Opinion ID: 606084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court-Martial.

Text: 4 No facts were in dispute on this issue. MacDonald argues that, because a general court-martial is not a court, and the military offenses of which he was convicted are not crimes in the civilian sense, he should not be deemed to have been convicted of a crime in a court for purposes of the felon in possession statute. Whether convictions such as MacDonald's by general courts-martial are within the scope of § 922(g)(1) is an issue of statutory interpretation, and is thus reviewed de novo. Anderson v. United States, 966 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir.1992). The statute at issue reads as follows: 5 (g) It shall be unlawful for any person-- 6 (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... 7 to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 8 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 9 MacDonald has been unable, as have we, to find authority for the proposition that military offenses without civilian equivalents are not crimes for purposes of § 922(g)(1). He correctly cites Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 749-50, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2558-59, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) and Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1281, 1289, 47 L.Ed.2d 556 (1976) for the proposition that the Uniform Code of Military Justice cannot be equated to a civilian criminal code. These cases also stand for the fact that the Uniform Code of Military Justice regulates a far broader range of conduct than a typical state criminal code. But he has not found authority for the proposition that conduct so criminalized is not a crime for purposes of the felon in possession statute. We can find no authority squarely on point either way. To the extent that any authority is analogous or suggestive, it holds that general courts-martial are courts, see United States v. Lee, 428 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017, 92 S.Ct. 679, 30 L.Ed.2d 665 (1972); United States v. Noble, 613 F.Supp. 1224 (D.Mont.1985), and convictions in courts of foreign countries establish crimes for purposes of the felon in possession law, see United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 116, 107 L.Ed.2d 77 (1989); United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754 (6th Cir.1986). 10 The statute defines crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year in a way which would accept the military definition of a crime for purposes of determining if a defendant is a felon in possession: 11 The term crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year does not include-- 12 (A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices, or 13 (B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less. 14 What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. 15 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). This provision requires that the meaning of a criminal conviction be drawn from the Uniform Code of Military Justice, not civilian law, where that was the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. 16 This deference toward the military definition is consistent with the recent decision of Congress to criminalize possession of a firearm by one who has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, whether convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year of imprisonment or not, see Act of May 19, 1986, P.L. 99-308, § 102, 100 Stat. 451, and with the general principle that civilian courts must grant full faith and credit to the judgments of general courts-martial, see Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 345, 27 S.Ct. 749, 751, 51 L.Ed. 1084 (1907). This construction is also consistent with the statutory purpose, to keep guns out of the hands of presumptively risky people. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 986, 991 n. 6, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983). 17 We hold that a general court-martial is a court within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and a conviction, such as MacDonald's, for which an individual is punishable for a term exceeding one year, amounts to a crime for purposes of § 922(g)(1). We therefore affirm MacDonald's conviction. 18