Opinion ID: 2518074
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wernberg v. State

Text: In Wernberg v. State, the only Alaska case since statehood relevant to the case before us, we referred to the many and varied rights of riparian owners that, generally speaking, include the right to build wharves and piers out to deep water if this can be done without interfering with navigation. [28] DNR characterizes this mention of the right to wharf out as a passing reference and classic obiter dictum, while Alaska Riverways argues that Wernberg firmly establishe[d] the right to wharf out in Alaska. The riparian rights listed in Wernberg were derived from a law review article published several years earlier, [29] and were not specific to Alaska nor, apart from the right of access to navigable waters, discussed in any detail in the opinion. It does not appear that the plaintiff in Wernberg had built or maintained a wharf. Wernberg involved a challenge to the state's construction of a highway preventing plaintiff's historical access to the Cook Inlet with his fishing boats via the creek and tidewaters adjacent to his property. Confirming the importance of the common-law right of access in Alaska, we held that this interference could constitute a taking requiring compensation. [30] We expressed a concern that a contrary holding might devalue riparian property: Alaska has a seacoast longer than that of the entire United States. A large number of Alaskan communities are located on the shores of bays and inlets in order to gain water access for transportation and shipping, or easy access to the fertile fishing grounds of Alaska. A substantial amount of development in these cities is along the waterfront.... [A] declaration that littoral access may be taken for any public purpose without compensation will immediately devalue property in such areas and limit the development of many isolated communities whose only means of access is by water.[ [31] ] While recognizing the importance of the right of access in Alaska, we also noted that the rights of riparian owners are not absolute, but are subject to those general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare, exercised pursuant to the state's police power. [32] We concluded that the Alaska Constitution, while authorizing the state to take plaintiff's right of access to construct a highway, [33] also required it to compensate plaintiff for his loss of access. [34] While Wernberg made a generalized statement that the right to wharf out was included among the rights of a riparian owner, it did not specifically address the scope and limitations of this right, nor whether it had been altered by the Alaska Constitution or by statute. Rather, Wernberg addressed a riparian owner's right of access, holding that the state may not take a riparian owner's right of access to navigable waters without compensation. It does not necessarily follow from this holding that the state may not require an owner who builds a wharf over state land to enter into a lease. For these reasons, Wernberg is not controlling. We next consider to what extent the common-law right to wharf out that was recognized in territorial days has been limited by the public trust doctrine, the Alaska Constitution, and actions by the Alaska Legislature, and whether any of these sources authorize DNR to require a riparian owner that builds a wharf over state land to enter into a lease.