Opinion ID: 844275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's absence from two hearings

Text: Defendant contends his absence from two conferences violated his right to be present during the trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution, and Penal Code sections 977, subdivision (b), and 1043, subdivision (a). The first conference between the court and counsel occurred during jury selection, as proceedings were about to resume, and the trial judge asked to see counsel in the hallway for a moment. Out of the presence of defendant and the prospective jurors, the court stated that it needed to put on the record and inform you both that a prospective juror had told the court's jury coordinator that the prospective juror had been informed by someone, they couldn't tell who, that they were all going to be videotaped. According to the court, the jury coordinator had checked and found no one with a video camera outside the jury assembly room. And [the bailiff] said he didn't see anyone out in the hallway. I don't know where it came from or who it was by or if you know anything about it at all. The prosecutor and the defense counsel responded that they would object if someone brought a camera into court. The court reiterated its purpose of ensuring counsel was aware of the report, and added that the jury coordinator did not have the juror's name. So we are in a situation where we have very little information other than that general information. Defense counsel stated, I am just going to ignore it at this point. The prosecutor added that he would do the same. Finally, the court stated that if it learned anything more, it would bring the information to counsel's attention. The second conference occurred again during jury selection after defense counsel undertook to explain to prospective jurors differences between the guilt and penalty phases of trial. With respect to the penalty phase, defense counsel stated that [y]ou can consider what type of upbringing he had. You can consider the area he lived in. You can consider his education. The prosecutor asked to approach the bench, and the court directed that counsel meet with the court in the hallway. At the conference, the prosecutor objected that defense counsel's comments were incorrect statements of the law. The court directed defense counsel not to preinstruct the prospective jurors, but the prosecutor clarified that he was not objecting to preinstruction, only to reference to neighborhood and so forth. Defense counsel then asserted that if I start talking about aggravating versus mitigating, [the prospective jurors] don't know what the heck I'm talking about. The court responded that it had already introduced the concepts of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to the prospective jurors, and defense counsel agreed to rephrase his comments. When voir dire resumed, defense counsel noted that the court had alluded to the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors, and asked whether anyone on the panel would feel that once the guilt phase is over and if you convict [defendant], that no matter what, at that point you won't listen to the mitigating factors that might be presented by me in this case? (1) Although a criminal defendant generally has a right to be personally present at trial, there are various limitations upon this right. First, `[u]nder the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present at a particular proceeding unless his appearance is necessary to prevent interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-examination.' [Citation.] ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1231 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] ( Cole ); see also Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 739 [96 L.Ed.2d 631, 107 S.Ct. 2658] [the Confrontation Clause's functional purpose [is to] ensur[e] a defendant an opportunity for cross-examination].) (2) Defendant provides no explanation concerning how these conferences during jury voir dire proceedings had any relation to his opportunity for effective cross-examination, nor do we perceive any relation. (See People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 198 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496] ( Gray ) [litigants must support each legal point with argument].) Second, `under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present at a particular proceeding unless he finds himself at a stage . . . that is critical to [the] outcome and his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.' [Citations.] ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1231; see also Kentucky v. Stincer, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 745 [same].) Defendant contends his presence at the first conference concerning the videotaping rumor would have contributed to the fairness of the trial. He bases his contention upon a subsequent event during jury selection: later the same morning, the prospective juror who had spoken to the jury coordinator about videotaping stated, in the presence of other prospective jurors, that the courthouse allowed videotaping and that he was concerned about gang retaliation in the event the jury returned a guilty verdict. Defendant asserts that, had he been present at the conference, he would have had the opportunity to object to the decision not to pursue the matter. Then, according to defendant, the prospective juror could have been questioned outside the presence of other prospective jurors, and the jury pool would not subsequently have been exposed to comments concerning gangs. His theory is speculation, and therefore is inadequate to establish that the conference was critical or that his presence would have contributed to the fairness of the procedure. ( People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1307 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 185 P.3d 727]; see People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 742 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46] ( Waidla ).) With respect to the second conference, concerning the propriety of defense counsel's description of mitigating factors, defendant asserts he could have assisted counsel by providing information about himself that could have been used to explain the concepts of aggravation and mitigation in a way that would have avoided the prosecutor's objection. Defendant's claim lacks merit. The conference concerned a legal issuewhether defense counsel was misstating the factors that may constitute mitigating circumstances. Therefore, defendant did not have a right to be present. ( People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 312 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 30, 132 P.3d 235].) (3) For the same reasons we have rejected defendant's contentions under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, we also reject his assertions of error under state law. `The state constitutional right to be present at trial is generally coextensive with the federal due process right. [Citations.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 861 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376, 209 P.3d 596].) Under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, `a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present either in chambers or at bench discussions that occur outside of the jury's presence on questions of law or other matters as to which [his] presence does not bear a ``reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.'' [Citations.]' [Citations.] ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1231.) Defendant provides no additional argument concerning the asserted violation of his rights under the California Constitution, and we perceive no manner in which his presence at either of the two conferences bore a reasonably substantial relationship to his opportunity to defend against the charges. For the same reason, defendant had no right under sections 977 and 1043 to be personally present at these bench discussions, nor was a written waiver required. ( Cole, at p. 1231.) B. Guilt Phase Issues 1. Instruction concerning asportation Defendant contends the trial court provided an erroneous instruction concerning the element of asportation for the offense of kidnapping, and thereby violated his rights to due process and a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution. (4) The trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 9.50, concerning the crime of kidnapping. (§ 207, subd. (a).) The instruction observed that kidnapping requires movement of the victim for a distance that is substantial in character. It further explained, in language taken from our opinion in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512] ( Martinez ) that, [i]n determining whether a distance . . . is substantial in character, you should consider the totality of the circumstances attending the movement, including, but not limited to, the actual distance moved or whether the movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior to the movement, or decreased the likelihood of detection, or increased both the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempt to escape and the attacker's enhanced opportunity to commit the additional crimes. (Italics added.) The events at issue here occurred before Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th 225, was decided, when the asportation standard [was] exclusively dependent on the distance involved. ( Id. at p. 233; see People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 574 [146 Cal.Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274], overruled in Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 229.) In Martinez, we held that the jury should consider instead `the totality of the circumstances' in deciding whether the distance a victim was moved was `substantial in character.' (20 Cal.4th at p. 237.) We further concluded that the new standard could not be applied retroactively, because it effected an unforeseeable enlargement of the factual basis for determining what constitutes a substantial distance under the kidnapping statute, and the defendant did not have fair warning of the enlargement. For the same reasons, and as the Attorney General concedes, the standards set forth in Martinez cannot be applied to defendant's actions. We also conclude, as the Attorney General concedes, that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) The prosecutor presented evidence that it would be more difficult to hear noises made in the procedure room than in the victim's office, stated to the jury that the movement was [n]ot a great distance in terms of actual feet, and urged the jury to focus upon whether the movement increased the likelihood of the attack and decreased the risk of detection. Thus, the evidence and argument focused upon the totality of the circumstances rather than the distance. Therefore, the conviction for kidnapping must be reversed and the findings based upon kidnapping must be vacated. 2. Instruction concerning implied malice Defendant contends that the trial court's instruction defining implied malice deprived him of his rights to due process, to trial by jury, and to be free from the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution. The trial court instructed the jury that [e]very person who unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought or during the commission or attempted commission of burglary, kidnapping, rape, sodomy by use of force or robbery, all of which are felonies inherently dangerous to human life, is guilty of the crime of murder . . . . (CALJIC No. 8.10.) The court further instructed that `[m]alice' may be either express or implied. [¶] Malice is express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being. [¶] Malice is implied when: [¶] The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶] The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶] The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. . . . (CALJIC No. 8.11.) Next, the court instructed the jury that [a]ll murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first degree, and it explained the terms willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (CALJIC No. 8.20, italics added.) The court then instructed the jury concerning first degree felony murder, explaining that a killing may be intentional, unintentional, or accidental, but it will be murder of the first degree if it is committed in the course of specified felonies. (CALJIC No. 8.21.) (5) Defendant asserts that the trial court's instructions erroneously authorized the jury to find him guilty of first degree murder based upon a finding of implied malice. `In reviewing [a] purportedly erroneous instruction[], we inquire `whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way' that violates the Constitution. [Citation.] In conducting this inquiry, we are mindful that `a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.' [Citations.]' [Citation.] `Additionally, we must assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.' [Citation.] ( People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 183 P.3d 1146] ( Richardson ).) The instructions in the present case correctly, but unnecessarily, explained implied malice. The instructions did not, however, inform the jury that it could find first degree murder based upon implied malice. Nor is there a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood the instructions to authorize such a finding. The two instructions that addressed the bases of first degree murderCALJIC Nos. 8.20 and 8.21correctly explained the two scenarios in which first degree murder could be found, and CALJIC No. 8.20 required express malice in the context of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. We reject defendant's view that the jury would have understood CALJIC No. 8.20, which referred to murder with express malice aforethought, as encompassing only a subset of intentional murders, and would have assumed that a finding of implied malice also would support a conviction of first degree murder. [14] In any event, because the jury found that the killing was committed in the course of burglary, robbery and sodomy, it necessarily found that the killing was first degree felony murder, regardless of its understanding of the malice requirement in connection with willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. Finally, we find no merit in defendant's assertion that the jury might have used implied malice as the standard for finding the commission of a felony in connection with the murder. CALJIC No. 8.10 explained that, to find defendant guilty of murder, it must be proved [t]he killing was done with malice aforethought or occurred during the commission or attempted commission of various specified felonies. (Italics added.) CALJIC No. 8.21 explained in connection with the charge of felony murder that [t]he specific intent to commit burglary, or kidnapping, or rape, or sodomy by use of force, or robbery . . . must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the jury could not logically have concluded that if defendant merely acted with conscious disregard for human life (CALJIC No. 8.11), and did not intend to commit the specified felonies, he could be found guilty of first degree felony murder. 3. Sufficiency of the evidence of kidnapping, sodomy, robbery, burglary, and of an independent felonious purpose Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support convictions for kidnapping, burglary, robbery, or sodomy, or to establish an independent felonious purpose in connection with the commission of these felonies. Therefore, he asserts, the convictions for these four felonies, any conviction for felony murder premised upon these four felonies, and the special circumstance findings that the murder was committed in the course of the commission of these four felonies, violate his right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (6) `When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidencethat is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuefrom which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 323, 190 P.3d 664].) `[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781]; see People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 460 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968] [`An identical standard applies under the California Constitution.']; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 39 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] [the same standard applies to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a special circumstance finding].) ( People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1289-1290 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 512, 210 P.3d 1119], fn. omitted ( Lewis ).) Although it is the jury's duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68].) a. Kidnapping As explained above in our discussion of the element of asportation, the conviction for kidnapping must be reversed, based upon error in the relevant jury instruction. Therefore, we need not address whether substantial evidence supports the conviction. b. Sodomy Sodomy is sexual conduct consisting of contact between the penis of one person and the anus of another person. Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime of sodomy. (§ 286, subd. (a).) Defendant makes two contentions: there is no evidence of penetration, and no evidence the victim was alive when any penetration occurred. (See People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 143 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988] [the victim must be alive at the time of penetration].) The evidence establishes that the victim was gagged, bound, naked from the waist down, and positioned in a manner that exposed her anal area, there were dried feces around her anal area, and the sock on which defendant's seminal fluid was found was stained with feces. From these facts, a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant's penis penetrated the victim's anus. Defendant asserts, however, that there are other rational explanations for the circumstantial evidence, such as rape or masturbation by defendant together with defecation by the victim. In support of this contention, he cites CALJIC No. 2.01, which instructed the jury that a finding of guilt . . . may not be based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only (1) consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.01, and resolved the issue of penetration against defendant. Defendant's second contention, that there is no evidence the victim was alive at the time of penetration, also fails. The evidence establishes (1) she was already gagged and bound when most or all of the wounds were inflicted, (2) she was alive when the 29 wounds to her neck were inflicted, and (3) she might have survived as long as 15 minutes after the lethal wounds to her carotid artery and jugular vein were inflicted. From these facts, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the victim was alive when defendant sodomized her. In addition, contrary to defendant's view, the timeline confirms he sodomized the victim before she died. The victim was alive and unperturbed at 9:28 a.m., and defendant left the clinic before patients began arriving at 10:30. During this period, defendant entered, overpowered, and gagged the victim, moved her 40 to 50 feet, put her on the procedure table, bound her, stripped off her socks, shoes, and other clothing, prodded and stabbed her 29 times, and also engaged in sexual activity. Defendant's contention that there is no evidence the victim was alive when penetration occurred is without merit. ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 553 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931] ( Bolden ).) c. Robbery Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. (§ 211.) Defendant contends there is no substantial evidence that he took any of the victim's property, or that he formed the intent to take the property prior to the victim's death or prior to her becoming unconscious. (7) The evidence reflects that the victim typically wore a watch and a ring at work, and that her watch and her ring were missing from her body after her death. In addition, defendant gave a watch and a ring to Gloria Salazar, stating that this bitch got me mad. The watch defendant gave Salazar was similar to a watch the victim wore, except by the time of trial its black leather band was missing and its finish appeared worn or faded. The ring he gave Salazar was gold with a green stone, and the victim's ring was described as gold with an emerald stone. The evidence reflects that the victim kept her purse and wallet in the office area, where she apparently was confronted by defendant as she was reading a book, and that her purse and wallet were missing from the scene. Finally, a satchel the victim carried between work and home, which contained petty cash of $30 to $40, was missing. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports the conclusion that defendant took the victim's watch, ring, purse, wallet, and satchel. (See People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 47 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896, 163 P.3d 896] ( DePriest ) [Where a person is left dead or dying in `relative proximity' to property that was taken, and such property is later found in the defendant's possession, the jury is entitled to infer that the victim was robbed and that the defendant committed the crime.]; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 402 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1] [because property that was in the possession of the victim was missing, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant stole the property].) The circumstances that no witness was certain it was the same watch, that no witness saw which ring the victim was wearing on the day of the crimes, that the ring, the purse, the wallet, and the satchel were not recovered, and that the victim's credit cards were not used, do not render this evidence insufficient. (8) With respect to when defendant formed the intent to take the property, the evidence reflects defendant had been employed only sporadically, [15] he was using heroin regularly, and he did not have money to pay for drugs very often. (See U.S. v. Mitchell (9th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 1104, 1107-1109 [addiction establishes a likelihood of desperate need and lack of self[-]control, not just financial interest in being richer]; U.S. v. Miranda (9th Cir. 1993) 986 F.2d 1283, 1285 [evidence of the defendant's heroin habit was admissible to demonstrate a motive to commit a bank robbery]; see also People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 96 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622] ( Cornwell ) [evidence of poverty, without more, is not admissible to prove a motive for theft or robbery].) The purse and wallet were missing from the office area where defendant would have first encountered the victim. The victim's book was on the floor, an unusual location. The watch and ring were not present when she was discovered with shoelaces tied tightly around her wrists. Because her hands were bound behind her back, her wrists and fingers would have been directly in defendant's view as he prodded her with a screwdriver and sexually assaulted her on the table. From these facts, a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant had a motive to steal, and that he formed the intent to steal from the victim before he traveled to her office, or soon thereafter, when he confronted her in the office, bound her wrists, and sexually assaulted her. (See DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 46-47 [court rejected defendant's complaint that prosecution did not eliminate the possibility the defendant formed the intent to steal after he used force, finding substantial evidence he intended to steal when he accosted his victim]; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 128-129 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166] ( Yeoman ) [intent to steal must be formed before or during the application of force]; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 499 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182] [one can certainly rob a living person by killing that person and then taking his or her property].) Therefore, substantial evidence supports the robbery conviction. Again, defendant's alternative inferences do not render insufficient the substantial evidence of his commission of robbery. d. Burglary (9) Any person who enters a building or room with the intent to commit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. (§ 459.) Defendant contends there was no substantial evidence that, at the time he entered the clinic, he intended to commit a felony therein. [A] defendant's intent . . . may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. [Citation.] ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1157 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476] ( Carter ).) As noted above, the evidence establishes that defendant had a motive to steal. The evidence also reflects that he desired anal intercourse, but his girlfriend resisted. In addition, the record reflects that defendant knew the victim would be alone in the office when he arrived, and that he parked his vehicle where it could not be seen from inside the clinic. Finally, the evidence reflects that defendant, armed with a screwdriver, stole the victim's property, moved her to the back of the clinic, gagged her, bound her, put her on the table, removed her clothes, sodomized her and stabbed her 29 times, all in less than an hour. From the swift execution of these acts, a rational trier of fact could conclude that when defendant entered the clinic, he intended to rob and sodomize the victim. The fact that the evidence may also support other scenarios does not render insufficient the evidence supporting the verdict. ( Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 553.) Defendant's suggestions that the vehicle was not the one he was driving, or that he parked at the restaurant because he planned to dine there after his visit to the clinic, or that he parked there because he missed the turn to drive to the clinic, or that the victim angered him after he entered the clinic, do not preclude the reasonable inference that he entered the clinic with the intent to commit a felony therein. In addition, the circumstance that the victim may have admitted him into the clinic does not negate his felonious intent. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 954 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183] [a person who enters for a felonious purpose may be found guilty of burglary even if he enters with the owner's or occupant's consent].) [16] e. Independent felonious purpose (10) `[T]o prove a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation, the prosecution must show that the defendant had an independent purpose for the commission of the felony, that is, the commission of the felony was not merely incidental to an intended murder.' [Citations.] ( People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.) [A] jury deciding the truth of the special circumstance allegation is not required to assign a hierarchy to the defendant's motives in order to determine which of multiple concurrent intents was `primary,' but instead the jury need only determine whether commission of the underlying felony was or was not merely incidental to the murder. ( Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 558.) [A] `concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a felony-murder special circumstance.' [Citation.] ( People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 511 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58] ( Abilez ).) Defendant contends there was no evidence of an independent felonious purpose with respect to the special circumstances based upon sodomy, robbery, and burglary. [17] As explained previously, the substantial evidence supporting defendant's convictions for sodomy, robbery and burglary also supports the conclusion that those felonies were not merely incidental to an intended murder. This behavior was not incidental or ancillary to the murder, but amply demonstrates an independent felonious purpose in support of the . . . special circumstances. ( Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 511.) Contrary to defendant's suggestion, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531] ( Blakely ), Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428] ( Ring ), and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] ( Apprendi ), do not require that the jury expressly find each element of a special circumstance. 4. Absence of instructions on lesser included offenses of second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, false imprisonment, and grand theft Defendant contends that the absence of jury instructions concerning second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, false imprisonment, and grand theft deprived him of his rights to due process, a fair trial, a jury determination of every material fact, a proper determination of death eligibility, and reliable determinations of guilt and penalty under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 1, 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution. (11) [I]t is the `court's duty to instruct the jury not only on the crime with which the defendant is charged, but also on any lesser offense that is both included in the offense charged and shown by the evidence to have been committed.' [Citation.] ( People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 200 P.3d 847]; see Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 637 [65 L.Ed.2d 392, 100 S.Ct. 2382].) Conversely, even on request, the court `has no duty to instruct on any lesser offense unless there is substantial evidence to support such instruction' [Citation.] ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1215.) Substantial evidence is not merely ` any evidence . . . no matter how weak' [citation], but rather `evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[]' that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed. [Citations.] ( People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 664 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970].) `On appeal, we review independently the question whether the court failed to instruct on a lesser included offense.' [Citation.] ( People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 699, 208 P.3d 634].) As explained below, we need not decide whether the evidence would have supported a charge of second degree murder, because the jury's findings establish that the jury found defendant guilty of first degree felony murder. In addition, because there was no substantial evidence to support convictions for involuntary manslaughter or grand theft, the court was not required to instruct the jury concerning these crimes. Finally, because the conviction for kidnapping must be reversed, based upon error in the relevant jury instruction, we need not decide whether the jury should have been instructed concerning false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of kidnapping. a. Second degree murder The trial court instructed the jury concerning two theories of first degree murder: (1) willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, and (2) killing in the commission of specified felonies. (§ 189.) The court initially indicated that it also would instruct the jury concerning the lesser included offense of second degree murder, but ultimately declined to do so, stating that, earlier, it had not taken into consideration the nature of the gagging and the binding. The verdict did not indicate whether the conviction for first degree murder was based upon a finding that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, or that the killing occurred in the commission of specified felonies. As noted above, however, the jury found true the allegations that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crimes of burglary, sodomy, and robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (D), (G).) Because the elements of felony murder and the special circumstance[s] coincide, the true finding[s] as to the . . . special circumstance[s] establish[] here that the jury would have convicted defendant of first degree murder under a felony-murder theory, at a minimum, regardless of whether more extensive instructions were given on second degree murder. [Citations.] ( People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 476 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968] ( Elliot ).) Therefore, the jury necessarily found defendant guilty of first degree felony murder, and any error in not instructing the jury concerning second degree murder was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant urges the court to hold that second degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder. He notes that we declined in People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 114-115, footnote 17 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296], to address this issue. We noted, however, the Attorney General's contention that second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder, because malice is an element of second degree murder, but is not an element of first degree felony murder. We ultimately concluded in Valdez that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on second degree murder, because there was no substantial evidence that the killing was other than [a] robbery murder. ( Id. at p. 116.) Here, defendant does not address (1) how second degree murder, which requires malice, can be a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder, which does not require malice, or (2) what substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the killing was other than a burglary robbery sodomy murder. (12) Defendant also cites People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145], in which the defendant was charged with murder by the administration of poison. (See § 189 [All murder . . . by means of . . . poison . . . is murder of the first degree].) We acknowledged in Blair that [i]f a jury is not satisfied that a defendant acted with either express or implied malice, it may find the defendant guilty of second degree murder on a felony murder theory. ( Blair, at p. 745, original italics.) We concluded, however, that (1) there was no substantial evidence that the defendant intended merely to injure the victim, and (2) any error in failing to instruct the jury concerning second degree felony murder was harmless, because the jury found true the special circumstance that the defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of poison. ( Id. at pp. 746-747.) Similarly, in the present case, (1) there is no evidence that defendant intended merely to injure the victim when he bound and gagged her, inflicted 29 wounds to her neck, and left her bleeding on the procedure table, and (2) the jury's finding that the killing was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crimes of burglary, sodomy, and robbery precluded the jury from finding that the murder was of the second degree. (See § 189 [murder committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery, burglary, or forcible sodomy is murder of the first degree].) Therefore, our acknowledgement in Blair that second degree felony murder could be a lesser included offense of first degree murder in the circumstances of that case is of no assistance to defendant. Finally, defendant asserts that [s]econd degree felony murder instructions would have presented the question whether [defendant] murdered [the victim] while committing a dangerous felony other than kidnapping, burglary, sodomy, and robbery, but he does not identify what other dangerous felony he might have committed. b. Voluntary manslaughter After the trial court noted that it had been provided with proposed instructions concerning attempted rape and attempted sodomy as lesser included offenses to rape and sodomy, it inquired of defense counsel, with regard to lesser included offenses, are there any others that you are aware of? Defense counsel responded, No, I don't believe so. The prosecutor then stated, just for the record, on that particular point on the lesser includeds, [defense counsel] and I have had discussions concerning this particular point in the case on several occasions. And [defense counsel] has indicated that this is a tactical thing on his part, and I will speculate as to what it is and I can understand what it may or may not be. But not to go into anything else, we have had discussions on this. The trial court responded, All right, and then proceeded to review other jury instructions. Defense counsel did not dispute the prosecutor's statements. (13) Based upon this exchange, respondent contends the doctrine of invited error bars defendant from challenging the absence of an instruction concerning voluntary manslaughter. Although the doctrine of invited error. . . applies if the court accedes to a defense attorney's tactical decision to request that lesser included offense instructions not be given ( People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1265 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015]), the record does not reflect that defense counsel made a tactical decision with respect to an instruction concerning voluntary manslaughter. (See People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1299 [the record shows no tactical reason, and therefore we do not apply the invited error doctrine]; People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 16 [73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620, 178 P.3d 1113] [the defendant's agreement that the court need not instruct on specific lesser included offenses was not invited error, because defense counsel did not express a deliberate tactical purpose for agreeing]; People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 115-116 [because the record was ambiguous as to which lesser included offenses counsel had considered and rejected, the doctrine of invited error did not apply].) (14) Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. (§ 192, subd. (a).) As we recently reiterated, to establish the crime of voluntary manslaughter, there must be evidence that (1) the defendant killed in the heat of passion, and (2) such passion would be aroused in an ordinarily reasonable person under the circumstances. ( People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1168-1169 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 652, 209 P.3d 977].) The evidence defendant cites in support of these elements is his statement to Gloria Salazar that this bitch got me mad, his statement that he had injured his thumb working at Toyo Tires, and the presence of the victim's book on the floor of her office. From this evidence, he proposes that the jury could have inferred that he traveled to the clinic to obtain treatment for his thumb, and [o]nce [defendant] arrived at the medical clinic, events transpired out of control because [defendant] became angry over some conduct or comment by the victim. We reject this claim. (15) The evidence does not reflect any provocation, and the theory is mere speculation. (See People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 941 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212] [Speculation is an insufficient basis upon which to require the giving of an instruction on a lesser offense.].) Further, his theory is at odds with the evidence that he parked his vehicle where it could not be seen from the clinic. There was no basis for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. c. Grand theft As discussed above, defense counsel informed the trial court that he did not believe there were any other lesser included offenses, and the prosecutor stated that defense counsel had made a tactical decision concerning lesser included offenses. The record does not reflect, however, that defense counsel made a tactical decision not to request an instruction concerning grand theft. Therefore, the doctrine of invited error does not apply to this claim. (16) `Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery, which includes the additional element of force or fear.' [Citation.] If intent to steal arose only after the victim was assaulted, the robbery element of stealing by force or fear is absent. [Citations.] ( People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055-1056 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544]; see Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 128-129 [to constitute robbery, intent to steal must be formed before or during the application of force].) Nevertheless, `the existence of  any evidence, no matter how weak will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense . . . .' [Citation.] ( DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 50.) Instructions on after-acquired intent and theft as a lesser included offense of robbery are unwarranted absent `substantial evidence' that the defendant first formed the intent to take the victim's property after applying force. [Citation.] ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 360 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105].) Defendant contends there is evidence to support the view that he took the victim's property as an afterthought. He cites Gloria Salazar's testimony that when he gave her the ring and watch, he stated th[e] bitch [made] me mad, and said he planned to discard the items. He concludes [i]t was unlikely that [defendant's] motive to commit the murder was to obtain the watch and ring if he was willing to throw those objects away. He also notes that he did not profit from the watch and ring, and that the victim's credit cards were not accessed. Finally, he characterizes the time within which the victim became unconscious as only a short period. First, the fact that defendant had other motives for killing the victim does not constitute evidence that he formed the intent to steal only after he ceased applying force against her. For example, in Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th 168, the 87-year-old victim was found in her trailer with her hands and feet bound and strips of towel tied around her head and mouth. Her nightgown had been pulled up and her underwear was around one leg. The presence of spermatozoa was detected in her vagina and rectum, and on her external genitalia. She had suffered blunt force trauma consistent with having been kicked, punched, or thrown. The home had been ransacked, and nickels and dimes the victim collected in jars, along with approximately $20 she kept in her purse, were missing. ( Id. at pp. 180-181, 219.) Following his conviction for murder, rape, sodomy, and robbery, the defendant urged on appeal that the jury should have been instructed concerning theft as a lesser included offense. Notwithstanding the strong inference that the defendant's application of force against the victim related in large part to the sexual assault and killing, we concluded there was no evidence that the crime was something less than robbery. Contrary to defendant's assertions, the evidence he committed a robbery was quite strong. Deadly force obviously was applied to the victim, easily satisfying the force or fear requirement for robbery. (§ 211.) And ample evidence showed the intruder had taken the victim's property. . . . Neither side presented any evidence casting doubt on [testimony that property was taken and the home ransacked]. Defendant, for example, presented a defense of simple denial, and neither he nor the prosecution presented evidence from which the jury could have inferred that he took the victim's property but formed his larcenous intent only after he killed her. [Citation.] . . . In other words, there was no substantial evidence worthy of the jury's consideration that the crime was something less than robbery. ( Gray, supra, at p. 219.) Similarly, the inferences in this case that defendant's attack was focused principally upon his desire to sodomize the victim, and that the killing was to avoid apprehension, do not support an inference that he formed the intent to steal only after he ceased applying force against the victim. Second, as in Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th 168, neither the prosecution nor the defense presented evidence that would support an inference defendant formed the intent to steal only after he applied force. The circumstances identified by defendanthe stated the victim made him mad and he intended to discard the watch and ring, he gave the watch and ring to his cousin, and he did not access the victim's credit cardsreflect that he ultimately decided not to keep or use these particular items (although he presumably spent the missing money), but these circumstances have no tendency to establish at what point in time he formed the intent to steal from the victim. Nor does the fact that the victim may have quickly lost consciousness establish when the defendant decided to steal. Because there is no substantial evidence that defendant formed the intent to steal only after he ceased applying force to the victim, the trial court was not required to give an instruction concerning grand theft. 5. Prosecutor's comments concerning the evidence Defendant contends the prosecutor commented upon defendant's failure to testify at trial, and thereby violated his right to remain silent under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He also contends that his counsel's failure to object to the comment constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. During the prosecutor's opening argument at the guilt phase, he reviewed the evidence against defendant and exculpatory testimony presented by the defense. With respect to the exculpatory testimony, the prosecutor concluded that the witnesses out of a desire . . . to help their relative and friend, their uncle, their brother, their boyfriend, ex-boyfriend, to help him out in this situation, tried to remember things that simply were not true but that was based upon a factual incident. Following his review of the evidence, he stated, That is the evidence in this case. The evidence in this case is not contradicted by any other evidence in this case. It is very clear. It is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those crimes that he is charged with. (Italics added.) Defendant did not object to these statements. (17) The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution forbid[] either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. ( Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229], fn. omitted.) Although a prosecutor is forbidden to comment `either directly or indirectly, on the defendant's failure to testify in his defense,' the prosecutor may comment `on the state of the evidence, or on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses.' [Citation.] ( Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 90.) Defendant has forfeited his claim by failing to object. ( Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1303.) He urges the court to reject the rule that a failure to object forfeits a challenge to a prosecutor's comment upon a defendant's failure to testify, but he provides no persuasive reason to alter the rule, and we decline to do so. Alternatively, he asserts counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim fails, however, because the prosecutor's statement that the evidence was uncontradicted simply reflected his view that the exculpatory evidence was not true; it was not a comment upon defendant's failure to testify. Thus, defense counsel had no basis for objecting to the statement, and was not deficient for declining to do so. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 689 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052] ( Strickland ).) 6. Cumulative prejudice Defendant contends errors committed during the guilt phase had a cumulative prejudicial effect. We have found error in the trial court's instruction concerning the asportation element of kidnapping, and have concluded that the conviction for kidnapping must be reversed and the true findings related to the kidnapping must be vacated. We have also concluded that any error in failing to instruct the jury concerning second degree murder was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the jury found that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crimes of burglary, sodomy, and robbery, and therefore necessarily found defendant guilty of first degree felony murder. Together, the error and the presumed error had no cumulative prejudicial effect, and did not deny defendant a fair trial. C. Penalty Phase Issues 1. Counsel's failure to object to the admission of evidence of defendant's escapes from custody Defendant contends that his counsel's failure to object to the admission of evidence of nonviolent escapes or attempts to escape from custody constituted a violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 15, of the California Constitution. During cross-examination of Drs. Hall and Gawin, the prosecutor reviewed defendant's criminal record, including two escapes from California Youth Authority facilities and one escape from the Los Angeles County jail. In addition, included in three packets of documents that were admitted to establish three prior convictions (first degree burglary, second degree burglary, and second degree robbery) were probation officers' reports that listed defendant's criminal record, including escapes from custody. Finally, Deputy Braaten testified that he found a homemade handcuff key in defendant's cell at the facility in which he was incarcerated during the trial. (18) The evidence of defendant's nonviolent escapes was inadmissible as an aggravating factor under section 190.3, factor (b): The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence . . . . Its inadmissibility as an aggravating factor, however, did not render it inadmissible on cross-examination to rebut good character evidence offered by defendant. [Citation.] ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 874 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1]; see also People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) In the present case, defendant presented evidence concerning his conduct in prison, his assertedly stable life during a period when he was not using heroin (a period when he escaped from a California Youth Authority facility), and his behavior when he was not associating with his brothers. Thus, an objection to the admission of evidence of defendant's escapes from custody would have lacked merit. Therefore, counsel's performance was not outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690.) (19) Defendant complains, however, that the prosecutor mentioned his escapes in the course of cross-examining Dr. Hall concerning the factors that determine a prisoner's placement and security level, and that these references were unrelated to defendant's character. In addition, the references to his escapes in the exhibits that were admitted to establish defendant's prior convictions were not admitted to rebut evidence concerning defendant's character. The decision whether to object to the admission of evidence is inherently tactical, and a failure to object will rarely reflect deficient performance by counsel. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].) Because the evidence was admissible to rebut defendant's good character evidence, counsel reasonably may have decided to avoid drawing further attention to defendant's escapes with objections to brief references to the escapes in other contexts. Although counsel could have objected outside the presence of the jury to the references in the probation officers' reports, any oversight in failing to do so could not have affected the outcome, in light of the admissibility of the same evidence in other contexts. [18] ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.].) 2. Defendant's right to present mitigating evidence Defendant contends that limitations placed by the trial court upon expert testimony provided by Dr. Armando Morales impaired defendant's right to present mitigating evidence, depriving him of his rights to due process and to be free from the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 7 and 17 of the California Constitution. As discussed more fully below, the trial court ordered that Dr. Morales was not to testify concerning any genetic cause of defendant's problems. The court also precluded Dr. Morales's use of a chart that listed (1) the criteria under the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), related to major depression, and (2) Dr. Morales's corresponding criteria of gang member depression. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (20) Several principles guide our analysis. First, The qualification of expert witnesses, including foundational requirements, rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] That discretion is necessarily broad: `The competency of an expert is in every case a relative one, i.e. relative to the topic about which the person is asked to make his statement. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Absent a manifest abuse, the court's determination will not be disturbed on appeal. [Citations.] ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1175 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950].) Second, the expert's opinion may not be based `on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support [citation], or on speculative or conjectural factors . . . . [¶] Exclusion of expert opinions that rest on guess, surmise or conjecture [citation] is an inherent corollary to the foundational predicate for admission of the expert testimony: will the testimony assist the trier of fact to evaluate the issues it must decide?' [Citation.] ( Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1008.) Finally, [t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.) As noted above, Dr. Morales was a professor of psychiatry and biobehavioral sciences, a field he described as cover[ing] the biological, social, psychological research and issues related to human behavior. He had a bachelor's degree in sociology with a minor in criminology, a master's degree in social work, and a doctorate in clinical social work. He was not, however, educated as a physician or geneticist. Prior to becoming a professor, he worked as a gang group worker at a recreational agency, as a peace officer with the Los Angeles County Probation Department, and as a senior deputy probation officer with that department. In addition to his work as a professor, he was a consultant with the California Youth Authority. In the course of his testimony, Dr. Morales described some of defendant's maternal ancestors who abused alcohol. The prosecutor interposed a relevancy objection. Outside of the jury's presence, Dr. Morales stated that mental health professionals examine family history, because increasingly they are finding research information to show certain genetic connections between alcoholism and drug dependence in offspring. On cross-examination, he conceded he had no training specifically in genetics, but testified that they have [found] addiction genes in individuals, and that another doctor had discovered specific gene connections from fathers to sons. He also stated that he had not done any gene testing on defendant or any of defendant's relatives. Upon inquiry by the court, Dr. Morales stated that when a mental health professional finds evidence of family alcohol problems, it gives us more information to be able to draw a conclusion, whether or not there appears to be a linkage in a heredity-type of factor to a particular patient. He added that when we look at [defendant's] mother's history and all her sons, we begin to see a very strong preponderance of addiction in the family, which again makes more solid a particular point of alcoholism or drug addiction in this particular family that might have a very powerful genetic basis to it. When pressed by the trial court to explain the basis of his conclusion that there were genetic reasons for the family history, Dr. Morales responded, Mainly how we are trained to take the history. But we are not experts in the genetic area. I'm not an expert in genetic areas and have not had all that particular kind of training. The court ruled that Dr. Morales could testify concerning defendant's family history, but not with regard to any issues involving genetics. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Dr. Morales was not competent to testify concerning a genetic basis for defendant's drug and alcohol problems. Dr. Morales testified that he had no training in genetics and was not an expert in genetic areas. His testimony reflects that he was trained as a social worker to collect information concerning family substance abuse, but it does not establish that he was qualified to testify concerning the genetic basis of a family's history. (See People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1334 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 130] [It is not unusual that a person may be qualified as an expert on one subject and yet be unqualified to render an opinion on matters beyond the scope of that subject.].) (21) Defendant attempts to cast the trial court's ruling as a violation of Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b), which provides that an expert's opinion must be [b]ased on matter . . . that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates. He asserts that Dr. Morales'[s] testimony that social scientists commonly look for genetic links between a patient and his family by examining the family background established that genetics was a matter reasonably relied upon by experts in Dr. Morales'[s] field. (Italics added.) Although there may exist genetic studies or information upon which a social scientist might reasonably rely in reaching conclusions concerning the causes of an individual's problems or conditions, Dr. Morales did not identify any such basis for the conclusions he sought to draw. He had not done any genetic testing on defendant or any of defendant's relatives. Dr. Morales stated that increasingly they are finding research information to show certain genetic connections between alcoholism and drug dependence in offspring, and that they have [found] addiction genes in individuals, but further inquiry revealed only that another doctor had discovered specific gene connections from fathers to sons. Not only were the gene connections not identified or described, but the proffered testimony concerned defendant's mother's family. Contrary to defendant's assertion, Dr. Morales did not testify that social scientists routinely base their opinions on the assumption that there is a genetic link between the patient and his family. Even if he had so testified, the mere fact that there is a genetic link between a patient and his or her biological family does not qualify a social scientist to testify concerning a genetic cause of substance abuse. In sum, the genetics upon which defendant claims Dr. Morales reasonably relied was an area of expertise rather than information considered by the witness, and Dr. Morales conceded that he was not an expert in this area. Defendant attempts to avoid these conclusions by contending that the trial court's ruling violated Evidence Code section 802, which provides that an expert witness may state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter . . . upon which it is based. Because the trial court determined Dr. Morales was not qualified to testify concerning genetics, and there was no other foundation for his proffered opinions on the subject of genetics, the court was not required to allow him to testify concerning his reasons for his opinions on genetics. Finally, defendant's assertion that [t]he trial court . . . lacked any factual foundation for concluding that social workers could not rely on genetics in forming their assessments of individuals ignores the burden of the profferer of expert testimony. The profferer must establish that the witness is an expert in the area upon which expert testimony will be given, and that the witness's opinion is based on matters of a type upon which such experts reasonably rely. (Evid. Code, § 801.) [19] Next, defendant challenges the evidentiary ruling precluding Dr. Morales's use of an exhibit regarding gang member depression. In the course of testifying about defendant's psychological disorders, Dr. Morales proposed to use a chart entitled DSM-IV Criteria for Depression Versus Gang Member Depression, which contrasted established diagnostic criteria for depression with what he referred to as the cultural expression of depression in gang members. The left column of the chart listed the DSM-IV's nine symptoms of major depression, and the right column listed nine corresponding criteria of gang member depression. The prosecutor objected that there was no foundation as to the source of this material. Dr. Morales stated that he had gathered the information over more than 40 years, based upon my clinical experience in working with gang members who had been suffering various kinds of depressions but which had been undetected by various mental health professionals because they were relying solely on DSM-IV criteria. During voir dire by the prosecutor, Dr. Morales confirmed that he had developed a new set of criteria related to depression, and he stated that he had published an article and given presentations to psychiatric peers concerning the differences in the criteria for gang member depression versus non-gang-member depression. After excusing the jury, the court commented that the prosecutor appear[ed] to be going towards a Kelly/Frye interrogation [20] of the witness. The prosecutor stated that he did not believe a Kelly/Frye hearing was required, because no foundation had been laid to establish that Dr. Morales's theory satisfied the criteria of a scientific study. The court expressed the view that the exhibit was not suggesting a new theory of depression, and Dr. Morales confirmed that his chart did not reflect a new scientific theory. [21] The court then asked the expert witness whether this is a step towards adding some type of specific category down the road somewhere after investigation into your observations occur[s] to the DSM-IV. He responded, No. The DSM-IV is something totally independent. He reiterated that he was trying to report his observations, and that scientific inquiry by others might confirm or totally disapprove these particular behaviors in trying to arrive at some diagnostic conclusion of depression. The court sustained the objection with regard to the chart itself. I will allow you to make inquiry of the doctor as to his evaluation, his observations, as to his expertise and experience and what he's observed about gang members that he's studied and depression and relate that to your client, which I expect is the next step that you are going to take. The prosecutor objected that there has been no relation of the proffered testimony to defendant, and the court further addressed the basis and limits of its ruling. It stated it would not allow the witness to use the chart, because the chart suggested that scientific studies had been performed or would be performed concerning the witness's theory. It then explained, I will allow you to ask him about his observations of depression in gang members. I will allow you to offer . . . that he agrees with the analysis of specifically depression. He's indicated he has relied on and reviewed the documentations from Dr. Hall and Dr. Gawin. And so I will allow you to make those connections to [defendant]. But I am going to keep [the chart] out. Defense counsel responded, No problem. Defendant now contends that the information set forth in the chart was admissible because (1) it was rationally based upon Dr. Morales's perceptions, (2) those perceptions were matters upon which an expert may rely, and (3) an expert may testify concerning the bases of his or her opinions. (Evid. Code, §§ 800, subd. (a), 801, subd. (b), 802.) As our summary of the record reflects, Dr. Morales was not precluded from testifying concerning the information set forth in his chart. Defendant also contends that Dr. Morales's observations did not require scientific validation. Although the prosecutor's objections focused upon his expectation that Dr. Morales would testify concerning a new scientific study, the trial court's concern was that the chart misleadingly suggested some scientific basis to Morales's criteria of gang depression. Thus, the court did not require scientific validation of Morales's observations; rather, the court excluded evidence that suggested there was scientific validation of the observations. [22] (22) Finally, defendant presents no legal authority for the proposition that the exclusion of testimony based upon the incompetence of the witness or the absence of a foundation for the testimony, or the exclusion of a misleading exhibit, violates a defendant's right to present mitigating evidence. As we have observed, [t]he `routine application of state evidentiary law does not implicate [a] defendant's constitutional rights.' [Citation.] ( People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1010 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 299, 189 P.3d 300].) 3. Defendant's absence from a hearing concerning penalty phase jury instructions Defendant contends his absence from a hearing at which the penalty phase jury instructions were discussed deprived him of his right to be present at critical stages of the trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution, and Penal Code sections 977, subdivision (b), and 1043, subdivision (a). Defense counsel reported to the court that defendant wished to be excused from a hearing concerning the jury instructions at the penalty phase. The trial court reviewed sections 977 and 1043 concerning the absence of a defendant at the defendant's request, and solicited the views of counsel as to whether defendant was required to be present at the discussion of jury instructions. Both the prosecution and the defense expressed the view that a court may allow a defendant to be absent upon his or her request. The court then addressed defendant: [Y]our attorney has indicated that you are requesting to be excused while we go over jury instructions. Is that your request, sir? Defendant responded, That's correct, your honor. The court asked, Do you understand we are going to finalize the jury instructions that will be given tomorrow to the jury with regard to this phase? Defendant responded, Yes, I understand that. The court asked, And you still wish not to be present? Defendant confirmed, That's correct. The trial court allowed defendant to be excused. (23) Defendant acknowledges that, `as a matter of both federal and state constitutional law, . . . a capital defendant may validly waive presence at critical stages of the trial.' [Citation.] ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1210 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254].) He contends, however, that (1) his waiver failed to meet the standards associated with waiver of a constitutional right, (2) the trial court erred in failing to obtain a written waiver of his statutory right to be present (§§ 977, 1043), [23] (3) the trial court's failure to comply with this statutory requirement constitutes a violation of the federal constitutional right to due process of law (see Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343 [65 L.Ed.2d 175, 100 S.Ct. 2227]), and (4) the asserted errors were prejudicial. Defendant's arguments fail because he had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to be present at the discussion of the penalty phase jury instructions. As discussed above, in part II.A., there are various limitations upon a defendant's right to be present at trial. First, `[u]nder the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present at a particular proceeding unless his appearance is necessary to prevent interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-examination.' [Citation.] ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1231.) Defendant provides no explanation concerning how the discussion of penalty phase jury instructions had any relation to his opportunity for effective cross-examination, nor do we perceive any relation. (See Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 198 [litigants must support each legal point with argument].) Second, `under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present at a particular proceeding unless he finds himself at a stage . . . that is critical to [the] outcome and his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.' [Citations.] ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1231.) Defendant contends that during discussion of whether his escapes from custody involved the use or attempted use of force or violence within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (b), he could have provided counsel useful facts about the escapes, but he does not identify any such facts. He also contends that when the prosecutor argued that defendant's escapes were admissible as aggravating evidence because any escape has the potential for violence, defendant could have assisted his counsel by pointing out to him that his escapes did not involve violence. According to defendant, defense counsel may then have realized that evidence of [defendant's] escapes . . . was not proper aggravation and should have been the subject of a motion to strike. Not only is this theory speculation, but the premise of the discussion was that the escapes did not involve violence, only the potential for violence. Therefore, it would have made no difference if defendant had been present and reiterated that his escapes did not involve violence. Defendant has failed to establish his presence would have contributed to the fairness of the proceedings. Third, [u]nder article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, `a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present either in chambers or at bench discussions that occur outside of the jury's presence on questions of law or other matters as to which [his] presence does not bear a ``reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.'' [Citations.]' [Citations.] ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1231.) For the same reasons that his presence would not have contributed to the fairness of the proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment, his presence did not bear a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend. (24) Finally, under sections 977 and 1043, a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present, even in the absence of a written waiver, where he does not have such a right under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. [Citations.] ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1231 [defendant's absence from in-court conferences related to guilt and penalty phase jury instructions did not bear a reasonably substantial relationship to his opportunity to defend against the charge]; see People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1195-1196 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969] [the defendant's presence at discussions of jury instructions would not have affected the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charges]; Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 741-742 [conference in chambers related to instructions did not bear a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of the defendant's opportunity to defend]; People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 538 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035] [We find it unlikely that defendant, a layperson, would have contributed in any way to the discussions regarding appropriate instructions on issues of law.].) For the same reason defendant had no right under the California Constitution to be personally present at these discussions, he had no right under sections 977 and 1043 to be personally present, nor was a written waiver required. ( Cole, supra, at p. 1231.) 4. Imposition of the death penalty upon individuals with defendant's mental and emotional deficits Defendant contends that imposition of the death penalty upon a person with the mental and emotional deficits from which he suffers constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution. Based principally upon the testimony of prosecution expert Dr. Baca, defendant asserts that he suffers from mental and emotional deficits that developed during his childhood, and that these deficits impaired his ability to perceive right from wrong, contributed to impulsive behavior, and substantially diminished his culpability for the crime. He contends that under the reasoning of Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304 [153 L.Ed.2d 335, 122 S.Ct. 2242] (8th Amend. prohibits the execution of mentally retarded criminals) and Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [161 L.Ed.2d 1, 125 S.Ct. 1183] (8th Amend. prohibits the execution of minors), the execution of an individual with such deficits violates prohibitions upon cruel and unusual punishment. As explained below, Atkins and Roper do not support defendant's contention. (25) To decide whether evolving standards of decency dictate that death is an excessive punishment, the high court looks first to objective evidence. ( Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 313.) In Atkins, the court noted that, following the execution of a mentally retarded murderer in 1986, numerous states had acted to prohibit the execution of mentally retarded criminals. During the same period, no states had acted to reinstate the execution of such individuals. The court concluded that it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it. ( Id. at pp. 313-316, fn. omitted.) Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. 551, the court observed that the majority of states had rejected the propriety of executing individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time they committed their criminal acts. ( Id. at p. 568.) (26) In addition to considering objective evidence, the high court applies its own judgment, by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators. ( Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 313.) The Atkins court noted that mentally retarded individuals have diminished capacities to process information, to communicate, to learn from experience, to reason, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. ( Id. at p. 318, fn. omitted.) It also acknowledged evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers . . . . ( Ibid., fn. omitted.) The court in Atkins concluded that these deficiencies diminish [the] personal culpability of such defendants. ( Ibid. ) In light of these deficiencies, the court identified two reasons for excluding mentally retarded individuals from imposition of the death penalty: (1) the justifications for the death penaltyretribution and deterrenceare not served by executing the mentally retarded, and (2) the risk of wrongful execution is enhanced by various factors, including the possibility of false confessions and their lesser ability to present evidence in mitigation and to assist counsel. ( Id. at pp. 318-321.) (27) Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. 551, the court identified differences between juveniles and adults that demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders. ( Id. at p. 569.) First, their lack of maturity and their underdeveloped sense of responsibility lead to reckless behavior, and this susceptibility to irresponsible behavior renders their conduct less morally reprehensible. Second, they are more susceptible to negative influences and pressures, and have less control over their environment. Therefore, they have a greater claim to forgiveness. Third, their personality traits are more transitory, which means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character. ( Id. at pp. 569-570.) Due to juveniles' diminished culpability, the case for retribution is weaker than for adult murderers. In addition, it is not clear whether the death penalty has a significant deterrent effect upon juveniles. Finally, the court rejected the view that these circumstances should be considered by the jury as mitigating factors rather than as a reason for the law to preclude imposition of the death penalty upon juveniles, concluding that [t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability. ( Id. at pp. 572-573.) Defendant fails to establish that his conditionan antisocial personality disorderis analogous to mental retardation or juvenile status for purposes of imposition of the death penalty. First, there is no objective evidence that society views as inappropriate the execution of death-eligible individuals who have an antisocial personality disorder. Second, although the expert testimony reflected that individuals with an antisocial personality disorder are not amenable to treatment, the evidence also reflected that such individuals are aware of what they are doing, and that they have the ability to choose not to commit crimes. Accordingly, their disorder does not diminish their personal culpability. In addition, the justifications for the death penaltyretribution and deterrencemay be served by application of the law to such individuals. Moreover, their ability to charm and manipulate others, to deny responsibility, and to provide excuses for their conduct, enhances rather than diminishes their capacity to avoid wrongful conviction and execution. For these reasons, we believe the high court would agree with the implied legislative decision not to exclude individuals with an antisocial personality disorder from eligibility for the death penalty. 5. Prosecutor's comments concerning defendant's lack of remorse Defendant contends the prosecutor commented upon defendant's failure to testify at the penalty phase, and thereby violated his right to remain silent guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He also contends that his counsel's failure to object to the comments constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. During the prosecutor's argument at the penalty phase, he stated that defendant  showed no sympathy, no empathy for her whatsoever. We can only imagine what she was doing during this attack, and in spite of that input that she was giving, the cries, the sounds, he continued his attack upon her. It was unprovoked. There was nothing she could have done to have prevented this crime happening to her. There are murder situations in which the victim does things, goes into areas, antagonizes a dangerous person, and as a result, things happen to that person. That didn't happen here. That didn't happen here. She was a completely innocent person in this particular case. And finally, this particular crime, so casual, in that the defendant, it appears, simply went to that place on a fantasy that he had, a thought that he had, knocked on the door, went in, did this all in a short period of time and then casually leaves the scene. Casually leaves the scene. That's one of the horrors in this case. The two people, three people inside that restaurant where he parked the car didn't hear any squealing of tires as he left. He casually left the scene here. We didn't hear any evidence of, you know, being struck by the horror of the crime that he had committed here, as so often you do see in other types of murder cases. In fact, this is a rather unique case in that the defendant, the crime in this particular case, has no remorse attached to it whatsoever.  (Italics added.) Defendant did not object to these statements. (28) Defendant contends that the italicized statements referred to evidence concerning his state of mind, which, he asserts, could be provided only by defendant. (See Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1266 [the prosecution may not refer to the absence of evidence that only the defendant's testimony could provide].) Defendant has forfeited his claim by failing to object. ( Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1303.) As noted above, defendant urges the court to reject the rule that a failure to object forfeits a challenge to a prosecutor's comment upon a defendant's failure to testify, but he provides no persuasive reason to alter the rule, and we decline to do so. Alternatively, he asserts counsel's failure to object constituted deficient performance by counsel. This claim fails, however, because the prosecutor's statements were not improper. Although the prosecution may not refer to the defendant's failure to testify, it may comment upon the defendant's lack of remorse. ( People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 453-454 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391].) The prosecutor's comments referred to the evidence of defendant's conduct in connection with his commission of the crime, and to the absence of evidence of remorse, which might have been presented by friends or relatives who believed he was remorseful; the prosecutor's comments did not directly or indirectly refer to defendant's failure to testify. Thus, defense counsel had no basis for objecting to the comments, and did not perform deficiently in declining to do so. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.) 6. Instruction and argument regarding mitigating factors Defendant contends (1) the trial court's failure to modify CALJIC No. 8.85 to delete descriptions of inapplicable mitigating factors, (2) the prosecutor's comments concerning certain mitigating factors, and (3) defense counsel's failure to object to the jury instruction and the prosecutor's comments, deprived him of his rights to due process, to a reliable determination of penalty, to be free from the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, and to effective assistance of counsel under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 7, 15, and 17 of the California Constitution. (29) We begin with the contention that the trial court should have modified the standard jury instruction. Before evidence was presented at the penalty phase, and again following the presentation of evidence and argument, the trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, concerning the factors it should consider, if applicable. [24] Defendant did not request any clarifying change to the pattern instruction. `Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.' [Citation.] ( People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168].) CALJIC No. 8.85 simply quotes the factors set forth in section 190.3, and we repeatedly have held that instructions in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 do not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to delete inapplicable sentencing factors . . . . [Citations.] ( People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 469 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64]; see also People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 516 [110 Cal.Rptr.3d 673, 232 P.3d 663] [the court is not required to delete inapplicable statutory factors]; People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 899 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 852, 220 P.3d 872] [same].) Because the instruction is a correct statement of the law and defendant did not request different language, he has forfeited his claim that the instruction should have been modified. And because the instruction does not otherwise violate his constitutional rights, his claim also fails on the merits. (30) Next, defendant challenges the prosecutor's remarks. In his argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor stated that section 190.3, factors (e) through (j) did not apply to this case. Defendant asserts, however, that various statements by the prosecutor indicated that the absence of evidence of a mitigating factor could be considered an aggravating circumstance. (See People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861] [it is improper for a prosecutor to argue that the absence of certain mitigating factors rendered them aggravating factors].) Defendant did not object to any of the prosecutor's statements concerning the mitigating factors. Accordingly, he has forfeited his claim. ( People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 749 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 192, 229 P.3d 101]; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1030 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099] ( Clark ).) The claim also fails on the merits. It is permissible for a prosecutor to observe that there is no evidence of a mitigating factor. ( People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 658 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].) As explained below, [a]lthough the prosecutor noted the absence of certain mitigating factors, he did not expressly or implicitly argue that the absence of these factors could be considered in aggravation. These statements were well within the range of proper prosecutorial argument. [Citations.] ( Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1030.) With respect to section 190.3, factor (h), which addresses the effect of mental defects and intoxication, the prosecutor stated the factor does not apply in this particular case. . . . [¶] We have no evidence in this case. As a matter of fact, we have contrary evidence in this case. The doctors testified that he may, in fact, be an addict, however, it played no part in this particular group of cases. And, in terms of mental disease, mental defect, mental illness, of any nature, the defendant simply does not have that. As a matter of fact, as Dr. Hall said, the defendant is, frighteningly enough, a perfectly normal person. The prosecutor's statement that defendant is, frighteningly enough, a perfectly normal person, did not indicate that the absence of a mental defect or intoxication could be considered an aggravating circumstance, particularly in light of the prosecutor's repeated statements that factor (h) was not applicable to the case. Rather, the statement indicated that defendant was less deserving of leniency, rather than more deserving of death. Argument of this type does not contravene the rule set forth in Davenport.  ( Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1031.) We decline defendant's invitation to overrule Clark 's distinction between statements that focus upon the absence of mitigating evidence and statements urging that the absence of mitigating evidence constitutes an aggravating circumstance. Contrary to defendant, we perceive a difference between an argument that a defendant is less deserving of leniency and an argument that a defendant is more deserving of death. With respect to section 190.3, factor (i), which addresses a defendant's age, the prosecutor stated that it was a factor in mitigation. It can't be reversed around and said to be a factor in aggravation. He stated that factor (i) applied when a defendant committed the crime at a young age, before he or she was socialized or understood the consequences of his or her actions. He added, Obviously age is not a factor here in that we have a person who is just the opposite. A person who is older, a person who's had the opportunity to see the impact of many, many crimes, to see the impact upon himself, to see the impact upon his victims, and to see the impact upon his extended family. Yet, despite all of that, the defendant chose, choseas Dr. Baca said, this man really chooses to take the very easy way through life. The very fun way, to use an odd word when we are discussing this type of crime, through life. But despite that, it's not a factor in aggravation. You can't twist it around . . . and use it against him. The prosecutor's comments explained why defendant's age was not a mitigating factor; contrary to defendant's contention, the comments did not urge that the absence of evidence that defendant's age was a mitigating factor rendered factor (i) an aggravating factor. [25] Finally, defense counsel's failure to object to CALJIC No. 8.85 or to the prosecutor's statements did not constitute deficient performance by counsel. As we have explained, the instruction was an accurate statement of the law, and the prosecutor's comments were permissible. Therefore, counsel was not deficient for failing to object, and there is no reasonable probability that an objection would have altered the outcome. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 694.) 7. Instruction concerning the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors Defendant contends that the jury instructions failed to convey that (1) a single mitigating factor is a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that a defendant should not be sentenced to death, and (2) a sentence of death is not required despite the absence of any mitigating factors. He asserts the instructions thereby deprived him of his rights to due process and to be free from the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 7 and 17 of the California Constitution. (31) The trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.88, regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We repeatedly have rejected the contention that CALJIC No. 8.88 is unconstitutional because it fails to instruct the jury that a single mitigating factor could outweigh multiple aggravating factors and by itself could justify a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole [citation] . . . . ( People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 304 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459, 226 P.3d 949] ( D'Arcy ).) We also have rejected the contention that the instruction fails to convey that the jury may return a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole even in the complete absence of any mitigating evidence. [Citations.] ( People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 410 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 621, 133 P.3d 534; see People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 43 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591].) CALJIC No. 8.88 accurately describes how jurors are to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. [Citation.] ( Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 488; see People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1226 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981].) Defendant identifies no persuasive reason to alter these established principles. 8. Instruction on the meaning of life without the possibility of parole Defendant contends the absence of a jury instruction concerning the meaning of life without the possibility of parole deprived him of his rights to due process and to be free from the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 7 and 17 of the California Constitution. (32) Defendant acknowledges that we have rejected the argument that life in prison without the possibility of parole must be defined for the jury, but asserts that we should reconsider our conclusion in light of Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154 [129 L.Ed.2d 133, 114 S.Ct. 2187] (a capital defendant was entitled to inform the sentencing jury that the alternative of life in prison would be without the possibility of parole) and Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) 532 U.S 36 [149 L.Ed.2d 178, 121 S.Ct. 1263] (the rule in Simmons applied when neither the instruction nor the argument sufficiently informed jurors that the capital defendant would not be eligible for parole). [W]e have consistently held that the phrase `life without possibility of parole' as it appears in CALJIC No. 8.84 adequately informs the jury that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole is ineligible for parole. [Citations.] ( People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1091 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 189 P.3d 911]. Nothing in Simmons [, supra, ] 512 U.S. 154 . . . causes us to reconsider that conclusion. ( People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 303 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 236 P.3d 1035].) In addition, [d]efendant's reliance upon Shafer [, supra , ] 532 U.S. 36 . . ., is unavailing. ( People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1317 [In Shafer, the court explained that `the South Carolina instructions were defective because they failed to inform the jury of the defendant's parole eligibility status,' whereas the California instructions `explicitly informed the jury that there would be no possibility of parole'].) ( People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 817 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 78, 209 P.3d 1], fn. omitted ( Dykes ).) [T]he concept of life in prison with no possibility of parole is clear. [Citation.] We are not persuaded by empirical claims made outside the appellate record and untested at trial suggesting the contrary is true. ( DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 58.) 9. The trial court's decision not to answer the jury's question concerning the consequences of a deadlock Defendant contends that the trial court's failure to answer the jury's question concerning what would occur if the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict at the penalty phase deprived him of his rights to due process and to be free from the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 7, 15, and 17 of the California Constitution. Jury deliberations began in the afternoon of November 30, and resumed in the morning on December 1. During the afternoon session on December 1, the court informed counsel that the jury had sent the following note: We want to know what happens if we cannot reach a unanimous decision? Judge makes decision? re-trial/entirely? re-trial/penalty? The trial court asked counsel their views concerning the appropriate response to the jury's inquiry. Defense counsel stated he had not experienced this issue before, that his concern was that the questions were irrelevant to the jury's decision, and that he did not know what position to take. The court read a passage from People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1075 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388], which stated that an instruction explaining the consequences of a hung jury `would have the potential for unduly confusing and misguiding the jury in their proper role and function in the penalty determination process.' [Citations.] The court concluded, That suggests to me that these questions should not be answered. Defense counsel responded, That's my feeling. And I hadn't read any cases on the issue. The court returned the written questions with the following response: The Court cannot answer these questions. The jury deliberated until 3:00 p.m. on December 1, resumed deliberations the morning of December 2, and informed the court at 11:45 a.m. that it had reached a verdict. (33) Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to inform the jury of the consequences of a deadlock. Defendant has waived this claim by agreeing with the trial court concerning the appropriate response to the jury's question. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 402 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432] ( Hughes ) [this claim is waived by defense counsel's agreement with the trial court that informing the jury of the consequences of a deadlock would have been improper].) Defendant asserts, however, that his counsel's earlier statement that he did not know what position to take, and his subsequent statement that he had not read any cases addressing the issue, reflect that counsel did not make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to waive defendant's right. The authority he cites in support of this proposition is inapposite, because it involves a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel. (See Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400 [125 L.Ed.2d 321, 113 S.Ct. 2680]; Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 465 [82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019].) In the circumstances presented here, defendant must establish ineffective assistance of counsel to avoid the consequences of his counsel's actions. In any event, the claim also fails on the merits. We repeatedly have held that a trial court is not required to educate a jury concerning the consequences of a deadlock. (See Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 402; see also Jones v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 373, 383 [144 L.Ed.2d 370, 119 S.Ct. 2090] [the court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to require in every capital case an instruction concerning the consequences of a deadlock at the penalty phase].) As we explained in Hughes, Especially in a case like thisin which it was not clear that there actually was any deadlockan instruction informing the jury of the consequence of a deadlock `would have diminished the jurors' sense of duty to deliberate, and to be open to the ideas of fellow jurors. The effect of a hung jury is irrelevant to the jury's deliberation of any issue before it. ' [Citation.] ( Hughes, supra, at p. 402, original italics.) Defendant notes, however, that the questions asked by juries in prior cases did not articulate retrial of the guilt phase as a possible consequence of a deadlock, and he contends that jurors' belief that such a retrial would occur would have resulted in improper pressure to reach a consensus regarding the penalty. This speculative contention does not alter our conclusion. The jury's note did not establish that any juror believed a retrial of the guilt phase would follow a deadlock at the penalty phase. Rather, the note reflected that one or more jurors apparently had speculated concerning possible scenarios, including the possibility of a retrial. Presumably, in most cases in which jurors request information about the consequences of a deadlock, jurors have given some thought to what events might follow a deadlock. That jurors in the present case articulated various scenarios does not establish that any juror believed a particular result would follow a deadlock. Nor did the jurors' speculation attenuate the principle that informing the jury of the consequence of a deadlock `would have diminished the jurors' sense of duty to deliberate, and to be open to the ideas of fellow jurors. ( Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 402.) Defendant's reliance upon Simmons v. South Carolina, supra, 512 U.S. 154, and Morris v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 826 is misplaced. In Simmons, the prosecution urged the jury to consider defendant's future dangerousness, and the court refused to inform the jury that defendant was not eligible for parole. In Morris, the written jury instructions erroneously stated that if the jury could not decide between death and life without the possibility of parole, it should return a verdict of life with the possibility of parole. Thereafter, the court declined to answer the jury's question concerning what sentence would be imposed if the jury could not agree. Thus, the jurors' alleged confusion in Simmons and Morris involved facts or principles that were relevant to the jurors' determination of the appropriate penalty. In contrast, the issue of whether retrial of any aspect of the litigation will occur if the jury cannot reach a verdict is irrelevant to the jury's determination of the appropriate penalty.