Opinion ID: 2656507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supervised Release Special Conditions

Text: McGee next challenges the special conditions of supervised release which prohibit him from possessing or viewing sexually arousing material and require the installation of filtering software regarding such material. 27 According to McGee, as there was no evidence in the record suggesting that (1) any kind of sexually arousing material was involved in his current or prior offenses or (2) he used the internet to assist in his prior offenses, these special conditions are “unreasonable because they are not tied [to] any aspect of” his 26 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50-53; Brantley, 537 F.3d at 349. 27 The challenged special conditions provide in full: (3) The defendant shall neither possess nor have under his control any material, legal or illegal, that contains nudity or depicts or alludes to sexual activities or depicts sexually arousing material. This includes but is not limited to any material obtained through access to any computer and/or communication device, including a computer and/or communication device (includ[ing] a smart phone) for employment purposes, or any material linked to computer and/or communication device access or use. (4) The defendant shall not receive or transmit any sexually arousing material, including child pornography, via the internet nor visit any website, including chat rooms or bulletin boards, containing any sexually arousing material, including child pornography. The defendant shall install filtering software on any computer he possesses or uses which will monitor/block access to sexually oriented websites. The defendant shall pay the costs of the filtering software/services as directed by U.S. Probation. 10 Case: 13-30691 Document: 00512559224 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/12/2014 No. 13-30691 crimes and are not reasonably related to the statutory supervised release factors. When a defendant contemporaneously objects to the imposition of supervised release conditions, as McGee did here, we review the district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion. 28 “A district court has wide discretion in imposing terms and conditions of supervised release. However, this discretion is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which provides that a court may impose special conditions of supervised release only when the conditions” are reasonably related to at least one of four specific § 3553(a) factors. 29 “In addition to being related to at least one of the four factors, a condition of supervised release cannot involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in § 3553.” 30 Finally, the “Supreme Court has recognized that the congressional policy in providing for a term of supervised release after incarceration is to improve the odds of a successful transition from the prison to liberty.” 31 With respect to whether these special conditions are reasonably related to the goals of supervised release, we have upheld similar restrictions, 28 United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 2009). 29United States v. Carrillo, 660 F.3d 914, 930 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Weatherton, 567 F.3d at 153). These § 3553(a) factors are (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” (2) the need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” (3) the need “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” and (4) the need “to provide the defendant with needed [training], medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (a)(2)(B)-(D). 30 United States v. Tang, 718 F.3d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted). McGee does not argue that the challenged supervised release conditions unduly deprive him of his liberty. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 708-09 (2000)) (internal quotation 31 marks and brackets omitted). 11 Case: 13-30691 Document: 00512559224 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/12/2014 No. 13-30691 although admittedly not on identical facts. 32 In this case, the district court acknowledged that the record did not reveal any evidence that McGee had access to child pornography, that such material contributed to his prior offenses, or that he used the Internet in committing his prior crimes. The court nevertheless justified the restrictions as “a precaution, purely protective” because of its concern “about the stimulation factor motivating [McGee] for additional types of conduct consistent with child molestation.” In light of McGee’s very troubling, sexually deviant criminal history, we conclude that the challenged special conditions are reasonably related to the relevant § 3553(a) factors, as they will tend to protect the public from further crimes. McGee has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in imposing them as special conditions of supervised release. 33 32 See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 226-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 2013 WL 4456638 (Dec. 2, 2013) (upholding, in a child pornography case, a special condition prohibiting the possession of sexually stimulating material because the crime was “sexual in nature” and the restriction was reasonable to restrict the defendant’s “access to sexually stimulating material more broadly in an effort to prevent future crimes or aid in his rehabilitation”); United States v. Hilliker, 469 F. App’x 386, 389 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2012) (unpublished) (upholding, in a SORNA failure-to-register case, special conditions prohibiting all access to computers, the Internet, cameras, photographic equipment, and other electronic equipment without the permission of his probation officer, and prohibiting the purchase or possession of any sexually oriented material, when the defendant admitted that viewing pornography contributed to his fondling of underage girls); Weatherton, 567 F.3d at 151-52 (upholding, in a case in which the defendant pleaded guilty to making a false FEMA claim, but also had prior convictions for forcible rape and aggravated burglary, a special condition prohibiting the possession of any “sexually explicit materials as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)”). 33 We recognize that another panel of this court recently vacated and remanded a similar special condition imposed in a SORNA failure-to-register case. See United States v. Salazar, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 700077 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2014). After reviewing the record in that case, the Salazar court determined that it could not uphold the challenged condition as there was “insufficient evidence of a reasonable relationship between the condition and the statutory factors.” Id. at . The court therefore concluded that “district court abused its discretion by not explaining how [the condition was] reasonably related to the goals of supervised release.” Id. at  & . Here, by contrast, the district court identified McGee’s significant criminal history involving several sexual assaults and his pattern for quickly reoffending following 12 Case: 13-30691 Document: 00512559224 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/12/2014 No. 13-30691