Opinion ID: 2792853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Annular chamfer”

Text: The district court concluded that Fivetech does not infringe claims 2–5 and 7–14 of the ’012 patent because the accused products do not meet the limitation that the captive screw include a screw head with an “annular chamfer.” Southco, Inc. v. Fivetech Tech. Inc., No. 101060, 2013 WL 5298576, at –7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2013) (’012 Order). Figure 10 of the ’012 patent shows an embodiment of a captive screw with a chamfer (29). ’012 patent col. 4 ll. 24–26. Exemplary claim 7 recites: 7. A captive screw attachable to a panel, for at- taching the panel to a surface, the surface hav- 10 SOUTHCO, INC. v. FIVETECH TECHNOLOGY INC. ing a threaded hole, the captive screw compris- ing: a) a screw having a head portion and a shaft hav- ing at least a threaded portion, said head por- tion having a top surface and a bottom surface, said head portion further having an annular chamfer peripheral to said bottom surface of said head portion; b) a knob secured to said head portion; and c) a ferrule having a first end and a second end through which said shaft extends, said ferrule having a panel attachment means at said first end to secure the captive screw to the panel. ’012 patent col. 7 ll. 3–16 (emphasis added). Fivetech’s motion for summary judgment, and the court’s decision, relied on an expert declaration from Fivetech’s expert Dr. David Dornfeld. Fivetech did not disclose Dr. Dornfeld’s noninfringement opinion until moving for summary judgment, after the deadline for disclosing expert reports under the court’s scheduling order. Accordingly, Southco moved to strike the Dornfeld Declaration as untimely and prejudicial, arguing that it did not have an opportunity to depose Dr. Dornfeld. The Court denied Southco’s motion to strike because the late disclosure was not prejudicial. Southco, Inc. v. Fivetech Tech. Inc., No. 10-1060, J.A. 46–48, 47 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2013) (Motion to Strike Order). Under Third Circuit law, we review a decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. Energy Transp. Group, Inc. v. William Demant Holding A/S, 697 F.3d 1342, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit has held that, in considering the exclusion of untimely disclosed evidence, it considers the factors listed in Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass’n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d SOUTHCO, INC. v. FIVETECH TECHNOLOGY INC. 11 Cir. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985). In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d. 613, 721 (3d Cir. 1999). Although the district court did not articulate the Pennypack factors in its decision, it considered whether the late disclosure prejudiced Southco—which is the first Pennypack factor. Pennypack, 559 F.2d at 904 (“(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded witnesses would have testified”). Specifically, the court found that there was no prejudice because Southco responded to the Dornfeld Declaration in opposition to Fivetech’s motion for summary judgment. Motion to Strike Order, at J.A. 47. We hold that the district court clearly erred in finding Southco was not prejudiced. Fivetech did not disclose Dr. Dornfeld’s opinion in an expert report as required by both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the district court’s scheduling order. When Fivetech supported its summary judgment motion with Dr. Dornfeld’s declaration, Southco objected because Dr. Dornfeld’s opinion was untimely. And, even though Southco did not have the opportunity to depose Dr. Dornfeld to learn about his tests and opinions, it presented expert testimony that Dr. Dornfeld’s testing procedures were improper and his conclusions unsupported. The court denied the motion to strike, reasoning that Southco was not prejudiced because it responded to Fivetech’s motion for summary judgment. At the same time, the court granted Fivetech’s motion for summary judgment, in part because it determined that Southco’s expert’s response was conclusory. ’012 Order, 2013 WL 5298576, at . The district court abused its discretion by failing to give Southco an opportunity to depose Dr. Dornfeld, relying on his declaration, and then faulting Southco for failing to rebut his opinion. Therefore, we reverse the denial of the motion to strike the Dornfeld Declaration. We need not, and do not, however, decide whether the prejudice could be cured on remand. 12 SOUTHCO, INC. v. FIVETECH TECHNOLOGY INC. Turning next to the grant of Fivetech’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement, we hold that Southco presented evidence raising a question of material fact. Fivetech produced engineering drawings of the accused product that Southco argues depict an annular chamfer. In opposing summary judgment, Southco’s expert testified that the drawing shows “that there is a chamfer on the screw head peripheral to the bottom surface.” J.A. 3583. A drawing—produced by the defendant—plausibly showing that a product includes a claim limitation and testimony confirming the same is sufficient evidence to present a question of material fact. Although Southco carries the burden for proving infringement, Fivetech carries the burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact when moving for summary judgment. Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment with respect to claims reciting an “annular chamfer.”