Opinion ID: 888519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juror J.B.

Text: ¶ 23 During voir dire questioning by the prosecutor, the following exchange occurred between J.B. and the prosecutor, George Corn: [J.B]: . . . When you were asking me if I could be impartial, I'm going to try to be impartial, but one of my daughters goes with one of my [sic] boys out of Pinesdale, so I have heard about this. MR. CORN: Do you realize that what you might have heard, [J.B.], is not evidence in thi[s] case? [J.B.]: Right, right. MR. CORN: Thank you. [J.B.]: And I have read everything that they put [in] the paper. I just don't know how partial  you know  MR. CORN: And you have to tell me and make that decision yourself. If the Judge instructs  [J.B.]: I'll try. MR. CORN:  you under oath? [J.B.]: I do have three little girls, so it's hard to be impartial. MR. CORN: All right. Well, I'm going to let you wrestle with that. [J.B.], have you heard the questions that I have asked of the other jurors? [J.B.]: I have. MR. CORN: Is there anything I touched upon  and I've been over a fair amount of material  but unless there's something specific  or was there anything that I touched upon that you need to discuss with me at this point? [J.B.]: No, I read it when it happened, that's the last I heard of it. MR. CORN: Have you  Based on what you read, is there anything that you read about that that would prevent you from reserving judgment in this case? [J.B.]: No. The prosecutor also asked J.B. several other isolated questions about previous jury duty, whether J.B. knew any of the witnesses, and the burden of proof in the case. ¶ 24 After the prosecutor completed his voir dire questioning of the potential jurors, Shockley began his questioning and asked the potential jurors a series of four questions dealing with sexual abuse, mental health treatment and association with the mental health profession, and whether any of the potential jurors were aware of anything else about the case that might prejudice them against Whitlow. Out of respect for the sensitive nature of the questions, Shockley then conducted individual interviews (in the judge's chambers) of each juror who responded affirmatively to any of the questions. J.B. was among the jurors who replied affirmatively to one of Shockley's questions, and Shockley proceeded to question J.B. in the judge's chambers as follows: THE COURT: [J.B.], which of those questions applied to you? [J.B.]: The mental health professional. I went through a divorce, and for a reality check, I went in twice, and my daughter went in twice. My son and I had a little trouble; he had an anger problem and went back to live with his mother, and before he could come home, he had to go see a professional to get his anger under control, went in about five or six times. MR. SHOCKLEY: It happens. [J.B.]: Yeah. Well, good enough, so the Marine Corps will let him in in five more months. MR. SHOCKLEY: I spent 25 years in the Marine Corps. I don't know that that's that high of a standard. [J.B.]: Got him straightened out just in time. MR. CORN: I don't have any more questions. THE COURT: Anything about any of those experiences that would tend to make you regard testimony from a psychologist or therapist differently than anyone else? [J.B.]: No. More of a listening session for him than anything else. There was no real direction. They just felt that if he needed to talk, to come on back. MR. SHOCKLEY: The magic question is  I think it's magic  would you give more credence to a psychologist because he's an expert witness than you would to a regular witness? [J.B.]: I guess I'd have to hear the testimony. MR. SHOCKLEY: But just because they're a psychologist, are they more believable than a guy off the street? [J.B.]: I don't think so. MR. SHOCKLEY: Okay, that's good enough for me. Towards the end of voir dire, Shockley asked the jury pool, Is there anyone here that doesn't think they can be objective, and their emotions are just too great about this issue to give Mr. Whitlow a fair trial? None of the jurors, including J.B., replied affirmatively to this question. ¶ 25 At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Shockley stated that he thought mentioning to J.B. that he (Shockley) had been in the Marine Corps might be a plus and that it was a good trial tactic to ingratiate himself with J.B. In addition, Shockley testified that he had received and reviewed the jury questionnaires prior to the jury selection process. Shockley explained, in reference to his review of the questionnaires, What I would want to do is get people who are likely to be open-minded and receptive to my evidence and hopefully inclined towards my client. Shockley also stated that as a general rule, he would observe jurors' body language, tone of voice, and general demeanor during the opposing counsel's questioning of the jury pool. Shockley testified that he almost certainly did this during Whitlow's trial. ¶ 26 Shockley also prepared voir dire notes in which he made comments on each of the jurors, including information about children, profession, or general demeanor. Shockley testified that it was his practice to review the juror questionnaires and then make notes on each juror before he went to court. Shockley further testified that he added additional notes on the sheet during voir dire. With respect to Whitlow's trial specifically, Shockley wrote, in the left-hand margin of the notes, comments about each of the jurors, including like, no, not like, bad, good, a lot like, and other similar comments. Several of these comments were underlined up to three or four times for emphasis. Most, but not all of the jurors received such comments. Shockley stated that he believed he wrote these comments during voir dire. For J.B., Shockley wrote the comments No kids, Been Juror, Slight hear [sic] Problem. Shockley also wrote under a second entry for J.B. Had kids. But Shockley did not write any comments such as like, not like, good or bad for J.B. ¶ 27 Whitlow claims that when Shockley allowed J.B. to serve on the jury despite J.B.'s multiple concerns about his ability to be impartial, Shockley's advocacy for Whitlow was deficient. Whitlow argues that J.B. raised questions about his ability to be impartial due to what he had read in the paper and the fact that he had three little girls. Whitlow contends that J.B. demonstrated bias and that Shockley failed to make any further inquiry into J.B.'s bias. Whitlow notes that although the prosecution left J.B. to wrestle with the issue of whether he could be impartial, Shockley never followed up regarding the outcome of this wrestling match. Whitlow also points to Shockley's testimony at the evidentiary hearing that he did not recall why he did not ask any follow-up questions of J.B. or why he left J.B. on the jury. When asked by Shockley's postconviction counsel whether, in hindsight, he would have asked J.B. further questions, Shockley replied, I think it would have been a good idea. Likewise, Shockley's affidavit in support of Whitlow's petition for postconviction relief stated that after reading the draft of the Memorandum of the Petitioner, it appears that I should have asked more questions. ¶ 28 The State counters by arguing that J.B.'s responses to the prosecutor's questions did not indicate partiality on J.B.'s part and, thus, that Shockley did not have any reason to ask J.B. follow-up questions. The State further claims that Whitlow's arguments and Shockley's testimony do not rebut the presumption that Shockley's performance was reasonable. Accordingly, the State maintains that Whitlow failed to satisfy the first prong of Strickland. Prior to evaluating whether Shockley's performance was reasonable, we begin by examining the purpose of voir dire and challenges to a juror. ¶ 29 Defense counsel has a duty to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. State v. Lamere, 2005 MT 118, ¶ 15, 327 Mont. 115, ¶ 15, 112 P.3d 1005, ¶ 15. The purpose of voir dire in a criminal proceeding is to determine the existence of a prospective juror's partiality, that is, his or her bias and prejudice. State v. Herrman, 2003 MT 149, ¶ 23, 316 Mont. 198, ¶ 23, 70 P.3d 738, ¶ 23. Adequate questioning enables counsel to exercise his or her peremptory challenges intelligently. Herrman, ¶ 23; Lamere, ¶ 15. Adequate questioning also enables counsel to properly raise a challenge for cause pursuant to § 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA. Lamere, ¶ 15. ¶ 30 Section 46-16-115, MCA, enumerates the grounds on which a juror may be excused for cause. Most relevant to this appeal, § 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA, provides that: A challenge for cause may be taken for all or any of the following reasons or for any other reason that the court determines: . . . having a state of mind in reference to the case or to either of the parties that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party. [Paragraph breaks omitted.] As the right to trial by an impartial jury is principally secured through the system of challenges exercised during voir dire, it is incumbent on defense counsel to develop information in the record that demonstrates a juror's bias as to a party or an issue in the case. Lamere, ¶ 15. If voir dire examination raises a serious question about a prospective juror's ability to be fair and impartial, then dismissal for cause is favored. State v. Heath, 2004 MT 58, ¶ 10, 320 Mont. 211, ¶ 10, 89 P.3d 947, ¶ 10. Disqualification based on a juror's alleged prejudice is necessary only where jurors form fixed opinions on the guilt or innocence of the defendant which they would not be able to lay aside and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court. State v. Freshment, 2002 MT 61, ¶ 12, 309 Mont. 154, ¶ 12, 43 P.3d 968, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 31 Examining Shockley's conduct in light of the purposes of voir dire and the circumstances surrounding voir dire at Whitlow's trial, we conclude that Whitlow has not shown Shockley's performance to be deficient with respect to J.B. Contrary to Whitlow's assertions, Shockley did essentially follow-up with J.B. by questioning him about both his and his son's mental health treatment and by asking him, along with the other jurors, whether there was anything that could keep him from being objective. Shockley testified that he observed the jurors during voir dire questioning, that he reviewed the questionnaire forms for all the jurors, that he took detailed notes on each of the jurors including J.B., and that he attempted to establish some rapport with J.B. based on J.B.'s son entering the Marine Corps. In addition, it is clear that there were other jurors who were of greater concern to Shockley in terms of being biased against Whitlow, as evidenced by Shockley's comments in his voir dire notes and his questioning during voir dire. Shockley himself stated in his affidavit that he did not believe that J.B. was biased at the time of voir dire and that it was only upon reflection several years later that he changed his mind. Yet, [a] fair assessment of Shockley's performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The circumstances surrounding Shockley's evaluation of J.B. do not establish that his original assessment of J.B. was unreasonable. ¶ 32 More to the point, Whitlow has failed to demonstrate that Shockley's conduct in evaluating J.B. fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The Supreme Court made clear in Strickland that [t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Whitlow, however, has offered no legal authority or expert testimony concerning the prevailing professional norms applicable to Shockley's evaluation of J.B. Cf. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 7-8, 124 S.Ct. 1, 5, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (per curiam). Rather, Whitlow has offered only Shockley's testimony that, in hindsight, he would have asked further questions of J.B. and he could not recall any tactical reason for not asking J.B. additional questions. Yet, even if an omission is inadvertent, relief is not automatic. The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight. Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 8, 124 S.Ct. at 6. As explained above, the pertinent question is whether, in light of all the circumstances, Shockley's decision not to ask additional questions of J.B. fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Again, there is a strong presumption that Shockley's conduct fell within this range, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; State v. Hamilton, 2007 MT 223, ¶ 16, 339 Mont. 92, ¶ 16, 167 P.3d 906, ¶ 16, and we conclude that Whitlow has not overcome this presumption. ¶ 33 In sum, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and was based on sound trial strategy. In order to overcome this presumption, the convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must demonstrate that counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness measured under prevailing professional norms. Here, Whitlow has failed to make this showing in his presentation to the Court. Accordingly, we hold that Whitlow has not demonstrated that Shockley's performance during voir dire with respect to J.B. was constitutionally deficient.