Opinion ID: 1110661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the jury verdict was against the overwhelming weight and sufficiency of the evidence

Text: ¶ 10. The standard of review for a post-trial motion, like a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, is abuse of discretion. See Brown v. State, 907 So.2d 336, 339 (Miss.2005) (citing Howell v. State, 860 So.2d 704, 764 (Miss.2003)). The key inquiry is whether the evidence shows `beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction.' Brown, 907 So.2d at 339 (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968)). In other words, the question to be answered, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown, 907 So.2d at 339 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)). Assuming arguendo that this Court may believe the evidence at trial failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, this is, nevertheless an insufficient basis for reversal. See Brown, 907 So.2d at 339. As long as `reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense,' [then] the evidence will be deemed to have been sufficient. Id. (quoting Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss.1985)). ¶ 11. Smith argues that only Joan and Karen could prove that he perpetrated any wrongs, and their testimony was inconsistent. Moreover, he asserts there was no physical evidence supporting their testimony. ¶ 12. In response, the State maintains that both Joan and Karen recounted the events in detail on numerous occasions, including at trial, and those details were uniformly consistent. Principal Dillon and Officer Perryman found the girls statements to be consistent and credible. The trial court found the information which Dillon and Perryman received from the girls, and upon which they based their testimony, was admissible under Miss. R. Ev. 803(25), the tender years exception to the hearsay rule. Miss. R. Ev. 803(25) states: A statement made by a child of tender years describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another is admissible in evidence if: (a) the court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide substantial indicia of reliability; and (b) the child either (1) testifies at the proceedings; or (2) is unavailable as a witness.... Miss. R. Ev. 803(25). The trial court stated, [t]here were no suggestive techniques used. There is nothing about the age or knowledge or the experience to indicate that they fabricated this ... there is sufficient indicia of reliability to qualify them for admission, the statements made to Officer Perryman and the statements made to [P]rincipal Dillon. The requirements of Miss. R. Ev. 803(25)(b)(1) were satisfied, as both girls testified at the trial. ¶ 13. Moreover, because they testified at trial, the statements of the girls are arguably not hearsay under Miss. R. Ev. 801(d)(1)(B) which provides: A statement is not hearsay if: ... (1)... The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.... Miss. R. Ev. 801(d)(1)(B). ¶ 14. Expert witnesses from the Southwest Mississippi Children's Advocacy Center also found the girls statements to be consistent and credible. Keith Stovall testified Joan's statements were very consistent and credible with a victim of sexual abuse. Bente' Hess testified that given the detail, consistency, and clarity of Karen's statements, her interview was highly credible. The only discrepancy which Hess observed in Karen's statements regarded when the incident occurred. However, Hess further testified that trouble in accurately placing dates is not unusual in children of Karen's age group. ¶ 15. The question to be answered, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown, 907 So.2d at 339 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781). Joan's testimony was that Smith kissed her neck, fondled her breasts, and put his fingers into her vagina. Such conduct clearly constitutes sexual battery under the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. Section 97-3-95(1)(c). [4] Karen's testimony was that Smith propositioned her to play a deviant game of hide-and-seek and began touching her on the thigh. This conduct clearly constitutes touching and handling a child for lustful purposes under the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. Section 97-5-23. [5] Therefore, a rational trier of fact could find the testimony of Joan and Karen, which was corroborated by their prior statements to the elementary school principal, an investigating officer, and experts in the field of child sexual abuse, all of whom interviewed the girls, was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the acts charged and that the essential elements of each count were established beyond a reasonable doubt. As the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, this argument is without merit.
¶ 16. A motion for new trial challenges the weight of the evidence. A reversal is warranted only if the lower court abused its discretion in denying [the motion]. Howell, 860 So.2d at 764 (quoting Edwards v. State, 800 So.2d 454, 464 (Miss.2001)). A greater quantum of evidence favoring the [S]tate is necessary for the [S]tate to withstand a motion for a new trial, as distinguished from a motion for j.n.o.v. Pharr v. State, 465 So.2d 294, 302 (Miss.1984). However, the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 844 (Miss. 2005). In reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an objection to the weight of the evidence, this Court will disturb a verdict only when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Id. Though the standard of review in such cases is high, `[t]his Court has not hesitated to invoke its authority to order a new trial and allow a second jury to pass on the evidence where it considers the first jury's determination of guilt to be based on extremely weak or tenuous evidence [,] even where that evidence is sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict.' Dilworth v. State, 909 So.2d 731, 737 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Lambert v. State, 462 So.2d 308, 322 (Miss.1984) (Lee, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)). ¶ 17. In this case, the corroborated testimony of Joan and Karen provided a sound basis for the jury's determination of guilt. As such, the jury's verdict was not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Bush, 895 So.2d at 844. Therefore, this argument is without merit.