Opinion ID: 891580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: change in current guidelines

Text: {41} We asked the Public Defender's office to file an amicus brief, and permitted the State to respond, addressing the issue of whether we should change the current guidelines  nine months for simple cases, twelve months for cases of intermediate complexity, and fifteen months for complex cases  concerning presumptively prejudicial length of delay. In light of our conclusion that Defendant's right was not violated, we recognize that we need not address the guidelines for determining when the length of delay becomes presumptively prejudicial. However, we do so in the interest of providing guidance to the lower courts and to recognize recent changes in the administration of our criminal justice system. {42} We have provided broad guidelines for determining when the length of delay triggers further inquiry into the claim of a violation of the right to speedy trial. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, ¶ 9, 145 N.M. 242, 195 P.3d 1254. These guidelines provide a standard on which the district courts may predicate a review of the merits of a defendant's claim when the defendant shows that the length of delay has crossed the threshold of reasonable delay. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686. {43} We implemented Rule 5-604(B) NMRA in response to Barker. Rule 5-604(B), commonly referred to as the six-month rule, requires the commencement of trial in a criminal proceeding within six months of the latest of several different triggering events. Duran v. Eichwald, 2009-NMSC-030, ¶ 2, ___ N.M. ___, 210 P.3d 238 (2009). The six-month rule is designed to assure prompt disposition of criminal cases. State v. Cardenas, 2003-NMCA-051, ¶ 12, 133 N.M. 516, 64 P.3d 543 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a case management tool, the six-month rule accounts for the amount of delay considered reasonable in bringing cases to trial. Therefore, the six-month rule helps us identify when the length of delay exceeds customary promptness for bringing a case to trial. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686. {44} Over time, the minimum length of delay considered presumptively prejudicial and the six-month rule have mirrored each other. This Court first held that a six-month delay is sufficient to trigger the Barker balancing test. State v. Mendoza, 108 N.M. 446, 450, 774 P.2d 440, 444 (1989) (Whenever there is a delay of more than six months between the time of arraignment and the date of the trial, four factors are to be considered in determining whether a defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial.). In Salandre, this Court increased that threshold from six to nine months. 111 N.M. at 428, 806 P.2d 562. Salandre relied on language from Barker, stating, [ Barker ] recognized that, in a jurisdiction with a six-month rule such as New Mexico, a nine-month delay may be unacceptable under certain circumstances. Salandre, 111 N.M. at 428, 806 P.2d 562; see Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Salandre held that nine months was the minimum length of delay considered presumptively prejudicial for simple cases. Salandre, 111 N.M. at 428, 806 P.2d 562. {45} When Salandre was decided, Rule 5-604(B) required that cases be tried within six months but permitted extensions upon application to the Supreme Court. In 1998, we amended Rule 5-604 to permit the district court to grant a three-month extension before requiring parties to apply to this Court for an extension of time. Thus, the 1998 amendment reflected the conclusion in Salandre that for simple cases, nine months was the minimum length of delay considered presumptively prejudicial. {46} On August 13, 2007, we amended Rule 5-604 by increasing the amount of time that the trial court may grant as an extension from three to six months before the parties must apply to this Court. That amendment demonstrates the need for greater flexibility in the trial courts to grant extensions due to greater inherent delays involved in the prosecution of criminal cases. With that amendment we no longer require application to this Court in which the party must explain the extreme circumstances necessitating an extension until the length of delay exceeds twelve months. In contrast, our speedy trial cases have continued to indicate that a nine-month delay may be presumptively prejudicial, resulting in the anomalous possibility that a defendant's right to a speedy trial may be violated by delay that is otherwise reasonable. The lack of congruence between our speedy trial standard and Rule 5-604 fails the purpose of our guidelines, which is to provide the courts and the parties with a rudimentary warning of when speedy trial problems may arise. Salandre, 111 N.M. at 427-28, 806 P.2d 562 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {47} We hold, therefore, that one year is the appropriate guideline for determining when the length of delay for a simple case may be considered presumptively prejudicial. This is consistent with the majority of other jurisdictions, both federal and state. The federal circuit courts are of a general consensus that delay of approximately one year may be considered presumptively prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Watford, 468 F.3d 891, 901 (6th Cir.2006) (We have stated that a delay is presumed prejudicial when it exceeds one year.); United States v. Titlbach, 339 F.3d 692, 699 (8th Cir.2003) (A delay approaching a year may meet the threshold for presumptively prejudicial delay requiring application of the Barker factors.); United States v. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir.1997) (The Supreme Court has said that the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay `presumptively prejudicial' at least as it approaches one year. We shall assume, under the foregoing, that the fifteen[-]month delay in this case was `presumptively prejudicial' so as to trigger further inquiry. (citations omitted)); United States v. Walker, 92 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir.1996) (The court acknowledged that lower courts had concluded that, depending on the charges, a delay that approaches one year would be `presumptively prejudicial,' triggering the speedy trial inquiry and appeared to accept that conclusion. The 37-month delay in this case is thus sufficient to trigger the speedy trial analysis. (citations omitted)); Robinson v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 568 (5th Cir.1993) (This circuit generally requires a delay of one year to trigger speedy trial analysis.). State courts are more divided on the appropriate length of delay considered presumptively prejudicial, but the majority of states consider a delay of one year as the benchmark for presumptive prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Fischer, 744 N.W.2d 760, 770 (N.D.2008) (A delay of one year or more is `presumptively prejudicial,' triggering an analysis of the other speedy trial factors.); State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 781 N.E.2d 72, 79 (2002) (The fact that appellant was brought to trial within a year of the murders can hardly allow the delay to be characterized as `presumptively prejudicial.'); State v. Zmayefski, 836 A.2d 191, 194 (R.I.2003) (A delay longer than one year is `presumptively prejudicial.'); State v. Tiegen, 744 N.W.2d 578, 585 (S.D.2008) (Delays of over a year are presumptively prejudicial; delays of less than a year are not.). But see Murray v. State, 967 So.2d 1222, 1230 (Miss.2007) (This Court has previously stated `that any delay of eight (8) months or longer is presumptively prejudicial. ' (citation omitted)). {48} Consistent with the 2007 amendment to Rule 5-604 and the consensus of our sister states and the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, we adopt one year as a benchmark for determining when a simple case may become presumptively prejudicial. Accordingly, we also shift the guidelines for cases of greater complexity: Fifteen months may be presumptively prejudicial for intermediate cases and eighteen months may be presumptively prejudicial for complex cases. {49} We emphasize that these guidelines should not be construed as bright-line tests. Rather, they are meant to guide the district courts' determination of presumptively prejudicial delay. The situation may arise where a defendant alerts the district court to the possibility of prejudice to his defense and the need for increased speed in bringing the case to trial, i.e., the impending death of a key witness. Where that possibility is realized and the defendant suffers actual prejudice as a result of delay, these guidelines will not preclude the defendant from bringing a motion for a speedy trial violation though the delay may be less than one year. However, it will then be up to the district court to decide whether the delay was sufficient to require further inquiry into the speedy trial analysis. {50} This shift in the applicable guidelines is predicated on the 2007 amendment to Rule 5-604, which became effective on August 13, 2007. This shift, therefore, was not foreshadowed prior to that date, and the district courts were not on notice that the old guidelines did not accurately represent the amount of delay that should trigger a speedy trial inquiry. Because these time thresholds are merely guidance to the district courts, where the courts have relied on the old guidelines prior to August 13, 2007, we will not apply the new guidelines to our review on appeal. Therefore, these guidelines apply only to speedy trial motions to dismiss initiated on or after August 13, 2007. Though it would make no difference in the ultimate result, we have not applied the new guidelines in the present case, because the district court heard and ruled on Defendant's motion to dismiss on April 27, 2007.