Opinion ID: 2335399
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invocation of the Fifth Amendment by Appellant's Proposed Witness

Text: During trial, appellant said that he would like to call Riley, the driver of the Cadillac, to testify. At the time, Riley (who was tried separately) had already been convicted of the armed robbery and sentenced, but his appeal was pending. Riley's counsel, who was present, informed the trial court that Riley did not wish to speak with appellant regarding any potential testimony he might give on his behalf; did not wish to testify on appellant's behalf; and, if called, would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. When the trial court inquired into the nature of Riley's potential testimony, Riley's counsel responded that it would not be anything exculpatory on behalf of Mr. Bell if he were forced to testify. Counsel noted that Riley's defense in his own case was one of duressthat appellant jumped into Riley's car after robbing the Payless Shoe Store, pulled a gun on Riley, and forced Riley to drive away. Riley's counsel stated that that would closely be what his testimony would be if forced to testify. The government advised the court that it would not grant Riley immunity even if he were willing to testify on appellant's behalf, since Riley's appeal was pending and there remained the possibility of a retrial. Appellant's counsel proffered, on the other hand, that Riley would testify that he had told appellant to keep quiet, that he knew appellant did not commit this crime and that, if Riley were asked, he would say so. According to appellant's counsel, Riley had told appellant that, if asked, Riley would take his own weight, meaning he would take his own charge, and confess to his own culpability. Riley purportedly said this to appellant while they were sharing a cell at D.C. Jail, before Riley's trial. The trial court relied on the representation of Riley's counsel that Riley would not testify favorably for appellant, and noted that Riley's position now that he will not provide exculpatory information is completely consistent with the evidence that came in during [Riley's] trial. Therefore, the trial court ruled that it would not compel Riley to testify, since his testimony would not be clearly exculpatory. The court denied appellant's request to make further inquiry of Riley. [3] Our review of a trial judge's decision authorizing a defense witness' invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination may implicate questions both of fact and of law. Littlejohn v. United States, 705 A.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C.1997). As in other comparable situations, we accord deference to the trial judge's findings of historical fact and to [her] first-hand assessment of the realities of the situation before [her]. Id.; see D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001)). We apply the non-deferential de novo standard, on the other hand, to the trial judge's conclusions of law. Id. When a potential defense witness refuses to testify by invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege, the court must first determine whether the testimony would, in fact, be incriminatory and thus create the possibility of future prosecution. See Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331, 344 (D.C.1996) (en banc). If so, the Fifth Amendment claim is valid. See id. In making this determination, when the privilege is invoked by someone other than the defendant, the court must ordinarily permit examination of the witness . . . one question at a time. Brown v. United States, 864 A.2d 996, 1004 (D.C.2005) (quoting Harris v. United States, 614 A.2d 1277, 1282 (D.C.1992)). A detailed examination is designed to prevent witnesses from attempting to excuse themselves altogether from testifying by claiming a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. However, when the witness does not make such a blanket claim, there is usually no need for the court to follow a question-by-question procedure (although the court, of course, may do so if it is appropriate for some other reason). Id. We have noted that trial judges often rely on proffers by counsel instead of a formal questioning procedure to make privilege determinations. We have never forbidden the practice of relying on proffers in such situations. . . . Id. If the invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege is valid, it must be respected. See Carter, supra, 684 A.2d at 344. But the court should inquire of the government about the possibility of a grant of use immunity to the defense witness, in order to accommodate the witness's Fifth Amendment privilege and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, if the defendant establishes that the witness's proposed testimony is (a) material, (b) clearly exculpatory, (c) non-cumulative, and (d) unobtainable from any other source. See id. Appellant claims that the trial court should have conducted the procedure envisioned in Carter, so as to permit him to present Riley's testimony as part of appellant's defense. We disagree. Here, any testimony given by Riley regarding his involvement in the armed robbery would have incriminated him in a retrial if his appeal were successful. Thus, as there was a possibility of future prosecution, the privilege was properly invoked. See Daniels v. United States, 738 A.2d 240, 244 n. 7 (D.C.1999) (noting that a co-defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege remained intact during the pendency of appeal, and thus co-defendant could be compelled to testify only if the government granted use immunity); Ramos v. United States, 569 A.2d 158, 162 n. 5 (D.C.1990) (remarking that a defense witness's testimony did not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege because his conviction had already been affirmed on appeal). Also, because any statement by Riley about his involvement in the armed robbery would incriminate him if it were to be helpful to appellant's defense, there was no need to call Riley to the stand to assert the privilege, question by question, particularly where appellant proffered that he would ask Riley to acknowledge that appellant was not involved while himself confessing to the crime. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951) (To sustain the privilege [against self-incrimination], it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.); Brown, supra, 864 A.2d at 1004; Reese v. United States, 467 A.2d 152, 157 (D.C.1983) (stating that the trial court had not erred when it failed to require defense witnesses to invoke the Fifth Amendment on a question-by-question basis because the trial court may bar a witness from testifying in the jury's presence if it properly concludes that the witness will refuse to answer essentially all the questions which he may be asked.); Alston v. United States, 383 A.2d 307, 313 (D.C.1978) (holding that appellant was not prejudiced by the court excusing a witness from testifying where the witness invoked a proper claim of privilege from testifying and his appearance on the stand could not have aided appellant in his defense.). As Riley's Fifth Amendment privilege was properly invoked, it could have been overcome only by a grant of use immunity, the need for which it was appellant's burden to establish by showing that Riley's proposed testimony was material, clearly exculpatory, non-cumulative, and unobtainable from any other source. See Carter, 684 A.2d at 344. Here, if Riley were made to testify, his defense counsel proffered, he would not only deny any culpability in the robbery, but also point the finger of blame at appellant. His testimony then was surely not clearly exculpatory of appellant. See id.; Brown, 864 A.2d at 1004 (affirming the reliance on counsel's proffer of the witness's testimony); cf. Daniels, 738 A.2d at 244 n. 7 (use immunity granted to accomplice/co-defendant who testified about his participation in the crime). In these circumstances, the trial court did not err in upholding Riley's invocation of the privilege without further inquiry into the possibility of immunity.