Opinion ID: 2293541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Governmental function

Text: Initially, we find the term governmental function, as used in this statute, to be materially ambiguous. See generally Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 601 Pa. 637, 653, 976 A.2d 474, 483 (2009) (recognizing that an ambiguity exists when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text under review). In modern times, the government has undertaken to operate various commercial enterprises, such as its systems of liquor stores and lottery games. Although in ordinary parlance it may seem incongruous to couch liquor and gambling ventures as governmental functions, they plainly are so in the sense that they are core activities assigned to and undertaken by government agencies. See 47 P.S. § 3-301 (requiring the Liquor Control Board to operate liquor stores); 72 P.S. § 3761-303(a) (tasking the Secretary of the Department of Revenue with the duty to operate and administer a state lottery). [14] Moreover, this understanding  i.e., that some activities which conventionally may be couched as proprietary in nature are being undertaken as governmental functions  is consistent with a common definition of the term as [a] government agency's conduct that is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, or other law and that is carried out for the benefit of the general public. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (8th ed.2004). Some municipal authorities have come to typify the phenomenon of line-blurring between public and private enterprise, with the Stadium Authority serving as an apt example. As developed above, the Authority's existence and tax exempt status are justified on the ground that it performs an essential governmental function, 53 Pa. C.S. § 5620, [15] yet no one has identified any function it serves other than via its identity as the owner and principal operator of an amusement enterprise. We do not see that the government's entry into areas which might more comfortably be associated with the private sector suggests diminished cause for openness. In this regard, it seems unlikely that that the Legislature would be naïve about the potential for inappropriate influences which have become a risk attending such ventures. [16] Rather, the nature of these activities, and the departures from the more conventional confines of government, appear to us to militate in favor of public scrutiny. Moreover, the Management Agreement governing the Stadium Authority's relationship with Appellant is framed in such a way as to afford the latter plenary powers over a primary function of a government agency, essentially deputizing Appellant as an agent of the Authority, and specifically prescribing that certain of Appellant's actions shall bind the agency. Management Agreement § 1.2(a). In this fashion, and through the income-sharing feature of the Management Agreement, the interests of the Stadium Authority and Appellant have become closely intertwined. In line with these observations, we agree with Appellees and their amicus that a reasonably broad construction of governmental function best comports with the objective of the Right-to-Know Law, which is to empower citizens by affording them access to information concerning the activities of their government. Furthermore, as ably developed by Judge Nealon, such policy is very different from that motivating the application of the governmental-proprietary distinction as it has evolved in other settings. Accordingly, and, in the absence of specific legislative guidance, we decline to infer that the General Assembly intended to transport such construct into the open-records arena merely by employing the term governmental function. Accord Griffith, Escaping from the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L.REV. at 327 (If courts apply the governmental/proprietary test without scrutinizing the actual interests at stake, they may import inappropriate standards[.]). Rather, we conclude that it is the delegation of some non-ancillary undertaking of government, and not a convention-based assessment of the governmental-versus-proprietary character of the activity, that should control. In offering this conclusion, we realize there is ambiguity in our use of the term non-ancillary. We have chosen it here, because we do agree with Appellant and its amici that the government-always-acts-as-government overlay of the East Stroudsburg majority is too broad for purposes of Section 506. We also believe the Legislature used the governmental function delimiter in Section 506 to narrow the category of third-party records subject to disclosure by some measure, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2) (embodying the principle, in statutory construction, that the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain), presumably on account of the burden, expense, and other impositions attending wholesale disclosure. Accord East Stroudsburg, 995 A.2d at 508 (Leadbetter, P.J., concurring) (Surely, government agencies enter into some, if not many, contracts that do not implicate a governmental function.). While extrapolating from other jurisdictions in the open-records is difficult due to variances in the approaches taken in the governing statutes, such concern appears to be a recurrent one in the cases. See, e.g., Evertson v. City of Kimball, 278 Neb. 1, 767 N.W.2d 751, 761 (2009) (We agree with other courts that public records laws should not permit scrutiny of all a private party's records simply because it contracts with a government entity to provide services.). To account for this consideration, and in the absence of a specific statutory degree-nexus, we find that the non-ancillary threshold represents an appropriate opening inroad into establishing an interpretive one. In this respect, we observe that this is the type of conception that is most amenable to further development over time in the decisional law. Notably, President Judge Leadbetter expressed this point in her concurrence in East Stroudsburg, as follows: We are here faced with a new statute which embodies not only new rules, but an entirely new conceptual and procedural framework. Many of these new concepts are provided in statutory language susceptible of multiple interpretations. Compounding the problem, the new Office of Open Records (OOR) is being overwhelmed by a deluge of requests which must be decided now. Under these circumstances, there is an understandable temptation to rush to fill in the details left blank in the new law and provide immediate interpretive guidance in the form of sweeping black letter rules. Nonetheless, I believe it is necessary to take our time and address these questions with a narrow focus on the facts presented in each case and avoid broad pronouncements which may prove unworkable or unwise in different circumstances. East Stroudsburg, 995 A.2d at 508-09 n. 4 (Leadbetter, P.J., concurring). [17] President Judge Leadbetter also correctly observed that Section 506 requires that the agency has contracted to perform a governmental function .... Id. at 508 (Leadbetter, P.J., concurring) (quoting 65 P.S. § 67.506(d)(1) (emphasis added)). We read this to connote an act of delegation of some substantial facet of the agency's role and responsibilities, as opposed to entry into routine service agreements with independent contractors. Of course, in the myriad factual scenarios as they will arise in the cases going forward, courts will be confronted with many examples between the extremes. The present circumstances, however, do not involve an independent contractor conducting some ancillary activity, nor do they lay in the boundaries. Rather, the Stadium Authority, having been formed to administer an amusement enterprise, generated substantial public indebtedness in such venture. Appellant has accepted delegation of the responsibility to operate the ball park for the public benefit as the Authority's agent. Consistent with all previous rulings in the appeal proceedings, we also have no difficulty holding that, where a government agency's primary activities are defined by statute as essential governmental functions, and such entity delegates one of those main functions to a private entity via the conferral of agency status, Section 506(d)(1) pertains on its terms to non-exempted records directly relating to the function. [18]