Opinion ID: 2960198
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Forfeiture Through Express Acceptance

Text: In this case, not only did the defendant fail to make a clear objection to the “more appealing” language itself, but any such argument that could be gleaned from the record was plainly abandoned during phase III of the charge conference, when defense counsel expressly accepted the “more appealing” language by requesting that the charge read, “[s]exual activity ‘with him’ more appealing,”5 and The Court: Now, where does – where does the – the enticement charge go, and what does it knock out, or – or does it not knock anything out. Id. 150.5-.6 (emphasis added). Such passive behavior by defense counsel, wholly at odds with the defendant’s argument on appeal that the specific objection to that language was raised below, is telling. 5 That portion of the charge conference proceeded as follows: -37- The Government: Basically, you just want it to say . . . The government only need show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant attempted to convince or influence the victim to engage in sexual activity. You want to add the words “with him,” or made the possibility of the sexual activity more appealing. And that covers your objection? The Defense: Sexual activity “with him” more appealing. The Government: Two words “with him” or made the possibility of the sexual activity “with him” more appealing? The Defense: And that covers that one piece of it. The other piece is that I think the charge, as given, lowers the burden of proof and basically says that you don’t have to persuade or entice. [Objection C] And we’re asking for the plain meaning and I don’t really understand why we wouldn’t just take the plain meaning of entice or -38- then turned the discussion to objection C. App. at 150.7. This court has held that such behavior constitutes forfeiture of the objection and will result in plain error review. See United States v. Giovanelli, 464 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[I]f a party invited the charge or affirmatively waived his position,” []he has waived any right to appellate review of the charge. Giovanelli has waived his challenge to Judge Rakoff’s jury charge. . . . [W]hen Judge Rakoff, responding to Giovanelli’s objection, presented the parties with a revised draft jury charge that no longer included the ‘natural and probable effect’ language, Giovanelli’s counsel acknowledged that she was happy about that particular omission. Thus, there was ‘approval or invitation’ of the omission (indeed, both).” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted)); Weintraub, 273 F.3d at 146 (“Weintraub also argues that counsel properly objected during the charge conference. To the contrary, defense counsel not only did not seek the instruction that Weintraub now argues for, they affirmatively accepted the government’s formulation. . . . We consequently review for plain error.”). Joseph also forfeited objection A when he failed to correct the government’s and the district court’s apparent understanding that he persuade as Sand recommends. App. at 150.7-.8 (emphasis added). -39- was only raising objection B. After the defense expressly requested the insertion of “with him,” the government replied, “if all defense attorney is asking is that we put in “with him” . . . and made the possibility of sexual activity ‘with him’ more appealing . . . into the charge, we don’t have an objection.” App. at 150.8. The government thereby gave defense counsel an opportunity to correct any misunderstanding and point out other objections. Rather than raise objection A and argue that the “more appealing” language should be struck in its entirety, defense counsel reiterated objection C, that the original charge erroneously included explicit definitions for “persuade” and “entice” rather than a simple reference to their plain meaning. He stated, “And just the other issue concerning the plain meaning.”6 Id. Joseph therefore forfeited any previous objection that 6 Earlier during phase III, defense counsel had stated: And that covers that one piece of it. The other piece is that I think the charge, as given, lowers the burden of proof and basically says that you don’t have to persuade or entice. And we’re asking for the plain meaning and I don’t really understand why we wouldn’t just take the plain meaning of entice or persuade as Sand recommends. App. at 150.7-.8 (emphasis added). The majority interprets “[t]he -40- other piece” of defense counsel’s objection as an objection that even with the addition of “with him,” the “more appealing” language was erroneous because it permitted the jury to convict without finding that the defendant persuaded or enticed. See Maj. Op. at [11] n.3. In other words, the majority asserts that defense counsel continued to raise objection A, even after objection B had been resolved to his satisfaction. As an initial matter, this reading ignores the fact that defense counsel stated that “the charge, as given, lowers the burden of proof and basically says that you don’t have to persuade or entice.” App. at 150.7-.8 (emphasis added). At that point in the charge conference, the district court had not yet accepted the addition of “with him.” Defense counsel’s statement thus referred back to the original proposed charge, and not to the charge as amended to include “with him.” I therefore disagree with the majority that defense counsel was arguing that the “more appealing” language was erroneous even with the addition of “with him,” and that “the other piece” of his objection was to the “more appealing” language itself. Plainly, “the other piece” of the objection was to the expansion of the meanings of “persuade” and “entice” in the original charge – -41- he might have made to the “more appealing” clause itself, and, under Second Circuit case law, we should review such a challenge for plain error.