Opinion ID: 2163595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: evidentiary sufficiency and the correct legal standard for determining whether antonia was born alive

Text: The defendant next claims that, even if the panel properly concluded that the born alive rule is applicable to the present case, he nevertheless is entitled to a judgment of acquittal with respect to the murder and capital felony charges pertaining to the death of Antonia because the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Antonia was born alive under prevailing Connecticut law defining what it means to be alive. [87] (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Specifically, the defendant contends that the panel failed to apply the principles articulated by this court in State v. Guess, supra, 244 Conn. at 761, 715 A.2d 643. We agree with the defendant's contention that the panel improperly failed to apply the principles articulated in Guess because, at the time of trial, neither the parties nor the panel appreciated the relevance of those principles to the present case. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction under the standard that the panel did apply, however, the defendant is not entitled to an acquittal, as he claims; rather, he is entitled to a new trial. Cf. State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 434, 438-39, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) (state entitled to retry defendant when trial court instructed jury using incorrect legal standard based on subsequent clarification in law, and evidence adduced at original trial was sufficient to meet that standard). We commence our review of the defendant's claim with a summary of our analysis and holding in Guess. In Guess, the defendant, Barry Guess, repeatedly shot the victim, Melvin McCoy, who, after being transported to the hospital, was placed on life-support systems. See State v. Guess, supra, 244 Conn. at 764-66, 715 A.2d 643. A short time later, it was determined that McCoy could not sustain either circulatory or respiratory function on his own. Id., at 766, 715 A.2d 643. It also was determined that McCoy was brain dead because he exhibited no sign of any brain activity. Id. After McCoy's parents authorized the hospital to remove him from life support, he was pronounced dead. Id. A jury found Guess guilty of McCoy's murder. Id., at 763, 715 A.2d 643. Following his conviction, Guess appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause that he had killed McCoy because, Guess maintained, the legal cause of McCoy's death was his removal from life-support systems rather than Guess' shooting of McCoy. See id. In particular, Guess contended that, because the legislature had not adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act, [88] and because the legislature did not define death in the Penal Code to include brain death, the court, in determining who or what caused [McCoy's] death, must use a common-law definition of death, which does not include brain death ... but rather depends solely [on] the cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions of the body. Id., at 766-67, 715 A.2d 643. The Appellate Court rejected Guess' claim, concluding that the proximate cause of [McCoy's] death was the bullet wound he had sustained, and the act of disconnecting the life support systems after [McCoy] had been declared brain dead was a medically reasonable act that neither caused [McCoy's] death nor constituted a sufficient intervening cause so as to negate [Guess'] acts as the cause of death. Id., at 763-64, 715 A.2d 643, citing State v. Guess, 44 Conn.App. 790, 800, 692 A.2d 849 (1997). Upon our granting of Guess' petition for certification to appeal, we concluded that, even if the legislature had not adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act as the operative definition of death under the Penal Code, we could, as a matter of common-law adjudication, define [the] term [death] in tandem with medical science and technology as they [had] evolved in recent years. State v. Guess, supra, 244 Conn. at 771, 715 A.2d 643. After noting the developments that had led to an expanded definition of death in the medical and legal fields; see id., at 772-78, 715 A.2d 643; we construe[d] the meaning of `death' as that term is used in the Penal Code to include a brain-based definition of death; id., at 780, 715 A.2d 643; thus placing the common-law definition of death in conformance with the definition of that term under the Uniform Determination of Death Act. See footnote 88 of this opinion. We therefore determined, for purposes of our common law, that an individual is deemed to be dead if that person has sustained either irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem. See State v. Guess, supra, at 780, 715 A.2d 643. In reaching our conclusion, we emphasized that our recognition of brain-based criteria for determining death [was] not unfaithful to any prior judicial determinations. Death remains the single phenomenon identified at common law; the supplemental criteria are merely adapted to account for the changed conditions that a dead body may be attached to a machine so as to exhibit demonstrably false indicia of life. It reflects an improved understanding that in the complete and irreversible absence of a functioning brain, the traditional loci of lifeโthe heart and the lungsโfunction only as a result of stimuli originating from outside of the body and will never again function as part of an integrated organism. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 780-81, 715 A.2d 643. In light of our determination in Guess concerning the applicability of the brain death standard, we concluded that the trial court in that case properly had found probable cause to charge Guess with the crime of murder. Id., at 781, 715 A.2d 643. Specifically, we stated: Because the trial court at the hearing in probable cause reasonably found that [Guess'] act of shooting [McCoy] caused extensive brain damage, leaving [McCoy] with no evidence of brain function, the court properly found that the state had established probable cause to charge [Guess] with the crime of murder. Id. On appeal to this court, the defendant in the present case concedes that the brain death standard that we adopted in Guess was not intended to supplant the traditional common-law definition but, rather, merely to supplement it as an alternative basis for establishing when death has occurred. He contends, nevertheless, that, because the court in Guess recognized that a person who is being sustained on life support may have died, that is, the person may be brain dead, even though that person continues to exhibit traditional signs of life, namely, circulatory and respiratory functions, the state's burden of proving that Antonia was born alive required the state to disprove any reasonable hypothesis arising from the evidence that [Antonia] actually died before she was extracted from the womb ... and placed on life support.  (Emphasis added.) The defendant maintains, moreover, that the state's evidence failed to meet this standard because the testimony of Palmer, the emergency department physician who delivered Antonia, was based solely on the fact that Antonia had a heartbeat and was breathing after she had been placed on a ventilator. The defendant further claims that, in light of the testimony of Harold Wayne Carver II, the state's chief medical examiner, that Antonia's brain was badly damaged and contained areas of atrophy or wasting away of the tissues as a result of prenatal oxygen deprivation, there is a very real possibility, which the state was required to disprove, that Antonia was brain dead at the time of her birth and, therefore, was not a person within the meaning of the state's murder statute. In response, the state contends that evidence of brain function never has been required to prove a live birth. The state therefore asserts that the defendant's reliance on Guess is misplaced and that Guess merely stands for the proposition that removing a person from life support does not bar a defendant's conviction for murder when the evidence establishes that the defendant's actions caused an irreversible cessation of that person's brain function before the removal of life support. In the state's view, Guess neither directly addressed nor implicitly resolved the issue raised by the present case, that is, whether an infant who, following her delivery, is placed on life support and sustained for forty-two days before being removed from life support, qualifies as a person within the meaning of our murder statute. [89] Before turning to the merits of the defendant's contention, we note that, at trial, the defendant never raised the evidentiary insufficiency claim that he now raises on appeal. Although defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's case-in-chief on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, his claim was based primarily on the contention that the state had failed to prove that the defendant had the intent necessary to support his conviction for the murder of Antonia because she was a fetus when he engaged in the conduct that caused her death. Thus, the claim of evidentiary insufficiency that defense counsel raised at trial differs markedly from the claim the defendant raises on appeal. Furthermore, the defendant, like the state, does not contend that the panel actually applied a brain function standard in determining that Antonia was born alive. We agree with the state that Guess does not directly address the issue of what type of proof or evidence is required to establish that an infant who is delivered by cesarean section after suffering prolonged oxygen deprivation in utero and is immediately placed on life support is a person within the meaning of our murder statute. Indeed, Guess did not present a factual scenario that required us to consider that question. More importantly, it is clear that the panel in the present case did not apply Guess or otherwise consider what relevance, if any, that case might have with respect to the issue of Antonia's status at the time of her birth. It is apparent, rather, that the panel, in determining her status, applied the traditional common-law test pursuant to which an infant is born alive if she has circulatory and respiratory functions that are independent of her mother. Indeed, our review of the record indicates that Guess was mentioned only once in the entire course of the trial. That occurred when defense counsel, at the close of the state's case-in-chief, moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground of evidentiary insufficiency. At that time, defense counsel primarily argued that the state had failed to prove that the defendant possessed the requisite intent to murder Antonia because she was still a fetus, and not a person, when the defendant inflicted the injuries on Rodgers that ultimately caused Antonia's death; defense counsel also asserted, however, that the state had failed to prove that the defendant's conduct, and not the actions of medical personnel in removing Antonia from life support, was the proximate cause of Antonia's death. In support of this latter contention, defense counsel relied on Guess, explaining that, in contrast to the proof that had been adduced by the state in Guess, there was no evidence tending to establish that Antonia was brain dead when she was removed from life support. [90] Thus, at trial, defense counsel contended that the evidence established that Antonia could have been alive when life support was removed, and that removing her from life supportโnot the defendant's conductโhad caused her death. In light of the foregoing argument, it is apparent that the defendant, like the state, viewed Guess merely as a causation case. [91] At no time, moreover, did the defendant seek to establish, through Palmer or any other witness, that Antonia was brain dead at the time of her birth. To the contrary, consistent with the aforementioned theory of defense, defense counsel apparently elicited testimony from Palmer that Antonia was alive when she was born and up until six weeks after being delivered, at which time she was removed from life support. The state, moreover, presented no evidence, through Palmer or otherwise, as to whether Antonia had demonstrated brain function at the time of her birth or thereafter. The state's failure to adduce any evidence of brain function as part of its case and its argument on appeal that Guess is inapplicable to the issue of whether Antonia was born alive compel the conclusion that the state did not believe that it was required to establish brain function and therefore never sought to demonstrate any such function with respect to the born alive issue. In light of defense counsel's contention at trial concerning the import of Guess, it is equally evident that the defense also did not believe that the state had any obligation to satisfy a brain function standard. Finally, and significantly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that either the court, Damiani, J., or the panel applied the standard set forth in Guess in determining whether Antonia had been born alive. Thus, although the claim of evidentiary insufficiency that the defendant raises in this court is predicated on the application of a test for determining whether a person is alive that requires due consideration of the principles articulated in Guess, it is apparent that, in the trial court, neither the parties nor the court had any such test in mind. For the reasons set forth in part V B of this opinion, we conclude that the panel improperly failed to apply the Guess standard for purposes of determining whether Antonia was born alive. More specifically, we conclude that, in light of the fact that, as in Guess, a person whose circulatory and respiratory functions are sustained by life support nevertheless may have suffered brain death, it necessarily follows that, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Antonia was alive at birth, the state must disprove that she was brain dead at birth. The proper remedy for the panel's use of the wrong legal standard is a new trial, however, not a judgment of acquittal. [92] Cf. State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. at 434, 953 A.2d 45 ([i]t is well established that instructional impropriety constitutes `trial error' for which the appropriate remedy is a new trial, rather than a judgment of acquittal).