Opinion ID: 1918397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred when it granted the state's jury instruction s-2 which defined the crime of kidnaping.

Text: ¶ 12. Chevalier objected to jury instruction S-2 on the grounds that it did not correctly define the crime of kidnapping. Instruction S-2 read: The defendant, Mark Chevalier, has been charged with the crime of kidnapping. If you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that: The defendant, Mark Chevalier, did on or about March 22, 1996, wilfully, feloniously, intentionally and forcibly seize and confine Karen B. Chevalier, a human being, against the will of and without the consent of Karen B. Chevalier, by forcing her into a vehicle and driving away from the scene, Then you shall find the defendant guilty of kidnapping. Chevalier claims that this is a misstatement of the law. He asserts that the crime of kidnapping consists not only of the elements of intent to forcibly seize and confine a person, but also requires the intent to secretly confine that person. According to Chevalier, a forcible seizure and confinement which lacks the latter element is an assault, not a kidnapping. ¶ 13. The statute defining kidnapping, Section 97-3-53, reads: Any person who shall without lawful authority forcibly seize and confine any other person, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned against his or her will ....shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for life in the state penitentiary if the punishment is so fixed by the jury in its verdict ... Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-53 (1994) (emphasis added). It is a long-settled rule of this Court that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Reining v. State, 606 So.2d 1098, 1103 (Miss.1992); State v. Burnham, 546 So.2d 690, 692 (Miss. 1989). Construction of criminal statutes means a reasonable construction, which requires some consideration of the statutory purpose. See Id. Nonetheless, we should not read out any language which is obviously contained in the statute. ¶ 14. In Aikerson v. State, 274 So.2d 124 (Miss.1973), this Court reversed the kidnapping conviction because the indictment, like the jury instruction here, failed to adequately set out the very same elements necessary for kidnapping, that were not set out in this case. The Aikerson Court observed that the failings in question would rewrite the statute to read, Any person who shall without lawful authority forcibly seize and confine any other person ... against his or her will ... shall on conviction suffer death or be imprisoned for life in the state penitentiary if the punishment is so fixed by the jury in its verdict,... Aikerson, 274 So.2d at 127. We went on to say that such a reading of the statute would mean that any person who seized and held another in a fist fight would be guilty of kidnapping. Id. The point is that our kidnapping statute requires more than intentional seizing or confining, it requires such acts with a specific intent. ¶ 15. Because § 97-3-53 requires strict construction and the instruction in this case fails to direct the jury that it must find Chevalier seized and confined Karen Chevalier with the intent to secretly confine or imprison before he could be found guilty of kidnapping, we must reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.