Opinion ID: 328974
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bloomfield Petition

Text: 17 The government's brief makes this concession: 18 Although the record is not entirely free from ambiguity on the matter (compare App. 119a-123a with App. 35a-37a), it does appear that the Commission, on the Secretary's motion, dismissed Bloomfield Mechanical as a named respondent. Therefore, the order of the Commission should have been entered only against Bloomfield-Blumin Joint Venture. . . . (Government Brief at 11 n. 8). 19 Our only disagreement is the reference to ambiguity. On July 18, 1973 the administrative law judge unequivocally dismissed Bloomfield from the proceedings. The February 19, 1974 order (made without the benefit of a brief either from Bloomfield or from the Secretary) is simply inexplicable. The government argues: 20 Practically speaking, however, it makes no difference since a wrong committed by a joint venture is imputable to the members of the joint venture jointly and severally. Pedersen v. Manitowoc Co., 25 N.Y.2d 412, 306 N.Y.S.2d 903, 255 N.E.2d 146 (1969). (Government Brief at 11 n. 8). 21 Practically speaking it makes all the difference in the world, because the individual liability of the joint venturers for the civil penalties assessed would only arise if the joint venture did not pay. That is an unlikely event which would arise only after the Secretary sued in the district court to collect an unpaid penalty. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k). But the effect of the ex parte entry of the order affirming the citation against Bloomfield is to place the violation on record against it as an employer for use in determining the level of civil penalties with respect to possible future violations. 29 U.S.C. § 666(i ). In view of the Secretary's stipulation that the joint venture, not Bloomfield, was the employer on the site, and the unequivocal dismissal of Bloomfield from the Commission proceedings, the entry of an order against Bloomfield was wholly unwarranted and will be set aside. 1