Opinion ID: 203972
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of murder evidence (Rosario)

Text: The superseding indictment included the murders of Valdes and Sierra as overt acts undertaken in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. At trial, the government's cooperating witnesses, Rodriguez and Santiago, described the murders, implicating Rosario and others in both of them. In connection with this testimony, the government introduced photographs of the bodies of the victims, identification testimony from family members of the victims, testimony from officers who responded to the scenes of the shootings, and testimony from pathologists. Prior to this evidence being admitted, Rosario filed a motion in limine, which the court denied after a hearing. Rosario argues that the district court erred when it admitted testimony from Rodriguez and Santiago describing the murders along with other testimony concerning the murders. His argument has two parts. First, he contends that the murder testimony was irrelevant under Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In his view, the government failed to establish that the murders were related to or in furtherance of the charged conspiracy. Second, and alternatively, he argues that even if the murder testimony was relevant, the court should have excluded it because it was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. In particular, he argues that the testimony from the cooperating witnesses, pathologists, firearms examiners and family members of the victims placed an undue emphasis on the murders.
We review the court's relevancy determination, objected to by Rosario below, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 28 (1st Cir.2006). Rosario's Rule 403 claim, however, makes its debut on appeal and we therefore review it for plain error only. [6] Id. The court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the murder evidence was relevant. Each murder was relevant in at least two respects: (1) to help prove the existence of a single, overarching drug conspiracy; and (2) to help prove Rosario's involvement in that conspiracy. With respect to the murder of Valdes, Rodriguez testified that Rosario killed Valdes, who allegedly was a point owner in the conspiracy, shortly after Valdes refused to adhere to rules about packaging set by the other point owners. This testimony tended to show that the point owners made rules that were subsequently enforced, and therefore helped to establish that a single, cohesive conspiracy was at work within the housing project. See United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 54 (1st Cir.2008) (noting that a murder was relevant to the RICO conspiracy counts as it tended to prove the existence and nature of the RICO enterprise and conspiracy (citation omitted)); Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d at 32 (The murder furthered the conspiracy by sending the message that those suspected of stealing from the conspiracy would be treated harshly.) (citation omitted). This evidence also helped link Rosario to the conspiracy, as the jury could infer from the murder that he was enforcing the conspiracy's directives. See Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 6-7 (evidence that the appellant accompanied a conspiracy member during the assassination of an apostate drug dealer who had broken [with the conspiracy] helped support appellant's conspiracy conviction); United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir.1998) ([Appellant's] violence against a suspected informant is relevant to prove his membership in the conspiracy and his acceptance of its objectives.). As for Sierra's murder, Santiago testified that Rosario shot and killed Sierra because Sierra had threatened to take over Santiago's, Torres', and Rosario's drug points. The evidence of this murder helped to establish the existence of a conspiracy in two ways. First, it showed joint efforts undertaken by co-conspirators to protect drug territory. See Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d at 32 (evidence that a victim was murdered to protect the drug territory was admissible to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy). Second, the evidence corroborated the testimony about concerted discipline: those who attempted to sell drugs without the approval of the point owners could be killed. Additionally, similar to the Valdes killing, the murder of Sierra was also relevant in that it helped establish Rosario's involvement in the conspiracy, by linking him with fellow accused co-conspirator Torres and with Santiago, an admitted co-conspirator and cooperating witness. Rosario's contention that neither murder was relevant is unavailing. He begins by broadly challenging the relevance of both murders, noting that participation in a drug related murder with members of a drug conspiracy does not, standing alone, establish membership in that drug conspiracy. United States v. Garcia-Torres, 280 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2002). We agree. But the government did not rely on this murder evidence alone to establish Rosario's membership in the conspiracy. Both Rodriguez and Santiago testified to Rosario's other conspiratorial activities within the housing project, including his drug dealing and his efforts to hide weapons for security purposes. See Rodriguez, 162 F.3d at 143 (Contrary to [the appellant's] claim, the evidence of the beating does not stand alone as proof of his membership in the conspiracy ... four witnesses testified that they either saw [him] selling drugs and/or purchased drugs directly from him.). A witness also placed Rosario at one of the point owner meetings, further establishing his connection to the conspiracy. Rosario also attacks the relevance of each murder independently. He challenges the relevance of the Valdes murder in two ways. First, he argues that there was no evidence that he was at the meeting where the point owners told Valdes to stop using a particular type of packaging. Accordingly, he appears to suggest that even if he did murder Valdes, that murder cannot be tied to Valdes' refusal to abide by conspiracy directives. But a piece of evidence need not conclusively establish the existence of a fact to be considered relevant. Rather, it need only have the tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Here, the point owners ordered Valdes to stop using a particular type of drug packaging. The government introduced evidence that, shortly after Valdes' refusal to do so, Rosario killed him. This evidence made it more probable that Rosario was a member of the conspiracy, as a jury could reasonably infer from this and other record evidence that Rosario was carrying out the conspiracy's wishes. Next, Rosario argues that evidence of Valdes' murder was irrelevant because absent evidence that the elimination of one conspirator would increase drug sales or profits, evidence not present here, no furtherance of the group objective was shown. The murder of Valdes, however, sent a message that rules set by the conspiracy would be enforced. Sending such a message would have been in the conspiracy's economic interests given that some of its rules, e.g., those dealing with pricing and brand protection, directly influenced profits. Rosario's challenge to the relevance of the Sierra murder is even less substantial. First, he suggests that Sierra's murder might be irrelevant because during voir dire Santiago testified that Rosario may have had another reason for wanting to kill Sierra, that Sierra's brother had been disrespectful to Rosario's wife. But Santiago identified that motive as an additional reason that Rosario wanted Sierra dead (in addition to the threat Sierra posed to Rosario's, Santiago's and Torres' drug points). That Rosario may have had another reason for killing Sierra that was unrelated to the furtherance of the conspiracy's objectives went to the weight rather than to the relevance of the evidence. See United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1413 (1st Cir. 1997). Next, Rosario argues that the murder of Sierra, an outsider who had threatened to take over the points of conspiracy members, could not have furthered the objectives of the conspiracy. This argument is a non-starter. As a potential competitor, Sierra posed an obvious threat to the conspiracy's economic interests.
Of course, under Rule 403 relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. [7] Rosario makes an extended Rule 403 argument on appeal. He begins by minimizing the probative value of the murders, noting that the government did not charge him or any of the other appellants with murder. He then argues that the extensive testimony about the murders, elicited from a number of witnesses, placed an unnecessary and prejudicial focus on the murders. Before considering Rosario's Rule 403 argument, we note what he does not argue. At trial, the court admitted murder scene photographs depicting the bodies of Valdes and Sierra. These photographs, especially two in particular, were graphic. When the photographs of the bodies were admitted, Rosario's counsel explicitly preserved a Rule 403 objection, which Rosario makes note of in the fact section of his opening brief. On appeal, Rosario has waived any argument that the admission of the photographs caused him unfair prejudice. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17. In developing his Rule 403 argument, Rosario makes no mention of the photographs. Instead, he focuses on the testimony elicited from the cooperating witnesses and others. [8] Moreover, Rosario makes it clear that the Rule 403 argument he presents on appeal is governed by the plain error standard of review, further indicating that he has abandoned his preserved objection to the photographs which would have been reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rosario's reply brief offers little more. There, he states that he was unduly prejudiced by the government's presentation of testimony from family members, pathologists and firearms examiners as well as some of the photographs introduced.  (emphasis added). Even putting aside that an argument cannot make its first appearance in a reply brief, the argument is not sufficiently developed in any event. The reply brief does not identify which pictures he is referencing and how they had the capacity to unfairly prejudice him. What remains is Rosario's challenge to the testimony about the murders. With respect to the testimony from the cooperating witnesses, there was no error, much less plain error. Although none of the defendants was individually charged with the murders, the murders were relevant to the conspiracy charges brought against Rosario and the other appellants, and not marginally so, as Rosario would have us believe. As previously noted, the murders were charged as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and helped establish not only the existence of a conspiracy but also Rosario's connection to it. Moreover, the testimonial accounts of the murders do not appear to have been calculated to arouse the passions of the jury. Both Rodriguez and Santiago described the murders matter-of-factly, stating that the men were shot but leaving out graphic details. C.f. United States v. Portillo-Quezada, 469 F.3d 1345, 1354 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing partly graphic testimony about the conspiracy defendant's uncharged murder of a victim). And although the discussion of murder at any level of detail was bound to leave an impression on the jury, trials were never meant to be antiseptic affairs; it is only unfair prejudice, not prejudice per se, against which Rule 403 guards. Veranda Beach Club Ltd. P'ship v. W. Supply Co., 936 F.2d 1364, 1372 (1st Cir.1991). A somewhat closer question is presented by the court's admission of the other murder-related testimony including (1) testimony from Valdes' wife about her identification of Valdes' body; [9] (2) testimony from the pathologists who examined the bodies; (3) testimony from firearms examiners identifying the caliber of ammunition used in the murder; and (4) testimony from the police officers who gathered and processed the evidence of the murders. On the one hand, admitting this evidence arguably carried the risk of turning a drug conspiracy case into a murder case. On the other hand, this evidence was not completely gratuitous. The government was relying on the testimony of two admitted drug dealers and co-conspirators to establish that the murders charged as overt acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred, and this evidence corroborated their accounts of these murders. [10] Also, Rosario contested his involvement in the murders, and the evidence that was presented helped link him to the crimes. For example, there was testimony at trial that Rosario used a nine-millimeter gun when committing both murders, and the forensic examiner testified that nine-millimeter caliber bullets were recovered from both victims. Given these tension points, and the great deal of deference we afford district court rulings of this sort, even were we to conclude that the court erred in admitting this evidence the error would not be clear or obvious, as the applicable plain error standard of review demands. See Griffin, 524 F.3d at 76 (noting that a plain error is one that is obvious and clear under current law).