Opinion ID: 1779107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Strike Jurors

Text: Dufour asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire in failing to strike jurors Cheryl Frazier and Polly Sullen, who Dufour claims should have been discharged because of their views in favor of the death penalty. Jurors who initially express views pertaining to the death penalty are permitted to serve if they clearly indicate an ability to abide by the trial court's instructions. See Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 637, 644 (Fla.1995); Bryant v. State, 656 So.2d 426, 428 (Fla. 1995); Penn v. State, 574 So.2d 1079, 1080-81 (Fla.1991). This Court has previously determined that [t]he test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court. Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984). In applying this test, if any reasonable doubt exists as to whether a juror possesses the state of mind necessary to render an impartial recommendation as to punishment, the juror must be excused for cause. Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985). Bryant, 656 So.2d at 428. Further, in Johnson, this Court reasoned: On this question, the trial court is in the best position to observe the attitude and demeanor of the juror and to gauge the quality of the juror's responses. If there is competent record support for the trial court's conclusions regarding rehabilitation, then the appellate courts of this state will not reverse the determination on appeal based on a cold record. Johnson, 660 So.2d at 644. Our decision in Penn is particularly instructive in the present case. There, a prospective juror initially indicated that he favored the death penalty. See Penn, 574 So.2d at 1080. After further questioning by the trial court and the state, the prospective juror stated that he would follow the law as instructed. See id. This Court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to excuse the juror for cause because he had demonstrated his competency by stating that he would base his decision on the evidence and instructions. See id. at 1081. Similarly, in Bryant, the challenged jurors expressed support for the death penalty during initial voir dire and even a predisposition to impose the death penalty if the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. See Bryant, 656 So.2d at 428. However, upon further questioning, five of the challenged jurors stated that either they would follow the trial court's instructions or that they would weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether death was the appropriate sentence. See id. As in Penn, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse these five prospective jurors. See id. Although the record indicates that juror Frazier initially indicated that if the murder was premeditated one should probably receive the death penalty, Frazier then stated that she would not vote for the death penalty in every premeditated murder situation, but would listen closely to factors that might favor the individual after being further advised as to the appropriate criteria. Significantly, Frazier clearly indicated that she could proceed with the guilt and penalty phases and consider according to applicable law whether the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. Therefore, notwithstanding that Frazier did initially express views pertaining to the death penalty, Frazier was properly permitted to serve because she clearly indicated an ability to follow the trial court's instructions and weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. See Johnson, 660 So.2d at 644; Bryant, 656 So.2d at 428; Penn, 574 So.2d at 1080-81. Dufour makes the same challenge as to juror Sullen, claiming that she also voiced a predisposition to impose death. However, upon questioning by defense counsel, juror Sullen specifically stated that she did not believe that every premeditated murder should by punished by death. Juror Sullen also stated that she could weigh and consider the aggravators and mitigators in making a determination with regard to whether to recommend life or death. Defense counsel Dvorak asserted an unsuccessful challenge for cause to juror Sullen. Based on the record, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that juror Sullen could follow the trial court's instructions and the law. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying Dufour's challenge for cause to juror Sullen, nor was counsel ineffective. Accordingly, we deny Dufour's claim with regard to both jurors Frazier and Sullen.