Opinion ID: 361296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Cross-Examination of the Character Witness

Text: 21 Finally, appellant Whitten asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the Government to cross-examine one of his character witnesses regarding Whitten's alleged reprimand by a judge and bar association for unprofessional conduct. The witness, an attorney, testified under direct examination that Whitten had a good general reputation in his community for veracity and integrity and declared that he would believe Whitten under oath. On cross-examination, the Government asked this witness whether he had heard that Mr. Whitten was reprimanded by Judge Dick Thomas in November of last year for unprofessional conduct?, and the witness replied, No, sir, I had not. During recross-examination, the Government queried, But you had not heard that Mr. Whitten had been reprimanded by the Bar Association through Judge Thomas in DeSoto County? Whitten's character witness responded, I was not aware of either one of them. The Government then asked, Well, the State Bar then, the Mississippi State Bar?, and the witness answered, I was not aware of that, no sir. Whitten's counsel objected to each of these questions and, at the close of trial, moved for a mistrial; the lower court overruled the objections and denied the motion. 22 Arguing that he was substantially prejudiced by this type of cross-examination, Whitten contends that the district judge should have invoked his discretionary power under Fed.R.Evid. 403 to stop this line of questioning, since its probative value (was) substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. We disagree. When a witness has testified in support of the defendant's good character, the trial court may in its discretion allow the Government to attempt to undermine the credibility of that witness on cross-examination by asking him whether he has heard of prior misconduct of the defendant which is inconsistent with the witness' direct testimony. United States v. Wells, 5 Cir., 1976, 525 F.2d 974, 976. However, there are two important limitations upon judicial discretion in admitting inquiries concerning such prior misconduct: first, a requirement that the prosecution have some good-faith factual basis for the incidents inquired about, and second, a requirement that the incidents inquired about are relevant to the character traits involved at trial. Id. at 977. Those requirements are both satisfied here. During a conference in chambers after the defendants rested their case, Whitten's lawyer moved for a mistrial, arguing that the government offered no evidence whatsoever of this highly prejudicial statement about a censure from the DeSoto County Bar, the Mississippi State Bar Association for unethical conduct. The Government replied that it was prepared to show the basis on which we asked the question, that it is a fact, and that our questions were based on that fact. It said that if Whitten's attorney will stipulate to the letter of reprimand we will introduce that in the record and volunteered to move to reopen and call Mr. Whitten for further cross-examination on the matter if his counsel thinks it necessary that we prove it. In our view, the Government's proffer of a letter of reprimand for stipulation and its willingness to reopen the case and attempt to prove the fact of Whitten's reprimand demonstrated the necessary good-faith factual basis for the incidents inquired about. Those incidents were also relevant to the character traits involved at trial. The character witness, an attorney, testified to Whitten's good reputation for honesty and integrity and the alleged reprimand for unprofessional conduct was relevant to Whitten's community reputation regarding those traits. 23 AFFIRMED.