Opinion ID: 220189
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: An action for reimbursement under section

Text: 9606(b)(2) of this title. (4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under section 9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an action may not be brought with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the site. PAKOOTAS v. TECK COMINCO METALS 8905 (5) An action under section 9606 of this title in which the United States has moved to compel a remedial action.21 Plaintiffs argue that both the title of the subsection, “Timing of review,” and a Seventh Circuit decision, Frey v. EPA,22 establish that the statute merely regulates timing, and is not a true jurisdictional statute. [2] Subsequent to the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court clarified how to determine whether a statute limits jurisdiction or simply affects whether a claim for relief can be stated.23 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. concedes that the Supreme “Court and others have been less than meticulous” about when statutes should be deemed “jurisdictional.”24 Rejecting what it called “drive-by jurisdictional rulings,”25 the Court adopted a “readily administrable bright[-]line” test.26 “If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.”27 If not, then the restriction is nonjurisdictional.28 21 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphases added). 22 270 F.3d 1129 (7th Cir. 2001). 23 We recently acknowledged that a jurisdictional limitation, such as “[s]tanding, or the lack of it, may be intertwined with whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, but it is not the same thing.” Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 06-17328, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 4138432, at  (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2010) (en banc). 24 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006). 25 Id. at 512. 26 Id. at 516. 27 Id. at 515-16; see also Henderson v. Shinseki, No. 09-1036, slip op. at 6 (S. Ct. Mar. 1, 2011) (“Under Arbaugh, we look to see if there is any ‘clear’ indication that Congress wanted the rule to be ‘jurisdictional.’ This approach is suited to capture Congress’ likely intent and also provides helpful guidance for courts and litigants, who will be ‘duly instructed’ 8906 PAKOOTAS v. TECK COMINCO METALS The Court reemphasized this bright-line test last year in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnik, focusing on whether the word “jurisdiction” was used in a sentence controlling the claim at issue.29 And even more recently in Henderson v. Shinseki, the Court held that the 120-day deadline for filing appeals in Veterans Court was nonjurisdictional because the provision at issue did not speak in jurisdictional terms.30 [3] Here, the statute says “[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction . . . .”31 That language expressly addresses jurisdiction, satisfying the bright-line test of Arbaugh.32 Because the words are “[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction,” the statute means that no federal court shall have jurisdiction. The statute limits the timing of judicial review33 by means of the “jurisdiction-stripping provision contained in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).”34 Were we to wiggle around the words “[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction” because of the timing language, we would be doing just the sort of “wrestl[ing]” Arbaugh rejects in favor of a bright-line test.35 As we held in regarding a rule’s nature.” (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-16, and n.11)). 28 See id.; Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16; Bodine v. Graco, Inc., 533 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Because [49 U.S.C. ]§ 32710(a) ‘does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts,’ it was improper to dismiss this case on jurisdictional grounds.” (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515)). 29 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1244-45 (2010) (discussing Arbaugh and choosing to “apply this same approach to [17 U.S.C.] § 411(a)”). 30 Henderson v. Shinseki, No. 09-1036, slip op. at 8-9 (S. Ct. Mar. 1, 2011). 31 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 32 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516. 33 City of Rialto v. West Coast Loading Corp., 581 F.3d 865, 869-71 (9th Cir. 2009). 34 Id. at 869. 35 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516. PAKOOTAS v. TECK COMINCO METALS 8907 McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, the statute “amounts to a ‘blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction.’ ”36