Opinion ID: 2502708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualifications of Testifying Witness

Text: Appellants first assert the ALC erred in admitting the opinion testimony of an unqualified witness and then relying upon that testimony for the basis of its decision. We disagree. Lorick Fanning was called to testify on behalf of Risher. As will soon become apparent, Appellants consistently objected to Fanning's ability to testify as to the facts and circumstances of this case, as well as the conclusions he drew therefrom. On appeal, Appellants assert the ALC committed reversible error in allowing Fanning to repeatedly testify beyond the scope of what they perceived to be his area of expertise. Fanning held undergraduate degrees in geology and forestry and had continuing education courses in land surveying, forestry, wetlands, and hydric soils, in addition to being registered as both a land surveyor and a forester in the State. The ALC qualified Fanning as an expert in forestry and land surveying, and, over objection, in the identification of wetland boundaries, including critical area boundaries. In support of his qualifications, Fanning testified he had delineated wetlands at least 1000 times, with the vast majority of those delineations dealing with coastal topography and critical area determinations. Later in his testimony, Fanning described the role that soil interpretations play in the analysis of wetland boundary determinations, relying on his academic background in hydric soils as well as his degree in geology; however, Fanning did not hold himself out as an expert in soil classification. Again, over objection, the ALC permitted Fanning to testify as to the role soils played in his determination of the Lot's wetland and critical boundary. Shortly thereafter, Appellants further objected to Fanning's ability to testify as to whether the Lot was a part of Fripp Island, based on his own performance of a mean high water survey. [3] The ALC overruled Appellants' objections, and Fanning was permitted to testify that the Lot was indeed a part of Fripp Island. Appellants again objected to Fanning's testimony regarding whether or not the Lot was an integral part of the surrounding area's estuarine system. [4] Here, the ALC initially sustained Appellants' objection regarding Fanning's qualifications to testify; however, the court later reversed its ruling on Appellants' objection and allowed Fanning to be recalled for the purpose of testifying as to his opinion on the Lot's inclusion in the estuarine system. To be competent to testify as an expert, a witness must have acquired by reason of study or experience or both such knowledge and skill in a profession or science that he is better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the particular subject of his testimony. Gooding v. St. Francis Xavier Hosp., 326 S.C. 248, 252-53, 487 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1997) (citation omitted); Rule 702, SCRE (If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.). Qualification depends on the particular witness' reference to the subject. Gooding, 326 S.C. at 253, 487 S.E.2d at 598. The qualification of a witness as an expert and admissibility of his testimony are matters largely within the discretion of the trial judge; however, the exercise of this discretion will be reversed where an abuse of discretion has occurred. Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 60-61, 495 S.E.2d 205, 211 (1998) (citation omitted). As discussed in a recent opinion of this Court, trial courts have a gatekeeping role with respect to all evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 702. State v. White, 382 S.C. 265, 274, 676 S.E.2d 684, 689 (2009). In the discharge of its gatekeeping role, a trial court must assess the threshold foundational requirements of qualifications and reliability and further find that the proposed evidence will assist the trier of fact. The familiar evidentiary mantra that a challenge to evidence goes to weight, not admissibility may be invoked only after the trial court has vetted the matters of qualifications and reliability and admitted the evidence. Id. In support of their contention that Fanning was unqualified to give his opinions on a variety of pertinent subjects, Appellants rely on two principal cases: Nelson v. Taylor, 347 S.C. 210, 553 S.E.2d 488 (Ct.App.2001); and State v. Ellis, 345 S.C. 175, 547 S.E.2d 490 (2001). We disagree. The record shows the ALC properly considered both the amount and quality of Fanning's educational qualifications in the first instance, as well as the reliability of the proffered testimony on each subject once he was duly qualified. The court was vigilant in its efforts to ensure Fanning's testimony did not go beyond the scope of his expertise, and correctly decided that the matters upon which he testified were subjects about which he could reliably address. Consequently, the ALC did not abuse its discretion in either qualifying Fanning or in admitting his testimony.