Opinion ID: 763759
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Millet

Text: 81 Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence revealed that in late 1993 and early 1994, Millet had several telephone conversations while in federal prison with Jose Rodriguez (J.Rodriguez), the then-Regional Commander of the Latin Kings in New Haven. J. Rodriguez reported in general terms that he suspected that a Latin King member was providing information about the gang's activities to New Haven police officers. Millet responded by encouraging J. Rodriguez to impose discipline upon the suspected informant. J. Rodriguez testified that these conversations led to the beating of Jose Garcia. 82 A New Haven police officer testified that he saw Garcia in January 1994 with bruises on his face and body and that Garcia did not want to speak with the officer. Despite J. Rodriguez's suspicions and the beat down, Garcia was not, in fact, an informant. 83 At the time of Millet's conversations with J. Rodriguez, there was an extensive federal investigation underway of the Latin Kings. The investigation was being conducted by a task force which included the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Connecticut State Police, as well as the New Haven and Bridgeport Police Departments. 84 Nonetheless, Millet asserts that the government did not introduce any evidence that he or J. Rodriguez had any indication that federal authorities were investigating Latin King activities, despite the fact that conversations between Millet and J. Rodriguez were tape-recorded by the government while Millet was being held in federal prison in California. Millet therefore argues that the government failed to satisfy the federal jurisdictional element of § 1512(b)(3) because (1) Garcia was not actually providing information to any law enforcement, let alone federal officers; and (2) Millet only intended to prevent Garcia from speaking with local, rather than federal law enforcement officers. These arguments are without merit. 85 In deciding whether there is a lack of federal jurisdictional nexus, our starting point must be the language of the statute itself. Section 1512(b)(3) makes it unlawful to use physical force with intent to ... hinder, delay or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer ... of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense. Subsection (a)(4) of 18 U.S.C. § 1515 defines a law enforcement officer as an officer or employee of the Federal Government, or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Government. Section 1512(f) notes that no state of mind [of the defendant] need be proved with respect to the circumstance ... that the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Government. 86 As to Millet's first contention, under the plain language § 1512(b)(3), it is irrelevant whether Garcia actually contemplated going to law enforcement. The statute's reference to intent to ... hinder, delay or prevent the communication reaches potential informants. See United States v. Romero, 54 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir.1984)). Likewise, the plain language of § 1512(f) makes it irrelevant that Millet only intended to prevent Garcia from speaking with local, rather than federal, law enforcement officers. Section 1512(f) expressly does not require that the government prove a defendant's state of mind with respect to the federal character of the law enforcement officer. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f); United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1054 (2d Cir.1991). Rather, as the Third Circuit found in United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 447, 139 L.Ed.2d 383 (1997), the statute mandates that: 87 [T]he government must prove that at least one of the law-enforcement-officer communications which the defendant sought to prevent would have been with a federal officer, but that the government is not obligated to prove that the defendant knew or intended anything with respect to this federal involvement.... [T]he government may carry this burden by showing that the conduct which the defendant believed would be discussed in these communications constitutes a federal offense, so long as the government also presents additional appropriate evidence. 88 Id. at 1349 (quoting United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 918 (3d Cir.1996)). Although Bell concerns subsection (a)(1)(C) of § 1512, we conclude that its reasoning applies here as well because the elements of subsection (b)(3) are similar to the elements of subsection (a)(1)(C). See United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir.1997) (comparing § 1512(b)(1) to § 1512(a)(1)(C)). 89 In this case, the government presented sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude (1) that Millet intended to prevent Garcia from communicating with local police because he feared that Garcia would provide information on the Latin Kings' racketeering activities, which clearly constitute federal offenses; (2) that Millet knew federal authorities could record his telephone conversations with J. Rodriguez; and (3) at the time of these conversations, federal authorities were in fact working closely with local police on a massive federal investigation of the gang's drug activities. Therefore, we find that a jury could reasonably have inferred from this evidence that if the potential informant communicated with the local police concerning Latin King activities constituting federal offenses, at least one of his communications would have been with a federal law enforcement officer. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to satisfy the federal jurisdictional element of § 1512(b)(3).