Opinion ID: 1209906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: legislative history points away from the majority's interpretation

Text: In 1959, the Legislative Assembly enacted Oregon's first statute requiring every motor vehicle liability insurance policy to contain uninsured motorist coverage. Or.Laws 1959, ch. 413, § 1. That statute ( former ORS 736.317, repealed by Or.Laws 1967, ch. 482, § 5) did not define uninsured motorist or uninsured vehicle. As a result, the definition of the term `uninsured motorist' or `uninsured vehicle' was frequently litigated. Lund v. Mission Ins. Co., 270 Or. 461, 464, 528 P.2d 78 (1974). Typically, uninsured motorist policies required physical contact by a hit-and-run vehicle before coverage was afforded. See Turlay v. Farmers Insurance Exch., 259 Or. 612, 618, 488 P.2d 406 (1971) (describing hit-and-run provisions of a standard uninsured motorist policy). In 1967, the legislature responded by enacting a comprehensive revision of the uninsured motorist statutes, House Bill 1506. Or.Laws 1967, ch. 482, § 3. The bill provided a statutory definition of uninsured vehicle. See Lund v. Mission Ins. Co., supra, 270 Or. at 465, 528 P.2d 78 (discussing legislative history of the uninsured motorist statutes). [1] In addition, it defined two separate categories of uninsured vehicles, the identity of the operator or owner of which could not be ascertainedhit-and-run vehicles and phantom vehiclesand eliminated the requirement of physical contact in accidents involving the latter. See Farmers Insurance Exch. v. Colton, 264 Or. 210, 214-16, 504 P.2d 1041 (1972) (noting that change and discussing reasons for it). As a replacement for the requirement of physical contact, the legislature imposed an equivalent requirement, now codified at ORS 742.504(2)(g)(B), relating to testimony by a disinterested witness. The purpose of that requirement, like the purpose of the requirement of physical contact, was to discourage and prevent fraudulent claims. See Farmers Insurance Exch. v. Colton, supra, 264 Or. at 215-17, 504 P.2d 1041 (discussing the 1967 amendments to the uninsured motorist statute). The House Financial Affairs Committee held a hearing on HB 1506 on May 2, 1967, during which committee members engaged in extensive discussion of the proposed wording of the amendment relating to phantom vehicle accidents. [2] Representative Skelton explained the need for the amendment as follows: Let me explain to you again what the phantom car is. The phantom car is a car which forces another car off the highway, causes damages and injuries to the car which was forced off the highway, there is no contact of any cars and the phantom car disappears. Now, theoretically, both the phantom car theory and the hit-and-run theory are aberrations of the uninsured motorist theory. The uninsured motorist theory is that you get into an accident with some other guy    and then you are unable to collect from him.    The uninsured motorist theory assumes that you are able to find him and bring him to some sort of bar and then he is financially unable to pay. Now the hit-and-run provisions which are put in this    law    say that if you are hit by a car that then disappears and you never find the identity of him, you can still collect under the uninsured motorist [provision]. The phantom car thing take[s] us one step further and says that if the accident is caused by this guy, whether there is contact between the two of them is a fiction. If he actually caused the accident,    the hit-and-run theory should be extended    to this situation where the accident actually was caused by this person who disappeared. Now, the hazard in it is there has been collusion and the hazard is not being able to prove it. If you have a hit-and-run at least you have damage to the car. I want to suggest to you however that if the person really is interested in collecting under the uninsured motorist [provision], he could always go out and hit his car after [the accident] with a sledge hammer creating the fiction of the hit-and-run. An honest man who says, `No, he didn't scrape me when he ran me off the highway, but he just missed me by a fraction of an inch and I missed him, but in dodging to miss him, I struck the    corner light.' I have got a case down on my desk right now    where this man was    at a four-corner right-angle intersection, a car pulled out in front of this, this other car. The car that had the right of way swerved to miss him, hit a telephone pole, turned around, hit another telephone pole. There were three serious injuries in the car but no contact between the two of them and the car that caused the accident disappeared.    If there had been just a fraction of a contact between these two cars, he could have collected. Now there is no contact, and no recovery. As pertinent to the provision requiring corroboration of an accident involving a phantom vehicle, Representative Skelton proposed that the witness offering corroborative testimony must be disinterested and competent. The committee considered how those terms would apply to  other passengers in the car, including family members and unrelated persons. (Emphasis added.) One member of the committee asked whether passengers should be considered competent to provide corroborating testimony. When the answer was that the unadorned requirement, in the draft amendment, that the person be disinterested was unclear, a member of the committee stated, [P]ut that in. We should, we should sure specify    [s]urely, anybody in the car. Another member of the committee stated that those people in that car are sure interested and    I don't think they should be considered to be disinterested. A committee member responded, There's where your collusion would come in. A committee member then stated, I think what we ought to do is we ought to exclude any person who stands to get any money as a result. A member of the committee next suggested that relatives be foreclosed from providing corroboration. Another member objected to the proposal that all claimants and relatives be considered interested persons; the member noted the possibility that a relative could be in another car following the vehicle involved in the accident. Further discussion ensued on the purpose of the requirements relating to phantom vehicle accidents. A member stated: If they're gonna lie and cheat, they'll do it   , but I think that we should try to tighten this up as tight as possible to avoid collusion because we do have some asty cases of collusion under this [hit-and-run] coverage. (Emphasis added.) That member later repeated, I'm not objecting to this endorsement but I just indicate it should be tied up as tight as possible to avoid collusion. After a brief discussion of the possibility of leav[ing] it up to the court to decide who was interested and who was competent, a member suggested the phrasing that now is codified at ORS 742.504(2)(g)(B). Another member suggested that the provision exclude any person injured in the accident and making a claim under the uninsured motorist provisions. (Emphasis added.) Without express discussion of the latter suggestion (which resembles somewhat the majority's view in this case), the committee instead agreed to adopt the former. Several themes emerge from that legislative history. [3] One is that the drafters of the provision generally intended to exclude, from the category of corroborating witnesses, persons occupying the car at the time of the accident if they stand[ ] to get any money as a result of the accident. Another is the theme of timing. The committee discussed various categories of persons who should be foreclosed from providing corroboration. Discussion of all those categories of persons focused on their status and location at the time of the accident. Finally, and perhaps most important, the committee expressed strong concern that the provision be worded as tight[ly] as possible, so as to avoid collusion. Taken as a whole, the described legislative history suggests that the wording ultimately adopted by the legislature for ORS 742.504(2)(g)(B) was intended to exclude a person in the position of the witness in this case.