Opinion ID: 3010281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ripeness, standing and equitable relief

Text: As an initial matter, the Government disputes whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution requires an actual controversy for a federal court to have jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The Government argues no justiciable controversy exists because Pic-A-State has never been threatened with prosecution under amended § 1301. It asserts the controversy is not ripe, Pic-A- State lacks standing, and Pic-A-State is not entitled to equitable relief.0 We will examine each of these contentions in turn.
In Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977), and Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983), the Supreme 0 The concepts of standing and ripeness require related but distinct inquiries. The ripeness doctrine is often confused with the standing doctrine. Whereas ripeness is concerned with when an action may be brought, standing focuses on who may bring a ripe action. Although these doctrines are analytically distinct, both have evolved from Article III's case or controversy requirement. Armstrong World Indus. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 411 n.13 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 7 Court held that ripeness turns on the fitness of the issue for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. For declaratory judgments, we have refined this test because declaratory judgments are typically sought before a completed injury has occurred. In determining whether to engage in pre-enforcement review of a statute in a declaratory judgment action, we look, among other factors, to (1) the adversity of the parties' interests, (2) the conclusiveness of the judgment, and (3) the utility of the judgment. Freehold Cogeneration Assocs. v. Bd. Reg. Comm'rs, 44 F.3d 1178, 1188 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 68 (1995); Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990). After considering these factors, we believe this case presents a controversy ripe for resolution.
For there to be an actual controversy the defendant must be so situated that the parties have adverse legal interests. Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 648 (quoting 10A Charles Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2757, at 582-83 (2d ed. 1983)). Although Pic-A-State has not been prosecuted under the Interstate Wagering Amendment, the impact of the Amendment is sufficiently direct and immediate to create an adversity of interest between Pic-A-State and the Government. Not only has Pic-A-State terminated its business and suffered economic loss in response to the passage of the Amendment, but any further attempt to pursue its line of business 8 would risk serious criminal penalties.0 Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution, and where a regulation requires immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs' conduct of their affairs with serious penalties attached to noncompliance, access to the courts . . . under the Declaratory Judgment Act must be permitted, absent a statutory bar or some other unusual circumstances. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 153.0 0 At oral argument, the Government suggested that review of the Interstate Wagering Amendment was inappropriate because the federal government was unlikely to prosecute Pic-A-State. Even if Pic-A-State were to resume its business, the Government asserted, any prosecution would be brought by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under Act 8 of 1993. Although a prosecution by state authorities would raise serious prudential concerns that might call for our abstention, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), we need not address this eventuality now. Furthermore, whether Pennsylvania has threatened to prosecute Pic-A-State is irrelevant to a possible federal prosecution under the amended 18 U.S.C. § 1301. The Government's argument would also place Pic-A-State in an untenable position. The district court found Act 8 to be unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause in Pic-A-State Pa. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 93-0814 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 1993). We reversed because the intervening passage of the Interstate Wagering Amendment made Act 8 consistent with federal law. Pic-A-State I, 42 F.3d 175, 178-80 (3d Cir. 1994). If the Interstate Wagering Amendment is unconstitutional, our decision in Pic-A-State I is of doubtful vitality and prosecution of Pic- A-State by Pennsylvania under Act 8 of 1993 would be suspect on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. Thus, regardless of whether Pic-A-State is prosecuted by state or federal authorities, the central issue in this case is the constitutionality of the Interstate Wagering Amendment. Yet the Government seeks to bar adjudication of this issue at this time. 0 Pic-A-State argues that under Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979), and Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), it is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459. While this statement is undoubtedly true, we note both Babbitt and Steffel 9 Moreover, courts have found sufficient adversity between parties to create a justiciable controversy when suit is brought by the only plaintiff subject to regulation by an enactment. See, e.g., Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1982) (as the Act has only one conceivable target . . . it is extremely unlikely that the state would overlook the violation, and the controversy is therefore ripe), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Entertainment Concepts, III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981). In introducing the Interstate Wagering Amendment, its sponsors were motivated by the desire to halt the operations of Pic-A-State specifically. See 139 Cong. Rec. S15247. Its chief sponsor mentioned the district court's decision in Pic-A-State Pa. v. Pennsylvania, No. 93-0814 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 1993), and explained the Amendment would close the loophole in the statute that allowed Pic-A-State to run its business. Id. Under these circumstances, we believe the likelihood of prosecution under the Interstate Wagering Amendment is so strong that a justiciable issue is presented.0 We also note that the involved challenges to statutes that criminalized the exercise of First Amendment rights. Pic-A-State's claim does not involve these rights, and so we do not rely on Babbitt or Steffel in finding adversity between the parties. 0 Moreover, as a policy matter, strong reasons counsel against requiring Pic-A-State to engage in illegal conduct before its challenge can be heard. Fear that courts may find the statute valid will deter many from risking violation; defense of criminal proceedings on constitutional grounds simply is not an 10 Government, although it has stated that a federal prosecution is unlikely, has not expressly disavowed an intent to prosecute. See Presbytery of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1463-68 (3d Cir. 1994) (failure of state to disavow intent to prosecute sufficient to create adversity between the parties); Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 1990) (no adversity where state gives express assurance that there will be no enforcement).
We next examine whether the issue raised here is based on a `real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be on a hypothetical state of facts.' Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937)) (emphasis added). Where the question presented is predominantly legal, a factual record is not as important as in fact-sensitive inquiries. Compare Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. at 201 (question adequate remedy. In addition to this practical fact, more abstract principles suggest that a citizen should not be required to sacrifice his wish to conform to valid social prescriptions in order to test his belief of invalidity; citizens should be allowed to prefer official adjudication to private disobedience. 13A Charles Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532.5, at 183-84 (2d Ed. 1984). 11 of federal preemption is predominantly legal and need not await development of factual record); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 149 (declaratory judgment challenge to regulations presented purely legal issues fit for resolution even before prosecution instituted); with Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 294-95 (1981) (actual factual setting is particularly important in cases raising allegations of an unconstitutional taking of private property.). Because Pic-A- State brings a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Interstate Wagering Amendment, further development of the factual record by the prosecution of Pic-A-State would not inform our legal analysis. Both parties have approached this case as one presenting the purely legal question of the scope of Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. The Government has made no attempt to justify the Interstate Wagering Amendment in factual terms. Accordingly, we believe the legal issues presented may be conclusively resolved even before the prosecution of Pic-A-State.
Finally, we focus on the utility of the present resolution of this dispute. We consider whether the parties' plans of action are likely to be affected by a declaratory judgment. Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 n.9. Unlike our cases in which we have concluded that a judgment would not have a significant effect, see Armstrong World Indus. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 423-24 (3d Cir. 1992); Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649-50, we believe resolution of this case will materially affect the 12 parties. Pic-A-State has abandoned its line of business because of the passage of the Interstate Wagering Amendment. Were the Amendment to be declared unconstitutional, Pic-A-State would promptly resume its activities. Accordingly, we believe this case is ripe at this time.
The Government also attacks Pic-A-State's standing to bring this suit, asserting no harm is imminent because no prosecution is pending. As the Supreme Court has stated, there is no question in the present case that petitioners have sufficient standing as plaintiffs: the regulation is directed at them in particular; it requires them to make significant changes in their everyday business practices; if they fail to observe the . . . rule they are quite clearly exposed to the imposition of strong sanctions. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 154. Accordingly, we find no merit in the Government's argument.
Finally the Government asserts equitable injunctive relief is unavailable because Pic-A-State is threatened with no immediate harm. The Government relies on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the line of cases that holds federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941). Here there is no state prosecution, a federal statute is at issue, and there are no grounds for federal courts to abstain from hearing the challenge. Therefore, we will reach the merits. 13