Opinion ID: 659996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: damages for allstate's failure to defend between july,

Text: 1984--APRIL 1985 12 Allstate's brief continues to dispute liability for the period between July, 1984 and April, 1985, arguing that the Harveys' notice to Riney did not exist or was insufficient. Allstate contends that there was no evidence Riney was notified of Whitaker's counterclaim in July 1984 and that Riney was an independent agent such that oral notice to him was not sufficient. 13 These contentions are wholly without merit. Both Harvey and her husband testified that they notified Riney by phone in July 1984 and both the Harveys and Riney testified that he was an Allstate agent. 6 The jury obviously found this testimony credible and resolved this factual dispute in favor of the Harveys. The district court correctly found that it had no reason to disturb this factual finding, and Allstate has not shown that the court manifestly abused its discretion in denying Allstate's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on this ground. Royal College Shop v. North Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 670, 677 (10th Cir.1990). 14 The remaining question is whether the district court correctly reduced Harvey's damages. We review the grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict de novo, and apply the same standard as the trial court. Meyers v. Ideal Basic Industries, 940 F.2d 1379, 1383 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S.Ct. 935 (1991). A trial court may not disturb a jury verdict awarding damages unless the award is so excessive or so inadequate as to shock the conscience and raise an irresistible inference that some improper cause influenced the jury. Moore v. Subaru of America, 891 F.2d 1445, 1451 (10th Cir.1989); Acree v. Minolta Corp., 748 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir.1984). 15 Here, the jury awarded Harvey a total of $94,000: $60,000 for the period between July 1984 and April, 1985 and $34,000 for the period after McMaster took over the case. This figure is considerably less than the Egan's total fee of $169,000 7 and considerably less than the amount Whitaker's insurance paid. Thus, we cannot find it was clearly excessive. Rather, the jury appears to have employed a reasonable, although not necessarily technically correct, method of estimating the costs of defending the counterclaim. 8 See Thompson v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp., 660 F.2d 1380, 1388 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1981) (A reasonable basis for computation [of damages] and the best evidence available under the circumstances is sufficient.). 16 The district court reduced Harvey's recovery because it found she could not recover more than the difference between the amount she owed Egan under the continent fee agreement ($144,000) and Egan's hourly fees ($169,921.43). The court reasoned that Harvey would have had to pay Egan $144,000 under the contingent fee agreement regardless of the counterclaim, and thus could not fairly recover more for the counterclaim than the difference between the contingent fee and Egan's hourly fee. Although this may be a plausible method of estimating the costs attributable to defending the counterclaim, it not necessarily more accurate than the jury's method. Uncontradicted evidence showed that Harvey reduced Egan's total hourly fee by attending depositions herself. Moreover, Harvey is not necessarily barred from recovering costs which would have been incurred defending the counterclaim, even if these same costs would have been incurred prosecuting her claim. Thus, we reject the theory that Harvey's award should necessarily be limited by Egan's total hourly fee. 17 Because the jury's award was not clearly excessive, the district court erred in reducing it to $25,921.43. 18