Opinion ID: 2183692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: motion to dismiss due to grand jury irregularities

Text: The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the secrecy of the grand jury was violated by the presence of two unauthorized persons during testimony before the grand jury on March 11, 1992, and on the ground that the prohibition against the disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury was violated by the dissemination of evidence gathered pursuant to the grand jury subpoena. The trial justice made certain findings of fact concerning violation of Rule 6, subsections (d) and (e), of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is not disputed that Clifford Coutcher of the Rhode Island State Bureau of Audits on loan to the Department of Attorney General and Lori Tellier, an auditor with the department, were present in the grand jury on the day and time under consideration. They each testified that they had been sworn as agents of the grand jury during the investigation of the defendant and the consideration of the evidence against him by the previous grand jury.    In addition, there is no dispute that during the months of investigation and presentment of evidence to the two grand juries, Coutcher was kept abreast of how matters were proceeding in the grand juries and that certain documents obtained pursuant to grand jury subpoena were made available to various other agencies upon presentment of duly authorized subpoena. On one occasion, the documents not relating to this defendant or any count in the indictment were viewed by a reporter from the print media. The defendant points out in his brief that the trial justice declined to grant the motion to dismiss on the ground of the presence of Coutcher and Lori Tellier because the presence of these two unauthorized persons for about one hour had no effect on the grand jury process. There is no question that certain documents that had been subpoenaed were shared with other agencies and that the principal investigator, Coutcher, was kept abreast of what was going on and organized and culled out for grand jury consideration those documents relevant to the investigation. The trial justice found that none of these activities resulted in any prejudice to defendant and had no effect upon the deliberations of the grand jury. Our own examination of the record indicates no prejudicial conduct by any of the persons or agencies that were permitted to examine the documents subpoenaed for use by the grand jury. No evidence exists of any interference with the deliberations of that body. Only a per se rule of dismissal for any violation of Rule 6 could support defendant's argument in this case. We have consistently declined to adopt such a per se rule of dismissal. In fact we have consistently stated that dismissal of an indictment because of violations of Rule 6 or due to prosecutorial misconduct or pre-indictment publicity in relation to the grand jury is an extraordinary sanction reserved for very limited and extreme circumstances. State v. Woodson, 551 A.2d 1187, 1190 (R.I. 1988); State v. Wilshire, 509 A.2d 444, 448 (R.I. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037, 107 S.Ct. 891, 93 L.Ed.2d 843 (1987); State v. Romano, 456 A.2d 746, 750 (R.I. 1983). Certainly irregularities resulting in no prejudice to defendant or to the grand jury process would not constitute such an extraordinary circumstance. We have further held that notwithstanding allegations of irregularity, an indictment returned by a legally constituted grand jury calls for a trial on the merits. Woodson, 551 A.2d at 1190; Wilshire, 509 A.2d at 448 (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408-09, 100 L.Ed. 397, 402-03 (1956)). We have also followed the rule enunciated in United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986), that a petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jury's verdict, then, any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 70, 106 S.Ct. at 941-42, 89 L.Ed.2d at 56. As we said in Woodson, the defendant's conviction by a petit jury completely unaffected by any of the irregularities raised by the defendant would make the dismissal of this indictment wholly inappropriate. See Woodson, 551 A.2d at 1191. For the reasons stated, the defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed. The judgment of the Superior Court is hereby affirmed. The papers in the case may be remanded to the Superior Court. LEDERBERG, J., did not participate.