Opinion ID: 733439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hospital Records

Text: 7 Mainiero argues that the trial judge's decision not to disclose parts of the complainant's psychiatric records denied him due process of law because the records are contrary to the complainant's trial testimony and rebut the primary, if not the sole, evidence in support of his sexual assault conviction. Habeas corpus review of state court judgments is circumscribed by section 2254 of Title 28 and the recently-enacted amendments to the same contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 3 which provides in relevant part: 8 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-- 9 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States ... (emphasis added). 10 The appellate court began its analysis by stating that under the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001-02, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987), it had to determine whether the psychiatric records contain[ed] information material to [Mainiero] that 'probably would have changed the outcome of [his] trial.'  Mainiero, 525 N.W.2d at 307 (quoting Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58, 107 S.Ct. at 1002). Quoting another decision of the Supreme Court, the appellate court observed that evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 57, 107 S.Ct. at 1001 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). 11 The appellate court issued its opinion affirming Mainiero's conviction on November 2, 1994. At this time, the aforementioned Supreme Court cases were the prevailing precedents defining material for purposes of determining when the government, consistent with due process, must turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 4 The appellate court's decision, therefore, was not contrary to clearly-established, relevant Supreme Court precedent. Under the new provision in section 2254, we must also determine if the appellate court's decision involved an unreasonable application of the foregoing Supreme Court precedents to the facts. 12 We review the appellate court's findings under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1438 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Silva, 71 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir.1995). The appellate court, upon review, agreed with the trial judge that the only cause identified by the complainant's treating psychiatrists for her depression and suicidal thoughts was the alleged sexual assault by Mainiero. Mainiero, 525 N.W.2d at 308. This being so, it was not unreasonable for the district court to find, relying upon the decision of the appellate court, that the failure to disclose two or three passing references to the death of the complainant's friend in the hundred-plus pages of the records, Mainiero, slip op. at 10, did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Cross-examination of the complainant concerning her references to the death of her friend would not necessarily have yielded any testimony exculpatory to Mainiero even if the complainant had admitted that her friend's death was a cause of her depression. Even though complainant may have testified that her mental health problems were attributable to more than one factor, this would not serve to undercut her allegations against Mainiero that he repeatedly made sexual contact with her. 13 Because Mainiero has not established that disclosure of the complainant's psychiatric records would have affected the outcome of his trial, the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be affirmed. The appellate court did not violate Mainiero's due process rights when it concluded that disclosure of the psychiatric records (reporting what the district court found to be passing references pertaining to the complainant's grief over the death of a friend) would not have affected the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the appellate court did not engage in an unreasonable application of prevailing Supreme Court precedent. 14