Opinion ID: 2996563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Connick-Pickering Analysis

Text: When a government employee is terminated and alleges that his exercise of protected speech motivated the termination, we initially evaluate whether the First Amendment protects the employee’s speech by conducting the two-part analysis set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See Wainscott v. Henry, 315 F.3d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 2003). The first element of the Connick-Pickering test requires that we consider whether the speech in question addresses a matter of public concern. See Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147). “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. We have determined that the content of the speech is the most important consideration. See Delgado, 282 F.3d at 517. The second element, the Pickering balancing test, requires us to determine whether “the interests of the [plaintiff], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public con10 No. 02-1231 cern” outweigh “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Kokkinis v. Ivkovich, 185 F.3d 840, 844 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). Both prongs of the ConnickPickering test are matters of law that this court reviews de novo. See Wainscott, 315 F.3d at 851 (stating that resolution of Pickering balancing test is a question of law); Snider v. Belvidere Township, 216 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that determination of matter of public concern is for the court). If we determine that the employee’s speech was constitutionally protected, we then must consider whether the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s actions. See Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2002). If the speech was such a factor, the employer must have the opportunity to prove that it would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment rights. See Vukadinovich v. Bartles, 853 F.2d 1387, 1389-90 (7th Cir. 1988) (quotation marks and citations omitted). However, we need not reach the issue of the employer’s motivations if the plaintiff’s statements are not constitutionally protected. See id. at 1390 n.5. The first step in the analysis requires that we determine whether Mr. Williams’ speech addressed a matter of public concern. At some point during or after the Dickens trial, Mr. Williams commented to reporters, “if the person who committed the murder was not on trial, the verdict would 4 not be just.” R.1 at ¶ 5. Mr. Williams contends that his 4 This quotation is taken from Mr. Williams’ complaint; the (continued...) No. 02-1231 11 statement “mirrored doubts felt and expressed by other members of the African American community of South Bend, Indiana” and that it was based on information from a witness that did not testify at the trial. Id. at ¶ 7. This statement purported to address the validity of a criminal conviction that Mr. Williams claims was influenced by race. Because we believe that the second prong of the ConnickPickering analysis is determinative, we assume, without deciding, that this comment constitutes a matter of public concern. See Knight v. Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (assuming arguendo that speech addressed matter of public concern and turning to Pickering balancing test); Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42, 46-47 (1st Cir. 1998) (same). In Gustafson, we outlined a number of factors for consideration in conducting the Pickering balancing test: Pickering contemplates a highly fact-specific inquiry into a number of interrelated factors: (1) whether the speech would create problems in maintaining discipline or harmony among co-workers; (2) whether the employment relationship is one in which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary; (3) whether the speech impeded the employee’s ability to perform [his] responsibilities; (4) the time, place, and manner of the speech; (5) the context within which the underlying dispute arose; (6) whether the matter was one on which debate was vital to informed decision-making; and (7) whether the speaker should be regarded as a member of the general public. Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 909 (citing Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 4 (...continued) record neither contains a direct quote nor a transcript of the media reports. 12 No. 02-1231 358, 371 (7th Cir. 2000)). The court’s opinion in Kokkinis v. Ivkovich is also instructive. In Kokkinis, a police officer appeared on a television newscast in disguise and shared his views concerning another officer’s allegation of sex discrimination within the police department. See Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 842. The court found that Kokkinis had no knowledge of the incident; rather, he had a personal dispute 5 with the Police Chief. The Police Chief was embarrassed by the broadcast and believed that the department as a whole was placed in a negative light. The Chief also received phone calls complaining about the interview. See id. We concluded that the Pickering balancing test weighed in favor of the defendants because “[d]eference to the employer’s judgment regarding the disruptive nature of an employee’s speech is especially important in the context of law enforce- 6 ment.” Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 845. 5 In Kokkinis, we held that the motive of the officer in making the statements ostensibly about sex discrimination was a private feud; therefore, the statements did not constitute a matter of public concern. See Kokkinis v. Ivkovich, 185 F.3d 840, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1999). However, we addressed the Pickering balancing test in the alternative. See id. at 845. 6 We note that in Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2002), we reached the opposite result and concluded that a police department had violated two police officers’ free speech rights by transferring them out of their elite tactical unit in retaliation for publicly criticizing an order of the department’s deputy inspector. We noted that, due to the need for relationships of trust and loyalty on a police force, deference given to police departments under the Pickering analysis is considerable; however, it is “by no means complete.” Id. at 910 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 677 (1994)). However, the result in Gustafson is distinguishable from the present case. In Gustafson, there was neither (continued...) No. 02-1231 13 In an organization such as a police department, discipline and respect for the chain of command are critical to accomplishing the entity’s mission of maintaining order and public safety. See Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that in the context of law enforcement the government has a “ ‘heightened interest . . . in maintaining discipline and harmony among employees.’ ” (citation omitted)); Tyler v. City of Mountain Home, 72 F.3d 568, 570 (8th Cir. 1995) (commenting that paramilitary character and mission of police departments results in greater latitude in discipline and personnel matters than a normal government employer). As an Assistant Police Chief, Mr. Williams served in a position of loyalty and confidence. He breached those by making the statement to the press. See Klunk v. County of St. Joseph, 170 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that a police officer’s position contains a duty of loyalty and confidence); Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1991) (commenting on need for loyal deputies for elected sheriff to promote public confidence in law enforcement). In addition to violating his duty of personal loyalty to Sheriff Seniff, it is undisputed that Mr. Williams’ conduct resulted in a number of phone calls to Sheriff Seniff similar to those in Kokkinis demonstrating the displeasure of various 6 (...continued) evidence that the speech was disruptive, nor that the defendants believed it would have future disruptive consequences. See id. The case turned on a failure of proof. Moreover, we emphasized that the manner and means of the employee’s speech is critical. See id. at 912 (noting the significance of the fact that the complaining officers properly took their concerns up the chain of command). In this case, the public manner and means of Mr. Williams’ speech was inappropriate, and the speech clearly had a significant disruptive impact within the police department. 14 No. 02-1231 individuals with Mr. Williams’ public statement. Moreover, Mr. Williams’ comment created significant unrest in the law enforcement community, almost enough to precipitate his expulsion from the F.O.P. See R.80, Ex.Lauck Aff. at ¶ 3; Tedder v. Norman, 167 F.3d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that deposition testimony of deputy director of police training academy, which upset crucial business relationships with other law enforcement agencies, was significant in Pickering analysis); Tyler, 72 F.3d at 570 (noting significance of negative impact on interagency relationships caused by employee’s speech). Additionally, as Assistant Chief of Police, Mr. Williams was charged with oversight of security at the Dickens trial. See R.76, Ex.Williams Dep. at 100 (Mr. Williams stating that his official role at the Dickens trial as Assistant Chief of Police was to be “in charge of people who worked in the courthouse and [to provide] security for the courthouse. I was in charge of the jail where he was housed.”); R.76, Ex.Seniff Dep. at 79 (stating that a captain was primarily responsible for courtroom security at the Dickens trial, but that if there were any problems the Assistant Chief, Williams, would be the next in line in the organizational chart to address security issues). Given his relationship to the judicial proceedings as the Assistant Chief of Police responsible for security at a trial, there was a significant governmental interest in Mr. Williams’ refraining from impugning the validity of the jury verdict to the press during or shortly 7 after the trial. 7 We note that the record does not provide the exact timing or circumstances of Mr. Williams’ comment. See R.75, Ex.Alan Lieb Dep. at 61-62 (stating that in television report the caption read only “Norval Williams” and did not identify him as a police (continued...) No. 02-1231 15 These considerations make clear that any limited interest in commenting on the verdict at trial that Mr. Williams may have possessed was outweighed by the considerations of the police department in maintaining appropriate order and discipline. Consequently, Mr. Williams did not have a protected First Amendment right to make his statement to the press. Therefore, Sheriff Seniff and Chief Waugh could not be liable for violating Mr. Williams’ First Amendment rights. This conclusion is equally applicable to the remaining First Amendment claims against Mr. Toth, Mr. Lauck and the Merit Board members.