Opinion ID: 2791033
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hypothetical Question to the VE

Text: Ms. Duncan next contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the VE at steps four and five of the analysis failed to include all of the limitations established by the record.6 6 In challenging the ALJ’s hypothetical questions, Ms. Duncan attempts to raise a sub-issue concerning the ALJ’s step two analysis. Although she does not expressly assert a step two error, she argues that the ALJ failed to state whether her middle and ring finger trigger release and anxiety disorder were “severe, non-severe, or medically non-determinable [impairments].” Aplt. Opening Br. at 33. To the extent Ms. Duncan attempts to advance an independent challenge to the ALJ’s step two findings within the context of her steps four and five argument, we decline to (continued) - 17 - An ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE must accurately reflect the “impairments and limitations that were borne out by the evidentiary record.” Newbold v. Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1268 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions “must include all (and only) those impairments borne out by the evidentiary record”). The ALJ’s RFC finding included a limitation for “no prolonged overhead gazing.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 16. Review of the record shows that the ALJ posed three hypothetical questions to the VE – the first two of which were limited to light work and the third to sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) and (b) (defining “sedentary work” and “light work”). In the second hypothetical question to the VE, the ALJ asked the VE to take the same physical restrictions from the first hypothetical question and add to them certain restrictions to the hands and arms and “no prolonged overhead gazing.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 62. In the third hypothetical question, the ALJ stated that he was using the same restrictions for the upper extremities but changed the exertional limitations. Ms. Duncan argues that the “no prolonged overhead gazing” limitation is missing from the third (and only sedentary) hypothetical question and, therefore, the VE could have answered the hypothetical question differently. We disagree. Based consider the issue. See Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to consider poorly developed sub-issues). - 18 - on our review, the third hypothetical question simply built upon the second, which included the limitation for no prolonged overhead gazing. Additionally, Ms. Duncan’s counsel questioned the VE regarding the impact of Ms. Duncan’s limitations in her ability to look up and down and the VE testified in response that she considered Ms. Duncan’s range of motion limitations in her testimony. We therefore reject Ms. Duncan’s challenge to the hypothetical question to the VE and find no error in the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s opinion. Ms. Duncan also argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding included a limitation to superficial contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public, but that the ALJ did not include this limitation in the hypothetical question to the VE involving sedentary work. She argues that the failure to include this limitation was erroneous because the jobs in the national economy that the VE testified Ms. Duncan could perform in response to the hypothetical – call-out operator, surveillance-system monitor, and election clerk – require “significant” contact with people or the public according to the DOT. Aplt. Opening Br. at 36; see DICOT 237.367-014 (call-out operator), 1991 WL 672186; DICOT 379.367-010 (surveillance-system monitor), 1991 WL 673244; and DICOT 205.367-030 (election clerk), 1991 WL 671719. “[E]ach job listed in the DOT is described by reference to various components. One component [of the DOT occupational code] is ‘Worker Functions.’ The worker function labeled ‘People’ expresses the degree of interaction with other people that the job requires.” Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 2005). The - 19 - three jobs identified by Ms. Duncan have a People rating of 6, indicating that the worker will be involved in “Speaking-Signaling” which requires “[t]alking with and/or signaling people to convey or exchange information [and]giving assignments and/or directions to helpers or assistants.” DOT, Appendix B – Explanation of Data, People, and Things, 1991 WL 688701 (4th ed. 1991). As Ms. Duncan notes, the three jobs at issue also have an “S-Significant” People rating. We agree that the sedentary hypothetical question to the VE did not include the limitation to “superficial contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public.” We conclude the omission does not require reversal, however, because any error was harmless. As we noted in Hackett, the full DOT job descriptions for the jobs of call-out operator and surveillance system monitor “indicate that contact with people is rather limited.” Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1175. Accordingly, at least two of the three jobs identified by the VE are consistent with the restriction of “superficial contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public.” See, e.g., id. at 1175-76 (concluding that there was no conflict between DOT’s job descriptions for call-out operator and surveillance-system monitor stating that jobs required significant contact and VE’s testimony that jobs were suitable for claimant with restriction of avoiding direct contact with the general public and only occasional interaction with coworkers). Any error was therefore harmless. See Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that improper reliance on two of three jobs identified by VE could have been deemed harmless error “had the number of available jobs identified by the VE - 20 - [in the one occupation consistent with the claimant’s RFC] not been one hundred but considerably greater”).