Opinion ID: 2506634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: consistency with established constitutional rights

Text: ¶ 20 Mr. Moreno argued that the order to submit to drug testing violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Because we find that the order was unreasonable based on its violation of Mr. Moreno's Fourth Amendment rights, we will not address whether it violated his Fifth Amendment rights. ¶ 21 An order that a parent submit to drug testing constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (holding that drug testing constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment); see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997) ([G]overnment-ordered collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable. (internal quotation marks omitted)). As such, even where a drug test is undertaken for a purpose other than a criminal investigation, it is governed by the constitutional restrictions on searches. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (holding that the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply to civil as well as criminal proceedings). Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure ... is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402. Generally, where a search is conducted without a warrant, it must fall into one of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement and must still be based on probable cause. C.R. v. State (In re A.R.), 937 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Utah Ct.App.1997); [3] see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). Probable cause exists where the facts ... acquired from reasonably trustworthy sources are sufficient to permit a reasonably cautious person to believe that an offense has been, or is being, committed. Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 16, 122 P.3d 506, rev'd on other grounds 547 U.S. 1017, 126 S.Ct. 1607, 164 L.Ed.2d 297 (2006). ¶ 22 Although probable cause is usually required for a search to be lawful, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all warrantless searches, only those that are unreasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). This is because reasonableness is the touchstone of the constitutionality of a governmental search. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002). The Supreme Court has stated that although some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, [the Court has] not hesitated to adopt such a standard. Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733. ¶ 23 One of the areas where warrantless searches have been held to be reasonable is where there is a reduced expectation of privacy or no expectation of privacy. See, e.g., State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1983). In Velasquez, we held that a parolee has a reduced expectation of privacy and could be searched without a warrant if his parole officer reasonably believed the parolee violated his parole or committed a crime. Id. Similarly, in State ex rel. A.C.C., we held that a juvenile probationer had no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore a suspicionless search of his belongings could be conducted. 2002 UT 22, ¶ 21, 44 P.3d 708. Suspicionless searches of prisoners have also been allowed based on a finding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Reaching such conclusions requires a balancing of the government's interest in operating its institutions and the individual's privacy interest. A.C.C., 2002 UT 22, ¶ 20, 44 P.3d 708. ¶ 24 A similar balancing test has been applied to determine the extent of a student's expectation of privacy in a school setting. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733. In T.L.O., the Court found that although students had a privacy interest, the school's interest in maintaining order was greater than that interest and permitted searches without warrants based on suspicion that did not rise to the level of probable cause. Id. Because the balance tipped in favor of the school's interest, students had a privacy interest that was less than they would have had outside the school setting. ¶ 25 Another instance in which warrantless searches are sometimes held to be reasonable is the so-called administrative search. An administrative search is a search conducted or required by a government actor but which does not have criminal investigation as its goal. Because the strict requirement for probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, it may be unsuited to determining the reasonableness of administrative searches where the [g]overnment seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions. Earls, 536 U.S. at 828, 122 S.Ct. 2559 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Search schemes where drug testing is required absent any suspicion of wrongdoing have been upheld where the scheme was enacted for purposes other than criminal investigation and where there is a special need for such searches. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313-14, 117 S.Ct. 1295; see also Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (holding that the United States Customs Service's requirement that employees be drug tested was reasonable); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (holding that a statute requiring testing of rail employees involved in accidents without regard to suspicion was reasonable). In Chandler, the Court held that where special needsconcerns other than crime detectionare alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and public interest advanced by the parties.... In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. 520 U.S. at 314, 117 S.Ct. 1295 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 838, 122 S.Ct. 2559 (holding that preventing drug use among students was a special need that justified a suspicionless drug testing regime for all students participating in extracurricular activities). ¶ 26 The hallmark of the cases allowing warrantless searches unsupported by probable cause is a weighing of the privacy interest and the government interest and a finding that the burden a probable cause requirement would impose on the government interest outweighs the privacy interest at stake. ¶ 27 Because ordering the parent of a delinquent child to undergo drug testing is not part of a criminal investigation, determining whether such an order is constitutional will depend on whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. To do so, we must first determine the extent of the parent's expectation of privacy and whether it is reduced such that a search based on less than probable cause would be justified. We will do so by balancing ... the government's interest in operating its institutions and the individual's privacy interest. A.C.C., 2002 UT 22, ¶ 20, 44 P.3d 708. If analysis under the balancing test does not demonstrate that the parent has a reduced expectation of privacy justifying a search based on less than probable cause, then the search must be supported by probable cause.
¶ 28 The first part of the balancing test requires an assessment of the extent of the privacy interest of the person being searched, in this case, the parent of a delinquent juvenile. There is nothing in the Juvenile Court Act that suggests that the parent of a delinquent juvenile has a limited right to privacy. In contrast, the finding that the juvenile probationer in A.C.C. had a limited privacy interest was heavily influenced by the fact that the juvenile's activities were being monitored while he was on probation and by the fact that he had signed a probation order subjecting him to search for the detection of drugs. A.C.C., 2002 UT 22, ¶ 22, 44 P.3d 708. In Velasquez, we found that a person on parole had a diminished privacy interest because he was being closely supervised as a condition of a sentence for a crime. 672 P.2d at 1259. No similar circumstances exist in the case of a parent whose child has been adjudicated delinquent. ¶ 29 A parent does not surrender his expectation of privacy merely because he acquires the status of a parent of a minor who has been adjudicated delinquent. In Skinner, the Supreme Court found that the railroad employees subject to testing under the statute at issue had a limited privacy right because of their status as employees. 489 U.S. at 624-25, 109 S.Ct. 1402. As employees, they were not free to come and go as they pleased and were subject to other restrictions placed on them by their employers. Id. The Skinner Court also found that the pervasive regulation of employees in the rail industry, including rules requiring hearing and sight tests as well as skill tests, demonstrated that those employees had limited privacy expectations. Id. at 627, 109 S.Ct. 1402. There is no corresponding pervasive regulation and oversight of parents which would lead to a conclusion that they have a limited privacy interest. Although the juvenile court may fashion some orders affecting parents in the context of a delinquency case, this power is not equivalent to the pervasive regulation present in Skinner. ¶ 30 Additionally, parents of delinquent children, even those who are suspected of drug involvement, do not undertake any voluntary actions that reduce their privacy interests. In A.C.C., Velasquez, Skinner, and Von Raab, the privacy interest of the people being searched was reduced because of their earlier bad choices or because of their voluntary participation in industries that were heavily regulated. ¶ 31 Because parents of a delinquent children have no reason to believe their behavior will be more closely monitored than it would were their children not delinquent, and because there is no legitimate justification for the regulation of parents outside of a welfare context, even for those parents with delinquent children, there is no basis for finding that their privacy interest is significantly reduced.
¶ 32 The second part of the balancing test requires us to determine the significance of the government interest in conducting the search. In a delinquency proceeding, the government interest in ordering the parent of a child involved in drugs, who is himself suspected of using drugs, to undergo drug testing is to ensure that the parent is drug free and therefore is not providing an inappropriate example to the minor or directly contributing to the minor's drug use. ¶ 33 The juvenile court has broad authority to act in the best interest of the child and to fashion remedies that aid in the prevention of future unlawful conduct and the development of responsible citizenship. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5)(b) (2008). The focus of the juvenile court system, however, is on modifying the behavior of the juvenile. Because the focus is on the behavior of the juvenile, the behavior of parents of juveniles involved in the system is of secondary importance. ¶ 34 Attempting to ensure that parents of delinquent juveniles are drug free also should not be confused with the goal of protecting children where there is a concern for their welfare. In the presence of a welfare concern related to the parent's drug use, the government's interest is decidedly increased, as are the possible consequences of waiting until there is probable cause for a search. By contrast, where the concern of the proceeding is the child's delinquent behavior, there is less necessity to obtain information about the parent's behavior. There is time to obtain information that will provide probable cause for a search of the parent.
¶ 35 In the cases where searches on less than probable cause were found to be reasonable, although there was an important government interest, the description of the privacy interest as reduced had a significant impact on the balancing. Absent a reduced privacy interest of some kind, it would be nearly impossible for even the most compelling government interest to override an individual's privacy interest unless the burden on the government interest was particularly onerous. Were it otherwise, the government's stated compelling interest in combating drug abuse could be grounds for random drug testing of all citizens. ¶ 36 In this case, there is very little to suggest that the parent of a delinquent juvenile has a significantly reduced privacy interest. On the other side of the balancing equation, while it is a commendable goal, the government's interest in ensuring that parents of delinquent juveniles provide good examples to their children is not as compelling as the other goals of the juvenile courts, such as protecting children from abuse and neglect. The interest is also not one that would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement that there must be probable cause for the search. While it could be possible for there to be a government interest in the juvenile court context that is significant enough and would be burdened enough by a probable cause requirement that the government interest would overcome a parent's privacy interest, we do not find that is the case here. Because the burden a probable cause requirement would place on the government's interest does not outweigh the individual privacy interest in this case, we find that where a delinquent child's parent is ordered to be drug tested, the search must be supported by probable cause.
¶ 37 Probable cause is not a rigid standard. It exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence ... will be found. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Although the standard is flexible, common rumor or report, suspicion, or even strong reason to suspect [is] not adequate. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 38 In this case, the juvenile court was presented with the following facts about Mr. Moreno: (1) Mr. Moreno is listed as a threat to law enforcement (although the record does not disclose how one is determined to be a threat to law enforcement nor, having found one's way onto the list, what can be done to remove oneself); (2) Mr. Moreno has evaded police; (3) police have been called to Mr. Moreno's home regarding domestic disturbances; (4) police have seen iodine stains on the hands of Mr. Moreno's live-in girlfriend, Karen Hardy; (5) Mr. Moreno made trips back and forth from the hills near Parowan with Ms. Hardy; and (6) C.M.'s grandparents believe that Mr. Moreno is an alcoholic and that Ms. Hardy uses drugs. Of all of these facts, only the fact that Mr. Moreno made trips back and forth to the hills with a suspected drug user is directly related to Mr. Moreno's possible involvement with drugs. Even this fact does not have direct bearing on whether Mr. Moreno was using drugs. Based on these facts, a person of reasonable prudence would not have reason to believe that evidence of drug use would be found through a drug test of Mr. Moreno. There is simply nothing in the evidence that would suggest that Mr. Moreno took drugs. The evidence regarding Mr. Moreno's girlfriend and the evidence of Mr. Moreno's interactions with the police could raise suspicion that he was using drugs; however, mere suspicion does not create probable cause. ¶ 39 Because a search based on less than probable cause does not meet the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness in this case, probable cause was required for the search to be constitutional. Since the search lacked probable cause, it violated Mr. Moreno's Fourth Amendment rights and was therefore not a reasonable condition to impose on him as part of his daughter's delinquency proceeding.