Opinion ID: 852075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other Safe Harbors and Permitted Statements.

Text: Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(b)(2)'s list of safe harbors reads in full: Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state: (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved; (2) information contained in a public record; (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress; (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto; (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and (7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6): (i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person; (iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation. In addition, Rule 3.8(f) permits a prosecutor to make statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, even if they might heighten public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Prof. Cond. R. 3.8, cmt. [5]. The inevitable negative consequences are why the announcement of the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime is presumptively prejudicial unless accompanied by a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty. See Prof. Cond. R. 3.6(d). We do not fault Respondent or any prosecutor for wanting to share with the public information on the prosecution of serious crimes of great interest in the community. It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved.. . . On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy. Prof. Cond. R. 3.6, cmt. [1]. In the cases at issue, there is no evidence that any of Respondent's statements were meant to serve such law enforcement purposes as protecting potential victims or apprehending suspected perpetrators still at large. Some of the information Respondent provided could have been properly communicated if framed within any of the safe harbors listed in Rule 3.6(b). We conclude that in performing his important responsibility of apprising the public of the activities of his office, Respondent stepped beyond the bounds permitted by Rules 3.6 and 3.8.