Opinion ID: 483605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: presumption of due care.

Text: 11
12 Monger argues that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on a presumption of due care. Monger reasons that to prove his case, he had to show that the plane was used in the manner reasonably anticipated by Cessna, that is that Kevin Monger performed a pre-flight inspection in accordance with the owner's manual, checking both the fuel supply and for the presence of water in the fuel. Monger contends that he was entitled to an instruction directing the jury that Kevin was presumed to have exercised due care, in the absence of direct or persuasive circumstantial evidence that a proper pre-flight inspection was not performed. 13 In a diversity case, the effect of presumptions is a substantive question, requiring application of state law. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446, 79 S.Ct. 921, 3 L.Ed.2d 935 (1958); see also Gulf, Mobile and Ohio R.R. v. Larkin, 307 F.2d 225, 228 (8th Cir.1962) (applying Illinois law to issue of burden of proving whether plaintiff exercised due care); Fed.R.Evid. 302. 14 In one of the seminal cases on the presumption of due care in a jury trial, the Missouri Supreme Court stated: 15 [T]he law presumes that the plaintiff, in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained at the hands of another, was at the time of the injury in the exercise of ordinary care. Slight circumstances, however, may overthrow this presumption. 16 Cahill v. Chicago & Alton Ry., 205 Mo. 393, 103 S.W. 532, 535 (1907) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). The appellate court thus upheld the trial court's instruction to the jury, that under the law, in the absence of proof to the contrary, you will presume that, at the time the plaintiff's husband was struck and killed, he was in the exercise of ordinary care on his part for his own safety. Id. 103 S.W. at 534, 535 (emphasis supplied). Applying this law, the Missouri Court of Appeals subsequently held there was no error in advising the jury that there is a presumption, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that    the deceased    was in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety. Hasenjaeger v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 227 Mo.App. 413, 53 S.W.2d 1083, 1087 (1932) (emphasis supplied). 17 In contrast, in a bench trial, where there is no direct or eye-witness evidence that the decedent was negligent, Missouri law requires the court to presume he or she exercised due care. E.g., Foley v. Hudson, 432 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Mo.1968); Keeney v. Callow, 349 S.W.2d 75, 80 (Mo.1961); Lyon v. Southard, 323 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Mo.1959). These cases did not purport to overturn the precedent that a trial judge may find it inappropriate to instruct the jury on the plaintiff's presumption of due care because of [s]light circumstances or proof to the contrary, however. Indeed, under well-settled Missouri law, it is reversible error to instruct the jury as to the existence of a presumption when there is evidence to rebut it. Kansas City v. Cone, 433 S.W.2d 88, 93 (Mo.Ct.App.1968) (citations omitted). 3 Furthermore, the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized that the existence of only circumstantial evidence on a material issue is no bar to recovery of and by itself [citation omitted] so long as the evidence establishes the desired inference with such certainty as to cause it to be the more reasonable and probable of the conclusions to be drawn [citation omitted]. Vaughn v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 708 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Mo.1986) (en banc) (affirming judgment on jury verdict). 18 In the present case, the district court concluded that the applicable law did not support a presumption of due care instruction because there was circumstantial evidence that Kevin Monger did not conduct a proper pre-flight inspection of the aircraft's fuel supply or for water in the fuel. We agree with the district court that circumstantial evidence of the decedent's negligence may be enough to deprive the plaintiff of an instruction on the presumption of due care. Hasenjaeger, 53 S.W.2d at 1087; see generally Vaughn, 708 S.W.2d at 661. The testimony that Kevin Monger did not conduct a proper pre-flight inspection before leaving R & B Aircraft, and that he did not have a ladder with which to conduct a pre-flight inspection outside of the airport restaurant, support the inference that no such inspection occurred. This was direct and circumstantial evidence of Kevin's negligence in operating the plane. We thus hold that the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the presumption of due care, because there was sufficient contrary proof to rebut any such presumption. 19
20 Monger contends that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to assert the presumption of due care in closing argument. Noting that Monger did in fact argue the presumption of due care despite the district court's direction not to, 4 we hold that the district court did not err, based on the above analysis. 21