Opinion ID: 852908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grounds for Removal after Deliberations Begin

Text: Typical grounds for discharge of a juror are bias due to exposure to publicity or contact with a party or witness. Wallace was not removed for bias on these or other grounds. Rather, removal was based on Wallace's actions in the course of deliberations. Once deliberations begin, discharge of a juror is warranted only in the most extreme situations where it can be shown that the removal of the juror is necessary for the integrity of the process, does not prejudice the deliberations of the rest of the panel, and does not impair the parties right to a trial by jury. Indeed, some jurisdictions hold that a mistrial is required if discharge occurs after deliberations begin. See State v. Adams, 320 N.J.Super. 360, 727 A.2d 468, 471 (1999). Here the actions leading to the dismissal arose from the deliberations, and the record does not establish that Wallace's conduct was improperly influencing the rest of the panel. A failure to agree, however unreasonable, is a ground for mistrial, not removal of the obstacle to unanimity. See United States v. Hernandez, 862 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir.1988) (That a juror may not be removed because he or she disagrees with the other jurors as to the merits of a case requires no citation.). Removal of a juror for misconduct requires more than a refusal to negotiate further. If there were a showing of physical confrontation, or attempts to intimidate other jurors, then removal may be permissible. Shotikare, 779 A.2d at 340, 345. But this record does not establish these extreme modes of conduct. It appears that the effect of the juror's dismissal may well have been the avoidance of a hung jury. Of course trial judges do and should seek to avoid a hung jury. We have often expressed the view that a mistrial is an extreme remedy, warranted only if less severe situations will not address the problem. West v. State, 758 N.E.2d 54, 55 (Ind.2001). The trial judge may guide, encourage and instruct to correct problems in jury deliberations. This policy in favor of assisting a jury in reaching a verdict is also reflected in Jury Rule 28. But it does not permit removal of a juror simply because the juror does not agree. The Court of Appeals dealt with similar facts in Gavin v. State, 671 N.E.2d 440 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). In Gavin, the trial judge removed a juror, even though the juror stated he based his beliefs on the evidence and had made up his mind during the trial. Noting that a trial court has broad discretion in replacing a juror, the Court of Appeals held that this discretion is abused when a trial court removes an impartial juror who has voted to acquit based upon the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 447. Here the decision to remove Wallace was based on the trial court's expressed concern for his effect on other members of the jury. But the potential for violence is at best unclear. What is clear is that the removal of the juror had the effect of removing a pro-defense juror who, after the jury had deliberated, appeared likely to create a hung jury. Importantly, as in Gavin, the juror represented that he was trying to fulfill his role as a juror and was making a decision based on the evidence. The foreman's accounts of Wallace's behavior amount to rudeness and intransigence but there is no record establishing physical threats, intimidation or other conduct justifying removal. Accordingly, as in Gavin, removal was improper.