Opinion ID: 2263177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: We begin by addressing the trial justice's denial of defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b). The defendant advances two arguments. The first is predicated upon an alleged error in the instructions through which the trial justice charged the jury. St. Paul argues that instructing the jury to find whether the professional services endorsement was attached to the original policy when it was issued misinterpreted the applicable substantive law. (Emphasis added.) Second, defendant asserts that we should reverse the denial of the motion because no reasonable jury could have found that the endorsement was not issued with the standard form policy. When considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial justice must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses,    draw[ing] from the record all reasonable inferences that support the position of the nonmoving party. Marketing Design Source, Inc. v. Pranda North America, Inc., 799 A.2d 267, 271 (R.I.2002) (quoting Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158, 1165 (R.I.2001)). If, after such a review, there remain factual issues upon which reasonable persons might draw different conclusions, the motion for [judgment as a matter of law] must be denied   . Wellborn v. Spurwink/Rhode Island, 873 A.2d 884, 887 (R.I.2005) (quoting Francis v. American Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 861 A.2d 1040, 1045 (R.I.2004)). This Court is bound by the same standards and rules as the trial justice. Saber v. Dan Angelone Chevrolet, Inc., 811 A.2d 644, 648 (R.I.2002). For reasons more fully discussed in Part II B. of our opinion, we are satisfied that the trial justice did not instruct the jury erroneously about the applicable legal principles. We proceed to address, therefore, defendant's assertions with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant argues that CFS had the burden of proving the existence of the umbrella policy, and that its exposure fell within the policy terms. Because CFS was unable to locate a copy of the standard form policy for the relevant period in its records, it necessarily relied upon the testimony of Margaret Johnson, [5] a St. Paul underwriter since 1978, to introduce into evidence the standard form policy in effect in September 1983. The defendant further asserts that Ms. Johnson's undisputed testimony also established that an endorsement, the language of which purports to exclude professional services liability, was issued at the same time. Thus, defendant contends, no reasonable jury could conclude that the standard form policy was issued, but that the endorsement was not. Ms. Johnson testified that St. Paul's underwriting files pertaining to CFS contained a declarations page indicating a policy period from November 17, 1982 to November 17, 1983. St. Paul's files also contained a one-page document entitled SCHEDULE A (schedule of underlying insurance) listing the primary insurance carriers and the respective limits of liability. The specific underwriting file did not contain the preprinted standard form policy, but Ms. Johnson did identify the standard form that would have been in effect during that policy period. Ms. Johnson further testified that the CFS underwriting file also contained a one-page endorsement entitled EXCLUSION OF PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OR ERRORS AND OMISSIONS (professional services endorsement) that she said was attached to my policy when it was issued. [6] The endorsement bore no date; nor was it stapled or otherwise physically attached to any other document in the St. Paul underwriting file. Ms. Johnson, however, testified about the routine custom and practice of St. Paul concerning the issuance of policies and endorsements in 1982. She indicated that the policy number, typed in a box in the upper left corner, which says ATTACHED TO AND FORMING PART OF POLICY NO., corresponds to the policy number on the declarations page of the 1982-1983 policy. Two other boxes, one for EFFECTIVE DATE OF ENDORSEMENT and the other for ISSUED TO, were left blank. The endorsement document, however, specifically provided that those two boxes need not be completed if this endorsement and the policy have the same inception date. Because Ms. Johnson's testimony went unchallenged and was not contradicted by any other evidence, defendant maintains that no reasonable jury could conclude that the endorsement was not issued at the same time as the standard form policy. Our independent review of the record, however, leads us to the possibility of a different conclusion. Ms. Johnson also testified that in 1982 it was the practice at St. Paul for a typist to type the necessary information onto the declarations page, the schedule of underlying insurance, and any endorsements that were attached to that particular policy, and then staple them to the standard form policy. Two sets of complete copies were forwarded to the insurance agent, and St. Paul retained a copy, also stapled together, but without the standard form policy. Ms. Johnson further testified that no typist would deviate from our custom, standard and practice. John Duval, an insurance agent at Starkweather & Shepley, [7] confirmed that when he received policies from St. Paul in 1982, they were bound together with a staple inside a jacket. Mr. Duval went on to testify that it was the routine practice of Starkweather & Shepley to deliver the policies to their insured clients stapled together as they got them from St. Paul. Yet, neither St. Paul nor Starkweather & Shepley produced a copy of the 1982-1983 policy with an endorsement stapled to the declarations page, schedule of underlying insurance, standard form policy, or any other document comprising the insurance contract. St. Paul's and Starkweather & Shepley's failure to locate a document conforming to what Ms. Johnson insisted was the routine custom and practice of St. Paul in 1982, when viewed in a light congenial to CFS, could well lead a jury to infer that the endorsement was not, as stated on the endorsement itself, ATTACHED TO AND FORMING PART OF POLICY NO. 569XE6952. In addition, St. Paul was unable to locate a form entitled RATING/DATA ENTRY WORKSHEET (rating worksheet), which is a one-page document that indicates the premiums charged for the different types of excess insurance St. Paul provided. If an endorsement added to or subtracted from the coverage that the standard form provided, the rating worksheet would reflect that change in a higher or lower premium. Although not a part of the umbrella policy, it was related to it, and, according to Ms. Johnson, typically would be located in the underwriting file. During trial, plaintiff introduced a rating worksheet for a policy that defendant issued to plaintiff in 1985, a policy that included an undisputed endorsement excluding professional services. The 1985 rating worksheet, while indicating premiums charged for automobile liability and general liability consistent with the policy, left blank the space provided for the premium charged for professional liability coverage. Moreover, the total policy premium charged for all coverage in 1985, noted at the bottom of the rating worksheet, is a sum of only the automobile liability and general liability premiums. Ms. Johnson testified that the absence of a professional liability premium in the 1985 rating worksheet indicates that the policy did not provide professional liability coverage, which was consistent with the exclusionary endorsement. The production of a rating worksheet applicable to the 1982-1983 policy would have provided strong evidence about whether professional services were covered or excluded in said policy. Conversely, the absence of such a worksheet, which was typically maintained in St. Paul's underwriting file, may have contributed to a reasonable inference that the professional liability exclusion endorsement was not in fact a part of the 1982-1983 policy. This distinction was all the more important because the declarations page of the 1982-1983 policy made no reference to an endorsement excluding professional services. Indeed, in denying defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial justice remarked that the rating worksheet's absence for the 1982-1983 policy called into question St. Paul's entire record-keeping procedure. We agree with the trial justice that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to CFS, the prevailing party, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could draw reasonable inferences to support its verdict. We hold, therefore, that the trial justice did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.