Opinion ID: 1608372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whistleblower claim

Text: FEPA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against its employee on the basis of the employee's opposition to an unlawful practice. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-1114 (Reissue 1998). The district court assumed that the practice in this statute referred to any unlawful practice of the employer. The parties do not dispute that the alleged unlawful acts which Wolfe opposedillegal drug usewere those of his fellow employees and not of his employer, BD. Whether FEPA protects this type of opposition is a question of first impression in Nebraska. The text of § 48-1114, under which Wolfe brings his first claim, states in its entirety: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his or her employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he or she (1) has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, (2) has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the act, or (3) has opposed any practice or refused to carry out any action unlawful under federal law or the laws of this state. In discerning the meaning of a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. Wilder v. Grant Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 0001, 265 Neb. 742, 658 N.W.2d 923 (2003). Seen in context of the entire act and in light of the apparent purposes the act is meant to serve, the practice in § 48-1114(3) refers to an unlawful practice of the employer. The statute's purpose is not served by giving an extra layer of protection from discharge to those employees who happen to voice their opposition to any manner of unlawful activity. While it may be unfair in many instances to disadvantage an employee for his or her vocal opposition to unlawful activities unrelated to the employment, FEPA `is not a general `bad acts' statute.' See Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 176 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir.1999) (speaking of analogous title VII employment discrimination act). See, also, Little v. United Technologies, 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir.1997) (title VII); Crowley v. Prince George's County, Md., 890 F.2d 683 (4th Cir.1989) (title VII); Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138 (9th Cir.1978) (title VII). There are many other abuses not proscribed by FEPA-type acts, including discharge for opposition to racial discrimination by other employees against the public, see Wimmer, supra, and discharge for opposition to discrimination based on an employee's sexual orientation, see Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Center, 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir.2000) (title VII). The evil addressed by § 48-1114(3) is the exploitation of the employer's power over the employee when used to coerce the employee to endorse, through participation or acquiescence, the unlawful acts of the employer. The legislative history bears out this interpretation. The 1985 amendment adding subsection (3) to § 48-1114 was intended to provide some protection for employees in the private sector who are asked by their employer or labor union to do something that is illegal. Statement of Purpose, L.B. 324, Committee on Business and Labor, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 13, 1985). Both the text of the rule and reasonable policy dictate that an employee's opposition to any unlawful act of the employerwhether or not the employer pressures the employee to actively join in the illegal activityis protected under § 48-1114(3). Therefore, since a § 48-1114(3) violation must include either the employee's opposition to an unlawful practice of the employer or the employee's refusal to honor an employer's demand that the employee do an unlawful act, Wolfe has failed to present a prima facie case for his first cause of action. The only unlawful act he alleges is illegal drug use by BD's employees. BD is not alleged to have been involved in the drug use or even to have endorsed its use. Liberally construed, Wolfe's allegations might include the breach of some duty of BD to act on credible information of drug abuse on its worksite. However, Wolfe's reports were not credible, being completely unsubstantiated by anything but hearsay and conjecture. No duty arises from such completely unsubstantiated information. Furthermore, the record lacks any allegation that Wolfe voiced any opposition to this supposed inaction. His opposition was consistently framed as being directed toward the alleged illegal drug use alone. Therefore, Wolfe's first assignment of error is without merit. There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Wolfe engaged in a protected activity. The court did not err in granting summary judgment regarding Wolfe's first cause of action.