Opinion ID: 535165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 10 Defendant claims the trial court erred in rejecting his timely Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 motion for acquittal in which he argued that a guilty verdict would be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. He also asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. He bases both claims on the theory that no direct evidence linked him to drug selling. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, in part, provides: 11 The court on a motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. 12 The question, therefore, is whether, 13 after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 15 Concededly, the evidence linking Kimbro to drug selling in large part was circumstantial. He was found in two known crack houses, one of which was barricaded, shortly after a controlled buy was conducted at each. Drugs and weapons were found on the premises, but no one who testified at trial could say they bought drugs from Kimbro. However, it is settled that: 16 Our court on appeal will reverse a judgment for insufficiency of evidence only if this judgment is not supported by substantial and competent evidence upon the record as a whole, and that this rule applies whether the evidence is direct or wholly circumstantial. 17 United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir.1984). Accord United States v. Ellzey, 874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir.1989). 18 Having reviewed the entire record, we cannot conclude that the jury's guilty verdict was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. A rational factfinder, considering the whole evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Kimbro was a drug seller at both the Kelton and Star Street houses. He was inside both houses, one of which was barricaded, shortly after the controlled drug buys were made. A factfinder could conclude that defendant carried a firearm in relation to the drug trafficking offenses committed at each address because of the proximity of numerous loaded weapons to the defendant within the two houses, and the indisputable fact that firearms are an integral part of drug selling operations. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for acquittal and that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain defendant's convictions on all four counts.