Opinion ID: 1884007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Timely Swear in the Jury with the Capital Oath

Text: ¶ 20. Golden next argues that the trial court failed to administer the oath required in a capital case until after the evidence had been presented, and that he was therefore deprived of a fair trial. The State responds that Golden failed to object or move for a mistrial and, therefore, this argument is procedurally barred. Alternatively, the State argues the claim has no merit because the trial court administered the oath. ¶ 21. First, we point out that any failure of the trial court to swear the jury in a capital case is waived where no contemporaneous objection is made. McMillan v. State, 191 Miss. 59, 61, 2 So.2d 823, 824 (1941). Here, the record reflects that counsel for Golden failed to make any objection when the judge administered the oath for capital cases midway through the trial. As such, Golden's plea on appeal for reversal on this issue is barred. Procedural bar notwithstanding, we will address the merits of Golden's claim. ¶ 22. Golden states that forcible rape is a capital crime which requires the special oath specified by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 13-5-73 (Rev. 2002), which provides that [t]he jurors in a capital case shall be sworn to well and truly try the issue between the state and the prisoner, and a true verdict give according to the evidence and law. In order to determine which crimes fit within the meaning of capital case, we turn to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 1-3-4 (Rev. 2005), which states: The terms capital case, capital cases, capital offense, capital offenses, and capital crime when used in any statute shall denote criminal cases, offenses and crimes punishable by death or imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary. (Emphasis added). ¶ 23. Golden was charged with the crime of forcible rape pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-65(4)(a) (Rev. 2006), which allows for a sentence of life imprisonment. Therefore, Golden was entitled to have the capital oath administered to the jurors. The record reflects that the trial judge administered this oath midway through the trial. In their briefs, however, the parties state that the trial judge administered the petit oath at the beginning of trial. ¶ 24. Although the record does not indicate that the trial judge administered any oath at the beginning of trial, the trial judge indicated on the record during voir dire that an oath had been given, stating [e]verybody understands that if you were to do that, you would be violating your oath. Finding no objection from either party to the judge's assertion that the oath had been given, we find that the petit oath was given at the beginning of trial, as represented by the trial judge. Furthermore, this Court has stated that when the record is silent, there is a presumption that the jury was properly sworn. Young v. State, 425 So.2d 1022, 1025 (Miss.1983); Ratcliff v. State, 201 Miss. 259, 29 So.2d 321 (1947). ¶ 25. Having found the trial judge did administer the petit oath, we further find that, even had the trial judge failed to administer the oath provided in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 13-5-73, there would be no error because the oaths required under Sections 13-5-73 and 13-5-71 are substantially equivalent, if not substantially the same. Wilburn v. State, 608 So.2d 702, 705 (Miss.1992). This Court has held that [t]he purpose of the judicial oath is to impart to the oath-taker the idea he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully and to awaken and stimulate his conscience and impress his mind with his duty and responsibility to do so. Wilburn v. State, 608 So.2d 702, 705 (Miss.1992). ¶ 26. Thus, we find that the oath given in the middle of trial, together with the petit oath given at the beginning of trial, were sufficient to instruct the jury of their duty to well and truly try all issue[s] and . . . a true verdict give according to the evidence and the law. Miss.Code Ann. § 13-5-73 (Rev. 2002). The trial judge asked the potential jurors to solemnly swear or affirm that [they would] well and truly try the issues between the State of Mississippi versus William Golden, Junior and give true verdicts . . . according to the evidence of the law. Because the oath reflected in the record was sufficient to insure the solemn duty of the jury, we find no reversible error.