Opinion ID: 1907936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Faculty Code.

Text: The University contends, and the trial judge effectively held, that Vice President French's letter was sufficient, as a matter of law, to satisfy the University's contractual obligations. We disagree. Words in a contract are to be given their common meaning. Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1367 (D.C. 1977) (per curiam); see also Sawyer v. Mercer, 594 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tenn.1980) (applying this principle to language in a faculty guide). The Faculty Code provides that a member of the faculty  who will not be granted tenure ... shall be so notified in writing no later than June 30 .... Code § IV.A.3.1.c (emphasis added). An impartial trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the words will not, as used in this context, presuppose that a final and definitive decision has been made with respect to tenure prior to the notice being given. The Code does not state that the faculty member is to be notified that he may not be granted tenure, or that he is not likely to be granted tenure, or that he has not been recommended for tenure. The operative words are  will not.  A reasonable person could find, in this context, that will not means will not, not something less definitive, and that a predictive notice is not sufficient. The University reads the notice provision as though it stated: If the Dean recommends that tenure be denied, then the faculty member shall be so notified. According to the University, a recommendation by the Dean that tenure be denied is the event which triggers the notice requirement. It may be that such a provision would be a sensible one and that the University could readily comply with it, but the parties agreed to something quite different. The Code as written contemplates notice of a decision that tenure will not be granted. The apparent triggering event is not the Dean's nonconcurrence, but a final decision denying tenure. A definitive decision could not have been made in this case in conformity with the Faculty Code until after the Board of Trustees had acted on Dr. Kakaes' application. Where, as here, the faculty and the administration have disagreed as to whether tenure should be granted, the Code designates the Board of Trustees as the body to which the offering recommendations are transmitted. Code Procedures § B.4. At each step prior to Board review, the role of the faculty and of the administration is to make recommendations. The use of the term recommendations necessarily means that a final decision has not been made, and it is the body to which the recommendations are transmitted  here, the Board of Trustees  that must determine which recommendation is to be followed. In the present case, Vice President French's notice to Dr. Kakaes was transmitted on June 28, 1993, more than half a year before any action was taken by the Board of Trustees. Moreover, the notice itself reveals the non-final character of the tenure decision. To be sure, French began his letter by advising Dr. Kakaes, in the language of the Faculty Code, that you will not be granted tenure at the conclusion of your current appointment. The ostensible certitude of this assertion, however, was dissipated by the disclosure, later in the letter, that the matter was being referred to the Board of Trustees for its consideration and that Dr. Kakaes will be notified of the outcome as soon as possible. If the outcome was dependent on an action by the Board which was to be taken in the future, then nobody could know for sure, at the time the letter was written, whether or not Dr. Kakaes  will  be denied tenure. The summary judgment record contains further evidence, aside from Vice President French's letter, that the University itself fully understood that the Board of Trustees was to be the final and decisive actor with respect to Dr. Kakaes' application. Dr. French acknowledged in his memorandum of June 30, 1993 to the chairman of Dr. Kakaes' department that the question of [Dr. Kakaes'] ultimate tenureing or termination remains to be resolved.  (Emphasis added). Moreover, as we have noted, the non-finality of the Dean's recommendation was subsequently acknowledged by counsel for the University and by President Trachtenberg. See pp. 131-132, supra. [5] The University argues that the Board of Trustees has never declined to follow a nonconcurring recommendation forwarded by the Dean, and that predictive notice which is sent prior to review by the Board is therefore sufficient as a matter of law. The contention that the Board automatically and uncritically approves the recommendations of administration officials, however, does not square with the language of the Code. The Code Procedures provide that nonconcurring recommendations (rather than decisions) shall be transmitted to the Board of Trustees. By the terms of the contract, then, the Board played a significant role in the tenure review process. Specifically, the Board was designated to make the final decision as to tenure when the administration and the faculty were unable to reach a consensus. In this case, as in Kyriakopoulos v. George Washington Univ., 275 U.S.App. D.C. 237, 243, 866 F.2d 438, 444 (1989), the contract does not transmogrify the Board into a rubber stamp of committee[ [6] ] decisions. [7] Further, in Kyriakopoulos, the court recognized the traditional discretion reserved to the Trustees and observed that the Board need not mechanically accept the committees' recommendations. Id. It is not for this court to say that Dr. Kakaes and the University understood the Board's function in the process to be a mere formality when the Faculty Code contains a provision which specifically identifies a role for the Board  indeed, a dispositive role  in the event of nonconcurrence. The University also contends that the Code does not require notice of a final decision regarding tenure because the language is prospective: it calls for notice that tenure will not be granted at the end of the faculty member's maximum term of appointment. This argument takes the Code's use of the future tense out of its evident context. The prospective nature of the notice requirement simply reflects the fact that the faculty member will continue to be employed through the end of his maximum term, at which point he will not be granted tenure. The provision requires notice that tenure will not be granted, not that tenure might not be granted. Accordingly, an impartial trier of fact could reasonably conclude that in order to comply with the Code, the University was required to complete its decision-making process by the contractual deadline. The University asserts that [e]very court faced with similar arguments regarding the sufficiency of notice to faculty has uniformly rejected [the argument that proper notice requires a definitive decision denying tenure]. This statement is not correct. The parties have cited no case law precisely in point, and we have found none. Dr. Kakaes' reading of the notice provision in the Faculty Code, however, finds support in at least two cases in which courts have recognized that notice of the denial of tenure, or of some comparable action, is not effective unless the underlying decision has been made in a timely fashion by the appropriate authority. In Papadopoulos v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 14 Or.App. 130, 511 P.2d 854 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919, 94 S.Ct. 2626, 41 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), the court was called upon to interpret a state board regulation requiring twelve months' notice [i]f any appointment of an academic staff member... not on indefinite tenure, is to be terminated otherwise than for cause. Id. 511 P.2d at 873. No official below the level of the President of the University had the authority to terminate a professor's employment. Professor Papadopoulos had applied for tenure, but he received notice of nonretention before the president had acted on the application. The court held that the notice was deficient because the relevant inquiry is not whether petitioner had knowledge of the possibility that he would be discharged; rather, the relevant inquiry is whether petitioner received timely notice of termination in compliance with [the regulation]. It seems obvious that the notice of termination contemplated by [the regulation] is notice from somebody with authority to make the decision to terminate. We conclude that there is no authority to terminate a professor's employment below the University President level. Id. at 874 (emphasis added); cf. Perrin v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 15 Or. App. 268, 515 P.2d 409, 412 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950, 94 S.Ct. 3078, 41 L.Ed.2d 670 (1974) (distinguishing Papadopoulos as a case involving the problem . . . of construing the recommendation of a subordinate as a definitive decision by one entitled to make the decision). In Farrington v. School Comm. of Cambridge, 382 Mass. 324, 415 N.E.2d 211 (1981), the court was called upon to construe a state statute which required that teachers be given notice no later than on April 15 of the current academic year if they were not to be retained for the following year. Id. 415 N.E.2d at 212. The court had previously held in Bonar v. City of Boston, 369 Mass. 579, 341 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1976), that a teacher is entitled to tenure after three consecutive years of employment unless the appropriate body (in Ms. Farrington's case, the school committee) has provided timely, authorized, and proper notice to the contrary. 415 N.E.2d at 212. Ms. Farrington received an otherwise timely notice from the superintendent of schools. At the time of the notice, however, the school committee had not yet voted on her reappointment. The court held that the notice was defective, and that Ms. Farrington was entitled to tenure: Tenure may be obtained upon the failure to give timely notice of a decision not to grant tenure or not to nominate for tenure.... The appropriate authority must in fact have made the decision by the time of the giving of such a notice .... We reject the notion that an unauthorized notice, given before the statutory deadline, properly may preserve an option in the school committee to make an adverse tenure decision at some later date.... Failure to act seasonably to deny tenure and to give notice of that decision has the effect of electing to grant tenure .... Id. at 213 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The issue in this case is at least roughly analogous to the questions resolved by the courts in Papadopoulos and Farrington, See also James T. Payne, Annotation, Sufficiency of Notice of Intention to Discharge or Not to Rehire Teacher Under Statutes Requiring Such Notice, 52 A.L.R. 4th 301, 365-68 (1987 & 1995 Supp.). [8] A reasonable person reading the applicable provisions of the Faculty Code could fairly conclude that the notice provided to Dr. Kakaes in Vice President French's letter of June 28, 1993 suffered from the same defects as did the notices provided to the plaintiffs in those two cases.