Opinion ID: 722387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: supplementation of post-trial election data.

Text: 66 Although the plaintiffs concede that this is not a serious error of law, they argue that data from the May 1994 election is important because the two black candidates who sought to replace Cherry were defeated. Now, only one black, Collins, remains on the FBISD Independent School Board. 67 FBISD responds that the motion and supporting affidavit to supplement the record contained matters already before the court. FBISD also contends that the information was not dispositive and actually buttressed the FBISD position that non-serious candidates consistently lose in the FBISD elections. Finally, FBISD claims that the plaintiffs fail to assert how this error affects their case and fails to cite authority in support of the error. 68 Rules 59(e) or 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides authority for the plaintiffs to seek supplementation. Accordingly, we must review the district court's denial of the motion for abuse of discretion. Midland West Corp. v. FDIC, 911 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir.1990). Although the plaintiffs did not allege the proper grounds and necessary proof required for reopening the record under rule 59(e) or rule 60(b), this Court has emphasized the relevance of elections occurring subsequent to trial and has even remanded cases to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to supplement the record with evidence of subsequent elections. See Westwego, 906 F.2d at 1045. Nevertheless, neither supplementation nor remand is justified in the present case. 69 First, the results do not alter the evidence presented at trial. The results of the May 1994 election show that Liz McLean, a white candidate, defeated two black candidates. McLean received 2,696 votes, while the black candidates, Arthur L. Pace, Sr., and James Beard, received 1,511 and 1,474 respectively. Collectively, the minorities received 2,985 votes. The election results are consistent with the defendants' theory of the case. This is the reasoning which the district court apparently adopted; therefore, this evidence standing alone would not have changed the outcome of this case. 70 Second, the plaintiffs' proffer came from a witness whom the district court apparently discredited. The plaintiffs attached a copy of the summary regression analysis prepared by their testifying expert, Dr. Flores, to their response to the defendants' opposition. The precinct by precinct analysis indicated that Beard, who carried sixty-eight percent of the votes in majority-minority precincts, was the overwhelming choice in the black community. Flores concluded that Beard would have prevailed in a single district system. Because the district court probably discredited this expert due to inadequate testimony and flawed trial exhibits, the court probably would not have found this supplemental analysis persuasive. 71 Finally, remand probably would waste judicial resources because the election data would not alter the district court's decision. Although the district court did not reopen the record or conduct a hearing, the court's memorandum opinion clearly indicates that it evaluated the quality of the proffered evidence. The district court noted that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for th[e] court to determine whether the at-large method for the FBISD school board elections violated the Voting Rights Act or the United States Constitution. Additionally, the court commented that the plaintiffs failed to show that the proffered new evidence required reopening the record or changes in the factual or legal findings already made by the court. Based on these statements, we are convinced that the district court did, in fact, consider the May 1994 elections and concluded that the data did not change or impact the evidence presented at trial. Because the district court considered the evidence to some extent before rendering its decision, we cannot say that the district court's decision represents an abuse of discretion. 72 Moreover, because the result would not likely change, this case is distinguishable from Westwego. In that case, the expert presenting the supplemental analysis was previously found credible by the district court. 906 F.2d at 1044. Also, the district court had noted in its first opinion that it was significant that no black had ever run for the alderman position at issue. The post-trial election involved a black who was defeated when running for this position. It was possible that because the subsequent election in Westwego involved the first alderman race with black candidate, the district court's decision might change. This is not the case here. The evidence from the May 1994 election is duplicative of the mountain of evidence adduced at trial. The race mirrored the many other races analyzed by the three experts. Remand is not necessary under these circumstances. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' request to supplement the record. 73