Opinion ID: 1288587
Heading Depth: 7
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overview of Harmless-Error Standard

Text: Before the enactment of AEDPA, the Supreme Court articulated two harmless-error standards. Eddleman v. McKee, 471 F.3d 576, 582 (6th Cir.2006). On direct review, before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). On collateral review, however, the State's burden is lessened: In those proceedings, courts should deem an error harmless unless the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710. When Congress enacted AEDPA, it complicated this dichotomy because AEDPA provides that habeas relief shall not be granted unless the state-court decision was either (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Eddleman, 471 F.3d at 582 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). We nonetheless continued to apply only the Brecht substantial-and-injurious-effect standard after AEDPA's enactment because we concluded that if a petitioner meets that standard, he will surely have demonstrated that the state court's finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt  the Chapman standard  resulted from . . . an unreasonable application of Chapman.  Id. (quoting Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir.1999)). In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003), however, we reconsidered this position in Eddleman and held that AEDPA replaced the Brecht standard with the standard of Chapman plus AEDPA deference when, as here, a state court made a harmless-error determination. Eddleman, 471 F.3d at 583. In other words, when assessing a state court's harmless-error review, we asked whether that review was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Chapman. See id. at 585 (We now must determine whether the [state-court] decision that admitting Eddleman's confession was harmless error was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Chapman. ). While Wilson's appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court rejected this approach. In Fry v. Pliler, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007), the Court unanimously concluded that regardless whether a state court applied Chapman 's harmless-error standard on direct review (i.e., that the state must prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), a federal habeas court applies the stricter (more state-deferential) Brecht standard (i.e., harmless unless the error had substantial and injurious effect on the outcome). In so holding, the Court explained that AEDPA did not replace the Brecht standard. Id. at 2326-27. The petitioner in Fry argued (just as the Eddleman court concluded) that, because of AEDPA, a federal habeas court conducting harmless-error review had to ask whether the state court unreasonably applied Chapman to determine whether habeas relief was warranted. Id. The Supreme Court explained, however, that it is implausible that, without saying so, AEDPA replaced the Brecht standard of `actual prejudice,' with the more liberal AEDPA/ Chapman standard which requires only that the state court's harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt determination be unreasonable. Id. at 2327 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That said, the Court continued, it certainly makes no sense to require formal application of both tests (AEDPA/ Chapman and Brecht ) when the latter obviously subsumes the former. Id. In other words, a federal habeas court technically applies Brecht in light of AEDPA, but because the Brecht test is stricter (i.e., tougher on the petitioner) than AEDPA/ Chapman, any petitioner that meets the Brecht standard will necessarily meet the AEDPA/ Chapman standard. Thus, when conducting harmless-error review, we simply apply the Brecht standard and ask whether Wilson has shown that the error had substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury's verdict.