Opinion ID: 2192166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Dog Sniffs as a Violation of the Privacy Clause

Text: Article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, in addition to prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, prohibits unreasonable    invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6. The additional language expands upon the individual rights which were contained in Section 6 of Article II of the 1870 Constitution and the guarantees of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. ILCS Ann., Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6, Constitutional Commentary, at 522 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Further, the protection against unreasonable invasions of privacy is stated broadly, and [n]o definition of types of privacy intended to be protected is offered. ILCS Ann., Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6, Constitutional Commentary, at 522 (Smith-Hurd 1993). This language was recommended to the Constitutional Committee by the Bill of Rights Committee, accompanied by a committee report stating: It is doubtless inevitable that any person who chooses to enjoy the benefits of living in an organized society cannot also claim the privacy he would enjoy if he were to live away from the institutions of government and the multitudes of his fellow men. It is probably also inevitable that infringements on individual privacy will increase as our society becomes more complex, as government institutions are expected to assume larger responsibilities, and as technological developments offer additional or more effective means by which privacy can be invaded. In the face of these conditions, the Committee concluded that it was essential to the dignity and well being of the individual that every person be guaranteed a zone of privacy in which his thoughts and highly personal behavior were not subject to disclosure or review. The new provision creates a direct right to freedom from such invasions of privacy by government or public officials. The search and seizure provision of article I, section 6, was intended to add nothing new or no new concepts. 3 Proceedings 1523 (comment of Committee Member Dvorak). The clause creating an additional right to privacy, however, was added to article I, section 6, in response to a concern that the government might use newly available technology to develop a general information bank that would collect and monitor personal information. 3 Proceedings 1525. In response to a delegate's question about the sorts of invasions of privacy that would fall within the scope of the privacy clause, a committee member gave the example of a governmental employer creating a peephole into a women's washroom to observe an employee suspected of theft. This could be considered an invasion of one's privacy. 3 Proceedings 1530. The delegates considered an amendment from the floor that would have stricken the privacy clause from article I, section 6. During the debate on this amendment, the chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee commented: We recognize in our report that in this kind of crowded, complicated world that there are necessarily a lot of invasions of privacythat some of those invasions are reasonable. All we are saying, without spelling out in detail, is that a halt ought to be called somewhere to these invasions of privacy. The individual ought not to be completely at the mercy of the state.    And the purpose obviously of this provision is to cover those situations that aren't covered by the other parts of the proposed section 6. (Emphasis added.) 3 Proceedings 1535 (comment of Chairman Gertz). The chairman offered the example of devices that could penetrate walls and can view what's going on inside a person's home, revealing bedtime intimacies and private conversations, as the kind of unreasonable invasion of privacy that should be prohibited. 3 Proceedings 1535. The amendment failed and the privacy clause became a part of our state constitution. Defendant argues that a canine sniff invades the zone of privacy guaranteed by the privacy clause of article I, section 6, and offends the dignity and well-being of the subject of the sniff. Thus, he argues that the privacy clause should be interpreted by this court to require the existence of specific and articulable facts suggesting drug activity before a canine sniff can be conducted during a routine traffic stop. Defendant asserts that this court's reasoning in Caballes I was correct, erring only in that it was based on a fourth amendment analysis rather than on an analysis of article I, section 6. Specifically, he argues that the constitutional commentary indicates the drafters' intent to create a zone of personal privacy free from disclosure or review and that a canine sniff subjects a citizen's behavior to disclosure and review, in violation of the clause. He does not, however, describe how an individual's private behavior is revealed when his vehicle is circled by a police officer and a trained narcotics-detection dog. He further asserts that a canine search during at traffic stop casts a pall of suspicion over innocent people. Amicus ISBA suggests that the transcript of the proceedings of the constitutional convention reveals the drafters' intent to provide greater protections under the privacy clause than are guaranteed under the search and seizure clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Amicus ACLU claims that this court has consistently applied the Privacy Clause to more sophisticated techniques that allow the State to gather and analyze data not available by employing ordinary unenhanced human sensory capacities. Amicus ACLU states that this court has created a false dichotomy between search and seizure claims and privacy claims, which is is unnecessary and too broad. The ACLU also contends that this dichotomy makes the privacy clause a meaningless nullity in all criminal contexts, because this court analyzes any investigative device or technique that invades privacy interests under the search and seizure clause rather than under the privacy clause. The State responds that the privacy clause is not implicated in the present case because this court's previous decisions dictate that the police conduct at issue should be analyzed only under the search and seizure clause. Further, the State argues that if this court were to apply the privacy clause in the context of a traffic stop, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in odors emanating from his vehicle, even if those odors were not detectable by an officer without the assistance of a trained dog. Our analysis must begin with this court's decision in In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d 381, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929 (1992). At issue in Will County Grand Jury were grand jury subpoenas ordering two individuals, against whom no charges had been filed, to appear in a lineup and to submit fingerprints, palm prints, and samples of blood, head hair, and pubic hair. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 385, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. This court noted that [e]ven before the adoption of the 1970 Constitution, its decisions had provided protection for individual privacy rights in books and records. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 391, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. Just as a person has a reasonable expectation that his private records will not be exposed to public view, he has a similarly reasonable expectation that he will not be forced to submit to a close scrutiny of his personal characteristics, unless for a valid reason. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 391-92, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. This court concluded, therefore, that a grand jury's ability to gather such evidence implicated not only the fourth amendment but also the privacy clause of article I, section 6, of the state constitution. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 389-91, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. Once the right to privacy under article I, section 6, is established, the court must determine whether the state's invasion of individual privacy is reasonable. In the context of a grand jury investigation, reasonableness is determined by balancing the interest of the individual in maintaining his privacy against the interest of the public in preserving the effectiveness of the grand jury. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 392, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. Under this analysis, a grand jury may not subpoena documents unless they are relevant to the investigation. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 393, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. A grand jury seeking physical evidence of a noninvasive nature, such as requiring an individual to appear in a lineup or to submit to fingerprinting, must make some showing of individualized suspicion as well as relevance. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 393, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. The taking of hair samples, however, deserves greater scrutiny. The taking of hair samples from an individual's head is more of an intrusion into individual privacy than is the direction to appear in a lineup or to provide fingerprints. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 399, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. Although head hair is a physical characteristic observable by the public, an individual does not ordinarily have the expectation that others will cut, pull or comb his hair without his permission, and thus he has a greater expectation of privacy in keeping his hair intact than he does in simply having it observed. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 399, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. The taking of hair samples diminishes the body of the individual, albeit to a small degree. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 399, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. Thus, a subpoena for the production of samples of head hair unsupported by probable cause, is an unreasonable violation of the right to privacy protected by the Illinois Constitution. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 399, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. With regard to samples of pubic hair, the violation of the right to privacy is even more clear. The pubic area is normally hidden from the view of others, and the demand for pubic hair represents a considerable intrusion into personal privacy, which must be justified by a showing of probable cause. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 395, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. Our decision in Will County Grand Jury thus established a continuum of privacy protectionsfrom mere relevance, to relevance plus individualized suspicion, to probable causedepending on the degree of intrusiveness of the grand jury's inquiry. In the wake of Will County Grand Jury, the privacy clause of article I, section 6, has been invoked in various contexts. In one group of cases, this court has applied the two-part analysis of Will County Grand Jury to determine whether the privacy clause is implicated in the particular context of the claim and, then, if necessary, gone on to consider the reasonableness of the invasion. The two contexts in which this analysis has been undertaken have involved either the State's effort to obtain access to personal documents and records or the information contained therein or to engage in close scrutiny of [the] personal characteristics of an individual. As we noted in Will County Grand Jury, the individual's privacy interest in his physical person, as well as his privacy interest in his documents, must be protected. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 391-92, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. In the other group of cases, although a party argued that the privacy clause was implicated, this court determined that the situation should instead be examined entirely under traditional search and seizure principles. These cases have not involved either the exposure of personal information or close scrutiny of personal characteristics. These are the cases that amicus ACLU describes as having created a false dichotomy between search and seizure claims and privacy claims. The first group of cases includes King v. Ryan, 153 Ill.2d 449, 180 Ill.Dec. 260, 607 N.E.2d 154 (1992), Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill.2d 302, 220 Ill.Dec. 369, 673 N.E.2d 281 (1996), Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill.2d 519, 228 Ill.Dec. 626, 689 N.E.2d 1047 (1997), Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997), Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill.2d 21, 259 Ill.Dec. 753, 759 N.E.2d 533 (2001), and People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004). In King, this court declared unconstitutional a statute authorizing the chemical testing of the blood, breath, or urine of an individual who had been in control of a vehicle involved in an accident causing personal injury or death. The flawed statute required only probable cause to believe that the driver had been at fault, in whole or in part, for the accident. There was no requirement that there be even the slightest indication the driver was intoxicated. Refusal to submit to the test resulted in suspension of the individual's driver's license. King, 153 Ill.2d at 455-56, 180 Ill.Dec. 260, 607 N.E.2d 154. This court concluded that the statute violated the fourth amendment because it failed to require probable cause of intoxication before the police could gather such evidence for use in a possible criminal proceeding. King, 153 Ill.2d at 458-64, 180 Ill.Dec. 260, 607 N.E.2d 154. This court then considered the plaintiff's additional argument that the statute violated the privacy clause of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Referring to our decision in Will County Grand Jury, this court stated that requiring a urine sample is more intrusive than cutting a person's hair and a chemical analysis of an individual's breath is at least as intrusive as requiring a hair sample for testing. King, 153 Ill.2d at 464, 180 Ill.Dec. 260, 607 N.E.2d 154. It followed, therefore, that the chemical tests the statute purported to authorize could not be conducted absent probable cause to believe the individual had committed a crime. King, 153 Ill.2d at 464-65, 180 Ill.Dec. 260, 607 N.E.2d 154. Subsequently, the legislature enacted a modified version of the invalidated statute, authorizing the testing of blood, breath, or urine of the driver of a vehicle involved in a personal injury or fatal accident, but only if the individual is arrested. In Fink, this court determined that the successor statute passed constitutional muster under both the fourth amendment and the state constitution. Under the successor statute, no driver can be chemically tested unless he has been arrested, based on probable cause, for a nonequipment violation of the Vehicle Code. Fink, 174 Ill.2d at 315, 220 Ill.Dec. 369, 673 N.E.2d 281. With respect to the privacy clause of article I, section 6, this court concluded that, as a result, the driver's zone of privacy is not unconstitutionally invaded when he is chemically tested pursuant to the statute. Fink, 174 Ill.2d at 315, 220 Ill.Dec. 369, 673 N.E.2d 281. In Kunkel, this court considered the constitutionality of section 2-1003(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1003(a) (West 1994)), which had been amended as part of the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 (Pub. Act 89-7, eff. March 9, 1995). After concluding that amended section 2-1003(a) violated the separation of powers clause of article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 ( Kunkel, 179 Ill.2d at 536-37, 228 Ill.Dec. 626, 689 N.E.2d 1047), this court went on to consider an alternate basis for declaring the amended statute unconstitutionalthat it violated the right to privacy expressly set forth in our state constitution. Kunkel, 179 Ill.2d at 537, 228 Ill. Dec. 626, 689 N.E.2d 1047. The privacy clause of article I, section 6, was implicated because the amended statute provided that any party alleging bodily injury or disease was deemed to waive any privilege of confidentiality with his or her health-care providers. The amended statute further provided that upon the request of any party, the party claiming such injury or disease shall sign and deliver consent forms authorizing his or her health-care providers to disclose medical records to the requesting party and to engage in ex parte conferences with the requesting party's attorney. Kunkel, 179 Ill.2d at 524-25, 228 Ill.Dec. 626, 689 N.E.2d 1047. This court noted that the confidentiality of personal medical information is, without question, at the core of what society regards as a fundamental component of individual privacy. Kunkel, 179 Ill.2d at 537, 228 Ill.Dec. 626, 689 N.E.2d 1047. Indeed, such information is generally contained in the very type of personal record or document that this court protected even prior to the enactment of the 1970 constitution. See Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 391, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. Such information is no less deserving of protection merely because it may be obtained directly from a health-care provider rather than from confidential medical records. Citing the earlier decision in Will County Grand Jury, this court stated that article I, section 6, forbids unreasonable invasions of privacy and that, [i]n the context of civil discovery, reasonableness is a function of relevance. Kunkel, 179 Ill.2d at 538, 228 Ill.Dec. 626, 689 N.E.2d 1047. Amended section 2-1003(a) was held unconstitutional because it permitted disclosure of highly personal medical information having no bearing on the issues in the lawsuit and, as such, permitted a substantial and unjustified invasion of privacy. Kunkel, 179 Ill.2d at 539, 228 Ill.Dec. 626, 689 N.E.2d 1047. See also Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997) (declaring the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 unconstitutional in toto; noting that the right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions upon privacy of article I, section 6, is supplemented by the constitutional right to a certain remedy for invasions of privacy in article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970). Several years thereafter, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action challenged the constitutionality of portions of the Hospital Licensing Act (210 ILCS 85/1 et seq. (West 2000)) on separation of powers, privacy, and special legislation grounds. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill.2d 21, 259 Ill.Dec. 753, 759 N.E.2d 533 (2001). The challenged provisions permit medical staff members to communicate with a hospital's legal staff regarding the care of a patient who files a malpractice action, even if the staff member is not a party to the action. In addition, the statute provides that hospital medical personnel who act in good faith in providing information about a patient's care to hospital legal staff are protected from civil or criminal liability. 210 ILCS 85/6.17(d), (e) (West 2000). We rejected the plaintiff's contention that these provisions violate the patient's right to privacy under article I, sections 6 and 12, and under this court's decisions in Kunkel and Best. Although the privacy clause is most certainly implicated by these provisions in the Hospital Licensing Act, only unreasonable invasions of privacy are constitutionally forbidden. Burger, 198 Ill.2d at 52, 259 Ill.Dec. 753, 759 N.E.2d 533. We concluded that the limited intrahospital communications allowed pursuant to subsections (d) and (e) in order to assure quality patient care do not unreasonably invade a hospital patient's expectation of privacy. This court first addressed a privacy claim based on article I, section 6, in the context of a criminal prosecution in People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004). The defendant, who was charged with failure to register as a sex offender, challenged the constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2002)), and the Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2002)) on privacy, due process, equal protection, and ex post facto grounds. Relying on the privacy clause of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, he argued that while the registration requirement itself did not violate his right to privacy, the wholesale dissemination of his photograph and other information via the Internet was unreasonable. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d at 192, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288. Such claims require a twofold inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the party challenging a statute on privacy grounds has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information he seeks to protect and, second, we must determine whether the statute unreasonably invades that expectation of privacy. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d at 193-94, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288. We concluded that the defendant's claim failed the first part of the twofold inquiry. The defendant did not have a cognizable privacy interest in information that was already a matter of public record in the pre-Internet version of the sex offender registry. Although accessibility via the Internet may have made the information more widely available to the public, the information was not private and, therefore, did not come within the scope of the protection provided by the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d at 197, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288, quoting People v. Logan, 302 Ill.App.3d 319, 334, 235 Ill.Dec. 539, 705 N.E.2d 152 (1998). Further, unlike the uncharged targets of the grand jury investigation in Will County Grand Jury, the defendant had been convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The conduct that resulted in his conviction lowered the privacy bar and culminated in a public record that contains the challenged information. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d at 198, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288. This line of cases employs a two-part framework for the consideration of a claim that a state statute or other state action violates the privacy clause of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Cases in which the privacy clause has been found to apply have involved either private records or documents or information of the type typically contained therein or an invasion of the actual physical body of the person. None of these cases have involved a claim that an individual's constitutionally protected zone of privacy was violated by an investigative technique employed by the police that did not involve the taking of physical evidence from the body of the individual. Further, none of these cases involved police conduct during a routine traffic stop or other routine encounter with a member of the public. Two cases involving just such claims are Mitchell, 165 Ill.2d 211, 209 Ill.Dec. 41, 650 N.E.2d 1014, and Bolden, 197 Ill.2d 166, 258 Ill.Dec. 538, 756 N.E.2d 812. In Mitchell, 165 Ill.2d at 216, 209 Ill.Dec. 41, 650 N.E.2d 1014, this court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (holding that the plain feel doctrine does not offend the fourth amendment), to conclude that the plain touch doctrine comports with the search and seizure clause of article I, section 6, of the state constitution. We then turned to defendant's argument that a pat-down search falls within the scope of the right to privacy clause of article I, section 6, rather than within the scope of the search and seizure clause, because it involves a police officer laying hands on the body of a person. Mitchell, 165 Ill.2d at 219, 209 Ill.Dec. 41, 650 N.E.2d 1014. We recognized a certain commonality of purpose shared by the three clauses of article I, section 6, but noted that [n]otwithstanding that commonality, each clause differs with respect to the conduct it was designed to prohibit. Mitchell, 165 Ill.2d at 220, 209 Ill.Dec. 41, 650 N.E.2d 1014. Further, although the touching of a person's body during a Terry stop and search triggers right-to-privacy concerns generally, such conduct is more particularly a search and seizure issue. Mitchell, 165 Ill.2d at 220, 209 Ill.Dec. 41, 650 N.E.2d 1014. After examining the history of the privacy clause, we concluded that the drafters intended no change in the categorization of conduct traditionally covered by the search and seizure clause. Mitchell, 165 Ill.2d at 221, 209 Ill.Dec. 41, 650 N.E.2d 1014. We held that the conduct at issue, a pat-down search by the police, continues to fall within the bounds of the search and seizure clause, and we declined to extend the reasoning of Will County Grand Jury to reach it. In Bolden, the defendant voluntarily appeared at the police station and participated in a lineup. He was identified by the witness and the lineup identification was admitted at trial, over defendant's objection that his constitutional rights were violated by the detectives' refusal to allow defense counsel to be present with the witness during the lineup. We rejected the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment claims ( Bolden, 197 Ill.2d at 175-77, 258 Ill.Dec. 538, 756 N.E.2d 812), and turned to his argument that refusal to allow his lawyer to observe the witness during the lineup converted his voluntary appearance into an involuntary seizure in violation of the fourth amendment ( Bolden, 197 Ill.2d at 177-78, 258 Ill.Dec. 538, 756 N.E.2d 812). He also argued that, even if he had not been seized for fourth amendment purposes, the police conduct nevertheless violated both the search and seizure clause and the privacy clause of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. We observed that the defendant had failed to distinguish between the two clauses and noted that [w]hile the privacy clause of article I, section 6, possesses a unique constitutional history, it is of no assistance here to the defendant, for it is a separate guarantee and does not serve to transform the nearby search and seizure clause into a source of state constitutional rights that are more extensive than those conferred by the fourth amendment. Bolden, 197 Ill.2d at 179, 258 Ill.Dec. 538, 756 N.E.2d 812. Finally, we determined that the defendant had not been seized because his freedom to leave the police station was unrestricted until the lineup was concluded and he was placed under arrest. Bolden, 197 Ill.2d at 181-82, 258 Ill.Dec. 538, 756 N.E.2d 812. Reading these two groups of cases in conjunction, it is evident that the privacy clause of article I, section 6, may be implicated in the context of a criminal investigation. Whether physical evidence obtained from the body of the defendant is sought by a grand jury or obtained by the police during an investigation, the state's intrusion into the individual's bodily zone of privacy must be reasonable. With regard to noninvasive physical evidence, such as fingerprints, voice exemplars, and handwriting samples, a showing of relevance and of individualized suspicion must be made. People v. Watson, 214 Ill.2d 271, 283, 292 Ill.Dec. 1, 825 N.E.2d 257 (2005), quoting Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 393, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929. When the state seeks physical evidence of a more intrusive nature, such as head, facial, or pubic hair, where the compelled production would constitute a search or seizure under the fourth amendment, probable cause is required. Watson, 214 Ill.2d at 283, 292 Ill.Dec. 1, 825 N.E.2d 257. The privacy clause is also implicated if, in the course of a criminal investigation, the state seeks access to medical or financial records that are within the scope of the protections of article I, section 6. See, e.g., Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 396, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929, citing with approval People v. Jackson, 116 Ill.App.3d 430, 434-35, 72 Ill.Dec. 153, 452 N.E.2d 85 (1983) (article I, section 6, assures citizens of a right of privacy in their bank records). In the present case, we are asked to determine whether having an officer circle a vehicle in the company of a trained narcotics-detection dog, while the dog sniffs the air in an effort to detect the presence of contraband, invades the zone of privacy established by article I, section 6. Defendant would have us treat the dog sniff as more like the taking of a physical specimen for analysis (as in Will County Grand Jury ) than the performance of a routine pat-down (as in Mitchell ) because it involves the government's use of a device that enhances ordinary human sensory perceptions. The State responds that the dog sniff took place in the course of a routine traffic stop and is properly analyzed under traditional search and seizure principles, without any need to consider the privacy clause. A dog sniff of an individual or of his vehicle or luggage does not reveal private medical information ( i.e., the presence of prescription medications for the treatment of psychiatric disorders or sexually transmitted diseases), so it does not implicate the concerns at issue in Kunkel. A dog sniff will not reveal the contents of diaries or love letters; it will not reveal the individual's choice of reading materials, whether religious, political, or pornographic; it will not reveal sexual orientation or marital infidelity. Thus, it does not infringe on the zone of personal privacy that the drafters intended to protect. Properly conducted, a dog sniff will not result in the slightest touching of the individual, so the privacy concerns at issue in Will County Grand Jury, King, and Fink, are not implicated. Indeed, once the dog sniff has been conducted, no search will ensue unless the dog alerts to the scent of illegal narcotics. Thus, the image suggested by amicus ACLU of the police searching an individual's luggage by the side of the road and exposing private matters to public view will not occur unless a dog sniff has revealed the presence of illegal narcotics. A person who chooses to transport contraband in his vehicle, knowing that its presence may be detected by a canine unit if he commits a traffic violation, has taken the risk of exposure during the ensuing search of whatever private materials he may have with him in the vehicle. We conclude that the dog sniff of a vehicle does not constitute an invasion of privacy. It is, in fact, even less invasive or intrusive than the routine pat-down which, after all, involves the officer's physical contact with the clothing of the individual. Thus, the present case falls within the line of cases represented by Mitchell and Bolden and must be analyzed solely as a search and seizure issue. Given our limited lockstep approach to search and seizure analysis, the answer is clear. The sniff did not violate defendant's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409, 125 S.Ct. at 838, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847 (the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dogone that `does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view'during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests cognizable under the fourth amendment), quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2644, 77 L.Ed.2d 110, 121 (1983).