Opinion ID: 1203202
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the superior court erred in awarding costs and attorney's fees to the state.

Text: Lyman argues that the award of attorney's fees and costs against him is unjust and unduly harsh. His argument is based on fairness. He argues that it would be unjust to make him pay the state costs when he is unemployed and financially distressed. The state counters on procedural grounds, contending that the issue is not presented in the form required by Alaska Appellate Rule 212. Specifically, Lyman's brief lacks a table of authorities, proper argument and references to the record. See Alaska R.App.P. 212(c)(1)[b], [c][1][i], [c](8) (1991-92). Moreover, the taxing of costs and attorney's fees awards is within the broad discretion of the superior court and can only be reversed by a showing of clear abuse of discretion. Lyman did not attempt to make such a showing in his brief. We will overturn an award of attorney's fees and costs only if such an award was manifestly unreasonable. Blackford v. Taggart, 672 P.2d 888, 891 (Alaska 1983). A trial court's award will be affirmed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Kaps Transport, Inc. v. Henry, 572 P.2d 72, 77 (Alaska 1977). In his opening brief, Lyman argues this issue only on fairness grounds, without any substantive legal argument or cited authority. However, before the state's brief was filed, Lyman was granted a Motion to Supplement the Statement of Points on Appeal. In his memorandum in support of this motion, he sets forth a cogent substantive argument that the superior court improperly applied the state standard for assessing costs and fees instead of the federal statutory standard. [6] The state noted Lyman's argument in an affidavit attached to its Motion for Filing Late Appellee Brief but did not brief this argument. Instead, the state noted that because of the new arguments additional briefing by each side would probably be requested. However, Lyman never supplemented his opening brief and the parties were not requested to submit additional briefing. Generally, points on appeal not briefed are considered abandoned. Miller v. City of Fairbanks, 509 P.2d 826, 829 (Alaska 1973). Further, the court may affirm the trial court on issues it considers inadequately briefed. Wren v. State, 577 P.2d 235, 237 n. 2 (Alaska 1978). However, the court has discretion to relax the formal requirements of the appellate rules if doing so would not unfairly prejudice the opponent. Miller, 509 P.2d at 829. This relaxation is especially appropriate for propria persona representation. Id. at 829 n. 8. Moreover, the court may reverse plain error which is obviously prejudicial even if it was not properly raised by the parties. Matter of L.A.M., 727 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Alaska 1986). In the alternative, the court may request briefing on this point after oral argument. See Vest v. First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks, 659 P.2d 1233, 1234 n. 2 (Alaska 1983), reh'g granted, 670 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1983); Appellate Rule 212(c)(11)[a] (1991-92). We believe that the superior court's application of the standards of Rules 79 and 82 constituted plain error. Four of the five causes of action filed by Lyman were based on federal statutes 28 U.S.C. § 1875 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. When a federal claim is brought in state court, the court must use the standards set forth in the federal statute rather than those in the Alaska Rules of Court. See DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 775 P.2d 515, 518 (Alaska 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922, 110 S.Ct. 287, 107 L.Ed.2d 267 (1989) (Civil Rights Act); Hayer v. Nat'l Bank of Alaska, 663 P.2d 547, 549-50 (Alaska 1983) (federal Truth-in-Lending Act); Ferdinand v. City of Fairbanks, 599 P.2d 122, 125 (Alaska 1979) (noting, with respect to the Civil Rights Act, that the trial court's discretion is narrowly limited when attorney's fees are awarded pursuant to the federal act, and will be reviewed on appeal in light of federal rather than Alaska law.). For claims I and III, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1875, Lyman relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1875(d)(2) which reads: The court may award a prevailing employer a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs only if the court finds that the action is frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1875(d)(2) (West Supp. 1991). For claims IV and V, filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 respectively, DeNardo, 775 P.2d at 518, is controlling [A] civil rights defendant may recover attorney's fees from the plaintiff only if the court finds `that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation... .' Id., quoting, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980). The trial court did not make such a finding but instead found that the lawsuit only bordered on the frivolous. [7] Attorney's fees and costs are thus not authorized for the federal law causes of action. The taxation of attorney's fees and costs should be limited to the lone state law cause of action. This action, for Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealings, was dismissed on May 1, 1989. The trial court award included attorney's fees and costs incurred after that date. Moreover, the trial court noted in its order on attorney's fees that time spent in connection with the case included the summary judgment on the statute of limitations. However, the statute of limitations was argued only with respect to the federal law causes of action. The order dismissing the sole state law cause of action originated from a separate issue raised in the same motion for summary judgment. The record at present does not include enough information to determine which costs and attorney's fees derive from defending the state law claim as distinguished from the federal law claims in the state case. [8] A remand on allocation of attorney's fees and costs to the state law claim and the federal law claims brought in state court is therefore required. On remand, the state has the burden of identifying and segregating the state law claim costs. Rule 79 requires that the party seeking costs submit a bill which distinctly set[s] forth each item claimed in order that the nature of the charge can be readily understood. Alaska R.Civ.P. 79(a) (1991-92). For attorney's fees, the superior court can order the state's counsel to itemize the hours and nature of the work spent on the case. Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929, 939 (Alaska 1986) (when counsel requests attorney's fees, other than based on the schedule in Rule 82(a)(1), accurate records of the hours expended and a brief description of the services reflected by those hours should be submitted.). AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.