Opinion ID: 2428722
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Comparative Fault Instruction

Text: As noted above, a major aspect of Ford's trial strategy was to argue that Ms. Newman's failure to wear a seatbelt contributed to the cause and severity of her injuries. Consistent with this theory, Ford proposed, and the court submitted to the jury, a comparative fault instruction. Pursuant to that instruction, the jury assessed five percent fault against Ms. Newman. In her sole point on appeal, Ms. Newman challenges the propriety of a comparative fault instruction premised on the failure to wear a seatbelt. Section 307.178 requires the use of a seatbelt for most front seat occupants of passenger cars. Subsection 3 sharply limits the degree to which evidence of a failure to obey this law may be used against an injured motorist: In any action to recover damages arising out of the ownership, common maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle, failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section shall not be considered evidence of comparative negligence. At most, a defendant can use this evidence, under some circumstances, to mitigate damages, but by no more than one percent of the amount awarded. [23] Ford argues that the statute does not apply, because the damages did not arise out of its ownership, maintenance or operation of the vehicle, but rather out of its design or manufacture of the car. Our precepts for interpreting statutory language are well-settled: As has been noted repeatedly, this Court has a duty to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words used in their plain and ordinary meaning. Wolff Shoe Co. v. Director of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1988). This Court cannot look to rules of construction if the statute contains no ambiguity. Bosworth v. Sewell, 918 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. banc 1996). When statutory language is clear, courts must give effect to the language as written. M.A.B. v. Nicely, 909 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Mo. banc 1995). [24] LaHue v. General Motors Corp., a federal district court case interpreting the Missouri statute, applied these principles and reached the conclusion advocated by Ford. [25] LaHue reasoned as follows: The legislature clearly specified the sorts of cases in which evidence of failure to use seat belts was inadmissible. In Section 307.178.3 the legislature established that the evidence of failure to use seat belts could not be used ... [i]n any action to recover damages arising out of the ownership, common maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle. Conspicuously absent is any reference to the design or construction of a motor vehicle. Even the most liberal interpretation of the words ownership, common maintenance and operation cannot stretch far enough to include design and construction. The plain meaning of the statute compels a conclusion that it was not intended to prevent evidence of failure to use seat belts in a product liability case. [26] While Ford is certainly correct that operation is not design, this argument ultimately fails, since it assumes its conclusionthat the operation referred to is that of the defendant and not of the plaintiff. The section refers only to damages arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle; it does not specify by whom, nor must it in order to make sense. Under the most plain reading of the statute, contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff for not wearing a seatbelt is disallowed in any action for damages arising out of operation of a motor vehicle, whether or not the defendant was the one operating the vehicle. While the trial court erred in giving the contributory negligence instruction, this error can be corrected without a new trial, by allocating the remaining five percent fault proportionally between the remaining defendants. Thus, the judgment is modified to assess 26.32 percent fault to Ford, and 73.68 percent to the CBS defendants. Damages to Ms. Newman are raised to $ 12,000,000, and with prejudgment interest the amount of the judgment in her favor is amended to be $ 13,982,465.70. Mr. Newman's award is increased to $ 500,000, and the total amount of judgment in his favor, including prejudgment interest, is amended to $ 582,602.69. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified. BENTON, C.J., PRICE, LIMBAUGH, and COVINGTON, JJ., and HAMILTON, Special Judge. concur. HOLSTEIN, J., not sitting. WOLFF, J., not participating because not a member of the Court when the cause was submitted.