Opinion ID: 1369044
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interpretation to avoid doubtful constitutionality.

Text: The majority recognize the rule that a statute should be construed to avoid grave and doubtful constitutional questions, and that when Carlos was decided a construction of the 1978 law which would permit the execution of an unintentional killer might violate the Eighth Amendment as construed in Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. 782. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1139-1140, 1146-1147.) The majority assume that such questions raised by Enmund have been fully and finally resolved. As we explained earlier, this assumption is itself dubious. ( Ante, p. 1154.) Carlos also noted two other constitutional problems which have not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court. First, the court in Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 427 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 405-406, 100 S.Ct. 1759], required that a state death penalty law provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. We questioned whether a law which included some who killed accidentally, while excluding the nonfelony but premeditated murder, would meet this standard. [18] We also noted that the statute classifies otherwise similarly situated persons  convicted murderers  and provides that a person who committed a willful and premeditated murder is not subject to the death penalty unless a special circumstance is present. An interpretation of section 190.2 that allows the death penalty for unintentional felony murderers, may violate the equal protection clause. Under accepted constitutional theory, a classification which directly abridges a fundamental constitutional right is tested by the stringent compelling interest test. I can think of no more fundamental right than life itself, nor a more direct abridgement of that right than execution. I doubt, however, that the classification imposed by the California statute (as construed by the majority) could even meet the rational-relationship test employed by courts to test classifications which do not affect fundamental rights. The state has an interest in deterring unintended felony murders, but surely it is no greater than its interest in deterring premeditated murder, so it cannot justify a greater punishment. ( Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. 782, would suggest that the state's interest in deterring unintentional felony murder is far less than its interest in deterring premeditated murder.) And while the unintentional felony murderer bears a measure of responsibility for his victim's death, and can be subject to retributive punishment accordingly, surely he bears no greater responsibility than the murderer who premeditates. In sum, even if one could find a rational basis for punishing unintentional felony murderers as severely as premeditating killers, there is no rationale that would justify punishing them more severely. [19] The majority's response to these arguments is to assert that [w]hether or not we approve of the wisdom of the statutory classification, it appears to be generally accepted.... But many practices are generally accepted until they are constitutionally challenged. The majority cite only one case, Gray v. Lucas (5th Cir.1982) 677 F.2d 1086, to support their conclusion that the classifications of the 1978 law are constitutional. If that decision is distinguishable or erroneous, then the constitutional issues raised in Carlos remain unsettled. Gray concerned a challenge to a Mississippi law which imposed the death penalty on felony murderers but not ordinary murderers. The decision of the court upholding that law can be distinguished on several grounds: (1) The jury expressly found that Gray committed an intentional felony murder. The Gray court noted that imposing the death penalty upon unintentional felony murders might pose a difficult question of constitutional law, (667 F.2d at p. 1103), but found it unnecessary to reach the issue. (2) In addressing the issue whether imposition of the death penalty on intentional felony murderers violated equal protection, the court assumed that the rational-basis test applied. In California, however, precedents such as People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236 [131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375] (which held liberty a fundamental interest), might compel use of a more exacting standard. (3) Gray found a rational basis for the challenged classification under the hypothesis that the Mississippi Legislature may have believed felony murder and ordinary murder posed two different problems, and planned to address the felony-murder problem first. That rationale could not be applied to the California statute: the 1978 law dealt comprehensively with felony and premeditating murderers. The voters were told expressly that the initiative applied to all murderers. (4) Gray asserted that the legislature could reasonably judge that the death penalty would be more effective in deterring felony murders since an experienced felon is more likely to assess the consequences of his acts, or conversely that it might not effectively deter simple murders since such persons are likely as a group to act on passion or impulse and thus be unmindful of the consequences of their crime. (677 F.2d at p. 1104.) But whatever its rationality in distinguishing between intentional felony murderers and intentional nonfelony murderers under Mississippi law, that reasoning breaks down completely when applied to the unintentional felony murderer. When a person who does not intend to kill contemplates the consequences of his acts, the possibility of the death penalty will not enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act. ( Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 799 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 1153].) No one has suggested a rational basis for believing that the death penalty is a more effective deterrent of unintentional felony murder than of premeditated murders. In Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 [139 Cal. Rptr. 620, 566 P.2d 254], we promised that when constitutional issues are raised, we would undertake a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals. When the court undertakes such an inquiry, it will find the imposition of greater punishment upon unintentional felony murderers than upon premeditated murderers presents a substantial constitutional question.