Opinion ID: 2750348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII Pay Disparity Claim

Text: In contrast to the Title VII tenure denial claim, the pay disparity claim falls under the Ledbetter Act and therefore is not time barred. The Ledbetter 8Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 630-31 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P., 595 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 10 Noel v. The Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 275 (3d Cir. 2010). 11 Tillman v. S. Wood Preserving of Hattiesburg, Inc., 377 F. App’x 346, 349-50 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2010). 7 Case: 13-11225 Document: 00512832068 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/10/2014 No. 13-11225 Act explicitly excepts pay disparity claims from the Ricks analysis and makes each paycheck at an allegedly discriminatory rate a separate, discrete act of discrimination, effectively resetting the statute of limitations for filing an EEOC charge. 12 Furthermore, the Act allows a plaintiff to recover “back pay for up to two years preceding the filing of the charge,” provided that the “unlawful employment practices” that occurred during the filing period are “similar or related to unlawful employment practices with regard to discrimination in compensation that occurred outside the time for filing a charge.” 13 Niwayama filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on October 24, 2011. Therefore, under the Ledbetter Act, Niwayama can obtain relief for discriminatory pay disparity from October 24, 2009 (two years prior to the filing of her EEOC charge). It is unclear from the record what time period Niwayama alleges discriminatory pay under Title VII; 14 however, at most, she can obtain relief beginning in October 2009. As to the substance of this claim, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 15 The Title VII inquiry is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on her gender or national origin. 16 An intentional discrimination claim can be established by either direct or circumstantial 12 Groesch v. City of Springfield, Ill., 635 F.3d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 2011). 1342 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e)(3)(A). TTU does not contest the application of the Ledbetter Act to Niwayama’s federal pay disparity claims. 14 Niwayama’s district court complaint and summary judgment evidence fails to identify the exact dates she alleges she was subjected to discriminatory pay in violation of Title VII. Niwayama does allege discriminatory pay practices going back to 2004. 15 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1). 16 Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 2004). 8 Case: 13-11225 Document: 00512832068 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/10/2014 No. 13-11225 evidence. 17 When analyzing a discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence, we apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 18 Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position she sought or held; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was treated less favorably than another similarly situated employee outside the protected group. 19 If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to identify a non-discriminatory justification for the adverse employment action. 20 If the employer does articulate a valid justification, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate a fact issue as to whether the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual. 21 Niwayama alleges that she was discriminated against because of her national origin and gender. More specifically, Niwayama claims that she was not paid the same salary as male and non-Japanese counterparts in the chemistry department. Only the issue of pretext is disputed – whether Niwayama has produced sufficient evidence to show that the reason TTU gave her for her pay inequality was pretextual. She argues that the summary judgment evidence was sufficient to carry her burden by showing that she was treated less favorably than another similarly situated employee. We are satisfied that Niwayama has produced enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on this element. Joachim Weber, a male assistant professor at TTU hired at the same time as Niwayama in the same department, 17 Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005). 18 Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2009). 19 Haire, 719 F.3d at 363. 20 Black v. Pan Am. Labs., L.L.C., 646 F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2011). 21 Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007). 9 Case: 13-11225 Document: 00512832068 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/10/2014 No. 13-11225 received a higher annual salary during the years they taught at TTU. According to the summary judgment evidence, this inequality occurred despite Weber’s lower teaching evaluations and similar history of obtaining grants. This conclusion is supported by other evidence in the summary judgment record and tends to support Niwayama’s claim of pretext rather than TTU’s argument that the pay differential was based on a neutral formula. It is true that Casadonte, the department chair, stated that the pay disparity affecting Niwayama resulted from the application of a neutral formula based on objective measurements of Niwayama’s research funding and teaching evaluations. But neither Casadonte nor any other university official was willing to provide with any precision how the salary is computed. Perhaps more importantly, the Tenure Hearing Panel disagreed with Casadonte’s reasoning and determined that Niwayama was held to a heightened standard in the areas considered, such as funding and teaching evaluations. Because the same department administrator (Casadonte) considered the same factors (funding and teaching evaluations) both in issuing the single recommendation to deny tenure and in applying the payment “formula,” we find a reasonable jury could make the inference that the payment formula (like the tenure criteria) was applied selectively and inconsistently. 22 We are persuaded that the hearing panel’s conclusion that TTU was applying a selective, inconsistent standard to Niwayama in comparison to other similarly situated colleagues regarding tenure supports the argument that some disparity was being applied to her regarding pay. 23 22We have suggested in several of our decisions, such as E.E.O.C. v. Louisiana Office of Community Services, 47 F.3d 1438, 1444-46 (5th Cir. 1995), that an inference of pretext may be drawn based on evidence showing that an employer’s relevant rules and standards “were not consistently applied.” TTU has placed considerable emphasis on Louisa Hope-Weeks, a female professor 23 who was paid more than most men in the department. But, even if Hope-Weeks was not 10 Case: 13-11225 Document: 00512832068 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/10/2014 No. 13-11225 We conclude that Niwayama’s Title VII discriminatory pay claim is limited to the period of October 2009 (two years prior to filing her EEOC complaint) until May 2010 when Niwayama was placed on termination track for pay purposes. TTU has established a policy of denying pay increases while the employee was on this status.