Opinion ID: 2598207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our 1997 Professional Engineers Decision

Text: Our decision in Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th 585, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, provides a further indication that pre-Proposition 35 statutes regulating private contracting were constrained by article VII limitations. In Professional Engineers, we declined to overrule the decisional law that had inferred article VII's restriction on private contracting, and rejected legislative attempts to expand Caltrans's authority to contract with private entities for architectural and engineering services beyond the limits permitted by the exceptions to article VII. Professional Engineers had its genesis in a 1986 lawsuit brought by Professional Engineers to enjoin Caltrans from contracting with private entities to carry out state highway projects traditionally performed by civil service employees. The 1986 litigation resulted in a permanent injunction, issued in 1990, prohibiting Caltrans from (1) contracting privately for engineering and inspection services for highway projects unless the work was to be performed in compliance with the then existing criteria set forth in section 14101 and former section 14130 et seq.; (2) entering into cooperative agreements with local entities when private entities were to perform part or all of the work; and (3) awarding contracts to private entities for construction survey staking. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 554, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) In response to the injunction, the Legislature adopted chapter 433. (Stats.1993, ch. 433, p. 2448.) Chapter 433 amended section 14130 in order (1) to allow Caltrans 'continued flexibility' to contract privately as needed to assure timely delivery of its projects; and (2) to afford `a new and independent basis upon which to justify contracting out actions.' ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 552, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) Among its provisions, the amendment to section 14130 stated that the use of private consultants was necessary to increase Caltrans's project delivery on state highway construction projects; that its use of consultants to assist project delivery was a new state function; and that Caltrans was not required to use existing state employees or hire new staff to meet the goals set forth in the chapter. ( Id., at pp. 552-553, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) Following the enactment of chapter 433, Caltrans sought to dissolve the 1990 injunction barring its use of private contractors except as permitted by established exceptions to article VII. The trial court declined to do so. It concluded that Chapter 433's legislative findings and directives are `obviously erroneous, unreasonable and inconsistent with the constitutional civil service mandate,' and for that reason the provisions are unconstitutional to the extent they purport to authorize Caltrans to contact privately without a factual showing that the contract is permissible under applicable constitutional principles. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 557, (53 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) A divided Court of Appeal disagreed and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to dissolve the injunction. We granted review. Caltrans asked us to overrule the body of decisional law originating with State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Riley, supra, 9 Cal.2d 126, 69 P.2d 985, that had construed article VII as a restriction on private contracting arid developed the exceptions to the restriction. Caltrans argued that ballot arguments made in connection with the predecessor provision to article VII demonstrated that the provision was only intended to implement merit as the basis of appointments and promotion in state service, but was silent on the issue of outside contracting. We declined to disapprove this body of law. As an analytical matter, Riley's rule seems appropriate to assure that the state civil service is not neglected, diminished, or destroyed through routine appointments to `independent contractors' made solely on the basis of political considerations and cronyism. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 563-564, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that Riley's constitutional interpretation was originally flawed, under settled rules of construction we must presume that Riley's interpretation was preserved and reincorporated into the Constitution on two subsequent occasions when (1) in 1970, the voters reenacted an amended version of former article XXIV pursuant to the recommendation of the California Constitution Revision Commission, and (2) in 1976, the voters adopted the substance of former article XXIV as new article VII. ( Id., at p. 564, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) Addressing Caltrans's various policy reasons for urging this court to overrule the case law at issue, we observed that although these reasons, if factually based, might support a constitutional amendment to clarify, or indeed abrogate, the private contracting restriction, they offer no solid ground for ignoring traditional principles of stare decisis. ( Id., at p. 566, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) We then turned to the question of whether chapter 433 affords an independent basis for overturning the trial court's injunction and enforcement orders. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 568, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) In answering this question we observed that [m]ost provisions of Chapter 433 appear intended to dispense with, rather than to satisfy, the constitutional civil service mandate. ( Id., at p. 570, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) We observed that certain new subdivisions of the amended version of section 14130 that conflicted with the civil service mandate were unsupported by express or implied findings or by any evidentiary support. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, [w]e conclude[d] that Chapter 433 contains no express or implied findings sufficient on their face to justify dissolving the trial court's injunction. To the extent Chapter 433's provisions conflict with the civil service mandate, they are invalid. ( Id., at p. 572, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) Proposition 35 expressly removed all article VII restrictions on the ability of government entities to contract out for architectural and engineering services. We turn now to the question of whether Proposition 35 also impliedly repealed statutes regulating private contracting that were enacted with the article VII restrictions in mind, particularly sections 14101, 14130 et seq., and 19130.