Opinion ID: 1119948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: central contractors statute of limitations issue

Text: This appeal raises an issue of first impression in Wyoming: whether or not the relation back limitations of W.R.C.P. 15(c) apply to an amendment of a complaint made to identify a defendant originally named fictitiously as John Doe I pursuant to W.R.C.P. 17(d) and made after the statute of limitations had run. Resolving this issue requires interpretation of three Wyoming rules of civil procedure and a statute of limitations. NUD relies on the Wyoming fictitious name rule, W.R.C.P. 17(d), which provides: Suing person by fictitious name.  When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name and description, and when the true name is discovered the pleading or proceeding may be amended accordingly; and the plaintiff in such case must state in his complaint that he could not discover the true name, and the summons must contain the words, real name unknown, and a copy thereof must be served personally upon the defendant.[ [8] ] Central cites a second relevant rule, W.R.C.P. 3(b), which governs the commencement of an action, and provides in pertinent part: When commenced.  For purposes of statutes of limitation, an action shall be deemed commenced on the date of filing the complaint as to each defendant, if service is made on him or on a co-defendant who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in interest with him, within sixty (60) days after the filing of the complaint. If such service is not made within sixty (60) days the action shall be deemed commenced on the date when service is made. (Emphasis added.) The applicable statute of limitations involved was found in a joint tort-feasor contribution act adopted by Wyoming in 1973, W.S. 1-1-110 through 1-1-113 (1977). The act was in effect at the time of the accident, February 13, 1985, as well as on February 1, 1986, the date of the settlement, and the date payment was made to the injured party. W.S. 1-1-112(d) (1977), on the enforcement of the statutorily authorized contribution claim, provided as follows: If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has either: (i) Discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of limitations period applicable to claimant's right of action against him and has commenced his action for contribution within one (1) year after payment [.] (Emphasis added.) NUD commenced this action for contribution against the Town and four John Does on November 3, 1986, clearly within one year of payment on February 1, 1986. However, under W.R.C.P. 3, action was not commenced against Central until acceptance of the summons on July 20, 1988, which is almost two and a half years after NUD's payment. Central argues that NUD's action against Central is barred because it was not filed within the one year mandated by W.S. 1-1-112(d) (1977). The third rule cited is W.R.C.P. 15(c) regarding the relation back of amendments to pleadings, which provides: Relation back of amendments.  Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. NUD points out that the Wyoming version of W.R.C.P. 15(c) is identical to the earlier version of F.R.C.P. 15(c), which was later amended in 1966 to add the following: An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party to be brought in by amendment that party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party. NUD argues that if the factors identified in the current Rule 15(c) are met, its amended complaint substituting Central for John Doe I relates back to the original complaint and further contends that analysis of these factors requires consideration of matters outside the pleadings making summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue inappropriate. The cases considering both a fictitious name statute and the longer, amended version of Rule 15(c) have held that plaintiffs have a right to use John Does and subsequently to amend their complaints. However, an amendment to a complaint substituting a named defendant for a fictitious defendant is considered to constitute a change of a party and will relate back to the filing of the original complaint and toll the statute of limitations only if the requirements of W.R.C.P. 15(c) are satisfied, i.e., the defendants actually had or should have had notice of the claim against them as to the occurrence in question. In Gould v. Tibshraeny, 21 Ariz. App. 146, 517 P.2d 104 (1973), the plaintiff named fictitious defendants pursuant to a fictitious name statute nearly identical to Wyoming's fictitious name rule, then subsequently substituted Tibshraeny for one of the Doe defendants after the statute of limitations had run. The court held that the amended complaint did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint to toll the statute of limitations where the requirements of Rule 15(c) had not been met: It is fundamental that the purpose of the statute of limitations is to provide a cutoff point in time for stale claims. Rule 15(c) carries out this sound policy by requiring notice of the institution of the action within the time limitations set by the statute of limitations before an amendment adding new parties will relate back to the date of the original pleading. Gould, 517 P.2d at 106. The first service of process followed amendment to substitute the actual name of the contended tortfeasor. Under this Arizona rule, amendment to change a fictitious name to an actual party constitutes a Rule 15(c) change of a party and criteria of the rule must be met to obtain benefit of the relation back result. Medina v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 677 P.2d 953 (Colo. App. 1983), overruled sub nom. Dillingham v. Greeley Pub. Co., 701 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1985). [9] See also Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986), which considered Rule 15(c) in conjunction with the related party amendment concept instead of the fictitious name change; and Jacobson v. Union Story Trust and Sav. Bank, 338 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1983), involving substitution of the executor of estate for the decedent. See also Richardson Associates, 806 P.2d at 799. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a plaintiff's amended pleading substituting the true names of defendants for the fictitious names used in the original pleading did not relate back so as to avoid bar of limitations where, prior to service of summons on original fictitious defendants, they had no notice of the pending lawsuit. Sassi v. Breier, 584 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1978). Accord prospectively, Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 723 P.2d 814 (1986). See also Gardner v. Fithian, 128 Ariz. 353, 625 P.2d 942 (1981); Hartford Ins. Group v. Beck, 12 Ariz. App. 532, 472 P.2d 955 (1970); Larson v. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co., Inc., 182 Ga. App. 356, 356 S.E.2d 35 (1987); Sims v. American Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121, aff'd 232 Ga. 787, 209 S.E.2d 61 (1974); Berns Const. Co., Inc. v. Miller, 491 N.E.2d 565 (1986), aff'd 516 N.E.2d 1053 (Ind. 1987); Lunn v. American Maintenance Corp., 96 Nev. 787, 618 P.2d 343 (1980); and Vocke v. City of Dayton, 36 Ohio App.2d 139, 303 N.E.2d 892 (1973). Contra Sooy v. Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc., 218 Mont. 418, 708 P.2d 1014 (1985), reversing Vincent v. Edwards, 184 Mont. 92, 601 P.2d 1184 (1979). With the passage of Rule 15(c), we follow the Arizona rule that the test is notice to the actual defendant and not necessarily diligence of the plaintiff attempting identification for amendment. Cf. Younger v. Kracke, 236 N.J. Super. 595, 566 A.2d 581 (1989). [10] This record establishes that although NUD states in its complaints it notified the Town as to its pending settlement with the injured party, there is no allegation or evidence in the record that it notified Central of its claims or gave Central an opportunity to participate in the negotiations or settlement with the injured party. Thus, the notice requirement of Rule 15(c) necessary to effectuate a relation back amendment result is not shown in this record. [11] The trial court consequently properly dismissed proceedings against Central on the basis that the statute of limitations had expired. NUD had a right to use a fictitious name in the initial complaint; but, when amendment is made after the time permitted by the statute of limitations has passed, an amendment relates back for time computation only when the defendant had or should have had notice of a claim against it. Vincent, 601 P.2d 1184.