Opinion ID: 1931326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Improper Doubling

Text: Spann argues that the trial court improperly doubled three aggravators: during the commission of a felony, pecuniary gain, and avoid arrest. The State counters that this issue was not properly preserved and that all three aggravators are based on different aspects of the crime so they should not be merged. To be preserved for appeal, the specific ground upon which a claim is based must be raised at trial and a claim different than that will not be heard on appeal. Rodriguez v. State, 609 So.2d 493, 499 (Fla.1992). Spann's argument was not preserved, but he contends that his failure to object does not preclude appellate review since the trial court may not double the aggravators. Spann is correct that the consideration of two or more aggravators is improper when the aggravators are based on the same aspect of the crime. See Rose v. State, 787 So.2d 786, 801 (Fla.2001) (citing Banks v. State, 700 So.2d 363, 367 (Fla.1997)). However, the facts of a case may support multiple aggravating factors so long as they are separate and distinct aggravators and not merely restatements of each other. Rose, 787 So.2d. at 801. This Court in Banks said: Improper doubling occurs when both aggravators rely on the same essential feature or aspect of the crime. However, there is no reason why the facts in a given case may not support multiple aggravating factors so long as they are separate and distinct aggravators and not merely restatements of each other, as in murder committed during a burglary or robbery and murder for pecuniary gain, or murder committed to avoid arrest and murder committed to hinder law enforcement. 700 So.2d at 367 (citation omitted). Therefore, when considering the issue of doubling, the focus is on the aggravators themselves, not on the overlapping facts. The trial court relied on the following facts to support the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping the victim of the homicide. Spann and Philmore planned to rob a bank because they did not get enough money from the robbery of a pawn shop the previous day. They planned to carjack a vehicle, abduct the woman driver, and then kill her so she could not identify them. The evidence shows that Spann and Philmore did exactly what they had planned. They followed the victim, Kazue Perron, to her residence, approached her as she was getting out of her vehicle, and forced her back into the car at gun point. Perron was forced to drive toward Indiantown. They eventually drove down an isolated road, where Perron was killed. These facts clearly demonstrate that the murder was committed during a kidnapping. In support of the pecuniary gain aggravator, the trial court considered the facts which demonstrated that during the series of events, Spann and Philmore stole the vehicle the murder victim had been driving. After Perron was forced to drive to an isolated location, the defendants took her vehicle. After they snatched $1000 from a customer in a bank, Spann and Philmore used Perron's Lexus to pick up their female companions. They were in the Lexus when they were spotted by the police. The murder was in fact committed for pecuniary gain of the vehicle. The testimony is clear that Spann told Philmore they needed to kill the victim of the carjacking so that she could not identify them and they would have enough time to get away with the car. The evidence was unrebutted that the elimination of the witness was the dominant motive for the murder. The victim's body was found in a remote area, and she was shot in the forehead, which is consistent with an execution-style killing. Philmore, who was also found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, also challenged the avoid arrest aggravator. Based on the same evidence, this Court upheld the trial court's finding that the sole or dominant motive for the killing was to eliminate the witness. See Philmore v. State, 820 So.2d 919, 935 (Fla.2002) (finding competent, substantial evidence of witness elimination existed where the defendant confessed that he killed the victim to eliminate her as a witness; he drove the victim for approximately thirty minutes looking for a remote location; and there was no indication that the defendant wore a mask or gloves to conceal his identity). It is clear that the facts in support of these three aggravating factors overlap. However, Banks does not prohibit the use of the same facts to support multiple aggravating factors so long as they are separate and distinct aggravators and not merely restatements of each other. We have previously upheld the finding of the pecuniary gain and committed during the course of a kidnaping aggravators. See Hartley v. State, 686 So.2d 1316, 1323 (Fla.1996) (noting that the assertion that the pecuniary gain and in-the-course-of-a-kidnapping aggravators are improperly doubled has been consistently rejected). Where other factors indicate that the defendant did not act with the absolute, sole motive of pecuniary gain, it is not error to find the pecuniary gain and in-the-course-of-a-kidnaping aggravators. Id. Spann's sole motivation for these crimes was not pecuniary gain; he clearly wanted the victim dead to prevent her from identifying him. Therefore, these two aggravators were properly found. We also reject the argument that the pecuniary gain aggravator is inconsistent with a concurrent finding of the avoid arrest aggravator. See Thompson v. State, 648 So.2d 692, 695 (Fla.1994) (holding that it is proper for a trial court to utilize both the pecuniary gain and avoid arrest aggravators in the same case); see also Hildwin v. State, 727 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla.1998) (holding in order to establish this aggravator the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that `the murder was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to obtain money, property or other financial gain') (quoting Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 680 (Fla.1995)). The evidence is clear that the murder was motivated by Spann and Philmore's desire to obtain a car so they could leave town in an unsuspicious car after they robbed a bank. The three aggravators are based on separate and distinct aspects of the criminal enterprise and were properly found. Therefore, relief on this claim is denied.