Opinion ID: 2306236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The D.C. Human Rights Act Claims

Text: We first address Judge Alprin's award of summary judgment on Carter's age discrimination and retaliation claims, the first two counts of her complaint. Carter filed her two Human Rights Act claims in Superior Court two-and-a-half years after the termination of her employment with DHS, well beyond the one-year period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. [8] Carter argues that the running of the statute of limitations was tolled by her timely filing of a complaint with OHR, as the statute itself provides. [9] The District argues that this tolling provision is inapplicable because Carter's OHR complaint omitted specific claims of age discrimination and retaliation. Alternatively, the District contends, Carter's assertion of her Human Rights Act claims in Superior Court is barred by her election to pursue the administrative remedy. Whether Carter's age discrimination and retaliation claims should have been considered by OHR is an issue in her pending appeal from the agency's decision, and we need not decide the question here. If her OHR complaint did not encompass those claims, Carter was time-barred from asserting them in her Superior Court action. It would make no sense for the OHR complaint to toll the running of the statute with respect to claims not asserted in that complaint. If, however, Carter did pursue her age discrimination and retaliation claims via her OHR complaint, as she contends she did, then she received no benefit from the statutory tolling provision because she never rescinded her election of the administrative remedy. [10] The D.C. Human Rights Act requires complainants to choose between an administrative or a judicial forum in which to pursue their claims. It provides that [a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction ... unless such person has filed a complaint hereunder[.] [11] As we have explained, [t]he jurisdiction of the court and OHR are mutually exclusive in the first instance. Thus, where one opts to file with OHR, he or she generally may not also file a complaint in court. [12] The statute recognizes two exceptions: the complainant may bring a lawsuit in court as if no [OHR] complaint had been filed if (1) OHR dismisses the complaint for administrative convenience or (2) the complainant withdraws her OHR complaint before OHR has decided it. [13] Relying on the latter exception, Carter argues that she withdrew her administrative complaint when she filed suit in Superior Court. But to preserve her right to pursue her claims in court, Carter was obliged to withdraw her administrative complaint prior to the agency's disposition. [14] That she did not do; she never withdrew her OHR complaint or even notified OHR of her civil lawsuit. [15] Instead, she allowed OHR to proceed to dispose of her complaint on the merits. We hold that to withdraw a complaint from OHR, a complainant must notify OHR that she wishes to do so. Furthermore, OHR did not dismiss Carter's age discrimination and retaliation claims on grounds of administrative convenience. The key element of a dismissal for administrative convenience is the agency's exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to commit resources to the claim, [16] for example because the EEOC will handle it, [17] or because OHR concludes that the complainant can be made whole without the need for formal proceedings. [18] In the present case, OHR reached a final decision on the merits of Carter's complaint; it did not purport to exercise prosecutorial discretion to limit its consideration of her claims. Accordingly, we hold that the District was entitled to summary judgment on Carter's age discrimination and retaliation claims under the D.C. Human Rights Act, because those claims were barred either by the statute of limitations or by Carter's election of an administrative remedy.