Opinion ID: 1058952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Credit for Time Served in the Program

Text: We now consider whether the Court of Appeals' correctly held that the decision to grant Charles credit for the period of time he served in the Program was a matter of trial court discretion. The Court based this holding on its construction of Code § 19.2-316.2. Subsection (B)(3) of that section specifically directs the trial court not to credit time spent in the Program to parolees, but the statute is silent with regard to the treatment of such time for probationers. The Court of Appeals construed the General Assembly's silence in this regard as an affirmative election to place the crediting decision in the discretion of the trial court and concluded that, in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Charles credit for the time he served in the Program. Charles, slip op. at 9, 11. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' construction of the statute and its conclusion. Rule 1:1 and long standing case law applying that rule preclude a trial court from entering a second sentencing order altering an original sentencing order that has become final. Robertson v. Superintendent of the Wise Correctional Unit, 248 Va. 232, 236, 445 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1994); Conner v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 455, 457, 150 S.E.2d 478, 479 (1966). The policy of finality contained in Rule 1:1 is not absolute, however. The General Assembly has enacted various exceptions to this policy. See, e.g., Code § 19.2-303 (court may modify unserved portion of sentence at any time before defendant is transferred to Department of Corrections); Code § 8.01-428 (court may modify final order in certain listed circumstances). Code § 19.2-612(B)(3) provides an exception to Rule 1:1. By denying a parolee credit for time incarcerated during the Program, the General Assembly has authorized a trial court to enter a second sentencing order upon revocation of parole that extends the length of incarceration imposed by the original sentencing order. The absence of such a provision for probationers indicates that the General Assembly knew that the trial court could not enter a second sentencing order that altered a sentencing order that had become final under Rule 1:1 and did not intend to alter the application of that Rule. Waterman v. Halverson, 261 Va. 203, 207, 540 S.E.2d 867, 869 (2001) (legislature presumed to be familiar with existing rules and case law when enacting legislation). In the absence of any legislative exception to Rule 1:1, the trial court did not have the authority or the discretion to enter a second sentencing order that extended the period of incarceration beyond that imposed in Charles' October 1999 final sentencing order. See Robertson, 248 Va. at 236, 445 S.E.2d at 118. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Code § 19.2-316.2 vested the trial court with the discretion to grant or deny Charles credit for the time he served in the Program.