Opinion ID: 53142
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment on Back Pay Claim

Text: The district court granted partial summary judgment for the Postal Service, ruling that Merriman’s failure to complete the back pay worksheets was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On appeal, Merriman argues that the Postal Service refused to send her the correct documents for payment of additional back pay. As a remedy, she requests additional back pay with interest. Although Merriman did question the appropriateness of the back pay forms during her administrative appeals, she did not offer any excuse in her district court pleadings for failing to file the back pay forms. The only excuse she gives first appears in her appellate briefs—and we do not consider material that was not before the district court. See Kemlon Prods. & Dev. Co. v. United States, 646 F.2d 223, 224 (5th Cir. 1981). Under Title VII, a federal employee is required to exhaust administrative remedies against an employer before bringing suit in federal court. Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-33 (1976)). “To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the employee must cooperate in good faith with the agency and the Equal Employment 1 Although Merriman pursues this appeal pro se, she was represented by counsel during the district court proceedings. 6 No. 06-41400 Opportunity Commission in the administrative proceedings.” Id. (citing Munoz v. Aldridge, 894 F.2d 1489, 1493 (5th Cir. 1990)). Though the exact definition of “good-faith participation” is unclear, the EEOC held in its appeal decision that “good faith requires complainant to complete back pay worksheets to the best of her ability in order to assist the agency in accurately calculating the back pay due complainant.” The EEOC remanded this issue to allow Merriman “one more opportunity” to comply with the good faith requirement. In its summary judgment order, the district court concluded that Merriman had not complied with the good faith requirement. We agree. Merriman did not address the matter in her responsive briefing on the summary judgment motion and offered the district court no reasonable excuse for failing to cooperate with the administrative process. Indeed, Merriman’s original complaint mentions back pay only in its prayer for relief. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Merriman, there simply was no evidence before the district court that she complied or attempted to comply with the administrative proceedings. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate.