Opinion ID: 150472
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: A Ban as Opposed to a Limit

Text: Finally, we consider the fact that the CFRA imposes an outright bannot a mere limiton contributions made by contractors, prospective contractors, and their principals. That fact, as discussed above, does not require us to review the law under the strict scrutiny standard. But we must nevertheless determine whether an outright ban on contractor contributions is closely drawn to the state's anticorruption interest. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (It is not that the difference between a ban and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to consider it is when applying scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the standard of review itself.). The majority of campaign laws reviewed by the Supreme Courtand other courtshave involved limits on contributions, not bans. See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 246, 126 S.Ct. 2479; Nixon, 528 U.S. at 381, 120 S.Ct. 897; Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 184, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court has, however, upheld the longstanding federal ban on direct corporate contributions. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154, 123 S.Ct. 2200. That is enough to demonstrate that laws banning contributions by a discrete group are not unconstitutional per se. Yet a ban is a drastic measure. A limit on contributions causes some constitutional damage, as it  restrict[s] `one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association.' Randall, 548 U.S. at 246, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25, 96 S.Ct. 612) (emphasis added). But a ban on contributions causes considerably more constitutional damage, as it wholly extinguishes that aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. A limit, moreover, leaves intact the contributor's right to make the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution. Id. at 247, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612). But a ban infringes that constitutional right, as it precludes the symbolic expression that comes with a small contribution. There are, therefore, undoubtedly many situations in which a strict contribution limitas opposed to an outright contribution banwill adequately achieve the government's objectives. In those situations it will be difficult for the government to establish that a contribution ban is closely drawn to its asserted interests. Instead, such a ban risks being struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad. Here, for example, a limitas opposed to a banwould likely be sufficient to address the General Assembly's interest in addressing actual corruption. If, for example, the CFRA were to allow contractors to make small contributions (say, $50 per election) to state officials, it is unlikely that a contractor could exert any influence over an official with the promise of such a modest sum. Yet such a limit would not wholly extinguish a contractor's associational rights, and it would allow the contractor to make the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution. Id. at 247, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612). Thus, if the state's only interest in this case were combating actual corruption, the CFRA's outright ban on contractor contributions would likely be held overbroad. Combating actual corruption, however, is not the state's only interest here; the CFRA is also meant to address the appearance of corruption caused by contractor contributions. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 303. As discussed above, Connecticut's recent corruption scandals were widely publicized, and corruption involving state contractors became a major political issue in Connecticut in recent years. See subsection I.B.1, ante. A limit on contractor contributions would have partially addressed the perception of corruption created by those incidents, but such a limit still would have allowed some money to flow from contractors to state officials. Even if small contractor contributions would have been unlikely to influence state officials, those contributions could have still given rise to the appearance that contractors are able to exert improper influence on state officials. The CFRA's ban on contractor contributions, by contrast, unequivocally addresses the perception of corruption brought about by Connecticut's recent scandals. By totally shutting off the flow of money from contractors to state officials, it eliminates any notion that contractors can influence state officials by donating to their campaigns. Thus, although the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions is a drastic measure, it is an appropriate response to a specific series of incidents that have created a strong appearance of corruption with respect to all contractor contributions. We hold, as a result, that in light of Connecticut's recent experience with corruption scandals involving state contractors, the CFRA's imposition of an outright ban on contributions by contractors, prospective contractors, and their principals, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-612(g), is closely drawn to the state's interest in combating the appearance of corruption.