Opinion ID: 4529971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Flow's cross-examination

Text: The defendants contend that the district court impermissibly limited Flow's cross-examination in three areas: charges pending against him, uncharged murders, and recorded jail calls. Although the defendants preserved only the second of these challenges, all three would fail even if preserved. So, favorably to the defendants, we will review these three areas for abuse of discretion, while reviewing de novo whether the defendants had a reasonable opportunity to impeach Flow. United States v. Casey, 825 F.3d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 2016). The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right of cross-examination; a district court, however, has - 31 - considerable discretion to impose reasonable limits on it. Id. at 23–24 (citation omitted). To establish that the district court has abused its discretion, the defendant[s] must show that the limitations imposed were clearly prejudicial. United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 37 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 634, 639 (1st Cir. 1993)). The ultimate question is whether 'the jury is provided with sufficient information . . . to make a discriminating appraisal of a witness's motives and bias.' United States v. Landrón-Class, 696 F.3d 62, 72 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2001)). We consider the three challenged areas in turn.
The district court's restriction of cross-examination into Flow's pending state-court charges was not clearly prejudicial. The defendants were able to inform the jury of: Flow's prior criminal convictions; the existence of Flow's cooperation agreement with the government (potentially reducing Flow's incarceration from a term of life to a governmentrecommended 87 months); and Flow's personal dislike for the defendants.
Seeking to discredit Flow at trial, the defense implied that Flow had killed five people, which he denied. At sidebar, Gómez's counsel claimed to have witnesses who could testify about - 32 - these uncharged murders. The district court ultimately struck these questions and answers based on Federal Rule of Evidence 608. On appeal, the defendants argue that involvement in murders where there has been no conviction is a proper subject of crossexamination since it is part of the benefits received by cooperating. The district court's contrary decision was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Thomas, 467 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that evidence rules allow judge to exclude extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter, whether offered to prove character for truthfulness or some other impeachment ground, like bias or contradiction).
The same rationale suffices to dispose of the defendants' argument that the district court erred by not admitting certain of Flow's jailhouse phone calls. See United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting judge's discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude extrinsic evidence of witness's bias). In any event, Flow admitted on crossexamination to many statements contained in the recordings that informed his motivation to testify, such as: that these people from La Perla, they treated me really bad; that he hate[d] some of the defendants; and that if he talk[ed], he expected to get a sentence between two, three or four years only. The jury had - 33 - sufficient information to discern Flow's possible bias. There was no reversible error here.