Opinion ID: 1057781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Verdict Amendment

Text: Rule 1:8 provides in pertinent part that [n]o amendments shall be made to any pleading after it is filed save by leave of court and that [l]eave to amend shall be liberally granted in furtherance of the ends of justice. Rule 3:25 provides in pertinent part that [a] party seeking to recover attorney's fees shall include a demand therefor and that [t]he failure of a party to file a demand as required by this rule constitutes a waiver by the party of the claim for attorney's fees, unless leave to file an amended pleading seeking attorney's fees is granted under Rule 1:8. Lawlor attached the Severance Agreement to his Second Amended Complaint. Rule 1:4(i) provides: The mention in a pleading of an accompanying exhibit shall, of itself and without more, make such exhibit a part of the pleading. In his complaint, Lawlor alleged a breach of the Severance Agreement in Count III, and in his prayer for relief, he requested attorneys' fees. It is undisputed that both parties agreed to wait until after trial on the merits to litigate the issue of attorneys' fees. ORC contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Lawlor to amend his complaint to include a more 28 specific reference to the Severance Agreement, which was the basis for Lawlor's fee request. ORC argues that under this Court's holding in Powell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 Va. 464, 344 S.E.2d 916 (1986), post-verdict amendments are not permitted. The trial court in this case determined that Powell's restriction on post-verdict amendments did not apply because the parties were not post-verdict on attorney fees. While we disagree with the trial court's determination that the attorneys' fee issue was not post-verdict, we hold that in the context of this case, it was not an abuse of discretion to permit recovery of attorneys' fees. A review of ORC's brief illuminates the real issue. ORC states, [f]or while Lawlor's counsel had disclosed before trial that he planned to seek fees under Count 3, he failed to disclose that he would seek fees for all of the other counts, even if he lost them. ORC's admission reveals that an amendment on this issue was unnecessary regarding claims for attorneys' fees under Count III, but may have been necessary to cover additional fees under an expanded theory under Delaware law characterized by Lawlor as an all or nothing recovery. Because we reject Lawlor's theory regarding expanded recovery of legal fees, he is left with recovery only under Count III, a 29 claim that ORC admits was properly identified at trial. See Part II.F.iii., infra.