Opinion ID: 2331578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Balance of probative value and danger of unfair prejudice under W.R.E. 403

Text: [¶ 20] Next, we must answer the more difficult question of whether the district court abused its discretion in its application of W.R.E. 403. W.R.E. 403 provides that, Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. As a general principle, we have stated that This rule is to be used sparingly, because it excludes evidence which is concededly relevant and probative. Mintun v. State, 966 P.2d 954, 959 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Towner v. State, 685 P.2d 45, 49 (Wyo.1984)). Further, W.R.E. 403, by its terms, is weighted in favor of admissibility, allowing evidence to come in unless prejudicial effect substantially outweighs probative worth. Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 22, 193 P.3d 228, 237 (Wyo.2008) (quoting Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal Evidence § 6:42 (3d ed.2007)). [¶ 21] Unfairly prejudicial evidence is evidence which will likely stimulate an excessive emotion or . . . awaken a fixed prejudice. . . and thus dominate the mind of the [jury] and prevent a rational determination of the truth. Furman v. Rural Elec. Co., 869 P.2d 136, 146 (Wyo.1994) (quoting 22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5215, at 278 (1978)). We have previously noted the importance of characterizing potential prejudice as unfair under Rule 403: Rule 403 does not allow the exclusion of evidence simply because it is prejudicial. All of the evidence against appellant [is] `prejudicial.' The evidence must be unfairly prejudicial before its prejudicial effect is weighed against its probative value. Robinson v. State, 716 P.2d 364, 367 n. 2 (Wyo. 1986) (emphasis in original); see also Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Wyo.1990) (For the prejudice factor to come into play the [trial] court must conclude that it is unfair.); Heinemann v. State, 12 P.3d 692, 702 (Wyo. 2000) (Evidence that is not in some way prejudicial would be irrelevant, since the purpose of evidence is to persuade the trier of fact of the validity of the charge.). With these principles in mind, we turn to the district court's evaluation of probative value and unfair prejudice. [¶ 22] As noted above, at the hearing on Union Pacific's motion in limine, the court determined that evidence of the prior incident should be excluded, but stated that its admissibility at trial would depend on whether Union Pacific opened the door to the evidence. The transcript from the hearing provides as follows: THE COURT: Well, I can see where [the prior incident] would have some relevance if the argument is made that they shouldn't have sent him out to walk the track, that it's unsafe to do that. I don't know if the railroad is going to do that. But just to bring in that the railroad is dangerous and obviously it was dangerous then and so it's dangerous now, I can't see just saying it's not a bigit can come in on that basis. I could see wheredepending on what the railroad does here, could see where it could come in on a limited basis maybe based on what Mr. Harrison just said. COUNSEL FOR UNION PACIFIC: Your Honor, we arewe believe that this evidence is coming in for the purpose of, the railroad was negligent, didn't pay any attention to the rules, it was dangerous, they almost killed Cleav Porter, so let's get all riled up about the railroad. It doesn't have anything to do with Steve Glenn's accident. The noticeif Mr. Porter's incident put the railroad on notice of anything it was, if you have somebody operating under the cars while the train is moving that can be dangerous. That doesn't have anything to do with this case, with the Glenn case. The cars were stationary. They weren't moving. THE COURT: Okay. I have no problem granting your motion in regard to what you just said. But if the issue comes up about it being unsafe or why was Mr. Glenn out there, that Black Butte was negligent in making him go out there and having that policy of walking the loop and checking these cars, then at that point, I think that opens the door for it to come in. COUNSEL FOR UNION PACIFIC: So that is the Court's ruling? THE COURT: That is my ruling. Your motion in limine is granted except if you it will be ungranted if you open the door on the basis of what I just said. During a colloquy in the judge's chambers just prior to trial, the court again indicated that admissibility of the prior incident would depend on Union Pacific's arguments at trial: THE COURT: I think U.P. has to be careful in how it handles that issue, but I am not interested in having the Cleav Porter incident in this trial unless U.P. puts me in a position where I have to let it in. . . . I think that is what I said before is I could foresee a possibility that U.P. could open the door, but I think I was sending a signal, don't open that door. I think that is what I was trying to say. Based upon the district court's pretrial ruling, it was clear that evidence of the prior incident would not be allowed to prove that Union Pacific was negligent. It was also clear, however, that Union Pacific could open the door to admissibility of that evidence if the issue comes up about it being unsafe or why was Mr. Glenn out there, that Black Butte was negligent in making him go out there and having that policy of walking the loop and checking these cars. Mr. Glenn contends that Union Pacific opened the door to receipt of the evidence and that the district court erred in excluding the evidence after Union Pacific had opened the door. We agree. [¶ 23] During opening statements, counsel for Union Pacific stated that Black Butte should not have allowed its employees to inspect train cars on the balloon track, and asserted that checking cars at the tipple was the safer alternative. COUNSEL: . . . What [Black Butte] forgot to tell their employees is we want you checking the cars in this flat area, in this smooth area by the tipple. Again, I'm the tipple, the road crossing is here, nice, smooth, level area. Out here is the asphalt or concrete apron on either side of the track. That is where Black Butte wanted their employees to check the cars, but they didn't tell them that. This is an awful procedure. They didn'tBlack Butte didn't tell their employees one of the critical aspectstwo of the critical aspects of the procedure. Number one, get an operator up in the tipple. Number two, check the cars, and close, latch and lock the doors where it's safe. Not out on a balloon track. There isn't going to be much, if any, dispute in this case about the fact that the balloon track is not a reasonably safe place to be closing, latching or locking doors. You have got a choice here. Nice smooth area here and here, or you go out on the balloon track where it's sloped, where you have got some of these coking briquettes, and it's a ballast shoulder. It's a rock shoulder. Which one is safer? It's obvious which one is safer and everyone is going to agree. It's so obvious we stipulated to it. That is not a reasonably safe place to work for Mr. Glenn. Black Butte knew that, but they didn't bother to convey that to their employees in this little procedure note. Further, during Union Pacific's direct examination of Black Butte's production superintendent, counsel for Union Pacific elicited testimony regarding the relative safety of checking cars on the balloon track as opposed to at the tipple: COUNSEL: Is it important out at the mine to provide employees with good footing when they are working? WITNESS: Yes. COUNSEL: Do you feel that's Black Butte's responsibility to provide its employees with a safe place to work? WITNESS: Yes, it is. COUNSEL: Is providing employees with good footing where they are working part of that responsibility to provide a safe place to work? WITNESS: You do the best you can to provide safe conditions such as footing. COUNSEL: I thought it was beyond doing the best you could. I thought there was an absolute mandatory duty that Black Butte had to provide its employees with a safe place to work. WITNESS: Yes, you provide your employees the best conditions. COUNSEL: The best conditions, working conditions, in the mining industry, I think I saw in one of the policy statements. WITNESS: Yes. COUNSEL: Would be the absolute safest workplace in the mining industry? WITNESS: Yes. COUNSEL: You don't want employees to be working in an area where they don't have good footing; is that right? WITNESS: If there is not good footing we need to address the situation to make it as safe as possible. Sometimes you can't completely eliminate the hazard so you have to address it. COUNSEL: And avoid it if you can't eliminate it? WITNESS: Yes, that is one of the possibilities. COUNSEL: We have got a stipulation in this case that the judge read to the jury in the beginning of the case and that stipulation is the balloon track at Black Butte was not a safe workplace for Mr. Glenn to close, latch and lock the coal car doors. WITNESS: Okay. COUNSEL: Would you agree with that? WITNESS: It's not the most desirable location, that is for sure. COUNSEL: The most desirable location is up at the tipple? WITNESS: If I was going to perform that job that is where I would want to do it. COUNSEL: Not out on the balloon track? WITNESS: No. COUNSEL: And the balloon track has when you go out there you have got railroad ties and rails and then this loose rock ballast that slopes down, right? WITNESS: Yes. COUNSEL: That doesn't sound like ideal. That is not ideal footing conditions? WITNESS: Not in my opinion. COUNSEL: And there isif you go out there there is product, there is coke and there is coal that is spilled from the cars mixed in with the ballast? WITNESS: In some areas, yes. COUNSEL: That would contribute to the bad footing conditions? WITNESS: Yes, it would. And again, during direct examination of Black Butte's safety supervisor at the time of Mr. Glenn's accident, counsel for Union Pacific elicited testimony relating to the footing on the balloon track and the area surrounding the tipple. COUNSEL: Did Mr. Glenn tell you where the accident happened? WITNESS: No, I don't think Steve told me. [His coworker] told me. [His coworker] told me specifically where it happened. COUNSEL: What did he tell you? WITNESS: It was outside the tipple area headed west out on the rail loop. COUNSEL: What was your reaction to that? WITNESS: That surprised me. COUNSEL: Why did that surprise you? WITNESS: Well, we have this specifically built area with a nice concrete pad that provides a good footing. Where the accident occurred is outactually out on the rail loop where there is poor footing and steep bank for the ballast. COUNSEL: So you provided the Black Butte employees with a safe place to do that job and Mr. Glenn and [his coworker] had chosen an unsafe place to do it? WITNESS: Yes. . . . COUNSEL: And they are in a dangerous workplace? WITNESS: It's a tough place to even walk out on the railroad loop. COUNSEL: Why is that, the railroad loop a tough place to work? WITNESS: Just the steep edges of the ballast itself, the ballast material, the railroad ties. That is why the concrete pad was specifically built at the tipple. Nice, smooth, level area for that work to be performed. COUNSEL: Is the ballast that we are talking about almost fist-sized rocks? WITNESS: Yeah. Three inch, yeah. COUNSEL: And to a certain extent if it's sloped like you said it is, as you walk on it it can shift and it's loose? WITNESS: Sure. COUNSEL: And it takesdoes it make it very difficult to walk on that? WITNESS: It's tough to walk, yeah. It's tough to walk along the rail. COUNSEL: And you have known for a number of years prior to the day of the accident that walking on that steep, loose ballast wasn't safe? WITNESS: Yes. COUNSEL: Would it be something that would be obvious to somebody the minute they started walking on the ballast? WITNESS: It would be instantly obvious. COUNSEL: It would just scream at you? WITNESS: Sure. COUNSEL: And especially if you were at the tipple where you could see the concrete pad, it's smooth, it's level. Do you keep it clean? WITNESS: That is what it was put there for, so you could get a bobcat in there for ease in keeping it clean. There is enough room in there to get a skid steer loader to help keep it clean, yes. COUNSEL: So if you check the cars there and there was any spillage from carry-back material you could very easily clean it up? WITNESS: Yes. [¶ 24] Despite the district court's earlier warnings that evidence of the prior incident may be admissible if Union Pacific argued that Black Butte was negligent in making him go out there and having that policy of walking the loop and checking these cars, the court determined that Union Pacific had not opened the door to that evidence. When counsel for Mr. Glenn sought to introduce testimony regarding the prior incident to defend against the argument that Black Butte was negligent, the court responded as follows: THE COURT: You are saying they only had two choices? That is it? That is one of the issues that I have. I mean, the jurorsone of the jurors said it really well yesterday when he said that every rule is made for a reason and they are written in blood, basically. And we aren't looking at the reason for all of the rules, whether it be Black Butte, whether it be why UP has these rules, whether it be why anybody has a rule. We are not looking at the reasons. We are dealing with the rules as they are. There is a stipulation in this case that the balloon [track] was not a safe workplace. I think it's a question, then, of responsibility. Both of you have stipulated it's not a safe workplace. The issue that I have is, so the Cleav Porter incident happens and that alerts people there is this issue. So Black Butte changes its rule or its policy. Why didn't it change it to a safer policy? I think you are trying to convince me that there are only two rules, the one that was in effect before Cleav Porter and the one that they chose afterwards. Isn't there some middle ground? Like they should come up there and unload or check the cars at that safe place. Why didn't they have that rule? Or why didn't they do a rule that we will clean out an area on the balloon track and let these cars be checked there or pour some concrete so there is special footing? . . . They enacted another rule, it seems to me, that wasn't any better than the one they had before. . . . COUNSEL FOR MR. GLENN: We just want to show the jury why they did it. THE COURT: Why aren't we showing them why they have all the other rules out there? Every rule has a reason. . . . COUNSEL FOR MR. GLENN: The reason why has to be part of the comparative fault because otherwiseI mean, if you ran out in the street because a semi is coming one way at you and another vehicle is coming another way and you have to make a quick decision, then all of that should be weighed into the facts. That is what we are saying, all of this information ought to be weighed into the facts, why they acted the way they acted. The jury is not knowing why they acted the way they acted. THE COURT: They don't know why all the other rules are in effect either. I mean, all these rules that you guys are talking about. No. And on top of all of that, what I said is that there is a relevance issue in my mind and the prejudice outweighs the probative value and that is where I'm at on it. I justbetween the stipulation COUNSEL FOR MR. GLENN: I don't see how the stipulation estops us to warnto demonstrate the facts. I mean, obviously we stipulate to facts to save time, but weand obviously that was an unsafe situation. But obviously, the tipple itself was an unsafe situation because Union Pacific violated its red zone rules and almost killed Cleav Porter. But Union Pacific is telling this jury that it's Black Butte's fault that they are not using the tipple when, in fact, it's Union Pacific's fault that they are not using the tipple. And if you are comparing fault, the pot is calling the kettle black. THE COURT: But I thought it had to be that the train was stopped. That that was the new rule, that it couldn't be checked until it was stopped. So why couldn't it have been periodically stopped? I don't know how big that flat area is. Why couldn't they have pulled up enough cars thereor they could have walked to the loop. Here is my solution. . . . Walk around it and see what needs to be fixed, closed and latched and locked and all of that and mark those cars or make a note. Then have the UP people pull them up to that safe area and stop the train. COUNSEL FOR UNION PACIFIC: And do it there. THE COURT: So we don't have another Cleav Porter incident. COUNSEL FOR MR. GLENN: That is what they were doing with Cleav Porter. They knew where the cars were and the tipple was a short space. So the idea was they move a car, have Cleav Porter go underneath and close the doors. Then they would let him get out from under it, move the cars again, and he would go underneath and close them. Only he was underneath one of them and they moved the train. THE COURT: Yes, I know it. I don't think the jury needs to hear that. I think it's inflammatory, it's prejudicial. The facts are different from this case. I'm not letting it in. I think that Black Butte had a damn good reason for changing their rule, but they should have come up with a better one. [¶ 25] The district court's refusal to admit evidence of the prior incident allowed Union Pacific to shift blame to Black Butte by producing testimony that its safety procedures were inadequate, but prevented Mr. Glenn from defending against those allegations by presenting the prior incident as the catalyst and justification for its change in procedure. Our precedent reflects a general reluctance to uphold evidentiary rulings which exclude evidence necessary to a party's defenses or theory of the case. For example, in Capshaw v. WERCS, 2001 WY 68, 28 P.3d 855 (Wyo.2001), a case involving an alleged breach of an employment contract, we addressed a challenge to the trial court's grant of a motion in limine, which prevented the plaintiff from arguing that his complaints relating to the defendant's mismanagement constituted the true motivation for his discharge. Id., ¶ 4, 28 P.3d at 856-57. We held that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence because the ruling effectively prevented Mr. Capshaw from presenting his theory of the case to the jury. Id., ¶ 10, 28 P.3d at 858. We noted that Mr. Capshaw clearly has the right to argue and attempt to persuade the jury that his criticism of management was in good faith and his discharge was in violation of his contract requiring good cause for termination. The only way he can succeed at trial is to convince the jury he had good reason for his criticism of management and problems did exist. A party should be allowed an appropriate opportunity to present and develop that evidence relevant to that party's theory of the case. Stauffer Chemical Company v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083,1098 (Wyo.1989). Id. Further, we noted the patent unfairness in the one-sided effect of the trial court's ruling: In addition, the precise language of the order granting the motion in limine appears to limit only Mr. Capshaw's presentation of his theory of pretextual discharge with no corollary effect on WERCS. Therefore, it has the unfortunate potential to permit WERCS to raise the mismanagement issue in its opening and evidentiary presentation in support of its counterclaim while restraining Mr. Capshaw from responding in kind. This circumstance alone raises concerns the order is arbitrary, capricious, and, hence, an abuse of discretion. Id., ¶ 11, 28 P.3d at 858. [¶ 26] Likewise in Schmid, 166 P.3d 1285, a case involving a dispute relating to the plaintiff's salary bonus, we addressed a challenge to the trial court's decision to exclude the defendant's proposed witness testimony indicating that the defendant's agreement with the plaintiff employee was similar to an agreement he had with two other employees. Id., ¶¶ 7-9, 166 P.3d at 1288. In holding that the decision to exclude the evidence was an abuse of discretion, and that the error was prejudicial, we noted that this Court has indicated that a litigant is usually entitled to a remand and a new trial if he was unfairly restricted in developing and presenting his theory of the case. Capshaw v. WERCS, 2001 WY 68, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d 855, 858 (Wyo.2001); Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1100 (Wyo.1989). When the issue is the exclusion of evidence, we generally prefer to allow a party his day in court to resolve a controversy on its merits. Winterholler [v. Zolessi ], 989 P.2d [621,] 628 [(Wyo. 1999)]. The trial court's rulings unduly restricted the presentation of [the defendant's] theory of his case, and largely denied [the defendant] his day in court, further supporting the conclusion that the error was unfairly prejudicial. Id., ¶ 21, 166 P.3d at 1291. [¶ 27] As in Capshaw and Schmid, the district court's evidentiary rulings in this case prevented Mr. Glenn from presenting a vital part of his theory of the case, which was that the car-checking procedure in effect at the time of Mr. Glenn's accident arose as a direct result of the prior incident, and that the subsequent procedure was more safe than the former procedure in light of that incident. Further, as in Capshaw, the district court's rulings had the unfortunate effect of allowing Union Pacific to argue repeatedly that Black Butte was negligent in allowing its employees to inspect train cars on the balloon track, while restraining Mr. Glenn from responding to those arguments with any concrete justification for Black Butte's judgment that the new procedure was safer than its former procedure. Although the district court was legitimately concerned with the danger of unfair prejudice, the court's rulings unduly restricted Mr. Glenn from presenting his theory of the case. Because the excluded evidence was essential to Mr. Glenn's defense against the allegations that Black Butte was negligent, and because it was the jury's prerogative to determine the degree of safety of Black Butte's car-checking procedure, we must conclude that the district court abused its discretion in applying W.R.E. 403. [¶ 28] In holding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the prior incident, we repeat the qualification offered in Capshaw, where we stated that We are not saying the court must allow any and all evidence the parties offer on the subject of mismanagement, but it must allow sufficient, admissible evidence to permit them to argue to the jury that Mr. Capshaw either did or did not have a good faith basis to criticize management. Ultimately, the judge has discretion to control the amount of evidence and the resulting length of the trial. Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 421 (Wyo.1985). Id., ¶ 12, 28 P.3d at 858. Likewise, in this case, the district court has discretion to tailor presentation of the evidence to prevent the jury from hearing unnecessary or inflammatory details of the prior incident. Additionally, the dangers of unfair prejudice can be addressed through an appropriate limiting instruction. Counsel for Mr. Glenn indicated his amenability to a limiting instruction on several occasions, stating at one point during trial that We don't have any problems with the Court giving limiting instructions or crafting our presentation of that so as to avoid unnecessary drama, but we think the facts of the case are intimately related to this Cleav Porter incident and that we should be allowed to tell the jury about it. As we noted in Capshaw, managing evidence through proper jury instructions accommodates the receipt by the trier of fact of all relevant evidence and, at the same time, permits the parties to fully litigate their case theories. Id., ¶ 13, 28 P.3d at 859.