Opinion ID: 1058342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: testimony of sheriff parson

Text: Prior to Sheriff Mike Parson of Polk County, Missouri, taking the stand, the defense objected and the following colloquy occurred: MR. STRAWN: ... We believe that the information that's going to be elicited from him has already been elicited from other witnesses. We think the danger of the jury being tainted with a potential crime that occurred in another state is too great. THE COURT: What's the purpose of this witness? GENERAL BIVENS: Your Honor. He is the one who advised them that Mr. Thacker  he is the one who advised them that Mr. Thacker was a suspect when he was called about the credit card, and that Thacker would be in the car. He described the car to them and gave them the license number. I'll be glad to lead him, Your Honor, and I have cautioned him I'm only going to ask him about the fact that Forrest Boyd was not in Tennessee on January 2nd, that Mr. Thacker was thought to be in possession  was a suspect to be in possession of Mr. Boyd's credit card and car, and that he gave them a description of the car and the license number. I'm not going to touch anything else with him. THE COURT: Can't we simply  y'all are not in a position where you can stipulate that? MR. KELLY: It's already in the record that it's Forrest Boyd's card laying there by the machine. It's already been testified to. GENERAL BIVENS: That's why I don't see any prejudice in it, Your Honor. It establishes how they had that information. MR. KELLY: What it's going to get in is, it's going to get in an unconvicted prior bad act of a theft in Missouri, without question. You know, it's not for any other purpose. GENERAL BIVENS: Your Honor, it goes to the question of premeditation. He knew that he was over here in somebody else's car and with somebody else's credit card, and when that credit card was used, he knew it was gonna come back as stolen. MR. KELLY: That's already in the record. THE COURT: No, that's not in the record. The only thing that's in the record is that he used a credit card that's Forrest Boyd's. MR. KELLY: Unauthorized  GENERAL BIVENS: No, sir, there's nothing in the record on that point. That's what we have to establish through him, that he was not authorized to have Forrest Boyd's credit card, and the only way we can establish that  THE COURT: How can he do that? GENERAL BIVENS: He actually knows. Your Honor, that Forrest Boyd was dead at that point, and he actually knows about the homicide. They were aware of the homicide. MR. STRAWN: You see how great the danger is here? GENERAL BIVENS: But I'm not going to that point, Your Honor, but he had knowledge that the credit card was stolen. . . . GENERAL BIVENS: It goes to his premeditation. THE COURT:  but it does go the issue of premeditation. All right, I'm going to let you put it in, but be careful, now. Being careful goes  it's a two-edged sword. It goes both ways. You could get the wrong information and end it on a mistrial here. . . . THE COURT: And by the same token, if you solicit the information  MR. STRAWN: Your Honor, we almost can't even cross him, because it's so dangerous.... And I think it's too dangerous. It's going to get in a prior  an unconvicted prior bad act. THE COURT: That's why I'm asking you why you can't stipulate that he had or was in possession of a Forrest Boyd credit card, and he was unauthorized to use it? MR. KELLY: We can. THE COURT: You can? Then what else do you need him for? GENERAL BIVENS: Your Honor, they were told that  he told the description of the vehicle and the license plate number. That's the main thing. If they want to stipulate that he had Forrest Boyd's car and credit card and was unauthorized MR. KELLY: What's his car got to do  identity is not an issue. GENERAL BIVENS: Still, Your Honor, it goes to the premeditation and flight. That's the car that was towed here. THE COURT: I don't know that you have to get the car into it. GENERAL BIVENS: That's the car that was towed in, Your Honor. Otherwise, the jury is going to have the impression, Your Honor, that he had this car over here and  MR. STRAWN: It's the credit card that he's saying goes to premeditation. We're stipulating that's unauthorized. GENERAL BIVENS: No, sir, it's the car and the credit card. He knew he was wanted because of that, Your Honor. . . . GENERAL BIVENS: The question is premeditation, Your Honor. The question is Thacker knew he was wanted, knew that he was and that's why he did this. That's in his statement, Your Honor, just the statement that he knew he was wanted is in his confession, not for what, but that he knew he was wanted, and that's why he did it. THE COURT: All right, I'm going to allow him to testify. Now, be careful. Sheriff Mike Parson testified, during the guilt phase, that Forrest Boyd was a resident of Polk County, Missouri, on January 2, 2000. He further stated that he advised Dyer County law enforcement that Mr. Boyd was not in Dyer County and that anyone who had his credit card or vehicle in Dyer County would have been unauthorized. Sheriff Parson related a description of Mr. Boyd's vehicle, including providing the license plate number. The Sheriff added that a person by the name of Steven Ray Thacker may be in possession of both the credit card and the vehicle. Sheriff Parson testified again at the sentencing phase. Sheriff Parson stated that on January 2, 2000, there were outstanding warrants for the arrest of Steven Ray Thacker in Polk County, Missouri. He added that he believed that Steven Ray Thacker left the state of Missouri in Forrest Boyd's vehicle. The defendant complains that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of Sheriff Parson. The defendant asserts that (1) the trial court failed to conduct a jury out hearing as required by Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (2) the defense agreed to stipulate to the fact that the defendant was in possession of Forrest Boyd's credit card and was unauthorized to use it; and (3) the prejudicial effect of the Sheriff's testimony outweighed any probative effect it may have had. In support of these contentions, the defendant states that the testimony of Sheriff Parson was neither relevant nor necessary, because it was already in the record that the credit card of Forrest Boyd was lying beside the cash register in the Patterson service station. From this, he contends, the jurors could infer that the credit card was stolen. The State responds that the evidence was necessary to show motive and, therefore, relevant to the issue of premeditation. The general parameters regarding admissibility of a defendant's bad acts other than the crime on trial is found in Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). As stated previously, evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally inadmissible as character evidence of the defendant to prove that he committed the crime in question. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). As the defense argues, the defendant's identity was not at issue. Rather, the only issue in this matter was the degree of homicide, the defendant's state-of-mind. Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for purposes other than to prove the character of a defendant, only if certain conditions are met: (1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury's presence; (2) The court must determine that a material issue exists other than conduct conforming with a character trait and must upon request state on the record the material issue, the ruling, and the reasons for admitting the evidence; and (3) The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. First, we note that the trial court was required to hold a hearing on the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence only upon request. (emphasis added). The defendant failed to request a 404(b) hearing. Thus, the trial court did not err by failing to conduct a hearing. Technically, it is waived. State v. Jones, 15 S.W.3d 880, 895 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999). Next, the State sought to introduce evidence (1) that Forrest Boyd was not in Dyer County, Tennessee, on January 2, 2000; (2) that the defendant's possession of Forrest Boyd's credit card was unauthorized; and (3) a description of the vehicle. This evidence was relevant to establish premeditation. While evidence had already been introduced that Forrest Boyd's credit card was found at the scene of the murder, no evidence was before the jury at that time that the defendant's possession of the credit card was unauthorized. Similarly, there was no other evidence establishing the fact that the defendant's use of Mr. Boyd's vehicle was unauthorized. Thus, Sheriff Parson's testimony was highly relevant in establishing the defendant's motive for the murder. Finally, we conclude that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. The State's examination of Sheriff Parson and Sheriff Parson's responses were restricted to very vague inquiries as to the presence of Forrest Boyd in Dyer County and whether the use of his credit card and/or car in Dyer County were authorized. No information was elicited regarding the murder of Forrest Boyd. Indeed, there is no indication from the testimony that Forrest Boyd is deceased. Additionally, the prosecution was careful to not elicit the term theft, steal, or an equivalent term from Sheriff Parson. Therefore, for the reasons stated, we conclude that the testimony of Sheriff Parson did not invoke error.