Opinion ID: 844221
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alleged Section 654 Violation

Text: Section 654's subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. Defendant argues that the trial court violated that provision's prohibition against multiple sentences for a single act or course of conduct, by imposing a death sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive 25-year-to-life term for the felony assault conviction. According to defendant, he formed the intent to kill Gordon before he ever assaulted her, and therefore any assaultive behavior that could possibly support his felony assault conviction (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) [assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury]) was done in an effort to kill Gordon. As suchdefendant assertshis murder and felony assault convictions were necessarily based on the same indivisible course of conduct, and under section 654, he can only be sentenced for one of the two. (See People v. Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784, 789 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 469, 863 P.2d 714].) Although defendant did not make this argument in the trial court, we will consider it on the merits. (See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354, fn. 17 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040] [§ 654 error results in an `unauthorized' sentence and hence is reviewable on appeal even if not raised in the trial court].) A trial court's express or implied determination that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives, must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730-731 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640].) Here, in sentencing defendant for both the murder and the assault, the trial court expressly concluded that the murder of Gordon was separate from defendant's earlier assault on her. The court said: Count III, which is assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, that actually is a separate incident. It was before the kidnapping and before the homicide.  (Italics added.) Substantial evidence supports that conclusion. As we pointed out earlier when addressing defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping special circumstance (pt. II.A., ante ), defendant might not have finalized his intent to kill Gordon at the time of the assault. Notwithstanding his boastful statements to Uele and Myers, if he had truly intended to kill Gordon from the first moment he assaulted her, he could have done so without first driving her 16 miles. Here, there was enough evidence from which the trial court could conclude, as it did, that defendant arrived at his final decision to kill Gordon after the assault. Accordingly, we find no error.