Opinion ID: 1297188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Frivolous Courtroom Atmosphere

Text: (28) Defendant contends the courtroom atmosphere was frivolous and antithetical to the seriousness of the proceedings, and destroyed [his] entitlement to a fair trial and due process of law. He refers to a number of exchanges among counsel for both sides and the court that were intended, with varying degrees of success, to be humorous. The exchanges often, although not always, occurred outside the presence of the jury. Defendant has waived the contention by failing to object to the complained-of comments. ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 411 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 753 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) On the merits, we find no error. Although a jury trial, especially for a capital offense, is obviously a serious matter, Well-conceived judicial humor can be a welcome relief during a long, tense trial. Obviously, however, the court should refrain from joking remarks which the jury might interpret as denigrating a particular party or his attorney. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 753-754.) We have reviewed the entire record, including each example defendant cites in support of his claim. During the course of the lengthy trial, the court and counsel engaged in occasional good-natured repartee. At no time did either court or counsel cross the line from the proper to the improper. No comments denigrated either defendant or his attorneys in any significant manner. Moreover, even if we were to assume that any of the exchanges were improper, there is no suggestion of prejudice to defendant. The trial as a whole, especially the portion in front of the jury, was conducted with appropriate solemnity.

(29) Defendant contends the court should have excluded James Peters's testimony regarding the facts of the 1961 armed robbery. He has waived the contention by failing to object. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 987 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704].) Moreover, there would have been no basis for the court to exclude the testimony upon an objection; therefore, contrary to defendant's claim, counsel was not ineffective. The short answer to this claim is that the evidence is expressly made admissible by factor (b) of [Penal Code] section 190.3. The court is not given discretion under Evidence Code section 352, to exclude this evidence when offered at the penalty phase where ... the question for the jury is not one of fact in determining guilt. ( People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 641 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; accord, People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 987.) Remoteness is not a ground to exclude penalty phase evidence of violent criminal activity, as it affects the weight, not admissibility, of the offense. ( People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 476 [276 Cal. Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107].) The court does have limited discretion under Evidence Code section 352 regarding the form of penalty phase evidence, that is, the way in which the prosecutor seeks to present the case. (See People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 140 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559].) Here, there was nothing questionable about the form of the evidence, consisting of live testimony of a victim, and thus no reason for the court to insist on the prosecutor presenting the facts in a different form. Defendant also challenges the evidence on various grounds that we have repeatedly rejected. (See People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 230-232.)
Defendant contends his attorneys were ineffective in their penalty phase representation. Some of the specific contentions have been or will be discussed elsewhere in this opinion. We reject the others. (30) In analyzing the contentions, we must keep in mind the strong presumption that counsel's actions fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. We also evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time of the acts or omissions complained of. ( People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1215.) (31a) Defendant contends his attorneys were incompetent in failing to cross-examine Peters, who testified about the 1961 burglary. He does not state what cross-examination they were supposed to have conducted. Peters's direct examination was brief and unemotional, and, so far as the record shows, undisputed. After all, defendant had been convicted of the crime. Counsel could reasonably have concluded it best if the witness, one of defendant's victims, was in and out of the courtroom as quickly as possible. Cross-examination could easily have been counterproductive by making the jury even more sympathetic to the witness and allowing him to describe once again defendant's criminal behavior. Although counsel were entitled to cross-examine the witness, they were not required to do so upon pain of being branded incompetent. Defendant challenges the presentation of the defense case in mitigation. He complains that his attorneys presented only four witnesses, and that their testimony took less than one day. He asserts, with no record support, that there was mitigating evidence that could have been presented, but was not. But so far as the record shows, this is mere assumption. Nothing rebuts the presumption that counsel presented the case as well as they reasonably could under the circumstances. (32) Even if we somehow assume additional mitigating evidence existed, counsel did not necessarily have to present it. As always, counsel had to consider the possible detriment as well as the benefit. Presenting mitigating evidence risks opening the door to rebuttal evidence. The prosecution may rebut mitigating penalty evidence with unfavorable revelations about the defendant. In rebuttal, the prosecution is bound neither by its statutory pretrial notice of aggravating evidence [citation] nor by the aggravating factors set forth in the statute. [Citations.] The possibility of damaging rebuttal is a necessary consideration in counsel's decision whether to present mitigating evidence about the defendant's character and background. ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1251 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) (31b) Here, the defense case triggered no rebuttal whatsoever. Nothing supports defendant's contention that counsel acted incompetently regarding the evidence they did put on. Defendant cites a question counsel posed to a defense witness that showed momentary confusion regarding the facts, but nothing close to incompetence is thereby shown. Any confusion was quickly straightened out, and may even have suggested to the jury that the evidence was coming from the witnesses, not orchestrated by counsel. The use counsel made of the witnesses they called came within the wide range of competence. For example, contrary to defendant's argument, it may well have been wise to use defendant's former wife solely to introduce the couple's two young daughters to the jury, an introduction that would undoubtedly have an emotional impact favorable to defendant. It is pure speculation to assume she was able or willing to provide useful mitigating evidence that would not open the door to harmful rebuttal, or to assume, as defendant does, that she had a loving relationship[] with him. Moreover, since defendant spent much of his adult life in prison, counsel may reasonably not have wanted to dwell on that life more than they did. Defendant also claims that counsel incompetently argued the case to the jury. Each side argued twice, with the prosecution going first, the defense second, the prosecution rebutting the defense, then finally the defense rebutting the prosecution. Each of defendant's two attorneys presented one of the arguments. We have reviewed the arguments, and have found nothing inadequate in them whatsoever. Unlike People v. Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 186, where we found no prejudice, the defense argument was not perfunctory. Between them, counsel presented the defense arguments vigorously and thoroughly, and, at times, eloquently. Defendant's current contentions are merely second-guessing in the light of hindsight, and fall far short of demonstrating incompetence.
Defendant alleges several counts of prosecutorial misconduct. We conclude that none, either singly or collectively, warrant reversal.
After the defense presented its penalty phase evidence, the court asked the district attorney in front of the jury if there was anything further. He responded, Not at this time, no. The court stated, If you don't do it at this time, I don't know when you're going to do it. The district attorney then said, I may have a rebuttal witness but I'm not sure you'll allow me to put him on. Ultimately, there was no further evidence. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the reference to a possible rebuttal witness implied to the jury there was additional aggravating evidence the court would not allow. The district attorney responded that he had some evidence regarding possession of razor blades in prison, and he did not want to rest until he could argue for its admission. The court denied a mistrial, stating, The jury has heard a lot of instructions. They know to base the decision on what they hear. I told them a million times: The statements of attorneys are not evidence and I think we're overly reacting. (33) Defendant complains of the comment regarding a possible rebuttal witness. The district attorney had to say something when the court wanted to know if there was anything further. While he certainly could have more artfully preserved his option to argue the matter later, we agree with the trial court that there was no prejudice. This reference to possible rebuttal was brief and vague. It was never exploited. The jury was instructed at both the guilt and the penalty phases that statements of the attorneys are not evidence, and not to consider any statement by an attorney not supported by the evidence. Any harm flowing from the alleged misconduct was thereby cured. ( People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 34 [171 Cal. Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].)
(34) The district attorney began his opening argument to the jury by stating, Thou shalt not kill. He then recounted the history of that command, and included numerous biblical references. He also discussed the historical origins of the death penalty, again with biblical references. He stated, In every civilization in the history of this world as you look back through, civilizations among us now, civilizations in the far past, great civilizations, small civilizations, ancient ones, new ones, modern ones, old ones, religious ones, nonreligious ones, all came forth with the same tenet. If you kill, you will be removed. You will be killed yourself. It's nothing new. He made additional biblical and religious references during the opening and closing arguments. We have generally condemned invocations to a different or higher law than that found in the California Penal Code. ( People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 260-261 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107], and cases cited therein.) What is objectionable is reliance on religious authority as supporting or opposing the death penalty. The penalty determination is to be made by reliance on the legal instructions given by the court, not by recourse to extraneous authority. ( People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 194, affd. sub nom. Victor v. Nebraska, supra, 511 U.S. ___ [127 L.Ed.2d 583, 114 S.Ct. 1239].) Defendant has waived this contention by failing to object. ( People v. Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 259-260.) Trial counsel not only failed to object, but he relied at length on the Bible as support for not imposing the death penalty. ( People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1012 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984], italics in original.) Defendant contends his attorneys were ineffective. [I]n the heat of a trial, defense counsel is best able to determine proper tactics in the light of the jury's apparent reaction to the proceedings. The choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal. [Citation.] Here, defense counsel did not object; rather, he countered the prosecution argument with argument of his own. ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 749 [280 Cal. Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197].) Counsel adeptly turned the argument around: You know, he responded to the jury, it's interesting that [the district attorney] read the Bible. He sort of when he gets to talking, he left out Christ's sermon on the mountain where Christ said.... He then quoted from the Sermon on the Mount, concluding, `Judge not that ye be not judged. For with that judgment ye judge ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.' We cannot say this tactic was unreasonable. We also find no prejudice. The district attorney did not urge the jury to impose biblical law. He made it clear, as did the court and defense counsel, that California law applied. The historical review and religious references were merely introductory to a discussion of the law the jury had to apply. The prosecutor stressed that in our particular society, in this state, we have narrowed it down to the most dangerous of people, a specific area in which the penalty of death applies. He noted that under California law, not all killers, not all murderers fall within the death penalty. It is an extremely narrow law. The death penalty only applies in a very limited situation, one that happens to occur here. He accurately described this narrowing process, noting that even after the jury found an intentional first degree murder with special circumstances, the law goes further and says you just don't get to apply the death penalty to anybody. The aggravating has to so substantially outweigh the mitigating that it warrants death. So, we have narrowed it even further. In light of this, the religious references were not so much prejudicial as pointless. They invited the defense to effectively respond in kind, as it did. Thus, we do not believe the objectionable remarks could reasonably have diminished the jury's sense of responsibility, or displaced the court's instructions. ( People v. Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 261.)
Without objection, the district attorney read a quote to the jury. [10] He then announced that the quote was not from an attorney or a judge, but from one of the prospective members of the panel during the individual death-qualifying voir dire, and described it as an attempt by a member of the panel to explain what the system meant to that person and how they fit in. He reread the same quote, and later asked the jury to remember it. The quoted juror sat on the actual jury that heard the argument. Defense counsel Strellis had asked the question that elicited the response two months earlier. (35) Defendant argues this was overt flattery of a sitting juror. The Attorney General responds, first, that the matter has been waived by the failure to object. Defendant answers that by attributing the quote to a prospective juror, the prosecutor caused defense counsel to not know that the quote was from a juror listening to the argument, which made it most objectionable. The Attorney General counters that the juror had been, indeed, a prospective juror at the time of the quote, and only later became an actual juror, and that defense counsel were present and elicited the quote. On balance, we agree with defendant. The voir dire in question occurred two months before the argument. Counsel examined many jurors during the lengthy selection process. It is unreasonable to expect counsel to remember who the quote was from, especially since the prosecutor ascribed it solely to a prospective juror. Since counsel were not effectively on notice that the prospective juror was also a sitting juror, we find the absence of an objection does not waive the issue. On the merits, the argument was improper in two respects. First, although the Attorney General is technically correct that the speaker was only a prospective juror at the time of the quote, for the district attorney not to further identify him as a sitting juror was misleading. Second, counsel should not quote individual jurors in their argument to the entire jury. In People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 395 [326 P.2d 457], overruled on other grounds in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1140 [80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, 43 A.L.R.3d 677], we stated that arguments should be addressed to the jury as a body and the practice of addressing individual jurors by name during the argument should be condemned rather than approved.... (Accord, Neumann v. Bishop (1976) 59 Cal. App.3d 451, 473 [130 Cal. Rptr. 786].) If counsel should not address individual jurors by name, they should similarly not quote individual jurors. Nevertheless, it does not follow that such conduct is necessarily prejudicial in any given case. ( People v. Wein, supra, 50 Cal.2d at pp. 395-396; accord, Neumann v. Bishop, supra, 59 Cal. App.3d at p. 474.) As in these cases, we find the impropriety harmless. The quotation itself contained nothing improper. Neither the quote nor the argument suggested that the juror, or any juror, should not engage in the required individualized weighing process. We find no reasonable possibility the complained of comments affected the penalty determination. ( People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 990.)
(36) Defendant contends the prosecutor impugned the defense attorneys' integrity. We disagree. Although some of the district attorney's comments were improper, they were also innocuous. In his opening argument, the district attorney stated: It is interesting not one of those witnesses had talked to Fred Freeman before they came to court except mom. They just got on the stand and said whatever Mr. Strellis wanted them to say because he led them through most of the testimony. Defense counsel Strellis objected, and stated, I never asked for perjury in my life. The court overruled the objection, observing, Nobody said anything about perjury. Defendant contends this effectively accused counsel of suborning perjury. It did not. It merely indicated what the jury could observe for itself, that defense counsel asked careful, specific questions to elicit the testimony he wanted. In context, the district attorney did not suggest the testimony was untruthful, merely that it was of limited value. We find no impropriety. In his rebuttal argument, the district attorney stated: And then Mr. Braverman [defendant's second attorney] turned to you and told you that this should be reserved for the worst possible people. He begged you for Fred Freeman's life. Yet in 1979, when he represented another guy who was one of the worst possible people, he begged for his life, too. He is just begging for the life of the client in this case. Defendant later moved for a mistrial, arguing that the reference to his arguments in the other case is outside the record. It was improper. The court denied the motion. It was indeed improper for the district attorney to refer to counsel's argument in another case. ( People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 922-923 [254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940].) But we perceive no prejudice. The district attorney suggested that the facts in the other case were worse than in this, which could hardly harm defendant. It would not astonish the jury to be told that counsel would also argue for life in another case, even if the facts were worse. No reasonable juror would infer that the propriety of death in this case should not be individually assessed. Defendant also complains of two objections by the prosecutor during defense counsel's rebuttal argument. Defense counsel argued, I was never spanked. Incidentally, Mr. Quatman [the prosecutor] told me neither was he. The district attorney objected, stating, [T]hat's incorrect. Mr. Strellis is making this stuff up. The court responded, Let's go on. [¶] Again, ladies and gentlemen, this is argument of counsel. A short time later, defense counsel argued, Now, he [the prosecutor] has access to records; and I don't. The prosecutor again objected, stating, That's incorrect again. Mr. Strellis is making this stuff up. He has access. The court responded, I don't know what he's going to say until he says it first. [¶] Go ahead. Defendant later moved unsuccessfully for a mistrial. Defendant argues the district attorney accused counsel of lying. Whether he accused counsel of lying or merely going outside the record is problematic. Reasonable jurors would most likely interpret the comments as saying there was no evidence to support what defense counsel claimed. But either way there has been no prejudice. Whether or not the prosecutor had said he had not been spanked was trivial. The jury knew it was beyond the scope of the evidence. The same is true of the question of access to records. None of this involved any of the significant issues at trial. There was no prejudicial impugning of defense counsel.
In his opening argument, the district attorney stated that defendant's sister gave you a reason for the killings. She basically said: I know exactly why he's killed all these people or at least this one person. In discussing the testimony that defendant's father abused him, the district attorney noted that the father did not turn his other children into homicidal maniacs, and then discussed the case [e]ven if dad had turned [defendant] into a homicidal maniac.... He used the phrase homicidal maniac[s] four times. In his closing argument, the district attorney stated, He's killed once more. How are you going to keep him from doing that again in prison? (37) Defendant argues the district attorney improperly suggested defendant had committed more than one murder, and that the references to homicidal maniac were inflammatory. He did not object, thus waiving the contention. ( People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 989.) Defendant contends his attorneys were ineffective. We disagree. As noted, the failure to object rarely establishes prejudice. Here, counsel Strellis countered the statements with argument of his own. ( People v. Frierson, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 749.) He responded: Is my client a homicidal maniac? [¶] Did you find any evidence of that? Is there any likelihood of that? Truthfully? [¶] Are you a little amazed? I was amazed. There was no need for counsel to object regarding the number of murders. Although the district attorney misspoke when he said defendant killed once more, there was no serious suggestion of additional murders. Indeed, the prosecutor himself stated, This is not a mass-murder situation.... You were all asked and told that the law applies in this case specifically to one murder during the course of one robbery  a couple of robberies in a bar, but basically one activity.
(38) In an amalgam of claims, defendant contends the court invited the jury to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors or factors not supported by the evidence, and the district attorney committed misconduct in arguing such factors. The record does not support the claims. Just before trial, the district attorney filed a Notice of Intention to Introduce Evidence in Aggravation, which included alleged misconduct in prison or jail in addition to the prior robberies. Early in the trial, the court noted that the notice was lacking in specificity, and made no ruling on the admissibility of the evidence. The question was never again raised on the record. To the extent defendant complains about the alleged prison misconduct evidence, he could not have been prejudiced because it was never presented. Defendant argues that these circumstances either induced or aggravated the other alleged error regarding aggravating factors. Neither the record nor logic supports this claim, except that the fact the evidence was not presented affected what the district attorney could argue to the jury. Defendant's claims regarding the aggravating factors must be judged on their own merits. Defendant contends the district attorney's description of him as a homicidal maniac, combined with his earlier reference regarding possible rebuttal evidence that was never presented, suggested there was, indeed, another murder. We disagree. Even the district attorney stated this case involved only one murder; the jury could not have been misled. Defendant contends the district attorney improperly argued future dangerousness by noting that defendant had killed before, and might in prison. Defendant's mistrial motion was properly denied. Although expert testimony on future dangerousness is not permitted, the prosecutor may argue the defendant is dangerous. ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 720-721 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729]; People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 249.) Defendant contends the argument violated a court order, and was error in light of his two mistrial motions, one after the opening argument and one after the closing argument. The discussion during the first mistrial motion indicated that the court had ruled off the record that the district attorney's rebuttal evidence, including evidence of razor blades in jail, would be inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. The settled statement indicates the court told the prosecutor it would only allow the two prior robbery convictions to be admitted as aggravating evidence. During the second motion, defense counsel argued, There is absolutely no evidence in the record one way or the other of future dangerousness in prison. [The district attorney] implied a great risk even though he understands I'm under order not to argue the contrary position. [¶] I think at this point his having argued it, at a minimum, I should be allowed to respond. Whatever order there may have been was not placed on the record. The settled statement indicates that the Court advised Mr. Quatman that he could not argue future dangerousness. [¶] The Court has no recollection of Mr. Strellis saying that he wanted to argue future dangerousness. The court denied a mistrial, but allowed defense counsel to say he's never killed anybody before. Counsel asked if he could say he never assaulted anyone... [w]hich is factually correct. The court responded, No. Defense counsel then argued to the jury, Danger. My client spent more than half of his life of his adult life in prison. If he murdered someone, do you think we would have mentioned it to you? I mean, come, on. You have no evidence one way or the other on this issue. It appears from this that, off the record, the court ruled inadmissible prosecution evidence regarding institutional misbehavior, may have placed restrictions on how the defense could argue defendant's good behavior, and told the prosecutor not to argue future dangerousness. As discussed above, there should be no proceedings off the record. But we perceive no prejudice. A ruling excluding aggravating evidence could obviously only benefit defendant. There is no indication the court limited the defense presentation of evidence. It is clear the court did not believe the prosecutor violated its directive not to argue future dangerousness in his generic argument that defendant had killed before and might again. The restriction on argument of future dangerousness was undoubtedly tethered to the court's limitations on aggravating evidence. Whether the court erred in limiting the defense argument is difficult to determine given the sparse record, but again there is no prejudice. The record is clear that no evidence regarding behavior in prison or jail  good or bad  was presented. The district attorney's argument that defendant might kill in prison was based solely on the crime of this case. We find no reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a different penalty determination had the defense argued there was no evidence defendant had assaulted anyone in prison. Defendant also criticizes defense counsel for merely telling the jury there was no evidence he had killed in prison, rather than specifically denying that he had killed. It was, however, clear to the jury that only one murder had been proven. As noted, even the district attorney expressly stated there was only one murder. On this record, no reasonable juror would have returned a verdict of death because of unfounded speculation there was more than one murder. (39) Defendant claims the district attorney improperly argued that none of defendant's family members asked the jury to spare his life. There was no objection, thus waiving the point. There was also no error. The district attorney did not argue this was aggravating, but was merely the absence of mitigation. The prosecutor may properly comment on defense evidence in mitigation. ( People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 644 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160]; People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 972; cf. People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861] [prosecutor may not argue that the lack of mitigating evidence rendered the crime aggravated].) Defendant argues counsel was ineffective regarding this argument. We disagree. Again, rather than object, defense counsel Strellis responded to the jury: Now, I am not allowed under the law, as I understand the law, to ask  I guess he probably could ask the mother. It's not permissible I should ask the mother do you want your son executed. She'd say yes [sic]. He'd object. The Judge would say  I'm not allowed to ask that question. The district attorney objected. The court overruled the objection, stating that [t]his is argument of counsel. Defense counsel continued: But on cross, he has much wider latitude. [¶] Did you hear him ask? No. [¶] Any question in your mind what they want? [¶] Any validity in this argument, even that much? Defendant argues that counsel was wrong, that it is permissible for defense counsel to ask family members if they want the defendant executed. This may be correct, but we cannot determine on appeal the tactical reasons for the approach counsel took. Counsel may have preferred this argument to having witnesses testify and be subject to cross-examination. Moreover, we do not know what the witnesses might have said if asked. There is no basis for finding ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant also challenges prosecution arguments that defendant's two children would be better off without him; that calling the children was the cheapest trick of all, was manipulating them, and was cold and calculating; and that even if defendant's father had abused him and turned him into a homicidal maniac, that just means that he's more dangerous than he ever was before. There was no objection, thus waiving the claims. Moreover, the argument was a proper response to the defense evidence in mitigation. ( People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1062-1063 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680] [the prosecutor may argue that defendant's evidence under [Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (k),] did not excuse his conduct  it made it worse. He was merely arguing the lack of weight of defendant's evidence].) Defendant also complains of argument that [w]e haven't had an execution in the state of California since 1966. That's 21, 22 years ago. He claims the prosecutor improperly told the jury, in effect, the execution won't happen, and thus minimized the jury's sense of responsibility for imposing the death penalty. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633].) There was no objection, so the claim has been waived. Moreover, in context, there was no impropriety. In his opening argument, defense counsel had described to the jury in vivid terms the horrors of an execution. The district attorney responded that counsel could not have been speaking from personal experience, since there had not been an execution for so long. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood the comments in a manner that violates the rule of Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320. ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 276 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897].) Finally, defendant claims, as he did at trial, that the district attorney violated the rule of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229] by arguing, Not one person, not his mother, not his sister, not his ex-wife, told you about remorse, sorrow. None. We disagree. The statement was fair comment on the state of the evidence. ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 178.) [I]n the absence of a clear reference to a defendant's failure to testify, a prosecutor is free to make a logical comment on the defendant's lack of remorse. ( People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 313.)
(40) Defendant claims, in general, that the penalty phase instructions were disorganized, confusing, and lacked the required guidance to assure [defendant] the precision necessary for individualized consideration. The instructions were, on the contrary, well organized and clear, and sufficiently guided the jury's consideration. Moving to specific contentions, the court instructed the jurors to consider, take into account, and be guided by the following factors in aggravation and mitigation, if applicable. ... (Italics added.) It did not list all the factors in Penal Code section 190.3, but only factors (a) (the circumstances of the crime), (c) (felony convictions), (i) (age), and (k) (the mitigation catchall). It also told the jury it could consider sympathy or compassion for the defendant. Reversing the common defense argument that the trial court is required to delete inapplicable mitigating factors (e.g., People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 47 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249]), defendant argues the court erred in doing so. Although the court need not delete inapplicable factors ( ibid. ), it is not error of which defendant can complain to do what defendants have long urged. (See People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 846.) The court listed all mitigating factors that had any possible relevance to this case. In light of the evidence of the 1961 robbery, however, it did inexplicably delete one clearly applicable aggravating factor, factor (b) (criminal activity involving force or violence). Omission of an aggravating factor could hardly have harmed defendant. In any event, since defendant was also convicted of the crime, the jury no doubt considered that evidence as a felony conviction. Defendant also challenges the use of the phrase if applicable. He claims the court, not the jury, must determine whether any factor applies. The phrase was appropriate. The jury ultimately determines whether any particular factor applies in any given case. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 105 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) Defendant next contends the court erroneously instructed on the catchall factor (k) of Penal Code section 190.3. The court told the jury it may consider any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it's not a legal excuse for the crime. [¶] You may consider any other aspect of the defendant's character, his background, his history or record that he offers as a basis of a sentence less than death. This is actually broader than the formulation we suggested in People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, footnote 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], and is certainly broad enough to encompass all the evidence the defense presented. Defendant complains that this instruction wrongly suggested that [he] had the burden of providing a `basis of a sentence less than death.' It did not. It merely told the jury it may consider any evidence the defendant did offer, nothing more. Defendant contends the court erred by identifying his convictions to the jury. Such identification was probably unnecessary, but we see no error, and certainly no prejudice. It was undisputed that defendant suffered them. Moreover, the court also told the jury to consider them if applicable. Defendant also contends the court improperly told the jury to consider[] all the arguments of counsel, claiming this either invited or aggravated the alleged prosecutorial misconduct relating to aggravating factors. This standard instruction is taken almost verbatim from Penal Code section 190.3, and was entirely proper. The court instructed, A factor in aggravation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This was unduly favorable to defendant, a point of which he can hardly complain. Except for evidence of other crimes, an aggravating factor need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1322 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) Defendant contends, however, that the instruction suggested to the jury that he had the same burden as to factors in mitigation. It did not. Defendant reiterates other arguments that have already been rejected. The court need not instruct the jury which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating. ( People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 919 [8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712].) The California legislative scheme and the factors in Penal Code section 190.3 are not unconstitutionally vague. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630]; People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808].) Consideration of age as a possible factor in either mitigation or aggravation was not improper. ( Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. ___ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 762-763, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2637-2638]; People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 77-79.)
The judgment is affirmed.