Opinion ID: 789047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rosa's Response to the Pedigree Inquiry

Text: 56 The State argues that the District Court, in granting Rosa's petition for habeas corpus, erred in determining that the state courts' decisions involved an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Specifically, the State argues that the appellate division reasonably applied federal law in ruling that the officer's inquiry as to [Rosa's] actual hair color was reasonably related to administrative concerns, and was neither intended, nor reasonably likely, to elicit an incriminating response. Rosa, 294 A.D.2d at 160, 743 N.Y.S.2d 400, aff'd, 98 N.Y.2d at 732, 749 N.Y.S.2d 482, 779 N.E.2d 193. 57 Generally,  Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.... [T]he term `interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); see also Muniz, 496 U.S. at 600-01, 110 S.Ct. 2638; accord United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Adegbite, 846 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1988). The Supreme Court has explained that any knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determining what the police reasonably should have known. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (internal quotation marks omitted). 58 The collection of biographical or pedigree information through a law enforcement officer's questions during the non-investigative booking process that typically follows a suspect's arrest, however, does not ordinarily implicate the prophylactic protections of Miranda, which are designed to protect a suspect only during investigative custodial interrogation. Such interrogations customarily involve questions of a different character than those that are normally and reasonably related to police administrative concerns. See id. at 601-02, 110 S.Ct. 2638; Carmona, 873 F.2d at 573; accord Rodney, 85 N.Y.2d at 292-94, 624 N.Y.S.2d 95, 648 N.E.2d 471. In Muniz, the Supreme Court explained that a routine booking question exception... exempts from Miranda 's coverage questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services and that permissible questions include those that appear reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns. 496 U.S. at 601-02, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Gotchis, 803 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir.1986); cf. Rodney, 85 N.Y.2d at 292-93, 624 N.Y.S.2d 95, 648 N.E.2d 471 (noting that responses to routine booking questions — pedigree questions, as we have referred to them — are not suppressible even when obtained in violation of Miranda  and that such questions avoid any ground for challenging the voluntariness of a statement made in response to the questions). 59 Whether the information gathered turns out to be incriminating in some respect does not, by itself, alter the general rule that pedigree questioning does not fall under the strictures of Miranda. See Gotchis, 803 F.2d at 79 (affirming admission of defendant's response to a pedigree question, even though the response helped establish defendant's intent to commit the crime with which he was charged); United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112 (2d Cir.1975) (affirming admission of defendant's response to a pedigree question, even though the response helped establish the identity of defendant as the rapist in question). 60 In this case, the appellate division correctly determined that Arroyo's inquiry as to [Rosa's] actual hair color was reasonably related to administrative concerns, and was neither intended, nor reasonably likely, to elicit an incriminating response. Rosa, 294 A.D.2d at 160, 743 N.Y.S.2d 400. Arroyo and Fitzgerald were engaged in a routine administrative process, and the booking questions were presented to Rosa in the exact order that the questions appeared on the booking form and without any substantive deviation from the form of the questions presented. Spaces were provided on the form for the entry of basic identifying information, including Rosa's name, date of birth, age, race, height, weight, eye color, and hair color. Hair color — like eye color, skin tone, or other personal physical characteristics — is a common element of pedigree information. Proper completion of the booking form in this case required the officer to complete the relevant portions of the form by filling in the correct information pertaining to the various elements that comprise the basic personal physical characteristics, including hair color. Moreover, if the officer perceives — either through direct observation or otherwise — that a specific piece of information provided by the arrestee is patently incorrect, then it is not only reasonable, but arguably the officer's duty, to inquire further. 61 We hold that Arroyo was engaged in a booking process that was reasonably related to police administrative concerns. But of course recognizing a booking exception to Miranda does not mean ... that any question asked during the booking process falls within that exception. Without obtaining a waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights, the police may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n. 14, 110 S.Ct. 2638; see also LaVallee, 521 F.2d at 1113 n. 2 (We recognize that this exception to Miranda lends itself to the possibility of abuse by police who might, under the guise seeking pedigree data, elicit an incriminatory statement.). 62 To determine whether the police abused the gathering of pedigree information in a manner that compels Miranda protection requires an objective inquiry: Should the police have known that asking the pedigree questions would elicit incriminating information? See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682 ([T]he definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. (emphasis in original)); cf. United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir.1983) (The test is objective. The subjective intent of the agent is relevant but not conclusive.). 63 The pedigree question here was not: When did you dye your hair? Rather, the question — What is your real hair color? — was narrowly crafted by the officer to obtain information necessary to complete the booking form. The likely answer that an officer in Arroyo's position would, or should, have expected is a one-word description of the accurate hair color (e.g., brown or blonde). Here, Rosa not only responded to the question but also volunteered a response beyond the scope of the question. Rosa provided, without elicitation from Arroyo, the additional information that he dyed it yesterday. The fact that Rosa's hair was dyed a different color was not necessarily incriminating. Rather, submitted to the jury as possible evidence of Rosa's consciousness of guilt was the fact that he had dyed his in hair in conjunction with the fact that he had dyed it recently — indeed, on the day of the robbery. But Rosa offered the critical piece of timing-related information voluntarily and outside the scope of the question. Thus, his entire response, including the damning portion, clearly was admissible. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 299-300, 100 S.Ct. 1682. 64 In addition to admitting that he had dyed his hair, Rosa's response provided Arroyo with information pertaining to when Rosa dyed his hair. Arroyo, however, could not reasonably have expected Rosa to offer additional inculpatory information that was outside the scope of the question. Indeed, requiring an officer to be on guard at all times for responses outside the scope of the booking questions would allow suspects to circumvent or hinder the police administrative process. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682 ([T]he police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions....). In any event, the fact that Rosa's hair was dyed is not a tell-all piece of evidence demonstrating his guilt — it was merely a piece of evidence supporting Hernandez' identification of Rosa as the individual who had robbed her. See Gotchis, 803 F.2d at 78. 65 We hold that the appellate division's decision in Rosa's case did not involve [ ] an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As such, we conclude that the District Court incorrectly determined (i) that Rosa's response was the product of investigative custodial interrogation that was likely to produce or elicit an incriminating response, and (ii) that the state courts' application of federal law in this case was objectively unreasonable. 66 Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court granting the writ of habeas corpus is reversed.