Opinion ID: 1283283
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the case an administrative appeal?

Text: Foster claims the superior court erred in treating this action as an administrative appeal, rather than as an action to completely re-examine his chain of title. We disagree. The Land Registration Law does not establish a right to a superior court determination of eligibility to repurchase. Instead, it addresses jurisdictional questions only in the most general language: The Department of Natural Resources shall administer this chapter. AS 34.10.010. We interpret this as a grant of original jurisdiction exclusively to the DNR. Agency determinations, of course, are subject to judicial review under Appellate Rule 601. Nor does any other statute create a cause of action for Foster that could be brought directly in superior court to determine one's right to repurchase. For example, the right to a quiet title action is spelled out in AS 09.45.010, but only for one in possession of property. [7] An owner not in possession of property may bring an action for ejectment under AS 09.45.630. [8] But since Foster does not claim to be the current owner, he has no present right to eject. While a declaratory judgment action might seem possible pursuant to AS 22.10.020(b), such actions cannot normally be used to circumvent limitations inherent in appeals, such as scope of review. [9] Also, the case was not so pleaded. Even without a statutory cause of action, the superior court arguably could have exercised its equitable powers to examine Foster's chain of title anew. Equitable jurisdiction generally is not dependent on statutory authorization. See, e.g., Dutton v. Rocky Mountain Phosphates, 438 P.2d 674, 684 (Mont. 1968); Marley v. Cannon, 618 P.2d 401, 404 (Okla. 1980); Robinson v. Manning, 378 P.2d 277, 280 (Or. 1963). But, [t]he exercise of equitable jurisdiction is a matter of discretion for the trial court. Wolff v. Arctic Bowl, Inc., 560 P.2d 758, 770 (Alaska 1977). Thus, Foster's only right in superior court was the right to appeal the adverse agency determination. The superior court, in its appellate capacity, could have granted a trial de novo. Alaska R.App.P. 609. However, it declined to do so, stating, This court will not decide the probable record owner or discount gaps in the chain of title. Since Foster has advanced no good reason why he should be allowed to present the same evidence twice, we will not disturb the superior court's exercise of discretion. [10]