Opinion ID: 1540750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The In Banc Hearing

Text: Baby G. was represented by separate counsel for the first time at the in banc hearing. On November 4, 1992, the in banc panel (Duckett, Williams, and Rushworth, JJ.) held: 1. that although the failure of the trial court to appoint counsel for the child violated § 5-323, the child's interest had been vigorously represented by counsel since the trial court's judgment. 2. that the focus below on Ernest's fitness obscured the paramount issue of whether the adoption was in the child's best interest; that even if the court concluded that Ernest was not unfit, that finding alone did not require denial of the adoption petition; and, consequently, the trial court erroneously equated the best interest standard with the fitness of the non-consenting father, and its factual finding was therefore clearly erroneous on that issue. 3. that the evidence before the trial court was insufficient to support its finding that Ernest had not failed repeatedly to contribute to the child's physical care and support under § 5-312. The in banc panel noted that the checks offered in evidence by Ernest at the trial were from Ernest's mother, were made payable only to Ernest, and were never endorsed or tendered on behalf of Baby G. It concluded that the child's best interests would be served by granting the adoption. It accordingly reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to that court with instructions to grant the decree of adoption. Ernest appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, raising these questions: 1. Whether the in banc panel erred in holding that the trial court had erroneously determined that it could not find by clear and convincing evidence that it was in Baby G.'s best interest to terminate Ernest's parental rights; 2. Whether the in banc panel erred in directing the trial court to grant the adoption rather than remanding the case for retrial under the proper best interest standard; 3. Whether the in banc panel erred in holding that the trial court erroneously concluded that it could not find by clear and convincing evidence that Ernest had repeatedly failed to contribute to Baby G.'s physical care and support; and 4. Whether the trial court and in banc panel erred in the application of the timing requirements of § 5-312(b).