Opinion ID: 210343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: '880 Patent: Few Feet

Text: The majority holds that the district court erred by failing to construe the '880 patent's claims to limit them to systems that operate within a range of a few feet. [1] It is undisputed that the claims of the '880 patent do not include any such range limitation. But the majority imputes one from the use of the claim term localized wireless gateway system, focusing specifically on the requirement that the gateway system be localized. It does so based on reading out of context snippets of language used by the applicants in the prosecution of not the '880 patent, but rather a related patent not asserted in this case. We have made clear the methods by which claims must be construed. The explicit language of the claims must be examined, and typically the ordinary meaning of the claim language will control. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed.Cir.2005). The specification must also be scrutinized and the claim language read in the context of the specification. Id. at 1315. The prosecution history may also be relevant, and can be dispositive when the applicant clearly and expressly disavowed claim scope. Id. at 1317; see also Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2003) (holding that the prosecution history may not be used to infer the intentional narrowing of a claim absent the applicant's clear disavowal of claim coverage). Here, as already mentioned, the claim language merely requires the gateway system to be localized. As the district court properly noted, the specification clarifies what is meant by localized. It states that [t]he gateway system is a localized private system, as opposed to the common, public cellular telephone networks, that can provide communication within an office or industrial complex . . . [or] a geographically limited public area of interest, such as an airport, shopping center, hotel/convention center complex or the like. '880 patent col.5 ll.30-37; see also id. col.10 ll.30-38 (discussing an embodiment that is a business application for a single factory or office location where the system's service would be limited to the area in and around the factory or office location); id. col. 10 ll.42-44. Nowhere does the specification mention any restriction to a few feet; to the contrary, it discloses areas of operation as large as an airport, shopping center, or industrial complex. Consequently, the district court properly rejected Vonage's proposed few feet limitation. The majority subverts the import of the unquantified term localized and ignores the clear meaning of the claim language and specification by finding prosecution history disclaimer. To be limiting, such a disclaimer must be clearly and expressly stated. Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1327. I agree with the majority that the prosecution of a divisional application may sometimes disclaim claim scope in a co-divisional application in the same family, even if the disclaimer occurs after the co-divisional application has been filed or issued as a separate patent. But the allegedly disclaiming language in the file history of the '880 patent's co-divisional application relied on by the majority as overpowering numerous clear statements in the specification simply does not rise to the level of a clear disavowal of claim scope. The majority seizes on two passages in the '880 patent's co-divisional application file history, both instances where the applicants are distinguishing their invention from prior art. In one, the applicants note that `wireless' [as used in the prior art references] does not mean `local wireless,' as claimed by the present invention, in the sense of a cordless phone that is restricted to operate within a few feet from a base station. J.A. at 7191 (emphasis added). The applicants here are clear that they are merely distinguishing certain prior art where the term `wireless' . . . is directed to systems having wide-ranging networks that span large geographic areas. Id. This distinction is precisely the same made in the specification. While the applicants use the example of a cordless phone operating within a few feet to illustrate why their invention is different, they are not clearly disavowing everything other than such cordless phones. The second excerpt from the prosecution history is even less clear as an alleged disavowal. The applicants merely stated, [a prior art reference] arguably appears to disclose a local cellular or local wireless system, such as, for example, a cordless phone that is restricted to operate within a few feet from a base station. J.A. 7189 (emphasis added). Applicants are describing a prior art reference, not their invention, and again simply use the example of a cordless phone as an illustration. The applicants go on to distinguish that prior art on other grounds. See id. This is not the clear disavowal of claim scope required by our precedents. Since no clear disavowal appears in the prosecution history, and the claim language, read in the context of the specification, specifically includes numerous embodiments with ranges greatly exceeding a few feet, I must dissent from the holding that the district court erred by not limiting the term localized wireless gateway system to require ranges limited to a few feet.