Opinion ID: 1374550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the burden of proving a financial exigency was properly placed upon the defendants

Text: Pace's action is for an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [3] Under § 1983, in order for a plaintiff to prevail, he or she must prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right.... Daniels v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). We have found no authority, however, which states that this rule means that the burden of proof on all issues in a § 1983 case must be placed upon the plaintiff, and a review of applicable case law shows that this is not the rule. In § 1983 cases the burden is on the defendants to prove affirmative defenses, such as good faith or immunity. See, e.g., Harris v. Pirch, 677 F.2d 681, 686 (8th Cir.1982); Evans v. Dillahunty, 662 F.2d 522, 527 n. 11 (8th Cir.1981). In racial discrimination cases, once a plaintiff has successfully proven a prima facie case of unlawful discriminatory action, the burden shifts upon the defendant to prove some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly unconstitutional action. See, e.g., Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (8th Cir.1981); Jackson v. City of Akron, Ohio, 411 F.Supp. 680, 687 (N.D.Ohio 1976). In search and seizure cases, the burden of pleading and proving exceptional circumstances authorizing a search without a search warrant is upon the defendants who conducted the search. Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 32 (9th Cir.1962). These cases, concededly, are not directly on point with respect to the issue before us. They do show, however, that in certain circumstances a defendant in a § 1983 case will have the burden of proving a fact or explaining certain conduct. In short, the cases referred to refute any argument that a plaintiff always has the burden of proving every factual dispute which arises in a § 1983 case. Applying these cases to the facts here convinces us that the district court did not err. Pace introduced evidence, which was undisputed, that she was a tenured professor. Her contract, quoted above, specifically guaranteed her continued employment with the University of Idaho except in cases where adequate cause is shown or a financial exigency exists. The defendants do not argue that Pace was fired for adequate cause. Thus the only valid reason under Pace's contract for which she could be terminated was the existence of a financial exigency. Financial exigency, as mentioned above, is defined in pertinent part by the University of Idaho's faculty-staff handbook as a  demonstrably bona fide imminent financial crisis ... which cannot be adequately alleviated by means other than a reduction in the employment force. [4] (Emphasis added.) As developed below, this definition clearly placed the burden of proof of this issue on the defendants. If the word demonstrably has any meaning at all, it must mean that the party declaring the exigency must be able to demonstrate the existence of a  bona fide imminent financial crisis ... which cannot be adequately alleviated by means other than a reduction in the employment force. R., Vol. 5, p. 319. The alternative would require Pace to demonstrate the non-existence of such a financial crisis, an interpretation clearly at odds with basic grammar and common sense. Other considerations also confirm our holding that the burden of proving a financial exigency rested with the defendants. It is the general rule that where evidence necessary to establish a fact lies peculiarly within the knowledge and competence of one of the parties, principles of fairness require that party to bear the burden of going forward with evidence on the issue. See, e.g., United States v. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n. 5, 78 S.Ct. 212, 214-15 n. 5, 2 L.Ed.2d 247 (1957); Browzin v. Catholic University of America, 527 F.2d 843, 849 (D.C.Cir.1975); Fitzgerald v. Wright, 155 N.J.Super. 494, 382 A.2d 1162, 1165 (App.Div.1978); Dixon v. Anadarko Production Co., 505 P.2d 1394, 1396 (Okl. 1973); Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal.2d 733, 433 P.2d 697, 715, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 707 (1967); Duncan v. Essary, 193 Kan. 241, 392 P.2d 877, 883 (1964); Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 337, p. 950 (3d ed. 1984). Applying this rule required the defendants to bear the burden of proving a financial exigency, because the numerous facts and considerations which went into the defendants' decision to declare a financial exigency were specially within their knowledge. It is also the general rule that `where the defense to an action is of an affirmative nature, the defendant becomes the proponent, and has the burden to bear....' Southeast Securities Co. v. Christensen, 66 Idaho 233, 239, 158 P.2d 315, 317 (1945), quoting Piland v. Crazy, 194 Okl. 666, 154 P.2d 583, 585 (1944). Here the defense to Pace's claim is financial exigency. This defense is affirmative in nature. Accordingly, applying this rule, the defendants also had the burden of proving a financial exigency. The fact that Pace has the burden of proving a constitutional deprivation does not change our analysis. There is no dispute here that Pace has a property interest in her contractwhich is constitutionally protected by the due process clauses of both art. 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Harkness v. City of Burley, 110 Idaho 353, 715 P.2d 1283, 1286-87 (1986). Thus, to prevail, Pace must still show that her dismissal violated due process. The due process guaranteed Pace has both a procedural and a substantive component to it. Harrah Independent School District v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 197, 99 S.Ct. 1062, 1063, 59 L.Ed.2d 248 (1979); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 1444, 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976). Pace does not argue that she was denied procedural due process, only that she was denied substantive due process. See Respondent's Brief, p. 27. Hence, in order to prevail, Pace has the burden of proving a substantive due process violation. Substantive due process means that state action which deprives [a person] of life, liberty, or property must have a rational basisthat is to say, the reason for the deprivation may not be so inadequate that the judiciary will characterize it as `arbitrary.' Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3-4 (7th Cir.1974). Accord Levitt v. University of Texas at El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224, 1231 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 599, 88 L.Ed.2d 578; Korf v. Ball State University, 726 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir.1984); Brenna v. Southern Colorado State College, 589 F.2d 475, 477 (10th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, refining further Pace's burden of proof, to prevail clear she must show that the decision to discharge her was arbitrary, capricious, or without a rational basis. Pace has not yet had the opportunity to go forth with her proofthat part of the case is set for the second half of the bifurcated trial. The fact that the defendants have failed their burden of proving a financial exigency does not mean, in and of itself, that her discharge necessarily violated substantive due process. While the absence of a bona fide financial exigency certainly strengthens Pace's argument that the decision to discharge hera breach of her contractwas arbitrary, capricious or without a rational basis, it is clear that this fact alone does not necessarily change Pace's burden of proof nor necessarily satisfy it, although it might, depending upon the facts of the case. [5] A review of case law on this issue sustains our analysis. In Browzin, supra, 527 F.2d 843, the plaintiff, a college professor, was dismissed as a result of an alleged financial exigency. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract. Before trial plaintiff stipulated that a financial exigency existed at the time of his firing. Plaintiff argued that even though there was a financial exigency, the defendants breached his contract because his contract also required the defendants to make every effort to find the plaintiff a different job within the University. The district court placed upon the plaintiff the burden of proving that the University had not made every effort to find plaintiff a different job within the University. Plaintiff did not object to this. Id. at 849-50. The district court ruled against the plaintiff, holding that he had failed his burden of proof. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Id. With respect to the burden of proof issue, it noted that because plaintiff had not objected to having the burden placed upon him, it would not reverse the district court's decision of placing the burden upon plaintiff. Id. Significantly, however, the court did state that had the issue been properly preserved, it would have disagreed with the district court's decision to place the burden upon the plaintiff. Said the court: Ordinarily a litigant does not have the burden of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposing party. The University here was plainly in a far better position to know what efforts were or were not undertaken to find for [plaintiff] another post within the University. Id. at 849 (footnotes omitted). This analysis is consistent with ours. The Browzin court relied upon another case, AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J.Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846, 856 (1974), for support. Bloomfield College is a superior court decision which held under facts quite similar to those found in our case that the defendants had the burden of proving a financial exigency which would justify their firing of several tenured faculty members. Defendants appealed. In AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615, 616 (App.Div. 1975), the New Jersey Appellate Court affirmed the lower court, stating: [Tenure] was their [the faculty members'] vested right which could legally be divested only if the defined conditions occurred. The proof of existence of those conditions as a justifiable reason for terminating the status of the plaintiffs plainly was the burden of defendants. Where a party seeks to avoid a contractual obligation by reason of the happening of an event or condition stipulated in a contract, the burden of establishing the occurrence of the condition rests upon the party asserting it. [ Fitzmaurice v. Van Vlaanderen Mach. Co., 110 N.J.Super. 159, 165, 264 A.2d 740, 744 (App.Div.1970), aff'd 57 N.J. 447, 273 A.2d 561 (1971) ]. 3A Corbin, Contracts, § 749 (1960). Another case involving the placing of burden of proof is Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.1978). The federal district court placed upon the defendants the burden of proving, among other things, whether a financial exigency existed at Goucher College, which would justify their terminating the plaintiff, who was a tenured faculty member. Id. at 676-77. The jury found for the plaintiff, but the district court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that the defendants had satisfied their burden. The plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the district court's decision was affirmed. Id. at 683. No issue was raised concerning the allocation of burden of proof. The final case this Court found dealing with the burden of proof issue is Bignall v. North Idaho College, 538 F.2d 243 (9th Cir.1976). The facts in Bignall are quite similar to ours: plaintiff was a tenured faculty member who was laid off after the defendants declared a financial exigency. Plaintiff sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that her procedural and substantive due process rights were violated because (1) she had not received adequate notice of her termination, and (2) was fired in violation of the terms of her contract. Id. at 245. The district court disagreed on both counts and ruled against her. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's procedural due process argument, stating that although plaintiff had received inadequate notice, sufficient procedural process was afforded the plaintiff when the district court granted plaintiff a de novo trial concerning her discharge. Id. at 248. With respect to plaintiff's substantive due process argumentsand significant to this appealthe court stated that the defendants bore the burden of proving that there was a financial exigency.... Id. at 249. The court affirmed the district court's decision that the defendants had satisfied this burden. Id. That holding which placed the burden of proof on the defendants is essentially on a par with ours. The defendants rely upon three cases to support their position. The first case is Levitt v. Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges, 376 F.Supp. 945 (D.Neb. 1974). In Levitt, discharged tenured faculty members brought a § 1983 action against the defendants, alleging that the process by which they were selected for termination in light of a budgetary cutback was arbitrary or capricious. The district court disagreed, stating that the process utilized to select the plaintiffs for termination was fair and reasonable and ... the plaintiffs have not carried the burden of proving that the selection process was either arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 950 (emphasis added). There was no issue in Levitt concerning whether a financial exigency existed. As stated above, the only issue was whether the plaintiffs were afforded procedural due process. Thus, Levitt is inapplicable; it decides an issue not before us and says nothing about the issue we are deciding. Despite its nonapplicability, Levitt's holding is consistent with our analysis. Levitt placed the burden of proving the alleged due process violation upon the plaintiffs. We have reaffirmed that principle here. As mentioned above, Pace still has the burden of proving a substantive due process violation. Requiring the defendants to prove a financial exigency does not contradict this holding. The other two cases are similar to Levitt, and, therefore, are equally inapplicable. See Brenna, supra, 589 F.2d 475; Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 377 F.Supp. 227 (W.D.Wis. 1974), aff'd mem, 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975). Accordingly, we affirm the district court on this issue.