Opinion ID: 832062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Self-Defense Elements

Text: Bailey asserts that the trial court's erroneous, muddled, and confusing self-defense instructions violated his right to due process by lessening the prosecutor's burden of proof. As a general rule, the killing of another person in self-defense by one who is free from fault is justifiable homicide if, under all the circumstances, he honestly and reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that it is necessary for him to exercise deadly force. The necessity element of self-defense normally requires that the actor try to avoid the use of deadly force if he can safely and reasonably do so, for example by applying nondeadly force or by utilizing an obvious and safe avenue of retreat. [ People v. Riddle, 467 Mich. 116, 119, 649 N.W.2d 30 (2002).] In addition to these general concepts, the Supreme Court emphasized in Riddle that a person is never required to retreat from a sudden, fierce, and violent attack; nor is he required to retreat from an attacker who he reasonably believes is about to use a deadly weapon. Id. (emphasis in original). [A]s long as he honestly and reasonably believes that it is necessary to exercise deadly force in self-defense, the actor's failure to retreat is never a consideration, and he may stand his ground and meet force with force. Id. In contrast, when a defendant is voluntarily engaged in mutual, nondeadly combat that escalates into sudden deadly violence, the defendant must retreat. Riddle, supra at 131-132, 649 N.W.2d 30. The Supreme Court in Riddle explained further the following situation in which an affirmative obligation to retreat exists: One who was the aggressor in a chance-medley (an ordinary fist fight, or other nondeadly encounter), or who culpably entered into such an engagement, finds that his adversary has suddenly and unexpectedly changed the nature of the contest and is resorting to deadly force. This ... is the only type of situation which requires `retreat to the wall.' Such a defender, not being entirely free from fault, must not resort to deadly force if there is any other reasonable method of saving himself. Hence if a reasonable avenue of escape is available to him he must take it unless he is in his `castle' at the time. [ Id. at 133, 649 N.W.2d 30 (citation omitted, emphasis in original).] Once evidence of self-defense is introduced, the prosecutor bears the burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Elkhoja, 251 Mich. App. 417, 443, 651 N.W.2d 408 (2002), vac'd in part on other grounds 467 Mich. 916, 658 N.W.2d 153 (2003). Bailey submits that the following instructions of the trial court regarding the concept of an aggressor effectively eliminated his claim of self-defense: You've also got to remember that a person forfeits self-defense, even if they'd otherwise have it, have the right to it, if they were the first to use deadly force, that's the ultimate bootstrapping. You can't use deadly force, and then have someone respond to deadly force and say, Now I can use deadly force to defend myself. You just can't do that. Nor can a person claim self-defense if they provoked the other person into using deadly force. They deliberately provoke them into using deadly force, and then say, Well, now that they are, I can respond to it. Nor can a person claim self-defense if what they do is confront someone, intending, by their mere presence, to provoke that person into doing something, and then take advantage of it. That is all making the person who is claiming self-defense the aggressor. You have to be without fault. Without fault means that you can't be the first one to use, and you can't provoke the other person into doing it, and you can't set up a situation where what you mean for them to do is to take the first step so that you are then claiming to take the second step. [Emphasis supplied.] In People v. Heflin, 434 Mich. 482, 509, 456 N.W.2d 10 (opinion by Riley, C.J.); 434 Mich. 482, 456 N.W.2d 10 (1990), the Supreme Court explained that an act committed in self-defense but with excessive force or in which defendant was the initial aggressor does not meet the elements of lawful self-defense. In People v. Van Horn (On Remand), 64 Mich.App. 112, 115, 235 N.W.2d 80 (1975), this Court quoted with approval from Wharton's Criminal Law & Procedure (Anderson ed), § 229, p 501: It is generally held that the aggressor is the one who first does acts of such nature as would ordinarily lead to a deadly combat or as would put the other person involved in fear of death or serious bodily injury. We find that the trial court improperly stated the law regarding the concept of an aggressor, particularly as to defendant Bailey, when he instructed the jury in this regard. No legal authority in Michigan supports that one becomes an aggressor merely by presenting oneself to the victim on a public street, even if armed. In People v. Bright, 50 Mich. App. 401, 405, 213 N.W.2d 279 (1973), this Court held that merely possessing a loaded weapon does not take away the claim of self-defense from an individual. In People v. Townes, 391 Mich. 578, 586-592, 218 N.W.2d 136 (1974), our Supreme Court rejected the notion that the defendant's trespass at a tire store and his attempted provocation of a store employee precluded him from arguing self-defense. Although the defendant shared some degree of fault for the encounter, he was nevertheless entitled to claim self-defense. Similarly, in Riddle, the Supreme Court explained that even one who is an aggressor in a chance-medley may be entitled to use deadly force, depending on the circumstances. Riddle, supra at 133, 649 N.W.2d 30. The Supreme Court stated that where a defendant `invites trouble' or meets nonimminent force with deadly force, his failure to pursue an available, safe avenue of escape might properly be brought to the attention of the factfinder as a factor in determining whether the defendant acted in reasonable self-defense. Id. at 127, 649 N.W.2d 30. Inviting trouble, according to Riddle, includes voluntarily participating in mutual nondeadly combat. Id. at 142, 649 N.W.2d 30. Further, it is generally accepted that [o]ne may, without forfeiting his right to defend himself against attack, seek an interview with another in a peaceable manner, for the purpose of demanding an explanation of offensive words or conduct or demanding the settlement of a claim, and according to many decisions, he need not go in a friendly spirit. He may, it seems, assert self-defense as excuse or justification, even though he arms himself before seeking the interview. [26 Am Jur, Homicide, § 131]. Standing alone, Bailey's armed presence on the street does not amount to either fault or provocation. Contrary to the trial court's charge, confront[ing] someone, intending, by their mere presence to provoke an affray does not eliminate one's potential opportunity to invoke a self-defense. Rather, Bailey's actions amount to conduct that a jury must evaluate, along with the totality of the surrounding circumstances, in deciding whether he started an assault ... with deadly force [or] with a dangerous or deadly weapon. CJI2d 7.18. The trial court's mere presence instruction additionally contradicts CJI2d 7.19, Nondeadly Aggressor Assaulted with Deadly Force: A defendant who (assaults someone else with fists or a weapon that is not deadly/insults someone with words/trespasses on someone else's property / tries to take someone else's property in a nonviolent way) does not lose all right to self-defense. If someone else assaults him with deadly force, the defendant may act in self-defense, but only if he retreats if it is safe to do so. Furthermore, no record evidence supports that Bailey intended by his mere presence to incite or provoke the victim. Construed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the record reveals that Bailey did not know the victim, and agreed to accompany Lambeth so that Lambeth could confront the victim. Contrary to the trial court's instruction, Bailey's mere presence at this confrontation, without more, did not automatically render him an aggressor, and did not eliminate his ability to claim self-defense.