Opinion ID: 1131456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the evidentiary problem and the legal effect, if any, of kelley's conviction

Text: Although the insured had conceded al most every undisputed fact relied on by Prudential, there is one point over which the parties differ. The insured maintains that Kelley merely shot in the direction of Willard and that the latter's injuries resulted from an accident or Kelley's negligence rather than from an intentional criminal act. Prudential had urged below that Kelley was convicted of the crime of shooting with intent to kill Willard. Inasmuch as this civil action is based on the same event for which, we are told, Kelley was held criminally accountable, the insurer urged that the issue of intent has already been resolved in its favor. On this record it is apparent that Prudential attempted to use the criminal conviction to show that Willard's injuries arose purely from the commission of a crime rather than from acts that are interconnected with, or reasonably related to, the use of an automobile. The insurer had tendered a copy of the appearance docket in Kelley's criminal case to show he had been charged, tried and convicted of intentionally shooting to kill the insured. [26] Although Kelley's intent is not per se relevant on the issue whether an accident had occurred (see Part II(A) of this opinion), it may be a circumstance to be considered in assessing the foreseeability of harm as well as in appraising the purpose for which Kelley used the uninsured car and the gun with which he fired. The foreseeability of harm to Willard and Kelley's purpose in using both the car and the gun are relevant to the inquiry into the causal connection between Willard's injuries and Kelley's use of the uninsured vehicle (see Part II(B) of this opinion). For this reason we now provide guidance for dealing, on remand, with proof of a criminal conviction. At common law judgments of conviction were inadmissible in a civil suit as proof of the facts essential to the criminal adjudication. [27] That legal norm now stands abrogated by the terms of the Evidence Code, [28] 12 O.S. 1981 § 2803(22). [29] A final judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence of the facts adjudicated by its terms; if an appeal is pending or appeal time has not yet run, evidence of the conviction may be admitted as another circumstance for the trier's consideration. [30] A trial judge, if called upon to do so, may take judicial notice of any record in the court on which he (or she) sits. When a case, pending or concluded in that court, is called to his attention and identified by number and style, a conviction cannot be proved by an appearance docket alone. It must be established by competent evidence [31]  i.e., the judgment roll. [32] Prudential may have done enough to benefit from judicial notice by tendering below a copy of the appearance docket in Kelley's criminal case, but, on this appellate record, the conviction has not been proved by the law's acceptable method. CERTIORARI IS GRANTED; THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INSURER IS REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS PRONOUNCEMENT. HARGRAVE, C.J., and HODGES, DOOLIN, ALMA WILSON and KAUGER, JJ., concur. LAVENDER and SUMMERS, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. SIMMS, J., dissents.