Opinion ID: 2559278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation and Application of the Use Tax Statutes

Text: [¶ 8] The purpose of the Maine use tax is to diminish the incentive to purchase goods for use in Maine at out-of-state locations where there are lower, or no, sales taxes. Brent Leasing Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 2001 ME 90, ¶ 11, 773 A.2d 457, 460-61. It is a tax that serves to minimize unfair competition between intrastate and interstate sales of tangible personal property. See id. at 460 (quotation marks omitted). Personal property purchased outside of Maine and brought into Maine for use is therefore subject to the use tax, which serves as a complement to the sales tax. See id.; John Swenson Granite, Inc., 685 A.2d at 428. To prevent an overbroad application of the use tax, the Legislature established certain exemptions from the use tax for instances where the use of personal property in Maine is insufficient to justify use taxation. See generally 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760 (1990 & Supp.2002). [¶ 9] The applicability of the use tax and exemptions from that tax to the Blue Yonder aircraft requires a review of the statutes that were in place at the time that the taxes were imposed, in light of the purpose of the use tax to reduce unfair competition between intrastate and interstate sales of tangible personal property. Brent Leasing Co., 2001 ME 90, ¶ 11, 773 A.2d at 460 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 10] When we interpret a tax statute, the plain meaning of the statute controls if the statute is unambiguous. See Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 2001 ME 11, ¶ 9, 765 A.2d 566, 569. To resolve any ambiguity, we look to the legislative history of the statute to determine its meaning. See Schaefer v. State Tax Assessor, 2008 ME 148, ¶ 16, 956 A.2d 710, 713. In our interpretation, we seek to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results. Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 2001 ME 11, ¶ 9, 765 A.2d at 569. Words in a statute must be given meaning and not treated as meaningless and superfluous. Id. We will not read additional language into a statute. Id. As noted above, because the Superior Court is directed by statute to rule on questions of law de novo, we do not accord any heightened deference to the Assessor in interpreting the tax statutes. See Enerquin Air, Inc., 670 A.2d at 928-29. [¶ 11] With these rules of construction in mind, we first examine the two exemptions asserted by Blue Yonder that governed in-state purchases followed by delivery or transport outside of Maine. See 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(23-C), (82). We then analyze the applicability of the remaining exemption, which applied to certain property purchased outside of Maine. See id. § 1760(45)(B).
[¶ 12] Blue Yonder contends that subsections (23-C) and (82) applied equally to sales and use taxation. It bases its argument on the introductory language of section 1760, which stated, Subject to the provisions of section 1760-C, no tax on sales, storage or use may be collected upon or in connection with the enumerated exemptions. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760 (Supp. 2002). [¶ 13] We agree with the Superior Court that we must not interpret the statutes in a manner that would render some of the language superfluous and meaningless. See Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 2001 ME 11, ¶ 9, 765 A.2d at 569; see also S. Portland Civil Serv. Comm'n v. City of S. Portland, 667 A.2d 599, 601 (Me.1995) (stating that a more specific statute takes precedence over a more general one). Applying these principles, we read the two exemptions pursuant to their plain language and conclude that they applied only to in-state sales, notwithstanding the prefatory language of section 1760. See 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(23-C), (82). [¶ 14] The exemption set forth in section 1760(23-C)(C) applied when an aircraft was purchased by a nonresident and intended to be driven or transported outside the State immediately upon delivery. Based on the language of the exemption, it was applicable only when the purchase of the aircraft occurred in Maine and the aircraft was immediately taken from Maine to an out-of-state location. Because of this language, the exemption necessarily applied exclusively to in-state sales and was not applicable to the imposition of use taxation. [¶ 15] Similarly, section 1760(82) exempted from taxation [s]ales of tangible personal property when the seller delivers the property to a location outside this State. This exemption eliminated sales taxation of property purchased in Maine but delivered to a location outside of Maine. An interpretation of subsection (82) that made it applicable to any property purchased and delivered outside of Maine would entirely thwart the purpose of the use tax. As did the Superior Court, we avoid this absurd result by reading the statute to apply only when the property has been purchased in-state and delivered outside the state. See Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 2001 ME 11, ¶ 9, 765 A.2d at 569.
[¶ 16] Ultimately, the only exemption cited by Blue Yonder that could exempt the aircraft at issue here from use taxation was set forth in section 1760(45)(B), which exempted from taxation [s]ales of property purchased and used by the present owner outside the State . . . [f]or more than 12 months. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(45)(B). The statute as then written did not indicate the quantity of out-of-state use during the twelve-month period that would trigger the exemption. [¶ 17] The tax exemption articulated in subsection (45)(B) was inherently ambiguous. Evidently in recognition of this lack of clarity, the exemption was recently amended to provide guidance on the issue that we must resolve in this appeal. See P.L.2005, ch. 519, § EE-1 (effective Jan. 1, 2007) (codified as subsequently amended at 36 M.R.S. § 1760(45) (2010)). [4] Because the clarifying amendment was not in effect when Blue Yonder purchased the aircraft, however, we must address the statutory ambiguity that existed at the time to determine how much of the first twelve-month period the aircraft must have spent outside of Maine for the exemption to apply. [¶ 18] The ambiguous language of the statute could be read to indicate either of two extremes: that the exemption would apply (1) if the aircraft was used outside the state at any time during the first twelve months, or (2) only when the aircraft was used exclusively outside the state for the first twelve months. [¶ 19] It would be absurd to interpret the statute to exempt property from use taxation based on any use of the property outside of Maine within the first twelve months after purchase. See Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 2001 ME 11, ¶ 9, 765 A.2d at 569. Such a reading would permit avoidance of the use tax simply by transporting property outside of Maine once within twelve months after its out-of-state purchase. [¶ 20] It would be equally illogical to conclude that the Legislature intended for the tax exemption to apply only if the aircraft was used exclusively outside of Maine during the first twelve months. See id. The Legislature cannot have intended, for instance, to impose a use tax on any aircraft that landed in Maine briefly for refueling or a single, short visit. Such taxation would be inconsistent with the purpose of a use tax to serve as a complement to the sales tax, see John Swenson Granite, Inc., 685 A.2d at 428. [¶ 21] Further, when we examine the statutory context of subsection (45)(B), see Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 2001 ME 11, ¶ 9, 765 A.2d at 569, we observe that, in other portions of section 1760, the Legislature explicitly authorized exemptions for items that were intended to be used exclusively in certain ways. See 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(21) (Supp.2002) (exempting certain automobiles used exclusively by . . . schools in driver education programs (emphasis added)); 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(32) (Supp.2002) (exempting [s]ales of machinery and equipment for use by the purchaser directly and exclusively in research and development in the experimental and laboratory sense (emphasis added)). Because the Legislature did not require use exclusively outside of Maine in the exemption we construe today, we do not read in that additional language. See Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 2001 ME 11, ¶ 9, 765 A.2d at 569. [¶ 22] Having rejected the two interpretations at the extremes, we must determine how to construe the statute in a reasonable manner that avoids absurd results. See id. In the absence of legislative guidance, and taking into account the purpose of use taxation, we conclude that the subsection (45)(B) exemption from the use tax applied if the use of the aircraft outside of Maine was sufficiently substantial to make unjust the imposition of a use tax in Maine. Although the parties seek a more categorical determination from us, we decline to establish any bright line. Determining whether the use outside of Maine was substantial will require a careful examination of the unique facts of each case. [¶ 23] Here, the Assessor does not dispute that the aircraft at issue was purchased outside of Maine and was registered in Massachusetts. The record reflects that the plane was present in Maine for at least twenty-one full days in the twelve-month period after purchase and for as many as twenty-five dates, including partial days. Those Maine trips included flights for the delivery of ill or injured patients to Massachusetts through the Angel Flight Program. Thus, the aircraft was within Maine for six or seven percent of its first twelve months. [¶ 24] In terms of the exemption, the aircraft was used by the present owner outside the State during roughly ninety-four percent of the first twelve months after purchase. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(45). We cannot agree with the Assessor's position that an aircraft that is used outside the State for about ninety-four percent of its first year of use does not qualify for the exemption. Rather, applying a reasonable interpretation of the exemption, as it existed at the time, we hold that subsection (45)(B) exempted Blue Yonder's aircraft from taxation because Blue Yonder used the aircraft outside of Maine for the first twelve months after purchase, with the exception of only six or seven percent of the year. The use of the aircraft outside of Maine during the first twelve months was, therefore, sufficiently substantial to make the use tax exemption provided in subsection (45)(B) applicable. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court entered on the Business and Consumer Docket and remand for the reversal of the use tax and interest. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Business and Consumer Docket for remand to the State Tax Assessor with instructions to reverse all use tax and interest assessed on Blue Yonder for the Cirrus aircraft purchased in 2002. LEVY, J., with whom MEAD, J., joins, dissenting. [¶ 25] I agree with the Court's analysis with respect to the exemptions from the use tax contained in 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(23-C)(C) and (82) (Supp.2002). I also agree with the Court's conclusion that the exemption established in 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(45)(B) (Supp.2002) is ambiguous because it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. See Competitive Energy Servs., LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2003 ME 12, ¶ 15, 818 A.2d 1039, 1046. I disagree, however, with the Court's construction of subsection (45)(B) so as to treat property used in Maine during the twelve months following an out-of-state purchase as exempt from taxation unless the use in Maine is shown to have been sufficiently substantial to justify imposition of the tax. 2011 ME 49, ¶¶ 22-24, 17 A.3d 667. Because the Legislature did not adopt a substantiality test when it enacted this law, and the Court offers no guidance as to where or how to draw the line between in-state use that is sufficiently substantial and that which is not, I respectfully dissent. [¶ 26] Section (45)(B) exempts from use taxation [s]ales of property purchased and used by the present owner outside the State . . . [f]or more than 12 months[.] To construe the statute, I look to the Legislature's general definition of the word use in 36 M.R.S. § 1752(21) (2010): `Use' includes the exercise in this State of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to its ownership[.] Subsection (45) also specifically defines use for its purposes as not includ[ing] storage, but meaning actual utilization of the property for a purpose consistent with its design. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(45). It follows that one who exercises any right or power over property and actually utilizes it for its designed purpose in this State at any time during the twelve-month period following a purchase is not exercising that right or power over the property outside the State . . . for more than twelve months. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(45)(B). Because Blue Yonder exercised rights incident to its ownership of its airplane in Maine for a period of no less than twenty-one days during the first twelve months of ownership, it is not entitled to an exemption from the use tax. [¶ 27] There is nothing absurd or illogical about the preceding construction. It may or may not be sound tax or economic policy to levy the use tax against property used in Maine for as little as a day or two during the twelve-month period following an out-of-state purchase, but those are judgments to be made by the Legislature, not this Court. [5] Further, we need not decide whether a truly de minimis use of an airplane in Maine, such as a single brief stop for refueling, would disqualify a taxpayer from taking the exemption. That scenario is not presented by this case. Moreover, we should not reject a construction of a statute that is fully consonant with the words enacted by the Legislature and avoids the need for any judicial embellishment like the Court's substantiality requirement based upon nothing more than the prospect that the construction could produce an absurd or illogical result if we are ever called upon to apply it to an extreme and therefore unlikely scenario. [¶ 28] The Legislature amended subsection (45) effective January 1, 2007, to specify that, as applied to aircraft, the exemption is available when the aircraft is present in this State for no more than twenty days during the first twelve months of ownership. P.L.2005, ch. 519, § EE-1 (effective Jan. 1, 2007) (codified and subsequently amended at 36 M.R.S. § 1760(45)(A-3) (2010)). The Legislature did not give the amendment retroactive effect. This change in the law was wholly within the province of the Legislature, and we should defer to its choice to apply the amendment prospectively only. Instead, the Court retroactively revises the earlier version of the exemption by adding a substantiality test in an effort to ameliorate what may be a harsh outcome in this case. Ironically, even under the current exemption as modified by the Legislature, Blue Yonder, LLC, would not be entitled to claim the exemption. [¶ 29] I would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.