Opinion ID: 1133920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Diminished Capacity Mitigator

Text: Hertz alleges that the trial court did not give significant weight to his diminished capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct factor because trial counsel failed to present the testimony of Dr. Sesta as to brain dysfunction. [5] Specifically, Hertz asserts that had Dr. Sesta's findings of frontal lobe deficit been presented, the trial court and jury would have realized that the capacity of Hertz to control his behavior was substantially impaired as a result of this condition. Hertz points to Dr. Sesta's testimony at the competency hearing, wherein the doctor explained that the frontal lobe of the brain is what separates the behavior of a five year old from the behavior of a thirty year old. It essentially provides the breaks for human behavior. Hertz argues that the failure of counsel to bring out this powerful evidence during the penalty phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. In the sentencing order, the trial court found that the capacity of Hertz to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was a mitigating factor. With respect to the decision to afford the mental problems only some weight, the trial court explained: With respect to the defendant's mental status and his attention deficit disorder, the Court is reasonably convinced that the defendant has this disorder which has been so diagnosed but finds that his condition was adequately attended by medication. It is also noted that in two competency hearings, this Court as well as another circuit court in Florida have found the defendant was competent and have so ruled. The evidence does not support any finding or conclusion that the capacity of the defendant to conform his conduct to the requirements of law and to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired, accordingly, while entitled to some weight it was not entitled to moderate weight. As mentioned above, the weight to be given to the evidence is a trial court decision entitled to reasonable deference on appeal. See Arbelaez, 898 So.2d at 32. It is clear from the record that trial counsel presented during the penalty phase ample evidence of the mental health problems and history Hertz experienced. His mother and grandmother both testified that Hertz had been diagnosed as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Evidence was presented that his behavior improved markedly when he was taking the Ritalin the doctors prescribed but he was not consistently provided the medication. In addition to lay testimony, Rand also presented expert testimony from Dr. D'Errico. After personally examining Hertz and reviewing all of his records, both mental health and otherwise, Dr. D'Errico agreed that the ADHD diagnosis was correct. Dr. D'Errico also addressed cognitive testing that he performed which revealed a 39-point differential in performance and verbal IQ scores. In explaining the significance of this disparity, Dr. D'Errico was of the opinion that although this point differential would suggest to me that some brain damage had occurred . . . [a]fter a neuropsychological evaluation . . . it was apparent that the difference was due to developmental reasons . . . [because] he was raised in a home where spoken language was not used.  (Emphasis added.) The current assertion that the testimony of Dr. Sesta would have provided more compelling evidence as to the diminished capacity mitigator is refuted by the record. Although Dr. Sesta did testify during the competency hearing with regard to flagrant deficits in frontal [lobe] functions, he later elaborated that the 39-point IQ differential on which he based this conclusion represented a neurodeficit developmental disorder . . . consistent with in part with some of the defendant's upbringing in a nonverbal household, being raised by deaf parents, as well as the presence of other forms of psychiatric disorder, ADHD and learning disability. On cross-examination, Dr. Sesta testified that he found no indication of retardation, borderline intellectual functioning, or Axis I major mental illness. Dr. Sesta described Hertz as having a cognitive disorder not otherwise specified which iswhich described the functioning of his brain that we discussed earlier with his poor verbal skills versus intact visual skills and the frontal lobe deficits that he had. In the order denying rule 3.851 relief, the trial court stated: The record reflects that Dr. Sesta, a neuropsychologist, did not find brain damage. . . . He found no indication of neurological disease or trauma; no indication of retardation, or borderline intellectual functioning, or any major Axis I mental illness. . . . [H]e gave him a diagnosis of cognitive disorder not otherwise specified to describe the functioning of the defendant's brain with very poor verbal skills and frontal lobe deficits that he had found. His final analysis was that the defendant had a neurodeficient developmental disorder. He interpreted this as being consistent with in part some of his upbringing in a non-verbal household, being raised by deaf parents, as well as his ADHD and learning disability which indicated some brain dysfunction. However, even if the trial court's assessment of Dr. Sesta's final diagnosis is in dispute, trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to call Dr. Sesta as a witness at the penalty phase because he had a valid strategic reason for his decision. Rand testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that he did not call Dr. Sesta as a witness at the penalty phase based on his weakness during cross-examination at the competency hearing. In the order denying rule 3.851 relief, the trial court stated: After seeing what happened to Dr. Sesta on cross examination . . . [Rand] decided that the doctor was not a good witness and not that helpful. Among other things, Dr. Sesta testified as to possible frontal lobe damage on direct examination, then essentially backed off that testimony upon cross examination. Additionally, Dr. Sesta admitted on cross-examination that Hertz could certainly be faking his test results by performing well when he chose to do so. This Court has held that strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. Howell v. State, 877 So.2d 697, 703 (Fla.2004) (quoting Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000)). In the instant case, Rand made a strategic decision that he would not use Dr. Sesta as a witness at the penalty phase because Dr. Sesta had not been a good witness at the competency hearing. Rand was of the view that on cross-examination during the competency hearing, Dr. Sesta had retracted his conclusion that the IQ score differential indicated that Hertz had frontal lobe damage. Rand's decision is supported by the trial court's observation that Dr. Sesta did not find any brain damage. The poor performance of Dr. Sesta on cross-examination during the competency hearing and the trial court's conclusion that Dr. Sesta found no brain damage demonstrate that the decision to not use Dr. Sesta as a witness at trial was clearly within the broad range of reasonably competent performance contemplated by the Supreme Court in Strickland and does not undermine our confidence in the outcome of the proceedings below. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.