Opinion ID: 874432
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Boundary Line

Text: The Porters argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the boundary issue for two reasons. First, they contend a determination of the boundary line was never sought by the parties. Second, they maintain the determination was not proper because the court relied on the opinion of a surveyor in deciding the issue as a matter of law, instead of examining the intent of the original parties as a question of fact. We disagree with the Porters' contention that a determination was not sought; however, we hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the boundary issue.
The only issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings, and the court must then also examine what issues pled have been raised in the motion for summary judgment. Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008). Here, the issue of the location of the boundary line was raised in the pleadings and then placed at issue by Bassett-Mendenhall's cross-motion for summary judgment. First, Bassett-Mendenhall alleged in their counterclaim that the Porters had wrongfully and willfully erected fences . . . not on the actual legal boundary. This allegation was not only denied by the Porters in their answer, but they also provided three alternative findings regarding the true location of the boundary line in their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. [2] In addition, Bassett-Mendenhall argued in their cross-motion for summary judgment that the proper location of the boundary was an issue remaining for trial. The boundary issue was also discussed at length by both parties during the pre-trial hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, as the district court stated, the Porters raised the boundary issue by arguing that I.C. § 35-103 applied. The language of I.C. § 35-103, which states that a fence is to be erected on, or as near as practicable to, the line of said land, necessitates a determination of the true boundary line. Thus, in arguing that I.C. § 35-103 applied, and that the fence had been erected as near as practicable to the boundary line, the Porters raised the issue of the true location of the boundary line. As such, the boundary issue was raised in both the pleadings and the motion for summary judgment and was, therefore, properly before the court.
Next, the Porters argue the district court erred in determining that meanderings of the hollow meant, as a matter of law, that the center of the hollow was the boundary line between the two parcels of property. The Porters contend the court also erred in relying on the affidavit of the surveyor. Instead, the Porters assert the meaning of the language meanderings of the hollow is ambiguous and, therefore, the intent of the original parties is an issue of fact that cannot be properly decided on summary judgment. In interpreting and construing deeds of conveyance, the primary goal is to seek and give effect to the real intention of the parties. Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). When an instrument conveying land is unambiguous, the intention of the parties can be settled as a matter of law using the plain language of the document. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005). However, if the language of the deed is ambiguous, ascertaining the parties' intent is a question of fact and may therefore only be settled by a trier of fact. See Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003). Ambiguity may be found where the language of the deed is subject to conflicting interpretations. Read, 141 Idaho at 499, 112 P.3d at 787. The trier of fact must then determine the intent of the parties according to the language of the conveyance and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Neider, 138 Idaho at 508, 65 P.3d at 530. Conflicting interpretations may arise when no potential boundary line unambiguously fits the language contained in the deed. Read, 141 Idaho at 500, 112 P.3d at 788. In Read, the language of the deed stating centerline of the creek, centerline of the main tributary of the creek, and centerline of the main tributary to Gold Creek may have referred to one of two drainage ditches or a comparatively dry historical natural creek channel. Id. Neither of the drainage ditches, nor the creek channel, unambiguously fit the language contained in the deeds, making the intentions of the drafters unclear. Id. Therefore, the intentions of the parties had to be determined as questions of fact with reference to the surrounding facts and circumstances, and summary judgment was not appropriate. Id. Similarly, conflicting interpretations may arise when a phrase lends itself, without contortion, to a number of inconsistent meanings. Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 858, 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1983). In Latham, this Court determined that the phrase exclusively for their use could be interpreted to mean (1) the grant of an easement right of way to the grantee, to the exclusion of all others, except the grantor; (2) the grant of an easement right of way excluding all others, including the grantor; or (3) as the grant of a fee simple estate to the grantee. Id. Thus, the instrument was reasonably subject to inconsistent meanings and was therefore ambiguous. Id. Likewise, in Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 771, 450 P.2d 990, 994 (1969), this Court determined that the phrase less a strip of land 30 feet wide off the East side for roadway was ambiguous because it may have either expressed the intent to retain the fee to the strip in the grantor, or to create an easement for roadway over the strip in favor of the grantor. Id. The Court found in that case that inconsistencies in a deed may throw such a `shadow of ambiguity' over the instrument as to warrant the introduction of parol evidence as an aid to discovering the intention of the parties. Id. Furthermore, the Idaho Court of Appeals has found that where facts regarding intent are not yet fully developed, but appear to be disputed, summary judgment is not proper. Currie v. Walkinshaw, 113 Idaho 586, 591, 746 P.2d 1045, 1050 (Ct.App.1987). In Currie, the deed description began with a call of `along the high water level' of the river `to a point exactly midway between the Northeast and Northwest corners of Lot 10.' Id. at 590, 746 P.2d at 1049. The court noted that while marked corners would normally be conclusive in a property description, a meander line was also involved which opened up the possibility that the boundary line was to follow the sinuosities of the river. [3] Id. The court determined the parties' respective arguments that the midpoint was to be found by following the shoreline of the river, or that it was to be a straight line between the two given points, were both reasonable and, therefore, a question of fact existed. [4] Id. While a presumption does exist that if a natural monument has width, then the boundary is the centerline of the monument, this presumption is rebuttable and does not replace the canon that the intent of the parties is determinative. 12 Am.Jur.2d Boundaries § 8 (1997); see also New Mexico v. Hidalgo Area Dev. Corp., 94 N.M. 63, 607 P.2d 601, 602 (1980). This centerline presumption has been demonstrated in Idaho cases, such as Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854, 949 P.2d 1061 (1997). In that case, the deed described one property line as Trestle Creek, and the court referred to the centerline of the creek as the boundary without discussion. Id. at 858, 949 P.2d at 1065. However, this presumption should only apply when the deed language is unambiguous. Here, the language of the deed is ambiguous and, therefore, a question of fact exists. The proposed boundary lines do not unambiguously fit the language of the deed, and the phrase meanderings of the hollow could be interpreted to mean a line either at the center of the hollow or following the sinuosities of the hollow from the SE to the NW corners. This case is very analogous to Currie because two reasonable conflicting principles exist: (1) a boundary line presumably runs in a straight line between known corners, and (2) when a monument is used, the centerline of the monument is the boundary. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists and summary judgment was not appropriate on the boundary issue.