Opinion ID: 857180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Use of Force Claim

Text: Davila and Duarte also failed to show that the NPS Rangers violated their Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during the Big Bend traffic stop. To state a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, the plaintiffs must 13 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 “show that [they were] seized” and “that [they] suffered (1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need and that (3) the force was objectively unreasonable.” Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004). This is a fact-specific inquiry to be made from the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer at the scene, rather than in hindsight. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. Officers are “authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985); see also United States v. Campbell, 178 F.3d 345, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1999). This authorizes both protective sweeps and the use of reasonable force. Law enforcement officers may also take reasonable steps to assert command of the situation. “The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is minimized . . . if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (alteration in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted). When the traffic stop began, the NPS Rangers surrounded the Kia with their guns drawn. They kept their guns drawn and aimed at Davila and Duarte during the search. Davila, Duarte, and Davila’s grandson were placed in handcuffs and required to kneel on the ground during the duration of the search, and were then placed into separate law enforcement vehicles while the officers checked their identity. They remained in handcuffs until another officer arrived at the scene and ordered the rangers to release them. Duarte was forced to kneel beside the muffler of a law enforcement vehicle that was still running during part of the search. All three occupants complied at all times with the rangers. 14 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 The plaintiffs pleaded that they suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and mental anguish in the course of the seizure. The plaintiffs adequately pleaded that they suffered injuries during the seizure. However, the injuries did not result from force that was excessive or objectively unreasonable because the NPS Rangers’ use of force was not excessive in light of the totality of the circumstances at the time of the traffic stop. Where, as in the present case, a car has been legitimately stopped by law enforcement officers, requesting occupants to step out of the vehicle is a “de minimis additional intrusion” that is outweighed by the government’s “legitimate and weighty interest in officer safety.” Johnson, 555 U.S. at 331 (citations and quotation marks omitted). This is particularly true where there are several occupants in a vehicle and the officials believe one to be dangerous. See, e.g., United States v. Tellez, 11 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, the NPS Rangers were justified in drawing their weapons during the traffic stop because they had reason to believe that an occupant of the car might be dangerous. See United States v. Bullock, 71 F.3d 171, 179 (5th Cir. 1995). For the same reason, they were justified in handcuffing the plaintiffs and requiring them to kneel down. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that officers were authorized to handcuff Sanders instead of relying solely on their aiming guns at him); see also id. at 207 (noting that “[i]f a suspect complies with a police order to lie face down on the ground, his ability to fight or flee is significantly reduced, thereby helping to preserve the status quo”). As a result of the search, the NPS Rangers were able to ascertain that Tocho was not in the car and that the plaintiffs were not armed. However, they did not have these facts before them when they searched the vehicle. They approached a vehicle after receiving a BOLO that had been issued that day, warning them that a fugitive was associated with, and might be riding in, the 15 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 Kia. They also knew that the fugitive had previously assaulted law enforcement officers. Given the information at their disposal, their decision to handcuff the plaintiffs, to make them kneel outside the vehicle, and to draw their weapons on the plaintiffs did not constitute excessive force. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the NPS Rangers on the basis of qualified immunity for the excessive force claims arising out of the Big Bend traffic stop. 2. FTCA Claims (Counts 7, 8, 9, and 10) The plaintiffs brought four claims against the United States under the FTCA arising out of the Big Bend traffic stop: assault (Count 7); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 8); false imprisonment (Count 9); and negligence (Count 10). The district court dismissed these claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The plaintiffs abandoned their appeal as to the district court’s dismissal of Count 8 by failing to argue it in its brief before this Court, thereby waiving it on appeal. See Yohey, 985 F.2d at 22425 (“[Plaintiff] has abandoned these arguments by failing to argue them in the body of his brief.”). They continue to appeal the dismissal of the assault, false imprisonment, and negligence claims. We review the district court’s dismissal of these claims de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Brown v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 647 F.3d 221, 225-26 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). a. Assault Claim The United States has waived its immunity where its law enforcement officers commit an enumerated intentional tort. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). “Liability under the FTCA is determined ‘in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.’” Villafranca v. United States, 587 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). In Texas, a person commits the 16 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 17 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 intentional tort of assault—which is identical to criminal assault—if he: “(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another . . . ; (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury . . .; or (3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01 (Vernon 2005). Texas law also provides a “civil privilege defense.” The statute provides, in pertinent part, that a “peace officer . . . is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search . . . if: the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful . . . ; and before using force, the actor . . . identifies himself as a peace officer.” Id. § 9.51(a). The Texas Penal Code defines “peace officer” as “a person elected, employed, or appointed as a peace officer under Article 2.12, Code of Criminal Procedure or 51.214, Education Code, or other law.” Id. § 1.07(a)(36) (emphasis added). Federal officers are peace officers for the purpose of the Texas criminal assault statute and its civil privilege defense. See Villafranca, 587 F.3d at 264 (“[W]e hold that the Government can invoke [the civil privilege defense] for its law enforcement officers as well.”). Therefore, federal law enforcement officers, including the NPS Rangers, are protected by the Texas civil privilege defense. See 16 U.S.C. § 1a-6(b) (providing that NPS rangers “shall maintain law and order and protect persons and property within areas of the National Park System,” and authorizing such rangers to carry firearms, make arrests, execute warrants, and conduct investigations in furtherance of their duties). For the defense to apply, the NPS Rangers must have “reasonably believe[d] the force [was] immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51(a). As we have already 17 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 18 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 established, the NPS Rangers’ use of force against Davila, Duarte, and Davila’s grandson was reasonable, given the totality of circumstances of the traffic stop. b. False Imprisonment Claim Neither is the government liable under the FTCA for the NPS Rangers’ actions in detaining the plaintiffs during the Big Bend traffic stop. Under Texas law, “[t]he elements of false imprisonment are (1) willful detention, (2) without consent, and (3) without authority of law.” Martinez v. English, 267 S.W.3d 521, 529 (Tex. App. 2008) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002)). Therefore, an officer acting with the authority of law does not commit false imprisonment. The district court correctly determined that the NPS Rangers acted with authority of law. The NPS Rangers are federal agents who are authorized by the government to: (1) carry firearms and make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in his presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony, provided such arrests occur within that system or the person to be arrested is fleeing therefrom to avoid arrest; (2) execute any warrant or other process issued by a court or officer of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of the provisions of any Federal law or regulation issued pursuant to law arising out of an offense committed in that system or, where the person subject to the warrant or process is in that system, in connection with any Federal offense; and (3) conduct investigations of offenses against the United States committed in that system in the absence of investigation thereof by any other Federal law enforcement agency having investigative jurisdiction over the offense committed or with the concurrence of such other agency. 16 U.S.C. § 1a-6(b). The NPS Rangers responded reasonably after receiving a BOLO that Davila’s vehicle was associated with and may have contained a 18 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 19 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 fugitive who had previously assaulted border patrol agents. They did not overstep their constitutional bounds, and were acting within the authority of law as stipulated in § 1a-6(b). Because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the NPS Rangers committed the intentional tort of false imprisonment, the district court correctly dismissed this claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.