Opinion ID: 2508099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Production of Dr. Oshrin's Report

Text: During the early stages of the criminal proceeding and at defense counsel's request, Dr. Oshrin, a psychiatrist, performed a psychiatric examination of defendant. In addition to reviewing defendant's record, Dr. Oshrin interviewed defendant on November 23, 1990. He then produced a report, dated November 24, 1990, which he gave to defense counsel. The prosecutor moved for discovery of defense materials relating to the penalty phase, pursuant to section 1054.3. The trial court granted the discovery motion. Defendant contends that the trial court's discovery order was improper because it required him to divulge information about witnesses whom the defense did not intend to call at trial. Specifically, he complains that, even though he did not intend to call Dr. Oshrin as a witness during the penalty phase, the discovery order improperly allowed the prosecution access to Dr. Oshrin's report containing privileged defense information. He alleges that the prosecution's obtaining that report violated the attorney work-product doctrine, his attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges, and his privilege against self-incrimination. However, no factual basis supports defendant's claim. First, contrary to defendant's assertion, the discovery order did not require the defense to produce any information about witnesses whom the defense did not intend to call at trial. The prosecution requested: (1) the names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, who[m] counsel or defendant intends to call as witnesses at trial ; (2) any relevant written or recorded statements of [those] persons ... and/or reports of the statements of such persons, or videotapes; and (3) any reports or statements of experts made in connection with this case, including, but not limited to, the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the defendant or counsel intend to offer as evidence at the trial of this case. [11] Defense counsel represented that the defense had not yet decided which expert witnesses it planned to call during the penalty phase. The trial court granted the prosecution's motion with the express caveat that the defense need not reveal the identity of and information about any medical expert until it had actually decided to call the particular witness. The court stated that the defense could reveal the identity of its expert witness on the very morning it planned to call the expert, but if that occurred, the prosecution would be entitled to a continuance. Thus, the record does not support defendant's claim that the court made a blanket discovery order that included all expert reports. Second, contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecution's acquisition of Dr. Oshrin's report did not result from the discovery order. In other words, the prosecution did not obtain the report through the enforcement of the discovery order. Instead, defendant voluntarily produced Dr. Oshrin's report during the recess between the direct and cross-examinations of Dr. Crinella at the guilt phase. During direct examination, Dr. Crinella testified that he had considered various reports, including Dr. Oshrin's November 24, 1990, report, in evaluating defendant and forming his opinions regarding defendant's mental state. Apparently, up until that point, the prosecutor had been unaware of Dr. Oshrin's evaluation or report. During the recess, defense counsel provided the prosecutor a copy of Dr. Oshrin's full report. Without objection, the prosecutor used the report to cross-examine Dr. Crinella. During cross-examination, Dr. Crinella acknowledged that, although he had concluded that defendant showed signs of brain damage, schizophrenia, and borderline personality disorder, Dr. Oshrin had reached a different diagnosis. Dr. Oshrin did not find that defendant suffered from any organic problems, but instead concluded that he probably had an antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Crinella conceded that defendant's history was consistent with that disorder. We presume that defense counsel provided Dr. Oshrin's report because he knew that the prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine Dr. Crinella about its contents. (See Evid.Code, §§ 721, subd. (a), 1016, subd. (a); People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 151, 255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32; People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 241, 246 Cal.Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669 [attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine inapplicable to matters relied on or considered in the formation of defense expert witness's opinion]; People v. Campos (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 304, 308, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 113; Woods v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 178, 186, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 182.) In any event, by voluntarily turning over the report and failing to object to the prosecutor's using it during cross-examination, defendant waived any claim that the production and use of the report violated the attorney work product doctrine, the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges, and the privilege against self-incrimination. (Evid. Code, § 912; People v. Poulin (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 54, 64, 103 Cal.Rptr. 623.) In sum, the trial court did not order the disclosure of the names and reports of all experts who had been retained by defendant, regardless of their status as intended witnesses, nor did the discovery order require the defense to give the prosecution Dr. Oshrin's report. Thus, defendant's claim of error must fail. Dr. Oshrin  Prosecution Rebuttal Witness During the penalty phase, the defense called Drs. Crinella and Fischer as expert witnesses and marked Dr. Oshrin's report as an exhibit for identification. Both doctors testified that they had read and considered Dr. Oshrin's full report and had relied on portions of it in forming their opinions. Dr. Crinella discussed and disclosed significant portions of Dr. Oshrin's report during his testimony, including some of defendant's statements to Dr. Oshrin. Dr. Crinella also read two paragraphs of the report into the record, and defense counsel provided the jury with copies of those two paragraphs during the doctor's direct examination. Defense counsel marked the full report as an exhibit for identification. Without objection, the prosecutor used the full report in cross-examining both doctors. Over defendant's objection, the trial court later permitted the prosecutor to call Dr. Oshrin as a rebuttal witness. After both parties rested, the trial court, on defendant's motion, admitted Dr. Oshrin's full report into evidence. Defendant claims that the trial court, in allowing the prosecutor to call Dr. Oshrin as a rebuttal witness, violated his attorney-client and work-product privileges and his United States Constitution Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant argues that the substantive content of Dr. Oshrin's report, including the communications between him and the doctor, was privileged information that could only be waived if the defense called Dr. Oshrin as a witness. At most, the prosecutor could cross-examine Dr. Crinella only on the parts of the report on which he relied in forming his opinions, and with which he presumably agreed. We reject the claim. Defendant has forfeited his appellate claim because he asserted only his psychotherapist-patient privilege at trial. Defendant objected to Dr. Oshrin's testimony on the ground that the court had appointed the doctor as a confidential mental health expert to advise defense counsel on possible mental defenses under Evidence Code section 1017. [12] The prosecutor argued that Drs. Crinella and Fischer had used Dr. Oshrin's report in forming their opinions and that defendant, by placing his mental state in issue at the guilt and penalty phases of trial, had waived his psychotherapist-patient privilege. Defense counsel responded that placing defendant's mental state in issue did not waive the confidentiality accorded to appointments under Evidence Code section 1017. Counsel contended that, although the experts had read and considered Dr. Oshrin's full report, they only adopted and relied on two paragraphs, which had been read to the jury; thus, defendant had only waived confidentiality as to those two paragraphs. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to call Dr. Oshrin as a rebuttal witness. It ruled that, because defendant placed his mental or emotional condition in issue, and because several defense mental health experts considered or relied on Dr. Oshrin's report, defendant had waived his section 1017 psychotherapist-patient privilege under Evidence Code section 912. Thus, defendant cannot belatedly claim on appeal that the trial court's ruling violated his attorney-client, or Fifth Amendment privileges or the attorney work-product doctrine. (Evid.Code, § 912, subd. (a); People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 626, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127; Woods v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 187, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 182; People v. Poulin, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at p. 64, 103 Cal.Rptr. 623.) In any event, defendant's claim lacks merit. Defendant waived any protections that the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine, and the privilege against self-incrimination afforded him regarding all matters that Drs. Crinella and Fischer considered or on which they relied, including Dr. Oshrin's report. (See People v. Coleman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 151-152, 255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32; People v. Milner, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 241, 246 Cal.Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669; see also Evid.Code, §§ 721, subd. (a), 912, subd. (a).) Moreover, by placing his mental state in issue, defendant waived his psychotherapist-patient privilege (which he concedes he waived) and his privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 1005, 1007-1008, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099; People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 923, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.) Because defendant had waived these privileges in regard to Dr. Oshrin's report, the prosecutor was free to call Dr. Oshrin as a rebuttal witness and to question him about that report. (Evid.Code, § 804, subd. (a); Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 851, 862, 236 Cal.Rptr. 778, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1272, fn. 15, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 302, 95 P.3d 523 [when expert testifies that opinion based in whole or in part on another's opinions, other person may be called as rebuttal witness].) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in permitting Dr. Oshrin to testify as a prosecution rebuttal witness.