Opinion ID: 1799945
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Heading: Retroactivity of Escobedo

Text: We cannot tell from reading the Escobedo case whether the United States Supreme Court intended the application of it to be prospective only. Retroactive application has been denied in California, [1] New Jersey, [2] New York, [3] Ohio, [4] Pennsylvania, [5] and a Federal district court in California. [6] Retroactive application has been accorded by Federal district courts in Nebraska, [7] Puerto Rico, [8] Pennsylvania, [9] and by the Court of Appeals for the Third [10] and Ninth [11] Circuits. Our court decided in State v. Richter, 270 Minn. 307, 133 N.W.2d 537, that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933, which bars use of illegally seized evidence in state criminal proceedings upon Federal constitutional grounds, should be applied prospectively only. But we have not had occasion to consider the arguments for and against retroactivity with respect to decisions of the United States Supreme Court involving the admissibility of confessions. The Supreme Court of California, in explaining its determination that the rule of the Escobedo case should not be applied retroactively, said in In re Lopez, 62 Cal.2d 368, 372, 42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 191, 398 P.2d 380, 383: We reach this conclusion upon the basis of the three following propositions   : First, although the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo, by providing a suspect with an opportunity to obtain the protection of counsel at the accusatory stage, sought to eliminate conditions which invited coerced confessions, the ruling does not require a retroactive application. Second, new interpretations of constitutional rights have been, and should be, applied retroactively only in those situations in which such new rules protect the innocent defendant against the possibility of conviction of a crime he did not commit; the fact that defendant was denied counsel under Escobedo does not affect the issue of guilt. Third, an absolute rule of retroactivity as to interpretations of constitutional rights which envisage the correction of future practices would impair the administration of criminal law and ultimately result in constitutional rigidity. It distinguished the situations where retroactivity has been accorded by observing (62 Cal.2d 376, 42 Cal.Rptr. 194, 398 P.2d 386):    Without counsel, a defendant unskilled in trial technique might not be able properly to establish his innocence at the trial. (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 [53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527]; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344-345 [83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733].) Without a transcript a defendant could not obtain an adequate appellate review of alleged errors at the trial which might be prejudicial. (Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 16 [76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055].) The involuntary confession, always potentially unreliable, could result in the conviction of the guiltless defendant. (In re Harris (1961) 56 Cal.2d 879, 886 [16 Cal.Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305] (Traynor, J., concurring).) To reject the retroactivity of the above constitutional rights would be to sanction the continued incarceration of a defendant despite errors at the trial which, upon correction, could well establish his innocence. In contrast, the California court said this of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo (62 Cal.2d 377, 42 Cal. Rptr. 194, 398 P.2d 386):    The court sought to discourage oppressive police practices; it did not seek to undo the procedures of yesterday, which despite their undesirability did not necessarily cause the conviction of the innocent. The same considerations which induce the denial of a retrospective application of the rule against the introduction of illegally seized evidence support a similar result here. The chief purpose of the rule in Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933], was to preclude police conduct which ignored `the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment' and to make certain that `the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers    no longer   remain[ed] an empty promise.' (Id. at p. 660.) The decision of the California Supreme Court in Lopez was decided January 29, 1965. Since then the United States Supreme Court has decided in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, that the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933, is not to be applied retroactively. If the analogy between the decision of Escobedo and that of Mapp, as made by the California Supreme Court, is correct, we are justified in anticipating a similar determination with respect to the retroactivity of Escobedo when the United States Supreme Court meets that problem. While we recognize that the analogy between Escobedo and Mapp may not be complete, we think it sufficiently so to make prospective application only of the Escobedo decision the better course for us to follow unless and until the United States Supreme Court decides otherwise. [12]