Opinion ID: 1224019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instructions on Breach of Warranties

Text: On a separate front, LSC attacks the instruction that the trial court gave the jury on breach of express and implied warranties. At trial, LSC maintained that SPI had breached express and implied warranties concerning the condition, processing capacity, and fitness for winter use of its thermal remediation unit. Specifically, LSC claimed that SPI had expressly promised that its equipment was in good condition and could process soil at a steady rate of at least six to ten tons per hour. LSC also claimed that SPI had given implied assurances that the equipment was capable of maintaining optimal performance throughout the winter. SPI denied giving LSC any guarantees about the processing capacity of the equipment and also denied making any representations  express or implied  about the equipment's fitness for use in the core winter months of January, February and March. SPI's position was that both parties had originally contemplated beginning the remediation project in mid-October and completing it by mid-December, that LSC had caused startup to be delayed until January, and that most of the subsequent delays had resulted from inclement winter weather and frozensolid soil. With respect to implied warranty, Instruction Number 18 stated: The law assumes that if SPI, at the time of making the contract, had reason to know of a particular purpose for which the leased equipment was required, and if [LSC] was relying on the skill or judgment of SPI to furnish the equipment, then there is an implied warranty that the equipment is fit for that purpose. The court more specifically addressed LSC's theory of the case in Instruction Number 19: In deciding whether the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was breached, you may have to decide whether the cold weather in January, February, and March 1993 was the cause of some or all of the problems on the job. If you find that the weather was a factor, you must decide whether [SPI] had a responsibility to give [LSC] written notice sufficient to alert [LSC] that the machine was not fit to operate in such cold weather. [SPI] had a responsibility to give [LSC] such notice if the equipment was not fit for a particular use which [SPI] knew or reasonably should have known would be part of the Fort Richardson contract. [LSC] contends that at the time the agreement was made with SPI, [SPI] knew, or reasonably should have known, that [LSC] contemplated using the equipment during cold winter weather such as occurred during January, February, and March 1993. SPI denies that [it] had reason to know this. If you find that it is more likely than not that SPI should have given [LSC] written notice sufficient to alert [LSC] that the equipment was not warranted for use in cold weather, and if you further find that cold weather caused problems with the equipment, then you must find that SPI breached its implied warranty of fitness. LSC objected to the latter instruction, requesting additional language stating, in conformity with UCC § 2A-214, that an implied warranty could be modified only by a clear, conspicuous written disclaimer. The trial court denied LSC's request, finding that it was not necessarily appropriate to incorporate directly and in total sales provisions of the UCC to equipment leases. The challenged instruction thus remained intact, requiring written notice sufficient to alert [LSC], of SPI's disclaimer of any implied warranty of fitness for winter use, but omitting the requirement that this written notice be clear and conspicuous. In its special verdict, the jury found that SPI had breached no express or implied warranties. On appeal LSC renews its claim that the jury instructions should have required a clear and conspicuous written disclaimer of SPI's implied warranty of fitness for intended winter use. Given the facts of the case, however, this claim lacks merit. As reflected in Jury Instruction No. 19, SPI's defense to LSC's implied warranty claim was that no warranty could be implied because SPI had no reason to know that [LSC] contemplated using the equipment during cold winter weather such as occurred during January, February, and March 1993. In other words, SPI essentially asserted that it had no reason to disclaim fitness for winter use because neither party contemplated winter use when the contract was signed. The additional language LSC asked the court to include in Instruction No. 19  the challenged instruction  would have required a clear and conspicuous written disclaimer of any implied warranty by SPI. The express language of the instruction, however, already specified that any implied warranty could be disclaimed only by a written notice sufficient to alert LSC. Thus, LSC's requested addition to the instruction could have had significance only if the jury had heard evidence suggesting the existence of some written disclaimer by SPI that was arguably unclear or inconspicuous. But the jury heard no evidence suggesting the existence of any disclaimer whatsoever, let alone a written disclaimer. Had the jury found an implied warranty, it would have been left with no rational basis for concluding that the warranty had been disclaimed in any way. Hence, in context, LSC's proposed addition to Instruction No. 19 was superfluous. LSC raises no other challenge to the implied warranty instruction, nor does the instruction otherwise appear inappropriate. See UCC § 2A-213. The trial court did not err in giving it.