Opinion ID: 1152631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Recovery in Tort?

Text: Plaintiff also asserts that the defendant is liable under LSA-C.C. 2315 (West 1985) for the full value of the crop which was destroyed when the well was erected in 1977, and for the loss of profits in 1978 and 1979 caused by the presence of Northcott's operations. He argues that the Public Records Doctrine was not intended to protect tortfeasors from liability. While we agree with that position, we do not agree that Northcott is a tortfeasor merely because he exercised his rights under the recorded mineral lease. [1] While growing crops belong to the landowner, they are a component part of the tract of land. LSA-C.C. 465 (West 1985). Component parts of a tract of land are immovable property. LSA-C.C. 462 (West 1985). However, when the standing crops belong to a person other than the landowner, they become movables by anticipation. LSA-C.C. art. 474 (West 1985), and LSA-C.C. art. 491 (West 1985). As between Mr. Broussard and the landowners, the crops in question were movables by anticipation which were owned by Mr. Broussard. As to third persons such as Northcott, the crops remained immovable property owned by the landowner in the absence of any other recorded interest shown on the public records. The crops are presumed to belong to the owner of the ground unless separate ownership is evidenced by an instrument filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish where the immovable is located. LSA-C.C. art. 491 (West 1985). The fact that Northcott had actual knowledge that the crops belonged to Mr. Broussard is irrelevant. Comment (e) to LSA-C.C. art. 491 indicates that the presumption created by that article is conclusive since it can be defeated only by an instrument filed for registry. Furthermore, it has been held on numerous occasions that actual knowledge of separate ownership does not displace the operation of the Public Records Doctrine. LSA-R.S. 9:2771; Minter v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 180 La. 38, 156 So. 167 (1934); and Meares v. Pioneer Prod. Corp., 382 So.2d 1009 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied 392 So.2d 667 (La.1980). Since Northcott recorded its mineral lease, Minos Broussard's predial lease became subject to the superior rights acquired by Northcott. Among these rights is the right of Northcott to conduct drilling operations on the property. However, Northcott must exercise this right subject to the limitations discussed below. Article 2315 provides in part: every act whatever of an that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. Fault is a breach of duty owed by one party to another under the particular facts and circumstances of a given case. It encompasses the exercise of contractual rights in such a manner as to cause unreasonable property damage. Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So.2d 93 (La.1975); Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So.2d 293 (1957); and Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955). As stated by this court long ago, every business, however lawful, must be conducted with due regard for the rights of others ... Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947). When Northcott exercised its rights under the mineral lease, it had an obligation to act reasonably. In conducting those operations it was entitled to destroy only so much of Mr. Broussard's crop as was required to allow it to reasonably exercise its' contractual right. Mr. Broussard cannot recover from Northcott, although he may against his landlord under LSA-R.S. 9:3203, for that portion of the crop destroyed by Northcott's reasonable exercise of its right. This is because Mr. Broussard rented the property subject to the rights granted to Northcott once the mineral lease was recorded. Northcott was entitled to rely on the absence of any recorded interests when drilling was commenced. This position was recently adopted by our brothers below in Oswalt v. Irby Cot. Co., 424 So.2d 348 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1982): As to the property within the limits of the right of way, plaintiff's lease was taken subject to the prior recorded right of way granted under the public records doctrine ... In the absence of negligence on the part of the grantee of the servitude or an unreasonable exercise of the grantee's rights, the plaintiff lessee is not entitled to recover from the grantee or its contractor for damages to his crop growing within the right of way caused by the operation of the grantee conducted pursuant to the rights granted in the right of way instrument... That which constitutes an unreasonable exercise of contractual rights must be determined on a case by case basis. One example of this may arise when ten acres of crops are destroyed when the destruction of only two acres would have been reasonable. This case is hereby remanded to the trial court to determine whether Northcott acted reasonably in conducting its operations. It was suggested at oral argument that the destruction of Mr. Broussard's tractor while sitting on the drill site would be analogous to the destruction of his growing crops. We disagree. Unlike standing crops, a tractor is always movable property and is never subject to the Public Records Doctrine, as it relates to immovables. While the mineral lease grants to the lessee the right to exercise dominion and control over immovable property in conducting drilling operations, it does not grant such rights over movable property sitting on the tract of land. Furthermore, it would clearly be unreasonable to destroy a tractor that could simply be moved. We acknowledge that the operation of the Public Records Doctrine places the farmer in a difficult position. In order to recover the losses resulting from the reasonable exercise of rights under the mineral lease, the farmer must institute suit against the landowner under LSA-R.S. 9:3203. This may jeopardize his rental of the property in the future. As a consequence, he may never recover deciding not to sue the landowner in order to avoid placing his year-to-year lease at risk. Despite the dilemma occasioned thereby to the farmer, we are not in a position to create an exception to the legislatively created Public Records Doctrine. That is a legislative function.