Opinion ID: 8053535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relatedness

Text: Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to sever the pending charges. He requested three trials: one for the charges involving only A.A., one for the charges involving only C.A., and one for the charges stemming from the incident in September 2002 during which the defendant assaulted A.A. and forced the children to engage in sexual acts with each other. The defendant argued that the offenses underlying the three sets of charges were “unrelated,” so he was entitled to severance as a matter of right under State v. Ramos, 149 N.H. 118 (2003). In Ramos, we adopted the ABA standards for joinder and severance of criminal offenses, holding that “any two or more offenses committed by the same defendant may be joined for trial, upon the application of the prosecuting attorney or the defense.” Id. at 128. We further explained, however, that: Whenever two or more unrelated offenses have been joined for trial, the prosecuting attorney or the defendant shall have a right to severance of them. “Unrelated” offenses are those that are not “related.” “Related” offenses are those that are based upon the same conduct, upon a single criminal episode, or upon a common plan. Id. (citations omitted). The State argued below that all charges should be joined for trial as all charged offenses were based upon a “common plan.” At that time, we had not defined “common plan” for purposes of the relatedness test. At the urging of the State, the trial court relied upon case law from Vermont, see State v. LaBounty, 716 A.2d 1 (Vt. 1998); State v. Johnson, 612 A.2d 1114 (Vt. 1992), to find all charges “related” because, like the facts underlying the Vermont cases, the defendant assaulted the children in the same manner, at the same location, and used his position of authority to effectuate the assaults. Subsequent to the defendant’s conviction, we adopted, for the purposes of the relatedness test, the definition of “common plan” under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b). State v. McIntyre, 151 N.H. at 466-67. We stated: The distinguishing characteristic of a common plan under Rule 404(b) is the existence of a true plan in the defendant’s mind which includes the charged crimes as stages in the plan’s execution. That a sequence of acts resembles a design when examined in retrospect is not enough; the prior conduct must be intertwined with what follows, such that the charged acts are mutually dependent. Id. at 467 (citations omitted). In McIntyre, we held that the trial court properly joined a felonious sexual assault charge with three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Id. at 468. The victim, who was eleven at the time of the assaults, had testified that the defendant had touched her breast twice over her objection. Id. at 466. Shortly thereafter, the defendant had touched the victim on her bare leg during a car trip. Id. One or two weeks later, the defendant had entered the room where the victim was sleeping, partially disrobed her, digitally penetrated her, performed cunnilingus on her, and forced her to perform fellatio on him. Id. We held that it was reasonable to conclude that the acts were mutually dependent, because the occurrence of the final assaults hinged upon the success of the earlier incidents. Id. at 467. We concluded that the charged offenses illustrated “a clear progression in the level of abuse, allowing a reasonable person to make an objective finding of a common plan.” Id. at 468. In adopting the Rule 404(b) definition of “common plan,” we relied primarily upon State v. Castine, 141 N.H. 300 (1996). McIntyre, 151 N.H. at 146-48. In Castine, we held that the trial court properly admitted testimony of prior uncharged assaults on the victim under the “plan” exception to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b). Castine, 141 N.H. at 303-04. The victim had testified at trial that, prior to the charged acts for felonious sexual assault and aggravated felonious sexual assault, the defendant began showing her pictures in pornographic magazines, and eventually began to take her hand and have her fondle his penis while showing her the pictures. Id. at 302. The defendant proceeded over time to show the victim pornographic movies. Id. The victim testified that the pornographic material amounted to a “how-to-guide” for an escalating series of assaults that culminated with weekly demands for fellatio. Id. at 303. We held that the challenged testimony described a series of interdependent acts, which, along with the charged acts, were “part of a calculated design by the defendant to ‘groom’ the victim.” Id. As such, we held that the trial court properly admitted the testimony under the “plan” exception to Rule 404(b). Id. The State concedes that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in determining relatedness, as the trial court did not have the benefit of our opinion in McIntyre. It argues, however, that the trial court, nevertheless, reached the correct result as the charges were related as a common plan under the standard set forth in McIntyre. Specifically, the State argues that the defendant possessed a plan to force the children to engage in sexual acts with each other for his gratification. It furthers argues that the September 2002 incident, in which the defendant coerced the children into engaging in sexual acts with each other, was the result of years of effort on his part. The defendant does not rebut these arguments, nor does he attempt to distinguish the instant facts from those in McIntyre or Castine. Instead, he argues that there was no showing of a “common plan” as the assaults on A.A. did not depend upon the success of the assaults on C.A., or vice versa, and only two child endangerment charges, arising from the September 2002 incident, involved allegations by both victims. We agree with the State, in part, that certain charges were “related” as stages in the execution of a common plan, and, thus, properly joined for trial. Soon after the family moved to Concord in November 2000, the defendant assaulted A.A., subjecting her to sexual intercourse and digital penetration, and forcing her to perform fellatio. The defendant assaulted both victims repeatedly throughout the 2001-2002 school year, insisting that they individually remain home from school as a “punishment.” He subjected C.A. to anal penetration and demanded mutual fellatio, and he subjected A.A. to sexual intercourse and cunnilingus and he forced her to perform fellatio. In January 2002, during a party at their home, the defendant subjected C.A. to anal penetration and forced him to engage in fellatio. At some point shortly thereafter, the defendant took A.A. into an empty cubicle at the RE/MAX Realty office, directed her to touch her vagina and breasts, said “f— me” and forced her to perform fellatio. During the summer of 2002, the defendant sexually assaulted A.A. in the pool in their backyard. In early September 2002, the defendant coerced A.A. into participating in sexual intercourse to avoid punishment. These acts of repetitive sexual abuse and exploitation, over a period of years, culminated in the September 2002 incident, when the defendant forced the victims to engage in sexual acts with each other for his gratification. His success was dependent upon his having desensitized the children to engaging in sex by regularly subjecting them to severe acts of sexual abuse. He was, thus, met with minimal resistance when he forced the children to perform sexual acts with each other while he observed and then participated. The State acknowledges that the “common plan” applies only to the criminal charges prior to and including the child endangerment charges from the September 2002 incident, and would, thus, not apply to the sexual assaults of A.A. that occurred on that date, but subsequent to the mutual acts. It argues, however, that all charges arising from the September 2002 incident were related as they constituted a single criminal episode, see Ramos, 149 N.H. at 128, and thus were properly joined. We agree. The defendant does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s secondary finding that severance was unnecessary to “achieve a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence,” id., because the jury would be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently to each offense. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not commit an unsustainable exercise of discretion by joining the charges that occurred prior to, and including the charges arising from, the September 2002 incident, when the defendant assaulted A.A. and forced the children to engage in sexual acts with each other. The trial court also joined for trial, however, three charges of aggravated felonious sexual assault of A.A. during the time period from September 10, 2001, through October 24, 2002; three charges of aggravated felonious sexual assault of A.A. that occurred on or about October 31,2002; and three charges of aggravated felonious sexual assault of C.A. that occurred on or about November 1, 2002. Insofar as these charges occurred, or could have occurred, subsequent to September 30, 2002 (the last date covered by the indictments for the September 2002 incident), we conclude that these charges could not have been part of the defendant’s plan to groom the children to engage in sexual acts with each other for his gratification. In the alternative, the State argues that all charges were “related” because they were otherwise “inextricably intertwined.” Specifically, the State references the similar accusations and recantations by the children in 1999, the fact that the children lived in the same house and were abused in the same manner, and that “all the same witnesses were necessary to prove all charges.” We agree with the defendant that the State misunderstands the relevance of offenses being “intertwined.” “Inextricably intertwined” is not a separate ground for establishing “relatedness” in this context, but is merely a component of the “common plan” analysis. McIntyre, 151 N.H. at 467 (for underlying criminal offenses to be construed as part of a “common plan,” the “prior conduct must be intertwined with what follows, such that the charged acts are mutually dependent” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the State has not established the “relatedness” of the charged offenses that occurred, or could have occurred, subsequent to the September 2002 incident. Finally, we take this opportunity to revisit the definition of “relatedness” set forth in Ramos. While we there adopted the ABA standards for joinder and severance of criminal offenses and thus defined “related” offenses as those that are “based upon the same conduct, upon a single criminal episode, or upon a common plan,” Ramos, 149 N.H. at 128, we did not foreclose expansion of that definition. Under our current definition of “relatedness,” a defendant, charged with multiple acts of sexual assault involving the same victim, would have an absolute right to sever each charge for trial if those charges did not arise from the same transaction, constitute the same act, or form part of a “common plan” as narrowly defined in McIntyre. The current definition of “relatedness” could, thus, entitle a defendant to numerous trials for charges arising from the sexual assault of the same victim over a period of many years, if the individual acts of abuse, each severe in its own right, did not constitute a “common plan.” Although we believe that Ramos was correctly decided, we are concerned, nonetheless, about the trauma inherent in subjecting a victim of multiple sexual assaults to multiple trials. We are also troubled by the potential dissipation of judicial resources in requiring multiple trials under such circumstances. However, the court should not adopt “new standards for joinder in criminal trials [for] an issue that is not squarely before the court,” and “the adoption of a new rule of criminal procedure should be accomplished through rulemaking,” see Sup. Ct. R. 51(A)(1)(b). Ramos, 149 N.H. at 128-29 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).