Opinion ID: 2549875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Victim character evidence

Text: Appellant contends that the district court improperly excluded independent evidence of specific violent acts committed by the victims and known to appellant prior to the shootings. The district court allowed appellant to relate his knowledge of specific violent acts by the victims, and it allowed other witnesses to give their opinion as to the victims' violent character. Appellant wanted to present additional evidence to corroborate his own testimony regarding specific acts by the victims, but the court did not allow that. This court overturns a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence only in the case of abuse of discretion. [24] NRS 48.045(1) sets forth the rule that character evidence is normally not admissible to show that persons have acted in conformity with their character. NRS 48.045(1) also provides three exceptions to the rule, and one is pertinent to the issue at hand: (b) Evidence of the character or a trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused ... and similar evidence offered by the prosecution to rebut such evidence .... This exception permits a defendant to present evidence of a victim's character when it tends to prove that the victim was the likely aggressor, regardless of the defendant's knowledge of the victim's character. [25] As previously explained, under NRS 48.055(1), when character evidence is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or in the form of an opinion. Evidence of specific instances of conduct is generally not admissible because `it possesses the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time.' [26] However, a party can test reputation or opinion evidence on cross-examination by inquiry into the witness's knowledge of relevant specific acts. [27] In addition, NRS 48.055(2) provides: In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense, proof of specific instances of his conduct may be made on direct or cross-examination. However, the use of specific acts under NRS 48.055(2) is confined `to cases in which character is, in the strict sense, in issue and hence deserving of a searching inquiry.' [28] Appellant invokes this provision, asserting that a victim's propensity for violence is an element of the claim of self-defense and therefore that the district court should have allowed evidence of specific acts on this ground. He provides no analysis and cites no other authority to support this assertion. We conclude that the character of the victim is not an essential element of self-defense unlike the defense of entrapment, for example, which makes a defendant's predisposition to commit the charged crime an essential element of the prosecution's case. [29] As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, to determine whether character constitutes an essential element, the relevant question is: would proof, or failure of proof, of the character trait by itself actually satisfy an element of the charge, claim, or defense? [30] Even if a defendant proves that a victim was a violent person, it does not establish an element of self-defense: proving that a person has a violent character does not prove that the person was the assailant or acted in such a way that the defendant reasonably believed it was necessary to use force against the person. [31] Nor does lack of proof that a victim had a violent character constitute a failure to prove self-defense: a victim's violent character is relevant but not required to establish self-defense. [32] Therefore, NRS 48.055(2) was not a basis for the admission of evidence of specific acts by the victims. However, this court has held that evidence of specific acts showing that the victim was a violent person is admissible if a defendant seeks to establish self-defense and was aware of those acts. [33] This evidence is relevant to the defendant's state of mind, i.e., whether the defendant's belief in the need to use force in self-defense was reasonable. [34] In this case, the district court allowed appellant to testify concerning the victims' specific acts within his knowledge, but did not allow extrinsic evidence of those acts and limited appellant's cross-examination of the surviving victims. To corroborate his testimony regarding violent acts by the victims, appellant believes he should have been allowed to cross-examine the surviving victims on their violent conduct and to call witnesses to testify to being robbed or assaulted by the victims. We agree. In Petty v. State, [35] this court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the victim's prior conviction where the defendant claimed self-defense. The evidence of the victim's prior conviction for robbery was admissible because the defendant was aware that the victim had committed robberies. [36] Therefore, under Petty, extrinsic evidence of a victim's specific conduct known to the defendant is admissible in the form of prior convictions. We conclude that extrinsic evidence of such conduct is also admissible in the form of corroborating testimony. We agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which has held that a defendant should be allowed to produce supporting evidence to prove the particular acts of which the accused claims knowledge, thereby proving the reasonableness of the accused's knowledge and apprehension of the victim and the credibility of his assertions about his state of mind.... [T]he self-serving nature of an accused's testimony about prior violent acts of the victim makes corroborating evidence of those acts particularly important for an accused's claim of self-defense. [37] We also agree that the admission of evidence of a victim's specific acts, regardless of its source, is within the sound and reasonable discretion of the trial court and is limited to the purpose of establishing what the defendant believed about the character of the victim. [38] The trial court should exercise care that the evidence of specific violent acts of the victim not be allowed to extend to the point that it is being offered to prove that the victim acted in conformity with his violent tendencies. [39] Thus, when a defendant claims self-defense and knew of relevant specific acts by a victim, evidence of the acts can be presented through the defendant's own testimony, through cross-examination of a surviving victim, and through extrinsic proof. Here, the district court abused its discretion in unduly limiting appellant's cross-examination of the surviving victims and in completely excluding testimony by defense witnesses regarding prior violent conduct by the victims known to appellant. This error alone was not so prejudicial that it requires reversal, but it contributes to the cumulative error, which does.