Opinion ID: 1931303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Removal Process

Text: The defendants contend that the town administrator has unfettered discretion in the hiring and firing of political appointees who hold policymaking positions in the administration, and that as a result, Sheppard was well within her rights to remove Kells in order to further her own political goals and objectives and those of her administration. However, we do not agree that defendants' argument is applicable in this case. The United States Supreme Court has determined that politically motivated firings of non-civil-service governmental employees were unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but limited such protections to nonpolicymaking employees. Montaquila v. St. Cyr, 433 A.2d 206, 208 (R.I.1981) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976)). Several years later, the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980) when it held that the continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot properly be conditioned upon his allegiance to the political party in control of the county government. The primary, if not the only, responsibility of an assistant public defender is to represent individual citizens in controversy with the State. In Branti, the Supreme Court reasoned that when assessing politically motivated firings, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Id. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. This Court addressed a similar issue in Montaquila, when it addressed the discharge, for purely political reasons, of the town solicitor and assistant solicitors for the Town of Coventry. Holding that town solicitors are not entitled to protection from patronage dismissals, we determined that: A town solicitor holds an important and sensitive position in ensuring the implementation of the policies of the administration. This arises as a result of the role that a town solicitor plays in the formation of policy. While he may not be a policymaker per se, he is nevertheless privy to the discussions and information involved in the policymaking process in his role as chief legal advisor to the town. This sensitive position requires trust and loyalty between the town administration and the town solicitor. Party affiliation is a permissible way for the town manager to ensure that the necessary trust and loyalty exist. Montaquila, 433 A.2d at 210. However, key to our holding that the town solicitors had no legally protected interests in their jobs, and thus were susceptible to termination without notice or a hearing, is the theory that [p]roperty interests    are created and their dimensions are refined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Id. at 212 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1971)). In Montaquila, the solicitors explicitly served `at the pleasure of the manager,' thus in this Court's opinion, the political nature of plaintiffs' positions renders any belief of entitlement to future employment unfounded, absent firm understandings to the contrary. Id. (Emphasis added.) We need not address the nature of the chief of police's role as a political appointee or policymaker in the town administration because, and irrespective of the existence of a contract between the town and the chief of police, the Lincoln Town Charter contains the explicit interest-creating language that was lacking in Montaquila. The provisions of a town charter are the organic law of the town with respect to municipal affairs. Borromeo v. Personnel Board of Bristol, 117 R.I. 382, 385, 367 A.2d 711, 713 (1977). Governing the town administrator's powers to appoint and remove town officers and employees, Article VI, section 6-6 of the charter lays out in explicit terms the standard to be employed when the town administrator seeks to terminate a Lincoln town employee. Section 6-6(1) states that the town administrator shall, when necessary for the good of the services, remove all officers and employees of the Town except as otherwise provided by the charter. (Emphasis added.) The defendants argue that this language permits the town administrator to remove an employee at his or her own discretion. In contrast, Kells contends that the charter's language prevents the town administrator from removing an officer or employee when cause does not exist. In an explicit and unequivocal holding, we previously have held that the phrase for the good of the service has the effect of limiting the valid exercise of that power to dismiss for cause. Aniello v. Marcello, 91 R.I. 198, 207, 162 A.2d 270, 274 (1960). It is that type of cause which in law constitutes a valid ground for the exercise of the power to remove, and entitles the petitioner to a specification of charges, due notice of a hearing, and an opportunity to be heard and offer evidence in defense or explanation. Davis v. Cousineau, 97 R.I. 85, 90, 196 A.2d 153, 156 (1963). Thus, in accordance with the plain and unambiguous terms of charter section 6-6(1), the town administrator may remove town officers and employees only after legally sufficient cause is shown. Salisbury v. Stone, 518 A.2d 1355, 1359 (R.I.1986). In light of this standard, defendants' contention that for the good of the services, permits removal based upon the judgment and discretion of the Town Administrator, is clearly wrong, and ignores the interest-creating nature of section 6-6(1). The defendants further allege that Kells's position is terminable at the will of the town administrator based on the indefinite nature of its duration. Article IX, section 9-1(1) establishes that the chief of police shall be appointed by the Town Administrator for an indefinite term and shall be subject to removal by the Town Administrator, in accordance with provisions of this Charter. The defendants point to case law which holds that employees who are hired for an indefinite period with no contractual right to continued employment are [considered] at-will employees [who are] subject to discharge at any time for any permissible reason or for no reason at all. Galloway v. Roger Williams University, 777 A.2d 148, 150 (R.I.2001) (quoting DelSignore v. Providence Journal Co., 691 A.2d 1050, 1051 n. 5 (R.I.1997)). We adhere to this rule because [i]t is not the role of the courts to create rights for persons whom the Legislature [in this case, the Town of Lincoln] has not chosen to protect. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464, 465 (R.I.1993). However, here, the position of chief of police is not terminable at will merely because it is for an indefinite term. Instead, this Court looks to mechanisms within the charter that clearly create and protect the rights of the chief of police and other town employees. When confronted with statutory provisions that are in pari materia, this Court will construe them in a manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is consistent with their general objective scope. State v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 666 (R.I.2004). Our process of statutory construction further involves a practice of construing and applying apparently inconsistent statutory provisions in such a manner so as to avoid the inconsistency. Montaquila, 433 A.2d at 214. We undertake the same process when faced with charter provisions dealing with the same or similar issues. On the surface, charter sections 6-6(1) and 9-1(1) might appear to be inconsistent with each other, with section 6-6(1) limiting the removal power of the town administrator to situations in which cause exists, and section 9-1(1) providing for an indefinite term, traditionally associated with an at-will position. However, section 9-1(1) clearly indicates that the chief of police is subject to removal by the town administrator in accordance with the provisions of the charter, namely, in accordance with the standard established in section 6-6(1). We read section 6-6(1) as empowering the town administrator to remove town employees and officials only for cause, and, in such instances, conferring upon the employee the right to specification of charges, notice, and a hearing. See Davis, 97 R.I. at 90, 196 A.2d at 156. Because town employees and officers are entitled to a hearing whereat the appointing authority would be required to establish that the dismissal was based on substantial grounds[,] Aniello, 91 R.I. at 207, 162 A.2d at 274-75, charter sections 14-10 and 14-11 of Article XIV provide the means for carrying out these entitlements. Charter section 14-10 governs the removal of officers on indefinite tenure, and provides that if an officer refuses the town administrator's request for his or her resignation, the town administrator may prefer charges against said officer before the Town Council, requesting his removal. Section 14-10 requires that the officer be provided with notice of the hearing, a specification of said charges, and a hearing before the town council. The officer may be removed only on an affirmative vote by a majority of the council. The defendants concede that prior to the amendment of the charter, and the enactment of section 17-3(3), section 14-10 would have governed the removal of Chief Kells. However, section 17-3(3), which became effective on January 7, 2003, [6] provides that the term officer relates only to the town administrator, members of the town council, the town clerk, and the finance director. Further, Article XVII, section 17-3(3) provides that its definition of officer shall control wherever used in the charter. When the language of a statute, or, correspondingly a charter, is clear and unambiguous, we interpret the statute literally and give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Badessa, 869 A.2d 61, 65 (R.I.2005). Thus, applying the definition provided in sections 17-3(3) to 14-10, we interpret the phrase officers appointed for an indefinite term as excluding all employees who do not fall within the short list of positions enumerated in section 17-3(3). Thus, there is nothing that brings the chief of police under the umbrella of section 14-10. Kells's exclusion from the protections afforded by section 14-10 does not, however, as defendants contend, leave him subject to the whims of the town administrator, nor does it eliminate the protections afforded him under the charter. Instead, because section 9-1 provides for the chief's removal by the town administrator in accordance with the provisions of the charter, and because section 6-6(1) establishes the town administrator's removal powers, there is no question that the chief of police is provided certain procedural protections afforded by section 6-6(1). Therefore, we look to section 14-11 as providing the appropriate means of removing the chief of police. That section provides that once any employee, except those in the School Department working in administrative, supervisory or teaching capacity, and except those provided for otherwise in this Charter in § C14-10, has been dismissed, suspended, demoted, transferred, or laid-off as provided herein, he or she may appeal in writing to the town council within ten days of the adverse employment action. The employee must be provided a hearing before the town council, whose ultimate decision is final and binding. The defendants, without conceding the applicability of section 14-11, have argued that if section 14-11 were to govern the chief's dismissal, Kells's right of appeal was waived because he failed to appeal to the town council within ten days of his termination. We reject this argument. Once the temporary restraining order was issued on January 8, 2003, there was no need for Kells to appeal. The injunctive relief rendered the appellate procedure set forth in the charter inapplicable because the order restrained and enjoined the town administrator from removing Chief Kells from his position as Chief of Police. For this reason, Kells's failure to appeal in writing within the ten days of his dismissal is not fatal to his cause.