Opinion ID: 676092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of the Marijuana

Text: 13 The government argues that Vargas lacks standing to challenge the seizure of the marijuana found in Torres's trailer. In response, Vargas contends that the government waived the issue of standing by failing to raise the issue prior to the court's order suppressing the evidence. 14 The government does not waive its right to challenge a defendant's standing when no facts were adduced at the hearing from which the government could reasonably have inferred the existence of the defendant's standing, United States v. Cardona, 955 F.2d 976, 982 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 381, 121 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992), which is what happened in this case. Vargas failed to testify, submit affidavits, or present any other factual evidence, much less legal argument, from which the government could infer that Vargas was contending that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trailer and therefore had standing to challenge the seizure of marijuana. Because no facts were adduced at the hearing from which the government could reasonably have inferred the existence of the defendant's standing, we conclude the government did not waive its right to challenge defendant Vargas's standing. Id. We turn to the issue of whether Vargas has standing to contest the seizure of marijuana from Torres's trailer. 15 Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted. United States v. Fuesting, 845 F.2d 664, 671 (7th Cir.1988) (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 967, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969)). It has long been the rule that a defendant can urge the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment only if that defendant demonstrates that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. United States v. Padilla, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1936, 1939, 123 L.Ed.2d 635 (1993). To establish that he has standing to claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, Vargas must demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the items seized. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). A legitimate expectation of privacy is an expectation actually and subjectively held by the defendant and one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. United States v. Tobin, 890 F.2d 319, 324 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979)). A defendant objecting to the search of a particular area bears the burden of proving a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. United States v. Duprey, 895 F.2d 303, 309 (7th Cir.1989). 16 In this case, dealing with the court's ruling following the suppression hearing before trial, Vargas lacks standing to challenge the seizure of the marijuana because he failed to submit evidence such as testimony or affidavits that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched (trailer) or the item seized (marijuana). In fact, rather than attempting to assert a legitimate expectation of privacy, at the suppression hearing Vargas attempted to establish that he had no connection or relation to the trailer or marijuana, and that he was but a mere passenger on the trip from McAllen, Texas, to East Chicago, Indiana. For example, Vargas's counsel established, through cross-examination of Officer Pizoni, that 1) the vehicle was registered to Torres; 2) there were no papers in the vehicle demonstrating that Vargas had ownership or right of possession of th[e] trailer; 3) Torres gave the police the key to the trailer; 4) the police didn't bother to ask Mr. Vargas for the [trailer] key; 5) at the time of the arrest, the police had no reason to believe that [Vargas] had anything at all to do with the marijuana that was concealed in Mr. Torres's trailer, and 6) Vargas was just riding along with Mr. Torres[.] Moreover, it is undisputed that Torres was the owner of the Blazer and trailer, not Vargas. While this circuit has recognized that a driver who does not own the vehicle he is operating may possess standing to challenge a search of the automobile, United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413 (7th Cir.1990), that case and the cases upon which it relies make clear that the driver must present evidence establishing that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or the object seized. Cf. Cardona, 955 F.2d at 981 (passenger in automobile without possessory interest therein lacks standing to challenge inculpatory evidence found within vehicle); United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1249-50 (10th Cir.) (driver of vehicle), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 238, 116 L.Ed.2d 194 (1991). Because Vargas failed to present any evidence establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trailer or the drugs, we conclude he is without standing to challenge the seizure of the marijuana found, and we hold that the district court erred in suppressing the stash of marijuana insofar as it concerns Vargas.
17 Torres contends that the court did not commit error in suppressing the marijuana because the police had no right to dismantle the wooden container containing the drug and Officer McConnell's search of the trailer exceeded the scope of the consent he had given. The government asserts that McConnell's releasing of the screws holding the container (wooden box) was within the scope of the written consent given by the defendants, because the waiver form, signed by Torres, stated that the police could search the Blazer and the trailer, including any part, compartment, or trunk of the vehicle and the contents of any object or container found therein. 18 A consensual search is manifestly reasonable so long as it remains within the scope of the consent. United States v. Martinez, 949 F.2d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)). [T]he scope of a consent search is limited by the breadth of actual consent[,] Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1419, and [w]hether the search remained within the boundaries of the consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir.1986). The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness--what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04. 19 In the case at bar, the very language of the consent form, including any part, compartment, or trunk of the vehicle and the contents of any object or container found therein, could not be clearer. In our opinion Torres consented to the search of the contents of any part or of the trailer, including the contents of any object or container found inside the trailer. His argument that the wooden box in which the marijuana was ultimately discovered was not a container or a compartment is without merit. A container is [a] thing in which material is held or carried; receptacle. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 287 (1970). A compartment is a separate room, section, or chamber[.] American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 271 (1970). These definitions precisely describe the wooden box in which Torres and Vargas transported the marijuana. Moreover, we note that [p]ermission to search a specific area for narcotics ... may be construed as permission to search any compartment or container within the specified area where narcotics may be found. Martinez, 949 F.2d at 1119; Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1419-20 (Without more, police can only search areas [that drug] items may reasonably be expected to be found. The opening of door panels is not normally included in this set of areas to be searched). Obviously in this case marijuana could have been, and in fact was, discovered within the wooden compartment. 20 The Supreme Court has specifically rejected the argument that the police must separately request permission to search each closed container within a car. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1804 ([W]e see no basis for adding this sort of superstructure to the Fourth Amendment's basic test of objective reasonableness.... If [the defendant's] consent would reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization). Here, Torres was well aware that the police were looking for drugs since Trooper Pizoni had asked him whether he was in possession of narcotics; as the Supreme Court noted in Jimeno, [a] reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of container. Contraband goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car. Id. If Torres did not wish the officers to search inside the wooden box, he was free to delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents. Id. Rather than withdrawing or limiting the broad and all-inclusive consent previously given, Torres during the search failed to object and stood by silently as Officer McConnell called for, received, and used a screwdriver to open the wooden box. See United States v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858 (8th Cir.1993) (defendant's failure to object [to search] made it objectively reasonable for the officers to conclude that his general consent to search the truck included consent to access the compartment in a minimally intrusive manner); Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 892 (defendant's failure to object to search while defendant stood by and observed search may be considered an indication that the search was within the scope of the consent). We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, an objective, reasonable person would have understood that by signing the consent to search form used in this case, the defendant agreed to allow the police to search the wooden container in which the marijuana was discovered. 21 Finally, we address Torres's argument that suppression of the drugs was proper because the police had to unscrew the compartment in order to gain access to its contents. We agree that general permission to search does not include permission to inflict intentional damage to the places or things to be searched. Martinez, 949 F.2d at 1119; see also Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1804 ([i]t is very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk). Torres has not alleged that the container or the trailer were damaged by Officer McConnell's act of removing the six screws. Moreover, police who have obtained a consent to search form as broad and valid as the form in this case may open locked containers, provided that the container to be opened is capable of holding the object of the search and that the opening of the container does not involve the unnecessary infliction of damage. See Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d at 858 n. 3 (use of screwdriver to puncture small hole in metal compartment hidden underneath truck bed reasonable; officers were unable to find any entry to the compartment and did not have late-night access to the garage tools necessary to remove the compartment from the truck); Martinez, 949 F.2d at 1120-21 (approving prying open of car trunk because reasonable, nondestructive removal of impediments was necessary to search for contraband and to gain access to other areas or compartments within the scope of the search); United States v. Milian-Rodriguez, 759 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.) (defendant's consent to search included authorization to pick the lock on closet door), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845, 106 S.Ct. 135, 88 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985)); cf. United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937 (11th Cir.1990) (defendant's consent to search automobile did not reasonably include consent to slash open spare tire). In the case before us, Officer McConnell merely released and withdrew six screws in order that he might inspect the contents of the compartment (wooden box) to ascertain whether the defendants had drugs concealed therein; he did not dismantl[e] the fabric of the trailer[,] as the district court found. In addition, we note that it was necessary for Officer McConnell to remove the screws in order to effectuate the officers' intent that the trailer, including any container found therein, be searched. See Martinez, 949 F.2d at 1121. We conclude that it was objectively reasonable for Officer McConnell to believe that the scope of Torres's consent permitted him to open the wooden container within the trailer by unscrewing the six screws. Because the search of the wooden box did not exceed the scope of the consent Torres gave authorizing entry and search of the motor vehicle and trailer, the defendant has not alleged his box or trailer was damaged, and he did not timely object to the search of the container, we hold that the court committed clear error in suppressing the marijuana on the grounds that Officer McConnell's search exceeded the scope of Torres's consent.