Opinion ID: 624808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: How the Indictment was Amended by the Plea Agreement

Text: Antonio-Agusta argues the plea agreement underlying his prior convictions amended the indictment, making it unclear whether he was convicted under parts of Arizona's aggravated assault statutes that constitute crimes of violence. Specifically, he argues the plea agreement does not indicate the precise manner in which the counts were amended. Moreover, he argues both the plea agreement and judgment indicate it was the offenses themselves, set forth in the first paragraph of each count, that were amended. Thus, Antonio-Agusta argues it is unclear whether he pleaded guilty to the offenses as originally charged in the indictment and, therefore, the indictment is not reliable evidence of the elements of his prior convictions. The first paragraph of each of the counts sets forth the offense with which Antonio-Agusta was charged. The second paragraph alleges the offense was committed in a dangerous manner, which would serve to enhance Antonio-Agusta's sentence under Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-604(P). See Montero v. Foreman, 204 Ariz. 378, 64 P.3d 206, 209 (App.2003). The enhancement set forth in § 13-604(P) is commonly referred to as an allegation of dangerousness. State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, 158 P.3d 263, 272 n. 10 (App.2007); Montero, 64 P.3d at 209. In Montero, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a plea agreement that dismissed an allegation of dangerousness served merely to remove the possibility of an enhanced sentence under § 13-604(P) but did not affect the charged offense. 64 P.3d at 209-10. The defendant in Montero pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct with the agreement that the State dismiss the `dangerous' designation that it had alleged with the crime pursuant to § 13-604(P). Id. at 207 & n. 1. The defendant argued that because the allegation of dangerousness was dismissed pursuant to his plea agreement, his disorderly conduct conviction was not a violent crime for purposes of a different Arizona sentencing provision. Id. at 209. The court rejected this argument. Id. at 209-10. It noted that in agreeing to dismiss the allegation of dangerousness the State made no representation that the offense would not be considered `violent' for purposes of [the Arizona sentencing provision]. Id. [T]hat the State did not elect to seek an enhanced sentence for Montero's disorderly conduct conviction based on its `dangerousness' does not mean that the crime was not a `violent crime.' Id. at 209-10. The plea agreement underlying Antonio-Agusta's Arizona convictions shows he pleaded guilty to Counts 1-3 as amended. The only amendment the plea agreement makes to Counts 1, 2 and 3 is a dismissal of the allegation of dangerousness. Montero makes clear this amendment served to dismiss the allegation of dangerousness set forth in the second paragraph of each count of the indictment. Neither the plea agreement nor the judgment indicate any amendment was made to the offense set forth in the first paragraph of Counts 1, 2, or 3 of the indictment. See id. at 209-10. Thus, the indictment and plea agreement underlying Antonio-Agusta's Arizona convictions make clear he pleaded guilty to the charges as set forth in the indictment. Contrary to Antonio-Agusta's assertions, the Arizona Court of Appeals's decision in Joyner does not cast doubt on this conclusion. The issue in Joyner was whether the defendant's prior convictions for armed robbery under Arizona law constituted violent felonies for purposes of the same Arizona sentencing provision at issue in Montero. 158 P.3d at 265-67. Under Arizona law, armed robbery could be committed with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or with a simulated deadly weapon. Id. at 266-67. If committed with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument the prior conviction constituted a violent felony. Id. If committed with a simulated deadly weapon it did not. Id. The charging documents underlying Joyner's prior convictions indicated he used a gun, i.e., a deadly weapon. Id. at 267. The court held, however, that the charging documents in that case were not reliable evidence of the elements established by his convictions because they were not incorporated by reference in the judgments of conviction. Id. at 272 (citing Thompson, 924 P.2d at 1051). Antonio-Agusta points to the following passage from Joyner, claiming it supports his argument the indictment is not reliable evidence of the elements of his prior Arizona convictions: [A]s reflected in Joyner's plea agreements and judgements for both cases, his prior convictions were for nondangerous offenses, and Joyner's plea agreements serve[d] to amend the charging documents to conform to his guilty pleas. As a result, the charging documents are not reliable evidence of the elements of Joyner's convictions. Id. at 272 (citation omitted). Antonio-Agusta argues this passage indicates that if the plea agreement and judgment provide that the offense is not dangerous, and the plea agreement served to amend the charging document, then the offense itself, as set forth in the charging document, may have been amended to conform to the guilty plea. See id. at 272. If so, Antonio-Agusta asserts, the charging document is not reliable evidence of the elements of the defendant's prior conviction. Antonio-Agusta asserts that, like in Joyner, the plea agreement and judgment underlying his Arizona convictions show they were for nondangerous offenses. Further, like in Joyner, the plea agreement served to amend the indictment to conform to his guilty pleas. Thus, he argues Joyner shows the offenses he was charged with, as set forth in the first paragraph of each count of the indictment, may have been amended. He therefore argues the indictment underlying his prior convictions, like the charging documents in Joyner, is not reliable evidence of the elements of his prior convictions. A careful reading of Joyner, however, indicates otherwise. In Joyner, the charging documents contained no § 13-604(P) allegation of dangerousness. Id. at 272 n. 10. Thus, however the plea agreements in Joyner served to amend the charging documents, it was not to eliminate a specific § 13-604(P) allegation of dangerousness. The plea agreements and judgments in Joyner were therefore in conflict with the charging documents: the plea agreements and judgments specifically stated the defendant's prior convictions were not for dangerous offenses while the charging documents showed they were for dangerous offenses, i.e., that the defendant committed armed robbery with a deadly weapon. Thus, the passage from Joyner on which Antonio-Agusta relies simply suggests that if a plea agreement and judgment conflict with the charging document, and the plea agreement serves to amend the charging document, the charging document is not reliable evidence of the elements of the defendant's prior convictions. In this case, there is no such conflict between the indictment and the plea agreement and judgment. Moreover, unlike in Joyner, the indictment underlying Antonio-Agusta's Arizona convictions was incorporated by reference in the judgment. See id. at 272 & n. 10. Finally, relying on this court's decision in United States v. Bennett, 108 F.3d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir.1997), Antonio-Agusta argues that, if there is any possibility he pleaded guilty to an offense that does not merit a sentence enhancement the government has not met its burden of showing the enhancement applies. Antonio-Agusta's reliance on Bennett is misplaced. Unlike in Bennett, this court has before it documents that enable us to determine whether Antonio-Agusta's Arizona convictions warrant an enhancement as felony crimes of violence. Cf. 108 F.3d at 1317-19. Moreover, a review of those documents reveals precisely how the plea agreement amended the indictment. Thus, unlike in Bennett, the record of the prior proceeding in this case does not inject any doubt that Antonio-Agusta was convicted of felony crimes of violence. The government has met its burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, Antonio-Agusta's prior Arizona convictions constitute felony crimes of violence. See United States v. Torres-Romero, 537 F.3d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir.2008).