Opinion ID: 1275251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Instruct and Obtain Jury Finding on Special Circumstance Allegation

Text: (24a) Defendant contends the multiple-murder special-circumstance finding, and thus the death judgment, must be reversed because the trial court refused, contrary to section 190.4, to submit the special circumstance allegation for a finding by the jury. Although the trial court erred, reversal is unwarranted. The issue arose in the following context: During discussions as to what instructions the jury should receive to assist its guilt phase deliberations, the prosecution requested the trial court read CALJIC Nos. 8.80 and 8.81.3 to the jury. Those instructions were designed to inform the jury that (1) if it concluded defendant was guilty of first degree murder, it must then determine the truth of the special circumstance allegations; and (2) to find true the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder, it must find the defendant was convicted in this case of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree. These instructions were drawn from section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), which as relevant at the time of trial provided as follows: (a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole in any case in which one or more of the following special circumstances has been charged and specially found under Section 190.4, to be true: [¶] ... [¶] (3) The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree. Section 190.4 provides in relevant part as follows: (a) Whenever special circumstances as enumerated in Section 190.2 are alleged and the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the trier of fact shall also make a special finding on the truth of each alleged special circumstance. The determination of the truth of any or all of the special circumstances shall be made by the trier of fact on the evidence presented at the trial.... (§ 190.4, subd. (a).) That statute also provides the trier of fact shall be a jury, unless a jury is waived by the defendant and the prosecution. (§ 190.4, subd. (a).) In denying the requested instructions, the trial court explained its reasoning: My thought in this particular instance is I don't have to give instructions at all on special circumstances. The jury does not, in the sense, the jury does not have to make a special finding that the defendant committed murder with special circumstances. If they convict the defendant of two first degree murders, or two counts of murder, at least one of which is murder of the first degree, they're persuaded of those beyond a reasonable doubt, then, the special circumstances have been established without any additional or further finding. Evidently the trial court feared the special circumstance instructions would confuse the jury. Section 190.4 plainly contemplates a jury finding on a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation unless the parties waive a jury. The trial court therefore erred in failing to submit the issue to the jury, and its error implicates the federal due process right. (See Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346 [65 L.Ed.2d 175, 180, 100 S.Ct. 2227] [arbitrary denial of a state-created right as denial of due process]; People v. Moreno (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 564, 573 [279 Cal. Rptr. 140]; People v. Gastile (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 1376, 1382 [253 Cal. Rptr. 283], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1104 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020].) [9] Defendant argues the error constituted a structural defect in the trial requiring reversal without consideration of prejudice. ( Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279 [113 L.Ed.2d 302, 111 S.Ct. 1246]; Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275 [124 L.Ed.2d 182, 113 S.Ct. 2078].) (25) A structural defect is the type of error affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself, one that `transcends the criminal process' and def[ies] analysis by `harmless-error' standards. ( Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 309-311 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 330-332].) Examples of structural defects include total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial ( Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]); trial before a judge who is not impartial ( Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510 [71 L.Ed. 749, 47 S.Ct. 437, 50 A.L.R. 1243]); and the giving of a constitutionally defective instruction on reasonable doubt ( Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, 508 U.S. at pp. 281-282 [124 L.Ed.2d at pp. 190-191, 113 S.Ct. 2078]). Trial errors, by contrast, are errors that occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether the error was harmless. ( Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 307-308 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 329-330].) There is a strong presumption any error falls within the latter category, and it is the rare case in which a constitutional violation will not be subject to harmless error analysis. ( Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 282 [124 L.Ed.2d at p. 191, 113 S.Ct. 2078] (conc. opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.).) (24b) We are unpersuaded the trial court's failure to permit the jury to make a finding on the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation constitutes a structural defect. The error was not so pervasive as to affect the framework within which the trial proceeded. Rather, it is susceptible to quantitative assessment because the record compels the conclusion the error had no effect on the outcome of the trial and was thus harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 45; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) The factual issue posed by the omitted instruction necessarily was resolved adversely to defendant under other properly given instructions. (See People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 684, fn. 12.) That is to say, the jury's verdict of guilt on three counts of murder in the first degree necessarily established the factual predicate of the special circumstance, that defendant was convicted in this proceeding of more than one count of murder in the first or second degree. And, significantly, the same jury, having heard all the mitigating evidence the defense proffered during the penalty phase, chose the penalty of death rather than life without possibility of parole. We may therefore confidently say there is no possibility this jury would have found defendant not deatheligible had the special circumstance allegation been submitted to it. We hasten to emphasize that, although undoubtedly harmless, removal of the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation from the jury's consideration was error under the plain language of section 190.4. The multiple-murder special circumstance is perhaps unique among those enumerated in section 190.2, subdivision (a), in requiring the finding of no facts beyond the bare recognition the jury has returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree and has convicted defendant of at least one additional count of murder in the same proceeding. [10] Other special circumstance allegations generally will not be encompassed by other jury findings, and, hence, the making of other special circumstance findings by the wrong entity will not necessarily be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.