Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discussion of Faretta Motion

Text: The trial court also properly denied defendant's various requests to represent himself. The right to eschew a professional legal advocate and represent oneself in a criminal trial, first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the seminal case of Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, is one aspect of the constitutional right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution ( People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335), and the erroneous denial of this right is reversible per se ( McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 177, fn. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122; People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 527, 65 P.3d 1286). The right, however, is not absolute. To invoke the constitutional right to self-representation, a criminal defendant must make an unequivocal assertion of that right in a timely manner. [Citation.] `The court faced with a motion for self-representation should evaluate not only whether the defendant has stated the motion clearly, but also the defendant's conduct and other words. Because the court should draw every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel, the defendant's conduct or words reflecting ambivalence about self-representation may support the court's decision to deny the defendant's motion. A motion for self-representation made in passing anger or frustration, an ambivalent motion, or one made for the purpose of delay or to frustrate the orderly administration of justice may be denied.' [Citation.] A reviewing court, in determining whether a motion for self-representation is unequivocal, is not bound by the trial court's apparent understanding that the defendant was making a motion for self-representation. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1087, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) These limitations on the constitutional right to self-representation are particularly relevant here. The first of defendant's three Faretta motions was made on September 3, shortly after the guilt phase had begun. He complained to the trial court that defense counsel had contacted his family against his wishes and stated that I'll be my own lawyer if he is going to be like that. (Italics added.) The trial court denied the Faretta request because it was not unequivocal. We have emphasized that a Faretta request must be unequivocal. ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20-25, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) This rule is necessary in order to protect the courts against clever defendants who attempt to build reversible error into the record by making an equivocal request for self-representation. ( Id. at p. 22, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) This concern applies here; circumstances strongly suggested defendant was attempting to delay the trial and did not state unequivocally and definitely that he wished to represent himself. The trial court acted properly in refusing to permit defendant to control and delay his trial. We also conclude the trial court properly denied defendant's second Faretta motion, made on September 15. Applying the factors we set forth in People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at page 128, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187, the trial court denied the motion on the merits. Defendant contends the trial court misapplied these factors in a number of ways, but we disagree. Defendant first argues the trial court was incorrect when it concluded counsel's representation had been excellent. Instead, defendant argues, counsel made no opening statement, called no witnesses, and had declared (in camera) that he could not be an effective advocate because defendant refused to speak with him. At the time of this motion, however, the People had called six witnesses and counsel had cross-examined each of them. Counsel had deferred making an opening statement, and the People had not yet rested. Counsel's confidential assessment of his own ability to provide effective assistance of counsel was based on defendant's refusal to speak to or cooperate with him. The trial court's implicit conclusion that no irreconcilable rift had occurred between client and counsel, and that defendant was merely attempting to delay the trial, was a reasonable one. Defendant next argues that contrary to the court's conclusion when it denied his second Faretta motion, he had no prior proclivity to substitute counsel. His contention is belied by the record, for he had made a similar motion just a few days before. The reason for his request, the third Windham factor, had not essentially changed from the time the court denied the first motion for self-representation. As the trial court noted, defendant did not think he could do a better job, but merely wanted to speed up the guilt trial so he could proceed to the penalty phase as soon as possible. The trial court properly concluded this reason would not support a midtrial decision to permit defendant to fire his lawyer and represent himself. The final Windham factors (the length and stage of the trial and the disruption and delay that would result from granting the motion) also strongly support the trial court's denial of the Faretta motion. Defendant's case had dragged on for more than two years, and defendant's second Faretta motion came in the middle of the guilt phase. Defendant affirmed that he would need a continuance to prepare for trial, leading the trial court reasonably to conclude that granting a mistrial would be necessary if it permitted defendant to represent himself at that late date. Defendant argues that [d]elay, and delay alone, should not be the determining factor, but that argument misconstrues the nature of the trial court's ruling. The court considered several factors other than the delay that would ensue if it granted the motion. Defendant also contends an objective assessment of the propriety of the trial court's denial of his second Faretta motion should consider the court's eve-of-trial denial of a requested 45-day continuance and the denial of his motion for appointment of second counsel. He argues that his Faretta motion was not made sooner because the denial of these motions sparked his dissatisfaction with defense counsel, which led to the motion for self-representation. Thus, he argues, the delay in making the motion was understandable. There are several answers to this claim. First, defendant had made an earlier Faretta motion. In denying the second motion, the trial court noted the previous, equivocal motion. Thus, this is not a case in which a defendant made a Faretta motion as soon as was practicable. Second, the trial court chose not to deny the motion as untimely; defendant therefore was not penalized for the belated nature of his motion. Third, nothing in the record indicates that defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel was linked to the denial of a continuance or the denial of second counsel. Defendant proclaimed in court that he wished to represent himself and that he could do a better job than counsel, but I don't want to cross-examine. I don't want to question no witness. I refuse to talk to any investigators or doctors or whatever that can be, you know. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's second Faretta motion. We reach the same conclusion with regard to defendant's third Faretta motion, made and denied as untimely on September 25. By the time defendant made this last Faretta motion, presentation of evidence at the guilt phase was complete and the prosecutor had finished the opening part of his closing statement. All that was left of the guilt phase was defense counsel's closing argument and the prosecutor's rebuttal. The trial court denied the motion, noting specifically that defendant wishes merely to have the jury convict him of all counts and all allegations so he can just ask for life in prison without the possibility of parole, and end the matter and that the trial was about to wind down to an end. The court also noted the disruption of the delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such motion. We find no abuse of discretion. Contrary to defendant's further argument, the trial court did not focus on any one fact but, as it expressly stated, denied the motion based on the totality of the circumstances. ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1109, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) Even if the guilt phase judgment must stand, defendant claims the penalty judgment must be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in denying this third Faretta motion. He argues the motion came at a convenient time as it was between the guilt and penalty phases of the trial and that no delay would have resulted because he did not request a continuance. The mere fact this third Faretta request came between the guilt and penalty phases is of no moment, for the request is still considered to be one made midtrial. [T]he penalty phase has no separate formal existence but is merely a stage in a unitary capital trial. ( People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 369, 247 Cal.Rptr. 31, 753 P.2d 1109.) Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to invoke the absolute right of self-representation. ( Ibid. ) Finding no abuse of discretion, we reject defendant's claim that we must reverse the penalty judgment. In sum, the trial court properly denied all three of defendant's Faretta motions.