Opinion ID: 782711
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged retaliatory withdrawal of vehicle privileges

Text: 52 On October 14, 1994, three days after Terry returned to work from medical leave and found himself assigned to Adams' unit, he was told he could no longer ride in a government car. 16 Terry claims that this prohibition was retaliatory. Defendants respond that there was no nexus between Terry's EEO activity and his vehicle suspension. Defendants claim that Terry's vehicle privileges were legitimately suspended because it was INS policy that government vehicles are only issued to persons who are on full duty, and that Terry was on light duty through January 9, 1994 on his doctor's orders. Terry counters that this action was retaliatory. He alleges that defendants were aware that he was able to successfully engage in activities requiring significant physical exertion because they knew he had excelled at the Police Olympics. In addition, he testified that no other ill agents were prohibited from riding in government cars. Consistent with this testimony, Ferrigno admitted at his deposition that he could not recall a single other instance in the 21 years he had worked for the INS in which an employee had not been allowed to ride in a government-owned vehicle because of his or her illness. This court fails to see any rational relationship between Terry's light duty status and the prohibition against his riding in a government-owned vehicle, and the defendants have failed to explain how a potential heart condition made it any less appropriate for Terry to merely sit in a moving car. 17 Moreover, the only evidence of a policy similar to that which defendants claim existed is Molerio's affidavit which states that government vehicles are only issued to persons of full duty status. However, the question before us is not whether a failure to issue Terry a vehicle could be seen as retaliatory, but rather whether the failure to even allow him to ride in one could be seen as retaliatory. Defendants have failed to put forth evidence of a policy which would support the prohibition against merely riding in government-owned vehicles. 53 Even if this court were to accept the defendants' explanation as legitimate, Terry has put forth sufficient evidence to support a finding that it was merely pretextual. First, the suspension occurred one day after a verbal altercation between Terry and Adams at which, according to Terry's affidavit, Adams allegedly told Terry that we'll take care of you tomorrow. Second, defendants fail to explain why the vehicle suspension apparently continued after Terry returned to full duty status. 54 Finally, defendants assert that the vehicle suspension could not be an adverse employment action. A reasonable trier-of-fact, however, could conclude that the inability to ride in a government-owned vehicle was a sufficiently adverse employment action where it would require plaintiff to undertake an allegedly much more taxing commute than would otherwise have been possible and where it appears that to fully engage in his new position Terry would have had to perform field work. 55 Because sufficient evidence was presented to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prohibition against riding in a government vehicle was retaliatory, granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's retaliation claim was improper. 56 5. Alleged retaliatory requirement to see a social worker, and resulting placement on administrative leave for 1½ years 57 Terry alleges that he was forced to see social worker Brian McDonald in retaliation for his EEO complaints. He further alleges that the Tarasoff warning issued by McDonald and his subsequent placement on administrative leave for 1½ years also resulted from a retaliatory motive. 58 The first allegation is wholly unsupported because Terry presents no evidence that defendants ever required him to meet with McDonald. The second allegation, however, is supported by evidence and should be heard by a trier-of-fact. 59 Contrary to the district court's conclusion, Terry has presented sufficient evidence for a trier-of-fact to conclude that there was a causal connection between his complaints and his placement on administrative leave. The district court stated that there was a lapse of over six months between when plaintiff filed an EEO complaint in September 1994 and when he was placed on leave. However, Terry's complaint alleges that he also filed an EEO complaint in February 1995, slightly less than three months before being placed on administrative leave. Moreover, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Terry, it appears that there was no meaningful lag time between his EEO activity and the onset of frequent harassment, 18 and a series of other retaliatory acts. 60 Also contrary to the district court's conclusion, Terry has presented sufficient evidence to permit the inference that defendants' stated rationale — i.e., the seriousness of a Tarasoff warning — was pretextual. Specifically, Terry has presented evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the warning was not credible, and that Terry's supervisors knew that it was not. Evaluating Terry some months later, Dr. Pappas stated that: 61 It is also my opinion, based on Mr. McDonald's lack of cooperation with this evaluation, that his Tarasoff Warning does not appear to be credible and germane to Mr. Terry's current functioning. Of particular significance, is that Mr. Terry never made any specific threats towards any individual, nor did he articulate any plan to carry out any harm against any individual. This information was ... verified by Mr. McDonald. 62 Consistent with this assessment, Terry testified that the warning was not the result of any threat he posed, but rather the result of pressure placed on McDonald by the INS which caused McDonald to compromise his professional integrity and declare Terry to be a threat. Terry testified that McDonald acknowledged to Terry that he knew the INS was after Terry and that the INS would go to great lengths to get him. Terry also testified that McDonald told him that he had never seen so much INS paperwork about one person, and stated If I could, I would like to see you in a one-man office out in Montauk Point looking for German submarines. Terry testified that he interpreted this statement as indicating that McDonald thought Terry was in some danger. Assuming that McDonald so testified at trial or that Terry's statements as to what McDonald said to him are admissible despite the hearsay rule, such statements might well make a reasonable fact-finder skeptical of the reasons offered by defendants for Terry's placement on administration leave. 63 Since Terry thus presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his placement on administrative leave was in retaliation for his EEO complaints, summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim was improper. 64 6. Alleged retaliatory transfer to the Deportation Branch and accompanying no promotion potential notation in his file 65 Terry contends that his transfer to the Deportation Branch when he returned from his lengthy administrative leave was a demotion. Terry alleges his new position was less prestigious and less glamorous than his previous position. He also complains that the transfer was accompanied by poor working conditions, including a failure to issue him any credentials or a badge, failure to initially give him a computer password or to give him computer training, and failure to provide him with either a desk or a workspace for his first two weeks in the position. Terry also claims that he was given low-level ministerial work which was unlike that assigned to other deportation officers. Finally, he notes that his transfer form contained the typed notation NO PROMOTION POTENTIAL. 66 Defendants respond by setting forth a non-discriminatory reason for transferring Terry out of the Investigations Branch: a recommendation from Dr. Pappas that Terry not work under supervisors with whom he'd had conflicts in the past. Since Molerio was one of those supervisors and was also the indirect supervisor of every special agent in the Investigations Branch, defendants claim that in transferring Terry to the Deportation Branch, the INS was merely following Pappas' recommendation. 67 Terry, however, has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that this rationale is merely pretextual. Specifically, Terry's evidence suggests that his supervisors transferred him in order to induce him to resign. Terry swore under oath that upon arriving at the deportation office, he spoke with his new supervisor who informed him that she had no idea that he had been reassigned to her office. According to Terry's affidavit, she then called Robert Bronillet, a personnel management supervisor at the district office, who stated: you mean to say he really showed up? 68 By comparison, we find that Terry has failed to show that the no promotion potential notation on his personnel form was itself retaliatory. Defendants explained that the INS routinely uses such notations when an employee has reached the top of the promotional ladder for the position he or she currently holds and can no longer be promoted non-competitively within that position. Terry has not provided any evidence to the contrary, nor has he alleged that he would have been eligible to receive non-competitive promotions in his former position. 69 Since we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether the transfer was retaliatory, although not as to whether the promotion notation was retaliatory, summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim was not proper. 70 7. Alleged retaliatory denial of annual leave time 71 Although not discussed in the district court's opinion, Terry testified in his deposition that because he was put on administrative leave, he was not able to use his 1996 annual leave time. He testified that he therefore requested that this leave time be restored so that he could use it later. This request was denied. Terry alleges that this denial was in retaliation for his refusal to quit in response to being reassigned to the Deportation Branch. Consistent with this allegation, Terry testified that he was able to restore his 1995 annual leave time and that defendants never indicated that there had been a change in policy or practice. 72 The denial of restoration of lost leave time is not sufficient to support a retaliation claim, however, as it is legally insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. By the time Terry was informed of the denial on February 28, 1997, he was no longer working as he was on medical leave. He never returned to work, allegedly because he was constructively discharged. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that Terry would ever have had the opportunity to use his annual leave time had it been granted. 19 73 That the denial of annual leave is not sufficient to support a retaliation claim is, however, of little practical consequence to Terry because his other evidence of retaliation is more than sufficient to defeat summary judgment.