Opinion ID: 1989377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudicial variance.

Text: Our conclusion that the indictment was not constructively amended would not ordinarily end our inquiry. The defendant was charged with touching K.D.'s genitalia, yet the major factual issue addressed on appeal is whether he touched the complainant's inner thigha violation of the statuteor only some other part of her thigh, which is not a violation. At the time that Carter's attorney was planning his strategy and cross-examining K.D., the issue of inner thigh versus thigh had not yet emerged, and the subsequent development of a controversy over this point contained obvious potential for prejudice. The sufficiency vel non of the evidence thus turns on an issue to which Carter's litigation strategy had not been addressed. A variance may be prejudicial if, inter alia, the accused . . . was so surprised by the proof that he was unable to prepare his defense adequately. Roberts v. United States, 743 A.2d 212, 223 (D.C.1999) (quoting United States v. Francisco, 575 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir.1978)). The defense might perhaps plausibly contend that this case involved such a surprise. But Carter, whose sole defense was consent, has made no claim of prejudicial variance, either in the trial court or on appeal. At the trial, his attorney did not create a record which would support such a claim. Subsequently, in his opening brief on appeal, Carter's appellate counsel made no allegation of a prejudicial variance. In its brief, the government noted the absence of such a claim. In his reply brief, Carter's counsel, adhering exclusively to the claim of constructive amendment, [13] asserted that the government's discussion of whether appellant has demonstrated prejudice is beside the point. Where, as here, the defense has eschewed any claim of prejudicial variance, even as a fall-back position, and has made no attempt to show prejudice, reversal upon a ground not asserted either at trial or on appeal cannot be justified.