Opinion ID: 2110037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Declaratory Judgment in the Workers' Compensation Court.

Text: In considering whether the Workers' Compensation Court has authority to enter a declaratory judgment, we first examine Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-21,149 (Reissue 1985) of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which provides: Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. Thus, if the Workers' Compensation Court is a court of record, that court has statutory authority for a declaratory judgment. The Workers' Compensation Court is vested with judicial authority. See Neb. Const. art. V, § 1, which states: The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, district courts, county courts ... and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be created by law. See, also, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-152 (Reissue 1988) (creation of Workers' Compensation Court). The phrase court of record, used in § 25-21,149, remains undefined in Nebraska law, although the phrase has been used in previous decisions of this court. See, Rohn v. Kelley, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Lambie v. Stahl, 178 Neb. 506, 134 N.W.2d 86 (1965) (finding that the county courts are courts of record); State, ex rel. City of Omaha, v. Board of County Commissioners, 109 Neb. 35, 189 N.W. 639 (1922) (determining that courts of record, as intended by the Legislature in 1879, meant those courts which were then known to the law). The old definition of a court of record given by Blackstone is that where the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memorial and testimony, which rolls are called the record of the court and are of such high and supereminent authority that their truth is not to be called in question. Chrisman v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 321, 325, 157 S.W.2d 831, 832-33 (1942). A court of record has also been defined as being one the history of whose proceedings is perpetuated in writing. Also, it is required that some duly authorized person should record such proceedings, and when an act speaks of courts of record it speaks of courts whose proceedings are duly recorded by some authorized person or persons. Tourtelot v. Booker, 160 S.W. 293, 297 (Tex.Civ.App.1913). Thus, a court which is required by law to keep a permanent and written memorialization of determinations made in proceedings brought to obtain a judicial resolution of a question is a court of record. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-167 (Reissue 1988) of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act provides: The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall keep and maintain, in its office at the State Capitol, a full and true record of all proceedings, documents, or papers ordered filed, rules and regulations, and decisions or orders. Also, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-157 (Reissue 1988) states in relevant part: The clerk [of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court] shall, under the direction of the presiding judge, keep a full and true record of the proceedings of the compensation court and record all pleadings and other papers filed with the compensation court, and no other action shall be taken thereon until the same have been recorded. Thus, we conclude that the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court is a court of record and, as such, has the authority to enter a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 25-21,149 et seq. (Reissue 1985). Our inquiry, however, does not end here, for we must also determine whether Deyle's claim for additional sums for waiting time, attorney fees, and interest under § 48-125 and for postjudgment interest is an appropriate subject for declaratory judgment. Section 25-21,150 provides: Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. Further, § 25-21,153 provides: The enumeration in [§] 25-21,150 ... does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in § 25-21,149, in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty. The remedy of declaratory judgment may be available to a litigant when a controversy exists as a result of a claim asserted against one who has an interest in contesting such claim, the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse, the party seeking declaratory relief has a legally protectable interest or right in the subject matter of the controversy, and the issue involved is capable of present judicial determination. Mullendore v. Nuernberger, 230 Neb. 921, 925, 434 N.W.2d 511, 514-15 (1989) (quoting Mullendore v. School Dist. No. 1, 223 Neb. 28, 388 N.W.2d 93 (1986)). Obviously, an award, order, or judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court reflecting a determination whether there is liability under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court. Cf. § 25-21, 149: Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights.... In light of the foregoing law, both statutory and decisional, Deyle's claim for additional sums under § 48-125 presents questions of law pertaining to the Workers' Compensation Court's prior award ( Bituminous I ) and are appropriate subjects for declaratory judgment. Since Deyle's second action in the Workers' Compensation Court raised a question of law and does not involve a request that the court vacate or modify its award, the rule expressed in Smith v. Fremont Contract Carriers, 218 Neb. 652, 358 N.W.2d 211 (1984), namely, the Workers' Compensation Court lacks authority to vacate or modify its judgment during the term at which the court renders the judgment, is inapplicable in the present appeal. Neither does our holding in Black v. Sioux City Foundry Co., 224 Neb. 824, 401 N.W.2d 679 (1987), that the compensation court lacks power to clarify its final judgment in the same action in which the judgment was entered, have any application.