Opinion ID: 198477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The court's supplemental charge

Text: 13 Hernandez claims that the court erred when it responded to the jury's impasse with the supplemental jury instruction, often described as a dynamite charge or an Allen charge, after Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). Counsel did not object at the time, and hence we review only for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Bradstreet, 135 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1998). 14 Plain error analysis requires four steps. First, an error must have been committed. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Second, the error must be plain or obvious. Id. at 734. Third, the plain error must affect[ ] substantial rights, Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), which generally means that it must have been prejudicial, see Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Finally, because Rule 52(b) is discretionary, we must be convinced that the error  'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings[ ]' ]'  before we will order a new trial. Id. at 736 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). 15 i. The Error. Any supplemental instruction in response to a jury's deadlock can have a significant coercive effect by intimating that some jury members should capitulate to others' views, or by suggesting that the members should compromise their rational positions in order to reach an agreement. See United States v. Angiulo, 485 F.2d 37, 39 (1st Cir.1973). Although federal courts have long sanctioned the use of supplemental charges in the face of an apparent impasse, see Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), we have warned that such action should be undertaken with great caution and only when absolutely necessary, United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir.1971). 16 Concerned about the instruction's potentially coercive effect, we have required that it contain three specific elements to moderate any prejudice. See United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir.1998). First, in order that the burden of reconsideration is not shouldered exclusively by those jury members holding the minority view, the court should expressly instruct both the minority and the majority to reexamine their positions. See Angiulo, 485 F.2d at 39. Second, the instruction should acknowledge that the jury has the right not to agree. See Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965) (per curiam). Third, the court should remind the jury that the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains, as always, with the government. See Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d at 197. 17 The charge at issue did not meet these criteria. While it could be argued that the first element was satisfied because each person was instructed to question the correctness of his or her position, the instruction did not address either of the other two requirements in any manner whatsoever. Although we have consistently refrained from offering any definite wording for an Allen charge, the instruction should have referenced in some way all three essential elements. The court's failure to do so was error. 18 The government presents a somewhat tautological argument in response. It claims that the omission of two elements was not erroneous because the instruction was not an Allen charge, and it was not an Allen charge because it did not follow the accepted format, i.e., it did not contain all three elements. In addition to protecting any supplemental instruction such as this one from judicial review for consistency with the three Allen criteria, the government's argument ignores our explicit ruling that any supplemental instruction which urges the jury to return to its deliberations must include the three balancing elements stated above. Angiulo, 485 F.2d at 40 (emphasis added). 19 ii. The Clarity of the Error. It is equally obvious that the second requirement, i.e., that the error is clear, has also been met. We first discussed the three elements in Flannery in 1971, and have followed them with unwavering devotion ever since. We have addressed them on a number of occasions, even describing them as essential, United States v. Vachon, 869 F.2d 653, 659 (1st Cir.1989). The district court's failure to mention either of the last two elements constituted plain error. 20 iii. Affecting substantial rights. Although the error was plain, we may not reverse Hernandez's conviction and order a new trial unless the error affect[ed] substantial rights. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). In a challenge to an improper Allen charge, the relevant inquiry revolves around whether the charge in its context and under all the circumstances coerced the jury into convicting him. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237. Hernandez's counsel below admitted that the charge was not coercive in the least. We agree, based on both the length of deliberations after the Allen charge and the verdict's internal consistency. See United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir.1998); Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d at 199. 21 The length of deliberations in this case negates any suggestion of coercion. The jury's task was relatively straightforward. The government claimed Hernandez joined Cabrera's and Ramirez's drug conspiracy because Hernandez lent Ramirez the money after learning that it would be used to purchase drugs. Hernandez's defense was that he was merely present when the drug deal occurred. Deciding which version of events to believe was a relatively uncomplicated exercise. It appears that the jury recognized as much and seemed to expect that deliberations would be swift: they complained of an impasse after deliberating for only two and one half hours. After the judge sent the written supplemental instruction, the jury deliberated for another hour. 22 Numerous courts have found no coercion under similar circumstances. See Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 886 (4th Cir.1998) (concluding that a one hour deliberation after a supplemental Allen instruction failed to suggest coercion); United States v. Hernandez, 105 F.3d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir.1997) (stating that deliberations of 40 minutes after Allen charge did not raise the specter of coercion); United States v. Smith, 635 F.2d 716, 721-22 (8th Cir.1980) (finding no coercion when jury deliberated forty-five minutes after Allen charge, in addition to previous three hour total deliberations). We note, however, that these cases do not establish a formula, but rather are illustrative of the principle that sufficient additional time can help to establish an absence of coercion. That principle is particularly applicable in this case, where the total time of deliberation was roughly 3 1/2 hours, of which the deliberations after the Allen charge represented almost one third. 23 The other relevant circumstance in this case, namely, the verdict's internal consistency, also implies an absence of coercion. As noted earlier, Hernandez was convicted of conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute. He was also convicted of possession of a gun, either the one on his person or the one under Ramirez's seat, during and in relation to the drug crime. Finally, he was acquitted of possessing the gun with an obliterated serial number which was found underneath Ramirez's seat. The jury's verdict indicates that it found Hernandez guilty of the drug crime and of possession of his own gun, but rejected the government's argument that he constructively possessed the firearm under Ramirez's seat. 2 The internal consistency of this result suggests a nuanced analysis and reasoned decision. See Plunk, 153 F.3d at 1027 (concluding that the fact that the jury rendered a mixed verdict [on independent counts] ... suggests that it reviewed the evidence rationally and independently); cf. Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d at 199 (finding confusion when jury convicted defendant of conspiracy but acquitted him on the underlying substantive charge, because evidence suggested defendant was either innocent of both or guilty of both). 24 Because the jury was not coerced, the court's error did not affect Hernandez's substantial rights, and we will not reverse his conviction due to the erroneous Allen charge. 25