Opinion ID: 4544632
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Undue Delay and Prejudice to the University

Text: As to her other proposed amendments, Banerjee argues that these were “minor” and therefore were not futile. Whatever else one might say about that argument, it makes it very hard to argue that the judge abused his discretion in denying such “minor” changes. See Colvin, 605 F.3d 282. Banerjee argued below and argues before us that the University’s long delay in submitting an Answer (see supra, n.3.) somehow either necessitated her own relatively late-in-the-day motion to amend, or meant that it should be allowed for reasons of fairness, or both. But a complicated case-management problem like the one that was presented here is exactly what district judges are trusted to handle. Judge Mattice’s solution was a reasonable one, even if it was not the one Banerjee would have preferred. The district court was under no compulsion to link the two issues. Meanwhile, the court correctly concluded that Banerjee herself had unduly delayed proposing her amendments and that the University would suffer prejudice if the court allowed plaintiff to amend 6 “[D]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim.” Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)), abrogated on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 12 19-6009, Banerjee v. Univ. of Tenn. her complaint. Therefore, insofar as any of Banerjee’s proposed amendments are not covered by our affirmance on futility grounds, we affirm them on the ground that the district court did not abuse its discretion. III. Banerjee’s Title VII Discrimination Claim Is Time Barred Banerjee was formally notified that the University had terminated her employment by Provost Martin’s letter of June 12, 2014. She did not file her EEOC charge until September 4, 2015. In order to bring a Title VII suit in federal court, a plaintiff must first have filed, within 300 days of the adverse action, a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(e)(1). September 4, 2015 is well over 300 days after June 12, 2014. Therefore, Banerjee’s claim is time-barred. The district court granted summary judgment to UTK on this ground. Banerjee argued then and argues now that her use of the internal-appeals process at UTK ought to toll the statute of limitations, particularly as discovery shows that the Chancellor relied on Dr. Zomchick’s advice in evaluating her letter of appeal. Dr. Zomchick was “the central figure in Plaintiff’s dismissal and the person furthest from being a disinterested party to the matter” and therefore this “represented a continuation of the discriminatory treatment Dr. Banerjee had suffered[.]” This argument suffers from several problems. First, and most significantly, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that use of the internal appeals process at a university should toll the time bar in Title VII cases, in Delaware State College v. Ricks. 449 U.S. 257, 261–62 (1980). In Ricks, as in our case, a university professor was denied tenure and given a terminal contract. He received notice of this by formal letter. He initiated an internal appeals process, in which he did not succeed. Id. at 253–54. He then filed an EEOC complaint against his college and later sued the college under Title VII. Id. at 254. The complaint would have been timely were the 13 19-6009, Banerjee v. Univ. of Tenn. triggering event the end of the university appeals process, but not if it were the formal notification of the denial of tenure. Id. at 260–61. Thus, the Supreme Court faced two closely related questions. First, which event marked the start of the 300-day clock for the filing of an EEOC complaint? The Court held that the clock began to run upon the notification by formal letter that Ricks had been denied tenure. Id. at 259. Second, given that this was so, did Ricks’s internal appeal toll the statute of limitations? The Court held that it did not. Id. at 261. Banerjee attempts to differentiate Ricks on the grounds that the Ricks court “recognized the validity of the continuing-violation theory, but rejected it only because the plaintiff had presented no ‘allegations of facts to support it.’” (Quoting Ricks, 449 U.S. at 259.) She claims, by contrast, that she “has presented substantial evidence of continuing discrimination in the appeals process itself, making the Ricks holding plainly inapplicable.” It is true that dicta in Ricks keeps open the possibility that a plaintiff could allege a continuing violation during the appeals process that would extend “the limitations periods to commence with the date of discharge[.]” Id. at 258. For the continuing-violation theory to apply, however, Ricks specifies that: “[the plaintiff] would have had to allege and prove that the manner in which his employment was terminated differed discriminatorily from the manner in which the College terminated other professors who also had been denied tenure.” Id. at 258.7 Banerjee fails to develop any such argument. Beyond the fact of Dr. Zomchick’s involvement in both her dismissal and her appeal, she introduces no evidence or allegations from which we might discern that this process “differed discriminatorily” from the norm.8 Ibid. Nor does she otherwise make out a continuing act of discrimination, other than 7 This statement comes in the context of a discussion of which date triggered the 300-day EEOC requirement, which was the topic of the first half of the opinion, rather than in the context of whether or not the pursuit of the grievance procedure should toll such a statutory limitation. However, the Court’s opinion discussing the latter question, which Banerjee cites, refers back to the previous discussion. See 449 U.S. at 459. 8 Banerjee says only that “common sense dictates that delegation of this responsibility to a plainly biased party deprived Dr. Banerjee of the independent review of her appeal to which she was entitled . . . .” But this is not 14 19-6009, Banerjee v. Univ. of Tenn. alleging ipso facto that Zomchick was biased because of his involvement in her firing. She presents no cases that bear on what we ought to do with the involvement of Dr. Zomchick in the appeal. Thus, we cannot differentiate Ricks. Moreover, one of the cases that Banerjee cites on the timeliness of her Title VII claim (and she only cites two) actually points another way: to the proposition that, at most, the appeals irregularities might represent a separate Title VII claim. In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 116 (2002), the Supreme Court held that: Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable “unlawful employment practice.” [The plaintiff] can only file a charge to cover discrete acts that “occurred” within the appropriate time period. Id. at 114. In light of this passage, Banerjee is arguing against her own cause when she writes, “This improper delegation [to Zomchick] was a separate, independent act of discrimination, which effectively tolled the statute of limitations period . . . .” (Emphasis added.) If the first half of the sentence is true, Morgan suggests the second half must be false. In other words, if Zomchick’s involvement in the appeal somehow did give rise to (or constitute) a discriminatory act, that would be at most the basis for a separate Title VII claim—not the one that Banerjee has brought. Ultimately, though, such speculation pales beside the overwhelming similarities between our case and Ricks. The district court was right to find Banerjee’s claims are time-barred. responsive to the strictures of Ricks. Banerjee points to no evidence of what sort, if any, of “independent review” her sending a letter entitled her to, what its processes were supposed to be, whether Dr. Zomchick (who held an academic administration position) was usually involved in such appeals, or whether there was any general due-process guarantee for such an appeal by letter. Absent such a showing, we cannot conclude that there were discriminatory differences of the sort that Ricks contemplated. 15 19-6009, Banerjee v. Univ. of Tenn.