Opinion ID: 668533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: JEM's Statutory and Due Process Claims

Text: 36 JEM's remaining arguments do not detain us long. First, JEM contends that it was entitled to have its application designated for a hearing under sections 309(d)(2) and (e) of the Communications Act of 1934. Read together, those sections provide generally that if the Commission for any reason is unable to find that granting an application would be in the public interest, it shall formally designate the application for hearing on those grounds. 47 U.S.C. Secs. 309(d)(2), (e) (1988). 37 Our cases make abundantly clear that the Commission enjoys broad discretion to establish cut-off dates beyond which applications failing to meet specified criteria will be dismissed without a hearing. We have acknowledge[d] and approve[d] the device of cut-off as a reasonable and necessary limitation on the statutory right to a comparative hearing. Radio Athens, Inc. (WATH) v. FCC, 401 F.2d 398, 400-01 (D.C.Cir.1968). Only recently, we reiterated that [t]here can be no doubt of the FCC's authority to impose strict procedural rules in order to cope with the flood of applications it receives or expects to receive. Glaser v. FCC, 20 F.3d 1184, 1186 (D.C.Cir.1994). 38 The only limitation we have placed on this general principle is that an applicant must be given adequate notice of the procedural rules. Thus, we held in Ranger that where the FCC had issued clear rules prescribing the requisites of a complete license application, it was not obliged to hold a hearing before dismissing applications that failed to comply with those rules. Ranger, 294 F.2d at 242. Indeed, Ranger considered statutory language virtually identical to that relied on by JEM in this case, and held that the right to a hearing was intended to apply to what might be termed questions of substance, i.e. to questions about the public interest that might arise after the Commission had all the required information before it. Id. The language did not mean that the Commission was required to designate a hearing where the applicant had failed to supply information necessary to a consideration of the application's merit. 2 See id. As we discuss below, the Commission provided adequate notice of the content of the hard look rules; thus, JEM's contention that the FCC was required to hold a hearing to determine which set of JEM's conflicting geographic coordinates was correct is meritless. 39 Finally, JEM makes the related claim that the FCC's failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before dismissing its application deprived JEM of due process under the Fifth Amendment. This claim also fails. In approving the FCC's stringent processing procedures, we have held that fundamental fairness [only] requires that an exacting application standard, enforced by the severe sanction of dismissal without consideration on the merits, be accompanied by full and explicit notice of all prerequisites for such consideration. Salzer v. FCC, 778 F.2d 869, 871-72 (D.C.Cir.1985) (approving FCC's adoption of letter perfect standard). Moreover, we have held in a prior case that, despite the absence of formal notice and comment proceedings for the hard look rules, the FCC gave adequate notice that FM license applications would be found acceptable for filing only if they fully complied with the FCC's technical rules. See Malkan FM Assocs. v. FCC, 935 F.2d 1313, 1315 (D.C.Cir.1991). In Malkan, the court found that the Commission gave adequate notice that applicants must comply with antenna height limits, because that item was enumerated in Appendix D to the FM Processing Rules. See id. at 1319. The same conclusion must follow here, as Appendix D also clearly states: 40 The geographic coordinates, to the nearest second, of the proposed transmitter site must be provided. Absence of these data makes it impossible to determine the distances from the proposed site to other proposed or existing broadcast facilities and to the community of license. 41 FM Processing Rules, 50 Fed.Reg. at 19945 (Appendix D). Immediately preceding this language, the hard look rules also warned that the absence of the specified data would prevent a determination of acceptability and render an application not substantially complete. See id. JEM was entitled to no more than this clear and explicit notice.