Opinion ID: 367068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Violations as to the Information Sought

Text: 12 The Board reversed the ALJ on the conclusions drawn from the facts. The ALJ concluded that the Company fulfilled its obligation to produce information concerning the insurance plans by supplying the corporate cost. He decided that the Company had no obligation to produce the average employee costs for the benefit plan since the Union could, in his view, calculate this information from Company pamphlets. Finally, the ALJ concluded that the Company satisfied its duty to provide the information regarding the number of unit employees in the Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan when it proffered a figure reflecting unit and nonunit beneficiaries. The Board reviewed the same evidence and determined that in none of these areas did the Company fulfill its statutory obligation to bargain in good faith. 13 As we explained in NLRB v. Matouk Industries, Inc., 582 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1978): In such cases the Board's special understanding is at least as important an aid in interpreting the facts as the ALJ's immersion in the case. Id. at 128. See also NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110, 117-18 (1st Cir. 1978). 14 Since the Board's review was based on the same facts and its interpretation is a reasonable one, we will not set it aside. Matouk,supra, at 129. We are satisfied that the Board adequately dealt with the findings of the ALJ. See Frattaroli v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 15, 18 and 19 n. 7 (1st Cir. 1978), where the Board failed to justify its finding which was contrary to the ALJ's, and consequently we did not enforce its order. 15 Upon examining Borden's argument on this first issue, we note with some puzzlement the novel interpretation it gives to NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 76 S.Ct. 753, 100 L.Ed. 1027 (1956). The Company takes one line from Truitt at 153, 76 S.Ct. at 756, that (e)ach case must turn upon its particular facts, and attempts to use this as a springboard for leaping over all contrary legal precedent. By emphasizing the purported uniqueness of this factual situation, the Company dismisses peremptorily any unfavorable holding without citing any cases to support its position. We feel it necessary to tread our way through the applicable law. 16 The employer has a general obligation to provide relevant information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 1123, 59 L.Ed.2d 333 (1979); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967); Western Mass. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1978). 17 The Board found that the Company's refusal to break down the corporate wide costs and to provide information concerning the insurance premiums amounted to a refusal to bargain collectively. This finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record and is in accord with the applicable law. The Board noted that in a letter of July 22, 1974, from Borden's corporate labor counsel to the NLRB concerning a prior dispute, the Company was able to pinpoint the ratio between premiums paid and the cost of claim payments specifically for the Leominster plant. 2 The Board considered the testimony of the Company's witness, Brenning, who admitted that Borden analyzes the costs of benefit programs for a particular facility for some purposes. He also testified that he met with Borden's director of employee benefits, Dennis Kiris, on September 6, 1976, in response to the Union's request for the Leominster costs. Brenning met with the Union negotiators on September 8, 1976, and informed them that he could furnish only the corporate wide costs. Despite the Union's persistent requests in the ensuing months of negotiation for the Leominster costs, Brenning did not attempt to obtain further information from Company headquarters as to reasons why the corporate costs could not be allocated nor did he explore alternatives. 18 The blanket refusal of the Company's chief negotiator to do more than repeat to the Union the Company's statement that unit figures were not available does not evince a good faith bargaining effort. As noted in San Diego Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977), where the requested information is intrinsic to the core of the employer-employee relationship, and the employer refuses to provide requested information, the employer has the burden to prove either lack of relevance or to provide adequate reasons why he cannot, in good faith, supply the information. Borden failed to shoulder this burden. 19 Relying on General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964), Vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 366, 86 S.Ct. 528, 15 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966), Enforced 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), Cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965, 90 S.Ct. 995, 25 L.Ed.2d 257 (1970), the Board held that Borden did not meet its obligation to obtain the requested information, to investigate alternative methods for obtaining the information, or to explain or document the reasons for its unavailability. The Company disparages the Board's reasoning, stating in conclusory fashion that neither the letter of its counsel nor the testimony of its witness, Brenning, supports the Board's finding that the Company had cost information available for the Leominster plant. Additionally, the Company presses us to distinguish both General Electric Co., supra, 150 N.L.R.B. 192, and NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1960), also relied upon by the Board, on the basis that in both of these cases the charged companies refused to divulge any of the information requested, while, here, Borden did release the corporate wide cost figures. 20 Borden misinterprets the holdings of these two cases, as well as the reading given them by the Board. The Board does not posit, as the Company states in its brief, that the employer has an obligation to furnish information in the exact form requested. Rather, the Board correctly emphasizes that the Company has an obligation to bargain in good faith. That duty, under both General Electric Co. and Swift, imposes on the Company an obligation to make a reasonably diligent effort to obtain relevant information. The Company's attempt to slough off its responsibility to bargain in good faith by claiming that it did in the main provide the Union with some information fails. The law is that a Company does not meet its obligation of disclosure by providing only some of the relevant data. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366, 371 (3d Cir. 1967), Cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1039, 88 S.Ct. 777, 19 L.Ed.2d 829 (1968). 21 The Board rejected the Company's position that the cost figures sought could be determined by the Union from the information furnished by the Company to the employees. Based on The Kroger Company, 226 N.L.R.B. 512 (1976), it found that the availability of the information from other sources did not relieve Borden of its obligation to furnish the requested figures. The Board also noted that the alternative sources pointed to by Borden, the Company brochures and the employees' individual pay stubs, did not contain all the requisite data, since to arrive at the average cost per employee per hour, the Union needed the annual earnings of each employee. Concededly, the Union could have polled each and every one of the one hundred thirty odd bargaining unit members to calculate this figure, but recourse to the Company was simpler, more efficient, and seemingly not overly burdensome for the Company. The union is under no obligation to utilize a burdensome procedure of obtaining desired information where the employer may have such information available in a more convenient form. Kroger, supra, 226 N.L.R.B. at 513. 22 The Company would distinguish Kroger from this case on the basis that the critical facts there were that the Company failed to respond to the Union's request. Borden does not have a clear focus of the holding on Kroger. Here, as there, the critical facts are that the Company deprived the Union of information which was readily available to the employer and would have been more burdensome for the Union to acquire. While the Company's failure to timely respond to the Union's request for information was a factor considered by the Board in Kroger, the linchpin of the holding is that a company may not play dog-in-the-manger just to put the Union through the hoops. 23 We affirm the holdings of the Board as to the section 8(a)(5) and (1) violations.