Opinion ID: 848845
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the castle doctrine

Text: It is universally accepted that retreat is not a factor in determining whether a defensive killing was necessary when it occurred in the accused's dwelling: Regardless of any general theory to retreat as far as practicable before one can justify turning upon his assailant and taking life in self-defense, the law imposes no duty to retreat upon one who, free from fault in bringing on a difficulty, is attacked at or in his or her own dwelling or home. Upon the theory that a man's house is his castle, and that he has a right to protect it and those within it from intrusion or attack, the rule is practically universal that when a person is attacked in his own dwelling he may stand at bay and turn on and kill his assailant if this is apparently necessary to save his own life or to protect himself from great bodily harm. [40 Am. Jur. 2d, § 167, p. 636.] The rule has been defended as arising from `an instinctive feeling that a home is sacred, and that it is improper to require a man to submit to pursuit from room to room in his own house.' People v. Godsey, 54 Mich.App. 316, 319, 220 N.W.2d 801 (1974) (citations omitted). Moreover, in a very real sense a person's dwelling is his primary place of refuge. Where a person is in his castle, there is simply no safer place to retreat.
Defendant, who was outside his home in the driveway or yard between the home and a detached garage at the time of the homicide, contends that he was wholly excused from any obligation to retreat because he was in his castle. We disagree and hold that the castle doctrine, as it applied in this state and as was codified in our murder statute in 1846, applies solely to the dwelling and its attached appurtenances. Although many courts have extended the castle exception to other areas, [26] we conclude that there is simply no basis in the case law of this state, contemporaneous with the enactment of our initial murder statute, to justify extending the rule in this manner. It is unknown whether the English common law applied the castle doctrine which, as we have noted, was relevant only to the voluntary participant in a nondeadly encounterto areas beyond the dwelling. As noted by Professors Perkins and Boyce, the scope of [the] special privilege granted to one so far at fault might have been limited to the actual building [but this] is mere speculation. Id. at 1134-1135, 220 N.W.2d 801. Because the only indication we have of the castle doctrine as it applied in Michigan at the time of the codification of our murder statute is that it applied in the dwelling, Pond, supra at 176 (emphasis supplied), we lack the authority to now extend this rule to areas beyond the dwelling itself. Defendant contends that this Court's statements in Pond indicate that Michigan's common law extended the castle doctrine to the curtilage surrounding the home. However, we agree with the prosecution's contention that Pond did not in any way purport to extend the self-defense castle exception to the curtilage area surrounding the dwelling. [27] With respect to self-defense, this Court explained in Pond that [t]he danger resisted must be to life, or of serious bodily harm of a permanent character; and it must be unavoidable by other means. Of course, we refer to means within the power of the slayer, so far as he is able to judge from the circumstances as they appear to him at the time. A man is not, however, obliged to retreat if assaulted in his dwelling, but may use such means as are absolutelynecessary to repel the assailant from his house, or to prevent his forcible entry, even to the taking of life. But here, as in the other cases, he must not take life if he can otherwise arrest or repel the assailant. [Emphasis supplied.] This statement of the castle rule, taken from a case issued quite contemporaneously with the enactment of our murder statute, provides no basis from which to conclude that the rule applied anywhere but in [the] dwelling, that is, an inhabited building and its attached appurtenances. [28] Pond, therefore, does not allow us to conclude that the castle doctrine, so far as it was a part of the common law of this state when our murder statute was enacted, extended to the curtilage surrounding the dwelling. Instead, by providing essentially the sole indication, contemporaneous with the enactment of the murder statute, concerning whether and to what extent any duty to retreat existed in our common law, Pond establishes that the castle doctrine applies in this State only to a residence. Thus, for example, while the castle doctrine applies to all areas of a dwellingbe it a room within the building, a basement or attic, or an attached appurtenance such as a garage, porch or deckit does not apply to open areas in the curtilage that are not a part of a dwelling. Defendant additionally argues that Lilly provides a basis for extending the castle exception to the curtilage. In Lilly, the defendant was attacked at night on his property in a passageway between his house and a new house that he was constructing. The defendant stabbed and killed the attacker, a farmhand whom he had recently discharged and who had earlier that day threatened the defendant with extreme personal violence. At the defendant's trial for murder, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: If you find that ... [the defendant] could have saved himself from all serious harm by retreating or calling for assistance, and the defendant so knew or believed, but that he did not do so; but stood his ground and resisted [the farmhand], and in such resistance killed [him], such killing would not be justifiable or excusable. If [the defendant] believed that [the farmhand] came to his premises on the evening of the homicide with the intention of seeking a combat with him, and that he sought him for that purpose and the defendant so knew, then it was [the defendant's] duty to have avoided [him], and to have avoided such combat by all reasonable means within his power, and if he chose to stand up and resist the assault when he might have avoided it,... such killing would not be justifiable. [Id. at 275.] This Court set aside the defendant's conviction for manslaughter and ordered a new trial, holding that the jury instructions improperly suggested to the jury that the facts would warrant findings that were not supported by the evidence, especially that defendant did not make reasonable efforts to avoid deceased and avert his attack. Id. Furthermore, this Court held, the instructions were improper because they indicated to the jury ... [that] it was incumbent upon [the defendant] to fly from his habitation where his wife and children were, in order to escape danger instead of resisting the aggressor. Such is not the law. The jury should have been instructed in effect that if they were satisfied that [the defendant] being at his own house had reason to believe and did believe from [the farmhand's] previous and present language, manner and actions, and what had already taken place, that it was necessary to inflict the wounds he did inflict ... to save his own life or to protect himself from danger of great bodily harm, he was excused. ... The charge was inconsistent with the view here explained, and it conveyed the idea that if help was within call and that defendant so believed, then his act was not lawful self-defense. [Id. at 275-276.] We do not agree with defendant's assertion that Lilly abrogates the necessity element of self-defense where the accused kills an assailant within the curtilage of his dwelling. Instead, Lilly reaffirms that the fundamental inquiry with respect to a claim of self-defense is whether the defendant reasonably believed that it was necessary to utilize deadly force against his aggressor. Lilly further establishes that the defendant was not required to leave his premisesthereby subjecting his wife and children to danger in his absenceor to seek aid from third parties. Lilly simply did not involve the castle exception. In short, there is no basis in our case law for supposing that Michigan ever recognized an extension of the doctrine beyond the inhabited dwelling itself at the time the common-law rules were codified. Instead, we adhere to this Court's formulation of the doctrine in Pond, supra at 176, that [a] man is not ... obliged to retreat if assaulted in his dwelling (emphasis supplied). Thus, the castle doctrine is relevant only to acts of self-defense that take place in the dwelling; the doctrine has no application to a conflict outside the home. People v. Stallworth, 364 Mich. 528, 535, 111 N.W.2d 742 (1961). [29]