Opinion ID: 749885
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Amendment Law

Text: 17 A state may not deny an individual public employment or benefits related thereto based on the individual's exercise of her First Amendment right to free expression even when the individual lacks a liberty or property interest in the employment or related benefit. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-84, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2896, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (Even though McPherson was merely a probationary employee, and even if she could have been discharged for any reason or for no reason at all, she may nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for exercising her constitutional right to freedom of expression.); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-45, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1688-89, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734-35, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir.1990). However, a government's interest in insuring that its agencies perform the tasks assigned to them by law in the most efficient manner possible is substantial and in certain circumstances justifies placing restrictions upon public employees' freedom of expression. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 1888, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J.) (The government cannot restrict the speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where the government is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be appropriate.). 18 In light of the competing interests of government employees in free expression and the government in efficiency of its operations, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment precludes retaliation against a public employee based upon her expression only if that expression satisfies two criteria. First, the expression must relate to a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1689-90; Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988, 992 (5th Cir.1992). Second, the employee's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern must outweigh the public employer's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734-35; see also Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 992. If a public employee establishes that her expression is protected by meeting the above two criteria, she must still prove that her expression caused the retaliatory act of which she complains in order to establish a violation of the First Amendment. See Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 993. 19 In this case, Jones contends that she never made any public comment about the prospect of placing the alternative education program on the Dunbar campus and that Jones retaliated against her based upon his perception that she spoke out negatively regarding this matter. Assuming for the sake of argument that Jones's expression as perceived by Collins would have been subject to constitutional protection (i.e., the negative comments perceived by Collins related to a matter of public concern and Jones's interest in making them outweighed TISD's interest in efficiently providing educational services), retaliation based on this perception, in the absence of any actual expression by Jones that is subject to First Amendment protection, does not constitute a constitutional violation. 20 In Barkoo v. Melby, 901 F.2d 613 (7th Cir.1990), the Seventh Circuit addressed a factual scenario analogous to the one at issue here: the plaintiff alleged that she was constructively discharged from her position as a communications operator for the Village of Skokie Police Department based upon her supervisors' erroneous belief that she had discussed a matter relating to the department with local media. See id. at 614-16. The court concluded that the plaintiff could not establish a violation of her First Amendment right to free expression because she had not actually engaged in any protected First Amendment activity. See id. at 619. The court observed: 21 To the extent Barkoo alleges that her employers retaliated against her because they thought she was engaged in First Amendment protected speech on an issue of public concern, we reject the notion that this allegation brings her claim within the requirements of § 1983. Every § 1983 case relating to workplace freedom of speech, from Connick on down, discusses the actual speech engaged in by the employee. Barkoo not only admits, she insists that she did not provide any information to the press. Barkoo provides no authority for the proposition that her free speech rights are deprived in violation of § 1983 when the speech at issue admittedly never occurred. 22 Id. 23 In Fogarty v. Boles, 121 F.3d 886 (3d Cir.1997), the Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion regarding a claim that a public school teacher was punished based upon the school principal's erroneous belief that the teacher had contacted the press about a matter of public interest at the school. See id. at 887. The court held that the teacher fail[ed] to meet his burden of proving a violation of his free speech rights [because] he denie[d] contacting, attempting to contact, or having any intention of contacting the press. Id. The court noted that, in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging retaliation based upon the plaintiff's exercise of her First Amendment rights bears the burden of showing, among other things,  'that his conduct was constitutionally protected.'  Fogarty, 121 F.3d at 890 (quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 575). The court reasoned that the teacher could not sustain that burden of proof because there was no conduct that was constitutionally protected--indeed, there was no conduct--period. Id. 24 The instant case is analogous to Barkoo and Fogarty in all material respects, and we find the reasoning of the Seventh and Third Circuits persuasive. Jones contends that she never spoke out--positively or negatively--regarding the prospect of placing the alternative education program on the Dunbar campus. The fact that Collins transferred her on the basis of a mistaken belief that she spoke out in a manner that we assume for the sake of argument would have been constitutionally protected fails to establish a violation of Jones's First Amendment rights. An asserted bad motive on the part of Collins cannot of itself form the basis of a First Amendment violation. See id. at 890.  '[A] free speech claim depends on speech, and there was none in this case.'  Id. (quoting Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir.1996) (Roth, J., dissenting)). 25 Jones argues, however, that her silence on the issue of the location of TISD's alternative education program is entitled to First Amendment protection. In support of this contention, she relies on Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), in which the Supreme Court invalidated a New Hampshire statute requiring residents to display the state motto of Live Free or Die on their license plates. While it is true that silence in the face of an illegitimate demand for speech is subject to First Amendment protection, see id. at 714, 97 S.Ct. at 1435, this principle is inapplicable here. Jones does not contend that Collins made a demand--legitimate or otherwise--that she speak out in favor of the possibility of placing the alternative education program on the Dunbar campus. Indeed, she specifically contends that he did not instruct her to speak on this matter. 1 Therefore, Jones's reliance on Wooley is inapposite. 26 Jones's silence in the absence of a demand for speech likewise does not constitute a form of symbolic expression warranting First Amendment protection. We reach this conclusion because [t]he First Amendment 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.'  Connick, 461 U.S. at 145, 103 S.Ct. at 1689 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)). The goal of unfettered interchange of ideas is not furthered by conduct without substantial communicative intent and impact. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 586, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1253, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) (White, J., concurring). Accordingly, 27 [f]or activities to constitute expressive conduct and fall within the scope of the First Amendment, they must be sufficiently imbued with elements of communication. In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we ask whether an intent to convey a particularized message was present and whether the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it. 28 Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101, 109 (5th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 29 Nothing in the summary judgment record indicates that Jones intended her silence on the issue of placement of TISD's alternative learning program to constitute a statement of any sort. Nor does the summary judgment record provide any indication that anyone, Collins included, had reason to perceive it as such. Jones has therefore not alleged that she engaged in any expressive conduct potentially subject to First Amendment protection. Cf. Langford v. Lane, 921 F.2d 677, 679 (6th Cir.1991) (applying the public interest and Pickering /Connick balancing test to an employer's express refusal to speak with her supervisor); Nicholson v. Gant, 816 F.2d 591, 599 (11th Cir.1987) (concluding that the plaintiff had engaged in speech warranting First Amendment protection where she clearly expressed her desire not to read [a] prepared statement at [a] political rally (emphasis added)); Sykes v. McDowell, 786 F.2d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1986) (A public employee who positively asserts the right not to speak when ordered to support his employer [politically] is within the protection of the first amendment. (emphasis added)). 30 In sum, the summary judgment record construed in the light most favorable to Jones indicates that Collins's transfer of Jones from her position as principal of Dunbar did not violate Jones's constitutional rights, much less any rights clearly established at the time of the transfer. Collins is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.