Opinion ID: 1790918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: currie's liability

Text: In the instant case, Currie made a claim against the estate for $12,000.00 in connection with his legal services rendered in the contest of probating the foreign will. Ms. Holt, the administratrix, approved the claim. After a hearing contested by Mr. Drake, the trial court ordered Currie's claim to be paid. Subsequently, the order approving Currie's claim, and ordering its payment, was reversed. Currie has consistently denied any liability to reimburse the estate for the amounts paid pursuant to the reversed order. Currie argued, and the court of civil appeals held, that he was not liable to the estate for the reimbursement of the $12,000.00 since (1) he earned it, and (2) he was a third party in regard to the administratrix's request for his claim to be paid, and the probate court's order that he be paid. We disagree with these holdings, and reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals in this regard. In Peticolas v. Carpenter, 53 Tex. 23 (1880), this Court adopted the principle that: Where a judgment for debt is reversed after it has been enforced by execution, and the case is finally decided in favor of the defendant, he is certainly entitled to restitution . . . . 53 Tex. at 29. In Peticolas, this Court approved a judgment permitting the party winning on reversal to seek restitution from the person to whom the money had been paid. This principle has been consistently reiterated over the years by the courts of this state. See, e.g., Texas Land & Irrigation Co. v. Sanders, 101 Tex. 616, 111 S.W. 648 (1908); Cleveland v. Tufts, 69 Tex. 580, 7 S.W. 72 (1888); King v. Rubinsky, 253 S.W.2d 937 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Cleveland v. Tufts , cited just above, we declared that it is settled that money paid upon a judgment afterwards reversed may be recovered by the party making the payment. 69 Tex. at 583, 7 S.W. at 74. Once again, we approved recovery of the money from the person who had received the payment pursuant to the subsequently reversed judgment. In the instant case, the probate court ordered that Mr. Currie receive from the estate the sum of $12,000.00 as compensation for his legal services to the estate. The estate paid this money to Currie. On appeal, this order was reversed. Under these circumstances, Mr. Currie was not a disinterested third party who can avoid reimbursing the estate. Rather, he was the claimant against the estate for whose benefit the order was rendered. Because it was this order approving his claim that was reversed, he is liable to the estate for reimbursement of the money paid to him. Currie's argument that the $12,000.00 was earned by him due to the work performed for Ms. Holt misses the point. Merely because Currie may be entitled to recover for his services from Ms. Holt does not mean that he can recover, or retain the benefit of payment, from the estate. Cf. Porter v. Marotta, 267 S.W.2d 222 (Tex.Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, no writ hist.). The estate has no interest in whether Currie is paid for services rendered to Ms. Holt in her individual capacity. Accordingly, the estate's funds must be returned, and Currie must look elsewhere for payment. Finally, Currie argues that since Ms. Holt has been held to have received the benefit of this erroneous payment out of the estate, he cannot be held liable because he could have received no benefit from this payment. His argument is based on the thesis that only one party can benefit from such a payment pursuant to a judgment; thus, he cannot be ordered to reimburse the estate since Ms. Holt, and not he, benefited from this payment. We disagree with this argument. More than one person can benefit from a single payment. In this case, Ms. Holt may have benefited in the payment of her personal debt to Currie. At the same time, Mr. Currie also received a benefit from the estate's payment of the claim; and he now holds $12,000.00 that would not otherwise be in his possession.