Opinion ID: 2626833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court of Appeals was correct to reject the Department's new, overbroad interpretation of WAC 296-127-018 and this court should affirm its decision

Text: ¶ 66 The plain language of WAC 296-127-018 provides that two conditions must be met before prevailing wages [2] will be required for drivers involved in the delivery of gravel, concrete, asphalt, or similar materials. First, the drivers must deliver . . . materials to a public works project site. WAC 296-127-018(2)(a). Second, the drivers must perform any spreading, leveling, rolling, or otherwise participate in any incorporation of the materials into the project. Id. Applying an accepted canon of statutory constructionejusdem generis [3] the Court of Appeals interpreted the latter requirement to mean that drivers must otherwise participate in incorporation of fill material at the site in a manner similar to spreading, leveling, or rolling  to be deemed participants in the incorporation process. Silverstreak, Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Labor & Indus., 125 Wash.App. 202, 211, 104 P.3d 699 (2005) (emphasis added). Because there was no evidence that the drivers had engaged in any activity similar to spreading, leveling, or rolling, the Court of Appeals reversed the Department's determination that the drivers had participated in the incorporation process. Id. at 216, 104 P.3d 699. I would affirm the Court of Appeals' decision on this point. ¶ 67 The majority rejects the Court of Appeals' determination for a number of reasons, all of which are erroneous. First, the majority suggests that the Court of Appeals has applied the rule of ejusdem generis in a manner that contradicts the legislature's intent in enacting the prevailing wage act (the Act) (chapter 39.12 RCW). Majority at 899. The purpose of the Act is twofold: (1) to protect employees working upon public works from substandard wages and (2) to preserve local wages. Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 84 Wash.App. 401, 406, 929 P.2d 1120 (1996) (Superior I) (citing Everett Concrete Products, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash.2d 819, 823, 748 P.2d 1112 (1988)), review denied, 132 Wash.2d 1009, 940 P.2d 654 (1997). Because the drivers here were merely delivering materials, they were not working upon a public works project within the meaning of the Act. See Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 112 Wash.App. 291, 299-300, 49 P.3d 135 (2002) (Superior II) (indicating mere delivery does not require prevailing wages), review denied, 149 Wash.2d 1003, 70 P.3d 964 (2003). Thus, denying these drivers prevailing (Seattle) wages [4] does not implicate the Act's purpose to protect employees working upon such projects. Additionally, under the Court of Appeals' interpretation, the Act's protective mechanisms will continue to function as to those drivers actually working upon public works projects. Thus, the court's reading of WAC 296-127-018 does not undermine the preservation of local wages. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of WAC 296-127-018, utilizing the rule of ejusdem generis, does not conflict with the legislature's intent. ¶ 68 The majority also errs in relying upon the term otherwise as a basis for rejecting the Court of Appeals' decision. According to the majority, the words `or otherwise participated' expand the coverage of the prevailing wage act to workers who participate in incorporating materials into the project in any way besides the three enumerated. Majority at 900. The majority would emphasize otherwise to the extent of ignoring the limiting terms spreading, leveling, or rolling, thus, contradicting its own admonition that a reviewing court has a duty to give meaning to every word in a regulation. Majority at 900. Like the Court of Appeals, I would decline to rewrite the statute by ignoring the words of limitation that are plainly present. Silverstreak, 125 Wash.App. at 217-18, 104 P.3d 699. ¶ 69 Finally, the majority faults the Court of Appeals for failing to accord the proper weight to the Department's interpretation of its own properly promulgated regulation. Majority at 900. However, it is actually the majority that has erred by giving too much deference to L & I or more precisely giving deference to the Department's belated reinterpretation of its policy. ¶ 70 In its final decision, the Department broadly interpreted the phrase or otherwise participate in any incorporation of the materials to encompass any activities by a driver who contribute[ ] to the efficiency and timely completion of an operation. Administrative Record (AR) at 3346-47 (relying on Superior II, 112 Wash.App. 291, 49 P.3d 135). L & I also interpreted the phrase to encompass all driver activities that are `directly related to the prosecution of the work' and `necessary for the completion of that work.' AR at 3347 (quoting Heller v. McClure & Sons, Inc., 92 Wash.App. 333, 337, 963 P.2d 923 (1998)). ¶ 71 As explained in detail by the Court of Appeals, the Department's reliance on both Superior II and Heller for its new, substantially broader interpretation of WAC 296-127-018 was misplaced. See Silverstreak, 125 Wash.App. at 216-17, 104 P.3d 699. Moreover, the Department's new interpretation completely disregards the plain language of WAC 296-127-018. See id. at 213, 218, 104 P.3d 699. Thus, L & I's decision was plainly erroneous and the Court of Appeals did not error in rejecting it. ¶ 72 In sum, the majority's rationale for rejecting the Court of Appeals' interpretation of WAC 296-127-018 is unconvincing. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals' interpretation and refuse to uphold the Department's new, overbroad reading of WAC 296-127-018. I would also affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that there is insufficient evidence that the end-dump truck drivers here participated in incorporation of fill material. See Silverstreak, 125 Wash. App. at 214, 104 P.3d 699.