Opinion ID: 3165208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: alleged sentence calculation errors

Text: Javidan argues that the district court committed multiple errors in calculating her sentence. For the reasons explained below, we disagree.
After the jury verdict, the probation department prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR specified that Javidan’s base level offense was 24, which was calculated by totaling her base offense level of six, two levels for employing sophisticated means, and 16 levels because her scheme resulted in a loss between $1 and 2.5 million. The PSR also added four levels because Javidan was an organizer or leader of the scheme. This resulted in a total offense level of 28, which yielded an advisory sentencing range of 78-97 months. Javidan submitted a sentence memorandum that challenged the PSR’s monetary loss calculation and the organizer-leader enhancement. With regard to the PSR’s monetary calculation, Javidan argued that the government had not put forth sufficient evidence to prove that all of Acure’s Medicare receipts were obtained via fraud. As to the organizer-leader enhancement, she argued that Shahab clearly ran her business; thus, she should not be considered the organizer or leader. The district court adopted the PSR’s findings. Although it could have sentenced Javidan to a term between 78-97 months, it chose to impose a sentence of 65 months. Nos. 13-2598/2599 United v. Meda, et al. Page 22
Loss Calculation and Leadership Enhancement We review a district court’s calculation of the “amount of loss” for clear error, but consider the methodology behind it de novo. United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975, 984 (6th Cir. 2013). For loss calculation purposes, a district court need only make a “reasonable estimate” of the loss. United States v. Mahmud, 541 F. App’x 630, 635 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) In determining the monetary loss, the government had to initially show by more than a preponderance of the evidence the amount of the total loss. Id. at 636. The district court found that “the Government more than met its burden that Acure was entirely a fraud.” (Page # ID 6371.) It based its finding on the testimony of multiple witnesses. (Page # ID 6371.) Accordingly, the district court found that the $2.2 million figure produced in the PSR was accurate. (Page ID # 6369.) Once the district court made this finding, the burden was on Javidan to prove how much of her business was legitimate. See id. (“Once the Government met its burden to prove the total amount, it was [the defendant’s] burden to prove ‘the specific value’ by which the loss amount should have been reduced”). Javidan did not meet this burden, as she neglected provide any evidence. (Page ID # 6409-11.) Therefore, since Javidan did not meet her burden and because the district court’s finding was supported by evidence in the record, we hold that the district court’s loss calculation was a “reasonable estimate of the loss” and that no clear error occurred. See Muhmud, 541 F.App’x. at 636. Javidan contends that her business was not shown to be entirely fraudulent at trial, because she offered witnesses who testified that some of her business was legitimate. (Appellant Br. 44.) As shown above, the district court did not commit a clear error in deciding the loss amount. Moreover, the district court’s methodology was also correct. See Muhmud, 541 Fed. App’x. at 636. The district court provided Javidan an opportunity to produce evidence to prove what amount of Acure’s Medicare business was legitimate, as is required by Muhmud when a district court determines that an enterprise was completely fraudulent. Javidan failed to produce any evidence. (Page ID # 6409-11.) Consequently, she is not allowed to use this court for a second bite at the apple. Nos. 13-2598/2599 United v. Meda, et al. Page 23 Javidan also argues that she should not have been deemed a leader or organizer of Acure’s fraud scheme. The Sentencing Guidelines provides for a four-level enhancement “if the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants of was otherwise extensive.” See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). As pointed out by the government in its brief, Javidan had all the indicia of Acure’s leader/organizer in its Medicare fraud scheme. It is undisputed that she was a part owner of Acure (an enterprise that the district court found to be entirely fraudulent), that she signed Medicare’s enrollment form, and that she was the sole signature authority on Acure’s bank accounts. Based on those facts alone, the district court did not commit a clear error in finding her as leader/organizer. Reasonableness of Sentence The substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007). In reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we must “take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Id. Importantly, a below-the-Guidelines sentence is presumed not to be unreasonably severe. United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008). In arguing that her sentence was not substantively reasonable, Javidan alleges that the district court placed excessive weight on factors that lengthened her sentence. (Appellant Br. 5254.) Not only is that assertion not supported by the record, but the record reflects that the district court took many of her mitigating factors into account when deciding to sentence her to shorter term than the PSR recommended. Thus, her argument is without merit.