Opinion ID: 1476426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Instruction on Defendant's Other Sentences

Text: Defendant asserts that by instructing the jury that the sentence for his other crimes was not to be considered a mitigating factor, the trial court violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to have the jury consider all relevant mitigating evidence. He acknowledges that the instructions comported with our prior holdings, but argues that when other sentences include life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, they constitute mitigating factors inasmuch as they establish a lack of future dangerousness. The trial court informed the jury: [I]f your verdict or your failure to reach a verdict requires that a term of imprisonment be imposed, then at a minimum the defendant will be serving two life terms, 55 years without parole, plus 30 additional years so that the defendant... will be required to serve 85 years prior to becoming eligible for consideration for parole. With Mr. Reddish receiving credit for time served on his first case, he would, therefore, not be eligible for parole until the year 2080. Mr. Reddish was born on March 17th, 1961. Members of the jury, the fact that Mr. Reddish is serving a lengthy sentence as a result of another case is not a mitigating factor. In other words, a capital defendant is not worthy of life because he or she may face a longer confinement in prison than another. Rather, a defendant's worthiness for life should depend only on the aggravating and mitigating factors that have been presented. I have informed you of his existing sentences and of my intention to impose a potential noncapital sentence consecutively so that you may be fully informed of the effect of your decision, that is, that as a consequence of your decision that the defendant should not receive the death penalty, he realistically will never be eligible for parole based upon a person's life expectancy. That instruction fully informed the jury of the consequences of its decision, Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 370, 680 A. 2d 677, and all prior sentences that defendant was serving, State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 373, 700 A. 2d 306 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1084, 120 S.Ct. 809, 145 L.Ed. 2d 681 (2000). Additionally, it correctly informed the jury that prior sentences are not properly submitted as mitigating factors. Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 370, 680 A. 2d 677; Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 603, 610 A. 2d 814; Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 49, 594 A. 2d 172. As the Court explained in Bey III, supra : The focus of the Capital Punishment Act is on individualized sentencing, requiring that the jury determine whether death is the appropriate punishment based on the circumstances of the offense and the aggravating and mitigating factors. To permit consideration of pending sentences for prior crimes might lead to the incongruous result that first-offenders would be more likely to be sentenced to death than would repeat-offenders. [129 N.J. at 603, 610 A. 2d 814.] Furthermore, [b]ecause the sentencing determination is fact specific and remains subject to significant sentencer discretion, the sentence imposed [on defendant] in another case under different circumstances has little probative value to the present jury's sentencing decision. Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 49, 594 A. 2d 172. In keeping with those principles, we reject defendant's argument and find no violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. As to defendant's assertion that his term of life imprisonment mitigated the risk of future dangerousness, we merely reiterate that [a] defendant's future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravating factor and must play no part in a jury's deliberations. Fortin II, supra, 178 N.J. at 631, 843 A. 2d 974. The State, properly, did not raise future dangerousness as an aggravating factor. See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 371, 680 A. 2d 677 (stating [f]uture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors); cf. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 521, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988) (concluding that prosecutor's discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error). Consequently, the trial court's instruction was consistent with this Court's prior precedents and in no way violated defendant's Eighth Amendment right to have the jury consider all relevant mitigating evidence.