Opinion ID: 68489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal-Mogul

Text: After a full review of the record, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Boutwell’s claim under Ala. Code § 12-16-8.1 against Federal-Mogul. As an initial matter, Boutwell established a prima facie 8 case by presenting evidence that she was employed by Federal-Mogul5 and that she was terminated while absent on jury duty.6 See Norfolk, 740 So. 2d at 398 (holding that employee established his prima facie case by showing that “he was removed just days after” he served on the jury). Federal-Mogul counters, as it always has, that it legitimately discharged Boutwell for failing to comply with its mandatory call-in policy. Specifically, Federal-Mogul asserts that the undisputed evidence shows that “Boutwell failed to call her supervisor’s cell phone to notify him that she would be absent, and that Federal-Mogul had no knowledge that Boutwell had been selected for a jury and therefore would be absent.” The burden, then, shifts back to Boutwell to demonstrate that this stated reason for the discharge is a pretext for retaliation. 5 On appeal, Federal-Mogul argues that Boutwell can not establish a prima facie case because Kelly Services, not Federal-Mogul, was Boutwell’s employer. This argument has no merit. Under Alabama law, “a temporary services employee is the employee of both his or her general employer (i.e., the employment agency) and his or her special employer (i.e., the employer to which the employment agency assigned the employee to work).” Marlow v. Mid S. Tool Co.,Inc., 535 So. 2d 120, 123 (Ala. 1988). 6 Federal-Mogul also argues on appeal that Boutwell does not establish a prima facie case because she presents no evidence that Grinage or Butler received Boutwell’s messages or otherwise had actual knowledge that she was serving on a jury. We disagree. First, the fact that Federal-Mogul discharged Boutwell while she was on jury duty is sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Norfolk, 740 So. 2d at 398. Moreover, assuming evidence of the employer’s knowledge is required at the prima facie stage, Boutwell presented evidence showing that she followed a procedure authorized by Federal-Mogul to notify her supervisor of her jury service. This evidence is sufficient to raise the inference that FederalMogul had the requisite knowledge. 9 As discussed above, there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Federal-Mogul’s employees were allowed to call either the main line or the supervisor’s cell phone to report absences and that Boutwell called the main line and left voice messages on Monday and Tuesday to report that she would be absent all week. Accordingly, although Boutwell admittedly did not call her supervisor’s cell phone, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether she actually satisfied Federal-Mogul’s mandatory call-in policy. Accordingly, Boutwell has presented evidence indicating that the stated reason for her discharge is false. Federal-Mogul asserts, however, that pretext can not be shown “merely by arguing that Federal-Mogul could (or even should) have known that Boutwell had been selected for a jury or that Federal-Mogul was wrong in believing that she had failed to call in.” Rather, Federal-Mogul argues that Boutwell’s claim fails as a matter of law because she has no direct evidence proving that either Grinage or Butler actually heard her voice messages on the main line or otherwise had actual knowledge that she satisfied the mandatory callin policy. We disagree. First, one struggles to think of what evidence Boutwell could produce to prove that Grinage and/or Butler heard her messages. Butler testified that Federal-Mogul had no system for saving or documenting the messages left on the main line and that “the only evidence [one] would be able to 10 obtain about calls made to [the main line] would be” his testimony. Second, because Boutwell presented evidence showing that she followed a procedure authorized by Federal-Mogul to notify her supervisor of her need to be absent because of jury service, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that FederalMogul had actual knowledge that she was serving on a jury, even in the face of contrary evidence. See Gulf States Steel, Inc. v. Whisenant, 703 So. 2d 899, 907 (Ala. 1997) (“[K]nowledge need not be shown by direct proof. It may be made to appear, like any other fact, by showing circumstances from which the fact or actual knowledge is a legitimate inference.”); Premdor Corp. v. Jones, 880 So. 2d 1148, 1149-55 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (noting that where employer’s policy states that an employee must contact his supervisor upon sustaining a job-related injury, evidence that employee orally told supervisor is sufficient to establish employer’s actual knowledge of the injury); see also Breda v. Wolf Camera & Video, 222 F.3d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that an employer is deemed to have actual notice of the sexual harassment where “an employer has a policy for reporting harassment that is clear and published to its employees, and an employee follows that policy”). Given Boutwell’s testimony that she left messages on the main line and Butler’s testimony that there were no messages from Boutwell on the main line, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Butler is credible and that 11 Federal-Mogul terminated Boutwell’s employment because she failed to call in as required. However, a reasonable fact finder could also conclude that Boutwell is credible, that Butler did receive Boutwell’s voice messages alerting FederalMogul that she was on jury duty, and that he chose to discharge her solely because she served on a jury. Because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Federal-Mogul’s stated reason for discharging Boutwell is a pretext, summary judgment is not appropriate on this claim. Accordingly, we remand this claim to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.