Opinion ID: 2182951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Joinder of trial on burglary and obstruction of an officer charges. []

Text: The offense of burglary and obstructing an officer were joined in the same amended information. When these crimes were tried together before the same jury and at the same time, counsel for the defendant at no point made any objection to the joinder of the two charges on the grounds that such joinder would prejudice the jury against the veracity of the defendant's alibi. Nor did the counsel for defendant put forward any cautionary instructions to the effect that the evidence offered on the obstructing charge could not supply a defect of proof on the main burglary charge. We conclude that even though trying both charges together was not error in this case and the failure to deliver proper cautionary instructions was not error in view of the failure of defendant's counsel to request such instructions, the giving of such an instruction was the only means of adequately protecting the defendant against the double-teaming effect of such joinder. We conclude that the lack of such an instruction caused an apparent miscarriage of justice, and that a new trial free of this defect may very well produce a different result. [1] Accordingly, it is proper for this court to exercise its power of discretionary reversal under sec. 251.09, Stats., and to grant a new trial in the interest of justice. On the charge of obstructing an officer the defendant contends that his constitutional right to present a defense, including an alibi defense, at trial [2] precludes prosecution for obstructing an officer under these circumstances. Although previous cases in this state on convictions for obstructing an officer have always involved physical abuse of an officer or officers while making an arrest or performing other official duties, [3] the statute permits conviction for obstruction of an officer under circumstances where efforts to intentionally mislead an officer may be involved as were allegedly present here. However, before such a charge should be made under sec. 946.41 (2) (b), Stats., the district attorney should have sound reasons for believing that statements made by a suspected defendant to the police in terms of an alibi were knowingly and intentionally made for the purpose of deceiving and misleading the police, and not simply out of a good-faith desire to defend against an accusation of crime. Sec. 971.12 (1) and (4), Stats., provides that two crimes may be joined in one information and tried together if they are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. The two crimes charged here, burglary and obstructing an officer, are connected together since the charge of obstructing an officer is based upon an alibi defense to the charge of burglarizing the tavern. A more difficult problem presents itself here in regard to whether the joinder of these two crimes, while technically proper, may still have been prejudicial to the defendant. Sec. 971.12 (3), Stats., provides that a trial court may order a severance if it appears that an otherwise proper joinder may prejudice the rights of the defendant. In this case, however, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering a severance. The general rule is that, if evidence of each crime is admissible in regard to the other crime, then the two crimes may be tried together. [4] The reason for the lack of prejudicial joinder in such cases is that, even if there were separate trials on each crime, the same evidence that would be admissible at the joint trial would also be admissible at the separate trial, and so there is no ground for claiming prejudice. In this case evidence of the burglary is admissible on the charge of obstructing an officer in order to show the motive for the obstruction. Conversely (and contrary to the defendant's arguments), evidence regarding fabrication of alibi is admissible on the burglary count. The probative value of such evidence on the burglary count is slight, but it does tend to show an awareness by the defendant that his defense to the main charge is so weak that he needs to fabricate evidence. From this awareness of weakness the trier of fact can legitimately infer a consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant in regard to the main charge. [5] It must be emphasized, however, that fabrication of alibi cannot be relied upon by the state as affirmative proof of elements as to which it has the burden of proof. The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of burglary by evidence independent and separate from the evidence relating to fabrication of alibi. In accord with this result is a line of federal cases which have held that it was not prejudicial to join charges involving false exculpatory statements with other charges regarding which the allegedly false statements were made. [6] The danger of prejudice in the trial together of two such charges can be overcome by the giving of a proper cautionary instruction. This is illustrated by the recent case of United States v. Pacente. [7] In Pacente, a Chicago policeman was tried on two charges: making false declarations before a grand jury and extorting money from a liquor store owner. The Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit decided that the danger of prejudice could be overcome by the giving of a proper cautionary instruction. The approved instruction in Pacente reads as follows: `The indictment that I am going to refer to in a few moments is not evidence of the defendant's guilt, it is simply, as I told you before [presumably on voir dire], the manner by which the government accuses a person of a crime and you should not be prejudice[d] against a defendant because an indictment has been returned against him. . . . 'You are instructed to consider the testimony given by the defendant Pacente before the Grand Jury on February 22nd only as evidence under Count 2 of the indictment and you should not consider it as evidence on any other count in the indictment. . . .  'Now, there are two counts in this indictment, and, as I have told you, each one charges a separate crime. You should consider each one separately. The defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged in one count should not affect your verdict on the other count. . .' [8] In the instant case only the first part of this instruction was given. Pursuant to Wisconsin Jury Instructions Criminal, Part I, 145, the jury was instructed that an information was nothing more than a written, formal accusation, that it could not be considered as evidence against the defendant, and that it did not raise any inference of guilt. The jury was not clearly and unequivocally instructed that it could not use the evidence relating to making false statements to an officer to find the defendant guilty of the crime of burglary. Such a cautionary instruction must be given in clear and certain terms, because otherwise there is a strong likelihood that the jury will regard the evidence on the obstructing-an-officer count as sufficient in itself to find the defendant guilty of burglary. The particular instruction given in Pacente overlooks the previously discussed rule that evidence relating to fabrication of alibi, while only slightly probative, nevertheless still may be considered on the burglary charge to show consciousness of guilt. The point which must be made is that the jury must not employ such evidence as affirmative proof of elements of the crime of burglary, for which the state must introduce separate and independent evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.