Opinion ID: 2037872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: history of environmental protection

Text: Before we begin our analysis, it is helpful to review the evolution of environmental protections in Illinois. The Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that every citizen has a right to a healthful environment. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XI, § 2.) Section 1 of article XI, in fact, declares it to be the public policy of the State to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of future generations. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XI, § 1.) Prior to enactment of the Constitution of 1970, however, common law remedies were available to abate and enjoin public nuisances which caused pollution. For a review of common law nuisance actions, see Metropolitan Sanitary District v. United States Steel Corp. (1975), 30 Ill.App.3d 360, 366, 332 N.E.2d 426. At the same time, in 1970, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 111½ par. 1001 et seq. ) Repealing several statutes, including the sanitary water board act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 19, § 145.1 et seq. ) and the Illinois Air Pollution Control Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 111 ½ § 240.1 et seq.), the Act established a unified statewide program to restore, protect and enhance the quality of the environment in the State. The purpose of this Act was set forth as follows: (b) It is the purpose of this Act, as more specifically described in later sections, to establish a unified, statewide program supplemented by private remedies, to restore, protect and enhance the quality of the environment, and to assure that adverse effects upon the environment are fully considered and borne by those who cause them. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 111 ½ par. 1002(b). The Act created the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. Its mission includes conducting a program of surveillance of actual and potential contamination sources of air, water, noise, and solid waste pollution; inspecting and investigating potentially hazardous sites to ascertain possible violations of the Act; and taking preventive and corrective action to remedy environmental damage. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 111 ½ par. 1004. Additionally, the Act created the Pollution Control Board. The Board's function is to determine, define and implement environmental control standards within the State of Illinois. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 111 ½ par. 1005(b).) The Board is authorized to conduct hearings upon complaints charging violations of the Act and has the power to impose monetary penalties for violations of the Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 111½ par. 1005; see City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill.2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146. In 1980, the United States Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), adding this to its program of environmental regulation. (42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1982).) CERCLA has a two-part structure: (1) it created a superfund from which the Federal government may draw for prompt response to the need for hazardous material removal, and (2) it provides a private right of action to recover funds from responsible parties for the problems caused by the improper release of hazardous materials into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1982). This bifurcated structure was intended to reflect the purposes of CERCLA. ( Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. (1st Cir.1986), 805 F.2d 1074, 1081.) Two policy concerns have generally been advanced in explaining Congress' purpose in enacting CERCLA: `First, Congress intended that the federal government be immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to the problems of national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created.' Dedham, 805 F.2d at 1081, quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp. (D.Minn.1982), 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1112. In December 1983, Illinois amended the Act to reflect the changes in environmental regulation made by CERCLA. The amendment added a superfund program to the Act which was patterned after CERCLA and which reflected its purposes. (Pub. Act 83-983, eff. Dec. 12, 1983; Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 111 ½ par. 1022.2 et seq.; see City of Quincy v. Carlson (1987), 163 Ill.App.3d 1049, 115 Ill.Dec. 68, 517 N.E.2d 33.) The amendment established a Hazardous Waste Fund into which parties must contribute sums of money for each gallon or cubic yard of hazardous waste which the organization generates. Any costs incurred for hazardous waste removal or remedial action are paid from the hazardous waste fund. This section of the statute also created liability for such costs in any person responsible for the release of hazardous substances. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 111 ½ par. 1022.2. Many decisions have been rendered by this court interpreting the Act and its amendments. Several cases in particular discussed issues of jurisdiction in the circuit courts. People ex rel. Scott v. Janson (1974), 57 Ill.2d 451, 312 N.E.2d 620, involved a suit, filed in the circuit court, to enjoin operation of a garbage dump whose operation was alleged to be in violation of the Act. The circuit court granted an ex parte injunction, imposed monetary penalties and held Janson in contempt, but later dismissed the injunction. The appellate court reversed, finding that the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to assess a penalty or enter a contempt order after it had dismissed the ex parte injunction. This court noted that sections 42 and 43 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111 ½ pars. 1042, 1043) and section 2 of the Attorney General's Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 14, § 12) permit the Attorney General to bring actions seeking injunctive relief pursuant to the Act in the circuit courts. This court then concluded that the circuit court did not lose jurisdiction after it dismissed the ex parte injunction, as other matters remained before the circuit court. For instance, there remained pending several complaints seeking further injunctive relief. Further, the Janson court noted there exists jurisdiction to abate public nuisances which may endanger the general welfare. Janson, 57 Ill.2d at 460, 312 N.E.2d 620. In People v. Fiorini (1991), 143 Ill.2d 318, 158 Ill.Dec. 499, 574 N.E.2d 612, this court held that, pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act, the circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate the third-party complaint, filed by private litigants, seeking injunctions and recovery costs. The circuit court retained jurisdiction over the third-party complaint even where the court had dismissed the count seeking injunctive relief. One of the issues raised in Fiorini was whether the third-party complaint should have been dismissed because the defendants had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Relying upon section 45(b) of the Act, the third-party defendants argued that administrative remedies would have to be exhausted before the court could obtain jurisdiction over the third-party complaint. ( Fiorini, 143 Ill.2d at 336, 158 Ill.Dec. 499, 574 N.E.2d 612.) In other words, the third-party complaint would first have to be addressed by the Board; the third-party complaint could not be appended to the original complaint and filed in the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the third-party complaint for want of jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's action. In holding that jurisdiction was proper, this court, relying upon its earlier decision in Janson, stated: In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the original action when the Attorney General filed the complaint in the circuit court. To require that a portion of the instant action be heard before the Pollution Control Board at this juncture would frustrate judicial economy and common sense. [Citation.] Accordingly, we reject third-party defendants' argument that the third-party complaint is barred since third-party plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Fiorini, 143 Ill.2d at 338, 158 Ill.Dec. 499, 574 N.E.2d 612.