Opinion ID: 167994
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A dm ission of M r. Stang’s Testim ony

Text: W e review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. W e “will not disturb a trial court’s decision unless we ‘have a definite and firm conviction that the [trial] court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.’” United States v. Talamante, 981 F.2d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986)). Union Pacific argued, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403, that the district court should not admit M r. Stang’s testimony because it was irrelevant and likely to mislead the jury. The district court denied this motion, and M r. Stang testified, as recounted above. On appeal, Union Pacific renews its relevancy arguments under Rules 401 and 403, primarily contending that M r. Stang’s earning history did not tend to prove what M r. Chaffin could have earned in the future because the two conductors were not similarly situated, citing Plourd v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 513 P.2d 1140 (Or. 1973) (Plourd I), for support. M r. Chaffin argues that he and M r. Stang were similarly situated, that 9 the jury knew of all relevant differences between the two, and that the Oregon Supreme Court’s rehearing of Plourd I supports the district court’s decision to admit M r. Stang’s testimony. See Plourd v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 534 P.2d 965 (Or. 1975) (Plourd II) (concluding that the plaintiff laid a proper foundation for a co-w orker’s testimony because the plaintiff offered additional evidence to explain discrepancies between their earnings histories). Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides, in relevant part, that “‘[r]elevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” F ED . R. E VID . 401. “Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” Id. 402. Although neither Plourd I or Plourd II is a case from this circuit interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, we nonetheless find that these cases provide a helpful framew ork to determine whether M r. Stang’s testimony “has sufficient probative value so as to be properly admissible.” Plourd I, 513 P.2d at 1148. The Plourd cases concerned an injured railroad employee’s attempt to prove his future earnings capacity by using the testimony of another railroad employee. Plourd I initially held that a trial judge erred by admitting the testimony of the other employee because the plaintiff demonstrated earning capacity was less than the other employee, but he provided no explanation for the 10 discrepancies between the other employee’s earnings and his own. This allowed the jury “to assume that in the future plaintiff will earn as much as the other workman. This is not a valid assumption in the face of proof of what they actually earned and in the absence of proof why plaintiff in the past had been earning less.” Id. at 1150-1151 (Holman, J., concurring in the result). The Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. On remand, the plaintiff again submitted evidence of other employees’ earnings to support his claim of lost future earning capacity. The other employees were all employed by the same division of the railroad company and of similar seniority. The plaintiff explained that the other employees earned more than he because he was responsible for raising his children after a divorce, but that after his children were raised, he intended to seek promotions and extra shifts. Plourd II, 534 P.2d at 968. Thus, the court found that the additional information caused the testimony to meet the standard for admissibility: “evidence of earnings of other employees is admissible upon the issue of impairment of future earning capacity if there is a substantial similarity in the circumstances.” Id. “[I]n this case, the differences in the circumstances of the plaintiff and of other such employees are matters which go to the weight to be given to such evidence by the jury, rather than to bar the admissibility of such evidence.” Id. at 969. The district court relied on the Plourd cases and decided that “some 11 differences did exist between Stang’s circumstances and those of the plaintiff. However, these differences clearly fell within matters which affect the weight they are to be given by the jury; they did not require Stang’s testimony to be excluded.” App. vol. II, at 254 (D ist. Ct. Order, dated July 22, 2004). W e hold that the district court was w ithin its discretion to admit M r. Stang’s testimony. M r. Chaffin submitted testimony that both he and M r. Stang had begun working for Union Pacific in 1979; were comparable in seniority; and had sufficient seniority to take the highest paying extra boards. M r. Chaffin also offered evidence regarding the differences between himself and M r. Stang – M r. Chaffin took days off in order to help raise his children, whereas M r. Stang worked every available day he could. M r. Chaffin told the jury that he had planned to w ork more once his children were raised. These similarities are sufficient to make testimony regarding M r. Stang’s earnings probative of what M r. C haffin would have earned had he continued to work. Union Pacific also argues on appeal that even if the testimony was relevant, it should nonetheless have been excluded because its probative value was outweighed by the “danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” F ED . R. E VID . 403. W e disagree. Although we accept that there is some danger of confusion to the jury when another person’s wages and experience are used to show what the plaintiff could have earned, the danger is 12 minimal when the jury hears evidence regarding not only the similarities between the witness and the plaintiff, but also their differences. Counsel for both parties clearly highlighted the differences between M r. Stang and M r. Chaffin, and the jury had the opportunity to evaluate those differences in calculating its award of damages, and therefore, the danger of prejudice and confusion was minimal. W e therefore hold that the district court properly admitted M r. Stang’s testimony over Union Pacific’s objections. B. M otion for a N ew T rial and Ju dgm ent as a M atter of L aw W e next consider Union Pacific’s M otion for a New Trial and Judgment as a M atter of Law, which presented two arguments before the district court: first, that M r. Chaffin had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove U nion Pacific’s negligence caused his injuries; and second, that M r. Chaffin failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claim for future lost w ages. Union Pacific renews both these arguments on appeal. 1 1 M r. Chaffin argued in his response brief in this appeal that Union Pacific failed to preserve these issues because its brief before the district court only challenged whether M r. Chaffin proved his injuries were foreseeable (not whether M r. Chaffin proved negligence, causation, and lost future w ages). M r. Chaffin’s position overlooks the oral motion for judgment as a matter of law that Union Pacific made at the close of M r. Chaffin’s evidence. See Rec. vol. IV, at 663668. The oral motion, in combination with the written brief, are sufficient to preserve Union Pacific’s arguments. See Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 993 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993). M r. Chaffin also contends that Union Pacific waived any appellate argument regarding (continued...) 13 W e review the district court’s denial of Union Pacific’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Escue v. N. Okla. College, 450 F.3d 1146, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006). “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the nonmoving party.” Id. W e review the district court’s denial of Union Pacific’s motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Snyder, 354 F.3d at 1187-88. The jury verdict must be upheld unless it is “clearly, decidedly, or overw helmingly” against the weight of the evidence. Weese v. Shuckman, 98 F.3d 542, 550 (10th Cir. 1996). W e “consider[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Snyder, 354 F.3d at 1187.
M r. Chaffin brought suit under FELA, which imposes liability on a railroad company when its negligence, or that of its employees or agents, results in injury to an employee. 45 U.S.C. § 51. “[T]he existence of negligence under FELA is a federal question which generally turns on principles of common law.” Smith v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 236 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2000). Those common law 1 (...continued) foreseeability because it did not discuss the issue in its opening brief on appeal. M r. C haffin is simply incorrect on this point. See Aplt’s Br. at 29-31. 14 elements “includ[e] duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation.” Williams v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 161 F.3d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1998). Union Pacific’s brief on appeal challenges each of these elements. W e conclude that M r. C haffin presented sufficient evidence under each element.
The district court instructed the jury that it had to find that Union Pacific breached at least one of the following duties: the provision of (1) reasonably safe conditions to work; (2) adequate assistance while working; (3) adequate tools and equipment; and (4) reasonably safe methods for working. App. vol. II, at 215 (Jury Instruction no. 13). Keeping in mind that because of FELA’s comparative negligence provision, see Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1994), an employer’s negligence need not have been the sole cause of injury, our review of the record shows that M r. Chaffin presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude, at least, that Union Pacific (1) failed to provide reasonably safe working conditions and (2) also failed to provide him with adequate assistance while cleaning the switches. See Rogers v. M o. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 513 (1957) (explaining that FELA requires a case be submitted to a jury when “the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for w hich damages are sought”). 15 W ith respect to breaching the duty to provide M r. Chaffin with adequate assistance, the evidence shows that M r. Forsythe failed to notify BN SF maintenance crews that M r. Chaffin’s train w as arriving, and thus they were unable to assist M r. Chaffin in clearing the ice and snow from the switches. Additionally, M r. Forsythe had told M r. Chaffin that he would send a van to transport M r. Chaffin around the train yard, or to take him somew here to w arm himself. M r. Chaffin, in reliance on this representation, proceeded down the track farther away from the train depot where he could have sought shelter from the elements when his foot began to numb. Regarding Union Pacific’s breach of the duty to provide reasonably safe working conditions, we acknowledge that the railroad cannot control weather conditions and that its employees are expected to work in adverse weather. However, M r. Chaffin identified numerous exacerbating factors that would allow a jury to infer that Union Pacific breached its duty to provide reasonably safe working conditions: the switches were not cleared of ice and snow by a maintenance crew as a result of M r. Forsythe’s failure to notify BNSF that M r. Chaffin’s train had arrived; M r. Forsythe changed M r. Chaffin’s assignment to a more lengthy, complicated one that involved cleaning multiple switches, despite the weather conditions; and M r. Forsythe did not deliver on his promise to quickly provide a van to transport M r. Chaffin between the switches. A reasonable jury 16 could have inferred that M r. Forsythe knew or should have known that having a BNSF maintenance crew clean the switches, or at least providing a warm mode of transportation for M r. Chaffin while he cleaned them, were necessary to ensuring that M r. Chaffin worked in reasonably safe conditions.
Union Pacific also argues that even if it breached any duty, its negligence was legally insufficient, or perhaps was “in the [frigid] air,” Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 341 (N.Y. 1928) (internal quotation marks omitted), and that it could not have foreseen that such a breach would lead to M r. Chaffin slipping and hurting his foot. It contends that M r. Chaffin’s argument depends on showing “that his foot injury – as opposed to the frostbite injury – was caused by the railroad’s negligence . . . .” Aplt’s Br. at 29. This position ignores the medical evidence submitted during the trial that M r. Chaffin’s slip outside was likely a result of the numbness in his foot caused by his exposure to the elements. Rec. vol. V, at 792-93. It also ignores FELA precedent, which clarifies that the railroad need not have foreseen the specific harm that resulted from its negligence to be held liable. Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 117-120 (“[R]easonable foreseeablility of harm is an essential ingredient of Federal Employers’ Liability Act negligence. . . . [F]or a defendant to be liable for consequential damages he need not foresee the particular consequences of his 17 negligent acts: assuming the existence of a threshold tort against the person, then whatever damages flow from it are recoverable.”). It was proper to submit the case to the jury on these facts, since the jury could have inferred that M r. Forsythe should have known that M r. Chaffin was in distress from his repeated calls, or should have foreseen from the severe weather conditions alone that an injury, such as frostbite (w hich in turn caused him to fall and injure his foot) might result from exposure to the elements.
Finally, Union Pacific contends that M r. Chaffin failed to present any evidence that his foot injury was caused by Union Pacific’s negligence, arguing that he offered no evidence about what caused the slip that, in turn, caused the debilitating injury. This is without basis, as M r. Chaffin presented testimony from his doctor, who explained that M r. Chaffin’s fall caused a twisting or inversion injury to his foot, and that if a person’s foot goes numb, as happens with exposure to extreme w eather conditions, an inversion injury is likely. There was ample evidence for the jury to find that the foot injury was caused by M r. Chaffin’s negligent exposure to the elements. W e conclude that M r. Chaffin presented sufficient evidence on each element of his FELA negligence claim to submit his case to the jury. Therefore the district court properly denied Union Pacific’s M otion for a New Trial or 18 Judgment as a M atter of Law.
W e next consider Union Pacific’s argument that M r. Chaffin presented insufficient evidence on his lost future wages claim. W e have explained that FELA entitles a claimant “to the difference between what he was able to earn prior to his injury and what he . . . could have earned thereafter.” Tayler v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 438 F.2d 351, 354 (10th Cir. 1971). Union Pacific contends that M r. Chaffin is not entitled to any lost future wages because he did not present sufficient evidence of what he earned prior to the injury. Specifically, Union Pacific points to the fact that he did not submit W -2s or testify as to the exact amount of his wages prior to the accident. Because of this lack of evidence, Union Pacific argues that the jury could not accurately calculate the extent of M r. Chaffin’s diminished earnings capacity. Union Pacific’s contention ignores that one of its own representatives testified at trial that conductors like M r. Chaffin earn $75,000 to $80,000 each year. W e acknowledge that W -2s or other evidence of actual past w ages w ould have certainly assisted the jury in coming to a determination about what M r. Chaffin would have earned but for the injury. For the years 1999 to 2003, however, when M r. Chaffin was still attempting to work at the railroad, he detailed the specific amount of money that he lost after taking time off because of 19 his injury. Rec. vol. IV, at 573. Additionally, the record makes clear that M r. Chaffin’s earnings history may not have been particularly relevant to what he would have earned but for his injury. M r. Stang testified that the earnings of all conductors had increased in the past few years. Rec. vol. III, at 476. Finally, it was within the jury’s discretion to discount the ranges of conductors’ earnings M r. Stang provided, depending upon whether they credited M r. Chaffin’s testimony that he had planned to work as much as M r. Stang once he finished raising his children. Our review of the record shows that M r. Chaffin presented sufficient evidence for the district court to submit his lost future earnings claim to the jury. C. Jury Instructions on L ost Future W ages Union Pacific’s final argument on appeal is that the district court erred by giving Instruction 23 to the jury, permitting them to aw ard damages based on M r. Chaffin’s lost future wages. “[W]e review the district court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion and consider the instructions as a whole de novo to determine whether they accurately informed the jury of the governing law.” United Stats v. Platte, 401 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Union Pacific objected to Instruction 23, particularly paragraph three, which allowed the jury to consider M r. Chaffin’s lost future wages claim. Union 20 Pacific concedes in its opening brief that this argument is a “corollary to its challenge to the sufficiency of Chaffin’s claim for future lost wages.” A plt’s Br. at 44, 46. Because we held that M r. Chaffin presented “sufficient competent evidence” to prove his lost future w ages claim, we hold that the district court properly instructed the jury on this element of damages as well. Perlmutter v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 4 F.3d 864, 872 (10th Cir. 1993); see Allen v. Wal-M art Stores, 241 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 2001) (“A party is entitled to an instruction on their theory of the case so long as the instruction is supported by competent evidence on the issue or theory supporting the instruction.”) (citing Perlmutter, 4 F.3d at 871).