Opinion ID: 2685893
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crack-Distribution Testimony

Text: Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine asking the district court to enter a pretrial order admitting into evidence testimony regarding defendant's crack cocaine distribution. The government argued: -5- The evidence as to the defendant's distribution of, and transport of, crack cocaine along with heroin, is part and parcel of the crime with the charged crime of conspiracy to distribute heroin. The United States anticipates that several witnesses will testify that they received both crack cocaine and heroin from the defendant, and that the defendant brought both crack cocaine and heroin with him to Waterloo from Chicago. The United States anticipates that an additional witness will testify that he received large quantities of crack cocaine from the defendant. These activities occurred during the same time period as the charged conspiracy, involved the same group of people, and trips from Chicago to Waterloo. The evidence, therefore, is appropriate evidence of the activities of the charged conspiracy. The district court granted the motion, finding that such evidence was admissible as intrinsic evidence and admissible under Rule 404(b). The crack-distribution evidence presented at trial was consistent with the government's pretrial characterization of that evidence. For example, Essex introduced crack customers to Thomas, who even redistributed crack in Waterloo. Also, Katina bought crack for personal use and redistribution, much like she did with heroin. Scott also purchased crack from Thomas. Several heroin coconspirators knew that Thomas distributed crack as well as heroin to other coconspirators. On appeal, Thomas contends that crack distribution evidence was not part and parcel of the heroin conspiracy. As proof, Thomas highlights that one witness who knew of his crack distribution knew nothing of Thomas's heroin distribution. He further avers that the crack distribution evidence violated Rule 404(b) because it was immaterial, was not similar in kind to the heroin evidence, and produced a prejudicial effect that substantially outweighed its probative value. Upon review, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the crackdistribution evidence constituted intrinsic evidence. The evidence of Thomas's crack -6- distribution was so blended or connected with the heroin conspiracy and distribution that it helped explain[ ] the circumstances thereof [and] is . . . an integral part of the immediate context of the crime charged. Fleck, 413 F.3d at 890 (quotation and citation omitted). Several witnesses testified that they received both heroin and crack from Thomas. Thomas transported both crack and heroin during his treks from Chicago to Waterloo. Coconspirators introduced Thomas to both heroin users/redistributors and crack users/redistributors. In one of the intercepted calls, Thomas arranged both a heroin and a crack transaction. As the government notes in its brief, Thomas blended his heroin and crack cocaine business together to the extent that it would be nearly impossible at times to separate the two. Thus, the crack-distribution evidence here constituted intrinsic evidence that Rule 404(b) does not prohibit.