Opinion ID: 1703227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the nica plan's tolling provision

Text: Petitioners further assert that a comparison of the NICA plan's tolling provision with the tolling provision of Florida's Workers' Compensation Act indicates that the nature of an infant's injury must be determined by an administrative hearing officer before a civil action can proceed when a defendant health care provider asserts the exclusivity of the NICA plan as an affirmative defense. The NICA plan expressly tolls the limitation period for filing a civil suit when a claim for benefits is filed and while such claim is pending before DOAH or on appeal. § 766.306. [1] Conversely, the workers' compensation scheme does just the opposite, tolling the time for filing a workers' compensation claim while the injured individual pursues a civil remedy. § 440.19(4), Fla.Stat. (1993). Petitioners contend that this difference in tolling provisions demonstrates that the NICA plan requires an administrative hearing officer to determine the nature of an infant's injury before a civil malpractice action can proceed in order to prevent potential NICA claims from becoming time-barred during an unsuccessful civil suit. We do not agree. We can only speculate as to why the legislature chose to provide a tolling provision for the NICA plan different from the one set out in the workers' compensation scheme. [2] In any case, this difference in tolling provisions is simply insufficient by itself to support the substantial leap required to reach the ultimate conclusion that the issue of whether the claim falls under NICA must be resolved in an administrative hearing rather than in circuit court. Rather, we approve of the district court's basic reasoning that because both the [NICA] Plan and the workers' compensation system possess common purposes and characteristics and are aimed at accomplishing similar results, albeit in different contexts, we may regard and construe them in pari materia. McKaughan, 652 So.2d at 858. Likewise, we agree with the district court that because the [NICA] Plan, like the Workers' Compensation Act, is a statutory substitute for common law rights and liabilities, it should be strictly construed to include only those subjects clearly embraced within its terms. Id. at 859. [3] In other words, there is simply no clear indication in the legislative scheme that the nature of the claim is to be determined exclusively in an administrative proceeding. [4] Further, we agree with the observations of the hearing officer and the district court that should a plaintiff elect to proceed with a medical malpractice claim, as opposed to seeking benefits under the NICA plan, that plaintiff faces the risk that the time for filing a NICA claim may expire while he is unsuccessfully litigating the exclusivity of the remedies afforded by the plan. If it is determined that the claim falls under the plan but the time for filing a claim under the plan has expired, the claimant runs the risk of being without relief. Nonetheless, that election is the exclusive province of the infant's legal representative.