Opinion ID: 1188941
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Recuse Prosecutor

Text: (1a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to recuse Deputy District Attorney Robert Martin, and that this error necessitates a new trial. This contention is without merit. Defendant moved to recuse Martin on the ground that a conflict of interest exists such as would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. Defendant relied on the fact that Martin was the prosecutor in defendant's first trial, in which the judgment, as noted above, was reversed for Wheeler error. Defendant also noted that Martin was the prosecutor in the then ongoing trial of Jose Fuentes. Defendant argued that Martin's use of peremptory challenges to limit the number of [B]lack potential jurors [in defendant's first trial] is in conflict with his duty not to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the presumption that [B]lack jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a [B]lack defendant. Defendant further noted that Martin was currently trying a capital case [Fuentes] in which 10 of the 14 peremptory challenges he used in that case were against [B]lacks. Defendant contended that he could not receive a fair trial if the jury is not drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.... Therefore, Mr. Martin must be recused in order to ensure a fair trial for the defendant. The trial court denied the motion without stating any reasons. (2) Section 1424 provides that a motion to recuse a district attorney shall not be granted unless it is shown by the evidence that a conflict of interest exists such as would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. (See People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148 [193 Cal. Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 294 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585].) A conflict, within the meaning of section 1424, exists whenever the circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the [district attorney's] office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner. ( People v. Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 148.) In determining whether a ruling on a motion to recuse was proper, a reviewing court applies the abuse-of-discretion standard. ( People v. Hamilton (1988) 46 Cal.3d 123, 140 [249 Cal. Rptr. 320, 756 P.2d 1348]; People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 293-294.) (1b) We conclude that the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion to recuse. Defendant's sole concern in making this motion was that Martin would, in the future, act to deny him a representative cross-section of the community in the jurors and thus a fair trial. However, we are not persuaded that Martin's earlier error meant that the district attorney would not exercise [his] discretionary function [in making peremptory challenges] in an evenhanded manner in this trial. ( People v. Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 148.) To follow defendant's argument to its logical conclusion, any time a prosecutor makes a mistake at a trial, he will automatically be subject to recusal at any subsequent retrial. We find no basis for this result in section 1424. Moreover, in Turner I, we concluded that while Martin failed to sustain his burden of showing that his peremptory challenges were not predicated on group bias, the inadequacy of the prosecutor's reasons was compounded by the court's apparent acceptance of those reasons at face value. In each instance the court listened to the prosecutor without question and promptly denied the motion without comment. ( Turner I, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 727-728.) Thus, the trial court here was within its discretion in impliedly concluding that Martin's lack of adequate explanation in the first trial did not mean he possessed a vendetta against Black defendants and Black jurors, as defendant asserts. Finally, as discussed more fully in part II.A.1.b., post, a defendant has the remedy of responding to a perceived Wheeler violation by timely objecting and stating a prima facie case of group bias. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that the availability of this remedy was sufficient to curtail any possible iteration of Martin's first trial error. Defendant advances two additional reasons in support of his recusal motion. These arguments were not raised below and were therefore waived. Moreover, both of the alleged improprieties, that Martin made inconsistent arguments in defendant's and Scott's separate trials, and that he committed Wheeler error in this trial, occurred after the trial judge's ruling on the recusal motion, and thus are not properly considered by us in reviewing the trial court's ruling on that motion. Defendant further claims, The actuality and appearance of a conflict and impropriety was increased by Martin's intervening similar conduct in People v. Fuentes . At the time of the motion, the Fuentes trial was ongoing. The verdict in that case was ultimately reversed by this court in People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 721 [286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75]. While Martin's actions were criticized in Justice Mosk's concurring opinion, the basis for the majority's reversal was the trial court's failure to determine whether the prosecutor's asserted reasons actually applied to the particular jurors challenged, not misconduct on the part of the prosecutor. ( Id. at pp. 721, 722) Moreover, our opinion appeared long after the court's ruling here. We conclude that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's recusal motion.