Opinion ID: 2626554
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Defendant's Other Sexual Offenses

Text: (2) Over objection, the trial court admitted the evidence of defendant's four other sexual assaults. In careful and thorough discussions, it found the evidence admissible under both section 1101 [2] and section 1108. It also found the evidence not unduly prejudicial under section 352. [3] The Court of Appeal concluded that section 1108 did not apply to this murder charge and further held that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence under section 1101. We conclude that section 1108 does apply here and the trial court properly admitted the evidence under that section. Section 1108, subdivision (a), provides: In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352. Section 1108, subdivision (d)(1), defines sexual offense: `Sexual offense' means a crime under the law of a state or of the United States that involved any of the following: (A) Any conduct proscribed by Section 243.4, 261, 261.5, 262, 264.1, 266c, 269, 286, 288, 288a, 288.2, 288.5, or 289, or subdivision (b), (c), or (d) of Section 311.2 or Section 311.3, 311.4, 311.10, 311.11, 314, or 647.6 of the Penal Code. (B) Any conduct proscribed by Section 220 of the Penal Code, except assault with intent to commit mayhem. (C) Contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person. (D) Contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant and any part of another person's body. (E) Deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person. (F) An attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in this paragraph. The original indictment in this case, filed in April 2002, charged defendant with Vickers's murder. It specifically alleged that defendant did with malice aforethought and during the perpetration and attempt to perpetrate rape and burglary, kill Betty Yvonne Vickers, a human being. Defendant was not also charged with Vickers's rape, no doubt because the limitations period on rape had expired by 2002. Later, an amended indictmentthe one in operation at trialsimply alleged that defendant did unlawfully and with malice aforethought, kill Betty Yvonne Vickers, a human being. The reference to rape and burglary was deleted. At trial, the prosecution sought and obtained a first degree murder verdict based on felony murder with rape and burglary the underlying felonies. (Pen. Code, § 189.) The burglary was based on defendant's entering Vickers's apartment with the intent to commit rape. (3) Section 1108's language makes clear that it is limited to the defendant's sex offenses, and it applies only when he is charged with committing another sex offense.  ( People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 916 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182].) Thus, the question before us is whether, under the circumstances of this case, defendant was accused of a sexual offense within the meaning of section 1108. The Court of Appeal held that he was not so accused because murder is not found in any of the enumerated Penal Code sections nor does it include as a necessary element nonconsensual sexual contact. We disagree. (4) Penal Code section 189 defines various types of first degree murder, including any murder which is . . . committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, . . . rape, [or] burglary . . . . First degree felony murder with rape and burglary (based on entry with the intent to rape) was the only theory of first degree murder presented at trial. This type of first degree murder unquestionably involves conduct proscribed by Penal Code section 261, the statute defining rape, or at least an attempt to engage in that conduct. The amended indictment deleted any specific reference to rape and simply included an open charge of murder. (5) But a pleading that contains an open charge of murder adequately notifies the defendant of the possibility of conviction of first degree murder on a felony-murder theory, including rape felony murder. ( People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 591 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104].) Defendant was not only prosecuted for, he was convicted of, first degree murder on this felony-murder basis. Accordingly, he was accused of a sexual offense as defined by section 1108. In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeal relied heavily on the decision in People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 257] ( Walker ), another murder case where the trial court admitted evidence of other sexual offenses under section 1108. The Walker court summarized the issue before it as whether section 1108, subdivision (d)(1)(E)'s inclusion in the definition of sexual offense of crimes that involve `[d]eriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person' authorizes use of evidence of other sexual offenses when the circumstances under which a violent crime has been committed suggest the defendant derived sexual pleasure or gratification from the victim's pain, even though sexual pleasure or gratification is neither a necessary element of the charged offense nor alleged in the information as an enhancement or aggravating factor. ( Walker, supra, at p. 799.) The appellate court interpreted section 1108 as requiring that the requisite sexual transgression must be an element or component of the crime itself without regard to the evidence establishing a specific violation. ( Walker, supra, at p. 800.) Under this standard, the court held that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under section 1108. ( Walker, supra, at p. 802.) Walker is distinguishable because the defendant in Walker, although charged with first degree murder, was convicted of second degree murder, and the opinion gives no indication the prosecution sought a first degree murder conviction on a rape-felony-murder theory. It appears the only theory in that case that would have made the charged crime a sexual offense under section 1108 was that the evidence suggested the defendant had killed for sexual pleasure or gratification. Walker recognized that sometimes murder can qualify as a sexual offense under section 1108, for example, if rape-related special circumstances are alleged. ( Walker, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.) (Here, no special circumstances were alleged, no doubt because the law in effect in 1976 providing for special circumstances had been declared unconstitutional. ( Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420, 426 [134 Cal.Rptr. 650, 556 P.2d 1101].)) Walker did not involve, or discuss, the question whether an open murder charge prosecuted as first degree murder on a rape-felony-murder theory is a sexual offense under section 1108. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal extended Walker to this case. (6) We need not and, accordingly, do not decide whether Walker, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 782, correctly interpreted section 1108. Even under Walker, defendant was accused of a sexual offense. As we have explained, first degree felony murder with rape the underlying felony involves, as an element, conduct proscribed by Penal Code section 261, the statute defining rape, or at least an attempt to engage in that conduct. Accordingly, even assuming, without deciding, that Walker was correct in limiting the applicability of section 1108 to offenses in which sexual misconduct is an element or component of the crime itself, the Court of Appeal erred in extending its holding to this case. (7) The Court of Appeal tried to bolster its conclusion by invoking a familiar maxim of statutory construction: expressio unius est exclusio alterius. That is, to specify one thing in a statute is to impliedly exclude other things not specified. It concluded that because section 1108, subdivision (d)(1)(E), specifies only killing for sexual pleasure or gratification and not other forms of sexual killing, such as killing during a rape, it impliedly excluded all other forms of sexual killing from its definition of a sexual offense. But this analysis simply assumes the conclusionthat other types of sexual killings are not included elsewhere. If other forms of sexual killing, such as killing while raping, are included in section 1108, subdivision (d)(1)(A), there would be no need to repeat those types of sexual killings elsewhere. It seems most reasonable to conclude, as the Attorney General puts it, that section 1108, subdivision (d)(1)(E)'s role is to capture a unique type of sexually motivated homicide not otherwise identified in other parts of the statute. The Court of Appeal also believed the legislative purpose behind section 1108 supports its restrictive interpretation. It quoted language from People v. Soto (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 966, 983 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 605], stating that in enacting section 1108, the Legislature `declared that the willingness to commit a sexual offense is not common to most individuals; thus, evidence of any prior sexual offenses is particularly probative and necessary for determining the credibility of the witness.' (Quoting Review of Selected 1995 California Legislation (1996) 27 Pacific L.J. 761, 762; see also People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 912.) Focusing on determining the credibility of witnesses and ignoring the reference to the particularly probative nature of this evidence, the Court of Appeal believed the legislative purpose does not apply here. It observed, Here, there was no witness whose credibility needed to be determined. The observation is factually correct because defendant killed Vickers, she could not testifybut it hardly supports the Court of Appeal's conclusion. The necessity for admitting this particularly probative evidence that exists when the alleged victim's credibility might be questioned can be no greater than the necessity that exists when the victim was killed and thus cannot even tell her story. To help determine what happened in Vickers's home the night defendant strangled her, it was particularly probative for the jury to learn of defendant's history of sexual assaults. Neither section 1108's language nor its purpose supports the conclusion the Legislature wanted to permit this evidence when the alleged sexual assault victim survives and can testify but not when the victim dies and cannot speak. The conclusion that section 1108 applies here finds support in the holding of People v. Pierce (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 893 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 397]. In Pierce, the issue was whether assault with intent to commit rape under Penal Code section 220 was a sexual offense under section 1108. The defendant was tried before section 1108, subdivision (d)(1), was amended to add to the list of qualifying crimes assault with the intent to commit rape. ( People v. Pierce, supra, at pp. 898-899.) The Court of Appeal held that assault with intent to commit rape was a qualifying sexual assault even before the amendment, noting that assault with intent to rape involves conduct proscribed by the offenses listed in section 1108, subdivision (d)(1)(A). ( People v. Pierce, supra, at p. 898.) The court concluded its discussion of the issue by noting that [u]nder Pierce's interpretation of the statute, if he had committed attempted rape, section 1108 would apply. But because he committed the more serious offense of assault with intent to commit rape, it does not. We are confident the Legislature did not intend such an absurd result. ( Id. at p. 899.) Similarly, we are confident the Legislature did not intend that section 1108 would apply when a sexual assault victim survives but not when the defendant kills the victim. (8) Defendant argues that the rule of lenity requires us to interpret section 1108 as not governing this situation. [W]e have repeatedly stated that when a statute defining a crime or punishment is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, the appellate court should ordinarily adopt that interpretation more favorable to the defendant. ( People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1], italics added.) The purpose of this rule is to ensure that criminal statutes provide fair warning of what behavior is considered criminal and what the punishment for that behavior will be. ( Ibid. ) But section 1108 governs the admissibility of evidence; it defines neither a crime nor punishment. The rule of lenity that applies to criminal statutes does not apply to rules of evidence. (See Jauregi v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 931, 943 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 553] [the rule of lenity applicable to forfeiture statutes does not apply to a section of the Evid. Code].) Moreover, although true ambiguities are resolved in a defendant's favor, an appellate court should not strain to interpret a penal statute in defendant's favor if it can fairly discern a contrary legislative intent. ( People v. Avery, supra, at p. 58.) Here we can fairly discern a legislative intent to define murder committed during the course of a rape as a sexual offense under section 1108. (9) For these reasons, we conclude that section 1108 applies at least when the prosecution accuses the defendant of first degree felony murder with rape (or another crime specified in § 1108, subd. (d)(1)), or with burglary based on the intent to commit rape (or other sex crime), the underlying felony. This conclusion avoids a difficulty inherent in the Court of Appeal's interpretation. If, as will often be the case of a killing prosecuted as a rape felony murder, the rape is separately charged, then section 1108 would certainly apply and evidence of other sexual offenses would be admissible but, under the Court of Appeal's view, only on the rape charge and not also on the murder charge. It would be difficult to instruct a jury meaningfully that it could consider the other sexual offenses in determining whether the defendant was guilty of rape, but it could not consider those offenses in determining whether the defendant was guilty of murder in the course of rape. This difficulty is avoided by interpreting the applicable sexual offenses to include murder during the course of a rape. (10) The conclusion that section 1108 applies does not end the inquiry into whether the trial court correctly admitted the evidence. Section 1108 preserves the trial court's discretion to exclude evidence under section 352 if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. (See People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 916; People v. Pierce, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 900.) In deciding whether to exclude evidence of another sexual offense under section 1108, trial judges must consider such factors as its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant's other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the offense. ( People v. Falsetta, supra, at p. 917.) Like any ruling under section 352, the trial court's ruling admitting evidence under section 1108 is subject to review for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 783 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548]; People v. Pierce, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 901.) The court did not abuse its discretion in this case. It carefully considered the evidence, found it had significant probative valueas it didand took steps to minimize any undue prejudice. It limited the evidence to what was relevant. For example, as in People v. Pierce, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at page 901, the court disallowed inflammatory evidence about [the victim's] injuries. It also ensured that the evidence would not take long to present. The ruling came well within the court's discretion. Because the trial court properly admitted the evidence under section 1108, we do not consider whether, as the Court of Appeal also concluded, the trial court abused its discretion in further finding that the evidence was admissible under section 1101. (See generally People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 782-787.)