Opinion ID: 1142323
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Any error resulting from the inadvertent mention of insurance was waived by defendant's failure to promptly object and move for a mistrial.

Text: This is an action for personal injuries suffered by the driver of a truck as the result of what was claimed to be a defective steering mechanism. Defendant's expert witness, upon cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel, was asked whether he had seen the remaining portion of the steering mechanism. In answer to that question defendant's witness stated: Yes, I think we did. The General Adjustment Bureau Insurance man took me up    to where the vehicle was   . No motion was made at that time by defendant's counsel to either strike that answer or to ask that the jury be instructed to disregard it, much less to ask that a mistrial be declared. Instead, defendant's counsel allowed the plaintiff's attorney to complete his cross-examination (extending over nine additional transcript pages) and then proceeded to complete his redirect examination of the same witness. It was only when the court then called its next recess that defendant's counsel, in chambers, made a motion for mistrial upon another ground and, in that connection, urged as an additional ground for that motion that a mention of insurance had been made by his own witness, despite his warning the witness about bringing out any mention of insurance. Defendant's counsel then conceded that the mention of insurance was not deliberate and that It's solely within the discretion of the court and in the light of everything else that happened in the case. The trial judge, after stating I realize that and agreeing with the statement that the mention of insurance was not deliberate, denied defendant's motion for a mistrial. According to an annotation in 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949), at p. 820: The conduct of defendant's counsel may be such as to estop him from successfully making the objection that a reference to insurance is such prejudicial error as to require the declaration of a mistrial. Among the cases cited in support of that rule is the case of Hatfield v. Levy Bros., 18 Cal.2d 798, 117 P.2d 841 (1941), in which it was held (at p. 849) that the defendant might not successfully claim prejudice from the inadvertent mention of insurance because no objection was made until after the witness had left the stand and because defendant never at any time made a motion to strike the answer or ask the court to instruct the jury to disregard the reference to insurance. See also other cases to the same effect as cited in 4 A.L.R.2d, supra, at 820-821. This court has not previously had occasion to rule upon the question whether failure of counsel to promptly object or to move to strike or to ask the court to instruct the jury to disregard a question or answer in which insurance is mentioned inadvertently, or to promptly move for a mistrial, will bar a defendant from a subsequent motion for mistrial or new trial on that ground. This court has held in many cases, however, that the failure to object promptly to an improper question waives such an objection and that, in addition, it is necessary to move promptly to strike an improper answer by a witness to a proper question. [2] This court has also held that in such an event, the trial judge should also be requested to instruct the jury to disregard such testimony [3] and that ordinarily the admonition by a trial judge to a jury to disregard improper testimony cures such an error except in extreme circumstances, such as a direct appeal to passion and prejudice (which this was not). [4] In addition, the court has held that a motion for mistrial must be made promptly and that such a motion when made later is ordinarily too late. [5] There are particular reasons why these same rules should be applicable and controlling in cases in which, in response to proper questions, improper answers are given in which mention of insurance is made inadvertently. Indeed, this court has already held that the admonition by a trial judge to a jury to disregard an inadvertent reference by a witness to insurance cures such an error (if any), at least in the ordinary case, such as this. [6] If defendants' counsel in personal injury cases are not required to take such action, and to do so promptly, they will be encouraged, by the making of a tardy and pro forma motion for mistrial in the expectation that it will be denied, to gamble on a favorable verdict and still retain a hedge in the record against an unfavorable verdict, rather than run the risk of having a prompt and vigorous motion for mistrial granted, with the resultant expense and inconvenience of a retrial. [7] A further reason why these same rules should be applied in cases involving the inadvertent mention of insurance is the extremely dubious prejudice of a reference to insurance upon a modern jury in the usual automobile accident cases, as discussed below. It follows that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for mistrial. It also follows that the trial court would not have erred in denying defendant's subsequent motion for a new trial on that same ground. Such a conclusion does not completely dispose of this case, in which the trial judge granted, instead of denied, defendant's motion for a new trial. This is because a trial court may grant a new trial because of an error in the admission of testimony, regardless of whether a proper objection, exception or motion was made by counsel. [8] It is still required, however, that there must have been a substantial and prejudicial error, as next discussed.