Opinion ID: 2263240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Variance/Constructive Amendment

Text: [¶ 17] Although Mr. Dougherty includes this argument with other complaints about the jury instructions, his first point of error implicates broad constitutional rights; consequently, we will address it separately. He claims that there was a fatal variance between the information and the jury instructions and/or a constructive amendment to the charge at trial. A variance is demonstrated when the evidence presented at trial proves facts different from those alleged in the information or indictment. Reversal is not required, however, unless the defendant could not have anticipated from the indictment or information what evidence would be admitted at trial, or the conviction would not bar subsequent prosecution. Spagner v. State, 2009 WY 12, ¶ 15, 200 P.3d 793, 800 (Wyo.2009). Because the question of whether there was a variance between the charge and the crime proven at trial implicates constitutional notice requirements, our review is de novo. Id., ¶ 14, 200 P.3d at 800. [¶ 18] Although this Court has not specifically discussed the related issue of constructive amendment, the concept is well defined in federal law. A constructive amendment occurs when the evidence presented at trial, together with the jury instructions, alter the charge so much that the defendant is convicted of a different crime than was charged. See, e.g., United States v. Farr, 536 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir.2008); United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir.2009). To constitute a constructive amendment, the district court proceedings must modify an essential element of the offense or raise the possibility that the defendant was convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment. Where an indictment properly pleads violation of a statute, and the defendant was not misled about the nature of the charges, his substantive rights are not prejudiced. Id. at 1182. [¶ 19] The amended information charged Mr. Dougherty as follows: 1. On or about the 20th day of February, 2008; 2. In the County of Laramie and the State of Wyoming; 3. RICKY L[.] DOUGHERTY; 4. Did unlawfully and knowingly commit an[] indecent or obscene act in the presence of a child, to wit: did masturbate in the presence of H.C. (DOB //   ), in violation of W.S. § 6-4-403(b)(iii), 2003 Lexis. The jury was instructed on the elements of the crime as follows: The elements of the crime of Endangering a Child by an Obscene or Indecent Act, as charged in this case, are: 1. On or about the 20th day of February, 2008; 2. In Laramie County, Wyoming; 3. The Defendant, RICKY L. DOUGHERTY; 4. Knowingly committed an obscene or indecent act; 5. In the presence of a child under the age of 16 years. [¶ 20] The information contained the details of the charged crime, i.e., masturbating in the presence of H.C., while the jury instruction did not. However, the State's theory of the case remained consistent throughout the legal proceedings and the evidence presented at trial precisely tracked the information in terms of the victim and the nature of the criminal activity. Mr. Dougherty had sufficient notice of the charges and the facts which would be presented at trial. He was not subjected to an unconstitutional variance. [¶ 21] Mr. Dougherty claims that, by failing to provide the particulars to the jury in the instructions, the charge was constructively amended. He points to federal cases which state that, if the charging document includes particulars, the jury instructions and the evidence introduced at trial must comport with those particulars. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 902 (10th Cir.2006), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1181-82. In Bishop, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a constructive amendment to the charge occurred when the indictment charged the defendant with unlawful possession of a 9 mm pistol, but during the trial the state introduced evidence that he unlawfully possessed a .38 caliber bullet and the jury was instructed that it could find him guilty if it concluded that he possessed either the pistol or the bullet. Bishop, 469 F.3d at 900, 902-03. [¶ 22] Bishop demonstrates that changing the particulars of a charge may result in a constructive amendment; however, the reasoning is not applicable to the case at bar. The information in the present case specifically indicated that the indecent or obscene act was masturbating in the presence of a specific child, H.C., while the jury instruction did not contain those particulars. Nevertheless, unlike in Bishop, the evidence presented at trial did not differ from that included in the information. [¶ 23] The jury was instructed to determine whether Mr. Dougherty's conduct was indecent or obscene. There was no possible alternative offense at issue in the trial and, therefore, no possibility that he was convicted of an offense not included in the charging document. Mr. Dougherty certainly cannot claim that he was misled by the nature of the charge or surprised by the evidence presented at trial. We, therefore, reject his claim that he was subjected to an unconstitutional variance or constructive amendment of the information.