Opinion ID: 1937548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wilshire

Text: In entering a summary judgment in favor of Wilshire, the trial court determined that the counteroffer was legally enforceable and, therefore, that the Hunters' sole remedy was the return of the earnest-money deposit. The Hunters argue, however, that the counteroffer is not operable as a matter of law. They argue that the purchase agreement and the addendum to that agreement constitute the only enforceable contract between the Hunters and Wilshire, and that that contract defines the rights of the parties. [3] The Hunters assert that Wilshire breached the terms of the purchase agreement and the addendum, and that, therefore, they are entitled to specific performance and the reimbursement of the expenses they incurred as a result of Wilshire's breach. We first consider whether the counteroffer is an enforceable contract. `The requisite elements of [a valid contract] include: an offer and an acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to terms essential to the formation of a contract.' Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Heilman, 876 So.2d 1111, 1118 (Ala.2003) (quoting Ex parte Grant, 711 So.2d 464, 465 (Ala. 1997), quoting in turn Strength v. Alabama Dep't of Finance, 622 So.2d 1283, 1289 (Ala.1993)). Here, on October 7, 2002, the Hunters offered Wilshire $118,900 to purchase a house. The Hunters' offer expired on October 9, 2002. On October 11, 2002, Wilshire presented the unsigned addendum to James Hunter, and he signed it. [4] On November 4, 2002, James Hunter received and signed the counteroffer, which, most notably, limited the Hunters' remedies. [5] On November 13, 2002, Wilshire first acknowledged receipt of the purchase agreement (which had by that time expired), signed the addendum, and signed the counteroffer, in that order. On November 4, 2002, by signing the counteroffer, the Hunters offered to purchase the house pursuant to the terms of the counteroffer for $119,500. The terms of the counteroffer were inconsistent with the terms of the purchase agreement and the addendum. Specifically, the counteroffer states that if Wilshire is unable to convey good and insurable title to the property, Wilshire can either extend the closing date or void the contract. The purchase agreement provides that A FURTHER PERIOD OF THIRTY (30) DAYS shall be allowed for closing if: (A) the closing is delayed by reason of title defects which can be readily corrected .... (Capitalization in original.) Although the purchase agreement states that [i]f ... the title is not marketable ... [the earnest-money] deposit [is] to be refunded, that statement does not purport to limit the Hunters' remedy. However, the counteroffer limits the Hunters' remedy, in the event of a default by Wilshire, to the return of the earnest-money deposit. In this case, Wilshire was unable to convey marketable title because of numerous judgments and liens against the property and because the house encroached on an adjoining property line. In accordance with the terms of the counteroffer, Wilshire attempted to return the earnest money to the Hunters. The Hunters refused the earnest money and sued for specific performance and damages. Wilshire originated, but did not sign, the counteroffer. The counteroffer specified the manner in which it was to be accepted, stating that it shall not become a binding Contract until signed by [Wilshire]. See Paterson & Edey Lumber Co. v. Carolina-Portland, 215 Ala. 621, 626, 112 So. 245, 249 (1927); Hardwood Package Co. v. Courtney, 253 F. 929, 931 (4th Cir.1918) (an unsigned contract cannot be enforced by either of the parties, however completely it may express their mutual agreement, if it was also agreed that the contract should not be binding until signed by both of them). See also 1 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 3.34 at 487 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1993) (When one party solicits and receives an ... expression of agreement from another, clearly specifying that there is to be no contract until ... assent by some officer or representative of the solicitor, the solicitation is not itself an offer. It is a request for an offer.). On November 13, 2002, Wilshire accepted the Hunters' offer to buy the house when it signed the counteroffer. The parties' signatures evidence a mutual assent to the terms of the counteroffer. Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Hennis, 776 So.2d 105 (Ala.2000) (Assent must be manifested by something. Ordinarily, it is manifested by a signature. ). Accordingly, the counteroffer became a legally enforceable agreement on November 13, 2002, when Wilshire signed the form. The Hunters' argument that the purchase agreement and the addendum contained the parties' only legally enforceable agreement and, accordingly, that the counteroffer is not legally binding, is without merit. Even if we were to conclude, as the Hunters argue, that the purchase agreement and the addendum were legally binding, we would nonetheless conclude that the counteroffer governs the parties' rights. When parties execute successive agreements and the `two agreements cover the same subject matter and include inconsistent terms, the later agreement supersedes the earlier agreement.' Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So.2d 634, 641 (Ala.2003) (quoting CMI Int'l, Inc. v. Intermet Int'l Corp., 251 Mich.App. 125, 130, 649 N.W.2d 808, 812 (2002)). [6] The subject matter of the purchase agreement and the addendum is the house located at 5425 Washington Boulevard in Theodore. The subject matter of the counteroffer is the same house. The counteroffer limits the Hunters' remedy in the event of Wilshire's default to the return of their earnest money; the purchase agreement and the addendum do not. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment in favor of Wilshire and concluding that, in accordance with the terms of the counteroffer, the Hunters' sole remedy is the return of their earnest money.