover, the defendant had been examined by two psychiatrists in November and December 1991 and had been found fit at that time. To adopt the defendant's argument in this case and order a remand for development of a further evidentiary record would mean that a remand must be available in every case in which the record contains some reference to the defendant's long-ago treatment with a psychotropic drug. We decline to extend Kinkead in that manner. B The defendant next argues that the trial judge erred in failing to grant a defense motion to quash the defendant's arrest and to suppress evidence stemming from the arrest. The police did not have an arrest warrant, and the defendant contends that they lacked probable cause to make the arrest. The offenses charged here were discovered by authorities sometime after 6 a.m. on January 12, 1983. In the apartment police found an address book containing Leroy Orange's name and providing two addresses for him, 702 E. 75th Street, and 7915 S. Emerald; Leroy's mother and half-brother, the defendant in this case, also resided at the latter address. Investigating officers learned from Enitowec Durr that Leroy Orange had been with Renee and others in the apartment around 9 o'clock the preceding night; Durr had spoken to Renee on the telephone around that time and had learned in the course of the conversation that Orange was at the apartment. Durr told police that Leroy was Renee's former boyfriend and that the two had not been getting along well. Three persons who had been at Renee's apartment the preceding night reported that Leroy was there when they left, around midnight. Detectives McNally and McCabe went to the 75th Street address between 2 and 3 p.m. on January 12, where they talked to Mildred Orange, Leroy's wife. Mrs. Orange told the officers that Leroy had left the residence around 7 o'clock the preceding night and had not returned that night. When Mrs. Orange learned that the police were trying to locate Leroy, she called the South Emerald Street address and discovered that he was there. McNally and McCabe remained with Mrs. Orange, while other officers went to South Emerald Street to arrest Leroy. Mrs. Orange also told the officers that when she had arrived home from work that afternoon, she had discovered a pair of shoes, pants, a shirt, and a jacket that had not been there in the morning. Mrs. Orange was able to identify the pants as belonging to the defendant. Around 3:45 that afternoon, Mrs. Orange received a telephone call from the defendant. Officers McNally and McCabe were still with her. In the telephone call, the contents of which Mrs. Orange later related to the officers, the defendant said that Leroy had been arrested, and the defendant asked Mrs. Orange to call the police and find out what the charges were. The defendant also said that he needed to talk to Mrs. Orange, and he made arrangements to meet her at a McDonald's restaurant. The defendant told Mrs. Orange  `that he and Leroy were involved in something that could put him in jail for the rest of their lives.'  Later that afternoon, the defendant was arrested at the McDonald's restaurant where Mrs. Orange had gone to meet him. To effect a warrantless arrest, a police officer must have probable cause to believe that an offense was committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225 (1964); People v. Montgomery, 112 Ill. 2d 517, 525 (1986); see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 107--2(1)(c). Under the probable cause standard, [e]vidence that will sustain a conviction is not required, but more than mere suspicion is necessary. [Citation.] In re D.G., 144