Opinion ID: 2639091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim Against UCO

Text: ¶ 15 Teeter argues on certiorari that UCO knew traffic on University Boulevard was dangerous to the pedestrians, voluntarily assumed the obligation of providing safe access across University Blvd., and failed to meet this obligation. UCO's motion for summary judgment asserts that it does not maintain the street or the crosswalk. Teeter's materials in responding to summary judgment note a request from UCO to the City of Edmond for a traffic plan to benefit the pedestrian traffic on University Boulevard, and refer to UCO's purchase of pedestrian warning lights that the City authorized for University Boulevard. No allegation is made that these warning lights were functioning improperly or were inadequately maintained. ¶ 16 Teeters' certiorari petition argues that UCO undertook the task of making it safe to cross University Street by installing flashing lights, ... A similar allegation was made in response to UCO's motion for summary judgment. Teeter's conclusion is that UCO is liable because it assumed the duties, with the consent of the City, of providing a crosswalk and regulating the traffic on University Boulevard. ¶ 17 Part of the police power of the state may, by the Legislature, be delegated to municipalities, boards, commissions, and subordinate state agencies. Gibbons v. Missouri, K. & T.R. Co., 1930 OK 108, 285 P. 1040, 1042. A municipality's power to regulate traffic on a public street is an exercise of police power delegated from the state. White v. City of Lawton, 1961 OK 287, 373 P.2d 25, 27; Ex parte Shaw, 1916 OK 179, 157 P. 900. Generally, a delegated police power may not be redelegated. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Livshee, 1994 OK 12, n. 13, 870 P.2d 770, 773. For example, the Supreme Court of Vermont said: In other words, when authority to exercise the police power within a defined sphere is delegated by the state to a municipal or other public corporation, the authority is inalienable in the corporation, and it cannot in any manner be contracted away or otherwise granted, delegated, diminished, divided, or limited by the corporation. Vermont Dept. of Public Service v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 151 Vt. 73, 558 A.2d 215, 220 (1989), quoting, 6A E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 24.41, at 116-17 (3d ed. rev.1988). ¶ 18 This principle is consistent with our recent opinion in Oklahoma Public Employees Association v. Oklahoma Dept. of Central Services, 2002 OK 71, ¶ 29, 55 P.3d 1072, 1084, where we explained that the statutory responsibility delegated by the Legislature to the Department of Human Services for operating a state institution could not be delegated by that Department to a different entity. See also Bidlingmeyer v. City of Deer Lodge, 128 Mont. 292, 274 P.2d 821, 823 (1954), (police power over roads and streets delegated to a municipal corporation by the state cannot be surrendered, delegated, or divested by contract by that municipal corporation); Victory Cab Co. v. Shaw, 232 N.C. 138, 59 S.E.2d 573, 577 (1950), (a fundamental rule is that a municipal corporation cannot surrender in any part or in any respect the police power delegated to it by the State). ¶ 19 UCO asked the City to address the problem of pedestrian access across University Boulevard, and not for a delegation of authority to UCO. The warning lights were purchased by UCO based upon a letter from the City to UCO that the warning lights could be used. The letter from the City contained no language stating that UCO would thereafter be responsible for regulating traffic on University Boulevard. Further, we note that the City's immunity argument on summary judgment is based upon the City's view that it, and not UCO, possesses and exercises police power in the nature of traffic regulation over University Boulevard. Teeter cites no provision of law in support of UCO possessing legal authority to control traffic on University Boulevard. ¶ 20 Teeter also contends that UCO assumed a duty to provide a safe crosswalk independent of the City's police power. Elements to a claim based upon negligence include (1) a duty to the plaintiff, (2) a violation of that duty, and (3) and injury resulting from that violation. Hesser v. Central National Bank & Trust Company of Enid, 1998 OK 15, ¶ 12, 956 P.2d 864, 867. This Court has previously noted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965), [4] and its standards for attaching liability based upon one who voluntarily assumes a duty. Jackson v. Mercy Health Center, Inc., 1993 OK 155, n. 9, 864 P.2d 839, 842-843. See also, Seavey, Reliance on Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 913, 928 (1951), (Where a person represents by word or act that he has done or will do something upon the performance of which he should realize that others will rely, he is liable for expectable harm caused by the reliance of others and his failure of performance, if his representation was negligently or intentionally false, or if without excuse he fails to perform.). ¶ 21 Even if we assume that (1) UCO could, as a matter of law, undertake a duty to provide a crosswalk, (2) UCO did in fact assume this duty and (3) UCO failed to perform this duty, Teeter's allegations relating to how this duty was breached amount to a claim of negligence, subject to the statutory immunity provided by the Governmental Tort Claims Act. Jackson v. Mercy Health Center, Inc., 864 P.2d at 842-844, (we explained that a statutory immunity was a complete defense to a claim for negligence in rendering emergency care in the nature of an assumed duty); Nail v. City of Henryetta, 1996 OK 12, 911 P.2d 914, 917, (the Governmental Tort Claims Act is the exclusive remedy for an injured plaintiff to recover against a governmental entity in tort). ¶ 22 The University of Central Oklahoma is one of the institutions of the State of Oklahoma's System of Higher Education, and is supervised, managed and controlled by the Board of Regents of Oklahoma Colleges exercising power pursuant to statutes of the State of Oklahoma and Art. 13-B of the Oklahoma Constitution. 70 O.S.Supp.1994 § 3201; 70 O.S.1991 §§ 3501.1, 3510; Okla. Const. Art 13-B. For the purposes of the GTCA, `State' means the State of Oklahoma or any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, ... or other instrumentality thereof ... 51 O.S.Supp.1994 § 152(10). UCO is thus an included entity and may invoke application of § 155(15) of the GTCA. ¶ 23 Because § 155(15) provides that no negligence-based liability rises from the failure to initially place road signs or warning devices, Teeter's claim that the University breached its alleged duty to create a safe crosswalk by failing to place additional signs, lights, or warning devices is barred by § 155(15) of the Governmental Tort Claims Act. ¶ 24 Finally, Teeter alleges that trucks were parked in the crosswalk, that these trucks were those used by contractors working at UCO, and that her injuries were caused by these allegedly wrongful circumstances. UCO defends upon § 155(18) of the GTCA: The state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or claim results from:. . . 18. An act or omission of an independent contractor or consultant or his employees, agents, subcontractors or suppliers or of a person other than an employee of the state or political subdivision at the time the act or omission occurred; Section 155(18) facially protects UCO from liability flowing from the acts of its independent contractors; Teeter has not pointed any authority that would restrict the application of it; and in the circumstances presented by this case it is sufficient to support the summary judgment granted to UCO. We thus conclude that summary judgment was properly granted to UCO.