Opinion ID: 2460171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trade name property

Text: Eddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc., suggests that Tri-County was not entitled to an injunction because it has no valid interest or property right in using the Howard name in connection with its business. The suggestion seems to be that Tri-County had not acquired an interest in the Howard name because (1) neither it, nor any of its predecessors, paid consideration to the Howards for the use of their name; (2) the Howards had orally given permission to Mr. Robertson to use their name, and that permission was later revoked with respect to Tri-County; and (3) the right to use the Howard name was not mentioned in the bill of sale and thus was not acquired by Tri-County from Mr. Jones. No authority is cited by the Howards or the Chancellor for the proposition that successful acquisition of a trade name depends on those factors. There is ample authority for the proposition that a person acquires a property right in a trade name merely by using the name in connection with a particular business for a period of time. Generally, the word `trade name' applies to a business and its good will, while the word `trade-mark' applies to the commodity to which it is affixed. King Pharr Canning Operations, Inc. v. Pharr Canning Co., 85 F.Supp. 150, 157 (W.D.Ark.1949). Trade names are afforded protection under the law of unfair competition. They are protected by a registration statute and by the common law. See Ark. Stat. Ann. 70-539(E), 70-550 [now Ark.Code Ann. § 4-71-113], and 70-552 (Repl.1979). Pullan v. Fulbright, 287 Ark. 21, 23, 695 S.W.2d 830, 831 (1985). [W]hen a name, mark or symbol has acquired a `secondary meaning,' the original user has a `property right which equity will protect against unfair appropriation by a competitor.' Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Sunrise Land Corp., 846 F.Supp. 742, 757 (W.D.Ark.1994), quoting Pullan v. Fulbright, supra . The concept of secondary meaning has been explained as follows: There are certain names, marks, and symbols which in their primary sense are merely generic or descriptive and do not ordinarily indicate the origin of goods or services. Such names, marks, or symbols, when used in their primary sense, cannot form the subject matter of a trade or service mark. However, a name, mark, or symbol by long and exclusive use and advertising by one person in the sale of his goods and services may become so associated in the public mind with such goods or services that it serves to identify them and distinguish them from the goods or services of others. When such an association exists, the name, mark, or symbol is said to have acquired secondary meaning in which the original user has a property right which equity will protect against unfair appropriation by a competitor. Pullan v. Fulbright, 287 Ark. at 23-24, 695 S.W.2d at 831, quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Ins. Co. of Tex., 185 F.Supp. 895, 903 (E.D.Ark.1960). We do not have many cases that thoroughly treat the question of how one acquires a property right in a trade name. Of course, we have recognized that a person may acquire such a right by purchasing the name. See Williams v. Spelic, 311 Ark. 279, 284, 844 S.W.2d 305, 309 (1992)(When a business purchases goodwill and a trade name, it acquires a valuable property right, and that is the right to inform the public that it possesses the experience and skill symbolized by the original concern.; sale of trade name specifically mentioned in bill of sale). One may, however, acquire a protectable interest in a trade name, without purchasing the rights to it, simply by using the name in connection with a business over the course of time and giving a secondary meaning to the name. Clyde Campbell University Shop v. Campbell-Bell, Inc., 243 Ark. 937, 422 S.W.2d 875 (1968); Liberty Cash Groceries, Inc., v. Adkins, 190 Ark. 911, 82 S.W.2d 28 (1935). See also Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Sunrise Land Corp., 846 F.Supp. at 757 (stating the right to a trademark or trade name originates in common law by prior appropriation and use), citing 4A RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 25.03 (L. Altman ed., 4th ed.1993); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) Unfair Competition § 18, at p. 184 (1995). Tri-County has used the Howard name continuously in connection with its business since 1984, and prior owners of the business used the name continuously since 1968. No one else in the area used that name or a similar name in connection with any business. The Howards, themselves, had never used their own name in connection with a business they owned. Howard Funeral Home was one of only two funeral businesses in the area, and its share of the funeral business was near 70 percent before Eddie Howard opened his business in 1996. Tri-County advertised and promoted its name in various ways. Thus, it is clear that Tri-County went through the necessary steps of acquiring Howard Funeral Home as a valid trade name with obvious secondary meaning. It occurred irrespective of any permission initially given by the Howards to Mr. Robertson in 1968 and irrespective of the fact that the Howards later purported to revoke the permission with respect to Tri-County, after it had used the name beginning in 1984. The Howard name was not previously appropriated when Mr. Robertson began to use it in connection with his funeral business in 1968. It was just a surname, and there is no protection given to a surname until it acquires a secondary meaning. 2 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13.02[1], at p. 13-5 (3d ed.1995). In 1968, the Howards had not used their name in connection with their business; it had not acquired a secondary meaning. Thus, it was not necessary for the Howards to permit Mr. Robertson or anyone else to call the business the Howard Funeral Home because the Howards had not established a protectable interest in their name. It also was irrelevant that the bill of sale was silent on the matter of whether the right to the Howard Funeral Home trade name passed in the transaction between Mr. Jones and Tri-County. Regardless of what transpired in connection with the bill of sale, Tri-County has continued to use, advertise, and promote the Howard Funeral Home name since 1984. Even if Tri-County did not acquire the right to that name at the precise point of the 1984 transaction with Mr. Jones, Tri-County most certainly gave the name a secondary meaning in the years thereafter.