Opinion ID: 1886412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Discretion Properly Exercised

Text: The trial judge properly exercised his discretion when he admitted the evidence that the decedents had not consumed drugs or alcohol as relevant to the decedents' behavior. The reports provided another piece of evidence for the jury to weigh when considering whether the defendant's criminally negligent conduct caused the accident or whether the decedents' dangerous behavior caused the accident. The reports did not, as Stickel argues, permit the State to imply improperly to the jury that someone who is not intoxicated is more likely to be careful. They simply provided relevant evidence for the jury to weigh in considering whether the decedents had engaged in dangerous behavior that caused the accident. In Lilly v. State , the defendant was driving while intoxicated, lost control of his vehicle, crossed over the median and collided head-on with another vehicle, killing the driver. [15] He was charged with Murder in the Second Degree. [16] At trial, evidence was presented that the decedent's vehicle was traveling normally in its proper lane. [17] The defendant did not seek to refute that evidence. [18] In fact, no evidence was offered at trial to suggest that the decedent had been driving in an improper place or manner. [19] Nonetheless, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of the decedent's blood alcohol content and ingestion of cocaine to show that her conduct caused the accident. [20] The trial court excluded the evidence as irrelevant and as more prejudicial than probative. [21] On appeal, we held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. [22] We explained that: [The defendant] failed to establish a factual basis demonstrating the relevance of [the decedent's] conduct. While evidence of [the decedent's] blood alcohol content or level of impairment from cocaine may have been probative of her conduct that night, such evidence is not relevant if it was not asserted at trial that [the decedent's] conduct was a cause of the accident. [23] At Stickel's trial, in contrast, it was asserted that the decedents' conduct was a cause of the accident. The State's witnesses gave conflicting testimony about whether the decedents had been speeding, drag racing or otherwise driving dangerously. In his opening statement and during cross-examination, Stickel attempted to place the decedents' behavior at issue. Therefore, whether the decedents had consumed drugs or alcohol, which would affect their behavior, was relevant. [24] Stickel relies on two cases that are inapposite. He relies on City of Wauwatosa v. Guetzkow, in which the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the sobriety of the person whose vehicle was struck by the defendant was not material and therefore inadmissible. [25] Guetzkow is distinguishable because it involved a civil forfeiture action. [26] The other driver's behavior did not affect whether the defendant was subject to civil forfeiture liability for driving her car while intoxicated. Therefore, the other driver's sobriety was irrelevant to the defendant's intoxication and arrest. [27] In this case, however, Stickel argued that the decedents' behavior ( i.e., speeding, drag racing and doing wheelies) caused the accident. Given that claim, whether the decedents were intoxicated and more likely to engage in reckless behavior, was relevant. Stickel also relies on Farmer v. State, an assault case. [28] In Farmer, the trial court ruled that it would permit testimony about the assault victim's intoxication if the defendant raised a self-defense claim. [29] The trial court reasoned that the victim's intoxication would be relevant if the defendant claimed that he was defending himself. [30] The defendant did not raise a self-defense claim, and so the trial court excluded the evidence of the victim's blood-alcohol content. [31] The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the evidence was irrelevant and not admissible. [32] Farmer does not support Stickel's argument. Farmer holds that evidence of the decedent's sobriety is admissible only if the decedent's behavior is an issue in the case. The decedent's behavior there was not placed in issue. We hold that, because the decedents' behavior in driving their motorcycles was an issue in Stickel's case, the trial judge properly concluded that the toxicology reports showing that the decedents had not consumed drugs or alcohol constituted relevant evidence. [33] That evidence affected the probability of a fact that Stickel put in issuewhether the decedents were speeding, drag racing or otherwise driving their motorcycles dangerously. Evidence that the decedents had not consumed drugs or alcohol was properly admissible in response to the defendant's factual assertions about the decedents' behavior. Therefore, the record reflects that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion when he admitted the evidence that the decedents had not consumed drugs or alcohol.