Opinion ID: 1117896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the trial court should have removed the district attorney.

Text: ¶ 27. In a pretrial motion, Jones's counsel informed the trial court that his client asked him to argue that since the current district attorney, Anthony Buckley, was previously a public defender at the time Jones was appointed a public defender, Buckley should be removed from the case. Jones's counsel said that the order appointing Jones a public defender in justice court did not specify Buckley as Jones's attorney. Further, Jones's counsel informed the trial court that, it is my understanding on information and belief that Mr. Buckley had no conversation whatsoever with my client. ¶ 28. Buckley stated to the trial court: There are four independent public defenders, all part-time. Although it's called office of the public defender, it's not like a true office where one recusal recuses all the other three. And since I'm not on this document, there was three others, and I'm not specifically named, and because I never met with Mr. Jones, I never counseled with him, I never offered advice, I never received information from law enforcement of any kind in regards to this case, then under the conflict statute I would have no conflict. I have received no information from this case that I can use for the State's advantage today. This is merely a procedure where often at justice court we just automatically appoint a public defender for initial appearance. And as you know, Mr. Jones hired himself a private attorney. Not Mr. McKenzie at the time, I believe a Ms. Perkins, and never met with any public defender, Your Honor. . . . ¶ 29. The trial court inquired as to whether the public defender, in fact, did not normally have any contact with defendants in justice court. Buckley said that the public defenders had no contact with defendants until appointed by the circuit court as the defendants were called up for arraignment. The trial court found no conflict because there was no contact. The trial court further found that Jones never did or said anything to the public defender or any public defender that would rise to the level of any prejudice against him. ¶ 30. Correctly applying holdings of this Court, the Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue, stating: It is well settled that a prosecuting attorney is disqualified from acting in a criminal case if he has previously represented or been consulted professionally by the accused with respect to the offense charged. Gray v. State, 469 So.2d 1252, 1254 (Miss.1985). The subsequent prosecution of a criminal defendant by an attorney who has previously gained confidential information from the accused relative to the charges against him is inherently incompatible with the right of a criminal defendant to receive a fair trial. Id. However, no purpose would be served by applying the proscriptive rule to bar a prosecuting attorney's participation in a criminal case where the evidence fails to establish that the attorney, by reason of his professional relations with the accused, gained any confidential information regarding the matter involved in the criminal prosecution. Each case must therefore be examined on its facts in order to determine the nature of the attorney's prior relationship with the accused and the substance of any communications between the attorney and the accused. Id. at 1255 (citing Dunn v. State, 264 So.2d 823 (Miss.1972); Russell v. State, 185 Miss. 464, 189 So. 90 (1939)). The question to be determined, then, is whether the trial court was clearly erroneous in its finding that no confidential information was transmitted . . . Vandergriff v. State, 920 So.2d 486, 492-493 (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (emphasis added). ¶ 31. We find that the trial court did not err in finding that no conflict existed to merit the removal of the district attorney, Buckley, from this case. This assignment of error is without merit.