Opinion ID: 432007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriateness of Class Action

Text: The maintenance of this action as it would now be constituted, however, depends upon the issue of class certification. Judge Neaher, noting that the complexion of this action has changed dramatically since it originated, determined that the class he had originally certified was no longer viable. He acknowledged that the issue whether a non-JCAH accredited facility can be found to have fallen below the standards of minimum care guaranteed by the due process clause was still outstanding, Woe v. Cuomo, supra, 559 F.Supp. at 1169. Yet finding the action now clearly unmanageable, id., he decertified the class and, since no litigating party remained, dismissed the action in its entirety. We find it odd that, having initially certified a massive class representing present and future individuals committed to all state institutions, the judge should now object to the scaled-down version of the litigation. Moreover, it is simply not the case that appellants originally complained of conditions in one psychiatric center, id. at 1168; the focus of their complaint has been state-wide since its initiation. It is often proper, as we noted in Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977, 89 S.Ct. 2131, 23 L.Ed.2d 766 (1969), for a district court to view a class action liberally in the early stages of litigation, since the class can always be modified or subdivided as issues are refined for trial. Indeed, it is an extreme step to dismiss a suit simply by decertifying a class, where a potentially proper class exists and can easily be created. See Ford v. United States Steel Corp., 638 F.2d 753, 760 (5th Cir.1981). We are also concerned about possible prejudice to members of a class who failed or were unable to take independent steps to protect their rights precisely because they were members of the class. We note, for example, that the respondent in Youngberg was forced to drop his claims for injunctive relief prior to trial, because they were already pending in another class action relating to the facility in which he was housed. Youngberg v. Romeo, supra, 457 U.S. at 311, 102 S.Ct. at 2455. For the reasons we have attempted to articulate with some precision, we believe the district judge abused his discretion by decertifying the class. On remand, subclasses should be certified as appropriate to press the outstanding claims we have identified. Without attempting to control the future course of this litigation, we would also suggest that the district judge consider employing more systematic methods of factfinding relating to the institutions still at issue. The services of a magistrate acting as special master might well expedite the proceedings. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 53. Discovery between the parties has done little to move the case forward until now, and the state has appeared reluctant to produce the primary material upon which appellants could construct their case. Placing the investigation under the aegis of the court and a magistrate might inure to the benefit of both parties. In addition, we note that mental institutions within the New York State system have lost and regained accreditation even within the course of this litigation. We would expect, of course, that the district judge will reexamine the facts as they exist at the time he revises class certification and as they evolve thereafter. Our discussion of the implications of nonaccreditation and noncertification should serve as a guide in analyzing the status of the appellants' case with respect to all of the hospitals at issue. [12]