Opinion ID: 2625111
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Provisions Requiring Defense Representatives To Give Unsolicited Advice and Obtain Written Consent

Text: As noted, Criminal Rule 16(d)(1) prohibits both the prosecution and the defense from advising witnesses to refrain from discussing the case with opposing counsel and likewise prohibits otherwise imped[ing] opposing counsel's investigation of the case. These prohibitions have both an ethical and a constitutional foundation. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice provide that [a] prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct communication between prospective witnesses and defense counsel. A prosecutor should not advise any person or cause any person to be advised to decline to give to the defense information which such person has the right to give. [39] The commentary to this standard provides in part: Obstructing Communications Between Witnesses and the Defense Prospective witnesses should not be treated as partisans. They should be regarded as impartial and as relating the facts as they see them. Because witnesses do not belong to either party, it is improper for a prosecutor, defense counsel, or anyone acting for either side to suggest to a witness that the witness not submit to an interview by opposing counsel. It is not only proper but it may be the duty of the prosecutor and defense counsel to interview any person who may be called as a witness in the case (except that the prosecutor is not entitled to interview a defendant represented by counsel who declines such an interview). In the event a witness asks the prosecutor or defense counsel, or a member of their staffs, whether it is proper to submit to an interview by opposing counsel or whether it is obligatory, the witness should be informed that there is no legal obligation to submit to an interview. It is proper, however, and may be the duty of both counsel in most cases to interview all persons who may be witnesses and it is in the interest of justice that witnesses be available for interview by counsel. It is proper for a prosecutor to tell a witness that he or she may contact the prosecutor prior to talking to defense counsel. The prosecutor may also properly request an opportunity to be present at defense counsel's interview of a witness, but may not make his or her presence a condition of holding the interview. It is also proper to caution a witness concerning the need to exercise care in subscribing to a statement prepared by another person. In the event that a written statement is signed or otherwise acknowledged by the witness as a correct representation of facts known to the witness, a copy of the statement should be furnished to the witness upon request.[ [40] ] Numerous cases hold that a prosecutor may not suggest, directly or indirectly, that witnesses not speak with defense representatives. [41] A good example is State v. Hofstetter. [42] In Hofstetter the prosecutor made plea agreements with co-conspirators requiring their cooperation in a prosecution against the defendant. [43] When the defendant's counsel attempted to interview the co-conspirators, the prosecutor took the position that if they consented to such interviews without a prosecutor present they would breach the cooperation clause and their plea agreements would be invalidated. [44] The defendant argued that this interfered with his ability to interview witnesses and violated his due process right to a fair trial. [45] The Washington Court of Appeals held that the prosecution's attempt to limit the defendant's right to interview the co-conspirators was prosecutorial misconduct. [46] In so concluding, the Hofstetter court relied both on the ABA Standards and on an extensive survey of cases that prohibit prosecutors from interfering with defense interviews. [47] One of the leading cases relied on by Hofstetter is Gregory v. United States. [48] In Gregory the prosecutor advised witnesses not to speak with defense representatives unless he was present. [49] The court concluded that this advice denied the defendant a fair trial because it was a suppression of the means by which the defense could obtain evidence: Witnesses, particularly eye witnesses, to a crime are the property of neither the prosecution nor the defense. Both sides have an equal right, and should have an equal opportunity, to interview them. Here the defendant was denied that opportunity which, not only the statute, but elemental fairness and due process required that he have. It is true that the prosecutor stated he did not instruct the witnesses not to talk to defense counsel. He did admit that he advised the witnesses not to talk to anyone unless he, the prosecutor, were present. We accept the prosecutor's statement as to his advice to the witnesses as true. But we know of nothing in the law which gives the prosecutor the right to interfere with the preparation of the defense by effectively denying defense counsel access to the witnesses except in his presence. Presumably the prosecutor, in interviewing the witnesses, was unencumbered by the presence of defense counsel, and there seems to be no reason why defense counsel should not have an equal opportunity to determine, through interviews with the witnesses, what they know about the case and what they will testify to. . . . . . . . A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for truth. That quest will more often be successful if both sides have an equal opportunity to interview the persons who have the information from which the truth may be determined. The current tendency in the criminal law is in the direction of discovery of the facts before trial and elimination of surprise at trial. A related development in the criminal law is the requirement that the prosecution not frustrate the defense in the preparation of its case. Information favorable to the defense must be made available to the defense. Reversals of convictions for suppression of such evidence, and even for mere failure to disclose, have become commonplace. It is not suggested here that there was any direct suppression of evidence. But there was unquestionably a suppression of the means by which the defense could obtain evidence. The defense could not know what the eye witnesses to the events in suit were to testify to or how firm they were in their testimony unless defense counsel was provided a fair opportunity for interview. In our judgment the prosecutor's advice to these eye witnesses frustrated that effort and denied appellant a fair trial.[ [50] ] The ABA Commentary recognizes that instances of prohibited interference with a defense investigation can be both direct and indirect. Thus, the Commentary to Standard for Criminal Justice 11-4.1 recognizes that [o]bstruction or interference with opposing counsel's investigation and preparation of the case frequently takes the form of instructing witnesses not to talk with opposing counsel or their staffs, but it may take the form of more subtle instructions. [51]
We believe that requiring defense representatives to give unsolicited advice to victims and witnesses that they are not required to talk to the representative and may have a prosecutor present if they do conveys an implied suggestion to prospective interviewees that it would be best if no interview were given. This none-too-subtle warning, in turn, substantially interferes with defense efforts to obtain evidence. The added requirement in sexual offense prosecutions of written consent to an interview serves to strengthen the message of noncooperation. The testimony presented at trial and the court's findings tend to confirm these observations. At trial numerous witnesses testified that the advice requirements resulted in a significant reduction in the number of people willing to give interviews. One attorney estimated, as the court summarized her testimony, that 90% of the people she contacts in civil and criminal cases talked with her when she gave no warning, but only about 50% are willing to talk after they receive the statutorily mandated warnings. A defense investigator who was formerly a police investigator testified, again as summarized by the court, that the statutes severely impede his investigations, because of the warning. Other witnesses also testified to reduced success in obtaining interviews. Witnesses also stated that the mandated advice makes people uncomfortable and suspicious. As a result, as the court observed, even if the interview is not thwarted by the warnings, the quality and quantity of information obtained through the interview declines. An expert witness presented by the State stated that the act has resulted in a declining number of witnesses being willing to talk with defense investigators. The court found that police and prosecutors agreed that if the police had to provide the same warning, this would have a negative impact on the prosecution's ability to investigate. The court found that the requirement of written consent in AS 12.61.125(a)(2) posed additional problems. The writing requirement has especially adverse consequences in remote locations because of logistical difficulties. In a state where many interviews must be conducted by telephone, the need for a signed written consent to an interview works as a practical roadblock. We set out the court's findings on this point in the margin. [52] The effect of the unsolicited advice and written consent requirements as detailed above is disturbing. We accept as given that it is in the interest of justice that the witnesses be available for interview by counsel [53] and that justice is more likely to be achieved if both sides have an equal opportunity to interview the persons who have the information from which the truth may be determined. [54] Yet it appears that the requirements are substantially interfering with these objectives.
The first section of the Victims' Rights Act states its purpose: The purpose of AS 12.61.100-12.61.150 is to protect victims of and witnesses to crime from risk of harassment, intimidation, and unwarranted invasion of privacy by prohibiting the unnecessary disclosure of their addresses and telephone numbers.[ [55] ] In 1994 the Alaska Constitution was amended by adding a victims' rights clause. Article I, section 24 provides: Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights as provided by law: the right to be reasonably protected from the accused through the imposition of appropriate bail or conditions of release by the court; the right to confer with the prosecution; the right to be treated with dignity, respect, and fairness during all phases of the criminal and juvenile justice process; the right to timely disposition of the case following the arrest of the accused; the right to obtain information about and be allowed to be present at all criminal or juvenile proceedings where the accused has the right to be present; the right to be allowed to be heard, upon request, at sentencing, before or after conviction or juvenile adjudication, and at any proceeding where the accused's release from custody is considered; the right to restitution from the accused; and the right to be informed, upon request, of the accused's escape or release from custody before or after conviction or juvenile adjudication. According to the State, the 1996 amendments to the Victims' Rights Act were meant to implement the new constitutional clause. The amendments added AS 12.61.120(d)prohibiting undisclosed recording of victim and witness interviewsand AS 12.61.125adding more stringent constraints in connection with recorded and unrecorded interviews of victims and witnesses in sexual offense cases. [56] The legislative history of the 1996 amendments indicates that they were meant to reduce the sense of continued violation that victims may experience when they participate in pretrial and trial processes. [57] With respect to the advice and written consent requirements that are the subject of this part of the opinion, the State contends that the requirements are designed to ensure that citizens are provided advice when they most need itwhen they are being approached by the defense for an interviewso that they can meaningfully exercise their rights and exercise some control over their life. The State summarizes the statutory purposes as follows: By requiring defense representatives to advise victims and witnesses they do not have to be interviewed and that they can have another person present, and to obtain their permission before tape recording them, the Legislature attempted to assure that victims are treated with dignity, respect and fairness, as required by Article I, sec. 24 of the Alaska Constitution, and to minimize instances of intimidation and harassment, and violations of the privacy guaranteed by Article I, sec. 22 of the Constitution.
The validity of the oral advice requirements of subsections .120(c)(2) and (3) as applied to sexual offense and domestic violence victims are not in question in this case. As to victims in those categories only the written consent requirement of subsection .125(a)(2)(B) is challenged. The superior court found, as described above, that the written consent requirement posed serious practical problems, especially in non-urban areas. The court concluded that the written consent requirement added little if anything to the understanding of a victim's rights that is obtained by compliance with the oral advice requirements. [58] As to witnesses in sexual offense cases, the court observed that the written requirement was overbroad since it applied to all witnesses, many of whom are not emotionally vulnerable. [59] The stated objectives of the Victims' Rights Act are unquestionably legitimate. But the written advice and consent provisions go well beyond what is reasonably needed to achieve them. Victims of sexual offenses can be advised of their rights in a neutral fashion by prosecution representatives or victims' rights advocates, and the advice may be repeated orally by defense representatives. Requiring the additional step of written consent in the context of a defense interview only serves to underline a message that cooperation with the defense is undesirable. As to witnesses, the written consent requirement conveys the same message of noncooperation with even less justification. Turning to the advice requirements in general, their unbalanced nature is noteworthy. Witnesses and victims have the same right to decline to be interviewed by police and prosecutors as by defense representatives. Likewise witnesses and victims have the right to give such interviews only in the presence of defense representatives or other persons. But the provisions under review do not require that these rights be communicated. It is reasonable to assume that with respect to some victims, only defense representatives seem threatening and thus only one-sided advice needs to be given. But it is also true that some victims and witnesses feel harassed by the demands made on them by law enforcement personnel. [60] The fact that only defense representatives must tell a victim or witness you don't have to talk to me strengthens the suggestion that noncooperation with the defense side is desirable. The one-sidedness of the requirements also suggests a design to give an unfair advantage to the prosecution and undercuts the argument that they are only meant to convey to prospective interviewees accurate information about their legal rights. [61] We do not suggest that victims and witnesses should not be advised of their legal rights. But the form of advice given, bearing as it does the endorsement of the State, must be accurate, balanced, and designed to avoid conveying any suggestion that it is desirable not to cooperate with defense representatives. We think this could be accomplished if law enforcement personnel or victims' advocates were to present a carefully thought-out statement to victims and witnesses at the outset of proceedings. The advice and written consent provisions in their present form interfere with defendants' investigations. Adhering to them necessarily carries a message that it is undesirable to cooperate with defense representatives. Further, the written consent requirement imposes needless practical obstacles and is overbroad. The neutral objective of informing victims and witnesses of their rights and achieving the benefits that flow from such information can be realized without these impediments. For these reasons we conclude that the provisions are inconsistent with the due process rights of those accused of crime.