Opinion ID: 758265
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Description of Premises

Text: 35 The defendants contend that the description in the original memorandum of the property to be subleased--as found by the district court to be the Yale-Gibson lot leased by MRC--did not identify the property adequately to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Generally speaking, a memorandum in writing meets the requirements of the statute of frauds ... if it contains ... a description of the property sufficient to render it capable of identification. Pitek, 184 P.2d at 652 (quotation omitted); see also Rhodes v. Wilkins, 83 N.M. 782, 498 P.2d 311, 313 (N.M.1972) (A written memorandum must contain a sufficient description of the land, or furnish the means or data within itself which points to evidence that will identify it.) (quotation omitted). The description of the property found by the district court to be in the original memorandum leaves no doubt as to what property the parties intended to sublease. See John C. Williams, Annotation, Requirements as to Certainty and Completeness of Terms of Lease in Agreement to Lease, 85 A.L.R.3d 414 § 6(a) (1978) (citing cases). The cases cited by the defendants in support of their position involved situations unlike this one where the court invalidated contracts for the sale of land because the property could not be identified at all from the written description. See Rhodes, 498 P.2d at 313 (contract describing land to be sold as approximately 1.862 acres within a ten acre tract insufficiently identified specific property to be conveyed); Pitek, 184 P.2d at 652 (description of premises to be purchased as property on E. Central Ave. inadequate to identify property where seller owned six contiguous lots fronting East Central Avenue).