Opinion ID: 2608724
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: express or implicit declaration of preemption

Text: The initial step in determining whether a state statute is preempted is to determine whether Congress has explicitly or implicitly declared that states are prohibited from regulating the field. Regardless whether the state action is consistent with the relevant federal statutes it is invalid if the federal legislative scheme announces, or is best understood as implying, a congressional purpose to `occupy the field.' [17] Congressional intent to occupy the field will not be lightly inferred. [18] The principle to be derived from [the Supreme Court's] decisions is that federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons  either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248, 257, reh. denied, 374 U.S. 858, 83 S.Ct. 1861, 10 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1963). [19] Moreover, Congress legislated here in a field which the states have traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447, 1459 (1947) (citations omitted). [20] The employment relationship, including minimum and other wage laws, is a local concern traditionally within the state's police power. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57, 96 S.Ct. 933, 936-937, 47 L.Ed.2d 43, 49 (1976). [21] Thus, the Alaska Act is not superseded absent a clear and manifest purpose of Congress. We discern no clear and manifest purpose of Congress to occupy this field. In fact, Congress explicitly provided in the FLSA that state regulation was not preempted. 29 U.S.C.A. § 218(a) (West 1975) provides: No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweek established under this chapter, and no provision of this chapter relating to the employment of child labor shall justify noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a higher standard than the standard established under this chapter. No provision of this chapter shall justify any employer in reducing a wage paid by him which is in excess of the applicable minimum wage under this chapter, or justify any employer in increasing hours of employment maintained by him which are shorter than the maximum hours applicable under this chapter. Moreover, there is no other language in the text of the FLSA or statement in its legislative history which indicates that Congress intended the FLSA to be an exclusive regulatory measure. Additionally, federal administrative regulations recognize that state laws may exist. [22] Since this is an area of traditional local concern and Congress expressly indicated that it wished to allow state regulations concerning wages and hours, we conclude that Congress did not intend to occupy the field in enacting the FLSA. [23] Alternatively, Bechtel argues that even if Congress had no intent to preempt all state wage and hour regulations, it intended to supersede all such regulations except those providing for a higher minimum wage or lower maximum workweek. Bechtel's contention is premised on its narrow reading of 29 U.S.C.A. § 218(a). 29 U.S.C.A. § 218(a), a saving clause, [24] makes clear that state statutes establishing a higher minimum wage or lower maximum workweek are not preempted. Bechtel contends that § 218(a) should be given a narrow construction and, thus, only state statutes with a higher minimum wage or lower maximum workweek are saved and, further, such statutes are saved only to the extent of the more beneficial increment. Bechtel notes that although the Alaska Act provides for a higher minimum wage, AS 23.10.065, this provision is not at issue since the Webster action involves recovery for wages greater than the Alaska statutory minimum wage. Bechtel also asserts that the Alaska Act does not provide for a lower maximum workweek. Based on that assertion and its contention that § 218(a) should be narrowly construed, Bechtel concludes that the Alaska Act is not saved. The flaw in Bechtel's logic is that the Alaska Act does provide for a lower maximum workweek. It provides for overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty hours [a week] or ... eight hours a day. AS 23.10.060. The applicable provision of the FLSA provides for overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty hours. 29 U.S.C.A. § 207 (West Supp. 1980). Bechtel argues that the eight hour provision of AS 23.10.060 is not a lower maximum workweek within the meaning of § 218(a). Bechtel asserts: Realistically, though, there is no reason to believe that `workweek' as used in section 218 means other than what it says, i.e., `week,' which is a thing different from a `day.' We decline to adopt such a literal interpretation of § 218(a). An argument similar to the one advanced by Bechtel was rejected in Glick v. State, 162 Mont. 82, 509 P.2d 1 (Mont.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856, 94 S.Ct. 158, 38 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973), appeal after remand, 165 Mont. 307, 528 P.2d 686 (1974), where the employer contended that the trial court erred in computing the regular hourly rate of pay by relying on Montana constitutional and statutory provisions providing for a maximum eight hour work day rather than standards provided by the FLSA. The employees argued that the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act provides a minimum base and that states can give greater benefits to the workers of their state. Id. 509 P.2d at 4. In holding that the trial court did not err in using the eight hour day as a base, the court relied on the following language from a New Jersey appellate court. The federal act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218(a), mandates compliance with a state maximum workweek requirement lower than that set by the federal act. Though `workweek' is not defined in the federal act, it is clearly the intent of the Congress that a lower state maximum hour regulation, creating an overtime arrangement more favorable to the employee than that contained in § 207 of the federal act, should prevail. Such an interpretation is dictated by the plain meaning of the statutory language. `Maximum workweek' does not in fact limit the number of hours an employee may work. It must refer to that number of excess hours worked for which an overtime rate must be paid. This conclusion is further evidenced by the utilization of the term `workweek' in 29 U.S.C.A. § 207, where it is used in reference to the number of hours worked in excess of which the overtime rate must be paid. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a)(2)(A). The term `maximum workweek' in 29 U.S.C.A. § 218(a) is thus synonymous with maximum hour/overtime. Accordingly, the requirement of 29 U.S.C.A. § 218(a) that a lower state maximum workweek be enforced mandates the enforcement of a state maximum hours/overtime provision more favorable to the employee than that set by the federal act. Id. at 4-5, quoting State v. Comfort Cab, Inc., 118 N.J. Super. 162, 286 A.2d 742, 748 (1972) (citations omitted). We also are persuaded that maximum workweek refers to the number of excess hours worked for which an overtime rate must be paid. Since, under the Alaska Act, the number of hours required for the overtime rate is less than that under the FLSA, the Alaska Act provides for a lower maximum workweek within the meaning of § 218(a). Consequently, the Alaska Act comes within the express saving clause. Consistent with its position that the express saving clause, § 218(a), should be literally and restrictively construed, Bechtel argues that other provisions of the Alaska Act, more favorable to employees, should be deemed preempted by the FLSA. It draws a negative inference from § 218(a), i.e., since § 218(a) on its face only saves those provisions of state statutes granting higher minimum wages and lower maximum work-weeks, it does not save other provisions more beneficial to employees. Appellants Webster et al., Cross-Appellant State of Alaska, and the United States Secretary of Labor, as amicus curiae, assert that § 218(a) should be expansively construed, thereby preventing preemption of provisions in state statutes which are more beneficial to employees. Both sides rely on the relevant federal legislative history, case law, and administrative regulations to support their respective positions. Because of the conclusion we reach, a discussion concerning the scope of § 218(a) is obviated. Having found that the Congress did not intend to occupy this field, we must conclude that the Alaska Act can only be void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158, 98 S.Ct. 988, 994, 55 L.Ed.2d 179, 188 (1978). Were we to find such conflicts here, the scope of § 218(a) would become crucial, as a saving clause may prevent preemption of state statutes which conflict with the purpose of a federal state. [25] Since we conclude below that the provisions in question do not conflict with the FLSA, we need not determine whether they are saved by § 218(a), the saving clause.