Opinion ID: 2313020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the trial court err in permitting the State to offer rebuttal evidence of the victim's state of mind?

Text: In this case, the defendant claims as error the admission over defendant's objection of certain testimony concerning a conversation that the witness had with the victim approximately a month prior to the murder. The witness testified that Ms. Blomberg said she was very upset, very frustrated because he wasn't making his payments, and she didn't know what to do about it. She didn't want to take any legal action because he was a friend. She never had any legal papers drawn up and he wouldn't get in touch with her about it or speak to her about it. She didn't know how to get in touch with him. There was just a gap between them at that time. The witness also testified that the victim appeared nervous and upset during the conversation. Defendant argues that such testimony was hearsay not covered by any exception nor relevant to any issue at the penalty phase. The State maintains the evidence, even if hearsay, was properly admitted under Evid.R. 63(12) as indicative of the victim's state of mind. Because this issue is likely to recur in a new penalty phase, we will address it briefly. Regardless of whether any or all of such testimony constitutes hearsay under Evid.R. 63, any description of the victim's statements or demeanor is admissible only if her state of mind is in fact relevant. Evid.R. 63(12), although an exception to the hearsay exclusion, does not overcome the most basic rule that in order to be admissible, evidence must be relevant. Rule 63(12) in fact restates this basic relevancy rule as a prerequisite to its invocation as a hearsay exception: A statement is admissible if it was made in good faith and it (a) described the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion or physical sensation    when such a mental or physical condition is in issue or is relevant to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant   . [ Evid.R. 63(12) (emphasis added).] Under the special circumstances of a capital sentencing hearing, the only aggravating factors that a jury shall consider are those set forth in the statute. See State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 507-08. In Rose, we emphasized the special responsibility that courts have to guarantee that extraneous factors do not influence the jury's capital sentencing disposition. Id. at 503-08. The State, in the penalty phase, is restricted to proving the statutory aggravating factors and rebutting proof of mitigating factors. Id. at 503. Thus, in this case, where the victim's state of mind was not relevant to any of the proposed aggravating factors, such testimony would be inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief. This is particularly true in light of the fact that there was no evidence that the victim ever communicated her concerns to the defendant, a prerequisite to the use of such evidence to establish defendant's motive. Cf. State v. Machado, 111 N.J. 480, 489 (1988) (Declarations of the victim's state of mind, however, should not be used to prove the defendant's motivation or conduct.). In this case, however, the testimony was not offered as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief, but as rebuttal to the defendant's claim that he and the victim were real close and never had an argument or disagreement. Cf. id. at 487 (evidence of victim's state of mind offered as part of case-in-chief). Moreover, the testimony in question did not imply in any way that the victim feared the defendant and therefore cannot be seen as unfairly prejudicial. Cf. id. at 489 (When the victim's declarations do not express fear of the defendant, they might be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule as a declaration of the victim's state of mind   .). Because the relevance of the testimony in question depends on the strategies followed and evidence presented, we are unable to predict whether such evidence will be admissible at any future penalty phase. Although the nature of the defendant's relationship to the victim is not relevant to any of the aggravating factors, if the defendant places his relationship with the victim in issue, evidence bearing on the nature of the relationship may be relevant. [W]e do not foreclose the possibility that some of the victim's statements may be admissible as background to establish the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant. Ibid. However, in the event such testimony is determined to be relevant, and not unfairly prejudicial, to the narrow issues in dispute at a capital-penalty hearing, the court should be careful to instruct the jury that the evidence of the victim's state of mind may not be considered as an aggravating factor in itself, but solely, and to a limited extent, as rebuttal background to the relationship. See State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 503-08. In addition, inflammatory material should not be introduced into the case unless the party is prepared to demonstrate its admissibility. For example, during cross-examination the prosecutor presented the defendant with a parking receipt and asked him whether he had written the note that had been scribbled on the back. When the defendant replied that it was not his handwriting, the prosecutor nonetheless asked him to read the note, which said Barbara you were due, please pay or we will get you. The prosecutor then asked the defendant if he had left the threatening note in Barbara's car, to which defendant once again replied No, that's not my handwriting. Although the ticket was not permitted to go to the jury, and the prosecutor did not in any way focus on this threat and did not use it in his closing argument, it is impossible to know what effect its introduction had on the jury. As such evidence was clearly of a prejudicial nature, it should not be referred to in any future trial or penalty phase unless some more substantial showing of relevance is established. In the absence of proof that the State can link defendant with the threat to the victim, such cross-examination should not be permitted. See Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 500 (Cross-examination was improper where no facts concerning the event on which the question was based were in evidence and the prosecutor made no proffer indicating his ability to prove the occurrence.) Finally, even relevant evidence of an inflammatory nature may not be admitted under Evid.R. 4, regardless of the availability of limiting instruction, if probative, non-inflammatory evidence on the same point is available. State v. Prudden, 212 N.J. Super. 608, 614 (App.Div. 1986); see also Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 503-04 (when court in capital case is aware of the State's intent to cross-examine concerning inflammatory evidence of limited relevance, it should rule in advance, outside the jury's presence, on the scope of such cross-examination).