Opinion ID: 1801755
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury instructions related to defendant's prior rape of Christa B.

Text: Defendant asserts that the trial court's instructions permitted the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed the prior offenses against Christa B., and to infer from such a finding that he committed the charged offenses. Thus, he claims, the instructions violated his right to a jury verdict based upon a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby violating his right to due process of law, a fair trial, and an impartial jury, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution. [28] After Christa B. testified, and again at the conclusion of the guilt phase, the court gave an instruction, designated Special Instruction No. 1, to guide the jury in its consideration of Christa's testimony. The instruction, a modified version of CALJIC Nos. 2.50 and 2.50.01, was drafted by the prosecutor and approved by defense counsel. It explained the purposes for which the evidence concerning the uncharged offenses could be considered, but did not address the burden of proof. [29] Immediately after giving Special Instruction No. 1 at the conclusion of the guilt phase, the court read CALJIC No. 2.50.1: Within the meaning of the preceding instruction, the prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed a crime or sexual offense other than that for which he is charged. [¶] You must not consider this evidence for any purpose unless you find by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed the other crime or sexual offense. The trial court also instructed the jury that [a] defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (CALJIC No. 2.90.) In addition, the court's instruction concerning the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence explained that each fact which is essential . . . to establish the defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (CALJIC No. 2.01), [30] and its instruction concerning a defendant's decision not to testify referred to the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the charges (CALJIC No. 2.61). [31] The portion of Special Instruction No. 1 about which defendant complains states that if you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may . . . infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit the same or similar type of sexual offenses. If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may . . . infer that he . . . did commit the crime of which he is accused. Defendant contends that this instruction, together with the instruction that the prosecution had the burden to prove the uncharged offenses by a preponderance of the evidence, informed the jury that it could find defendant guilty of the charged crimes if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed the uncharged offenses, in violation of his right to a jury verdict based upon evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Special Instruction No. 1 also informed the jurors, however, that [y]ou may not convict [defendant] merely because you believe he committed another offense or because you believe he has a character trait that tends to predispose him to committing the charged offense. (See ante, fn. 29.) This clarification anticipated a 1999 revision to CALJIC No. 2.50.01, which added the following paragraph: However, if you find [by a preponderance of the evidence] that the defendant committed [a] prior sexual offense[s], that is not sufficient by itself to prove [beyond a reasonable doubt] that [he] [she] committed the charged crime[s]. The weight and significance of the evidence, if any, are for you to decide. (CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (1999 rev.).) In People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 62 P.3d 601] ( Reliford ), we reviewed CALJIC No. 2.50.01, as revised in 1999. The defendant in Reliford complain[ed] that, having found the uncharged sex offense true by a preponderance of the evidence, jurors would rely on `this alone' to convict him of the charged offenses. We responded: The problem with defendant's argument is that the instruction nowhere tells the jury it may rest a conviction solely on evidence of prior offenses. Indeed, the instruction's next sentence says quite the opposite: `if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense. . ., that is not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crime.' The jury, of course, was instructed to consider the instructions `as a whole' (CALJIC No. 1.01), just as we must view a challenged portion `in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record' to determine `whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.' [Citations.] Viewed in this way, the instructions could not have been interpreted to authorize a guilty verdict based solely on proof of uncharged conduct. ( Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 923 [CALJIC No. 2.50.01 `incorporates' the admonition `not to convict defendant solely in reliance on the evidence that he committed prior sex offenses'].) ( Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1013.) The court added that [n]o reasonable juror would believe [that the requirements for finding the defendant guilty of the charged offenses] could be satisfied solely by proof of uncharged offenses. Even the Court of Appeal deemed the fact `that defendant committed the previous crime is not enough, by itself, to prove that he committed the charged offense' a `truism.' [Citation.] Or, as other courts have stated, a conviction based solely on the uncharged conduct is `a logical impossibility.' [Citation.] ( Id. at pp. 1013-1014.) Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1007, also addressed the contention that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, as revised in 1999, could be interpreted as authorizing conviction of the charged offense based upon only a preponderance of the evidence. We do not find it reasonably likely a jury could interpret the instructions to authorize conviction of the charged offenses based on a lowered standard of proof. Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . . The instructions instead explained that, in all other respects, the People had the burden of proving defendant guilty `beyond a reasonable doubt.' (CALJIC Nos. 2.61, 2.90; see CALJIC No. 10.65.) Any other reading would have rendered the reference to reasonable doubt a nullity. In addition, the jury was told that circumstantial evidence could support a finding of guilt of the charged offenses only if the proved circumstances could not be reconciled with any other rational conclusion (CALJIC No. 2.02)which is merely another way of restating the reasonable-doubt standard. [Citation.] The jury thus would have understood that a conviction that relied on inferences to be drawn from defendant's prior offense would have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1016.) As was the case in Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1007, Special Instruction No. 1 informed the jury it could not convict [defendant] merely because you believe he committed another offense or because you believe he has a character trait that tends to predispose him to committing the charged offense, and other instructions informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, as noted above, this burden imposed upon the prosecution was referenced in instructions concerning the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence and the defendant's decision not to testify. Defendant notes, however, that in contrast to the version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 reviewed in Reliford, Special Instruction No. 1 did not include language regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This difference is of no consequence, because the conclusion we reached in Reliford was not based upon the reference in CALJIC No. 2.50.01 to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, as in Reliford, we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted the instructions as a whole to authorize a conviction based upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the uncharged offenses. (See Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72-73 [116 L.Ed.2d 385, 112 S.Ct. 475] [the standard for evaluating an ambiguous jury instruction is whether, in light of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, the instruction gave rise to `a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way' that violates the Constitution].) Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, Special Instruction No. 1 does not suffer from the same flaws as an instruction we reviewed in Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th 903. The defective instruction considered in that case stated that the evidence of the defendant's uncharged sex offenses could be used only to establish his propensity to commit similar crimes; in fact, however, the evidence also properly could be considered for purposes such as establishing motive, intent, or identity. Moreover, the proposed instruction improperly advised [jurors] to approach the other crimes evidence with caution, told them not to give the evidence undue weight, and gave them a detailed procedure on how to approach and weigh the evidence. `[I]nstructions bearing on the weight to be attached to a particular piece of evidence are properly refused.' [Citation.] Furthermore, the instruction was both lengthy and confusing in various respects. ( Id. at pp. 922-923.) Special Instruction No. 1 does not suffer from any of the flaws affecting the validity of the instruction reviewed in Falsetta. Although the instruction before us included detailed guidance concerning the steps involved in determining the relevance of uncharged sexual offenses, its explanation was brief and reasonably clear.