Opinion ID: 3034636
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Procedural Default and Standard of Review

Text: Generally, under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a federal habeas court reviews a state court’s decision to determine whether the state decision was “ ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ ” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In this case, however, Chaker’s First Amendment claim was never decided on the merits in a state court. Rather, the California Supreme Court denied Chaker’s First Amendment claim without opinion, citing cases relating to procedural default. Procedural default normally constitutes an adequate and independent state ground precluding federal court review of a habeas petition. See Zichko, 247 F.3d at 1021. But the state did not raise the issue of procedural default in district court or on appeal. Consequently, the state waived its procedural default defense by failing to raise the issue in response to Chaker’s habeas petition. See Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, though we may sua sponte dismiss Chaker’s petition as procedurally barred, see Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003), we decline to do so as “the state provides no explanation whatsoever for its failure to raise a procedural default argument in the district court, much less any extraordinary reason for reaching the procedural default defense despite the state’s failure to raise the issue below,” Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1233. Thus, although we are not precluded from ruling on the merits of Chaker’s claim due to his procedural default, there is no state court ruling on the merits of Chaker’s First Amendment claim. There is therefore no state decision to review to determine whether the decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal CHAKER v. CROGAN 15107 law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In such a circumstance, we review the district court’s decision de novo without the deference usually accorded state courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Hudson v. Hunt, 235 F.3d 892, 895 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying de novo standard of review to a claim in a habeas petition that was not adjudicated on the merits by the state court); Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); LaFevers v. Gibson, 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). “To the extent it is necessary to review findings of fact made in the district court, the clearly erroneous standard applies.” Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002).