Opinion ID: 1365990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Double-counting of Guilt Phase Crimes and Special Circumstances Under Factors (a) and (b).

Text: (16) Defendant argues that the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that the crimes for which he was convicted during the guilt phase and the special circumstances found to be true were to be considered in aggravation only under factor (a) (§ 190.3, factor (a) [The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true]) and not also under factor (b) (§ 190.3, factor (b) [presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence]). He points to the fact that the prosecution argued the Booher kidnapping and the Donner-Lucchesi assaults in aggravation under factor (b), thus making it possible that the jury considered them under both factors (a) and (b) and to have given them an improperly inflated aggravating effect. In People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, we stated that to avoid any possible confusion trial courts in the future should instruct capital sentencing juries that factors (b) (violent criminal activity) and (c) (prior felony convictions) refer to crimes other than those underlying the guilt determination. ( Id. at p. 106, fn. 28.) We do not believe that the absence of such an instruction here caused any confusion. Although the prosecutor did argue for consideration of the Booher kidnapping and Donner-Lucchesi assaults under factor (b), he did not suggest to the jury that the crimes should be counted twice. Thus, we find no reasonable possibility that the jury was misled.