Opinion ID: 1960245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: prior guilty plea.

Text: Appellant next contends that the Commonwealth deliberately referred to his prior guilty plea to a charge of drug trafficking in violation of KRE 404(b), ignoring the trial court's explicit pretrial order that his prior conviction not be admitted into evidence. This objection is best understood in the context in which it occurred. Appellant's counsel called Appellant's daughter to the stand and asked her the following question: Q: Have you ever seen your dad have any illegal drugs in the house? A: No. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked: Q: I believe [Appellant's counsel] asked whether or not you've ever seen your father sell drugs. Is that correct? A: [inaudible]. Q: And your answer was no. Have you ever known him to sell? A: No. Q: Do you know why he pled guilty (pause). Let me approach your honor. Appellant's counsel and the prosecutor approached the bench and the following colloquy ensued: Pros: Your honor I think they opened the door on asking with regard to his previous conviction for the sale of LSD and simulated controlled substance. I thought I better approach before I got into that line of questioning. Counsel: Judge, the entire reason that Mr. Johnson is here today is because he's being accused of being a drug dealer. He was charged with two counts of trafficking. Asking my witness whether or not she's ever seen the defendant trafficking controlled substances as related to these charges, it does not open the door to his past conduct. Furthermore, [the prosecutor's] stating in the presence of the jury, why did your dad plead guilty .... Pros: That's the reason I stopped in the middle, judge. Before I got into it. I do think he opened the door. I think by the defense asking that question as to try to make him out as not being someone who sold drugs when in fact he's pled guilty on that charge within the last ten years prior to this. Counsel: Further, judge, we stipulated at the beginning of this case that Mr. Johnson's prior record would not be brought up provided he did not take the stand. He has not taken the stand. Court: Well, the question [inaudible]. But the intent was on this particular charge, the question that you asked her, I think the intent was that did she see him sell recently or around the time that these charges arose. I think we would probably be better off if we didn't get into his prior convictions. You know how the Supreme Court dislikes that in that line of cases. So let's move on. Counsel: Judge, I'd also ask for an instruction for the jury to disregard [the prosecutor's] statement about pleading guilty to anything. Pros: I didn't get into any type of charge. I'm glad I stopped. Court: I'll give the admonition if you really want it. Counsel: Yes I do. Court: But you are calling attention to the fact. Pros: That's a double-edged sword. Counsel: Yeah, I know it's a double-edged sword. But at this point the jury's already heard it. It's already been done. Court: You can plead guilty to almost anything. [inaudible]. My admonition will be to disregard the last question. Whether Mr. Johnson has pled guilty to any offense has no bearing on whether he is guilty of this offense. Counsel: That would be fine. That's what I want. The Court then gave the following admonition: Court: Ladies and gentlemen. Mr. Coleman started to ask Ms. Johnson if Mr. Johnson, the defendant, had ever pled guilty. He stopped at that point. You all disregard that particular question and the fact that Mr. Johnson may have pled guilty to any offense at any other time. It's not evidence or an indication that he's guilty of the offenses for which he's on trial here today of trafficking marijuana and trafficking methamphetamine or those four counts we are here for today which will be set out in the instructions for you. Appellant now contends that despite the trial court's admonition the Commonwealth's mention of an unspecified guilty plea entitles him to a new trial under KRE 404(b). We disagree. The trial court's admonition put this issue to rest. A jury is presumed to follow an admonition to disregard evidence and the admonition thus cures any error. Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473, 485 (1999) (holding that there is nothing for us to review when trial court cured the Commonwealth's reference to defendant's prior incarceration for an unspecified crime and the defendant failed to present any argument to rebut the presumption that the trial court's admonition cured the error.). See also Maxie v. Commonwealth, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 860, 863 (2002); Alexander v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1993), overruled on other grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 883 (1997). There are only two circumstances in which the presumptive efficacy of an admonition falters: (1) when there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court's admonition and there is a strong likelihood that the effect of the inadmissible evidence would be devastating to the defendant, Alexander, supra, at 859; or (2) when the question was asked without a factual basis and was inflammatory or highly prejudicial. Derossett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 867 S.W.2d 195, 198 (1993); Bowler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 558 S.W.2d 169, 171 (1977). Neither exception applies here. The question had a factual basis, i.e., Appellant had, in fact, previously pled guilty to a controlled substance offense. Nor was there an overwhelming probability that the jury would be unable to follow the admonition. The jury heard the prosecutor ask only, Do you know why he pled guilty .... Let me approach your honor. The jury could have assumed that the prosecutor was referring to, e.g., a speeding ticket, or that the prosecutor asked to approach the bench because he suddenly realized that he could not prove that Appellant had ever pled guilty to anything. Moreover, no further relief was requested after the admonition was given, i.e., there was no request for a further admonition or a mistrial. Appellant received all the relief he requested (That would be fine. That's what I want.); thus, there is no error to review. Mills, supra, at 485; Curtis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (1971). Even if there had been no admonition, it is doubtful we would find reversible error. The daughter's testimony that she had never seen [her] dad have any illegal drugs in the house was inadmissible character evidence. [C]haracter can be proven only by evidence of general reputation or by opinion, not by specific instances of conduct. Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 32 (1998). [2] Thus, the daughter's testimony opened the door, if only slightly, to inquiry on cross-examination as to specific instances of conduct. KRE 405(b). See Commonwealth v. Higgs, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 886, 894 (2001) (noting Commonwealth's ability to rebut even proper KRE 405(a) evidence). Cf. Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 1.10 at 30-33 (3d ed. Michie 1993) (introduction of inadmissible evidence by one party opens the door to the introduction of inadmissible evidence by the other party that negates, explains or counterbalances the prior inadmissible fact, especially when the initial inadmissible evidence is prejudicial); United States v. Jansen, 475 F.2d 312, 315-16 (7th Cir.1973) (defendant's inadmissible good character testimony that he had never committed a crime opened the door to prosecution's evidence that he had been convicted of several misdemeanors).