Opinion ID: 1798053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Signed this day Jan 16th 1962

Text: This document was found in a desk drawer in the decedent's home after her death. A sister of the decedent filed a petition for revocation of the probate order admitting the will to probate. She contended that the decedent failed to dispose of all of her property under the instrument and relying on Manchester, supra , she argued that the instrument was not subject to probate because it was not signed by the author. She contended that the failure of the decedent to dispose of all of her property indicated a lack of intention to execute the instrument as a will. The petition was denied by the probate court and the sister appealed to the District Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of California. In sustaining the probate court in admitting the instrument to probate as the last will and testament of the decedent, the appellate court recited the true rule as laid down in Manchester, supra , and distinguished the two cases by pointing out that in Manchester the recitation Whereunto I hereby sign my hand this fourteenth day of January 1914 was in the present tense and indicative of intention to sign. Whereas the instrument in Rowe appeared to be a completed will; that the last sentence fixed the date of execution and used the past tense of the word sign, i. e. signed, to indicate that the instrument had already been signed. The court in Rowe then cited a number of California cases since Manchester including the very interesting 1952 case of In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21, in which the California Supreme Court upheld the probation of an instrument in the handwriting of Helene I. Bloch. The instrument was found in the lock box of Helene I. Bloch after her death and consisted of an envelope with writing on both sides. It named an executor, disposed of the property belonging to Helene I. Bloch and the only place where the decedent's name appeared on the instrument was in reference to a part of her property as follows: Bonds belonging solely to Helene I Bloch 8000.00 The Supreme Court in that case said: The language of the document involved here is plainly dispositive in character, and the document was dated and was admittedly written by the hand of the decedent. The sole question is whether the decedent's name, which appears only in the body of the instrument, constitutes a signature within the meaning of the statute. It is settled in California that the signature need not be located at the end but may appear in another part of the document, provided the testator wrote his name there with the intention of authenticating or executing the instrument as his will. After citing a number of California decisions, the Supreme Court then continues: The instrument involved in the present case, as we have seen, discloses a testamentary intent, and, in our opinion, constitutes a complete testamentary document under the foregoing decisions. The writing, on its face, indicates that the testatrix did everything that she intended to do: She specified that the bonds which belonged solely to her were to be distributed equally among seven named individuals; she excluded her husband from sharing in this bequest, giving reasons for doing so; and she appointed her sister executrix and directed her to resist any action which might be taken by the husband. The document, after giving the reasons of the testatrix for exclusion of her husband, ends, in a natural manner, by stating: `Therefore I feel he does not participate.'    Since it appears that the holographic document written by Mrs. Bloch is a complete testamentary instrument, it follows, under the decision in Estate of Kinney, supra, 16 Cal.2d 50, 56, 104 P.2d 782, that her name is to be regarded as having been written in the body of the instrument with authenticating intent. The order is affirmed. Justice Traynor wrote a dissenting opinion in Bloch, supra , reciting his view that the mere name of the decedent used in describing her property did not fulfill the statutory requirement. Justice Traynor's minority opinion is of value in that it points out the following distinctions: Regardless of where the name may appear in the instrument, there is always the possibility, of course, that it was intended as a signature. The mere existence of that possibility, however, is not enough to permit a reasonable inference that it was so intended. When the name is used to identify the decedent as the author of the alleged will as in Estate of Kinney, 16 Cal.2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (`I, Anna Leona Graves Kinney, do bequeath all my possessions to my four sisters'), or to identify the instrument as decedent's will as in Estate of Brooks, 214 Cal. 138, 4 P.2d 148 (`This is my will Elizabeth Ryan Brooks'), and in addition the instrument appears to be a complete testamentary document, it may reasonably be inferred that the name was placed where it was with the intention of executing the instrument. In such cases the name is linked to the alleged testamentary act and the probabilities that it was intended as a signature are strong. In the present case, on the contrary, decedent's name appears only in the description of her property. Returning now to the case at bar, there is no question that Mr. Rutherford intended to make a will and there is no question that he attempted to do so. There is no question of fraud involved in this case and there is no question that Mr. Rutherford thought he had executed a valid holographic will. There is no question that Mr. Rutherford completely disposed of all of his property under the instrument offered in probate, even to a provision for taking care of his dogs after his demise. Looking now to the language employed, the first line on page one of the instrument defines the instrument in the handwriting of the decedent as follows: Will of Julian Leland Rutherford. The first paragraph then recites: I Julian Leland Rutherford... do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my last will and testament. The last line of the instrument then recites: Witness my hand and seal this 11 day of July, 1970. There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Rutherford did not write Witness my hand and seal... on the same day he wrote I Julian Leland Rutherford ... do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my last will and testament. (Emphasis added). Even if we should adopt and strictly apply the California rule announced in Manchester as urged by the appellants, the instrument signed by Rutherford would qualify as a holographic will subject to probate under the subsequent decisions of the California courts. But in this case Mr. Rutherford delivered the sealed envelope to his attorney and told him that it contained his will. All other evidence clearly indicates that when Mr. Rutherford delivered the instrument to his attorney, he had fully carried out his announced intentions of disposing of his property by will to the exclusion of the appellants. In Page on Wills, vol. 2, § 20.9, p. 294, is found the following: There is a conflict of authority concerning the admissibility of evidence of testator's declarations and acts, together with surrounding circumstances, to determine whether his name which was written by him in the body of the will was intended as a signature. The weight of authority permits introduction of such evidence for the purpose of determining the intention with which testator wrote his name. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in admitting the instrument to probate as the last will and testament of Julian Leland Rutherford, and that the judgment of the probate court should be affirmed. Affirmed. HARRIS, C. J., not participating.