Opinion ID: 202018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence Challenges to Verdict

Text: 65 1. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Finding Arrieta Was Disabled Within the Meaning of ADA 66 Were we forced to squarely confront it, the question of whether Arrieta suffered from a disability or was regarded as having a disability within the meaning of the ADA, as found by the jury, would be a difficult one. However, Wal-Mart failed to preserve appellate review of the issue by failing to renew its Rule 50 motion at the close of all the evidence. See Muniz v. Rovira, 373 F.3d 1, 5 & n. 2 (1st Cir.2004). Wal-Mart's failure rendered inutile [its] post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and precluded ordinary appellate review of sufficiency of the claim. Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir.2005). We have observed that requiring the motion to be made at the close of all the evidence gives the opposing party an opportunity to respond to any evidentiary deficiencies noted by the motion by seeking to reopen the evidence prior to submission of the case to the jury. Keisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 758-59 (1st Cir.1994). For that reason, [a] party's failure to move under Rule 50 at the close of all evidence `cannot be taken lightly.' Castillo v. Autokirey, Inc., 379 F.3d 4, 9 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Jusino v. Zayas, 875 F.2d 986, 991 (1st Cir.1989)). 67 Wal-Mart admits the procedural default, but argues that nonetheless we have some room to review the claim, based on our modicum of residual discretion to inquire whether the record reflects an absolute dearth of evidentiary support for the jury's verdict. Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir.1999); see also Surprenant, 424 F.3d at 13. This review is exceedingly narrow, and only very unusual circumstances will justify treating a motion at the close of the plaintiff's case as a surrogate for a motion at the close of all the evidence. Keisling, 19 F.3d at 759. 68 Such extraordinary review is not warranted in this complicated case. Under Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998), reproduction is a major life activity for the purposes of the ADA and [r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself. Id. at 638-39, 118 S.Ct. 2196. But at the same time, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) held that if a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures — both positive and negative — must be taken into account when judging whether that person is `substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus `disabled' under the Act. Id. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 2139. 69 Both Sutton and Bragdon have to do with actual disability. But here the jury explicitly found that Arrieta was either disabled or regarded as disabled. Under the ADA, a plaintiff is regarded as disabled if he: 70 (1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; 71 (2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or 72 (3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(1) or (2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment. 73 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( l ); see Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 431 F.3d 204 (5th Cir.2005) (discussing regarded as basis for liability). Whether Arrieta met either the actual disability or the regarded as test is not an easy issue. 74 Absent preservation of the issue, and any clear explication of it even on appeal, we decline to address the issue. 75 2. Sufficiency of Evidence To Support Hostile Work Environment 76 Wal-Mart argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that there was a hostile work environment that reasonably led to a constructive discharge. Wal-Mart raised this challenge before the district court as part of its post-verdict motion for a new trial. 7 The district court denied the motion. 77 Wal-Mart faces a daunting appellate standard of review. We review denials of motions for a new trial for abuse of discretion, keeping in mind that [a] district court should only grant such motions if `the outcome is against the clear weight of the evidence such that upholding the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice.' Johnson v. Spencer Press of Me., Inc., 364 F.3d 368, 375 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 731 (1st Cir.1999)). 78 There is no abuse of discretion here. As the district court correctly noted: 79 [T]here was evidence presented as to the constant mockery and harassment that Arrieta was subjected to by fellow co-workers and supervisors alike due to his condition; there was evidence presented that this harassment was constant and unbearable, leading to Arrieta's resignation; and there was evidence that Arrieta's supervisors knew about the harassing conduct and rather than stop it, participated in it. 80 As a result, the jury verdict as to the existence of a hostile work environment is not against the clear weight of the evidence.