Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Sun Valley Swap Meet Robbery

Text: Prior to trial, the prosecutor moved to admit evidence of defendant's participation in the Sun Valley swap meet robbery in 1988. The prosecutor argued the evidence was admissible on the issues of identity, intent, and motive pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), [20] because of the striking similarities between the crimes. Thus, he asserted that in both crimes (1) the perpetrators robbed a swap meet; (2) there were three participants, one who grabbed the money, one who stood behind him with a gun, and one in the getaway car; (3) the robbers stole readily available cash, not merchandise; (4) the robbers used an Uzi-like weapon or machine gun; (5) the weapon was obscured by clothing (in the Sun Valley crime, a coat was draped over the gun; in the San Fernando crime, the shooter wore a long coat to hide the weapon); and (6) the getaway car was owned by either a participant or a friend. Responding to the prosecutor's motion, defense counsel emphasized the differences between the two crimes. For example, the robbers in the Sun Valley crime broke into a secured area, whereas the San Fernando crime was essentially a snatch and run. Defense counsel disputed that swap meets were per se a distinctive location for a crime, arguing that robberies are committed wherever money is present, including at swap meets. The prosecutor countered that defendant, knowing he was about to be convicted in the Sun Valley crime, committed the San Fernando robbery in order to provide some money for his girlfriend; thus, the earlier robbery provided a motive for the second one. [21] In addition, the prosecutor argued that because in the Sun Valley crime the security guard had been a key witness against him, when Teal obstructed his getaway in the San Fernando crime defendant was motivated to kill him as revenge for [the security guard's] testimony ... and that Mr. Teal was clearly killed to prevent him from testifying based upon the lesson that was learned by [defendant] in the previous robbery. [22] The trial court ruled the evidence was admissible and, to the extent defendant was also moving to exclude the evidence under Evidence Code section 352, denied that motion as well. Evidence was then presented showing defendant's guilt of the Sun Valley crime. Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his participation in the previous Sun Valley swap meet robbery under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) and that its admission prejudiced him by permitting the jury to conclude he possessed a bad character. We disagree. [23] The rules governing the admissibility of evidence of other crimes are well settled. `Evidence of the defendant's commission of a crime other than one for which the defendant is then being tried is not admissible to show bad character or predisposition to criminality but it may be admitted to prove some material fact at issue, such as motive or identity. (Evid.Code, ง 1101.) Because evidence of other crimes may be highly inflammatory, its admissibility should be scrutinized with great care. [Citation.]' [Citation.] In cases in which the prosecution seeks to prove the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the charged offense by evidence he had committed uncharged offenses, admissibility `depends upon proof that the charged and uncharged offenses share distinctive common marks sufficient to raise an inference of identity.' ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 748, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) A somewhat lesser degree of similarity is required to show a common plan or scheme and still less similarity is required to show intent. ( People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402-403, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) On appeal, we review a trial court's ruling under Evidence Code section 1101 for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) As Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) recognizes, that a defendant previously committed a similar crime can be circumstantial evidence tending to prove his identity, intent, and motive in the present crime. Like other circumstantial evidence, admissibility depends on the materiality of the fact sought to be proved, the tendency of the prior crime to prove the material fact, and the existence vel non of some other rule requiring exclusion. ( People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 146, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Defendant placed all issues in dispute by pleading not guilty. ( Ibid. ) [24] Accordingly, the identity of the person who robbed Pipkin and killed Teal, and that person's intent and motive, were all material facts. The evidence of defendant's participation in the Sun Valley crime also tends to prove these material facts. For identity to be established, the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense must share common features that are sufficiently distinctive so as to support the inference that the same person committed both acts. [Citation.] `The pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.' ( People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) Requiring a highly unusual and distinctive nature [for] both the charged and uncharged offenses virtually eliminates the possibility that anyone other than the defendant committed the charged offense. ( People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 425, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777.) Here, defendant and his cohorts victimized the owners or proprietors of swap meets, an unusual venue for such crimes. We disagree with defendant's characterization of a swap meet as just another generic location where money can be found by those willing to transgress the larceny laws. Swap meets are distinctive in that they are large sprawling affairs with less security over cash receipts than might be found in a permanent brick and mortar establishment. Moreover, the crimes here were committed in a distinctive manner. One robber grabbed the cash, not merchandise, while a second stood behind him with an Uzi or machine gun partially obscured by clothing. The third member of the group waited in a car to facilitate a rapid departure. In light of the distinctiveness and unusual nature of these shared characteristics, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling evidence of the Sun Valley offense would support the inference the same person committed the San Fernando offense. We reach the same conclusion as to the issue of intent. `We have long recognized that if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably harbors the same intent in each instance [citations], and that such prior conduct may be relevant circumstantial evidence of the actor's most recent intent. The inference to be drawn is not that the actor is disposed to commit such acts; instead, the inference to be drawn is that, in light of the first event, the actor, at the time of the second event, must have had the intent attributed to him by the prosecution.' ( People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 171, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169.) In other words, if defendant intended permanently to deprive the victim of the Sun Valley crime of his money, the jury legitimately could infer he harbored the same intent with regard to his actions toward Pipkin. Although defendant argues the intent to deprive was not significantly in issue, it nevertheless was part of the prosecution's burden to prove such intent. Finally, we conclude likewise as to motive. Although defendant argued at trial that motive was not one of the elements of any crime the prosecutor was obliged to prove, evidence of motive makes the crime understandable and renders the inferences regarding defendant's intent more reasonable. Motive is not a matter whose existence the People must prove or whose nonexistence the defense must establish. [Citation.] Nonetheless, `[p]roof of the presence of motive is material as evidence tending to refute or support the presumption of innocence.' ( People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676.) Because the security guard at the Sun Valley swap meet had provided key prosecution evidence against defendant, the jury could infer that defendant had a motive to eliminate Teal as a witness. Although defendant argued below that Teal was not, in fact, a security guard for the San Fernando swap meet, he could not have known that at the time of the robbery. All defendant saw was that Teal had captured Ayala during the getaway period; for all intents and purposes, Teal must have appeared to defendant as a security guard. On appeal, defendant contends this theory of motive is completely unfounded and far too speculative to support admission of other crimes evidence. On the contrary, Jude Barrios later testified that defendant told her he killed Teal to eliminate a witness to the crime, indicating the theory was not so speculative as defendant would have us believe. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of the Sun Valley swap meet robbery. For the same reasons, we also find the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to exclude this evidence under Evidence Code section 352. Even were we to find the court abused its discretion, however, any error would have been harmless. After Jude Barrios and Christine Zorns testified, there was little doubt on the issue of identity. Moreover, given defendant's actions during the robbery, coupled with the jury's finding that he personally used a firearm to shoot Teal, there would have been little doubt about his intent or motive. Any error in admitting evidence of the Sun Valley swap meet robbery was thus harmless.