Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Aggravating Circumstance Instruction

Text: Capano argues that the aggravating circumstance instruction given to the jury in connection with its sentencing recommendation was erroneous. According to Capano, this instruction defined the relevant aggravating circumstance in such a way as to allow the jury to recommend the death penalty if it found the same degree of intent required to convict of first degree murder. Review of this claim is de novo. [517] We do not agree with Capano's argument because we find that the instruction in this case sufficiently narrowed the class of people eligible for the death sentence. The statutory aggravating circumstance in question is that the murder was premeditated and the result of substantial planning. [518] In making a sentencing recommendation, the jury was required to answer two questions. First, whether this aggravating circumstance existed. [519] Second, whether the aggravating circumstances it found (statutory or nonstatutory) outweighed any mitigating circumstances it found. [520] In this case, the jury found by a vote of 11 to 1 that the statutory aggravating circumstance existed. The jury also found by a vote of 10 to 2 that the aggravating circumstances in the case outweighed the mitigating circumstances also present. [521] The aggravating circumstance instruction delivered by the trial judge to the jury in this case is as follows: This statutory aggravating circumstance requires a finding of premeditation. In order for a murder to be premeditated, the defendant must have thought about it, considered it, or deliberated about it beforehand. The design to kill must arise from the sedate, deliberative process and not a rash or impulsive, though intentional act. This statutory aggravating circumstance also requires that the murder was the result of substantial planning. Substantial planning is planning which is considerable or ample for the commission of the crime. [522] We find no merit in Capano's argument that this instruction fails to distinguish for the jury between the aggravating circumstance of premeditation and substantial planning and the intent element of first degree murder. Due process requires aggravating circumstances to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and ... reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. [523] The aggravating circumstances must permit the sentencer to make a principled distinction between those who deserve the death penalty and those who do not. [524] In determining whether these criteria are met, we find the relevant inquiry to be whether `the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance [in this case, as defined in the jury instructions] applies to every defendant eligible for the death sentence....' [525] The instruction in this case fulfilled these criteria. The instruction defines the aggravating circumstance in a way that excludes intentional killings that are not a result of calm deliberation and preparation. The instruction requires that the planning be substantial, i.e., considerable or ample, not merely the amount of planning necessary for the act resulting in death. [526] Moreover, the instruction specifically excludes killings that are rash or impulsive, though intentional. In contrast, a first degree murder conviction requires only that the killing be intentional. [527] Therefore, Capano's argument is without merit.