Opinion ID: 3190115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Production of Records

Text: Gemma next argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to compel the production of classified DCF records. The Court reviews the denial of a defendant's discovery motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cartagena, 593 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 2010).4 Prior to trial, Gemma requested the production of records in the possession of DCF. A magistrate judge denied the motion, finding that Gemma had failed to show that the requested records were relevant or to describe the documents with any specificity. In addition, the magistrate judge noted that, to the extent the DCF records contained information regarding prior instances of A.L. engaging in prostitution, such information might not be admissible because Federal Rule of Evidence 412(a)(1) prohibits the admission of 'evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior' in a case involving allegations of sexual misconduct. Gemma thereafter filed a renewed motion for production in which he argued that the exclusion of evidence that A.L. had previously engaged in prostitution before meeting him would 4 Because neither party requests de novo review, the question of whether this standard would apply is waived. Cf. United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2015) ([W]e review interpretations of law de novo, including whether an evidentiary ruling violates a defendant's constitutional rights.). - 15 - violate his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to confront her by cross-examination and to have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. After reviewing a set of records submitted ex parte and under seal, the court ordered the government to disclose an email from a social worker that discussed an incident involving A.L. The email stated that another young woman who had been on the run with A.L. told this social worker that A.L. had been wandering the streets offering to sleep with men in exchange for a place to stay. At trial, A.L. denied these statements and testified that she did not remember the names of the other two young women she was with at the time. The defendant then moved for disclosure of records identifying these two young women. The court denied the motion, calling it speculative that additional evidence would become available and noting that the defense already had an opportunity to cross-examine A.L. about the issue. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 412(a), evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior is generally prohibited in a criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct. This rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details. Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee's note to 1994 amendment. Rule 412(b)(1)(C) provides an - 16 - exception for evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional rights. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974). Supreme Court cases construing the (confrontation) clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965). Additionally, the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to a fair trial, and courts have long interpreted this standard of fairness to require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). In order to protect this right, [a] defendant has a constitutionally protected privilege to request and obtain from the prosecution evidence that is either material to the guilt of the defendant or relevant to the punishment to be imposed. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Less clear . . . is the extent to which the Due Process Clause imposes on the government the additional responsibility of guaranteeing criminal defendants access to exculpatory evidence beyond the government's possession. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 486. On appeal, Gemma challenges the court's denial of his request for the production of additional evidence pertaining to A.L.'s alleged prior prostitution. We can find no error. First, - 17 - the evidence sought is either entirely irrelevant or of such slight probative value in comparison to its prejudicial effect that a decision to exclude it would not violate Gemma's constitutional rights. A number of other circuits have held that evidence of prior prostitution is irrelevant to a charge under § 1591(a), and thus is properly barred. See United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Roy, 781 F.3d 416, 420 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Valenzuela, 495 F. App'x 817, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). Gemma contends that he did not force A.L. into prostitution and that evidence of her prior sexual behavior would shore up his cause. Not so. The victim's participation in prostitution either before or after the time period in the indictment has no relevance to whether [Gemma] beat her, threatened her, and took the money she made from prostitution in order to cause her to engage in commercial sex. Roy, 781 F.3d at 420. Nor is Gemma's contention significantly strengthened by shifting away from a coercion basis for criminal liability. Because the victim[] [was a] minor[] and could not legally consent, the government did not need to prove the elements of fraud, force, or coercion, which are required for adult victims. Instead, the government was only required to prove [Gemma] knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, or obtained a minor, knowing the minor would be caused to engage in commercial sex acts. - 18 - United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Moreover, even if we were to accept Gemma's contention that the evidence had some probative value with respect to his relationship with A.L., the balance of probative and prejudicial effect is such that the court's decision could hardly be said to have violated his constitutional rights. See id. In this case, there was no dispute that A.L. engaged in prostitution; the only question was whether Gemma acted as her pimp. Rather than evincing Gemma's intent at the time of the offense, introducing A.L.'s alleged acts of prior prostitution would have only strengthened Gemma's hand by reinforcing a narrative that A.L. acted consistent with prior sexual behavior. This evidence and line of reasoning falls squarely within a class deemed so extremely prejudicial as to warrant special treatment under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Second, this is not a case wherein a discrete piece of identified evidence was deemed inadmissible by the district court; rather, this is a case where the defendant's request for additional discovery was denied. As the district court noted, this rendered the defendant's request more speculative than specific and weakened an already attenuated basis for his motion. Finally, the requested evidence was not only speculative and likely inadmissible, but bordered on cumulative. As the court - 19 - emphasized, the defense already had an opportunity to crossexamine A.L. about her alleged acts of prior prostitution. This is arguably more than Gemma was entitled to in the first place. In sum, Gemma has a right to cross-examine the witnesses against him and a right to present a complete defense, but these do not create an auxiliary right to have all discovery and evidentiary rulings turn in his favor. If Gemma was deprived of anything, it was the opportunity to seek unspecified and presumably inadmissible evidence to engage in additional cross examination on a topic of questionable relevance to begin with.5