Opinion ID: 1198856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Butters has Standing to Challenge the Validity of the Ordinance Amendment.

Text: Butters asserts that the district court erred in denying her relief in this declaratory judgment action because she did not have standing to bring the action. Butters contends that she has standing because she has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, and she has suffered an injury which is traceable to the challenged ordinance amendment. The district court held that Butters lacked standing because she failed to show that the alleged injury was peculiar to her. Relying on Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 875 P.2d 236 (Ct.App.1994), the district court held that standing cannot be conferred upon Butters because her injuries resulting from the ordinance amendment, while arguably palpable, are not unique to her. We disagree and hold that Butters does have standing to challenge the validity of the ordinance amendment. The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989). Although the doctrine is imprecise and difficult in its application, in Miles this Court adopted a criterion which explained: [t]he essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court so depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. As refined by subsequent reformation, this requirement of personal stake has come to be understood to require not only a distinct palpable injury to the plaintiff, but also a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978)) (citations omitted). Furthermore, under certain circumstances, a declaratory judgment action is the appropriate mechanism for judicial determination of the validity of zoning ordinance amendments. Student Loan Fund, 125 Idaho at 827, 875 P.2d at 239. However, the court held that to challenge the validity of zoning ordinance amendments: [a grievance relating to s]tatus as an owner of land within a designated area does not relieve a complainant of the necessity of demonstrating a distinct palpable injury traceable to the challenged governmental conduct. It is the quality or magnitude of the injury suffered which must differentiate a plaintiff from the citizenry at large in order to confer standing. The situs of owned property in relationship to an area touched by an ordinance is relevant to a standing inquiry only insofar as the property's location exposes the landowner to peculiarized harm. Id., at 828, 875 P.2d at 240. Here, Butters argues that she owns land in close proximity to the tower; the tower looms over her land; and its physical invasiveness affects her enjoyment of her property. Although the location of her property alone does not confer standing, the location does expose her to peculiarized harm. In particular, Butters contends that she had to spend $1,500 for a new telephone system to eliminate the tower's radio signal from her telephone and that the tower's radio signal still broadcasts through her daughter's compact disc system. Nevertheless, both Hauser and the Board argue that while Butters may have a personal stake in the issuance of the conditional use permit, she does not have a personal stake in the ordinance amendment. Hauser and the Board contend that Butters' argumentthat the tower caused problems with her phones and compact disc playerrelates to the issuance of the permit but does not show that she was injured as a result of the ordinance amendment. However, we see no such distinction and conclude that Butters' peculiarized harm is fairly traceable to both the ordinance amendment and to the issuance of the conditional use permit. Butters has shown a peculiarized harm as a result of the conditional use permit which was issued pursuant to the new appeal procedure prescribed by the ordinance amendment in question. Thus, we conclude that Butters does have standing to pursue a declaratory judgment action regarding the validity of the ordinance amendment.