Opinion ID: 1299913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sherman, Crowley and Taylor.

Text: Sherman filed a motion to dismiss and grounds of defense, with supporting memorandum of law, in which he stated that his counsel sought and obtained advice from the Attorney General's Office to expedite his release after entry of the order suspending the balance of his sentence; that he was released on September 17, 1980, upon authorization of the Department; that he has rejoined his wife and begun his own photographic printing and graphics business in Durham, North Carolina; and that he has complied with all the terms of his probation. Crowley filed a motion to dismiss and grounds of defense, with supporting memorandum of law, in which he stated that he was released from custody by the Department on February 26, 1981, and that, after reporting to the Virginia Department of Probation and Parole, he had returned to Florida, his former home, where he was living as a law-abiding citizen. Taylor filed a motion to dismiss and grounds of defense, with supporting memorandum of law, in which he stated that his counsel sought and obtained advice from the Attorney General's Office to expedite his release after entry of the order suspending the balance of his sentence; that he was released on October 15, 1980, upon authorization of the Department; that he returned to Colorado to his former seasonal employment in a ski shop; that he was employed for the summer as an electrician in construction work; and that he has complied with all the terms of his probation. The Department's theory, as advanced by the Attorney General, is that the cases of Sherman, Crowley and Taylor are not concluded, and that the orders suspending the balance of their sentences and placing them on probation were invalid orders, so that the Department may reacquire custody of the three as if they were escaped felons without incurring the risk of being held in contempt of the trial court. The Attorney General suggested in oral argument that the proper mandate for this Court to enter would prohibit the trial court from effectuating the release orders already entered. We can not pass upon the validity of the orders under which Sherman, Crowley and Taylor were released from custody. The Attorney General has misconstrued the function of the writ of prohibition, which is not available to undo errors that may have been committed in ordering the release of these defendants. The function of the writ was defined in United States v. Hoffman, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 158, 18 L.Ed. 354 (1866) as follows: The writ of prohibition, as its name imports, is one which commands the person to whom it is directed not to do something which, by the suggestion of the relator, the court is informed he is about to do. If the thing be already done, it is manifest the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for that would require an affirmative act; and the only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all action, and to prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited direction. Id. at 161-62. The writ may be used to prevent the exercise of assumed jurisdiction of the court by the judge to whom it is directed, either when he has no jurisdiction or when he exceeds his jurisdiction, but it may not be used to correct error already committed. Rollins v. Bazile, 205 Va. 613, 616, 139 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1964); Grief v. Kegley, 115 Va. 552, 557, 79 S.E. 1062, 1064 (1913). See Lee v. Jones, 212 Va. 792, 793, 188 S.E.2d 102, 103 (1972); see also English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293, 297 (Fla.1977); Burks Pleading and Practice § 200, at 326 (4th ed. 1952). Here, three defendants were released from custody by orders entered by the court which tried the cases, with the approval of the Commonwealth's Attorney, and pursuant to a practice approved in 1975 by the then Attorney General. In each case, the release is an accomplished fact; thus, the time for challenging such releases in a petition for a writ of prohibition has passed. So long as these defendants continue to comply with the terms of their probation, the orders of the trial court are final and conclusive. The only portions of the release orders that remain executory are the requirements for continuing supervisory probation. If the orders were improperly entered, the effect of prohibiting enforcement of the unexecuted provisions would be to leave the defendants free from the constraints of probation, a result that unquestionably would be contrary to the public interest. We hold, therefore, that the purpose of the releases has been accomplished, that the writ of prohibition may not be used to revoke these releases, and that the Department's petition must be dismissed as to Sherman, Crowley and Taylor.