Opinion ID: 854572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Over-Detention Claims

Text: As for the over-detention claims, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to individuals the right to be free from excessive continued 5 Case: 12-11422 Date Filed: 03/07/2013 Page: 6 of 14 detention after a jail or prison ceases to have a legal right to detain the individual. See Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1562–63 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the “right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release”); Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980).4 A Fourteenth Amendment claim based on over-detention “must meet the elements of common law false imprisonment and establish that the imprisonment worked a violation of [F]ourteenth [A]mendment due process rights.” Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1562–63 (footnote omitted). “The elements of common law false imprisonment are an intent to confine, an act resulting in confinement, and the victim’s awareness of confinement.” Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009). “To establish a due process violation, [Plaintiffs] must prove that [Barrett] acted with deliberate indifference.” Id. Deliberate indifference exists when a government official “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; and (2) disregarded that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “[D]eliberate indifference requires that the indifference be a deliberate choice, which is an exacting standard.” Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 4 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 6 Case: 12-11422 Date Filed: 03/07/2013 Page: 7 of 14 334, 344 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). There is no evidence Barrett personally participated in the releases of the Plaintiff inmates here. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims against Barrett are based on supervisory liability. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend the Jail employees working for Barrett violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights and Barrett, as their supervisor, is liable for those officials’ wrongful conduct. A supervisory official is only liable under § 1983 “for the unconstitutional acts of [her] subordinates . . . . if there is a causal connection between [her] actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” West, 496 F.3d at 1328 (original alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The necessary causal connection exists when: (1) “a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation and he fails to do so”; (2) “a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights”; (3) “facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully”; or (4) facts support an inference that the supervisor “knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations and original alterations omitted) (emphasis added). The standard for supervisory liability is “extremely rigorous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Case: 12-11422 Date Filed: 03/07/2013 Page: 8 of 14 Assuming without deciding that, when they were over-detained, Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the Jail employees, Plaintiffs have not established that Barrett is liable as a supervisor. As for the first possible method for establishing the necessary causal connection, notice and failure to take corrective action, Barrett concedes that she was on notice of a widespread over-detention problem during the relevant period. The over-detentions were not created by Barrett but by: (1) a shortage of staff; (2) a sharp increase in the average daily Jail population owing to an influx of Atlanta Police Department arrestees; and (3) inefficient filing and communication systems of the courts. Nevertheless, the record shows that Barrett took significant corrective actions. For example, Barrett attempted to increase the number of Jail staff processing release orders by: (1) requesting additional funds from Fulton County; (2) seeking authorization to allow civilian employees to process release orders; and (3) by requiring all department employees to work shifts at the Jail. Additionally, Barrett reformed the Jail’s methods of processing release orders by: (1) posting a board in the release order processing office that displayed the number of releaseeligible inmates awaiting release; (2) requiring bonding companies to arrive at specific times each day; and (3) implementing a new filing system that required records to be kept in a filing cabinet instead of in milk crates. Barrett also 8 Case: 12-11422 Date Filed: 03/07/2013 Page: 9 of 14 attempted to improve communication between the courts and the Jail by: (1) asking judges to use a standardized release order form; (2) asking judges to send all release orders to a single fax machine located at the Jail; and (3) assigning a deputy to work as a liaison between the Jail and the courts. Barrett did these things after hiring a new Chief Jailer and tasking him with studying and improving the Jail’s release operations. Barrett’s corrective measures were very similar to corrective measures that this Court previously considered in another case involving over-detention claims. West, 496 F.3d at 1325–26. As is the case here, in West, the jail supervisors admitted that they were aware of an over-detention problem. Id. at 1329. Because, however, the supervisory defendants acted to correct the over-detention problem, we held that they were not subject to supervisory liability under the first method described in Cottone. Id. at 1330. For example, the supervisory defendants in West: (1) attempted to improve channels of communication between the courthouse and the jail; (2) requested that employees work overtime; (3) shifted employees from other departments to the jail’s release processing units; (4) installed new computer systems at the jail; and (5) hired new employees. Id. Like in West, Barrett’s corrective measures were sufficient to rebut any showing of a causal connection between Barrett’s actions and any constitutional deprivations 9 Case: 12-11422 Date Filed: 03/07/2013 Page: 10 of 14 that Plaintiffs suffered. 5 As for the second possible method, deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs must show that Barrett’s chosen custom or policy resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. See Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1358. This they did not do. There is no evidence that any custom or policy adopted by Barrett created the Jail’s overdetention problem. Instead, as discussed above, various factors outside of Barrett’s control created the problem, including: (1) a 29% increase in the Jail’s inmate population caused by the Atlanta Police Department’s decision to send all arrestees suspected of committing state offenses to the Jail instead of to City detention facilities; (2) understaffing in departments responsible for processing release orders; (3) delays in transmitting release orders from the Fulton County Courthouse to the Jail; (4) Jail officials’ difficulties in interpreting release orders; (5) twice-weekly maintenance-related shutdowns of the Jail’s computer system; and (6) the Jail, the district attorney, and the court system each using different computer systems. As to the third and fourth methods, there is no evidence that Barrett directed any subordinates to act unlawfully and no evidence sufficient to support an inference that she knew subordinates would act unlawfully. The district court did 5 To the extent that Plaintiffs contend that Barrett is liable for a failure to train or a failure to supervise, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Jail officials did not receive adequate training or supervision in processing release orders. 10 Case: 12-11422 Date Filed: 03/07/2013 Page: 11 of 14 not err in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to show a constitutional violation by Defendant Barrett personally or as a supervisor and in granting summary judgment to Defendant Barrett on Plaintiffs’ over-detention claims based on qualified immunity.