Opinion ID: 153281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of Detention Following Initial Stop:

Text: 34 As the Supreme Court has stated, an investigative detention must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see also United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034, 1038-39 (10th Cir.1996). In this case, Mr. McRae's vehicle was initially stopped because of equipment violations. 35 We have previously stated the parameters of permissible activity during a routine traffic stop: 36  'An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning.'  37 United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988), overruled in part on other grounds by, United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir.1995) (en banc)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1862, 128 L.Ed.2d 484 (1994). Detention beyond that time period is only justified if the officer has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring ... [or] the initial detention has become a consensual encounter. Id. at 1483 (citations omitted). The government does not argue, nor could it, that the detention here evolved into a consensual encounter. 3 The government also does not argue, nor could it, that the detention only lasted as long as is necessary to issue the citation and warning. It clearly lasted longer; indeed, Officer Colyar retained Mr. McRae's license and rental papers after he finished issuing the citation and warning, thus denying Mr. McRae his ability to go on his way. We must therefore determine whether Officer Colyar possessed reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity to justify this continued detention. 38 The government relies upon the following as providing articulable suspicion: (1) Mr. McRae said he had rented the car and was going to a wedding in New York, but the rental papers indicated the car was due back in Los Angeles in two days; (2) when Officer Colyar returned to his patrol car to issue the citation and warning, and to run the computer check on Mr. McRae's driver's license, Mr. McRae adjusted his mirror and intensely watched the officer; (3) when asked about his criminal record, Mr. McRae denied any arrests; and (4) Mr. McRae was nervous when asked about the criminal record. 4 When evaluating whether these factors can provide articulable suspicion, we bear in mind that we, and the district court, evaluate the officer's conduct in light of  'common sense and ordinary human experience.'  United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1562 (10th Cir.1993)). We defer to the ability of a trained law enforcement officer to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions. United States v. Martinez-Cigarroa, 44 F.3d 908, 912 (10th Cir.) (Baldock, J., concurring), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1386, 131 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585-86, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). We make our determination after evaluating the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir.1994). 39 We have held that implausible or contradictory travel plans can contribute to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. See United States v. Kopp, 45 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (10th Cir.) ([d]efendant's explanation of his travel plan and purpose was not plausible, where defendant said he was driving from California to North Carolina to take a very dilapidated sofa to some friends and he was vague about his actual destination), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1721, 131 L.Ed.2d 579 (1995); United States v. Sanchez-Valderuten, 11 F.3d 985, 989 (10th Cir.1993) (finding reasonable suspicion in part because of defendant's unlikely route, where defendant claimed to be going to New York but said he was moving his family to the state of Washington). This case does not present as implausible or contradictory travel plans as those cases. Nonetheless, Mr. McRae's evident lack of concern about how he would return the rental car displays an unusually cavalier attitude towards a financial obligation most people take quite seriously. We conclude that his vague response to Officer Colyar's inquiries concerning his rental car arrangements correctly contributed to a reasonable suspicion in a trained and experienced officer like Officer Colyar. 40 The government also relies upon Mr. McRae's conduct in carefully watching Officer Colyar while the officer ran a check in his patrol car. Officer Colyar testified this was unusual. Thus, this unusual behavior was, to Officer Colyar, suspicious behavior. Deferring to the ability of a trained law enforcement officer to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions, Martinez-Cigarroa, 44 F.3d at 912, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding Officer Colyar credible and in finding that Mr. McRae's unusual behavior properly raised an articulable suspicion in an experienced officer that Mr. McRae was engaged in some unlawful conduct. 41 Finally, the government relies upon Mr. McRae's untruthful answer when asked if he had ever been arrested before. 5 As Mr. McRae points out, Officer Colyar had completed writing the citation and warning, but still held Mr. McRae's license and rental papers, when he asked about his prior record. Thus, the detention continued beyond the time necessary to issue the citation and warning when Officer Colyar made that inquiry. We must first determine, therefore, whether Officer Colyar had articulable suspicion to continue to detain Mr. McRae and ask him about his criminal record, and then to inquire about contraband. 42 As we have stated, at this point the officer was aware of three circumstances which, alone and in combination, made him suspicious: the vague rental car arrangements, Mr. McRae's behavior while watching Officer Colyar, and the Triple I check's revelation that Mr. McRae had a record of drug trafficking arrests. 6 This combination of suspicious circumstances would have permitted the officer to ask Mr. McRae whether he was carrying contraband. Instead, the officer asked an intermediate question--whether Mr. McRae had a criminal record--and his untruthful answer to that question provided further articulable suspicion to ask if Mr. McRae was carrying contraband and inquire about a search of the car. 7 See United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1497-98 (10th Cir.1994) (defendant's lie about his departure city contributed to a reasonable suspicion permitting seizure of briefcase); United States v. Moore, 22 F.3d 241, 243 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 238, 130 L.Ed.2d 161 (1994). 43 We therefore hold that the brief detention of Mr. McRae following his stop was lawful.