Opinion ID: 1349797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of immunity for petitioner's witnesses

Text: (10a) Petitioner insists that in light of his witnesses' invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights, either the prosecution, or the court, had an obligation to grant his witnesses immunity sufficient to allow them to testify at the hearing. Petitioner's claim of a right to compulsory prosecutorial immunity for his witnesses is easily rejected. Petitioner has no such right. ( In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 720 [114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 523 P.2d 229]; People v. St. Joseph (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 289, 298-299 [276 Cal. Rptr. 498], and cases cited; People v. DeFreitas (1983) 140 Cal. App.3d 835, 838-841 [189 Cal. Rptr. 814], and cases cited.) As these cases disclose, although the prosecution has a statutory right, incident to its charging authority, to grant immunity and thereby compel testimony (Pen. Code, § 1324), California cases have uniformly rejected claims that a criminal defendant has the same power to compel testimony by forcing the prosecution to grant immunity. Petitioner insists, nevertheless, that the court  in this matter, our referee  had inherent power to grant his witnesses whatever immunity might be necessary to compel their testimony. He relies on People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 972 et seq. [264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608], in which we declined to decide whether in appropriate circumstances an essential witness for a criminal defendant should be granted judicial use immunity (p. 975), but concluded that, even if available, such immunity was not required in that case. As Hunter, supra, makes clear, the vast majority of cases, in this state and in other jurisdictions, reject the notion that a trial court has inherent power to confer immunity on a witness called by the defense. We noted and discussed the one case which has clearly recognized such a right, Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3d Cir.1980) 615 F.2d 964, and concluded that even under Smith, the defendant's offer of proof fell well short of the standards set forth in that case. ( People v. Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 974.) We reach the same conclusion, by the same reasoning, in this case. (11) As we explained in Hunter, supra, although the Smith court recognized the possibility of judicially conferred immunity in special cases, it also recognized that `the opportunities for judicial use of this immunity power must be clearly limited; ... the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be essential; and there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of immunity.... [¶] [T]he defendant must make a convincing showing sufficient to satisfy the court that the testimony which will be forthcoming is both clearly exculpatory and essential to the defendant's case. Immunity will be denied if the proffered testimony is found to be ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or it is found to relate only to the credibility of the government's witnesses.' ([ Virgin Islands v. Smith, supra, 615 F.2d] at p. 972.) ( People v. Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 974.) (10b) In Hunter, we concluded the proffered testimony failed to meet Smith's first two requirements, because it was not `clearly exculpatory and essential' to his defense. (49 Cal.3d at p. 974.) We reach the same conclusion here: Petitioner does not explain how his witnesses' testimony might meet that stringent requirement; in fact, as suggested above, it is unclear whether his witnesses' testimony would have been favorable to petitioner. [21]