Opinion ID: 4539940
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: lisd

Text: Section 1983 “makes liable ‘[e]very person’ who, under color of state law, violates federal constitutional rights.” Littell v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. 2018). Municipal entities—such as LISD—qualify as persons under § 1983. Id. For liability to attach to a municipal entity, a litigant must prove the existence of three elements: “a policymaker; an official policy [or custom]; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 865 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., (Signature)”. 28 U.S.C. § 1746. The closest Appellant’s declaration arrives at complying with § 1746 is when she states: “This declaration is being made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. I am over twenty-one years of age, competent and qualified to make this declaration, personally acquainted with the facts set forth herein and such facts are true and correct.” But nowhere does Appellant state that the facts are true “under penalty of perjury.” As such, Appellant has submitted no competent summary judgment evidence. Nonetheless, we do not interpret this as fatal to her appeal. No party argued that Appellant’s evidence is incompetent on appeal or at the district court. Nor did the district court discuss the competence of the evidence sua sponte. See Capital Concepts Props. 85-1 v. Mut. First, Inc., 35 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1994) ([B]ecause CapCon has failed to challenge on appeal the court’s conclusion that CapCon did not offer competent summary judgment evidence of Old Sunbelt’s fraud, . . . the district court’s judgment would still stand.”); see also Anderson v. Hillsborough Cty. Sch. Bd., 390 F. App’x 902, 904 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“[M]ost importantly, Anderson’s response to the Board’s motion for summary judgment did not challenge the admissibility of any of the evidence submitted in support of the Board’s motion for summary judgment. We have long held that we do not consider an issue that was not raised in district court but raised for the first time [on] appeal.”) (citation omitted); Tinsley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 700, 705 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Although there is some question as to the admissibility of portions of the affidavits that Tinsley has submitted, the admissibility question has not been raised by Calloway.”). 6 Case: 19-10832 Document: 00515444897 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/08/2020 No. 19-10832 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that an official policy or custom of the governmental-entity defendant must have caused the alleged constitutional deprivation for municipal liability to attach). Regarding official policies, when “the decision to adopt [a] particular course of action is properly made by that government’s authorized decisionmakers, it . . . represents an act of official government ‘policy’ as that term is commonly understood.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (footnote omitted). The court must “identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). “[W]hether a particular official has ‘final policymaking authority’ is a question of state law.” Id. (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483) (emphasis in original). Appellant argues that Parker had final policymaking authority for LISD and that A.M. and N.M.’s removal from the third grade was an exercise of that authority. But under Texas law, LISD’s board of trustees possesses final policymaking authority over policies applicable to the School. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.151(b); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, Parker could not create policies for LISD. And LISD is not liable for Parker’s independent actions. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (stating that “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory”); cf. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.”). Nor does Appellant identify any LISD policy or custom in association with her § 1983 claims let alone argue that an LISD policy or 7 Case: 19-10832 Document: 00515444897 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/08/2020 No. 19-10832 custom was the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violations. For these reasons, Appellant’s § 1983 claims against LISD are unavailing.