Opinion ID: 1405904
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Implied Promise of Leniency on Gas Station Charges.

Text: (7) In general, a confession is considered voluntary if the accused's decision to speak is entirely `self-motivated' [citation], i.e., if he freely and voluntarily chooses to speak without `any form of compulsion or promise of reward....' [Citation.] ( People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 327-328 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].) However, where a person in authority makes an express or clearly implied promise of leniency or advantage for the accused which is a motivating cause of the decision to confess, the confession is involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of law. ( People v. Brommel (1961) 56 Cal.2d 629, 632 [15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 364 P.2d 845].) Mere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth, when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise, does not, however, make a subsequent confession involuntary. ( People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 611.) (8a) Boyde claims that his initial statement admitting knowledge of the Gibson robbery-homicide was induced by an implied promise that a statement would lead to more favorable disposition of the charges of robbery and kidnapping for robbery of Baker, for which he had been arrested. Because Detective Callow admitted that he considered appellant a potential suspect in the Gibson homicide at the time of the January 22 interview regarding the Baker robbery-kidnapping, Boyde asserts the officer was motivated by a desire to obtain an incriminatory statement. Further, although Callow repeatedly informed Boyde that the police could not promise leniency but could only pass any information along to the district attorney who had the authority to make such an offer, Boyde argues Callow made it crystal clear that he had no hope of anything other than incarceration unless he gave a statement on the homicide. (See In re Roger G. (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 198 [125 Cal. Rptr. 625].) The argument is unpersuasive. The evidence shows that there was no promise of leniency, no attempt to induce a confession, and no confession. Appellant initiated discussion of the homicide because of his own hopes of obtaining leniency on the robbery-kidnapping charges. The statement he gave was neither a confession nor an admission, but an attempt to lay blame for the crime on Big Mike and Ellison. Detective Callow's role in eliciting the story was responsive rather than aggressive, and he repeatedly and clearly stated that he had no authority to make any promise of leniency regarding the pending robbery-kidnap charges, but could only pass information on to the district attorney. The cases upon which Boyde relies are inapposite. In In re Roger G., supra, 53 Cal. App.3d 198, for instance, officers engaged in a lengthy effort to induce a minor to abandon his claim of innocence of a shooting for which he had been arrested. They told him he might be incarcerated for `seven or eight or ten or life, you know ...' and said, `... it's gonna help you out for a chance of probation or getting parole if you are honest about the thing .... [but] if you go in there ... and... try to cover up, do you think we'd give you a chance at probation or parole? No way.' Although they subsequently stated they could not promise probation or parole, that it was only a possibility, the appellate court found the evidence established an implied, if not express threat of harsher punishment if Roger did not confess, and an implied, if not express, promise of the possibility of more lenient treatment if he did. ( Id. at pp. 200-202.) And although dictum in People v. Nelson (1964) 224 Cal. App.2d 238 [36 Cal. Rptr. 385] indicates that a confession to crimes for which defendant was arrested might be involuntary if induced by promises of lenient treatment on an unrelated pending charge, that is not the factual posture of appellant's case. At the time of his January 22 statement Boyde made a voluntary, if unwise, decision to offer false information in hope of obtaining favorable treatment. The trial court's determination that the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt is correct.