Opinion ID: 338662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: 15 One of the primary purposes of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970), is to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population    . Section 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1). Pursuant to the court order in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F.Supp. 253 (D. D.C.1972), aff'd per curiam, 4 ERC 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court, sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541, 93 S.Ct. 2770, 37 L.Ed.2d 140 (1973), the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated regulations designed to prevent  significant deterioration of air quality in those areas which have air that already is cleaner than the national ambient air quality standards. 1 The regulations employ a classification scheme under which these clean air regions may be designated Class I, II, or III. All such areas initially are designated Class II, under which specified increments in sulfur dioxide and particulate matter pollution are considered insignificant. A state, Indian territory, or federal land may be redesignated after hearing and by application to EPA. Designation as Class I implies a region of very clean air, in which relatively small increments in air pollution would be considered significant deterioration; Class III areas are those in which deterioration of air quality to the national ambient air quality standards would be considered insignificant. 16 The court has heard the regulations attacked from several perspectives. Petitioner Sierra Club contends that the regulations fail, in a variety of ways, to prevent significant deterioration of existing clean air. The States of New Mexico, Wyoming, and California 2 agree in some respects with Sierra Club, but are concerned that the regulations infringe on the general regulatory authority vested in the states by the Clean Air Act. A large number of electric power companies and industrial organizations have argued that the regulations are not authorized by the Clean Air Act, that their promulgation was procedurally defective, that the allowable increments are arbitrary and capricious, and that the regulatory structure created by the regulations is unconstitutional. 17 We conclude that the Administrator's action is rationally based and has not been shown to be either without his authority or unconstitutional. We therefore do not disturb the regulations as promulgated.