Opinion ID: 895300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: In 1961, the Legislature enacted the Injection Well Act (the Act), which governs the permitting process for all injection wells in the state. [8] The Actcurrently codified in Chapter 27 of the Water Codedistinguishes between two types of injection wells, those used to dispose of industrial and municipal waste, and those used to dispose of oil and gas waste. TEX. WATER CODE § 27.002(5)-(6). Under the Act, the Commission has jurisdiction over injection wells used to dispose of oil and gas waste, see id. §§ 27.031, 27.051(b), while the Texas Commission for Environmental Quality (TCEQ) has jurisdiction over other types of injection wells, including those used for the disposal of industrial and municipal waste, see id. §§ 27.011, 27.051(a). The distinction between the jurisdictions of these two agencies is important because the statute governing the issuance of permits differs as to factors each agency must consider in granting a permit. Both statutes require the agencies to determine that the use or installation of the injection well is in the public interest, id. § 27.051(a)(1), (b)(1), but the TCEQ is additionally required to find that an applicant for a hazardous waste well not located in an industrial area has made reasonable effort to ensure that any burden of the proposed injection well on public roadways will be minimized or mitigated, id. § 27.051(a)(6). [9] The statute does not require the Commission to make this public roadway determination. Originally, the Act required both agencies to consider the same factors in determining whether to issue a permit, but a 1987 amendment added the public roadway requirement for the TCEQ's consideration in certain situations but did not enact a similar requirement for the Commission. [10] The Act further requires the TCEQ to consider specific criteriaincluding the compliance history of the applicant, whether an alternative to the well is reasonably available, and, in some circumstances, whether the applicant will maintain sufficient insurancein its public interest inquiry, though the Act specifically states the TCEQ is not limited to consideration of these factors. Id. § 27.051(d). [11] The Act provides no parallel provision enumerating the types of public interest considerations the Commission must evaluate. The Act declares a purpose of protecting freshwater supplies in this state, as provided in its statement of policy and purpose: It is the policy of this state and the purpose of this chapter to maintain the quality of fresh water in the state to the extent consistent with the public health and welfare and the operation of existing industries, taking into consideration the economic development of the state, to prevent underground injection that may pollute fresh water, and to require the use of all reasonable methods to implement this policy. Id. § 27.003. Beyond this statement of purpose, the Act, as a whole, details procedures related to the protection of natural resources, as well as the technical processes involved, in the permitting of an injection well. The chapter prescribes no requirements for the Commission to engage in any sort of process or deliberation involving matters that do not involve oil and gas production and the protection of natural resources. With this statutory framework in mind, we turn to the Commission's construction of public interest to determine if it is reasonable and in harmony with the language of the statute.
Texas Citizens argues, and the court of appeals held, that public interest is a broad term, intended by the Legislature to encompass any number of subsidiary issues that might impact the public interest. Texas Citizens asserts two primary arguments in favor of its interpretation: (1) the term is inherently an amorphous, unlimited term, encompassing all possible factors that might affect the public; and (2) since other factors in section 27.051(b) require the Commission to consider matters pertaining to the production of oil and gas and the prevention of fresh water pollution, it must follow that the public interest factor is intended to encompass something else. Both of these arguments are at least somewhat reasonable, though both have flaws. An argument can be assertedas Pioneer doesthat section 27.051(b)(2) and (3) specifically address the need to produce oil and gas in a manner that does not harm oil, gas, and mineral reserves and protects fresh water supplies, while the public interest factor contemplates whether the proposed well will ultimately positively impact the production of oil and gas. The amorphousness of the phrase public interest further cuts against Texas Citizens' argument that its interpretation is the only reasonable interpretation of the provisionthe statute is, as this dispute demonstrates, subject to more than one interpretation. The greater deficit in Texas Citizens' arguments, though, is that while Texas Citizens' position has some merit, the Commission's interpretation does too. It is precisely when a statutory term is subject to multiple understandings that we should defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation. See Fiess, 202 S.W.3d at 747-48. Because we only require an agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering to be reasonable and in accord with the statute's plain language, we need not consider whether the Commission's construction is the onlyor the bestinterpretation in order to warrant our deference. In determining whether the Commission's interpretation is reasonable, we begin with the language in the statute itself.
The term public interest in section 27.051(b)(1) is undefined. We ordinarily construe a statute so as to give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed in its plain language. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680 at 683. `If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its words according to their common meaning.' First Am. Title Ins. Co., 258 S.W.3d at 631 (quoting State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex.2006)). As discussed above, the phrase public interest is anything but clear and unambiguous. There are several factors, however, lending support to the Commission's determination that its consideration of the public interest is intended to be a narrow one precluding consideration of traffic-safety concerns. First, the Legislature's addition of a traffic-related inquiry to the TCEQ's required findingsamended more than twenty-five years after the Act was initially enactedweighs in favor of the Commission's interpretation. We generally avoid construing individual provisions of a statute in isolation from the statute as a whole. See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.2003). We therefore `read the statute as a whole and interpret it to give effect to every part.' Id. (quoting Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex.1998) (per curiam)). When the Legislature uses a word or phrase in one portion of a statute but excludes it from another, the term should not be implied where it has been excluded. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1995). [12] Had the Legislature intended for the Commission and the TCEQ to entertain traffic-related evidence in their public interest inquiries, it would not have needed to amend the statute to expressly require the TCEQ to consider a well's impact on traffic in certain situations. See Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.1990) (A statute is presumed to have been enacted by the legislature with complete knowledge of the existing law and with reference to it.); see also Leland v. Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex.2008). [13] Second, under the principle of ejusdem generis, we have warned against expansively interpreting broad language where it is immediately preceded by narrow and specific terms. Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Tex.2010). [W]hen words of a general nature are used in connection with the designation of particular objects or classes of persons or things, the meaning of the general words will be restricted to the particular designation. Hilco Elec. Coop. v. Midlothian Butane Gas Co., 111 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex.2003). Given that the surrounding statutory schemeincluding the other three factors the Commission is specifically required to consider in evaluating a permit applicationexclusively concern matters related to the production of oil and gas, it is reasonable for the Commission to decline to consider the completely unrelated inquiry of traffic safety in weighing the public interest. Third, the Act's statement of purpose expressly declares the purpose of the Act is to maintain the quality of fresh water in the state to the extent consistent with the public health and welfare and the operation of existing industries. TEX. WATER CODE § 27.003. This narrow policy statement declines to promote a purpose of protecting public safety except where natural resources are concerned. Finally, in the portions of the Act where the Legislature intends for the TCEQ or the Commission to evaluate a particular factor in considering the public interest, it says so. The Legislature requires the TCEQ to examine specific factors in its public interest inquiry. See id. § 27.051(d). Texas Citizens argues that section 27.051(d) does not limit the TCEQ's consideration of these factors in its public interest investigation. See id. (providing that the TCEQ shall not be limited to the consideration of the enumerated public interest factors). But the Legislature does not require the TCEQ to consider any particular additional factor either. Id. In contrast, there is no statutory directive for the Commission to consider matters related to traffic safety or any other specific factor in its public interest evaluation. When, as here, a statutory scheme is subject to multiple interpretations, we must uphold the enforcing agency's construction if it is reasonable and in harmony with the statute. See First Am. Title Ins. Co., 258 S.W.3d at 632. As the Supreme Court has explained, governmental agencies have a unique understanding of the statutes they administer. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1201, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)). In a complex regulatory scheme like the Act and with a phrase as amorphous as public interest, this deference is particularly important. See Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Tel. Ass'n., 163 S.W.3d 204, 213 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (Public interest determinations are dependent upon the special knowledge and expertise of the [Public Utility] Commission.). Under the plain terms of the Act, we conclude the Commission's construction of public interest as a narrow term that does not include traffic-safety considerations is reasonable and in alignment with the statute's meaning.
Texas Citizens argues that we should afford no deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute that does not lie within its administrative expertise or pertain to a nontechnical issue of law. See Rylander v. Fisher Controls Int'l, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 291, 302 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.). Texas Citizens further contends that requiring the Commission to consider traffic-safety evidence in its public interest evaluation does not impose on it a duty to regulate truck traffic or otherwise evaluate matters beyond its expertise, but rather to simply consider whether traffic-safety concerns might cut against the propriety of the proposed well. The Commission could, Texas Citizens argues, limit the amount of waste the injection well can accept or regulate hours of operation, thus curtailing potential truck traffic, without having to regulate or make policy decisions impacting the state's roads. The Commission counters that its statutory directive is to regulate matters related to oil and gas production, not traffic concerns, and that it does not have the expertise or jurisdiction to consider these sorts of public-safety issues. As an initial matter, the breadth of the term public interest is a question of law that implicates the Commission's very technical decision of whether to grant an injection well permit. But, more importantly, we disagree with Texas Citizens that the Commission's public interest inquiry is unrelated to its administrative expertise: to the contrary, the Commission interpreted the public interest finding in such a way as to ensure that it will only consider matters within its expertise. As we concluded above, the Commission's determination that public interest does not include traffic-safety matters is reasonable under the Act's statutory scheme. We further conclude it is reasonable given the Commission's unique competence as the state's agency overseeing oil and gas production. The Commission has long been the agency charged with regulating matters related to oil and gas production, and is given broad discretion in its administration of oil and gas laws. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 85.202(b) (requiring the Commission to do all things necessary for the conservation of oil and gas and prevention of waste of oil and gas); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Tex.1992) (acknowledging the Legislature's grant of broad discretion to the Commission in administering the laws regulating oil and natural gas); Stewart v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 377 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex.1964) ([T]he courts have consistently recognized that the Commission must be given discretion in administering the oil and gas statutes.). Among other matters related to oil and gas production, the Legislature charges the Commission with making and enforcing rules and orders for the conservation of oil and gas and prevention of waste of oil and gas. TEX. NAT. RES.CODE § 85.201. [14] As the Commission argues, nothing in any of the Commission's enabling acts grants the Commission authority over matters related to traffic safety. Rather, each of these statutory provisions make clear that the Commission is the agency charged with administering laws related to oil and gas production. See R.R. Comm'n v. Sterling Oil & Ref. Co., 147 Tex. 547, 218 S.W.2d 415, 418 (1949) (The Legislature realized the great value of oil and gas and the importance of the task and duty placed on the Railroad Commission to conserve same for the use of the public, and by many provisions of the statutes full power is given the Railroad Commission to prevent the waste of oil and gas.). Further, it is utterly impossible for the Legislature to meet the demands of every detail in the enactment of laws relating to the production of oil and gas.... The Legislature ... has authorized the Railroad Commission to handle the details relating to the preservation and conservation of the natural resources of the State. Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961, 964 (1945). The Commission must have discretion in determining the minutiae of its statutory mandates. Here, Texas Citizens raised arguments concerning the impact of large trucks on dirt roads, inadequate road width to handle truck traffic, and safety concerns related to the truck traffic. Given the Commission's institutional focus on matters concerning oil and gas production, it is reasonable for the Commission to decline to consider matters beyond its administrative expertise. This is especially the case given the limitless number of factors the Commission may need to consider in evaluating an injection well permit if the Commission is required to study any potential subsidiary matter bearing on the public interest, such as truck traffic in this case. As Texas Citizens conceded at oral argument, it does not merely want for the Commission to examine matters related to truck traffic, but rather any factor that might conceivably touch on a broad definition of public interest. In opposition to an injection well, a creative opponent could assert any number of concerns impacting the public interest entirely unrelated to the Commission's express legislative directives. Under Texas Citizens and the court of appeals' approach, the Commission would have to consider and weigh a limitless number of factors beyond the Commission's institutional competence. [15] The Commission's purpose is to do all things necessary for the conservation of oil and gas and prevention of waste of oil and gas. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 85.202(b). As the agency charged with administering the state's oil and gas laws, it is reasonable for the Commission to refuse to consider traffic-safety evidence in its public interest analysis. [16]
The Commission finally argues that in the half-century since the Legislature first promulgated the requirement that it weigh the public interest in evaluating an injection well permit, it has never considered traffic-safety concerns. The Commission urges that its long-standing construction of the term public interest is especially entitled to judicial deference. Citing an Amarillo Court of Appeals' opinion, Texas Citizens counters that, at least on one occasion, the Commission did, in fact, consider traffic-safety evidence. The Amarillo Court of Appeals' decision, however, does not support Texas Citizens' assertion. In that case, as in the instant dispute, property owners protested a proposed injection well in a contested hearing before the Commission, arguing that the well would not comport with the public interest because of public-safety concerns. Berkley v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 282 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.). Following the Austin Court of Appeals' holding in the instant case, the Amarillo Court of Appeals explained that safety concerns are indicia that should be considered by the Commission when assessing public interests. Id. In Berkley, however, there is no indication the Commission considered traffic-safety evidence in its decision; instead, the Commission found the proposed injection well would serve the public interest for similar reasons as those articulated in the order here. Id. [17] We agree with the Commission that an agency's long-standing construction of a statute, especially in light of subsequent legislative amendments, is particularly worthy of our deference. See Stanford v. Butler, 142 Tex. 692, 181 S.W.2d 269, 273 (1944) (explaining that an agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is worthy of serious consideration as an aid to interpretation, particularly where such construction has been sanctioned by long acquiescence) (citations omitted); see also Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 53 S.W.3d 310, 324 (Tex.2001). [18] The Commission has declined to consider public-safety evidence in its public interest analysis for almost fifty years, and Texas Citizens provides no authority to the contrary. Had the Legislature disagreed with the Commission's construction of public interest, it could have amended the Act to require the Commission to take a broader view of the term. See Stanford, 181 S.W.2d at 273-74. We will not judicially amend the Act in the manner Texas Citizens proposes.