Opinion ID: 1817835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: effect of federal law

Text: Initially, we reject Global Travel's assertion that enforcement of the arbitration agreement is mandated by federal law. Although the Federal Arbitration Act, which applies to both federal and state court proceedings, reflects a strong federal policy in favor of enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, the FAA also provides that an arbitration agreement may be ruled unenforceable upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). The United States Supreme Court has held that under this provision, state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of § 2. A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law. Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable. . . . Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987) (citations omitted). In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996), the Court noted that generally applicable contract defenses under state law, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening section 2 of the FAA. Accord Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Petsch, 872 So.2d 259, 264 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 884 So.2d 23 (Fla.2004); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So.2d 570, 573-74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The public policy of protecting children from waiver of their litigation rights, on which the Fourth District decision rests, is a generally applicable contract principle and is not peculiar to arbitration agreements. We have previously held that contract provisions unrelated to arbitration may be ruled unenforceable on public policy grounds. See Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 761 So.2d 306, 311 (Fla.2000) (holding that a choice-of-law provision in a contract is enforceable unless the law of the chosen forum contravenes strong public policy). As the Fourth District observed, the issue of whether a parent may validly enter into an agreement on behalf of a minor child to waive the child's rights is a question not of the scope of the arbitration agreement but rather of contract formationwho may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate. Shea, 870 So.2d at 23; see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (The FAA directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts, but it does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we are not foreclosed by the FAA from determining the enforceability of the arbitration agreement solely on public policy grounds under state law.