Opinion ID: 1984601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Presence

Text: The accused contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction for felony murder because there was insufficient evidence to establish an element of the underlying felony of robbery  that the property taken was taken from the victim's presence. Although this Court has recognized that robbery involves `the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another from his person or in his presence by the use of violence or by putting him in fear,' Hadder v. State, 238 Md. 341, 354, 209 A.2d 70, 77 (1965) (emphasis added), we have not previously considered the scope of the term presence. Courts in other jurisdictions that have considered the scope of the term generally agree that presence involves proximity and control. E.g., Cobern v. State, 273 Ala. 547, 551, 142 So.2d 869, 871 (1962); Clements v. State, 84 Ga. 660, 664, 11 S.E. 505, 506 (1890); State v. Constantine, 342 A.2d 735, 737 (Me. 1975); Lancaster v. State, 554 P.2d 32, 34 (Okla. Crim. 1976). Indeed, courts and commentators have described presence as requiring that the property taken must have been close enough to the victim and sufficiently under the victim's control that, had the latter not been subject to violence or intimidation by the robber, he could have prevented the taking. E.g., Commonwealth v. Homer, 235 Mass. 526, 533, 127 N.E. 517, 520 (1920); Fields v. State, 364 P.2d 723, 726 (Okla. Crim. 1961); see, e.g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 94 at 696 (1972); 4 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 473 (14th ed. 1981); 67 Am.Jur.2d Robbery § 12 (1973); 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 9 (1952). Thus, as stated as long ago as 1920, in Commonwealth v. Homer, 235 Mass. 526, 533, 127 N.E. 517, 520 (1920): `A thing is in the presence of a person, in respect to robbery, which is so within his reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.' Courts applying this principle have consistently held that property has been taken from the victim's presence if it was taken from a room in a building other than that in which the victim was present, e.g., State v. Calhoun, 72 Iowa 432, 436, 34 N.W. 194, 196 (1887); Constantine, 342 A.2d at 737; from a car parked outside the building, e.g., Cobern, 273 Ala. at 551, 142 So.2d at 871; State v. Hayes, 518 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Mo. 1975); Lancaster, 554 P.2d at 34; Fields, 364 P.2d at 726, or from another building on the premises, e.g., Clements, 84 Ga. at 664, 11 S.E. at 506. Here, there was evidence to show that the victim's property was taken from a room in a motel other than the one in which the victim was present at the time of the murder. This evidence was sufficient to support an inference that the victim's money was close enough and sufficiently under the victim's control for her to have prevented its taking had she not been killed. Thus, this evidence, if believed, was sufficient to show that the property was taken from the victim's presence. Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to show that a robbery had in fact been committed. B