Opinion ID: 780718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Personal Jurisdiction over Step Two

Text: 32 As Zippo and the Courts of Appeals decisions indicate, the mere operation of a commercially interactive web site should not subject the operator to jurisdiction anywhere in the world. Rather, there must be evidence that the defendant purposefully availed itself of conducting activity in the forum state, by directly targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via its web site, or through sufficient other related contacts. 33 Based on the facts established in this case thus far, Toys has failed to satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. Step Two's web sites, while commercial and interactive, do not appear to have been designed or intended to reach customers in New Jersey. Step Two's web sites are entirely in Spanish; prices for its merchandise are in pesetas or Euros, and merchandise can be shipped only to addresses within Spain. Most important, none of the portions of Step Two's web sites are designed to accommodate addresses within the United States. While it is possible to join Club Imaginarium and receive newsletters with only an email address, Step Two asks registrants to indicate their residence using fields that are not designed for addresses in the United States. 34 Moreover, the record may not now support a finding that Step Two knowingly conducted business with residents of New Jersey. The only documented sales to persons in the United States are the two contacts orchestrated by Toys, and it appears that Step Two scarcely recognized that sales with U.S. residents had been consummated. 5 35 At best, Toys has presented only inconclusive circumstantial evidence to suggest that Step Two targeted its web site to New Jersey residents, or that it purposefully availed itself of any effort to conduct activity in New Jersey. Many of the grounds for jurisdiction that Toys advanced below have been deemed insufficient by the courts. First, the two documented sales appear to be the kind of fortuitous, random, and attenuated contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citations omitted). As for the electronic newsletters and other email correspondence, telephone communication or mail sent by a defendant [do] not trigger personal jurisdiction if they `do not show purposeful availment.' Barrett, 44 F.Supp.2d at 729 (quoting Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. DiVeronica Bros., Inc., 983 F.2d 551, 556 (3d Cir.1993)). The court in Barrett found that the exchange of three emails between the plaintiff and defendant regarding the contents of the defendant's web site, without more, did not amount to the level of purposeful targeting required under the minimum contacts analysis. Id. at 729; see also Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F.Supp.2d 531, 542 (D.N.J. 2002) (minimal email correspondence, by itself or even in conjunction with a single purchase, does not constitute sufficient minimum contacts.). Non-Internet contacts, such as Mr. Tena's visits to New York and the relationships with U.S. vendors, have not been explored sufficiently to determine whether they are related to Toys' cause of action, or whether they reflect purposeful availment. 36 Absent further evidence showing purposeful availment, Toys cannot establish specific jurisdiction over Step Two. 6 However, any information regarding Step Two's intent vis-a-vis its Internet business and regarding other related contacts is known by Step Two, and can be learned by Toys only through discovery. The District Court's denial of jurisdictional discovery is thus a critical issue, insofar as it may have prevented Toys from obtaining the information needed to establish personal jurisdiction. We next turn to whether the District Court properly denied Toys' request for jurisdictional discovery.