Opinion ID: 1366630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cinnamon Hills' constitutional claims.

Text: Although only touched upon in the litigants' briefing papers, this court may examine constitutional issues on appeal that substantially impact the rights of the litigants. McCullough v. State, 99 Nev. 72, 74, 657 P.2d 1157, 1158 (1983). Exercising this prerogative, we find it inappropriate to allow this case to proceed at the trial court level encumbered by Cinnamon Hills' legally deficient, constitutionally based claims for relief. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), a litigant has a federal cause of action for damages when an official acting under the color of state law infringes upon a protected constitutional right. Moreover, a litigant may state a viable § 1983 claim if denied a building permit in violation of protected constitutional rights. Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.1988); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1421 (4th Cir.1983). Yet absent any constitutional infringement, a § 1983 claim fails. In the instant case, we conclude that Boulder City did not violate any of Cinnamon Hills' constitutional rights. First, denial of a building permit was not an unconstitutional taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Even assuming that Cinnamon Hills had exercised its option to purchase the development property, denial of a permit to build living quarters for the elderly did not destroy all viable economic value of the prospective development property. Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1131 (3rd Cir.) (denial of building permit does not destroy all economic use of property in violation of Takings Clause), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851, 109 S.Ct. 134, 102 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988); see also Scott, 716 F.2d at 1421. Hence, there was no Fifth Amendment takings violation. Second, Boulder City could not have violated Cinnamon Hills' substantive due process rights. The grant of a building permit was discretionary. Therefore, under the applicable land use laws, Cinnamon Hills did not have a vested entitlement to a constitutionally protected property interest. This point is aptly illustrated by Gardner v. Baltimore Mayor & City Council, 969 F.2d 63 (4th Cir.1992). In Gardner, a developer filed a § 1983 claim against the Baltimore City Council for allegedly infringing upon its substantive due process property rights by denying the developer a building permit. In upholding summary judgment in favor of the City Council, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the developer had to show an entitlement to the permit before any substantive due process interest was created. If the City Council had any discretion in granting or denying the permit, there could be no entitlement and no constitutionally protected interest. Id. at 69. The court opined that the constitution was not a tool for obtaining damages in matters of pure legislative and local concernland use management: Several circuits have applied Roth 's [ Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577[, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548] (1972) ] `claim of entitlement' standard to substantive due process challenges to municipal land-use decisions. Under this approach, whether a property-holder possesses a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permit or approval turns on whether, under state and municipal law, the local agency lacks all discretion to deny issuance of the permit or to withhold its approval. . . . . [This] standard represents a sensitive recognition that decisions on matters of local concern should ordinarily be made by those whom local residents select to represent them in municipal governmentnot by federal courts. It also recognizes that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not function as a general overseer of arbitrariness in state and local land-use decisions. Id. at 68-69 (emphasis in original); see also Mackenzie v. City of Rockledge, 920 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11th Cir.1991). As evidenced by Gardner, resolution of Cinnamon Hills' substantive due process claim is a matter of statutory interpretation. At issue is the exclusionary language of the Growth Control Ordinance and Resolution 638. After examining these two rules, it is clear that Boulder City retained discretion in granting a building permit to Cinnamon Hills. The language of the Growth Control Ordinance indicates that an allotment allocation exception for senior citizens housing must be approved by the City. This evinces an intention to retain control over the municipality's senior citizens housing developments, even in light of any language carving out an exception to the allotment process. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. CMC of Nevada, 99 Nev. 739, 744, 670 P.2d 102, 105 (1983) (court should read every sentence, word, and phrase of ordinance within context of the purpose of the legislation). Additionally, this intention is not thwarted by any of the language contained in Resolution 638. Resolution 638 merely defines what is meant by an eligible housing project for the elderly. It cannot mean that any time a developer meets the criteria therein, it is automatically entitled to a building permit regardless of the size or desirability of the project. This conclusion would affront the entire purpose behind the Growth Control Ordinance and what Resolution 638 was meant to promote. [3] Finally, aside from the foregoing ordinance interpretation analysis, Boulder City certainly thought that it had discretion to accept or reject Cinnamon Hills' permit application. Boulder City's interpretation of its own land use laws is cloaked with a presumption of validity and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 242, 362 P.2d 268, 270 (1961); see also State v. State Engineer, 104 Nev. 709, 713, 766 P.2d 263, 266 (1988) (administrative agency afforded great discretion in interpreting statute that it is charged with enforcing). We cannot conclude that Boulder City manifestly abused its discretion in interpreting the Growth Control Ordinance and Resolution 638. While the subject language is not a model of clarity, it would certainly accommodate the interpretation that Boulder City had the discretion to accept or reject Cinnamon Hills' permit request. In light of our interpretation of these land use laws and Boulder City's broadly defined zoning powers, we conclude that the City Council had discretion to accept or reject Cinnamon Hills' permit request. As a result, Cinnamon Hills did not have an entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. As a final point, we also conclude that Boulder City did not violate Cinnamon Hills' equal protection rights. With no suspect classification at issue, Cinnamon Hills faced a heavy burden to prove that Boulder City intentionally discriminated on the basis of class and its actions were not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540-41, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); see also Southern Pacific v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 507 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 382, 116 L.Ed.2d 333 (1991); Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir.1990); Carpenter v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 804 F.Supp. 1316, 1329 (D.Nev.1992). Cinnamon Hills failed in this task. We have searched the record on appeal and find no evidence establishing or even suggesting that Boulder City was motivated by intentional class-based discrimination. New Burnham Prairie Homes v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th Cir.1990) (simple disparate treatment from another developer does not present an equal protection claim). Moreover, even assuming that Boulder City was so motivated, its actions do not fail rational basis scrutiny. From the inception of the Cinnamon Hills project, there was opposition to the development from the municipality's citizenry. At the initial Allotment Committee meeting on February 29, 1988, and again at the City Council meeting on April 12, 1988, town residents complained that the development was not suited for a senior citizen community, located too far from essential services and not supported by public transportation. In addition, it is undisputed that when the City Council rejected Cinnamon Hills' building permit, it had already committed to a 181-unit development proposed by the Villages. Boulder City claimed that all these factors indicated the need to reject the permit in furtherance of the Growth Control Ordinance. Mackenzie, 920 F.2d at 1559-60 (denial of a permit in an effort to limit commercial development is sufficient rationale to defeat equal protection constitutional attack on zoning decision); see also Christian Gospel Church v. San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999, 111 S.Ct. 559, 112 L.Ed.2d 565 (1990). Cinnamon Hills responds to this analysis, claiming that the unconstitutional nature of Boulder City's action is evidenced by the different treatment afforded to the Villages development. There is evidence that the City Council was swayed by negotiations and pressuring from the Villages. In fact, this led to the City Council reaching a compromise with that developer, issuing an allotment/exception combination so that the Villages could construct a 181-unit senior citizens living complex. Cinnamon Hills also alleges that Boulder City's claim that it was considering several other proposed housing projects for the elderly was contrived after two different orders of remand from the district court. Cinnamon Hills' contentions are unpersuasive. Any conflict of evidence or allegations of contrived rationale are irrelevant to this court when considering the constitutional implications of Boulder City's actions. It is well-settled under rational basis scrutiny that the reviewing court may hypothesize the legislative purpose behind legislative action. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 461, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980); see also Brandwein v. California Bd. of Osteopathic Ex'rs, 708 F.2d 1466, 1470-71 (9th Cir.1983). Additionally, simply admitting that facts supporting the governmental action are arguable or in dispute is enough to constitutionally justify the state action. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111, 99 S.Ct. 939, 950, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979). The record indicates that Boulder City rejected Cinnamon Hills' permit request due to citizen opposition and a glut of proposed development projects for the elderly. The fact that the Villages development was approved by the City Council, and the Cinnamon Hills development was not, does not support a § 1983 equal protection cause of action. The United States Constitution simply does not forbid democratic government to succumb to individual and public pressures in reaching land use decisions that work to the detriment of an individual litigant. Greenbriar, LTD. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1579 (11th Cir.1989) (upholding permit denial decision under substantive due process attack). Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Boulder City did not violate any rights afforded Cinnamon Hills by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. [4]