Opinion ID: 1247774
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sympathy Factor.

Text: (23) Defendant asserts that ambiguity in the record concerning the court's consideration of sympathy requires reversal. Defendant acknowledges the court understood it could properly consider sympathy for defendant, but maintains it failed to understand that sympathy alone could form the basis for a life sentence. We disagree. In making its sentence determination the court expressly noted that it could properly consider sympathy or pity for the defendant in determining whether or not to show mercy and spare the defendant from execution (italics added) and that defendant was constitutionally entitled to have it consider any sympathy factor raised by the evidence. As the basis for his claim of ambiguity, defendant points to the court's subsequent statement in ruling on his penalty-reduction application that although it recognized and considered sympathy factors raised by the evidence, the Court still feels that it is bound to review the evidence and consider and take into account and be guided by aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in the statute. Read in context, however, with the court's earlier express recognition that sympathy could form the basis for mercy, this statement was fully consistent with our subsequent decisions relied on by defendant. (E.g., People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 875-879; People v. Lanphear, supra, 36 Cal.3d 163, 166-167; People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 536-540 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], revd. on other grounds California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837].) The record thus does not support an inference the court did anything other than give sympathy the weight it determined was appropriate in this case.