Opinion ID: 186014
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equitable tolling on the facts of this case

Text: 18 Finally, we turn to the question whether Chung has presented a sufficient excuse for his failure to file suit within two years of the time his cause of action arose. Chung's plea agreement required him to cooperate fully with federal law enforcement authorities and granted prosecutors broad discretion to decide whether, in return, to ask the district court to reduce his sentence. Chung claims that by virtue of that agreement [h]e was at the mercy of the subjective opinion of the very government agency that violated his rights secured by the Privacy Act. Upon the assumption that prosecutors would have viewed a lawsuit against the Department of Justice as a failure to cooperate fully, Chung argues he was prevented by a superior power from filing suit until he was sentenced in December 1998. We review de novo the district court's rejection of Chung's argument. See United States v. Saro, 252 F.3d 449, 455 n. 9 (D.C.Cir. 2001) (we employ de novo review when a district court holds — as the court appears to have done here — that the facts cannot justify equitable tolling as a matter of law). 19 In evaluating a claim for equitable relief from a statute of limitations, we must be careful to distinguish between the two primary tolling doctrines. See Currier v. Radio Free Europe, 159 F.3d 1363, 1367 (D.C.Cir.1998); Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-52 (7th Cir.1990). Equitable estoppel precludes a defendant, because of his own inequitable conduct — such as promising not to raise the statute of limitations defense — from invoking the statute of limitations. Currier, 159 F.3d at 1367; Cada, 920 F.2d at 450-51. The doctrine of equitable tolling, on the other hand, applies most commonly when the plaintiff despite all due diligence ... is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim. Currier, 159 F.3d at 1367. We have previously pointed out that the two doctrines, although functionally similar, have distinct criteria — the former revolving around the conduct of the defendant and the latter around the circumstances of the plaintiff. Id. There is a difference in effect as well: Equitable estoppel takes the statute of limitations out of play for as long as is necessary to prevent the defendant from benefitting from his misconduct, whilst equitable tolling — as a method for adjusting the rights of two innocent parties — merely ensures that the plaintiff is not, by dint of circumstances beyond his control, deprived of a reasonable time in which to file suit. Cada, 920 F.2d at 452. See also Phillips v. Heine, 984 F.2d 489, 492 (D.C.Cir.1993) (The purposes of the doctrine [of equitable tolling] are fully achieved if the court extends the time for filing by a reasonable period after the tolling circumstance is mended). 20 In this case the district court assumed for the sake of the argument that the limitations period of the Privacy Act was subject to adjustment for equitable reasons but refused to grant relief: First, it believed a plaintiff's fear of retaliation by the defendant could not, as a matter of law, justify equitable relief; second, Chung had not claimed prosecutors threatened him or took any specific action that prevented him from filing his lawsuit. Chung, slip op. at 13. 21 Whatever the merits of the district court's first ground — and we have our doubts, see Currier, 159 F.3d at 1368 ([A]n employer's affirmatively misleading statements that a grievance will be resolved in the employee's favor can establish an equitable estoppel.... [A]n employee understandably would be reluctant to file a complaint with the EEOC for fear he would jeopardize his chances to gain relief voluntarily) (emphasis omitted) — we agree that Chung's failure to allege any specific act or misleading statement by the defendant is problematic. We disagree, however, regarding the extent of the problem. Whereas the district court thought it fatal to Chung's claim, we think it so only insofar as Chung urges equitable estoppel, which, as we have said, is based upon the conduct of the defendant. 22 But what about equitable tolling? The district court left that ground unplowed, and we are unable to finish the job on the record now before us. One situation in which equitable tolling may apply — when a plaintiff knows he has been injured, but is unaware that his injury may be the result of possible misconduct by the defendant, see Cada, 920 F.2d at 451 — does not seem applicable here. From the press reports containing leaked information, Chung learned simultaneously that his personal information had been disclosed and that the disclosure was attributed to officials familiar with the DOJ investigation. Chung's complaint alleges that, at the same time, his lawyer learned that DOJ officials were responsible for the leaks. 23 We believe, however, that Chung may be entitled to relief pursuant to the doctrine of equitable tolling if fear that his lawsuit would jeopardize his request for leniency — a fear that seems objectively reasonable in light of the plea agreement and the surrounding circumstances — in fact prevented him from filing suit from May 1998, when his claim arose, until his sentencing in December 1998. If so, then the time remaining in the limitations period — January 1999 to May 2000 — may or may not have been a reasonable time within which to file. That will likely depend on the extent, if any, to which Chung's duty to cooperate with the Government interfered with his ability to prepare his claim. See Cada, 920 F.2d at 452 (equitable tolling gives the plaintiff extra time if he needs it. If he doesn't need it, there is no basis for depriving the defendant of the protection of the statute of limitations). We leave these questions — and the ultimate issue whether Chung suffered delay sufficient to excuse his filing two months late, in August 2000 — to the district court for resolution in the first instance.