Opinion ID: 1515913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Motions to Vacate

Text: The record discloses that there were two motions to vacate the judgments filed and argued by successor counsel before two different justices of the Superior Court. The second motion to vacate was filed on December 15, 1999, and was heard on January 31 and February 22, 2000. The hearing justice issued a written decision on May 8, 2000, and denied the requested relief. During the hearing before the second hearing justice, defendants argued that the court should vacate or modify the judgments entered in this case because § 45-19-1, pursuant to which three plaintiffs asserted the right to relief, does not apply to retired police officers and, according to the established factual allegations in the complaints, each plaintiff was entitled to 100 percent of the salary and benefits he would have received while a member of the police department up to the date he retired. We agree with this argument and hold that this is the only remedy available to plaintiffs Webster, Riccitelli and Bolton. Significantly, the allegations in the complaints, accepted as true, are that these plaintiffs were injured on duty and rendered wholly incapacitated and ceased the performance of their duties as full-time police officers and,  [p]ursuant to 45-19-1, the Town of Johnston should be paying the salary, wages and other benefits [they] would have been entitled to had [they] not been so incapacitated. We therefore conclude that, according to the language contained in the complaints, theplaintiffs' entitlement to compensation is governed by § 45-19-1 and the previous pronouncements of this Court. When the state workers' compensation statute was first enacted in 1912, police officers and firefighters were not excluded from it's provisions. However, they subsequently were excluded by the Legislature in 1917. See Labbadia v. State, 513 A.2d 18, 20 (R.I.1986); and see P.L.1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 1. In 1944 the precursor to § 45-19-1 was enacted [by the General Assembly in] P.L. 1944, ch. 1479, which required cities and towns to pay police officers who were incapacitated during the course of performing their duties, their full salary for the duration of the incapacity. Labbadia, 513 A.2d at 20. The term police officer included in the original act and in each of the eleven successive amendments was defined as any chief or other member of the police department of any city or town, regularly employed at a fixed salary or wage. [14] (Emphasis added.) The question of a police officer's entitlement to salary and benefits after an on-duty injury or illness pursuant to § 45-19-1 has been before this Court on a number of previous occasions. In Labbadia, we declared that § 45-19-1 is a substitute for workers' compensation and affords greater protection to injured police officers and firefighters than either the common law remedy or the state workers' compensation scheme and was intended by the Legislature to provide greater benefits to these public service employees. In Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 259 (R.I.1996), we were called upon to determine whether a police officer was entitled to maintain an action in tort for negligence against his municipal employer and we again distinguished the IOD statute from the state Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) and held that [t]he IOD statute provides that any police officer in Rhode Island who isinjured in the performance of his or her duties may recover the benefits under the statutory scheme, including payment of medical and related expenses for police officers. Id. at 258-59. Further, we noted that all such medical expenses related to this injury will be covered if he or she retires in a disabled condition as a result of the injury and he or she suffers a recurrence of the injury that led to the retirement. Id. at 259. (Emphasis added.) We have never held, nor do we hold today, that an on-duty injury or illness and a voluntary retirement amounts to a lifetime appointment to the police force or a lifetime pay check, including uniform allowances and other benefits. Section 45-19-1 is limited to police officers, firefighters and other public safety personnel who are actually employed when they suffer the disability and are paid the compensation provided by the IOD statute. We now hold in clear and unambiguous language that § 45-19-1 is not a retirement act. It applies to a police officer or another enumerated individual who is wholly or partially incapacitated by reason of injuries received or sickness contracted in the performance of his or her duties and who is entitled to like compensation and benefits, while he or she remains a member of the department. We recognize that some officers may suffer career-ending injuries or illnesses. Although these officers may never return to active duty, as long as they are receiving benefits in accordance with § 45-19-1, similar to any other workers' compensation scheme, they remain employed by the department, are subject to its rules and regulations and may be required to undergo periodic examinations to determine whether the injury or illness is continuing. Officers who continue to collect paychecks from their respective departments pursuant to § 45-19-1 are employees of the municipality that is paying them full salary and benefits and are not free, as are retired officers, to undertake a second career or otherwise deviate from the rules of the department respecting outside employment. Further, as the statute contemplates, if an officer receivingcompensation pursuant to § 45-19-1 elects to retire or reaches mandatory retirement age, he or she is entitled to reimbursement for non-covered medical expenses thereafter. Over twenty years ago in the case of Aiudi v. Pepin, 417 A.2d 320 (R.I.1980), we held in clear and unequivocal terms that [s]alary benefits become payable only if, at the time of the demand, the officer would have been eligible to receive a salary. Id. at 321. We declared that an officer who is no longer a member of the police department is not entitled to the benefits provided by § 45-19-1. Aiudi, 417 A.2d at 321. A judgment by default does not change the law in this jurisdiction nor does it transpose a police officer's voluntary retirement into active duty or IOD status. [15] This case is distinguishable from Brissette v. Potter, 560 A.2d 324 (R.I.1989), a case relied upon by plaintiffs. Brissette had been injured while responding to a domestic disturbance and began receiving benefits pursuant to § 45-19-1 until he was terminated from the force thirty-three months later. We reversed the decision of the trial justice that denied him continued benefits pursuant to the IOD statute and held that as a member of the department, Brissette was entitled to receive the salary to which he would have been entitled had he not been so incapacitated. Brissette, 560 A.2d at 326. We were not called upon to reach the question of the effect, if any, of a voluntary retirement. Accordingly, we hold that § 45-19-1 is applicable to the public safety personnel enumerated in the statute who are regularly employed at a fixed salary or wage and does not include retirees of these departments. Nor are we satisfied that the liability respecting count 2 of the complaints is of any assistance to these plaintiffs. It has been conclusively established that each plaintiff was a member of the collective bargaining unit and that Article X, the section concerning sick leave of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time of their retirements provided that,  All members of the police department who are injured or contact [ sic ] illness in the line of duty shall receive benefits in conformity with the General Laws of the State of Rhode Island, ([§] 45-19-1) as amended. (Emphasis added.) However, by its terms, this provision, consistent with the provisions of § 45-19-1, applies to those individuals who are members of the police department at the time they are injured or contract a job-related illness. See Aiudi v. Pepin, 417 A.2d 320 (R.I.1980). Thus this provision is of no assistance to the plaintiffs in this case. The third theory of liability contained in plaintiffs complaints related to an unidentified opinion of this Court that decid[ed] the legal issue which forms the basis of the Plaintiff[s'] claim[s]. A review of the record indicates that the plaintiffs relied upon Chester as support for their conclusion that a disability pension was somehow transmuted into active duty status for which decades of back pay are due and owing. They are incorrect; Chester bears little resemblance to the issues before this Court. In Chester, we were not asked to construe the meaning of § 45-19-1 or to decide whether the language of Article X of the collective bargaining agreement, the same language relied upon by plaintiffs herein that deals with sick leave and not retirement, is applicable to a voluntary retirement. In that decision the only issue we were called upon to decide was whether the inclusion of the aforementioned provision in the town's collective bargaining agreement superseded a special Act of the General Assembly. We held that, when there exists a valid and an enforceable collective-bargaining agreement whose terms provide greaterdisability benefits than is afforded by the special legislation, Chester, 667 A.2d at 521, the provision of the collective bargaining agreement takes precedence over the special act. We were not called upon to decide, and indeed never addressed, the meaning of these provisions or their applicability to long-retired officers. We merely held that the [T]own of Johnston properly entered into an agreement whose terms provide greater disability benefits to the [T]own of Johnston police officers.  Id. at 522. (Emphasis added.) Although the plaintiffs' conclusions of law contained in the complaints are not deemed admitted by the default, Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd., and, like all questions of law, are reserved to the Court, Chester is a decision involving accepted principles of statutory construction in which our task was to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. See Chester v. aRusso, 677 A.2d 519 (R.I.1995); see also Matter of Falstaff Brewing, 637 A.2d at 1049-50. It has no bearing on the question of plaintiffs' entitlement to damages. To the extent that Chester holds otherwise, we specifically overrule it. Accordingly, we are satisfied that plaintiffs Webster, Bolton, and Riccitelli, who claimed compensation pursuant to the provisions of § 45-19-1, are entitled to receive compensation from the town for all periods during which they were actively employed and were entitled to a paycheck. Aiudi v. Pepin, 417 A.2d 320 (R.I.1980). Each plaintiff is owed 100 percent of the salary and benefits he was receiving up to the date of his voluntary retirement. These cases are remanded for a new determination of damages in accordance with this decision. The judgment for plaintiff Ferrante, who made no claim under § 45-19-1, but who contended that the town failed to afford him the benefits of a disability retirement and failed to appropriately calculate his pension entitlements and periodic increases, including medical benefits and periodic pension increases and proceeded to make a general, boilerplate demand for relief is vacated in its entirety.