Opinion ID: 1246319
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Kidnaping Convictions

Text: We first consider defendant's contention that the several kidnaping convictions are invalid under our decision in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 [80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, 43 A.L.R.3d 677]. (1a) Defendant takes the position that the rule announced by us in Daniels applies not only to aggravated kidnaping (§ 209) but to so-called simple kidnaping (§ 207). We shall explain that Daniels does not apply to the latter classification. In Daniels we held that it was the intent of the Legislature to exclude from the reach of section 209 as amended in 1951 not only `standstill' robberies ... but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. [Citations.] (71 Cal.2d at p. 1139.) In People v. Mutch (1971) supra, 4 Cal.3d 389, 396 [93 Cal. Rptr. 721, 482 P.2d 633], we held that a defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief under Daniels if there is no material dispute as to the facts relating to his conviction and if it appears that the statute under which he was convicted did not prohibit his conduct. In In re Madrid (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 996 ... the Court of Appeal held that habeas corpus relief authorized by Mutch is available to a defendant whose conviction was based on a guilty plea. ( In re Crumpton (1973) 9 Cal.3d 463, 467 [106 Cal. Rptr. 770, 507 P.2d 74].) Defendant's plea of guilty to the kidnaping charges, as in Crumpton, preceded the Daniels decision. However, the plea in Crumpton was an integral part of a plea bargain. We reasoned there that [i]t would be unconscionable to hold a defendant bound by a plea made under such significant and excusable misapprehension of the law. ( Id. at p. 468.) In the instant case, a fortiori, defendant's plea, which was not part of a plea bargain, should not be binding on him. [9] (2) We first examine in the light of these rules defendant's conviction of kidnaping for robbery (§ 209) as charged in count X of the indictment. The facts are briefly these. The victim, Mrs. D., [10] was walking home from a shopping center in the early evening. Defendant approached her on the road, grabbed her from behind and while holding an ice pick at her throat, threatened to have sexual intercourse with her. He dragged her onto an open field approximately 25 feet from the road, bound her hands with wire and forcibly raped her. Before fleeing, defendant took approximately $15 from the victim's purse. Comparing the circumstances involving a charge of aggravated kidnaping in People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pages 1124-1125, with the undisputed facts in the present case, it is apparent that defendant's conviction cannot stand. In Daniels, the defendants, armed with a gun, forced entry into the victim's apartment. Holding her at gunpoint, they walked her a distance of about 30 feet, first to the kitchen and then to the bedroom where each of them raped her. They warned her not to move and, upon leaving, took money from her purse. In reversing the convictions arising from this incident and similar ones, we said, defendants had no interest in forcing their victims to move just for the sake of moving; their intent was to commit robberies and rapes, and the brief movements which they compelled their victims to perform were solely to facilitate such crimes. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1130-1131.) We also concluded that the brief movements of the victims did not substantially increase the risk of harm otherwise present. ( Id. at p. 1140.) In the case at bench, the asportation of the victim was for a distance slightly less and was accomplished for the specific purpose of raping and robbing her. Thus the movement of the victim cannot be regarded as substantial and was merely incidental to the commission of those crimes. The People assert that the risk of harm was significantly increased here because defendant moved the victim from the road, an area of relative safety, to an adjacent field where it was easier for him to inflict bodily harm upon his prey. (See People v. Hill (1971) 20 Cal. App.3d 1049, 1052-1053 [98 Cal. Rptr. 214].) Under Daniels, the risk of harm factor refers to the risk created by the victim's movements that he will suffer significant physical injuries over and above those to which a victim of the underlying crime is normally exposed; it does not refer to the increased risk that the crime of robbery will be committed. ( People v. Timmons (1971) 4 Cal.3d 411, 414 [93 Cal. Rptr. 736, 482 P.2d 648].) However, acts of removing the victim from public view do not in themselves substantially increase the risk of harm within our rule in Daniels.  ( In re Crumpton, supra, 9 Cal.3d 463, 467; italics added.) In any event, contrary to the People's argument, there is no evidence that the relatively brief movement of the victim here removed her from public view or in any other manner substantially increased the risk, beyond that inherent in the underlying crimes, that she would suffer physical harm. We conclude that under the undisputed facts, defendant's conduct did not constitute a violation of section 209 and that his conviction on this count must be reversed. (1b) We turn to the four convictions of simple kidnaping (§ 207) as charged in counts II, V, VI and VIII of the indictment. We emphasize at the outset that the rule articulated by us in People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at page 1139 is not applicable to kidnaping charged as a violation of section 207 but only to charges of kidnaping for robbery bottomed on section 209, commonly referred to as aggravated kidnaping. Nor did we indicate in any way in Daniels that our rule was applicable to charges under section 207; if defendant's argument is intended as an invitation to extend the rule to all types of kidnaping, we decline to do so. [11] As we have explained, the Daniels rule consists of two factors: first, a movement of the victim other than that which is merely incidental to the robbery of the victim; and, second, a substantial increase in the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the robbery. Both factors are evaluated in the context of the commission of the underlying crime. As will be made clear, neither applies to a charge of simple kidnaping. A careful reading of Daniels in conjunction with section 207 [12] makes clear that while the rationale for the first factor of the Daniels rule was developed from our earlier opinion in Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459 [15 Cal. Rptr. 65, 364 P.2d 241], a case dealing with section 207, the movement of the victim factor is by its very terms inapplicable to section 207. The kidnaping charges in Cotton, based on an alleged violation of section 207, arose from an altercation between union organizers and farm workers in a farm labor camp. During the fighting one farm worker was chased, another was pushed and a third dragged for a distance of 15 feet. The union organizers were charged with rioting, assault and simple kidnaping. In ordering that prosecution of the kidnaping charges be restrained, we stated, it does not seem reasonable that the California Legislature, in enacting Penal Code section 207, intended the statute to apply to a case of assault or riot such as occurred in the case now engaging our attention. Such a holding could result in a rule that every assault could also be prosecuted for kidnapping under Penal Code section 207, as long as the slightest movement was involved. Where the movement is incidental to the alleged assault, Penal Code section 207 should not have application, as the Legislature could not reasonably have intended that such incidental movement be a taking `... from one part of the county to another.' (56 Cal.2d at p. 465.) In Daniels, we observed that section 209 fails to define the term kidnaps in that section and concluded that the Legislature must have intended the term to have the same meaning as the word kidnaping used in section 207. ( Daniels, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1131.) In sum, both Daniels, involving section 209 kidnaping, and Cotton, involving section 207 kidnaping, construe the term kidnaping to mean movements which are not merely incidental to associated crimes. However, the movement factor of the Daniels rule is uniquely suited to section 209 and not to section 207. The rule concerns one type of kidnaping described in section 209 which, by definition, involves the underlying offense of robbery. [13] In contrast, kidnaping, as defined by section 207, may occur in the absence of another crime. Thus where only simple kidnaping is involved, it is clear that the victim's movements cannot be evaluated in the light of a standard which makes reference to the commission of another crime. Coincidentally, Cotton did involve related charges of rioting and assault. Because the victim's movements were not substantial, we concluded that those movements were only incidental to the assault and rioting. ( Cotton, 56 Cal.2d at p. 464.) Nevertheless, the central thrust of Cotton is contained in our reasoning that the Legislature did not intend to apply criminal sanctions where the slightest movement is involved. ( Cotton, 56 Cal.2d at p. 465.) In enacting section 207, the Legislature did not provide a definition of kidnaping that involves movements of an exact distance; rather, it defined it in minimum terms as forcible movements into another part of the same county. (§ 207.) Indeed, to define the phrase, `another part of the same county,' in terms of a specific number of inches or feet or miles would be open to a charge of arbitrariness.... [Nonetheless] [t]he law is replete with instances in which a person must, at his peril, govern his conduct by such nonmathematical standards as `reasonable,' `prudent,' `necessary and proper,' `substantial,' and the like. ( Daniels, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1128-1129.) Of course in the application and enforcement of the section, it is our duty to avoid absurd consequence[s] and achieve a sensible construction. ( Cotton, 56 Cal.2d at p. 465.) [T]he statute is to be given effect in its commonsense meaning. ( People v. Rocco (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 96, 105 [98 Cal. Rptr. 365].) In performing that duty, it is imperative to refer to the language of section 207 itself. The section defines kidnaping in part as movement into another country, state, or county, or into another part of the same county. [14] The statutory language implies that the determining factor in the crime of kidnaping is the actual distance of the victim's movements; and further, that the minimum movements necessary for the commission of the crime are present where the victim is forcibly taken into another part of the same county. (Italics added.) Finally, because the victim's movements must be more than slight ( Cotton, 56 Cal.2d at p. 465) or trivial ( People v. Rocco, supra, 21 Cal. App.3d 96, 105), they must be substantial in character to constitute kidnaping under section 207. Neither does the second factor of the Daniels rule  an increase in the risk of harm above that present in the underlying crime  apply to simple kidnaping. A kidnaping under section 207 does not of necessity occur in connection with another offense. ( People v. Apo (1972) 25 Cal. App.3d 790, 797 [102 Cal. Rptr. 242].) Moreover, this second factor has its origin not in section 207 but in section 209 itself. (See fn. 13, ante. ) Accordingly, in our examination of the four kidnaping convictions under section 207, we do not apply the rule announced by us in Daniels. (3) We start by considering together the two kidnapings involving Susan Box and Caree Collison, victims also involved in the murder counts. Defendant came upon the two victims as they were attempting to hitch a ride near a gas station in Pinole. He drove past them, but then returned to offer them a ride. They explained that they wanted to go to Berkeley and he agreed to take them there. However, he admitted at the penalty trial it was his intention at the outset to rape and murder them. When the victims told him that he was not driving in the direction of Berkeley, he explained that he intended first to stop briefly at a lumber yard. Instead, he drove them to Point Wilson overlooking San Pablo Bay. He stopped near some railroad tracks, removed a .22 caliber pistol that was hidden under the front seat of the vehicle, pointed the gun at the victims and ordered them to walk to a small hill approximately one-quarter of a mile away. Upon reaching the hill, defendant ordered the girls to disrobe. Caree began to run away but returned when he threatened to kill Susan. Without further word he fired two shots into Caree's head. He then shot Susan in the head, undressed her and proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards he placed both bodies under a bush and covered them with branches. As he was leaving, he heard a groaning sound and fired another shot at the victims. The bodies were not discovered for two days. Susan was dead. Caree was in a comatose state and died nine days later. There was evidence that Susan had a puncture wound in her chest, a burned or blistered area on one leg and scratches and abrasions about her body. Based on this incident, defendant was convicted of the kidnap and murder of Caree Lee Collison and the kidnap, rape and murder of Susan Muriel Box. Defendant contends that in determining whether a kidnaping occurred, involving movements solely within the state, we must consider only those movements produced by force. The initial movement in the car from Pinole to Point Wilson, he explains was accomplished because of the victims' belief that defendant would drive them to Berkeley. Hence the forcible movements of the victims did not commence until he stopped the car near the railroad tracks at Point Wilson where he ordered the victims at gunpoint to the hill. Defendant's reading of the statute is correct. (See People v. Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 660 [111 Cal. Rptr. 556, 517 P.2d 820]; People v. Rhoden (1972) 6 Cal.3d 519, 526-527 [99 Cal. Rptr. 751, 492 P.2d 1143].) As we explained in Rhoden, section 207 contains three distinct definitions of kidnaping. (See fn. 12, ante. ) The first is a general definition containing the elements of the use of force. The latter two are special definitions which for example may involve movements induced by fraud; however, they are limited to movements out of the state for purposes of slavery or movements into the state for any purpose. Inasmuch as defendant was charged under the general definition of kidnaping, only those movements accomplished by force are pertinent. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude as a matter of law from the uncontradicted evidence in the record that defendant did not commit the act of kidnaping when he forced the victims at gunpoint to walk for a distance of one-quarter of a mile. Such a distance cannot be reasonably regarded as slight or insubstantial (cf. People v. Apo, supra, 25 Cal. App.3d 790, 794 [simple kidnaping occurred where school officials were forced to walk a distance of 700 yards]); thus, within the meaning of section 207, it constituted movement into another part of the same county. Consequently, the convictions for kidnaping both girls must stand. (4) We next take up the third and fourth convictions of kidnaping under section 207. (Counts VI and VIII.) Since they raise similar issues, we consider them together. The conviction on count VI involved the kidnaping of Miss W. In the late afternoon the victim was driving out of a parking lot at her place of employment in Richmond. While she was stopped at a stop sign, defendant approached and asked for a ride to his car parked down the street. She refused and he reached into the car, unlocked it and entered on the passenger side. He held a knife at her stomach and ordered her to drive, directing her through several side streets in Richmond until she reached a freeway. She left the freeway and continued on to the south end of the parking lot of Golden Gate Fields in Berkeley. The record before us does not indicate the actual distance traveled. When the car was parked, defendant bound the victim's hands with wire, partially undressed her and then committed the act of rape. While having sexual intercourse defendant stated that he was going to kill her and began choking her at the throat until she lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness, defendant untied her hands, allowed her to dress and then drove her back to the store parking lot. The conviction on count VIII involved the kidnaping of Miss S., a high school student 17 years of age. As the victim was driving out of a school parking lot in Richmond in the early evening, defendant approached her car. He entered on the passenger side and held a knife to her stomach, explaining that she would not get hurt if she did what he wanted. He directed her to a side street, bound her hands with wire and forced her to the floorboard in the front seat of the vehicle. Defendant then drove the vehicle for an estimated distance of five to ten miles to Point Richmond where he forced her onto the beach area. He removed her clothing, began to fondle her and then forced his penis into her mouth. Defendant then drove the victim back to the school parking lot, returning her clothing and threatened to harm her if she reported the incident to the police. He was convicted of both kidnaping (§ 207) and oral-genital copulation (§ 288a) based on the foregoing incident. From the facts that appear in both incidents, the movements of the victims in their vehicles cannot be reasonably regarded as trivial. As to Miss W., the actual distance is not revealed in the record but it is apparent that the forcible movements she experienced were substantial. The victim was forcibly taken through Richmond, onto a freeway and then to a parking lot in Berkeley. (Cf. People v. Rocco, supra, 21 Cal. App.3d 96, 101 [kidnaping occurred where victim taken from apartment building in Berkeley to unpopulated place in same city].) As to Miss S., the distance was estimated to be five to ten miles. In sum, we are not able to say that the asportation was so insubstantial or slight that it did not constitute movement into another part of the same county; therefore, the conviction of kidnaping under count VI and count VIII must stand.