Opinion ID: 1206957
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Advise Regarding Constitutional Rights

Text: As noted previously, the act provides that an interrogated officer must be immediately informed of his constitutional rights once it is deemed that he may be charged with a criminal offense. (§ 3303, subd. (g).) In the present case, apart from being told that his refusal to cooperate would result in administrative discipline, defendant was not informed regarding the extent of his constitutional rights. (3) Before considering what rights are contemplated by the foregoing provision, we must determine whether or not it was deemed within the meaning of section 3303, subdivision (g), that appellant might be charged with a criminal offense at the time the interrogation commenced. (See § 3303, subd. (g).) The record contains no conclusive evidence of the officers' subjective views regarding the matter. Yet, as previously indicated, a criminal investigation was indeed pending regarding various specified acts of misconduct by officers of the 77th Street vice unit to which appellant was assigned. The interrogation was conducted in the presence of five investigating officers, suggesting that the department had indeed focused on appellant as a likely suspect. (As noted above, the act provides that questions should be asked by no more than two interrogators.) Finally, prior to the time when appellant elected to remain silent, his attorney summarized the various allegations for his client, stating that they're charging you with five specific felonies, including false arrest, false imprisonment, falsification of records, accepting a bribe and conspiracy. None of the investigating officers corrected counsel's characterization of the proceeding as one brought for the purpose of investigating criminal charges against appellant. [1] Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that appellant was deemed a criminal suspect, thereby triggering the statutory requirement that he be immediately informed of his constitutional rights. ( Ibid. ) What were appellant's constitutional rights? (4) Given the context of an administrative inquiry into possible criminal misconduct, we think it likely the Legislature intended that interrogated officers be advised of their so-called  Miranda rights [2] (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]), as modified by the Lefkowitz/Garrity rule previously discussed. In other words, appellant should have been told, among other things, that although he had the right to remain silent and not incriminate himself, (1) his silence could be deemed insubordination, leading to administrative discipline, and (2) any statement made under the compulsion of the threat of such discipline could not be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding. (See Lefkowitz v. Turley, supra, 414 U.S. 70, 77-79 [38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281-283]; Garrity v. New Jersey, supra, 385 U.S. 493, 500 [17 L.Ed.2d 562, 567].) (5) Although appellant was properly advised of the adverse effect of his silence, he was never told of the extent of the protection afforded to any statements he might make. That omission was critically important here. It is argued that, because appellant refused to answer any questions, he was not harmed by the failure to advise him of his rights. Yet had appellant understood that his statements during the administrative interview could not be used against him in a criminal proceeding, he might well have elected to cooperate rather than remain silent. Although respondents suggest that appellant must have known his constitutional rights, being a police officer accustomed to admonishing suspects, and being represented by counsel at the administrative hearing, for the following reasons we cannot so readily make such a presumption on this record. First, the act specifically requires that all police officers, despite their supposed experience in law enforcement, be advised of their constitutional rights if possible criminal charges are contemplated, thus indicating a legislative judgment that some officers may be unaware of those rights. Second, appellant's counsel appears to have advised his client to remain silent because of the possibility appellant might incriminate himself in a criminal charge. When the subject first arose, and one of the officers confirmed that a potential criminal investigation was involved, counsel at once replied: At this time ... we decline to answer any questions in regard to the criminal investigation. Appellant himself, as a police officer, undoubtedly was familiar with the general admonition that anything he said would be used against him. Thus, it appears that both appellant and his counsel may have failed to appreciate that, if appellant were compelled to testify under the threat of administrative discipline, his testimony could not be subsequently used to incriminate him in criminal proceedings. ( Lefkowitz, supra, 414 U.S. at pp. 77-79 [38 L.Ed.2d at pp. 281-282].) We conclude that the trial court erred in denying a peremptory writ of mandate to annul the administrative decision terminating appellant's employment. Accordingly, we need not reach appellant's alternative contentions. [3] The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.