Opinion ID: 200468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the appeals of the defendants

Text: 15 In their brief on appeal, the defendants raise a panoply of objections to the outcome of this litigation. Arguing that the court erred in refusing to direct verdicts on certain claims, admitting certain evidence during the trial, and voiding the contracts at issue, the defendants ask us to undo the jury's verdict against them and overturn the court's declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the contracts. We decline the invitation. 16
17 In its most complex argument on appeal, Pot O'Gold claims that the jury's verdict that it, the corporation, was not liable for fraudulent inducement requires judgment in its favor and a reversal of the jury's verdicts against the individual defendants, Kratze and Germain. Before we address this argument on the merits, we must provide some additional factual background. 18 When Rischitelli met with Kratze and Germain in Detroit in February, he signed a series of contracts formalizing his relationship and Kenda's as consultants to Pot O'Gold, and transferring a number of Kenda assets to the new corporation. Among those contracts was one entitled General Release of All Claims and Waiver of Rights. The third clause in that contract states: 19 The undersigned, KENDA CORPORATION,... does hereby remise, release and forever discharge, POT O' GOLD MONEY LEAGUES, INC.... and its officers, directors and shareholders, ... of and from all and all manner of actions, causes of actions, suits, ... claims and demands whatsoever, known or unknown, liquidated or unliquidated, in law or equity against POT O' GOLD MONEY LEAGUES, INC., ... and its officers, directors and shareholders.... 20 The first clause states that Rischitelli similarly releases all claims he may have against Pot O'Gold, its officers, directors, and shareholders. Rischitelli signed this contract both in his own capacity and as President of Kenda. Rischitelli signed another contract on behalf of Kenda entitled Agreement, outlining Rischitelli's and Kenda's responsibilities as consultants to Pot O'Gold. This Agreement contains a clause which states, in pertinent part: 21 KENDA CORPORATION, now and forever, relinquishes all of its rights; contractual relationships and contracts to and with all of its league members or past league members for the reason it no longer wishes to independently create, develop, control, manage and supervise pool leagues.... KENDA CORPORATION waives all rights and claims to any names, indicia, slogans, copyrights, including Pot O'Gold Pool Leagues, Inc. and all similar names. 22 Kenda also agreed in this contract to transfer its equipment and records to Pot O'Gold. Finally, Kenda signed a contract assigning the servicemark Pot O'Gold to Pot O'Gold. 23 Less than three months after signing these contracts, Kenda filed this lawsuit against Pot O'Gold, Kratze, and Germain, alleging that Pot O'Gold, Kratze, and Germain had fraudulently induced Kenda into signing the aforementioned contracts and had tortiously interfered with Kenda's business relationships. Kenda also sought a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the contracts signed on February 5. The fraud and tortious interference claims went to the jury, which found for Pot O'Gold but against its officers, Kratze and Germain. The complex jury verdict form had eight questions, most with subparts, for the jury to answer. We excerpt the relevant portions: 24 Question 1(A): Did Kenda Corp. prove that its agent, David Rischitelli (Rischitelli) was fraudulently induced by any of the defendants listed below to enter into the agreements dated on or about February 5, 1998? Pot O' Gold Money Leagues, Inc. Yes/No David Kratze (Kratze) Yes/No Jeffrey Germain (Germain) Yes/No 25 . . . . 26 If you answer Question 1(A) No as to Pot O'Gold Money Leagues, proceed to Question 2(B). 27 . . . . 28 Question 2(B): Did Kenda Corp. prove that either of the individual defendants listed below tortiously interfered with a contractual or advantageous business relationship belonging to Kenda Corp.: Kratze Yes/No Germain Yes/No 29 Beneath both question 1 and 2, the jury was asked to determine the amount of damages due Kenda if it found that any of the defendants had committed fraud or tortious interference. The instructions on the verdict form also told the jury that if they answered Yes with respect to any of the defendants listed in question 1(A), they were to skip questions 4-6. Questions 4-6 addressed Pot O'Gold's counterclaims against Kenda (for breach of contract, conversion, and service mark infringement). 3 The jury concluded that Pot O'Gold did not fraudulently induce the contracts, but that Kratze and Germain did. It also concluded that Kratze and Germain committed tortious interference. After the jury delivered its verdict, the court issued a written opinion declaring that the Agreement, General Release, and Assignment were void for fraud and lack of consideration. 30 The defendants now argue in their brief on appeal that the jury's verdict in favor of Pot O'Gold requires judgment in its favor. They elaborate as follows: 31 There can be no doubt that the Feb [sic] 5 Agreements are valid. The Jury determined that there was no fraud by Pot O'Gold. The individual defendants, Kratze and Germain, were not signatories to the Agreements.... [O]ver counsel's objections, the Verdict Form directed the Jury to consider the claims against the individuals even if it found the Feb 5 Agreements valid. But for [plaintiff's argument that the individual defendants were acting outside the scope of their authority], the individuals would have been exonerated[,] as the Feb 5 Agreements, including the Release, were determined by the Jury to be valid, i.e., no fraud by the only party to the Agreements, Pot O'Gold. 32 As relief, the defendants ask that [w]ith respect to all Agreements, this Court should declare them valid, enforceable and enter an Order requiring Kenda and Rischitelli to honor their terms. They also state that the individual verdicts against Kratze and Germain must be reversed to avoid a substantial miscarriage of justice. 33 As the defendants see it, the jury's verdict in favor of Pot O'Gold on the fraudulent inducement claim conclusively establishes the validity of the contracts signed on February 5, 1998, including the General Release, which, by its terms, barred the kind of claims Kenda brought against Pot O'Gold, Kratze, and Germain. Consequently, the jury verdict form was flawed in that it permitted the jury to consider claims of fraudulent inducement and tortious interference against Kratze and Germain even after finding that Pot O'Gold had not committed fraud. 4 Moreover, the favorable finding for Pot O'Gold precluded the court from finding in its written opinion that the contracts were void. 34 The defendants contend that if Kenda is able to collect damages for the tortious conduct of the individual defendants as well as rescind its contracts with Pot O'Gold, Kenda will have it both ways. The jury verdict against the individual defendants (but not against the corporation) likely was based on the theory that the individual defendants were acting outside the scope of their agency as directors of Pot O'Gold when they fraudulently induced Kenda to sign the February 5, 1998, contracts. 5 The defendants now claim that if the jury concluded that Kratze and Germain were acting outside the scope of their agency as directors of Pot O'Gold, then the corporation cannot be held liable for these actions. 35 This is a strange argument because Pot O'Gold is not being held liable in this case. The jury did not award any tort damages against the corporation. Pot O'Gold's only loss is the loss of the benefit of its contracts with Kenda — contracts that the jury specifically found Kenda was fraudulently induced into signing. Far from an unfair or inconsistent resolution, the rescission of the February 5, 1998, contracts is entirely permissible under basic principles of contract law. 36 Fraud in the inducement can serve as both a basis for tort liability, see W. Page Keaton, et al., Prosser and Keaton on Torts § 105 (5th ed.1984), and as grounds for rescinding a contract, see Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 124 N.E.2d 912, 914-15 (1955); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537, 541-42 (1957); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164 (1981). 6 See also Harris v. Delco Prods., 305 Mass. 362, 25 N.E.2d 740, 742 (1940) (The test to be applied in the case at bar to determine whether the defendant is to be relieved of its contract by reason of any alleged fraudulent misrepresentations is the same as that applied in actions of tort for deceit.). Principles of contract law permit rescission of a contract even when the misrepresentations at issue were made by a non-party to the contract. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164(2) (If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or material misrepresentation by one who is not a party to the transaction upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient....). Rescission is an equitable remedy, and can be imposed on a contract even in the absence of culpable behavior. See Robert L. Haig, 3 Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts § 41.14 (1998) (recognizing that rescission can be granted in cases of mistake and innocent representation). Therefore, the mere fact that Pot O'Gold did not engage in conduct warranting a remedy in tort does not prevent the court from relieving Kenda of a contract it was fraudulently induced into signing by directors of Pot O'Gold. 37 While Pot O'Gold contends that the rescission of its contracts with Kenda must be in error because it would permit Kenda to have it both ways — by recovering tort damages from the individual defendants for their ultra vires activities and being able to rescind the contracts with Pot O'Gold — the defendants are actually the ones trying to have it both ways. After convincing the jury that the corporation should not be held liable for the tortious conduct of its directors (thereby relieving itself of vicarious tort liability), Pot O'Gold now seeks to retain the benefits of Kratze and Germain's tortious conduct — namely, the signed contracts with Kenda. Such a result does not accord with the equitable principles of rescission. See, e.g, Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Brooks, 309 Mass. 52, 34 N.E.2d 435, 439 (1941) (discussing fraudulent inducement as a defense to enforcement of a promissory note; The [bank] cannot adopt [the acts of an agent acting beyond his authority] in accepting the note from the [maker] and at the same time disavow the means by which he secured the execution and delivery of the note in its behalf.); Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass. 170, 31 N.E.2d 551, 559 (1941) (opining that a principal should not be able to enforce for his own benefit a contract procured through the actual fraudulent misrepresentation of his agent); White Tower Mgmt. Corp., v. Taglino, 302 Mass. 453, 19 N.E.2d 700, 701 (1939) ([The seller] ought not to be permitted to take the benefit of false and fraudulent misrepresentations made by its agent.). After the rescission of the contracts, Pot O'Gold is now in the same position it would have been in but for the intentional misrepresentations of the individual defendants — there are no contracts between Pot O'Gold and Kenda. The district court's ruling on the declaratory judgment permitting the rescission of the February 5 agreements was correct. 38 As a necessary corollary, then, since the jury's verdict in favor of Pot O'Gold did not conclusively establish the validity of the February 5, 1998, contracts — including the General Release — it was permissible for the jury to consider Kenda's claims against the individual defendants. Therefore, the district court did not err in its construction of the jury form. 39
40 The defendants also challenge the jury's verdict against Kratze on the fraudulent inducement claim on the ground that it was not supported by the evidence produced at trial. In evaluating claims that the evidence does not support the jury verdict, our standard of review is de novo. Walton v. Nalco Chem. Co., 272 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir.2001). We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prevailing party, and we will affirm unless the evidence was `so strongly and overwhelmingly inconsistent' with the verdicts that no reasonable jury could have returned them. Id. (quoting Negron v. Caleb Brett U.S.A. Inc., 212 F.3d 666, 668 (1st Cir.2000)). In order to overturn the verdict, we must find that no reasonable jury could have found that all five elements of common law fraud were met with respect to the alleged misrepresentations.... These elements are: (1) that the statement was knowingly false; (2) that [the defendants] made the false statement with the intent to deceive; (3) that the statement was material to the plaintiffs' decision to sign the contract; (4) that the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the statement; and (5) that the plaintiffs were injured as a result of their reliance. Turner v. Johnson & Johnson, 809 F.2d 90, 95 (1st Cir.1986). The defendants contend that no reasonable jury could have found that Rischitelli reasonably relied on the statements Kratze and Germain made when he signed the contracts. 41 At trial, Rischitelli testified that Kratze and Germain brought in a chart that showed projections where they were going to make $50 million in the next year running their pool league. He also testified that Kratze talked to him about the league affiliating with Oprah's Angels 8 — that he had 300,000 kids signed, sealed and delivered as league participants. Finally, Rischitelli testified that Kratze told him he was going to invest his own money in the corporation. The defendants argue that these statements cannot be the basis for fraud liability. 42 Noting that the statements relied upon by Rischitelli were not incorporated into the signed contracts, the defendants point to an integration clause included as Paragraph 10 of the Agreement, which states: Each party hereto agrees that this Agreement is the entire agreement and understanding between the parties and no verbal statements at any time shall affect in any way the terms and conditions of this Agreement. But it is well settled in Massachusetts that [a]n integration clause in a contract does not insulate automatically a party from liability where he induced another person to enter into a contract by misrepresentation. Starr v. Fordham, 420 Mass. 178, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1268 (1995). See Sound Techniques Inc. v. Hoffman, 50 Mass.App.Ct. 425, 737 N.E.2d 920, 924 (2000) (Whether we refer to the clause in question as a merger clause, an integration clause, or an exculpatory clause, the settled rule of law is that a contracting party cannot rely upon such a clause as protection against claims based upon fraud or deceit.); see also Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 212 N.E.2d 556, 562 (1965) (Fraud involved in the contract may be proved by extrinsic evidence....). 9 43 Rischitelli testified that he actually relied on the statements cited above when deciding to sign the contracts: I inquired about whether or not I could become a stockholder with them. I liked what he had to say about the fact that they were going to give some money and they had Oprah's Angels already signed up.... [They said t]he only way to bring me on board was for me to sign a consulting agreement. The jury could have found that Rischitelli's reliance was reasonable. 44 [S]tatements of present intention as to future conduct may be the basis for a fraud action if ... the statements misrepresent the actual intention of the speaker and were relied upon by the recipient to his damage. McEvoy Travel Bureau Inc. v. Norton Co., 408 Mass. 704, 563 N.E.2d 188, 192 (1990). Kratze's statement that he planned to invest his own money into Pot O'Gold is more than just a vague promise. Rischitelli could have believed that it accurately expressed his intent at the time he convinced Rischitelli to sign the contract. Rischitelli had no reason to believe that Kratze did not intend to carry through with this investment. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that Kratze never invested any of his own money into Pot O'Gold. 45 Similarly, Kratze's statement that he had a signed, sealed, and delivered contract with the Oprah's Angel Network was a statement of fact, which Rischitelli also had no reason to suspect was not true. The defendants contend that Rischitelli was a sophisticated businessman who could have detected Kratze's intentional misrepresentations simply by asking to see the contract with Oprah. Although Rischitelli might have demanded more of his future business associates, his failure to confirm that there was actually a contract with Oprah's Angels does not make his reliance unreasonable. Certainly where a defendant has wilfully made false representations with intent to deceive he ought not to be relieved of liability because of his victim's lack of diligence. Yorke, 124 N.E.2d at 916. The outer limit of this doctrine requires only that the relied-upon statement not be preposterous or palpably false. Id.; see Kuwaiti Danish Computer Co. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 438 Mass. 459, 781 N.E.2d 787, 795 (2003) (finding that plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied on an oral statement made during contract negotiations when the statement's falsity would have been discovered if plaintiffs had read the entire contract). The mere fact that Rischitelli could have discovered Kratze's misrepresentation by pressing Kratze to produce the contract at issue does not render the statement palpably false. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra, § 108 (It is now held that assertions of fact as to ... matters inducing commercial transactions ... may justifiably be relied on without investigation... where the falsity of the representation might be discovered with little effort by means easily at hand.); see also Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 575 N.E.2d 70, 71 (1991) (upholding the determination that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the false statement, even though its falsity would have been uncovered merely by obtaining an independent estimate). Hence, the jury supportably could have found that Rischitelli's reliance on Kratze's representations without further investigation was not unreasonable. 46 Kratze's statement that Pot O'Gold could generate $50 million in revenue in 1998 presents a more difficult question on the issue of justifiable reliance. Because we find Rischitelli could have reasonably relied on Kratze's other statements, and these provide a sufficient basis for the jury's verdict, we need not determine whether Kratze's projection was mere puffery. 47
48 The contract Rischitelli signed on January 23 states, inter alia: 49 For a period of one (1) year after your discussion and any resolution [sic] discussions hereafter, you agree not to compete with the Company, in any manner, with respect to the business conducted by the Company, anywhere in the United States of America.... This Agreement not to compete pertains to all business conducted by the Company, including (by way of example only) the Company's pool and/or dart leagues. 50 Pot O'Gold claimed that Rischitelli breached this contract in March 1998 when he regained control of the teams that had played in the league operated by Pot O'Gold since January. The jury disagreed. After the conclusion of the trial, the court considered the parties' request for a declaratory judgment on the validity of the January 23 contract, and declared the contract void. 51 The validity of this contract must be considered separately from the validity of the contracts Rischitelli signed on February 5, 1998. While we have concluded that the individual defendants' misrepresentations tainted the February 5, 1998, contracts to the extent that they could be rescinded, the statements that Pot O'Gold had a signed contract with Oprah's Angel Network and that Kratze and Germain were going to invest their own money into the corporation were not made until after Rischitelli signed the January 23, 1998, contract. These statements, then, cannot be the basis for finding that Rischitelli was fraudulently induced into signing the January 23, 1998, contract. Therefore, we must carefully review the jury's verdict and the judge's decision to determine whether the January 23, 1998, contract fails for a lack of consideration. 52 The judge had instructed the jury that [i]f you find by a preponderance of the evidence that consideration did not exist with respect to a particular contract, the party accused [of] breaching that contract is excused from performing under the terms of that contract and may not be held liable for breach of that contract. 10 There was no objection to this instruction. Question eight on the jury verdict form asked: Did Pot O'Gold Money Leagues, Inc. prove that Rischitelli breached a contract he had with it[?] The jury responded no. After this verdict, the district court determined that the Non-Competition Agreement was void for lack of consideration in that the defendants provided nothing of value to Rischitelli in exchange for his promise. 53 Defendants argue that the promise to tell Rischitelli about their plans was sufficiently valuable consideration to enforce the contract. That argument ignores Rischitelli's testimony that Kratze and Germain's business plans consisted only of their desire to see the Pot O'Gold League expand its player base and their claims that such growth was imminent given their signed, sealed, and delivered contract with the Oprah's Angels Network. Noting that this valuable information turned out to be no more than a series of misrepresentations, the trial court explained its decision to rescind the January 23 contract: 54 The party seeking rescission must demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentation and resulting failure of consideration amounts to an abrogation of the contract, or goes to the essence of it, or takes away its foundation. NIKE, Inc., 1 F.Supp.2d at 65, citing Plumer v. Houghton & Dutton Co., 281 Mass. 173, 183 N.E. 266 (1932) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although as a general principle of contract law, courts will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration in an agreed-upon exchange, equity will grant relief where the consideration is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court. See Wroblewski v. Wroblewski, 329 Mich. 61, 67, 44 N.W.2d 869 (1950). 55 We find no fault with this analysis.
56 The plaintiffs elicited testimony from several witnesses who were shareholders working as either league directors or employees of the new corporation, Pot O'Gold. The defendants object to three types of evidence that they claim were irrelevant: 57 &#x2022; oral testimony that Germain and Kratze lied to [these shareholders], owed them unpaid wages, stole money and threatened them; 58 &#x2022; a letter Perry wrote to Kratze outlining the problems Pot O'Gold was having with its finances; and 59 &#x2022; a document prepared by Germain and presented to a Pot O'Gold shareholder/league director showing that Pot O'Gold could earn $48 million in revenues in 1998. 60 The defendants argue that this evidence, having nothing to do with Kenda and Rischitelli, the only plaintiffs in this case, was irrelevant to Kenda's claims and unfairly prejudicial. They insist that the only evidence that the Jury should have heard was that concerning the alleged fraudulent inducement of the Feb [sic] 5 Agreement. We agree with the trial court that the defendants take much too narrow a view of the case and the concept of relevance. 61 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. The district court enjoys substantial latitude in admitting testimony pursuant to this rule, and `only in exceptional cases will reversible error be found in the district court's determination of the probative value of testimony in a particular case.' Cummings v. Standard Register Co., 265 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting Conway v. Electro Switch Co., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st. Cir.1987)). The evidence in question was relevant to the issues present in the case at the start of the trial. 62 In addition to its claim of fraudulent inducement, Kenda alleged tortious interference with business relations, violations of civil RICO, and violations of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act (Chapter 93A). The defendants added to the complexity of the case with their counterclaims. All of the evidence challenged by the defendants was relevant to at least one of the claims present in the litigation. For example, Germain's assertion, accompanied by a chart, that Pot O'Gold could make $48 million in 1998 helped to convince league directors to keep their teams aligned with Pot O'Gold, and hence bore directly on Kenda's tortious interference claim. It was also relevant to Kenda's RICO claim. 11 In order to prove the defendants violated RICO, Kenda had to show the defendants were committing a pattern of racketeering activity. Therefore, conversations among Pot O'Gold shareholders (and documents produced during those conversations) regarding Kratze's and Germain's attempts to expand the company could have supported Kenda's claims that Pot O'Gold was engaging in such a pattern. 63 Testimony describing the general disarray of Pot O'Gold between January 1998 and March 1998 was similarly relevant to Kenda's claims. In support of Kenda's fraudulent inducement claim, Rischitelli testified that Kratze and Germain told him they were going to infuse the league with substantial amounts of their own money. The testimony elicited from Pot O'Gold shareholders — that Kratze and Germain had not contributed their own funds to the league, that the corporation's money was being handled inappropriately, and that the corporation was therefore unable to pay its bills — was relevant to whether Kratze and Germain's statements to Rischitelli were misrepresentations. 64 There is no reason to think that the evidence presented in this case was unfairly prejudicial. The witnesses testified only to Germain and Kratze's conduct as businessmen. Although that portrayal was unfavorable, it was offered in support of claims that they acted improperly in creating Pot O'Gold and in carrying out its business. Flattering evidence would not have made the case. See Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 348 (1st Cir.1998) ([A]ll probative evidence is prejudicial.); Onujiogu v. United States, 817 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir.1987) (The fact that a piece of evidence hurts a party's chances does not mean it should be automatically excluded. If that were true, there would be precious little left in the way of probative evidence in any case.).
65 After finding Kratze and Germain liable, the jury awarded Kenda $55,500 on its fraudulent inducement claim and $35,000 on its tortious interference claim. The defendants now contend that those damages awards are not supported by the evidence submitted in the trial, and alternatively, that the awards are redundant. We disagree.
66 Rischitelli testified that he wrote Germain a $25,000 check for the purpose of fulfilling his responsibilities under the February 5, 1998, Agreement. That agreement states that Kenda would be responsible for the tournament fees for the upcoming national tournament. Rischitelli gave the $25,000 check to Germain shortly after the February 5 meeting. 12 As the jury found that Rischitelli was fraudulently induced into signing the February 5, 1998, contract on behalf of Kenda, the transfer of this $25,000 can be directly traced to this contract. 67 Additionally, Rischitelli testified that he estimated Kenda would have received approximately $80,000 in revenue if it had operated the league between January 5, 1998, and March 23, 1998. Certainly, as Kenda did not operate the league during this period, Rischitelli could not know for sure how much money players actually paid in dues to Pot O'Gold. Nevertheless, his estimate was reconstructed from records indicating the number of teams registered and the number of games played during the three-month period that the teams were sending their dues to Pot O'Gold and Germain. The remainder of the jury's award for fraudulent inducement ($30,500) could have been to compensate Kenda for this lost income. It is reasonable to assume, as the jury must have, that at least $30,500 of the estimated $80,000 in revenues Kenda lost would have been earned after February 5, 1998, the date of the contract signing.
68 Kenda also adduced sufficient evidence to justify a discrete award of $35,000 on the tortious interference claim. Rischitelli and Perry both testified that Perry transferred $26,000 from the Kenda account to Germain before Rischitelli even knew Perry was abandoning their business. Perry took two blank checks that Rischitelli had signed before leaving for vacation in December 1997, wrote out one for $10,000 and the other for $16,000, and gave them to Germain. The remaining $9,000 of the award could have come from revenues Kenda lost before February 5, 1998. Teams affiliated with Kenda had been paying dues through the mail. Kenda employees would send blank score sheets to the teams together with an envelope addressed to Kenda's post office box. After playing each week, the teams would fill out their score sheets, place them in these envelopes along with their weekly fees, and mail them. After the meeting on December 19, 1997 (when Perry and the other former Kenda employees and league directors became shareholders of Pot O'Gold), Germain directed Pot O'Gold employees to change the addresses on these envelopes. The new address was a post office box controlled by Pot O'Gold. Rischitelli testified that when he returned from vacation in early January, the Kenda post office box had very few envelopes in it. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume, as the jury probably did, that Kenda lost at least $9,000 in revenues before February 5, 1998. Consequently, we find that the jury verdict was both supportable and non-redundant.
69 Finally, the defendants cite what appears to be a clerical error in the amended judgment. The district court entered judgment on September 5, 2001. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff moved to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) for the purpose of adding prejudgment interest. The defendants did not oppose the motion, and the court issued an amended judgment on April 1, 2002. In the amended judgment, the district court omitted the following sentence that had been present in the initial judgment: [A]nd it is FURTHER ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant Pot O'Gold Money Leagues, Inc. on the plaintiff's claims against it that were tried before the jury. Although the plaintiffs prevailed in their claims against Kratze and Germain, the jury concluded that Pot O'Gold was not liable for fraudulent inducement. Therefore, on that claim, Pot O'Gold was the prevailing party. This sentence should have been retained in the amended judgment. Therefore, we will direct the district court to restore the deleted language to its amended judgment.