Opinion ID: 200812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Accrual of Claim

Text: 6 Under Puerto Rico law, an action for damages for negligence must be commenced within one year of its accrual. 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 5298(2). The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as incorporating a discovery rule. Villarini-García v. Hospital Del Maestro, Inc., 8 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir.1993). Under this discovery rule, a claim accrues, and the one-year period starts to run, not at the time of the injury, but upon the discovery by the injured party of the injury and of its author. 3 Espada v. Lugo, 312 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2002)(citing Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Pérez y Cía., De Puerto Rico, Inc., 142 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1998)). 7 Because [t]he law of Puerto Rico treats a person as being aware of all ... that person would have been likely to come to know through the exercise of care, Rodríguez-Surís v. Montesinos, 123 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1997), the González family's claim accrued at the earlier of the following moments: (1) when the González family had subjective awareness of González's injury and its author, see id. at 15, or (2) when they should have known about the injury and its author by the exercise of due diligence. 4 See id. at 16. If the González family's claims accrued before August 31, 2000, a year ahead of the complaint's filing, their claim is time-barred. 8 As the González family is the non-moving party, we interpret the record in the light most favorable to them. Ruiz-Sulsona v. Univ. of P.R., 334 F.3d 157, 159 (1st Cir.2003). Nevertheless, the González family's own testimony demonstrates that they discovered the injury and its author well before the end of August 2000. González's husband, Mr. Ortiz, was already considering a suit when his wife was released from the hospital in early June, his legal theory being the doctor's alleged negligence. González's sister Gloria remembers Ortiz's saying, in May or June, that the stroke could have been avoided if González had received adequate treatment. These admissions, on their own, may well suffice to commence the running of the statute of limitations under Puerto Rico law. See Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir.2000). Dr. Lemoine's extensive and detailed deposition, however, definitively settles the point. 9 Dr. Lemoine developed the opinion, during González's hospitalization at HIMA, that she had not received the appropriate care from the start, that all of this could have been avoided, that the care after she received the stroke [sic] was not aggressive enough, that details for any common stroke patient were not being observed, that the monitoring of the patient in the hospital was inadequate.... Dr. Lemoine had technical opinions regarding Dr. López's and HIMA's failings: A patient that presents with new onset atrial fibrillation generally should be anticoagulated.... When the patient starts to complain of numbness and tingling in their arm and difficulty with speech, they need to be evaluated by a physician immediately and then treatment subsequently started. Dr. Lemoine had specific complaints regarding Dr. López's competence: I felt that the use of simply [sic] a transthoracic echocardiogram to determine whether or not she had a source for embolization was not adequate, ... that possibly the extent of her stroke could have been prevented, that I should not have had to tell [Dr. López] basic standards of care for a stroke victim.... Moreover, Dr. Lemoine shared these opinions with the González family later in June, and he had already communicated his dissatisfaction with González's care to Mr. Ortiz during the initial hospitalization. 10 Dr. Lemoine stated that these initial assessments were not definitively confirmed until he was able to review González's hospital record. We doubt that Puerto Rico law demands such certainty; nevertheless, Dr. Lemoine looked at the records and confirmed his earlier opinions no later than the first week of August, well before the critical August 30 date. The subjective awareness implied by these statements, even on the reading most favorable to the González family, is incompatible with a belief that any entity or person other than HIMA and Dr. López bore responsibility for an injury the González family clearly thought, correctly or not, could have been avoided. 11 To counteract the clear picture painted by their depositions, the González family argues that the claim accrued only after they met with Dr. Blaize Ferracio, a neurologist, on September 25, 2000. In September, González and her husband moved to Clarksville, Tennessee to be near the Lemoines. Dr. Lemoine arranged an informal visit with Dr. Ferracio to follow up on González's treatment. Miriam Lemoine and Mr. Ortiz asked Dr. Ferracio after that meeting whether he would take their legal case (presumably as an expert witness) since the family was so upset by González's condition. Dr. Ferracio recommended working with Puerto Rico counsel and helped the family identify suitable attorneys. It was only after speaking with Dr. Ferracio that the family agreed to bring legal action against HIMA and Dr. López. To support the contention that the claim accrued at that point, they cite our language in Montesinos: If a plaintiff is not aware of some level of reasonable likelihood of legal liability on the part of the person or entity that caused the injury, the statute of limitation will be tolled. 123 F.3d at 13-14. The González family would have us hold that their claim did not accrue until they were sure they had a case worth pursuing. Not only have they misunderstood our language by taking it out of context, 5 we cannot accept the substance of the contention. 12 Some plaintiffs decide to bring suit the instant their claims accrue, upon discovery. Often, however, there is a span of time during which the prospective plaintiff mulls over the injury and the tortfeasor's liability before initiating legal process. Under Puerto Rico's discovery rule, these two moments are distinct, and only the former has legal significance. Cf. Villarini-García v. Hospital Del Maestro, 8 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir.1993) (The discovery rule... focuses on whether the plaintiff knew the facts that gave rise to the claim, not their full legal implications.); see, e.g., Colón Prieto v. Géigel, 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. 313, 329 (1984) (claim accrued when plaintiff found out that the injury had not been caused by a bite but by the fact that the right lingual nerve had been cut). Although Puerto Rico's discovery rule is, relatively-speaking, plaintiff friendly, compare Joyce v. A.C. & S., Inc., 785 F.2d 1200, 1204 (4th Cir.1986) (discussing Virginia's rule that a claim accrues at the time of injury regardless of its discovery), its purpose is not to ensure plaintiffs a set period of time to draft a complaint after resolving to file one. 13 The González family also argues that Dr. López and HIMA gave them reassurances that delayed their discovery until after August 31. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has, indeed, recognized the special role that a tortfeasor's reassurances can play in delaying a victim's discovery of an injury or its author. See Montesinos, 123 F.3d at 16-17 (citing Colón Prieto, 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 329-30); see, e.g., Galarza v. Zagury, 739 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1984) (finding period tolled where doctor informed patient that her difficulties were due to a weakened sphincter but did not disclose that the sphincter had been lacerated in a prior visit). But [i]f the defendant succeeds in showing that plaintiff has not satisfied, or cannot satisfy, plaintiff's burden of proving lack of true knowledge (that is, lack of full awareness of all that need be known to preclude tolling), final judgment for the defendant on the ground of late filing is appropriate. Montesinos, 123 F.3d at 14. 14 We conclude that facts sufficient to support every element of the claim were apparent to the González family before the end of August 2000. See Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 339 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003) ([A] complaint sufficiently raises a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory as a basis for that claim, as long as relief is possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent with the allegations.) (quoting Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1134 (7th Cir.1992) (internal quotations omitted)).