Opinion ID: 1628675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count One: White v. General Motors Corporation

Text: In White v. General Motors Corp., 699 F.Supp. 1485 (Kan.1988), Respondent represented two clients, Frederick White (White) and Benjamin Staponski (Staponski), who brought claims against General Motors Corporation (GM) for wrongful discharge and breach of contract. White also brought a separate claim against GM for slander. The district court found insufficient legal and factual bases to support these claims and ordered summary judgment for GM. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions against Respondent after finding that she had engaged in numerous acts of misconduct. White v. General Motors Corp., 126 F.R.D. 563 (Kan.1989). The district court's findings in the White case may be summarized as follows: 1. Respondent failed to make a reasonable factual inquiry before filing the wrongful discharge complaint. Id. at 565. Both of her clients had previously executed documents releasing GM from employment-related claims, and she knew of the existence of the releases before she filed the wrongful discharge complaint. Id. Nevertheless, she filed the wrongful discharge complaint without first obtaining copies of the releases. Id. 2. Respondent pursued White's slander claim without making a reasonable inquiry to determine whether that claim was wellfounded in fact. Id. at 565-66. The only proposed witness to the alleged slander had stated in an affidavit that she had not spoken with GM regarding White, but Respondent continued to press this claim after the affidavit had made it apparent that there was no factual basis to do so. Id. 3. Respondent disregarded well-established Kansas law by arguing that the determination of whether the facts surrounding the signing of the release constituted duress was initially a jury question, rather than a question of law. Id. at 566. Respondent's attempt to distinguish the court's previous decision on this issue was specious because it presented a distinction without a difference. Id. In this way, Respondent advanced her claims without having a reasonable basis to believe that those claims were well-founded in law. Id. 4. Respondent's argument that the releases signed by plaintiffs were ambiguous, which was her excuse for continuing to use the releases, was not well-founded in fact or law. Id. Although she claimed that the releases were unclear regarding claims unknown at the time the releases were entered, the releases unequivocally discharged any and all claims, known or unknown. Id. 5. Respondent advanced the action for an improper purpose, not only by filing suit, but also by threatening to contact the media and government agencies before suit was ever filed. Id. at 567. The improper purpose was evident by the fact that she had failed to make a reasonable inquiry to determine that the claims were well-founded. Id. 6. Respondent needlessly increased the cost of litigation by making voluminous discovery requests that would not have been necessary had she made a reasonable inquiry to determine that the claims were well-founded in the first place. Id. Based on these findings, the district court ordered Respondent to pay GM's costs and attorney's fees totaling $172,382.19. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir.1990). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings but remanded for reconsideration of the appropriate amount of sanctions. Id. at 683. On remand, the district court reduced the amount of sanction to $50,000, White v. General Motors Corp., 139 F.R.D. 178, 183 (Kan.1991), and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sanction on appeal. White v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 499, 503 (10th Cir.1992). Informant charges in Count I that the conduct for which Respondent was sanctioned in the White case also constitutes a violation of Rules 4-3.1, 4-3.2, 4-8.4(a), and 4-8.4(d) of the Missouri Rules. Rule 4-3.1 forbids an attorney from bringing a proceeding or asserting an issue unless there is a non-frivolous basis for doing so. A claim is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated. Rule 4-3.1(Comment). However, continuing to pursue a claim once it becomes apparent that there is no factual basis to support that claim is clearly contrary to the requirements of the rule. By pursuing White's slander claim even after it became apparent that there was no factual basis for that claim, Respondent violated Rule 4-3.1. Rule 4-3.2 requires an attorney to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation. In the White case Respondent 1) filed a wrongful discharge claim without first obtaining copies of the employee releases knowing that they existed, 2) pursued a slander claim after it had become apparent that there was no factual basis for the claim, 3) pursued issues of duress and ambiguity that were not wellfounded in law, and 4) engaged in voluminous discovery to support claims that were not well-founded in fact or law. By engaging in that conduct, Respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation and thus violated Rule 4-3.2. Rule 4-8.4(a) states that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. By violating Rules 4-3.1 and 4-3.2, Respondent has necessarily violated Rule 4-8.4(a). See In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. banc 1994). Rule 4-8.4(d) states that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. By engaging in the conduct that constituted violations of Rules 4-3.1 and 4-3.2, Respondent also violated Rule 4-8.4(d).