Opinion ID: 197341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PIN, Phillips, and Pardilla

Text: We now turn to the issue of whether the district court properly granted summary judgment sua sponte for PIN, Phillips, and Pardilla. It is [clear] that district courts have the power to grant summary judgment sua sponte. Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 1996). Two conditions, however, circumscribe the district court's exercise of this power: first, discovery must be sufficiently advanced that the parties have enjoyed a reasonable opportunity to glean the material facts; second, the district court must give[] the targeted party appropriate notice and a chance to present its evidence on the essential elements of the claim or defense. Id.; see also Stella v. Tewksbury , 4 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1993); Jardines Bacata, Ltd. -62- 62 v. Diaz-Marquez, 878 F.2d 1555, 1560 (1st Cir. 1989). In this case, discovery had proceeded to the point that the parties understood the material facts. PIN filed its complaint and conducted the press conferences in September 1994. The district court did not make its sua sponte ruling until October 1995. By this time, the parties had compiled a voluminous record that included depositions of all of the parties involved in the press conference. As in Berkovitz, however, the district court never gave the [cross-Appellants] a meaningful opportunity to cull the best evidence supporting [their] position[s], and to present that evidence, together with developed legal argumentation , in opposition to the entry of summary judgment with respect PIN, Phillips, and Pardilla. Id. at 31. On the contrary, the district court's sua sponte ruling took these parties by surprise; only Marcello had moved for summary judgment and neither Schiavi nor the Palmer Defendants filed defamation claims against Marcello.32 32. Although Key Bank did have the opportunity to present its position with respect to Marcello, it did not in the case of PIN, Phillips, and Pardilla because none of these parties moved for summary judgment. Key Bank's argumentation may have differed little in response to summary judgment motions filed by PIN, Phillips, and Pardilla, given the similarity of the facts and circumstances relating to its claims against these parties. The nature of PIN, Phillips, and Pardilla's relationship to the conduct at issue as well as the defenses that these parties now assert in response to Key Bank's defamation claims, however, support Key Bank's argument that it would have responded differently to these parties had the district court afforded it an opportunity to do so. See -63- 63 We acknowledge that [t]his court from time to time has refused to permit appellants to take advantage of supposed ghts that had not been called to the district court's attention by way of a [timely] motion to reconsider. Id. (citing United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 570 n.9 (1st 1996); oversi Cir. Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 678 (1st Cir. 1995); VanHaaren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1993)). Like the appellant in Berkovitz , however, the Palmer Defendants timely filed a motion to reconsider. Although Key Bank and Schiavi did not follow suit, the considerations that govern the filing of a motion for reconsideration are very flexible. See Berkovitz, 89 F.3d at 31; United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1992). In any event, neither the cases that Berkovitz cites nor Rule 56 imposes an obligation on the subject of a sua sponte summary judgment ruling to move for reconsideration in order to preserve its claims on appeal. We therefore refrain from penalizing Key Bank and Schiavi for their purported oversight. Because the district court failed to afford the Stella, 4 F.3d at 56 (noting the special preparation necessary to defend a motion for summary judgment).Significantly, Key Bank did not present evidence, either in its written or in its oral defense to Marcello's summary judgment motion, concerning PIN, Phillips, or Pardilla. See Berkovitz, 89 F.3d at 31 n.8 (reasoning that plaintiff at issue in Berkovitz did not have an opportunity to put forth evidence relating to summary judgment motion). We thus include Key Bank in our disposition of the district court's sua sponte defamation rulings. -64- 64 cross-Appellants any opportunity to oppose its grant of summary judgment for PIN, Phillips, and Pardilla, we hold that this ruling cannot stand.