Opinion ID: 3050063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A person is guilty of aggravated driving or

Text: actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs if the person does any of the following:
under the influence)], § 28-1382 [(driving under the extreme influence)] or this section while the person’s driver license or privilege to drive is suspended, canceled, revoked or refused . . . . Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1383(A)(1). [3] The BIA concluded that a violation of § 28-1383(A)(1) was a crime involving moral turpitude in Matter of LopezMeza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1194-96 (1999). In reaching its conclusion, the BIA reasoned that although a simple DUI did not involve moral turpitude, “when that crime is committed by an individual who knows that he or she is prohibited from driving, the offense becomes such a deviance from the accepted rules of contemporary morality that it amounts to a crime involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 1196. The BIA concluded that a violation of § 28-1383(A)(2), a DUI aggravated by multiple DUI convictions within five years4 was not a crime involving moral turpitude in In re TorresVarela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 83-85 (2001).5 In its opinion, the 4 The statute was amended in 2006 to expand the time period to seven years. 2006 Ariz. Leg. Sess. ch. 395, § 5 (effective September 21, 2006). 5 We cannot comment on the wisdom or consistency of distinguishing § 28-1383(A)(2) and § 28-1383(A)(1) as crimes of moral turpitude because the Constitution “limits our role to resolving the ‘[c]ases’ and ‘[c]ontroversies’ before us” therefore “we decide only the case at hand.” Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2572 (2007). As a result, we are bound to review the BIA’s application of its decision in Lopez-Meza, and nothing more. See Lopez-Molina v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2004) (following precedent concerning statute at issue and refusing to apply precedent concerning a different, related statute not at issue in the case). 12322 MARMOLEJO-CAMPOS v. GONZALES BIA specifically distinguished Lopez-Meza, however, and reaffirmed its holding that a violation of § 28-1383(A)(1) involved a culpable mental state. Id. at 85-86. The BIA noted that, “[t]he aggravating factor rendering the DUI conviction a crime involving moral turpitude in Matter of Lopez-Meza was the culpable mental state.” Id. at 85. [4] In Hernandez-Martinez v. Ashcroft, we held that “the statute under which Hernandez was convicted [§ 281383(A)(1)] is divisible and its range does not include only crimes of moral turpitude.” 329 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003). We found that the BIA erred by failing to apply the modified categorical approach to determine if the alien in that case was driving or merely in control of a stationary vehicle. Id. Specifically, we stated that “[t]he Board’s error of law was not to treat the statute as divisible.” Id. at 1119. We also noted that although we defer to the BIA’s interpretation of “crimes involving moral turpitude,” we did not believe that the BIA intended to conclude that being in control of a parked car while intoxicated and with a suspended or revoked license was a crime of moral turpitude. Id. at 1118-19. We did not, however, overrule Lopez-Meza or reject its reasoning for actual driving while intoxicated. [5] Giving due deference to the BIA’s decision in LopezMeza, we conclude that a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-1383(A)(1) for aggravated DUI involving actual driving is a crime involving moral turpitude. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Driving while intoxicated is despicable, and when coupled with the knowledge that one has been specifically forbidden to drive, it becomes “an act of baseness, violence or depravity in the private and social duties which a [person] shows to [a] fellowman or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty.” Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 235 n.7 (1951) (citing Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawles Third Revision, p. 2247). MARMOLEJO-CAMPOS v. GONZALES 12323 The crime reflects a willful disregard for the law and a reckless indifference to the safety of others. [6] A conviction under § 28-1383(A)(1) is not a mere combination of two simple and independent regulatory offenses. Driving drunk with knowledge that one does not have a valid license to drive is one “innately reprehensible act” (United States v. Barner, 195 F.Supp. 103, 108 (N.D. Cal. 1961)) involving two criminal offenses perpetrated at the same time with one willful and recklessly indifferent mental state. See Matter of Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611, 613 (BIA 1976) (holding that criminally reckless conduct can constitute a crime of moral turpitude). One who commits the crime creates a substantial risk of harm or death to others, thereby breaching accepted rules of morality and duties owed to society. Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 90 (3d Cir. 2004) (reckless conduct endangering the safety of others can be a crime of moral turpitude); Reitz v. Mealy, 314 U.S. 33, 36 (1941) (noting the dangers posed by negligent drivers and the necessity of licensing laws as “a form of protection against damage to the public”), overruled on other grounds by Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971). [7] Campos’ convictions under Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-1383(A)(1) were crimes involving moral turpitude under INA § 237(A)(2)(a)(ii). DENIED.