Opinion ID: 4019782
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal challenges

Text: Employees claim that the trial court erred in dismissing their disparate treatment and hostile work environment claims. We agree with Employees that the State's explicitly race-based staffing directive constituted facial discrimination in 7 Blackburn v. State, No. 91494-0 violation ofRCW 49.60.180(3). Since 1949, the WLAD has existed to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of race, among other protected characteristics. The WLAD shall be construed liberally to accomplish its antidiscrimination purposes. RCW 49.60.020. RCW 49.60.180 prohibits racial discrimination in employment. At the federal level, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, also contains antidiscrimination provisions with some similar statutory language. Although this case involves claims only under the WLAD, Washington courts often look to federal case law on Title VII when interpreting the WLAD. See, e.g., Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 180, 23 P.3d 440 (2001). We view Title VII cases as a source of guidance, but we also recognize that they are not binding and that we are free to adopt those theories and rationale which best further the purposes and mandates of our state statute. Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 361-62, 753 P.2d 517 (1988). The WLAD makes it unlawful for an employer [t]o discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of . . . race. RCW 49 .60.180(3 ). This case involves claims of disparate treatment under RCW 49.60.180(3). 'Disparate treatment ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' Shannon v. Pay 'N 8 Blackburn v. State, No. 91494-0 Save Corp., 104 Wn.2d 722, 726, 709 P.2d 799 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.IS, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1977)). When an employee makes out a claim of disparate treatment under the WLAD, like Title VII, the employer's action is unlawful unless the employer has a valid justification. See, e.g., Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 328-29, 646 P.2d 113 (1982) (The County's decision to achieve a sexual balance by providing a male counselor and female counselor resulted in the County refusing to hire Sellers because of her sex. As such, the action was prohibited by statute unless it was based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.); Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hasp., 78 F.3d 128, 132 (3d. Cir. 1996) (policy of requiring both males and females on all shifts: When open and explicit use of gender is employed, as is the case here, the systematic discrimination is in effect 'admitted' by the employer, and the case will tum on whether such overt disparate treatment is for some reason justified, such as through affirmative action or a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)); Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers ofAm. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199-200, Ill S. Ct. 1196, 113 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991) (Whether an employment practice involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination ... 9 Blackburn v. State, No. 91494-0 . The beneficence of an employer's purpose does not undermine the conclusion that an explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under [Title VII] and thus may be defended only as a BFOQ.). The trial court held that Employees' disparate treatment claim failed. We disagree. According to the trial court's findings of fact, the State made staffing decisions that explicitly prevented certain employees from working on a particular ward over the course of one weekend due to their race. Although the trial court found these staffing orders were likely an overreaction, this does not change the resulting discriminatory nature of the staffing decisions. CP at 2710 (FOF 7). The trial court found that the decision was made that [M.P.] should not have access to African[-] American staff' and Yates directed that a white staff person needed to go to F-8, instead of the African-American staff who were next on the pull list. CP at 2710 (FOF 7, 9). These overt race-based directives affected staffing decisions in such a manner as to constitute discrimination in terms or conditions of employment because of ... race in violation ofRCW 49.60.180(3). We hold that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. We also detennine that the State has no valid legal justification for its discrimination. RCW 49.60.180 allows employers to take protected characteristics into account in limited circumstances. See RCW 49.60.180(1) (prohibition against discrimination in hiring does not apply if based on a BFOQ), (3) (permitting 10 Blackburn v. State, No. 91494-0 segregated washrooms and locker facilities on the basis of sex and allowing the Human Rights Commission to issue regulations or rulings for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes), (4) (prohibition against discrimination in advertising, job applications, and preemployment inquiries does not apply if based on a BFOQ). In order to satisfy the BFOQ standard, the employer must prove (1) that the protected characteristic is essential to job purposes or (2) that all or substantially all persons with the disqualifying characteristic would be unable to efficiently perform the job. Hegwine, 162 Wn.2d at 358. None of these statutory exceptions apply. RCW 49.60.180(3) allows limited exceptions for classifications only based on sex, not race. And even if the BFOQ defense from RCW 49.60.180(1) or (4) could apply in this case, which is doubtful, the State waived it. CP at 2641; 1 Verbatim Report ofProceedings (Feb. 2, 2015) at 11. The State fails to assert any other defense that our statutes or case law recognize. Therefore, Employees prevail on their disparate treatment claims. Employees also challenge the trial court's dismissal of their hostile work environment claim. RCW 49.60.180(3) prohibits harassment based on a protected characteristic that rises to the level of a hostile work environment. An employee must demonstrate four elements for a hostile work environment claim: that the harassment (1) was unwelcome, (2) was because of a protected characteristic, (3) affected the terms or conditions of employment, and (4) is imputable to the 11 Blackburn v. State, No. 91494-0 employer. Glasgow v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 103 Wn.2d 403, 406-07, 693 P.2d 708 (1985); see also Fisher v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 53 Wn. App. 591, 595-96, 769 P.2d 318 (1989) (extending the hostile work environment standard in Glasgow to race-based hostile work environment claims). The trial court held that the employees failed to meet the third element, which requires that [t]he harassment must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. Glasgow, 103 Wn.2d at 406. Harassing conduct has also been described as severe and persistent, and it must be determined with regard to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 406-07. 4 Based on the trial court's factual findings, which we find are supported by substantial evidence, the trial court did not err in dismissing Employees' hostile work environment claim. The trial court applied the correct legal standard and did not err in concluding that the staffing decision over the course of a single weekend did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive harassment. Employees request relief in the form of damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, interest, attorney fees, and costs. RCW 49.60.030(2) allows successful 4 The Court of Appeals has adopted criteria [t]o determine whether the harassment is such that it affects the conditions of employment ... :the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Washington v. Boeing Co., 105 Wn. App. I, I 0, 19 P.3d 1041 (2000) (citing Sangster v. Albertson's, Inc., 99 Wn. App. 156, 163, 991 P.2d 674 (2000) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993))). 12 Blackburn v. State, No. 91494-0 plaintiffs in WLAD actions to recover damages, injunctive relief, costs, and attorney fees. Because we find that Employees have prevailed on their disparate treatment claim and have complied with RAP 18.1 and RCW 49.60.030(2), we remand this case to the trial court to determine the appropriate damages and reasonable attorney fees to award in this case. On remand, the trial court should also consider whether injunctive relief is appropriate and, if so, the trial court will be responsible for crafting the scope of and enforcing any injunction issued. 13 Blackburn v. State, No. 91494-0 WE CONCUR: 14