Opinion ID: 1195356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Pretrial motions to suppress evidence

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of evidence the police obtained as the result of statements made by Duane Moody  statements the trial court determined were involuntary. Defendant contends that the murder weapon, evidence relating to the automobile thought to have been used in the shooting of Detective Williams, and the testimony of Ali and Cathy Woodson should have been excluded as the fruit of Moody's involuntary statements. Accordingly, defendant contends the trial court violated his right to due process of law as guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions. He also contends this evidence should have been excluded as the fruit of a violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In pretrial proceedings, before their cases were severed, defendant joined in codefendant Moody's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5. Defendant contended he had standing to claim that Moody's arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, because the warrantless arrest of Moody constituted outrageous government conduct in violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process. He maintained that Moody's statement to the police and all evidence obtained as the fruit of the statement should be suppressed. Defendant also joined in codefendant Moody's motion to suppress the statements on the ground that they were involuntary because they were obtained as the result of offers of leniency and other physical and psychological coercion preceding and during interrogation. Defendant asserted that he had standing to raise the claim that Moody's statements were involuntary under Fifth Amendment principles, also asserting an independent due process right under the state and federal Constitutions not to have his conviction based upon the involuntary confession or statement of another. He moved to suppress Moody's statements and all tangible and intangible evidence obtained by the exploitation of the involuntary statements and their fruits. Evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress indicated that in a November 4, 1985, interrogation, Moody informed the police where he had secreted the murder weapon. The weapon was discovered at the location indicated  the Woodsons' house. In a November 6, 1985, statement, Moody said the vehicle that had been used in the shooting of Detective Williams was a sky-blue Oldsmobile with a white top, and he described its location. The vehicle was found at that location. The trial court heard numerous witnesses, and concluded that: Moody's arrest was supported by probable cause; Moody's claim that the police physically mistreated him was not supported by the record; statements Moody made to the police prior to November 4, 1985, were voluntary, but that Moody's statements to the police on November 4, 1985, were involuntary and inadmissible, apparently on the ground that they were the product of offers of leniency. In addition, the court found Moody's statement to the police on November 6, 1985, inadmissible as a fruit of the earlier coerced statement. Nonetheless, the court held that the murder weapon, the vehicle connected with the murder, and the testimony of Ali and Cathy Woodson were admissible because inevitably they would have been discovered during the course of a lawfully conducted investigation. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the murder weapon, evidence concerning the vehicle from which the fatal shots appeared to have been fired, and certain shell casings discovered in the vehicle. Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of the Woodsons regarding codefendant Moody's action in storing the murder weapon at their home on the night of the murder. He maintains that this evidence was the fruit of Moody's involuntary statements, and that the trial court erred in determining that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation even without Moody's statements. In his reply brief, defendant also contends that he has standing to raise this claim because violation of Moody's privilege against self-incrimination constituted a violation of his own due process rights. The coercion applied to Moody, he contends, caused Moody to disclose the whereabouts of the weapon and the vehicle, and to disclose the identity of the Woodsons. Without a rule requiring suppression of the challenged evidence, he alleges, police misconduct would be encouraged rather than deterred. Respondent contends that the trial court erred in determining that Moody's statements were involuntary, that defendant lacks standing to complain of any violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment rights, and that the trial court correctly determined that the challenged evidence inevitably would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation. Respondent claims, finally, that the introduction of the evidence, even if obtained as a result of an involuntary statement, did not violate defendant's due process right to a fair trial. As we shall explain, we need not and do not determine whether the statements were voluntary or whether the evidence inevitably would have been discovered, because we agree with respondent's final contention that, in any event, the introduction of this evidence did not violate defendant's due process rights. As an initial matter, we agree with respondent that defendant lacks standing to raise the claim that in conducting their interrogation, police officers violated Moody's privilege against self-incrimination. A defendant lacks standing to complain of the violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 501, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640, disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) Defendant does have standing, however, to assert that his own due process right to a fair trial was violated as a consequence of the asserted violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment rights. ( People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 344, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877; People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 501, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640.) As we have recognized, the `admission at trial of improperly obtained statements [of a third party] which results in a fundamentally unfair trial violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.' ( People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 499, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640.) The violation of a third party's privilege against self-incrimination may deprive a defendant of his or her due process rights if such action adversely affects the reliability of testimony offered against the defendant at trial. As we have said: [W]hen the evidence produced at trial is subject to coercion ... defendant's due process rights [are] implicated and the exclusionary rule ... [is] applied. When a defendant seeks to exclude evidence on this ground, the defendant must allege that the trial testimony is coerced [citation], and that its admission will deprive him of a fair trial [citation]. ( People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 344, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, italics in original.) Defendant does not contend that testimony presented at trial was the result of coercion. Moody did not testify at defendant's trial. Rather, defendant contends that the fruits of Moody's involuntary statements were inadmissible under the exclusionary rule applicable in cases of violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He maintains that police misconduct must be deterred, and that if the fruit of police coercion of a third party could be admitted against a defendant, the police ... would have little incentive ... to refrain from taking extreme and illegal measures to obtain evidence from one codefendant to use against another. Our opinion in People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th 330, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, however, establishes that a defendant may not prevail simply by alleging that the challenged evidence was the fruit of an assertedly involuntary statement of a third person. In that case, we determined specifically that a defendant may not secure the exclusion of the trial testimony of a third party simply on the ground that it was the fruit of the third party's involuntary statement. ( Id. at pp. 346, 348-350, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) We explained that when the defendant's claim is based upon the involuntariness of a third party's statement, the exclusionary rule applicable to a claimed violation of the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply. ( Id. at p. 346, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) Rather, the defendant may prevail only by demonstrating fundamental unfairness at trial, normally by establishing that evidence to be produced at trial was made unreliable by coercion. ( Id. at pp. 347-348, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) As we observed in the Badgett case, the primary purpose of excluding coerced testimony of third parties is to assure the reliability of the trial proceedings .... ( People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 347, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) In addition, [t]he purpose of exclusion of evidence pursuant to a due process claim ... is adequately served by focusing on the evidence to be presented at trial, and asking whether that evidence is made unreliable by ongoing coercion.... ( Id. at pp. 347-348, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, italics in original.) Defendant's assertion that the challenged evidence should have been excluded in order to deter police misconduct is inconsistent with the primary justification for recognizing the accused's limited standing to complain of the violation of another individual's privilege against self-incrimination  a concern to provide fundamental fairness at trial by ensuring the reliability of the evidence presented at that proceeding. Defendant's assertion that the goal of deterring police misconduct in all criminal investigations requires the exclusion of the ensuing evidence would result in the adoption of a Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule in such cases, affording defendants unlimited standing to complain of the violation of a third person's privilege against self-incrimination, without the necessity of demonstrating any fundamental unfairness in the trial itself. The law provides, however, that it is only the defendant's own right to fundamental fairness that is at stake in such circumstances, and that the exclusionary rule applicable to violations of the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply. When in the past we have considered due process claims such as defendant's, the trial evidence sought to be excluded was the testimony of the third party who assertedly had been subject to coercion. (See People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 342, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877; People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 498-499, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640.) In the present case, defendant did not seek to exclude statements of the third party. Moody did not testify, nor was evidence of his involuntary statements to the police presented in evidence. Rather, at trial defendant sought to exclude demonstrative evidence he claims was discovered as a product of the coercion of Moody  the murder weapon and evidence relating to the vehicle from which it was asserted the fatal shots were fired  as well as the testimony of the Woodsons, in whose home Moody stored the murder weapon. We see no reason, however, to conclude that demonstrative evidence should be subject to a broader exclusionary rule under these circumstances than is applicable to testimonial evidence  quite the reverse, since coercion of a statement is far less likely to render physical evidence unreliable than it is likely to affect the reliability of trial testimony. We detect no connection between the asserted coercion of Moody  apparently arising out of offers of leniency in return for his cooperation with the investigating officers  and the reliability of the Woodsons' testimony at trial, or of the murder weapon or the vehicle, as evidence of defendant's guilt. Indeed, defendant has not contended that there is such a connection. Assuming, without deciding, that in some circumstances physical evidence might be excluded as unreliable as a consequence of the coercion of a third party, we observe that defendant makes no claim that the physical evidence he sought to exclude was unreliable, or that its reliability was in some way affected by any police coercion of Moody. We reject defendant's contention because he fails to carry the burden of demonstrating any fundamental unfairness at trial. (See People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 348, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) We have acknowledged that in some instances, courts analyzing claims of third party coercion have expressed some concern to assure the integrity of the judicial system by vindicating a due process right of the defendant in this context. ( People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 347, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, citing United States v. Chiavola (7th Cir.1984) 744 F.2d 1271, 1273; United States v. Fredericks (5th Cir.1978) 586 F.2d 470, 481, & fn. 14; LaFrance v. Bohlinger (1st Cir.1974) 499 F.2d 29, 32-34.) A recent decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, recognizes that the unreliability of a coerced confession of a third person is not the sole reason for its exclusion from evidence: `It is unthinkable that a statement obtained by torture or by other conduct belonging only in a police state should be admitted at the government's behest in order to bolster its case.... Yet methods offensive when used against an accused do not magically become any less so when exerted against a witness.' ( Clanton v. Cooper (10th Cir.1997) 129 F.3d 1147, 1158.) In the present case, no `statement obtained by torture or by other conduct belonging only in a police state' ( Clanton v. Cooper, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 1158) was admitted at trial. The trial court determined that the police did not coerce Moody physically, and the assertedly coerced statement was not admitted at all. Accordingly, we are not called upon to decide whether evidence produced by outrageous police misconduct, but not otherwise shown to be unreliable or subject to the ongoing effects of coercion, should be excluded in order to vindicate the integrity of the judicial system. [9] Defendant fails to demonstrate that his right to a fair trial was undermined by the introduction of physical evidence whose reliability is not questioned, or by the introduction of the testimony of witnesses who were not shown to be subject to any police coercion before or during trial. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence, and we reject defendant's due process claim.
In a motion to suppress evidence brought pursuant to section 1538.5, defendant contended that the seizure of his briefcase and its contents from his sister's home violated his right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial court denied the motion, finding that a warrant authorizing the search of defendant's Jeep, which had contained the briefcase until it was removed by defendant's sister, authorized the search of the briefcase; that defendant's sister consented to the seizure of the briefcase; that the contents of the briefcase inevitably would have been discovered, because a warrant would have issued to authorize the search; and finally, that exigent circumstances justified the search of the briefcase. Defendant contends the trial court erred as to each ground stated in denying the motion to suppress. He also contends that to the extent it found his sister, Diane Jenkins, had consented to the search, the court erred in determining that her consent was voluntary. Respondent contends defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his briefcase, and that the trial court correctly determined that the search was reasonable on the grounds of consent, inevitable discovery, and exigent circumstances. In addition, respondent contends any error in admitting the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the court properly denied the motion to suppress because the search was consensual. In reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, deferring to those express or implied findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365; People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785.) We independently review the trial court's application of the law to the facts. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 182, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) The hearing on the motion to suppress produced the following evidence. Detective Holder of the Los Angeles Police Department served a search warrant at defendant's residence on November 2, 1985. A neighbor informed him that on the previous evening, some persons had removed property from the residence. The neighbor supplied Holder with the license number of the vehicle used to remove the property. On the following day, Holder, along with several other officers, went to the address where the vehicle was registered. Holder testified that the occupant, Diane Jenkins, who informed Officer Holder that the residence was hers, permitted him to enter when he told her he was conducting an investigation of a murder of a police officer and asked whether he and other officers could come in and look around. He did not have a warrant. Ms. Jenkins consented verbally to the search, and she signed a written form indicating her consent and also noting that she paid the rent on the premises. When Holder asked whether there were weapons in the house, she affirmed that there were, leading him to her bedroom and disclosing the location of two guns she asserted belonged to her boyfriend. Almost simultaneously with his request to conduct the search, Holder asked whether there was any property belonging to her brother, defendant, in the home. Holder believed that she understood he was there to investigate a murder in which her brother might be involved. When Holder asked whether the residence contained any property belonging to her brother, Ms. Jenkins responded that there was a briefcase belonging to him. When she handed the unlocked briefcase to him in her bedroom, he opened it to determine whether it contained firearms, in particular the murder weapon, which to his knowledge had not been recovered. He also examined the contents of the briefcase to aid in identifying additional suspects, finding that it contained a binder with the name Dan on it, various papers, some with names, addresses, and telephone numbers on them, photographs, and a vehicle license. He took the briefcase with him when he left the premises after concluding the search. Ms. Jenkins indicated in writing that the property seized during the search, specifically including the briefcase and its contents, was given to Detective Holder by me freely without threat or promise. Detective Thies testified that he received the briefcase from Holder and examined its contents. It contained a license plate, a phone message retrieval apparatus, a combination knife, brass knuckles, a book containing defendant's limousine listings, phone bills, a telephone and address book with notations in defendant's handwriting, another telephone and address book bearing another person's handwriting, and a business card. In addition, there was a piece of paper bearing Elihue Broomfield's telephone number. The materials found in the briefcase also contained the telephone numbers of Reecy Cooper and Tyrone Hicks, and the address and telephone number of Anthony Bryant. Diane Jenkins testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that she had learned of defendant's arrest on November 1, 1985, from a person whose identity she could not recall. She did not talk to defendant on that date. At her mother's request, she picked up defendant's unlocked Jeep at the San Fernando courthouse, finding the keys under the floor mat. She removed the briefcase from the Jeep and placed it in her residence. She spent the night at defendant's home, fearing it might be subject to a break-in in his absence. She testified that when Holder arrived at her home on November 2, 1985, she asked whether he had a search warrant, and he responded that he did not, but that unless she consented to a search, he would arrest her on an outstanding traffic warrant and search the premises anyway. She stated that Holder observed the briefcase in her bedroom, seized it, and examined its contents. She testified that she was under duress when she signed the form indicating her consent to the search and the removal of property from her residence. The trial court stated that it believed several exceptions to the search warrant requirement applied. First, it declared that the officers possessed a warrant to search defendant's Jeep, and stated its belief that there is a good argument that that briefcase had been in the car; that the search warrant authorized a search of the car and authorized a search of Mr. Jenkins's property inside the house; that there actually was a search warrant to cover it. The court added, I think the other theory is possibly a consent theory, although I somewhat agree [with defense counsel's argument] that consent to turn it over or turning it over doesn't necessarily give consent to open it and to search, in and of itself. Other theories the court found possibly applicable were inevitable discovery and exigent circumstances. With respect to the first, the court explained: there had been a search warrant for the car and the property. It would not have taken long for them [the police] to have gotten a search warrant and opened the briefcase. With respect to the second, it explained: I really do think that the emergency exception, the exigent circumstances exception, applies when you have a nine-millimeter weapon outstanding that has yet to be found. And based on the information in the affidavit, there was a very good chance that it might have been found within the briefcase. The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against unreasonable intrusion on the part of the government. A warrant is required unless certain exceptions apply, including the exception that permits consensual searches. ( Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 U.S. 248, 250-251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 79, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) As the high court has explained: The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. [Citation.] The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable. ( Florida v. Jimeno, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801.) A warrantless search may be reasonable not only if the defendant consents to the search, but also if a person other than the defendant with authority over the premises voluntarily consents to the search. ( United States v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 170-171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 [person sharing a bedroom with defendant had authority to consent to a search of the premises and diaper bag found therein]; see also Frazier v. Cupp (1969) 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 [cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, which both men used and which had been left in the cousin's home].) Further, the United States Supreme Court has stated that in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one which has `a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.' ( Minnesota v. Carter (1998) 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373, quoting Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 134, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387.) The defendant must assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in `the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.' ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1171, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146, italics in original.) A defendant has the burden at trial of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the thing seized. (See Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at pp. 130-131, fn. 1, 134, 99 S.Ct. 421; see also People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1172, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) The prosecution has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of a warrantless search. (See People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1300, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221; see also United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 171, 177, 94 S.Ct. 988.) The state may carry its burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of a search by demonstrating that the officer conducting the search had a reasonable belief that the person consenting to the search had authority to do so; it is not required that the state establish that the person consenting to the search had actual authority to consent. ( Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148; see also People v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, 481, 233 Cal.Rptr. 323, 729 P.2d 757; People v. Bishop (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 220, 236, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 629.) Defendant failed to assert that he had any possessory interest or legitimate expectation of privacy in his sister's home, so he failed to establish that the search of the home itself violated his own constitutional rights. Defendant did, however, assert that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his briefcase, and we assume for the purpose of this appeal that he carried his burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy in that object. [10] Nonetheless, we conclude that the search of the briefcase was reasonable by virtue of defendant's sister's voluntary consent to the search. At the outset, defendant contends that his sister's consent to search her home and the briefcase was not voluntary. (See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 [whether consent was voluntary or was the product of coercion on the part of searching officers is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances].) The evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress was in sharp conflict on this point. Detective Holder testified that defendant's sister was friendly and cooperative, and readily consented to the search without the application of any pressure on the part of the police. He denied threatening her with arrest. She memorialized her consent in writing, stating that it was freely given. Ms. Jenkins testified, however, that her consent to the search was coerced by a threat to arrest her on an outstanding warrant if she refused to supply her consent. We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, deferring to those express or implied findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. (See People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 182, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365; People v. Miranda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at pp. 921-922, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785.) It is evident from the trial court's reliance upon consent as a justification for the search that the trial court resolved in favor of the prosecution the factual dispute regarding the circumstances under which Ms. Jenkins granted her consent, and did not credit her testimony that her consent was the product of a threat to arrest her. We defer to this implied factual determination, which is supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, we reject defendant's contention that Ms. Jenkins's consent to the search was involuntary. We next turn to the question whether the voluntary consent given by Ms. Jenkins established the search as reasonable. Ms. Jenkins clearly had authority to consent to a search of her own apartment  a place in which defendant had no possessory interest. In some circumstances, however, the consent to a search given by a person with authority to consent to a search of the premises does not necessarily supply consent to search personal property found within the premises. As Justice O'Connor explained in her concurring opinion in United States v. Karo (1984) 468 U.S. 705, 725, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530, [a] privacy interest in a home itself need not be coextensive with a privacy interest in the contents ... of everything situated inside the home. This has been recognized before in connection with third-party consent to searches. A homeowner's consent to a search of the home may not be effective consent to a search of a closed object inside the home. Consent to search a container or a place is effective only when given by one with `common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.' United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S., at 171 [94 S.Ct. 988]. `Common authority ... rests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes....' Id., at 171, n. 7 [94 S.Ct. 988]. As this language indicates, at least two questions are presented when the state seeks to justify a warrantless search by relying upon the consent of a third party who is the occupant of the premises searched: whether the third party had authority to consent to the search, and whether the scope of the consent given included the object or container that was searched. In the resolution of these questions, as noted, the state may carry its burden by demonstrating that it was objectively reasonable for the searching officer to believe that the person giving consent had authority to do so, and to believe that the scope of the consent given encompassed the item searched. ( Florida v. Jimeno, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801 [scope of consent may be established by showing that the searching officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe the consent included the item searched]; Illinois v. Rodriguez, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793 [search may be reasonable if officer had an objectively reasonable belief that the person consenting to the search had authority to do so].) In Florida v. Jimeno, supra, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297, the high court explained that the scope of consent usually is defined by the expressed object of the search. ( Id. at p. 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801.) In that case, where a police officer stopped a vehicle, informing the occupant of the officer's suspicion that the vehicle contained narcotics, the driver's consent to a search of the vehicle reasonably could be understood to include within its scope the search of a closed paper bag discovered within the vehicle. The standard for measuring the scope of consent, the court said, is to ask what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. ( Ibid. ) The court pointed out that in granting permission to search the vehicle, the defendant did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search. ( Ibid. ) The officer had informed the defendant he believed the defendant was carrying narcotics, and that the officer would be looking for narcotics. The court concluded: We think that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container.... The authorization to search in this case, therefore, extended beyond the surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag lying on the car's floor. ( Ibid. ) Although the court cautioned that the defendant's consent probably would not extend to a locked briefcase in the trunk of the car, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the police must request separate permission to search each container in the area to be searched. ( Florida v. Jimeno, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 251-252, 111 S.Ct. 1801.) The court found no basis for adding such a requirement, observing that although a suspect may limit the scope of consent, if consent reasonably would be understood to extend to a container, no further authorization is required. ( Id. at p. 252, 111 S.Ct. 1801.) The court relied upon the public's interest in permitting consensual searches, stating that `[t]he community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense.' ( Ibid. ) Other courts and commentators have observed that open-ended consent to search normally does not suggest that the person consenting would expect the search to be limited in any way, and that a general consent to search includes consent to pursue the stated object of the search by opening closed containers. (See People v. $48,715 United States Currency (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1515, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 829 [consent to search vehicle for drugs included seed bags and suitcases, or any area of the vehicle that might contain drugs]; United States v. Stewart (5th Cir.1996) 93 F.3d 189, 192 [consent to look at medicine bottle includes consent to examine contents]; United States v. Snow (2d Cir. 1995) 44 F.3d 133, 135 [consent to search vehicle for drugs includes consent to open and search a duffel bag inside the vehicle]; United States v. Zapata (1st Cir.1994) 18 F.3d 971, 977 [consent to search vehicle includes consent to search duffel bag found in trunk]; 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d ed. 1996) § 8.1(c), p. 613 [general consent ordinarily may be understood to extend to an examination  in furtherance of the object of the search  of closed containers found in the area, particularly if the police have indicated they are searching for a small object which might be concealed in such a container]; see also Erwin et al, Cal. Criminal Defense Practice (1998 ed.) § 22.02[6], pp. 22-31 to 22-32 [consent to search generally implies consent to a complete search, unless a limitation is expressed]; but see United States v. Infante-Ruiz (1st Cir.1994) 13 F.3d 498, 504-505 [when third party consent to search a vehicle and trunk is qualified by a warning that the briefcase belonged to another, officers could not assume without further inquiry that the consent extended to the briefcase].) [11] Under the circumstances of the present case, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that the scope of Diane Jenkins's consent included the briefcase. Detective Holder explained to Ms. Jenkins that he was investigating the murder of a police officer  an investigation that reasonably would be understood as involving an intensive search for such objects as weapons. When she granted open-ended consent to the search of her home, she had been informed that the officer was seeking evidence concerning her brother. In addition, having supplied consent to search, when asked whether any of her brother's belongings were in her home, she handed the officer her brother's briefcase. (See, e.g., People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 217, fn. 14, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302 [third party's consent to search her own purse, with statement that wallet contained therein was defendant's, arguably extends the scope of consent to include the wallet].) Her written consent indicated express consent to search her home, and included a statement that the briefcase had been given to Holder freely, without threat or promise. As noted, Holder was not required to seek separate consent for each container searched, providing the search otherwise was reasonable. ( Florida v. Jimeno, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 251-252, 111 S.Ct. 1801.) A briefcase obviously is a container that readily may contain incriminating evidence, including weapons. Because the announced object of the search was evidence connected with the murder of a police officer  thus including weapons that could be hidden in a briefcase  and involving her brother, Ms. Jenkins's consent to search her home and her action in disclosing the location of the briefcase, identifying it as her brother's, and handing it to the police officer would be understood by a reasonable person to include consent to search the briefcase. As for Ms. Jenkins's authority to consent to the search of defendant's briefcase, it is settled that the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared. ( United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 170, 94 S.Ct. 988.) For example, in the Matlock case, the high court determined that the consent of a tenant who shared a bedroom with the defendant and was told that the police were searching for stolen currency was effective to justify a search of the bedroom, including a diaper bag found in a closet. ( Id. at pp. 166-167, 94 S.Ct. 988.) The court explained that the consent of a third party may be valid if that party possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. ( Id. at p. 171, 94 S.Ct. 988; see also People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 979, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099; People v. Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 481, 233 Cal. Rptr. 323, 729 P.2d 757.) Applying these rules, courts have determined in various circumstances that third parties were authorized to consent to a search of luggage, bags, or other personal belongings of a defendant. ( United States v. Davis (2d Cir.1992) 967 F.2d 84, 85, 86-87 [tenant has authority to consent to search of footlocker shared with defendant and of containers belonging to defendant found within the footlocker]; United States v. Falcon (10th Cir.1985) 766 F.2d 1469, 1474 [brother's consent to examination of defendant's audiotape marked confidential was authorized because the tape was discovered in a room occupied solely by the brother, and the brother had exclusive control over its contents]; United States v. Miroff (7th Cir.1979) 606 F.2d 777, 778-779 [dominant occupant of premises authorized to consent to search of defendant guests' personal belongings found in area subject to common use, especially because guests assumed the risk of inspection by assuring occupant there was nothing illicit therein]; State v. Schad (1981) 129 Ariz. 557, 633 P.2d 366, 372 [girlfriend authorized to consent to search of defendant's wallet, on ground that defendant assumed the risk she would permit inspection when he gave it to her]; Johnson v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) 519 So.2d 713, 714 [third party in whose possession defendant had left a suitcase had authority to consent to a search of the suitcase he identified as belonging to defendant]; United States v. Salinas-Cano (10th Cir.1992) 959 F.2d 861, 865 [not reasonable for officer to believe defendant's girlfriend had authority to consent to search of defendant's luggage found in her home when there was no evidence of mutual use or joint interest and control over the suitcase]; Owens v. State (1991) 322 Md. 616, 589 A.2d 59, 66-67 [officers could not reasonably believe occupant of apartment had authority to consent to search of luggage left behind by visitor, because there was no evidence of common authority over the bag].) The question before us is whether the facts available to the officer at the moment ... [would] `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the property as to which consent is given. ( Illinois v. Rodriguez, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793.) Under the circumstances of the present case, it was objectively reasonable to conclude Diane Jenkins had authority to consent to the search of defendant's briefcase, because it was reasonable for the officers to believe she had exercised control over the briefcase and had not only joint, but at the time of the search, exclusive access to it and control over it. It is reasonable to conclude that a family member who officers believe has retrieved a brother's belongings from his premises and stored such belongings in her own bedroom has at the very least joint access to and control over the belongings. Under the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the search  that shortly after defendant's arrest, items were removed in a vehicle registered to Diane Jenkins from the area named in a search warrant directed at defendant's residence and vehicles, and that the only item belonging to him remaining in her home was the briefcase  it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that Diane Jenkins had secured the briefcase at her brother's behest. Such a request, of course, would impose upon defendant the risk that Diane Jenkins might consent to a search of the briefcase. (See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, supra, 394 U.S. at p. 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420 [defendant, in permitting third party to use a duffel bag and in leaving the bag at the home of the third party, assumed the risk that [the third party] would allow someone else to look inside]; see also United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 171, fn. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988; People v. Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 481, 233 Cal.Rptr. 323, 729 P.2d 757; United States v. Davis, supra, 967 F.2d at p. 88.) Some lower federal courts have asserted that authority to consent to a search depends in part upon a showing that the person consenting enjoyed not only access to and control over, but also mutual use of the property searched. (See, e.g., United States v. Whitfield (D.C.Cir.1991) 291 App. D.C. 243, 939 F.2d 1071, 1074 [mother lacked apparent authority to consent to search of adult son's bedroom without evidence that she enjoyed common use of the room and closet in which contraband was found]; see also United States v. Welch (9th Cir.1993) 4 F.3d 761, 764 [third party who jointly had rented vehicle with defendant had authority to consent to a search of the vehicle but lacked actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of the defendant's purse located in the trunk of the vehicle, because there was no evidence of joint access or control or use of the purse]; United States v. Salinas-Cano, supra, 959 F.2d at p. 863 [girlfriend lacked apparent authority to consent to search of defendant's suitcase left in her home, when he slept in the home several nights a week and maintained control over the suitcase, and there was no evidence his girlfriend used the suitcase].) The cases cited rely upon a footnote appearing in United States v. Matlock : Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements, see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 [81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828] (landlord could not validly consent to the search of a house he had rented to another), Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 [84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856] (night hotel clerk could not validly consent to search of customer's room) but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. ( United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 171, fn. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988, italics added.) This language, read in conjunction with the cases cited, however, addresses the problem of the authority of an owner, manager, or co-occupant of premises to consent to a search of those premises. In such a case, mutual use of the premises would be significant in establishing a third party's authority to consent to a search of the premises, because it certainly is not the case that every owner of property may consent to a search of his or her tenant's home. We do not believe, however, that the United States Supreme Court intended to require that in every circumstance in which a third party occupant of premises consents to the search of personal property of another located on the premises, authority to consent to search depends upon the third party's actual mutual use of the personal property, in addition to access to and control over the property. As we have explained, objects left in an area of common use or control may be within the scope of the consent given by a third party for a search of the common area. ( People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 979, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099.) We believe that when the person who consents to the search enjoys a possessory interest that the defendant does not share in the premises searched and also enjoys apparent joint or exclusive access to and control over the personal property searched, the privacy interest of the owner of the closed container or other personal property is far reduced and the authority of a third party to consent to a search may be established. (See United States v. Falcon, supra, 766 F.2d at p. 1474; United States v. Miroff supra, 606 F.2d at pp. 778-779; see also People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1172, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146 [defendant retained no expectation of privacy when he rid himself of a crime weapon by giving it to the occupant of the premises searched].) It can hardly be the case, for example, that the police would be unreasonable in acceding to the request of the sole occupant of a home to search luggage under the occupant's control but belonging to another in order to exonerate the occupant or protect him or her from hazard. (See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Latshaw (1978) 481 Pa. 298, 392 A.2d 1301, 1306-1307 [owner of barn, who suspected that containers found therein belonging to another contained contraband, was authorized to consent to a police search of the containers].) The high court has made clear that one basis for the consent exception to the warrant requirement is to serve the community's interest in producing `necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense.' ( Florida v. Jimeno, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 252, 111 S.Ct. 1801.) Accordingly, although the searching officer had little reason to suppose that Diane Jenkins herself was using defendant's briefcase, this circumstance does not require us to conclude the officer lacked a reasonable basis for believing she had authority to consent to a search of the briefcase, when the facts known to him indicated she had exercised control over the briefcase in the manner shown by the testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Defendant asserts that it is never reasonable for a police officer to conclude that a third party has authority to consent to a search when the personal property searched is identified as belonging to another person, but this claim is without merit. Although a third party who is the subject of a search and admonishes an officer that a bag belongs to someone else may be understood to deny joint access and control over the property (see United States v. Jaras (5th Cir.1996) 86 F.3d 383, 389), or to limit the scope of his or her consent (see United States v. Infante-Ruiz, supra, 13 F.3d at pp. 504-505), a third party who responds to a search focused upon the defendant by handing over the defendant's belongings that are in the third party's exclusive possession and control may create a reasonable belief on the part of the searching officer that the third party has authority to consent to the search. ( United States v. Falcon, supra, 766 F.2d at p. 1474 [rejecting the claim that it necessarily is unreasonable to search property identified as belonging to another]; United States v. Carter (4th Cir. 1977) 569 F.2d 801, 804-805 [same]; United States v. Buckles (8th Cir.1974) 495 F.2d 1377, 1382 [same]; Johnson v. State, supra, 519 So.2d at p. 714 [same].) We conclude the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress and that no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred. [12]