Opinion ID: 573090
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Penry factors.

Text: 45 Wilkerson contends his youth and his cooperation or acceptance of responsibility come within Penry 's criticism of the Texas sentencing scheme and that the jury was unable to give them full mitigating consideration. The state argues that Wilkerson's sentence should not be set aside unless there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have interpreted its instructions to preclude effective consideration of the mitigating force of the evidence. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198-99 & n. 5, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). The state contends the second special issue, future dangerousness, allowed the jury to give such consideration to youth. It further contends cooperation and acceptance of responsibility could be considered under both the first and second special issues. 46
47 Whether youth, in general, may be given full consideration under the Texas scheme has recently been decided in this circuit. In Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc ), the court held that the Texas scheme allowed full consideration of youth as a mitigating circumstance. 48 Wilkerson says his youth is more than a chronological fact. Age represents a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage ... [and] lack[ing] the experience, perspective, and judgment expected of adults. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). Youth, he urges, involves not only a measured span of time, but also the qualities of youth or mental age. Wilkerson alleges that he has impairments of a long-standing nature which affect his mental age and the quality of his youth. 49 When Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 925-26 (5th Cir.1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), was remanded to this court, we concluded, 882 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1989), that the Texas special issues did not permit the jury to consider the mitigating effect of evidence concerning the defendant's retardation, arrested emotional development, and troubled youth. Penry was shown to have limited mental ability at a competency hearing before trial. There was testimony at that hearing that Penry was beaten as a child and behaved strangely as both a child and a teenager. At the guilt/innocence phase of his trial, the three testifying psychiatrists disagreed as to the degree and cause of Penry's mental limitations. But, all agreed that Penry had mental limitations and that his problems manifested themselves, among other ways, in an inability to learn from his mistakes. 832 F.2d at 917. Penry was over 20 years old at the time of the crime. 832 F.2d at 925 n. 8. 50 Wilkerson claims that his habeas corpus petition demonstrates that he suffers from a serious, long-standing mental impairment that was first diagnosed when he was seven years old. He alleges that a recent neuropsychological evaluation confirms that he is borderline mentally retarded and suffers from serious brain dysfunction and cognitive impairments, including severely impaired auditory processing and that he is functionally illiterate. Wilkerson argues that this recent evaluation is consistent with the results of a much earlier psychological evaluation performed when he was in the first grade. The state replies that Wilkerson's school report does not show him to be mentally retarded though it discloses his level of intelligence is low. The state points out that Wilkerson's strongest scores were in the test areas dealing with day-to-day problems. 51 More significant than the degree of difference in the mental and emotional state of the two defendants is the fact that the serious physical and psychological deficits asserted by Penry were established in the record. Here, Wilkerson's much more attenuated problems must be the subject of conjecture built upon a school report prepared when Wilkerson was in the first grade. No psychiatric testimony was offered at trial, as was done in Penry. Instead, Wilkerson refers to a recent psychological evaluation which he first tendered in support of his motion for a hearing in the state habeas corpus proceedings. 52 In De Luna v. Lynaugh, 890 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1989), we affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief to a defendant who, at trial, had offered no evidence arguably within Penry. The defendant, De Luna, 21 years old at the time of the crime, made no claim of childhood abuse or substance use which significantly reduced his mental capacities nor did he offer evidence of mental retardation. We apply that same reasoning here. A defendant cannot claim factors exist in his case which are not covered by the Texas special issues unless he has offered proof of those factors at trial. To demonstrate that the trial court committed constitutional error in conducting his trial a defendant must afford that court the right to consider and rule on such proof. 53 In argument to the jury at the punishment phase, Wilkerson's trial counsel urged, without objection, his chronological age of nineteen years as a reason not to impose a death sentence. Obviously, counsel thought Wilkerson's age could receive full consideration under the Texas special issues. Nothing in the record indicates the jury failed to give due consideration to argument of counsel. 54 In Ex Parte Jewel Richard McGee, Jr., 817 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), Texas rejected a claim that a 19 year old defendant's relative youth could not be considered by the jury under the future dangerousness special issue. See also Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (on rehearing). 55 It is not necessary for us to rule on whether the second special issue permits consideration of Wilkerson's mental age claim. We hold it was too conjectural to establish a federal constitutional basis for habeas corpus relief. 56
57 Wilkerson also argues that the jury was precluded from giving full mitigating effect to his acceptance of responsibility for participation in the offense. Shortly after Wilkerson was arrested he gave a statement to police officers admitting his involvement in the robbery and the murder. He directed and accompanied the police to the locations where they found evidence of the crime. Wilkerson did not bargain with officers or request anything in return. The officers who took his statement believed that he was forthright and honest. Wilkerson contends that such acceptance of responsibility for one's criminal conduct and cooperation with police historically have been treated as character evidence which are entitled to consideration in mitigation of punishment. He argues that this mitigating relationship to criminal sentencing decisions is demonstrated by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which provide for a reduction in the guideline offense level when the defendant demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3E1.1 (1990). 58 Wilkerson points out that the jury was limited by the punishment stage instructions to giving yes or no answers to the special issues. This procedure confined the jury's role to determining whether Wilkerson's conduct was deliberate and whether there was a probability that in the future he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Without special instructions, he argues, the jury was precluded from giving full mitigating effect to his acceptance of responsibility for his participation in the offense within the scope of the first special issue. Rather, without such instructions, he says the jury was bound to weigh his evidence of cooperation heavily in favor of an affirmative answer to the issue of deliberations. 59 Wilkerson contends that the second special issue also precluded the jury from considering and giving full effect to the mitigating effect of his evidence of cooperation. He argues that the jury reasonably could have concluded because he cooperated he was less culpable, less blameworthy and, when considered together with his age, had a sufficient possibility for rehabilitation to warrant a life sentence. At the same time, he argues, the jury could have concluded that, despite his potential for rehabilitation, the evidence required an affirmative answer to the second special issue. 60 Wilkerson calls to our attention that the jury specifically expressed confusion and uncertainty about the meaning of the second special issue. In a handwritten note, the jury foreman asked the court, What is the effect if one of the Special Issues is not answered? and How is the word 'probability' in Special Issue No. 2 defined? The trial court responded that it could not answer the first question under the law and could not define the word probability. Cf. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2955 n. 5, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). Wilkerson argues that this expression of jury confusion and uncertainty confirms that the instructions were constitutionally unacceptable. He does not, however, challenge the court's refusal to answer the question about the result of a failure to answer. 61 The district court held that Wilkerson offered no authority for the proposition that his acceptance of responsibility or cooperation with the authorities were mitigating circumstances which would require the court to instruct the jury to give such effect to this evidence. The court refused to read Penry to encompass this type of evidence. It held that a defendant's acceptance of responsibility and cooperation with authorities are factors which this jury could consider in mitigation of punishment. We agree. 62 Wilkerson's trial counsel made a full and uninterrupted argument to the jury that Wilkerson's acceptance of responsibility could and should be considered under the special issues. The jury was free to accept this argument under the instructions of the court. Further instruction was not required. 63