Opinion ID: 869748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Information Received by the District

Text: Court Prior to Rejecting Plea Ciavarella next contends that Judge Kosik‟s recusal was also warranted following the rejection of Ciavarella‟s guilty plea. He argues that Judge Kosik relied on the presentence report during his plea hearing, which contained 18 factually disputed evidence,6 to prejudge both the strength of the Government‟s case and Ciavarella‟s guilt. He also asserts Judge Kosik considered media reports as support for his conclusion that Ciavarella “has resorted to public statements of remorse, more for his personal circumstances, yet he continues to deny what he terms „quid pro quo‟ his receipt of money as a finder‟s fee.” App. 21. But Ciavarella has not pointed to any extrajudicial source on which the District Court relied. Rather, his denials of sending juveniles to detention for money were contained in the record, including in Ciavarella‟s plea colloquy stating that he was “not in complete agreement at this time on all of the facts alleged in the Information.” Supp. App. 60-61. As we recently stated, “[t]o warrant reassignment under § 455(a), a case generally must involve apparent bias deriving from an extrajudicial source, meaning something above and beyond judicial rulings or opinions formed in presiding over the case.” United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 282 (3d Cir. 2012). As there is no showing of extrajudicial sources that Judge Kosik relied on, Ciavarella‟s argument fails. Nor can the District Court‟s ability to preside impartially over the remaining jury trial be questioned due to its exposure to the presentence report. We have never held that a judge must recuse him or herself after viewing a presentence report and rejecting a plea. To the contrary, we have recognized that “circumstances often may arise when 6 Because Ciavarella did not object to the presentence report when given the opportunity to do so, his contention that it contained factually disputed evidence is not properly before us. 19 the judge views a defendant‟s presentence report for legitimate purposes before trying him or presiding over his trial.” United States v. Small, 472 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1972). Furthermore, “[i]t has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551. Ciavarella fails to demonstrate any sufficient basis for recusal.