Opinion ID: 798530
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government Comments

Text: Salesman argues that the government’s closing argument impermissibly vouched for the strength of the government’s case and disparaged defense counsel and the defendant. Salesman points to several statements: (1) “Since the evidence is so strong, since the defendant has been caught red-handed on tape recordings eagerly taking his bribe money, there’s only one way he could be found not guilty, if there was some confusion, if you had some difficulty applying the facts and the law that [the district court] gave you and how that connects with the indictment.”; (2) “[W]e just heard from defense counsel. And he gave his version of events. He was able to speak out of, as attorneys sometimes do, both sides of his mouth.”; and (3) “And while the defendant through his counsel is speaking out of both sides of his mouth, so has the defendant as you have heard through the course of this trial.” 25 Because Salesman failed to object below to these statements, we review for plain error. United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1206 n.14 (11th Cir. 1991). The plain error rule is invoked in this circumstance only when a review of the entire record persuades this Court that “a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1046 (1985). The prosecutor’s statements were not improper. The first two statements were permissible comments on the quantum of evidence against Salesman and the failure of the defense to address or counter the evidence. United States v. Chirinos, 112 F.3d 1089, 1100 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is not improper to comment on the failure of the defense, as opposed to the defendant, to counter or explain the evidence . . . .”). Salesman contends the third statement could be interpreted as a reference to the jury’s having heard no testimony from him at trial. In context, however, the statement clearly refers to the extensive recordings played during trial of Salesman’s interactions with the undercover FBI agents. We also note that, even assuming any possible impropriety, the plain error standard is not met for two reasons: The district court issued a curative instruction, and the government’s evidence was strong. See United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1560 (11th Cir. 1985). As to the first, the district court instructed the jury that arguments of counsel were not evidence and that the government had the 26 burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. And second, as the evidence recounted above demonstrates, the government had a convincing case against Salesman. For these reasons, we conclude there was no error in the prosecutor’s comments.