Opinion ID: 1896428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: MRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 3.5(a)(8)

Text: The violations of these Rules found by Judge Lamasney rest on common facts. The MRPC 3.3(a)(1) violation was based on her finding that Hermina had, on a number of occasions, falsely stated to the court that BLIC had failed to respond to his discovery requests, and that those statements were intentionally false. The MRPC 3.5(a)(8) violation was based on Judge Lamasney's finding that Hermina had intentionally disrupted the trial by objecting to documents on the ground that he had not received them, when, in fact, he had, by moving for a mistrial on the ground that BLIC had failed to respond to interrogatories that Judge Lamasney found had never been sent, and by moving to recuse Judge Kavanaugh in the middle of trial because she did not believe his version with respect to those matters. On May 19, 1997, Hermina sent a certified letter to Freedlander. There is frequent reference to that letter, but we are unable to locate it in the record. Hermina claimed that he enclosed with the letter two sets of interrogatoriesone, a set of 26 interrogatories entitled Plaintiff Reed's First Set of Interrogatories, in the Reed case, and one in the Kreh case, which was among the six other actions Hermina had filed against BLIC. Freedlander contended that the only interrogatories enclosed with that letter were those in the Kreh case and that he never received any First Set of Interrogatories in Reed. Freedlander testified that the only interrogatories he ever received in Reed was a set of four interrogatories, captioned Plaintiff Reed's Second Set of Interrogatories, that he received on December 29, 1997 and answered. There was a clear dispute in the evidence regarding whether the May 19 letter enclosed a set of interrogatories in the Reed case. Hermina did not file a notice in the Reed case that the First Set of Interrogatories had been filed until May, 1998a year after he claimed they were filed and barely a month before trial. [3] This dispute first arose, of course, during the litigation, and Judge Kavanaugh had found that interrogatories in the Reed case were not sent with that May 19 letter. Judge Lamasney, after listening to testimony from Hermina, his brother (who was also his partner), and his secretary, as well as from Freedlander, Erb, and Barnes, and considering a number of documents bearing on the matter, found likewise. That was essentially a credibility determination based on disputed evidence, and we shall not disturb it. Although we accept the finding that the First Set of Interrogatories were not, in fact, sent on May 19, we do not accept the finding that Hermina deliberately and intentionally misled Judge Kavanaugh in asserting that they were sent at that time (Rule 3.3(a)(1)) or that his motion for mistrial based on Freedlander's failure to answer those interrogatories amounted to an attempt to disrupt the trial (Rule 3.5(a)(8)). There appears to be no dispute that interrogatories in the Kreh case were enclosed with that letter. Hermina believed that interrogatories in the Reed case were enclosed as well, and there is some independent evidence to support that belief, even though Judges Kavanaugh and Lamasney found, as a fact, that the interrogatories were not sent. [4] Judge Kavanaugh never found a deliberate misstatement. She noted that there was no evidence that he had sent the first set of interrogatories in a timely manner, and commented that [y]ou may have mismailed them. I am not sure what you did. We sustain the finding that no interrogatories were enclosed with the May 19 letter and that what are labeled the First Set of Interrogatories were never, in fact, served on Freedlander, but we reject the finding that Hermina's representation to the contrary was deliberate and intentional, rather than negligent. There is not, to us, clear and convincing evidence that Hermina did not honestly, even if erroneously, believe that he had sent those interrogatories. That was not the only basis for Judge Lamasney's finding, with respect to MRPC 3.3(a)(1), of deliberate misrepresentation, or with respect to MRPC 3.5(a)(8), of disruption of the trial. The Rule 3.3(a)(1) violation also rested on Hermina's representations to Judge Kavanaugh that (1) he had not received certain documents in discovery, and (2) he had been precluded by a protective order issued by Judge Rupp from conducting any discovery, both of which Judge Lamasney found to be false. With respect to the receipt of documents, Judge Lamasney credited the testimony of Judge Kavanaugh, Mr. Erb, and Mr. Barnes over that of Hermina, and we shall not disturb that credibility determination. The substance of that testimony was rather thin, however; some of it was in conflict, and some of it was thoroughly confusing. Clearly, some documents were delivered to Hermina, and he admitted so. He claimed, and his secretary corroborated, that the documents he was given consisted of about 20 pages of old pleadings and did not contain the requested discovery. It is frankly not clear what other documents were delivered. Judge Kavanaugh believed that all the documents in question had been turned over to Hermina by Mr. Erb in her chambers, but Mr. Erb confirmed Hermina's assertion that he had not turned them over at that time. Erb stated at one point that he delivered 500 original documents to Hermina in a red-well tub and, at another time, said that he had delivered about 1,000 such documents. He never got a receipt for any of the documents and had no verification of their delivery. It strikes us as odd, to say the least, that a lawyer in a hotly contested and contentious case, chock full of discovery disputes that had produced several motions to compel and cross motions for sanctions, would turn over 500 to 1,000 original documents and not get a receipt or have some written evidence of delivery. The evidence on this point is not, to us, clear and convincing. The issue of Judge Rupp's protective order has more significance. Hermina filed (or at least believed he had filed) a variety of discovery requests in May, 1997, one of which was to take the deposition of a particular handwriting expert. As Freedlander either had filed or intended to file a motion to dismiss the action, he took the position that he was not required to respond to discovery until that motion was decided. Freedlander therefore moved for a protective order to preclude the taking of the deposition. On June 20, 1997, Judge Rupp granted that motion. The only effect of the order was to preclude the deposition. Hermina nonetheless asserted on several occasions that the order precluded him from engaging in any discovery. He sought his own protective order and later objected to the trial testimony of a defense expert on that basis. In making that argument, Hermina was completely misconstruing the order; there was no reasonable basis for a belief that Judge Rupp had precluded Hermina from taking any discovery throughout the rest of the case, and for Hermina to assert that as a ground for precluding discovery by BLIC or precluding trial testimony by a defense witness was a deliberate misrepresentation and thus a violation of MRPC 3.3(a)(1). On this limited basis, we shall overrule Hermina's exceptions to the finding that he violated MRPC 3.3(a)(1). The Rule 3.5(a)(8) violation also had an additional basisa motion Hermina made to recuse Judge Kavanaugh. That, too, arose initially from the dispute over whether Hermina had mailed the First Set of Interrogatories on May 19. The issue surfaced, again, on the first and second days of trial. Judge Kavanaugh listened to Hermina, examined the record before her, and made a finding that the First Set of Interrogatories had not been sent. She said that her decision was based, in part, on her assessment of Hermina's credibility, but also on the lack of any contemporaneous documentation that the interrogatories had been sent. Counsel had traded accusations of being untruthful, and, in response to that, Judge Kavanaugh noted in passing that another case that Hermina had filed against BLIC had been dismissed because he had not appeared for trial. What relevance that had and how Judge Kavanaugh even knew such a fact is unclear. Hermina asked whether it was part of some court record, to which the judge replied that she had learned of it through correspondence from Hermina. The next day, Hermina filed a written motion to recuse Judge Kavanaugh, accusing her of bias against him. The motion mentioned a number of instances of perceived bias but was predominantly based on her not believing Hermina when he said that he had mailed the First Set of Interrogatories in May, 1997. The motion was denied. Judge Kavanaugh explained that, with the lawyers calling each other liars, she had to make a determination of whether or not I thought the evidence showed that documents had been presented to you. Judge Lamasney concluded that the motion to recuse was made to bolster and support the misrepresentations already made and, for that reason, can not be with an honest intention. From that, she declared that it was intended to, and did, disrupt the orderly progress of the trial, in contravention of MRPC 3.5(a)(8). We disagree and shall sustain Hermina's exception. We do not question Judge Kavanaugh's ruling on the recusal motion, which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Special Appeals ( Reed v. Baltimore Life, supra, 127 Md.App. 536, 549-63, 733 A.2d 1106, 1113-1120), and we do not countenance the filing of motions to recuse simply because a judge makes unfavorable rulings or does not accept a lawyer's statement or explanation. Under all of the circumstances, however, we do not believe that the evidence demonstrates that the motion was made to disrupt the trial or the tribunal. It was a motion that had no merit and was properly denied, but it did not suffice to show a violation of MRPC 3.5(a)(8). [5] MRPC 3.2 and 3.4(c) and (d) The violation of MRPC 3.4(c) was based on Judge Lamasney's conclusions that (1) Hermina did not provide any discovery after receiving a timely request to do so, and (2) [b]y failing to participate in the pretrial conference, [Hermina] knowingly disobeyed an obligation created by the scheduling order. In support of the first conclusion, Judge Lamasney found that BLIC had filed a request for answers to interrogatories on December 23, 1997, and that Hermina admitted receiving the request and failing to provide answers. His explanation was that he declined to respond because of his belief that BLIC had failed to respond to his discovery requests, thereby prejudicing his ability to prepare his case. Judge Lamasney found, of course, that Hermina had received BLIC's responses, and thus concluded that his failure to respond to BLIC discovery was without merit and constituted a violation of both the discovery rules and Judge Weinstein's scheduling order. Hermina does not directly challenge this conclusion in his exceptions. We note that, if the underlying finding is valid, so is the conclusion, but the conclusion is valid even if Hermina did not receive all of the discovery to which he was entitled. Retaliation is not a proper basis for failing to comply with valid discovery requests. If a party is unable to answer discovery because of another party's dereliction or would be prejudiced in some material way if required to respond in advance of compliance by the other side, a proper motion for extension of time to respond can be filed, and the matter can be resolved by the court. What occurred at the pre-trial conference, like most everything else in this case, was in sharp dispute. The conference, mandated for the purpose of preparing a joint pre-trial statement ( see Maryland Rule 2-504.1(c)(2)), was brief and inconclusive. Hermina testified that Erb and Barnes, representing BLIC, were loud and rude, and that, as a result, he left without attempting to work on a joint statement. Erb and Barnes both claimed that Hermina had not brought with him the required witness list and exhibits, and that he simply took the documents brought by them and left. Although Erb admitted raising his voice, he and Barnes both denied being rude or making the statements attributed to them by Hermina. As a result of the failure of the conference, BLIC and Hermina each filed a separate pre-trial statement. At some point, apparently in response to a motion for sanctions, Judge Beard ordered Hermina to turn over a witness list and exhibits. In light of her more general determination that Hermina had engaged in a pattern of dishonesty and animosity, Judge Lamasney found that Hermina's testimony regarding the pre-trial conference and the joint pre-trial statement was not credible and rejected his version of the event. Judge Lamasney concluded that, by effectively failing to participate in the pre-trial conference, Hermina knowingly disobeyed the scheduling order and thereby violated MRPC 3.4(c) and 3.2. She noted, however, that the failure to produce a joint statement had no real effect on the trial. Judge Lamasney regarded that as an extenuating circumstance. We regard it as precluding the finding of a violation of MRPC 3.2. We do find, however, that Hermina's conduct constituted a violation of MRPC 3.4(c) and overrule his exception in that regard.