Opinion ID: 3133033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: In 2013, this Court determined that Matthew Kelty was eligible for personal injury protection (―PIP‖) benefits under an insurance policy between State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (―State Farm‖) and John and Shirley Lovegrove after Kelty was injured in an accident involving the Lovegroves‘ vehicle.1 As a result, this Court reversed the Superior Court‘s earlier grant of summary judgment to State Farm and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the parties argued about whether Kelty was entitled to receive only the statutory minimum of $15,000,2 or $100,000, including excess coverage the Lovegroves opted to pay for but which was expressly limited in the policy to the insureds and their relatives who lived with them. The Superior Court held that Kelty was entitled to receive the full $100,000 because the policy‘s limitation on who could benefit from the excess coverage was ―void as against public policy.‖3 Because the plain language of the statute, 21 Del. C. § 2118, requires PIP policies to provide only $15,000 of coverage, the Superior Court erred by imposing a higher minimum here simply because the Lovegroves chose to pay for additional coverage for themselves and their relatives. Doing so thwarts Delaware‘s public policy to encourage drivers to purchase more than the statutorily-mandated minimum by increasing the cost 1 Kelty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 73 A.3d 926 (Del. 2013). 2 See 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)b (―The minimum insurance coverage which will satisfy the requirements of subparagraph a. of this paragraph is a minimum limit for the total of all payments which must be made pursuant to that subparagraph of $15,000 for any 1 person and $30,000 for all persons injured in any 1 accident.‖). 3 Kelty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 3057887, at  (Del. Super. May 28, 2014). 1 of excess coverage. Further, although Delaware‘s public policy, as reflected in the statutory scheme, supports the idea that every driver must obtain a certain amount of automobile insurance to cover anyone she might injure in a car accident, the General Assembly has simultaneously set the amount of that coverage at the level it deems appropriate. It is not the role of the judiciary to alter that amount and thus disrupt the incentives that the General Assembly has itself set up for insurers and consumers. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.