Opinion ID: 4505190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness and Appealability

Text: The government argues that (1) the Notice of Appeal filed on December 16, 2016, is untimely as to the October 27, 2016, order, and (2) the November 17, 2016, order is neither the result of a tolling motion, nor independently appealable. We disagree with the government’s premise that the dispositive substantive order regarding the subject of this appeal—the scope of Ms. Spain’s paid representation—is the October 27, 2016, order. In that order appointing Ms. Spain to represent N.H.M., the court concluded that her organization, Open City Advocates, could not be compensated for work done before DYRS and Ms. Spain could be compensated for her work before the court. But the court did not clearly decide until November 17, 2016, that Ms. Spain could not be compensated for her 6 The court did not understand the motion for clarification to be in the nature of a motion for reconsideration of the October 27, 2016, order, but rather as a new motion “request[ing] compensation for a wider range of services.” 6 representation of N.H.M. in any DYRS proceedings. Regardless of its label as a “clarification” of the October 27, 2016, order,7 the November 17, 2016, order is the dispositive substantive order in this appeal, and it started the thirty-day appellate clock under our rules. D.C. App. R. 4.8 Calculating from the November 17, 2016, order, we conclude that the December 16, 2016, Notice of Appeal was timely filed.
This court’s jurisdiction is defined by statute and is generally limited to the review of final judgments and orders. See D.C. Code § 11-721(a)–(b). A final order is one that “disposes of the whole case on its merits so that the court has nothing remaining to do but execute the judgment or decree already rendered.” Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 876 (D.C. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re Estate of Chuong, 623 A.2d 1154, 1157 (D.C. 1993) (en 7 The court’s characterization of the November order as a ruling on a new request, see supra note 6, likewise supports this conclusion. 8 We need not decide which rules should apply—criminal (because this is a delinquency case), see District of Columbia v. M.A.C., 328 A.2d 375, 376 (D.C. 1974), or civil (because the collateral order being appealed is civil in nature), see id. (explaining that “the nature of the issue to be litigated and not the overall nature of the cause of action” determines which rules apply). Under either D.C. App. R. 4(a) (governing civil appeals) or D.C. App. R. 4(b) (governing criminal appeals), the timeframe to appeal is “within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.” 7 banc) (explaining that “[t]o be reviewable, a judgment or decree must not only be final but also complete, that is, final not only as to all parties, but as to the whole subject matter and all the causes of action involved” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Ms. Spain concedes that the trial court’s ruling regarding the scope of her paid representation is not a final order and is reviewable by this court only if it falls under the collateral order doctrine. The collateral order doctrine is “a narrow but well-recognized exception to the rule against appeals from non-final orders.” In re Estate of Chuong, 623 A.2d at 1157 (internal quotation marks omitted). It requires a showing that the order in question (1) “conclusively determine[s] the disputed question,” (2) “resolve[s] an important issue . . . separate from the merits” of the case, and (3) is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. There is no dispute that the order in this case satisfies the first two prongs of the collateral order doctrine. We conclude that the trial court’s order is effectively unreviewable because there is no other point in time in the juvenile’s case when the trial court might revisit this decision in a final order that could then be appealed to this court. The government argues that, if N.H.M. is “dissatisfied with the services he is receiving or his level of placement, he may petition the Superior Court to modify 8 its dispositional order[,] D.C. Code § 16-2323(h)[,]” and that at such a proceeding there is “no reason that the question of counsel’s involvement in accordance with these statutory provisions cannot be raised and decided.” But a theoretical opportunity to have an argument be considered again in a trial court is not the type of opportunity for later review that bars application of the collateral order doctrine. Reviewability under the collateral order doctrine turns on whether a litigant has a later opportunity to come before this court to obtain appellate review of a claim previously conclusively determined by the trial court. 9 We see no later opportunity to seek this court’s review of the scope of Ms. Spain’s paid representation. That issue was decided at the outset of and in conjunction with Ms. Spain’s appointment. And having been decided, the avenue to revisit the decision is this appeal, rather than an attempt to relitigate the issue at a later review hearing, before the trial court, concerning the separate question of the child’s disposition. Federal courts have likewise held that orders defining the scope of paid representation are reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. See Clark v. 9 The government also suggests that the court’s ruling about the scope of Ms. Spain’s paid appointment will not evade review because N.H.M. has a right to administratively appeal certain decisions by DYRS. See, e.g., 29 DCMR § 1211.7 (2020). But any review of the agency’s decisionmaking would not afford a forum to revisit, much less overturn, the trial court’s order. 9 Johnson, 278 F.3d 459, 460–61 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that an order denying a motion by appointed counsel in a federal habeas proceeding to expand the authorized scope of her representation to include state clemency proceedings not specified in the CJA was reviewable under the collateral order doctrine), abrogated on other grounds by Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009); cf. Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 182–83 (2009) (holding that a Certificate of Appealability in a federal habeas proceeding was not required for appeal of order denying a motion to expand the authorized scope of paid representation under the CJA because the order was “appealable” despite not being a “final order[] that dispos[ed] of the merits of a . . . proceeding”). The government cites a different line of cases holding that particular CJA fee determinations are not appealable and are instead properly addressed in administrative proceedings.10 But its reliance on these cases is misplaced because we are not reviewing an order determining how much Ms. Spain should be paid for representing N.H.M. before DYRS, but rather an order ruling that she categorically may not seek payment for these services.11 10 See, e.g., In re Carlyle, 644 F.3d 694, 698–99 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. French, 556 F.3d 1091, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009). 11 We disagree with the government’s argument that because Ms. Spain has yet to bill for particular services—having been ordered not to do so—she is seeking an “advisory opinion.” We also reject the government’s suggestion that we should not deem the trial court’s order reviewable under the collateral order doctrine because Ms. Spain (continued…) 10 We conclude that the court’s order denying paid compensation for work done before DYRS is effectively unreviewable at a later point in time, and thus we review it now.