Opinion ID: 3030367
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contrary to clearly established Supreme Court

Text: precedent [5] The Oregon post-conviction trial court decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent because it applied “a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.”25 The Oregon postconviction trial court applied a “more probabl[e] than not” 20 See Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002). 21 Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067. 22 See Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 See id. 24 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 25 Williams I, 529 U.S. at 405. 1946 COOPER-SMITH v. PALMATEER standard in assessing whether the motion to quash the search warrant would have been granted if Counsel had pursued the motion. Although the Supreme Court has never spoken to ineffective assistance of counsel standards in the stipulated facts trial context, because the Court’s precedent includes not only the bright-line rules it establishes but also the legal principles and standards flowing from it, Strickland applies to this issue.26 [6] In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”27 and “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”28 Thus, Strickland established a twopronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on a “reasonable probability” standard. Accordingly, because the Oregon court used a “more probabl[e] than not” standard, its decision on this issue was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent.29 Because the Oregon postconviction trial court’s decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, we are not bound by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).30 Instead, we review de novo, utilizing the correct legal standard to determine whether the case warrants habeas relief.31