Opinion ID: 408075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of McCruiston's Prior Convictions

Text: 10 McCruiston's primary objection to the district court decision is predicated on the admissibility of McCruiston's prior convictions for impeachment purposes. It is the position of McCruiston that the court ruled these convictions to be admissible for impeachment purposes without complying with this court's decision in United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025, 97 S.Ct. 646, 50 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). 11 In Mahone, we urged trial judges to balance the probative value of prior convictions against their prejudicial effect, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) after a hearing on the record, and to find explicitly that the prejudicial effect was outweighed by the probative value if the convictions are to be deemed admissible. Such an explicit finding is desirable to aid the appellate court in assessing whether the requirements of Rule 609 had been met. In Mahone, we also set forth some of the factors to be considered in the balancing determination: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the point in time of the conviction and the witness's subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the charged crime; (4) the importance of the defendant's testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue. United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976). 12 After the district court's decision in this case, this court reaffirmed the principles enunciated in Mahone and evaluated when a trial court should make its balancing determination on the record in response to a pretrial motion to exclude prior convictions. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e) states that (a) motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court, for good cause, orders that it be deferred for determination at the trial.... In United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 2335, 68 L.Ed.2d 854 (1981), we noted that the pre-trial motion in that case filed three weeks before the trial could have been decided before trial, but on the facts of the case we found no reversible error because the defendant at the pre-trial conference had agreed to defer the hearing on the motion until later. 13 In the present case, the defendant filed a motion in limine on December 1, 1980, just minutes prior to the trial, while the jury panel waited. The court had previously ordered on October 16, 1980, that all pre-trial motions were to be filed within ten days. The defendant claims that its delay in filing was attributable to the Government's delay in conveying to him a list of his prior convictions. In any event, the trial judge permitted filing of the motion and allowed the defendant to argue the motion. 1 14 Counsel for McCruiston argued the motion incorporating the Mahone standards but not referring to the case by name. At the end of defendant's argument, the court responded, (W)e are not faced with it right at the moment. The Rule provides for 10 years, as you know. When asked by counsel for McCruiston for a ruling in order to make an opening statement, the court said: 15 My posture is that I will admit it, but I want to look into the matter further. There is a decision by Judge Swygert I want to go back and read. 16 It is this purported ruling from which McCruiston appeals and upon which his refusal to testify was purportedly based. The court did not at any time afterwards address the motion nor was the motion again urged by McCruiston. 17 In United States v. Sternback, 402 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1082, 89 S.Ct. 862, 21 L.Ed.2d 774 (1969), this court was presented with a similar factual situation and equivocal ruling. In that case, the defendant made a motion to exclude prior convictions during a recess in the government's case. The judge indicated a ruling but expressed concern about other relevant decisions and concluded, We will check it out. Subsequently no precise ruling by the court or renewed motion by defense counsel was made. We concluded that ... if this defendant's fear of the use of the conviction was indeed the reason why he decided not to testify it was incumbent upon counsel to pursue the question and obtain a definite ruling. Thus, we refused to find that the issue had been preserved for appeal. 18 On the facts of this case before us, the district court judge initially concluded that the parameters of the case had not been sufficiently developed to warrant a pre-trial ruling on the motion. He indicated his inclination to admit the convictions but expressly reserved a ruling until he could at least check another decision. Under these circumstances, there was no definite ruling at that point admitting the convictions from which McCruiston could appeal. McCruiston failed to renew his motion at any time thereafter to obtain a ruling. Under Sternback, therefore, the defendant is in no position to contend in this appeal that he was prevented from testifying in his own behalf by an erroneous ruling. 19 The dissent attempts unsuccessfully to distinguish Sternback and thereby excuse defense counsel's failure to pursue the motion on the grounds that Sternback did not involve a pre-trial motion. Noting that the motion in limine in this case was a pre-trial motion, the dissent claims that it was reasonable for McCruiston's counsel to expect that the motion would be ruled on prior to trial and therefore reasonable for him to conclude that a ruling had been made. The dissent chooses to ignore that the motion was filed just minutes prior to trial while the jury panel waited and after the deadline set by the court for the filing of all pre-trial motions pursuant to Rule 12(c). Moreover, the motion does not fall into any of the categories of motions under Rule 12(b) that must be made prior to trial, for which a pre-trial ruling might be more reasonably expected. In light of these facts and the court's statement that it wanted to look into the matter further, the dissent's assertion that it was reasonable for defense counsel not only to expect a ruling prior to trial but also to believe a ruling had in fact been made strikes us as unrealistic. 20 Nothing in our decision in Sternback or its application to this case conflicts with Rule 12(e) or this court's decision in Mahone. Mahone dealt only with the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) and on its facts did not address the time within which a court must rule on a pre-trial motion to exclude prior convictions under Rule 12(e). Nothing in Mahone, nor for that matter in Fountain, establishes a per se rule that all pre-trial motions to exclude prior convictions must be ruled on prior to trial. As Rule 12(e) states, the court shall rule on all pre-trial motions prior to trial unless the court defers determination for good cause. 21 The occasional difficulty of ruling on such motions prior to trial is well illustrated by the present case. The defendant claimed in his motion that admission of the prior convictions would impair his defense of entrapment, but the only defense the defendant actually presented during the trial was a so-called sting defense that the defendants had intended to abscond with Milton's money without ever providing any heroin. Although the prior convictions might have been admissible for purposes of showing prior disposition to rebut an entrapment defense, their admissibility would have been another matter altogether in relation to a sting defense. 22 The motion in this case was filed only minutes before trial. The trial court deferred its ruling only until such time as the facts had been sufficiently developed for a determination or at least until it could check additional case law. Given these facts, the district court did not run afoul of Rule 12(e) in deferring its ruling until after the trial had commenced. We are not convinced by the defendant's argument that a pre-trial ruling was necessary under these circumstances for preparation of his opening statement. The limited purpose of opening statement is to delineate the evidence the defense intends to present. It is not unusual for defense counsel to dispense with opening argument altogether to await developments during trial, and it is certainly not necessary or perhaps even advisable to specify whether a defendant will take the stand at such an early stage. 23 Further, we have observed that generally defense counsel choose not to have the defendant take the stand in order to press the Government into proving its case without the opportunity to impugn the defendant's credibility, and that the attitude of the criminal bar is that it usually is a mistake for the defendant to take the stand. Our remarks in this respect, of course, in no way are intended to minimize the importance, from a constitutional point of view, of the law that no inference should be drawn from the failure of a defendant to testify in his own behalf. 24 In the present case, while defense counsel did at one point say he did not see how his client would be able to take the stand in the case if the convictions were to be admitted, the record is silent as to any clear statement that even in the absence of their admission, it was contemplated that the defendant would testify. 25 Therefore, we conclude that the trial judge acted within the parameters of Rule 12(e) in deferring his ruling until after the commencement of the trial. Thereafter it became incumbent upon defense counsel to renew his motion to obtain a definitive ruling from which to appeal. Having failed to do so, the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal. 26