Opinion ID: 1900957
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Rebuttal Witness

Text: At trial, defendant not only objected to that portion of Patricia Williams' testimony recounting the conversation between defendant and the victim discussed in Part IV above, but also objected to the State's use of Patricia at all as a rebuttal witness. Citing studies showing that juries tend to be disproportionately influenced by the most recent testimony heard, [12] defendant argues that the presiding justice should have kept Patricia off the stand under M.R. Evid. 611(a). [13] Rebuttal evidence is proper if it repels or counteracts the effect of evidence which has preceded it. Emery v. Fisher, 128 Me. 124, 125, 145 A. 747 (1929). A presiding judge's decision to allow rebuttal testimony may be reversed only for abuse of discretion. State v. Gullifer, 384 A.2d 48, 50 (Me.1978). In the case at bar, the defense had put on a number of witnesses in its attempt to show that Anaya was a battered wife and had killed in self-defense. Among those witnesses was a psychologist who testified that battered wives typically stay with their men out of economic dependency, and that they most frequently. . . react with passivity to the violence of their mates. Patricia Williams then took the stand to recount the February stabbing incident and to testify that the victim held no steady job throughout the time he lived with defendant. Thus, her testimony tended to refute the battered-wife defense. We cannot say that the presiding justice abused his discretion in permitting the State's rebuttal. See State v. Armstrong, 344 A.2d 42, 47-48 (Me.1975) (where defense psychiatrist had told the jury that defendant had a close relationship with his parents, prosecution could put defendant's father on the stand to testify that defendant had never called his father Dad or by other familiar terms). The entry is: Judgment of conviction affirmed. All concurring.