Opinion ID: 2691462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tax Commissioner’s Cross-Appeal

Text: 1. First and Second Propositions of Law on Cross-Appeal {¶ 20} The tax commissioner’s first three propositions of law are in support of his cross-appeal. The arguments asserted in his first proposition of law are identical to arguments that he raised in the first and second propositions of law of his motion to dismiss. Our disposition of the motion to dismiss in effect disposed of the commissioner’s first proposition of law on cross-appeal. See Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Levin, 122 Ohio St.3d 1231, 2009-Ohio-3477, 911 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 3 (rejecting argument that a rule-review proceeding before the BTA is quasi- 6 January Term, 2010 legislative in character) and ¶ 4 (rejecting argument that appellants may not use the BTA’s rule-review proceeding to challenge the constitutionality of a rule or statutory classification). {¶ 21} The commissioner’s second proposition of law was also resolved by our disposition of the motion to dismiss. See Ohio Apt. Assn., 122 Ohio St.3d 1231, 2009-Ohio-3477, 911 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 5 (rejecting argument that rules are not ripe for review until a statutory classification has been declared unconstitutional). 2. Third Proposition of Law on Cross-Appeal {¶ 22} In the commissioner’s third proposition of law, he claims that appellants lack standing to challenge the reasonableness of Ohio Adm.Code 570325-18 through the rule-review process in R.C. 5703.14(C) because the actual or potential injury to appellants is caused by the enabling statute and not the rule. The commissioner’s reasoning is as follows: Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-18(A), which withholds the 10 percent rollback from appellants, merely replicates R.C. 319.302(A)(1); thus, even if the rule is deemed unconstitutional, R.C. 319.302 remains intact, and so does the injury to appellants. {¶ 23} Although standing was not raised in the commissioner’s motion to dismiss, we find that our decision on that motion forecloses his standing argument. The commissioner’s standing claim is premised on his continuing argument – raised in his motion to dismiss and the first two propositions of law of his merit brief – that a rule-review proceeding cannot be used to attack the constitutionality of the underlying statute that authorized the rules under review. But we rejected the argument when we denied the commissioner’s motion to dismiss. In essence, we held that appellants’ challenges to the administrative rules inherently implicate the rule’s conformity with the underlying statute, and to that extent, the statute itself has been placed at issue. Ohio Apt. Assn., 122 Ohio St.3d 1231, 2009-Ohio-3477, 911 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 4 (rejecting argument that appellants may not use the BTA’s rule-review proceeding to challenge the 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO constitutionality of a statutory classification) and ¶ 5 (rejecting argument that a rule-review proceeding is not ripe until a statutory classification has been declared unconstitutional). {¶ 24} R.C. 5703.14(C) also cuts against the commissioner’s standing argument. This provision specifies that an applicant for rule review must be a person “who has been or may be injured by the operation of the rule.” The injury requirement ensures that rule review at the BTA involves a genuine case or controversy. And although the commissioner argues that appellants have not demonstrated any injury from Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-18 independent of R.C. 319.302, he does not dispute or otherwise challenge appellants’ contention that they have suffered economic injury from the loss of the 10 percent property-tax rollback. {¶ 25} We hold that the tax commissioner has not demonstrated that appellants lack standing under R.C. 5703.14(C) to prosecute this matter. Therefore, we reject the commissioner’s third proposition of law. 3. Conclusion — Cross-Appeal {¶ 26} Based on the foregoing, we hold that none of the arguments raised on cross-appeal has merit. Accordingly, the tax commissioner’s cross-appeal is overruled.