Opinion ID: 1852240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Batson[1]Analysis

Text: First, the per curiam opinion issued on the initial application for rehearing gives only passing reference to the Batson issue. Although the three-step Batson analysis is well-settled law, there are no definite standards by which to determine whether the party striking a minority veniremember is using a pretext for a racially discriminatory strike. The only clear standard in this Court's precedent is that the trial court's determination shall not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. See Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987). I believe Prudential Ballard presents in its application for rehearing a solid argument that is comparable to that presented in Smith v. Jackson, 770 So.2d 1068 (Ala. 2000). The facts in this particular case are almost identical to those in Smith and they call for a reversal, as this Court ordered in that case. In Smith, a husband and wife sued a building-contractor corporation and its owner, alleging breach of express warranty and breach of contract in regard to the construction of their home. The husband and wife, the Jacksons, used their peremptory strikes to remove all white veniremembers. The circuit court eventually accepted a jury verdict in favor of the husband on the breach-of-contract and breach-of-the-express-warranty claims and entered a judgment on that verdict. The contractor appealed; this Court reversed and remanded. This Court wrote in Smith: The jury venire was composed of 8 white persons and 29 black persons. The Jacksons exercised peremptory challenges against all eight white veniremembers. The defendants made a Batson objection, and the trial court required the Jacksons to provide race-neutral reasons for each of the eight contested challenges. The trial court found that the Jacksons' stated reasons were race-neutral, were not pretextual, and were based on information disclosed during voir dire examination. On appeal, the defendants argue that, as to three of the white veniremembers, the Jacksons' stated reasons were pretextual and were not based on information disclosed during voir dire. With respect to one of the veniremembers, we agree. The Jacksons' attorney offered the following reason for striking veniremember M.H.: `She worked for the Welch's company selling baby stuff all up and down through this area for years. I don't know how much stuff she sold to every person in the county including the Smiths. You have got toyou know yourself when you sell baby stuff to these people who are now defendants, I thought that whether or not she would admit it you keep seeing everybody as little Jimmy Smith or little Mac Smith or something like that.' There was no information disclosed during voir dire concerning M.H.'s alleged past employment with Welch's or her having sold `baby stuff to Mac Smith or his family. The Jacksons' attorney did, however, ask the veniremembers during voir dire whether any of them knew either of the Jacksons. M.H. did not indicate that she did. . . . . ... The explanation given by the Jacksons' attorney as to why he struck M.H. was not based on information disclosed during voir dire. The explanation given by the Jacksons' attorney is somewhat cryptic, but it appears that his reason for asserting a peremptory challenge against M.H. was either that M.H. knew Mac Smith because she had in fact sold `baby stuff to him or to his family, or that M.H.'s former occupational experiences would somehow influence her to look upon Smith more favorably than upon the Jacksons. If M.H. had in fact sold `baby stuff to Mac Smith or his family, and that fact had been disclosed during voir dire, we might accept the trial court's finding that the reason offered by the Jacksons' attorney was legitimate and race-neutral. See Looney [v. Davis, ] 721 So.2d [152,] at 165 [(Ala.1998)], (noting that `[s]trikes based on the veniremember's relationship to or acquaintance with the defendant or with the defendant's witnesses have generally been upheld') (quoting Rowe v. State, 625 So.2d 1210, 1211 (Ala.Crim.App.1993)). The Jacksons' attorney, however, could easily have ascertained during voir dire whether that was a fact, but failed to do so. Therefore, we must conclude that, to the extent the explanation given by the Jacksons' attorney can be understood as implying that M.H. knew Mac Smith, it was based on `intuitive judgment or suspicion' and did not constitute a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike. Looney, 721 So.2d at 165. To the extent the explanation given by the Jacksons' attorney can be understood as implying that M.H. would be influenced by her former occupation to look more favorably upon Mac Smith than upon the Jacksons, it also fails to constitute `a clear, specific, and legitimate reason for the challenge which relates to the particular case ... and which is nondiscriminatory.' [ Ex parte] Branch, 526 So.2d [609] at 623 [(Ala. 1987)] (emphasis omitted). Although a veniremember's past or present occupation can be a legitimate, race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike, see Burlington Northern R.R. v. Whitt, 575 So.2d 1011, 1018 (Ala.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 948, 111 S.Ct. 1415, 113 L.Ed.2d 468 (1991), `strikes allegedly based upon a veniremember's occupation have not been upheld where the employment does not appear in any way to relate[ ] to the particular case to be tried.' Looney, 721 So.2d at 166 (quoting Branch, 526 So.2d at 623). The Jacksons' attorney offered no reason why M.H.'s former occupation of selling `baby stuff was relevant to this case involving home construction, and we do not perceive any such reason. Therefore, we hold that, under the facts of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the reasons given by the Jacksons' counsel for striking M.H. were not pretextual. This Court has stated that `the removal of even one juror for a racially discriminatory reason is a violation of the equal protection rights of both the excluded juror and the party challenging the peremptory strike.' Looney, 721 So.2d at 163 (citing Ex parte Jackson, 640 So.2d 1050 (Ala.1993), and Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676 (Ala.1991)). Because the trial court erred in accepting as race-neutral the Jacksons' explanation for striking veniremember M.H., we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for a new trial. 770 So.2d. at 1072-74 (emphasis added.) The facts of this case are very similar to those in Smith they do not support a finding that the reasons offered for the strike were not pretextual. In this case, the venire consisted of 9 Caucasians and 26 African-Americans, and every Caucasian member of the venire was struck. Potential juror # 24 was struck because his wife was employed by someone who had been asked about that potential juror and who said that that potential juror was quite conservative, very defense-oriented, and did not need to be on the jury. Counsel for the Weatherlys made no attempt to follow up on the comments with questions to juror # 24 regarding whether those comments were true, and no evidence in the record supports his dismissal from the venire. Similarly, the excuse given for striking potential juror # 56 was that while investigating the venire list before trial it was learned that she had previously served as a witness in an unrelated case involving an insurance company and that her husband was associated with the local water-works board and appeared outspoken, argumentative, and closed-minded. Once again, counsel for the Weatherlys made no attempt to follow up with questions concerning these allegations, and the record contains no evidence to support his reason for striking her from the venire. The excuse given for striking potential juror # 101 was that he had served on a federal jury in a civil matter where an inmate sued the state and that he had a background in the military which, as purported by the Weatherlys, relate[d] to one of the defendants in this case and also witnesses in this case. Therefore, counsel for the Weatherlys deemed him unable to afford to [the Weatherlys] an opportunity to have a level playing field and be able to [make] a decision ... based on the facts and the evidence. However, the Weatherlys offered no relevant, specific evidence as it related to this particular juror to support their excuse for striking him. Potential juror # 144 was struck, counsel said, because he was a truck driver and had been a plaintiff in a small property-damage case and was leery of the legal system. Again, the Weatherlys offered no relevant evidence in the record to justify striking him and did not attempt to follow up these allegations with questions concerning his ability to be objective or his alleged bias against the legal system. I do not believe any great distinction can be made between Smith and the instant case; but, if it can be, then this is an issue that we need to fully consider in order to clarify the law regarding pretext and the clearly-erroneous standard. Otherwise, they both appear to be cases in which potential jurors were dismissed from the venire for reasons that were never explored during voir dire, as to which no relevant evidence was offered, and as to which there was offered no legitimate reason to justify their dismissal. The constitutional principle of Batson depends on this Court's willingness to address forthrightly this problem so that the bench and bar will not be confused. The per curiam opinion issued on the first application for rehearing in this case provides no such guidance and, when considered in the light of Smith, is quite confusing.