Opinion ID: 1965277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Victim's Pregnancy

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony during the trial that Stephanie McDuffey was eight and a half months pregnant at the time of her murder, asserting that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudice. [17] A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is admissible. Commonwealth v. Cargo, 498 Pa. 5, 15, 444 A.2d 639, 644 (1982). If the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact, the decision of the trial court will not be reversed. Id. Here, the evidence of McDuffey's pregnancy was relevant for two purposes. First, the pregnancy gave rise to a physical characteristic which was relevant to establish the existence of a common scheme, plan or design which included selecting tall, heavy black women as victims. Hughes, supra, at 521 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264 (physical similarity between victims relevant in determining whether prior crime is admissible). This purpose was served by the testimony of Mrs. McDuffey that her daughter was tall and had always been a little heavy, and that as a result of the pregnancy she was very large. Second, evidence regarding the victim's pregnancy was necessary since police used the presence of fetal remains in the pelvic area of the skeleton to identify the victim as McDuffey. This purpose was achieved by the testimony of McDuffey's obstetrician that she was eight and a half months pregnant, and the testimony of the medical examiner that the skeleton found in the Swatara landfill contained the remains of a fetus and that he had been able to identify the victim because of medical characteristics which corresponded to the files concerning McDuffey's pregnancy. Appellant argues that the evidence is not relevant to establish a common scheme because he does not deny killing McDuffey and because the defense stipulated to the identity of the victim. Therefore, he argues that this prejudicial evidence to establish identity was improperly admitted. However, the Commonwealth never agreed to the stipulation as to the identity of McDuffey, nor was it required to do so. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 128, 661 A.2d 352, 362 (1995); Commonwealth v. Evans, 465 Pa. 12, 17, 348 A.2d 92, 94-93 (1975) (Commonwealth is permitted to prove defendant's guilt by whatever evidence it can muster). In the absence of a stipulation by both parties, the evidence was clearly relevant for the purpose of identifying the victim. Furthermore, even if appellant admitted to committing the murder of McDuffey, the Commonwealth still needed to establish the identity of the victim since appellant did not know the identity of his second victim. This testimony was limited to the reasons for which it was relevant. Moreover, the Commonwealth did not dwell on the victim's pregnancy, and the trial court instructed the jury to exclude the testimony regarding the pregnancy during the penalty phase. Therefore, because the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial impact, it was properly admitted.