Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assertedly erroneous admission of evidence

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing, over defense objections at various points in the competency trial, irrelevant discussion and evidence of the factual details of the charged offenses. (Evid. Code, § 350.) Defendant further argues that any relevancy of these details was substantially outweighed by the prejudice they caused him before the competency jury, in violation of Evidence Code section 352 and his right to due process of law under the state and federal Constitutions. Defendant complains that, during voir dire, the prosecutor asked prospective jurors, [I]f it were to come out during the testimony of the psychiatrists that because there are multiple murder charges against Jon Dunkle, some other judge and some other jury down the road  not you, nothing for you to consider . . . may have to consider the death penalty, do you have such strong feelings, one way or the other, that it would affect them in the competency trial. The prosecutor later asked similar questions of other prospective jurors. Defense counsel objected that the penalty in the criminal trial was irrelevant to and remote from the issues in the competency proceeding, and that competency jurors should not be considering the issue of possible penalties. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to inquire. There was no error. A trial court enjoys wide latitude in determining what questions may be asked on voir dire, and its exercise of discretion in this respect forms grounds for reversal only when it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 737, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302.) Contrary to defendant's assertion, the subject of penalty was relevant to the competency trial, in that the psychiatric experts' testimony touched on defendant's understanding of the potential outcome of the criminal proceedings and his possible motivation to delay them. Defendant suffered no undue prejudice by the prosecutor's mention of the potential penalty during voir dire. (See People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 925, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388 [for purposes of Evidence Code section 352, undue prejudice stems from evidence that `tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual' and that has a negligible bearing on the issues, not the prejudice `that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.'].) Defendant's due process claim lacks merit for the same reasons. Defendant further complains of the admission of references to the uncharged killing of Sean Dannehl. First, defendant notes the prosecutor, out of the presence of the jury, stated that Dr. Missett and Dr. Wilkinson had discussed the Dannehl homicide with defendant and that he intended to bring up evidence pertaining to that offense because defendant would be dealing with [it] during the penalty phase. Defense counsel objected on grounds of irrelevancy and undue prejudice. The trial court ruled inadmissible any mention of the Dannehl homicide unless it became clear that the probative value of such evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Detective Robert Bell, a homicide investigator in the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department who had worked on the Dannehl case, later testified for the prosecution without mentioning that case. Dr. Levy and Dr. Missett, in their respective testimony, referred to the existence of the Dannehl homicide, without describing any details of the offense. The determination of the extent of a defendant's ability rationally to assist counsel in presenting a penalty defense may necessitate reference to evidence of uncharged offenses likely to be presented to the penalty phase jury. (See People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 427, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 887-888, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282; People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 494-496, 174 Cal.Rptr. 684, 629 P.2d 485.) Here, Dr. Missett testified that, during the competency examination, defendant spontaneously referred to Sean Dannehl but refused to discuss the details of the offense; probing a defendant's understanding of those details, Dr. Missett noted, is relevant to the competency determination. We therefore see no error in the references to the Dannehl homicide. Defendant additionally argues the prosecutor improperly brought the facts of the Turner and Davies homicides before the jury, causing prejudice requiring reversal of the judgment. During his opening statement to the competency jury, the prosecutor summarized the evidence of those offenses; when defense counsel objected, the prosecutor explained the evidence would show that defendant remembered what he had done in the course of the killings and related it to the evaluators. As promised, the prosecutor then presented the testimony of Belmont Police Officer Joseph Farmer, who related the substance of defendant's 1986 confessions to the Davies and Turner homicides and the Murphy attempted murder. Specifically, Farmer testified defendant said that in 1984 he approached Lance Turner on a trail, stabbed him with a knife in the throat, stomach and chest, and dragged the body off the trail into the bushes; in November 1981 he invited John Davies to have some beer and listen to his car stereo, and then at Edgewood Park took a knife from his car, walked up a hillside with John, stabbed him in the back and throat, strangled him, hit him over the head with a rock, and pushed the body 100 feet off the side of the hill; and in 1982 he deliberately ran Stephen Murphy over with his car, put him into the car, drove him to another undeveloped part of Belmont and left him there. Defendant contends these facts were irrelevant to the issues involved in the competency trial, and that he never contested (as by a claim of amnesia or organic brain damage) that he remembered his actions. Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence of the homicides and attempted homicide served a legitimate purpose in the competency trial: to convey to the jurors the essence of the case against which defendant would have to defend himself, in order that they could assess his understanding of the charges and ability to assist counsel in his defense. The evidence, moreover, illuminated defendant's failure to discuss the facts of the offenses with the mental health professionals appointed or retained to evaluate him, as contrasted with his earlier, more forthcoming admissions to law enforcement officers. This, in turn, tended to support the prosecution's contention that defendant could rationally assist counsel, if he so chose. In any event, a minimum of time was spent on the facts of the homicides, and the jurors were instructed not to be biased against the defendant, or swayed by sympathy, passion, prejudice, or the possible consequences of their verdict. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting references to the facts of the Turner and Davies homicides to come before the jury, defendant was not denied due process. (Cf. People v. Turner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 427, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505.)