Opinion ID: 783131
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supportability of the punitive damages award

Text: 85 The jury awarded Zhang $2,600,000 in punitive damages on his discrimination claim against the corporate defendants, which the appellants argue is not supported by substantial evidence. The appellants first raised this objection in their post-trial motions for a new trial and for JMOL, arguing that punitive damages should not be available at all. Zhang counters that this objection has been waived. 86 Ordinarily, this Court can strike down a jury award of punitive damages if the evidentiary prerequisites to such an award are not supported by substantial evidence. Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1012. In a federal employment discrimination suit such as this one, punitive damages are available against an employer who `discriminate[s] in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law.'... [A]lthough egregious conduct could be evidence of intent to break the law, such conduct [is] not required to establish punitive damages liability. Thus, in general, intentional discrimination is enough to establish punitive damages liability. Passantino, 212 F.3d at 515 (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999)) (first alteration in original). Review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support punitive damages would thus be nearly identical to substantial evidence review for liability for discrimination. 87 Just as our review of the evidence supporting the corporate defendants' liability for discrimination is foreclosed by waiver, however, our review of the evidence supporting the availability of punitive damages is limited because the appellants did not raise the issue until after trial. As noted above, in general, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must be made in a Rule 50(a) motion for JMOL at the close of the evidence in order to be renewed in a Rule 50(b) motion for JMOL after trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b); Janes, 279 F.3d at 887. In Kelly v. City of Oakland, 198 F.3d 779 (9th Cir.1999), we held that this rule governs review of the evidence supporting punitive damages, concluding that where the defendant did not object to the jury instructions on punitive damages, and did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support punitive damages in his Rule 50(a) motion, he could not raise the issue in a Rule 50(b) motion. Id. at 786. The same situation is presented here; the record does not reflect that the corporate defendants objected to instructions allowing the jury to award punitive damages, nor that they made any objection to the sufficiency of the evidence for a punitive damages award at the close of the evidence. 88 As in their challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the liability finding, however, the appellants argue that the waiver rules are different where the issue of evidentiary sufficiency is raised only by the alleged inconsistency in the jury's verdict. According to this argument, although the evidence at trial might have been sufficient to support a punitive damages award, it could not support such an award in the absence of a finding of liability against Lees. 89 We will apply the same rules to review of the punitive damages award as we did to the liability finding. If the appellants believed that there was insufficient evidence to support punitive damages unless the jury found that Lees was liable for discrimination, they should have pointed this out prior to submission of the case to the jury, thereby giving Zhang the opportunity to correct any defects in proof. The appellants could have requested a jury instruction that would have allowed the jury to find punitive damages only if they found Lees liable for discrimination. Having failed to do so, they cannot now challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the damage award. 13 90