Opinion ID: 1107739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Probability of a Life Sentence

Text: In denying Van Poyck's motion, the trial court pointed out that opinions of this Court and the Eleventh Circuit have essentially held that even though the defendant was not the `triggerman,' the imposition of the death penalty was fair, just, and proportional. The trial court made no finding on the dispositive question of whether the contents of the affidavit, if taken as true, would probably produce a sentence of life imprisonment as the sole alternative to the death penalty. On the question of whether the new evidence, if believed, would probably yield a life sentence, Van Poyck IV is controlling. There, relying on Van Poyck I and Van Poyck III, we determined that new evidence on the identity of the triggerman would not create a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence. 908 So.2d at 330. The reasonable probability standard from rule 3.853, which we applied in Van Poyck IV to affirm the denial of DNA testing, actually presents a lower hurdle for defendants than the Jones standard governing Van Poyck's current claim. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court adopted the prejudice standard of a reasonable probability of a different result for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and rejected the higher standard governing newly discovered evidence claims. In distinguishing the two tests of prejudice, the Court stated that [t]he result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome. . . . A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Jones standard for newly discovered evidence requires that the new evidence be such that it would probably produce an acquittal or a sentence of life imprisonment on retrial. Having decided in Van Poyck IV that new evidence showing that Valdes was the triggerman would not create a reasonable probability of a different result, we are bound to conclude here that different evidence on the same fact would not probably create a different result. Recognizing that Van Poyck IV is controlling as to his current claim, Van Poyck asks us to reconsider that decision. He relies in part on several opinions in which this Court noted the importance of triggerman status on the death-sentencing decision, and on a recent United States Supreme Court decision concerning new evidence on the identity of the triggerman in a capital case. We conclude that none of these decisions compels us to recede from Van Poyck IV. In Barrett v. State, 649 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1994), we reversed a first-degree murder conviction for a new trial on a different issue and ruled that the defendant could not be sentenced to death on remand because the trial court erred in overruling a life recommendation that could have rested in part on the jurors' conclusion that a codefendant committed the murder. Id. at 223. Similarly, in Cooper v. State, 581 So.2d 49 (Fla.1991), this Court reversed the trial court's override of a jury's life recommendation, noting that the evidence supporting the trial court's determination that the defendant committed the killing was far from certain and that [c]onflicting evidence on the identity of the actual killer can form the basis for a recommendation of life imprisonment. Id. at 51. In Downs v. State, 572 So.2d 895 (Fla. 1990), this Court ruled that the trial court committed error, albeit harmless, when it excluded testimony in a new penalty phase that corroborated other testimony indicating that the defendant was not the triggerman. Id. at 899. The Court considered this evidence relevant to the circumstances of his participation in the crime, which, if true, would have been valid mitigation under the minor participation statutory mitigator. Id. (citing to § 921.141(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (1975)). In Zerquera v. State, 549 So.2d 189 (Fla.1989), the Court reversed a murder conviction because the trial court erroneously sustained objections to testimony that bullets of the same caliber used in the killing were discovered in a codefendant's belongings. Id. at 191-92. Dissenting in part, Justice Grimes stated that he would have granted only a new penalty phase. He concluded that the question of who did the actual shooting directly bears on whether Zerquera should receive the death penalty. Id. at 193 (Grimes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In this case, unlike Barrett and Cooper, in which the jury recommended a life sentence, the trial court followed an eleven-to-one jury recommendation in imposing the death penalty. Further, unlike Downs and Zerquera, the issue here does not concern evidence on the identity of the triggerman excluded by the trial court. These decisions do not compel reconsideration of the Court's 2005 decision in this case or an evidentiary hearing on the present newly discovered evidence claim. In reaching this conclusion, we consider our recent decision in Diaz v. State, 945 So.2d 1136 (Fla.2006), which presented the same issue we now face here. In Diaz, this Court affirmed the summary denial of a newly discovered evidence claim based on an affidavit bearing on the identity of the triggerman in a case involving codefendants. The affiant was a fellow prisoner, Gajus, who had testified against Diaz at trial. Id. at 1146. The Court noted that the affidavit [did] not recant his trial testimony on the critical issue of whether Diaz made a statement about being the shooter, but concluded that even if the Gajus affidavit was considered a recantation of the trial testimony, it would not probably yield a less severe sentence. Id. at 1146-47. In Diaz, the Court relied on its determination in the direct appeal that Diaz's actions made death a proportional punishment under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), and on the postconviction court's specific finding that in the sentencing order the trial judge indicated that whether Diaz was the shooter did not impact the final sentence. Diaz, 945 So.2d at 1147. We also quoted with approval the sentencing order's explanation for rejecting the statutory mitigator that the defendant was a minor participant in the crime. Id. As in Diaz, the trial court in this case found that the death penalty was justified for Van Poyck independent of evidence regarding the identity of the triggerman. The trial court noted that Van Poyck checked the guns to ensure that they were loaded while traveling to the location where the murder occurred, and concluded that [b]y all evidence Mr. Van Poyck was a major participant in the murder. At most, non-triggerman status would have constituted nonstatutory mitigation which, considering the four aggravating factors and absence of other mitigation, would probably not have yielded a lesser sentence. Finally, we address Van Poyck's reliance on Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005). In that case, Stumpf pled guilty to a capital murder committed during a robbery. Id. at 179, 125 S.Ct. 2398. The State argued in Stumpf's sentencing proceeding that he was the triggerman in a murder committed during a robbery, and obtained a sentence of death. As in this case, the prosecutor also asserted that the death penalty was appropriate even if Stumpf was not the shooter, because the circumstances of the robbery provided a basis from which to infer Stumpf's intent to cause death. Id. at 180, 125 S.Ct. 2398. Subsequently, the State obtained information after Stumpf was sentenced that the codefendant, Wesley, admitted to a fellow inmate that he had shot the victim. The prosecution used the inmate's testimony to seek the death penalty in Wesley's trial. Wesley countered this evidence by pointing to the prosecutor's contradictory position in Stumpf's trial and Stumpf's resulting sentence of death. Wesley was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. The Supreme Court determined that the precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to Stumpf's conviction for aggravated murder and reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision voiding Stumpf's guilty plea based on the new evidence. Id. at 187, 125 S.Ct. 2398. However, the Court determined that it is at least arguable that the sentencing panel's conclusion about Stumpf's principal role in the offense was material to its sentencing determination. Id. Because the Court found that it was not clear whether the Court of Appeals would have concluded that Stumpf was entitled to resentencing had the court not also considered the conviction invalid, it remanded for reconsideration of the effect of the inconsistencies on the sentence. Id. Bradshaw is largely limited to its facts and procedural posture. Its mandate was simply to reconsider the effect of the new evidence on the sentence, an issue the lower court had not reached because it had erroneously reversed the conviction. In addition, Bradshaw involves a due process claim grounded in inconsistent positions taken by the prosecution in trials of codefendants, which is not an aspect of this case. [4] To the extent that Bradshaw has any bearing on this case, it stands for the proposition that new evidence concerning the identity of the triggerman is material to a death sentencing determination. This Court's 2005 opinion in this case includes the same acknowledgment: We do not hold . . . that it makes no difference in the capital sentencing process which of two codefendants actually committed the killing. Rather, we determine only that under the circumstances of this case involving a murder of a prison guard in a brutal armed attack planned by Van Poyck and carried out with Valdez, DNA evidence indicating that Van Poyck was not the triggerman would not have created a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence. Van Poyck IV, 908 So.2d at 330. Therefore, Bradshaw does not require reconsideration of the 2005 decision.