Opinion ID: 662459
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Text and Structure

Text: 1. 32 On its face, section 1367 appears to make at least two changes to the Gibbs standard. First, although it retains the basic division between power and discretion, the structure of 1367 reveals a different emphasis. Gibbs stressed that courts have discretion to exercise the power conferred upon them under Article III to hear pendent state law claims. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. Section 1367(a), however, appears to make supplemental jurisdiction mandatory by its language that the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1367(a) (West 1993) (emphasis added). Under the statute, if power is conferred under section 1367(a), and not prohibited by section 1367(b), 4 the district courts exercise discretion only in deciding whether to decline that jurisdiction under one of the four criteria specifically enumerated in Sec. 1367(c). These are: 33
34 (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 35 (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or 36 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 37 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1367(c) (West 1993). 38 We agree with a number of courts that have found this structural difference evinces an intent on the part of Congress to create a presumption that, if power exists under section 1367(a) and is not stripped by section 1367(b), supplemental jurisdiction must be asserted by a district court unless a factor specifically listed in section 1367(c) applies. See, e.g., Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1285 n. 14 (3d Cir.1993) (The language in Sec. 1367 expressly ... states that ... federal courts shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent claims arising out of the same case or controversy and may decline to exercise jurisdiction [as provided by Sec. 1367(c) ]. (emphasis in original)); 5 LaSorella v. Penrose Saint Francis Healthcare Sys., 818 F.Supp. 1413, 1415-16 (D.Colo.1993); Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 794 F.Supp. 1179, 1184 (D.N.H.1992) ([If] the court finds that it has the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims [it must exercise that jurisdiction] subject only to the narrow circumstances detailed by Congress.); Cedillo v. Valcar Enters. & Darling Delaware Co., 773 F.Supp. 932, 939 (N.D.Tex.1991) (If the claim is within the court's supplemental jurisdiction, the court must exercise such jurisdiction unless one of the four categorical exceptions in Sec. 1367(c) is satisfied. (emphasis added)); cf. Picard v. Bay Area Regional Transit Dist., 823 F.Supp. 1519, 1523 (N.D.Cal.1993) (conducting the two step analysis prescribed by the statute's structure). We further note that this is the view accepted by most commentators. See, e.g., 13B Wright & Miller, supra, Sec. 3567.3, at 39 (Supp.1992) (The circumstances in which a court may exercise discretion to refuse to hear a case within its supplemental jurisdiction are quite strictly defined.); John B. Oakley, Recent Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 735, 766-67 (1991) (By the juxtaposition of section 1367(a) and 1367(c) Congress appears to have created a strong presumption in favor of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.); David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1367 comment, at 235-36 (West 1993). 39 Moreover, at least one of the discretionary factors provided in the statue for declining supplemental jurisdiction is narrower than its Gibbs counterpart. Although Gibbs, as discussed above, was interpreted as permitting a district court to decline or exercise jurisdiction over pendent state law claims when to do so would be consistent with the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the catch-all provided in section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction only when in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1367(c)(4) (West 1993) (emphasis added). As a result, most commentators, and the few courts that have considered the question, have concluded that section 1367(c)(4) is narrower than the Gibbs catch-all. See, e.g., LaSorella, 818 F.Supp. at 1415-17; Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute--A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 Ariz.St.L.J. 849, 977 & n. 619 (1992); Arthur D. Wolf, Codification of Supplemental Jurisdiction: Anatomy of a Legislative Proposal, 14 W.New Eng.L.Rev. 1, 25 (1993); see also Picard, 823 F.Supp. at 1527 (interpreting section 1367(c)(4) as requiring sufficiently compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction but not citing Gibbs in conducting this analysis); Lent v. Mills, 1991 WL 239944, at  6- 7, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 16512, at  20- 21 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1991) (same); cf. Cedillo, 773 F.Supp. at 942 (suggesting that the section 1367(c) factors are narrower than Gibbs ); Rosen v. Chang, 758 F.Supp. 799, 803 n. 6 (D.R.I.1991) (noting that [o]n its face, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c) seems to indicate that a court should decline jurisdiction ... only in unusual circumstances). 6 2. 40 Other courts have come to a different conclusion. For instance, the Seventh Circuit has concluded that the new statute [was] intended to codify rather than to alter the judge-made principle[ ] of pendent ... jurisdiction. Brazinski v. AMOCO Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir.1993) (emphasis added); see also Palmer v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc., 1993 WL 390053, at  1- 5, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 14069, at  4- 12 (D.Kan. Sep. 27, 1993) (stating that [s]ection 1367(c) codifies the discretionary basis [identified in Gibbs ] for declining pendent jurisdiction and interpreting section 1367(c)(4) by reference to the Gibbs catch-all); cf. Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.2d 1087, 1097 n. 10 (5th Cir.1992) (It is unclear whether [section 1367] merely codifies the pendent jurisdiction doctrine or actually changes the doctrine in some fashion.); Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 828 F.Supp. 1018, 1027 n. 7 (W.D.N.Y.1993) (noting that the statute providing for supplemental jurisdiction essentially codified existing caselaw on the subject of pendent jurisdiction (alternations and internal quotations omitted)). Thus, it is necessary to examine the legislative history to determine if congressional intent is clearly expressed. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1001, 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990); Mount Graham Red Squirrel, 954 F.2d at 1452. 41