Opinion ID: 2091620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defendant's contention as to standing

Text: To begin with, the issue here is not whether the government had the right to seize the trailer. The issue is whether the defendant had standing to object to the introduction of evidence of the results of that seizure. Standing has been called one of `the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law.' Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 99; 88 S Ct 1942; 20 L Ed 2d 947 (1968). Standing relates to civil [4] as well as criminal matters. [5] The basis for standing to challenge a search or seizure may be possession, [6] physical location, [7] or right to privacy, [8] among others. Defendant contends there is another and different basis for standing from any of the above, i.e., automatic standing, where the defendant is charged with an offense that includes as an [essential element of the] offense charged the possession of seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure. Defendant relies on the Michigan Court of Appeals case of People v Godwin, supra . [9] Godwin relied on Jones v United States. It is true that both Godwin and Jones support defendant's contention. However, the automatic standing rule of Jones was limited in Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 142-143; 99 S Ct 421; 58 L Ed 2d 387 (1978), and overruled in United States v Salvucci, supra, p 85. Defendant, however, does not discuss the federal law and relies on Const 1963, art 1, § 11 and Godwin rather than on US Const, Am IV. [10] If defendant convinces us that the rationale in Godwin and Jones is superior to that in Rakas and Salvucci and that Const 1963, art 1, § 11 should be construed to grant defendants greater standing rights than they possess under US Const, Am IV, we should consider adopting the automatic standing rule. However, we are not so convinced on either score. Defendant's arguments for his rationale fail to persuade us for at least the following three reasons: 1. The self-incrimination rationale on which Godwin and Jones rely is inapplicable because, in fact, trial procedures protect defendant against self-incrimination. 2. The automatic standing rule attempts to invoke an art 1, § 11-Am IV right vicariously, but the art 1, § 11-Am IV right, like other rights, is personal. 3. While we have on occasion interpreted art 1, § 11 more liberally than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted Am IV, we do not find anything in the differences in language between the state and federal constitutions or in our precedents that requires us to adopt defendant's position. [11]