Opinion ID: 1801790
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective Juror A.R.

Text: In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror A.R. stated that she was generally against the death penalty, but that her view might be impacted if her own family member or friend had been murdered. She explained that she felt that way about the death penalty because I don't believe anyone has the right to choose who lives or dies, unless acting in self defense. When asked if her feelings about the death penalty were very strong, Prospective Juror A.R. responded, yes and explained, My feelings are pretty setbut I have no way to know if an individual case m[a]y impact them. Prospective Juror A.R. agreed with the statements you should hear all of the circumstances surrounding a case and you should hear and review all of the circumstances concerning the defendant and his background before deciding between the penalties of life without parole and death. On the other hand, when asked, in what cases do you believe the death penalty may be appropriate? she replied, none. When asked, in what cases do you believe the death penalty may not be appropriate? she answered, all. Given two options in the appropriate case, she could see herself rejecting the death penalty and choosing life without the possibility of parole, but could not see herself rejecting life imprisonment and choosing death. The questionnaire further asked, if defendant were found guilty of first degree murder and the felony-murder special circumstance allegation were found to be true, would she always vote for death and reject life without parole, regardless of the evidence at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror A.R. circled no. However, when the same hypothetical was posed in terms of whether she would always vote for life without parole and reject death regardless of the evidence at the penalty phase, Prospective Juror A.R. circled yes, and wrote in, I don't know. Regarding the felony-murder special-circumstance allegation, she indicated that she strongly disagree[d] that anyone who commits murder during the course of a robbery or burglary should always get the death penalty, but agree[d] somewhat, that anyone who commits murder during the course of a robbery or burglary should never get the death penalty. In response to the trial court's questions, Prospective Juror A.R. reiterated that she was against the death penalty in theory, and that she could not see herself rejecting life imprisonment and choosing the death penalty. She acknowledged there may be cases in which she might vote for the death penalty, although she would still have great difficulty. When asked to elaborate, she replied, I guess I don't know the specifics. I guess I would have to be presented with the information that would make me feel that way. The court responded that it could not present particular facts, but attempted to explore the topic further. In response to more questions from the court, Prospective Juror A.R. indicated that certain circumstances relating to malice, remorse, and life experiences might influence her to choose the death penalty. The court then asked if she could see [her]self voting for death if [she] thought it was appropriate in the following situation: she found defendant guilty of first degree murder, determined the truth of the special circumstance allegation, and decided that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. Prospective Juror A.R. stated she could not answer that question, but assured the court she could give both sides a fair trial. Defense counsel refused to stipulate to an excusal for cause. Later, during questioning by the prosecutor, Prospective Juror A.R. acknowledged that, although it was difficult for her to envision circumstances in which she would vote for death, she asserted that she could vote for the death penalty if the circumstances would allow me to do that. She would consider the heinousness of the crime, the person who committed it, and whether the victim had been tortured. But when the prosecutor asked, When it comes right down to it, do you really feel that you could ever say death? Prospective Juror A.R. answered, I guess I don't know. In granting the prosecutor's challenge for cause, the trial court reasoned, She takes a long time in answering. She is obviously struggling; this is difficult for her. It's clear to me this is something that would be almost impossible. She might come up with some imaginary situation, but I find she would be substantially impaired and I do find cause. In response to the court's invitation for further argument, defense counsel said, submitted, and the court reiterated, I do find cause. As in People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 262 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451], defendant merely submitted the question to the trial court. Hence, as a practical matter, he `did not object to the court's excusing the juror, but ... also refused to stipulate to it.' ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 734 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302].) Although `this failure to object does not forfeit the right to raise the issue on appeal, ... it does suggest counsel concurred in the assessment that the juror was excusable.' ( Id. at pp. 734-735; see Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 434-435 [in light of counsel's failure to question the prospective juror or object to her excusal for cause, `it seems that ... no one in the courtroom questioned the fact that her beliefs prevented her from sitting'].) ( People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 262.) Moreover, as did the prospective juror in People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, Prospective Juror A.R. gave equivocal answers and was less than consistent in her answers. ( Id. at p. 15.) `In many cases, a prospective juror's responses to questions on voir dire will be halting, equivocal, or even conflicting. Given the juror's probable unfamiliarity with the complexity of the law, coupled with the stress and anxiety of being a prospective juror in a capital case, such equivocation should be expected. Under such circumstances, we defer to the trial court's evaluation of a prospective juror's state of mind, and such evaluation is binding on appellate courts.' ( People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1094 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36].) ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 15-16.) Here, the trial court found sufficient cause for excusal based on its observation of Prospective Juror A.R.'s demeanor, her equivocal and conflicting responses, and her inability to state her views. ( People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 262 [excusals for cause proper where prospective jurors could not state they would be able to consider imposing the death penalty, either in any case or in the kind of case at issue there].) `[W]e pay due deference to the trial court, which was in a position to actually observe and listen to the prospective jurors. Voir dire sometimes fails to elicit an unmistakably clear answer from the juror, and there will be times when `the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.... [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.' ([ People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 60 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224],] [q]uoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. [at p.] 426.)' ( People v. Griffin [(2004)] 33 Cal.4th [536,] 559 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344].) ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 14; see also People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 263.) Deferring to the trial court's assessment of her state of mind, we conclude that Prospective Juror A.R. was properly excused.