Opinion ID: 184342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Basic Principles of Comity

Text: 7 In Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 92 S.Ct. 815, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972), the Supreme Court outlined the basic principles of comity that must prevail between civilian courts and the military judicial system. Id. at 46, 92 S.Ct. at 822. At the heart of these principles is the general rule that a federal court must await the final outcome of court-martial proceedings in the military justice system before entertaining an action by a service member who is the subject of the court-martial. Although this rule often is framed in terms of 'exhaustion,' it may more accurately be understood as based upon the appropriate demands of comity between two separate judicial systems. Id. at 40, 92 S.Ct. at 819. 8 The Court in Parisi allowed the petitioner in that case--a service member seeking discharge as a conscientious objector--to pursue a habeas corpus petition in federal court even though court-martial charges were still pending against him. The Court concluded that the demands of comity did not require dismissal of Parisi's habeas petition, because he had fully exhausted the administrative procedures that were in place for review of claims by persons seeking discharge as conscientious objectors. Since the Court found that [c]ourts martial are not convened to review and rectify administrative denials of conscientious objector claims or to release conscientious objectors from military service, id. at 42, 92 S.Ct. at 820, it followed that the petitioner was not required to await the disposition of a court-martial charge before seeking habeas relief in federal court. However, the Court in Parisi made it clear that the decision, which merely recognize[d] the historic respect in this Nation for valid conscientious objection to military service, id at 45, 92 S.Ct. at 822, was narrow and [327 U.S.App.D.C. 151] should not be understood as impinging upon the basic principles of comity, id. at 46, 92 S.Ct. at 822. 9 Any doubt about the narrow reach of the judgment in Parisi was put to rest in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975). In Councilman, the Court reaffirmed the general rule that federal courts normally will not entertain habeas petitions by military prisoners unless all available military remedies have been exhausted. Id. at 758, 95 S.Ct. at 1313; see also Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 693-98, 89 S.Ct. 1876, 1882-85, 23 L.Ed.2d 631 (1969); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 71 S.Ct. 149, 95 L.Ed. 146 (1950). This rule was seen to be grounded in the same considerations of comity, Councilman, 420 U.S. at 756, 95 S.Ct. at 1312-13, alluded to in Parisi. 10 Councilman indicates that there are two principal reasons why considerations of comity normally preclude a federal court from intervening in a pending court-martial proceeding. First, the military justice system must remain free from undue interference, because [t]he military is a 'specialized society separate from civilian society' with 'laws and traditions of its own developed during its long history.'  Id. at 757, 95 S.Ct. at 1313 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2555, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)). Second, Congress sought to balance the competing interests in military preparedness and fairness to service members charged with military offenses, by creat[ing] an integrated system of military courts and review procedures. 420 U.S. at 758, 95 S.Ct. at 1313. [I]t must be assumed that the military court system will vindicate servicemen's constitutional rights. Id. Thus, as suggested in Parisi, the doctrine of comity aids the military judiciary in its task of maintaining order and discipline in the armed services, eliminates needless friction between the federal civilian and military judicial systems, and gives due respect to the autonomous military judicial system created by Congress. Parisi, 405 U.S. at 40, 92 S.Ct. at 819.