Opinion ID: 2538643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Combined Theories of Premeditated Murder and Felony Murder

Text: Next, Hoge raises two issues regarding the State's prosecution under the combined theories of premeditated murder and felony murder as a basis for first-degree murder. First, he argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that it could rely on the combined theories of premeditated murder and felony murder rather than agreeing on a single theory. Second, he argues that his conviction for first-degree murder must be reversed because the jury did not agree on the underlying theory of guilt, thereby denying him a unanimous verdict. Although both issues are analyzed using different standards of review, both are predicated on the same basic argument. Consequently, they will be analyzed together to avoid repetition. Both of Hoge's arguments are predicated on his conclusion that premeditated murder and felony murder are separate and distinct crimes. Hoge relies on State v. Wakefield, 267 Kan. 116, 977 P.2d 941 (1999), and State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 970 P.2d 42 (1998), for this proposition. In both Wakefield and Vontress, the defendants were charged with first-degree murder under both theories of premeditated murder and felony murder and found guilty under both theories. The Wakefield and Vontress defendants argued that their convictions were not unanimous because the jury did not unanimously agree on the underlying theory. Noting the legislative change in sentencing options for premeditated murder, the Wakefield and Vontress courts distinguished earlier case law which required unanimity as to the crime of first-degree murder but did not require unanimity as to the underlying theory. Wakefield, 267 Kan. at 137-141 (citing State v. Thompkins, 263 Kan. 602, 609-10, 952 P.2d 1332 [1998]; State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 785, 851 P.2d 370 [1993], modified on other grounds by State v. Willis, 254 Kan. 119, 864 P.2d 1198 [1993] [holding that the jury unanimously convicted the defendant of first-degree murder even if it was not unanimous about the underlying theory without distinguishing the recent enactment of the hard 40 sentence]; State v. Hartfield, 245 Kan. 431, 781 P.2d 1050 [1989]; State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 552 P.2d 931 [1976], overruled on other grounds State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 317, 597 P.2d 1108 [1979] [finding the jury's verdict unanimous even though the jury did not specify the underlying theory]); Vontress, 266 Kan. at 262-64 (citing the same cases as Wakefield ). In 1990, the legislature added the hard 40 sentencing option for persons convicted of premeditated murder. L. 1990, ch. 99, sec. 8. In 1994, the legislature amended the sentencing provisions, requiring 15 years before a defendant is eligible for parole for felony murder while subjecting a defendant convicted of premeditated murder to several harsher sentencing options like the death penalty, a hard 40 sentence, or a hard 25 sentence. See K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4706(c); K.S.A. 21-4624(a); K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4635(a); K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-3717(b)(1). Nevertheless, both courts upheld the convictions, finding that the verdicts were unanimous. Wakefield, 267 Kan. at 141; Vontress, 266 Kan. at 264. Although the Wakefield and Vontress courts noted the change in sentencing laws, they did not apply the change to overrule previous decisions that did not require unanimity on the theory of first-degree murder. In Vontress, the court applied the change in sentencing laws by limiting the available sentences if the jury did not reach a unanimous verdict regarding the premeditated-murder theory. 266 Kan. at 264. The Vontress court stated: Where the sentencing court cannot ascertain whether the jury unanimously convicted the defendant of both premeditated murder and felony murder, the sentencing court has no authority for sentencing the defendant for premeditated murder. 266 Kan. at 264. In dicta, the Vontress court stated: As stated in the statute, premeditated murder and felony murder are separate and distinct offenses, although the death of an individual is an element necessary to prove each of the crimes. 266 Kan. at 262. Hoge pinpoints this dicta from the Vontress opinion, which was later included in the Wakefield opinion, to support his argument that the jury verdict was not unanimous. It is important to note that the Vontress court made this statement without analyzing whether premeditated murder and felony murder were separate crimes. In fact, this court has determined that the two are not separate and distinct crimes, but merely different theories of proving the required elements of premeditation and intent for the crime of first-degree murder. See State v. Chism, 243 Kan. 484, 491-92, 759 P.2d 105 (1988) (holding that lesser included crime instructions were not necessary for defendant who was charged alternatively with premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Barncord, 240 Kan. 35, 37-38, 726 P.2d 1322 (1986) (finding an amendment to the information unnecessary to charge felony murder in the alternative to premeditated murder and stating that premeditated murder and felony murder are not separate and distinct offenses); State v. McCowan, 226 Kan. 752, 759-61, 602 P.2d 1363 (1979)(allowing the State to amend the information on remand to allege a different underlying felony for the felony murder charge and permitting the trial court to instruct the jury on premeditated murder in the second trial even though the defendant's first trial proceeded solely on the theory of felony murder). `The felonious conduct is held tantamount to the elements of deliberation and premeditation which are otherwise required for first-degree murder.' [Citation omitted.] State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 887, 26 P.3d 673 (2001). In State v. Davis, 268 Kan. at 669, the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder under the combined theories of premeditated murder and felony murder. The Davis court analyzed the issue using the alternate means rule from State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 288-90, 875 P.2d 242 (1994). Davis, 268 Kan. at 679. After finding sufficient evidence to support both theories, the Davis court concluded that the defendant was not deprived of his right to a unanimous verdict. Davis, 268 Kan. at 680-81. The form of the statute supports the Davis court's conclusion that premeditated murder and felony murder are alternate means of committing the same crime and not separate and distinct crimes. K.S.A. 21-3401 provides: Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human being committed: (a) Intentionally and with premeditation; or (b) in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto. Hoge's argument that premeditated murder and felony murder are separate and distinct crimes is without merit. Nevertheless, we will address each of the issues he raises based on this argument. First, Hoge argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the combined theories of felony murder and premeditated murder as a basis for first-degree murder. When reviewing jury instructions, an appellate court must consider all of the instructions together without isolating any one instruction. If the instructions as a whole properly and fairly state the law as applied to the facts of the case and a jury could not have been misled by them, then the instructions do not constitute reversible error even if they are in some way erroneous. State v. Peterson, 273 Kan. 217, 221, 42 P.3d 137 (2002). The instruction at issue, No. 18, states: In this case, the State has charged the defendant with one offense of murder in the first degree and has introduced evidence on two alternate theories of proving this crime. The State may prove murder in the first degree by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Joby M. Hoge killed Ivan A. Winn and that such killing was done while in the commission of or attempting to commit Aggravated Burglary, or in the alternative by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Joby M. Hoge killed Ivan A. Winn intentionally and with premeditation, as fully set out in these instructions. Where evidence is presented on the two alternate theories of proving the crime charged, you must consider both in arriving at your verdict. In Instruction No. 16, the court has set out for your consideration the essential claims which must be proved by the State before you may find the defendant guilty of felony murder, that is the killing of a person in the commission of or in an attempt to commit Aggravated Burglary. In Instruction No. 15, the court has set out for your consideration the essential claims which must be proved by the State before you may find the defendant guilty of premeditated murder. If you do not have a reasonable doubt from all the evidence that the State has proven murder in the first degree on either or both theories, then you will enter a verdict of guilty of Murder in the First Degree. Your presiding juror will then check which theory you based your decision upon. Theory (1A) should be checked if you unanimously agree that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of premeditated murder. Theory (1B) should be checked in you unanimously agree that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony murder. If you unanimously agree that the defendant is guilty under both theory (1A) and (1B) then your presiding juror should check both (1A) and (1B). If you unanimously agree that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree but you cannot unanimously agree under which theory then your presiding juror should check theory (1C) which is the combined theory of premeditated murder and felony murder. Checking theory (1C) means that all jury members must have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under either theory (1A) or (1B) but the jury members could not unanimously agree between the two theories. If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant as to the crime of murder in the first degree on either or both theories, then you must enter a verdict of not guilty. In Wakefield, the jury was instructed as follows: `If you do not have a reasonable doubt from all the evidence that the State has proven murder in the first degree on either or both theories, then you will enter a verdict of guilty on either or both theories. If you are unable to unanimously agree on either theory, but you each agree that the State has proven murder in the first degree on one of the two theories, you will enter a verdict of guilty on the combined theories of premeditated murder and felony murder.' 267 Kan. at 137. In Vontress, the jury was instructed as follows: `Where evidence is presented on the two alternate theories of proving the crime charged, you must consider both in arriving at your verdict. . . . . `If you do not have a reasonable doubt from all of the evidence that the State has proven murder in the first degree on either or both theories, then you will enter a verdict of guilty.' 266 Kan. at 261. The jury was further instructed: `If you find the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, the Presiding Juror shall sign the applicable verdict form and, in addition, you shall then determine the alternative theory or theories contained in Theory 1A, Theory 1B, or Theory 1C. The Presiding Juror shall sign the applicable alternative Theory Verdict form.' 266 Kan. at 261. The verdict form in Vontress stated: `1. We, the jury, unanimously find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. . . . . `Select the appropriate theory or theories: `Theory (A) We, the jury, unanimously find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of premeditated murder. . . . . `Theory 1(B) We, the jury, unanimously find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony murder. . . . . `Theory 1(C) We, the jury, unable to agree under Theory 1(a) or 1(b), do unanimously find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the combined theories of premeditated murder and felony murder.' 266 Kan. at 261. Although the Wakefield court appears to find error with these instructions, the Vontress court found that the instructions clearly inform the jury that a unanimous verdict was required under either or both theories of guilt. Wakefield, 267 Kan. at 137; Vontress, 266 Kan. at 264. Neither court, however, reversed the defendants' conviction based on an error in the instructions. Wakefield, 267 Kan. at 141; Vontress, 266 Kan. at 264. The instructions given in this case are a combination of the PIK recommended instructions and verdict forms for murder in the first degree under alternative theories. The instruction at issue exactly follows the language in PIK Crim. 3d 56.02A and the format of the corresponding verdict form PIK Crim. 3d 68.16, both of which incorporate the instruction and verdict form language from Vontress. Although the use of PIK instructions is not mandatory, it is strongly recommended as a starting point in the preparation of any set of jury instructions. If the facts in a case require modification, the trial court should modify or add to the PIK instructions as necessary. State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1035, 40 P.3d 139 (2001). The instruction in this case differs from the pattern instruction and verdict form by informing the jury to check both theories (1A) and (1B) if the members unanimously agree on both theories and by elaborating on the instruction for theory (1C) when the members could not unanimously agree on either theory. These differences clarify the law without misstating the law or confusing the jury. Thus, the trial court did not erroneously instruct the jury regarding the alternative theories for first-degree murder. The next issue is whether Hoge's conviction for first-degree murder must be reversed because the jury verdict was not unanimous. The issue of jury unanimity is a question of law over which this court has de novo review. See, e.g., Davis, 268 Kan. 661, 678-81, 998 P.2d 1127 (2000); Wakefield, 267 Kan. at 136-41; Vontress, 266 Kan. at 260-64; Kingsley, 252 Kan. at 785-86; Hartfield, 245 Kan. at 446-47; Wilson, 220 Kan. at 344-45. To determine whether the jury verdict was unanimous when the defendant is charged with both felony murder and premeditated murder as underlying theories for first-degree murder, the proper test to apply is the alternative means test as found in State v. Timley, 255 Kan. at 289, which provides:. `In an alternative means case, where a single offense may be committed in more than one way, there must be jury unanimity as to guilt for the single crime charged. Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by which the crime was committed so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative means. [Citations omitted.] In reviewing an alternative means case, the court must determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found each means of committing the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations omitted.]' In this case, there is sufficient evidence to support a rational juror's belief that Hoge committed first-degree murder under either theory. Hoge admitted that he and Hadley entered Winn's house to rob him. He also admitted that he knew Hadley had a gun. When combined with Hoge's fingerprint on the window and the evidence of forced entry, these admissions support a finding of felony murder. Likewise, the number and location of shots fired in Winn's bedroom coupled with the presence of alcohol, which was the target of the robbery, lead to the inference that Hoge and Hadley broke into Winn's house for the purpose of killing Winn. It also supports the inference that Hoge and Hadley killed Winn to prevent him from being a witness against them. The jury could have inferred that they brought the gun to kill any possible eyewitnesses. This clearly establishes the premeditation and intent necessary for premeditated murder. The jury unanimously found Hoge guilty of first-degree murder. The jury was not required to agree on the means by which Hoge committed the crime as long as both alternative means were supported by the evidence. Accordingly, Hoge's conviction for first-degree murder need not be reversed for lack of jury unanimity.