Opinion ID: 1103270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether clay county is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations.

Text: ś 27. Williams argues that Clay County should be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Equitable estoppel can be asserted to a statute of limitations defense to avoid a serious injustice if there is inequitable conduct. Trosclair v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 757 So.2d 178, 181 (Miss.2000). Estoppel is action or nonaction that induces another's reliance thereon, either in the form of action or nonaction, to his or her detriment. Carr, 733 So.2d at 265 (quoting Fritsch v. St. Croix Cent. Sch. Dist., 183 Wis.2d 336, 515 N.W.2d 328 (Ct.App. 1994)). For equitable estoppel to apply, there must be a representation by a party, reliance by the other party, and a change in position by the relying party. Carr, 733 So.2d at 265. Governmental entities are not immune from equitable estoppel. Id. ś 28. We did not apply equitable estoppel to prevent the State from asserting a statute of limitations defense when the State was diligent in working with the claimant and made attempts to settle the claim. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Stringer, 748 So.2d 662, 665 (Miss.1999). Stringer was in constant contact with the Department of Public Safety after his accident. Id. at 664. He was paid for his property damage, but rejected two offers to settle his other claims. Id. Stringer filed his complaint two years after the accident. Id. Addressing his equitable estoppel argument, we stated, [a]dditionally, while inequitable or fraudulent conduct does not have to be established to estop an assertion of an inadequate notice of claim defense, inequitable or fraudulent conduct must be established to estop a party from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Id. at 665. We also stated that equitable estoppel should not be applied liberally: Although under certain circumstances a defendant's actions may be such that estop that defendant from claiming the protection of a statute of limitations, we do not agree that equitable estoppel should be applied so liberally as to allow a plaintiff to assert estoppel where no inequitable behavior is present. Statutes of limitations are well established in our judicial system. We have stated their purpose before as follows: The primary purpose of statutory time limitations is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time. These statutes are founded upon the general experience of society that valid claims will be promptly pursued and not allowed to remain neglected. They are designed to suppress assertion of false and stale claims, when evidence has been lost, memories have faded, witnesses are unavailable, or facts are incapable of production because of the lapse of time. Accordingly, the fact that a barred claim is a just one or has the sanction of a moral obligation does not exempt it from the limitation period. These statutes of repose apply with full force to all claims and courts cannot refuse to give the statute effect merely because it seems to operate harshly in a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... Deficiencies, if such there should be, in statutes of limitation should be remedied by the legislature. It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.... Stringer, 748 So.2d at 665-66 (quoting Smith v. Sneed, 638 So.2d 1252, 1263 (Miss.1994) (Hawkins, C.J., dissenting)). We found there was no allegation or evidence the State misled or caused Stringer to believe he did not need to comply with the notice provision or statute of limitations. Id. at 667 ś 29. Here, Robinson, the chancery clerk, told Williams that Clay County would pay for any valid medical claims. In his letter to Waide, Robinson admitted he told Williams this on March 16, 2000, but he also stated that she never presented any bills or medical claims as of that date, February 13, 2001. Robinson's conduct did not rise to the level of inequity or fraud. He told Williams that Clay County would pay a valid claim, yet Williams never presented any bills or anything indicating her expenses. Instead of bringing forth her medical bills so the county could review or pay them, she brought suit nearly fifteen months after her accident. As in Stringer, there is no allegation or evidence that Robinson misled or caused Williams to believe that she did not have to comply with the statute. [6] ś 30. This claim is without merit.