Opinion ID: 844193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pretrial Issues Regarding Penalty Phase

Text: Defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to replace appointed counsel at the penalty phase retrial, resulting in a violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant‘s motion.
On August 27, 1998, during jury selection for the guilt phase of trial, defendant made his first motion to substitute Defense Counsel Robert Amador. The trial court held a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. 5 For the first time on appeal, defendant asks us to conduct a comparative analysis regarding the prospective jurors‘ responses and the prosecutor‘s questioning of them. Here, the trial court did not ask the prosecutor for his reasons for the excusals or rule on the prosecutor‘s actual reasons for excusing Prospective Juror No. 44. (See People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 174, fn. 3; People v. Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 79, fn. 2.) Because the trial court determined there was no showing of a prima facie case, we decline to conduct a comparative juror analysis in this ― ‗first-stage‘ ‖ Wheeler/Batson case. (People v. Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 80, fn. 3.) 23 Defendant stated that, although counsel had been assigned at the beginning of the case, defendant had not seen any police reports or documents and was unaware of his defense. He believed that Amador was not prepared because he had not filed a written response to one of the prosecution‘s motions, but had only responded verbally. When defendant stated he believed counsel was not adequately defending him, the trial court asked him to provide specific examples of what he wanted Amador to do that he had not done. Defendant responded that the prosecution‘s motions contained ―lies‖ and he wanted Amador to challenge the truthfulness of the evidence. The court noted that defendant had not proffered any facts to support his claim. It stated that defendant had not provided a reason for relieving Amador, but appointed independent counsel to provide assistance to defendant on the Marsden motion. On August 31, 1998, at the next hearing on the Marsden motion, Charles Nacsin, who had been appointed to assist on the motion, announced that defendant wanted to withdraw the motion. Defendant told the court that after speaking with Amador, his concerns had been resolved and he understood what Amador was doing. On September 21, 1998, the jury returned guilty verdicts and true findings on the special circumstances. On October 14, 1998, the jury advised the court it could not reach a verdict on the penalty; the trial court found the jury was hopelessly deadlocked and declared a mistrial on the penalty phase of trial. On November 2, 1998, during jury selection for the first penalty phase retrial, Defense Counsel Amador moved to be relieved as counsel.6 Amador 6 On November 25, 1998, the trial court discharged the jury after granting defendant‘s motion for a continuance. Defendant‘s second penalty phase retrial began on January 19, 1999. 24 stated he was concerned that another attorney had been visiting defendant in jail, that this would interfere with his representation of defendant, and that defendant refused to provide Amador reasons for the visits. A jail log revealed that Attorney David Karlson had visited defendant nine times from July 25, 1998 to October 28, 1998. Defendant denied that Karlson was interfering with Amador‘s representation. He explained that Karlson had said there was nothing he could do for defendant on his case until after the penalty phase ended. Defendant felt that because Amador did not want to represent him, he too did not want Amador representing him. Amador clarified that he was not currently asking to be relieved, but that if Karlson‘s jail visits continued, he would ask to be relieved. The court issued an order to show cause against Karlson and appointed Attorney Nascin to consult with defendant regarding the need for a Marsden motion. On November 4, 1998, the trial court held a hearing regarding Attorney Karlson‘s jail visits with defendant. Karlson testified that defendant asked to speak with him after the jury hung on the penalty verdict. On October 28th, Karlson visited defendant briefly and told him that because defendant was already represented, he could not advise him on the case until after the trial and his attorney-client relationship with Amador had ended. Karlson assured the court he would follow its order barring any future contacts with defendant. Attorney Nascin then requested a Marsden hearing; after talking with defendant, he felt that there was a breakdown in the relationship between defendant and Amador. On the following day, the trial court held a Marsden hearing, with Nascin representing defendant. Defendant initially testified that he had lost confidence in Amador for two reasons. First, Amador had asked to be relieved as counsel. Second, Amador had failed to respond to his requests during the guilt phase to pursue other evidence and to ask witnesses certain questions. When asked about his first Marsden motion, defendant explained that he had withdrawn the motion 25 after Amador assured him things would be better and that ―he had stuff up his sleeves he was going to bring out.‖ But, as the trial progressed, defendant felt that Amador was not fighting for him and giving him ―100 percent,‖ and that he did not receive a fair trial. Defendant testified that his feelings about Amador ―really changed‖ when the trial court dismissed the jury after its penalty deadlock. He had questions on what was going to happen next, but could not reach Amador by telephone. Defendant was told that Amador had gone to Reno and would return the following morning. But, Amador did not call or visit him during the two-week period after the mistrial. Because he and his family were concerned about the future proceedings, defendant contacted Karlson for information, but Karlson did not provide any answers. Defendant stated that he lost confidence in Amador because he felt that if Amador was professional and had been doing a good job, he would not have been concerned about defendant‘s contacts with Karlson. Defendant also questioned why Amador had advised him not to testify and why he told the court of that advisement, even though defendant wanted to testify. Finally, defendant stated he felt that there was no communication between him and Amador. Amador testified that on defendant‘s suggestion, the defense team spoke to several witnesses. Because several of these witnesses had ―nothing good to say‖ about defendant, they determined that these witnesses would have caused more harm to defendant‘s case. For example, one witness related that a few days before he burned Yolanda, defendant wanted to borrow a handgun. Amador denied that he told defendant that he had ―something up‖ his ―sleeve.‖ Amador testified that because defendant did not want him as his lawyer and did not like Amador, he felt uncomfortable and did not want to represent defendant. Amador felt that their relationship had broken down and was irreparably harmed. Because defendant refused to tell him why Attorney Karlson 26 was visiting him so often, Amador felt that defendant was not candid and did not cooperate with him. However, Amador believed that if defendant was counseled to cooperate and communicate with him, Amador could still try the case. His personal feelings would not detract from his professional representation of defendant. On the adequacy of Amador‘s representation, the trial court found that defendant‘s complaints about his failure to pursue certain matters and his unpreparedness were not specific enough, and that counsel‘s advice to defendant not to testify was an insufficient showing of ineffective representation. Regarding Amador‘s failure to see defendant after the penalty mistrial, the court noted that the quality of representation does not depend solely on the number of times a defendant speaks with his attorney. It commented that throughout the proceedings in this case, Amador conducted the defense appropriately, was prepared, and argued persuasively. It saw nothing unfair about the trial. The court noted that given the evidence and defendant‘s confession at the guilt phase, defendant could not have expected a not guilty verdict. The court further noted that, at the first penalty trial, Amador was able to convince a jury to hang on the verdict. The trial court found that ―what we have here, very unfortunately, is a personal relationship that has broken down.‖ The court noted that Amador asked to be relieved based only on his perception that defendant had been consulting another attorney, who might have been ―second-guessing‖ Amador‘s representation of defendant. The court further noted that defendant ―joined in‖ Amador‘s motion, but did not initiate the motion for relief. It was only at that point that defendant lost confidence in Amador‘s ability to defend him. Despite their personal relationship, the trial court denied Amador‘s and defendant‘s motions for relief of counsel because there was not an irreconcilable conflict and there was no showing of ineffective representation. The court 27 accepted Amador‘s representation that his personal feelings would not influence or affect his ability to professionally represent defendant and advised defendant to cooperate and communicate with his attorney.
―When a defendant seeks substitution of appointed counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44, ‗the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate performance. A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.‘ ‖ (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599.) ―A trial court should grant a defendant‘s Marsden motion only when the defendant has made ‗a substantial showing that failure to order substitution is likely to result in constitutionally inadequate representation.‘ ‖ (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1025.) ―We review the denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of discretion.‖ (People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 599.) ―Denial is not an abuse of discretion ‗unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the defendant's right to assistance of counsel.‘ ‖ (Ibid.) We conclude that defendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion. Although defendant emphasizes that Amador failed to communicate with him, defendant‘s testimony reveals that this claim was based primarily on counsel‘s failure to speak with him during the two-week period between the penalty phase mistrial and the motions for relief of counsel. Although not answered immediately, defendant‘s questions about the upcoming proceedings presumably were answered later. Similarly, 28 defendant‘s lack of confidence in Amador was based primarily on counsel‘s failure to communicate with defendant during that two-week period and on counsel‘s request to be removed. However, as the trial court explained, ―the number of times one sees his attorney, and the way in which one relates with his attorney, does not sufficiently establish incompetence.‖ (See People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 622.) After presiding over the guilt phase trial and the first penalty phase trial, the court noted that counsel had performed adequately and accepted counsel‘s representation he could continue to represent defendant professionally. Although defendant now points to some of Amador‘s actions as specific examples of a ―rather tepid‖ performance throughout the case, he failed to raise those claims to the trial court. In any event, tactical disagreements between a defendant and his attorney or a defendant‘s frustration with counsel are not sufficient cause for substitution of counsel. (People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 688; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1092.) On this record, the court reasonably concluded that defendant failed to show counsel provided inadequate representation or that any conflict between defendant and Amador was irreconcilable. There was no abuse of discretion. 2. Absence of Defense Counsel and Presence of Substitute Attorney During Portion of Jury Selection At Penalty Phase Retrial Defendant claims that the absence of his attorney and the presence of substitute counsel during the distribution of juror questionnaires and hardship screening at the penalty phase retrial deprived him of his right to counsel under the federal and state constitutions. He is wrong. On January 19, 1999, the first day of the second penalty phase retrial (third penalty phase trial), Attorney Amador was not present in court because of illness. Another attorney, Julian Ducre, was present to represent defendant during Amador‘s absence. The trial court asked defendant if somebody spoke to him 29 ―about the situation with Mr. Amador.‖ Defendant replied yes. The court explained that during the proceedings in Amador‘s absence and Ducre‘s presence, ―nothing will happen regarding the presentation of your case or the prosecution‘s case except to explain to the jury the procedure and hand out the questionnaires and have them returned on a later date.‖ When asked if he would consent to that procedure, defendant replied yes. During Ducre‘s presence, three groups of prospective jurors were called into the courtroom and sworn. The first group appeared on the morning of January 19. The second group was brought in that afternoon, while the third group came in on the following morning. During all three sessions, the trial court introduced the parties, read the information, related that Attorney Ducre would be sitting in that day because defendant‘s attorney, Amador, was ill, and explained the proceeding was a penalty phase trial. It discussed the jury selection procedure and schedule, including the fact that questionnaires would be distributed, and the prospective jurors would be dismissed and ordered to return on February 1st with the completed questionnaires. After the questionnaires were distributed, the court explained the grounds for a hardship excusal. The court asked those prospective jurors claiming hardship to stay and dismissed the other prospective jurors. After questioning, the court dismissed those prospective jurors who had been excused by stipulation. After the above proceedings, the trial court ordered the prosecutor to meet with Amador to discuss the questionnaires and return to court on February 1. On that date, Amador was present in court when the first group of prospective jurors returned with their completed questionnaires. The Attorney General claims that defendant cannot challenge his attorney‘s absence because he consented to Amador‘s absence and the substitution of Attorney Ducre. Defendant responds that defendant agreed to have stand-in 30 counsel only for the purpose of handing out the jury questionnaires and was not advised that the court would be excusing prospective jurors for hardship in Amador‘s absence. Defendant argues that, under these circumstances, he did not waive his right to have his attorney present during the excusal proceedings. Because we conclude that defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel, we need not decide the waiver issue. On the merits, defendant contends that the absence of Amador during jury selection proceedings constituted a ―structural error‖ that requires automatic reversal of the judgment without reference to harmless error analysis. (Arizona v. Fulminate (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309.) Alternatively, he argues that Amador‘s absence was a presumptively prejudicial violation of his right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 695-697; United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659.) ―A criminal defendant enjoys the right to counsel under both the state and federal Constitutions (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15, Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 339-345, People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335.) A complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, including during jury voir dire (Gomez v. United States (1989) 490 U.S. 858, 873), gives rise to a presumption that the trial was unfair. (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659). But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the presumption of prejudice will only stand when counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 695; Cronic, at p. 659.)‖ (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 86.) We reject defendant‘s claims for several reasons. First, because defendant had an attorney representing him at all times during the jury selection proceedings, there was not a complete denial of counsel, let alone ―structural error.‖ (People v. 31 Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 86 [defense cocounsel‘s conducting of voir dire in absence of lead counsel not a violation of right to counsel]; Carroll v. Renico (6th Cir. 2007) 475 F.3d 708, 712-713.) Second, we question whether Amador‘s absence and Ducre‘s presence occurred during a critical stage of the proceedings. Hardship screening of the jury pool is not a critical stage of the proceedings. (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 72 [defendant had no absolute right to be present during hardship screening]; People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 395-396 [jury commissioner‘s screening of jury pool for financial hardship in absence of defense counsel or defendant not constitutionally significant].) Here, the court‘s hardship screening and distribution of juror questionnaires bore ― ‗no reasonable, substantial relation to [defendant‘s] opportunity to defend the charges against him‘ ‖ (People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 74), nor was there even an opportunity for counsel to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing during the preliminary portion of the jury selection process. (Bell v. Cone, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 695; United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659.) Thus, defendant was not presumptively prejudiced by Amador‘s absence. Moreover, defendant has failed to show he was actually prejudiced. Defendant argues that Amador‘s presence was necessary because he ―had an awareness of trial strategy and an understanding of the unique aspects of the case.‖ Hardship excusals ― ‗are to be granted only on a sufficient showing that the individual circumstances of the prospective juror make it unreasonably difficult for the person to serve or that hardship to the public will occur if the person must serve in the particular case.‘ ‖ (People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 663.) The propriety of a hardship excusal does not depend on the underlying facts of the specific case, but rather on the juror‘s individual circumstances of hardship in 32 serving on a jury in general. Thus, intimate knowledge of the case is not necessary for counsel‘s effective representation during hardship excusals. Defendant contends that stand-in counsel failed to object to the trial court‘s use of a more lenient standard for hardship excusals than designated in California Rules of Court, rule 2.1008. For example, he argues that financial hardship excusals were granted by the court or by stipulation without a showing that there was an ―extreme‖ burden (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1008(d)(3)) and were granted to full-time students and those with planned vacations, criteria not designated in the rules of court. However, as the Attorney General argues, even if Attorney Amador had been present, the result would have been the same. As she points out, in the first trial, Amador stipulated to the excusal of jurors who requested a hardship dismissal on the same grounds defendant now claims were too permissive. Moreover, there is no showing that any of the hardship excusals were improper or an abuse of discretion. ―[R]ule 2.1008‘s strictures on the jury commissioner‘s authority to issue hardship excusals do not necessarily apply to hardship excusals granted by the trial court during voir dire.‖ (People v. Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 665, fn. 18.) Defendant has failed to show that any of those excusals resulted in the seating of biased jurors or that the panel from which persons were excused for hardship reasons was less than representative. (See People v. Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 663, fn. 16.) Finally, defendant argues that Attorney Ducre failed to object when the trial court stated that because a previous jury had determined defendant‘s guilt and the truth of the special circumstances, it ―will not be something that you will have to concern yourself with.‖ He claims that he was prejudiced because the statement undermined the concept of lingering doubt. As discussed below, the trial court‘s statement was not incorrect. (See post, pp. 77-79.) Moreover, as the Attorney General points out, it was likely that Amador himself would not have objected. 33 Amador did not object when the trial court gave the same information to prospective jurors before the start of the first penalty phase retrial. Accordingly, the presence of a substitute attorney during the preliminary stage of jury selection was not a denial of defendant‘s right to counsel.