Opinion ID: 853462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inherent Authority to Dismiss

Text: Sivels asserts, as he did in the hearing on the motion to dismiss, that the trial court had the inherent authority to take up [his] Motion to Dismiss the Information and rule favorably thereon. (Appellant's Br. at 24.) He supports this contention by citing Hawkins v. State, 125 Ind. 570, 573, 25 N.E. 818, 819 (1890), in which we said, When a court is created by the legislature under the constitution, all the powers essential to the existence of the tribunal, and the due exercise of its powers, at once vest in it from the constitution. . . . This power . . . is an inherent one, and exists independently of statute. In addition to a court's inherent power, Sivels claims refuge in the federal Constitution's Due Process Clause [2] and the Indiana Constitution's Due Course of Law Clause. [3] He maintains that the clauses are interchangeable for purposes of legal analysis. (Appellant's Br. at 24, citing White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 908 n. 4 (Ind. 1986)(referring to a substantial line of cases treating the Due Process Clause and the Due Course Clause as interchangeable).) The State responds by indicating that these federal and state provisions are analogous only in a civil law context. [4] (Appellee's Br. at 4.) The State relies on the declaration in McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 975-76 (Ind.2000): By its terms, [the Due Course of Law] provision applies only in the civil context. It omits any reference to deprivation of `life, liberty, or property,' which is the trigger of due process requirements in the criminal context. The State, therefore, urges that no authority exists for a trial court to step into the shoes of the prosecutor and dismiss an indictment following a hung jury. . . . (Appellee's Br. at 5.) It also asserts that such authority has not been recognized by the highest courts of either the federal judiciary or our appellate judiciary. (Id.) Finally, the State suggests that there is no need to create this authority under the guise of due process because defendants are adequately protected against excessive prosecutions by the Double Jeopardy Clause. (Id.) [5] At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that it ha[d] inherent jurisdiction to limit prosecutions, because at some point it gets to be unreasonable. (R. at S12.) We agree. A survey of courts in several jurisdictions provides strong support for the proposition that a trial court has inherent authority to dismiss an information or indictment with prejudice where multiple mistrials caused by hung juries infringed on the defendant's right to fundamental fairness. In State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418, 493 A.2d 513, 515-16 (1985), the Supreme Court of New Jersey was confronted with a defendant who faced a third trial after two prior mistrials due to deadlocked juries. The court stated, [P]recepts of fundamental fairness, together with the judiciary's need to create appropriate and just remedies, and its general responsibility to assure the overall efficient administration of the criminal justice system, confirm an inherent power in a trial court to dismiss an indictment with prejudice following general mistrials attributable to repeated jury deadlocks. Id. at 517. In State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 647 P.2d 705, 708 (1982), the defendant also experienced two hung jury mistrials. The Supreme Court of Hawaii indicated, trial courts have the power to dismiss . . . an indictment with prejudice and over objection of the prosecuting attorney. Id. at 711. The court clarified that the trial court's authority is limited [w]ithin the bounds of duly exercised discretion. . . . Id. The Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed a case involving a defendant whose first three murder trials resulted in hung juries. State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.1978). The court stated, [T]rial judges have the inherent authority to terminate a prosecution in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, where . . . repeated trials, free of prejudicial error, have resulted in genuinely deadlocked juries and where it appears that at future trials substantially the same evidence will be presented and that the probability of continued hung juries is great. Id. at 917. In People v. Thompson, 424 Mich. 118, 379 N.W.2d 49 (1985), a defendant was convicted of armed robbery and felony murder. The conviction was reversed and the case retried. A mistrial was declared due to a hung jury and upon retrial the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan stated, [T]here may be cases in which repeated retrials after repeated jury deadlock might be so fundamentally unfair as to violate the due process guaranteed by [the state or federal constitutions]. . . . Id. at 55. [6] In State v. Sauve, 164 Vt. 134, 666 A.2d 1164, 1165 (1995), the State appealed the district court's dismissal of an information that was amended after a mistrial. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the decision and stated, In reaching its determination regarding dismissal of a case following one or more hung juries, the trial court must generally defer to the prosecutor's decision to retry the case, but if fundamental fairness compels dismissal, the court is authorized to do so. Id. at 1166. While different jurisdictions refer to different sources of the trial court's authority to dismiss after multiple mistrials, the majority of the appellate courts rely on precepts of fundamental fairness and notions of fair play and substantial justice. [7] We agree with the many jurisdictions that hold trial courts have inherent power to dismiss an information with prejudice following mistrials attributable to repeated jury deadlocks, where necessary to uphold guarantees of fundamental fairness and substantial justice.