Opinion ID: 146214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior possession testimony

Text: Adams challenges the district court's rulings concerning his prior possession and discharge of the rifle. Before trial, the district court ruled the government could introduce the testimony pursuant to Rule 404(b) as evidence of knowledge or intent to possess the firearm. Citing our decision in United States v. Rock, 282 F.3d 548 (8th Cir.2002), the district court determined at trial that the evidence of prior possession was intrinsic to the charged offense. Although Adams does not concede the evidence could be properly admitted under Rule 404(b), he primarily argues on appeal that the district court erred in relying on Rock to treat the evidence as intrinsic to the crime charged and to admit it without a limiting instruction. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, United States v. Nadeau, 598 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir.2010), we find no error in the admission of this evidence. In Rock, we held evidence that the defendant burgled a storage unit, carried firearms to the residence he shared with his girlfriend, and displayed them to various people on a date prior to his arrest was not merely evidence of other wrongs but directly supported the government's charge that the defendant possessed the firearms. Id. at 550-51. The defendant in Rock argued that while the display of the weapons at other times was evidence of possession, the government did not need the burglary evidence to prove its case. Id. at 551. We concluded that 404(b) did not bar presentation of the entire episode because it completes the story of the crime or explains the relationship of the parties or the circumstances surrounding a particular event. Id. Adams's argument that the prior possession testimony neither completes the story nor gives a total picture of his possession of the rifle on March 14, 2008 misses the mark. This testimony is evidence of possession that directly supports the charge. Even if we were to find Rock inapplicable, we affirm nonetheless. See United States v. Gettel, 474 F.3d 1081, 1087 (8th Cir.2007) (court of appeals may affirm the admission of evidence on any basis supported by the record). The government could prove that Adams knowingly possessed the gun by showing he actually or constructively possessed it. United States v. Byas, 581 F.3d 723, 726 (8th Cir.2009). Constructive possession may be established by evidence demonstrating ownership, dominion, or control over a gun. Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the testimony indicates that the same individual was in sole, knowing possession of the same rifle in the same house on four successive occasions leading up to the charged date. Such testimony therefore helps to establish his ownership or control of the gun. As the evidence tends logically to prove [an] element of the crime charged, it is not subject to Rule 404(b). Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir.1999). Such evidence is still subject to Rule 403. Id. We have little trouble in concluding that Rule 403 would not bar the testimony here. How the defendant used and controlled the weapon under similar circumstances is directly relevant to the charged offense. See Rock, 282 F.3d 548. Adams next asserts that the prior possession testimony constructively amended the indictment because it altered the date of the offense. The government counters Adams is really arguing a variance arose instead. The difference between the two is well established, though at times difficult to apply: a constructive amendment changes the charge, while the evidence remains the same; a variance changes the evidence, while the charge remains the same. United States v. Stuckey, 220 F.3d 976, 981 (8th Cir.2000). A constructive amendment primarily affects the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury and constitutes reversible error per se, while a variance implicates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to notice of the nature of the charge and is subject to harmless error analysis. Id. Upon de novo review, see id. at 979, we conclude neither constructive amendment nor a variance occurred. Because Adams argues the testimony changed the date of the offense, not the offense charged, no constructive amendment occurred. See United States v. Howe, 538 F.3d 842, 850 (8th Cir.2008), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2009). We conclude no variance occurred either, particularly because the government never wavered in its theory of the case at trial: the location where the gun was found established Adams possessed the firearm on or about the charged date and Thomas's testimony simply provided confirmation of possession. See Howe, 538 F.3d at 851 (no variance where government's theory did not change and allegedly problematic closing argument merely summarized that theory); cf. United States v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 936, 941-42 (8th Cir. 1991) (no constructive amendment for same reason). In sum, we reject Adams's arguments that there was either a constructive amendment to or a variance in the indictment.