Opinion ID: 217403
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 11 No. 09-4267 As a general matter, we have noted that “[t]he withdrawal of a guilty plea is inherently in derogation of the public interest in finality and the orderly administration of justice.” Id. Therefore, “[w]hen a defendant has entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty at a hearing at which he acknowledged committing the crime, the occasion for setting aside a guilty plea should seldom arise.” Id. This Court has stated that “[a] defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea and bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.” Id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) permits a defendant to “withdraw a plea of guilty . . . after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if . . . the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” We have reiterated that “[t]his rule is designed to allow a hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and confused mind to be undone, not to allow a defendant to make a tactical decision to enter a plea, wait several weeks, and then obtain a withdrawal if he believes he made a bad choice in pleading guilty.” Ellis, 470 F.3d at 28081. See also United States v. Haygood, 549 F.3d 1049, 1052-53 (6th Cir, 2008); United States v. Lineback, 330 F.3d 441, 443 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, “[w]ithdrawal of a plea is appropriate where there is a real confusion or misunderstanding of the terms of the agreement.” Id. at 281. In determining whether a defendant has met the Rule 11(d)(2)(B) standard, and articulated a reason for withdrawal of his guilty that is fair and just, this Court looks to a set of seven factors: (1) the amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the motion to withdraw it; (2) the presence (or absence) of a valid reason for the failure to move for withdrawal earlier in the proceedings; (3) whether the defendant has asserted or maintained his innocence; (4) the circumstances underlying the entry of the guilty plea; (5) the defendant’s nature and background; (6) the degree to which the defendant has had prior experience with the criminal justice system; and (7) potential prejudice to the government if the motion to withdraw is granted. 12 No. 09-4267 United States v. Dixon, 479 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Bashara, 27 F.3d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir. 1994)). However, “the factors listed are a general, non-exclusive list and no one factor is controlling.” Ellis, 470 F.3d at 286. Application of the factors to the instant case demonstrates that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Regarding the first factor, the amount of time that elapsed between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw, this Court has stated that “[t]he shorter the delay, the more likely a motion to withdraw will be granted, and a defendant’s reason for filing such a motion will be more closely scrutinized when he has delayed his motion for a substantial length of time.” Id. Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea 91 days after pleading. This Court has “frequently relied on much shorter delays for upholding a withdrawal denial.” Dixon, 479 F.3d at 436. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 362 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding a denial of a motion to withdraw due to a 75 day delay); United States v. Durham, 178 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding a denial of a motion to withdraw due to a 77 day delay); United States v. Baez, 87 F.3d 805 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding a denial of a motion to withdraw due to a 67 day delay). Moreover, Defendant failed to proffer any reason explaining his 91 day delay in moving to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant’s unexplained delay weighs against him, and supports upholding the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw. The district court further noted that the jury was already empaneled prior to Defendant’s entry of the guilty plea. Although Defendant asserts that the district court improperly considered this fact in denying his motion to withdraw, the district court did not err in considering this fact in its analysis. 13 No. 09-4267 This Court has stated that the list of enumerated factors is not exhaustive. See Ellis, 470 F.3d at 281. Thus, a district court may consider any additional facts relevant to determining whether permitting a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea is mandated by justice. In this case, the jury was already empaneled prior to Defendant’s entry of the guilty plea, and the government had prepared for Defendant’s trial prior to Defendant’s plea. These facts highlight the effect of Defendant’s delay, and further weigh in favor of denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw. Regarding the third factor, Defendant did assert his innocence in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, stating, “Mr. Sharp has consistently asserted his innocence in this case.” (R. 71, Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea at 3.) However, the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s guilty plea undercut Defendant’s assertion of innocence in his motion to withdraw. Initially, on April 1, 2009, the district court refused to entertain Defendant’s guilty plea, stating that it would not “tak[e] a plea from a defendant that is not fully accepting of the terms and conditions.” (R. 86, Tr. of Pretrial Hearing 4/1/09 at 6.) In light of Defendant’s initial reticence, the district court was circumspect in its inquiry regarding Defendant’s innocence. Prior to accepting Defendant’s guilty plea, the district court asked Defendant several times whether he “did . . . the things the government alleges,” (R. 72, Tr. of Trial/Change of Plea Hearing 6/23/09 at 10), “underst[ood] . . . that [he was] entering a plea of guilty to all the counts of the indictment,” (id at 14), and “[was] pleading guilty . . . to these three offenses because [he was] in fact guilty of these three crimes.” (Id. at 15.) Therefore, although Defendant asserted his innocence in his motion, in view of the plea colloquy in the district court, this assertion rings hollow. 14 No. 09-4267 Furthermore, both Defendant’s background, and his prior experience with the criminal justice system weigh in favor of upholding the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to withdraw. Defendant’s periodic experience with the criminal justice system, described by the district court, suggests that Defendant was not unsure of the ramifications of his guilty plea, but rather that he pled guilty fully understanding the consequences of doing so. Defendant’s background, and experience with the criminal justice system thus also weigh in favor of upholding the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to withdraw. The seventh factor, potential prejudice to the government, also points to the fact that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw. Prior to Defendant’s guilty plea, the government had arranged for the district court to continue Defendant’s co-defendants’ sentencing because they were cooperating with the government, and had agreed to testify against Defendant at trial. Subsequent to Defendant’s guilty plea, but prior to Defendant’s motion to withdraw, the district court sentenced Defendant’s co-defendants. Granting Defendant’s motion to withdraw, and requiring the government to try Defendant in the instant case, would prejudice the government as it would have to arrange for the co-defendants, who may not be as cooperative post-sentencing, to testify. Finally, Defendant’s stated reason for moving to withdraw his guilty plea was that at the time of Defendant’s plea, “there was no suggestion of a two level enhancement for an upward departure based upon obstruction of justice,” and that “[w]ithout such knowledge, Mr. Sharp [could not] enter into a knowing and intelligent[] guilty plea.” (R. 71, Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea at 2-3.) Although it is true that the district court did not inform Defendant at the time of his guilty plea that 15 No. 09-4267 he was exposed to this particular enhancement, the district court did thoroughly explain to Defendant the range of sentences to which he was exposed. Prior to accepting Defendant’s guilty plea the district court explained that two of the offenses to which Defendant was pleading guilty carried a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years of imprisonment. (See R. 72, Tr. of Trial/Change of Plea Hearing 6/23/09 at 17.) Moreover, the district court explained that it was uncertain of Defendant’s advisory guidelines range. (See id. at 20.) The district court also stated that the guidelines range was advisory, and enumerated the § 3553(a) factors it would consider in determining Defendant’s sentence. (See id. at 18-19.) Defendant was sentenced to 52 months of imprisonment, within the range discussed by the district court at Defendant’s June 23, 2009 plea colloquy. Rather, Defendant’s stated reason for moving to withdraw his guilty plea is exactly the type of tactical reconsideration prohibited by this Court. See Ellis 470 F.3d at 281.