Opinion ID: 787920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Quasi-Judicial Immunity for Parole Officers

Text: 16 The Supreme Court has reserved deciding whether members of state parole boards have absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their official actions. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). We have held, however, that parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity when they perform quasi-judicial functions. Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909-10. Thus, parole board officials of the BPT are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole because these tasks are functionally comparable to tasks performed by judges. Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1303; Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.1991) (holding Sellars immunity encompasses actions taken when processing parole applications). Absolute immunity has also been extended to parole officials for the imposition of parole conditions and the execution of parole revocation procedures, tasks integrally related to an official's decision to grant or revoke parole. Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909. 17 We have also explained, however, that parole officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for conduct not requiring the exercise of quasi-judicial discretion. Id. There is no reason to clothe actions taken outside an official's adjudicatory role with the absolute immunity tailored to the demands of that role. Id. Thus, while parole officials may claim absolute immunity for those actions relating to their responsibility to determine whether to revoke parole, their immunity for conduct arising from their duty to supervise parolees is qualified. Id. at 910; see also Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1415-16 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that a parole officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for depriving a woman of her clearly established due process right to bodily privacy by entering a bathroom stall and watching her urinate). Anderson, therefore, expresses the broad principle that, under a functional analysis, parole officials may be accorded one degree of immunity for one type of activity and a different degree for a discrete function. Anderson, 714 F.2d at 910. 18