Opinion ID: 1863941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: court of appeals' discretion.

Text: After determining that an error was committed, the court of appeals reversed the conviction of Johnson pursuant to its discretionary power granted by sec. 752.35, Stats. It held the real controversy had not been fully tried. [2, 3] This court will ordinarily refrain from reviewing a discretionary determination of the court of appeals. State v. McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 369, 326 N.W.2d 781 (1983). If this court does review, we must review the court of appeals' decision as we would any other exercise of discretion. Id. 113 Wis. 2d at 370. [W]hether or not we would have agreed with the decision of the court, we will uphold the discretion of a court we are reviewing if the decision made on appropriate facts and the correct law is one which a court reasonably could have reached. Id. (citation omitted). See also McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971) ([T]his court will not find an abuse of discretion if there exists a reasonable basis for the trial court's determination) (citation omitted); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 131 Wis. 2d 332, 336, 388 N.W.2d 912 (1986) (We will sustain a discretionary act ... if the court ... reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach). There are two circumstances under which we have held that the real controversy has not been fully tried: `(1) When the jury was erroneously not given the opportunity to hear important testimony that bore on an important issue of the case; and (2) When the jury had before it evidence not properly admitted which so clouded a crucial issue that it may be fairly said that the real controversy was not fully tried.' State v. Romero, 147 Wis. 2d 264, 276, 432 N.W.2d 899 (1988) (citation omitted). A finding of a substantial probability of a different result on retrial is not required for a case to be reversed if the real controversy has not been fully tried. State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 735, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1984). We hold that a court could not reasonably conclude the improperly admitted evidence in this case so clouded a crucial issue that the real controversy was not fully tried. The jury had the opportunity to view B. on the stand and hear her testimony. They were also able to watch and assess the testimony of three of B.'s friends who described B.'s emotional state shortly after the alleged assault. In addition, B.'s friends also told the jury the story B. had told them. The jury was also able to consider Johnson's version and his demeanor on the stand. In addition, defense counsel also presented witnesses who supported Johnson's assertions. In viewing the whole record, it was not reasonable to conclude that the remarks and questions by the prosecutor, though improper, so clouded a crucial issue that the real controversy was not fully tried. In reaching its decision in this case, the court of appeals compared this case with the circumstances in State v. Penigar, 139 Wis. 2d 569, 408 N.W.2d 28 (1987). In Penigar, this court reversed a court of appeals' decision, which had affirmed a judgment of conviction for third-degree sexual assault because the real controversy was not fully tried. Id. 139 Wis. 2d at 586. Penigar was charged with second-degree sexual assault contrary to sec. 940.225(2)(b), Stats. (sexual intercourse without consent of the victim causing a venereal disease). The victim testified at trial that she never consented to any sexual contact with Penigar. She further stated that neither before nor after the assault had she had sexual intercourse, or had anyone touched her vaginal area, or had she ever touched anyone else's genitals. Id., 139 Wis. 2d at 575. Penigar contended the victim had consented to the sexual contact. At the conclusion of its case in chief, the state asked permission to amend the charge to third-degree sexual assaultsexual intercourse without consent of the victim. This was granted by the circuit court without objection by Penigar's counsel. A jury found Penigar guilty of third-degree sexual assault. After the trial at a presentence investigation interview, however, the victim admitted she had had an incestuous relationship with two of her brothers. Penigar moved for a new trial and the circuit court denied his motion. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision. This court held: Upon reading the record we conclude that the case hinged on false and inadmissible testimony about the complainant's lack of prior sexual experience. When consent is a determinative issue in a rape trial and the jury's decision on consent turns on testimony about the complainant's lack of prior sexual experience which is both false and inadmissible under the rape shield law, the jury is rendered unable to evaluate the testimony of the complainant and the defendantwhose credibility were the crucial aspects of the trialbecause inadmissible, highly prejudicial and false evidence pervaded the course of the trial. Thus we conclude that the real controversy was not fully tried because `the circumstances of the trial prevented a fair trial of the factual issues of the case.' Id. 139 Wis. 2d at 586 (footnote and citations omitted). The court of appeals found the record [here] is indistinguishable from that in Penigar, where the victim's consent was also the key issue. Indeed, this may well be a more aggravated case. We, however, find a crucial difference between Penigar and the case here. In Penigar, the inadmissible evidence was closely related to the key issue of consent. The state attempted to use the victim's testimony about her lack of prior sexual experience to persuade the jury that the victim would not have consented to the intercourse. Penigar, 139 Wis. 2d at 584. The inadmissible evidence was used by the prosecutor to persuade the jury the victim in Penigar would never have consented. We agree with the court of appeals that in the case before us, consent was also the crucial issue. The evidence of whether the victim here had filed a civil action against Johnson, however, had no direct connection with whether the victim consented to the sexual contact. That evidence is related to her general credibility as she testified as a witness at trial, not whether she consented to the sexual encounter. The jury was given ample opportunity to assess B.'s credibility. [4] The actual references to the possible civil suit were slight when measured against the whole record. While there were several references to the subject, it was not a topic which pervaded the atmosphere of the entire trial. When read in context of the complete record, these references are only small isolated items which had no measurable impact on the crucial issue of consent. As such, it cannot be said that a court could reasonably conclude the crucial issue of consent had been so clouded as to prevent the real controversy from being fully tried. Consequently, we reverse the court of appeals' decision. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the judgment of conviction. JUSTICE WILLIAM A. BABLITCH took no part.