Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ajaj

Text: 308 Ajaj argues that the government presented insufficient evidence to establish his guilt on the counts for which he was convicted. As an initial matter, Ajaj argues that the government failed to prove his membership in the conspiracy that bombed the World Trade Center. Ajaj contends that the government's evidence fails to prove that Ajaj agreed to the essential nature of the plan, that is, to bomb a populated structure in an urban area. According to Ajaj, the government's conviction was derived from evidence that proves nothing more than that Ajaj attempted to enter the United States illegally and had a passing association with Yousef. On appeal, Ajaj revisits the government's case at trial, seeking to demonstrate that the government's evidence is susceptible to alternative inferences consistent with Ajaj's innocence. 13 309 Ajaj also argues that, assuming he is guilty of conspiracy, the government failed to present sufficient evidence under the Pinkerton doctrine that he is vicariously liable for crimes arising from the bombing of the World Trade Center. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180. In the alternative, Ajaj argues that his incarceration before the construction and detonation of the World Trade Center bomb constituted a withdrawal from the conspiracy as a matter of law, shielding him from criminal liability for the offenses later committed by his co-conspirators. See United States v. Greenfield, 44 F.3d 1141, 1150 (2d Cir.1995). Ajaj also challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction for violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. To prove a violation of the Travel Act, the government was required to establish that Ajaj: (1) used a facility of interstate or foreign commerce; (2) with intent to commit any unlawful activity (including arson in violation of New York state law); and (3) thereafter performed an additional act to further the unlawful activity. See United States v. Jenkins, 943 F.2d 167, 172 (2d Cir.1991). The general definition of arson under New York law is the intentional or reckless damaging of a vehicle or building by fire or explosion. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 150.05, 150.10 (McKinney 1988); United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir.1973) ([T]he initial inquiry in a Travel Act case is whether the underlying activity violates a state law.); see also United States v. Jones, 909 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C.Cir.1990). Ajaj's arguments are unpersuasive. 310 Count One of the Southern District indictment charged Ajaj with conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to (a) bomb buildings, vehicles and other property used in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i); (b) bomb buildings, vehicles and other property owned, used by and leased to the United States and its departments and agencies, 18 U.S.C. § 844(f); (c) transport explosives interstate to bomb buildings, vehicles, and other property, 18 U.S.C. § 844(d); and (d) bomb automobiles used in interstate commerce with reckless disregard for the safety of human life, 18 U.S.C. § 33. 311 Counts Two to Six and Counts Eight to Ten charged Ajaj with the substantive offenses arising from the World Trade Center bombing. Ajaj was charged with (1) bombing a building used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(i) and 2 (Count Two); (2) bombing buildings, vehicles and property owned, used by and leased to the United States and its departments or agencies, 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f) and 2 (Count Three); (3) transporting a bomb interstate to destroy buildings, vehicles or other property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(d) and 2 (Count Four); (4) bombing vehicles used in interstate commerce, with reckless disregard for the safety of human life, 18 U.S.C. §§ 33, 34, and 2 (Counts Five and Six); (5) assaulting federal officers, 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 2 (Count 8); (6) using or carrying a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence, that is, the assault on federal officers charged in Count Eight and the bombing conspiracy charged in Count One, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2 (Counts 9 and 10, respectively). In addition, Count Seven charged Ajaj and Yousef with violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 and 2, by traveling in foreign commerce with intent to commit crimes of violence, namely arson, and to promote that unlawful activity. 14 For the following reasons, we conclude that the government presented ample evidence to support Ajaj's conviction on all ten counts. 312 With respect to the conviction under Count One for conspiracy, the government's argument at trial that Ajaj not only agreed to the essential nature of the plan but was one of the conspiracy's architects enjoyed solid evidentiary support. The government established that in April 1992, Ajaj surreptitiously traveled from the United States to Pakistan to attend Camp Khaldan, a terrorist training camp. Evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Ajaj traveled to Pakistan under an alias, misrepresented to his landlord in Texas that he was moving to New York, and sought to conceal his departure from family members. Ajaj, in the Middle East, obtained a letter of introduction to Camp Khaldan and terrorist materials that contained instructions on the sabotage of buildings and vehicles with explosives. Significantly, these manuals bore Ajaj's fingerprints as well as handwritten notes that set forth formulae for various explosives. Ajaj also obtained propaganda materials expressing anti-American sentiments, including an instructional videotape that began with the suicide bombing of an American Embassy using a van. 313 The government further established that Ajaj, once in the Middle East, made contact with Yousef and they together plotted to bomb targets in the United States. The presence of both of their fingerprints in the terrorist manuals indicated that Ajaj and Yousef studied the materials, assimilating knowledge that Yousef later applied directly to the construction of the World Trade Center bomb. For example, Ajaj's fingerprints appear on a manual page that contains the formula for urea nitrate, the same compound used as the main charge for the World Trade Center bomb. 15 The same section of that terrorist manual also instructs that the addition of aluminum powder and other metals enhance urea nitrate's destructive impact, instructions followed by the conspirators as well. Yousef's fingerprints appear on a manual page opposite the formula for ammonium nitrate, a compound the conspirators utilized to boost the bomb's main charge. Moreover, the conspirators used nitroglycerine and lead azide as boosters for the World Trade Center bomb, consistent with instructions contained in the handwritten notebooks. 314 The government demonstrated that after completing their training, Ajaj and Yousef jointly prepared to enter the United States illegally. Ajaj and Yousef carefully created false identities for themselves in the names of Khurram Khan and Azan Mohammad, respectively. They collected false passports, identification cards and bank, education and medical records to support their false identities. According to the government, Ajaj agreed with Yousef that he would carry the terrorist materials in his own belongings to maximize Yousef's chances of entering the United States without garnering suspicion. To facilitate Ajaj's own entry into the United States with the terrorist materials, he was assigned a fake Swedish passport issued to a Khurram Khan, as individuals bearing a valid Swedish passport do not need a visa to enter the United States. Later, on Yousef's arrest at Kennedy Airport, INS inspectors searched Yousef's belongings and found evidence linking him to Ajaj. Among other things, they found an identification card bearing Yousef's picture and the name Khurram Khan (Ajaj's alias) as well as a small notepad containing the Dallas, Texas, telephone number and address of Ajaj's friend, Mohammad Abukhdeir. Yousef, on questioning, claimed to be traveling alone, and he was later released on his own recognizance. Similarly, when INS officials searched Ajaj's belongings, they discovered evidence that linked Ajaj to Yousef. Among other things, they found a British passport and an airline ticket issued to an Azan Mohammad, which was the alias that Yousef had traveled under. INS inspectors also found an identification card for a Khurram Khan, identical to the one found in Yousef's possession, but with Ajaj's, not Yousef's, photograph affixed. 315 Evidence presented at trial also established that Ajaj facilitated Yousef's entry into the United States at Kennedy Airport and remained in close contact with Yousef after Ajaj's incarceration for passport fraud. Customs Inspector Robert Malafronte testified at trial that Ajaj, when questioned at Kennedy Airport as to whether he was traveling with others, lied and claimed to be traveling alone. According to the government, Ajaj, by relieving Yousef of the terrorist materials and lying about their association, effectively deflected the INS's attention away from Yousef and facilitated Yousef's entry into the United States. 316 Ajaj's participation in the conspiracy continued even after his incarceration on the passport fraud conviction. Ajaj stayed abreast of the conspiracy's progress through telephone conversations with Yousef. Ajaj never contacted Yousef directly but telephoned a friend, Mohammad Abukhdeir in Texas, who then, as an intermediary, either relayed messages or patched three-way calls to Yousef. According to the government, Ajaj, Abukhdeir and Yousef discussed the bombing conspiracy in code, referring to Yousef as Rashed, the bomb plot as the study and the terrorist materials as university papers. During one such conversation on December 29, 1992, Ajaj agreed to convey the terrorist materials to Yousef. Specifically, Ajaj informed Yousef that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York had ordered the government to return Ajaj's belongings, including the terrorist materials. When Yousef asked if he could take possession of Ajaj's belongings, Ajaj at first agreed but then opined that its shipment to Yousef would jeopardize Yousef's business which would be a pity! Ajaj suggested that it would be preferable that you send someone else to get them. Yousef agreed, stating that he would send someone else than me and would give Ajaj, through Abukhdeir, the address of someone here who was one of Yousef's friends. Ajaj agreed and assured Yousef that proceeding in this manner was better so that you don't jeopardize your work. 317 In sum, the government presented ample evidence to demonstrate that Ajaj agreed to the essential nature of the conspiracy's plan. The government's evidence went far beyond proving Ajaj's mere association with terrorists and suspicious circumstances. The possibility that the government's evidence at trial is subject to alternative inferences consistent with Ajaj's innocence does not vitiate the reasonableness of the jury verdict. 16 318 Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence to convict Ajaj of the substantive counts charged in the indictment. With respect to Ajaj's vicarious criminal liability on Counts Two to Six and Eight to Ten under the Pinkerton doctrine, the terrorist manuals and anti-American propaganda materials discovered in Ajaj's possession at Kennedy Airport constituted sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the crimes arising from the World Trade Center bombing were committed in furtherance of and were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the bombing conspiracy. 17 Moreover, in light of Ajaj's travel to the United States from Pakistan with the terrorist materials, and his denial of Yousef at Kennedy Airport, the evidence was sufficient to convict Ajaj under Count Seven for violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. As a final point, we reject Ajaj's argument that, as a matter of law, his incarceration on passport fraud charges constituted his withdrawal from the bombing conspiracy. To the contrary, we have held that imprisonment for an offense unrelated to the conspiracy charged does not, standing alone, entitle a defendant to a directed verdict with respect to his withdrawal.... Thus, whether an imprisonment constitutes withdrawal from a conspiracy must be decided by the jury. Panebianco, 543 F.2d at 454 n. 5. 18