Opinion ID: 2453721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Standard of Review/Preemption Doctrine Generally

Text: Preemption is a question of law over which this court exercises de novo review. Zimmerman v. Board of Wabaunsee County Comm'rs, 289 Kan. 926, 974, 218 P.3d 400 (2009); Steffes v. City of Lawrence, 284 Kan. 380, 385, 160 P.3d 843 (2007). The doctrine of federal preemption is founded in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. U.S. Const. art. VI, paragraph 2. Simply put, the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law. Application of this well-recognized interpretation of the Supremacy Clause has led to recognition that federal law may supersede state law in several different ways, and in turn this recognition has led to the use of several analytical categories. See Doty v. Frontier Communications, Inc., 272 Kan. 880, 889, 36 P.3d 250 (2001). Broadly speaking, a preemption analysis divides into two principal categories: express and implied preemption. Implied preemption is further divided into two analytical subcategories: field preemption and conflict preemption. Then, yet a third strata of analytical subcategories is used when examining claims of conflict preemption: per se conflict and obstacle preemption. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985); see Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (referring to both field and conflict categories as implied preemption); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (same). Even though it is analytically helpful to consider the relationship of these categories, it must be remembered that these analytical categories are not rigidly distinct. English, 496 U.S. at 79 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 2270. For example, field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress' intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation. English, 496 U.S. at 79 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 2270. In this case, both parties cite to our decision in Doty, in which we enumerated and summarized the categories of implied preemption, noting the doctrine applied to situations [1]where there is an actual conflict between federal and state law; [2] where compliance with both federal and state law is, in effect, physically impossible; [3] where Congress has occupied the entire field of regulation and leaves no room for states to supplement federal law; or [4] when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress. Doty, 272 Kan. 880, Syl. ¶ 4, 36 P.3d 250. With this analytical framework in mind, we will consider Kanza's preemption arguments.