Opinion ID: 2630605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admissibility of the february 25, 1998, adjudication order

Text: ¶ 40 We now address whether the juvenile court acted correctly in taking judicial notice of its February 25, 1998, adjudication order declaring W.A. a dependent and placing him in the State's custody. D.A. contends that taking judicial notice of this adjudication order violated her due process rights because she did not have the opportunity to confront the witnesses that testified at the adjudication proceeding. We disagree. ¶ 41 D.A.'s contention is without merit because she stipulated that the State had custody of W.A. and the adjudication order was admitted exclusively for that purpose. Indeed, at trial, the following conversation occurred: MS. NAGLE [The State's attorney]: Well, essentially, your Honor, the purpose of offering [the adjudication order] is to show that [W.A.] has been in the custody of the State since February 25, 1998. MR. SHIRLEY [D.A.'s attorney]: And we'll stipulate to that fact, so the document's irrelevant. THE [JUVENILE] COURT: Well, the Court's not going to put a limitation on its own findings.... [T]he Court will receive [the adjudication order] and it will stand by itself as a finding by the court as it relates to the child, [W.A.]. Therefore, whether the juvenile court denied D.A. her right to confront her accusers by taking judicial notice of the February 25, 1998, adjudication order is irrelevant because D.A. stipulated to the sole fact for which the adjudication order was submitted. [14] We conclude that the trial court committed no error because D.A.'s stipulation to the only fact that the State sought to prove by the admission of the adjudication order nullified any harm that may have resulted from the admission.