Opinion ID: 1154523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: the removal hearing

Text: Due process and the use of Fee Hearing evidence in the removal hearing. In his opening brief, Holman argues that the trial court should not have considered Fee Hearing evidence in the subsequent removal hearing. He argues that removal was not properly pleaded and that he was unfairly surprised when notified on the opening day of trial that the Attorney General sought his removal. The trial court, however, considered the request for removal to be only a request for relief and would address it only if the court concluded that removal might be appropriate. [A]t that time the Court could allow the parties to present evidence ... as to whether or not that's [removal] a harsh remedy not contemplated by Mrs. Stuart and so forth and so on. Report of Proceedings, at 20-21 (July 23, 1984). Holman claims that he then asked for clarification as to whether he needed to respond if removal issues came up and the court agreed that he did not have to respond to such issues. Holman actually asked whether he needed to respond to a removal case now, and if that comes up, [whether] it will be bifurcated in time, allowing me to get ready to prepare? (Italics ours.) Report of Proceedings, at 27. Holman then appears to have waived his objections upon assurance that he would be granted a continuance, if the necessity arose, to prepare for a removal case. He concluded, Then I will not address removal at all in this trial now. Report of Proceedings, at 28. [8] Even if Holman did not waive his objection, this was an action in equity. When equity jurisdiction attaches, it extends to the whole controversy and whatever relief the facts warrant will be granted. Haueter v. Rancich, 39 Wn. App. 328, 331, 693 P.2d 168 (1984) (citing Hubbell v. Ward, 40 Wn.2d 779, 246 P.2d 468 (1952)). Holman concedes that Beneficiaries' complaint prayed for such other relief as the Court may deem proper. Brief of Appellant, at 72. Finally, Holman had four months (August 1984  December 1984) to prepare a defense to the removal case and had every opportunity during the removal hearing to recall any and all witnesses they wished to cross-examine with regard to evidence presented at the fee case. Brief of Respondents, at 82. That appellants chose not to take this action hardly provides a basis for a due process claim. Whether Holman's bankruptcy creates a conflict of interest justifying his removal. Holman concedes the obvious that so long as he is required to reimburse the fees and interest, there exists a conflict in his roles as debtor and creditor of the trusts, which justifies his removal. Whether findings constitute sufficient grounds for Holman's removal. Given the existing conflict we need not address the other grounds upon which the trial court relied to remove Holman from the trusteeship. However, we do agree that the other findings justify his removal. In his opening brief, Holman contends that only an egregious breach of trust will justify removal of a trustee. Brief of Appellant, at 83. Findings 2.1 through 2.8 include Holman's taking of excessive and unjustified compensation (2.1); his interference with the American Heart Association (2.2); his wrongful attempts to increase the bank's fee in order to justify his own fee (2.3); his agreeing with the bank's investment decisions to gain favor as to his cotrustee's fee (2.4); his collection of his full fee for managing the CRAT's while they were in a bank common trust fund which required no investment advice on his part (2.5); his giving and then attempting to use as a shield his legal opinion as to his own fee (2.6); his knowingly charging a fee in excess of a normal fee (2.7) and his allocation of his fee between principal and income to avoid the Beneficiaries' objections to the size of his fee (2.8). These constitute an egregious breach. [9] Holman does not address Beneficiaries' argument that the trial court's decision in a removal case will seldom be overturned absent an abuse of discretion (quoting Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Haskins, 254 Ga. 131, 327 S.E.2d 192 (1985) (citing G. Bogert, supra, § 527)). In a still frequently cited trustee removal case, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the basis for this discretion rests in an equity court's paramount duty to see that trusts are properly executed; and may properly be exercised whenever such a state of mutual ill-feeling, growing out of his behavior, exists between the trustees, or between the trustee in question and the beneficiaries, that his continuance in office would be detrimental to the execution of the trust, even if for no other reason than that human infirmity would prevent the cotrustee or the beneficiaries from working in harmony with him, and although charges of misconduct against him are either not made out, or are greatly exaggerated.... May v. May, 167 U.S. 310, 320-21, 42 L.Ed. 179, 17 S.Ct. 824 (1897). Even if Holman could convince this court to reverse some of the trial court's factual findings, the law will not support reversing the trial court's result. In fact, under May, even if Holman were to have completely prevailed on appeal, the bad will generated by the litigation would alone justify his removal. Attorney General's standing. Holman argues that the Attorney General has no supervisory and visitorial powers over any of the Stuart trusts because the trusts are private trusts outside the scope of the charitable trust act. See RCW 11.110. While Holman's legal arguments are not without merit, they can be ignored because Holman expressly waived his objection to the Attorney General's presence. See Report of Proceedings, at 122-23 (July 24, 1984). Findings of fact in the removal hearing. Holman challenges several factual findings made in the removal case. For the most part, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the trial court's findings. In all instances, there is, at least, substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings.