Opinion ID: 2639471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Emotional Disturbance as a Mitigating Factor

Text: Defendant claims that Penal Code section 190.3, factor (d), by asking the penalty jury to consider whether defendant acted under extreme mental or emotional disturbance during the commission of the offense, unduly limited the kinds of evidence admissible at the penalty phase. This contention is without merit. We have repeatedly rejected challenges to the word extreme in section 190.3, factor (d). (See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 885, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1 ( Burgener ); People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 522-523, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521; People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 190, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 359, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) Because Penal Code section 190.3, factor (k) of the 1978 death penalty law permitted the jury to look to any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, it therefore allows consideration of any mental or emotional condition, even if it is not extreme. ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 163, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561.)