Opinion ID: 782580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Initial and Expanded Contracts

Text: 49 The Secretary appears to argue, however, that even if there were available funds with regard to ongoing contracts, there was a statutory cap on initial or expanded contracts, which limited the amount of available funds for initial and expanded contracts and excused the Secretary's duty to pay full contract support costs for those contracts. The appropriations acts at issue here all grant a lump-sum appropriation to the Indian Health Service and do not include not to exceed language. But these acts do include a provision stating that, of the funds provided, $7,500,000 shall remain available until expended, for the Indian Self Determination Fund, which shall be available for the transitional costs of initial or expanded tribal contracts. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-189 (1996); see also Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub.L. No. 103-332, 108 Stat. 2499, 2528 (1994); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-138, 107 Stat. 1379, 1408 (1993). 12 Initially, it appeared that the Secretary had abandoned the argument that the shall remain available language constituted a statutory cap. In his brief, the Secretary conceded that [u]nlike the [Bureau of Indian Affairs], [the Indian Health Service's] annual appropriation acts did not place such a cap. (Appellant's Br. at 33.) The Secretary made the further concession that [i]n order to be a statutory `cap,' the language would have to read that `not to exceed' $7.5 million was available for new [contract support costs], rather than that $7.5 million `shall remain available.' (Appellant's Br. at 33, n. 17 (citing Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. 87 F.3d at 1342)). At oral argument, the Secretary presented directly inconsistent theories, at one and the same time reiterating the concessions in his brief, 13 and then arguing that there was an explicit statutory cap. 14 We treat the Secretary as making this argument, but conclude that the appropriations legislation did not impose a statutory cap as to initial and expanded contracts. 50 In the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the Secretary argued that the shall remain available language was ambiguous, and that committee reports should be consulted to resolve the ambiguity. Those courts agreed. In Shoshone-Bannock, the court found, [t]he appropriation language is arguably ambiguous. The language, $7.5 million `shall remain available until expended' is not an unambiguous cap, as was the `of which not to exceed' language of [the 1995 appropriations provision at issue in Oglala Sioux ]. 279 F.3d at 666. The court held, however, that the committee report of the House Appropriations Committee helped to resolve this ambiguity in favor of finding a limitation. The committee report stated, [t]he Committee has provided $7,500,000 for the Indian Self-Determination Fund. These funds are to be used for new and expanded contracts. H.R.Rep. No. 104-173, at 97. The court held that [t]his Committee Report language lends itself to the ... reading[] that only $7.5 million is available. Shoshone-Bannock, 279 F.3d at 666. In Cherokee, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Shoshone-Bannock and with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that there was a $7.5 million cap on contract support costs for new and expanded contracts. 311 F.3d at 1063-64. In Cherokee, the Tenth Circuit held, to the extent there is any indicia of Congressional intent... in the appropriations committee report... it supports the conclusion that Congress intended the $7.5 million to be the maximum [for new and expanded contracts]. Id. at 1065 n. 10. 51 We conclude that the Ninth and Tenth Circuit decisions were incorrect in this respect. We recognize that where appropriations acts are ambiguous, legislative history can be relied upon to resolve that ambiguity. See Dickerson, 310 U.S. at 561, 60 S.Ct. 1034. However, the shall remain available language was not ambiguous. Such language is commonly understood as a carryover provision, not a statutory cap. The phrase shall remain available is a term of art in appropriations legislation that our sister circuits have consistently interpreted, not as a statutory cap on funding to a particular source, but as an authorization of carryover authority, indicating that unexpended funds shall remain available for the same purpose during the succeeding fiscal year. See, e.g., Mass. Dep't of Educ. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 837 F.2d 536, 538-39 (1st Cir.1988) (interpreting shall remain available language in 20 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) as preserving unexpended funds to state agencies for obligation and expenditure during the succeeding fiscal year); Wilson v. Watt, 703 F.2d 395, 400 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that because the relevant appropriations act provided that unexpended funds shall remain available, plaintiffs could demonstrate that Congress intended unexpended funds to be used for the same purpose in the succeeding fiscal year); Nat'l Ass'n of Reg'l Councils, 564 F.2d at 589 n. 12 (distinguishing shall remain available language from not to exceed language and finding that the former does not impose a statutory cap, but is typically used to carryover unexpended funds to the succeeding fiscal year). In the present case, there is no indication that the shall remain available language constituted anything other than a typical carryover provision. It certainly did not constitute a statutory cap excusing the Secretary from fulfilling his obligations under the availability clause of section 450j-1(b). 15