Opinion ID: 2338070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Establishing a Batson Challenge

Text: Fugett next argues the Commonwealth impermissibly used two of its peremptory challenges against African-American jurors. While acknowledging the Commonwealth offered race-neutral reasons, he argues those reasons do not withstand scrutiny. Fugett asserts that two jurors were treated differently from similarly situated jurors. Thus, he argues the court erred in rejecting his Batson challenge. Challenging prospective jurors on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause. Washington v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 376, 378-79 (Ky. 2000). Therefore, an objection to the use of peremptory challenges on this ground is evaluated under a three-step process set out in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Citing to Batson , this Court in Washington described the process, as follows: First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of racial bias for the peremptory challenge. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to articulate clear and reasonably specific race-neutral reasons for its use of a peremptory challenge. `While the reasons need not rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause,' self-serving explanations based on intuition or disclaimers of discriminatory motive are insufficient. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Ky.1990) (quoting Batson, supra, at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724.) Finally, the trial court has the duty to evaluate the credibility of the proffered reasons and determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Washington, 34 S.W.3d at 379. Applying the three-step process set out in Batson , the trial court concluded that Fugett, an African-American, had established a prima facie case by showing the Commonwealth had exercised four of its nine peremptory challenges against African-American jurors. On the other hand, we note that the fourteen-person panel that heard Fugett's case included three African-American jurors. Fugett's challenge, however, focuses on only two of the four African-American jurors struck by the Commonwealth. As a consequence of the objection, the Commonwealth was required to articulate clear and reasonably specific race-neutral reasons for its use of the peremptory challenges. As to Juror 116572, the Commonwealth noted that the juror believed African-Americans were discriminated against by the system, that whites had too much political power, and that the death penalty should not be used for population control. The juror also noted that his own research had shown only one white person had ever received the death penalty for killing an African-American. As to Juror 125118, the Commonwealth pointed out that the juror had described in detail a very negative experience with police. Juror 125118 had expressed the belief that African-Americans were unfairly treated by the system, that they were more likely to be charged, and that the system seemed to impose more time for marijuana offenses than murder. In response, Fugett argued the jurors were being treated differently from similarly situated white jurors. Fugett noted that several white jurors admitted to having negative experiences with police. Fugett also argued that Juror 116572's answers concerning historical discrimination and the use of the death penalty as population control were taken out of context. Having heard both arguments, the court concluded the Commonwealth had proffered race-neutral reasons. The court specifically noted that the Commonwealth was free to consider the totality of the juror's responses. The court further noted that the responses could be interpreted as out-spoken beliefs. Finally, the court noted that three African-Americans were on the panel. Of significance to the court was the fact that these jurors had shared views of discrimination, yet had not been so extreme or out-spoken. These circumstances led the court to conclude the Commonwealth was looking at individual jurors, and not simply acting on racially-impermissible grounds. The record thus supports our conclusion that the three-step process was applied properly and the court complied with its duty in evaluating the reasons offered. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the court erred in rejecting Fugett's Batson challenge.