Opinion ID: 6986366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Past Response Costs

Text: Prior to submitting the case to the jury, the parties stipulated that the jury would determine the availability of past response costs, and the district court would set the amount. The jury decided that response costs were appropriately awarded against Xerox, but the district court found that plaintiffs had not actually incurred any costs of response and set plaintiffs’ CERC-LA recovery for past response costs at zero. On appeal, plaintiffs point to over $135,000 they claim to have spent responding to Xerox’s contamination, and further argue that they should be able to recover certain of their attorney’s fees incurred forcing Xerox to take responsibility for the contamination on the Gussack property. Xerox argues that all of these expenses were either unnecessary of were incurred only in anticipation of litigation and are therefore not recoverable. We review the district court’s statutory interpretation as to the compensability of various response costs de novo. See National Loan Investors L.P. v. Town of Orange, 204 F.3d 407, 410 (2d Cir.2000). But we review the district court’s factual determinations deferentially. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 820 n. 14, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994) (“As .is customary in assessments of this sort, of course, trial courts will determine the exact amount of these [remediation] costs that is recoverable.”). CERCLA does not. define “response costs.” It provides that a polluter shall be liable for “any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). “Respond” and “response” are defined as “remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action.” ■ Id. § 9601(25). And “remove” and “remedial- action” are defined at length. 2 While compensable' costs are broadly defined in the statute, they do not include expenses incurred solely in preparation for litigation unless they “significantly benefited the entire cleanup effort and served a statutory purpose apart from the reallocation of costs.” Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. at 820, 114 S.Ct. 1960. Such expenses can include “[t]raeking down other responsible ... polluters,” which “increases the probability that a cleanup will be effective and get paid for.” Id. Xerox argues that because plaintiffs’ experts conducted none of their own independent testing, their work should not be considered necessary costs of response. Xerox’s interpretation of the statute is too narrow. CERCLA imposes no requirement that experts must conduct their own testing before their fees will be recoverable. We do not doubt that in many instances assessing the extent of pollution will necessarily include consultation with experts who have not conducted their own physical tests but are merely interpreting data gathered by others. There is, however, a requirement that experts’ fees be incurred not merely in preparation for litigation but as a necessary cost of remediating a site. The district court was asked, by stipulation of the parties, to determine as a factual matter the extent of plaintiffs’ experts’ fees that were recoverable response costs. The district court found that none of the fees were recoverable as they were not “ ‘closely tied to the actual cleanup’ of the Gussack Property so as to constitute a necessary cost of response. Plaintiffs were able to and did identify Xerox as a potentially responsible party without the expenditure of any of the requested consultation services.” Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we cannot say that the district court erred in its determination. And plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees were even less directly related to the actual cleanup of the property and thus fail under the Key Tronic standard. Thus, prior to litigation, plaintiffs incurred no costs compensable under CERCLA.