Opinion ID: 1058965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Capital Murder in the Commission of an Act of Terrorism

Text: Muhammad was also convicted of capital murder pursuant to Code ง 18.2-31(13) for the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Dean Meyers in the commission of an act of terrorism as defined in Code ง 18.2-46.4. Code ง 18.2-46.4 defines an act of terrorism as an act of violence as defined in clause (i) of subdivision A of ง 19.2-297.1 committed with the intent to (i) intimidate the civilian population at large; or (ii) influence the conduct or activities of the government of the United States, a state or locality through intimidation. Code ง 19.2-297.1 includes, among the acts of violence the offenses of first and second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, malicious wounding, and robbery. Additionally, Code ง 18.2-18 provides that a person convicted of capital murder under Code ง 18.2-31(13) is not required to be a principal in the first degree to the murder if the killing was pursuant to the direction or order of the one who is engaged in the commission of . . . an act of terrorism. Significantly, Muhammad does not contest the sufficiency of evidence to support the charge that acts of violence committed by him and Malvo were done with the intent to intimidate the civilian population at large or to influence the conduct or activities of the government of the United States, a state or locality through intimidation. Rather, he challenges his conviction for capital murder based upon the terrorism predicate by attacking the validity of the statute, constitutionally and otherwise, and by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that he directed or ordered Malvo with respect to the killing of Dean Meyers. We will consider Muhammad's challenge to the validity of the statute elsewhere in this opinion. The Commonwealth argues that the evidence is sufficient to support two separate evidentiary theories upon which Muhammad's conviction for capital murder in the commission of an act of terrorism is based. One theory is based upon Muhammad committing the murder of Dean Meyers as a principal in the first degree because he is an immediate perpetrator of the crime. The second evidentiary theory is based upon Muhammad giving a direction or order to Malvo to kill Dean Meyers. Either or both theories are sufficient to sustain the proof necessary to affirm Muhammad's conviction for capital murder in the commission of an act of terrorism. As stated above, the proof is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Muhammad acted as a principal in the first degree, as an immediate perpetrator, in the death of Dean Meyers. The sniper theory advanced by the Commonwealth is supported through Spicer's expert testimony, the ample evidence of such a methodology, and our prior decisions. As an immediate perpetrator of the death of Dean Meyers in a murder that qualifies as an act of violence under Code ง 19.2-297.1, Muhammad was a principal in the first degree in the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of [a] person . . . in the commission . . . of an act of terrorism. Code ง 18.2-31(13). Additionally, the combined weight of direct and circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain Muhammad's conviction even if he is considered to have been a criminal actor in the second degree who gave an order or direction to Malvo to kill Dean Meyers. Malvo and Muhammad were seen in the Caprice in the vicinity of Meyers' shooting approximately one hour beforehand. The Caprice was the same vehicle in which Muhammad and Malvo were arrested. It was altered to provide access to the trunk from the inside and a portal for firing a rifle through the trunk lid. Muhammad was interviewed by police immediately after the shooting in a parking lot across the street from where Meyers was shot. Malvo was not seen at the parking lot. There was a direct line of fire between the parking lot and the Sunoco station where Meyers was shot. Between the parking lot and the site where Meyers was shot were nine traffic lanes. The evidence shows that Malvo and Muhammad possessed the .223 caliber Bushmaster rifle, mittens with open fingers, a GPS receiver, earplugs, maps, rifle scopes, walkie-talkies, a voice recorder, an electronic organizer, and other evidence previously described. The evidence proves that the bullet that killed Dean Meyers came from the .223 caliber Bushmaster rifle in the possession of Muhammad and Malvo when they were arrested. The evidence also contains direct or circumstantial proof of instances where the two men committed similar crimes together. Muhammad and Malvo were seen nearby in the Caprice immediately before the murder of Dean Meyers. Only Muhammad was seen immediately afterward. The weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that either Muhammad or Malvo fired the fatal shot that killed Dean Meyers. If it was Muhammad, he is a principal in the first degree, with or without the sniper theory advanced by the Commonwealth. The evidence more reasonably proves that Malvo was the shooter and was in the converted trunk when Muhammad was interviewed in the parking lot immediately after the murder. The circumstances of this murder are consistent with the expert testimony concerning a two-man sniper team. As Spicer testified, the spotter sets up the shot at a position safe from view yet within range of the target. In this case, the relatively limited range of the shooter in the trunk of the car requires split-second timing to successfully hit a target that quickly comes into range and just as quickly moves out of range. This abbreviated window of opportunity is made all the more difficult by nine lanes of traffic passing between the shooter and the target. According to Spicer, the job of the spotter is to communicate with the shooter, give the order or direction, and then to provide an undetected getaway. Furthermore, the record is replete with evidence that Muhammad directed and ordered Malvo in the entire criminal enterprise. As the Commonwealth argued based upon evidence presented: It was Muhammad who brought Malvo to this country from Jamaica. It was Muhammad who had the military background in shooting and snipering skills and who trained Malvo. It was Muhammad who provided the weapons. It was Muhammad who was determined to terrorize his ex-wife's area of the country. It was Muhammad who was the father and Malvo who was the son. All the evidence about their relationship โ from the Lighthouse Mission and friends in Washington state to Muhammad's cousin in Baton Rouge and the YMCA personnel in Maryland โ consistently showed Muhammad directing and ordering Malvo's conduct. Everyone who saw them together observed that Malvo was extremely obedient to Muhammad, not the other way around. On this issue, the trial court held that there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence regarding [Muhammad's] direction and ordering of Mr. Malvo. Upon review of the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly wrong or without evidence to support this conclusion. Powell, 268 Va. at 236, 602 S.E.2d at 120-21. We hold that Muhammad was an immediate perpetrator and as such was a principal in the first degree in the commission of capital murder during the commission of an act of terrorism. We further hold that the evidence proves that Muhammad gave a direction or order sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Code ง 18.2-18 such that even if he were a criminal actor ordinarily demonstrating culpability as a principal in the second degree, he is nonetheless guilty of capital murder under Code งง 18.2-31(13) and 18.2-18.
Muhammad maintains that it was error for the trial court to give Instructions 5 and 6 and to refuse his Instructions K and M. (Assignments of Error 67, 68, 72, 74). Assignment of error 68 regarding instruction 6 has been waived for failure to brief the issue. Upon review of the evidence and the instruction, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting instruction 5. With respect to Muhammad's proffered instructions K and M, he states in his brief only that they properly addressed the terrorism issues. There is no argument concerning why it would be error to refuse them in light of the other instructions given. We will not consider this argument. Rule 5:17(c).