Opinion ID: 1592917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of good faith in the determination of necessity.

Text: We consider the most significant point raised on this issue to be the fact that at the same meeting at which the board adopted the resolution of necessity, it also went on record supporting the pending legislation which provided for a study by another state agency to determine the best use of the land. At a meeting of the land committee of the board on August 14, 1969, discussion was held concerning appellant's land and the condemnation thereof in accordance with a previously formulated plan to develop the area into a wildlife refuge and recreation area. At the board meeting which followed, it was proposed to condemn the land by adoption of a resolution which declared that the private lands were needed for conservation purposes. One of the members expressed a desire to condemn the land, parcel it off, and thereafter determine its ultimate use. Legal counsel advised the board that the sole question was whether the board wanted to condemn the land and use it for conservation purposes, and that the resolution of necessity must so state; if not, the land would have to be transferred to appellant pursuant to the prior agreement. After discussion with appellant concerning future negotiations relating to the proposed condemnation, the board passed a resolution declaring the necessity of obtaining the lands for purposes of recreation and a wildlife refuge. The board then endorsed Senate Bill 593 providing for acquisition of the same lands by the state building commission and a study of the best possible use of such lands. At trial, Smith testified it was his understanding as well as Voigt's, that condemnation would proceed, letting the future determine the ultimate use of the land. He further testified that he informed the governor's representatives that this was the posture of the department on the matter. Appellant attacks the finding of necessity for conservation purposes, contending the real reason for the condemnation was that it was advantageous to the state to take the lands immediately to avoid being forced to convey them to appellant. Sec. 23.09 (7) (d), Stats. 1967, declares the purposes for which land may be acquired through condemnation by the DNR: (d) Lands, acquisition. Acquire by purchase, condemnation, lease or agreement, and receive by gifts or devise, lands or waters suitable for the purpose hereinafter enumerated, and maintain the same for the said purposes: 1. For state forests for the purpose of growing timber, demonstrating forestry methods, protecting watersheds or providing public recreation. 2. For state parks for the purpose of preserving scenic or historical values or natural wonders. 3. For public shooting, trapping or fishing grounds or waters for the purpose of providing areas in which any citizen may hunt, trap or fish. 4. For fish hatcheries and game farms. 5. For forest nurseries and experimental stations. In Banach v. Milwaukee (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 328, 143 N. W. 2d 13, it was stated: Plaintiffs are in error contending that the motives of the members of the common council are material to a judicial review of the validity of the council's determination of the necessity for the taking of their land. Such determination of the necessity of taking is legislative in character. Therefore, the motives which prompt a legislative body, such as a city council, in performing such a legislative function are not within the field of judicial scrutiny. While determination of necessity of taking made by the body authorized by the legislature to make it is not beyond the pale of judicial review, such review operates within vary narrow limits. In Swenson v. Milwaukee County this court quoted with approval a statement from American Jurisprudence that courts normally will not disturb such a determination in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion. This court has held that the determination made of the necessity of taking is beyond question if there is any reasonable ground to support it. The determination of necessity was upheld in Banach where the city took condemned land of the plaintiff for the extension of an existing street. The court stated that in order to find that the taking would serve no purpose, the undisputed evidence would have to establish that the opening of the street would serve no useful purpose either presently or in the reasonably foreseeable future. In Schumm v. Milwaukee County (1951), 258 Wis. 256, 266, 45 N. W. 2d 673, the county attempted to condemn lands on which a private corporation would build a war memorial pursuant to an agreement between the county and the corporation. The contract contained certain contingencies which might have prevented the development of the site for a public use. The court, in upholding a challenge to the condemnation, held that [p]ublic use under this `contract' is thus made conditional but private property may not be condemned unless the public use in it is to be unequivocal and absolute except for necessary and reasonable regulation in the use and enjoyment thereof. In Swenson v. Milwaukee County (1954), 266 Wis. 129, 133, 63 N. W. 2d 103, it was stated: No doubt a court would find it necessary to interfere to prevent an abuse of discretion by an attempted taking of land in utter disregard of the necessity of its use, and would not consider itself bound by a mere legislative declaration of such purpose as a means of concealing a design to take it for an illegal purpose; that is not the situation here, however. In the instant case, there is evidence that progress had already begun on surrounding lands in establishing a wildlife refuge and public recreation facilities. This fact provides a reasonable basis for the finding of necessity to condemn the lands of appellant for conservation purposes. It is urged that by endorsing Senate Bill 593 there was a recognition by the board that conservation perhaps might not be the highest and best use of the land. If the proposed study provided for by the then pending legislation concluded that any other use of the property would be preferable, the board would accede to legislative pre-emption. There is no requirement that the board's finding of necessity for a public purpose be immediate or the most desirable. In 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), p. 553, sec. 4.11[2], it is stated: . . . The expediency of constructing a particular public improvement and the extent of the public necessity therefor are clearly not judicial questions; but it is obvious that, if property is taken in ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for a use that is not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the courts. As the trial court noted, the DNR could not use the lands for any other purpose than those allowed by sec. 23.09 (7) (d), Stats. Absent a determination by the legislature that some other use of the land constituted the best public use of the land, it must be assumed that the DNR would proceed in developing it for conservation purposes. We are not impressed with argument that during the discussion that preceded the adoption of the resolution, one of the board members inquired as to whether the resolution could be adopted without specifically providing that the lands be used for specified conservation purposes. Neither do we deem it to be significant that counsel came to the board with a previously prepared resolution of necessity.