Opinion ID: 441742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: applicability of the kidnap statute

Text: 77 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201 requires that a kidnapping be for ransom or reward or otherwise. Appellant Welden claims that the statute does not apply to the Government's case against him. In Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936), the Supreme Court held that Congress enacted the kidnapping statute to prevent the transportation in interstate commerce of persons who were unlawfully restrained for the purpose of the captor's securing some benefit to himself. Id. at 128, 56 S.Ct. at 397. The court examined the legislative history of the statute and noted that two years after its initial enactment Congress added the words or otherwise for the express purpose of extending the Act to persons who have been kidnapped and held, not only for reward, but for any other reason .... Id. (quoting H.Rep. No. 1457, 73rd Cong.2d Sess.). 78 The statute broadly prohibits the interstate transportation of a person against his will if the captor hopes to obtain any benefit to himself from the abduction. The evidence supports the district court's conclusion that Welden participated in the kidnapping to attain some benefit to himself. Callaway had just witnessed the murder of her boyfriend and therefore was a potential witness against the killers. Taking a person away from her home for the purpose of silencing her as a potential witness comes within the or otherwise proviso of the kidnapping statute. Hence Welden's claim must fail. 79