Opinion ID: 698657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ex Post Facto Clause and Sentencing Guidelines

Text: 14 On November 1, 1990, after Keller committed the June 1990 robbery but before his June 1994 sentencing, guideline Sec. 4B1.4, the armed career criminal guideline, became effective. That guideline subjects a defendant to an enhanced sentence for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of three violent felonies. Application of this new provision, in isolation, would have resulted in an increase in Keller's federal sentence. To avoid this ex post facto problem, the presentence report recommended using the guidelines in effect on June 29, 1990, the date of Keller's offense, which is exactly what the sentencing court did. 15 Generally, a sentencing court must use the version of the guidelines in effect at the time of defendant's sentencing, not that extant at the time of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a)(4) (1988); see also United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 756, 130 L.Ed.2d 655 (1995). Yet, when the guidelines are amended after the defendant commits a criminal offense, but before he is sentenced, and the amended provision calls for a more severe penalty than the original one, those guidelines in effect at the time the offense was committed govern the imposition of sentence. The reason for this is to avoid a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 3. See generally Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429-35, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2450-53, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). 16 Since the earliest days of our Republic it was understood that that clause prohibits, among other things, application of a law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). To violate this constitutional prohibition a statute (1) must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and (2) must disadvantage the offender affected by it. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. at 2451 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)); see also United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1119 (2d Cir.1994). Application of the 1993 Guidelines satisfies the first prong of this test. Whether sentencing Keller under the 1993 Guidelines would disadvantage him, as the second prong requires, and as the district court believed, is the focus of the following discussion. Before resolving that critical issue, we must first analyze the rules that govern how the guidelines are to be applied.