Opinion ID: 793659
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Elements

Text: 54 In order to convict for obstruction of justice under the omnibus clause of section 1503, the government must establish (1) that there is a pending judicial or grand jury proceeding constituting the administration of justice, (2) that the defendant knew or had notice of the proceeding, and (3) that the defendant acted with the wrongful intent or improper purpose to influence the judicial or grand jury proceeding, whether or not the defendant is successful in doing so — that is, that the defendant corruptly intended to impede the administration of that judicial proceeding. United States v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 447 (7th Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir.1995)); see also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). 55 In Aguilar, the Supreme Court charted the metes and bounds of the omnibus clause, expressly embossing a nexus limitation on the statute. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-600, 115 S.Ct. 2357. The nexus limitation is best understood as an articulation of the proof of wrongful intent that will satisfy the mens rea requirement of corruptly obstructing or endeavoring to obstruct. As used in the statute, the word corruptly is normally associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 2136, 161 L.Ed.2d 1008 (2005). In Aguilar, the Court noted that to prove the accused was corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct or impede a grand jury investigation, the government had to prove a connection between the defendant's intentional acts and the likelihood of potentially affecting the administration of justice: 56 The action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court's or grand jury's authority. United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (C.A.9 1982) (citing cases). Some courts have phrased this showing as a nexus requirement — that the act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings. United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (C.A.10 1993); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679, and n. 12 (C.A.3 1975). 57 In other words, the endeavor must have the 'natural and probable effect' of interfering with the due administration of justice. Wood, supra, at 695; . . . This is not to say that the defendant's actions need be successful; an endeavor suffices. . . . But as in Pettibone [ v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893)], if the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct. 58 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. 59 Applying this standard, the Court struck down the obstruction of justice conviction of a United States District Court judge who provided false statements to an investigating agent where the agent had not been subpoenaed or otherwise directed to appear before the grand jury. Id. at 601, 115 S.Ct. 2357. The Court vacated the conviction because the false statements could not be said to have the `natural and probable effect' of interfering with the due administration of justice. Id. The Court came to this conclusion even though the lied-to agent had represented to Aguilar that, in substance, the grand jury might hear evidence related to Aguilar's attempt to thwart its investigation. See id. at 595-97, 600, 115 S.Ct. 2357; see also Arthur Andersen LLP, 125 S.Ct. at 2136-37 (discussing Aguilar ). 60 The touchstone for the nexus requirement, therefore, is an act taken that would have the natural and probable effect of interfering with a judicial or grand jury proceeding that constitutes the administration of justice; that is, the act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. In the context of a grand jury subpoena, this rule limits criminal liability to cases where the defendant has notice that his wrongful conduct will affect the administration of justice, because false information will be provided to a grand jury or otherwise pertinent information known to be called for by a grand jury may be placed beyond its reach. Cf. id. A defendant's awareness that a subpoena seeks documents, coupled with his actions taken to place those documents beyond the grand jury's reach clearly would meet the hemming function of the nexus requirement. The defendant need not read the grand jury subpoena or know its precise contents; it is enough if he knows that a subpoena calls for a category of documents, or even one particular document, and then takes steps to place those documents beyond the reach of the grand jury. 19 61