Opinion ID: 803081
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII and Prima Facie Matters

Text: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise [] discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2010). “The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.” Tisdale v. Federal Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 529 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000)). A plaintiff may succeed in his Title VII claim “by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer . . . .” Id. (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 517 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). In disparate treatment cases lacking direct evidence of discrimination, we apply the burdenshifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dep’t, 581 F.3d 383, 390 (6th Cir. 2009). The first step of the framework requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. For Title VII, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: “(1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) that he was qualified for the position; and (4) that a person outside the protected class was treated more favorably than him.” Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493 -4- No. 10-3559 Litton v. Talawanda School District (6th Cir. 2001). Once the plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show “some legitimate non-discriminatory reason” for the disputed action. Id. (quoting Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1329 (6th Cir. 1994)). Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s explanation is “a pretext for discrimination.” Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255). The Supreme Court has clarified that the prima facie rubric does not create mandatory elements for Title VII claims, but rather provides a “sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). Indeed, it has cautioned courts against “applying legal rules which were devised to govern ‘the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof,’ in deciding this ultimate question.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 524 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716) (internal citations omitted). Pursuant to this schema: when the defendant fails to persuade the district court to dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case, and responds to the plaintiff’s proof by offering evidence of the reason for the plaintiff’s rejection, the fact finder must then decide whether the rejection was discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15 (footnote omitted). Stated differently, the prima facie inquiry “is a preliminary matter which cannot be revisited at a later time.” EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997). Therefore, once “the case proceed[s] to trial . . . we are no longer concerned with whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case, but instead focus on the actual question of discrimination.” Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of City of Hazel Park, 364 F.3d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 2004). -5- No. 10-3559 Litton v. Talawanda School District This principle is well settled in this circuit. See, e.g., Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t, 549 F.3d 666, 674 (6th Cir. 2008) (courts may not review the sufficiency of a prima facie case after a merits trial); Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 546 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); Tisdale, 415 F.3d at 529 (same); Fuhr, 364 F.3d at 757; Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 822 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). See also Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir. 2000) (district court may not dismiss plaintiff’s action for failure to meet the first McDonnell Douglas prong based on the evidence defendant advances regarding the second McDonnell Douglas prong). Indeed, it is followed by every circuit in the country. See, e.g., Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hether Bates established a prima facie case of employment discrimination in the summary judgment ‘burden-shifting’ sense is moot after trial. The relevant inquiry now is simply whether the evidence presented at trial supports a finding of liability.”); Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e need not indulge the parties’ disputes about which material facts are in dispute or whether Riser met his burden in establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas regardless of the ‘threshold’ we have set for such proof.”); Whittington v. Nordam Grp., Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 993 (10th Cir. 2005) (“We have repeatedly stated that juries are not to apply the McDonnell Douglas framework and that we are not concerned with plaintiff’s proof of a prima facie case when we review a jury verdict.”); accord Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2005); Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 342 F.3d 569, 574 (5th Cir. -6- No. 10-3559 Litton v. Talawanda School District 2003); Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 906 (7th Cir. 2002); Coffey v. Dobbs Int’l Services, Inc., 170 F.3d 323, 326 (2d Cir. 1999); Hopp v. City of Pittsburgh, 194 F.3d 434, 439 (3d Cir. 1999); Gibson v. Old Town Trolley Tours of Wash., D.C., Inc., 160 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 720 (1st Cir. 1994). Thus, precedent compels us to disregard the jury’s assessment of Litton’s prima facie case and instead focus on “the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.” See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714. Talawanda would have us reject this precedent based on the technicality that the district court did not deny outright Talawanda’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, but rather allowed the case to proceed and “delegated” the issue to the jury to resolve at the close of evidence. In making this argument, it relies on Gafford v. General Electric Co., in which a district court likewise instructed the jury to rule on the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s prima facie case at the close of evidence, and this Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendant. 997 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). Talawanda maintains that because the jury ruled in Talawanda’s favor on the adverse employment action question, it was precluded from finding for Litton on the question of discrimination. Talawanda’s argument fails. Most importantly, Gafford differs from this case, because the Gafford jury also found for the defendant on the ultimate question. The Gafford court resolved only whether the district court committed reversible error by asking the jury to resolve questions regarding the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The case at bar carries a contradiction that Gafford lacked: the jury found for Talawanda on one question and for Litton on the other. Gafford does not instruct us on how to resolve such a conflict. -7- No. 10-3559 Litton v. Talawanda School District Aikens does resolve this very question and does so in Litton’s favor. In Aikens, the parties underwent a full bench trial. At the close of evidence, the district court issued a verdict that “erroneously focused on the question of prima facie case rather than directly on the question of discrimination.” 460 U.S. at 717. After expressing “surpris[e]” that the parties continued to dispute a threshold question after the trial had ended, id. at 714, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to “decide on the basis of the evidence before it whether the Postal Service discriminated against Aikens.” Id. at 717. We adopted the Aikens principle in full in Avery Dennison. In Avery Dennison, the district court likewise ruled, after a full trial on the merits, that the plaintiff should lose because he had failed to establish an element of his prima facie case. 104 F.3d at 860. We relied on Aikens to reverse the district court’s ruling and remand it “for a determination on the ultimate issue of discrimination.” Id. at 863. When Talawanda lost its summary judgment motion before trial and did not prevail in its motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Litton’s case-in-chief, it “fail[ed] to persuade the district court to dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case.” See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714. That the district court did not deny the latter motion outright does not strengthen Talawanda’s claim. Aikens does not condition its rule on the district court’s express denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, but rather on (1) its failure to grant such a motion and (2) the defendant proceeding to “respond[] to the plaintiff’s proof by offering evidence of the reason for the plaintiff’s rejection.” Id. at 714-15. Cf. Tisdale, 415 F.3d at 529 (declining to visit sufficiency of prima facie case where defendant did not move for judgment as a matter of law during trial); Avery Dennison, 104 F.3d 858, 860-61 (district court’s denial of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion prior to trial constituted -8- No. 10-3559 Litton v. Talawanda School District acknowledgment that plaintiff had met his prima facie burden). Thus, the jury’s assessment of Litton’s prima facie case did not control its finding on the ultimate question of discrimination. In any event, we have already addressed the potential conflicts between Gafford, Aikens, and Avery Dennison, interpreting Gafford to preclude the argument that Talawanda raises. In Kovacevich, we explained that: While, as Gafford states, the elements of the prima facie case can indeed go before a jury, Aikens and Avery Dennison simply state that in reviewing a trial that proceeds beyond the prima facie stage, neither the district court nor appellate court should refocus on the question of whether a plaintiff established her prima facie case. . . . [I]n reviewing the facts of a discrimination claim after there has been a full trial on the merits, a district court or an appellate court must focus on the ultimate question of discrimination rather than on whether a plaintiff made out her prima facie case. 224 F.3d 806, 824-25 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus, the district court was not only permitted to disregard the jury’s answer to the adverse employment action question, it was required to do so, and instead to evaluate the strength of the evidence as a whole. Talawanda confined its argument on appeal to whether the district court erred by failing to defer to the jury’s determination of the adverse employment action question. It did not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding on the ultimate question of discrimination. Having rejected Talawanda’s argument, we see no need to address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.