Opinion ID: 1525226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Search of the Bus

Text: The State contends that the warrantless entry into the bus, and the seizure of weapons from within it, were justified on two bases: 1) a limited intrusion of a vehicle reasonably required for the protection of the investigating officers, and 2) a consent search. The State eschews reliance upon the automobile exception established by Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Petitioner argues that under the circumstances here present the bus must be considered a dwelling, and that there was no showing of an exigency sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into a home. Concerning the issue of consent, he does not deny that the officer was invited to enter the bus. Rather, he contends that the consent was not voluntarily given, but was a response to a threat of force. The first justification for the search advanced by the State is grounded upon the exception recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). There, the Supreme Court recognized that certain on-the-spot police activity cannot be subject to the warrant procedure, but instead must be tested against the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. Recognizing that a perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate information to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime, 392 U.S. at 26-27, 88 S.Ct. at 1882-83, the Court held that where specific and articulable facts and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a search for weapons should be conducted, and the search is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the intrusion in the first place, a warrantless search may be reasonable. Terry involved a pat-down of the person, but subsequent cases have made it clear that legitimate state interests in police safety may justify other types of intrusion. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), the Court held that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police may order the driver out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that a legitimate concern for the safety of the officer outweighed the minor inconvenience to the driver, and thus the action was reasonable. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the Court upheld as reasonable the action of a police officer in reaching into a vehicle and removing a gun from the occupant's waistband, where the officer was conducting a legitimate investigation, the surrounding circumstances gave him ample reason to fear for his safety, and he had received information that the person he was investigating was carrying a loaded weapon at his waist. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a limited Terry -type search could extend beyond the person of the suspect, and into the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, if a reasonably prudent person in the position of the officer would have entertained an articulable suspicion that the protective search was reasonably necessary to neutralize the threat of physical harm. Borrowing from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the Court held that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. (footnote omitted). Michigan v. Long, supra, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481. The Court made clear that not every investigative stop of an automobile will justify a search of the passenger compartment for weapons, but that the level of suspicion identified in Terry must be present. Id. at 1049-50, n. 14, 103 S.Ct. at 3481, n. 14. Although the Belton concept engrafted upon Terry -type searches provides a bright-line rule for determining the permitted area of a limited search of a motor vehicle for weapons, the more difficult question of when such a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment necessarily requires a careful balancing of interests under the particular facts of each case. The justification for the intrusion must be balanced against the character of the intrusion. Circumstances that justify a brief stop for investigation may not be sufficient to support a frisk for weapons. Where the intrusion is minimal, it may be justified by the general knowledge that police officers are statistically at risk in certain situations. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra . Where the justification is specific and substantial, an intrusion that exceeds an ordinary frisk may be reasonable. Adams v. Williams, supra . In assessing the gravity of an intrusion, we consider the objective expectation of privacy that reasonably existed, and the extent to which it was invaded. When the expectation of privacy is legitimately high, only the most exigent circumstances will justify a warrantless intrusion. Thus, when the sanctity of the home is involved, the exceptions to the warrant requirement are few. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 104 S.Ct. 641, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). Where a motor vehicle is involved, however, the exceptions are more numerous. This is true not only because the mobility of an automobile tends to create an omnipresent exigency, but also because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). Difficulty arises, however, when the distinction between one's home and one's means of transportation becomes blurred. The Supreme Court faced this problem in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), a case involving the warrantless search of a motor home parked in a lot in downtown San Diego. Carney argued that because his vehicle was capable of functioning as a home, and because at the time of the search it was being put to a use more consistent with that of a residence than that of a vehicle, he should be afforded the expectation of privacy one would have in his home. The Supreme Court disagreed. Although noting that Carney's vehicle possessed some, if not many, of the attributes of a home, the Court declined to establish categories for Fourth Amendment purposes based upon the size of the vehicle and the quality of its appointments. 471 U.S. at 393, 105 S.Ct. at 2070. Rather, the Court focused upon the objective picture presented by the facts. A mobile home parked on or near a public road, retaining the indicia of ready mobility, will ordinarily be treated as a vehicle. Although not passing on the issue, the Court suggested that the same mobile home, on blocks and connected to utilities in a mobile home park, would likely qualify for the Fourth Amendment protection afforded a home, because mobility is obviously lacking and the clear objective indications are that the vehicle is being used as a residence. Applying the principles of Carney to the facts of this case, we are persuaded that the circumstances justified the officers' treatment of the bus as a vehicle rather than a home for purposes of conducting a limited search for weapons in a portion of the bus. [5] To the officers, the bus presented the appearance of an instantly mobile vehicle. [6] It was not on blocks, but rested on its own fully-inflated tires. It was not connected to any utilities, nor was it located in a mobile home park or other similar area. It was fully equipped with lights, turn signals, mirrors, radio antennas, windshield wipers, and the like. Its window glass was intact and clean. It bore Virginia license tags. [7] It was located on and at the end of an unpaved, but clearly established, roadway which traversed the B & B yard, and which intersected with Jones Road approximately 100 yards to the west. The bus had been backed into the end of the roadway, so that it pointed toward Jones Road. Although a dilapidated sofa was located in front of the bus, the sofa readily could have been moved, or the bus could have been backed up a few feet and then driven out to the right of the sofa. On the other hand, the officers had been told that people were living in the bus, and they could observe that interior curtains had been drawn across the windshield. We conclude that under these circumstances the officers were not required to view the bus as a home. Although Doering lived in the bus, his expectation of privacy could be no greater than one who elects to live in his automobile or van. As the Supreme Court said in Carney, the public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles than in its homes. 471 U.S. at 392, 105 S.Ct. at 2070. Unless the surrounding circumstances indicate that the vehicle has lost its characteristic mobility and is being used exclusively as a residence (as opposed to a combination residence and means of transportation) it is not unreasonable to limit the expectation of privacy to that ordinarily associated with a vehicle. A reasonably prudent police officer looking at this bus would have seen a vehicle and not a home. Doering's reasonable expectation of privacy properly may be gauged by the circumstances under which he chose to live. These police officers were investigating a murder by gunshot that had occurred not more than one-quarter to one-half mile from the location of the bus. They had a description of several men who were seen acting in a suspicious manner near the victim's residence less than an hour before. The two men they saw outside the bus exactly fit the description they had been given. They also had been told the men who lived on the bus did a lot of shooting there, and to be careful. They had seen a number of rifle and shotgun shell casings in the immediate area of the bus, some of which were not yet tarnished, indicating that they had been recently fired. As a result of a pat-down search for weapons, they removed a buck knife and three shotgun shells from Doering, and a bayonet knife and buck knife from Moffett. [8] They knew that Moffett and Doering had lied to them about whether anyone else was on the bus, and that Reinhardt had attempted to hide, coming out of the bus only at the request of his friends. The two officers faced a situation fraught with danger. They had no way of knowing whether other persons were on the bus, and they had no confidence in the suspects' statements that no one else was there. They had every reason to believe that there were guns on the bus, not only from what they had been told, but also from what they had observed. They had a right to detain the suspects until the victim's granddaughter could be brought to the scene for a show-up, and yet they were vulnerable to attack by any confederates still on the bus, and at risk if there were, in fact, guns located in close proximity to the suspects. Under these circumstances, we conclude that a limited search for weapons, conducted in the passenger compartment of the bus, was reasonable. No greater intrusion took place than was necessary under the circumstances. Even if, in retrospect, we could conjure up an alternative method by which the officers could have gained some measure of protection, that would not be decisive. These officers were faced with the need to make a quick decision as to how to protect themselves, and under these circumstances we believe their decision was reasonable. See Michigan v. Long, supra, 463 U.S. at 1052, 103 S.Ct. at 3482. We also conclude that the initial entry into the bus by Lieutenant Nugent may be sustained on the ground of consent. After Reinhardt came out at the urging of his companions, the police inquired of all three suspects whether anyone remained on the bus. Reinhardt answered that there was no one else, and said go check for yourselves, or words to that effect. Lieutenant Nugent entered the bus and immediately encountered a substantial number of rifles and shotguns, most of them loaded. He removed and unloaded the weapons. He did not find anyone else on the bus, although he declined to search beyond a curtain located near the rear of the bus. The first question is whether Reinhardt, who was living on the bus and who therefore had authority to consent to the entrance by another into a common area, made the statement attributed to him. Both officers testified that he did, and no one else who was present took the stand to deny that fact, or to suggest that the circumstances under which the statement was made were other than as related by the police. We accept the finding that the statement was made. The next and more difficult question is whether the consent was voluntary in the constitutional sense. The burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given is upon the State. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). Consent that is coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority, is not voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2051, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Coercion that defeats voluntariness may be by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. 412 U.S. at 228, 93 S.Ct. at 2048. Although custody is a factor to be considered in determining voluntariness, it is not dispositive, and a person in custody may validly consent to a search. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). In the instant case, there was a display of force by the police. At first contact, both officers had their revolvers drawn. Lieutenant Nugent holstered his weapon immediately after Reinhardt emerged from the bus and had been patted down. At the time the statement of consent was made, Corporal Foracappo had his revolver out, but not pointed at anyone. The detention at this point had been relatively brief, and the police had made no threats, nor claimed authority to enter the bus. We think a most important consideration is the fact that the consent was volunteered, and was not given in response to a request by the police. It is difficult to conceive of the consent merely being an acquiescence to the commanding presence of the police when the idea for the search originated with the persons being detained. We conclude that Judge Fader did not err in sustaining the search upon the additional ground of consent. C