Opinion ID: 202634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conspiracy, Duplicity and Variance

Text: 20 A claim that the government improperly has characterized a series of allegedly unlawful transactions as a single enterprise can implicate both the doctrine of duplicity — the joining of two or more distinct offenses in a single count of an indictment, see, e.g., United States v. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294, 297 (1st Cir.1999), and the doctrine of variance — the presentation at trial of evidence that varies materially from the crime charged in the indictment, see, e.g., United States v. Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 315 (1st Cir.2004). Trainor asserts both here. He claims that the indictment's allegations reflect a surgical division between the two sets of charges and that Count One thus improperly joins them in a single alleged conspiracy. In addition, he maintains that the evidence produced at trial proved two different and disconnected conspiracies. 21 Appellant argues, in other words, that the indictment alone establishes reversible error on the conspiracy count because the two conspiracies were improperly joined in a single count, but that, even if we reject the duplicity claim, the conspiracy conviction nonetheless is defective because the evidence as presented at trial depicted two separate conspiracies. He further argues that error of either type requires that we reverse the jury's verdicts on all counts because of the prejudice resulting from trying the two transactions together. 15 22 We find it unnecessary in this case to discuss duplicity separately. Appellant does not argue that the facts presented at trial differed from the factual allegations in the indictment — only that these facts, as alleged and proven, established two conspiracies rather than one. Our conclusion that the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's verdict on Count One as alleged — i.e., that appellant participated in a single, overarching conspiracy — necessarily dooms his contention that the indictment was fatally flawed. This is so because, in rejecting his variance claim, we also are implicitly concluding that the facts set out in the indictment — which mirror the facts proven at trial — describe a scenario that is permissibly viewed as a single conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Mastelotto, 717 F.2d 1238, 1244 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 134-36, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) ([T]he question for review is simply whether the indictment may be read to allege a single unified scheme in each count.). We therefore address the legality of the conspiracy conviction solely as an issue of variance. 16 23 In assessing whether the government's case varied materially from the crime charged in the indictment, the initial question-and the only one that we need to reach here — is one of evidentiary sufficiency. United States v. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2003); see also United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 773 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Glenn, 828 F.2d 855, 858 (1st Cir.1987)). 17 24 [W]e employ the same framework that we employ in connection with other sufficiency challenges in criminal cases: we canvass the evidence (direct and circumstantial) in the light most agreeable to the prosecution and decide whether that evidence, including all plausible inferences extractable therefrom, enables a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime. 25 Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 7 (quoting United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 494 (1st Cir.1997)); see also Balthazard, 360 F.3d at 315. Specifically, when the question is `the singleness or multiplicities of the conspiratorial relationships,' United States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1234 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries 423 (1985)), we consider all relevant circumstances and focus on such factors as whether the alleged conspirators shared a common purpose, whether their actions demonstrated interdependency, and the extent to which participants overlapped during the life of the alleged conspiracy. Balthazard, 360 F.3d at 315; see also, e.g., Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 7. At the end of the day, a defendant cannot succeed with a sufficiency challenge `as long as a plausible reading of the record supports the jury's implied finding that he knowingly participated in the charged conspiracy.' Balthazard, 360 F.3d at 315 (quoting Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 7). 26 Such is the case here. The government alleged a scheme in which appellant and his co-defendants conspired to enrich themselves and others by securing mortgages based on false representations. From the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could conclude that, from the beginning, Trainor anticipated using both of his family's Trainor Road properties to effectuate the scheme. He initiated the second deal on the heels of the closing for the first property, proposing DesMarais's purchase of 16 Trainor Road as, in essence, a method of obtaining additional financing for the purchase of 12 Trainor Road. Although there was no evidence that DesMarais initially shared Trainor's long-range vision, the jury rationally could find that DesMarais agreed to extend the original conspiracy to protect his interest in 12 Trainor Road, and that he did so by recruiting partners to purchase 16 Trainor Road. Similarly, while Smith was uninvolved in the first phase of the alleged conspiracy, the evidence of his friendship with DesMarais and his presumed awareness of DesMarais's need for cash permitted the jury to find that Smith knew from the outset of his participation that the unorthodox financial arrangements that Trainor proposed — e.g., selling the property for $130,000 while seeking a $200,000 mortgage — were part of the larger scheme involving both pieces of property. Smith's acquiescence in DesMarais's role as a silent partner in the second deal — as the recipient of a finder's fee — reinforces the inference that Smith knew the 16 Trainor Road transaction was intended, at least in part, to prop up the original deception. The circumstances were thus readily susceptible to a finding of shared purpose among the three charged co-conspirators. 27 Moreover, the collaborators' overlapping participation is on its own a significant factor. DesMarais was a key player in both deals, serving as the central co-conspirator in the first enterprise and playing an important role in the second transaction by bringing in Smith. For his efforts, he was rewarded with the $10,000 fee in connection with 16 Trainor Road, and thus benefitted from both transactions. The fact that Smith was not involved until the second transaction did not inevitably signal that a new enterprise was born: [O]ne conspiracy [does not] necessarily end and a new one begin each time a new member joins the organization. Balthazard, 360 F.3d at 314. 28 Both episodes also used similar techniques, including sham down-payments and falsely reported sales prices, and were in various ways interdependent. For example, the jury could have found that the appraisals appellant obtained for 12 Trainor Road were inflated; 18 those valuations later were used as comparable sales to justify the also inflated $445,000 appraisal reported for 16 Trainor Road. 19 By invoking DesMarais' purported payment for an easement, appellant took advantage of DesMarais' ownership of 12 Trainor Road to generate — on paper — $30,000 of the $50,000 down-payment that Smith needed to qualify for the mortgage on 16 Trainor Road. Both mortgage deals also used Walden as a financial resource. Indeed, the successful payoff to Walden from the proceeds obtained from the 12 Trainor Road mortgage set the stage for his willingness to go along with appellant's odd proposal that he accept a mortgage on 16 Trainor Road as security for his investments — an arrangement that advanced Smith's application for a construction loan on the property. 29 We think this evidence sufficient to permit the jury to find appellant guilty of the charged single conspiracy. It is of significance, too, that the court gave the jury an extended instruction on the government's burden to prove the existence of one overall conspiracy . . . as opposed to separate and independent conspiracies. 20 Determining whether one or more conspiracies existed is ordinarily . . . a question of fact for the jury to resolve, Balthazard, 360 F.3d at 315; see also United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 696 (1st Cir.1999), and this jury, properly instructed, knew how to make that judgment.