Opinion ID: 780695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Common-Law Claims

Text: 17 The plaintiffs' state-law claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit were dismissed on summary judgment. Thus, we review this issue de novo to determine whether the substantive law has been correctly applied. Republic Nat'l Bank of New York v. Delta Air Lines, 263 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir.2001). 18 The construction projects were federally funded and the contracts specifically provided that the DBA applied. The DBA requires that all laborers and mechanics working on federally funded construction projects be paid not less than the prevailing wage in the locality where the work is performed. 40 U.S.C. § 276a. Although the Supreme Court has not considered whether the DBA confers a private right of action on an aggrieved employee for back wages, the great weight of authority indicates that it does not. See, e.g., Operating Eng'rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir.1998); Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir.1993); Weber v. Heat Control Co., 728 F.2d 599, 599-600 (3d Cir.1984). 19 In Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.1993), this Court indicated that a private right of action does not exist under the DBA. Id. at 102. In Chan, laborers under municipal contracts sued the contractor, the City of New York and the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development for back wages alleging that they were not paid prevailing wages as required — not by the DBA — but by the Housing Community and Development Act (HCDA). Id. at 99. 20 In determining that no private right of action exists under HCDA, we found an analogy in Congress' adoption of the DBA's regulatory scheme providing administrative remedies. Id. at 102. The Court determined that, although there is no statement that the administrative remedies are exclusive, there is simply no indication that, along with the cited regulatory mechanism, Congress intended to authorize private suits. Id. 21 It is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional remedies. Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 533, 109 S.Ct. 1282, 103 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989) (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979)). In such cases, [i]n the absence of strong indicia of contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. Id. (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 Although the Court in Chan found that a civil rights action for the violation of the minimum wage provision was available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court differentiated between a private right of action conferred by statute and an action under § 1983. Id. at 103. The Court noted the § 1983 inquiry begins with a presumption in favor of the right to bring suit, for the `general rule' is that § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutory rights unless `Congress has affirmatively withdrawn the remedy.' Id. (quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)). 23 Here, the plaintiffs did not bring a § 1983 action. Nor did they allege claims directly under the DBA, but instead brought state-law claims for breach of contract as third party beneficiaries of the contracts and for quantum meruit. Unlike claims brought under § 1983, there is no presumption in favor of a right to bring suit for such common law claims. 24 At bottom, the plaintiffs' state-law claims are indirect attempts at privately enforcing the prevailing wage schedules contained in the DBA. To allow a third-party private contract action aimed at enforcing those wage schedules would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme and would interfere with the implementation of that scheme to the same extent as would a cause of action directly under the statute. Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 677, 680 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting common law contract claim as end-run around statute on remand after this Court held the Vocational Rehabilitation Act provided no private right of action). 25 The plaintiffs rely almost exclusively on the New York Court of Appeals case of Fata v. S.A. Healy Co., 289 N.Y. 401, 46 N.E.2d 339 (1943), for the proposition that, consistent with § 220 of the New York Labor Law employees can bring parallel actions seeking recovery of wages both under an administrative structure and through common-law remedies. However, the present contracts between the defendants and the NYCHA were federally funded and, as such, are governed by the prevailing wage requirements set forth in the DBA, not by § 220 of the New York Labor Law. Since in this case, unlike in Fata, no private right of action exists under the relevant statute, the plaintiffs efforts to bring their claims as state common-law claims are clearly an impermissible end run around the DBA.