Opinion ID: 877415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sandstrom-type instructions

Text: Although the Sandstrom-type instruction issue has been previously litigated, McKenzie's contention in this appeal is that in the manner we have applied the harmless error rule to the instructions, we have denied him equal protection of the laws. He says we have chosen a standard of harmless error to apply to him that we have never applied to any other defendant. To that I must agree. Not only did the majority in McKenzie I11 adopt a harmless error test that should never be applied to instructions, but it is true that we have never applied that test to any other defendant. That, call it by whatever other name you like, is a denial of equal protection of the laws. Intent was an issue at the trial of this case. In Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, the United States Supreme Court held that an instruction stating that a person is presumed to intend the consequences of his voluntary act is unconstitutional because it shifts the burden to the defendant on an essential element of the crime--intent. The Supreme Court remanded Sandstrom to this Court to determine whether the unconstitutional instruction may have been harmless. We promptly ruled that the error was not harmless, and that Sandstrom was entitled to a new trial because we could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that the instruction had no effect on the jury's decision. State v. Sandstrom (1979), - Mont . -, 603 P.2d 244, 35 St. Rep. 744. -84- Although the United States Supreme Court decided the issue in Sandstrom, the issue had been raised by McKenzie at his trial in January 1975 and in all of his appeals since then. It just so happened that because of the procedural morass that the McKenzie case has been involved in, the United States Supreme Court first directly decided the constitutionality of the instruction Sandstrom. After the Sandstrom decision, the United States Supreme Court (even though McKenzie had raised many meritorious constitutional issues other than the Sandstrom instruction issue) remanded the McKenzie case back to this Court to determine whether the Sandstrom-type instructions given at the McKenzie trial were harmless error. Oddly enough, only one unconstitutional instruction was given in the Sandstrom case. But in the McKenzie case eight of these unconstitutional jury instructions were given to the jury. Notwithstanding this situation, this Court, in deciding McKenzie 111, held that the unconstitutional instructions were harmless error because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. State v. McKenzie (1980), Mont . - 608 P.2d , at 457, cert.den. - U.S. , 101 S.Ct. 626, 66 L.Ed.2d 507 (1980). In my dissent to McKenzie 111, I concluded that the eight unconstitutional instructions could not be harmless error. Intent was an issue in the case and McKenzie presented evidence that he did not have the required mental state to issue in the case, it cannot be stated beyond a reasonable doubt that eight unconstitutional instructions stacing that a person is presumed to intend the consequences of his voluntary act are harmless error. I further stated that the overwhelming evidence test for harmless error cannot legitimately apply to jury instructions which have been declared unconstitutional. And finally, I pointed out that on previous occasions, in assessing the impact of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instruction, we had never applied the overwhelming evidence test. After our decision in McKenzie 111, McKenzie then for the third time petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari--raising many important constitutional issues that this Court erroneously decided. Without comment, a majority of the members of the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari, stating only that [tlhe petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. But Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. In an opinion stating why they would grant certiorari, they strongly criticized this Court for the way we had treated the McKenzie case. 449 U.S. 1050, 1056, 101 S.Ct. 626, 630, 66 L.Ed.2d 507, 510. In particular, they were highly critical of the method by which this Court had decided the Sandstrom issue. In stating why certiorari should be granted on the Sandstrom issue, the dissent stated: . .. A state court's analysis of harmless error in a typical case may not present a question worthy of full review by this Court, yet, where, as here, the death penalty is the result, close scrutiny is required. Because I find the court's analysis of harmless error lacking of even-handed treatment, I dissent from this Court's denial of certiorari. 4 4 9 U.S. at 1051. In describing the effect of this Court's use of this erroneous overwhelming evidence harmless error test as applied to unconstitutional jury instructions, the dissent stated: The result [reached by the Montana Court] was perhaps inevitable once the state court selected the 'overwhelming evidence' of guilt standard to analyze whether the constitutional error was harmless. For whatever value that standard may have in reviewing a verdict following introduction of evidence in violation of con- stitutional guarantees, see, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), use of t h e standard actually precludes effective review of the prejudicial impact of unconstitutional jury instructions. Where isolated, tainted evidence is at issue, the reviewing court may exclude that evidence from its assessment of whether the remaining evidence supports the conviction. But where the constitutional error occurred in the jury instructions, no isolated portion of the record can be eliminated from the judicial assessment. Nor can the effect of the instructions be evaluated by examining the evidence alone, and ignoring the unconstitutional instructions. For the precise issue in such cases is the manner in which the jury could have assessed the evidence as a whole, not the importance of any particular piece of evidence to sustain the verdict. In selecting the 'overwhelming evidence' standard on the theory that 'an appellate court should review the case as a whole in assessing harmless or prejudicial error, ' Mont. at , 608 P.2d at 458, the state court neglected to review the possible effect of the unconstitutional instructions on the jury's verdict. (Emphasis added.) 449 U.S. at 1054. The dissent then described how this Court had selectively treated the McKenzie case in applying the overwhelming evidence test to the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions, and then summed up its criticism of this Court's majority opinion in McKenzie 111: It appears that only in petitioner's case is the Montana court unwilling to apply this analysis. This seems to be yet another case in which a court sanctions 'egregious violations of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants by blandly reciting the formula 'harmless error.' Briggs v. Connecticut, 447 U.S. 912, 915 (1980), (MARSHAEL BRENNAN, JJ., dissenting). However and unpleasant the facts of this or other cases may be, the courts are obligated to protect the constitutional rights of the defendant. Due to concern that petitioner's rights have not been preserved, this Court has already remanded this case twice. I can understand the Court's reluctance to entertain this case yet again, for we presume that lower courts adhere to the purposes of remands from this Court. Yet the Montana court has failed to fulfill its obligation to carry out the mandate of our decisions. Therefore, I would grant certiorari and set the case for plenary consideration. 449 U.S. at 1056-7. , The message of this dissent is crystal clear. This Court adopted an erroneous standard of harmless error in deciding the impact of the Sandstrom-type instructions. And this Court denied McKenzie equal protection of the laws by selecting him as the only recipient of the overwhelming evidence test as applied to unconstitutional instructions. It is in the light of how this Court applied the harmless error analysis to one unconstitutional instruction in other cases, and how this Court then applied the harmless error analysis to eight unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions in his case, that McKenzie now claims this Court has denied him equal protection of the law. McKenzie bases his equal protection argument on precisely