Opinion ID: 773006
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Relative Nature of the Work Test

Text: 36 Despite the aforementioned flaws in the respective analyses of the ALJ and the Board, these analyses correctly downplayed the issue of which entity, employer or the union, controlled the details of [Marinelli's] work. Marinelli, 2000 WL 1133566, at . This control factor is not suited to the facts of th[is] particular case, id., because it was inherent in Marinelli's position as a shop steward - a position created by agreement between ASL and the union - that neither party exercised control over the details of his work. As the ALJ found, based on substantial evidence, it was Marinelli's job to mediate disputes between ASL and the union, and he sometimes sided with ASL, other times with the union. Marinelli could not have performed this role if he had been under the detailed control of either entity. 9 37 Hence, in deciding which of the three employer-employee tests generally applied by the Board is best suited to the facts of this case, the ALJ quite properly avoided the tests that make the right to control the details of the employee's work an important factor, namely, the right to control the details of the work test 10 and the test embodied in Section 220(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Ageny. 11 The remaining test the Board has used, namely, the relative nature of the work test, accords no weight to this control factor and therefor is the appropriate test to use in this case. In applying the relative nature of the work test, a court should 38 focus on two distinct areas: the nature of the claimant's work and the relation of that work to the alleged employer's regular business. In evaluating the character of a claimant's work, a court should focus on various factors, including the skill required to do the work, the degree to which the work constitutes a separate calling or enterprise, and the extent to which the work might be expected to carry its own accident burden. In analyzing the relationship of the claimant's work to the employer's business the factors to be examined include, among others, whether the claimant's work is a regular part of the employer's regular work, whether the claimant's work is continuous or intermittent, and whether the duration of claimant's work is sufficient to amount to the hiring of continuing services as distinguished from the contracting for the completion of a particular job. 39 Oilfield Safety and Mach. Specialities, Inc. v. Harman Unlimited, Inc., 625 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1980). 40 Applying this test to the present case, it is evident that Marinelli's shop steward position did not constitute a calling or enterprise separate from ASL's stevedoring operation. On the contrary, the position existed solely by agreement of ASL and the union. As ASL's owner testified, other non-union stevedoring operations are conducted without the benefit of this position. Nor was Marinelli's position one that could be expected to carry its own accident insurance. Indeed, ASL's owner testified that ASL deducted sums from Marinelli's paychecks for disability benefits. See also Carle v. Georgetown Builders, Inc., BRB No. 83-1618, 1986 WL 66425, at  (B.R.B. Nov. 28, 1986) (finding employer-employee relationship because, inter alia, claimant did not carry his own accident burden). Turning to the relationship between Marinelli's work and ASL's regular business, we have noted in the preceding section that Marinelli's shop steward duties were a regular part of ASL's regular stevedoring work. Marinelli held the position continuously from 1986 or 1987 until March 16, 1997, a period of time that is sufficient to amount to hiring of continuing services. Furthermore, the fact emphasized by the ALJ, ASL's payment of Marinelli's wages, also supports a finding that ASL was Marinelli's employer. See Oilfield, 625 F.2d at 1255 (under relative nature of the work test, finding employer-employee relationship because, inter alia, entity paid claimant's salary); Carle, 1986 WL 66425, at  (same). In sum, viewed through the lens of the relative nature of the work test, the ALJ's determination that an employer-employee relationship existed between ASL and Marinelli was supported by substantial evidence. 41 This conclusion is not disturbed by the fact that ASL exercised no control over the details of Marinelli's work. As indicated above, this fact does not count against a finding that ASL was his employer because it was inherent in the very nature of Marinelli's shop steward position - a position created by the CBA - that Marinelli operated independently of both ASL and the union. See Oilfield, 625 F.2d at 1256 (stating that entity's lack of control over claimant did not count against finding that entity was claimant's employer because [t]he nature of [claimant's] job virtually prohibits a supervisor from controlling the details of the work). 42 ASL contends that application of the relative nature of the work test to this case yields the conclusion that the union, not ASL, was Marinelli's employer because Marinelli was a labor representation [sic], and [ASL] was not in the business of providing labor representation. [ASL] was in the business of loading and unloading ships. The only employer in this case who was in the business of providing labor representation was [Marinelli's] union. This argument is without merit. Simply applying the conclusory label labor representation to Marinelli's work does not alter the actual nature of that work - work that the ALJ and the Board correctly determined to constitute maritime employment.