Opinion ID: 1177499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted Unconstitutionality of Committing Persons Who Are in Imminent Danger of Becoming Addicted

Text: Defendant makes a two-pronged attack on the constitutionality of involuntary commitment of persons who by reason of the repeated use of narcotics are in imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcotics (see Pen. Code, § 6500). He first contends that the subject language is unconstitutionally vague in that it assertedly provides no ascertainable standard for measuring the degree of addiction or immanency of addiction that will be sufficient to support a commitment to the rehabilitation program; secondly, defendant urges that even if this category could be adequately defined, the police power of the State cannot constitutionally be extended to place in involuntary quarantine persons who are not actually afflicted with the disease of narcotics addiction but are only in imminent danger thereof. This is the first case to come before us which squarely presents both issues. In each of the previous commitment cases before this court (beginning with In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 134) the defendant was found to be an addict and was committed as such; here, by contrast, the reports and testimony of the examining physicians established unequivocally that defendant was not then and had never been hooked or addicted in the strict sense of the word, so much so that the question of whether defendant was an addict was not even submitted to the jury. Yet defendant was found to be in imminent danger of becoming addicted by the same examining physicians, by the committing court, and by the reviewing jury, and was expressly committed to the California Rehabilitation Center on that basis. Thus the factual distinction between the two grounds of commitment could not be more clearly presented. Resolution of these issues, moreover, is a matter of substantial importance to the operation of the narcotic commitment program as a whole, for the subject language (or its variant, in imminent danger of addiction) is used throughout the commitment provisions of this legislation (Pen. Code, §§ 6450, 6451, 6500, 6504, 6506), in the statutory declaration of intent (Pen. Code, § 6399), and in the sections creating the narcotic addict rehabilitation facility (Pen. Code, §§ 6400, 6551). In these circumstances we address ourselves to the issues raised by the challenged language. Asserted unconstitutional vagueness of the phrase in imminent danger of becoming addicted. This question was briefly touched on in In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 153 [16a-16b], where we observed (at p. 153 [17]) that Words used in a statute are ordinarily to be construed according to the context and `the approved usage of the language' (Civ. Code, § 13), and `a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs words of long usage or with a common law meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ' [citation]. We adhere to those rules; but as the petitioner in De La O was found to be  and was committed as  an addict rather than one in imminent danger of becoming addicted, we had no occasion in that case to define the latter phrase more fully. The occasion is now presented. The words imminent danger are words of long usage, both in everyday speech and in the law. Reflecting common understanding, the dictionary defines imminent as Ready to take place; near at hand; impending; hanging threateningly over one's head; menacingly near. (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3rd ed. 1961), p. 1130.) [14] And in various contexts the courts have followed common usage and the lexicographers in construing the terms imminent or in imminent danger (see cases collected at 42 C.J.S., p. 394, fns. 19-27; 20 Words & Phrases, pp. 215-225); for example, in applying the sudden peril doctrine in the law of torts (see Leo v. Dunham (1953) 41 Cal.2d 712, 714 [1] [264 P.2d 1]) it is often held that to be imminent the danger must be `certain, immediate, and impending; it may not be remote, uncertain or contingent. A likelihood or bare possibility of injury is not sufficient to create imminent peril.' ( Ornder v. Childers (Mo. 1959) 327 S.W.2d 913, 916 [3].) These various shades of meaning all share a common element: i.e., the proximity of the event that is said to be imminent. Defendant recognizes that the foregoing represents the commonly understood meaning of this language, but argues that there are so many degrees of proximity that in any given case one cannot be certain of how close is imminent. The argument, in the circumstances of the case at bench, is untenable. Admittedly the word is to some extent a relative one; but the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. ( Nash v. United States (1913) 229 U.S. 373, 377 [33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed. 1232].) The language here in issue is, if anything, more restricted in scope than many other terms that have been upheld by our courts against a challenge that they were void for vagueness. (See, e.g., Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Court (1932) 214 Cal. 668, 675 [8] - 678 [13] [8 P.2d 140, 80 A.L.R. 1217] [diligent effort to find the owner]; People v. Associated Oil Co. (1930) 211 Cal. 93, 107-108 [7] [294 P. 717] [unreasonable waste of natural gas]; Ex parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636, 646 [5] - 647 [6] [192 P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172] [unsafe and unreasonable rate of speed]; People v. Curtiss (1931) 116 Cal. App. Supp. 771, 778 [2] - 781 [5] [300 P. 801] [unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering]; People v. Crossan (1927) 87 Cal. App. 5, 9-10 [2] [261 P. 531] [due caution and circumspection]; People v. Smith (1939) 36 Cal. App.2d Supp. 748, 751-752 [2] [92 P.2d 1039] [a wilful or a wanton disregard for safety].) [24] It follows, pursuant to the rules stated above, that the presence of an element of degree in the definition of imminent danger does not of itself render the statutory language insufficiently certain to comply with due process. [25] `Reasonable certainty is all that is required. A statute will not be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given its language.' [Citation.] It will be upheld if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to other definable sources. ( American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Education (1963) 59 Cal.2d 203, 218 [9] [28 Cal. Rptr. 700, 379 P.2d 4].) A primary source of definition is the context of the questioned language (Civ. Code, § 13), i.e., imminent danger of becoming addicted.  Little guidance is to be derived, unfortunately, from the various statutory definitions of the word addict that have been promulgated over the years (see, e.g., present Pen. Code, § 6407; present and former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350; former Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11009 and 11720; Stats. 1927, ch. 89, § 2, p. 150). Their changing content reflects an understandable hesitancy and experimentation on the part of the Legislature in defining what is primarily a medical concept, but it precludes us from distilling any consistent pattern of statutory expression. [15] Turning to the case law, in In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 153 [16a-16b], we analogized to the use of the word addicted in Vehicle Code section 23105 (It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the use ... of narcotic drugs ... to drive a vehicle upon any highway), which word had been held to mean simply accustomed or habituated to the use of narcotics ( People v. Kimbley (1961) 189 Cal. App.2d 300, 307 [10] [11 Cal. Rptr. 519]). In De La O, however, we were not in fact concerned with the presently relevant category of persons who by reason of repeated use of narcotics are in imminent danger of becoming addicted. [26] Yet if reasonably possible we must construe this legislation so as to harmonize its provisions and give force and effect to every phrase thereof. ( Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [2-3] [335 P.2d 672].) In common parlance one who is accustomed or habituated to the use of narcotics would tend to take them usually or frequently (see In re Newbern (1960) 53 Cal.2d 786, 794 [13-14] [3 Cal. Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116]). But if the word addicted is to be thus defined in the language of the narcotic commitment law now in issue, that language would purport to authorize commitment of those who by reason of repeated use of narcotics are in imminent danger of using narcotics usually or frequently. Not only would such a construction verge on redundancy, it would also revive the spectre of unconstitutional vagueness (see In re Newbern (1960) supra, 53 Cal.2d 786, 792 [9] - 797 [16b]; McMurtry v. State Board of Medical Examiners (1960) 180 Cal. App.2d 760, 766 [1] - 772 [12c] [4 Cal. Rptr. 910]). Because we are bound to prefer a constitutional to an unconstitutional construction of an act of the Legislature ( County of Madera v. Gendron (1963) 59 Cal.2d 798, 801 [4] [31 Cal. Rptr. 302, 382 P.2d 342]), it becomes appropriate to reconsider the definition of addict in the light of the particular statutory language now in issue. [27] In creating a distinct category of persons who by reason of repeated use of narcotics are in imminent danger of becoming addicted, the Legislature has in effect recognized the fundamental medical fact that narcotics addiction is not so much an event as a process. [28] Judicial recognition is likewise shown in People v. Jaurequi (1956) 142 Cal. App.2d 555, 561 [11] [298 P.2d 896], where it was said that The court will take judicial notice of the fact that the inordinate use of a narcotic drug tends to create an irresistible craving and forms a habit for its continued use until one becomes an addict (italics added). [29] Certainly mere sampling or experimentation does not make an addict; but it could be a step in the process. [30] Among the identifiable stages in this process may be listed the following: (1) introduction to and initial experimentation with the drug; (2) joy popping or occasional use to satisfy personal gratification or social pressures; (3) increasingly frequent use coincident with development of a growing degree of emotional dependence on the drug; (4) bodily reaction to such use by development of increasing physical tolerance; (5) temporary cessation (whether voluntary or not) of use of the drug, resulting in manifestation of physical dependence in the form of withdrawal symptoms; (6) realization by the user of the fact that it was his failure to maintain his intake of the drug that caused the withdrawal distress; (7) continuing use of the drug thereafter for the conscious and primary purpose of forestalling or alleviating withdrawal distress; and (8) concomitant side-effects, such as the tendency towards lowering of the user's anxiety threshold so that normal (nonaddict) instances of nervousness or discomfort become misinterpreted as signs of an impending withdrawal experience and hence increase even further the user's recourse to and dependence on the drug. (See Proceedings of the Institute on the Problem of Narcotics Addiction (1962) pp. 61-72; Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease? (Joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association on Narcotic Drugs) (1961) pp. 35-45; Winick, Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment (1957) 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 9, 10-14; Clausen, Social and Psychological Factors in Narcotics Addiction (1957) 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 34, 48-50; The Narcotic Problem (1954) 1 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 405, 426-429.) [31] The emphasized terms should be further explained. While no single definition of addiction may be satisfactory for all purposes, there is general agreement that abuse of an addictive depressant drug (e.g., morphine, heroin, codeine, and other opium derivatives; at least certain of the morphinelike synthetic analgesics and the barbiturates and similar hypnotics) will tend to produce in the user the three characteristic mental and physical responses of the addiction process: i.e., emotional dependence, tolerance, and physical dependence. Much has been written about these phenomena, and it appears that much is yet to be learned before they are fully understood. For our present needs, however, it will be enough to mention the following salient features of each: Emotional dependence appears to be the result of a complex interaction of such factors as (1) deficiency or inadequacy of the preaddicted personality of the user; (2) initial effectiveness of the drug in relieving the user's feelings of insecurity or anxiety, whatever their source; (3) assimilation of the user into a drug-oriented group in which the conventional moral disapproval of narcotic abuse is rejected as square, the pleasures of drug effects are overvalued, and rationalizations are provided to allay fears of becoming hooked; and (4) progressive substitution of drug intake for normal forms of adaptive behavior until the user comes to believe the drug is the one and only panacea for all his real or imagined ills. (See Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease? op. cit. supra, pp. 50-64; Clausen, Social and Psychological Factors in Narcotics Addiction (1957) 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 34, 38-50.) These and other factors may of course be of varying importance in any given case, according to the individual's psychological makeup and his familial and social environment; but it is generally agreed that when the stage of full emotional dependence has been reached, the user lives in a state of overpowering need or compulsion to periodically experience the effects of the drug and hence that its continued use becomes the primary support of and motive for his existence. [16] The remaining two elements of the addiction process have been adequately described as follows (Proceedings, White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse (1962), pp. 277-278): Tolerance is a fundamental survival mechanism which permits body cells to be exposed continuously to toxic substances without evoking possibly dangerous responses. This is manifested by the phenomenon that successive doses of the same amount of drug produce lesser effects and that, conversely, larger and larger doses are necessary to achieve the effects of the first dose. Following repeated use, brain and other tissues become resistant to morphine and, to a lesser extent, to alcohol, barbiturates, and other depressants. Equivalent doses no longer relieve pain as effectively, nor do they depress respiration or produce euphoric effects to the same degree. In order to reestablish the desired effects larger doses are required. But additional tolerance is acquired to the larger doses until, ultimately, amounts of the drug ordinarily capable of producing lethal respiratory failure cause only minimal effects.... ... With repeated administration and increasing doses, the brain is exposed to the concentration of a drug necessary for development of maximum physical dependence.  Physical dependence, a state of latent hyperexcitability, develops in the cells of the central nervous system of higher mammals following frequent and prolonged administration of morphinelike analgesics, alcohol, barbiturates, and other depressants. It becomes apparent in specific subjective and objective symptoms and signs  the abstinence syndrome or the withdrawal illness  upon abrupt termination of drug administration.... The type of physical dependence which occurs with morphine is a unique biological phenomenon and occurs only ... [with] the morphinelike analgesics. A different picture of dependence occurs with alcohol and the barbiturates. Although the mechanisms are not fully understood, they undoubtedly involve a biochemical adaptation in the central nervous system. During the continued administration of the drug no overt signs of physical dependence are observed. The abstinence syndrome, which appears following cessation of drug administration, involves a resurgence of activity of the nervous system. [17] [32] To recognize that addiction is more a process than an event is also to clarify the scope of the challenged category of persons who by reason of repeated use of narcotics are in imminent danger of becoming addicted. On the one hand, an individual may not escape an inquiry into his addictive status merely by showing that he is not yet hooked in the strict sense of the word. On the other, to be brought within this category it is not enough that the individual be addiction-prone, or associate with addicts, or even have begun to experiment with drugs; he must have subjected himself to repeated use of narcotics. [18] [33] Defendant's argument that repeated use can theoretically mean as few as twice is unreasonable when the phrase is seen in the context of the whole addiction process, for At least several weeks of experience with a drug are usually necessary for the development of an addiction. (Winick, Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment (1957) 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 9, 13.) Nor is it enough that the individual have thus repeatedly used narcotics, or even be accustomed or habituated to their use, unless such repeated use or habituation has reached the point that he is in imminent danger  in the commonsense meaning of that phrase discussed above  of becoming emotionally or physically dependent on their use. [34] Asserted lack of constitutional power to quarantine persons who are in imminent danger of addiction. This corollary contention falls with the first, for the necessary power flows from the nature of the addiction process itself and the wording of the controlling statutes. As construed hereinabove, the legislation is not vulnerable to defendant's charge that it subjects to narcotic commitment proceedings individuals who simply suffer from personality disturbances or predisposition towards addiction. [35] The legislation does not reach such persons until by repeated acts of obtaining, preparing, and ingesting an addictive drug they demonstrate that they have failed to resolve their problems by socially acceptable methods and that total addiction is just a matter of time. When that stage is reached, the state has the right and duty to intervene for the protection of the individual in question and of society at large. There is no novelty in such timely intervention to minimize at the imminent stage the personal and social damage which could only be more grievous with total addiction. In almost identical language Health and Safety Code section 11751 empowers the Adult Authority to retake a parolee and place him in a narcotic treatment-control unit when it has reasonable ground to believe that the parolee is addicted to, or is in imminent danger of addiction to, narcotics (see also Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11750, 11752, 11753). Similarly, the law relating to sexual psychopaths (now called mentally disturbed sex offenders) authorizes post-conviction civil commitment proceedings if by reason of mental defect or disease the individual is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses dangerous to others (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5500 et seq.). Again, commitment is authorized under the different category of mentally abnormal sex offenders if the individual has evidenced a total lack of self-control and hence is likely to commit sexual attacks (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5600 et seq.). And commitment is authorized of a mentally defective or psychopathic minor who is an habitual delinquent or has tendencies toward becoming an habitual delinquent (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 7050 et seq.). The constitutionality of sexual psychopath laws, of course, has been upheld ( Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court (1940) 309 U.S. 270, 274-276 [60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744, 126 A.L.R. 530]), and no reason is shown to doubt the validity of the other cited statutes. [36] Finally, in delineating the subject category of persons amenable to civil commitment the Legislature has struck a reasonable balance between the interest in safeguarding the constitutional rights of the individual to be committed (when the statutory language is construed as indicated herein) and the interest in promoting the beneficial goals of this legislation, i.e., the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of narcotics addicts (see Pen. Code, § 6399; In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 148 [12]). Those goals are at best difficult to achieve in many cases, in view of the complex and imperfectly understood causes of this affliction; but the chances of success will be enhanced in any given instance if the rehabilitation process can be begun before the individual is hooked or totally dependent on the drug. [37] For these reasons it appears to be well within the Legislature's constitutional power to recognize and interrupt an established addiction process; i.e., to provide that when the danger to the individual and to society has become imminent the committing authorities need not sit idly by, but may move to institutionalize the affected person before the inevitable final scenes of the drama of addiction are played out. [2b] Solely upon the ground that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under Penal Code sections 6500 to 6510 in the circumstances hereinabove related, the order of commitment must be and is reversed.