Opinion ID: 2566838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ownership of wuc 57-8492

Text: ¶ 19 Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, ¶ 15, 57 P.3d 997; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We give a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment no deference and review it for correctness. Norman, 2002 UT 81 at ¶ 15, 57 P.3d 997. We view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at ¶ 2. ¶ 20 Meyer's claim of ownership rests on his assertion that he filed WUC 57-8492 for his own benefit and not for the collective benefit of the property owners who operated and maintained the water pipeline system. According to Meyer, the entity he listed as claimant on the WUC form  Pinecrest Water Users Association  was a personal d/b/a of his and not, as PPOC contends, one of the many names the association used prior to its incorporation. Meyer further claims he filed the WUC without the knowledge or direction of the association of property owners and with the sole intention of reserving the WUC rights for himself. In support of its motion for partial summary judgment, PPOC submitted documents in which the association of property owners, before incorporating, referred to itself as the Pinecrest Water Users Association. ¶ 21 Meyer asserts that the question of whether he filed the WUC for himself or for the association created a genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. We disagree and hold that the trial court's summary dismissal of Meyer's claim to WUC 57-8492 was correct for the following three reasons. ¶ 22 First, Meyer failed to object to the state engineer's proposed determination of water rights. Section 73-4-11 of the Utah Code provides as follows: After full consideration of the statements of claims ... the state engineer shall formulate a report and a proposed determination of all rights to the use of the water ..., and a copy of the same shall be mailed by regular mail to each claimant with notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may within ninety days of such mailing file with the clerk of the district court a written objection thereto .... Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (2001). A claimant who fails to file a timely objection to the proposed determination demonstrates acquiescence to the state engineer's delineation of water rights. See United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, ¶¶ 19-20, 79 P.3d 945; In re San Rafael River Drainage Area, 844 P.2d 287, 289-91 (Utah 1992). We stated in United States Fuel Co. that [t]he fate of a water right claimant who fails to object to a proposed award [is] similar to that of a defaulting party in a lawsuit. `If the claimant makes no objection, he, by his silence, ... confesses the statements contained in the engineer's proposed determination of his water rights.' 2003 UT 49 at ¶ 19, 79 P.3d 945 (quoting Eden Irrigation Co. v. Dist. Ct., 61 Utah 103, 211 P. 957, 960 (1922)). ¶ 23 Meyer signed a receipt and waiver of service of the state engineer's proposed determination in March 1984. He filed no objection to the proposed determination under his own name or under the name of Pinecrest Water Users Association, his claimed d/b/a. Meyer's failure to file an objection within the statutory period prevents him from now contesting the disposition of WUC 57-8492. ¶ 24 Second, the doctrines of appropriation and beneficial use do not support Meyer's claim that he is individually entitled to WUC 57-8492. A water user's appropriations are limited to the amount the user puts to beneficial use. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶ 34, 84 P.3d 1134. Beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (2003). `No one can acquire the right to use more water than is necessary, with reasonable efficiency, to satisfy his beneficial requirements.' Green River Canal Co., 2003 UT 50 at ¶ 34, 84 P.3d 1134 (quoting McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570, 572 (1952)). ¶ 25 Meyer's claim of personal ownership based on the historical water usage of multiple families runs afoul of these principles. Meyer submitted an affidavit explaining that he filed WUC 57-8492 in order to claim rights to the amount of water being used by twenty-seven homes attached to the water pipeline system. The claim form likewise notes the domestic water usage of twenty-seven homes. If, as Meyer asserts, the claim form was filed solely for his own benefit and not for the benefit of the association of property owners, then Meyer's argument must fail because a single water user cannot claim more water than he can beneficially use, nor can he claim for himself water beneficially used by others. ¶ 26 Third, we agree with the trial court that the facts surrounding the filing of WUC 57-8492, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Meyer, leave no genuine dispute as to the identity of the claimant. Meyer designated the Pinecrest Water Users Association c/o LeRoy Meyer (Treasurer) as the claimant for the water right. Although Meyer asserts that Pinecrest Water Users Association was his personal d/b/a (of which he served as treasurer and all other officers), he did not register that name as a d/b/a before or after filing the water user's claim. When the state engineer sent a letter to Meyer recognizing the filing for the Pinecrest Water Users, Meyer did not object or ever seek to clarify that the claimant was Meyer individually. PPOC, on the other hand, relied on records of business dealings in which the association of property owners explicitly refers to itself as the Pinecrest Water Users Association. On one document, Meyer and others affixed their signatures as members of the board of directors of the Pinecrest Water Users Association, an action patently inconsistent with Meyer's alleged ownership of Pinecrest Water Users Association as his personal d/b/a. ¶ 27 In addition, the priority date Meyer listed on the claim form is 1908, even though Meyer did not move to the Pinecrest area until approximately 1970. Meyer asserts that he selected that date because he eventually purchased the old hotel property and was entitled to stand in the shoes of the hotel's former owner. This position is untenable because the hotel burned down in 1951 and any water rights associated therewith would necessarily have been long abandoned by 1979 when Meyer filled out the form. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (2000). Even if Meyer could claim water rights as a successor in interest to the original owner of the hotel property, he would still be limited to water that had been beneficially used on that property. He could not have claimed water beneficially used by other property owners, as discussed above. ¶ 28 In short, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Meyer, the evidence is insufficient to establish Meyer's claim that he filed WUC 57-8492 for his own benefit rather than for the benefit of the association. Meyer's testimony that he harbored an undisclosed intent to retain all of the water rights for himself is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. In addition, as a matter of law, Meyer was incapable of claiming WUC 57-8492 given his failure to object to the state engineer's proposed determination and his inability to obtain for himself water beneficially used by others. ¶ 29 Meyer raises additional arguments in his quest to overturn the trial court's ruling, none of which we find persuasive. Meyer argues that the trial court improperly relied on legal and factual findings made in the related proceeding, which resolved disputes regarding ownership of the physical water pipeline system, attendant property easements, and various d/b/a designations, including ownership of the d/b/a Pinecrest Water Users Association. [1] Meyer asserts that the trial court's reliance on these findings violated his rights under the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions, as well as the open courts clause of the state constitution. We need not address this argument because we do not rely on the factual findings in the related proceeding in affirming the summary judgment. ¶ 30 Meyer also argues that PPOC's claim to WUC 57-8492 is defective and that he should therefore be awarded the water rights associated therewith. We disagree inasmuch as any weakness in PPOC's claim to the water does not translate into a cognizable basis for Meyer's claim. Although this litigation arises in the context of a general adjudication and not an action to quiet title, the following principle is nevertheless applicable: An action to quiet title to water rights is in the nature of an action to quiet title to real estate. To succeed in an action to quiet title to real estate, a plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his own claim to title and not on the weakness of a defendant's title or even its total lack of title. Likewise, in an action to quiet title to water rights, a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title, not on the weakness of defendant's. Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted); see also Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, ¶ 20, 5 P.3d 1206; Colman v. Butkovich, 538 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1975). Because Meyer failed to establish a legitimate claim to WUC 57-8492, allegations regarding defects in PPOC's claim are of no consequence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment awarding WUC 57-8492 to PPOC.