Opinion ID: 2353959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: teaching career with arthur murray

Text: Fall training class for ballroom dancing instructors forming and given free to those who qualify. 1. Age 22-32. 2. College background or equivalent. 3. Interested in people. Good opportunities for advancement due to expansion program. Arlington, Silver Spring, Bethesda, Washington areas. Income, $90 for 36 teaching hours. Apply in person. . . . At the studio, appellant was interviewed by a Mr. Scheibert, one of appellee's top-level executives, who told her she would have to take some lessons to qualify. As they were represented as necessary to initiate her career as a dancing instructor, she contracted for 46 lessons, for which she paid $460.00. Within the next few weeks she was told by Scheibert and other studio counselors that she would need additional lessons. She then agreed to expand her course. Ultimately, in a series of contracts, some signed before fully incorporated on paper, she became obligated for $6,257.00. She testified that had she not believed she would be placed on the staff as a dancing instructor at the studio, she would not have continued the lessons. The prospect of employment was held out to her from time to time, and on various occasions she discussed the matter with her dancing analyst and representatives of the studio. At one point, when she explained she had no funds to meet her obligation, Scheibert suggested that she sell her house or borrow a portion of the amount due and pay the balance in periodic installments from the money she would receive when she started teaching. In reliance that she would become a paid instructor, appellant continued her dancing course for approximately two years. About this time her daughter overheard a conversation between one of appellee's executives and an instructor indicating they were trying to mulct appellant of all the money they could. This prompted appellant, apparently in a final effort to ascertain whether she was to be placed on the studio staff as an instructor, to try to speak to appellee's president, [4] but she could not obtain an audience. She then stopped taking lessons. Although the facts related above would not compel a finding of fraud or deception, reasonable men could find that there was promise of employment and of free instruction, when in fact these representations were nothing more than a fraudulent inducement for appellant to enter into a series of contracts for dancing lessons; that appellant was misled by these representations, which the studio had no intention of fulfilling; and that the conduct of appellee amounted to a scheme to defraud her of substantial sums. In our judgment the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of appellant presented a prima facie case of fraud which required submission of her case to the jury. [5] Reversed and remanded for a new trial.