Opinion ID: 1879728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: retrospective or prospective application of sdcl 35-4-78(2) and walz

Text: The majority in Walz noted that the court in Griffin had declined to expand the common law to afford a remedy and also did not extend SDCL 35-4-78(2) to impose a civil liability duty. Walz, supra at 122. However, the court went on to state that [s]ince Griffin essentially turned on a reluctance to impose a common law duty [4] in the absence of express civil liability legislation, we did not fully reach Justice Dunn's interpretation of SDCL 35-4-78(2). We do now. Id. The court then discussed SDCL 35-4-78(2) and concluded that the statute had established a standard of care or conduct, a breach of which is negligence as a matter of law.  (emphasis added) Id. at 123. Clearly, the Walz decision is based upon a cause of action existent under SDCL 35-4-78(2), (which should control the date of application). It can be argued that Walz should not be applied retroactively because: (1) the Walz majority did not address the application issue, (2) caselaw holds that where prior settled law is overturned, the decision should be prospectively applied, and (3) to apply Walz retroactively would be inequitable. We believe the Walz majority opinion, read in its entirety, clearly demonstrates that the court determined that [s]ince this decision applies existing statutory law, it was unnecessary to state that the decision was both prospective and retrospective. SDCL 35-4-78(2) was a statute within the Codified Laws of South Dakota before any of the actions in this case or Walz occurred. As such, it provided a standard of care or conduct from the moment it became law. There has been criticism of the negligence per se rule, see Prosser, Law of Torts § 36 (4th ed. 1971); 3 Cooley on Torts § 481 (4th ed. 1932); 5 The Law of Torts § 17.6 (1988), however, it is clear that this rule has been adhered to by this court for some time. The violation of a statute enacted to promote safety constitutes negligence per se. Engel v. Stock, 88 S.D. 579, 581, 225 N.W.2d 872, 873 (1975); Bothern v. Peterson, 83 S.D. 84, 155 N.W.2d 308 (1967); Blakey v. Boos, 83 S.D. 1, 153 N.W.2d 305 (1967). It is inconceivable that violation of a statute may be negligence per se on one day, but cannot be the day before. Walz did not overrule prior settled law. Griffin dealt with the common law cause of action and there was no prior settled law construing civil liability under SDCL 35-4-78(2). Finally, it is no more inequitable to apply Walz retrospectively than it is, in any case, to acknowledge that violation of a criminal statute may result in a finding of civil liability. Generally, bar owners were aware of SDCL 35-4-78(2) and the acts it prohibited and cannot assert ignorance. The negligence per se rule has never been restricted to only those laws which facially provide both civil and criminal remedies and the wisdom of so doing is not a question before this court. Therefore, based upon a clear reading of Walz and the application of the well-settled rule of negligence per se, we hold that the decision in Walz was intended to apply both retrospectively and prospectively.
Even if it were conceded that Walz impliedly overrules the precedent established in Griffin, Walz can and should be applied retroactively. The general rule in civil cases seems to be that unless the overruling decision declares that it shall have only prospective effect, which the court overruling its prior decision generally has the power to do, the judicial overruling of a precedent has both prospective and retroactive effect. 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 233 (1965). This general rule has been denominated the Blackstonian Doctrine, Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 571, 157 N.W.2d 595, 596 (1968), and appears to have evolved from a traditional view of the judiciary as the interpretors of law. As a matter of constitutional law, retroactive operation of an overruling decision is neither required nor prohibited. Comment, Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision, 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 § 2; Annotation, United States Supreme Court's Views as to Retroactive Effect of Its Own Decisions Announcing New Rules, 22 L.Ed.2d. 821, 830 (hereinafter S.Ct. Annotation). The United States Supreme Court has developed criteria for determining retroactivity of new rules which are substantially the same as those enunciated by this court in State v. One 1966 Pontiac Auto., 270 N.W.2d 362, 365 (S.D. 1978). These criteria are: (1) the purpose to be served by the particular new rule; (2) the extent of reliance which had been placed upon the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule. S.Ct. Annotation, supra at 832. The first criteria is the purpose to be served by the new rule. Clearly, one general purpose of the rule in Walz was to recognize an implied civil cause of action under a criminal statute. If retroactive application is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the new rule, then this is a significant factor in giving the new rule retroactive effect. S.Ct. Annotation § 4[b] at 832. The court in Walz believed that SDCL 35-4-78(2) was enacted to protect citizens from the risk of being killed or injured `as a result of the drunkenness to which the particular sale of alcoholic liquor contributes.' Walz, 327 N.W.2d at 122-123. Thus, to effectuate the interpreted intent and purpose of the statute, it was and is necessary to give the decision retroactive application. It is argued that there was good-faith reliance on the old rule (i.e., Griffin ) and, therefore, Walz should not be applied retroactively. Specifically, it is argued that it is inequitable to apply the new rule because many bar owners did not have liability insurance coverage for these situations prior to Walz and thus could suffer severe monetary losses, and that the state of the law was and is unclear. Although we agree that the imposition of liability, where proven, may be financially harsh for bar owners who were not covered by insurance, this must be balanced against the harsh effect non-retroactivity would have upon those wrongfully injured whose economic and physical losses may be more severe. Additionally, as mentioned above, there is no question that SDCL 35-4-78(2) prohibited bar owners from serving intoxicated persons or minors. The conduct in question was prohibited and proven violation of the statute was punishable by criminal sanctions. We do not believe good-faith reliance means that violators of SDCL 35-4-78(2) relied upon violation only costing them a one thousand dollar fine, one year of imprisonment, or both. See SDCL 22-6-2. Additionally, the retroactive application of Walz is unlikely to have a significant effect on the administration of justice.
Even if the decision in Walz were given only prospective application, it would not bar the suit by these plaintiffs under this court's prior interpretation of prospective application. The court in City of Aberdeen v. Meidinger, 89 S.D. 412, 233 N.W.2d 331 (1975) determined that the holding therein would have only prospective application. The court stated that the Meidinger decision does not apply to cases handled by the ... courts previous to the date of this decision. (emphasis added) Id., 233 N.W. 2d at 334. A review of prior cases involving both prospective and retroactive application make it clear that prospective application means the overruling decision is not applied to cases commenced before the decision was announced. [5] Therefore, the overruling decision is applied to cases commenced after the decision is announced. The Walz decision was announced in 1982 and Baatz commenced this action in 1984. Therefore, the Walz decision applies to the Baatz action. Although it can be argued that prospective application should mean the decision is applied only to transactions or events occurring after the announcement of the decision, this is not what our prior caselaw indicates and for obvious sound reason.