Opinion ID: 1976452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The continuance from the March 22, 1983, trial date.

Text: A. As noted in the above factual recital, this case first was set for trial on March 22, 1983. As that date approached at least twelve motions were pending, including two motions for summary judgment. With all interested parties represented, these motions were submitted in open court on February 28, 1983, Judge Irvin presiding. Gold Crown asked for and received permission to promptly file its own summary judgment motion to be considered with the others. Judge Irvin stated that in view of his own trial schedule and the complexity of the motions, he was going to continue the case. No objections were raised by the parties. Even if we were to ignore the knowledge of modern district court structure and procedures that this court must possess in order to fulfill its constitutional mandate to exercise administrative control over Iowa's courts, [2] it is clear under this record that in the fourth judicial district the duty to coordinate the trial docket and schedule cases for trial has been delegated to the court administrator. Judge Irvin thus promptly contacted the court administrator, secured an available trial date, and entered his March 4, 1983, order noting the summary judgment motions were taken under submission and specifying the new June 28, 1983, trial date. When the previously scheduled trial date of March 22, 1983, was reached, a new trial date already had been fixed and the three summary judgment motions not only were pending, they had been submitted to the court and were under its consideration. This is the distinguishing difference between Brown v. Iowa District Court, 272 N.W.2d 457, 458-59 (Iowa 1978), relied on by Gold Crown, and Humboldt Livestock Auction, Inc. v. B & H Cattle Co., 261 Iowa 419, 422-26, 155 N.W.2d 478, 481-83 (1967), which presented a factual situation strikingly similar to the one before us. When the final trial date was reached in Brown no substitute date had been scheduled. 272 N.W.2d at 458 (It was not tried then nor was any further continuance requested or granted.). Although we there rejected the argument that the case should not have been dismissed under rule 215.1 when a summary judgment was on file, id., we neither cited to nor distinguished Humboldt Livestock Auction. In the latter case a summary judgment motion had been filed, heard on the date fixed for trial, and submitted to trial court. No ruling, however, was filed until after the try-or-dismiss term had ended. Humboldt Livestock Auction, 261 Iowa at 424, 155 N.W.2d at 482. The parties, who there asserted the case had been dismissed automatically pursuant to rule 215.1, contended no motion for continuance had been made before the term had ended. We held: [A]lthough we agree that a motion for summary judgment is not a motion for continuance, the matter had been fully and finally submitted to the court during the November term on December 27 and rule 215.1(a) does not apply to cases under order of submission to the court. Id. at 426, 155 N.W.2d at 483 (emphasis added). It would be anomalous indeed to hold that a party submitting a complex, dispositive motion to the court had not by that action impliedly stipulated the court should have reasonable time to consider and rule on it. In other situations we have held pending matters over which the court had taken jurisdiction will carry a case past the rule 215.1 deadline for trial. See Schimerowski v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Iowa 1972). We conclude here, as we did in Humboldt Livestock Auction, that rule 215.1 did not trigger a dismissal of this action on March 22, 1983. B. Moreover, D.R.R. advances a second valid reason for rejecting Gold Crown's contention the case was dismissed when not tried on the first assigned trial date. D.R.R. asserts the parties intended their stipulation on October 22, 1982, to relate not only to that continuance, but to future continuances required by the course of the active litigation. We agree. Contrary to Gold Crown's arguments, we have never held an application is the sole vehicle for securing a valid rule 215.1 continuance order. The language of the rule, No continuance under this rule shall be by stipulation of parties alone but must be by order of court, implies a proper stipulation, followed by a court order, may be substituted for an application by one of the parties. We have so held. Humboldt Livestock Auction, 261 Iowa at 425, 155 N.W.2d at 483 (Of course, the court may grant a continuance upon a stipulation of the parties. The prohibition in the rule is against the parties stipulating a continuance themselves.); see Baty v. City of West Des Moines, 259 Iowa 1017, 1025, 147 N.W.2d 204, 209 (1966); Talbot v. Talbot, 255 Iowa 337, 339, 122 N.W.2d 456, 458 (1963). Here the application of D.R.R. recited a pretrial conference had been held and the trial date had been set for March 22, 1983. It asserted the cause should be continued to March 22, 1983, for dismissal unless further continuance is granted thereafter by this court. (Emphasis added.) This statement was stipulated and agreed to, with the signatures of counsel for all three interested defendants. At the hearing on February 28, 1983, or at least by the subsequent March 4, 1983, enrolled order, the court did in fact grant a further continuance. There was substantial evidence to support the finding in Judge Burgett's final order that the parties intended this document to be a continuing authority to the court to reschedule the trial date in the orderly [course] of the administration of the court business. All of the subsequent conduct of Gold Crown substantiates the conclusion that it did in fact intend its stipulation to be a continuing one, approving the subsequent rescheduled trial dates made necessary by the complexities of the case and the exigencies of the trial court case load. Gold Crown continued to pursue discovery and file motions and applications, culminating in its September 26, 1983, Application for Pre-Trial Conference. This application was filed after the three dates that had been fixed for trial and alleged the case should now be tried, more discovery may be necessary, and a new pretrial conference should be ordered. Upon oral submission of the application for further review in this court, Gold Crown's counsel, when asked why his client had taken all these steps in an action it deemed dismissed as of March 22, 1983, stated Gold Crown's motive was to save time should an application for reinstatement be filed by D.R.R. We do not endorse litigation by ambush. We find substantial evidence to support at least a narrow interpretation of Judge Burgett's conclusion that this conduct by Gold Crown, in all the circumstances, estopped it from claiming a dismissal under rule 215.1. Gold Crown at least should be held estopped from asserting that its stipulation was not a continuing one, consenting to further continuances ordered by the court beyond the March 22, 1983, first-assigned trial date. Seymour v. City of Ames, 218 Iowa 615, 619, 255 N.W. 874, 876 (1934) (An estoppel is based upon the idea that one who has made a certain representation... should not thereafter be permitted to change his position to the prejudice of one who has relied thereon.); see Johnston v. State Bank, 195 N.W.2d 126, 128-29 (Iowa 1972); Laverty v. Hawkeye Security Insurance Co., 258 Iowa 717, 726, 140 N.W.2d 83, 88-89 (1966); Wetzstein v. Dehrkoop, 241 Iowa 1237, 1243-45, 44 N.W.2d 695, 698-99 (1950). C. Finally, with respect to the March 22, 1983, trial date, we believe this case is controlled by Kutrules v. Suchomel, 258 Iowa 1206, 141 N.W.2d 593 (1966). In Kutrules we wrote: We have never said that a case should be dismissed for lack of prosecution while on the active trial assignment, assigned for trial on a date certain and before the arrival of the trial date. ... ... Plaintiff had filed two Certificates of Readiness and had asked for trial. The case was at issue. Plaintiff's counsel had done everything he could do except ask for continuance and continuance was not what he wanted. He wanted a trial. Id. at 1213, 141 N.W.2d at 598. Capsulating the Kutrules holding in Baty, we observed: Under [the Kutrules ] record this court held no delay could be attributed to plaintiff by assent or otherwise. Under those circumstances we were satisfied plaintiff disclosed ample grounds for relief. Rule 215.1 was intended to be a shield, not a sword. It was not designed as a technicality to trap a diligent party and prevent him from having a day in court. 259 Iowa at 1026, 147 N.W.2d at 210. For the above reasons we hold this case was not automatically dismissed on March 22, 1983.