Opinion ID: 6357225
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Althaus (1): The relationship between the parties

Text: Having surveyed the regulatory background, we now consider how it informs the question of Defendants' duty. 21 We begin by examining the relationships at issue in this case, which implicate the first Althaus factor. Typically, whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff arises from the relationship between those parties, not the relationships between agents of the injury who stand between or outside plaintiff and defendant. Thus, in the New York Court of Appeals' seminal decision in Palsgraf , Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo observed that, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining , the observance of which would have averted or avoided the injury. 162 N.E. at 99-100 (quoting W.V. Cent. & P. Ry. Co. v. Md. ex rel. Fuller , 96 Md. 652 , 54 A. 669 , 671-72 (1903) ) (emphasis added); cf. Dahlstrom v. Shrum , 368 Pa. 423 , 84 A.2d 289 , 290 (1951) (quoting Palsgraf , 162 N.E. at 100 ) (The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or others within the range of apprehension.). Whence, our time-honored general rule: Although each person may be said to have a relationship with the world at large that creates a duty to act where his own conduct places others in peril, Anglo-American common law has for centuries accepted the fundamental premise that mere knowledge of a dangerous situation, even by one who has the ability to intervene, is not sufficient to create a duty to act. Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft , 523 Pa. 1 , 564 A.2d 1244 , 1248 (1989) (emphasis in original); see  Feld v. Merriam , 506 Pa. 383 , 485 A.2d 742 , 746 (1984) ([T]here is a general rule against holding a person liable for the criminal conduct of another absent a preexisting duty.). Accordingly, [t]he fact that the actor realizes that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314, irrespective of the gravity of the danger to which the other is subjected and the insignificance of the trouble, effort, or expense of giving him aid or protection. Id. § 314 cmt. c; see Seebold , 57 A.3d at 1246 (noting our reliance upon Section 314 in Yania , 155 A.2d at 346 ). The lower courts and the parties acknowledge the lack of direct relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants. See, e.g., Walters , 144 A.3d at 118 . However, [w]here the defendant stands in some special relationship with the person whose conduct needs to be controlled, a duty may be imposed. Id. ; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965), supra n.12; Emerich , 720 A.2d at 1036 (holding that duty may lie where the defendant stands in a special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct). The Superior Court noted that Kwiatkowski was an employee or agent of Defendants at the time the duty to report arose, see R.W. , 888 A.2d at 747 ([D]uty is predicated on the relationship that exists between the parties at the relevant time.), and that a special relationship may include a master's duty to control a servant, pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317. As well, Section 319 of the Restatement identifies a special relationship where [o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319. The Superior Court focused upon Section 319, concluding that it established a qualifying special relationship because Defendants knew of his diversion and substitution and knew that he was dangerous and likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled while he remained under their control. Walters , 144 A.3d at 119 . Defendants could have exercised control in this instance and could have discharged their duty, the Superior Court concluded, by reporting Kwiatkowski's conduct to the DEA and/or another law enforcement agency. Defendants dispute the Superior Court's ruling to the extent that it relies upon either Section 317 or 319. Under specific circumstances, Section 317 imposes a duty upon a master to control a servant. 22 Plaintiffs argue, in effect, that a master could control its servant acting outside the scope of his employment, presently or prospectively, by satisfying a duty to report. Indeed, relative to the terms of Section 317, it is not unfair to say that, when Kwiatkowski diverted controlled substances and substituted other substances  for them, he was acting outside the scope of his employment on the premises of UPMC, which also were premises he was privileged to enter only as Maxim's servant, and that UPMC and/or Maxim arguably knew of their ability to control him and were aware of the opportunity to do so, albeit indirectly, by reporting his conduct to the DEA and/or another law enforcement agency. Plaintiffs' resort to Section 319 is less convincing, though Plaintiffs depend here as well upon the proposed duty to control by reporting illegal diversion to the DEA or another law enforcement agency. Section 319 provides that [o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm. Id. § 319. The commentary to Section 319 suggests that it is intended to apply in two situations: first, when the actor has charge of one or more of a class of persons to whom the tendency to act injuriously is normal, and, second, when the actor has charge of a third person who does not belong to such a class but who has a peculiar tendency so to act of which the actor from personal experience or otherwise knows or should know. Id. § 319 cmt. a. Only two illustrations are provided, one involving a hospital that allows patients infected with a communicable disease to escape, thus infecting others, and another concerning a mental institution's failure to restrain a homicidal maniac who flees and injures a third party. These examples comport with Defendants' contention that Section 319 should apply only when the third person in question is confined, submissive or otherwise fully subjected to the control of the defendant, and we are aware of no binding authority to the contrary. See Brief for UPMC at 23 (citing Johnson v. Johnson , 410 Pa.Super. 631 , 600 A.2d 965 , 971 n.7 (1991) ) (emphasis omitted). Focusing strictly upon the relationships at issue, we conclude that Defendants were in respective master-servant relationships with Kwiatkowski when the putative duty to report arose. Such reports might have led to the end of Kwiatkowski's career working for CSA registrants, because the same regulation that imposes the duty to report also provides that a registrant shall not employ, as an agent or employee who has access to controlled substances, any person who has been convicted of a felony offense relating to controlled substances. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.76 (a). Inasmuch as a felony prosecution of Kwiatkowski could have followed upon a report to either DEA or another law enforcement agency, as it ultimately did in New Hampshire for the same conduct, this factor clearly supports imposing a duty to report upon both UPMC, and to a lesser extent Maxim, given that it could have done so even absent the legal reporting obligation that applies to UPMC.