Opinion ID: 359689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mail Fraud Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Text: 57 According to this court in United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th Cir. 1976), the mail fraud statute can be utilized to prosecute a public official if he devises a scheme whereby bribes or kickbacks are accepted in the course of conduct of his office, since such conduct operates to defraud the citizens of his government of their right to his honest and faithful service. 58 This concept offers a broad interpretation of the mail fraud statute applicable in situations in which the official commits fraud in connection with an affirmative duty of his office. The concept of fraud upon the public may clearly fall within the ambit of the mail fraud statute where dishonest conduct by a public official directly implicates the functions and duties of that official's public office. Whether a showing of dishonesty on the part of a state official, outside his official duties, with no financial loss to the state constitutes a fraud upon the public and thereby statutory mail fraud is, in our judgment, highly questionable. Every case of breach of public trust and misfeasance in office in connection with which some mailing has occurred does not and cannot fall within the confines of the mail fraud statute. In the instant case, we hold the evidence does not establish mail fraud within the federal statute. 59 The indictment charges, in essence, that Rabbitt defrauded the citizens of Missouri by accepting a ten percent commission on architectural contracts awarded to the Berger-Field firm and concealing or failing to disclose his interest in those contracts. The evidence clearly shows that Rabbitt acted unethically and violated his canons as a lawyer, 16 a candidate disclosure statute requiring disclosure of fees received during the preceding twelve months, 17 and possibly a Missouri law rendering  partiality or abuse in public office unlawful. 18 But such violations, although bearing on intent to defraud, do not in and of themselves establish the substantive crime of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 60 In support of its argument that Rabbitt's conduct constituted mail fraud, the Government relies on several cases in which the courts employed various combinations of factors to establish a scheme to defraud cognizable under the mail fraud statute. In each of these cases, the conduct deemed fraudulent deprived the public either of some potential tangible gain such as favorable contracts, 19 or of its right to honest and fair dealing in the conduct of the officer in question, 20 or of its right to disclosure of the officer's interest in the transaction at issue. 21 61 We find none of these factors present in this case. The state officials who awarded architectural contracts did so on merit. 22 There is no evidence that Rabbitt's use of his friendship, position, and influence to aid Berger-Field in obtaining contracts resulted in inferior work, greater expense, or any other tangible loss to the citizens or state. 62 We also find no evidence that Rabbitt's conduct deprived the citizens of their right to honesty and fairness in the conduct of his official duties. Rabbitt did not, in his official capacity, control the awarding of state contracts to architects. There is no evidence that Rabbitt failed to carry out the duties and responsibilities of his legislative office or leadership positions for the sake of Berger-Field. In this respect, the case resembles United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976), in which the chief plumbing inspector for the City of St. Louis accepted unsolicited gratuities from plumbing contractors. While McNeive benefited from his office in a reprehensible way, his conduct neither injured the Government nor affected the performance of his duties and therefore did not violate federal law. We held that McNeive did not commit fraud by defrauding citizens of a right to honest and faithful service. 23 63 Finally, Rabbitt was under no affirmative duty to disclose his interest. The Government refers to no standard of conduct applicable to legislators which clearly required disclosure of Rabbitt's interest in the Berger-Field contracts. 24 The candidate disclosure act applied to Rabbitt as a candidate for Lieutenant Governor, not to his services as a legislator. Thus, he did not deprive the citizens of any right to disclosure. 64 To affirm the convictions on the Berger-Field mail fraud counts would mean expansion of the statute beyond its application in prior political corruption cases. This we refuse to do. We hold that Rabbitt's motion for judgment of acquittal on mail fraud counts I through X should have been granted. Accordingly, we reverse his convictions on those counts. 65