Opinion ID: 767804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of Any Statements To Be Suppressed (Miranda Issue).

Text: 35 The critical inquiry here is not whether a Miranda violation occurred but rather when it occurred. An individual is in custody at the point a reasonable person would feel that he was not free to terminate the interrogation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1995). The district court concluded that the in custody inquiry was  `essentially a factual determination'  (citing Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981)), and thus seemingly afforded a high level of deference to the state trial court's determination of this issue. The Supreme Court in Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111-12, however, held that the inquiry is really a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to de novo review by appellate courts. While the ultimate issue of when Bains was in custody is subject to de novo review, the state trial court's answers to the sceneand action-setting questions (i.e., the underlying factual questions) still are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See, e.g. , id. 36 In the present case, the state trial court determined that, as a factual matter, either Bains himself suggested that his questioning by the police continue at the police station or he simply chose not to object when the police suggested that his questioning continue at the police station. In either event, according to the state trial court's determination, Bains was not coerced into going to the police station and instead voluntarily accompanied the police to the police station. While this determination is not decisive of the ultimate in custody issue, it nevertheless must be presumed to be correct so far as setting the scene and reconstructing Bains's and the police's lines and actions are concerned. See, e.g., id. 37 There is no evidence here to suggest that, under clearly established federal law, a reasonable person in Bains's situation would have felt that he was not free to terminate the police interrogation, at least until the first time that he requested to speak with a lawyer and with his wife and to leave the police station and had his requests denied by the police. Although Bains was questioned by several police officers, who in fact had lied to him about whether Hidalgo actually had made incriminating statements about him, such admittedly targeted questioning solely by virtue of occurring at a police station does not constitute a custodial interrogation sufficient to trigger the requirements of Miranda. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1977) (per curiam). At the very least, the state courts' (i.e., the trial court's and the California Supreme Court's) determinations that no Miranda violation occurred until after Bains first had made his requests, cannot be said to have been so erroneous that they can be said to have resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Therefore, since all of the relevant self-incriminating statements made by Bains to the police were made prior to his first requests (and thus prior to the occurrence of any Miranda violation), we hold that their introduction at trial was permissible. 38