Opinion ID: 2085062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Anticipatory Deadlock Instruction

Text: Where the death penalty is sought on a first degree murder indictment, if the jury finds the defendant guilty, it must then determine how the defendant's crime should be punished. To assist the jury with its sentencing responsibilities, CPL 400.27 (10) requires the trial court to instruct the jury that it must unanimously decide whether to impose the death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. That provision further requires the court to instruct the jury that in the event the jury fails to reach unanimous agreement with respect to the sentence, the court will sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment with a minimum term of between twenty and twenty-five years and a maximum term of life. Defendant argues that this instruction is unconstitutional because of the substantial risk that jurors who believed that a sentence of life without parole was appropriate would be coerced into voting for the death penalty in order to avoid the possibility that the defendant might someday be released from prison. At the outset, it is necessary to note that because of its severity and irrevocability, the penalty of death is qualitatively different than any other type of sentence, regardless of the length of the period of imprisonment ( see Woodson v North Carolina, 428 US 280, 305 [1976] [plurality op]). Because of this qualitative difference, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that there is a heightened need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case ( id. ; see People v Harris, 98 NY2d at 497-506 [Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part], citing Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238, 306 [1972] [Stewart, J., concurring]; Caldwell v Mississippi, 472 US 320, 340 [1985]; California v Ramos, 463 US 992, 998-999 [1983]). In order to ensure that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the basis of `reason rather than caprice or emotion,' the Court has invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination ( Beck v Alabama, 447 US 625, 638 [1980]; see Gardner v Florida, 430 US 349, 358 [1977]). A jury instruction that introduces a level of uncertainty and unreliability cannot be tolerated in a capital case ( Beck at 643; see People v Harris, 177 Misc 2d 160, 162 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1998, Feldman, J.]). New York leaves the decision of capital sentencing in the hands of the jury. Like the majority of such jurisdictions, New York provides that when a jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the trial judge assumes the responsibility to impose the defendant's sentence according to its respective statute. New York is but one of four states that instructs its juries as to the consequences of a failure to decide between death and some determined lesser sentence. [4] However, in each of the other states that requires such an instruction, the court in the event of deadlock, is required to impose a lesser penalty that the jury had been considering. Only in New York is the trial judge required to impose a sentence more lenient than the two sentencing options upon which the jury had deliberated. Such a sentencing scheme is irrational and carries a substantial risk of coercing a unanimous sentencing verdict from a jury, even under circumstances where individual jurors hold a genuine belief that their position, though different than that of their fellow jurors, is the just one. The sentencing scheme to be employed upon a jury deadlock is therefore unconstitutional. While the legislative history of the New York death penalty statute offers no insight into why the only sentence available for the trial court to impose upon a jury deadlock would be a sentence more lenient than the options the jury had been considering, the legislative debates demonstrate that the members of the Legislature were aware of the risk that the jury instruction could result in a coerced verdict but consciously disregarded the risk. [5] During the State Senate debate over the issue of the anticipatory deadlock instruction, the following exchange took place: SENATOR DOLLINGER: . . . [H]ow do you avoid the problem of a jury that is hung up on the issue of either life in prison without parole or the death penalty of putting additional pressure on the jurors, knowing that if they failed to agree they are going to face a penalty that is less than either of the two penalties that they are currently in dispute over? SENATOR VOLKER: That's, I think, the option that they face. (New York State Senate Debate on Senate Bill S 2850, Mar. 6, 1995, at 1912.) [6] At a subsequent exchange, the following occurred: SENATOR DOLLINGER: . . . But isn't it inherently coercive to tell them that you have to [reach a consensus on the most severe penalties]; otherwise, there is going to be another penalty imposed? SENATOR VOLKER: They don't have to do anything. I mean what you do have to do, I think, Senator, the problem would bemy own personal feeling is I think there could be a problem if you didn't inform the jury right up front as to what happens when they fail to make a decision ( id. at 1916). Senator Volker has since introduced a bill amending the death penalty statute that, among other things, proposes that the sentence to be imposed by the trial judge upon a jury impasse with regard to sentencing would be the non-death sentence that the jury had been consideringlife imprisonment without the possibility of parole ( see 2001 NY Senate Bill S 5409, New York 224th Annual Legislative Session, introduced May 31, 2001). The sentencing consequence of a deadlock, as provided by CPL 400.27 (10), creates an intolerable risk of coercion on the jury's deliberative process. Essentially, jurors are informed at the very outset of their deliberations that if they cannot unanimously decide whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the judge will impose a prison term of life with the possibility of parole after serving from 20 to 25 years. Such an instruction plainly goes to the heart of one of the chief concerns a deliberating jury would have about the defendanthis or her future dangerousness ( see Simmons v South Carolina, 512 US 154, 162 [1994] [a defendant's future dangerousness bears on all sentencing determinations made in our criminal justice system]; Jurek v Texas, 428 US 262, 275 [1976] [any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose]). Future dangerousness of a defendant is such a crucial issue for a jury deciding a defendant's sentence because jurors do not want to be responsible for the release of a defendant they believe will continue to be a societal threat ( see William J. Bowers and Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 Tex L Rev 605, 701 [1999] [according to accounts, jurors often impose death, not because they deem the sentence to be retributively appropriate, but for the incapacitative purpose of removing the defendant from society]). According to an empirical study conducted by the Capital Jury Project in South Carolina, one of the most important considerations jurors make in assessing a defendant's future dangerousness is the probable actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence if the death penalty is not imposed (Eisenberg and Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L Rev 1, 4, 7 [1993]). Jurors perceive a defendant likely to be released after a shorter prison term as more dangerous than the same defendant expected to serve a longer term. Consequently, jurors tend to sentence to death those defendants expected to serve a shorter term ( see id. ; Laurie B. Berberich, Note, Jury Instructions Regarding Deadlock in Capital Sentencing, 29 Hofstra L Rev 1301, 1324 [2001] [The sooner (jurors) think the defendant will get out of prison, the more likely they are to vote for death]). [7] It rationally follows that a jury's perception of a defendant's future dangerousness is vastly diminished when the only options for his sentence are death and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The availability of a life sentence without the possibility of parole necessarily means that the death penalty is no longer the only way to achieve a defendant's permanent incapacitation ( see Bowers and Steiner, Death by Default, 77 Tex L Rev at 707 [life without parole and death are essentially equivalent for incapacitative purposes]). Indeed, there may be no greater assurance of a defendant's future nondangerousness to the public than the fact that he never will be released on parole ( Simmons, 512 US at 163-164). However, a jury instruction that the failure to reach a unanimous verdict between those two options would result in a parole-eligible life sentence interjects the issue of the defendant's future dangerousness into the deliberative process where it otherwise would have no place. Where jurors are divided as to which incapacitative sentence to impose, they inevitably are faced with the possibility that if they do not come to a consensus, the defendant will be sentenced to a term that will possibly result in his eventual release from prisona prospect that the jurors are not being asked to contemplate, and possibly may not want. [8] Plainly, the most disturbing risk that the statute poses is that a juror who is in the minority in his or her vote for life without parole would inevitably feel pressured to vote with the majority for the death sentence in order to avoid the possibility of defendant's eventual freedom. [9] And where the jury vote is substantially in favor of the death sentence, the jurors in the minority no longer are choosing between death and life without parole; they are choosing between death and life with the possibility of parole within 20 to 25 years as a result of creating an impasse. Faced with the possibility that they will not otherwise be able to prevent the defendant's return to society, jurors favoring life without parole may relinquish their conscientiously held beliefs and vote for the death penalty ( see Berberich, Jury Instructions, 29 Hofstra L Rev at 1325 [Common sense leads to the conclusion that a juror who would impose death over a life sentence because of his or her fear that a capital offender would be released on parole, would also impose a death sentence if he or she believed that a hung jury would lead to the same result.]). A unanimous death sentence, secured under these circumstances, would not be the product of reason but rather of uncertainty and coercion; it therefore cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny ( see Beck v Alabama, 447 US 625 [1980] [where the death penalty was automatic upon conviction of first degree murder and the state statute forbade the jury from considering lesser included offenses, the Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutionally coercive in violation of the Eighth Amendment because rather than determining solely whether the evidence established the defendant's guilt, the statute inevitably forced jurors to take into account whether the defendant would die for his crime or simply go free]). The People argue that the challenged jury instruction could also have the effect of pressuring jurors who favor the death sentence to vote in favor of life without parole in order to avoid the more lenient deadlock sentence. The People are certainly correct on this point. But for two important reasons, the possibility of such an outcome does not matter. First, as explained above, the finality and irrevocability of a death sentence makes that punishment qualitatively different than any other punishment that may be imposed, no matter how long the period of imprisonment ( see Woodson, 428 US at 305 [plurality op]). It is the possibility of the death sentence that triggers a heightened scrutiny analysis, not the possibility of a life sentence. Surely, a statutory provision which creates a substantial risk that jurors would be coerced into sentencing a defendant to die cannot be saved by the fact that the provision also creates the risk that the jury would be coerced into sparing his life. These are not comparable outcomes. Moreover, because we can never predict in any given case how the votes of the jury would be configured, we cannot anticipate how the pressure of the deadlock sentence would be applied ( see Harris, 177 Misc 2d at 164). In any event, the substantial risk of coercion posed by the deadlock sentence cannot be tolerated. Second, regardless of whether the deadlock provision favors the defendant or the prosecution, it remains coercive. It introduces a measure of uncertainty and unreliability into the deliberative process. Thus, there is a substantial risk that the jury verdict may not reflect the true conscience of the jury. As a constitutional matter, such a result cannot be countenanced in a capital case ( see Beck v Alabama, 447 US at 643). Any criminal defendant, and especially any capital defendant, being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body ( Lowenfield v Phelps, 484 US 231, 241 [1988]). However, when [capital jurors] impose a death sentence because life without parole, the sentence they deemed most appropriate, is not available, death is a forced choice (Bowers and Steiner, Death by Default, 77 Tex L Rev at 611 n 22 [1999]). The result is an unreliable death verdict that does not accurately reflect the collective conscience of the community and seriously offends principles of due process and fundamental fairness. Thus, CPL 400.27 (10) is unconstitutional insofar as it provides that upon the failure of the sentencing jury to reach a unanimous verdict, the trial judge must impose a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and a minimum sentence of between 20 and 25 years. Just as significant, the appropriate cure for this coercive statutory provision is not simply to withhold from the jury the fact that the trial judge could impose a more lenient sentence should the jury fail to reach a unanimous decision. New York has, with good reason, decided that the jury should be made aware of what would happen in the event of a deadlock. Providing such instruction is rooted in the significant interest of minimizing the risk of an arbitrary or capricious action. Indeed, without such an instruction, there is an intolerable likelihood that jurors would speculate as to what would happen to the defendant in the event of a deadlocked jury. Studies have shown that such speculation often tends to favor the imposition of the death sentence because jurors tend to underestimate the severity of the non-death sentencing alternative ( see Eisenberg and Wells, Deadly Confusion, 79 Cornell L Rev at 4; Bowers and Steiner, Death by Default, 77 Tex L Rev at 705). Thus, telling jurors nothing about the sentence to be imposed upon a jury deadlock would risk the same unacceptable results that already exist with the instructions provided in the current statute. Therefore, the only proper way to cure the infirmity of the provision is to strike the deadlock instruction itself. The only constitutionally proper sentence for a judge to impose upon the failure of the jury to decide between death and life imprisonment without parole is the lesser sentence considered by the jurylife imprisonment without parole. Such a result ensures that the jury's verdict expresses the true conscience of the community and is not the result of uncertainty or coercion.