Opinion ID: 1907823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the 1928 public land patent to taltavull was valid

Text: ¶ 34. The trial court held that the land patent from the State presumedly conveying the land in question to Taltavull, one of IPM's supposed predecessors in interest, was null and void for want of authority. Taltavull had owned the IPM parcel of land in 1928 where he operated his Biloxi Canning and Packing Company and Bay View Crushing Company businesses engaged in oyster canning and crushing and disposing of the byproduct shells. On July 11, 1928, the State of Mississippi issued a Public Land Patent to Taltavull, for consideration of $8.13. The biennial report of the Commissioner of State Lands dating from July 1, 1927, to June 30, 1929, shows the Taltavull Patent to be 6.5 acres of land for a consideration of $8.13, the statutory minimum of $1.25 per acre as fixed by law in the 1906 Mississippi Code. The trial court concluded that [t]here is no credible evidence that the statutory minimum consideration paid by Taltavull for the patented land is so grossly inadequate that it constitutes a donation prohibited by Section 95 our State Constitution, and we agree. ¶ 35. However, the trial court went further and found there were no later conveyances from Taltavull divesting him, his heirs or devises, of title to the patented land and there were no conveyances vesting IPM or its predecessors in title with any interest in the land. Thus the trial court found the patent null and void for want of authority and violative of section 81 of our state constitution (Legislature shall never authorize the permanent obstruction of any of the navigable waters of the State). ¶ 36. Bayview and IPM argue that Taltavull conveyed to Roy Rosalis and Virgilio DosSantos the upland and the part of the patent area filled. However, the trial court found that no part of the patented land was included in the conveyance. Bayview and IPM point out that the Chancery Court of Harrison County upheld a similar grant of such tidelands to the Beau Rivage, and argue that there is no material difference between the character of the tidelands, the grantee, or the public purposes of the trust that were served through the grant. In Money v. Wood, 152 Miss. 17, 118 So. 357 (1928), this Court voided an attempted sale of public state land to a private party under what was then Section 2919 Miss.Code of 1906 (currently Miss.Code Ann. § 29-1-65). This doctrine has been reaffirmed in International Paper Co. v. Mississippi State Highway Dep't, 271 So.2d 395, 399 (Miss. 1972). See also Cinque Bambini, 491 So.2d at 521. This Court held that the state cannot convey in fee such rights to private owners for private purposes because the Court found no authority given to the land commissioner to make such a conveyance. Money, 152 Miss. at 29, 118 So. at 359 (relying on Huber v. Freret, 138 Miss. 238, 103 So. 3 (1925)). Finding the deeds absolutely void for want of authority on the part of the land commissioner to make such a sale, this Court reasoned that land in the statute at issue in that case meant dry land and not submerged land. Id. at 359-60. This Court found there that the improvements planned by the purchaser for the land purchased were not for any public purpose but rather for private enterprise, designed as a scheme of financial advantage. Id. at 358. The trial court distinguished Treuting, where a public land patent to the Biloxi Park Commission was upheld, based on the facts of that particular case. The overall purpose of the conveyed, submerged land in Treuting was to be development of a large marina and some 46 miles of inland waterways fronted by residential property, with plans of better access to seafood packing plants for fishing boats, and a reduction of wave action on the shore of Biloxi, offering greater protection to the Biloxi harbor area. 199 So.2d at 631. When the project is completed, approximately twenty-seven percent of the land area of Deer Island will be devoted to public uses. Included in this classification is land for two 18-hole golf courses, two nine-hole courses, beaches, parks, green belts, waterways, schools, churches, marinas, and similar facilities. Another twenty percent of the island's surface will be allocated to such uses as street rights of way, utility easements, sewage treatment plants, water wells, and fire stations. The remaining fifty to fifty-three percent of the island will be devoted to residential, commercial and resort development. The completed project will offer 8,700 residential units for sale on the island. A fixed level bridge to the island will be built with a horizontal clearance of 125 feet and a vertical clearance of 50 feet. All of the some 280 vessels which make Biloxi their home port will be able to pass under this bridge.       The cost of constructing the project is estimated to be some forty million dollars. The project will be financed by revenue bonds, secured by the sale of property on the island. Revenue from the island is expected to produce some forty million dollars. Id. ¶ 37. In the end, this Court concluded in Treuting that this action by the State was an appropriate exercise of authority and consistent with the overall purposes of the public trust. [B]ecause the overall purposes of the proposed development of Deer Island promote a large number of public interests and uses, the incidental private ownership of parts of the development is not inconsistent with the public trust in the submerged lands. In essence it is an effectual development and discharge of this trust.       The proposed development of Deer Island will promote navigation and fishing, and will give some protection to the Biloxi port. Navigation will be assisted by deeper channels. Biloxi fisheries will be better protected from storms and dangerous weather. Necessary additional housing for the geographically restricted City of Biloxi will promote additional manufacturing, and assist in the industrial development of the area. Id. at 634. ¶ 38. Distinguishing today's case from Treuting, the trial court explicitly found that Taltavull's operating his business on the land in question served no more of a public purpose than the attempted purchaser in Money. Because of this, the trial court found the Taltavull patent to be void for want of authority (of the land commissioner), meaning IPM could not claim to be a successor in interest by deed. ¶ 39. IPM and Bayview point out that certain exceptions to the Money rule exist. IPM also draws our attention to State v. Stockett, 249 So.2d 388 (Miss.1971), where this Court upheld a land patent conveying submerged swamp lands under the same statute at issue today. The reasoning in that case was that the land at issue in Stockett was rural rather than urban when conveyed, and validity of a land patent depends on the circumstances of the land at the time of conveyance; thus, this Court was able to distinguish the facts from those in other cases where land patents have been found invalid. Stockett, 249 So.2d at 391-94. ¶ 40. In the end, we find of significant import the trial court's application of Money and Treuting to today's case. The chancellor found this case to be factually aligned with Money and distinguishable from Treuting; however, we find that the case sub judice is factually aligned with Treuting and distinguishable from Money. In Money, a private landowner, Wood, who had a home facing the Mississippi Sound on the beach at Biloxi, and who also had certain property on the west end of Deer Island, brought a suit to prevent private persons from developing property on the west end of Deer Island. 152 Miss. at 24, 118 So. at 358. These private persons had received title to this property from the state land commissioner. Id. It appear[ed] that the [individuals] had undertaken to buy lands from the state of Mississippi lying under the waters of the Mississippi Sound for the purpose of constructing and erecting an artificial island, with hotels, boulevards, and residences for the private purposes of the [individuals]. Id. Wood claimed that this construction would invade his rights as enjoyed under the laws of the state, and. . . . would so interfere with his navigation, fishing, and other legitimate uses of the public waters which he enjoyed, and. . . . the enjoyment of his property both on the beach and on Deer Island. 152 Miss. at 26, 118 So. at 358. This Court, in Money, found that the deeds in question were void for want of authority on the part of the land commissioner to make the sale because section 81 of our state constitution prohibited the sale of state lands of such character to a person for purely private business.  152 Miss. at 30-31, 118 So. at 360 (emphasis added). ¶ 41. In today's case, Taltavull's 1928 public land patent from the State was at a time when his property (and the subject property in today's case) was being utilized, albeit by a private company, to promote the State's booming oyster industry. Taltavull and Biloxi Canning Company, in concert with the State, and indeed as required by statute, was storing oyster shells on its property subject to disposition at the direction of the State, with a portion of the shells being used, inter alia, for paving roads and replanting in the natural oyster reefs of the tidelands. See also 1926 Miss. Laws, ch. 293; 1928 Miss. Laws, § 6881; 1944 Miss. Laws, ch. 288; 1958 Miss. Laws, ch. 195. Thus, clearly, the facts of today's case are more aligned with the facts of Treuting, as opposed to Money. The 1928 public land patent from the State to Taltavull was not violative of section 81 of our state constitution. This public land patent was certainly wholly consistent with the public purposes of the public trust tidelands. We thus find that the chancellor erred in finding that this conveyance was null and void for want of authority. We are likewise constrained from the record before us to find error in the chancellor's determination that there were no existing conveyances divesting Taltavull and his heirs of title to he subject property. The substantial credible evidence in the record reveals that the 1943 deed from Taltavull to Rosalis and DosSantos conveyed title to Taltavull's uplands, including the patented area, as substantiated by the deraignment of title submitted by Bayview and IPM. Therefore, we find that the chancellor likewise erred in finding that there were no existing conveyances divesting Taltavull and his heirs of title to the patented land and vesting title in Bayview's predecessors in title.