Opinion ID: 2994430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count three: The Plaintiff’s Termination

Text: Violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement Lastly, Amundsen contends that the court erred when it dismissed his claim that he was terminated in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. He asserts that his claim is governed by federal law and therefore was not required to timely seek judicial review. We disagree because Illinois law governs the plaintiff’s claim. Under 29 U.S.C. sec. 152, the federal Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) does not cover Illinois employees working for a local public entity created by the state. See 29 U.S.C. sec. 152(2) (excluding any State or political subdivision thereof from its definition of employer)./6 Because the Park District is a political subdivision of the state of Illinois, state law applies and as such, [a]ll final administrative decisions by the personnel board discharging . . . an employee with career service status are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Review Law. 70 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1505/16a(c)(4)(J) (The Park District Act). Thus, when the Personnel Board’s decision to terminate Amundsen became final on December 29, 1997, Amundsen had 35 days to seek judicial review under Illinois state law. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-103 (Every action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision . . . .)./7 The record reveals and Amundsen conceded that he failed to file an appeal within 35 days of the Personnel Board’s final decision to terminate him./8 Thus, because he failed to meet the statute of limitations for seeking judicial review under Illinois law, the court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants on Count three. See Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 549 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ill. 1990) (The requirement that a complaint be filed within the 35-day limit is jurisdictional; if a complaint is not timely filed, no jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court and judicial review of the administrative decision is barred.)./9 Because the plaintiff failed to establish actual bias on the part of the hearing officer, failed to demonstrate that he was unconstitutionally denied the right to subpoena witnesses, and ignored the fact that the hearing was not required to comport with formal rules of evidence, we agree with the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Count one. We also conclude that the court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on Counts two and three because Amundsen failed to sufficiently allege facts in support of his conspiracy claim and failed to file a timely appeal under Illinois law, respectively. The district court’s decision is AFFIRMED. /1 The plaintiff’s original complaint was filed on May 8, 1998, and after the judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on virtually all counts, the court granted Amundsen leave to file an amended complaint. /2 Amundsen contends that he merely flicked [the child] on the forehead to get his attention. Nonetheless, the parents of the allegedly stricken child swore out a criminal complaint for battery against Amundsen. He was charged but was later acquitted. /3 We note that the Park District hearing officer found that [t]he advice [Amundsen] received from his union president . . . was only partially correct. While it is true that usual procedures require written notice of suspension, . . . such written notice is not mandated. . . . There is little evidence in support of Mr. Amundsen’s contention that this refusal to obey his superiors by leaving and not returning to Park District premises was based on a good-faith misunderstanding of the provisions of the Code of Conduct and on advice of his union president. Rather, it is reasonable to conclude that he refused to leave because he was obstinate, especially given his caustic responses to his superiors when they ordered him on numerous occasions to leave. /4 Amundsen was later acquitted of the charge. /5 Amundsen’s suit does not belong in federal court in spite of the fact that his claims are meritless because his allegation that he was discharged in violation of the collective bargaining agreement is governed by Illinois law. /6 Amundsen also mistakenly contends that the district court previously concluded that his claim falls under the Federal Labor Management Relations Act and thus, this court on appeal is bound by the court’s decision. Upon review of the record, we have been unable to discover any language in the court’s decision to support his assertion. /7 We also note that Section 12.3 of Amundsen’s collective bargaining agreement provides that Illinois law governs: Suspensions of any length and discharges may be appealed to the Personnel Board of the District in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Illinois Compiled Statutes (1992) and the Illinois Revised Statutes (1991) and the procedures of the Personnel Board and existing procedures and practices in effect on the effective date of this Agreement or as modified from time to time in accordance with Section 16.7 herein. /8 The plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to file an appeal of his discharge in the Illinois state court system and furthermore failed to file his federal suit until May 8, 1998, more than three months after the expiration of the 35-day statute of limitations. /9 Because Illinois state law governs the plaintiff’s claim that he was terminated in violation of his collective bargaining agreement, the district court had only pendent jurisdiction over the claim. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367. Although [t]he general rule is that when as here the federal claim drops out before trial (here way before trial), the federal district court should relinquish jurisdiction over the supplemental claim, Van Harken, 103 F.3d at 1354, the district judge chose not to do so. We see no reason to disturb the judge’s ruling because his interpretation of state law was correct and he correctly resolved the plaintiff’s suit rather than burden the state courts with the case. See id.