Opinion ID: 1781522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DUI Manslaughter Statute

Text: To place the current state of the law in context, we begin by reviewing the evolution of the DUI manslaughter statute, our case law construing the statute, and the recently adopted DUI manslaughter standard jury instruction. Under our case law for the last 75 years, simple negligence has been something of a subliminal or presumed underlying element of DUI manslaughter. [3] That is, the Legislature determined that it is criminal negligence for a person in an intoxicated condition to attempt to drive an automobile upon the highways of this state and that if death results to any person while so doing, such initial negligence will be imputed to the act itself and the driver held guilty of manslaughter. Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 218, 107 So. 360, 362 (1926) (emphasis added). [4] Or, stated another way, [t]he provision of the statute with reference to the death of a person being `caused' by the operation of the car is the equivalent of stating that death resulted from his misconduct which had its inception at the time he took control of the car and proceeded to operate it while not in possession of his faculties. Roddenberry v. State, 152 Fla. 197, 202 11 So.2d 582, 585 (1942). [5] As to a negligence element, we explicitly stated that there is no burden upon the state to prove that at the time of the incident the defendant was negligent. That element is established if it be shown that he was not, at the time, in possession of his faculties due to the voluntary use of intoxicants. Id. at 201, 11 So.2d 582, 11 So.2d at 585. In a similar vein, another opinion from that era defined DUI manslaughter as the causing of the death of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Tootle v. State, 100 Fla. 1248, 1250, 130 So. 912, 913 (1930). Thus, in that case we concluded that [i]t was not necessary to allege culpable negligence of the defendant in the operation of the motor vehicle, as that is not a specific element of the offense defined by the particular statute. [6] Tootle, 100 Fla. at 1251, 130 So. at 913. [7] More recently, we construed section 316.193's precursor statute [8] in Baker v. State, 377 So.2d 17 (Fla.1979). There, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the DUI manslaughter statute on the basis that it did not require a causal connection between the intoxication and the resulting fatality. We initially surveyed our case law and concluded that neither specific intent nor a causal connection between the prohibited act of driving while intoxicated and the resulting death were elements of DUI manslaughter. Id. at 18. From that point of departure, we rejected Baker's substantive due process argument, reasoning that: Statutes which impose strict criminal liability, although not favored, are nonetheless constitutional, particularly when the conduct from which the liability flows involves culpability or constitutes malum in se as opposed to malum prohibitum. Two classic examples of such legislation are statutes which impose severe criminal sanctions where a homicide occurs during the commission of a felony and where one has intercourse with a female under a prescribed statutory age. In the case of felony murder, there need be no showing of causation or active participation by the defendant in the homicide so long as he is proven to have been a participant in the felony out of which the homicide occurred. In the instance of statutory rape it is no defense that the defendant actually believed the female to be in excess of the prohibited age. Regina v. Prince, 13 Cox Crim.Cas. 138 (1875), early on settled the validity of statutory rape legislation. As recently as 1978 the United States Supreme Court conceded the constitutional authority of the several states to enact felony murder statutes. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). That the legislature intended section 860.01(2) to have strict liability consequences is beyond peradventure. Cannon v. State was decided by this Court in 1926. Decisions of this Court and of the district courts of appeal since that date have consistently held that negligence and proximate causation are not elements of the crime described in section 860.01(2). The legislature's reluctance to revisit the statute, in spite of ample opportunity, leads to the conclusion that the judicial construction of section 860.01(2) accurately reflects legislative intent. [Is] section 860.01(2) a rational response to a real problem? We must respond that (i) the problem of drunken drivers operating motor vehicles on the highways of this state is pernicious and real, and (ii) the response embodied in section 860.01(2) can be justified on deterrence grounds. Both are supported by our recent decision in Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla.1976), where, in the context of a civil action for punitive damages, the statistics regarding fatalities resulting from accidents where drinking was a contributing factor are recited, and the public policy of punishment of drunk drivers as a deterrent is recognized. Although the majority of legal scholars adjure [sic] strict criminal liability on the grounds that it is indefensible to impose criminal sanctions in the absence of mens rea and that such liability is not an effective deterrent, there are those who make a respectable argument for the rationality of strict criminal liability. Furthermore, section 860.01(2) is not the classic strict liability statute criticized by the commentators. Even in the parlance of the ALI Model Penal Code, which is very critical of strict criminal liability, the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated involves culpability. We are not here dealing with the type of statute which imposes strict criminal liability for mere negligence or an act malum prohibitum. Given, then, that the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated is a reckless (and therefore culpable) act, is it rational for the legislature to impose criminal sanctions for any death which occurs without regard to the tort law concept of proximate causation between operation of the automobile and the death? If the legislature can reasonably conclude that such a measure operates as a deterrent to those who create a recognized and serious social problem, then certainly it is. Although, as noted, legal scholars have questioned the efficacy of the deterrent effect of strict liability statutes, an argument can be made that the presence of strict liability sanctions for a particular activity has the effect not only of inducing persons to engage in that activity with greater caution, but may also have the effect of keeping a relatively large class of persons from engaging in the conduct at all. This thesis cannot be proved empirically, but neither can the position of the opponents of strict criminal liability. Consequently, it cannot be asserted that the legislature has acted irrationally in enacting section 860.01(2) where it is just as plausible as not that it does have the desired deterrent effect. Baker, 377 So.2d at 19-20 (footnotes omitted). On the basis of that reasoning, we held that neither negligence nor proximate causation was an element of DUI manslaughter. Id. at 20. Justice Boyd dissented, arguing that [b]ecause of the lack of required causal connection between the intoxication and the death, the [DUI] manslaughter statute applies to conduct that is no more culpable than the conduct of one who drives while intoxicated to the point at which his faculties are impaired. Id. at 22 (Boyd, J., dissenting). Consequently, Justice Boyd concluded that [s]ince the conduct of one who drives while intoxicated is of the same degree of culpability regardless of whether such a collision and death occur, the provision for a possible maximum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment constitutes excessive punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. [9] Ten years after issuing Baker, we again addressed the DUI manslaughter statute in Magaw v. State, 537 So.2d 564 (Fla. 1989). There, the issue presented was whether the holding in Armenia was still valid in light of the 1986 legislative amendments to section 316.193(3)(c). After summarizing the holdings and reasoning in Baker and Armenia, we began our analysis by comparing the wording of the pre-and post-amendment statute and examining its legislative history to determine if a causation requirement had been added. Magaw, 537 So.2d at 565-67. In particular, we quoted a staff analysis which stated there now must be a `causal connection' between the operation of the vehicle by the offender and the resulting death and that the bill insert[s] the element of causation into the definitions of DUI crimes. Id. at 566-67. We also found persuasive an excerpt from a floor debate on the proposed amendment wherein one senator remarked that [t]he new language does have the word cause, and I think it's the intent of the drafters of the bill that causation be a factor in a DUI manslaughter conviction. Id. at 567. Upon consideration of those factors, we concluded that the 1986 amendments to section 316.193(3) introduced causation as an element of the crime of DUI manslaughter. [10] Id. However, we attached several caveats to that conclusion: We caution ... that the statute does not say that the operator of the vehicle must be the sole cause of the fatal accident. Moreover, the state is not required to prove that the operator's drinking caused the accident. The statute requires only that the operation of the vehicle should have caused the accident. Id. Then, in what has been interpreted as reading a required simple negligence element into the statute, [11] we stated, Therefore, any deviation or lack of care on the part of a driver under the influence to which the fatal accident can be attributed will suffice. Id. The revised DUI manslaughter standard jury instruction we recently adopted mirrors the DUI manslaughter statute in all material respects. See Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (97-2), 723 So.2d 123, 146-48 (Fla.1998). The relevant portion of the instruction is as follows: Before you can find the defendant guilty of DUI Manslaughter, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. (Defendant) drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle. 2. While driving or while in actual physical control of the vehicle, (defendant) a. was under the influence of [alcoholic beverages] [a chemical substance] [a controlled substance] to the extent that[his][her] normal faculties were impaired, or b. had a blood or breath alcohol level of 0.08 or higher. 3. As a result, (defendant) caused or contributed to the cause of the death of (victim). Id. at 146-47. The elements of the crime provided in the instruction track the precise statutory language and, as the First District noted, the instruction mentions neither negligence nor deviation from a standard of care, Hubbard, 748 So.2d at 291, although the marginal note to the instruction cites Magaw as authority for the causation element: As a result, (defendant) caused or contributed to the cause of the death of (victim).