Opinion ID: 836195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: LANSING MAYOR v. PUB. SERVICE COMM.

Text: This Court's most recent pronouncement on the proper standard for discerning whether statutory language is ambiguous was espoused in Lansing Mayor v. Pub. Service Comm. [22] In that case, the Court examined MCL 247.183 to determine whether it required a company to obtain local government consent before beginning pipeline construction. Critical to the Court's analysis was its discussion of the proper method for discerning statutory ambiguity. The Court stated that statutory provisions are not ambiguous unless one irreconcilably conflicts with another or unless a term is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning. [23] Applying this definition, the Lansing Mayor majority observed that [o]nly a few provisions are truly ambiguous. [24] Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity is unsupported by any Michigan law whatsoever, having been derived, as it were, from thin air. [25] Rusinek v. Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co . is the only Michigan case predating Lansing Mayor that employs the language equally susceptible. [26] However, Rusinek did not state that language is ambiguous only if it is equally susceptible to different interpretations. Instead, Rusinek simply held that statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed. [27] Also unsupported as a threshold for finding ambiguity is the irreconcilably conflicts with another provision language found in Lansing Mayor. The Lansing Mayor majority cited Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc. [28] for this definition of ambiguity, but Klapp simply states that language is ambiguous when its provisions are capable of conflicting interpretations. [29] It neither requires an irreconcilable conflict nor that the language be equally susceptible to more than one interpretation. Thus, the two-pronged equally susceptible and irreconcilably conflicts test adopted in Lansing Mayor has no basis in Michigan law. Furthermore, the Lansing Mayor majority made two explicit and glaring misstatements of law. First, it cited Klapp for the proposition that a finding of ambiguity is a finding of last resort. [30] Klapp did not say this. Instead, Klapp held that the rule of contra preferentem [31] is a rule of last resort. Indeed, Klapp concluded that the language at issue in that case was ambiguous, without commenting on whether such a conclusion was a good or a bad thing. [32] Wholly absent from Klapp, or other Michigan law, is any indication that consideration of whether language is ambiguous should be given only as a last resort. Second, I note that the Lansing Mayor majority expressly rejected the reasonable minds standard for discerning ambiguity as applied by the dissent in that case. The majority stated, [t]hat is not, and has never been, the standard either for resolving cases or for ascertaining the existence of an ambiguity in the law. [33] However, the Court cited no authority for this proposition. In fact, this holding was a blatant misstatement of the law. [34] Because it was based on a mythical definition of ambiguity and egregious misstatements of law, I reject Lansing Mayor's standard for discerning statutory ambiguity. [35]
Because I conclude that Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguous is unsupported by Michigan law, I must now determine whether it ought to remain the controlling method for discerning ambiguity in the laws of this state. I treat the definition as governed by stare decisis for purposes of analysis. Stare decisis is short for stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm. Stare decisis attempts to balance two competing considerations: the need of the community for stability in legal rules and decisions and the need of courts to correct past errors. [37] This doctrine has been part of the American legal landscape since the country's formation. [38] Alexander Hamilton wrote that, to avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that [courts] should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.... [39] In the early twentieth century, Justice (then-Judge) Cardozo wrote that the labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him. [40] Although any rule is only as solid as its boundaries are clear, it was not until recently that this Court formally established a test to determine when it should depart from stare decisis. In 2000, in Robinson v. Detroit , [41] the Court held that the first question in deciding whether to overrule precedent is whether an earlier decision was wrongly decided. [42] Next, according to Robinson, courts should review (1) whether the decision defies practical workability, (2) whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship if the decision were overturned, and (3) whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the decision. [43] Thus, Robinson enunciated a test premised on whether the questioned decision was wrongly decided, to be followed by a three-pronged analysis of whether stare decisis nonetheless counsels upholding it. Although the Robinson test was implemented as a mechanism for determining when a prior decision of the Court should be upheld, its application has proven superficial and cursory. [44] In fact, an examination of cases applying the Robinson test demonstrates that not once has the Court cited it as a basis for upholding a prior decision. [45] Robinson's statement that a wrongly decided case should invariably be overruled was a chilling signal that a conclusion that precedent has been wrongly decided is sufficient justification for overruling it. [46] These facts alone suffice to show that Robinson is insufficiently respectful of precedent. Therefore, I would modify it by shifting the balance back in favor of precedent and expanding on Robinson's list of factors to consider in applying stare decisis. I would hold that a stare decisis analysis should always begin with the presumption that upholding the precedent involved is the preferred course of action. The presumption should be retained until effectively rebutted by the conclusion that a compelling justification exists to overturn the precedent. Robinson, by contrast, contained no such presumption. Moreover, the Court's applications of Robinson suggest that such a presumption was never considered. Even if it had been initially applied, once a case was deemed to have been wrongly decided, any presumption in favor of upholding precedent disappeared. [47] I would reject this approach and reiterate that a rebuttable presumption exists in favor of upholding precedent. [48] The question arises what deference should be paid to cases in which Robinson was used to overturn existing precedent. I believe that a lower level of deference should be accorded to these cases because they represent a departure from the traditional notions of stare decisis. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, [49] the United States Supreme Court expressly addressed the distinction between consideration of well established law and cases representing a recent departure from precedent: It is worth pointing out the difference between the applications of stare decisis in this case and in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey . Casey explained how considerations of stare decisis inform the decision whether to overrule a long-established precedent that has become integrated into the fabric of the law. Overruling precedent of that kind naturally may have consequences for the ideal of the rule of law. In addition, such precedent is likely to have engendered substantial reliance, as was true in Casey itself. ([F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.). But in this case, as we have explained, we do not face a precedent of that kind, because Metro Broadcasting itself departed from our prior cases ÔÇö and did so quite recently. By refusing to follow Metro Broadcasting, then, we do not depart from the fabric of the law; we restore it. We also note that reliance on a case that has recently departed from precedent is likely to be minimal, particularly where, as here, the rule set forth in that case is unlikely to affect primary conduct in any event. [50] Furthermore, the Court stated: Our past practice in similar situations supports our action today. In United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 [113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556] (1993), we overruled the recent case of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 [110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548] (1990), because Grady lack[ed] constitutional roots and was wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent. In Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 [107 S.Ct. 2924, 97 L.Ed.2d 364] (1987), we overruled O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 [89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291] (1969), which had caused confusion and had rejected an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to 1960. And in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 [97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568] (1977), we overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 [87 S.Ct. 1856, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249] (1967), which was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from precedent, and of which [t]he great weight of scholarly opinion ha[d] been critical. See also, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830, [111 S.Ct. 2597, 2611, 115 L.Ed.2d 720] (1991) overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 [107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440] (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 [109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876] (1989); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 [98 S.Ct. 2018, 2038-2041], 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) partially overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 [81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492] (1961), because Monroe was a departure from prior practice that had not engendered substantial reliance); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128-129 [86 S.Ct. 258, 267-268, 15 L.Ed.2d 194] (1965) overruling Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of Utah, 369 U.S. 153 [82 S.Ct. 807, 7 L.Ed.2d 641] (1962), to reaffirm pre- Kesler precedent and restore the law to the view... which this Court has traditionally taken in older cases). [51] Thus, there is substantial support for applying a decreased presumption in favor of precedent when that precedent itself represents a recent departure from prior established caselaw. [52] The next inquiry should be whether there exists a compelling justification for overruling precedent. [53] A compelling justification is not a mere belief that a precedential case was wrongly decided or that the Court, as currently composed, would have decided the case differently. Rather, in determining whether a compelling justification exists, the Court should consider several evaluative criteria, none of which, standing alone, is dispositive. These criteria include, but are not limited to: (1) whether the rule has proven to be intolerable because it defies practical workability, (2) whether reliance on the rule is such that overruling it would cause a special hardship and inequity, (3) whether related principles of law have so far developed since the rule was pronounced that no more than a remnant of the rule has survived, (4) whether facts and circumstances have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification, (5) whether other jurisdictions have decided similar issues in a different manner, (6) whether upholding the rule is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests, and (7) whether the prior decision was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from precedent. Not all of these factors will be applicable in every case. Nor is there a magic number of factors that must favor overruling a case in order to establish the requisite compelling justification. Rather, I believe that the conclusion about whether these factors support finding a compelling justification should be reached on a case-by-case basis.
As stated above, I begin my stare decisis analysis with a presumption in favor of upholding precedent. Only if a compelling justification exists should the Court overrule the prior decision. Although Lansing Mayor was wrongly decided with respect to the definition of ambiguity, this fact does not constitute the requisite compelling justification to overrule it. Instead, we must examine additional factors to determine whether there exists a compelling justification to overrule it. First, I consider whether the method for discerning ambiguity in Lansing Mayor has proven intolerable because it defies practical workability. I believe that it does. Intrinsically, an analytical approach to interpreting statutes on the basis of their plain meaning, where reasonable minds disagree on what that meaning is, is unworkable. This standard gives judges unfettered discretion to pick and choose among available plain meanings or dictionary definitions, and thus sheds little light on what the Legislature intended statutory language to mean. [54] It also potentially leads to arbitrary outcomes and injects instability into the law. Moreover, the mere fact that different justices of this Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, and trial judges disagree on the meaning of statutory language suggests that ambiguity exists. Allowing a judge to pick one meaning among several equally plausible meanings without using the rules of statutory construction is quite simply an exercise in speculation. As Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court stated: [T]he minimalist judge who holds that the purpose of [a] statute may be learned only from its language retains greater discretion than the judge who will seek guidance from every reliable source. A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained, increases the risk that the judge's own policy preferences will affect the decisional process. [55] I share Justice Stevens's concerns and believe that Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity is inherently unworkable. I also note that application of Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity has never once led the Court to find statutory language ambiguous. [56] If a rule of statutory interpretation inevitably leads to the same result in each case in which it is applied, such a rule is innately unworkable. Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor of abrogating the Lansing Mayor definition. Second, I examine whether reliance on the rule is such that overruling it would cause a special hardship and inequity. I believe that litigants have reasonably relied on Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity. [57] Its application potentially leads to a different statutory interpretation than one based on alternative definitions. Hence, I conclude that rejecting the definition may prejudice current litigants who have relied on it. However, I also recognize that litigants have continued to rely on previous standards for discerning ambiguity. This reliance is also reasonable given the inconsistent application of Lansing Mayor's definition, [58] as well as the disagreement over the proper definition of ambiguity among the justices of this Court. [59] Such reliance is not surprising given that Lansing Mayor's definition is so vastly different from the definitions of ambiguity that preceded it for more than 150 years. [60] In fact, despite its explicit holding, Lansing Mayor did not overrule or cite any previous cases that addressed the proper method for discerning ambiguity. Nevertheless, because Lansing Mayor stands as the most recent declaration of how to discern statutory ambiguity, litigants reasonably relied on it for this point. I therefore conclude that this factor weighs moderately in favor of upholding the definition. Third, I consider whether related principles of law have so far developed since the Lansing Mayor definition of ambiguity was pronounced that only a remnant of the definition has survived. This factor is inapplicable to the stare decisis analysis in this case. The definition of ambiguity is a tool of judicial construction. Its only relevance is to discern ambiguity or the lack of it in a given statute. Thus, the definition of ambiguity stands alone and is not inherently related to other principles of law. Accordingly, this factor neither weighs in favor of nor against replacing the Lansing Mayor definition. Fourth, I examine whether facts and circumstances have so changed, or have come to be seen so differently, as to rob the old definition of significant justification. This factor focuses on real-world practicalities. [61] However, the definition of ambiguity is not beholden to the underlying facts and circumstances of a given case. Accordingly, because the definition of ambiguity does not implicate practical concerns, I do not believe that this factor weighs in favor of or against replacing the Lansing Mayor definition. Fifth, I consider whether other jurisdictions have decided similar issues in a different manner. My review indicates that Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity is unsupported by any other jurisdiction. In fact, not a single jurisdiction, state or federal, requires an irreconcilable conflict between provisions or that language be equally susceptible to more than one meaning before finding statutory ambiguity. [62] Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor of rejecting the Lansing Mayor definition. I note that the sixth factor, whether upholding the Lansing Mayor definition is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests, has no bearing on this case. As previously stated, the definition of ambiguity is merely a tool of statutory interpretation. As such, its application has no relevance to public interests because the definition of ambiguity, standing alone, does not dictate any course of action in a particular case. Finally, I consider whether the prior decision was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from precedent. As noted earlier, Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity is nothing more than a legal fiction, wholly unsupported by any law. Furthermore, it represented a decisive and abrupt shift from precedent without recognition of the prior standards for discerning statutory ambiguity. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of abrogating Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity. Under my analysis of the aforementioned factors, Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity has proven unworkable, is unsupported by other jurisdictions, and represents an abrupt and unexplained departure from precedent. Although it has been relied on in Michigan, reliance has been uneven and short-lived. Accordingly, I conclude that a compelling justification exists for replacing it. [63]