Opinion ID: 1927414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Call Appellant Penalty Phase

Text: Appellant next claims that he is entitled to a new penalty hearing because his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not preparing appellant for the penalty phase of trial and for not calling appellant as a witness at the penalty hearing. Appellant asserts that if he had testified at his penalty hearing, he would have testified as to his family relationships, achievements at the Glen Mills School, employment history, participation in community functions and relationships with friends and neighbors. As for appellant's preparation claim, appellant ignores the findings made by the trial court after its hearing on appellant's ineffectiveness claim. The trial court found that appellant's counsel discussed the penalty phase with appellant, including the presentation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, from the commencement of his representation of appellant. This finding is supported by the record. Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to prepare appellant for the penalty hearing. As for the claim that trial counsel should have presented appellant as a witness at his penalty hearing, appellant's claim rings hollow since he twice made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to testify at the penalty hearing on the record. In fact, trial counsel was so concerned about appellant's decision not to testify that he had the trial court conduct a colloquy of appellant twice on this decision. Since appellant refused to take the stand and present any mitigating evidence, appellant trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to call appellant as a witness. See Cross, 535 Pa. at 44-45, 634 A.2d at 176 (counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to introduce evidence which a client does not want counsel to present). Moreover, if this Court were to allow such an ineffectiveness claim to succeed after appellant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to testify, it would have the unwanted and absurd effect of allowing appellant and other defendants to build ineffectiveness claims into their case in order to guarantee themselves a new sentencing hearing should they receive the death penalty. Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. (h) Jury Instructions  Penalty Phase [17] Appellant next alleges that he is entitled to a new penalty hearing because his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the trial court's instruction during the penalty phase of trial as to how the jury was to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances for the purpose of determining whether to impose the death penalty. Appellant complains that trial counsel should have objected on the grounds that the instruction given was prejudicial since it infringed upon the sole province of the jury to weigh such factors and the instruction deprived appellant of the right to have each juror weigh and evaluate the various factors according to their individual conscience. During its jury charge, the trial court gave the following instruction on weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances: As I told you earlier, you must unanimously agree on one of the two general findings before you sentence the defendant to death. They are that a finding  they are a finding that there is at least one mitigating circumstance  I'm sorry. I'm sorry. They are a finding that there is at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances or a finding that there are one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Do not simply count their number. Compare the seriousness and importance of the aggravating with the mitigating circumstances. If you all agree on either one of the two general findings, then you can and must sentence the defendant to death. When voting on the general findings, you are to regard a particular aggravating circumstance as present only if you all agree that it is present. On the other hand, each of you is free to regard a particular mitigating circumstance as present despite what the other jurors may believe. This different treatment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is one of the law's safeguards against unjust death sentences . . . Remember, the Commonwealth must prove any aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt while the defendant only has to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. (N.T. 10/28/94 at 930-31). When reviewing a challenge to a part of a jury instruction, the Court must review the jury charge as a whole to determine if it is fair and complete. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 529 Pa. 140, 144, 602 A.2d 816, 818 (1992). A trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its charge and can choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error. See Commonwealth v. Prosdocimo, 525 Pa. 147, 150, 578 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1990). Section 3 of the Sentencing Code provides that a jury must return a sentence of death if it determines that one or more aggravating circumstance outweighs any mitigating circumstances. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). [18] The Sentencing Code, however, offers no specific formula on how the jury should conduct its weighing of these factors. Thus, this Court has held that the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be left to the individual jurors. Commonwealth v. Blount, 538 Pa. 156, 175-76, 647 A.2d 199, 209 (1994). A trial court improperly infringes upon this process when it instructs the jurors on how to weigh each factor. Blount, 538 Pa. at 176, 647 A.2d at 209 (trial court improperly invaded the sole province of the jury when it instructed the jurors that lack of unanimity in finding the existence of a mitigating circumstance must be considered when weighing whether aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances). Here, the trial court's instruction on weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstance, when viewed in the context of the entire charge, did not infringe upon the sole province of each juror to individually weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Instead, the jury was instructed not to simply count votes, but to individually make the assessment of whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Thus, the trial court did not err in giving this instruction. Accordingly, this claim of ineffectiveness must fail since counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 140, 661 A.2d 352, 368 (1995) (counsel cannot be deemed ineffective if underlying claim devoid of merit). Appellant also claims that he is entitled to a new penalty hearing because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's jury instruction which appellant claims improperly defined preponderance of the evidence. The relevant portion of the trial court's instruction is as follows: The Commonwealth must prove any aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not mean that the Commonwealth must prove the aggravating circumstance beyond all doubt or to a mathematical certainty. A reasonable doubt is a kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable and sensible person to hesitate before acting upon a matter of importance in his or her own affairs. A reasonable doubt must be a real doubt. It may not be one that a juror imagines or makes up to avoid carrying out an unpleasant duty. By contrast, the defendant must prove any mitigating circumstance. However, he only has to prove it by the preponderance of the evidence, that is, the greater the weight of the evidence. (N.T. 10/28/94 at 928-29). Appellant asserts that this definition of preponderance of the evidence was improper because it suggested that appellant had a greater burden of proof than the Commonwealth during the penalty phase since it did not clarify that preponderance is a lesser standard than reasonable doubt. A review of the record satisfies this Court that the trial court's instructions in this case, when taken as a whole, accurately and correctly conveyed to the jury its task of determining if an aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven. The trial court instructed the jury that mitigating circumstances need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and that a preponderance exists when the evidence for the proposition to be proven is greater than the weight of the evidence against the proposition. Although the trial court's definition is admittedly terse, [19] we find that it sufficiently conveyed to the jury the proper meaning of preponderance of the evidence when viewed in conjunction with the rest of the instructions. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 538 Pa. 485, 518-19, 649 A.2d 435, 451-52 (1994) (trial court's instruction that a preponderance of the evidence exists where one side is more believable than the other side was not error since when viewed with rest of the charge it conveyed the proper meaning on the defendant's burden of proof). Accordingly, this claim of ineffectiveness must fail since trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. See Travaglia, 541 Pa. at 140, 661 A.2d at 368 (counsel cannot be deemed ineffective if underlying claim devoid of merit).