Opinion ID: 1303959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attorney's fees at the district court

Text: The district court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 (1979) (providing that the court may award attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties), and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) (1980). The latter provides for attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 where the court finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation... . See also, e.g., Eliasen v. Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234, 241, 668 P.2d 110, 117 (1983). As is well established, [t]he award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) at the trial level is a matter within the trial court's discretion. Everett v. Trunnel, 105 Idaho 787, 791, 673 P.2d 387, 391 (1983). United First cites Verway v. Blincoe Packing Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 315, 698 P.2d 377 (Ct.App. 1985) for the proposition that the conduct of the parties, as opposed to the bringing, pursuing, or defending of the case, cannot afford the basis of an award pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). United First primarily asserts that that district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees by considering United First's enforcement of the due-on-sale clause during the pendency of the O'Boskey I appeal. This assertion distorts the grounds for the district court's award. The district court did recount aspects of United First's conduct in its decision to award attorney's fees. However, the district court carefully observed that the defendant's actions were not a part of the defense of this case. However, they have some relevance in that they show an attitude which may be relevant in interpreting other facts. R., Vol. 3, p. 318. The record shows the district court was aware of the Verway decision. Having disavowed consideration of conduct, the district court expressly established two grounds for its award (as discussed below). We reject United First's suggestion that the district court based its decision on grounds it said it did not consider, and not on the grounds enumerated. The first of the two enumerated grounds was United First's assertion of the defense that the transaction between the named plaintiffs [4] threatened to impair the security. The district court discussed this ground as follows: Another element of obstructionism appears clearly in the record prior to the appeal. At the outset of this case the defendant asserted that impairment of security by the proposed transfer was an issue. The prominence of this issue appears several places. The defendant's second affirmative defense stated the following: That Plaintiff, S. Kay Kemp, was not a qualified party to either obtain a new loan or to assume the existing loan obligation of the Plaintiffs O'Boskey for the reason that Plaintiff Kemp did not qualify pursuant to loan policies of Defendant and, therefore, no cause of action is presented in this matter. The defendant's fifth affirmative defense asserted that Plaintiff, S. Kay Kemp, is not qualified to either assume or take out a new loan for the purchase of the subject residence pursuant to the loan policies of Defendant. The assertion is clearly made that an impairment of security was involved in this case. That assertion affected decisions by this court. See memorandum opinion and orders filed September 1, 1981, and memorandum opinion and order filed November 25, 1981. The defendant asserted this as an issue to the Supreme Court in its motion for permission to appeal by certification, stating the following at page 5 of the emotion: If the District Court's order is not permitted to be appealed by certification then it will be necessary to have a trial to determine whether or not the sale or transfer of the property described in the deed of trust impairs the security of the deed in trust. After which the matter would again be before this court on appeal raising the questions of the proper interpretation and legal affect to be given this language together, in all probability, with other issues arising from the trial. It is now clear to the court, and from the outset of this case has been clear to the defendant, that impairment of security by the proposed transfer was never an issue. Robert G. Dickinson, Senior Vice-President of United First Federal Savings and Loan Association, states the following in his affidavit filed May 25, 1984: That United First Federal Savings and Loan Association does not believe that the sale by plaintiffs O'Boskey to plaintiff Kemp of the real property which is discussed in the deed of trust given to United First Federal by plaintiffs O'Boskey causes an impairment of the security of the deed of trust, if plaintiff Kemp will personally assume the obligations secured thereby. The deposition of Mr. Dickinson makes it clear that impairment of security as justification to invoke the due-on-sale clause was never an issue in this case. This court was advised it was an issue. The Supreme Court was told it was an issue. It was not an issue. The decisions to invoke the due-on-sale clause were based upon market conditions, not supposed security impairment. R., Vol. 3, pp. 323-25 (emphasis added). The district court concluded that this defense was unreasonable. We see not a scintilla of error in this conclusion. The second enumerated ground was United First's defense against class certification and notice. According to the district court, United First knew from the first of the class of persons deserving the injunctive relief indicated by the court in November of 1981. Nevertheless, United First withheld its knowledge and continued to oppose class certification and notice throughout the proceedings, even after the district court had decided the questions. These actions delayed dissemination of the effect of this Court's holding O'Boskey I. The district court observed: A question that arises in one's mind is why has it been necessary to go through the protracted proceedings that have taken place since the Supreme Court affirmed this court's rulings on the motions for summary judgment? A reasonable person would assume that once the Supreme Court made its ruling that the defendant would take affirmative action to bring this matter to an end. It could mark in conspicuous lettering on those instruments in its possession that the provision was unenforceable except in the event of security impairment and give notice of that fact to those who had executed deeds of trust. There would have remained nothing for this court to enjoin. However, the defendant did not do that. Instead, it has continued the fight to keep information from those entitled to it. It has turned identification of the class members into a struggle that was not necessary or reasonable. It has obstructed and delayed the plaintiffs and their fellow class members. [ [5] ] This exists in the context that the plaintiffs were not seeking financial damages that would recompense them, and the court had indicated it would only grant injunctive relief to the class members. The plaintiffs in this action could not receive money damages. With this knowledge the defendant has used its substantial resources and erected numerous barriers against adjudication of issues in this case. ... [T]oo much of the defense in this case has been directed towards delay and obstruction. Individuals who stand to profit very little personally have been met by a large financial institution that has used the tactic of intimidation in threatening foreclosure and the tactic of intimidation by raising the costs of litigation beyond what are reasonable. This court finds, as this record indicates, that the defense of this case as it relates to the plaintiffs efforts to identify a class of persons entitled to injunctive relief and to obtain certification of that class has been unreasonable. The plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys fees for that effort. R., Vol. 3, pp. 325-27 (emphasis added). Again, we can find no abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusions or award.