Opinion ID: 1180281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: effect of the partial summary judgment

Text: Before discussing the separate issues presented by the appellants for resolution, a procedural question raised at oral argument must be answered. Viani's amended complaint [1] was duly answered by each of the insurers. Additionally, Allstate cross-complained against Aetna for its costs of investigation and defense of Bowles. Thereafter various affidavits [2] and a deposition, plus exhibits consisting of the three policies, related correspondence, along with the pleadings and jury instructions of the Viani v. Bowles trial were submitted. The case was discussed at a pre-trial conference where the parties agreed that certain of the issues could be treated as having been submitted to the court on motions for summary judgment. They also stipulated that the portion of Viani's trial memorandum or brief describing Viani's agreement with Bowles could be considered by the court as the facts related to the alleged employer-employee relationship (discussed infra ). The district court entered an order for partial summary judgment which rejected certain defenses that the insurance companies raised against Viani, [3] and essentially decided that each insurance company was separately liable to Viani on its policy. The partial summary judgment order left for resolution at trial the issue of the conflicting other insurance clauses contained in each policy, the question of which company was to pay for the defense of Bowles, and the apportioning of payment of Viani's judgment and attorney fees among the insurers. As it turned out the actual trial of these remaining issues was abbreviated; the court received evidence limited to attorney fees of Viani and the insurers. The question has been raised whether those issues resolved by the order for partial summary judgment are subject to review here in that none of the appellants appealed from that order but rather appealed only from the final judgment. The partial summary judgment order entered by the district court is in effect a pre-trial order resolving, for purposes of the case, those questions about which there was no factual dispute and noting what specific issues remained for trial. This order remained subject to subsequent revision by the court and thus is an interlocutory order. I.R.C.P. 56(c) provides that [a] summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. In the present action there remained after the entry of the partial summary judgment the question of the amount of attorney fees due plaintiff as well as the question whether each of the three insurers would be liable to some extent in light of the other insurance clauses. Thus from the standpoint of plaintiff all his requested relief had not been disposed of by the court and the summary judgment was not a final judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(b); Gerry v. Johnston, 85 Idaho 226, 378 P.2d 198 (1963); Clear v. Marvin, 83 Idaho 399, 363 P.2d 355 (1961); 6 Moore's Fed.Practice §§ 56.20-56.21. I.R.C.P. 54(b) is also in another way controlling, as there was a cross-claim by Allstate against Aetna. In such a case, in order to make a particular decision a final judgment, the district court must expressly determine there is no just reason for delay and expressly direct entry of judgment. Absent such determination, as is the case here, the order for partial summary judgment shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims. The relationship of I.R.C.P. 54(a) and I.C. §§ 13-201 and 13-219 also must be noted. Rule 54(a) defines judgment as including a decree and any order from which an appeal lies; what is appealable is governed specifically by statute. I.C. § 13-201 defines a judgment as appealable if it is a final judgment in an action or special proceeding commenced in a district court. A judgment in this sense means a final determination of the rights of the parties. I.C.R. § 10-701. I.C. § 13-219 makes clear what this Court may review by stating that appealable decisions and orders from which an appeal is not taken cannot be reviewed. As the partial summary judgment was not appealable it constitutes an intermediate order or decision affecting the final judgment and may therefore be reviewed under I.C. § 13-219. See Maple v. Williams, 15 Idaho 642, 98 P. 848 (1908).