Opinion ID: 628601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Definition of Removal

Text: 41 Given our conclusion that a removal is a removal whether it is undertaken pursuant to CERCLA or another statute, the key issue becomes: should CERCLA's definition of removal be read to encompass the government's activity in overseeing removal or remedial action paid for and conducted by private parties? 16 If such oversight activity may properly be characterized as a government removal action, then the government is entitled to recover the costs of that oversight pursuant to Sec. 107(a) whether the oversight was conducted under RCRA or any other statutory authority. On the other hand, if we conclude that CERCLA's definition of removal should not be read to include the sort of oversight activity in question, then Sec. 107(a) does not allow government recovery of the costs incurred in conducting such oversight activity. In making our determination, we must keep in mind that under NCTA, the government may recover the oversight costs it here seeks only if Congress clearly intended that such costs be recoverable; any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendants.
42 Nowhere in the definition of removal is there an explicit reference to oversight of activities conducted and paid for by a private party. Nowhere is there an explicit statement that Congress considers administrative and regulatory costs incurred overseeing the removal and remedial actions of a private party to be removal costs in and of themselves. Nevertheless, EPA contends that the requisite clear statement of congressional intent as to the recoverability of oversight costs may be found in the third of the five categories in the definition of removal, i.e., such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances. 43 Examined in a vacuum, this language could be understood to encompass at least some oversight of the activities of a private party, particularly private activities focusing on assessment of the risk. On the other hand, it is at least as plausible to read this language as referring only to actual monitoring of a release or threat of release rather than oversight of the monitoring and assessment activities of others. This latter reading would be consistent with an understanding of the definition that distinguishes at all stages--assessment, response formulation, and execution--between actions taken to define the scope of the risk created by a release or threatened release and actions taken to evaluate the performance of others to determine whether they are meeting their legal obligations. We believe a reading of the statutory definition that embraces this distinction is linguistically the more plausible one. 17 Moreover, when we expand our inquiry to a consideration of the other provisions of CERCLA and to the place of CERCLA in the landscape of federal environmental legislation, we find additional support for the view that this reading was the intended one. All things considered, we cannot say that clause of the removal definition is sufficient to constitute the clear statement of intent required by NCTA.
44 Given the context in which CERCLA was enacted, we find it highly significant that Congress omitted any mention of oversight, or of government activities conducted under Sec. 106, in the definition of removal. As noted earlier, when Congress enacted Sec. 104(a) and Sec. 107 of CERCLA, it contemplated a mechanism by which the government would perform cleanups of hazardous waste and then seek reimbursement from the parties; in addition, however, Congress created a second mechanism by which the problems of hazardous waste releases might be ameliorated. In passing Sec. 106, Congress contemplated suits and administrative orders to force private parties to clean up waste at their own expense. This concept of forcing responsible parties to conduct the necessary removal or remedial action was already familiar to Congress as evidenced by the similar mechanism present in RCRA Sec. 7003, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6973 (1988). 45 In addition to the preexisting congressional preference for private corrective action, it seems to us significant that, so far as we have been able to determine, no environmental statute predating CERCLA authorized imposition upon the regulated parties of EPA's regulatory cost of monitoring compliance with the law. As we have noted, there is no provision in RCRA for the general recovery of costs incurred by the government in overseeing corrective actions at the thousands of RCRA licensed sites. 46 When Congress passed CERCLA, and when it amended the statute in 1986, it undoubtedly was aware that pursuant to CERCLA Sec. 106 as well as other statutes, EPA would be forcing numerous private parties to conduct removal and remedial activities and overseeing the implementation of its directives. 18 Indeed, given the congressional preference for settlements and Sec. 106 consent orders expressed in Sec. 122(a), it might be expected that removal and remedial activity conducted and paid for by private parties would be much more common than the government cleanups contemplated in CERCLA Sec. 104(a). See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9622(a) (1988). Given the extent of this expected private activity and the established prior practice of financing oversight activities from appropriated funds, a directive that EPA would henceforth be able to recover all of the costs of overseeing private corrective actions under any applicable environmental statute would represent a major policy change. We find it difficult to believe that Congress would choose to manifest such a change solely by including in CERCLA's definition of removal a reference to such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release of threat of release of hazardous substances. 47 We think it far more likely that Congress viewed EPA's overseeing of a private party's removal activities as qualitatively different from EPA's actually performing removal activities and intended for EPA to recover the costs of the latter but not the costs of the former. Had its view and intent been otherwise, we are confident that it would at least have made some reference to government activity under Sec. 106 when it was carefully providing examples of removal actions at the conclusion of the definition. 19
48 Turning from that which Congress omitted to that which it saw fit to include, various statutory provisions, as well as the general structure of CERCLA, suggest to us that Congress did not intend to include oversight in the definition of removal. Although the primary function of Sec. 104(a) of CERCLA is to authorize removal and remedial action by the government, it also permits EPA to allow responsible parties to carry out necessary removal and remedial actions so long as EPA finds that such action will be done properly and promptly. However, the section also provides that: 49 No remedial investigation or feasibility study (RI/FS) [by a responsible party] shall be authorized except on a determination by the President 20 that the party is qualified to conduct the RI/FS and only if the President contracts with or arranges for a qualified person to assist the President in overseeing and reviewing the conduct of such RI/FS and if the responsible party agrees to reimburse the Fund for any cost incurred by the President under, or in connection with, the oversight contract or arrangement. 50 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(a) (1988). An RI/FS is an investigation of the type contemplated in Sec. 104(b) and is clearly a removal action. If Congress considered government oversight of a private removal action to be a removal action in itself, the provision of Sec. 104(a) requiring reimbursement of costs incurred by the government overseeing the private RI/FS would be unnecessary as Sec. 107(a) would authorize the recovery of such oversight costs. Even more significant is the fact that although Sec. 104(a) authorizes EPA to permit private parties to undertake all kinds of removal and remedial actions, it only discusses government oversight, and reimbursement for such oversight, with regard to RI/FS's. Had Congress intended the government's cost of overseeing private party removal and remedial activity other than RI/FS's to be recoverable, surely it would have added something to Sec. 104(a) to manifest that intent. 51 Equally strong evidence of Congress's intent concerning oversight costs can be found in Sec. 111 of CERCLA. That section sets forth six different categories of payments that can be made from the Superfund. The first, found in subsection (a)(1), is Payment of governmental response costs incurred pursuant to [Sec. 104]. Response costs consist of removal and remedial costs. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601(25) (1988). A fourth, and separate, category of authorized Superfund payments is found in subsection (a)(4)--Payment of costs specified under subsection (c) of this section. Subsection (c) of Sec. 111 lists in excess of fourteen items of costs that can be funded from the Superfund. Subsection (c)(8) designates as appropriate Superfund charges:[t]he costs of contracts ... entered into under section 9604(a)(1) of this title [CERCLA Sec. 104(a)(1) ] to oversee and review the conduct of remedial investigations and feasibility studies undertaken by persons other than the President and the costs of appropriate Federal and State oversight of remedial activities at National Priorities List sites resulting from consent orders or settlement agreements. 52 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9611(c)(8) (1988). If EPA's costs of overseeing removal or remedial activities were in themselves removal costs, they would be covered under the provision allowing EPA to use Superfund funds for payment of governmental response costs and Sec. 9611(c)(8) would be unnecessary. Moreover, it seems apparent to us that the drafters of subsection (a) of Sec. 111 viewed the items included by virtue of subsection (a)(4) as qualitatively different from those included in subsection (a)(1). 53 In summary, while CERCLA Sec. 104 is concerned almost exclusively with government cleanups of hazardous waste, CERCLA Sec. 106, RCRA Sec. 7003, RCRA Sec. 3008(h), as well as other statutes are concerned almost exclusively with private cleanups. The government's role in overseeing a private cleanup effort is far removed from any sort of literal government removal or activity peripherally connected to such removal. CERCLA Sec. 107 appears to have been drafted primarily with CERCLA Sec. 104 in mind; its cost recovery provisions allow recovery of all costs of government removal and remedial activity (i.e. the activity explicitly authorized by Sec. 104(a)) as well as the costs of investigatory activity of the type authorized by Sec. 104(b). On the other hand, there is no clear indication in Sec. 107, Sec. 104, the definition of removal, or Sec. 106 that government oversight actions conducted in connection with Sec. 106 (or RCRA Secs. 3008(h), 7003) were intended to be recoverable removal costs. 21 Accordingly, we find the clear indication mandated by NCTA to be lacking and hold that the United States is not entitled to recovery of the oversight costs it seeks.