Opinion ID: 514264
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to File Timely Appeal

Text: 50 As set out above, Osborn attempted to appeal the denial of his motion to reconsider, although he had not appealed the denial of the underlying relief on which the motion to reconsider was based. The State's motion to the Wyoming Supreme Court to dismiss Osborn's appeal, and the court's subsequent dismissal, were apparently based in part on Osborn's initial failure to appeal the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In a very unfocused argument, the State now appears to assert that Osborn is barred from federal habeas relief by his failure to appeal the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. 51
52 The first question we must address is the procedural default standard applicable in determining whether the failure to appeal the denial of a state post-conviction petition precludes federal redress of a constitutional claim. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), the Supreme Court considered procedural bar in the context of the petitioner's failure to take a direct appeal from a state court conviction. The Court held that such a petitioner is barred if he has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies. Id. at 438, 83 S.Ct. at 849. The Court described deliberate bypass as  'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'  Id. at 439, 83 S.Ct. at 849 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). The Court further explained that 53 [i]f a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits--though of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other means, of the facts bearing upon the applicant's default. 54 Id. The Court has never overruled Fay, and has twice reserved the issue of whether a failure to file an appeal at all falls under the cause and prejudice standard. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2507 n. 12, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977); Carrier, 106 S.Ct. at 2648. 55 A persuasive argument can be made that the deliberate bypass standard remains applicable to fundamental decisions made by the defendant himself as opposed to strategic legal issues decided by his attorney. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 92-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2509-10 (Burger, C.J., concurring). By stressing that ineffective assistance of counsel and new developments in the law are a clear means of showing cause, see Carrier, 106 S.Ct. at 2646, the Court has indicated that the cause and prejudice test is best suited to address attorney decisions. See, e.g., Reed, 468 U.S. at 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2907 (asserting that cause and prejudice test applies where defendant has failed to abide by a State's procedural rule requiring the exercise of legal expertise and judgment ) (emphasis added)); cf. Amadeo v. Zant, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 1776, 100 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). Following this rationale, we have consistently held with respect to direct appeals that until the Supreme Court overrules Fay, we shall apply the rule of that case at least to situations in which no state appeal has been taken. Holcomb v. Murphy, 701 F.2d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 3546, 77 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1983); see Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir.1988); accord Crick v. Smith, 650 F.2d 860, 867 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1281, 71 L.Ed.2d 464 (1982); Boyer v. Patton, 579 F.2d 284, 286 (3d Cir.1978). 11 56 Our own decision in Holcomb and the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Reed and Murray convince us that the Fay standard continues to apply to decisions which properly rest with the defendant/petitioner. See Hughes, 800 F.2d 905, 910-14 (9th Cir.1986) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (discussing the failure-to-appeal issue in detail). The ultimate decision whether to file a post-conviction appeal properly rests with the petitioner, just as it does in deciding whether to file a direct appeal. We thus apply the deliberate bypass standard to Osborn's failure to file a timely appeal from the denial of his state petition for habeas relief. 57
58 Although the State makes a general assertion that Osborn deliberately bypassed his state remedies, the State has never argued or pointed to any evidence showing that Osborn's failure to appeal the May 13 order denying the consolidated petition was due to his own deliberate decision to forego his right to appeal that denial. Our examination of the record reveals nothing tending to establish that Osborn himself intentionally and knowingly relinquished his right to appeal the denial of post-conviction relief within the meaning of Fay. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Osborn is not barred by his failure. III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 59 The Supreme Court has long recognized that 'the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel'  under the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)), United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2044, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). An effective attorney must play the role of an active advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 835, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656, 104 S.Ct. at 2045; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1399, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Forty years ago, Justice Black articulated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as follows: 60 The right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests of his client.... Undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service to a client are prized traditions of the American lawyer. It is this kind of service for which the Sixth Amendment makes provision. And nowhere is this service deemed more honorable than in case of appointment to represent an accused too poor to hire a lawyer, even though the accused may be a member of an unpopular or hated group, or may be charged with an offense which is peculiarly abhorrent. 61 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26, 68 S.Ct. 316, 324, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948). 62 The most common means by which an attorney may fail to function as his client's advocate in the absence of affirmative state interference involves a conflict of interest arising from multiple or dual representation. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342-45, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1714-17, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); United States v. Burney, 756 F.2d 787, 790-92 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Dressel, 742 F.2d 1256, 1259-60 (10th Cir.1984). An attorney may, however, abandon his duty to loyalty to his client through other sorts of conflicts as well. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 267, 270-71, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1101, 1103, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (applying Cuyler to conflict where attorney hired and paid by defendants' employer created interests arguably adverse to defendants); Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 136 (3d Cir.1984) (attorney could have been indicted for same crime and testified against defendant); United States v. Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596, 601-02 (9th Cir.1984) (attorney had potential conflict between duties to defendant and the state); United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.1980) (attorney possibly more concerned with publicity than with client's best interests). Similarly, an attorney who adopts and acts upon a belief that his client should be convicted fail[s] to function in any meaningful sense as the Government's adversary. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666, 104 S.Ct. at 2051. Whether the attorney is influenced by loyalties to other defendants, third parties, or the government, if [he] entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047. 63 The state's duty to ensure effective assistance of counsel goes further than actual breakdowns in the adversary process. In Strickland, the Supreme Court considered when a defense attorney may be constitutionally ineffective simply by failing to render 'adequate legal assistance.'  466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344, 100 S.Ct. at 1716). When the trial or sentencing process is rendered unreliable because it has clearly lost its adversary character, the Sixth Amendment violation is clear. When an ineffectiveness claim rests exclusively on the inadequacy of an attorney's strategic legal decisions, however, the process retains its formal adversary nature. In this situation, the defense attorney may have advocated his client's interests to the best of his ability. Nevertheless, the Court has held that if the attorney's inadequacies fall below that of a reasonably competent attorney and his errors may have affected the result, the proceeding, though formally adversarial, is deemed inadequate to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2063. 64 The Court in Strickland adopted a two-prong test to help lower courts determine when errors in legal decision-making alone effectively render the guilt determination process nonadversarial. First, an attorney should be judged by an objective reasonableness standard focusing on the defense attorney's knowledge at the time of the relevant proceeding. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. Reviewing courts should avoid hindsight and second-guessing, and extend deference to counsel's tactical judgments. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Courts must, however, determine whether the attorney fulfilled his duty to make reasonable investigations or to determine reasonably that such investigations were not necessary. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. We have defined this reasonableness standard as the 'exercise [of] the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonable competent defense attorney.'  Burney, 756 F.2d at 790 (quoting Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945, 100 S.Ct. 1342, 63 L.Ed.2d 779 (1980)). 65 Second, the defendant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's errors. Although the Court intended the prejudice standard to be flexible, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, it emphasized that a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Instead, the defendant bears the burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 12 Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 66 Although the underlying issue in an ineffectiveness claim is always the adversary nature of the process, the Court's decisions in Strickland and Cronic suggest that the convicted defendant can pursue an ineffectiveness claim in two ways. He can assert that the process was not adversarial because of affirmative state interference or a conflict of interest, and/or he can argue that his attorney was so inadequate that he was effectively denied the benefit of full adversarial testing of his guilt. See Zepp, 748 F.2d at 131-32; cf. Burger v. Kemp, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (engaging in separate inquiries). When a defendant challenges the adequacy of his counsel's performance, he must meet the Strickland reasonableness and prejudice requirements. See Burger, 107 S.Ct. at 3123; Zepp, 748 F.2d at 132. Conversely, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1718-19; see Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488, 98 S.Ct. at 1180; but see Burger, 107 S.Ct. at 3120 (mere possibility of prejudice inherent in every instance of multiple representation does not establish presumption). When an actual conflict of interest is demonstrated, prejudice is presumed because counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. 67 In this case, the district court held that Osborn's counsel was constitutionally ineffective at both the guilty plea and sentencing stages. 13 The court based its conclusion on specific fact findings, which may not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Griffin v. Winans, 684 F.2d 686, 689-90 (10th Cir.1982). We conclude that these findings are amply borne out by the record and provide persuasive support for the court's decision to grant habeas relief. See Osborn, 639 F.Supp. at 615-18. 68 The district court found that the strategy of Osborn's counsel was to talk the prosecutor out of seeking the death penalty prior to or at the sentencing hearing. Id. at 616. When the prosecutor insisted on pursuing the death penalty, defense counsel was left unprepared. Id. This lack of preparation forced him to rely on the argument that Osborn's participation in the crimes was more limited than that of his co-defendants, who were not sentenced to die. 14 If Osborn's counsel had made a tactical decision after adequate investigation and reasoned judgment to rely on this lone argument, we would not consider it completely untenable. In this case, however, the district court found and the record confirms that defense counsel completely failed to investigate other plausible lines of defense and was inadequately prepared to effectively present the tactical defense he chose. See id. at 616-17. [I]n a capital case the attorney's duty to investigate all possible lines of defense is strictly observed. Coleman, 802 F.2d at 1233; cf. Burger, 107 S.Ct. at 3126 (less than complete investigation justifiable only to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066)). 69 Counsel did not have to prepare for a trial because Osborn had pled guilty. Even though counsel's sole responsibility was to argue the sentencing question, the district court found that he did little in preparation. Osborn, 639 F.Supp. at 616-17. It should be beyond cavil that an attorney who fails altogether to make any preparations for the penalty phase of a capital murder trial deprives his client of reasonably effective assistance of counsel by any objective standard of reasonableness. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 533 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998, 106 S.Ct. 374, 88 L.Ed.2d 367 (1985). Here, counsel failed to uncover mitigating family background witnesses and medical history when both were available. 70 More importantly, counsel did not object to prejudicial ex parte information provided to the trial court before sentencing that indicated Osborn was the ringleader of the group. Osborn, 639 F.Supp. at 617. The introduction of such information may well have been unconstitutional. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1206, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (denial of due process to impose death penalty on basis of information defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain). Counsel's failure to contact co-defendant Teel's attorney to discover who Teel thought was the ringleader undermined counsel's ability to challenge this ex parte information. 15 Osborn, 639 F.Supp. at 617. Counsel was not adequately prepared to argue, as he attempted to do, that Osborn was no worse than his cohorts who were not sentenced to die. Cf. Coleman, 802 F.2d at 1234 (when only one line of defense available, counsel must investigate it). Counsel did not have transcripts from, nor did he attend, the co-defendants' plea hearings. Osborn, 639 F.Supp. at 617. He never conferred with co-defendant Green, who later testified at the federal habeas hearing that he was the leader. Although counsel called a psychiatrist who had examined Osborn, he did nothing to prepare this witness. Counsel never inquired about comparisons between Osborn's and Green's psychiatric history although the doctor had examined both men. At the habeas hearing, the psychiatrist testified that Green was more violent and aggressive than Osborn. 71 Once his strategy of convincing the prosecutor to forgo the death penalty failed, counsel was required to proceed with a sentencing hearing for which the district court found he was not prepared. Id. at 617. Even granting deference to counsel's choices, we cannot conclude that he reasonably determined that he need not undertake further investigation, before proceeding with an argument he was wholly unprepared to make. Burger, 107 S.Ct. at 3126. We agree with the district court that this performance did not meet constitutional standards. 72 In addition, the district court's findings clearly establish that Osborn's attorney so abandoned his overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, that the state proceedings were almost totally non-adversarial. Osborn, 639 F.Supp. at 615-16. Evidence of this abandonment came to light when Osborn decided that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court found that Osborn's counsel made statements to the press indicating that Osborn had no evidence to support his claims and that he was playing a game to attract attention. Id. at 615. Publicly chastising a client is evidence of ineffectiveness. See United States ex rel. Zembowski v. DeRobertis, 771 F.2d 1057, 1064 (7th Cir.1985). The district court correctly asserted that [s]uch statements could easily have come from the prosecutor, rather than defendant's counsel. Osborn, 639 F.Supp. at 616. 73 Counsel's actions in regard to sentencing even more clearly indicate the abandonment of his duty of loyalty. At the federal habeas hearing, Osborn's counsel admitted that he had made public statements to the effect that Osborn was not amenable to rehabilitation, and conceded that such statements probably did not help his client's chances to avoid the death penalty. Supp. rec. vol. 12, at 186-87. In addition, although counsel knew or should have known that the prosecutor's office had conveyed ex parte information to the sentencing court, counsel never sought to discover its contents or counteract its effect. See Osborn, 639 F.Supp. at 617. This information indicated that Osborn was the leader of the group of four criminals, the key factor that convinced the sentencing judge to impose the death sentence. Counsel's testimony at the habeas hearing suggests that he did not challenge the ringleader assertion because he believed it correct; that conflicting evidence existed was apparently of no moment to him. Defense counsel must present conflicting evidence to the court, not judge the issue for himself. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988, 1006, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (Blackman, J., concurring in judgment) (Except in the rarest of cases, attorneys who 'adopt the role of the judge or jury to determine the facts,' pose a danger of depriving their clients of the zealous and loyal advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment.) (quoting United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir.1977) (citation omitted)). 74 The most striking indication of counsel's failure to fulfill his duty of loyalty to his client is apparent from his behavior at the sentencing trial itself. The district court described it as follows: 75 Counsel's arguments at the sentencing hearing stressed the brutality of the crimes and the difficulty his client had presented to him. At the beginning of the hearing, counsel referred to the difficulty of presenting mitigating circumstances when evidence against a client is overwhelming. In closing, counsel referred to the problems Osborn's behavior had created for counsel throughout the representation. Counsel described the crimes as horrendous. He analogized his client and the co-defendants to 'sharks feeding in the ocean in a frenzy; something that's just animal in all aspects.'  76 Osborn, 639 F.Supp. at 617 (emphasis added). 16 Cf. King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462, 1464 (11th Cir.1984) (holding counsel ineffective in part because argument at sentencing hearing unnecessarily stressed the horror of the crime). 77 The problems do not end there. After the sentencing hearing, counsel responded to a request to evaluate the district judge's performance. Counsel informed the judge in a letter, subsequently submitted to the state supreme court hearing Osborn's appeal, that in essence his client deserved the death sentence, that the defendant brought it on himself. Although counsel was in the process of arguing the appeal when he wrote this letter, he insisted that whether it helped his client wasn't my concern. Supp. rec., vol. 12, at 168. 78 Osborn's counsel was an experienced criminal attorney who had previously argued and won capital cases. In a typical case where an attorney's loyalty is questioned, the reason for his divided allegiance is relatively clear, while its effect on his representation is questionable. Here the opposite is true. No particular reason for defense counsel's behavior is apparent, although he repeated many times that Osborn was an extremely difficult client, and that he had another very high profile capital case before the Wyoming courts at the same time as this one. Whatever the reason, the record supports the district court's finding that defense counsel turned against Osborn, and that this conflict in loyalty unquestionably affected his representation. A defense attorney who abandons his duty of loyalty to his client and effectively joins the state in an effort to attain a conviction or death sentence suffers from an obvious conflict of interest. Such an attorney, like unwanted counsel,  'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In fact, an attorney who is burdened by a conflict between his client's interests and his own sympathies to the prosecution's position is considerably worse than an attorney with loyalty to other defendants, because the interests of the state and the defendant are necessarily in opposition. As the Supreme Court has asserted: 79 The right to effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.... [I]f the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated. 80 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57, 104 S.Ct. at 2045. 81 We base our conclusion that Osborn did not receive effective assistance of counsel on the clear evidence that the process by which he pled and was sentenced to death was not adversarial, and therefore was unreliable. The performance of Osborn's counsel was constitutionally unreasonable, but more importantly, the evidence presented at his habeas hearing overwhelmingly established that his attorney abandoned the required duty of loyalty to his client. Osborn's attorney did not simply make poor strategic choices; he acted with reckless disregard for his client's best interests and, at times, apparently with the intention to weaken his client's case. 82 Prejudice, whether necessary or not, is established under any applicable standard. See Osborn, 639 F.Supp. at 616. Although Osborn may be guilty of several horrible crimes, 17 the state court might not have accepted his guilty plea if his counsel had actively advocated his interests. Counsel knew Osborn was only pleading guilty in an attempt to get the ACLU interested in his case. Nevertheless, he made every effort to ensure that the court would accept his client's plea. Even assuming that Osborn might have insisted on pleading guilty, a true advocate would have attempted to convince the state to allow Osborn to withdraw his plea before sentencing. Defense counsel here did nothing while ACLU attorneys unfamiliar with the case hastily prepared a motion to withdraw Osborn's guilty plea. Once the motion was filed, counsel informed the press that the motion was, in his opinion, meritless. His public acknowledgement of his doubts about the merits of the issue not only infected the immediate decision of the state trial court, but also that of the state supreme court to whom counsel argued on appeal the very same issue he had publicly pronounced untenable. 83 Finally, we believe it significant that counsel admittedly disregarded evidence that Osborn was not the ringleader. The state court's decision to impose the death penalty, as its order indicates, was based on its belief that Osborn was the ringleader. This belief might have been refuted or at least significantly undermined had Osborn had a true advocate in the courtroom. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in finding that Osborn's counsel's behavior prejudiced his case. With an effective advocate in his corner, a reasonable probability exists that the court might never have accepted Osborn's guilty plea nor sentenced him to death. IV. CONDITIONAL WRIT 84 The district court ordered Osborn's case remanded to state court to allow Osborn to withdraw his plea, enter a new plea, and be tried and/or sentenced. The court ordered that these proceedings take place before a different state court judge in a different location. We view the district court's remand order as, in effect, the issuance of a conditional writ. Accord Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438, 1448 (11th Cir.1986). The State contends that the conditions imposed by the court below in granting habeas relief exceeded its authority. 85 Federal courts are authorized, under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2243, to dispose of habeas corpus matters 'as law and justice require.'  Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 2118, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987). The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that section 2243 vests a court with broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief. Id. The record before us reflects that the judge who took Osborn's guilty plea and sentenced him to death received numerous ex parte communications pertinent to those proceedings. The vice of such ex parte information is that Osborn's death penalty may have been imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362, 97 S.Ct. at 1207. Osborn and his present counsel have since learned of the content of some of these communications and would therefore presumably be able to rebut them in new proceedings. However, the record clearly indicates that other such communications may well have occurred, the existence and content of which Osborn has no way of ascertaining. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the lower court abused its broad discretion in requiring that new state proceedings be held under circumstances fashioned to eliminate any lingering effects of ex parte knowledge of the case. V.