Opinion ID: 1305632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Necessity of an Evidentiary Hearing.

Text: Brummer does not challenge Iowa's right, generally, to maintain a sex offender registry, conceding the state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens by giving prompt notification to potential victims and relevant caregivers with respect to registrants who are accurately determined to be at risk. Brief for Appellant at 23; see also In re S.M.M., 558 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Iowa 1997) (recognizing the purpose of chapter 692A is to require registration of sex offenders and thereby protect society from those who because of probation, parole, or other release are given access to members of the public). Nor does he deny that his conviction for indecent contact with a minor required his registration with the state's sex offender registry. See Iowa Code § 692A.2(1); Iowa Admin. Code r. 201-38.3(2). Instead, Brummer challenges the sufficiency and fairness of the process with which his risk to reoffend was assessed. Brummer argues that a moderate risk to reoffend assessment and the threatened public notification arising from the assessment impinges on a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions by permanently and publicly branding him as a sex offender likely to commit another sex offense. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. He asserts that this proposed infringement entitles him to procedural due process of law in the course of Corrections' assessment process, namely notice and an opportunity to be heard in the context of a contested case proceeding. See Greenwood Manor, 641 N.W.2d at 834 (A contested case entitles [a party] to an adversarial hearing with the presentation of evidence and arguments and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and introduce rebuttal evidence.). Corrections responds to these assertions by arguing that Brummer was provided adequate notice and was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the administrative process underlying the assessment was other agency action which does not warrant extensive due process procedures. See id. (At most, other agency action entitles affected parties to an informal hearing in addition to those procedures voluntarily promulgated by the agency and the general requirement that the agency act reasonably.). As both parties recognize, the core issue raised by Brummer's appeal is the determination of the precise nature of the agency action that was undertaken in his risk assessment. All agency action falls into one of three categories, each of which involves different procedural processes and protections: `rulemaking;' `adjudication' (otherwise known as [a] contested case); and `other agency action.' Id. at 833 (citation omitted). Neither party argues that Brummer's risk assessment constituted rulemaking, but the parties disagree significantly over whether the assessment involved a contested case or other agency action. Because other agency action is defined as action that does not constitute rulemaking or a contested case their dispute evolves into a single key question: is the risk assessment a contested case? Id. at 834. This is a question permeated by important constitutional considerations implicating both the federal and state constitutions. A contested case is a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by Constitution or statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. Iowa Code § 17A.2(5). Thus, to determine whether particular agency action is a contested case, we must examine whether a hearing is required by statute or constitution. See id.; Greenwood Manor, 641 N.W.2d at 834. However, even if we determine a hearing is required under either body of law, we must also consider whether an exception to the evidentiary hearing requirement comes into play. See Greenwood Manor, 641 N.W.2d at 837. We take up each of these questions in turn.