Opinion ID: 1152979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Whether prejudicial error occurred when the jury was instructed on the appropriate use of the character evidence presented by the prosecution during the penalty phase.

Text: Lisle argues that the jury instructions during the penalty phase were ambiguous and led the jury to rely improperly on his character and his unadjudicated murder charge in finding him death-eligible. Lisle contends that nothing prevented the jury from considering character evidence along with aggravating and mitigating evidence in arriving at the death penalty option. He argues that the evidence presented by the State at the penalty hearing was solely evidence of his bad character, and the jury should have been instructed not to consider this evidence until after it weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. When a sentencing body is given discretion to impose the death sentence, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (Opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875, 97 S.Ct. 197, 50 L.Ed.2d 158 (1976). In Gallego v. State, this court explained the process by which a Nevada jury arrives at a sentence of death. 101 Nev. 782, 711 P.2d 856 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 246, 93 L.Ed.2d 171 (1986) (where jury was instructed not to consider evidence of uncharged homicides as aggravating circumstance, such evidence was relevant to the considerations of defendant's death worthiness). Individuals who are identified as potential recipients of the death penalty because of conduct statutorily defined as an aggravating circumstance must then be scrutinized according to their individual characteristics. 101 Nev. at 791, 711 P.2d at 862. In the present case, the jury was clearly instructed that it must find an aggravating circumstance before the death penalty was an option, and the aggravator was defined. Instruction 8B clearly states that evidence of other crimes is not to be considered as an aggravator. [2] We conclude that the instructions to the jury regarding the use of character evidence minimized the risk of arbitrary and capricious action, and no prejudicial error occurred.