Opinion ID: 891674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Necessary Nexus Between the Affidavit and the Place to Be Searched

Text: {20} There must be sufficient detail in the affidavit to show a nexus between the evidence sought and the particular place being searched. See Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 24, 146 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216. This link must be made by the [issuing] judge or magistrate on a case-by-case basis. Id. The fundamental inquiry is whether there is probable cause to believe there will be evidence of a crime at a particular location.  Id. ¶ 25. Finally, when considering whether an affidavit established probable cause to issue a search warrant, review is limited to the four corners of the document. Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, ¶ 31, 146 N.M. 488, 212 P.3d 376. {21} Returning to the case before us, we recall that the address to be searched, 1208 Juanita SW, was listed on each page of the affidavit. The affidavit describes in graphic detail numerous acts of sexual molestation, and evidence to be found in proof thereof, at a place variously described as the residence, the Trujillo home, and the address, with the only address listed in the affidavit being 1208 Juanita SW. But the affidavit never explicitly connects the two. Accordingly, we must decide whether the lack of an explicit nexus in the affidavit between the place to be searched, 1208 Juanita SW, and the place of the evidence, the Trujillo home, the residence, and the address is determinative. {22} We are not without guidance in our inquiry. We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the failure to explicitly state in a search warrant affidavit that the listed address is that of the defendant is not a fatal flaw, at least not always, as long as a reasonable inference to that effect can be drawn from the facts detailed in the affidavit. United States v. Hunter, 86 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir.1996). [1] The facts of Hunter are quite similar to those of the instant case. Probable cause that the defendant committed bank robbery was not at issue, as the defendant turned himself in to the authorities three days before the search warrant issued. Id. at 681-82. An attachment to the affidavit described the place to be searched as the residence at 510 Palace Court, Schaumburg, Illinois, while the affidavit only referred to Hunter's residence without linking the residence to the address. Id. at 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the affidavit made no reference to any other place connected to Hunter. Id. The court ruled that [a]lthough Hunter correctly notes that the affidavit did not explicitly state that 510 Palace Court was his residence, that is the only logical conclusion supported by a common-sense reading of the affidavit. Id. {23} The most significant of the similarities between Hunter and the case before us is that both affidavits only describe one place connected to the suspects. In each case, the affidavit lists the address to be searched, and then the narrative proceeds to discuss one location in detail. And, in each case, no express statement connects the address to be searched with the address described where evidence can be found. Nonetheless, that connection is the only logical conclusion supported by a common-sense reading of the affidavit. Id. {24} Such an inference is even more reasonable in the case before us. The same address is listed at the top of each page of the affidavit; all of the crimes described in the instant case occurred in Defendant's bedroom; some of the specific items of evidence are expected to be found under Defendant's bed or mattress. The detective had two separate victims tell him precisely where in his bedroom Defendant kept the pornographic magazines that were the object of the search. The issuing judge had a more solid foundation from which to draw inferences than in Hunter, where the crimes occurred away from the suspect's residence and the affiant wished to search for evidence that might have been brought back to the suspect's residence. {25} Barring a hypertechnical reading of the affidavit, an inference that the residence described is the same as the residence where evidence can be found, is much more reasonable than its oppositethat the residence described in such painstaking detail actually has no relationship to the events of this case. We think the reviewing judge was well within his rights to draw the rational inference and avoid the irrational. Understandably, the reviewing judge was concerned that [t]here [was] no indication in the affidavit that . . . Defendant lived at this address, that he was presently at that address or had been at that address sometime in the past. However, considered in context, what else could the detective have intended to say? More significant still, what other inference could the issuing judge reasonably have come to? {26} Simply put, it is a stretch to draw the opposite inference; one must work hard not to infer that 1208 Juanita SW is the residence where all these criminal acts occurred and where incriminating evidence can be found. Deference is due under the circumstances, and his decision to issue the warrant is supported by a substantial basis in the record. {27} Defendant argues that State v. Herrera, 102 N.M. 254, 694 P.2d 510 (1985) supports suppression in this case. In Herrera, this Court found insufficient probable cause to determine that the residence to be searched was in fact the defendant's residence. Id. at 258, 694 P.2d at 514. The affidavit in that case provided [a] thorough description of the residence to be searched, and later referred to it as his residence or the [d]efendant's residence. Id. at 257, 694 P.2d at 513 (emphasis omitted). But, there was no statement of foundation explaining why the affiant thought the residence was the defendant's. Id. The only supporting information in the affidavit was that the defendant was apprehended driving away from the `general direction' of the described residence, and there were unfrozen, fresh tire tracks at the described residence. Id. at 258, 694 P.2d at 514. This Court concluded that merely because a residence is described in even minute detail does not provide a magistrate with the necessary evidence to infer that a suspect makes such residence his home. Id. The affidavit merely stated the conclusion that the described residence was Herrera's home. Id. As a result, [t]here was virtually no evidence presented in the affidavit from which a magistrate could properly infer that the place to be searched was Herrera's residence. Id. {28} In contrast with Herrera, the affidavit in this case is sufficiently detailed to allow the issuing judge to reasonably infer that Defendant in fact lives at the described residence, the one listed as an address where all the evidence will be found. All of the alleged criminal conduct in the instant case occurred in the same residence, in Defendant's bedroom, whereas the criminal conduct in Herrera occurred at a nightclub away from the defendant's home. From the affidavit, we know that both J.J. and D.M. know where Defendant lives, with J.J. residing in the same house, while in Herrera there was no indication that any of the eyewitnesses who identified the defendant actually knew where he lived. Reading Herrera even today, we are left to speculate why the affiant picked that house as the defendant's residence. {29} Additional corroboration was not necessary in this case. Again, it is clear from the affidavit that J.J. lived with Defendant. It is equally clear that D.M. knew were Defendant lived. The detective even asked D.M. why she stopped going over to the Trujillo home. This is more than an investigating officer's mere unsupported assumption that the residence to be searched is that of the defendant, as was the case in Herrera. Rather, the affidavit details the factual foundation for exactly how the detective concluded that Defendant resided at 1208 Juanita SW and why incriminating evidence would be found at that particular place. {30} Defendant argues that [i]t would be inappropriate to search based on the word of a 15 year old girl that the address is the one listed, and there is no way for an issuing court to know whether the officers in a case like this one had verified the girl's statement. First, we disagree with the argument that a 15-year-old girl is not qualified to identify where and with whom she lives. Second, it is clear from the affidavit that the detective in this case independently verified J.J.'s allegations. According to the affidavit, and prior to applying for the search warrant, the detective was able to obtain a letter written between J.J. and Defendant. This letter not only directly corroborates her allegations, but documents the abuse of D.M. as well. {31} In sum, the difference between Herrera and Defendant's case is that the affidavit in Herrera was wholly lacking any foundational information to allow the inference that the residence described was in fact the defendant's residence. In contrast, the affidavit in this case lacked only a statement of the obviousthat the residence referred to on the final page of the affidavit, the one in which the alleged crimes occurred and which evidence from under Defendant's bed can be found, is identified as 1208 Juanita SWthe address that appears on every page of the affidavit. The affidavit laid an adequate foundation for how Defendant's address was determined; the affidavit just lacked the final link in the chain. While this link is a material fact, it need not be proved by direct evidence. It is sufficient if there is evidence from which the fact can properly be inferred. State v. Snedeker, 99 N.M. 286, 290, 657 P.2d 613, 617 (1982). {32} This same discussion equally applies to United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir.2005), upon which Defendant also relies. Again, lacking in Gonzales was any foundational information that would permit an inference that the described residence was that of the defendant or contained evidence of a crime. Id. at 1227-28. Like Herrera, the actual crime occurred away from the residence, no information linked the defendant to the residence, and the only link between the residence and the evidence to be seized was a conclusory statement by the affiant. Gonzales, 399 F.3d at 1230. As explained above, that situation is vastly different from the one presented in this case. {33} We acknowledge that this is a close case. Had the issuing judge denied the search warrant based on the same affidavit, we would likely uphold that decision as well. Here, we sustain the search because some deference is due the decision of the issuing judge [2] and because, in accordance with sound policy, close cases in this area are to be decided in favor of our pronounced preference for warrants.