Opinion ID: 687305
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compliance with the Strip Search Statute

Text: 32 The appellant next argues that the district court erred in holding that Davis's failure to comply with all of the requirements of the Illinois strip search statute did not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Although he recognizes that a claim under Sec. 1983 must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988), the appellant asserts that his claim meets this requirement because the alleged violation of the state statute implicated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 33 Analysis of the appellant's argument is somewhat difficult because the Fourteenth Amendment provides both substantive and procedural due process rights, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), and the appellant's brief fails to identify the theory he intends to pursue. Close scrutiny, however, shows that his claim must fail under either theory. 34 First, with regard to substantive due process, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits a state from violating a fundamental right--i.e., one that is among those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1446-47, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The Supreme Court has used a process of selective incorporation to find that most, if not all, of the provisions of the Bill of Rights constitute such fundamental liberty interests. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2804, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). 35 The Supreme Court has also gone on to identify other significant interests that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution but which deserve protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's due process clauses. See id. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2804-08 (describing cases in which substantive due process rights have been recognized). However, the rights encompassed by this theory have been carefully limited to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. Albright v. Oliver, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 807, 812, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). 36 The appellant argues that the state of Illinois has created a federally protected liberty interest by enactment of the state statute and regulations governing strip searches. In support of this argument, he cites the decision in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), which stated that [a] State may create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause through its enactment of certain statutory or regulatory measures. However, what appellant fails to recognize is that the Supreme Court has never held that such state-created interests constitute a fundamental liberty interest protected under a substantive due process theory. Rather, the Court has analyzed state-created liberties under a procedural due process theory. 37 We find, therefore, that the state strip search statute does not create a substantive due process right. There is no question that Kraushaar's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (holding Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). However, as this court made clear in the recent case of Doe v. Burnham, 6 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir.1993), the provisions of the state statute are irrelevant to that analysis--i.e., plaintiffs cannot rely upon provisions of state law to determine what conduct is reasonable under the federal Constitution. 38 Burnham, like the case at bar, involved a Sec. 1983 claim alleging that the police had conducted an illegal strip search of an arrestee. At issue on appeal was the propriety of a jury instruction on the Fourth Amendment's standard for reasonableness. The first part of the instruction correctly set forth the law when it stated that: Law enforcement officers may not strip search an individual for contraband unless the officers have a reasonable basis to believe at the time of the search that the individual is concealing contraband on his or her body. The test of reasonableness requires a balancing of the privacy interests involved in the search and the government's need for conducting the search. However, the last part of the instruction improperly tied the reasonableness of the search to the Illinois strip search statute. 39 Although the instruction initially encouraged the jury to consider the constitutional standards for reasonableness, it ultimately required the jury to confine its assessment of reasonableness to the norms of Illinois law. The problem is that the norms embodied in the Constitution and the norms authorized by the Illinois legislature are not necessarily interchangeable. In fact, a state may provide greater protections under its laws than the Constitution requires.... The Illinois legislature's sense of reasonableness cannot be grafted onto the Fourth Amendment. Illinois may set its own standards and provide remedies under its laws for their violation. But just because Illinois chooses to regulate police behavior in a certain way does not mean the police officers violate the Constitution by transgressing those rules. 40 Id. at 480 (citations omitted). In short, Burnham reemphasizes that the violation of state law is not itself the violation of the Constitution. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 1338, 103 L.Ed.2d 809 (1989). Certainly [a] state ought to follow its law, but to treat a violation of state law as a violation of the Constitution is to make the federal government the enforcer of state law. State rather than federal courts are the appropriate institutions to enforce state rules. Id. 41 Turning to the procedural due process analysis, we must determine whether the state statute in fact created a liberty interest that would trigger a constitutional violation if fair procedures were not followed to deprive a plaintiff of that interest. As the appellant acknowledges, courts will find a liberty interest only if the state's statute or regulation uses language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will' or 'must' be employed, Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471, 103 S.Ct. at 871, and contains substantive standards or criteria for decisionmaking as opposed to vague standards that leave the decisionmaker with unfettered discretion. Miller v. Henman, 804 F.2d 421, 427 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 844, 108 S.Ct. 136, 98 L.Ed.2d 93 (1987). 42 In this case, the strip search statute uses mandatory language in stating that [n]o person arrested for a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled substance, shall be strip searched unless there is a reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a weapon or controlled substance. 725 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/103-1(c). Arguably under Hewitt, this portion of the statute creates a liberty interest in being free from unreasonable strip searches. However, as the district court pointed out, this interest is virtually identical to the appellant's existing Fourth Amendment right. Thus compliance with the Fourth Amendment would satisfy the state statutory requirement as well. 43 The appellant argues that the state statute goes on to provide that any police officer who conducts a strip search shall obtain written permission from a designated person and prepare a report regarding the search. Based upon this mandatory language, the appellant argues that the statute creates a liberty interest in being free from a strip search unless a command or watch officer issues a written authorization for the search and a written report is subsequently prepared. 44 This court has repeatedly rejected the notion that any and all state ... rules and regulations containing such language automatically create 'legitimate claims of entitlement' triggering the procedural protections of the due process clause. Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir.1990). Some statutes and regulations create only guidelines that direct the manner in which state personnel exercise their discretion to perform certain activities. See id.; Miller, 804 F.2d at 424. These types of guidelines do not create substantive rights or legally enforceable expectancies. Miller, 804 F.2d at 424. 45 By requiring written authorization and a written report, the Illinois statute appears to be establishing guidelines to direct state personnel in exercising their discretion to conduct a strip search rather than creating an expectancy that a strip search will not be done unless those requirements are met. However, even if we were to find that the strip search statute did create an expectancy, that would not end the inquiry. Under a procedural due process analysis, the deprivation of the liberty interest is not itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation without proper process (i.e. fair procedures). Colon, 899 F.2d at 666. Thus, the appellant must go on to prove that he was denied this expectancy without due process. 46 This analysis demonstrates the fundamental flaw in the appellant's case. He argues that he was denied the process set forth in the statute--i.e., obtaining written permission from a commander or watch officer before the search was conducted. However, it is well settled that [f]ederal judges do not enforce state-created procedures in the name of the Constitution. Gordon v. Degelmann, 29 F.3d 295, 301 (7th Cir.1994). 47 [S]tate procedural protections cannot define what process is due. The Fourteenth Amendment's limitation on state action would be illusory indeed if state practices were synonymous with due process.... [T]he task of defining the procedural protections which attach to [a protectable liberty interest] is wholly a matter of federal constitutional law and is accomplished through the balancing analysis of Matthews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ]. 3 48 Colon, 899 F.2d at 670 (internal quotations omitted). 49 What the appellant is really trying to argue is that the state can never conduct a strip search without first obtaining this written permission. That argument implicates a substantive due process, rather than a procedural due process, analysis. See Miller, 804 F.2d at 427 (the nub of a substantive due process claim is that some things the state just cannot do, no matter how much process it provides.). As discussed above, state-created liberty interests do not create federally enforceable rights. 50 In short, Davis's failure to follow procedures that are required by state law, but not by the federal Constitution, establishes only a violation of the state law. See Gordon, 29 F.3d at 301. The district court, therefore, properly held that the appellant could not rely upon the state strip search statute to establish either a substantive or procedural violation of his federal rights. 4