Opinion ID: 2586281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted Error in Refusal to Instruct on Voluntary Manslaughter as to Mary Magoon

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the voluntary manslaughter of Mary Magoon as a lesser included offense of murder, on the theory that her killing was committed either in sudden quarrel/heat of passion or in unreasonable self-defense. Defendant claims the court's failure to so instruct deprived him of his due process right to have the jury determine every material issue the evidence presented. Defendant again points to Mary Magoon's alleged propensity for violence and claims that her alleged role in the family business may have led defendant to believe she was going for a weapon in the bathroom when killed. Defendant asserts that this evidence supports a voluntary manslaughter instruction because it was sufficient to deserve consideration by the jury, and a reasonable jury could find it sufficiently persuasive to warrant a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. We disagree. `Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice [Citation.]' ( People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 102, 24 Cal. Rptr.3d 507,105 P.3d 1099, quoting ง 192.) Even though a court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues the evidence raises, [a] court is not obligated to instruct sua sponte on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense in the absence of substantial evidence that the defendant acted in a `sudden quarrel or heat of passion' (ง 192, subd. (a)), or that the defendant killed in ``unreasonable self-defense.'' [Citation.] ( Benavides, at p. 102, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099.) There was no evidence that the killing of Mary Magoon involved sudden quarrel/heat of passion or unreasonable self-defense, and therefore no support for a voluntary manslaughter instruction.