Opinion ID: 3017046
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of Corpus

Text: Delicti Jacobs’ final claim based on the corpus delicti rule is that the evidence of Holly’s murder (apart from his out-of-court admission) is insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the baby was killed by unlawful means. Jacobs asserts that Holly died from drowning under circumstances equally consistent with an accident as with a crime. (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 48). From this, Jacobs concludes that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime had been committed. The short answer to this argument is that the Commonwealth was not required to prove the corpus delicti of Holly’s murder because the closely related exception applies. Even if it did not apply, this argument lacks merit. The circumstances of Holly’s death are not equally consistent with an accident as with a crime. Indeed, Jacobs testified that Tammy killed Holly to get back at him, and that he killed Tammy when he lost control at finding his baby dead. No persuasive evidence was presented at trial to establish that 43 Holly’s death was anything but a homicide.18 For these reasons, we agree with the District Court that Jacobs’ claims based on the corpus delicti rule do not warrant federal habeas relief. C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Investigate and Present Evidence of Delois Jacobs’ Alcoholism At a preliminary hearing, Delois Jacobs testified that her son had admitted to her in telephone conversations that he killed both Tammy and Holly. At trial, however, Delois testified that she had been going through some problems and was very upset when Jacobs called her, and that she could not remember whether he admitted killing Holly. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, 9/16/92 at 543:20-545:3, 549:2-551:12). Jacobs now claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present evidence that Delois had a long history of alcoholism and may have been intoxicated when Jacobs made out-of-court admissions to her.19 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits because: (1) there was no evidence that Delois was 18 Common sense suggests that an infant of Holly’s age did not climb into the bathtub on her own and drown accidentally. 19 Jacobs exhausted this claim by presenting it in his PCRA petition and on PCRA appeal. 44 intoxicated at the time Jacobs confessed to her; and (2) trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he did not want to undermine the credibility of Delois’ trial testimony by crossexamining her regarding her alcoholism. Jacobs II, 727 A.2d at 549. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, counsel had a reasonable basis for proceeding as he did and thus was not ineffective. Id. The District Court likewise rejected this claim on the merits after concluding that counsel’s actions constituted sound trial strategy. Jacobs III, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 414. We agree that this claim lacks merit. Jacobs’ assertion is, at best, that his mother may have been under the influence of alcohol at the time he confessed to her. We find no evidence establishing that Delois was intoxicated or that intoxication caused her to misrepresent the content of her conversations with Jacobs. Counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he had spoken to Delois a couple of times before trial, and that she had never mentioned the possibility of intoxication. (PCRA Hearing Tr. 5/29/97 at 39:21-39:25). At the PCRA hearing, Delois testified that she did not remember whether she had been drinking alcohol the day Jacobs confessed to her. (PCRA Hearing Tr. 6/13/97 at 16:14-16:24). In other words, Jacobs has little factual support for his assertion of ineffective assistance in this regard. Additionally, Jacobs has failed to address how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to discover Delois’ alcoholism and potential intoxication. He does not explain how he can demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted of murdering Holly if counsel had attacked Delois’ credibility. Delois’ testimony at trial plainly favored Jacobs – if 45 counsel had attacked Delois’ credibility with evidence of alcoholism, the jury could well have discounted her entire testimony, including that portion of her testimony which was favorable to Jacobs. In short, Jacobs has fallen short of demonstrating that he is entitled to federal habeas relief as to this claim. The District Court properly rejected this claim on the merits. D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Request Voir Dire Concerning Racial Bias Jacobs is African-American; Tammy Mock was white. Each member of the venire panel was white. During voir dire, trial counsel did not question any prospective juror concerning racial bias. Jacobs claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during voir dire for failing to inquire about racial bias, especially where a young African-American man was on trial for murdering his white girlfriend. The District Court declined to consider this claim. According to the District Court, this claim challenged counsel’s representation at the penalty phase, not at the guilt phase. The District Court believed that it need not address the merits of this issue because the death sentence had been vacated on other grounds. Jacobs III, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 409-10. After reviewing Jacobs’ habeas petition and his reply memorandum in support filed in the District Court, we disagree 46 that this claim challenges only counsel’s representation at the penalty phase. This claim challenges counsel’s failure “to inquire concerning racial bias among the members of the jury, where the entire venire was white and the case involved the murder of a white female teenager and child by her AfricanAmerican boyfriend.” (Pet. at 26). In his reply memorandum, Jacobs alleges that “counsel ineffectively failed to inquire concerning racial bias among members of the jury.” (Reply Mem. at 47). The discussion of this claim is included within the discussion of several other of counsel’s alleged errors regarding voir dire. (Id. at 46-58). Jacobs concludes this discussion in the following manner: Counsel’s numerous failures to protect Mr. Jacobs’ right to be tried by an impartial jury that would decide his guilt or innocence and sentence based on the law and the facts rather than preconceived bias, prejudice, or statements made about the case outside the court created an “unacceptable risk of . . . prejudice infecting the capital sentencing proceeding,” Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. at 37, in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 58). To conclude that this claim challenges the death sentence, but not the underlying convictions, is unduly restrictive. We consider next whether this claim is exhausted and thus subject to federal habeas review. According to the Commonwealth, this claim is procedurally barred because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found it waived for failure to 47 present it to the PCRA court. (Appellees’ Br. at 36-37). The Commonwealth is correct that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to consider this claim on the merits after finding it waived for failure to present it to the PCRA court. Jacobs II, 727 A.2d at 548 n.5. The fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to consider this claim for procedural reasons does not necessarily render the issue procedurally barred on federal habeas review. A federal “habeas court ‘will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 325 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). We have previously explained that a rule is adequate 20 only under the following conditions: “(1) the state procedural rule speaks in unmistakable terms; (2) all state appellate courts refused to review the petitioner’s claims on the merits; and (3) the state courts’ refusal in this instance is consistent with other decisions.” Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683-84 (3d Cir.1996). In other words, a procedural rule is adequate only if it is “firmly established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed at the time of the purported default.” Szuchon, 273 F.3d at 327. Generally, Pennsylvania’s PCRA requires a petitioner to 20 There is no question that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of its waiver rule is independent from any federal question presented. 48 prove that his allegation of error has not been w aived. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9543(a)(3). An issue is deemed waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding. Id. § 9544(b). Currently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enforces the waiver rule in capital cases on PCRA appeal, and generally deems an issue waived where the petitioner failed to present it to the PCRA court. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (Pa. 1998). Prior to Albrecht, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the relaxed waiver doctrine in capital cases on PCRA appeal. Id. Under the relaxed waiver doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to apply ordinary waiver principles in capital cases in an effort to prevent the court “from being instrumental in an unconstitutional execution.” Id. On November 23, 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Albrecht expressly abandoned the relaxed waiver doctrine in capital cases on PCRA appeal. Id. The relevant question, then, is whether Pennsylvania’s strict enforcement of the waiver rule in capital cases on PCRA appeal was “firmly established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed at the time of the purported default.” Szuchon, 273 F.3d at 327. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Jacobs waived his claim challenging counsel’s failure to request voir dire regarding racial prejudice when he failed to present it to the PCRA court. See Jacobs II, 727 A.2d at 548 n.5. Jacobs initiated PCRA proceedings by filing a pro se petition on January 13, 1997, which appointed counsel supplemented on May 23, 1997. The PCRA court denied many of Jacobs’ claims 49 in an oral decision rendered May 29, 1997. The PCRA court then denied all relief in a second oral decision on June 13, 1997. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not firmly establish its strict enforcement of the waiver rule in such cases until November 23, 1998, when it decided Albrecht, more than a year after Jacobs’ PCRA petition was denied. It follows that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s strict enforcement of its waiver rule in capital cases on PCRA appeal is not adequate to support the judgment for the purpose of finding a procedural default under federal habeas law. See Szuchon, 273 F.3d at 327. Accordingly, we are free to examine the merits of Jacobs’ claim.21 “[A] capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.” Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1991). The defendant must specifically request such an inquiry. Id. at 37. “[T]he trial judge retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on” racial prejudice. Id. Here, the potential jurors were never questioned concerning racial bias because trial counsel did not request it. The specific issue, then, is whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request such voir dire. Under Strickland, a federal habeas court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 21 Because no state court has rendered a decision on the merits of this claim, we review it de novo. See Everett, 290 F.3d at 508. 50 466 U.S. at 689. The defendant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that “the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “When counsel focuses on some issues [and excludes] others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). This presumption “has particular force where a petitioner bases his ineffective-assistance claim solely on the trial record, creating a situation in which a court may have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive.” Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, if Jacobs’ counsel had requested voir dire respecting racial prejudice, the trial court would have been constitutionally bound to grant his request. See Turner, 476 U.S. at 36-37. Our review of the entire voir dire confirms that counsel did not ask any questions of any potential jurors regarding racial prejudice. Certainly nothing in the record suggests that Tammy Mock’s killing was racially motivated. Counsel reasonably could have believed that probing the jurors’ potential racial prejudices might unduly emphasize the racial differences, somehow inject racial issues into a trial where none existed, or taint the jurors’ view of Jacobs and his attorney. In other words, counsel reasonably could have concluded that asking prospective jurors questions about racial prejudice would do more harm than good. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we presume that counsel’s decision was sound trial strategy. Jacobs has failed to overcome this strong presumption. 51 He notes “continuing racial tensions in York” since the 2001 indictment of a former mayor for his alleged participation in the slaying of an African-American woman in 1969. (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 63 n.37). He does not describe the racial climate in York at the time of his trial in 1992, nor does he explain how the racial tensions in 2001 could have impacted his trial. Jacobs also asserts that his trial was racially sensitive because it involved an interracial sexual relationship between an African-American man and his white girlfriend. He suggests that counsel always has a duty to inquire into possible racial bias in a racially sensitive case. (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 64, 66). Whether Jacobs properly characterizes his trial as racially sensitive is subject to debate.22 Even if his trial were racially sensitive, Jacobs cites no federal authority for the proposition that the Constitution requires defense counsel to inquire into possible racial bias in each racially sensitive case.23 Moreover, 22 To the extent that Jacobs relies on Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 367 S.E.2d 176 (Va. Ct. App. 1988), for the proposition that his case was racially sensitive, we are not persuaded. Reynolds’ case was “replete with racial epithets” and “racially inflammatory evidence.” Id. at 182. Our scrutiny of the record here reveals no such evidence. 23 Jacobs cites Butler v. State, No. C.C.A. 1163, 1988 WL 63526 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 1988), holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to request voir dire regarding racial prejudice. We find nothing in Butler suggesting that the Constitution requires counsel to inquire about racial prejudice in 52 we decline to adopt a rule which would require counsel to inquire as to racial prejudice, even where he reasonably deemed such questioning a poor strategic choice. For these reasons, we conclude that Jacobs has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to inquire into possible racial bias on voir dire. Accordingly, his claim of ineffective assistance in this regard fails.