Opinion ID: 453541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violation of Right to Confront and Cross-Examine Witnesses under the Sixth Amendment

Text: 19 Since we have concluded that the petitioner has met the cause and actual prejudice standard, we will proceed to determine on the merits whether the petitioner has shown that his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was violated. The petitioner argues that this right was violated when a statement made by a nontestifying co-defendant, with whom the petitioner was being jointly tried, was revealed to the jury. 20 In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's conviction in a joint trial should be set aside when a co-defendant's confession inculpating the defendant is revealed through the testimony of a witness even though the trial court has instructed the jury to disregard the confession in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. In Bruton, a postal inspector testified at the joint trial of two defendants that one of the defendants had confessed orally that he and his co-defendant had committed a robbery. Id. at 124, 88 S.Ct. at 1621. Although noting that the oral confession was legitimate evidence against the defendant who made it, the Court held that the introduction of the confession posed a substantial threat to the other defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, since the confessing defendant did not take the stand. Id. at 127-28, 137, 88 S.Ct. at 1623, 1628. The Court reasoned that an instruction by the trial court to disregard such a confession could not deflate the impact on the jury of such a powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statement. Id. at 135-36, 88 S.Ct. at 1627-28. The Court concluded that the unreliability of such a confession would be intolerably compounded if the alleged accomplice did not testify and thus become subject to cross-examination. Id. at 136, 88 S.Ct. at 1628. 21 In interpreting Bruton, we have held that the admission of a co-defendant's out-of-court confession violates a defendant petitioner's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment where the confession is vital to the government's proof of its case and directly implicates the defendant. United States v. Key, 725 F.2d 1123, 1125-27 (1984). In the present case, we hold that Jack Riner's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him was violated by the admission of Ronald's testimony as to his conversation with Evans even though the judge sustained defense counsel's objection to the testimony as to Jack. As in Bruton, the impact of the admission of the incriminating testimony on the jury could not be deflated by the trial court's instruction to disregard the testimony as to Jack, especially when the testimony was the only evidence clearly implicating Jack as an aider and abettor of his uncle. Ronald's testimony as to Evans's statement was vital to the government's case and directly implicated Jack in the murder. In such a case, the admission of the prejudicial testimony is not harmless. Cf. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969) (any violation of Bruton is harmless error where there is overwhelming evidence of the petitioner's guilt and the prejudicial impact of the co-defendants' statements is relatively insignificant). We hold that the admission of the testimony directly violated the petitioner's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 22 In conclusion, the district court's denial of Jack Riner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reversed. 23