Opinion ID: 2403835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: judge as witness testimony inadmissible

Text: The McCools contend that it was reversible error per se for the Superior Court judge who presided over the trial of their malpractice claim to testify for Dr. Gehret at the subsequent trial of their tortious interference claim. In support of that position, the McCools rely, in part, on Delaware Uniform Rule of Evidence 605, which provides: The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point. Generally, the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence are patterned on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Specifically, Delaware's Rule 605 tracks its same numbered federal counterpart. Two decisions made by the drafters of the Federal Rules reflect the policy underlying Rule 605: First, [the drafters] rejected the notion that the presiding judge is generally competent to testify. Second, they disqualified the presiding judge from testifying in any case, thus declining to follow the partial competency approach employed by other codes. 27 Charles A. Wright & Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6062 (1990). In the case sub judice, the President Judge of the Superior Court specially assigned the entire proceeding between the McCools and Dr. Gehret to the original trial judge. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 40. The President Judge entered a pre-trial order stating the above-captioned case is specially assigned to you [the original trial judge] for all purposes until final disposition.  (emphasis added). Dr. Gehret argues that the original trial judge was, nevertheless, competent to testify for him as a witness because a second judge was presiding at the trial of the McCools' tortious interference claim. That argument has been anticipated and answered by the leading commentators on the Federal Rules of Evidence. [I]t may be argued that when Rule 605 disqualifies the judge presiding at the trial, the rule uses the present, not past, tense. This suggests that prior involvement as presiding judge even at the same trial is immaterial so long as that status has terminated by the time the testimony is given. However, there is no evidence that the drafters ever attributed such subtlety of meaning to the language employed in the rule. The limited authority on point suggests that a judge should be disqualified under Rule 605 [from testifying] in such a situation, even if his involvement was limited to proceedings prior to commencement of trial. 27 Charles A. Wright & Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6063 (1990). Consequently, those same commentators opined that: [W]hen a judge presides over the beginning of a trial, is replaced by another judge, and is then called to testify at the same trial.... if the judge-witness made any rulings in the case that are still controlling, the subsequent testimony of that individual may destroy the appearance of impartiality since the rights of the parties have been fixed by one who has assumed a partisan affiliation. Rule 605 should prevent a [judge] witness from testifying in such a case since accuracy and the appearance of impartiality, the central policy goals of that statute, would otherwise be jeopardized. Id. In this case, the original trial judge fixed the rights of the parties by, inter alia: ordering the trials of the medical malpractice claim and tortious interference claim to be severed; inducing the McCools to waive their right to a jury trial by agreeing to personally hear the tortious interference claim as a bench trial; subsequently deciding not to adjudicate the tortious interference claim; overruling the McCools' objection to that decision; and, by denying the McCools' motion for a continuance of the tortious interference claim. Moreover, following the judge's testimony, the rights of the parties were subject to further adjudication by that same judge  the original trial judge  since the McCools' motion for a new trial remained under advisement. When the motion was ultimately decided, the original trial judge denied the request for a new trial on the malpractice claim. In denying the McCools' motion, notwithstanding having testified on behalf of Dr. Gehret regarding the tortious interference claim, the original trial judge reaffirmed that a severance of the McCools' claims was required to avoid prejudice to Dr. Gehret. This performance of dual roles, as judge and as witness, raises a concern about the appearance of impartiality. [9] Compare In re Estate of Waters, Del.Supr., 647 A.2d 1091 (1994). The number of reported cases involving the testimony of a trial judge on behalf of a litigant who had appeared before that judge in a preceding trial are, understandably, few. Such a situation did occur, however, in California approximately twenty years ago. Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal.App.3d 858, 110 Cal.Rptr. 511, 527-28 (1974). The ratio decidendi and holding of the Merritt case are instructive. In Merritt, during a second trial, the judge who had presided at the first trial appeared as an expert witness for the plaintiff. The judge testified that, in the judge's expert opinion, a particular witness at the earlier trial had not been persuasive. The judge's opinion supported the plaintiff's position at the second trial. Similarly, in this case, the judge who conducted the medical malpractice trial appeared as a witness for Dr. Gehret at the subsequent trial of the tortious interference claim. The original trial judge rendered an opinion that the McCools' expert witness, Dr. Dein, had been an effective witness. That opinion supported Dr. Gehret's position that, even if he had interfered with Dr. Dein, he had not caused the McCools any damage. Opinion testimony by a judge is problematic: [10] Public policy considerations militate against the trial judge testifying as an expert witness in litigation involving parties who previously appeared before him. Ethical mandates governing judicial conduct dictate that a judge should not create the appearance of impropriety. Opinion testimony by a judge creates the appearance of partiality on behalf of a litigant, is greatly prejudicial to the adverse party, and raises the suspicion of judicial favoritism in the prior litigation. Phillips v. Clancy, Ct.App., 152 Ariz. 415, 733 P.2d 300, 306 (1986) (citing R. Mallen & V. Levit, Legal Malpractice § 667 (2d ed. 1981)). In Merritt, the court concluded that it was prejudicial to one party for a judge to testify as an expert witness on behalf of the other party with respect to matters that took place before [the judge] in his judicial capacity. Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal.Rptr. at 528. The court observed that in such an instance, the judge appears to be throwing the weight of his position and authority behind one of two opposing litigants. Id. The court noted that the California code of evidence, like Delaware's Rule 605, absolutely prohibits the judge presiding at the trial from testifying as a witness. The court concluded that it was almost as prejudicial to one party for the judge to express an opinion as a witness, in a subsequent proceeding between the same litigants, about events that occurred in an earlier trial over which that judge had presided. The record reflects that the Superior Court judge's testimony in the tortious interference trial irrevocably compromised the integrity of the judicial process in the entire proceeding between Dr. Gehret and the McCools. See Joachim v. Chambers, Tex. Supr., 815 S.W.2d 234, 238-39 (1991). First, the appearance of impartiality was undermined by the judge's testimony favoring one of the litigants, Dr. Gehret. Second, the adversarial process was impaired when the McCools' attorney was placed in the untenable position of having to cross-examine the original trial judge during the tortious interference trial, while his clients' motion for a new trial of the malpractice claim remained pending before that very jurist. [11] Third, following the judge's testimony, the McCools (and the second trial judge) were placed in a difficult position because the success of their tortious interference claim depended, in large part, upon the second trial judge discrediting his colleague's assessment of Dr. Dein's effectiveness as a witness. In fact, the second trial judge's ultimate conclusion was that clearly no injury occurred since, in the opinion of the presiding [original trial] judge, Dr. Dein's testimony was very effective. Delaware Rule of Evidence 605 precludes the presiding judge from testifying in that trial. This case exemplifies the problems that can arise when a judge has presided over some facet of the proceedings in a case, is subsequently disqualified or leaves the bench for some other reason, and is then called to testify in the same proceeding. Accordingly, we agree with the logic of the learned commentators' analysis that Rule 605 applies to such a situation. Otherwise, the undisputed policy goals of Rule 605; i.e., accurate fact-finding and the appearance of impartiality, are significantly undermined by the two roles the presiding judge occupies in what is fundamentally one continuous proceeding. See 27 Charles A. Wright & Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6063 (1990). [12] The record reflects that the testimony on Dr. Gehret's behalf by the judge specially assigned to preside at this entire proceeding was contrary to the purpose and policy of Rule 605. We hold that, under the facts of this case, the absolute prohibition of Rule 605 applied. The Superior Court judge's testimony on Dr. Gehret's behalf during one severed phase of a proceeding that had been, and would thereafter continue to be, presided over by that same judge was reversible error per se. D.R.E. 605; Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal.App.3d 858, 110 Cal.Rptr. 511 (1974). See also Evans v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 19, Del.Supr., 652 A.2d 574 (1995). In Evans, this Court held that a judge who had imposed a sanction upon an attorney was precluded from appearing as a witness in a subsequent proceeding. Evans v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 19, 652 A.2d at 577 (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941); Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 25 S.Ct. 58, 49 L.Ed. 193 (1904)). This Court stated that such testimony would be destructive of judicial responsibility and undermine the integrity of the judicial process. Id. Independent of the specific per se prohibitions set forth in Delaware Rule of Evidence 605 and the context of the specific factual circumstances presented in Evans, we note our agreement with the general proposition that: Only in the rarest of circumstances should a judge be called upon to give evidence as to matters upon which he [or she] has acted in a judicial capacity, and these occasions, we think, should be limited to instances in which there is no other reasonably available way to prove the facts sought to be established. State ex rel Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash.2d 12, 482 P.2d 775, 781 (1971). Accord Battle v. Thornton, D.C. Ct.App., 646 A.2d 315, 325 (1994). Cf. Gold v. Warden, State Prison, 222 Conn. 312, 610 A.2d 1153, 1157 (1992).