Opinion ID: 2982549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Materially Adverse Actions

Text: Plaintiffs primary claim in this case is retaliatory discharge, which is obviously a materially adverse action (as well as an adverse employment action that affects the terms and conditions of employment). The question is whether Plaintiffs secondary claims constituted materially adverse employment actions. We agree with the district court that none of the secondary claims satisfy the third element of her prima facie case. Roskovics’ report was not a materially adverse action. It is uncontroverted that regardless of whether the anglecock was closed or open, Roskovics investigated but was unable to determine whether it was done for a legitimate reason or sabotage. Roskovics’ lie to management, which was not discovered until after Roskovics’ deposition in 2012, could not have dissuaded Plaintiff or a reasonable employee from exercising her Title VII 19 rights. Roskovics’ alleged failure to remove or investigate anonymous graffiti ignores the fact that Roskovics took some action — namely that he told all employees that further graffiti would not be tolerated and directed the supervisors to visit the caboose daily and paint over any new graffiti. Yet Plaintiff followed up with Roskovics only once, a week or two after her initial complaint, and did not complain about the allegedly inadequate response for another six months, until the new graffiti appeared in June 2010, so Roskovics “inaction” cannot be deemed adverse. Roskovics’ refusal to exercise his discretion to modifi the job assignment was also not an adverse action. Plaintiff offers nothing to show that the assigned position—the single position— as considerably worse than the job she desired. Cf Burlington, 548 U.S. at 71 (holding that whether a reassignment of job duties within the same job description is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case). In fact, Plaintiff testified that she preferred the tying position because it allowed for more exercise than the single position. It is undisputed that the alleged train sabotage occurred and the graffiti appeared when Plaintiff was assigned the tying position, undermining her argument that Roskovics was retaliating against her by not giving her the allegedly “safer” tying position assignment. Moreover, the assignment was on a rotation; all of the other members of the second shift yard crew also had to work the single position. At most, Plaintiff offers her testimony that she feared or did not like certain coworkers; but this is not the type of conduct Title VII is designed to redress. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (“Title VII, we have said, does not set forth ‘a general civility code for the American workplace.” (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). In short, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that none of these events constituted materially adverse actions, individually or in the aggregate. 20