Opinion ID: 2534384
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DeNardo's prior claims and the stipulated dismissal

Text: DeNardo's original and amended complaints in his first state court action, Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI, alleged, among other causes of action, claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. They also stated that Calista and ANI sexually discriminated against DeNardo, although the complaints did not explicitly refer to AS 18.80. The discrimination claim relied on the same facts as the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. We have held that the pleadings of pro se litigants should be held to less stringent standards than those of lawyers. [11] This proposition reflects a policy against finding unintended waiver of claims in technically defective pleadings filed by pro se litigants. [12] We therefore conclude that DeNardo's complaints in Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI encompassed a statutory state-law based sex discrimination claim even though they did not refer specifically to AS 18.80. [13] Alaska Statute 18.80.220(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate unjustifiably against a person because of the person's sex. [14] The dissent argues at 336-37 that DeNardo's position on appeal, which disavows any intent to assert a claim under AS 18.80 in his original state complaint, precludes us from reading that complaint as encompassing such a claim. The dissent's discussion of DeNardo's complaint and the stipulation might be compelling if DeNardo had been represented by counsel. But given the leniency with which we interpret the pleadings of pro se litigants, we think that focusing on DeNardo's current understanding of his original pleadings is misplaced. A pro se litigant's interpretation of his own complaint need not be determinative of what it actually pleads; the court must exercise its independent judgment in determining what claims the complaint's words assert. DeNardo's recitation of facts and use of the term sexually discriminated in his first complaint establish that it pleaded a AS 18.80 claim, his post hoc explanation of his pleading intentions notwithstanding. [15] Although DeNardo's present interpretation of his first complaint is not determinative of what claims that complaint alleged, his contemporaneous understanding of the meaning of the stipulation for dismissal is relevant to its interpretation. As to this issue, DeNardo contends on appeal that he understood the stipulation to preserve his claims then pending in federal court. DeNardo's federal complaint in Case No. A00-309-CV asserted state-law based claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as federal-law based claims of discrimination. The federal complaint alleged the same facts pleaded in the state law discrimination claim in Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI; the complaint in Case No. A00-309-CV therefore should be read to include the same claims as the complaint in Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI. For that reason, and given our leniency in interpreting the pleadings of pro se litigants, [16] we read the federal complaint in Case No. A00-309-CV to have asserted: (1) a federally based discrimination claim, (2) a state-law based discrimination claim, and (3) state-law based negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. The claims asserted in that federal action are important, given the terms of the stipulation for dismissal signed by the parties in Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI. To determine the res judicata effect of the stipulated dismissal, it is necessary to determine the stipulation's effect. After the first state action was removed to federal court and then remanded to the superior court, the parties signed the stipulation dismissing Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI with prejudice. [17] Res judicata applies if: (1) a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) has rendered final judgment on the merits, and (3) the same cause of action and same parties or their privies were involved in both suits. [18] In Plumber v. University of Alaska Anchorage we discussed whether a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice could give rise to res judicata: [A] stipulation to dismiss claims with prejudice is sufficient for res judicata purposes: [A] stipulation [to dismiss claims with prejudice] is just as valid as a final judgment resulting from a trial on the merits, and is res judicata as to all issues that were raised or could have been determined under the pleadings.[ [19] ] There is no dispute that the first and third requirements for res judicata are present here. The parties do not dispute the superior court's jurisdiction in the first state action. It is also undisputed that the parties in both the first state action and the present action included DeNardo, Calista, and ANI, and that causes of action are the same in both lawsuits. But there is a dispute concerning the second requirement. The parties do not dispute that the superior court rendered a final judgment on the merits when it granted the stipulation to dismiss with prejudice in Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI, but they disagree about what claims the dismissal actually resolved. [20] Res judicata based on a stipulated dismissal does not prevent a plaintiff from bringing a cause of action that was expressly reserved for later adjudication. [21] A stipulation may reserve a claim for later litigation, and courts will not construe the stipulation to waive rights not plainly intended to be relinquished. [22] We recognize that courts look with favor on stipulations designed to simplify, shorten or settle litigation, or to save costs and will not give such stipulations a forced construction. [23] Moreover, the language purporting to reserve a claim must be explicit, so that `the parties not only ha[ve] an opportunity to dicker over the language, but [are] thereafter on notice about which claims were reserved and which were not.' Blanket reservations of rights will not suffice. [24] We therefore turn to the stipulation to determine which claims DeNardo preserved. Defendants' counsel drafted the stipulation in Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI, and DeNardo and defendants' attorney signed it on April 27, 2001. The first paragraph stated that the claims asserted by [DeNardo] in [Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI] ... against all defendants are dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice. But the second paragraph stated that [t]his stipulation does not affect plaintiff's claims against Calista Corporation and Alaska Newspapers, Inc. in ... A00-309 Civ...., currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska. Therefore, even though DeNardo agreed in the first paragraph to a dismissal with prejudice of the claims he had asserted in his first state court action, the second paragraph preserved his claims against Calista and ANI then pending in federal court as of April 27, when the parties signed the stipulation. The claims then pending in federal court included claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and discrimination. The stipulation is ambiguous, because it did not clearly explain how to resolve claims that were pending, as of April 27, 2001, in both state and federal court, i.e., claims encompassed by both the first and second paragraphs of the stipulation. The dissent correctly notes that a dismissal with prejudice usually bars a plaintiff from refiling the same claim in the same court. [25] But given the ambiguity introduced by the stipulation's second paragraph, we cannot conclude that the first paragraph's dismissal of claims with prejudice bars this action before we resolve which claims the stipulation dismisses and which claims it preserves. We conclude, for three reasons, that the stipulation should not be read to foreclose the claims reserved by the second paragraph. First, we hold pro se litigants to less stringent standards. [26] Second, we construe the ambiguous terms of the document contrary to the preparer of the document, Calista's counsel. [27] Third, we interpret waiver language narrowly. [28] This reading does not render the stipulation a nullity from its inception; when the parties entered into the stipulation, the federal court had not yet ruled that Calista was not an employer. Parties entering into the stipulation could have rationally assumed that the federal court, in resolving the Title VII claim, would also resolve the pendant emotional distress claims. Given the litigation history of the employment dispute, parties could have rationally thought it was desirable to attempt to resolve all remaining claims, including the Title VII claim and the state law claims, in a single forum in a single proceeding. Two circumstances might justify a different outcome. First, the policy of favoring stipulations to simplify or settle litigation favors reading the two paragraphs in a way that avoids conflict. Second, extrinsic evidence might help resolve the apparent ambiguity: DeNardo's April 20, 2001 offer to enter into a stipulation implies that he was willing to dismiss his entire state court action; it stated that he wished only to maintain the prosecution of his Title VII action in the federal court. The text of his dismissal offer would support a conclusion that he only intended to prevent a stipulated state court dismissal from interfering with the federal court proceeding (perhaps through any res judicata effect the proposed dismissal could have on the federal action). This would support a conclusion that the reservation in the stipulation was not necessarily intended to permit DeNardo to begin a new state court action asserting claims that were in the federal court only through exercise of that court's pendant jurisdiction. But the stipulation's reservation was not as limited as DeNardo's offer. Furthermore, the stipulation explicitly preserved DeNardo's claims then pending in federal court, [29] not the forum where those claims were then pending. That the stipulation described the claims to be preserved as those then pending in the federal court did not preclude their later adjudication in state court. Instead, because the stipulation did not state that the preserved claims would be barred in state court if they were not finally adjudicated in federal court, it did not designate the federal court as the exclusive forum for the preserved claims. Despite the apparent dismissal with prejudice of the disputed claims in state court, their dismissal in state court was without prejudice because they were among the pending federal claims expressly preserved. The dissent argues at 337 that we err by giving DeNardo relief on unraised substantive grounds that differ substantially from the issues that the parties actually briefed. In our view, DeNardo raised the grounds on which our holding rests when he asserted in his opening brief that the second paragraph of the stipulation preserved all claims then pending in federal court. Because DeNardo's first state court complaint and his federal complaint both included AS 18.80 claims and the stipulation preserved all claims in DeNardo's federal complaint, we conclude that the stipulation does not prevent DeNardo from litigating his AS 18.80 claim in state court.