Opinion ID: 2680424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asarco’s Arguments

Text: We acknowledge at the outset that “CERCLA does not contain any provision that imposes liability directly upon the estates of [the] four classes of [potentially] responsible parties,” Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1994), much less the beneficiaries of such estates. That cannot end the inquiry, however, because our precedents make clear that under some circumstances, the liability of potentially responsible parties may pass to certain of their successors‐in‐interest. For example, while “CERCLA does not specifically provide that a successor corporation may be held liable for response costs,” New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 2006),we have held that CERCLA encompasses such successor liability, see id. Asarco contends that we should craft a rule of federal common law under CERCLA mandating that a decedent’s personal liability is transferred to those 17 who benefit from the decedent’s estate, a rule known as the “trust fund doctrine.” Appellant’s Br. 17; see W.R. Peele, Sr. Trust, 876 F. Supp. at 743. Such an approach, however, is foreclosed by our precedents. As we recently reiterated, “where federal statutory regulation is comprehensive and detailed, as CERCLA is, we presume that matters left unaddressed are left subject to the disposition provided by state law.” Price Trucking Corp., 748 F.3d at 84 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our decision in Marsh, 499 F.3d at 165, illustrates that principle. There, the State of New York appealed from an order dismissing its claims under CERCLA against the shareholder‐distributees of a dissolved Delaware corporation. The relevant provision of Delaware law established “a three‐year continuation period, beginning at dissolution, for dissolved corporations to wind up their affairs and for unknown claimants to assert claims against the corporation.” Id. at 170 (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 278). The state asserted its claims “several years after [the corporation] had been dissolved, [and] outside the corporate wind‐up period” established by Delaware law. Id. at 169. In affirming the district court’s dismissal, we declined to create a rule of federal common law that would have displaced Delaware law regarding actions against dissolved 18 corporations, concluding that “CERCLA does not suggest that the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon a federal statute.” Id. at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted). The same conclusion necessarily obtains with respect to federal claims against decedents’ estates, which, by longstanding precedent, are governed by state probate law and procedures, unless federal law specifically provides otherwise. See, e.g., Pufahl v. Parks’ Estate, 299 U.S. 217, 225 (1936); Forrest v. Jack, 294 U.S. 158, 162‐63 (1935). CERCLA gives no indication of any intention to displace state probate law, any more than it displaces state law regarding successor liability in the case of dissolved corporations. Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s rejection of Asarco’s argument that the Trustees may be held liable by application of a trust fund theory as a matter of federal law.
Having concluded that state law governs whether liability may be imposed against the beneficiaries of Rockefeller’s estate, we turn next to Asarco’s arguments based on New York law. The relevant New York statute provides: 19 Subject to the other provisions of this article, distributees and testamentary beneficiaries are liable, in an action, to the extent of the value of any property received by them as such, for the debts and reasonable funeral expenses of a decedent, the expenses of administering his estate and all taxes for which the estate is liable, which have not previously been recovered from the personal representative or from any other source . . . . N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 12‐1.1(a).6 The relevant question is whether the “debts . . . of a decedent” may arise as a result of legislation enacted following the decedent’s death, and which has been expressly made retroactive. “CERCLA by its terms has unlimited retroactivity,” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and it is by now settled that Congress intended CERCLA to have such retroactive effect. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986). Such retroactive application does not violate the due process clause, and does not convert CERCLA into a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d 6 The law in effect at the time of Rockefeller’s death was Decedent Estate Law § 170, which was materially similar to N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 12‐1.1(a). See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. Joseph Wechsler Estate, 259 N.Y. 9, 12‐13 (1932) (quoting that statute: “An action may be maintained, as prescribed in this article, against the . . . legatees of a testator to recover, to the extent of the assets paid or distributed to them, for a debt of the decedent . . . .”). 20 at 174‐75. Although Asarco does not identify any case in which New York courts have interpreted “debts . . . of a decedent” to include debts created by post‐ demise legislation that has been expressly made retroactive, and is not otherwise constitutionally infirm, it does cite cases that might support such a conclusion by negative pregnant. Essentially, those cases hold that New York courts will generally presume that New York statutes do not impose liability retroactively on the estates of decedents, and will not consider as “debts . . . of a decedent” liabilities retrospectively imposed by legislation after the decedent’s death where such retrospective imposition would be unconstitutional.7 Asarco argues that we can infer that New York law would recognize as such debts liabilities retrospectively imposed where, as in the case of CERCLA, the legislature clearly 7 See, e.g., In re Malavase, 133 A.D.2d 759, 760 (2d Dep’t 1987) (“It has been repeatedly held that the rights of individuals who may have an interest in a decedent’s estate are fixed as of the date of death. Thus, the Legislature is presumed not to have intended to deprive those individuals of their rights through the retroactive operation of a statute passed after the date of death.”); In re Kania’s Estate, 126 N.Y.S.2d 395, 400 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. Broome County 1953) (“It is well established that, even in an instance where it intended to do so, the Legislature is without power to enact a law which destroys or impairs pre‐ existing vested rights, titles and interests. A statute which assumes to do so is sometimes regarded as being in violation of the ‘due process of law’ provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions.”); id. at 401 (“Cases upholding the protection of vested property rights against the operation of an ‘ex post facto’ statute are very numerous.”). 21 did intend to impose such liability and the statute has been held constitutional. We are hesitant to rely on inference to decide an important issue of New York law. We might, of course, certify the issue to the New York Court of Appeals for its definitive resolution. See Second Cir. Local R. 27.2(a); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 22, § 500.27(a); see also N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 3(b)(9). We do not do so in this case, however, because the answer to the potential “certified question is [not] determinative of a claim before us.” In re Thelen, 736 F.3d at 224 (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of the conclusions we reach below regarding the statute of limitations, even if New York would consider liabilities imposed by CERCLA long after Rockefeller’s death to be “debts . . . of a decedent” chargeable to his estate or its beneficiaries, Asarco’s claims are, in any event, time‐barred. We therefore assume arguendo that New York law would permit the imposition of liability against John Rockefeller’s testamentary trusts under these circumstances, and proceed to consider the statute of limitations issues.
CERCLA contribution claims are subject to a three‐year statute of limitations, which provides that “[n]o action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be commenced more than 3 years after . . . entry of a 22 judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or damages.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B). The event triggering the beginning of the limitations period – “entry of a judicially approved settlement” – is the point of contention here. The district court, relying on the plain language of that provision, concluded that the statute of limitations began to run for the Everett Smelter Site on April 18, 2008, and for the MCMA on June 5, 2009. Asarco contends that the district court “committed legal error by ignoring the bankruptcy context in which the Everett Site and MCMA Site Agreements were negotiated and approved,” Appellant’s Br. 32‐33, and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date its reorganization plan became effective. We disagree. We review the interpretation of federal statutes de novo. W. R. Grace & Co. – Conn. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2009). “[O]ur obligation is to look to the plain language of the statute to effectuate the intent of Congress.” Id. The plain language of § 9613(g)(3)(B) contradicts Asarco’s contention that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until its Reorganization Plan was either approved by the bankruptcy court or became effective. See RSR Corp. v. Commercial Metals Co., 496 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he statute of limitations for contribution actions runs from the ‘entry’ of the settlement, 42 23 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B), not from the date that each provision of that settlement takes effect.”). Pursuant to its authority under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019(a), the bankruptcy court approved settlements for the Sites, which, by the terms of each settlement, resolved Asarco’s liability for the corresponding government entities for the response costs incurred at each site. Moreover, each settlement was effective once approved by the bankruptcy court and was not conditioned on the confirmation of a reorganization plan. We have no doubt that the bankruptcy court’s approval of the settlement falls within § 9613(g)(3)(B). Asarco contends that the bankurptcy court’s approval of the settlement agreements only resolved the disputed proofs of claim and did not immediately trigger CERCLA’s three‐year statute of limitations for direct contribution claims because “[n]o moneys could be paid at that time,” and because “it could not even be definitively stated how much would be paid at the time the Bankruptcy Court approved the two agreements.” Appellant’s Br. 33. Therefore, Asarco argues, the date that the reorganization plan became effective is the most logical triggering event for the statute of limitations because “[o]nly upon the [Reorganization] Plan’s judicial confirmation and effective date was the 24 contribution amount finally determined and payable,”id., in this case, December 9, 2009.8 It is a sufficient answer to say that Congress chose to tie the limitation period to the “entry of a judicially approved settlement” and not to “approval of [a reorganization] [p]lan.” We note as well, however, that under the terms of the statute a “judicially approved settlement” need only “resolve[]” a potentially responsible party’s liability, and not fix the settlement amount. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). Such a resolution occurs when a potentially responsible party is released from CERCLA liability, which the Everett Smelter and MCMA settlements accomplished with respect to Asarco. See Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d at 125‐26; RSR Corp., 496 F.3d at 558. Moreover, given that the confirmation of a reorganization plan could plausibly take years, tying the statute of limitations to that date would do nothing to ensure the “principal purpose of limitations periods in this setting,” namely “ensur[ing] that the responsible parties get to the bargaining‐ and clean‐up‐table sooner rather than later.” RSR Corp., 496 F.3d at 559. Because the bankruptcy court approved a settlement as to the Everett 8 Asarco alternatively argues that the date of the bankruptcy court order confirming the Plan, November 13, 2009, could be the triggering event. We reject that argument too as having no basis in the statutory text. 25 Smelter Site on April 18, 2008, and as to the MCMA on June 5, 2009, we agree with the district court that the three‐year statute of limitations for the Everett Smelter expired on April 18, 2011, more than a year before this action was commenced on May 10, 2012. As to the MCMA, the three‐year statute of limitations expired on June 5, 2012 – after this action was filed, but before Asarco filed its first amended complaint on July 17, 2012. It was only in that amended complaint that Asarco first asserted a claim relating to the MCMA. Thus, as Asarco concedes, that claim is time‐barred unless it relates back to the filing of the initial complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Upon de novo review, we find no error in the district court’s determination that the MCMA claims do not relate back the original complaint. See Slayton v. Am. Exp. Co., 460 F.3d 215, 228 (2d Cir. 2006). For a newly‐added claim to relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), “the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he central inquiry is whether adequate notice of the matters raised in the amended pleading has been given to the opposing party within the statute of limitations by the general fact situation alleged in the original pleading.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 26 Here, Asarco’s original complaint dealt exclusively with the alleged contamination at the Everett Smelter, and contained no facts whatever about the MCMA settlement, any actions taken or costs incurred to remediate the MCMA site, or even any reference to the environmental contamination there. Indeed, the original complaint explained that the suit involved a claim “for costs incurred by Asarco at a former lead smelter and arsenic extraction facility . . . and surrounding areas located in Everett, Washington.” J.A. 19, ¶ 1. In contrast, the MCMA claims, as described in the Second Amended Complaint, arose as a result of “mining, ore concentrating, and transportation facilities located . . . in Snohomish County, Washington,” approximately 40 miles away from Everett. J.A. 71, ¶ 1. While the Second Amended Complaint alleges that the enterprises involved in the Everett and MCMA operations were “interrelated,” we cannot see how the original complaint would have given “adequate notice” that the MCMA claims, which were based on different conduct, in a different location, and attributable to different entities than the claims set forth in that pleading, would be at issue in the dispute. See Slayton, 460 F.3d at 228. Accordingly, Asarco’s direct contribution claims are time‐barred.