Opinion ID: 1747707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the defendant tried for the offense of rape over 270 days after his arraignment without a showing of good cause for the delay?

Text: Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Supp. 1988) provides that, without good cause and a duly granted continuance, trial must begin within 270 days of arraignment. In computing compliance with the statute, the arraignment date does not count, but the trial date and weekends do, unless the 270th day falls on a Sunday. Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 167 (Miss. 1991); Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 674 (Miss. 1990); Ransom v. State, 435 So.2d 1169, 1169-70 (Miss. 1983). If the state demonstrates good cause for the delay, the statutory clock is tolled; if the state fails to demonstrate good cause or if the record is silent, the risk of non-persuasion advances the clock against the state. Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1375 (Miss. 1988); Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760, 761 (Miss. 1985). Here, too, congested courts may serve as good cause for a continuance. Adams, 583 So.2d at 167. Where the state's continuances were intended to injure the defendant's case, the delay weighs more heavily against the state. See Williamson, 512 So.2d at 876 (analyzing the 270-day rule), citing Bailey, 463 So.2d at 1063 (analyzing a constitutional speedy trial violation). As in constitutional speedy trial analysis, defendant-caused delays also toll the clock. Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769, 771 (Miss. 1991), citing Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314, 1319 (Miss. 1990); Handley v. State, 574 So.2d at 674; Vickery, 535 So.2d at 1376. In this case, for the same reasons discussed in the constitutional analysis, the defendant suffered no violation of his statutory right to speedy trial. Weighing the delays, he came to trial 156 days after his waiver of arraignment. Thus, no reverse-and-render remedy is necessary.