Opinion ID: 1090506
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Mental Mitigators

Text: Hoskins asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting two statutory mental mitigators: that the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); and that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2004). As we have previously stated: Whenever a reasonable quantum of competent, uncontroverted evidence of mitigation has been presented, the trial court must find that the mitigating circumstance has been proved. A trial court may reject a defendant's claim that a mitigating circumstance has been proved if the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's rejection of the mitigating circumstance. Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 529 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377, 385 (Fla.1994)). With respect to expert psychological evaluations, we have explained that expert testimony alone does not require a finding of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Even uncontroverted opinion testimony can be rejected, especially when it is hard to reconcile with the other evidence presented in the case. Philmore v. State, 820 So.2d 919, 936 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Knight v. State, 746 So.2d 423, 436 (Fla.1998)). A trial court has broad discretion in determining the applicability of a particular mitigating circumstance, and this Court will uphold the trial court's determination of the applicability of a mitigator when supported by competent substantial evidence. Id.; see also Foster v. State, 679 So.2d 747, 755 (Fla.1996) (As long as the court considered all of the evidence, the trial judge's determination of lack of mitigation will stand absent a palpable abuse of discretion.). As we explain below, the sentencing order reflects that the trial court considered all of the evidence presented, and the rejection of the statutory mental mitigators is supported by competent, substantial evidence.
In rejecting the under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator, the trial court summarized the evidence presented, including substantial expert testimony, and found that (1) Hoskins has a hypofrontal lobe abnormality that can result in reduced ability to control impulsive behavior; (2) it is not a mental or emotional disturbance, much less an extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (3) even if considered an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, the testimony is clear that Hoskins was not under its influence at the time of the murder. The evidence supports the trial court's findings. The defense's own expert (Dr. Krop) testified that, while the frontal lobe impairment could explain the rape, there was no connection between the frontal lobe impairment and Hoskins's subsequent actions. None of the experts testified that Hoskins was under the influence of any mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. This case is similar to Philmore, 820 So.2d at 936. There, a defense expert testified that the defendant suffered from a psychotic disturbance as well as a possible brain injury and posttraumatic stress disorder. Id. The State's expert found no credible evidence that the defendant suffered from psychosis or brain damage, but agreed that the defendant suffered from an antisocial personality disorder. Id. After considering the testimony, the trial court concluded that [t]he facts and circumstances of the homicide indicate a coherent and well thought out plan. . . . There simply is no record evidence to suggest the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of commission of the homicide. Id. We upheld the rejection of the mental mitigator. Id. at 937; see also Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381, 391 & n. 8 (Fla.1994) (noting that [r]easonable persons could conclude that the facts of the murder are inconsistent with the presence of the two mental mitigators and that [a] debatable link between fact and opinion relevant to a mitigating factor usually means, at most, that a question exists for judge and jury to resolve). Similarly, here, the facts show an element of planningHoskins placed Ms. Berger in the trunk of the car, drove approximately six hours (stopping for gas and to change a fuse), stopped at his parents' house to borrow a shovel, drove to a remote location nearby, and eventually killed Ms. Berger by manual strangulation. The defense's own expert testified that Hoskins's actions required planning. The facts of the murder are inconsistent with a claim that Hoskins was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Finally, the trial court clearly considered the evidence presented. It found low IQ, low mental functional ability, brain abnormalities, and mental age equivalent to be nonstatutory mitigators (although it assigned little weight). Because the trial judge considered all of the evidence and the findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, we reject Hoskins's claim.
The trial court likewise rejected the capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to the requirements of law statutory mental mitigator. Specifically, the trial court rejected the argument that Hoskins lacked the mental and emotional maturity to control his conduct (to stop and extricate himself from the situation): There may be evidence to support this argument with regard to the rape, but there is simply no evidence to support this argument with regard to the murder. Dr. Krop's testimony is that after the sexual battery, The rest of what happened is pretty much consistent with an individual who has already engaged in an act which he knows is wrong and trying both to avoid detection and trying to cover up for his crime. When questioned about the Defendant's purpose in binding and gagging Ms. Berger and stuffing her in the trunk of the car, Dr. Krop testified that I presume the purpose was to avoid detection and to get away from the scene as quickly as he could without being detected. With regard to the drive to Georgia, Dr. Krop testified, Well, he's driving. He's obviouslyagain, by this point he knows he's done something and he's trying to avoid detection. (Record citations omitted.) Again, the defense's own expert testified that by the time Hoskins drove to Georgia (prior to the murder), he knew he had done something wrong and was trying to avoid detection. In Nelson, 850 So.2d at 531, the defendant (who the defense argued suffered from brain damage) removed the victim from her home after sexually assaulting her, drove to two separate orange groves before killing her, and lied to police about the crime. We found the defendant's purposeful actions . . . indicative of someone who knew those acts were wrong and who could conform his conduct to the law if he so desired. Id. Similarly, Hoskins's purposeful actions in binding and gagging Ms. Berger before placing her in the trunk, driving to his parents' home six hours away, borrowing a shovel, driving to a remote area where he killed Ms. Berger, and then telling his brother he hit a possum when blood was noticed dripping from the rear wheel well are indicative of someone who knows his conduct is wrong. While evidence may suggest otherwise regarding the rape, there was no evidence that because of the frontal lobe impairment Hoskins could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time of the murder. Because the trial court's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, we reject Hoskins's claim. See Philmore, 820 So.2d at 936.