Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PCR Court's Exclusion of Witnesses

Text: Defendant seeks a remand on his PCR claims because he was denied the opportunity to present certain witnesses during the PCR proceeding. He was not permitted to present testimony from his capital defense expert, David Glazer, Esq., or from Nardone, Probation Officer Meckel, Gloria Dunn, Detective Golden, Tariq Ayers, Sheila Fairchild, P.D. Investigator Goldstein, and defendant's original counsel, Abatemarco and Hamilton.
In respect of Glazer's testimony, defendant submitted two certifications. In addition to attesting to credentials, Glazer's first certification, dated February 21, 2001, stated that he reviewed in connection with this matter the penalty phase transcripts, Call's memos, Fairchild's report, our opinion affirming defendant's sentence, Nardone's report, the affidavit of defendant's biological father, defendant's psychiatric and school records, expert reports admitted into evidence, and defendant's PCR petition. In a subsequent June 2002 certification, he stated that he also reviewed the additional materials found by defendant's PCR counsel in preparation of this PCR petition, specifically the Trenton State Hospital records, defendant's hospital birth records, and Mattie's criminal history. In the earlier certification, Glazer concluded that defendant's trial counsel committed seven trial errors that, standing alone and cumulatively were below the standard of representation usually accorded capital defendants in this State and prejudiced Mr. Harris in the presentation of his penalty phase. In his second certification, Glazer stated that trial counsel overlooked the newly discovered institutional records, which would have affected the jury's deliberations at the penalty phase. The PCR court reviewed the certifications but declined to hear Glazer's testimony and accorded [the certifications] no weight. The court characterized Glazer's certifications as essentially reiterat[ing] the legal points raised in the PCR petition, and remarked that Glazer had significantly less capital experience than Call and Scully.
Having reviewed this record, we agree with the State that most of the proposed witnesses were not relevant to establishing defendant's IAC claims. Dunn, Golden, Ayers and Fairchild were not relevant because their trial testimony was on record. The attorneys, Abatemarco and Hamilton, did not need to testify about the file they left Call and Scully because the latter trial counsel could, and did, speak to that. Furthermore, we reject the asserted need for Probation Officer Meckel to testify. We earlier determined that there was no legal basis for defendant's claim that his presentence interview was illegal. Defendant does not specify how testimony from any of these witnesses would have helped the PCR court assess his claims. As for Nardone, the PCR Court did accept and consider her report, as do we. It was not error to deny the request for her live testimony, and we decline to require a remand for that purpose based on our de novo review of this record. The most important witnesses to defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel were Call and Scully, and they testified. In respect of Glazer, the capital defense expert, defendant's argument is based entirely on our discussion of a similar claim in an earlier matter. In DiFrisco III, we said: Ordinarily, the necessity for and admissibility of expert testimony are matters to be determined within the sound exercise of discretion by the trial court. State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280, 293 [658 A. 2d 702] (1995) (citation omitted). Generally, a trial court will admit expert testimony if the subject matter at issue, or its specific application, is one with which an average fact finder might not be sufficiently familiar, or if the trial court determines that the expert testimony would assist it in understanding the evidence and determining facts in issue. [ Supra, 174 N.J. at 237, 804 A. 2d 507 (parallel citations omitted).] In addressing whether DiFrisco's PCR court abused its discretion in declining to consider the written submission and hear the testimony of the defendant's capital litigation expert, David Bruck, we took the view that the field of capital defense litigation is a constantly evolving, specialized area of the law. Id. at 239, 804 A. 2d 507. Accordingly, we stated our belief that [a]ll judges, irrespective of their experience level, can be informed by such information. Thus, when PCR counsel offers that form of testimony in a capital case, the court should hear it or at least consider it in written form. Ibid. Although we identified the refusal to consider such expert evidence a deficiency, that does not render the proceeding below automatically flawed. A practical approach is in order, as was employed in DiFrisco III where such expert evidence was lacking and we had to determine what impact, if any, that had on the evaluation of the defendant's IAC claims. Here, we discern no basis for requiring the live testimony of Glazer in order to evaluate properly defendant's IAC claims. Harris's IAC claims do not suggest the need for an expert witness. His claims are not complicated. PCR counsel have presented clearly the reasoning and basis for contending that the alleged trial errors prejudiced defendant. Given the straightforward nature of Harris's claims, it is not surprising that Glazer's certification consists of mere assertions and is short on developing the reasoning for those assertions. For example, Glazer faulted trial counsel for failing to meet with defendant's natural father and to call him to the stand. That statement was made before Call testified at the PCR hearing, where he stated that defendant's father refused to participate or help in defendant's case. Glazer's criticism adds nothing that is beyond the ken of the court after hearing Call's testimony during the evidentiary hearing. Glazer also stated that it was unreasonable for trial counsel not to offer the (5)(a) and (5)(d) mitigating factors to the jury. However, in listing the documents he reviewed, Glazer did not indicate any consideration of Harris's criminal or DOC records. Call, on the other hand, set forth very clearly his rationale for not presenting an adult psychological profile of Harris (and, thus, for not submitting the (5)(a) and (5)(d) factors). Without an idea of defendant's criminal and DOC records, Glazer was in no position to assess the reasonableness of Call's strategy. In addition, we are acutely aware of the capital experience of Call and Scully. Scully had been assigned to more than eight capital cases and had tried five to conclusion. As a regional supervisor in the Office of the Public Defender, he oversaw all capital litigation in his region. He also managed the capital litigation for individual regional offices and assisted the supervisor of the OPD's capital litigation unit. Call had represented fifteen capital defendants, eleven of whom received life. That considerable experience is apparent from our review of the instant claims of ineffective assistance.
We reject defendant's argument in support of his request for a remand.