Opinion ID: 209744
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rebuttal of Laches Presumption

Text: A patentee can rebut the presumption of laches by offering evidence to show an excuse for the delay or that the delay was reasonable or by offering evidence sufficient to place the matters of [evidentiary] prejudice and economic prejudice genuinely in issue. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038; see also Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp., 369 F.3d 1289, 1297 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (The laches defense has two underlying elements: first, the [plaintiff's] delay in bringing suit must be `unreasonable and inexcusable,' and second, the [defendant] must have suffered `material prejudice attributable to the delay.' (quoting Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028)). The district court held that Serdarevic had not met her burden of production on either reasonable delay or prejudice. Serdarevic argues that her eight-year delay in bringing suit was reasonable or excusable because of her unfamiliarity with the U.S. patent system, her inability to obtain legal counsel, and her efforts to license her inventorship rights. The district court considered these excuses, but found them insufficient to rebut the presumption that her delay was unreasonable. Serdarevic, . We agree. While Serdarevic herself may have been unfamiliar with the U.S. patent system, she was represented by patent counsel in 1999. Her personal lack of familiarity with the patent system therefore does not excuse her failure to file suit. Nor can her later inability to find counsel willing to pursue her claims on a contingency basis excuse her delay. A patentee's inability to find willing counsel... is widely rejected as a legally cognizable reason to excuse an unreasonable delay in filing suit. Hall, 93 F.3d at 1554. Finally, Serdarevic does not explain  and we do not understand  why her ongoing efforts to license her inventorship rights would prevent her from bringing suit to correct inventorship. If anything, her interest in licensing her claimed invention should have provided a strong incentive for her to correct inventorship as soon as possible. Even taken together, Serdarevic's excuses are insufficient to rebut the presumption that her eight-year delay was unreasonable. There is no basis for us to conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that Serdarevic's delay was unreasonable. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion when it concluded that Serdarevic failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice: Material prejudice ... may be either economic or evidentiary. Evidentiary, or `defense' prejudice, may arise by reason of a defendant's inability to present a full and fair defense on the merits due to the loss of records, the death of a witness, or the unreliability of memories of long past events, thereby undermining the court's ability to judge the facts.... Economic prejudice may arise where a defendant and possibly others will suffer the loss of monetary investments or incur damages which likely would have been prevented by earlier suit. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033 (citations omitted). The district court held that Serdarevic had failed to meet her burden to rebut the presumption of evidentiary prejudice, because three witnesses with knowledge of Serdarevic's inventorship claim  Massin, Maurice, and Berson  all died during the period of her delay, and because of the cumulative and inherent prejudice from the dimming memories of all participants, including Serdarevic herself. Serdarevic, . Because it concluded that Serdarevic had failed to meet her burden of production on evidentiary prejudice, the district court did not reach the issue of economic prejudice. Serdarevic argues that the district court erred in finding evidentiary prejudice, because the three deceased witnesses were not material. Specifically, she claims that the witnesses would only confirm her inventorship claim, that both parties had sufficient documentary evidence to decide the issue of inventorship without their testimony, and that she was willing to forego any reliance on the deceased witnesses. Serdarevic's claim that the witnesses are unimportant is belied by her discussion of interactions with each of the witnesses in the portion of her declaration describing the conception of her invention. As the district court concluded, the witnesses were each important enough to the historical record for Serdarevic to describe her work with them in the declaration she submitted in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id. Moreover, Serdarevic's willingness to forego reliance on the witnesses does not undo the prejudice to the defendants. There are no declarations by the witnesses in the record, and the defendants have had no opportunity to question them. Thus, as the district court concluded, their deaths prevent the defendants from fully investigating Serdarevic's claims. Id. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Serdarevic had failed to rebut the presumption of evidentiary prejudice.