Opinion ID: 1359265
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Evidence of Gang Activity

Text: As previously mentioned (see pt. I.A.3., ante ), the prosecution called Deputy Sheriff Ronnie Williams, an expert in juvenile gangs, to testify. Deputy Williams was assigned to the street gang detail at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Lennox Sub-Station; for the previous four and one-half to five years his work had involved the investigation of street gangs in the Lennox area. He testified as follows: Deputy Williams was familiar with the Raymond Avenue Crips. That gang's prime hangout was Helen Keller Park. Defendant Ross, defendant Champion, and Evan Malett (identified by Mary and Cora Taylor as the man who held a gun during the robbery in which Michael Taylor was murdered) had each told Williams that they were members of the Raymond Avenue Crips. According to other gang members, the gang's nicknames for defendant Ross were Evil and Little Evil; Champion's gang nickname was originally Mr. Crazy 8, and later Treacherous, Trech, and Mr. Trech. Champion, Ross, and Malett were all members of a subgroup of the Raymond Avenue Crips called the Old Gangsters, because they had been gang members for a long time. Deputy Williams also testified about a brown Buick automobile. As we discussed earlier in our summary of the facts, sheriff's deputies saw four Black males in a brown Buick automobile, driving without its headlights, on the night Michael Taylor was murdered. When they attempted to stop the car, it took off at high speed. The deputies gave chase; the car struck a curb and was abandoned by its occupants. Inside the car, police found items stolen from the Taylors' apartment as well as the.357-caliber Ruger revolver stolen from the Hassan residence. According to Deputy Williams, a man named Frank Harris owned the Buick. Three of Harris's sons  Lavell, Marcus, and Michael Player  were members of the Raymond Avenue Crips. Deputy Williams had seen Marcus and Michael Player driving the Buick. In the months immediately preceding the murders of the Hassans and Michael Taylor, Williams had frequently observed defendants together with the Player brothers and Malett. Deputy Williams explained that gang members use graffiti to advertise their gang membership. He had taken three photographs of gang graffiti in the neighborhood of Helen Keller Park. Two of the photographs, which were admitted into evidence, showed a circle with the number 8 and the letters O/R/C. The circle and the number 8 identified defendant Champion by his earlier nickname, Mr. Crazy 8, and the letters O/R/C stood for Old Raymond Crips. The third photograph showed a building diagonally across the street from the home of Michael Taylor. On the building was written Trecherous, Popeye, Raymond Avenue Crips Cuzzins, and do-re-me and a dollar sign. According to Deputy Williams, Treacherous was defendant Champion's nickname, Popeye was the name of another member of the Raymond Crips, and the word do-re-me and a dollar sign referred to the obtaining of money in a robbery or burglary. Deputy Williams identified the persons appearing in a set of four photographs found in defendant Champion's bedroom when he was arrested. One photograph showed Lavel Player clasping defendant Ross's left hand, while Ross held a revolver in his right hand. A second photograph depicted defendant Ross embracing Marcus Player. A third showed defendant Champion standing in the kitchen, brandishing a revolver, while the fourth depicted Lavel Player holding a bat, with a gun (apparently the same revolver) thrust into the top of his trousers. Deputy Williams also identified three other photographs, which an anonymous person had given him. Two of the photos showed defendant Champion standing face-to-face with Marcus Player, while the third depicted defendant Champion making a Raymond Crip sign with his hand. Deputy Williams also identified Bobby Hassan, Jr., who was the son of murder victim Bobby Hassan and the brother of murder victim Eric Hassan, as a junior member of the Raymond Avenue Crips gang. (11a) Defendants contend that Deputy Williams's testimony was inadmissible and prejudicial. They rely on a variety of theories. Defendants first argue that the prosecution failed to show that they were members of the Raymond Avenue Crips gang when the crimes in this case occurred. Not so. Deputy Williams testified that defendants admitted to him that they were members of the gang. Defendants contend that they made these admissions to Williams several years before the murders in this case, and that Williams never demonstrated that they were gang members when the murders occurred. This objection goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of Williams's testimony. Based on Williams's testimony that defendants had admitted their gang membership, and that they continued to associate with other admitted gang members until the time of the murders, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendants were still members of the Raymond Avenue Crips at the time of the murders. Defendants next argue that evidence of their gang membership was irrelevant to any issue in the case, and was a prosecutorial attempt to prove them guilty by association. We disagree. The prosecution offered substantial evidence that members of the Raymond Avenue Crips participated in the murders of Michael Taylor, Bobby Hassan, and Eric Hassan. Items stolen during each of the murders were found in a car owned by the father of three members of the gang: Lavell, Marcus, and Michael Player. Two witnesses identified another gang member, Evan Malett, as a participant in one of the murders. Given this evidence, proof that defendants were members of the same gang formed a significant evidentiary link in the chain of proof tying them to the crimes in this case. Moreover, evidence that defendants were members of the Raymond Avenue Crips gang was important to explain the portion of the tape-recorded conversation between defendants in which they discussed Bobby Hassan, Jr. (the son of murder victim Bobby Hassan and the brother of murder victim Eric Hassan). As set forth previously (see pt. II.D., ante ), defendant Ross asked defendant Champion: He ain't never said nothing? Defendant Champion responded: No, he's a punk ass. These otherwise cryptic comments became significant if defendants and Bobby Hassan, Jr., were members of the same gang. Because the evidence showed them to be members of the Raymond Avenue Crips, the jury could reasonably infer that Bobby Hassan, Jr., could, through his gang association, have learned of defendants' participation in the murders with which they were charged, that defendants were concerned that he might reveal that information to the police, and that they were discussing this possibility in their tape-recorded conversation. Deputy Williams's testimony that defendants and Bobby Hassan, Jr., were members of the same gang was thus important to give meaning to defendants' discussion. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid. Code, § 210.) We have said that evidence is relevant if it tends `logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference' to establish material facts such as identity, intent or motive. ( People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 177 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664].) Here, as explained above, evidence that defendants were members of the same gang as other persons involved in the commission of the crimes in this case fortified the testimony of the persons who identified defendants as participants in the murders. Thus, evidence of defendants' gang membership tended logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to establish their identities as perpetrators of those offenses, and the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion ( ibid. ) when it determined that the evidence of gang membership was relevant. (See People v. Plasencia (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 546, 553 [223 Cal. Rptr. 786].) (12) Defendants contend that even if the gang membership was relevant, the trial court should nevertheless have excluded that evidence because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (Evid. Code, § 352.) They note that juvenile gangs have been the subject of widespread publicity regarding their illegal and violent activities, and argue that evidence of gang membership creates the risk that the jury will improperly infer that a defendant has a criminal disposition, and therefore is guilty of the offenses charged. ( People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 945; People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 905 [184 Cal. Rptr. 165, 647 P.2d 569]; In re Wing Y. (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 69 [136 Cal. Rptr. 390].) As defendants point out, evidence of a defendant's criminal disposition is inadmissible to prove that he committed a specific criminal act. (Evid. Code, § 1101.) Because evidence that a criminal defendant is a member of a juvenile gang may have a highly inflammatory impact on the jury ( People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 660 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351]), trial courts should carefully scrutinize such evidence before admitting it. In this case, however, the trial court reasonably concluded that the probative value of the evidence of gang membership was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. As we explained previously, such evidence was significant to connect defendants to the car in which the police found property stolen during the Hassan and Taylor murders, to link them with another gang member (Even Malett) identified as a participant in one of the murders, and to demonstrate their relationship with Bobby Hassan, Jr., a gang member who was also the son of victim Bobby Hassan. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' challenge, under Evidence Code section 352, to the admissibility of Deputy Williams's testimony that defendants were members of the Raymond Avenue Crips. (See People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 175 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862] [Evidence of gang membership relevant and admissible.].) (11b) Defendants argue that even if this evidence was admissible, the trial court should not have permitted Deputy Williams to testify that their monickers were Treacherous and Evil, and that they were members of a subgroup of the Raymond Avenue Crips called the Old Gangsters. Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court should have excluded this evidence, there is no reasonable probability that the trial court's error in permitting this testimony affected the jury's verdict. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) The error was therefore harmless. Furthermore, defendant Ross never objected to Deputy Williams's testimony that Ross's nickname was Evil. [13] He is therefore barred from raising this objection on appeal. ( People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 635.) Defendants further complain that the trial court erred in permitting Deputy Williams to testify regarding the gang-related graffiti. In particular, defendant Champion argues that the trial court should have barred Williams from testifying about the graffiti on a building across the street from the Taylor residence, containing the words Treacherous, Popeye, Raymond Avenue Crips Cuzzins, and do-re-me together with a dollar sign. As we mentioned earlier, Deputy Williams testified that Treacherous was defendant Champion's nickname, Popeye was the name of another member of the Raymond Crips, and the word do-re-me with a dollar sign referred to the obtaining of money in a robbery or burglary. Assuming that defendant Champion adequately objected to this testimony, [14] any error in admitting the graffiti testimony was harmless. Although it could be inferred from the graffiti that defendant Champion participated in the robbery and murder of Michael Taylor, defendant Champion was neither charged with nor convicted of those offenses. Any bearing the graffiti had on Champion's guilt of the crimes of which the jury eventually convicted him  the robberies and murders of Bobby and Eric Hassan  was tangential, and not likely to affect the outcome of the case. (13) Defendants contend that the trial court should have excluded two photographs used by Deputy Williams at the trial. One of the photographs showed defendant Ross brandishing a revolver; the other photograph depicted defendant Champion with the same gun. These photographs were highly relevant. A prosecution expert testified that the gun depicted in each photograph was a Colt revolver, either a .357 or a .38 Special. The same expert, analyzing the bullet that killed Bobby Hassan, determined that the bullet was .357-caliber; the bullet bore markings (produced by the gun that fired it) that the expert described as six lands and grooves with a left hand twist. According to the expert, Colt revolvers of the type depicted in the photographs fire .357-caliber bullets. Bullets fired by such revolvers have six lands and grooves with a left-hand twist. Photographs showing both defendants in possession of the type of gun used to kill Bobby Hassan were obviously relevant, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. (14) Defendants assert that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to recall Deputy Williams to explain the meaning of a number of the words used by defendants in their tape-recorded conversation in the van transporting them to the jail. [15] They contend that this testimony was beyond the scope of Williams's expertise. We do not agree. Because Deputy Williams had spent a number of years investigating and associating with juvenile gangs, the trial court could reasonably conclude he was sufficiently familiar with gang terminology to accurately interpret the words used by defendants. The use of an expert for this purpose is not uncommon. (See, e.g., People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1111; People v. Velasquez (1976) 54 Cal. App.3d 695, 699 [126 Cal. Rptr. 656].) Here, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the meaning of some of the words used by defendants were sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.... (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) Defendants also contend that the deputy's testimony was irrelevant and that its primary purpose was to stress that defendants spoke a different language than the members of the jury, thereby playing on the jurors' fears of the unknown and of ethnic or social minorities. Because defendants did not object to Deputy Williams's testimony on this ground, they are barred from asserting it on appeal. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 786, fn. 7 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].) Defendants' objections to the admissibility of Deputy Williams's testimony were made in limine, immediately before Williams testified. After the prosecution's offer of proof regarding the deputy's proposed testimony, the trial court overruled defendants' objections. Defendants characterize the prosecutor's offer of proof as misleading, because it did not describe certain aspects of Williams's testimony that suggested it lacked reliability and did not mention that Williams would give highly prejudicial testimony. These omissions, defendants contend, undermined the trial court's ability to properly exercise its discretion when ruling on the admissibility of Williams's testimony. We have examined the prosecutor's offer of proof; in our view, it is essentially accurate. To the extent that there were variations between the offer of proof and Deputy Williams's testimony, defendants should have brought them to the court's attention and should have requested that Williams's testimony be stricken. Because they failed to do so, they now may not now complain of any such variations. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 142 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559].) Defendants assert that the admission of Deputy Williams's testimony rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, thereby violating their right to due process of law; that the prosecution used this testimony to prove them guilty by association, in violation of their First Amendment right to freedom of association; and that Deputy Williams's testimony regarding the gang-related graffiti violated their Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses. We find no constitutional violation. As we have discussed, the trial court properly admitted the vast majority of Deputy Williams's testimony. Those portions of Williams's testimony that the trial court should have excluded did not render defendants' trial fundamentally unfair, and did not violate their right to due process of law.