Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective Juror Smith

Text: The prosecutor stated he had excused prospective juror Smith in error. More specifically, the prosecutor stated: She should be on this jury. I got her confused. She's a police officer, and I made a mistake. I should have kept her on. Let me show you what I have here. I have an eight to nine for guilt. Eight to nine for overall. I didn't pull this one out beforehand, and I thought we were going this way and.... In response to further questioning from the court, the prosecutor stated he wanted Smith on the jury. I will be glad to pull my other statements as to the other blacks on the panel, and her guilt rating and death rating are higher than theirs. That was a flat out mistake. The prosecutor offered to call her back and put her on the panel  if [the] defense wants to stipulate to this.... Defense counsel stated: I don't think it is an issue at this time. Defendant argues the prosecutor's claim his challenge of potential juror Smith was simply a mistake did not constitute a sufficient rebuttal of the prima facie case of presumed racial bias the trial court impliedly found. (3a) Defendant points out that, in Wheeler, we stated that in order to sustain his burden of justification, the allegedly offending party must satisfy the court that he exercised such peremptories on grounds that were reasonably relevant to the particular case on trial or its parties or witnesses  i.e., for reasons of specific bias.... ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282; see also People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216 [255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047].) In People v. Johnson we contrasted Wheeler 's holding that peremptory challenges are permissible so long as they are based on specific bias, with the rule of Batson v. Kentucky which does not use the term `specific bias' [but] permits the challenges so long as they may be justified by a `neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried.' ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216, citing Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 [106 S.Ct. at pp. 1723-1724].) (1c) Defendant argues the prosecutor's proffered reason for excusing prospective juror Smith  a mistake  amounts to no reason at all, hence neither a reason on grounds of specific bias ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 277) nor one related to the particular case to be tried ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1724]). We disagree. First, a mistake is, at the very least, a reason, that is, a coherent explanation for the peremptory challenge. It is self-evidently possible for counsel to err when exercising peremptory challenges. Second, a genuine mistake is a race-neutral reason. Faulty memory, clerical errors, and similar conditions that might engender a mistake of the type the prosecutor proffered to explain his peremptory challenge are not necessarily associated with impermissible reliance on presumed group bias. ( People v. Davis (1987) 189 Cal. App.3d 1177, 1194 [234 Cal. Rptr. 859], overruled on other grounds by People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216 [242 Cal. Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452].) Third, a mistake may be a reason based on specific bias ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 277) where, as appears to have been the case here, the prosecutor's error is one of erroneously believing, owing to clerical error, that a prospective juror had earlier been evaluated as specifically biased, when in fact she had not. Finally, a mistake is a reason related to the particular case to be tried ( Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1724]) to the extent the possibility that genuine errors of this sort will be made exists in every case. We realize the possibility always exists that counsel called upon to explain a questionable peremptory challenge will take refuge in a disingenuous claim the challenge was mistakenly made. In such a case, we rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282.) We and the United States Supreme Court give great deference to the trial court's determination that the use of peremptory challenges was not for an improper or class bias purpose. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1221; Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1724].) Defendant suggests the trial court never even reached the analytic stage of making the sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor's explanation ( People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167-168 [197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854]) we expect from the trial court as the price of our deference. The record refutes the suggestion. After the prosecutor indicated he had made a mistake in excusing prospective juror Smith, the court requested clarification: so you excused her in error? When the prosecutor responded affirmatively, the court pressed for additional clarification: you wanted her to . Only after the prosecutor had offered to pull my other statements as to the other blacks and show that her guilt rating and death rating are higher than theirs, did the court indicate it would accept these reasons at this time. In short, nothing in the record suggests the trial court failed to make the requisite sincere and reasoned determination regarding the genuineness of the prosecutor's explanation for challenging prospective juror Smith. Though in making its determination a trial court is not necessarily required affirmatively to make further inquiry of the prosecutor concerning his proffered explanations for disputed peremptory challenges ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1222), the trial court in this instance, where the proffered explanation was of a type particularly susceptible to abuse by overzealous prosecutors, wisely engaged in such inquiry. The trial judge's findings in such a context, largely turning on evaluations of credibility, are entitled to great deference. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1221; Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1724].)