Opinion ID: 806890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wiggins claim.

Text: Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in his investigation, development, and presentation of mitigation evidence, as well as the 8 Case: 11-70031 Document: 00511960177 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/17/2012 No. 11-70031 development of rebuttal evidence for the state’s aggravating factors at sentencing. He claims this deficiency merits relief under Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2007) (holding that lack of a “reasonable investigations” of mitigating evidence may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 2052 (1984)). The district court found this claim procedurally defaulted, because it was dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in a succinct order for failing to meet the criteria for a successive petition. Alternatively, the district court found the claim meritless, because even if Petitioner could demonstrate deficiency in his trial representation, he could not demonstrate prejudice. To obtain a COA, as noted, Petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could disagree regarding the district court's disposition. Skinner v. Quarterman, 528 F.3d 336, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 338, 123 S. Ct. at 1029). Federal courts cannot reach the merits of a habeas claim if the state court denied relief on an adequate and independent state law ground. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553 (1991). To be adequate, a state rule must be “firmly established and regularly followed.” James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348, 104 S. Ct. 1830, 1835 (1984). A state court’s ground for judgment is not independent if it “depends on a federal constitutional ruling.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1092 (1985). Here, the relevant state court order stated that the petitioner’s Wiggins claim “does not meet the requirements for consideration of subsequent claims under Article 11.071, Section 5. Therefore, we dismiss this subsequent application.” Ex parte Ibarra, No. 48,832-04, 2008 WL 4417283 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2008). Petitioner contends that the state ground for dismissal was both inadequate and not independent. 9 Case: 11-70031 Document: 00511960177 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/17/2012 No. 11-70031 It was inadequate, he suggests, because “an emerging equitable exception” to Section 5 permits an applicant to seek relief where his first appointed counsel fails to raise a single cognizable claim in his application. See Ex parte Granados, No. WR-51135-1 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 10, 2007) (unpublished) (denying relief because Petitioner failed to identify claims that would be revealed in new petition); Ex parte Moreno, 245 S.W.3d 419, 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (reopening application for writ on the basis of two new Supreme Court decisions and taking into account “applicant’s diligence in raising the claim in his initial state application”); Ex parte Ruiz, SW-04:8-13; 2007 WL 2011023 (Tex. Crim. App. July 6, 2007) (unpublished) (denying relief over suggestion by two dissenting justices and one concurring justice that forbidding subsequent petitions was inappropriate where state habeas counsel was ineffective in failing to raise claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness); Ex Parte Medina, 361 S.W.3d 633, 642-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (permitting subsequent application where “habeas counsel ha[d] employed a Machiavellian strategy designed to thwart the proper statutory procedure for filing a death penalty writ” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Petitioner finds Medina especially suggestive of his idea that the Texas abuse of writ bar is not firmly established or regularly followed. Medina, he argues, should have been applied in Petitioner’s case. But in fact, the Medina court took pains to distinguish that case from cases like Petitioner’s. Not only was it sui generis in that counsel “intentional[ly] refus[ed] to plead specific facts that might support habeas corpus relief,” but even more because “counsel’s filing was not a proper habeas-corpus application,” as the state there acknowledged. Id. at 642-43. The circumstances in that case involved “not habeas counsel’s lack of competence but his misplaced desire to challenge the established law at the peril of his client.” Id. at 643. Petitioner makes no such allegation regarding intentional malfeasance on the part of his state habeas counsel here. Texas’s 10 Case: 11-70031 Document: 00511960177 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/17/2012 No. 11-70031 Section 5 bar remains an adequate state ground for finding procedural bars based on TCCA decisions. See, e.g., Balentine v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 842, 854 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Balentine II”). No decision of this court holds otherwise. The district court’s conclusion that the TCCA’s decision here was based on an adequate state ground is not subject to dispute among jurists of reason. Likewise, reasonable jurists could not disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the TCCA’s decision was based on an independent state ground. The TCCA’s decision was not interwoven with federal law. As the district court noted, “[t]here is no indication in the order that the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on anything other than abuse of the writ.” Ibarra v. Thaler, No. W-02-CA052, slip op. 30 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011). Where a Texas court does not state which prong of Article 11.071, Section 5 it relies on in dismissing a subsequent petition, we do not presume that it reached the separate statutory subdivision that involves the application of federal law. Coleman, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). A denial of relief under Section 5, without more, does not justify a presumption that the TCCA reached the federal merits of the petition. Balentine, 626 F.3d at 856. Petitioner offers no evidence or even an assertion that he satisfied the first prong of Section 5, which requires that a petitioner establish that the factual or legal basis of his claim was unavailable at the time of his first petition. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 11.071, 5(a). Unlike the uncertain situation faced by this court in Ruiz v. Thaler, 504 F.3d 523, 527 (5th