Opinion ID: 3011942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application to the Abington Ordinance

Text: As noted above, the Congregation moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that the Ordinance was facially unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. The District Court, however, proceeded to evaluate whether the Ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause as applied, and did so in order to avoid making [an] unnecessarily broad constitutional judgment. Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F. Supp.2d at 436. Relying on City of Cleburne, the District Court concluded that the Ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to the Congregation because it did not permit the Congregation to apply for a special exception in an R-1 Residential District. As the District Court viewed it, the issue was whether the Township’s scheme was rationally related to its proffered reason for excluding the Congregation -- a concern over 26 traffic, light, and noise pollution. That is, the question was whether it was permissible for the Township to allow uses other than residences in the R-1 Residential District, while simultaneously excluding the Congregation. The District Court observed that Abington’s traffic, noise and light concerns also exist for the uses currently allowed to request a special exception. Id. at 437. Thus, the court concluded that the means employed by the Ordinance, i.e., distinguishing between country clubs and the Congregation, was not rationally related to the goal of preventing traffic, noise, and light pollution in the neighborhood. Accordingly, the court ordered the ZHB to hold a hearing on whether the Congregation was entitled to a special exception. The Township submits that the District Court erred in its equal protection analysis, for which it relied primarily on City of Cleburne. We agree. First, the District Court failed to make the preliminary determination in the equal protection analysis, as we identified above. See supra Section IV. That is, the District Court failed to inquire whether the uses permitted by special exception, such as country clubs, were similarly situated to religious institutions or to the Congregation in particular. Rather, the District Court concluded that because the impact of the uses, either similar or not, was the same, there could be no rational basis for distinguishing between them, and that the Congregation must therefore be able to apply for a special exception. At oral argument the Congregation claimed that the District Court had focused, and that this Court should focus, on the impact of the different uses because that was the proffered reason offered by Abington for distinguishing between country clubs and religious uses. However, based on our review of City of Cleburne and other caselaw, discussed supra Section III, we conclude that this argument overlooks the fact that Abington need not justify its exclusion of religious uses if such a use is not similarly situated to, for example, a country club. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Christian Gospel Church,[i]n order to prevail, the Church must make a showing that a class that is similarly situated has been treated disparately. 896 F.2d 27 at 1225. It is not until this showing is made that it becomes incumbent on the City to provide a rational basis for [the] apparent unequal treatment of similarly situated entities. Cornerstone, 948 F.2d at 472. That Abington offered a rationale based on the Congregation’s impact does not relieve the Congregation of its burden to demonstrate, at the outset, that it is similarly situated to the uses permitted by special exception in the R-1 District. So then, the Congregation must demonstrate that it is similarly situated to other permitted entities by demonstrating that it is similarly situated in relation to the Township’s purpose in creating the R-1 Residential District. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ([T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind or for a particular use . . . is to be determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality.). The Township’s purpose in creating R-1, as stated in the Ordinance, is to provide low density single-family, neighborhoods. [1000a]. The burden on the Congregation is to demonstrate that it is just as compatible with this goal as is, for example, a country club. To be sure, it may be that an inquiry into whether something is similarly situated will involve an inquiry into whether the two entities have the same impact. But the analysis for equal protection purposes is more nuanced. In City of Cleburne, for example, the nature of the uses was dwellings for large numbers of people. In this case, a court must evaluate not only the impact of the Congregation as compared with a country club, the example raised by the Congregation at oral argument, but also what requirements or needs it may have in order to operate within the neighborhood. Should the Congregation prevail, the burden then shifts to the Township to offer any evidence of a rational reason for distinguishing between the uses. We will turn presently to the similarity of uses issue. But first we are constrained to note that if we were to conclude, as the District Court did, that all uses with a similar impact must be treated alike, regardless of the fact that such uses 28 may be fundamentally distinct, we would turn zoning law on its head. That is, such a conclusion would mean not only that churches must be allowed in a zone where country clubs are allowed (based on the conclusion that country clubs impact light, traffic and noise as well), but also, by necessity, that a host of other uses that impact light, traffic and noise must also be permitted in such zones. But this would strip of any real meaning the authority bestowed upon municipalities to zone since the broad power to zone carries with it the corollary authority to discriminate against a host of uses that a municipality determines are not particularly suited for a certain district. Placing the burden on the complaining party first to establish that it is similarly situated with other, permitted uses preserves the clearly established local authority in the land use context. The District Court did not do this and hence its judgment must be set aside. To the extent that the District Court’s conclusion rests on the notion that a house of worship inherently further[s] the public welfare, Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F. Supp.2d at 437, it is seriously problematic for the reasons set forth in the margin. 5 (Text continued on page 31) _________________________________________________________________ 5. The Congregation concedes that a municipality may indeed decree that some [uses] are suitable in a particular district and some are not. For example, it could decide that it wishes to permit golf clubs in a residential neighborhood, but exclude tennis clubs. The Congregation also acknowledges that a local government may generally exclude a use from a residential zone because the use ‘lacks residential character,’ even if the excluded use would be similarly intense as those permitted. However, the Congregation contends that a local government may not permit any of those things and prohibit houses of worship and rely on ‘compatibility with residential life’ as its reason for distinguishing the uses. In its submission, The Constitution privileges the activity of religious worship at least to this extent: that it bars government from finding nonreligious uses, other than ‘residences’ themselves, permissible within a residential district, while excluding religious uses for reasons related solely to the ‘character’ of the activity. This argument, which is essentially a challenge to the facial validity of the Ordinance under the Equal Protection Clause, is not necessary to our disposition of the case, nor do we think it prudent to pass upon it now; as the District Court noted in ruling on the Ordinance as applied to the Congregation, and as the Supreme Court observed in City of Cleburne, it is preferable, when possible, toavoid making unnecessarily 29 broad constitutional judgments. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447; see also Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 436. However, we do note that this argument seems to boil down to a contention that religious institutions get a preference in the land use context, and we think that such a preference would pose a significant problem. First, under Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a local government must even-handedly apply its laws and cannot single out religion for either discriminatory or preferential treatment. Id. at 879 (the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ). As the Court observed, We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. Id. at 878-79. Second, a conclusion that religious uses may not be excluded from residential districts takes away the deference that has been granted to local municipalities to make a determination whether or not such a use is suited for a residential district. As stated at oral argument, it creates a cookie-cutter approach to zoning that seems contrary to, at the very least, the Supreme Court’s observation that regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity. FERC v. Missippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982). Second, we are unpersuaded by the Congregation’s citation to several decisions in state courts holding that houses of worship are inherently compatible with residential zoning. See, e.g., State v. Maxwell, 617 P.2d 816 (Haw. 1980); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39 (Ind. 1961); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 136 N.E.2d 827 (N.Y. 1956); Congregation Committee v. City Council of Haltom City, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1956); O’Brien v. Chicago, 105 N.E.2d 917 (Ill. 1952). Although some jurisdictions have so held, not all states espouse this ruling, see, e.g., Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281 (1958); West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263 (1956); Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany v. Miami Beach, 82 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1955); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter Day Saints v. Porterville, 203 P.2d 823 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949), nor does the Congregation cite a federal case explicitly upholding this extremely broad principle. Most importantly, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not spoken directly on this subject, lower court decisions demonstrate that it is not good law in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ v. 30
Since we review the grant of (partial) summary judgment de novo, see Olson v. General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996), we apply the same standard as the District Court in determining whether summary judgment was appropriate, Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1321 (3d Cir. 1995). Therefore, we may analyze whether the Congregation is similarly situated to uses permitted by special exception in the R-1 Residential District, i.e., whether, as submitted by the Congregation at oral argument, Congregation Kol Ami is similarly situated to a country club. We are tempted to do this because the District Court, albeit in summary fashion, did so, and because delay in disposition of this matter impedes the Congregation’s relocation efforts. In response to questioning at oral argument, the Congregation contends that it is similarly situated to a country club, a use that is permitted by special exception in the R-1 Residential District. In its submission, a country club conducts activities at the same time and with the same number of people as the Congregation would, yet the country club is permitted by special exception but the Congregation is not. The Congregation submits that it should make no difference that Congregation Kol Ami, and not Country Club Kol Ami, applied for a special exception. If Abington permitted full-scale country clubs, this argument might have some force. It is unclear however, based on a review of the Abington Ordinance, whether country clubs, as described by the Congregation, are permitted in the R-1 Residential District in Abington. Leaving aside the religious events conducted at the synagogues, which have no analogue to any of the uses _________________________________________________________________ Lower Merion Township, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (Mont. Co. Ct. of Comm. Pleas 1964) (upholding generally applicable zoning regulation that denied church a special exception to locate in a residential area). At all events, the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Smith renders questionable the continuing vitality of this line of state cases for the reasons discussed above. 31 permitted in R-1 by special exception, the country club described at oral argument was one that would be on a par with a 450-family synagogue regularly hosting weddings and Bar and Bat Mitzvah services.[OA Trans. At 62, 68, 93]. But we cannot tell whether the Ordinance would permit such a club. The R-1 Residential District permits Outdoor Recreation by special exception.[1001a]. Outdoor recreation is then defined as follows: Public or private miniature golf courses, swimming pools, ball courts, tennis courts, ball fields, trails, and similar uses which are not enclosed in buildings and are operated on a commercial or membership basis, primarily for the use of patrons who do not reside on the same lot on premises. Outdoor recreation shall include any accessory use, such as snack bars, pro shops, club houses, country clubs, or similar uses which are designed and intended primarily for the use of patrons of the principal recreational use. Outdoor recreation shall not include amusement parks, open space recreational uses, overnight camping parks, or other uses specifically provided herein. (Emphasis added). [1098a]. This ordinance is not a model of clarity, but its text does not appear to permit full-scale country clubs. While country clubs are permitted within the meaning of outdoor recreation, when read in connection with the permitted outdoor recreation it seems that country clubs like those envisioned by the Congregation are not permitted. For example, the use permits miniature golf courses, not full-scale golf courses, which is a limitation that seems to restrict the possibility that any grand country club could or would locate in the R-1 Residential District. Rather, under the text of the Ordinance the type of country club permitted in the R-1 Residential District appears specifically designed to be an accessory use and, as such, to serve those uses listed in the sentence preceding the list of accessory uses, such as miniature golf courses, swimming pools, and tennis courts. Under this reading, the Congregation’s argument that such clubs could be used for 32 weddings and other celebrations would be inconsistent with the precise language of the Ordinance.6 But this argument, which depends on a rather crabbed characterization of country club, is less than fully convincing. At all events, because the ordinance is so poorly written that we cannot be sure what it means, we will remand so that the District Court can consider the similarity issue in the first instance. In consideration of this remand, we make a number of observations for the guidance of the District Court. First, we note that of the uses permitted by special exception in the R-1 Residential District, the country club comparison seems to be the only possible similarity. 7 We are mindful that in City of Cleburne, the different housing arrangements used for comparison were, essentially, multiple housing arrangements. It is hard to describe how one of the arrangements differed from the other insofar as its use was concerned. Clearly, as the similarity of use wanes, so too the inequality in treatment will be increasingly tolerated under the law. On the basis of the present record, it seems doubtful that the Congregation is similarly situated to the other uses permitted by special exception in R-1. Kennels, riding academies, and outdoor recreation facilities are very low-intense uses of land that preserve residential character. [1074a-75a, 1098a]. Train _________________________________________________________________ 6. We note, in this regard, that restaurants and clubs in general are not permitted either by right or by special exception in the R-1 Residential District. Rather, restaurants are permitted only in commercial districts, such as in the Town Commercial District [1007a], Special Commercial District [1010a], Planned Business Districts[1014a], Mixed Use Districts [1028a], and as an accessory use to a golf course [1097a]. Clubs are permitted in the Apartment-Office Districts [1018a], Mixed Use Districts [1028a], and Recreation/Conservation Districts[1036a]. Country clubs of the type conceived of by the Congregation, with full-scale golf courses, are permitted in the Community Service Districts by conditional use permit (where houses of worship are permitted by right), ApartmentOffice Districts, and Recreational/Conservation Districts by special exception. [1019a, 1036a]. 7. Although the notion that a country club and a synagogue are similarly situated at first seems counterintuitive, perhaps an explanation (beyond similarity of impacts) can be found. 33 stations and bus shelters are located adjacent to (usually long established) public rights of way which transport suburban commuters into Philadelphia and support regional transportation. [1108a]. Municipal complexes, emergency services, and utility facilities for sewers and electricity are indispensable to the health, safety, and administration of a residential community [1094a, 1108a]. All of these uses would appear to have functionally different purposes than the Congregation, and would seem compatible with a low-density residential neighborhood so as to represent a lower likelihood of generating negative secondary effects. In addition to the fact that the uses permitted by right or by special exception differ in scale and purpose from the Congregation, we note that the Congregation’s proposed use presents an intense use of the land, which the Township might determine was incompatible with its residential designation. Services and educational classes typically require a large number of people to arrive and leave by car at roughly the same time. As we previously observed, a municipality may chart out a quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. . . . The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where . . . the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. Village of Belle Terre, 446 U.S. at 9. As represented at oral argument by the Township, the Congregation stated at the initial proceeding before the ZHB that it had a membership of 207 families and predicted a growth to about 350 families. By the time the special exception hearing was held, the Congregation was willing to put a cap at 450 families. There is no doubt that the Congregation is growing, probably due to a popular rabbi. The Congregation may well grow larger. With a large and growing congregation comes increased traffic and noise. Indeed, at the special exception hearing, the Congregation reported that it would need to expand the existing parking lot to 137 spaces, but might need to make available an additional 54 spaces for reserve parking for heavy-use 34 occasions. [3904a]. This matter might well be considered by the District Court on remand.
Since we remand for resolution of the similarity of uses issue, we need not reach the ultimate rationality question, even though the District Court did so. We do however, offer some observations on that issue should the District Court need to revisit it. First, we note that there is no evidence of anti-Jewish or anti-religious animus in the record. Although such evidence is not necessary to sustain an equal protection violation, this court has stated that negative attitudes or biases, unfounded fears or speculation, prejudice, self-interest, or ignorance [are] arbitrary and irrational ends that warrant finding a statute unconstitutional. Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 685. Second, the facts of this case illustrate why religious uses may be, in some cases, incompatible with a place ofquiet seclusion. When conducting its Comprehensive Plan in 1992, the Township determined that institutional uses, such as schools, churches, and hospitals, have distinctive requirements that would best be addressed by placing them in particular districts. Specifically, the Township concluded that although these entities provide many benefits to the community, they also have specific use, space and locational requirements which are inherently different from other land categories . . . [and] necessitate[ ] a separate land use classification. [889a]. To that end, the CSCommunity Service District was established to meet the particular needs of churches and other institutions. [1024a]. In view of the enormously broad leeway afforded municipalities in making land use classifications, see discussion supra, it is strongly arguable that the Township’s decision to group churches together with schools, hospitals, and other institutions is rationally related to the needs of these entities, their impact on neighboring properties, and their inherent compatibility or incompatibility with adjoining uses. If so, the foregoing 35 standard of review in land use cases will be met. Such planning is the raison d’etre of zoning ordinances, and broad latitude is given to authorities that rationally conduct this municipal function. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-89 (The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement, will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity.). Finally, we do not believe land use planners can assume anymore that religious uses are inherently compatible with family and residential uses. See, e.g., Megachurches as Minitowns, NYT F1, F6 (May 9, 2002). Churches may be incompatible with residential zones, as they bring congestion; they generate traffic and create parking problems; they can cause a deterioration of property values in a residential zone . . . . Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 293 (1975). Thus, the District Court must refrain from making a blanket determination that religious institutions are inherently compatible, and, as argued by the Congregation, essential to residential zoning. See supra n.5. These matters need to be considered on remand as well.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and order of the District Court will be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The special exception granted by the ZHB and the land use permit issued by the Township are declared to be null and void. Parties to bear their own costs. A True Copy: Teste: Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 36