Opinion ID: 687305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment in Favor of Davis and Tazewell County

Text: 19 The appellant argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of jailer Davis on the grounds that the strip search at the jail did not violate his constitutional rights. He also contends that the district court erred in concluding that Davis's conduct did not constitute an assault and battery because Davis had not touched Kraushaar during the search. 20 Because these rulings came on a motion for summary judgment, they are to be reviewed de novo. Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 663 (7th Cir.1992); McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 370 (7th Cir.1992). 21 In order to uphold a grant of summary judgment, we must view the record and all inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion ... and conclude there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 22 McCoy, 957 F.2d at 370. Summary judgment is only appropriate when the record reveals that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id.
23 Count IX of the amended complaint alleged that the strip search conducted by Davis at the jail violated Kraushaar's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. The complaint alleged that there was no probable cause to believe that Kraushaar was guilty of any crime or that he was in possession of a weapon or other controlled substance. The complaint further alleged that the search was conducted in violation of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure's requirements for strip searches. 2 24 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Davis on the grounds that probable cause existed for the limited strip search based upon the information provided by trooper Flanigan--i.e., that Flanigan believed that Kraushaar had hidden something in his pants. The court acknowledged that the search did not comply with all of the requirements set forth by the state statute governing strip searches because there was no written authorization form and or a written report of the search. However, the court held that the state statute did not create a federally protected liberty interest and, therefore, failure to comply with the statute's requirements was not actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. We find no error in either ruling. 25 The Fourth Amendment provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.... U.S. Const. amend. IV. To determine whether a search is reasonable requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). 26 A detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers[,] id., and officials have a legitimate and substantial need to prevent arrestees from bringing weapons or contraband into such a facility. Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir.1983). Balanced against this interest, however, is the fact that strip searches involving visual inspection of the genital areas are demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission.... Id. at 1272. Accordingly, this court has held that it is unreasonable to conduct a strip search of a person arrested for a traffic offense unless authorities have a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband on his person. Id. at 1273. Whether a suspicion is reasonable depends upon such factors as the nature of the offense, the arrestee's appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record. Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053, 105 S.Ct. 2114, 85 L.Ed.2d 479 (1985). 27 The undisputed facts show that Kraushaar had been arrested for driving under the influence pursuant to 625 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/11-501(a) and the arresting officer informed Davis that the officer believed that Kraushaar had put something down his pants. As the district court pointed out, Davis and Flanigan could reasonably infer that an arrestee would not normally put an item inside his pants unless it was something he intends to hide from authorities. That inference is not an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), but rather the sort of 'common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior' upon which 'practical people'--including government officials--are entitled to rely. New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 346, 105 S.Ct. 733, 745, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Indeed, if Davis had not conducted a search based upon this knowledge, he would have been open to negligence charges if Kraushaar had in fact concealed a weapon or contraband in his pants and that item ultimately caused a death or injury inside the jail. 28 Kraushaar argues that while Davis may have had grounds to believe that Kraushaar put something in his pants, there was no reason to infer that the item was a weapon or contraband. However, Kraushaar ignores the fact that Sec. 11-501 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code makes it a crime to drive while under the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof. 625 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/11-501(a) (emphasis added). Although there was strong evidence of alcohol intoxication in Kraushaar's case, that does not rule out the possibility of impairment by drugs as well. 29 The appellant points to decisions by other circuits which suggest that a DUI is not commonly associated by its very nature with the possession of weapons or contraband.... Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir.1984); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982). Absent in those cases, however, was any additional factor that would suggest that the DUI arrestee might possess contraband. In Kraushaar's case, on the other hand, the fact of his arrest was coupled with specific conduct--i.e., the furtive hand movements that suggested that he was attempting to hide something in his pants. Because an officer cannot rule out the possibility that a DUI is drug-related, the combination of these facts gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that Kraushaar may have been trying to hide drugs. 30 The appellant also cites to several Tenth Circuit decisions which suggest that jails can meet their security concerns by less-intrusive means, such as a thorough pat-down search. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Kaysville City, Utah, 994 F.2d 730, 735 (10th Cir.1993); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 396-97 (10th Cir.1993); Hill, 735 F.2d at 394. In that court's view, [a]lmost anything that the examining officer could have found through [a strip search] would have already been discovered during the pat down search that had been conducted on plaintiff's arrival at the jail. Hill, 735 F.2d at 394. However, in each of those cases, the Tenth Circuit found no circumstances that would suggest that the arrestee was harboring weapons or contraband. Thus, the strip search was not used to recover an item that was reasonably believed to be concealed under the arrestee's clothing; rather, the search was used as a means of discovering whether an arrestee possessed such items. In Kraushaar's case, on the other hand, the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that Kraushaar had hidden some type of contraband in his pants. Therefore, for purposes of jail security, it was necessary to conduct a more intrusive search to either dispel or confirm that suspicion. Where an arrestee is wearing blue jeans or another heavy material, even the most thorough pat-down search will not necessarily turn up small items such as several hits of LSD on postage stamps, a small rock of crack cocaine, or a razor blade. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to conduct a limited strip search, as Davis performed on Kraushaar, when an officer is trying to recover suspected contraband. 31 The appellant argues that Davis had not observed Kraushaar's conduct for himself and, therefore, Davis's only basis for conducting the search was officer Flanigan's statement that he saw Kraushaar put something down his pants. We find nothing improper in this procedure. The Supreme Court has recognized that officers in one police department may properly arrest a suspect based upon a bulletin or flyer issued by another police department even though the arresting officers themselves were unaware of specific facts that established probable cause for the arrest. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229-33, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680-83, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). It follows that if trooper Flanigan had observed facts that would establish a reasonable suspicion that Kraushaar had been concealing a weapon or contraband, then jailer Davis would be justified in relying on Flanigan's description of those facts; Davis need not have observed the conduct for himself.
32 The appellant next argues that the district court erred in holding that Davis's failure to comply with all of the requirements of the Illinois strip search statute did not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Although he recognizes that a claim under Sec. 1983 must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988), the appellant asserts that his claim meets this requirement because the alleged violation of the state statute implicated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 33 Analysis of the appellant's argument is somewhat difficult because the Fourteenth Amendment provides both substantive and procedural due process rights, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), and the appellant's brief fails to identify the theory he intends to pursue. Close scrutiny, however, shows that his claim must fail under either theory. 34 First, with regard to substantive due process, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits a state from violating a fundamental right--i.e., one that is among those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1446-47, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The Supreme Court has used a process of selective incorporation to find that most, if not all, of the provisions of the Bill of Rights constitute such fundamental liberty interests. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2804, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). 35 The Supreme Court has also gone on to identify other significant interests that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution but which deserve protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's due process clauses. See id. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2804-08 (describing cases in which substantive due process rights have been recognized). However, the rights encompassed by this theory have been carefully limited to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. Albright v. Oliver, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 807, 812, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). 36 The appellant argues that the state of Illinois has created a federally protected liberty interest by enactment of the state statute and regulations governing strip searches. In support of this argument, he cites the decision in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), which stated that [a] State may create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause through its enactment of certain statutory or regulatory measures. However, what appellant fails to recognize is that the Supreme Court has never held that such state-created interests constitute a fundamental liberty interest protected under a substantive due process theory. Rather, the Court has analyzed state-created liberties under a procedural due process theory. 37 We find, therefore, that the state strip search statute does not create a substantive due process right. There is no question that Kraushaar's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (holding Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). However, as this court made clear in the recent case of Doe v. Burnham, 6 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir.1993), the provisions of the state statute are irrelevant to that analysis--i.e., plaintiffs cannot rely upon provisions of state law to determine what conduct is reasonable under the federal Constitution. 38 Burnham, like the case at bar, involved a Sec. 1983 claim alleging that the police had conducted an illegal strip search of an arrestee. At issue on appeal was the propriety of a jury instruction on the Fourth Amendment's standard for reasonableness. The first part of the instruction correctly set forth the law when it stated that: Law enforcement officers may not strip search an individual for contraband unless the officers have a reasonable basis to believe at the time of the search that the individual is concealing contraband on his or her body. The test of reasonableness requires a balancing of the privacy interests involved in the search and the government's need for conducting the search. However, the last part of the instruction improperly tied the reasonableness of the search to the Illinois strip search statute. 39 Although the instruction initially encouraged the jury to consider the constitutional standards for reasonableness, it ultimately required the jury to confine its assessment of reasonableness to the norms of Illinois law. The problem is that the norms embodied in the Constitution and the norms authorized by the Illinois legislature are not necessarily interchangeable. In fact, a state may provide greater protections under its laws than the Constitution requires.... The Illinois legislature's sense of reasonableness cannot be grafted onto the Fourth Amendment. Illinois may set its own standards and provide remedies under its laws for their violation. But just because Illinois chooses to regulate police behavior in a certain way does not mean the police officers violate the Constitution by transgressing those rules. 40 Id. at 480 (citations omitted). In short, Burnham reemphasizes that the violation of state law is not itself the violation of the Constitution. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 1338, 103 L.Ed.2d 809 (1989). Certainly [a] state ought to follow its law, but to treat a violation of state law as a violation of the Constitution is to make the federal government the enforcer of state law. State rather than federal courts are the appropriate institutions to enforce state rules. Id. 41 Turning to the procedural due process analysis, we must determine whether the state statute in fact created a liberty interest that would trigger a constitutional violation if fair procedures were not followed to deprive a plaintiff of that interest. As the appellant acknowledges, courts will find a liberty interest only if the state's statute or regulation uses language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will' or 'must' be employed, Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471, 103 S.Ct. at 871, and contains substantive standards or criteria for decisionmaking as opposed to vague standards that leave the decisionmaker with unfettered discretion. Miller v. Henman, 804 F.2d 421, 427 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 844, 108 S.Ct. 136, 98 L.Ed.2d 93 (1987). 42 In this case, the strip search statute uses mandatory language in stating that [n]o person arrested for a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled substance, shall be strip searched unless there is a reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a weapon or controlled substance. 725 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/103-1(c). Arguably under Hewitt, this portion of the statute creates a liberty interest in being free from unreasonable strip searches. However, as the district court pointed out, this interest is virtually identical to the appellant's existing Fourth Amendment right. Thus compliance with the Fourth Amendment would satisfy the state statutory requirement as well. 43 The appellant argues that the state statute goes on to provide that any police officer who conducts a strip search shall obtain written permission from a designated person and prepare a report regarding the search. Based upon this mandatory language, the appellant argues that the statute creates a liberty interest in being free from a strip search unless a command or watch officer issues a written authorization for the search and a written report is subsequently prepared. 44 This court has repeatedly rejected the notion that any and all state ... rules and regulations containing such language automatically create 'legitimate claims of entitlement' triggering the procedural protections of the due process clause. Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir.1990). Some statutes and regulations create only guidelines that direct the manner in which state personnel exercise their discretion to perform certain activities. See id.; Miller, 804 F.2d at 424. These types of guidelines do not create substantive rights or legally enforceable expectancies. Miller, 804 F.2d at 424. 45 By requiring written authorization and a written report, the Illinois statute appears to be establishing guidelines to direct state personnel in exercising their discretion to conduct a strip search rather than creating an expectancy that a strip search will not be done unless those requirements are met. However, even if we were to find that the strip search statute did create an expectancy, that would not end the inquiry. Under a procedural due process analysis, the deprivation of the liberty interest is not itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation without proper process (i.e. fair procedures). Colon, 899 F.2d at 666. Thus, the appellant must go on to prove that he was denied this expectancy without due process. 46 This analysis demonstrates the fundamental flaw in the appellant's case. He argues that he was denied the process set forth in the statute--i.e., obtaining written permission from a commander or watch officer before the search was conducted. However, it is well settled that [f]ederal judges do not enforce state-created procedures in the name of the Constitution. Gordon v. Degelmann, 29 F.3d 295, 301 (7th Cir.1994). 47 [S]tate procedural protections cannot define what process is due. The Fourteenth Amendment's limitation on state action would be illusory indeed if state practices were synonymous with due process.... [T]he task of defining the procedural protections which attach to [a protectable liberty interest] is wholly a matter of federal constitutional law and is accomplished through the balancing analysis of Matthews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ]. 3 48 Colon, 899 F.2d at 670 (internal quotations omitted). 49 What the appellant is really trying to argue is that the state can never conduct a strip search without first obtaining this written permission. That argument implicates a substantive due process, rather than a procedural due process, analysis. See Miller, 804 F.2d at 427 (the nub of a substantive due process claim is that some things the state just cannot do, no matter how much process it provides.). As discussed above, state-created liberty interests do not create federally enforceable rights. 50 In short, Davis's failure to follow procedures that are required by state law, but not by the federal Constitution, establishes only a violation of the state law. See Gordon, 29 F.3d at 301. The district court, therefore, properly held that the appellant could not rely upon the state strip search statute to establish either a substantive or procedural violation of his federal rights. 4
51 The appellant argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Davis and the county on Count VI, which alleged that the strip search was an unlawful assault and battery. He acknowledges that he was not touched by Davis during the search and, therefore, Davis's conduct does not constitute a battery as defined in Sec. 12-3 of the Illinois Criminal Code. 5 However, he argues that the conduct constitutes an assault because he was instructed by Davis to remove his pants and lower his underwear for a visual inspection with the implication that if he did not do so voluntarily, those tasks would be performed for him by Davis. 52 Under state law, [a] person commits an assault when, without lawful authority, he engages in conduct which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. 720 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/12-1(a). The key phrase for purposes of this analysis is without lawful authority. Obviously if Davis was justified in conducting the strip search, as we have found, he had proper authority to imply that he would carry out the search himself if Kraushaar had failed to comply with Davis's instructions. The district court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment against the appellant on this count. 53