Opinion ID: 887751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in instructing the jury regarding (A) negligence and statutory damages, (B) res ipsa loquitur, and (C) the exception to the AIDS Prevention Act's informed consent provision?

Text: ¶ 24 (A) The District Court provided the jury several instructions on negligence and damage awards. Howard argues that these instructions were insufficient because they did not allow the jury to determine whether St. James acted recklessly and they failed to inform the jury that the AIDS Prevention Act requires a defendant to pay per se damages if it finds the defendant violated the Act by acting negligently or recklessly. ¶ 25 Section 50-16-1013, MCA, allows a person aggrieved by a violation of the AIDS Prevention Act to recover against a person who negligently violates a provision of this part, damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater and against a person who intentionally or recklessly violates a provision of this part, damages of $20,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater. Section 50-16-1013(1)(a) and (1)(b), MCA. Howard maintains that the jury should have been instructed on the above language so that the jury could not only decide whether St. James acted recklessly, but also understand that the law presumes a monetary injury from a violation of the Act; Howard insists that [i]f the jury could see no [actual] damages they might presume there was no injury and, hence, no liability. ¶ 26 A district court does not need to instruct on a theory unless there is evidence to support the theory. Edie v. Gray, 2005 MT 224, ¶ 21, 328 Mont. 354, ¶ 21, 121 P.3d 516, ¶ 21. Howard fails to cite any evidence in the record which would support a jury instruction on his claim that St. James acted recklessly. Moreover, the court provided the jury with a special verdict form that asked whether St. James breach[ed] the standard of care in the medical treatment provided to Allen Howard. The jury answered in the negative. Although the court did not specifically instruct on recklessness, the jury's finding of no breach of the standard of care eliminated any possibility of recklessness. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in only instructing on negligence. ¶ 27 Additionally, Howard argues that the jury was uninformed that a finding of negligence would require an award of damages to Howard because the court did not instruct the jury on statutory damages. Given the jury's finding that St. James did not breach the standard of care, the issue of damages was moot. Christofferson v. City of Great Falls, 2003 MT 189, ¶ 51, 316 Mont. 469, ¶ 51, 74 P.3d 1021, ¶ 51. ¶ 28 (B) Howard also insists that the court should have instructed the jury on res ipsa loquitur, the doctrine that permits proof by circumstantial evidence. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence on the part of one in control of an instrumentality which causes injury when (1) the injury occurs without any fault of the injured person; (2) the instrumentality is under the exclusive control of the defendant at the time of the injury; and (3) the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if the one having such control uses proper care. Romans v. Lusin, 2000 MT 84, ¶ 32, 299 Mont. 182, ¶ 32, 997 P.2d 114, ¶ 32. ¶ 29 Howard maintains that res ipsa loquitur applies because the hospital restraints (the so-called instrumentality) were under the exclusive control of St. James. While it is possible that Howard's back injury resulted from the use of restraints, evidence also supports a finding that the seizures alone could have caused the injury. If the restraints were not necessarily the cause of Howard's injury, res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Accordingly, the court properly refused to instruct the jury on this doctrine. ¶ 30 (C) Finally, Howard argues that there was no emergency requiring HIV testing, therefore the court erred by instructing the jury that [t]here is an exception to the informed consent doctrine for emergencies.  (Emphasis added.) When analyzing instructions, we look at them as a whole. Edie, ¶ 21. An earlier instruction stated the AIDS Prevention Act's guidelines regarding when an HIV test may be ordered without informed consent: (i) the subject of the test is unconscious or otherwise mentally incapacitated; (ii) there are medical indications of an HIV-related condition; (iii) the test is advisable in order to determine the proper course of treatment of the subject; and (iv) none of the individuals listed [including a significant other] in subsection (1)(b), (1)(c), or (1)(d) exists or is available within a reasonable time after the test is determined to be advisable.... Section 50-16-1007(9)(c), MCA (emphasis added). Reviewing the instructions together, we hold that the District Court properly instructed the jury. ¶ 31 Additionally, we disagree with Howard's assertion that the court misled the jury by instructing: The fact that [Howard] and Pam Hunter are presently married does not establish Pam Hunter Howard was a `significant other' as prescribed by Montana Law in August of 1997. Howard contends that the fact that [he and Hunter] are currently married is evidence of their close relationship in August of 1997. For purposes of informed consent, the Act required Howard and Hunter to have been living in a spousal relationship in 1997. The fact that Howard and Hunter married a few years after the incident at St. James Community Hospital does not conclusively bear on their status in 1997. The jury was appropriately instructed. ¶ 32 Finally, Howard also contends that even conceding all the other requirements for [the] exception, subsection (9)(c)(iv) was not met because Hunter qualified as Howard's significant other and, since she was available, St. James should have sought her consent. As we have already noted, however, it was the jury's duty to determine whether or not Hunter qualified as a significant other. We determine there was substantial credible evidence to support the jury's verdict. See Onstad v. Payless Shoesource, 2000 MT 230, ¶ 56, 301 Mont. 259, ¶ 56, 9 P.3d 38, ¶ 56.