Opinion ID: 7196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: parratt/hudson doctrine

Text: 9 Under the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine, a state actor's negligent or intentional deprivation of a plaintiff's property does not result in a violation of procedural due process rights if there exists an adequate state postdeprivation remedy. 12 Our examination of Alexander's allegations leads us to conclude that the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine does not foreclose her Sec. 1983 claim.
10 We noted in Alexander I that it was clear that under applicable law, whoever held Ms. Alexander's property was required to institute a forfeiture proceeding promptly. 13 Alexander's allegation that the Defendants failed to institute a timely forfeiture proceeding convinces us that the available state remedies--which may be adequate in other circumstances 14 --were not adequate as applied to Alexander in the instant case. 11 As the purpose of the forfeiture proceeding was to determine whether the Defendants were entitled to forfeiture of Alexander's car, the Defendants' initiation of the forfeiture proceeding was a necessary predicate to adjudicating the state tort action. Consequently, even though Alexander pursued the available state remedy of filing a tort action against the Defendants seeking damages and return of her car, she could not procure relief without the Defendants' cooperation. Alexander was therefore stymied in her pursuit of her available state remedy by the very action--or, more accurately, inaction--that is the focus of her Sec. 1983 claim. 12 The Supreme Court ruled in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 15 that the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine was not designed to reach a case in which the state, pursuant to established procedures, deprives someone of an opportunity [to be heard] granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 16 The Logan Court found that the established state procedure of foreclosing a handicapped state employee's claim of unlawful termination if the state failed to convene a timely factfinding conference unreasonably destroyed the terminated employee's entitlement without proper procedural safeguards. 17 Moreover, the Logan Court observed that the lengthy and speculative process of bringing a state tort suit--the terminated employee's only remedy--would not be constitutionally adequate to redress the employee's injuries. 18 13 The Defendants' unreasonable delay in instituting a forfeiture proceeding forced Alexander to suffer, for nearly three years, a continuing property deprivation over which she had no say or control, and it effectively denied Alexander an opportunity for redress. In light of the slow progress of Alexander's state tort action, even after the Defendants finally instituted a forfeiture proceeding, we are convinced that the available state remedies did not protect, and are not adequately protecting, Alexander's right to an opportunity to address her entitlement to the car in the Defendants' custody. We conclude that the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine does not foreclose Alexander's Sec. 1983 claim and that the Defendants' refusal to institute a forfeiture proceeding within a reasonable time after the seizure, even after Alexander's fervent, repeated requests, provides appropriate grounds for her claim that the Defendants violated her due process rights. 19
14 In addition to finding that the Defendants' conduct served to enervate the adequacy of Alexander's available state remedies, we also find that the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine is inapplicable because the random and unauthorized element necessary for its application is absent in Alexander's Sec. 1983 claim. The Supreme Court in Zinermon v. Burch 20 observed that, to warrant application of the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine, the state actors' conduct must have been random or unpredictable as well as unauthorized, in the sense that it was not within the state officials' express or implied authority. 21 15 We disagree with the Defendants' contention that their actions were unpredictable, intentional violations of state law that fell within the ambit of the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine and therefore foreclosed Alexander's Sec. 1983 claim. Although the Louisiana statute providing for a forfeiture proceeding gives the DA the authority to institute the proceeding, it does not specify a time period within which the DA should act. 22 The Defendants therefore had discretion to institute the proceeding whenever they wanted, and their actions in delaying for nearly three years, although unreasonable, were not in conflict with their authority under state law. 16 Moreover, Alexander averred in her Sec. 1983 claim that the Defendants were following their common practice for dealing with seized property when they kept her car in custody without timely instituting a forfeiture proceeding, and she supported her assertion with corroborating depositions. As Alexander alleged that the Defendants' failure timely to institute a forfeiture proceeding was in accordance with their customary procedures, the random and unauthorized element required for Parratt/ Hudson preclusion of a claim is not met. The Defendants' delay, which effectively blocked Alexander from asserting her rights to her car, also undermined the adequacy of the existing state remedies of a tort action and a forfeiture proceeding. Both the predeprivation and postdeprivation conditions necessary for applying the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine to invalidate a procedural due process claim, therefore, are unfulfilled, and Alexander has stated an actionable Sec. 1983 claim.