Opinion ID: 2188935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: meaning of being one of these departments

Text: The specific question we must answer is whether respondent, because he is both a state senator and an associate professor at a state college, is a person ... being one of these departments who exercises any power properly belonging to either of the other departments. Respondent does not dispute the fact that, as a senator, he exercises the powers of the legislative branch. Rather, he contends that an assistant professor at a state college is not an executive officer and does not exercise any power properly belonging to the executive and that, therefore, holding the two positions does not offend the dual services prohibition of article II. While, as discussed earlier, the officer-employee distinction is relevant to the question of whether quo warranto is applicable, it is not determinative of the issue now under consideration, for article II does not speak in terms of officers or employees; it speaks of persons being one of the branches of government. This is the first time we have been asked to determine the scope of the dual services prohibition. Our determination is dependent in part upon the meaning of the phrase being one of these departments. In conducting our study we are bound by the cardinal rule that courts must apply and enforce the Constitution as it is written. Moreover, constitutional provisions are not open to construction as a matter of course; construction of a constitutional provision is appropriate only when it has been demonstrated that the meaning of the provision is not clear and that construction is necessary. In re Application A-16642, 236 Neb. 671, 463 N.W.2d 591 (1990). If a constitutional provision must be construed, its words are to be interpreted in their most natural and obvious sense, although they should receive a more liberal construction than statutes and are not subject to rules of strict construction. State ex rel. Spire v. Public Emp. Ret. Bd., 226 Neb. 176, 410 N.W.2d 463 (1987). The unusual expression being one of these departments is not clear; accordingly, construction is necessary. One thing that is clear, however, is that being one of these departments is not intended to be synonymous with exercising any power of a branch. Had such identity of meaning been intended, identical language would surely have been used. That is what was done by the framers of the Constitutions of Colorado (Colo. Const. art. III), Idaho (Idaho Const. art. II, § 1), Montana (Mont. Const. art. III, § 1), New Mexico (N.M. Const. art. III, § 1), Virginia (Va. Const. art. III, § 1), West Virginia (W.Va. Const. art. V, § 1), and Wyoming (Wyo. Const. art. II, § 1). The Oregon Supreme Court has refused to read the terms functions and duties in the separation of powers provision of that jurisdiction's Constitution as being synonymous for the same reason. See Monaghan v. School District No. 1, 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797 (1957). The language of a constitutional provision is to be interpreted with reference to established laws, usage, and customs of the country at the time of its adoption, but its terms and provisions are constantly expanded and enlarged by construction to meet the advancing affairs of humankind. In re Application A-16642, supra. With this in mind, we turn to the historical record and examine the evolution of the relevant provisions of our Constitution. Article II was adopted as part of the Constitution of 1875. Normally, we would turn to the debates of the relevant convention as part of our search for clarification of ambiguous constitutional language. Unfortunately, the proceedings of the 1875 Constitutional Convention are lost. See, 1 Neb. Const. Convs. 7 (1906); Jaksha v. State, 222 Neb. 690, 385 N.W.2d 922 (1986); State ex rel. Johnson v. Chase, 147 Neb. 758, 25 N.W.2d 1 (1946). We thus cannot avail ourselves of the debates of that convention and must look elsewhere to determine the intent of the framers of the phrase at issue. Notwithstanding that the journal of the 1875 convention has survived, it is of little help. It merely indicates that article II was the last provision to be adopted by the convention, apparently with little or no debate. 3 Neb. Const. Convs. 672 (1913). A provision identical to article II, however, was a part of the proposed Constitution of 1871. Although that Constitution was rejected by the people, many of its provisions, including what was to become article II, found their way unchanged into the 1875 Constitution. The drafters of the Constitution of 1871 were influenced by the Constitution recently adopted by Illinois, see, e.g., 1 Neb. Const. Convs. 522 (1906) and 2 Neb. Const. Convs. 359 (1907), and some provisions, including that which was to become article II, appear to have been taken verbatim from that document. Compare, e.g., Neb. Const. 1871 Preamble; art. I, §§ 3, 7, 9, 10, 14-17, and 24; and art. II with Ill. Const. 1870 Preamble; art. II, §§ 3, 7, 9, 10, 14-17, and 20; and art. III. Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600, 149 N.E. 526 (1925), determined that the Illinois provision prohibited a member of the state Legislature from receiving compensation for acting as a deputy and assistant to the Attorney General. In so ruling, the Illinois Supreme Court stated at 604-06, 149 N.E. at 528: By this provision the people intended to provide, and did provide, a complete separation of the branches and completely deprived a member of one branch of authority to exercise any power properly belonging to the other two branches. Under the constitution of 1818 nearly all the important offices of government were filled by an election on joint ballot of the two houses of the legislature, alone. This system gave rise to injurious combinations affecting legislation and combining the departments of government. In forming the constitution of 1848 one of the things sought was to prevent the performance of duties and exercise of powers in one department of government by members of either of the other departments. In order that this might be brought about there was inserted in that constitution, as article 2, a provision in effect the same as article 3 of the present constitution [the provision identical to our own article II].... ... The language is plain that no person of one department shall exercise any power properly belonging to another department of the State government.... The appellant contends that the above provision [article 3] can apply only to cases where a member of one department acts as an officer in another department, and not to one acting in a purely ministerial capacity. There is no language in the article which limits the application of it to persons of one department acting as officers of another department. The language is, no person shall exercise any power properly belonging to another department, and the simple question arises here, Did the appellant, in the service performed, exercise any of the powers of the executive department of the State government? Thus, Illinois considered the phrase being one of these departments to mean being a member of one of these departments, and the distinction between officer and employee was not relevant to that portion of the inquiry. This reading is not, however, the interpretation Illinois has since given Saxby. In 1960, Illinois held that article III of that state's Constitution did not apply to legislators performing purely ministerial duties. See The People v. Capuzi, 20 Ill.2d 486, 170 N.E.2d 625 (1960). The Capuzi court focused on the following language in Saxby and apparently ignored the language we quoted earlier: It may readily be conceived that one who serves as an investigator merely, collecting facts, and who thereby prepares himself to become a witness in a lawsuit, or who engages in similar service, is not exercising powers peculiar to the department of government by which he is employed, and is not, therefore, within the inhibition of article 3 of the constitution, though he may be a member of the different department of government. This is so because such employee exercises no powers of a department in which he works. The People v. Capuzi, supra at 492-93, 170 N.E.2d at 629 (quoting Saxby, supra ). From this, the Capuzi court concluded that a member of one coordinate branch who was employed by a second branch but did not exercise the powers of the second branch did not fall within the constitutional provision. The Capuzi court did not, however, question Saxby's reading of being one of these departments as meaning being a member of such a branch. The question on which it appears to have focused was whether a state legislator who also held a ministerial position under the judicial branch exercised the powers of the judiciary. The Capuzi court did not consider whether the judicial employee exercised the powers of the Legislature. Because it failed to consider this second question, Capuzi treated being one of these departments as synonymous with exercising the powers of a branch. While we would not presume to take issue with the Illinois Supreme Court's reading of its own precedents or its interpretation of the Constitution of its state, we do find the Capuzi analysis unsatisfactory when applied to our Constitution. This jurisdiction requires that its Constitution, as amended, be read as a whole. Jaksha v. State, 222 Neb. 690, 385 N.W.2d 922 (1986); Elmen v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Neb. 141, 231 N.W. 772 (1930). There are three provisions in the Nebraska Constitution which relate to the ability of an individual to hold more than one position under the authority of the state. The first is article II set out above. The other two are Neb. Const. art. III, § 9, and art. IV, § 2. While article II has remained unchanged since it was first adopted in 1875, over the years the people have modified the other two provisions. Since the Constitution must be read in connection with the facts of history and development of the representational form of government, see Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972), a brief overview of these changes is in order. Under the Constitution of 1866, Neb. Const. art. III, § 15, provided: No member of congress, or other person holding office under the authority of this state, or of the United States, shall execute the office of governor, except as herein provided. This provision was replaced by article V, § 2, in 1875, which expanded the disqualification to cover all executive officers, but removed the bar for federal officers. The relevant portion of the provision read as follows: None of the officers of the executive department shall be eligible to any other state office during the period for which they shall have been elected. In the past, we have given this provision broad application, holding that it prevented the Lieutenant Governor from seeking the nomination of his party for the post of Governor. See State, ex rel. McKelvie, v. Wait, 95 Neb. 806, 146 N.W. 1048 (1914). The 1920 amendments to the Constitution expanded the executive branch, and the disqualification contained in article V, § 2 (which became the present article IV, § 2), was expanded correspondingly, to wit: None of the officers mentioned in this article shall be eligible to any other state office during the period for which they have been elected or appointed. This section was again amended in 1962, expressly permitting the Lieutenant Governor to be eligible to be a candidate for Governor. In 1966, article IV, § 2, was amended into its present form. The exception for the Lieutenant Governor was removed, and the second sentence was changed to read: None of the appointive officers mentioned in this article shall be eligible to any other state office during the period for which they have been appointed. (Emphasis supplied.) This change appears to have been effected in order to permit all the elective executive officers to be eligible as candidates for other executive positions. The strictures of article IV, § 2, operate as a prohibition against appointive executive officers' holding other positions in the executive or any other branch of state government. In this respect, article IV, § 2, is somewhat broader than the prohibition of article II against holding positions in different branches, although, since article IV, § 2, is applicable only to appointive executive officers, it is, in that respect, narrower than article II. The earliest predecessor of article III, § 9, which prohibits dual office holding by legislators, was Neb. Const. art. II, § 14, of the Constitution of 1866: No person being a member of congress, or holding any military or civil office under the United States, shall be eligible to a seat in the legislature; and if any person shall, after his election as a member of the legislature, be elected to congress, or be appointed to any office, civil or military, under the government of the United States, his acceptance thereof shall vacate his seat. The analogous provision adopted in 1875 as article III, § 6, was much broader; the disability extended not only to those holding office under the authority of the United States, but also to those holding any lucrative office under the authority of the state: No person holding office under the authority of the United States, or any lucrative office under the authority of this state, shall be eligible to or have a seat in the legislature; but this provision shall not extend to precinct or township officers, justices of the peace, notaries public, or officers of the militia; nor shall any person interested in a contract with, or an unadjusted claim against the state, hold a seat in the legislature. That the framers thought it necessary to provide an explicit exception for precinct or township officers, justices of the peace, notaries public, or officers of the militia indicates that the disqualification of the holder of any lucrative office under the authority of this state was intended to have broad scope. Clearly, the framers did not envision it as applying only to constitutional officers. In 1972, this disqualification was again expanded. The exceptions for justices of the peace, notaries public, and precinct, township, and militia officers were dropped and a new disqualification was added. The provision (renumbered as article III, § 9, in 1920) now reads: No person holding office under the authority of the United States, or any lucrative office under the authority of this state, shall be eligible to, or have a seat in the Legislature. No person elected or appointed to the Legislature shall receive any civil appointment to a state office while holding membership in the Legislature or while the Legislature is in session, and all such appointments shall be void. This review of the evolution of article III, § 9, shows a continuing expansion in the disqualification placed upon legislators' holding other government positions. With that in mind, we return to the language of article II. If the phrase being one of were to be construed as if it read, acting in the capacity of, the relevant passage would declare that no person or collection of persons [acting in the capacity of] one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others. Under such a construction, a violation of the personnel aspect of article II would occur only if an individual simultaneously serving more than one branch discharged his or her multibranch duties at one and the same time. Such a reading would thus leave article III, § 9, dealing with the legislative branch, and article IV, § 2, dealing with the executive branch, as the only bans against multibranch office holding. The problem with such a construction is that there would then be no constitutional prohibition against a member of the judiciary's serving as an elected executive officer, so long as that person did not discharge the duties arising from the two positions at the same time. This would be so because the article on the judiciary, article V, contains no provisions analogous to article III, § 9, and article IV, § 2. While article III, § 9, prohibits sitting judges from serving in the Legislature, article IV, § 2, only applies to appointive executive officers. Thus, there would be no constitutional prohibition against, for example, a single individual's serving as both Chief Justice and Attorney General. Clearly, the framers did not contemplate such a bizarre result. Indeed, the development of the prohibitions now found in article III, § 9, and article IV, § 2, evidences an expanding constitutional predisposition against multibranch public service. The continual expansion of these restrictions via amendments to the Constitution demonstrates the intention of both the framers and the body politic that such restrictions be interpreted broadly. Thus, the relevant provision of article II cannot be construed as meaning no person or collection of persons [exercising any power of] one of these departments, as respondent suggests, but, rather, must be read as construed in Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600, 149 N.E. 526 (1925): no person or collection of persons being [a member of] one of these departments. As a consequence, article II prohibits one who exercises the power of one branch that is, an officer in the broader sense of the wordfrom being a memberthat is, either an officer or employeeof another branch. Is respondent a member of one branch exercising the power of another? There are two formulations this question can take: (1) Is the respondent, as an assistant professor of a state college, a member of the executive branch, and does he exercise any powers of the Legislature? or (2) Is the respondent, as a state senator, a member of the legislative branch, and does he exercise any powers of the executive? If the answer to either of these formulations is yes, then respondent, by holding both positions, is in violation of article II.