Opinion ID: 1444254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Res Judicata and Estoppel

Text: Ottema contends that because the Division awarded extended benefits from 1992 through 1994 based on the 1985 provision, the Division is now precluded by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel from applying a different provision to his 1995 claim. In Tenorio v. State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 238 (Wyo.1997), we said: The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel incorporate `a universal precept of common-law jurisprudence   ' that a right, question or fact put in issue, and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit by the same parties or their privies. While the interest of finality served by these doctrines are the same, this court has carefully distinguished the two: [A]lthough many cases speak of res judicata in the administrative context, they actually apply collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel is the appropriate doctrine since collateral estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated issues.    Res judicata on the other hand bars relitigation of previously litigated claims or causes of action. (Citations omitted.) As in Tenorio, Ottema's 1995 application for benefits is a new claim; therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply. Id. Instead, Ottema must rely on the application of collateral estoppel, which we have expressly held to be contrary to the intent of the legislature as applied to the Division's uncontested award of benefits in a subsequent proceeding for an outstanding claim. Id., at 240. In this case, the Division did not contest Ottema's earlier claims and has not attempted to recoup the benefits paid during the previous three years. Therefore, the Division's belated application of the 1987 law to Ottema's 1995 application is not precluded by collateral estoppel. Neither is the Division barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel is a doctrine which precludes a party from asserting inconsistent positions in different judicial proceedings. Matter of Paternity of SDM, 882 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Wyo. 1994). Under this doctrine, a party who by his pleadings, statements or contentions, under oath, has assumed a particular position in a judicial proceeding is estopped to assume an inconsistent position in a subsequent action. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 848 (6th ed.1990); see also Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Wyo.1991). Whether judicial estoppel applies to administrative proceedings remains an unanswered question in our court. See Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Constr., 939 P.2d 718, 723-24, n. 1 (Wyo.1997). That issue is not determinative here, however, because in no event will judicial estoppel apply to legal conclusions based on undisputed facts. Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 445 (Wyo. 1993). There are no contested facts in Ottema's case, and his previous awards were based on the Division's erroneous legal conclusion that the 1985 law applied. Therefore, judicial estoppel is inapplicable to Ottema's claims. Moreover, we discern no public policy which favors the payment of a worker's compensation claim based on the misapplication of the law. See Tenorio, 931 P.2d at 240. In sum, neither judicial estoppel nor any other preclusive doctrine prevents the Division from asserting that W.S. XX-XX-XXX(g) (1987) controls Ottema's 1995 claim for extended benefits.