Opinion ID: 181255
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strickland’s Letter

Text: Brantley first alleges he met with Dr. Lane on August 20 to complain about gender disparities and a hostile workplace in the food services department. According to the record, Dr. Lane informed Strickland of those complaints on August 24, 2007. Strickland testified she gave Brantley his demotion letter (dated August 22) four days later, on August 28. Given that time line, Brantley argues the August 22, 2007 date on his demotion letter proves Strickland lied about when she reached her decision to demote him. In support of this argument, he contends (1) Strickland did not mention she was contemplating a job transfer when she and Brantley met on August 10; and (2) Strickland similarly did not mention she was demoting Brantley at the August 24 meeting with Dr. Lane and in her August 27, 2007 memorandum detailing Brantley’s disciplinary history. In other words, Brantley contends that if Strickland truly had begun drafting the transfer letter on -9- August 22, as she claims, she would have mentioned it to Dr. Lane on either August 24 or in her August 27 memo. The fact that she did not do so, Brantley argues, shows she was retaliating against Brantley for complaining about gender disparities and that she merely placed the August 22 date on the demotion letter to cover her retaliatory animus. Brantley provides no evidence Strickland’s story is false other than his own interpretation of what the dates on the letters mean. “To withstand a motion for summary judgment, ‘the nonmovant must do more than refer to allegations of counsel contained in a brief.’” Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992)). “Rather, sufficient evidence (pertinent to the material issue) must be identified by reference to an affidavit, a deposition transcript or a specific exhibit incorporated therein.” Thomas, 968 F.2d at 1024 (emphasis added). As to the August 10 meeting, Strickland’s failure to identify the job transfer as a possibility does nothing to contradict her explanation of the events surrounding her decision. Nor do the August 22 letter and August 27 memorandum to Dr. Lane create an inference of retaliatory animus. First of all, we see no significance to the fact that Strickland did not document when she made the transfer decision in her August 22 letter. In light of this, Brantley attempts to cobble together sufficient evidence by arguing -10- Strickland’s failure to mention his demotion to Dr. Lane on August 24 indicates she had not conceived of it until after she heard of his complaints to Dr. Lane. Brantley’s argument, however, contradicts the undisputed facts and testimony. He received multiple warnings in the build up to his demotion, including his suspension for inappropriate comments and his reprimand for being insubordinate toward Houston and denigrating her to another employee. Moreover, Strickland testified, without contradiction, that several days after Brantley’s insubordinate behavior toward Houston, around August 10, she discussed demoting Brantley with Dr. Lane and persons in Unified’s human resources department. Brantley does not point to any evidence from Dr. Lane or Unified casting doubt on this testimony. Even if an inference could be drawn that Strickland lied about when she prepared the letter, that inference does not lead to an inference-upon-aninference of retaliatory animus. 3 While the date on the letter could have significance given other evidence of retaliatory animus, without more, it does not provide evidence Strickland acted out of an illicit motive. 3 Brantley suggests that Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. 530 U.S. 133 (2000), compels a different conclusion. But in Reeves the alleged misstatement went to the reason for termination, not the timing of the decision to terminate. As Reeves also acknowledges, “an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue, and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” Id. at 148 (emphasis added). That is the case here. -11-