Opinion ID: 2754957
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissions During Proffer

Text: Okeayainneh next argues that the district court erred in granting the government’s motion in limine to admit statements he made during a January 18, 2011 proffer session with the government. After he was arrested, Okeayainneh and his defense counsel met with federal agents and a federal prosecutor for a proffer session. Prior to the session, Okeayainneh reviewed a proffer letter, which included the requirement that he “respond truthfully and completely to any and all questions or inquiries that might be put to [him] at the meeting.” The letter warned Okeayainneh that “any statements made or other information provided by [him] during the meeting” could be used against him for any purpose if the government concluded he “knowingly withheld material information from the government or otherwise [had] not been completely truthful and candid.” Okeayainneh reviewed the proffer letter with his counsel, and the prosecutor also reviewed the terms of the agreement with Okeayainneh. Okeayainneh signed the letter, agreeing to its terms. While preparing for trial, the government obtained audiotapes of telephone calls that Okeayainneh made while incarcerated, which they had translated and transcribed. The telephone calls—made on January 14 and 15, 2011, just days before Okeayainneh signed the proffer letter—revealed that Okeayainneh had decided to give false information to investigators, and withhold relevant information from them during the session. In its motion in limine seeking permission to introduce Okeayainneh’s proffer statements at trial, the government asserted that Okeayainneh had breached the express terms of the agreement by providing material false information during the proffer session. After reviewing the translated transcripts, the district court allowed the use of Okeayainneh’s proffer statements, finding that he had “explicitly agreed to” the “clear and unambiguous” terms of the agreement, which entitled the government to use his statements “against him for any purpose,” if it was found he was “not truthful and/or knowingly withheld material information.” The decision of -14- the district court enforced the agreement under principles of contract law, consistent with our precedent. See United States v. Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 2008). On appeal, Okeayainneh does not directly contest that he breached the proffer agreement. Instead, he argues that he did not knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when he entered into the agreement due to “a strained relationship with counsel” and an incomplete understanding of the proffer process. While Okeayainneh presented a variation of this argument in a filing with the district court, he offered no evidence to support it. Argument is not evidence, see United States v. Fetlow, 21 F.3d 243, 248 (8th Cir. 1994), and without any evidence to support this claim, the district court did not err in admitting the statements at trial. See also United States v. McFarlane, 309 F.3d 510, 514 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining that by entering into an informal immunity agreement, “the defendant essentially gives up his right to later assert his Fifth Amendment privilege” as to the information he provided under the terms of the agreement).