Opinion ID: 2981789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: As a general rule, we review a district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Tolbert, 668 F.3d 798, 800 (6th Cir. 2012). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Byrd, 689 F.3d 636, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 173 (6th Cir. 2011)). A “district court’s interpretation of the -7- No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing United States v. Anglin, 601 F.3d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 2010)). We review sentencing determinations, however, using a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See United States v. Robinson, 669 F.3d 767, 773 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). B. Defendant’s Sentence Is Procedurally Unreasonable. Defendant argues that the 210-month sentence imposed by the district court is procedurally unreasonable, and that the case must be remanded for resentencing because the district court miscalculated his offense level, which resulted in an incorrectly calculated sentencing range. We agree. Criminal sentences must be procedurally reasonable. United States v. Stubblefield, 682 F.3d 502, 510 (6th Cir. 2012). In order for a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, the district court must not have committed a “significant procedural error, such as . . . failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Gray, 692 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 324 (6th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the district court misinterprets the Guidelines or miscalculates the Guidelines range, then the resulting sentence is procedurally unreasonable.” Byrd, 689 F.3d at 639 (quoting Stubblefield, 682 F.3d at 510) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a district court makes a mistake in calculating the sentencing range, this court is required to remand for resentencing “unless [it is] certain that any such error was harmless—i.e., any such error ‘did not affect the district court’s -8- No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner selection of the sentenced imposed.’” United States v. Duckro, 466 F.3d 438, 446 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2006)). Defendant argues that the sentencing-range calculations adopted by the district court were incorrectly calculated, resulting in an “advisory guideline range significantly higher than it should have been.” Defendant contends that the inclusion of three “pseudo counts” for Defendant’s pre-charge sexual conduct with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 as “relevant conduct” constitutes reversible procedural error and that, as a result, this court should vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. The Government agrees with Defendant that the sentencing range was incorrectly calculated and that Defendant’s sentence is procedurally unreasonable. Under § 2G1.3(d)(1), if the “offense involved more than one minor, Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts) shall be applied as if the persuasion, enticement, coercion, travel, or transportation to engage in a commercial sex act or prohibited sexual conduct of each victim had been contained in a separate count of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(d)(1) (emphasis supplied). “Offense” is defined as “the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct under § 1B1.3.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(H) (emphasis supplied). Finally, “relevant conduct” is defined as: (1) acts or omissions committed by the defendant “that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility” for the conviction offense, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A); or (2) acts or omissions “that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction” for those offenses that require grouping of multiple counts pursuant to § 3D1.2(d), U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). -9- No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner The district court and Probation interpreted “relevant conduct” to include Defendant’s pre-charge sexual conduct with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3. In Probation’s response to Defendant’s first objection, Probation based its interpretation on the conclusion that the pre-charge sexual conduct with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 was “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction,” and that the common plan was to participate in prohibited sexual conduct with minors over an eight-year time span. The district court adopted this reasoning, holding that all of the “minor victims were the victims of prohibited sexual conduct.” We conclude, however, that Defendant’s pre-charge sexual conduct with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 does not fall within the definition of “relevant conduct.” The determination by a district court of conduct as “relevant” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) “involves the application of law to fact and is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Long, 457 F. App’x 534, 540 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Maken, 510 F.3d 654, 657 (6th Cir. 2007)). Additionally, the Sentencing Guidelines are interpreted using “the traditional canons of statutory interpretation.” United States v. Jackson, 635 F.3d 205, 209 (6th Cir. 2011). “The language of the statute is the starting point for interpretation, and it should also be the ending point if the plain meaning of that language is clear.” Id. (quoting United States v. Choice, 201 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The definition of “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3(a)(2) used by Probation and the district court is not applicable in this case. Under § 1B1.3(a)(2), the definition of relevant conduct applies to only those “offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (emphasis supplied). United States Sentencing Guideline § 2G1.3 Commentary Note 6, states that, for the purposes of § 2G1.3(d)(1), multiple counts involving more - 10 - No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner than one minor are not to be grouped together under § 3D1.2. See also United States v. Cade, 452 F. App’x 47, 48 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that under § 2G1.3(d)(1), “multiple counts involving more than one minor are not to be grouped together under § 3D1.2”). Even if § 2G1.3(d)(1) allowed the grouping of multiple counts involving more than one minor under § 3D1.2, grouping would still be inappropriate under § 3D1.2(d). Section 3D1.2(d) provides two lists: one list of the offenses that are required to be grouped, and one list of the offenses that are specifically excluded from grouping. Section 2G1.3 does not fall within either list.2 Pursuant to § 3D1.2, counts involving “substantially the same harm” are grouped together [w]hen the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover such behavior. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d). Offenses not listed in § 3D1.2(d) may or may not be grouped “based upon the facts of the case and the applicable guidelines.” Id. “Counts involving offenses to which different offense guidelines apply are grouped together under subsection (d) if the offenses are of the same general type and otherwise meet the criteria for grouping under this subsection.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.6; see also United States v. Lacefield, 250 F. App’x 670, 678 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.6). 2 The Government states in its brief that “U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 falls within the list of offenses that are not to be grouped, as do all offenses involving prohibited sexual conduct with a minor.” Section 2G1.3, however, unlike § 2G1.1 and § 2G1.2, is not included in the list of offenses that are specifically excluded from grouping under § 3D1.2(d). - 11 - No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner Since § 2G1.3 does not fall under the list of those offenses required to be grouped, grouping is appropriate only if the offenses could be considered of the “same general type.” The district court concluded that the definition of “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3(a)(2) was applicable because the offense of conviction and the “pseudo counts” could be grouped under § 3D1.2(d). In this case, however, grouping under § 3D1.2(d) would not be appropriate. The offense of conviction and the “pseudo counts” are factually dissimilar; they did not involve the same victim, they did not occur contemporaneously, they involved discrete incidents, and they were carried out by different means. Additionally, unlike the offenses that must be grouped under § 3D1.2(d), the aggregate harm in this case cannot be quantitatively “measured.” Application Note 6 gives examples of cases in which the harm can be aggregated: (1) The defendant is convicted of five counts of embezzling money from a bank. The five counts are to be grouped together. (2) The defendant is convicted of two counts of theft of social security checks and three counts of theft from the mail, each from a different victim. All five counts are to be grouped together. (3) The defendant is convicted of five counts of mail fraud and ten counts of wire fraud. Although the counts arise from various schemes, each involves a monetary objective. All fifteen counts are to be grouped together. (4) The defendant is convicted of three counts of unlicensed dealing in firearms. All three counts are to be grouped together. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.6. The aggregate harm of Defendant’s federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and the “pseudo counts” cannot be measured in the way that harm described in the above examples can be measured. Grouping is not appropriate under § 3D1.2 and, as a result, the definition of “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3(a)(2) was incorrectly applied in this case. Defendant’s pre-charge sexual conduct with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 also does not constitute “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Defendant pled guilty to the use of the internet to entice - 12 - No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). First, none of the pre-charge sexual conduct with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 occurred during the commission of the conviction offense. The pre-charge sexual conduct was not contemporaneous with the use of the computer as asserted in the Information. Second, none of the pre-charge sexual conduct with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 occurred in preparation for the offense of conviction. The pre-charge sexual conduct did not involve the use of a computer or any other facility in interstate commerce to entice a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct and was wholly independent of the offense of conviction. Finally, none of the pre-charge sexual conduct with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 occurred in an attempt to avoid detection. The pre-charge sexual conduct occurred prior to the conviction offense. The district court, therefore, erred in finding that Defendant’s pre-charge sexual conduct with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 constituted “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). See United States v. Davis, 453 F. App’x 452, 462 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that defendant’s pre-charge sexual conduct with a minor did not constitute “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)). As a result, the pre-charge sexual conduct with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 should not have been included as additional separate “pseudo counts” under § 2G1.3(d)(1). Additionally, the district court’s error was not “harmless.” Had the offense level been correctly calculated, the sentencing guideline range would have been 70 to 87 months with a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months rather than 168 to 210 months. Accordingly, we vacate Defendant’s sentence and remand this case with instructions to the district court to conduct a second sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion. - 13 - No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner C. Testimony by the Mother of One of the Victims Was Not Improperly Considered. Defendant argues that the district court erred in considering victim-impact testimony from the mother of one of the victims. Defendant contends that the testimony should not have been considered as victim-impact testimony for sentencing purposes and, on remand, should not be considered at resentencing. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, a district court must give any crime victim who is present the opportunity to be heard before sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(B). “Victim” is broadly defined as “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e). Additionally, where the victim is under eighteen years of age, the legal guardian may assume the crime victim’s rights and be given an opportunity to be heard as if the guardian was the victim. Id. Defendant contends that the district court erroneously considered the victim-impact testimony of a person who did not meet the definition of a “crime victim” under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e). Defendant asserts that none of the pre-charge victims constitute “victims” of the conviction offense because the pre-charge sexual conduct does not constitute “relevant conduct” and does not constitute a “federal offense.” Given this, Defendant argues that the mother of one of the victims cannot be considered a “crime victim” under Rule 32 because she was not directly or proximately harmed, and she was not the legal guardian of a minor who was directly or proximately harmed by a federal offense. The Government argues that Defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review because he did not raise an objection to the inclusion of the victim-impact testimony at the - 14 - No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner sentencing hearing. As a result, the Government argues that the plain-error standard governs Defendant’s claim that the district court erroneously considered the victim-impact testimony of a person who did not meet the definition of a “crime victim” under Rule 32(i)(4)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e). In order for a litigant to preserve an issue of error for appeal, the litigant “must object . . . in a timely manner [or] his claim for relief from the error is forfeited.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009). If a litigant does not timely object, the issue is forfeited and this court can only review the claim under the plain-error standard. Id.; see also United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2010). In order to satisfy the plain-error standard, a litigant bears the burden of showing: “(1) error[,] (2) that was obvious or clear[,] (3) that affected defendant’s substantial rights[,] and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Ferguson, 681 F.3d 826, 831 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wallace, 597 F.3d at 802) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plain-error standard of review is extremely deferential to the sentencing judge. See Wallace, 597 F.3d at 804. In the instant case, Defendant failed to object to the inclusion of the victim-impact testimony from the mother of one of the victims. In failing to timely object to the use of this testimony, Defendant forfeited this claim and thus his claim is subject to the deferential plain-error standard of review. Defendant has not offered any evidence showing that the district court committed plain error. Even assuming that the district court committed error in characterizing the mother as a “crime victim,” Defendant cannot show that the district court committed plain error in considering the - 15 - No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner statement of the mother. First, the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 3771 requires the court to consider victim-impact testimony does not mean that the district court cannot hear from other individuals at sentencing. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3661, “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” Courts are thus permitted under this section to “consider the widest possible breadth of information about a defendant.” Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011). In the instant case, the testimony of the mother of Victim No. 2, Defendant’s most recent victim, was relevant to the background, character, and conduct of Defendant as well as the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that Congress expressly instructed district courts to consider at sentencing. Additionally, under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, the minimum standard of reliability for evidence presented in sentencing proceedings is that the evidence has “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” United States v. Hunt, 487 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant admitted to the facts underlying his pre-charge sexual contact with Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 during his plea colloquy and also did not object to the statement of facts regarding pre-charge acts as to Victims No. 1 and 2 during the sentencing. As a result, the mother’s testimony regarding the pre-charge sexual contact with her son was sufficiently reliable to be considered by the district court during sentencing. Although the district court may not have been required to hear the testimony of the mother of Victim No. 2, the district court was within its discretion to consider the testimony of the most recent victim’s mother during sentencing. Since it is clear that the consideration of such testimony - 16 - No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights, we affirm the district court’s consideration of the mother’s testimony.3 D. Defendant’s Case Should Not Be Reassigned to a Different Judge for Resentencing. Defendant requests that we reassign this case to another judge on remand for resentencing. Defendant contends that under United States v. Gapinksi, 422 F. App’x 513 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Gapinski III”), the factors for reassignment favor reassignment in this case. Defendant asserts that the sentencing judge received information that should not have been considered—namely, the information about Victims No. 1, 2, and 3 in the PSR—and that it is unlikely that the sentencing judge would be able to put the information out of his mind and not give it excessive weight in resentencing. In support of this assertion, Defendant points to the following statements made by the sentencing judge that Defendant claims demonstrate that the judge was particularly moved by the victim-impact statements in the PSR: that the conduct described in the victim-impact statements was “nothing short of the most egregious that I’ve seen;” and “I’m just a judge on the secular court so I can’t stand in judgment of the kind of person that you are, but I do hope that you will receive whatever help is necessary that will enable you to function appropriately in society once you are released from incarceration.” Defendant argues that the combination of these statements and the sentencing judge’s exposure to improper information indicate that “there is little 3 Insofar as Defendant argues that the district court afforded improper weight to the mother’s testimony, this issue is premature. Given that the sentence was not procedurally reasonable and must be vacated and remanded for resentencing, the claim that improper weight was given to this testimony in sentencing Defendant is moot pending the resentencing. - 17 - No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner reason to think that . . . remand would cause the judge to disavow his previously expressed views about the case,” the result of which would be the appearance of unfairness. The Government argues that there is no need to reassign to another judge. It argues that the sentencing judge was within his discretion in considering the victim information contained in the PSR as information pertinent to Defendant’s character, history, and conduct. As a result, there is no improper information that the sentencing judge would have to put out of his mind in resentencing Defendant. Additionally, the Government asserts that Defendant’s reliance on Gapinski III is unfounded. In Gapinski III, this court ordered reassignment of the case to a different judge only after the case had twice been remanded to the same district judge. See United States v. Gapinski, 561 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Gapinski II”); United States v. Gapinski, 226 F. App’x 592 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Gapinski I”). The Government asserts that reassignment was only appropriate in Gapinski III because the district judge had not considered or explained his reasons for rejecting the request for a lower sentence after Gapinski I; the district judge had imposed an identical sentence after this court’s remand in Gapinski II; the record demonstrated that on remand after Gapinski II, the district judge made statements indicating that he had difficulty ignoring his previous views (“Okay. I’ve reviewed it, I’ve reconsidered it, and I’m not going to change.”); and that the record demonstrated that on remand after Gapinski II, the district judge questioned the wisdom of the substantive law this court directed him to apply. The following factors govern whether a case should be reassigned on remand: - 18 - No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously expressed views or findings, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. John B. v. Goetz, 626 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reassignment is an extraordinary power, so reassignments “are rare and should be made reluctantly.” Id. at 365. In the instant case, there is no need to reassign to a different judge for resentencing. The record does not demonstrate that the sentencing judge would have difficulty in conducting a de novo sentencing of Defendant. See United States v. Garcia-Robles, 640 F.3d 159, 168 (6th Cir. 2011). First, the information about Victims No. 1, 2, and 3, while incorrectly used to calculate the sentencing guideline range, is still admissible at the sentencing hearing as information pertinent to Defendant’s character, history, and conduct, as well as to the factors that must be considered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Second, the sentencing judge’s statements cited by Defendant are insufficient to suggest that the judge will be unable to revisit the matter with an open mind. Third, even though the sentencing judge used an incorrectly calculated sentencing range based on the PSR, the sentencing judge sentenced Defendant within what he believed the guidelines to be. Fourth, unlike the district judge in Gapinski III, the sentencing judge in this case has not been given an opportunity to correctly sentence Defendant under the correctly calculated guidelines and the judge has not shown any resistance to reconsidering the sentence on remand. Finally, since the sentencing judge is familiar with this case, it would be wasteful and duplicative to assign this case to another judge for resentencing. - 19 - No. 12-3374 United States v. Weiner Accordingly, we deny Defendant’s request for reassignment to a different judge on remand.