Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hearsay Statements of Gabriel Flores

Text: Defendant contends the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony that the victim Flores picked defendant's picture out of a photographic lineup. [17] After a pretrial hearing on the issue, the trial court ruled that evidence of the identification was relevant for a nonhearsay purposeto establish that defendant's motive for killing Flores was to eliminate him as a witness. The identification that was made provided evidence of a motive, regardless of whether it was accurate. The trial court also concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The court instructed the jury that this evidence was offered to show a motive for the murder and was not to be considered for its truth, that is, to prove that defendant committed the robbery. It was alleged as a special circumstance that the victim was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony in any criminal proceeding. (Former § 190.2, subd. (c)(2).) It is the accused's subjective intent that is crucial to establish the witness-killing special circumstance. ( People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 854, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380.) In People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 171, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629, we held that evidence establishing that the deceased victim had identified the defendant as the person who had raped her was admissible to prove a witness-killing special circumstance. In Heishman, the defendant actually had been charged with the rape at the time of the capital crime. Although the defendant's knowledge of the pending charges provided some evidence that he killed the victim to prevent her from testifying, we concluded that evidence demonstrating that she actually had identified him nevertheless was relevant to prove the special circumstance allegation. The defendant would not likely believe it was necessary to kill his accuser unless he knew or believed she had identified him to the police and was prepared to identify him at trial. ( Id. at p. 172, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.) [18] Defendant contends that the victim Flores's identification of defendant's photograph nevertheless should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352 because of the risk that the jury would use it for an improper purpose, that is, to prove the charge that defendant robbed Flores. Defendant also contends the probative value of the actual identification was minimal, because there was other evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant believed he had been identified namely, that the police had told Jesse Perez that a witness had identified defendant, and Jona Cardona testified that defendant knew he had been identified. We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's decision that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 134, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164.) Other witnesses testified that defendant's motive in killing the victim was that he had identified defendant, but that did not render proof of the actual identification superfluous as to motive. Jona Cardona testified that, before the killing, defendant told her he had committed a robbery at a gas station and wanted to obtain revenge on the victim because he had picked out defendant from a photograph and had his motorcycle license number. Shirley Chavez testified that defendant admitted he killed the victim because he had identified him. Evidence of the identification tended to corroborate the testimony of these other witnesseswitnesses whose credibility the defense vigorously challenged at trial. Furthermore, the risk that the jury would rely on the identification as proof of defendant's guilt of the robbery was low, because several other witnesses testified that defendant had admitted committing the robbery. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Defendant also contends the actual photo display from which the victim Flores made the identification was irrelevant and should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant argues the photo display was prejudicial because the jury could have interpreted defendant's photograph as a mug shot and could have concluded he had been previously arrested and had a criminal history. The trial court rejected that argument, ruling there was nothing about the photograph that would identify it as a mug shot. Having reviewed the photograph at issue, we agree.
Defendant further contends the trial court erred in admitting, as spontaneous declarations, victim Flores's hearsay statements concerning the robbery and the license plate number of the motorcycle used in the robbery. Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception. (Evid.Code, § 1240.) We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's decision to admit evidence as a spontaneous declaration. ( People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 58, 991 P.2d 145.) The trial court conducted a hearing at which Officer Guerra testified that when she interviewed the victim Flores at the gas station on August 26, 1987, he appeared to be nervous. He said he had been robbed about 15 minutes earlier, described the robbery and robbers in some detail, and gave her the license plate of the motorcycle they were driving. The trial court concluded that Flores's statements to Officer Guerra were admissible as spontaneous declarations, and Officer Guerra testified concerning these statements at trial. In addition, Flores's supervisor, Eulalio Solorio, testified that on the day of the robbery, Mr. Flores called him at home, sounding scared. Flores told Mr. Solorio that he had just been robbed and that he had recorded the license number of the getaway motorcycle. The trial court's decision is sufficiently supported by the evidence. Mr. Flores described a robbery that he had personally perceived, shortly after it occurred. The court's conclusion that he was under the stress of the event at the time he made the statements is supported by the brief lapse of time before he made the statement, by Officer Guerra's statement that he seemed nervous, and by Mr. Solorio's statement that he sounded scared. That statements were made to Officer Guerro in response to her questions does not render the exception inapplicable. Neither lapse of time between the event and the declarations nor the fact that the declarations were elicited by questioning deprives the statements of spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance. ( People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176, 81 Cal.Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259.) Defendant contends that the admission of Mr. Flores's statements to the police regarding the robbery nevertheless violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The confrontation clause applies to hearsay statements that are testimonial in nature, including statements made during police interrogation. ( Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177.) Such hearsay may be admitted at trial only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The high court recently concluded that hearsay statements are testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation and the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. ( Davis v. Washington (2006) ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-2274, 165 L.Ed.2d 224.) Assuming for the purposes of discussion that Mr. Flores's statements to Officer Guerra were made in response to interrogation and that their admission in this case violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, we conclude that any error was nevertheless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [19] To the extend that Officer Guerra's testimony tended to establish that Flores had been robbed and tended to connect defendant to that robbery, it was cumulative of other evidence. Mr. Solorio testified that the victim told him he had been robbed and had obtained the license plate number of the motorcycle used in the robbery. He also testified that $30 was missing from the gas station. Numerous other witnesses testified that defendant had admitted committing the robbery.