Opinion ID: 2347232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the 1964 transactions create contract rights?

Text: In Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 249 Md. 311, 239 A.2d 748 (1968) and Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967), we concluded that an agreement under which a developer makes certain concessions to a town or village in consideration of an undertaking by the town or village to support a requested change in a zoning classification did not constitute impermissible contract or conditional zoning because it was the county, and not the town or village, which had the power to zone or rezone. We are prepared to adopt a similar principle as being applicable here. It should be emphasized that the conveyance of a part of the Cranes' tract was not made to the City as a result of a private bargain struck between the City and the Cranes. Ordinance No. 148 was originated by the City and the Planning Commission to facilitate the construction of highways in developing areas. It proposed a mechanism available to any property owner who was willing to contribute a right of way. This cannot be equated with a situation where there is a change in the zoning classification of a particular property or the granting of a special exception to a particular owner conditioned upon some undertaking given by that owner to the legislative body, as was the case in Montgomery County v. National Capital Realty Corp., 267 Md. 364, 373-75, 297 A.2d 675, 680-81 (1972). The Cranes rely on Ward v. City of New Rochelle, 20 Misc.2d 122, 197 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 9 App. Div.2d 911, 197 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 1959), aff'd without opinion, 8 N.Y.2d 895, 204 N.Y.S.2d 144, 168 N.E.2d 821 (1960). There, Mrs. Ward was the owner of a 62.2-acre tract, which had recently been placed in an R-1A District (individual residence on lots containing 10,000 square feet). The New Rochelle City School District requested Mrs. Ward to contribute a 13.3-acre parcel, for the construction of an elementary school and recreational facilities. Mrs. Ward agreed, if the 13.3-acre parcel, worth $140,000.00, were taken into account in permitting Mrs. Ward to divide her remaining land into lots, a proposal which was approved by the City Planning Board on 10 December 1956. Mrs. Ward made the necessary conveyances in December, 1956 and January, 1957. Six days after the last conveyance, the Planning Board disapproved the subdivision plan, and recommended that the property be put in a classification requiring 20,000 square foot lots. Mrs. Ward brought an action for a declaration of her rights. In the course of an opinion upholding Mrs. Ward's contention that she should be permitted to develop her land in accordance with the subdivision plan submitted, the referee noted: Vested rights are variously defined in various cases, and no case has been found which is the parallel of this case. Most cases of vested rights grow out of circumstances in which a permit has been issued by some municipal official with authority, and pursuant to that permit, the permittee proceeds with his improvements, spends money to further it, and obligates himself in reference to it. It should be pointed out that if, in such cases, a vested right comes into being, although such expenditures are expected to be recouped by the sale of lots, how much more readily should a vested right come into being in a case such as this, where the permittee has actually permanently parted with land of great value for the benefit of the School District and the City, as well, with no chance of recoupment, as in the case of the usual permittee, who claims a vested right. 20 Misc.2d at 128, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 70-71. The City would have us distinguish this case, largely on the ground that the result was reached on equitable considerations. We perceive no real difference between the Cranes' situation and Mrs. Ward's.