Opinion ID: 2759419
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grounds Related to Breakdown in Communication

Text: or Irreconcilable Difference Because we find the circuit court committed prejudicial error in denying Harter’s motion for withdrawal and substitution of counsel based on Ickes’ conflict of interest, it 47 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER is unnecessary to evaluate whether “good cause” existed due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. However, in light of the frequency that this issue arises in our trial courts, we discuss the inquiry that applies under such circumstances. Substitution of counsel is commonly requested when there is a breakdown in communication or there is an irreconcilable difference between a defendant and his or her counsel. See State v. Kossman, 101 Hawaiʻi 112, 120, 63 P.3d 420, 428 (App. 2003) (citing Soares, 81 Hawaiʻi at 355, 916 P.2d at 1256). Good cause for substitution of counsel exists under such circumstances because the “attorney-client relationship involves the highest degree of trust and confidence.” Disciplinary Bd. of Haw. Sup. Ct. v. Kim, 59 Haw. 449, 453, 583 P.2d 333, 336 (1978); see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he attorney-client relationship . . . involves not just the casual assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney. This is particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the client’s life or liberty.”). 48 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Before ruling on a motion to substitute counsel based upon a breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable difference, a trial court must conduct a “penetrating and comprehensive inquiry” into the nature of the relationship between the defendant and counsel. Soares, 81 Hawaiʻi at 355, 916 P.2d at 1256 (citing Kane, 52 Haw. at 487-88, 479 P.2d at 209). This inquiry is not only required for the trial court to make an informed decision, but it also should seek to “ease the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern.” AdelzoGonzalez, 268 F.3d at 777 (quoting Garcia, 924 F.2d at 926). Thus, when a motion to substitute counsel is based upon a breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable difference between counsel and client, the trial court “may need to evaluate the depth of any conflict between defendant and counsel, the extent of any breakdown in communication, how much time may be necessary for a new attorney to prepare, and any delay or inconvenience that may result from the substitution.” Id. For example, in this case, it is evident that the attorney-client relationship between Harter and Ickes was strained at the time Ickes sought to withdraw as Harter’s counsel during the initial hearing. Ickes informed the court that Harter was not satisfied with her as counsel and that 49 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Harter did not trust her; Ickes also emphasized her inability to communicate with Harter. Ickes told the court that she had only one scheduled meeting with Harter, and that otherwise, she spoke with her on the phone or when at court. The tension between Harter and Ickes became even more evident during the hearing the following morning when Harter explained that she was unable to get in touch with Ickes “since the very beginning.” It also was noted that Harter was speaking with her “voice enraged” to Ickes outside the courtroom and that Ickes “was yelling” at Harter. Given the evident tension and breakdown in communication between Ickes and Harter, it would have been appropriate for the circuit court to inquire into the following areas: (1) the reasons behind the communication breakdown between Ickes and Harter; (2) why Ickes had not met with Harter in over five months despite multiple requests by Harter to schedule other meetings; and (3) the basis for Harter’s lack of trust and confidence in Ickes. Answers to these questions, which focus on the “status and quality of the attorney-client relationship,” would have significantly aided the circuit court in “evaluat[ing] the depth” of any difference between Ickes and 50 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Harter and the “extent of any breakdown in communication” between them.25 See Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d at 778-79. Here, the circuit court was overly focused on Ickes’ ability to provide adequate representation, which is problematic because even with the most competent counsel, a serious breakdown in the attorney-client relationship can result in a deficient defense. See id. at 778 (finding there was “too much emphasis on the appointed counsel’s ability to provide adequate representation”); United States v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Even if a defendant’s counsel is competent, a serious breakdown in communication can result in an inadequate defense.”). Once the court has gained information regarding the breakdown in the attorney-client relationship through such questioning, the court may then more accurately evaluate the extent of the conflict and determine whether there is any action that may be taken in an effort to repair the attorney-client relationship. Depending on the extent of the breakdown, the trial court, for example, may continue the motion for substitution of counsel to give the defense counsel and the defendant an opportunity to resolve their differences. Where 25 After sentencing was completed, the circuit court granted Ickes’ motion to withdraw as counsel without Ickes stating any reason for the motion other than that Harter wished to appeal. In the court’s Order Appointing Counsel, the court found “good cause” for the appointment of substitute counsel. 51 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER the defendant is concerned about the lack of time to prepare for trial or conduct a sufficient investigation, the court may consider continuing the scheduled trial or other pending proceeding to allow the defendant and defense counsel additional time for preparation. Although we believe the communication and trust issues that had arisen between Harter and Ickes clearly required the court to conduct further inquiry, we need not resolve whether the circuit court erred in finding otherwise.26 Instead, we emphasize that a trial court must conduct a “penetrating and comprehensive inquiry” into the status and quality of the attorney-client relationship before ruling on a motion to substitute counsel based on a breakdown in communication or an 26 The law is unsettled as to the result of a trial court declining to replace appointed counsel when there is a breakdown in communication. See LaFave et al., supra, § 11.4(b) (“Some courts have held that such an error establishes a Sixth Amendment violation and requires reversal of the conviction, absent a prosecution showing that the error was harmless. Others have held that a constitutional violation is established only if the defendant can show prejudice, under the ineffective-assistance standard . . . .”). In a prior decision, the ICA held that a trial court’s denial of a motion to substitute counsel will not be overturned on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion that prejudiced the defendant by amounting to an unconstitutional denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Soares, 81 Hawaiʻi 332, 355, 916 P.2d 1233, 1256 (App. 1996), overruled by State v. Janto, 92 Hawaiʻi 19, 986 P.2d 306 (1999). In using this standard, the ICA in Soares cited solely to this court’s decision in State v. Torres, 54 Hawaiʻi 502, 510 P.2d 494 (1973), which held that a denial of a request for a continuance is not a per se denial of the right to counsel but the appellate court should scrupulously review the record to determine whether, under the circumstances, “there was an abuse of discretion that prejudiced the defendant by amounting to an unconstitutional denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel.” 54 Hawaiʻi at 505, 510 P.2d at 496. This standard was subsequently cited by the ICA in State v. Kossman, 101 Hawaiʻi 112, 63 P.3d 420, 427 (App. 2001). 52 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER irreconcilable difference between the defendant and counsel. Such an inquiry should elicit information regarding the extent of the claimed breakdown in communication and the source and depth of the claimed irreconcilable difference. AdelzoGonzalez, 268 F.3d at 778-79. A trial court may consider the delay or inconvenience that would result from a substitution of counsel in addition to its consideration of the status and quality of the attorney-client relationship. B. Trial Court Duty to Sua Sponte Convene a Competency Hearing The second issue before the court is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte hold a hearing to determine Harter’s competence to stand trial. “It is a fundamental precept of the American system of justice that a ‘person whose mental condition is such that he or she lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him or her, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his or her defense may not be subjected to a trial.’” Soares, 81 Hawaiʻi at 345, 916 P.2d at 1246 (App. 1996) (alterations omitted) (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct. 896, 903 (1975)). Some have viewed this basic principle “as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia” because “the mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no 53 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER opportunity to defend himself.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (quoting Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 832, 834 (1960)); Soares, 81 Hawaiʻi at 345, 916 P.2d at 1246. HRS § 704-403 (1993) protects defendants accused of a criminal offense who lack the capacity to understand the proceedings against them or to assist in their defense. An initial procedural mechanism for providing this protection is through evaluations of defendants by qualified medical examiners whenever a defendant relies on the defense of physical or mental disease, there is “reason to doubt the defendant’s fitness,” or there is “reason to believe that the physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect of the defendant will or has become an issue in the case.” HRS § 704-404(2) (Supp. 2012) (emphases added). Although HRS § 704-404 provides that the court may suspend the proceedings and appoint an examiner or panel of examiners once one of the triggering events occurs, a trial court “is duty bound to sua sponte convene a . . . hearing if it itself has or is presented with rational basis for believing that the physical or mental defect of a defendant will become an issue on the question of fitness or responsibility.” State v. Castro, 93 Hawaiʻi 454, 462, 5 P.3d 444, 452 (App.) (Acoba, J., concurring), adopted by 93 Hawaiʻi 424, 426, 5 P.3d 414, 416 54 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (2000). This duty required by HRS § 704-404 satisfies the procedural due process protections of article I, section 5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution, and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.27 Cf. Janto, 92 Hawaiʻi at 28, 986 P.2d at 315 (noting that when a trial court makes a fitness determination under HRS § 704–403 it must also meet procedural due process requirements). Thus, when a trial court finds that there is “reason to doubt” a defendant’s fitness or “reason to believe” that the defendant’s mental or physical state will become an issue in the case, the court is required to suspend the proceedings and order an examination pursuant to HRS § 704-404. Castro, 93 Hawaiʻi at 426, 5 P.3d at 416. The court’s “reason” “may come from the trial court’s own observations, known facts, evidence presented, motions, affidavits, or any other reasonable or credible sources.” Hobbs v. State, 359 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. App. 2012). This may include evidence related to the defendant’s history, the defendant’s irrational and bizarre behavior, or the defendant’s demeanor in court. See Castro, 93 Hawaiʻi at 427 n.2, 5 P.3d at 417 n.2 (finding “reason to doubt” the 27 The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution provide in relevant part that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” 55 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER defendant’s fitness to proceed and “reason to believe” he was suffering from a disease, disorder, or defect that affected his ability to assist in his own defense based on the defendant’s history and behavior); United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 814 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that under the federal standard it is appropriate to consider “the defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor in court, and any prior medical opinions on his [or her] competence”). During the proceedings in this case, Harter’s recounting of past events and her current status was sometimes disjointed and bizarre. While describing her employment as a “dancer and a hostess” at a nightclub, Harter stated she was starting a “modeling agency” for charity “with them as [her] sponsor.” She testified that the police officer who spoke to her outside of Club 939 was a “very short,” “old man” who had “gray hair and a mustache” despite none of the officers testifying that such a person existed. Harter also testified she had “shrunk” after the incident, possibly because her muscles were “contracted instead of relaxed.” Harter stated that being “touched” by the bouncer caused her “extreme” pain because she “hadn’t been touched for about six months because [she] had just gotten out of [an] engagement” despite the fact 56 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER that she also said she was living with her “boyfriend” at the time. Harter’s mental state appeared to have substantially deteriorated by the time of the sentencing hearing. During the sentencing hearing, Ickes stated to the court that she thought Harter would respond well to “a probationary period and perhaps even with a special condition that she obtain and complete mental health treatment.” Further, Harter seemed delusional when speaking with the court. For example, she informed the court, “I used to have like $20 million, and I just lost my family and my fiancé. And during this, I had lost three businesses, I believe, because I had to stop and participate in the case.” Harter claimed that her case was really a case of mistaken identity, and she asserted there was a statement by her boyfriend’s dad, a Supreme Court justice, supporting her claim of mistaken identity. Harter claimed that she spoke to the FBI about her case and that she had gone to speak to her friend, the commander of Pearl Harbor.28 Harter conveyed that she was terrified that something bad was going to happen to her throughout the proceedings because the district court judge at the first preliminary 28 This may have been an attempt to explain how Harter got arrested on Hickam Air Force Base one month after her trial. 57 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER hearing had “screamed over everybody that was in the court and said, I’m going to fry you, da, da, da. I’m pushing it to the limit. You’re going to be in jail for three years, da, da, da.” Given Harter’s bizarre statements at sentencing, the record was clear that there was “reason to doubt” Harter’s fitness during the sentencing proceedings, and the circuit court should have suspended the proceedings and appointed an examiner to evaluate Harter pursuant to HRS § 704-404. In Janto, this court held that the correct standard of review of a trial court’s determination of fitness is abuse of discretion. See Janto, 92 Hawaiʻi at 28, 986 P.2d at 315. Similarly, an abuse of discretion standard should apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision not to sua sponte order a fitness examination of a defendant under HRS § 704-404. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the circuit court abused its discretion in not ordering a fitness examination.29 In its Memorandum Opinion, the ICA noted that Harter’s counsel never raised a mental impairment issue to the court. We recognize that “judges must depend to some extent on counsel” to 29 No pre-sentence report was required by the circuit court prior to sentencing. HRS § 706-601 allows courts the discretion to order pre-sentence reports for persons over the age of twenty-two years old who are convicted of misdemeanor offences. HRS § 706-601 (1) & (2) (Supp. 1997). Had the court requested a pre-sentence report, the court would have received a report on Harter’s physical and mental condition, which likely would have more fully informed the court’s sentencing decision. HRS § 706-602(1)(b) (Supp. 2012). 58 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER raise questions of fitness. Castro, 93 Hawaiʻi at 462, 5 P.3d at 452 (Acoba, J., concurring) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 176-77). This is consistent with the expectation that defense counsel is responsible for raising his or her good faith doubts regarding the defendant’s fitness.30 Nevertheless, any expectation that defense counsel will raise fitness issues is separate from the requirement that HRS § 704-404 imposes on trial courts. Consequently, when the trial court’s own observations or other indicators present the court with a “reason to doubt” the defendant’s fitness, the court is required to order an examination irrespective of whether defense counsel raises the issue. The duty placed on a trial court to sua sponte order an examination under HRS § 704404 ensures the court’s compliance with due process obligations and also serves the public interest. “In the most egregious of circumstances, a mentally ill defendant who otherwise should have been subjected to examination and treatment may remain untreated in prison and upon his or her release, present a further or greater risk to public safety.” Castro, 93 Hawaiʻi at 30 Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the defendant’s competence when he or she has a good faith doubt regarding defendant’s competence to stand trial and “should make known to the court and the prosecutor those facts known to counsel which raise the good faith doubt of competence.” See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Criminal Justice: General Professional Obligations, Standard 7.4.2(c) (1989). 59 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 462, 5 P.3d at 452 (citing HRS §§ 704-404 and 704-406(1)). We therefore emphasize that, while HRS § 704-404 does not affirmatively require a trial court to investigate the competency of a defendant, it does require a court to consider indicators of a defendant’s unfitness that are before the court.