Opinion ID: 845997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the intermediate sanction cell problem and solution

Text: As shown above, and as I discussed in McCuller, the existence of intermediate sanction cells in Michigan's sentencing guidelines creates a Blakely problem. The reason is that judicial fact-finding used to score the OVs or to depart from the intermediate sanction cells changes a defendant's statutory maximum sentence. The change in the statutory maximum makes the sentence constitutionally infirm. Then, the question must be addressed whether the offending portions of the sentencing guidelines can be severed from the nonoffending portions. Such severance might be possible if the Legislature had intended the sentencing guidelines to function without intermediate sanction cells. But that was not its intention. I must reiterate my belief, as set forth in McCuller, that the offending sections cannot be severed. Nearly every class of felony involves intermediate sanction cells. In fact, only class A and M2 felonies do not. See MCL 777.61 to 777.69. Nearly every single felony could present a Blakely problem if the defendant has the correct number of PRV points. The comprehensiveness of the problem creates extreme entanglement. At the start of any jury trial, the participants will be uncertain which sentencing method will be appropriate if the defendant is convicted. They will not know whether judicial fact-finding will be required or permitted. And the prosecution will be uncertain of the entirety of the facts it must prove to the jury. Moreover, the offending sections of the sentencing guidelines will be difficult to spot. For one defendant convicted of a crime, it would be appropriate to score the OVs. For another convicted of the same crime, it would be impermissible to score the OVs because that defendant's PRV level places him or her in an intermediate sanction cell. Such entanglement shows that severance is simply not feasible. Blank v. Dep't of Corrections, 462 Mich. 103, 123, 611 N.W.2d 530 (2000) (opinion by Kelly, J.). Also, it is unlikely that the Legislature would have enacted a noncomprehensive version of the guidelines. The Legislature intended the guidelines to be comprehensive. People v. Garza, 469 Mich. 431, 434-435, 670 N.W.2d 662 (2003). Its specific goals were to eliminate sentencing disparity and ensure that certain crimes not warranting prison time result in jail sentences. Id. at 435, 670 N.W.2d 662. Severing the intermediate sanction cells from the sentencing guidelines would work counter to both goals. This demonstrates that severance is not appropriate. People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 157-159, 228 N.W. 723 (1930). Given that the offending sections cannot be severed, the guidelines as a whole must be found no longer valid. However, alternative solutions should be explored. For example, we could replace all judicial fact-finding with jury determinations. The prosecution could include in its charges the specific facts needed to score relevant OVs. Then, in a bifurcated hearing, the prosecution could present evidence regarding each of them. The jury could deliberate and make specific findings. It could indicate which facts the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because it would be the jury making the determinations, there would be no constitutional impediment to an OV score moving a defendant's sentence out of an intermediate sanction cell. See McCuller, 475 Mich. 176, 715 N.W.2d 798. This solution would ensure that the Legislature's intent in enacting the guidelines would be fulfilled. At the same time, it would allow defendants full Sixth Amendment protection by putting the prosecution to its proofs. Such a system would be compatible with the Blakely cases.