Opinion ID: 4556499
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The meaning of “same offense” depends on the

Text: analytical framework applied. In resolving claims of double jeopardy, courts have generally relied on one of two tests: (1) the “statutory elements” (or “required evidence”) test and (2) the “actual evidence” test.6 See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42. The “statutory elements” test, as the name suggests, applies a comparative analysis of the statutory elements to determine whether two or more offenses are the “same.” Id. at 42 n.21. This test is the standard currently used by the federal judiciary. As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, “where the same act or transaction” violates two distinct statutes, the question is whether each statute “requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (emphasis added). If the answer to this question is “yes,” the two offenses are different; otherwise, the two offenses are the same. Id. The “actual evidence” test, on the other hand, looks to whether two or more offenses are the same based on the evidence actually presented at trial, rather than engaging in a strict comparative analysis of the statutory elements.7 Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42 n.23. This test, in other words, calls for an analysis of the evidence as applied to, rather than as required by, 6Courts and commentators often group these two tests under the nominal umbrella of a “same evidence” test. See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42 & nn. 21, 23. Separate from this analytical framework is the “same transaction” test, which focuses on the defendant’s alleged conduct or behavior to determine whether a prior conviction or acquittal bars a second prosecution. See id. at 41–42. For an historical overview of other “same offense” tests applied by Indiana courts, see generally Note, Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy in Indiana Criminal Procedure, 33 Ind. L.J. 409 (1958). 7A variation of the “actual evidence” test is the “alleged evidence” test, which finds two or more offenses the same “if there is sufficient similarity between the allegations of the two indictments.” See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42 & n.22 (citation omitted). Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-340 | August 18, 2020 Page 9 of 37 each element of the statutory offense.8 Whereas the “statutory elements” test takes a more deferential approach to the legislative definition of an offense, the “actual evidence” test looks beyond the elements of a crime to determine whether two offenses are the “same.” Beyond these judicially-created tests, many states have enacted legislation prohibiting the conviction of a defendant—whether in a single trial or in successive proceedings—for both an offense and a “lesser included” offense. Jay A. Sigler, Double Jeopardy: The Development of a Legal and Social Policy 109 (1969). Indiana is no exception. See I.C. § 35-38-1-6 (2019) (single trial); I.C. § 35-41-4-3 (subsequent prosecution). This statutory bar rests on the longstanding common-law recognition that a “lesser included” offense is the “same” as its greater (encompassing) offense. See, e.g., Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 479, 13 N.E.2d 524, 525–26 (1938) (“A prosecution for any part of a single crime, bars any further prosecution based upon the whole or a part of the same crime.”); Wininger v. State, 13 Ind. 540, 541 (1859) (relying on the same rule). See also 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 682, at 705 (2d ed., 1858) (illustrating this principle with concentric circles). Depending on the scope of protection, these statutes may expand or restrict the meaning of “same offense” in relation to the judicial tests described above. See generally Christen R. Blair, Constitutional Limitations on the Lesser Included Offense Doctrine, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 445, 455–62 (1984). 8For example, unlike the crime of burglary, the offense of attempted armed robbery does not require evidence of breaking and entering. Compare I.C. § 35-43-2-1 (2019) (burglary), with I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (robbery) and I.C. § 35-41-5-1 (attempt). Because the offenses aren’t the “same” under the “statutory elements” test, there’s no double-jeopardy violation. But when the analysis centers on the evidence as applied, that evidence, under the “actual evidence” test, may prove otherwise distinct elements under the respective statutory offenses. In Lee v. State, for example, the defendant argued that evidence of him barging into the victim’s house could have satisfied both (1) the breaking-and-entering element of burglary and (2) the substantialstep element required for attempted armed robbery. This Court ultimately rejected that argument, citing evidence presented to the jury “beyond Lee’s barging through the front door.” 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008). But the case illustrates the possibility of finding double jeopardy based on the actual evidence used to convict, rather than relying solely on the evidence required by each element of the offense. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-340 | August 18, 2020 Page 10 of 37 2. The “same offense” test in Richardson v. State created more confusion than clarity. In Richardson v. State, this Court adopted analytical variations of both the “statutory elements” test and the “actual evidence” test. 717 N.E.2d at 49. As formulated by a majority of the Court, “two or more offenses are the ‘same offense’ in violation” of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause “if, with respect to either [1] the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or [2] the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.”9 Id. The “statutory elements” test generally tracks the federal Blockburger analysis. Id. at 50 n.41. The “actual evidence” test, on the other hand, examines whether—based on the charging information, jury instructions, and arguments of counsel at trial—there’s a “reasonable possibility” that the jury used the same evidence to support two or more convictions. Id. at 53; Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 720 (Ind. 2013). By articulating these tests, the Court in Richardson set out to create a “single comprehensive rule” for resolving all substantive double-jeopardy claims under the Indiana Constitution. Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 832 (Ind. 2002). But despite this lofty goal, subsequent application of the rule quickly proved untenable, ultimately forcing the Court to retreat from its all-inclusive analytical framework. To begin with, the adoption of two tests, rather than one, did little to reconcile decades of conflicting precedent. See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 49 (drawing upon several early Indiana cases, none of which “presented a comprehensive analysis, a generally articulated test, or a standard of review for double jeopardy claims”). This generated more confusion than