Opinion ID: 178122
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.

Text: The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act establishes civil liability for cyberpiracy where a plaintiff proves that (1) the defendant registered, trafficked in, or used a domain name; (2) the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a protected mark owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant acted with bad faith intent to profit from that mark. [10] Nahum first argues that as a matter of law, this statute does not apply to what he did. He argues that the statute applies only to one who registers a well-known trademark as a domain name, and then attempts to profit in bad faith by either (1) selling the domain name back to the trademark holder, or (2) using the domain name to divert business from the trademark holder. He argues that he cannot owe damages under the statute because the evidence shows only that he used DSPT's mark to gain leverage over DSPT in bargaining for money he claimed he was owed, not to sell under DSPT's mark or sell the mark to DSPT. He argues that even if in some sense he had a bad-faith intent to profit, any intent to profit under the act must be an intent to profit from the goodwill associated with the mark rather than to gain some other benefit. The core of his argument is that he did not register the domain name in bad faith, and used it only to get what he was entitled to. His arguments are not implausible, but we conclude that they are mistaken. True, the statute was intended to prevent cybersquatters from registering well-known brand names as internet domain names in order to make the trademark owners buy the ability to do business under their own names. [11] Nahum cites a remark in a Senate Committee report mentioning the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with someone else's trademark. [12] And the Sixth Circuit noted that [t]he paradigmatic harm that the [Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act] was enacted to eradicate [was] the practice of cybersquatters registering several hundred domain names in an effort to sell them to the legitimate owners of the mark. [13] But the statute, like so many, is written more broadly than what may have been the political catalyst that got it passed. As in Bosley Medical Institute v. Kremer , we conclude that the words of the statute are broader than this political stimulus that led to its enactment. [14] Though there was no evidence of anything wrong with Nahum's registration of the domain name to himself, the evidence supported a verdict that Nahum subsequently, years later, used the domain name to get leverage for his claim for commissions. The statute says registers, traffics in, or uses, with or between the terms, so use alone is enough to support a verdict, even in the absence of violative registration or trafficking. As for whether use to get leverage in a business dispute can establish a violation, the statutory factors for bad faith intent establish that it can. [15] Evidence of bad faith may arise well after registration of the domain name. [16] The statute contains a safe harbor provision, excluding a finding of bad faith intent for persons who reasonably believed that use of the domain name was fair use or otherwise lawful, [17] but that safe harbor has no application here. Nahum could not have reasonably believed that he could lawfully use eq-Italy when he no longer worked for DSPT. The safe harbor protects uses such as parody and comment, [18] and use by persons ignorant of another's superior right to the mark. [19] The statute provides that a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to the previously enumerated list of nine. [20] Nahum does not challenge the jury instruction, which listed all of the factors, even though some have no bearing on this case, and some do not offer either side much support. One of the factors, number VI in the statute, strongly supports DSPT's claim. That factor notes that it is indicative of a bad faith intent to profit from the mark if the person offering to transfer the domain name to the owner of the mark has never actually used or intended to use the domain name for bona fide sales of goods. [21] Factor VI may fairly be read to mean that it is bad faith to hold a domain name for ransom, [22] where the holder uses it to get money from the owner of the trademark rather than to sell goods. The jury had evidence that Nahum was using the eq-Italy.com domain name as leverage to get DSPT to pay him the disputed commissions, not for the bona fide sale of clothes. Though there was no direct evidence of an explicit offer to sell the domain to DSPT for a specified amount, the jury could infer the intent to give back the site to DSPT only if DSPT paid Nahum the disputed commissions. The intent to profit, as factor VI shows, means simply the intent to get money or other valuable consideration. Profit does not require that Nahum receive more than he is owed on his disputed claim. Rather, [p]rofit includes an attempt to procure an advantageous gain or return. [23] Thus, it does not matter that, as the jury concluded, Nahum's claim for unpaid commissions was meritless, because he could not hold the domain name for ransom even if he had been owed commissions. In this case, shortly after DSPT's content disappeared from eq-Italy.com, Nahum e-mailed Dorigo stating that the eq-Italy.com website would be back up under a new format. Nahum testified that he would transfer the domain to DSPT after Nahum and DSPT were able to resolve the monetary issues regarding [Nahum's] commissions. Nahum's subsequent employer testified that Nahum told him that DSPT wanted the website returned to them, but Nahum was keeping it to use it as leverage in order to get the money he said DSPT owed him. This is evidence of an intent to profit under the Act.