Opinion ID: 1146557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Summary Considerations

Text: In the final analysis we consider our task as arbiters of the practice of intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2) as not to require an elaborate legal minuet in the courts below, but to support the efforts of those courts to insure that litigation moves sensibly and purposefully forward. Martin v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 450 F.2d 542, 554 (5th Cir.1971). Again, whether the putative intervenor is likely to prevail on the merits is not a part of the calculus in which the trial court should engage in considering such an application. We think there is much to be said for an overall attitude which gives the benefit of the doubt to the one seeking intervention, particularly where intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2) is claimed. Corby Recreation, Inc. v. General Electric Company, 581 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir.1978). This attitude is expressed in the Comment to Rule 24 which describes the rule as represent[ing] a judgment that ... justice demands that the interest of the absentee [intervenor] should predominate over the interests of the absentee parties and of trial convenience. See Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.1978); Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Wedco, 102 F.R.D. 41, 43 (D.Nev. 1984). Two considerations dictate this approach. First, whether as a practical matter one has an interest that may be impaired or jeopardized is a matter no court will ever be able to determine as well as the intervenor himself. The court will never understand the facts as well as the intervenor, nor, because its neck is not on the line, may a court be expected to appreciate the impact of refusing intervention. On the other hand, liberal intervention may be denied an adverse impact on the remainder of the litigation by the court's inherent power to control the intervenor's participation in the action. Reikes v. Martin, 471 So.2d 385, 391 n. 2 (Miss. 1985). Of course, the court's ultimate weapon in this regard is the power to sever the intervenor's claims for pretrial or trial proceedings. See Rule 42(b), Miss.R.Civ.P. Without further ado, we hold that the Circuit Court erred when on January 10, 1986, it overruled and denied GNIC's motion for leave to intervene.