Opinion ID: 3037822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: discussion of fedex’s appeal

Text: We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of treaties to which the United States is a party. Motorola, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 308 F.3d 995, 999 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). We review applications of law of the case doctrine for abuse of discretion. Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, the district court abused its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine for two reasons. First, the court misunderstood the effect of its summary judgment rulings. FedEx sought summary judgment on whether liability is limited even if the Original Warsaw Convention applies. It did not concede that this applied for the purposes of trial if the motion was denied. Denying summary CONTINENTAL INSURANCE v. FEDERAL EXPRESS 7161 judgment rendered no decision on what law governed; no actual ruling on the issue of applicable law was made. The record bears this out: nowhere is it evident that the court actually analyzed the treaties in force. By invoking the law of the case doctrine to prevent judicial consideration of a dispositive legal issue not yet ruled upon for the purposes of trial, the district court abused its discretion. Second, the district court erred by applying the Original Warsaw Convention to this case. Given that various nations have ratified either the Original Warsaw Convention or its various amending agreements, the question as to what law applies has ordinarily been determined on a “lowest common denominator” basis. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Federal Express Corp., 248 F. Supp. 2d 905, 907-09 (N.D. Cal. 2003); see also Paul S. Dempsey, International Air Cargo & Baggage Liability And The Tower Of Babel, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 239, 240 (2004). The latest treaty ratified by both origin and destination countries supplies the governing law. The most recent common treaty in force between Hong Kong and the United States is not the Original Warsaw Convention, but The Hague Protocol.
[1] From July 1, 1997, the People’s Republic of China resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the United Kingdom, becoming a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”) of China. Prior to that date, the U.K. had ratified treaties and other international agreements on Hong Kong’s behalf. Upon changing status to a SAR, Hong Kong neither automatically ceased to honor its past obligations nor automatically became subject to China’s agreements. Rather, China issued a joint statement with the U.K. to the effect that certain enumerated treaties to which China was a party would be applied to Hong Kong from July 1, 1997, while certain treaties to which China was not yet a party, but which applied to Hong Kong prior to July 1, 1997, would continue to apply. 7162 CONTINENTAL INSURANCE v. FEDERAL EXPRESS See The Position Of The People’s Republic Of China And The United Kingdom On Multilateral Treaties Applying To The Hong Kong Special Administration Region, 36 I.LM. 1671, 1676-1678 (1997). This document gave renewed effect in Hong Kong to both The Hague Protocol and the Original Warsaw Convention. See id. at 1678, 1684; see also DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2004, 349 n.3 (2004). [2] By contrast, the Montreal Protocol No. 4 did not become effective in the U.K. until June 14, 1998, long after Hong Kong’s change of status. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 322(1) (1986) (observing that “the provisions of an international agreement do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact that took place . . . before the date of the entry into force of the agreement with respect to that party”). Because the Montreal Protocol No. 4 never came into force in Hong Kong, was never subject to the Chinese/British note on multilateral treaties applying to Hong Kong, and, indeed, was ratified by China itself only within the last year—without application to Hong Kong—the Montreal Protocol No. 4 cannot apply.
[3] The United States expressly ratified The Hague Protocol on December 14, 2003. However, the question before the court is whether, by adopting the Montreal Protocol No. 4, the United States acceded to The Hague Protocol, such that the terms of the Original Warsaw Convention as amended by The Hague Protocol should govern this matter. This is a question of first impression in this circuit. [4] In dictum, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “The Hague Protocol did not enter into force for the United States until the Montreal Protocol No. 4 was ratified by the Senate” on March 4, 1999, Motorola Inc., 308 F.3d at 999 n.6, implying that CONTINENTAL INSURANCE v. FEDERAL EXPRESS 7163 upon ratification of the Montreal Protocol No. 4, the United States became bound by the terms of The Hague Protocol. District courts in the Southern, Central, and Northern Districts of California have adhered to Motorola and the March 4, 1999 date. See, e.g., Polanski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1226 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (“[O]n September 28, 1998, the United States ratified a later amending treaty, Montreal Protocol No. 4, which became effective as to the United States on March 4, 1999. By doing so, the United States acceded to the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol.”) (citations omitted); In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan, 2002 WL 32513726,  (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2002) (Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d) (“[R]atification [of Montreal Protocol No. 4] made the Hague Protocol effective in the U.S. as of March 4, 1999.”); G.D. Searle, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 907-909 (concluding that by ratifying the Montreal Protocol No. 4 the U.S. “did in fact express its consent to accede to the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol”). [5] The Second Circuit agreed in Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 431 (2d Cir. 2001). The Second Circuit stated that the United States was not governed by The Hague Protocol “until another international agreement, Montreal Protocol No. 4, was ratified by the Senate on September 28, 1998 and became effective on March 4, 1999.” Even Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 307 n.4 (2d Cir. 2000), relied on heavily by Continental, accepts that the United States “acceded to the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol” upon ratification of the Montreal Protocol No. 4. See also Schopenhauer v. Compagnie Nat’l Air Fr., 255 F. Supp. 2d 81, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“When referring specifically to the 1955 Hague revisions of the original Warsaw Convention, the Court occasionally refers to the ‘Hague Protocol,’ even though those revisions did not take effect in this country until the ratification of Montreal Protocol No. 4 in 1999.”); Royal & Son Alliance Ins. v. Am. Airlines, et al., 277 F. Supp 2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The Second Circuit has twice recognized that the 7164 CONTINENTAL INSURANCE v. FEDERAL EXPRESS United States has acceded to the Hague Protocol, as has the Ninth Circuit.”).4 [6] This treatment is consistent with the language of the Montreal Protocol No. 4, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and positions taken by the Executive Branch. A review of the express language of the Montreal Protocol No. 4 indicates that by ratifying the Montreal Protocol No. 4, the United States expressed its consent to accede to The Hague Protocol. Article XVII(2) of the Montreal Protocol No. 4 provides: This provision incorporates by reference the revisions to the Warsaw Convention made at The Hague in 1955 and defines the resulting single instrument as the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and by Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, 1975. (emphasis added) Likewise, Article XVII provides that Ratification by any state which is not a party to the Warsaw Convention and to The Hague Protocol has the effect of accession to the new single instrument defined in Article XV. Paragraph 2 of this article has the important function of making clear that it is not necessary to ratify the Warsaw Convention or The Hague Protocol in order to become a party to the new single instrument created by Protocol 4. (emphasis added) Read in conjunction, this language supports our position, as does Article 40 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea- 4 In a recent case, however, the Second Circuit retreated from this position, treated Fujitsu’s statements adopting the March 4, 1999 date as dicta, and arrived at a different construction. See Avero Belgium Ins. v. American Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 82-90 (2nd Cir. 2005). CONTINENTAL INSURANCE v. FEDERAL EXPRESS 7165 ties, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INTL. L. 875 (1969). Article 40 addresses the amendment of multilateral treaties and provides that: 5. Any state which becomes a party to the treaty after the entry into force of the amending agreement shall, failing an expression of a different intention by that state:
amended; and (b) be considered as a party to the unamended treaty in relation to any party to the treaty not bound by the amending agreement.5 See also Saul Sorkin, Goods In Transit § 9.19 (2003) (“[I]f a State failed to become a party to the original Warsaw Convention but thereafter adhered to the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention it thereby became a party to the Warsaw Convention.”); Dana L. Christensen, Comment, The Elusive Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Air Transportation Between The United States and South Korea, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 653, 688-89 (2001) (“[M]ost scholars agree that . . . adherence to an amending agreement binds a new party to the terms of the original treaty with respect to parties that adhere solely to that treaty.”) [7] The authorities cited above are persuasive. We hold that the ratification of the Montreal Protocol No. 4 brought The Hague Protocol into full force and effect in the United States on March 4, 1999. 5 The Second Circuit in Avero Belgium did not apply section 5(b) because the court held that the United States, in ratifying Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, expressed an intention that this provision did not apply. We reach a contrary conclusion, holding that no such intention was expressed by Congress. 7166 CONTINENTAL INSURANCE v. FEDERAL EXPRESS We observe that President Bush’s transmittal to the Senate on July 31, 2002 of The Hague Protocol for advice and consent, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-14, 1955 WL 45606 (2002), does not undermine this holding. The transmittal took no position on The Hague Protocol’s then-current status. It was offered to dispel future uncertainty as to whether the United States is bound by The Hague Protocol. In a June 2003 State Department white paper, offered as testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Administration clarified that it sought to eliminate any ambiguity for the future, observing only that: If the courts were to conclude that Montreal Protocol No. 4 does not create treaty relations under The Hague Protocol, the United States’ treaty relations with the 79 countries that are parties to both the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Protocol, but not to Montreal Protocol No. 4, would be based on the Warsaw Convention, unamended by any later protocol . . . . This is an unsatisfactory result . . . . Ratification of The Hague Protocol will eliminate any ambiguity and secure for the U.S. industry The Hague Protocol’s more modern cargo documentation rules, which are critical to the efficient movement of air cargo. John R. Byerly, U.S. Aviation Policy: the Montreal Convention and The Hague Protocol, at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ rls/rm/2003/21869.htm.