Opinion ID: 3047906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Mandatory Preliminary Injunction

Text: [1] Defendants contend that the district court failed to apply the appropriate legal standard for issuance of a mandatory preliminary injunction. We disagree. First, the district court correctly described the applicable test for the granting of a preliminary injunction, see Rodde, 357 F.3d at 994 (describing test), as well as the heightened standard that applies to mandatory injunctive relief, see Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1320 (stating that, when issuing a mandatory preliminary injunction, the court must find that the “facts and law clearly favor” plaintiffs). [2] Second, in concluding that plaintiffs were entitled to a mandatory preliminary injunction, the district court correctly applied these tests. The court found that plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their Medicaid Act claims. It also discussed the possibility that plaintiffs would face unnecessary institutionalization without the preliminary injunction, recognized that such harms were “grave,” and rejected defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs failed to show that they faced irreparable harm. It is evident that the court concluded that plaintiffs faced the potential for irreparable injury without the injunction. This is sufficient to meet the general requirement of “probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury” for preliminary injunctive relief. Rodde, 357 F.3d at 994. The court’s finding of a strong likelihood that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their claims also evidences a conclusion that the law and facts clearly favor plaintiffs, meeting the requirement for issuance KATIE A. v. BONTÁ 3401 of a mandatory preliminary injunction. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1320. Defendants also argue that the district court did not make any explicit findings showing that it considered the federalism principles that require federal courts to grant each state “the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs” and to find “a threat of immediate and irreparable harm” before enjoining a state agency’s operations. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 378-79; Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001); Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court, however, did describe plaintiffs’ vulnerability, complex needs, and ongoing “unmet mental health needs and the harms of unnecessary institutionalization.” That description suffices to show that the court found a threat of immediate and irreparable harm to plaintiffs. As for the deference accorded to state agencies in their internal affairs, the court appropriately allowed defendants an opportunity jointly to develop the remedial plan needed to implement the injunction. No further deference was required; the order itself required only that defendants supply the services that the court found to be required under federal law. It did not mandate detailed or burdensome procedures for compliance. See Clark, 60 F.3d at 604.