Opinion ID: 2046867
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Statement by the Alleged Coconspirator.

Text: The defendant contends evidence of statements made by Schreiber was hearsay and violated her right of confrontation. The gist of Schreiber's statements, which came in through the testimony of a Charles Denham, was that Schreiber (who was also charged with the murder) had told Denham that he and the defendant were going to get the victim drunk and drop him off in Des Moines. Schreiber asked Denham, his employer, for money to buy gas. We review the admission of hearsay evidence for errors at law. State v. Moeller, 589 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Iowa 1999). We review claims under the Confrontation Clause de novo. State v. Jefferson, 574 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Iowa 1997). A. Preservation of error. At the outset, we must determine whether Tangie has preserved error with respect to the hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues. Prior to trial, Tangie filed a motion in limine to prevent Denham's testimony. The motion asserted both hearsay and Confrontation Clause arguments, but the court did not rule on the motion prior to trial. At trial the defendant pressed for a ruling on her hearsay objection, but she did not raise a Confrontation Clause argument. In response to the State's argument that the evidence should be admitted under Iowa Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), the court made it clear it would wait until the evidence was proffered before it ruled on the objection, saying [w]e'll cross that bridge when we get there, counsel. Defense counsel then asked to make an offer of proof, and the court responded as follows: THE COURT: Counsel, I have no idea as to what context this is going to be brought up in. You can forewarn me prior to the time that it starts to come up, and we'll take a look at it then. Later, during the State's examination of Denham, defense counsel asked that a hearing be held in the absence of the jury to allow the court to hear the evidence in question. The court granted the request. In that hearing, Denham related the conversation with Schreiber concerning the plan to get the victim drunk and drop him off in Des Moines. The defendant's lawyer then renewed the hearsay objection, and the court said it finds that the statements are admissible under [Iowa Rule of Evidence] 801(d)(2). The Confrontation Clause was not raised in this hearing. In fact, the only time it was ever mentioned was in the defendant's written motion in limine. Ordinarily, error claimed in a court's ruling on a motion in limine is waived unless a timely objection is made when the evidence is offered at trial. State v. Edgerly, 571 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Iowa App.1997) (citing State v. Davis, 240 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Iowa 1976)). However, where a motion in limine is resolved in such a way it is beyond question whether or not the challenged evidence will be admitted during trial, there is no reason to voice objection at such time during trial. In such a situation, the decision on the motion has the effect of a ruling. State v. Miller, 229 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Iowa 1975). This rule is inapplicable in this case because the court did not, in addressing the motion in limine, resolve[ ] [the issue] in such a way it is beyond question whether or not the challenged evidence will be admitted during trial.... Id. In fact, the court made it clear it would not rule on the hearsay objection until the evidence was offered at trial, and it gave no indication at all how it would rule on a Confrontation Clause argument had the argument been presented to it. We conclude the defendant has failed to preserve a Confrontation Clause argument and has therefore waived it. It is likely defense counsel did not press the Confrontation Clause issue because, as the State argues, there is no merit in the argument in any event. Our court of appeals, in reversing on the Confrontation Clause issue, relied on the Supreme Court cases of Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), both of which must be distinguished. These cases involved confessions by nontestifying codefendants who stood to gain by implicating the defendant. In the present case, the evidence was not admitted as a confession by a codefendant but as a statement by a codefendant in furtherance of a conspiracy under Iowa Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). The identical federal rule of evidence, according to the Supreme Court, is so firmly established there is no need for a separate Confrontation Clause analysis. According to the Court, [w]e think that [prior Supreme Court] cases demonstrate that co-conspirators' statements, when made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, have a long tradition of being outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion. Accordingly, we hold that the Confrontation Clause does not require a court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of statements that satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2783, 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 158 (1987). B. Merits of arguments. For the reasons just discussed, we reject Tangie's Confrontation Clause argument and proceed to the hearsay issue. The district court allowed evidence of Schreiber's out-of-court statement under the coconspirator exception of Iowa Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which provides a statement is not hearsay if [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Tangie argues the district court erred in admitting the evidence under this rule because the State failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy and failed to show the statement was made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy. Under rule 801(d)(2)(E), statements by a coconspirator are admissible against the party as an admission of a party-opponent. State v. Ross, 573 N.W.2d 906, 914 (Iowa 1998). Before the statement is admissible, the court must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a conspiracy to commit a crime existed between the declarant and the nonoffering party. In re Property Seized from DeCamp, 511 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Iowa 1994). Such a finding is implicit when the district court admits the statement into evidence. State v. Florie, 411 N.W.2d 689, 695 (Iowa 1987). We review a district court's determination that a conspiracy existed under the substantial-evidence test. Id. The defendant contends the foundation for admitting evidence under rule 801(d)(2)(E) must be established by evidence independent of the out-of-court statement itself. Otherwise, admitting an out-of-court statement that is supported only by the statement itself has been characterized as impermissible bootstrapping. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680, 701-02 (1942). However, the Glasser rule has been effectively superseded by Congress through its adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181, 107 S.Ct. at 2781, 97 L.Ed.2d at 156. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), similar to our rule of the same number, provides: Preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.... In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(d)(1), which is similar to our rule 1101(c)(1), states that the rules of evidence, except those involving privileges, shall not apply to [t]he determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under rule 104. Under the federal rules, there is little doubt a court may consider the out-of-court statement itself to establish the foundational facts to apply the coconspirator exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 180, 107 S.Ct. at 2781, 97 L.Ed.2d at 156. We believe a similar approach is appropriate under Iowa Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 1101(c)(1). We hold decisions on admissibility made pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence 104(a) may be made by the court without respect to the rules of evidence, including those concerning hearsay. See Florie, 411 N.W.2d at 695-96. The statement attributed to Schreiber as a coconspirator was presented to the court in its in camera hearing: Q. When you were talking to Mr. Schreiber, did he talk about a plan? A. Yes. Q. Tell the jury what happened. A. Benny [Schreiber] had mentioned that talking about this relationship with Evelyn [Tangie] and mentionedthere was only one problem and that she'd had a boyfriend. And I had replied, one problem, she's got a boyfriend? And he says, I hear he's a real asshole. I never knew the guy. And I replied, well, good, hopefully he'll kick your ass and I can get some work out of you again. Then later on Benny mentioned, well, the plan is that them or Mary and Evelyn are to take him out and get him drunk tonight and I'm going to drive him and drop him off in Des Moines. Q. And after that conversation after Mr. Schreiber told you that, was there any talk about gas money? A. Yes. Q. Tell us about that. A. Benny had asked for some money for some gas so I wrote him out a check for $15, I believe. Q. Did you write the check out to him personally? A. No. I wrote it out to Amoco. Q. So when Mr. Schreiber told you the plan was to getMary and Evelyn were to getJohn Terry drunk and go drop him off, did he say where? A. He said Des Moines. The court in Bourjaily found it unnecessary to decide whether a court may rely solely on hearsay statements to find the existence of a conspiracy because in that case the statements of the coconspirator regarding the existence of a conspiracy were supported by subsequent events tending to show the existence of a conspiracy. Id. at 181, 107 S.Ct. at 2781-82, 97 L.Ed.2d at 156. That is the case here; the out-of-court statement is supplemented by other evidence of the conspiracy: Denham testified he had seen Schreiber and Tangie together the Thursday or Friday before the murder (which occurred on Saturday) and that Schreiber was awful happy because [h]e had met Evelyn ... and he was all excited because of just the relationship that they were gonna have. Mary Gerlich, a friend of Tangie, testified that on the day of the murder Tangie asked her to take her to talk to Schreiber. Gerlich said Schreiber and Tangie talked about Tangie getting a restraining order against Terry, about Tangie going to look at the bus in which Schreiber lived, and their concern about the bus being big enough, apparently in reference to Tangie moving in with Schreiber. Gerlich also testified to driving Tangie to Schreiber's bus and to later picking up Tangie, Terry, and Tangie's son to take them to Gerlich's house. While Tangie and the victim were at Gerlich's house on the day of the murder, Schreiber arrived, and Tangie went outside to talk to him. Tangie and Schreiber later suggested they go with the victim to look at a trailer house. They left in Schreiber's car, and when they returned, the victim was not with them. Karen Brown, Schreiber's neighbor, testified Schreiber did not have a telephone and that on the day of the murder a female called for Schreiber, identifying herself as Evelyn, Benny's [Schreiber] girlfriend. She testified the person sounded excited and panicky, making it seem urgent to get Schreiber on the line. This extrinsic evidence and the alleged coconspirator's statement itself provide substantial record support for the trial court's finding of a conspiracy. Once a conspiracy is established, two conditions must be met for rule 801(d)(2)(E) to apply: the statement must have been made during the pendency of the conspiracy, and it must be in promotion of the conspiracy's object or design. Ross, 573 N.W.2d at 915. The evidence of the parties' activities surrounding the statement and the statement itself provide substantial support for the court's implied finding the statement was made during the pendency of the conspiracy and in furtherance of it. For example, a reasonable inference from Schreiber's statement regarding gas money is that it was needed as a part of the plan to drive the victim to Des Moines. The court did not err in admitting Schreiber's statements under Iowa Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).