Opinion ID: 1846588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in admitting incriminating portions of swinney's statements to police, but excluded exculpatory statements.

Text: ¶ 42. On a motion in limine by the State, the trial judge admitted Swinney's confession into evidence as an admission under M.R.E. 801(d)(2), but excluded portions of her three previous statements to police where she said I didn't do it as inadmissible hearsay. Specifically, the court prevented the defense from questioning the officers about the exculpatory statements on cross-examination. ¶ 43. Swinney argues that if inculpatory portions of the statements she gave to police while in custody are admitted, then the entire statements must be admitted, including her exculpatory statements. As authority, she cites the following: If a statement is admissible in evidence as an admission or declaration, it is admissible as an entirety, including the parts that are favorable, as well as those parts that are unfavorable, to the party offering it in evidence. In the event a statement admitted in evidence constitutes part of conversation or correspondence, the opponent is entitled to have placed in evidence all that was said or written by or to the declarant in the course of such conversation . . . The general principles discussed above apply in criminal as well as civil cases. It is an elementary rule of law that when admissions of one on trial for the commission of a criminal offense are allowed in evidence against him or her, all that he or she said in that connection must also be permitted to go the jury ... The fact that the declarations made by the accused were self-serving does not preclude their introduction in evidence as a part of the whole statement. 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 759, at 122-23 (1994) (emphasis added). Swinney also cites McIntyre v. Harris, 41 Miss. 81 (1866), for the proposition that where a part of a conversation is introduced into evidence, opposing counsel has a right to draw out the rest of the conversation on cross-examination. ¶ 44. The fact that Swinney thrice denied killing Harville brings into question the veracity of her admission. She should have been allowed to question the officers regarding her entire statement on cross-examination. The fact that the State only used selected portions of her statement in its case in chief also may indicate bias by the State's witnesses in not being forthcoming with exculpatory evidence. ¶ 45. Furthermore, as was argued by Swinney at trial, adopting a rule such as that applied by the circuit court may force the defendant to testify to her statement in order to place it, in its entirety, before the jury. This may operate to subvert the accused's right not to testify in her own defense. ¶ 46. Therefore, the circuit court erred when it admitted the portions of Swinney's statements that favored the State's theory of the case while not allowing Swinney to draw out on cross-examination those portions of the statements that favor her position. However, Swinney has failed to show that this error has prejudiced the outcome of her trial. As a result, this error is harmless.