Opinion ID: 6536624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Mr. Hopkins prevented from presenting a complete defense?

Text: [¶17] Applying the same reasoning he argued in issues I and II, Mr. Hopkins contends that he should have been allowed to argue to the jury that his conduct better matched the mens rea required for related crimes, such as aggravated assault and battery under subsection (a)(i) (causing serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life) or driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (h) (LexisNexis 2017). In other words, Mr. Hopkins wanted to present an alternative charges theory to argue that subsection (a)(ii) must require proof he purposefully used his car as a deadly weapon if aggravated assault and battery under subsection (a)(ii) is to be distinguished from those other crimes. He asserts that the district court's interpretation of knowingly in subsection (a)(ii) prevented him from presenting a complete defense and, thus, violated his due process rights. Mr. Hopkins frames his due process claim in terms of how the jury was ultimately instructed-arguing that the district court violated his due process rights when it (1) failed to instruct the  jury on the defense's theory of the case, and (2) instructed the jury on the knowingly element by giving the pattern general criminal intent instruction over his objection and refusing to give his proposed instruction defining knowingly as purposefully.
[¶18] The failure to give an offered instruction on the law related to a theory of defense is a due process issue, which this Court reviews de novo.  Tingey v. State , 2017 WY 5 , ¶ 27, 387 P.3d 1170 , 1178 (Wyo. 2017) (citing James v. State , 2015 WY 83 , ¶ 17, 357 P.3d 101 , 105 (Wyo. 2015) ). However, the failure to give an instruction that is not offered by a defendant is reviewed for plain error. Id. (citing Vaught v. State , 2016 WY 7 , ¶ 13, 366 P.3d 512 , 515 (Wyo. 2016) ; Schaeffer v. State , 2012 WY 9 , ¶ 26, 268 P.3d 1045 , 1056 (Wyo. 2012) ). [¶19] Our review is for plain error because Mr. Hopkins did not submit a theory of defense instruction outlining his position. 4 Tingey , ¶ 27, 387 P.3d at 1178 . In order to prevail under the plain error standard, Mr. Hopkins must show the record reflects that a clear and obvious violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law adversely affected a substantial right to such a degree that he was materially prejudiced. Id. (citing Vaught , ¶ 14, 366 P.3d at 516 (footnote omitted)). To establish that failure to give the instruction violated a clear rule of law, he must provide authority showing that ... Wyoming law had a clear-cut requirement that juries be given the instruction he now champions. Tingey , ¶ 27, 387 P.3d at 1178 (quoting Vaught , ¶ 14, 366 P.3d at 516 (footnote omitted)). Material prejudice requires Mr. Hopkins to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been more favorable to the defendant had the error not occurred. Larkins v. State , 2018 WY 122 , ¶ 94, 429 P.3d 28 , 50 (Wyo. 2018). [¶20] Mr. Hopkins does not identify a clear and unequivocal rule of law the district court violated and we have found none. As discussed above, Mr. Hopkins' defense theory, that the State was required to prove he purposefully hit the victim's vehicle, is legally flawed and, therefore, was properly excluded from presentation to the jury. See, e.g. , Bush v. State , 2008 WY 108 , ¶ 59, 193 P.3d 203 , 218 (Wyo. 2008) (citation omitted) (explaining that the United States Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant, or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice or confusion of the issues); Marfil v. State , 2016 WY 12 , ¶ 25, 366 P.3d 969 , 975 (Wyo. 2016) (citation omitted) (approving the refusal of a proposed jury instruction that misstates the law). [¶21] Moreover, it is not a theory of defense to request that the jury be instructed on crimes the State has not charged. Harnetty v. State , 2019 WY 21 , ¶ 29, 435 P.3d 368 , 374 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Bouwkamp v. State , 833 P.2d 486 , 490 (Wyo. 1992) (Suggestion of an alternative charge is not a defense to the crime being prosecuted.)). Mr. Hopkins had no due process right to have the district court instruct the jury on a crime under which he was not charged. See Harnetty , ¶ 30, 435 P.3d at 375 . He was not charged with aggravated assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502 (a)(i) or driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (h). Consequently, Mr. Hopkins has failed to demonstrate any plain error impacting his due process rights.
[¶22] During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the district court, inquiring as follows: Need clarification for instruction #11, Point 4. Knowingly caused What is the  legal definition? How are we as jurors to understand and apply this point? In response to the jury's question, the district court informed the parties of its intent to provide the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 6.13, defining general criminal intent. Mr. Hopkins advised the district court that he did not believe further instruction was necessary, but that if the district court was inclined to do so, he proposed that the district court provide an instruction stating knowingly means purposefully. After further discussion, Mr. Hopkins informed the district court of his final position that he objected to any further instruction. He also argued that the pattern instruction would attempt to define a common usage term-knowingly-that needs no further definition. The district court provided the general intent instruction over Mr. Hopkins' objection. 5 [¶23] Mr. Hopkins now asserts that the jury's question struck at the heart of the issue the defense wanted to raise and the court prevented, which is the 'knowing' element. He claims he was prejudiced by the district court giving the general intent instruction over his objection and the district court's refusal to provide his proposed instruction. We disagree. [¶24] The district court has wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will not be found. Dennis v. State , 2013 WY 67 , ¶ 36, 302 P.3d 890 , 897 (Wyo. 2013) (citation omitted). We review the district court's refusal to give a requested instruction for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citation omitted). Prejudice results when the instructions confuse or mislead the jury. Id. (citations omitted). [¶25] Although Mr. Hopkins objected to the district court providing the pattern instruction defining general criminal intent, he has not demonstrated that the instruction was confusing, misleading, or an inaccurate statement of the law. In fact, at trial, Mr. Hopkins admitted that he saw nothing wrong with the pattern instruction as it outlines the law. [¶26] Mr. Hopkins' claim that the district court erred when it refused to give his proposed instruction that knowingly means purposefully likewise is without merit. A district court is not required to define a statutory term unless the term has a technical or legal meaning different than its common meaning. Marfil , ¶ 25, 366 P.3d at 976 (citations omitted). We previously held that the term 'knowingly' requires no clarification because the legal meaning of the term is not so separate from its ordinary meaning. Adekale v. State , 2015 WY 30 , ¶ 42, 344 P.3d 761 , 770 (Wyo. 2015) (citing Morris v. State , 2009 WY 88 , ¶ 16, 210 P.3d 1101 , 1105 (Wyo. 2009) ); see also Marfil , ¶ 25, 366 P.3d at 975 (citation omitted) (explaining that where a term used in a criminal statute is not given a statutory definition, we presume the legislature did not mean for the term to have a specialized meaning). Mr. Hopkins conceded at trial that knowingly is a common usage term that did not require further definition. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Mr. Hopkins' proffered instruction.