Opinion ID: 580302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vasquez's Challenges To His Sentence

Text: 16 Vasquez also raises two challenges to the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines in calculating his sentence. Vasquez first argues that the court erred in enhancing his sentence two points pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1(b) for possession of a dangerous weapon because he lacked actual knowledge of the weapons' existence. 17 Sentencing Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(1) permits a two-level increase in the base offense level [i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed during commission of the offense. Application Note 3 to this section instructs that [t]he enhancement for weapon possession reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons. The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). 18 Here the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the presence of a veritable arsenal of weapons in safes in an apartment where vast quantities of contraband were found constituted possession under the Sentencing Guidelines regardless of whether the safes had been open or closed. This finding is not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Pellegrini, 929 F.2d 55, 56 (2d Cir.1991) (an enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) is warranted when weapons are present in the same apartment where narcotics are stored); United States v. Paulino, 887 F.2d 358, 360 (1st Cir.1989) (finding possession under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) where firearms were located in a closet of an apartment rented by the defendant in the same building as another apartment, also rented by the defendant, where drugs were uncovered); United States v. Gillock, 886 F.2d 220, 223 (9th Cir.1989) (affirming two level upward adjustment for possession of a weapon pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) where firearm and drugs were seized from the same closet); United States v. McGhee, 882 F.2d 1095, 1099 (6th Cir.1989) (defendant possessed firearms pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) even though the weapons were located in a safe as well as a secret compartment in the walls of an apartment where cocaine was seized). 19 Vasquez nevertheless contends that the court erred in applying the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement because he lacked actual knowledge that firearms were located in the apartment from which he fled. Whether a defendant's sentence is subject to enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) when the defendant lacks personal knowledge of a weapon's existence presents an issue of first impression in this Circuit. 20 Section 1B1.3(a)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines directs courts, in deciding whether to apply a specific offense characteristic, such as the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, to a particular defendant to consider the following relevant conduct: 21 [A]ll acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense, or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense. 22 Application Note 1 to this section explains in pertinent part that, [i]n the case of criminal activity undertaken in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy, the conduct for which the defendant 'would be otherwise accountable' also includes conduct of others in furtherance of the execution of the jointly-undertaken criminal activity that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. (emphasis added). Based on § 1B1.3(a)(1) and its commentary, every circuit that has addressed this issue to date has held that a firearm enhancement may be applied to a defendant's sentence based on possession of a weapon so long as the possession of the firearm was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. See United States v. McFarlane, 933 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Bianco, 922 F.2d 910, 912 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Barragan, 915 F.2d 1174, 1177-79 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1349-50 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Aguilera-Zapata, 901 F.2d 1209, 1212-15 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433 (4th Cir.1989). We also choose to adopt this standard. 23 Applying the applicable standard, we believe Vasquez reasonably could have foreseen that firearms would be possessed in connection with his crack-packaging activities in the apartment. As this Court has observed, firearms are as much tools of the trade as are commonly recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia. United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007, 108 S.Ct. 1471, 99 L.Ed.2d 700 (1988). Given the large quantity of narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia in the apartment where Vasquez was arrested, and given the fact that three types of various caliber ammunition were strewn about the apartment in plain view, we do not believe that the district court's determination that possession was reasonably foreseeable was clearly erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Bianco, 922 F.2d at 913-14; United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d at 1350. 24 Vasquez finally contends that the district court erred in refusing to grant him a two-level downward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), which provides for such an adjustment when a defendant is a minor participant in an offense. A defendant who claims minor participation must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is entitled to a reduction due to his or her reduced level of culpability. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 920 F.2d 153, 156 (2d Cir.1990). A district court's finding as to a defendant's role in a criminal activity is a factual determination that will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, 656 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 595, 116 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). 25 Vasquez argues that he was completely subordinate to everyone else at the time the agents entered the apartment, and was therefore a minor participant. However, there was ample evidence presented at trial indicating that Vasquez was a co-equal member of the drug organization who was entrusted with large quantities of narcotics to be packaged for distribution. Under these circumstances, the district court's finding that Vasquez had not sustained his burden of showing that he was a minor participant is not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Garcia, 920 F.2d 153, 154 (2d Cir.1990).