Opinion ID: 786352
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Berg Certification

Text: 81 Before we reach the substantive issue of actual confusion, we must consider the evidentiary status of the Berg Certification on which Kos's claims about such confusion rest. Andrx challenges the admissibility and reliability of the Berg Certification, which it deems self-serving, unreliable and uncorroborated hearsay that is an insufficient basis for the issuance of preliminary relief in a trademark matter. Appellees' Br. at 25. 15 82 We have considered the possibility that the district court's conclusory finding as to these Lapp factors was based on its acceptance of the objections Andrx raised below to the Berg Certification. While it is implicit in the district court's holding that it found the Berg Certification insufficient to show actual confusion, nothing in the record suggests that it sustained Andrx's objections to the admissibility or credibility of the document itself. See, e.g., JA at 41. Indeed, in its opinion, the court twice took cognizance of the Certification with no indication that it viewed the document as inadmissible, inherently unreliable, or otherwise unworthy of consideration. Id. at 6, 12. 83 Nor do we agree with Andrx that the Berg Certification is an inadequate basis for preliminary relief because it contains multiple levels of hearsay and is not based solely on personal knowledge. It is well established that a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). In keeping with this principle, many of our sister Circuits have recognized that [a]ffidavits and other hearsay materials are often received in preliminary injunction proceedings. Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1986); see also Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Asseo ); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995) (At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction....); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) (courts at preliminary injunction stage may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay); Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir.1984) (The urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction ... makes it difficult to obtain affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial. The trial court may even give inadmissible evidence some weight....); cf. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.2003) (The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.). 84 These cases are consistent with the lack of any rule in the preliminary injunction context akin to the strict rules governing the form of affidavits that may be considered in summary judgment proceedings. Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (affidavits on summary judgment shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein) with Fed.R.Civ.P. 65 (no similar provision in rule governing preliminary injunctions). See also 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2949 (2d ed. 1995) ([A] consideration of the different policies that underlie Rules 56 and 65 indicates [that the Rule 56(e) standard] should not be imposed on applications under the latter rule.). 85 District courts must exercise their discretion in weighing all the attendant factors, including the need for expedition, to assess whether, and to what extent, affidavits or other hearsay materials are appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding. Asseo, 805 F.2d at 26. The weight to which such materials are entitled may of course vary greatly depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. 16 Under the circumstances here, we find that the district court's implicit admission of the Berg Certification for use at this preliminary stage was not clearly erroneous. 86 Moreover, we note that some of the evidence of actual confusion in the Berg Certification would be admissible even if compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence or the strictures governing Rule 56(e) affidavits were required. The first level of hearsay analysis concerns the underlying statements said to show confusion. Such statements fall into two categories — those exhibiting confusion and those proclaiming it. Statements of the first type (Dr. A 17 says We have plenty of Advicor but points to Altocor samples) are not hearsay because they are not submitted for their truth; indeed, it is their falsity that shows the speaker's confusion. Statements of the second type (Dr. B says I find these names confusing.) are admissible as statement[s] of the declarant's then existing state of mind. Fed.R.Civ.P. 803(3). To the extent such statements address the speaker's plans (Dr. C says Because these names are confusing, I will not prescribe either drug.), they create an inference that the declarant acted in accord with that plan. See, e.g., United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 738 (3d Cir.1989). The second level is the report of the marketing representative to Berg (Employee D: Dr. A told me....). There is a factual dispute as to whether some, all, or none of these reports satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Even if the reports are not garden variety business records, however, Berg could attest to having received more than 60 reports of confusion in his official capacity. Berg's direct testimony that he received numerous and varied reports of alleged confusion is not hearsay but a factual claim that, as discussed below, has independent evidentiary significance tending to show actual confusion. 87