Opinion ID: 2630947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: breath test, miranda, and unconstitutional conditions

Text: In addition, Shadden raises two issues regarding the admission of evidence that he refused to take a breath test. First, he contends that the district court improperly permitted the State to elicit testimony regarding Shadden's refusal to take a breath test in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Shadden claims that the statement he made in refusing to take the breath test was inadmissible because Officer Weiler had not read his Miranda rights before requesting that he take the test. He argues that this refusal was the equivalent of an incriminating statement given during a custodial interrogation. Second, Shadden contends that he was forced to choose between constitutional rights, prohibited by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, because he was forced to assert either his right against self-incrimination or his right to be free from an unreasonable search. He argues that the breath test is an unreasonable search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that his refusal to take the breath test then cannot be used against him, because to do so would violate the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals refused to consider these issues because Shadden did not object to the admission of this evidence. Shadden acknowledges that he makes these arguments for the first time on appeal and recognizes that Kansas law generally requires a contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence to be lodged in order to preserve the evidentiary issue for appeal. K.S.A. 60-404. He nevertheless argues that the statutory requirement should be waived because consideration of the issue is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights. See State v. Hawkins, 285 Kan. 842, 845, 176 P.3d 174 (2008) (recognizing three categories when appellate courts can consider new issues on appeal, one of which is to serve the ends of justice or to present denial of fundamental rights); Pierce v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Kan. 74, 80-81, 434 P.2d 858 (1967) (same). Shadden's argument is contrary to this court's recent decisions that emphasized the importance of th[e] legislative mandate contained in K.S.A. 60-404, which dictates that evidentiary errors shall not be reviewed on appeal unless a party has lodged a timely and specific objection to the alleged error at trial. King, 288 Kan. at 349, 204 P.3d 585. In King , the prosecutor asked the defendant on cross-examination at trial about his continued silence after receiving Miranda warnings. Although there was no objection lodged at trial, the defendant subsequently appealed on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, arguing the cross-examination violated his rights under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (prosecutor's use of defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach credibility violates Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution). King, 288 Kan. at 339-40, 204 P.3d 585. Refusing to consider the issues presented in King's appeal on the merits, this court found that the defendant's challenge to the testimony at issue, while perhaps implicating constitutional rights, was an evidentiary-based claim of prosecutorial misconduct intended by the legislature to be included within the scope of the contemporaneous objection rule set forth in K.S.A. 60-404. As such, and in the absence of an objection as required by the statute, we concluded that King had failed to preserve his Doyle claim for appellate review. King, 288 Kan. at 347-49, 204 P.3d 585. Notwithstanding past decisions, which may have relaxed the statutory obligation to object in the prosecutorial misconduct context, this court expressly clarified that [f]rom today forward, in accordance with the plain language of K.S.A. 60-404, evidentiary claimsincluding questions posed by a prosecutor and responses to those questions during trialmust be preserved by way of a contemporaneous objection for those claims to be reviewed on appeal. King, 288 Kan. at 349, 204 P.3d 585. Since King , this court has continued to apply this rationale and has reiterated that the contemporary objection requirement must be followed even where constitutional concerns are at stake. State v. Hollingsworth, 289 Kan. 1250, 1257, 221 P.3d 1122 (2009) (stating that the fact that an evidentiary claim may have a federal constitutionalrather than a state statutorybasis does not alone excuse the lack of compliance with K.S.A. 60-404); State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 429-30, 212 P.3d 165 (2009) (stating if we were to overlook the lack of this particular objection and consider the issue because it is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of Richmond's right to a fair trial, these and other case law exceptions would soon swallow the general statutory rule). Hence, we conclude that without a timely and specific objection, the constitutional implications concerning the testimony regarding Shadden's refusal to take a breath test have not been properly preserved for appellate consideration. The decision of the Court of Appeals on the issues subject to review is reversed. The judgment of the district court on the issues subject to review is affirmed. DAVIS, C.J., not participating. LARRY T. SOLOMON, District Judge, assigned. [1]