Opinion ID: 750139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Ineffective Assistance Question.

Text: 62 The district court concluded that Fretwell's attorney was ineffective in failing to investigate what other members of Fretwell's immediate family might have known about his father's pervasive child abuse. We disagree. Like defense counsel in Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. at 790, 107 S.Ct. at 3123-24, Fretwell's attorney was aware of some, but not all, of this family history. At counsel's request, the court appointed Dr. Stevens as defense expert. His pretrial report to counsel disclosed the same childhood abuse summarized in his above-quoted trial testimony. Counsel also discussed the issue with Fretwell, who was reluctant to talk about it and never suggested that counsel discuss it with other family members. Finally, although Fretwell's mother testified at the habeas hearing that she had no contact with defense counsel until she came to the trial, the attorney-client conference transcripts reveal that Fretwell and his counsel were in frequent contact with both parents prior to trial, discussing subjects such as whether to hire another psychiatrist to investigate Fretwell's competency, whether the parents would testify that Fretwell was insane, and whether Fretwell should tender a plea of guilty to the court. In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that counsel's investigation of the issue was constitutionally defective. As the Supreme Court said in Strickland: 63 The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. For example, when the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether. 64 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066; see LaRette v. Delo, 44 F.3d 681, 685-86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. LaRette v. Bowersox, 516 U.S. 894, 116 S.Ct. 246, 133 L.Ed.2d 172 (1995); Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547, 1555 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied sub nom. Battle v. Bowersox, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1881, 135 L.Ed.2d 176 (1996); Whitmore v. Lockhart, 8 F.3d 614, 618-22 (8th Cir.1993). This is not a case where counsel failed to make any investigation whatsoever resulting in a total abdication of duty. Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1467 (8th Cir.1983). Counsel's decision not to mount an all-out investigation into petitioner's background in search of mitigating circumstances was supported by reasonable professional judgement. Burger, 483 U.S. at 794, 107 S.Ct. at 3125-26; see Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1387 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 1944, 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989). 65 The district court further concluded that counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to call Fretwell's mother, brothers, and sister to testify as to the abuse he suffered as a child. The decision to call family members as witnesses is a strategic decision. Guinan v. Armontrout, 909 F.2d 1224, 1231 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074, 111 S.Ct. 800, 112 L.Ed.2d 861 (1991). Thus, Fretwell must overcome a strong presumption that his counsel's actions constituted reasonable trial strategy. Snell v. Lockhart, 14 F.3d 1289, 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Snell v. Norris, 513 U.S. 960, 115 S.Ct. 419, 130 L.Ed.2d 334 (1994). Decisions relating to witness selection are normally left to counsel's judgment, and 'this judgment will not be second-guessed by hindsight.'  Williams v. Armontrout, 912 F.2d 924, 934 (8th Cir.1990) (en banc) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1127, 111 S.Ct. 1092, 112 L.Ed.2d 1197 (1991). 66 The record on this issue is unsatisfactory because, at the habeas hearing nine years after Fretwell's trial, all counsel could recall was, I probably didn't see that there was anything to be gained by putting family members on. However, recognizing the strong presumption of reasonable trial strategy, we can readily reconstruct at least two strategic reasons why counsel may have made this decision. First, Fretwell and the family were reluctant to discuss the issue of abuse, and the abuser, Fretwell's father, was alive and attending the trial. Even assuming, as the district court did, that Fretwell's mother and siblings would have risked the father's wrath by testifying as they did at the habeas hearing, counsel could reasonably fear that there might be dramatic and negative consequences if he called other family members to testify on this subject. As the Supreme Court observed in Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. at 793, 107 S.Ct. at 3125, graphic evidence of a defendant's violent and troubled family background is by no means uniformly helpful. 67 The second strategic reason is perhaps more significant. Counsel did present evidence about Fretwell's abusive childhood, the testimony of Fretwell and Dr. Stevens. 4 Though counsel gave this potentially mitigating information to the jury, he elected to focus in closing argument on two factors more directly related to Fretwell's crime, whether the prosecution had proved an aggravating circumstance, and Fretwell's post-arrest cooperation and confessions. Counsel could reasonably fear that too many witnesses on Fretwell's family background would distract the jury from the issues that counsel believed were more likely to avoid the death penalty. In evaluating ineffective assistance claims, [w]e address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled. Laws, 863 F.2d at 1384. Decisions to introduce only some of the available evidence on a point do not, unless deficient in some significant respect, fail the first prong of Strickland. Smith v. Armontrout, 888 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir.1989). There was no significant deficiency here. 68 Fretwell has not demonstrated that the challenged actions of his trial attorney were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to enter judgment denying Fretwell's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.