Opinion ID: 6500514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of the Maxwells’ Severance

Text: Motion39 Separately, the Maxwells assert that they are entitled to a new trial because the District Court abused its discretion in denying their motion to sever their trials from that of Scarfo and Pelullo. They say that the introduction of evidence of Scarfo’s and Pelullo’s connections to organized crime created spillover prejudice because the Maxwells were not part of the mob but were nonetheless effectively grouped in with it. Once more, we are unpersuaded. In assessing the Maxwells’ request for severance, the District Court observed that a “fundamental princip[le]” of federal criminal law is the “preference for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together.” (D.I. 297 at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 775 (3d Cir. 2005)).) Noting that the preference “is particularly strong in cases involving multiple defendants 39 “[D]enial of severance is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge[.]” United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991). 62 charged under a single conspiracy” (D.I. 297 at 17 (citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1094 (3d Cir. 1996))), the Court held that the Maxwells did not meet the heavy burden of demonstrating the need for severance based on a risk of spillover prejudice.40 It also promised to instruct the jury on “the limited admissibility of certain evidence” about Scarfo’s and Pelullo’s ties to organized crime. (D.I. 297 at 27.) “A defendant seeking a new trial due to the denial of a severance motion must show that the joint trial led to ‘clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial[,]’” a demanding standard that requires more than “[m]ere allegations of prejudice[.]” United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 2014) (first quoting Urban, 404 F.3d at 775; and then quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 1981)). The Maxwells “are ‘not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.’” Id. (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540). In making the initial determination of whether to grant severance, the “critical issue” before a district court is “not whether the evidence against a co-defendant is more damaging but rather whether the jury will be able to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defendants in view of its 40 Other defendants – Gary McCarthy, Howard Drossner, David Adler, Donald Manno, William Handley, and John Parisi – sought severance, many of them for the same reasons, and the Court rejected their arguments as well. 63 volume and limited admissibility.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Maxwells fail to show that any claimed spillover prejudice from the organized crime evidence concerning Scarfo and Pelullo was clear and substantial and, instead, make “mere allegations of prejudice” that are insufficient to clear the high bar for severance. Id. (citation omitted). In United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1991), which involved a RICO prosecution of Scarfo’s father’s criminal enterprise, we rejected the same sort of spillover prejudice argument. We concluded that because “all appellants were charged with the same conspiracy to participate in the same Scarfo enterprise, the public interest in judicial economy favored joinder.” Id. at 568. The Maxwells’ argument based on prejudice from their codefendants’ mob ties is even less compelling than that of the Eufrasio defendants because, here, the District Court repeatedly gave limiting instructions that “[t]here is no evidence and the government does not allege that any defendants[,] other than Scarfo and Pelullo[,] were associates [in] any organized crime organization.” (JAC at 712, 1751.) The Maxwells’ only response is that the jury may not have followed these instructions. But, as discussed earlier, we presume that the jury follows instructions, which “often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. There is no reason to believe otherwise in this case. Indeed, the acquittal of other defendants indicates just the contrary. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the jury could “compartmentalize the evidence” as it related to the Maxwells, John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d at 197 64 (citation omitted), and, consequently, severance was not warranted.