Opinion ID: 1187875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant cites the burglary statute under which he was charged: Burglary; aggravated burglary; penalties. (a) A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein. (b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, burglary is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both. Section 6-3-301, W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1985. [1] Appellant asserts that there was no sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction that he either entered the Ferguson home or intended to commit a felony therein. We must decide whether the jury received sufficient evidence to justify its verdict. As always, when sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we conduct our review and examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Smith v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194 (1977). Downs v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 610 (1978), and Newell v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 8 (1976), guide our disposition of this case. In Downs, a grain elevator owner reported tools missing shortly after a local resident reported to police that appellant was at her house trying to sell her some tools. Appellant was located at the railroad yards, in possession of one of the stolen tools. The other stolen tools were returned by a brakeman who had purchased them from appellant. Downs was convicted of burglary, and appealed that the jury's finding of guilt was based solely on appellant's possession of stolen goods, and that there was no evidence placing him at the scene of the crime. The court cited Blakely v. State, Wyo., 542 P.2d 857 (1975), to explain that circumstantial evidence is to be measured on the same basis as direct evidence. In analyzing proof of the elements of burglary in Downs, the court said:    There can be no question but what the Greybull Elevator was intentionally entered without the consent of the person in lawful possession by someone with the intent to steal. The entry is established by the presence of the tools at closing time and their absence when the building was reopened the next morning, not more than 14 hours later. Any reasonable mind must conclude that in order to effect removal of the tools, entry was necessary. The larceny could not have been committed without a felonious entry. The phenomena of rubbing Aladdin's lamp or levitation have not gained general acceptance as a shortcut. Since the tools were not taken by the owner nor by one with his permission, the element of stealing was present. The tools in the possession of the defendant were proved to be the same tools as those stolen from the building entered. 581 P.2d at 615. Applying the Downs rationale to the case at bar, the entry to the Ferguson home is established by the presence in the stolen car of the checks, jewelry and personal items, followed by the discovery of their absence several days later. Appellant attempts to distinguish Downs on this point, claiming that there is no evidence of the date that an illegal entry occurred at the Ferguson home. Yet Yvonne Ferguson testified that on February 14 she discovered that several items were missing, and that the only opportunity for someone to enter through an unlocked door was the weekend of February 9 and 10. Her testimony, coupled with the disappearance of Barry Davis' car that same weekend, satisfies us that the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that an illegal entry occurred on that weekend. A jury's finding of fact should not be interfered with if there is any substantial evidence to support it. Smith v. State, supra, 564 P.2d at 1198; Reilly v. State, Wyo., 496 P.2d 899, reh. denied 498 P.2d 1236 (1972). Also consistent with Downs, the Fergusons' possessions were not taken by them, nor did anyone have permission to use them, and Yvonne Ferguson identified the items stolen from her home as the same items that were found with the appellant in Barry Davis' stolen car. Additional corroboration in this case comes through the testimony of the Sturgis bank teller who identified appellant as the man who cashed the forged check. Another factor cited by the Downs majority as corroborative evidence was the opportunity of the defendant to commit the crime charged.    Evidence of opportunity to commit the crime is a link which considered with other incriminating facts may establish the guilt of the defendant. Jones v. State, Wyo. 1977, 568 P.2d 837. 581 P.2d at 616. In addition to having the opportunity to enter the Fergusons' unlocked home on February 9 or 10, appellant had a link to the Fergusons' home in particular. Yvonne Ferguson testified that appellant claimed to be the husband of Tammy Smith, who had lived (albeit with another man) in the same trailer court as the Fergusons, and who helped Yvonne Ferguson do cleaning work. Mrs. Ferguson also testified that appellant had visited with her husband, Wiley, on two occasions at a bar in inquiry about Tammy. Finally, Downs also says that: Fabrication of a false, exculpatory statement for the sake of diverting inquiry or casting off suspicion is circumstantial evidence of guilt. Bennett v. State, Wyo. 1963, 377 P.2d 634. 581 P.2d at 616. Appellant Cowell testified that he did not go to Sturgis, South Dakota, to cash the checks, that he did not forge the checks, and that the bank teller was incorrect in identifying him. He did not explain how his name happened to appear on the checks or who could have presented his birth certificate as identification. Any jury could reasonably determine the statement was false, see Mirich v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 590 (1979), and consequently this court will not interfere with the jury judgment in such case unless its conclusion is inherently impossible or unreasonable. Downs v. State, supra; People v. Heiple, 29 Ill. App.3d 452, 330 N.E.2d 556 (1975). The other case which guides our decision is Newell v. State, supra, also a burglary case, in which sufficiency of the evidence was an issue. Newell was found guilty of breaking into and stealing drugs and a gun from a Casper pharmacy. Newell testified that he obtained possession of the stolen goods by purchasing them from drug dealers whom he met in the Wonder Bar in Casper. In affirming his conviction, the Newell court said: Possession plus an explanation which the jury could find to be false is corroboration. [Citations.] It is a factfinder's question whether explanation raises a doubt. [Citations.] The trier of fact is not required to believe the defendant's explanation of possession. [Citations.] The cases cited in this paragraph were jury-tried. The weakness or falsity of the defendant's explanation can be considered as supportive of guilt, when hitched to exclusive possession. [Citations.] 548 P.2d at 14. In addition to denying that he had cashed the forged check in Sturgis, appellant testified that he borrowed the car from a Curt Dunne, whom he met at the Good Times Bar in Gillette, for a trip to Denver to visit friends. Appellant, on cross-examination, testified that he did not know where Dunne lived, and when asked how he could return the car if he did not know where Dunne lived, Cowell said that he was supposed to return it at the Good Times Bar. The jury chose not to believe appellant's explanation, which explanation at best was highly unlikely, particularly so since he did not also appeal the joyriding conviction. Dunne was not otherwise materialized as a real person by any trial evidence. Appellant's credibility was further in question because of a criminal record revealed by cross-examination after his direct examination. He was on probation from a prior accessory-to-burglary conviction. The other important factor in Newell was appellant's possession of the stolen goods:    The most significant and material evidence of defendant's guilt is his possession of the stolen property. Possession is a strong circumstance tending to show guilt and only slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances is required. Orcutt v. State, Wyo. 1961, 366 P.2d 690, 692-3. While it may be otherwise elsewhere, in this jurisdiction, possession alone is insufficient in itself to convict. Orcutt, supra; State v. Costin, 1934, 46 Wyo. 463, 469, 28 P.2d 782, 783. 548 P.2d at 13. We find as additional corroboration that, upon apprehension, appellant possessed the stolen Davis car, the Fergusons' watches, jewelry, personal items, and personal checks, with several of the recovered checks made payable to him. Additionally, he had cashed one of the checks, and was positively identified by the bank teller in using his birth certificate as identification. This is determined to be more than the slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances which is required by Newell v. State, supra, and Orcutt v. State, Wyo., 366 P.2d 690 (1961). See also Leppek v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1117 (1981), and Delmont v. State, 15 Wyo. 271, 88 P. 623 (1906). This case is clearly distinguished from State v. King, Wyo., 718 P.2d 452 (1986), where corroborative factors were not found.