Opinion ID: 787590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Related Expenditure Provision is Constitutional as to Contributions

Text: 182 We also affirm the District Court's holding that the related expenditure provisions of Act 64 are constitutional because they serve to reinforce the anti-corruption goals of the contribution limitations. Pursuant to Act 64, related expenditures on behalf of a candidate by a third party count toward the third party's contribution limit as well as the candidate's expenditure limit. The Act defines related expenditures as those intentionally facilitated by, solicited by or approved by the candidate or the candidate's political committee. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2809(c). The plaintiffs challenge the provision on three grounds: (1) the phrase facilitated by is vague; (2) political parties and PACs should have greater abilities to engage in coordinated expenditures with candidates; and (3) the Act's rebuttable presumption that an expenditure benefiting six or fewer candidates is a related expenditure is a content-based speech restriction discouraging advertisements about a small number of candidates. We reject each claim. 183 Plaintiffs argue that the facilitated by standard is vague because it leaves open the possibility that any communication about a candidate's views with a third party that then undertakes independent expenditures will qualify as a contribution. The First Amendment permits the treatment of coordinated expenditures as contributions to a candidate. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47, 96 S.Ct. 612. Independent expenditures may not be limited because the absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo. Federal Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985). The plaintiffs' objection to Act 64 is really one which assumes that the word facilitated has its broadest meaning, akin to giving any aid in support of the third-party expenditure. If that were what the statute meant, then we would agree that the provision might raise constitutional problems. 184 We think that, in light of the terms solicited by or approved by that accompany it, the term facilitated should be given a narrower reading. Such a reading would also resolve the ambiguity of the statutory language so as to guarantee the constitutionality of the statute. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 873-89 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing canon of constitutional avoidance). Accordingly, we construe the phrase facilitated by as requiring some prearrangement or coordination with the candidate. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 498, 105 S.Ct. 1459. Under such a construction, sharing routine information about a candidate is not sufficient to meet the facilitated by requirement. Thus, the provision is not constitutionally invalid. 185 Nor is there any constitutional barrier to applying this provision to related expenditures by PACs and political parties. The plaintiffs' argument on this point substantially restates their claim discussed above—that different contribution limits ought to apply to PACs and political parties. We reject it for the same reasons. 186 Finally, the provision's rebuttable presumption, which presumes that expenditures by political parties or PACs that benefit six or fewer candidates are contributions to those candidates, does not violate the Constitution by chilling protected speech. The plaintiffs argue that the presumption is unconstitutional because (1) the law may never presume that an expenditure is coordinated and (2) the presumption could never be rebutted and, as a result, chills independent advocacy of particular candidates. We find neither claim persuasive. 187 The Constitution does not bar the use of rebuttable presumptions in this context. The plaintiffs base their argument on Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) ( Colorado Republican I ). There, the Supreme Court struck down a federal provision that automatically treated all party expenditures, including those made independently, as contributions to candidates. The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' analysis that the government was entitled to a conclusive presumption that party expenditures are coordinated. Id. at 619, 116 S.Ct. 2309. The fact that the presumption was conclusive, however, played the critical role in that decision: it eliminated the need for a finding that the expenditures were in fact coordinated and foreclosed the possibility of a defense. Id. at 625, 116 S.Ct. 2309. Act 64 does nothing of the sort, since its presumption is rebuttable. 188 The plaintiffs' argument that the presumption is functionally conclusive because one cannot prove a negative is, at least in the legal arena, inaccurate. There are ample strategies that an accused party can employ to demonstrate that an expenditure was truly independent from the candidate it supported. The party can, for example, testify that no discussion took place with the candidate about advertising strategies, including the sharing of information about advertising plans. Candidates can testify that they never gave feedback on an independent advertising scheme or that the third parties never solicited such feedback. Adjudicative bodies can take such evidence, or other similar testimony, as proof and infer a lack of coordination. For these reasons, we uphold Act 64's rebuttable presumption concerning related expenditures. 189