Opinion ID: 1141622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is King's Sentence Barred by Double Jeopardy?

Text: King alleges that granting a continuance and holding a subsequent hearing violated his protection against double jeopardy. In DeBussi v. State, 453 So.2d 1030 (Miss. 1984), this Court held that a convicted felon could not be resentenced as an habitual after the prosecution failed in its first attempt to produce sufficient evidence of defendant's habitual status. King argues from this that jeopardy attached at the habitual offender hearing, citing this language from DeBussi : The habitual offender sentencing hearing, like the capital sentencing hearing, is itself a trial on eligibility for a harsher sentence, and therefore constitutes jeopardy. Id. at 1033. King correctly argues that jeopardy attaches for a bench trial when the first witness is sworn. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). In Watts v. State, 492 So.2d 1281, 1284 (Miss. 1986), this Court stated: The double jeopardy prohibition does not mean that every time a trial aborts or does not end with a final judgment the defendant must be set free. Schwarzauer v. Miss, 339 So.2d 980, 982 (Miss. 1976). However, if a mistrial is granted upon the court's own motion, or upon the state's motion, a second trial is barred because of double jeopardy unless there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial, taking into consideration all the circumstances. Jones v. State, 398 So.2d 1312 (Miss. 1981). Some examples of manifest necessity are: failure of a jury to agree on a verdict, Jones at 1315; biased jurors, Id. ; an otherwise tainted jury, Id. at 1318; improper separation of jury, Schwarzauer, supra; when jurors otherwise demonstrate their unwillingness to abide by the instructions of the court, Schwarzauer, 339 So.2d at 982. Thus, there would seem to be two questions: 1) is a continuance in a bench trial sufficiently like a mistrial in a jury trial setting to invoke the Watts analysis, and, if so, 2) was there any manifest necessity for the mistrial. We need not reach the second question, however, for we hold that a continuance is not a mistrial in all situations, especially where, as here, the continuance is granted without defendant's objection. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar question in Webb v. Hutto, 720 F.2d 375 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1080, 104 S.Ct. 1444, 79 L.Ed.2d 764 (1984). In Webb, the court of appeals addressed a habeas corpus petition containing a claimed double jeopardy violation based on a continuance granted the prosecutor solely because of his realization that the case could not be made against the petitioner without the testimony of at least one of the codefendants. Id. at 377. The trial court continued the trial for five days, at which time a co-defendant provided especially damaging testimony. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, stating: The simple, yet to us controlling, consideration is that the accused must be placed in jeopardy twice for double jeopardy to exist. It happens when the second event involves a completely new beginning, i.e., when the second proceeding takes place before a new trier of fact, whether that be a different judge or jury, or the same judge starting with a clean slate. It simply does not occur when the very same proceeding continues on after a brief postponement before the first and only trier of fact, as was the case here. Id. at 379. Substance rather than form should control the determination of whether a trial is continued or started anew. Id. at 380. Other courts have fashioned different analytical models to help decide this issue. See, e.g., State v. O'Keefe, 135 N.J. Super. 430, 343 A.2d 509 (1975) (resuming trial not barred unless prosecutorial neglect triggering continuance is inexcusable and the continuance is an unreasonable break in the continuity of the trial). We lean toward accepting the rationale of the Fourth Circuit in Webb, but under either analysis we would reach the same conclusion: the resumed hearing was not barred by double jeopardy. Here, as in Webb, it is indisputable that the subsequent proceeding was a continuation of the first hearing. When the hearing resumed on December 12, 1985, the prosecution eventually continued its examination of Lt. Grones without requalifying him as an expert. In O'Keefe, the delay was two weeks, while in Webb the delay was only five days. The delay here was six days. This does not seem to be an unreasonable break. Since O'Keefe framed the test in the conjunctive, if the break is not unreasonable then the Court would not need to reach the neglect prong. Of no small moment is defendant's failure to timely object to the continuance. Here, there is evidence in the record that the prosecution might have had sufficient documentation from the Department of Corrections to meet its burden without Grones' knowledge of identifying fingerprints. Thus, it seems especially inappropriate to hold the resumed hearing barred when a timely objection might have properly framed the issue for the trial court. In this light, King's failure to object can only be viewed as an acquiescence to the continuance. This assignment of error is without merit.