Opinion ID: 1989907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Disputed Findings and Recommendations

Text: We begin our discussion by more specifically identifying the three categories of disputed findings and recommendations. First, there are a number of disputes about the criteria employed by the Alcotest to identify an acceptable breath sample and convert the measurement data into a reported result. This category includes the Special Master's recommendations on each of the following matters: (a) the utilization of the 2100 to 1 blood/breath ratio (Special Master's Finding 1(b)); (b) the minimum breath sample criteria (Special Master's Finding 6); (c) the requirement for the addition of a breath temperature sensor (Special Master's Finding 9); and (d) the acceptable tolerance among test results (Special Master's Finding 10). Second, there are a number of disputes arising from the supplemental remand that relate to the firmware and source code analysis. This category includes the Special Master's recommendations about each of the following matters: (a) the fuel cell drift algorithm; (b) the weighted averaging sequence; and (c) the adequacy of the overall software design. In addition, although the parties agree on the need to revise the firmware to address two shortcomings identified through the source code analysis, namely, the buffer overflow error and the disabling of the catastrophic error detector, to the extent that these conceded errors may have an impact on the reliability of AIR results pending modification of the firmware, we are compelled to address them as well. Finally, there are a number of issues that arise as a result of the Special Master's findings and recommendations concerning foundational evidence (Special Master's Findings 5(a), 5(b)). This category includes all of the following recommendations: (a) the requirement for disclosure of foundational documents as a prerequisite for admissibility of any Alcotest results; (b) the required foundational documentary proofs at trial; (c) the admissibility or uses of incomplete reports; and (d) the constitutionally-required testimonial proofs. We begin, then, with the disputed findings and recommendations as they relate to the criteria employed by the Alcotest for the collection of an adequate breath sample and the creation of an acceptable and reportable result.
As we have previously noted, the drunk driving statutes in New Jersey define the offense in terms of BAC. In the majority of cases involving individuals charged with these offenses, however, the particular defendant has not undergone a blood test but instead has submitted to a breath test. Modern breath testing devices include an internal mechanism that collects an acceptable breath sample and converts the alcohol detected in the breath (BrAC) into a measure of the person's BAC. Historically, breath testing devices convert from BrAC to BAC by using a mathematical calculation based upon a scientifically accepted, judicially established blood/breath ratio. The Alcotest utilizes a blood/breath ratio of 2100 to 1, a ratio that this Court has previously considered as a part of a challenge to the breathalyzer. See Downie, supra, 117 N.J. at 460-63, 569 A. 2d 242. The Special Master concluded that the 2100 to 1 blood/breath ratio adopted by this Court in Downie and utilized by the Alcotest remains a valid measuring mechanism. He based this conclusion on the opinions of three of the State's experts and on a number of published studies here and abroad relating to the average, or mean, blood/breath ratio that he found to be authoritative. [22] At the same time, the Special Master rejected the opinions offered by two of the experts who testified on behalf of the defendants. He found that the analysis of one of these experts was filled with so many errors that it could not be reliable, and he rejected as flawed the assertion of the other defense expert that the Alcotest actually does not test alveolar air. Defendants nonetheless assert that the continued use of the 2100 to 1 ratio is not scientifically supported and they urge us to reject any use of the Alcotest on this basis. The true focus of our analysis on this issue must be on whether there has been any development in the scientific community in the time since we decided Downie that undermines our continued confidence in the accuracy and validity of the conclusion we drew there about the 2100 to 1 blood/breath ratio. Simply put, there is not. Our review of the record demonstrates that the arguments that we considered and rejected in Downie have been raised anew, but there is no basis on which to conclude that the continued utilization of this ratio is in any way in error. We reach this result for reasons similar to those that we relied upon in Downie. First, we defer to the findings of the Special Master concerning the credibility of the expert witnesses who testified. See Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 471, 724 A. 2d 234. In part, his credibility analysis reflects the fact that one of defendants' experts candidly conceded that the use of this ratio generally tends to underestimate blood alcohol, to the benefit of the test subject. Second, although there is some evidence that there is a percentage of the population for whom the 2100 to 1 blood/breath ratio may actually overstate the presence of blood alcohol, this evidence is not significantly different from the record considered in Downie, supra, 117 N.J. at 460, 569 A. 2d 242. Scientific studies comparing actual blood alcohol content to breath-tested alcohol content found only a minute number of individuals for whom this ratio would have incorrectly reported a result over the established legal limit for driving while intoxicated. The percentage of individuals for whom there may be an overestimation by use of this ratio remains extraordinarily small. Id. at 469, 569 A. 2d 242. Finally, defendants' experts on this issue did not produce any evidence to the effect that the ratio is regarded by authorities in the field with even the slightest suspicion or is otherwise subject to any significant scientific challenge. Indeed, the overwhelming evidence demonstrates that use of this ratio tends to underestimate the actual BAC in the vast majority of persons whose breath is tested. Although, as in Downie, there may be a small number of individuals who are disadvantaged by a device that uses the 2100 to 1 blood/breath ratio, there is sound scientific support for its continued utilization. We are confident, based on our review of the record and our evaluation of the Special Master's findings, that there is sufficient credible evidence to support his findings as to the continued validity of the 2100 to 1 blood/breath ratio. We therefore reject defendants' challenge to its use and we adopt the Special Master's recommendation that it continue to be utilized in the Alcotest.
As we have explained, the Alcotest is programmed to require that a test subject produce a breath sample that meets four minimum criteria before the sample is considered to be sufficient for purposes of deriving an accurate test result. The Special Master recommended approval, in general, of four minimum criteria for a breath sample, which are: (1) minimum volume of 1.5 liters; (2) minimum blowing time of 4.5 seconds; (3) minimum flow rate of 2.5 liters per minute; and (4) that the IR measurement reading achieves a plateau (i.e., the breath alcohol does not differ by more than one percent in 0.25 seconds). However, the Special Master also found that there was credible evidence to support lowering the minimum breath volume from 1.5 to 1.2 liters for women over the age of sixty. He recommended that the State reprogram the device to reflect that finding, but found no need to lower the minimum volume for the general population. Although both defendants and the State agreed with these recommendations, the amicus NJSBA suggested that the minimum breath volume be reduced to 1.2 liters for all persons, so as to avoid a potential equal protection challenge to the tests. Because no party has raised a challenge to any of these criteria other than the minimum required volume and because the Special Master's findings as to the other minimum criteria are based on substantial credible evidence, we consider only the minimum breath volume issue.
Breath alcohol concentration increases, in general, as exhalation continues and deep alveolar air is expelled. The rate of increase in alcohol concentration declines as a person exhales, but the breath alcohol concentration itself continues to increase until exhalation ends. The record reflects that the minimum breath volume for the Alcotest in New Jersey was fixed at 1.5 liters because the State's experts believe that this volume will exceed the point after which most of the relatively rapid rise in concentration has occurred and the average person is in a fairly level part of the exhalation curve. In addition, the State's experts contend that 1.5 liters is the minimum volume necessary for an accurate BAC calculation because samples of lesser volume, in general, do not include deep lung air. At present, the most commonly used minimum breath sample among the states is 1.5 liters. That requirement, however, is not universal. For example, Alabama, where the Alcotest is currently in use, has adopted a minimum sample requirement of 1.3 liters for all test subjects. Moreover, although the experts generally agreed that 1.5 liters is the optimal minimum, some people may be incapable of providing that sample. In particular, the record demonstrates that as women age, they have an increasingly difficult time producing a 1.5 liter breath sample. Data from Alabama introduced during the proceedings shows that women aged sixty to sixty-nine have more difficulty producing the 1.5 liter minimum requirement than their younger counterparts. One of the State's experts cited a study from Germany [23] that demonstrated that women from age sixty- to sixty-nine have an average breath volume of 1.4 liters, women seventy and over have an average of 1.3 liters, and women eighty and over have an average volume of 1.2 liters. The German study included data that demonstrates that men, regardless of age, were capable of producing a sample of 1.5 liters. Indeed, Brettell also conceded that his own study data confirmed the accuracy of the assertion that older women were the only ones unable to produce a sample of 1.5 liters. Based on this data and the expert opinions offered during the hearing, the Special Master recommended that the minimum breath sample be fixed at 1.5 liters for all test subjects except for women over the age of sixty. He suggested that the device be reprogrammed to require women over the age of sixty to provide a 1.2 liter minimum sample for a valid test result. Although defendants and the State agreed with these recommendations, the NJSBA suggests that this Court should instead require that the minimum required sample volume for all subjects be reduced from 1.5 to 1.2 liters in order to avoid a future potential equal protection challenge. There is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the Special Master's findings and recommendations concerning the required minimum breath sample volume. The assertion by the NJSBA that adopting a different standard for women over the age of sixty than we apply to all other test subjects might give rise to an equal protection challenge, however, requires our careful consideration. The minimum breath volume is significant, in and of itself, because the Alcotest is programmed to determine whether the four minimum criteria have been met in a precise order, the first of which is the volume analysis. A sample that falls short of the currently required 1.5 liter volume measurement will be found to be unacceptable. In that event, the Alcotest will report the amount of air delivered and will display an error message which reads: minimum volume not achieved. The Alcotest permits up to eleven attempts to collect two breath samples, after which, the only options that the device offers are terminate or refusal. If the operator chooses terminate, the Alcotest will reset and the subject can then be given the opportunity for eleven more attempts. If the operator chooses refusal, the test sequence ends, but the operator is not required to issue a summons for refusal. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. Charging an arrestee with refusal remains largely within the officer's discretion. See generally State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475, 724 A. 2d 241 (1999). Although an Alcotest operator has several options if the device reports that the test sample is inadequate, the fact remains that one of them, refusal, carries with it the possibility of severe sanctions. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. In the face of abundant evidence in the record that there is an identifiable group in the test population who may be physiologically incapable of complying, the risk of permitting the device to reject samples from members of that group and, by extension, authorizing the issuance of a summons for refusal, is unjust. By the same token, however, if the machine were reprogrammed to accept the lowered volume from a woman of the appropriate age, even if she could produce the ordinarily required higher volume but attempted to limit her breath output to avoid producing the deep lung air needed for the most accurate analysis, the machine would reject the sample because it would not achieve the plateau. It is therefore clear that lowering the volume for this identifiable group of test subjects will not, in reality, afford them any advantage over others. The constitutional question raised by the NJSBA, however, also requires us to consider whether it will disadvantage the other individuals required to take the test.
Lowering the minimum breath volume for women over sixty implicates both age and gender classifications and requires us to consider a potential challenge brought pursuant to both the federal and state constitutions. Because these standards are different and because the decision-making paradigm is different in the federal and state courts, we address them in turn. The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1985). The federal equal protection analysis looks to the characteristics of the impacted protected class or the nature of the right being affected by the government action. The federal test used to evaluate an age-based challenge is concerned with whether the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they serve with razorlike precision. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83, 120 S.Ct. 631, 646, 145 L.Ed. 2d 522, 542 (2000). On the other hand, if the government distinguishes between males and females, the classification is subject to a heightened scrutiny. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1978, 155 L.Ed. 2d 953, 963 (2003). For a gender classification to survive this scrutiny, the government must show `at least that the [challenged] classification serves `important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are `substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'' United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2275, 135 L.Ed. 2d 735, 751 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1090, 1098 (1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150, 100 S.Ct. 1540, 1545, 64 L.Ed. 2d 107, 114 (1980))). Unlike its federal counterpart, the New Jersey Constitution does not contain an equal protection clause. Instead, we have found that [a] concept of equal protection is implicit in Art. I, par. 1 of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution. . . . McKenney v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304, 316, 412 A. 2d 1041 (1980). Therefore, even though Article I, paragraph 1 of our Constitution does not include the phrase equal protection, it is well settled law that the expansive language of that provision is the source for [this] fundamental constitutional guarantee [ ]. Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 177 N.J. 318, 332, 828 A. 2d 306 (2003). Although conceptually similar, the right under the State Constitution can in some situations be broader than the right conferred by the Equal Protection Clause. Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 94, 662 A. 2d 367 (1995). Indeed, we have held that our Constitution provides analogous or superior protections to our citizens in the context of equal protection. Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 79, 389 A. 2d 465 (1978). [W]here an important personal right is affected by governmental action, this Court often requires the public authority to demonstrate a greater public need than is traditionally required in construing the federal constitution. Specifically, it must be shown that there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment. [ Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 43, 364 A. 2d 1016 (1976) (citing Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 370, 331 A. 2d 262 (1975)).] In considering equal protection-based challenges, we have not followed the traditional equal protection paradigm of the federal courts, which focuses rigidly on the status of a particular protected class or the fundamental nature of the implicated right. Instead, when analyzing equal protection challenges under New Jersey's Constitution, we have applied a balancing test that weighs the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction. Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 473, 842 A. 2d 125 (2004) (quoting Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 567, 494 A. 2d 294 (1985)). Finally, in addressing equal protection challenges raised in the context of the exercise of police power, we have held that [t]he constitutional principles of due process and equal protection demand that the exercise of the power be devoid of unreason and arbitrariness, and the means selected for the fulfillment of the policy bear a real and substantial relation to that end. Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 123, 118 A. 2d 824 (1955). There are, in theory, two potential equal protection challenges to the adoption of a different minimum volume standard for women over the age of sixty. First, one could argue that the lowered volume allows testing of a smaller sample of shallower depth and therefore results in a lower BAC reading. As to this challenge, it is undisputed that the device will not accept a sample that has not reached a plateau. An older woman who is capable of producing a greater volume of air but does not do so can be identified by her failure to meet the plateau. Therefore, we can be certain that all test subjects, regardless of age or gender, will only achieve a valid sample when the deeper lung air is included. Second, one could argue that the differentiation permits older women who produce a sample with a volume between 1.2 and 1.5 liters to avoid being charged with refusal but exposes both younger women and all men who provide samples of the same volume to be prosecuted with that offense. The record on which the differentiation between the test groups is based, however, demonstrates that the older women, and only the older women, may be physically incapable of producing the larger sample. The right to equal protection does not require us to scrutinize gender distinctions that are based on real physiological differences to the same extent we would scrutinize those distinctions when they are based on archaic, invidious stereotypes about men and women. See State v. Vogt, 341 N.J.Super. 407, 418, 775 A. 2d 551 (App.Div.2001) (recognizing that [t]he Equal Protection Clause . . . does not demand that things that are different in fact be treated the same in law, nor that a state pretend that there are no physiological differences between men and women). Similarly, the federal courts have recognized that not all sex-based differentiations are actionable. For example, in the employment context some standards that appropriately differentiate between the genders are not facially discriminatory. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F. 3d 1104, 1109-10 (9th Cir.2006); see Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F. 3d 128, 132 (3d Cir.1996) (recognizing that gender may, in certain defined circumstances, be a bona fide occupational qualification for employment). Applying the principles we have derived from both the federal and state constitutional analyses, we discern no meritorious ground for an equal protection challenge to the proposed two-tiered approach for minimum breath sample volume, regardless of which level of scrutiny we apply. Viewed against our flexible approach to equal protection challenges as derived from Article I, paragraph 1 of our Constitution, the system survives the constitutional challenge. The governmental policy of achieving accurate breath samples as part of law enforcement's role in ridding our roads of drunk drivers is appropriately coupled with the authority to prosecute for refusal. The proposed two-tiered system for minimum breath volume, however, is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary for it advances these goals without holding the identified class, older women, to a standard that they cannot meet. In this manner, the policy goals are fulfilled through means . . . [that] bear a real and substantial relation to that end. Katobimar, supra, 20 N.J. at 123, 118 A. 2d 824. Similarly, under either the rational relationship test applicable to age-based classifications, or the heightened level of scrutiny applied to gender-based classifications under the federal constitution, the lowered requirement for women over sixty passes constitutional muster. The policy goals we have identified for our state constitutional analysis are, in federal parlance, important governmental objectives, see Hibbs, supra, 538 U.S. at 728-29, 123 S.Ct. at 1978, 155 L.Ed. 2d at 963. The selection of the two tiers for this aspect of the test requirements is both rationally related to those goals and substantially related to their achievement. Ibid. Notwithstanding the concern voiced by the NJSBA, there is no scientific or other ground in the record to direct that the minimum volume be lowered for all test subjects. On the contrary, there is ample support for the Special Master's two-tiered approach and we discern no equal protection violation in lowering the required breath volume to 1.2 liters for women over the age of sixty.
Our conclusion that the firmware must be revised to accept a minimum breath volume sample of 1.2 liters from women over the age of sixty requires us to consider the impact of this directive for pending prosecutions. We presume that there may be women who meet this criteria and whose prosecutions have been stayed pending our decision on these issues. For the sake of completeness of our analysis, we address briefly the possible factual scenarios relevant to these defendants. First, there may be defendants who attempted but failed to achieve a sufficient volume for an acceptable sample. These individuals will be readily identified by an AIR with a breath volume error message. Obviously, proof of the charge of drunk driving for these women can only be based on observational proofs because there will be no reportable BAC results in an AIR. The significance of the lowered breath sample volume, however, rests less in the evidence utilized to support a charge of drunk driving and more in its relationship to a charge of refusal. In light of the scientific evidence that we have found to be persuasive, in the absence of some other evidence that supports the conclusion that any such individual was capable of providing an appropriate sample, by volume, we must assume that she was unable to do so. For these individuals, then, an AIR demonstrating insufficient breath volume may not be used as proof on a charge of refusal. On the other hand, if the AIR demonstrates that a woman over the age of sixty was able to provide at least one sample that was deemed to be sufficient for purposes of the 1.5 liter volume requirement, but she failed to do so on a subsequent attempt, the AIR demonstrating those facts may be utilized as evidence, albeit not conclusive proof, in support of a refusal charge.
The Special Master also recommended that in the future the State acquire and utilize a breath temperature sensor device separately marketed by Draeger, [24] and that, in the interim, all previously reported results be reduced by 6.58 percent to account for breath variations in individuals tested. (Special Master's Finding 9). This recommendation was based on the Special Master's factual findings about breath temperature. We are compelled to reject this recommendation because there is insufficient support in the record for the factual findings on which it is based. In particular, the Special Master found that [m]ost breath analyzers used in the United States operate on the assumption that the temperature of an expired breath sample is 34 degrees C[elsius], but that [r]ecent scientific research supports the proposition that the temperature of an expired breath sample is actually almost 35 degrees C[elsius]. He then found that BrAC increases by 6.58 percent for each degree above thirty-four degrees Celsius, and reasoned that all BAC results should be reduced by 6.58 percent to ensure their accuracy and that the optional breath temperature sensor should be used in the future. He noted, in support of his recommendation, that the State of Alabama requires reduction of all breath results from the Alcotest by this percentage. Although defendants and the NJSBA urge this Court to adopt this finding and recommendation, in part based on the assertion that the most relevant scientific community is Alabama, the State argues that Alabama's program is an aberration and that this recommendation is both unsupported and unsound. We are persuaded to agree with the State for both evidentiary and practical reasons. [25] First, the record reflects that the generally accepted average temperature for human breath is 34 degrees Celsius. Only one study, performed in Alabama and therefore relevant for that jurisdiction's purposes, concluded that the average breath temperature is closer to 35 degrees Celsius. At best, then, there is a debate about average breath temperature. In fact, however, there is no support in the record for the Special Master's assumption that a rise in breath temperature increases BrAC. Notwithstanding that, some of the experts conceded that a one-degree Celsius increase in breath temperature could theoretically produce a 5.5 to 6.8 percent increase in BrAC, assuming that all other variables remained constant. Accordingly, a one-degree Fahrenheit increase in breath temperature could theoretically cause the BrAC to rise by 3.8 percent. There is, however, no evidence in the record that this theoretical increase translates into an inaccurately elevated BAC result. Moreover, all of the experts agreed that even a theoretical possibility of a link would not alter the reported BAC readings in practice. That is, if a person with a normal temperature submitted a breath sample with a 0.07 percent BAC, that person's breath test would be read as being over 0.08 percent BAC only if he had a 2.5 degree-Celsius or 4.5 degree-Fahrenheit increase in body temperature. There is no evidence in the record from which we can conclude that there is any risk that any individuals with such an elevated temperature are even being tested. There is also no evidence in the record to support the finding that the average breath temperature exceeds 34 Celsius or that an elevation of the breath temperature, in and of itself, results in an elevated BAC reading. Second, to the extent that there might be a relationship between the breath temperature of the subject submitting the sample and BAC, there is significant evidence in the record to support the finding that an independent device to measure that temperature or to reduce the results to account for it [26] would be redundant. The device as currently configured incorporates two methods that account for any possible overestimation of the BAC reading that an elevated breath temperature might theoretically cause, and they operate to the benefit of the person being tested. Both the truncation of results and the use of the 2100 to 1 blood/breath ratio, a ratio that in part takes temperature into account, effectively underestimate the calculation to the advantage of the test subject. The debate about the effect of temperature is not new. It was presented specifically in Foley, supra, and in part in Downie, supra . The trial court in Foley, supra, analyzing virtually the same factual assertions as are included in this record, concluded that, apart from a test subject suffering from a very high fever, the natural variation of temperature was subsumed within the variability of the blood/breath ratio. 370 N.J.Super. at 355, 851 A. 2d 123. As that court recognized: The factor of 2100 to 1 was developed by doing studies on persons in the field including both arrested subjects and research subjects. The breath temperature of all these subjects varied. Therefore, the 2100 to 1 ratio already subsumes within it the variation in breath temperature of the general population. [ Ibid. ] We, too, have previously considered the relationship, in general, between temperature and the blood/breath ratio, see Downie, supra, 117 N.J. at 462-63, 569 A. 2d 242. We there concluded that the utilization of the 2100 to 1 ratio adequately accounts for any small impact that a particular subject's elevated temperature might potentially have on the result. Our review of the record convinces us that the Alcotest BAC reading would not be made more accurate by the addition of the breath temperature sensor or by the across-the-board reduction of all values by 6.58 percent to account for the theoretical temperature factor as suggested by the Special Master. More to the point, perhaps, we reach our conclusion for practical reasons as well. The unrebutted evidence in the record convincingly demonstrates that requiring the addition of the breath temperature sensors would result in an unreasonable maintenance burden to the program. In fact, the record includes detailed descriptions of the added steps, equipment, time and personnel that are necessary simply to maintain and calibrate the temperature sensors. [27] That added practical and logistical burden on the State and the municipalities in New Jersey, while perhaps not prohibitive, is unreasonable in light of the scant basis in the record that might support requiring the sensor. Our evaluation of the evidence therefore leads us to reject the Special Master's recommendation concerning utilization of a breath temperature sensor or reduction in BAC results by a 6.58 percent factor as unsupported by the factual record and unnecessary. Rather, we are persuaded that the effect of breath temperature on BAC is theoretical at best, and that the effect, if any, is ameliorated because the Alcotest uses both truncation and the 2100 to 1 blood/breath ratio to calculate BAC. Because both of these safeguards effectively underestimate BAC, any additional subtraction to account for temperature is redundant and unnecessary. We therefore reject the Special Master's finding and recommendations concerning the breath sensor and a 6.58 percent compensating reduction.
The Special Master recommended that the firmware be revised to correct the acceptable tolerance among the reported results so as to permit results to be accepted if they are within plus or minus 0.005 percent BAC or plus or minus five percent of the mean for the four readings, whichever is greater. (Special Master's Finding 10). Although the State does not dispute the need to correct future firmware versions, both the recommendation of the Special Master as to the acceptable tolerance range and the effect of this determination upon pending cases require our analysis. The acceptable tolerance question raises a variety of concerns, including its implications for the validity of any particular test result, our confidence in the accuracy and reliability of a specific Alcotest unit, the need for performance of a third test on any particular test subject, and the appropriate method by which to assess tolerance in light of changes to the quantification of the per se violation in recent years. We address each of these difficult issues in turn.
Tolerance is the range of any set of measurements that is accepted as being representative of a true reading. Precision and accuracy can be ensured by requiring the application of a narrow range for tolerance. Conversely, the wider the acceptable tolerance between reported results, the lower our confidence in the accuracy of any of the reported results. Therefore, for purposes of permitting any device to be utilized for proof of a per se violation of the statute, the acceptable tolerance is of fundamental importance. As a matter of historical perspective, we first considered the question of acceptable tolerance ranges in Romano, supra . There, as a part of our evaluation of whether the test results obtained from two breathalyzer models which might have been affected by radio frequency interference (RFI) could be admissible, we accepted the 0.01 percent BAC standard as a scientifically reliable tolerance range, based on the opinions of two experts who so opined, see Romano, supra, 96 N.J. at 86, 474 A. 2d 1. At the time, the statute created a per se offense for any person whose BAC was 0.10 percent or greater, see id. at 78, 474 A. 2d 1. As we articulated the tolerance analysis in Romano, admissibility is satisfactorily established . . . [i]f the breathalyzer results consist of two tests or readings within a tolerance of 0.01 percent of each other. . . . Id. at 87-88, 474 A. 2d 1. The point, of course, was that if a breathalyzer that might be influenced by RFI could nevertheless read two separate breath samples with results within this range, we would presume those results were unaffected by external influences and, therefore, valid. After our decision in Romano, the 0.01 percent BAC tolerance range became the benchmark against which all breathalyzer results, not just those from RFI-susceptible models, were tested for general reliability and accuracy. In Downie, we again referred to the 0.01 percent BAC tolerance range as a benchmark for reporting accurate results. See Downie, supra, 117 N.J. at 455, 569 A. 2d 242. Although we did not independently evaluate the continuing validity of that tolerance range, we adhered to it as a part of our evaluation of the overall scientific accuracy and reliability of the breathalyzer. Indeed, we have never departed from that standard and have not previously been called upon to consider any different articulation of that accepted range of tolerance. Prior to the trial court's decision in Foley, the tolerance range for the Alcotest was fixed by the software to be 0.01 percent BAC or a range of ten percent for all samples. That range was determined by Brettell when the Alcotest program was first devised. The range, however, was tested by reference to the arithmetic mean, the effect of which halves the expression of the range. In addressing the challenge to the tolerance as being inconsistent with Romano, the court in Foley described the tolerance as fixed in the Alcotest in somewhat different terms. The Foley court explained that our long-accepted standard of a required tolerance of 0.01 percent BAC between two breath samples was the strictest standard in the United States, and concluded that, as applied to the four results derived by Alcotest, the additional parameter of ±10 [percent] is within the tolerance considered acceptable for reliable results by the scientific community. Foley, supra, 370 N.J.Super. at 357, 851 A. 2d 123. In so articulating the tolerance range, however, the court did not simply re-articulate a long-accepted tolerance, expressing it as a percentage rather than an absolute. Nor did it accurately express the tolerance used by the device, an earlier version of software known as Firmware version 3.8, in which the tolerance was expressed in alternate terms. Rather, the court, inadvertently, we think, endorsed a tolerance range that effectively doubled that which we have allowed. There are several considerations arising from this expanded tolerance that are now before us. First, the use of a percentage tolerance range tends to permit readings at higher levels that are wide of the previously accepted 0.01 percent BAC standard. This might lead to results that are, in and of themselves suspicious in terms of their intrinsic reliability. That is to say, although for purposes of guilt, it might not matter whether we accepted two test results that were within ten percent but beyond 0.01 percent BAC of each other, those results might raise a concern about the overall reliability of the particular machine. Second, however, use of an absolute rather than a percentage might arguably disadvantage subjects whose test results are at the lower end of the range by accepting test results that are, by percentage, more widely separated and that would be rejected as out of tolerance were a percentage analysis applied. Third, in some measure the amendments to the statute and the creation of new per se offenses, not extant when we considered the acceptable tolerance in Romano and Downie, makes our evaluation of this issue more complex. In the abstract, tested against a statute that only utilized one per se test for drunkenness, namely, 0.10 percent BAC, our acceptance of the single test for acceptable tolerance was well supported in the scientific record. The question, in light of the lowered per se limits now in force, is what we should demand in terms of precision to demonstrate accuracy and support admissibility. Taking into account these considerations, we turn to an evaluation of the evidence in the record concerning tolerance and its significance. At present, assuming the subject has provided an otherwise acceptable sample, the Alcotest reports the EC and IR results of the first sample. The device is programmed to accept the EC and IR test results from a second sample only if those results are within its programmed tolerance of the EC and IR results from the first breath sample. If the second-sample results are not within the tolerance, the Alcotest will record the results, but require a third sample. For Firmware version 3.8, used in the Alcotest program at issue in Foley, Brettell testified that he set the tolerance in accordance with the breathalyzer tolerance expressed in Downie. He interpreted the Downie standard to mean that two breath tests had to be within 0.01 percent BAC of each other when the mean BAC measured below 0.10 percent BAC, which was the per se level when Downie was decided. Brettell testified that, notwithstanding the fact that the Court never varied from the 0.01 percent BAC standard, he assumed we intended a tolerance of ten percent for BAC values above 0.10 percent BAC. Therefore, Firmware version 3.8 was programmed to accept the second breath test if there was no more than 0.01 percent BAC or ten percent between the highest and lowest readings. Notwithstanding Brettell's acknowledgment that he knew that the Foley statement about tolerance was mathematically incorrect, he concedes that following the decision in Foley, the State directed Draeger to reprogram the device so as to take advantage of that far wider, effectively doubled, range for tolerance. He explained that he did so to make the test conform with programs in other states and to address criticism of the relative frequency with which the device in Foley rejected results for being out of tolerance and required the administration of a third test. Brettell believed that taking advantage of the court-sanctioned wider tolerance would alleviate a similar challenge in the future. The State concedes that Firmware version 3.11 did precisely that, creating a range of either plus ten percent or minus ten percent of the mean, for a doubled tolerance. [28]
Although New Jersey, prior to the introduction of Firmware version 3.11, in compliance with our decision in Romano and Downie, adhered to the 0.01 percent BAC tolerance standard, there is no general agreement among the states as to what standard is acceptable. Many states other than New Jersey utilize the 0.01 percent BAC tolerance standard as well, but the National Safety Council, for example, recommends a tolerance of no more than 0.02 between the highest and lowest readings. One of the State's witnesses, Rod Gullberg, testified about his previously published conclusions on tolerance measurement. He opined, therefore, that the Firmware version 3.11 tolerance is too broad. See R.G. Gullberg, Determining an Appropriate Standard for Duplicate Breath Test Agreement, 39 Can. Soc'y Forensic Sci. J. 15, 23 (2006). Instead, he recommended using plus or minus five percent of the mean of the four tests. He estimated that if the firmware were changed to utilize this tolerance, the number of people who would have to submit additional samples would increase by approximately five percent. That estimate is mirrored by a comparison of the data from Pennsauken, in which Firmware version 3.8 was used, with the data from Middlesex County, in which Firmware version 3.11, with its doubled tolerance, was used. Another of the State's witnesses, Hansueli Ryser, explained that if New Jersey used a tolerance of plus or minus 0.005 percent BAC, or plus or minus five percent, of the mean, whichever is greater, then for mean measurements below 0.10 percent BAC, the acceptable tolerance would be plus or minus 0.005 percent BAC. As an example, if a person had a mean alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent BAC, the tests would be in tolerance if they fell between 0.075 and 0.085 percent BAC. [29] For mean concentrations above 0.10 percent BAC, the relevant tolerance would be plus or minus five percent. Brettell testified that he planned to revisit the tolerance because it had caused so much litigation. He testified that the 0.02 percent BAC National Safety Council recommendation might be the easiest to adopt, but he preferred the use of a combination of a set value and a percentage because the percentage would account for scientifically defensible wider tolerance at very high values. Overall he favored [30] plus or minus 0.005 percent BAC from the mean or plus or minus five percent of the mean, whichever was greater.
Although we have never considered the use of a tolerance other than the absolute 0.01 authorized in Romano, intervening legislative enactments require us to address the continuing validity of that standard. At the time that we decided the question of acceptable tolerance in Romano, there was but one per se standard for drunk driving prosecutions, namely, the 0.10 percent BAC. Since that time, however, the Legislature has reduced that per se limit to 0.08 percent BAC, while maintaining the 0.10 percent BAC standard for enhanced punishment. [31] The issue is what measure of tolerance comports with scientifically reliable, and therefore admissible, results. Expressing the tolerance in terms of the greater of the absolute or a percentage of deviation from the mean authorizes, in effect, a wider range of tolerance at the higher readings. There is, in this record, evidence that demonstrates to our satisfaction that at the higher readings, all measures of BAC are somewhat less precise than they are at the lower ranges. As a result, the wider tolerance expressed by a percentage deviation from the mean applied to the upper ranges of possible readings does not suggest that the device is not working properly. At the lower readings, in contrast, a deviation outside of the tolerance limit we have traditionally required most assuredly will raise a question about the functioning of the particular device. Our evaluation of the record compels us to conclude that, even in light of the lowered overall per se limit adopted since Romano, the continued use of the absolute 0.01 percent BAC standard, coupled with the use of a like range of tolerance expressed as a percentage deviation from the mean, is both scientifically appropriate and consistent with our understanding of the intention of the Legislature in adopting these per se limits. To the extent that Firmware version 3.11 took advantage of an explanation of the tolerance range in Foley that inadvertently doubled the permissible range, however, it cannot be sustained. We therefore direct that for future firmware revisions, the device be programmed to fix the tolerance range to be plus or minus 0.005 percent BAC from the mean or plus or minus five percent of the mean, whichever is greater, in order to ensure scientifically accurate, admissible test results.
Our inquiry, however, cannot end there. There is stark evidence in the record, based on a comparison of the data from the Pennsauken program, in which the device with Firmware version 3.8 and the appropriate tolerance was utilized, with the data collected in Middlesex County, using Firmware version 3.11 and its doubled range, that the intervening expansion of the tolerance range resulted in tests being deemed acceptable by the device that cannot meet the tolerance range we have required. In fact, the data demonstrates that precisely the effect that Brettell desired, namely, reducing the frequency of out of tolerance readings that required third samples, was achieved to the point of apparent elimination. The Special Master, while recommending that the software be revised for future uses to reflect his analysis of acceptable tolerance ranges, did not regard the State's adoption of a different and widely expanded tolerance to be problematical for pending prosecutions. The State urges us to adopt this finding that the doubled tolerance had no effect on any defendant's substantive rights. We disagree. The simple fact is that the tolerance range is a critical component in our conclusion that this or any other device correctly and accurately measures breath alcohol and converts that data into a scientifically reliable, accurate BAC analysis. Our acceptance of those results for purposes of supporting, without more, a criminal conviction, must be based on our conclusion that the results are reliable and accurate. The use of a doubled tolerance, however, deprived some percentage of test subjects of a third, and perhaps dispositive, test. At the same time, it undermines our confidence in the accuracy of the reports of those tests that fall outside of the range that we have demanded be utilized as a prerequisite for scientific accuracy and that undergirds admissibility in a criminal proceeding. It is easy enough to identify those individuals for whom a third test should have been given. To be sure, if we had the third test data for those defendants, some of them would achieve a result within the authorized tolerance and thus be shown to have violated the per se limits. But just as surely, there may be others for whom a third test would have yielded a result still further out of range so as to, perhaps, call the accuracy of the particular machine into question. And it is even possible that there might be a defendant for whom a third test would result in a reading that would meet the test for tolerance but would exonerate that individual. The suggestion that we permit those test results that are outside of the range for tolerance to be utilized for purposes of a per se conviction unfortunately is, simply put, unacceptable. Zealousness in ridding our roads of drunk drivers cannot overcome our ordinary notions of fairness to those accused of these offenses. Therefore, we are constrained to direct not only that future firmware updates utilize the tolerance computation that we have concluded is acceptable, but that all pending prosecutions include an evaluation of whether the two reported test results exceeded this acceptable tolerance. Any AIR that reports results from tests of only two breath samples, therefore, must be analyzed to determine whether its results are within our accepted tolerance by use of a mathematical calculation. The appropriate calculation for this purpose will consist of applying the following formula: (a) add the IR and EC results given for the first breath sample to the IR and EC results for the second breath sample; (b) divide the sum calculated in (a) by 4 to derive the arithmetic mean; (c) compute the upper limit of tolerance by taking the larger value of the mean multiplied by 1.05 or the mean plus 0.005 percent BAC; (d) compute the lower limit of tolerance by taking the smaller of the value of the mean multiplied by 0.95 or the mean minus 0.005 percent BAC; (e) if all of the IR and EC results of the two samples fall within the upper and lower limits of the tolerance range, the AIR is valid, but if any of the results fall outside of the tolerance range, the AIR is not valid. Although we have prepared a worksheet that is attached to the order that accompanies this opinion for use in all prosecutions pending reprogramming of the device, two examples will, we think, illustrate the way in which the formula should be utilized in practice to differentiate between an AIR that reports results within tolerance and one that does not. If, for example, a defendant's first breath test sample yielded an IR result of 0.100 percent BAC and an EC result of 0.101 percent BAC, and the second sample yielded an IR result of 0.104 percent BAC and an EC result of 0.103 percent BAC, the calculations would be performed as follows: (a) first all four of the results (two IR and two EC) would be added, in this example, 0.100 + 0.101 + 0.104 + 0.103 = 0.408; (b) next, the arithmetic mean would be derived by dividing that sum by four, 0.408 / 4 = 0.102; (c) then the upper limit of acceptable tolerance must be determined by comparing the two methods for computing the range, namely, the use of the absolute or the percentage. This is done by computing each separately and selecting the greater of the two. In this example, the computation would yield the following options: (0.102 x 1.05 = 0.1071) OR (0.102 + 0.005 = 0.1070). Because the greater of these is 0.1071, that will be the correct upper tolerance limit; (d) next, the lower limit of acceptable tolerance must be derived by comparing the two methods for computing the range, again, by using the absolute and the percentage calculations. This is done by computing each separately and selecting the lesser of the two. In this example, the computation would yield the following options: (0.102 x 0.95 = 0.0969) OR (0.102-0.005 = 0.0970). Because the lesser of these is 0.0969, that will be the correct lower tolerance limit; and (e) finally, by comparing all four of the reported test sample results (0.100, 0.101, 0.104, 0.103) against this accepted tolerance range of 0.0969 to 0.1071, it becomes plain that, in this example, the AIR is valid because all four test results fall within the accepted tolerance range. Because the Firmware version 3.11 utilized a doubled tolerance range, there will be AIRs that will not meet the test for tolerance that we have deemed to be permissible. We therefore provide a further example to illustrate the calculations relating to an AIR that would be out of tolerance under this standard and, therefore, inadmissible in a prosecution. If, for example, a defendant's first breath test sample yielded an IR result of 0.089 percent BAC and an EC result of 0.080 percent BAC, and the second sample yielded an IR result of 0.091 percent BAC and an EC result of 0.084 percent BAC, the calculations, which would be performed in the same manner, would yield a different outcome, as follows: (a) first, all four of the results (two IR and two EC) would be added, in this example, 0.089 + 0.080 + 0.091 + 0.084 = 0.344; (b) next, the arithmetic mean would be derived by dividing that sum by four, 0.344 / 4 = 0.086; (c) then the upper limit of acceptable tolerance must be determined by comparing the two methods for computing the range, namely, the use of the absolute or the percentage. This is done by computing each separately and selecting the greater of the two. In this example, the computation would yield the following options: (0.086 x 1.05 = 0.0903) OR (0.086 + 0.005 = 0.0910). Because the greater of these is 0.0910, that will be the correct upper tolerance limit; (d) next, the lower limit of acceptable tolerance must be derived by comparing the two methods for computing the range, again, by using the absolute and the percentage calculations. This is done by computing each separately and selecting the lesser of the two. In this example, the computation would yield the following options: (0.086 x 0.95 = 0.0817) OR (0.086-0.005 = 0.0810). Because the lesser of these is 0.0810, that will be the correct lower tolerance limit; and (e) finally, by comparing all four of the reported test sample results (0.089, 0.080, 0.091, 0.084) against this accepted tolerance range of 0.0810 to 0.0910, it becomes plain that, in this example, the AIR is invalid because the first breath sample's EC result (0.080) does not fall within the accepted tolerance range. The use in Firmware version 3.11 of the doubled tolerance range, which we have rejected, requires that all AIRs that report results of only two breath samples be tested for validity against the tolerance range we have accepted. Therefore, in all prosecutions stayed by our January 10, 2006 Order, the State shall review the BAC results as reported in the AIR and shall calculate whether those results fall within tolerance, and the court shall review those calculations and make them a part of the record. In those cases in which this review reveals that the results fall outside of the acceptable tolerance, the AIR cannot be deemed to be sufficiently scientifically reliable to be admissible and it shall not be admitted into evidence as proof of a per se violation.