Opinion ID: 1957391
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Is the Denial of a Bonding Study in a Permanency Plan Situation Appealable?

Text: To determine appealability in this case, it is necessary for us to consider what parental rights, if any, are implicated in a motion for independent bonding study made during a permanency plan review hearing that resulted in, continuation of the same permanency plan. In the case before us, Katina M. sought a change of the existing permanency plan to reunification during the review hearing, and in support thereof, requested a bonding study under Section 3-816 to refute the testimony, which she classified as expert, of the social worker who testified about the level of bonding between the children and Katina M. and the foster parents. We recognize that the levels of bonding or attachment and emotional ties to the child's parent, and to the caregiver, testified by the social worker, are significant facts to be considered in the development of a permanency plan pursuant to Section 5-525(e)(ii) and (iii) of the Family Law Article, but are not the only factors, so that the denial of a bonding study would not per se affect parental rights in the permanency planning context. We also have not previously addressed whether a social worker's testimony on bonding should be considered as factual or as expert opinion, governed by Maryland Rule 5-702, [12] as Katina M. has asked us to do, which she posits supports appealability of the denial of the bonding study. In this regard, the Court of Special Appeals, although not addressing this specific question, has limited a social worker's testimony during CINA proceedings to lay observations of the children. In In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 2152A, 2153A, 2154A, 100 Md.App. 262, 641 A.2d 889 (1994), the Court of Special Appeals held that the social worker was competent to testify as a lay witness about the behavior of the children that she heard and saw first hand and the efforts that she undertook to prepare the children for the changes that they were facing, id. at 276, 641 A.2d at 895, all of which were factual matters compared to evaluative opinions, but limited the social worker so that she would not be permitted by the trial court to express any expert opinion about the adjustments of the children to their foster homes. Id. Various of our sister states have determined social worker's testimony about bonding to be equivalent to expert testimony when it was evaluative in nature. See In re Luke M. et al., 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 907, 917 (2003) (considering social worker's testimony, it would be detrimental for [the children] to live with [the biological father] in Ohio because they were bonded with [the foster parents], to be evaluative in nature); In the Interest of S.O. et al., 483 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Iowa 1992) (determining that social worker's testimony was evaluative when she described the bond between the mother and her two older daughters as unhealthy); In re the Adoption of M.T.S., 489 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn.App.1992) (qualifying two social workers as experts to testify about the child's bond with the natural parents); In the Matter of Amanda Broadway, 191 Or.App. 78, 81 P.3d 99, 103 (2003) (viewing social worker's testimony that the mother and her children had a `strong attachment' to each other as evaluative in nature); Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah App.1992) (considering a social worker's testimony regarding the strength of [mother's] bond with the children as evaluative in nature); In re D.C., 163 Vt. 517, 659 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1995) (treating social worker's testimony that taking a special needs child from the family with which the child had bonded would have negative therapeutic implications for the child as appropriate expert testimony). Whether social workers testify about their observations regarding the bond between the parent or caregiver and child as a fact witness, or give an evaluation about the state of a bond between the parent or caregiver and the child as an expert, the court in its discretion may order an independent medical examination of the child. In re Mark M., 365 Md. at 715, 782 A.2d at 348-49. It is not necessarily the nature of the testimony in the action that controls the decision, but whether the proponent of the examination satisfies the factors articulated in In re Mark M., to demonstrate good cause for such an examination, show that the examination is reasonably calculated to assist the trier of fact in rendering its decision, and establish that the proposed examination will not be harmful to the child. Id. at 717-18, 782 A.2d at 350. With respect to the last factor in deciding whether a psychological examination would be harmful to a child, courts of other jurisdictions have considered the age and emotional condition of the child, the nature of the allegations of abuse and neglect, the strength of the relationship between the child and parent, and the child's difficulty in discussing family related issues. See In the Matter of Thea T., 174 Misc.2d 227, 663 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1997); Matter of Nicole, 146 Misc.2d 610, 551 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751-52 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1990); In re Child M., 452 Pa.Super. 230, 681 A.2d 793, 802 (1996). In addition, courts have assessed the nature of the examination by probing the qualifications of the clinician conducting the evaluation, including: his or her training, background, experience; the number of sessions the child would meet with the therapist; and the methodology employed during the sessions. See In the Matter of Kaitlyn S., 148 Misc.2d 276, 560 N.Y.S.2d 88, 93 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1990); Matter of Nicole, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 752-53; In re Child M., 681 A.2d at 802. In the case sub judice, the court exercised its discretion in denying Katina M.'s motion for a bonding study, but confirmed the permanency plan with additional time for visitation based, in part, upon the court's view of the bond that the children had with Katina M. and the caregiver. As such, the denial of the bonding study would only be appealable as an interlocutory order under Section 12-303(x) if it deprived Katina M. of her right to care and custody of the children or changed the terms of her parental rights. See In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 438, 765 A.2d at 628. In maintaining the permanency plan to proceed with the adoption of the children, the trial court continued the permanency plan from the prior year, as well as allowed Katina M. increased access to her children. Katina M.'s rights would have been implicated had she made the motion for bonding study and appealed its denial when the court changed the permanency plan from reunification to adoption pursuant to Section 3-823(e) and (g) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and our decision in In re Damon M., 362 Md. 429, 765 A.2d 624 (2001), but not when the judge continued the plan and increased visitation. We acknowledge that bonding studies can be beneficial to the determination of a permanency plan and may assist the court in making decisions about a child's placement. Nevertheless, based upon the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court's order denying the motion for such a study is not an appealable final judgment and does not constitute an interlocutory order under Section 12-303(x). [13] The second issue for consideration is whether the trial court erred in quashing the subpoenas for the children to testify during the permanency plan review hearing and declining to interview the children in camera. The trial judge's actions arose within the context of a permanency plan review hearing, after which he continued the previous permanency plan of adoption, as well as increased Katina M.'s visitation. Because the order continuing the permanency plan did not adversely affect Katina M.'s parental rights or change the terms of the permanency plan to Katina M.'s increased detriment, the trial judge's actions are not reviewable by this Court. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS APPEAL; PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.