Opinion ID: 2974751
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Computation of the Guidelines Sentence

Text: Adams argues that the court below misapplied the Guidelines in three ways: (1) it inappropriately relied on allegations of obstruction of justice when those facts were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) relied on hearsay in violation of the Confrontation Clause, and (3) it added an enhancement based on the finding that he was a career offender within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
The PSIR added four points for obstruction of justice and involvement of others. It noted that several witnesses had testified that Adams threatened his former girlfriend to prevent her from testifying and that he enlisted others to do so, soliciting his cell mate and his nephew. While the PSIR ultimately relied only on the career offender enhancement, 18 U.S.C. § 4B1.1, in determining Adams’ recommended sentence, it appears that the obstruction charge might have influenced the district court to sentence Adams at the top of the range recommended by the Guidelines. In Booker, the Supreme Court found that, “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. The plea agreement did not establish the facts of 4 obstruction of justice. Rather, Adams consistently denied these allegations. However, the statutory maximum for bank robbery is 20 years. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Adams was sentenced to only 188 months. Therefore, the obstruction enhancement did not increase his sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the statute and thus did not violate Booker. While the court below did not explicitly find that Adams had acted to obstruct justice as alleged by the PSIR, it was certainly aware of the charge and that Adams contested their inclusion. The government, Adams, and the court discussed the allegations in the PSIR and the surrounding issues at length during the resentencing colloquy. Adams admitted that his nephew had pleaded guilty to misprision of a felony. It was uncontroverted that Lipsey had testified to a grand jury that Adams had contacted her in an attempt to change her testimony. Ultimately, the test of a sentence is its reasonableness. Therefore, we must determine whether it was reasonable for the district court to sentence Adams to 188 months. We examine reasonableness more fully below, but we reiterate that because the obstruction charge did not increase Adams’ sentence beyond “the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty,” Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, i.e. bank robbery, the charge did not need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Adams also argues that hearsay admitted at sentencing, to wit the PSIR’s reliance on absent witnesses, violates his Sixth Amendment rights to Confrontation as established by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). He admits in his brief that this argument has already been rejected by this court in Katzopoulos, 437 F.3d at 576. This panel cannot overrule that decision, thus we reject this argument. 5
Likewise, this court has also rejected the argument that the Supreme Court’s holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), is no longer good law. See United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292, 299 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006). Adams admits that his argument is erroneous in light of this circuit’s precedent yet “wishes to preserve the issue for further appellate review.” Therefore, we reject this argument.