Opinion ID: 184751
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WOC's Procedural Claim

Text: 25 In contrast, we conclude that we may exercise jurisdiction over WOC's procedural claim alleging that the Forest Service violated its own regulations. We first conclude that WOC has standing to bring its procedural claim. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 431-32 (D.C.Cir.1998) (in banc); Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664-65 (D.C.Cir.1996). While it is true for the reasons set forth above that there is no certainty that drilling will commence on the disputed lands, the procedural barrier which WOC alleges to have been breached no longer stands in the way. The land of concern is in genuine danger, though potentially shielded by the NEPA considerations which we have already held are not before us. Where the agency acting in obedience to its congressional mandate has erected that procedural barrier, and where the leasing process has reached the stage evidenced in this case, we hold that the impending threat of injury is sufficiently real to constitute injury-in-fact and afford constitutional standing to adjudicate the claimed procedural irregularity. Cf. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717. 26 As the Supreme Court has stated,  'procedural rights' are special. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130. That is, [t]he person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Id. This does not mean--nor could it--that the plaintiff asserting the breach of a procedural right is not required to establish the constitutional minima of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. It only means that the necessary showing to support those minima is reduced. That is, in cases involving alleged procedural errors, the plaintiff must show that the government act performed without the procedure in question will cause a distinct risk to a particularized interest of the plaintiff. Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 664. This WOC has shown. 27 Therefore, we conclude that WOC's procedural claim is ripe. Unlike its NEPA claim, WOC's procedural claim has become concrete and final, Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 915, since there no longer exists the possibility that further agency action will alter the claim in any fashion. While the Forest Service may undertake further efforts to comply with NEPA, it has completely and finally implemented its procedures under 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e). As the Supreme Court noted in Ohio Forestry, a person with standing who is injured by a failure to comply with [some procedural requirement] may complain of that failure at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can never get riper. 118 S.Ct. at 1672; see also Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1258 (D.C.Cir.1995) (concluding that First Amendment challenge was ripe where there was little or nothing more that the agency could do in a particular adjudication that would likely inform the court's decision on the question whether the enforcement scheme is currently being, or is capable of being, administered in accordance with the first amendment). In this case, WOC's claim that the Forest Service procedures violate its own regulations can never get riper. The Forest Service has implemented the procedures that WOC asserts are inconsistent with 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e). Therefore, no further actions will be taken by the Forest Service that may be relevant to WOC's claim that the Forest Service violated its own regulations. As a result, WOC's procedural claim under 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e) is ripe for review, and we may proceed to the merits.