Opinion ID: 1770805
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Heading: Principles of Federalism

Text: The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution specifically provides that all powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution are reserved to the states. Indeed, [i]t is fundamental in our federal structure that states have vast residual powers. Those powers, unless constrained or displaced by the existence of federal authority or by proper federal enactments, are often exercised in concurrence with those of the national government. United States v. Locke, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1148, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)). The United States Supreme Court has observed that the States under our federal system have the principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195, 79 S.Ct. 666, 671, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959); see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1631, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Nonetheless, if federal law has preempted state law, either expressly or impliedly, the Supremacy Clause [7] requires state law to yield. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 1107, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157, 98 S.Ct. 988, 994, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978). Thus, in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 61 S.Ct. 924, 85 L.Ed. 1193 (1941), the United States Supreme Court concluded that Florida could prosecute one of its citizens for violating state laws regulating the taking of commercial sponges, even if the crime occurred outside of Florida's territorial waters. Id. In determining that the State's exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was proper, the Court examined whether any conflict with federal law existed. See id. at 74-75, 61 S.Ct. 924, 928. Because there was no conflict with federal law and the State had an interest in the proper maintenance of its sponge fishery, the Court found that the State continued to exercise its traditional police powers. See id. With this constitutional framework in mind, we examine whether section 910.006(3)(d) conflicts with federal law and whether the prosecution is within the State's police powers. First, we examine whether the State's exercise of jurisdiction in this case conflicts with any provisions in the United States Constitution, specifically the provision granting Congress the right to define piracies and felonies on the high seas, see U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 10, the provision granting the federal government the power to enter treaties, see U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and the provision granting the federal courts the power to hear admiralty and maritime cases, see U.S. Const., art III, § 2, cl. 1.
The Constitution's grant of power to Congress to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on high Seas, U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 10, does not preclude states from punishing an act that also violates the state's laws. The same act or omission can offend the laws of both the state and federal government. See Abbate, 359 U.S. at 194, 79 S.Ct. 666 ([A]n act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each.) (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382, 43 S.Ct. 141, 142, 67 L.Ed. 314 (1922)). For example, although the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to define and punish ... offenses against the Law of Nations, U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 10, both Congress and the states can prosecute a criminal for counterfeiting foreign currency. See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487, 7 S.Ct. 628, 632, 30 L.Ed. 728 (1887). Therefore, the same felony on the high seas can violate the laws of both the United States and a state, and be subject to prosecution by both the state and the federal government. Accordingly, this constitutional provision is not implicated.
We next turn to the constitutional provision relied on by the Fifth District, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, of the United States Constitution, [8] which prohibits states from entering treaties. See Stepansky, 707 So.2d at 879. According to the Fifth District, the State is unable to prosecute this crime because Florida is constitutionally prohibited from entering into a treaty with the flag state, Liberia. See id. Stepansky asserts this prosecution is prevented by the flag-state rule set forth in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. VI, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 2315, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 86. [9] However, as Stepansky conceded during oral argument, criminal defendants lack standing to raise a violation of an international treaty that is not self-executing. [10] See Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 76, 61 S.Ct. 924; United States v. Roberts, 1 F.Supp.2d 601, 606 (E.D.La.1998). Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas is not a self-executing treaty and does not operate to limit the jurisdiction traditionally asserted by the United States over foreign vessels on the high seas. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 884 (5th Cir.1979); see also Roberts 1 F.Supp.2d at 606. Therefore, the question of whether section 910.006(3)(d) is in violation of this treaty is not properly before this Court. Further, on the merits, the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is not an attempt by the State to enter a treaty. In Skiriotes, the United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the State was preempted from exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction because it would encroach upon the exclusive treaty-making power of the United States. 313 U.S. at 71-72, 61 S.Ct. 924. Instead, the Court reasoned that because the United States would have been able to exercise jurisdiction, the question of whether the State could also exercise jurisdiction was one of federal rather than international law. See id. at 75-77, 61 S.Ct. 924. International law is not concerned with the question of whether this defendant is prosecuted by a state or the federal government. [11] As a comment to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations (1986) [hereinafter Restatement], explains: Since international and other foreign relations law are the law of the United States, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution an exercise of jurisdiction by a State that contravenes the limitations of §§ 402-403 is invalid.... International law normally is not concerned with how authority to exercise jurisdiction is allocated within a state's domestic constitutional order. Whether a State may exercise jurisdiction that the United States is entitled to exercise under international law is, therefore, generally a question only of United States law. Subject to constitutional limitations, a State may exercise jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality, including effects within the territory, and, in some respects at least, on the basis of citizenship, residence, or domicile in the State. Id. at § 402 cmt. k (emphasis supplied). Stepansky does not dispute that the federal government could prosecute him for this crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 7(8) (1994); Roberts, 1 F.Supp.2d at 607-08; United States v. Pizdrint, 983 F.Supp. 1110, 1112-13 (M.D.Fla.1997). Thus, because the United States can exercise jurisdiction in this case, so may the State of Florida as long as the State's actions do not conflict with federal law. See Restatement, supra, § 402 cmt. k. Although Stepansky hypothesizes that the treaty clause would prevent the State from prosecuting a foreign national under Florida's special maritime criminal jurisdiction statute, that scenario is not presented in this case. The general rule is that absent a First Amendment challenge, a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581, 109 S.Ct. 2633, 105 L.Ed.2d 493 (1989); see City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197, 202 (Fla.1985). This general rule reflects two `cardinal principles' of our constitutional order: the personal nature of constitutional rights and the prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication. Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Pub'g Corp., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 120 S.Ct. 483, 489, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999). Therefore, because the exercise of jurisdiction is proper as to Stepansky, who is a United States citizen, the Fifth District's holding that the statute was facially invalid as a violation of article I, section 10, see Stepansky, 707 So.2d at 879, was erroneous.
Lastly, the federal constitution's grant of power to federal courts to hear all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction, U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1, also does not preclude a state's exercise of concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government within the state's territorial waters. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341, 93 S.Ct. 1590, 36 L.Ed.2d 280 (1973); see also Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 471 (6th Cir.1959) (finding that the federal government may exercise concurrent jurisdiction with states over crimes committed within the states' territorial waters). It is black letter law ... that the mere grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concurrent jurisdiction over the cause of action. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 479, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981). Certainly, as Stepansky concedes, the federal government would be able to exercise jurisdiction over this criminal matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 7(8), which extends federal maritime jurisdiction to offenses committed by or against United States nationals on board foreign vessels scheduled to depart from or arrive in the United States. See Roberts, 1 F.Supp.2d at 607-08; Pizdrint, 983 F.Supp. at 1112-13; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2111 (1984) (criminalizing robberies committed within the federal maritime jurisdiction); 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) (criminalizing aggravated sexual abuse in the federal maritime jurisdiction). There is no indication, however, that this grant of federal jurisdiction is exclusive. [12] In fact, the statute conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts over all federal crimes, such as robberies and assaults within the federal maritime jurisdiction, specifically provides that: Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1994). The courts will infer congressional intent to preempt state legislation if [t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, the federal legislation touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject, or the object sought by the federal legislation may reveal the same purpose. Ray, 435 U.S. at 157, 98 S.Ct. 988 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). Unlike the comprehensive federal regulations governing certification of oil tankers and standards of oil tanker operation at issue in Ray and Locke, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69, the statutes at issue in this case do not involve a scheme of comprehensive federal regulations that are so pervasive as to give rise to a reasonable inference that Congress intended to preempt most state legislation. The United States Supreme Court has explained, Even though Congress has acted in the admiralty area, state regulation is permissible, absent a clear conflict with the federal law. Askew, 411 U.S. at 341, 93 S.Ct. 1590; see Ray, 435 U.S. at 157, 98 S.Ct. 988. Thus, the general rule on preemption in admiralty is that states may supplement federal admiralty law as applied to matters of local concern, so long as state law does not actually conflict with federal law or interfere with the uniform working of the maritime legal system. Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1422 (9th Cir.1990); see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 2-5 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp.1999). In fact, in Locke, the Supreme Court found that the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 did not displace state laws which, rather than imposing substantive regulation of a vessel's primary conduct, establish liability rules and financial requirements relating to oil spills. ___ U.S. at ___, 120 S.Ct. at 1146. This Court has previously rejected the argument that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas precluding the State from exercising its criminal jurisdiction. See Keen v. State, 504 So.2d 396, 398-99 (Fla.1987), disapproved on other grounds, Owen v. State, 596 So.2d 985 (Fla.1992). The defendant in Keen committed murder while on the high seas. We found that because the element of premeditation occurred in Florida, jurisdiction was properly exercised under section 910.005(2), Florida Statutes (1977), which grants Florida jurisdiction over crimes committed partly within the state. 504 So.2d at 398-99. Although the State in Keen exercised a different basis for jurisdiction over the defendant, the critical holding of Keen is that the grant of criminal maritime jurisdiction to the federal courts in 18 U.S.C. § 7 is concurrent rather than exclusive in cases where the offense violates the laws of both sovereigns. Keen, 504 So.2d at 399.
We conclude that the structure of section 910.006 ensures that it will not violate the constitution, that it will not conflict with the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts, and that it will not interfere with the uniform working of the maritime legal system. See Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n, 918 F.2d at 1422. Section 910.006 provides that the State is not authorized to prosecute a crime under this statute unless federal law prohibit[s] substantially the same act or omission. § 910.006(4). Further, pursuant to section 910.006(4), No person shall be tried under this section if that person has been tried in good faith for substantially the same act or omission. Similarly, section 910.006(5)(a)1. specifies: This section is not intended to assert priority over or otherwise interfere with the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the United States, the flag state, or the state in whose territory an act or omission occurs. Accordingly, section 910.006 makes clear that the State will not exercise jurisdiction if the federal government, the foreign flag state, or the state in whose territory the act occurs prosecutes the defendant. Therefore, under Tenth Amendment federalism principles, the State's exercise of jurisdiction in this case is not preempted by federal law. See Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 74-75, 61 S.Ct. 924; Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n, 918 F.2d at 1422.