Opinion ID: 499806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to meet first amendment standards

Text: 61 The Clark County regulation is not a routine business licensing provision. Under a routine licensing scheme, the escort services might be required to submit certain information and perhaps pay a fee, and would then receive licenses automatically. Such licensing requirements have been upheld even where they apply to first amendment activities. For example, we recently upheld an ordinance that required erotic dancers and operators of erotic dance studios to obtain licenses. Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.1986). Under that ordinance, applicants were required to submit certain information, but they then received licenses automatically; the county had no discretion to refuse to issue the licenses. Id. at 1060. We noted that there is no suggestion that the licenses ... would be difficult to obtain or would for some other reason discourage protected expression. Id. We therefore treated the licensing requirement as a time, place, and manner regulation; such regulations are permissible  'so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.'  Id. at 1058 (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 106 S.Ct. 925, 928, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986)). 6 62 The Clark County regulation imposes a significantly greater restriction on the exercise of first amendment rights than did the ordinance we upheld in Kev. Clark County puts the burden on the applicant to prove that he or she is deserving of a license, and gives the licensing officials broad discretion to grant or withhold permission to associate based on a number of subjective factors. Thus the licensing scheme is not simply a restriction on the time, place, and manner in which the escort services do business. To the contrary, the escort services cannot do business at all unless the state, in the exercise of its discretion, allows them to do so. Although the regulation does not ban protected activity outright, it clearly inhibits the ability or the inclination to engage in such activity. Kev, 793 F.2d at 1060. 63 Accordingly, the Clark County regulation must meet stricter standards than the regulations at issue in Kev and in the zoning cases. Restrictions on the right of expressive association (other than time, place, and manner restrictions) are impermissible unless inter alia they are drawn narrowly and with specificity and constitute the least restrictive means of advancing the state's interests. The Clark County licensing scheme meets none of these requirements.
64 A discretionary licensing provision, under which the licensing authority decides whether protected activity may or may not be carried on, raises the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). For this reason, such a provision must inter alia meet a very high standard of specificity. Where a first amendment right is implicated, as it is here, we must ensure that the regulation under challenge has been carefully drafted and that it provides adequate standards to guide law enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). 7 65 In several cases, the Supreme Court has overturned ordinances that required licenses or permits for the exercise of first amendment rights because of the danger of arbitrary enforcement. For example, in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969), the Court reversed a conviction under a local ordinance requiring a permit for any parade, procession, or public demonstration and giving city officials broad discretion to grant or withhold such permits. The Court held that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional. Id. at 150-51, 89 S.Ct. at 938 (footnote omitted); see also Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S.Ct. 277, 2 L.Ed.2d 302 (1958) (reversing conviction under city ordinance requiring permit to solicit membership for any organization or union that collected dues); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (reversing conviction under city ordinance requiring permit to canvass or distribute handbills). 66 The Clark County regulation fails to meet the standard of specificity that the first amendment demands. It requires that licenses be obtained for the exercise of associational rights, yet it allows the licensing officials to deny, suspend, and revoke licenses on subjective and indefinite grounds. For example, the licensing board may deny any application if the applicant is not a person of good character, honesty and integrity, CCC Sec. 8.32.080(I)(1); if the applicant's prior activities, reputation, habits, or associations pose a threat to the public interest of the county, id. Sec. 8.32.080(I)(2); if the escort service's source of financing is not suitable, id. Sec. 8.32.080(J)(1); if unsuitable persons are or will be involved in the escort service's day-to-day operations or have a financial interest in the service, id. Secs. 8.32.080(J)(9-10); if the applicant is not [i]n all other respects qualified to be licensed or is not found suitable consistently with the declared policy of this chapter, id. Sec. 8.32.080(I)(3); or for any cause deemed reasonable, id. Sec. 8.32.080(J)(11). A license may also be suspended or revoked if the licensee or any of its partners, managers, or employees has [c]onducted or maintained the business in a manner contrary to the peace, safety, general welfare or morals of the community. Id. Sec. 8.32.140(j). 67 Such criteria are acceptable where the activity being licensed is not constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177 (9th Cir.1980) (upholding Nevada gaming statute granting Gaming Commission wide discretion in licensing). Here, however, the regulation vests in the licensing board the discretion to allow or disallow protected association. In the present context, the use of words like suitable, threat to the public interest, and morals of the community raises the possibility that the licensing officials will enforce the law arbitrarily or in such a way as to require others to comport themselves according to the life style deemed appropriate by those in authority. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170, 92 S.Ct. 839, 847, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (overturning vagrancy ordinance on vagueness grounds); see Coates, 402 U.S. at 616, 91 S.Ct. at 1689 (prohibition against annoying associations invited discriminatory enforcement against those whose ideas or lifestyle were unpopular). The freedom to engage in protected association, like the freedom to hold a public demonstration or to distribute handbills, cannot be made dependent on such uncontrolled discretion.
68 Because the Clark County regulation affects associational rights, it must also meet the standard spelled out by the Supreme Court in Jaycees: Infringements on [the right to associate for expressive purposes] may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. 468 U.S. at 623, 104 S.Ct. at 3252. The escort service licensing scheme fails to meet the third prong of this standard. 69 In applying the Jaycees test, we look first to the interests that the county has asserted as justification for the regulation. Those interests fall into three broad categories: the health and safety of the public, community, and tourists; public morality and decency; and economic development. CCC Sec. 8.32.010(C). The first is threatened by the dangers of infectious disease, see id. Sec. 8.32.010(C)(d), violence to the escorts, see id. Sec. 8.32.010(C)(m), and fraud against the patrons, see id. Secs. 8.32.010(C)(a, b, i, j). The second is implicated because the county believes the escort services are primarily prostitution operations. Id. Sec. 8.32.010(C)(o). The third is affected because the escort services are harmful to the cause of attracting tourists, visitors, and conventions to the county. Id. Sec. 8.32.010(C). These interests are unrelated to the suppression of ideas, and they may all be regarded as compelling. 70 However, the Clark County regulation fails to satisfy the final element of the Jaycees test, because it is readily apparent that there are means of achieving the county's goals that are significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623, 104 S.Ct. at 3252. Indeed, most, if not all, of the evils that the county associates with escort bureaus can be (or have already been) addressed by criminal statutes targeted directly at the evils themselves. If the county is seeking to halt prostitution, it has already taken the least restrictive means of achieving that goal: it has outlawed prostitution. The other problems that the county ascribes to escort services can be relieved more directly and less harmfully by enacting, amending, and enforcing laws against fraud, coercion, extortion, and pandering. The county admits that laws already exist requiring weekly health examinations for infectious disease, see CCC Sec. 8.32.010(C)(d), and requiring escort services that act as employment agencies to obtain licenses, see id. Sec. 8.32.010(C)(g). Other concerns might be addressed by requiring the escort services to provide protection for their employees and by legitimate time, place, and manner restrictions. For example, Clark County might eliminate the licensing scheme or make the issuance of licenses automatic, and simply require all escort services to maintain open offices or prohibit the use of runners. See, e.g., Kev, 793 F.2d at 1061-62. 8 71 In overturning other ordinances that prohibited or imposed a licensing requirement on the exercise of first amendment rights, the Supreme Court similarly required that the least intrusive means of achieving state interests be adopted. In Schneider, for example, the Court noted that licensing the distribution of handbills was not the most direct way of controlling fraudulent solicitations for charity: 72 Frauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by law. Trespasses may similarly be forbidden. If it is said that these means are less efficient and convenient than bestowal of power on police authorities to decide what information may be disseminated from house to house, and who may impart the information, the answer is that considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press. 73 308 U.S. at 164, 60 S.Ct. at 152. Where prevention of littering was the goal, the Court observed: There are obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets. Id. at 162, 60 S.Ct. at 151; see City of Houston v. Hill, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2510 n. 11, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) (invalidating ordinance making it unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his or her duties, suggesting that such an offense might constitutionally be punished under a tailored statute that forbade individuals from physically obstructing an officer's investigation rather than a broad statute aimed at speech); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637, 100 S.Ct. 826, 836, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980) (striking down ordinance prohibiting solicitation by charities that spend more than 25% of receipts on salaries and administrative expenses, noting that prohibition of fraudulent misrepresentation was less intrusive means of achieving same goal); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267, 88 S.Ct. 419, 425, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967) (striking down statute limiting employment of members of Communist groups at defense facilities, commenting that Congress can, of course, prescribe criminal penalties for those who engage in espionage and sabotage); see also Posadas de Puerto Rico, 106 S.Ct. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Puerto Rico could directly address the harms associated with casino gambling rather than prohibiting constitutionally protected advertising). 74 The comprehensive, discretionary licensing scheme that Clark County has adopted is not the least restrictive means available to achieve its ends. It is therefore constitutionally impermissible.
75 In assessing an overbreadth challenge, the courts must look to the ambiguous as well as the unambiguous scope of the regulation; in this respect, the vagueness of a law affects overbreadth analysis. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 n. 6, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). A previous version of the Clark County regulation, which prohibited working as an escort, was struck down by the Nevada Supreme Court as impermissibly vague because it failed to give adequate notice of what conduct was forbidden: For example, persons functioning as social secretaries--as companions to the aged, lonely or infirm--or even as babysitters, arguably might be guilty of impermissible conduct. Eaves v. Board of Clark County Commissioners, 96 Nev. 921, 924, 620 P.2d 1248, 1250 (1980). The regulation was subsequently revised to license rather than prohibit escort activities and to refine the definition of escort. The current regulation also exempts from the escort licensing requirement businesses that are otherwise licensed by the state or county and that perform an escort or escort bureau function as a service merely incidental to [their] primary function. CCC Sec. 8.32.150. 9 76 Nevertheless, it is not clear that the amendments have resolved the ambiguities cited in Eaves. Babysitters, companions, and social secretaries may all fall into the category of persons held out to the public as available for hire and paid to accompany others to social affairs, places of amusement, or public resorts. These individuals are not required to obtain licenses under state law. 10 Moreover, for a paid companion or social secretary, the escort function is the primary focus of employment. 11 Thus the post-Eaves amendments do not appear to have removed these individuals from the Clark County regulation's scope. 77 However, Clark County has offered no justification at all for licensing these associations. Its licensing scheme affects all first amendment associations in which one person is paid to associate with another, regardless of whether the association creates any of the harms that the county seeks to prevent. In this regard, the Clark County regulation differs significantly from the zoning ordinances targeted at adult establishments which the Supreme Court upheld in City of Renton and Young. The zoning regulations were carefully limited to the particular type of expressive activity that was thought to create problems: the exhibition of adult films. 12 See Young, 427 U.S. at 82, 96 S.Ct. at 2458 (Powell, J., concurring) (The case would present a different situation had Detroit brought within the ordinance types of theaters that had not been shown to contribute to the deterioration of surrounding areas.). 78 In contrast, the Clark County licensing scheme is not limited to particular harms or to particular types of association that are linked with those harms; in fact, businesses that promote the objectionable type of association--sexually oriented escort bureaus--cannot be licensed at all. The regulation governs all associations in which one party receives monetary compensation. But the payment of money is not the evil with which the county is concerned, and that single criterion is not so closely linked to the harms cited by the county as to justify the regulation of protected association. The county cannot require that all paid-for protected association be licensed just because one type of paid-for association may give rise to problems or difficulties. See Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 2572, 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987) (invalidating resolution prohibiting all first amendment activity in Los Angeles airport, noting that the resolution banned all protected expression rather than merely regulat[ing] expressive activity ... that might create problems); Coates, 402 U.S. at 614, 91 S.Ct. at 1688 (although ordinance prohibiting annoying associations was broad enough to encompass many types of conduct clearly within the city's constitutional power to prohibit, it should have been directed specifically toward such conduct); Chase, 645 F.2d at 738-39 (invalidating ordinance restricting topless dancing on ground of overbreadth). 79 Precision of regulation must be the touchstone where first amendment rights are concerned. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). Yet the Clark County regulation reaches protected associations that are completely unrelated to the interests the county is seeking to advance. Again, this violates constitutional standards. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95, 102 S.Ct. at 1191-92.