Opinion ID: 805977
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The relevant standard: Strickland

Text: Because there is a right to counsel in Atkins proceedings, we must next determine which standard governs counsel’s performance. Generally, ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims are analyzed under the rubric of Strickland. See Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1167. But Mr. Hooks argues that Cronic, rather than Strickland, applies in this case. In Cronic, decided the same day as Strickland, the Supreme Court recognized that there are “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” 466 U.S. at 658. The Court in Cronic set forth “three situations when Strickland does not apply” such that a court may “presume -55- prejudice without inquiring into counsel’s performance.” Danny Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d 715, 724 (10th Cir. 2010).19 Mr. Hooks asserts that his Atkins trial involved the second of the three: “a breakdown in the adversarial process.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. According to Mr. Hooks, when Atkins was decided, it “created a log jam” of cases in the Oklahoma criminal defense system, with insufficient resources and staff to handle them, and his case was assigned to attorneys whose experience involved postconviction proceedings, not criminal jury trials. Aplt. Opening Br. at 64. Standing alone, these circumstances do not warrant a presumption of prejudice. When the Court in Cronic spoke of “a breakdown in the adversarial process,” it envisioned a situation in which “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” 466 U.S. at 659, 662 (emphasis added). This means that “the attorney’s failure must be complete.” Cone, 535 U.S. at 697. It is not enough even that defense counsel “failed to [oppose the prosecution] at specific points.” Id. Rather, for Cronic’s presumption to apply, that failure must run “throughout the . . . proceeding as a whole.” Id. Plainly, this kind of case will be an “unusual” one. Davis v. Exec. Dir. of Dep’t of Corr., 100 F.3d 750, 757 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996). This is simply not a case in which counsel “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. The 19 Our decision in Danny Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d 715 (10th Cir. 2010), involved a § 2254 petition by Oklahoma prisoner Danny Keith Hooks. That case is unrelated to this one. -56- record reveals a vigorous adversarial trial, with numerous objections by Mr. Hooks’s counsel, poignant cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, several side bars with the court to advance Mr. Hooks’s cause, and a competent closing argument. See Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1296 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that Cronic did not apply because counsel “conducted limited cross-examination, made evidentiary objections, and gave a closing argument”); Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1175 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Cronic did not apply because “[d]efense counsel cross-examined the State’s guilt-stage witnesses, made objections to the State’s evidence, presented some evidence in Petitioner’s defense, and made opening and closing arguments”). The fact that attorneys assigned to Mr. Hooks’s case were responsible for a number of Atkins cases at the time, or that they had no experience with criminal jury trials, may bear upon actual performance but does not warrant application of Cronic. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665 (“The character of a particular lawyer’s experience may shed light in an evaluation of his actual performance, but it does not justify a presumption of ineffectiveness in the absence of such an evaluation.”).20 Because we find that counsel for Mr. Hooks actively and zealously participated in all phases of the trial proceedings, we will not presume prejudice under Cronic. Strickland, therefore, remains the appropriate standard for evaluating counsel’s 20 We also take note of the OCCA’s finding that “the record reflects that counsel is qualified and able to represent defendants in capital mental retardation proceedings.” Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. at 8. That finding is presumed correct under § 2254(e)(1), and Mr. Hooks has not rebutted it. -57- performance. See Hooks, 606 F.3d at 725. Mr. Hooks “must show both that his counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that ‘the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’” Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1167 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88). These two prongs may be addressed in any order, and failure to satisfy either is dispositive. Id. “[O]ur review of counsel’s performance under the first prong of Strickland is a ‘highly deferential’ one.” Id. at 1168 (quoting Hooks, 606 F.3d at 723). “Every effort must be made to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time . . . .” United States v. Challoner, 583 F.3d 745, 749 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dever v. Kan. State Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1168 (alteration omitted) (quoting Dever, 36 F.3d at 1537) (internal quotation marks omitted). Surmounting this “high bar” is not an “easy task.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fox, 200 F.3d at 1295 (“[Petitioner] bears a heavy burden in that he must overcome the presumption that his counsel’s actions were sound trial strategy . . . .”). A state prisoner in the § 2254 context faces an even greater challenge. Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1168. “[W]hen assessing a state prisoner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on habeas review, ‘[w]e defer to the state court’s determination that counsel’s -58- performance was not deficient and, further, defer to the attorney’s decision in how to best represent a client.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Crawley v. Dinwiddie, 584 F.3d 916, 922 (10th Cir. 2009)). As the Supreme Court has explained, “because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). Thus, our review of ineffective-assistance claims in habeas applications under § 2254 is “doubly deferential.” Id. “[T]he question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788. The second prong of Strickland—prejudice—requires an applicant to show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s error, ‘the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Challoner, 583 F.3d at 749 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Reasonable probability is more than mere speculation, and an applicant must show more than “some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “‘reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the trial.” Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). With one exception, which relates to counsel’s failure to redact certain letters, the OCCA denied relief on all of the instances of ineffective assistance alleged by Mr. Hooks -59- under the second (prejudice) prong of Strickland. This was an entirely appropriate mode of analysis. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Strickland intimated that resolving ineffectiveassistance claims on prejudice grounds may be preferable: “The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697. Of course, this is not a hard and fast rule, and Strickland contemplates that relative ease in certain cases may (though not “often”) counsel resolution under the performance rather than prejudice prong. We believe this is such a case. We could, as the OCCA did, resolve each of Mr. Hooks’s allegations of ineffective assistance on prejudice grounds. That, however, would not be sufficient to dispose of the claim because a further analysis of “cumulative prejudice” would be necessary. See Spears, 343 F.3d at 1251 (considering the cumulative impact of prejudice “assuming that [petitioner’s] attorney was deficient” in two respects); Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[A] decision to grant relief on ineffective assistance grounds is a function of the prejudice flowing from all of counsel’s deficient performance . . . .” (emphasis added)). The cumulative-prejudice analysis is sometimes difficult to conduct because, whether we assume or determine that counsel performed unreasonably, we must assess the aggregate impact of these numerous errors and decide whether they collectively “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1122 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Thornburg v. Mullin, 422 F.3d 1113, 1137 (10th Cir. 2005)) -60- (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, save for one instance—which relates to Mr. Hooks’s counsel’s failure to comply with a discovery order—we believe the performance prong of Strickland provides “a more certain basis” for resolving Mr. Hooks’s ineffective-assistance claim, even though the state court rested its conclusions on lack of prejudice. Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, taking into account its impact on the standard of review, we follow that course in our analysis below. Cf. Gilson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding it “unnecessary” to address the first Strickland prong, even though the OCCA resolved the ineffective-assistance claim on that ground, because “applying a de novo standard of review” the applicant could not satisfy the second Strickland prong). More specifically, in those instances where the OCCA did not address the performance prong of Strickland and we elect to do so, our review is de novo. See id.; Pondexter, 537 F.3d at 524; see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) (“Because the state courts found the representation adequate, they never reached the issue of prejudice, and so we examine [the prejudice] element of the Strickland claim de novo . . . .” (citation omitted)).21