Opinion ID: 2367661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Appellant Has Raised Substantial Questions About the Performance of His Trial Counsel

Text: Counsel for appellant has done a commendable job of preserving and presenting this issue without guidance from our case law. On September 12, 2008, less than one year after the final decree of adoption became effective, see D.C.Code § 16-310 (2001), she filed in this court a motion asking us to remand for an evidentiary hearing on appellant's claim that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. This motion was not a bare-bones procedural request, but contained more than a dozen pages of cogent legal argument and citation to the record. It was supported by statements or affidavits submitted by appellant, G.A., and B.S. The issue thus was raised in a timely fashion, and we conclude that the allegations are substantial enough to require an evidentiary hearing. [11] Appellant makes a number of complaints about his attorney's performance, emphasizing counsel's apparent failure to keep in touch with appellant, his untimely request for a continuance, and his purported failure to protect appellant's right to participate meaningfully in the show cause hearing (by telephone or otherwise). Appellant also faults counsel for failing to call any witnesses to support appellant's preference that members of his family provide care for D.T. Many of these claims are supported by the trial record. Others are based on affidavits which proffer in some detail what appellant and other witnesses would have said if they had been called to testify. Indeed, both judicial officers pointed to some of counsel's failures as justifications for denying appellant's claims. For example, Magistrate Judge Dalton found that counsel's request for a continuance on the day of the trial was inappropriate and unreasonable, given that the father is incarcerated, a fact known to counsel. The whereabouts of the biological father [were] known and in any event, were easily ascertainable since his prison identification number was known. [C]ounsel had more than adequate time to make the necessary arrangements to ensure that the father participate by telephone. Judge Long highlighted at least three distinct failures of counsel. As the findings of the trial court show, the attorney for the father had not been sufficiently diligent or aggressive in using available prisoner identification information to pinpoint his client's location and to commence making arrangements with the United States Bureau of Prisons. The court also noted that [i]f there was any viable basis for finding that the nominated caregivers were actually willing to raise the child, the father's lawyer could have called them as witnesses to explain their commitment to the trial judge. No witnesses were called on behalf of the father. Thus, there is absolutely no evidence in the record to refute the testimony of the social worker, who explained why such persons were not appropriate alternatives to the petitioner. Finally, counsel's Motion for Review contain[ed] only terse, conclusory arguments.... It contain[ed] no meaningful briefing of points and authorities. Notably, G.A. has stated in her affidavit that she is licensed in the District to provide therapeutic foster care and to have two foster children, she was asked by appellant in 2002 to take custody of D.T., and she was thenand remainswilling to have D.T. live with her and to adopt D.T. G.A. added that she called D.F.'s attorney a few times to receive updates on D.T., but she has not heard from him since late 2005 or early 2006. Taken together, these allegations of deficient performance by counsel are far from conclusory. They are, instead, sufficient to require further inquiry into counsel's effectiveness. [12] We recognize, of course, that we have not heard counsel's side of the story, and [t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. For example, it appears from this record that appellant failed to keep counsel informed of his new location in prison. It may also be true that appellant's family members did not follow through on what they needed to do in order to qualify to assume custody of D.T. We previously have rejected the wait and see approach to foster care. In re Application of L.L., 653 A.2d 873, 887-88 (D.C.1995). Both the District of Columbia and R.E.S. have urged us to reject the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that appellant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. They emphasize, among other things, that appellant has never had a parent-child relationship with D.T., that D.T. seems to have found a loving home with R.E.S., and that our guiding principle is the best interest of the child. We by no means foreclose an ultimate resolution of the claim on this basis, but, for reasons which should be apparent from what we have said, we feel the need to learn more about why counsel did not preserve his client's right to participate in the show cause hearing and why he did not call witnesses to support his client's position. In other words, we deem it important to know what the record would have looked like if these witnesses had been called.