Opinion ID: 2587254
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attempted sodomy in jail used as aggravating circumstance

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor failed to give defense counsel adequate notice that she planned to present evidence of an unadjudicated attempted sodomy at the penalty phase. On October 20, 1986, while in jail on the current charges, defendant attempted to sodomize another inmate. On October 27, 1986, defense counsel filed a written motion for discovery, including the names and addresses of all witnesses who would testify and all information pertaining to alleged criminal activity not charged in the present case. On November 3, 1986, defense counsel agreed to informal discovery, but the trial court directed the prosecutor to file a written notice of evidence to be used in aggravation at the penalty phase. On November 7, 1986, following a preliminary hearing, defendant was held to answer on the charge of attempted sodomy. On May 14, 1987, the prosecutor filed a written notice of intention to introduce evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, including the following: Evidence will be introduced regarding [defendant's] current incarceration ... including any incident reports and disciplinary matters, involving force or violence. On July 6, 1988, jury selection commenced. On July 26, 1988, after the jury had been sworn, defense counsel objected to the presentation of evidence of the attempted sodomy, because the prosecution had not made the information available prior to trial. The prosecutor responded that she had shown counsel a copy of the police report that counsel had read, and had supplied them with the case number prior to trial. She agreed to make a copy of the police report. The following day, defense counsel acknowledged receipt of the police report and information. On August 22 and 24, 1988, following the guilty verdicts, defense counsel moved to exclude evidence of the attempted sodomy unless the prosecutor produced the victim, and not simply a witness, Henry White, who had testified at the preliminary hearing. Defense counsel argued the notice was insufficient, but conceded that they had received oral notice in May 1988. The trial court found the notice adequate and granted the defense request to interview the witness the following morning. Defendant did not object at trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, and the claim is therefore waived. ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 942, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) In any event, the claim must be rejected on the merits. Section 190.3 provides that other than evidence in proof of the charged offense or special circumstances subjecting the defendant to the death penalty, the prosecution may not present evidence in aggravation unless notice ... has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. The statute does not mandate written notification. ( People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 708, fn. 24, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887.) In the present case, defense counsel received general written notification as well as more specific oral notification prior to trial. Counsel received additional specific written information, including the police report, prior to the guilty verdicts. (See People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1359-1360, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) The notice was adequate. (Cf. People v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 736-737, 276 Cal.Rptr. 391, 801 P.2d 1142 [notice adequate when actual notice is given prior to trial but written notice is not filed until after the guilty verdicts were rendered]; People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 637, 253 Cal.Rptr. 863, 765 P.2d 70 [same].) Moreover, defendant has not shown how he would have dealt with the witness differently had he received earlier notice that the witness would be called. ( People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1153-1154, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Defense counsel asked for a half-day to interview the witness, which was granted, and did not request additional time. ( Ibid. ) There is no reasonable possibility that defendant suffered prejudice from the manner in which the prosecution provided notice of the attempted sodomy. ( People v. Bradford supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1360, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.)
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of attempted sodomy because that evidence was substantially more prejudicial than probative. He also claims that the evidence did not establish the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and did not establish that an act of violence had occurred. Section 190.3, factor (b), permits the trier of fact to take into consideration at the penalty phase evidence of violent criminality committed at any time in the defendant's life, and whether or not adjudicated, to show his propensity for violence and to assist the sentencer in determining whether he is the type of person who deserves to die. [Citations.] The prosecution may prove commission of such conduct by any competent means, and may also place the incident `in context, so that the jury has full opportunity, in deciding the appropriate penalty, to determine its seriousness.' [Citations.] The trial court has no discretion to exclude such incidents under Evidence Code section 352 on the ground they are substantially more prejudicial than probative at the penalty phase. [Citation.] Nor is the defendant entitled to preclude admission of the graphic or sordid details of his factor (b) crimes by stipulating to any resulting conviction or to a sanitized version of the facts surrounding the offense. [Citations.] ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 349-350, 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846, italics added; cf. People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1200-1201, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130 [at penalty phase, trial court retains discretion to exclude particular items of evidence if substantially more prejudicial than probative].) Testimony by an eyewitness is a competent means to prove the offense. ( People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 782-783, 251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260.) There was substantial evidence that would permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the prior offense, and that the act was violent or forcible in nature. The witness testified that he observed defendant hit the victim in the head, push him to his knees, place him in a headlock, and put his erect penis into the victim's rectum. The witness testified that it appeared the victim was forced and did not consent to being sodomized. Although, as defendant has pointed out, there was no testimony that the victim cried out, in view of the other evidence that defendant's conduct was forcible that circumstance does not establish that the encounter was consensual.
Defendant contends that the jury instruction on attempted sodomy was erroneous as a matter of state and federal law, because the instruction did not inform the jury it must find as elements that the act had been attempted without the other party's consent and with force, and to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [13] The trial court instructed the jurors pursuant to former CALJIC No. 8.84.1.2, informing them that they could consider as an aggravating circumstance evidence of attempted sodomy involving the express use of force or violence, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant did not request instruction on the elements of sodomy. We repeatedly have held that a trial court does not have an obligation sua sponte to instruct at the penalty phase of a capital trial on the elements of offenses not currently charged. ( People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th 920, 963-964, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574.) As we also have explained, a defendant may have tactical reasons for declining to request such instructions in order not to emphasize unduly these crimes to the jury. ( Hawkins, at pp. 963-964, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 48-9, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673; People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569, 591-592, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err.