Opinion ID: 2626015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: because the county failed to transmit a record, the district court improperly reached the merits of the citizens' claims

Text: ¶ 23 The Citizens argue that the district court lacks jurisdiction to review the Council's action because the Council's approval of Ordinance 454 was administrative in nature and because Grand County failed to transmit a record of the proceedings before the Council as required by statute. Alternatively, the Citizens contend that, if we find that Ordinance 454 was legislative in nature, the Council's decision should be reversed for failure to satisfy numerous technical statutory requirements. ¶ 24 Cloudrock responds by asserting that the district court correctly found that Ordinance 454 was legislative in nature. And, given that CLUDMA requires a reviewing court to uphold any land use decision when it is reasonably debatable that the decision serves a legitimate land use purpose, [17] Cloudrock argues that the district court correctly concluded that it could uphold the Council's decision without a transmitted record of the proceedings below. Finally, Cloudrock argues that, even if Grand County was obligated to transmit a record to the district court, its failure to do so does not justify reversal because the Citizens have failed to show how they were prejudiced by the lack of a transmitted record. ¶ 25 Because we determine that the County's failure to transmit a record prevented review by the district court, we do not reach the merits of the parties' arguments regarding whether Ordinance 454 was legislative in nature and whether the Council erred in approving it. Although we do not conclude that the lack of a record divests the district court of jurisdiction over the Citizens' appeal, we determine that the transmission of a recordwhen one existsis a prerequisite to review of any land use decision. We further hold that the County's acknowledged failure to transmit the record to the district court may not be excused based upon a harmless error analysis. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for transmission of the record and resolution of the Citizens' challenge on its merits.
¶ 26 The Citizens first argue that the district court should have required the County to transmit the record of the proceedings below. The district court found that Ordinance 454 was a legislative decision, which it was required to uphold so long as it is reasonably debatable that the decision ... promotes the purposes of [CLUDMA]. [18] In light of this finding, the court concluded that it did not have to review a record to determine whether there is no basis for the [Council's] decision. ¶ 27 The Citizens contend that there is nothing in the plain language of CLUDMA that excepts legislative land use decisions from the general requirement that a record be provided to the reviewing court. CLUDMA states that [t]he land use authority ... shall transmit to the reviewing court the record of its proceedings. [19] Accordingly, the Citizens assert that in every case where a record exists that may be transmitted, CLUDMA requires its transmission to the reviewing court. ¶ 28 Cloudrock argues that the district court correctly concluded that it did not require a record to review the Council's decision because (1) CLUDMA does not expressly require a record when reviewing a legislative land use decision; (2) a record is not required given the highly deferential standard of reviewwhether it is reasonably debatable that the decision ... promotes the purposes of [CLUDMA] [20] applicable to legislative land use decisions; and (3) the provision of CLUDMA authorizing a court to call witnesses and take evidence when there is no record available [21] shows that the legislature did not contemplate that transmission and review of a record would be required in all cases. ¶ 29 We are persuaded by the Citizens' position. The language of CLUDMA clearly requires that a record shall be transmitted to the reviewing court and contains no exceptions. [22] We find unpersuasive Cloudrock's contention to the contrary, which rests on its own conception of the usefulness of a record in reviewing legislative land use decisions and tenuous inferences it draws from related statutory provisions. ¶ 30 Although Cloudrock may be correct that review of a legislative land use decision under the reasonably debatable standard may not always require resort to a record, there are times in which a record may be useful even under such a deferential standard. For example, when the plain text of a legislative land use decision is ambiguous as to the decision's effect, the record may be necessary to clarify legislative intent and determine the true nature of the enactment. [23] And the assessment of the actual effect of the decision is certainly a threshold determination that must precede the assessment of whether it is reasonably debatable that the decision serves a legitimate land use purpose. ¶ 31 Additionally, a record is clearly helpful with respect to the second ground for invalidating a legislative land use decisionthat the decision is otherwise illegal. [24] A land use decision is illegal when it violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made. [25] Whether there has been compliance with specific procedural statutory requirements, such as the provision of adequate notice or certain documents, would require a record upon which the district court could base factual determinations. ¶ 32 Finally, the fact that CLUDMA may provide for alternative means of obtaining evidence when a record of a legislative decision is unavailable does not, as Cloudrock suggests, support the conclusion that no record is required for review. The existence of language in Utah Code section 17-27a-801(8)(b) providing that a court may receive evidence or call witnesses in the event that no record exists [26] does not speak to the question of what must be done when a record does exist. It is section 17-27a-801(7) that speaks to this question, which states only that [t]he land use authority, or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders and, if available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings. [27] When statutory language is clear, there is no need for us to look further to determine legislative intent. [28] We find the statute's plain language to be conclusive on this point and hold that CLUDMA requires transmission of a record to the reviewing court in all caseslegislative or administrativewhere a record exists. ¶ 33 Cloudrock acknowledges that the County did not transmit a record of the proceedings before the Council to the district court. In proceeding to the merits of the Citizens' challenge without a transmitted record, the district court erred. We now consider Cloudrock's argument that the district court's error does not justify reversing its grant of summary judgment.
¶ 34 Cloudrock argues that, even if the district court erred by reaching the merits of the Citizens' claims without a transmitted record, the Citizens are not entitled to relief on this ground because they have failed to establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that the district court's decision would have been different had a record been transmitted by the County. Cloudrock is correct in noting that, under CLUDMA, land use decisions are presumed valid, [29] and the party challenging the decision bears the burden of proving that the land use authority erred. [30] We have also stated in the past that the mere fact that a land use decision violates a provision of CLUDMA does not justify reversing the decision unless the violation was prejudicial. [31] And finally, we have repeatedly declined, in the nonadministrative appellate context, to presume prejudice or reversible error based on the absence of a complete record. [32] Instead, when a record is so incomplete that it renders effective review of a lower court's action impossible, we have simply declined to disturb the status quo. [33] ¶ 35 But a district court's review of a county land use decision presents a different case. First, the legislature has specifically placed the burden of transmitting a record on the County. [34] Second, the record of a land use decision is in the custody of the opposing partythe land use authority, who is also the appellee. And third, CLUDMA's provisions expressly limit the reviewing court to considering evidence in the record when reviewing the challenged decision. [35] Taken together, these three realities evidence a legislative intent that review of a land use decision will involve a record and that the party challenging the decision will not bear the burden of obtaining and presenting that record to the court. ¶ 36 We would fail in our duty to give effect to this legislative directive if we found that a land use authority's duty to provide a record of proceedings to the reviewing court could only be enforced upon a showing of prejudice by the appealing party. A party required to prove prejudice as a prerequisite for relief bears the burden of showing that an error was so substantial that there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the result would have been different. [36] When the alleged error is the failure to transmit a complete record, or, as in this case, the failure to transmit any record at all, the party can only show prejudice by obtaining and presenting the absent record to the court. This is directly contrary to the legislature's express instruction on how this burden is to be allocated in appeals of land use decisions. ¶ 37 Accordingly, we hold that the statutory provision requiring a land use authority to transmit a record of proceedings below to the reviewing court may be enforced simply upon a showing that the complete record has not been transmitted. And if a land use authority refuses to provide a complete record after a court's express direction to do so, the reviewing court should grant appropriate relief to the appealing party. In an extreme case, such relief may include ruling in favor of the appealing party on the merits of its claims. [37] ¶ 38 In this case, it is undisputed that the County did not transmit a record of the proceedings before it to the district court. [38] We remand this case back to the district court with the instruction that the County be ordered to transmit the record of proceedings to the district court, which will then proceed to the merits of the Citizens' claims in light of the transmitted record.