Opinion ID: 763105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Testimony in the Second Trial

Text: 55 At his second trial, Pelullo again testified in his own defense, setting out his entitlement theory much as he had in the first trial. The District Court found that the only significant difference between his testimony at the two trials was that he did not testify about the $114,000 in the second trial. The Court found that this was powerful and compelling evidence that his reason for waiving his fifth amendment privilege and testifying at the first trial had nothing to do with the information contained in the Brady material, because the information contained in the Brady material was relevant only to the $114,000 transaction with Mr. DiSalvo and was not relevant to the other counts about which Mr. Pelullo freely testified. See id. at 413. 56 Pelullo correctly points out that the District Court had (erroneously) ruled at the beginning of the second trial that the jury would be instructed that it had to find as a matter of law that Pelullo had committed the acts set forth in Count 54. Pelullo argues that he had no choice but to take the stand in an attempt to mitigate the explosive impact of that error, though he fails to explain precisely why he felt that taking the stand to discuss Counts 1-53 would mitigate the error. Thus, he would have us conclude, the trial was so fraught with error that it cannot be used as evidence of anything. 57 However, with regard to trial two, either of two assumptions could be correct. While it might be true that Pelullo had to get on the stand in order to combat the District Court's erroneous use of collateral estoppel, it also could be true that taking the stand when Count 54 was not in issue indicates that the role of Pelullo's testimony in his own defense encompassed more than just a response to Count 54. Since either inference is viable, we discern no clear error in the District Court's finding. 58