Opinion ID: 2584741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Snyder Decision

Text: Almost three years after its decision in Miller-El II, the United States Supreme Court in Snyder once again performed a comparative juror analysis not previously conducted in the trial court. In Snyder, the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against all five Black panelists. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1207].) The Supreme Court considered the prosecutor's reasons for challenging one of those panelists, Jeffrey Brooks. In the first phase of jury selection, the court inquired of panelists whether jury service would result in extreme hardship. Brooks explained that he was a college senior who needed to complete his student-teaching requirement to graduate and expressed concern that jury service would cause him to miss classes. The court contacted the university dean, who gave assurances that he would work with Brooks to make up classes. After receiving this information, Brooks expressed no further concern and the prosecutor did not question him further on the issue. ( Id. at pp. ___ - ___ [128 S.Ct. at pp. 1209-1210].) In explaining his peremptory challenge against Brooks, the prosecutor offered two race-neutral reasons. First, he stated that Brooks appeared nervous throughout the voir dire questioning. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1208].) Second, [t]he prosecutor claimed to be apprehensive that Mr. Brooks, in order to minimize the student-teaching hours missed during jury service, might have been motivated to find petitioner guilty, not of first-degree murder, but of a lesser included offense because this would obviate the need for a penalty phase proceeding. ( Id. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1210].) Defense counsel disputed both explanations and the trial court ruled: `All right. I'm going to allow the challenge. I'm going to allow the challenge.' ( Id. at p. ___ [128 S.C.t at p. 1208].) The trial and penalty phases concluded two days after Brooks was struck. ( Id. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1210].) As to the prosecutor's first explanation, the Supreme Court noted that nervousness cannot be shown from a cold record. Thus, deference is especially appropriate where a trial judge has made a finding that an attorney credibly relied on demeanor in exercising a strike. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1209].) The trial court in Snyder, however, responded to the prosecutor's two proffered reasons by simply allowing the challenge without explanation. Thus the high court would not presume that the trial judge credited the prosecutor's explanation of nervousness. ( Id. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1209].) Regarding the second proffered reason the Supreme Court characterized the prosecutor's explanation as highly speculative. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1210].) The court also stated, Perhaps most telling, the brevity of petitioner's trialsomething that the prosecutor anticipated on the record during voir dire meant that serving on the jury would not have seriously interfered with Mr. Brooks' ability to complete his required student teaching. ( Ibid., fn omitted.) (3) The Supreme Court additionally considered evidence of comparative juror analysis in evaluating the prosecutor's second reason: The implausibility of this explanation is reinforced by the prosecutor's acceptance of white jurors who disclosed conflicting obligations that appear to have been at least as serious as Mr. Brooks'. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1211].) Before undertaking its analysis the court cautioned: We recognize that a retrospective comparison of jurors based on a cold appellate record may be very misleading when alleged similarities were not raised at trial. In that situation, an appellate court must be mindful that an exploration of the alleged similarities at the time of trial might have shown that the jurors in question were not really comparable. In this case, however, the shared characteristic, i.e., concern about serving on the jury due to conflicting obligations, was thoroughly explored by the trial court when the relevant jurors asked to be excused for cause. ( Ibid. ) [14] The Supreme Court noted that White Juror Roland Laws, a self-employed general contractor, offered strong work and family reasons as to why jury service would cause him hardship. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1211].) The Supreme Court observed that while these obligations seem[ed] substantially more pressing than those of Mr. Brooks, the prosecution declined to use a peremptory challenge to strike him. ( Ibid. ) If the prosecution had been sincerely concerned that Mr. Brooks would favor a lesser verdict than first-degree murder in order to shorten the trial, it is hard to see why the prosecution would not have had at least as much concern regarding Mr. Laws. ( Ibid. ) The court noted the circumstances of another White juror who twice addressed the court during voir dire about important work commitments. The juror advised that in order to serve he would have to cancel an urgent appointment at which his presence was essential. Despite the juror's concern, the prosecution did not strike him. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1212].)