Opinion ID: 4549156
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mental and Emotional Health

Text: Respondent-mother also challenges certain findings of fact by the trial court related to the mental and emotional health component of her case plan. After acknowledging respondent-mother’s successful completion of an initial course of psychotherapy with Ms. Hudson in September 2017, the trial court found as follows: 29. The Mother returned to out-patient therapy with Ms. Hudson on May 5, 2018 and was discharged on November 4, 2018 after nine additional sessions. During these sessions, the Mother addressed parenting in the wake of domestic violence and verbalized her understanding of potential issues that might arise for her -15- IN RE K.L.T. Opinion of the Court children due to their exposure to domestic violence. However, the Mother did not discuss with her therapist, Ms. Hudson, that at a prior hearing, in the underlying case, the Mother defended her beliefs about the culpability of her cognitively impaired daughter’s actions regarding the sexual assault by [respondent-father] and concluded her cognitively impaired daughter was partly responsible for the sexual assault. The Mother also failed to discuss her three failed marriages, two of which[ ] were with men who exhibited aggression and subjected the Mother and her children to physical and emotional abuse. The Mother married [respondent-father] just eighteen months after she divorced her second husband. The Mother’s involvement in her current relationship [with Mr. Westray] began prior to her divorce from [respondent-father]. The Mother’s choice in partners and hurried attachments are issues requiring in-depth therapy to avoid repeated mistakes. (Emphases added.) Respondent-mother takes exception to the italicized portions of this finding of fact. In her report dated 16 October 2018, respondent-mother’s therapist, Ms. Hudson, stated that “[i]t is my assessment that [respondent-mother] has engaged in meaningful conversations about the effect that domestic violence has had on her family, as well as the initial concern that she somehow held her then-teenage daughter responsible for the sexual abuse perpetrated by an adult in the home.” Similarly, Ms. Hudson testified at the termination hearing as follows: Q. . . . Did [respondent-mother] tell you that she had come to court and testified that originally she blamed her daughter as part of the reason why her husband, [respondent-father], sexually assaulted her daughter? A. I don’t recall if I learned about that from her or from the [GCDHHS] referral or where I got that information. -16- IN RE K.L.T. Opinion of the Court Q. Did you all talk about it? A. That [it] was a concern, yes. Q. And what did she say? A. That she does not hold her daughter responsible for what happened to her. Q. Did you ask her then why did she testify to that in court? A. We did not discuss her testimony. We were just discussing [the] issue. Respondent-mother testified that she believed with “99 percent” certainty she had, in fact, discussed this issue in therapy with Ms. Hudson and she recalled explaining to Ms. Hudson that she had been “scared at the time just by the nature of the type of person [respondent-father] was.” In any event, even if there was evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact concerning whether respondent-mother and Ms. Hudson specifically discussed her prior testimony regarding the culpability of her daughter for the abuse committed by respondent-father, the undisputed testimony of both respondent-mother and Ms. Hudson demonstrates that they did discuss the key underlying issue that respondent-mother’s daughter was not responsible for the sexual abuse. Respondent-mother next contends that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that her “choice in partners and hurried attachments are issues requiring in-depth therapy to avoid repeated mistakes.” We agree. To be sure, the -17- IN RE K.L.T. Opinion of the Court evidence shows that respondent-mother has been divorced three times and that her two most recent husbands, Mr. L. and respondent-father, were abusive. However, none of the treatment professionals who worked with respondent-mother on the subjects of domestic violence, mental and emotional health, or parenting believed she needed additional treatment in order to avoid such abusive relationships in the future. Moreover, the evidence concerning respondent-mother’s actions since separating from respondent-father in October 2016 does not support a finding that she is in danger of repeating her past mistakes in tolerating domestic violence or abuse. To the contrary, the evidence showed that she took appropriate action by divorcing respondent-father and obtaining a DVPO against him. Respondent-mother also challenges the following finding of fact regarding her therapy: 42. . . . Although the Mother has participated in individual therapy, there is no clear, convincing evidence that the Mother has incorporated the knowledge or techniques obtained through therapy into her everyday life. It is concerning to this [c]ourt that Ms. Hudson, the therapist, indicated that there were pertinent issues that were not discussed during the course of the therapeutic relationship between the Mother and the therapist. The [c]ourt expressed its concern that if the therapist were not given a full, true and complete picture of the issues that led to the juvenile’s removal from the home, those issues and concerns were not addressed and still exist. . . . Once again, we find merit in respondent-mother’s arguments. A faulty premise underlies the trial court’s finding that “there is no clear, convincing evidence” of respondent-mother’s successful integration of the lessons she learned during therapy -18- IN RE K.L.T. Opinion of the Court into her daily life. Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f), it was GCDHHS’s burden—as petitioner—to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence the existence of facts establishing grounds for the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). It was not respondent-mother’s burden to prove that such grounds did not exist. Moreover, evidence was presented that respondent-mother (1) divorced and ceased all contact with respondent-father; (2) relocated from an isolated rural area in Brown Summit, North Carolina, to the city of Greensboro, where she has ready access to transportation (via the city bus system); and (3) cultivated an additional social support network by joining the board of directors of a local disability rights organization. Respondent-mother also devoted many hours—with the assistance of Ms. Hudson—to developing a detailed safety plan for Kirk in anticipation of regaining custody of the child. We discern no evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s assertion that respondent-mother’s progress in therapy was hindered by her failure to discuss with her therapist specific aspects of her CPS history or her past relationships in the precise manner referenced by the trial court. None of respondent-mother’s treatment providers believed she required additional therapy, and their testimony and reports indicate that they addressed with her the issues that led to Kirk’s removal from her custody.