Opinion ID: 181925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Variance and Departure

Text: Although we have already determined that the District Court committed clear error by increasing Kulick's offense level through the § 2K2.1(c)(1) cross-reference, we consider nonetheless Kulick's second contention to provide guidance to the District Court on remand. Kulick argued at sentencing that the District Court should grant either a downward departure or a variance from the Guidelines' range on the basis of his post-arrest alcohol treatment and long-term charitable contributions. The District Court refused to grant the downward departure or variance and instead sentenced Kulick to a term of years at the low end of the imprisonment range. Before this Court, Kulick argues that the District Court did not formally rule on the departure request or, in the alternative, did not adequately explain its decision not to vary downward under § 3553(a). These arguments have little merit. The record reveals that the District Court adequately explained its decision to stay within the Guidelines. Kulick first argues that the District Court did not formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties and stat[e] on the record whether [it was] granting a departure and how that departure affect[ed] the Guidelines calculation. United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir.2006)). A close examination of the record reveals that Kulick's counsel actually requested a variance, rather than a departure: I would like to move toI have touched on one, and this is probably more of a variance issue than a departure from the guidelines issue, and I think when the Court is looking at what is an appropriate sentence and when to apply the guidelines here, look at the real, true acceptance of responsibility that Mr. Kulick has undertaken here. Part of the problems, past problems in Mr. Kulick's life are due to alcohol abuse and dependency. This case, Your Honor, was a life-changing event for Mr. Kulick. Immediately after being arrested in this matter and released, Mr. Kulick undertook inpatient alcohol abuse treatment and therapy. He maintains on it. I think you saw the letter that we have attached from Dr. Colangelo that talked about how he has maintained his sobriety ever since this case started, and not only has he maintained that sobriety, but he has made it a point, as just mentioned to help out in any way possible. That includes law enforcement. That includes charitable involvement. That includes a renewed commitment to his wife and two young children. I think the Court should consider that in deciding whether this is a typical case. Another ground for a variance, Your Honor, in addition to his alcohol rehabilitation and charitable works and the cooperation is this, is a very unusual felon in possession case. (App. at 84-85) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the District Court properly treated the argument as a request for a variance rather than a departure. [8] Kulick next argues that the District Court did not give sufficient justification for its decision not to vary downward under § 3553(a). This argument also fails. The District Court fully articulated the justification for Kulick's sentence. It twice acknowledged Kulick's alcohol abuse treatment. First, the court noted: [t]he report that I have read is certainly detailed, together with the statements by Mr. Moran and Mr. Schwartz and yourself concerning with regard to [sic] rehabilitating yourself from the problem and the struggles you have with alcoholism. (App. at 99-100.) Second, the court stated, [Kulick] has a history of great struggle with alcohol, and he has done work at Clearbrook Manor and Father Martin's Ashley in Maryland, and he's under the care and counseling of Dr. Colangelo. ( Id. at 101.) Both of these statements reveal that the District Court actively considered Kulick's arguments for a downward variance based on his post-arrest alcohol treatment. In contrast to Kulick's alcohol abuse treatment, it is unclear whether the District Court explicitly acknowledged Kulick's charitable contributions at sentencing. The court ambiguously remarked that, [Kulick] has a history of great struggle with alcohol, and he has done work at Clearbrook Manor and Father Martin's Ashley in Maryland, and he's under the care of Dr. Colangelo. ( Id. ) (emphasis added). Kulick argues that this statement was exclusively about his alcohol abuse treatment at Clearbrook Manor. The government contends that this statement was also a passing reference to his charitable contributions to Clearbrook Manor. ( See PSR Objection Letter, Feb. 24, 2009, p. 5.) The fact that this is ambiguous, however, is not dispositive. A court need not discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly without merit.... Nor must a court discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir.2006). Even though the District Court did not explicitly and unambiguously reference the charitable contributions, we believe it did not ignore any of Kulick's arguments in favor of a downward variance. Moreover, the Guidelines actually discourage a district court from considering a defendant's charitable contributions. According to § 5H1.11 of the Guidelines, charitable and similar prior good works are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11. Therefore, while a district court is not forbidden from considering the charitable contributions of a defendant, it must find that this factor existed to an exceptional degree or, in some way, that makes the case different from the ordinary case in which the factor is present. United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 772 (3d Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted) (upholding departure based on extraordinary charitable activity evidenced by numerous letters from personal beneficiaries). Thus, the District Court had substantial discretion to decide the appropriate weight, if any, to give to evidence of Kulick's charitable donations. Id. The District Court reasonably concluded that the charitable contributions should be given little to no weight. The remainder of the District Court's sentence explained the reasons that the court did not believe a downward variance was warranted. The court noted that Kulick had been in contact with the law on numerous occasions, came from a better background, and should have known better. (App. at 102.) The court concluded that it had taken into account everything [Kulick] did with respect to the charges that were placed in this matter. ( Id. ) We find that the District Court adequately considered all factors under Section 3553(a) at the sentencing hearing.