Opinion ID: 1174599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reviewability of cfec's refusal to grant a hearing

Text: The CFEC asserts that its refusal to hear John's challenge to the regulations is not judicially reviewable. The CFEC argues that it is entirely within the agency's discretion to deny or to grant a hearing on a petition seeking to change a regulation per AS 44.62.220. [4] Support for this position comes from AS 44.62.230, which provides in pertinent part: Upon receipt of a petition requesting the adoption, amendment or repeal of a regulation under AS 44.62.180  44.62.290, a state agency shall, within 30 days, deny the petition in writing or schedule the matter for public hearing... . The statute does not provide for any review of action taken pursuant to AS 44.62.220. The absence of any mention of reviewability in AS 44.62.230 does not necessarily mean a court cannot pass on the validity of an act done pursuant to the provision. In Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth, 426 P.2d 1006 (Alaska 1967), there was no express statutory provision permitting judicial review of the administrative acts at issue. The Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources and the Director of the Division of Lands approved a lease of public lands according to the Alaska Land Act. A question arose whether the administrative decision was reached in accordance with the law. Specifically, it was alleged that the successful bidder did not file a development plan; did not file evidence of his authority to act for his principal; that the payment tendered did not meet the law's requirements. Id. at 1007. The defense of non-reviewability was raised and we rejected it, explaining that it was not intended that Alaska's courts be divested of their constitutionally vested duty to insure compliance with the laws of Alaska. Id. at 1012. Courts have the power in situations such as this, in other words, to look for administrative compliance with the demands of due process. K & L Distributors v. Murkowski, 486 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1971). In Murkowski, the court had to decide whether the Commissioner of Economic Development's grant of an industrial incentive tax credit was subject to judicial review in the face of a statute which provided: All decisions and findings of the [Commissioner] ... are final and no judicial or administrative appeal or other proceeding lies against them... . AS 43.26.040(e). The Murkowski court borrowed from its decision in Holdsworth to justify a judicial review limited in scope, despite the statute's clear language: It is the constitutionally vested duty of this court to assure that administrative action complies with the laws of Alaska. We would not be able to carry out this duty to protect the citizens of this state in the exercise of their rights if we were unable to review the actions of administrative agencies simply because the legislature chose to exempt their decisions from judicial review. The legislative statement of finality is one which we will honor to the extent that it accords with constitutional guarantees. But if the administrative action is questioned as violating, for example, the due process clause, we will not hesitate to review the propriety of the action to the extent that constitutional standards may require. Murkowski, 486 P.2d at 357 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). This court's precedents fully support the reviewability of the CFEC's refusal to grant Johns a hearing. [5] The determination that the CFEC's refusal to grant a hearing is judicially reviewable does not end our inquiry. We must further ask whether the CFEC complied with the demands of the law when it refused to hold a hearing as Johns requested. AS 44.62.230 provides that a state agency shall, within 30 days, deny the petition in writing or schedule the matter for public hearing... . Johns first sought to change the maximum number regulation in April 1982. The CFEC responded the same month with the letter reproduced in part above. [6] This document meets the requirements of the statute, and demonstrates that the refusal to grant a hearing was not arbitrary. Accordingly, we find no error regarding the CFEC's actions. [7] Based on the preceding discussion, we reverse the decision of the superior court that appellants lacked standing and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [8] REVERSED and REMANDED.