Opinion ID: 2064646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does the Face of the Indictment Belie Materiality?

Text: Appellant refers to his acknowledgement, set forth in the indictment, that he had learned about the temporary restraining order from the clerk of the judge in chambers prior to the date set for hearing on the order to show cause. He argues that this constituted an admission of actual receipt of the restraining order. He reasons that he thereby conceded contempt for failure to comply with an order actually received. This means, he says, that the gravamen of the indictment  the alleged falsity of his denial that Mr. Marshall (or anyone else) had served the order  is immaterial to proving his contempt. It follows that this false statement, because it was immaterial, could not have been perjurious. This contention is specious. Dr. Hsu's acknowledgement that he had received notice of the temporary restraining order prior to the contempt hearing might have constituted an admission of contempt if the date of receipt had been sufficiently before the hearing date to permit compliance with the order. Dr. Hsu, however, did not mention the date that he became aware of the order, so he is not correct in claiming that he had admitted the alleged contempt. If anything, he implied that he received the clerk's call close to the hearing date itself  an implication contrary to admission of contempt. In any event, even if the date Dr. Hsu received word of the TRO had been reported  and was early enough to permit compliance before his scheduled date to show cause  it would not necessarily purge his earlier contempt during the period prior to the clerk's call, based on initial defiance of the temporary restraining order. Actual, proper service by Mr. Marshall  denied by Dr. Hsu  was material to his contumacy up until the time he was further notified by the telephone call from the judge's clerk. Thus, we cannot find that Dr. Hsu's response, quoted in the indictment, constituted an admission of contempt; but even if it did, it would not necessarily negate the materiality of his denial of service of the temporary restraining order. We reject this final assault upon the sufficiency of the indictment. We hold, based on case law applied to appellant's specific allegations, that the indictment fulfills the specificity requirements of Super.Ct.Cr.R. 7(c) and D.C.Code 1973, § 23-323. We further hold, on the facts here, that compliance with these rules satisfies the constitutional criteria of Russell v. United States, supra . We turn, therefore, to appellant's claim that the trial court erroneously admitted much prejudicial evidence.