Opinion ID: 621480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Melendez-Rocha

Text: At the outset of the trial in response to a motion in limine, the district court ordered that no mention be made of Melendez-Rocha's immigration status. During voir dire and again during his closing argument, co-defendant Michelle Munoz's counsel alluded to the fact that all of the defendants other than Munoz were not citizens. Both of these instances prompted Melendez-Rocha to move for a mistrial. The district court refused to declare a mistrial but did issue a curative jury instruction. We review its decision to deny the request for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brandon, 521 F.3d 1019, 1026 (8th Cir.2008). We give the district court `broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for mistrial because it is in a far better position to weigh the effect' of any possible prejudice. United States v. Urqhart, 469 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Davidson, 122 F.3d 531, 538 (8th Cir.1997)). [L]ess drastic measures such as a cautionary instruction are generally sufficient to alleviate prejudice. Davidson, 122 F.3d at 538. When such an instruction is given, we must determine whether the verdict was `substantially swayed' by the prejudicial comment. United States v. Urick, 431 F.3d 300, 304 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1087 (8th Cir. 2003)). In making this determination, we must evaluate whether a curative instruction was sufficient in the context of the entire trial, and weigh the prejudice against the strength of the government's evidence. Id. This court will affirm a conviction ... where there was `substantial evidence' of guilt. Id. (quoting Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1087). The evidence of Melendez-Rocha's guilt was substantial. Maria Rojas, who worked as a driver and assistant for Dario Verdugo-Galaviz, testified that she delivered money and a Mercedes-Benz automobile to Melendez-Rocha on Verdugo-Galaviz's behalf as payment for methamphetamine. She further testified that she and Melendez-Rocha discussed his drug distribution business extensively. Later, Rojas offered to distribute drugs for Melendez-Rocha, but he told her that his business was not doing very well and declined her offer. Rojas also testified that on Verdugo-Galaviz's orders she deposited money owed to Melendez-Rocha for drugs into a bank account. Sergio Munoz testified that he transported methamphetamine from Melendez-Rocha in Phoenix to Verdugo-Galaviz in Sioux Falls. Melendez-Rocha dropped methamphetamine off at Munoz's house, and then Munoz would drive it north to Sioux Falls. Munoz testified that he delivered a boat to Melendez-Rocha as payment for a drug debt, that he bought drugs from Melendez-Rocha at Melendez-Rocha's house, and that Verdugo-Galaviz deposited money into a bank account for Melendez-Rocha as payment for methamphetamine. Laura Welch, the mother of two of Melendez-Rocha's children, gave extensive testimony about Melendez-Rocha's activities in the methamphetamine trade and described how large quantities of methamphetamine were often stored at their home and in his cars and how she withdrew money from bank accounts on his behalf. Laura's mother, Kerri Welch, testified that she set up a bank account on Melendez-Rocha's behalf and would withdraw money for him as it was deposited by others. Because there was substantial evidence of Melendez-Rocha's guilt, Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1087, the verdict was not `substantially swayed' by the prejudicial comment, Urick, 431 F.3d at 304 (quoting Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1087), and therefore the curative instruction given was sufficient in the context of the entire trial to alleviate any prejudice that may have resulted from the reference to Melendez-Rocha's immigration status. See Urick, 431 F.3d at 304.
The district court sentenced Melendez-Rocha to 348 months' imprisonment, varying below his advisory sentencing guidelines range to do so. [W]here a district court has sentenced a defendant below the advisory guidelines range, `it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion.' United States v. Moore, 581 F.3d 681, 684 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Lazarski, 560 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir.2009)). Melendez-Rocha argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to consider his age, family situation, or educational status as required by § 3553(a) and that [h]e is a non-violent drug offender, and 348 months is simply too much time in light of his offense. We do not require a mechanical recitation of the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing. Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461. Instead, it simply must be clear from the record that the district court actually considered the § 3553(a) factors in determining the sentence. United States v. Walking Eagle, 553 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Little Hawk, 449 F.3d 837, 840 (8th Cir.2006)). Although it did not mechanically list each of these factors, the district court stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors in reaching its sentencing decision. The district court also received and read a number of letters from supporters of Melendez-Rocha, and recognized Melendez-Rocha's non-criminal business activities and the law-abiding character of his family, and heard extensive argument from Melendez-Rocha's counsel. [W]here the district court heard argument from counsel about specific § 3553(a) factors, we may presume that the court considered those factors. United States v. Keating, 579 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir.2009). We find no procedural error on the part of the district court, and Melendez-Rocha has not shown that the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors in determining his below-guidelines-range sentence or that his sentence was in any other way substantively unreasonable. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in Melendez-Rocha's sentence.