Opinion ID: 660188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: admission of other instances of fraud

Text: 60 Console and Curcio argue that the admission of prejudicial evidence of prior bad acts in violation of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) taints their convictions. 16 First, they challenge the admission of firm files containing allegedly inflated bills submitted to the firm by doctors other than Markoff. Console Br. at 34. Four guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court govern the admission of prior bad acts: 61 (1) the evidence must have a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) it must be relevant under Rule 402; (3) its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) the court must charge the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it is admitted. 62 United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir.1992) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1502, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). Rule 404(b) provides that: 63 [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 64 We review the district court's decision to admit evidence of prior bad acts for abuse of discretion. Sampson, 980 F.2d at 986 (citing United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 389 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821, 110 S.Ct. 78, 107 L.Ed.2d 44 (1989)). 65 Console and Curcio argue that the files containing bills submitted by other doctors were not introduced for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) and were irrelevant under Rule 402. We, however, disagree. Although the prosecutor may not have clearly articulate[d] a way in which the tendered evidence logically tend[ed] to establish or refute a material fact in issue, the court did. It held that the files were admissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence of knowledge, intent, plan, scheme, and design. Govt.App. at 525-31; Console App. at 489-532. Rule 404(b) is inclusive, not exclusive, Sampson, 980 F.2d at 886, and Console's argument that knowledge and intent were not at issue in this case lacks merit. Console's and Curcio's knowledge of the fraudulent bills submitted to them by Markoff and their intent to defraud the insurance companies to whom they submitted these claims were central issues in this case. Evidence that Console and Curcio received and submitted fraudulent bills from other doctors tended to support the finding that Console and Curcio knew Markoff's bills were fraudulent and that they intentionally submitted them to insurance companies as part of a broader plan to defraud insurance companies through fraudulent personal injury claims. Moreover, the files satisfy the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. There was ample evidence to connect them to Console and Curcio, and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendants. See Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1237. 66 Appellants also argue that the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Michael Keeler, one of the firm's former personal injury clients, who testified that Console, Curcio, and the doctor to whom they referred him helped him to submit an inflated insurance claim. This evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) on the same basis as the files containing inflated bills from doctors other than Markoff, and satisfied the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. Moreover, although appellants argue that Keeler's testimony regarding statements made by the doctor to whom he was referred are inadmissible hearsay, we conclude that they are admissible statements by a coconspirator. See United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1360-62 (3d Cir.) (citing Rule 801(d)(2)(E); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778-79, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2800, 115 L.Ed.2d 973 (1991). Console and Curcio contend that the hearsay statements themselves were the sole evidence of a conspiracy among Console, Curcio, and the doctor to whom they referred Keeler. Keeler's testimony regarding statements made by Console and Curcio prior to Keeler's appointment with the doctor, and the inflated medical bill submitted by the doctor, however, provide ample independent evidence of the existence of a conspiracy among the appellants and Keeler's doctor. Govt.App. at 602-52. Thus, without reaching the issue of whether the doctor's hearsay statements alone could establish the existence of a conspiracy, Gambino, 926 F.2d at 1361, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Keeler's testimony regarding the doctor's statements. 67