Opinion ID: 2304074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Adams also argues that his petition for post-conviction relief should be granted because the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction on jurisdiction. The trial court, utilizing a special verdict, instructed the jury that there were two possible bases for jurisdiction. First, the jury may find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes occurred in Maryland. Second, the jury may find that the State had jurisdiction to prosecute the crimes under Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 465. Adams's post-conviction contention on this score, however, also has been waived. As discussed above, it is clearly established that failure to object to a jury instruction at trial normally constitutes waiver of that ground for purposes of the UPPA. Adams failed to object at the time of the instruction and also failed to raise an appropriate issue on direct appeal. [37] Adams has not rebutted the presumption of waiver. Furthermore, he has not shown any reason for us to excuse this waiver. The arguments upon which Adams relies in his arguments regarding the advisory jury instructions do not apply to his arguments regarding the jurisdiction alternatives. Arguments regarding jurisdiction were reasonably available to his trial counsel. Adams's counsel argued throughout the case about this point. At a preliminary hearing, counsel for Adams and counsel for Adams's then co-defendant, Knight, demonstrated apt understanding of the distinction between venue and jurisdiction. Counsel for Knight: Now, we think, we submit to the Court, that that conduct, those rapes which occurred outside of the State of Maryland, by virtue of the State's own evidence, this Court does not have jurisdiction over and we ask the Court to determine that question as a preliminary matter, since these counts are present in the indictment and testimony would be allowed otherwise to come before the jury relating to alleged criminal acts over which this Court has no jurisdiction. We think that the reliance of the State upon the provisions of the Maryland Statute in question, in light of the facts, make it really a question of law which can be determined in advance of trial; and therefore, if decided in favor of the defendant would not put the defendant in the position of having evidence come into this trial with respect to the allegations of the other charges in this indictment of rape that are alleged to have occurred in Maryland, that would infect the entire trial with evidence of a great many rapes over which the Court has no jurisdiction. The introduction of that testimony would prejudice the defendant severely, if otherwise not admissible, and so determined later. So, we would ask the Court to determine that as a preliminary matter. Court: All right. I assume you join in that, [Adams's Defense Counsel]? Adams's Defense Counsel: Yes, I would join in [Counsel for Knight's] argument. And I would also add that it is basic law that in order for a given State to have jurisdiction over a criminal act the act basically must have occurred within the State. Now in this particular case I think it is incumbent upon the State to show the critical element, to wit, the perpetration of a rape occurred in the State of Maryland. As [Counsel for Knight] pointed out, the State's own witnesses, at least in preliminary reports, clearly indicate those acts did not take place in the State of Maryland. Court: All right. State's Attorney: Your Honor, I would point out a number of things. First of all, Article 27, Section 465, I suggest to the Court in fact makes it a crime to actually transport with intent to rape, regardless of where the rape eventually occurs. I would point out, first of all, under that particular statute that even if all the rapes occurred in D.C., which we do not in any way either suggest of [sic] concede, that the State would have jurisdiction, providing that we show that at the time of transportation there, in fact, was an intent to commit rapes. The Legislature I think clearly made it a crime in and of itself to transport with that intent, made it a crime equivalent to the actual act of rape. Secondly, in this particular case I think it is without dispute that some of the rapes without a doubt occurred in the State of Maryland. . . . . For all those reasons we ask the Court [to] deny the motions. Counsel for Knight: Your Honor, [the State's Attorney's] first comment, that 465 creates a separate crime, I don't believe that is true. But in any event, they weren't indicted for violation of 645, if that us some of new crime that is created. Court: I don't think 465 creates any kind of crime. Counsel for Knight: He indicates a crime. Court: It creates jurisdiction. State's Attorney: That is what I meant to say. Court: I have read this four times, and it says that if somebody transports with intent to violate any of the provisions, and that is any of the provisions of this subheading, which I assume is all rape offenses, and the intent is followed by an actual violation of this subheading, the defendant may be tried in an appropriate court within whose jurisdiction the county lies, where the transportation was offered, solicited, has begun, continued, or ended. I think it describes this. If you form an intention eventually to rape somebody, and you start out in Baltimore and you end up in the State of Washington, and you finally rape her there, I think this statute says that Baltimore has jurisdiction. Counsel for Knight: Well, I would submit to the Court that my interpretation of that statute, and would hope the Court would accept this interpretation of the statute, is that that statute relates to intercountry situations and intrastate situations; that Maryland would be constitutionally powerless to extend its jurisdiction for an act which occurs outside of its boundaries by saying that if you merely form the intent in Maryland you are guilty of the substantive crime. That creates constitutional problems which I believe could only be avoided by interpreting that section the way the Court has interpreted that section in the annotation to that section, and that is a Baltimore City-Baltimore County situation, that provides for the place where trial may be held. And certainly there would be no constitutional problem to that, because there is no constitutional right to venue. But there certainly is a constitutional limitation on the power of the Court to extend its jurisdiction beyond the physical boundaries. And we would submit to the Court that the only way to avoid that inherent problem is the Courtand this is the only case that I have been able to find on this particular section Court: That had to do with Baltimore CountyBaltimore City? Counsel for Knight: That is correct. I recognize the facts of that case are of little help under the circumstances. Court: I understand that. Counsel for Knight: But it is the only law that we have in Maryland. And I think that basically jurisdictional and constitutional law tells us that the State of Maryland can't extend its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries for a substantive act. And I think even though it is a venue case, the McBurney [38] case is also instructive with respect to this case. We have here a crime. A crime is not completed when the intent is formed to commit the rape. [Actus reus] is also an integral part of the crime, and that is really what establishes jurisdiction. So, I submit to the Court that on [the State's Attorney's] legal theory it can't create a separate offense. And I agree with the Court it doesn't purport to create a separate offense. I think it creates a situation where Prince George's County could try a guy for picking up somebody in Prince George's County and transporting them and raping them in Montgomery County. Court: All right. Is there a motion here for me to decide this preliminarily? Counsel for Knight: That is correct. Court: All right. Anything else you want to tell me? Adams's Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I would again adopt [Counsel for Knight's] arguments, and I would like to argue to the Court another line of cases where situations did arise where the acts were crossing state lines, particularly between the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia. In one case, your Honor, the case of Bowen v. State, 206 Md. 368 [111 A.2d 844 (1955) ], a case of larceny after trust and embezzlement, where the acts were connected with Maryland, but the conversion of the assets and all the transactions involving the checks took place in D.C. The conviction by a Maryland Court was reversed for lack of jurisdiction. Another case is Goodman v. State, 237 Md. 64 [205 A.2d 53 (1964)], where a person obtained a prescription falsely to obtain narcotic drugs in Montgomery County, went to the District of Columbia and passed a prescription, received drugs. The Court held the critical element of the offense, which was passing the drugs, did not take place within the State of Maryland; therefore, Maryland did not have jurisdiction. Court: You didn't have a statute, did you? Adams's Defense Counsel: No, your Honor. Court: Didn't have any kind of statute like this. Adams's Defense Counsel: I would also cite Urciolo [v. State], 272 Md. 607 [325 A.2d 878 (1974)], with which the Court may be familiar. But your Honor, again I submit that Maryland has no authority to legislate itself into having jurisdiction over acts that do not occur within the State. During the direct examination of Kathy P., Adams's counsel objected to Kathy P.'s testimony that the rapes occurred on Branch Avenue. At that point, the parties approached the bench, and the following discussion occurred: Adams's Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I am going to object to any testimony about any sexual acts, because as I understand it now counsel is not in a position to proffer that any of those acts took place in the State of Maryland. As I understand it at this point the evidence that the State poses is to the contrary, being that all sexual acts took place within the District of Columbia. State's Attorney: Your Honor, the evidence that we have, and I think it will come out through testimony, is as follows: That they started to undress her while she was on Branch Avenue, toward the District of Columbia; but at some point later she was in fact raped. When she was first raped she asked the individuals in the van where she was. They said in Maryland. She was then moved to another location, at which point she was raped by other individuals. She doesn't know where she was. . . . . At any rate, under the jurisdiction statute which I previously cited the Court, Article 27, 465, I think it is quite clear we have the transportation in this county either beginning, continuing or ending, and the intent is, in fact to commit a sexual offense, and when such action as that occurs the statute gives this county jurisdiction to prosecute, and that is the reason we are proceeding. Adams's Defense Counsel: Your Honor, it is the position of the defendant that this statute cannot extend the jurisdiction of the State of Maryland beyond the State borders, but must be strictly within the counties within the state. The exchanges illustrate that not only was the post-conviction argument regarding jurisdiction reasonably available to be made by Adams's counsel at trial, but that Adams's counsel understood the distinction between jurisdiction and venue. Therefore, Adams's objection regarding the jury instructions and special verdicts regarding jurisdiction was waived by his failure to object at trial or raise the issue on direct appeal. [39]