Opinion ID: 2831433
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the good faith or bad faith of the offender;

Text: b. the degree of willfulness, vindictiveness, negligence, or frivolousness involved in the offense; c. the knowledge, experience, and expertise of the offender; d. any prior history of sanctionable conduct on the part of the offender; e. the reasonableness and necessity of the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the offended person as a result of the misconduct; f. the nature and extent of prejudice, apart from out-of-pocket expenses, suffered by the offended person as a result of the misconduct; g. the relative culpability of client and counsel, and the impact on their privileged relationship of an inquiry into that area; h. the risk of chilling the specific type of litigation involved; i. the impact of the sanction on the offender, including the offender’s ability to pay a monetary sanction; j. the impact of the sanction on the offended party, including the offended person’s need for compensation; 25 list of factors is helpful in guiding the often intangible process of determining a penalty for sanctionable behavior, and it provides context for our review of the trial court’s award. We advised in Low that “[a]lthough we do not require a trial court to address all of the factors . . . to explain the basis of a monetary sanction . . . it should consider relevant factors in assessing the amount of the sanction.” Id. at 620–21 (emphasis added). In practice, this means that when a factor is relevant to a party being sanctioned, that factor must inform the issuance of the award. To take just one example, one factor we referenced in Low is “any prior history of sanctionable conduct on the part of the offender.” Id. at 620 n.5. A court obviously need not consider prior sanctionable conduct in calibrating a sanction award for a first-time litigant for the self-evident reason that no such conduct exists. Yet, were the example reversed and a sanctioned litigant possessed a lengthy history of prior sanctions, the court “should consider” that party’s checkered history in levying a sanction. Id. at 620–21 & 620 n.5. Here, the trial court cited and then considered nearly all of the relevant Low factors. In the context of this matter, however, one factor made relevant by the protracted nature of this litigation k. the relative magnitude of sanction necessary to achieve the goal or goals of the sanction; l. burdens on the court system attributable to the misconduct, including consumption of judicial time and incurrence of juror fees and other court costs; .... n. the degree to which the offended person’s own behavior caused the expenses for which recovery is sought. Low, 221 S.W .3d at 620 n.5 (quoting A M ERIC AN B AR A SSO CIA TIO N , S TAN D ARD S AN D G U ID ELIN ES FO R P RACTIC E U N D ER R U LE 11 OF TH E F EDERAL R U LES O F C IV IL P RO CED U RE , reprinted in 121 F.R.D. 101, 104 (1988) (omission in original)). 26 is “the degree to which the offended person’s own behavior caused the expenses for which recovery is sought.” Id. at 620 n.5 (quotation marks omitted). The trial court failed to address this factor, though it is unquestionably relevant. The statements Nath addressed in his original petition were made in 2004, and Nath filed suit well after the one-year limitations period had run. Yet, the record indicates that all three parties litigated a host of merits issues for nearly a half-decade before the Hospital and Baylor moved for summary judgment on such grounds as limitations. Thus, while Nath was the initiator of this litigation, the degree to which the Hospital and Baylor caused their attorney’s fees is a relevant inquiry. A party is entitled to thoroughly and vigorously litigate a matter. But if issues asserted in pleadings are revealed to be frivolous, and the defending party delays moving for summary judgment and sanctions, the defending party adopts some responsibility for the overall increase in litigation costs. Of course, placing the entire cost of litigation on a plaintiff may be proper and deserved if the plaintiff was the party responsible for sustaining frivolous litigation over a prolonged period. Here, the trial court found the defamation claims were friviolous ab initio because the statements were alleged to have been made at least one year before suit was filed. Moreover, the time-barred statements permeated subsequent pleadings. The defendants, however, did not file a summary judgment for years after the allegations were first made. A defending party cannot arbitrarily shift the entirety of its costs on its adversary simply because it ultimately prevails on a motion for 27 sanctions. Because the trial court did not discernibly examine this relevant Low factor, we remand for it to do so.30