Opinion ID: 1288237
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hawai`i requires actual authority.

Text: While the concept of apparent authority is well-recognized on the federal level, this court has always required a showing of actual authority to satisfy article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution. See Mahone, 67 Haw. at 647, 701 P.2d at 173-74 (A third party cannot waive another's constitutional right to privacy unless authorized to do so. Thus, the consent of a third party cannot validate a warrantless search unless the third party possessed authority to consent.); State v. Matias, 51 Haw. 62, 67, 451 P.2d 257, 260 (1969) (holding that an individual's constitutional right to privacy cannot be waived by another unless he or she has authorized that other person to do so). To be sure, consent of a third party is only effective if it is shown `that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.' State v. Brighter, 63 Haw. 95, 99 n. 3, 621 P.2d 374, 378 n. 3 (1980) (citations omitted). In this appeal, it is undisputed that Kelly's mother did not possess actual authority to consent to the search of the Hauanios' home. Acknowledging our tradition of requiring actual authority, the prosecution nevertheless urges this court to adopt the federal concept of apparent authority. For the reasons set forth below, we decline to do so. As the ultimate judicial tribunal in the state, this court possesses the final and unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawai`i Constitution. Bonnell, 75 Haw. at 136, 856 P.2d at 1272 (quoting State v. Quino, 74 Haw. 161, 177, 840 P.2d 358, 365 (1992) (Levinson J., concurring), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1849, 123 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993)). In exercising this authority, it is well-established that as long as we afford defendants the minimum protection required by the federal constitution, we are free to provide broader protection under our state constitution. Quino, 74 Haw. at 170, 840 P.2d at 362 (citing State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 (1967)); see also State v. Bowe, 77 Hawai`i 51, 57, 881 P.2d 538, 544 (1994) (emphasizing that `[w]hen the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a provision present in both the United States and Hawai`i Constitutions does not adequately preserve the rights and interests sought to be protected, we will not hesitate to recognize the appropriate protection as a matter of state constitutional law.'). In the area of searches and seizures under article I, section 7, we have often exercised this freedom. See, e.g., Quino, 74 Haw. at 170, 840 P.2d at 362 (declining to adopt the definition of seizure employed by the United States Supreme Court and, instead, choosing to afford greater protection to the citizens of Hawai`i); State v. Kim, 68 Haw. 286, 289-90, 711 P.2d 1291, 1293-94 (1985) (declining to adopt the federal standard and requiring police officers to have a reasonable basis of specific articulable facts to believe a crime has been committed before ordering a driver to get out of the car after a traffic stop); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 661-62, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985) (holding on independent state grounds that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash bags and thus warrantless seizure of them violates article I, section 7, absent exigent circumstances); State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 282, 686 P.2d 1379, 1390 (1984) (providing broader protection on the state level for probationers subject to warrantless searches); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 367-69, 520 P.2d 51, 57-58 (1974) (providing broader protection under article I, section 7, in the area of warrantless searches incident to a valid custodial arrest than is provided on the federal level). Our willingness to afford greater protection of individual privacy rights than is provided on the federal level arises from our view [that] the right to be free of `unreasonable' searches and seizures under article I, section 5 [23] of the Hawai[`]i Constitution is enforceable by a rule of reason which requires that governmental intrusions into the personal privacy of citizens of this State be no greater in intensity than absolutely necessary. Kaluna, 55 Haw. at 369, 520 P.2d at 58-59 (emphasis added). Thus, each proffered justification for a warrantless search must meet the test of necessity inherent in the concept of reasonableness. State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 282-83, 686 P.2d 1379, 1390 (1984) (emphasis added). At this point, we simply cannot say that it is necessary to allow third parties to consent to searches of an individual's personal and private belongings when they are devoid of any authority to do so. Our constitution guarantees more to the citizens of the State of Hawai`i. Moreover, unlike its federal counterpart, article I, section 7, specifically protects against invasions of privacy. [24] Allowing warrantless searches of an individual's home without the consent of someone authorized to give it, absent any exigent circumstances, would fly in the face of this protection. Indeed, an invasion of privacy is no less of an invasion if the governmental officials are reasonable in their mistaken belief that the third party possesses the authority to consent. This is because, regardless of whether the police acted in good faith, the individual's privacy is still invaded when the police search his or her personal belongings without permission. We further note that while the United States Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule on the federal level is to deter illegal police conduct, see, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3417, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ([T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct[.]) (emphasis added); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 619-20, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) ([T]he [exclusionary] rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct[.]) (emphasis added); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (stressing that the rule's major thrust is a deterrent one) (emphasis added), this court has yet to fully explicate the purpose of the exclusionary rule as it applies to article I, section 7. Although we acknowledge that the Hawai`i exclusionary rule serves the valuable purpose of deterring governmental officials from circumventing the protections afforded by the Hawai`i Constitution, see State v. Furuyama, 64 Haw. 109, 122, 637 P.2d 1095, 1104 (1981), we now pronounce that an equally valuable purpose of the exclusionary rule under article I, section 7, is to protect the privacy rights of our citizens. This pronouncement is consistent with our past interpretations of article I, section 7, whether or not the interpretations were based on the added privacy protection afforded by our constitution. It is also consistent with our decision today. We are not alone in departing from the federal rationale of the exclusionary rule. See People v. Wood, 201 Mich.App. 58, 505 N.W.2d 882, 886 (1993) (The [exclusionary] rule has a dual purpose: (1) protection of the right to privacy, and (2) deterrence of police misconduct.); State v. Rogers, 314 Or. 114, 118, 836 P.2d 127, 129-30 (1992) ([U]nlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule which has been based on deterring police misconduct, exclusions under Article I, section 9 [of the Oregon Constitution], have been based on the personal right to be free of an unlawful search and seizure.); State v. Davis, 313 Or. 246, 253-54, 834 P.2d 1008, 1012-13 (1992) (holding that the exclusionary rule is based on personal rights theory and not deterrence); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887, 896-99 (1991) (rejecting the federal good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and holding that the purpose of the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania is to safeguard individual privacy rights). We therefore hold that, in order for a consent to search to be valid under article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution, the individual consenting must actually possess the authority to do so. In so holding, we reject the prosecution's suggestion that we adopt the federal doctrine of apparent authority under the Hawai`i Constitution. Accordingly, because there is no question that Kelly's mother did not actually possess the authority to consent to Detective Guillermo's search of the Hauanios' house, we hold that Detective Guillermo's search of the Hauanios' house violated article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution. [25]