Opinion ID: 1281413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Community Sentiment

Text: In a separate argument, defendant asserts that the particular facts of this murder  the killing of a man fishing alone in an isolated area  independent of the pretrial publicity, itself generated such strong negative community sentiment as to preclude defendant from receiving a fair trial in predominantly rural Tuolumne County. We have already rejected this as a sole determinative factor in discussing the nature and gravity of the offense under the Harris factors. ( Ante, at p. 231.) Moreover, none of the actual jurors who heard the case had expressed the view during voir dire that they found the circumstances of the murder unusually shocking. All but two of the jurors were themselves originally from metropolitan areas; none was a native of Tuolumne County. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant's motions for change of venue were properly denied. 2. Prosecutorial Misconduct  Guilt Phase (5) Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his direct examination of Tillery. After she testified about her idea to sell her coat to get money for sweet rolls, the prosecutor asked her: This is before any agreement to commit a robbery or murder, is that correct? Defendant's objection on grounds that she had testified there was an agreement to commit robbery, not murder, was overruled. In fact her testimony, subsequently corroborated by defendant, was that they all agreed to rob the victim by hitting him over the head and throwing him into the river in order to get money and transportation back home. The logical consequence of such a plan was the victim's demise. Thus the question as phrased was a reasonable interpretation of evidence properly before the jury. ( People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1061, 1085 [80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 458 P.2d 479].) In any case, the jury was instructed that statements made by the attorneys during trial are not evidence. (6) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed numerous instances of misconduct in his closing argument at the guilt phase. The prosecutor argued: The three of them [defendant, Love and Tillery] sat there in camp and discussed robbing David Lee Orozco. And they discussed hitting him on the head. And they discussed taking his money. And they discussed throwing him in the river. [¶] And ladies and gentlemen, that is a discussion of murder. Closing argument presents a legitimate opportunity to argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. ( People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 212 [152 Cal. Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396].) For the reasons discussed above, we reject defendant's claim that such argument misstated the evidence. (7) Similarly, the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence in arguing that, when in the victim's car, defendant admitted to Tillery that he had murdered Orozco. When asked, Did [defendant] say anything about the death of David Orozco?, Tillery testified defendant told her he had shot Orozco, that it was horrible, and that there was blood bubbling out of his nose and mouth. From such testimony an inference could fairly be drawn that defendant in essence admitted murdering the victim. (8) Next, defendant misplaces reliance on People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Cal.2d 719 [249 P.2d 1], in claiming that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to state facts to which non-testifying witnesses would have testified. The record lends no support to defendant's claim that in his closing argument the prosecutor improperly characterized what the witnesses would have testified to but for the stipulation. In Kirkes we reiterated the well-settled rule that statements of facts not in evidence by the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury constitute misconduct. ( Id., at p. 724.) There was no such misconduct here. The prosecution and defense had entered into broad stipulations covering several major aspects of the physical evidence in the case ( ante, p. 229), and therefore the prosecutor argued to the jury: I didn't have to call witnesses to establish any one of those things that were considered in that stipulation. Defense counsel himself conceded the propriety of such argument, objecting only to the prosecutor's further statement that testimony of 20 witnesses to prove the stipulated facts had been spared (a matter which had already been explained to the jury by the trial judge). Moreover, counsel never requested an admonition to lessen any possible prejudicial effect he perceived such argument might have on the jury. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) (9a) Defendant next contends that the prosecutor, through expressions of personal belief during opening and closing arguments, impermissibly cast his own testimonial doubts on [defendant's] version of the affair. (10) A prosecutor may not express a personal opinion or belief in a defendant's guilt where there is substantial danger that jurors will interpret this as being based on information at the prosecutor's command, other than evidence adduced at trial. ( People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848 [97 Cal. Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564].) (9b) We have scrutinized the prosecutor's arguments and find no such misconduct. [E]xamination of his arguments to the jury demonstrates that he was merely presenting his views of deductions and inferences warranted by the evidence. ( People v. Pineiro (1982) 129 Cal. App.3d 915, 924 [179 Cal. Rptr. 883].) In most of the complained-of instances he merely used the pronoun I (e.g., The term reasonable doubt, look at the instruction, and after you've weighed the evidence, can you really say in good conscience that there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. I don't see that you can  (italics added)). Such phraseology hardly establishes that he was impermissibly injecting his own personal beliefs into his argument. ( Pineiro, supra, at p. 924.) In any event, defendant raised no objection, hence the claim is waived on appeal. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 34.) (11) Nor was it misconduct for the prosecutor to characterize defendant's version of the incident as fabrication, and I believe it is a fabrication as the evidence shows it to be, of trying to abandon the crime. It is long settled that a prosecutor may use appropriate epithets warranted by the evidence. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 580 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) Characterization of defendant's claim of abandoned intent as fabrication was fair comment on the state of the evidence, which included defendant's own testimony that he initially agreed to rob Orozco, the circumstance that the fatal bullet was fired from his rifle with which he admittedly was armed, his admission to Tillery that he shot the victim, his possession of the victim's wallet according to her testimony, his complicity in the theft of the victim's car after the murder, and his removal of the car stereo and personally devised plan to dispose of the vehicle. So too did these facts support the prosecutor's use of the epithet cold-blooded murder. The portions of the argument to which defendant has directed us fail to support his further claim that the prosecutor attempted to impugn defense counsel's honesty and integrity by suggesting he improperly conspired with defendant to fabricate the defense. (Compare People v. Bain, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 847 [unsupported implication that defense counsel fabricated a defense]; see People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 762 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) Failure to object to this line of argument has waived any claim of misconduct on appeal. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 34.) (12) There is no merit to defendant's claim that it was misconduct to argue to the jury that under the felony-murder rule, If you are involved in the commission of the robbery, and the murder occurs, whether it's intentional or not, you had the intent to rob, that is first degree murder. Such was an accurate statement of the law. (See People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 476-477 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697].) (13) Finally, defendant seeks to overcome the waiver rule by asserting that in those instances where counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's alleged misconduct, or failed to request a curative admonition, such omissions deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 584.) We have found no misconduct. Even were we to conclude otherwise, none of the claimed errors were of such significance that it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a more favorable result but for counsel's omissions. ( Ibid. ) 3. Admission of Tillery's Testimony (14a) Defendant maintains that Tillery's testimony was erroneously admitted because the trial court found the plea bargain she entered into with the district attorney was unconstitutional. (15) [A]lthough there is a certain degree of compulsion inherent in any plea agreement or grant of immunity, it is clear that an agreement requiring only that the witness testify fully and truthfully is valid. [Citations.] ( People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1252 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].) The record establishes that Tillery agreed to testify truthfully for the People at all hearings and/or trials in defendant's prosecution, in exchange for immunity from prosecution for the murder and acceptance of her guilty plea to robbery in juvenile court. The written terms of the plea bargain expressly provided only that if any of her statements or testimony proved to be untruthful, then the above bargain would be rescinded. At the time of defendant's trial, Tillery had already admitted the truth of the robbery petition pursuant to the terms of the plea bargain and been sentenced to the California Youth Authority. (14b) Relying on People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 438 [116 Cal. Rptr. 133], and People v. Green (1951) 102 Cal. App.2d 831 [228 P.2d 867], defendant moved to exclude Tillery's testimony on grounds that, under the plea bargain, she would feel pressured to testify in conformance with her earlier statement to police, or her preliminary hearing testimony, in order to ensure that the terms of her plea bargain would remain in effect. In Medina it was held that a defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution's case depends substantially upon accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion. ( People v. Medina, supra, 41 Cal. App.3d at p. 455.) (16) Thus, when the accomplice is granted immunity subject to the condition that his testimony substantially conform to an earlier statement given to police ([ Medina, ] id., at p. 450), or that his testimony result in the defendant's conviction ([ Green, supra, ] 102 Cal. App.2d 831, 837-839), the accomplice's testimony is `tainted beyond redemption' [citation] and its admission denies the defendant a fair trial. ( People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1251-1252, fn. omitted.) We have recognized that these principles are equally applicable to plea bargain agreements. ( Id., at p. 1252, fn. 5, and cases cited.) (14c) Medina and Green, however, are distinguishable from the instant case. Nothing in Tillery's plea bargain resembles the evils inherent in the immunity agreements condemned in those cases. Nothing in the record suggests Tillery was ever told or led to believe that the benefits of her plea bargain would remain in force only if she testified in conformity with her statements to police or her preliminary examination testimony. Nor did the trial court so find; it did not determine Tillery's plea bargain to be unlawfully coercive or unconstitutional. Rather, the court was concerned that the prosecution not be permitted to repudiate the plea bargain should Tillery's trial testimony prove at variance with that which she gave at the preliminary examination. For that reason, the court ruled that her prior testimony could not be used by the People for impeachment purposes, nor as a basis for a collateral prosecution for perjury. [8] The fact that Tillery may have felt some inherent compulsion to testify in accord with her earlier testimony does not, in itself, render the agreement invalid. ( Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1253.) There was substantial evidence presented by the People which more than met the corroboration requirement for Tillery's testimony. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 100 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) Crucially, defendant himself testified that just about everything Tillery testified to was true. We conclude that Tillery's plea bargain was not unlawfully coercive, and that admission of her testimony did not deny defendant a fair trial. 4. Sufficiency of Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation (17a) Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support an instruction on willful, premeditated first degree murder. (18) In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942], we identified three categories of evidence which might sustain a finding of premeditated murder: (1) facts showing prior planning of the killing; (2) facts about any prior relationship or conduct with the victim from which the jury could infer a motive; and (3) facts about the manner of the killing from which the jury could infer that the defendant intentionally killed the victim according to a preconceived plan. ( Id., at pp. 26-27; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 86.) (19) In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must draw all inferences that can be reasonably deduced in support of the verdict and must uphold the judgment if, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255]; People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [90 Cal. Rptr. 417, 475 P.2d 649].) (17b) The record here shows evidence of willful premeditation under each of the three Anderson categories. There was evidence of prior planning. [T]he fact that defendant brought his loaded gun ... [to the victim's position on the river bank] and shortly thereafter used it to kill an unarmed victim reasonably suggests that defendant considered the possibility of murder in advance. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 87.) The preconceived plan to rob the victim and throw him into the river further supports that inference. Defendant's motive was robbery. The evidence showed a preconceived plan to rob the victim, in Tillery's words, to get some money to get back home and transportation. That defendant and his cohorts planned to steal the victim's vehicle as a means of flight back to Modesto with the proceeds of the robbery lends further support to the inference that the victim's demise was intended. The manner of killing  a single fatal shot to the back of the head of the unarmed victim from a distance of six to ten feet as he kneeled, baiting his fishhook  further establishes that the shooting was conceived in advance. The evidence showed that defendant and Love crept up to a ledge of rocks and then onto a boulder overlooking the unwitting victim's position. Defendant testified Love had dropped his club and that he (defendant) alone was armed as they approached the victim. We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, supports the jury's verdict of willful, deliberate and premeditated first degree murder. 5. CALJIC No. 2.27 and the Corroboration Requirement for Accomplice Testimony (20) Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 2.27, which instructs the jury that the testimony of one witness is sufficient for the proof of any fact, misled the jury as to the need for corroboration of accomplice Tillery's testimony. In People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823 [218 Cal. Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372], we held that the giving of CALJIC No. 2.27 in conjunction with accomplice instructions was not error per se, but we agreed with the suggestion of the Court of Appeal in People v. Stewart (1983) 145 Cal. App.3d 967, 975 [193 Cal. Rptr. 799], that it should contain an explicit reference to testimony requiring corroboration. ( Chavez, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 831.) As in Chavez, here, looking to the instructions as a whole we find no error. (39 Cal.3d at pp. 830-831.) The full panoply of standard CALJIC instructions on accomplice testimony and the requirement of corroboration was given here. Both the prosecution and the defense proceeded on the premise that corroboration was needed. ( Id., at p. 831.) In his opening statement and closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the accomplice instructions, acknowledged that Tillery was an accomplice, and argued that her testimony was amply corroborated by the evidence. Defendant's own testimony supplied the requisite corroboration; he acknowledged that just about everything Tillery testified to was true. As a result, the jury was not misled as to the need for corroboration and no prejudice resulted. The emphasis placed on the corroboration requirement, and on the other accomplice instructions, demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed on the proper standard of evaluating [Tillery's] testimony. ( Ibid. ) 6. Instruction Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.75 Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.75 (1982 New), the jury was instructed as to how to proceed in returning verdicts with respect to the charge of first degree murder and the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. CALJIC No. 8.75 was derived from Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503 [183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809]. In Stone, the jury had unanimously concluded the defendant should be acquitted of murder, but remained deadlocked on the lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. ( Id., at p. 509.) We were concerned with formulation of a procedure for the receipt of a partial verdict consistent with the double jeopardy clause. Accordingly, we held that a trial court must permit entry of a verdict of acquittal on the greater charge when the jury has reached unanimous, final agreement on acquittal, but remains deadlocked on lesser included offenses. ( Id., at pp. 514-519.) We have since clarified that our holding in Stone does not preclude a jury from considering lesser offenses during its deliberations. ( People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal. Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) Nor does CALJIC No. 8.75 purport to instruct the jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty of the greater offense before considering any lesser offense. ( Id., at pp. 330-331.) Moreover, CALJIC No. 17.10, also given here, instructs that [i]f the jury is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged and it unanimously so finds, it may convict him of any lesser offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in the offense charged, if the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of such lesser offense. The only lesser included offense herein concerned was second degree murder; there were no manslaughter instructions. Thus, defendant's guilt of either offense turned only on a finding of premeditation and deliberation. There is nothing in the record of deliberations to suggest that the jury had great difficulty, or was divided, on the proof and existence of this element. There was no request for a rereading of testimony. The jury commenced deliberations at 2:45 p.m. on June 2, 1983; by 11 a.m. the following morning they had reached a unanimous verdict of willful, deliberate and premeditated first degree murder. Finally, the jury was instructed in the exact language of CALJIC No. 8.75; there was no further embellishment by the court advising them not to consider or deliberate upon the lesser offense of second degree murder before reaching a verdict on the greater charge. Accordingly, no error is shown. 7. CALJIC No. 2.90  Reasonable Doubt Instruction (21) Defendant next contends that CALJIC No. 2.90 (1979 Rev.), the standard instruction defining the presumption of innocence, the state's burden of proof, and reasonable doubt, is unintelligible. Acknowledging that the language of the instruction is taken verbatim from section 1096, and without proffering any authority in support of his position, he nevertheless urges us to declare the instruction and statute unconstitutional. We long ago declined the invitation. Since CALJIC No. 2.90 is a verbatim copy of a statute  section 1096  the remedy for any perceived deficiency in that section's codification of the reasonable doubt standard is not judicial but legislative. (See People v. Brigham (1979) 25 Cal.3d 283, 290, fn. 11 and 293 [157 Cal. Rptr. 905, 599 P.2d 100] (conc. opn. by Mosk, J.).) 8. Jury Unanimity on Theory of First Degree Murder (22) Defendant maintains that the jury should have been required to unanimously agree on the theory of first degree murder underlying its verdict. We have long since rejected this argument: [I]n a prosecution for first degree murder it is not necessary that all jurors agree on one or more of several theories proposed by the prosecution; it is sufficient that each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder as that offense is defined by the statute. ( People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 194-195 [107 Cal. Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956]; People v. Chavez (1951) 37 Cal.2d 656, 670-672 [234 P.2d 632].) Moreover, the verdict in this case was unanimous as to theory, the jury having found defendant guilty of first degree murder other than under the felony murder rule, to-wit: that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and having further found that he personally used a firearm in its commission. 9. Beeman Error (23a) Defendant contends that the court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct on intent with regard to accomplice liability for the crimes. ( People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 [199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].) The standard CALJIC aiding and abetting instructions found deficient in Beeman were given here. Former CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01 were erroneous because they did not advise the jury that conviction as an aider and abettor required not only that the defendant have knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator of the offense, but also that the defendant share that purpose or intend to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of the crime. ( People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 11-12 [221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392]; People v. Caldwell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 223-224 [203 Cal. Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274]; People v. Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.) (24) Prejudice from Beeman error is assessed under the Chapman harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test. (See People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 60-64 [246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1].) However, in this instance we need not employ such review, for we have recognized that in some circumstances it is possible to determine that although an instruction ... was erroneously omitted, the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions. In such cases the issue should not be deemed to have been removed from the jury's consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and there can be no prejudice to the defendant.... ( People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913]; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 335 [185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) (23b) Defendant was found guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated first degree murder. The jury further found that in the commission of the robbery defendant had personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5. In light of that finding, it is clear the jury conclusively determined defendant to be the actual killer. They were instructed the finding could be found true only if defendant personally used the firearm in the commission of the robbery, and were expressly told that the aiding and abetting instructions did not apply to the firearm-use finding. The term used a firearm was defined as: to display a firearm in a menacing manner, intentionally to fire it, or intentionally to strike or hit a human being with it. (CALJIC No. 17.19 (1980 Rev.), italics added.) Here, the rifle was never displayed to the victim in a menacing manner, nor was he struck with it. Rather, he was ambushed from behind as he kneeled baiting his hook, and felled with a single bullet to the back of his head. Since defendant was found to be the actual killer who personally, intentionally fired the fatal shot, the aiding and abetting instructions given here had no effect upon the guilty verdict.