Opinion ID: 2084499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Exclusion of Micah Bryan's Juvenile Record

Text: Walls contends that the trial court erred by precluding him from cross-examining Micah Bryan about his juvenile adjudication for second-degree murder. The exclusion of this evidence, Walls maintains, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses and, indirectly, his right to present a defense. He claims that the use of Bryan's juvenile record was critical to his defense because [w]ithout effective impeachment evidence, the jury could merely have determined that the discrepancies [between the testimony of Bryan and that of Cherry] were minor, given the time of night, the short time period of events, and the notion that, generally, no two people recall the details of events exactly the same. When this court is faced with a claim that cross-examination was unduly restricted, our standard of review will depend upon the scope of cross-examination permitted by the trial court measured against our assessment of the appropriate degree of cross-examination necessitated by the subject matter thereof, as well as the other circumstances that prevailed at trial. Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 856 (D.C.1978); accord, e.g., ( Reginald) Smith v. United States, 392 A.2d 990, 991 (D.C.1978). Our first step is to determine whether the trial court has permitted sufficient cross-examination to comport with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Springer, 388 A.2d at 856. Walls concedes in his brief that the trial court did not totally curtail cross-examination, but argues that the trial court's exclusion of the evidence of Bryan's juvenile adjudication was an abuse of discretion. He asks us nevertheless to apply the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), applicable to constitutional errors, because in his view the trial court's ruling effectively shattered the heart of [the] defense theory  that Bryan's testimony and prior statements to the police were not credible and that his prior statements about the shooting were biased because of his continued supervision status in the juvenile case. We decline to apply Chapman because we do not agree that the trial court's curtailment of defense counsel's cross-examination of Bryan amounted to constitutional error. [T]he Sixth Amendment does not require the trial court to permit impeachment with juvenile adjudications unless they can be used to establish bias, not merely to challenge general credibility. Tabron v. United States, 410 A.2d 209, 212 (D.C.1979) ( Tabron I ). Thus evidence of a prior conviction usually is inadmissible [to impeach general credibility] if the conviction resulted from a juvenile adjudication. Smith, 392 A.2d at 993 (citation omitted). We recognize, of course, that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses with evidence of bias must prevail over the policy of protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders. Id. at 992 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)). In the instant case, however, it is not entirely clear from the record that defense counsel was seeking to establish that Bryan was biased, rather than simply that his testimony was generally incredible. When counsel stated his intention to impeach Bryan with his juvenile adjudication, the trial court asked if he meant to use it to attack his testimonial credibility, and counsel answered, Yes. During the ensuing discussion, counsel twice more referred to the impact of Bryan's juvenile adjudication on the jury's assessment of Bryan's credibility, but he did not speak in terms of bias. Other comments by defense counsel, however, could arguably be read as asserting that Bryan was biased, in that he had lied to get [himself] out of trouble and out of jail. Assuming arguendo that the bias claim was adequately preserved for appellate review, Walls' contention on appeal, as stated in his reply brief, is that the fact that Bryan was still under court supervision when first interviewed by the police would show that his prior statements about the shooting were biased. Thus, the argument goes, the evidence of the juvenile adjudication would impeach Bryan's assertion that the reason he did not come forward initially was that he wanted to protect the shooter. The flaw in this argument is that Walls does not explain how this impeachment evidence would have shown that Bryan's trial testimony was biased in any way. As we explained in Tabron I, in referring to the use of prior convictions or adjudications to impeach for bias, we mean an effort to show that a witness currently has a relationship to the court system ... which arguably provides a basis for that witness to curry favor with the government, perhaps even by lying. 410 A.2d at 212 (citations omitted; emphasis added). In this case, however, as the trial court pointed out, Bryan's commitment as a juvenile had long since come to an end by the time he took the stand in Walls' trial. Thus we do not see how Bryan's prior juvenile record could have been used to establish the kind of bias to which Davis v. Alaska and Tabron I refer, namely, testimonial bias. We hold accordingly that the Davis rule was not violated, and that there was no constitutional error. The only remaining question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in restricting the cross-examination of Bryan. See Smith, 392 A.2d at 993. We have held that it was error to deny a defendant the right to impeach a witness' general credibility with a prior juvenile adjudication when the disclosure of the prior adjudication[] `might have affected the outcome' of the trial. Tabron v. United States, 444 A.2d 942, 946 (D.C. 1982) ( Tabron II ) (citation omitted). The trial court's task, and ultimately ours as well, is to determine whether a reasonable jury could have arrived at a different outcome, not what the trial court itself would have concluded as trier. Id. We are satisfied that the disclosure of Bryan's juvenile record would not have had an appreciable effect on the outcome of the trial because the jury had already heard ample evidence undermining Bryan's credibility, much of it provided in Bryan's own testimony. On direct examination, Bryan admitted that he had twice been convicted of possession of narcotics with intent to distribute (once in Maryland and once in the District of Columbia) and had also been convicted of possession of a handgun. He conceded, in addition, that when he was initially interviewed by the police and the FBI about the murder of Jesse Moore, he falsely stated that he knew nothing about it. He explained that he had lied to the FBI at first because he did not want to say anything to implicate Walls, who was his friend. He also said that he was afraid of Walls because Walls had told him not to let anyone know what he had done. It was not until after his Maryland conviction (for possession with intent to distribute) that Bryan changed his story and identified Walls as the gunman. Bryan stated that he agreed to testify after entering into an agreement on February 15, 1994, while he was still serving time in Maryland. Under this agreement, the prosecutor promised to seek a reduction in his Maryland sentence of eight years in exchange for Bryan's testimony against Walls. By the time of Walls' third trial, Bryan had been released on parole after serving three years of his Maryland sentence. He insisted that his testimony had nothing to do with his being paroled, although he was still hoping for a reduction in sentence. On cross-examination, however, Bryan admitted that his sentence in Maryland, which was originally ordered to run consecutively to an earlier sentence imposed in the District of Columbia, had been changed to run concurrently with that sentence after he agreed to cooperate with the government. Bryan maintained nevertheless that he had been unaware of the favorable change. Walls argues that, without the addition of Bryan's juvenile adjudication, his impeachment of Bryan was insufficient to affect the jury's assessment of Bryan's credibility. According to Walls, disclosure to the jury of Bryan's juvenile record, along with the fact that he was still under court supervision when he initially withheld information from the police, would have undermined Bryan's assertion that his only reason for not coming forward earlier was to protect Walls and would have negated the jury's impression that Bryan's criminal record was relatively minor. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Bryan's juvenile record might have had the effect that Walls supposes, it does not necessarily follow that the trial court's decision to exclude it was erroneous. Trial judges are afforded considerable discretion to control cross-examination, and may restrict the subject of inquiry if the danger of unfair prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value. Smith, 392 A.2d at 991 (citation omitted). On the record before us, we discern no abuse of that discretion, primarily because the probative value of the excluded evidence was slight. Even if the jury believed that Bryan's reason for initially lying to the police was to protect his own interests, rather than to shield his friend Walls, there was other abundant impeaching evidence before the jury. Bryan, moreover, was not the only eyewitness to the shooting. Ramon Cherry provided significant evidence of Walls' guilt. His testimony, to be sure, was also impeached, but it was entitled to such weight as the jury chose to give it. Bryan's testimony was essentially consistent with that of Cherry. The jury's assessment of Bryan's credibility at trial, therefore, would not have been significantly affected by the admission of his juvenile record, and thus it is extremely unlikely that the outcome of the trial would have been any different. We find no abuse of discretion and hence no basis for reversal.