Opinion ID: 199263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Special Permit Issuance Procedure

Text: 8 Appellants' principal contention is that the Wellfleet Planning Board acted outside the scope of its authority in issuing the special permit to Omnipoint pursuant to its negotiated settlement, rather than according to the procedures prescribed by state zoning law. Their brief cites extensively to Massachusetts cases holding that a planning board's decision to grant an application for a previously denied special permit is invalid if it was not preceded by a fresh round of public notice and hearing. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, and draw factual inferences in the light most favorable to appellants. Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1999). 9 We start from the uncontroverted premise that the Planning Board violated the TCA when it rejected the initial special-permit request based on the potential health risks posed by the telecommunications equipment, in spite of its acknowledgment that Omnipoint had satisfied all criteria of Wellfleet's zoning bylaws. The Board essentially admitted as much when it entered into a negotiated settlement with Omnipoint and agreed to issue, without further process, a permit it had already denied. Because the TCA does not expressly state the remedy to be ordered for violations of its substantive provisions, 3 the district court, in ruling on the Wellfleet citizens' suit, could have either endorsed the Planning Board's direct issuance of the permit, or required that the Board hold further hearings on the matter. In ratifying the settlement agreement, the district court chose the course followed by the majority of courts in comparable situations: awarding injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring that the wrongfully withheld permit issue. 4 See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). 10 Several factors counsel the adoption of this approach. First and foremost, the TCA provision that provides a cause of action in this setting places a premium on the speedy resolution of such proceedings, directing district courts to hear and decide such action[s] on an expedited basis. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v); see also Town of Amherst, 173 F.3d at 17 n.8 (Congress made clear [in § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)] that it expected expeditious resolution both by the local [zoning] authorities and by courts called upon to enforce the federal limitations [under the TCA].). An award of injunctive relief, rather than a remand for further proceedings, best fulfills this statutory goal. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d at 497. Second, in cases such as this one, where a planning board knows to a relatively high degree of certainty that its earlier denial of a special permit is violative of the TCA, it is not unreasonable for the board to settle with the applicant on the terms most favorable to the town rather than to engage in litigation doomed from the start. As we have previously noted, such settlements are fully consistent with the TCA's aims. See Town of Amherst, 173 F.3d at 17 ([I]t is in the common interest of [planning boards] and [telecommunications providers] to find ways to permit the siting of towers in a way most congenial to local zoning.). Requiring further hearings for the sole purpose of revisiting the underlying validity of the permit application would complicate the settlement process and delay the ultimate resolution of the zoning dispute. Finally, appellants have identified no practical benefit to sending the matter back to the Planning Board in order to have that body hold a hearing destined to result in the issuance of the special permit. Because all relevant evidence was adduced at the initial hearing -- after all, the Planning Board unanimously found that Omnipoint's request satisfied the town zoning bylaws in all respects -- a remand to the Planning Board would serve no useful purpose. Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 181 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). For all of these reasons, we find that the applicable law does not require that the Planning Board hold further hearings in a TCA case before issuing the special permit. 5 11 Appellants claim that even if the district court correctly ordered the issuance of the special permit for the Planning Board's TCA violation, the court should have nonetheless followed Massachusetts zoning law by requiring that the permit only be issued after a new round of public notice and hearing. But we believe that the state law that might ordinarily control such disputes is preempted in this setting, for similar reasons as those favoring injunctive relief in the first place. Having determined that Congress meant to empower district courts to order that town planning board decisions in violation of § 332(b)(7)(C) be set aside, it would make little sense to further conclude that courts exercising that authority must do so within the confines of state zoning procedure. Under the TCA, local zoning ordinances, such as those invoked by appellants, apply only to the extent that they do not interfere with other provisions of the Act. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D. Mass. 1997). In this case, a remand for further hearings, which appellants claim Massachusetts law requires, would accomplish nothing more than opening up for public debate the issue of whether the Planning Board should comply with the terms of the settlement agreement it had entered into (not to mention the consent decree embodying that settlement). 6 Patterson v. Omnipoint Communications, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 222, 228 (D. Mass. 2000); cf. Roberts v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 709 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Mass. 1999) (Congress certainly intended to protect providers of [personal wireless] services from irrational or substanceless decisions by local authorities who might bend to community opposition to these facilities.). 7 As such, Massachusetts law requiring a remand for further proceedings under these circumstances (if, indeed, such is the law) stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), and is consequently preempted by the TCA. 12 Appellants make a final equitable argument that this method of awarding special permits, which they describe as being worked out by the adepts in secret away from the gaze of the citizens of Wellfleet to protect the mystery, is fundamentally unfair in that it effectively shuts them out of the permitting process. We cannot agree with this characterization of the process followed, as appellants had the opportunity to intervene, and fully assert their rights, in the suit brought by Omnipoint against the Planning Board that ultimately led to the settlement agreement. Appellants failed, however, to avail themselves of that opportunity. We find that their belated attempt now to use Massachusetts zoning procedure to undo the settlement agreement is precluded by the TCA. 8