Opinion ID: 2392444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Variations from Proposal A

Text: After hearing oral argument and debating the merits of various portions of Proposal A, we have concluded that certain modifications should be made. Further, we are aware of a need for clarification in some areas. We now proceed to discuss these modifications and to attempt these clarifications.
The rule we announce today permits advertising by use of electronic broadcast media. First we approach this issue from a standpoint of fundamental fairness to the electronic media. It has been suggested that if permitted to do so, lawyers might eventually advertise to the tune of $250 million dollars annually. [6] This figure may or may not be realistic, but we are persuaded that lawyer advertising will generate substantial revenue accruing to the benefit of the media. We can think of no reason for discriminating against the electronic media. We are not unmindful of the Bates phraseology that the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration. We are not in agreement. The Supreme Court has held that lawyer advertising is a form of commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. This protection would be fragile indeed if it were only applied to certain media and not to others. Advertising is advertising irrespective of the device or instrumentality employed. Restricting lawyer advertising to the print media would frustrate the only legitimate benefit flowing from advertising, i.e., the provision of legal services to the public based upon the knowledgeable selection of a lawyer. It was represented to the Tate Task Force that there were 40 million functionally illiterate American citizens. [7] Other sources suggest that there are conservatively 20 million American adults who are functionally illiterate. [8] It has been estimated that there are 1.4 million Americans who can neither read nor write. [9] It is evident that a large segment of our society cannot profit from print media publication and must rely upon the electronic broadcast media. Again, if the public interest is to be served by lawyer advertising, illiterates and functional illiterates, along with the non-sighted, must have a means of access to that advertising. We expect the electronic media, through their own codes, to solve any special problems that may arise and we will not countenance the use of their facilities for any false, deceptive or misleading advertising. The rule we adopt today does not have the force of holy writ and it is subject to alteration should electronic media advertising become a special problem.
We decline the invitation and reject the suggestion that we attempt to define the phrase routine legal services that figures so prominently in Bates . This is a matter of relativity. It has been said that one man's poison is another man's meat. So with routine legal services. The procurement of patents and copyrights is routine to the practitioners in those fields but is wholly beyond the ken of the general practitioner. A so-called simple will or a simple deed or a simple divorce, contested or not, may present significant tax problems that are routine to some practitioners and yet beyond the ability of others. Instead of permitting advertisement of routine legal services, the rule we adopt today permits the advertisement of any legal service, restricted only by the guidelines and standards contained in various portions of the Code. We invite special attention to EC 2-30 directing that a lawyer not accept employment when he is unable to render competent service; to EC 6-1 directing that a lawyer accept employment only in matters in which he is or intends to become competent to handle; and to EC 6-3 providing that a lawyer should not accept employment in any area of the law in which he is not qualified unless he intends to make a good faith effort to become qualified. We hold that a lawyer may not advertise in any area in which he is not currently competent. His intent to become competent is not sufficient. His advertising must await his proficiency. We recognize that this is a broad standard, but we are dealing with a new and novel idea and embark upon an uncharted course. We cannot and will not specify with precise accuracy the outer limits of lawyer advertising, but we urge caution and discretion on the part of lawyers who advertise and believe that advertising should be conducted with decorum and in a manner consistent with the standards of a learned profession.
Notwithstanding what we have said in the preceding section, the rule we adopt precludes advertising by the use of handbills, circulars, billboards, or by any other means, except the established and regularly circulated, or broadcast, media. Not only is handbill, circular and billboard advertising beneath the dignity of the profession, such advertising poses insurmountable problems in enforcement and is unnecessary to a proper enjoyment of the constitutional right of commercial speech.
We have exempted members of the legislature from the provisions of DR 2-102(B) because we think it unfair to require that its members, who serve on a part-time basis, remove their names from the firm names or from professional notices.