Opinion ID: 2070572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improprieties During the Prosecutor's Summation

Text: Of defendant's numerous claims of prosecutorial misconduct during summation, only one requires discussionthe prosecutor's references to defendant allegedly having smiled during the testimony of two witnesses. [18] During the prosecutor's examination of Detective Whiteside, the prosecution asked the detective if the smile that the defendant is giving you now was the same smile that defendant purportedly gave the detective shortly before his arrest. The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection. The prosecutor then asked Whiteside when you just looked at the defendant now, did he make an expression towards you? Over defense counsel's general one-word objection, the detective was allowed to reply A smirk. On summation, the prosecutor stated, Angie Brown. Do you think it was fun for her to come in here and testify through the tears? To identify this defendant who, as he did with Detective Whiteside, smiled at her. The trial court overruled defense counsel's single-word objection to the statement. We have recognized that admitting evidence of a smile as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt is error ( People v Basora, 75 NY2d 992, 994). A smile    can convey many different states of mindfor example, relief, bewilderment, nervousness, exasperation or happiness ( id. ). Though not reversible error here, this type of evidence is of questionable and limited probative value; we caution against its admission. Defendant now contends that the prosecutor's summation statements concerning defendant's court demeanor violated his constitutional rights against compelled self-incrimination, to due process, to a fair jury trial, and to confront those who testify against him (US Const 5th, 6th, 8th, 14th Amends; NY Const, art I, §§ 5, 6). Here, defendant's single-word objections to the smile/smirk statements fell far short of apprising the court of the constitutional claims he now raises on appeal. Moreover, defendant's motion to set aside the verdict based on this conduct does not cure his failure to register a specific objection ( see CPL 330.30 [1]; see also People v Padro, 75 NY2d 820, 821). Even if we were to review these claims in the interests of justice ( see CPL 470.30 [1]; see also CPL 470.15, 470.20) we would find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Crimmins, 36 NY2d at 237).