Opinion ID: 1161008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The denial of the defendant's application for new attorney

Text: On April 17, 1993, the defendant filed a pro se application for reassignment of counsel in which he asked for a new attorney on the basis that a conflict of interest existed because the public defenders were employees of the State, one of his attorneys had an excessive workload, a communication gap existed between himself and one of his attorneys, his attorneys had ignored his request for investigative services and production of evidence, and his attorneys had withheld information from him. The record fails to support any of the above contentions, and the defendant's claim is without merit. Generally, the question of whether a new counsel should be appointed is left to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Hegwood, 256 Kan. 901, 903, 888 P.2d 856 (1995). To warrant substitute counsel, a defendant must show justifiable dissatisfaction with appointed counsel. Justifiable dissatisfaction sufficient to merit substitution of counsel includes a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communications between the attorney and the defendant. 256 Kan. at 903-04. The defendant argues that his attorneys were from the public defender's office and, thus, paid by the State. We rejected the exact same argument in State v. Ferguson, 254 Kan. 62, 66-67, 864 P.2d 693 (1993), wherein we noted that any appointed counsel suffers from the same problems and that this fact does not deny the defendant a fair trial. The defendant claims that his attorneys had an excessive case load. However, the trial court questioned the defendant's attorneys, who stated that although they had a large case load, they had spent considerable time on the defendant's case and were ready to proceed. The remainder of the defendant's assertions regarding this allegation concern communication gaps between him and his appointed counsel. Although the defendant makes such assertions, these assertions do not show a complete breakdown in communication occurred. In State v. Collier, 259 Kan. 346, 358, 913 P.2d 597 (1996), we held that as long as the trial court has a reasonable basis for believing the attorney-client relation has not deteriorated to a point where appointed counsel can no longer give effective aid and a fair presentation of a defense, the court is justified in refusing to appoint new counsel. Based upon the above circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion. (2) Ineffective assistance of counsel Before counsel's assistance is determined to be so defective as to require reversal of a conviction, the defendant must establish two things. First, the defendant must establish that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance was less than that guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Second, the defendant must establish that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Orr, 262 Kan. 312, Syl. ¶ 1, 940 P.2d 42 (1997). At the sentencing hearing, the defendant brought up numerous issues relating to the competency of his counsel. He asserted that this counsel was too busy to adequately represent him at trial and that his counsel failed to introduce evidence relating to his character. The defendant also claimed his counsel should have called Cortez Loudermilk because Loudermilk was at the victim's residence on the night in question. The defendant also asserted that his counsel should have called other witnesses, including Copridge. He further claimed that his counsel also failed to allow him to be present during the instruction conference. Finally, he complained that his counsel had failed to attempt to get the aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping thrown out as beyond the statute of limitations. The trial court, having presided over the trial, concluded that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary and denied the defendant's motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Both the performance and prejudice prongs of an ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry are generally mixed questions of law and fact on appeal. State v. Orr, 262 Kan. 312, Syl. ¶ 4. However, where the trial court, after reviewing the performance of defense counsel for the entire trial and considering the allegations of the defendant, finds that the question may be resolved as a matter of law, the matter may be concluded without hearing. With the exception of the defendant's allegation concerning Loudermilk and Copridge, most of the defendant's claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit. They amount to bare assertions of the defendant without support in the record. We have previously examined some of the claims regarding ineffective assistance and concluded that claims such as the statute of limitations contention have no merit. Regarding the defendant's claim that his counsel should have called Loudermilk and Copridge, it is clear that any attempt to call Copridge would have been futile as Copridge's own conviction was on appeal and, thus, Copridge could have asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. The defendant did not proffer to the court the content of Loudermilk's testimony other than to indicate that Loudermilk would testify as to how long the defendant was at Williams' apartment on the night of the murder. However, any testimony of this nature would have been suspect, especially considering the defendant's statement to police that he was at Williams' apartment until the purported fight between Copridge and Williams began. Under these circumstances, it would be reasonable for the trial court to assume that failure to call such witnesses was attributed to sound defense strategy. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to have made a determination without hearing that the defendant failed to establish that counsel's performance was deficient and or that any deficient performance by counsel did not prejudice the defendant. Therefore, we conclude the trial court's denial of his motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel was proper. (3) The defendant's right to self-representation The defendant contends that the trial court prevented him from representing himself. There is no merit to this claim. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the trial court did not deny him the right to represent himself. While the court did advise against self-representation, the trial court advised the defendant he would be able to do so. The fact that the defendant did not avail himself of this opportunity does not mean that he was prevented by the trial court from representing himself.