Opinion ID: 2031083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is the Plaintiffs' Expression of their Views on the Proposed Constitutional Amendment Protected by Art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights?

Text: The plaintiffs also claim the protection of arts. 16 and 19 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth. Since we find protection for the plaintiffs under art. 16, we shall not address ourselves to the type of protection offered by art. 19. Article 16 declares: The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth. The right of free speech shall not be abridged. In Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, the court had before it an initiative petition that sought to amend G.L.c. 55, § 7, to include labor unions within its scope. Although the case concerned the addition of labor unions to the statute, one of the results of the proposed legislation was declared to be: that a corporation ... would no longer have a right to make any political contribution for the purpose of influencing or affecting the popular vote on any question submitted to the voters even though that question might materially affect the property, business or assets of the corporation. The Bowe case, supra, at 234. The proposed law, which admittedly only directly concerned a labor union, was held inconsistent with the liberty of the press and the right of assembly under arts. 16 [18] and 19 of the Declaration of Rights and was thus excluded from the popular initiative. There is no doubt that the effect on the plaintiffs of the 1972 statutory amendment to G.L.c. 55, § 7, so far as it affects the present case, is precisely as stated in the Bowe case, supra. In the Bowe case, supra, at 249, we said that the freedoms guaranteed to labor unions under arts. 16 and 19 were comparable to the rights of `freedom of speech' and `of the press,' and the right of the people `peaceably to assemble,' declared in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and held to be part of the `liberty' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State without due process of law. We see no reason why such freedoms should not also be afforded to the corporations in the instant case. [19] Whether the freedom of press and expression guaranteed to corporations under the First Amendment is, in all respects, similar to the freedom guaranteed them under art. 16 of the Declaration of Rights, [20] we need not decide. In the circumstances of this case we hold that the safeguards of art. 16 apply to the plaintiffs.