Opinion ID: 1058506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: analysis of issues presentedguilt phase

Text: The defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for individual, sequestered voir dire of the jury panel. The prevailing voir dire practice is to examine jurors collectively. State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, app. at 471 (Tenn.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (2003). There is no requirement in capital cases that death qualification of a capital jury be conducted by individual, sequestered voir dire. Id. (citing State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 540 (Tenn.1994)). Moreover, as a general rule, the decision to allow individual voir dire of prospective jurors is within the discretion of the trial court. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 540. The defendant has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for individual, sequestered voir dire.
The defendant contends that the trial court's conclusory rejection of a timely Batson challenge to the state's striking of five African-American members of the venire, without any contemporaneous findings and without requiring the state to proffer an explanation, warrants a remand for a hearing to determine whether a new trial should be granted. During voir dire, seven jurors were excused by the state as a result of peremptory challenges. After their dismissal, the defense raised an objection and noted that five of these jurors were African-American. The trial court found there was no basis to declare that any of the challenges were based upon race. A state's use of peremptory challenges to intentionally exclude jurors of the defendant's race violates the defendant's right to equal protection. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The Court upheld this principle in Powers v. Ohio, but eliminated the requirement that the defendant and the potential juror share the same race. 499 U.S. 400, 415, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). A defendant seeking to raise a Batson claim must first make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination against a prospective juror. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The defendant must establish that a consideration of all the relevant circumstances raises an inference of purposeful discrimination. Woodson v. Porter Brown Limestone Co., 916 S.W.2d 896, 903 (Tenn.1996). If a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination is established, the burden then shifts to the state to establish a neutral basis for the challenge. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The trial court must give specific reasons for each of its factual findings in ruling on peremptory challenges. Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 906. This should include the reason the objecting party has or has not established a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. The trial court's findings are to be accorded great weight and will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.; see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (noting deference to the trial court is necessary relating to credibility). The trial court found that the defendant had not made a prima facie showing of discrimination. In determining whether the defendant has established a prima facie case, the trial court may consider whether similarly situated members of another race were seated on the jury. State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 711 (Tenn.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 998, 122 S.Ct. 471, 151 L.Ed.2d 386 (2001). The trial court may also consider the demeanor of the attorney who exercised the challenge, which is often the best evidence of the credibility of proffered explanations. Id. at 711-12 (citations omitted). In the instant case, the record reveals that the final jury consisted of six African-Americans and six Caucasians. At the motion for new trial, the court commented that the only reason advanced by the defense to establish a prima facie case was the number of strikes used against African-Americans. While the court conceded that a prima facie case may be established by numbers alone, the trial court further explained that was not done in the instant case. Indeed, the trial court stated: ... if all you're standing up and saying is ... numbers alone, that's my prima facie case, I stilland I know what the case law saysbut I'm still of the opinion that at the time of my observations, my being present, listening to the jurors testify, observing the demeanor of the jurors, watching and taking notes of what was going on, I was not convinced at that time that there was a systematic exclusion of African-Americans from this jury, and that was the basis for it; not strictly on numbers, but it was based on the overall circumstances of what was occurring in the courtroom. We cannot conclude that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. See State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, app. at 227-29 (Tenn.2000) (holding there was no showing of purposeful discrimination where four African-American jurors were peremptorily challenged by the state), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 907, 121 S.Ct. 1233, 149 L.Ed.2d 142 (2001). In light of the trial court's findings, we conclude this issue is without merit.
The defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support both convictions.
In Tennessee, great weight is given to the result reached by the jury in a criminal trial. A jury verdict accredits the state's witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn.1994). On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Id.; State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn.1978). Moreover, a guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence which the appellant enjoyed at trial and raises a presumption of guilt on appeal. State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). The appellant has the burden of overcoming this presumption of guilt. Id. Where sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Abrams, 935 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tenn.1996). The weight and credibility of the witnesses' testimony are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the triers of fact. State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn.1984); State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tenn. Crim.App.1996). The state's theory at trial was that the defendant was responsible for the actions of his fellow Gangster Disciples based upon the theory of criminal responsibility. It is undisputed that the defendant was not present at the murder scene. As applicable to the case at bar, a person is criminally responsible for the conduct of another if, [a]cting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2) (1997).
In this case, it is without dispute that the victim was unlawfully removed or confined so as to substantially interfere with his liberty; it was accomplished with a deadly weapon; and the victim suffered serious bodily injury. Thus, an especially aggravated kidnapping was committed. See id. §§ 39-13-302(a), -305(a)(1), (4). It is further without dispute that the victim was intentionally killed with premeditation. Thus, a premeditated first degree murder was committed. See id. § 39-13-202(a)(1). The only issue relating to sufficiency of the evidence is whether the defendant was criminally responsible for the conduct of those who actually committed or consummated these offenses. See id. § 39-11-402(2). We begin our detailed analysis of the evidence in this case by reiterating that our standard of examining the evidence in a light most favorable to the state includes all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn.2000) (citing Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835). Thus, we recognize that jurors may evaluate the evidence in light of their common experiences in life and their common sense. See Liakas v. State, 199 Tenn. 298, 286 S.W.2d 856, 858-59 (1956). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, the evidence established the defendant was a high ranking Gangster Disciple. He was portrayed as chief of security for the entire city of Memphis. Upon his arrival at Black's apartment, he ordered fellow Gangster Disciples to snag the victim for GD arrest. Several Gangster Disciples, in parade-like fashion, brought the victim before the defendant. The defendant initiated a beating of the victim by hitting him numerous times; others subsequently joined in the beating. The defendant demanded that the victim tell him the location of the Vice Lords. Reluctantly, the victim revealed a location. The defendant then ordered some Gangster Disciples to scout the location and return with their findings, which they did. The evidence further indicated that the defendant was angry upon learning that the Vice Lords were not at the location described by the victim. The defendant, Prentiss Phillips, and Kevin Wilkins were each part of a telephone conversation with Kaos, who was superior in rank to the defendant. Immediately after this conversation, the defendant directed Phillips and Wilkins to each pick three men and take the victim fishing. He further stated, Y'all know what to do. Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to assume the defendant, Phillips, and Wilkins were all aware of Kaos's directive, and the defendant ordered that Phillips and Wilkins be responsible for carrying out that directive. Although Shipp thought the order to take the victim fishing only meant physical abuse, Shipp was not a part of the conversation with Kaos. The jury could further infer that Wilkins, who had been a part of the phone conversation and knew the victim was to be killed, was ordered by the defendant to carry out the directive. One of the first things said to the victim at the park was from Wilkins, who was the ranking Gangster Disciple at the park and who asked the victim if he had any last words. The murder was then accomplished under Wilkins' direction. As it relates to the charge of premeditated first degree murder, the state was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in giving these orders had the specific intent that the victim be murdered. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we conclude a rational trier of fact could find the defendant and Wilkins got the directive from Kaos that the victim was to be killed; the defendant ordered Wilkins (and Phillips) to carry out the directive; and Wilkins, a subordinate of the defendant, personally supervised the murder. The jury could further rationally conclude from the evidence that the Gangster Disciples was an organization structured according to rank and that orders given by those of superior rank should be obeyed in order to avoid severe sanctions. Thus, the jury could rationally conclude Wilkins carried out the order of the defendant. What started out as a rift between a Vice Lord and a Gangster Disciple culminated in the gathering of a throng of Gangster Disciples, heavily armed and bent on retaliation. The retaliation effort had as one of its leaders the defendant. The lower-ranking Gangster Disciples followed not only the defendant's orders, but his example of violence. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for criminal responsibility for premeditated first degree murder. As to the defendant's conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, we conclude the evidence is sufficient. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, the defendant ordered the victim to be brought to the apartment where numerous Gangster Disciples had weapons. The defendant severely beat the victim with his fist and a broom stick; others beat him as well. The defendant ordered that Green be taken upstairs where numerous gang members threatened him with weapons pointed at his head. The defendant ordered Green be taken fishing and told his fellow Gangster Disciples, Y'all know what to do. Wilkins followed those orders, took the victim to Bellevue Park, and supervised the murder. This evidence is more than sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping.
The defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient because it consisted of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Additionally, he asserts that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that (a) accomplice testimony cannot be corroborated by evidence from another accomplice; (b) only a non-accomplice can corroborate the testimony of an accomplice; (c) Jarvis Shipp was an accomplice as a matter of law; and (d) the jury must decide whether Christopher James and Shaun Washington were accomplices.
The state contends that the defendant has waived these issues for failing to submit proposed instructions on accomplice testimony. See State v. Anderson, 985 S.W.2d 9, 17 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997) (holding the failure to request accomplice instruction waives issue); State v. Foster, 755 S.W.2d 846, 848-49 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1988) (noting the defendant's responsibility to request instruction; failure constitutes waiver). In instructing the jury regarding accomplice testimony, the trial court utilized the pattern jury instruction. See T.P.I. CRIM. 42.09 (4th ed.1995). The trial court further instructed the jury that they were to determine whether the witness, Jarvis Shipp, was an accomplice to the alleged crime. The pattern charge does not contain a specific provision that accomplice testimony cannot be corroborated by other accomplice testimony. The record reflects the trial court advised the parties that it would be instructing on accomplice testimony. There were no special requests. After instructing the jury and prior to jury deliberations, there were no objections and no special requests. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) provides that the parties are to be given an opportunity to object to the content of jury instructions or the failure to give requested instructions; however, the failure to make objections in these instances does not prohibit them from being used as grounds in the motion for new trial. See Tenn. R.Crim. P. 30(b); State v. Lynn, 924 S.W.2d 892, 898-99 (Tenn.1996). However, alleged omissions in the jury charge must be called to the trial judge's attention or be regarded as waived. State v. Haynes, 720 S.W.2d 76, 84-85 (Tenn. Crim.App.1986). In contrast to an erroneous instruction or the failure to give a requested instruction, defense counsel cannot sit on an objection to an omitted charge and allege it as a ground in the motion for new trial. Id.; State v. Stigall, No. 02C01-9610-CR-00371, 1998 WL 3340, at , 1998 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 27, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 7, 1998, at Jackson). The jury instruction given by the trial court was accurate. The defendant has waived any alleged error for the failure to specifically charge the jury that accomplice testimony cannot be corroborated by the testimony of other accomplices. Further, we discern no plain error. See Tenn. R.Crim. P. 52(b).
An accomplice is a person who knowingly, voluntarily and with a common intent unites with the principal offender in the commission of a crime. State v. Allen, 976 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1997). Uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice-witness will not support a conviction. State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1115, 122 S.Ct. 925, 151 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002). Corroborating evidence is evidence entirely independent of the accomplice's testimony, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference not only that a crime has been committed but also that the defendant was implicated in it. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 803 (citations omitted). The independent corroborative testimony must include some fact or circumstance which affects the defendant's identity. State v. Boxley, 76 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001). In Bethany v. State, this court stated: The question of who determines whether a person is an accomplice depends upon the facts of each case. When the facts of a witness's participation in a crime are clear and undisputed, it is a question of law for the court to decide. When such facts are in dispute or susceptible of an inference that a witness may or may not be an accomplice, it then becomes a question of fact for the jury to decide. 565 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978); see State v. Lawson, 794 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn.Crim.App.1990).
The evidence established that Christopher James was a relatively new member of the Gangster Disciples and had no rank within the group. The evidence further established that, at the aid and assist meeting held at the apartment, James was punished for failing to take part in the earlier fight that initiated the chain of events culminating in the murder. Although he was present when Vernon Green was brought into the apartment, there is no evidence that James did anything other than sustain a beating for his failure to assist fellow gang members earlier that day. The proof fails to establish that James was an accomplice to the murder and kidnapping of Vernon Green. [1] Thus, the defendant's argument that the trial court should have submitted an instruction to the jury as to whether Christopher James was an accomplice is without merit.
The defendant contends Shaun Washington's identification should be considered accomplice testimony. Washington did not testify as a witness in this matter. Sergeant William Ashton testified that Christopher James identified the defendant in a photo line-up as the person whom James referred to as Shaun. Defense counsel asked Sergeant Ashton on cross-examination if anyone else identified the defendant in the photo line-up. Sergeant Ashton, in response to this question, stated that Washington had identified the defendant as being present at the apartment on the night of the murder. There was no request that Washington be included in the accomplice instruction. This issue is waived.