Opinion ID: 108586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Government urges:

Text: The essential charge of the indictment and the theory on which the case was tried was that the [Pipefitters] Fund, although formally set up as an entity independent of Local 562, was in fact a union fund, controlled by the union, contributions to which were assessed by the union as part of its dues structure, collected from non-members in lieu of dues, and expended, when deemed necessary, for union purposes and the personal use of the directors of the Fund. Brief for the United States 23 (emphasis added). See also Brief for the United States in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari 11-12. [45] This was indeed, as we shall shortly see, the theory on which the indictment was drawn, the jury was instructed, and petitioners' convictions were affirmed. It is also the construction of § 610 that we have rejected in favor of the Government's narrower construction that the prerequisite for a permissible political fund is simply that it not be financed by actual or effective dues or assessments. See supra, at 413-414. On the other hand, we find that the indictment may be read to allege not only that the Pipefitters fund was a union fund, controlled by the union, but that contributions to [it] were assessed by the union as part of its dues structure, [and were] collected from non-members in lieu of dues . . . . For reasons that follow, however, we do not now construe the indictment as making this essential allegation, but leave that question open for determination on remand. We hold now only that the jury instructions failed to require proof of the essential element for conviction, and hence reverse the judgment below. First. Petitioners moved before trial to dismiss the indictment on the following ground, App. 28: The gist of the indictment is to allege that Section 610 . . . prohibits labor unions from forming parallel political organizations which receive voluntary contributions from the members of the union to be contributed and expended in Federal elections. Congress intended such political organizations to be legally authorized. Thus, the indictment fails to state an offense . . . . Petitioners also moved for a bill of particulars, id., at 30: whether it is the government's position and theory of the case that the mere fact that the [Pipefitters fund] was established, maintained, and administered by members, officers, employees, agents, foremen and shop [stewards] of Local 562 is, in and of itself, sufficient to make said Fund, under the law, a Fund of Local 562[;] . . . whether or not it is the government's position that Section 610 . . . prohibits the members, officers, employees, agents, foremen and shop [stewards] of a union from establishing any political organization or fund for the purpose of making contributions and expenditures in connection with [federal] elections . . . [;] . . . whether it is the government's position and theory of the case that the alleged `regular and systematic collection, receipt, and expenditures of money obtained from working members of Local 562 and from working members of other labor organizations employed under jurisdiction of the defendant Local 562' were voluntary or involuntary collections and contributions. [46] In a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, the Government acknowledged petitioners' argument that the indictment is defective in that it does not allege that the funds involved were not voluntary and took the position that [p]roof of the offense charged here does not depend upon whether the funds were volunteered or not by union members. The issue is whether these funds were the general funds of Local 562, id., at 56, which the indictment, in the Government's view, impliedly charged in alleging that petitioners  `unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did conspire and agree with each other . . . to violate Section 610 . . . .'  Id., at 54. The trial court overruled each of petitioners' motions without opinion. On appeal the Court of Appeals adopted the Government's theory of the case. First, it ruled that by implication [t]he gist of the government's claim as reflected by the indictment is that the money in the fund is in truth and in fact money belonging to Local 562. 434 F. 2d, at 1120. [47] The court then held, ibid.: The failure of the indictment to allege that the payments to the fund were involuntary is not fatal. . . . If [the allegation that the money in the fund is in fact Union money] is established by the evidence, the issue of whether the payment to the fund is voluntary or involuntary is not controlling. Of course as observed by the [trial] court in its instructions, the issue of whether the payments to the fund were voluntary is relevant and material on the issue of whether the fund is the property of Local 562. Other considerations such as the intention of the donors as to ownership and control of the fund also bear upon the issue. This account of the proceedings below indicates that the question of the voluntariness of the contributions to the Pipefitters fund was regarded both at trial and on appeal as a matter relating to, but not essential for the basic charge of the indictment that Local 562 concealed political contributions of Union monies through the subterfuge of a Union-controlled fund. This theory, of course, flies in the face of the legislative history of § 610. The impressive lesson of that history in this regard is that the political contributions in issue violated § 610 if, and only if, payments to the fund were actually or effectively required for employment or union membership. In other words, the essence of the crime in this respect is whether the method of solicitation for the fund was calculated to result in knowing free-choice donations. Whether the fund was otherwise controlled by the Union is immaterial. We think, nevertheless, that the indictment may be read, consistently with the proper interpretation of § 610, to allege that the contributions to the Pipefitters fund derived from effective dues or assessments. [48] But whether the indictment should now be construed in light of the proceedings below to make this allegation is an altogether different question. [49] Since this precise question was not addressed below and has not been briefed or argued before us and since the case must, in any event, be remanded, whereupon the issue may become moot, [50] we do not now undertake to decide it. Instead, in the event that the Government chooses to proceed with the indictment before us, petitioners shall have leave to renew their motion to dismiss. Second. The jury instructions embody an interpretation of § 610 that is plainly erroneous. The trial court refused requests by petitioners for instructions that the jury should acquit if it found that contributions to the Pipefitters fund were made voluntarily. [51] Adopting a contrary view, the court instructed the jury, over petitioners' objections, that it should return verdicts of guilty if the fund was in fact a union fund, . . . the money therein was union money, and . . . the real contributor to the candidates was the union. In determining whether the Pipefitters Voluntary Fund was a bona fide fund, separate and distinct from the union or a mere artifice or device, the jury was further instructed to take into consideration all the facts and circumstances in evidence, and in such consideration . . . [to] consider 19 factors, several of which related to the regularity, rate, method of collection, and segregation from Union monies of payments to the fund. Others concerned the kinds of expenditures the fund made and the Union's control over them. Still others involved whether the payments to the fund were made voluntarily. In the latter regard the court charged (emphasis added): A great deal of evidence has been introduced on the question of whether the payments into the Pipefitters Voluntary . . . Fund by members of Local 562 and others working under its jurisdiction were voluntary or involuntary. This evidence is relevant for your consideration, along with all other facts and circumstances in evidence, in determining whether the fund is a union fund. However, the mere fact that the payments into the fund may have been made voluntarily by some or even all of the contributors thereto does not, of itself, mean that the money so paid into the fund was not union money.  See n. 9, supra. On appeal the Court of Appeals did not address the validity of these instructions other than to agree with the trial judge that the issue of whether the payments to the fund were voluntary is relevant and material [but not determinative] on the issue of whether the fund is the property of Local 562. Supra, at 438. The instructions, as the Court of Appeals confirmed, clearly permitted the jury to convict without finding that donations to the Pipefitters fund had been actual or effective dues or assessments. This was plain error. [52] The judgment of the Court of Appeals as to petitioners Callanan and Lawler is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the indictment against them. See n. 11, supra. The judgment of the Court of Appeals as to petitioners Local 562 and Seaton is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court for proceedings as to them consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.