Opinion ID: 2982507
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Official-Capacity Claims Under Title VI

Text: A plaintiff may only assert Title VI claims against “the entity . . . receiving the financial assistance.” Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, Tenn., 99 F.3d 1352, 1357 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Shannon, 334 F. App’x at 508. On appeal, Appellants challenge the dismissal of the official capacity suits against Judnic and Stuecher. Official-capacity claims are “in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Where the entity is named as a defendant, an official-capacity claim is redundant. E.g., Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 522 F. App’x 322, 327 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Having sued . . . the entity for which [plaintiff] was an agent, the suit against [plaintiff] in his official 3 Because Appellants did not claim that MDOT’s audit of BBF was retaliatory in the district court, we need not rule on this claim. See Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Ordinarily, we will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal.”) (citing McFarland v. Henderson, 307 F.3d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 2002)). Nonetheless, we note that even if the issue were properly before us, we would find that Appellants still failed to allege a plausible retaliation claim and thus that this claim was properly dismissed. - 19 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan capacity was superfluous.”). Here, because Appellants named MDOT and the State of Michigan as defendants, their official-capacity suits against Judnic and Stuecher are superfluous. Because the Title VI claims against the State and MDOT fail, Appellants’ official-capacity claims against Judnic and Stuecher necessarily also fail. See Jackson v. Wilkins, 517 F. App’x 311, 321 (6th Cir. 2013); Chesher v. Neyer, 477 F.3d 784, 797 (6th Cir. 2007).