Opinion ID: 1226981
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpreting Leon

Text: Our Courts of Appeal, like the appellate courts of other states and the federal appellate courts, have expressed confusion in attempting to apply Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897. For example, some courts appear to conclude that in determining whether an officer was objectively reasonable in submitting an affidavit to a magistrate, it is proper to consider the fact that the magistrate signed (albeit erroneously) the warrant. ( People v. Brown (1990) 231 Cal. App.3d 1201 [274 Cal. Rptr. 432], review granted Jan. 4, 1991 (S018256) [magistrate's issuance of warrant is a factor in determining whether objectively reasonable officer would have submitted affidavit to magistrate].) [2] Other courts have held otherwise. (5) People v. Maestas (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 1208 [252 Cal. Rptr. 739] concludes that the objective reasonableness of an officer's decision to apply for a warrant must be judged based on the affidavit and the evidence of probable cause contained therein and known to the officer, and without consideration of the fact that the magistrate accepted the affidavit. ( Id., at p. 1214.) [3] On this point, we agree with Maestas, supra, 204 Cal. App.3d 1208. The fact that a magistrate has issued a warrant  in other words, the fact that an officer sought and obtained advance judicial approval for the search  is what caused the high court to establish the Leon exception in the first place. By definition, in every case in which the prosecution seeks the benefit of Leon, a magistrate has issued a warrant; issuance of the warrant defines the class of cases eligible for nonexclusion under the Leon rule. Because issuance of a warrant is a constant factor in these cases, it cannot logically serve to distinguish among them. Moreover, it is clear that the high court does not intend the issuance of a warrant to be a consideration under Leon. [4] We thus conclude that in determining whether a case is within the third Leon situation, the fact that the warrant issued is of no significance. [5] (6) Maestas, supra, 204 Cal. App.3d 1208, 1217, 1218, also correctly articulates the test by which the objective reasonableness of an officer's decision to submit an affidavit to a magistrate is to be judged: The test, which was initially formed in Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at pages 919-926 [82 L.Ed.2d at pages 696-701], and which was subsequently articulated clearly in Malley, supra, 475 U.S. at page 345 [89 L.Ed.2d at page 281], is whether a reasonable and well-trained officer would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant. ( Ibid., italics added, fn. omitted.) But if such an officer would not reasonably have known that the affidavit (and any other supporting evidence) failed to establish probable cause, there is no reason to apply the exclusionary rule, because there has been no objectively unreasonable police conduct requiring deterrence. ( Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 919 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 696].) An officer in this latter situation will be permitted to rely on the warrant, and Leon's general rule of nonexclusion will apply, unless one of Leon's other limited exclusion situations is triggered.