Opinion ID: 3011408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Extraordinary Circumstances Issue

Text: In Cornblatt v. Barow, 708 A.2d 401, 413 (N.J. 1998), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a dismissal for failure to comply with the [affidavit of merit] statute should be with prejudice in all but extraordinary circumstances. The District Court in this case acknowledged that it would be appropriate to grant permission for the filing of the required affidavit nunc pro tunc if extraordinary circumstances were present, but found none. Accordingly, it refused to give such permission and dismissed the case with prejudice. What constitutes an extraordinary circumstance is a fact-sensitive analysis. See Hartsfield v. Fantini, 695 A.2d 259 (N.J. 1997). To find extraordinary circumstances, the court must determine that those circumstances did not arise from an attorney's mere carelessness or lack of proper diligence. Id. (internal quotes omitted). Generally, substantial compliance with the filing limitation and allegations that defendants used negotiations to lull the plaintiffs into missing the filing date will not constitute extraordinary circumstances. . . . Id. In short, the circumstances must be exceptional and compelling. Id. at 264. We agree with the District Court that the circumstances here fall short of exceptional and compelling. As it noted, the plaintiff has provided no adequate excuse for her failure to comply with the statute, and the most reasonable inference from the record is that plaintiff's counsel was simply unaware of the affidavit of merit requirement. The plaintiff complains that because the defendant did not request the affidavit in his answer to her complaint and the District Court did not require it in the pre-trial scheduling order, she was lulled into believing an affidavit 12 of merit was not necessary. Neither the defendant nor the Court had a duty to call the attention of plaintiff's counsel to the requirements of the statute, however. If counsel had been aware of the statute, it is difficult to believe that he would have failed to comply in reliance on the answer and the scheduling order, and any such reliance, in any event, would have been unreasonable.6 The New Jersey statute clearly sets out the filing requirements and makes no provision for exemptions, except where the attorney applies for an extension for good cause. The plaintiff herefiled no motion for an extension and so had no statutory basis for an exemption from the affidavit requirement. The plaintiff compares her case to Hyman Zamft and Manard, L.L.C. v. Cornell, 707 A.2d 1068, 1072 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), where the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey found extraordinary circumstances existed. There, a mediation order implied that a time-out existed for parties to refile pleadings. In contrast, nothing occurred during this case that would lead the parties to believe a time-out from filing deadlines existed. It is true the Hyman Zamft Court also noted that no demand for the affidavit of merit was made in the responsive pleading, and no case management order of the trial court required filing of an affidavit of merit. These factors were cited by the Court in the course of itsfinding extraordinary circumstances. See id. at 1071, 1072. Nevertheless, the Court also noted that the mediation order alone was sufficient grounds for excusing the failure to file the affidavit in a timely manner, indicating that this factor was the most influential in its decision. The plaintiff here also compares some of the circumstances of her case to those of Barreiro v. Morrais, 723 A.2d 1244 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). In Barreiro, the Court remanded for a hearing on whether extraordinary circumstances existed because a protracted delay by the _________________________________________________________________ 6. If counsel had focused on the affidavit of merit statute, he would have been aware that it would be applied by the District Court. Prior to the filing of the complaint, the District Court had held that a federal court sitting in a diversity case was bound by that statute. RTC Mortgage Trust v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., 981 F. Supp. 334 (D.N.J. 1997). 13 defendants in providing legible hospital records had prevented timely filing of an affidavit. The plaintiff in Barreiro first requested medical records before filing the complaint and was rebuffed. After filing the complaint, the plaintiff made several requests for records and transcriptions thereof, since the original records were indecipherable. The transcriptions were not provided until 130 days after the defendants filed answers. See id. at 1249. The Barreiro Court opined that the purpose of the 60-day filing window is not to afford defendants with a sword to fight off action by procrastinating in providing records and other relevant materials that a competent, conscientious expert would have to analyze before submitting an Affidavit of Merit. Id. at 1248. Unlike the situation in Barreiro, where the defendants ignored repeated requests for medical records after the complaint was filed, the defendant here provided the necessary medical records one week after the pre-trial scheduling conference and three weeks before the affidavit of merit had to be filed, sufficient time for the plaintiff to either obtain the affidavit of merit or file a motion for a 60day extension. The repeated delays and indecipherable records in Barreiro constituted the sword the Court referred to in that case. In contrast, the sword the plaintiff complains about here is a perfectly legitimate motion filed by the defendant to dismiss the complaint for failure to file the affidavit of merit. Because there are no circumstances here that rise to the extraordinary level required by Cornblatt, we must affirm the District Court's decision to dismiss with prejudice, at least with respect to the negligent acts that were alleged to have occurred after June 29, 1995, the effective date of the affidavit of merit statute.