Opinion ID: 2737823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fuller’s state-law claims

Text: In addition to his Title VII claims, Fuller raises claims under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act based on the Bridge Authority’s failure to promote him in 2010, for race discrimination in discharging him, and for retaliatory discharge. These claims are not subject to the same administrative procedures as Title VII claims nor are they subject to Title VII’s 90-day window in which to file suit. See Rogers v. Bd. of Educ., 2 F.3d 163, 168 (6th Cir. 1993) - 15 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation (holding that “plaintiffs need not exhaust their administrative remedies under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act before bringing suit for unlawful discrimination”); see also Womack-Scott v. Dep’t of Corr., 630 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that a three-year statute of limitations applies to Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act cases). These claims therefore survive despite the dismissal of Fuller’s Title VII claims.
Both parties agree with the district court’s determination that the McDonnell Douglas framework governs Fuller’s denial-of-promotion claim and that he established a prima facie case of racial discrimination on this issue. The burden thus shifted to the Bridge Authority to offer legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its 2010 decision to promote Lilliquist and Miller instead of Fuller. In this case, the parties agree that the decision was made jointly by a panel of Steiner, O’Brien, and Brown and then approved by Sweeney. The essence of the reasons given for not selecting Fuller for either of the two available permanent positions was that the chosen applicants (1) were more accurate in handling money, (2) came in more frequently when called for fill-in duty, and (3) responded better to the interview questions. Fuller responds by arguing that these stated reasons are false and shifting. False and shifting reasons are acceptable methods of demonstrating that the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory reasons are in fact pretextual. Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 545 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The plaintiff may show that (1) the employer’s stated reason for terminating the employee has no basis in fact, (2) the reason offered for terminating the employee was not the actual reason for the termination, or (3) the reason offered was insufficient to explain the employer’s action.”); see also Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, - 16 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation 1167 (6th Cir. 1996) (“An employer’s changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext.”). Regarding the factual accuracy of an employer’s claims, “a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). Fuller argues, first, that his response to call-ins was better than Lilliquist’s. Second, Fuller claims that his money handling was sufficiently accurate. Finally, Fuller contends that the panel’s proffered rationale for not selecting him changed over time and was inconsistent. Fuller’s first argument is supported by an exhibit purporting to show that he was called in to work 291 times during 2009 and 2010 and worked 40 shifts, or 14% of the time, whereas Lilliquist received 148 calls and worked only 15 shifts, or 10% of the time. The Bridge Authority counters that the exhibit is an unauthenticated document prepared by Fuller’s counsel. Generally, “[t]he proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006. Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of evidence, however, requires that “the summary must be properly introduced through the testimony of a witness who supervised its preparation.” United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 409 (6th Cir. 2005) (further citation omitted). We have doubt as to the admissibility of Fuller’s summary chart because Fuller points to neither an affidavit nor deposition testimony authenticating the document. On the other hand, the Bridge Authority does not appear to dispute the key point made by the summary chart; i.e., that considering both 2009 and 2010 together, Fuller came in more frequently than did Lilliquist. - 17 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation This fact tips the scale slightly in Fuller’s favor. Cf. Satawa v. Macomb Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 689 F.3d 506, 513 n.7 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding no error in considering a transcript at the summary-judgment stage of the case even though the “transcript was likely inadmissible at the time of summary-judgment briefing because it had not been properly authenticated [but considering the same] on the assumption that the parties would reduce it to admissible form at trial”). The Bridge Authority attempts to rebut this evidence by suggesting that Lilliquist was more reliable in the single year 2010, that O’Brien may simply have been referring to the aggregate number of times that Fuller was unavailable, or that O’Brien may have been referring only to his own attempts to call Fuller, not to calls made by others. All of these explanations are plausible, but the test is whether Fuller has produced “sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. A jury could so find if Fuller came in more frequently than did Lilliquist over the course of 2009 and 2010. Fuller’s attempt to disprove the money-handling rationale raised by Steiner and O’Brien is less persuasive. Using his own calculations, Fuller claims that the percentage of his monetary errors was only .11%, not the .15% that the Bridge Authority cited. The district court, however, was unable to duplicate Fuller’s calculations because of the highly questionable mathematical method used by Fuller. As explained by Administrator Sweeney, the Bridge Authority calculates money-handling errors based on the overall cash handled by the toll collectors, which varies seasonally, and thus monthly. It then evaluates the overall number of errors relative to the revenue taken in by the toll collector. In this regard, Lilliquist’s and Miller’s numbers were better—.11% for Lilliquist and .07% for Miller—compared to .15% for Fuller. Fuller has thus - 18 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation failed to call into question the Bridge Authority’s money-handling rationale for not selecting him. But Fuller’s final argument—that the Bridge Authority’s rationales have shifted in ways suggesting that they are pretextual—has more merit. Bridge Safety Supervisor O’Brien testified that Fuller answered all of the interview questions correctly. This contradicts the testimony of Personnel Liaison Brown and Administrator Sweeney that Fuller’s failure to answer an interview question correctly was dispositive. Moreover, Brown’s memo recommending Lilliquist and Miller made no mention of an incorrect answer to an interview question. This conflicting testimony, together with the fact that Fuller’s call-in percentage was actually better than Lilliquist’s for 2009–2010, creates a genuine dispute of material facts that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Accordingly, a jury should evaluate whether the Bridge Authority’s purported justifications for not promoting Fuller in 2010 were truthful or pretextual.
Fuller’s claims relating to his termination do not fare as well. He argues, alternatively, that his termination was in retaliation for the 2010 charge that he filed with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights and the EEOC regarding the Bridge Authority’s failure to promote him, that his termination was in retaliation for his September 20, 2011 internal complaint regarding his coworkers’ racist comments, and that his termination was outright discriminatory. The Bridge Authority responds that it terminated Fuller because he knowingly made false statements to obtain unemployment compensation to which he was not entitled. Fuller attempts to overcome this explanation by arguing, first, that his termination came just seven days after he filed a complaint with Bridge Services Manager Steiner regarding the - 19 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation negative comments made by three coworkers regarding his race. Second, Fuller argues that another employee, Dean O’Brien (again, not to be confused with Bridge Safety Supervisor Dan O’Brien) engaged in similar conduct with regard to claiming unemployment benefits, but was not terminated until two months after that conduct came to light. He likewise argues that Melissa Brown (again, not to be confused with Personnel Liaison Janet Brown) engaged in similar conduct and was found to have committed fraud on January 11, 2012, but was not terminated until January 23, 2012. Fuller’s protestations that he was fired more promptly than Dean O’Brien or Melissa Brown fall short of establishing that the Bridge Authority fired him for reasons other than his own unemployment-benefits fraud. Indeed, the fact that the Bridge Authority fired multiple people for unemployment-benefits fraud suggests that this was its true motivation. The fact that one employee “lasted a few weeks longer than another, when both were eventually terminated, is not the stuff of a compelling discrimination claim.” Gaffney v. Potter, 345 F. App’x 991, 993 (6th Cir. 2009). Moreover, we note that Melissa Brown’s termination came just 12 days after she was found to have committed fraud, which is in fact a shorter time period than the 19-day gap between the September 8, 2011 determination that Fuller had committed the same offense and his discharge on September 27, 2011. Fuller’s argument is thus not only without merit, but fails even on its own terms. Fuller’s argument that he was fired shortly after the filing of his internal complaint likewise fails to raise a genuine dispute regarding whether the Bridge Authority’s stated reasons are pretextual because temporal proximity alone is insufficient to create such a dispute. See Asmo v. Keane, Inc., 471 F.3d 588, 598 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that “temporal proximity between [an employee’s protected activity] and [the employer’s] decision to terminate her cannot - 20 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation alone prove pretext”). Although temporal proximity alone can be sufficient to establish a prima facie case that an employee’s termination is causally connected to protected activity, Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 505 (6th Cir. 2014), this evaluation is distinct from determining whether the proffered reason—in this case unemployment-benefits fraud—is pretextual. See Id. at 508 (“Having concluded that Montell has presented a prima facie case of retaliation, we turn to the next steps of the burden-shifting analysis.”). As this court has previously stated, “[p]retext is a commonsense inquiry: did the employer fire the employee for the stated reason or not? This requires a court to ask whether the plaintiff has produced evidence that casts doubt on the employer’s explanation, and, if so, how strong it is.” Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009). Fuller cites no evidence, other than temporal proximity, to show that he was fired for any reason other than his unemployment-benefits fraud. He therefore raises no genuine dispute of material fact as to the reason for his discharge.