Opinion ID: 885785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did the District Court apply the correct law in determining the proper scope of the Appellants' easement?

Text: ¶ 42 The Appellants contend that the District Court's reliance on, or misinterpretation of, this Court's decision in Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri (1996), 276 Mont. 421, 916 P.2d 751, constituted reversible error. Appellants contend that the District Court's conclusion that Leffingwell stands for the proposition that historical use is somehow supposed to restrict the scope and extent of purchased deeded easements like the one at issue in this case, is erroneous. ¶ 43 The basis of the Appellants' argument is that the 1977 deed granting the easement to Hardy should control because it is clear and not ambiguous. Accordingly, they contend that the court erred when it obviously went beyond the plain language of the Deed to reach these findings and conclusions.... Curiously, the Appellants then offer multiple examples of extrinsic evidence of what Hardy and his grantor, Hauge, obviously intended and what the deed almost incontrovertibly establishes. ¶ 44 Despite this inherent inconsistency, Appellants express grave concern that due to the District Court's improper application of case law, the rule of law on this particular issue is at stake, and that this Court risks establishing precedent that would conflict with case law governing easements in Montana. Namely, Appellants contend that there is a clear distinction between deeded easements and those created through implication or by prescription. Only in analyzing the scope and location of the latter, they contend, may a court look to an easement's historical use and its general purpose in light of the circumstances surrounding its use. ¶ 45 This position, however, ignores the prevailing authority established in our case law that is conveniently absent from the pages of Appellants' brief to this Court, but was obviously followed by the District Court in reaching its conclusions. ¶ 46 Appellants are correct that, as a general rule, where the creating words of a deed make the scope and the location of an easement perfectly clear, there is no need for further inquiry. Where an easement is specific in nature, the breadth and scope of the easement are strictly determined by the actual terms of the grant. Mason v. Garrison, 2000 MT 78, ¶ 21, 299 Mont. 142, ¶ 21, 998 P.2d 531, ¶ 21 (emphasis added and citations omitted). In other words, if the grant is specific in its terms, it is decisive of the limits of the easement. Mason, ¶ 21. See also § 70-17-106, MCA (extent of a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant); Van Hook v. Jennings, 1999 MT 198, ¶ 12, 295 Mont. 409, ¶ 12, 983 P.2d 995, ¶ 12 (breadth and scope of an easement are determined upon the actual terms of the grant) (citations omitted). ¶ 47 This Court has consistently held, however, that where the granting language is general in nature, rather than specific, courts must look beyond the plain language of the grant in defining the scope and breadth of the servitude: If the easement is not specifically defined, it need only be such as is reasonably necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was created. It is sometimes held... where the grant or reservation of an easement is general in its terms, that an exercise of the right, with the acquiescence and consent of both parties, in a particular course or manner, fixes the right and limits it to that particular course or manner. Strahan v. Bush (1989), 237 Mont. 265, 268, 773 P.2d 718, 720 (citations omitted). Under such circumstances, the question of what may be considered reasonably necessary and convenient in light of the easement's intended purpose is determined with a view to the situation of the property and the surrounding circumstances. See Mason, ¶ 22; Strahan, 237 Mont. at 268, 773 P.2d at 720; Section 70-17-106, MCA (extent of a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired). See also 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses § 83 at 654 (1996) (stating guiding principle that no definite rule can be stated as to what may be considered a reasonable use of an easement as distinguished from an unreasonable use; rather, the question is usually one of fact to be determined in the light of the situation of the property and the surrounding circumstances). ¶ 48 Thus, in stark contrast to Hardy's version of the rule of law, we have consistently held that in the absence of clear specifications defining scope no use may be made of a right-of-way different from the use established at the time of the creation of the easement so as to burden the servient estate to a greater extent than was contemplated at the time the easement was created. See Leffingwell, 276 Mont. at 431, 916 P.2d at 757. One formula articulated by the authors of a treatise suggest that as conditions change, so too may the use by the dominant tenement so long as the changes are evolutionary but not revolutionary. See Roger A. Cunningham et al., The Law of Property § 8.9 at 459 (2d ed.1993). ¶ 49 The deed at issue here is clearly one of a general nature in terms of scope. It merely provides that it would provide access to the property agreed to be bought and sold via a presently situated road that was perhaps 14 feet in width. Indeed, we agree with Appellants that the easement was unrestrictedrather than restricted by specific particulars regarding scopeand therefore the intended purpose, the use of the easement by its owners, as well as the general surrounding circumstances, must be accounted for where the scope is controverted by the parties. Thus, in applying the appropriate rules, the questions before the District Court boiled down to one: in light of all the surrounding circumstances of the easement at issue, was the Appellants' use of the easement reasonable? ¶ 50 In view of the foregoing, we conclude that Appellants committed a fundamental error of legal analysis by utterly confusing rules with facts in arguing that the Leffingwell decision is inapplicable to this case when they chimed: Given the vast factual differences between this case and Leffingwell, the District Court erred in determining that Leffingwell was the guiding case for construction of the road easement at issue.... The District Court did nothing more than follow several well-founded rules identified by this Court in Leffingwell and applied them to its own findings of fact in reaching it conclusions concerning the reasonableness of the Appellants' use of the easement. ¶ 51 For example, in Leffingwell we quoted from this Court's decision in Strahan v. Bush that [i]f the easement is not specifically defined, it need only be such as is reasonably necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was created. See Leffingwell, 276 Mont. at 430, 916 P.2d at 757 (quoting Strahan, 237 Mont. at 268, 773 P.2d at 720). The Leffingwell Court further quoted from Strahan the very rule this Court has cited above, that where the grant or reservation of an easement is general in its terms, that an exercise of the right, with the acquiescence and consent of both parties, in a particular course or manner, fixes the right and limits it to that particular course or manner. Leffingwell, 276 Mont. at 430, 916 P.2d at 757. ¶ 52 The Leffingwell Court then identified the rule found in Lindley v. Maggert that no use may be made of the right of way different from the use established at the time of the creation of the easement so as to burden the servient estate to a greater extent than was contemplated at the time the easement was created. Leffingwell, 276 Mont. at 431, 916 P.2d at 757 (quoting Lindley v. Maggert (1982), 198 Mont. 197, 199, 645 P.2d 430, 432). ¶ 53 The Appellants similarly attempt to discredit the District Court's reliance on Kelly v. Wallace, 1998 MT 307, 292 Mont. 129, 972 P.2d 1117. Why the legal issue discussed in that casewhether the court erred in defining the scope and thereby limiting an easement holder's use of an easementis not germane here is not explained by Appellants in any meaningful sort of way. See generally Kelly, ¶¶ 28-38. Although addressing the scope of an easement by prescription, rather than by deed, we nevertheless followed the same general rules that apply in determining the scope of an easement. For example, we relied on Leffingwell for the rule that a substantial increase in traffic can constitute an impermissible expansion of easement rights. See Kelly, ¶ 33. ¶ 54 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court correctly applied the case law germane to the legal questions involving the scope of easements at issue, and did not err in reaching any conclusions based on its interpretation of governing case law.