Opinion ID: 158881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Search and Consent under the Fourth Amendment

Text: 18 The Fourth Amendment also prohibits unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A warrantless search of an arrestee's home is per se unreasonable unless it falls within some well defined exception to the general rule. United States v. Butler, 966 F.2d 559, 562 (10th Cir. 1992). An arrestee's consent to the search qualifies as one such exception. Id. Consent must be unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given. United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993). The government must prove the satisfaction of these criteria in light of the totality of circumstances. Id. Where a consensual search is preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation, the government must prove not only voluntariness, but 'establish a break in the causal connection between the illegality and the evidence thereby obtained.' Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1053 (quoting United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985)). We examine the entire record on appeal in determining voluntariness. United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 1993). 19 Davis argues that the consent which he gave to search his home was the product of an illegal detention. Absent any intervening event purging the resultant taint, he contends that his consent was involuntary. Again we disagree. Davis' detention was not illegal. Davis' arrest was supported by probable cause and therefore could not taint his consent to the search of his bedroom. Accordingly, we need only determine whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Davis' consent was unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given. 20 The district court found at the suppression hearing that Davis had been advised of his Miranda rights, had orally consented to the search of his bedroom for his gun, and had signed a plainly drafted form advising him of his right to refuse. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Davis did not know what he was doing, that he did not know of his right to refuse, or that he could reasonably have feared any harm to himself in the event that he should exercise that right. Further, at trial Davis testified clearly to the knowing and voluntary nature of his consent, his awareness at the time of his right to refuse, his having directed Patrolman Waters to the precise location of his rifle, and even the reasons for his cooperation. We thus find that the district court did not commit clear error when it determined that Davis freely, intelligently, unequivocally and specifically consented to the search of his bedroom. Therefore, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.