Opinion ID: 1893812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Improper Statements on Voir Dire and in Argument

Text: Tisius alleges several instances during voir dire and in guilt phase closing argument in which the prosecutor committed misconduct and in which trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. [2]
During voir dire, the prosecutor told the panel that a county prosecutor can request assistance from the attorney general in a case and that the Randolph County prosecutor had requested such assistance because the county has not had the misfortune of having that many murders so it is not something with which he comes into contact regularly. Trial counsel did not object to this statement. In his amended motion, Tisius alleged that this statement suggested to the jury panel that the case was among the worst in the county and warranted the death penalty. The prosecutor's explanation did not suggest a qualitative difference between Tisius' case and other murder cases. The motion court did not clearly err in finding that Tisius was not prejudiced by the comment and that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. Tisius also alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the panel whether they could consider the different mental states for first and second-degree murder. Tisius contends that counsel's failure prevented him from discovering whether prospective jurors could impartially consider second degree murder in a case in which law enforcement officers were the victims. Jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions. State v. Gilbert, 103 S.W.3d 743, 751 (Mo. banc 2003). The jury was instructed on the difference between first and second-degree murder. Tisius' speculative allegations do not overcome the presumption that the jury followed the instructions. The motion court did not clearly err in denying relief on this claim.
Tisius alleges five instances in which counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements made in closing arguments. First, Tisius alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the following argument: Did the defendant commit murder in the second degree? Yes. Because murder in the second degree is a lesser included offense. What does that mean? That means that if you commit murder in the first-degree, murder in the second degree has also been committed. You have to in order to commit murder in the first degree have done something more. And that was deliberation. That's the only difference between murder in the second degree of one submission than the other, murder in the second But keep in mind if you find that he did the three elements he shot these two men, he knew that he was doing was likely to kill. And he did it after deliberation, you don't even have to consider the rest of it. You look at murder second if and only if you do not believe that we proved those things beyond a reasonable doubt. But we did. Tisius claims that this was an improper acquittal first argument because it told the jury that it could only consider second degree murder if they first acquitted him of first degree murder. Missouri's instructions on lesser-included offenses do not require that the defendant first be acquitted of the greater offense before the jury can consider the lesser offense. State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 517 (Mo. banc 1994). Instead, MAI-CR3d 313.04 provides that juries are allowed to consider the lesser-included offense if they do not find the defendant guilty of the greater offense. Id. Therefore, an acquittal first argument is a misstatement of the law and can constitute reversible error. Tisius' claim is without merit. The jury was properly instructed on lesser-included offenses with an instruction tracking MAI-CR3d 313.04. The jury is presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions. State v. Gilbert, 103 S.W.3d 743, 751 (Mo. banc 2003). Additionally, even if this argument were considered an acquittal first argument, the strength of the evidence of deliberation precludes a finding of prejudice. Second, Tisius alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an improper argument that was contrary to the evidence. Deputy Willie White testified that, during the escape attempt, he returned to the jail and saw Tisius holding a gun. White then heard four popping noises and saw Tisius turn to Bulington and say, Get him. Get him. Get him. The prosecutor argued that: He [Tisius] gave her [Tracie Bulington] the directions for Willie White who's outside at that point watching, saying, `Get him. Get him. Get him.' However, in the penalty phase, Tracie Bulington testified that after Tisius fired the first shot at Deputy Acton, Deputy Egley ran around the counter and Tisius yelled get him. Although trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that it was a mistake to not object, the record reflects that the prosecutor's argument was not necessarily inconsistent with the evidence. The different accounts given by White and Bulington support the reasonable inference that Tisius yelled get him on two different occasions: first, directed at Egley prior to shooting him; and second, at White, who could see Tisius and thus making it possible that Tisius could also see him. A prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences from the evidence. Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 742 (Mo. banc 2003). Additionally, the uncontradicted testimony that Tisius, gun in hand and having just shot Acton, was yelling get him, is highly relevant to the Tisius' deliberation on the murders. Whether he was referring to White or Egley is secondary. The motion court did not clearly err in denying relief on this claim. Third, Tisius alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of photographs of the victims' bodies during closing argument. The prosecutor used the photographs to show the number and location of gunshot wounds in order to support the inference that Tisius deliberated on the murders. As noted earlier, the photographs were admissible. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection. Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Mo. banc 2003). Fourth, Tisius alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a rebuttal argument in which the prosecutor argued that Tisius' argument that he had not deliberated was incredible sophistry and an attempt to fool the jury. Tisius argues that this suggested that defense counsel was lying and that the prosecutor had personal knowledge of Tisius' guilt. The prosecutor's argument was response to defense counsel's argument that Tisius had not deliberated because Deputy Egely was not killed immediately with a shot at point blank range. However, defense counsel had earlier argued that Tisius certainly wasn't coolly and calmly reflecting on whether or not to shoot Jason Acton. The prosecutor's argument was thus directed at pointing out a perceived inconsistency between the defense argument that an immediately fatal, point blank shot would have shown deliberation in one instance but not the other. Comments directed at the tactics of defense counsel are permissible. State v. Collins, 150 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Mo.App. S.D. 2004); State v. Hanson, 974 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo.App. E.D.1998). The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim. Finally, Tisius alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's argument that Tisius' statement that he was sorry was little consolation to deputy Acton and deputy Egley. He said he was sorry after he was caught. Later, the prosecutor also argued that [A]nd somehow because he shows remorse there's no deliberation? Tisius argues that this comment was inflammatory and was an improper comment on his right to remain silent. This claim has no merit. Tisius argued that his remorse indicated that he did not deliberate. A prosecutor is entitled to rebut a defense argument. State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 177 (Mo. banc 1998).