Opinion ID: 800677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Establishing Causation in a Retaliation Claim

Text: Protected speech does not cause an adverse action in the traditional sense because protected speech does not act, but we say protected speech causes an adverse action if the speech motivates an individual actor to take acts that then proximately cause an adverse action. Subjective motivation appropriately enters the picture on a retaliation claim because our concern is with actions by public officials taken with the intent to deter the rights to free expression guaranteed under the First Amendment. Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 681-82 (6th Cir.1998) ([A]n act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, causation in retaliatory claims may really be considered a two-part inquiry: A plaintiff must show both (1) that the adverse action was proximately caused by an individual defendant's acts, Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir.2005), but also (2) that the individual taking those acts was motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right, Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 386. Causation in the constitutional sense is no different from causation in the common law sense. McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 438 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1090, 126 S.Ct. 1026, 163 L.Ed.2d 854 (2006). An officer may therefore be liable under § 1983 `for the natural consequences of his actions.' Id. (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)). This includes liability for acts giving rise to the ultimate harm, even if the harm is executed by someone else. Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 609 (6th Cir.2007) (Even if an intervening third party is the immediate trigger for the plaintiff's injury, the defendant may still be proximately liable, provided that the third party's actions were foreseeable.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 813, 129 S.Ct. 44, 172 L.Ed.2d 21 (2008); see also Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 281-82 (6th Cir.2010) (holding state actor could be liable for retaliation for making false statements to plaintiff's employer causing her to be fired); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 311-12 (6th Cir.2010) (rejecting argument that officers could not be liable for malicious prosecution because they did not make the decision to prosecute). The district court found that four of the five defendantsWells, Chaffee, Singleton, and Berghuiscould not be liable for retaliation because they were not involved in the decision to increase King's security level. King IV, 2009 WL 3424221, at . The district court's use of the word involved, however, erroneously focused solely on who made the ultimate decision to increase King's security, not whether any of the defendants' actions were the proximate cause of the increase in security. The district court failed to acknowledge that a person who sets in motion an adverse action can be liable for retaliation for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his actions. Siggers-El, 412 F.3d at 702. That brings us to motive. Motive is often very difficult to prove with direct evidence in retaliation cases. Bloch, 156 F.3d at 682-83. Circumstantial evidence may therefore acceptably be the only means of establishing the connection between a defendant's actions and the plaintiff's protected conduct. We have previously considered the temporal proximity between protected conduct and retaliatory acts as creating an inference of retaliatory motive. Paige, 614 F.3d at 282-83; Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 417-18 (6th Cir.2004) ([T]emporal proximity alone may be significant enough to constitute indirect evidence of a causal connection so as to create an inference of retaliatory motive.) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants urge us to hold that the plaintiff must show an intent to achieve the specific adverse actionhere, the increase in security leveland not just a general intent to retaliate for the protected speech. We decline to do so. Under such an approach, the corrections officer who wanted to punish an inmate for filing complaints against her could write a letter to her superior demanding a transfer for false allegations of violence, and under the defendants' view, she would be liable only if the inmate was then transferred, not if her superior decided to place the inmate in solitary confinement as a result of the officer's letter. The officer could guarantee escaping liability entirely by requesting no specific action at all, knowing full well the likely result of her letter labeling the inmate a security risk would be some sort of punitive act against the inmate and intending some form of punishment to occur. Such a standard would permit those with the necessary intent to retaliate to escape liability for setting in motion a punitive act ultimately executed by someone else. The district court found all five of the defendants could not be liable because they were motivated to take action against King not because of his protected activities but because he was using his influence over other prisoners to create problems and was undermining the authority of prison officials. King IV, 2009 WL 3424221, at . The district court's finding with respect to the defendants' motivation is a finding of fact to which we afford deference.