Opinion ID: 1775658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Ollman Analysis

Text: The first factor requires a court to analyze the common usage or meaning of the allegedly defamatory words themselves to determine whether the statements have precise meaning giving rise to clear factual implications. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979-80. Loosely definable or variously interpretable statements cannot in most contexts support an action for defamation. Id. at 980. The second Ollman factor requires a court to consider the degree to which the statements are verifiable. Id. at 981. A reader cannot rationally view an unverifiable statement as conveying actual facts. The third Ollman factor is to consider the linguistic context of the allegedly defamatory statements. Id. at 982. The distinction between fact and opinion can be made only in context. The fourth Ollman factor directs a court to examine the social context in which the statements occur. Courts should fully take into account the different social conventions or customs in different types of writing (or settings). Id. at 984. Under Ollman , the statements that Brand was a barbarian, ruled McAllen like an ayatollah, and that his administration was an iron fist are unmistakably loosely definable and variously interpretable statements of opinion made in the heat of a political campaign. The statements are obviously unverifiable. Thus, as a matter of law, these are statements of opinion. Finally, I turn to the more difficult question of whether the following statement published in The Nation magazine is actionable: [A]ccording to Casso, Mr. Brand tried to make a deal which would have shut the hospital doors to our city's poor, without even notifying the citizens of the plan. Apparently, he hadn't bothered to look at the City charter. Under Ollman , this statement is closer to fact than opinion. It was published after the campaign had ended and is considerably more verifiable than the previously mentioned statements. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in the next section, summary judgment is still proper because Brand failed to satisfy his burden of proof on the issue of malice under either the current standard or the procedure that I propose.