Opinion ID: 2402179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Questioning of Detective Gillis Regarding Retrieval of the Items Found in the Vehicle

Text: The defendant's next contention on appeal is that the trial justice erred in permitting the state to question Detective Gillis as to whether or not anyone had come forward to retrieve the items that had been found in the vehicle that was parked by the side of the road near the bottom of the Lavens' driveway. Detective Gillis testified at trial that a rental agreement, a cellular telephone, and a wallet were found inside the vehicle. Detective Gillis further testified that these items were seized from the vehicle and were taken into the custody of the Warwick Police Department along with the vehicle itself. Detective Gillis also testified that a representative from Alamo Rental later came to the police station and retrieved the vehicle. The prosecutor then questioned Detective Gillis as follows: Aside from the representative from Alamo, did anyone else at any point in time come to the Warwick Police Department to try and retrieve evidence? At that point, defense counsel objected. Following a lengthy bench conference, during which the jury was not in the courtroom, the trial justice allowed the state to pursue this line of questioning. Detective Gillis then testified that, other than the Alamo representative and Shannon Laven (the Lavens' daughter), no one else had come to the Warwick Police Department to retrieve any of the property that had been seized by the police. The defendant makes essentially the same argument on appeal regarding this questioning of Detective Gillis as he made to the trial justice  namely, that the above-quoted question and answer had the effect of permitting the jury to make an inference of guilt based upon defendant's failure to retrieve his belongings from the police department. The defendant argued at trial, and argues before us on appeal, that the posing of this question coupled with the answer of Detective Gillis in effect permitted the state to comment upon his invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The trial justice rejected this argument on the ground that evidence that defendant had not retrieved his belongings from the police department was not testimonial in nature. It is our view that the trial justice correctly allowed the challenged questioning of Detective Gillis, because the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was inapplicable in the above-described situation. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have clearly established that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination extends only to evidence that is testimonial or communicative in nature. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State ex rel. Widergren v. Charette, 110 R.I. 124, 132, 290 A.2d 858, 862 (1972). In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. 384 U.S. at 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Similarly, in Charette, this Court stated that the great weight of authority supports the conclusion that the `[Fifth Amendment] privilege is a bar against compelling communications or testimony   .' 110 R.I. at 132, 290 A.2d at 862 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764, 86 S.Ct. 1826). In the present case, the fact of the defendant's failure to retrieve his belongings that had been left in the rental vehicle certainly did not constitute communication or testimony. Accordingly, admitting evidence of the defendant's inaction in the context that we have described did not violate his rights under the Fifth Amendment.