Opinion ID: 183847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Tan and Dr. Graff

Text: Smith‘s main argument is that the hypothetical question did not sufficiently include Dr. Tan‘s and Dr. Graff‘s conclusions that Smith was ―moderately limited‖ in the various areas that they noted in Section I of the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. As the Social Security Administration‘s guidelines (the ―Program Operations Manual System,‖ or ―POMS‖) explain, however, ―Section I is merely a worksheet to aid in deciding the presence and degree of functional limitations and the adequacy of documentation and does not constitute the RFC assessment.‖ POMS DI 24510.060, available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0424510060 (emphasis added). Numerous district courts in this circuit have recognized this point and held that Section I of the form may be assigned little or no weight. See Molloy v. Astrue, No. 7 08-4801, 2010 WL 421090, at  (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2010) (―According to the Social Security Administration‘s internal operating guidelines . . . , this section of the examination form does not constitute the RFC assessment but rather is merely a worksheet to aid employees. Therefore, [the ALJ] was not required to assign any weight to this part of the report because it was not the final RFC finding.‖ (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Liggett v. Astrue, No. 08-1913, 2009 WL 189934, at  (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2009) (explaining that ―Dr. Chiampi‘s actual mental residual functional capacity assessment [was located] in Part III of the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Form‖ and that ―the undersigned does not accept the ‗summary conclusions‘ in Part I as the assessment of the claimant‘s mental residual functional capacity here‖); Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-1951, 2008 WL 5244384, at  (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2008) (―[T]he check blocks in Section I of the assessment do not constitute the assessment itself, but function rather as a worksheet to aid the physician in making an assessment. Therefore, the ALJ's hypothetical accurately reflected [the doctors‘] opinion of Plaintiff‘s condition.‖ (citation omitted)). The District Court also understood this point. See Smith v. Astrue, No. 08 Civ. 2875, 2009 WL 1372536, at  (D.N.J. May 15, 2009) (―As the Commissioner correctly notes, Section I is not the actual Residual Functional Capacity (‗RFC‘) assessment, but rather a worksheet to aid in determining the presence and degree of functional limitations. Instead, the actual mental RFC assessment is found in Section III of the Form.‖). Parenthetically, it bears noting that the definition of ―moderate limitation‖ assumed by Meola is incorrect, as the Social Security Administration has provided a specific definition of the term in the context of the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. See POMS DI 24510.063(B)(2), available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0424510063 (indicating that ―moderately limited‖ should be selected when ―the individual‘s capacity to perform the activity is impaired‖). The definition does not require that the individual‘s capacity be at a level that is unacceptable in a national workforce; rather, the instructions specify that ―[t]he 8 degree and extent of the capacity or limitation must be described in narrative format in Section III.‖ Id. Because Smith cannot rely on the worksheet component of the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment to contend that the hypothetical question was deficient, his argument is without merit as it pertains to Dr. Tan and Dr. Graff.