Opinion ID: 782204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admission of Echevarria's Out of Court Statements

Text: 40 Although the Sixth Amendment generally bars the admission of out-of-court statements without an opportunity for cross-examination, see Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), the Supreme Court has also recognized that in limited circumstances, a defendant's intentional misconduct can constitute a waiver of his Confrontation Clause right. 6 See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (defendant waives his right to be present at his trial if he engages in disruptive and disrespectful behavior requiring his removal from the courtroom). Although it is clear that one can waive Sixth Amendment protections, the boundaries of the waiver rule are not well established. See John R. Kroger, THE CONFRONTATION WAIVER RULE, 76 B.U.L. Rev. 835, 870-77 (1996) (noting that the confrontation waiver rule implicates six major legal issues that each court must resolve, and noting that four of these issues provoke sharp disagreement among the federal circuits). This court, as well as a majority of our sister circuits, have applied the waiver-by-misconduct rule in cases where the defendant has wrongfully procured a witness's silence through threats, actual violence or murder. See, e.g., U.S. v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (collecting cases). With specific regard to the admission of out-of-court statements, the Supreme Court has held that the Clause permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the defendant's inability to confront the declarant at trial. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). 41 Petitioner challenges the admission of Echevarria's out-of-court statements on three separate grounds. First, he claims that the trial court's determination that petitioner procured Echevarria's unavailability by intimidating him constituted a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the Sirois hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Second, he argues that the determination of the trial court that he waived his right to confront Echevarria on the substance of the out-of-court statements was an unreasonable interpretation of the bounds of Supreme Court doctrine concerning the right of cross-examination — in other words, an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Finally, he argues that the admission of hearsay statements lacking particularized guarantees of trustworthiness was contrary to the clearly established law set forth by the Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 42 A. Was the determination that Cotto procured Echevarria's unavailability an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented? 43 As recounted above, the evidence presented at the Sirois hearing consisted of the testimony of the following witnesses: Officer Vargas, Detective Quinones, Echevarria, Echevarria's mother, Miriam, and Echevarria's sister, Opelita. In addition, the government introduced the two voice-mail messages to the lead prosecutor left by Echevarria on the eve of his testimony. Officers Vargas and Quinones testified to Echevarria's statements at the previous week's trial preparation sessions, as well as their conversations with Echevarria and his family about the alleged threats. Echevarria's mother also testified that her daughter had informed her about being stopped on the street and asked about her brother's testimony, but Echevarria's sister and Echevarria himself denied that any threats were made. 44 In its written opinion following the Sirois hearing, the trial court concluded: I credit the testimony of Vargas, Quinones and Miriam Echevarria as being consistent with both the objective evidence and the common sense inferences which arise from it, and [as] thoroughly consistent with one another's testimony in every essential detail. Cotto, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 793. The trial court went on to discredit the testimony of Anthony Echevarria and his sister Opelita as inconsistent with the other evidence. Id. at 793-94. 45 The trial court based its determination that threats were made to Echevarria's family and that, as a result, Echevarria changed his testimony and became unavailable to the People due to intimidation that was either initiated or approved by defendant, on a thorough set of findings of fact entitled to deference on federal habeas review. Id. at 796. Specifically, the trial court heard the voicemail messages left for the prosecutor by Echevarria expressing an unwillingness to testify, and concluded that the panic in his voice in itself renders incredible Echevarria's proffered reasons for expressing concern for his family. Id. at 795. After observing Echevarria at the hearing, the trial court indicated that he appeared to be anxious, uncomfortable and forced in his responses, a demeanor inconsistent with truthfulness and consistent with a state of mind demonstrating a fear of harm to his family or to himself if he should testify against Richard Cotto. Id. at 794. 46 In concluding that the threats were traceable to Cotto, the court found that Cotto had the opportunity to arrange for Echevarria's intimidation because he was out on bail both prior to and during the trial. Id. at 795. The court also relied on: (1) the timing of the threats, coming immediately after it was revealed that Echevarria would testify against Cotto; (2) the conclusion that defendant was the only person who stood to benefit if Echevarria refused to testify; and (3) Cotto's alleged threat to Echevarria immediately after the murder, as recounted to the police by Echevarria — as circumstantial evidence of Cotto's involvement in the threats. Id. at 795-96. 47 The dissenting judges in the New York Court of Appeals voiced concern that Cotto could be deemed to have waived his constitutional right to confront Echevarria on the statements based on vague allegations of `word on the street.' Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 84, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. Indeed, de novo review might well lead to the conclusion that even if Echevarria and his family were sincerely afraid, the relatively weak evidence connecting Cotto to the intimidation of Echevarria's family was insufficient to permit the admission of the out-of-court statements. Nonetheless, the degree of deference mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires a different conclusion. 48 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the fact-findings of the trial court are subject to a presumption of correctness, a presumption that is particularly important when reviewing the trial court's assessment of witness credibility. See Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2001). As the Court of Appeals noted in upholding the trial court's determination, the credibility clash presented at the hearing has been resolved by findings of the Trial Judge (who observed the witnesses) — affirmed by the Appellate Division — that the People's evidence was credible, the contrary evidence not. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 76, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. On habeas review, the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Given the extremely narrow scope of our review, we cannot reverse the trial court's finding that Cotto was behind the intimidation of Echevarria as an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 49 B. Was the determination that Cotto forfeited his Confrontation Clause and hearsay objections to the out-of-court statements an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law? 50 Petitioner also claims that the determination of the trial court, as upheld by the New York Court of Appeals, that he had waived his Confrontation Clause and hearsay objections to the out-of-court statements constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Specifically, petitioner argues that the state court unreasonably extended the forfeiture-by-misconduct principle to a new context where it should not apply. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). 7 We disagree, and reject his claim. 51 First, the state court's application of this principle here is not at all an extension to a new context. Indeed, witness intimidation is the paradigmatic example of the type of misconduct that can lead to the forfeiture of confrontation rights. See, e.g., Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 651 (collecting cases). 52 Second, petitioner's claim that the state court unreasonably applied the caselaw on the evidence required to support a finding of forfeiture also must fail. Petitioner argues that the evidence in this case is considerably less direct than that previously deemed sufficient to constitute a forfeiture of confrontation rights in prior cases by this court and other circuits. See U.S. v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1982) (prosecution produced tape recordings in which defendant threatened murdered witness); U.S. v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.1992) (prosecution introduced a letter with defendant's fingerprints telling the witness to lie; witness also confirmed that defendants had threatened him); U.S. v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 815 (2d Cir.1994) (informant testified that defendants had personally ordered witness's murder); see also U.S. v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278 (1st Cir.1996), aff'g in relevant part, U.S. v. Houlihan, 887 F.Supp. 352, 363-65 (D.Mass.1995) (informant testified that defendants had offered him money to kill potential witness), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1118, 117 S.Ct. 963, 136 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997); U.S. v. White, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 960, 118 S.Ct. 390, 139 L.Ed.2d 305 (1997) (eyewitness testified that she saw defendant and co-conspirator kill witness). 53 Petitioner's argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence does have some force. Certainly, confrontation rights may only be waived by a defendant through a knowing and intentional relinquishment. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 651 (quoting Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279); cf. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) (There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But there is no Supreme Court caselaw definitively establishing the circumstances sufficient, or the standard of proof applicable, in analyzing waiver cases under the Confrontation Clause. Cf. Fed. R.Evid. 804(b)(6) Advisory Committee's Notes to 1997 amendment (Every circuit that has resolved the question has recognized the principle of forfeiture by misconduct, although the tests for determining whether there is a forfeiture have varied.) (citing cases). And petitioner offers no compelling reason why the evidence of intentional relinquishment cannot be circumstantial, as was the case here. 54 In fact, our own circuit's requirement on the standard of proof applicable at a federal Mastrangelo hearing — that the government prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant procured the witness's unavailability — is actually less stringent than the New York standard, which requires a showing of intimidation by clear and convincing evidence. Compare Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272 (preponderance of the evidence standard) with Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d at 362, 625 N.Y.S.2d 469, 649 N.E.2d 817 (clear and convincing standard). 55 Finally, the objectively unreasonable standard of § 2254(d)(1) means that petitioner must identify some increment of incorrectness beyond error. See Fuller v. Gorczyk, 273 F.3d 212, 219 (2d Cir. 2001); Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.2000). Given the extensive federal precedent recognizing that the admission of out-of-court statements is appropriate when a defendant has intimidated a witness, and the absence of clearly established Supreme Court law limiting the circumstances that constitute forfeiture by misconduct, we cannot conclude that the New York Court of Appeals' determination was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. 56 C. Did the statements bear sufficient indicia of reliability? 57 Petitioner also argues that the admission of Echevarria's statements violates the clearly established Supreme Court holding of Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), because Echevarria's statements lacked indicia of reliability. In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the state bears the burden of proving that hearsay statements bear sufficient indicia of reliability to withstand scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 816, 110 S.Ct. 3139. Following Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1990), the Court explained that the indicia of reliability requirement is met in either of two circumstances: where the hearsay statement `falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,' or where it is supported by `a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Id (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). 58 In Dhinsa, we held, however, that a defendant who engages in misconduct waives any Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of hearsay testimony from a witness whose unavailability was procured by the defendant. See Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 655. Nonetheless, relying on our decision in Aguiar, petitioner argues that the due process clause independently protects against the admission of unreliable hearsay statements even when any Confrontation Clause challenge has been waived. See Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47 ([w]e may assume that the admission of facially unreliable hearsay would raise a due process challenge). 59 Indeed, as part of the Sirois hearing, the prosecution argued for admission on the ground that the statements had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, and the trial court agreed. The Appellate Division upheld this ruling, calling the statements highly reliable. Cotto, 240 A.D.2d at 193, 658 N.Y.S.2d 278. 60 In concluding that the statements had sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy due process, the Court of Appeals relied on the following factors: (1) Echevarria's statements were repeated only days after they had first been made, were (according to the affirmed findings) lucid and credible, and described in detail defendant's actions both before and after the shooting; (2) the statements were made on two separate occasions, and recounted in the testimony of two witnesses subject to cross-examination, thus making it unlikely that Echevarria was misunderstood; and (3) the testimony indicated that Echevarria received no special treatment from the police and had no motive to change his original story and put himself or his family at risk. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 77-78, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. The Court of Appeals' conclusion that these factors constitute sufficient indicia of reliability is properly considered a mixed question of law and fact, analyzed under the unreasonable application prong of § 2254(d)(1). Cf. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 135-37, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) (examining reliability issue in Confrontation Clause context). 61 As we explain more fully below in considering the second issue certified on appeal, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion on this third factor that Echevarria had no motive to change his original story. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the statements were sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury, as supported by the other two factors considered, is not objectively unreasonable. 62 In sum, we conclude that the determination that petitioner procured Echevarria's unavailability was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the Sirois hearing, and the legal conclusion that Echevarria's out-of-court statements should then be admitted was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.