Opinion ID: 42471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eyewitness Identification Testimony Issues

Text: 3 We also note that, even if we were to assume that the gun-count acquittal established that a reasonable doubt exists on whether Smith committed the robberies, the evidence was still admissible under Dowling because of the lower standard of proof: to admit the evidence in the trial under review now, the Government did not have to establish -- beyond a reasonable doubt -- that Smith committed the robberies. Instead, under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, similar act evidence is permissible if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred. See Dowling, 110 S.Ct. at 672. 7
Smith contends that the district court erred in permitting eyewitnesses Davis, Shields and Roberts to comment on their level of certainty when testifying about their identification of Smith. We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence for clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1357 (11th Cir. 1997). No case law in this Circuit or the Supreme Court has been brought to our attention that prohibits the admission of testimony by an eyewitness about their level of certainty in an identification.4 Nor was the testimony precluded under the Federal Rules of Evidence. We have never concluded that testimony about an eyewitness’s level of certainty has a tendency to confuse the jury so that it should be precluded pursuant to Rule 403’s prohibition of information creating “unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. In fact, in assessing the reliability of an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure, we consider the level of a witness’s certainty. Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893, 895 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing Neil v. Biggers, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382 4 Smith claims that the Supreme Court’s decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994), stands for the proposition that a trial court’s failure to correct any jury misperception results in a due process violation. We, however, do not read Simmons this way. Simmons stands for a more narrow proposition: briefly stated, that due process requires a jury to be informed -- in determining whether to impose a death sentence or life imprisonment -- that a defendant’s life sentence renders him parole ineligible. 8 (1972)). We note that the evaluation of an eyewitness’s testimony is precisely the kind of analysis that is reserved for the jury. See United States v. Billue, 994 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1993) (“This court does not evaluate witnesses’ credibility. Such determinations are within the exclusive province of the jury.”). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the eyewitness testimony on this matter.
Smith contends that the district court erred by excluding the testimony of Dr. Michael Leippe, an expert on the area of memory and perception, without conducting an appropriate inquiry. Dr. Leippe would have commented on 1) the lack of correlation between certainty and accuracy; 2) the weapon-focus effect;5 and 3) the impact of stress on memory.6 We review the district court’s decision to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. Smith, 122 F.3d at 1357. To determine whether expert testimony is 5 The weapon-focus effect is a theory about the adverse affect on memory of the presence of a weapon. 6 We reject Smith’s claim that the district court erred by declining to hold a hearing or otherwise declining to consider whether the proffered testimony would assist the trier of fact. The district court’s (albeit brief) re-consideration of the eyewitness-identification expert testimony in this trial was not the first instance in which the court had reviewed this testimony. And the district court specifically referenced its more thorough ruling from Smith’s previous trial, where the court addressed the topics on which Dr. Leippe planned to testify and explained how the court reached the conclusion that such testimony would not assist the trier of fact. 9 admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, we must determine two things: 1) whether the testimony is scientific knowledge, and 2) whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2795-96 (1993). In United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (superseded by statute on other grounds), we concluded that a district court did not err in excluding proffered expert testimony about eyewitness reliability because we concluded that such testimony does not assist the jury.7 We reaffirmed this conclusion, post-Daubert, in United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1335, 1357-59 (11th Cir. 1997), where the defendant sought to present the testimony of an expert about all three of the issues which Smith sought to present here. Therefore, based on Smith, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony about these topics.8 7 In Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982), we concluded that Unit B panel or en banc court decisions of the former Fifth circuit are binding precedent in this Circuit. 8 We reached this decision in Smith by referencing our reasoning in Thevis: 1) such testimony would permit a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness; 2) the problems of eyewitness identification could be addressed through cross-examination; and 3) a jury could weigh the problems of eyewitness identification through common-sense analysis. See Smith, 122 F.3d at 1357-59. Smith has presented data that might undermine parts of this rationale. He specifically presents evidence tending to demonstrate that the lack of correlation between a witness’s level of certainty and the accuracy of their identification is not within the common sense of the jury. But as in our decision in Smith, we feel limited by the prior-panel-precedent rule: only a decision of this Court en banc or the Supreme Court may overrule Thevis and Smith. See Smith, 122 F.3d at 1359. 10 We suspect that even if the exclusion was an error, the error was harmless. In addition to the testimony of three eyewitnesses, the Government presented the testimony of several other people linking Smith to the robbery.9
We review the district court’s refusal to give a defendant’s requested jury instructions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chirinos, 112 F.3d 1089, 1101 (11th Cir. 1997). A refusal to give a requested jury instruction is an abuse of discretion if: “1) the instruction is correct; 2) the court did not address the substance of the instruction in its charge; and 3) the failure to give the instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to present an effective defense.” United States v. Sirang, 70 F.3d 588, 593 (11th Cir. 1995). “[W]e examine whether the jury charges, considered as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so that the By the way, even if the district court erred in excluding this element of Dr. Leippe’s testimony, the error was probably harmless. The eyewitness identifications were not the linchpin of the prosecution’s case. The prosecution gave only limited attention to the witness’s level of certainty in presenting its case: only a single question in the Government’s direct examination of each of the eyewitnesses asked whether they had any “doubt” that Smith was the robber. 9 As one example, Todd Griffin corroborated the eyewitness accounts. As another, two women -- Linda Gardner (Smith’s ex-girlfriend of several years) and her mother -- identified Smith when viewing the bank surveillance video/pictures. Therefore, even if the district court erred by excluding the testimony of an expert who would have undermined the eyewitnesses’ identifications, the error was harmless because the Government presented substantial additional evidence of Smith’s guilt. Those courts that have admitted experts like Dr. Leippe have reached that conclusion in part because the eyewitness identification played a much more significant role in the prosecution’s case. See, e.g. United States v. Lester, 254 F.Supp.2d 602, 610 (E.D. Va. 2003) (observing that the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits take this approach). 11 jurors understood the issues and were not misled.” Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003). Here, Defendant requested the judge to provide a pretty elaborate (four pages long) instruction on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. The requested instruction included a discussion that emphasized a variety of factors that potentially affect eyewitness identifications, including: the circumstances surrounding the identification, the age and race of the eyewitness, stress, the viewing of mug shots or photo spreads or both after the criminal event but before a later in-person identification, the length of time between the criminal event and the later identification, the lack of correlation between witness confidence and accuracy, and the conditions affecting viewing during the time of the crime (including the presence of a weapon, visibility and distance). The requested instruction was argumentative at some points: for example, “When a weapon is present, the witness’[s] attention is drawn to the weapon and away from the facial and physical characteristics of a perpetrator” (emphasis added) reads like opposition to the eyewitness identifications rather than guidance to jurors about their role in evaluating the accuracy of testimony. The district court did give an instruction guiding the evaluation of eyewitness identification which broadly addressed the substance of the requested 12 charge. Although the given instruction may not have detailed every factor that Defendant highlighted might affect an identification, the district court’s instruction was sufficiently comprehensive to assist the jury in evaluating the accuracy of the eyewitness identifications. The court instructed the jury on the effect of circumstances surrounding the identification, the race of the eyewitness, stress, the length of time between the criminal event and the later identification, and conditions affecting eyewitness observation during the time of the crime (including visibility and distance). This instruction addressed the substance of the potential problems -- both physical and psychological -- that Defendant requested the trial court to explain might affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. For example, although the district court’s instruction did not specifically address the weapon-focus effect, this factor was encompassed by the instruction on the effect of stress: a jury can infer -- without instruction -- that the presence of a weapon may create a stressful environment, which (as they were properly instructed) may affect the accuracy of an identification. As another example, on the requested instruction about the effect of viewing mug shots or photo spreads (or both) after the criminal event but before a later in-person identification, we believe that the district court’s instruction to the jury to consider the circumstances surrounding the later identification encompasses this caution: a witness’s prior 13 viewing of a picture of the Defendant is a “circumstance” that may affect the later identification. We conclude that the district court’s refusal to give Defendant’s instruction was no abuse of discretion: the jury was sufficiently instructed and not misled.10