Opinion ID: 27707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones Act Seaman

Text: Sonat contents that the ALJ erred in finding that Rogers was covered by the LHWCA in light of its evidence that he was a Jones Act seaman. In order to be covered by the LHWCA, a claimant must meet the status and situs requirements of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3); 33 U.S.C. § 903(a); Miles v. Delta Well Surveying Corp., 777 F.2d 1069, 1071 (5th Cir. 1985). The LHWCA excludes from coverage a “master or member of a crew of any vessel.” See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G). “As the Court has stated on several occasions, the Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually exclusive compensation regimes: ‘master or member of a crew’ is a refinement of the term ‘seaman’ in the Jones Act; it excludes from LHWCA coverage those properly covered under the Jones Act.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 355 (1995). The essential requirements for seaman status are twofold. Id. at 368. First “an employee’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.” Id. Second, a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature. 3 Id. “A worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act.” Id. at 371. The ALJ concluded that while Sonat’s evidence supported a finding that Rogers spent some of his time as a member of a crew, that evidence did not support a finding that his connection to Sonat’s fleet was substantial in duration. The BRB concluded that this finding was rational and supported by substantial evidence. We agree. There was evidence that Rogers held numerous jobs (including painter, chipper, radio operator, motorman, helper and water-maker) over 14 years on various submersible rigs, jack-up rigs, fixed platforms and tender vessels. There was no evidence, however, regarding how much time Rogers spent on any given vessel doing any given job. Clearly Rogers worked on non-vessels, Kerr McGhee Corp. v. Ma-Ju Marine Serv. Inc., 830 f.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that fixed platforms are not vessels), and there was evidence that the lion’s share of the work performed by Rogers could be performed both on vessels and non-vessels. In its attempt to demonstrate otherwise, Sonat simply speculates as to the amount of time spent on each of the five rigs Rogers identified in an interrogatory answer as those on which he worked. The ALJ did not err in rejecting Sonat’s speculative analysis.