Opinion ID: 537614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the leftover pieces

Text: 20 We address, albeit briefly, two additional pieces which appellant claims must be fitted into the puzzle. In our view, neither has any legitimate place in this exercise. 21
22 The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment demands that criminal statutes put persons on notice of criminally proscribed behavior with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2204, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). Similarly, citizens should not have to wonder at the meaning of penalty provisions. See United States v. Colon-Ortiz, 866 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1966, 104 L.Ed.2d 434 (1989). 23 Although acknowledging that the statutes in question are not a model of legislative draftsmanship, we do not think that the statutory scheme is so tenebrous as to fail constitutional muster. The enactments, although they require some study, are quite definite. They consistently adjure post-confinement monitoring for those who transgress what was formerly section 841(b)(1)(B). And, the functional equivalence of special parole and supervised release eliminates any possibility of cognizable confusion. Under the former mechanism, the Parole Commission is charged with responsibility for a defendant's post-confinement oversight, whereas the sentencing court is the monitoring agency under the latter mechanism. Otherwise, the similarities are striking. In both cases, the probation department performs the task of actually keeping tabs on the offender. At least two circuits have indicated that the variations between special parole and supervised release present only a distinction without a difference. United States v. Molina-Uribe, 853 F.2d 1193, 1198 (5th Cir.1988) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1145, 103 L.Ed.2d 205 (1989); United States v. Smith, 840 F.2d at 890 n. 3. Whether or not that is literally so, the modalities bear such a strong family resemblance that forewarning a defendant as to one is tantamount to forewarning him as to the other. 5 24 Individuals are entitled to fair notice of the criminal consequences of felonious activities--not necessarily letter perfect notice. In this instance, the pieces of the puzzle, once arranged sequentially, form an unmistakable picture: no matter how a person of ordinary intellect might read the statutory mosaic, he would assuredly have known that a mandatory interval of post-confinement monitoring would follow a sentence imposed under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1984), even for an offense perpetrated during the hiatus period. The penalty provision was sufficiently well defined to meet the constitutional minima. 25
26 Appellant's suggestion that the rule of lenity should rescue him from the toils of special parole is a meritless endeavor to squeeze a square piece into a curved space. 27 Under the rule of lenity, a [c]ourt will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178, 79 S.Ct. 209, 214, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958). But, an indispensable condition for the rule's operation is statutory ambiguity. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980). The doctrine is not invoked until a court, [a]fter 'seiz[ing] every thing from which [legislative intent] can be derived ... [is] left with an ambiguous statute'. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971) (citation omitted). 28 In this case, the amendments, howsoever read, do not meaningfully increase the applicable penalty. Furthermore, guesswork is unnecessary: it appears beyond question that Congress meant to subject defendants sentenced under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1986) to a period of post-confinement monitoring; and it also appears with clarity enough that Congress' intent was to continue to require a special parole term vis-a-vis what would have been section 841(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1984) offenses perpetrated during the hiatus period. Accordingly, the rule of lenity is inapposite. See Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387, 100 S.Ct. at 2252; Bass, 404 U.S. at 347, 92 S.Ct. at 522; United States v. Noe, 634 F.2d 860, 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 876, 102 S.Ct. 355, 70 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981).