Opinion ID: 1189753
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Bynum's right to procedural due process violated by the parole board in imposing supplemental conditions of parole?

Text: The United States and the Alaska Constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Alaska Const. art. 1, § 7. In this case, Bynum contends that an Alaska inmate has a constitutionally protected liberty interest relating to mandatory parole conditions. Although Bynum does not succinctly describe this interest, we gather that it entails the right to be free from inappropriate conditions of parole  those which unduly interfere with a parolee's personal and property rights. The State takes no issue with Bynum's contention that he has a protected liberty interest in conditions of parole and we accept this implied concession. The question presented in this case is whether the procedures afforded Bynum to challenge the special conditions of parole comply with the principle of due process. We have stated that questions of this type depend on the nature of the government function involved and the private interest affected by the government action. Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 353 (Alaska 1988) (quoting Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 436 (Alaska 1979)). More specifically, we have followed the lead of the Supreme Court of the United States which in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), stated that in order to determine what due process requires, three factors must be considered: [F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903, quoted in Hilbers v. Mun. of Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31, 36 (Alaska 1980). The Supreme Court has invoked the Mathews formulation in reviewing parole procedures. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 14, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2107, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). In order to assess the constitutional adequacy of the procedures available to Bynum, the procedures must first be identified. Alaska Statute 33.20.030 provides for mandatory parole at the expiration of the term of sentence less the time deducted for good conduct. Alaska Statute 33.20.040 commits the disposition of a mandatory parolee to the parole board under AS 33.16. Part of the AS 33.16 parole system governs the imposition of parole conditions. Alaska Statute 33.16.150(a) sets forth a condition that all parolees must obey the law. Subsection (b) of that section sets forth seventeen other conditions that [t]he board may require of parolees. The Alaska statutes, however, do not set forth how the parole board is to impose these conditions. Rather, AS 33.16.060(b)(3) provides that [t]he board shall adopt regulations ... governing procedures of the board. By regulation, the department has established fourteen standard conditions of parole. 22 AAC 20.200(a). It has also set forth the general procedural framework for imposing supplemental conditions. Under 22 AAC 20.270(b), [a] prisoner for whom the board is considering imposing a supplemental or special condition of parole under 22 AAC 20.205 will be provided a reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposed condition before its imposition... . (Emphasis added.) [7] Prospective mandatory parolees are given notice of proposed conditions prior to their release. A request form filled out by an institutional probation officer suggesting special parole conditions is supplied to the inmate. If such a form is not used the inmate is given a copy of the conditions proposed by the board or a board member. Upon receiving notice of the proposed special conditions, the inmate is given ten days to comment on them. Under 22 AAC 20.205 any member of the parole board may impose supplemental conditions of parole. [8] Supplemental conditions must bear a reasonable relationship to the parolee's offense and behavior. Thus, 22 AAC 20.205(a) gives the board, or an individual member, discretion to impose any supplemental condition that reasonably relates to the parolee's offense, prior record, prior behavior, current circumstances, or perceived risk to the community. Once conditions of parole are set, an inmate or a parolee may request a modification of the conditions. 22 AAC 20.215. Such requests are made in writing and decided by the board on the record without an interview of the parolee. The board must decide such cases within forty-five days after receipt of the request. The board's decision must be in writing and must be accompanied by the reason for the decision. 22 AAC 20.215(3) and (4). The board may order a formal hearing conducted by a hearing officer if the change in parole conditions warrants it. 22 AAC 20.215(d). Bynum argues that (1) the inmate should be given notice of the proposed conditions 120 days before the date of release and that the notice should include a statement of the reasons and the evidentiary basis for each condition, (2) the inmate should be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard after receiving notice of the proposed conditions, including at least fifteen days within which to respond, (3) the board should be required to issue a written decision listing the conditions that will be imposed and stating the basis for its decision, and (4) a hearing should be held if the conditions proposed are intended to restrict or impinge upon constitutional rights. Bynum presents his argument in the abstract. He seems to assume that he has the right to raise hypothetical due process violations which might occur in some cases but did not occur in his case. He lacks standing to do this. [9] Thus our primary focus is on what happened to Bynum, not what might happen. We now address each of his four arguments concerning due process.
Due process traditionally entails a requirement of reasonable notice. One hundred twenty days advance notice of proposed parole conditions is certainly reasonable, as are many shorter periods. Bynum in fact received 120 days advance notice. Thus no due process violation occurred concerning the length of the notice. Bynum also argues that the State should be required to include a statement of reasons for each proposed condition and a statement of the evidence to be relied upon. However, he does not argue that he was prejudiced by the State's failure to provide such information. Although a statement of reasons may help an inmate formulate a written response in some cases, it is not generally necessary to satisfy due process requirements. In addition, the evidence available to the board is available to the inmate. See 22 AAC 05.095(b), (h). Like the board, the inmate can review the record which will be before the board and argue that it does not support imposing certain challenged parole conditions. A requirement that the notice specify the evidence which supports proposed special conditions would require additional work for State corrections officials and provide little, if any, additional benefit for the inmate.
Bynum's second request is that inmates be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Bynum does not argue under this point that a meaningful opportunity to be heard includes an evidentiary hearing. He treats that contention separately. See infra point 4. Under the present heading he contends that the inmate should have the opportunity to present evidence to either correct inaccuracies in his file or demonstrate that there is no basis for imposing a given condition of parole. He also contends that the inmate should be given fifteen rather than ten days within which to respond. The regulations provide that when the board is considering imposing special conditions, the inmate will be given a reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposed condition before its imposition. 22 AAC 20.270(b). We construe this to mean that the inmate will be permitted to submit written material, including the statements of others, in an attempt to correct errors in his records, respond to concerns implicit in the notice of proposed conditions and otherwise support his position. These procedures afford the inmate an opportunity to be heard and to represent his interests. That is all that due process requires. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348, 96 S.Ct. at 909; Keyes v. Humana Hosp, 750 P.2d at 353 (The crux of due process is an opportunity to be heard and the right to adequately represent one's interests.). Bynum does not claim that he was prevented from making any such submissions. Bynum also contends that due process requires at a minimum fifteen days within which to object to proposed conditions rather than the ten days which he was given. In the abstract, this argument may be correct, especially if the inmate intends to file extensive opposition in an effort to correct mistakes in the record. Such an effort could easily take more than ten days given the restrictions placed on prisoners. However, Bynum filed his opposition within four days of receiving notice of the proposed conditions, did not ask for additional time to submit more material, and does not identify any manner in which he was prejudiced by the ten-day period. Thus his claim that his due process rights were violated by an unduly short response period was correctly rejected.
Bynum argues that in order to preclude the possibility of arbitrary or mistaken decisions by the board, it is necessary for the board to provide the inmate with a final written decision listing the imposed conditions and stating the basis for its decision. Under 22 AAC 20.205, supplemental conditions must reasonably relate to the parolee's offense, prior record, prior behavior, current circumstances, or perceived risk to the community. We have ruled in a broad variety of administrative adjudications that the decision maker should identify the reasons for his decision. We reviewed the law on this subject in City of Nome v. Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska, 707 P.2d 870, 875 (Alaska 1985): Even absent a statutory duty to make findings, an agency that makes an adjudicative decision must articulate its reasons. See Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Ryherd, 628 P.2d 557, 562 (Alaska 1981) (requiring findings in formal adjudications); Fields v. Kodiak City Council, 628 P.2d 927, 933 (Alaska 1981) (requiring findings in informal adjudications). Such findings facilitate judicial review, insure careful administrative deliberation, assist the parties in preparing for review, and restrain agencies within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Fields, 628 P.2d at 932 (quoting Mobile Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Comm'n, 518 P.2d 92, 97 n. 11 (Alaska 1974)). The reasons for requiring decisional grounds to be expressed are applicable to decisions of the parole board concerning challenged conditions of parole. As noted, supplemental conditions must bear a reasonable relationship to the parolee's offense, prior record, prior behavior, current circumstances or perceived risk to the community. 22 AAC 20.205(a). Requiring a statement of reasons will focus the board's attention on the need for this relationship and, using the terms of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903, reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the parolee's] interest. Reasons need not be expressed with formality, however, thus this requirement should not prove to be unduly burdensome. In this case the expression of reasons by the individual parole board member who imposed the supplemental conditions after reviewing Bynum's comments, are, in form, minimally sufficient. [10]
Finally, Bynum argues that if the proposed supplemental conditions are intended to restrict or impinge upon [an inmate's] constitutional rights, a hearing must be provided. At least two of the special conditions imposed on Bynum implicate constitutional rights: submission to searches for drugs and for alcohol. Bynum cites Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977), to support his argument that due process requires a hearing prior to the imposition of these conditions. In Roman, we recognized that conditioning release on consent to searches is consistent with the goal of rehabilitation and necessary for the proper functioning of the parole system. Id. at 1242. However, we also stated that a search condition could be imposed only by the parole board and only after the parolee has an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 1244. The procedure followed in the present case meets both of the foregoing requirements. The parole board approved all of the search conditions imposed on Bynum. Additionally, Bynum was given the opportunity to object to each of the proposed conditions and state the reasons for his objections. Bynum does not present any specific arguments why these procedures did not afford the process required by Roman. [11] Based on the foregoing we conclude that the procedures employed to impose special parole conditions on Bynum satisfied due process requirements. Bynum was given notice of the proposed conditions, he had an opportunity to make his objections to them known and to correct any mistaken facts on which they were based, and the board member who imposed the conditions explained his reasons for rejecting Bynum's objections. No more is required.