Opinion ID: 867640
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ripeness of SBA List’s claims

Text: Because the Commission acted on Driehaus’s 2010 complaint, but did not reach a final decision or penalize SBA List, this case raises questions regarding SBA List’s standing to sue, and whether its claims are moot or ripe for review. Briggs v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 61 F.3d 487, 491 (6th Cir. 1995). These doctrines “all originate in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language,” which forms the basis of federal-court jurisdiction. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). “We review jurisdictional challenges based on standing, ripeness, and mootness de novo.” Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 2010). “As there is no obligation to favor one of these justiciability doctrines over the other and as none of these questions goes to the merits of the case, we may address them in any sequence we wish.” Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). Here, as in Warshak, “[w]e start—and end—with ripeness.” Id. -5- Susan B. Anthony List, et al v. Driehaus Nos. 11-3894/3925 Ripeness “‘is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)). It prevents federal courts from “entangl[ing]” themselves in a “premature adjudication” of legal matters, even ones involving constitutional issues, “that may with time be satisfactorily resolved at the local level and that may turn out differently in different settings.” Miles Christi Religious Order v. Twp. of Northville, 629 F.3d 533, 537 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). In its broadest formulation, the ripeness doctrine poses “a question of timing” and counsels against resolving a case that is “anchored in future events that may not occur as anticipated, or at all.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 284 (6th Cir. 1997). “Three factors guide the ripeness inquiry: (1) the likelihood that the harm alleged by the plaintiffs will ever come to pass; (2) whether the factual record is sufficiently developed to produce a fair adjudication of the merits of the parties’ respective claims; and (3) the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at this stage in the proceedings.” Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the First Amendment context, the likelihood-of-harm analysis focuses on “‘how imminent the threat of prosecution is and whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an intention to refuse to comply with the statute.’” Id. (quoting Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2002)). Although a plaintiff is not required to “‘expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution’” before challenging the constitutionality of a statute, id. at 296 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, -6- Susan B. Anthony List, et al v. Driehaus Nos. 11-3894/3925 459 (1974)), he must nonetheless show “a credible fear” that it will be enforced against him, Norton, 298 F.3d at 554. We first consider the imminence of the threat of prosecution against SBA List at the hands of the Commission members, Secretary Husted, and Driehaus. We then evaluate the sufficiency of SBA List’s alleged intent to disobey the challenged statute. SBA List argues that its ability to speak is chilled by the possibility that the Commission will pursue future proceedings against it for speech—similar to the Driehaus ads—in which it plans to engage. That the billboard never went up, SBA List maintains, shows that its speech already has been abridged and will be diminished again in the future. SBA List also points to the Commission’s probable-cause finding and the existence of Ohio’s false-statement statute. Taken together, SBA List says, this evidence shows that if it desires to engage in similar speech, an imminent threat of prosecution forces it to choose between risking further harm or abandoning the speech altogether. We see it differently. In the normal course, we have little trouble finding a threat of future injury if a plaintiff has been subjected to the challenged action. Briggs, 61 F.3d at 492 (quoting dicta from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992)). However, our precedent in the standing context (which overlaps this part of the ripeness analysis) makes clear that a prior injury, without more, is not enough to establish prospective harm: Even when a party has been unlawfully sanctioned in the past, we have heeded the Supreme Court’s directive that past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects. While previous sanctions might, of course, be evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury . . . where the threat of repeated injury is speculative or tenuous, there is no standing to seek injunctive relief. -7- Susan B. Anthony List, et al v. Driehaus Nos. 11-3894/3925 Fieger v. Mich. Sup. Ct., 553 F.3d 955, 966 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (ellipses in original); see also O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974). This is equally true when a plaintiff alleges that his injury is chilled speech. See Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d 602, 609 n.7 (6th Cir. 2008) (“We make no distinction . . . between allegations of a past-experienced chill and allegations of chill seeking forward-looking relief. Without more, both will fail to constitute an injury-in-fact.”). “‘[S]ubjective chill’ alone—without some other indication of imminent enforcement—d[oes] not constitute injury in fact.” Berry, 688 F.3d at 296. The prior harms to which SBA List points—the billboard rejection and the probable-cause hearing—do not help it show an imminent threat of future prosecution. The rejected billboard is largely irrelevant. SBA List was unable to place the billboard because the private company that had committed to renting it to SBA List blinked when Driehaus’s counsel threatened legal action. The Commission had no role in this failed transaction, and SBA List cannot lay this failure at the Commission’s feet to show that its fear of future enforcement is reasonable. Neither does the probable-cause hearing show an imminent threat of prosecution based on prior enforcement, as the Commission never found that SBA List violated Ohio’s false-statement law. Statutorily, the preliminary hearing to which SBA List was subjected decides only “whether probable cause exists for the full commission to determine whether a violation of Ohio election law has occurred.” Ohio Admin. Code § 3517-1-11(A) (emphasis added). A probable-cause determination is not a “concrete application of state law” that enables SBA List to claim that the law has been enforced against it. See Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. & Bartenders Int’l Union Local 54, -8- Susan B. Anthony List, et al v. Driehaus Nos. 11-3894/3925 468 U.S. 491, 512 (1984) ( “Because the Commission never imposed this sanction . . . we are presented with no concrete application of state law. The issue is hence not ripe for review.”). Like an agency’s “reason to believe” determination that a violation may have occurred, the Commission’s conclusion that probable cause exists serves only to start proceedings that may—or may not—find an infraction. See FTC v. Standard Oil of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 241–42 (1980). A probable-cause determination is neither a “definitive statement of position,” nor a “definitive ruling or regulation” that establishes an imminent enforcement threat. Id. at 241, 243. Attempting to escape this conclusion, SBA List argues that a final Commission adjudication is not required to show a threat of future harm based on past enforcement activity. It leans heavily on Briggs and Berry to support its argument that the Commission’s acts are sufficient to demonstrate imminent injury. In Briggs, after determining that a candidate had violated an election law, the Commission declined to refer the matter for prosecution but said it would consider the violation in future investigations involving the candidate. 61 F.3d at 492–93. Briggs “present[ed] a sufficient future threat of injury” to enable her to challenge the statute’s constitutionality for three reasons: the Commission actually found a violation, Briggs planned to run for office in Ohio again, and the Commission’s policy of using past violations to evaluate later complaints meant the finding had future effect. Id. at 492. Berry involved an attorney’s challenge to an ethics rule that the state bar association, following an investigation, said he violated. Because the bar association was unequivocal that his conduct violated the rule and “instructed [him] to avoid such conduct in the future,” we held that the threat of enforcement hung over the attorney and “more than subjectively chilled” his speech. 688 F.3d at 297. -9- Susan B. Anthony List, et al v. Driehaus Nos. 11-3894/3925 Neither Briggs nor Berry shows that the Commission’s past actions make it likely that the Commission will threaten SBA List with prosecution anytime soon. The Commission’s probablecause determination was not a final adjudication, a finding of a violation, or even a warning that SBA List’s conduct violated Ohio law. While it green-lighted further investigation, the Commission expressed no opinion about the application of Ohio law to SBA List’s speech. SBA List does not suggest that the probable-cause finding would carry any weight in the future—in this hearing or any other. And its contention that a preliminary assessment that a violation may have occurred establishes the threat of future harm finds no support in our cases. No sword of Damocles dangles over SBA List to justify its fears. See Briggs, 61 F.3d at 493. SBA List’s claim also suffers from another problem peculiar to the Commission’s statutory powers—namely, that the Commission cannot initiate proceedings, but instead must wait for someone to bring a complaint. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.153(A). This hardly erects an formidable barrier to enforcement, but it does make its likelihood rather speculative. Who is likely to bring a complaint to set the wheels of the Commission in motion? SBA List hazards a guess: “any complainant,” it speculates. At oral argument, SBA List was marginally more specific: “some citizen in Ohio who supports Obama.” If such conjecture could establish a credible threat of future harm, any plaintiff could challenge Ohio’s election laws based on any intended speech. Article III’s “case” or “controversy” requirement does not stretch that far. SBA List has not shown that it labors under an imminent threat of prosecution by the Commission. SBA List’s claim that it credibly fears that Secretary Husted will enforce the false-statement law against it doesn’t fare much better. The organization points to the Secretary’s statutory duty to - 10 - Susan B. Anthony List, et al v. Driehaus Nos. 11-3894/3925 file a Commission complaint if he “has or should have knowledge of” an election-law violation. Id. § 3501.05(N)(2). And it warns that Secretary Husted has “exercised his authority” to enforce falsestatement claims, and has offered “no indication that he intends to discontinue doing so.” But SBA List does not suggest that the Secretary has ever attempted to enforce the law against the type of speech it intends to make. And more, Secretary Husted has declined to file a Commission complaint against the actual statement that gave rise to this litigation during the twoyear period the law allows. See id. § 3517.157(A). SBA List “can point to no action or statement” that suggests Secretary Husted intends to regulate its speech, making it “far from clear that any harm will occur . . . in the future.” Adult Video Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 71 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 1995). We finally consider whether SBA List’s fear of imminent enforcement at the hand of Driehaus is credible. Driehaus’s 2010 complaint tells us two things. First, Driehaus believed that SBA List violated the false-statement law. Second, Driehaus—just like “any person”—was able to file a complaint and so trigger enforcement proceedings. SBA List asks us to make a third inference—namely, that Driehaus’s complaint shows his willingness to file complaints in the future, posing a continuing threat to SBA List. This is a stretch. Driehaus remains in Africa on a multi-year assignment with the Peace Corps. He has no cause to complain about allegedly false election ads lobbed against him. SBA List says Driehaus may run for office again, but the evidence is thin at best.1 It is also far from certain 1 SBA List cites to a newspaper article that reads: Asked if there was anything he’d miss about Capitol Hill, Driehaus acted as if he’d - 11 - Susan B. Anthony List, et al v. Driehaus Nos. 11-3894/3925 that some future Driehaus candidacy would require the same response from SBA List. Without incumbency, for example, Driehaus may be too insignificant a candidate to attack. Or SBA List may decide that the Act’s purported funding of abortions is no longer a timely or effective political message. The degree of speculation required to consider Driehaus a present threat is fatal to SBA List’s claimed fears. The next step of the likelihood-of-harm analysis focuses on whether SBA List has “sufficiently alleged an intention to refuse to comply with the statute.” Berry, 688 F.3d at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted). The statutes SBA List challenges apply only to a person who “knowingly” makes a false statement or disseminates a statement “knowing [it] to be false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.21(B)(9), (10). SBA List would be closer to establishing ripeness if it had alleged that it intends to violate Ohio’s falsestatement law. But SBA List does not say that it plans to lie or recklessly disregard the veracity of its speech. Instead, it alleges the very opposite, insisting that the statement it made and plans to repeat—that the Act allows for taxpayer-funded abortions—is factually true. An unqualified intention to comply with a statute whose application depends on “specific facts demonstrating that plaintiffs acted with the been asked if he’d miss a toothache. He laughed a short, derisive laugh. “No,” said Driehaus, who was defeated after one term. “It’s a job. I mean, I lost an election. I move on . . . . I’m not real stuck on being a member of Congress.” Not exactly a ringing endorsement for the place. So, would he ever run again? “I might,” he said. David A. Fahrenthold, Between losing and going home: The House basement, Washington Post, Dec. 9, 2010, at A1. - 12 - Susan B. Anthony List, et al v. Driehaus Nos. 11-3894/3925 requisite . . . intent” may preclude a party’s ability to show that “the alleged harm will ever come to pass.” Norton, 298 F.3d at 554. SBA List’s insistence makes the possibility of prosecution for uttering such statements exceedingly slim, particularly because SBA List can only be liable for making a statement “knowing” it is false. It also means the fear animating SBA List’s request for prospective relief is the risk of a false prosecution. But SBA List offers no basis for this fear, leaving us to speculate about the reasons. “Not only is that fear misplaced, it’s inadequate to generate a case or controversy the federal courts can hear.” Glenn v. Holder, 690 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2012). SBA List has not sufficiently alleged an intention to disobey the statute. Given that SBA List has neither done this, nor demonstrated an imminent threat of prosecution at the hands of any defendant, it cannot show a likelihood of harm to establish that its challenge is ripe for review.
The factual record here is not sufficiently developed to review SBA List’s claims. Ohio has not applied its law to SBA List’s speech. The Commission has not found that SBA List violated the false-statement law. And no prosecutor has taken any action upon any Commission referral. SBA List says it seeks to engage in substantially similar speech in the future. Allowing such a case to proceed would require us to guess about the content and veracity of SBA List’s as-yet unarticulated statement, the chance an as-yet unidentified candidate against whom it is directed will file a Commission complaint, and the odds that the Commission will conclude the statement violates Ohio law. A court cannot decide SBA List’s claims on this threadbare record without engaging in precisely the kind of conjecture that the ripeness doctrine bars. - 13 - Susan B. Anthony List, et al v. Driehaus Nos. 11-3894/3925 SBA List counters that none of these details are relevant because the mere possibility that it ultimately could be sued for engaging in protected speech is factually sufficient to make this matter ripe. That is not correct. SBA List’s challenge to the applicability of a statutory scheme to its conduct would benefit from knowing what the scheme prohibits and what it permits. Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 707–08 (6th Cir. 2003). Some cases surely involve pure questions of law in which “[n]o factual development can change what the statute bans and what it protects.” Macaw, 132 F.3d at 291. But this is not one of them. And even if SBA List presented a “purely legal question,” it “remains a purely speculative legal question . . . that may be answered differently in different settings.” Warshak, 532 F.3d at 528. The current factual record is insufficient to permit review.
Withholding judicial relief will not result in undue hardship to SBA List. No complaint or Commission action is pending against SBA List and, for the reasons discussed above, SBA List has not demonstrated an objective fear of future enforcement. In fact, SBA List’s conduct after Driehaus filed the complaint in 2010 suggests that its speech has not been chilled. Recall that the only speech SBA List alleges it was unable to engage in was putting up the billboard. Apart from this, SBA List continued to actively communicate its message about Driehaus’ voting record. SBA List announced on October 19, 2010, for example, its plan to air radio ads claiming that Driehaus voted for taxpayer-funded abortion. And after the district court denied SBA List’s motion for a temporary restraining order, the organization issued a press release stating that Driehaus did not want his constituents to hear that he voted for taxpayer-funded abortion. Later still, - 14 - Susan B. Anthony List, et al v. Driehaus Nos. 11-3894/3925 appearing on television, SBA List’s president said that even if the Commission prevented SBA List from putting up its billboards, “we will double down and make sure that our message floods his district. We’ve got radio ads going out all across his district. We will simply not be intimidated into silence.” This is not the sound of chilled speech or a silenced speaker. “SBA List clearly has not been enjoined from any speech, and all indications are that its speech continues to be robust.” Susan B. Anthony List, No. 10-4320, at . On these facts, there is no hardship where the evidence suggests SBA List is not deterred from engaging in the very conduct that it claims is encumbered. See Norton, 298 F.3d at 555. Withholding judicial review will not result in undue hardship to SBA List. To conclude: the district court correctly determined that SBA List’s challenge is not ripe for review and properly dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.