Opinion ID: 1652723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Lacked Authority to Dismiss Appellant's Indictment With Prejudice

Text: The issue, as articulated by Appellant, is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to designate as with prejudice the dismissal of her indictment. That phrasing of the issue begs the question as to whether the trial court has the authority to so designate a pretrial dismissal against the objection of the Commonwealth. In Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.2004), we extensively discussed the Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers as it relates to the involvement of each branch of government in criminal prosecutions. As we noted in Hoskins, and as the Court of Appeals observed in its decision in this case, our state Constitution specifically articulates the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 11. Section 27 of the Kentucky Constitution divides the power of government into the three distinct departments: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. Section 28 states: No person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. The power to define crimes and establish the range of penalties for each crime resides in the legislative branch. The power to charge persons with crimes and to prosecute those charges belongs to the executive department, and by statute, is exercised by the appropriate prosecuting attorney. The power to conduct criminal trials, to adjudicate guilt and to impose sentences within the penalty range prescribed by the legislature belongs to the judicial department. See Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 11-12. Citing authority for the principle that the executive branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a case, and broad discretion as to what crime to charge and penalty to seek, we stated in Hoskins: Concomitantly, subject to rare exceptions usually related to a defendant's claim of a denial of the right to a speedy trial, the trial judge has no authority, absent consent of the Commonwealth's attorney, to dismiss, amend, or file away before trial a prosecution based on a good indictment. Id. at 13. In Hoskins, we examined the intersection of judicial and executive power when we considered the constitutionality of CR 9.64, which requires the court's permission for the voluntary dismissal of an indictment by the prosecutor. Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 16-17. A similar analysis was required in the case of Flynt v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 415 (Ky.2003). The issue presented in Flynt , was whether a trial court could place a criminal defendant on a pretrial diversion program without the consent of the prosecuting attorney. Id. at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully completes a Pretrial Diversion Program is entitled to dismissal of his charges under circumstances that shall not constitute a criminal conviction. KRS 533.258(1). Upon completion of the program, RCr 8.04(5) provides for the charges to be dismissed with prejudice. In holding that the prosecuting attorney's consent was required, we said: [t]o interpret KRS 533.250(2) as permitting a trial court to approve pretrial diversion applications over the Commonwealth's objection  and thus conferring upon circuit courts the discretionary authority that we have previously held to be within the exclusive province of the executive branch  would construe it in a manner inconsistent with Kentucky's constitutional separation of powers provisions..... (W)here the Commonwealth objects to pretrial diversion, circuit courts cannot unilaterally approve a defendant's diversion application. Id. at 426. Critical to our holding in the Flynt case is the fact that, unlike other pretrial diversion schemes, the program established by the General Assembly enables a criminal defendant to avoid a felony conviction entirely, and potentially, if the Program is satisfactorily completed, results in a dismissal of the case with prejudice, barring future prosecution for that offense. Thus, we held that our Constitution's provision for separation of powers requires the agreement of the executive branch (the Commonwealth) before entry into the Program may be ordered by the court. We find the same reasoning applicable in the instant case, where Appellant would vest the judicial branch with the discretion to unilaterally terminate a criminal prosecution permanently. There are a variety of situations which may result in a dismissal of a criminal case under circumstances which, against the wishes of the Commonwealth, preclude further adjudication and are, in effect, a dismissal with prejudice. These include the violations of the right to speedy trial and the mistrials that occur after jeopardy attaches. In Commonwealth v. Baker, our Court of Appeals recognized that outrageous government conduct could taint evidence irrevocably, or prejudice a defendant's case on the merits such that notions of due process and fundamental fairness would preclude reindictment. 11 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Ky.App.2000). We note further that, by enactment of KRS 505.030, the legislative branch has defined the circumstances in which a prosecution for an offense is barred by a previous prosecution for that same offense. Omitted from those circumstances is the kind of dismissal with prejudice that Appellant would, under CR 41.01, place in the hands of the trial court. KRS 505.030, together with the Constitutional issues described above, are among the situations giving rise to dismissals in which a future prosecution is barred. A judge may designate such a dismissal as with prejudice, but it is the underlying substantive law, not the judge's discretion, that precludes further litigation. A judge cannot, simply by the exercise of his own discretion however well founded it may be, preclude future prosecution with a designation of a voluntary dismissal as with prejudice, in the absence of substantive law justifying same. The control of the judiciary, when a voluntary dismissal without prejudice appears unjust, is simply to withhold permission and disallow the voluntary dismissal, as provided for in RCr 9.64.