Opinion ID: 1949728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Should We Simply Impose Identical Discipline?

Text: In Zilberberg, where the record failed to affirmatively show that a greater sanction [was] warranted, we declined to remand, but simply imposed identical reciprocal discipline. 612 A.2d at 835-36. At the present juncture, we are not willing to forego a remand in this case because the record raises legitimate reasons for further investigation of respondent's fitness to practice law. Moreover, respondent has resisted identical discipline (a five-year suspension) by invoking all five exceptions in Rule XI, § 11(c). [9] See note 2, supra. Although we reject some of these arguments, others cause us concern, and we will ask the Board to consider them anew. Respondent has not established that he was denied due process in Virginia. He had notice and an opportunity to be heard. In fact, he testified in the Circuit Court proceedings. The Supreme Court of Virginia did not deny him due process by treating the ruling on appeal as presumptively correct, or by requiring respondent to comply with its rules for filing the record. These principles are well-established in Virginia, see, e.g., Morrissey v. Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 472, 538 S.E.2d 677, 678 (2000); El-Amin v. Virginia State Bar, 257 Va. 608, 514 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1999); Va. S.Ct. R. 5:11, and we apply similar rules in our own review. See, e.g., Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., Inc., 453 A.2d 110, 111 (D.C.1982) (A judgment of any trial court is presumed to be valid.... A losing party who notes an appeal from such a judgment bears the burden of convincing the appellate court that the trial court erred.... In meeting that burden, it is appellant's duty to present this court with a record sufficient to show affirmatively that error occurred. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001) (When the case was tried without a jury, the court [of appeals] may review both as to the facts and the law, but the judgment may not be set aside except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.). We also agree with the Board that collateral estoppel precludes us from reconsidering respondent's jurisdictional and standing arguments. See In re Bridges, 805 A.2d 233, 234 (D.C.2002). Respondent's allegations of bias are completely unsupported. See In re Banks, 805 A.2d 990, 1003 (D.C.2002); Faulkenstein v. District of Columbia Bd. of Medicine, 727 A.2d 302, 308 (D.C.1999). The burden of proof on an attorney who would seek to establish the `infirmity of proof' exception by the requisite clear and convincing evidence is a heavy one. Bridges, 805 A.2d at 235. This exception is not an invitation to the attorney to relitigate in the District of Columbia the adverse findings of another court in a procedurally fair proceeding. Id. Respondent has not carried his burden here. See id. Nor has he established that a grave injustice would result if the same discipline were imposed by this court. See, e.g., In re Beattie, 930 A.2d 972, 979 (D.C.2007); In re Day, 717 A.2d 883, 890 (D.C.1998). Nevertheless, both the paucity and the substance of the factual findings in the Virginia court's opinion give us substantial concern. When we take those findings at face value, we confront a serious question whether they justify a five-year suspension from the practice of lawin other words, whether [t]he misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in the District of Columbia. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(4). Indeed, it is not clear that some of that conduct would constitute misconduct in the District of Columbia. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(5). For example, the Circuit Court found that respondent had been charged in Virginia with being drunk in public [and] for driving while intoxicated.... But the Virginia findings do not tell us the circumstances surrounding those charges or whether respondent was found guilty. The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957). Similarly, a charge is not a conviction. We recognize that a conviction is not a prerequisite to a finding that a lawyer has violated Rule 8.4, see In re Slattery, 767 A.2d 203, 207 (D.C. 2001), but in this case the Virginia Circuit Court did not find that the underlying conduct had in fact occurred. Respondent represents, without contradiction, that his arrests occurred in 1995 and 1996, so the remoteness of these events may bear upon the question of whether identical discipline is appropriate. He also states in his brief that he pled not guilty and was fined $25.00 for being drunk in public and that he pled not guilty and was fined $250.00 for driving while intoxicated. Bar Counsel asks us to infer from these obliquely-worded statements that respondent must have been found guilty of these alcohol-related offenses. Such inferences might be reasonable, but they would not be based upon the findings of the Virginia court. This uncertainty about whether respondent was convicted or not should be easy to resolve on remand. Our cases involving discipline for intoxication-related offenses have involved either more modest sanctions or conduct more severe than respondent's. In In re Reynolds, 763 A.2d 713 (D.C.2000), for example, the respondent had been convicted (in Virginia) of two counts of driving while intoxicated, one count of hit and run, and one count of eluding a police officer. Id. at 714. We noted that he had four prior convictions for DWI, one of which violated the terms of court-ordered probation. Id. He also had made false statements to probation officers and to the Hearing Committee. Id. Nevertheless, we accepted a recommendation (to which no exceptions were filed) that he be suspended for six months and be required to demonstrate fitness as a condition of reinstatement. Id. at 715. In In re Murtaugh, BDN 45-03 (Inf.Adm. Dec. 1, 2003), Bar Counsel issued an informal admonition for, among other things, a violation of Rule 8.4(b) where the underlying conduct consisted of four alcohol-related arrests and three alcohol-related convictions. By contrast, we disbarred a lawyer (but stayed imposition of that sanction in favor of five years of probation) in In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321, 328 (D.C.1987). The lawyer's twenty-four violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility included two arrests for drunk driving and another alcohol-related accident, but also frequent missed or late court appearances, over 100 blackouts, no financial record-keeping system, failure to file Criminal Justice Act vouchers, commingling and personal use of client funds, a prior reprimand and censure by the District of Columbia Bar, and the complete domination of his life by alcohol. Id. at 324. As recited above, the Virginia court did describe the basis for the obstruction of justice charge. This conduct certainly was foolhardy as well as illegal, and it may reflect adversely upon respondent's fitness as a lawyer, but it does not call his honesty or trustworthiness into question to the same extent that an attempt to obstruct justice by bribing a juror or a witness would do. See In re Wilkins, 649 A.2d 557 (D.C.1994) (Bar Counsel did not carry burden of showing that conviction for misdemeanor offense of obstructing justice in Virginia involved moral turpitude; six-month suspension imposed). The abbreviated findings about respondent's litigating history do not add compelling support for the proposed sanction. The Circuit Court found that respondent has a long history of filing civil actions against numerous and various defendants on grounds that are, at best, of questionable merit. Perhaps the court was attempting to be kind, but it is fair to say that much litigation is of questionable merit. Although it may have thought so, the court did not say that the civil actions were frivolous, malicious, or filed for purposes of harassment. Nor did it find that respondent had violated Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 (related to frivolous claims) or 3.4(j) (related to filing a suit that would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another). Cf. In re Shieh, 738 A.2d 814, 819 (D.C.1999) (Undeterred by legal sanctions and even criminal contempt, [respondent] filed suit after suit, motion after frivolous motion, and appeal after frivolous appeal ... solely `to harass his opponents....'; reciprocal discipline of disbarment imposed). On the other hand, the fact that a federal judge enjoined respondent from filing additional complaints without leave of court certainly is some indication that the suits were frivolous and harassing in nature. We recognize that the whole often is greater than the sum of its parts, but the findings of the Virginia Circuit Court leave us with significant questions about the extent of respondent's misconduct and whether a five-year suspension would be imposed in original proceedings here. To borrow the words of a colleague, we do not think that the presumption in favor of reciprocal discipline is so compelling that it applies even where the other jurisdiction's proceedings leave significant doubt as to the extent of the attorney's wrongful conduct. Zilberberg, 612 A.2d at 836 (Steadman, J., dissenting from a decision not to remand for further factual inquiry). An amplified report from the Board will greatly assist us in resolving these issues. In sum, we direct the Board to take a closer look at whether the conduct established in the Virginia proceedings constitutes misconduct in the District of Columbia and whether substantially different discipline is warranted. The proceedings in Montana do not provide a basis for reciprocal discipline. Any recommendation of greater discipline must be clearly supported by the record. Of course, in accordance with our previous order, the Board retains the option of proceeding de novo. This matter is remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [10] So ordered.