Opinion ID: 1553988
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether Burley has standing as an interested party.

Text: ¶ 24. First, we must determine whether an interested party may commence a wrongful-death action, or merely join one. The first paragraph of the Statute provides that an action may be brought in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person[,] or by [one of the listed relatives], or all parties interested may join in the suit .... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004) (emphasis added). However, the Statute goes on to allow an action [to be] brought ... by the widow, husband, child, father, mother, sister or brother of the deceased ..., or by all interested parties.  Id. (emphasis added). Recognizing this language, we have stated that: [T]here are three alternatives for bringing a wrongful death suit: (1) by the personal representative on behalf of the estate and all other persons entitled to recover; (2) by one of the [listed relatives] on behalf of all persons entitled to recover; or (3) by all interested parties.... Long, 897 So.2d at 168 (quoting Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13). [7] Therefore, we hold, consistent with Long, that, not only may an interested party join a wrongful-death suit, but an interested party may initiate a wrongful-death action under the terms of the Statute. ¶ 25. Next, we must determine if Burley qualifies as an interested party. No Mississippi case has explicitly defined who qualifies as an interested party for purposes of the wrongful-death statute. However, this Court previously has determined that one who qualifies as an heir of the deceased also qualifies as an interested party under the wrongful-death statute. [8] In Alack v. Phelps, 230 So.2d 789 (Miss. 1970), we held that adopted twin boys could still inherit from their natural father, and we specifically stated that the boys were interested parties under the wrongful-death statute and should have been included in the wrongful-death action for their natural father's death. Id. at 793. See also, Estate of Jones v. Howell, 687 So.2d 1171, 1175 (Miss.1996) (holding, without labeling him an interested party, that adopted child could bring wrongful-death action for the death of his natural father); McLemore v. Gammon, 468 So.2d 84, 86 (Miss.1985) (holding, without labeling them interested parties, that adoptive brothers and sisters of adopted child killed in car accident could bring wrongful-death action to the exclusion of the adopted child's natural siblings); Long, 897 So.2d at 169. [9] ¶ 26. We hold that Burley qualifies as an interested party under the wrongful-death statute, and therefore, he had standing to bring this action. Burley is a blood relative of Joshua and Jakura Hill, and because Francesca Hill  Joshua and Jakura's mother and their only available listed relative  was killed in the same accident that tragically claimed Joshua's and Jakura's lives, she was removed from the line of descent and distribution. Thus, at the moment of their deaths, Burley held the status of an heir of Joshua and Jakura Hill, such that, under our laws of intestate descent and distribution, he would have been entitled to inherit property from them. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 91-1-1 to -31 (Rev.2004). His later adjudication by the chancery court as an heir-at-law of the children merely confirmed this status. Thus, when he commenced the suit, Burley qualified as an interested party under the terms of the Statute, and he was an appropriate wrongful-death claimant under the facts of this case. ¶ 27. YVEPA, however, argues that, under the clear language of Long v. McKinney , Joshua and Jakura's estates must, of course, be opened and administered through the chancery court before Burley may pursue a wrongful-death claim on behalf of the estate. See Long, 897 So.2d at 174. We do not think the holding in Long is applicable to this case, for the following reasons. ¶ 28. Burley did not sue on behalf of the estates of Joshua and/or Jakura Hill. He brought his action as  James A. Burley, Parent/Guardian and Next Best Friend of Francesca Hill, Joshua Hill and Jakura Hill, Minors.  Although this wording is awkward, it is clear that Burley's complaint does not indicate that Burley brought the suit as personal representative of the deceased children or on behalf of the children's estates. In fact, Burley's complaint stated that the Plaintiff, James A. Burley, lost the life of his daughter and [two] grandchildren. (Emphasis added.) It indicates that he, individually, had suffered injury. Thus, the original complaint makes no claims on behalf of the estates of either Joshua or Jakura Hill. ¶ 29. Burley's amended complaint, however, is different. The amended complaint asks for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as damages for  medical expenses, funeral expenses, and damages to personal property.  (Emphasis added.) It is not inconceivable that this language in Burley's amended complaint, seeking pre-death and funeral damages, indicates that Burley was bringing an action on behalf of the estates of Joshua and Jakura Hill. ¶ 30. YVEPA picks up on this language and argues that Burley's claims concerning Joshua and Jakura Hill necessarily were brought on behalf of their estates. YVEPA cites In re Estate of England, and argues that if none of the listed relatives survives the decedent, the damages become an asset of the decedent's estate. In Matter of Estate of England, 846 So.2d 1060, 1066 (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (citing Smith v. Garrett, 287 So.2d 258, 261 (Miss. 1973)). Therefore, YVEPA argues, under England, that Burley must have brought the suit on behalf of the estates of Joshua and Jakura Hill, because none of their listed relatives survived. We disagree. ¶ 31. The wrongful-death statute differentiates between who has the authority, or standing, to bring the suit and which wrongful-death claimants may recover what damages, and when they may do so. [10] The Statute confers priority as to which listed relatives may recover damages, but it does not play favorites regarding which potential wrongful-death claimant may bring the suit. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004). The paragraph concerning who may bring the action simply lists the prospective plaintiffs (the personal representative, listed relatives, and interested parties) in a series, separated by or. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13. No potential wrongful-death claimant has priority over another. See J.J. Newman Lumber Co., 91 So. at 11. ¶ 32. The paragraph delineating which listed relatives may recover damages, however, does set out priority. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13. It provides that if [the decedent] has no children all shall go to his wife; and if she has no children all shall go to the husband; and if the deceased has no husband or wife, the damages shall be equally distributed to the children; and if the deceased has no husband, nor wife, nor children, the damages shall be distributed equally to the father, mother, brothers and sisters, or such of them as the deceased may have living at his or her death. Id. This language clearly indicates a hierarchy of priority as to who may recover damages under the Statute. ¶ 33. Our holding today recognizes the statutory distinction between a party's authority to bring the wrongful-death action and the party's ability to recovery damages from it. Burley brought this action as an interested party, a status he held because of his qualification as an heir-at-law of Joshua and Jakura Hill. Burley's later-acquired status as administrator of their estates did not confer upon him standing, as personal representative or otherwise, to commence the wrongful-death action, but merely gave him authority to bring additional claims within that action for certain damages on behalf of the estates. ¶ 34. Hence, Burley brought many different claims within his wrongful-death action. He included claims for his own individual injuries (such as loss of society and companionship, etc.) and claims for property damage and medical and funeral expenses, which may be characterized as claims of the estates. See Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So.2d 142, 149-50 (Miss.2008) (holding that the Mississippi wrongful-death statute ... encompasses all claims  including survival claims which could have been brought by the decedent, wrongful-death claims, estate claims, and other claims.). Burley was required to bring the so-called estate claims because the statute instructs that there shall be but one (1) suit for the same death which shall ensue for the benefit of all parties concerned. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13. [11] However, the fact that Burley happens to be seeking the same damages as Joshua's and Jakura's estates would seek, namely medical and funeral expenses, does not change the nature of Burley's suit nor his standing as an interested party to bring it. ¶ 35. Each wrongful-death claimant's ability to recover damages, and the point when that ability becomes available, is a separate question. The Statute's first paragraph sets out the potential wrongful-death claimants, allowing the wrongful-death action to be brought by the personal representative of the decedent, by a listed relative, or by an interested party. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004). In a later paragraph, however, the Statute provides that the decedent's property damages and medical and funeral expenses may be recovered by the listed relatives or the interested parties, whether or not an estate has been opened. Id. Personal representative is left out of this section. ¶ 36. Therefore, each claimant's ability to recover these damages becomes available at different times. That difference is tantamount to the fact that the estate must, of course, be opened and administered through the chancery court before the claimant may pursue a wrongful-death claim on behalf of the estate. Long, 897 So.2d at 174. In other words, a claimant cannot bring claims on behalf of an estate that does not yet exist. Hence, Burley amended his complaint specifically to seek damages for property damage and medical and funeral expenses only after he was appointed administrator of Joshua and Jakura Hill's estates. Burley had standing to bring the suit as an interested party from the moment of Joshua's and Jakura's deaths, but he gained the ability to recover on behalf of the estates only after those estates came into existence and he was appointed administrator. ¶ 37. The estate has no greater right to bring the suit than does a listed relative or an interested party. J.J. Newman Lumber Co., 91 So. at 11; England, 846 So.2d at 1066. Listed relatives, on the other hand, do have priority in recovering damages. All damages other than those for property damage and medical and funeral expenses are distributed according to the hierarchy of listed relatives discussed above. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13. But if none of the listed relatives survives the decedent, those damages become an asset of the decedent's estate and are also used in payment of the estate's debts, with any residue to be distributed according to the will or under the laws of descent and distribution in the case of intestacy. Smith v. Garrett, 287 So.2d 258, 261 (Miss.1973); England, 846 So.2d at 1066. Therefore, no matter who brings the suit, the damages recovered from the suit (other than for individual claims) necessarily will fall to the estate in the event that none of the Statute's listed relatives survives the decedent. ¶ 38. To sum up, because Burley brought this wrongful-death action as an interested party, he may recover damages for the children's property damage, if any, and for their medical and funeral expenses, even though he brought suit before the estates were opened. However, those damages are, pursuant to the Statute's clear terms, subject to the debts and liabilities of Joshua and Jakura Hill's estates. Furthermore, since Joshua and Jakura were not survived by any of the Statute's listed relatives, all other damages Burley may recover (other than his own individual damages) [12] will also become assets of those estates, subject to the estates' debts and liabilities. [13] However, Burley's ability, or the lack thereof, to seek and/or recover certain damages at specific times from the wrongful-death suit does not determine the character of his standing as a particular type of wrongful-death claimant. ¶ 39. YVEPA's final argument is that Burley occupies the same restricted status in relation to Joshua and Jakura Hill as the claimant in Pope held, and that, therefore, Burley has no standing. We disagree. ¶ 40. Payne, the claimant in Pope, does not fit the mold of an interested party under the terms of the Statute. First, Payne was merely the son of one of the decedent's surviving nieces. Pope, 995 So.2d at 124. Thus, Payne would not have been entitled to inherit property under our laws of intestate descent and distribution because he was too far removed from those who would have been so entitled, namely the surviving nieces. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 91-1-1 to -31 (Rev.2004). Second, because Payne was not within the class of persons entitled to recover, he could not be, and never was, adjudicated to be an heir-at-law of the decedent. Pope, 995 So.2d at 126. Thus, Payne had no relationship with or connection to the decedent at the time of her death which would confer standing upon him as an interested party under the Statute. Id. Payne's later appointment as administrator of the decedent's estate did not change this. [14]