Opinion ID: 1378366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: alternatives available to the court for 1982 elections

Text: There remains the problem as to what districts are to be used for the 1982 primary and general elections. Absent the filing of referenda challenging the 1981 reapportionment statutes, each of those laws would have gone into effect on January 1, 1982. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c).) But referenda have been filed, and this court has concluded that they are valid and that their filing stays the date upon which the challenged statutes become law unless and until they are approved by the voters. As a result, the new districts, although presumptively valid, are not now in effect. The old districting scheme, in effect since its establishment by this court in 1973 (see Legislature v. Reinecke ( Reinecke IV ) (1973) 10 Cal.3d 396 [110 Cal. Rptr. 718, 516 P.2d 6]), no longer meets the one-person, one-vote requirement embodied in the equal protection clauses of our state and federal Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) All parties agree that the population changes revealed by the 1980 census demonstrate that the old districts contain population disparities that are clear violations of the state and federal Constitutions' one-person, one-vote mandate. [13] The old districts are, therefore, no longer valid. Moreover, the old congressional district boundaries have been repealed. (Stats. 1981, ch. 535, § 1.) [14] With no valid districts in effect, the state's election machinery cannot operate. In order for the 1982 elections to proceed, some temporary districting scheme must be established. The impasse now confronting the state must be resolved. Courts have repeatedly affirmed that reapportionment is a task best performed by the state legislatures. [T]he institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality ... is the Legislature. ( Connor v. Finch (1977) 431 U.S. 407, 414-415 [52 L.Ed.2d 465, 473-474, 97 S.Ct. 1828].) Since that is not a viable alternative prior to the June primary, this court is forced to assume the unwelcome obligation ( id., at p. 415 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 474]) of stepping into the reapportionment fray. The options available to the court are limited. Were time constraints less pressing, the court might consider requesting the Legislature to develop an interim plan. However, the June primary is less than five months away. Respondents Eu, the Secretary of State, and Panish, the Registrar of Voters of Los Angeles County, report that it is too late to use any districts except those in either the out-dated plan or the Legislature's plans. Computer programming requiring two to four months of work has already been performed for both of those plans. There is no time to do similar preliminary programming for any other plan. Further, no new districts could be put into effect in time to inform the electorate and the candidates of their districts before the primary election. [15] Real parties argue that the 1981 reapportionment measures are not among the options this court may consider. However, decisions of the Supreme Court are to the contrary. Those decisions demonstrate that any practical alternative available to this court may be given consideration, including reapportionment plans which are not yet in effect and which are scheduled to be submitted to the electorate. The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that regardless of the requirements of state constitutions, the delay inherent in following [a] state constitutional prescription for approval of [reapportionment measures] cannot be allowed to result in an impermissible deprivation of [the citizens'] right to an adequate voice in the election of legislators to represent them. ( Roman v. Sincock (1964) 377 U.S. 695, 711 [12 L.Ed.2d 620, 630, 84 S.Ct. 1449]; Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 584 [12 L.Ed.2d 506, 540, 84 S.Ct. 1362].) When the delay caused by such state constitutional prescriptions conflicts with a citizen's federal constitutional right to cast an equally weighted vote, a court has the power to set aside the state constitutional provision. Acting under general equitable principles, the court must determine whether circumstances require the immediate effectuation of the federal constitutional right. ( Roman v. Sincock, supra, 377 U.S. at pp. 711-712 [12 L.Ed.2d at pp. 630-631].) (6) From these principles, it follows that a court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, may not only consider but also adopt reapportionment plans which are not yet final within the framework of a state constitution. This is precisely the action affirmed by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533. In 1962, during the pendency of a federal suit challenging the apportionment of the Alabama Legislature, that body adopted two reapportionment plans. Neither was to take effect until the 1966 election. One of the plans was a proposed constitutional amendment which was scheduled to be submitted to the voters for ratification at the November 1962 general election. The other plan was statutory. It was enacted as a standby measure and was to take effect only if the voters rejected the constitutional amendment, or, should the amendment pass, if a court subsequently declared the amendment unconstitutional. ( Id., at pp. 537, 542-544 [12 L.Ed.2d at pp. 513, 515-517].) After trial, the district court declared the existing apportionment of the Legislature unconstitutional. ( Id., at p. 545 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 517].) The court fashioned a temporary remedy comprised of certain aspects of the two proposed plans for use in the 1962 election only. ( Id., at p. 552 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 521].) The Supreme Court held that the District Court acted properly in considering [the] proposed plans, although neither was to become effective until the 1966 election and the proposed constitutional amendment was scheduled to be submitted to the State's voters in November 1962. ( Id., at p. 570 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 532].) Why? Because [c]onsideration by the court below of the two proposed plans was clearly necessary ... in ascertaining what sort of judicial relief, if any, should be afforded ... for the 1962 elections. [16] ( Id., at p. 571 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 532]; see also, Reinecke I, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 602.) Given the breadth of a court's equitable powers in reapportionment cases under federal law, it is clear that this court may give consideration to the Legislature's 1981 reapportionment plans, even though those plans are not yet in effect and are now scheduled to be submitted to a popular vote. In ascertaining the remedy to be applied in a given case, a court may give consideration to any practical alternative which is available. In addition, a ruling that the stay provision of article II, section 10, subdivision (a) precludes consideration of the Legislature's reapportionment plans would create serious conflicts with other provisions of our state Constitution. Article XXI, adopted in 1980, requires that the Legislature reapportion the Senate, Assembly, and Congressional districts [i]n the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade.... It also requires that all members of the Legislature and Congress be elected from single-member districts. (Art. XXI, § 1, subd. (a).) Further, article I, section 7, the state equal protection clause, adopted in 1974, mandates a recognition of the one-person, one-vote principle. To construe the referendum stay provision so as to prohibit consideration of the 1981 reapportionment plan would frustrate the requirements of both of these newly reaffirmed constitutional provisions. It would substantially delay redistricting of the state, despite the constitutional requirement that reapportionment occur immediately after the federal census. This court would be left with no practical alternative but to impose the old, now seriously malapportioned districts on the state, in violation of the equal protection clause. (See discussion, ante, at p. 658.) Further, the Legislature's reapportionment plan is the only available option that provides for 45 congressional districts, rather than the 43 formerly allotted to California. If that plan were eliminated from consideration, there would be no way to implement the constitutional requirement that all members of Congress be elected from single-member districts. (See discussion, post, at pp. 661-664.) Nothing in our state Constitution dictates that the stay provision of article II should have more force and effect than the commands of article XXI or the equal protection clause of article I, section 7. Rather than promoting any particular constitutional provision at the expense of other, equally important provisions, this court must harmonize the various articles of our Constitution so as to minimize any potential conflicts. The conclusion that the referendum stay provision of article II does not remove the 1981 reapportionment statutes from this court's consideration saves that constitutional provision from a potential conflict with the mandates of article XXI and the state equal protection clause. Petitioners' claim that the referendum provisions of the Constitution do not apply to reapportionment statutes seems unfounded. Similarly without merit is real parties' assertion that the qualification of the referenda prohibits this court from considering the Legislature's plans. The federal Constitution, federal precedent, and our own Constitution all require that the court weigh all the options currently available, including those challenged by the referenda.