Opinion ID: 667153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Qualified Immunity and Good Faith

Text: 129 We consider next whether private actors can substitute good faith for immunity and, if so, how the two may differ. The district court granted the Bermans' Rule 56(c) summary judgment motion and the Attorneys' Rule 12(b)(6) motion because of its conclusion that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability on plaintiffs' claim. Fox Rothschild I, 787 F.Supp. at 482. Whether private defendants threatened with section 1983 liability, like their public counterparts, can assert qualified immunity in a section 1983 action was at the time an open question in this circuit. The courts of appeals of other circuits that had ruled on it were sharply divided. Compare F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1318-19 (9th Cir.1989) (no qualified immunity for private section 1983 defendant) and Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir.1988) (same) with Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir.1988) (in banc) (private section 1983 defendant entitled to same qualified immunity as public official), vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1002, 109 S.Ct. 1105, 103 L.Ed.2d 170 (1989); Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, N.A., 830 F.2d 1487, 1489-90 (8th Cir.1987) (same), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1001, 108 S.Ct. 1723, 100 L.Ed.2d 188 (1988) and Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (same); see also Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 928-29 (1st Cir.1992) (qualified immunity available to private section 1983 defendant sued for acts undertaken at behest of state to assist state in performing essentially governmental function); accord DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 722 (10th Cir.1988). 130 After the district court had issued its opinion, however, the Supreme Court resolved the split among the circuits by holding that private defendants faced with a section 1983 claim for invoking a state replevin, garnishment or attachment procedure cannot interpose a qualified immunity defense. See Wyatt v. Cole, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1834, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992). The availability of qualified immunity to private persons who act under color of law is no longer an open question. It is settled. Private persons cannot assert it. 131 Though Wyatt overrules the district court's holding that the Bermans and their Attorneys are entitled to qualified immunity, it leaves open the question whether private parties acting under color of law can raise an affirmative defense of good faith in a section 1983 action. See id. ([W]e do not foreclose the possibility that private defendants faced with Sec. 1983 liability under Lugar ... could be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause or that Sec. 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens.); see also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. at 2756 n. 23 ([The] concern[ ] that private individuals who innocently make use of seemingly valid state laws would be responsible, if the law is subsequently held to be unconstitutional, for the consequences of their actions.... should be dealt with not by changing the character of the cause of action but by establishing an affirmative defense.). 132 In Wyatt, this open question concerning good faith came before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on remand. It concluded good faith is a defense available to private persons who act under color of law. It said: [P]rivate defendants should not be held liable under Sec. 1983 absent a showing of malice and evidence that they either knew or should have known of the statute's constitutional infirmity. Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 470, 126 L.Ed.2d 421 (1993). We are in basic agreement, but we believe malice in this context means a creditor's subjective appreciation that its act deprives the debtor of his constitutional right to due process. 30 If it turns out that Jordan Mitchell, Inc. has not waived its right to pre-deprivation notice and hearing, the district court, on remand, will have to decide whether the Bermans and their Attorneys met this standard. 31 133 In addressing these issues, we note especially some of the concerns the Supreme Court expressed in Lugar and Wyatt. In particular, we note the statement that persons asserting section 1983 claims against private parties could [be] require[d] to carry additional burdens[,] --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1834, and the statements in Lugar which warn us a too facile extension of section 1983 to private parties could obliterate the Fourteenth Amendment's limitation to state actions that deprive a person of constitutional rights and the statutory limitation of section 1983 actions to claims against persons acting under color of law. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936-37, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54. These considerations lead us to conclude good faith gives state actors a defense that depends on their subjective state of mind, rather than the more demanding objective standard of reasonable belief that governs qualified immunity. 134 Because we believe private actors are entitled to a defense of subjective good faith we also think the Pennsylvania cases that place state law limitations on the use of judgment by confession may, as we have already pointed out, sometimes be relevant on the good faith issue. 32 We think, though, these principles of state law lose force in the context of good faith because they are based on objective theories of contract. They are concerned with what a reasonable person would think his or her creditor can do. On the other hand, good faith is usually concerned with what a particular actor thinks is all right to do. Nevertheless, because of our belief that state law on confession of judgment may have some bearing on the Bermans' and Fox Rothschild's state of mind when they used Pennsylvania's procedure for judgment by confession to seize Jordan Mitchell, Inc.'s property without prior notice or hearing, we will briefly mention some of the state cases we think especially likely to bear on good faith. 135 We specifically recall Pennsylvania's strict construction of a provision authorizing judgment by confession against the creditor who invokes it. Egyptian Sands Real Estate, Inc., 294 A.2d at 803 (citing Grady v. Schiffer, 384 Pa. 302, 121 A.2d 71 (1956)). We also note again that in Pennsylvania the consent of the party authorizing confession [must] be clearly given. Id. (citing Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953)). 136 Though we believe in accord with the court of appeals in Wyatt that a good faith defense is available, we cannot say on this record that good faith indisputably appears. 33 137 Finally, we note section 1983 does not include any mens rea requirement in its text, but the Supreme Court has plainly read into it a state of mind requirement specific to the particular federal right underlying a Sec. 1983 claim. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 532, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1911, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). It is also clear that a negligent deprivation of due process will not sustain a Sec. 1983 claim. See Daniels v. William, 474 U.S. 327, 333-34, 106 S.Ct. 662, 666-67, 88 L.Ed.2d 662. (Where a government official's act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is merely negligent, 'no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required. ') (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 548, 101 S.Ct. at 1919 (Powell, J. concurring in result) (emphasis in original). In Daniels the Supreme Court stated a plaintiff who wishes to sustain a Sec. 1983 claim based upon a violation of procedural due process must, at a minimum, prove recklessness or gross negligence and in some instance may be required to show a deliberate decision to deprive the plaintiff of due process. Because this case concerns a deprivation of procedural due process recent decisions of this Court requiring a person claiming a deprivation of substantive due process to prove the defendant's act shocks the conscience may not apply. At a minimum, however, Jordan Mitchell, Inc. must prove gross negligence. Whether it must prove recklessness or some higher degree of culpability is an issue not now before us which we leave initially to the district court if the issue arises on remand. Therefore, we suggest that the district court should take care not to incorrectly place the burden of proving the defendants' mens rea on the defendants. We think the need to produce evidence and prove that both the Bermans and Fox Rothschild acted at least recklessly or with gross indifference to Jordan Mitchell, Inc.'s rights always remains on Jordan Mitchell, Inc.