Opinion ID: 789967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: conclusion

Text: 40 In Ehrlich, we stated that [w]e are, of course, bound to implement [ Saucier ], and fully expect to do so in the vast majority of qualified immunity cases that come before us. Ehrlich, 348 F.3d at 57. The majority's treatment of Saucier in this case demonstrates how far we have deviated from Ehrlich 's narrow language. Perhaps our responsibilities were less burdensome under Horne and other pre- Saucier cases, but I am troubled by a decision that seeks to avoid the difficult questions that the Supreme Court has obligated us to face. 41 For whatever reason, New York's courts have shown no inclination to hold that § 240.30(1) violates the First Amendment insofar as it criminalizes speech that is merely annoying or alarming, and New York police continue to enforce the statute to the detriment of citizens' core First Amendment rights. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I concur with the majority's resolution of the qualified immunity issue, but respectfully dissent from its refusal to reach the constitutional issue and, once and for all, hold § 240.30(1) unconstitutional. Notes: 8 In Brosseau v. Haugen , 125 S.Ct. 596 (decided Dec. 13, 2004), the Supreme Court declined to reconsider Saucier, see id. , at 598 n.3, despite the disagreement of three Justices whose reasons were similar to those the majority adopts in this case. See id. at 601 (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Scalia and Ginsburg, JJ.). 9 The constitutionality of § 240.30(1), insofar as it criminalizes harassing or threatening communications, is not disputed in this appeal 10 To be sure, the conduct at issue in some of these cases could be termed harassment, but the courts have not required the state to prove harassment or threats, and for good reason: § 240.30(1) merely requires the state to prove annoyance or alarm