Opinion ID: 2815884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Major participation

Text: Considering the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, there was substantial evidence to show Matthews acted as the getaway driver for an armed robbery. The jury could infer from Matthews‘s movements that he dropped his confederates off near the dispensary. Matthews then waited three blocks away for approximately 45 minutes. Moments after the shooting and a call from Banks, he drove toward the dispensary. A witness saw Daniels flag Matthews down. He slowed, Daniels and Gardiner got in, and he drove them away. The evidence in the record places Matthews at the Enmund pole of the Tison-Enmund spectrum. Indeed, as Matthews argues, his conduct is virtually indistinguishable from Earl Enmund‘s. No evidence was introduced establishing Matthews‘s role, if any, in planning the robbery.6 No evidence was introduced establishing Matthews‘s role, if any, in procuring weapons. Matthews and two confederates—though not the shooter—were gang members, but, in contrast to the convicted murderers the Tison brothers chose to free and arm, no evidence was introduced that Matthews, Gardiner or Daniels had themselves previously committed murder, attempted murder, or any other violent crime. The crime itself was an armed robbery; Enmund and Tison together demonstrate that participation in an armed robbery, without more, does not involve ―engaging in criminal 6 The People argue Matthews had a greater role than Enmund in planning their respective armed robberies, but the prosecution introduced no evidence that would support this. At most, there was evidence Matthews participated in the robbery, from which a jury might reasonably infer he had some role in planning it, but the nature of that role is, on the record before us, a matter of pure conjecture. In Enmund, in contrast, the trial court made express findings that Earl Enmund had planned the robbery. (See Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 803–806, 809 (dis. opn. of O‘Connor, J.); Enmund v. State, supra, 399 So.2d at pp. 1365, 1372–1373.) 17 activities known to carry a grave risk of death.‖ (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 157.) During the robbery and murder, Matthews was absent from the scene, sitting in a car and waiting. There was no evidence he saw or heard the shooting, that he could have seen or heard the shooting, or that he had any immediate role in instigating it or could have prevented it. On this record, Matthews was, in short, no more than a getaway driver, guilty like Earl Enmund of ―felony murder simpliciter‖ (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 147; see Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 784–787; Enmund v. State, supra, 399 So.2d at p. 1370) but nothing greater. As such, he is ineligible for the death penalty under Tison and Enmund. Because section 190.2(d) incorporates the Tison-Enmund standard, if the evidence was insufficient to make Matthews death eligible under these cases, the evidence was also insufficient to find the special circumstance true and Matthews eligible for life imprisonment without parole under state law. The Court of Appeal dismissed the relevance of comparisons to the facts of Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. 782, treating Enmund as applicable only to the constitutionality of certain death sentences and immaterial to the present inquiry, whether as a statutory matter the section 190.2(d) special circumstance applies to Matthews. The People also argue Enmund has no bearing, noting that section 190.2(d)‘s statutory language is drawn from Tison, not Enmund. But Enmund cannot be dismissed so easily. As we have explained, Tison did not overrule Enmund, but rather elaborated on the constitutional limits to punishment of felony-murder accomplices first announced there. (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158 [defining what conduct would ―satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement‖]; see Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 69 [treating Tison and Enmund as of equal continuing vitality in marking the bounds of the 8th Amend.]; Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 421 [same]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 18 536 U.S. 584, 594 [Tison represents a qualification of the rule in Enmund].) Under the spectrum of culpable felony-murderer behavior Tison constructs, Earl Enmund‘s conduct marks one end. (Tison, at pp. 149–150.) The facts and holding of Enmund are thus essential to an understanding of that spectrum and where each new case should be deemed to fall on it. Enmund is inseparable from Tison. In the alternative, the People offer the prosecutor‘s closing argument below to illustrate how Matthews‘s conduct can be distinguished from Earl Enmund‘s. Tellingly, however, the closing argument offers no distinction; were one simply to replace the names of those involved in this case with those involved in Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. 782, it would apply equally—save for the fact Enmund, unlike Matthews, contributed to not one but two homicides: ―And what ‗major participant‘ means is this: what was his involvement, how important was Mr. [Enmund‘s] involvement in the crime, and with that you look at his actions. As I‘ve stated multiple times, Mr. [Enmund] is the one that gets everyone to this location. Mr. [Enmund] is the guy that drives the getaway vehicle. Mr. [Enmund] is the one that‘s supposed to pick up everybody at this location. [¶] You know, short of Mr. [Armstrong] who actually killed Mr. [and Mrs. Kersey], next most involved person had to be Mr. [Enmund], right? Mr. [Enmund] is the one that started all this process. He gets everyone to the location, waits around, and his job was to get everyone to safety afterwards. [¶] I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that Mr. [Enmund] was a major participant. Without him, you don‘t even have an attempted robbery. Without him, you don‘t have a burglary. And honestly, without him taking Mr. [Armstrong] to this location, you wouldn‘t have the murder of [the Kerseys].‖ The People also highlight the evidence of cellphone contact between Matthews and Banks, the shooter. The record shows a series of nine cellphone calls between Matthews and Banks, each lasting less than one minute, and as 19 many as six of which may simply have gone to voicemail. No evidence about the content of the calls was introduced, and the bare evidence of the call records tells us nothing additional about Matthews‘s awareness of or involvement in the shooting. Banks and Matthews apparently spoke either hours before or shortly after the killing, and GPS evidence established Matthews was away from the scene until after the victim was dead. Earl Enmund, too, no doubt found out after the robbery that his coconspirators had killed two people, yet he still drove them away to safety and apparently directed disposal of the murder weapons. (Enmund v. State, supra, 399 So.2d at p. 1366.) Matthews, like Enmund and unlike the Tisons, did not see the shooting happen, did not have reason to know it was going to happen, and could not do anything to stop the shooting or render assistance. The call records do nothing to increase Matthews‘s role beyond that of Enmund‘s; instead, they show only that technology has changed. The other facts the People cite—that Matthews drove near the crime scene, sat in a parked car blocks away waiting for a signal to pick up his confederates, and afterward drove toward the dispensary and picked up two accomplices—show simply that he acted as a getaway driver. Earl Enmund, too, was a getaway driver who may have been involved in planning an armed robbery, but as a matter of precedent Enmund is the quintessential ―minor actor.‖ (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 149.) It follows that Matthews is as well and, as a matter of law, cannot qualify as a major participant under section 190.2(d).