Opinion ID: 1124567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conviction vs. Acquittal

Text: If reliance on the term sentence were insufficient to prove Well's point, the term postconviction or conviction permits no denial. Unless words have lost their meaning, conviction and acquittal are opposites which cannot coexist in harmony. By definition one who is committed as criminally insane is a person who has been acquitted of a crime charged by reason of insanity.... (RCW 10.77.010(1)) (emphasis added). By operation of law the one-year time bar applies only to collateral attack, statutorily defined as any form of postconviction relief.... RCW 10.73.090(2). Even the definition of final judgment for the purpose of this statute is keyed upon Supreme Court denial of a timely petition for certiorari affirming the conviction on direct appeal. RCW 10.73.090(3)(c). The notice provision of the same enactment (section 5) codified in RCW 10.73.120 specifically mandates notice be given to [e]very person who, on July 23, 1989, is serving a term of incarceration, probation, parole, or community supervision pursuant to conviction of a felony. As previously noted, this notice provision in Section 5 is inextricably linked to the one-year time bar which appears in Section 1 (Laws of 1989, ch. 395, §§ 1, 5). If we read these sections in pari materia, the conclusion is unmistakable that the same class of people subject to the time bar are equally privileged to the notice, i.e., convicted felons, and vice versa. [2] Were the statute construed to time bar petitions for relief from those committed by reason of a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity plea there is no apparent reason why the Legislature would rationally withhold from these same individuals that notice otherwise required to be furnished to their criminal counterparts. Moreover, were we to read the statute as does the majority (time bar yes, notice no), this disparity might well lead to statutory invalidation on equal protection grounds. Compare Morris v. Blaker, 118 Wash.2d 133, 147-48, 821 P.2d 482 (1992) (no rational basis to treat former mental patients differently from felons for purposes of allowing them to show they are sufficiently cured to possess a firearm). [3] Such a construction is not preferred because it would violate the maxim that the statute should be construed in a constitutional manner if possible. State v. Rohrich, 132 Wash.2d 472, 939 P.2d 697 (1997).