Opinion ID: 1264824
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Evidence Regarding Elmore's Prior Molestation of the Victim Was Properly Admitted

Text: Elmore contends jury consideration of his statements about the prior molestation of Kristy was improper because the evidence did not support the trial court's ruling that the prior acts were connected to the homicide[,] and that such evidence is inflammatory. Opening Br. of Appellant at 132, 139. Elmore further contends the prior molestation was a separate bad act and had to be evaluated under ER 404(b). We disagree. The record makes clear the prior molestation of Kristy Ohnstad was intricately linked to this crime. In Elmore's confession, he admits he molested Kristy when she was 5 years old and indeed links her threats of disclosure of that prior molestation to her killing. The prior molestation was part of the res gestae of this crime. In State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 570-71, 940 P.2d 546 (1997), cert denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1192, 140 L.Ed.2d 322 (1998), we approved the admission of challenged evidence under the res gestae or same transaction exception to ER 404(b). There, we found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony regarding the defendant's subsequent sexual attack on another victim, holding such testimony qualified as res gestae evidence because it provided the jury with a more complete picture of events surrounding the crimes committed against [the victim here]. Id. at 573, 940 P.2d 546. Likewise, evidence regarding Elmore's prior molestation of Kristy completes the picture here. See also State v. Lane, 125 Wash.2d 825, 831, 889 P.2d 929 (1995). The trial judge properly allowed evidence of Elmore's prior molestation of Kristy because Elmore confessed the threat of disclosure of the prior molestation served in part as a catalyst for the murder. In his confession, Elmore revealed Kristy did indeed mention the prior molestation the morning he killed her. He also indicated the constant threat of disclosure of the prior molestation played a role in her death. Elmore indicated on the morning of the homicide that he and Kristy had words on the way to school and the prior molestation came up again. Elmore then became angry and decided not to take Kristy to school. [9] When asked to describe the rape, Elmore noted that during the rape, Kristy pleaded with him, reminding him that he promised not to do it again, referring to the prior molestation. [10] Because consideration of the prior molestation helped to complete the picture of the murder, its consideration by the jury was proper and necessary, as the trial judge ruled. Elmore also argues State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984), specifically held evidence of uncharged crimes was not admissible in a death penalty proceeding. While we did hold portions of RCW 10.95.060(3) paragraph one unconstitutional in Bartholomew, we specifically upheld paragraph two of the same statute, stating: in the event that the sentencing jury is not the jury which convicted the defendant of aggravated first degree murder, the prosecution may in addition present evidence of the facts and circumstances of the murder, as provided by the second paragraph of RCW 10.95.060(3). Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d at 643, 683 P.2d 1079. [11] Here, because Elmore pleaded guilty, the sentencing jury was not the jury that convicted him of aggravated first-degree murder. Thus, evidence regarding the circumstances of the murder could be properly presented to the sentencing jury in compliance with the second paragraph of RCW 10.95.060(3) and Bartholomew. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 643, 888 P.2d 1105 (it is proper for the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime); State v. Rice, 110 Wash.2d 577, 607, 757 P.2d 889 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3200, 105 L.Ed.2d 707 (1989). Because the prior molestation played a significant role in the circumstances of the murder, its consideration by the jury was proper and necessary, as the trial judge ruled. Evidence regarding Elmore's prior molestation of Kristy was properly admitted.
Elmore asserts the trial court erred in giving instructions 3 and 8 and in failing to give his proposed instruction 15. Elmore contends instruction 3 [12] improperly limited the jury to considering only mitigating evidence that directly related to the circumstances of the murder. We rejected this argument in numerous capital cases. [13] We do so again. In Gentry, we stated constitutional requirements are met where the instructions as a whole allow the jury to consider relevant mitigating evidence: [T]he requirement of individualized determination required in capital cases is met when the jury can consider relevant mitigating evidence of the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime. This is what a capital jury in this state is to focus on and penalty phase jury instruction 4 [the statutory question instruction] was followed by instruction 5 which informed the jury that it was to consider as mitigating circumstances any other factors concerning the offense or the defendant that it found to be relevant. We conclude, as we have concluded repeatedly in the past, that RCW 10.95.060(4) is constitutional. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 653, 888 P.2d 1105 (citations omitted). As in Gentry, the instructions as a whole in Elmore's case allowed the jury to consider any relevant mitigating circumstances. Instruction 8 defines mitigating circumstance, notes the appropriateness of the exercise of mercy, lists nonexclusive factors the jury may consider, and concludes [i]n addition to the factors listed above, you are to consider any fact about Clark Elmore or the offense that you deem to be a mitigating circumstance. Clerk's Papers at 182 (emphasis added). Elmore's contention that the jury was not allowed to consider the full scope of mitigating circumstances is without merit. Elmore also asserts the term significant as used in instruction 8 is unconstitutionally vague. Instruction 8 uses language substantively identical to RCW 10.95.070(1) and states in pertinent part: You are to consider as mitigating circumstances any other factors concerning the offense or the defendant that you find to be relevant, including, but not limited to, the following: 1) Whether the defendant has or does not have a significant history of prior criminal convictions; Clerk's Papers at 182. We rejected this same argument in Pirtle, holding such term not to be unconstitutionally vague and finding no constitutional infirmity in the instruction. 127 Wash.2d at 681, 904 P.2d 245. Elmore's challenge to these instructions is meritless. Elmore also asserts the trial court erred in refusing his proposed instruction 15 which read: You are instructed that the following crimes, of which Clark Elmore was convicted, are not most serious offenses, commonly known as strikes, under the 3 Strikes, You're Out law: 1) Forgery in the First Degree 2) Grand Larceny 3) Burglary Clerk's Papers at 295. Elmore asserts the trial court should have given this instruction as it was an accurate reflection of the law and offered guidance to the jury in interpreting whether Elmore had a significant criminal history. Whether or not the instruction is an accurate statement of 3 strikes jurisprudence is irrelevant. Indeed, mixing SRA standards with the task before the jury under RCW 10.95 would tend more to confuse matters than provide helpful guidance. As we noted in Brett, 126 Wash.2d at 184, 892 P.2d 29, the SRA does not govern the sentencing of capital defendants. The SRA and RCW 10.95 serve two separate functions and are consistent. The SRA is a determinate sentencing system for felony offenders. It gives first degree aggravated murder a seriousness score of 15 and provides for two possible sentences, life without parole or death. The statute, however, does not purport to govern or guide penalty phase juries in their sentencing decisions. This function is served by RCW 10.95, which guides and channels the jury's discretion in reaching an individualized sentencing decision for each defendant convicted of a capital offense. Id. Because Elmore's status under the 3 strikes law is irrelevant to the issues before a capital case sentencing jury, and discussion of same could yield more confusion than enlightenment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Elmore's proposed 3 strikes instruction. J. The SRA Washout Provisions Do Not Apply Elmore asserts that the SRA washout provisions (RCW 9.94A.360(2)) and/or ER 403 balancing should be applied to strike his criminal history. He asserts not applying such provisions to capital case defendants violates equal protection. Elmore acknowledges we have previously rejected these arguments in Brett, 126 Wash.2d at 184, 892 P.2d 29; but, nevertheless urges us to abandon Brett. We recently reaffirmed Brett, however, in State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d 668, 744-46, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (declining to adopt SRA washout provisions or an ER 403 balancing requirement in death penalty cases, rejecting defendant's equal protection claim, and approving Brett ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1193, 140 L.Ed.2d 323 (1998). We reaffirm our prior holdings in Brett and Stenson. K. The State's Closing Argument Did Not Deny Elmore a Reliable Sentencing Hearing Elmore asserts misconduct by the State in closing argument in commenting on the future dangerousness provision of instruction 8, and by suggesting the 20 year indeterminate sentence Elmore received for a prior first degree forgery conviction be considered in determining whether Elmore had a significant criminal history. The law applicable to prosecutorial misconduct is summarized in Gentry: Where improper argument is charged, the defense bears the burden of establishing the impropriety of the prosecuting attorney's comments as well as their prejudicial effect. Reversal is not required if the error could have been obviated by a curative instruction which the defense did not request. The failure to object to a prosecuting attorney's improper remark constitutes a waiver of such error unless the remark is deemed to be so flagrant and ill intentioned that it evinces an enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized by an admonition to the jury. 125 Wash.2d at 640, 888 P.2d 1105. See also State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (remarks of the prosecutor, even if improper, are not grounds for reversal if they were invited or provoked by defense counsel and are in reply to his or her acts and statements, unless the remarks are not a pertinent reply or are so prejudicial that a curative instruction would be ineffective), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1129, 115 S.Ct. 2004, 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995); Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 561, 940 P.2d 546 (prosecuting attorney's allegedly improper remarks must be reviewed in the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions given to the jury). Here, Elmore neither objected to the comments he now characterizes as misconduct nor did he ask for a curative instruction or move for a mistrial. The prosecutor's misconduct must therefore meet Gentry 's flagrant, intentional and incurable test. The prosecutor's comments, while clearly advocacy, simply do not rise to such level. Furthermore, the prosecutor's statements on future dangerousness were made in rebuttal as a response to a defense assertion in closing argument that the State had produced zero, no evidence, none on the issue of future dangerousness. 17 Report of Proceedings at 2636. No error was present in such a response. Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 86, 882 P.2d 747. Also regarding the issue of significant criminal history, while advocating his viewpoint, the prosecutor also urged the jury to make their decision based on all the evidence, 17 Report of Proceedings at 2646, in compliance with Brown. [14] The State's comments were not sufficiently flagrant and did not produce such incurable prejudice as to amount to misconduct under Gentry. L. No Prejudicial Error Was Present Where the Jury Played the Tape of Elmore's Confession During Deliberations Elmore contends it was improper for the jury to replay his taped confession during deliberations. By agreement of counsel, the tapes of Elmore's April 23rd confession were redacted to exclude certain portions, such as references to Elmore's James Dickey alias. Elmore's counsel, however, opposed the omission of a small portion of the redacted confession in which Elmore described his relationship with Kristy. The State and the defense thereafter agreed this passage, relevant to Elmore's remorse argument, could come in through the testimony of Detective Gitts. [15] The redacted confession was ultimately admitted as exhibit 18 and played to the jury. The State and Elmore's counsel both referenced the taped confession and Detective Gitts' testimony in closing argument. After oral argument, the bailiff assembled the exhibits, including the tape and tape recorder, in the presence of the prosecutor and both defense attorneys and helped carry them to the jury room. [16] The jury replayed the tapes in the jury room. [17] After the verdict, Elmore moved for a new sentencing hearing on May 3, 1996, claiming that, unbeknownst to his attorneys, the jury was allowed unsupervised access to a recording device. The trial court denied Elmore's motion. We recently decided the case of State v. Castellanos, 132 Wash.2d 94, 935 P.2d 1353 (1997), which concerned the use of tape players by the jury. In Castellanos, we noted decisions regarding the admission of exhibits as evidence were within the sound discretion of the trial court and would not be disturbed on review absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Id. at 97, 935 P.2d 1353. An abuse of discretion occurs only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Id. Noting that under CrR 6.15(e) the jury shall take with it ... all exhibits received in evidence when it retires for deliberation, we held exhibits taken to the jury room generally may be used by the jury as it sees fit. Id. As Elmore argues here, the defendant in Castellanos contended the trial court's decision interfered with the fundamental guarantees associated with a jury trial, and unrestricted access to recordings during deliberations created a danger the jury would give undue emphasis to the tapes. Id. at 98, 935 P.2d 1353. We specifically rejected such argument, noting: in State v. Frazier, 99 Wash.2d 180, 188, 661 P.2d 126 (1983), this court held a tape recorded statement of the defendant and a properly authenticated transcript thereof may, within the sound discretion of the trial court, be admitted as exhibits and reviewed by the jury during its deliberations. At issue in Frazier was a tape recording of an oral statement the defendant had previously given the police. We stated such exhibits [may] go to the jury if, in the sound discretion of the trial court, the exhibits are found to bear directly on the charge and are not unduly prejudicial. Id. at 189[, 661 P.2d 126]. Id. We held the rule in Frazier remains a workable method for lower courts to deal with such issues. We also held the correct test for prejudice under this analysis was not undue influence, but whether such evidence is likely to stimulate an emotional response rather than a rational decision. Id. at 100, 935 P.2d 1353. In Castellanos, we noted allowing the tapes with a playback machine to go to the jury is consistent with the law in most other states. Id. at 100-01, 935 P.2d 1353 (citing with approval Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Wyo.1995) (defendant's tape-recorded confession a nontestimonial exhibit which the jury may review during deliberations)). Id. We found the trial court's decision to allow the jury unlimited access to the tapes with playback equipment was not an abuse of discretion: The fact the jury had unlimited access to the recordings and could play them at its whim does not prove it gave undue prominence to the exhibit. The playback machine allowed the jury to utilize the tapes as any other exhibit. Castellanos, 132 Wash.2d at 102, 935 P.2d 1353. [18] Castellanos essentially reiterated our holding in Frazier and the policy regarding jury use of exhibits articulated in CrR 6.15(e). To reiterate, a party seeking the admission of a nontestimonial exhibit must appropriately seek a ruling from the trial court on the admission of such an exhibit. Any objection to the exhibit's admission or its use by the trier of fact must be articulated at that time for a ruling by the trial court. However, once admitted into evidence, an exhibit may be used by the trier of fact in whatever fashion it chooses under CrR 6.15(e). In the present case, the tapes of Elmore's April 23rd confession (ex. 18) and his April 21st interview (ex. 13), both nontestimonial exhibits, were admitted into evidence by the trial court upon agreement of the parties. The jury was entitled to use these exhibits as it saw fit with the appropriate technical means to do so, i.e., a tape player. Otherwise, [w]ithholding the playback machine would be like admitting a written contract into evidence but denying jurors their eyeglasses necessary to read it. Castellanos, 132 Wash.2d at 102, 935 P.2d 1353. Even if there was error in the trial court's failure to make a specific ruling on the use of these exhibits at the time of their admission, any error was harmless. First, as in Castellanos, there is no indication here the content of the tapes caused such an emotional response in the jury as to overpower reason. [19] Likewise, the tapes were relevant to the jury's inquiry. As the trial court noted, the recording of Elmore's lengthy confession was essentially the case for both sides because it both described the crime and reflected Elmore's decision to come back and take responsibility. Hearing (5-3-96) at 25-26 (... this can hardly be said to be a piece of evidence which was small in comparison to the rest of the case and, therefore, susceptible to being overemphasized. Id. at 25). Moreover, the evidence of remorse present in that portion of the tape redacted from exhibit 18 (Elmore's taped confession) came into evidence through the testimony of Detective Gitts, as previously stipulated by the parties. Elmore could argue his theory of remorse to the jury from this testimony, other unredacted portions of his taped confession, [20] and the other evidence he presented at trial. Indeed, he did so. In closing argument, Elmore's attorney urged that Elmore's acceptance of responsibility and remorse were two powerful mitigating factors that the jury must consider. Elmore's attorney then reviewed the evidence presented, which showed Elmore felt remorse for Kristy's murder and accepted full responsibility without excuse. Some of this evidence included Elmore's voluntary return after fleeing to Oregon, turning himself in to the Bellingham Police, and providing a complete confession, all of which appear on the tape. Elmore's counsel emphasized the testimony of Lieutenant Sucee the officer to whom Elmore surrendered at the Bellingham Police Department, which described Elmore as visibly remorseful. Again, Elmore's attorney read into the record Detective Gitts' testimony regarding Elmore's description of his relationship with Kristy and the regrets Elmore expressed. Elmore's attorney further noted the testimony of a court commissioner and two judges describing Elmore's demeanor as dejected and Elmore's consistent desire at all stages of his case to plead guilty. Elmore was not denied an opportunity to argue his theory of the case to the jury. The jury simply found his position wanting in light of the total evidence before it. The jury's review of taped exhibits during deliberations was proper. CrR 6.15(e). [21] M. The Presence of Alternate Jurors in the Jury Room Prior to the Reading of the Verdict Did Not Constitute Prejudicial Error Elmore asserts prejudicial error occurred when alternate jurors were admitted into the jury room prior to the reading of the verdict, relying on State v. Cuzick, 85 Wash.2d 146, 530 P.2d 288 (1975). He asserts the presence of the alternate jurors immediately before verdict resulted in essentially unquantifiable error infecting the entire decision making process. Opening Br. of Appellant at 172. Cuzick, however, is distinguishable. In that case, we found the presence of an alternate juror in the jury room during deliberations invalidated the verdict because the presence of an outsider during deliberations violates the cardinal requirement that juries must deliberate in private. Cuzick, 85 Wash.2d at 149, 530 P.2d 288 (emphasis added). We stated: we adhere to those cases which hold that prejudice will be presumed to flow from a substantial intrusion of an unauthorized person into the jury room unless it affirmatively appears that there was not, and could not have been, any prejudice. Where, as here, the intrusion involves the visible presence of a nonjuror for the full length of deliberations, the presumption of prejudice clearly has not been so conclusively defeated. Id. at 150, 530 P.2d 288 (citations omitted). Central to our holding in Cuzick was the presence of an unauthorized person in the jury room during deliberations. That is simply not the case here. While alternate jurors were in the jury room prior to announcement of the verdict, it was only to line up and file in with the jury when court was reconvened to take the verdict. The record indicates the alternate jurors were not in the jury room during deliberations. The trial court excused the alternate jurors when the panel retired to the jury room to deliberate. After the jury reached its verdict, the alternate jurors were summoned from home by the bailiff to be present at the reading of the verdict and joined the jury while lining up to go into the courtroom. When questioned by the trial judge, [22] the Presiding Juror confirmed there was no discussion with alternates. Juror 1 noted the alternates did not know the jury's decision. The bailiff also affirmed the alternates arrived just prior to the jury's filing into the courtroom. The alternates were not present during deliberations and upon their arrival were not informed of the jury's verdict prior to its announcement in open court. As no unauthorized person was present in the jury room during deliberations, the error we discerned in Cuzick is not present here. The arrival of the alternates in the jury room as the panel lined up to go into the courtroom for the reading of the verdict could not possibly have influenced the jury's already completed deliberations. N. The Trial Court Lacks Authority to Conduct a Proportionality Review Elmore asserts his sentence must be reversed because the trial court erroneously believed it did not have the authority to engage in a proportionality review. Before the trial court, Elmore moved to strike the special sentencing proceeding on proportionality grounds, asserting [i]t makes little sense and wastes judicial resources to require a defendant to wait and see if a jury imposes death where that sentence would then be reversed on appeal on proportionality grounds. Clerk's Papers at 472. The trial court denied the motion. In his Opening Brief of Appellant on Conflict Issues at 7-9, Elmore argues while RCW 10.95.130(2) requires the Supreme Court to engage in a proportionality review, it does not prevent the trial court from engaging in such inquiry, urging such review for the sake of judicial economy. The plain language of RCW 10.95.130, however, is determinative of this issue. RCW 10.95.130(2) states: [w]ith regard to the sentence review required by this act, the supreme court of Washington shall determine: ... (emphasis added). Proportionality review is a special statutory proceeding that is conducted by this Court and this Court alone. RCW 10.95.100, .130(1). There is no statutory authority for a trial court to engage in a proportionality review, with the purpose of foregoing the special sentencing proceeding, as suggested by Elmore. Indeed, to do so would ignore the mandate of RCW 10.95.050 which requires that a special sentencing proceeding be held in cases where a defendant is adjudicated guilty of aggravated first-degree murder. Elmore's contention is meritless. O. Mandatory Statutory Review At the conclusion of the sentencing phase, the jury found the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt there were not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency for Elmore. We must now review Elmore's death sentence as required by RCW 10.95 to determine: (a) whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the affirmative finding by the jury that there were not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency; (b) whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant; (c) whether the sentence of death was brought about by passion or prejudice; and (d) whether the defendant was mentally retarded. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 550, 940 P.2d 546; [23] see also RCW 10.95.130(2)(a)(d). In connection with this mandatory statutory review, Elmore has attempted to supplement the record. The State moved to strike this new evidence for failing to comply with RAP 9.11. We grant the State's motion. Elmore states the Social History (Second Supplemental Clerk's Papers at 872-88) is offered for the limited purpose of addressing the mandatory review questions (i.e., presumably sufficiency and proportionality reviews) discussed in his Opening Brief of Appellant on Conflict Issues. But Elmore's brief references the Social History only in addressing his proportionality argument. In general, an appellate court is confined to evidence presented to the trial court. Erection Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 121 Wash.2d 513, 522, 852 P.2d 288 (1993); Casco Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 37 Wash.2d 777, 784-85, 226 P.2d 235 (1951). We take this opportunity to indicate this rule applies in capital cases. This rule affords the trier of fact the full opportunity to consider all admissible evidence. If the evidence Elmore now seeks to bring before us was mitigating, the jury should have had a chance to assess its significance. Cf. State v. Sagastegui, 135 Wash.2d 67, 954 P.2d 1311 (1998) (noting the absence of mitigating evidence does not preclude or inhibit review). In Sears v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 111 Wash.2d 636, 640, 762 P.2d 1141 (1988), we held new evidence may be accepted by an appellate court only if all six criteria of RAP 9.11(a) [24] are met. See also State v. Ziegler, 114 Wash.2d 533, 541, 789 P.2d 79 (1990) (same), and Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Council 28, AFL-CIO v. State, 99 Wash.2d 878, 884-85, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983) (same). However, while Sears and Council 28 state all six criteria of RAP 9.11(a) must be met, they also recognize such provisions may be waived to serve the ends of justice (RAP 1.2, 18.8). Sears, 111 Wash.2d at 640, 762 P.2d 1141; Council 28, 99 Wash.2d at 884-85, 665 P.2d 1337. Here, the ends of justice do not call for admission of the proffered Social History. A review of the record on appeal indicates the relevant information about Elmore contained in the Social History was actually presented at trial through the testimony of defense witness Michael Sparks. The proffered Social History, however, also contains much irrelevant information including: an account of the death of a neighbor child from a monkey bite where the child's Christian Scientist parents refused to seek medical aid; Elmore's twin brother's account of sexual contacts with older siblings; an older sister's account of her disappointing marriages to two alcoholic husbands; the twin brother's subsequent marriage to, and divorce from, the defendant's former wife; and a niece's account of sexual contact with the defendant's father. This additional information, although tragic, is not relevant to any issue in this case. As the events described do not involve Elmore, they do not bear on inquiries regarding mitigating circumstances or personal characteristics under proportionality review. Also, by containing only repetitious and irrelevant information, the Social History does not satisfy the RAP criteria for allowing additional information to be considered on review. See RAP 9.11(a)(1), (2), and (6). Likewise, for the same reasons, the ends of justice do not require our consideration of the Social History. Elmore argues the statutory framework for mandatory review (RCW 10.95.130) contemplates we must necessarily consider such evidence, and such evidence has been so considered in other cases (citing State v. Dodd, 120 Wash.2d 1, 25, 838 P.2d 86 (1992); State v. Benn, 120 Wash.2d 631, 689, 845 P.2d 289, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944, 114 S.Ct. 382, 126 L.Ed.2d 331 (1993); and Lord, 117 Wash.2d at 913, 822 P.2d 177. First, the Social History is not necessarily required in order for us to complete a proportionality review. In State v. Sagastegui, 135 Wash.2d at 87-90, 954 P.2d 1311, where no mitigating evidence was offered at trial, we rejected amici's argument that such absence precluded us from making a reasoned decision on the mandatory review issues. Rejecting amici's call for appointment of counsel to ferret out and present mitigating evidence not in the record, we held [t]he absence of mitigating evidence does not preclude or inhibit review. Id. at 90, 954 P.2d 1311. Nor do the cases cited by Elmore support his contention that we must consider the untimely offered Social History. In Benn and Lord, we considered relevant information about the defendant, gleaned from the record, and bearing directly on the personal characteristics phase of the proportionality review. See Benn, 120 Wash.2d at 689, 845 P.2d 289 (Court considered psychological experts' reports regarding defendant's manipulative tendencies); Lord, 117 Wash.2d at 912-13, 822 P.2d 177 (Court considered content of defendant's statement against interest as bearing on issue of pattern of violent behavior). Again, the relevant information about Elmore found in the Social History which bears on the personal characteristics issue also appears in the record; and the Social History's additional information regarding the hardships of other persons is irrelevant to any proportionality review inquiry. Nothing in Benn or Lord would require us to consider the proffered Social History, which contains repeated and/or irrelevant information. Likewise, Dodd does not advance Elmore's position. Like Sagastegui, Dodd offered no mitigating evidence at trial. As part of our substantial evidence review, we noted only that consideration of such alleged mitigating evidence by the jury would not have changed the verdict. See Dodd, 120 Wash.2d at 25, 838 P.2d 86. We did not, however, mention such evidence when conducting the personal characteristics inquiry. Id. at 27, 838 P.2d 86. In any event, Dodd is clearly distinguishable because the relevant information regarding Elmore appearing in the Social History was presented at trial as mitigating evidence. Its separate introduction here is superfluous. We grant the State's motion.
Elmore contends there was insufficient evidence to support a death verdict in light of the mitigating circumstances he offered at the hearing. In support of his argument, he directs us to the evidence of his good prison behavior, remorse, the fact that he turned himself in and pleaded guilty, his history as an abused child, and his lack of planning in carrying out the crime. In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence in a capital case, we determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support the jury's finding there were not sufficient circumstances meriting leniency. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 756, 940 P.2d 1239. The test is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found sufficient evidence to justify the jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 551, 940 P.2d 546. In applying this test, we do not duplicate the jury's role and reweigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors, but rather we consider the circumstances of the crime along with any mitigating factors and determine whether a rational jury could have concluded the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the circumstances of the crime. Dodd, 120 Wash.2d at 24-25, 838 P.2d 86; Rice, 110 Wash.2d at 623-25, 757 P.2d 889; State v. Hansen, 122 Wash.2d at 718, 862 P.2d 117 (State entitled to all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from evidence). The mere presence of mitigating circumstances does not require reversal if the jury is convinced the circumstances of the crime outweigh the proposed mitigating factors. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 553, 940 P.2d 546. Elmore's crime was particularly egregious. Elmore was entrusted to drive Kristy to school. After an argument with Kristy that morning, during which she again mentioned her prior molestation, Elmore, however, did not drop her off at school, but continued driving until he reached a remote location at Lake Samish. Until they reached the remote location, Kristy had no idea what her stepfather had planned for her. Elmore then pulled Kristy into the back of his van where he forcefully removed her clothes. Not strong enough to resist Elmore, Kristy pleaded with him not to do this again and cried as Elmore raped her. Elmore then beat Kristy in the face, choking her first with his hands, and then with her own belt. Kristy was still making noises, so Elmore jammed a long needle-like tool into her left ear and through her brain. Believing Kristy might still be alive, Elmore placed a garbage bag over her head and bludgeoned her skull repeatedly with a sledgehammer. After making sure Kristy was dead, Elmore dragged her body into the woods, draped a drop cloth over her and drove away. Searchers discovered Kristy's deteriorating body three days later. Elmore used his role as Kristy's stepfather to facilitate her molestation, rape and murder. His abuse of authority, his relationship with Kristy, her young age, and the brutality of the abuse and murder intensify the heinous nature of his crime. In an attempt to conceal his actions, Elmore also mislead police and lied to Kristy's mother. He then fled when he realized Kristy's body was about to be discovered. Elmore offered mitigating testimony from several judges and an investigator from the public defender's office. The judges described Elmore's dejected demeanor during court appearances and indicated Elmore appeared willing to plead guilty. Elmore had a difficult childhood; his parents argued constantly and his father had an alcohol problem and was not steadily employed. Elmore's father disciplined the children with a belt. Elmore dropped out of school in the 11th grade, joined the Army, and was discharged in 1972 after serving in Vietnam. The defense also argued Elmore's three felony convictions were insignificant because they would have washed-out under the SRA and did not constitute predicate strikes under the 3 strikes statute. The defense would characterize Elmore's criminal history as more of a mitigating factor rather than a consideration weighing against leniency. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Elmore did not merit leniency. Overcoming the setbacks of childhood and serving his country, while admirable, does not excuse or explain the heinous nature of the crime he committed. Nor does Elmore's assertion that his criminal history does not qualify as strikes or would washout under an irrelevant sentencing statute necessarily turn his criminal history into a mitigating factor. Likewise, a rational trier of fact could have interpreted Elmore's defeated appearance not as remorse or repentance, but rather as recognition he faced life imprisonment or death because of his crime. The fact that Elmore pleaded guilty does not necessitate a verdict of life imprisonment. Cf. Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Dodd, No. 89-1-01134-4 (Clark County Super. Ct. July 26, 1990). A rational jury could well have discounted Elmore's mitigating evidence in light of the exceptionally brutal nature of his crime. As the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Elmore did not deserve leniency, the requirements of RCW 10.95.130(2)(a) are met.
RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) mandates we must undertake a proportionality review in every capital case to determine: Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. For the purposes of this subsection, similar cases means cases reported in the Washington Reports or Washington Appellate Reports since January 1, 1965, in which the judge or jury considered the imposition of capital punishment regardless of whether it was imposed or executed, and cases in which reports have been filed with the supreme court under RCW 10.95.120[.] The purpose of proportionality review is to discourage random arbitrariness and imposition of the death sentence in a racially discriminatory manner. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 555, 940 P.2d 546; see also Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 655, 888 P.2d 1105. In meeting this purpose, we consider both the crime and the defendant in light of other similar cases to determine whether death was imposed  generally in similar cases, and not imposed wantonly and freakishly. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 555, 940 P.2d 546. After several modifications of proportionality review, [25] and recognizing mathematical precision is unworkable and unnecessary, Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 555, 940 P.2d 546, we have established a four-part test in analyzing the crime and the defendant in relation to similar cases. The four factors include: (1) the nature of the crime, (2) the aggravating circumstances, (3) the defendant's criminal history and (4) the defendant's personal history. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 555-56, 940 P.2d 546. Contrary to Elmore's assertions, a statistical approach is not required. If the facts of Elmore's case are similar to some of the facts taken from cases in which the death penalty was upheld, the proportionality review is satisfied. See Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 556-60, 940 P.2d 546. As we noted in Dodd: The concept of proportionality does not require precise uniformity between cases. Precise uniformity is not possible because the brutal and extreme [crimes] with which we deal in death penalty cases, are unique and cannot be matched up like so many points on a graph. Instead, the court looks for overlapping similarities and common resemblances between cases. Dodd, 120 Wash.2d at 26, 838 P.2d 86 (citations omitted). Accord Lord, 117 Wash.2d at 910-11, 822 P.2d 177. a. Nature of the Crime Elmore brutally raped and tortured his stepdaughter. Comparing the facts of this case with similar cases reveals that Elmore's crime is at least as vicious as other cases in which the death penalty was imposed. See, e.g., Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Rupe, No. 81-1-00316-1 (Thurston County Super. Ct. June 7, 1983) (single gunshot wound to the head, no torture); Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Benn, No. 88-1-01280-8 (Pierce County Super. Ct. June 12, 1990) (gunshot wounds to front of trunk and back of head, no torture); Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Harris, No. 84-1-01190-6 (Pierce County Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 1985) (gunshot wounds to head and neck, no torture, contract killing); Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Gentry, No. 88-1-00395-3 (Kitsap County Super. Ct. July 22, 1991) (victim chased through woods, sexually assaulted and bludgeoned to death); Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Lord, No. 86-1-00470-8 (Kitsap County Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1987) (defendant took female to his house where he knocked her unconscious, raped her, and then beat her to death with a hammer). See also Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 557 n. 56, 940 P.2d 546. b. Aggravating Circumstances While a single aggravator will support the death penalty, Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 558, 940 P.2d 546, Elmore's crime involved two aggravating circumstances, each of which supported an enhanced penalty. A sentence of death in this case is certainly not disproportionate when compared to other cases where a verdict of death was supported by only one aggravating factor. See Report of the Trial Judge, Gentry, Benn, Harris (each finding death penalty not disproportionate based on single aggravating factor); see also Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Jeffries, No. 6488 (Clallam County Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1983) (death penalty upheld where there were two aggravating factors). c. Defendant's Criminal History Elmore's criminal history includes a 1973 conviction for first degree forgery, a 1976 conviction for burglary, and a 1977 conviction for grand larceny. Contrary to Elmore's contention, these are not all minor property crimes. Opening Br. of Appellant on Conflict Issues at 15. Moreover, burglary is viewed as a crime of violence. See RCW 9.41.010(11)(a); WPIC 133.51. The death penalty has been imposed in cases where the defendant had little to no criminal history. See Report of the Trial Judge, Rupe (no criminal history, no torture); Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Mak, No. 83-1-00504-0 (King County Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 1983) (no history); Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Bartholomew, No. 81-1-00579-1 (Pierce County Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 1981) (nonviolent theft, trespass, possession of stolen property, no physical torture of victim); Report of the Trial Judge, State v. Rice, No. 85-1-01004-0 (King County Super. Ct. July 21, 1986) (nonviolent history of lewd conduct and grand theft auto); Report of the Trial Court, Benn (nonviolent thefts, grand larceny and numerous misdemeanors). Elmore's death sentence is not disproportionate when compared to the nonviolent nature of Benn's, Bartholomew's, and Rice's criminal pasts, and the complete nonexistence of criminal history in Rupe and Mak. See also Dodd, 120 Wash.2d at 27, 838 P.2d 86 (Lack of criminal history, alone, however, does not render a sentence disproportionate.). d. Defendant's Personal History Elmore's personal history does not excuse his crime. The role of mitigation evidence is to reduce culpability for a crime that has already been proved. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 688, 904 P.2d 245. Elmore offered mitigating evidence that his alcoholic father hit him with a belt and was generally abusive. Although commonly asserted, a history of abuse as a child seldom affects the outcome of aggravated first-degree murder cases. Id.; Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 559, 940 P.2d 546. See also Rice, 110 Wash.2d at 592-96, 757 P.2d 889 (deep personality disorder but no organic brain dysfunction, death penalty upheld). Thus, we have previously affirmed a verdict of death in cases where the facts are less brutal and include fewer aggravating factors, where the defendant had no criminal history, and where more mitigating factors existed. Given the very clear parallels to Gentry and Lord, we cannot say Elmore's death sentence shocks the conscience of this Court. Elmore's death sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate to other cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. The requirements of RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) are met. [26]
Regarding our final two inquiries required by RCW 10.95.130(2), Elmore does not argue that the jury's verdict was the result of passion or prejudice. RCW 10.95.130(2)(c). Indeed, nothing in the record would support such an assertion. As to the final inquiry of whether the defendant was mentally retarded, RCW 10.95.130(2)(d), mental disability was never an issue in this case and Elmore never claimed it was. In fact, during Elmore's July 6, 1995 guilty plea hearing, Elmore's attorney assured the court Elmore was mentally competent. [27]