Opinion ID: 854096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Hirsch's Testimony

Text: Hirsch argues that the trial court erred in barring him from testifying to Redfield's refusal to stop fighting. The claim is that Hirsch's testimony was admissible under the Indiana Rules of Evidence and highly probative as to self-defense because it illustrated: (1) the reasonableness of Hirsch's fear of further attack and need to defend himself; and (2) that Redfield responded to Hirsch's offer to withdraw by threatening to continue. [7] Although rulings admitting or excluding evidence are typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion, the ruling at issue here is reviewed de novo because it turns on a misunderstanding of a rule of evidence, specifically the hearsay rule. Stahl v. State, 686 N.E.2d 89, 91 (Ind.1997). The elements of self-defense are defined by statute: A person is justified in using reasonable force against another person to protect himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person is justified in using deadly force only if he reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself.... IND.CODE § 35-41-3-2(a) (1993). Force is not justified if the defendant enters into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor, unless the defendant communicates an intent to withdraw and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action. § (d)(3). If self-defense is supported by the evidence, the State must disprove at least one element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Birdsong v. State, 685 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. 1997); Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind.1995). When a claim of self-defense is interposed, [a]ny fact which reasonably would place a person in fear or apprehension of death or great bodily injury is admissible. Russell v. State, 577 N.E.2d 567, 568 (Ind. 1991). Here the statement (Redfield's refusal to stop fighting) was relevant irrespective of the truth of the matter asserted (that Redfield would not stop). Otherwise stated, the fact that Redfield said it is itself a relevant fact. As such, the statement is not hearsay at all and requires no exception to the hearsay rule. This general proposition has been specifically applied in self-defense cases to admit reports of statements that generate fear or concern when that is in issue. Isaacs v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1036, 1038-39 (Ind.1995) (victim's responses were as pertinent to self-defense claim as defendant's statements to victim); Shepard v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983); Nuss v. State, 164 Ind.App. 396, 406-07, 328 N.E.2d 747, 754 (1975). We agree with Hirsch that his account of Redfield's refusal to stop fighting was highly relevant and easily passes the liberal relevancy standard of Evidence Rule 401. First, whether it was true or not as a report of what Redfield intended to do, the refusal certainly could have reasonably led Hirsch to believe that Redfield intended to continue fighting. Hirsch's holding Redfield down until he agreed to stop fighting could have been viewed as reasonable because Redfield, according to inmates Lucius and Whaley, was taller and heavier than Hirsch. Second, although the evidence as a whole does not suggest that Hirsch initiated the confrontation, Redfield's refusal was all the more important if the jury concluded that Hirsch either entered into combat with Redfield or was the initial aggressor. If credited, Hirsch's testimony proved that Redfield responded to an offer to withdraw by threaten[ing] to continue unlawful action. IND.CODE § 35-41-3-2(d)(3) (1993). This in turn justified Hirsch's continuing use of force irrespective of how the altercation began. Id. The same analysis governs the application of the hearsay rule to testimony by other witnesses relaying Redfield's statements. Redfield's responses to Hirsch's apparent requests for an armistice were relevant irrespective of the truth of their contents. Accordingly, they are not hearsay. In sum, the trial court erred in barring Hirsch's testimony because it was highly relevant to assessing his claim of self-defense and was not inadmissible on hearsay grounds.