Opinion ID: 2630631
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: De-escalation from a Seizure to a Consensual Encounter

Text: ¶ 33 A traffic stop that begins as a seizure may de-escalate to a mere consensual encounter. As a general framework, there are three [different] levels of police encounters with the public. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987) (citing United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984)); see also United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990) (stating that there are three categories of citizen encounters with law enforcement officials). Because each level has different legal rules that apply, we turn now to a discussion of the different levels.
¶ 34 A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning by an officer. Id. Since the encounter is consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498-99, 103 S.Ct. 1319. ¶ 35 A level two encounter involves an investigative detention that is usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive. United States v. Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir.1991); see also Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407 (noting a level two encounter is an investigative detention or  Terry stop). Although it is a Fourth Amendment seizure, probable cause is not required. Evans, 937 F.2d at 1537. Rather, when specific and articulable facts and rational inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime, an officer may initiate an investigative detention without consent. Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407. ¶ 36 A level three encounter involves an arrest, which has been characterized [as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] requires probable cause. Id. A level three encounter is also a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id. ¶ 37 Typically, a traffic stop is considered to be an investigative detention (i.e., a level two encounter). Walker, 933 F.2d at 815. A person is seized, but usually the seizure is not highly intrusive or lengthy. See United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir.1994) (stating that for a seizure to be merely investigatory, it must be sufficiently limited in scope and duration). While a traffic stop may begin as an investigatory detention, it is possible for it to de-escalate to a consensual encounter. See State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Utah 1994); Werking, 915 F.2d at 1408. Since a consensual encounter is not a seizure, questioning during such an encounter is lawful, regardless of scope, as long as the person remains a willing participant. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498-99, 103 S.Ct. 1319; Walker, 933 F.2d at 817. ¶ 38 Thus, it is important to determine whether Hansen's encounter with Officer Huntington had de-escalated from an investigatory detention to a consensual encounter before Hansen was asked additional questions. We conclude the detention had not de-escalated.
¶ 39 A traffic stop de-escalates to a consensual encounter when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or she is free to end the encounter and depart. See Higgins, 884 P.2d at 1244; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (expressing minority opinion that has since become the opinion of the Court); Royer, 460 U.S. at 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319. If a reasonable person would not believe he or she is free to leave or disregard questioning, however, the encounter remains an investigatory detention. ¶ 40 As a threshold matter, `an encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed consensual unless the driver's documents have been returned to him,' United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir.1994)), because absent the return of documents, a person legally could not proceed on his way, Werking, 915 F.2d at 1409. Since Officer Huntington returned Hansen's license and registration to him prior to the additional questioning, this threshold requirement was met. ¶ 41 Although no single factor is dispositive, factors tending to show de-escalation include informing a person he is free to leave, or that he does not have to answer additional questions. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 231, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). In contrast, failure to issue a warning or citation before engaging in additional questioning weighs against de-escalation. Likewise, a `coercive show of authority, such as the presence of more than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical touching by the officer, or his use of a commanding tone of voice indicating that compliance might be compelled,' also weighs against de-escalation. United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 959 (10th Cir.1991)). ¶ 42 The State argues that none of the factors pertaining to a coercive show of authority were present at the time of the additional questioning, and therefore, the detention had de-escalated to a consensual encounter. We disagree for two reasons. ¶ 43 First, the factual differences between the initial traffic stop and the additional questioning were minimal. During the initial traffic stop, Officer Huntington was the only officer present. While he was armed, there was no evidence that he displayed his weapon or physically touched Hansen. Thus, factors demonstrating a coercive show of authority were absent at the time of the initial seizure. Since these factors were never present to begin with, a reasonable person would not be able to discern that a seizure had de-escalated to a consensual encounter due to the absence of such factors at the time of additional questioning. ¶ 44 Second, at the time of the additional questioning, there was an arguably threatening presence of more than one officer. As Officer Huntington walked back to Hansen's vehicle to return his documents, another patrol car appeared on the scene. The second patrol car had its lights flashing, and it pulled in behind Hansen's vehicle. The second officer stepped out of his vehicle and stood next to Officer Huntington's patrol car. Only then did Officer Huntington ask Hansen about alcohol, drugs, and weapons, and request to search his vehicle. Thus, a reasonable person actually may have believed that the encounter was escalating rather than de-escalating. ¶ 45 Other factors during the encounter also tend to show Hansen was still seized. Officer Huntington informed Hansen that he detained him because he had made an illegal lane change and had no vehicle insurance. Yet, when Officer Huntington returned Hansen's license and registration to him he did not address the illegal lane change before he started questioning Hansen about contraband. Furthermore, Officer Huntington did not tell Hansen that he was free to leave or that he did not have to answer the additional questions. We question whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave before being issued a warning or citation, or at least being told he or she could leave. ¶ 46 Looking at these factors in totality, we conclude Hansen's detention had not de-escalated to a consensual encounter at the time of the additional questioning; and thus, he was illegally seized. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision on this issue. Although we conclude that Officer Huntington's questioning exceeded the scope of the traffic stop and that the stop had not de-escalated to a consensual encounter at the time of the additional questioning, evidence obtained from the search may nevertheless be admitted if Hansen consented to the search and the consent was sufficiently attenuated from Officer Huntington's prior illegality. We now address these issues.