Opinion ID: 1129388
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victim's Statements to a Friend

Text: The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that allowed the State's witness, Pamela Carey, a friend of the victim's, to testify over Martin's objection as to certain statements the victim had made to Carey before her death. The basis of Martin's objection was that the statements were hearsay and that they did not fit within an exception to the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible. In making his objection to the testimony when Carey was on the stand, defense counsel stated, for the record, the grounds of that objection is there's not a proper exception under 803[, Ala. R. Evid.,] to the hearsay rule. . . . It is impossible to lay the predicate . . . and it calls for opinion testimony. [1] Carey testified that, a few days before the victim's death, Carey had a conversation with the victim in which the victim told Carey that if she did not hear from the victim in three or four days, she was to call [the victim's] mama and daddy and tell them he did it. Carey also testified that the victim said to her during that same conversation: he might not do it, George loves me. The State argues that the statements were offered for the purpose of showing the victim's fear of Martin. In other words, according to the State, the testimony was not intended to prove the truth of the fact that Martin planned to kill the victim, but simply to show the victim's belief that he might do so. The State makes this argument by referring to the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Rule 803(3), Ala. R. Evid. We note that the statements attributed to the victim in this case are not expressions of a state of mind, as would be the case with statements such as, I hate him or I am afraid. The first statement attributed to the victim consists entirely of an instruction as to what Carey should do should she not hear from the victim in three or four days after their conversation. From this instruction, one can only infer a state of mind. Therefore, under a literal reading of the state-of-mind exception contained in Rule 803(3), Ala. R. Evid., that exception does not apply to this particular statement. The other statement is the victim's observation that Martin might not kill her, because she believed that he loved her. This statement relates to Martin's state of mind, not the victim's. Consequently, Rule 803(3) is also inapplicable to the second statement. While the state-of-mind exception of Rule 803(3) is not applicable to the statements in this case, it does not follow that these statements were inadmissible hearsay. Whether the two statements attributed to the victim are subject to a hearsay objection depends upon whether they fall within the definition of hearsay set forth in Rule 801(c), Ala. R. Evid: `Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. If the victim's statements to Carey were offered to prove that Martin was indeed planning on harming or killing the victim, then they were offered for the truth of the matters asserted and are hearsay. If they were offered simply to show circumstances from which one might infer the victim's state of mind, then the statements were not offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein (that Martin might or might not kill the victim) and they therefore do not fit within the definition of hearsay. [2] Further, even if these statements were not offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein and are therefore not hearsay, we must determine whether the purpose for which they were offered is relevant to the case under Rule 401, Ala. R. Evid. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Two potential bases exist for determining that the victim's statements were relevant. First, evidence of a person's fear of his or her spouse could arguably be probative evidence indicative of a bad marriage. In turn, evidence that the accused and the victim's marriage was bad could show a motive for murder. See, e.g., McClendon v. State, 813 So.2d 936, 944 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001) (Therefore, evidence of Yvonne and McClendon's possible involvement in Joanne's murder was properly admitted, because it suggested a motive for McClendon's desire to have Yvonne eliminated, specifically, extrication from an unhappy marriage to a spouse who wanted a divorce and a portion of his retirement funds.); Hellums v. State, 549 So.2d 611, 614 (Ala. Crim.App.1989) (The testimony in question in the case at bar [where a witness testified that the defendant had threatened to kill a third party for `wrecking' his marriage] related to the marriage of the [defendant] and [the victim]. It tended to show a possible motive by the [defendant] to kill his wife, i.e., the appellant's `wrecked' marriage.). We need not decide in this case whether a statement offered not for the truth of the matters asserted, but to suggest a state of mind indicative of fear, indicating that the accused and the victim were involved in a bad marriage, is admissible as nonhearsay under Rule 801(c) or as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(c). We also need not decide whether, if such a statement is admissible to show a bad marriage, the State impermissibly injected the bad-marriage issue into the case by its opening statement so as to make the fear of the victim-spouse relevant. [3] We do not answer these questions because a separate and independent basis exists for admitting the victim's statements. Evidence of the victim's state of mind or, as here, facts from which one might infer a state of mind, can be relevant where a theory put forth by the defense opens the door to such evidence, thereby making the victim's state of mind relevant. While other jurisdictions are not entirely consistent, [4] many courts have allowed evidence of a victim's state of mind only in certain situations. See United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 767 (D.C.Cir.1973) (recognizing three categories of cases in which a homicide victim's fear is relevant: 1) where the defendant claims self-defense; 2) where the defendant claims the victim committed suicide; and 3) where the defendant admits some involvement in the crime, but claims that the death was the result of an accident); State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (Where an accused claims self-defense, the deceased's state of mind is relevant to the issue of which participant in the killing was the aggressor. Where a defendant concedes his or her presence and involvement in a victim's death but claims an accident or suicide caused the death, the deceased's statements as to fear of guns or similar state of mind are relevant to rebut these defenses. (citations omitted)); Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 375, 381-82 (Ky.2002) ([W]here a defendant did not claim self-defense, an accidental death, or suicide, such statements [of the victim's fear of the defendant] usually have `little relevancy except toward providing a strong inference of appellant's intent, actions or culpability.' (quoting Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1996))); People v. Armendariz, 37 Cal.3d 573, 586, 693 P.2d 243, 251, 209 Cal.Rptr. 664, 672 (1984) (This court has repeatedly held that a victim's out-of-court statements of fear of an accused are admissible . . . only when the victim's conduct in conformity with that fear is in dispute. Absent such dispute, the statements are irrelevant.); Hatcher v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1155, 1161 (Ind.2000) (We have noted three situations where [a statement indicating a homicide victim's fear] is admissible: (1) to show the intent of the victim to act in a particular way, (2) when the defendant puts the victim's state of mind in issue, and (3) sometimes to explain physical injuries suffered by the victim. . . . We decline the State's invitation to extend this list to include the admissibility of a victim's state of mind to show the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant.  (emphasis added)). It is unnecessary for us to decide whether a statement offered not for the truth of the matters asserted, but to suggest a state of mind indicative of fear of a spouse and therefore indicative of a bad marriage, is admissible as nonhearsay under Rule 801(c) or as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(c). It is unnecessary because Martin suggested during his opening statement that the victim in this case might have committed suicide. Such a theory of defense puts in issue the victim's state of mind. Statements probative of the victim's fear of dying or of her will to live are inconsistent with any suicidal tendencies on her part and are therefore relevant. Carey testified that the victim told her that if she did not hear from the victim in three or four days, to call [the victim's] mama and daddy and tell them he did it. Such a state of mind, which was consistent with the possibility of her death being occasioned solely by a third party and not by her own hand, was relevant to rebuttal of the defense's suggestion that the victim may have been suicidal. [5] Therefore, the statement, from which a fact-finder could infer the victim's state of mind, was relevant to an issue in the case, and the statement was admissible under Rule 401, Ala. R. Evid. [6] Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence over Martin's hearsay objection.