Opinion ID: 111736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: EVIDENCE OF RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING.1.Appellants' Argument

Text: North Carolina and the United States also contest the evidence upon which the District Court relied in finding that voting patterns in the challenged districts were racially polarized. They argue that the term racially polarized voting must, as a matter of law, refer to voting patterns for which the principal cause is race. They contend that the District Court utilized a legally incorrect definition of racially polarized voting by relying on bivariate statistical analyses which merely demonstrated a correlation between the race of the voter and the level of voter support for certain candidates, but which did not prove that race was the primary determinant of voters' choices. According to appellants and the United States, only multiple regression analysis, which can take account of other variables which might also explain voters' choices, such as party affiliation, age, religion, income[,] incumbency, education, campaign expenditures, Brief for Appellants 42, media use measured by cost, . . . name, identification, or distance that a candidate lived from a particular precinct, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30, n. 57, can prove that race was the primary determinant of voter behavior. [31] Whether appellants and the United States believe that it is the voter's race or the candidate's race that must be the primary determinant of the voter's choice is unclear; indeed, their catalogs of relevant variables suggest both. [32] Age, religion, income, and education seem most relevant to the voter; incumbency, campaign expenditures, name identification, and media use are pertinent to the candidate; and party affiliation could refer both to the voter and the candidate. In either case, we disagree: For purposes of  2, the legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent. It means simply that the race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where different races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different candidates. Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello 203. As we demonstrate infra, appellants' theory of racially polarized voting would thwart the goals Congress sought to achieve when it amended  2 and would prevent courts from performing the functional analysis of the political process, S. Rep., at 30, n. 119, and the searching practical evaluation of the `past and present reality,'  id., at 30 (footnote omitted), mandated by the Senate Report. 2. Causation Irrelevant to Section 2 Inquiry The first reason we reject appellants' argument that racially polarized voting refers to voting patterns that are in some way caused by race, rather than to voting patterns that are merely correlated with the race of the voter, is that the reasons black and white voters vote differently have no relevance to the central inquiry of  2. By contrast, the correlation between race of voter and the selection of certain candidates is crucial to that inquiry. Both  2 itself and the Senate Report make clear that the critical question in a  2 claim is whether the use of a contested electoral practice or structure results in members of a protected group having less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. See, e. g., S. Rep., at 2, 27, 28, 29, n. 118, 36. As we explained, supra, at 47-48, multimember districts may impair the ability of blacks to elect representatives of their choice where blacks vote sufficiently as a bloc as to be able to elect their preferred candidates in a black majority, single-member district and where a white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the candidates chosen by blacks. It is the difference between the choices made by blacks and whites ÔÇö not the reasons for that difference ÔÇö that results in blacks having less opportunity than whites to elect their preferred representatives. Consequently, we conclude that under the results test of  2, only the correlation between race of voter and selection of certain candidates, not the causes of the correlation, matters. The irrelevance to a  2 inquiry of the reasons why black and white voters vote differently supports, by itself, our rejection of appellants' theory of racially polarized voting. However, their theory contains other equally serious flaws that merit further attention. As we demonstrate below, the addition of irrelevant variables distorts the equation and yields results that are indisputably incorrect under  2 and the Senate Report. 3. Race of Voter as Primary Determinant of Voter Behavior Appellants and the United States contend that the legal concept of racially polarized voting refers not to voting patterns that are merely correlated with the voter's race, but to voting patterns that are determined primarily by the voter's race, rather than by the voter's other socioeconomic characteristics. The first problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that members of geographically insular racial and ethnic groups frequently share socioeconomic characteristics, such as income level, employment status, amount of education, housing and other living conditions, religion, language, and so forth. See, e. g., Butler 902 (Minority group members' shared concerns, including political ones, are . . . a function of group status, and as such are largely involuntary. . . . As a group blacks are concerned, for example, with police brutality, substandard housing, unemployment, etc., because these problems fall disproportionately upon the group); S. Verba & N. Nie, Participation in America 151-152 (1972) (Socioeconomic status . . . is closely related to race. Blacks in American society are likely to be in lower-status jobs than whites, to have less education, and to have lower incomes). Where such characteristics are shared, race or ethnic group not only denotes color or place of origin, it also functions as a shorthand notation for common social and economic characteristics. Appellants' definition of racially polarized voting is even more pernicious where shared characteristics are causally related to race or ethnicity. The opportunity to achieve high employment status and income, for example, is often influenced by the presence or absence of racial or ethnic discrimination. A definition of racially polarized voting which holds that black bloc voting does not exist when black voters' choice of certain candidates is most strongly influenced by the fact that the voters have low incomes and menial jobs ÔÇö when the reason most of those voters have menial jobs and low incomes is attributable to past or present racial discrimination ÔÇö runs counter to the Senate Report's instruction to conduct a searching and practical evaluation of past and present reality, S. Rep., at 30, and interferes with the purpose of the Voting Rights Act to eliminate the negative effects of past discrimination on the electoral opportunities of minorities. Id., at 5, 40. Furthermore, under appellants' theory of racially polarized voting, even uncontrovertible evidence that candidates strongly preferred by black voters are always defeated by a bloc voting white majority would be dismissed for failure to prove racial polarization whenever the black and white populations could be described in terms of other socioeconomic characteristics. To illustrate, assume a racially mixed, urban multimember district in which blacks and whites possess the same socioeconomic characteristics that the record in this case attributes to blacks and whites in Halifax County, a part of Senate District 2. The annual mean income for blacks in this district is $10,465, and 47.8% of the black community lives in poverty. More than half ÔÇö 51.5% ÔÇö of black adults over the age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less. Just over half of black citizens reside in their own homes; 48.9% live in rental units. And, almost a third of all black households are without a car. In contrast, only 12.6% of the whites in the district live below the poverty line. Whites enjoy a mean income of $19,042. White residents are better educated than blacks ÔÇö only 25.6% of whites over the age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less. Furthermore, only 26.2% of whites live in rental units, and only 10.2% live in households with no vehicle available. 1 App., Ex-44. As is the case in Senate District 2, blacks in this hypothetical urban district have never been able to elect a representative of their choice. According to appellants' theory of racially polarized voting, proof that black and white voters in this hypothetical district regularly choose different candidates and that the blacks' preferred candidates regularly lose could be rejected as not probative of racial bloc voting. The basis for the rejection would be that blacks chose a certain candidate, not principally because of their race, but principally because this candidate best represented the interests of residents who, because of their low incomes, are particularly interested in government-subsidized health and welfare services; who are generally poorly educated, and thus share an interest in job training programs; who are, to a greater extent than the white community, concerned with rent control issues; and who favor major public transportation expenditures. Similarly, whites would be found to have voted for a different candidate, not principally because of their race, but primarily because that candidate best represented the interests of residents who, due to their education and income levels, and to their property and vehicle ownership, favor gentrification, low residential property taxes, and extensive expenditures for street and highway improvements. Congress could not have intended that courts employ this definition of racial bloc voting. First, this definition leads to results that are inconsistent with the effects test adopted by Congress when it amended  2 and with the Senate Report's admonition that courts take a functional view of the political process, S. Rep. 30, n. 119, and conduct a searching and practical evaluation of reality. Id., at 30. A test for racially polarized voting that denies the fact that race and socioeconomic characteristics are often closely correlated permits neither a practical evaluation of reality nor a functional analysis of vote dilution. And, contrary to Congress' intent in adopting the results test, appellants' proposed definition could result in the inability of minority voters to establish a critical element of a vote dilution claim, even though both races engage in monolithic bloc voting, id., at 33, and generations of black voters have been unable to elect a representative of their choice. Second, appellants' interpretation of racially polarized voting creates an irreconcilable tension between their proposed treatment of socioeconomic characteristics in the bloc voting context and the Senate Report's statement that the extent to which members of the minority group . . . bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health may be relevant to a  2 claim. Id., at 29. We can find no support in either logic or the legislative history for the anomalous conclusion to which appellants' position leads ÔÇö that Congress intended, on the one hand, that proof that a minority group is predominately poor, uneducated, and unhealthy should be considered a factor tending to prove a  2 violation; but that Congress intended, on the other hand, that proof that the same socioeconomic characteristics greatly influence black voters' choice of candidates should destroy these voters' ability to establish one of the most important elements of a vote dilution claim. 4. Race of Candidate as Primary Determinant of Voter Behavior North Carolina's and the United States' suggestion that racially polarized voting means that voters select or reject candidates principally on the basis of the candidate's race is also misplaced. First, both the language of  2 and a functional understanding of the phenomenon of vote dilution mandate the conclusion that the race of the candidate per se is irrelevant to racial bloc voting analysis. Section 2(b) states that a violation is established if it can be shown that members of a protected minority group have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to . . . elect representatives of their choice.  (Emphasis added.) Because both minority and majority voters often select members of their own race as their preferred representatives, it will frequently be the case that a black candidate is the choice of blacks, while a white candidate is the choice of whites. Cf. Letter to the Editor from Chandler Davidson, 17 New Perspectives 38 (Fall 1985). Indeed, the facts of this case illustrate that tendency ÔÇö blacks preferred black candidates, whites preferred white candidates. Thus, as a matter of convenience, we and the District Court may refer to the preferred representative of black voters as the black candidate and to the preferred representative of white voters as the white candidate. Nonetheless, the fact that race of voter and race of candidate is often correlated is not directly pertinent to a  2 inquiry. Under  2, it is the status of the candidate as the chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the candidate, that is important. An understanding of how vote dilution through submergence in a white majority works leads to the same conclusion. The essence of a submergence claim is that minority group members prefer certain candidates whom they could elect were it not for the interaction of the challenged electoral law or structure with a white majority that votes as a significant bloc for different candidates. Thus, as we explained in Part III, supra, the existence of racial bloc voting is relevant to a vote dilution claim in two ways. Bloc voting by blacks tends to prove that the black community is politically cohesive, that is, it shows that blacks prefer certain candidates whom they could elect in a single-member, black majority district. Bloc voting by a white majority tends to prove that blacks will generally be unable to elect representatives of their choice. Clearly, only the race of the voter, not the race of the candidate, is relevant to vote dilution analysis. See, e. g., Blacksher & Menefee 59-60; Grofman, Should Representatives be Typical?, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 98; Note, Geometry and Geography 207. Second, appellants' suggestion that racially polarized voting refers to voting patterns where whites vote for white candidates because they prefer members of their own race or are hostile to blacks, as opposed to voting patterns where whites vote for white candidates because the white candidates spent more on their campaigns, utilized more media coverage, and thus enjoyed greater name recognition than the black candidates, fails for another, independent reason. This argument, like the argument that the race of the voter must be the primary determinant of the voter's ballot, is inconsistent with the purposes of  2 and would render meaningless the Senate Report factor that addresses the impact of low socioeconomic status on a minority group's level of political participation. Congress intended that the Voting Rights Act eradicate inequalities in political opportunities that exist due to the vestigial effects of past purposeful discrimination. S. Rep., at 5, 40; H. R. Rep. No. 97-227, p. 31 (1981). Both this Court and other federal courts have recognized that political participation by minorities tends to be depressed where minority group members suffer effects of prior discrimination such as inferior education, poor employment opportunities, and low incomes. See, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 768-769; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, Miss., 554 F. 2d 139, 145-146 (CA5) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 968 (1977). See also S. Verba & N. Nie, Participation in America 152 (1972). The Senate Report acknowledges this tendency and instructs that the extent to which members of the minority group . . . bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process, S. Rep., at 29 (footnote omitted), is a factor which may be probative of unequal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives. Courts and commentators have recognized further that candidates generally must spend more money in order to win election in a multimember district than in a single-member district. See, e. g., Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 720-721 (WD Tex. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. White v. Regester, supra . Berry & Dye 88; Davidson & Fraga, Nonpartisan Slating Groups in an At-Large Setting, in Minority Vote Dilution 122-123; Derfner 554, n. 126; Jewell 131; Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils, 12 Urb. Aff. Q. 223, 230 (1976). If, because of inferior education and poor employment opportunities, blacks earn less than whites, they will not be able to provide the candidates of their choice with the same level of financial support that whites can provide theirs. Thus, electoral losses by candidates preferred by the black community may well be attributable in part to the fact that their white opponents outspent them. But, the fact is that, in this instance, the economic effects of prior discrimination have combined with the multimember electoral structure to afford blacks less opportunity than whites to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. It would be both anomalous and inconsistent with congressional intent to hold that, on the one hand, the effects of past discrimination which hinder blacks' ability to participate in the political process tend to prove a  2 violation, while holding on the other hand that, where these same effects of past discrimination deter whites from voting for blacks, blacks cannot make out a crucial element of a vote dilution claim. Accord, Escambia County, 748 F. 2d, at 1043 ( `[T]he failure of the blacks to solicit white votes may be caused by the effects of past discrimination' ) (quoting United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 739 F. 2d 1529, 1536 (CA11 1984)); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F. 2d, at 1567. 5. Racial Animosity as Primary Determinant of Voter Behavior Finally, we reject the suggestion that racially polarized voting refers only to white bloc voting which is caused by white voters' racial hostility toward black candidates. [33] To accept this theory would frustrate the goals Congress sought to achieve by repudiating the intent test of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), and would prevent minority voters who have clearly been denied an opportunity to elect representatives of their choice from establishing a critical element of a vote dilution claim. In amending  2, Congress rejected the requirement announced by this Court in Bolden, supra, that  2 plaintiffs must prove the discriminatory intent of state or local governments in adopting or maintaining the challenged electoral mechanism. [34] Appellants' suggestion that the discriminatory intent of individual white voters must be proved in order to make out a  2 claim must fail for the very reasons Congress rejected the intent test with respect to governmental bodies. See Engstrom, The Reincarnation of the Intent Standard: Federal Judges and At-Large Election Cases, 28 How. L. J. 495 (1985). The Senate Report states that one reason the Senate Committee abandoned the intent test was that the Committee. . . heard persuasive testimony that the intent test is unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of individual officials or entire communities. S. Rep., at 36. The Committee found the testimony of Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, particularly persuasive. He testified:  `[Under an intent test] [l]itigators representing excluded minorities will have to explore the motivations of individual council members, mayors, and other citizens. The question would be whether their decisions were motivated by invidious racial considerations. Such inquiries can only be divisive, threatening to destroy any existing racial progress in a community. It is the intent test, not the results test, that would make it necessary to brand individuals as racist in order to obtain judicial relief.'  Ibid. (footnote omitted). The grave threat to racial progress and harmony which Congress perceived from requiring proof that racism caused the adoption or maintenance of a challenged electoral mechanism is present to a much greater degree in the proposed requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that racial animosity determined white voting patterns. Under the old intent test, plaintiffs might succeed by proving only that a limited number of elected officials were racist; under the new intent test plaintiffs would be required to prove that most of the white community is racist in order to obtain judicial relief. It is difficult to imagine a more racially divisive requirement. A second reason Congress rejected the old intent test was that in most cases it placed an inordinately difficult burden on  2 plaintiffs. Ibid. The new intent test would be equally, if not more, burdensome. In order to prove that a specific factor ÔÇö racial hostility ÔÇö determined white voters' ballots, it would be necessary to demonstrate that other potentially relevant causal factors, such as socioeconomic characteristics and candidate expenditures, do not correlate better than racial animosity with white voting behavior. As one commentator has explained: Many of the[se] independent variables . . . would be all but impossible for a social scientist to operationalize as interval-level independent variables for use in a multiple regression equation, whether on a step-wise basis or not. To conduct such an extensive statistical analysis as this implies, moreover, can become prohibitively expensive. Compared to this sort of effort, proving discriminatory intent in the adoption of an at-large election system is both simple and inexpensive. McCrary, Discriminatory Intent: The Continuing Relevance of Purpose Evidence in Vote-Dilution Lawsuits, 28 How. L. J. 463, 492 (1985) (footnote omitted). The final and most dispositive reason the Senate Report repudiated the old intent test was that it asks the wrong question. S. Rep., at 36. Amended  2 asks instead whether minorities have equal access to the process of electing their representatives. Ibid. Focusing on the discriminatory intent of the voters, rather than the behavior of the voters, also asks the wrong question. All that matters under  2 and under a functional theory of vote dilution is voter behavior, not its explanations. Moreover, as we have explained in detail, supra, requiring proof that racial considerations actually caused voter behavior will result ÔÇö contrary to congressional intent ÔÇö in situations where a black minority that functionally has been totally excluded from the political process will be unable to establish a  2 violation. The Senate Report's remark concerning the old intent test thus is pertinent to the new test: The requirement that a court . . . make a separate . . . finding of intent, after accepting the proof of the factors involved in the White [v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755] analysis . . . [would] seriously clou[d] the prospects of eradicating the remaining instances of racial discrimination in American elections. Id., at 37. We therefore decline to adopt such a requirement. 6. Summary In sum, we would hold that the legal concept of racially polarized voting, as it relates to claims of vote dilution, refers only to the existence of a correlation between the race of voters and the selection of certain candidates. Plaintiffs need not prove causation or intent in order to prove a prima facie case of racial bloc voting and defendants may not rebut that case with evidence of causation or intent.