Opinion ID: 5715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Oral Confessions

Text: Naranjo argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress his oral confessions because they were involuntary and obtained through the use of coercion. A confession is voluntary if, under the 'totality of the circumstances,' the statement is the product of the accused's 'free and rational choice.' United States v. Doucette, 979 F.2d 1042, 1045 (5th Cir. 1992), quoting United States v. Rogers, 906 F.2d 189, 190 (5th Cir. 1990). On appeal, this Court must give credence to the credibility choices and findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. The ultimate issue of voluntariness, however, is a legal question, subject to de novo review. Id. The government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 21 evidence that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights and that the statements he made were voluntary. United States v. RojasMartinez, 968 F.2d 415, 417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 113 S.Ct. 828, 121 L.Ed.2d 698 (1992), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 113 S.Ct. 995, 122 L.Ed.2d 146 (1993). A confession is voluntary in the absence of official overreaching, in the form of either direct coercion or subtle psychological persuasion. Id. at 418. Courts consider a number of factors in determining whether a confession is the product of a free will. All of the circumstances are to be considered, including the following, but the presence or absence of any of these five factors need not be conclusive: (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel, and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. 22 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b). Official overreaching, with regard to the voluntariness of the waiver of rights and to the voluntariness of the confession itself, can take forms other than physical coercion. Psychological coercion can be a form of official misconduct. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Promises or inducements can taint the voluntariness of a confession. United States v. McClure, 786 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1986). Prior to trial, Naranjo filed a motion to suppress all statements of confession and statements of cooperation as being coerced. The motion was heard on Friday, February 21, 1992, and the transcript of the hearing remains under seal pursuant to an Order of the district court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district judge took the matter under advisement. On February 24, 1992, immediately prior to trial, the Court ruled on Naranjo's motion: First of all, the government (sic) denies in part and grants in part Defendant Naranjo's motion, particularly as follows. The fact that a Defendant may have post arrest cooperated with the government for some period of time is suppressed. The fact that a Defendant may have participated in telephone calls that may have been recorded or the contents of those calls is suppressed. If the government has any statements from agents or others involved that may be offered, those will be submitted for examination by the Court to determine 23 whether portions should be redacted. Counsel for the government and both Defendants shall not communicate the fact of cooperation or the Court's ruling in this respect to anyone, including other Defendants. . . . The Court is not suppressing and the motion is denied in this respect, any statements made by Defendant Naranjo in the nature of confessions. Now, I appreciate the fact that there may be reasonable dispute about what amounts to confession or whether a statement might be one of cooperation, implicate other people or potentially other people. Anything that comes close to falling in that category before the government would offer it, approach the bench for the Court to rule on it. At the trial, statements of confession were admitted through two of the government's witnesses: Jackie Grier, a DEA special agent, and Edward John Kacerosky, a U.S. Customs agent. The agents spoke to Naranjo on two separate occasions. Both agents testified that Naranjo was read his rights, that he indicated he understood them, and that he indicated he wished to talk to them. Naranjo admitted to both agents that he had knowledge of and participated in the venture that brought 1,080 kilograms of cocaine to Texas, and that the first shipment of concrete fence posts was a dry run. He also told agent Kacerosky that the ultimate destination of the cocaine was New York. 24 Agent Grier testified that Naranjo indicated to him that he knew of the existence of an additional 12,000 kilograms of cocaine in the vicinity of Miami, Florida. Grier testified that Naranjo told him that people in Florida had detected drug enforcement surveillance there and that they intended to transport the entire 12,000 kilograms to east Texas if all went well with the first shipment. Agent Kacerosky also testified that Naranjo told him of the presence of approximately 10,000 kilograms of cocaine in Miami. Naranjo told Kacerosky that he had made three trips to Miami from east Texas for the purpose of obtaining expense monies for the operation, ranging from $30,000 to $50,000 per trip. Agent Kacerosky stated that Naranjo told him the purpose of the expense monies was to rent a warehouse to set up a caleta, and to hire a person to mind the caleta.3 A defendant is entitled to a fair hearing and reliable determination of the voluntariness of a confession prior to its use at trial. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1781, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). At this hearing, both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of [the] confession [must be] actually and reliably determined. Id., 378 U.S. at 380, 84 S.Ct. 3 At this point, counsel for Restrepo objected on the grounds that the reference to a caleta implicated his client, creating a Bruton error, and moved for a mistrial. On the next day of trial, the district judge instructed the jury to disregard Agent Kacerosky's testimony regarding expense monies, the warehouse, the caleta, and a person to mind the caleta. Our discussion regarding Restrepo's objection follows. For discussion purposes as to Naranjo, we will disregard this particular jury instruction. 25 at 1783. Although the judge need not make formal findings of fact or write an opinion, his conclusion that the confession is voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967). We have reviewed the sealed transcript of the February 21, 1992, suppression hearing and find that although the judge did not make his ruling until the following Monday, at the conclusion of the hearing on Friday he made a specific finding that the confessions were made after adequate warnings and were voluntary. In addition, we find ample evidence to support the district judge's ruling. Implicit in his ruling is the factual finding that the government's witnesses were more credible than Naranjo. The government's witnesses admitted that certain promises were made to Naranjo, but that they were made toward the end of his period of cooperation, and that the confessions were made at the beginning of his period of cooperation. Naranjo submits, however, that his confessions were intertwined with his decision to cooperate. He argues that by suppressing the statements of cooperation, the district court impliedly ruled that any statements made during the period of cooperation should be suppressed. Thus, he contends, if the confessions were made during the period of cooperation, the district court erred in denying Naranjo's motion as to his confessions. Our reading of the suppression hearing transcript does not 26 support Naranjo's contention. At the beginning of the hearing, the judge stated that he was concerned with the alleged promises made to Naranjo by the government. This issue was fully developed during the hearing, both by counsel and by the judge who also questioned the witnesses. Although no explicit finding was made concerning the sequence of events, it is clear from the record as a whole that the district judge found that the promises or inducements were not made until after Naranjo's confessions. We find that the district judge's decision to credit the testimony of the government's witnesses over that of Naranjo was not clearly erroneous. We therefore agree with the ruling of the district court that the government carried its burden of showing that, under the totality of the circumstances, Naranjo's confessions were voluntary. The district court did not err in denying Naranjo's motion to suppress. C. Restrepo's Objection to the Testimony of Agent Kacerosky Prior to trial, Restrepo filed a motion to sever his trial from the trial of his co-defendant, Naranjo, which motion was denied. During the trial, Agent Kacerosky testified that Naranjo had told him about trips to Miami to pick up expense monies for this operation, which monies were to be used to rent a warehouse as a caleta, or hiding place, and to hire someone to mind the caleta. At this point, Restrepo's counsel objected. Outside the presence of the jury, Restrepo moved for a mistrial, but the district judge denied the motion. On the day following Agent Kacerosky's testimony, the judge read aloud the testimony to which 27 Restrepo's counsel had objected and instructed the jury: You will completely disregard the questions and the answers and not consider [the testimony] for any purposes and not take it into consideration at all in your deliberations. Restrepo argues that the damage done by Agent Kacerosky's testimony was irreparable, and is sufficient to entitle him to a new trial. The government argues that the instruction cured any problem that might have been created, that Naranjo's statement, as related by Kacerosky, never directly implicated Restrepo, and that, in any event, the statement could not have been a crucial factor in the jury's consideration of the case against Restrepo. Rule 14, Fed.R.Crim.P., provides in part: If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. The decision of whether a severance of defendants is warranted lies within the district court's discretion, and we do not disturb that decision unless we find abuse of that discretion. United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1035 (5th Cir. 1992). To demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion, an appellant must show that he received an unfair trial, which 'exposed [him] to compelling prejudice against which the district court was unable to afford protection.' Id., quoting United States v. Kane, 887 F.2d 28 568, 571 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1159, 107 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1990). A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is violated when (1) several co-defendants are tried jointly, (2) one defendant's extrajudicial statement is used to implicate another defendant in the crime, and (3) the confessor does not take the stand and is thus not subject to cross-examination. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1014, 90 S.Ct. 1248, 25 L.Ed.2d 428 (1970). Under these circumstances, [s]everrance of the trials is proper, but only in cases where a defendant's statement directly incriminates his or her co-defendants without reference to other, admissible evidence. United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 91, 95 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Bruton is not violated unless the co-defendant's statement directly alludes to the appellant, even if the evidence makes it apparent that the defendant was implicated by some indirect references. Id., quoting United States v. Espinoza-Seanez, 862 F.2d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 1988). Bruton issues are also reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Beaumont, 972 F.2d at 95. Restrepo argues that this was precisely the kind of problem he sought to avoid by his motion to sever. When the Bruton problem arose, Restrepo moved for a mistrial, but his motion was denied. He now contends that the district judge should be reversed and he should be granted a new trial. The government points out that Naranjo never directly mentioned Restrepo; therefore, the statement 29 cannot be said to fall within the proscription of Bruton. The Supreme Court has recently limited the application of Rule 14 in Zafiro v. United States, __U.S.__, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). The Court, reviewing a severance request based on mutually antagonistic defenses, concluded that when defendants have been joined under Rule 8, Fed.R.Crim.P., the district court should grant a severance only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro, 113 S.Ct. at 938. The Court stated that such a risk might occur when evidence is introduced that is probative of a defendant's guilt but is technically admissible only against the co-defendant. Id. The Court then concluded, however, that in such a case less drastic measures, such as a limiting instruction, will often suffice to prevent the risk of prejudice. Id. Restrepo claims that the district court should have severed his trial from the trial of Naranjo because of testimony that was admissible against Naranjo but not against Restrepo. However, since both Restrepo and Naranjo were convicted of essentially the same conspiracy, severance is not required merely because the Government introduced evidence admissible only against a codefendant. Restrepo's argument also fails under Bruton. With Bruton claims, we have held it to be critical to determine whether the out-of-court statement 'clearly implicates the co-defendant.' Foy v. Donnelly, 959 F.2d 1307, 1312 (5th Cir. 1992), quoting 30 Espinoza-Seanez, 862 F.2d at 534. Bruton is not violated unless Naranjo's statement directly alludes to Restrepo, which it clearly does not. Pointing to references in the statement that Naranjo sought to obtain a caleta and someone to mind it, Restrepo evidently contends that Bruton is implicated since the other evidence adduced at trial made Restrepo's connection apparent, thereby indirectly connecting him to Naranjo's post-trial confession. However, the rule in this circuit is that an indirect reference to a co-defendant is not enough to bring a statement within the proscription of Bruton. Furthermore, the district court gave a limiting instruction that the specific portion of the statement was to be totally disregarded. In any event, even without the limiting instruction, we find that Naranjo's statement could not have been a crucial factor in the jury's consideration of the case against Restrepo. The jury heard clear and abundant evidence implicating Restrepo in the conspiracy count and counts 5 and 6. The evidence came not only from co-conspirators Johnson, Brooks and Lanier, but also from agents who watched Restrepo's movements and discovered the hidden safes in his house, and from local citizens such as one witness who testified that the Seven Pines Cut-off Road warehouse was rented by Restrepo purportedly for an auto repair shop that never materialized, and another who rented a forklift to Restrepo so that he could lift concrete posts onto the truck that took them to Brooks' property. Thus, even if there were a Bruton error, we find it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 31 D. The Search of Restrepo's House On November 18, 1991, a search warrant was issued by a federal magistrate judge for the search of Restrepo's house. Restrepo argues that the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause. Restrepo also argues that the warrant was so broad as to constitute a general search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He contends that the evidence seized pursuant to the search should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The government acknowledges that the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not describe any drug activity occurring at Restrepo's house. The government argues, however, that the affidavit contained enough information derived from the affiant's experience and from his and other agents' observations to allow the magistrate judge to conclude that evidence of illegal drug activity could be found at the house. In addition, the government offers other bases to sustain the district court's ruling that the evidence should not be suppressed: (1) Restrepo's motion was not timely made; (2) the affidavit met the test of probable cause; and (3) the warrant met the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The government also argues that the admission into evidence of the seized items, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We engage in a two-step review of a district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant: (1) whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies; and (2) whether probable cause supported the warrant. 32 United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1992). If we decide that the good-faith exception applies, we need not reach the probable cause issue. Id. Restrepo's argument is basically the same this court addressed in United States v. Pigrum, 922 F.2d 249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 111 S.Ct. 2064, 114 L.Ed.2d 468 (1991). In Pigrum, the appellant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in the search of his house because there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The appellant also argued that the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, thereby precluding a good faith exception under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). This court first addressed the latter argument, noting that under Leon's good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, evidence will be admitted if it is obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a magistrate judge; furthermore, [t]his is so even if the affidavit on which the warrant was based is insufficient to establish probable cause. Pigrum, 922 F.2d at 252. The first issue that must be addressed, therefore, is whether the officers reasonably relied on the magistrate judge's determination in light of the information set forth in the affidavit. Id. We review de novo the reasonableness of an officer's reliance upon a warrant issued by a magistrate judge. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 321. 33 In Pigrum, we concluded that when a warrant application is supported by more than a 'bare bones affidavit' containing wholly conclusionary statements, it is appropriate for officers to rely on the warrant's validity. Pigrum, 922 F.2d at 252. A bare bones affidavit lacks the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate judge can independently determine probable cause. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 321. The affidavit supporting the warrant for the search of Restrepo's house was provided by DEA special agent Jackie Grier. It began with a lengthy statement that in his more than 11 years of experience, he had observed that drug traffickers maintain records relating to drug activity at a place such as a home, for ready access; and that contraband, drug proceeds and other indicia of drug trafficking such as coded telephone numbers, photographs and firearms are secreted in safe places such as homes. The affidavit also contained information Agent Grier learned during the course of his investigation leading to Restrepo's arrest. He described the shipments of concrete fence posts containing cocaine from Venezuela to Miami, the fact that the intended named recipient company's offices were staffed by temporary workers and did no business, and the delivery of four truckloads of concrete fenceposts to the Seven Pines Cut-off Road warehouse. He also described Restrepo's association with the warehouse as its lessee, Restrepo's purchase of the home in White Oak, Texas, in June or July of 1991, after he had leased the warehouse, and Restrepo's observed presence at the warehouse. The 34 affidavit noted the absence of any legitimate business activity or even telephone service at the warehouse, Restrepo's avowed lack of familiarity with a forklift when he took delivery of a truckload of concrete posts, and the presence of equipment in the warehouse that was consistent with a drug smuggling technique involving the use of hidden compartments in vehicles. Agent Grier described Restrepo's refusal to sign his full name legibly on the bills of lading, the delivery of more fence posts to the warehouse in November of 1991, the surveillance of the movement of those fence posts to Marion County, the arrests of Brooks, Johnson and Lanier, and the discovery of 297 pounds of cocaine at the Marion County location. Regarding Restrepo's residence, the affidavit offered the following information: 1. Restrepo obtained utilities for the residence in June or July of 1991; the house was owned by Cleo Harrell Bales; 2. The house was secluded with its only means of egress and ingress essentially being a dead-end road; 3. The Ford truck registered to Restrepo was observed traveling to this residence on October 24, 1991; 4. No other individuals had been observed there since periodic surveillance began; 5. The telephone number was in the name of Restrepo; telephone calls were made to Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, Columbia, California, and Houston; a call was made to a company near Tyler, Texas, that sold digital scales; 35 Columbia is a known source country for cocaine; South Florida is designated a High Intensity Drug Area; Miami is the location from which the fence posts originated. The affidavit also provided other information about Restrepo. He was observed by an agent at the post office when he was attempting to renew his post office box. He refused to reveal to the postal clerk the address either of his business or of his residence, and he left without renewing the post office box. The affiant stated that this behavior is consistent with the actions of drug traffickers who do not wish to be identified or associated with given locations or names during the course of unlawful activities. The affidavit also contained facts pertaining to the probable cause of cocaine being present at the warehouse and of the occurrence of drug trafficking at the warehouse. This affidavit is more than a mere bare bones affidavit. It furnished sufficient information to allow the conclusion that a fair probability existed that seizable evidence would be found in Restrepo's house. The officers' reliance on the magistrate judge's determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, and the good faith exception to Leon's exclusionary rule applies. Since the officers acted in good faith in relying on the warrant, we need not address the issue of probable cause for the warrant. However, probable cause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 'only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.' United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 1300, 1302 (5th Cir.), cert. 36 denied, ___U.S.___, 112 S.Ct. 648, 116 L.Ed.2d 665 (1991), quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). A magistrate judge's determination is entitled to great deference; furthermore, a magistrate need only have a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Id. In the affidavit on which the search warrant was based, Restrepo's criminal activity was demonstrated. He was the person the undercover agents contacted when they arrived in Texas with the cocaine, and he was the one who actually unloaded the posts containing the cocaine. On the day the posts arrived in Texas, October 24, 1991, Restrepo's truck was observed at the warehouse as well as at his residence. Restrepo's mailing address was a post office box, and he refused to give the post office the location of either his business or his residence. It thus appears to us that the magistrate judge had a substantial basis on which to conclude that a search of Restrepo's residence would uncover wrongdoing. The affidavit meets the test of probable cause.