Opinion ID: 1102851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Steele v. Kehoe

Text: In Steele the petitioner claimed that his privately retained counsel orally agreed to file a motion for postconviction relief but failed to do so in a timely manner. We held that due process entitles a prisoner to a hearing on a claim that he or she missed the deadline to file a rule 3.850 motion because his or her attorney had agreed to file the motion but failed to do so in a timely manner. Steele, 747 So.2d at 934. The State argues that those same due process concerns do not pertain where the petitioners have had the opportunity to raise their claims in the trial court in an original motion for postconviction relief. See Steele v. Kehoe, 724 So.2d 1192, 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (Sharp, J. concurring specially) (Unlike the present case, Lambrix had an opportunity to file a motion for post-conviction relief. In contrast, Steele's counsel frustrated his intention to file postconviction relief proceedings.) approved, 747 So.2d 931 (Fla.1999). We disagree. We find the State's attempt to distinguish Steele unavailing: If a defendant potentially can file a belated rule 3.850 motion due to counsel's neglect, it should follow that the defendant can file a belated appeal of the trial court's denial of a rule 3.850 or rule 3.800 motion due to counsel's neglect. Demaria v. State, 778 So.2d 302 (Fla. 2d DCA) review granted, 761 So.2d 328 (Fla.2000). As this Court stated in State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892, 896 (Fla.1964), and reiterated in Steele, [postconviction] remedies are subject to the more flexible standards of due process announced in the Fifth Amendment, Constitution of the United States. We conclude that those same flexible standards of due process which compelled our decision in Steele prevail where a defendant has timely requested counsel to file an appeal from the denial of a 3.850 motion and counsel fails to do so. Consistent with our determination in Steele, we hold that the appropriate procedure in these cases is for the defendant to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As we noted in Steele, such a procedure is accommodated by the final clause of rule 3.850(h), which provides: (h) Habeas Corpus. An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court that sentenced the applicant or that the court has denied the applicant relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the applicant's detention. (emphasis added). See Steele, 747 So.2d at 934; see also Medrano v. State, 748 So.2d 986, 987 (Fla.1999) ([U]nder Steele, a defendant... must petition the court for a writ of habeas corpus citing the failure of counsel to timely file the necessary pleadings after being asked to do so by the defendant. Thereafter, the court, will conduct a hearing on the merits of the claim that counsel agreed to file a 3.850 motion, but failed to timely do so.). This case also creates the need to amend rule 3.850(g) by adding a provision to allow a belated appeal in this circumstance, similar to our amendment of rule 3.850(b) in Steele, [3] and to that provided under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j). [4] This amendment to rule 3.850(g) will be published in a companion opinion. See Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(g), No. SC00-1452, ___ So.2d ___, 2000 WL 1726772 (Fla. Nov. 22, 2000). Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the Second District's decisions in Williams and Rogers. It is so ordered. ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. HARDING, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which WELLS, C.J., concurs. WELLS, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. HARDING, J., concurring in result only. I would decline to answer the certified question in light of this Court's adoption of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(g). I would apply this rule to these defendants. WELLS, C.J., concurs. WELLS, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in result only in allowing the belated appeals. I do not agree with the reasoning of the opinion for the reason stated in Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931 (Fla.1999), that it is illogical and in conflict with Lambrix v. State, 698 So.2d 247 (Fla.1996), to allow the belated appeals on the basis of due process. Rather, I would adopt Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(g) and make it applicable to these defendants.