Opinion ID: 1191368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Search of Lightford's Residence.

Text: We reach a different conclusion, however, regarding the evidence seized during the search of Lightford's home. The admissibility of the heroin found therein depended entirely upon the voluntariness of the consent of appellant to the search, since the arresting officers did not have a search warrant for the premises. While it is true that a person may validly consent to a search even though the person is in custody, State v. Plas, 80 Nev. 251, 391 P.2d 867 (1964), the voluntariness of that consent must be proved by the State by clear and convincing evidence. Thurlow v. State, 81 Nev. 510, 515, 406 P.2d 918, 921 (1965). In Thurlow v. State, supra , we said: The burden of proving consent rests with the state. Clear and persuasive evidence is required, particularly when the suspect is under arrest. [Citations omitted.] In such circumstances a court must distinguish between the peaceful submission by the arrested suspect to the authority of a law enforcement officer, from an intelligent and intentional waiver of a constitutional right. [Citations omitted.] As in Thurlow, we do not feel that the State has sustained its burden of demonstrating by clear and persuasive evidence that Lightford's consent was given freely and voluntarily, especially when viewed in the light of Officer Moody's testimony that one of the attending officers had suggested the possibility of kicking the appellant's door in if the door key was refused. Any subsequent consent given by Lightford was tainted by the coercive threat of the officer. Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir.1960). The search of Lightford's residence was improper, and the seized heroin should have been suppressed. We affirm Lightford's conviction of the unlawful possession of heroin found on his person, and we reverse the remaining charge. THOMPSON, C.J., and GUNDERSON, BATJER and ZENOFF, JJ., concur.