Opinion ID: 1321543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Purpose to be Served by the Objections

Text: In State ex rel. Browning v. Blankenship, 154 W.Va. 253, 175 S.E.2d 172 (1970), the Attorney General of West Virginia sought by an original mandamus proceeding in this Court to require the Clerk of the House of Delegates of West Virginia to publish the budget bill for fiscal year 1970-71 passed by the legislature without the subsequent reductions made by the governor. In Browning, the legislature passed the budget bill on February 14, 1970, and adjourned on that day sine die. On February 18, 1970, within five days after the adjournment of the legislature, the governor filed in the office of the secretary of state (1) the budget bill with the notation approved with reductions and (2) a list of the budgetary accounts the governor had reduced. Upon the budget bill, the governor had struck through certain items of appropriation and inserted reduced amounts and added his initials. No other notation appeared upon the budget bill. This Court held in Browning that the governor had indicated a disapproval of the 1970-71 budget bill but failed to make or file proper objections to that bill within the time and manner specified in W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 51. Therefore, the budget bill passed by the legislature constituted the budget act for 1970-71, rather than the budget bill reduced by the governor. The Court stated as follows: The ... provisions of [ W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 51] confer upon the Governor a qualified, not an absolute, power of veto and prescribe the manner in which he shall exercise his power of veto, and as these constitutional provisions are clear and unambiguous and are mandatory in character they must be literally complied with and the failure of the governor to exercise that power in the manner prescribed will render his veto invalid and of no force and effect.... The manner in which the Governor should disapprove the bill or an item is by filing his objections with the bill as provided by the Amendment. 154 W.Va. at 260, 175 S.E.2d at 177. Important to the decision in Browning was the conclusion of this Court that, under W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 51, the governor's disapproval of a budgetary item is to be distinguished from his objection to a budgetary item: The action of the Governor in striking the items in question indicates that he disapproved of the items in their original form but mere disapproval does not constitute an objection.... 154 W.Va. at 260-61, 175 S.E.2d at 177. It was held in syllabus point 3 that: The word `objections', as used in the Modern Budget Amendment, means a statement of an adverse reason in opposition to a budget bill, or its items or parts, and the action of the Governor in the elimination of the amount of an item in the bill by striking the amount by drawing a line through the figure or the substitution of a reduced amount and the addition of the initials of the Governor does not constitute the objections required by the Amendment. [10] Finally, this Court in Browning rejected the assertion of the governor that he had substantially, though not literally, complied with the provisions of W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 51, in making his reductions. With respect to the governor's constitutional power of veto over budgetary items, this Court stated that [t]he express provision of the Modern Budget Amendment here involved, which is plain and unambiguous and is mandatory in character, is not satisfied by substantial compliance but instead must be accorded full and literal compliance. 154 W.Va. at 268, 175 S.E.2d at 181. Consistent with State ex rel. Browning v. Blankenship, supra , are other West Virginia cases which indicate that objections by the governor under the Modern Budget Amendment serve to provide an adverse reason with respect to a budget bill or budget item and, more generally, serve to provide information by the governor concerning a budget bill for consideration by current or future legislatures. See n. 10, supra. In that regard, this Court has conducted an extensive search for cases in other jurisdictions. The few cases which have been found generally support the proposition that objections serve to satisfy the informational needs of legislatures and the public. [11] In State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, W.Va., 214 S.E.2d 467 (1975), this Court indicated that the type of veto action in question by the governor of a budgetary appropriation should be reviewable by the legislature. This Court stated as follows: [R]eason would indicate that items altered by veto should retain sufficient identity of subject or purpose and amount to permit intelligent review by the legislature when it reconsiders veto actions of the Governor. 214 S.E.2d at 484. In May v. Topping, 65 W.Va. 656, 64 S.E. 848 (1909), the Court awarded a writ of mandamus which required the Clerk of the House of Delegates to deliver to the petitioner a copy of an appropriations bill regardless of an attempted veto by the governor. This Court held that, pursuant to the predecessor to W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 51, the governor failed to timely file the veto in the office of the secretary of state. The constitutional provision in question, subsequently revised, stated that with respect to bills making appropriations of money, the governor, if he disapprove the bill, or any item or appropriation therein contained,... shall communicate such disapproval with his reasons therefore to the House in which the bill originated.... 65 W.Va. at 659, 64 S.E. at 849. In May, this Court held that the above constitutional provision was mandatory and meant that no disapproval by the governor of an appropriations bill could be effective if expressed after the adjournment of the legislature. The phrase disapproval with his reasons, within that provision, was described in the May opinion as follows: [T]he Constitution intends that the disapproval of the Governor, to be a disapproval at all, must be communicated to the house of the Legislature in which the bill originated, so that the Legislature may again act upon the item; so that it may repass it, if the Governor's reasons for disapproval do not persuade it to do otherwise.... 65 W.Va. at 659-60, 64 S.E. at 850. Subsection C of W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 51, the Modern Budget Amendment, is entitled Supplementary Appropriation Bills and provides, in part, as follows: Neither house shall consider other appropriations until the budget bill has been finally acted upon by both houses.... In State ex rel. Moore v. Blankenship, W.Va., 217 S.E.2d 232 (1975), this Court held that final action by both houses within the meaning of subsection C contemplates passage by both houses, signature or veto by the Governor, and any subsequent action by the Legislature to override the veto; it does not contemplate the mere passage of the budget bill by both houses. Syl. pt. 3. This Court stated as follows: The Court concludes that the Modern Budget Amendment contemplates that the Legislature have the entire budget in final form before proceeding to make supplementary appropriations. Were we to hold that final action contemplates exclusively passage by the Legislature, then that body could make supplementary appropriations without regard to the actual amount of money remaining for such appropriations and the Governor would not have an opportunity to explain to the Legislature his reasons for vetoing items or parts of items, as mandated by sub. D(11). 217 S.E.2d at 238. In State ex rel. Boynton v. French, 133 Kan. 579, 300 P. 1082 (1931), the Supreme Court of Kansas, citing May v. Topping, supra , invalidated the veto by the governor of certain appropriations, where contrary to the Kansas constitution, the governor stated that he objected to the appropriations but did not state his reasons for those objections. In syllabus point 2, the Kansas court held as follows: A statement by the governor that he objects to certain items of an appropriation bill, without stating his reasons therefore, is insufficient, under our constitution (art. II, § 14), to constitute an effective veto of such items. It must be made clear that by stating that objections, within the meaning of the Modern Budget Amendment, serve to provide an adverse reason with respect to a budget bill or budget item and, more generally, serve to provide information by the governor concerning a budget bill, this Court does not thereby limit the governor's discretion concerning budgetary matters. Rather, we hold that pursuant to W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 51, the Modern Budget Amendment, the validity of the governor's disapproval or reduction of items or parts of items contained within the budget bill depends upon the governor's objections to such items or parts of items. The objections, to satisfy the requirements of the Modern Budget Amendment, need communicate in a rational manner to the public and current or future legislatures a statement of an adverse reason in opposition to a budget bill, or its items or parts, as to why the budget bill, or an item or part of an item within the budget bill, has been disapproved or reduced by the governor. [12] Similar to the provisions of W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 51 D(11), relating to the governor's disapproval of budgetary items is W.Va. Const., art. VII, § 14. W.Va. Const., art. VII, § 14, provides for the governor's power of veto of bills other than bills making appropriations of money and requires objections by the governor for such action. Capito v. Topping, 65 W.Va. 587, 64 S.E. 845 (1909), involved the predecessor to W.Va. Const., art. VII, § 14. The predecessor to W.Va. Const., art. VII, § 14, required that, after the adjournment of the legislature, the governor had five days to file the bill with his objections in the office of the secretary of state, to effect a veto. It was held in Capito that, inasmuch as the governor failed to timely file the bills in question, the bills were not vetoed. In the Capito opinion, this Court recognized that constitutional provisions necessarily stand on a much higher plane than mere statutes. 65 W.Va. at 591, 64 S.E. at 847. Furthermore, with respect to the predecessor to W.Va. Const., art. VII, § 14, this Court stated as follows: We think, therefore, the veto is not effective, unless the bill is filed with objections to the prescribed office. Nor have we any doubt that it must be filed within the prescribed time. 65 W.Va. at 592, 64 S.E. at 847. Capito, supra, was cited by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Arnett v. Meredith, 275 Ky. 223, 121 S.W.2d 36 (1938). In Arnett, the governor attempted to veto a bill by stating as follows: This bill is hereby vetoed, this March 11, 1938. That veto was held to be ineffective because the governor failed to file his objections to the bill as required by the Kentucky constitution. The Court stated as follows: We will now turn to our constitutional provision relating to the veto power of the Governor of this Commonwealth.... It may be divided into two parts(a) vetoes by the Governor which are made while the General Assembly is still in session, and (b) those made by him after the session is adjourned.... In discussing constitutional provisions conferring veto power on the chief executive, courts in construing them (and they are all similar to ours) say that the framers of the Constitution intended to prescribe that under situation (a) supra the reasons and objections accompanying the veto of the Governor might be reconsidered by the Legislature and the act passed over his veto, or it might be amended so as to meet his objections. In other words, that after the bill had been disapproved by the Governor and returned back to the Legislature it might reshape the act so as to meet the reasons and objections stated as a basis of the veto; or it might ignore such reasons and pass the act over the veto. The same reason also exists with reference to a veto made under part (b) supra, of our constitutional provisions, whereby a future Legislature might in the same manner circumvent or override the reasons or objections as given by the executive. A still further reason might appropriately be assigned for the rule as so declared, and which isthat it was the purpose of the constitutional convention, and the people in adopting the Constitution, to force the Governor to state reasons and objections for his opposing the enactment, so that both the Legislature and the people might know whether or not he was motivated by conscientious convictions in recording his disapproval. When so restrained a chief executive would hesitate to base his veto upon apparently unfounded reasons, but would endeavor to furnish and set forth reasons and grounds of apparent substance for his opposition, although they might eventually turn out to be fallacious. The public generally who are not members of the Legislature, and also the members of the Legislature, have the right to know the reason or reasons why a particular act was disapproved by the Governor so that they may exercise their rights and powers as voters and lawmakers to overcome such objections in the future, if the act is a meritorious one and approved by them. 275 Ky. at 230-32, 121 S.W.2d at 40. With the above principles in mind, we now turn to the question of whether the governor filed objections to the appropriations within Account No. 4160 of the budget bill for fiscal year 1983-84 as mandated by the Modern Budget Amendment. We are of the opinion that no objections were filed within the meaning of the Modern Budget Amendment, and, therefore, the governor failed to effect a reduction of appropriations with respect to that account. With regard to the budget bill filed by the governor in the office of the secretary of state, the governor merely struck through certain appropriations for Account No. 4160 and substituted reduced amounts and added his initials. As this Court held in syllabus point 3 of State ex rel. Browning v. Blankenship, discussed supra, such action by the governor is not sufficient to constitute an objection to an appropriation under the Modern Budget Amendment. We must, therefore, look to the governor's message dated March 21, 1983, filed by the governor with the budget. The governor's message dated March 21, 1983, contains an introduction which states that as a result of a poor national and state economy, unnecessary state spending must be eliminated and a jobs program initiated. That introduction makes no reference to any of the numerous accounts within the budget bill and, in view of the authorities outlined above, does not constitute an objection under the Modern Budget Amendment to any item of the budget bill. The governor's message, with reference to Account No. 4160, indicates that, because of the governor's reductions of appropriations, $1.5 million will be allowed for the operation of Spencer State Hospital as a 60 bed facility for the treatment of geriatric patients. That message further indicates that the governor's reductions will allow $1 million to improve services at Weston and Huntington Hospitals with respect to patients currently at Spencer. Finally, the governor's message concerning Account No. 4160 indicates that, generally, the duplication of administrative costs at state hospitals should be eliminated. We find nothing in the governor's message sufficient under the Modern Budget Amendment to constitute an objection supportive of the governor's reduction of appropriations for Account No. 4160. That message implies that appropriations for Spencer Hospital should be reduced or eliminated but fails to so state directly. Specifically, no reason or explanation for the reduction, particular to Spencer Hospital, is stated for the consideration of the legislature or the public. Moreover, the statement that the duplication of administrative costs should be eliminated does not of itself indict Spencer Hospital, as opposed to any other state hospital. We, therefore, hold that where the West Virginia Legislature passed the budget bill containing Account No. 4160, which account enumerated appropriations for the state mental hospitals for fiscal year 1983-84, and, furthermore, the legislature produced, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 4-1-18 [1969], a legislative digest directing specific appropriations within Account No. 4160 to Spencer Hospital, a subsequent reduction by the governor of appropriations within Account No. 4160 of the budget bill, which reductions would result in the closing or substantial curtailment of services at Spencer Hospital, was void under W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 51, the Modern Budget Amendment, because the governor failed to file objections to those appropriations, as required by the Amendment, where (1) the governor merely struck through certain appropriations, substituted reduced amounts, and added his initials, (2) the governor's message filed with the budget bill described the effects of the governor's reduction of appropriations upon certain state hospitals, rather than adverse reasons why appropriations for Spencer Hospital should be reduced and (3) the governor's message filed with the budget bill merely stated a general desire by the governor to eliminate the duplication of administrative costs with respect to state hospitals. In DeVault v. Nicholson, W.Va., 296 S.E.2d 682 (1982), this Court held in the syllabus that [w]here a women's prison has been created by a legislative act, W.Va. Code, 28-5C-1. (1947), et seq., a legislative act is required to close it. In that action, this Court recognized a statutory duty on the part of the executive branch of government to operate the prison in question and stated that, although proper financial support for the prison was lacking, the legislature had not granted the executive branch authority to close the prison. This Court stated as follows: We appreciate chronic budgetary problems; however, the fact remains that the excuse of lack of funds cannot be permitted to undermine statutory entitlements. 296 S.E.2d at 684. It was upon the basis of DeVault that this Court granted relief to the petitioners with respect to fiscal year 1982-83. Inasmuch as we hold that the governor failed to effect a reduction in appropriations for Account No. 4160 for fiscal year 1983-84, the appropriations for that account, as passed by the legislature, constitute the true appropriations for fiscal year 1983-84, and Spencer Hospital is neither closed nor its services substantially curtailed. As in DeVault, therefore, the executive branch has a duty to operate Spencer Hospital pursuant to statutory law. W.Va.Code, 27-2-1 [1977], provides, in part, as follows: The state hospitals heretofore established at Weston, Spencer, Huntington, Barboursville, Lakin, Guthrie, Roney's Point, St. Marys and Lewisburg shall be continued and known respectively as the Weston Hospital, Spencer Hospital, Huntington Hospital, Barboursville Hospital, Lakin Hospital, Guthrie Center, Roney's Point Center, Colin Anderson Center and the Greenbrier School for Retarded Children. Said state hospitals and centers shall be managed, directed and controlled by the department of health. In summary, the governor's message must be analyzed in light of the purpose of an objection. As gleaned from a study of the cases, it is without controversy that the purpose of an objection is to inform the public and the legislature in a rational manner a reason or explanation as to why a governor disapproved or reduced an item or parts of items in a budget bill. Clearly, in the Browning case, there was no objection within the contemplation of the Constitution. The governor's action was not sufficient, therefore, to meet the requirements of the Constitution. In the cases now before us, the governor added certain information, no doubt in an attempt to comply with the law enunciated by the Court in the Browning case. Does such additional information satisfy the rigid demands of the Constitution? We think not. Certainly, no one would argue seriously that the budget bill could have been vetoed only by the information contained in the introduction to the governor's March 21, 1983, message. Such an attempt would not stand constitutional muster. The public and the legislature would be informed of nothing other than what is common knowledge. Few citizens of West Virginia have escaped the ravages of the current state of the economy. A veto of the budget bill would jeopardize the life of state government which serves the people. A veto of such a critical matter would require a more rational explanation. Otherwise, the constitutional process would be rendered meaningless. Does the information relating to the reductions of items in Account No. 4160 satisfy the commands of the Constitution? It is evident that the first paragraph of the governor's message relating to Account No. 4160 merely summarized or put into words what appeared on the budget bill after the governor made the reductions and returned the document to the secretary of state. The second paragraph added nothing to explain why Account No. 4160 was reduced. Reference is made only to a total of $2.5 million of that account being targeted for certain projects. The third paragraph is not specifically directed to Spencer Hospital. Instead, it is a general statement which is applicable to the administration of all state hospitals. It is the duty of the governor through the Department of Health to insure that the administration of the hospitals is accomplished in the most efficient manner possible to meet the clinical needs of the patients in those hospitals. It is also important to emphasize the circumstances under which the reductions occurred. It would serve no purpose for us to again belabor the troubled history of Spencer Hospital. It has been center stage since the governor's State of the State address in January. From that time to the present, a significant portion of executive, legislative, and judicial time has been consumed because of the controversy. The executive branch appears determined to close that hospital or curtail the services. The legislative branch has steadfastly refused to enact legislation to close the hospital and has taken the additional step of funding its operation. The judicial branch has assumed its constitutional role in resolving the conflict between the other two branches of government pursuant to the delicate constitutional process. Although we will not avoid our duty, we note our concern in routinely being called upon to resolve disputes in this continuing tug of war between the coequal executive and legislative branches of government. This conflict calls to mind the following language found in State ex rel. Moore v. Blankenship, supra : While this Court can never disapprove the recourse of any party to court resolution of disputes, the Court is fearful that the type of hostility which currently exists between the executive and legislative branches with regard to budgetary matters, demanding as it does constant court resolution, is less than salutary for the efficient administration of government. It would be the hope of this Court that the two Brotherton cases ... and this case, when read together, would give definite guidance with regard to the appropriate balance between the executive and legislative branches in the budget-making process. 217 S.E.2d at 242. [13] The records in these actions clearly reveal that the governor failed to state objections sufficient to comply with constitutional requirements to the legislative appropriations for Account No. 4160, and, in that regard, the governor failed to follow the Modern Budget Amendment of the Constitution of West Virginia. The governor's power of veto or disapproval under that constitutional amendment is a limited one. State ex rel. Browning v. Blankenship, supra, 154 W.Va. at 260, 175 S.E.2d at 177. [14] Where the governor has failed to properly execute that power, a conflict between the executive and legislative branches of the government of West Virginia will inevitably occur. Therefore, Account No. 4160, entitled State Health DepartmentMental Hospitals, contained within the budget bill for fiscal year 1983-84, shall be published as enacted by the legislature. For the reasons set forth in this opinion and for the reasons stated in the above-described orders of February 9, 1983, and April 27, 1983, the respondents shall continue to operate and maintain Spencer Hospital at the level of services required by law through June 30, 1984, unless otherwise directed by the legislature. Writs as moulded awarded.