Opinion ID: 1674429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: is the manslaughter statute under which mayfield was charged unconstitutionally vague?

Text: Mayfield contends that Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-47 (1972), the manslaughter statute under which he was charged, is unconstitutionally vague since it, in his words, contains no ascertainable standards from which an objective determination can be made as to whether one's activities constitute `culpable negligence.' This assignment of error is specious. First, this Court has traced the parameters of the term culpable negligence again and again during the twenty years since the legislature enacted § 97-3-47. Mayfield will not be heard to argue that he had no notice of what culpable negligence entails. Mayfield further contends that even if the statute itself is constitutional, his conviction must be overturned since the jury was not instructed concerning what specific acts would constitute culpable negligence. If Mayfield had been convicted of manslaughter by culpable negligence, then his argument might have some persuasive force. In the instant case, however, Mayfield was acquitted on the two manslaughter charges. The issue of whether the jury instructions concerning manslaughter by culpable negligence are impermissibly vague is therefore moot.