Opinion ID: 1268291
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-October-2004 Circuit Court Cases

Text: In Brown v. Vance, 637 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir.1981), the Fifth Circuit considered Mississippi's system for paying judges, under which judges were paid based on the number of cases they heard, and plaintiffs (including prosecutors) were able to choose which judge would hear the case, thereby creating a temptation for judges to depart from judicial neutrality. In reaching its conclusion that the fee system was in violation of the due process clause under the Tumey-Ward test, id. at 283, the court felt compelled to distinguish Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), a case in which the Supreme Court had found insufficient bias  and no due process violation  in an agency's conduct of serving both investigative and adjudicative roles, because the plaintiff had failed to overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Withrow from Tumey, Ward, and Berryhill on the basis of pecuniary interest, stating simply: There was no question of the members of the board [in Withrow ] profiting personally from [their] decision[s]. Brown, 637 F.2d at 283. The court continued: In [ Tumey, Ward, and Berryhill ], the Supreme Court was fully aware that a presumption of probity attached to adjudicators but it was concerned over the `possible temptation to the average man' of yielding to the expectation of personal gain by abandoning neutrality. . . . In Tumey and Ward [,] the Supreme Court, as we read the opinions in those cases, was not as interested in the probity of an individual judge or perhaps even, of the great majority of judges. It was interested rather in the inherent defect in the legislative framework arising from the vulnerability of the average man  as the system works in practice and as it appears to defendants and to the public. The Court's inquiry there and our inquiry here is not whether a particular man has succumbed to temptation, but whether the economic realities make the design of the fee system vulnerable to a `possible temptation' to the `average man `as judge. Here we have no need to be solicitous of the honor of a particular judge; none has been questioned. Nor do concerns of judicial administration necessarily require a high evidentiary barrier. The Tumey-Ward test, in sum, is leveled at the system, not the individual judge. This is the reason it speaks of temptation to the average man. The `average man as judge' concept was made the heart of the test to introduce a humble Everyman, prey to the vicissitudes of life, the need for bread on the table, and for small favors from the right people. Id. at 284 (quotation marks, citations, and paragraph break omitted; emphasis added). The court found the financial temptation in question sufficient to create probable bias and violate due process. In Dyas v. Lockhart, 705 F.2d 993, 995 (8th Cir.1983), the Eighth Circuit considered Dyas's habeas claim that he was denied his due process right to a fair trial because the presiding judge was the uncle of the Prosecuting Attorney and the brother and father of the two Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys who participated in the prosecution. The court considered the claim in two parts: first, whether Dyas had waived disqualification; and second, whether the judge is conclusively presumed to be biased[,] given his relationship to the Prosecuting Attorney; [such that Dyas] need not demonstrate [] actual bias or actual prejudice Id. at 996. As to the latter, the court reasoned: Generally, a habeas petitioner seeking reversal of his conviction on due process grounds because of the trial judge's alleged bias must demonstrate that the judge was actually biased or prejudiced against the petitioner. However, as the Supreme Court has recognized, not only is a biased decision-maker constitutionally unacceptable but our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. Accordingly, there are cases where experience teaches that the probability of actual prejudice on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. For example, experience teaches that the probability of actual bias is too high where the judge has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a trial or where the judge has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him. The test in determining if a judge's bias should be presumed in a particular case is whether, realistically considering psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, the judge would be unable to hold the proper balance between the state and the accused. In making this inquiry we, of course, presume the honesty and integrity of those serving as judges. Id. at 996-97 (citing Tumey, Murchison, Ward, and Withrow ) (citations, quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Furthermore, a trial judge's disqualification under the Code of Judicial Conduct does not necessarily imply impermissible bias under the due process clause. Id. at 997. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the presiding judge's relationship to the Prosecuting Attorneys was, standing alone, insufficient to raise the conclusive presumption of his actual bias. Id. The presiding judge had no personal interest in the outcome of the case other than fairly trying and submitting the issues to the jury. . . . Furthermore, the relationship here does not necessarily suggest that [the presiding judge] had such a strong personal or financial interest in the outcome of the trial that he was unable to hold the proper balance between the state and the accused. Id. In Anderson v. Sheppard, 856 F.2d 741, 745 (6th Cir.1988), we considered an employment-discrimination plaintiff-appellant's claim on direct appeal that he had been denied a fair trial because of judicial bias, premised on the presiding judge's open hostility towards him. Relying on our interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, we opined that due process require[s] not only an absence of actual bias, but an absence of even the appearance of judicial bias, and reasoned that [a]lthough there is no mechanical test for determining when bias and/or hostility exists, when a trial judge exhibits the open hostility and bias at the beginning of a judicial proceeding as was exhibited here, it follows that the judgment entered therein must be reversed. Id. at 746-47 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 n. 19, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951)). Because we found that the trial judge had exhibited actual bias, we were not presented with a question of probable, potential, or apparent interest, and we were not called upon to apply the possible-temptation test. In Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1369-70 (7th Cir.1994) (en banc), the Seventh Circuit considered Del Vecchio's habeas claim that he had been denied a fair trial because the presiding judge in his murder trial, Judge Louis Garippo, had been a prosecutor who participated in Del Vecchio's prior murder conviction 14 years earlier (in 1965), which created an appearance of bias because of some personal responsibility Judge Garippo felt for Del Vecchio's light sentence for the 1965 murder. In addressing this claim, the en banc majority reasoned: The dissents treat the Supreme Court's `appearance of justice' language from Murchison and Aetna as holding that the due process clause requires judges to recuse themselves based solely on appearances. But those cases present no such holding; the Supreme Court's mention of `appearance of justice' certainly does not compel reversal on due process grounds if a federal judge decides  based on a personal view of judicial protocol  that it looked bad for a state judge to try a case. Such a pure appearance approach would be hard to reconcile with the bevy of Supreme Court precedents on the issue of recusal which do not address the `appearance of justice.' Appearances are usually for the eyes of the beholder. Years after whatever appearance there was has disappeared, a reviewing judge is left not with appearance but with hindsight speculation. That will not suffice as a basis for overturning a conviction. The Supreme Court has never rested the vaunted principle of due process on something as subjective and transitory as appearance. Instead, the Supreme Court simply uses the `appearance of justice' language to make the point that judges sometimes must recuse themselves when they face possible temptations to be biased, even when they exhibit no actual bias against a party or a cause. . . . Moreover, even if Judge Garippo faced some `possible temptation' to be biased against Del Vecchio, not every `possible temptation' to be biased presents a sufficient possibility of bias to require disqualification. This is evident from other language in the same cases in which the Court talks about `possible temptations.' Thus, in Aetna and Tumey, the Court noted that not all questions of judicial qualification involve constitutional validity. Matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest, would generally be matters of legislative discretion  even though any of these matters, particularly kinship and personal bias, could offer a `possible temptation' to be biased. At some point, a biasing influence will be too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitutional constraints. Id. at 1371-72 (citations, editorial marks, and footnote omitted; emphasis added). Based on this reasoning, the Seventh Circuit concluded that [d]isqualification is required only when the biasing influence is. . . so strong that we may presume actual bias [and] . . . [j]udged by this standard, Judge Garippo was not required to disqualify himself. Id. at 1375. In Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (8th Cir.2004), the Eighth Circuit considered Jones's AEDPA habeas petition, in which Jones claimed that he had been denied a fair trial because of judicial bias, premised on the presiding judge's preexisting and ongoing animosity toward the public defender. The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by editorializing about the possible-temptation test (i.e., standard), proclaiming that clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, recognizes not only actual bias, but also the appearance of bias, as grounds for disqualification, but, [a]lthough clearly established, this standard is inherently vague. Id. at 1012 (citation, quotation marks, and editorial marks omitted). Application of this vague [possible-temptation] standard, when viewed through the deferential lens of Williams v. Taylor and the AEDPA, necessarily leaves state courts considerable latitude to pronounce rulings that do not contradict, and are reasonable applications of, Murchison and Tumey.  Id. at 1012-13. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that application of the possible-temptation test is simple when a judge's interest in the outcome of a case is pecuniary, or in the context of contemptuous behavior in closed proceedings, but application of the rule is not as simple where the alleged bias is personal and the case involves no closed proceedings or alleged procedural infirmities. Id. at 1013. In such cases, the court explained  emphasizing the objective nature of the test  the test require[s] disqualification [only if] the potential for bias is sufficiently great to tempt an average man serving as a judge to stray from impartiality. Id. In applying this test, the [Supreme] Court explained that we are not to hold judges to a superhuman standard that would allow no expressions of emotion, and that we are to presume the ability of judges to rule impartially notwithstanding personal attacks and challenges to their authority. Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded that, despite the obvious animosity between the judge and the public defender, the apparent bias had not violated due process, explaining: Upon reviewing the instances of hostility identified by Jones, we do not believe [that the judge]'s demeanor was wholly unjustified nor do we believe that [his] reactions exceeded that which imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as judges, sometimes display. Id. at 1014-15 (citations and quotation marks omitted). In Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253, 254 (3d Cir.2004), the Third Circuit considered Johnson's AEDPA habeas petition, in which Johnson claimed that he had been denied a fair sentencing hearing because an ex parte sentencing recommendation had biased the presiding judge. That is, in an unrelated proceeding in 1981, a state prosecutor named James Liguori had prosecuted Johnson and obtained a conviction. Id. Johnson sent Liguori a Christmas card from prison, in which he had written a vague but menacing note. Id. at 255. When Johnson escaped from prison, the incident made the local news, prompting some concern for Liguori and his family. Id. The case at issue  stemming from Johnson's 1997 kidnapping of his estranged 16-year-old daughter  was tried in 1999 and the jury convicted Johnson on multiple counts. Id. Prior to sentencing, the presiding judge happened upon Liguori at a social function, and Liguori commented that Johnson was a `bad guy,' that he had `threatened' Liguori and his family, and that Liguori `wanted to see that justice was done.' Id. The presiding judge reported this ex parte communication to the parties, and Johnson's counsel assured the judge that Johnson's 1981 Christmas card was part of the public record, and that she had no intention of filing a motion for recusal or disqualification. Id. at 256. After his conviction was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, Johnson sought habeas relief in federal court. Id. The district court agreed with Johnson that the ex parte communication created an appearance of bias and that the trial judge's failure to recuse himself sua sponte resulted in a violation of Johnson's due process rights. Id. at 256-57. The government appealed on the theory that the district court had failed to apply the AEDPA standard of review. On appeal, the Third Circuit began its analysis by confining Johnson's claim: Johnson has not asserted, and there is no evidence, that the trial judge harbored any actual bias toward him; [but only] that the ex parte communication created an appearance of bias and that the appearance of bias violated his due process rights []. Id. at 258-59. The court continued by framing the issue as follows: Under the plain language of § 2254(d), as well as the United States Supreme Court's case law, we are presented only with one narrow issue: whether the Supreme Court has ever held in any of its decisions existing at the time of the District Court's judgment, including the three cases relied on by Johnson and the District Court, that an appearance of bias on the part of a state court judge, without more, violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. We are not, and cannot be, concerned with the issues of whether the trial judge should have recused himself sua sponte or whether the ex parte communication at issue was sufficient to constitute an appearance of bias. We assume that there was an appearance of bias. Id. at 259. Having thus framed the issue, the Third Circuit explained in some detail, and ultimately concluded, that the Supreme Court's case law has not held, not even in dicta, let alone `clearly established,' that the mere appearance of bias on the part of a state trial judge, without more, violates the Due Process Clause, [and therefore,] the District Court's judgment based on that erroneous view must be reversed under AEDPA. Id. at 263. See also United States v. Couch, 896 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir.1990) (observing that 28 U.S.C. § 455 and the Due Process Clause are not coterminous); Hardy v. United States, 878 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding similarly that § 455(a)'s appearance of impropriety standard is not mandated by the Due Process Clause).