Opinion ID: 3010125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: Although Rule 19(a) requires joinder if feasible, joinder is not feasible in this case because of the Supreme Court's ruling in Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185 (1990). Carden held that, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, a limited partnership is considered a citizen of each state in which its partners are citizens. Thus, although there is complete diversity without joinder of the Partnership because the suit is brought by two Delaware and Vermont citizens against a New Jersey citizen, diversity will be destroyed if the Partnership, a citizen of Vermont, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, is joined. Because joinder is therefore not feasible, this case should be dismissed if the Partnership is deemed an indispensable party. The question, then, is whether this case can, in equity and good conscience, proceed without the Partnership as a party, Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in holding that the case cannot so proceed. In contrast to Carden's jurisdictional rule, which the Supreme Court acknowledged to be technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to policy considerations, Carden, 494 U.S. at 196, whether a person is indispensable depends on pragmatic considerations, Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendment; see Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 116 n.12 (1968). Rule 19(b) lists several factors to consider in deciding whether a person is indispensable: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). Applying these factors, the district court dismissed the case, concluding that exclusion of the Partnership would prejudice the Partnership's interests and, because of the possibility that the Partnership itself could later sue on the same claims, would prejudice Manchester's interests; that protective provisions in the judgment could not lessen this prejudice; and that the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy if the suit is dismissed because of the identical litigation filed by Manchester in Vermont state court. The court also decided that the HB entities' suit is a derivative action, and found guidance in cases holding that a partnership is an indispensable party in derivative actions. Manchester echoes all of these reasons and offers, as an additional reason for dismissal, that its counterclaims against the Partnership cannot be heard in federal court. We conclude that none of the reasons offered for dismissal is meritorious.