Opinion ID: 1060523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Forfeiture of Counsel

Text: We begin our analysis of this issue by summarizing the events that culminated in Carruthers being required to represent himself at trial. As previously stated, these crimes occurred on February 24 or 25, 1994. Carruthers' family initially retained AC Wharton, Jr., to represent him. Wharton was allowed to withdraw on March 19, 1994, because of a conflict of interest. On May 31, 1994, the trial court appointed Larry Nance to represent Carruthers. The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty on July 8, 1994. At a hearing held on July 15, 1994, the trial court scheduled a pre-trial motions hearing for September 30, 1994 and set the case for trial on February 20, 1995. Carruthers was present at this hearing and asked the trial court, I'd like to know why this is being dragged out like this. I asked Mr. Nance if we can go forward with a motion of discovery and he's asking for a reset. And I'd like to know why. Nance informed the court that he was planning to visit the prosecutor's office later in the week to review the discoverable materials and evidence. The trial judge then advised Carruthers in pertinent part as follows: [G]iven the fact that the trial isn't until February, we're setting the next Court date in September for the arguing of motions. Between now and September, your attorney and the attorneys representing your two co-defendants can get with the prosecutors and can obtain their discovery. They're all excellent attorneys. And they'll all do that. And once they've obtained the discovery, they'll meet with their clients and they'll file appropriate motions, which will be heard on September 30th, which will still be well in advance of the trial date, which will give everyone ample time to then evaluate the case, after the motions have been heard and ruled on. So given the fact that we can't get a three-defendant capital case that's still in the arraignment stage to trial any earlier than February, there's plenty of time for your attorneys to meet with the prosecutors, get the discovery, meet with the clients, file motions, argue motions. Just because he hadn't done it yesterday, because you want him to have it done yesterday, doesn't mean that he's not working on your case diligently and properly. He'll have everything done well in advance of the next Court date. And so, you know, he may not do it the very moment you want it done, but you're going to have to work with him on that because there's ample time for him to get it done. On August 12, 1994, the trial court appointed Craig Morton to assist Nance. [14] When the pre-trial motions hearing convened on September 30, 1994, all defense attorneys involved in the case requested a continuance until November 14, 1994 so that additional pre-trial motions could be filed. The trial judge agreed to continue the hearing and also indicated that, where appropriate, a pre-trial motion filed on behalf of one defendant would be applied to all defendants without a specific request. Because the trial judge had received an abundance of correspondence from both Mr. Montgomery and Mr. Carruthers expressing concern about the pretrial investigation that has been conducted by their attorneys, the defendants were brought into open court and advised of the continuance. The trial judge then asked the attorneys to state, for the record, the work that they've done and the work they intend to continue doing on behalf of their client. Each team of defense lawyers reported to the trial judge on the work that had been completed and on the work they intended to complete in the following days. In particular, Nance indicated that he had inspected a majority of the physical evidence, filed six or seven motions, issued subpoenas for approximately eight witnesses, interviewed several of the one-hundred witnesses listed by the State, [15] met with Carruthers in lock-up at the courtroom on two separate occasions, met with Carruthers' family, and spent approximately twenty-five hours on the case. Nance admitted that some enmity had developed between him and Carruthers, but indicated that he believed the problem could be resolved. Carruthers also was allowed to voice his complaints about his attorneys on the record, and his primary complaint was that his attorneys had not met with him as often as he had expected. After hearing the comments of both Nance and Carruthers, the trial judge concluded as follows: in my opinion, what has been done thus far in this case, given the fact that there are still six more weeks before the next motion date, and then a full three months beyond that before the trial date, is appropriate and well within the standards of proper representation. On October 21, 1994, the trial court approved payment for investigative services for Carruthers and authorized competency evaluations for both defendants. Morton informed the trial court that the investigator, Arthur Anderson, had attempted twice to meet with Carruthers at the Shelby County jail and that Carruthers had refused to meet with him on both occasions. On November 14, 1994, Carruthers filed his first motion for substitution of counsel. Four days later, on November 18, Morton asked the trial court to appoint a different investigator who would take a more aggressive approach. The trial court agreed to appoint a new investigator and continued the hearing date on the pre-trial motions until December 16, 1994. On November 23, 1994, Morton advised the trial court that he had retained the services of Premier Investigation. Although the record does not reflect that a hearing was held, the trial court allowed Nance to withdraw from representing Carruthers on December 9, 1994. [16] According to statements made by the trial court at a later hearing, Nance was allowed to withdraw because of personal physical threats made by Carruthers that escalated to the point that Nance did not feel comfortable or safe, personally safe, in continuing to represent Mr. Tony Carruthers. Coleman Garrett was appointed to replace Nance and represent Carruthers along with Morton. The trial judge also authorized James Turner, a third attorney, to assist the defense as an investigator. Both counsel and Carruthers continued to file pre-trial motions. Some of these motions were heard on December 16, 1994, and another hearing was scheduled for January 30, 1995. On that date, Garrett and Morton appeared and presented argument on over seventeen motions. At this hearing, the trial judge agreed to reschedule the trial from February of 1995 to September 5, 1995. At a hearing on May 1, 1995, Garrett and Morton presented argument on several more pre-trial motions including a motion to dismiss the indictments, a motion to sever, and a request for expert services to analyze an audio-tape of Nakeita Shaw's statement. On May 5, investigator/attorney James Turner was allowed to withdraw because he was a solo practitioner and could not maintain his practice and effectively perform the investigation needed on the case. However, the trial court appointed another attorney, Glenn Wright, to act as investigator. On June 2, 1995, Garrett again argued that the indictments should be dismissed due to Shaw's allegedly false testimony before the grand jury. On June 23, 1995, Garrett, Morton, and Wright sought and were granted permission to withdraw by the trial court. The record reflects that Carruthers also filed a motion for substitution of counsel. At a hearing on July 27, 1995, the trial court appointed William Massey and Harry Sayle to represent Carruthers. During this hearing, the trial judge commented as follows: All right. I understand that these three defendants are on trial for their lives and that these are the most serious of charges and that they are all concerned that they are well represented and properly represented, and it's everyone's desire to see to it that they are well represented and properly represented. And toward that end, efforts are being made that they are represented by attorneys that have enough experience to handle this type of case and by attorneys that can establish a rapport with their clients that would allow them to represent their clients well. We have gone through several attorneys now in an effort to accommodate the defendants' requests in that regard, but at some pointand in my opinion, each of the attorneys and each of the investigators that has represented these defendants that has been relieved have been eminently qualified to do the job, but I have allowed them to be relieved for one reason or another. I want the record to be perfectly clear at this point because of some suggestions that have already been raised by some of the correspondence that I have received from Mr. Carruthers, and all of it, by the way, will be made a part of the record. But Mr. Carruthers has suggested, in his correspondence, that some of the previous attorneys have been relieved because they weren't capable or competent to do the job. And that is, in my opinion, at leastmy humble opinion as the judge in this caseabsolutely and totally an inaccurate statement. The attorneys that have been relieved thus far have been fully capable and fully competent and had been doing an outstanding job, but for a variety of reasons, I've allowed them to withdraw from the case.       Mr. Carruthers has raised, through his correspondence, and apparently through direct communication with his previous attorneys, certain matters that are pretty outrageous suggestions, but because of the nature of the matters that he's raised, the attorneys that represented him previously felt that an irreparable breach had occurred between their abilitybetween Mr. Carruthers and themselveseffecting their ability to continue to represent them. And at some pointand that could well have been the point, but it wasn't. But at some point these matters that are raised by the defendants cannot continue to be used to get new counsel because it gets to be a point where they'reit's already well beyond that point, but, obviously, at some point, gets to the point where they're manipulating the system and getting what they wantMr. Carruthers, sit still, please, or you can sit back theregets to the point where they're manipulating the system and getting trial dates and representation that they want and are calling the shots. That's another matter that's been raised by Mr. Carruthers in some of his correspondence, that he wants his attorneys to know that he's the man calling the shots in this case, and he's the man to look to. Well, of course, again, it's a free country, and he can say whatever he wants, and he can think whatever he wants, but as far as I'm concernedand this applies to all three defendants and any defendants that come through this court that are represented by counseland this gets back to what Mr. McLin alluded to earlierthe attorneys are calling the shots in this case. They are trying the case except for certain areas where the defendant has the exclusive and final say, such as areas of whether he wants to testify or not and that sort of thing. The attorneys are in here representing these clients and will do so to the best of their ability. They are the ones who have been to law school. They are the ones that have been through trial many times before, and they're the ones that are here for a reason, and that reason is to represent these individuals. And, so you know, if there's a conflict between the attorney and client with regard to how to proceed in the case, you all resolve it as best you can, but ultimately the attorney is trying the case. And, you know, we don't pull people in off the sidewalk to try these cases, and the reason we don't is because of certain things that they need to learn and certain experiences they need to have professionally before they're prepared to try these cases. So they're here for that reason and for that purpose.       So that gets me to the reason for our being here. Because of the matters raised by Mr. Carruthers, I have granted the request of his previous two attorneys and investigator reluctantly because, in my opinion, they were doing an outstanding job of representing Mr. Carruthers and his interests.       Because of the most recent rash of allegations raised by Mr. Carruthers in his many letters that he's sent meI assume he's sent copies of the letters to his counsel and to others, but I've certainly got them, and they will be made a part of the record. And because of the types of things he alleged in those letters and the position that it put his previous attorneys in, and their very, very strong feelings about not continuing to represent Mr. Carruthers under those circumstances, I have reluctantly agreed to let them withdraw. And in an effort again to get attorneys who I'm satisfied have the experience and the willingness to handle a case of this seriousness, I have approached and am inclined to appoint Mr. Harry Sayle, who is out of town this week and couldn't be here today but who indicated he would be willing to take the case on, and Mr. Bill Massey, to represent Mr. Carruthers.       And as I have stated, I'm running out of patience with regard to these different issuesand I use that word advisedlybeing raised by the clients with regard to any objections they have with regard to their attorneys. And as far as I'm concerned, these are the attorneys that will represent these men at trial. It's going to have to be one gigantic conflictone gigantic and real proven, demonstrated conflict before any of these men will be relieved from representation in this case. There will be no more perceived conflicts, no more unfounded, wild allegations raised through correspondence, no more dissatisfaction with how my attorney is handling my case for anybody to be relieved in this case. These are the attorneys, gentlemen. You either work with them or don't. It's up to you. But they're the men that are going to be representing you at trial. (Emphasis added.) Consistent with prior practice, the trial court approved an initial $1000 expenditure for investigative services for Carruthers' newly appointed defense team and conditioned further funding upon a specific showing of necessity by the investigator. Massey indicated that he preferred to use his own investigator rather than an attorney; therefore, Arthur Anderson, who previously had been employed on the case, was retained. The trial court approved additional funding for investigative services on August 11, August 31, and again on September 27, 1995. Also, due to his recent appointment to the case, Massey requested and was afforded a trial continuance until January 8, 1996. Like previous counsel, Massey and Sayle filed many pre-trial motions on behalf of Carruthers. By November 17, 1995, Massey informed the trial court that all necessary and appropriate pre-trial motions had been filed. However, about a month later, on December 19, 1995, Massey filed a motion requesting permission to withdraw as counsel. As grounds for the motion, Massey stated that his relationship with Carruthers had deteriorated to such a serious degree that [counsel] can not provide effective assistance as required by state and federal law.... Counsel's professional judgment cannot be exercised solely for the benefit of Defendant, as counsel fears for his safety and those around him. Attached to the motion were several letters Carruthers had sent to Massey, both at his home and at his office in late November and early December of 1995. In the letters, Carruthers accused Massey of lying, [17] and of being on drugs, [18] threatened counsel, [19] and expressed overall dissatisfaction with counsel's handling of the case. [20] Massey made the following statements to the trial court at the hearing on his motion to withdraw: I would just say that in 15 years of practicing law, I have never ever made a motion of this nature. I have neverI've never found it difficult to advocate on behalf of a case. I wouldn't find it difficult to advocate on behalf of this case. I do at this point, however, find it very difficult to advocate on behalf of Mr. Carruthers. And that is simply because he's made it that way. If I were receiving letters that merely stated I was incompetent and that I wasn't handling his case right, and those type of letterswe all get those time to timeI don't mind those. Those don't bother me. When I have letters that come to me that are threatening, when I have telephone calls that come to my office that are threatening the safety of me and my staff and those around me, I have real problems with that. It's gotten so bad, your Honor, that my secretary is having nightmares. The last call Mr. Carruthers made is Exhibit E to this verified motion. She called me in absolute tears crying uncontrollably, hysterically crying over his antics. That's the same way he's been doing me. I just haven't broken down and started crying about it. But I do have very, very strong, such strong personal reservations as I have never experienced before as an advocate. Your honor, in advocating cases, particularly capital cases, I find the first thing I have to do to be persuasive is to believe. I have to believe and I have to feel. Because if I don't believe and I don't feel and I'm not sincere, I cannot impart that to a jury. They see my insincerity. They see just words, a parrott-like proficiency as opposed to feeling. They don't act on that. They shut that out. That's been my experience. And I don't believe that that feeling, I know that I can't advocate. I've lost my will to advocate on this case. I don't have any doubt about that at this point. I don't have any doubt. I'll tell you as an officer of this court. I don't have any doubt that would be a major problem. And despite Mr. Carruthers threats and antics, I care for the integrity of the system. I care that his rights are protected even when he tries to destroy them himself and impair them. And I don't know what the Court's answer is. I know that the Court is in a very difficult position here. Obviously, it's very clear what the ploy is. It's very clear that we're never going to get to trial like this. And if we do, then there's going to be a record made for ineffective assistance of counsel. And they believe, Mr. Carruthers believes, that doing all of these things is going to make him a record as opposed to doing things from a legal standpoint in the courtroom. There are motions, objections at trial and through the proper avenues that the courts of appeals will recognize as a legal basis for a reversal. But we've gotten outside the legal area in this case and we've gone into the area of intimidation, threats. (Emphasis added.) Despite Massey's argument, the trial judge denied Massey's motion, stating as follows: With regard to Mr. Massey's concerns, I certainly believe that everything Mr. Massey has stated in his motion is factually accurate and correct. I don't have any reason to doubt that his secretary received the phone call that she says she received in the memo she prepared, or that any of these other things transpired. But I do think and I do agree with Mr. Massey's characterization that these efforts by Mr. Carruthers are a part of an overall ploy on his part to delay the case forever until something happens that prevents it from being tried.       In my opinion, to try to make the record reflect as clearly and accurately as possible the fact that the system is doing everything it can to make sure that Mr. Carruthers is properly and thoroughly represented in this case. And Mr. Carruthers may step out to the back. He just was pointing to Mr. Massey with some sort of threatening gesture. And he's going to sit in the back for the remainder of this hearing. Put him in the back room and keep him back there. Lock the door. Mr. Montgomery, you will join him in a minute if you choose to conduct yourself in that manner as well. The system has done all it can, in my opinion, to make sure that Mr. Tony Carruthers is well represented. And I've tried to be as patient as I can be in listening to the concerns of defense counsel and investigators in making sure that no conflict existed in the representation of either of these men. The specific reasons, the narrow specific reasons for the excusal of the previous attorneys and investigators differ a little bit from those complaints that Mr. Massey has raised today. And so when Mr. Massey says `[t]hat just because I'm the 4th or 5th attorney in line doesn't mean that I now have to be stuck, in effect, in representing him just because others have been relieved and the Court is anxious to get the case tried. My complaints are as valid as theirs were. And if they were relieved, then I should be relieved as well.' And I understand that position. But first of all I'll respond to that by saying their complaints were a little bit different, and I'm not going to go through them on the record now. The record is clear in those instances. One envelope is sealed with several letters that will reveal what those complaints were and the complaints from attorneys prior to that were a little bit different in nature. Not to minimize the seriousness of Mr. Massey's complaints, but those complaints were a little bit different. And so its not that he just happens to be the 5th attorney in line, and he's the one that is going to quote, get stuck, representing Mr. Carruthers. Their complaints were a little bit different. And factually there are some distinctions that can be drawn between the complaints that they had and the complaints that you've voiced. (Emphasis added.) The trial court also emphasized that Carruthers' ploy had become more apparent over the course of the proceedings. With the very first set of attorneys I tried to give Mr. Carruthers the benefit of the doubt and excused them for reasons similar to yours, but a little bit different. With the second set of attorneys I tried to give Mr. Carruthers the benefit of the doubt and excuse them for reasons similar to yours, but a little bit different. Now that we're in the third set of attorneys, the ploy is much more apparent than it was with the first set of attorneys. Although, it was somewhat apparent to any of us who have been in these courts for many, many years as we all have been. Not wanting to jump to any conclusions or not give him the benefit of the doubt, the first and second sets of attorneys were excused. But now that we're into the third set of attorneys the ploy is much more apparent and, therefore, I'm much less receptive to these sorts of arguments than I was a year ago when the first set of attorneys came in wanting to be relieved. (Emphasis added.) Finally, in response to counsel's comment that Carruthers should just go pro se, the trial court concluded that it should refuse to force a man to go pro se in a capital case if he doesn't want and observed that Carruthers had never asserted his right of self-representation. Although Massey's motion to withdraw was denied, the trial judge granted his request for additional funds for further investigation and for hiring a mitigation specialist. On January 2, 1996, six days before the trial was scheduled to begin, Massey renewed his motion to withdraw. Massey informed the trial court that he had continued to receive threatening letters at his home and was concerned for his daughter's safety because Carruthers had described the car she drove. Massey indicated that he cared more about Carruthers' right to a fair trial than did Carruthers himself, but given the recent and ongoing threats, Massey declared, I don't want to represent this man. I can't represent him. I won't represent him. At this hearing, the prosecution took the position that Massey should not be allowed to withdraw because the defendant was simply manipulating the system in an attempt to delay his trial. The State pointed out that the case had been pending for almost two years and each time a trial date drew near Carruthers would increase his letters and efforts to alienate his attorneys either through written or verbal personal attacks or threats. The State urged the trial court to deny the motion to withdraw and proceed to trial: [I]f a defendant, Your Honor, can threaten the system, if he can manipulate the system by threats, by letters, I'm not sure if that's what the makers of the constitution meant when they sat in Philadelphia and they said, look, let's let every defendant have a fair trial. Let's let him have a lawyer. Let's let a jury be over here. Let's let him have a judge; that's fair. Let's let no man be accused of a crime, will not go to trial, unless he receives a fair trial. Let no man be convictedbut the framers of the constitution, Your Honor, had not met Tony Carruthers. After considering the comments of counsel, the trial judge briefly recounted the history of the case and again emphasized that, in his opinion, all of the attorneys appointed for the defendant, including Massey and Sayle, were excellent trial lawyers who had fully performed their duties with regard to Carruthers' defense, including filing all relevant motions and thoroughly pursing the investigation of the case. The trial court then ruled on Massey's motion to withdraw, stating as follows: Now, this is the way that the case is going to proceed on Monday. Mr. Massey is still on the case. He still represents Mr. Carruthers. If between now and Monday Mr. Carruthers chooses to discuss with Mr. Massey the case and to cooperate with Mr. Massey in his preparation of the defense in this case, then I'll look to Mr. Massey to go forward in representing Mr. Carruthers. There have been disputes and conflicts between attorney and client before. This is not the first time that there has been a problem between attorney and client, and these types of problems can be repaired oftentimes. And differences can be patched up, and attorneys can go forward. And I would hope that that would be the case in this case. And I would hope that Mr. Carruthers would between now and Monday, work with Mr. Massey and Mr. Sayle in preparation for a trial. If Mr. Carruthers elects not to, however, he will go forward representing himself. This was raised on the 19th when Mr. Massey filed his motion to withdraw and we first heard it. At that time, I rejected the idea. I was reluctant to because I've never required an individual to go forward representing himself when he has not requested that. And I don't like that idea, but I've given a lot of thought to that suggestion since the 19th. For the record, Mr. Massey called me shortly after our hearing on the 19th when he received some letters in the mail from Mr. Carruthers that dealt furtherthat he felt further undermined his ability to represent him. And I just want that on the record so there is no misunderstanding about that. But since the 19th, and after the phone call from Mr. Massey that I received, after the hearing on the 19th, and after his request today, I've given it a lot of thought to what options were left, what options are still available in this case. And in my judgment, the only option that is still available if Mr. Carruthers chooses not to work with Mr. Massey and Mr. Sayle in going forward with this case next Monday, is for him to represent himself. And I'll provide him with a copy of the rules of Tennessee procedure, the rules of evidence. And he can sit at counsel table and voir dire the jury, and question witnesses, and give an opening statement, as any lawyer would, and he would be required to comply with all the rules as any lawyer would, if he chooses to go forward on his own. If he chooses to say nothing, then that's his prerogative, andBut that's what the situation will be next Monday, Mr. Carruthers. And the choice is yours. Again, the choice is yours. You have for the third time around an outstanding attorney representing you. And he's here, and he'll be available. If you choose to avail yourself of his services, he will represent you on Monday. If you choose not to, you can go forward representing yourself. If you go forward representing yourself, I will require Mr. Massey and Mr. Sayle to be available as elbow counsel so that at any recess or overnight, you can seek advice from them, and they can confer with you and advise you in any way that they deem appropriate. So if you elect not to have him represent you and you go forward representing yourself, they'll be in the courtroom observing, and they'll be available to offer advice and counsel to you at any recess, lunch break, overnight break. One of those two scenarios will occur next Monday. And again, it's up to Mr. Carruthers because we've been through this now for many, many months and at this point in time, the case needs to go forward. There is no other reason for the case to be reset, no proof problems from one side or the other, no witness problems from one side or the other. The case is now set for the third time for trial. There is no extrinsic reason for an additional continuance. Andso Mr. Carruthers is going to have to decide in which manner he wishes to proceed on Monday, but the case will go forward on Monday. And I'll hear back from Mr. Massey Monday morning with regard to whether he has been able to confer with his client and what the progress of that has been, and whether he feels that the progress has been such that it would allow him to go forward in representing Mr. Carruthers. (Emphasis added.) The record reflects that at a hearing held the next day, January 3, 1996, Carruthers was glaring at Massey while gritting his jaw. [21] Upon observing Carruthers' conduct, the trial court once again cautioned the defendant as follows: And again, as I did yesterday, I want to remind Mr. Carruthers that if it is his decision not to proceed with Mr. Massey and to proceed pro sejust a minute. I'll let you speak in a momentthen he needs to understand that he will be held to the same standard that attorneys are held to during a trial. Rules of evidence, rules of procedure will apply. And he will need to familiarize himself as best he can with those procedures and those rules between now and trial date because in proceeding pro se, he will certainly be held to that same standard. Obviously, he realizes the charges that are pending and the potential for the imposition of the death penalty involved in this case. We've had numerous hearings and motions over the past fifteen or eighteen months, and all of those matters should be very apparent to Mr. Carruthers at this point in time. Responding to the trial court's admonition, Carruthers said he did not want Massey representing him because Massey was on cocaine. Following this hearing, Massey filed an application for extraordinary appeal [22] in the Court of Criminal Appeals challenging the trial court's ruling that he remain on the case either as counsel or as advisory counsel. In an order dated January 8, 1996, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Massey should be allowed to immediately withdraw from further representation, stating: This Court is of the opinion that the attorney-client relationship which may have previously existed, has deteriorated until such a relationship does not exist between Carruthers and Mr. Massey. Also the circumstances of this case make it impossible for Mr. Massey to ethically represent Mr. Carruthers. Carruthers has proclaimed that he will do bodily harm to Massey. He has in essence and in fact threatened Massey with death. Carruthers, who has a history of violent conduct, is apparently a member of a gang. All of his correspondence to Massey carries a drawing of a lidless eye that watches from the top of a pyramid. Moreover, Massey's family is filled with fear and anxiety due to the threats made to Massey; and Massey's secretary, who has had dealings with Carruthers by telephone, likewise has fear and anxiety based upon her conversations with Carruthers and the threats made against Massey. Given these circumstances, Mr. Massey had no alternative but to seek permission to withdraw as counsel. He is supported in this endeavor by the Disciplinary Counsel for the Tennessee Supreme Court Office, which advised Massey that he was ethically required to withdraw as counsel, and, if the motion was denied he was required to seek relief in the appellate courts.       Given these facts and circumstances as well as the relevant provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the State of Tennessee, Mr. Massey was entitled to be relieved as counsel of record for Mr. Carruthers. If there ever was an amicable attorney-client relationship, it was eradicated by Mr. Carruthers' conduct in writing the letters aforementioned and threatening to do bodily harm to Mr. Massey the first time he saw him. Today, Mr. Massey and Mr. Carruthers are at odds and their differences are irreconcilable. Furthermore, Mr. Massey, who emphatically denied any misconduct or addiction to drugs, must attempt to protect his family, secretary, and himself from physical harm as well as protect himself from further disciplinary complaints. [23] (Emphasis added.) The same day this order was filed, but before the trial judge had received the order, a hearing was held in the trial court. After learning that Massey had received seven more pieces of certified mail at his home since the hearing on January 2, and after being advised by Massey that the difficulties with Carruthers had not improved, the trial judge concluded that Carruthers, through his actions, through his accusations, and letters, he has forced himself into a situation where I have no option but to require that he proceed pro se. And so in deference to your request, I will go forward with my previous statement and that is that you and Mr. Sayle will remain as elbow counsel. Mr. Carruthers will represent himself. The trial court then reiterated, [f]rom this point forward I'll give Mr. Carruthers the opportunity to speak on his own behalf at appropriate times. As I indicated to him last week, he will be expected to comply with all of the rules of procedure and evidence that an attorney would be required to comply with. Upon hearing the trial court's ruling, Carruthers claimed that he had attempted to reconcile with Massey and complained that he was not qualified to represent himself. The trial judge responded: Well, those are the perils in going forward pro se. And in my judgment, Mr. Carruthers, as I've said on several occasions, and I don't intend to get back into a lengthy hearing on this issue at this time, but we've had two or three hearings already on this. In my judgment, and I understand you're stating now that you don't feel capable of going forward and representing yourself. But you need to understand that in my judgment you have created this problem for yourself. You are the author of your own predicament by, in my opinion, sabotaging the representation of you by four previous attorneys. These are now your fifth and sixth attorneys. In my judgment, because of actions that you've taken over the past 18 months, because of actions that you've taken, you are now in this situation. And so it may well be difficult for you to go forward in representing yourself, but this is the situation that you've created and you're going to have to do the best you can, because there is virtually no option left at this point. To reset it again, history would should would onlywould be a futile effort, because at the eleventh hour with the seventh and eighth attorneys representing you, there would be some other effort, in my opinion, some other manipulation on your part that would then cause those attorneys to come in and want to get off your case. And then we'd reset it and appoint the ninth and tenth attorneys, and the eleventh and twelfth. And there'd be no end to it.       And so we're going forward and you're going to represent yourself. I understand you're not an experienced attorney. I understand you may well have never gone through a voir dire process before. And that's unfortunate. I wish you had cooperated and gotten along with Mr. Nance a year and a half ago. He was an excellent attorney, has tried many, many cases in these courts, serious difficult cases and done an excellent job. I wish you had cooperated and gotten along with Coleman Garrett who, in my opinion, is one of the best trial attorneys in this entire state. He's tried many cases in this courtroom and defended individuals remarkably well. I wish you had cooperated and gotten along with Mr. Craig Morton and Mr. Glenn Wright, and Mr. Harry Sayle, and Mr. William Massey, because I think it would've been in your best interest to have done so. But it's been obvious that you have not. And so for that reason we're going forward.       It's not easy to make this decision. It's not a decision that I made lightly or take lightly. But I tell you what, if the record isn't complete enough and replete enough with evidence of manipulative conduct and obstructionism, then I can't imagine ever there being a record for the appellate courts in Tennessee that would meet that criteria. (Emphasis added.) After the trial court ruled, Carruthers offered to waive any conflict, to allow Massey to continue representing him, to apologize to Massey, and to testify that the accusations he had made against Massey were untrue. The trial court refused, finding that Carruthers was merely using another tactic to delay the proceeding. The next day, January 9, 1996, the Court of Criminal Appeals entered an addendum to its previous order and allowed Massey to be completely relieved from further representation or participation in the case including providing assistance as elbow counsel. However, Sayle continued on the case as elbow or standby counsel. During voir dire two days later, January 11, 1996, the State requested a continuance of the trial due to the hospitalization of one of its material witnesses, Nakeita Shaw. The trial court granted the State's motion for a continuance and rescheduled the trial for April 15, 1996. At this point, in light of the continuance, Carruthers made an oral motion for appointment of new counsel. [24] The trial court denied the motion, stating: The ruling still stands. The system will not be held hostage by Tony Carruthers, and to go through another round of attorneys will be doing just that, because history suggests, as you've done in the past, that is if new attorneys were appointed and spent the time and investigated, the effort to get ready on this case, then at the eleventh hour something would happen, some allegations would be made that would undermine their ability to represent you, they'd ask to withdraw, we'd be back in the same situation that we were in with Mr. Larry Nance, with Mr. Coleman Garrett, with Mr. Bill Massey, all three of whom are outstanding criminal defense attorneys. All three of whom were fully capable of representing you, and all three of whom had to be relieved because of your actions. And in my judgment, enough is enough. And because of your actions, these attorneys are no longer representing you and, therefore, you will be representing yourself. You have ample time to prepare. You have access to legal opinion from Mr. Sayle. You have the file. You have the rules. You have a jury consultant. You have an investigator. And this is the manner in which we're going forward. On January 16, 1996, the trial court approved Carruthers' request for funds to obtain an investigator to assist him and authorized the investigator to contact the trial court directly if additional funds were needed. In February of 1996, Carruthers filed two more written motions for appointment of counsel which were again denied by the trial court for the same reasons set out above. In a hearing on February 20, 1996, the trial court considered Carruthers' pre-trial requests for funding for expert services, and, at this hearing, again recounted the events that culminated in Carruthers being required to represent himself. The trial court observed that it will be apparent to anyone who objectively views this situation that Carruthers is not being denied the right to counsel. Throughout these pre-trial proceedings, the trial court treated Carruthers with respect, patiently listened to his arguments and requests, and afforded Carruthers and his investigator considerable latitude in scheduling and arguing motions, even though most of these motions were similar or identical to motions that had already been filed and argued by counsel who had previously represented Carruthers. When Carruthers requested ex parte hearings to seek funding for experts, the prosecution would voluntarily leave the court room. The trial judge granted Carruthers' request for funding to obtain a forensic pathologist, but denied his request for funding for an accident reconstructionist. In February of 1996, the trial court allowed Sayle to withdraw as elbow counsel because Carruthers apparently had no confidence or trust in Sayle and because Carruthers was launching personal, verbal attacks upon Sayle. When Sayle moved for permission to withdraw as elbow counsel, he stated: He has expressed the feeling that I am not working for him and that I have not done anything for him, I'm not going to do anything for him. He suspectshe's made it clear that he suspects that I'm working with the state in some capacity. And frankly none of the advice I give him is followed, and I don't think there is any intention of following it. And frankly its justand the abuse gets extremely personal. Personal villification over the last couple of meetings, and I see no basis for being able to continue. Thereafter, Carruthers twice made oral motions for appointment of counsel, first on March 4, 1996, and then on April 15, 1996, the day jury selection began. Again, the trial court denied these motions and noted that this was not the first case in which Carruthers had employed such tactics. [25] Carruthers therefore represented himself at trial and sentencing, participating in voir dire, presenting opening statement, questioning witnesses on cross-examination, making objections, presenting witnesses in his defense, and presenting closing argument. After the jury returned its verdicts as to guilt and sentencing, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Carruthers on his motion for new trial and on appeal. In the Court of Criminal Appeals, Carruthers, by and through counsel, first asserted that he had been denied due process when the trial court required him to represent himself at trial and sentencing in this capital case. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his claim and held that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was justified in requiring Carruthers to represent himself, reasoning as follows: We do not take lightly the result that a defendant has to proceed pro se in any trial, especially one involving a capital offense. Our judicial system could not survive if those accused of crimes were literally run over roughshod. But while the individual must be protected by the system, the judicial system must also be protected from abuses by an individual. A person charged with criminal acts cannot be allowed to subvert the judicial system. In this Court, counsel for Carruthers again contend that he was denied his right to due process when he was required to represent himself during the trial of this capital case. Counsel assert that Carruthers did not expressly waive his right to counsel, that any implicit waiver was invalid because the trial court did not advise Carruthers of the possibility of waiver or the dangers of self-representation, and that his conduct is not egregious enough to justify a finding of forfeiture. In response, the State argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly found that Carruthers forfeited his right to counsel because Carruthers was using this right in order to manipulate the judicial system and delay the trial. In the alternative, the State argues that the record in this appeal supports a finding that Carruthers implicitly waived his right to counsel by his course of conduct and that the trial court's warnings to Carruthers were sufficient to inform him that he would be deemed to have waived his right to counsel if his conduct continued and of the dangers of self-representation. Both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions guarantee an indigent criminal defendant the right to assistance of appointed counsel at trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9; Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 120 S.Ct. 684, 686, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); State v. Small, 988 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tenn.1999); State v. Northington, 667 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tenn.1984); see also Tenn. R.Crim. P. 44(a). The right of an accused to assistance of counsel, however, does not include the right to appointment of counsel of choice, or to special rapport, confidence, or even a meaningful relationship with appointed counsel. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617-18, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983); United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir.1988); Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 44 (3d Cir.1985); State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 968 P.2d 578, 579 (1998); Snell v. State, 723 So.2d 105, 107 (Ala.Crim.App.1998); Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253, 258 (Fla.1984); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610, 625 (1989). The essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate, not counsel preferred by the defendant. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Ordinarily, waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466-67 (1938); Small, 988 S.W.2d at 673. Typically, such a waiver occurs only after the trial judge advises a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and determines that the defendant knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942); see also Small, 988 S.W.2d at 673; Northington, 667 S.W.2d at 61-62. Many courts, however, have recognized that the right to counsel is not a license to abuse the dignity of the court or to frustrate orderly proceedings. [26] Accordingly, several courts have acknowledged that, like other constitutional rights, [27] the right to counsel can be implicitly waived or forfeited if a defendant manipulates, abuses, or utilizes the right to delay or disrupt a trial. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 249 (3rd Cir.1998) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he physically assaulted his attorney); United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1097-1101 (3rd Cir.1995) (discussing the principles of implicit waiver by conduct and forfeiture, but concluding that defendant had not forfeited his right to counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 326 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by exhibiting abusive, threatening, and coercive conduct toward his attorney); United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 642 (7th Cir.1989) (holding that defendant waived his right to counsel where, after being warned that he could lose the right if he failed to cooperate, defendant continued to refuse to cooperate with numerous court-appointed lawyers); United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that defendant implicitly waived the right to counsel where, to delay the trial, defendant refused to accept appointed counsel or hire his own attorney); United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 256-57 (5th Cir.1985) (holding defendant waived his right to counsel when, in bad faith and for purpose of delay, he retained counsel known to have a conflict of interest and failed to retain other counsel); Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 756 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that defendant's refusal to allow any public defender, regardless of competence, to represent him constituted a waiver of the right to counsel); United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that defendant's persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new counsel ... is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); United States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Travers, 996 F.Supp. 6, 17 (S.D.Fla.1998) (finding forfeiture as a result of the defendant's persistently abusive, threatening and coercive dealings with his attorney and noting that the defendant had been repeatedly warned that his failure to cooperate could result in a finding of forfeiture); United States v. Jennings, 855 F.Supp. 1427, 1442 (M.D.Pa.1994) (finding that defendant waived his right to counsel when he physically assaulted his attorney); Siniard v. State, 491 So.2d 1062, 1063-64 (Ala.Ct.Crim.App.1986) (holding that defendant forfeited the right to counsel where he was allowed eight months and several continuances to retain counsel but failed to do so); Brooks, 819 S.W.2d at 290 (recognizing forfeiture, but concluding that forfeiture was not appropriate because the record did not show that the defendant used his right to manipulate the judicial system); Potter v. State, 547 A.2d 595, 602 (Del.1988) (stating that a defendant's dilatory actions in retaining counsel can justify a forfeiture of the right to counsel); Jones, 449 So.2d at 256 (holding that defendant waived his right to counsel by persistently demanding counsel of his choice and refusing to cooperate with appointed counsel); Brickert v. State, 673 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that defendant waived his right to counsel by engaging in conduct designed to frustrate the judicial process and avoid or delay a trial); People v. Sloane, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncooperative behavior towards four successive appointed attorneys); People v. Gilchrist, 239 A.D.2d 306, 658 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1997) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he assaulted his fourth appointed attorney); Montgomery, 530 S.E.2d at 69 (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel when, over the course of fifteen months, he was twice appointed counsel and twice released his appointed counsel); Painter, 762 P.2d at 992 (holding that defendant waived his right to counsel when he failed to secure counsel or request appointed counsel so that he could delay his hearing); State v. Boykin, 324 S.C. 552, 478 S.E.2d 689, 690 (Ct.App.1996) (recognizing that a defendant may implicitly waive the right to counsel by misconduct, but finding no implicit waiver because no warnings had been given the defendant); City of Tacoma v. Bishop, 82 Wash.App. 850, 920 P.2d 214, 218 (1996) (recognizing forfeiture but concluding that the defendant's misconduct was not sufficiently egregious to support a finding of forfeiture); State v. Cummings, 199 Wis.2d 721, 546 N.W.2d 406, 418 (1996) (holding that defendant had forfeited his right to counsel where he consistently refused to cooperate and constantly complained about counsel's performance to manipulate, disrupt, and delay the proceedings); see generally Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure, § 11.3(c) (2nd ed. 1999) (What these courts have held, in effect, is that the state's interest in maintaining an orderly trial schedule and the defendant's negligence, indifference, or possibly purposeful delaying tactic, combined to justify a forfeiture of defendant's right to counsel....). Some courts have attempted to distinguish the concepts of implicit waiver and forfeiture. See, e.g., Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099-1100; City of Tacoma, 920 P.2d at 218. These courts hold that an implicit waiver occurs when, after being warned by the court that counsel will be lost if dilatory, abusive, or uncooperative misconduct continues, a defendant persists in such behavior. Id. In contrast, forfeiture results regardless of the defendant's intent to relinquish the right and irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the right. Id. Accordingly, where a defendant engages in extremely serious misconduct, a finding of forfeiture is appropriate even though the defendant was not warned of the potential consequences of his or her actions or the risks associated with self-representation. See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102; City of Tacoma, 920 P.2d at 218. However, many courts considering this issue do not distinguish between the two concepts and have used the terms implicit waiver and forfeiture interchangeably. See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098; Cf. Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 895 n.2, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2647 n. 2, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (The Court uses the term `waive' instead of `forfeit.' The two are really not the same, although our cases have so often used them interchangeably that it may be too late to introduce precision. Waiver, the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, is merely one means by which a forfeiture may occur. Some rights may be forfeited by means short of waiver.) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Although this Court has never considered the precise question presented in this appeal, when discussing a non-indigent defendant who fired his attorney in open court and thereafter repeatedly protested about going to trial without a lawyer, we recognized that even [t]hough a defendant has a right to select his own counsel if he acts expeditiously to do so ... he may not use this right to play a `cat and mouse' game with the court.... State v. Chadwick, 224 Tenn. 75, 79, 450 S.W.2d 568, 570 (1970); see also Glasgow v. State, 224 Tenn. 626, 461 S.W.2d 25 (1970); State v. Dubrock, 649 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983) (holding that non-indigent defendants waived the right to counsel because they refused to hire an attorney). The idea that the right to counsel may not be used to manipulate or toy with the judicial system applies equally to indigent and non-indigent defendants. Although an indigent criminal defendant has a constitutional right to appointed counsel, that right may not be used as a license to manipulate, delay, or disrupt a trial. See footnote 26 supra, citing cases. Accordingly, we conclude that an indigent criminal defendant may implicitly waive or forfeit the right to counsel by utilizing that right to manipulate, delay, or disrupt trial proceedings. We also hold that the distinction between these two concepts is slight and that the record in this case supports a finding of both implicit waiver and forfeiture. When Garrett and Morton were allowed to withdraw and Massey and Sayle were appointed, the trial court advised Carruthers that Massey and Sayle would be the lawyers representing him at trial and that there would be no further withdrawal and new appointments absent a gigantic conflict. Despite this admonishment, Carruthers once again launched personal attacks and threats against Massey, threats that eventually extended to Massey's office staff and family members. When Massey renewed his motion to withdraw on January 2, 1996, the trial court specifically and clearly advised Carruthers that he had two choicescooperate with Massey or represent himself. Carruthers also was advised that if he chose not to cooperate with Massey and to represent himself, he would be required to comply with all procedural rules as if he were an attorney. The trial court repeated his admonishment at a hearing on January 3, 1996. Despite the trial court's clear warnings, quoted fully earlier in this opinion, Carruthers persisted with his attitude of hostility toward Massey, as is evidenced both by his glaring at Massey during the hearings and by the letters Massey received after those hearings. In our view, Carruthers implicitly waived his right to counsel, because, after being warned by the trial court that he would lose his attorney if his misconduct continued, Carruthers persisted in his misconduct. In so holding, we reject Carruthers' claim that the warnings given him by the trial court were not sufficient to support a finding of implied waiver. The cases upon which Carruthers relies in support of this claim are inapposite because they involve explicit, voluntary waiver cases. See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir.1987); Crandell v. Bunnell, 25 F.3d 754 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245, 248-49 (10th Cir.1989). We decline to hold that a trial court must provide extensive and detailed warnings when a defendant's conduct illustrates that he or she understands the right to counsel and is able to use it to manipulate the system. We conclude that an implicit waiver may appropriately be found, where, as here, the record reflects that the trial court advises the defendant the right to counsel will be lost if the misconduct persists and generally explains the risks associated with self-representation. Cf. Kelm, 827 F.2d at 1322 (considering the record as a whole when determining the sufficiency of the trial court's advisements). Even assuming the warnings given Carruthers were insufficient to support a finding of implicit waiver, however, we conclude that Carruthers' conduct was sufficiently egregious to support a finding that he forfeited his right to counsel. The circumstances culminating in the trial court's ruling have been fully summarized. Carruthers repeatedly and unreasonably demanded that his appointed counsel withdraw and that new counsel be appointed. Carruthers' demands escalated as his scheduled trial dates drew near. As the trial court recognized, the ploy to delay the trial became increasingly apparent with each new set of attorneys. In addition, Carruthers' conduct degenerated and his outrageous allegations and threats escalated markedly with each new set of attorneys. As the trial court emphasized, Carruthers was the author of his own predicament and sabotaged his relationship with each successive attorney with the obvious goal of delaying and disrupting the orderly trial of the case. Under these circumstances, the trial court was fully justified in concluding that Carruthers had forfeited his right to counsel. Indeed, in situations such as this one, a trial court has no other choice but to find that a defendant has forfeited the right to counsel; otherwise, an intelligent defendant could theoretically go through tens of court-appointed attorneys and delay his trial for years. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d at 419. As did the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals, we have carefully considered the ramifications of holding that an indigent criminal defendant in a capital case has implicitly waived and forfeited his valuable right to counsel. [28] We are aware that both implicit waiver and forfeiture are extreme sanctions. However, Carruthers' conduct was extreme and egregious. The sanction is appropriate under the circumstances and commensurate with Carruthers' misconduct. We reiterate that a finding of forfeiture is appropriate only where a defendant egregiously manipulates the constitutional right to counsel so as to delay, disrupt, or prevent the orderly administration of justice. Where the record demonstrates such egregious manipulation a finding of forfeiture should be made and such a finding will be sustained, even if the defendant is charged with a capital offense. Persons charged with capital offenses should not be afforded greater latitude to manipulate and misuse valuable and treasured constitutional rights. Carruthers also claims that he was denied due process because he was forced to choose between incompetent counsel and no counsel at all, and he asserts that the trial judge should have held a hearing to determine the validity of his complaints about his attorneys. We disagree. There is simply no evidence indicating that any one of the many attorneys appointed to represent Carruthers was ineffective. [29] In fact, the record fully supports the trial court's repeated findings that the attorneys were qualified, competent, and highly skilled trial lawyers. The record demonstrates that the trial court closely supervised the case, inquired about defense counsel's progress, allowed Carruthers to voice his concerns about counsel, and conscientiously reviewed and considered letters from Carruthers containing allegations about his attorneys. Based upon this information, the trial court repeatedly found the attorneys representing Carruthers to be competent. Most of Carruthers' complaints about his attorneys were outrageous personal attacks that had little or nothing to do with legal representation. Indeed, these allegations were so outrageous that the letters were sealed at trial and remain a sealed exhibit to the record on appeal. Although we have reviewed the letters, it is not necessary to reveal the specific nature of the offensive and unfounded allegations. [30] Suffice it to say that, given the nature of the allegations and the trial court's close and careful supervision of the case, a formal hearing to determine counsel's competency was not necessary. To the extent that Carruthers is alleging that his pro se representation was ineffective, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that when a defendant forfeits or waives the right to counsel, regardless of whether the waiver is explicit or implicit, he or she also forfeits or waives the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Small, 988 S.W.2d at 673; State v. Goodwin, 909 S.W.2d 35, 45 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995); Cf. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 n.46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n.46 ([W]hatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel.). [31] Carruthers also argues that his right to counsel was violated when the trial court allowed Sayle to withdraw as advisory counsel. We disagree. This Court recently held that there is no constitutional right to the appointment of advisory counsel where a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel. Small, 988 S.W.2d at 675. We also recognized in Small that trial courts have discretion to appoint advisory counsel, but emphasized that trial court decisions regarding appointment of advisory counsel will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Id. Carruthers has cited no authority that would require adoption of a different rule in this case. After finding that Carruthers had implicitly waived or forfeited his right to appointed counsel, the trial court, consistent with preferred practice, [32] appointed advisory counsel. Sayle was allowed to withdraw because Carruthers leveled personal attacks against him. Given Carruthers' relationship with his five prior court-appointed attorneys, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Sayle to withdraw. Indeed, the trial court's decision was entirely reasonable. Cf. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d at 419 (upholding the trial court's refusal to appoint standby counsel because the defendant had totally refused to cooperate with his previous court-appointed counsel). This issue is without merit. Finally, Carruthers argues that the trial court did not treat him fairly because he was forced to represent himself. Carruthers recites an extensive list of over thirty episodes allegedly supporting his allegations that his trial was unfair and his treatment unequal. As the Court of Criminal Appeals found, most of the restrictions about which Carruthers complains resulted from his status as a pro se litigant and a prisoner subject to strict security measures. In fact, the record reflects that the trial court was much more lenient with Carruthers than with the other defense attorneys and went to great lengths to accommodate Carruthers' requests, even issuing subpoenas for witnesses during trial. The trial court also liberally approved funds for Carruthers to secure expert and investigative assistance. The trial court was not required to exempt Carruthers from complying with the rules of evidence and procedure or to allow Carruthers free reign in the courtroom. The record reveals that Carruthers was treated fairly by the trial court, and this issue is without merit.