Opinion ID: 2199622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admission of Gang Affiliation & Other-Crimes Evidence

Text: Defendant next argues that he was prejudiced during his sentencing hearing by the circuit court's admission of certain testimony concerning defendant's (i) gang membership and (ii) involvement in other crimes. We address each in turn. The State called Michael Lockett to testify during the aggravation/mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing as to certain statements made to him by defendant while both were incarcerated in the same correctional center. Throughout his cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to impeach Lockett by eliciting from him his motivation for testifying. Defense counsel intimated, for example, that Lockett was awaiting sentencing for attempted murder and aggravated battery and was hoping to get something in exchange for his testimony. When Lockett denied the charge, defense counsel inquired about a pin which was affixed to Lockett's lapel. Lockett indicated that the pin signified a conservative vice lord. On redirect, the prosecutor asked whether defendant was a gang member. Over a defense counsel objection, Lockett responded that defendant was a gangster disciple. Lockett further indicated that it was difficult to testify against a gang member and fellow inmate because all types of things could happen to him. On re-cross-examination, defense counsel then asked Lockett whether his gang [got] along with defendant's gang. Lockett admitted that they do not. Defendant now contends that the circuit court should have excluded this evidence of defendant's gang affiliation. This court has consistently held that evidence of gang affiliation is admissible as long as the relevance of the evidence is established. People v. Hope, 168 Ill.2d 1, 40, 212 Ill.Dec. 909, 658 N.E.2d 391 (1995), citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992). We note that in this case, it was defense counsel's attempt to impeach Lockett's credibility by noting his gang affiliation which opened the door to the State's inquiry concerning defendant's affiliation and the concomitant risks which attended Lockett's testimony against another gang member. Indeed, defendant's gang membership became relevant, as it provided the jurors with a clearer picture of all the potential motivations behind Lockett's testimony, thereby aiding them in evaluating the veracity of his testimony. For example, fear of reprisal might have made Lockett's testimony more believable. On the other hand, rivalry between the two gangs might have detracted from its believability. Under these circumstances, the relevance of the evidence cannot be seriously questioned. Defendant also maintains that he suffered prejudice when Lockett testified that defendant had told him that it did not matter whether he was convicted of the five murder charges and to look at how many he had gotten away with. Defendant argues that the remark was uncorroborated, and that the circuit court should have given the jury some guidance to assist it in determining whether the purported conversation actually occurred or whether it constituted mere bragging. Defendant's claim does not persuade. Under the provisions of section 9-1(e) of the Criminal Code of 1961, a jury is allowed to hear and consider information during sentencing regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(e) (West 1992). Although we have recognized that some precautions may be necessary to preclude the contaminating influence of improper information from influencing the jury (see People v. Devin, 93 Ill.2d 326, 348, 67 Ill.Dec. 63, 444 N.E.2d 102 (1982)), we are of the opinion that the jury in this case received sufficient instruction in assessing the testimony. The circuit court gave the jury Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No. 1.02 (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02 (3d ed.1992)), which informed the jury that it could take into account a witness' bias and the reasonableness of his testimony. We further note Devin, the sole case to which defendant cites in support of this argument, is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. There, several witnesses testified at the sentencing hearing that defendant had recounted to them detailed, graphic descriptions of torture and murder. However, psychiatric experts all agreed that a sociopathic personality (which defendant possessed) frequently engages in homicidal fantasies. As a result, this court reasoned that the jury should have been alerted to the possibility that defendant's descriptions could have been the product of fantasy and not defendant's actual conduct. Devin, 93 Ill.2d at 348-49, 67 Ill.Dec. 63, 444 N.E.2d 102. Lockett's testimony in this case in no way compares to the testimony given in Devin. Nor are we confronted with the type of psychiatric testimony which called the Devin testimony into question. For these reasons, we conclude that a new sentencing hearing is not required in this case.