Opinion ID: 887195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Propensity Evidence

Text: ¶ 48 `The difference between the proper use of other acts evidence to prove identity and the improper use of such evidence to prove propensity is a subtle matter.' State v. Sweeney, 2000 MT 74, ¶ 32, 299 Mont. 111, ¶ 32, 999 P.2d 296, ¶ 32 (quoting United States v. Luna (9th Cir.1994), 21 F.3d 874, 882). Indeed, this classification forms the crucial distinction at the basis of the third prong of the modified Just test. Specifically, if the proponent for admissibility offers the evidence solely to show propensity, Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid., prohibits courts from admitting that evidence. When evidence of prior bad acts is offered, the proponent must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which may be the inference that the defendant has the propensity to commit the crime charged. [2] United States v. Himelwright (3d Cir.1994), 42 F.3d 777, 782 (interpreting Rule 404(b), Fed.R.Evid.); People v. Zackowitz (1930), 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (Cardozo, C.J., delivering the opinion of the court). ¶ 49 Of the six categories of evidence that Cheryl offers, four of them (psychological problems, behavioral problems, discharge from the U.S. Army for psychological reasons, and commitment to a mental health institution) provide only propensity evidence. Cheryl contends that Daniel has psychological problems, so he acted in conformity with those problems by writing the letters; he has behavioral problems, so he acted in conformity with those problems by writing the letters; etc. These chains of inferences clearly implicate propensity evidence. ¶ 50 Someone vandalized the Cliffords' car by spray-painting profanities in pink. Cheryl sought to admit evidence that Daniel had been convicted for vandalizing cars in East Helena. That evidence also creates a chain of inferences implicating propensity evidence: Daniel vandalized cars in East Helena, therefore he is a vandal, therefore he acted in conformity with that character trait when he vandalized the Cliffords' car. Evidence in this category is clearly inadmissible propensity evidence. ¶ 51 The more difficult question arises when considering the admissibility of specific, prior sexual activities in which Daniel, willingly or unwillingly, participated. At various points, Cheryl wanted the court to admit evidence of or allow examination into various experiences including the specific acts of sodomy to which Michael Scott subjected Daniel, the presence of two other men while Michael Scott molested Daniel, the specifics of Daniel being molested when he was very young, and the specific acts of incest. The District Court admitted references to the acts, but excluded the specific activities. Evidence proving these specific facts is relevant to the identity of the author, Cheryl argues, because the letters refer to specific acts of sodomy, a buttfuck party, and specific incestuous acts. ¶ 52 The District Court excluded these categories of evidence under the modified Just rule. Unfortunately, we cannot discern which rationale the court used to exclude the evidence. The fourth prong of that test repeats Rule 403, M.R.Evid. Compare Rule 403, M.R.Evid., with Matt, 249 Mont. at 142, 814 P.2d at 56. Generally, we review a district court's discretionary Rule 403, M.R.Evid., decisions for abuse of discretion, but we agree with the Himelwright court that when a district court rules on a Rule 403, M.R.Evid., question, but its reasons are not apparent from the record, we cannot review its discretion. Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 781. In such cases, we may examine the record and balance the factors ourselves. Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 781. Accordingly, we will balance the Rule 403 factors de novo. ¶ 53 Rule 403, M.R.Evid., provides that, [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The greater contains the less. Section 1-3-227, MCA. The District Court admitted copious amounts of evidence that Michael Scott had molested Daniel. No fewer than six witnesses testified that Michael Scott had molested Daniel, and that theme pervaded the case. As stated earlier, because these categories of evidence constitute reverse 404(b) evidence, this Court may not consider the danger of unfair prejudice in its balancing. Nevertheless, the jury need not have heard the multiple, graphic details painstakingly recounting the horrors through which Michael Scott put Daniel. The jury's imagination could quickly fill in the gaps without such detailed evidence. Thus, the probative value is very low. Taken together, the waste of time and needless presentation of cumulative evidence from such technical, detailed, and vivid explanations substantially outweigh the low probative value of that evidence. A similar analysis shows the District Court properly excluded specific evidence of Daniel's molestation. ¶ 54 In addition, the District Court allowed questions as to whether Daniel committed incest, but did not allow questions as to the specific acts. As above, the waste of time and needless presentation of cumulative evidence substantially outweigh the probative value of dwelling upon the specific instances. The District Court properly excluded this evidence. ¶ 55 Finally, the District Court also admitted evidence that other boys participated in the molestations at Michael Scott's home. Given this evidence that Daniel experienced a buttfuck party, evidence that two other men were present at other times amounts to needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The needless presentation of that cumulative evidence substantially outweighs the negligible probative value. Because these evidentiary items fail one prong of the modified Just test, we need not address the remaining prongs for admissibility. The District Court did not err by excluding this evidence.