Opinion ID: 2583901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Qualified Immunity of Sheriff's Deputies Under Section 1983

Text: As McMillian explains, the rule exempting the state and its officers from liability under section 1983 applies to officers such as sheriffs only if they were acting as state agents with final policymaking authority over the complained-of actions. ( McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 784-785, 117 S.Ct. 1734.) Accordingly, the parties in this case have correctly assumed that the sheriff's deputies would not be shielded by the sheriff's own state agent immunity, and are persons who may be held liable for damages under section 1983 for violating someone's constitutional rights. County, however, argues these deputies were entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983 because reasonable officers in their position would have believed their actions were lawful under established law. (See Saucier v. Katz (2001) 533 U.S. 194, 201-202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 ( Saucier ); Hunter v. Bryant (1991) 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589.) Because this issue is primarily a factual one once the correct legal principles are identified, and the factual record is extensive, we will remand the case to the Court of Appeal for a redetermination of the issue. Saucier furnishes adequate guidance as to the controlling principles. A rule of qualified immunity shields a public officer from an action for damages under section 1983 unless the officer has violated a clearly established constitutional right. ( Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.) As stated in Saucier, The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.) The high court explained that [i]f the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate. ( Ibid. ) Saucier confirmed that, despite a possible Fourth Amendment violation, officers still must be granted immunity for reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions. ( Id. at p. 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151.) The plaintiff in Saucier brought a section 1983 action against police officers alleging that they used excessive force in arresting him. At issue was whether the immunity analysis was so intertwined with the question of excessive force that the qualified immunity and constitutional violation issues should be treated as one question, to be decided by the trier of fact. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the inquiries merged into a single question for the jury. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ruling on qualified immunity required an analysis separate from the question whether unreasonable force was used in making the arrest. ( Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 199, 121 S.Ct. 2151.) Saucier set forth the following framework for ruling on a claim of qualified immunity: First, accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true, was a constitutional right violated? If so, was the right so well established that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the circumstances? ( Ibid. ) Thus, Saucier makes clear that a ruling on qualified immunity requires an analysis separate from the question whether a constitutional violation occurred. Yet, the Court of Appeal in this case appeared to assume that a bare showing of possible constitutional rights violations would be sufficient to avoid defendants' motion for nonsuit. The court phrased the relevant inquiry as simply whether the evidence, viewed in plaintiffs' favor, support[ed] a determination that respondents' conduct violated a federal right under the Fourth Amendment, and proceeded to find sufficient evidence to support such a violation. This analysis seemingly ignores Saucier and its emphasis on whether a reasonable officer would believe his conduct clearly unlawful. Without such a finding, defendant deputies would be immune from a section 1983 action. Significantly, the Court of Appeal opinion failed to cite Saucier, which was decided only a few months earlier. Here, as the Court of Appeal noted, the trial court in granting nonsuit expressly found that the officers acted reasonably by any objective standard. The briefs before us argue at length as to whether or not the record supports that finding. Given the Court of Appeal's failure to consider Saucier and review the evidence with the Saucier principles in mind, it is appropriate that the Court of Appeal reconsider this primarily factual issue.