Opinion ID: 1681076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: assignments of error relating to penalty phase

Text: Because we find defendant is not entitled to a new penalty phase of her trial, we now turn to the remaining assignments of error regarding her penalty phase that we pretermitted in our original hearing. [6] Impermissible Elicitation of Expert's Opinion In her twenty-fourth assignment of error, defendant argues that the state impermissibly elicited the basis for its expert witness's opinion at the penalty phase of the trial. Defendant claims that throughout the state's direct examination of Dr. Scurria, he testified that his opinion of the defendant was partially based on psychological testing conducted by Dr. Drolley, information he had received from a background investigation, and the reports of Dr. Franklin and Dr. Burns. According to defendant, the admission of this evidence violates La. C.E. art. 705(B). [7] Defense counsel, however, stipulated and agreed to the admission of these records, and as a general rule, any objections to testimony forming the basis of a stipulation are waived. In State v. Fabacher, 362 So.2d 555, 557 (La.1978), this court held that, although forgery of endorsement on a check was not charged in the bill of information, defense counsel stipulated that defendant had forged an endorsement on the check during the course of trial. This stipulation constituted a waiver by defendant of any complaint on the basis of a variance between allegations of information and evidence offered in support thereof. See also Tutorship of Taylor, 329 So.2d 910, 912 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1976); State v. Issac, 527 So.2d 1045, 1051 (La. App. 5th Cir.1988). Consequently, because defendant stipulated to the admission of these records, she cannot now raise the issue as error on appeal. Consequently, this assignment of error is without merit. Closing Argument In these assignments of error, defendant contends that the state's closing argument at the penalty phase violated her due process rights and her right to a reliable sentence. Specifically, defendant argues that the state misrepresented the facts, misstated the law, improperly argued the necessity of a death sentence, asked the jurors to put themselves in the victims' place, argued that the jury sentence defendant to death because as a police officer she had violated the public trust, called for a hasty verdict, misrepresented the jury's role, and improperly argued that life in prison was too easy. At the outset, we note that prosecutors are allowed wide latitude in choosing closing argument tactics. State v. Legrand, 02-1462, p. 16 (La.12/3/03), 864 So.2d 89, 101. La. C.Cr.P. art. 774 confines the scope of argument to evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusion of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case. The trial judge has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument. Id.; State v. Prestridge, 399 So.2d 564, 580 (La.1981). Even if the prosecutor exceeds these bounds, we will not reverse a conviction if not thoroughly convinced that the argument influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. See State v. Martin, 93-0285 (La.10/17/94), 645 So.2d 190, 200; State v. Jarman, 445 So.2d 1184, 1188 (La.1984); State v. Dupre, 408 So.2d 1229, 1234 (1982). First, defendant contends that, with no evidence to back up their assertions, prosecutors argued that the defendant pistol whipped one of the victims and that she planned the entire crime: They knew they were going to die. They knew that. She pistol whipped him. . . . Antoinette Frank was the one who was planning this robbery. That was her who was moving everything forward . . . in each instance, that it's Antoinette that is assuming the leadership role. Antoinette that is leading the way . . . It's Antoinette Frank that steals those keys . . . It's Antoinette Frank who steals those phones . . . And, of course, it's Antoinette Frank that executes these people with numerous, numerous shots. . . . Antoinette Frank did this, and this, and this, and this, and this, and this, and this, and this and created that scene. (State simultaneously referring to crime scene photographs). . . . Despite defendant's assertions, the district attorney's argument did not violate the requirements of La.C.Cr.P. art. 774, which specifically allows for closing argument to contain conclusions of fact the state may draw from the evidence admitted. The comments to which defendant points are based on the evidence as the two bodies were found in kneeling positions, and one of the victims had wounds consistent with a pistol whipping. Therefore the statements fall within that range of conclusions the state may permissibly draw during closing argument. State v. Bretz, 394 So.2d 245, 248 (La.1981). See also State v. Clark, 387 So.2d 1124, 1131 (La.1980)(prosecutor's closing argument placing defendant at wheel of car held a reasonable conclusion from the facts in evidence, which included evidence that placed defendant's car near scene of crime to which defendant was otherwise linked). Next, defendant contends that the prosecutor misstated the law. First, appellate counsel claims that the state told the jury that the Legislature mandated the death sentence for the defendant: The People of Louisiana, through the Courts, through the Legislature have determined that one crime deserves one penalty. One crime is so heinous . . . [t]he people of Louisiana have decided that one who takes life in a first-degree murder should face the taking of heir [sic] own life. . . . The law says that she deserves death. In the instant case, despite the prosecutor's remarks, it is unreasonable to believe the jury did not understand the gravity of their duty and the finality of their decision, as this responsibility was impressed upon them several times during the court's jury instructions: [W]e're now to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without benefit or parole, probation, or suspension. . . . Before you decide the sentence of death should be imposed, you unanimously must find beyond a reasonable doubt, one of the aggravating circumstances. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance exists, you may consider imposing the death sentence. The finding of an aggravating circumstances [sic] does not mean that you must impose the death sentence. If however, you do not . . . unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt a statutory aggravating circumstance . . . then life imprisonment, without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence is the only sentence that can be imposed. Even if you find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, you must also consider any mitigating circumstances before you decide that a sentence of death should be imposed. . . . Nothing said or furnished you in these instructions should be taken as an opinion of the Court as to the existence or non-existence of statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances, or as an opinion concerning the appropriate sentence to impose. It is your responsibility in accordance with the principles of law I have instructed to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without benefit of probation parole or suspension of sentence. In light of these admonitions, we find the jury was properly informed of the seriousness and finality of their decision as to the defendant's punishment. In addition, it should be noted that defense counsel did not object to the comment about which defendant now complains. Although the lack of objection does not preclude the issue from review, in this pre- Wessinger penalty phase proceeding, [8] this court has noted that the lack of an objection is a factor to be considered in examining the impact of a prosecutor's closing argument; and the lack of an objection demonstrates the defense counsel's belief that the live argument, despite its appearance in the cold record, was not overly damaging. State v. Taylor, 93-2201, p. 22 n. 10 (La.2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364, 376. Accordingly, this portion of the assignment of error lacks merit. Next, the defendant argues that the state misled the jury by stating that the mitigating factor of no significant prior history of criminal activity was not applicable to the defendant, despite the fact that she had never even been arrested or charged with another crime. Apparently, in arguing that the defendant did indeed have a criminal history, the state was referring to the penalty phase testimony of John Stevens and Anthony Wallace that the defendant had assaulted and falsely imprisoned Wallace after an altercation with Lacaze. While it is well-settled that the prosecution may not argue that a particular factor should not be a mitigating circumstance, it is acceptable for the state to try to disprove the existence of a mitigating factor. State v. Hampton, 98-0331, p. 22 (La.4/23/99), 750 So.2d 867, 886. In the instant case, the prosecutor's comment was intended to show why the mitigating factor raised by the defense in its closing argument was not applicable in the instant case. The prosecutor's comment discarding the defendant's lack of a criminal history was pointed out that, according to penalty phase testimony, defendant had assaulted and falsely imprisoned Wallace, even though she was never charged with the crime. Accordingly, this argument lacks merit. Next, the defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly argued the necessity of a death sentence. Specifically, defendant points to the following excerpt from the state's penalty phase closing argument: Christ said in the very beginning, because he knew that men governed other men. And, so, remember that part in the Bible where he said render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and render unto God, that which is God's. That's Caesar and we want him to sentence her to death, based upon your recommendation. . . . Let me tell you something; Antoinette Frank not only deserves to die, she needs to die. As an initial matter, we note defense counsel did not object to these remarks. Nevertheless, despite defendant's contentions, this court has not found such arguments reversible. See State v. Howard, 98-0064, pp. 31-21 (La.4/23/99), 751 So.2d 783, 816-17 (opening statement in penalty phase of capital murder trial, that referred to defendant as a thing that deserved the death penalty, was not reversible error under either harmless-error standard or review of errors affecting fundamental fairness of the proceedings and reliability of sentencing verdict, even though statements were unprofessional attacks and came dangerously close to reversible error); State v. Taylor, 93-2201 at 21-22, 669 So.2d 364, 375-76 (La.1996)(prosecutor's statement that giving the death penalty is the right thing to do, and that, anything else would be a disgrace not reversible error); State v. Summit, 454 So.2d 1100 (La.1984) (although prosecutor may not suggest that protections to the rights of the accused are inconvenient hindrances, he may compare the trial afforded the defendant to the summary execution of his victim, even to the extent of asking the jurors to give defendant the same justice that he gave to the victim). Any perceived error contained in this portion of the argument is harmless. Additionally, this court will not reverse a conviction or sentence on the ground of improper closing argument unless it is thoroughly convinced that the remarks influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. Taylor, 93-2201 at p. 21, 669 So.2d at 375. Giving deference to the good sensibility and fairmindedness of juries, State v. Bourque, 96-0842 (La.7/1/97); 699 So.2d 1, 5, and after reviewing the argument as a whole and the limited nature of the prosecutor's objectionable comments therein, we can conclude that the comments did not influence the jury or contribute to the death sentence. Defendant also claims that the state violated the golden rule of asking the jurors to put themselves in the victims' places. Specifically, defendant point to the following excerpt of the state's penalty phase closing argument: So, I ask you now, to listen as you look at the circumstances of this offense, the nature of this offense. And, I ask you again, to do this on behalf of these people. . . . I would ask you to look in your mind's eye, and I would ask you to consider and to see the horror of the last few minutes of these lives. That's what this is all about. I ask you to see in the mind's eye what these people experienced. . . . [T]he horror that they lived through . . . the last thing he saw . . . the last thing he ever sees. And what's the last thought you're going to have if you're going to be killed instantly? Shock . . . pain, despair. . . . And, the knowledge, in fact, that he was about to die. Again, as an initial matter, we note no objection was raised to this portion of the state's argument. In State v. Wessinger, this court held similar remarks in which the prosecutor urged jurors to put themselves in the victim's position just before he or she died and to show the defendant no more mercy than he showed the victim, while arguably improper, were not so prejudicial that it would befuddle jurors into disregarding the law as given to them by the trial judge. See also State v. Monroe, 397 So.2d 1258, 1271 (La.1981)(this court criticized the eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth argument as improper but found no reversible error since the argument when considered as a whole lost much of its objectionable flavor.). Thus, in the instant case, while the prosecutor's argument was arguably improper, once again the remarks did not urge the jury to disregard the law as given to it in the instructions of the trial court. id., and therefore, this claim does not present grounds for reversal. In this assignment of error the defendant also claims that it was improper for the state to argue that the jury should sentence her to death because of her status as a police officer and her betrayal of the public trust. Defendant's main contention is that this is not an enumerated consideration under Louisiana's approved system of aggravating and mitigating factors. set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.4. However, despite the fact that the defendant's status as a police officer does not qualify as an aggravating circumstance at sentencing in a capital trial, the district attorney's argument was a fair comment on the evidence and addressed defendant's character. La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.2; State v. Bourque, 96-0842, p. 14 (La.7/1/97), 699 So.2d 1, 10-11 (evidence about an incident during which the defendant used derogatory language toward victim and victim's mother admissible in penalty phase of capital trial as it went to defendant's character and propensities). Consequently, this argument was not improper. Defendant also claims that the state's closing arguments at the penalty phase impermissibly diminished the jury's sentencing role and the gravity of the proceedings. First, defendant complains of the state's comment to the jury that, [y]a'll came back in about 20 minutes with a verdict of guilty as charged. It ought to take you about 10 to come back with a recommendation of death. Thank you. In this same claim, defendant also argues that the state repeatedly argued that the jury's sentencing verdict is just a recommendation. Again, defense counsel raised no objection to this portion of the state's argument. Nevertheless, a review of the passages cited by defense counsel reveal that the prosecutor did not refer to the decision as just a recommendation, but instead asked the jury to recommend the death penalty and just recommend it. Neither of the prosecutor's arguments likely misled jurors as to the finality of their decision to impose the death sentence, when the jurors were properly informed of seriousness and finality of their decision by the trial judge. State v. Wessinger, 98-1234, pp. 27-28 (La.5/14/99) (prosecutor's reference to jury's penalty phase decision as recommendation did not mislead jury as to finality of decision to impose death sentence when jury was properly informed of seriousness and finality of their decision by prosecutor and trial judge); State v. Williams, 96-1023 p. 26 (La.1/21/98), 708 So.2d 703, 723 (court rejected similar argument that the court lessened the juror's sense of responsibility by using the word recommendation in describing the jury's sentence). Accordingly, we find no reversible error disclosed by this argument. Next, in a similar argument, the defendant claims that the prosecutor erred by commenting on prison life, stating: Then, [defense counsel] wants to talk to you about the horrors of 40 years locked in a little cage. . . . Just take a ride up to Angola or Hunt and look around. That's not the way life is up there. This court has previously held that references to prison lifestyle are improper. State v. Scales, 93-2003, p. 11 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 1326, 1334; State v. Kyles, 513 So.2d 265 (La.1987). However, when, as here, the comments do not render the jury's sentencing recommendation unreliable, they do not constitute reversible error. Id. Although these unobjected-to references were improper, their limited nature convinces us they did not render the jury's sentencing recommendation unreliable. Consequently, we find no reversible error in this portion of the state's argument. Finally, defendant complains of the prosecution's argument that her death by lethal injection would be a lot more pleasant than the deaths of the victims, because all they're going to do is put her on a little slab of table and they're going to give her a shot and then she's going to go gently to sleep. Defense counsel failed to object to this portion of the state's argument. Nevertheless, again, even assuming impropriety of the prosecutor's statement, it did not render the jury's sentencing recommendation unreliable or create a substantial risk that the death penalty would be imposed under influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. See e.g. State v. Mitchell 94-2078, pp. 11-12 (La.5/21/96), 674 So.2d 250, 257-58 (La.1996)(argument by prosecutor requesting jurors to impose same penalty that defendant imposed on victim although in a much nicer manner, not reversible error.). On the whole, defendant cannot show that any of these arguments injected an arbitrary factor, worthy of reversal, into the sentencing phase, given this court's admonition that reviewing courts must accord [c]redit . . . to the good sense and fair-mindedness of jurors who have heard the evidence, Jarman, 445 So.2d 1184, 1188 (La.1984). Accordingly, these assignments of error lack merit. In her twenty-eighth assignment of error, defendant claims the state's closing argument at the penalty phase impermissibly lessened the juror's awesome sense of responsibility. While this assignment of error is unargued and no specific portion of the state's argument is pointed out, the foregoing discussion thoroughly examines the state's closing argument at the penalty phase. We cannot say we are thoroughly convinced that any improper argument influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. Accordingly, this assignment of error is also without merit.