Opinion ID: 1199950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overview of Authority to Appoint Discovery Masters

Text: Alaska Civil Rule 53(a) governs the use of special masters in civil trials. It provides in part: (a) Appointment and Compensation. The presiding judge of the superior court for each judicial district ... may appoint one or more standing masters for such district.... [T]he word master includes a referee, an auditor and an examiner, and a magistrate or a deputy magistrate. The compensation, if any, to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the action which is in the custody and control of the court, as the court may direct.... (b) Powers. The order of reference to the master may specify or limit the master's powers and may direct the master to report only upon particular issues or to do or perform particular acts.... Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before the master and to ... take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of the master's duties under the order. Although we have not previously set forth guidelines for the use and appointment of special masters to supervise the discovery process, we have addressed generally the use of referees in lieu of judges for various purposes in civil trials. In Dean v. Firor, [10] the seminal Alaska case regarding the use of masters, we noted that the language in Federal Civil Rule 53(b), including the requirement that an exceptional condition justify the use of a master, [11] was purposefully omitted from Alaska Civil Rule 53. [12] We acknowledged that the drafters of the Alaska rule may have intended to allow the trial judges a more liberal use of masters than that allowed under the federal system and that therefore application of the extensive federal case law on this subject [is] inappropriate. [13] Nevertheless, we decided that [w]hile some jurisdictions may give trial judges a great deal of liberty in referring cases, we find a more restrictive view to be more appropriate. [14] We reasoned that the judiciary should be solely responsible for resolving questions of law, such as the claim for fraudulent conveyance at issue in Dean, and that a trial court should not reduce itself to the role of a quasi-appellate court by simply reviewing the findings of the master. [15] We declined to address the propriety of appointing a discovery master in a more recent case involving the same attorney appearing for the plaintiffs in the present case, Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc. [16] In Gonzales, the trial court had appointed a master due to ongoing discovery disputes. [17] After the master had made several rulings, the plaintiff moved to discharge the master on the grounds that the fees infringe[d] upon his access to the court and violate[d] his due process and equal protection rights. [18] But because the plaintiff did not object at the time of appointment, we concluded that he had waived the issue. [19] We also noted that trial courts generally have authority under Civil Rule 53 to appoint masters and fix their compensation. [20] This case law, albeit limited, provides Alaska state courts with authority under Civil Rule 53 to use discovery masters in at least some circumstances. The harder task, and one that this case requires us to perform, is to define those circumstances in order to determine whether appointment of a discovery master was appropriate in this case.
Some jurisdictions set forth criteria for determining the propriety of referring a discovery dispute to a master. For example, California's rule gives courts discretion to appoint a master over one party's objection only when it is necessary for the court to appoint a referee to hear and determine any and all discovery motions and disputes. [21] California courts have interpreted this rule to permit reference over the parties' objection where that procedure is necessary, not merely convenient. [22] A recently proposed Michigan rule would allow courts to appoint discovery masters only if there are complex or numerous discovery issues and a master's assistance would facilitate a more speedy and economical determination of those issues. [23] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 similarly requires that an exceptional condition exist before a master can be appointed. [24] Although this restriction does not exist in Alaska Civil Rule 53, we believe a discussion of the use of discovery masters in federal courts is still an important source of guidance given our endorsement of a restricted view of the use of masters in Dean. Alaska District Court Local Rule 53.1(a) allows courts to appoint discovery masters in order to assist the parties in the speedy and economical conduct of discovery and resolution of discovery disputes. As a condition of such appointment, and especially in complex cases involving numerous, significant disputes, the court may require the parties to pay the fees of the discovery master. (Emphases added.) This provision discourages courts from forcing parties to pay for a referee unless the case is complex or time consuming, although the decision remains within the court's discretion. The Manual for Complex Litigation counsels that judges should reserve the use of masters for cases where the financial stakes justify imposing the expense on the parties and where the amount of activity required would impose undue burdens on a judge. It is generally preferable to appoint special masters with the parties' consent. [25] Special masters are sometimes appointed during discovery in complex [federal] cases to limit massive discovery requests, to rule on claims of privilege and to make factual determinations necessary to rule on the admissibility of evidence. [26] A referee may be appropriate where disclosure is complicated by an intractable opponent, discourteous and uncooperative attorneys, [or] constant rulings on disclosure disputes. [27] Both federal and state courts have justified appointing discovery masters based on the contentious or unwieldy nature of discovery disputes. In one federal case in which the parties filed twenty-seven motions to compel or for protective orders, the court appointed a discovery master but acknowledged that [t]he use of a special master in this district for the purpose of discovery management is an extraordinary event, occurring perhaps once a decade. [28] The court lamented that the case is a mess because the lawyers are out of control. [29] Another federal court similarly appointed a discovery master because of what it described as the acrimony between counsel; the court believed this hostility necessitate[d] the provision of day care for counsel who, like small children, cannot get along and require adult supervision. [30] The California Court of Appeal has approved use of discovery masters to reduce [] the tension between contentious discovery disputants. [31] Our research uncovers no universally applied list of factors for determining when a court's appointment of a discovery master is appropriate. Still, certain principles repeatedly surface in those authorities that have considered the issue. Based on a review of our own case law, the law of other jurisdictions, academic literature, and policy considerations, we believe that appointment of a discovery master should generally be reserved for cases (1) where the issues are unusually complex or specialized; (2) where discovery is particularly document intensive; (3) where resolving discovery disputes will be especially time consuming; (4) where the parties are particularly contentious or obstructionist; or (5) where a master will facilitate a more speedy and economical determination of the case. We believe that these factors reflect a respect for the immense and often unreasonable burdens placed on trial courts' time and resources, while avoiding an undesirable shift in the role of trial courts to that of quasi-appellate courts. [32] Perhaps more importantly, the guidelines attempt to ensure nonwealthy litigants' access to the courts.