Opinion ID: 1202382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prediction of Future Dangerousness

Text: (21) The prosecutor argued that some crimes, because of their atrocity, justify the death penalty even though the offense seems isolated. He stated: And so for one single, isolated, unprovoked, uncalled for atrocity, should this man be sentenced to the ultimate punishment? Or should he be spared because there's just one atrocity and not two, or not three? [ถ] Shall we ask ourselves if even in prison can we be sure that he won't kill again? Defendant characterizes this as an invitation to the jury to speculate that if they imposed life without possibility of parole, defendant would kill prison guards or other prisoners and therefore this future dangerousness was an aggravating factor militating in favor of the death penalty. He relies also on our decision in People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d 733 regarding penalty phase testimony forecasting violent acts in prison. Again, defense counsel failed to object to this comment. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27.) And in any event we cannot agree that this brief remark constituted an invitation to rely on a nonstatutory aggravating factor or that it constituted an argument of counsel unsupported by the evidence. What the prosecutor was asking was that the jury contemplate defendant's potential for committing such acts, a potential the death penalty would obviously terminate. He was not making a prediction that future violence would in fact occur in prison and telling the jury to consider this as an aggravating factor. Immediately after his comment, he stressed that the issue before the jury, from which they should not stray, was whether the aggravating factors โ the nature of this crime โ outweighed any mitigating evidence. Prediction of future dangerousness was not a significant part of his argument. Furthermore, defendant's reliance on Murtishaw is misplaced. That case involved testimony by an expert witness predicting that even in prison defendant would be violent and assaultive. ( Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 767.) Given the level of unreliability for such predictions, the prejudice from such testimony, and the weight the jury might wrongly assign to it because of its expert source, we found its admission improper under the circumstances of that case. ( Id. at pp. 767-775.) Murtishaw did not, however, disallow any testimony, even any expert testimony, on the issue of future dangerousness. ( Id. at p. 774; see also Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 110-111.) Furthermore, there is no constitutional impediment to consideration of such testimony, whether expert or lay. ( Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) 463 U.S. 880, 896-906 [77 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1106-1112, 103 S.Ct. 3383]; Jurek v. Texas (1976) 428 U.S. 262, 274-276 [49 L.Ed.2d 929, 939-941, 96 S.Ct. 2950]; see also Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 335 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 243, 105 S.Ct. 2633].) Here we have no established and credentialed expert and we have no firm prediction. We have a single comment made in the course if the sort of vigorous argument a prosecutor is entitled to make. ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) We conclude that the prosecutor's comments were not beyond the proper bounds of argument and did not constitute invitation to consider a nonstatutory aggravating factor. [27]