Opinion ID: 544294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to mention the substantial step requirement

Text: 47 Mr. Martinez also contends that the district court's instruction on attempt was deficient for failure to mention the requirement that a defendant take a  ' substantial step ... strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent '  before being convicted of an attempt. See Martinez' Br. at 28 (quoting United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1072 (7th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114, 95 S.Ct. 792, 42 L.Ed.2d 812 (1975)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031, 96 S.Ct. 561, 562, 46 L.Ed.2d 404, 405 (1975)). 48 In describing the elements necessary to find a defendant guilty of criminal attempt, this court has applied the Mandujano formulation of attempt:First, the defendant must have been acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime which he is charged with attempting.... 49 Second, the defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. A substantial step must be conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent. 50 United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir.1985) (quoting Green, 511 F.2d at 1072), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1076, 106 S.Ct. 838, 88 L.Ed.2d 809 (1986). This same basic formulation of the elements of the offense is followed in other circuits. 14 In Rovetuso, this court upheld an attempt instruction that essentially tracked the Mandujano rule, and that did mention the substantial step requirement. Id. at 822; see also United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir.) (upholding an attempt instruction that contained the substantial step language), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 937, 95 S.Ct. 207, 42 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974). Other circuits have approved identical or similar instructions. 15 These cases, however, have not focused on the language at issue here. Indeed, there is a dearth of authority as to whether the substantial step language is essential to the instruction. 16 Only the Ninth Circuit has held squarely that, at least when counsel makes timely objection, such terminology is essential. United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 711-12 (9th Cir.1983). 17 Here, the jury was instructed that an attempt means wilfully to do some act in an effort to bring about or accomplish something the law forbids. Tr. at 538 (emphasis supplied). Mr. Martinez failed to object to the instruction at trial. Therefore, we review the record under the plain error standard. In order to constitute plain error, the alleged error must result in a  'miscarriage of justice'  of such magnitude that the defendant probably would have been acquitted absent the error. United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 356 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). Under this standard, we do not believe that reversal is justified. See United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1975) (upholding the some act formulation identical to the one at issue here under a plain error standard); see generally Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 & n. 7, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1922 & n. 7, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (under a charge of obscenity, instruction that erroneously directed jurors to use a contemporary community standard rather than a reasonable person standard to measure the value prong of the obscenity test was not necessarily reversible error; convictions may be affirmed despite instructional errors concerning standard of proof by which elements of crime must be found); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-80, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106-07, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (instructional error that impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of malice under a murder charge may constitute harmless error); United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 938 (7th Cir.1988) (failure to instruct clearly on an element of a crime is not necessarily plain error), opinion modified on other grounds, 838 F.2d at 841. The evidence that Mr. Martinez had taken a substantial step strongly corroborative of his criminal intent was so strong that any error resulting from the district court's omission of the substantial step language did not rise to the level of plain error. 18 The record shows that Mr. Martinez ordered several hydraulic jacks for Mr. Valencia, that he assisted in the installation of at least one of these devices in a sophisticated storage compartment for cocaine, and that he flew across the country in search of this equipment. Moreover, the evidence shows that Mr. Martinez assisted in the attempted purchase of cocaine by transporting large sums of money back to Mr. Valencia's house and assisting in the transaction in an effort to close the cocaine deal. These acts were strongly corroborative of Mr. Martinez' intent to facilitate the criminal act of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 19 E. Failure to Define Possession 51 Mr. Martinez also argues that the district court erred in failing to define possession within the jury instructions. Mr. Martinez contends on appeal, as he did below, that an instruction should have been given to distinguish the concepts of actual possession from constructive possession. The district court refused this instruction on the basis that the distinction between actual and constructive possession was irrelevant in the case. We agree with the district court. Mr. Martinez and Mr. Valencia were charged with attempted possession. To require the jury to find either actual or constructive possession in order to find Mr. Martinez guilty would obliterate the distinction between attempt and the completed offense. We agree with Mr. Martinez (and the cases he cites) that it is error to fail to instruct the jury on all the essential elements of the offense; however, neither actual nor constructive possession is an essential element of the offense with which he was charged. The essential element is attempted possession, which by definition means that the defendant did not commit the completed offense. 20 52 Moreover, Mr. Martinez could have been convicted for aiding and abetting Mr. Valencia's attempted possession of cocaine. We recently have noted that one who aids and abets another's possession of drugs with intent to distribute need not obtain either actual or constructive possession of the drugs in order to be found guilty as an aider and abettor. United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 609 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Wesson, 889 F.2d 134, 135 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 761 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3221, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (1989). It follows with even more logical force that one who aids and abets an attempted possession need not have either actual or constructive possession. And because the principal, Mr. Valencia, was charged only with attempted possession, the prosecution also was not required to prove that Mr. Valencia had either actual or constructive possession. Thus, there was no need in the jury instructions to define either actual or constructive possession. 53 F. Refusal to Give Mr. Martinez the Minimal rather than Minor Participant Adjustment 54 Finally, Mr. Martinez challenges the district court's application of section 3B1.2 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, he argues that he should have received a four-level minimal participant adjustment under section 3B1.2(a) rather than the two-level adjustment the district court awarded him under 3B1.2(b) for being a minor participant in the offense. This argument is meritless. We shall reverse a district court's findings and determinations under section 3B1.2 only if they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Tholl, 895 F.2d 1178, 1186 (7th Cir.1990). We certainly cannot say that the district court's decision to award Mr. Martinez a minor rather than a minimal participant adjustment was clear error. The Commentary to section 3B1.2 states that [t]he determination whether to apply subsection (a) [the minimal participant adjustment] or subsection (b) [the minor participant adjustment] ... is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case. Sec. 3B1.2 (Commentary, Background ) (emphasis supplied). Mr. Martinez contends that he is less culpable than the sample minimal participant described in Application Note 2 to section 3B1.2 who played no part in a very large drug smuggling operation other than to offload part of a single marihuana shipment. Sec. 3B1.2 Application Note 2. Mr. Martinez argues that his role was less serious because he handled no drugs, was unaware of the scope of the operation, and did nothing other than assist in the creation of a storage area. Martinez' Br. at 34. Mr. Martinez overlooks the fact that, in the offense with which he and Mr. Valencia were charged, no one handled drugs. Moreover, Mr. Martinez seeks to minimize his conduct by comparing it to that of some unspecified group whose existence and activities are not a part of the record. The section 3B1.2 adjustment requires us to focus on the defendant's role in the offense, rather than unspecified criminal conduct that is not part of the offense. Federal Sentencing Guidelines Sec. 3B1.2 (emphasis supplied); United States v. Tetzlaff, 896 F.2d 1071, 1074 (7th Cir.1990). Finally, his extensive participation in the acquisition of equipment and construction of a sophisticated storage compartment suggests that he had complete knowledge of the offense with which he was charged and that he made a substantial effort to see the criminal enterprise succeed. In light of all these circumstances, the district court did not clearly err in finding Mr. Martinez a minor, rather than a minimal, participant. III Mr. Valencia's Appeal A. The Instruction on Attempt 55 Mr. Valencia argues that the district court erred in giving several jury instructions and that the cumulative effect of this error was to diminish the government's burden of proof and to allow his conviction under less than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. The first such instruction Mr. Valencia submits was erroneous was the attempt instruction. Mr. Valencia contends that this instruction was deficient for its failure to mention that a substantial step beyond mere preparation is required in order to convict a person for an attempt. The instruction at issue read as follows: 56 To attempt an offense means wilfully to do some act in an effort to bring about or accomplish something the law forbids. 57 Tr. at 538. Because Mr. Valencia failed to object to this instruction below, he is precluded from raising this objection on appeal absent a showing of plain error. McNeese, 901 F.2d at 608; United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 935-36 (7th Cir.1988), opinion modified on other grounds, 838 F.2d at 841. 21 For the reasons discussed regarding Mr. Martinez' identical objection, supra pp. 683-85, we conclude that the omission of a substantial step discussion was not plain error in Mr. Valencia's case. The evidence showed that he already had negotiated the purchase of 150 kilograms with the undercover agent, had obtained a substantial sum of money with which to make his downpayment on the purchase, had modified his truck to enable him to haul large concealed quantities of cocaine, and had supervised the construction of an elaborate storage space in his garage for the cocaine. The evidence against Mr. Valencia was overwhelming that he had taken a substantial step  'strongly corroborative of the firmness of [his] criminal intent.'  United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1072 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031, 96 S.Ct. 561, 562, 46 L.Ed.2d 404, 405 (1975)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1076, 106 S.Ct. 838, 88 L.Ed.2d 809 (1986); see also United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1975) (upholding the some act formulation identical to the one at issue hereunder a plain error standard). B. The Conscious Avoidance Instruction 58 Mr. Valencia next argues that the district court erred in giving an ostrich or conscious avoidance instruction without giving a limiting instruction to make clear that this instruction applied only to defendant Martinez and not to Mr. Valencia. See supra p. 679 for the text of the conscious avoidance instruction. The essence of Mr. Valencia's argument here is that, because it was clear that Mr. Valencia either knowingly negotiated the cocaine deal or did not, an ostrich instruction was not appropriate in his case. We have no quarrel with Mr. Valencia's proposition that an ostrich instruction is appropriate only when a defendant pleads ignorance. See United States v. Talkington, 875 F.2d 591, 596 (7th Cir.1989). As noted earlier, this court has explained the limited circumstances under which the conscious avoidance instruction is appropriate: 59 A conscious avoidance instruction is 'properly given only when the defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge and there are facts and evidence that support an inference of deliberate ignorance.'  60 Talkington, 875 F.2d at 596 (quoting United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 92, 88 L.Ed.2d 76 (1985))). 22 61 It is clear that the district judge recognized that an ostrich instruction was not appropriate for Mr. Valencia. The judge allowed the instruction because he deemed it appropriate in light of Mr. Martinez' defense. Tr. at 411-15. He refused Mr. Valencia's request for a limiting instruction because he seemed to think there was no danger that Mr. Valencia would be convicted based on the ostrich instruction. Id. at 413-14. We cannot say that the district court erred in making this judgment. See United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1022-23 (7th Cir.1990) (rejecting a similar argument that an ostrich instruction intended for co-defendants had a prejudicial effect on a defendant who had admitted knowledge of the criminal venture). 23 62 Moreover, even assuming that the court erred by refusing to give the limiting instruction, such error was, at most, harmless. In considering an error in a jury instruction, we must view the instructions as a whole and determine  'whether the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty.'  United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 622 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003, 1010 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 3096, 57 L.Ed.2d 1137 (1978)). Here, there seems to have been no real danger that Mr. Valencia could have been convicted unfairly on the basis of the ostrich instruction. If the jury believed the government's version of the facts, it convicted Mr. Valencia on the basis of his direct intent as manifested by his negotiations with the undercover agent. If the jury had believed Mr. Valencia's version of the facts, it would have concluded that Mr. Valencia was negotiating over something totally unrelated to the purchase of cocaine (namely, the release of Diego Munoz) and would have acquitted him. Mr. Valencia does not contend that the government argued conscious avoidance as a theory under which he might be found guilty. Because the probability that the jury would have convicted Mr. Valencia on the basis of the ostrich instruction is so remote, we conclude that there is no ground for reversal. C. The Aiding and Abetting Instruction 63 Mr. Valencia's objection to the aiding and abetting instruction 24 is very similar to his objection to the conscious avoidance instruction. His argument simply is that, because the government's theory of the case was that Mr. Valencia was the principal (and, presumably, Mr. Martinez was the accomplice), there was no one left for Mr. Valencia to aid and abet. Therefore, he argues, the district court erred in giving an aiding and abetting instruction that could not possibly have applied to him. 64 Again, even assuming for sake of argument that the district court erred in failing to specify that the aiding and abetting instruction applied only to Mr. Martinez, such error was harmless. See Zapata, 871 F.2d at 622. There seems to have been no real danger that Mr. Valencia would be convicted on the basis of aiding and abetting or that the jury was confused or misled by the instruction. Throughout the government's case, Mr. Valencia's conduct was portrayed as that of a principal. As Mr. Valencia points out, the government in its closing argument portrayed Mr. Valencia's conduct as that of a principal. See Tr. at 448. Based on the evidence against Mr. Valencia as a principal and the government's theory of the case, we conclude that the danger of Mr. Valencia's being convicted on the basis of the aiding and abetting instruction was so remote that any error in not limiting this instruction to co-defendant Martinez was harmless.