Opinion ID: 2585525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intentional and or Negligent Spoliation of Evidence

Text: The final certified question asks: Does Hawai`i law recognize a civil cause of action for damages for intentional and/or negligent spoliation of evidence? Initially, the Matsuuras allege that conduct by DuPont constitutes spoliation of evidence. Accordingly, we limit our examination of this issue to allegations of spoliation of evidence by a party to the underlying litigation. We expressly omit discussion or analysis of spoliation by a third party.
The few jurisdictions that recognize a cause of action for intentional spoliation (as opposed to negligent spoliation, discussed infra ) of evidence require a showing of the following elements: (1) the existence of a potential lawsuit; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the potential lawsuit; (3) the intentional destruction of evidence designed to disrupt or defeat the potential lawsuit; (4) disruption of the potential lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship between the act of spoliation and the inability to prove the lawsuit; and (6) damages. Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 297 Mont. 336, 993 P.2d 11, 22 (1999); Drawl v. Cornicelli, 124 Ohio App.3d 562, 706 N.E.2d 849, 851 (1997); Torres v. El Paso Electric Co., 127 N.M. 729, 987 P.2d 386, 401 (1999). For a claim of negligent spoliation of evidence, jurisdictions generally require that the plaintiff prove: (1) the existence of a potential civil action; (2) a legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence that is relevant to the potential civil action; (3) destruction of that evidence; (4) significant impairment in the ability to prove the lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship between the destruction of evidence and the inability to prove the lawsuit, and (6) damages. Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So.2d 313, 315 (Fla.App.1990), reh'g denied, 598 So.2d 76 (Fla.1991); Oliver, 993 P.2d at 19.
DuPont contends that this is not a proper case to consider adopting an independent tort for spoliation of evidence because the Matsuuras have failed to plead and cannot prove a causal relationship between the destruction of evidence and an inability to prove their lawsuit. The Matsuuras' claims are virtually identical to the claims made by the plaintiffs in Florida Evergreen Foliage v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., 165 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1359-61 (S.D.Fla.2001) [hereinafter, Florida Evergreen II ], wherein the federal district court held that the plaintiffs in that case could not satisfy the elements of a spoliation claim because the relevant data had not been destroyed and the destruction of the actual plants used in the Costa Rica study did not significantly impair or render the plaintiffs unable to prove their claims. Florida Evergreen II, 165 F.Supp.2d at 1359-61. In reviewing the adequacy of a complaint, we deem the allegations contained within it to be true and examine whether it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would entitle him or her to relief. Blair v. Ing, 95 Hawai`i 247, 252, 21 P.3d 452, 457 (2001) (quoting Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 545, 852 P.2d 44, 53 (1993) (internal citations omitted)). As indicated supra, both intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence require: (1) the destruction of evidence; [20] (2) the disruption or significant impairment of the lawsuit; and (3) a causal relationship between the destruction of evidence and the inability to prove the lawsuit. The Matsuuras' complaint includes the following allegations: 186. In addition to illegally withholding the laboratory data referred to above, DUPONT also illegally withheld documents and information regarding testing it had conducted in the field in Costa Rica in 1992.... ..... 209. Despite the facts of the test, the existence of data confirming the tests and the evidence proving Benlate caused plant damage, DUPONT never produced these documents in Bush Ranch, Kawamata/Tomono or any of the MALONE cases, including Plaintiffs', nor were they ever identified in any privilege log, nor were they revealed in sworn testimony by any DUPONT employees who were specifically asked about such tests during discovery.... 210. When the Costa Rica test was uncovered in 1996 in connection with the Davis Tree Farms, Inc. v. DUPONT case filed in Florida, and the deposition of Mr. Cefalo [21] was scheduled, DUPONT went to Costa Rica and attempted to intimidate and/or impede his testimony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1503 and 1512. 211. In that case, DUPONT admitted it had waived any work product objection with respect to the 1992 test documents and yet obstructed discovery and refused to produce them even in the face of a court order compelling it to do so and even under threat of a default order.... .... 214. In the Davis Tree Farms case and all cases previous to it, including Plaintiffs' cases, DUPONT intentionally withheld this crucial information re: the Costa Rica field test conducted in 1992, and denied its existence in an effort to prevent the disclosure to the Plaintiffs and the Court.... 215. Once the Costa Rica test was uncovered, DUPONT, in a last ditch effort, mislabeled and concealed the secrecy agreement and the contract with Welker Plaints, Inc., on the privilege log. This conduct violated 18 U.S.C. Sections 1503 and 1512. .... 217. DUPONT concealed the Costa Rica test and the documents and evidence associated with it in many other Benlate cases, including Bush Ranch, Kawamata/Tomono, Plaintiffs' cases and the other MALONE cases.... Such concealment was in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1503. ...... 219. DUPONT's fraudulent concealment of the Costa Rica testing was in part intended to and did in fact prevent Plaintiffs herein from discovering the fraud DUPONT had perpetrated on them and was meant to and did prevent them from seeking redress for such redress in a timely manner. .... 222. MALONE on behalf of his clients, including Plaintiffs, had requested the production of documents and information, pursuant to which DUPONT should have produced the ALTA SU documents, the other lab testing revealing contamination of Benlate and the Costa Rica field test documents. With the exception of a small amount of the other lab contamination testing, none of the above-referenced information was disclosed or provided to MALONE by DUPONT. 223. The above-referenced evidence was damaging to DUPONT, very helpful to Plaintiffs and would clearly have enhanced their cases 224. As a result of the fact that DUPONT illegally concealed and lied about the above-referenced evidence and because of the effect of the concealment, Plaintiffs settled their cases for far less than their actual losses and the fair settlement value of their cases. Thus, according to the Matsuuras' complaint, documents and information from the Costa Rica field test proved that Benlate damaged plants. This documentation was not destroyed and was, ultimately, disclosed by DuPont. In their underlying lawsuits, the Matsuuras alleged damages from the use of Benlate. Thus, in order to constitute a valid claim of spoliation of evidence, the Matsuuras must prove that the destruction of the plants from the Costa Rica field test resulted in their inability to prove that Benlate damaged their plants and fields. However, the Matsuuras indicate that documents and other information pertaining to the Costa Rica field test including photos and videotape of the plantsdemonstrated the harmful effects of Benlate. Additionally, the Matsuuras indicate that the Alta test results and the Keeler documents both indicated that Benlate was contaminated with herbicides. Moreover, the plaintiffs in Kawamata Farms were successful in proving substantially identical claims without the benefit of any evidence from the Costa Rica field test. Therefore, given that the Matsuuras' allegations indicate that evidence other than the plants from the Costa Rica field test demonstrated the harmful effects of Benlate, the destruction of the Costa Rica plants did not result in their inability to prove their suit. Because the facts alleged cannot support their spoliation claim, this court need not resolve whether Hawai`i law would recognize a tort of spoliation of evidence. Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 150 Ill.App.3d 248, 103 Ill.Dec. 774, 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1321 (1986), reh'g denied, 150 Ill.App.3d 248, 103 Ill.Dec. 774, 501 N.E.2d 1312 (1987), appeal denied, 114 Ill.2d 556, 108 Ill.Dec. 424, 508 N.E.2d 735 (1987). Therefore, insofar as the third certified question does not appear to be determinative of the cause, it was inappropriate for certification under HRAP Rule 13. Accordingly, we decline to answer it.