Opinion ID: 1755783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ms Bailey's claims on behalf of Jada

Text: As indicated in the introduction to this opinion, the specific argument set forth by the defendants is apparently unique in the reported case law. In fact, we have not discovered any reported cases that have considered an argument that, under the discovery rule, the statutory period for filing suit seeking damages arising from birth defects or other prenatal injuries should commence on a date prior to the child's birth when the parent acquired knowledge of the birth defects as a result of a medical procedure. Rather, the reported cases generally fall into two categories: (1) those holding that the statutory period for filing suit commences on the date of the child's birth, [13] and (2) those applying the discovery rule and holding that the statutory period for filing a suit for damages arising from birth defects or other prenatal injuries does not begin until the date after the child's birth when the cause of the birth defects was discovered. [14] A review of the cases indicates that the latter rule is often applied to claims that birth defects were caused by the mother's ingestion of drugs during pregnancy. The first rule has been applied in a number of Louisiana cases when some specific circumstance attendant to the child's birth provided the parent notice that the child had suffered injury related to negligent medical care. See Tucker v. Lain, 98-2273 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/5/01), 798 So.2d 1041, writ denied, 01-2715 (La.1/4/02), 805 So.2d 210; Richardson v. Moffett, 608 So.2d 275 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992), writ denied, 612 So.2d 81 (La.1993); Maung-U v. May, 556 So.2d 221 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 559 So.2d 1385 (La.1990); Percy v. State of Louisiana, 478 So.2d 570 (La.App. 2 Cir.1985). The second rule has also been widely applied to Louisiana cases in which the cause of a birth defect apparent at delivery was discovered sometime after the birth. See Bailey v. Haynes, 37,038 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/9/03), 843 So.2d 584 writ denied, 03-1209 (La.10/10/03), 856 So.2d 1207; Adams v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance, 33,030 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/7/00), 756 So.2d 708, writs denied, 00-1313, 00-1322 (La.6/30/00), 766 So.2d 540; LeCompte v. State of Louisiana, 97-1878 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 723 So.2d 474; Welch v. St. Francis Medical Center, Inc. 521 So.2d 758 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writs denied, 524 So.2d 513 La.1988); Poole v. Physicians & Surgeons Hospital, 516 So.2d 1185 (La.App. 2 Cir.1987), writs denied, 519 So.2d 127, 128 (La.1988). Although none of the cases listed above address the exact issue presented in this case, a review of those cases reveals that medical malpractice cases involving birth defects and other prenatal injuries involve unique problems, not necessarily present in other medical malpractice cases. In fact, it has been recognized that such cases differ from other medical malpractice cases in several significant ways. Jennifer M. Chow, Civil Practice Law and Rules, 69 St. John's L.Rev. 675, 679 (1995). Those differences have been generally described as follows: First, unborn children have never been recognized as persons in a legal sense. Second, unlike claimants in other medical malpractice cases, an unborn child cannot bring a claim when the act occurs, but must wait until birth. Third, the tortious act in a prenatal injury case creates conditional prospective liability which only attaches if the child is born alive. Id. (Footnotes omitted.) These differences, Ms. Chow suggests, must be considered in order to determine when a cause of action for medical malpractice resulting in birth defects or other prenatal injuries accrues. Actually, determination of the accrual date of a cause of action for medical malpractice resulting in birth defects or other prenatal injuries in this case is facilitated by the fact that Louisiana is one of only a few jurisdictions in the United States that has adopted specific legal provisions relative to the rights of unborn children subsequently born alive. [15] Thus, the first of the three differences listed by Ms. Chow between medical malpractice cases involving birth defects and other medical malpractice cases is not present in this case. La. Civ.Code art. 26 specifically provides that [a]n unborn child shall be considered as a natural person for whatever relates to its interests from the moment of conception, unless it is born dead, in which case it shall be considered never to have existed as a person, except for purposes of actions resulting from its wrongful death. We find that the accrual of Ms. Bailey's claim on behalf of Jada is controlled by the language of La. Civ.Code art. 26, coupled with its legislative history. La. Civ.Code arts. 24 through 27, all cited by the defendants, are found in Louisiana Civil Code, Book I, Title I, which relates to Natural and Juridical Persons. Title I of Book I of the Civil Code was most recently amended by Act 125 of the 1987 Acts of the Louisiana Legislature. The amendments adopted by the Legislature as part of Act 125 (1987) were recommended by the Louisiana State Law Institute in a report from its meeting that occurred on October 10 through 11, 1986, prepared by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos. The Reporter appended comments to the Institute's recommendation that the legislature adopt the provision now designated as La. Civ.Code art. 26, which provides that [n]atural personality commences from the moment of live birth and terminates at death. Those comments included the following excerpt from Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law System, § 50 (1977): The personality of natural persons commences at the moment of birth, that is, at the moment in which a child is completely separated from the body of its mother. Until that time, the child has no distinct life; as the Romans said, it is merely pars viscerum matris. But, by virtue of a legal fiction, an unborn child is considered to possess personality, as if it had already been born, when this is to its advantage: nasciturus pro nato habetur, quoties de commodis ejus agitur. This idea is expressed in Article 29 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, which declares that Children in the mother's womb are considered, in whatever relates to themselves, as if they were already born; thus, the inheritances which devolve to them before their birth, and which may belong to them, are kept for them, and curators are assigned to take care of their estates for their benefit. The anticipated personality of an unborn child produces various civil effects. In addition to the right of inheritance and the appointment of a curator, mentioned in Article 29 of the Civil Code, a posthumous child may have a cause of action under the workmen's compensation law or under the law of delictual obligations for the wrongful death of its father. Moreover, an unborn child may have a right to recover damages for prenatal injuries, namely personal injuries suffered en ventre de sa mere. It should be kept in mind, however, that the personality of the unborn child is recognized only for the preservation of its interests. Thus, while an illegitimate child may be recognized before its birth, an action for disavowal of paternity must be brought after the child is born. (Emphasis added.) We realize that the comments of the Institute Reporter do not carry the weight of law, and that the Yiannopoulos article quoted by the Institute Reporter discussed Louisiana Persons law as it existed prior to the 1987 amendments to La. Civ.Code art. 26. We nevertheless find them persuasive evidence of the intention of the Legislature when it adopted the current version of La. Civ.Code art. 26 in 1987, especially in light of the fact that the Official Legislative Comments to the 1987 amendment specifically state that the provision does not change the law, as noted by this court in Wartelle v. Women's and Children's Hospital, 97-0744, p. 9 (La.12/2/97), 704 So.2d 778, 783. In Wartelle, a case that involved a different legal issue than is here involved, we noted that La. Civ.Code art. 26 applies only to matters that advance the interests of the fetus, consistent with Professor Yiannopoulos's comments. Therein we said that La. Civ.Code art. 26 accords to an unborn fetus provisional legal personality for its own interests conditioned on its subsequent live, birth, such that it can acquire a cause of action and inherit while en ventre sa mere, but that the article does not confer actual legal personality; it provides that the fetus shall only be `considered' as a natural child and it limits the fictional personality of the fetus to matters that advance the interests of the fetus. Id. at 4, 704 So.2d at 781 (italics in original; boldface emphasis added). [16] Ultimately then, Louisiana law belies defendants' argument that Louisiana law contains no support for Ms. Bailey's argument that an unborn child should be treated differently from other natural persons for purposes of prescription. In fact, Louisiana law specifically provides that the legal fiction of natural personality that attaches to an unborn child from the moment of conception pursuant to La. Civ.Code art. 26 applies only when such application is for the benefit of the child or for the preservation of its interests, as in the Malek case in which the court allowed the mother to assert the filiation and support action prior to the child's birth. It follows logically that the legal fiction of the unborn child's natural personality from the date of conception established by La. Civ.Code art. 26 does not attach when its application does not inure to the benefit of the child or for the preservation of its interests, and particularly when applying that legal fiction would be to the child's detriment, as here. Certainly applying the legal fiction to hold that prescription commenced at some point prior to the child's birth when the mother became aware of the existence of its birth defects would not inure to either the benefit of the child or the preservation of its interests. The language of La. Civ.Code art. 26 that an unborn child is to be considered as a natural person for whatever relates to its interests from the moment of conception is an exception ... established by legislation to the general rule set forth in La. Civ.Code art. 3468 that prescription runs against minors and incompetents. Further, none of the cases cited by defendants demands a different result. Thus, we hold that Ms. Bailey's claim filed on behalf of Jada accrued on March 20, 1997, the date Jada was born, and that prescription on that claim therefore commenced on that date. In order to reach our conclusion in this case, we rely heavily on the fact that the legal fiction of natural personality conferred upon an unborn child by La. Civ.Code art. 26 applies only to whatever relates to its interests. In that regard, this decision may be seen as a logical extension of a much earlier Louisiana case  i.e., Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La.App.Orl.1923). In that case, the court held, contrary to most reported decisions at the time, that an unborn child subsequently born alive has a cause of action for prenatal injuries. Id. In so holding, the Cooper court relied on La. Civ.Code art. 29, which then declared that children in their mother's womb are, in whatever relates to themselves, considered as if they were already born. Id. at 360 (emphasis added). Focusing on the phrase in whatever relates to themselves, the court rejected the argument that the article applied only to successions, and found that the phrase was of the the most sweeping character. Id. A California court reached a similar conclusion in Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal.App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939), which involved a suit for injuries sustained by a child prior to its birth as a result of the alleged malpractice of a physician in negligently using metal clamps and forceps in connection with the child's delivery. At that time, Cal. Civ.Code art. 29 stated as follows: A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth. Id. at 630, 92 P.2d 678. The language and effect of this article is very similar to La. Civ.Code art. 26. The Scott court rejected an argument that the word interests in the codal article should be limited in its application to the child's right of inheritance or to its property rights, and not applied to grant the child a right of action for a tort committed prior to its birth. Id. at 631, 92 P.2d 678. The court found that the provision was as clear and concise as the English language could make it, and that the word interests should therefore be interpreted to include both personal and property rights. Id. See also Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal.App.2d 95, 268 P.2d 178. Because the language in La. Civ.Code art. 26 is also as clear and concise as the English language can make it, we find that it protects both the personal and property rights of the unborn child subsequently born alive. The rule established by this case is also consistent with cases from other jurisdictions that, like Louisiana, have express statutory provisions conferring natural personality on unborn children subsequently born alive. Many of those cases have relied upon previous decisions establishing a general rule for when a cause of action accrues, which typically occurs when all of the factual elements of the tort are present. See Chow, supra. [17] For example, in Wilson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 141 Cal.App.3d 891, 190 Cal.Rptr. 649 (1983), the court found that, under such a provision, live birth is a condition precedent to accrual of legally cognizable rights. Id. Applying the same principle, the court in Simmons v. Weisenthal, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 54, 1962 WL 6989 (Pa.Com.Pl.1962), found that the statute of limitations does not commence in cases involving injuries to unborn children until the date of the child's birth. In so holding, the court stated as follows: It is apparent that liability for a prenatal injury attaches at the earliest possible time upon birth of the infant, whether recovery is allowed for a live or a still birth. If liability does not attach until birth, whether alive or still, there is what has been termed an implied condition that the child be born. We do not see, therefore, how the statute of limitations can possibly begin to run until fulfillment of the implied condition that the child be born, at which time liability will attach. Until there is liability there can be no right upon which an action could be brought, and until a right exists the statute cannot run. Id. at 55-56. See also Cosgrove v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 117 Idaho 470, 788 P.2d 1293 (1990). Under general Louisiana law, a cause of action accrues when a party has the right to sue. Falgout v. Dealers Truck Equipment Co., XXXX-XXXX, p. 12 (La.10/19/99), 748 So.2d 399, 407. Because La. Civ.Code art. 26 imposes an implied condition of live birth on an unborn child's right to be considered a natural person, we find that a cause of action for damages arising from prenatal injuries does not accrue until the child's live birth. This is especially true since, under the provisions of La. Civ.Code art. 26, tortfeasors have no liability for prenatal damages unless and until the child is born alive. Because the cause of action does not accrue until that date, prescription does not commence until that date. Accordingly, the lower courts properly denied the defendants' peremptory exceptions of prescription regarding Ms. Bailey's claim filed on behalf of her child, Jada.