Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the marriage statute claim

Text: Appellants contend that the Clerk should be required to issue them a marriage license because the marriage statute is gender-neutral and does not expressly prohibit same-sex marriages. We cannot agree. The language and legislative history of the marriage statute demonstrate that neither Congress nor the Council of the District of Columbia has ever intended to define marriage to include same-sex unions.
On March 3, 1901, Congress enacted the first District of Columbia Code. See An Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia, 31 Stat. 1189, ch. 854 (1901). That Act read: [A]ll acts of Congress by their terms applicable to the District of Columbia... in force at the date of the passage of this act shall remain in force except in so far as the same are inconsistent with, or are replaced by, some provision of this code. Id., ch. 1, § 1, at 1189. Chapter 43 of the Code addressed marriage; [2] Chapter 22 dealt with divorce. [3] The current marriage provision, D.C.Code §§ 30-101 to -121 and, for the most part, the present divorce provisions, D.C.Code §§ 16-901 to -924 (1989 & Supp. 1993), are essentially the same as those enacted in 1901. [4] The only significant changes in the marriage and divorce provisions since 1901 occurred in the Marriage and Divorce Act of 1977, D.C.Law 1-107, 1977 D.C.Stat. 114. See generally Samuel Green & John V. Long, The Real and Illusory Changes of the 1977 Marriage and Divorce Act, 27 CATH.U.L.REV. 469 (1978). [5] Before that Act was adopted, however, Councilmember Arrington Dixon had introduced substantially different legislation, Bill No. 1-89, the District of Columbia Marriage and Divorce bill, which would have completely repealed and redrafted D.C.Code §§ 30-101 to -121 (1973) (marriage) and §§ 16-901 to -924 (1973) (divorce). See The District of Columbia Marriage and Divorce Act, Bill 1-89 (May 6, 1975, with amendments proposed July 7, 1975) (hereafter Original Bill 1-89). In particular, Bill No. 1-89 would have changed § 30-101 to read: A marriage between two persons which is licensed, solemnized and registered as provided in this Act is valid in the District of Columbia. (Emphasis added.) Id. During a public hearing on Bill 1-89, Councilmember Dixon explained that the bill would permit marriages between persons of the same sex. See Councilmember Arrington Dixon, Opening Statement at Public Hearings on Bill No. 1-89 2 (June 7-8, 1975). Although the language of the bill did not directly authorize same-sex marriages, proposed § 30-112 expressly referred to such unions and thus indirectly acknowledged their validity: (a) The court shall enter its decree declaring the invalidity of a marriage entered into under the following circumstances:       (2) a party lacks the physical capacity to consummate the marriage by sexual intercourse, and at the time the marriage was solemnized the other party did not know of the incapacity; provided that this clause shall not apply to married persons of the same sex. Original Bill 1-89, § 30-112 (Emphasis added). If Bill 1-89 had become law, same-sex marriages clearly would have been authorized in the District. Because of the fervent debate generated by Bill 1-89, [6] however, Councilmember Dixon moved to substitute for original Bill 1-89 another bill proposed by the bar associations. This substitute bill was the one Council enacted as the Marriage and Divorce Act of 1977. See 1977 D.C.Stat. 119. Rather than entirely repealing and redrafting D.C.Code §§ 30-101 to -121 (1973) (marriage) and §§ 16-901 to -924 (1973) (divorce), the 1977 Act merely amended existing code provisions. See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND CRIM.LAW, REPORT ON BILL No. 1-89, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, at 1-5 (June 24, 1976). The 1977 Act contained no reference to same-sex marriage. In fact, it made only the following two changes in the long-standing marriage chapter: Sec. 113. (a) Section 1291 of the Act of March 3, 1901 (D.C.Code, sec. 30-110) is amended by striking names, ages and color and inserting in lieu thereof names and ages.[ [7] ] (b) Section 1296 of the Act of March 3, 1901 (D.C.Code, sec. 30-116) is repealed.[ [8] ] [O. 7] 1977 D.C.Stat. 119. In sum, the 1977 Act made no change germane to the issue before us; we are left to interpret marriage as understood by the Congress that enacted and codified the marriage statute in 1901 and, later, as understood by the Council that implicitly reconfirmed existing provisions of that statute while amending others through the 1977 Act.
Because the present marriage statute is essentially the same as the 1901 statute, which was derived from even earlier legislation, see supra note 2, the initial question is: what did Congress intend by the word marriage when it enacted the marriage statute in 1901? [9] Citing our well-known interpretive criteria, appellants stress that we should focus, first, on the plain words of the statute. See Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983) (en banc). They contend that since its inception the marriage statute, standing alone, has been essentially gender-neutral and, for that reason, has always authorized same-sex marriages. One provision of the present marriage statuteand only onehas always used genderspecific language. [10] The so-called consanguinity provision, D.C.Code § 30-101, refers to marriages of a man with a wife, and of a woman with a husband. [11] Appellants maintain that the policy underlying this provision is the prevention of genetic birth defects and mental retardation, a policy that necessarily would not apply to same-sex couples because they cannot produce children together. From this policy premise, appellants argue that this one statutory exception to gender neutrality in the marriage statute actually substantiates their argument that the right to marry extends to same-sex couples. According to appellants, because the only gender references are contained in a public health provision, relevant only to opposite-sex couples, it follows, perforce, that the omission of gender references in all other provisions of the marriage statute necessarily implies that same-sex marriages are permitted. See McCray v. McGee, 504 A.2d 1128, 1130 (D.C.1986) (basic rule of statutory construction is that when a legislature makes express mention of one thing, the exclusion of others is implied, because there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions). Appellants' argument, by its own terms, only has force if the consanguinity provision is limited to prohibitions against biological inbreeding. It is not. While that concern is obvious in the prohibition of a man's marrying his sister or a woman's marrying her father, there is no genetic danger in other prohibited situations; for example, the prohibitions against a man's marrying his son's wife or a woman's marrying her stepfather. See D.C.Code § 30-101(1) and (2), supra note 11. The consanguinity provision, therefore, reflects taboosindeed moral judgments about improper marriage relationshipsthat transcend genetic concerns. The use of gender-based terminology in § 30-101 to prohibit certain marriages, therefore, reflects a legislative understanding that marriage, as understood by Congress at the time of original enactment and thereafter, is inherently a male-female relationship. If that were not so, some of the statutory prohibitions not based on genetic reproductive concerns either would not be there or, to be consistent, would have been extended, for example, to prohibit a man's marrying his stepfather (just as a man cannot lawfully marry his stepmother) or to prevent a woman's marrying her wife's father (just as a woman cannot lawfully marry her husband's father). See D.C.Code § 30-101, supra note 11. If appellants were to prevail in their statutory interpretation, the law would permit same-sex couples to enter into some kinds of marriage relationships that the statute forbids for opposite-sex couples, even though such relationships would not be genetically dangerous for any kind of marriage. Indeed, if men could marry men, § 30-101 would not preclude a bi-sexual man who may have had a biological son from marrying that son, or from marrying his own father or brother. We do not believe that Congress, almost a century ago, envisioned such possibilities, given the consanguinity prohibitions imposed on opposite sex couples. See supra note 11. Nor is there any indication that more recent Congresses, or the Council in amending the marriage statute, ever modified the fundamental legislative understanding that marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples. Appellants' argument that § 30-101 reflects merely public health limitations, leaving room for all genetically safe marriages regardless of gender, accordingly fails. In sum, to conclude that Congress intended to permit same-sex marriages would mean that Congress in 1901 intended to permit various categories of genetically safe, same-sex marriages that were denied, though genetically safe, to opposite-sex couples. There is no evidence this was the case; the consanguinity provisions, far from supporting appellants' argument, actually reinforce the government's position that the legislature never had same-sex marriages in mind when adopting, codifying, or amending the marriage statute.
Our conclusion that the marriage statute does not authorize same-sex marriages is buttressed by looking at the larger statutory scheme of which it is a part. See Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Zoning Comm'n, 392 A.2d 1027, 1033 (D.C.1978) (en banc) (It is a canon of statutory interpretation that one looks at the particular statutory language within the context of the whole legislative scheme when legislative intent is to be determined.); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (5th ed. 1992). As indicated earlier, see supra notes 2 and 3, the marriage and divorce statutes originally were enacted at different times, but the modern statutes were both enacted in 1901. See supra notes 2 and 9. Nonetheless, these statutes from the beginning have been placed in different chapters of the D.C.Code, perhaps suggesting that they are not part of the same legislative scheme. On the other hand, there is, necessarily, a logical relationship between the marriage and divorce statutes; if same-sex couples can marry then, presumably, they must be able to divorce. Thus, as elaborated below, we can look at the divorce statute for clues as to how Congress, as well as the Council, has understood marriage. The divorce statute, traceable to congressional legislation before codification in 1901, see supra note 3, is replete with gender-distinctive references. See D.C.Code §§ 16-901 to -924 (1989). More specifically, the following provisions contain the terms husband and wife: D.C.Code's §§ 16-904(d)(1) (annulment granted if either party has a husband or wife living), -911 (husband or wife must pay alimony to other spouse pending divorce), -912 (husband or wife may retain right of dower in other's estate), -913 (husband or wife may be required to pay alimony when divorce is granted), -916 (court may decree permanent alimony if husband or wife fails to maintain needy spouse). [12] Accordingly, when the marriage statute is read in context with the broader legislative scheme that includes divorce, one cannot say that marriage is gender-neutral. Although we attribute corroborative, not determinative, significance to the divorce statute's pervasive use of gender terminology, it is significant that Congress enacted and codified the divorce chapter at the same time it enacted and codified the marriage chapter, in 1901, using gender-specific terminology in each. See District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 630 (D.C.1991) (when legislature enacts two statutes at same time and the statutes have similar subject matter and purpose, principle of in pari materia dictates that the statutes should be read with reference to each other). That basic language has been carried forward ever since, both by Congress and by the Council of the District of Columbia. See supra note 3. This statutory evolution, therefore, strongly suggests a consistent legislative understanding and intent that marriage meansand thus is limited tounions between persons of opposite sexes.
Our statutory understanding is further confirmed by the ordinary sense and meaning traditionally attributed to the word marriage when used to indicate an intimate relationship. See Barbour v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 499 A.2d 122, 125 (D.C.1985) (Words of a statute must be construed by their common meaning and their ordinary sense.); In re Estate of Shutack, 469 A.2d 427, 429 (D.C.1983) (The words of the statute should be construed according to their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.). Black's Law Dictionary defines marriage as the [l]egal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 972 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). The second edition of Black's Law Dictionary printed in 1910presumably reflecting the common understanding at the time the marriage statute was enacted in 1901defined marriage as the civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (2d ed. 1910) (emphasis added). Similarly, Webster's Dictionary from 1902 defined marry as follows: [t]o unite in wedlock or matrimony; to join, as a man and woman, for life; to make man and wife. WEBSTER'S MODERN DICTIONARY 281 (1902) (emphasis added). The same dictionary today defines marriage as the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex as husband or wife. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1384 (1986) (emphasis added). Although this edition of Webster's, as a third definition, defines marriage as an intimate or close union, see id., and commitment and union are undoubtedly fundamental elements of a marriage, we are satisfied that the ordinary understanding of the word marriageboth at the turn of the century when the marriage statute was enacted and in modern times when that statute was amendedmeans the union of two members of the opposite sex. Of course, the meanings of words are continually evolving, and we do not overlook the fact that the terms marriage and gay marriage are used colloquially today to refer to long-term same-sex relationships between gays and between lesbians. See Cory & LeRoy, Homosexual Marriage, 29 SEXOLOGY 660 (1963). Our task, however, is to determine what the legislature intended marriage to mean when the marriage statute was enacted, codified, or amended. Given the statutory language used, buttressed by the usual definition of marriage, we cannot conclude that any legislature for the District of Columbia that has addressed the marriage statute has ever intended to authorize same-sex unions.
Although not at all dispositive here, we note that the cases from other jurisdictions with marriage statutes similar to the District'sneither expressly prohibiting nor expressly authorizing same-sex marriages have uniformly interpreted marriage, by definition, as requiring two members of opposite sexes. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, for example, explained: Minn.St. c. 517, which governs marriage, employs that term as one of common usage, meaning the state of union between persons of the opposite sex. It is unrealistic to think that the original draftsmen of our marriage statutes, which date from territorial days, would have used the term in any different sense. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S.Ct. 37, 34 L.Ed.2d 65 (1972). See also Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky.1973) (same-sex couple incapable of entering into marriage as the term is defined); M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J.Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204, 208 (App.Div.1976) (requirement that marriage must be between a man and a woman ... is so strongly and firmly implied from a full reading of the statutes that a different legislative intent, one which would sanction a marriage between persons of the same sex, cannot be fathomed); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash.App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1974) (marriage statute clearly founded upon the presumption that marriage, as a legal relationship, may exist only between one man and one woman); Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Marriage Between Persons of the Same Sex, 63 A.L.R.3d 1199, 1199 (1975) (In all cases so far discovered which have considered the question whether persons of the same sex may marry each other, the view has been taken that since the marriage relationship has always been the union of a man and a woman as husband and wife, there may be no valid contract entered into between persons of the same sex). [13] While these cases do not deal with our local statute, they at least reflect the interpretive approach we apply here and thus provide precedent in the sense of analytical support for the result we reach.
Appellants do not rest on their own interpretation of the marriage statute. They argue that the Council itself, through two separate pieces of legislation, has indirectly confirmed (or reinterpreted) the statutory definition of marriage in ways that guarantee the right to same-sex marriages. The first interpretive legislation was the Anti-Sex Discriminatory Language Act of 1976. See 1976 D.C.Stat. 194. [14] This Act, which among other things amended the 1901 marriage statute, sought to achieve equality under the law for men and women by eliminating sex-based distinctions in the District of Columbia Code, so that the rights and responsibilities of persons under D.C. law will not be different solely on the basis of their sex. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND CRIM.LAW, REPORT ON BILL No. 1-36, THE ANTI-SEX DISCRIMINATORY LANGUAGE ACT, at 2-3 (May 20, 1976) (hereafter COMM. REPORT ON BILL 1-36). The Anti-Sex Discriminatory Language Act made only one change in the marriage statute: Sec. 32. Section 1292 of the Act of March 3, 1901 (D.C.Code, sec. 30-111), is amended by striking out unless the father of such persons, or if there be no father, the mother, and inserting in lieu thereof unless a parent.[ [15] ] 1976 D.C.Stat. 201. Because Councilmember Dixon's Bill 1-89 recognizing same-sex marriages was pending at the time the Council was discussing Bill 1-36 to establish the Anti-Sex Discriminatory Language Act, the Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law clarified the relationship between the two bills: It is true that Bill 1-36 makes substantive changes in the domestic relations law. However, every such change is designed to achieve only one result, i.e., to make the law equal in effect for males and females.... Comprehensive revision of the divorce and marriage laws is contemplated in another Council bill, Bill No. 1-89, the District of Columbia Uniform Marriage and Divorce act. That bill would make major revisions to local domestic relations law and would do so in a non-sex-discriminatory manner.... [T]he Council should promptly enact Bill 1-36 which would do only one thingenact the principle of sex equality into the D.C.Code including the domestic relations law. Thereafter, the Council may proceed to consider a more comprehensive revision of the domestic relations law.... COMM. REPORT ON BILL 1-36, at 5-6. This comment clarifies that the Anti-Sex Discriminatory Language Act served a limited purpose: to make the law equal in effect for men and women vis-a-vis each other; for example, it gave mothers a right equal to that of fathers to consent to marriage by a child under 18. See supra note 15. There was not a hint that the legislation was intended to give one class of males, e.g., gay men, an equality with another class of males, e.g., heterosexual men. Thus, the 1976 Act did not revise the substance of the marriage statute to redefine the term marriage.
Finally, in 1982, the Council adopted a new Gender Rule of Construction, D.C.Law 4-111, § 2(a), 29 D.C.Reg. 1684 (1982), now contained in D.C.Code § 49-203 (1990). Appellants say this Rule conclusively requires interpretation of the marriage statute to authorize same-sex marriages. This 1982 legislation amended the language of former D.C.Code § 49-203, traceable to the 1901 Code, 31 Stat. 1189, ch. 854, Preamble, § 2 (Second), which had provided: Words importing the masculine gender shall include all genders, except where such construction would be absurd or unreasonable. The new Rule also amended the language of D.C.Code § 1-230, adopted in 1975, which had read: For the purposes of any act or resolution of the Council of the District of Columbia, unless specifically provided otherwise... (3) words importing one gender include and apply to the other gender as well. 22 D.C.Reg. 1990 (1975). In adopting the new Gender Rule of Construction in 1982, therefore, the Council amended two provisions of the D.C.Code (among others not relevant here). It amended § 49-203 to say: Unless the Council of the District of Columbia specifically provides that this section shall be inapplicable to a particular act or section, all the words thereof importing 1 gender include and apply to the other gender as well. D.C.Code § 49-203 (1990). And it amended § 1-230(3) to read: With regard to resolutions, words importing 1 gender include and apply to the other gender as well. D.C.Code § 1-230(3) (1992). Appellants argue that, when the Council removed the words except where such construction would be absurd or unreasonable from the 1901 rule of construction in former § 49-203, without adding a disclaimer with respect to the marriage statute, the Council implicitly authorized same-sex marriages. We cannot agree. The legislative history of the Gender Rule of Construction makes clear that the Council enacted the Rule in 1982 for one purpose: to create a consistent gender rule of legislative construction throughout the D.C.Code. COMM. ON PUBLIC SERVICES & CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COMMENTS ON BILL 4-374, THE ANTI-SEX DISCRIMINATORY LANGUAGE ACT AMENDMENT ACT OF 1981, at 1 (Feb. 16, 1982). Wilhelmina J. Rolark, then Chair of the Committee on Public Services & Consumer Affairs, elaborated: Presently, there are two separate, somewhat inconsistent rules for interpreting statutory words having a gender meaning. Section 49-203 of the Code (31 Stat. 1189, enacted March 3, 1901) provides that words importing the masculine gender shall be held to include all genders, except where such construction would be absurd or unreasonable. By contrast, Code section 1-230 (D.C.Law 1-17, 22 DCR 1990, effective September 23, 1975) provides that for the purposes of any act or resolution of the Council of the District of Columbia, unless specifically provided otherwise words importing one gender include and apply to the other gender as well. Id. Not only was the original (1901) § 49-203 deficient because it did not apply to feminine gender words e.g., the word steward in a statute would be construed to include a stewardess, whereas the word stewardess in a statute would not be construed to apply to a stewardbut also that former § 49-203 had different criteria from those in former § 1-230 for determining when the gender rule of construction [would] not apply. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL No. 4-374, THE ANTI-SEX DISCRIMINATORY LANGUAGE ACT OF 1981, at 3 (Feb. 10, 1982). The Report to the Members of the Committee on the Judiciary explained: The absurd or unreasonable criteria is found in sec. 49-203. In sec. 1-230, the gender rule of that section applies unless specifically provided otherwise by the legislature. Section 2(a) of Bill 4-374 [to adopt the gender Rule of Construction] would make the latter criteria the rule for all statutes in the Code. Id. Thus, the Council merely intended to make D.C.Code § 49-203 (traceable to 1901) consistent with § 1-230 (adopted in 1975) when, in 1982, it adopted the Gender Rule of Construction to remove the words except where such construction would be absurd or unreasonable from former § 49-203. Had the Council intended to enlarge the statutory definition of marriage to include same-sex unions, it surely would have mentioned such a significant intention in the legislative history of the statute implementing the new Gender Rule of Construction. See National Org. for Women v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 274, 276 (D.C.1987) (if Council intended such a dramatic change in law, it is reasonable to assume that there would have been at least some specific reference to it in the language of the Act or, at least, within its legislative history) (hereafter NOW ). The Council did not do so. The Council merely intended to resolve a conflict between two inconsistent rules of construction on the books. We conclude, accordingly, that the Gender Rule of Construction, D.C.Code § 49-203, § 1-230, does not require recognition of same-sex marriages in the District. See NOW, 531 A.2d at 276.