Opinion ID: 1681558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adverse Possession Under the Three-Year Statute of Limitations

Text: The defendants next argue that the plaintiffs were barred from foreclosing their judgment lien because they (the defendants) had acquired full title to the land in question, thereby precluding all claims, under Article 5507, supra. The jury found that the defendant Texas Sand Company, together with its successors in title, had not held peaceable and adverse possession of the 2,031 acres in question for three years prior to the institution of this suit. The burden was upon the defendants to establish the affirmative of this issue. The evidence fails to show as a matter of law that the defendants discharged their burden of proving that they had established title under the three-year statute of limitations. The defendants argue that they proved peaceable and adverse possession by the Texas Sand Company and Flora Shield for a period of three years under title or color of title, as provided for in Article 5507, supra. We do not agree. The last transfer of record involving the land in question was the deed dated March 17, 1954, from the defendants Richard Shield and wife to the Texas Sand Company. This company was incorporated by the Shield family on February 2, 1954. Its right to do business in this state was forfeited on July 5, 1955, for failure to pay franchise taxes. On September 1, 1956, the Attorney General forfeited the company's charter for the same reason. The defendants recognize that the claimed possession exercised by the Texas Sand Company did not fulfill the requirements of the three-year statute. In fact, the person who claimed possession of the land at the time of trial was not the Texas Sand Company, but was the defendant Flora Shield. In regard to Flora Shield's claim of title by adverse possession, the uncontradicted evidence shows that the chain of transfers of the land in question does not extend to her. Any interest she had in this land passed under the conveyance of March 1, 1954. This is so because a conveyance, though fraudulent, is valid as between the parties to the conveyance. See Eckert v. Wendel, supra; Douglas v. First National Bank, 120 Tex. 631, 40 S.W.2d 801 (1931); Rutherford v. Carr, 99 Tex. 101, 87 S.W. 815 (1905). After the last transfer of record involving this 2,031 acres was made to the Texas Sand Company on March 17, 1954, no further deeds were executed. The defendants argue that it is immaterial whether or not there was a written deed from the company to Flora Shield. It is their position that she was the owner of the company, and that when its charter was forfeited, the alleged title or color of title of the company automatically transferred to Flora Shield, thereby extending the possession for the full three years. The defendants further argue that upon the dissolution of the company, the corporate assets became the property of its stockholders, in proportion to their respective shares. The defendants then conclude that since Flora Shield was the sole stockholder in Texas Sand Company, the sole question is whether the title acquired by her to the property of the company upon its dissolution constitutes title or color of title within the meaning of Article 5507, supra. The difficulty with the defendants' position, even assuming that it correctly states the law, is that the jury could reasonably believe from the evidence that Flora Shield was not the owner and sole stockholder of Texas Sand Company. In this regard, Flora Shield testified that no stock certificates were ever issued by the company; that no stock was paid for in cash; and that she did not have any evidence in writing to show her to be the owner of such stock. Elgean Shield also testified that he did not know of any stock being issued to show who owned the company and, although he stated he was the last president of the company, he did not know who owned it. The record in this case does not show, as a matter of law, that the Texas Sand Company, or its successors in title, held adverse possession of the land in question in compliance with the requirements of Article 5507.