Opinion ID: 1784340
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue: Whether the State's Delay in Providing Holland with the Rape Kit Violated His Constitutional Rights?

Text: In this case, investigators employed a so-called sexual assault kit to collect samples of Krystal's body fluids. Holland filed a motion requesting preservation of these samples for future testing by his expert. The trial judge granted Holland's request and ordered the State's expert, Larry Turner, to use no more than half the samples in his testing and to preserve the remaining half for testing by Holland's forensic expert. Turner complied with the judge's order and conducted various serological tests. The testing revealed the presence of acid phosphate, an enzyme which is a strong indicator of the presence of semen. About a year later, Holland received the samples after his proposed expert, Dr. Dennis Canfield, was adjudged qualified to conduct the testing. Canfield's testing revealed the presence of no acid phosphate  a result which contradicts Turner's test results. Holland then filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that he was prejudiced because his receipt of the samples was untimely  untimely because he did not receive them until almost one year after Turner conducted his testing. This, he says, resulted in a degradation of the samples which left him unable to accurately and conclusively test them for the presence of semen. For support, he cites the inconsistent test results reached by Turner and Canfield. Holland conceded that he believed neither the State nor Turner is guilty of any misconduct. Upon completion of a lengthy hearing, the judge overruled Holland's motion, and Holland appealed. Id. at 2153.
In this appeal, Holland contends: It is unconscionable that the State's delay in producing th[e samples] result [ sic ] in such a gross prejudice to [his] ability to examine and test this evidence  a prejudice that was all too obvious during the cross-examination of [his] expert [Canfield]. Appellant's Brief at 44-45. Holland adds: [D]ue process requires that a criminal defendant have access to physical evidence for independent testing. Id. at 43. The State counters that Holland's contention is unequivocally contrary to dispositive constitutional law  i.e., his due process rights were not violated. Appellee's Brief at 29-32.
The record is simply devoid of any evidence to substantiate Holland's contention that his untimely receipt of the samples was due to the State's employment of dilatory tactics which resulted in a prejudicial degradation of potentially-exculpatory evidence. The record reveals the State fully complied with the judge's order to preserve half the samples. Indeed, Holland conceded during the hearing:  We are not saying there was any misconduct certainly by Mr. Turner or by the State.  Vol. XII, at 2114. And Holland's own expert, Canfield, disputes his degradation theory. Id. at 2130-31. Any delay in receiving the samples was due to (1) Holland's inaction  i.e., his failure to simply go and get the samples from Turner who had properly preserved and stored them for him and (2) his mistaken belief that Turner had used up all the samples. Id. at 2114-16. Because the record reveals no evidence of bad faith on the part of the State, no constitutional violation has been committed. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S.Ct. 455, 466, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 481 (1971) (no constitutional violation committed because there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage); see Knapp, Prosecution's Failure to Preserve Potentially Exculpatory Evidence As Violating Criminal Defendant's Due Process Rights Under Federal Constitution  Supreme Court Cases, 102 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1989). In sum, this Court affirms on this issue.