Opinion ID: 1801680
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Voluntariness of defendant's recorded confessions

Text: Defendant claims that his later recorded confessions, made on the afternoon, evening, and night of December 4 and December 6, 1993, were involuntary. He argues these confessions were coerced in light of the asserted violation of his rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, and Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. 477. This claim fails for the reasons given in part II.D.3., ante, where we rejected his claim that the trial court should have suppressed his statements on December 4, 1993, on the ground that they were obtained in violation of Miranda and Edwards. Defendant also claims it was improper for Sergeant Meese to suggest to defendant that a confession to a sexual assault would not change defendant's predicament. During the first tape-recorded interrogation on December 4, 1993, Meese encouraged defendant to get it all out in the open and get it off [his] chest, and to admit any unlawful sexual conduct because [i]t ain't going to make a difference to anything that happens. In the December 6 confession, Meese again encouraged defendant to say whether he had sexually assaulted Polly, at one point commenting, [i]t ain't gonna make a hill of beans as far as what goes on if you go to trial. (24) A confession elicited by any promise of benefit or leniency, whether express or implied, is involuntary and therefore inadmissible, but merely advising a suspect that it would be better to tell the truth, when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise, does not render a confession involuntary. ( People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164].) Here, Sergeant Meese's comments encouraging defendant to tell the truth were not accompanied by an impermissible promise of benefit or leniency. Sergeant Meese said nothing beyond the obvious ( People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 115) in that defendant's crimes, involving the kidnap and murder of a child, made him eligible for the death penalty. Meese correctly implied that any evidence of a sexual assault (or lack thereof) would not have altered that circumstance. Defendant himself acknowledged that he knew he faced the death penalty and even admitted he deserved it. (25) Defendant also contends that Sergeant Meese misled him during the December 6, 1993, interrogation by claiming that semen was found on Polly's body, assertedly to coax an admission of sexual assault and to prevent defendant from invoking his right to counsel. The record, however, supports the trial court's finding that Meese entertained a good faith belief that the stain on Polly's panties could contain semen. [5] At the time, Meese properly relied upon a fluorescence test that indicated the possible presence of semen. [G]ood faith confrontation is an interrogation technique possessing no apparent constitutional vice. ( People v. Andersen (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 576 [161 Cal.Rptr. 707].)