Opinion ID: 785213
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Appellate Division's Jurisdiction

Text: 37 We exercise plenary review in determining whether a court hierarchically below us had subject matter jurisdiction. Wujick v. Dale & Dale, Inc., 43 F.3d 790, 792 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Savings, F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 383 (3d Cir.1994)). As previously noted, we look to local law to determine the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division. See 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a); Gov't of V.I. v. Warner, 48 F.3d 688 (3d Cir.1995). The asserted basis for the Appellate Division's subject matter jurisdiction is 4 V.I.Code § 39(a)(1), which provides: 38 The United States or the Government of the Virgin Islands may appeal an order, entered before the trial of a person charged with a criminal offense under the laws of the Virgin Islands, which directs the return of seized property, suppresses evidence, or otherwise denies the prosecutor the use of evidence at trial, if the United States Attorney or the Attorney General conducting the prosecution for such violation certifies to the Judge who granted such motion that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge pending against the defendant. 39 There do not appear to be any cases—either from this Court or from the Appellate Division—considering this provision in any depth. 11 We are, however, fortunate to be guided in this novel exercise by interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 3731, the analogous provision for interlocutory appeals by the government of suppression motions decided in federal district courts. 12 40 The defendants' challenges to the Appellate Division's jurisdiction are fourfold: First, they argue that the Territorial Court's redactions were not an order ... suppress[ing] evidence. Second, they submit that the Government's certification was inadequate because the Territorial Court was not afforded an opportunity to review it before the Government noticed its appeal to the Appellate Division. Third, they contend that the statements in question, even unretracted, are not substantial proof of the charge pending against [them]. Fourth, they assert that the statute denies them equal protection of the laws, by permitting the government to appeal adverse orders but not affording a similar opportunity to defendants facing adverse orders. We will treat each of these challenges in turn. 41
42 The defendants contend that the Territorial Court's redaction order was not an order suppress[ing] evidence within the meaning of 4 V.I.Code § 39(a)(1). But it would be a terribly crabbed reading of the statute to hold that admitting a statement subject to redactions does not amount to a suppression of evidence. The statute finishes its list of appealable orders with a catch-all category—those orders which otherwise den[y] the prosecutor the use of the evidence at trial. Id. Even if the redaction order is not an order suppressing evidence, it surely denies the Government the use of the full confessions at trial. Thus we reject the defendants' contention that the Territorial Court's order was not a proper subject for appeal. 43
44 The defendants next argue that the Territorial Court should have had an opportunity to review the certification provided by the Government. While as a policy matter, one might conclude that the Territorial Court should be given an opportunity to review the certification, there is at present simply no basis in the statute for such a requirement. We decline to read one in. 45 Moreover, this Court has decided in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3731 that that statute requires nothing more than the delivery of the certification to the district court in question. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir.1979) (adopting United States v. Comiskey, 460 F.2d 1293, 1297-98 (7th Cir.1972) (holding that no evidence was required to support a certification under 18 U.S.C. § 3731)). We hold, by analogy, that 4 V.I.Code § 39(a)(1) is also completely satisfied by simple delivery of the certification to the Territorial Court. Thus the Government's certification in this case was adequate. 46
47 The Courts of Appeals have generally held that the substantial proof requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 is a requirement of the certification, not a requirement of actual fact. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1226. 13 The certification under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 must state both (1) that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay; and (2) that the evidence is a substantial proof of a material fact in the proceeding. The United States Attorney's word is enough; the reviewing court does not consider the truth of the certification. 48 If 4 V.I.Code § 39(a)(1) were worded identically to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, on which In re Grand Jury Investigation is binding precedent, this would certainly be the end of it. But the Virgin Islands statute is not clearly drafted: It is missing an additional that immediately before the evidence is a substantial proof, which would make it grammatically unambiguous. As it now stands, it could be read to require essentially the same two certification elements that 18 U.S.C. § 3731 does; or it could be read (as the defendants urge) to require a certification that the appeal is not taken for delay, and also require that, in actual fact, the evidence be substantial proof. 49 We decline to read it as the defendants would have it, for four reasons. First, the Virgin Islands statute is plainly modeled on the federal statute, and we conclude it is best to follow the federal statute as a guide. Second, if the Virgin Islands Legislature actually wanted the statute to operate as the defendants would have it, there were far less cryptic ways of communicating that intent. For example, the Virgin Islands Legislature could have put the substantial proof requirement before the certification clause. Third, the statute is silent on what court would evaluate the substantiality of the proof, or on how that court would go about the evaluation, suggesting that no such review is to be undertaken. Fourth, review of the substantiality of the proof necessarily entails a look at the other evidence that the Government has available to it, an inquiry that could both take considerable time and prejudice the Government's case. Both of these seem at odds with the expedited interlocutory appellate review contemplated by the statute. 14 Thus, we conclude that the Appellate Division did not need to evaluate the substantiality of the proof in order to accept the certification.
50 The defendants object that the statute affords the Government an appeal right that it does not confer on defendants, and that this disparity amounts to a violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. But this argument is foreclosed by United States v. Heinze, 218 U.S. 523, 545-46, 31 S.Ct. 98, 54 L.Ed. 1139 (1910), which held that the Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2564 (which was later codified at 18 U.S.C. § 682, which in turn was the forerunner of 18 U.S.C. § 3731) did not violate equal protection or due process principles. 51 Moreover, even under more recent equal protection jurisprudence, Heinze reached the right result: The Supreme Court has not announced that the status of criminal defendant is a suspect classification, nor has it held the right to appeal in a criminal case to be a fundamental right. Thus we subject this legislation to rational basis review. See, e.g., Ramsgate Court Townhome Ass'n v. W. Chester Borough, 313 F.3d 157, 160 (3d Cir.2002) (reiterating that equal protection challenges to legislation not based on a suspect classification or implicating a fundamental right require only rational basis review of the legislation). 52 The Virgin Islands Legislature certainly had a rational basis for distinguishing between the Government and defendants on the question of appeal rights. To identify only one such basis, the Virgin Islands Legislature could rationally conclude that the efficient administration of criminal justice demanded that the Government have expansive pre-trial appeal rights, and the defendant have expansive post-trial appeal rights. Thus we find no merit in the defendants' equal protection challenge. 53 In sum, we conclude that the Government followed the procedures set out in 4 V.I.Code § 39(a)(1), and that the Appellate Division had jurisdiction over the appeal.