Opinion ID: 3201361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instruction Matters

Text: Mr. Morgan next urges that the district court committed multiple errors related to instructing the jury. First, he argues 67 Appellant’s Br. 29–30. 68 R.57 at 10. 69 R.115‐1 at 478–79. 70 Id. No. 14‐3307 45 that the court abused its discretion when it allowed the de‐ fendants to offer new jury instructions after the close of evi‐ dence. At the conclusion of trial, the court directed the parties to confer before the next court date and then provide a set of agreed instructions and jury forms. When the court recon‐ vened, the parties had reached agreement on roughly thirty instructions but had remaining disputes on another fifteen, and the court heard arguments on the disputed instructions. During argument, Mr. Morgan objected to one of the defend‐ ants’ proposed instructions on the ground that it “was just proposed last night,” to which the court responded, “you’ve … had months to work on this,” and overruled the 71 objection. Mr. Morgan argues only that the defendants’ proposed in‐ struction was untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(a)(1), which states: “At the close of the evidence or at any earlier reasonable time that the court orders, a party may file and furnish to every other party written requests for the jury instructions it wants the court to give.” Because the proposed instruction was submitted after the close of evidence, Mr. Mor‐ gan contends that the defendants were limited to “fil[ing] re‐ quests for instructions on issues that could not reasonably have been anticipated by an earlier time that the court set for requests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(a)(2)(A). Mr. Morgan’s timeliness argument, however, ignores Rule 51(a)(2)(B), which allows a party, “with the court’s permission,” to submit “untimely re‐ quests for instructions on any issue.” Id. 51(a)(2)(B). In any event, Mr. Morgan does not explain how the court’s ruling caused him prejudice. See Johnson v. General Bd. of Pension & 71 Id. at 551–52. 46 No. 14‐3307 Health Benefits of United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 722, 732 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that Rule 51(b) error was harmless where appellant “ha[d] not argued, let alone shown, that the … error caused her independent prejudice”). Mr. Morgan next asserts that the district court wrongly de‐ clined to give the parties’ agreed upon response to a question posed by the jury. During the second day of jury delibera‐ tions, the jury sent a note asking whether, in the context of an investigatory stop, it is necessary for an officer to reasonably suspect an individual of “being connected with a crime or misdemeanor … having committed a crime or misde‐ meanor … having information regarding a crime or misde‐ meanor [or] … intending to commit a crime or misde‐ 72 meanor[.]” The parties submitted to the court an agreed‐upon answer: “With respect to reasonable suspicion, you must find that the defendant … had reasonable suspicion that the plaintiff had committed or was about to commit a 73 crime.” The court, however, believed that the response was not an accurate expression of the law and declined to give it. The court instead gave the following instruction: An investigative stop is a brief detention which gives police officers a chance to verify or dispel well‐founded suspicions that a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Permissible encounters between police officers and citizens are not limited to situations involv‐ ing possible criminal activity, but also include 72 Id. at 666. 73 Id. at 667. No. 14‐3307 47 situations in which persons may need help or are in danger of harming themselves or others. … In determining whether particular cir‐ cumstances rise to the level of a reasonable sus‐ picion, courts must look—must take into con‐ sideration the modes or patterns of operations of certain kinds of law‐breakers which allow trained officers to draw inferences and make de‐ ductions that might well elude an untrained person.[74] Mr. Morgan’s counsel objected that the jury had already been instructed on reasonable suspicion and that the court’s in‐ struction “elaborates on things that aren’t really pertinent to the question that the jury asked” and “goes far beyond what 75 they have already been instructed on.” The court overruled the objection and gave its own response. In his brief, Mr. Mor‐ gan submits that the court’s supplemental instruction “was overly broad, biased, and unnecessary” and that “[t]his was a 76 close case.” We review the court’s response to the jury’s question for abuse of discretion. United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2005). In so doing, we ask: “(1) whether the instructions as a whole fairly and adequately treat the is‐ sues; (2) whether the supplemental instruction is a correct statement of the law; and (3) whether the district court an‐ swered the jury’s questions specifically.” Id. at 688. 74 Id. at 668. 75 Id. at 670. 76 Appellant’s Br. 33. 48 No. 14‐3307 The district court’s supplemental instruction accurately stated the law and addressed directly the jury’s questions. When read in conjunction with the original jury instruction 77 regarding investigatory stops and reasonable suspicion, the court’s response fairly and adequately treated the issue. We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in giving its supplemental instruction in lieu of the parties’ agreed upon response.