Opinion ID: 1057335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Mitec Telecom is bound by the release

Text: ¶ 27. It remains to determine, however, whether the release barred Mitec Telecom’s coverage claims. Mitec Telecom contends that it is not a successor, affiliate, or assign of Mitec Systems, and that its coverage rights—which it asserts derive from Mitec Manufacturing’s rights—are therefore unaffected even if the release does extend to future claims by Mitec Systems’ successors. We do not agree. ¶ 28. In interpreting the language of the release, as with any contract, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the parties. State v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. , 2008 VT 11, ¶ 13, ___ Vt. ___, 945 A.2d 877. We presume that the parties’ intent is reflected in the plain language of the release when that language is clear. In re Adelphia Bus. Solutions of Vt., Inc. , 2004 VT 82, ¶ 7, 177 Vt. 136, 861 A.2d 1078. ¶ 29. The release here binds “successors, affiliates, and assigns” of Mitec Systems. Defendants’ principal argument against the superior court’s conclusion in this regard is that the court erroneously concluded that Mitec Telecom is a “successor to two affiliates” of Mitec Systems. According to defendants, Telecom itself is neither a successor to, nor an affiliate of, Mitec Systems, and thus is not bound by the release. The argument very nearly defeats itself. A general release is meant to buy peace from a discrete set of claims. Here, NSIC paid consideration to Mitec Systems in exchange for a release from liability for coverage claims by Mitec Systems and its successors and affiliates. NSIC’s purchase would be hollow indeed if the releasor’s affiliates—i.e., Mitec Manufacturing or Mitec Electronics—could unilaterally reimpose liability on NSIC simply by changing their corporate form once, to become a “successor to two affiliates.” ¶ 30. The summary-judgment evidence amply supported this conclusion. The trial court’s summary-judgment order largely cited plaintiff’s pleadings and exhibits for factual support. The “once-removed” citations here erect no great obstacle to our review, and we decline to reverse on that basis, as defendants urge us to. We briefly recount the undisputed facts relied on by the superior court. ¶ 31. The court found that Mitec Electronics provided a letter of credit to the State on behalf of Mitec Systems as part of the 1986 settlement of the original pollution claims. Defendants do not dispute this fact. The court also found that Mitec Systems sold its assets to Mitec Manufacturing at an inflated price (many of these assets, it is worth noting, were purchased from Mitec Manufacturing just a few years before). Contrary to the claim that defendants continue to press—that there was a “complete lack of any corporate relationship among Systems, Electronics, and Telecom” — the trial court found that there was a “unity of control and ownership” of all the Mitec companies; that the companies all “worked hand in glove as if part of a larger company”; and that Mitec had shown no facts that would rebut that conclusion. There was no error in concluding that Mitec Telecom, as successor to one or more affiliates of Mitec Systems, was bound by the general release. ¶ 32. Finally, we note again that Mitec Telecom explicitly claimed coverage as a successor to Mitec Systems in the earlier federal action arising out of the Bates-lawsuit coverage dispute, see supra , ¶¶ 17-18, which is to say that Mitec Telecom’s own explicit understanding, at least in 1999, was that it was itself a successor to Mitec Systems. Mitec Telecom cannot avoid the release.