Opinion ID: 2330409
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Court's Findings and Rulings

Text: Both parties appeal the trial court's award of alimony to the petitioner. The court awarded the petitioner $1,300 per month for two years, based upon findings that he does not have sufficient assets or income to support himself, but that he has sufficient vocational skills to be gainfully employed in or within two years in real estate development, construction and/or the business of purchasing and selling antiques. The petitioner argues that he is disabled due to injuries suffered in a 1988 fall and an automobile accident in 1993, and that the court's finding that he can be gainfully employed in two years is against the weight of the evidence. The respondent argues that: (1) the petitioner failed to prove his need for alimony; (2) the amount of alimony awarded is excessive; and (3) the trial court failed to adequately consider the petitioner's fault in awarding alimony. RSA 458:19, I (Supp.2005) authorizes the trial court to award alimony if: (1) the party in need lacks sufficient income, property, or both to provide for his or her reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; (2) the payor is able to continue to meet his or her own reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; and (3) the party in need cannot be self-supporting through appropriate employment at a standard of living that meets reasonable needs, or is the custodian of the parties' child, whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not seek employment outside the home. Hampers, 154 N.H. at 283, 911 A.2d 14. In determining the amount of alimony, a trial court must consider various factors enumerated in RSA 458:19, IV (2004). Nevertheless, trial courts have broad discretion in awarding alimony. Marsh v. Marsh, 123 N.H. 448, 451, 462 A.2d 126 (1983). We review the trial court's decision under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. Hampers, 154 N.H. at 283, 911 A.2d 14. The record shows that the court considered the RSA 458:19, IV factors. Specifically, the court stated that it considered the length of the marriage (fourteen years), recognized that there was conflicting evidence concerning Petitioner's disability and his ability to earn a living, and noted that there was no current medical evidence concerning the Petitioner's current medical condition. However, the court found that the petitioner had sufficient vocational skills to be gainfully employed within two years. The court found that the respondent had been the sole support for the family since 1991, when the parties were married, and that the petitioner currently does not have sufficient assets or income to support himself. The court's order also acknowledged the petitioner's behavior throughout the marriage, which supported its finding of a fault-based divorce. This factor, however, does not preclude an alimony award: In determining the amount of alimony . . . the conduct of the guilty party is not conclusive but is an element to be considered under all the circumstances. Kibbee v. Kibbee, 99 N.H. 215, 216, 108 A.2d 46 (1954). Additionally, the court denied the petitioner's request for retroactive alimony based upon the amounts already paid by the respondent prior to the final order. Based upon these factors and the evidence in the record, we cannot say that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by ordering the respondent to pay alimony to the petitioner for a period of two years. Hampers, 154 N.H. at 284, 911 A.2d 14.
Next, we review the petitioner's argument that the trial court's visitation orders were unsustainable and the respondent's counter-argument that the trial court erred in awarding the petitioner even limited visitation. In the final decree, the trial court awarded the respondent sole legal and physical custody of the parties' daughter and awarded the petitioner supervised visitation for two hours every other Sunday. The petitioner argues that there was no reasonable basis for the visitation orders since the court found that the petitioner did not present a danger to the parties' daughter. The respondent argues that: (1) visitation with the petitioner will not benefit the parties' daughter and is not in her best interests; (2) the daughter does not wish to see the petitioner; (3) the respondent's right to travel under the New Hampshire Constitution is violated by the visitation order; and (4) the trial court failed to adequately consider the petitioner's behavior during the marriage. The trial court has wide discretion in matters involving custody and visitation. That discretion necessarily extends to matters such as assigning weight to evidence and assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Conflicts in the testimony, questions about the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given testimony are for the trial court to resolve. Our review is limited to determining whether it clearly appears that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion. In the Matter of Choy & Choy, 154 N.H. 707, 713, 919 A.2d 801, 806 (2007) (citations omitted). Before issuing its final order in June 2005, the trial judge reviewed the recorded testimony of the GAL, who testified that: [r]ight now it would not be in [the child's] best interests to have contact with [the petitioner]. . . . [The petitioner] has a lot of work to do to deal with his own awareness of what this situation . . . [has] done to [the child] as well as his inappropriate communications with [the child] during the visitation times . . . and understanding of where [the child] is emotionally and what her views are. . . . [I]f at any time in the future visitation were considered, . . . [the child's] emotional state and her readiness and her preparedness for that would have to be paramount. . . . I have not seen any indication that [visitation] would benefit her in any way at this time. The child's therapist, Kay Edwards, testified that the child had indicated that if she were to see the petitioner, she would want someone there all of the time to feel safe. Edwards also testified that given the child's age (thirteen at the time of trial), it would be proper to consider her desires regarding visitation. Dr. Richard Shulik, a psychologist who evaluated all of the parties, testified that the child spoke of the petitioner with affection and at one point stated that she wished that she could see him, but . . . only if he doesn't make trouble. In matters of visitation, the court's overriding concern is the best interests of the child. In the Matter of R.A. & J.M., 153 N.H. 82, 93, 891 A.2d 564 (2005). Although visitation by [a] non-custodial parent is an important right, it is one that must yield to the greatest good of the child. In the Matter of Lockaby & Smith, 148 N.H. 462, 465, 808 A.2d 832 (2002) (quotation omitted). In making this determination, the trial court may consider, among other things, the desires of the child, the effect visitation will have on the child's emotional well-being, see Lester v. Lester, 111 N.H. 117, 119, 277 A.2d 503 (1971), and the recommendations of the GAL, Choy, 154 N.H. at 714, 919 A.2d at 807. However, none of these factors is dispositive and the recommendations of a GAL should not be afforded greater presumptive weight than other evidence in the case. Id. at 713-14, 919 A.2d at 806-07. The trial court made detailed findings and there is sufficient evidence in the record to support its visitation orders. The court considered the testimonies of the GAL, the child's therapist, and the psychologist who evaluated the parties and their daughter. The court found that the respondent was the primary caretaker for the child, that the child is well adjusted and desires to continue living with her mother. The court also found that the petitioner had made threats to the respondent and accepted the psychologist's conclusion that he is emotionally volatile. However, the court also found that the petitioner loves his daughter and desires to resume a relationship with her, and that [n]o credible evidence was offered . . . that the Petitioner was a threat to his daughter's safety. Based upon these findings and rulings, the court awarded the petitioner supervised visitation. Based upon the trial court's analysis and the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion in its visitation order. We decline to address the respondent's constitutional claim because she has failed to demonstrate that this issue was preserved for our review. See Bean, 151 N.H. at 250, 855 A.2d 564.
Both parties challenge the trial court's division of the assets as unsupported by the evidence. The respondent also argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider the fault of the petitioner in dividing them. The trial court awarded the marital residence to the respondent, citing the fault of the petitioner under RSA 458:7, V and further citing concern that the parties' daughter maintain a stable living environment in the marital home. The court then ruled that an equitable division of the parties' remaining assets is appropriate. RSA 458:16-a, II creates a presumption that equal distribution of marital property is equitable. Absent special circumstances, the court must make the distribution as equal as possible. Hampers, 154 N.H. at 285, 911 A.2d 14 (quotation and citation omitted). The statute enumerates various factors for the court to consider, such as the length of the marriage, the ability of the parties to provide for their own needs, the needs of the custodial parent, the contribution of each party during the marriage, retirement accounts, and the fault of either party. Id. ; RSA 458:16-a, II. Additionally, the court may consider any other factor it deems relevant in equitably distributing the parties' assets. RSA 458:16-a, II( o ). A trial court is not precluded, however, from awarding a particular asset in its entirety to one party. As we afford trial courts broad discretion in determining matters of property distribution in fashioning a final divorce decree, we will not overturn the trial court's decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. If the court's findings can reasonably be made on the evidence presented, they will stand. Hampers, 154 N.H. at 285, 911 A.2d 14 (quotations, citations and brackets omitted). [I]f the court concludes that an unequal distribution of property is warranted, it should state its reasons and make specific findings and rulings supporting its decision. Bursey v. Bursey, 145 N.H. 283, 286, 761 A.2d 491 (2000) (quotation omitted); see RSA 458:16-a, IV (2004). The petitioner argues that the trial court erred when it relied upon fault grounds to award the marital home to the respondent. Under RSA 458:16-a, II( l ), the trial court may order an unequal distribution of assets if it finds that [t]he fault of either party as specified in RSA 458:7 . . . caused the breakdown of the marriage and: (1) Caused substantial physical or mental pain and suffering; or (2) Resulted in substantial economic loss to the marital estate or the injured party. The trial court found that the petitioner's fault caused the irremediable breakdown of the parties' marriage and caused the respondent to suffer significant emotional distress. As there is support in the record for these findings, we uphold them and hold that the trial court did not err when it relied upon fault grounds to award the marital home to the respondent. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the petitioner's alternative assertion that there was no evidence to support a finding that his treatment of the respondent resulted in substantial economic loss to her or to the marital estate. The petitioner also argues that the court unequally divided the parties' remaining assets by awarding the respondent her entire retirement account, which gained well over $90,000.00 during the marriage. The respondent counters that the assets were divided unequally in favor of the petitioner, considering a $48,000 debt she has paid off, which includes the parties' joint debt as well as debt accrued by the petitioner under the respondent's name, and the advances the petitioner has received during the litigation. The respondent also argues that the court gave inadequate weight to the petitioner's fault in dividing the parties' assets. The trial court found that after the award of the marital home to the respondent, an equitable division of the parties' remaining assets was proper in light of the evidence before it. Given the unsustainable exercise of discretion standard we must apply, the appealing party must show that the trial court's ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his or her case. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296, 787 A.2d 175 (2001). The record before us, however, does not contain account records, property assessments or any other form of valuation for the assets in dispute. Due to the absence of evidence that clearly shows the asset division was inequitable, neither party has demonstrated on appeal that the trial court's ruling was clearly unreasonable. See Bean, 151 N.H. at 250, 855 A.2d 564; Lambert, 147 N.H. at 296, 787 A.2d 175. The respondent further argues that the court erred in failing to reaffirm a previous order directing that the GAL fees be paid from the parties' joint funds, which resulted in the respondent shouldering this entire amount and contributed to the inequitable asset distribution. We disagree. In its final order, the court ordered that the respondent pay the GAL expenses, and took this into account when denying the petitioner's request for retroactive alimony. We cannot say, therefore, based upon the record before us, that the trial court's ruling on this issue was clearly unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the remainder of the court's order dividing the parties' assets.
We next address whether the trial court's continuation of the restraining order was unsupported by the evidence. In its final order, the trial court incorporated the restraining order issued in March 2005 and continued it pending further order of the court. The petitioner argues that after the July 2000 incident, there was no contact to warrant any restraint. The respondent counters that the court justifiably found that a present threat exists. Although no statute is cited in the order, on appeal, both parties presume it was issued under RSA 458:16. We proceed, therefore, under the same assumption. RSA 458:16 provides, in pertinent part: I. After the filing of a petition for divorce, . . . the superior court may issue orders with such conditions and limitations as the court deems just which may, at the discretion of the court, be made on a temporary or permanent basis. . . . Said orders may be to the following effect: (a) Directing any party to refrain from abusing or interfering in any way with the person or liberty of the other party. (b) Enjoining any party from entering the premises wherein the other party resides upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result. . . . . (d) Enjoining any party from harassing, intimidating or threatening the other party. . . . RSA 458:16, I. The trial court found that [c]redible evidence was . . . offered at trial that on July 14, 2000 the Petitioner physically assaulted the Respondent. The court further found that [t]he Respondent is genuinely in fear for her safety as a result of the acts and credible threats of the Petitioner, and that the petitioner made additional threats to the respondent after the July 2000 incident. At trial, the respondent testified to these threats and her fear of the petitioner. Dr. Shulik also testified that he had some concerns as to whether [the petitioner] was trying to frighten his wife, that the petitioner did not accept the separation, and that the petitioner had admitted to him that he had violated a previous restraining order. The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence before it. See Choy, 154 N.H. at 713, 919 A.2d at 806. A review of the record reveals that the trial court reasonably could have found that there was a continuing need for a restraining order. We cannot say that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion.
We next address the petitioner's argument that the trial court's finding of fault grounds was against the clear weight of the evidence. The petitioner argues that nothing happened, until the date of the parties' separation [in July 2000], and that there was no further aggression thereafter. Whether the irremediable breakdown of the marriage was caused by irreconcilable differences or the petitioner's fault was a factual question for the trial court. Hampers, 154 N.H. at 279, 911 A.2d 14. We will affirm the trial court's factual findings unless the evidence does not support them or they are legally erroneous. Id. The trial court found that the Respondent has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Petitioner's treatment of the Respondent during the course of the parties' marriage constitutes treatment which has endangered the Respondent's health and reason within the meaning of RSA 458:7[,] V. RSA 458:7 provides, in pertinent part, that the trial court shall grant a divorce in favor of the innocent party . . . [w]hen either party has so treated the other as seriously to injure health or endanger reason. RSA 458:7, V. The statute does not require proof of conduct that would have affected an average or reasonable person, but only that the health or reason of the complaining spouse was actually affected. In the Matter of Gronvaldt & Gronvaldt, 150 N.H. 551, 553, 842 A.2d 87 (2004). In its narrative order, the trial court found that the following conduct endangered the respondent's health and reason: [T]he Petitioner, during the parties' marriage, was possessive and controlling of the Respondent. . . . . . . The Petitioner restricted the Respondent's freedom by isolating her from family and friends; forbidding her to talk with neighbors and parents of [the child's] schoolmates; . . . and ordering her not to speak with anyone at church. The Petitioner enforced isolation on the Respondent by threatening to punish [the parties' child] for the Respondent's wrongdoing. When the Petitioner was angry with the Respondent, he disabled her car or took her keys to prevent her from going to work or from going out. On July 14, 2000, the Petitioner became enraged that the Respondent was taking [the parties' child] to a friend's home. He began screaming, disconnected the telephones, barricaded doorways with his body, grabbed the Respondent and [the child] so they could not leave the parties['] home, pushed the Respondent and [the child] into a door and against a wall, causing both the Respondent and [the child] to be physically injured. Subsequent to the issuance of the restraining order, the Petitioner threatened the Respondent by telling her that there are going to be some Sicilian neckties around here. . . . When the Petitioner was angry with the Respondent, he would sit inside the marital residence and shoot at targets in the back yard. The Respondent was frightened of the Petitioner throughout the marriage and feared that he was capable of killing her. The actions of the Petitioner, during the parties' marriage, caused the Respondent significant emotional distress, causing her to seek the assistance of a Pastoral Counselor. Additionally, in granting the parties' specific requests for findings, the court found that: (1) the petitioner denigrated, belittled and humiliated the respondent and called her degrading names; (2) the petitioner cut off the respondent financially when he was angry with her; and (3) without the respondent's knowledge and permission, the petitioner had the respondent's mail diverted to his post office box in Epsom. All of these findings have support in the record, including the respondent's testimony and that of a psychologist. Among other things, the psychologist testified that the petitioner was emotionally volatile. The trial judge was in the best position to evaluate the evidence, measure its persuasiveness and assess the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 554, 842 A.2d 87. Because the record supports the trial court's findings, we find no error in its decision to grant a divorce on the ground that the petitioner so treated the respondent as seriously to injure her health or endanger her reason. Id.