Opinion ID: 489490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Charge to the Jury on Theft of Government Property

Text: 15 Nichols claims that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury on the intent necessary to commit theft of government property. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. Although he acknowledges that the court instructed the jury on the intent necessary to commit the crimes charged as a general matter, 1 he argues that the failure to explain the necessary intent when discussing theft specifically is reversible error. 16 This argument might have merit if the general discussion of intent that preceded the instruction on the theft count had not been so thorough. The court clearly stated that this intent was a necessary element of each of the charges. The judge then flagged that intent requirement when he began his instruction on theft by stating that 17 [c]ount 2 of the indictment charges the defendant, William Nichols, with stealing and knowingly converting to the use of another and selling information from the TECS computer system without authority. 18 (Emphasis supplied). Given the extensive instruction on knowingly and willfully that the judge finished moments earlier, there was no need to go into another instruction on the same subject. Jury instructions must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir.1984) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)). The jury received adequate instruction on the intent necessary to commit a theft of government property.