Opinion ID: 2757661
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffectiveness Regarding Teresa Jones

Text: Blake contends that upon learning that Teresa pleaded guilty to petit theft and was sentenced to probation, Blake’s trial counsel should have investigated the circumstances of Teresa’s pending charge of armed robbery and what Teresa hoped to gain from cooperating with the State. Blake asserts that the timing of the plea agreement demonstrates that Teresa received a lenient sentence in exchange for her testimony against Blake. The postconviction court did not err in denying relief. Blake has not established that his trial counsel’s investigation of the plea agreement or cross-examination of Teresa was unreasonable. Prior to calling Teresa as a State witness at Blake’s trial, prosecutor Castillo informed the defense that he just learned that the day before, Teresa had entered a plea in an unrelated case. The trial court bifurcated Teresa’s testimony to give trial - 24 - counsel an opportunity to research the plea agreement before cross-examining Teresa. The next day, the parties and the trial court further discussed the issue. Blake’s trial counsel stated that he intended to cross-examine Teresa on “the fact that she was charged with a crime similar to [the crime with which Blake was charged] and that she entered a plea to a much lesser offense.” Defense counsel further stated, however, that he did not intend to ask Teresa if she received the plea deal in exchange for her testimony. Trial counsel explained that after speaking with Assistant State Attorney Pickard, the prosecutor handling Teresa’s robbery case, and William Sites, Teresa’s attorney, trial counsel “d[i]dn’t believe there’s any evidence to support” that theory. Trial counsel then cross-examined Teresa about her two prior convictions involving crimes demonstrating dishonesty and inquired about her recent plea agreement. Trial counsel asked Teresa why, after being charged with armed robbery with a firearm, she was able to plead to misdemeanor petit theft. Teresa answered: “Because I was innocent.” At the evidentiary hearing, prosecutor Pickard testified that he offered Teresa the opportunity to plead guilty to petit theft and receive a sentence of six months of probation. Pickard stated that he signed the plea agreement on November 4, 2004, and then sent it to Teresa’s attorney. Pickard testified that he made the lenient offer because—based on his reading of police reports—he believed the State had a poor case against Teresa and that if he took the charge to - 25 - trial, it would likely result in a directed verdict of not guilty. Pickard could not remember if, at the time of offering the plea, he was aware that Teresa was a potential witness in Blake’s case, but he was aware of the connection by the time Teresa accepted the agreement on February 22, 2005. Pickard further testified that he did not have any conversations with Teresa about her cooperating with the State, and that due to the trial courts’ dockets at that time, a plea offer from early November being accepted in mid-February was “about the right time frame.” Attorney Sites confirmed that the plea agreement was not offered in exchange for Teresa’s testimony against Blake. Sites testified that while he could not remember the dates involved, he negotiated a plea agreement on Teresa’s behalf in an armed robbery case and that she accepted the offer of a misdemeanor conviction and a sentence of probation. Sites further testified that during the negotiation, there was no mention of a homicide case that involved Blake.
In this portion of his appeal, Blake contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Teresa with her prior inconsistent statements. Prior to testifying at Blake’s 2005 trial for the Patel shooting, Teresa gave statements to law enforcement officers on August 12, 2002, and August 14, 2002; testified before a grand jury on August 29, 2002; participated in a deposition on June 14, 2003; testified against Blake in an unrelated June 2004 trial; and testified - 26 - at Green’s 2004 trial for the Patel shooting. Blake has demonstrated that only minimal additional impeachment was possible. Thus, he has not shown that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s cross-examination of Teresa. Prior to Teresa’s cross-examination at Blake’s 2005 trial, the trial court, the attorneys, and Teresa discussed the fact that she should not refer to Blake’s 2004 trial during her testimony. To avoid revealing the unrelated homicide to the jury during the guilt phase, trial counsel Gil Colon explained to Teresa that if he intended to ask her about her testimony at a prior trial, he would ask her about her “prior testimony” or the “hearing.” Trial counsel then cross-examined Teresa about the differences between her current testimony, her 2004 “prior testimony,” and her 2002 grand jury testimony. Trial counsel specifically asked Teresa about her varying statements regarding whether on August 12, 2002, she saw Blake remove two guns from the abandoned car. Defense counsel also examined Teresa about her 2004 testimony, in which Teresa stated that her 2002 testimony before the grand jury about Blake removing the guns from the car was fabricated in an effort to satisfy the law enforcement officers who investigated the case. Blake’s defense counsel did not, however, confront Teresa with an available, inconsistent statement when Teresa testified that Blake told her that he shot someone. The prosecutor asked Teresa if on August 12, 2002, Blake told her that - 27 - he shot someone. Teresa answered: “Something like that.” The State refreshed Teresa’s memory by showing her a copy of her 2002 grand jury testimony and again asked whether Blake stated that he shot someone. This time, Teresa answered, “[y]es.” Blake contends that defense counsel should have crossexamined Teresa about her 2003 deposition, in which she stated: “I didn’t say nothing about no shooting. I never said nothing about no shooting. [Blake] told me he was fighting.” Trial counsel acted reasonably in not confronting Teresa with her 2003 deposition. When Teresa testified during her 2003 deposition that Blake did not admit to shooting someone, the State impeached Teresa with a prior inconsistent statement, in which she told the investigating detectives that on August 12, 2002, Blake said: “[H]e got into it with somebody. He hit him with a bat and he shot him.” Accordingly, if trial counsel attempted to impeach Teresa with her 2003 deposition, trial counsel would have opened the door for the State to examine Teresa about her 2002 statement to the detectives, which was made just days after the Patel shooting. “Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present evidence that would open the door to damaging cross-examination and rebuttal evidence that would counter any value that might be gained from the evidence.” Johnson v. State, 921 So. 2d 490, 501 (Fla. 2005). - 28 - Blake also contends that trial counsel should have impeached Teresa with her testimony during Green’s 2004 trial that she hoped that she and Green would receive a benefit from the State in exchange for their cooperation. During Blake’s 2005 trial, Teresa testified that no one had promised her anything in exchange for her testimony. In contrast, during Green’s 2004 trial, the following exchange occurred between defense counsel and Teresa: Q. Now, Ms. Jones, have you ever been charged with anything or accused of anything in connection with this case? A. No. Q. And did—the police officers, did they offer you anything in any way? A. As in if we was to help them? Q. Um-hum. A. Yes. Q. What did they offer you? A. That if we helped them get what they wanted, then they would help us. They just wanted the person that shot [Patel]. Although Blake’s trial counsel did not cross-examine Teresa about this testimony, her comment about expecting “help” from the State would have been cumulative. The jury was aware that Teresa had received lenient treatment from the State.
Next, Blake argues that the postconviction court should have concluded that his trial counsel was ineffective for not questioning Teresa about whether her testimony was motivated by a fear that if she did not assist the State, the State would attempt to take her children away from her. Blake appears to contend that if - 29 - asked, Teresa would have admitted having a fear of losing her children or that if she denied having such a fear, trial counsel could have used extrinsic evidence to impeach her. Blake did not establish that reasonable trial counsel should have known about this potential bias. During the evidentiary hearing, Blake produced a document from the Winter Haven Police Department. It was signed by a detective and dated December 13, 2002. The report read: On 12-09-2002, I was assigned this case for follow-up investigation. This case is a result of DCF case #02-193854, which alleges child abuse. I met with the family and found the children were normally clothed and well behaved. The apartment was orderly and there was a normal amount of food. The children appeared healthy and happy and denied any abuse or neglect. The suspect, Teresa Jones stated that she never sends her kids out at night for any reason. She feels that this was falsely reported by a neighbor who is angry at her. Case closed/unfounded. Whether this report would tend to establish that Teresa was biased is unclear. On one hand, the report shows that Teresa’s parenting was investigated by law enforcement officers shortly after the Patel shooting. On the other hand, the report clears Teresa of wrongdoing, indicating that she would no longer need to fear losing custody of her children as a result of that accusation of child abuse. Blake also relies on the evidentiary hearing testimony of Priscilla Hatcher and Travell Jones. Hatcher testified that a few days after Blake was arrested, she observed a uniformed law enforcement officer, who she knew by the name Mouse, - 30 - say to Teresa and Green: “You better come with me and I can help you out of this. You want your kids taken away? It’s you or them, it’s you or them, you better tell them what they want to hear, it’s up to you.” Travell Jones (Travell), in turn, testified at the evidentiary hearing: [Teresa] was more afraid of something happening to her kids, or somebody doing harm to her. So she said she wasn’t going to get involved in the Court system with this and she advised me not to either at that time. So, anyway, nobody ever came forward and asked me nothing about it so I never said anything to any cops or anything about the situation and so on. When reviewing whether counsel’s investigation was deficient, “a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Ferrell v. State, 918 So. 2d 163, 170 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527)). “Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant.” Id. at 170 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533). Here, Blake failed to demonstrate that trial counsel knew or should have known to ask Teresa whether she had any concern about State action regarding her children. The record does not establish whether the State provided the police report to trial counsel, and Blake does not explain why trial counsel should have known to interview Hatcher or Travell about Teresa’s possible bias. Furthermore, while Hatcher’s comment could support the inference that Teresa testified against - 31 - Blake because she feared the State would take her children, Travell’s statement can be read to suggest that Teresa actually feared that Blake would harm her children if she cooperated with the State. “An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the failure to present . . . evidence where that evidence presents a double-edged sword.” Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 437 (Fla. 2004).
In his last argument regarding trial counsel’s examination of Teresa, Blake contends that trial counsel should have objected to or cross-examined Teresa about her testimony that she hesitated to tell the grand jury about Blake removing the guns from the car because at that time, she had received threatening phone calls and was “a little bit” afraid of Blake or his family. Blake has not demonstrated that trial counsel erred. Blake asserts that the testimony could have been excluded under section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2005), which provided that “[r]elevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” This argument is without merit. The question of why Teresa did not testify consistently at trial and before the grand jury was relevant to Teresa’s credibility. The danger of unfair prejudice—that if the jurors heard that Blake or his family were making threatening phone calls, they might conclude that - 32 - Blake was a violent person—did not substantially outweigh its probative value regarding Teresa’s credibility. Alternatively, Blake contends that if trial counsel failed to exclude the testimony, trial counsel should have cross-examined Teresa about her fear of Blake’s family. At trial, the State asked Teresa if she was afraid of Blake or his family, and Teresa answered, “[n]ot no more, no.” Blake has not explained how further questioning Teresa about her former—but no longer existing—fear would have been helpful to Blake.