Opinion ID: 1677390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Amendment Issue

Text: Boros argues that the trial court erred in refusing him leave to amend his complaint on the day of trial to add counts alleging involuntary servitude and consumer fraud. The defendants argue that Boros had had five years to amend his complaint, and that he failed to explain to the trial court the pertinence and applicability of the additional counts. The applicable version of Rule 15(a), Ala. R.Civ.P. [4] , reads: A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 30 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading without leave of court but subject to disallowance on the court's own motion or motion to strike of an adverse party; but such amendments shall be freely allowed when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be longer, unless the court otherwise orders. Although Rule 15(a) itself calls for liberal amendment, this Court has held consistently that the grant or denial of leave to amend is a matter that is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Schoen v. Styron, 480 So.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Ala.1985); Ex parte Reynolds, 436 So.2d 873 (Ala.1983). Further, this Court has stated: Rule 15, [Ala.R.Civ.P.], is not carte blanche authority to amend a complaint at any time. Discretion rests in the trial judge to deny amendments for good cause. `[I]f the court determines ... that a party has had sufficient opportunity to state a claim or revise his answer to a complaint but has failed to do so, leave to amend may properly be denied.' Ex parte Tidmore, 418 So.2d 866 (Ala. 1982) (quoting Stallings v. Angelica Uniform Co., 388 So.2d 942, 946-47 (Ala.1980)). (Citations omitted.) We conclude that Boros had had ample opportunity to amend his complaint before the day of trial. Clearly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in disallowing Boros's requested amendment here. We pretermit any discussion of Boros's new trial issue because it is merely repetitive of the directed verdict issue. Also, we pretermit discussion of the expert witness issue because we find it meritless factually. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's judgment entered on the directed verdict for the defendants. AFFIRMED. HORNSBY, C.J., and SHORES, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.