Opinion ID: 174536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other FHA Claims

Text: The FHA also prohibits retaliation against any person on account of his having exercised or enjoyed a right granted or protected by the FHA. 42 U.S.C. § 3617; see generally Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program. Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 54 (2d Cir.2002) (elements of FHA retaliation claim). Appellants vaguely assert that the City's code enforcement actions were retaliatory, but they have not identified how they exercised or encouraged others to exercise rights under the FHA or how the City retaliated. Appellants' unsupported and conclusory allegations cannot defeat summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (nonmoving party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather its response must ... set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial) (emphasis added); Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 728 (8th Cir.2007) (same). Further, to the extent that Appellants allege that the City retaliated against them for leasing to tenants in protected classes, their claim fails as a matter of law. Appellants were not exercising a right under the FHA by leasing to racial minorities. Were we to adopt Appellants' expansive view of § 3617, every disparate treatment claim would automatically become a retaliation claim. Appellants also contend that the City failed to affirmatively further fair housing, contrary to its certifications to HUD. [7] Included in this duty, according to Appellants, was an obligation to analyze impediments to fair housing. This claim is not properly before the Court because Appellants failed to pursue it as anything more than background information before the district court. See Universal Title, 942 F.2d at 1314. Were we to consider this claim, we would nonetheless conclude that the City's duty to affirmatively further fair housing has no independent significance. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F.Supp.2d 33, 72-73 (D.Mass. 2002) (duty to affirmatively further fair housing mirrors the obligations imposed by the FHA); see also Charleston Hous. Auth., 419 F.3d at 740 (assuming that the affirmatively further fair housing claim is subsumed by the FHA claim). Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Appellants' claims that the City unlawfully retaliated against them, failed to affirmatively further fair housing, and failed to analyze impediments to fair housing.
Appellants' claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985 are duplicative with their FHA disparate treatment claim, as the underlying constitutional violations for these claims require a showing of discriminatory intent. See Dirden v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 86 F.3d 112, 114 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (sections 1981 and 1982); Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th Cir.1996) (section 1985). Appellants acknowledge this overlap and argue that the district court did not consider the evidence from the FHA analysis when it evaluated their constitutional claims. However, the evidence from the FHA analysis is insufficient to establish discriminatory intent, and therefore it is irrelevant that the district court did not repeat its analysis. Because there is insufficient evidence to show a discriminatory intent, see supra Sec. II-A-(1), summary judgment was proper as to Appellants' claims under §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985.
Appellants contend that the district court improperly dismissed their equal-protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Appellants do not argue that they are members of a suspect class or that their claims involve a fundamental right. Instead, they assert a class of one claim based on the City's preferential treatment of the Public Housing Authority (PHA), a distinct government entity funded by HUD that provided 4,300 units of public housing in St. Paul. To prevail on this claim, Appellants must prove that the City intentionally treated [them] differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam). Even assuming arguendo that the City intentionally treated PHA differently than private property owners, summary judgment was warranted because Appellants have not refuted the rational basis for treating PHA differently from private rental properties. As the district court explained, PHA is an organization with a comprehensive inspection schedule, staff dedicated to maintenance, and a demonstrated record for maintaining its properties. Steinhauser, 595 F.Supp.2d at 1008. The evidence presented by Appellees shows that PHA responds quickly and appropriately to DNHPI correction orders. The district court concluded, Given the City's limited resources and PHA's record of maintaining its properties, Defendants have a rational basis for permitting PHA to manage its own repairs. Id. at 1009. Appellants fail to explain why this justification was inadequate. We conclude, therefore, that summary judgment was appropriate on their equal-protection claim.
Appellants in Case No. 09-1209 (the Gallagher Appellants) appeal the dismissal of their substantive due process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We interpret their claim as challenging the City's Housing Code enforcement as applied to them, not as a facial challenge to any policy or practice. [T]he theory of substantive due process is properly reserved for truly egregious and extraordinary cases. Myers v. Scott County, 868 F.2d 1017, 1018 (8th Cir.1989). To prevail on this claim, the Gallagher Appellants must show a constitutionally protected property interest and that [City] officials used their power in such an arbitrary and oppressive way that it `shocks the conscience.' Entergy, Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 991 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)). In light of the uncontested legitimate goals of enforcing the Housing Code, there is insufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that this is a truly egregious and extraordinary example of government regulation. In addition, the Gallagher Appellants contend that Code Compliance Certification violated their substantive due process rights because that procedure conflicts with the Minnesota State Building Code. The supposed conflict with Minnesota state law is not actionable under § 1983, Myers, 868 F.2d at 1018, and will be discussed further in Section II-G. For these reasons, summary judgment was proper on the Gallagher Appellants' substantive due process claim.
The Gallagher Appellants allege that the St. Paul Legislative Code is void for vagueness in violation of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They appear to assert both an as applied challenge and a facial challenge. First, the Gallagher Appellants challenge the term vacant building in § 43.02(7)(e) as applied to the property at 1522/1524 Carroll Ave. The Carroll Ave. property was allegedly declared vacant twenty-three days after the property was sold to Appellant Troy Allison. The Gallagher Appellants complain that the DNHPI inspector ignored the obvious occupancy of the home and based his vacancy determination merely on an observation that the second-story window lacked any blinds or window coverings. However, as the district court noted, Allison admitted in his deposition testimony that the downstairs unit at the Carroll Ave. property was unoccupied and had multiple Housing Code violations when the City declared it a vacant building. The Gallagher Appellants do not challenge that finding on appeal. As such, the Carroll Ave. property was clearly within the definition of a vacant building. See St. Paul, Minn.Code § 43.02(7)(e) (defining a vacant building as [a] building or portion of a building which is . . . unoccupied and has multiple housing or building code violations). Therefore, Allison cannot complain of the vagueness of § 43.02(7)(e). See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.). The Gallagher Appellants also assert a facial challenge to several chapters of the St. Paul Code under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Facial challenges to legislative enactments are, to say the least, discouraged. See United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033, 1037 (8th Cir. 2010). Appellants' basic complaint is that the St. Paul Code does not provide sufficient notice of rental property owners' obligations under the law, placing unwarranted discretion in the hands of DNHPI. The Gallagher Appellants point to several City employees' inability to explain the categorization of vacant buildings and the meaning of the terms problem property and Code Compliance Certification. However, the Gallagher Appellants must do more than allege general confusion regarding a legislative enactment. To start with, they must identify a particular section of the St. Paul Code that is impermissibly vague, as we will not declare entire chapters of the St. Paul Code facially unconstitutional. Appellants fail to reference a particular section of the St. Paul Code, let alone analyze why that section is vague. Without more, the Gallagher Appellants' facial void-for-vagueness claim fails as a matter of law.
Appellants allege causes of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). A plaintiff who brings suit under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) must prove that the defendant engaged in (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1347 (8th Cir.1997). Under § 1962(d), conspiracy to violate § 1962(c) is also prohibited. Racketeering activity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) as a list of predicate acts, including certain state law crimes, conduct that is indictable under various federal provisions, and numerous other offenses. On appeal, Appellants have narrowed the alleged RICO predicate acts to several patterns of conduct, which we address in turn. Appellants allege that Magner, a DNHPI supervisor, engaged in a scheme of extortion and attempted extortion. Specifically, they allege that Magner approached property owners after he wrote up Housing Code violations and offered to arrange a sale of their property for a price well-below market value. It is undisputed that none of those property owners actually accepted Magner's offer. Appellants assert that Magner transferred inside knowledge to a close friend, Wally Nelson, who subsequently purchased many distressed single family and duplex homes under Magner's control. They further allege that Nelson, in return, has provided construction services to Magner's father at a discounted rate. Even if we assume there is sufficient evidence of a RICO predicate act, Appellants lack standing to challenge Magner's conduct. Importantly, the only evidence offered to support Appellants' allegations are three affidavits from rental-property owners who are not plaintiffs in these consolidated lawsuits. Appellants have not shown that they themselves suffered any injury from the alleged extortion scheme, and therefore their RICO-based extortion claims fail for lack of standing. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) ([T]he plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.); Bowman v. W. Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 384 (8th Cir.1993) (Section 1964(c) confers standing on any individual who has experienced injury to his or her business or property that occurred `by reason of a RICO violation'); see also Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1347 (2d Cir.1994). Next, the Appellants in Cases No. 09-1528 and 09-1579 argue on appeal that the City went so far as to `fix' the State District Court in their favor. Collectively, the allegations amount to a pattern of cooperation between Dawkins, the city attorney, the mayor, a housing referee, and a Minnesota state judge, resulting in a crackdown on landlords in the City. Though these are serious allegations, summary judgment was nonetheless appropriate. The sole evidentiary basis for this claim is Appellant Meysembourg's affidavit, which essentially mirrors the argument in Appellants' brief. Notably, Meysembourg's affidavit merely states that he learned this troublesome story without any explanation of how he learned it. Appellants may not rest on mere allegations, but instead must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Postscript Enters. v. City of Bridgeton, 905 F.2d 223, 226 (8th Cir.1990) (quotation omitted). Affidavits are one way to set forth such facts, but the affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, must set forth facts which would be admissible in evidence, and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated. Id. Under these standards, Appellants' proffered evidence is insufficient. Alternatively, Appellants' claim fails because they have not explained what predicate act they are alleging. General allegations of inter-governmental cooperation and use of phrases like buy in are not enough to formulate a RICO claim. Appellants allege other predicate acts, including falsification of Housing Code violations, intentional delay and misdirection of notices, concealment of the strict nature of the Housing Code, condemnation of properties without justification, and violation of the state building code. These claims, however, lack adequate evidentiary support for a RICO claim. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate on all of Appellants' RICO claims.