Opinion ID: 78555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Osborne Decision

Text: Osborne was convicted in Alaska state court of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2314. He and an accomplice were charged with picking up a prostitute and then, after she demanded payment in advance, raping and severely beating her, and leaving her for dead in the snow. Id. at 2313. The victim's identification of Osborne was not as strong as Brown's identification of Cunningham in this case. The crime in Osborne happened in the evening; the victim had suffered a head injury; the first time she picked out Osborne's photo was several days after the fact, and she did so with some uncertainty. Id. at 2312-13. There was, however, other evidence of Osborne's guilt. Id. His accomplice gave a statement to police implicating both Osborne and himself, and other witnesses placed Osborne with the accomplice shortly before the crime. Id. A blue condom apparently used by the rapist was found at the crime scene, along with some pubic hairs. Id. The State tested semen from the condom using relatively imprecise DQ Alpha testing, which excluded the victim, Osborne's co-defendant, and a third suspect, and matched Osborne but also matched about 16% of the black male population. Id. The pubic hairs appeared similar to Osborne's, but they were not suitable for DQ Alpha testing. Id. at 2313-14. A more precise RFLP-DNA test was available at the time, but Osborne's attorney, who presented a mistaken-identity defense at trial, made a tactical decision not to use that test because she feared its result would inculpate him further. Id. at 2314. After his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, Osborne sought collateral review under Alaska Stat. § 12.72, Alaska's general postconviction relief statute. He claimed that further DNA testing of the semen and hairs, which he now requested under discovery rules, would prove his innocence. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 2308, J.A. at 22. The Alaska Court of Appeals held that Osborne could not obtain discovery under the state statute because the testing he sought had been available at trial, so he failed to meet the statute's requirement that the evidence be both new and diligently obtained. Osborne v. State, 110 P.3d 986, 995 (Alaska Ct.App.2005). However, the court also held that the due process clause of Alaska's constitution might allow a petitioner claiming actual innocence to obtain postconviction DNA testing even if he did not meet the requirements of the statute. Id. For that reason, the court remanded, directing the trial court to consider three factors in deciding whether Osborne had a state constitutional right to DNA testing: (1) whether the conviction rested primarily on eyewitness identification; (2) whether there was demonstrable doubt as to the identification of the perpetrator; and (3) whether scientific testing would likely be conclusive. Id. On remand, the trial court reconsidered the evidence and found that Osborne had failed to establish any of the three elements. See Osborne v. State, 163 P.3d 973, 975 (Alaska Ct.App.2007). Because other physical evidence linked Osborne to the scene and witnesses placed him with the other perpetrator, the conviction did not rest primarily on the victim's identification and there was no serious doubt about that identification. Id. at 978. The court also found that even if testing revealed someone else's DNA it would not be conclusive proof of innocence, given the extensive other evidence against Osborne and the possibility that because the condom had been discovered more than a day after the assault, it might have been left coincidentally by someone unconnected to the crime. Id. The Alaska Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's conclusions, and affirmed the denial of Osborne's petition. Id. at 982. Meanwhile, Osborne had filed a § 1983 action in federal district court. Asserting a variety of constitutional claims, he asked the court to compel the Anchorage District Attorney's Office to allow him access to the semen from the condom and the hairs, for mitochondrial and STR-DNA testing at his own expense. The district court granted summary judgment for Osborne, holding that under the unique facts of the case, he had a very limited constitutional right to DNA testing. Osborne v. District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist., 445 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1081 (D.Alaska 2006). The court noted that the testing Osborne sought had not been available at trial, that it could be done at no cost to the State, and that the result could be significant to determining guilt or innocence in proceedings for postconviction relief. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Osborne v. District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.2008). Reasoning that the prosecutorial duty under Brady v. Maryland to disclose exculpatory evidence extended to the postconviction context, the Ninth Circuit held that due process prohibited the State from denying Osborne access to biological evidence for DNA testing. Id. at 1128, 1141-42. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 129 S.Ct. at 2316. The Supreme Court held that Osborne's due process rights had not been violated. It rejected Osborne's substantive due process argument, refusing to recognize a freestanding right to DNA evidence unconnected to any underlying liberty interest. Id. at 2323. Osborne also asserted a procedural due process claim, arguing that the DNA testing was a process he needed to vindicate his liberty interest in proving his innocence and obtaining various forms of postconviction relief. Id. at 2319. The Court rejected Osborne's attempt to assert a federal liberty interest in bringing an actual innocence claim under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). Assuming without deciding that such a Herrera claim exists, the Court noted that the claim should be brought in habeas, where federal rules allowing discovery for good cause would satisfy the requirements of due process. Id. at 2321-22. It also held that Osborne did not have a liberty interest in seeking pardon or commutation, because no one is entitled to executive clemency as a matter of Alaska law. Id. at 2319. However, the Court said, where state law entitles a petitioner to have his conviction vacated upon a sufficiently strong showing of actual innocence, a liberty interest is created and the State's procedures for vindicating that interest must satisfy due process. Id. Because a criminal defendant convicted after a fair trial no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, his liberty interest is more limited and the State has more flexibility in deciding what procedures are necessary. Id. at 2320. Postconviction relief proceedings do not require the full range of procedural rights that are available at trial, and Brady v. Maryland has no application in the postconviction context. Id. at 2319-20. The Supreme Court held that a State's process for postconviction relief is constitutionally adequate unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, or transgresses any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation. Id. at 2320 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2577-78, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992)). Federal courts may not interfere unless the State's process is fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights provided. Id. [13] The Supreme Court attempted neither to define exactly the level of process required to satisfy the fundamental fairness standard nor to specify the process due. See id. (When a State chooses to offer help to those seeking relief from convictions, due process does not dictate the exact form such assistance must assume. (citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted)). Instead, the Court concluded that there was nothing inadequate about Alaska's postconviction relief procedures, either in general or specifically with regard to requests for access to DNA evidence. Id. In reaching that conclusion, the Court pointed to several factors: Alaska's statute provides a substantive right to be released on a sufficiently compelling showing of new evidence that establishes innocence; [i]t exempts such claims from otherwise applicable time limits; and it provides for discovery in postconviction proceedings. Id. The Court noted at least one state trial court had applied the statute to grant a request for DNA testing. Id. (citing Patterson v. State, No. A-8814, 2006 WL 573797, at  (Alaska Ct. App., Mar. 8, 2006)). [14] The Supreme Court decided that Alaska's limitations on postconviction relief claimsthat the evidence be newly available, that it have been diligently pursued, and that it be sufficiently materialare not inconsistent with the traditions and conscience of our people or with any recognized principle of fundamental fairness. Id. at 2320-21 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In doing so, the Court considered the fact that those limitations were similar to the ones imposed by other States' DNA evidence procedures and by federal law, thereby suggesting that the fundamental fairness of a State's procedure for postconviction relief can be measured by comparison to other jurisdictions. See id. at 2320. Statutes providing for postconviction DNA testing typically place a variety of constraints on access to DNA evidence, such as requiring a showing of materiality or a sworn statement that the applicant is innocent. Id. at 2317. Some States require that the requested testing have been technologically unavailable at the time of trial; others deny testing to applicants who had declined it at trial for tactical reasons. Id. (citing examples). Osborne clearly implies, if it does not actually hold, that such limitations are permissible. The Supreme Court acknowledged some uncertainty in the details of how claims for access to DNA might fare under Alaska's postconviction relief procedures. Id. at 2321. However, it reasoned that the State could not be blamed for this uncertainty, because Osborne ha[d] not tried to use the process provided to him by the State or attempted to vindicate the liberty interest that is now the centerpiece of his claim. Id. The Court noted that Osborne had not sought from the state courts the same STR-DNA testing he was seeking in his federal lawsuit, and that Osborne's attempt to sidestep state process put him in a very awkward position, making it difficult for him to criticize the state process. Id. If Osborne were to make such a request in state court now, he might well get itor if not, it may be for a perfectly adequate reason, just as the federal statute and all state statutes impose conditions and limits on access to DNA evidence. Id. Although it did not impose a general requirement for exhaustion of state-law remedies, the Court nevertheless held that it was Osborne's burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of state-law procedures for postconviction relief. Id. Because Alaska's procedures were adequate on their face, and Osborne had not tried them, he could not complain that they might not work in practice. Id.