Opinion ID: 2533533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: a trial court may deny a motion for leave to amend when the amendment was futile

Text: ¶ 39 In its Ruling and Order, the district court did not dismiss McLaughlin's fiduciary duty claim but rejected the grounds on which he pled the claim, leaving open the opportunity to amend the complaint so long as he met the burden of alleging new facts and evidence that would support a claim of breach of fiduciary duty that had not already been addressed by the court. When McLaughlin submitted an amended complaint that added two additional parties but relied on largely the same facts, the district court denied this motion. ¶ 40 When considering a motion to amend, the district court should primarily consider whether the motion would cause unavoidable prejudice to the opposing party. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Utah 1998). In addition, the district court may also consider delay, bad faith, or futility of the amendment. Id. In this case, the district court correctly held that McLaughlin's proposed amended complaint would have been futile as the court already determined that interparty contracts barred the existence of any duty owed to McLaughlin in relation to the complained of acts. A party cannot obtain a different outcome by adding to the parties or rephrasing claims. ¶ 41 McLaughlin argues the district court had only ruled on fiduciary duties arising out of existing contracts and that his amended complaint raised tort-based theories of fiduciary duties. This is an inaccurate characterization of the district court's determination and, moreover, a distinction without a difference. Regardless of how McLaughlin phrases his claims, they are the same theory: Cookietree shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to McLaughlin by waiving the right of refusal for the 1999 stock transaction and by terminating his employment. Whether this theory is characterized as arising out of contract or tort, it is the same theorya tort for breach of duty. Thus, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion because McLaughlin's amendment failed to state new facts or a new theory that had not already been addressed by the court; an amendment would have been futile.