Opinion ID: 1979848
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Heading: Your first question is:

Text: Is the Act a law necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health or safety so that the emergency clause validly renders the Act effective as of the date of its enactment pursuant to Article III, § 22 of the South Dakota Constitution? The answer to this question is yes. In a similar economic situation, the Court upheld a foreclosure moratorium law. Culhane v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 65 S.D. 337, 274 N.W. 315 (1937). In upholding the moratorium law under the police powers of the state, the Court relied upon the recitals in the act, facts of which it took judicial notice, and resolved any doubt in favor of the legislative declaration. The eight findings of the legislature in the present Act clearly indicate it is immediately necessary to protect the social and economic interests of this state. We take judicial notice that agriculture in this state is undergoing serious financial problems because of deflating land prices, low commodity prices, and high operating expenses. As a result, many of our lending institutions are having financial difficulties, which makes it extremely difficult for the agricultural sector to obtain adequate financing. South Dakota's main industries are farming and ranching, and we are unable to say the present Act is not immediately necessary to protect the social and economic interests of South Dakota. In our prior decisions, this court has used the term police power synonymously with preservation of public peace, health, or safety. Both terms can be used to identify one class of law exempted from referendum. State ex rel. Kornmann, supra, 81 S.D. at 549, 138 N.W.2d at 4 (citations omitted). Many attempts have been made to define the term police power as applied to legislation. Justice Shaw, in the case of Com. v. Alger, (Mass.) 7 Cush. 53, said: It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and source of this power than to mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise. However, in the same case this great jurist gave what is perhaps the best definition ever attempted, defining it as: The power vested in the Legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth and of the subjects of the same. State v. Central Lumber Co., 24 S.D. 136, 155, 123 N.W. 504, 510 (1909); aff'd 226 U.S. 157, 33 S.Ct. 66, 57 L.Ed. 164 (1912). More recently the Supreme Court of Wisconsin defined police power as the inherent power of government to promote the general welfare.... It covers all matters having a reasonable relation to the protection of the public health, safety or welfare. State v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 65 Wis.2d 482, 490-92, 222 N.W.2d 912, 916 (1974) (citations omitted). Measures to promote and protect a state's major industry are within a state's police powers. Miller v. Michigan State Apple Commission, 296 Mich. 248, 296 N.W. 245 (1941). [I]t cannot be reasonably contended that the protection and promotion of [South Dakota's agriculture economy] is not a matter of public concern or that the Legislature may not determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for the protection and expedient for promotion of that industry. Id., 296 Mich. at 255, 296 N.W. at 247 quoting Floyd Fruit Co. v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 578, 175 So. 248, 253 (1937).