Opinion ID: 2630199
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Expert testimony/recall bias

Text: Thomas's final assignment of trial error concerns the general recall bias testimony presented by WMC's expert, Edward Panacek, M.D., M.P.H. [9] We reject this claim of error for two reasons. First, Thomas makes a different objection on appeal than the one she madeindeed, prevailed onat trial. Second, even if error occurred in connection with Dr. Panacek's general testimony about recall bias, it does not rise to the level required to reverse. `Recall bias' refers to the human tendency, when confronted with [a] rare outcome, such as the development of autism [after a child is vaccinated], to recall with greater frequency or clarity events which may explain the outcome. Hendrix v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 568, 601 n. 62 (N.D.Fla. 2009). While expert testimony on recall bias has been permitted in the context of epidemiological challenges to the validity of retrospective public health studies, see Colon v. Abbott Laboratories, 397 F.Supp.2d 405, 409-10 (E.D.N.Y.2005), we have found no published case approving its admission on individual witness credibility, and Nichols v. American National Insurance Co., 154 F.3d 875, 882-83 (8th Cir.1998), persuades us that such use of recall bias testimony invades the province of the jury and seems unhelpful. [10] We thus decline respondents' invitation to equate recall bias testimony with the cross-cultural eyewitness identification testimony we permitted in Echavarria v. State, 108 Nev. 734, 839 P.2d 589 (1992). On appeal, Thomas objects to Dr. Panacek's general testimony about recall bias on the grounds that it amounted to an improper, thinly veiled comment on her credibility as a witness. Thomas's problem is that she did not timely raise or preserve this objection in the trial court. While Thomas mentioned recall bias in her omnibus motion in limine, she gave it just a single paragraph, stating Dr. Panacek is a medical doctor and an expert in Emergency Room medicine [and h]e is not qualified to testify regarding a subject called `recall bias,' which is not even subject to expert application. Fairly read, this objection went to Dr. Panacek's qualifications to give recall bias testimony, not its helpfulness. Because the trial court properly declined to give a definitive ruling on this sketchy objection (which appears invalid in any eventDr. Panacek's master's in Public Health qualified him on recall bias, see supra note 9), the contemporaneous objection rule required Thomas to object at trial. See Richmond v. State, 118 Nev. 924, 929-32, 59 P.3d 1249, 1252-54 (2002); NRS 47.040(1). Thomas did not renew her motion in limine or ask the court to exclude all testimony about recall bias before Dr. Panacek testified, as our dissenting colleague would find. Before Dr. Panacek was called, Thomas reminded the court and opposing counsel that the section of her motion in limine concerning Dr. Panacek remained unresolved in several respects, recall bias being one. She did not renew her motion in limine or ask for an order forbidding reference to recall bias. Instead, Thomas affirmatively advised that she might well have no objections to Dr. Panacek being asked about recall bias, depending on what was asked and the foundation laid. Per Thomas, WMC's counsel is a very experienced and skillful lawyer [who] knows how to phrase a question . . . we're just going to have to wait and see whether the question occurs to any of us as being objectionable. It may not be. On appeal Thomas challenges the district court's admission of any testimony on the subject of recall bias. But as noted, this was not the objection in the omnibus motion in limine or in the colloquy that preceded Dr. Panacek's testimony. True to her stated position in the trial court, Thomas allowed Dr. Panacek to testify for five pages about recall bias, in general, and its application to epidemiology and bad medical outcomes, in particular, without objection. It was only when Dr. Panacek was asked if he had an opinion ... to a reasonable medical probability that recall bias is involved in this case that Thomas objected. When Thomas finally objected, the court called a recess. After the jury was excused, Thomas volunteered that she had made a deliberate, tactical decision not to object to the general recall bias testimony because it's general information that really isn't anything that we all don't know. Thomas stated that her objection was to Dr. Panacek tying recall bias to the facts in this case, which Thomas argued was more prejudicial than probative and a comment on Thomas's credibility, invading the province of the jury. The court sustained Thomas's objection to the question asked before the recesswhether Dr. Panacek had an opinion about recall bias being involved in the case. However, the court stated that it would overrule the objection to recall bias testimony in general. But this latter ruling was gratuitous because by then the general recall bias testimony had been admitted without objection and Thomas's counsel had stated that he didn't deem the general testimony harmful or even objectionable. Following the break, defense counsel spent only two pages on recall bias and covered nothing that hadn't already been covered without objection in greater detail before the break. NRS 47.040(1)(a) requires a party who objects to the admission of evidence to make a timely objection or motion to strike. . ., stating the specific ground of objection. The failure to specifically object on the grounds urged on appeal preclude[s] appellate consideration on the grounds not raised below. Pantano v. State, 122 Nev. 782, 795 n. 28, 138 P.3d 477, 486 n. 28 (2006). This rule is more than a formality, since an objection educates both the trial court and the opposing party, who is entitled to revise course according to the objections made. 1 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 103.02[9], at 103-18 (9th ed. 2006). Where, as here, an objection was stated as to certain evidence but not to other related evidence, and this was confirmed on the record to be the product of deliberate choice, [t]here is no reason ... to allow reconsideration of this strategic choice on appeal. Id. We agree with the dissent that it can be argued that there isn't much difference between general questions about recall bias and the question that would have tied the concept to this case directly. See Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 118-19, 734 P.2d 705, 709 (1987). That argument is off limits to Thomas here, though, given her failure to timely object to the testimony about recall bias in general, her lawyer's affirmation that such a difference did exist and was the crux of the matter, and the frank, on-the-record acknowledgment that the effect of the general recall bias testimony was negligible. Certainly, on this record, the error in allowing the general testimony about recall bias cannot qualify as plain. See Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 16, 174 P.3d 970, 980 (2008); NRS 47.040(2); see also United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (2d Cir.1995) (a decision not to raise an objection for strategic reasons amounts to waiver, not merely forfeiture, and is not reviewable even for plain error) (discussing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). [11]