Opinion ID: 78403
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hudson's Judicial Council Complaint

Text: On appeal, Ginsberg asserts that the filing of a complaint of judicial misconduct with the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit was his main basis for filing the Recusal Motion. Ginsberg's Recusal Motion repeatedly referenced this complaint of judicial misconduct (the Complaint), which was filed by Phil Hudson (Hudson) with the Judicial Council, regarding Judge Briskman's conduct in the bankruptcy action Advanced Telecomm. Network, Inc. v. Daniel W. Allen ( ATN ). (Recusal Mot. at 2.) In ATN Shuker represented ATN, Hudson represented the defendants/creditors Daniel and David Allen, and Judge Briskman initially presided. Cuthill served as a witness in that case, but there is no overlap in the parties or the issues between ATN and the instant bankruptcy proceedings. According to the Recusal Motion, Shuker filed an ex parte motion in ATN, Judge Briskman held an ex parte hearing on that motion, and Judge Briskman ordered the ex parte motion be removed from the docket. These allegations are generally accurate. However, it is important to note the context. ATN was attempting to recover funds from the Allens. At the motion hearing, Shuker expressed ATN's concern that the Allens would secret assets in other corporations to avoid turning them over. The Allens had already been ruled in contempt of two orders relating to the disclosure or repatriation of assets, so ATN did not want to give the Allens any advance warning of its attempt to have a temporary receiver appointed. At the hearing, Shuker and Judge Briskman also discussed the possibility of the Allens being arrested for contempt. Judge Briskman agreed to take the hearing off the docket sheet so that the Allens would not have advance warning of the matters discussed therein. A court reporter who transcribed the hearing was also present and a full record was made. Hudson later learned of the ex parte motion and hearing and filed an Emergency Motion to Disqualify Opposing Counsel. At some point ATN was transferred to Bankruptcy Judge Jenneman, who held a hearing on the Motion and denied it. In her Order denying the Motion, Judge Jenneman stated,  ex parte hearings, while discouraged, are sometimes appropriate. In this case, the decision to allow ATN to proceed with a hearing without notice to the Allens does not appear improper. Moreover, the hearing was held on the record. (Am. Memo. Op. Den. Defs.' Emergency Mot. to Disqualify at 8.) Thereafter, Hudson also filed the Complaint with the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit. In this case, Ginsberg first learned of Hudson's Complaint from Spradley on July 7, 2006. Spradley received an email from an attorney with his firm named John Anthony informing him that Hudson had filed a Complaint related to the ATN matter. Anthony heard this from another attorney (not Hudson). On the same day, Spradley spoke to Hudson about the Complaint, confirmed that Hudson had in fact filed one, and informed Ginsberg of what he had learned. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 119.) On July 8, 2006 Ginsberg began researching the Recusal Motion. ( Id. at 18.) Ginsberg himself never spoke to Hudson before filing the Recusal Motion ( id. at 30), and neither Spradley nor Ginsberg asked Hudson for a copy of the Complaint or other proof of its filing ( see id. at 30; 142, 153-54). At the sanctions hearing Ginsberg testified that after reviewing the ATN docket he detected parallels between the ATN case and this one. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 169.) Ginsberg said he was troubled by the appointment of an interim trustee in both cases. ( Id. ) Additionally, Ginsberg claimed that Shuker's threats of imprisonment in ATN reminded Huggins and Knight of Shuker's threats of imprisonment in this case (discussed below), and they were concerned about the implication that Shuker would have Judge Briskman's approval in doing so. ( Id. ) Ginsberg therefore filed the Recusal Motion. In the Motion, Ginsberg alleged that Judge Briskman presiding here is, himself, under investigation by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals following ex parte, allegedly inappropriate communications with Mr. R. Scott Shuker. (Recusal Mot. at 2.) Ginsberg claimed that Judge Briskman's failure to notify the parties of the ongoing investigation, as well as Shuker's role as a future witness in the investigation, further bolstered the appearance of partiality. ( Id. at 21, 27.)
We find that the bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in finding no factual support for Ginsberg's assertion that the existence of the Complaint created an appearance of impropriety requiring recusal. The mere filing of a complaint of judicial misconduct is not grounds for recusal. As Shuker's expert witness Lubet explained, it would be detrimental to the judicial system if a judge had to disqualify himself anytime someone filed a complaint about his conduct. A party would only have to file a complaint to get a different judge. Lubet testified that the Rules of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability (Judicial Council Rules) allow lots of complaints to be filed, many of which are frivolous. (Recusal Tr. Vol. II at 13-14.) The Rules therefore create their own screening mechanism for these complaints; a stage one limited inquiry to determine whether a formal investigation into the validity of the complaint is necessary. ( Id. ); see also Judicial Council Rule 4(a) (the Chief Judge may conduct a limited inquiry for the purpose of determining(1) whether appropriate corrective action has been or can be taken without the necessity for a formal investigation; and (2) whether the facts stated in the complaint are plainly untrue or are incapable of being established through investigation. (emphasis added)). This limited inquiry resolves 98% of all filed complaints; only 2% of all complaints ever proceed to the formal investigation stage. (Recusal Tr. Vol. II at 13-14.) It would create an absurd result to force a judge to recuse himself because of the 2% possibility that the complaint will become an investigation and the even smaller chance that an involved party will be called as a witness in that investigation. ( Id. ) Thus, the mere existence of a complaint of judicial misconduct does not create an appearance of impropriety. While a formal investigation into a complaint may trigger recusal, there is no evidence of an impending investigation here. Yet, the Recusal Motion referred to the Complaint as an investigation twelve times, made fourteen implications of the existence of a formal investigation, and referred to Shuker as a key player in the investigation and a future witness. (Recusal Mot. at 21.) During the Sanctions Hearing, Ginsberg testified that he assumed there was an ongoing investigation by virtue of the fact that Hudson's Complaint had not been dismissed for a number of months. [5] Yet, according to the Judicial Council Rules the length of time that a complaint remains pending is irrelevant. [6] Ginsberg further asserted that Spradley used the term investigation when relating his conversations with Hudson (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 5) and Spradley testified that Hudson had used the term investigation when relating the events to him ( id. at 136-37, 142). In Hudson's deposition, however, he testified that he never used the term investigation. (Sanctions Order at 28.) Anthony's deposition revealed he did use the term investigation, but Anthony admitted that he had no first hand knowledge of the Complaint. (Recusal Ex. II at 56-57, 62.) Anthony compared his knowledge of the Complaint to knowledge about Britney Spears' divorce ... a lot of people have heard a lot. ( Id. at 56-57.) Moreover, the Judicial Council Rules clearly state that if the Chief Judge was conducting a formal investigation, Hudson (the complainant) would be informed. See Judicial Council Rule 4(c) (If the complaint is not dismissed ... the Chief Judge shall appoint a special committee ... to investigate the allegations of the complaint.... The Chief Judge shall notify the complainant and the complained-of judge of the appointment of a special committee.... (emphasis added)). Hudson was never notified of such and never indicated to anyone that he had been. Spradley testified that Hudson's only correspondence with the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit was immediately after he filed his Complaint. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 142.) Hudson received a letter confirming the Complaint was received and submitted to the Chief Judge. ( Id. ) Spradley further testified that he spoke with Hudson three or four times after that with the expressed reason to ask if he had heard the result or an update, and he replied in the negative. ( Id. at 154.) Even though the Judicial Council Rules clearly state that Hudson would be informed if his Complaint was dismissed or moved to the investigation stage, Ginsberg relied only on the fact that Hudson was not informed of a change in status to deem it an investigation. [7] This is clearly an unreasonable reliance and jump to an unsupported conclusion. Similarly, the mere existence of an ex parte hearing is not grounds for recusal. As Lubet explained there are many reasons judges properly hold ex parte hearings, such as a temporary restraining order or bail revocation proceedings. Indeed, in ATN Judge Jenneman stated that ex parte hearings may be appropriate. (Am. Memo. Op. Den. Defs.' Emergency Mot. to Disqualify at 9.) In fact, Judge Jenneman held that the ex parte hearing in ATN did not create the appearance of impropriety. ( Id. ) ([T]he conversation [did] not rise to the level of a specifically identifiable impropriety.).
The bankruptcy court also found that the Recusal Motion lacked legal support. We agree. The only case Ginsberg relied on for the proposition that a complaint of judicial misconduct (which Ginsberg equates with an investigation) requires recusal was United States v. Garrudo, 869 F.Supp. 1574 (S.D.Fla.1994). (Recusal Mot. at 20.) In Garrudo, a district court judge was under investigation by the United States Attorney's Office for accepting gratuities worth thousands of dollars.... Garrudo, 869 F.Supp. at 1576. While presiding over criminal cases, the judge was told he was the subject of a pending United States Attorney's Office investigation. Id. The Judge was subsequently interviewed by federal agents and served with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. Id. Once he was informed that his status was elevated to that of a target the judge recused himself from all pending criminal matters. Id. Criminal defendants convicted or sentenced by the judge while the investigation was pending, but before the judge recused himself, challenged their convictions. Id. The defendants claimed that the judge had an incentive to curry favor with the government. Id. The district court held that recusal was appropriate. [8] Ginsberg argues that the criminal grand jury investigation in Garrudo and the present judicial misconduct complaint are analogous. (Recusal Mot. at 20) (Fortunately there are few cases in which courts have had to apply the recusal statute to a circumstance in which a judge is under an investigation like the instant investigation. A notable exception is Garrudo.  (emphasis added)). However, there is no evidence that Judge Briskman was under investigation, let alone a criminal one. In our view, a civil complaint of judicial misconduct and a criminal grand jury investigation are not analogous. The facts at issue here are further distinguishable from Garrudo. Ginsberg relies on Garrudo for the principle that an alignment of interests between the presiding judge and counsel in a position to influence the outcome of an investigation or inquiry affecting the judge would cause a reasonable objective observer to question the impartiality of the court. (Initial Br. at 32.) In Garrudo, however, the party conducting the investigation (the United States Government) was actually before the court, so the court may have had an incentive to curry favor. Here, there was no investigation, only a complaint which had a 2% chance of becoming an investigation. Moreover, the existence of the investigation was well known in Garrudo and could therefore affect public confidence in the judiciary. The investigation was discussed in various newspapers and was printed on the front page of the Miami Daily Business Review. Garrudo, 869 F.Supp. at 1576. On the other hand, evidence of this Complaint was not in the public forum until Ginsberg filed the Recusal Motion. A confidential complaint that the public is not aware of does not have any affect on the public's confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the judicial process. See Davis, 506 F.3d at 1332 n. 12. In this regard, we agree with the rulings of the bankruptcy court and the district court.