Opinion ID: 1714364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: conclusion

Text: ¶ 26. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable case law, the May 1st order is not a final order, but an interlocutory order. We conclude this matter is not properly before this Court; and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the remaining issues will not be discussed. The holding of this Court does not bar the plaintiffs from raising these issues on appeal from a final judgment. ¶ 27. APPEAL DISMISSED. PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., WALLER, COBB, EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR. DIAZ, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McRAE, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING. DIAZ, J., Dissenting. ¶ 28. Less than two months ago this Court held that a grant or denial of a motion to compel arbitration is reviewed de novo. East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 2002 WL 1584301, at  (Miss.2002)(pending on motion for rehearing). Citing Webb. v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 256, (5th Cir.1996), we asserted jurisdiction over a motion to compel arbitration and reiterated that applicable contract defenses available under state contract law such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability may be asserted to invalidate the arbitration agreement without offending the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. We then affirmed the denial of the motion and remanded on the basis that the arbitration agreement in that case was procured unconscionably. Id. Today, however, the majority holds that we lack jurisdiction over such claims. ¶ 29. The majority relies on Green Tree Fin. Corp-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000) and American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702 (5th Cir.2002) to deny jurisdiction, but ignores the most glaring propositions for which these cases stand. Consequently, Mississippi jurists and litigants are left with a perplexing message. I therefore dissent. ¶ 30. Our starting point is the order below, which reads as follows:  [a]ll matters at issue in this case must ... be arbitrated pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreements.  (Emphasis added). Indeed, plaintiffs were ordered to arbitrate  all claims  they had asserted. (Emphasis added). We must now determine, therefore, whether this appeal is from an immediately appealable final judgment or a non-appealable interlocutory order. ¶ 31. The majority relies on Green Tree for the proposition that where plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice by a district court and plaintiffs are ordered to arbitrate any remaining claims, the judgment is considered final and therefore immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 85, 121 S.Ct at 519. Green Tree, however, stands for much more than this rule alone. Indeed, the majority's attempt to distinguish Green Tree as inapplicable to the present case ignores the corpus of law upon which the Green Tree Court relied to both define and set forth as a standard the rule of finality for purposes of determining jurisdiction over grants or denials of motions to compel arbitration. ¶ 32. In setting forth the standard, the Green Tree Court emphasized that a final decision has a well-developed and longstanding meaning. It is a decision that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment. Id. at 85, 121 S.Ct. 513 (citing Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994)), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (both quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)); see also St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Southern Exp. Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28-29, 2 S.Ct. 6, 27 L.Ed. 638 (1883). The Green Tree Court emphasized that [b]ecause the FAA does not define `a final decision with respect to an arbitration' or otherwise suggest that the ordinary meaning of `final decision' should not apply, we accord the term its well-established meaning. 531 U.S. at 85, 121 S.Ct. 513 (citing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259-60, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992)). The Court stated that when an order plainly disposes of an entire case on the merits and leaves no part of it pending before the court, such an order constitutes a final judgment. The FAA does permit parties to arbitration agreements to bring a separate proceeding in a district court to enter judgment on an arbitration award once it is made (or to vacate or modify it), but the existence of that remedy does not vitiate the finality of the District Court's resolution of the claims in the instant proceeding. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 11). ¶ 33. Additionally, footnote two of Green Tree has garnered recognition in the law as an important guidepost, which is worth considering here. Where a district court enters a stay instead of a dismissal along with an order to arbitrate, such an order would not be appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1). American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d at 713 (Dennis, J., concurring). [1] ¶ 34. In the present case, defendants moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the claims or, in the alternative, to stay the litigation. The record does not reveal a grant or denial of either motion. The majority thus holds that this case is a non-appealable interlocutory order, although judgment was entered on plaintiffs' state law claims in favor of defendants and all remaining issues were ordered to arbitration. ¶ 35. In finding for defendants on the issue of jurisdiction, the majority cites American Heritage as a reminder that we are no longer bound to make distinctions between independent and embedded claims to determine our jurisdiction over denials or grants of motions to compel arbitration. American Heritage, 294 F.3d at 707. But the majority fails to cite American Heritage as the leading authority that also tells us the final decision analysis as set forth in Green Tree is to be our guide. Id. at 707. In the present case, although we deal with neither a stay nor a dismissal, we do deal with a final decision as is defined by both the Green Tree and American Heritage courts. ¶ 36. In American Heritage, the appellees made arguments similar to those of the defendants here. They argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the district court, while compelling arbitration, did not dismiss the case. Rather, it ordered the case closed. Id. The appellees relied on Green Tree to argue that a formal dismissal was required to provide appellate jurisdiction over the order. Id. The Fifth Circuit found that the appellees' attempt to distinguish the terms `dismiss' and `close' as they apply to disposition of a case was an attempt to thwart the Court's instruction in Green Tree to apply the well-established meaning of `final decision.' Id. The Court then found that regardless of the terminology employed, the district court had nothing more to do but execute the judgment. Id. at 708. ¶ 37. Much the same analysis is applicable here. Regardless of the fact that we neither deal with a stay nor dismissal, the circuit court has nothing left to do but supervise compliance with the order or to enforce an arbitration award. As such, [t]here is nothing interlocutory about an order compelling arbitration that does all that the court has to do. Id. at 714 (Dennis, J. concurring) (citing Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Kings Reinsurance Co., 241 F.3d 131 (2d Cir.2001)). ¶ 38. Under both Green Tree and American Heritage, we have jurisdiction over the merits of this appeal. Although defendants properly argue that, under the FAA, we would not have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal, the appeal now before us is not interlocutory. Indeed, it comes to us from of a final judgment, as defined by the final judgment rule. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 85, 121 S.Ct. at 519; American Heritage, 294 F.3d at 707. The circuit court, therefore, has but one remaining responsibility as to the plaintiffs here; and that is to execute judgment. This being the case, the circuit court's order constituted a final decision which is immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. ¶ 39. On the merits, the record supports a finding of error in ordering arbitration. The issues on appeal regard the application of state law to determine the validity of the contracts and thus of the arbitration agreements therein. It should be recognized that at the time the order was entered, the circuit court did not have the benefit of East Ford's clarity, although this would not prevent a finding of error. As clarified in East Ford, the applicable standards for determining both procedural and substantive unconscionability in the procurement of contracts and arbitration agreements are as follows: Substantive unconscionability may be proven by showing an agreement to be oppressive. Procedural unconscionability may be proven by showing any of the following: (1) a lack of knowledge (2) a lack of voluntariness (3) inconspicuous print (4) the use of complex legalistic language (5) disparity in sophistication or bargaining power of the parties (6) a lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about the contract terms. ¶ 40. After a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration below, and without allowing any discovery on the issue of unconscionability, the court found that the arbitration agreements were binding and therefore enforceable because (1) the agreements were in plain language. (2) the agreements were signed, and (3) even though they did not have an opportunity to read the contract, the plaintiffs' affidavits did not indicate a lack of understanding, and (4) neither did those affidavits indicate that plaintiffs were precluded from intelligently comprehending the agreements as measured by their education levels. ¶ 41. The fact that an arbitration agreement is in plain language does not, in and of itself, prove it was bargained for at arms length. Likewise, the fact that an arbitration agreement is signed does not, in and of itself, prove that the agreement was bargained for at arms length. And interestingly, while the circuit court did note that the plaintiffs did not have an opportunity to review the documents, it did not inquire as to whether the lack of such an opportunity barred the plaintiffs from comprehending the agreements, or to what extent, if any, the plaintiffs did or did not rely on the defendants' representations in relinquishing their legal right to have any future dispute settled in a court of law, pursuant to the strictures of due process, equality, and fairness. In fact, the plaintiffs stated that they were rushed through the loan process in less than ten minutes and did not know what arbitration meant. ¶ 42. In addition, the court did not consider the knowledge or sophistication of the plaintiffs compared to the defendants nor the sufficiency of plaintiffs' opportunity to review the contract documents. The court did not consider the fact that the plaintiffs were not fully informed of the costs of arbitration although this issue was argued before the court. And importantly, the judge did not consider the fact that pursuant to the plain language of the arbitration agreement, the plaintiffs would be forced into arbitration to enforce any claims or remedies while defendants reserved the right to pursue their remedies in courts of law and equity. Instead, the plaintiffs were denied discovery on these issues and were ordered to arbitrate. ¶ 43. We have jurisdiction in this case. We should thoroughly consider the merits and determine whether the trial court erred in summarily sending these litigants to arbitration. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.