Opinion ID: 2977233
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The County Prosecutor

Text: The Appellants’ argument concerning the County Prosecutor, though slightly better articulated, also fails. The Appellants rely heavily on Pembaur. In Pembaur, a sheriff attempted to execute an arrest warrant for several of Pembaur’s employees at Pembaur’s place of business. Pembaur refused to allow the police to enter. The sheriff contacted the county prosecutor, who in turn “instructed” the sheriff to “go in and get” the employees. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 472-73. The police then used an axe to chop down the door in order to execute the arrest warrants. Pembaur sued under § 1983, arguing that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court held that Pembaur’s rights had been violated because the Fourth Amendment prohibits police, absent exigent circumstances, from searching an individual’s home or business without a search warrant even to execute an arrest warrant for a third person. Having acknowledged a violation of rights, the only question was whether the municipality could be held liable under § 1983. The Court ultimately held that it could, basing its decision on the fact that the county prosecutor authorized the sheriff to take the illegal actions. Because the county prosecutor “was acting as the final decisionmaker for the county,” the sheriff’s action represented the municipality’s official policy. Id. at 485. The facts of Pembaur are far different from those in the case at hand. The record shows that Prosecutor Gene Long was only an advisor to the Health District. The Appellants argue that Long was acting in more than an advisory role and point to certain portions of Dallas Hettinger’s and Denise Minor’s deposition testimony as evidence. The relevant portion of Minor’s testimony is as follows: - 11 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. Q. I’m going to hand you [the notes from the September 28, 2004 regular public meeting of the Board of Health] and you can take a look at it. It’s a two-page document. ... Q. In here, it mentions the Pickaway County Prosecutor Gene Long and his advice and I believe earlier you said you met with– or you spoke with the prosecutor; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And that was Mr. Long? A. Yes. Q. And did he give you certain advice? A. Yes. ... Q. Did you rely on his advice– A. Yes. Q. –in taking–could you tell me what his advice was to you? Ms. Courtwright: Objection. Mr. Holloway: Objection, privileged. Don’t answer the question. Q. We have sort of touched this but I wanted to give you an opportunity to say–why exactly, in your mind, was–were the permits suspended? A. Public health issues. The relevant portion of Hettinger’s testimony is: Q. When you say, “Per prosecutor Gene Long,” what role did the prosecutor, Gene Long, have in this? - 12 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. A. Denise Minor, the [H]ealth Commissioner, and I discussed this with Gene Long to discuss what proceedings we would need to take in order to do this suspended permit. . . . Q. I’m not going to ask you what went on in the meetings. I’m asking you for what you did in this case. Did you rely on the advice Mr. Long gave you in taking the actions to suspend the permits? A. I discussed it with the Health Commissioner. We evaluated what the situation was with the rules and then we took that information to the prosecutor for advice on how to proceed. Q. But I guess my question is, whatever advice he gave you–I don’t want to know what it is, but whatever advice he gave you did you rely on that in suspending the permits? Mr. Holloway: Objection. Go ahead and answer the question. A. Yes. The Appellants’ argument that Long, like the prosecutor in Pembaur, “was acting as the final decisionmaker for the county” is unconvincing. Though the record does not detail the exact nature of Long’s advice, there is nothing in the record to suggest that his advice related to the Board’s (and through it, the Health District’s) evaluation of Lots 4 and 5 or to its decision that the installation of septic tanks and leach beds posed “public health issues.” What the record does demonstrates is that: (1) it was the “public health issues” that motivated the Board to revoke the permits; (2) these same issues led the Board to deny Cummings’s request for an issuance of a permit at its public meeting; and (3) Long’s advice in these matters was sought only after the Board had formed its opinion regarding the health concerns. The record also suggests that the Board sought Long’s advice regarding how to execute its decision to revoke the permit. Long’s role in this matter is clearly - 13 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. different from that of the prosecutor in Pembaur. There, the prosecutor instructed the police to take action; here the Board decided to take action and asked the prosecutor for advice on how it could best execute its decision. Our circuit has not directly addressed the distinction between an attorney’s role in creating policy and in giving legal advice, but the Fifth Circuit has examined the issue, concluding that these roles are distinct and that only the former role may give rise to municipal liability. In Bennett v. Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim against a city based upon the actions of the city attorney, even though it affirmed the personal liability of the attorney. Id. at 765. In that case, the city attorney deliberately delayed his review of the plaintiff’s liquor license application for a nightclub and then advised the city council to delay the application as well. Allegedly, the attorney was influenced by the city auditor, who had a personal stake in the matter. Despite the fact that the attorney was personally liable, the Fifth Circuit held that the attorney did not have “policymaking authority” because he was “employed only to give legal advice.” Id. at 769. The court emphasized that under Louisiana law, only the city council has the authority to issue liquor licenses. Ibid. Similarly, Ohio law clearly distinguishes between the role of the County Prosecutor and that of the Health District. Under Ohio law, “the prosecuting attorney of the county constituting all or a major part of such district shall act as the legal advisor of the board of health.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3709.33. It is the Health District (acting through the Board of Health), however, that makes the ultimate decision to grant or deny sewage permits. Ohio Rev. Code § 3718.02 (A)(3)(d)(5). Regardless of whether the Board listened to the advice of county officials such as the County - 14 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. Prosecutor or County Engineer, the record displays no evidence that the Health District abdicated its ultimate decisionmaking authority or handed over such authority to the County, its Commissioners, or any other county employee. As such, neither the County, its Commissioners, nor any other county employee can be the source of any official policy that resulted in the suspension or denial of Appellants’ sewage permits. The district court was therefore correct to grant summary judgment to these defendants, and we accordingly affirm the district court’s decision and order on this point.