Opinion ID: 1718704
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Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Hudson Had Authority to Enter Into a Settlement Agreement.

Text: For their alternative contention, the appellants assert there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hudson had authority from the appellants to enter into the settlement agreement on their behalf. This was the issue the district court decided, and the court decided Hudson did have such authority. Iowa Code section 602.10114 provides that an attorney has power to [b]ind a client to any agreement, in respect to any proceeding within the scope of the attorney's or counselor's proper duties and powers. . . . Iowa Code § 602.10114(2) (1997). An attorney's offer of settlement is generally within the scope of the attorney's litigation duties. See Strong v. Rothamel, 523 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa App. 1994); Starlin v. State, 450 N.W.2d 257, 258 (Iowa App.1989). However, an attorney cannot settle or compromise a case without authority. Dillon v. City of Davenport, 366 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Iowa 1985). If a settlement is made with authority, that settlement is binding on the client. Id.; see Iowa Code § 602.10114(2). An attorney is presumed to act with authority. Dillon, 366 N.W.2d at 923. The presumption, however, is not conclusive and may be rebutted. Id. The presumption is overcome only by clear and satisfactory proof. Lonning v. Lonning, 199 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1972). In its ruling granting the motion for partial summary judgment, the district court noted that Hudson stated at the hearing that all of the defendants, including the appellants, had agreed to the settlement. Hudson's statement to the court was a professional statement. A professional statement means a statement of fact presented to the court by an attorney in connection with a matter then before such court, verified in effect by the oath of such attorney, and designed or calculated to aid or influence the court in the determination of a given cause or issue. State v. Williams, 315 N.W.2d 45, 53 (Iowa 1982) (quoting Cogley v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 257 Iowa 1381, 1386-87, 137 N.W.2d 310, 313 (1965)). Additionally, a professional statement is a technique, used as a matter of convenience and practical necessity to establish a record of matters peculiarly within the knowledge of an attorney. In offering a professional statement an attorney pledges the honor of his profession and his personal integrity. It has the effect of an affidavit. Id. (quoting State v. Brewer, 247 N.W.2d 205, 212 (Iowa 1976)). Hudson's statement to the district court regarding the extent of his authority clearly concerned a matter within his knowledge. Because the statement had the status of an affidavit, the district court could properly consider it. See Wende, 530 N.W.2d at 95. In addition to Hudson's professional statement, the district court noted that according to Kahler's affidavit Hudson through Kahlerhad authority from all the defendants to enter into the settlement agreement and to sign the notation of settlement agreement. We agree with the district court's assessment of Kahler's affidavit. Like the district court, we find nothing in the summary judgment record to refute Kahler's affidavit on this point. To further support its conclusion, the district court cited the following language from the Statement of Disputed Facts signed by Hudson on behalf of those defendants resisting Gilbride's motion for partial summary judgment: Prior to trial in the spring of [1998] the parties, through their attorneys of record, negotiated a settlement which is evidenced by the Notation of Settlement Agreement filed in this record, reliance upon which trial date was missed. Said settlement was negotiated in good faith by both of the attorneys and all of the parties in this matter. The only defense Hudson presented at the summary judgment hearing was based on the following italicized language in the first sentence of the notation of settlement agreement: COMES NOW, Eldon J. Winkel, attorney for plaintiff and James C. Hudson, attorney for defendants, and hereby state that the above-entitled case was set for trial on April 23, 1998, however, prior thereto the parties, through their respective undersigned attorneys, entered into a binding settlement agreement in consideration for the ultimate dismissal of the above-entitled cause upon the proper execution by all interested parties to carry out the terms of the settlement agreement. (Emphasis added.) Hudson's defense (which the appellants have not urged on appeal) was that there was to be no settlement until the deeds were signed. The district court properly rejected the argument, stating its reasoning as follows: That phrase [upon the proper execution by all interested parties to carry out the terms of the settlement agreement] is obviously a statement of time when something would happen, namely, dismissal of the lawsuit. If the phrase is read in context with what appears immediately before it, it becomes clear that the parties have agreed that the lawsuit would be dismissed upon proper execution by all interested parties of whatever documents are necessary to carry out the terms of the settlement. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the appellants have not demonstrated that there was record evidence generating a genuine issue of material fact on whether Hudson had the authority to settle on their behalf. They make much of the fact that witnesses did not testify as to the nature of the communications between Hudson, Kahler, and the other defendants. They repeatedly argue that the record is thin and that we simply don't know on this record who said what, when they said it, and what exactly happened. However, the appellants had the burden to adequately resist the summary judgment motion once Gilbride presented a record of undisputed facts that sufficiently supported summary judgment. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(c), (e); see also Humphries v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 566 N.W.2d 869, 872-73 (Iowa 1997) (A factual issue does not arise simply from the claim that one exists.). They cannot now assert that a thin record warrants a reversal of the summary judgment when they presented nothing to generate a genuine issue of material fact.