Opinion ID: 172401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Forest Park and Dell Creek Forest Service Feedgrounds

Text: GYC has live claims as to the Forest Park and Dell Creek Forest Service feedgrounds. NEPA requires an environmental analysis of a project when the federal government's involvement in [the] project is sufficient to constitute `major federal action.' Vill. of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart, 906 F.2d 1477, 1480 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)). Major Federal action includes actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18.
The last environmental analysis of the Forest Park feedground occurred in 1980. Under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c), agencies [s]hall prepare supplements to either draft or final environmental impact statements if: (i) The agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns; or (ii) There are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts. The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of when an agency must undertake a supplemental environmental analysis in the context of relevant new information or circumstances. If there remains major Federal action to occur, and if the new information is sufficient to show that the remaining action will affect the quality of the human environment in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already considered, a supplemental [environmental analysis] must be prepared. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). GYC contends circumstances have changed since the 1980 Forest Park environmental analysis as a result of the discovery of the brucellosis and chronic wasting disease threats at feedgrounds, and thus the Forest Service must undertake a supplemental analysis to address these changes. The Forest Service points out that the duty to supplement an environmental analysis under NEPA ends after the major federal action is completed, and alleges the major federal action here was completed when the permit was issued. According to GYC, however, the elk feeding activities constitute an ongoing major federal action under NEPA because the Forest Park permit states it may be amended in whole or in part by the Forest Service when, at the discretion of the authorized officer, such action is deemed necessary or desirable to incorporate new terms, conditions, and stipulations as may be required by law, regulation, land management plans, or other management decisions. In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance , the Supreme Court considered whether there was major federal action to occur or ongoing major federal action when allegedly new circumstances arose after BLM approved a land use plan for federal lands it administered in Utah. 542 U.S. 55, 72-73, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004). Generally, a land use plan describes, for a particular area, allowable uses, goals for future condition of the land, and specific next steps. Id. at 59, 124 S.Ct. 2373. After noting that the Secretary may issue management decisions to implement land use plans, the Court concluded there was no ongoing major federal action or major federal action to occur. Id. at 69, 73, 124 S.Ct. 2373 (quotation omitted). The Court distinguished an earlier case where it concluded a major federal action was not yet complete, explaining that in the earlier case: that condition was met: The dam construction project that gave rise to environmental review was not yet completed. Here, by contrast, although the  approval of a [land use plan] is a major Federal action requiring an EIS. . . that action is completed when the plan is approved. The land use plan is the proposed action contemplated by [NEPA]. There is no ongoing major Federal action that could require supplementation.... Id. at 73, 124 S.Ct. 2373 (discussing Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374, 109 S.Ct. 1851). Here, the Forest Service's approval and issuance of the Forest Park permit, like BLM's approval of the land use plan in Norton, was the major federal action contemplated by NEPA. Under Norton, that major federal action was completed when the permit was approved and issued. See also Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 894 (9th Cir.2004) (concluding no supplemental analysis was required for a Bison-testing facility operated by the State of Montana on federal land pursuant to a Forest Service permit because the Forest Service's NEPA obligations ended when the permit was issued and approved). It is important to note the relevant NEPA provisions expressly apply only to federal action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Since issuance of the permit, the Forest Service has remained largely uninvolved in the operations of the feedground. That the Forest Service retains discretion to amend the permit does not alone lead to the conclusion there is ongoing major federal action or major federal action to occur. While the Forest Service could potentially amend the permit in such a manner as to constitute a major federal action, there is no allegation this has occurred. Because the State of Wyoming remains the only meaningful actor involved in the operation of the Forest Park feedground, there is no ongoing major federal action or major federal action to occur. Thus, the Forest Service's decision not to undertake an environmental analysis of the Forest Park feedground was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of GYC's request to compel an environmental analysis of the Forest Park feedground.
The Forest Service has never conducted an environmental analysis of the Dell Creek feedground. NEPA's implementing regulations state major federal actions may include new and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a). Because GYC's challenge to the Forest Service's initial failure to conduct an environmental analysis of the Dell Creek feedground would presumably be barred by the relevant statute of limitations, [3] GYC argues the Forest Service's involvement with the Dell Creek feedground is a continuing federal activity that satisfies the definition provided in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) of a major federal action. This is so, according to GYC, because like the Forest Park permit, the Dell Creek permit provides the Forest Service may amend the permit when, at the discretion of the authorized officer, such action is deemed necessary or desirable to incorporate new terms, conditions, and stipulations. In support of this argument, GYC relies primarily on two cases. In Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) entered into a loan and capital grant contract prior to NEPA's enactment. 551 F.2d 1178, 1179 (10th Cir. 1977). This contract required HUD to approve all acquisitions and dispositions of property. Id. at 1181. This court concluded HUD's handling of a certain structure within the project, which included treating this building separately in its negotiations and administratively as evidenced by the fact it was not demolished and has been contracted to be sold as a separate structure, was continuing federal action constituting a major federal action. Id. at 1181-82. GYC relies heavily on this court's statement in Hart that, as long as agency decisions remain to be made or are open to revision, [NEPA] should be applied. Id. at 1181. This statement, however, merely summarizes the holdings of two cases from other circuits in which the courts also were faced with whether or not to apply NEPA to major agency actions ongoing at the time NEPA became effective. Id. The courts in those cases concluded that for projects ongoing at the time of NEPA's passage, Congress intended NEPA to apply unless the project had reached a stage of completion such that NEPA's application could be considered a retroactive application not intended by Congress. Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 773-74 (7th Cir.1975); Arlington Coal. on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1331 (4th Cir. 1972). Contrary to GYC's assertion, instead of merely considering whether there were agency decisions yet to be made or open to revision, this court in Hart went on to identify the key inquiry in the analysis: whether the actual, not potential, involvement of the federal government to date in the activity constituted a major federal action. See Hart, 551 F.2d at 1181-82. In the second case relied upon by GYC, Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce, HUD approved an urban renewal plan and entered into a loan and capital grant contract, again prior to the passage of NEPA. 714 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir.1983). The contract required the local public agency ... to furnish HUD promptly with documentary data concerning any proposed actions of the local agency pertaining to the project and authorized HUD to inform the local agency in writing of its objection to a proposed step, and to refuse a requested payment if the agency proceeds without securing the prior approval of the Secretary of HUD. Id. at 278. It was alleged that HUD failed to comply with NEPA because it never undertook an environmental analysis of the project. Id. at 275. HUD argued its inaction did not violate NEPA because the effective date of NEPA succeeded the signing of the contract and the approval of the urban renewal plan. Id. After noting the district court's finding that HUD has remained meaningfully involved in the Project[,] the court concluded NEPA should be applicable to federally-assisted projects [like the one in question] which were initiated prior to 1970 but which remain subject to the authority of a Federal agency to review the implementation of the project on a stage by stage basis. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, like this court in Hart, in reaching its conclusion the court analyzed the actual degree of ongoing federal involvement in the project. Id. The cases cited by GYC stand only for the proposition that if an agency began a project prior to the passage of NEPA, that alone would not shield the agency from NEPA compliance if the agency remained meaningfully involved in the project after NEPA became effective. They are not, however, authority for the existence of a major federal action merely because an agency retains a degree of discretion in a project. The district court was thus correct when it opined that it would be a stretch to use these cases to stand for the proposition [GYC] desires. The projects in the cases cited by GYC involved continuing meaningful federal agency involvement at various stages. Here, however, the State of Wyoming manages the feedground and there is nothing in the permit mandating continuing, stage-by-stage involvement of the Forest Service. More relevant to this analysis is Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137. While Norton involved the question of whether there was ongoing major Federal action or major Federal action to occur in a federally approved activity so as to require a supplementary environmental analysis, id. at 73, 124 S.Ct. 2373, the Court's analysis is certainly relevant to the issue of whether there is a continuing Federal action requiring an initial environmental analysis. In Norton, although the Secretary retained discretion to issue management decisions to implement the land use plan in question, the Court held that the federal action was completed when the plan was approved. Id. at 69, 73, 124 S.Ct. 2373. This holding indicates that, as with the Forest Park permit, the major federal action was completed when the Forest Service issued the Dell Creek permit in 1996, and was not continuing. [4] See id.; Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d at 894. Thus, the Forest Service's decision not to undertake an environmental analysis of the Dell Creek feedground was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of GYC's request to compel an environmental analysis of the Dell Creek feedground.