Opinion ID: 2773216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gross Negligence Claim

Text: We likewise conclude that genuine fact disputes preclude summary judgment with respect to gross negligence. 8 Under Arizona law, “[a] party is grossly or wantonly negligent if he acts or fails to act when he knows or has reason to know facts which would lead a reasonable person to realize that his conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others but also involves a high probability that substantial harm will result.” Walls v. Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 826 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). This standard is less exacting than the federal deliberate indifference standard. See Braillard v. Maricopa Cnty., 232 P.3d 1263, 1273 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s statement that “[a] claim of deliberate indifference requires proof of more than gross negligence” (quoting Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 9 The State is liable for the actions of its 8 Both parties refer to state procedural law on summary judgment in connection with the gross negligence claim, but the standard for summary judgment set forth in Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls. The district court had federal question jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law gross negligence claim, and “a federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is bound to apply the law of the forum state to the same extent as if it were exercising its diversity jurisdiction.” Bass v. First Pac. Networks, Inc., 219 F.3d 1052, 1055 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). Under the Erie doctrine, “federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005). 9 The Arizona Court of Appeals has also cited the Second Circuit’s observation that deliberate indifference is “closely intertwined” with gross negligence. Rourk v. State, 821 P.2d 273, 280 (Ariz. Ct. App. 16 CORTEZ V. SKOL employees in the scope of their employment. See Rourk v. State, 821 P.2d 273, 275–76, 280 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). Because we have concluded that there are material fact disputes with respect to deliberate indifference, and because Arizona’s gross negligence standard is lower than the federal deliberate indifference standard, we necessarily conclude that there are also material fact disputes with respect to gross negligence. Indeed, in addition to being responsible for Skol’s behavior, the State may also be liable for the aggregate conduct of other prison staff. See, e.g., Armenta v. City of Casa Grande, 71 P.3d 359, 365 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing whether “the City knew or should have known” certain facts and whether “the City’s actions would have led it to realize” a risk); Rourk, 821 P.2d at 275–76, 280 (describing actions of a state agency that seem to have been taken by multiple employees and describing what the agency knew or should have known based on the aggregate actions of those employees). This means that the State also could be responsible for the actions of the officers who failed to place leg irons on the inmates on the day of the attack and for any informal directive to stop applying leg restraints for escorts through no man’s land. Summary judgment on Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim was thus improper. 1991) (citing Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 1981)). Rourk is consistent with Braillard because gross negligence can be both closely intertwined with deliberate indifference and also a lower standard. Braillard’s statement that gross negligence requires less proof than deliberate indifference makes sense because gross negligence merely requires “reason to know” facts that would lead to recognition of a risk, whereas deliberate indifference demands actual, subjective awareness. CORTEZ V. SKOL 17