Opinion ID: 848794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Elements Of Common-Law Murder And Manslaughter

Text: Common-law murder encompasses all killings done with malice aforethought and without justification or excuse. People v. Scott, 6 Mich. 287, 292-293 (1859). See also People v. Potter, 5 Mich. 1, 6 (1858)(Murder is where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, in the peace of the state, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied.). First-degree murder is defined in M.C.L. § 750.316. [6] All other murders are murders in the second degree. MCL 750.317. See also People v. Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 463-464, 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998), which enumerated the elements of second-degree murder as (1) death, (2) caused by defendant's act, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification. Manslaughter is murder without malice. See Potter, supra at 9 (noting that without malice aforethought, a killing would be only manslaughter, if criminal at all). See also People v. Palmer, 105 Mich. 568, 576, 63 N.W. 656 (1895), remarking: Manslaughter is perfectly distinguishable from murder, in this: That though the act that causes death be unlawful or willful, though attended with fatal results, yet malice, either expressed or implied, which is the very essence of murder, is to be presumed to be wanting in manslaughter. [Quoting the trial court jury instructions.] The common law recognizes two forms of manslaughter: voluntary and involuntary. People v. Townes, 391 Mich. 578, 589, 218 N.W.2d 136 (1974). Common-law voluntary manslaughter is defined as: [T]he act of killing, though intentional, [is] committed under the influence of passion or in heat of blood, produced by an adequate or reasonable provocation, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to resume its habitual control, and is the result of the temporary excitement, by which the control of reason was disturbed, rather than of any wickedness of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition....[ Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862).] See also Townes, supra at 590, 218 N.W.2d 136 (A defendant properly convicted of voluntary manslaughter is a person who has acted out of a temporary excitement induced by an adequate provocation and not from the deliberation and reflection that marks the crime of murder.). Thus, to show voluntary manslaughter, one must show that the defendant killed in the heat of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions. See People v. Pouncey, 437 Mich. 382, 389, 471 N.W.2d 346 (1991). [7] Significantly, provocation is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. See People v. Moore, 189 Mich.App. 315, 320, 472 N.W.2d 1 (1991). Rather, provocation is the circumstance that negates the presence of malice. Scott, supra at 295. Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of another, without malice, during the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause great bodily harm; or during the commission of some lawful act, negligently performed; or in the negligent omission to perform a legal duty. See Townes, supra at 590, 218 N.W.2d 136. See also People v. Heflin, 434 Mich. 482, 507-508, 456 N.W.2d 10 (1990)(opinion by RILEY, C.J.).