Opinion ID: 884355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: chris's issue on appeal

Text: Did the District Court err in awarding Sue attorney fees? We review a district court's award of attorney fees in a dissolution action to determine whether the court abused its discretion. In re the Marriage of Roullier (1987), 229 Mont. 348, 360, 746 P.2d 1081, 1088 (citations omitted). A district court has abused its discretion if its award of attorney fees is not supported by substantial evidence. In re the Marriage of Hall (1990), 244 Mont. 428, 436, 798 P.2d 117, 122. The attorney fees at issue here were awarded pursuant to § 40-4-110, MCA, which states: The court from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under chapters 1 and 4 of this title and for attorney's fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or after entry of judgment. The court may order that the amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his name. This Court has held that an appropriate attorney fee awarded pursuant to § 40-4-110, MCA, is one which is: (1) based on necessity; (2) reasonable; and (3) based on competent evidence. In re the Marriage of Barnard (1994), 264 Mont. 103, 109, 870 P.2d 91, 95 (citing In re the Marriage of Zander (1993), 262 Mont. 215, 227, 864 P.2d 1225, 1233). Moreover, the district court must conduct a separate hearing after trial in order to determine the reasonableness of the attorney fees. In re the Marriage of Davies (1994), 266 Mont. 466, 479-80, 880 P.2d 1368, 1377. Chris contends that the District Court's attorney fee award did not comply with any of these requirements. We agree. In its findings of fact the court found: [t]hat after considering the financial resources of both parties pursuant to Sec. 40-4-110, MCA, [Chris] should be responsible for paying [Sue's] attorney fees and costs incurred in the this [sic] action, as well as his own. In its conclusions of law, the court stated: [t]hat [Chris] should pay [Sue's] reasonable attorney fees and costs of suit as well as his own. Sue contends that this Court has repeatedly affirmed an award of attorney's fees where the record shows that the District Court considered the financial resources of both parties, citing Roullier, 746 P.2d at 1088; In re the Marriage of Manus (1987), 225 Mont. 457, 465, 733 P.2d 1275, 1279-80; and, In re the Marriage of Carr v. Carr (1983), 205 Mont. 269, 273, 667 P.2d 425, 427. However, there is nothing in Sue's contention, or in the cases she cites, that requires us to affirm the court's award here. The court's statement that it considered the parties' financial resources, without more, is an insufficient basis upon which to determine that an attorney fee award is necessary. The court made no other findings that would indicate how a consideration of the parties' respective financial resources dictated an award to Sue. Moreover, our review of the record does not reveal any evidence which would clarify how the parties' respective financial resources leads to, and supports, the court's conclusion. We reverse the award of attorney fees.