Opinion ID: 4565245
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing for Executive Committee Claim

Text: To determine whether SCF has standing to bring its claim for a declaratory judgment that the formation of the Executive Committee violated federal law (the “Executive Committee Claim”), we begin our analysis with the plain language of Section 325. See United States v. Gallegos, 613 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language.”). In no uncertain terms, Section 325 provides that the “[t]he Consortium shall be governed by a 15-member Board of Directors, which shall be composed of one representative of each regional health entity listed in subsection (a) above[.]” Pub. L. No. 105-83, § 325(b). In addition, Section 325 expressly identifies thirteen regional health entities that shall be represented on the Board, including SCF. Id. § 325(a). Section 325 also guarantees that “[e]ach member of the Board of Directors shall be entitled to cast one vote,” provided that the regional health entities maintain their status as such by operating a regional health program. Id. § 325(a)–(b). 12 SOUTHCENTRAL FOUNDATION V. ANTHC Based on this language, we have no difficulty concluding that SCF has met its burden to demonstrate that the injury it asserts—infringement of its governance and participation rights under Section 325—is sufficiently concrete and particularized. It is clear that the alleged injury is sufficiently particularized, as Section 325 allocates the right to govern the statutorily-authorized Consortium to a Board of Directors that expressly includes a representative from SCF. It is also clear that the alleged injury is sufficiently concrete. SCF alleged that the creation of the Executive Committee, and the delegation to it the full powers of the Board, infringed on SCF’s right under Section 325(b) to cast its vote in the management of the Consortium, thereby depriving SCF of the ability to effectuate the “meaningful Indian self-determination” envisioned by Congress when it enacted the ISDEAA. 25 U.S.C. § 5302; cf. Lapidus v. Hecht, 232 F.3d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 2000) (shareholders had standing under Massachusetts law to bring direct action for violation of their voting rights). We are not persuaded by ANTHC’s argument that SCF’s right to “participat[e] in the Consortium” referenced in Section 325(a) pertains only to SCF’s right to participate in the Consortium’s “provi[sion of] all statewide health services.” The clause in Section 325(a) referring to the “provi[sion of] all statewide health services” merely describes the types of “contracts, compacts, or funding agreements” that the Consortium is permitted to enter into; it does not limit the scope of the regional health entities’ right to “participat[e] in the Consortium.” Rather, the clause in Section 325(a) regarding the regional health entities’ right to “participat[e] in the Consortium” relates to preserving each regional health entity’s status as such in order to serve on the Board of Directors. In other words, so long as the regional health entities operate a regional health program, SOUTHCENTRAL FOUNDATION V. ANTHC 13 they can appoint representatives to the Board to “participat[e] in the Consortium.” Nor are we persuaded by ANTHC’s argument that Section 325 grants rights of governance only to Directors. ANTHC highlights that Section 325(b) references persons specifically—as opposed to entities—when it mandates that ANTHC “shall be governed by a 15-member Board of Directors, which shall be composed of one representative of each regional health entity . . . and two additional persons who shall represent Indian tribes.” Pub. L. No. 105-83, § 325(b). Had Congress intended that the regional health entities exercise governance rights themselves, ANTHC argues, Congress would have specified how to allocate decision-making power among the regional health entities. But Congress did just that when it created the right to have a “representative” on the Board. A representative is “[s]omeone who stands for or acts on behalf of another.” Representative, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). “The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Steinle v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2013)). Had Congress meant, for instance, that regional health entities were merely “advisory,” it could have used this alternate language. Instead, Congress endowed each specified regional health entity with the right to have a “representative” on the Board that stands in the shoes of the designating entity by acting on its behalf. We briefly pause to note that ANTHC does not meet its “heavy burden” to establish mootness by virtue of the subsequent Bylaws amendment. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 14 SOUTHCENTRAL FOUNDATION V. ANTHC (2000). ANTHC argues that, after the Bylaws were amended in April 2017 to require Executive Committee actions to be ratified by the full Board to be effective, there is no reasonable likelihood that the alleged violation will recur. We have explained that “the mere cessation of illegal activity in response to pending litigation does not moot a case, unless the party alleging mootness can show that the ‘allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” Rosemere Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 581 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189). Here, however, ANTHC does little more than point to the fact of the April 2017 amendment as evidence of mootness, which does little to assure that the amendment is not merely “a temporary policy that . . . will [be] refute[d] once this litigation is concluded.” Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000)). This is especially true where ANTHC is not entitled to a presumption of good faith that its cessation of the disputed conduct will not recur. As we recently explained, the voluntary cessation of challenged acts by a private party is not entitled to the presumption of good faith enjoyed by legislative bodies when they repeal or amend a challenged legislative provision. Bd. of Trs. of the Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. v. Chambers, 941 F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). Therefore, without more, ANTHC has not met its burden to establish mootness. In sum, while we express no views on the merits of SCF’s claim that the formation of the Executive Committee violated Section 325, we conclude that Section 325 granted SCF governance and participation rights in the management of ANTHC to be exercised through SCF’s representative on SOUTHCENTRAL FOUNDATION V. ANTHC 15 the Board and that SCF has alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing to bring its claim.