Opinion ID: 771740
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Missing SIMMS Chips

Text: 11 Lexmark's only proof of wrong-doing is the surveillance tape of the March theft. Mr. Snowden concedes that his identification in the video is sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Appellee Br. at 8. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Lexmark, we will concede that there may be a genuine factual dispute about whether the missing chips were taken from an interstate shipment as required by 18 U.S.C. § 659. Thus, for purposes of this summary judgment motion, Lexmark may properly claim the March theft as a RICO predicate act that implicates Mr. Snowden. 12 The same cannot be said for the other alleged theft. There is simply no evidence that Mr. Snowden stole Lexmark chips in January 1996. In fact, there is no evidence that anyone stole the chips. What Lexmark calls an unexplained shortage might just as well have been misplaced or misdelivered inventory. Appellants have not shown otherwise, instead speculating: A logical inference is that the same persons who stole the SIMMS in March were also responsible for the similar theft from the same location in January. Appellant Br. at 11. This wholly unsubstantiated claim cannot serve as a predicate act, even at this stage in the proceedings. To withstand a defense motion for summary judgment,[the plaintiff] must adduce some concrete evidence on which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor. Frank v. D'Ambrosi, 4 F.3d 1378, 1384 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment against a RICO plaintiff who offered only wild and unsupported statements to support his claim) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986)).