Opinion ID: 1776668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: standard of review

Text: ¶ 22. During a suppression hearing, the trial judge sits as a fact finder. Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss.1996). On appeal, the trial judge's findings can only be reversed for manifest error or if they are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 23. An accused must be informed of his constitutional right, particularly his right to counsel and right to remain silent and the consequences of waiving those rights before police may initiate interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-28, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once a person in custody invokes the right to counsel, any interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Minnick v. Mississippi. 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). An accused is not subject to further interrogations by authorities, unless the accused initiates the communication. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). ¶ 24. In Riddle v. State, 580 So.2d 1195, 1199 (Miss.1991), this Court clarified this issue by holding the following: Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), reaffirmed and reinforced Miranda, Edwards, and Roberson, stating: ... [A] fair reading of Edwards and subsequent cases ... bar[s] police-initiated interrogation unless the accused has counsel with him at the time of questioning. Whatever the ambiguities of our earlier cases on this point, we now hold that when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney. This Court also recognized a caveat and held that [i]f the accused indicates in any manner that he wishes access to counsel, interrogation without counsel is allowed only if the accused himself initiates it. Id. (citations omitted). In Minnick, the United States Supreme Court held that Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment protections after counsel has been requested, provided the accused has initiated the conversation or discussions with the authorities. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156, 111 S.Ct. 486, 492, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). ¶ 25. The trial court ruled that the statement was voluntary and provided the following reasoning: ... I took the opportunity of going over my notes during the recess and satisfying my mind that the Miranda rights had been given this defendant and he indicated that he understood those rights. When asked to sign the waiver of rights, he indicated he would not sign and wanted to see an attorney. And I think everybody in here agrees as that point in time that stops or tolls the running of any interrogation. If they have to go back to re-interrogate him, then if he starts to make any statement that is not voluntary, then they would have to re-Mirandize him and go through the process all over again; I think everybody here agrees with that. But that's apparently not what happened in this case. Apparently, after he indicated he wanted to see a lawyer, this defendant apparently at that point, and according to the testimony of the witness, ceased the interrogation. And it was only after that that the voluntary statement was made, and as such, the Court would rule that it would not be necessary for him to be re-Mirandized since it was, in fact, a voluntary statement made by the defendant. That being the case, I will allow that to be asked in the presence of the jury. ¶ 26. If the voluntariness of a confession is in question, the accused has a right to determine if the confession was actually voluntary in nature. Kircher v. State, 753 So.2d 1017, 1024 (Miss.1999). In Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671, 673 (Miss. 1966), the procedure was set forth which requires an evidentiary hearing. Id. The State has the burden of proving all facts prerequisite to admissibility beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing Cox v. State, 586 So.2d 761, 763 (Miss.1991); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss.1984)). `This burden is met and a prima facie case made out by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward.' Id. (quoting Cox v. State, 586 So.2d 761 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 27. In the case sub judice, Randolph does not challenge the voluntariness of the statement, but rather, that the statement was made after he invoked his right to counsel and with no counsel present. Furthermore, he claims that the statement was vague and nebulous and does not have a close nexus to the crime in which he was charged. Despite Randolph's reliance upon invoking the right to counsel, the issue before this Court goes right to the heart of the voluntariness of the statement. Testimony showed that Randolph did not sign a waiver of rights and requested a lawyer. The authorities stopped the interview at this point in compliance with Minnick. Without solicitation from the authorities, Randolph, then made his statement. The trial court determined that the statement was voluntary based upon testimony given by Clark. Accordingly, this Court finds that the issue is without merit.