Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Denial of Motion for Recusal

Text: In May 1999, while this Court had jurisdiction of this appeal, but the matter had been remanded for the trial judge to decide Capano's motion for a new trial, Capano made two requests that Judge William Swain Lee recuse himself in view of Judge Lee's possible candidacy for governor and various newspaper articles highlighting his role in the Capano trial. Judge Lee denied these requests by letters to the parties, stating that his ability to impartially address [the pending motions] has not been affected by the trial's impact on other aspects of [his] life. On August 20, 1999, a formal motion for recusal was filed. Judge Lee denied the recusal motion on August 24, 1999. The next day, he issued his opinion denying the motion for a new trial. After several extensions of time, Capano's brief in the appeal of his conviction and sentencing was filed with this Court on February 4, 2000. Just before that filing, Capano filed a motion in this Court for a limited remand of the proceedings to enlarge the record on appeal in connection with the recusal issue. We denied this motion in an opinion dated March 17, 2000. [305] Instead of interrupting Capano's appeal by staying briefing on the merits in order to conduct an evidentiary hearing that might become an open-ended fishing expedition, [306] we directed Capano to file a supplemental brief on the recusal issue together with his other briefing. As we stated: The supplemental briefing should address discrete instances of judicial discretion by Judge Lee, the exercise of which may have (a) been motivated by political ambitions; and (b) influenced the outcome of the trial to Capano's prejudice. Assuming that the briefing demonstrates an appropriate issue or issues for factual inquiry, a remand on discrete issues may be necessary. If a remand becomes necessary, we will address these issues in the context of all other issues on appeal. On the other hand, we may never have to reach the issues raised by the motion, depending on the outcome of other aspects of the appeal. [307] We now consider Capano's argument in the context of his appeal from his conviction and sentence.
Capano contends that Judge Lee's ambition to run in the 2000 gubernatorial contest created the appearance, and, quite probably, the reality that because of political ambition, Judge Lee tilted in favor of both conviction and the death penalty because they were the politically popular outcomes in this widely publicized case. [308] Capano argues that based on the record submitted to this Court, consisting mainly of newspaper articles quoting Judge Lee, it was error for him to deny the motion for recusal, and that we should reverse the conviction and death sentence. Alternatively, Capano continues to argue for a limited remand to conduct a hearing into the factual basis of his argument. It is necessary to examine the record on which rests Capano's argument and his earlier recusal motion. On May 5, 1999, after sentencing but while a motion for new trial was pending, a news article was published in the Wilmington News Journal under the headline, Judge William Swain Lee May Run for Governor. [309] In addition, Capano cites a newspaper report containing statements allegedly made by Judge Lee indicating that Republicans had approached him during Capano's trial to encourage him to consider running for governor. [310] In suggesting that Judge Lee's political ambitions create a conflict of interest, Capano places particular emphasis on statements by Judge Lee in which he acknowledges the role that the Capano trial played in encouraging his candidacy. One newspaper article reports that in a speech given during Judge Lee's later campaign for the Republican nomination, he credited the Capano case and the guilty verdict for his popularity, saying that if Capano had been acquitted, the Judge would have been seen as just another judge who failed to see that the system did its job. [311] Another newspaper article reports Lee making similar comments on another occasion. [312] Capano argues that, given the link  belatedly acknowledged by Judge Lee himself  between the Judge's political interests and a completed trial resulting in a guilty verdict, Judge Lee cannot have been impartial when he ruled on the recusal motion and the motion for new trial.
Canon 3C(1) of the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct provides: a judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. When faced with a claim of bias or conflict of interest, the judge must follow a two-part analysis: First, he must, as a matter of subjective belief, be satisfied that he can proceed to hear the cause free of bias or prejudice concerning that party. Second, even if the judge believes that he has no bias, situations may arise where, actual bias aside, there is the appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge's impartiality. [313] On appeal of the trial judge's recusal decision, the reviewing court must determine: (i) whether, as a matter of subjective belief, the judge was satisfied that he or she could proceed to hear the case free of bias or prejudice concerning a party; and (ii) whether objectively there is an appearance of personal bias. [314] We must be satisfied that the trial judge engaged in the subjective test and will review the merits of the objective test. [315] The standard of review is abuse of discretion. [316] We are satisfied that Judge Lee's decision not to recuse himself was a proper exercise of discretion. In response to Capano's first request that he recuse himself, Judge Lee determined that his ability to impartially address [pending] issues has not been affected by the trial's impact on other aspects of my life. Judge Lee maintained this position in subsequently denying a second recusal request and a later motion for recusal. These responses fulfill the first part of the Los analysis described above. Accordingly, we turn to whether there is an objective appearance of bias in this case. The highly publicized nature of the Capano trial brought all the participants into the public spotlight, a fact that Judge Lee obviously realized. We see no basis, however, to extrapolate the reality or the appearance that Judge Lee was unable to act impartially in all matters pertaining to the guilt and sentencing phase. There is nothing in the record to suggest that political ambitions of Judge Lee affected his ability to preside impartially over the entire proceedings in this case. Moreover, as noted in our opinion of March 17, 2000, we directed the parties to identify and discuss discrete instances of judicial discretion by Judge Lee, the exercise of which may have (a) been motivated by political ambitions; and (b) influenced the outcome of the trial to Capano's prejudice. [317] In our view Capano has not satisfied this burden. Thus, Judge Lee's refusal to recuse himself, supported by his subjective belief that he could be impartial [318] was not an abuse of discretion. We find that Judge Lee did not violate the provisions of Canon 7 of the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 7A(2) states that a judge should not ... make speeches for a political organization or candidate or publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for public office. Canon 7A(3) prohibits judges from several forms of participation in political organizations, including attend[ing] political gatherings. [319] Canon 7C states that a judge should not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system or the administration of justice. The Delaware Court on the Judiciary has observed that a judge should not have to resign merely to learn whether he has a realistic chance of election.... [320] Any exploratory activity, however, must be done in a manner consistent with the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct. [321] Assuming that during Capano's trial or sentencing, Judge Lee had private conversations with one or more Republican leaders concerning a possible candidacy, such conversations did not violate his obligations under Canon 7. Likewise, assuming that Judge Lee was considering a possible candidacy, there is no evidence that he did so improperly under Canon 7. The Code of Judicial Conduct does not require judges to resign immediately upon conceiving of the possibility of running for office. [322] Nor does it disqualify judges who have been assigned to sensitive or well-publicized cases from seeking political office. [323] Capano's argument that Judge Lee acted improperly in this case because he entertained political ambitions has no basis in this record or Capano's proffer on remand.