Opinion ID: 3188458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Favoritism for Appellees

Text: Appellant‟s last contention is that the trial court‟s rulings for appellees show bias against appellant. Specifically, he argues that the trial court: unevenly applied Superior Court Civil Rule 12-I (a) by permitting appellees to file a motion without complying with the rule‟s requirement that a certification be included signifying that consent was sought from the opposing party, yet denying appellant‟s motion to recuse the judge for failing to comply with the same rule; denied appellant‟s motion to strike and request to depose appellees‟ counsel after counsel submitted an allegedly tampered affidavit; and “white-wash[ed]” the record and denied appellant‟s motion to depose appellees‟ counsel after counsel made what appellant characterizes as a knowing misrepresentation regarding incorrect attorney‟s fees charges. 59 We perceive no merit in appellant‟s argument that these rulings support his claim that the trial court was biased in favor of appellees. The trial court explained the reason for its uneven application of Rule 12-I (a). Noting that it regularly denied motions for failing to comply with the rule‟s requirement of advance consultation with the opposing party, the trial court said it did not penalize appellees for failing to comply with the rule in filing a motion for summary judgment because appellant had “wasted the court‟s time with at least one patently frivolous motion, and a balancing of the equities [did] not entitle him to” relief on his motion to strike. In contrast, the trial court denied—albeit without prejudice— appellant‟s motion to recuse for failure to comply with Rule 12-I (a), because appellant was familiar with the rule and had attempted to invalidate a motion of appellees for noncompliance with its requirements only one month before his own failure to comply with the rule. The trial court‟s reasoned explanation for the two different rulings defeats appellant‟s claim that they were motivated by bias. Appellant‟s claim about the need to depose appellees‟ counsel for “tampering” with Vance Wilson‟s affidavit, based on the fact that one of its three pages was faxed while the other two were laser-printed, is unsupported in light of appellees‟ 60 counsel‟s explanation, which appellant has not refuted.22 Appellant‟s third claimed evidence of bias involves the trial court‟s denial of his request to depose appellees‟ counsel about a minor mistake in the billing records presented with appellees‟ request for attorney‟s fees.23 There is simply no evidence that the trial court “white-wash[ed]” the record or that the disputed entry was anything other than a billing error rather than an intentional misrepresentation.