Opinion ID: 217289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Boling's 2005 Conviction

Text: Boling argues the district court erred by admitting evidence of Boling's 2005 conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. We review the district court's ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir.2010). The government could not properly introduce evidence of Boling's prior offense to show his propensity to commit drug crimes, but it could properly introduce the evidence to show his intent to commit the charged crime. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Evidence of a prior offense is admissible when: (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged; (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar act, and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially out-weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Long, 86 F.3d 81, 83 (7th Cir.1996). Boling argues the evidence of his 2005 conviction does not satisfy the first, second, or fourth prong of this test. According to Boling, his 2005 conviction was not admissible for any of the other purposes anticipated by Rule 404(b). The district court found Boling's 2005 conviction was admissible to show Boling's intent to distribute the cocaine base found on his person during the October 3, 2007, search. Boling argues his 2005 conviction could not be properly admitted to show intent because he denied possessing crack cocaine, not the intent to distribute it. As Boling's argument suggests, [t]he most obvious justifiable situation in which prior convictions are admissible in drug prosecutions on the issue of intent are in those situations in which the defendant, while admitting possession of the substance, denies the intent to distribute it. United States v. Jones, 455 F.3d 800, 808 (7th Cir.2006). While Boling did not concede possession at trial, Captain Almaroad testified that, during their October 3 interview, Boling had admitted to possessing crack cocaine but had denied intending to sell it. Moreover, Boling maintained throughout trial that he had usedbut had not solddrugs. So even though Boling denied possession at trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of his 2005 conviction to show his intent to distribute the crack cocaine found on him during the October 3 search. See United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011, 1022 (7th Cir.2009) (finding admission of Rule 404(b) evidence appropriate where defendant did not contest the elements of knowledge and intent, but instead maintain[ed] that he did not commit the crime at all). Next, Boling argues his 2005 conviction was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be relevant. He claims that the only shared characteristic of his 2005 conviction and the charged offense is that they both involve narcotics. This claim is ridiculous. In fact, both offenses involved Boling's possession of sixteen individually packaged rocks of crack cocaine, weighing between 2 and 3 grams. The incidents took place less than three years apart. The second prong is satisfied. Finally, Boling argues the unfair prejudice of admitting his 2005 conviction outweighs any probative value of the evidence. But Boling does not identify any prejudice from the conviction; rather, he merely restates his argument that his 2005 conviction was only weakly similar to the charged offense. Because Boling identifies no unfair prejudice, and because his 2005 conviction is sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be relevant, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence.