Opinion ID: 777205
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Support for a Conviction for Conspiracy to Distribute Marijuana

Text: 28 In both Orozco-Prada and Barnes we held that the district court was required to sentence the defendant under the statutory provision carrying the most lenient sentence for which there was sufficient evidence supporting conviction. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1083; Barnes, 158 F.3d at 668. Thus, we must determine whether sufficient evidence was presented at Zillgitt's trial to support a guilty verdict on the basis of his involvement in a marijuana conspiracy. 29 At Zillgitt's trial, one witness testified to buying marijuana from Zillgitt on one or two occasions. A second witness, who had served as a confidential informant, testified that he purchased marijuana from Zillgitt on a number of occasions, from around 1983 until 1990, thereby demonstrating a course of dealing in marijuana spanning a number of years. The same witness further testified that around 1988 or 1989 he began purchasing quarter-pound quantities of marijuana from Zillgitt. 30 Additionally, the government introduced into evidence a cassette tape on which was recorded separate cocaine and marijuana transactions between the confidential informant and a co-defendant also found guilty under Count One. The government also produced a plastic baggy containing a sample of marijuana for identification by a special agent during his testimony. The evidence here supporting a marijuana conspiracy is a far cry from that offered in Barnes, which we found, based on our review of the record, to consist solely of a small amount of suspected marijuana seized at the [gang's] headquarters ... which other evidence indicated the defendant sometimes visited. 158 F.3d at 668. We conclude here that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which the jury could have found that Zillgitt conspired to distribute marijuana. 31 In assessing the possibility that a jury may have convicted Zillgitt of a marijuana conspiracy, we also examine the language of the government's summation and the district court's charge to the jury. See id. at 671; United States v. Nicholson, 231 F.3d 445, 454 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994). In its closing arguments, the government summarized the marijuana-related testimony offered against Zillgitt. The prosecutor also told the jury that 32 I am confident that you will ... find the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that these defendants entered in a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute marijuana and cocaine. That they possessed with intent to distribute and distributed cocaine on March 18th, March 24th and April 13th of 1993. And that they possessed with intent to distribute and in fact distributed a quantity of marijuana on April 13th, 1993, as charged. 33 Thus, the government persisted in arguing to the jury that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant participated, at a minimum, in a conspiracy involving marijuana. Moreover, during oral argument on this appeal, the government stated repeatedly that it had presented sufficient evidence supporting conviction for a marijuana conspiracy. 34 The district court's charge to the jury lends further support to our conclusion that the guilty verdict could conceivably have been reached by the jury's finding that Zillgitt participated in a marijuana conspiracy. The court instructed the jury that 35 to prove its charge of conspiracy, the government must prove that a defendant and at least one other person knowingly and deliberately arrived at some type of agreement or understanding that they, and perhaps others, would distribute or possess a controlled substance — that is the cocaine or marijuana — with the attempt [sic] to distribute it by means of a common plan or course of action. 36 (Emphasis added.) 37 In clarifying the elements required for a conviction for conspiracy, the court stated that 38 a defendant may be shown to be part of a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and marijuana without having actually possessed or distributed cocaine and marijuana. The government is therefore not required to prove that a defendant actually possessed with the intent to distribute or distributed cocaine or marijuana in order to establish his guilt as to Count One. 39 (Emphasis added.) 40 The district court's sometimes use of the disjunctive (marijuana or cocaine) leaves open the possibility that the jury may have convicted Zillgitt of a conspiracy to distribute only marijuana. See Garcia, 37 F.3d at 1370; Newman v. United States, 817 F.2d 635, 638 (10th Cir.1987). That the indictment here is phrased in the conjunctive (cocaine and marijuana), does not clarify the ambiguity of the jury's verdict. See id. at 639 (holding that, despite the indictment's conjunctive language, the district court's instructions could have led the jury to convict for conspiracy involving a drug carrying a more lenient sentence). 41 Based on our review of the record — including the evidence presented at trial, the government's summation, and the charge to the jury — coupled with the government's insistence at oral argument that there was sufficient evidence on which to convict Zillgitt of a conspiracy to distribute marijuana, we conclude that a jury could have convicted Zillgitt for conspiring to distribute marijuana. Thus, in light of the general verdict, the district court erred under the rule of Orozco-Prada in sentencing Zillgitt to a term of imprisonment exceeding the sixty-month statutory maximum permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). II Plain Error Review 42 We review Zillgitt's challenge to his sentence for plain error since he failed to raise this objection below. See United States v. Miller, 263 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir.2001) (reviewing sentencing errors first raised on appeal for plain error); United States v. Robie, 166 F.3d 444, 455 (2d Cir.1999) (same); United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 675-76 (2d Cir.1998) (same). Although we have not previously had occasion to review for plain error this precise sentencing challenge, we find, as have our sister circuits, that it is subject to plain error review. See United States v. Dale, 178 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 574, 577 (5th Cir.1994); Newman, 817 F.2d at 637 n. 1. 43 We analyze a claim for plain error under the four-pronged test set forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). See United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 667 (2d Cir.2001) (en banc). 44 [B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 45 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). 46 A. Error 47 The indictment charged Zillgitt with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute a quantity of cocaine and a quantity of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The rule announced in Orozco-Prada requires that under a general verdict convicting a defendant on a single count of conspiracy involving multiple controlled substances, the district court must sentence the defendant as if convicted of a conspiracy involving only the drug that carries the lowest statutory sentencing range. 732 F.2d 1076, 1083. 48 For the reasons discussed above, the court was required to sentence Zillgitt under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), the statutory provision applicable to a conspiracy involving an indeterminate amount of marijuana, which carries a sixty-month statutory maximum sentence. Instead, the court sentenced Zillgitt to a term of imprisonment exceeding that statutory maximum. Thus, the sentence imposed by the district court was erroneous, and the first prong of Olano is satisfied. 49 B. Error That Is Plain 50 The second prong of Olano is also satisfied. An error is plain if it deviates from an established rule that is clear or obvious either at the time of trial or at the time of appellate review. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; Thomas, 274 F.3d at 666. Our 1984 holding in Orozco-Prada was well established at the time of Zillgitt's trial and has been reiterated in opinions of this Court on numerous occasions prior to this appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Moreno, 181 F.3d 206, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Bravo, 10 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Underwood, 932 F.2d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir.1991). The district court's sentencing error was therefore plain. 51 C. Error That Affects Substantial Rights 52 An error affects substantial rights if it was prejudicial, meaning that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. Id. Zillgitt was sentenced to 109 months' imprisonment, rather than a term not exceeding the 60 month statutory maximum sentence for a marijuana-only conspiracy. Thus, the sentencing error increased Zillgitt's term of imprisonment by more than 80 percent of the maximum sentence he would have received in the absence of that error. We find this result prejudicial. See Thomas, 274 F.3d at 666 (It is beyond cavil that imprisonment for an additional 52 months beyond the penalty authorized by Congress, ... constitutes prejudice.); see also Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1061 (holding that significant increase in sentence constitutes plain error, thereby implicitly affecting the defendant's substantial rights); Dale, 178 F.3d at 434 (same); Newman, 817 F.2d at 637 n. 3 (same). Moreover, we have recently held that [i]f the error is a sentencing error, the prejudice is clear. Guevara, 277 F.3d at 124. We conclude that the plain error here affected Zillgitt's substantial rights, and Olano 's third prong is satisfied. 53 The government argues in its brief that Zillgitt's sentence was not prejudicial, and thus did not affect his substantial rights, in light of the overwhelming evidence of his involvement in a cocaine conspiracy. Based on our review of the portions of the record submitted on this appeal, we do not disagree that more, even significantly more, of the evidence presented to show the drug conspiracy related to cocaine transactions than it did to marijuana transactions. We nonetheless find the government's argument unavailing for a number of reasons. 54 First, in neither Orozco-Prada nor Barnes did we undertake a weighing of the evidence. Rather, we acknowledged that there was evidence sufficient to sustain convictions punishable under the provisions carrying the higher penalties. See Barnes, 158 F.3d at 670; Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1083. In Orozco-Prada we cited with approval the D.C. Circuit's decision in Brown v. United States, 299 F.2d 438 (D.C.Cir.1962), noting that [i]n that case ... the court found that the record contained evidence from which a jury could have concluded that the statutes with the higher penalty had been violated but nonetheless refused to affirm the district court. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1083-84. 55 In Quicksey, another case on which our decision in Orozco-Prada relied, the Fourth Circuit did not disagree with the government's assertion that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction carrying a higher penalty, but the panel nonetheless found the defendants' sentence improper. 525 F.2d at 340-41. We conclude that the relevant question is not whether there was sufficient evidence supporting a conviction for a cocaine conspiracy, but rather whether there was sufficient evidence supporting conviction for a marijuana conspiracy. 56 Second, the cases cited by the government in support of this argument are inapposite. In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), the case upon which the government principally relies, the petitioner argued, based on an intervening Supreme Court decision, that the element of materiality in a tax fraud charge must be determined by the jury rather than the judge, as had happened in Neder. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), also cited here by the government, involved precisely the same issue. In both Neder and Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the failure to submit the element of materiality to the jury did not affect the appellants' substantial rights in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting that omitted element. Neder, 527 U.S. at 16, 119 S.Ct. 1827; Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544. In those cases, however, the petitioners were challenging the validity of their convictions and asking the Court to reverse guilty verdicts supported by overwhelming and uncontested evidence demonstrating materiality, because the district court, rather than the jury, determined this element of the crime charged. In contrast, Zillgitt is not contesting the jury's verdict. 57 The problem here, unlike in Neder and Johnson, is that while the jury clearly found Zillgitt guilty beyond a reasonable of conspiring to distribute drugs, it rendered an ambiguous verdict for sentencing purposes. Thus, while the evidence proffered may also support a conviction for a cocaine conspiracy, we cannot tell, in the absence of a special verdict, whether the jury ever made that determination. In other words, the general verdict leaves open the possibility that the jury may have convicted Zillgitt on the basis of the evidence supporting a marijuana conspiracy without ever reaching a conclusion as to, or perhaps even considering, his involvement in a cocaine-only or a cocaine and marijuana conspiracy. See Barnes, 158 F.3d at 671. That is a distinction with a significant difference. The jury verdicts in Neder and Johnson were unambiguous. Those cases did not present the problem that the verdict... provide[d] no guidance in determining which statutorily mandated sentence [was] applicable. Id. 58 Finally, we agree with the Tenth Circuit that it is [in]appropriate for an appellate court to weigh the evidence in the jury's stead. Newman, 817 F.2d at 639. This is based on the fundamental principle that [a] defendant may assuredly insist upon observance of [the constitutional right to a jury trial] even when the evidence against him is so overwhelming as to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 268, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, even assuming there was more than enough evidence supporting a conspiracy involving cocaine, we find that the district court's sentencing error affected Zillgitt's substantial rights.