Opinion ID: 1679447
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: city investigation

Text: Froshour was interviewed several times by the City's Internal Affairs Division. The first interview was the day after Fike's arrest and was conducted by Sergeant J.L. Covington. When asked by Covington if he had struck Fike, Froshour denied it. In his testimony Froshour explained this answer by stating that he thought Covington meant had he hit Fike with his fist or a club, and his slapping Fike with his open hand (holding papers) did not register with him. A second interview was conducted on November 6, 1985, at approximately 8:24 a.m. by Sergeant Covington, primarily to inform Froshour that he might need to submit to a polygraph examination. A polygraph examination was subsequently conducted by William B. Inman, Jr., around 11:00 that morning. On the afternoon of the next day, Froshour was interviewed by Chief of Police L.C. Smith concerning discrepancies between the initial interview with Sergeant Covington and statements made to the polygraph examiner. Froshour was then immediately sent to Sergeant Covington to explain the discrepancies. During this interview when asked if he had lied on the polygraph, Froshour refused to answer. Subsequently the chief of police was called to order an answer from Froshour. Based on Froshour's continued refusal, the chief suspended him. Froshour was later sent a letter of intent to dismiss and offered a pre-termination hearing. On November 25, 1985, Froshour was terminated and given notice that he had a right to appeal to the Commission within ten days. Froshour did appeal to the Commission which held a hearing on January 30, 1986, before Gene A. Wilkinson, chairman, William K. Dease and Jacqueline Povall. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission took the matter under advisement. An opinion was subsequently rendered on February 13, 1986. The Commission's order first noted that Froshour's termination letter notified him that: the police department had found his and Fike's statements conflicted and that his answers were evasive; both parties submitted to a polygraph examination; and that Froshour had admitted to lying to the polygraph examiner, but refused to answer which questions he had lied about, and even after he received an order of the chief of police to answer the question. This constituted insubordination. Froshour was also notified that he was not truthful when he told Internal Affairs that he did not strike Fike; that he in fact kneed and struck Fike more than once. The letter went on to note that Froshour's file contained more complaints than any other officer of the police department, and of nineteen complaints against him, eleven had been for brutality. The letter further noted that Froshour had admitted to popping Fike more than once, pulling his hair, and kneeing him, all while he was handcuffed. The letter concluded that Froshour's insubordination, refusal to cooperate in the investigation, brutality and dishonesty would no longer be tolerated. The Commission order further found that Froshour physically assaulted Fike when the latter was handcuffed, that bruises had been noted on Fike's wrists, trunk, abdomen and back, and that Fike had a swollen lower lip with a cut on the inside. The order further noted that while Froshour at the hearing had denied striking Fike other than with the back of his hand, he had admitted to the polygraph examination that he had struck Fike in the stomach with his knee, and rabbit punched him several times in the back and stomach. The order then contained the following sentence: Moreover, given the circumstances immediately leading up to his arrest, there is no indication of any motivation for Mr. Fike to lodge an unfounded complaint against Officer Froshour or resist arrest. The order found that the police department's decision to discharge Froshour was supported by the facts. The Commission rejected Froshour's contention that the police department's requirement that he submit to a polygraph violated his constitution rights, but found in any event that his admission to the polygraph examiner was made prior to the examination. The Commission did not rule on Froshour's contention that his Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by the police department's using the polygraph results in terminating his employment, because the Commission found there was no evidence the department had used the examination's results in deciding to terminate him. The Commission found, moreover, that there was substantial evidence supporting the department's decision regardless of the polygraph results. The order concluded: IT IS THEREFORE, the opinion of this Commission that the City of Jackson has convincing evidence to support the dismissal of Officer Froshour and that he was not dismissed for political or religious reasons. The Commission therefore affirms the findings of the appointing authority of the City of Jackson. Froshour appealed to the circuit court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, claiming: 1. The verdict of the commission was manifestly wrong, or that the city had filed to establish its case by conclusive evidence. 2. That the city had violated his constitutional rights by threatening to discharge him if he refused to execute a waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights preliminary to taking a polygraph examination. 3. That his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights had been violated. The circuit judge on September 29, 1986, by a memorandum opinion reversed the Commission's order, and a judgment directed that Froshour be reinstated was entered October 8, 1986. The circuit judge's opinion quoted the above sentence from the Commission that Fike had no motivation to lodge an unfounded charge, and found: This finding is erroneous. By even a cursory review, the record is replete with evidence that Fike was untruthful and that he had a propensity to be violent; certainly a mere indication of such motivation exists within the record. It is well-established that the Commission may consider and then reject the controverted evidence offered by Froshour, but for the Commission to make a finding that evidence does not exist within the record when, in fact, such evidence does exist is a blatant failure to the Commission to provide a good faith review The circuit judge's opinion further stated: The Commission's Order further states: Evidence presented at the hearing convincingly indicates that the police department's decision to dismiss Officer Froshour was supported by the facts and leaves us with no alternative but to affirm the City's decision. There is no indication by the Commission's Order as to what the additional facts are which compelled it to affirm Froshour's dismissal. The City in turn has appealed the circuit court judgment directing that Froshour be reinstated.