Opinion ID: 2330522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The True Threat Doctrine

Text: The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech . . . because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. [8] The First Amendment, however, does not protect classes of speech which are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. [9] The United States Supreme Court has held that true threats are a class of proscribable speech. [10] In Watts v. United States , [11] the United States Supreme Court overturned the conviction of an individual who stated, during a political rally regarding the Vietnam War, If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J., because the speech was mere political hyperbole, not a true threat. [12] The Court analyzed the speech in its context, but did not define what constituted a true threat. [13] After Watts, federal circuit courts split over the proper test for what constitutes a true threat. On the one hand, the Eighth Circuit, among others, adopted a reasonable listener test, holding that a court must analyze an alleged threat in the light of its entire factual context, and decide whether the recipient of the alleged threat could reasonably conclude that it expresses a determination or intent to injure presently or in the future. [14] On the other hand, the Third Circuit, among others, adopted a reasonable speaker test, holding that a true threat exists when the defendant intentionally make[s] a statement . . . in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the [target]. [15] While each of the above tests focuses differently, they can both be viewed as objective tests. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Virginia v. Black [16] has created uncertainty over whether courts can still use an objective test to determine whether speech constitutes a true threat. In Black, the Court held that a state could pass a law banning cross burning when there is an intent to intimidate and pass constitutional muster, even though cross burning can be considered a form of speech. The Court described true threats as follows: True threats encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. [17] A plurality of the Court, however, held that a jury instructionstating that the act of burning a cross was itself prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate was unconstitutional, because it did not distinguish constitutionally protected speech from unprotected speech. [18] Courts after Virginia v. Black have differed over whether the Black test replaces the objective tests with a subjective intent test. One circuit court has questioned the continued validity of an objective test and adopted a subjective test: [S]peech may be deemed unprotected by the First Amendment as a `true threat' only upon proof that the speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat. [19] Other courts have read Black to be consistent with an objective test. [20] We need not decide which test to adopt, however, because 11 Del. C. § 621 applies only to speech made with the subjective intent to threaten. [21] This case is therefore similar to Virginia v. Black , which used a subjective intent test where the underlying statute required a subjective intent to intimidate. As we read Black, Andrews's speech is proscribable. Andrews directed a threat to Edmunds with the intent of placing Edmunds in fear of bodily harm or death. Under Black, as well as 11 Del. C. § 621, it is irrelevant that Andrews may not have intended to carry out the threat. [22] Rather, the relevant intent is the intent to threaten or intimidate. [23] Andrews admitted that he directed his comments to Edmunds to get Edmunds to leave him alone. [24] In other words, Andrews intended to intimidate Edmunds. The evidence suggests that he intended to create the very fear of violence and the . . . disruption that fear engenders, . . . proscribable under Black. Furthermore, as the situation escalated between Andrews and Edmunds, Edmunds, a disciplinarian with five or six years' experience, testified that he believed Andrews's threats to be real and to have escalated beyond Andrews's past statements. [25]