Opinion ID: 1898079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Use of Hearsay Statements to Cross-examine Defense Experts

Text: Defendant argues that the prosecutor's improper reliance on hearsay evidence to cross-examine defense experts exposed the jury to inadmissible and prejudicial information that deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and to confront adverse witnesses. U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, and XIV; N.J. Const. of 1947 art. I, paras. 1 and 10. Defendant also asserts that the improper cross-examination injected unreliable information into his capital-sentencing proceeding in violation of the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; N.J. Const. of 1947 art. I, para. 12. During the penalty phase of defendant's trial, the defense presented two psychiatric experts, Dr. Seymour Kuvin and Dr. A.J. Visceglia. While cross-examining those witnesses, the prosecutor attacked their credibility by reference to documents on which they had not relied. We addressed a similar challenge in Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 499-501, 548 A. 2d 1058. In Rose, the prosecutor questioned the defendant's experts about details of his record in high school, the army, and in jail. Id. at 499, 548 A. 2d 1058. Those records, however, had not been admitted into evidence or relied on by defendant's experts. We held that those questions were improper because they were unrelated to the experts' opinions or to the material on which the experts had relied. Also, the questions were not based on evidence in the record, and the prosecutor made no proffer that he could prove the underlying events. Id. at 500, 548 A. 2d 1058. Here, the prosecutor committed a similar error. In response to the prosecutor's cross-examination, Dr. Kuvin stated that he had not seen defendant's rap sheet, which had not been admitted into evidence. Nonetheless, the prosecutor persisted in cross-examining Dr. Kuvin about defendant's conduct while on parole as evidenced by that document: Q. And you noted in your report, I believe, that he [defendant] had approximately ten juvenile dispositions, convictions for crimes. Is that correct? A. So he said, yes. I didn't have his rap sheet. Q. You didn't have his rap sheet? A. Right. Q. You don't know about his convictions for breaking and entering and larceny and things of that sort? A. All I know is he had ten offenses.         Q. And his adult record, you are aware of his adult record, besides the conviction for the murder, you are aware he was convicted also in 1981 of armed robbery. You are aware of that, are you not? A. I know he's had several charges and several convictions. I know most of them are robberies. I never saw his rap sheet, as I say. I know it is not a savory record.         Q. Are you aware that [the] robbery incident happened in March of 1981 and he had only been paroled in May of 1981 for a murder conviction? A. No, I'm not aware of that.         Q. And are you aware that he was paroled on the armed robbery charge in 1985 and a short time after that murdered Arlene Connors? A. I don't know the circumstances, you know, the parole or whatever.         Q. Now do you also know about that time that he committed the armed robbery in 1981 while he was on parole for the murder that  [Emphasis added.] Defense counsel's objection at that point was overruled. Although the trial court correctly concluded that evidence of defendant's prior convictions would be admissible to impeach the credibility of defense witnesses, Evid.R. 47, the court specifically limited the prosecution to use of the fact of such convictions. Evid.R. 4. The prosecution exceeded that limitation by referring to parole documents that had not been reviewed by Dr. Kuvin and that were not admitted into evidence. Once the witness testified that he had not relied on defendant's rap sheet in forming his opinion, the prosecutor should not have continued questioning him about defendant's conduct while on parole. The prosecutor was equally persistent concerning medical reports from other physicians that Dr. Kuvin likewise had not reviewed: Q.    Now, those psychiatric opinions that I asked you about, which found that he's manipulative and that he lies to feign mental illness when he gets in trouble, you are aware of them, are you not? A. I'm aware of them. I don't agree. Q. Let's go over them a little bit. Are you aware of Doctor Bird's evaluation of Mr. Pennington? A. Which one is that? Q. Doctor Bird? A. Wait a minute. Q. The clinical psychiatrist from New Jersey State Prison who evaluated him in 1975? A. Where is it? What time? Q. 1975. A. No, I don't have that one.         Q. Okay. Let's go over this report a little bit, Doctor.    In talking with him today, this is entirely all manipulation. He acted up in order to go to the Vroom Building because he was told he could escape from there. He did escape from the mental hospital in North Jersey after being a month in that institution. That's what Doctor Bird said. Is that correct? A. Yes.         Q. Doctor, once again, he may be a paranoid inadequate antisocial individual, and in fact, you have indicated he was a paranoid inadequate antisocial individual? A. I also said he was paranoid and inadequate, yes. Q. Absolutely. There is no question about that. Certainly, he seems to be able to manipulate. That's what it says in the report. Is that correct? A. It does. Q. He plans here to work in the law library whereby he can work on his case. He does seem to have that type of personality and I think he's going to be a problem within the institution. It says it there. Isn't that correct? A. It does. Q. That's Doctor Bird's opinion as a clinical psychologist? A. Yes, that is. Q. You've had a chance to look over that? A. I haven't seen that one particularly, but I've had a chance to see the others. Q. In fact, he was a problem within the institution, wasn't he? A. I don't know. Q. Did you take a look at his prison records? A. No. [Emphasis added.] Although defense counsel did not object, the trial court warned the prosecutor that his questioning was becoming inappropriate: Now, I do not want a parade of other psychiatric reports that this Doctor either hasn't read or doesn't treat as part of his conclusions in his reports here. I've allowed you to go partway into this. I think that's more than far enough. Now, if there are other psychiatric reports that this doctor considered, and on which he based his report, I can see that. But otherwise, I don't know why, if you want Doctor Bird's opinions in here, that Doctor Bird shouldn't be here and be subject to cross-examination just like any other psychiatrist. The trial court then opened the next day's proceedings with a lengthy jury instruction limiting the uses to which the doctor's reports could be put: During the cross examination of Doctor Kuvin, there were references to reports of other doctors, questions as to whether the doctor had considered these reports or not considered those reports and also references to certain things which it was stated that Mr. Pennington had done or had not done in the past. Now, all of that was admitted only as solely for the  for whatever effect it may have on your evaluation of Doctor Kuvin's testimony. It was cross examination of Dr. Kuvin. The only significance it has is whatever significance you give it as it affects Doctor Kuvin's testimony; that is, for example, there were references to a report of a Doctor Bird. Doctor Bird's report is not evidence in this case of anything of a significant issue in the case other than the significance of whether or not Doctor Kuvin considered it, whether you think that matters or not, whatever affect you give to Doctor Kuvin's report as a result of Doctor Bird's report. Let me see if I can simplify that a little bit. The only significance of any of these reports is whatever effect they may have on Doctor Kuvin's report. They have significance only to that extent and not as independent evidence of anything. Doctor Bird's report, as one example, is not evidence in the case. Nothing that was said in that report is evidence in the case. The only significance they have is whatever effect they may have on Doctor Kuvin's report, on Doctor Kuvin's considering any of these materials or not considering them. I just use Doctor Bird as an example. There were other references to other reports and other acts. None of that is independent evidence of anything and it was admitted only and solely for whatever significance it may have as it affects Doctor Kuvin's report and your evaluation of Doctor Kuvin's report. That will also be true today, incidentally, if we have another doctor testifying and if he should be cross examined about other doctors' reports and did he consider this or did he consider that, the significance of all of those questions are only and limited to whatever weight they may have on that doctor's testimony. They are not independent evidence of any of the findings that it contains. With the trial court's acquiescence, the prosecutor then used similar inadmissible hearsay in his questioning of Dr. Visceglia, the defense's second expert witness. Dr. Visceglia testified on direct examination that in 1984 he had recommended to the parole board at the New Jersey State Prison at Leesburg, where defendant was incarcerated at the time, that mandatory mental-health counseling be made a condition of defendant's parole. In an attempt to discredit the witness during cross-examination, the prosecutor relied on parole records never reviewed by the doctor and not admitted into evidence: Q. Doctor, I'm going to ask you to take a look at S-82 which is entitled on the top page Certificate of Parole.         So, Doctor, it does appear that [when] he [defendant] was paroled in 1985, the parole board took your recommendation. Isn't that correct? A. That's correct, according to that statement.         Q.    Now, Doctor, as a result of your investigations in this case, you do know that he was paroled to a religious halfway house where he did receive intensive psychotherapy? A. For how long, I need to know. Q. Well, you don't know that? A. No, I don't. You see, we have no follow-up. As far as we're concerned, once they are paroled, the situation is out of our hands as professional staff at the prison. The prosecutor then questioned the doctor on information contained in other reports also not admitted into evidence: Q.    [Y]ou weren't familiar with Robert Davis' name either because you didn't read those reports? A. No. Q. Okay. With respect to those reports though, from 1974 and specifically with your statement that, you know, if there is a person with whom he can relate to, to turn him around, you might be able to turn him around, are you aware that at the time he killed Robert Davis, according to those reports, he had been living for six years with Linwood Allen, his mother's common law husband, and had a very warm relationship with him? A. I wasn't aware of that. Q. But that would be relevant? A. It could be, yes. Q. It could be. When defense counsel objected, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the information: I will sustain [defense counsel's] objection to the last question and the jury will please not consider any reference to any statement made in that report which is not in evidence concerning any relationship or non-relationship which Mr. Pennington may have had or may not have had with an individual named in that report which is not in evidence and should not be considered by you. Experts may be required on cross-examination to disclose the underlying facts or data on which they relied. Evid.R. 57. When an expert has not relied on hearsay evidence, however, it may not be employed on cross-examination. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 499-500, 548 A. 2d 1058. The same result obtains under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed.R. Evid. 705; United States v. Dyer, 752 F. 2d 591, 593 (11th Cir.1985); Blevins v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 728 F. 2d 1576, 1579 (10th Cir.1984), cert. dismissed, 468 U.S. 1228, 105 S.Ct. 32, 82 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1984); Bobb v. Modern Prods., 648 F. 2d 1051, 1055-56 (5th Cir.1981); Bryan v. John Dean Div. of F.M.C. Corp., 566 F. 2d 541, 545-47 (5th Cir.1978). On remand, we caution the prosecutor not to cross-examine defendant's experts about the details of documents on which the experts did not rely. The prosecutor may elicit whether the expert relied on any such evidence, but in the face of a denial, may not use the details of those documents as the basis of further cross-examination.