Opinion ID: 2770336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reference to Appellant’s Time in Jail

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial after the mother of D.J. and M.J. mentioned that appellant “was released 4 The government contends that because D.J. adopted the statements in her CAC interview after the video was played at trial, any error in admitting the video was harmless. It is true that “when a witness testifies under oath and adopts a prior statement not made under oath, that prior statement becomes substantive evidence.” Williams v. United States, 859 A.2d 130, 138 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1195 (D.C. 1999) (internal alteration omitted)). However, that doctrine requires that the prior statement be properly admitted in the first instance. See, e.g., Koonce v. United States, 993 A.2d 544, 552-53 (D.C. 2010) (CAC video adopted at grand jury and admitted as substantive evidence at trial when properly admitted to impeach witness); Williams, 859 A.2d at 138 (CAC video admitted as substantive evidence at trial after properly used to impeach witness). The statements in this case were initially admitted by the trial court as impeachment and demeanor evidence. As we have explained, the CAC tape should not have been admitted for impeachment purposes because the record does not establish that it contained prior inconsistent statements. Even if the tape was properly admitted to show D.J.‟s demeanor, that would not permit the jury to consider what she said. Cf. In re L.C., 41 A.3d 1261, 1263 (D.C. 2012) (testimony of witness about demeanor of victim under report-of-rape rule “properly includes „only enough details to show that the complainant reported the sexual assault charged‟” (quoting Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 223 (D.C. 1993)). Thus, the doctrine of adoption does not apply because the statements in this case were admitted improperly in the first instance. 23 from jail in 2000.” The trial judge denied the motion, instead instructing the jury that “being in jail does not mean Mr. McRoy was convicted of any crime” and that “the law prohibits you from using that passing reference in any way whatsoever to determine whether the [g]overnment has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. McRoy is guilty of any of the charges in this indictment.” “We will reverse a trial court‟s denial of a mistrial only where it „appears irrational, unreasonable, or so extreme that failure to reverse would result in a miscarriage of justice.‟” Evans v. United States, 12 A.3d 1, 7 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Coleman v. United States, 779
Improper references to a defendant‟s criminal history, though potentially prejudicial, do not always warrant a mistrial. See, e.g., Dorsey v. United States, 935 A.2d 288, 293-94 (D.C. 2007); Goins v. United States, 617 A.2d 956, 959 (D.C. 1992). The reference to appellant‟s having been in jail was brief and nonspecific, and it was not intentionally elicited by the government.5 The reference was not related to the credibility of the complaining witnesses, which was the 5 Appellant contends that the government was at least reckless because its line of questioning was irrelevant to the issues at trial. However, the government did warn the witness not to refer to appellant‟s time in jail. We accept the trial court‟s finding that there was no government misconduct, although we reiterate “that it is the prosecutor‟s responsibility to take all reasonable steps to assure that government witnesses not disclose inadmissible and potentially prejudicial evidence to the jury.” Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 402 n.9 (D.C. 2000). 24 central issue at trial. Finally, the court issued a clear curative instruction, which we presume the jury followed, absent evidence to the contrary. Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 165 (D.C. 1992) (en banc). Under those circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant‟s motion for a mistrial. See Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76, 79-80 (D.C. 1993) (reference to defendant‟s prior incarceration did not require a mistrial where there was no government misconduct, the prosecution‟s case was strong, and defendant‟s counsel rejected trial judge‟s offer of curative instruction).