Opinion ID: 2227557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to remove jurors

Text: [¶ 32.] Rodriguez asserts that Adams should have removed three jurors with peremptory challenges, and that he failed to offer any reason during the habeas hearing for leaving them on the jury panel. He points to jurors Wayne Reynolds, Jennifer Bradley, and David Jewitt. [¶ 33.] Juror Reynolds said during voir dire that he was bothered that Rodriguez lived in the United States yet used Spanish as his primary language. Reynolds was firmly convinced that a person who becomes a citizen should learn English. Juror Bradley was left on the jury even though her husband had just been hired as a reserve police officer in Spearfish. Juror Jewitt was an administrator of the Spearfish School District, and stated during voir dire that the prosecutor had worked with the Spearfish school on drug issues. [¶ 34.] All three of these jurors, however, assured Adams that they could put these feelings and experiences aside and decide the case on the evidence presented. Reynolds answered absolutely when asked if he could see past his feelings on the use of the English language and still judge this case on the facts. Bradley responded no when Adams asked whether her decision would be influenced by her husband's occupation, and answered affirmatively when asked if she could weigh the facts independent of her husband's job. Jewitt told Adams that his contact with the prosecutor was limited to asking him for his input on school policies. As did the other jurors in question, he indicated that he could decide this case based on the evidence presented, and that his contacts with the prosecutor would not interfere with his ability to hear the case. [¶ 35.] Decisions on how to exercise peremptory challenges involve tactical choices, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not established by merely complaining about counsel's failure to challenge certain jurors or his failure to make proper objections. Tsipouras v. State, 567 N.W.2d 271, 276 (Minn.Ct.App.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1114, 118 S.Ct. 1049, 140 L.Ed.2d 113 (1998). Rodriguez has failed to sustain his burden of showing that Adams' performance was deficient, and therefore we need not decide whether he was prejudiced by the alleged failure. See Stead v. United States, 67 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1080 (D.S.D.1999)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 2071, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699-700, 702; Stokes v. Armontrout, 851 F.2d 1085, 1092 (8thCir.1988)). d. Failure to investigate or call potential witnesses [¶ 36.] Rodriguez next contends that Adams' performance fell below the Strickland standard when he failed to investigate or consider calling potential witnesses that could have confirmed the existence of Fernando Lara. Rodriguez was the only defense witness called at his criminal trial. He did not provide his counsel with information to help locate Lara, other than a business card from a restaurant in Chicago where he said he was supposed to meet Lara if they became separated during their cross-country trip. Yet, Rodriguez admitted that the only thing he knew about Lara was his name and that Lara was moving from California. The card had nothing noted on it about Lara; it was simply a printed restaurant business card. Furthermore, when the Lawrence County Sheriff's office contacted California law enforcement to get information on Lara, the California authorities could not find the name in their computer records. [¶ 37.] Rodriguez said that when Adams asked him if he had any witnesses, he thought it was a ridiculous question because he felt his attorney was the one who was supposed to find witnesses. At the habeas hearing Adams testified, We didn't ever make an attempt to try and find another witness, you know, to get one here, no. According to Rodriguez, his wife, his sister, and the owner of the Blazer could have been called as witnesses on his behalf. Rodriguez believed his sister could have testified that she had seen Lara pick him up at his parents' home. He was vague about what he felt the owner of the Blazer could have testified to, stating that [w]ell, at least he could provide more information than I  than I do to try to locate the guy that I believe is this Fernando Arturo Lara, you know, because I believe he know more than I do about him, you know. None of these witnesses were called to testify at the habeas hearing, so we have only Rodriquez's speculation about what they would have said. [¶ 38.] Failure to call a witness will not automatically produce ineffective assistance of counsel. Lodermeier, 1996 SD 134, ¶ 20, 555 N.W.2d at 625 (citing Garritsen, 541 N.W.2d at 94). There must be a showing of prejudice that deprived the accused of a fair trial. Sund, 1998 SD 123, ¶ 21, 588 N.W.2d at 226 (citations omitted). Rodriguez must show how these witnesses would have changed the outcome of his trial. Fast Horse v. Weber, 1999 SD 97, ¶ 16, 598 N.W.2d 539, 544. Unlike the showing of prejudice in Sund, where potential witnesses testified at the petitioner's habeas hearing and thereby produced evidence of reasonable doubt on whether Sund had the requisite criminal intent, here only Rodriguez and attorney Adams testified at the habeas hearing. We find that Rodriguez has not met his burden of showing that counsel's errors were sufficiently serious and prejudicial to deprive him of a fair trial. [¶ 39.] Affirmed. [¶ 40.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and AMUNDSON and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur. [¶ 41.] SABERS, Justice, concurs in result.