Opinion ID: 1772790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: was there a miranda violation?

Text: At issue is the admissibility of a statement made by Johnson to investigator Slack on the night of the crime. Shortly after midnight, deputy Boyd, while at the Johnson apartment, read the Miranda rights to Christine Johnson. He then took a statement from her. That statement was not introduced and is not before us. One hour later, Slack took a statement from Johnson. Slack testified that he gave Johnson all the Miranda warnings. This was verified by coroner Hayes, who was present. However, the taped interview and the transcript introduced into evidence make it plain that Slack never told Johnson that any statement she made could be used against her. Johnson now contends that this lapse by Slack is fatal to the admission of the statement given to him by her, and, furthermore, that she did not understand the warnings given her. The trial judge found from the evidence at the suppression hearing that Boyd had read Johnson all of her rights and that Slack had explained her rights to her. Johnson herself testified that they told her she had the right to remain silent and that anything that she said would be used against her. From this, the trial judge found that Johnson had made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her rights. The test used to determine if there was an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is: (1) The Miranda warnings must have been given; (2) When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of an inculpatory statement, the state must prove such beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) The trial judge must determine from the totality of the circumstances if there has been a sufficient waiver; (4) The determination of the trial judge will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous, as being against the substantial evidence. Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952 (Miss. 1985); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1984). We have repeatedly upheld determinations of waiver when, at the suppression hearing, the officers who were present when the statement was given testified that the Miranda warnings were read, that there was no coercion, threats or promises of leniency, and that the accused seemed to understand the warnings. Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss. 1979); Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984). The only issue we must address is the effect of Slack's apparent failure to comply with Criminal Rule 1.03. A careful reading of that Rule disposes of this issue. Rule 1.03, in addition to setting out the six warnings which must be given, in pertinent part, says: These warnings must be made after the person is placed under arrest or physically detained prior to questioning. The Miranda warnings should be given prior to any subsequent interrogation session with the person in custody even though the warnings were given in the prior interrogations. When the warnings must be given allows no wiggle room. However, when they should be given allows some very slight room for interpretation, particularly when the two descriptive words are used in such close conjunction as they are here. That should conjures up an obligation, if not a duty, cannot be denied. We are of the opinion that Slack had a duty to readvise Johnson of her rights. He was obliged to do so. We cannot say, however, that upon the narrow limits of the facts presented in this case, Slack's breach of this duty rendered the statement inadmissible. There were no threats, there was no coercion, there were no promises of leniency. Johnson was not questioned in the threatening confines of a jail cell. Johnson appears to have understood the warning. This becomes manifest when Johnson herself testified that she was told she had a right to remain silent, anything she said would be used against her. She knew and understood the very warning she now complains was not given to her. Both interrogations took place in her apartment within an hour of one another. We cannot say that the trial judge was clearly wrong when he found from the totality of the circumstances that Johnson had intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived her rights. The question is a close one, and our determination that no reversible error took place here should not be interpreted as a recession from the requirements of Rule 1.03. The state has not suggested nor requested such a retreat in this case, and none is present.