Opinion ID: 2999425
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Investigation into Demain

Text: Finally, Adams alleges that Fiske acted unreasonably when he failed to locate and call Demain as a witness. As we 14 No. 05-1573 have noted repeatedly, a lawyer owes his client “ ‘a duty to make reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary,’ and a failure to investigate can certainly constitute ineffective assistance.” Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 631 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691); See also Harris, 365 F.3d at 555-56; Brown, 304 F.3d at 691. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded that Fiske reasonably chose to limit investigations into Demain because he had decided not to call any defense witnesses as part of his strategy. Adams, 2002 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1214, at -6. We disagree. The “failure to investigate a particular lead may be excused if a lawyer has made a ‘reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’ ” Washington, 219 F.3d at 631 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). “In our assessment of counsel’s actions, we evaluate counsel’s conduct from the perspective at the time the decision was made to forgo the investigation.” Brown, 304 F.3d at 692. Here, Fiske made an unreasonable decision not to investigate Demain because Fiske possessed knowledge, before the trial, that Demain could have swung the case in his client’s favor.5 Fiske knew that Demain, like Sheets, appeared throughout all accounts of the events, both before the assault and after, and thus was a witness to several key moments in the 5 As stated previously (and which will be discussed below), the trial that resulted in Adams’s conviction was actually the second trial in this matter. In the first trial, the state presented all of its evidence, but the district court granted a mistrial based on an improper amendment of the charges after the close of the evidence. No. 05-1573 15 chronology. Unlike any other witness, Demain had no prior relationship with either the men or S.E.S., thus rendering him impartial and independent. Demain could explain what occurred in his room prior to the sexual encounter, including whether he heard the women invite the men to visit their room and what happened when S.E.S. left his room. Further, the police report, which Adams’s attorney reviewed as part of his preparations, contained a statement from Demain that he witnessed S.E.S. downstairs with the three men after the time of the sexual encounter. Demain, therefore, appeared to be a witness who could shed considerable, perhaps conclusive, light on the events of that night. Demain gained added importance given Fiske’s unique, and enviable, position of having seen the state’s entire case against his client. As mentioned, the initial trial of Adams, Henley, and Hill ended in a mistrial after the presentation of the state’s case because of the state’s improper attempt to amend a pleading. Fiske and the other attorneys witnessed a dress rehearsal of the state’s case and could prepare accordingly before the second trial. Fiske knew that Sheets and S.E.S. did not agree on whether the women invited the men up to their room before the sexual encounter. Demain, who was in the room at the time, could have resolved this dispute in Sheets’s favor, and thus completely undercut S.E.S.’s version of uninvited strangers bursting into her room. Moreover, Fiske reviewed the police report that indicated that Demain saw S.E.S. with the men later that night. This would seem to strongly contradict S.E.S.’s story of a sexual assault, the men quickly leaving the scene, and S.E.S. calling her boyfriend immediately following the alleged rape. Instead, this would support a plausible theory of a consensual encounter between the men and S.E.S., thus damaging the state’s theory of the case. 16 No. 05-1573 Demain was not an irrelevant bystander. Rather, he was present at two crucial events where the evidence is sharply conflicting. Given the testimony at the first trial, it was essential that Demain be found in order to determine what he saw and heard before informed decisions about strategy (no defense witnesses) could be made. Although Fiske made minimal attempts to locate Demain, when the initial attempts failed, he let the matter drop. Fiske did not hire an investigator, and his total efforts were comprised of asking witnesses and the University Demain’s location. As Luchsinger, the co-defendant’s counsel, admitted during a postconviction proceeding, he and Fiske had no real strategic reason for their decision not to call Demain besides “that we were not going to present a defense and ride that horse, hoping that no defense would carry, would outweigh the advantages of a favorable witness.” Despite the fact that Fiske had the benefit of hearing the prosecution’s case before a mistrial, knew the relevant inconsistencies in the stories, and was aware that Demain had information about these crucial facts and could resolve these key points in his client’s favor, he chose not to track down Demain because he had already decided not to call witnesses in the second trial. This knowing disregard was unreasonable. See Washington at 631. Fiske committed to a predetermined strategy without a reasonable investigation that could have produced a pivotal witness. Therefore we find that the conclusion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (that Fiske’s decision not to call defense witnesses without first locating and interviewing Demain was reasonable trial strategy) was not a reasonable application of the first prong of Strickland. No. 05-1573 17 Turning to the second prong of the Strickland analysis,6 we ask whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for Fiske’s error, the trial result would be different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. As mentioned previously, a reasonable probability is one undermining our confidence in an outcome. See id. at 694. In this case, Adams has established prejudice from the failure to investigate and call Demain. This was a very close case, and its outcome was highly contingent on the credibility of S.E.S. Looking at Demain’s testimony in Hill’s trial (and in the police report), he was able to place S.E.S. with the men smoking cigarettes after the alleged assault. He also testified that the women left with two of the men and that they were going to the women’s dorm room. In addition, he testified that the third man, Hill, stayed behind for about thirty minutes playing a video game. This could have helped explain why S.E.S. encountered Hill on the stairs after her closed-door conversation with Sheets. Such testimony completely contradicts S.E.S.’s description of the events of that night. Nor can we blind ourselves to the results of Hill’s trials. Hill, who was charged with precisely the same offenses as Henley and Adams, was tried in February 2001 and presented Demain’s testimony. This trial resulted in a hung jury. Eventually, the charges against Hill were dismissed at a later trial because of the prosecution’s failure to turn over police notes regarding their investigation. We do not contend that the result from Hill’s trial would necessarily dictate the same result had Fiske investigated Demain. But the outcome of that trial, together with Demain’s testimony and the relatively thin evidence presented at Adams’s trial, does undermine 6 As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded that counsel’s actions regarding Demain were reasonable, it did not, nor was required to, inquire into prejudice. 18 No. 05-1573 our confidence in the outcome, such that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Adams’s trial would be different.