Opinion ID: 4513510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rasmy’s Retaliation Claim

Text: Rasmy also contends that the District Court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Rasmy’s retaliation claim. Specifically, he argues that there are disputed issues of material fact from which a reasonable jury could find that Rasmy was fired for complaining about unlawful discrimination. We agree. To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1) that [he] participated in a protected activity, (2) that [he] suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there was a causal connection between [his] engaging in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”55 Rasmy’s complaints to Marriott’s management regarding the alleged discrimination he was facing on a daily basis and his eventual termination satisfy the first two elements of the prima facie case.56 With respect to the third element, the District Court concluded that Rasmy could not make out a prima facie case because the record does not show that he was terminated for complaining about harassment. To reach that conclusion, the District Court employed a 55 Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010). See Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 56 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988) (“To prove that he engaged in protected activity, the plaintiff need not establish that the conduct he opposed was in fact a violation of Title VII. However, the plaintiff must demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated the law.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 22 “but‐for” causation standard, which applies at the later stage of the burden shifting‐analysis when a plaintiff is attempting to demonstrate that an employer’s allegedly neutral reason for an adverse action is a pretext for retaliation.57 We conclude that Rasmy’s retaliation claim raises issues of material fact. The record indicates that Rasmy had complained about discrimination for years prior to being fired, and that his last formal complaint was made in January 2016, five months before his termination. On the basis of this timeline, the District Court held that “no reasonable juror could find that Marriott would not have terminated Rasmy but for his complaints of discrimination.”58 As noted above, however, the rule of but‐for causation is not applicable as to whether Rasmy established a prima facie case—it applies when a plaintiff is rebutting an employer’s neutral reason for an adverse employment action. As it happens, we have previously held that “five months is not too long to find the causal relationship.”59 Questions regarding the time gap and causal connection of an alleged retaliatory termination may entail special consideration of the size and 57 See Ya‐Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 70 (2d Cir. 2015). 58 Sp. App’x 18. 59 Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 110; see also Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that a “seven‐month gap between [plaintiff’s] filing of the instant lawsuit and the decision to terminate her employment privileges is not prohibitively remote”); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 45‐46 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding a causal connection between a retaliatory act and an EEOC complaint filed eight months earlier). 23 complexity of a defendant employer, where termination of employment may involve multiple layers of decisionmakers, as well as the nature of plaintiff’s claims. In some such circumstances, a five‐ month time frame for a decision to fire an employee may not be exceptional. In sum, we find that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Rasmy’s allegations that his attempts to raise the issue of harassment with higher management at Marriott in January 2016 led to him being fired. Specifically, Rasmy asserts that after he filed his EEOC charge, Doherty was upset, “verbally abused” him, threatened to fire him, and told him to “keep [his] mouth shut” about anything that happened in the hotel “or [his] days will be numbered.”60 Whether Rasmy’s firing five months after a complaint of discrimination was caused by his complaints or, as Marriott argues, by his fight with Pongpanta, raises a factual issue that should be decided by a jury. Marriott’s claim that Doherty’s reaction related to Rasmy’s reports of wage theft rather than his complaints of discrimination also poses a factual question that both sides are disputing, and therefore should be presented to a jury. As our cases hold, the question of what motivated an employer’s desire to fire a worker is a quintessential jury function.61 In the 60 App’x 361, 367, 494. 61 See Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that, “[i]n assessing the record to determine whether there is such an issue, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is 24 circumstances presented here, a reasonable jury could find that Marriott’s reasons for firing Rasmy were pretextual. Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation under the burden‐shifting framework, the defendant may rebut the “presumption of retaliation” by “articulat[ing] a legitimate, non‐retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.”62 If the defendant provides an explanation, the plaintiff must prove “that the desire to retaliate was the but‐for cause of the challenged employment action.”63 Here, Marriott states that its non‐retaliatory reason for firing Rasmy was due to his physical altercation with Pongpanta on May 24, 2016.64 However, Rasmy argues (and a jury could agree) that this proffered reason is mere pretext, and the decision to terminate his employment was due to his repeated complaining to Marriott about ongoing discrimination. It bears recalling, that in discrimination cases, plaintiffs rarely produce direct evidence of retaliation. As we observed in Carlton v. Mystic Transportation, Inc.: [P]roof is seldom available with respect to an employer’s mental processes. Instead, plaintiffs in discrimination suits often must sought”); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994) (“A trial court must be cautious about granting summary judgment to an employer when, as here, its intent is at issue.”). 62 Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005). 63 Ya‐Chen Chen, 805 F.3d at 70 (citation omitted). 64 See Appellees’ Br. at 19. 25 rely on the cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence, since an employer who discriminates against its employee is unlikely to leave a well‐marked trail, such as making a notation to that effect in the employee’s personnel file. Ordinarily, plaintiff’s evidence establishing a prima facie case and defendant’s production of a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action raise a question of fact to be resolved by the factfinder after a trial. Summary judgment is appropriate at this point only if the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason is dispositive and forecloses any issue of material fact.65 Here, Rasmy has made a prima facie case of retaliation based on Doherty’s threats for Rasmy “to keep [his] mouth shut” or his “days will be numbered.”66 Marriott claims that Rasmy was fired because of his altercation with Pongpanta, and that both employees were treated equally because Pongpanta was fired as well.67 There are a host of disputed facts in this regard that render summary judgment inappropriate. Rasmy denies hitting Pongpanta (both Marriott and Pongpanta argue that Rasmy initiated the physical conflict), and based on Rasmy’s earlier complaints about Pongpanta, Marriott was aware that Pongpanta had been instigating confrontations with Rasmy 65 202 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). 66 App’x 361, 367. 67 Pongpanta was later reinstated to his position after a post‐termination arbitration proceeding brought through his union. Rasmy never attempted to appeal his firing through arbitration. 26 repeatedly by making offensive remarks about Rasmy’s race, religion, and national origin. Marriott claims that there were no cameras in the hallway where the fight took place, which Rasmy disputes in his testimony, recalling at his deposition that there were “two cameras in the hallway ceiling pointed at the ground of the hallway … [and that] they were functioning.”68 Whether or not such cameras were in place and functioning are relevant and disputed factual questions that should be decided by a jury. On our review of the record, we think a jury could find in favor of Rasmy on the issue of fact as to whether Marriott was aware of video footage of the altercation, but declined access to it. In sum, we conclude that it was error to grant summary judgment to Defendants on Rasmy’s retaliation claim.