Opinion ID: 2527080
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Temporary Prejudgment Orders and Full Faith and Credit

Text: Regarding Dodson's first argument, Padron does not dispute that the Florida injunction was not a final order and concedes it was not a determination of the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Instead Padron argues the lack of finality is not determinative because the language of K.S.A. 60-3001(a) recognizes any judgment, decree or order of a sister state and suggests this language is sufficiently broad to encompass the Florida temporary injunction. This argument ignores the limiting language of K.S.A. 60-3001(a) that recognizes any judgment, decree or order of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state. (Emphasis added.) In other words, only if a foreign judgment or order is entitled to full faith and credit can the judgment or order be enforced. Dodson argues that temporary prejudgment orders are not orders entitled to full faith and credit under either the United States Constitution or the Foreign Judgments Act. This argument is not supported by any specific statement to this effect in the Foreign Judgments Act. Nevertheless, the concept of the finality of judgment is incorporated in K.S.A. 60-3004(a), which permits the filing of foreign judgments that have been appealed or are subject to appeal, but it requires that enforcement of such judgments be stayed until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated. The provision states: If the judgment debtor shows the district court that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated, upon proof that the judgment debtor has furnished the security for the satisfaction of the judgment required by the state in which it was rendered. K.S.A. 60-3004(a). Applying this provision, this court has indicated that K.S.A. 60-3004(a) does not require that the foreign judgment be a final judgment in the sense that time for an appeal has expired or appellate remedies have been exhausted; instead, when the district court is notified of an appeal of the foreign judgment, the enforcement of the foreign judgment is stayed until the appeal becomes final. Otherwise, attempts to enforce a foreign judgment which is subject to modification would be a waste of everyone's time. In re Estate of Rains, 249 Kan. 178, 185, 815 P.2d 61 (1991). This holding does not clearly apply to this case, however, because Estate of Rains dealt with a judgment on appeal, not a temporary injunction. Further, K.S.A. 60-3004(a) does not directly apply because the temporary injunction was not an appealable order. In fact, there does not appear to be any controlling authority on point; the parties do not cite and we have not found a Kansas case determining whether a prejudgment order, such as a temporary restraining order or injunction, is entitled to full faith and credit. See Hicks v. Hefner, 210 Kan. 79, 82-86, 499 P.2d 1147 (1972) (approvingly citing cases from other states holding that orders subject to modification are not entitled to full faith and credit but deciding issue on other grounds). Nevertheless, the question has been considered in other jurisdictionsunder both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Foreign Judgments Actwith the generally accepted result being that full faith and credit is not required when a decree is interlocutory or subject to modification under the law of the rendering state, except for an exception in some jurisdictions for child custody orders. E.g., Harris v. Harris, 14 Conn.App. 384, 388, 540 A.2d 1079 (1988) (The plaintiff, by obtaining both final orders, made the judgment impervious to modification and therefore took the necessary step in entitling her case to full faith and credit under Connecticut law.); Cook v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 347 Mont. 372, 378, 198 P.3d 310 (2008) (limiting the Full Faith and Credit Clause to final judgment); Clark v. Clark, 714 A.2d 427, 430 (Pa.Super.1998) (because child and spousal support orders are modifiable, they are considered nonfinal orders not subject to full faith and credit in Pennsylvania); Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, 839 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.1992) (full faith and credit not required when decree is interlocutory or subject to modification under the law of the rendering state); Mindis Metals v. Oilfield Motor & Control, 132 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. App.2004) (only when judgment is conclusive locally does Full Faith and Credit Clause preclude any inquiry into merits; party seeking to enforce foreign judgment has initial burden to present judgment that appears on its face to be final, valid, and subsisting judgment); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 107 (1971) (A judgment will not be recognized or enforced in other states insofar as it is not a final determination under the local law of the state of rendition.). Presumably, a distinction is made between final and nonfinal orders because a judgment that is conclusive in the state where it was pronounced is equally conclusive elsewhere, and a judgment that is not conclusive in the state of its rendition is equally inconclusive in another state. Overmyer v. Eliot Realty, 83 Misc.2d 694, 704-05, 371 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1975) (stating that a foreign judgment is entitled to same weight in state in which enforcement is sought as the rendering state would accord it there; if judgment could be impeached in the rendering state, it can be collaterally attacked in a state where enforcement is sought). For example, in this case it is possible the Florida court would determine it did not have jurisdiction over Dodson or would otherwise determine that Padron was not entitled to relief on the merits. As a result, the Florida court could modify the injunction. Because of such a possibility, our sister jurisdictions have generally refused to allow a prejudgment remedy based on a nonfinal judgment. E.g., Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co., 268 Conn. 264, 275, 842 A.2d 1113 (2004) (Since a plaintiff cannot bring an action to enforce a foreign judgment until that foreign judgment is obtained, a plaintiff likewise cannot base an application for a prejudgment remedy on an action to enforce a foreign judgment until that foreign judgment is obtained.); American Refractories v. Combustion Controls, 70 S.W.3d 660, 663 (Mo.App.2002) ([J]urisdiction over an attachment proceeding is derived from the main action, so the main action must necessarily be in the court where the attachment is sought, otherwise there is no action in that court from which to acquire jurisdiction. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to enter a writ of attachment in Missouri based on a Pennsylvania legal action.). The rationale of these decisions is persuasive and consistent with this court's holding in In re Estate of Rains, 249 Kan. 178, 815 P.2d 61. An additional consideration is that K.S.A. 60-3007 obligates us to interpret and construe the Foreign Judgments Act in uniformity with other states that have adopted the uniform act. As a result, although there may be exceptions we are not called on to consider in this case, we conclude that in general an ex parte temporary injunction is not entitled to full faith and credit and is not subject to enforcement under the Foreign Judgments Act, K.S.A. 60-3001 et seq. Nevertheless, Padron argues we cannot affirm the district court on this basis because Dodson did not raise the issue before the district court and the district court did not rely on the temporary nature of the Florida order in making its ruling. In response, Dodson suggests that although the district court did not articulate the finality issue, it correctly refused to limit its considerations to extrinsic fraud and Florida's jurisdiction to issue the injunction. We agree with Dodson, although on slightly different grounds. As discussed, a Kansas court enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Foreign Judgments Act only has jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment that is entitled to full faith and credit. In other words, the district court's subject matter jurisdiction is limited to such orders, and subject matter jurisdiction is a question that may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal or even on an appellate court's own motion. Shipe v. Public Wholesale Water Supply Dist. No. 25, 289 Kan. 160, 166, 210 P.3d 105 (2009); see also Pierce v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Kan. 74, 80-81, 434 P.2d 858 (1967) (recognizing three situations where an issue, including a constitutional issue, can be presented for first time on direct appeal: [1] newly asserted theory involves only question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and issue is finally determinative of the case; [2] resolution of question is necessary to serve ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights; or [3] district court reached right conclusion but relied on wrong ground or assigned wrong reason for its decision). As a result, we are not precluded from considering whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of either Dodson's failure to argue the issue before the district court or the district court's lack of reliance on that basis for its decision. We, therefore, affirm the district court's refusal to enforce the Florida ex parte temporary injunction under the Foreign Judgments Act, K.S.A. 60-3001 et seq. Because we reach this conclusion, we need not consider the parties' arguments regarding whether the Florida court had jurisdiction over Dodson. However, we must consider Dodson's arguments that the Kansas district court was entitled to order the return of the aircraft to Kansas, to order an additional bond, and to consider Dodson's counterclaim because of the provisions of K.S.A. 60-3002.