Opinion ID: 1658335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the lower court erred in overruling appellant's motion in limine challenging for cause all the veniremen who are members of coast electric power association.

Text: Attorneys for appellant filed a motion in limine before the trial of this cause, requesting the Court to grant appellant a challenge for cause on each member of the jury panel, who was a user of Coast Electric Power Association's electricity because such juror would have a direct financial interest in the association. Appellant offered to waive the objection for cause challenges, if the appellee would stipulate and permit the jury to be informed that appellee was fully insured and that the verdict in the instant case would not affect the jurors or the defendant financially. The motion was overruled. Twenty-eight (28) prospective jurors were examined during the voir dire. Of that twenty-eight in number, only seven (7) were asked whether they received electrical service from appellee and six (6) stated that they did. One juror's answer was not audible. Appellant and appellee each exercised two (2) peremptory challenges to excuse four (4) of those jurors and three (3) were accepted on the jury. The remaining nine (9) jurors who were impaneled were not asked about their connection, if any, with appellee. All jurors were asked, and responded, in the affirmative as to whether they could be fair and impartial. Appellant exercised only two of her four peremptory challenges and two remained unexercised. The main thrust of appellant's contention here is that a potential juror, who is a member of a cooperative association, which is a party to a lawsuit, is per se disqualified from sitting as a juror. Appellant makes no distinction between members of a cooperative and stockholders in a corporation, who ordinarily are not competent to sit as jurors in an action where the corporation is a party, or where it has a direct pecuniary interest. 47 Am.Jur.2d Jury § 325 (1969). Appellant cites Ozark Border Electric Coop v. Stacy, 348 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. App. 1961), which held that it was not necessary for jurors, who are members of a cooperative association interested in the case, to show actual bias before being declared unqualified, since their disqualifying interests arose by reason of the relationship between them and their cooperatives. Under that rule, the remoteness of the interest is not relevant. There have been cited cases in five states to date upholding the theory set forth in Ozark, supra . In Thompson v. Swanee Membership Corp., 157 G.App. 561, 278 S.E.2d 143 (1978), the court stated that members of electric membership corporations are disqualified from service as jurors in the trial of a case in which damages are sought against the corporation. In a largely rural area such as exists in Mississippi, all people outside municipalities are supplied by electrical cooperatives. Any pecuniary gain the customer or member receives is practically nil. Most of those cooperatives have been in existence since the early 1930's, and, in the presentation of this case and the briefs, there has been no citation of a case in the state, which has inclined toward the rule announced in Ozark, supra, and Thompson, supra . Mississippi jurisprudence is not ready to adopt or establish such a rule. We have adequate law and authority which will provide for the obtaining of a fair and impartial jury without such a per se disqualification for cause. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-69 to -79 (1972 & Supp. 1985). Belesky v. City of Biloxi, 412 So.2d 230 (Miss. 1981); City of Jackson v. McFadden, 181 Miss. 1, 177 So. 755 (1937). In the case sub judice, without applying the per se rule, none of the jurors disqualified themselves from the standpoint of bias or interest. Also, we note that: (1) Appellant only asked three of the twelve jurors selected concerning their association with appellee; (2) Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-145 (1972) permits four challenges to each of the parties here and appellant only exercised two of her challenges with two remaining unused; (3) It was obvious that impaneling a jury in Hancock County without members of Coast Electric would be difficult; (No change of venue was requested) (4) The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in holding that there was no bias or prejudice to warrant a challenge for cause and was satisfied that a fair and impartial jury could be and was impaneled. Assignment III is rejected.