Opinion ID: 1125007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: An Instruction on The Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine May Be Appropriate if the Proof at Trial Were Consistent With Record Here.

Text: ¶ 8 In Qualls v. U.S. Elevator Corp., 1993 OK 135 ¶ 7, 863 P.2d 457, 460 we described res ipsa loquitur: Res ipsa loquitur is a pattern of proof which may be applied to an injury that does not occur in the usual course of everyday conduct unless a person who controls the instrumentality likely to produce injury fails to exercise due care to prevent its occurrence.... The fundamental element of this evidentiary process is the control of the instrumentality which caused the damage. [Footnotes omitted.] There we held that a res ipsa loquitur instruction was proper in a case where a passenger was injured when an automatic elevator in a hospital had failed. We held that because the plaintiff had no control over the elevator's mechanisms after she pressed the button to put it into operation, it was within the exclusive control of the defendant elevator maintenance company that had a maintenance contract on the elevator. ¶ 9 When applied by the trier of fact, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine gives the plaintiff the benefit of an inference that the defendant's negligence was the cause of the failure of an instrumentality if (1) the instrumentality was within defendant's exclusive control when it failed, and (2) failure of such an instrumentality ordinarily does not occur when due care is exercised in the appliance's construction, installation, and maintenance by the person charged with those responsibilities. Qualls, 863 P.2d at 460. The reason for the rule is that, even after examination by plaintiff's experts following an accident, it is often difficult to develop evidence concerning negligence. Under such circumstances it is fairer to require the party who controlled and was responsible for the instrumentality to come forward with proof of the reason for the instrumentality's failure than to require the plaintiff, who had no control over it, to do so. ¶ 10 Here Mitchell alleges that the lift was within the exclusive control of Cox's employees; Mitchell was a passenger who had to rely on Cox and his employees for his safety while he was on the lift. These facts alone show that it would be inappropriate to say as a matter of law that Mitchell would not be entitled to a res ipsa loquitur instruction. ¶ 11 The Court of Civil Appeal's opinion relied on the fact that the lift was outside instead of enclosed as had been the elevator in Qualls as a justification for its conclusion that res ipsa loquitur was not available to Mitchell. The opinion also relied on deposition testimony that delivery truck drivers had, at other times, operated the lift themselves, and that Cox's employees regularly inspected the lift and oiled its chains. These factors are insufficient to deprive Mitchell of a right to have the jury instructed on the issue, they are instead for the trier of fact to consider in deciding whether to apply res ipsa loquitur. ¶ 12 The lift was a heavy, complex, and potentially dangerous, piece of industrial machinery. It was owned by Cox and he and his employees were responsible for its safe operation. Mitchell was unable to protect himself while he was on the lift. He had to rely on Cox and his employees to preserve his safety. Under the circumstances it is fair to allow submission of the res ipsa loquitur pattern of proof here. We stress that the doctrine affords but an option for the jury. The Uniform Instruction on res ipsa loquitur tells the jury that it may but is not required to, find negligence from the mere fact that the accident occurred. OUJI-CIV 9.13. Thus, a res ipsa loquitur instruction does not necessarily relieve a plaintiff of the obligation to prove negligence, it merely gives the jury the opportunity to do so. ¶ 13 The Court of Civil Appeals's opinion relied on Avard v. Leming, 1994 OK 121, 889 P.2d 262 and National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Elliott, 1956 OK 182, 298 P.2d 448, 451 in support of its conclusion that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was unavailable to Mitchell as a matter of law. Neither Avard not Elliott supports the opinion's affirmation of the trial court's summary judgment. ¶ 14 Avard did not involve hazardous mechanical equipment. There, a baby sitter stepped on a sliver of glass in the carpet of the defendants, for whom she was sitting. Plaintiff did not show where the glass came from, nor that defendants had any knowledge of its presence before plaintiff stepped on it. In Elliott, plaintiff's loss was caused by a fire that started near defendant's truck but plaintiff could not prove that defendant's truck started the fire. Thus both Avard and Elliott are distinguishable from the facts presented by the record here. ¶ 15 If the proof at trial be consistent with the evidentiary material presented in this record, a res ipsa loquitur instruction may not be inappropriate, and the ultimate decision as to whether the res ipsa loquitur pattern of proof supports the claim must be made by the trier of fact. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND MATTER REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO PROCEED IN A MANNER NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ¶ 16 KAUGER, C.J., SUMMERS, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA and ALMA WILSON, JJ., concur. ¶ 17 SIMMS, J., concurs in judgment. HARGRAVE, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.