Opinion ID: 66017
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Law: Reasonable Suspicion

Text: “An investigative vehicle stop is permissible under Terry only when the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” 5 Although “reasonable suspicion” need not rise to the level of probable cause, a “mere hunch” is insufficient.6 The stop “must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.”7 The circumstances, however, “need not rule 3 Gonzalez, 328 F.3d at 758. 4 Id.; see United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party unless “such a view is either not consistent with the district court’s findings or is clearly erroneous considering the evidence as a whole”). 5 United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 574 (5th Cir. 2008); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 6 Zavala, 541 F.3d at 574. 7 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 4 No. 08-30561 out the possibility of innocent conduct.” 8 An officer’s reasonable suspicion must be based on the “totality of circumstances confronting her, including all information available at the time she decided to stop [the defendant].” 9 “As a corollary . . . of the rule that the police may rely on the totality of facts available to them . . . , they also may not disregard facts tending to dissipate” reasonable suspicion.10 “Reasonable suspicion, however, does not have to be based on a personal observation. It can be based on information provided by a confidential informant, if the information possesses an ‘indicia of reliability.’” 11 In turn, whether information has indicia of reliability depends on, inter alia, “[1] the credibility and reliability of the informant, [2] the specificity of the information contained in the tip or report, [3] the extent to which the information in the tip or report can be verified by officers in the field, and [4] whether the tip or report concerns active or recent activity, or has instead gone stale.” 12 No single factor is dispositive and “‘[a] deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining 8 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). 9 United States v. Jaquez, 421 F.3d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 10 See Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing this corollary in the equally applicable context of probable cause). 11 United States v. Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1993). 12 United States v. Martinez, 486 F.3d 855, 861 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). We are not as skeptical of known, confidential, informants as we are of unknown, viz., anonymous, informants. See, e.g., United States v. Casper, 536 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Where the tip is anonymous, the credibility and reliability of the informant cannot be determined, and the government must establish reasonable suspicion based on some or all of the other factors.”). The Supreme Court views anonymous informants with “strong distrust”; a known informant is different because her “‘reputation can be assessed’” and she may be “‘held responsible’” if her information is fabricated. Martinez, 486 F.3d at 862–63 (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000)). 5 No. 08-30561 the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.’”13