Opinion ID: 2585200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Self-representation and related issues

Text: After resolution of the proceedings under section 1369 with a finding that defendant was competent to stand trial, Judge Hugh Rose III heard and granted defendant's motion for self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. [15] Defendant contends he was incompetent to act as his own attorney and that, in granting his motion, Judge Rose effectively denied him his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, thereby committing reversible error. The requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel are (1) a determination that the accused is competent to waive the right, i.e., he or she has the mental capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him or her; and (2) a finding that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, i.e., the accused understands the significance and consequences of the decision and makes it without coercion. ( Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400-401 & fn. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321; People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 372, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 406.) Defendant's argument centers on his claim that his waiver of counsel was involuntary in light of the attendant circumstances. First, he urges his waiver was involuntary and not unequivocal because he in fact wished to be represented by counsel, but the trial court told him none would be found (given his refusal to waive his speedy trial right). Second, he argues the trial court inadequately admonished him about the dangers of self-representation. Third, he contends he waived counsel only on the understanding that he would have access to legal materials necessary to aid in his defense, and their unavailability rendered his waiver involuntary. Fourth and finally, he contends Advisory Counsel Robert Winston's unpreparedness at the penalty phase rendered his waiver involuntary. Examination of the record establishes defendant's claim, in all its aspects, lacks merit. First, the record does not substantiate defendant's contention that he in fact wished to be represented by counsel but was coerced into self-representation. Defendant emphatically and repeatedly sought to dismiss his retained counsel and represent himself. As the Attorney General observes, the circumstance that defendant offered to accept advisory counsel in lieu of appointed counsel so that he would not have to waive time undermines his claim of coercion. With regard to defendant's second contention, we agree that as well as determining that a defendant who seeks to waive counsel is competent, the trial court, by making the defendant aware of the risks of self-representation, must satisfy itself that the waiver is knowing and voluntary. ( Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 400, 113 S.Ct. 2680; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1224, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) No particular form of words, however, is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to forgo the right to counsel and engage in self-representation. `The test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.' ( People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1048, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756, revd. on other grounds sub nom. Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293, quoting People v. Bloom, supra, at p. 1225, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) Defendant complains Judge Rose did not sufficiently explore whether defendant truly appreciated the enormity of the charges facing him and the task he faced in representing himself. Specifically, defendant complains Judge Rose made no effort to explain in any detail what rules and procedures he expected defendant to follow; did not mention that defendant was facing the death penalty until after granting the Faretta motion; did not explain that defendant might face a second, penalty, phase of trial; and did not identify the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation except to point out that the prosecutor was a very skilled, highly experienced attorney. Review of the record reveals the following colloquy: The Court: Do you understand that if you are representing yourself that you will receive no special treatment by the Court, that you must follow all the technical rules of evidence and procedure and the substantive law in making objections and motions, and so forth, the same rules will apply to you as will apply if you had a lawyer represent you? Do you understand that? [¶] The Defendant: Yes, I am aware of that, Your Honor. [¶] The Court: Do you understand that the prosecution is being run by a very skilled attorney who has many years of experience in the practice of the law and that you will be not given any further consideration because of the fact that you don't have his skill and training in the representation of criminal defendants? [¶] The Defendant: I am aware of that, Your Honor. [¶] The Court: You are not going to receive any greater library privileges than any other pro per defendant and you will receive no extra time for preparation, you will have no staff of investigators at your beck and call. Do you understand that? It was then noted for the record that a defense investigator had already been retained and defendant would be provided with the investigator's findings. The court continued: You can read and write, I assume? [¶] The Defendant: Yes, sir. [¶] The Court: If there is any kind of disruption or misbehavior at the time of trial your right of self-representation could be vacated at that point. [¶] The Defendant: I wasn't aware of that, but I accept that as true. [¶] The Court: And if you, in spite of your bestor worstefforts in representing yourself, if you were at some point convicted, you can't claim later on that you were inadequately represented by counsel. [¶] The Defendant: I read that in the law, Your Honor. [¶] The Court: Mr. Brazelton [the prosecutor], do you have any further comments? [¶] Mr. Brazelton: No, Your Honor. [¶] The Court: Mr. Kinney, we'll relieve you. Thank you, sir. Three days later, when the matter was next on calendar, with defendant and the prosecutor present before the court, the following colloquy transpired: The Court: Mr. Lawley, Mr. Winston and the Court and my administrator have had some discussion about his representation of you in this matter as at least associate counsel or assistant counsel in this matter. What is your desire in this matter, Mr. Lawley? [¶] The Defendant: I would be happy to have him as assistant counsel, Your Honor. [¶] Mr. Brazelton: Excuse me, Your Honor. IsI believe the proper[¶] The Court: Advisory. [¶] Mr. Brazelton: term is `advisory.' [¶] The Court: Advisory counsel. You don't want him to represent you formally? [¶] The Defendant: No. [¶] The Court: You still want to represent yourself? [¶] The Defendant: Yes, I am. [¶] The Court: You're still aware of all the things I said before and, in addition, you are aware the maximum penalty of death if things go badly for you? [H] The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. After admonishing defendant that he, not advisory counsel, would control the defense and obtaining defendant's assent, Judge Rose appointed Attorney Robert Winston as advisory counsel. Defendant complains that Judge Rose failed to explain in any detail what rules and procedures he expected him to follow, failed to mention that defendant was facing the death penalty until after he granted the Faretta motion, and failed to tell him there might be a second phase of trial to determine penalty. We disagree. Judge Rose's remarks, taken together, adequately admonished defendant of the risks of self-representation. ( People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 572-574, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 [recommending virtually identical set of admonitions].) The record suggests no confusion on defendant's part regarding the meaning of the admonitions, risks of self-representation, or the complexities of his case, much less that his election to represent himself was other than voluntary. Defendant, moreover, was found by Dr. Trompetter to possess a very sophisticated awareness of the charges and their seriousness and himself acknowledged he had been through about six trials and had an understanding of trials. On this record, his claim of inadequate admonishment must fail. With respect to defendant's contention that the unavailability of necessary legal materials vitiated his waiver of counsel, we reject ( post, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 651, 38 P.3d at p. 492) his related claim that the trial court erred in failing to inquire into the adequacy of the resources available to him as a self-represented defendant. Because defendant fails to establish the underlying premise of these claims, i.e., the actual inadequacy of available resources, the contention fails to cast doubt on the validity of his waiver. Finally, we reject defendant's contention that Advisory Counsel Winston's alleged unreadiness to assume appointed counsel status at the penalty phase vitiated his waiver of counsel. In granting defendant's motion for self-representation, Judge Rose admonished him he was in the driver's seat, that Winston had no power to address the jury, make objections on defendant's behalf, or speak to the court, and would only be permitted to give defendant advice. Having been advised of and having accepted these restrictions on advisory counsel's role, defendant cannot now complain that his waiver of counsel and concomitant assumption of responsibility for his own defense were involuntary. As the Attorney General suggests, defendant was not entitled both to represent himself and to receive the benefit of professional representation. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1368, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.)
Defendant contends his advisory counsel, Robert Winston, labored under a conflict of interest stemming from his representation of prosecution witness Treva Coonce; defendant never waived the conflict, he further contends, but was coerced into accepting Winston as advisory counsel by virtue of the trial court's professed inability to find other advisory counsel for him under the circumstance that defendant refused to waive time. The conflict, defendant asserts, denied him due process, his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, his right to a fair and reliable verdict under the Eighth Amendment, and his rights under parallel state constitutional provisions. We note that because there is no constitutional right to advisory counsel (see post, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 650, 38 P.3d at p. 491), defendant's claim must arise under the due process clause. Resolution of this issue requires a fairly extended recitation of the factual circumstances. Attorney Winston represented defendant on a charge of murdering Kenneth Stewart, with a kidnapping specialcircumstance allegation, from February 8, 1989, to the dismissal of the charges in April 1989. When the case was refiled, on May 1, 1989, defendant was represented by Ernest Kinney. On August 14, 1989, following the trial court's finding him competent to stand trial, defendant moved to dismiss Kinney and represent himself with the help of advisory counsel. At the same time, he told the court he did not want his trial postponed further and would not waive time. After warning defendant of the slim chance of finding an attorney to assist him without a waiver of time, and admonishing him of the dangers of self-representation, the court granted his request to proceed in propria persona and relieved Kinney as counsel. On August 17, 1989, the court appointed Winston as advisory counsel. On August 25, 1989, the prosecution notified the court of a possible conflict of interest in Winston's service as advisory counsel, in that on July 25, 1989, Winston had undertaken the representation of prosecution witness Treva Coonce in several factually unrelated cases. According to the prosecution, the disposition of Coonce's cases depended on her truthful testimony in defendant's trial. After a private discussion with defendant, Winston explained on the record the circumstances of his representation of Coonce as follows: The municipal court had requested him to represent Coonce on two felony and three misdemeanor matters, all factually unrelated to defendant's case. Winston had accepted the appointment and met Coonce in court, introduced himself to her, and told her they would talk at a later time. Before they ever discussed her cases, Coonce became seriously ill, was admitted to a hospital, and was not expected to recover. When Winston thereafter was appointed as defendant's advisory counsel, he recognized a problem in connection with his representation of Coonce, but he did not regard the problem as an actual conflict because he had never discussed her cases or any other case with Coonce. He appeared in municipal court the day after his appointment as defendant's advisory counsel, intending to conflict out on Coonce's cases, only to discover the district attorney's office had already dismissed four of the five cases filed against her. Winston informed the prosecutor handling the fifth Mr. McKenna, of the disposition of the other four; McKenna immediately dismissed the fifth case. Winston understood the reason for the dismissals was the county's desire to avoid responsibility for the cost of the medical and surgical treatment Coonce required to save her life. Winston further advised the court that he understood Coonce was not expected to live, and that if she did survive, she was likely to have suffered brain damage and severe disability and would be unable to testify in defendant's case. Winston was never informed of any immunity agreement between Coonce and the district attorney's office pertaining to defendant's capital case until the day the prosecution raised the issue of the potential conflict. The prosecutor then represented to the court and the defense that Coonce in fact had recovered more fully than had been anticipated and likely would be able to take the stand by the time her testimony was needed. The prosecutor expressed concern that Coonce had not waived any conflict arising from the prior representation. Defendant then declared he was not waiving any conflict. He further insisted he was not waiving time in order to find new advisory counsel. In view of the seriousness of the case and the potential conflict of interest, the trial court then discharged Winston as advisory counsel. On August 29, 1989, Winston moved the trial court to reconsider its ruling. He reiterated he had never received confidential communications from Coonce, the cases on which he was appointed to represent her were factually unrelated to defendant's capital case, and the only documents he received in her casespolice reports were available to any member of the public who cared to review the files. He explained: I feel no compunction or influence that would keep me from being an aggressive advisory counsel to Mr. Lawley. I certainly wouldn't pull any punches and my relationship, such as it was with Ms. Coonce, would not affect my representation or advisory representation to Mr. Lawley in any manner whatsoever. Winston stated that, during his initial representation of defendant, he recalled receiving no police reports or other documents even mentioning Coonce. [16] He acknowledged he would not undertake any future representation of Coonce and would resist any attempt to reappoint him to her cases, should they be revived. Winston also acknowledged that assisting defendant in thoroughly and actively cross-examining Coonce would be part of the job of advisory counsel, and that if Coonce lied on the stand and was subsequently recharged with a felony, such a scenario would not affect his ability to serve defendant. In response to inquiry by the trial court, defendant stated he could not judge whether Winston had a conflict, and was not waiving any conflict. The prosecutor opposed Winston's reappointment as advisory counsel, citing People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712, 250 Cal.Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490, in which a death sentence was reversed due to defense counsel's conflict of interest in simultaneously representing a prosecution witness in a civil lawsuit arising out of the same incident (an alleged arson) that formed the basis of the prosecution's penalty phase case. Based on all the circumstances, the trial court concluded Winston had no conflict in representing defendant in an advisory capacity. Consequently, the court reappointed Winston as advisory counsel nunc pro tunc, and Winston served in that capacity for the remainder of the trial. [17] Although, as the Attorney General notes, a self-represented defendant has no constitutional right to the appointment of advisory counsel (e.g., People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1368, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259), when such counsel is appointed the defendant is entitled to expect professionally competent assistance within the narrow scope of advisory counsel's proper role (see People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1164, fn. 14, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730). Professionally competent assistance comprises assistance unaffected by conflict of interest. ( Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220; see People v. Easley, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 724, 250 Cal.Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490.) When the trial court knows, or reasonably should know, of the possibility of a conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel, it is required to make inquiry into the matter. ( People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 836, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.) The court, upon inquiring, may decline to relieve counsel if it determines the risk of a conflict is too remote. ( Id. at pp. 836-837, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460, citing Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426.) In making its determination, the court may rely on the representations of defense counsel that no conflict exists. ( U.S. v. Crespo de Llano (9th Cir.1987) 838 F.2d 1006, 1012.) To obtain relief on appeal, the defendant must establish the existence of an actual conflict that adversely affected counsel's performance. ( People v. Bonin, supra, at pp. 837-838, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.) In the present case, the trial court found no conflict existed, presumably based on Winston's representation he had received no confidential information from Coonce. Defendant argues this finding was erroneous, pointing out that an attorney-client relationship exists from the moment counsel is appointed by the court ( Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 562, 68 Cal.Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65 [dicta]), regardless of the absence of substantive communication between attorney and client (cf. Morris v. Sloppy (1983) 461 U.S. 1, 14, fn. 6, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 [no 6th Amend, requirement of meaningful relationship between attorney and client]). While we agree Winston formed an attorney-client relationship with Coonce upon his appointment in her cases, and such relationship evidently did not terminate until after his appointment as advisory counsel to defendant, in order to find that Winston labored under a conflict of interest during the period when he was advising defendant, we would have to conclude that Winston's duty of loyalty to Coonce as a former client potentially could have hampered his performance as defendant's advisory counsel, such as by causing him to pull his punches in assisting defendant in cross-examining her. Winston disclaimed such a possibility, and we may reasonably rely on that disclaimer, especially given Winston's assurance he would not undertake any future representation of Coonce. ( U.S. v. Crespo de Llano, supra, 838 F.2d at p. 1012.) For this reason, defendant's insistence in the trial court that he was not waiving any conflict fails to bring this case within the rule in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. at page 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173, where the high court articulated a rule of automatic reversal in situations where a trial court requires the continuation of conflicted representation over a timely objection. In any event, assuming some potential conflict not apparent on this record, defendant fails to demonstrate it adversely affected Winston's performance as advisory counsel. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 837-838, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.)
Defendant contends he was denied his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by the trial court's failure, despite his repeated complaints, to inquire into the adequacy of the law library and the sufficiency of the ancillary services available to him. Defendant argues the court's failure, coupled with the actual inadequacy of those resources, deprived him of his due process right to meaningful access to the courts and his Sixth Amendment right as a self-represented defendant to an opportunity to prepare his defense. ( Bounds v. Smith (1977) 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 [right of meaningful access to courts entails providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law]; Milton v. Morris (9th Cir.1985) 767 F.2d 1443, 1445 [right to self-representation premised upon the right to make a defense].) [18] Defendant further contends the trial court's error affected his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable determination of guilt and penalty. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, defendant was denied no constitutional rights by any lack of inquiry into the resources available to him and that he has not shown those resources in fact were inadequate. As the Attorney General points out, whenever defendant voiced complaints about his lack of access to the jail law library, the means to review tape recordings of interviews with prosecution witnesses, or access to witnesses, the trial court made an effort to address his concerns. For example, on August 21, 23, and 29, 1989, prior to the commencement of trial, when defendant complained he had not been permitted to use the jail law library, the trial court entered orders that he be allowed access to the library at reasonable times consistent with the jail's security requirements. On September 5, 1989, when defendant requested transcripts of all tapes of law enforcement interviews of potential witnesses in the case, the court noted for the record that defendant would be allowed to have a tape recorder in the jail; defendant acknowledged he wished to listen to the actual recordings, and the court implicitly indicated it would entertain a request for transcripts if defendant subsequently concluded he needed them. When defendant sought the court's authorization to interview witnesses adjacent to the courtroom every morning between 9:30 and 10:00, the trial court noted that time was impracticable due to the court's schedule, but offered defendant the opportunity to interview witnesses in the jury room between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. each day. The court also asked the bailiff to inquire what facilities might be available at the jail. Thereafter, the court informed defendant there was a room available at the jail for such interviews; alternatively, in order to avoid subjecting witnesses to search, defendant could interview them by telephone at the jail, and the court ordered that any telephone defendant used for this purpose be disconnected from the jail recording system. The court observed that witnesses could be compelled by subpoena to appear at the jail for interviews. When defendant complained that his investigator, Larry Cahill, was not meeting with him daily, the court corrected his misunderstanding of its earlier order (which had been that Cahill report directly, not daily, to defendant) and invited defendant to bring to the court's attention any matter defendant needed discovered. Defendant made no further complaints about his interaction with Cahill. When defendant complained about the inadequacy of the jail law library, the court reminded him that Advisory Counsel Winston could be called on to find materials unavailable to defendant. In sum, the record reflects that the trial court promptly addressed each complaint defendant raised. Defendant thus fails to demonstrate that the trial court should have inquired more fully into the resources available to him.
The jury returned its guilt phase verdicts on October 10, 1989. The trial court scheduled the commencement of the penalty phase for October 16, 1989. On the latter date, the court convened outside the presence of the jury, and Advisory Counsel Winston argued for continuance of the penalty phase for a significant period of time, a few weeks at the minimum, in order to prepare the defense case. Winston acknowledged defendant did not want a continuance of that length, and, after discussions concerning the prosecutor's upcoming trial obligations, including Seabourn's trial, the trial court scheduled the penalty phase to begin on October 23, 1989. On that date, just after the jury was called into the courtroom for the trial on penalty, defendant asked to speak with the trial court outside the jury's presence. After the jury was excused, defendant advised the court: I have at least a philosophical objection to begging these people for my life, and I am not going to do it, and as a result of that perhaps my attorney should, should do this phase of the trial. I am not going to. I am not going to do it. Winston told the court he had no prior knowledge of defendant's request and was not at that time prepared to proceed as counsel. The trial court stated: I look upon this request as nothing more than an attempt to delay the prosecution in this case. Mr. Lawley, you were properly advised ... at the time that you sought to represent yourself, number one. Number two, you knew two weeks ago, more than two weeks ago now, that we were headed into a penalty phase trial when the jury came back with a verdict of guilty of first degree murder and found the special circumstances to be true. You have delayed all of that time until this morning with the jury sitting in the jury box ready to begin presentation of evidence to inform the Court of your feeling. After putting on the record its observations of defendant's conduct of his case and good working relationship with advisory counsel, the trial court concluded: Having in mind the [ People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187] factors and having in mind the other cases that the Court has reviewed, I'm satisfied that your request is untimely. And it is, therefore, going to be denied. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187 ( Windham ), on which the trial court relied, addressed the situation in which a defendant who is represented by counsel during the first part of a trial invokes his or her right to self-representation midtrial. We held that in order to invoke the constitutionally mandated right of self-representation, a defendant in a criminal trial must unequivocally assert that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of the trial. Once a defendant has chosen to proceed to trial represented by counsel, his or her demand to discharge counsel and assume the defense shall be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. ( Id. at pp. 127-128,137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187.) Factors for the trial court to consider in assessing such a request made after the commencement of the trial include the quality of counsel's representation of the defendant, the defendant's prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay [that] might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion. ( Id. at p. 128, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187.) Defendant's case presents the reverse scenario, i.e., a self-represented defendant who, after commencement of the trial, seeks to relinquish responsibility for his own defense and obtain the appointment of counsel to represent him for the remainder of the trial. In this situation, we have indicated that the Windham factors apply and that the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances in exercising its discretion. ( People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 164, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169.) Defendant fails to persuade us the trial court abused its discretion. Examining the Windham factors ( Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187), we first note that despite what defendant calls the mismatch between himself and the prosecutor, and despite the delusional themes defendant occasionally introduced into the trial, the quality of his self-representation did not compel the granting of his motion. As the Attorney General observes, defendant successfully interposed objections, cross-examined prosecution witnesses, and presented evidence in his own defense. Second, as to defendant's proclivity to substitute counsel, the Attorney General correctly observes that defendant had previously dismissed Ernest Kinney as his attorney over a disagreement concerning the conduct of the defense, and that he often did not follow Advisory Counsel Winston's suggestions. Defendant strenuously disagrees that these circumstances yield the inference he had such a proclivity to substitute counsel as to militate against Winston's appointment as counsel for the penalty phase. In our view, while the inference might not be compelling, this factor provides some support for the trial court's ruling. Third, as to the reasons for the request, the Attorney General argues that defendant's primary reason was his philosophical objection to begging [the jurors] for [his] life, while defendant contends the request was made out of a recognition of his incapacity to perform the task. In our view, the record does not support a conclusion defendant was incapable of presenting a penalty phase defense. [19] The final Windham factorsthe length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay occasioned by the requestclearly support the trial court's ruling. Significantly, defendant allowed two weeks to elapse, from the jury's guilt phase verdict to the very day set for the commencement of the penalty phase, without making his request for appointment of counsel or even mentioning his intention to advisory counsel. The timing of the request thus strongly suggests, as the trial court found, an attempt to delay the trial. And Winston's appointment as counsel indeed would have necessitated substantial delay, which in turn would have thrown into doubt the jury's continued availability. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for Winston's appointment as counsel at the penalty phase, and the record fails to establish a miscarriage of justice or violation of defendant's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [20]