Opinion ID: 1971691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Impact of UIFSA

Text: We turn now to assess whether  in the words of D.C.Code § 16-914.01  retention of jurisdiction under these circumstances would contravene other statutory provisions  in this case UIFSA. Contravene is a strong word, defined as [t]o violate or infringe; to defy or to be contrary to. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (8th ed. 2004). These definitions are consistent with our general rules of statutory interpretation. `[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed [legislative] intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.' United States Parole Comm'n v. Noble, 693 A.2d 1084, 1087 (D.C.1997) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) (emphasis added in Noble )), opinion adopted in United States Parole Comm'n v. Noble, 711 A.2d 85, 86 (D.C.1998) (en banc). See also George v. Dade, 769 A.2d 760, 764 (D.C.2001) ([O]ur task is to reconcile [statutes], if possible.). Thus, D.C.Code § 16-914.01, and our prior case law, authorized the Superior Court to modify the divorce decree to include an order for child support unless UIFSA precludes it. Codified at D.C.Code §§ 46-301.01 to 46-309.01 (2001), [5] UIFSA attempts to clarify the methods of establishment, enforcement, or modification of support orders across state lines. LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tenn.2001). Accord, Hamilton v. Foster, 260 Neb. 887, 620 N.W.2d 103, 114 (2000) (The general purpose of UIFSA is to unify state laws relating to the establishment, enforcement, and modification of child support orders.). One goal of UIFSA is to establish a one-order system so as to avoid the problems of multiple and conflicting support orders that arose under the previous regime, the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, prefatory n.II.B.3 (1996), 9 U.L.A. 287 (2005). As the prefatory note explains, the principles of UIFSA promote the concept that only one valid support order may be effective at any one time. Id. See also Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 90 A.L.R. 5th 1, 33 (2001) (UIFSA establishes a one-order system, in contrast to the multiple support orders that could be in effect in several states under its predecessors).
It is crucial to recognize that this case does not involve competing orders for child support. Indeed, no such order has yet been issued by this, or any other, jurisdiction. Rather, Ms. Connole filed a request to issue or establish one. Moreover, Mr. DeGroot does not contest the Superior Court's jurisdiction over his person. Thus, this case might properly be analyzed as a one-state proceeding. See Case v. Case, 103 P.3d 171, 175 (Utah Ct.App.2004) (A one-state proceeding occurs when the forum state exercises its long-arm statute to bring the nonresident within the jurisdiction of the forum state, thus eliminating the interstate nature of the action.); LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d at 495 (the multistate provisions of UIFSA have no application when only one state is implicated). As the comment to UIFSA § 202 explains, [a]ssertion of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident essentially results in a one-state proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that the parties reside in different states. With two exceptions, the provisions of UIFSA  labeled an interstate act  are not applicable to such a proceeding. . . . In all other situations, the substantive and procedural law of the forum state applies. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 202 cmt. (1996), 9 U.L.A. 335 (2005). [6] Although the commentary just quoted suggests that  with two exceptions [7]  none of the provisions of UIFSA apply to a one-state proceeding, the text of UIFSA § 202 expressly excludes only chapters III through VII. See note 7, supra. This ambiguity is significant because UIFSA § 205, on which appellant principally relies is found in chapter II. Thus, whatever the contours of a one-state proceeding may be, we apparently cannot avoid confronting UIFSA § 205. Furthermore, in Case and LeTellier, the petitioner was a resident of the forum state. We therefore will assume, without deciding, that UIFSA § 205 and the other provisions of UIFSA apply to a case like this which involves residents of two or more states. Even so, appellant has not identified any provision of UIFSA that precludes the Superior Court from issuing a support order in the circumstances presented here.
Section 401 of UIFSA, codified at D.C.Code § 46-304.01 (2001) (Petition to establish support order), appears to be directly relevant, and it provides, in pertinent part, that (a) If a support order entitled to recognition under this chapter has not been issued, a responding tribunal of the District may issue a support order if: (1) The individual seeking the order resides in another state; or (2) The support enforcement agency seeking the order is located in another state. . . . Id. The related commentary explains: This section authorizes a tribunal of the responding state to issue temporary and permanent support orders binding on an obligor over whom the tribunal has personal jurisdiction. UIFSA does not permit such orders to be issued when another support order exists, thereby prohibiting a second tribunal from establishing another support order and the accompanying continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. See Section 205 (Continuing, Exclusive Jurisdiction) and Section 206 (Enforcement and Modification of Support Order by Tribunal Having Continuing Jurisdiction).[ [8] ] UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 401 cmt. (1996), 9 U.L.A. 398 (2005). Because Ms. Connole resides in another state, and because no support order has yet been issued, it would not contravene UIFSA § 401 if the Superior Court issued an order in this case. Additional limits on the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction are found in section 204 of UIFSA, codified at D.C.Code § 46-302.04 (2001), and entitled Simultaneous proceedings in another state. [9] Section 204 restricts the authority of the Superior Court to establish a support order, but only in circumstances not present here. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 46-302.04(a) (describing limited circumstances in which [a] tribunal of the District may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed after a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state. . . . (emphasis added)); D.C.Code § 46-302.04(b) (describing circumstances in which [a] tribunal of the District may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed before a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state. . . . (emphasis added)). Of course, there was no proceeding in another state when Ms. Connole filed her motion in the Superior Court. Although she later filed a protective suit for child support in Maryland, none of the provisions in UIFSA § 204 would preclude the Superior Court from issuing a child support order in the circumstances presented here. [10] Nevertheless, Mr. DeGroot insists that the Superior Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to issue the support order sought by his ex-wife. He points to D.C.Code § 46-302.05 (2001) [11] and especially the corresponding comment in the Uniform Act, which explains that if all the relevant persons  the obligor, the individual obligee, and the child  have permanently left the issuing state, the issuing state no longer has an appropriate nexus with the parties or child to justify exercise of jurisdiction to modify.  UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205 cmt. (1996), 9 U.L.A. 340 (2005) (emphasis added). [12] As its language makes obvious, the comment on which Mr. DeGroot relies discusses jurisdiction to modify a child support order. This key restriction implements the one-order system contemplated by UIFSA. See In re Marriage of Hillstrom, 126 P.3d 315, 318 (Colo.Ct.App. 2005) (UIFSA allows for only one enforceable order in a case at any time. This is accomplished by limiting jurisdiction to modify the original order.); Bordelon v. Dehnert, 770 So.2d 433, 436 (La. Ct.App.2000) (UIFSA attempts to limit modification jurisdiction to just one state at a time, once there is an existing child support award issued.). See also McLean v. Kohnle, 940 So.2d 975 (Miss.Ct. App.2006) (once Virginia court modified Mississippi divorce decree and support order, the Virginia order became the controlling order; Mississippi court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify its prior judgment). [13] The commentary suggests that the court automatically loses its continuing exclusive jurisdiction when all of the relevant parties have left the jurisdiction. However, the statute itself indicates that the issuing state loses its power to modify only when a court of another jurisdiction has modified the order: A tribunal of the District issuing a child support order consistent with the law of the District may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify the order if the order has been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to a law substantially similar to this chapter. D.C.Code § 46-302.05(b) (emphasis added.). We need not resolve the ambiguity because the drafters of the Uniform Act intended section 205(a) to apply only to the court's jurisdiction to modify its support orders[,] Zaabel v. Konetski, 209 Ill.2d 127, 282 Ill.Dec. 748, 807 N.E.2d 372, 376 (2004), and the power to modify a child support order is not at issue here. [14] As many cases illustrate, subject matter jurisdiction is not a monolithic concept under UIFSA. See Jurado v. Brashear, 782 So.2d 575, 579 (La.2001) ([I]f the issuing state loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (such as when the obligor, the obligee and the child all relocate to another state), and no party takes actions to establish jurisdiction in another state (which would be the responding state if such action had been taken), two separate questions arise: (1) whether the court of the issuing state may enforce the order that it issued and (2) whether that court may modify the order. (emphasis in original)). Curiously enough, a court may lack jurisdiction to modify an order it issued, but still retain jurisdiction to enforce it. See, e.g., Linn v. Delaware Child Support Enforcement, 736 A.2d 954, 956 (Del.1999) (holding that a Minnesota Court did not lose jurisdiction in 1995 to enforce its 1983 Child Support Order, despite that all the parties and the children had left Minnesota by that time, because no other court had assumed jurisdiction over the matter.); Zaabel, 282 Ill.Dec. 748, 807 N.E.2d at 377 (We hold that section 205(a) of the Act does not apply to the circuit court's jurisdiction to enforce its support order.); Lunceford v. Lunceford, 204 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Mo.Ct.App.2006) (Although an issuing state may lose subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order, that state may still enforce the child support order then in effect until the order is properly modified by another state pursuant to UIFSA.); Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 50 Va.App. 257, 649 S.E.2d 200, 204 (2007) (the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction to enforce, as opposed to modify, the order. . . . (emphasis in original)); Commonwealth, Dept. of Social Services ex rel. Kenitzer v. Richter, 23 Va. App. 186, 475 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1996) (We hold that Virginia continues to have the right to enforce its own decrees even if all parties are no longer residents.); cf. Desai v. Fore, 711 A.2d 822 (D.C.1998) (case not governed by UIFSA; Superior Court had jurisdiction to enforce its child support order although parents and children no longer lived in the District of Columbia). The parties have not cited, and we have not found, a case precisely like this one, but we apply the principles discussed above, refining our inquiry to ask: subject matter jurisdiction to do what? As we have seen, Section 205 and its commentary do not restrict the Superior Court's jurisdiction to issue or establish a support order in the circumstances presented here, and we have found no other provision of UIFSA that does so. Mr. DeGroot thus has not demonstrated that it would contravene UIFSA if the Superior Court retained jurisdiction of this case for the purpose of issuing or establishing a support order, as otherwise authorized by our case law and by D.C.Code § 16-914.01. We therefore hold that the Family Division of the Superior Court has jurisdiction to consider Ms. Connole's motion, irrespective of the fact that the parties no longer reside in the District. [15]