Opinion ID: 2623509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Duty for Employer/Independent Contractor Relationship

Text: [¶ 10] We have defined an independent contractor as one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer except as to the result of the work. Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1043 (Wyo.1978) (quoting Lichty v. Model Homes, 66 Wyo. 347, 211 P.2d 958, 967 (Wyo.1949)). Generally, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants. Hittel v. WOTCO, Inc., 996 P.2d 673, 676 (Wyo.2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1965)); Hill v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 765 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Wyo.1988); see also, Noonan, 713 P.2d at 164-67. Two limited exceptions to non-liability have been recognized in our previous decisions: (1) workplace owner/employer (owner) exercises controlling and pervasive role over the independent contractor's work; or (2) owner assumes affirmative safety duties. Hittel, 996 P.2d at 676; Jones v. Chevron, 718 P.2d 890, 896 (Wyo.1986). The first exception does not apply unless the employer (owner) has the right to control the details of the work. Noonan, 713 P.2d at 164. The owner may retain a broad general power of supervision and control as to the results of the work so as to insure satisfactory performance of the independent contract including the right to inspect, the right to stop the work, the right to make suggestions or recommendations as to details of the work, the right to prescribe alterations or deviations in the workwithout changing the relationship from that of owner and independent contractor or the duties arising from that relationship. Id. at 165. We have reaffirmed this rule in Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029 (Wyo.1987), and Ramsey v. Pacific Power & Light, 792 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Wyo.1990). [¶ 11] To determine whether the nature and extent of the control present is sufficient to impose liability, both applicable contractual provisions and the actual exercise of control are relevant. Jones v. Chevron, 718 P.2d at 896. Franks contends that Jack Andregg, as IPC's agent, exercised pervasive control over the site daily by stopping work and over Justin Browning and Wayne Franks on the day of the accident; however, our review of the record indicates that, under the respective oral or written contracts, A-1 and R & J were the independent contractors employed by IPC, and Jack Andregg and Justin Browning were employees of the respective independent contractors. Agency is a fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control and consent. There is no presumption that an agency exists. Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 411 (Wyo.1997) (quoting True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991, 999 (Wyo.1978)). In Wyoming, the overriding element in determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is dependent on whether the employer has a right to control the details of the work whereby liability is sought to be established. Krier, at 411 (quoting Noonan, 713 P.2d at 164). Andregg and IPC have established an employer/independent contractor relationship; however, even if Andregg was IPC's agent, we disagree that the record shows that Andregg exceeded the scope of control allowed under Noonan by his daily actions on the well site that would allow duty to be imposed against IPC or Andregg and R & J. The evidence shows that Andregg ordered use of the backhoe to unload the casing and then sat in his truck as Justin and Wayne proceeded and had nothing else to do with the unloading until the accident. Andregg can require that employees of other independent contractors begin working without giving rise to liability. Noonan, 713 P.2d at 165-67. [¶ 12] Franks further contends that a tort duty was created because IPC's drilling contract with A-1 provided that IPC would unload well casing, and IPC delegated that obligation to Jack Andregg, who then arranged for A-1's backhoe to unload casing brought by Wayne. The drilling contract contained an Exhibit A that had a list of the equipment, materials and services to be furnished by A-1 and a separate list of equipment, materials and services to be furnished by IPC. Our review of the record shows that IPC agreed to allow A-1 to invoice it for use of its equipment at IPC's request by a provision that stated: Backhoe: To be invoiced at $45.00/hour when used at Operator's convenience to (a) [u]nload, move or handle casing. Another provision detailed how much A-1 could bill IPC for labor when unloading casing. IPC contends that the drilling contract did not provide that it would unload casing and this provision was not a leasing arrangement separate and apart from A-1's obligations for drilling the well, but merely a provision governing invoicing procedures. Our review of the drilling contract shows that it plainly states that A-1 is an independent contractor who would drill and case to depths specified in the contract. The contract did not provide that A-1 would be paid one set amount for this service. Instead, the contract contained extensive lists of equipment, materials, and services that were individually priced. We found no language assigning unloading casing to a particular party and none of the parties claim that such language exists. The complete text of the provision in Exhibit A allows invoicing for use of the backhoe to [u]nload, move or handle casing; [d]ig more than one (1) drilling pit; [b]ackfill drilling pits upon completion of drilling; and [a]ny use at operator's request other than drilling of first drilling pit. We must agree with Appellees that the plain language of the provision read in the context of the whole contract provides pricing for services and was not a statement that IPC was responsible for unloading well casing. See Massengill v. S.M.A.R.T. Sports Medicine Clinic, P.C., 996 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wyo. 2000). [¶ 13] Franks contends that IPC's agent, Jack Andregg, conducted frequent safety meetings and frequently shut down the well site for safety reasons and by doing so assumed affirmative safety duties with the result that all Appellees owed a duty of care to Wayne. Our review shows, however, that Andregg did not direct Justin or Wayne in the performance of their duties for unloading well casing and no genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Andregg was an independent contractor or assumed affirmative safety duties for the unloading of the casing. Andregg, as an employee of R & J, served as a site supervisor within the parameters set forth in Noonan, and no duty of care was created. [¶ 14] Franks also contends that a tort duty was created because the well casing was delivered under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) by IPC's order and the UCC requires that the buyer furnish suitable facilities for the receipt of goods under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-503(a)(ii). Although the UCC provision probably governs the relationship between a buyer and seller, no authority is provided that application of the UCC to IPC as a buyer is evidence that IPC retained the obligation for unloading well casing. We find the UCC inapplicable to that question. In this case, Justin Browning, the employee of an independent contractor, A-1 Drilling, and Wayne Franks, as the employee of a vendor, Cole's, unloaded the well head casing with A-1's backhoe. Under IPC's contract with A-1, IPC would be billed a certain amount per hour for this service as part of the drilling services. Under these circumstances, the employer/independent contractor relationship was maintained and IPC had no duty of care to Wayne under these asserted contractual or statutory provisions. Jack Andregg, employee of another independent contractor, R & J, ordered the unloading to begin; however, this control is not pervasive within the meaning of Noonan, and this is not an action for which liability arises for Andregg and his partnership company or for his employer, IPC.