Opinion ID: 2353577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Depraved Indifference Murder Statute

Text: White's indictment charged him with either intentionally or knowingly having caused the death of Francis White, Jr. [1] or engag[ing] in conduct which manifested a depraved indifference to the value of human life and which in fact caused the death of Francis White, Jr. [2] At trial, White unsuccessfully moved for the dismissal of the depraved indifference charge, claiming that it was unconstitutional as applied to him. Following his conviction under both alternatives, White again raises constitutional objections to Maine's depraved indifference murder statute. First, White contends that depraved indifference murder is not rationally distinguishable from the crime of manslaughter, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203, and that the more severe penalty possible for depraved indifference murder is thus necessarily arbitrary and therefore invalid. In State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58, 63-67 (Me.1981), however, we explicitly rejected such an attack. In Crocker, we discussed the differences between the two crimes and concluded that, although they differ only by a matter of degree, id. at 67, they are constitutionally distinguishable. White's second argument is that `a person of ordinary intelligence' could not `reasonably understand' that his conduct was prohibited by the depraved indifference statute. See State v. Parker, 372 A.2d 570, 573 (Me.1977) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 811, 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954)). He contends that, in light of medical testimony that many persons are not aware that vigorous shaking may be harmful to a baby, the ordinary person . . . could hardly have been expected to know that the risk was substantial. That extremely vigorous shaking of a baby can, alone, constitute depraved indifference is noted in W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 70 at 543 (1972). From the evidence presented at trial, moreover, the jury could have concluded that White shook the baby with severe to very, very, very severe force, that he did so on at least three occasions, and that the baby had, at least once before, briefly stopped breathing. We therefore conclude that the depraved indifference statute gave the defendant adequate notice that his conduct in question was proscribed.