Opinion ID: 505930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In--in prison.

Text: THE COURT: ... in prison, awaiting trial? A. Yes, sir. THE COURT: Go ahead. A. So--a heap of times I went there and talked to him down there, and then he don't do nothing but sit down and stare at the wall and be quiet. I'd say, What's wrong with you Kenny? He'd say, Nothing, don't you see something up there? I'd say I don't see nothing. He'd say, I see y'all with the TV there about every night. He'd say I don't even watch TV. He'd say, I have a little son, I see him every night on TV. I'd say, You don't see us on TV at night. I'd say, What's wrong with you? He'd say, Yeah, I do, too, 'cause I don't want to watch it. He'd say, I don't watch it. And he used to say a lots of things like that. He was working with Sunbeam and he drove his truck way up in Harlem. He said he was going to the crossroads because the Lord had called him to come over. And he got out of the car and went walking. The police picked him up there in Harlem and put him in jail, and they called me. And I went up there about 5:00 o'clock that morning, and they said, Your son was walking up and down the street just like he's crazy. And they said he got out of a Sunbeam truck and they said, Is it stolen? And I said, No, I said, he's not stole it. They said when they found it it had give out of gas. I asked him where--where he was going? He said, I don't know. He said 'cause the Lord had done called him to come to the end of the world, and I was going over, and I saw white lamb's shoes. I don't know what all he didn't told me he saw. And I had to go up there and pay--I had to pay $30.00 to get him out of jail, and then I brought him on home. And that night--he stayed around the house as long as I was there, and when I left, then I got another call saying, Come on, Mama, let's go get Kenny, he's walking the streets again. He just walked and walked, bare feet. He had blisters on his feet from walking. So I don't know what happened to him. So I just thought if y'all see in your heart--don't kill him, that's all. 7 In his closing argument in the penalty phase, the prosecutor discounted appellant's mother's testimony as follows: I'm not going to spend a lot of time talking about Mrs. Stephens' testimony because you just heard--heard what I heard, it was pretty sad. It's always sad when you have a mother. Parents always suffer for the crimes of their children. Now, it's a little bit sad, too, that of all the people this man has come in contact with in 33 years, they could only find one to get on the stand and say anything good about him, his mother. And I guess we can expect mothers to say something good. They love us no matter how badly we disappoint them; no matter how bad or how rotten we may be, they always love us. It's great. 8 Appellant's initial brief was filed before Witt was decided. In his reply brief, however, appellant was able to address the bearing Witt has on this case 9 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) provides as follows: In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-- (1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing; (2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing; (4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject mater or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding; (5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding; (6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or (7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding; (8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record: And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous. 10 Juror Clark was initially questioned along with another juror as follows: THE COURT: Are you, or any of you, conscientiously opposed to capital punishment? All, right, your name, please, ma'am? A JUROR: Katherine Farr, F-A-R-R THE COURT: And, yes, sir? ANOTHER JUROR: Thomas L. Clark. THE COURT: Please remain standing. Thomas L. Clark. Did all of you understand that question: Are any of you conscientiously opposed to capital punishment? Is there any misunderstanding in the mind of anyone of what I mean by capital punishment? No indication. Please remain standing while I ask you several more questions, these two. Would your reservation--and the questions are asked of both of you--would your reservations about capital punishment prevent you from making a impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt? MRS. FARR: I would think so. MR. CLARK: No. THE COURT: It would not, Mr. Clark said. Are your reservations--the question again is directed to both of you--are your reservations about capital punishment such that you could never vote to impose the death penalty? Mr. Clark? MR. CLARK: No. THE REPORTER: What was her reply? THE COURT: Her reply was Yes. Again, a question to both of you, Are your reservations about capital punishment such that you would refuse even to consider its imposition in the case before you? MRS. FARR: I wouldn't consider it. MR. CLARK: No. 11 We need not reproduce the lengthy voir dires of jurors Parkman and Hall, as we find no plausible basis for challenging their exclusion for cause under Witt. The entire voir dire of juror Farr, along with part of the voir dire of juror Clark, is reproduced supra note 10 Her exclusion for cause on the basis of her responses to the trial court's questions was entirely appropriate under Witt, and the trial court was under no obligation to permit defense counsel to question her in an attempt to persuade the court otherwise. 12 Appellant fails to distinguish between malice and intent, as most courts have, for purposes of determining whether a Sandstrom error has been made and, if so, whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant may have chosen to fuse the two elements because his petition for habeas corpus only alleged an impermissibly burden-shifting instruction with respect to malice, and did not discuss intent. In his brief in support of the petition, however, appellant quoted the language of the charge concerning intent that we have examined for a Sandstrom error on intent and appellant noted that in Sandstrom, the Supreme Court held that a similar instruction could be interpreted either as a conclusive presumption or as a burden-shifting presumption. Sandstrom, of course, concerned a burden-shifting instruction on intent that was quite similar to the instruction on intent that is at issue in this case. The district court apparently considered a Sandstrom challenge to the intent language of the charge to have been properly raised, as it passed on the charge on intent separately from its consideration of the portion the charge concerning malice. Appellee addressed those issues on the merits similarly on this appeal, raising no claim of procedural default concerning any errors in the trial court's charge on intent. We therefore find appellant's constitutional challenge to the intent language of the charge to be properly before us on this appeal 13 In Mason we discussed the relationship between a claim of self-defense and the element of intent to kill as follows: Apparently, the district court believed that by raising self-defense the defendant admitted having the intent to kill. This analysis is too broad. When claiming self-defense, one does not necessarily admit intent to kill, but rather admits that the killing occurred. As the petitioner points out in his brief, one can shoot to kill in self-defense, shoot to wound in self-defense, shoot to frighten in self-defense, or even shoot reactively in self-defense with no specific purpose. The mere raising of self-defense clearly does not establish that the defendant had the intent to kill. Mason v. Balkcom, 669 F.2d at 227. 14 This was stated in Tucker as follows: The Davis case emphasized that the nature of the defense at trial is an important factor in the harmless error analysis. Davis, 752 F.2d at 1521. In Davis, as here, the thrust of the defense was the defendant's non-involvement, and the defense made no effort to rebut the evidence that the killing which had taken place was intentional. While intent remained at issue in the sense that it was not conceded and the burden of proof remained on the state, the Davis court expressly considered as important the fact that the defense did not contest the issue of intent, thus leaving unrebutted the overwhelming evidence that the killing was intentional. Accordingly, although Tucker's defense posture does not by itself conclude the harmless error analysis, it is relevant to our consideration of the first prong under Davis, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Tucker, 762 F.2d at 1501-02 (footnote omitted). 15 The trial court charged the jury concerning the legal justification of self-defense as follows: Members of the Jury, I charge you that a person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself against another's imminent use of lawful [sic] force; however, a person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself, or a third person. A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified above if he initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon his assailant; or he is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or the attempted commission of a felony; or was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so, and the other notwithstanding continues or threatens to continue the use of lawful force. I charge you that if you believe the defendant did shoot and kill the deceased as alleged in the bill of indictment, but if you believe he did so in defense of his own person against an unjustified, violent assault sought to be inflicted upon him by the deceased, then you should acquit the defendant. And I further charge you that if there were a seeming necessity to take human life, that is, if as a reasonably courageous man under the facts and circumstances as they existed, or appeared to him to exist, the defendant believed his life was about to be taken in such justified--unjustified, violent, felonious assault on his person and in good faith acted upon those fears and not in a spirit of revenge, the defendant would be justified. In the district court, appellant argued that the instructions given the jury on his theory of the case and on self-defense were prejudicially erroneous. On appeal, appellant has chosen not to argue those claims separately, but simply to reassert them without further argument as part of his argument that any Sandstrom error should not be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We find these instructions constitutionally adequate under the circumstances of this case. 16 The letter carrier, who testified that he is hard of hearing, heard only the three shots fired from appellant's louder weapon, and therefore could not testify concerning who fired first 1 See infra note 4 and accompanying text 2 Justice Blackmun, writing for the plurality in Johnson, stated that [i]n presenting a defense such as alibi, insanity, or self-defense, a defendant may in some cases admit that the act alleged by the prosecution was intentional, thereby sufficiently reducing the likelihood that the jury applied the erroneous instruction as to permit the appellate court to consider the error harmless. We leave it to the lower courts to determine whether, by raising a particular defense or by his other actions, a defendant himself has taken the issue of intent away from the jury. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 87, 103 S.Ct. at 977-78 (citation omitted). In Bowen v. Kemp, 832 F.2d 546 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1120, 99 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), we held that a defendant ordinarily does not concede intent as to the consequences of his acts by pleading the defense of insanity. We noted, however, that there may be cases in which the defendant, in presenting an insanity defense, does admit that the act alleged by the prosecution was intentional. Id. at 550 n. 13 (quoting Cook v. Foltz, 814 F.2d 1109, 1113 (6th Cir.1987)). Our analysis in Bowen shows that each case involving a defense that potentially concedes the issue of intent must be evaluated on the basis of its particular facts. 3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981 4 We explained in a footnote that [b]y general intent we mean intent in the sense that a person intends the consequences of his voluntary physical actions--e.g., an intentional shooting in self-defense. The contrasting term is specific criminal intent, which refers to a state of mind that is thought culpable--e.g., premeditation as part of murder, or hot blood as part of manslaughter. Holloway, 632 F.2d at 618 n. 26. 5 In Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir.1982), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit handed down after September 30, 1981 We emphasized in Mason that the mere fact that the defendant raised the defense of self-defense, standing alone, is insufficient to remove from the case the issue of whether the defendant intended the consequences of his acts. We noted that [w]hen claiming self-defense, one does not necessarily admit intent to kill, but rather admits that the killing occurred. As the petitioner points out in his brief, one can shoot to kill in self-defense, shoot to wound in self-defense, shoot to frighten in self-defense, or even shoot reactively in self-defense with no specific purpose. Mason, 669 F.2d at 227 (emphasis added). See also Patterson v. Austin, 728 F.2d 1389, 1395-96 (11th Cir.1984). Mason should not be read as standing for the proposition that raising the defense of self-defense never concedes intent as to the consequences of one's acts. Not only would such an interpretation be inconsistent with the language in Mason quoted above, but it would be directly contrary to our holding in Holloway, a binding case that preceded Mason. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Mason, a panel opinion, cannot be deemed to have overruled Holloway, because in this circuit only the court sitting en banc can overrule binding precedent. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc). Mason should be read as merely standing for the proposition that whether raising self-defense concedes intent depends on the particular facts of the case. 1 The majority also points out that the defense motion for experts was made one year after the crime, and that the deceased officer's hands probably could not be tested for gun powder at that late date. While the delay might well have affected that particular test, it is unlikely that the delay would have impeded the more significant ballistics tests which were sought by Stephens. Significantly, delay was not mentioned by the prosecutor or the trial judge as a reason for denying the motion 2 That these matters are in fact subject to varying expert interpretations was borne out by the affidavits and depositions proffered in Stephens' federal habeas corpus proceedings. These experts reach different conclusions than those reached by the state's experts at trial, specifically contradicting the conclusion that the physical evidence refutes Stephens' contention that the victim fired first. See Depositions of Fassnacht and Riddick 3 In an alternative holding, the majority finds overwhelming evidence that Stephens did not act in self-defense, because a disinterested witness observed the final moments of the incident, observing Stephens walking slowly to the rear of the car and firing a final shot into the car. However, it is clear that the disinterested witness's testimony is not relevant at all to the issue of who fired the first shot. See footnote 16 of the majority opinion acknowledging that the disinterested witness could not testify concerning who fired first. In my judgment, if the officer did fire the first shot, I would be reluctant to conclude that there is overwhelming evidence that Stephens was not acting in self-defense