Opinion ID: 2979084
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presence of a child at the Residence

Text: Adams argues that the variance imposed by the district court was substantively unreasonable because the district court afforded too much weight to the presence of a child at the Residence. Adams asserts that because his calculated total offense level already included a two-level increase for the presence of a child at the Residence, and his crime was “not particularly egregious[,]” it was inappropriate for the district court to give significant weight to this factor. This argument fails, however, because a court does not attach unreasonable weight to a factor merely because it considers it both under the advisory Guidelines and in connection with the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Hope, 167 F. App’x 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a substantive reasonableness challenge to a sentence based on invalidity of “double counting” the threat of violence presented by defendant in both the mandatory minimum sentence and the § 3553(a) likelihood of recidivism and danger to public factors). Moreover, Adams asserts that his crime was not egregious, and takes issue with the fact that the district court did not explain why this case differs from mainstream child-presence cases, thereby warranting a sentence greater than that contemplated by the Guidelines. However, although Adams asserts that his behavior was not egregious, the facts of this case are disturbing. Here, Adams was not merely storing methamphetamine at the child’s residence, he also stored the ingredients and equipment used to make methamphetamine at the Residence, and methamphetamine residue was found on a child’s toy in the Residence. Adams admitted the “one pot” reactor was sitting next to the door the child used to enter and exit the Residence on a daily basis. Furthermore, the children 11 may have had access to the ingredients used to manufacture methamphetamine. The district court determined that the drug was particularly dangerous, and the children were “actually exposed to the drug and/or its residue.” (Sentencing Tr. 19:13–14.) The district court recognized that Adams consistently stated that he never manufactured methamphetamine in the Residence; however, it also noted that there were a number of items present at the Residence that were consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine therein. These items included the “one pot” cooker and a gallon bottle of ammonia. The district court stated that the child’s presence was the factor that increased the seriousness of the offense and made the case “stand out[.]” (Id. at 19:5.) It was not unreasonable for the district court to conclude that the actual presence of methamphetamine residue on the toys and the children’s exposure to the drug or its residue made this case more serious than a case involving the drugs that were stored in a residence without resultant exposure to children residing therein. The district court did not give unreasonable weight to this factor. 3. Provision of medical, educational, and correctional treatment Adams also argues the district court afforded too much weight to the time needed to provide him with medical, educational, and corrections treatment. Adams asserts that this factor does not warrant a higher sentence because the drug program in which he will enroll lasts only eighteen months, a time period that does not exceed a within-Guidelines sentence. But Adams does not suggest that the district court’s variance was imposed solely to enable Adams to receive substanceabuse treatment. Cf. United States v. Yopp, 453 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that where the sole purpose of sentence was to provide mental health and substance-abuse treatment, it was substantively unreasonable to sentence defendant to twenty-four months because the 500-hour drug 12 treatment program could be finished in nine months). Instead, Adams argues that the “sentence should not be increased based on his need for [medical and educational] treatment.” (Br. for Def.- Appellant 21.) This argument fails because Adams’ argument that the drug-treatment program does not take [sixty] months to complete translates into an argument that his sentence should be only as long as the drugtreatment program takes to fulfill. The district court’s concerns with the public’s protection and with [Adams’] criminal record are not adequately addressed by a fivehundred hour drug treatment program. United States v. Bailey, 488 F.3d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 2007). The district court placed great weight on Adams’ need for substance-abuse treatment and vocational training; it stated that it intended the sentence to provide “opportunities to improve [Adams’] life and to break this cycle that [he has] been in[.]” (Sentencing Tr. 26:6–8.) However, as in Bailey, the district court also cited numerous other § 3553(a) factors that suggested additional incarceration was necessary. Accordingly, Adams has not provided us with any evidence that the district court “‘fail[ed] to examine the full spectrum of information on the record before it relating to that factor.’” Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d at 638 (quoting Hughes, 283 F. App’x at 351). Adams has not shown that the district court afforded an unreasonable amount of weight to this factor.