Opinion ID: 1891965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: conversion of insurance.

Text: The circuit court's order was based on its finding that the defendant did not cooperate in the conversion of  health insurance coverage for the plaintiff [wife] . . . as required by paragraph 10 of the divorce judgment. The standard of review applicable on appeal from such a determination was set forth in Chandler v. Chandler, 25 Wis.2d 587, 131 N.W.2d 336 (1964). There this court considered whether certain medical and drug expenses were unusual medical expenses within the meaning of a divorce judgment. The court said that this was a factual issue, and that: . . . The test, therefore, to be applied to the trial court's determination of this issue is whether such determination is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. . . . Chandler, supra, 590. See also: Thies v. McDonald, 51 Wis.2d 296, 187 N.W.2d 186 (1971); and Foregger v. Foregger, 40 Wis.2d 632, 162 N.W.2d 553, 164 N.W.2d 226 (1968). [2] Similarly, in the instant action, the circuit court considered whether the defendant has cooperate[d] within the meaning of the judgment, and found that he had not. This finding will not be upset unless it is contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The defendant argues that his duty of cooperation was merely to act jointly or concurrently with the plaintiff, and that she . . . had the burden of taking the initial step. . . . She responds, and the court below agreed, that the defendant was required to cooperate by taking initial affirmative action to convert the insurance. This conclusion is supported by the record. The insurance policy specified the manner of effecting a conversion of coverage. The policy was at all times in the possession of the defendant. The testimony of the parties is in conflict as to contacts between them about insurance during the period immediately following the  divorce. However, the defendant did testify that after the divorce he kept the policy of insurance himself, and never contacted or informed the insurance company about the change in his marital status or spoke to them about giving the plaintiff an opportunity to convert the coverage. The plaintiff testified that she did not know when the coverage would lapse, and that she had asked defendant to inform her when anything changed, so that she could take any necessary action. He had told her he would assist her in obtaining coverage, but he did nothing. This evidence supports the finding of the trial court that the duty of the defendant under the judgment was to initiate the conversion by notifying the insurance company of the divorce. While the term cooperate is not without ambiguity in this context, the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence is not against the circuit court's conclusion that the defendant did not meet his duty of cooperation.