Opinion ID: 626096
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Post-Judgment Motions

Text: Appellants further argue that the district court erroneously denied their motions to reconsider and to amend their complaint after it entered final judgment. A district court's decision to deny a motion to alter or amend a complaint under Rule 59(e) and its determination of whether to permit the filing of an amended complaint are both reviewed for abuse of discretion. Matrix Capital Mgm't Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Appellants brought their motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59 and/or 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A Rule 59(e) motion may only be granted in three situations: (1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Zinkand v. Brown, 478 F.3d 634, 637 (4th Cir.2007) (citations omitted). It is an extraordinary remedy that should be applied sparingly. EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 116 F.3d 110, 112 (4th Cir.1997). Like a 59(e) motion, Rule 60 provides for an extraordinary remedy that should not be awarded except under exceptional circumstances. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950). Dispositive in this case, however, is Matrix Capital 's dictate that [T]he district court may not grant [a Rule 15(a)] motion unless the judgment is vacated pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). A conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to amend, however, is sufficient grounds on which to reverse the district court's denial of a Rule 59(e) motion. Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 193. In other words, Rule 15(a) and Rule 59(e) motions rise and fall together. Thus, to evaluate whether the motion to reconsider should have been granted, we must determine whether the denial of the motion for leave to amend was proper.
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that a party may amend its pleadings only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires. FED. R.CIV.P. 15(a)(2). This directive gives effect to the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits instead of disposing of them on technicalities. Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 193. This means that a request to amend should only be denied if one of three facts is present: the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or amendment would be futile. Id. The district court's denial of the 15(a) motion was contrary to Circuit precedent. In its order, the court noted the Matrix Capital ruling that it may not grant a post-judgment motion unless the judgment is vacated pursuant to a motion to reconsider; and because it had denied the motion to reconsider, [3] it summarily denied the motion to amend. But the court failed to take note of the rule in Matrix Capital, which holds that an improper denial of a 15(a) motion is sufficient grounds for reversing the denial of a motion to reconsider. See Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 193. The court's reasoning, therefore, was contrary to controlling authority. Nevertheless, we affirm the district court's denial of the motion. With respect to the breach of contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices claims, the liability waivers preclude recovery. See supra II.A. 1. Any amendments to those counts, therefore, would be futile. As for the new defamation allegations and the new additional tort claims, we find that permitting Appellants to amend their complaint would be prejudicial to the Appellees. Whether an amendment is prejudicial will often be determined by the nature of the amendment and its timing. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006). And while delay alone is an insufficient reason to deny a motion to amend, the further the case progressed before judgment was entered, the more likely it is that the amendment will prejudice the defendant.... Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 193. Here, the conduct giving rise to this lawsuit occurred nearly three years ago, in May 2009. The complaint itself was filed over two and a half years ago, giving the Appellants ample time to make any amendments before the district court granted judgment on the pleadings. The amount of discovery is also a relevant consideration in determining whether prejudice would result from the granting of a 15(a) motion. See Equal Rights Center v. Niles Bolton Assoc's, 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir.2010). Here, a significant amount of discovery had already been conducted: Appellants themselves, in their opposition to a motion by the Appellees, asserted that the parties have engaged in significant and lengthy discovery. The district court also foundand this finding was not challenged by Appellantsthat there was no new evidence that could not have been discovered previously. Thus, Appellants have no excuse for failing to include these additional allegations and causes of action in their original complaint. Additionally, as the district court noted, the new allegations and causes of action asserted by the Appellants arise out of an entirely new event and nucleus of facts. The additional allegations meant to bolster the defamation claim revolve around an alleged interaction that occurred in January of 2006, more than three years prior to the drug test that spawned this litigation. The new intentional tort claims are based on alleged interference with an entirely separate sponsorship agreementconduct that is, by Appellants' own admission, unrelated to the Substance Abuse Policy. In its order granting dismissal the district court wrote that the litigation in this case had been extremely contentious. Our review of the record confirms this observation. And while the court decline[d] to impose sanctions at this time, it warned that if Plaintiffs continue to file unsubstantiated pleadings that are prejudicial to the Defendants, the decision not to impose sanctions will be revisited. We find compelling the argument that the amendmentcoming so belatedly would change the nature of the litigation and, would therefore, prejudice the Appellees. Equal Rights Center, 602 F.3d at 604. We therefore find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend.