Opinion ID: 2076741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Suppression of Evidence

Text: Raising their challenge to the conduct of the police and wardens only under the United States Constitution, defendants moved to suppress the marijuana found in Bag 1, the marijuana found in Bag 2, and the marijuana and drug paraphernalia found in the house. The Superior Court suppressed the marijuana in Bag 1, finding that Warden Annis was within the curtilage of the Storers' home when he seized it without a warrant. The court also suppressed the evidence found during the search of the Storers' house, concluding that the warrant was tainted by the unlawful seizure of the marijuana found [in Bag 1] within the [Storers'] curtilage. The court did not, however, suppress the marijuana that Warden Annis and Investigator Bickford found in Bag 2 across the road from the Storers' house, holding that the Storers had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that area and that the discovery and seizure of this bag was not dependent on the seizure of the first bag.
We turn first to the Superior Court's suppression of the evidence seized in the Storers' house pursuant to the search warrant. In this application of the exclusionary rule, the court suppressed as the fruits of the poisonous tree evidence that the police and wardens had obtained as a result of an illegal seizure of Bag 1. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415-16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The rationale for extending the exclusionary rule to this type of evidence is to deter police from furthering an investigation by engaging in illegal conduct. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508-09, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). On the other hand, [w]hen the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation. Id. at 443, 104 S.Ct. at 2509. Consequently, the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule allows admission of evidence which was gained through an independent source as well as the tainted source. United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 740 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233, 108 S.Ct. 2897, 101 L.Ed.2d 931 (1988); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2533, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988); United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 602-04 (1st Cir.1985), vacated on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 2241, 90 L.Ed.2d 688 (1986). Because the police's discovery of the marijuana in Bag 2 did not result from the illegal seizure of Bag 1 and it thus provided an independent basis for the search warrant, the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the evidence obtained during the search of the Storers' house. Probable cause for issuing the search warrant was based in part on the marijuana found in Bag 1 and in part on the marijuana found in Bag 2. The Superior Court found that Mrs. Storer had thrown Bag 2 outside the Storers' curtilage and that it had been legally retrieved by Warden Annis and Investigator Bickford. In this situation the court should have excised from the affidavit used to obtain the warrant all the information it believed had been illegally obtained and then should have determined whether the magistrate would have had probable cause to issue the warrant relying solely on the remaining information. See United States v. Veillette, 778 F.2d 899, 903-04 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 106 S.Ct. 1970, 90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986). Upon doing so, one readily concludes that Bag 1 was unnecessary to the probable cause showing and that the warrant would have issued even if Bag 1 had not been seized. The indisputably legal seizure of Bag 2 provided the magistrate with ample grounds to issue the search warrant and constituted an independent source for the evidence found in the house during the search pursuant to the warrant.
In its challenge to the suppression of Bag 1, the State argues that the Superior Court committed clear error in finding that Warden Annis seized that bag from within the curtilage of the Storers' house. Because the search warrant in any event would not be invalidated by the illegality of the seizure of Bag 1, we need not review the court's factual finding of the extent of the Storers' curtilage. Instead, the dispositive question is whether Bag 1 should be admitted on the ground that it would ultimately or inevitably have been discovered even if no violation of any constitutional ... provision had taken place. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 434, 104 S.Ct. at 2504. The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule derives from the independent source doctrine, but it differs in that the question is not whether the police did in fact acquire certain evidence by reliance upon an untainted source but instead whether evidence found because of a Fourth Amendment violation would inevitably have been discovered lawfully. 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.4(a), at 378 (2d ed. 1987); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. at 539, 108 S.Ct. at 2534 ([t]he inevitable discovery doctrine ... is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered (emphasis in original)). The purpose of the two exceptions to the exclusionary rule are exactly the same: to prevent an earlier act that violated a constitutional right from undermining an investigation based on other, legal sources of information. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. at 2509. In order for the inevitable discovery exception to apply, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. Id.; see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. at 543, 108 S.Ct. at 2536. The record compels a finding that the State has made that showing. Even if Warden Annis could not have legally seized Bag 1 without a warrant, he did nothing illegal in watching Mrs. Storer from a position plainly outside the curtilage and seeing her deposit Bag 1 away from the house. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1141, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987). With that observation and the knowledge that Bag 2 containing marijuana was thrown minutes later into the woods across the road from the front of the house, the officers conducting the search would have gone directly to Bag 1 once they had the warrant in hand. The warrant authorized them to search the Storers' entire premises, including their outbuildings and curtilage.