Opinion ID: 1135495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the bar's complaint

Text: A. The Morris Complaint: In its complaint, the Bar alleged that the accused falsely represented to the circuit court that Morris' case against Foster had been settled and that later he agreed to a settlement and signed a stipulated judgment on behalf of Morris that settled both Morris' claim against Foster and Foster's counterclaim against Morris without Morris' knowledge, consent, or authority. The Bar further alleged that the accused failed to disclose to Morris: 1. that the litigation had been dismissed by the court on April 20, 1988; 2. that Foster had filed a counterclaim against Morris; 3. that nature of the counterclaim; 4. that the trial was set for January 19, 1989; 5. that the litigation was dismissed by the court a second time on January 18, 1989; 6. that the trial was reset to February 7, 1989; 7. the effect of a restraining order; 8. that the accused was engaged in settlement negotiations; and 9. the terms of the settlement and stipulated judgment. The Bar alleged that the accused's conduct in the Morris case violated DR 1-102(A)(3); [3] DR 1-102(A)(4); [4] DR 7-102(A)(5); [5] DR 6-101(A); [6] DR 6-101(B); [7] DR 7-101(A)(1); [8] and DR 7-101(A)(2). [9] B. The Newby-Crosby Complaint: The Bar further alleged that the accused represented Newby and Crosby as co-petitioners in their dissolution of marriage without the required consent and without full disclosure of the possible effect of joint representation, when the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each was or was likely to be adversely affected by his representation of the other. The Bar charged that this conduct violated former DR 5-105(A) and (B). [10] The Bar's complaint further alleged that, when the accused accepted employment from Newby for the purpose of compelling Crosby to release her lien and, on behalf of Newby, brought an action against Crosby for slander of title, the accused violated DR 5-105(C) [11] and DR 7-102(A)(1). [12] The case was heard by a trial panel, which found, regarding the Morris complaint and the Newby/Crosby complaint, that the accused had not violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 7-102(A)(5), 6-101(A), or 7-101(A)(1), but had violated the other disciplinary rules cited in the Bar's complaint. The trial panel imposed a sanction of suspension from the practice of law for six months.