Opinion ID: 4544387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Did Armitage Waive Statute of Limitations Defense? [4] We begin our analysis by considering Bonness’ argument that Armitage waived the statute of limitations defense. Initially, we note that nothing in our record indicates that Bonness raised this argument in the trial court, and it is thus not clear that it is properly preserved for appellate review. See, e.g., State v. Kruse, 303 Neb. 799, 808, 931 N.W.2d 148, 155 (2019) (“[a]s a general rule, an appellate court will not consider an argument or theory that is raised for the first time on appeal”). But even assuming the argument is properly before us, we find that it lacks merit for reasons we will explain. A party can waive a statute of limitations defense. See, e.g., McGill v. Lion Place Condo. Assn., 291 Neb. 70, 864 N.W.2d 642 (2015). For example, a party waives a statute of limitations defense if it fails to plead it. See id. In this case, however, Bonness concedes that Armitage did not fail to plead a statute of limitations defense. Armitage asserted in his answer to the first amended complaint that Bonness’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. And although Armitage did not file an - 754 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports BONNESS v. ARMITAGE Cite as 305 Neb. 747 answer to the second amended complaint, he filed a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. Unable to liken this case to those in which a party fails to plead a statute of limitations defense and thereby waives it, Bonness argues that Armitage waived the statute of limitations defense by not immediately moving to dismiss the first amended complaint. According to Bonness, as soon as the first amended complaint was filed, Armitage had all of the information necessary to file a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds but instead engaged in discovery for several months. This, Bonness contends, led him to believe that Armitage was defending the case solely on its merits and thus amounts to a waiver of the defense. [5] Bonness acknowledges that he is unable to direct us to any cases in which we or another court has held that a party waived a statute of limitations defense by not immediately filing a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. Instead, Bonness relies on cases in which we have discussed waiver in a general sense and said that “[o]rdinarily, to establish a waiver of a legal right, there must be a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of a party showing such a purpose, or acts amounting to an estoppel on his or her part.” See, e.g., Eagle Partners v. Rook, 301 Neb. 947, 959, 921 N.W.2d 98, 108 (2018). Bonness asserts that Armitage’s engaging in discovery after the first amended complaint was filed qualifies as a waiver under that standard. We find Bonness’ contention that Armitage waived the statute of limitations defense unsound. As we noted in recounting the standards of review applicable to this appeal, a challenge to a pleading on statute of limitations grounds is a challenge that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Carruth v. State, 271 Neb. 433, 712 N.W.2d 575 (2006). This is relevant because our rules of pleading in Nebraska state that “[a] defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under § 6‑1107(a), or by motion - 755 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports BONNESS v. ARMITAGE Cite as 305 Neb. 747 for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.” § 6‑1112(h)(2). Our rules of pleading thus make clear that a party does not waive the right to contend that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by not filing a motion under § 6‑1112(b)(6). Rather, the defense is preserved through trial. Accordingly, Armitage’s decision not to file a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint could not have amounted to an act showing an intention to waive the statute of limitations defense. Neither could it amount to an estoppel. Bonness’ estoppel theory is that he was led to believe that Armitage would not seek to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds when he did not immediately move to dismiss. For reasons we have explained, however, Bonness could not reasonably conclude from Armitage’s choice to engage in discovery that Armitage would not later seek to contend that the pleading failed to show it was filed in accordance with the statute of limitations. We see no basis to find that Armitage waived the statute of limitations defense. Was Dismissal on Statute of Limitations Grounds Proper? Having found that Armitage did not waive the statute of limitations defense, we turn to Bonness’ contention that the district court erred by dismissing the case on statute of limitations grounds. As we have discussed, a defendant may, as Armitage did here, raise the statute of limitations as part of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. If such a motion is made but the complaint does not disclose on its face that it is barred by the statute of limitations, dismissal is improper. See Lindner v. Kindig, 285 Neb. 386, 826 N.W.2d 868 (2013). However, if the face of the complaint does show that the cause of action is time barred and the plaintiff does not allege facts to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, dismissal is proper. See Chafin v. Wisconsin Province Society of Jesus, 301 Neb. 94, 917 N.W.2d 821 (2018). The - 756 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports BONNESS v. ARMITAGE Cite as 305 Neb. 747 task before us is thus to review the second amended complaint and determine whether, accepting the factual allegations therein as true, it shows that the cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that it does. There appears to be some disagreement between the parties as to whether the applicable statute of limitations is the professional negligence statute of limitations set forth in § 25‑222 or the statute of limitations in the Nebraska Hospital‑Medical Liability Act set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44‑2828 (Reissue 2010). The parties agree, however, that those statutes of limitations are identical as they relate to this case. Accordingly, we will consider the case under § 25‑222, which provides: Any action to recover damages based on alleged professional negligence or upon alleged breach of warranty in rendering or failure to render professional services shall be commenced within two years next after the alleged act or omission in rendering or failure to render professional services providing the basis for such action; Provided, if the cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such two‑year period, then the action may be commenced within one year from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier; and provided further, that in no event may any action be commenced to recover damages for professional negligence or breach of warranty in rendering or failure to render professional services more than ten years after the date of rendering or failure to render such professional service which provides the basis for the cause of action. Under the statute, an action must be commenced within 2 years of the date the limitations period began to run unless the action was not or could not reasonably be discovered within that 2‑year period, in which case, it must be commenced within 1 year after it is discovered or should be discovered. - 757 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports BONNESS v. ARMITAGE Cite as 305 Neb. 747 See Guinn v. Murray, 286 Neb. 584, 837 N.W.2d 805 (2013). As we will explain, the parties disagree in this case, both as to when the statute of limitations began to run and when Bonness discovered or reasonably could have discovered his claims against Armitage. Bonness argues that Armitage committed several isolated acts of negligence and that a separate statute of limitations period began to run upon each such act. Specifically, Bonness contends that Armitage was negligent in 2010, 2011, and 2013, when he saw Bonness, but did not perform PSA testing, did not properly interpret Bonness’ earlier PSA test results, and did not refer him to a urologist. Bonness acknowledges that under his theory, the 2‑year statute of limitations would have expired as to his claims unless § 25‑222’s discovery exception applies. But Bonness argues the discovery exception does apply. He contends that he did not discover and could not reasonably have discovered his claims until he learned his prostate cancer had recurred on June 24, 2016. He thus argues that he timely filed this action by filing it within 1 year of that date. Armitage disagrees with Bonness, as to both when the statute of limitations began to run and when he could have reasonably discovered his claims. Armitage argues that under the continuing treatment doctrine, see, e.g., Carruth v. State, 271 Neb. 433, 712 N.W.2d 575 (2006), the statute of limitations did not begin to run on Bonness’ claims until January 2015, when the professional relationship between Bonness and Armitage concluded. Based on his contention that the statute of limitations began to run in January 2015, Armitage asserts that even if Bonness is correct that he could not reasonably have discovered his claims until June 2016, his claims are nonetheless barred, because the 1‑year discovery extension does not apply if a plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered his or her claims prior to the expiration of the 2‑year statute of limitations. See, e.g., Egan v. Stoler, 265 Neb. 1, 653 N.W.2d 855 (2002). Alternatively, Armitage argues that the district - 758 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports BONNESS v. ARMITAGE Cite as 305 Neb. 747 court was correct to conclude that based on the facts alleged in the operative complaint, Bonness discovered or reasonably could have discovered his claims in January 2015, and that thus, his claims are barred even if the statute of limitations began to run as early as Bonness contends. [6‑8] We will begin our analysis by considering whether the district court was correct to conclude that under the facts alleged in the operative complaint, Bonness discovered or reasonably could have discovered his claims in January 2015, when he first learned of the presence of prostate cancer. Several principles govern when a party discovers a claim for statute of limitations purposes. “Discovery,” in the context of statutes of limitations, refers to the fact that one knows of the existence of an injury and not that one has a legal right to seek redress. Guinn v. Murray, supra. It is not necessary that a plaintiff have knowledge of the exact nature or source of the problem, but only that a problem existed. Id. In a professional negligence case, “discovery of the act or omission” occurs when the party knows of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the knowledge of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action. Id. In a cause of action for professional negligence, legal injury is the wrongful act or omission which causes the loss. Id. Legal injury is not damage; damage is the loss resulting from the misconduct. Id. Given these governing principles, we must consider what Bonness knew in January 2015 and whether a reasonable person in his position with that knowledge would have pursued an inquiry that would have led to knowledge of facts constituting the basis of his claims. The first and most obvious fact that Bonness knew at that time was that he had been diagnosed with prostate cancer. The district court seemed to conclude that Bonness had discovery of his claims based on his diagnosis alone. It reasoned that as soon as Bonness knew that he had prostate cancer, he would have known that “the treatment - 759 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports BONNESS v. ARMITAGE Cite as 305 Neb. 747 provided by [Armitage] had not been effective in precluding [Bonness’] development of prostate cancer.” Although this statement of the district court is unquestionably true, we find it does not shed much light on the question at hand. Bonness does not allege that Armitage was negligent because he failed to prevent prostate cancer; he alleges that Armitage was negligent because he should have detected prostate cancer earlier. It is not so clear to us that based on a diagnosis of a condition alone, a patient is on inquiry notice of a claim that his or her physician should have diagnosed the condition earlier. We need not, however, decide whether Bonness discovered his claims against Armitage based on a diagnosis alone. As we will discuss below, the second amended complaint disclosed that at the time of his diagnosis, Bonness was aware of other information relevant to the discovery of his claims. At the time he was diagnosed with cancer in January 2015, Bonness not only knew that he had been diagnosed, he also knew what Armitage had done and not done with respect to testing for prostate cancer before that diagnosis. As noted above, Bonness alleged that before Armitage became his doctor in 2010, he had undergone PSA testing for several years at the direction of other physicians and, on one occasion, was referred to a urologist for an elevated PSA result. Bonness alleged Armitage did not direct PSA testing for several years and represented to him in those years that PSA testing was not immediately necessary and that it was “deemed unreliable.” Bonness also alleged, however, that elevated results on PSA testing ordered by Armitage in 2014 and 2015 led to the referral of Bonness to a urologist in early 2015 and his prostate cancer diagnosis. By the time of his diagnosis, then, Bonness would have known his diagnosis occurred as a result of elevated levels on a test that he had previously received regularly at the direction of other physicians, but that Armitage had declined to perform for several years and had claimed was unreliable. - 760 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports BONNESS v. ARMITAGE Cite as 305 Neb. 747 We also note that the second amended complaint contains several other allegations regarding Bonness that suggest a person in his position would have questioned Armitage’s detection efforts as soon as a diagnosis was made. As noted above, Bonness alleged that because members of his family and friends had been diagnosed with prostate cancer, Bonness repeatedly expressed concerns to Armitage about prostate cancer and made it clear that he wanted to do whatever was necessary to detect it. In addition, in the years in which Armitage did not order PSA testing, Bonness inquired about whether testing should be performed. In our view, once Bonness was diagnosed with cancer, a reasonable person in his position would have known of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the knowledge of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action. We are not persuaded by Bonness’ argument that the fact that he was told he was cancer free following surgery in March 2015 is relevant to the discovery analysis. The fact that Bonness was told the cancer had been removed following surgery may have affected the extent of damages available for Armitage’s alleged negligence in failing to detect prostate cancer. The focus, however, in deciding when a plaintiff discovered a cause of action for statute of limitations purposes is when the plaintiff knows of the existence of an injury. See Guinn v. Murray, 286 Neb. 584, 837 N.W.2d 805 (2013). Injury, for these purposes, is the wrongful act or omission which causes the loss, not damage. See id. One need not know the extent of his or her damages to have discovery. See Gering ‑ Ft. Laramie Irr. Dist. v. Baker, 259 Neb. 840, 612 N.W.2d 897 (2000). Because we find that the face of the second amended complaint shows that Bonness discovered his claims against Armitage upon learning of his prostate cancer diagnosis in January 2015, it is not necessary for us to pinpoint exactly when the statute of limitations period began to run. Whether the statute of limitations began running in January 2015, as - 761 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports BONNESS v. ARMITAGE Cite as 305 Neb. 747 Armitage contends, or earlier, as Bonness claims, the action was not commenced within 2 years of accrual or within 1 year of discovery.