Opinion ID: 1841380
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mental Health Defense

Text: Grim argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present (through the use of a neuropharmacological expert) a multi-faceted defense based on Grim's intoxication, use of prescribed and illicit drugs, brain damage, and intermittent explosive disorder. The trial court rejected this claim, concluding counsel was limited by Grim's lack of cooperation. The trial court also found that defense counsel conducted a sufficient investigation and made a reasonable professional decision not to secure the services of a neuropharmalogical expert based on the facts of this case. We agree. Grim was represented at trial by Richard Hill and Michael Rollo. Hill was primarily responsible for the guilt phase and Rollo for the penalty phase. Rollo contacted Dr. James Larson, a psychologist, who had several meetings with counsel and interviewed and performed psychological testing on Grim. Larson testified at the evidentiary hearing that Grim previously had been diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder and antisocial personality disorder and had been treated with Depakote and Prozac. He further testified that Grim abused alcohol. Testing showed red flags indicating possible brain damage or an organic brain problem. Larson repeatedly testified that he discussed various defenses with counsel and Grim, but Grim was adamant that he was interested only in exoneration and did not want such information used. Hill testified that the defense at trial was basically one of reasonable doubt. He further testified that he discussed other defenses with Grim, including a possible intoxication defense, but Grim adamantly refusedhe wanted a not guilty verdict or the death penalty. Although Hill had numerous conversations with Grim and advised him that the chances of success were small, Grim did not change his mind. After rejecting all lowered culpability defenses at trial, Grim now claims counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present a defense based on a combination of his voluntary intoxication, drug use, brain damage, and intermittent explosive disorder. We conclude the decision not to employ another expert was reasonable. Trial counsel was aware of Grim's possible brain damage, explosive disorder, use of prescribed drugs, and history of substance abuse. Trial counsel discussed with Grim a possible intoxication defense, but Grim repeatedly refused any defense that would require an admission of guilt or would result in anything other than exoneration. We rejected a similar claim in Henry: [T]he record is clear that Henry was adamant that trial counsel not rely on any evidence of intoxication or addiction in Henry's defense, in either the guilt or penalty phases. When a defendant preempts his attorney's strategy by insisting that a different defense be followed, no claim of ineffectiveness can be made. 937 So.2d at 571 (quoting Rose v. State, 617 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla.1993)). This is not a situation where trial counsel was unaware of the facts underlying a possible defense or completely failed to discuss a possible defense with the defendant. Hill and Larson both discussed possible intoxication-type defenses with Grim. The decision not to hire another expert was based on Grim's refusal to consider a defense that would require an admission of guilt. See Henry, 937 So.2d at 573 (`[T]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions.') (quoting Stewart v. State, 801 So.2d 59, 67 (Fla.2001)). Therefore, Grim's claim fails the first Strickland prong. Further, there is no prejudice. Grim would not even allow counsel to utilize Larson at trial. Had trial counsel consulted another expert, there is no evidence that Grim would have changed his mind and permitted trial counsel to use that expert. Trial court findings that Grim's lack of cooperation limited trial counsel and that trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation are supported by competent, substantial evidence.