Opinion ID: 187215
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Florida

Text: The final rule included the State of Florida for ozone and PM2.5. However, the proposed rule had included the State only for PM2.5. Petitioners sought reconsideration contesting the inclusion of the State as a whole for ozone and the inclusion of southern subregions for ozone and for PM2.5. Upon granting reconsideration as to ozone only, EPA affirmed its determination that the State should be included in CAIR. Petitioners now object to EPA's use of rounding at an initial screening stage for including the State for ozone as arbitrary and capricious. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A). Alternatively they contend that under Michigan, 213 F.3d 663, EPA was required to exclude parts of Southern Florida (south of latitude 28.67 for ozone and south of latitude 29.2 for PM2.5) that do not make a significant contribution to nonattainment, or at least the area south of latitude 26 for both ozone and PM2.5 because EPA initially had no data for this area. The record supports EPA's reasoned explanation for including the entire State for ozone and PM2.5. As an initial screening indicator of whether to include a state in CAIR for ozone, EPA considered whether the state's average contribution to ozone nonattainment in a downwind area was less than one percent of total nonattainment in the downwind area. [7] CAIR, 70 Fed.Reg. at 25,191. If so, then EPA would not test the state further; if not, then EPA would perform additional analysis to determine whether the state should be included. EPA found the State of Florida's average percent of contribution to nonattainment in Fulton County, Georgia to be 0.81 percent. Upon rounding up to one percent, EPA determined after further analysis that the State makes large and frequent contributions... to elevated ozone concentrations in Fulton Co[unty] and should be included for ozone. Reconsideration, 71 Fed.Reg. at 25,320. Although petitioners characterize this rounding as creating the nonsense result of transforming a number ... that is clearly `less than one percent' to one, Pet'rs' Br. at 28, the court owes substantial deference to EPA's technical expertise, see Appalachian Power, 249 F.3d at 1051-52, absent a showing of legal or factual error. Because petitioners challenge only the initial screening indicator and not the record evidence showing that the State of Florida meets the air quality threshold, [8] they can hardly protest that rounding did not serve the appropriate purpose of identifying the State for further analysis. EPA treated this State no differently than others at the initial screening stage. Even assuming the rounding convention were flawed, it was not dispositive of the State's inclusion in CAIR. Hence, no prejudice could be shown on the basis of that error alone. EPA reasonably explained that its use of the rounding convention is commonplace and customary as well as a reasonable means of creating a conservative initial indicator that cast[s] a wider net, with further winnowing to occur in subsequent steps when more detailed analysis is applied. Reconsideration, 71 Fed. Reg. at 25,320. Petitioners neither identify error resulting from use of rounding at the initial screening stage nor offer any persuasive reason to question EPA's choice of a technical convention that is reasonable on this record. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A). Neither have petitioners shown that EPA should have excluded any part of Southern Florida. EPA was not obligated to measure pollution coming from each possible slice of the State. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 684. The lack of information about a subregion conceivably might result in a miscalculation of the downwind contribution of the State as a whole, see id. at 682, but alone could not exonerate a subregion and does not undermine EPA's inclusion of the area south of latitude 26 for either ozone or PM2.5. Given the rulemaking record, EPA appropriately determined that the State of Florida as a whole should be included. In regard to inclusion of the area south of latitude 29.2 for PM2.5, petitioners submitted no modeling or data during the comment period to show that it was innocent of contributing to the State's collective downwind pollution impact. See id. at 684; Appalachian Power, 249 F.3d at 1050-51. Instead, their first request to EPA for assistance in duplicating EPA's modeling results came after the final rule was promulgated. They offer no reason why they could not present such modeling during the comment period. EPA thus properly denied reconsideration on inclusion of the State for PM2.5. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B). [9] In regard to ozone, petitioners submitted data in support of their request for reconsideration of inclusion of the area south of latitude 28.67. EPA declined to exclude this area. First, EPA found that the data was unpersuasive inasmuch as it has authority to regulate an upwind area even if its specific contribution may appear insubstantial as long as it contributes a measurable amount of pollution to the State's collective contribution to downwind nonattainment. Reconsideration, 71 Fed.Reg. at 25,321. The court agrees; EPA was not required to exclude an area that petitioners have drawn precisely in order to avoid the significance threshold. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 684; Appalachian Power, 249 F.3d at 1050. Second, EPA found that the area south of latitude 28.67 is not innocent of material contribution but contribute[s][a] substantial portion[ ] of the total ozone loading from Florida to Fulton County[, Georgia]. Reconsideration, 71 Fed.Reg. at 25,321 (citing Michigan, 213 F.3d at 683-84). As the contested area contributes almost one-third of the State's entire downwind ozone contribution, petitioners' challenge to its inclusion fails. Petitioners' other concerns, such as the test for measurable contribution and the alleged departure from EPA precedent, were not presented to EPA and thus the court does not address them. See supra notes 6 & 9; 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B); S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 472 F.3d at 891.