Opinion ID: 1965086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: statements made by brand and murayama

Text: Fossett next argues that certain statements made by Brand and Murayama to her and her family raise genuine issues of fact and thereby eliminate the requirement for expert testimony. Affidavits introduced by Fossett contain statements of fact allegedly made by Brand and Murayama to Fossett, Fossett's husband, and Fossett's mother. We accept these statements as true because on appellate review of summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. See Schweitzer v. American Nat. Red Cross, 256 Neb. 350, 591 N.W.2d 524 (1999). In this case, Brand and Murayama each filed an affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment. Each affidavit stated that the care rendered to Fossett complied with the applicable standard of care for a similar physician under similar circumstances in a similar community. This is sufficient for summary judgment purposes to present a prima facie showing that appellees were not negligent in their treatment of Fossett. See Boyd v. Chakraborty, 250 Neb. 575, 550 N.W.2d 44 (1996) (holding that affidavit of defendant physician in malpractice case which states that defendant did not breach appropriate standard of care presents prima facie case of lack of negligence for purposes of summary judgment). The burden then shifted to Fossett to rebut this evidence and to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Since Fossett presented no medical expert opinion to contradict Brand's and Murayama's affidavits, we must determine whether statements made by Brand and Murayama create a reasonable inference of negligence on their part. Fossett argues that under Healy v. Langdon, 245 Neb. 1, 511 N.W.2d 498 (1994), Brand's and Murayama's statements create a genuine issue of material fact. In Healy, the plaintiff introduced the defendant doctor's deposition in opposition to the defendant doctor's motion for summary judgment. In one portion of the deposition, the defendant doctor stated that he would have deviated from the standard of care if he had failed to inform Sherry Healy that death was a potential side effect of the chemotherapy. Id. at 8, 511 N.W.2d at 503. To establish a breach of that standard, the plaintiff offered his own affidavit, which stated that `at no time prior to or during the course of the chemotherapy treatment' did [the defendant doctor] inform Sherry Healy that death was a potential side effect of the chemotherapy. Id. at 9, 511 N.W.2d at 503. The court found that the plaintiff's affidavit directly conflicted with evidence presented by the defendant doctor and therefore created a factual issue. The court held that because there was a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment was improper. We recognize that Healy implicitly stands for the proposition that a defendant physician's own statements can be used to create a factual issue in a medical malpractice case. Healy is factually distinguishable, however, from the case at hand because in Healy, the plaintiff introduced a direct statement by the defendant doctor on the applicable standard of care. The plaintiff then offered his own affidavit which stated that the defendant doctor had not acted in conformity with that standard. In Healy, the defendant doctor stated that it would have been a deviation from the applicable standard of care if he had failed to inform the patient that death was a potential side effect of the treatment. In this case, neither party has set out the applicable standard of care. As a result, the record contains no indication of the standard by which to evaluate Brand's and Murayama's professional conduct. Therefore, Healy does not control the outcome of Fossett's appeal. However, this is not a typical case in which the plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence from a qualified medical expert. Fossett has introduced statements by Brand and Murayama that constitute evaluations of their own performances. According to the affidavits introduced by Fossett, when Fossett's mother asked Murayama why he had not removed the fluid from Fossett's abdomen, he replied, I don't know why I left it there, I just left it there. When Fossett asked Murayama why he had not removed the fluid, he replied that he thought it would absorb into her body. When Fossett discussed with Brand the fluid left in her abdominal cavity by Murayama, Brand told her that leaving it in there was a mistake. We agree with the district court that these statements are not sufficient to create an issue of fact as to Murayama. These statements provide no insight into the requisite standard of care for treating Fossett, who had infectious fluid in her abdomen. The mere statement by Brand that leaving it in there was a mistake, does not create a reasonable inference of negligence. A mistake is not synonymous with negligence. We therefore conclude that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Murayama. In reference to Brand, however, there is more evidence of the requisite standard of care and his failure to meet that standard. According to the affidavits introduced by Fossett, Brand approached Fossett's husband after he performed the ERCP and said, I have punctured her duodenum. I made a false passage, I made a terrible mistake, I'm very very sorry. Brand told Fossett's husband that there might be fluid leaking into Fossett's abdominal cavity. When Fossett's husband told Brand that it was okay, Brand responded, No, it isn't. This shouldn't have happened. In addition, when Fossett later asked Brand what went wrong with the ERCP, he told her that the puncture caused by the tube going down her throat was not supposed to have happened. Brand's statements to the effect that the puncture should not have happened constitute an evaluation of his own performance. Viewing these statements in a light most favorable to Fossett and giving her the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we determine that Brand's statements imply that he did not meet the requisite standard of care. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Brand. We reverse.