Opinion ID: 149112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relation Back Under the FCA

Text: At the time of trial the FCA did not by its terms address relation back, but the district court held the FCA nonetheless implicitly permitted an otherwise untimely claim to relate back under what is now Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B). See 563 F.Supp.2d at 139-40 n. 137 (interpreting what was then Rule 15(c)(2)). In 2009, after trial but before this appeal was briefed, the Congress amended the FCA expressly to provide for relation back. The statute now reads: For statute of limitations purposes, any such Government pleading shall relate back to the filing date of the complaint of the person who originally brought the action, to the extent that the claim of the Government arises out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the prior complaint of that person. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c). The statute as thus amended applies to this case on appeal. Although most of the 2009 amendments to the FCA apply only to conduct on or after the date of enactment, the provision permitting relation back was made expressly appl[icable] to cases pending on the date of enactment. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub.L. No. 111-21, § 4(f)(2), 123 Stat. 1617, 1625 (emphasis added). The defendants' arguments that the amended statute cannot constitutionally be applied to this case are unpersuasive. The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution applies only to penal legislation. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-91, 1 L.Ed. 648, (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (citing Calder ). The FCA is not penal. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100-03, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (overruling Court's prior decision that a civil FCA proceeding could be criminal under the Double Jeopardy Clause). We need not address the arguments concerning the Takings and the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution because they were raised in only two conclusory sentences. See Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d 1306, 1312 (D.C.Cir.2010) (Federal courts should not... decide [a] constitutional question unless it is presented with the clarity needed for effective adjudication.) (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 869 (D.C.Cir.2001) (A litigant does not properly raise an issue by addressing it in a cursory fashion with only bare-bones arguments.) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants argue the Congress did not intend that the amendment reach cases in which the Government had already intervened because it referred to cases pending rather than to  all pending cases. In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), upon which the defendants rely, the Supreme Court discussed in a footnote the use and omission of all and any in statutory provisions. See id. at 328-29 n. 4, 117 S.Ct. 2059. There the Court interpreted a retroactivity provision that on its face applied only to one of several chapters in the statute. See id. at 326-27, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 107, 110 Stat. 1214, 1226 (Chapter 154 ... shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act)); see also Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 356, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999) (explicating Lindh ). Unlike the statute interpreted in Lindh, the clause in the FERA specifying the effective date of the provision concerning relation back is not limited in scope to a particular type of case or subset of cases. The defendants, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2229, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010), would also have us infer, from a temporal sequence or choice of verb tense, that Congress intended to limit the effect of the statute to cases in which the Government has not yet intervened. We have no need to draw inferences, however, when the statute is clear on its face. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.) (internal quotation marks deleted). The amendment applies to cases pending on the date of enactment. Pub.L. No. 111-21, § 4(f)(2), 123 Stat. 1617, 1625. Because this case was pending on the date of enactment, the amendment applies. Q.E.D. The defendants urge us to adopt an equitable doctrine of relation back and so not to allow the Government's claims to relate back in this case because it delayed filing its own complaint and unsealing Miller's complaint until several years after the statute of limitations had run. We reject this argument because the statute, as amended, permits both relation back andif good cause be shownmaintaining the relator's complaint under seal indefinitely beyond the sixty days. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3). Although the Government may take advantage of the relator's filing date, the FCA still does limit the claims it may add. Under the new provision, the Government's complaint can relate back to the original complaint only to the extent that the claim of the Government arises out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the prior complaint. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c). The defendants do not argue the scope of the Government's claims concerning Contract 20A impermissibly expands beyond that of Miller's. Accordingly we hold the Government's claims concerning Contract 20A are not barred by the statute of limitations because they relate back to Miller's original timely complaint.