Opinion ID: 2328073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Area Variances

Text: HHALP requests only area variances, and not any more demanding use variance. D.C.Code § 6-641.07(g)(3) provides that the BZA may grant a variance [w]here, by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or shape of a specific piece of property at the time of the original adoption of the regulations or by reason of exceptional topographical conditions or other extraordinary or exceptional situation or condition of a specific piece of property, the strict application of any regulation adopted under this subchapter would result in peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties to or exceptional and undue hardship upon the owner of such property, to authorize, upon an appeal relating to such property, a variance from such strict application so as to relieve such difficulties or hardship, provided such relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent, purpose, and integrity of the zone plan as embodied in the zoning regulations and map. . . . See also 11 DCMR § 3103.2. This court has distilled a three-part test that [i]n order to obtain [area] variance relief, an applicant must show that (1) there is an extraordinary or exceptional condition affecting the property; (2) practical difficulties will occur if the zoning regulations are strictly enforced; and (3) the requested relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent, purpose, and integrity of the zone plan. . . . Washington Canoe Club v. District of Columbia Zoning Com'n, 889 A.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. 2005); see also The Oakland Condominium v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 22 A.3d 748, 752 (D.C.2011). [13] Petitioner and intervenor focus their objections on the BZA's analysis of the uniqueness and practical difficulties prongs of the variance test; we will address each in turn.
In Gilmartin v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 579 A.2d 1164, 1168 (D.C.1990), we explained the uniqueness test at length: [T]he rationale behind the uniqueness test is that difficulties that are common to or affect an entire neighborhood, or a substantial portion thereof, are properly addressed by seeking amendment of the regulations themselves from the Zoning Commission . . . If such problems were addressed through individual variances, the effect would be a de facto amendment of the zoning regulations by BZA because requests by other owners similarly situated would have to be granted as a matter of equal protection under the due process clause. It is the Zoning Commission, however, not BZA that is empowered to make such amendments to the overall zone plan. The test follows from its rationale. To support a variance it is fundamental that the difficulties or hardships [be] due to unique circumstances peculiar to the applicant's property and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood. Palmer v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 287 A.2d 535, 539 (D.C.1972), quoted in Myrick [ v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment ], supra, 577 A.2d [757] at 760 [(1990)]. There is no requirement that the uniqueness inheres in the land at issue. . . . [ Capitol Hill Restoration Society v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment ] Capitol Hill II, supra, 534 A.2d [939] at 942 [(1987)]. See also Monaco v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 407 A.2d 1091 (D.C.1979); Clerics of St. Viator, Inc. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 320 A.2d 291 (D.C.1974). The statute does not preclude the approval of a variance where the uniqueness arises from a confluence of factors. The critical point is that the extraordinary or exceptional condition must affect a single property. (Alterations in original). We conclude that in this instance the BZA properly applied the uniqueness test when it concluded that the difficulties or hardships cited by HHALP were unique circumstances peculiar to the applicant's property. Palmer, supra, 287 A.2d at 539. The BZA's Decision and Order demonstrates that it made sufficient factual findings concerning the property's uniqueness, considered as a whole. [14] The BZA concluded that the property is irregularly shaped and wooded, described in detail its extreme topography, and discussed the property's significant grade differential. We have elsewhere affirmed the BZA's determination of uniqueness based upon a site's irregular shape, steeply sloping grade, the large size and physical configuration. . . . French v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 658 A.2d 1023, 1035 (D.C.1995). In addition, the BZA found that the property had minimal street frontage in comparison to its perimeter of over 3,000 feet, no public street infrastructure, and is encumbered on its southern boundary by a private parking lot, which provides no benefits to the development but reduces the property's buildable area.
Determinations of whether `practical difficulties' exist, like determinations of whether the variance at issue is one of area or use, must be made case-by-case, and must be judicially reviewed under a rule of deference to administrative expertise. Wolf v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 397 A.2d 936, 942 (D.C.1979). With respect to area variances, [i]n order to prove that an applicant suffers from `practical difficulties' two elements must be proven: The applicant must demonstrate that (1) compliance with the area restriction would be unnecessarily burdensome; and (2) the practical difficulties are unique to the particular property. . . Economic use of property has been considered as a factor in deciding the question of what constitutes an unnecessary burden or practical difficulty in variance cases. Gilmartin, supra, 579 A.2d at 1170 (quotations and citations omitted). [15] It is for BZA, in the first instance, to weigh carefully the claims of potential difficulty advanced by the applicant. Id. at 1171. Petitioner argues that the BZA's finding that HHALP was presented with practical difficulties was not supported by substantial evidence. According to petitioner, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating why HHALP's compliance with the existing zoning regulations would not be economically reasonable. In petitioner's view, in its application and at the hearing, HHALP described the project it wished to construct, but it did not sufficiently explain the practical difficulties beyond just asserting that compliance is not feasible or not reasonable and did not specifically explaining why the 54 units was the desired and best option, rather than, say, 30 or 40. According to petitioner, HHALP could haveand should haveintroduced evidence supporting its claim that compliance with the zoning regulations was not feasible, such as the purchase price, financial projections, comparative financial scenarios, or costs from development alternatives. To the contrary, we conclude that the record contains sufficient factual findings supporting the BZA's conclusion that HHALP was presented with practical difficulties warranting the area variance relief. The BZA identified several extraordinary and exceptional conditions inherent in the property, including its topography, the acreage devoted to the extension of Southern Avenue, the lack of public street infrastructure, the wooded open space to serve as a buffer, and a parking lot. The record further reflects that the OP submitted a report to the BZA which highlighted these and other practical difficulties, including the property's challenging slope, and the unfeasibility of extending streets from the north onto the site, therebyin the OP's view making HHALP's cluster design choice the most appropriate because it is a more efficient and environmentally-sound use of the land. The OP presented similar testimony at the hearing. While petitioner and intervenor contested these representations, [t]he mere fact that petitioners presented contrary evidence . . . is immaterial. As the trier of fact, the Board may credit the evidence upon which it relies to the detriment of conflicting evidence, and need not explain why it favored the evidence on one side over that on the other. French, supra, 658 A.2d at 1035 (quotation and citation omitted). Petitioner perhaps misconceives the variance process to require HHALP to defend every economic aspect of its proposed development design as a sine qua non to variance approval. We discern no such absolute obligation in this case from D.C.Code § 6-641.07(g)(3). The BZA is authorized to consider the weight of the burden of strict compliance, the severity of the variance(s) requested, and the effect the proposed variance(s) would have on the overall zone plan. Gilmartin, supra, 579 A.2d at 1171. We are satisfied that the BZA carefully weighed these factors in granting HHALP's application. The BZA considered the OP's analysis and found that denying the variances for the front and side yards would only prompt a need for other variances, including a variance to narrow private roads, and that the steep slope of the property made it difficult to comply with the home height requirements. The BZA further concluded that the [c]onstruction activities on the northern portion of the property . . . could only be accomplished with greatly increased effort and expense on the part of Applicant and acknowledged the financial difficulties that would be incurred based upon the common sense principle that construction costs on a site with extreme topographical changes would be higher than on a site without those changes. Finally, the BZA considered HHALP's proposed 54 unit development to be thoughtfully laid out and designed, and represent[ing] a reasonable density of development. [16] The BZA assessed the severity of the variances requested to be minor relative to the hardships inherent in the property. The BZA noted that none of the sites/dwellings need relief from the maximum lot occupancy of 40% mandated for this R-1-B zone . . . nor from the maximum building height of 40 feet mandated in the zone. In fact, as the BZA explained, many of the requested variances were born from HHALP's considerations of the zone plan and the development's impact on the surrounding areas, including leaving a portion of the property undeveloped to buffer the already-existing neighborhoods from potential adverse impacts of the development and increasing recreational opportunities, constructing a private road and alley to provide access for emergency and trash disposal vehicles, and improving the flow of traffic by completing Southern Avenue. In light of these and other aspects of HHALP's proposal, the BZA reasonably concluded that the clustering of the development on the southern/southeastern half of the property is a reasonable response to the property's topographical constraints as well as to the community's desire to open space along the northern boundary of the property. Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, the agency's decision is. Affirmed.