Opinion ID: 380054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: liability of the defendant unions

Text: 59 The district court found the International Union of Operating Engineers and the local union, Local 18, liable for the assault on John Shimman. The court premised liability against both the local and the international on two theories: (1) express authorization; 2) carelessness in the selection of agents. 60 Specifically, the court found culpability because of the conduct of John Possehl, who was a Vice-President of the International Union and also Business Manager of the local. The court found that Possehl was warned of Frank's threats and conduct, but failed to remove Frank or otherwise eliminate problems between him and the dissidents. In addition, the court stated that it had no doubt that both Local 18 and the International Union had determined that it would be necessary to use physical violence to beat the members of District Two into submission, and the named individual defendants (Frank, James Grothaus, Terry Grothaus) were the agents selected for the purpose. The district court's explanation of why the local and international unions should be liable is not very helpful. Instead of remanding for more specific analysis, however, we have carefully examined the record. 61 Unions, like corporations or other artificial entities, can act only through their agents. Under general principles of agency, a union can be liable if its officers and agents actively participate in unlawful conduct. Morrissey v. National Maritime Unions of America, 544 F.2d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1976) (Landrum-Griffin Act); Riverside Coal Co. v. U.M.W., 410 F.2d 267, 270-72 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed.2d 95 (1969) (Taft-Hartley Act). Most such situations arise in the case of an illegal strike. Whether the union is liable for damages resulting from an illegal strike depends on the conduct of its officials in differing fact situations. See Koehring Co. v. United Steelworkers, 616 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1980); Buckeye Power, Inc. v. Utility Workers Union of America, 607 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1979); Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. U.M.W., 551 F.2d 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876, 98 S.Ct. 227, 54 L.Ed.2d 155; Riverton Coal Co. v. U.M.W., 453 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 915, 92 S.Ct. 2439, 32 L.Ed.2d 690 (1972). 62 The rule of law remains, however, that a union may only be held responsible for the authorized or ratified actions of its officers and agents. North American Coal Co. v. U.M.W., 497 F.2d 459, 466-67 (6th Cir. 1974) (citing cases). 63 This same rule of law applies in situations where both a local and an international union are sued. The fact that an officer of the local union may have transgressed does not mean that the International is liable. 25 The Supreme Court first outlined this principle in United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 395, 42 S.Ct. 570, 577-578, 66 L.Ed. 975 (1921) opinion after remand, 268 U.S. 295, 45 S.Ct. 551, 69 L.Ed. 963 (1923) when discussing the liability of the parent United Mine Worker's Union for strike-related violence at the local level: 64 A corporation is responsible for the wrongs committed by its agents in the course of its business, and this principle is enforced against the contention that torts are ultra vires of the corporation. But it must be shown that it is in the business of the corporation. Surely no stricter rule can be enforced against an unincorporated organization like this. Here it is not a question of contract, or of holding out an appearance of authority on which some third person acts. It is a mere question of actual agency, which the constitutions of the two bodies settle conclusively. If the International body had interfered or if it had assumed liability by ratification, different questions would have arisen. 65 Plaintiff contends that the Coronado rule applies only in strike situations and evinces a higher standard for liability than would ordinarily apply. Plaintiff argues that this higher standard is the one codified in § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 26 applicable in labor-strike situations only. Plaintiff is wrong, Coronado simply states the common law agency rule of respondeat superior, as applied to a labor union generally. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 100 S.Ct. 410, 62 L.Ed.2d 394 (1979) demonstrates this. There, the Court found no basis for holding an international union liable for a strike not authorized, participated in, or ratified by it. Id. at 414. The Court made clear that this standard was that of common law agency, as codified by Congress in § 301(e), 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) id. The Court also made clear that this was the standard originally used in Coronado. 27 66 The question which remains, then, is whether either Local 18 or the parent International Union of Operating Engineers could be liable under the above agency standard for the beating of John Shimman.
67 We see ample evidence in the record supporting a finding of liability against Local 18. The conduct of John Frank and John Possehl is the basis for this liability. Frank, of course, was the appointed head of district two as well as Vice-President of the local. Possehl was the Business Manager of the local. 68 Much of the evidence in the record regarding John Frank's conduct has already been outlined above. There is more. Ervin Shimman testified that he had a lengthy telephone conversation with John Frank on October 14, 1971. Ervin Shimman testified that during this conversation Frank made numerous threats, including if you don't go along with me, you are my enemy , and I destroy all my enemies. Frank also stated: I am the hatchetman from Cleveland. I come here to chop heads and you are one of the heads I am going to chop. 69 The next day, Ervin Shimman spoke with John Possehl and informed him of John Frank's threats. Possehl did intercede with Frank and arranged for Ervin Shimman to get a job referral to which he was clearly entitled. At about this time, John Frank was denying work assignments to Glenn Oberle and Walter Shimman. 28 Walter Shimman complained to John Possehl about this, but received no satisfaction. Walter Shimman testified that he outlined Frank's conduct to John Possehl and requested Possehl to remove Frank from the district before there was trouble. Possehl's response was no, I sent him here for a job and he is going to do it. I know there is trouble in this district and I know it is in the office. 29 On September 16, 1971, Glenn Oberle wrote to John Possehl, also outlining John Frank's conduct. Possehl sent back a non-committal letter but apparently took no action. The testimony regarding John Possehl is unrefuted. 30 70 The plaintiff argues, and the district court apparently found, that Possehl sent Frank to suppress the long-time dissidents in District Two. It is clear that Possehl failed to act when informed of John Frank's abusive conduct. 31 Although there is no direct evidence in the record of open antagonism between Possehl and the dissidents, it is obvious that their interests were opposed. Possehl, as Business Manager of Local 18, was a key official opposed by the dissidents. Indeed, they ran candidates against him. Possehl essentially did nothing when he received notice of John Frank's illegal and highhanded conduct. Possehl at the very least had an obligation to see to it that his subordinate, John Frank, did not flout the law. 71 The conduct of Frank and Possehl, in our opinion, justifies finding Local 18 liable. Frank was the district representative who ran District Two on behalf of Local 18. His long-term anti-dissident conduct was within the scope of his authority. Frank's conduct in instigating the beating of John Shimman is imputable to the local union. The local's liability also stems from Business Manager John Possehl's inaction despite continuing anti-dissident conduct by John Frank. 32
72 While we affirm the finding of liability against the local union, we see no basis for the district court's finding of liability against the International. Throughout its opinion, the district court referred to both unions as if though they were one and the same. They are not. 73 The International Union is a separate body from the local. The acts of the local and its agents cannot automatically be imputed to the International. This is clear from the International Union of Operating Engineers' Constitution which defines the relationship between the International and its affiliated locals. Under the constitution, local unions govern themselves and transact business on their own behalf. 33 Local unions can call strikes on their own, except when a collective bargaining agreement is in existence or when the local union desires the International's help with strike benefits. 34 Local unions elect their own officers, pass their own by-laws, transact business and discipline members. 74 Plaintiff argues that the local is an agent of the International because of the International's retention of substantial regulatory and supervisory powers. 35 This ignores the local's substantial autonomy in handling its own affairs. The local is simply not an arm of the International for all purposes. 36 75 The dispute over which this case is about was a local matter. The record shows that dissident activities were directed to correct certain abuses of power by local union leaders, notably at the district level. According to the dissidents, the local union leadership did whatever it could to keep itself in power and reward its friends. The International Constitution left the running of day to day local affairs to locally elected union representatives (such as John Possehl) and their appointees (such as John Frank). The wrongful conduct of these local union leaders cannot be imputed to the International, absent proof of actual International participation or ratification. Any other holding would render the International Union of Operating Engineers liable for any misconduct of locally elected union officials. We decline to so expand union liability concepts. 37 Under some circumstances, a local union's officers or agents can be deemed to act on behalf of the International. We do not see how this can be true when dealing with a local controversy between locally elected union officials and a minority of the local membership. 76 In the alternative, plaintiff argues that John Possehl's conduct must be deemed to be that of the International. This is because Possehl was one of eleven general Vice-Presidents of the International, in addition to being Business Manager of the local. We do not agree. It is clear that any wrongful conduct by John Possehl was done in his capacity as Business Manager of Local 18. The fact that he was also an International Vice-President is, on these facts, irrelevant. It is an established principle of agency law that if an agent serves two masters, his conduct may be on behalf of one, the other, neither, or both masters, depending on the facts. 77 In this case, the fact that John Possehl was an International Vice-President was a coincidence. It was in his capacity as elected Business Manager of Local 18 that Possehl appointed John Frank to run District Two. The only reason why the dissidents had any dealings with Possehl at all was because Possehl was the business manager of the Local. In fact, dissident correspondence to Possehl always addressed him in his capacity as Business Manager and not as an International Vice-President. There is simply no evidence that anything Possehl did or did not do vis-a-vis the dissidents was done on behalf of the International. 78 Aside from John Possehl, there exists no connection between the International and the beating of John Shimman. John Frank was not an officer or employee of the International, nor was there any evidence that he ever acted on behalf of the International. The same thing is true of James and Terry Grothaus. Nor is there any evidence that the International ratified the beating or any of John Frank's anti-dissident activities. Under the International Constitution, only the general president or the general executive board could do that. Simply stated, there is no proof that anyone acting on behalf of the International in any way encouraged, participated in or ratified the beating of John Frank. 79 Plaintiff makes one final argument. He claims that the International was under a duty to oversee and correct the anti-dissident abuses which were going on within Local 18. He finds this duty in the Landrum-Griffin Act, 38 in the common law, 39 and in the International's Constitution. 40 Once again, plaintiff points his finger at John Possehl and accuses him of breaching these duties in his capacity as an International Vice-President. 80 We reject this argument. It is an attempt to find an international union vicariously liable for mere inaction on the part of its officers. 41 In the collective bargaining area, Congress favors arbitration and conciliation. Congress does not favor strikes which breach collective bargaining agreements. Yet, even if an illegal strike takes place, an international union is not liable if it fails to take steps to end the strike, so long as the union does not authorize, encourage or ratify the strike. Carbon Fuel Co., supra; North America Coal Co., supra. We think that the same law should apply here. An international union which does not authorize, encourage or ratify § 101 violations should not be held liable for them. Otherwise, International Unions could be destroyed by liability findings based on a hindsight analysis of what they should have done. Like the Supreme Court in Carbon Fuel Co., we will not imply an obligation to act from alleged general duties.