Opinion ID: 675128
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mandamus and Sec. 1447

Text: 27 The Airbus Defendants also contend that 1) the district court remand was based on a post-removal event--the citizenship stipulation--2) such remand meant that the case was originally properly removable, and 3) the remand for this post-removal event was thus not based on a ground enumerated in Sec. 1447(c). Therefore, conclude the Airbus Defendants, this remand is reviewable by mandamus. 36 28 We find this argument intriguing yet unpersuasive. Initially, we note that mandamus adds nothing to the authority of this court to review jurisdictional remands under Sec. 1447. When such a remand order is not reviewable by appeal it is not reviewable otherwise. 37 29 Turning to the merits of the Airbus Defendant's contention, we observe that--even if this stipulation can properly be considered a post-removal event 38 --we have twice before concluded that jurisdictional remands premised on post-removal events are not reviewable. In Tillman v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 39 the district court remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on a post-removal event--the joinder of a state agency. Despite the fact that this decision was clearly wrong--and that it was based on a post-removal event--we held that it was nonetheless non-reviewable because the remand was granted on Sec. 1447(c) jurisdictional grounds. 40 Tillman merely followed our prior precedent, In re Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 41 in which we stated that such remands are not reviewable in light of Supreme Court precedent and the statutory policy of avoiding substantial delays caused by appellate review. 30 Finally, we conclude that the attempt by the Airbus Defendants to distinguish cases such as Tillman simply does not work. 42 The Airbus Defendants argue that Tillman involved the joinder of a party, one of the grounds expressly enumerated in Sec. 1447(e). Accordingly, insist the Airbus Defendants, as this is a ground enumerated in subsection (e) of Sec. 1447, it falls within the bar contained in subsection (d) of that same section. The instant case is thus different, they urge, because it involves a remand based on a non-enumerated ground--the loss of diversity jurisdiction caused by a change in citizenship status. 31 But our cases, such as Tillman, are not based on any purported enumerated-nonenumerated distinction between the various grounds for the lack of jurisdiction. Rather, these cases are premised on the concept that when the district court declares that it is remanding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, its remand order may not be reviewed on appeal, no matter how erroneous. The operative fact is the ultimate one--the district court's conclusion that it no longer has jurisdiction. Efforts to dissect the reasoning of that conclusion so as to find appellate jurisdiction are little more than veiled attempts to investigate indirectly the correctness of the district court's conclusion. Our concluding statement in Tillman regarding the non-reviewability of such error is instructive: 32 Consequently, having been erroneously remanded on Sec. 1447(c) jurisdictional grounds, this case is irretrievably beyond anything we can do about it. We cannot review it by any means. We emphasize our complete inability to do anything about the trial court's joinder order, whether interlocutory or final, because what we cannot review we cannot by some juridical self-help get back to federal court. 43 III