Opinion ID: 6984727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is Weyer a “qualified individual” under Title I?

Text: Title I of the Act says that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 4 The plain language of the Act thus allows only those who are “qualified individuals” to bring suit. The Act defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 5 “An ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ — that is, a person ‘who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions’ of her job.” 6 A totally disabled person who cannot “perform the essential functions of the employment position” with or without reasonable accommodations thus cannot be a “qualified individual” entitled to sue under Title I of the Act. We so held in Kennedy v. Applause, Inc. 7 There, we explained that “[b]ecause [the plaintiff] was totally disabled, there was no genuine issue [of fact] that she could have performed her job with the proposed, or any other, accommodation.” 8 Weyer got Social Security benefits for total disability, identified herself as “totally disabled” to Fox and UNUM as late as September 1996, and presented no evidence that she could perform the essential functions of her former employment position with or without reasonable accommodation. Her brief concedes that “[t]here is no dispute that Ms. Weyer is totally disabled.” 9 She therefore did not raise a material issue of fact as to whether she was a “qualified individual” entitled to sue under Title I. 10 That Weyer seeks a remedy for discrimination in fringe benefits applicable to a time following her employment does not alter the plain statutory requirement that she must be able to “perform the essential functions of the employment position” to sue under Title I of the Act. Five circuits have so held, and we are not persuaded to decide the issue differently. In Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th. Cir.1999) 11 the Sixth Circuit dealt with a case that is materially identical to this one. The plaintiff in Parker was totally disabled from depression and got benefits under a policy with the same two year limitation on mental disabilities. 12 When the benefits ended after two years, the employee sued under Title I. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff had no standing to sue under Title I because she “was at no time a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ ” under the plain meaning of the statute. 13 The Sixth Circuit explained that “[a]t the time she could ‘perform the essential functions’ of her job, she was not disabled for purposes of her long term disability claim, and therefore was not covered by the Disabilities Act, and at the time her insurance benefits were terminated, she could no longer perform her job.” 14 While the Sixth Circuit said that excluding those in the plaintiffs position might have resulted from Congressional “oversight,” they declined “to rewrite the statute in a way that conflicts with what appears to be fairly clear language.” 15 “Such an oversight is ... for Congress to remedy.” 16 By quoting this language from the opinion, we do not intimate that the statutory language resulted from oversight; Congress may have intentionally limited the scope of the Act as it did. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos. 17 held that a totally disabled plaintiff could not sue under Title I for alleged discrimination in a similar long-term disability policy. The Seventh Circuit noted that Title I expressly refers to the ability to perform a job, not the ability to receive benefit checks, 18 and said that the plaintiffs efforts to shoehorn “a person who is no longer able to hold an ‘employment position’ ” into the definition of a “qualified individual” were “strained.” 19 The Eighth Circuit in Beauford v. Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home 20 held that a totally disabled plaintiff alleging discrimination in the employer’s refusal to approve certain fringe benefits could not sue under similar language in the Rehabilitation Act. 21 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that because “Beauford admits that she cannot perform the essential functions of the job in question and further states that she will be unable to do so in the near future, ... she does not meet the prerequisites to be protected under this provision.” 22 [B]oth the language of the statute and its interpretation by the Supreme Court [in Southeastern Community College v. Davis 23 ] indicate that section 504 was designed to prohibit discrimination within the ambit of an employment relationship in which the employee is potentially able to do the job in question. Though it may seem undesirable to discriminate against a handicapped employee who is no longer able to do his or her job, this sort of discrimination is simply not within the protection of section 504. 24 The Eleventh Circuit followed suit in Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., 25 in which it held that a plaintiff whose health benefits were capped after he was fired was not entitled to sue under the Act. The Eleventh Circuit specifically relied on the reasoning of Beauford and concluded that because the plaintiff was not “capable of performing essential functions of an available job with GFF at or subsequent to the time the alleged discriminatory conduct was committed, he was not a [quali-fled individual] within the meaning of the ADA.” 26 Finally, the Tenth Circuit recently adopted the same position in dicta. In Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 27 the Tenth Circuit explained that “a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ has to be someone who can perform the essential functions of a job.” 28 Likewise, we join with the Circuits holding that former employees are not “qualified individuals” capable of suing under Title I of the Act. In Gonzales, 29 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that “since the fruits of many fringe benefits are realized during the post-employment period, Congress must have intended former employees to be protected under the ADA as well.” 30 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit held that [w]e find the plain language of the ADA clearly demonstrates the intent of Congress to limit the scope of the Act to only job applicants and current employees capable of performing essential functions of available jobs. We find no clearly expressed legislative intent suggesting that former employees such as [the plaintiff] should be covered under the Act as well. 31 The Eleventh Circuit.reasoned that “interpreting the ADA to allow any disabled former employee to sue a former employer essentially renders the [qualified individual] requirement under the Act, that an individual with a disability hold or desire a position the essential functions of which he or she can perform, meaningless.” 32 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in CNA Ins. Cos. and held that “[b]ecause [the plaintiff] no longer has an ‘employment position’ with CNA, nor is she an applicant, she has no claim under § 102.” 33 Distinguishing a Title VII case that gave former employees a cause of action for retaliation for protected activity, the Seventh Circuit explained that nothing happened that discriminated against [the plaintiff] during the time she was working at CNA. The only thing that occurred was CNA’s 1985 decision to reduce the long-term benefits available to all of its employees for mental health problems. While in [the Title VII case] the protected interest of the former employee arose during the period of employment, it did not here. 34 Weyer and amici argue that the 1997 Supreme Court decision, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 35 makes these authorities bad law. In Robinson, the Supreme Court held that the term “employees” in Section 704(a) of Title VII includes former employees. 36 The Court began its inquiry by noting that the “first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning.” 37 The Court then reasoned that the statute was ambiguous because “there was no temporal qualifier in the statute such as would make plain that § 704(a) protects only persons still employed at the time of the retaliation.” 38 The Court ultimately concluded that, because the surrounding provisions clearly contemplated suits by former employees, “it is far more consistent to include former employees within the scope of ‘employees’ protected by § 704(a).” 39 Weyer and amici argue, by analogy, that Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act is ambiguous as to whether one must be a “qualified individual” at the time of the discrimination and whether a former employee can sue, because Title I also contains no “temporal qualifiers.” The Second and Third Circuits have so held. 40 These Circuits argue that the majority reading of Title I is inconsistent with § 12112(b)(2), which puts the provision of fringe benefits within the ambit of the Act, and reason that former employees must be included because “certain fringe benefits such as pensions and VSF benefits are provided only post-employment and are meaningful only in that context.” 41 We reject this view because the statutes are not analogous. Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, unlike Title VII in the Civil Rights Act, is unambiguous. “Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’ ” 42 Title I unambiguously excludes totally disabled persons. Title I, unlike the section of Title VII at issue in Robinson, has a “temporal qualifier.” Title I says that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual.” A “qualified individual” is someone who “can perform.” That definition uses the present tense. Thus, one must be able to perform the essential functions of employment at the time that one is discriminated against in order to bring suit under Title I. In addition, one must be discriminated against “because of the disability” — which requires that the disability exist at the time of the discrimination and be the motivation for the discrimination. This reading makes sense. Congress could reasonably decide to enable disabled people who can work with reasonable accommodation to get and keep jobs, without also deciding to equalize post-employment fringe benefits for people who cannot work. We join the five circuits that have held that only persons who can perform the essential functions of a job can sue under Title I, rather than the two circuits that have held to the contrary, for compelling reasons. First, the statute says so, quite plainly. Second, most circuits have said that it says so. Third, there is a sensible purpose Congress may well have had in saying so, which gives us confidence that we understand the words. Fourth, other -legislation, such as ERISA, addresses fringe benefits for people unable to perform the functions of a job even with reasonable accommodations. Finally, other sections of the Act suggest that this distinction is intentional. For example, Title III of the Act regarding public accommodations applies not to “qualified individuals,” but simply to any “individual.” 43 We agree with the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits that someone who is totally disabled cannot sue under Title I’s unambiguous provisions. Weyer is not a “qualified individual” because she cannot now perform the essential functions of the employment position as a result of her total disability, and because she was not disabled at the time of the alleged discriminatory conduct. The term “qualified” limits the protection of Title I of the Act. Title I also unambiguously excludes former employees. A “qualified individual” is one who “can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” “Holds,” in the present tense, refers to current employees. Likewise, “desires,” in the present tense, refers to people who presently want jobs, as opposed to those who do not, protecting job applicants against discrimination. This is language well designed to help people get and keep jobs, not to help those no longer able to work get disability pay. Congress has the authority to improve the circumstances of disabled people in some respects even if it does not improve them in all respects. A statute may provide a partial remedy for what Congress perceives as a social problem because the proponents are compelled to compromise with others who think a broader statute would be a worse social problem. We cannot avoid an inter-circuit conflict, because the Second and Third Circuits have held contrary to the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. In Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 44 the Third Circuit explained that [o]nce an individual becomes disabled and thus eligible for disability benefits, that individual loses the ability to sue under a strict reading of Title I’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability” because that individual can no longer work with or without a reasonable accommodation. In order for the rights guaranteed by Title I to be fully effectuated, the definition of “qualified individual with a disability” would have to permit suits under Title I by more than just individuals who are currently able to work with or without reasonable accommodations. 45 The Second Circuit held the same way in Castellano v. City of New York. 46 The Second Circuit reasoned that a narrow reading may “permit irrational discrimination as between disabled retirees, some of whom (for whatever reason) could still perform the essential functions of their former employment and others of whom could not.” 47 We cannot accept the Third Circuit’s view, that we should construe Title I contrary to what it says “in order for the rights guaranteed by Title I to be fully effectuated.” It is rare, in a diverse democratic republic, for there to be a solid legislative majority for “fully effectuating” any interest to the exclusion of all competing interests. For example, Congress in passing the Americans With Disabilities Act had to consider among the many serious interests affected (1) helping disabled people who could work to get jobs; (2) avoiding such heavy burdens on employers of disabled people that the risks of covert illegal discrimination would be less than the risks of employing disabled people; (3) avoiding increasing the costs of employing disabled people so much that the number of jobs for all people would be adversely affected; (4) avoiding pushing costs of fringe benefits higher so that nondisabled people in good health would elect not to be covered, generating a vicious cycle of adverse selection; (5) maintaining legislative focus on the main problems addressed- to avoid jeopardizing a majority over secondary problems. Legislation often results from a delicate compromise among competing interests and concerns. If we were to “fully effectuate” what we take to be the underlying policy of the legislation, without careful attention to the qualifying words in the statute, then we would be overturning the nuanced compromise in the legislation, and substituting our own cruder, less responsive mandate for the law that was actually passed. Finally, we note that even if Weyer were a “qualified individual” under Title I, she still could not sue UNUM because UNUM is not a “covered entity.” 48 Title I defines a “covered entity” as “an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” 49 UNUM was none of these. It was simply the administrator of the employer’s disability policy. That UNUM was an “employer” of its own employees does not make it an employer of Weyer and subject to suit by Weyer under the Act.