Opinion ID: 2638703
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority Creates an Unworkable Test

Text: The majority adopts a new two-part test requiring that: (1) a plan must be sufficiently attentive to county boundaries; and (2) county splits must be accompanied by an adequate factual showing that less drastic alternatives could not have satisfied the equal population requirement of the Colorado Constitution. Maj. op. at 1241, 1246, & 1249. Our court has never before articulated this two-part test. We have never previously even used both of these two phrases in the same case. Additionally, neither phrase was central to the holding of the particular case from which it was taken. Thus, the majority combines two unrelated phrases, contained in two opinions spanning ten years, to create a test that lacks meaningful standards and will be difficult for future courts to apply. The first prong of the majority's test is taken from In re Reapportionment 1982. In that case, in response to opponents' arguments that the senate redistricting plan did not comply with section 47(2) of our constitution, we noted our belief that the Commission was sufficiently attentive to county boundaries. In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 195. This remark was made in the context of a discussion of why the Commission's 1982 plan, given all of the constitutional criteria, was approved. Id. at 195-97. The second prong of the majority's test, that the Commission must advance an adequate factual showing that less drastic alternatives could not have satisfied the equal population requirement, is taken from In re Reapportionment 1992. In that case, we rejected a split of Pitkin County as unconstitutional because: (1) both a city and a county were split; (2) the resulting district lacked compactness; (3) the split destroyed a community of interest; and (4) the Commission's explanation of the split was not detailed enough to provide a basis for meaningful judicial review. In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 195-96. Hence, the remark that forms the basis for the second prong of the majority's new test was also made in the context of a discussion of the necessity of applying all of the constitutional criteria. The majority's test has, thus, overemphasized isolated language from our previous cases in order to develop its two-part analysis. In doing so, it has created a test that lacks predictability and defined standards. For instance, it is unclear when the Commission will have been sufficiently attentive to boundaries, or when it will have provided an adequate explanation of its decisions. I conclude that the imprecision of the majority's test will make it impossible for this court to render any consistent review of the constitutionality of future Commission plans. On one hand, the majority articulates its two-part test without defining when a Commission's plan will have been sufficiently attentive to county boundaries. Thus, the Commission and future courts have little guidance as to when a plan will meet the first prong of the majority's test or when it will fall short of compliance. On the other hand, the majority's application of the rule demonstrates that there will be only one way for the Commission to satisfy the first prong of the majority's two-part test. The majority indicates that the first prong is met only when the Commission follows the bright-line rule that it must begin by allocating districts to the most populous counties. This bright-line rule is contrary to our precedent, as discussed below. In addition, the majority's rejection of the Commission's build-out justifications strips the Commission of the discretion historically afforded it to determine the order in which counties should be arranged into districts. Based on the majority's application of its test to the Proposed Plan, I would assume that, any time that the bright-line rule is violated, the first prong of the two-part test will not have been satisfied and that the Proposed Plan is therefore unconstitutional. Thus, the articulation of the bright-line rule renders the first prong of the test unnecessary since the bright-line rule provides a complete answer to the question of whether the Commission has been sufficiently attentive to county boundaries. To summarize, the majority has fashioned a two-part test that finds no support in precedent and that uses language that is vague and imprecise. It then institutes an unprecedented bright-line rule to be implemented under the first part of the test. The second prong of the test, however, remains unexplained, with no standards provided to determine when an explanation will be adequate.