Opinion ID: 795105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of the proposed framework

Text: I now turn to the task of applying this proposed standard to the facts before us. The only evidence that Wright has produced to support his mixed-motive claim is his establishment of a prima facie case of race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Wright has offered no other evidence, direct or circumstantial, to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his race or sex `was a motivating factor' in Murray Guard's decision to terminate him. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). Under these circumstances, Wright's prima facie case of race discrimination does not suffice to show that his race was a motivating factor in the termination decision. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment on Wright's mixed-motive claims was appropriate under the post- Desert Palace framework described above. Notes: 1 A question remains, however, as to what approach would be taken when there is direct evidence to support a mixed-motive claim 2 Presumably, if the employer carries this burden, the questions of injunctive or declaratory relief and attorney fees and costs still remain. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) 3 The Eleventh Circuit, in a footnote, rejected an argument that Desert Palace modified McDonnell Douglas so that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a defendant may no longer simply articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, but rather must prove that it would have taken the same action absent the alleged discrimination. Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n. 17 (11th Cir.2004), rev'd in part on other grounds, Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 1197-1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006). The court reasoned that this reading of Desert Palace was unsupported because the [Supreme] Court explained that it did not decide whether its analysis applied in other contexts and the Court did not even mention McDonnell Douglas in Desert Palace.  Id. The plaintiffs in Cooper did not allege that the adverse employment actions taken with respect to them were a result of mixed motives. 4 The plaintiff in the case to which the Eighth Circuit refers, Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003), did not claim that the discrimination against him resulted from mixed motives. 5 Although the plaintiff did not produce such evidence in Hill, if she had, this would likely result in shifting the burden to the defendant to prove the limited same-decision affirmative defense. Hill, 354 F.3d at 284-85. 6 One recent Fourth Circuit opinion appears to share this view, explaining that in pretext cases, if a plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination or simply prefers to proceed without the benefit of the burden-shifting framework, she is under no obligation to make out a prima facie case. Diamond, 416 F.3d at 319 n. 4. 7 Although the posture of this case requires an analysis of mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage, it should be emphasized that an employee need not label his or her claims as single or mixed motive from the outset of the case Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion). Often the employee will not know whether both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory motivations formed the basis for his or her employer's decision without the aid of discovery. Id. Once a case proceeds to trial, the issue of mixed motives will be focused on the jury instructions, including whether a mixed-motive instruction and a limited same-decision affirmative defense instruction are appropriate given the facts of the case. See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 740 (6th Cir.2005); Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1041 n. 7.