Opinion ID: 672340
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Agent Barnette

Text: 17 Shortly after Appellants were arrested, Agent Keith Barnette was arrested and charged by Alabama authorities with vehicular homicide committed while on duty. 6 At trial, Appellants sought to question Barnette regarding the arrest and discrepancies between his testimony and his rough notes, prepared one week after the arrest. Appellants proffered that they would impeach Barnette by showing that he had changed his testimony as a result of the arrest in the hopes of receiving leniency in his pending criminal case and/or assistance in any civil actions against him. However, the government filed a motion in limine to prevent defense counsel from examining Barnette concerning the vehicular homicide action. In granting the government's motion, the district court held that so long as Barnette's testimony was consistent with his rough notes, which had previously been turned over to Appellants, Appellants could not question Barnette about the accident or pending action against him. 18 On direct examination, Barnette testified that Diaz had spoken to him regarding the count on the cocaine and had used a calculator to add the cocaine packages. On cross-examination, Barnette admitted that his notes did not reflect the conversation or Diaz's use of a calculator. Appellants then asked Barnette whether there had been new developments in your life that might cause you to want to curry favor with the United States Government prosecutors and customs agents and other law enforcement agents in this case. Barnette answered in the negative. Asked the same question a second time by the court, Barnette again denied having any reason to curry favor. Appellants then moved to pursue further this line of questioning, which was denied. 19 Appellants next asked whether Barnette was under investigation by the Internal Affairs of the Customs Service and no longer on active duty. The court sustained the government's objections before Barnette answered either question. However, Barnette did answer yes in response to Appellants' question if he would lose his job if he committed perjury. On redirect, Barnette testified that the day after Appellants' arrest and prior to creating his notes, he told the U.S. Attorney's Office about the conversation with Diaz and about Diaz's use of a calculator. After the government concluded its case-in-chief, defense counsel recalled the witness and attempted to establish its proffer. As before, Barnette denied being biased or motivated on behalf of the government. Consequently, the court maintained its prior ruling prohibiting examination into the vehicular homicide action. On appeal, Appellants claim that restricting Barnette's cross-examination was error. We disagree. 20 Although the district court possesses discretionary power to rule on the admissibility of evidence, United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1468 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2723, 129 L.Ed.2d 847 (1994), its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination is subject to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Id.; United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir.1992). 7 The right to cross-examine is not unlimited, however, because once there is sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, further questioning is within the district court's discretion. United States v. Taylor, 17 F.3d 333, 340-41 (11th Cir.1994). The test for the Confrontation Clause is whether a reasonable jury would have received a significantly different impression of the witness' credibility had counsel pursued the proposed line of cross-examination. Id. (quoting Garcia, 13 F.3d at 1469). 21 Appellants wished to question Barnette about the state court indictment, hypothesizing that it gave him motive to testify favorably for the government in the hopes that he would receive leniency or assistance as to the homicide action. Appellants rely on Greene v. Wainwright, 634 F.2d 272, 275-76 (5th Cir.1981) for the proposition that because they were attempting to show bias on the part of a prosecution witness, Barnette, the limitation on cross-examination was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the mere fact that Appellants sought to explore bias on the part of a prosecution witness does not automatically void the court's ability to limit cross-examination. It is axiomatic that the right to cross-examination is not absolute because the information sought to be elicited must be relevant. Haber v. Wainwright, 756 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985). 22 Here, Barnette's testimony was consistent with statements given prior to both the creation of his notes and his arrest. Barnette's testimony simply parroted statements made at a time when he had no special incentive to seek the government's help. Because of the highly prejudicial nature of the arrest, the court properly handled the cross-examination by limiting inquiry into the accident as long as Barnette's testimony did not deviate from his notes and prior statements. The fact that his testimony was entirely consistent with these prior statements demonstrates that Barnette was not shading his testimony in an effort to gain leniency on his state court case. Moreover, we note that there is no evidence in the record showing that the government had the ability to grant leniency in Barnette's Alabama action. 8 In light of these circumstances, we fail to see how the limitation on cross-examination constituted an abuse of discretion or violated the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Thorn, 917 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir.1990) (barring defendant from exploring government witness' state law indictment did not violate Sixth Amendment as there was no evidence the government could influence the state court proceedings, and the existence of a pending state court indictment on charges totally unrelated to the testimony offered in the case did not give the witness a substantial reason to cooperate with the government). Finally, Appellants were able to delve into Barnette's credibility, albeit in a limited fashion, by inquiring if he had any reason to curry favor with the government. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Appellants' cross-examination of Barnette.