Opinion ID: 222704
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to Trial Proceedings

Text: Benner asserts that his constitutional right to present a full and complete defense2 was violated when the trial court excluded the proffered testimony of Maria Alejandra Santin that she told Benner in January 2009 that Cruz was working for the FBI. Benner sought to introduce Santin’s statement to show that he did not believe that he was doing anything illegal and thus lacked the necessary mens rea to be guilty of bribery. See 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1). Because Benner did not raise this constitutional claim below, we review it for plain error. United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001). To establish plain error, Benner must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affected his substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The exclusion of Santin’s testimony did not violate Benner’s constitutional right to present a defense, let alone amount to plain error. Benner argued at trial that Santin’s proposed testimony was admissible to show the effect of her 2 A defendant’s right to call witnesses and present evidence in his favor is secured by both the text of the Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. United States v. Hurn, 368 F.3d 1359, 1362 (11th Cir. 2004). 7 statement on Benner’s state of mind. On appeal Benner contends that Santin’s testimony was necessary to corroborate Benner’s testimony about Santin’s statement and cites United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1984), in support of this argument. In Eisenstein, the defendants asserted the defense of good faith reliance on advice of counsel after full disclosure of all relevant facts. Id. at 1543. In support of this defense, defendants sought to elicit the testimony of counsel. Id. at 154445. After one defendant testified concerning what he told the lawyer, the testimony of counsel as to what he had been told in order to render advice was erroneously excluded on the ground of hearsay. Id. This error was not harmless because it was “necessarily relevant” to the advice of counsel defense for the attorney to tell the jury the facts disclosed by the defendants upon which he gave his advice. Id. at 1546 (emphasis omitted). Further, counsel in Eisenstein was asked to testify to objective facts, not as to the state of mind of a defendant. Id. at 1544-45. Unlike the defendants in Eisenstein, Benner did not rely on an advice of counsel defense. Instead Benner contended that he did not have the mens rea to commit the crime for several reasons, one of which was the effect Santin’s statement had on his state of mind. However, Santin was not shown to be 8 competent to testify to Benner’s state of mind. The effect of Santin’s statement on Benner’s state of mind was a matter solely within the knowledge of Benner. Benner described to the jury at trial, without objection, Santin’s statement to him, when it was made, and its effect upon him.3 Thus Santin’s excluded testimony was merely cumulative to Benner’s undisputed testimony regarding Santin’s statement, and the exclusion of Santin’s proposed testimony did not violate Benner’s constitutional right to present a mens rea defense. See United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that cumulative testimony was properly excluded); United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that the exclusion of a defense witness does not violate due process where the proposed testimony would be cumulative or irrelevant (citations omitted)). Even assuming that Santin’s testimony was improperly excluded, the resulting prejudice to Benner did not amount to plain error. The government presented overwhelming evidence that Benner acted with corrupt intent, including: (1) Benner’s post-arrest admissions that he participated in the scheme to unfreeze the accounts, that he would receive between $5,000 and $6,000 for unfreezing the accounts, and that the Bank of America employee would receive 5% of the 3 Benner testified that in January of 2009, Santin told him that Cruz was working for the FBI. Benner further stated that he thought Cruz “could only be doing good things” and could not “get involved in something illegal or any wrongdoing” if Cruz was working for the FBI. 9 proceeds for unfreezing the accounts; (2) the overall clandestine and irregular nature of the scheme; (3) Benner’s text messages and trial testimony suggesting that he knew that the Bank of America employee was to receive money for unfreezing the bank accounts; (4) Benner’s education, intelligence, and experience in the mortgage industry; (5) Benner’s testimony that according to Parra, Bank of America would receive a 5% commission for releasing the frozen funds; (6) Benner’s testimony that he told Cruz that there would be a commission for her and for the bank in unfreezing the accounts; and (7) the surveillance video and transcript showing that Parra gave Special Agent Santamaria $2,000 in exchange for the proceeds of the frozen bank accounts. In light of this evidence, the exclusion of Santin’s testimony did not affect Benner’s substantial rights. Benner also maintains that the jury instruction on aiding and abetting was erroneous because it failed to specify that the jury must find that a person besides the defendant actually committed the substantive offense. The aiding and abetting jury instruction at issue adequately embodies the well-settled principle that one cannot aid or abet himself, United States v. Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1407 (11th Cir. 1984), and it is virtually identical to the aiding and abetting instruction sustained in United States v. Broadwell, 870 F.2d 594, 607 n.32 (11th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, we reject Benner’s assignment of error to the aiding and abetting jury instruction 10 used in his case.