Opinion ID: 199869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the fish pier ban

Text: We divide our discussion of the outright ban on leafletting imposed in respect to the Fish Pier proper into two segments. See supra note 4. We grapple first with the status of the Fish Pier and then ponder the validity of the ban.
We consider the Fish Pier to be a property separate and apart from the abutting section of Northern Avenue. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 676-79 (proceeding similarly in the case of an airport terminal), Hawkins v. City of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (doing the same in the context of a government-owned performing arts center); see also Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Expo. Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 698 (7th Cir. 1998) (treating separately each distinct area of Chicago's Navy Pier). Since the Fish Pier is autonomous for First Amendment purposes, we treat Massport's policy as a total ban, rather than as a time, place, and manner regulation that restricts leafletting to the Northern Avenue sidewalk (which lies outside the gates). NERCC contends that the Fish Pier is a traditional public forum, or, alternatively, a designated public forum. In determining whether either of those labels applies, we must consider both the nature of the property and its past uses. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680-82. Historically, the Fish Pier was used only for purposes related to the commercial fishing industry. -20- While the permitted uses have changed over time, the pier remains quite different from the types of property that are most often deemed to be public fora. It is not a public thoroughfare like a street or sidewalk, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481, or a gathering place like a park or town green, e.g., Knights of Columbus v. Town of Lexington, 272 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2001). Although space on the pier is no longer limited to activities directly related to receiving, storing, and shipping fish — the Fish Pier is now home to a conference center, two eateries, and several offices — the dominant character of the property is still that of a commercial fishery. Space on the seaward side is used for unloading fish; the two long buildings are used to store the catch; and the central area is used for loading fish onto trucks, which circle around the ECC (formerly known as the Fish Exchange) and exit through the gate onto Northern Avenue. The site is notable for the absence of either sidewalks or other design characteristics that might be viewed as welcoming the general public. NERCC points out, correctly, that there is an interior roadway on the Fish Pier, and that members of the public enter the premises for a variety of purposes. Furthermore, NERCC has sought to cast doubt upon Massport's contention that the Fish Pier is a closed facility limited to authorized persons by proffering affidavits of NERCC members who assert that they entered the Fish -21- Pier without being stopped or questioned. But Massport has taken appropriate steps to restrict access to the site; and even if Massport's policy of restricted access is erratically enforced, the fence, gate, security booth, and signage hardly add up to an open invitation for the public to enter. We do not believe that these attributes are enough to convert the Fish Pier into a traditional public forum. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680 (expressly stating that comparable evidence, without more, is insufficient to justify a finding that a location is a public forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (similar). While the level of public access is a salient consideration, it cannot be accorded decretory significance — especially since the Fish Pier's primary use does not depend at all on public access. Nor is the Fish Pier a designated public forum. At most, the circumstances suggest that Massport tolerates the presence of some members of the public on the Fish Pier, including persons attending ECC events, restaurant patrons, and an occasional passerby bent on contemplating the harbor's scenic beauty. Such tolerance is not tantamount to an affirmative act — and an affirmative act of a governmental body is required to support a finding that the authorities have designated a forum as a place for public expression. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680 (plurality op.). -22- The proof of the pudding is in the case law. On balance, the Fish Pier is far less of a public space than, say, the airport terminal at issue in ISKCON or the post office sidewalk at issue in Kokinda, neither of which was found to be a public forum. See id. at 683; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730. This conclusion flows principally from the fact that the Fish Pier's primary uses are not dependent upon public access. We hold, therefore, that the Fish Pier is a non-public forum.
Because the ban on leafletting, as written, is clearly content-neutral, and there is absolutely no record evidence to support an inference that Massport has applied it unevenly, we turn next to the reasonableness of the ban. At the expense of belaboring the obvious, we reiterate that leafletting is one of the most highly respected (and, therefore, highly protected) ways in which citizens may exercise First Amendment rights. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 176-77. Building on this sturdy foundation and highlighting the unobtrusive nature of the activity, NERCC suggests that an outright ban on leafletting never can be reasonable. We do not agree. NERCC bases much of its argument on the fact that the ISKCON Court invalidated a ban on leafletting in an airport. However, NERCC's attempts to reason from that analogy are unpersuasive. ISKCON did not go so far as to suggest that a ban on -23- leafletting is always unconstitutional. To the contrary, the case suggests that we should refrain from basing a reasonableness determination on any single factor (such as whether a ban involves leafletting or whether a non-public forum is a multi-purpose facility), encouraging us instead to weigh all the factors that point in favor of allowing speech against those that support the need for restrictions. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In this process, we bear in mind that while the regulation adopted by the State need not be the most reasonable of all available options, id. at 683 (plurality op.), the State's justifications must be solidly grounded. We hold, therefore, that a ban on leafletting in a non-public forum is not impermissible per se. See Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1289-90, 1292 (sustaining a total ban on leafletting). We proceed from the general to the particular. As said, the Fish Pier accommodates multiple uses, and thus is distinguishable from the sidewalk in Kokinda and from other singlepurpose fora. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (making this distinction). But context in this type of case often involves matters of degree, and there is much less diversity of use on the Fish Pier than at a large international airport, see id. at 689 (noting that the airport terminal at issue doubled in brass as a shopping mall), in Boston's subway stations, see Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319, -24- 1325 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting the presence of a myriad of . . . nontransit activity), or even at the Chicago Navy Pier, see Chicago Acorn, 150 F.3d at 702 (noting the existence of a shopping mall, an entertainment center, and an amusement park on the pier). The closest parallel is Hawkins, in which there were a comparable number of secondary uses: three commercial establishments incidental to the venue's primary purpose (a performing arts center). 170 F.3d at 1290. There, however, unlike in this case, the forum's primary use depended upon access by members of the public — yet the Tenth Circuit nonetheless found an outright ban on leafletting reasonable. Id. at 1289-90. All in all, the nature of the Fish Pier weighs quite heavily against NERCC's position. This brings us to Massport's rationale for barring the distribution of handbills on the Fish Pier.7 Massport has offered several reasons supporting the ban. Some of these reasons are of uncertain force in the First Amendment calculus (e.g., Massport's insistence that it may legitimately exclude leafletters from the Fish Pier because they are undesirable to tenants or because the Fish Pier is classified as a restricted area), and we do not dwell on them. Rather, we go directly to Massport's principal rationale: 7 Although the regulations cover the Fish Pier as a whole and apply not only to leafletting but also to other First Amendment activities, the parties focus on leafletting in the vicinity of the ECC. Accordingly, we limit our holding to that activity and place. -25- that public safety would be endangered if leafletting were allowed at the entrance to the ECC. As an abstract matter, this rationale stands on solid legal footing. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 715 (stating that protection of citizens' health and safety is within the government's traditional police power). In the particular setting, the rationale also withstands scrutiny: the fishing fleet generates a great deal of activity; there is a high volume of truck traffic; and there appears to be precious little room in front of the ECC. What space is available serves primarily as a roadway and truck turnaround. In these cramped confines, pedestrian safety and traffic flow are vital concerns. The validity of these concerns is underscored by the fact that, when Massport erected concrete bollards to protect the entrance to the ECC several years ago, the bollards were so severely damaged by trucks executing turnarounds that Massport had to remove them. Thus, although there are few, if any, problems intrinsic to the act of leafletting, safety is a plausible concern here. In an effort to parry this thrust, NERCC argues that Massport has exhibited a general disregard for pedestrian safety by allowing pedestrians to walk the length of the pier to attend events at the ECC (or, sometimes, merely to gaze at the harbor). NERCC's factual premise is sound: a pedestrian must traverse the interior roadway to reach and enter the ECC. But NERCC's suggested -26- conclusion — that Massport cares not a fig for pedestrian safety — does not follow. At most, NERCC's allegations suggest that a leafletting ban would not solve every safety problem on the Fish Pier. But even in a public forum, partial solutions may be acceptable. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Arch'l Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175, 191 (1st Cir. 1991). In a non-public forum, the reasonableness standard is satisfied as long as there is a plausible basis for distinguishing between restricted activities and allowed activities. Here, there is such a basis for differentiating between leafletters and ordinary pedestrians. Given the peculiar setting of the ECC entrance, leafletters run a serious risk of obstructing vehicular traffic and distracting pedestrians as they traverse the roadway. We have said enough on this score. Massport's public safety concerns pass the reasonableness screen. Accordingly, we hold that Massport's interest in public safety in the context of a commercial fishery and truck depot justifies the outright ban on leafletting activity that it has imposed (at least in front of the ECC, see supra note 7).