Opinion ID: 1786760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the chancellor committed reversible error in finding the doctrine of res judicata to have precluded relitigation of the subject adoption.

Text: ¶ 7. Generally, four identities must be present before the doctrine of res judicata will be applicable: (1) identity of the subject matter of the action, (2) identity of the cause of action, (3) identity of the parties to the cause of action, and (4) identity of the quality or character of a person against whom the claim is made. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 394 So.2d 299, 301 (Miss.1981); Cowan v. Gulf City Fisheries, Inc., 381 So.2d 158, 162 (Miss.1980); Standard Oil Co. v. Howell, 360 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Miss.1978). If these four identities are present, the parties are prevented from relitigating all issues tried in the prior lawsuit, as well as all matters which should have been litigated and decided in the prior suit. Pray v. Hewitt, 254 Miss. 20, 24-25, 179 So.2d 842, 844 (1965). In other words, the doctrine of res judicata bars litigation in a second lawsuit on the same cause of action `of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were available to the parties [in the first action], regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.' Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1063 (5th Cir.1980) (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2209, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979)). Res judicata applies in this case because both the insufficient consent action and the guardian ad litem action concerned claims attacking the adoption's validity. The Carrolls could have and should have raised the guardian ad litem claim when they first raised the insufficient consent claim. ¶ 8. The Carrolls seek to avoid the preclusive effect of res judicata by arguing that it is now the minor, Katherine, who is challenging the adoption. However, the Carrolls never appealed the adoption decree or the order denying their insufficient consent claim. Because the adoption decree terminated their parental rights, the Carrolls have no standing to assert a collateral attack of the adoption. As such, the action leading to the February 9, 1998, decree and the action leading to the October 22, 1999, judgment concerned the same parties. Accordingly, the action which led to the latter judgment was barred by the earlier decree. There was no error in the chancellor's finding res judicata applicable.