Opinion ID: 857825
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: BIA and Ninth Circuit Precedent

Text: Although we base our conclusion on the text, history, and structure of the statute, our holding also comports with Ninth Circuit precedent and with the BIA’s practice of applying the Frentescu case-by-case analysis in most cases involving convictions of offenses other than aggravated felonies. In two en banc decisions, the BIA held that the IIRIRA revived the Frentescu case-by-case analysis for aggravated felony convictions resulting in a sentence of less than 5 years. See Matter of L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 649 (BIA 1999) (en banc), Matter of S-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 458, 463–65 (BIA 1999) (en banc).8 In 2006, this court accordingly reversed a decision by the BIA for failure to apply the Frentescu factors. See Afridi, 442 F.3d at 1218. Afridi was convicted under California Penal Code § 261.5(c) for unlawful intercourse with a minor who was more than three years younger than the perpetrator and was sentenced to three years’ probation. Id. at 1214. The BIA found him statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal because he had been convicted of a particularly serious crime. Id. at 1217. This court granted the petition for review in part noting, “The BIA considered two of the Frentescu factors, the nature of the conviction and the 8 In Matter of S-S-, the BIA also noted that “Congress easily could have designated categories of aggravated felonies that it considered to be particularly serious crimes – either independently or in conjunction with a specific sentence – but it did not do so.” 22 I. & N. Dec. at 464. After holding that an individualized consideration of the facts and circumstances of each conviction for aggravated felonies resulting in less than five years’ imprisonment was necessary, the BIA went on to note, “W e leave for another day the question of whether, and under what conditions, it might be appropriate, as a matter of discretion, for the Attorney General to designate certain offenses as being particularly serious crimes per se.” Id. at 465 n.7. BLANDINO -MEDINA V . HOLDER 19 sentence imposed . . . [but] the BIA did not consider the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction.” Id. at 1219. We specifically noted that under the most recent statutory amendments, “aggravated felonies resulting in sentences fewer than five years are not per se particularly serious and still require a case-by-case analysis, as laid out in Frentescu.” Id. at 1220 n.4. The government argues that we should defer to the BIA’s construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1231 in Matter of N-A-M, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), that it may designate an offense as a particularly serious crime per se. But, because we have already resolved this case at the first step of the Chevron inquiry, we do not move to the second step of the inquiry, in which we ask whether the agency’s interpretation is a “permissible construction” of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. We note briefly, however, that Matter of N- A-M does not necessarily support the government’s position. The respondent in that case was convicted of felony menacing and sentenced to four years’ deferred judgment. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 337. The BIA stated that where “a conviction is not for an aggravated felony for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years, we examine the nature of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction.” Id. at 342. The agency noted in dictum that “[o]n some occasions, we have focused exclusively on the elements of the offense,”9 but “we have generally 9 The BIA cited Matter of Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 423, 425–26 (BIA 1986), in support of this proposition. The applicant in Garcia-Garrocho had been convicted of first-degree burglary in violation of New York Penal Law § 140.30. Id. at 425. The BIA stated that certain crimes are “inherently” or “per se” particularly serious, and require “no 20 BLANDINO -MEDINA V . HOLDER examined a variety of factors and found that the consideration of the individual facts and circumstances is appropriate.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). And, although stating that “that the respondent’s offense is a particularly serious crime based solely on its elements,” the BIA nonetheless examined the individualized characteristics of the offense, including the fact that the offense was a crime against a person, that the respondent was required to register as a sex offender, and the statement in support of the warrantless arrest describing the nature of the respondent’s crime. Id. at 343. We acknowledge that two other circuits have assumed, without explicitly deciding, that the BIA can make the “particularly serious crime” determination based solely on the elements of the offense.10 However, no Ninth Circuit decision so holds, and our considered analysis of the statute at issue compels a contrary conclusion. further inquiry into the nature and circumstances of the underlying conviction,” id., and held that “the applicant’s conviction for burglary in the first degree is within the category of crimes that are per se ‘particularly serious.’” Id. at 426. However, Garcia-Garrocho predates the 1996 passage of IIRIRA, which established the two-tier approach to determining which offenses are particularly serious crimes. 10 In Hamama v. INS, which was decided several months before the “particularly serious crimes” provision at issue in this case was enacted by the IIRIRA, the Sixth Circuit stated that the BIA “has the prerogative to declare a crime particularly serious without examining each and every Frentescu factor.” 78 F.3d 233, 240 (6th Cir. 1996). In Lapaix v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit stated that in making the “particularly serious crime” determination, the IJ is “free to rely solely on the elements of the offense,” but that “IJ’s generally consider additional evidence” and apply the Frentescu factors. 605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010). BLANDINO -MEDINA V . HOLDER 21