Opinion ID: 456033
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assessment

Text: 15 We find that the district court's addition of postjudgment interest to its award of attorney fees was not barred by principles of sovereign immunity. While the United States enjoys a broad general sovereign immunity from interest on judgments entered against it, Congress may expressly waive this immunity. See, e.g., Shaw v. Library of Congress, 747 F.2d 1469, 1475 (D.C.Cir.1984) (citing cases); Arvin v. United States, 742 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir.1984). And Congress has waived this immunity, with respect to awards of postjudgment interest against USPS, by way of 39 U.S.C. Sec. 401(1), which provides that the Postal Service may sue and be sued in its official name. Milner v. Bolger, 546 F.Supp. 375, 381 (E.D.Cal.1982); White v. Bloomberg, 501 F.2d 1379, 1386 (4th Cir.1974); Cross v. United States Postal Service, 733 F.2d 1327, 1332 (8th Cir.1984) (en banc) (Arnold, J., dissenting) (equally divided court), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1750, 84 L.Ed.2d 815 (1985). But see id. at 1329-30 & n. 3 (refusing to apply 39 U.S.C. Sec. 401(1) because underlying cause of action arose under Title VII). 16 Section 401(1) constitutes a broad waiver of USPS's sovereign immunity, and subjects it to liability ... the same as any other business. Franchise Tax Board v. United States Postal Service, --- U.S. ----, ----, 104 S.Ct. 2549, 2554, 81 L.Ed.2d 446 (1984). USPS is not less amenable to judicial process than a private enterprise under like circumstances would be, FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245, 60 S.Ct. 488, 490, 84 L.Ed. 724 (1940), quoted in Franchise Tax Board, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2553, and it is subject by virtue of the sue and be sued clause to all the natural and appropriate incidents of legal proceedings. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 85, 61 S.Ct. 485, 487, 85 L.Ed. 595 (1941). 17 Bolger's arguments in support of USPS immunity to postjudgment interest awards are without merit. He contends that the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure code's general interest provision, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961, does not constitute an all-encompassing waiver of United States immunity to liability for interest. But the absence of a global waiver is of no consequence, because we find that in another statute, 39 U.S.C. Sec. 401(1), Congress has authorized USPS in particular to pay interest on judgments. In addition, the cases from the Court of Claims which Bolger urges us to follow, e.g., Coley Properties Corp. v. United States, 593 F.2d 380 (Ct.Cl.1979), are not apposite; litigation in that forum must conform to a special interest-restricting statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(a), which does not bind us in the present case. We uphold the district court's determination that an award of interest was appropriate.