Opinion ID: 574278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Antitrust Claims

Text: 28 A number of appellant's antitrust claims may be ripe for judicial review. In order to make out a claim for damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, a party must be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988); see, e.g., Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319, 1321 (5th Cir.1985) ([t]o maintain an action for treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15, plaintiffs must allege and prove injury to their business or property proximately caused by a violation of the Sherman Act); Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1068 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102, 106 S.Ct. 884, 88 L.Ed.2d 919 (1986) (proof of violation of Sherman Act standing alone does not establish civil liability for damages under § 4 of Clayton Act; there must be proof of injury to business or property); Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 735 F.2d 577, 586 (D.C.Cir.1984) (assuming that particular practice violates § 2 of Sherman Act, plaintiff still has to prove that practice caused economic injury). 29 Appellant alleges that appellees have conspired to preclude his membership in the Johns Hopkins Health Plan and United Health Services. If proven, such a conspiracy is arguably forbidden by the antitrust laws. Moreover, it may have caused, and/or continues to cause, injury to appellant's practice. 30 Appellant also alleges that appellees interfered with his application for reappointment to the Courtesy Staff at the Columbia Hospital for Women Medical Center. Again, if indeed appellees combined and conspired to interfere with or delay appellant's reappointment to the Courtesy Staff at Columbia Hospital for anticompetitive reasons, this too would arguably run afoul of the antitrust laws. Any resulting suspension of appellant's membership and privileges at that facility could have caused economic injury to appellant's practice. Thus, these two claims, as well as several of appellant's other antitrust claims, 9 would appear to allege sufficient injury to qualify for damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act 10 without regard to whether or not appellant was terminated from Greater Southeast. 31 Appellees argue, however, that even if appellant has suffered some form of legally cognizable injury from these alleged practices, prudential considerations warrant deferring their judicial consideration until the Hospital hearing process has been completed. Brief for Appellees at 23. Prudential considerations do on occasion justify courts in postponing review of an administrative agency's actions despite the presence of an Article III case or controversy. Prudential aspects of the ripeness inquiry focus on whether there is an inherent lack of fitness for judicial review at this juncture and include  'the agency's interest in crystallizing its policy before that policy is subject to judicial review, [t]he court's interest in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in deciding issues in a concrete setting, and the petitioner's interests in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action.'  Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 845 F.2d 1088, 1093 (D.C.Cir.1988) (quoting Better Government Ass'n v. Department of State, 780 F.2d 86, 92 (D.C.Cir.1986)). 32 Even assuming that the same ripeness considerations apply outside of the agency context, they do not point towards a prudential deferral in this case. These allegedly illegal acts have already been completed. Appellees either conspired to exclude appellant from the Johns Hopkins Plan and United Health Services and to interfere with his reappointment to the Courtesy Staff at Columbia Hospital or they did not. He either suffered injury from such acts or he did not. No amount of time will further crystallize appellees' policy in either regard, nor will deferral permit the development of a more concrete factual setting. There is no risk of unnecessary adjudication because the alleged injuries will survive, in the form of appellant's claims for damages, regardless of whether appellant is or is not ultimately restored to full membership and privileges at Greater Southeast. 33 We find, then, no prudential reason to defer consideration of appellant's antitrust claims that do not depend on termination. 34