Opinion ID: 2160758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: nature of discretionary function exemption

Text: In considering the discretionary function exemption under the State Tort Claims Act and holding that summary judgment should not have been granted the State, we, in Wickersham v. State, 218 Neb. 175, 180, 354 N.W.2d 134, 138-39 (1984), stated: Performance of or failure to perform a discretionary function or duty cannot be the basis for liability under the State Tort Claims Act. See Fletcher v. State, 216 Neb. 342, 344 N.W.2d 899 (1984); cf. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and §§ 2671 et seq. (1948)). That which is protected under the State Tort Claims Act, § 81-8,219(1)(a), is the discretion of a governmental executive or administrator to act according to one's judgment of the best course to be taken. Such discretion includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. Discretion includes determinations or judgments made in establishing plans, specifications, or schedules of operations. Where policy judgment exists, there also exists discretion exempted from liability under the State Tort Claims Act. Cf. Dalehite v. United States, supra . However, the discretionary function or duty exemption in the State Tort Claims Act extends only to the basic policy decisions made in governmental activity, and not to ministerial activities implementing such policy decisions. See Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977); cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (Federal Tort Claims Act). In other words, the State is liable for negligence of its employees at the operational level, where there is no room for policy judgment. See Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Company, 221 F.2d 62 (D.C.Cir.1955). In Wickersham, the State, through its Department of Agriculture, had under statutory direction adopted regulations in conformance with regulations of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which required that the State both test for brucellosis and directly notify, among others, purchasers of cattle which came from an infected herd. We reasoned that the State was rendered liable by its failure to comply with its own regulations by failing to timely test cattle which Wickersham had purchased and by failing to timely notify him of its subsequent discovery that the cattle he had purchased came from an infected herd. However, in Blitzkie v. State, 241 Neb. 759, 491 N.W.2d 42 (1992), we affirmed the judgment in favor of the State against Blitzkie's claims that he, as an owner of hogs near an outbreak of pseudorabies, should have been notified personally and that the notice given to local veterinarians was inadequate. There, we wrote: The very letter of § 54-701 implies that the Department of Agriculture has the discretion of employing the most efficient and practical means in the control and prevention of livestock disease. The evidence is uncontroverted that the Department of Agriculture did quarantine the affected animals, in compliance with the statute, and in its discretion, notified the state's veterinarians by way of newsletter. The method of notice and to whom the notice would be sent were completely discretionary functions, and plaintiff's claims that these activities were ministerial, rather than discretionary, are without merit. Blitzkie, 241 Neb. at 763, 491 N.W.2d at 45. In Security Inv. Co. v. State, 231 Neb. 536, 437 N.W.2d 439 (1989), we, in affirming the sustainment of the State's demurrer, held that the alleged general failure of the state Department of Banking and Finance to enforce the banking laws, take remedial steps with respect to a failing financial institution, remove certain officers of the institution, inform other financial institutions of the failing institution's condition, and put the failing institution into receivership all fell within the discretionary function. Quoting extensively from Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988), we wrote: `[I]t is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case.' [486 U.S. at 535] 108 S.Ct. at 1958 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984)). The Court then described the conduct which is within the discretionary function exception: In examining the nature of the challenged conduct, a court must first consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting employee. This inquiry is mandated by the language of the exception; conduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or choice. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34, 73 S.Ct. 956, 967, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (stating that the exception protects `the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judgment of the best course'). Thus, the discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. And if the employee's conduct cannot appropriately be the product of judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in the conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect. Cf. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. [292], 108 S.Ct. 580, [585], 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988) (recognizing that conduct cannot be discretionary if prescribed by law). Moreover, assuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, a court must determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. The basis for the discretionary function exception was Congress' desire to `prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.' United States v. Varig Airlines, supra, [467 U.S.] at 814, 104 S.Ct., at 2764-2765. The exception, properly construed, therefore protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy. See Dalehite v. United States, supra, [346 U.S.] at 36, 73 S.Ct., at 968 (`Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion'). In sum, the discretionary function exception insulates the Government from liability if the action challenged in the case involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment. Security Inv. Co., 231 Neb. at 544-45, 437 N.W.2d at 445. Most recently, in Lemke v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 243 Neb. 633, 502 N.W.2d 80 (1993), a political subdivision which retailed odorized natural gas had received information that certain flexible connectors deteriorated with age and could leak. Although it had not installed all such connectors in the area, the subdivision had emplaced several thousand of them and had been on the plaintiffs' premises to make adjustments to their gas appliances. The subdivision had in place a program which informed, through literature, its customers and, through advertisements, the general public concerning the benefits and risks involved in using natural gas. Nonetheless, the political subdivision did not undertake to inform its customers about the connector problem; instead, it merely filed the information in its library without even telling its service personnel about the defect. The plaintiffs sustained damages when, because of a deteriorated connector, an explosion occurred while one of them attempted to relight a pilot light. In affirming the judgment rendered against the political subdivision, we wrote: [W]hen (1) a governmental entity has actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition or hazard caused by or under the control of the governmental entity and (2) the dangerous condition or hazard is not readily apparent to persons who are likely to be injured by the dangerous condition or hazard, the governmental entity has a nondiscretionary duty to warn of the danger or take other protective measures that may prevent injury as the result of the dangerous condition or hazard. In such a situation, a governmental entity's failure to warn or take other protective measures is not a planning-level decision involving a social, economic, or political policy judgment and, therefore, does not come within the discretionary function exemption of the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. Id. at 647, 502 N.W.2d at 89. We have previously distinguished ministerial acts from discretionary functions. In Allen v. County of Lancaster, 218 Neb. 163, 352 N.W.2d 883 (1984), the plaintiffs alleged that the county had improperly approved the construction of a sewer which did not comply with a certain county resolution and had improperly inspected the sewer. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the sewer violated seven of the various criteria set forth in five pages of the resolution, which provided that all sewers would be constructed `in conformance with the requirements of the health Officer who shall be guided by' the specified criteria. Id. at 164, 352 N.W.2d at 884. In affirming the sustainment of the county's demurrer, we held that where a health officer must make a judgmental decision within a regulatory framework, such decision is distinguishable from a ministerial act: In this case the health officer had a great deal of room for policy judgment and decision, and as stated in Dalehite 346 U.S. at 36, 73 S.Ct. at 968, where there is such room there is discretion. The health officer is clearly required to exercise his discretion. He is not given standards that he must follow, but instead he and the public are informed that individual sewage systems must be installed in conformance with [his] requirements and that, in connection with those requirements, he is to be guided by certain criteria, many of which require the exercise of further discretion. Consideration of the second of Allens' statements set out abovethat the acts complained of were ministerialreinforces our holding herein. In State of Nebraska ex rel. Line v. Kuhlman, 167 Neb. 674, 682-83, 94 N.W.2d 373, 380 (1959), we stated: `A ministerial act has been defined as one performed in response to a duty which has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or upon conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion.' In Mekota v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 146 Neb. 370, 19 N.W.2d 633, we quoted with approval this definition: `A ministerial act may    be defined to be one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done.' Examination of the regulation herein, delegating authority to the health officer of Lancaster County, shows clearly that that officer is to exercise a great deal of his own judgment and that his acts are clearly not ministerial. Allen, 218 Neb. at 168-69, 352 N.W.2d at 886-87.