Opinion ID: 1478174
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waste Management's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: [¶ 28] Priscilla Reid argues that Waste Management owed James Reid a duty to reasonably and safely locate the trash dumpsters, and to ensure that the transfer station was operated in a safe manner. She contends this duty arises from both Waste Management's Agreement with the Town and a common law duty of care. [¶ 29] The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law. Guilford Transp. Indus. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2000 ME 31, ¶ 13, 746 A.2d 910, 914. Construing the Agreement between Waste Management and the Town in its plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning, see Villas by the Sea Owners Ass'n v. Garrity, 2000 ME 48, ¶ 9, 748 A.2d 457, 461, we do not read it to hold Waste Management responsible for the maintenance of safety measures around the dumpsters. [¶ 30] In the Agreement, Waste Management is required to indemnify the Town for any damages arising out of its performance of [] work. Paragraph ten of the Agreement states that Waste Management shall have exclusive control of and the exclusive right to control the details of the services and work performed. Priscilla's argument that these clauses create a duty of care presupposes that the work Waste Management performs includes the maintenance of adequate safety measures. Nowhere in the Agreement, however, does it state that the work Waste Management is to perform includes anything to do with safety. [¶ 31] In addition, Priscilla Reid has offered no evidence that Waste Management and James Reid had a special relationship, or any evidence that the dumpster had been incorrectly placed in the earthen pit by Waste Management. Without more facts, Pricilla Reid has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Waste Management owed James Reid a duty of care. [¶ 32] Finally, Priscilla Reid argues that Waste Management is liable for James Reid's accident under a theory of negligent entrustment. In order to prevail on a negligent entrustment claim, a plaintiff must show that defendant had the right to control the property in question, which was entrusted to a third party, on the occasion when the accident occurred. See Pelletier v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 485 A.2d 1002, 1004 (Me.1984). [¶ 33] Though Priscilla Reid's complaint alleges that Waste Management was negligent in its placement of the dumpsters flush with the ground and without adequate safety measures, it mentions nothing about Waste Management maintaining control over the dumpsters while they are located at the Town's transfer station. Priscilla Reid had the burden of setting forth a clear demand for the relief she sought in her initial complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 8(a). Because her complaint was insufficient to put Waste Management on notice of a negligent entrustment claim, the claim has not been preserved. [¶ 34] Even if Priscilla Reid's claim of negligent entrustment was not barred by her failure to adequately plead it in her initial complaint, she has not offered evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Waste Management's control over the dumpsters. Furthermore, the indemnification clause contained in the Agreement makes no mention of Waste Management maintaining control over the dumpsters or even servicing them while they are at the transfer station. Therefore, we affirm summary judgment in favor of Waste Management. The entry is: Judgments affirmed. SILVER, J., dissenting. [¶ 35] I agree with the Court's analysis surrounding Clayton and Waste Management, but I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to affirm summary judgment in favor of the Town. Today's decision by the Court moves us further away from what the Legislature intended and leads to inconsistent and illogical applications of the statute. See 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2) (2006). [1] [¶ 36] In Adriance v. Town of Standish, 687 A.2d 238-40 (Me.1996), we held that a town may be held liable pursuant to the public building exception for its negligent failure to properly construct, operate or maintain a waste transfer station. In Adriance, much like in the instant case, an individual suffered injuries after falling into a trash hopper at the town's waste transfer station. Id. at 239. We concluded that the transfer station was a public building for the purposes of the Maine Tort Claims Act, and therefore, fell within an exception to sovereign immunity. Id. at 240. [¶ 37] In Adriance, the claimant suffered injuries after falling into a trash hopper at the Town of Standish waste transfer station. Id. at 239. The station was a large garage-type structure containing an office and a trash hopper. Id. The trash hopper was surrounded by a concrete wall, except on the side of the back-up area. Id. [¶ 38] The Court's holding today thus creates an anomalous result. If James Reid had fallen into a dumpster in Standish, for example, Priscilla would have been allowed to recover damages for the town's negligent failure to maintain a protective barrier around the dumpster. We should not construe the Legislature's words to produce absurd and manifestly unjust results. A patchwork of liability and immunity is simply not endorsed by the text and spirit of 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A. [¶ 39] In the instant case, Reid fell into a dumpster flush with the ground. It does not make sense to have a policy allowing suit to proceed as a result of a fall into a partially open dumpster and not allow a suit to proceed when the dumpster is totally open. This distinction does not come from the statute, see 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2), but comes instead from this Court's interpretation of the statute. The Legislature did not intend for such inconsistent results, and it is the Court's duty to prevent illogical and absurd results as a result of our interpretation. See Carroll v. Town of Rockport, 2003 ME 135, ¶ 23, 837 A.2d 148, 155; Brent Leasing Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 2001 ME 90, ¶ 6, 773 A.2d 457, 459. [¶ 40] By this decision, the Court is further confusing an already confusing area. The Town of Mount Vernon allowed a dangerous situation to continue for a significant period of time. However, if the same accident occurred with a partial concrete wall surrounding three sides of the dumpster area, this Court may have reached a different decision. This decision is not good public policy. [¶ 41] Accordingly, I would vacate the trial court's grant of a summary judgment for the Town.