Opinion ID: 1057584
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury's Role in Sentencing Decision

Text: During its final closing argument, the prosecution told the jury: If you voteAnd I think it's appropriate, and I'm asking you based upon the law and the evidence to impose the death penalty in this case. You're not putting the Defendant to death. Don't go for that trip. I'm not putting the Defendant to death. The State of Tennessee is not putting that Defendant to death. His actions, his conduct, his repeated conduct is such that makes him responsible for his own conduct and the consequences of that conduct. The defense made no contemporaneous objection, but now contends that this argument misled the jury into feeling less responsible than it should be for the sentencing decision that it had to make and that its verdicts of death therefore failed to meet the heightened standard of reliability required under the 8th Amendment. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court stated that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). In Caldwell, the prosecution argued to the jury that its decision to render a death sentence was not the final decision.... Your job is reviewable.... [T]he decision you render is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. Id. at 325-26, 105 S.Ct. 2633. Additionally, on objection, the trial court endorsed the prosecution's argument, telling the jury, I think it proper that the jury realizes that it is reviewable automatically as the death penalty commands. Id. at 325, 105 S.Ct. 2633. Concluding that the State sought to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death, the United States Supreme Court vacated the death penalty. Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 2633. Subsequently, the high court has construed Caldwell as `relevant only to certain types of commentthose that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision.' Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)). Therefore, `[t]o establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.' Id. (quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989)). See also State v. West, 767 S.W.2d 387, 399 (Tenn.1989) (The concerns voiced in Caldwell are triggered when a jury is misled as to its role in the capital sentencing scheme.). This Court has determined that [t]he two steps in reviewing an alleged Caldwell violation are determining (1) whether the prosecutor's comments to the jury were such that they would minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death and (2) whether the trial judge in the case sufficiently corrected the impression left by the prosecutor. West, 767 S.W.2d at 399 (quoting Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1456 (11th Cir. 1988)). In West, this Court held that the prosecutor's argument that the law is self-executing, that the law provides the punishment, not you, [the jury], and that you [the jury] don't impose the sentence, the law provides the sentence, you are merely finders of fact, violated Caldwell. 767 S.W.2d at 399. We held that [s]uch statements minimize the jury's role and allow[] [the jurors] to feel that the responsibility for a death sentence rests elsewhere. Id. We found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, however, because these brief erroneous characterizations of the jury's role in determining the appropriateness of a death sentence were sufficiently corrected by the trial judge [in its charge to the jury on its responsibility in determining the death penalty] and the accurate portions of the district attorney's and the defendant's arguments stressing the proper responsibility of the jury. Id. at 399-400. Similarly, in State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn.1994), we found error where the prosecutor told the jury that the law says it[']s not your decision anymore, that you're not making the finding of the death penalty. You're finding fact, that the verdict is automatic, and the law book says what the verdict shall be. Id. at 263-64. We determined the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, however, because the trial court did not endorse the remarks but rather instructed the jury correctly about its responsibility for determining whether a death sentence was appropriate, and because other portions of the State's final argument correctly set forth the responsibility of the jury under Tennessee's capital sentencing procedure, and the defendant's final argument repeated and re[i]nforced the State's correct argument. Id. at 264. Although the prosecution should avoid telling the jury that it is not putting a defendant to death while simultaneously asking the jury to render a sentence of death, the overall message of the quoted portion of the prosecution's argument in this case was that Defendant, himself, took the actions that made a death sentence possible. While seeking to reassure the jury that Defendant was responsible for his own conduct and therefore responsible for facing the ultimate punishment, the prosecution was not, in our view, trying to shift the ultimate authority for imposing the death sentence to another entity, as did the prosecution in Caldwell. Rather, we agree with our Court of Criminal Appeals that this type of argument can just as easily be interpreted as an expression of the [defendant's] burden of responsibility for his own actions. State v. Blanton, No. 01C01-9307-CC-00218, 1996 WL 219609, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. Apr. 30, 1996), aff'd, 975 S.W.2d 269 (Tenn.1998). See also State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 517 (Tenn.1997) (appendix) (observing that the State may properly argue that a defendant is the `author of his own fate' (quoting Wright v. State, No. 01C01-9105-CR-00149, 1994 WL 115955, at  (Tenn. Crim.App. Apr. 7, 1994))). We hold that the prosecution's comments did not go so far as to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death. West, 767 S.W.2d at 399. Further, even if the prosecution's argument crossed the Caldwell line, the trial court corrected any improper impression made by the prosecutor's comments. Before the prosecution began its closing argument, the trial court instructed the jury that [i]t is now your duty to determine within the limits prescribed by law the penalty which shall be imposed as punishment for these three offenses and that [t]he jury is the sole judge of the facts and of the law as it applies to the facts in this case. After closing arguments were finished, the trial court instructed the jury that, [i]f you unanimously determine that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt and said circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the State to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence shall be death. The jury therefore knew that it was responsible for deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty on Defendant for each of the murders he committed. The jury was never told by either the trial court or counsel for the parties that an appellate court, or any other person or entity, would be reviewing the jury's decision. Because no substantial right of Defendant's was adversely affected by the challenged argument, Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief on this basis.