Opinion ID: 411288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Chapman Standard

Text: 69 Having determined that there must be a showing of prejudice, it remains for us to allocate the burden of proof on this issue. For many constitutional violations the existence of prejudice is presumed, and the state can rebut it only upon a showing of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. 29 In certain respects, however, the violation of a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is sui generis. See, e.g., McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir.1974). The violation is not caused by the state. Consequently, the harsh burden of proof in Chapman, which is meant to prevent the state from benefiting from its own wrongs, does not serve the same equitable and deterrent function in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 219. Additionally, where ineffectiveness is predicated upon the failure of counsel to raise certain objections, application of the Chapman rule would relieve petitioner of the requirement that he show prejudice before he can raise those objections on collateral review. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1333. See generally United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. at 170, 102 S.Ct. at 1596. 30 Alternatively, when counsel is faulted for his failure to develop and present a certain line of evidence, application of the Chapman rule would require the state to prove that the failure to produce certain evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, even though the evidence is more readily accessible to the petitioner. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. ----, ----, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3448-49, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982); United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 228 (MacKinnon, J., concurring); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d at 230 (Craven, J., dissenting). 31 70 For these reasons, we believe that application of the Chapman standard without an initial showing of harm by the petitioner would be ill-advised.