Opinion ID: 895405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Casteel and Its Progeny

Text: Casteel involved a dispute between an insurance agent and the insurer. 22 S.W.3d at 381. In Casteel, the trial court submitted a single broad-form question on the issue of the insurer's liability to the agent, which included thirteen independent grounds for liability. Id. at 387. We determined that five of the thirteen independent grounds for liability did not apply and held that the trial court erred by submitting the invalid grounds for liability in the charge. Id. We then considered whether the charge error was harmful. Id. Because the single broad-form charge mixed valid and invalid theories of liability, we held that the charge error constituted harmful error, explaining: It is fundamental to our system of justice that parties have the right to be judged by a jury properly instructed in the law. Yet, when a jury bases a finding of liability on a single broad-form question that commingles invalid theories of liability with valid theories, the appellate court is often unable to determine the effect of this error. The best the court can do is determine that some evidence could have supported the jury's conclusion on a legally valid theory. To hold this error harmless would allow a defendant to be held liable without a judicial determination that a factfinder actually found that the defendant should be held liable on proper, legal grounds. Id. at 388. Therefore, we held: When a single broad-form liability question erroneously commingles valid and invalid liability theories and the appellant's objection is timely and specific, the error is harmful when it cannot be determined whether the improperly submitted theories formed the sole basis for the jury's finding. Id. at 389. Following Casteel, we have clarified the extent of its presumed harm analysis on several occasions. See Urista, 211 S.W.3d 753; Romero v. KPH Consolidation, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212 (Tex.2005); Harris Cnty., 96 S.W.3d 230. In Harris County, we extended Casteel 's presumed harm analysis to a broad-form question that commingled valid and invalid elements of damages for which there was no evidence. 96 S.W.3d at 233-34. In Romero, we applied Casteel 's presumed harm analysis to a single broad-form proportionate responsibility question that included a factually-unsupported malicious credentialing claim. 166 S.W.3d at 227-28 (noting that unless the appellate court is `reasonably certain that the jury was not significantly influenced by issues erroneously submitted to it,' the error is reversible (citations omitted)). Later, in Urista, we declined to extend Casteel 's presumed harm analysis to the trial court's submission of an erroneous inferential rebuttal instruction. 211 S.W.3d at 756-57. In Urista, we explained: We specifically limited our holdings in Casteel and Harris County to submission of a broad-form question incorporating multiple theories of liability or multiple damage elements. We have never extended a presumed harm rule to instructions on defensive theories such as unavoidable accident, and we decline to do so now.... When, as here, the broad-form questions submitted a single liability theory (negligence) to the jury, Casteel 's multiple-liability-theory analysis does not apply. Moreover, when a defensive theory is submitted through an inferential rebuttal instruction, Casteel 's solution of departing from broad-form submission and instead employing granulated submission cannot apply. Unlike alternate theories of liability and damage elements, inferential rebuttal issues cannot be submitted in the jury charge as separate questions and instead must be presented through jury instructions. Therefore, although harm can be presumed when meaningful appellate review is precluded because valid and invalid liability theories or damage elements are commingled, we are not persuaded that harm must likewise be presumed when proper jury questions are submitted along with improper inferential rebuttal instructions. Id. (citations omitted). Cf. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 865 (applying Rule 61.1(b) in a non- Casteel context where the trial court omitted the defendant's proposed instruction in a single-theory-of-liability case, thereby allowing the jury to potentially find the defendant liable on an invalid basis). Because we held that Casteel 's presumed harm analysis did not apply to the inferential rebuttal question in Urista, we applied the traditional harmless error analysis, which considers whether the instruction probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. 211 S.W.3d at 757; see TEX.R.APP. P. 61.1(a); see also Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995) (Error in the jury charge is reversible only if, in the light of the entire record, it was reasonably calculated to and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.). After reviewing the entire record, we concluded in Urista that there was some evidence the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof and therefore held that the unavoidable accident instruction did not probably cause the jury to render an improper verdict. 211 S.W.3d at 758-59. Notwithstanding Casteel 's presumed harm analysis in situations that erroneously commingle valid and invalid theories of liability, we have repeatedly reaffirmed our longstanding, fundamental commitment to broad-form submission. See, e.g., Harris Cnty., 96 S.W.3d at 235-36. We first expressed our preference for broad-form practice in 1973 and, after issuing multiple opinions in which we supported broad-form submission, we modified Rule 277 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1988 to more expressly mandate the use of broad-form submission. See id. ; see also Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex.1984) (explaining our progression from separate, granulated charge issues to the broad-form charge). See generally William G. Bud Arnot, III & David Fowler Johnson, Current Trends in Texas Charge Practice: Preservation of Error and Broad-Form Use, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 371, 416-40 (2007) (providing a more detailed history of Texas jury charge practice); William L. Davis, Tools of Submission: The Weakening Broad-Form Mandate in Texas and the Roles of Jury and Judge, 24 REV. LITIG. 57 (2005) (same). Since 1988, Rule 277 has stated, in pertinent part: In all jury cases the court shall, whenever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-form questions. TEX.R. CIV. P. 277. Casteel and its progeny denote situations where broad-form submission may be unfeasible. See, e.g., Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 389. But whenever feasible, broad-form submission should be the norm. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 277; Harris Cnty., 96 S.W.3d at 235-36; see also Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex.1990) (interpreting whenever feasible to mandate broad-form submission in any or every instance in which it is capable of being accomplished).