Opinion ID: 1791846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficient Evidence of Punitive Damages

Text: We review the denial of a motion for directed verdict to determine if the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence. D'Arbonne Const. Co., Inc. v. Foster, 354 Ark. 304, 123 S.W.3d 894 (2003). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way or the other with reasonable certainty, and it must force the mind to pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Id. When determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the party on whose behalf judgment was entered, and we give that evidence the highest probative value. Id. A motion for directed verdict should be granted only when the evidence viewed is so insubstantial as to require the jury's verdict for the party to be set aside. Id. A motion for directed verdict should be denied when there is a conflict in the evidence, or when the evidence is such that fair-minded people might reach different conclusions. Id. We have recently set out the standard for determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages in a negligence case: This court has said that an award of punitive damages is justified only where the evidence indicates that the defendant acted wantonly in causing the injury or with such a conscious indifference to the consequences that malice may be inferred. Stein v. Lukas, 308 Ark. 74, 823 S.W.2d 832 (1992); Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Mackey, 297 Ark. 137, 760 S.W.2d 59 (1988); National By-Products, Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Company, Inc., 292 Ark. 491, 731 S.W.2d 194 (1987). In other words, in order to support this element of damages by way of punishment, it must appear that the negligent party knew, or had reason to believe, that his act of negligence was about to inflict injury, and that he continued in his course with a conscious indifference to the consequences, from which malice may be inferred. Mackey, 297 Ark. at 145, 760 S.W.2d at 63; National By-Products, Inc., 292 Ark. at 494, 731 S.W.2d at 196. In order to warrant a submission of the question of punitive damages, there must be an element of willfulness or such reckless conduct on the part of the defendant as is equivalent thereto. Dalrymple v. Fields, 276 Ark. 185, 188, 633 S.W.2d 362, 364 (1982)(quoting Hodges v. Smith, 175 Ark. 101, 293 S.W.2d [298 S.W.] 1023 (1927)). D'Arbonne Const. Co., Inc. v. Foster, 354 Ark. at 308, 123 S.W.3d at 898 (2003). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that the critical inquiry is to determine whether there is evidence that a party likely knew or ought to have known, in light of the surrounding circumstances, that his conduct would naturally or probably result in injury, and that he continued such conduct in reckless disregard of the consequences from which malice could be inferred. See In re Aircraft Accident at Little Rock, 351 F.3d 874 (8th Cir.2003) (citing D'Arbonne Const. Co., Inc. v. Foster, 354 Ark. at 308, 123 S.W.3d at 898 (2003)). The evidence supporting an award of punitive damages, viewed in the light most favorable to the Barbers, is as follows. Willie Savage, a twenty-six year veteran of the railroad as a track-man, assistant foreman, and a foreman, testified for the Barbers at trial. Just before Southern Pacific Railroad's merger with Union Pacific in September 1996, he was working for Southern Pacific as a tie-gang foreman. According to Mr. Savage, a track inspector or road master would mark railroad ties that needed replacement and then a tie-gang would follow up replacing the bad ties. Savage explained that the tie-replacement was done to keep the track maintained as a sixty-mile-per-hour track. However, after Union Pacific took over the tracks, and prior to reaching the 123 Crossing, the railroad had stopped replacing all the bad ties and instituted a cluster-buster tie replacement program. In a cluster-buster, the tie-gang would only replace one or two ties in a string of bad ties. Mr. Savage explained that the railroad then issued a slow order for the portions of track where the cluster-buster replacement was being performed. In connection with his work as a tie-gang foreman, Mr. Savage complained to his supervisor, Mac McCartney, about the 123 Crossing. Mr. McCartney went to the crossing, but stated that he was not in charge of fixing crossings. Mr. Savage was concerned that the overgrown vegetation at the crossing would prevent his men from seeing a train and that one of his vehicles crossing the tracks would get hit by a train. Mr. McCartney suggested that Mr. Savage place a flagger at the crossing before they attempted to cross it. According to Mr. Savage, one or two men would stand at the crossing and direct the vehicles to cross when it was safe. He also testified that in working for Union Pacific there was never any response to complaints about overgrown vegetation. Carl Jones, another garbage truck driver, testified that he had experienced problems with the overgrown vegetation at Crossing 123. Mr. Jones attempted to contact Union Pacific in April 1997 to inform them about the problem. He made between seven and ten complaints by phone to Union Pacific regarding the 123 Crossing. In addition, Mr. Jones flagged down a Union Pacific worker on the road and complained that the vegetation at Crossing 123 was life threatening. Donald DePriest, a retired locomotive engineer, locomotive fireman, and brakeman also testified for the plaintiffs. He worked for the railroad from 1962 through 2000. Mr. DePriest testified that while he worked as locomotive engineer for Union Pacific he informed the train master, Tommy Stokes, and the train safety committee that the 123 Crossing was a hazard to the railroad employees and the public because there was a danger of hitting a vehicle at the crossing. Mayor Willetta Carroll of Palestine testified regarding her communications with Union Pacific. In 1997, Mayor Carroll contacted various personnel with Union Pacific concerning the track going through Crossing 123, including Vice President Jack Kyle, David Peterson, and Arkansas Grade Crossing Safety Coordinator Larry Hatley. She told these persons that Crossing 123 was overgrown and unsafe. In addition to considering the direct evidence that Union Pacific was put on notice that a life threatening condition existed at Crossing 123, the jury in this case was given an instruction on spoliation of evidence, which stated in part as follows: In this case, the plaintiffs contend that by intentional conduct the defendant railroad failed to preserve voice tapes and track inspection records that should have been preserved. Therefore, you may, but are not required, to infer that the contents of the voice tapes and track inspection records would have been unfavorable to the defendant. In Arkansas, spoliation is defined as the intentional destruction of evidence and when it is established, [the] fact finder may draw [an] inference that [the] evidence destroyed was unfavorable to [the] party responsible for its action. Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., Inc., 342 Ark. 143, 146, 27 S.W.3d 387, 388 (2000) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1401 (6th ed.1990)). Alan J. Blackwell, a railway consultant, testified in the Barbers' case-in-chief. Prior to becoming a consultant, Mr. Blackwell worked for Union Pacific in many different roles, including track inspector, track supervisor, road master, [7] and assistant road master. After being hired by the Barbers's counsel in this case, Mr. Blackwell asked counsel to get the Union Pacific Inspector's records and the Federal Railroad Track Inspector's records. Counsel, however, was unable to get those documents from Union Pacific. He was also unable to review Union Pacific's dispatch tapes of communications between the dispatcher, the train crew, and the maintenance people. Union Pacific's director of dispatching practices and quality assurance, John Reininger, testified as to the use of the dispatch voice tape. The voice tapes record conversations between a dispatcher and field employee. Mr. Reininger testified that Union Pacific retained the voice tapes for about ninety days, but that a claims representative could make a request to preserve the tape longer. According to Mr. Reininger, the tapes were recycled within ninety days even when people die. He also testified that the tapes would reflect reports from engineers of any dangerous condition experienced. The discovery process in this case was the subject of testimony given by Patricia Long, a senior claims representative for Union Pacific. Ms. Long testified that she was involved as the claims representative and that she received the request for track records in October 1998 for the accident that occurred at Crossing 123 in January of that same year. She testified that the documents were retained for at least one year. Yet, according to Ms. Long, the track records in this case were no longer available when the request was made for them in October. She explained that her request for the track records was forwarded to Union Pacific's Manager of Track Maintenance in December, but no response was forthcoming. When Ms. Long followed up on the earlier request, she was advised that the track inspection records were unavailable. Mr. Blackwell eventually made a trip to Union Pacific's headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, and found a stack of slow orders concerning a different set of tracks in Louisiana that was subject to arbitration between Union Pacific and Burlington Northern Railroad. Mr. Blackwell discovered that slow orders for the 123 Crossing area were listed at the tail end of some of the Louisiana slow orders. Blackwell explained that in 1996, before Union Pacific owned the tracks, various slow orders had been issued for the track covering the 123 Crossing. Those slow orders reduced the train's maximum speed from sixty miles per hour to forty miles per hour. As noted earlier, Union Pacific merged with Southern Pacific on September 11, 1996. Although Mr. Blackwell had experience at Union Pacific maintaining computerized records of slow orders, when he tried to find slow orders covering the 123 Crossing, Union Pacific told him the records did not exist. He was also unable to get Union Pacific's track inspection records. Finally, Mr. Blackwell discovered that Union Pacific had entered into a contract to have the overgrown vegetation at Crossing 123 cut back in August 1997, but it did not allot money for the contract. Union Pacific cites this court to Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Mackey, 297 Ark. 137, 760 S.W.2d 59 (1988), as authority for its assertion that there is insufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages. In Mackey , we held that while there was no question of the railroad's negligence in maintaining its right-of-way, the evidence did not support an award of punitive damages. The Mackey court pointed out that there was no evidence that the crossing was hazardous or that the dangers had been presented to the railroad. Based on the evidence detailed above, we conclude that there was ample evidence that Crossing 123 was hazardous and that Union Pacific was on notice of its condition. Here, direct evidence reflects that Union Pacific was notified of an imminent danger at Crossing 123. In addition, through the spoliation instruction, the jury was at liberty to infer that the destroyed voice tapes and track records contained remarks about the near misses testified to at trial and the dangerous condition presented by the overgrown vegetation. We conclude that the evidence in this case was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that Union Pacific likely knew or ought to have known, in light of the surrounding circumstances, that allowing the vegetation to remain overgrown and allowing trains to pass through Crossing 123 at close to sixty miles per hour would naturally or probably result in injury, and that Union Pacific continued such conduct in reckless disregard of the consequences from which malice could be inferred.