Opinion ID: 715791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Step 3--Was the Extent of Departure Reasonable?

Text: 31 Finally, we must determine whether the extent of the district court's departure--four levels for four additional offenses--was reasonable. 15 We review the court's determination for abuse of discretion. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098. We find it useful to begin our discussion with a simple mathematical analysis. Had the district court considered only one victim, MacLeod's total offense level would have been 24 and his guideline range would have been 77 to 96 months rather than 121 to 151 months (the range applicable after the five level increase of section 3D1.4). Thus, the first five additional victims raised MacLeod's term of imprisonment by fifty-five months (151 minus ninety-six). The average increment per additional offense was eleven months (fifty-five divided by five). When the district court departed an additional four levels for the four uncounted victims, MacLeod's guideline range became 188 to 235 months. Thus, these four victims raised MacLeod's sentence eighty-four months (235 minus 151) or twenty-one months per victim (eighty-four divided by four). 32 In evaluating the reasonableness of the district court's departure, we seek guidance from the guidelines themselves. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1111 (Recognizing the need for additional standards, the courts of appeals have recently begun to look to the guidelines themselves for guidance in determining the reasonableness of a departure. Today we endorse that general approach.) (citations omitted). When departing from a sentencing range, courts should remain faithful to structured guideline principles and attempt, where possible, to create sentences analogous to those explicitly specified by the guidelines for similar offenses. We note that at higher sentencing ranges, where MacLeod's sentence falls, an increase of one level generally makes a quite large and continually increasing amount of jail time. Thus, we must consider with extreme care the district court's decision to depart four levels. 33 MacLeod's offense involved Chapter 3, Part D of the sentencing guidelines. The introductory commentary to that part indicates that its aim is provide incremental punishment for significant additional criminal conduct. USSG Ch. 3, Pt. D, intro. comment. However, the amount of additional punishment [is to] decline [ ] as the number of offenses increases. Id. (emphasis added). The district court's departure is at odds with this principle of declining marginal punishment. MacLeod's first five additional offenses carried an average of eleven additional months imprisonment. Given the district court's departure, MacLeod's final four offenses carried an average of twenty-one additional months imprisonment. Thus, contrary to the commentary to Section 3, Part D, as the number of MacLeod's offenses increased, so did his additional punishment. 34 An examination of the guideline sections pertaining to both theft and fraud also suggest that the extent of the district court's departure was problematic. These sections are a good source of comparison because they permit, without departure, an offense to be increased beyond five levels (the limit imposed for grouping increments in § 3D1.4). Especially as one gets beyond an increase of five offense levels, each one level increase requires a growing amount of harm. For instance under USSG § 2B1.1, the guideline involving theft, embezzlement and receipt of stolen property, raising a five level increase to a six level increase requires $10,000 more loss. Raising a six level increase to a seven level increase requires $20,000 more loss. Raising a nine level increase to a ten level increase requires $80,000 more loss. At the extreme, raising a nineteen level increase to a twenty level increase requires $40,000,000 more loss. USSG § 2F1.1, the guideline for fraud and deceit, forgery, and counterfeiting, follows a similar pattern. Yet, in the instant case, each level of the district court's four level departure was based on the same amount of harm--the exploitation of one child. Analogy to USSG §§ 2B1.1, 2F1.1 suggests that this is unreasonable. 35 The three court of appeals cases in this area support our decision. In the two cases that found a departure reasonable, the departure was significantly lower than it is here. In United States v. Okane, 52 F.3d 828 (10th Cir.1995), the court upheld a departure of one level for five additional bank robberies. The court wrote: 36 We find the district court's proffered reason for departing, which was Mr. Okane's additional pleas of guilty to five other robbery charges, is legally sufficient to warrant a one level upward departure.... 37 While the Guidelines' overarching purpose of achieving uniformity and proportionality in sentencing is a countervailing concern in this calculus, the Guidelines do contemplate some sentencing disparities in cases where the circumstances justify it. The Guidelines do not prohibit any sentencing disparity; they prohibit unwarranted sentencing disparities. In this case, the offenses in question are undoubtedly serious and we find they warrant a one-level departure. 38 Id. at 833 (citations omitted). Thus, in Okane, the court found reasonable a much smaller departure than the one here at issue. 39 In United States v. Chase, 894 F.2d 488, 491-92 (1st Cir.1990), the First Circuit affirmed a departure of approximately fifty months for nine additional bank robberies. Dividing fifty months by nine robberies indicates that the average additional imprisonment time for each robbery was approximately five and one-half months. As this was roughly equivalent to the additional punishment, under the guidelines, for each of the first five additional offenses, the court upheld the departure. Id. In the case at bar, the district court departed eighty-four months for four additional offenses. This resulted in an average of twenty-one additional months imprisonment per offense. In contrast to the departure found reasonable by the Chase court, this is approximately double the average punishment for the first five additional victims (eleven months). 40 In the one case that found the district court's departure unreasonable--United States v. Pearson, 911 F.2d 186, 190 (9th Cir.1990)--the district court's departure, approximately fifty-seven months for two offenses (or twenty-eight and one-half months per offense), id. at 187, closely approximates the district court's departure here. The Ninth Circuit had little difficulty in concluding that the district court's six level departure was unreasonable and that a one level departure would be appropriate instead. Id. at 190-91. 41 We appreciate the district court's dilemma here. With no previous guidance from this Court, it was obliged to sentence truly repugnant criminal behavior. Its decision to depart was certainly appropriate. However, for the reasons set forth above, the extent of its departure is inconsistent with the exercise of sound discretion. 42 The commentary to Chapter 3, Part D indicates that the amount of additional punishment should decline as the number of offenses increases. See USSG Ch.3, Pt.D, intro. comment. Thus, the average punishment for the four additional offenses should be somewhat less than eleven months (the average punishment for the first five additional offenses). An appropriate departure, therefore, should be no more than two levels. Under such a departure, MacLeod's new sentencing range would be 151-188 months. A sentence at the upper-end of that range would be a thirty-seven month increase from the original 121 to 151 month guideline (188 minus 151). Dividing thirty-seven by four indicates an addition of approximately nine months imprisonment per offense. A departure of greater magnitude is unreasonable. 16 The judgment of the district court will therefore be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.