Opinion ID: 2684157
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lima's Words - Concessions of Removability

Text: We first account for Lima's words in the proceedings below. As noted, Lima's initial attorney conceded not only that he -10- was removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, but also that his 2009 conviction was for breaking and entering a house. And in Lima's brief filed with the BIA in connection with his first appeal, successor counsel conceded his removability for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. On petition to this Court, instead of telling us why we should not hold him to the concessions of removability, Lima spends most of his brief arguing that his 2009 conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude and, therefore, he is not removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i). DHS takes a different view. It asserts, first of all, that Lima is bound by his admissions through counsel that (1) his 2009 conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, and (2) that he is removable. It additionally argues that because Lima did not challenge removability before the IJ in the initial proceedings or before the BIA in his first appeal, it is too late for him to do so now. Thus, DHS asks us to uphold the BIA's conclusion that Lima's 2009 conviction renders him removable. To resolve this petition, we must determine whether the BIA erred when it refused to disregard Lima's concessions. And, regardless of our answer to this question, we must then consider whether the BIA's finding of removability was supported by substantial evidence in the record. We begin with Lima's concessions. -11-
As we have noted, the BIA held Lima to his first attorney's admission of removability based on Lima's convictions for two crimes involving moral turpitude, and found him removable on that basis.7 In actuality, the record reveals that Lima made several separate admissions bearing on his removability. His initial attorney submitted written pleadings admitting to the charges in the first NTA, and he stated before the IJ that the two crimes of conviction were ones involving moral turpitude. This attorney also stated, on the record, that the 2009 conviction arose out of Lima's having broken into a house.8 And after changing attorneys, even his new counsel admitted Lima's removability in the initial appeal to the BIA. Generally speaking, [a] party's assertion of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission by which it normally is bound throughout the course of the proceeding. Schott Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 976 F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). And an admission of counsel during trial is binding on the client if, in context, 7 The BIA also noted that in order to be removable for the commission of a single crime involving moral turpitude, that crime must have been committed within five years of his admission to the United States. Lima does not contest that the offense occurred within five years of admission. 8 Neither party has remarked upon this concession. -12- it is clear and unambiguous. Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 134 (1st Cir. 1997). These rules hold true in the immigration context. Leblanc v. I.N.S., 715 F.2d 685, 694 (1st Cir. 1983). Where a noncitizen fails to demonstrate that his attorney's conduct was so egregious as to warrant releasing [him] from his attorney's concessions, those admissions are binding upon him. Karim v. Mukasey, 269 Fed. App'x. 5, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2008). Furthermore, where a litigant has advanced no grounds to revisit a concession of removability, we have held that the concession is both binding on the noncitizen and establishes sufficient grounds for finding him removable. Karim v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 109, 111-12 (1st Cir. 2005). Lima's assertion to this court that his 2009 conviction is not for a crime involving moral turpitude cannot undo the clear and unambiguous concessions both of his attorneys have made to the opposite effect. Indeed, Lima does not claim that his first attorney's admissions amounted to the type of egregious circumstances that would be necessary for us to set them aside. He fails to even address successor counsel's concession of removability in his first brief to the BIA. Simply put, Lima offers no substantial reason why we should free him from his concessions of removability beyond his assertion that he wishes to amend his pleadings. Our review of the -13- record leads us to the ineluctable conclusion that his attorneys' concessions of removability were considered tactical decisions made because Lima did not have a meritorious defense to the charges of removability. Indeed, the pleadings submitted during the March 17, 2011 hearing clearly indicate that Lima's counsel conceded removability with the intention of then applying for relief from removal. We have previously stated that [i]t is not unusual or egregious for counsel to make tactical decisions that ultimately fizzle and redound to the client's detriment. Leblanc, 715 F.2d at 694. Nor does such a tactical decision constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (a claim which, by the way, Lima does not make) even when it turns out to have been less than optimal. Id. We conclude, therefore, that Lima has failed to demonstrate that his attorneys' concessions of removability were so egregious as to warrant releasing [him] from [those] concessions. Karim, 269 Fed. App'x. at 6-7. Therefore, like the BIA, we too hold Lima to the words of his attorneys. Having reached this conclusion, we now turn to whether the BIA properly relied exclusively on these concessions and the admissions of removability in finding Lima removable. (b) Concessions as Sufficient Evidence of Removability The government bears the burden of establishing the facts showing that a noncitizen is removable by clear, unequivocal, and -14- convincing evidence. Urizar-Carrascoza, 727 F.3d at 32; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a). It has been further provided by regulation that If the respondent admits the factual allegations and admits his or her removability under the charges and the immigration judge is satisfied that no issues of law or fact remain, the immigration judge may determine that removability as charged has been established by the admissions of the respondent. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c). Thus, although the government must establish the facts to support a finding of removability, we have found that an IJ may apply 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) to determine that removability has been established based on the noncitizen's admissions. Urizar-Carrascoza, 727 F.3d at 33; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c); see also Karim, 269 Fed. App'x. at 6-7 (explaining that an IJ may rely on a noncitizen's pleadings to determine removability). Our sister circuits have reached similar conclusions. In Selimi v. I.N.S., the Seventh Circuit held that the government was relieved of its burden to prove removability where the noncitizen conceded removability because the concession was in the nature of a judicial admission, and such an admission has the effect of withdrawing the issue from controversy. 312 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2002). Along these same lines, the Ninth Circuit has held that an IJ may rely on a noncitizen's counsel's concessions of removability and that no further evidence concerning the issues of -15- fact admitted or law conceded is necessary. Perez-Mejia v. Holder, 663 F.3d 403, 414 (9th Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit's opinion in Hoodho v. Holder is particularly illuminating here. 558 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2009). That court rejected a petitioner's argument that, even though he had conceded removability based on his criminal record, the IJ must independently examine that record to determine whether he was, in fact, removable. Id. at 191. In doing so, the Second Circuit held that such admissions of removability are not subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure that the admissions are fully supported by the underlying record. Id. The court explained that the acceptance by the IJ of a plausible concession of removability is an unremarkable feature of removal proceedings. Id. at 187. Thus, the Second Circuit held that a petitioner may not take back a concession of removability when, in hindsight, it might have been preferable for him to have contested removability instead. Id. We find the reasoning of our sister circuits persuasive and apply it here. Indeed, holding noncitizens to concessions made by counsel fits comfortably within our well-established rule in civil litigation that a pleading admitting a fact alleged in an antecedent pleading is treated as a binding judicial admission, removing the fact from contention for the duration of the litigation. Harrington v. City of Nashua, 610 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2010). Lima's concessions amounted to binding judicial -16- admissions, upon which the IJ permissibly relied in determining removability. Although this would appear to bring the discussion to an end, Lima retorts by arguing that whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of law that he may not concede. In support of this proposition, he cites the Third Circuit's holding that the legal classification of prior convictions is not a factual proposition susceptible of admission by a litigant. Garcia v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 462 F.3d 287, 290 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006). Lima's reliance on the Third Circuit rule is misplaced. We do not need to address this rule, which appears to be inconsistent with First Circuit precedent, because Lima's concession was both of fact and law. One of the factual concessions was that Lima's prior conviction for breaking and entering was of a house. The BIA was entitled to rely on that. In light of Lima's admission that his 2009 conviction resulted from his breaking into a house, we find that the BIA's conclusion that Lima's 2009 conviction rendered him removable was not arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to law. To sum up, the BIA did not err in holding Lima to his attorneys' concessions of removability, nor did it abuse its discretion in determining that Lima was removable based upon his 2009 conviction. -17-