Opinion ID: 374663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Per Se Attack

Text: 41 At this point in the history of the fight against discrimination, it cannot be seriously argued that there is any insurmountable barrier to the use of goals or quotas 26 to eradicate the effects of past discrimination. See Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875, 98 S.Ct. 225, 54 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 1561, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Masonry Contractors Association of Memphis, Inc., 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), modified, 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895, 95 S.Ct. 173, 42 L.Ed.2d 139 (1974); Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957, 94 S.Ct. 1971, 40 L.Ed.2d 307 (1974); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1997, 44 L.Ed.2d 481 (1975); United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam); United States v. Local Union No. 212, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers International Union, Local Union No. 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939, 93 S.Ct. 2773, 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851, 93 S.Ct. 63, 34 L.Ed.2d 94 (1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984, 92 S.Ct. 447, 30 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971); Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S.Ct. 98, 30 L.Ed.2d 95 (1971); United States v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943, 91 S.Ct. 245, 27 L.Ed.2d 248 (1970); Local 53 of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969). To the contrary, affirmative relief is required to ensure that the effects of past discrimination are negated. In Morrow, supra, this court held, en banc, that a decree which resulted in an increase in the number of black patrolmen on the Mississippi Highway Patrol from four to six was insufficient. We insisted that the District Court fashion an appropriate decree which would have the certain result of increasing the number of blacks on the Highway Patrol. We suggested to the District Court several of the various forms of affirmative relief which might be appropriate: hiring ratios, hiring pools, or a freeze on white hiring. We recognized the need for the plaintiffs and defendants to fully cooperate with each other and with the District Court. 42 No decision of the Supreme Court has ever adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be color blind. See Bakke, supra, 438 U.S. at 336, 98 S.Ct. at 2772 (opinion of Justice Brennan). The Supreme Court has unanimously rejected a statute mandating color blindness on the ground that it would prevent District Courts from fashioning appropriate decrees. See North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45, 91 S.Ct. 1284, 1285, 28 L.Ed.2d 586 (1971). Race must be considered, the Supreme Court said. Id. at 46, 91 S.Ct. at 1286. Race-conscious plans have also been approved by the Supreme Court in, for example, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 91 S.Ct. 1287, 28 L.Ed.2d 582 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225, 89 S.Ct. 1670, 23 L.Ed.2d 263 (1971); and Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). 43 Thus, unless the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke spells the doom of the use of racial and sexual goals by municipal employers, 27 prior precedent compels us to conclude that hiring and promotional goals are not per se unconstitutional, illegal, or against public policy. 44 We frankly admit that we are not entirely sure what to make of the various Bakke opinions. In over one hundred and fifty pages of United States Reports, the Justices have told us mainly that they have agreed to disagree. In addition, we now know that Mr. Bakke must be admitted to the Medical School at the University of California at Davis, but that this does not mean that all affirmative action is doomed. If we wished to delay voluntary efforts by municipal employers to achieve equality of employment opportunity for all persons regardless of race, national origin, or sex, we would have no trouble finding language in the opinion of Mr. Justice Powell supporting the position that, as a constitutional matter, race cannot be used as a factor in a selection process unless constitutional or statutory violations have been proved. See Bakke, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2755, 2757, 2758 (opinion of Justice Powell). However, this was the view of Justice Powell alone; the four Justices who agreed with his result in the case found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue. Moreover, we read his opinion to deny that specific findings of past illegal conduct are constitutionally required before a public employer can base decisions on race. 45 First, Mr. Justice Powell states explicitly that the decision does not call into question congressionally authorized administrative actions, such as consent decrees under Title VII. 98 S.Ct. at 2755 n.41 (emphasis added). Not only is the factual situation in employment discrimination cases materially different from that involved in Bakke, see id. at 2754, but also there has been detailed legislative consideration of the various indicia of previous constitutional or statutory violations, id. at 2755 n.41, particular administrative bodies have been charged with detecting violations and formulating remedies, id., and there is a legislative mandate to remove barriers to equality of employment opportunities. Id. at 2758. 28 46 Moreover, the opinion of Justice Powell suggests that the Congressional findings of discrimination in employment accompanying the passage of Title VII are sufficient to justify race-conscious remedies. See Bakke, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2758 n.44 (opinion of Justice Powell). This conclusion is supported by Mr. Justice Powell's citation with approval of two cases involving affirmative action remedies imposed under Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted following 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e at 281 (West 1974), without detailed findings of past discrimination. See Bakke, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2754-55 (opinion of Justice Powell), citing Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S.Ct. 98, 30 L.Ed.2d 95 (1971); Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957, 94 S.Ct. 1971, 40 L.Ed.2d 307 (1974). In neither of these cases were detailed findings of past discrimination by the employer relied on to support the affirmative action plan; rather, the remedies were based on underutilization of minorities by labor organizations and the general findings supporting the Executive Order. In neither case were there findings of specific instances of identified past discrimination. 47 In the instant case, the Department of Justice made a determination, based on its investigation of the employment practices of the City of Miami, that there was a pattern and practice of discriminatory employment practices in the City of Miami. 29 By signing the consent decree, the Department of Justice gave its administrative approval to the remedy chosen. Nothing more is constitutionally required by the opinion of Mr. Justice Powell. To conclude otherwise would require parties in agreement over a proposed remedial plan to put on a trial neither desires to convince a judge to approve their proposed plan. 48 It is clear that, under the views of the other four Justices 30 who reached the constitutional issue, the only possible obstacle to affirmative relief of the type here proposed would be a determination that the specific plan is unreasonable. See Bakke, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2792 (opinion of Justice Brennan). 31 They correctly prognosticated the precise problem we face today: 49 Indeed, the requirement of a judicial determination of a constitutional or statutory violation as a predicate for race-conscious remedial actions would be self-defeating. Such a requirement would severely undermine efforts to achieve voluntary compliance with the requirements of law. And, our society and jurisprudence have always stressed the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the law. Judicial intervention is a last resort to achieve cessation of illegal conduct or the remedying of its effects rather than a prerequisite to action. 50 Bakke, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2786 (opinion of Justice Brennan). 51 Moreover, Justice Brennan noted that the presence or absence of past discrimination is largely irrelevant to resolving respondent's constitutional claims, id. at 2787, because the whites and males affected by affirmative action are innocent of past discrimination. Thus, while it may be fair to punish an employer or educational institution by interfering with its free selection processes only if it has been guilty of past discrimination, the wrongdoing of the institution is largely unrelated to the expectations of nonminority workers or applicants. 52 We thus conclude that at least under the views of the five Justices who reached the constitutional issue in Bakke, the consent decree here is constitutional so long as the remedy was reasonable. To that question we now turn.