Opinion ID: 1697961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidentiary Hearing on the Brady/Giglio Claims

Text: Nixon next claims the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his claims that the prosecutor withheld certain exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). He also alleges he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the State knowingly used false or misleading evidence in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Generally, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the postconviction motion or any particular claim in the motion is legally insufficient or the allegations in the motion are conclusively refuted by the record. See Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.2000). In order to support summary denial, the trial court must either state its rationale in the order denying relief or attach portions of the record that would refute the claims. See Anderson v. State, 627 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Fla.1993). Additionally, where no evidentiary hearing has been held, an appellate court must accept the defendant's factual allegations as true to the extent that such allegations are not refuted by the record. See Peede v. State, 748 So.2d 253, 257 (Fla.1999). The burden is on the defendant to establish a legally sufficient claim. See Freeman, 761 So.2d at 1061. Based on these principles, we affirm the trial court's summary denial of these claims because the evidence was not material and the State did not use false or misleading evidence. [8] In order to demonstrate a Brady violation, the defendant must establish that the State suppressed material evidence that was favorable to the accused (i.e., the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching) and that he was prejudiced by the State's suppression. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). If it is demonstrated that material evidence was suppressed, the next inquiry must be whether the favorable evidence would put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the outcome. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1041 (Fla. 2000). In this case, even assuming that the State withheld evidence, this Court's first inquiry must be whether that evidence was material. As the Supreme Court said in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish `materiality' in the constitutional sense. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Nixon argues the State withheld information that Lamar Nixon, the defendant's uncle, said he saw the defendant in another town around the time of the murder. He also claims the State withheld information that John Nixon and Wanda Robinson, two witnesses who testified for the State, received money from the sheriff's office for their testimony, that John Nixon received favorable treatment on his case, [9] that John Nixon was threatened with an outstanding arrest warrant, and that John Nixon was an informant for the State. [10] We accept these allegations as true but find that this evidence does not meet the test of materiality set forth in Bagley and its progeny. We further find that there is no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different; in other words, our confidence in the outcome of the trial has not been undermined. Although Lamar Nixon stated the defendant was in another town near the time of the murder, this statement is contradicted by the other evidence in this case, including the defendant's confession to three persons and the physical evidencethe defendant's hand print was found on the victim's car. The defendant was also seen driving the victim's car on the day of the murder. In addition, another witness at the trial, Wanda Robinson, testified that Lamar Nixon was with her at the time he claims to have seen the defendant in Woodville. Several other witnesses placed the defendant with the victim near a mall in Tallahassee at the same time. Despite the fact that John Nixon indicated in an affidavit executed in 1993, some eight years after Joe Nixon's trial, that he and Wanda Robinson received money from the sheriff's office for their testimony, in 1984 both he and Robinson stated they had not received anything in exchange for their testimony. They further indicated there had been no threats or coercion on the part of the State to elicit their testimony. Moreover, given the evidence that was introduced connecting the defendant to this murder, there is no reasonable probability that this impeachment evidence would have resulted in a different verdict. The trial court did not err in summarily denying Nixon's claims based on Brady and Giglio.