Opinion ID: 77200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Does the Union Qualify as an Employer for the Purposes of the EPPA?

Text: 32 Plaintiffs also argue that the Union's proposal that they take polygraph tests converted the Union into an employer for the purposes of the EPPA. We disagree. 33 The EPPA defines an employer as any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee. 29 U.S.C. § 2001(2). The question of whether and under what circumstances a union can qualify as an employer for purposes of the EPPA is one of first impression for this Circuit. 34 Indeed, we have found only one case that takes up this precise question. In del Canto v. ITT Sheraton Corp., the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a union's status as an employer depends upon the level of control the union wielded over the putative employer as dictated by the economic realities of their relationship. 865 F.Supp. 927, 932-33 (D.D.C.1994), aff'd sub nom. del Canto v. Richardson, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C.Cir.1995) (unpublished). The economic reality test has also been the prevailing approach for courts determining whether a polygraph examiner is an employer for the purposes of the EPPA. See, e.g., Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.3d 721, 726-28 (5th Cir.2002); James v. Professionals' Detective Agency, Inc., 876 F.Supp. 1013, 1015-16 (N.D.Ill.1995); Fallin v. Mindis Metals, Inc., 865 F.Supp. 834, 839-40 (N.D.Ga.1994); and Rubin v. Tourneau, Inc., 797 F.Supp. 247, 252-53 (S.D.N.Y.1992). 35 This Circuit has also used the economic reality test in determining whether a party is an employer for the purposes of other federal employee protection statutes with definitions of employer similar to that of the EPPA. In Welch v. Laney, this Circuit had to determine whether the defendant was an employer for the purposes of the Equal Pay Act, an extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), incorporating its definition of an employer: any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . . . 57 F.3d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1978)). There, we considered the total employment situation and, in particular, how much control did the alleged employer exert on the employees; and, did the alleged employer have the power to hire, fire, or modify the employment condition of the employees. Id. (internal citations and brackets omitted). In Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 686-87 (11th Cir.1999), we applied the Welch test to the definition of employer found in the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which used the same definition as in the FLSA and the Equal Pay Act. Given the substantial similarity between the definitions of employer in the EPPA and in the FMLA and the FLSA, we find the economic reality test appropriate here as well. 36 Turning to the record, there is no evidence that the Union exerted enough control over the Company to be considered an employer. Instead, the record indicates the contrary; the record indicates that the Union was acting in this case in the interests of its members, the plaintiffs, and not in the interest of the Company. The Union had originally requested that plaintiffs be reinstated in their jobs, and those requests were denied by the Company. Furthermore, the Union suggested polygraph exams to give plaintiffs a quick way to clear their names and regain their jobs. The proposal was for the benefit of the plaintiffs, not the Company. There is no indication that the Union acted directly or indirectly in the interest of the Company in relation to the plaintiffs, so the Union cannot be considered an employer for the purposes of the EPPA. Thus, the plaintiffs' suit against the Union must fail.