Opinion ID: 2639585
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Testimony of Gang Expert

Text: Sergeant Al Garcia testified as an expert on street gangs in East Los Angeles. Defendant objected to some of the testimony on various grounds. The court sustained some of the objections and maintained control over the nature and extent of the expert testimony, but it also overruled many of the objections. Defendant contends the court erred in several regards. In general, this court and the Courts of Appeal have long permitted a qualified expert to testify about criminal street gangs when the testimony is relevant to the case. Under Evidence Code section 801, expert opinion testimony is admissible only if the subject matter of the testimony is `sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.' ( Id., subd. (a).) The subject matter of the culture and habits of criminal street gangs, of particular relevance here, meets this criterion. ( People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713; see also People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 438, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78; People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494, 506, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 135; People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1370, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596 [The use of expert testimony in the area of gang sociology and psychology is well established.].) Trial courts exercise discretion in determining both the admissibility of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 [citation] and a witness's expert status [citation]. ( People v. Ochoa, supra, at p. 437, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) As we explain, the court acted within its discretion in this case. At one point, the prosecutor asked the witness, Assuming a member of Lopez Maravilla was called to testify against a rival gang member, a Lott Stoner, do you have an opinion as to whether or not there would be intimidation against the gang member who was called to testify by his own gang as well as any other gang? The court overruled defendant's objection, and the witness answered, Definitely. The witness further testified that the person's own gang as well as the rival gang would be doing the intimidating. The prosecutor then asked, Assuming that a member of Lott Stoners was called to testify in a case involving a Lott Stoner as a defendant, do you have an opinion as to whether or not there would be intimidation from the Lott Stoners gang to the witness? The court overruled defendant's objection, and the witness said, That witness'[s] safety would be in great jeopardy. Defendant objected again. The court and parties conferred outside the hearing of the jury, after which the court permitted the witness to testify that, assuming a member of the Lott Stoner 13 gang was called to testify against a fellow gang member, there would be intimidation by the gang members. On further questioning, the witness testified that this opinion was based on his experience at the East L.A. station. He elaborated, What happens is that every morning I review all reports. I have six investigators that work for me, and a lot of times they prep me on any incidents of witness intimidations. Many times we have had to go to court because of intimidation of witnesses and provide security. Also, there was one incident where a gang member who assisted in an investigation was murdered by his own gang for cooperating with law enforcement. At this point, defendant objected and moved to strike the testimony and for a mistrial. After another hearing at the sidebar, the court overruled the objection and mistrial motion. Regarding this testimony, defendant argues that the court erred in permitting Sergeant Garcia to make unqualified assertions about how all relevant gang members would behave in a particular set of circumstances. The Attorney General argues that to the extent defendant bases this argument on the fact that the witness used the word definitely, the claim is not cognizable because defendant failed to object to that word and move to strike it. We disagree. Although a party must object on the specific ground asserted on appeal (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a)), defendant's many objections, both before the witness testified and during the actual testimony, made reasonably clear he was objecting on grounds that included those raised on appeal. On the merits, however, we find no abuse of discretion. This testimony was quite typical of the kind of expert testimony regarding gang culture and psychology that a court has discretion to admit. Whether members of a street gang would intimidate persons who testify against a member of that or a rival gang is sufficiently beyond common experience that a court could reasonably believe expert opinion would assist the jury. It is difficult to imagine a clearer need for expert explication than that presented by a subculture in which this type of mindless retaliation promotes `respect.' ( People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal. App.4th at p. 1384, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596; accord, People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal. App.4th 1539, 1551, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 124.) Sergeant Garcia's testimony was relevant to help the jury decide which version of the testimony was truthful: the eyewitnesses' initial identifications of defendant as the shooter, and Cardenas's initial statement that defendant admitted being the shooter, or the later repudiations of those identifications and that statement. Evidence that a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is therefore admissible. [Citations.] An explanation of the basis for the witness's fear is likewise relevant to her credibility and is well within the discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1; see also People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 211, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717) Evidence of possible intimidation would help explain why the witnesses might repudiate earlier truthful statements. Contrary to defendant's argument, the fact that the witness used the word definitely in response to a question whether he had an opinion on this matter does not make the testimony inadmissible. Opinions that are otherwise admissible are not made inadmissible merely because they are definite. Relying primarily on People v. Killebrew (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876, defendant argues that Sergeant Garcia did not merely testify about gang customs or habits in general but improperly testified that the witnesses were being intimidated, not just that they may be intimidated by other gang members. As did the court in People v. Gonzalez, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, we read Killebrew as merely prohibit[ing] an expert from testifying to his or her opinion of the knowledge or intent of a defendant on trial. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, at p. 1551, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 124; see also People v. Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 209-210, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717.) [3] Even if we assume, without deciding, that Killebrew is correct in this respect, it has no relevance here. Sergeant Garcia merely answered hypothetical questions based on other evidence the prosecution presented, which is a proper way of presenting expert testimony. Generally, an expert may render opinion testimony on the basis of facts given `in a hypothetical question that asks the expert to assume their truth.' ( People v. Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 618, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713; see also People v. Gonzalez, supra, at p. 1551, fn. 4, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 124.) The witness did not express an opinion about whether the particular witnesses of this case had been intimidated. (See also People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371, 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 596 [permitting expert testimony that focused on what gangs and gang members typically expect and not on [one of the defendant's] subjective expectation in this instance].) It is true that Sergeant Garcia's opinion, if found credible, might, together with other evidence, lead the jury to find the witnesses were being intimidated, which in turn might cause the jury to credit their original statements rather than their later repudiations of those statements. But this circumstance makes the testimony probative, not inadmissible. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1551, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 124 [This evidence, coupled with the evidence that appellant was a gang member, may have led the jury to the ineluctable conclusion that appellant intended to kill Cruz, but that does not render it inadmissible.].) The law does not disfavor the admission of expert testimony that makes comprehensible and logical that which is otherwise inexplicable and incredible. ( Ibid. ) Defendant also argues that the trial court erroneously allowed Sergeant Garcia to opine on whether or not the witnesses against [him] were telling the truth. He bases this argument partly on the evidence regarding gang intimidation discussed above and partly on the witness's testimony that, because aiding law enforcement would cause one to be labeled a rat or snitch, a gang member would not lie to the police when implicating a fellow gang member in a crime. He particularly challenges the witness's testimony that, in his experience and training, he had never known a gang member, including a member of the Lott Stoner 13 gang, to lie about a fellow gang member making him a rat or a snitch. He argues that this testimony was an impermissible opinion on the credibility of a particular witness. We disagree. Sergeant Garcia was not asked, and did not testify about, any particular witness in this case. He merely provided expert testimony regarding the gangs in general. It was up to the jury to determine how much to credit this testimony and, if it found it credible, to apply it to the rest of the evidence it heard. Again, it is true that this testimony, if found credible, might, together with other evidence, lead the jury to find that the witnesses' original statements incriminating defendant were truthful. But this circumstance does not render the testimony inadmissible. Finally, defendant contends the court erred in denying a trial motion to strike Sergeant Garcia's testimony. The issue arose in the following context. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited from Sergeant Garcia that his expert opinion rested in part on information he had received in the street. Then came this colloquy (questions by defense counsel, answers by Sergeant Garcia): Question: And you would tell us that the people that you spoke with have consistently given you truthful and accurate information which you used to form the basis of your expert opinion? Answer: Not always. Question: You can't tell when you are getting truthful, accurate information, can you? Answer: No. Question: You don't know if someone is lying or perhaps even making a mistake when you get information from them, let us [ sic ] alone if it was truthful, true? Answer: That is true, somewhat. Question: So sometimes even errors or mistakes can be the basis of misinformation as well as lies, because it is a human thing, would you agree? Answer: That is correct. Later, outside the presence of the jury, defendant moved to disqualify [Sergeant Garcia] as an expert in the area of gangs. The court denied the motion. Defendant contends the court erred. He correctly notes that expert testimony must be based on material of a type that is reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming their opinions. ( People v. Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 618, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713.) He argues that because of Sergeant Garcia's admissions quoted above, his testimony was based on unreliable material. The Attorney General argues, first, that defendant has forfeited the issue. We agree in part. Defendant did not object that Sergeant Garcia's testimony was based on unreliable material at any time before he finally moved to disqualify him as an expert. Indeed, before the witness testified, defense counsel told the court that he might challenge Sergeant Garcia's expert qualifications by cross-examination in front of the jury (as he later did), but he would not raise it as an issue that the court will have to deal with as to the qualifications. Accordingly, although the record contains some information regarding Sergeant Garcia's qualifications as an expert, it is not necessarily complete in this regard. Because defendant did not challenge Sergeant Garcia's qualifications at trial, he may not do so on appeal. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 194, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) [4] All that remains of the current claim is whether the cross-examination that defendant cites, by itself, required the court to disqualify the witness. It did not. Sergeant Garcia merely admitted the obviousthat people in the street sometimes lie. But he never said that he based his opinion solely on unreliable information. Indeed, Sergeant Garcia also testified that his opinion was not based on information from a single person but on corroborative information from other citizen informants, other evidence that we have at hand, reports, people from the community. A gang expert's overall opinion is typically based on information drawn from many sources and on years of experience, which in sum may be reliable. ( People v. Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 620, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713.) We see no abuse of discretion in the court's refusal to strike the testimony.