Opinion ID: 196785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gratuity Statute Jury Instructions

Text: 83 Because the Travel Act convictions rely upon violations of the Massachusetts gratuity statute, we now address an additional state-law aspect of the gratuity statute about which the parties disagree. 84 The gratuity statute requires that the item of substantial value be given for or because of any official act performed or to be performed. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, § 3(a). An official act is defined as: any decision or action in a particular matter or in the enactment of legislation. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, § 1(h). 20 Here, Sawyer allegedly bestowed gratuities upon legislators who were members of the Insurance Committee. Thus, for purposes of this discussion, we proceed on the theory that the government had to prove that Sawyer gave the gratuities for or because of ... any decision or action in the enactment of legislation. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, §§ 3(a), 1(h). 85 The parties' interpretations of the gratuity statute differ with respect to the scope and character of the connection required between the gratuity and the official act. Sawyer contends that the gratuity must be linked to a specific, identifiable official act. The government argues that it is sufficient to prove that the gratuity would not have been given but for the legislator's ability to take official action favorable to Sawyer. In a pretrial ruling on Sawyer's motions to dismiss, the district court agreed with the government's interpretation, and instructed as such. 21 86 No Massachusetts court decision has yet interpreted the operative for or because of any official act language in ch. 268A, § 3(a). To support their respective positions, the parties present differing arguments regarding the statutory language, legislative history, comparable statutes, and State Ethics Commission rulings. We consider these sources separately.
87 The gratuity statute prohibits the giving of gratuities for or because of any official act performed or to be performed. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, § 3. The statute does not read for or because of the official's position. Rather, it forbids gratuities motivated by any official act and further defines, rather meticulously, official act. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, §§ 1(h) & (k). Thus, on the face of the statute, it does not appear that the unlawfulness of the gratuity could be established by proof that it was motivated solely by the official's position. In other words, proof of the offense requires something more than a simple showing that but for the official's authority, the gratuity would not have been given. 22 88 This observation, however, does not lead to the conclusion that the gratuity must be shown to be motivated by a specifically identified official act. As noted supra, a gratuity offense is essentially a bribery offense without proof of corrupt intent. The concern behind the gratuity statute, like the bribery statute, is the potential undermining of official integrity. A gratuity does not compromise this integrity because of its possible effect on the official's position; rather, the danger is in its ability to affect the official's performance of duties, i.e., official acts. It is not surprising, then, that the statute proscribes gratuities motivated by official acts rather than official position. 89 Thus, the use of the term official act appears to ensure that the gratuity would be deemed unlawful only when the giving of an item of substantial value is linked to the official's performance of duties. The connection between the gratuity and the performance of official duties, however, does not necessarily require the identification of a specific official act, and we find nothing in the statutory language to require such a demonstration.
90 The gratuity statute was based, in part, upon a bill drafted by a 1962 Massachusetts Special Commission on Code of Ethics. See Report of the Special Commission on Code of Ethics, 1962 House Doc. No. 3650, p. 8. Nothing in the Commission's Report, however, assists us in resolving the instant question. It states only: It should be noted that to constitute a criminal act, the giving or receiving of the item of such 'substantial value' must be 'for or because of' an official act. Id. at 11; see Commonwealth v. Famigletti, 4 Mass.App.Ct. 584, 354 N.E.2d 890, 893 (1976) (noting same language in the report). The Report neither parses out what these terms mean, nor gives examples of what was intended. From this we discern only that the Commission was concerned that innocent gifts to officials would not fall within the gratuity statute's purview. 91 The Commission's report does tell us that [m]uch of the language of the proposed legislation is taken and adapted from [a proposed federal bribery/gratuity bill]. Report of Special Commission, supra at 8; see Dutney, 348 N.E.2d at 822 n. 16. As discussed below, however, the comparable federal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), is also unhelpful in resolving the question before us.
92 In support of its position, the government relies on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of a different statute in Commonwealth v. Lapham, 156 Mass. 480, 31 N.E. 638 (Mass.1892), and on federal cases interpreting the federal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c). 93 Lapham involved a milk dealer who attempted to bribe a city milk inspector and was convicted under a statute punishing anyone who: 94 corruptly gives, offers or promises to any executive, legislative ... or judicial officer ... any gift or gratuity whatever, with intent to influence his act, vote, opinion, decision, or judgment on any matter, question, cause, or proceeding, which may be then pending, or may by law come or be brought before him in his official capacity. 95 Mass. Pub. St. ch. 205, § 9 (Ch. 349 Revised May 21, 1891); see Lapham, 31 N.E. at 638-39. The milk dealer argued that the indictment was insufficient because it did not aver a particular matter to be influenced. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, reasoning as follows: 96 Nor is it necessary in an indictment under [ch. 205, § 9] to aver that the corrupt intention to influence the act, opinion, decision or judgment of the inspector was in relation to any specific and particular matter then pending before him, or which was then expected to come before him. It is enough to aver a corrupt intention so to influence him in any matter which may then be pending, or which may by law come or be brought before him. If for example an executive, legislative or judicial officer is bribed corruptly to favor a particular person in any and all matters affecting that person which may come before such officer, without specification or knowledge of the particular matters likely to come up, the statute is broad enough to include such a case. A narrower construction of a similar statute has been adopted in Alabama, but we cannot follow it. Barefield v. State, 14 Ala. 603 [1848]. 97 Id. 31 N.E. at 639. 98 The difficulty with the government's reliance on Lapham is, of course, the fact that it involved a differently worded statute. The Lapham statute proscribes a corrupt gift to influence an official act on any matter ... which may be then pending or may by law come or be brought before him in his official capacity. Mass. Pub. St. ch. 205, § 9 (Ch. 349 Revised May 21, 1891) (emphasis added). In holding that an averment of a specific matter was not necessary, the Lapham court repeatedly used the word may. See, e.g., id. (It is enough to aver a corrupt intention so to influence him in any matter which may then be pending, or which may by law come or be brought before him.) (emphasis added). 99 The question is whether the absence of the word may in the present gratuity statute, see Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, §§ 3, 1(h) & (k), signifies, by negative implication, the requirement of a specific official act. The reasoning in Lapham does seem to indicate some relationship between the word may and the absence of a specificity requirement. We think, however, that it does not follow that the word may is the only manner in which to indicate that particular official acts need not be shown to establish a gratuity offense. 100 The present statute proscribes a gift for or because of any official act performed or to be performed, 23 and further defines official act as any decision or action in a particular matter or in the enactment of legislation. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, §§ 3(a), 1(h) (emphasis added). Use of the broad term any is consistent with a legislative intent to proscribe gifts motivated by unidentified official acts. Most importantly, given the reasoning set forth in Lapham, we think that if the Massachusetts Legislature had wanted to drastically narrow the scope of the gratuity offense by requiring specifically identified official acts, it would have spoken more clearly than it has. In the end, the Lapham case supports the conclusion that a gratuity offense may be established without proof that a specific official act was the motivation for the gratuity. 101 The government also relies on cases interpreting the similarly worded federal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), 24 that indicate that a conviction under that statute does not require a showing that the gratuity was linked to a specific official act. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir.) (it is sufficient for the government to show that the defendant was given the gratuity simply because he held public office), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 473, 133 L.Ed.2d 402 (1995); United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 68-69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980, 99 S.Ct. 567, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978); United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1080 (3d Cir.1979) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980). The government reasons that because much of the Massachusetts gratuity statute's language was based upon the federal statute, see Dutney, 348 N.E.2d at 822 n. 16, and because some federal cases hold that specific acts need not be shown, a similar interpretation of the state law should obtain. 102 Reliance on those cases, however, is undermined by the fact that the First Circuit has expressly reserved ruling on the question of whether or not a gratuity prosecution under the federal statute requires proof of a causal relation to any 'specific, identifiable act.'  United States v. Previte, 648 F.2d 73, 82 n. 8 (1st Cir.1981) (quoting Niederberger, 580 F.2d at 68-69). Sawyer, on the other hand, cites no federal gratuity cases (or state gratuity cases, for that matter) squarely holding that specific acts must be shown; although, he does cite cases in which specific official acts were shown, see e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 99-100 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052, 109 S.Ct. 1312, 103 L.Ed.2d 581 (1989); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 77-78 (D.C.Cir.1974). This is not the proper case for us to decide the federal issue. Thus, we conclude that it would be inappropriate to take any guidance here from cases interpreting the federal gratuity statute.
103 The Massachusetts State Ethics Commission is the primary civil enforcement agency for violations of the gratuity statute. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268B, § 3(i). The Ethics Commission has the power and duty to investigate alleged gratuity offenses, initiate appropriate adjudicatory proceedings, and order civil penalties if it concludes that a violation has occurred. Id. § 4. Upon the petition of any party, a final action of the Ethics Commission is subject to review by the Massachusetts superior court, which may enforce, modify or set aside the order. Id. § 4(k). 104 The Ethics Commission has repeatedly interpreted the gratuity statute as forbidding gifts motivated generally by the official's authority to act favorably for the donor. See In Re Charles F. Flaherty, 1990 SEC 59 (Disposition Agreement) ( 'All that is required to bring [the gratuity statute] into play is a nexus between the motivation for the gift and the employee's public duties'  (quoting In Re George A. Michael, 1981 SEC 59, 68)); SEC Commission Advisory No. 8 Free Passes (May 14, 1985) (noting that even in the absence of any specifically identifiable matter that was, is or soon will be pending before the official, [the gratuity statute] may apply) (citing United States v. Standefer, 452 F.Supp. 1178, 1183 (W.D.Pa.1978)). 105 We give the Ethics Commission's interpretation some deference. See Olszewski v. Berube, 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 297, 1995 WL 808889 (Mass.Super.No. 922666) (Jan. 27, 1995) at  2 (stating that although the Ethics Commission's decision on matters within its competence is to be given great weight, the courts are the final interpreter) (citing Finkelstein v. Board of Reg. in Optometry, 370 Mass. 476, 349 N.E.2d 346, 348 (1976)). That deference, however, is tempered not only by the fact that no Massachusetts court has passed on the Ethics Commission's interpretation, but also because this is a criminal case and the Ethics Commission is charged only with civil enforcement. The Commission may very well have valid reasons for adopting a broad, prophylactic interpretation of the statute in its civil dispositions of individual transgressions; its interpretation is easier to prove and the offender is more likely to settle with the Commission if she does not have to admit to more egregious wrongdoing. 106 Nonetheless, we note that the Ethics Commission's interpretation of the gratuity statute has been left undisturbed by the Massachusetts Legislature, and its interpretation is not arbitrary, unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute. Finkelstein, 349 N.E.2d at 348. Thus, the Ethics Commission's opinion on the matter further supports the conclusion that a specific official act need not be identified in a gratuity offense.
107 The absence of a Massachusetts court decision on this issue is troubling. We have carefully considered, however, all of the authority and arguments on Sawyer's behalf, and none of them is availing. We also take note of the fact that Sawyer does not cite a single gratuity case, either federal or state (and we have found none), holding that a specific official act must be linked to the unlawful gratuity. Thus, we conclude that the Massachusetts gratuity statute does not require proof that the offender gave the item of substantial value because of a specifically identified official act. Of course, the identification of certain official acts in relation to the gratuity might make a gratuity offense easier to prove, and we suspect that most cases will include such proof although it is unnecessary.