Opinion ID: 2976282
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Wisconsin Burglary Statute

Text: Wis. Stat. § 943.10 (1997), which defines burglary, provides: (1) Whoever intentionally enters any of the following places without the consent of the person in lawful possession and with intent to steal or commit a felony in such place is guilty of a Class C felony: -7- No. 07-1230 United States v. Thomson (a) Any building or dwelling; or (b) An enclosed railroad car; or (c) An enclosed portion of any ship or vessel; or (d) A locked enclosed cargo portion of a truck or trailer; or (e) A motor home or other motorized type of home or a trailer home, whether or not any person is living in any such home; or (f) A room within any of the above. Thomson was charged with two counts under § 943.10(1). Because that statute is broader than generic burglary as defined in Taylor, under Shepard, the sentencing court was required to look to the charging documents, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, or any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16. Thomson pled no contest to counts four and five in case number 1997CF000120. These counts represent the April 8, 1997, and April 11, 1997, burglaries described above. Count four charged Thomson with “intentionally enter[ing] the One Stop Convenience Store, without consent, and with intent to steal.” Count five charged Thomson with “intentionally enter[ing] the Ravina Bay Bar and Grill, without consent, and with the intent to steal.” Ibid. Thus, the charging documents clearly detailed the elements of Taylor’s generic definition of burglary. Thomson acknowledges that “at first glance the Appellant’s prior Wisconsin convictions appear to be violent felonies because they were ‘burglary’ convictions.” Appellant’s Br. 5. Nevertheless, Thomson argues that the ACCA should distinguish burglaries of unoccupied buildings from burglaries using violence or burglaries of dwellings and that only the latter two kinds of -8- No. 07-1230 United States v. Thomson burglaries should be considered violent felonies. In Taylor, however, the Supreme Court declined to adopt such a narrow definition. After reviewing the legislative history, the Court noted, “[t]here never was any proposal to limit the predicate offense to some special subclass of burglaries that might be especially dangerous, such as those where the offender is armed, or the building is occupied, or the crime occurs at night.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588. The court also reasoned that a narrower definition of burglary, would not be “supported by the language of the statute or the legislative history” and that the “choice of language indicates that Congress thought ordinary burglaries, as well as burglaries involving some element making them especially dangerous, presented a sufficiently ‘serious potential risk’ to count toward enhancement.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 589. Despite the Supreme Court’s clear refusal to narrow the generic definition of burglary and its specific choice to include burglaries of any building or structure, Thomson argues that the definition should be narrowed to include only burglaries of dwellings. He presents three arguments, all equally futile. First, he argues that because Wisconsin distinguishes between burglaries of occupied and unoccupied buildings, federal law should do the same. Second, he notes that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines contain a definition of violent felony different from that found in the ACCA. Third, Thomson presents three cases in support of his interpretation. All of Thomson’s arguments are inapposite. Additionally, as Thomson is aware, our circuit briefly considered and dismissed a similar argument in Ortkiese. Ultimately, Thomson presents no reason why this court should do what the Supreme Court and a panel of our own circuit refused to do. -9- No. 07-1230 United States v. Thomson 1. The Wisconsin distinction between Class C and Class B felonies As noted above Wis. Stat. § 943.10 (1997), defines burglary and creates a distinction between Class C and Class B felony burglaries. Thomson argues that the “Wisconsin statutes make a distinction between different types of burglaries–burglary of an unoccupied building is treated much less severely than burglaries using violence or burglaries of dwellings.” Appellee’s Br. 5. This argument is not only irrelevant, it is also based on a false premise. Wisconsin simply does not distinguish between burglaries of unoccupied buildings and burglaries of dwellings. Section 943.10(1)(a) clearly places buildings, occupied or not, and dwellings on equal footing. Yet, even if it did make such a distinction, that distinction would be irrelevant under Taylor. The point of Taylor was to make federal law independent of underlying state law so that differences in state law treatment of the same criminal conduct would not carry over into federal law, which is meant to apply uniformly across the country. For this reason, the Court adopted a generic definition of burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592 (“‘[B]urglary’ in § 924(e) must have some uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes.”). 2. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Thomson also argues that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines use a definition different from that found in §924(e). This is true,1 but irrelevant. Definitions of similar sounding, but distinct 1 The Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 even highlights the difference: This guideline applies in the case of a defendant subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), a defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence if the instant offense of conviction is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and the defendant has at least three prior convictions for a “violent felony” or - 10 - No. 07-1230 United States v. Thomson terms need not be consistent across pieces of federal legislation. As we have noted before, the terms “crime of violence” and “violent felony” have distinctly different meanings and are not interchangeable. Hornaday v. Lamanna, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10785, No. 99-4196, at  (6th Cir. May 9, 2000) (citing United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 928 (6th Cir. 1999) and United States v. Oliver, 20 F.3d 415, 417 (11th 1994)). 3. Case law Thomson cites three cases to support his contention that the term “burglary” under § 924(e) should be limited to burglary of a dwelling: United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Crowell, 997 F.2d 146 (6th 1993); and United States v. Throneburg, 921 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1990). None of these cases are on point. At issue in Arnold was whether a prior Tennessee conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual battery constituted a “crime of violence” under the “otherwise” clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (“or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury “serious drug offense,” or both, committed on occasions different from one another. The terms “violent felony” and “serious drug offense” are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2). It is to be noted that the definitions of “violent felony” and “serious drug offense” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) are not identical to the definitions of “crime of violence” and “controlled substance offense” used in § 4B1.1 (Career Offender), nor are the time periods for the counting of prior sentences under § 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History) applicable to the determination of whether a defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). - 11 - No. 07-1230 United States v. Thomson to another”), which sets the standard for determining whether a non-enumerated offense is a “crime of violence.” Our circuit held that: [i]f the statute does not clearly establish that the offense involves the ‘use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,’ the court may then look at the charge in the indictment to which the defendant pled guilty or was adjudged guilty to determine if the offense involved a serious potential risk of physical injury to others. In the case of a guilty plea, the district court may also consider the plea agreement relating to the prior offense. Arnold, 58 F.3d at 1124. This holding, however, was limited to interpreting the “otherwise” clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) and has no bearing on how courts count an offense that is one of the enumerated crimes in § 924(e). Indeed, to conclude otherwise would vastly narrow the definition of burglary adopted in Taylor, which requires only “unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. Crowell also involved the interpretation of “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The question was whether a Colorado conviction for aggravated motor vehicle theft constituted a “crime of violence.” The aggravated motor vehicle theft count charged Crowell with taking a taxi “without authorization and by threat and deception.” Crowell, 997 F.2d at 149. The district court, however, relied on additional information contained in the indictment sheet, relating to charges arising from the same set of circumstances, but which were ultimately dropped. Our circuit held that though an indictment may be used as evidence of the facts essential to sustain a guilty plea, it cannot be used “as evidence that all conduct charged in the indictment occurred.” Ibid. Again, Crowell is - 12 - No. 07-1230 United States v. Thomson irrelevant because it deals only with the interpretation of “crime of violence” under the Guidelines and dictates nothing as to how courts should interpret the crimes enumerated in § 924(e). Throneburg involved Michigan’s entering without breaking statute, which provided, “any person who, without breaking, shall enter any [buildings specified in statute] with intent to commit a felony or any larceny therein, shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in that state prison . . . .” Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.111 (1979). Our circuit held that “[b]ecause the Michigan offense of entering without breaking does not require an unprivileged entry, it does not qualify as a burglary under the Court’s definition in Taylor.” Throneburg, 921 F.2d at 659. Throneburg is inapposite because the Michigan statute at issue was broader than the generic statute and there was no further usable information. As discussed above, while the Wisconsin statute is also broader than the generic definition of burglary, the charging documents for the crimes at issue demonstrate that Thomson pled to all of the elements of a generic burglary.