Opinion ID: 2508855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Suppress Admissions in Defendant's March 22 Statement

Text: In his statement to police on March 22, 1983, defendant admitted he went to the Pencin-Cimmino residence early on the morning of March 20, that he was drunk at the time, that both women answered the door, that he told them he was stranded, that he may have used their telephone, and that all he remembers after that is Debbie screaming in the carport. Defendant contends those admissions should have been suppressed as involuntary because they were induced by an implied threat of capital prosecution if he did not admit the killings and a corresponding promise of leniency if he did. We find no such improper threat or promise. In the March 22 interview, defendant readily admitted that, contrary to his previous day's statement, he was in the neighborhood of the Pencin-Cimmino residence on the morning of the crimes, but denied that he went to the townhouse or saw the victims that morning. He persisted in that denial despite long and vigorous questioning by Sacramento Sheriff's Detectives Michael Hash and Joseph Dean, who repeatedly accused him of lying, confronted him with evidence contrary to his story, and suggested that he may have gone over to the townhouse without malicious intent, just to see Debbie and get a ride home, and that he might have killed Debbie accidentally. Detective Hash warned defendant he was, by denying any involvement, digging a hole so deep that you're never gonna see your way out of it and suggested again that defendant went to see Debbie without any intent to harm her, but something happened, she started struggling, perhaps yelling, and you got her around the throat. Tried to get her to stop. She wouldn't stop. Detective Dean then began asking defendant routine booking questions, which Hash interrupted by once more suggesting that the killings may have been accidental but that if defendant did not say so, with the evidence we got, you're gonna be found guilty. Defendant argued, Even if it was an accident, it's still murder. Hash said, No, not really. The exchange continued as follows: Hash: What I'm talking about is I wanta, I want you to understand something. We're talking about a death penalty case here. Holloway: I know. Hash: No ifs, ands or buts. The truth cannot hurt you, if it's known. The longer you sit there and not say anything and you just ride with it, and you're just, you're gone. [¶] Was it an accident? Holloway: I didn't kill Deb and Diane. (Italics added.) Hash again warned defendant that with the evidence they had and were acquiring, [y]ou're biting the bull for the whole thing, but defendant once more answered, I didn't do it. The detectives then continued with the booking process, beginning their arrest report and having defendant empty his pockets. Finally, Hash made another appeal: Hash: For god's sake man, if you blacked out and you didn't realize what was happening. You lost control of your temper, whatever. . . . Holloway: What difference would that make? Hash: It makes a lot of difference. Makes a lot of difference. Difference between someone gone, going over to do something intentionally before you can get that, I'll go over and do this crime. There's a hell of a difference. [¶] . . . [¶] Hash: If that's how it was, Duane, say so. . . . Holloway: I didn't say ah . . . I did, I drank more than I said I did. (Italics added.) Defendant then went on to make the other admissions previously noted. The trial court denied defendant's suppression motion regarding the challenged admissions in his March 22 statement, finding the statement voluntary: Defendant made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent Miranda Waiver before questioning began. [¶] Although the questioning was extended, it does not appear to the Court from listening to the tape that any psychological impact on defendant was such as to overbear his will to resist. . . . [¶] Defendant sounded relaxed and cooperative. The questioning was not overly aggressive or accusatory. [¶] Again, it appears that defendant was attempting to use the interview as much as the officers. [5] The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 15, of the state Constitution bar the prosecution from using a defendant's involuntary confession. [Citation.] [These provisions] require[ ] the prosecution to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's confession was voluntary. . . . [¶] Under both state and federal law, courts apply a `totality of circumstances' test to determine the voluntariness of a confession. . . . On appeal, the trial court's findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but the trial court's finding as to the voluntariness of the confession is subject to independent review. [Citations.] In determining whether a confession was voluntary, `[t]he question is whether defendant's choice to confess was not essentially free because his will was overborne.' ( People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29.) Here, there is no dispute as to the historical facts, no claim of physical intimidation or deprivation, and no assertion of coercive tactics other than the contents of the interrogation itself. [6] When detained at his house, defendant was in the process of seeking out the detectives. Aware his alibi had collapsed, he wanted to tell the detectives why he had asked Cruz to lie about his whereabouts. Before being interviewed, defendant was fully advised of his rights and voluntarily waived them; at no point in the challenged portion of the interview did he indicate any reluctance to cooperate with the investigation or any desire to end the interview. The only question, which this court must answer independently, is whether the detectives' mention of a possible death penalty and suggestions that defendant would benefit from giving a truthful, mitigated version of the crimes  passages italicized in the transcript quotes reproduced above  constituted implied threats and promises of leniency sufficient to render the subsequent admissions involuntary. It is well settled that a confession is involuntary and therefore inadmissible if it was elicited by any promise of benefit or leniency whether express or implied. [Citations.] However, mere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary. . . . Thus, `[w]hen the benefit pointed out by the police to a suspect is merely that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct,' the subsequent statement will not be considered involuntarily made. [Citation.] On the other hand, `if . . . the defendant is given to understand that he might reasonably expect benefits in the nature of more lenient treatment at the hands of the police, prosecution or court in consideration of making a statement, even a truthful one, such motivation is deemed to render the statement involuntary and inadmissible. . . .' ( People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 611-612, 147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672, overruled on other grounds in People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 510, fn. 17, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037.) Once a suspect has been properly advised of his rights, he may be questioned freely so long as the questioner does not threaten harm or falsely promise benefits. Questioning may include exchanges of information, summaries of evidence, outline of theories of events, confrontation with contradictory facts, even debate between police and suspect. . . . Yet in carrying out their interrogations the police must avoid threats of punishment for the suspect's failure to admit or confess particular facts and must avoid false promises of leniency as a reward for admission or confession. . . . [The police] are authorized to interview suspects who have been advised of their rights, but they must conduct the interview without the undue pressure that amounts to coercion and without the dishonesty and trickery that amounts to false promise. ( People v. Andersen (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 576, 161 Cal.Rptr. 707.) We conclude the detectives in this case did not cross the line from proper exhortations to tell the truth into impermissible threats of punishment or promises of leniency. In telling defendant that [w]e're talking about a death penalty case here, Detective Hash said nothing beyond the obvious, for the crime  the murder of two young women, in their home, with signs of sexual assault  was a clear candidate for capital prosecution. This was not news to defendant, who responded, I know. As we have explained, moreover, a confession will not be invalidated simply because the possibility of a death sentence was discussed beforehand ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 340, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846), but only where the confession results directly from the threat such punishment will be imposed if the suspect is uncooperative, coupled with a promise [of] leniency in exchange for the suspect's cooperation ( ibid. ). Hash's further suggestions that the killings might have been accidental or resulted from an uncontrollable fit of rage during a drunken blackout, and that such circumstances could make[ ] a lot of difference, fall far short of being promises of lenient treatment in exchange for cooperation. The detectives did not represent that they, the prosecutor or the court would grant defendant any particular benefit if he told them how the killings happened. To the extent Hash's remarks implied that giving an account involving blackout or accident might help defendant avoid the death penalty, he did no more than tell defendant the benefit that might `flow[ ] naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct' ( People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 612, 147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672), for such circumstances can reduce the degree of a homicide or, at the least, serve as arguments for mitigation in the penalty decision. As the appellate court explained in People v. Andersen, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at page 583, 161 Cal.Rptr. 707, Homicide does possess degrees of culpability, and when evidence of guilt is strong, confession and avoidance is a better defense tactic than denial. Defendant began the March 22 interview with the intent merely of explaining why he had asked Cruz to provide him with a false alibi. In the course of their interview, the detectives made defendant aware of some of the evidence they possessed against him, particularly fingerprints indicating defendant's recent use of a telephone in the townhouse and recent presence in Debbie Cimmino's car. By beginning the booking process, they also made clear to defendant that his complete denial would not save him from arrest and probable prosecution for the killings. At that point, defendant made limited admissions to his presence at the scene at the time of the crimes, while laying the groundwork for a possible claim of mitigation based on intoxication. As the trial court remarked, it appears that defendant was attempting to use the interview as much as the officers. The interview in this case is better characterized as a dialogue or debate between suspect and police in which the police commented on the realities of [his] position and the courses of conduct open to [him] ( People v. Andersen, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 583, 161 Cal.Rptr. 707) than as a coercive interrogation. The decisions upon which defendant principally relies, People v. McClary (1977) 20 Cal.3d 218, 142 Cal.Rptr. 163, 571 P.2d 620 (overruled on other grounds in People v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 510, fn. 17, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037), People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 469, 74 Cal.Rptr. 889, 450 P.2d 265, and People v. Cahill (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, are all distinguishable factually: In People v. McClary , the officers ignored repeated requests from the 16-year-old suspect for assistance of counsel, falsely told her she would face the death penalty unless she changed her statement, and strongly implied she would be charged only as an accessory if she admitted mere `knowledge' of the murder. ( People v. McClary, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 229, 142 Cal.Rptr. 163, 571 P.2d 620.) Here, we have no such insistent overriding of a defendant's invocation of rights, no false representation regarding the death penalty, and no promise of a particular charge or other particular lenient treatment in exchange for cooperation. In People v. Johnson, the defendant was advised by one interrogator that any information he gave would only be an investigative aid and was not admissible in court; another interviewer neglected to include the right to remain silent in his advisements, the defendant was never asked if he waived the right to counsel, and the record did not contain an affirmative showing he agreed to waive any of his rights. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 474, 74 Cal.Rptr. 889, 450 P.2d 265.) No such circumstances are present in this case. At the outset of the taped interview, defendant was fully advised of, and expressly waived, his rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. Finally, in People v. Cahill, the interrogator gave the defendant a detailed but materially deceptive ( People v. Cahill, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 315, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 1) account of the law of homicide. In particular, the detective led the defendant to believe he could avoid a first degree murder charge, in a burglary-murder case, by admitting to an unpremeditated role in the killing. ( Id. at pp. 306, 314-315, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.) Here, the detectives gave defendant no such misleading assurances. No specific benefit in terms of lesser charges was promised or even discussed, and Hash's general assertion that the circumstances of a killing could make[ ] a lot of difference to the punishment, while perhaps optimistic, was not materially deceptive. The line can be a fine one ( People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 169, 266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857) between urging a suspect to tell the truth by factually outlining the benefits that may flow from confessing, which is permissible, and impliedly promising lenient treatment in exchange for a confession, which is not. But considering all the circumstances of this case, we do not believe the detectives crossed that line by mentioning a possible capital charge or suggesting that defendant might benefit in an unspecified manner from giving a truthful, mitigated account of events.