Opinion ID: 3030375
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Standard of Lloyd and Fenton

Text: From Lloyd and Fenton a two-part standard may be distilled for determining whether an offense committed in connection with possession of a firearm may support an enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(5). The first part of the test, from Blockburger, is legal in nature and asks whether the predicate offense and the firearms possession crime each have an element that is not shared by the other. Lloyd, 361 F.3d at 10 In Lloyd we rejected the government’s invitation to adopt a broader reading of section 2K2.1(b)(5), under which a crime would be considered “another felony offense” whenever the completion of that crime is temporally separate from possession of the firearm. 361 F.3d at 203. This approach would preclude application of the enhancement only in those cases in which possession of the firearm occurred at the same time as commission of the other offense. Id. Adoption of this standard would arguably contravene Fenton, since the offense of burglary was completed when the defendant entered the building with the intent to commit a felony (whether or not he actually committed that felony) and therefore the possession of the firearms was temporally separate from that crime. Id. at 203, 205. 17 204-05; see also Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. The second part of the test, from Fenton, is essentially factual in nature and asks whether more than mere possession of the firearm – brandishment or other use – was an integral aspect of the predicate offense.11 Lloyd, 361 F.3d at 204-05; see also Fenton, 309 F.3d at 827-28. If these two questions are answered in the affirmative, then the four-level enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(5) should apply. See id. Judged by this standard, it is clear that the District Court properly applied the enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(5). The predicate offense in this case was drug distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), a “felony offense” under the Guidelines. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1 cmt. n.4. The offenses of drug distribution and firearms possession satisfy the first part of the Lloyd standard, the Blockburger test. Dispensation of a controlled substance is an element of drug distribution but not of firearms possession; possession of a firearm is an element of firearms possession but not of drug 11 Although not directly relevant to resolution of this case, it should be noted that the application notes of section 2K2.1 of the Guidelines have been amended, and the amendments became effective in November 2006. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14 (providing for broader interpretation of “another felony offense,” covering even those offenses that involve only simple possession of a firearm). We recognize that the amendments call into question our decision in Fenton for defendants who are sentenced under the current Guidelines and application notes. 18 distribution. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The two offenses each have an element not shared by the other and therefore should be viewed as separate offenses for purposes of section 2K2.1(b)(5). The offenses also satisfy the second part of the Lloyd standard, the Fenton test. The offense of drug distribution involves only the dispensation of a controlled substance; it does not require an exchange of something of value. See, e.g., United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 124 (1st Cir. 1987). Navarro’s possession of the firearm was therefore not an integral aspect of the offense. Because the offense did not involve mere possession of the firearm, it cannot be deemed the functional equivalent of a “firearms possession offense.” The enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(5) can apply. Notwithstanding the relative simplicity of this analysis, the parties have engaged in an extensive debate over the meaning of Lloyd and its effect on Fenton. These discussions are almost wholly unnecessary because, even under a broad reading of Fenton, the enhancement in this case would be applicable. The problem can be traced to a minor misunderstanding of what constituted the “other” felony offense in this case. The “other” offense in the case is described by the parties in various ways including drug trafficking, drug dealing, trading drugs for a gun, and drug distribution. In reality, the offense is drug “distribution.” See 21 U.S.C. § 841. “Distribution” involves only dispensation, without the necessity of something being provided in return. See id. at 508; see also, e.g., Coady, 809 F.2d at 124. Because receipt of something of value is not an essential element of drug distribution, Navarro’s possession of 19 the firearm was not an integral aspect of the offense.12 The offense therefore cannot be considered the functional equivalent of a “firearms possession offense.”