Opinion ID: 1104877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Florida Constitutional Provisions

Text: The House contends that several of the Compact's provisions encroach on the Legislature's law- and policy-making powers. To answer the question, we first review the separation-of-powers provisions of the Florida Constitution and our interpretations of it. We then discuss one specific provision on which the Governor relies: the necessary business clause.
The Florida Constitution generally specifies the relative powers of the three branches of government. Article II, section 3 provides innocuously that [t]he powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein. In construing our constitution, we have traditionally applied a strict separation of powers doctrine. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321, 329 (Fla.2004) (quoting State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345, 353 (Fla.2000)). These provisions are not specific, however. In fact, as we first noted 100 years ago, the state constitution does not exhaustively list each branch's powers. State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 974 (1908). Both the Governor and the House concede that the state constitution does not expressly grant either branch the authority to execute compacts. We must therefore expand our analysis beyond the plain language of the constitution. We have held that the powers of the respective branches are those so defined ... or such as are inherent or so recognized by immemorial governmental usage, and which involve the exercise of primary and independent will, discretion, and judgment, subject not to the control of another department, but only to the limitations imposed by the state and federal Constitutions. Id. at 974. A branch has the inherent right to accomplish all objects naturally within the orbit of that department, not expressly limited by the fact of the existence of a similar power elsewhere or the express limitations in the constitution. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735, 742 (Fla.1961) (quoting In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 266 (1937)). As we noted over seventy-five years ago, what determines whether a particular function is legislative, executive, or judicial so that it may be exercised by appropriate officers of the proper department is not the name given to the function or to the officer who performs it but the essential nature and effect of the governmental function to be performed. Florida Motor Lines v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876, 881 (1930). The House argues that, precisely because the state constitution does not expressly grant the governor authority to execute compacts, such authority belongs to the Legislature. In other words, the residual powerthat is, powers not specifically assigned to the governorbelongs to the Legislature. Albeit many years ago and under different circumstances, we have implied as much. See State ex rel. Green v. Pearson, 153 Fla. 314, 14 So.2d 565, 567 (1943) (The legislative branch looks to the Constitution not for sources of power but for limitations upon power. But if such limitations are not found to exist, its discretion reasonably exercised may not be disturbed by the judicial branch of the government.); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Davis, 123 Fla. 41, 166 So. 289, 297 (1936) (The test of legislative power is constitutional restriction; what the people have not said in their organic law their representatives shall not do, they may do.). And, as we noted above, other state courts have ascribed to their legislatures any residual power on which the state constitutions were silent. See Clark, 904 P.2d at 25; Pataki, 766 N.Y.S.2d at 668, n. 11, 798 N.E.2d at 1061 n. 11. We need not decide, however, whether the authority to bind the state to compacts always resides in the legislature. Although the line of demarcation is not always clear, we have noted that the legislature's exclusive power encompasses questions of fundamental policy and the articulation of reasonably definite standards to be used in implementing those policies. B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987, 993 (Fla.1994); see also Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913, 925 (Fla.1978) (stating that under the nondelegation doctrine, fundamental and primary policy decisions shall be made by members of the legislature). Therefore, even if the Governor has authority to execute compacts, its terms cannot contradict the state's public policy, as expressed in its laws.
The Governor argues that his authority to execute the Compact derives from article IV, section 1 of the Florida Constitution. That provision states in part that [t]he governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed ... and transact all necessary business with the officers of government. Art. IV, § 1(a), Fla. Const. The Governor submits that the phrase transact all necessary business with the officers of government includes negotiating with the Tribe and that he cannot ignore the federal directive to negotiate; therefore, negotiating the Compact was necessary business under IGRA. IGRA provides that a tribe seeking to offer Class III gaming must request [that] the State ... enter into negotiations for a compact and that the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). The Governor is therefore correct that IGRA requires states to negotiate. As other courts have recognized, however, nowhere does IGRA equate the state with the governor. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75 n. 17, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (contrasting IGRA's repeated[] refer[ences] exclusively to `the State' with other federal statutes directed at a state's governor and concluding that the duty imposed by the Act ... is not of the sort likely to be performed by an individual state executive officer or even a group of officers); Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1029 (IGRA uniformly addresses itself to `the State'; not once does it impose duties or responsibilities on a particular officer of the state (e.g., the governor, the legislature, etc.).). [6] In addition, when a state fails to negotiate, a tribe must sue the state, not the governor. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74-75, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (holding that Congress intended § 2710(d)(3) to be enforced against the state, not the governor); Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1029 ([T]hese suits are not against officials in an attempt to force them to follow federal law.). More importantly, a State's duty to negotiate under IGRA cannot be enforced. A state may avoid its duty, as Florida has effectively done, by asserting its immunity. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47, 116 S.Ct. 1114. Therefore, although IGRA requires a state to negotiate, it does not impose any duty on a state's governor. Moreover, IGRA does not prescribe the terms of a compact, see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d), and it does not confer on the governor the authority to bind the state to a compact or act in contravention to state law. In other words, IGRA does not grant a governor, or any state actor, any powers beyond those provided by the state's constitution and laws. See Clark, 904 P.2d at 26 (We do not agree that Congress, in enacting the IGRA, sought to invest state governors with powers in excess of those that the governors possess under state law.). We express no opinion on whether the necessary business clause may ever grant the governor authority to bind the State to an IGRA compact. [7] We do conclude, however, that the clause does not authorize the governor to execute compacts contrary to the expressed public policy of the state or to create exceptions to the law. Nor does it change our conclusion that the legislature's exclusive power encompasses questions of fundamental policy and the articulation of reasonably definite standards to be used in implementing those policies. B.H., 645 So.2d at 993. We now discuss why, in authorizing conduct prohibited by state law, the Governor exceeded his authority.