Opinion ID: 598598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of the Aiding and Abetting Conviction

Text: 15 Smentek argues that the prosecutor in [his case] never knew, and never informed the defendants or the jury that the defendants were being charged as drug kingpins or as drug kingpins' police protectors. 21 U.S.C. § 848. Smentek was actually indicted and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2, which prohibits aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, or procuring the commission of an offense against the United States, in this case a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848. (see indictment, O.R. 1, and jury sheets, O.R. 395). Because the aiding and abetting offense involves different elements of proof than the kingpin statute itself, the prosecution properly distinguished the two offenses and appropriately referred to the aiding and abetting charge as a section 2 offense. 16 Smentek also argues that, at the time of his conviction, this court had not yet decided whether a person could be convicted of aiding and abetting a drug kingpin. 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C. § 848. Because we had not affirmatively ruled on that issue until after Smentek's trial, Smentek claims that neither the defendants [n]or the jury knew the essential elements or punishment of the crimes charged. See United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989); Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505. He argues that, by charging him with an undefined crime, the government violated the principals of Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 830-31 (1974). 17 We disagree with Smentek's characterization of his case. While we recognize that Huddleston requires fair warning about what conduct is criminal, id., we find no violations of these principles here. We did not create new law in Ambrose or in Pino-Perez, our cases discussing the interplay between the drug kingpin and the aider and abettor statutes. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1233. Instead, we pointed out that the aider and abettor statute, by its express language, applies to individuals who aid or abet the commission of any offense against the United States. Id. at 1231; 18 U.S.C. § 2. [E]very time Congress has passed a new criminal statute, the aider and abettor provision has automatically kicked in and made aiders and abettors of the violators of the new statute punishable as principals. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1233. Considering the wide-reaching scope of the aider and abettor statute, the defendant could have expected that he would be charged with aiding and abetting a drug kingpin. 18 Finding no potential claim for relief, we AFFIRM the district court.