Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Juarez Evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on Juarez's competency to testify at trial. Further, assuming that Juarez was competent to testify, defendant contends the court abused its discretion in precluding evidence that Juarez suffered from psychiatric disabilities and hallucinations that affected his ability to perceive and report events accurately. Defendant asserts these errors violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, fundamental fairness, cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and a reliable judgment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We discuss the contentions in turn.
During Juarez's testimony, out of the presence of the jury, defendant argued that Juarez was clearly having some problem with the ability to understand his obligation to tell the truth and that his testimony thus far provided a foundation for allowing an expert to testify before the jury that Juarez was a sociopath who was incapable of telling the truth. Spradlin argued that Juarez's inability to tell the truth was obvious and moved to strike his entire testimony, and Richard joined in the motion [b]ased on incompetence as a witness. The trial court ruled: Request is denied. I think that is entirely within the province and responsibility of the jury. Defendant failed at trial to request a hearing on Juarez's competency to be a witness. His request, rather, was for an expert to be allowed to testify before the jury about sociopaths and their inability to tell the truth. And in context, the trial court's ruling was a response both to defendant's request for an expert witness and to Spradlin's and Richard's request to strike Juarez's testimony. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited his claim. (See People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 360, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) Were we to interpret the above exchange as an objection to Juarez's competence, we would find no substantial basis for the trial court to determine that Juarez was incompetent to testify. A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is [i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him (Evid.Code, § 701, subd. (a)(1)) or [i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth (Evid.Code, § 701, subd. (a)(2)). `[T]he burden of proof is on the party who objects to the proffered witness, and a trial court's determination will be upheld in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]' [Citations.] The challenging party must establish a witness's incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citations.] Unlike a witness's personal knowledge, a witness's competency to testify is determined exclusively by the court. [Citations.] ( People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 360, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34; see also People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 572-574, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) The record does not support the contention that Juarez was incapable of communicating so as to be understood or of understanding his duty to tell the truth. Juarez's testimony was, indeed, difficult to comprehend  largely because his statements were so contradictory from one moment to the next. But contradictory testimony does not suffice to show incapacity to understand the duty of truth, or to express oneself coherently. To the extent defendant contends Juarez's responses were incompetent because he was lying, this was, of course, an issue of credibility for the jury and not relevant to the issue of his competency. (See, e.g., People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 361, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) `Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citations.]' [Citation.] ( Ibid. )
Assuming Juarez was competent to testify, defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding, under Evidence Code section 352, evidence of his mental deficiencies as it bore on his credibility. In a pretrial hearing, counsel for Richard Avila sought to admit Juarez's statements to a member of the psychiatric staff in jail following his arrest in 1991 that he was hearing voices telling him to kill, that he had an unspecified injury when he was seven years old, that he could not control his anger, and that he had a bad memory. Counsel for Richard also sought to admit Juarez's prior inconsistent statements regarding drug use. Although defendant did not expressly join in Richard's motion, he made arguments in support of Richard's position. The court ruled it would admit evidence Juarez had a bad memory, but would otherwise exclude evidence of his mental deficiencies under Evidence Code section 352. Juarez later testified that, during an interview with police, he indicated he had a history of mental problems and a bad memory. Detective Ybarra testified similarly. Juarez also testified he had a learning disability, had difficulty remembering what people told him, and was confused at times. We conclude defendant's argument in support of Richard's position was sufficient to preserve the claim for appeal, but the claim lacks merit. The trial court acted within its discretion in ruling that the probative value of the evidence of Juarez's additional mental deficiencies was substantially outweighed by undue consumption of time. Moreover, defendant was able to cross-examine Juarez about his memory and learning disability, and the jury did learn that Juarez acknowledged a history of mental problems. A reasonable jury would not have received a significantly different impression of Juarez's credibility had the excluded evidence been admitted. (See, e.g., People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 579, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; see also id. at p. 609, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)