Opinion ID: 796549
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and

Text: 21 (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 22 Fed.R.Evid. 702. In essence, Daubert and its progeny have placed the district courts in the role of gatekeeper, charging them with evaluating the relevance and reliability of proffered expert testimony with heightened care. In discharging that role, district courts possess broad discretion to make admissibility determinations. Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2000). 23 Defendant here challenges the district court's reliability determination. Daubert itself set forth a list of non-exhaustive factors to guide district courts in assessing reliability. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. However, district courts need not adhere to those enumerated factors, as [t]he inquiry . . . is a flexible one. Id. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Indeed, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143, 118 S.Ct. 512). As this Court has observed, where non-scientific expert testimony is involved, the [Daubert] factors may be pertinent, or the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience. Barreto, 268 F.3d at 335 (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167); see also Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 470 (6th Cir.2004). The gatekeeping inquiry is context-specific and must be tied to the facts of a particular case. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (internal citations omitted). 24 At trial, Watt opined that the October 2001 attack on Defendant's driver could have been prevented if the bus had been equipped with an entry-resistant barrier. Watt further testified to the feasibility of designing such a barrier, as he himself had previously done. Martin rendered an opinion on the sufficiency of Defendant's risk management training for drivers, and further opined that the prior incidents suggested the need for a barrier between Defendant's drivers and its passengers. Plaintiff's experts did not offer scientific expert testimony; rather, their testimony constitutes technical or other specialized knowledge. Fed.R.Evid. 702; Barreto, 268 F.3d at 332. In this context, the factors enumerated in Daubert cannot readily be applied to measure the reliability of such testimony. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167; Barreto, 268 F.3d at 335. 25 Nevertheless, at the pretrial hearing on Defendant's motions in limine, the district court achieved its fundamental objective . . . to ensure the reliability and relevancy of that testimony. Barreto, 268 F.3d at 335. First, it should be noted that the district court ruled that Martin and Watts could not proffer their opinions on the issue of foreseeability, noting that anybody can give the opinion that it's foreseeable if there have been this many incidents. (J.A. at 857) At the outset, therefore, the court limited the nature of the experts' testimony to exclude commentary unnecessary to aid the jury. Additionally, the district court heard arguments from counsel for both sides on the reliability of Plaintiff's proffered experts, and Plaintiff highlighted aspects of the experts' personal knowledge and experience as it relates to the opinions they ultimately rendered. Although the district court did not explicitly probe the rationale for the proposed expert opinions during the hearing, counsel set forth the basis of the proffered witnesses' expertise, and directly linked it to the facts of the case. 26 Moreover, the record indicates that the experts adequately explain[ed] how th[eir] experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. See Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note. In his deposition, Watt elaborated on his experience designing driver's enclosures for Seattle transit buses and testified to viewing line haul buses similar to the bus Sands drove in October 2001. Watt discussed at some length the effect of installing a driver's shield on preventing passenger attacks, linking it expressly to the facts of this case. Likewise, in his written declaration, Martin details his threat assessment experience at length. He further lists the materials reviewed in formulating his opinion, which include Defendant's prior incident reports, Defendant's Professional Driver's Guidelines, Driver's Handbook, Driver's Bulletin on Emergency Operations, the deposition transcript of Defendant's Vice President of Risk, as well as the testimony of Defendant's various other personnel. Martin expressly states that his opinions were based on his extensive experience and review of the relevant materials. Cf. Fed. R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's notes ([W]hen a law enforcement agent testifies regarding the use of code words in a drug transaction . . . [t]he method used by the agent is the application of extensive experience to analyze the meaning of conversations.) Upon review of the record, we cannot say with definite and firm conviction that the district court abused its discretion in finding Plaintiff's experts reliable, and permitting them to testify. See Conwood, 290 F.3d at 781.