Opinion ID: 180038
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: General versus Specific Intent

Text: Fuller further argues that the district court erred in denying his requested jury charge that SORNA requires specific intent. This Court reviews jury charges de novo. See United States v. Van Buren, 599 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2010). SORNA's criminal provision requires proof that the accused knowingly fail[ed] to register or update a registration. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3). This Court has held that the use of knowingly in a statute typically signals that the statute only requires a finding of general intent for conviction. United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 389 n. 6 (2d Cir.2004). General intent does not necessarily [refer] to a culpable state of mind or to knowledge of the law, rather, the term merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192-93, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998). Whether SORNA requires specific or general intent is a question of first impression in this Circuit, but every Circuit to have considered the matter has held that SORNA is a general intent crime. See, e.g., United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 468 (4th Cir.2009) (SORNA's criminal provision is not a specific intent law ... [t]here is no language requiring specific intent or a willful failure to register such that [the defendant] must know his failure to register violated federal law.); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir.2010) (same); United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325, 328-29 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). Fuller has failed to identify any reason why the term knowingly, as it is used in SORNA, should not be given its typical meaning of requiring only general intent. See George, 386 F.3d at 389 n. 6. Because Fuller was clearly aware that he was required to register and update his registration by virtue of his voluntary agreement to and participation in Missouri's sex offender registration scheme, his failure to register upon his interstate travel, with either New York or Missouri authorities, was a knowing act, see Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192-93, 118 S.Ct. 1939, and was therefore sufficient to sustain the indictment for violating SORNA, see 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); cf. Gould, 568 F.3d at 468.