Opinion ID: 2799910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Introduction of Evidence of Prior Shooting4

Text: Torrence also complains that, in explaining why the police officers stopped him during the June 2, 2010 incident, the jury was allowed to hear that the officers were responding to a radio call for a shooting. He argues that he was not charged with gun possession, nor was it listed as an overt act in the conspiracy, and therefore admitting that testimony was unduly prejudicial. Again, we disagree. As Torrence acknowledges, the jury was told that the police were responding to a radio call for a shooting to explain why they were present in Bartram Village on the night in question. The evidence that the police were responding to a radio call was relevant to provide context to the jury and was, at most, prejudicial in that it showed that Torrence was present in an area where crime and gun violence were common.5 We cannot say that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the contextual relevance of the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 4 We review the District Court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003). 5 The District Court’s opinion and the government’s brief tend to focus on whether it was permissible for the government to introduce evidence through the testimony of cooperating co-conspirators that, in furtherance of the RICO enterprise, Torrence actually did shoot a rival drug dealer on June 2. Torrence’s argument on this point, however, is not as to that testimony, but is limited to the police testimony regarding their June 2 stop. Nonetheless, as we discuss below, evidence that Torrence shot a rival drug dealer was relevant to the charged RICO offenses. 6 C. Introduction of Recorded Conversations Between Co-Conspirators6 Finally, Torrence argues that the District Court should have excluded two recorded conversations between Moten and a confidential informant that reference “Hak” – Torrence’s alias – shooting a rival drug dealer on June 2. Torrence contends that the conversations were irrelevant, hearsay, and unduly prejudicial.7 First, evidence from co-conspirators that Torrence actually shot at a competing drug dealer – ultimately missing his intended target – was direct evidence of his participation in the Harlem Boys’ enterprise and was thus intrinsic to the charged offenses. United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2010) (evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible if it “directly proves” the charged offense or if the misconduct was contemporaneous with the charged crime and facilitated its commission). Second, the recording was not hearsay because it was plainly a statement made by a coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 6 As we have noted, we review the District Court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. Brennan, 326 F.3d at 182. 7 One of the conversations that Torrence complains about is the following exchange: Moten: I don’t know what you heard but I just need my bread. This shit crazy. It’s all Hak’s fault. Confidential Informant: It’s Hak’s fault? Oh, he done put him on a mission. (Torrence App. at 700; App. at 5114.) This largely incomprehensible exchange falls in the middle of a larger discussion about how one of the Harlem Boys obtained a gun that he used during a robbery. Torrence is mentioned by his alias in passing during that discussion and his attorney immediately made that point clear during cross examination, when he prompted the agent to explain that Torrence had nothing to do with either the gun or the robbery. Accordingly, this conversation was not prejudicial to Torrence and was relevant to the purpose for which it was admitted. 7 Finally, even though the testimony as to the uncharged misconduct is prejudicial, its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 403.