Opinion ID: 864512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether, by consenting to the in-chambers

Text: INTERVIEW BY THE COURT, THE PARTIES WAIVED ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE COURT’S RULINGS OR FINDINGS OF FACT BASED UPON THE IN-CHAMBERS INTERVIEW WITH THE CHILD.
¶10. The agreement of counsel and chancellor to the in-chambers interview with Brittany does not waive the issue for appellate review. It is essential that appellate courts have a complete and accurate record when reviewing child custody judgments. 5 ¶11. In Dykes v. Dykes, 488 So. 2d 368, 371 (La. Ct. App. 1986), a Louisiana appellate court stated that “even though the presence of counsel was waived. . . with no record having been made of the proceeding we are without means [to] review. . . the reliability of any stated preferences as to custody [by the children].” In Dykes the counsel invited the trial court to interview in-chamber the children and waived any objection to said interview. The court acknowledged that such in-chambers interviews are important in “custody proceedings to relieve the child of the possibly intimidating presence of the mother and father”; however, the court went on to say “such an interview must be conducted with a reporter present and a record made of the questioning by the court and the answers of the [children].” Id. ¶12. In an Arkansas case, the transcript of two minor children's testimony, in keeping with an agreement by the parties and representations made by the trial judge to these children at the time they were interviewed in chambers, was sealed. The appellate court ordered unsealing of the record, finding that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-64-129(a)(2) and Administrative Order Number 4 : appear to countenance a waiver of the record by the parties. However, for the following reason this would not appear to be a satisfactory solution to the problem of allowing children to testify with confidentiality. If the parties agree to waive a record and permit the child or children to be interviewed privately by the trial judge, and the aggrieved parent desires to appeal, the absence of a record virtually renders the judge’s decision irreversible. McNair v. Johnson, 57 S.W.3d 742, 744 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). ¶13. Here, there is no dispute that Thomas, Carol and respective counsel agreed to the offthe-record interview of Brittany. Ordinarily a waiver between two parties would preclude that issue from appellate review, but when the waiver concerns the best interest of a child, 6 we will not allow it to prevent appellate review, especially where no guardian ad litem was appointed to protect the child’s best interest. The concern of this Court is that, although the chancellor admittedly relied on the in-chambers interview to make her decision2 she made no findings on the record concerning that interview, even after the Court of Appeals instructed her to do so. She stated: “[a]ll this Court will disclose regarding the off-therecord conversation with [Brittany] is that it was relevant.” While the stipulation would ordinarily waive any objection to the lack of a record, we find that the need for a record to enable meaningful appellate review outweighs any need to find waiver here. ¶14. The chancellor first notes in her Findings on Remand, that Thomas’s remarriage was a substantial change in circumstances. This Court has long held that remarriage itself does not constitute a material change in circumstances that would justify a change of custody. Allen v. Allen, 243 Miss. 23, 33, 136 So.2d 627, 632 (1962). At the time of the hearing, Thomas had been remarried almost five years. Thomas’s wife testified that she is very close to Brittany and is her cheerleading coach. At the time of the December 1998 Consent Modification Decree Thomas was remarried. Custody should not be changed unless there has been a material change which “adversely affects the child’s welfare occurring since the original decree.” Kavanaugh v. Carraway, 435 So.2d 697, 699 (Miss. 1983). ¶15. The chancellor also noted that Thomas’s “drinking, temper and inappropriate discipline were red flags to the Court that the child’s custody should be changed.” Carol, 2 The chancellor stated “[in weighing the testimony and evidence presented and the Court’s conversation in chambers with the minor child, this court found without a doubt that the child’s custody should be awarded to the mother.” 7 Sonia (one of Carol’s friends), and Carol’s mother provided testimony to support Carol’s motion for modification; each testifying that Thomas was a heavy drinker or had a drinking problem. However, none of them had ever seen him drink excessively and none had actually seen him drink in years. The chancellor must weigh the credibility of witnesses and take into account any bias motives a witness may have. Chamblee, 637 So. 2d at 860. Taking the testimony as the chancellor did, as believable, it only shows that at some time Thomas drank excessively but does not indicate any danger to himself or the children. As for the “inappropriate discipline” that was a reference to the bruises that Carol discovered on Brittany. Carol and her witnesses testified that the bruising was more extensive than just on her buttocks. This testimony contradicted that of the examining physician Dr. Wheelis. There was no other evidence presented that indicated previous abuse by Thomas. “[A]n isolated incident, e.g., an unwarranted striking of a child, does not in and of itself justify a change in custody.” Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So. 2d 1294, 1297 (Miss. 1984). Even taking all these things together, there is little to indicate a material change in circumstances that adversely affected Brittany’s welfare. ¶16. In addition, the chancellor failed to use the correct standard of review for a child custody modification. The chancellor stated, “[s]ince the original custody agreement between the parties, Mr. Robison has remarried and has also undertaken the responsibility of raising two step-children. Therefore there is a substantial change in circumstances if in fact this is the right legal standard to be applied in a child custody situation.” (emphasis added). In proceedings to modify custody, “the prerequisites [are] (1) proving a material change in circumstances which adversely affects the welfare of the child and (2) finding that 8 the best interest of the child requires the change of custody.” Brocato v. Brocato, 731 So. 2d 1138, 1141 (Miss. 1999) (citing Smith v. Jones, 654 So. 2d 480, 486 (Miss. 1995)). The burden of proof is on the movant. Id. The Court of Appeals was correct when it stated “[t]he evidence in the record is sparse to support that there was a material change in circumstances adverse to the interest of the child, or that the mother’s receiving custody was in the child’s best interest.” Robison III, 822 So. 2d at 1037. ¶17. We cannot properly review a chancellor’s judgment without full knowledge of all the evidence the chancellor considered when making the judgment. The in-chambers interview, and the chancellor’s continuing refusal to reveal any of the content of that interview, prevents this Court from having a full review of the evidence the chancellor used in making her decision. However, from the record as it exists before us, it appears that there was no material change adversely affecting Brittany. A “substantial change in circumstances” is not enough for a modification of custody lacking some adverse result for the child, and the record shows nothing warranting a change in custody. B. Whether the in-chambers interview should be made part of the record. ¶18. The lack of supporting evidence in the record leads to the real issue, whether courts must make a record of in-chambers conversations with children. Because this Court has not previously addressed the necessity for making a record of in-chambers conversations with minor children, we look to our sister states for guidance. The best analysis is found in Watermeier v. Watermeier, 462 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (La. Ct. App. 1985), in which the Louisiana Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, addressing the question of whether a record should be made of a judge’s in-chambers interview, opined as follows: 9 We have given this matter grave consideration and, whereas we are impressed by the very plausible argument of counsel for respondent that an interview by the judge alone (without a record being made and without the ominous presence of parents and counsel), would relieve the child of fear and tension so that he would be more inclined to talk freely and truthfully, we cannot agree. To do so would do violence to the basic concerns of our adversary system because the attorneys and parties, as well as the appellate court, would be forced to trust completely and without reservation the discretion of the trial judge as to the propriety of his questions, his assessment of the veracity of the answers, and his entire judgment without ever knowing what was told to him. Such answers could well be the basis of his ruling. In addition, there would be no way for a party to ever contest, disapprove, or argue on appeal about any statement or accusation, no matter how wild or false, that the child may have made (perhaps in his fancy)–unless he knows what the child said to the judge. See also Weaver v. Weaver, 824 So. 2d 438 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Hicks v. Hicks, 733 So. 2d 1261 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Dykes v. Dykes, 488 So. 2d 368 (La. Ct. App. 1986). The absence of a record of the conversation “makes impossible our ability to thoroughly and properly review the record of the trial between the parties.” Hicks, 733 So. 2d at 1267. ¶19. In Georgia, not only has this problem been addressed in the Uniform Superior Court Rules, but the Court of Appeals of Georgia has also commented on and affirmed the importance of making a finding on the record regarding such in-chambers conversations. See Uniform Superior Court Rules 24.1 et seq., 24.5(B); Williams v. Stepler, 471 S.E.2d 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). A trial court’s refusal to make a record of a “private conversation” between the court and the child “left the father with no means of knowing the basis for any findings the court might make.” Williams, 471 S.E.2d at 286 (Beasley, C.J., specially concurring). The court held “the trial court erred in issuing an order containing findings based in part on an interview with a child which was not recorded . . . [such] proceedings 10 were fatally flawed . . . .” Id. Of great importance to the court was the purpose of the recordation, which was to “preserve the court’s interview with the child, and the child’s statements to the court.” Id. Likewise, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act sets out guidelines for in-chambers interviews of children in custody proceedings. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/640(a) (West 1996). “The court shall cause a court reporter to be present who shall make a complete record of the interview instantaneously to be part of the record in the case.” Id. In an Illinois case, one party was prevented from being present during the in-chambers interview because said party was a pro se litigant.3 However, because the interview was recorded by the court reporter and made a part of the record, the court was able to properly determine that there was no prejudice to the party. In re Marriage of Knoche 750 N.E. 2d 297, 302-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). ¶20. We agree with our sister states that a record of in-chambers interviews with children must be made and become a part of the record. We set forth the following procedure to be employed by courts dealing with in-chambers interviews of children. A record must be made by a court reporter physically present during the in-chambers interview. We are mindful that a child may be uncomfortable in an in-chambers interview with even one adult, and that discomfort might be exacerbated by the presence of a second adult with the attendant equipment of a court reporter. However, we are confident that the chancellors in our state will be able provide an atmosphere in which the child is able to converse freely with the chancellor, without attention being drawn to the reporter. It will be at the court’s discretion 3 The Illinois rule also provides that counsel for the parties shall be present. We, however, do not adopt that provision as a part of our procedures adopted herein. 11 whether to seal the interview, which may by order of the trial court or an appellate court be unsealed for review.