Opinion ID: 2652742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: TVPA Claim

Text: Second, defendants argue that it is impossible to know whether the jury found in favor of plaintiff on the basis of an ATS or TVPA theory of liability. As a consequence, defendants contend, if the ATS claim must be vacated then the judgment must be vacated in its entirety and the cause remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court decades ago announced the so‐called general verdict rule, that “a new trial will be required” where “there is no way to know that [an] invalid claim . . . . was not the sole basis for [a] verdict.” United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass’n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 619 (1959); see also Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 30 (1962); Tire Eng’g & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 313 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that when a jury issues a general verdict on multiple theories of liability and one of those theories is overturned on appeal, the entire verdict falls.”). TVPA claim against WBH. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2012) (holding that “Congress did not extend liability to organizations” under the TVPA). 13 Numerous subsequent courts, however, “have engrafted a . . . harmless error gloss onto the basic principle.” Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 564 (5th Cir. 2006). So it is that we have recognized, in this context, that “[h]armless error arises when we are sufficiently confident that the verdict was not influenced by an error in the jury charge.” Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 759‐760 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009); see also Tire Eng’g & Distribution, 682 F.3d at 314; Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have generously applied the harmless error concept to rescue verdicts where we could be reasonably sure that the jury in fact relied upon a theory with adequate evidentiary support.”). Applying a harmless error analysis to the facts of the instant case, we have no difficulty in concluding, as we discuss below, that there was indeed adequate evidentiary support for a jury to find the defendants liable for torture under the TVPA. Under the straightforward circumstances of this case, plaintiff’s claim brought under the ATS and his claim under the TVPA both stemmed from the same alleged acts of torture, and Khan can point to no circumstances in which the jury could have found him liable under the ATS but not the TVPA. ii. Other Challenges to the TVPA Claim: Extraterritoriality, Torture, and Agency
Defendant Khan also raises other challenges to the validity of judgment entered against him under plaintiff’s TVPA claim. All of his arguments lack merit. 14 First, Khan asserts that the conduct underlying the TVPA claim here “do[es] not ‘touch and concern’ the United States,” Appellant’s Supp. Letter Br. 4 (quoting Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669), and we must therefore exercise a “‘vigilant door keeping’ function,” id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732‐33), to bar it. We find no support in Kiobel or any other authority for the proposition that the territorial constraints on common‐law causes of action under the ATS apply to the statutory cause of action created by the TVPA. Rather, we must conduct a separate statutory analysis with respect to the TVPA to determine whether that statute—not the ATS—“‘gives . . . clear indication of an extraterritorial application.’” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878). Under this separate analysis, we conclude that the TVPA, unlike the ATS, has extraterritorial application. Our analysis begins with the text of the statute. Congress created civil liability in the TVPA, inter alia, for torture and extrajudicial killing carried out by an individual with “actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.” TVPA § 2(a) (emphasis supplied). Although this language could conceivably refer to conduct occurring within the United States, the provision is more naturally understood to address primarily conduct occurring in the territory of foreign sovereigns.7 The legislative history of the TVPA unambiguously supports that conclusion. See S. Rep. No. 102–249, p. 3‐4 (1991) (“A state that practices torture and summary execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law. Consequently, the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) is designed to respond to this situation by providing a civil 7 Justice Kennedy—one of the five Justices who joined the Kiobel majority opinion— explicitly endorsed the extraterritorial reach of the TVPA in his concurring opinion in Kiobel, noting that the TVPA addresses “human rights abuses committed abroad.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 15 cause of action in U.S. courts for torture committed abroad.”); H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, pt. 1, p. 4 (1991) (noting Judge Bork’s skepticism in Tel‐Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), as to whether “victims of torture committed in foreign nations” could bring a cause of action under the ATS absent an explicit grant of a cause of action and stating that the “TVPA would provide such a grant”). Thus, we find no bar on the basis of extraterritoriality to Chowdhury’s TVPA claim.8
Second, Khan argues that the facts presented do not constitute torture under the TVPA, because not all police brutality is actionable under the statute. It is clearly true, of course, that not all conduct falling under the journalistic and political rubric of “police brutality,” whether here or abroad, can be described as “torture,” but a review of the particular facts of this case persuades us that the jury could have properly found the conduct presented to constitute torture under the TVPA. The TVPA defines torture as any act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as Although the parties do not raise the issue, we note that our affirmance of plaintiff’s 8 TVPA claim here necessarily recognizes that aliens—not just American citizens—may bring suit under the TVPA, a conclusion that we have relied upon, but not made explicit, in prior decisions. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 176 n.13 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing “that past holdings of our Court, as well as those of our sister courts of appeals, strongly suggest that TVPA actions may in fact be brought by non‐U.S. citizens,” and collecting authorities), vacated and superseded, on other grounds, on rehearing en banc, 585 F.3d 559, 568 (2d Cir. 2009). 16 obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. TVPA § 3(b)(1). While “torture [under this definition] does not automatically result whenever individuals in official custody are subjected even to direct physical assault,” Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we conclude that the term “torture” can apply to powerful electric shocks administered to the body, when the fact‐finder determines that the shocks are sufficiently severe. This conclusion is bolstered by the numerous courts of appeals that have referred to electric shocks as an instrument of torture. See, e.g., Jean‐Pierre v. U.S. Attorney General, 500 F.3d 1315, 1324 n.6 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that electric shock can constitute torture within the meaning of the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100‐20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, the multilateral international convention upon which the TVPA was based); see also Cherichel v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1002, 1009, n.11 (8th Cir. 2010) (electric shock may rise to the level of torture); Abdel‐Rahman v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 444, 448 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833, 848 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Webster, 392 F.3d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 2004) (same); Price, 294 F.3d at 92‐93; Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (same). Additionally, the TVPA contemplates the “purposes” for which torture might be undertaken by the perpetrator, and specifically lists “intimidating or coercing” the victim among them. 17 TVPA § 3(b)(1). Here, defendants subjected Chowdhury to electric shocks for the distinct purpose of coercing him to relinquish his business interests to Khan. In this case, moreover, the District Court took particular care to instruct the jury on the definition of torture in a manner consistent with the one provided by the TVPA, stating that “[t]he severity requirement is crucial in determining whether conduct is torture” and that “an act must be a deliberate and calculated act of an extremely cruel and inhuman nature specifically intended to inflict excruciating and agonizing physical or mental pain or suffering” in order to constitute torture.9 Joint App’x 213. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff’s allegations of being subject to electric shock while detained by the RAB were properly actionable as torture under the TVPA.
Third, Khan claims that the jury’s verdict was predicated on improper agency theories of liability, arguing that any brutality by RAB agents was not attributable to him. We disagree. The weight of authority makes clear that agency theories of liability are available in the context of a TVPA claim. For a claim of torture to be actionable under the TVPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, that a defendant acted “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.” TVPA § 2(a). To determine whether a defendant acted under color of foreign law, we look to “principles of agency law and to jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995). Under those principles, “[f]or purposes of the Indeed, the District Court further instructed the jury, properly, that not all physical 9 assaults, instances of police brutality, or excessive force rise to the level of torture. 18 TVPA, an individual acts under color of law . . . when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid.” Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d for want of a quorum sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (same); cf. Arar, 585 F.3d at 567‐568 (“[T]o state a claim under the TVPA, [plaintiff] must adequately allege that the defendants possessed power under [foreign] law, and that the offending actions . . . derived from an exercise of that power, or that defendants could not have undertaken their culpable actions absent such power.”). Khan, who was found to have conspired with state authorities in Bangladesh, thus clearly acted under color of law within the meaning of the TVPA. Agency law, however, does not simply apply to the question whether a defendant acts under color of law; it also can provide a theory of tort liability if a defendant did not personally torture the victim. As the Supreme Court recently explained in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012), “Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common‐law adjudicatory principles,” id. at 1709 (quotation marks omitted), and therefore “the TVPA contemplates liability against officers who do not personally execute the torture or extrajudicial killing,” id. (citing Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2009)). Congress has not, in other words, “specified” any “intent” that traditional agency principles should not apply under the TVPA. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287 (2003); see also S. Rep. No. 102‐249, at 9 (1991) (noting that “responsibility for torture . . . extends beyond the person or persons who actually committed those acts”); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the [TVPA] reaches those who ordered, abetted, or assisted in the wrongful act”). Accordingly, an individual can be 19 liable for “subject[ing]” the victim to torture even if his agent administers the torture,10 see TVPA § 2(a)(1), and the District Court did not err in permitting agency theories of liability to be submitted to the jury.11