Opinion ID: 745429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attorney Sanctions

Text: 19 Finally, Hill contends the district court erred in imposing sanctions for her counsel's violation of Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1). SLU responds that the issue is not properly before this court, because Hill did not file her notice of appeal within 30 days of the sanctions order and, alternatively, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the sanctions. 20 We must first address SLU's jurisdictional argument. We begin with the general proposition that a sanction[§ order] against present counsel to a party [is] immediately appealable as a final decision under [28 U.S.C.] § 1291 and under the Cohen collateral order doctrine. Crookham v. Crookham, 914 F.2d 1027, 1029 n. 4 (8th Cir.1990) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, as a general matter, a notice of appeal from a sanctions order must be filed within 30 days from the entry of the order. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1). Timely filing is not merely a procedural requirement, but is mandatory and jurisdictional. United States v. Fitzgerald, 109 F.3d 1339, 1342 (8th Cir.1997) (internal quotations omitted). 21 Like other orders, however, a particular sanctions order may not be final in that it may leave something for the court to do besides execute the judgment. See Union Pacific R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir.1993) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633-34, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1072, 114 S.Ct. 881, 127 L.Ed.2d 76 (1994). With this principle in mind, we have held that a judgment awarding attorney fees for bad faith damages, but not fixing the amount of the fees, is not a final, appealable order. Maristuen v. National States Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 673, 678-79 (8th Cir.1995). Nor is a determination of liability in contract normally final until controversial determinations of damages have been made. See St. Mary's Health Ctr. of Jefferson City v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 493, 497-98 (8th Cir.1987) (noting that if the determination of damages is mechanical and uncontroversial, immediate appeal is allowed). 22 In the instant case, the district court entered its sanctions order on March 14, 1996, but did not quantify the amount of the sanctions. On April 19, 1996, the district court entered a judgment granting SLU's summary judgment motion, thus triggering the 30-day period for filing the notice of appeal on the merits of her case. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. Hill filed her notice of appeal on May 17, 1996, from both the sanctions order and the grant of summary judgment. The district court had not yet reduced the sanctions to a sum certain, however, and thus, we hold that the sanctions order was not yet final. Accord Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 4 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir.1993) (holding sanctions order not final where the amount of sanctions had not yet been determined). 23 On August 27, 1996, the court ordered payment of $1,921.85 for the attorney fees owed under the sanctions order, rendering the sanctions order a final, appealable order. At that time, Hill's notice of appeal from the sanctions order became effective. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(2) (A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or order is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry.). Hill's notice of appeal from the sanctions order was therefore then timely, and we consequently have jurisdiction to review her claim. We now turn to the merits of Hill's appeal from the sanctions. 24 Rule 4.2 of the Missouri Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct states: In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. Missouri Supreme Court Rules, Rule 4.2 (1996); see also id., Code Comparison (noting that Disciplinary Rule 7-107(A)(1) is substantially identical). Rule 4.2 is meant 'to prevent lawyers from taking advantage of uncounselled lay persons and to preserve the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship.'  Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 448 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting the Model Rules of Prof. Conduct 4.2(1) cmt. (1992)). Rule 4.2 protects not only individual parties but also organizational parties, such as SLU. The commentary to Rule 4.2 sets out three categories of people with whom opposing counsel may not communicate when an organization is a party: (1) persons having managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, (2) persons whose acts or omissions in connection with the matter litigated may be imputed to the organization, and (3) persons whose statements may constitute an admission on the part of the organization. The Supreme Court of Missouri adopted this commentary and its three-category test in State ex rel. Pitts v. Roberts, 857 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo.1993) (en banc). 25 The district court held that Dr. Andres falls within the group of people Hill's attorney was prohibited from contacting, because Dr. Andres' position as a department chair requires him to perform managerial duties. We agree with the district court's assessment and find no abuse of discretion in the court's imposition of sanctions for violating the ethical rules. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2460-61, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (standard of review). 26 Hill does not dispute the district court's conclusion that Dr. Andres had managerial responsibilities; instead, she contends that his responsibilities were totally unrelated to Hill's job and that even with these responsibilities, he functioned essentially as a faculty member not a manager. We disagree. Dr. Andres' managerial responsibilities place him squarely within the first category of persons protected from communication by opposing attorneys. That he was not Hill's supervisor is immaterial. Therefore, any ex parte communication by Hill's counsel with Dr. Andres was a clear violation of the ethical rules, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions it did.