Opinion ID: 1884413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: prima facie proof for open-account cases

Text: ¶ 6. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has defined prima facie as: [evidence] such as will suffice until contradicted and overcome by other evidence . . . [a] case which has proceeded upon sufficient proof to that stage where it will support [a] finding if evidence to the contrary is disregarded. In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir.1982) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1353 (4th ed.1968)) (cited with approval in Hewes v. Langston, 853 So.2d 1237, 1270 (Miss.2003)). A prima facie case is made by the proponent solely on his proof. When this burden of proof has been met, the burden of going forward shifts to the contestants to overcome the prima facie case. Smith v. Averill, 722 So.2d 606, 611 (Miss.1998). More specifically, once a prima facie case is made on an open account, the burden of proof shifts to the account debtor to prove that the amount claimed is incorrect. B.E.I., Inc. v. Newcomer Lumber & Supply Co., 745 N.E.2d 233, 237 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) (citing Auffenberg v. Board of Trustees of Columbus Regional Hosp., 646 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ind.Ct.App.1995)). ¶ 7. The Iowa Supreme Court has explained what is required to make a prima facie case in an open-account case: It is our conclusion that plaintiff's actual ledger cards showing each entry of debit and credit, the testimony of plaintiff's manager showing the simultaneous business machine posting and invoice billing of the customer, his testimony concerning the correctness of the entries, and his testimony that all materials represented by the entries had been delivered to defendant constitute sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case. Prestype, Inc. v. Carr, 248 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Iowa 1976) (quoting Gardner and Beedon Co. of Springfield v. Cooke, 267 Or. 7, 513 P.2d 758 (1973)). ¶ 8. Stacy Taggert, branch manager for Natchez Electric, testified as to how Natchez Electric operated its daily business. He provided specific detail concerning the three methods of delivery and billing to the Johnson Electric account that occurred over the period from April 1994 to May 1996, when Natchez Electric did business with Johnson. The most common method involved employees from Johnson Electric entering the Natchez Electric store with either a written or verbal list of supplies for purchase. Natchez Electric employees would pull the material, take the name of the job from Johnson Electric, print a delivery ticket, and forward an invoice to Johnson Electric at regular intervals for payment. The Johnson Electric employees would either sign the delivery ticket upon receipt of the goods or leave the store once the materials were loaded without signing the delivery ticket. In case of the latter, Natchez Electric might hand-write on the delivery ticket the name of the Johnson Electric employee who picked up the goods. Taggert testified Natchez Electric was instructed not to detain Johnson Electric employees waiting on the delivery ticket to print. ¶ 9. The other two methods of delivery occurred when Natchez Electric delivered electrical goods to a Johnson Electric job site, or a manufacturer, at the request of Natchez Electric, delivered goods directly to a job site. In both cases, the delivery ticket would be unsigned. A freight charge would appear on Natchez Electric invoices for material forwarded from a manufacturer to a Johnson Electric job site. The trial testimony and exhibits contain evidence of all three types of delivery. Taggert testified that the outstanding balance on the invoices entered as an exhibit, less the $19,000 adjustment for overbilling and returned merchandise found on those invoices, is an accurate calculation of the amount Johnson Electric owed to Natchez Electric: $41,794.45. ¶ 10. We find that Taggert's testimony constituted a prima facie case for the open-account debt. The testimony described Natchez Electric's standard practice of conducting business with Johnson and supported the accuracy of the invoices. ¶ 11. The burden of proof then shifted to Johnson, who asserted that the invoices were inaccurate, that he did not receive some of the merchandise listed on the invoices, and that a Natchez Electric employee was stealing merchandise and charging it to his account. The burden of proving an affirmative defense lies upon the party who relies upon that defense. Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, Inc., 933 So.2d 923, 927 (Miss.2006) (citing Graham v. Pugh, 417 So.2d 536, 541 (Miss. 1982)). We now turn to address the issue of whether Natchez Electric is entitled to a JNOV or a new trial.