Opinion ID: 874795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Although Frederick has preserved his claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, he has failed to preserve his state constitutional claim.

Text: The State asserts that before the district court, with respect to the federal constitution, Frederick's suppression motion was based solely on his contention that because the officer did not `contact' him while he was still in his vehicle, a search under [ Belton ] was not warranted, while his argument on appeal is that [ Belton ] should be limited to searches where the officer has reason to believe the automobile contains evidence related to the crime for which the defendant was arrested. The State is incorrect on both counts. It is true that much of Frederick's argument below focused on the fact that Officer Cullen did not make contact with Frederick until he was already outside of his car. Frederick also argued, however, that the search was illegal under Belton due to the fact that the search was not justified by concern that Frederick would grab a weapon or reach into his truck and destroy evidence. Counsel for Frederick argued: The right to search the vehicle comes from . . . the right to search the wingspan, the person, the lunge area incident to arrest, to search their person, to search their wingspan. Other courts have called it their lunge area. That's what the courts have the authority to do. The right to search the vehicle comes from that authority. It comes from the right to search the wingspan, the person, the lunge area incident to arrest. And over the years, it's evolved to become a right to search the entire interior compartment of a vehicle. Contrary to the State's assertion, Frederick renewed this argument on appeal: [T]he evidence obtained following a search of Mr. Frederick's car, should have been suppressed [because] . . . [a]t the time of the search, Mr. Frederick was handcuffed and locked in the back of Officer Cullen's patrol car. In sum, Frederick argued below that the search was illegal under the federal constitution because it was not justified by concerns about safety or the possible destruction of evidence. Thus, the issue was preserved, and Frederick properly renewed it on appeal. [3] The State is correct, however, that Frederick has failed to preserve his argument that the search violated the state constitution. Frederick's motion to suppress did assert that the search of his truck violated Article I, Sections 13 and 17 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. However, in his argument before the district court, Frederick made no mention of the state constitution. Frederick did make explicit reference to two Idaho cases, State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 905 P.2d 1032 (Ct.App.1995), and State v. Harris, 130 Idaho 444, 942 P.2d 568 (Ct.App. 1997), but neither of these cases mention the state constitution. Finally, the district court did not mention the state constitution in its oral ruling and only noted it in passing in its written order. Thus, Frederick's argument on appeal that the state constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment is not preserved. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 406-407, 825 P.2d 501, 503-04 (1992) (declining to consider whether the state constitution afforded the defendant greater protection from a warrantless search than the federal constitution because, though he mentioned it in his motion, defendant failed to further clarify his state constitutional argument to the district court).