Opinion ID: 2051750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether a contested case hearing is required by statute

Text: The charter schools argue that they are entitled to a contested case hearing because the DCAPA itself compels the Board to conduct such a hearing when it is engaged in weighing particular information and arriving at a decision directed at a party's specific rights. Petitioners, however, have misread the DCAPA and our case law by looking to that statute as the source of their purported right to a contested case hearing. Instead, the DCAPA provides that contested case proceedings must be required by a law ( other than this subchapter ). D.C.Code § 1-1502(8) (emphasis added); see also Angell v. Henneberry, 92 Md.App. 279, 607 A.2d 590, 601 (Md.1992) (the APA itself does not grant a right to a hearing). Thus, the DCAPA does not grant a right to a contested case hearing, but provides that such a right must be derived either from the School Reform Act or by constitutional mandate. See United States v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 644 A.2d 995, 998 (D.C.1994); Donnelly Assocs., supra, 520 A.2d at 277. In determining whether Congress intended for a trial-type contested case hearing to take place before the revocation of a public school charter, we begin by considering the language of the School Reform Actnot the DCAPAin order to determine if the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983) (en banc); see also Timus, supra, 633 A.2d at 758. We expect that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language... used, and we construe those words according to their plain meaning. Id. If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous and will not produce an absurd result, we will look no further. Hayes v. United States, 707 A.2d 59, 62 (D.C.1998). Readily disregarding the plain meaning of a statute creates a risk that the courts are exercising their own desires instead of those of the legislature. Berryman v. Thorne, 700 A.2d 181, 184 (D.C.1997). The language of the School Reform Act provision governing revocations provides that a charter school has the right to an informal hearing after receiving notice of the proposed revocation of its charter. D.C.Code § 38-1802.13(c). Even though neither the School Reform Act nor the legislative history defines what constitutes an informal hearing, we may infer that something less than a contested case hearing is required. Congress's reference in the statute to an informal hearing does not lend itself to any ambiguity that requires us to determine whether it may have had a contested case hearing in mind. The conclusion that a trial-type contested case hearing is not required is also supported by language contained in the notice provision indicating that the eligible chartering authority shall provide ... procedures to be followed at the hearing to the Board of Trustees of the charter school pursuant to D.C.Code § 38-1802.13(c)(3)(A). See Hotel Ass'n of Washington v. District of Columbia Minimum Wage & Indus. Safety Bd., 318 A.2d 294, 304-05 (D.C.1974) (organic act that provides for a hearing and also prescribes procedures agency should follow do[es] not comport with the notion that the statutory scheme requires a `contested case' type hearing). Thus, we conclude that congressional intent to provide for an informal hearing rather than a trial-type contested case hearing is explicit from the language of the provision. However, our conclusion that Congress did not intend that a contested case hearing take place before a charter revocation does not end our inquiry, since a contested case hearing may be required by the due process clause. See Donnelly Assocs., supra, 520 A.2d at 278 (requirement for trial-type hearing will be read into the statute to save the statute from [constitutional] invalidity) (citations omitted). Consequently, we must determine whether the due process clause is implicated when a charter is at issue and whether only a contested case proceeding prior to the charter's revocation will meet constitutional requirements.