Opinion ID: 1214384
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dunlea's Emotional Distress Claim

Text: In Count II of her complaint, Dunlea alleged that Dappen's statements to Jacobs and to Dunlea directly, that he would not forgive Dunlea for what she had done in 1964, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct which was intended to cause severe emotional distress and did cause severe emotional distress. [11] Dappen's motion for summary judgment established, by means of Dunlea's deposition testimony, that there is no dispute that: (1) Dappen's statement to Jacobs was made on Dappen's lanai, with no one but himself and Jacobs present; (2) Dappen's statement to Dunlea was made in response to Dunlea's inquiry in the course of a telephone conversation initiated by Dunlea; (3) the statement was made to Dunlea only once; and (4) there was no further contact between Dappen and Dunlea following the single phone call. In her opposition to Dappen's motion, Dunlea failed to establish that there was a genuine issue of material fact; she attached only Dappen's responses to a request for admissions in which Dappen admitted that (1) he made the statement to Jacobs, and (2) Defendant Howard Dappen states when[,] in August of 1991, Sandra Dunlea called and asked, Defendant Dappen told her he would not forgive her for making accusations. Therefore, summary judgment with respect to count II of Dunlea's complaint would be proper if, on the undisputed facts, Dappen was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In Marshall v. University of Hawai`i, 9 Haw.App. 21, 38, 821 P.2d 937, 947 (1991), the Intermediate Court of Appeals enumerated the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) that the fact allegedly causing the harm was intentional; (2) that the act was unreasonable; and (3) that the actor should have recognized that the act was likely to result in illness. Id. (citation omitted). More recently, in Ross, this court explained that [r]ecovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is permitted only if the alleged tortfeasor's acts were unreasonable. Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Hawai`i 310, 321 n. 7, 876 P.2d 1278, 1289[, n. 7] (Sup. 1994), as amended, 76 Hawai`i 453, 879 P.2d 558 (Sup.1994); Chedester v. Stecker, 64 Haw. 464, 467, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (1982); Marshall v. University of Hawai`i, 9 Haw. App. 21, 38, 821 P.2d 937, 947 (1991). An act is unreasonable if it is `without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency[.]' Chedester, 64 Haw. at 468, 643 P.2d at 535 (quoting Fraser v. Blue Cross Animal Hospital, 39 Haw. 370, 375 (1952)). In other words, the act complained of must be outrageous, as that term is employed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). Id. The question whether the actions of the alleged tortfeasor are unreasonable or outrageous is for the court in the first instance, although where reasonable persons may differ on that question it should be left to the jury. Wong v. Panis, 7 Haw. App. 414, 421, 772 P.2d 695, 700 (1989) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment h). Ross, 76 Hawai`i at 465, 879 P.2d at 1048 (footnote omitted). We noted that, [i]n explaining the type of outrageous conduct that makes a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress actionable, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states: It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by malice, or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous! Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d. Ross, 76 Hawai`i at 465 n. 12, 879 P.2d at 1048 n. 12. Dunlea points to no evidence in the record that Dappen's statement to Jacobs was outrageous, or that Dappen should have recognized that his statement to Jacobs would cause Dunlea illness or injury. Dappen expressed his own feelings to a close family member in the privacy of his home. We therefore hold that Dappen's statement to Jacobs was not so unreasonable or outrageous as to give rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because the statement to Jacobs was not actionable, we also hold that Dappen's statement was not made actionable by the fact that he repeated it to Dunlea, in direct response to Dunlea's inquiry. Consequently, Dappen's motion for summary judgment on County II of Dunlea's complaint was properly granted.