Opinion ID: 2628312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standing under the kjra

Text: The KJRA recognizes four categories of persons who have standing to seek judicial review of an agency action, as set forth in K.S.A. 77-611: (a) A person to whom the agency action is specifically directed; (b) a person who was a party to the agency proceedings that led to the agency action; (c) if the challenged agency action is a rule and regulation, a person subject to that rule; or (d) a person eligible for standing under another provision of law. The appellants claim that they have standing to challenge the KDHE's issuance of the landfill permit to Waste Connections under either subsection (b), as parties to the agency proceedings that led to the action, or subsection (d), as persons eligible under another provision of law. The Court of Appeals held that the appellants have standing to sue under subsection (b) pursuant to this court's decision in FACT. Board of Sumner County Comm'rs, 38 Kan.App.2d at 561, 168 P.3d 1034. Waste Connections argues that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of K.S.A. 77-611(b) in this case was erroneous because the court failed to take into account the definition of a party under K.S.A. 77-602(f) and focused on the appellants' participation in the agency determination instead of their participation as parties to the proceedings. The KJRA defines party to agency proceedings, as the term is used in K.S.A. 77-611(b), as [a] person to whom the agency action is specifically directed or a person named as a party to any agency proceeding or allowed to intervene or participate as a party in the proceeding.  (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 77-602(f); see also W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm'n, 241 Kan. 744, 750, 740 P.2d 585 (1987) (applying K.S.A. 77-602[f][2]). The district court correctly determined that KDHE's grant of permit to Waste Connections was not specifically directed at the appellants. Likewise, none of the appellants were named as a party during the permit process, and none of them formally intervened in that process. We may only find that the appellants have standing as part[ies] to the agency proceedings under K.S.A. 77-611(b) if they were allowed to ... participate as [parties] in the proceeding under K.S.A. 77-602(f)(2). We have discussed K.S.A. 77-602(f)(2) in only one previous case Dickey Clay, 241 Kan. 744, 740 P.2d 585. In that case, W.S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Company sought judicial review of orders by the Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) relating to a franchise agreement between the City of Pittsburg and the Gas Service Company. Although the KCC provided notice of the proceedings regarding the franchise agreement, Dickey Clay was not a `party, intervenor or protestant' in that process. 241 Kan. at 746, 740 P.2d 585. The KCC also held a public hearing regarding the agreement; an employee of Dickey Clay attended this hearing but `did not formally enter an appearance, present any testimony, or otherwise participate.' 241 Kan. at 746, 740 P.2d 585. Only after the KCC issued the orders in question and denied requests by the City of Pittsburg and the Gas Service Company for a rehearing did Dickey Clay file a motion to intervene. The KCC denied this motion. Dickey Clay filed a petition for judicial review under the KJRA. The district court ruled that Dickey Clay's motion for intervention was untimely, and this court agreed that Dickey Clay did not take timely steps to become a party to the proceedings or to perfect its appeal. 241 Kan. at 749, 740 P.2d 585. More important, we held that Dickey Clay could not challenge the agency action because it did not have standing under K.S.A. 77-611, basing our decision on the definition of a party in K.S.A. 77-602(f). After quoting the language of K.S.A. 77-602, this court explained that [b]ecause the action was not specifically directed toward Dickey Clay and Dickey Clay failed to intervene, it does not have standing under [K.S.A.] 77-611(a) or (b). 241 Kan. at 750, 740 P.2d 585. Amicus curiae Holcomb Common Facilities, LLC (Holcomb Facilities), argue that this court's decision in Dickey Clay indicates that a person may only have standing under K.S.A. 77-611(b) if the person was a named party in the agency proceeding or successfully intervened in that proceeding. We do not agree that Dickey Clay defines party so narrowly. Throughout Dickey Clay, this court indicated that Dickey Clay did not participate in the agency proceedings regarding the franchise agreement until after the KCC had issued its orders. See 241 Kan. at 746, 749, 740 P.2d 585. Although the court did state that Dickey Clay did not have standing under K.S.A. 77-611(b) because it was not a named party and failed to intervene, we did not consider whether Dickey Clay was a party under K.S.A. 77-602(f)(2) as a person allowed to ... participate as a party in the [agency] proceeding under K.S.A. 77-611(b), which is the precise issue that must be resolved in the case we now consider. Had Dickey Clay participated at all in the process leading up to issuance of the orders in question as a protestant to the agency action as appellants did in this case, Dickey Clay may have been decided differently. See 241 Kan. at 746, 740 P.2d 585. The question before us is one of first impression calling for construction of the statutory language in K.S.A. 77-602(f)(2) that defines a [p]arty to agency proceedings or party as a person ... allowed to ... participate as a party in the proceeding. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. LSF Franchise REO I v. Emporia Restaurants, Inc., 283 Kan. 13, 19, 152 P.3d 34 (2007). When courts are called upon to interpret statutes, the fundamental rule governing our interpretation is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted. State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001). For this reason, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts need not resort to statutory construction. In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 79, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007). Instead, [w]hen the language is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court is bound to implement the expressed intent. State v. Manbeck, 277 Kan. 224, Syl. ¶ 3, 83 P.3d 190 (2004). Where a statute's language is subject to multiple interpretations, however, a reviewing court may look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested. [Citation omitted.] Robinett v. The Haskell Co., 270 Kan. 95, 100-01, 12 P.3d 411 (2000). Generally, courts should construe statutes to avoid unreasonable results and should presume that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. Hawley v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 631, 132 P.3d 870 (2006). We ascertain the legislature's intent behind a particular statutory provision from a general consideration of the entire act. Effect must be given, if possible, to the entire act and every part thereof. To this end, it is the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. [Citation omitted.] In re Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 594, 783 P.2d 331 (1989); see also State ex rel. Morrison v. Oshman Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 275 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 2, 69 P.3d 1087 (2003). Thus, in cases that require statutory construction, courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act but are required to consider and construe together all parts thereof in pari materia.  Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, Syl. ¶ 2, 544 P.2d 791 (1975). As we have previously indicated in this opinion, the KJRA's definition of party to agency proceedings as someone who is allowed to participate as a party to the agency proceedings is far from clear. See K.S.A. 77-602(f)(2); K.S.A. 77-611(b). We therefore must employ principles of statutory construction to determine what the legislature intended when it adopted the standing provisions of the KJRA. Black's Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed.2004) defines a party as [o]ne who takes part in a transaction. In other words, the determination as to whether a person is a party is defined by that person's participation in a lawsuit or other action (such as the drafting of a contract). This definition is consistent with the principles of the KJRA because K.S.A. 77-602(f) and K.S.A. 77-611(b) indicate that a person is a party for purposes of standing if that person participate[d] in the agency proceedings. This court must therefore determine what is meant by an agency proceeding and what is required in terms of participation in that proceeding. Waste Connections argues that an agency proceeding, as the term is used in the KJRA, should be narrowly interpreted as being synonymous with hearing or adjudication. It does not offer any support for or explanation of this interpretation. Our review of other provisions of the KJRA, however, reveals that the legislature intended for the term proceeding to be read more broadly. K.S.A. 77-612, which requires that persons exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a petition for judicial review under the KJRA, states as an exception to this requirement that [a] petitioner for judicial review of a rule or regulation need not have participated in the rulemaking proceeding upon which that rule and regulation is based. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 77-612(a). Administrative rulemaking generally does not involve public hearings unless specifically provided for by other statutes or regulations. Instead, rulemaking generally involves a proposed rule, a public notice and comment period, and the issuance of a final rule along with responses to the comments. See generally K.S.A. 77-415 et seq. (setting forth the procedures for administrative rulemaking). Despite these limited procedures, the KJRA refers to the rulemaking process as a proceeding the same term used in its definition of standing under K.S.A. 77-611(b). Likewise, K.S.A. 77-615, which governs the notice requirements for petitions of judicial review, specifically refers to  adjudicative proceedings. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 77-615(b). If the legislature intended the term proceeding as it is used in the KJRA to refer only to adjudications, there would have been no reason to include this descriptive qualification in the notice statute. In the same way, the legislature could have limited standing under the K.S.A. 77-611(b) to persons who participated in adjudicative proceedings as it did in terms of notice under K.S.A. 77-615(b), but it did not do so. Reading these statutes together, we find the legislature intended the term proceeding as it is used in the KJRA to be read broadly to refer to the process by which an agency carries out its statutory duties. Under this broad reading, we find that the permit process that the KDHE undertakes when considering whether to grant a landfill permit is a proceeding within the meaning of the KJRA. The landfill permit process is governed by K.A.R. 28-29-6a. This regulation provides that any interested person may submit written comments during the public comment period and these comments shall become a part of the permit record and shall be considered in making a final decision on the proposed permit action. K.A.R. 28-29-6a(b). The regulation further states that the KDHE may schedule a public hearing if there is sufficient local interest in a proposed permit action and [a]ll written and verbal comments received during a public hearing ... shall become a part of the permit record and be considered in making a final decision on the proposed permit action. K.A.R. 28-29-6a(c). The appellants allege in their petition for judicial review that they participated in the permit process under both of these sections. In particular, the Board commissioned the Terrane study to evaluate Waste Connections' proposed site plan and submitted that study to the KDHE. Members of Tri-County, including appellant Holland, attended the public hearings held during the landfill process and submitted comments to the KDHE at that time. We must determine whether this participation was sufficient to confer standing under K.S.A. 77-602(f) and K.S.A. 77-611(b). Although we did not discuss participation in terms of K.S.A. 77-602, our decision in FACT focused on the question of participation in agency proceedings under K.S.A. 77-611(b). In that case, a nonprofit organization challenged the KDHE's issuance of a permit to Murphy Farms, Inc., for a hog farm. The agency had granted the permit under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), a delegated federal permitting program under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1994). Members of FACT (the organization) submitted comments and participated in a public hearing before the permit was issued. After the KDHE granted the permit, FACT formally requested that the permit be revoked, as the governing regulations required. When the KDHE did not respond to FACT's request for a revocation of the permit, FACT filed a petition for judicial review under the KJRA. The district court dismissed the petition under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6), ruling that FACT lacked standing to sue. We reversed, finding that FACT had standing under both K.S.A. 77-611(b) and the traditional test for organizational standing discussed in NEA-Coffeyville v. U.S.D. No. 445, 268 Kan. 384, 387, 996 P.2d 821 (2000). FACT, 268 Kan. at 810-11, 1 P.3d 884. In reaching this conclusion, we found that before we could consider the question of organizational standing, we were required to determine whether FACT had standing under the KJRA. 268 Kan. at 807, 1 P.3d 884. Although we rejected the organization's claims that it had standing under K.S.A. 77-611(d), this court ultimately concluded that FACT had participated as a party to the agency proceedings, explaining: FACT argues that it fully participated in the permitting process as allowed by K.A.R. 28-16-61. K.A.R. 28-16-61(b) requires KDHE to provide for a public notice and comment period during the NPDES permitting process. During the public comment period, any interested person may submit written comments on a draft permit and may request a public hearing. K.A.R. 28-16-61(c). `All comments shall be considered in making the final decision and shall be answered as provided in subsection (e) of this regulation.' K.A.R. 28-16-61(c). Clearly KDHE must allow citizens to comment on its proposed permits, and it also must respond to their comments. At the request of FACT and others, a public meeting was held in Hodgeman County. At that meeting, members of FACT and two consultants hired by FACT submitted comments on the pending permit for Murphy's hog farm.... FACT participated in the agency proceedings (permit review and public comment) that led to the agency action (granting the permit). During oral argument before us, KDHE's counsel said: `[T]hose citizens did both as a group and individually have the opportunity to participate in the permitting process through the public hearing process, through the opportunity to submit comments on the permit.' We hold that FACT is entitled to assert standing as a `person who was a party to the agency proceedings that led to the agency action' under K.S.A. 77-611(b). 268 Kan. at 810, 1 P.3d 884. The court also determined that FACT had organizational standing under the three-prong test of NEA-Coffeyville. FACT, 268 Kan. at 810-11, 1 P.3d 884. Our discussion in FACT demonstrates that interested persons' submission of written comments during a public notice and comment period and all persons' comments made during a public hearing held by an agency both qualify as participation within the meaning of the KJRA's standing requirements. In its decision in this case, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the actions of FACT were analogous to the actions of the appellants here. See Board of Sumner County Comm'rs, 38 Kan.App.2d at 561-63, 168 P.3d 1034. Waste Connections argues that the Court of Appeals' reliance on FACT was unfounded because it failed to take into account the regulatory differences between the NPDES process in FACT and the landfill permit process in this case. For support of this claim, Waste Connections cites the last paragraph in FACT, whereafter having determined that FACT had standing under the KJRA and NEA-Coffeyville, see 268 Kan. at 810-11, 1 P.3d 884the court closed with the following observation: The KDHE administrative regulations support FACT's standing as a `party.' K.A.R. 28-16-62(g) specifically governs the procedures for modifying, revoking, reissuing, and terminating NPDES permits. Any interested person may request that a permit be modified, revoked, reissued, or terminated. K.A.R. 28-16-62(g)(1) (as FACT did here). Denials of such requests are not subject to public notice, comment, or hearings. However, the regulations state that this informal process is `a prerequisite to seeking judicial review of agency action' in denying the request. K.A.R. 28-16-62(g)(2). This is a clear indication that citizens are allowed to both comment on proposed NPDES permits and seek judicial review of permit granting. 268 Kan. at 811, 1 P.3d 884. Waste Connections asserts that these observations by the court indicate its holding was based in part on the NPDES process' provision stating that [a]ny person may request that a permit be revoked, and such a request was a prerequisite for seeking review under the KJRA. Waste Connections points out that no such provision exists in the landfill permit process. There are several problems with Waste Connections' interpretation of FACT. First, the above quoted language in FACT followed our determination that FACT had both standing under K.S.A. 77-611(b) and NEA-Coffeyville. See 268 Kan. at 810-11, 1 P.3d 884. We explained that the specific provisions of the NPDES permit process support[ed] our previous conclusion; we did not state that our decision in FACT was based on the particularities of that process. The Court of Appeals correctly found that this court's observations in the above quoted language were illustrative ofnot inherent toits decision. See Board of Sumner County Comm'rs, 38 Kan.App.2d at 561-63, 168 P.3d 1034. In addition, Waste Connections' narrow interpretation of FACT is contrary to our previous conclusion that the term proceeding should be read broadly under the KJRA. Our consideration of whether a person participated in the underlying proceedings for purposes of the KJRA is guided by the particular process governing an agency action. The fact that different actions may be subject to different processes does not necessarily render participation in those processes any less meaningful for purposes of standing under the KJRA. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the appellants' actions in this case qualified as participation under the KJRA pursuant to this court's decision in FACT. The appellants' petition states that the Board submitted comments to the KDHE along with the Terrane study that the Board commissioned. The petition similarly states that members of Tri-County, including Holland, offered comments and expressed concerns at the public hearings held in Harper County. On the face of the petition and all inferences drawn therefrom, the appellants have demonstrated that they participated in the agency proceedings that led to the KDHE's issuance of the permit in this case. We affirm the Court of Appeals conclusion that the appellants have standing to file a petition for judicial review under K.S.A. 77-611(b). Before turning to the question of whether the appellants meet the requirements of standing under the traditional tests for individuals and associations, we find that two additional clarifications should be made regarding arguments raised by Waste Connections and amicus Holcomb Facilities. First, Waste Connections argues extensively in its petition for review that the appellants have not substantiated the claims regarding their participation in the agency proceedings with evidence. This claim is without merit, as the underlying action was dismissed for lack of standing on the face of the petition itself before discovery had commenced. As such, we only consider the allegations of the petition itself-and all reasonable inferences therefrom-in determining whether the appellants have standing to file the petition for judicial review. See McCormick v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 272 Kan. 627, 634, 35 P.3d 815 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 841, 123 S.Ct. 170, 154 L.Ed.2d 65 (2002). Second, amicus Holcomb Facilities argues that a ruling that the appellants have standing under the KJRA would lead to unworkable notice requirements in light of K.S.A. 77-615(b). This statute provides that a petitioner shall give notice of the petition for judicial review to all other parties in any adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action. Amicus argues that if we determine the appellants have standing under K.S.A. 77-611(b), K.S.A. 77-615(b) would require notice be given to at least the 317 persons who submitted comments to the KDHE regarding the permit in question. These concerns are unfounded. K.S.A. 77-615(b) relates only to adjudicative proceedings, not to the permit process at issue in this case. In adjudications, which are quasi-judicial in nature, the notice requirement of K.S.A. 77-615(b) would not be any more unwieldy than the notice requirements in complicated civil cases. In all other cases, petitioners for judicial review need only serve notice upon the agency head, on any other person or persons designated by the agency head to receive service, on any agency officer designated to receive service in an order or on the agency officer who signs an order. K.S.A. 77-615(a). The appellants in this case complied with this requirement. Because the appellants participated in the landfill permit process in this case by offering written and oral comments, the appellants have standing to challenge the KDHE's issuance of the permit under K.S.A. 77-611(b).