Opinion ID: 2581004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality of underlying orders

Text: In In re Doe Children, this court observed that: In general, appeals in family court cases, as in other civil cases, may be taken only from (1) a final judgment, order, or decree, see HRS §§ 571-54 (1993)[ [21] ] and 641-1(a) (1993),[ [22] ] or (2) a certified interlocutory order. See HRS § 641-1(b) (1993).[ [23] ] ... Nevertheless, [family court] orders are appealable [even if the family court retains continuing jurisdiction if] ... they meet the requisite degree of finality of an appealable order[.] In re Doe, 77 Hawai'i 109, 115, 883 P.2d 30, 36 (1994). The very nature of a family court chapter 587 proceeding entails an ongoing case which does not result in a `final' order, as that term is generally defined[,] Doe, 77 Hawai'i at 114, 883 P.2d at 35 (citing In re N.D., 857 S.W.2d 835, 842 (Mo.Ct.App.1993)), because, under chapter 587, the family court retains continuing jurisdiction over the case in order to prevent future harm or threatened harm to a child. Thus, in such family court cases, we consider whether the particular order appealed from contains a sufficient degree of finality to establish appellate jurisdiction. For example, in Doe, we held that the requisite degree of finality existed to establish appellate jurisdiction to review a natural mother's appeal of a family court order awarding foster custody of her five-year-old child to DHS, despite the fact that the family court's continuing jurisdiction and supervision of the case was not final. Doe, 77 Hawai'i at 110, 115, 883 P.2d at 31, 36. This court noted that the manifest importance of the right of a parent to raise his or her child[,] which we analogized to a fundamental liberty interest[,] weighed heavily in favor of establishing appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 114-15, 883 P.2d at 35-36. Analogously, in Cleveland v. Cleveland, 57 Haw. 519, 559 P.2d 744 (1977), this court held that a family court decree granting divorce and dividing real property was final and appealable even though the family court retained jurisdiction to decide questions of custody and support of the couple's minor children. Id. at 523-24, 559 P.2d at 747-48. We noted that it would be intolerable for an unappealed divorce decree to remain uncertain as to finality because the family court continues to retain jurisdiction of the proceeding to deal with the welfare of minor children[.] Id. at 524, 559 P.2d at 748. We also noted that to deny appellate jurisdiction could leave titles [to real property] in question for periods approaching 18 years. Id. In re Doe Children, 96 Hawai'i at 283-84, 30 P.3d at 889-90. In re Doe Children held that family court orders reflected the requisite degree of finality to establish appellate jurisdiction where [t]he issue involved in the orders  who will pay for services needed to prevent future harm to Children  [wa]s sufficiently distinct from the question of Children's actual need for the services, such need establishing the rationale for the family court's continuing jurisdiction. Moreover, the interests at stake [we]re important and require[d] appellate resolution.... In short, the fact that the question of who [wa]s responsible for payment for particular services received by Children c[ould] be decided independently from the need for the family court's continuing jurisdiction, coupled with the importance of obtaining a definitive ruling on the issue, establishe[d] that the requisite degree of finality [wa]s present to permit appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 284, 30 P.3d at 890 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). The focus of the present matter is the December 6, 2001 orders concerning the Child Protective Act regarding John, which ordered the DOE to place John in the eighth grade. [24] The December 6 orders were not `final' in that the family court retain[ed] continuing jurisdiction over [John] ... and no interlocutory orders were certified. Id. at 283, 30 P.3d at 889. Nevertheless, the issue involved in the December 6, 2001 orders  i.e., whether John should be placed in the eighth or ninth grade  is distinct from the matter of John's obvious need for education in general, which establishes the rationale for the family court's continuing jurisdiction. Thus, the December 6, 2001 orders are final as to the narrow issue of John's proper grade placement. Furthermore, the interests at stake, namely, a child's proper education and the scope of the family court's subject matter jurisdiction, are important and require appellate resolution. Therefore, the fact that the question of John's grade placement can be decided independently of the need for the family court's continuing jurisdiction, coupled with the importance of obtaining a definitive ruling on the issue of the family court's subject matter jurisdiction, establishes the requisite degree of finality such that we may resolve the present matter.