Opinion ID: 783949
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Factual predicate for the conscious avoidance instruction

Text: 28 Having found no doctrinal obstacle to employing a conscious avoidance instruction in the context of a two-person conspiracy, we now turn to the question of whether the facts in the instant case support such an instruction. 29 We note at the outset that Robles raised his challenge to the factual predicate for the conscious avoidance instruction in a footnote. See Appellant's Brief at 31 n. 15. It is well-established in this Circuit that `[w]e do not consider an argument mentioned only in a footnote to be adequately raised or preserved for appellate review.' United States v. Quinones, 317 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Restrepo, 986 F.2d 1462, 1463 (2d Cir.1993)) (other citations omitted). In any event, for the reasons that follow, we find Robles' argument on this point unpersuasive. 30 A conscious avoidance instruction may only be given if (1) the defendant asserts the lack of some specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction,... and (2) the appropriate factual predicate for the charge exists, i.e., `the evidence is such that a rational juror may reach [the] conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt ... that [the defendant] was aware of a high probability [of the fact in dispute] and consciously avoided confirming that fact[.]' Ferrarini, 219 F.3d at 154 (internal citations omitted). The second prong of this test thus has two components — there must be evidence that the defendant (1) was aware of a high probability of the disputed fact and (2) deliberately avoided confirming that fact. See Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951-52 (5th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir.1988)) (footnote omitted). Of course, the same evidence that will raise an inference that the defendant had actual knowledge of the illegal conduct ordinarily will also raise the inference that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct. Id. at 952. Moreover, the second prong may be established where, [a] defendant's involvement in the criminal offense may have been so overwhelmingly suspicious that the defendant's failure to question the suspicious circumstances establishes the defendant's purposeful contrivance to avoid guilty knowledge. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 31 Here, the first prerequisite is easily met, as Robles denied knowledge of the unlawful source of Svoboda's investment advice. The second prerequisite is also easily met. First, the source of Svoboda's information was suspicious — Robles knew that Svoboda was a credit officer at Nations Bank and would thus be privy to confidential financial information. Second, the timing of Robles' trades was suspicious — for example, some of Robles' trades occurred as little as a day before a tender offer announcement. Third, the success of the trades was suspicious — Robles realized large returns, up to 400%, on trades based on Svoboda's advice. These facts suggest a high probability that Svoboda's tips were based on inside information and that any lack of actual knowledge on Robles' part was due to a conscious effort to avoid confirming an otherwise obvious fact. We therefore find that there was a sufficient factual predicate in the instant case to warrant a conscious avoidance instruction. 10 32