Opinion ID: 2542673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Sexual Assault Statutes

Text: Finally, for the first time on appeal, Hicks contends that: The sexual assault statutes are unconstitutional because they permit conviction of sex offense without any proof of sexual intent. All criminal convictions require proof of state of mind. See HRS § 702-204 [(1993) [6] ]. Sexual Assault in the Third Degree requires only knowing sexual contact. [7] Most troubling is that sexual contact is defined merely as contact with the body parts associated with sex, there is no statutory requirement of sexual purpose, gratification or intent. In other words, Hicks argues that the legislature should have drafted the sexual contact statute more narrowly to require proof of sexual intent, sexual purpose or sexual gratification and that, because it failed to do so, the statute is unconstitutional. Specifically, Hicks, directing this court to the exclusions in the text of Alaska's sexual contact definition statute, [8] asserts that Alaska's sexual contact definition has survived constitutional challenge because of its attempt to proscribe only conduct which is sexual in nature. Hicks, thus, implies that Hawaii's definition of sexual contact would have been struck down by the Alaska court as unconstitutional. Accordingly, Hicks maintains that Hawaii's sexual assault statutes are unconstitutionally overbroad because the scheme punishes an excessively broad range of conduct under the banner of sexual assault in violation of due process rights of [Hicks] and others. Generally, the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal. State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150, 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990) (citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 423 P.2d 438 (1967)). Specifically, this court has held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Tin Yan, 44 Haw. 370, 355 P.2d 25 (1960). However, in cases where we have considered the constitutionality of a statute raised for the first time on appeal, we have done so on the ground that the constitutionality of the statute is of great public import and justice required that we consider the issue. See, e.g., Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Smith v. Smith, 56 Haw. 295, 535 P.2d 1109 (1975). State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584, 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992). [I]n the exercise of this discretion[,] an appellate court should determine whether the consideration of the issue requires additional facts, whether the resolution of the question will affect the integrity of the findings of fact of the trial court[,] and whether the question is of great public import. State v. Kapela, 82 Hawai`i 381, 392 n. 4, 922 P.2d 994, 1005 n. 4 (App.1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (first set of brackets in original). Although Hicks concedes that the constitutionality issue is raised for the first time on appeal, he contends, without more, that such does not make the issue unreviewable, citing Kapela. Although this court's consideration of the constitutionality of the sexual assault statutes would not (1) require additional facts or (2) affect the integrity of any factual findings of the trial court, we have considered the constitutionality of HRS § 707-700 on the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth, holding that the subject statute is not unconstitutionally vague because the definition of sexual contact is crystal clear. State v. Richie, 88 Hawai`i 19, 31-32, 960 P.2d 1227, 1239-40 (1998); see also State v. Kalani, 108 Hawai`i 279, 288, 118 P.3d 1222, 1231 (2005). As such, we decline to address Hicks' constitutional challenge. However, even if we were to conclude that the question present is of great public import, Hicks' argument  as demonstrated below  lacks merit. Preliminarily, we note that, with the exception to statutes that create suspect classifications, [e]very enactment of the Hawai`i Legislature is presumptively constitutional, and the party challenging a statute has the burden of showing the alleged unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bui, 104 Hawai`i 462, 466, 92 P.3d 471, 475 (2004) (citation, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted). In Richie, the defendant contended that his conviction of promoting prostitution in the second degree should be reversed because the definition of sexual contact was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 88 Hawai`i at 31, 960 P.2d at 1239. As previously stated, this court held that the subject statute is not unconstitutionally vague because the definition of sexual contact is crystal clear: The statute establishes a bright-line rule, which in laypersons' terms can be summarized as: You can look but you can't touch. This definition gives the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited. It also constitutes an explicit standard that avoids arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and is not subjective. Id. at 31-32, 960 P.2d at 1239-40. However, the Richie court recognized that [t]he doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct as well as unprotected conduct is included in its proscriptions. Id. at 32, 960 P.2d at 1240 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In that case, the defendant specifically argued that the constitutionally protected conduct infringed upon by the definition of sexual contact was nude dancing. Id. This court nonetheless rejected the argument, holding that nothing in the definition of sexual contact in HRS § 707-700 prohibits nude dancing per se. Individuals are not prevented from dancing in the nude. The conduct prohibited is the touching of sexual or intimate parts. Thus, the statute still permits dancing in the nude and allows customers to look at performers dancing in the nude; what the customers cannot do is touch the performers. Id. (emphases in original). The defendant then argued overbreadth by raising extreme and patently absurd examples, i.e., contending that dance instructors, fashion designers, tailors, and even Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny could be prosecuted under the definition of sexual contact. Id. This court responded: In reviewing a penal statute, we accord it a limited and reasonable interpretation in order to preserve its overall purpose and to avoid absurd results. [The defendant's] attempt to apply HRS § 707-700 to extreme and absurd situations is not sufficient to render it unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. (ellipsis omitted). In Kalani, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault by kissing a nine-year-old girl and inserting his tongue into her mouth. 108 Hawai`i at 281, 118 P.3d at 1224. On appeal, the defendant argued that, if this court allows the definition of `sexual and other intimate parts' to be broadened to include parts of the body not commonly associated with sexual relations, such as the mouth, tongue, hair, neck, shoulders, back and waist, the definition of `sexual contact' will no longer be crystal clear. Id. at 287, 118 P.3d at 1230 (some internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The court, however, rejected the defendant's contention, reasoning that the defendant had not established that a person of ordinary intelligence would not know that his conduct constituted sexual contact and, thus, failed to demonstrate that HRS § 707-700 is unconstitutionally vague with respect to his conduct. Id. at 288, 118 P.3d at 1231. Here, Hicks has not demonstrated that the sexual assault statutes are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad with respect to his conduct. The sole basis of Hicks' challenge is his citation to Alaska's sexual contact definition statute. However, the difference between Alaska's definition statute and Hawaii's definition statute does not somehow render Hawaii's sexual assault statutes unconstitutional. Accordingly, Hicks has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual assault statutes under which he was convicted are unconstitutional as applied to his conduct.