Opinion ID: 2607459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: GM Testing of Semen Stains

Text: Dr. Schanfield basically testified that defendant belonged to a small percentage of the Black population who could have contributed semen found near Kimele's body. (19) Defendant argues here, as below, that the evidence should have been excluded because it was irrelevant and prejudicial, and because no competent expert testimony established that GM typing of aged or dried semen stains is scientifically reliable under the Kelly/Frye rule. (Compare People v. Yorba (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 1017, 1024-1025 [257 Cal. Rptr. 641] [GM testing of dried bloodstains deemed reliable].) Defendant challenged Schanfield's testimony before it was admitted and after it was questioned by two experts at trial (Blake and Wraxall). The court overruled defendant's objections based on extensive testimony previously given by four experts at an evidentiary hearing (Schanfield, Blake, Tahir, and Divall). Even assuming the court erred in admitting Schanfield's testimony, the verdict would not have been different under any standard of prejudice now urged by defendant. First, we doubt the jury was persuaded by Dr. Schanfield's attempt to identify the donor of semen found near Kimele. Trial testimony established that the stained carpet and underwear were each subjected to several GM tests; that no two tests on either item produced the same results; and that Schanfield inexplicably combined the results of the various underpants tests to reach his critical conclusions about defendant. All three experts who testified at trial, including Schanfield, agreed that the results of the various underpants tests were inconsistent or strange because dominant genetic markers were not detected even where weaker markers were said to be present. Defense and prosecution experts also observed  and Schanfield did not deny  that he failed to consider certain variables that could have affected test results. The most notable factor was whether the semen stains were so diluted that a positive GM reading of any kind suggested contamination by vaginal secretions, bacteria, urine, or cloth fibers. In addition, evidence of defendant's guilt of both murders was strong. The testimony suggested defendant had recently threatened those Progressive employees  Kimele and her male supervisor  who were responsible for janitorial complaints. Defendant was evidently present at the scene when the murders most likely occurred, and he made alibi statements to police and at trial that were uncorroborated, inconsistent, and/or refuted by other witnesses. Fingerprints, cigarette butts, and janitorial supplies connected defendant to the victims' bodies and/or their bloodstains, and testimony about defendant's knife linked him to the murder weapon. Finally, in accordance with the prosecution's theory of first degree felony murder, there was other convincing evidence that each victim was killed in the course of a rape or attempted rape. Catherine, a virgin, was found spreadeagle and naked from the waist down, with semen in her vagina. Kimele was found similarly disrobed in a position suggesting that a violent sexual assault had occurred. A pubic hair that could have belonged to defendant, but not to the victims or any other possible suspect, was found on a semen-stained portion of carpet underneath her body. Thus, any error in admitting Schanfield's testimony over defendant's Kelly/Frye or relevance objections was not prejudicial. Defendant separately claims that testimony placing him within a small group of Blacks (1 to 4 percent) who could have contributed the semen found on Kimele's underpants suggested a mathematical probability of guilt that misled the jury and deprived him of a fair trial and the right to be acquitted upon a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Collins (1968) 68 Cal.2d 319, 329-332 [66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 438 P.2d 33, 36 A.L.R.3d 1176].) Defendant's failure to challenge admission of this evidence under Collins at trial waives the issue on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 749, 776-777.) We also note that this claim conflicts with defendant's attack on the hair comparison evidence insofar as it purportedly lacked similar mathematical specificity (see discussion, ante ). In any event, we find no error or prejudice. Statistical stain-typing evidence of the sort which includes the accused within the class of possible donors has long been admitted in California. ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 215 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302]; People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 324 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082]; People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 536, fn. 6 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], and cases cited.) Moreover, as already explained, Dr. Schanfield's testimony about the semen stains found in Kimele's panties was inherently weak, and the clearly valid evidence that defendant killed and sexually assaulted both victims was strong. Hence, it is not reasonably probable that the verdict was affected by Dr. Schanfield's calculations of mathematical probability about defendant and the stains.