Opinion ID: 802339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The District Court’s Decision to Exclude

Text: Evidence of the Pozo Plot Worse yet for the government, on November 8, 2011, the Court reversed course on the admissibility of Pozo’s testimony. Acknowledging that it had previously “indicate[d] that that testimony would be admissible under [Rule] 404(b),” the Court said it had changed its mind, “after hearing the case and the context in which [the testimony was] now being offered.” (Joint App. at 19.) The Court described a threestep process for considering whether to admit evidence under Rule 404(b): first, to “decide whether there is sufficient evidence that the other act in question actually occurred”; second, to assess “whether the evidence of other acts is probative of the material issue other than character”; and third, to consider “whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect.” (Id.) Pozo’s testimony, the Court said, was problematic under the first step of that procedure, because there was no independent documentation corroborating the substance of his intended testimony: 2.) And because it believed that Bergrin had brought his intent into question, the government asked the Court to allow it to introduce, among other things, Esteves’s testimony so as to rebut Bergrin’s “blanket, self-serving assertion” that he would never say “[l]et’s get rid of the informant … to … a client facing charges because of a cooperating witness.” (Id. at 5 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).) 19 The first step is very rarely even an issue. … [It] is almost typically a prior conviction. It will be evidence of even a prior arrest which has some independen[t] corroboration because police make a prior arrest and then they seek to offer that type of evidence. It might even be a wiretap. …. One of the concerns I have, and I’ve had, is that we’re talking about conversations which allegedly occurred many years ago, and we’re talking about people’s best recollections of that conversation without it having been recorded, without it having been documented immediately. …. We have that in this case already. We have this case, one of the biggest contentions in this case is if the statement “No Kemo, no case” was made, what exactly does that mean. And the conversation with Mr. Pozo, I know the Government will say that’s Mr. Pozo’s best recollection. But there’s nothing to document – when we’re talking about parsing such important words, there’s nothing to document what actually was spoken at that time in those few little sentences that the Government contends would show that Mr. 20 Bergrin was attempting [to] … you know, to murder the witness. (Id. at 19-21.) The Court suggested that its concern about whether Pozo’s testimony was truthful also played a role in assessing whether, under the third step, the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by “its potential prejudicial effect.” (Id. at 19.) And the Court declared Pozo’s testimony would be “cumulative,” “collateral,” and “confusing.” It explained: I have no sense of confidence that this evidence would be so reliable that its probative value would outweigh its prejudicial effect. And I think, you know, there’s a concern that it would be considered by this jury as propensity versus really going to intent. Now, in that context, let me also say, one of the considerations is, is there other evidence of intent in this case? And, you know, you have other evidence, so this would be cumulative and very collateral and very confusing, in this Court’s opinion. …. [Y]ou have evidence of intent, you have, if the jury believes Mr. Young, you have the 21 conversation that Mr. Young testified to …, which is a very specific conversation that he says he recalls Mr. Bergrin making at that time back in 2004, shortly after … Mr. Baskerville’s arrest. He testified at … some length about that conversation. So you have evidence of what “No Kemo, no case” means. You also have the evidence that you brought forth about Mr. Castro. You brought forth evidence that Mr. Bergrin went to … another motivated witness, … which the jury will have to consider in which he says, Mr. Bergrin went to him at some point and said, you know: I’ll give you $10,000 if you would, you know, kill this guy. Mr. Pozo would be another witness, a drug dealer who is claiming at some point some conversation occurred. It’s not documented. And in weighing the factors that I need to weigh as far as, you know, the minimum degree it will have with respect to intent, because the jury would have to parse those words, whatever they finally conclude were the words, first of all, because there’s nothing to document other than Mr. Pozo saying what he remembers, and then on cross it may come out to … be something else, they’d have to document those – they’d have to parse those words along with the “No Kemo, no case.” And I think their challenge as far as dealing with “No Kemo, no case” is enough. 22 (Id. at 23-26.) That evening, the government filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider its decision to exclude evidence of the Pozo Plot and the Esteves Plot. As the government argued the next morning in support of its motion, one might perceive “an inherent tension” between the ruling that the Pozo Plot was based on “insufficient proof … because we don’t have a tape” and the ruling that the Esteves Plot was too prejudicial “because we do have a tape.” (Id. at 36, 37.) The District Court was not persuaded, however, and reaffirmed its rulings. 16