Opinion ID: 1188941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective Juror Herman Palmer

Text: (7) In stating his reasons for excusing Mr. Palmer, the prosecutor observed that Palmer had an extremely poor grasp of the English language. He had to deliberate exceedingly long and there were pauses between questions. He had a very poor comprehension. He couldn't understand the instructions given to him by the court. The prosecutor acknowledged that Witherspoon questions are somewhat difficult, but observed that he had repeated the questions for Palmer not once, not twice, but three times. ( Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770]; see Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767-769 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) The prosecutor stated that Palmer had then attempted to look up the word deterrent in the dictionary, and the court noted that he could not locate it. Palmer had many no answers in his questionnaire. And he sat on a hung jury. Finally, the prosecutor found him questionable as to being in favor of the death penalty. The prosecutor got the impression Palmer would modify his answers depending on who was questioning him. Because it was the early stage of challenges, the prosecutor thought he could locate a better juror than Palmer. After hearing argument by defense counsel, the court stated that it listened carefully to [the prosecutor's] explanation of why he made the challenge, found the reasons to be adequate, and denied the motion. Of course, where a prosecutor's concern for a juror's ability to understand is supported by the record, it is a proper basis for challenge. ( People v. Barber (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 378, 397-399 [245 Cal. Rptr. 895].) Defendant argues, however, that this basis was insufficient here because the prosecutor did not excuse other non-Black jurors who displayed similar intellectual limitations. However, we have previously rejected a procedure that places an undue emphasis on comparisons of the stated reasons for the challenged excusals with similar characteristics of nonmembers of the group who were not challenged by the prosecutor, noting that such a comparison is one-sided and that it is not realistic to expect a trial judge to make such detailed comparisons midtrial. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1220.) In addition, we have observed that the same factors used in evaluating a juror may be given different weight depending on the number of peremptory challenges the lawyer has at the time of the exercise of the particular challenge. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1220.) Thus, at the beginning of voir dire a prosecutor may exercise his challenges freely against a person who appears to have difficulty understanding or communicating, and later be more hesitant with his challenges on the ground that if he exhausts them too soon, he may be forced to go to trial with an even more problematic juror. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, the very dynamics of the jury selection process make it difficult, if not impossible, on a cold record, to evaluate or compare the peremptory challenge of one juror with the retention of another juror [who] on paper appears to be substantially similar. [5] ( Id. at p. 1221.) Finally, Palmer's experience of sitting on a hung jury constitutes a legitimate concern for the prosecution, which seeks a jury that can reach a unanimous verdict. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding these race-neutral explanations sufficient to satisfy the prosecution's burden.