Opinion ID: 1858184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusion of Hinton's Live Testimony/Denial of Forensic Testing

Text: Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Reaves filed a motion for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum [7] seeking to have Hinton appear and testify. The motion was denied, but the trial court allowed Hinton's affidavit to be used and argued. Reaves argues the trial court erred in excluding Hinton's live testimony at the evidentiary hearing because the testimony was relevant and material to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Reaves also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for forensic testing of some of the evidence for drug metabolites because the testing would provide scientific support to bolster the claim of intoxication at the time of the offense. Conversely, the State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Hinton to testify in light of his prior testimony and deposition. The State also contends the trial court did not err in denying the motion for forensic testing because Reaves failed to show how the testing would reveal his level of intoxication at the time of the offense. In light of Hinton's testimony at the 1987 trial and the fact that he would not testify at retrial in 1992, we agree the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Hinton to testify at the evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, denial of the motion for forensic testing was proper because the testing could not reveal Reaves' level of intoxication at the time of the offense. The standard of review for a trial court's ruling on a motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is abuse of discretion. See Moody v. State, 418 So.2d 989, 992 (Fla.1982). The abuse of discretion standard of review also applies to the denial of a motion for discovery in a postconviction case. See State v. Lewis, 656 So.2d 1248, 1250 (Fla.1994). Reaves has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court on either of these issues. Hinton was physically present as a witness for the State but refused to testify at the 1992 retrial and was ruled unavailable to testify pursuant to section 90.804(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991). See Reaves v. State, 639 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1994). Thereafter, Hinton's testimony from the 1987 trial was read into the record. Id. Hinton's testimony revealed that when Reaves showed up at his home and told him about the incident he had no trouble understanding Reaves; his speech was not slurred and he appeared to be in full control of his faculties. Id. Reaves sought to have Hinton testify at the evidentiary hearing in regards to Hinton's 1999 affidavit wherein he described Reaves as all strung out, he had been smoking crack and pretty much out of his head. The affidavit was created seven years after Hinton refused to testify at the retrial and is significantly different from his 1987 trial testimony. The issue before the trial court at the evidentiary hearing was, however, ineffectiveness of counsel at retrial in 1992. Trial counsel had reviewed the statements Hinton made prior to the 1987 trial, and he had reviewed Hinton's 1987 trial testimony as well. Hinton's account at the time was that he had no trouble understanding Reaves; Reaves' speech was not slurred, and Reaves seemed to be in control of his faculties. At retrial that was the only information, other than Reaves' statements, available to counsel in regards to Reaves' level of intoxication at the time of the murder. Hinton made himself unavailable to testify at the retrial, and his previous trial testimony in 1987 did not indicate that Reaves was intoxicated when Hinton saw him after the murder. The trial court properly found that the affidavit contained the sum and substance of any testimony that would have been procured from Hinton if he had testified at the evidentiary hearing. That testimony in effect was irrelevant to the ineffectiveness of counsel issue because the information now being posited by Hinton was not available to counsel in 1992. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for testing for drug metabolites. Reaves failed to show how the additional testing would reveal material evidence to show his level of intoxication at the time of the crime. At the hearing, Reaves' own expert, Dr. Debra Mash, testified that, at most, testing could reveal the presence of drugs. However, testing could not reveal the actual time the drugs were taken or in what amount. Therefore, any drugs, drug paraphernalia, hair sample, or clothing seized could not provide competent evidence relating to Reaves' level of intoxication at the time of the crime. In light of these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reaves' request to have Hinton testify at the evidentiary hearing and did not abuse its discretion in denying his request to have items tested for the presence of drug metabolites.