Opinion ID: 716752
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of the Word Parent

Text: 34 In resolving the question whether Floyd is exempt from prosecution for kidnapping, we must first determine whether the word parent, as used in section 1201, includes a person who is not a biological parent. Floyd does not argue that the record demonstrates that he is Michael's biological father. Thus, if the statutory exemption is limited to biological parents, Floyd cannot prevail on this issue. 35 Congress did not define the word parent in section 1201. In interpreting Congressional intent, a reviewing court must determine whether the language used in a statute is ambiguous, or whether it has an ordinary meaning. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-62, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1925, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (if statutory language has not been defined and does not have any established common-law meaning the terms of the statute must be given their ordinary meaning). If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'  United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). 36 We are persuaded, after consulting the dictionary, that the word parent is not ambiguous. The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VII at 222 (2nd ed. 1989) defines parent as both [a] person who has begotten or borne a child; a father or mother and [a] person who holds the position or exercises the functions of a parent; a protector, guardian. Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 1641 (4th ed. 1976) defines parent as one that begets or brings forth offspring and a person standing in loco parentis although not a natural parent. Accord, Black's Law Dictionary at 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (In common and ordinary usage [parent] comprehends much more than mere fact of who was responsible for child's conception and birth and is commonly understood to describe and refer to a person or persons who share mutual love and affection with a child and who supply child support and maintenance, instruction, discipline, and guidance) (citing Solberg v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 50 Wis.2d 746, 185 N.W.2d 319, 323 (1971)). 37 There is only one reported opinion that has discussed the question whether the exemption in section 1201 can apply to a person who is not a biological parent. In Miller v. United States, 123 F.2d 715 (8th Cir.1941), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 192, 63 S.Ct. 187, 87 L.Ed. 179 (1942), the appellant claimed that he was exempt from prosecution for kidnapping his married stepdaughter. Id. at 717. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that, [t]he term 'parent' primarily means one who begets a child.... However, it is also well recognized that the term 'parent' in a broad sense and under certain circumstances may include anyone who stands in a position equivalent to that of a parent. Id. at 717. The court concluded that the appellant was not exempt from prosecution because, at the time of the kidnapping, he was like an utter stranger to this minor and had never accepted any of the duties and liabilities ... of one who stood in loco parentis. Id. at 717-18. The defendant could not, therefore, satisfy even the broadest and most latitudinarian definition ... of the term 'parent'. Id. We agree with the Eighth Circuit that a person who stands in the place of a biological parent at the time of a kidnapping is exempt from prosecution pursuant to section 1201. 38 Our conclusion that a surrogate parent is exempt from prosecution under section 1201 does not contravene Congress' intent in creating the parent exception to section 1201. In deciding whether the words or otherwise that follow held for ransom and reward in section 1201 require proof of an intent to obtain money or something of value, the Supreme Court reasoned as follows in Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936): 39 [t]he words 'except, in case of a minor, by a parent thereof' emphasize the intended result of the enactment. They indicate legislative understanding that in their absence a parent, who carried his child away because of affection, might subject himself to condemnation of the statute. 40 Id. at 129, 56 S.Ct. at 397. We are persuaded that a surrogate parent, who has not voluntarily abandoned the responsibilities of a biological parent prior to the time he or she carries a child away, is not subject to prosecution under the statute. 41