Opinion ID: 804000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Speedy Trial Act and Governmental Bad Faith

Text: Under the Speedy Trial Act, an indictment must be filed within 30 days from the date of an individual’s arrest. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2004). A superseding indictment that issues more than 30 days after the arrest, but before the original indictment is dismissed, does not violate § 3161(b). United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir. 1996). The Speedy Trial Act also requires that the trial of a defendant commence within 70 days from the later of the filing date of the indictment, or the date the defendant appeared before a judicial officer of the appropriate court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2004). A jury trial commences, for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, when the district court begins voir dire. United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441, 443 (11th Cir. 1982). The filing of a superseding indictment does not reset the Speedy Trial Act clock for charges that were included in the original indictment. United States v. Young, 528 F.3d 1294, 1295-97 (11th Cir. 2008). 6 Certain periods of time, however, are excluded from the calculation of the 70-day period. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2004). Any delay resulting from a pretrial motion is excluded, and this period runs “from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (2004). With respect to a motion for which a hearing is required, the entire period from the filing of the motion to the hearing on that motion is excluded without reference to whether that time period was unreasonable. United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 1991). If, after the hearing, the court has all of the materials necessary to rule on the motion, it has the motion under advisement immediately following the hearing. Id. From that date, any delay reasonably attributable to the period during which the motion is under advisement by the district court, which cannot exceed 30 days, is excludable. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(J) (2004); Davenport, 935 F.2d at 1228. A delay resulting from a codefendant’s motion is excludable as to each codefendant. United States v. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482, 1488 (11th Cir. 1997). Likewise, any period of delay that results from a continuance granted by the district court is excludable if the district court grants the continuance on the basis of a finding that “the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. 7 § 3161(h)(8) (2004). This time period, however, is only excludable if the district court sets forth in the record, whether orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Id. Unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish constitutional violations that will support granting a motion to vacate. United States v. Jones, 614 F.2d 80, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1980).1 The district court erred by concluding that the filing of the superseding indictment reset the Speedy Trial Act clock. Nonetheless, Collins did not establish that trial counsel’s failure to move to dismiss the superseding indictment based upon an alleged violation of the Speedy Trial Act was deficient or prejudicial. When one computes the days excludable due to Green’s motions, the period the district court considered those motions, and the district court’s continuance, fewer than seventy days elapsed. Moreover, counsel adopted a codefendant’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment based upon the government’s bad faith, and the district 1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)(en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 8 court ultimately denied that motion on the merits. Collins’s attorney, therefore, did not render deficient performance in this regard. In any event, Collins’s unsubstantiated and conclusory statements that the government obtained the superseding indictment in bad faith were insufficient to support a showing of prejudice.