Opinion ID: 2508574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Courts' Differing Interpretations

Text: Courts have differed as to the effect of actions for appellate or postconviction relief on the statute of limitations for a related malpractice action brought by a criminal defendant. Some courts have opted for a bright-line rule under which statutes of limitations for the malpractice actions do not begin to run until a criminal defendant is exonerated through appellate or postconviction relief. Other courts have concluded that criminal defendants' actions for appellate or postconviction relief do not affect the statutes of limitations for related malpractice actions. These courts have required criminal defendants to file malpractice actions while actions for appellate or postconviction relief are pending. We outline these approaches and their justifications below, and ultimately adopt the latter approach.
Some jurisdictions have adopted a bright-line rule to resolve when the statute of limitations begins to run for malpractice actions brought by criminal defendants simultaneously seeking appellate or postconviction relief. [6] These jurisdictions have concluded either that malpractice actions do not accrue or that statutes of limitations are tolled until defendants receive appellate or postconviction relief. These courts have cited concerns of judicial efficiency and fairness to criminal defendants to support their position. Most jurisdictions that tie the running of the statute of limitations for malpractice actions to appellate or postconviction relief have concluded that malpractice actions only begin to accrue, and therefore statutes of limitations begin to run, when a defendant receives such relief. See Noske v. Friedberg, 670 N.W.2d 740, 746 (Minn.2003); Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556, 559-66 (1993); see also Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931 (Fla.1999); Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 2003). Underlying this rule is the idea that criminal defendants do not fully learn or discover the injury or harm caused by their attorney's negligence until they receive appellate or postconviction relief. [7] See Stevens, 851 P.2d at 566 (Plaintiff had not suffered ... harm at [attorney's] hands in this case unless and until he was exonerated). Similarly, another court has held that the statute of limitations for malpractice actions is tolled until criminal defendants obtained appellate or postconviction relief. [8] Shaw v. State, 816 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Alaska 1991). The efficiency of the bright-line rule appeals to some courts because it provides a clear demarcation of the point in time at which the statute of limitations begins to run. Trobaugh, 668 N.W.2d at 584; see also Noske, 670 N.W.2d at 744 n. 3 (stating that requiring criminal defendants to seek stays in malpractice actions until criminal matters are settled would squander scarce judicial resources). Thus, courts appreciate the utility of a bright-line rule in determining when the statute of limitations begins to run for malpractice claims. Additionally, some courts view the bright-line rule as most fair to defendants, citing problems that may arise when criminal defendants are forced to bring civil actions while criminal appeals or motions for postconviction relief are pending. Some courts hesitate to require defendants to concern themselves with malpractice claims while seeking wrongful conviction relief. Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1361. Others attempt to avoid forcing criminal defendants to argue inconsistent positions in the civil and criminal actions. See Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex.1991). Similarly, some courts warn that in malpractice claims, defense attorneys may reveal privileged information that could aid the prosecution in the criminal matter. See, e.g., Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1361. Thus, these courts have decided to prolong the running of statutes of limitations for malpractice claims in the interest of fairness to the criminal defendants. Courts following the bright-line approach therefore have opted for a rule that serves the interests of judicial economy and fairness to criminal defendants. Other courts, however, have failed to find these reasons persuasive.
Some jurisdictions have rejected the bright-line rule in favor of a two-track approach that follows conventional accrual and tolling rules. See, e.g., Silvers v. Brodeur, 682 N.E.2d 811 (Ind.Ct.App.1997); Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535, 510 N.W.2d 900 (1994); Seevers v. Potter, 248 Neb. 621, 537 N.W.2d 505 (1995); Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103 (Tenn.2001). These courts reason that this approach promotes the policies that underlie statutes of limitations, is consistent with the intent of legislatures, and protects the interests of criminal defendants. Under the two-track approach, a criminal defendant must file a malpractice claim within the period defined in the statute of limitations. See Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907. In jurisdictions following the discovery rule, the criminal defendant must file a malpractice claim within the specified period after the defendant learns or should have learned of the injury and its cause. See § 13-80-108(1); Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907. The criminal defendant then may seek a stay in the civil suit until the criminal matter is resolved. Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907. As in most situations in which related criminal and civil matters are simultaneously pending, courts have discretion as to whether the civil suit should proceed or whether it should yield to the criminal matter. Id. This approach therefore allows both the civil and criminal matters to proceed along separate tracks. Id. Courts adopting the two-track approach reason that it promotes the objectives of statutes of limitations. They explain that statutes of limitations aim to promote stability in the affairs of persons and to avoid the unfairness and burdens inherent in defending stale claims. Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556, 571 (1993) (Unis, J., specially concurring). These courts reason that by tying the statute of limitations period to the time at which the criminal defendant knew of the negligence rather than at exoneration, the two-track approach prevents criminal defendants from bringing malpractice actions decades after the negligence occurred. Silvers, 682 N.E.2d at 817; see also Stevens, 851 P.2d at 571-72 (Unis, J., specially concurring); Gibson, 58 S.W.3d at 117. In their view, this approach protects attorneys by guaranteeing that they receive formal, seasonable notice of malpractice claims. Silvers, 682 N.E.2d at 817; see also Gibson, 58 S.W.3d at 117. Additionally, these courts explain that the two-track approach ensures that malpractice claims are brought before they become stale. Stevens, 851 P.2d at 571-72; see also Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 25 P.3d 670, 680 (2001). Thus, courts adopting the two-track approach perceive it as furthering the purposes of statutes of limitations. Additionally, courts that have endorsed the two-track approach reason that it is consistent with the intent of the legislatures. According to these courts, legislatures have chosen to define the statute of limitations for a professional negligence claim as two years after the plaintiff learns of the injury and its cause. See Stevens, 851 P.2d at 573 (Unis, J., specially concurring); see also Duncan v. Campbell, 123 N.M. 181, 936 P.2d 863, 866 (N.M.Ct.App.1997). Because legislatures did not distinguish between malpractice claims arising out of civil and criminal cases when defining the statutes of limitations, courts adopting the two-track approach have concluded that legislatures intended for the same rule to apply to each. See Stevens, 851 P.2d at 573 (Unis, J., specially concurring); see also Seevers, 537 N.W.2d at 511. These courts therefore reason that the two-track approach is consistent with legislative intent because it mandates that statutes of limitations begin to run once a criminal defendant learns of the injury and resulting damage. Finally, courts that endorse the two-track approach differ with those that adopt the bright-line approach, contending that the two-track approach also serves the interests of both defendants and judicial economy. They believe that the approach safeguards the rights of criminal defendants because trial courts have discretion to stay the civil suit until the criminal matter is resolved. See, e.g., Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907. Similarly, these courts maintain that the two-track approach does not waste judicial resources because trial courts may choose to continue the civil proceedings if such course does not jeopardize the criminal defendants' rights. See id. Therefore, these courts reason that the two-track approach sufficiently protects both the interests of defendants and those of judicial economy.