Opinion ID: 2173098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misconduct of jurors or prevailing party.

Text: Appellant's first argument on appeal is that she was entitled to a new trial because of misconduct by the jury and the appellees. Appellant raised this argument to the trial court in the motion for a new trial, which was deemed denied. We must determine whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial. The standard in making this decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Langston v. Hileman, 284 Ark. 140, 680 S.W.2d 89 (1984). Appellant first argues that the silence of two jurors about knowing Mr. Dougherty requires a new trial. While a juror is required to reveal information he or she knows could cause prejudice, a juror is not required to bring to the court's attention information that the juror does not realize might bear upon his credibility as a juror. Big Rock Stone & Material Co. v. Hoffman, 233 Ark. 342, 344 S.W.2d 585 (1961); Kristie's Katering, Inc. v. Ameri, 72 Ark.App. 102, 35 S.W.3d 807 (2000). Appellant cites numerous cases where a new trial was granted when jurors failed to inform the court of potential issues reflecting on their qualifications as fair and impartial jurors but provides no case supporting the idea that a juror can commit misconduct by failing to bring to the court's attention information the juror does not realize would bear on his or her impartiality. In fact, two cases specifically suggest otherwise. In Kristie's Katering, Inc., supra , the appellant, Kristie's, argued that it was entitled to a new trial because one of the jurors failed to disclose that her son had been ejected from Kristie's nightclub twice. The Arkansas Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that there was no evidence that the juror knew her son had been ejected from the appellant's nightclub or even that she knew he went there. Furthermore, in Big Rock Stone & Material Co. v. Hoffman, supra , this court reversed a trial court's grant of a new trial where one of the jurors was unknowingly being represented by appellant's counsel. We stated: Here it is established by the undisputed proof as well as by the trial court's finding of fact that the plaintiffs could not have been prejudiced by [the juror's] participation in the case. [The juror] had no knowledge that a suit had been filed in his behalf by [the appellant's firm] or by anyone else, and it was therefore impossible for the pendency of that case to have any effect whatever upon his deliberations and conclusions as a juror. Id. at 344, 344 S.W.2d at 587. In Zimmerman v. Ashcraft, 268 Ark. 835, 597 S.W.2d 99 (Ark.App.1980), perhaps the strongest case cited by the appellant, the Court of Appeals upheld the grant of a new trial where the jurors certainly could have been aware they were not answering truthfully. Zimmerman v. Ashcraft, 268 Ark. at 837, 597 S.W.2d at 101. The present case is more akin to Kristie's Katering and Big Rock Stone than to the Zimmerman case, in that the jurors could not have known that they were withholding information that might bear on their impartiality. The appellant seems to argue that the jurors should have realized they had an obligation to disclose their relationship with Mr. Dougherty because they surely knew he was an attorney and were clearly aware of his presence in the courtroom. While the jurors may have been aware that Mr. Dougherty was an attorney, he was not identified as a member of either legal team. He was merely sitting in the courtroom and observing the voir dire process. Under these circumstances, the jurors could not possibly be expected to realize that they had a responsibility to disclose their relationship with Mr. Dougherty, and their failure to do so cannot constitute juror misconduct. Appellant's second contention is that the conversations between Mr. Dougherty and the two jurors necessitate a new trial. Appellant's primary authority for this point is the case of Langston v. Hileman, 284 Ark. 140, 680 S.W.2d 89 (1984). In Langston , this court overruled a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial where the jury foreman admitted to talking to one of the witnesses during a recess. The court noted that the trial court had specifically instructed the jury, Please have no conversation with the attorneys, with anyone who is a party in the case or with anyone who is believed by you to be a witness in the case. Id. at 141, 680 S.W.2d 89. In reversing the trial court's decision to deny a new trial, we stated, It is a well established principle that `justice ought not only to be fair, but appear to be fair.' When we consider the conduct of the jury foreman and the two witnesses we must conclude that in the present case there was at least the appearance of unfairness. Id. at 142, 680 S.W.2d 89. The facts in Langston v. Hileman, supra , are notably different from those at issue here. In Langston , the juror was conversing with a witness, a person with whom the juror knew it would be improper to engage in conversation. Similarly, in Moody Equipment & Supply Co. v. Union National Bank, Adm'r, 273 Ark. 319, 619 S.W.2d 637 (1981), a conversation occurred between the juror and a witness. In cases such as these, where the juror knows he or she is conversing with a person he or she has been specifically admonished not to talk to, the actual content of the conversation is irrelevantthe mere fact that the juror knowingly disobeyed a court's direction is what creates the appearance of impropriety. Where the juror, however, is unaware that the conversation is improper, the fact that such a conversation occurred does not create the appearance of impropriety; rather, the proponent of the new trial must show that the conversation prejudiced the party. Cf. Porter v. State, 308 Ark. 137, 823 S.W.2d 846 (1992). In Porter , the appellant requested a new trial because he saw a juror conversing with Dr. Harbison, a potential State's witness. Dr. Harbison testified that he did not hear an instruction not to talk to the jurors but knew not to talk to them about the case. He testified that he talked to the juror during a recess, but that they did not discuss the case. Id. at 148, 823 S.W.2d at 852. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, finding, It has not been established that the two involved discussed this case. Id. This court upheld that ruling. Furthermore, even though the Porter case was decided after Langston, supra , and Moody, supra , we did not discuss, much less conclude, that there was an appearance of impropriety in the mere fact that Dr. Harbison talked to a juror. See also Clayton v. State, 321 Ark. 602, 906 S.W.2d 290 (1995)(noting that Clayton had the burden of proving that information about an alleged bribe had filtered into the jury room and resulted in prejudice). Here, while the jurors may have known that Mr. Dougherty was an attorney, they had no way of knowing that he was in any way affiliated with the case. Thus, when our case law is applied to the facts here, the appellant must show actual prejudice and not the mere fact that a conversation occurred between the jurors and Mr. Dougherty. As the testimony of both jurors and Mr. Dougherty established that they had not discussed the case, we conclude that the appellant failed to show actual prejudice. Additionally, even if the jurors might have realized that Mr. Dougherty was somehow involved with the case, they did not know which side he was working with. In a similar situation, the Texas Court of Appeals refused to presume prejudice where a shadow juror hired by a jury consultant asked Juror Martinez for a cigarette and a quarter. Mercado v. Warner-Lambert Co., 106 S.W.3d 393 (2003). The Texas Court noted, Martinez testified that he did not know the shadow juror was associated with either party . . . Id. at 397. Here, the circuit court concluded that both the jurors retain impartiality. They have spoken with Mr. Dougherty, but have no association or belief that he is associated with one side or the other, and they have stated it does not affect their ability to try this lawsuit, and the Court feels that it does not. We cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that the jurors retained their impartiality. Thus, the circuit court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on grounds of jury misconduct. Appellant's third argument is that a new trial is warranted because of the failure of defense counsel and Mr. Dougherty to alert the circuit court to Mr. Dougherty's relationship with the jurors. The only authority cited by the appellant for this proposition is Kane v. Erich, 250 Ark. 448, 465 S.W.2d 327 (1971), but that case is not instructive on the point. In Kane , the court was faced with a situation where the plaintiff, knowing he had a bad relationship with one of the jurors, allowed the juror to be seated anyway. The plaintiff then wanted to challenge the juror's participation, arguing that the juror should have revealed his potential conflict. The court disagreed, and held that the plaintiff knew as much about her difficulties with [the juror] as [the juror] would have known and under the circumstances appellant owed an obligation to the trial court, the witnesses, and the other jurors to call the matter to the court's attention at the earliest possible moment. Id. These facts do not control the facts at hand, where the party complaining of juror misconduct is not the party who was aware of the conflict in the first place. The central question is whether the appellees' counsel had a duty to identify to the appellant or to the court the identity of their jury consultant. Currently, attorneys are given the ability to make their use of a jury consultant as public or private as they choose. 3 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 64:13 (2004). Some lawyers choose never to reveal to opposing counsel that they are using a jury consultant. Id. Others choose to have the jury consultant watch from the gallery, as was the case here. Still others allow the consultant to sit beside them at the counsel table during voir dire and introduce them to the jury as a consultant. Id. Ultimately, the decision about whether and when to reveal the consultant's work to opposing counsel is purely a strategic one. Id. Thus, as the appellees had no duty to report the identity of Mr. Dougherty, the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial on this point cannot be an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, while Mr. Dougherty undoubtedly knew that it was inappropriate for him to converse with a member of a jury he helped choose, his actions alone do not warrant a new trial. In a similar context, we have upheld a trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct absent any showing of actual prejudice. Williams v. State, 294 Ark. 345, 742 S.W.2d 932 (1988). In Williams, we stated, We consider misconduct on the part of counsel on the facts of each case. What is prejudice in one case might not be in a similar case. Id. at 351, 742 S.W.2d at 936. As noted earlier, the jurors themselves were unaware that Mr. Dougherty was associated with the case. We hold that, under these circumstances, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.