Opinion ID: 362454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence as to walker

Text: 35 All of the defendants were charged in an indictment alleging that they did wilfully . . . conspire . . . to commit offenses against the United States. . . . It was part of said conspiracy that the defendants would knowingly and intentionally import into the United States from a place outside thereof, a controlled substance . . . Although defendant Walker concedes that he loaded marijuana aboard the NAHOA, he contends, first, that there was insufficient evidence to establish that there was a conspiracy to import marijuana Into the United States ; moreover, even if the other defendants joined in such a scheme, there was no evidence whatsoever to establish that he had knowledge that the plot was directed at the United States. He maintains that he believed the NAHOA was bound for a rendezvous with a Canadian trawler off George's Bank when it was apprehended by United States Coast Guard authorities. 36 Walker was convicted of conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) which makes it illegal to import into the United States from any place outside thereof, any controlled substance . . . Our duty here is to determine whether a reasonable jury could, after hearing all the evidence, conclude that the defendant was guilty of the specific crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 5 Cir. 1978, 575 F.2d 524, 527; United States v. Alonzo, 5 Cir. 1978, 571 F.2d 1384, 1387; United States v. Warner, 5 Cir. 1971, 441 F.2d 821, 825, Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829, 92 S.Ct. 65, 30 L.Ed.2d 58. It would not suffice to show that beyond peradventure he was engaged in some other criminal act. 37 To achieve a conviction on the conspiracy count, the government had the burden of proving an agreement among the defendants including Walker, the intended purpose of which was a violation of United States law. The essence of conspiracy is agreement; (n)obody is liable in conspiracy except for the fair import of the concerted purpose or agreement as he understands it. United States v. Peoni, 2 Cir. 1938, 100 F.2d 401, 403 (L. Hand, J.). See also United States v. Borelli, 2 Cir. 1964, 336 F.2d 376, 384, Cert. denied, 1965, 379 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 647, 13 L.Ed.2d 555; United States v. Andolschek, 2 Cir. 1944, 142 F.2d 503, 507. It is not necessary that the members of the conspiracy know all the details of the plan, but they must be aware of the essential nature and scope of the enterprise and intend to participate. United States v. Rosenblatt, 2 Cir. 1977, 554 F.2d 36, 38; Stanley v. United States, 6 Cir. 1957, 245 F.2d 427, 430; Duke v. United States, 5 Cir. 1956, 233 F.2d 897, 901. Such knowledge must be clear and unequivocal, but can be inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties involved. United States v. Addonizio, 3 Cir. 1971, 449 F.2d 100, 102, Cert. denied, 1972, 404 U.S. 1058, 92 S.Ct. 737, 30 L.Ed.2d 746; United States v. Gallishaw, 2 Cir. 1970, 428 F.2d 760, 763; United States v. Fellabaum, 7 Cir. 1969, 408 F.2d 220, 224, Cert. denied, 396 U.S. 818, 858, 90 S.Ct. 55, 125, 24 L.Ed.2d 69, 109. 38 Conspiracy to import a controlled substance into the United States requires proof of an agreement to commit every element of that substantive offense. Just as a defendant cannot be convicted of such a conspiracy without knowledge that the substance he was carrying was controlled, See, e. g., United States v. Restrepo-Granda, supra, 575 F.2d at 529, or without knowledge that he was transporting some substance, See, e. g., United States v. Jones, 9 Cir. 1975, 518 F.2d 64, 67; United States v. Jiminez, 5 Cir. 1973, 484 F.2d 91, 92, so the government must meet the burden of showing that the conspiracy to import was directed at the United States. Cf. Ingram v. United States, 1959, 360 U.S. 672, 677-78, 79 S.Ct. 1314, 1319, 3 L.Ed.2d 1503 (It is fundamental that a conviction for conspiracy . . . cannot be sustained unless there is 'proof of an agreement to commit an offense against the United States.' Pereira v. United States, (1954,) 347 U.S. 1, 12, 74 S.Ct. 358, 364, 98 L.Ed. 435.); United States v. Bright, 5 Cir. 1977, 550 F.2d 240, 241 (The essential elements of a criminal conspiracy are an agreement among the conspirators to commit an offense against the United States attended by an overt act of one of them in furtherance of the agreement). See also United States v. Barrera, 5 Cir. 1977, 547 F.2d 1250, 1256; United States v. Isaacs, 5 Cir. 1975, 516 F.2d 409, 410, Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 936, 96 S.Ct. 295, 46 L.Ed.2d 269. 39 The requirement that Walker know the destination of the cargo to be convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana into the United States in no way contradicts the holding of the Supreme Court in United States v. Feola, 1975, 420 U.S. 671, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541. Feola concerned merely the interpretation of a conspiracy statute in order to divine and effectuate congressional intent. The Court concluded that a person who joins in a conspiracy to assault someone can be convicted of conspiracy to assault a federal officer even though the conspirator had no knowledge that the victim was a federal agent. (I)n order to effectuate the congressional purpose of according maximum protection to federal officers by making prosecution for assaults upon them cognizable in the federal courts, (18 U.S.C.) § 111 cannot be construed as embodying an unexpressed requirement that an assailant be aware that his victim is a federal officer. All the statute requires is an intent to assault, not an intent to assault a federal officer. Id., 420 U.S. at 684, 95 S.Ct. at 1264, 43 L.Ed.2d at 552. This interpretation was followed by us in United States v. Bell, 5 Cir. 1978, 577 F.2d 1313, in determining the statutory elements of a conspiracy to violate the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-2313, prohibiting interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles. 40 In Feola, the Court further noted that the defendant's state of mind may, however, be a relevant consideration; (t)he statute does require a criminal intent, 420 U.S. at 686, 95 S.Ct. at 1264, 43 L.Ed.2d at 553. Here, if it be assumed that Walker indeed planned only to cooperate in the export of marijuana to Canada, there would be no criminal intent on his part cognizable in an American court and no federal interest involved. The importation of marijuana into Canada may or may not violate Canadian law. Even if it does, the question might be raised whether the Congress has the power, as a matter of due process, to make criminal a conspiracy entered into abroad directed only against another foreign country. We need not reach that question here for Congress has shown no intention even by remote implication to punish a person who in some other nation conspires against the laws of a third nation. Therefore, Walker's conviction on the conspiracy count necessarily must be supported by proof that he knew the marijuana was destined for the United States. 41 The government demonstrated the existence of an agreement involving marijuana smuggling, and showed continual activities related thereto, terminating only upon the capture of the NAHOA. There was testimony by the government informant, later contradicted by defendant Schubert on the witness stand, that the ship was bound for Connecticut or elsewhere on the eastern coast of the United States. The ship's name was written in English, and its master and all of the crew save Budal were Americans. There was also uncontroverted testimony by the government informant, Budal, that Schubert made phone calls to Walker in Jamaica during the course of the conspiracy, and that Walker joined the other defendants on board the NAHOA after the marijuana had been loaded. Had there been no testimony on behalf of the defense, Walker would not have been entitled to a directed verdict. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to warrant his conviction. 42 The defense did offer Schubert's testimony regarding Walker's knowledge of the ship's destination. Schubert, it will be recalled, was one of the original planners. He testified unequivocally that the NAHOA was bound for George's Bank, and that Walker was the only one aboard the vessel to whom Schubert divulged the plan. Walker was apprised of the destination because he had a financial interest in it. The defense sought to corroborate this by showing that the vessel did have a detailed chart of northern waters but none of the waters of the southern United States where the NAHOA was apprehended. 43 Clearly Walker joined in a plan to ship marijuana and he admittedly participated actively in efforts to consummate it. The jury might have believed Schubert's account, or it might have found it adequate to create reasonable doubt that Walker knew the destination of the cargo. Yet, it might also have refused to believe Schubert when he identified the destination of the cargo as Canada and sought to exonerate Walker. Under the circumstances we cannot find that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker had the requisite knowledge and intent to be guilty of conspiracy to import marijuana into the United States.