Opinion ID: 1137859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tampering With Juror Carvin

Text: Prior to the approval by this Court of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice on August 15, 1979, the rule in Mississippi was that, where the crime charged is punishable by death or a maximum of imprisonment for life, the jury shall be sequestered and this right cannot be waived either by the attorney for the accused or at the discretion of the trial court. Cox v. State, 365 So.2d 627, 629 (Miss. 1978). This rule was changed by the Uniform Rules to allow the right to be waived. Barnes v. State, 374 So.2d 1308, 1309 (Miss. 1979) (construing Rule 5.07, Miss.Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Prac.). Gerlach urges that Cox is the better rule and that Barnes should be overruled. Procedurally, Gerlach is in a difficult position: (1) she failed to request that the jury be sequestered; and (2) upon learning that the tampering with Juror Carvin occurred, Gerlach failed to place in the record any objection. [2] In fact, insofar as the record reflects counsel for Gerlach said nothing about the matter until several days later  after the jury's guilty verdict had been returned. Appellate counsel for Gerlach obviously feel that the tampering with Carvin is a most significant issue. The matter is complicated by the inadequacy of the record which does not even reflect what rationale the trial judge employed in sending Juror Carvin back into the jury room. The general rule recognized by this Court, and applied to questions similar to that which is before us, is, that if the verdict was rendered under circumstances in which its purity might have been affected, it must be set aside; if it could not have been affected, it will be sustained. [citation omitted]. Ned and Taylor v. State, 33 Miss. 364, 372-73 (1857). A more recent analogy is contained in Hines v. State, 417 So.2d 924 (Miss. 1982), where the trial judge, in response to an allegation that a juror had been sleeping, investigated and determined that the juror had in fact been awake. 417 So.2d at 925. In light of the judge's finding, there was no error in the proceeding. Significantly, unlike in Gerlach's case, the trial judge placed in the record his reasons for leaving the juror on the jury. 417 So.2d at 925 n. 1. It would appear that, if Gerlach had objected at trial to Carvin's remaining upon the jury on the grounds that the information in the telephone call would adversely prejudice Carvin's deliberations concerning Gerlach's guilt, then Carvin should have been taken off the jury and an alternate juror seated. In this context we note that the trial judge interrogated Juror Carvin extensively, and it appears without serious doubt that the juror understood her obligation to disregard the telephone call and to decide the case solely on the evidence presented in open court. Because the record fails to reflect a timely and adequate objection on the part of defense counsel, we deny the assignment of error.