Opinion ID: 1709949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Assessment of the Murder in the Course of a Felony Aggravator

Text: Tanzi asserts that the trial court impermissibly doubled the aggravator that the murder was committed during the course of a felony by listing its finding that Tanzi committed the murder during the course of a kidnapping as aggravator number two and by listing its finding that Tanzi committed the murder during the course of sexual batteries as aggravator number three. In reviewing aggravating factors on appeal, this Court review[s] the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding. Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla.1997). Section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1999), provides an exclusive list of aggravating factors, expressly stating that [a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to those aggravators. This Court has stated that section 921.141 is designed to limit the unbridled exercise of judicial discretion in cases where the ultimate penalty is possible. Provence v. State, 337 So.2d 783, 786 (Fla.1976). The particular statutory aggravator at issue is: The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any: robbery; sexual battery; aggravated child abuse; abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult resulting in great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; arson; burglary; kidnapping; aircraft piracy; or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1999). Nothing in this provision appears to authorize a trial court to treat this single aggravator as multiple and separate aggravators depending upon the number of felonies committed. Instead, if a trial court determines that a defendant committed a capital offense during the course of any of the felonies delineated above, the trial court can find this single aggravating circumstance. See also Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058, 1063-64 (Fla.1982) (treating the fact that a murder was committed during the course of multiple felonies as a single aggravating circumstance). Of course, the trial court is free to give this single felony murder aggravating circumstance greater weight due to the fact the murder was committed during the course of multiple felonies. Therefore, the trial court in this case should have found one murder in the course of a felony aggravator based upon the multiple felonies of kidnapping and sexual battery and weighed the aggravator accordingly. Having determined that one murder in the course of a felony aggravating circumstance was erroneously listed by the trial court, this Court must determine if this error was harmless. The record reflects six valid aggravators: (1) that the murder was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment or on community control or on felony probation; (2) that the murder was committed while Tanzi was engaged in the commission of kidnapping and sexual batteries; (3) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest; (4) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (5) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (6) that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP). The trial court gave each of these valid aggravators great weight except the HAC aggravator, which the trial court gave utmost weight. Therefore, there are six substantial aggravators, including the HAC and CCP aggravators, and nonstatutory mitigation that the trial judge gave some weight and some small weight. After carefully reviewing the record, including the jury's unanimous recommendation of death, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that even without a second murder in the course of a felony aggravator, the trial court would have found that the aggravating factors present in this case substantially outweighed the mitigating evidence. Thus, this Court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the trial court's imposition of a death sentence. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986) (stating that the harmless error test requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict).