Opinion ID: 4519859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the jury verdict was complete.

Text: ¶10. In its order declaring a mistrial, the trial court found that the jury “did not reach a complete and unanimous verdict on any count, having returned an incomplete verdict on counts 1 and 2 and no verdict on count 3.” Nickson argues that “[b]ecause the jury verdict was unanimous as to . . . first-degree murder, it was error for the [trial court] to find that the verdict was incomplete.” This Court agrees. ¶11. Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.4(b) states, “[i]f the jury cannot agree on all counts as to any defendant, the jury shall return a verdict on those counts on which it has agreed.” Thus, Rule 24.4(b) allows a jury to return partial verdicts as to multiple counts. See MRCrP 24.4 cmt. ¶12. Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment charged Nickson with the first-degree murder of Nedra and Adams. The trial court instructed the jury on the charged offense of first-degree 6 murder and further instructed the jury on second-degree murder. Thus, the jury instructions regarding Counts 1 and 2 included two murder offenses, first-degree murder and seconddegree murder. Additionally, the form of the verdict for both Counts 1 and 2 allowed the jury to find Nickson guilty or not guilty of first-degree murder and, in the event the jury found him not guilty, then guilty or not guilty of second-degree murder. As a result, the instructions allowed the jury to agree on one offense but not the other. ¶13. The record shows that the jury unanimously agreed against guilt on the charged offense of first-degree murder but that the jury was unable to agree on second-degree murder or possession of a weapon as a convicted felon. The jury’s verdict was in writing and in proper form in accordance with the jury instructions. See MRCrP 24.1, MRCrP 24.3. As a result, under Rule 24.4(b), the jury returned a partial verdict against guilt on first-degree murder in Counts 1 and 2. Accordingly, the jury’s verdict was complete as to the charged offense of first-degree murder in Counts 1 and 2. II. Whether Nickson can be retried for first-degree murder. ¶14. Nickson next argues he cannot be retried for first-degree murder because the jury acquitted him of that offense. He claims that because the jury returned a unanimous verdict as to first-degree murder, “a retrial on first-degree murder would violate the double jeopardy clause.” This Court agrees. ¶15. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. The clause 7 guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict the accused, “thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1977) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S. Ct. 221, 223, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1957)). Additionally, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Mississippi Constitution provides, “[n]o person’s life or liberty shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense; but there must be an actual acquittal or conviction on the merits to bar another prosecution.” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 22. ¶16. In response to Nickson’s argument, the State relies on Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 182 L. Ed. 2d 937 (2012). In Blueford, the defendant was charged with capital murder. Id. at 602. The trial court instructed the jury on the charged offense of capital murder and the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. Id. at 602. During deliberations, the jury indicated that it “[could not] agree on a charge at all.” Id. at 603 (internal quotation mark omitted). The trial court issued an instruction that emphasized the importance of reaching a verdict. Id. The jury continued its deliberations. Id. Later, the jury advised that it was still unable to agree on any one charge. Id. When the trial court summoned the jury, the foreperson reported that the jury was deadlocked. Id. The trial court asked the foreperson to disclose the jury’s votes on each offense. Id. The foreperson responded that the jury was unanimous against guilt on both capital murder and first-degree murder but that it had deadlocked on manslaughter and had 8 not voted on negligent homicide. Id. at 603-04. The trial court issued another instruction emphasizing the importance of reaching a verdict, and the jury continued its deliberations. Id. at 604. Shortly thereafter, the jury again advised that it remained deadlocked. Id. The trial court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Id. The defendant was later retried on all charges. Id. ¶17. The Supreme Court held that the foreperson’s report was not a final verdict of acquittal because it lacked the “finality necessary to constitute an acquittal on the murder offenses.” Id. at 606. The Court explained, The foreperson’s report was not a final resolution of anything. When the foreperson told the court how the jury had voted on each offense, the jury’s deliberations had not yet concluded. The jurors in fact went back to the jury room to deliberate further, even after the foreperson had delivered her report. When they emerged a half hour later, the foreperson stated only that they were unable to reach a verdict. She gave no indication whether it was still the case that all 12 jurors believed Blueford was not guilty of capital or first-degree murder . . . . Id. ¶18. The Court concluded that because the foreperson’s report was not a final resolution of the defendant’s guilt, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit a second trial on the same offenses. Id. at 610. ¶19. This Court finds Blueford distinguishable. Importantly, in Blueford, the jury instructions included “separate forms to convict on each of the possible defenses, but there was only one form to acquit, and it was to acquit on all of them.” Id. at 610. Thus, “the jury’s options . . . were limited to two: either convict on one of the offenses, or acquit on all.” Id. The Court found that “[w]hen the foreperson disclosed the jury’s votes . . . , the trial 9 court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to add another option—that of acquitting on some offenses but not others.” Id. Here, the jury’s options were not as restricted. Indeed, the jury instructions allowed the jury to return a partial verdict and to acquit on some offenses but not others. ¶20. Moreover, unlike in Blueford, the jury was able to unanimously agree on the charged offense of first-degree murder. The foreperson did not simply disclose the jury’s votes on each offense. Instead, the foreperson announced that the jury had reached a verdict on two counts and had delivered a verdict in writing and in proper form. The jury was then polled and the trial court determined that the jury’s verdict was unanimous. In fact, the trial court referred to the jury’s verdict as a “partial verdict of the jury on Count 1 and 2.” ¶21. After the jury’s verdict was announced, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the remaining offenses, which indicates counsel’s understanding that the verdict was a final verdict against guilt on first-degree murder. The trial court denied defense counsel’s motion stating it was “still early.” Although a Sharplin instruction was given, it was given after the jury had reached a unanimous verdict on first-degree murder. In other words, although the jury continued its deliberations, it did so only after it had reached and delivered its verdict against guilt on first-degree murder. Thus, as the record reflects, the jury’s announcement that it was “hopelessly deadlocked” was in reference to the remaining undecided offenses of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. ¶22. Here, unlike in Blueford, a final resolution against guilt on first-degree murder was reached. The jury’s verdict contained the finality necessary to constitute an acquittal on first- 10 degree murder. As a result, this Court agrees that a retrial for first-degree murder would violate Nickson’s constitutional right against double jeopardy. III. Whether Nickson can be retried for second-degree murder. ¶23. Nickson agrees that “a retrial on second-degree murder can . . . occur if second-degree murder is a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder.” Nickson asserts, however, that while second-degree murder is a lesser offense than first-degree murder, it is not a lesserincluded offense. He therefore argues that the jury’s “verdict . . . as to [the] first-degree murder charge also precludes or bars [him] from being retried on the lesser offense of second-degree murder.” This Court disagrees. ¶24. This Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, has found that second-degree murder is a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. Montgomery v. State, 253 So. 3d 305, 307 (Miss. 2018); Potts v. State, 233 So. 3d 782, 789 (Miss. 2017); Clark v. State, 237 So. 3d 844, 846 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). Accordingly, Nickson’s argument fails. Nickson can be retried on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.