Opinion ID: 1437042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: trial on the substantive offenses

Text: In the trial on the merits, the evidence was simple and direct. The victim testified as to the occurrence of a robbery, and identified defendant as one of the perpetrators. One Priscilla Schmidt testified that she entered the store while the robbery was taking place, and also identified defendant as one of the perpetrators. An officer who responded to the call to the police testified that defendant and a friend were arrested within minutes of the robbery, one and one-quarter blocks from the store. A pistol was taken from the defendant, and a nickelplated toy pistol and a paper sack containing currency were taken from his friend. Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery and received concurrent sentences. Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent if resisted to maim, wound or kill. C.R.S.1963, 40-5-1. We have heretofore held    specific intent is ordinarily inferable from the facts and proof thereof is necessarily by circumstantial evidence. Johnson v. People, Colo., 484 P.2d 110 (1971). In the instant case, the store owner and an eyewitness positively identified the defendant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery, and testified that he brandished a pistol at the time. The store owner testified that the defendant raised the pistol over his head, told him to turn around, and when the owner protested at the possibility of being struck, the defendant exclaimed, I said turn around or I'll kill you. The other eyewitness stated that the defendant was getting ready to hit the owner of the store, and this statement was objected to as being conclusory. The court overruled the objection and error is directed to that ruling. We agree with the trial court's ruling. While it is axiomatic that witnesses should relate facts and not conclusions, an exception to this rule exists when a witness has personally observed the physical activity of another, and summarizes his sensory impressions thereof because they    can hardly be described in any other manner. State v. Nichols, 268 N.C. 152, 150 S.E.2d 21 (1966); accord, State v. Bailey, 4 N.C.App. 407, 167 S.E.2d 24 (1968); see United States v. Alexander, 415 F.2d 1352 (1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1014, 90 S.Ct. 1246, 25 L.Ed.2d 427; State v. McCullough, 94 Ariz. 209, 382 P.2d 682 (1963); People v. Perez, 135 Cal.App.2d 205, 286 P.2d 979 (1955). Since it would be difficult, if not impossible, to accurately and vividly describe defendant's bodily movements to the jury in a completely factual manner, and since Mrs. Schmidt qualified her conclusion immediately subsequent to defendant's objection by stating that defendant looked like he was going to hit the owner, the trial court committed no error in overruling defendant's objection to her testimony. The evidence was sufficient to at least present a jury question as to whether the defendant possessed the requisite specific intent to maim, wound or kill, if resisted. See McGraw v. People, 154 Colo. 368, 390 P.2d 819 (1964). In such case, the finding of the jury is conclusive before this court. Ruark v. People, 157 Colo. 320, 402 P.2d 637 (1965). The judgment is affirmed. HODGES, GROVES and LEE, JJ., concur.