Opinion ID: 40802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to adequately account for factors

Text: 15
16 It is undisputed that the district court failed to determine the correct Guideline range. We have held that the applicable range should be determined in the same manner as before Booker/Fanfan  and that a judge may still find all the facts supporting a sentence. Mares, 402 F.3d at 519. Thus, the court's conclusion that it could not adjust Duhon's Guideline range upwardly based on facts neither admitted by Duhon nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt was incorrect. The correct sentencing range was twenty-seven to thirty-three months imprisonment, not the fifteen to twenty-one months considered by the court. 17 Duhon argues that this error was harmless because the court stated that it would have imposed the same non-Guideline sentence regardless of the Guideline range. Duhon is correct that the sentence was imposed in spite of rather than as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f). In Villegas, we recognized that section 3742(f) survives Booker. Under that statute, we review de novo and vacate a sentence imposed as a result of a Guidelines error without reaching the sentence's ultimate reasonableness. Villegas, 404 F.3d at 362. Because Duhon's non-Guideline sentence did not directly result from the Guidelines error, it need not be vacated under Villegas based solely on the miscalculation. 18 But it does not follow from this that the error in calculating the Guideline range is irrelevant to our second-step review for reasonableness. Mares recognized that if the district court commits a legal error in required sentencing procedures, the sentence may not merit the great deference ordinarily accorded on reasonableness review. 402 F.3d at 520. Among those sentencing procedures required by Mares is that the district court calculate the Guideline range before imposing a non-Guideline sentence. Id. at 519; United States v. Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir.2005). 19 This requirement reflects Booker 's mandate that sentencing courts take account of the Guidelines along with other sentencing goals. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 764-65 (emphasis added). In light of its duty to account for the Guidelines, the court's statement that it would impose the same sentence regardless of which range applied, makes the sentence more, rather than less, problematic. The court cannot reasonably impose the same sentence regardless of the correct advisory range anymore than it could reasonably impose the same sentence regardless of the seriousness of the offense. Both are sentencing factors that must be taken into account under section 3553(a). See Smith, 440 F.3d at 707 (holding that the Guideline range must be a frame of reference for a non-Guideline sentence). A sentencing court cannot evade its duty under Booker and Mares to correctly calculate the Guideline range with the expedient of saying the Guidelines would not affect the result. Accordingly, the miscalculation deprives the sentence of great deference and is a factor to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the sentence. 20
21 Under Booker, a sentence must account for more than just the applicable Guideline range. Section 3553(a) requires the court to consider the kinds of sentence available under the Guidelines as well as any pertinent policy statement. In the case at bar, the district court ignored Guidelines provisions relating to probation and physical injury. 22 First, the sentence deviates from a relevant advisory Guideline disallowing probation in Duhon's case. The Guidelines do not authorize a sentence of probation where the applicable Guideline range is in Zone C or D of the Sentencing Table. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5B1.1 cmt. n. 2, 5C1.1(f). Both Duhon's correct Guideline range and the range incorrectly used by the district court fell within Zone D. See U.S.S.G. § 5A. Thus, the probationary sentence varies, not only from the applicable Guideline range, but also from the kinds of sentence available under the Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(4). In such a situation, the court, at a minimum, should acknowledge that it is aware that probation would not ordinarily be available under the advisory Guidelines. 23 Second, the sentence diverges from a policy statement prohibiting the consideration of physical condition. The district court considered Duhon's back injury in imposing its sentence. Section 5H1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines states that [p]hysical condition . . . is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted. At the pre- Booker sentencing hearing, the court acknowledged that the Guidelines would not permit a downward departure for Duhon's physical condition. At the post- Booker hearing, however, the district court relied on Duhon's back injury without explaining its deviation from the advisory policy statement. We agree with the Sixth Circuit that a district court that relies on any factors which are deemed by the Guidelines to be prohibited or discouraged. . . [should] address these provisions and decide what weight, if any, to afford them in light of Booker.  Jackson, 408 F.3d at 305 n. 3 (6th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir.2005) (stating that the district court must consider the availability of departure authority before imposing a non-Guideline sentence). The court's reliance on Duhon's physical condition without addressing the relevant policy statement is especially troubling here since the court found that Duhon no longer sees a physician and does not take any prescription medications for his back injury. 4 24 The court's failure to appropriately take into account the Sentencing Guidelines is significant. It is not necessary for us to decide, however, whether this alone is sufficient to render Duhon's sentence unreasonable. The sentence also fails to adequately reflect the seriousness of Duhon's offense and inappropriately gives weight to the Guideline sentence of Duhon's codefendant.
25 Under section 3553(a)(2)(A)—(B), the sentence imposed must reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and afford adequate deterrence. Our review of the sentencing transcript convinces us that the district court severely misjudged the seriousness of Duhon's possession of child pornography. As a result, the sentence fails to advance adequately the objectives of subsections (a)(2)(A)-(B). 26 The court's comments at Duhon's hearings are replete with criticism of child pornography laws and suggest that the court believed Duhon's offense was not harmful to children because Duhon himself did not physically molest anyone. At Duhon's plea hearing, the district court stated: 27 There are those who think that the way Congress has reacted to child pornography is pretty much one size fits all . . . . [T]hey've got a lot of folks out there that. . . will take advantage of young people in their day life [sic] or try to make contact with them. That's on the one hand. On the other hand, its my belief . . . that everybody that does what you have admitted to doing here today doesn't fall in that category, but the law doesn't make much of a distinction, frankly, and that's unfortunate. 28 Similarly, at the first sentencing hearing, the court minimized the offense and suggested that prosecuting child pornography cases was a waste of time and resources: 29 [The Assistant United States Attorneys] work very hard for all of us. They do stuff like get really bad guys that are killing our society with drugs. They protect us against terrorists. And sometimes, because the Congress dictated to them, they go out and get people who get on the Internet and just screw up like what happened in this case in my view. 30 . . . . 31 It would amaze you—all as taxpayers if you really understood what's going on inside the judiciary, inside all the government agencies right now. . . . 32 Mr. Duhon knows what I am going to do. . . . I am going to give him as little as I can because I think that's what it merits. 33 The Assistant United States Attorney objected, stating that he did not want to give the impression that he believed these cases should not be prosecuted. The court responded that they had philosophical differences on the issue: 34 They've got people that ought to go to jail because they might be dangerous and they've got people that do stupid things. If we had a federal statute that says you're guilty of being stupid, Mr. Duhon might be guilty of that, but that's not the point. 35 At the close of hearing, the court explained to those in attendance that the prosecutors were just doing their duty under the oath. We're all in this together, and usually these are the good guys putting away the bad guys. (Emphasis added). 36 At the post- Booker sentencing hearing, the court similarly stated, 37 If there was a federal statute that made it illegal to do dumb things, you would be guilty. I can only imagine how embarrassing this is for you today . . . . Nothing in this record indicates to me that you're one of those guys who are going out and trying to hurt young boys or girls, but we've got some sickos out there that are. 38 The district court's view of Duhon's child pornography offense was misguided for several reasons. The court stated that the law fails to distinguish between simple possession of child pornography and try[ing] to make contact with children to take advantage of and hurt them. The law, in fact, makes a drastic distinction. 39 Congress established a series of distinctly separate offenses respecting child pornography, with higher sentences for offenses involving conduct more likely to be, or more directly, harmful to minors than the mere possession offense. Similarly, the guidelines clearly reflect consideration of whether and the degree to which harm to minors is or has been involved. 40 United States v. Grosenheider, 200 F.3d 321, 332-34 (5th Cir.2000) (collecting cases rejecting departures based on rationale that defendant had not abused any child, and had no inclination, predisposition or tendency to do so). Indeed, the applicable Sentencing Guidelines provide an offense level of thirty-three for soliciting minors under twelve for prohibited sexual conduct using a computer. See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(a), (b)(2)(A), (b)(6). Had Duhon solicited children for sex, rather than possessed child pornography, the sentencing range would have been 135-168 months, more than five times his actual Guideline sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5A. Thus, the district court's view that a sentence below Duhon's Guideline range may have been warranted because the law doesn't make much of a distinction between possession of pornography and solicitation of children for sex was incorrect. 5 41 More importantly, the court's judgment that Duhon's offense was just a dumb thing, a stupid thing, and merely a screw up understates the harm caused by possessing child pornography. In United States v. Norris, this Court held that children are victims in the possession of child pornography. 159 F.3d 926, 929 (5th Cir.1998). Norris recognized that possessing the images is itself a form of abuse because it inva[des] the privacy of the child depicted. Id. at 930. The possession perpetuates a permanent record of the original abuse that can haunt[] those children in future years. Id. at 929-30. Additionally, the consumer of child pornography instigates the original production of child pornography by providing an economic motive for creating [it]. Id. at 930. [P]ossession of child pornography is not a victimless crime. A child somewhere was used to produce the images downloaded . . ., in large part, because individuals like [the defendant] exist to download the images. United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir.2005). 42 The severe molestation and young children involved in the images suggest that Duhon's offense could instigate violent abuse. According to the PSR, the pictures which Duhon downloaded were of prepubescent girls aged eight to ten years. These pictures included photographs of a girl being raped by an adult man, forced to perform oral sex and placing foreign objects into her vagina. The PSR also states that Duhon distributed child pornography to at least one other individual, his codefendant Berne Life. 6 43 Under the circumstances, the district court misjudged the seriousness of Duhon's offense. As a result, the sentence imposed fails to advance sufficiently the sentencing objectives enumerated in section 3553(a)(2)(A)—(B). 44