Opinion ID: 173060
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Swensen

Text: Swensen is the Salt Lake County Clerk charged with placing a proposal to detach a portion of a school district on the general election ballot, and placing school board candidates in the subsequently divided school districts on the ballot. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-2-118(5)(a), -118.1(3)(a)(i). Swensen argues (1) the excluded voters lack standing to assert their claims because they cannot obtain a remedy from her that will redress their injuries, and (2) the excluded voters' claims against her are now moot because she has already placed the detachment and school board candidacy issues on the ballot. We reject both arguments. The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements: injury in fact, a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Swensen argues that, even assuming they can demonstrate the first two elements, the excluded voters still lack standing because they cannot show redressability. According to Swensen, because she has merely ministerial duties under the detachment statute, she cannot cure any constitutional infirmities. Whatever order federal courts may craft in this case, she has no power to enforce it upon the state, its officials, or any local government entity seeking detachment from an existing school district. The appropriate challenge, she argues, should be directed at the state. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1(2) (mandating the Utah Attorney General defend in all cases where state officers are parties and take charge in civil matters of interest to the state). Swensen, however, cannot dispute that the district court has the power to enjoin her from conducting school district-related elections under her authority stemming from the challenged statute. Nor can she argue that, at the time the lawsuit was filed, she was not the appropriate local official for injunctive relief. So while she may not be able to enforce a federal remedy against the state, she was the official responsible for running the local detachment election, and may yet be subject to future federal court restrictions. This is sufficient to satisfy the voters' redressability requirement for standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Because Swensen's role under the detachment statutory scheme is ongoing, her mootness argument is unavailing. Further, as we concluded above, the issue this scheme presents is capable of repetition. We therefore reject Swensen's challenges to the voters' standing as well as her argument that the issue is moot.