Opinion ID: 1100512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absolute LiabilityWhether the Installation of Metal Sheeting is Pile Driving

Text: We first consider whether the Third Circuit correctly determined that the absolute liability standard of La. Civ.Code art. 667 applied to the plaintiff's claim, because the plaintiff had demonstrated, as a matter of law, that the defendants engaged in the ultrahazardous activity of pile driving when they installed metal sheeting in the ground near his home. We find that the plain language of article 667, along with jurisprudence considering this article's application to the activity at issue and deposition testimony submitted by the defendants, do not support the Third Circuit's conclusion. Rather, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the installation of metal sheeting is not pile driving under article 667. We begin the analysis in support of our conclusion with the relevant language of article 667: [T]he proprietor is answerable for damages without regard to his knowledge or his exercise of reasonable care, if the damage is caused by an ultrahazardous activity. An ultrahazardous activity as used in this Article is strictly limited to pile driving or blasting with explosives. La. Civ.Code art. 667. This article imposes absolute liability only where the proprietor engages in an ultrahazardous activity. Id. The article provides that ultrahazardous activities are strictly limited to pile driving and blasting with explosives. Id. (emphasis added). The article's language limiting ultrahazardous activities to pile driving and blasting was added as part of sweeping tort reform undertaken by the Louisiana legislature in 1996. See Acts 1996, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 1, § 1. In light of the 1996 amendment, Louisiana courts are relieved of the responsibility to decide whether a certain activity is ultrahazardous for purposes of deciding whether the absolute liability standard applies. See, e.g., Mossy Motors, Inc. v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of City of New Orleans, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/12/99), 753 So.2d 269 (discussing the 1996 amendment and noting that [t]he new definition by amendment defines an ultrahazardous activity legislatively). Article 667 now clearly articulates that the only cognizable ultrahazardous activities are pile driving and blasting with explosives. Any other activities besides the two the article specifically lists are not ultrahazardous for purposes of article 667. Thus, to qualify for the absolute liability standard, the plaintiff must show that the activity complained of is either pile driving or blasting with explosives. The plaintiff argues, and the court of appeal agreed, that the defendants' installation of metal sheeting constituted pile driving. The term pile driving is not defined in article 667. However, the Fifth Circuit, in Vicknair v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/30/04), 871 So.2d 514, 521, found that pile driving in article 667 did not encompass the installation of sheeting, the precise activity defendants' undertook in the present case. In Vicknair, 871 So.2d at 516, the defendant was hired to perform an emergency sewer repair near the plaintiffs' home. As part of the repair job, the defendant installed steel sheeting using a vibratory hammer, and used a backhoe to drive wood sheeting. [11] Id. at 517. The plaintiffs' alleged that these activities caused damage to their home, including a cracked slab, ceiling, and walls. Id. at 516. The plaintiffs argued that the work performed by the defendant constituted pile driving, an ultrahazardous activity, and that their claim was subject to the absolute liability standard rather than the more onerous negligence standard. Id. at 521. The Vicknair court disagreed, finding that the activities at issue did not constitute pile driving. Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs' own expert testified that no pile driving was performed. Id. Further support for the conclusion that the installation of sheeting is not pile driving is found in the deposition of Mike Moore, Boh Brothers' superintendent on site for the Belle Terre Coulee Project. Describing the equipment that would be used to perform pile driving, as he understood that term, Moore stated, Oh, you would have a crane with a hundred-foot boom, a big old heavy set of leads, you would have an air hammer, you would have an air compressor half the size of this room to drive  drive the air ... but we didn't have that on this job. Comparing the installation of metal sheeting and the activity normally considered to be pile driving in the construction industry, Moore observed, [A] sheeting is like a sliver, it just  there's not much vibration because it just  it's like it just slivers on the ground, where a pile you've got something two foot round and you're beating it to go in a pile. The ground up-heaves, it's got  you know, you put a piling in one spot, you've got mud displaced and it's got to go somewhere. But with the sheeting that's why a sheeting is done, is because it's real thin and it just slides in the mud; there's not much vibration. Moore maintained throughout his deposition testimony that no pile driving was performed in the Belle Terre Coulee project, and distinguished the potential vibrations caused by installing metal sheeting as compared to that caused by conventional pile driving. We find that the court of appeal erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the installation of metal sheeting in this case constituted the ultrahazardous activity of pile driving. We find, rather, that the trial court correctly determined, as a matter of law, that the installation of sheeting is not pile driving. We find that article 667's strict limitation of ultrahazardous activities to pile driving and blasting indicates a legislative intent to restrict application of the absolute liability standard to the activity generally considered to be pile driving in the construction industry, namely, using a crane and air hammer to drive broad-based pilings, for the purpose of providing support to a structure. The work the defendants performed in this case is not pile driving as that term is understood in the construction industry. The defendants have demonstrated that the material driven in this case, thin metal sheets, and the equipment used, a backhoe, differed from the materials and equipment involved in conventional pile driving. It is not sufficient to show that there may be some similarities between the activities of installing metal sheeting and conventional pile driving, e.g., the production of vibrations, because article 667 strictly limits ultrahazardous activities to actual pile driving. The article does not provide for absolute liability for activities that are merely comparable to pile driving. We thus agree with the Vicknair court that a plaintiff's claim regarding the installation of metal sheeting does not qualify for the absolute liability standard under article 667, because such a claim does not involve the ultrahazardous activity of pile driving. Moreover, Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 284 So.2d 905 (La.1973), does not require a different conclusion. In Lombard, 284 So.2d at 907, 912-13, on which the Third Circuit relied, this court suggested that the absolute liability standard of article 667 would govern the plaintiff's claim seeking damages related to the defendants' construction activities that included both the installation of sheet piling and the driving of round, wood piling. As the Third Circuit noted, the Lombard court did not distinguish between the defendants' activities in reasoning that article 667 applied to the plaintiff's claim. But, Lombard does not compel the conclusion that article 667 applies to the plaintiff's claims in this case. Lombard was decided more than twenty years before the 1996 amendment to article 667 that strictly limited ultrahazardous activities to pile driving and blasting. The Lombard court thus considered a version of article 667 that differed dramatically from the present version of the article, and the court's conclusions regarding the article's application to the installation of metal sheeting do not control our analysis. Because we find that the defendants' installation of metal sheeting in this case is not pile driving under article 667 as a matter of law, we reverse the court of appeal's judgment on this issue and reinstate the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the City and Boh Brothers and the denial of the plaintiff's motion. Thus, the plaintiff may not avail himself of the less onerous absolute liability standard in proving his claim related to the defendants' installation of metal sheeting near his home.