Opinion ID: 806272
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Southwell’s Arguments on Appeal

Text: Rather than attack the district court’s conclusions directly, Southwell argues that the district court failed to address her allegations of ordinary negligence and wrongful death when it dismissed her claim in its entirety. Under Tennessee law, a claim may “be separated into acts and omissions constituting medical malpractice and acts and omissions constituting ordinary negligence.” Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 558 (Tenn. 2011). In French, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that “not all care given to patients at nursing home facilities is necessarily related to the rendering of medical care by a medical professional.” Id. at 560. The court drew a distinction between “[t]he assessment of a patient's condition and the development of a plan of care,” which would be subject to the TMMA, and “[a] nursing home's failure to ensure that its staff, including certified nursing assistants, actually complies with the plan of care and performs services that, however necessary, are routine and nonmedical in nature,” which falls into the category of ordinary negligence. Id. Thus, if Southwell’s claims can be construed as relating to the implementation of the plan of care for Adkins, as opposed to the medical determinations that 3 Southwell does argue on appeal that the alleged violation of the ADA constitutes negligence per se. We have previously held that a plaintiff may not bootstrap an ADA claim against a private entity into a claim for monetary damages via a negligence per se theory. See Smith, 167 F.3d at 293 (“[T]o use ADA as the basis for a negligence per se claim would create a damages remedy in every state allowing negligence per se recovery, and [we have found] no state cases allowing such a remedy.”) Thus, we agree with the district court that Southwell’s allegations regarding the alleged lack of an interpreter should be dismissed. -7- No. 11-5992 Southwell v. Summit View of Farragut, LLC informed the development of the plan, then her claim could go forward despite her failure to properly plead a claim under the TMMA. Southwell asserts three specific factual allegations against Summit View that could plausibly be construed as sounding in the failure to implement a plan of care, and thus constitute a claim for ordinary negligence under Tennessee law : (1) failing to “tak[e] proper care of the late Claudia Adkins, including placing her in a suitable room,” (2) failing to properly care for Adkins’s emphysema and cancer; and (3) failing to “promptly inform[] the supervising Nursing Home Physician of the progression and deterioration of the patient’s condition . . . .” However, there is nothing in Southwell’s complaint that asserts that these alleged failures stem from non-medical personnel’s implementation of Adkins’s plan of care, which would be required to make out an ordinary negligence complaint under French. Thus, even with a liberal reading of the complaint, Southwell’s ordinary negligence claim should be dismissed as well. Nevertheless, “where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.” U.S. ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 644 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court dismissed the entire action, including the ordinary negligence theory, when it dismissed the TMMA and ADA claims. Thus, Southwell did not have her “one chance” to amend her complaint and substantiate her ordinary negligence claim. For this reason, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and remand the action -8- No. 11-5992 Southwell v. Summit View of Farragut, LLC back to the district court to give Southwell an opportunity to amend her complaint with regard to the ordinary negligence theory.4 Finally, Southwell continues to assert a wrongful death claim. Under Tennessee law, a wrongful death claim “does not create a new cause of action for the plaintiffs, but simply preserves [the decedent’s] right of action which would otherwise be extinguished by her death.” Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a) (codifying wrongful death claims under Tennessee law). In other words, the “wrongful death” claim is entirely derivative of, and tied to, the underlying tort theory that establishes the harm to the decedent. Southwell is thus free to plead in her amended complaint that the injuries suffered by Adkins from the ordinary negligence of Summit View resulted in the death of Adkins.