Opinion ID: 2049885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: representation of state of wisconsin by a private person.

Text: Both secs. 288.02 and 195.07(3), Stats. 1975, require a forfeiture action under sec. 196.625 to be brought in the name of the State of Wisconsin. Appellants contend that a private person may commence a forfeiture action under sec. 196.625 and the State of Wisconsin impliedly consents to participate in any such action. They assert that sec. 288.02 gives private persons the authority to bring such actions on behalf of the state. In McGovern v. Eckhart, 192 Wis. 558, 213 N.W. 332 (1927), this court construed secs. 288.01 and 288.02, Stats., and concluded that the right to proceed in a forfeiture action was with the state and not with an individual. The provisions of ch. 288 which were considered by the court in that case were the same as the present provisions. This court stated: There being no other provision specially provided for by the statute, the right of action to recover the penalty is in the state and not in the plaintiff.... Id. at 562.  Furthermore, this court has expressed its disapproval of private persons purporting to bring actions on behalf of the state. In State ex rel. Hartung v. City of Milwaukee, 102 Wis. 509, 78 N.W. 756 (1899), a private person brought an action to enjoin the continuance of an alleged public nuisance. Before bringing the action he requested the attorney general to bring suit in the name of the state. The attorney general denied the request, whereupon the relator, upon notice to the attorney general, applied to the circuit court for leave to prosecute the case in the name of the attorney general and on behalf of the state. The circuit court granted leave. This court dismissed the appeal because ... this action was never in fact an action on behalf of the state, because the state has never been represented by its proper law officer, and the court has no power to authorize a private relator to act pro hac vice as such officer. Id. at 514. The court also stated: ... We have been referred to no case, however, which holds that this action on behalf of the public may be maintained by a private relator without the presence of the proper law officer of the state. It is true that the expression is frequently used that the information may be filed either by the attorney general ex officio, or upon the relation of a private person ... But this does not mean that a private relator may prosecute alone, and without the presence of the proper law officer of the state. It simply means that a private person, especially interested perhaps, may make the sworn relation upon which the attorney general or other proper prosecuting officer of the state founds his action. Id. at 512, 513. [5] Similarly, the phrase in sec. 196.625, Stats., one-half of which shall go to the use of the person or corporation prosecuting therefor, cannot be construed to mean that a private person could commence a forfeiture action  alone, and thus force the state to become a party without the presence of the attorney general, as appellants contend. Rather it must be held to mean that a private person could prosecute in conjunction with the state pursuant to sec. 288.04, which provides in part, In case a portion of any forfeiture shall belong or shall be payable to any person, he may join with the state as a plaintiff; ... (Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Wisconsin Central Railroad Co., 128 Wis. 79, 107 N.W. 295 (1906), this court stated: Sec. 3297, Stats. 1898, [presently sec. 288.04] expressly authorizes the joining with the state of the person entitled to any portion of the forfeiture, as the plaintiff Crane is alleged to be, under the provisions of sec. 1819.... Id. at 81. Sec. 1819 was similar to sec. 196.625 in that it provided that ... such corporation shall, for each and every such violation or failure, forfeit not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, one half to the person prosecuting, ... (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 81. In that case, the state was represented by the attorney general and the private plaintiff was permitted to join with the state in the action. [6, 7] This court has stated that in interpreting statutes, they must be construed so as to give effect to every part, and it should not be presumed that any part of a statute is superfluous. Associated Hospital Service v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis.2d 447, 463, 109 N.W.2d 271 (1961). Stated differently, a statute should not be construed so as to render any portion or word surplusage. State v. Ross, 73 Wis.2d 1, 5, 242 N.W.2d 210 (1976); Mulvaney v. Tri State Truck & Auto Body, Inc., 70 Wis.2d 760, 764, 235 N.W.2d 460 (1975). If a private individual could compel the state to bring a forfeiture action or could bring an action in the name of the state, it would  render meaningless that portion of sec. 288.04, Stats., which permits a person to join with the state.