Opinion ID: 66289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Argument

Text: “We review de novo a defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Anderson, 289 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002). A jury’s verdict must stand “if any reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Herrera, 931 F.2d 17 761, 762 (11th Cir. 1991). In addition, we have held that “convictions challenged on sufficiency of the evidence grounds can be affirmed based on a finding that a jury reasonably could infer from circumstantial evidence that the defendant[] acted knowingly and willfully.” United States v. Lockhart, 167 Fed. Appx. 111, 112 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Gafyczk, 847 F.2d 685, 692 (11th Cir. 1988)). For Counts One through Four, Germany contends that the government’s evidence fails to sufficiently prove the intent element, and on Count Five he argues lack of proof of an agreement between himself and Combs.17 We conclude that both of Germany’s sufficiency of the evidence arguments are wholly without merit. First, we consider Germany’s intent to misapply government funds as charged in Counts One through Four. Although direct evidence of Germany’s intent is limited, the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming. When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence presented at trial clearly supports Germany’s convictions. Germany directed a substantial amount of the district and park funds at his disposal to conduit entities – e.g., JCCEO, American Charities and the ETBA 17 Germany does not argue, and we do not consider, the sufficiency of the evidence as to the remaining elements of the charged misconduct. 18 – which, in turn, funneled those monies on to Germany’s friends, associates and, in many instances, back to Germany himself. The funds steered to the JCCEO were almost always unsolicited. Moreover, they were usually accompanied by specific instructions from Germany directing the JCCEO to disburse funds to organizations not named in the contract between the county and the JCCEO, in effect bypassing the county approval process altogether. The recipient organizations were usually connected to Germany in some form or fashion. MedHealth was a for-profit corporation run by Miller, an associate of Germany’s.18 MedHealth received $19,000 through JCCEO after Miller “helped” Germany’s wife obtain a Mercedes by spontaneously providing a $17,000 down payment on the car. Miller then received an unsolicited $2000 “scholarship” from American Charities, another organization funded by JCCEO at the express direction of Germany. American Charities also cut checks to Allen, Germany’s ex-girlfriend, and Starks, a “very good friend” of Germany’s, all pursuant to Germany’s instructions. Allen and Starks then used the funds for personal expenses and incidentals. The ETBA was also a prime beneficiary of Germany’s largesse. Founded and directed by Germany’s best friend (Combs), the ETBA received funds from 18 County rules prohibited county funding for for-profit organizations like MedHealth. 19 Germany both via JCCEO and through the UDV request process.19 The ETBA’s working address was Combs’s home address and Combs was the sole signatory on the ETBA account. Another association with the same name existed contemporaneously with Combs’s ETBA. That organization started little league in East Thomas Park and raised money in order to hire youth baseball and football officials. Combs was not associated with that organization nor were any county funds directed to it. Instead, county funds steered towards Combs’s ETBA were either deposited into Combs’s ETBA account or funneled through the ETBA and on to Germany’s friends and associates, e.g., McElroy, Allen, the Platinum Club, Dismuke and others. Germany contends that there is no direct evidence of any agreement between himself and Combs and, as such, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction on Count Five. We have held that “[i]n order to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government must show (1) the existence of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy; and (3) the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1281-82 19 Germany initiated both UDV requests for county funds to be directed to ETBA. Each request was accompanied with insufficient supporting documentation but each was approved nonetheless. 20 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Harmas, 974 F.2d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 1992)). Likewise, we have held that direct evidence is not required to sustain a conspiracy conviction. Indeed, “[t]here is rarely any direct evidence of an agreement to join a criminal conspiracy, and thus the defendant’s assent can be inferred from acts that furthered the conspiracy’s purpose.” United States v. Miller, 693 F.2d 1051, 1053 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The circumstantial evidence in support of Charge Five is substantial. Germany initiated both UDV requests for park funds for ETBA. The first request was accompanied by almost no supporting documentation. The second request came with price quotes for uniforms and landscaping services. No invoices were included and no landscaping services were ever provided. Nevertheless, both UDV requests were approved by the commission and paid out to ETBA. Once the funds hit Combs’s ETBA account, he almost immediately began writing checks to cash and disbursing funds to Germany’s friends and associates, as previously discussed. At the same time, Combs deposited large amounts of money into his personal account. He then wrote several checks directly to Germany and others to cash, which were later endorsed by Germany. Although Germany also wrote several checks to Combs during this period, Germany’s own witness testified that 21 Germany ultimately came out ahead, to the tune of about $26,000. Our cursory sketch of the record has yielded ample proof on which the jury could find Germany guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts. Our confidence in the verdict is undiminished by the circumstantial nature of much of the evidence. “As we have explained, it is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Anderson, 289 F.3d at 1325 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997)). In this case, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to arrive at such a conclusion and, as such, we conclude that Germany’s sufficiency of the evidence argument must fail. B. Indictment Charged Overt Acts Occurring Outside the Statute of Limitations In the district court, Germany challenged the government’s inclusion of certain charged overt acts in Count Five, claiming that their introduction was barred by the statute of limitations.20 As previously discussed, the district court 20 As noted by the district court, Germany contended that overt acts 1 through 14, 20 through 37, and 49 through 72 were alleged to have occurred prior to 28 July 2000, outside the five-year statute of limitations applicable to § 666. 22 denied Germany’s motion. Germany now renews his argument before us.21 “We review the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment for abuse of discretion, but the sufficiency of an indictment is a legal question that we review de novo.” United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review when considering a trial court’s application of Rule 403. See United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). The district court correctly observed that although the limitations period normally begins to run on the date on which a crime is complete, some offenses, such as conspiracy, are deemed “continuing offenses” because they are committed over a period of time. United States v. Gilbert, 136 F.3d 1451, 1453 (11th Cir. 1998). For continuing offenses, the statute of limitations commences on the date of the last overt act in furtherance of the crime. Id. at 1453 n.4. The statute of limitations is a bar in a conspiracy action only in the event that no overt action in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within the limitations period. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97, 77 S. Ct. 963, 969-70 (1957). In this case, the indictment contains multiple overt acts which occurred within the limitations 21 Germany’s argument stresses the unfairly prejudicial impact of the evidence compared to its probative value and so is largely predicated on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 23 period. We concur with the district court’s reasoning and conclude that the district court correctly denied Germany’s motion. In addition, mindful that we “look at ... [Rule 403] evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact[,]” we find Germany’s Rule 403 argument equally unpersuasive. Smith, 459 F.3d at 1295 (quoting United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 784 (11th Cir. 1989). C. Indictment was Constitutionally and Procedurally Defective Germany’s third argument centers on several alleged deficiencies in the government’s second superceding indictment. Specifically, Germany contends that the indictment insufficiently references 18 U.S.C. § 2 and fails to state essential facts with particularity. We address each argument in turn. As we noted previously, “the sufficiency of an indictment is a legal question that we review de novo.” Pendergraft, 297 F.3d at 1204. “Generally, an indictment is sufficient if it: 1) sets forth the elements of the offense in a manner which fairly informs the defendant of the charge against which he must defend and 2) enables him to enter a plea which will bar future prosecution for the same offense.” United States v. Poirier, 321 F.3d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir.) corrected on other grounds, 2003 WL 21211926 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Belt v. United States, 868 F.2d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, we have held that “when 24 analyzing challenges to the sufficiency of an indictment, courts give the indictment a common sense construction, and its validity is to be determined by practical, not technical, considerations.” Poirier, 321 F.3d at 1029 (quoting United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 813 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted)). 1. Indictment Insufficiently References 18 U.S.C. § 2 Germany contends that the indictment was defective because the government’s reference to “Section 2” in the indictment failed to indicate which subsection – (a) or (b) – applied. His argument fails because it runs counter to both the language in the indictment and our circuit precedent. Counts One through Four of the indictment charged that Germany “did knowingly, willfully, and intentionally misapply, and cause to be misapplied” funds and property, inter alia. R1-13 at 1-3. This language clearly tracks that in § 2(b) (“Whoever willfully causes an act to be done. . . .”) and fairly informs Germany of the charges against which he must defend. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b). Furthermore, we have held that a defendant can be convicted under § 2 even when the statute itself is not mentioned in the indictment. United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2004). 2. Indictment Fails to State Essential Facts with Particularity Germany also argues that the indictment fails to state with sufficient 25 particularity the distinction between “funds and property,” the identity of “persons known to the grand jury,” the amount of the funds valued at “$5000 or more,” and the identity of the “conduit entities and individuals” named in the indictment. For the following reasons, we disagree and conclude that Germany’s arguments are without merit.
Each count of the indictment specifies “funds and property.” R1-13 at 1-11. Germany contends that because the government failed to describe the type of property misapplied or the value of the property versus the value of the funds, the indictment was defective. Germany’s support for this proposition comes in the form of a First Circuit case that is readily distinguishable on its facts from this case. Moreover, we have previously found an indictment sufficient that alleged that defendants “did knowingly and willfully devise and intend to devise a scheme . . . to defraud Fulton County, Georgia, and its citizens of money and property. . . .” Poirier, 321 F.3d at 1029. We find that a commonsense construction of the five counts charged in the indictment and the over 150 overt acts listed therein fairly informed Germany of the charges against which he had to defend.
Germany next argues that the government’s use of the phrases “person 26 whose identity is known to the Grand Jury” and “unnamed co-conspirator” are fatal to the indictment. Our circuit precedent and the facts in the record dictate otherwise. Indictments that include the phrase “persons known to the grand jury” regularly pass muster in our circuit. See United States v. Luiz, 102 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Metallo, 908 F.2d 795 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Williams, 203 Fed. Appx. 976 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). In addition, the record indicates that the government provided Germany with the identities of the persons referenced in the indictment in its response to Germany’s motion for a bill of particulars and in its response to Germany’s motion for a pretrial evidentiary hearing. c. Funds Valued at $5000 or More and Identity of Conduit Entities and Individuals Finally, Germany contends that the indictment is impermissibly vague because the government failed to identify the funds valued at $5000 or more in Counts Two and Five and failed to specify the identities of the conduit entities and individuals in Count Five. Once again, the record refutes Germany’s argument. As previously noted, the government disclosed the identities of entities and individuals named in the indictment as well as the evidence relating to the “funds valued at $5000” in response to defense discovery requests and in response to the defense motion for a bill of particulars. We conclude that that information, 27 coupled with the list of over 150 overt acts for Count Five, more than adequately appraised Germany of the nature of the charges brought by the government. D. Germany’s Sentence was Unreasonable In Germany’s last argument, he contends that his sentence was unreasonable for two reasons. First, he argues that his sentence violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) and its progeny, because it was based on enhancements unsupported by a jury verdict. Second, he contends that the district court erred in applying the two-level enhancement for “status as a public official,” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(8)(Mar. 2006). We turn to Germany’s Apprendi argument first. Germany argues that the district court based its sentence on a finding that the amount misapplied was $479,990, when post-judgment expert testimony showed that the amount misapplied was $159,490. He concludes that his sentence should be vacated because he was sentenced on facts neither proven to a jury, nor admitted by him. As Germany did not object to the amount of the loss determination on the basis of Apprendi or United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), in the district court, our review is for plain error. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005). When reviewing for plain error, we can reverse 28 if there is (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. After Booker, “the use extra-verdict enhancements in an advisory guidelines system is not unconstitutional.” United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The district court may find facts not found by a jury, nor admitted by a defendant, and use them in formulating a sentence, as long as the district court properly applies the advisory guidelines. Id. at 1324. “The district court’s factual findings for purposes of sentencing may be based on, among other things, evidence heard during trial, undisputed statements in the PSI [Presentence Investigation], or evidence presented during the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004). In this case, the district court explicitly acknowledged that the sentencing guidelines were advisory. The district court excluded and included payments in its amount of loss calculation based upon the testimony of James Kiel, a special agent with the Alabama Attorney General’s office and chief investigator in this case.22 22 The district court made specific, detailed factual findings regarding the amount of loss and ultimately excluded nearly $200,000 from its loss calculation. The testimony and factual findings concerning the amount of loss inquiry filled about 100 pages of transcript. 29 As the district court’s sentence was imposed under advisory guidelines, its use of extra-verdict factual findings was not improper. Accordingly, Germany’s challenge to the district court’s authority to make such extra-verdict factual findings is without merit. We now address Germany’s contention that the district court erred by applying a two-level enhancement for his “status as a public official.” Although Germany cites § 2B1.1(b)(8) as the relevant guidelines provision, presumably he means to challenge the § 3B1.3 enhancement for abusing a position of public trust. Germany alleges that because the enhancement and the substantive offenses were based on the same conduct, the enhancement’s application constitutes double counting. He contends that a necessary element of an 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) violation is the defendant’s status as a public figure. We review allegations of impermissible double counting de novo. United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). However, because Germany did not allege that any of the enhancements were improper based on a theory of double counting before the district court, our review is limited to plain error. See Kahn v. Olshan, 371 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2004). “Impermissible double counting occurs only when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that 30 has already been fully accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines.” Dudley, 463 F.3d at 1226-27 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The sentencing guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant abused a position of public . . . trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. In addition, the abuse of trust enhancement “may be employed in addition to an adjustment under § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role).” Id. However, the enhancement is not to be used if “an abuse of trust or skill is included in the base offense level or specific offense characteristic.” Id. Germany’s statutory offense was a misapplication of governmental funding. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A). The applicable base offense level guideline provision is § 2B1.1(a)(2). This guideline provision applies to a wide variety of basic economic offenses including larceny, embezzlement, fraud, and misapplication of government funds. There is no language in the text of § 2B1.1(a) itself or in the applicable commentary that contemplates the abuse of a position of public trust as inherent in any application of § 2B1.1(a). The commentary for § 3B1.3 defines public trust as a “position ... characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference).” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. cmt. n.1. Again, this language is not mirrored in 31 either § 2B1.1(a)’s text or commentary. Germany’s double counting argument is without merit. Germany’s base offense level was based upon his misapplication of government funds. An abuse of a position of public trust is not accounted for in applying the base offense level to his statutory violation. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(2). Rather, an abuse of a position of public trust more accurately describes how Germany misapplied the government funds. Moreover, the remaining specific offense characteristic enhancements do not account for an abuse of trust. See Dudley, 463 F.3d at 122627. Germany’s aggravated role enhancement can be applied in tandem with an abuse of trust enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. The amount of loss enhancement is based strictly upon a monetary calculation and does not take an abuse of trust into account. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). Accordingly, because Germany’s base offense level and the other enhancements do not take into account his abuse of a position of public trust, the application of the § 3B1.3 enhancement cannot constitute impermissible double counting.