Opinion ID: 580299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attorney-Work-Product Privilege

Text: 41 The more interesting question is whether enforcement of the subpoena would violate the privilege protecting an attorney's work product, as distinct from the attorney-client privilege, see United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2170 n. 11, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 392. The work-product privilege protects work product of the lawyer by prohibiting unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney, id. at 510-11, 67 S.Ct. at 393, whether in civil litigation, see id., or in criminal litigation, United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238 & n. 12, 95 S.Ct. at 2170 & n. 12. This privilege is not absolute, but disclosure of protected material will be compelled only in restricted circumstances. In a civil case, materials prepared by a party's attorney in anticipation of litigation or for trial are not discoverable except on a showing that the party seeking production has substantial need for the materials for preparation of its case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3); see also id. (in ordering discovery, court is to protect against disclosure of attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories). In a criminal case, except for scientific or medical reports, documents made by a defendant's attorneys or their agents in connection with the case are not discoverable. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b)(2). 42 The attorney-work-product doctrine generally does not shield from discovery documents that were not prepared by the attorneys themselves, or their agents, in the course of or in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238-39 & n. 13, 95 S.Ct. at 2170 & n. 13. However, where a request is made for documents already in the possession of the requesting party, with the precise goal of learning what the opposing attorney's thinking or strategy may be, even third-party documents may be protected. See Gould Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 825 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.1987); Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903, 106 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed.2d 230 (1985). In Sporck, pursuant to the plaintiff's document demands, the defendants had made available hundreds of thousands of documents, of which the plaintiff's attorney selected more than 100,000 for copying. In preparation for the deposition of one of the defendants, the defense attorney culled a folderful of documents for review. At the deposition, the plaintiff's attorney began by asking the defendant which documents he had reviewed in preparation for his deposition. The defendant refused to answer on the ground that the selection of documents from among the larger number already furnished to the plaintiff constituted defendants' attorney's work product. Though none of the reviewed documents themselves constituted attorney work product, the Sporck court agreed. Noting that the plaintiff had made no claim that any documents had been withheld from production, and construing the inquiry as designed simply to gain information as to what documents defendants' attorney believed were most relevant, the Sporck court upheld the assertion of work-product privilege, noting that  '[i]n selecting and ordering a few documents out of thousands counsel could not help but reveal important aspects of his understanding of the case.'  Id. at 316 (quoting James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D.Del.1982)). 43 In Gould, this Court accepted the Sporck principle but characterized it as creating only a narrow exception to the principle that documents do not acquire protection simply by being transferred by client to attorney. See Gould Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 825 F.2d at 680. We stated that the applicability of such an exception depends upon the existence of a real, rather than speculative, concern that the thought processes of [the client's] counsel in relation to pending or anticipated litigation would be exposed. Id. We further noted that the equities might not favor the application of the Sporck exception if the files from which documents had been culled by [counsel] were not otherwise available to [the party seeking them] or were beyond reasonable access to [that party]. Gould Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 825 F.2d at 680. 44 Our review of the sealed record in the present case persuades us that circumstances calling for application of the Sporck -type exception are not present. The government's document demand is not designed to glean what telephone calls Paul-Weiss deems relevant; the demand is for all telephone company records for the targeted phone lines for a five year period. And with the advent of inexpensive photocopying, it seems likely that most sets of copied documents maintained by law firms will be sufficiently voluminous to minimize disclosure of the attorney's identification of some occasional wheat among the chaff. Further, XYZ has not produced most of the subpoenaed documents and has represented that it no longer has these records; and counsel for Doe has conceded that many of the telephone records for the period covered by the November subpoena are likely no longer maintained by the telephone company. Absent production by Paul-Weiss, it appears that most of the records would not be available to the government. We conclude that the circumstances justify the district court's rejection of the claim of attorney-work-product privilege in the present case.