Opinion ID: 357282
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Corps's Jurisdiction Under FWPCA.

Text: 48 The scope of regulatory authority under the FWPCA presents a substantially different issue. The district court's holding that the Corps's regulatory jurisdiction under the FWPCA is coterminous with that under the Rivers and Harbors Act, extending to the former line of MHHW of the bay in its unobstructed, natural state, is faulty. Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt, supra, 412 F.Supp. at 1102-03. In its opening brief in this appeal, Leslie properly concedes that: 49 . . . the Corps' jurisdiction under Section 404 of the FWPCA is broader than its jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act in that it encompasses existing marshlands located above as well as below the lines of mean high water and mean higher high water which are currently subject to tidal inundation. 50 Brief for Appellant Leslie Salt Co. at 60. 12 51 Leslie contends, however, that the use of the former unobstructed, natural MHHW line extends the Corps' regulatory authority significantly further than is authorized by the FWPCA, because it results in the possibility that the Corps would be able to regulate discharges onto dry lands under an Act whose purpose is to control pollution of the nation's waters. Id. 52 This contention presents a false issue. Neither the Corps nor the Sierra Club argues for the result envisioned by Leslie. Instead, they contend that under the FWPCA, 13 the case law interpreting it, and the Corps's own regulations, neither the MHW nor the MHHW line marks the full limit of the Corps's jurisdiction to regulate the pollution of the waters of the United States. The appellees, however, agree with appellant Leslie that, as stated in the Sierra Club's brief, 53 (i)f any portions of Leslie's property were in fact dry, solid upland as of the date of the passage of the FWPCA, therefore, not subject to being returned to their former natural condition of periodic tidal inundation should the artificial obstructions be abated, that property would fall outside the Corps' Section 404 jurisdiction . . . . 54 Brief for Appellee Sierra Club at 84. 55 Where the parties differ is on the question of whether the Corps's jurisdiction covers waters which are no longer subject to tidal inundation because of man-made obstructions such as Leslie's dikes. These are the waters which the district court apparently wanted to include under the aegis of the FWPCA through the use of the historic MHHW line in its unobstructed, natural state. 56 There are at least two problems with the district court's solution to the issue of Corps authority over Leslie's salt ponds. First, it goes beyond the necessities of this case. Although the appellees insist that the court did not mean to include fast land, or improved solid upland within the ambit of its decision, its order is in fact ambiguous. It simply states that: 57 Pursuant to the FWPCA the Corps may require permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material up to the line of MHHW in its unobstructed natural state, as defined in effect in the Corps' Public Notices 71-22 and 71-22(a) . . . . 58 Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Co., supra, 412 F.Supp. at 1104. 59 Public Notice No. 71-22(a), published on January 18, 1972, restricts the permit requirement for new work in diked areas below former MHHW to unfilled portions thereof. 14 The court's order, on the other hand, leaves open the possibility of an interpretation to which appellant objects and upon which appellee does not insist. 60 Second, and much more important, the court below actually placed undue limits on the FWPCA when it stated that the geographical extent of the Corps' jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act is coterminous with that under FWPCA. Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Co., supra, 412 F.Supp. at 1102. It is clear from the legislative history of the FWPCA that for the purposes of that Act, Congress intended to expand the narrow definition of the term navigable waters, as used in the Rivers and Harbors Act. 15 This court has indicated that the term navigable waters within the meaning of the FWPCA is to be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation under the Commerce Clause. California v. Environmental Protection Agency, 511 F.2d 963, 964 n.1 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Environmental Protection Agency v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 96 S.Ct. 2022, 48 L.Ed.2d 578 (1976) (Congress clearly meant to extend the Act's jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. . . .). See United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F.Supp. 1181 (D.Ariz.1975); United States v. Holland, supra, 373 F.Supp. 665 (M.D.Fla.1974). Also in Phelps Dodge, supra, the court interpreted the FWPCA broadly in finding that: 61 . . . a legal definition of navigable waters or waters of the United States within the scope of the (Federal Water Pollution Control) Act includes any waterway within the United States also including normally dry arroyos through which water may flow, where such water will ultimately end up in public waters such as a river or stream, tributary to a river or stream, lake, reservoir, bay, gulf, sea or ocean either within or adjacent to the United States. 62 Phelps Dodge, supra, 391 F.Supp. at 1187. See also, United States v. Holland, supra, 373 F.Supp. at 670-676. 63 The water in Leslie's salt ponds, even though not subject to tidal action, comes from the San Francisco Bay to the extent of eight to nine billion gallons a year. We see no reason to suggest that the United States may protect these waters from pollution while they are outside of Leslie's tide gates, but may no longer do so once they have passed through these gates into Leslie's ponds. Moreover, there can be no question that activities within Leslie's salt ponds affect interstate commerce, since Leslie is a major supplier of salt for industrial, agricultural, and domestic use in the western United States. Much of the salt which Leslie harvests from the Bay's waters at the rate of about one million tons annually enters interstate and foreign commerce. 64 Our suggestion that the full extent of the Corps's FWPCA jurisdiction over the waters of the United States is in some instances not limited to the MHW or the MHHW line is reinforced by regulations published by the Corps on July 19, 1977 and found at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2, as published at 42 Fed.Reg. 37144-37145. 16 65 Without determining the exact limits of the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction under the FWPCA, we find that the regulations at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 are reasonable, consistent with the intent of Congress, and not contrary to the Constitution. We therefore hold that the Corps's jurisdiction under the FWPCA extends at least to waters which are no longer subject to tidal inundation because of Leslie's dikes without regard to the location of historic tidal water lines in their unobstructed, natural state. We express no opinion on the outer limits to which the Corps's jurisdiction under the FWPCA might extend. 66 Our holdings with respect to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and the FWPCA dispose of the declaratory judgment sought by Leslie in its case. Any claims by Leslie, which may be engendered by these holdings, and which are not also involved in Sierra Club's case, whether based on equitable considerations, estoppel, or surrender, must be made and considered in a separate and independent proceeding.