Opinion ID: 1159053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: There Was A Rational Basis In The Evidence For A Verdict Acquitting Kupau Of The Offense Charged And Convicting Him Of The Included Offense.

Text: In Kupau, supra, the ICA correctly noted that [in] Hawai`i, a trial court `is not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.' HRS § 701-109(5) (1985). Id. at ___, 879 P.2d at 562. Accordingly, the ICA properly framed the threshold question as whether, based on the evidence in this case, the jury could rationally have acquitted [Kupau] of second degree assault charges and convicted him instead of third degree assault. Id. In order to answer the threshold question thoroughly, it is necessary to understand the interrelationship among a number of key provisions of the Hawai`i Penal Code, which establish a fundamental paradigm critical to a complete understanding of the substantive offenses set out in the code. In this connection, we noted in State v. Chung, 75 Haw. 398, 411, 862 P.2d 1063, 1070 (1993), that: HRS § 701-114 [(1)(a) and (b) (1985)] requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense, as well as `[the] state of mind required to establish each element of the offense.' State v. Pinero, [75 Haw. 282, 300, 859 P.2d 1369, 1378 (1993)]. Moreover, HRS § 702-204 (1985) provides in relevant part that a person is not guilty of an offense unless [the person] acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, with respect to each element of the offense. Finally, HRS § 702-207 (1985) provides that [when] the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. See also In re Doe, Born on January 5, 1976, 76 Hawai`i 85, 92, 869 P.2d 1304, 1311 (Sup. 1994). In addition, [pursuant] to HRS § 702-205 (1985), [4] [the requisite] state of mind applies to such conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct as are specified by the definition of the offense. Chung, 75 Haw. at 411-12 n. 8, 862 P.2d at 1071 n. 8. With the fundamental paradigm of the Hawai'i Penal Code in mind, we now turn our attention to the ICA's analysis in this case. The ICA's rationale as to why the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the included offense of assault in the third degree was as follows: The difference between these two types of assault [ i.e., assault in the second and third degrees] ... is the degree of injury, and pursuant to HRS § 701-109(4)(c) (1985), every charge of [assault in the second degree] under HRS § 707-711(1)(a) necessarily includes the [included] offense of [assault in the third degree] under HRS § 707-712(1)(a). .... Whether Rockwell's injuries amounted to a bone fracture or a major laceration, avulsion, or penetration of the skin so as to constitute substantial bodily injury was a question of fact for the jury, which could [rationally] have concluded that Rockwell did not sustain a substantial bodily injury. Consequently, [Kupau] could have been acquitted of the [assault in the second degree] charges [sic]. The jury could also have [rationally] concluded that Rockwell suffered at least physical pain, illness, or harm amounting to bodily injury and therefore convicted [Kupau] of the [included offense] of [assault in the third degree]. Therefore, a rational basis existed in the evidence for acquitting [Kupau] of the greater offense and convicting him of the [included offense], and pursuant to HRS § 701-109(5), [Kupau] was entitled to the [included offense] instruction. Kupau, ___ Hawai`i at ___ _ ___, 879 P.2d at 562-563 (footnote omitted). The ICA's analysis is not incorrect as far as it goes; assault in the second degree, pursuant to HRS § 707-711(1)(a), and assault in the third degree, pursuant to HRS § 707-712(1)(a), do indeed differ with respect to the requisite degree of injury  i.e., the result of Kupau's conduct. See HRS §§ 701-109(4)(c), 701-114(a), and 702-205. But in light of the nature of Rockwell's injuries, see supra at 6, we believe that there is a more significant difference and a broader issue  Kupau's requisite state of mind with respect to his conduct and the result thereof. See HRS §§ 701-109(4)(c), 701-114(1)(b), 702-204, and 702-205. First, assault in the second degree, in violation of HRS § 707-711(1)(a), requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intentional or knowing state of mind as to each material element in order to establish culpability; assault in the third degree, in violation of HRS § 707-712(1)(a), requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intentional, knowing, or reckless state of mind. In this connection, it is significant that Kupau claims that he struck Rockwell only once and in self-defense. If Kupau merely acted recklessly with respect to his conduct, see HRS §§ 702-206(3)(a) and 702-205, then he can be guilty at most of assault in the third degree even if his conduct resulted in Rockwell suffering substantial bodily injury. See HRS §§ 707-711(1)(a) and 707-712(1). Second, and equally important, even if Kupau acted intentionally or knowingly with respect to his conduct and Rockwell in fact suffered substantial bodily injury as a result thereof, if he did not so act with respect to that result  i.e., substantial bodily injury, see HRS §§ 707-711(1)(a) and 707-700  but merely acted recklessly with respect thereto, see HRS §§ 702-206(3)(c) and 702-205, then he may, depending upon the circumstances, likewise be guilty at most of assault in the third degree. See HRS §§ 707-711(1)(a), 707-712(1), 702-214 (1985), [5] and 702-215 (1985). [6]