Opinion ID: 771984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alien Tort Claims Act

Text: 26 The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, provides: The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. The plaintiffs argue that [i]f the [Egyptian] government seized the plaintiffs' property as part of a national program of religious persecution, the seizure violated the law of nations and therefore conferred federal jurisdiction under the [Alien Tort Claims Act]. The argument is misdirected. It does not matter for purposes of determining whether there is jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act whether the Egyptian government violated international law because there is no allegation that Coca-Cola was involved in the taking of the Bigios' property or complicit in the government's alleged violation of international law. 27 The complaint alleges that sometime after 1993, Coca-Cola purchased or leased the plaintiffs' property from ENBC with full knowledge that ENBC had acquired the property through unlawful confiscation on the basis of religion. The complaint contains no other allegation of wrongful conduct by Coca-Cola. We confine our discussion to the allegations in the complaint because if the complaint did not plead a violation of the law of nations by Coca Cola, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act, and neither it nor we may consider the matter further under the Act. See Kadic v. Karadi, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) ([T]he Alien Tort Act requires that plaintiffs plead a 'violation of the law of nations' at the jurisdictional threshold.... (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350)); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1980) (distinguishing Alien Tort Claims Act, with its jurisdictional pleading requirement, from general federal question jurisdiction, which is not defeated by the possibility that the averments in the complaint may fail to state a cause of action (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946))). 28 The first issue we must address is whether Coca-Cola can have violated the law of nations if it acted solely as a non-governmental entity. 29 This Court held in Kadic that certain forms of conduct by private individuals may violate the law of nations even where the individual in question does not act under color of law. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. We took note of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1986), which identifies those violations that are actionable when committed by a state and a more limited category of violations of 'universal concern'... . Id. at 240. And there are 'a handful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibility.' Id. (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985)). The relevant portion of the Restatement provides: 30 A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where [no other basis of jurisdiction] is present. 31 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 (1986). We held in Kadic that war crimes and acts of genocide are actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act without regard to state action, but that torture and summary execution - when not perpetrated in the course of genocide or war crimes - are proscribed by international law only when committed by state officials or under color of law. 70 F.3d at 243. 32 The complaint's sole allegation against Coca-Cola is that it acquired or leased property that previously had been expropriated on the basis of the owners' religion. However reprehensible, neither racial or religious discrimination in general nor the discriminatory expropriation of property in particular is listed as an act of universal concern in §404 or is sufficiently similar to the listed acts for us to treat them as though they were incorporated into §404 by analogy. Instead, these forms of conduct are included only in §§ 702 and 712 of the Restatement, which describe conduct that violates international law when undertaken by a state actor, which (as explained below) Coca-Cola was not. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 & cmts. j & m (racial and religious discrimination), § 712 (discriminatory taking of property). 33 If a plaintiff does not allege conduct that supports private liability under international law, he or she must plead that the conduct was committed by state officials or under color of law in order for the court to exercise jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. The question therefore is whether Coca-Cola was a state actor for these purposes. In Kadic we observed: 34 The color of law jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. §1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act. A private individual acts under color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid. 35 Id. at 245 (citation omitted). The complaint does not allege that Coca-Cola acted together with state officials. Neither was Coca-Cola charged with committing a violation of the law of nations with significant state aid. There is no allegation in the complaint that Coca-Cola's ability to purchase the property in question was enhanced by the transfer of the property from the Bigios to Misr -- in other words, that its ability to purchase the property, or the price it paid, depended on the fact that the Egyptian government had expropriated the Bigios' property. A private party does not act under color of law simply by purchasing property from the government. 36 On appeal, the plaintiffs have attempted to expand their allegations against Coca-Cola by articulating claims not included in the complaint. 37 The plaintiffs allege, first, that Coca-Cola may have been a participant or co-conspirator in the Egyptian government's actions in the 1960's. The Plaintiffs argue that Coca-Cola's precise role in the seizure by the Egyptian government cannot be known prior to discovery. There is no allegation in the complaint, let alone any hint of evidence, however, that Coca-Cola had any role as a participant or co-conspirator in the confiscation of the Bigios' property. 38 The plaintiffs allege, second, that Coca-Cola may be held liable for any economic benefit it derived before 1994 from the seizure of the plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs submit: 39 If the plaintiffs are permitted to engage in discovery of Coca-Cola's records and to depose its officers and employees, they may establish that Coca-Cola benefitted from the sequestration and nationalization of its landlord's property. How did Coca-Cola's business and profits compare before the Bigio property was seized and after the seizure? Did the expropriation of the Bigios' property provide any economic benefit to Coca-Cola? 40 The causal chain between the Egyptian government's seizure and Coca-Cola's benefit is not articulated. An indirect economic benefit from unlawful state action is not sufficient to support jurisdiction over a private party under the Alien Tort Claims Act. Cf. Ginsburg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1999) (Section 1983 [which, we have noted, is analogous to the Alien Tort Claims Act for these purposes] does not impose civil liability on persons who merely stand to benefit from an assertion of authority under color of law, but only on those who act under color of law.). Thus, even if this allegation were included in the complaint, the Alien Tort Claims Act would not provide for jurisdiction over this claim. 41 The plaintiffs allege, third, that Coca-Cola failed to prevent the Egyptian Government from seizing the Bigios' property in the 1960's. Yet the plaintiffs do not explain why Coca-Cola was under a legal obligation to intervene or how it possibly could have done so, and they point to no legal authority for the proposition that a private party may be liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act or § 1983, which is comparable for these purposes, for its failure to stop unlawful state action. Again, even if included in the complaint, this claim would not fall within the scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act. 42 We conclude that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to plead a violation of the law of nations by Coca Cola. The district court therefore did not have subject matter jurisdiction over their claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1350.