Opinion ID: 853322
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alternate Juror's Statement

Text: After Griffin's jurors deliberated for about two and a half hours, they sent a note advising the judge that they could not agree on a verdict. The judge replied, Please continue. (R. at 435.) Griffin asserts, based on juror affidavits submitted with his motion to correct error, that several jurors then sought to break the deadlock by asking the alternate her opinion on Griffin's guilt. This violated the judge's specific instruction prohibiting the alternate's participation in deliberations. [3] The alternate answered that she thought Griffin was guilty because the victim's identification was reliable based on his twenty-minute conversation with the carjacker. One juror stated in her affidavit that the alternate's input affected my vote. (R. at 164.) Juror misconduct involving an out-of-court communication with an unauthorized person creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. Currin v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1045, 1046 (Ind.1986). The trial court nonetheless denied Griffin's motion: [4] The Court finds that based on the evidence presented, the comments allegedly made by the alternate juror, did not rise to the level of impermissible juror misconduct as there was no showing that if the alternate, in fact, did improperly speak during deliberations, that this affected the decision of any of the twelve regular jurors. In fact, each of the jurors was individually polled after the verdict and each orally said it was their individual and collective verdict. (R. at 190.) A threshold question is whether the juror affidavits may be considered at all. Indiana Evidence Rule 606(b), adopted in 1994, says: Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify (1) to drug or alcohol use by any juror, (2) on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or (3) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying may not be received for these purposes. Griffin argues that the alternate's opinion was an outside influence under the third exception, and we agree. The affidavits are therefore admissible, at least as evidence (which the State did not refute) that the alternate improperly participated in jury deliberations. We therefore proceed to consider the ramifications of this conduct. A defendant seeking a new trial because of juror misconduct must show that the misconduct (1) was gross and (2) probably harmed the defendant. Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind.1988). We review the trial judge's determination on these points only for abuse of discretion, with the burden on the appellant to show that the misconduct meets the prerequisites for a new trial. Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.2000) (citations omitted). To meet his burden, Griffin relies in part on one juror's assertion that the alternate's opinion affected her vote. (R. at 164; Appellant's Br. at 11.) We must therefore decide whether this statement impeaching the jury's verdict is admissible. In doing so we look to the history and policy behind the general rule that jurors may not later seek to nullify their verdicts via affidavit. See, e.g., Taylor v. Garnett, 110 Ind. 287, 11 N.E. 309 (1887). This Court has long supported the rule prohibiting jurors from later impeaching their verdicts. The policies underlying this rule are important. Allowing such juror affidavits could defeat the jury's solemn acts under oath, open the door to post-trial jury tampering, and allow dissatisfied jurors to destroy a verdict after assenting. Id. Moreover, if impeachment were allowed, [t]he sanctity of verdicts would [ ] be diminished and no verdict could ever be final. Jurymen would forever be harassed. Turczi v. State, 261 Ind. 273, 275, 301 N.E.2d 752, 753 (1973) (citations omitted). For these reasons we have historically been reluctant to open the door to a contest of affidavits and counter-affidavits and arguments and re-arguments as to why and how a certain verdict was reached. Such an unsettled state of affairs would be a disservice to the parties litigant and an unconscionable burden upon citizens who serve on juries. Stinson v. State, 262 Ind. 189, 198, 313 N.E.2d 699, 704 (1974). The problem, of course, is how to protect such vital defendants' rights as the right to confront witnesses (which may be violated if a jury considers information that was not in evidence) or the right to an impartial jury, if the best (and often only) witnesses to jury improprieties cannot be heard. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966). The U.S. Supreme Court considered that dilemma over a century ago and held that a juror may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892) (quoting Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 (1871)). This Court adopted the Mattox approach in Fox v. State, 457 N.E.2d 1088, 1093 (Ind.1984). Ten years after Fox, we adopted Rule 606(b) as Indiana law on juror impeachment of verdicts. This is our first occasion to decide whether the common law prohibition against a juror testifying about how an outside influence affected his decision still applies when a defendant invokes one of the Rule 606(b) exceptions. Federal practice may inform our analysis. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is very similar to Indiana's rule. [5] Federal courts generally continue to follow the rule of Mattox, and will accept juror affidavits stating that deliberations were tainted by improper information or influence, but disregard any statements on the effect of that information or influence on the juror's decision. See 2 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 905 (7th ed.1998). [6] As the Seventh Circuit has explained: In evaluating a claim that the jury was improperly influenced by extraneous material, a district court must ignore a juror's comment regarding how a particular piece of material disposed the juror toward a particular verdict, and the district court must make an independent determination of the likely effect of the prejudicial material. United States v. Paneras, 222 F.3d 406, 412 n. 1 (7th Cir.2000)(quoting United States v. Berry, 92 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.1996)). This approach would seem to restrain the potential for a losing party to provoke virtual re-enactments of the deliberation through competing affidavits purporting to describe the thought processes of individual jurors. As Judge Allen Sharp observed, one risk in allowing juror impeachment of verdicts is that [i]t is all too easy for ingenious counsel to prepare carefully worded affidavits to cast doubt on a jury verdict. Lindsey v. State, 282 N.E.2d 854, 861 (Ind.App.1972). Thus, the fact that one juror says the alternate's input affected her decision is not part of the analysis governing the request for a new trial. Rather, the trial court must consider the alternate's conduct in the overall trial context. The alternate did not add any fresh perspective to the discussion; the other jurors were well aware that the State's case relied on a strong eyewitness identification. [7] It is difficult to believe that if eleven other jurors favored conviction, the twelfth only acceded because the alternate also favored conviction when the majority solicited one more view. Our skepticism takes into account the fact that an alternate is like a regular juror in two important respects: the alternate has been through the same voir dire to safeguard against bias or knowledge of information not in evidence, and has heard exactly the same evidence. Intrajury influence is not sufficient to overturn a verdict. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 700 N.E.2d 480, 481 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (Jurors may not decide, in hindsight, that the weighing process overcame their spirit or will.). See also Ferguson v. State, 489 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind.1986) (citations omitted) ([T]he legal bar to the impeachment of a verdict by a juror who participated in its return is greatest where the interchange between jurors is the source of the problem, and not a communication from some nonjuror.). An alternate is not, of course a member of the jury, and he or she qualifies as an outside influence under Rule 606(b). Here, however, the alternate's only influence was adding one more me, too to the collective voice of the jury majority. Under the facts presented, Griffin has not shown either gross misconduct or probable harm. The trial judge therefore acted within the bounds of his discretion in denying relief based on juror misconduct.