Opinion ID: 349561
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability of defendants for attorney's fees

Text: 63 The defendants also allege that the trial court had no legal authority to assess attorney's fees against them in their official capacities or against the funds allocated to the Sheriff's Office, because such an award would expend itself on the public treasury of Jacksonville, Florida. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 46. We find that the award could properly run against the public treasury of Jacksonville. 64 First, the legislative history shows that Congress meant to allow awards against governmental units even when the units are not named parties. The Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, then Senate Bill 2278, stated: 65 In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Federal statutes to which S. 2278 applies are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancillary and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by S. 2278 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, defendants in these cases are often State or local bodies or State or local officials. In such cases it is intended that the attorneys' fees, like other item of costs, will be collected either directly from the official, in his official capacity, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the State or local government (whether or not the agency or government is a named party ). (Footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 66 S.Rep.No.1101, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, pp. 5908, 5913. After this report was issued, the Senate twice tabled attempts to exempt state and local governments from the operation of the Act by votes of 59-28 and 52-20. 122 Cong.Rec. S16,432, 16,434 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976; id, S16,567 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1976); id, S16,656, 16,657 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1976). 67 The Report of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary on the Act, then House Bill 15460, shows a similar intention to allow the assessment of fees against public treasuries: 68 With respect to the awarding of fees to prevailing defendants, it should further be noted that governmental officials are frequently the defendants in cases brought under the statutes covered by H.R. 15460. See, e. g., Brown v. Board of Education, (1954, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873); Gautreaux v. Hills, (1976, 425 U.S. 284, 96 S.Ct. 1538, 47 L.Ed.2d 792); O'Connor v. Donaldson, (1975, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396). Such governmental entities and officials have substantial resources available to them through funds in the common treasury, including the taxes paid by the plaintiffs themselves. Applying the same standard of recovery to such defendants would further widen the gap between citizens and government officials and would exacerbate the inequality of litigating strength. The greater resources available to governments provide an ample base from which fees can be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in suits against governmental officials or entities. 69 H.R.Rep.No.1558, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1976) (footnote omitted). 70 Second, the defendants argue that Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 5 Cir. 1976 (en banc), 528 F.2d 499, prevents an award of attorney's fees against a governmental unit because a governmental unit cannot be sued for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even indirectly. Although section 1983 provides no cause of action against local governments because they are not persons within the meaning of that statute, Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, it creates no immunity for them. Congress was free to pass another statute without the restrictive language of § 1983. Because we find that the intention of Congress in passing the 1976 Act was to allow fee awards against local governments, Muzquiz and Monroe do not control. 71 Third, this Court has already held that a court may assess attorney's fees under the Act against a state governmental unit, because of the Supreme Court's holding in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 1976, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614, that Congress may authorize awards of damages and fees against a state under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment in spite of the eleventh amendment. Rainey v. Jackson State College, 5 Cir. 1977, 551 F.2d 672. We recognize that the state's eleventh amendment immunity is different in nature from the omission of lesser governmental bodies in § 1983. It would be anomalous, however, to hold that while state governments and state entities may be compelled to pay fees under the Act, local governments and their agencies cannot. Although a constitutional amendment was required to limit the eleventh amendment's immunity, 427 U.S. at 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, only a statutory authorization is necessary to fill the gap in § 1983 and allow the recovery of money from a local government. See, e. g., 20 U.S.C. § 1617, of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, construed in Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 1974, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (allowing an award of attorney's fees against a municipal entity). 72 Fourth, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs' attorney may not receive an award because he is court appointed. Pre-Act cases denied attorney's fees to court-appointed counsel. Dragon v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 414 F.2d 228 (per curiam); Gardner v. Joyce, 5 Cir. 1973, 482 F.2d 283 (per curiam). Those cases, however, were based on lack of judicial authority to order attorney's fees. Now that the Act gives trial courts discretion to award attorney's fees we see no reason to discriminate against court-appointed lawyers. Cf. Armstrong v. O'Connell, E.D.Wis.1976, 416 F.Supp. 1325, 1342-43 (allowing attorney's fees to appointed counsel under20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Aid Act). Compare Newman v. Alabama, 5 Cir. 1975 (en banc), 522 F.2d 71, 74 (per curiam) (court-appointed counsel) with Gates v. Collier, 5 Cir. 1975 (en banc), 522 F.2d 81 (per curiam) (no mention of appointment). To allow fees to court-appointed counsel will encourage the vindication of civil rights which is the purpose of the Act, and court-appointed counsel should be no more expensive than hired attorneys. We hold that court-appointed counsel may be awarded fees under the Act. 28 On remand, the district court should assess additional attorney's fees for services performed after April 30, 1975, including the services performed for this appeal. See Gates v. Collier, 5 Cir., 1977, 559 F.2d 241 at 243.