Opinion ID: 1098497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: alternative sentencing possibilities

Text: Section 43-21-159(3), Miss. Code Ann. (1989 Supp.) reads in part as follows: And if any child shall be convicted by any circuit court, the trial judge may, in his discretion, commit such child to the county jail for any term not in excess of one (1) year, or he may suspend sentence and release on probation, or commit such child to the custody of the Department of Corrections or impose a fine as though such child was an adult, under such terms and conditions as he may prescribe... . The circuit court shall not have the authority to commit such child to the custody of the Department of Youth Services for placement in a state-supported training school. The quoted part of the statute was amended in 1983. Prior to the amendment this statute provided that if the judge considered it to be in the best interest of a child convicted in the circuit court and in the interest of the public welfare, the judge might in his discretion in lieu of the statutory punishment commit the child to any state institution now or hereafter established for delinquents, or that he might commit the child to the county jail, etc. That part which allowed him to place the child in any state institution was deleted. Prior to the amendment, in the case of May v. State, 398 So.2d 1331, 1338 (Miss. 1981), a case which presented legal questions somewhat similar to those presented here, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged against a fourteen-year old minor defendant and the court recessed until the next day for the purpose of pronouncing sentence. On re-convening, the counsel for the defendant moved the court to defer sentencing until a later date so that the defendant could present other testimony with regard to sentencing. May, 398 So.2d at 1338. The court declined to delay the proceeding but, with evident reluctance, allowed the counsel to call Dr. Beth Wildmon to testify. Id. at 1338-1339. Through Dr. Wildmon, counsel sought to show what facilities might be available to the Mississippi Department of Corrections with regard to the treatment or education of the minor defendant. Id. At this point the court interrupted and made it clear that he wished to hear only matters in litigation. Id. at 1339. The court stated that he was familiar with all of the alternatives that were available and indicated that he had made an exhaustive study. Id. at 1339-1340. On appeal, this Court stated that the legislature, in providing alternative methods of sentencing for minors, intended in cases involving special circumstances surrounding a minor defendant that the judge seriously consider all the alternatives enumerated in the statute. Id. at 1340. The Court also indicated that the presence or absence of facilities for the care of a minor defendant should be considered in mitigation of punishment authorized under the statute. Id. The Court went on to hold that in addition to the court's consideration of the expert testimony, the judge should have placed in the record the sources and facts of his study, should have allowed defense counsel to introduce evidence of the presence or absence of facilities at the penitentiary for the care of the defendant, and the availability of other institutions or facilities which could be utilized by it. Id. The Court then remanded the case to the lower court for a hearing of further evidence of extenuation or mitigation, and for sentencing not inconsistent with its opinion. Id. at 1340-41. It is noteworthy that, when May was decided, the statute authorized the court to commit the child to any state institution established for delinquents, a provision which is no longer available to him. We have several decisions since May which should be considered by the trial court on remand. Bougon v. State, 405 So.2d 101, 106 (Miss. 1981), is a case which arose before the amendment of the statute. In Bougon, 405 So.2d at 105-06, the case was remanded because we are unable to discern if the trial court considered the statutory alternative for sentencing minor offenders under the provisions of § 43-21-159(3). The case of Gardner v. Gardner was before the Court twice, first at 455 So.2d 796 (Miss. 1984) and later in 514 So.2d 292 (Miss. 1987). In the first instance, the Court sent the case back for consideration of the alternative sentences provided under the Youth Court Act. Gardner, 455 So.2d at 800-01. On the second occasion, the case was remanded again for the same purposes, it being apparent that the second trial judge had considered that the amendment in the statute had deprived him of the right to sentence the child to a state training school. Gardner, 514 So.2d at 293-94. The Court held, in this second instance, that the alternatives available to the judge under the 1981 Act remained available since the statute was not amended until after the Act under which the child was charged. Id. at 294. The most recent address to this point was Reed v. State, 526 So.2d 538, 541 (Miss. 1988), where a seventeen year old murder defendant was involved and where the crime alleged was committed after the amendment to the statute. In Reed, the Court reviewed May but observed that the trial court had conducted an extensive review of twenty-four letters submitted by acquaintances of defendant and that the judge took into consideration the tender years of the accused in imposing the sentence. Reed, 526 So.2d at 541. The judge also admitted that he was fully aware of the discretion afforded him by the Youth Court Act. Id. The Court held that it was within his discretion to impose the life sentence and affirmed. Id. There are still alternatives set out in the Youth Court Act which the circuit court judge should consider in imposing sentence on a child. While it seems most unlikely that the Court would suspend the sentence, impose a fine, commit the child to the county jail for a term which cannot exceed one year in a case which even approaches the callous brutality involved in this case, it is, nevertheless, possible that under different circumstances and with extenuating factors involved, a court might utilize one of the alternatives set out. For that reason, and so that this Court may make appropriate evaluation of the discretion exercised by the trial judge, it is appropriate for the trial judge to see to it that the record clearly reflects the reasons which prompted him to exercise his discretion in utilizing or not utilizing the alternatives afforded. The trial court should let the record disclose the facts which prompted the exercise of his discretion either way.