Opinion ID: 877111
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: presence of the child

Text: The question thus remains whether either presence or domicile by itself should be a sufficient basis for the state's asserting jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding where the tribe is also asserting jurisdiction. The basic judicial policy of protecting the child (the parens patriae doctrine) has led several courts to indicate that jurisdiction can be based on the substantial presence of the child within the state. See, e.g., In Re Duryea (1977), 115 Ariz. 86, 88, 563 P.2d 885, 887. H. Goodrich & E. Scoles, Conflict of Laws 272 (4th ed. 1964). In Finlay v. Finlay (1925), 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625, Justice Cardozo explained the parens patriae rationale: The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody of infants found within its territory does not depend upon the domicile of the parents. It has its origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless ... (Citations omitted.) For this, the residence of the child suffices, though the domicile be elsewhere ... (Citations omitted.) In the case of In Re Cantrell (1972), 159 Mont. 66, 495 P.2d 179, this Court essentially followed this doctrine by declaring an Indian child temporarily off the reservation to be dependent and neglected and authorizing his adoption after an Indian tribal court on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation had already found the child to be neglected, but had later returned the child to the custody of the mother approximately one year before the state assumed jurisdiction. Cases in this area are often sui generis, but in light of recent developments of law at the federal level, we do not believe that this same result would necessarily follow today. In its legislative findings to the Indian Child Welfare Act, Congress found that the states in exercising jurisdiction over Indian child custody matters have often failed to consider the unique cultural and social standards of the Indian community. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5). Courts following the present standard, on the other hand, assume that the court having the most ready access to the child can best protect the child and can best promote the child's welfare. Finlay v. Finlay, supra. Although this assumption may be generally valid, in the context of an Indian child custody dispute, it ignores the inherent bias of a non-Indian society against Indian culture, and fails to protect the Indians' right of self-government. Note, 21 Ariz.L.Rev. 1123, 1131 (1979); see also, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5). Our goal should be to resort to the most appropriate forum rather than to the most easily accessible forum. Note, 21 Ariz.L.Rev. 1123, 1133 (1979). Furthermore, adherence to the presence test will undoubtedly encourage forum-shopping and thus invite contradictory decisions. It is not at all difficult to imagine that a nonprevailing party in a custody dispute tried in tribal court would be sorely tempted to relitigate the matter in state court by filing suit in state court should the child be temporarily off the reservation.