Opinion ID: 1620393
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's challenges for cause to prospective jurors based on their inability to return a life sentence.

Text: In this argument, defendant claims that the court erroneously ruled on various cause challenges based on six prospective jurors' inability to consider both a life sentence and a death verdict when considering the appropriate penalty for first-degree murder. The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (holding that a prospective juror who would vote automatically for a life sentence is properly excluded); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); State v. Sullivan, 596 So.2d 177 (La. 1992), rev'd. on other grounds sub nom. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). In a reverse- Witherspoon  context, the basis of the exclusion is that a prospective juror will not consider a life sentence and . . . will automatically vote for the death penalty under the factual circumstances of the case before him. . . . State v. Robertson, 92-2660 (La. 1994), 630 So.2d 1278, 1284. [18] Jurors who cannot consider both a life sentence and a death sentence are not impartial, and cannot accept the law as given . . . by the court. La.C.Cr.P. art. 797(2),(4); State v. Maxie, 93-2158, p. 16 (La. 4/10/95), 653 So.2d 526, 534-35. In other words, if a prospective juror's views on the death penalty are such that they would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties in accordance with their instructions or their oaths, whether those views are for or against the death penalty, he or she should be excused for cause. State v. Taylor, 99-1311, p. 8 (La. 1/17/01), 781 So.2d 1205, 1214. A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and these rulings will be reversed only when a review of the voir dire record as a whole reveals an abuse of discretion. State v. Cross, 93-1189 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 683, 686-687. A trial judge's refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause is not an abuse of his discretion notwithstanding that the juror has voiced an opinion seemingly prejudicial to the defense, when subsequently, on further inquiry or instruction, he has demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. State v. Robertson, supra ; State v. Cross, supra . Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is denied erroneously by a trial court and the defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges. State v. Robertson, supra at 1280; State v. Ross, 623 So.2d 643, 644 (La. 1993). In Louisiana, a defendant must use one of his peremptory challenges curatively to remove the juror, thus reducing his remaining peremptory challenges, or waive any complaint on appeal. [19] State v. Connolly, 96-1680, p. 8 (La. 7/1/97), 700 So.2d 810, 818; State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198, 229-30 (La. 1993); State v. Fallon, 290 So.2d 273, 282 (La. 1974). An erroneous ruling depriving an accused of a peremptory challenge violates his substantial rights and constitutes reversible error. State v. Cross, supra at 686; State v. Bourque, supra at 225. 1. Jeanette E. Theriot: Defendant claims that the court should have granted his challenge for cause to prospective juror Jeanette Theriot because she indicated that she could consider a life-sentence only in circumstances in which the murder was justified. Jeanette Theriot was among the first of three large panels of prospective jurors. She was questioned on voir dire in the fourth group in Panel One. The groups were first questioned as to death-phase qualifications and for cause challenges were made at that time. Theriot was challenged for cause and the trial court denied that challenge. The jurors in groups A-D of Panel One remaining after the for cause challenges then underwent general voir dire questioning and counsel were given the opportunity to exercise their peremptory challenges. Instead of exercising one of his twelve peremptory challenges then available against Theriot, defense counsel agreed with the State that she be selected as a juror, and she did indeed sit as a juror. Because he did not exercise an available peremptory challenge against Theriot, any erroneous ruling by the trial court did not deprive defendant of a peremptory challenge; thus, defendant waived his right to assert this claim on appeal. State v. Connolly, supra at 818; State v. Bourque, supra at 229. 2. Joshua P. Foret: Next, defendant claims that the court erred when it denied his challenge for cause to Joshua Foret because he unequivocally expressed the opinion that he would automatically vote for the death penalty under the circumstances of the case. Foret appeared on the same panel as Theriot and when initially examined by the state, he indicated that he could consider mitigation evidence before deciding on an appropriate sentence. Specifically, he answered that he would not disagree that a person's mental state and capacity was a mitigating factor that the jury must consider, and he agreed that a mental disease or defect or drunkenness was a mitigating factor a juror must consider. He also agreed that if the circumstances justify it, he could consider voting for both life imprisonment and the death penalty. Defense counsel followed up on Foret's attitude concerning mitigation evidence. After Theriot answered a question indicating her opinion that she would not consider mitigating factors in the case of an aggravated burglary, Defense counsel asked: Q: Okay. That's what I'm trying to understand. Mr. Foret, about what you [sic]? A: Yes, sir. If the evidence is proved, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, I could consider the death penalty. I can consider the circumstances. Q: The mitigating circumstances? A: Yes, sir. Q: Okay. You can understand that the mitigating circumstances are not an excuse for anything. A. Yes, sir. Q: It's not saying it's okay to do it if you have one of these mitigating circumstances. A: Yes, sir. And if the evidence if there to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed, I can consider the death penalty. Q: Okay. But that would be after you considered the mitigating circumstances? A: Yes, sir. Q: And you're not likeor, do you agree with some of the other individuals who testified and said that if it's proven that Mr. Blank committed a murder, a homicide, killed an individual during the course of an [a]ggravated [b]urglary, that you would feel that automatically would make youif it's proven beyond a reasonable doubt and you're satisfied that it's been proved, that you would have to vote for the death penalty? A: Yes, sir. Q: You would? A: Yes, sir. Q: Is that the way you feel? A: Yes, sir. Q: As I said, there are not any right or wrong answers. We may have an individual up here that says, I don't know. I don't think killing someone is that big a deal. I don't think anybody ought to get killed for killing someone. But nobody that I know feels like that. But I'm saying the way wethe point I'm trying to make is that each of us feel a little bit differently about it. And each of us, if we are asked over a cup of coffee or a cold drink, How do you feel about the death penalty, say, Well, I feel, and you say it, and sometimes you haven't even thought about it that much. This is when it's time to fish or cut bait. We have to decide how we feel about it. Under oath and talking to lawyers that go on and on and on. Okay? What I am saying is are you telling me that if an individual is convicted of going in someone's home and killing the individual while they are in there that you would have to vote for the death penalty? A: Yes, sir. Q: And you would do that automatically? That's the way you feel? A: Yes, sir. Q: And the mitigating factors, the fact that someone was young or didn't have a prior record, wouldn't even come into your mind? A: Well, there areyeah, the mental, intoxication, there would be factors that I would consider, but under the circumstancesifif the evidence has proved that it was done, I believe in the death penalty, yes, sir. Q: Okay. But you would consider some of these? A: Yes, sir. Q: Which ones? You said mental? A: I could consider the mental, yes, sir. Q: What about the fact that the person didn't have any prior criminal record; would that bother you? A: That wouldn't swing me, no, sir. Q: That would make any difference to you? A: Not really. Q: Okay. Let me ask you this. At the second phase of the trial, what we call the penalty phase, the second trial, if the second trial is ever reached, the State is allowed to bring out what is called evidence about the character and propensities of the person accused. Okay? And they can bring out anything that fits under the law. If it were shown at this second trial that the person being tried had committed another murder, an unrelated murder, not the one he's on trial for, but a separate murder, would that keep you from considering any mitigating circumstances? Would that cross the line in your mind? A: Well, I would sayummit might throw out the mitigatingyeah, it might throw out the circumstances. Q: The point I am trying to make is I believe that there is probably some point in everyone's mind where they would agree that mitigating is just humbug. Okay? Mr. Long talked about if Hitler came back. Okay? Hitler was a terrible person responsiblethat was before your time, but I assume everybody knows about Hitler. A: Yes, sir. Q: He was responsible for millions of deaths. Okay? And I'm sure that many, especially people from that time, many jurors that would sit there and I would say, Can you consider these mitigating circumstances in regard to Mr. Hitler, and they would have to say, No. Too bad. What he did was too bad. None of these would have any impact. Okay? I'm saying if you could backwards from a million After the State objected to defense counsel's questioning regarding Hitler, and after the trial judge instructed the prospective jurors on the guilt and penalty phase, questioning of Foret continued: Q: Mr. Foret, I don't believe we have finished. When we were talking a moment ago, we were talking about there being circumstances in which you would reach a point where you could no longer or would no longer consider any mitigating factors; is that right? A: Yes, sir. Q: And I had talked about Hitler, if Hitler were on trial and you knew of all the millions of people that he had killed, that might be a situation where you would say, I'm sorry. It's too bad a situation. I can't consider it. I'm voting for the death penalty, period. I am not going to think about those. Do you understand what I'm saying? A: Yes, sir. Q: And I asked youand I'm sure that there is some point for everyone, but I would ask you if the fact that there was maybe multiple homicides, more than one person killed in a situation, would that keep you from considering mitigating evidence? A: Yes, sir. Q: And that's just the way you feel? A: Yes, sir. Before denying the challenge, the court summarized Foret's responses on the questionnaire and testimony at voir dire: I believe the death penalty should be around. If someone should commit a serious crime punishable by the death penalty, it should be enforced . . . would consider `drunk' as a mitigating circumstance, yes. If circumstances showed it, could you vote for death? Yes. If circumstances showed it, could you vote for life? Yes. If evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt death penalty, I could consider the mitigating circumstances . . . after considering the mitigating circumstances . . . if guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, vote for the death penalty.    If convicted . . . going into someone's home . . . vote for the death penalty. And you were asking there whether or not that would be automatic. There would be factors I would consider. Mental, drunk could consider mental. No prior criminal record? He said, Wouldn't sway me. Now, that's not saying he wouldn't    He didn't say he wouldn't consider it. He said that that particular factor wouldn't sway him. Well, in any one of those lists there might be a factor that wouldn't sway you, but he said he would consider them all. If shown defendant had committed another murder, would that cross the line? Yes, it might throw out the mitigating circumstances. If Hitler came back, etc. . . . I don't think he is a cause. I think he stays. Defendant exercised a peremptory challenge against Foret. Defendant maintains that the court's ruling violated Witherspoon because the juror's last responses suggested that he would not consider mitigation evidence in a case involving multiple killings. Given the state's expected (and actual) presentation of evidence that defendant committed multiple murders, defendant claims that Foret was not competent to serve. As we explained in State v. Lucky , even a strong predisposition towards capital punishment does not disqualify a prospective juror, or at least a trial judge does not abuse his or her broad discretion by so finding, if the juror's responses as a whole fairly support a conclusion that the juror would keep an open mind about penalty, no matter how grudgingly, until all of the evidence has been presented. State v. Lucky, 96-1687 (La. 4/13/99), 755 So.2d 845, 851 ([T]he trial judge perceived [the juror's] responses to mean that his predisposition toward the death penalty, balanced with a willingness to consider mitigating circumstances and to credit those that he deemed `pretty heavy,' did not significantly impair [the juror's] performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.). In this grey area, the critical determination of whether such predisposition constitutes substantial impairment is within the province of the trial judge's discretion. State v. Higgins, 03-1980 (La. 4/01/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1238 (citing Lucky, supra at 850-51). This Court has been confronted with this vexing issue numerous times. In some cases, the denial of a challenge for cause constituted reversible error. See State v. Divers, 94-0756, pp. 8-13 (La. 9/5/96), 681 So.2d 320, 324-27 (challenges to two jurors who felt that any deliberate or intentional killing merited the death penalty should have been granted); Maxie, supra at 537-38 (error not to disqualify juror who could listen to mitigating evidence but viewed death as the only appropriate penalty, [o]nce the crime guilt is established); Robertson, supra at 1281-84 (error not to grant challenge for juror who would vote automatically for death if the accused were convicted of the double murders charged;) Ross, supra at 644 (error to deny challenge for juror who felt that the only penalty upon conviction of first-degree murder was death). [20] See also State v. Jacobs, 99-1659 (La. 6/29/01), 789 So.2d 1280 (error to deny a challenge for cause to two prospective jurors who expressed a pro-death sentiment, where there was no attempt to rehabilitate them and voir dire was devoid of any meaningful discussion by the state, defense counsel, or the trial judge of the role mitigating circumstances play in Louisiana's bifurcated capital sentencing procedure). However, other jurisprudence has upheld trial courts' determinations that the juror was not disqualified by his or her predisposition towards the death penalty. State v. Juniors, 03-2425 (La. 6/29/05), 915 So.2d 291; State v. Higgins, supra at 1236-39; State v. Ball, 00-2277, pp. 11-25 (La. 1/25/02), 824 So.2d 1089, 1101-1111; State v. Lucky, supra at 848-51; State v. Taylor, supra at 1215-16; State v. Chester, 97-2790 (La. 12/1/98), 724 So.2d 1276, 1284-86; State v. Hart, 96-0697 (La. 3/7/97), 691 So.2d 651, 656-58. In Juniors, for example, the prospective juror stated flatly that she believed in the proverbial and Biblical eye for an eye, which meant, in a capital case, death for death. In Ball, one of the challenged jurors expressed her opinion that she would automatically vote for death in any case in which the offender intentionally killed. In each instance, the Court found, after a painstaking parsing of the jurors' responses as a whole, no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the cause challenges. Thus, in Juniors, further questioning by defense counsel, which led the juror to state that she would not violate the law and that she would abide by an instruction from the court to consider any mitigating evidence, sufficiently rehabilitated the juror. Juniors, supra . In Ball, although neither the state nor the court attempted to rehabilitate the juror, the Court found that the totality of the juror's responses, including those to general questioning which indicated that she could consider both death and life imprisonment, reflected her ability to consider the whole picture before deciding what sentence to impose. Ball, supra at 1108. Considering the above, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disqualify Foret for cause. Here, the trial court's ruling raises a difficult question because the discussion of multiple murders occurred in the context of the extreme Adolph Hitler hypothetical. Clearly, a person's attitudes towards Hitler do not serve as a litmus test for selection on a capital jury. That a juror could vote for death in Hitler's case but would hesitate to do so in any other case does not disqualify him for jury selection under Witt's substantial impairment standard; nor would a jurors belief that no amount of mitigating evidence would lead him or her to spare Hitler's life disqualify the juror from service under the same standard if he or she expressed a willingness to consider mitigating evidence in less extreme circumstances more akin to the facts of the particular case. In addition, a defendant who has committed multiple murders is scarcely in a position to complain that jurors may express a strong predisposition towards the death penalty under those circumstances. The best he can reasonably hope for is that the juror will not reach his sentencing determination until all of the evidence has been presented and argued and will consider, but not necessarily be convinced by, the mitigating factors presented. Given Foret's general statements that he would consider mitigating circumstances before imposing a penalty, and that he would consider certain mitigating circumstances in the case of a home-invasion murder, the trial court could reasonably have understood the prospective juror's comment about multiple homicides as reflecting nothing more than agreement with defense counsel in principle that some cases (such as Hitler's) are so extreme that mitigating evidence simply drops out of the picture. Given the vast discretion given to trial courts in this area, and considering the judge's close attention and consideration to this juror, we find that the trial court did not err in denying this challenge for cause. 3. Dudley J. Hebert: Next, defendant claims that the court should have granted his challenge to prospective juror Dudley Hebert because his responses demonstrated that the only mitigation he would consider was innocence. Like the rest of the jurors on his panel, when examined by the state, Hebert stated that he would consider mitigation evidence and sure could vote for life if the circumstances dictated it was the appropriate punishment. Later, when examined by the defense, Hebert stated that he would also have to consider the impact his decision would have on the victim's family. When counsel asked if his responses indicated that he would be leaning towards returning a death verdict before considering any evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, Hebert stated, Well, it all depends on what I hear. I would keep all of this in mind, but you've got to think whoit could be your family, I mean. The following exchange then transpired: Q: If you're thinking, Someone is convicted of First Degree Murder and that could be my family, so I want the death penalty for them just like I would want the death penalty for somebody that is murdered in my family? A: If it's proven, right. Q: So you would be for the death penalty? A: Right. If it's proven. Q: If he's proven guilty of First Degree Murder? A: Right. Q: I've got to write that down. I will forget it if I don't. And that's the way you feel, and I'm not going to talk you into it or out of it? A: Well, I mean, I'm going to take all of that into consideration, too, but I mean, I would have to weigh itI'd be leaning that way. The court denied defendant's ensuing challenge for cause, summarizing the juror's testimony: Dudley Hebert. Could vote for the death penalty. Could vote for life. Sure could. He was a man of one word on his questionnaire. What do you think about it, and he just put, Good. Could you vote if your vote put him to death? Sure could. I kind of feel like [prospective juror] Mr. Harper. You've got to think of the family. If he's proven guilty, I can consider all of this, but I've got to think the other way too. Life, death, can do it. . . . . All depends on what I hear. I'll keep all of this in mind, but you've got to think it could be my family. Death penalty, if proven guilty, First Degree Murder. I am going to take all of this into consideration too, but I am leaning that way. Effect of multiple homicide, it would be the same. I kind of agree with [the state's argument] that the defense got to loading the wagon with the questions and how horrible they ended. I don't think and I don't put Hebert and [excused juror] Harper in the same bucket, so to speak, so I say no challenge for cause. Defendant subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge against Hebert. The court's reference to counsel's inquiries suggests its belief that the defense could not demonstrate prospective jurors' inability to consider voting for life imprisonment merely by proposing to them the most gruesome scenarios and then showing that in those cases, they expressed serious reservations about whether they could be swayed by mitigation evidence. As discussed above, a juror's attitude toward extreme hypothetical situations Adolph Hitler or the murder of the juror's family memberdoes not serve as a fair litmus test of the juror's qualification to sit on a capital case. In the end, that Hebert would be leaning towards capital punishment yet still able to consider mitigating circumstances, did not disqualify him. Given the deference afforded to the trial court and the defense's failure to show Hebert's answers demonstrated that he categorically would not consider mitigation evidence, defendant fails to show that the court erred when it did not excuse the juror for cause. 4. Jerry D. Dover, Jr. Next, defendant claims that the court should have excused Jerry Dover because he would vote for the death penalty upon a guilty verdict for first degree murder. The substance of Dover's voir dire testimony resembled that provided by Hebert. When questioned by the state, the prospective juror initially indicated that he could vote for either life imprisonment or the death penalty and would consider mitigation evidence. However, when defense counsel questioned the panel, the following exchange occurred: Q: What if it were shown that there were four or five murders; would you still consider the mitigating factors before you would vote? A: (Owen Breaux, Jr.) You would have to weigh everything, yes, sir. Q: What do you think, Mr. Dover? A: (Terry Dover, Jr.) I'm basically the same way he feels. I would consider the circumstances. But my honest, real feeling on the matter is if somebody commits that type of crime, that's what I would want done if that crime was done to me or somebody in my family. That's the way I would feel. . . . Q: . . . [I]f you say, I think if someone kills someone the proper penalty is death, and that's the way I feel, period, we don't send you home with an F on your report card. We are just trying to find out. If that's the way you feel, that's the way you feel. Would that be an accurate description of your feelings? A: Yes, sir. Q: Okay. And if someone takes a human life, and they are proven guilty of First Degree Murder where there's no excuse for it, then you would vote for the death penalty? A: Yes, sir. Q: And mitigation would be nice, but in your mind you would be death penalty all they way? A: Yes, sir. Q: I seem a little apologetic for that. I hope I'm notthere's nothinglike I said, some people feel, No death penalty under any circumstances. I don't want to be a part of it. And that's a correct answer. If you say, If someone kills someone, I feel strongly enough about it that I think that they ought to be killed themselves after he's proven guilty, then there's nothing wrong with that. A: The only way I can come about trying to think about this would be, you know, if he did it to someone in my family. That's the only way I can think of it. The court denied the defense challenge for cause, summarizing Dover's comments: If a person has taken someone's life, he or she should receive the death penalty That's what he put on the questionnaire. The only way to answer, if a loved one had that done to him, would you consider death? Yes. Would you consider life? Would you consider mitigating circumstances? Yes. By [the state] If it was one or 100 people, would you consider mitigating circumstances? And he says, Yes. Then you asked [prospective juror] Mr. Breaux some questions. The Defense asked Mr. Breaux some questions about, Would you consider or would mitigating factors go to second phase, would you go in with an open[] mind? And he said, Yes. Four or five murders? He said he would have to weigh the circumstances. Then you jumped to Mr. Dover and asked him the same question about if there were four or five. He says, I feel like Mr. Breaux, but if done to a member of my family it's no excuse. Mitigating would be nice, says [defense counsel] but in your mind you would be for the death penalty all the way? And he says, Yes. The only way I could think about this, if it would be some member of my family. And I think he is saying if you kill some member of his family then he's not going to consider anything whatsoever.    But he has given enough positive answers to mitigating factors that you don't get a challenge for cause on him. Defendant subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge against Dover. Dover's statement that he would vote for death in any case involving the death of one of his family members did not disqualify him from service on the jury in the present case which had an entirely different set of circumstances. Further, Dover initially stated that he could consider mitigating circumstances and he even agreed with prospective juror Breaux that he would do so in a case involving four or five murders. Dover may have understood counsel's questions to refer specifically and only to the situation in which the victim was a member of his own family. Given this ambiguity and considering his responses in their entirety, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the cause challenge on the basis of the prospective juror's remarks in their entirety. 5. Dennis M. Petrie: Defendant alleges that the court erroneously denied his cause challenge to prospective juror Dennis Petrie as he stated that he would impose the death penalty because it is needed as a deterrent. When examined by the state, Petrie indicated that he could vote for life imprisonment if the circumstances justified it. On cross, after defense counsel inquired about a case involving multiple murders, the prospective juror maintained that he would consider mitigating evidence but stated he would vote for the death penalty [i]f it's needed and agreed that its imposition could have a deterrent effect. Later, in response to defense counsel's leading questions, he indicated that that while he would think about and consider the statutory mitigating circumstances, he would vote for the death penalty if the state proved defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. After the parties presented argument on the issue of the defense cause challenge to Petrie, the court summarized the prospective juror's responses to inquiries about imposition of the death penalty: Okay. Youth of the defendant as a mitigating circumstance. Could you consider? Yes. . . . If circumstances showed it, could you vote for the death penalty? Yes. If circumstances showed it, could you vote for life? Yes. If the decision was yours to make . . .? Yes, he could make it. Mr. Petrie, what about and you gave an example that I didn't write down [defense counsel]. I would consider mitigating circumstances. I say the death penalty is needed. If in the back of somebody's mind, meaning the death penalty, if I do this and there is a death penalty it is a deterrent, so he thinks it's a good thing. If I was ordered by the [j]udge . . . I would consider mitigating circumstances. And then [defense counsel] asked him, If the [j]udge told you to fly out of the chair . . ., and he says, Well, I would protest. I might hurt myself and I don't think that would be a wise thing to do. I think that was kind of an off-the-wall question.    Considering mitigation factors. I guess I would consider. But you would still go for the death penalty? I would consider but strong feeling a death penalty appropriate. If he had a good work history, I would consider it, but if it's needed I would go for the death penalty. I think he stays. Defendant subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge against Petrie. Like the majority of the court's rulings on defendant's reverse- Witherspoon challenges, it would certainly have been preferable had Petrie been rehabilitated following his responses to defense counsel's somewhat-leading inquiries concerning his ability to give meaningful consideration to mitigation evidence. Nonetheless, the trial court fairly described Petrie's testimony and defendant fails to show that it abused its discretion when it determined that his attitudes about the death penalty would not substantially impair the prospective juror from voting for life imprisonment. 6. Wayne P. Eschete: Defendant claims juror Wayne Eschete should have been removed for cause because his testimony indicated that he would automatically vote for the death penalty notwithstanding any mitigation the defense might introduce if the state demonstrated that he committed a series of aggravated burglaries where people were killed. However, just like Theriot, because defense counsel failed to exercise one of its twelve available peremptory challenges against him, this claim is waived. State v. Connolly, supra .