Opinion ID: 782573
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District court's refusal to recuse immediately

Text: 33 Price and LMPP argue that the disqualification and all other orders resulting from Judge Clemon's order directing that the motion to disqualify be transferred to another judge are void ab initio because, once Judge Clemon learned of the basis for disqualification, he was without authority to take further action in the case. Petitioners chiefly rely on McCuin, supra, in which the Fifth Circuit vacated the order of the conflicted trial judge designating a particular judge to take over the case, including the pending motion to disqualify counsel. The McCuin court found the assignment order invalid because, once the judge's relative acted in the case by filing a notice of appearance, triggering Section 455(b), the judge was prohibited from making further substantive rulings. Id., 714 F.2d at 1261; see also Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, 143 (3rd Cir.1988) (Once a judge has disqualified himself, he or she may enter no further orders in the case.... His power is limited to performing ministerial duties necessary to transfer the case to another judge (including the entering of `housekeeping' orders).) (parenthetical in original). 34 These cases, however, involve substantive decisions taken after the court should have recused, which — unlike the judge's action here — went beyond mere housekeeping. For instance, in Moody, after declaring at a hearing that he had learned of a conflict that statutorily required his recusal, the district judge kept the case for two more months and entered numerous orders, including one disqualifying two law firms for alleged bad-faith conduct. See id., 858 F.2d at 140, 143. By contrast, Judge Clemon did not pass on any contested issue or otherwise direct the course of the case in any fashion. His transfer order was a purely ministerial act of the kind permitted by Moody. 35 Petitioners mischaracterize Judge Clemon's actions. He did not assign the matter to another judge; he did not designate the judge to hear the disqualification motion. Rather, he merely referred the matter to the Clerk for reassignment, and stayed any matters before him. Judge Clemon's action was the functional equivalent of recusing until and unless the randomly assigned new judge should rule otherwise. We readily conclude that Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that a writ of mandamus should issue on this account. 4