Opinion ID: 2467100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: claims as to b-j's family bar

Text: That Section 537.053 is inapplicable does not end our inquiry, however. Respondents argue that the common law rule in existence at the time of this accident will not recognize a claim against sellers of alcoholic beverages. The common law finds its clearest expression in the pages of judicial opinions. Our courts have long recognized their continuing responsibility as arbiters of the common law, modifying that great body of rules, doctrine and tradition as the needs of advancing society dictate. It thus remains the prerogative of appellate courtsproperly exercised only when justifiedto modify the common law where the legislature has failed to speak. The Supreme Court is a court of limited appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3. General appellate jurisdiction is vested in a single Court of Appeals, id., divided into three districts. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 1. The responsibility to announce the common law is not, therefore, the exclusive province of this Court. The common law moves tentatively; the process of modification is one of careful steps, of thoughtful maturation. It is a process in which the Court of Appeals plays an important role. We may deny the Court of Appeals its role in the common law process only by ignoring the constitutionally mandated division of judicial power and at the risk of calcifying the common law. In 1934, the General Assembly repealed Missouri's dram shop act which had provided a civil remedy against dram shop owners for injuries caused by their intoxicated patrons. Section 4487, RSMo 1929 (repealed 1933-34 Laws of Missouri, 77.) The repeal of the dram shop act did not alter the common law; instead, the repeal of the dram shop act restored questions of dram shop liability to the arena of the common law and the transfiguring touch of the courts. Until 1983, the common law in Missouri did not recognize a cause of action against a tavern owner by a person injured by an intoxicated tavern patron. [1] In 1983, however, the Court of Appeals, Eastern District, found a common law duty in tavern owners to refrain from serving intoxicated patrons and imposed liability for injuries resulting from a breach of that duty. Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo.App. 1983). The court found that Section 311.310 is indicative of Missouri public policy, a public policy which is expressed even more fundamentally in the general law of torts. Carver, 647 S.W.2d at 575. The court reasoned that under the general law of torts, [e]very person is required to take ordinary care against injuries reasonably to be anticipated. Id. This standard of ordinary care imposed a duty upon [the tavern owner] to avoid supplying Mr. Schafer with intoxicating liquor once it became apparent that Mr. Schafer was intoxicated. Id. The court determined that the well-documented foreseeability of accidents caused by drunken drivers and the statutory policy expressed in sec. 311.310, id., justify the extension of liability under common law concepts to tavern owners who serve intoxicated patrons. The Court of Appeals decided Carver February 8, 1983. No transfer application was filed in this Court. Mr. Lambing died October 26, 1983. At the time of Mr. Lambing's death, Carver recognized a common law cause of action against a tavern owner who served alcohol to an intoxicated patron who subsequently injured a third person. Thus, under Carver appellants' petition stated a cause of action against B-J's Family Bar. Because Section 575.053 cannot operate retrospectively to extinguish appellants' common law claim against B-J's, the trial court erred in sustaining B-J's motion for summary judgment.