Opinion ID: 1232435
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the Navajo Nation Within the Scope of Arizona's Uniform Act?

Text: Arizona's Uniform Act provides that a judge may direct the witness to appear at a criminal proceeding in another state if a judge of a court of record in any state which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within that state to attend and testify in this state certifies ... that there is a criminal prosecution pending in such court ... [and] that a person being within this state is a material witness in such prosecution.... A.R.S. § 13-4092(A) (emphasis added). The definitional section of the Uniform Act reads as follows: In this article, unless the context otherwise requires:       State includes any territory of the United States and the District of Columbia. A.R.S. § 13-4091(2). Thus, the validity of the superior court's order turns on whether the Navajo District Court is a court of record [4] of any territory of the United States. In People v. Superior Court (Jans), the California Court of Appeal became the first and only court thus far to consider whether the Navajo Nation is a territory for purposes of the Uniform Act. 224 Cal. App.3d 1405, 274 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1990), review denied (Nov. 28, 1990). In a well-reasoned opinion that examined the purpose and policy behind the statute and the jurisdictional relationship between the tribes and the states, the court concluded that the Navajo Nation constitutes a territory for purposes of California's Uniform Act and that the superior court had jurisdiction to summon a California resident to appear as a witness in a criminal proceeding before the Navajo District Court. Id. 274 Cal. Rptr. at 590. California's Uniform Act is substantially identical to Arizona's. Because we must construe Arizona's Uniform Act in light of our own state policies, however, and because Tracy has pointed to the fact that on a different issue a panel of our court of appeals concluded that the term territory did not include Indian tribes, we undertake a thorough analysis of statute and case law to determine whether the Navajo Nation constitutes a territory for purposes of the Uniform Act.

Arizona's Uniform Act defines state to include any territory of the United States. Tracy argues that the language any territory comprehends only organized territories operating pursuant to congressional law and having a governor appointed by the president. See, e.g., In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443, 10 S.Ct. 760, 34 L.Ed. 219 (1890) (Oklahoma Indian Territory, which had no organized executive, legislative, or judicial branch, was not a territory for purposes of federal criminal statute); People ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 475-76, 29 S.Ct. 190, 192, 53 L.Ed. 286 (1909) (Puerto Rico is a territory under Lane definition for purposes of extradition of fugitive criminal). The Bingham-Lane definition of territory encompasses only organized territories that derive their power from Congress and is but one definition courts have given to territory. Significantly, this narrow and technical definition of territory originated at a time in this nation's history when the United States did not have the same relationship with various quasi-sovereign entities  i.e., Guam, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone, American Samoa  that it has today, and indeed, before Puerto Rico attained its quasi-sovereign status as a commonwealth. In cases since Bingham and Lane, the term territory has often been interpreted more broadly to serve the purposes of the statute or enactment under consideration. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil, 404 U.S. 558, 560, 92 S.Ct. 661, 662, 30 L.Ed.2d 713 (1972) (American Samoa is a territory for purposes of Sherman Act provision); [5] Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 258-59, 58 S.Ct. 167, 169-70, 82 L.Ed. 235 (1937) (whether Puerto Rico comes within a given congressional act depends upon the character and aim of the act; Puerto Rico is not a territory within reach of sixth and seventh amendments, but may be considered a territory for purposes of the Sherman Act); Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431 (3rd Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943, 87 S.Ct. 977, 17 L.Ed.2d 874 (1967) (Puerto Rico is a territory for purposes of federal full faith and credit statute); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Growth Co., 391 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Puerto Rico is a territory for purposes of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); Wolfe v. Au, 67 Haw. 259, 686 P.2d 16 (1984) (Micronesia is a territory for purposes of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, even though it is destined for nationhood rather than statehood); cf. Garcia v. Friesecke, 597 F.2d 284 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (Puerto Rico is not a territory for purposes of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950). [6] From the authorities cited, it is clear that the term territory is susceptible of interpretation because it does not have a fixed and technical meaning that must be accorded to it in all circumstances. Americana of Puerto Rico, 368 F.2d at 436. Therefore, we must determine whether the Navajo Nation may properly be considered a territory within the meaning of Arizona's Uniform Act.
Tracy cites Kriz v. Buckeye Petroleum Co . for the proposition that the intent of the legislature at the time of the enactment governs the interpretation of the act. 145 Ariz. 374, 701 P.2d 1182 (1985). Accordingly, Tracy argues that because the 1937 Arizona legislature that adopted the Uniform Act could not have contemplated tribes as territories for purposes of the Act, we cannot now interpret the Uniform Act to include the Navajo Nation. We do not find this argument persuasive. In Kriz, we also stated that where the statutory language does not indicate the legislature's intent as to a particular application of the statute, we must read the Act as a whole, looking to its subject matter, effects and consequences, reason, and spirit. Id. at 377, 701 P.2d at 1185; see also Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co., 144 Ariz. 291, 294, 697 P.2d 684, 687 (1985) (in interpreting statute and determining legislature's intent, supreme court will look to policy behind statute and the evil it was designed to remedy, as well as to the words, context, subject matter, and consequences of the statute). Arizona's Uniform Act was adopted by the 1937 legislature without indication as to its prospective scope. H.B. 78, 13th Leg., 1st Reg.Sess., 1937 Ariz.Laws, ch. 74 § 2. However, given the status of tribal self-government on Arizona Indian reservations at that time, [7] we can safely conclude that the 1937 legislature could not have contemplated whether the Act could or should be applied to Indian tribes.
Essentially, Tracy and the dissent argue that because the legislature did not contemplate applying the Act to the Navajo Nation, we may not now make such an application. Under this view of statutory construction, Arizona would also be unable to recognize the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico as territories for purposes of the Uniform Act. We believe that sound principles of statutory construction preclude such a narrow reading of the Uniform Act. Circumstances constantly arise presenting factual situations that were unforeseen at the time a statute was adopted. Consequently, the interpretation of general remedial statutes cannot fairly be limited to only those specific applications clearly contemplated by the legislature at the time of enactment. Such a limitation would impose an impossible burden on legislatures. We note that the framers gave Congress power only to raise and maintain an army and navy. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Unless they were as prescient as Tennyson, [8] neither those who framed nor those who ratified the Constitution could have contemplated that this language would include an air force. Yet it surely must. See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 70 and n. 172 (1954). Of course, if a particular application does violence to the text of a statute, our duty is clear: the application cannot be made. But the Uniform Act is not limited to organized territories. Instead, the text of this statute extends to any territory and is broad enough, therefore, to include anything within the commonly understood meaning of the term. See, e.g., State v. Korzep, 165 Ariz. 490, 493, 799 P.2d 831, 834 (1990) (We give words their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.). The Navajo Nation passes that test; it clearly fits the dictionary definition of a geographical area of the United States under the jurisdiction of a political authority. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2361 (1965). We also acknowledge that where a factual application of a statute was considered and rejected by the legislature, the courts are powerless. Again, such is not the case with this statute. The application of this statute to organized tribal governments and their court systems could not have been foreseen in 1937 and was not considered. We deal, then, with a text broad enough to include the application advanced by the Navajo Nation. We deal also with an application not rejected but simply not foreseen by the legislature. We believe, with Mr. Justice Holmes, that in such cases it is a wholesome truth that the final rendering of the meaning of a statute is an act of judgment. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.L.REV. 527, 531 (1947). Nor do venerable canons of [statutory] construction save us from the anguish of judgment. Such canons give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in fact a delicate judgment, concluding a complicated process of balancing subtle and elusive elements. Frankfurter, supra, 47 COLUM. L.REV. at 544. We agree with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that laws are not abstract propositions. They are expressions of policy arising out of specific situations and addressed to the attainment of particular ends. Id. at 533. It is in part because legislatures cannot foresee every application that judges are required to interpret and apply statutes. Id. Thus, in construing a general statute enacted to further a remedial purpose, we do not believe a specific application is outside the statute simply because it was not foreseen. United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d 269, 273 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085, 100 S.Ct. 1043, 62 L.Ed.2d 771 (1980); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 354 F.2d 507, 510-11 (D.C. Cir.1965); see Shell Co., 302 U.S. at 257, 58 S.Ct. at 169 (that Congress did not have Puerto Rico in mind when the Sherman Act was enacted is not enough to exclude Puerto Rico from the Act's operation; the proper inquiry is whether, had acquisition of Puerto Rico been foreseen, Congress would have intended to exclude Puerto Rico from the Act's operation). Thus, where there is no contrary textual or legislative expression of intent on a particular application, we must apply the statute in such a manner as will best serve the legislature's purposes, policies, and goals. See State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 270, 693 P.2d 921, 925 (1985); Cohen v. State, 121 Ariz. 6, 588 P.2d 299 (1978); State v. Berry, 101 Ariz. 310, 312, 419 P.2d 337, 339 (1966) (statutes must be construed in view of the purpose they are intended to accomplish and the evils they are designed to remedy). Therefore, we turn to examine the purpose and policy behind the Uniform Act to see whether inclusion of the Navajo Nation is consistent with the Act's general intent.

We must first determine whether tribes are sufficiently analogous to territories to fall within the legislature's general intent to broaden the definition of state by including territories. Indian tribes are quasi-sovereign entities with sui generis status as domestic, dependent nations under federal law. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831). Indian tribes are not foreign nations, as Tracy would have us believe, and thus do not come within the prohibition against foreign countries being deemed territories. Id.; see Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578, 591, 22 S.Ct. 515, 520, 46 L.Ed. 697 (1902) (term territory in ordinary acts of Congress does not include foreign states). Similarly, Indian tribes are not organized territories whose powers are delegated by Congress and therefore exist as agencies of the federal government. Rather, Indian tribes exercise powers of self-government as an aspect of their inherent sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319-23, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1084-86, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). In this respect, the Navajo Nation exercises its judicial power as would a state. Id. at 321-22, 98 S.Ct. at 1085 (tribe is separate sovereign from federal government for purposes of double jeopardy; in prosecuting tribal member for crime, tribe was not exercising federally delegated power, like territory, but sovereign power, like state). Clearly, then, Indian tribes do not fit within the narrow definition of an organized territory. Instead, they occupy a unique status within our federal system. The tribes are similar to states in terms of their judicial jurisdiction and power of self-government over matters occurring within their territorial boundaries. See Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721, 724 (8th Cir.1897). However, in exercising their powers of self-government, Indian tribes are still subject to the overriding plenary authority of Congress. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1676, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). In this latter respect, Indian tribes are analogous to the territories of the United States, which are also subject to Congress's plenary power. See Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co. v. Hawaii, 305 U.S. 306, 314, 59 S.Ct. 202, 206, 83 L.Ed. 189 (1938) (Congress has full and complete legislative authority over territories). The political status of Indian tribes has been analogized to that of other quasi-sovereign entities under the protection of the United States, such as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. See generally Comment, Conflicts Between State and Tribal Law: The Application of Full Faith and Credit Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 ARIZ. ST.L.J. 801, 808; Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L.REV. 841, 858 (1990). In any case, Indian tribes, like Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, have often been regarded as territories for purposes of various statutory enactments. In United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, for example, the United States Supreme Court held that the Cherokee Nation is a territory for purposes of a federal statute requiring recognition of administrators appointed from the territories. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 15 L.Ed. 299 (1855). In holding that letters of administration issued by the Cherokee Nation should be given full faith and credit in a District of Columbia court, the Court stated: In some respects [the Cherokee people] bear the same relation to the federal government as a territory did in its second grade of government, under the ordinance of 1787. Such a territory passed its own laws, subject to the approval of congress, and its inhabitants were subject to the constitution and acts of congress. The principal difference consists in the fact that the Cherokees enact their own laws [subject to some federal restriction], appoint their own officers and pay their own expenses. This, however, is no reason why the laws and proceedings of the Cherokee territory, so far as relates to rights claimed under them, should not be placed upon the same footing as other territories in the Union. It is not a foreign, but a domestic territory,  a territory which originated under our constitution and laws.... In no respect can it be considered a foreign State or territory, as it is within our jurisdiction and subject to our laws. Id. at 103-04 (emphasis added). [9] Similarly, various lower federal courts and state courts have deemed Indian tribes to be states or territories within the meaning of the statutes under consideration. See, e.g., In re Larch, 872 F.2d 66 (4th Cir.1989) (Cherokee tribe is a state for purposes of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738); Martinez v. Superior Court, 152 Ariz. 300, 731 P.2d 1244 (Ct.App. 1987) (Indian reservations are territories or possessions of the United States within the meaning of Arizona's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, A.R.S. §§ 8-401 through 8-424); Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, 311 Minn. 241, 248 N.W.2d 722 (1976) (Red Lake tribe was a state or territory for purposes of a Minnesota motor vehicle statute that was premised on policy to recognize the validity of automobile registration licenses issued by other jurisdictions); Whitsett v. Forehand, 79 N.C. 230, 232 (1878) (Cherokee Nation is a territory for purposes of state statute governing admission of deed to probate and registration). A majority of courts has deemed Indian tribes to be territories for purposes of the federal statute extending the application of the full faith and credit clause to the territories and possessions of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 P.2d 895 (1982); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975); In re Buehl, 87 Wash.2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976); see also Cornells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305, 306 (8th Cir.1894); Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836, 845 (8th Cir.1894); Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 12, 19 (8th Cir.1893) (recognizing Indian tribes as territories under an earlier version of the full faith and credit statute); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65 n. 21, 98 S.Ct. at 1681 n. 21 (Judgments of tribal courts, as to matters properly within their jurisdiction, have been regarded in some circumstances as entitled to full faith and credit in other courts.) (citing Mackey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100; and Standley, 59 F. at 845). In Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., our court of appeals took the opposite approach, declining to accord full faith and credit to a Navajo tribal statute governing automobile repossessions on the reservation. 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct.App. 1977). The court rejected the analysis of Americana of Puerto Rico that the term territory in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 may be construed to encompass entities other than organized territories. Id. at 196, 571 P.2d at 693. The court distinguished Mackey, pointing out that it dealt with the definition of territory in a different statute. Id. Instead, the court based its opinion on an 1883 district court case, Ex Parte Morgan, 20 F. 298 (D.C.Ark. 1883), which held that territory refers only to organized territories that are destined for statehood, and that Indian tribes, as sovereigns predating the constitution, cannot be considered territories. Brown, 117 Ariz. at 196-97, 571 P.2d at 693-94. We do not consider whether the court of appeals correctly decided that Indian tribes are not territories for purposes of the full faith and credit statute, as that issue is not now before us. [10] However, we disagree with the court's statement that Indian reservations have never been considered as a `territory' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, but simply they are the home of the Indians. Id. at 197, 571 P.2d at 694. This statement is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mackey, as well as the many decisions of lower federal courts and state courts cited above holding that Indian tribes may be considered territories for purposes of certain statutes. In addition, the court seems to have overlooked the many federal cases holding that the term territory may be applied to quasi-sovereign entities that are not organized territories destined for statehood. Indian tribes possess a unique political status; however, tribal governments are comparable to states and territories in many ways, and jurisdictionally, Indian reservations are a great deal more than the home of the Indians. The case law demonstrates that Indian tribes may be considered territories within the meaning of certain statutes. The proper approach is to analyze each statute, in terms of its purpose and policy, to determine whether Indian tribes may be regarded as territories within the statute's intent, as another panel of our court of appeals did in Martinez with regard to Arizona's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 152 Ariz. at 303, 305, 731 P.2d at 1247, 1249. Again we note that California, using this analysis, has recently held that the term territory in the Uniform Act we are considering includes the Navajo Nation. Superior Court (Jans), 274 Cal. Rptr. 586.
The controversy over the full faith and credit statute is most relevant to cases in which the issue is the effect to be given to tribal court judgments. In this case, we deal with a tribal law, rather than a judgment. As the court in Brown correctly noted, irrespective of the effect of the full faith and credit statute, tribal laws are entitled to recognition on the basis of comity if they are otherwise in accord with Arizona's public policy. 117 Ariz. at 198, 571 P.2d at 695; see Fremont Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 144 Ariz. 339, 345, 697 P.2d 1089, 1095 (1985) (citing Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 272, 56 S.Ct. 229, 231, 80 L.Ed. 220 (1935)) (comity doctrine may apply even in situations in which the full faith and credit clause is inapplicable). Arizona courts have consistently afforded full recognition to tribal court proceedings. For purposes of Arizona State Bar disciplinary proceedings, judgments of the Navajo Nation courts are given equivalent weight to judgments of other courts. See In re MacDonald, No. SB-91-0001-D (minute order, March 5, 1991) (granting State Bar's motion for interim suspension of Navajo attorney convicted of bribery, conspiracy, and other misdemeanors in Navajo District Court, pursuant to Rule 57(c), Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides for suspension if an attorney is convicted of a non-felony serious crime). Several other cases have given recognition to tribal court proceedings on the grounds of comity. Leon v. Numkena, 142 Ariz. 307, 311, 689 P.2d 566, 570 (Ct.App. 1984) (divorce decree issued by Hopi tribal court was conclusive and binding against challenge in state superior court as a matter of comity and out of deference and mutual respect); In re Lynch's Estate, 92 Ariz. 354, 357, 377 P.2d 199, 201 (1962) (holding that proceedings in Navajo tribal court must be treated the same as proceedings in a court of another state, and therefore that a will admitted to probate in Navajo tribal court should have been given effect in ancillary proceedings in state superior court). The principle of comity is that the courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect. Brown, 117 Ariz. at 198, 571 P.2d at 695. The Uniform Act under consideration in the present case is premised on the principle of comity, not on full faith and credit. In State v. Jordan, this court held that: The Uniform Act does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts of this state beyond its territorial limits, for this is not within the power of the legislature. The operation of the Uniform Act depends upon the principles of comity, and it has no efficacy except through the adoption of the same act by another state. 83 Ariz. 248, 251, 320 P.2d 446, 448 (1958) (quoting State v. Blount, 200 Or. 35, 264 P.2d 419, 426 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 962, 74 S.Ct. 711, 98 L.Ed. 1105 (1954)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922, 78 S.Ct. 1364 (1958); accord State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555, 400 P.2d 695, 699 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1015, 86 S.Ct. 628, 15 L.Ed.2d 529 (1966); In re Saperstein, 30 N.J. Super. 373, 104 A.2d 842 (App.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 874, 75 S.Ct. 110, 99 L.Ed. 688 (1954). Therefore, we believe the principles of comity militate in favor of interpreting the word territory to include the Navajo Nation.
In considering whether to give the Uniform Act a broad or narrow construction, we note that the Act's definitional section provides that the term state includes any territory of the United States. A.R.S. § 13-4091(2). A term whose statutory definition declares what it includes is more susceptible to extension of meaning by construction than one whose definition declares what the term means. The word includes is most often a term of enlargement, rather than limitation, and a court may find that it encompasses items that were not specifically enumerated. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.07, at 133 (4th ed. 1984 Rev.). In addition, Arizona's Uniform Act is included within A.R.S. Title 13, the criminal code. The rules of construction for provisions within Title 13 are set forth at § 13-104, which provides: The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this title, but the provisions herein must be construed according to the fair meaning of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law, including the purposes stated in § 13-101. See State v. Tramble, 144 Ariz. 48, 51, 695 P.2d 737, 740 (1985) (rule of strict construction followed by other state courts in interpreting penal statutes is not consistent with Arizona's legislative policy). We note also the public policy set forth by our legislature at the beginning of the chapter containing the Uniform Act. A.R.S. § 13-101 reads in relevant part: It is declared that the public policy of this state and the general purposes of the provisions of this title are: 1. To proscribe conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests; ...       6. To impose just and deserved punishment on those whose conduct threatens the public peace. This language indicates that Arizona's public policy supports interpreting the statutes within Title 13 in a manner that will further effective criminal prosecution. This is also an underlying purpose of the Uniform Act, which requires reciprocal cooperation among jurisdictions for the enforcement of witness attendance orders. See Vannier v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.3d 163, 172, 650 P.2d 302, 306, 185 Cal. Rptr. 427, 431 (1982); Ortez v. State, 165 Ind. App. 678, 333 N.E.2d 838, 846 (1975). In New York v. O'Neill, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Uniform Act, noting that it was designed to solve the practical problems created by the constitutional division of powers, and that the `policy and necessity ... to preserve harmony between States, and order and law within their respective borders' motivated the states to adopt the Uniform Act. 359 U.S. 1, 5-6, 79 S.Ct. 564, 568, 3 L.Ed.2d 585 (1959) (citation omitted). The Court further stated: The primary purpose of this Act is not eleemosynary. It serves a self-protective function for each of the enacting States.... Today forty-two States and Puerto Rico[ [11] ] may facilitate criminal proceedings, otherwise impeded by the unavailability of material witnesses, by utilizing the machinery of this reciprocal legislation to obtain such witnesses from without their boundaries. This is not a merely altruistic, disinterested enactment. Id. at 9, 79 S.Ct. at 570; accord In re Saperstein, 104 A.2d at 846 (New Jersey's Uniform Act was enacted in aid of comity between states to assist the orderly and effectual administration of justice and prosecution of criminal conduct). In light of the articulated purposes behind the Uniform Act, we must next examine the jurisdictional nature of Indian tribes to determine whether the Uniform Act's purposes will be served by interpreting territory to include the Navajo Nation.
Indian tribes have historically been regarded as distinct, sovereign political entities, subject only to the plenary authority of Congress. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 232-33 (1982). In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice John Marshall articulated the foundation for the principle that tribal sovereignty over its territory and people, and federal protection of the tribes, combine to eliminate state jurisdiction: The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832). Thus, although a tribe may be within the geographical boundaries of a state, the tribe is jurisdictionally distinct from the state, and the state has no authority to impose its laws on the reservation. [12] In several more recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has held that the 1868 Navajo Treaty precludes extension of state law to Indians residing on the Navajo reservation. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 85 S.Ct. 1242, 14 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959). In McClanahan, the Court acknowledged that the state has no civil or criminal jurisdiction on the reservation absent some affirmative delegation by Congress and pursuant to tribal consent. 411 U.S. at 177-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1265-67. In accordance with the principles that limit state jurisdiction over Indian Country, various courts have invalidated states' attempts to reach Indians residing on the reservation. Thus, in the area of extradition it has been held that control of the extradition process is inherent in the tribal sovereignty of the Navajo Nation, and therefore a state may not arrest an Indian located on the Navajo reservation, but rather must seek extradition through the Navajo courts. Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003, 90 S.Ct. 551, 24 L.Ed.2d 494 (1970); see also Benally v. Marcum, 89 N.M. 463, 553 P.2d 1270 (1976); A.R.S. § 13-3869 (allowing extradition of persons to and from an Indian reservation only if both the Indian tribal governing body and the state have mutually entered into an extradition compact, and providing that the state shall comply with tribal extradition law). The jurisdiction of state courts has been similarly circumscribed in the area of civil process. State officials may not enforce valid state court judgments against Indians residing on the reservation. See, e.g., Joe v. Marcum, 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.1980); Begay v. Roberts, 167 Ariz. 375, 807 P.2d 1111 (1990), rev. denied April 22, 1991 (state court has no jurisdiction to garnish a tribal member's wages, earned on the reservation, where tribal law does not permit garnishment of wages); Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971) (state officials may not enforce state judgment by attaching property located on Cheyenne River Sioux reservation). This court has held that state officers lack authority to serve process on Indians residing on the reservation. Francisco v. Arizona, 113 Ariz. 427, 556 P.2d 1 (1976). Automobile dealers must comply with tribal law when repossessing automobiles on a reservation. Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926, 104 S.Ct. 1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 180 (1984). From the foregoing, it is obvious that Arizona courts lack jurisdiction to compel a Navajo witness located on the Navajo reservation to testify in a state court criminal proceeding without resort to the provisions of the Uniform Act. The Uniform Act is only operative where the other jurisdiction has enacted reciprocal legislation, as the Navajo Nation has done here. Therefore, if we decline to recognize the Navajo Nation for purposes of our Uniform Act, we would undercut the process of efficient law enforcement in our own state proceedings by rendering a significant number of people potentially unavailable as witnesses. The Navajo Nation has nearly 200,000 members on a reservation that consists of more than fifteen million acres, about two-thirds of which is within the geographical boundaries of Arizona. We would do violence to the legislative purpose that prompted the adoption of the Uniform Act were we to exclude the Navajo Nation from recognition, thereby allowing material witnesses to evade testifying in our courts, or those of the Navajo Nation. The close proximity of our respective jurisdictions favors recognizing valid enactments of the Navajo Nation that do not conflict with our own public policy.
Recognizing the Navajo Nation as a territory for purposes of the Uniform Act would support Arizona's policy of facilitating effective criminal prosecution. However, Tracy argues that if we allow an Arizona court to summon an Arizona citizen to appear as a witness in a foreign sovereign's political courts, we will be, in effect, supporting civil rights violations against our citizens. Tracy Memorandum on Special Action at 2. As we have already discussed, the Navajo Nation is clearly a separate jurisdiction within our federal system and not a foreign sovereign. Regarding the civil rights violations, Tracy claims that the Navajo court's use of the Uniform Act is an exercise of criminal jurisdiction, which is prohibited under the opinions of the Supreme Court in Oliphant and Duro, and that Duro casts doubt on the legitimacy of tribal courts in general. The Uniform Act is a provision to assist jurisdictions in conducting criminal prosecutions. In any prosecution there may be a need for the testimony of a material witness who resides beyond the subpoena power of the prosecuting state. Either the prosecutor or the defendant may utilize the Uniform Act to procure the attendance of such a witness. State v. Smith, 87 N.J. Super. 98, 208 A.2d 171, 174 (App. 1965). In fact, where the testimony is critical to the defense, it may violate the defendant's due process rights to deny his request to summon an out-of-state witness to testify in his behalf under the Uniform Act. State v. Brady, 122 Ariz. 228, 594 P.2d 94 (1979). [13] The Uniform Act, then, serves a truth-seeking function and is consistent with other mechanisms that are intended to assist in the pursuit of a fair trial. Thus, though the purpose of the Uniform Act is to assist in criminal prosecutions, the proceedings to compel attendance of a witness under the Uniform Act are not criminal in nature. Epstein v. New York, 157 So.2d 705, 707 (Fla.App. 1963). In addition, the Uniform Act does not extend the criminal jurisdiction of the requesting jurisdiction beyond its boundaries; rather, the Act's effectiveness depends on principles of comity and reciprocity in the courts of the jurisdiction where the witness resides. See Jordan, 83 Ariz. at 251, 320 P.2d at 448. Once an Arizona court has issued the summons and Tracy appears in the tribal court, he will be subject to the Navajo court's authority to compel his testimony. If Tracy refuses to testify despite a grant of constitutionally adequate immunity, the Navajo court will have the inherent power of any court to cite him for contempt. See Willie v. Herrick, 5 Nav. Rptr. 129, 130 (Nav.Sup.Ct. 1987) (Navajo Nation courts have inherent power to punish for contempt). We assume that the Navajo court would be limited to civil contempt sanctions, due to its lack of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011. Thus, to the extent that Tracy will be subject to the authority of the Navajo court, this will be an exercise of the court's civil jurisdiction. Oliphant 's discussion regarding the inability of a tribal court to criminally prosecute a non-Indian is therefore irrelevant to Tracy's situation. Instead we must focus on the statements of the United States Supreme Court regarding the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld tribal courts' jurisdiction over civil cases involving personal and property rights of both Indians and non-Indians. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65, 98 S.Ct. at 1680-81. In recognition that the tribes' exercise of civil jurisdiction has not been constrained by federal action, the Court has declined to extend the Oliphant limitations to the realm of tribal civil jurisdiction. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 854-55, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 2452-53, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). In Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, the Supreme Court stated: Tribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government, and the Federal government has consistently encouraged their development. Although the criminal jurisdiction of the tribal courts is subject to substantial federal limitation, their civil jurisdiction is not similarly restricted. 480 U.S. 9, 14-15, 107 S.Ct. 971, 975-76, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987) (citations omitted). We do not believe summoning Tracy to appear before the Navajo District Court to testify about his transactions with the Navajos poses any inherent violation of his civil rights as a citizen of Arizona. Tracy is not subject to tribal criminal prosecution and the Navajo courts have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. Williams, 358 U.S. at 222, 79 S.Ct. at 272. Tracy apparently voluntarily entered into consensual dealings with Peter MacDonald, Sr. and/or the Navajo Nation, which renders his testimony material to a valid tribal prosecution of one of its members, and, in addition, indicates that he could have foreseen the possibility that he would become subject to the civil jurisdiction of the tribal court. [14] Further, by declining to recognize the Navajo Nation for purposes of our Uniform Act, we would impinge on the Navajo Nation's powers of self-government by undercutting the tribe's ability to prosecute a tribal offender. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322, 98 S.Ct. at 1085 (stating that the right of internal self-government possessed by Indian tribes includes the right to prescribe laws applicable to tribe members and to enforce those laws by criminal sanctions). The decisions of the United States Supreme Court have consistently supported the federal government's long-standing policy of encouraging tribal self-government. Iowa Mut. Ins., 480 U.S. at 14, 107 S.Ct. at 975 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 890, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 2313, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 894, 902 n. 5, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 and n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 2583-84 and n. 10, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980); Williams, 358 U.S. at 220-22, 79 S.Ct. at 270-71). As the California appeals court noted in Superior Court (Jans): [E]ach jurisdiction is encouraged to interpret matters which concern tribal governance in a manner which fosters self-determination. In recognizing the right of the tribal courts to request the attendance of witnesses, we recognize their right to conduct such criminal proceedings. To deny them the power to compel witnesses we risk reducing their criminal proceedings to a farce or sham. If they cannot force necessary and material witnesses to appear they must either proceed in the face of inadequate evidence or be deprived of the ability to prosecute certain criminals.... If we barred Native American nations from the community of jurisdictions which reciprocally recognize one another, we would undermine their self-determination. 274 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (citations omitted). [15] We conclude that substantial case authority, a proper methodology of statutory construction, the policy goals articulated by the legislature, and principles of comity, together with the specific objectives underlying Arizona's Uniform Act, all require us to read the term any territory, as used in A.R.S. §§ 13-4091 through 13-4096, to include the Navajo Nation. Such a construction belies neither the text of the statute nor the legislature's intent.