Opinion ID: 1900027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Authority to Alter Agreed Upon Pre-Injury Wages

Text: Leo argues that the Commissioner erred in his calculation of the average weekly wage by failing to consider wages earned by Leo at his employment with Sears, Roebuck and Company. Leo was employed at Sears during the same period of time he worked at American Hoist. The claim of error rests on the argument that these wages should be included in computing Leo's average pre-injury weekly wage because they were not included in the original agreement between the parties and thus the amount specified in the agreement does not accurately reflect Leo's pre-injury earning capacity. While we agree that wages earned in the course of concurrent employment may be relevant in ascertaining an employee's pre-injury earning capacity, we do not believe the Commissioner erred in failing to consider this evidence when only a petition for review of incapacity was pending. Leo rests his argument on the language of paragraph two of 39 M.R.S.A. § 100 (repealed and replaced by P.L.1981, c. 514, § 4, effective September 18, 1981) which provides in part: Upon such review the commissioner may increase, diminish or discontinue such compensation or vocational rehabilitation in accordance with the facts, as the justice of the case may require. Read in a vacuum, this language might support Leo's contention that the Commissioner is empowered to fully review all aspects of a compensation agreement when presented with a petition for review. However, the language of the first paragraph of § 100 must be examined in order to ascertain the full meaning of the language relied upon by Leo. The first paragraph of § 100 provides in part: While compensation is being paid . . . under any agreement, award or decree, the incapacity of the injured employee due to the injury . . . may from time to time be reviewed by a single commissioner upon the petition of either party upon the grounds that such incapacity has subsequently increased, diminished or ended . . . . (Emphasis added.) The clear import of this language indicates that a petition for review of incapacity merely focuses on whether the degree of incapacity of the employee has changed. A petition for review of incapacity addresses itself to change of circumstances since the time of the earlier determination, by commission decree or by agreement of the parties approved by the commission, of the employee's disability and the causal connection of that disability to a work incident.... Only changes in circumstances of disability or causation occurring after the decree or agreement count in support of making a change in compensation payments. Dufault v. Midland-Ross of Canada, Ltd., Me., 380 A.2d 200, 203-04 (1977) (emphasis in original); see Wilcox v. Stauffer Chemical Corp., Me., 423 A.2d 241, 243 (1980); Mortimer v. Harry C. Crooker & Sons, Inc., Me., 404 A.2d 228, 230-31 (1979). Thus, a review of incapacity is only a device for either an employee or employer to ask the Commissioner to determine whether the incapacity of the injured employee has changed since the date of the agreement; it is not the vehicle for collaterally attacking other aspects of a decree or agreement. [5] This restricted scope of review serves to `insure that a petition for review of incapacity can never serve as a tool for prying open matters already settled.' Hafford v. Kelly, Me., 421 A.2d 51, 53 (1980), quoting Nelson v. Town of East Millinocket, Me., 402 A.2d 466, 468 (1979). The underlying purpose of such a rule is to establish once and for all matters pertaining to the approved agreement; only changes in the level of disability occurring after the agreement can weigh towards a change in a level of compensation. This limitation on the scope of petition for review of incapacity is not unjust in light of the possible remedy available to Leo under 39 M.R.S.A. § 102. That section permits an employee to petition the Commissioner to annul an agreement provided such an agreement was entered into through mistake of fact by said petitioner or through fraud. Upon annulment, the employee is free to pursue whatever remedies are available to him in absence of a binding agreement. St. Pierre v. St. Regis Paper Co., Me., 386 A.2d 714, 720 (1978). We have observed that a mistake on the part of the employee causally connected to the agreement and regarding wages earned from a second job could, under certain circumstances, provide grounds for annulment of an approved compensation agreement. Cannon v. Folsom, Me., 401 A.2d 997, 1000 (1979). Leo's petition for resumption of compensation payments did not bring this matter into issue at the review of incapacity proceedings. The agreement was not a part of the record; the circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement were not presented at either of the two hearings. Moreover, the petition for resumption of payments only made mention that the possibility of underpayment existed and the parties were in the process of resolving the error. The mere introduction of a wage statement into evidence is clearly insufficient to bring mistake of fact into issue particularly when § 102 clearly contemplates initiation of such a proceedings by petition. [6] Accordingly, we conclude the Commissioner did not err by not altering the previously agreed upon wage amount.