Opinion ID: 865371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying king’s

Text: MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE DEATH PENALTY BECAUSE OF (A) 22-YEAR INCARCERATION ON DEATH ROW AND (B) UNAVOIDABLE JURY BIAS. ¶32. King argues that the trial court should have granted his Motion to Exclude the Death Penalty because he has been on death row for twenty-five years 14 as a result of repeated trial court errors which have substantially prolonged his incarceration. King argues that serving an excessive period on death row constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of his constitutional rights. Additionally, King argues that the trial court should have granted his motion, as this motion not only established his excessive time on death row, but also unavoidable juror bias resulting from the jurors’ knowledge of his prior death sentences. ¶33. This Court has considered and rejected this argument before. Wilcher v. State, 863 So. 2d 776, 834 (Miss. 2003); Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95, 144-45 (Miss. 2003); Jordan v. State, 786 So. 2d 987, 1028 (Miss. 2001). In Wilcher, the defendant asserted that he had been subjected to “cruel and inhuman treatment” in violation of his constitutional rights because he had been kept in maximum confinement on Mississippi’s Death Row and had; been subjected to numerous execution dates during a period of nineteen to twenty years. Wilcher, 863 So. 2d at 834. Citing Jordan v. State, 786 So. 2d 987, 1028 (Miss. 2001), the Wilcher Court stated: Jordan argues that he has been incarcerated on death row from the time the crime was committed in this case, in 1976, until 1991, and then again in 1998, when the life sentence was vacated, until now. He claims that he has suffered psychological trauma waiting for his execution and that there is nothing gained 14 The issue presented by King references a “22-year incarceration;” however, in his brief, King states that he has been on death row for 25 years. 27 by the State from 22 years of needless infliction of pain and suffering. He indicates that the United States Supreme Court has held that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment when it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, i.e., retribution and deterrence, and is nothing more than needless imposition of pain and suffering. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2956, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 289 (1989). .... There is no precedent which supports Jordan’s contention that his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment has been violated. Therefore, there are no grounds for reversal on this issue. Jordan v. State, 786 So. 2d 987, 1028. This Court’s language in Jordan goes to the very heart of the issue presented by Wilcher. There is no law of the United States or of this state to support Wilcher’s claim. Wilcher, 863 So. 2d at 834. (Emphasis added). Accordingly, we find this claim devoid of any merit. ¶34. Next, we address King’s claim that because his prior death sentence was mentioned before the jury, the trial judge should have declared a mistrial due to unavoidable jury bias. Specifically, King cites three instances to support his allegation of unavoidable jury bias. First, he cites the response of Jane Anderson, Mrs. Patterson’s daughter, to a question on direct examination about the impact of her mother’s death on her and her family. Anderson responded: It’s been really hard on us because we know what a tragic death she has and it’s just been really hard. You know, she loved my son. He was five-years-old and he didn’t have a grandmother, so it’s been bad on all of us, really bad. Nobody knows until they’ve gone through something like this. It’s been horrible. Twenty-three years of it is a lot of 23 years over and over and over and over. It’s a long time. (Emphasis added). King argues that the last sentence of her response made the jury aware of how long King had been incarcerated and awaiting death. 28 ¶35. Secondly, King moved for a mistrial after Dr. Robin King’s response to a question by the prosecution regarding the criteria for determining malingering, specifically the first criteria of a patient presenting himself in a medical/legal context. Dr. King stated that when he saw King in 1983 or 1984, King was on death row. The judge reserved ruling on the motion until a time when he had read cases concerning oral curatives but nonetheless admonished the jury to disregard the testimony and “any possible inference that you could make from the answer and to disregard that inference that was given by Dr. King.” The trial court subsequently denied the motion for mistrial. ¶36. Lastly, King points to Dr. Whelan’s testimony in response to a question by the defense that he “pretty regularly saw Mr. King on death row. . .” King objected to Dr. Whelan’s response to his own question, which was sustained. The judge instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. King then moved for a mistrial, which was denied by the court. King argues that these statements undoubtedly tainted the jury in its deliberations, arguing that (1) the jury likely assumed the extended lapse of time on death row was somehow King’s fault and/or (2) the jury simply deferred to the original jury during both the guilt and sentencing phases or the 1998 jury that resentenced King to death after evaluating the evidence. ¶37. In Wilcher, this Court held that Wilcher’s claim of jury bias based on comments made during his resentencing did not warrant relief. 697 So. 2d 1087, 1101 (Miss. 1997). To support his argument, Wilcher cited West v. State, 463 So. 2d 1048, 1052-53 (Miss. 1985), in which the Court held that the portion of judgments dealing with the death sentence should have been redacted in a manner that the jury could not have read, for the reason that 29 “if the jury knows that the appellant is already under a sentence of death it would tend to relieve them of their separate responsibility to make that determination.” Id. In distinguishing West and finding that Wilcher’s claim lacked merit, this Court stated: In the case at hand, the jury was not given a copy of the previous judgments or told that Wilcher had previously been sentenced to death. The jury was told that Sid Salter interviewed Wilcher at Parchman’s maximum security unit, commonly referred to as “death row.” Salter’s comment did not tell the jury that Wilcher was “already under a sentence of death.” The jury was, however, aware that Wilcher had been convicted of two capital murders. It is logical that criminals of this nature would be confined in a maximum security area -- regardless of whether they were awaiting execution. Moreover, the jury was also aware that they were responsible for determining whether Wilcher received the death penalty for killing Noblin. For these reasons, Salter’s comment did not relieve the jury of its “separate responsibility to make the determination.” See West, 463 So. 2d at 1052-53. Wilcher, 697 So.2d at 1102. (Emphasis added). First, nothing in Anderson’s testimony mentioned King’s time served on death row. She only mentioned “23 years” of dealing with the impact of her mother’s death; therefore we find King’s claim that this statement made the jury aware of the length of time he had been awaiting execution lacks merit. As such, we find no prejudice to King as a result of Anderson’s statement. ¶38. Next, King’s argument concerning Dr. King’s and Dr. Whelan’s statements that they saw King “on death row” also lacks merit for the same reasons set forth by this Court in Wilcher. Like the comment in Wilcher’s case, the jury was told that Dr. King interviewed King on “death row.” Dr. King’s comment did not tell the jury that King was “already under a sentence of death.” Id. Likewise, Dr. Whelan’s comment that “he pretty regularly saw Mr. King on death row” did not inform the jury of King’s death sentence. Further, the jury was aware that King had been convicted of capital murder. As this Court previously stated, “[i]t 30 is logical that criminals of this nature would be confined in a maximum security area -- regardless of whether they were awaiting execution.” Id. Additionally, as the jury members were aware of their responsibility for determining whether King received the death penalty for the murder of Patterson, these comments did not relieve the jury of its “separate responsibility to make the determination.” See West, 463 So. 2d at 1052-53. For these reasons, King’s argument fails.