Opinion ID: 1399448
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Use of Dismissed Count III at Sentencing

Text: In this case, dismissed Count III featured prominently in the court's consideration of Wind's sentence. [4] A sentencing court may rely upon dismissed charges in fashioning a reasonable sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.21 (providing for the use of dismissed or uncharged conduct at sentencing, if the conduct was not used to determine the pre-departure Guidelines range). A dismissed charge may even be relied upon if it was dismissed as part of a plea agreement in the case. See United States v. Left Hand Bull, 477 F.3d 518, 521 (8th Cir.2006) (stating that defendant did not lose the benefit of his plea bargain when dismissed charge was relied upon for an upward departure at sentencing). In order to rely upon a dismissed charge for purposes of sentencing, the government must prove the defendant committed the alleged offense by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Bradford, 499 F.3d 910, 919-20 (8th Cir.2007) (discussing the preponderance of the evidence standard). In addition, the government has the burden to prove the absence of any defense by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Betts, 509 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir.2007). Thus, although the quantum of proof is less than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt formulation used at trial, the burden of proof remains unchanged at sentencing: the government bears the burden. The district court did not correctly apply the burden of proof when considering the absence of self defense as related to the conduct underlying dismissed Count III. Count III alleged that Wind willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation and with malice aforethought killed Pickner by stabbing him in the chest with a knife. At the sentencing hearing, Wind countered this murder charge by raising self defense as a justification for Pickner's death. The court acknowledged that the government bears the burden of proving an absence of self defense once the issue is called into question during a trial, but indicated it was unsure of the proper allocation of the burden of proof when considering the issue at sentencing. This was a significant procedural error. After self defense became an issue at sentencing, the government bore the burden of establishing Wind did not act in self defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The failure to correctly assign the burden of proof on the question of self defense calls into question the court's conclusion that she stabbed him while he was unable to defend himself. We do not know if the court concluded the government successfully proved a lack of self defense, or if the court concluded Wind failed to show she stabbed Pickner in self defense. The court's statement that it is certainly possible that the Defendant stabbed him while he was unconscious and killed him gives us pause. We are also troubled by the court's refusal to specifically make a finding of fact on self-defense. The court emphasized that there was no indication of any third person being involved here, without resolving the evidence ... in dispute as to the circumstances surrounding the stab wounds inflicted upon Wind. A finding of fact as to Wind's claim of self defense was a necessary prerequisite to considering the dismissed charge as a factor in Wind's sentencing. The evidence at sentencing as to the circumstances of Pickner's death was conflicting, as the district court acknowledged. Much of the uncertainty dealt with seriousness of Wind's injuries, the likelihood that Wind's wounds were self-inflicted, the timing and order of the various stab wounds, and Pickner's location and orientation when he was stabbed. For example, two witnesses presented by the defendant, Dr. John Jones, Wind's treating physician, and Dr. Lindsey Thomas, a forensic examiner who reviewed Wind's medical records and other materials, described Wind's wounds as severe and life threatening. Dr. Thomas stated that, in her opinion and based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Wind did not stab herself. Dr. Jones reached the same conclusion. His opinion was based both upon his examination and treatment of Wind's wounds and upon his knowledge of Wind's severe aversion to needles and shots. In contrast, Raymond Pierce, a retired New York City Police Department Homicide Detective called by the government as an expert, testified that he concluded Wind's wounds were self-inflicted. Based upon the evidence presented at sentencing, we cannot conclude that the district court's failure to properly assign the burden of proof did not impact the court's findings related to Pickner's death. Moreover, the district court relied upon its conclusion that Wind stabbed Pickner when he was unable to defend himself in determining Wind's sentence, specifically referencing this conclusion in its oral pronouncements at the sentencing hearing, as well as in its written statement of reasons. This procedural error cannot be considered harmless, and we must remand.