Opinion ID: 1160943
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel Abandoned His Client

Text: The original version of the Supreme Court Policies provided that [a]ppellate counsel in capital cases shall have a duty to investigate factual and legal grounds for the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ... All petitions for writs of habeas corpus should be filed without substantial delay. (Supreme Ct. Policies, supra, policy 3, former std. 1-1.) This duty imposed on appellate or habeas corpus counsel has three phases. In the first, or preliminary phase, counsel should review the record, trial counsel's case files and the appellate briefs, and should discuss the case with trial counsel and the client. In the second, or investigative phase, counsel should seek investigative funds from this court (Supreme Ct. Policies, supra, policy 3, stds. 2-1 to 2-8.3) and promptly and diligently investigate those potential habeas corpus claims concerning which counsel has become aware of triggering facts. In the third, or petition phase, after the diligent investigation of all potential claims is completed, counsel, if appropriate, should prepare and file a habeas corpus petition presenting all potentially meritorious claims. We recently amended the Supreme Court Policies. Policy 3, standard 1-1 of the Supreme Court Policies, as amended February 4, 1998, provides: Habeas corpus counsel in a capital case shall have a duty to investigate factual and legal grounds for the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The duty to investigate is limited to investigating potentially meritorious grounds for relief that come to counsel's attention in the course of reviewing appellate counsel's list of potentially meritorious habeas corpus issues, the transcript notes prepared by appellate counsel, the appellate record, trial counsel's existing case files, and the appellate briefs, and in the course of making reasonable efforts to discuss the case with the defendant, trial counsel and appellate counsel. The duty to investigate does not impose on counsel an obligation to conduct, nor does it authorize the expenditure of public funds for, an unfocused investigation having as its object uncovering all possible factual bases for a collateral attack on the judgment. Instead, counsel has a duty to investigate potential habeas corpus claims only if counsel has become aware of information that might reasonably lead to actual facts supporting a potentially meritorious claim. All petitions for writs of habeas corpus should be filed without substantial delay. [5] Should counsel, after a diligent and thorough review of trial counsel's files, the trial record and the appellate briefs, reasonably conclude there are no triggering facts that would lead one to suspect the existence of issues of potential merit, counsel may legally and ethically cease his or her efforts at that time. (See Guidelines for Fixed Fee Appointments, on Optional Basis, to Automatic Appeals and Related Habeas Corpus Proceedings in the California Supreme Court, guideline 5, ¶¶ 2, 4, adopted Dec. 14, 1993 [if, after all potential leads have been pursued to the extent possible given funding provided therefor, counsel concludes that no habeas corpus petition will be filed, counsel should file a confidential declaration with the court to that effect].) If triggering facts exist, however, counsel must investigate those grounds. [6] If, after a diligent and thorough investigation, counsel reasonably concludes no potentially meritorious grounds exist for collateral relief, counsel may at that time terminate his or her efforts. Counsel has no obligation to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising claims that are not even potentially meritorious. If, on the other hand, counsel uncovers grounds to support a potentially meritorious claim for relief, he or she must prepare and timely file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In light of the scope of these duties, we discern two general situations in which we might find abandonment by counsel constituting good cause for the delay in filing a petition. First, abandonment would occur if, as we have seen in some cases, counsel did absolutely nothing to commence a habeas corpus investigation, or otherwise failed even to acknowledge his or her habeas corpus responsibilities. We have declined to impose the bar of untimeliness in such cases. Second, abandonment also occurs when counsel ceases representation before he or she should have done so (i.e., before investigation is complete, and/or before counsel has a reasonable basis upon which to conclude that no potentially meritorious habeas corpus issue exists). Under either form of abandonment, counsel's inaction places a habeas corpus petitioner in the same position as he or she would have been in had he or she been un represented. So viewed, abandonment can constitute good cause for delayed presentation of claims, for this court cannot conclude a delayed claim should have been presented earlier, when at the earlier time the petitioner effectively was unrepresented (but reasonably thought he or she was represented). We turn to the particular facts of this case. Counsel was appointed to represent petitioner on appeal on January 25, 1983. Counsel filed the appellant's opening brief on October 5, 1984, and the reply brief on March 28, 1985. The original version of the Supreme Court Policies became effective on June 6, 1989. We filed our opinion in petitioner's direct appeal more than a year later, on September 27, 1990. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d 471, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561.) On appeal, appellate counsel argued trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by permitting petitioner to waive a penalty phase defense. We rejected the claim, explaining that nothing in the record showed trial counsel failed to investigate available mitigating evidence or advise defendant of its significance. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 526, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561.) At the time the appeal was decided, therefore, appellate counsel was on notice that the only way properly to present this claim was to investigate it and, if the facts warranted, present it in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In October 1989, appellate counsel sought investigative funds from this court to undertake a habeas corpus investigation. We denied without prejudice all but $3,000 of the request. Counsel then used the $3,000 authorization to hire an investigator to interview petitioner to obtain basic historical information about petitioner and his family, something trial counsel had never done. Petitioner asserts appellate counsel's initial investigation uncovered biographical information establish [ing] that a major investigation was required in order to compile the evidence necessary to support habeas claims regarding petitioner's waiver of a penalty defense and trial counsel's failure to investigate possible mitigating evidence. Counsel himself states in a 1994 declaration that [the] biographical information [uncovered in the initial investigation using the $3,000] made clear that a full-scale investigation would be required to adequately allege habeas claims regarding petitioner's waiver of a penalty [phase] defense and trial counsel's failure to investigate possible mitigating evidence. After obtaining this triggering information, counsel should (under the rules then applicable (see ante, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 907, fn. 6, 981 P.2d p. 1045, fn. 6)) have returned to this court to seek additional funding. Instead, citing press of other work and a belief the Supreme Court Policies did not apply to this case, appellate counsel did nothing. Counsel's 1994 declaration explains that he did not proceed to investigate triggering facts (or seek additional funds to do so) because [s]uch an investigation simply was beyond my abilities given the extent of my caseload . ... (Italics added.) In a supplemental 1996 declaration, counsel further stated that in 1989, he advised the California Appellate Project that I was unable to investigate and draft a habeas corpus petition on behalf of Mr. Sanders. I believe that I explained ... that my workload could not accommodate another capital habeas case, since I already was representing two other capital inmates. (Italics added.) [7] To the extent petitioner claims the Supreme Court Policies do not apply to his case, he is mistaken. As noted, the original version of the Supreme Court Policies provided that [a]ppellate counsel in capital cases shall have a duty to investigate factual and legal grounds for the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ... All petitions for writs of habeas corpus should be filed without substantial delay. (Supreme Ct. Policies, supra, policy 3, former std. 1-1, see now std. 1-1, 2d par.) Immediately preceding the quoted language, the Supreme Court Policies stated: effective June 6, 1989, all petitions for writs of habeas corpus arising from judgments of death, whether the appeals therefrom are pending or previously resolved, are governed by these standards. (Italics added.) As is clear, because petitioner's appeal was pending at the time the Supreme Court Policies became effective, the original version of the policies placed appellate counsel on notice that he was required to investigate the grounds for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, if potentially meritorious grounds were uncovered, to prepare and file a petition without substantial delay. ( Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 808, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311.) As we explained in Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 783, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, with exceptions not applicable here, the timeliness requirements in the Supreme Court Policies did not create or modify the timeliness requirements applicable to all habeas corpus petitions. Rather, the Supreme Court Policies merely incorporate[d] preexisting timeliness requirements, [and] the plain language of the Policies demonstrates that their timeliness standards apply to all capital appeals, including those which arose prior to adoption of the Policies.' ( Clark, supra, at p. 785, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, italics added.) Although we acknowledged that [t]he Policies did, for the first time, impose an express obligation on counsel representing appellants in capital cases to investigate possible bases for habeas corpus ( id. at p. 783, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729), we explained that counsel, to come within the rule directing such petitions be filed without substantial delay, need only have filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus within a reasonable time following promulgation of the Supreme Court Policies ( id. at p. 785, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729). Petitioner is correct that he would not, in 1989, have been able to qualify for a finding of presumptive timeliness under the then newly adopted Supreme Court Policies, for his reply brief was filed much earlier than their effective date. Nevertheless, petitioner could have filed a habeas corpus petition without substantial delay. We thus reject petitioner's claim his appellate counsel had no duty at least to investigate the potential grounds for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As indicated, petitioner's appellate counsel was on notice, no later than June 6, 1989, the date we adopted the Supreme Court Policies, that he was obligated to investigate the grounds for a possible petition for a writ of habeas corpus, prepare a petition if such grounds were discovered, and file the petition in this court without substantial delay. ( Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 791-792, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311.) Counsel's failure to do so left petitioner essentially with no legal representation with regard to habeas corpus claims; that circumstance, as indicated, is relevant to determining whether good cause exists to excuse the lateness of the present petition. Petitioner further contends his appellate attorney did not believe the timeliness rules in the Supreme Court Policies actually applied to this case in 1989. In Robins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 780, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, however, we stated that good cause is not established by prior counsel's asserted uncertainty about his or her duty to conduct a habeas corpus investigation and to file an appropriate habeas corpus petition. (Italics in original.) Petitioner asserts two additional circumstances relevant to the question of good cause. First, petitioner alleges that, when the Supreme Court Policies became effective in 1989, appointed counsel was unable to undertake the investigation for and the preparation of a state habeas corpus petition due to other appointments in capital cases from this court, as well as being counsel of record in more than thirty other cases between June 6, 1989, when the [Supreme Court Policies] were announced, and August 2, 1991 when certiorari was denied [in this case]. (Italics added.) In his declaration, counsel states that during the critical time in question (1989), he was counsel of record in four capital case appeals ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274; and People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280) and in more than thirty other criminal cases (including one State Bar matter and one parole hearing before the Board of Prison Terms). That an appellate attorney has demonstrated a willingness to undertake the difficult task of representing criminal defendants sentenced to suffer the death penalty does not excuse his failure timely to investigate fully the potential grounds for habeas corpus relief in any particular case. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-110(A) [A member shall not intentionally... fail to perform legal services with competence.], and (B) [competence defined as applying the mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance of such service].) If appellate counsel in this case found himself overextended, he should have sought help by associating other counsel to assist him in complying with his legal obligations (see id., rule 3-110(C)(1)) or filed a motion to withdraw as attorney of record. Counsel's failure to do either supports a finding that he simply abandoned petitioner. Second, petitioner contends this court's denial of investigative funds hampered counsel's ability to conduct a proper investigation. In Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th 825, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 959 P.2d 290, we recognized a petitioner may establish a claim was filed without substantial delay if he or she previously was unaware of information offered in support of a given claim, and reasonably failed to discover earlier the information offered in support of that claim because he or she timely requested but was denied funding to investigate that claim. (Id. at pp. 834-835, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 959 P.2d 290, italics added, fn. omitted.) If denial of investigative funds is relevant to determining the question of substantial delay, that factor reasonably should also be relevant to the question of whether good cause exists to explain the delay. As in Gallego, in petitioner's case we granted counsel's request for investigative funds only in part. (See Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 830, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 959 P.2d 290.) Unlike in Gallego, however, we denied the balance of counsel's fund request without prejudice. Thus, although petitioner contends this court's denial of investigative funds hampered counsel's ability to conduct a thorough investigation, counsel need only have renewed his request for funds, making sure to allege [s]pecific facts that suggest there may be an issue of possible merit. (Supreme Ct. Policies, supra, policy 3, std. 2-4.2.) Gallego, then, is inapposite. Nor is this a case lacking potentially meritorious issues. Although we will, by separate order, address the substantive merits of the claims raised in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we note the petition contains no shortage of claims raising issues of potential merit. Perusal of the petition reveals the allegation of some potentially disturbing aspects of petitioner's trial, including claims that: (i) petitioner's trial counsel, a former prosecutor, had previously used one of the prosecution witnesses in a sting operation; (ii) trial counsel had, in 1973 and in his role as a prosecutor, accepted a guilty plea from one of petitioner's alibi witnesses; (iii) police actively concealed the whereabouts of a potentially exculpatory witness; (iv) a juror who served on the jury concealed on voir dire her arrest for growing marijuana; (v) one juror received extrinsic evidence; (vi) one juror received a letter from petitioner; (vii) one juror was experiencing severe emotional problems during trial and stated that, had she been less depressed, she might well have held out and not voted to convict; (viii) petitioner was incompetent to waive a penalty phase defense; (ix) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and present evidence in mitigation; and (x) at least some of the jurors learned that the jury in petitioner's first trial had hung 11 to 1. Triggering facts for many of these and other claims now raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus were either known to petitioner or exist in the appellate record. Such claims would certainly appear to have been potentially meritorious for purposes of investigation and, if appropriate, for presentation to this court. Irrespective of the ultimate success of the petition in any given case, habeas corpus counsel (or, as here, appellate counsel acting as habeas corpus counsel), as explained, ante, has the duty to conduct a reasonable investigation and to present not just actually meritorious claims (an imponderable before adjudication), but all potentially meritorious claims. [8] In sum, neither counsel's belief in the inapplicability of the Supreme Court Policies, nor his pressing caseload, excuses his inaction. Appellate counsel possessed facts indicating that issues of potential merit existed and that additional investigation was required. In response to such triggering facts, counsel did not seek additional funding or conduct a further investigation in order to determine whether potentially meritorious claims existed. Nor did he move to associate additional counsel to assist him with his workload, or withdraw from his appointed obligations. Instead, he did nothing. Counsel, in short, abandoned his client. Respondent argues petitioner's appellate attorney was an experienced, perhaps pre-eminent, authority on capital defense and that it is unlikely that such an experienced capital defense attorney ... simply cavalierly concluded that [the Supreme Court] Policies did not apply to him because the briefs in this case were filed before the policies were published. Respondent suggests counsel had a tactical reason for failing to investigate in the face of triggering facts. This tactical reason, respondent suggests, eliminates the possibility that counsel's abandonment was other than a calculated plan to delay the case. Petitioner strenuously opposes this notion; he has filed a supplemental declaration by appellate counsel that flatly denies counsel had any tactical reason for failing to file a habeas corpus petition. [9] On the state of this record, keeping in mind our inquiry concerns the timeliness of the filinga procedural point and not the entitlement to substantive relief, we resolve this issue on the pleadings and simply accept the assertions in counsel's sworn declaration. Our resolution of this issue on the pleadings is consistent with our decision in Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th 770, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, in which, faced with conflicting allegations in the respondent's return and the petitioner's traverse regarding when the petitioner learned of the factual basis of a claim, we resolved the issue on the pleadings and accepted the petitioner's sworn statements. ( Id. at pp. 798-799, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311.) Under the circumstances, we reject respondent's contention that counsel acted for a tactical reason.