Opinion ID: 2080543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Armed with a Dangerous Weapon.

Text: At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was instructed about five possible verdicts, including robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit, a firearm, and robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm. Robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon, of which crime defendant was found guilty, is a Class A offense whether committed with a firearm or some other type of weapon capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. However, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(5) provides that if the state pleads and proves that a Class A crime was committed with a firearm against a person, a minimum sentence of four years imprisonment shall be imposed. For the purpose of applying the provision armed with a dangerous weapon, the criminal code provides, in subdivision 9(D) of section 2, that a thing presented in a covered or open manner as a dangerous weapon shall be presumed to be a dangerous weapon. The presiding justice instructed the jury regarding this statutory presumption as follows: If a thing is presented as a weapon in an open or covered manner, you are permitted  you are not compelled but you are permitted  to infer that the thing was a dangerous weapon and conclude, if you see fit to do so, that it was a dangerous weapon. This instruction was coupled with a general charge relative to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that it must find the existence of the preliminary facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to reach a verdict of guilty on the basis of the statutory permissible inference. It is true that where the state rests its case as to an element of the crime charged entirely on a permissible inference, the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the facts from which the inference is to be drawn. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). It is not required, however, that a separate instruction be given when a permissive inference is charged. The trier of fact is free to accept or reject the inference. No burden is placed upon the defendant. The trial court's general instruction relative to burden of proof was therefore applicable and sufficient. Defendant argues finally that the jury's finding that the theft was committed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm was not rational. In essence, defendant complains because the jury found some instrument not to be a firearm  perhaps because they were not convinced it was operable as a firearm  yet inferred that it was a dangerous weapon, capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. This point of appeal is controlled by State v. Heald, supra , wherein we re-applied the majority rule that a defendant cannot be heard to complain of an error which works to his advantage because he is not thereby prejudiced. Neither the trial court's instruction on the point nor the jury's verdict is open to objection. Moreover, defense counsel acquiesced in the charge, and, in response to a request by the jury for clarification of the five possible verdicts, merely asked that the five alternatives be written out on separate pieces of paper. There was no error. The entry is: Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed. All concurring.