Opinion ID: 836596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: authority to empanel an advisory jury

Text: After holding that B.C.W. has no constitutional right to a jury trial, the juvenile court ordered that an advisory jury be empaneled in the present case. B.C.W.'s alternative motion cited ORCP 1 A and ORCP 51 D as sources of authority for an advisory jury in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The question before us is whether the juvenile court acted within its statutory authority when it ordered an advisory jury. ORCP 1 A provides in part: These rules govern procedure and practice in all circuit courts of this state, except in the small claims department of circuit courts, for all civil actions and special proceedings whether cognizable as cases at law, in equity, or of statutory origin except where a different procedure is specified by statute or rule.  (Emphasis added.) For the purpose of discussion, we assume (without deciding) that proceedings in juvenile court come within the coverage of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure as special proceedings of statutory origin. [9] ORCP 51 D provides: In all actions not triable by right to a jury, the court, upon motion of a party or on its own initiative, may try an issue with an advisory jury or it may, with the consent of all parties, order a trial to a jury whose verdict shall have the same effect as if trial to a jury had been a matter of right. As the first portion of this opinion demonstrates, this matter is not triable by right to a jury. Consequently, ORCP 51 D would appear to allow the use of an advisory jury unless the emphasized proviso of ORCP 1 A operates. We turn, then, to the dispositive question under the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure: whether there is a different procedure    specified by statute, ORCP 1 A, for a juvenile delinquency proceeding. This proceeding arose from a petition alleging that B.C.W., a youth, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to ORS 419C.005. ORS 419C.400 prescribes the manner of conducting a hearing in such cases: (1) The hearing shall be held by the court without a jury and may be continued from time to time. (2) The facts alleged in the petition showing the youth to be within the jurisdiction of the court as provided in ORS 419C.005, unless admitted, must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. (3) For the purpose of determining proper disposition of the youth, testimony, reports or other material relating to the youth's mental, physical and social history and prognosis may be received by the court without regard to their competency or relevancy under the rules of evidence. (4) An adjudication by a juvenile court that a youth is within its jurisdiction is not a conviction of a crime or offense. (Emphasis added.) In construing ORS 419C.400, we apply the template established in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). The statute directs that [t]he hearing shall be held by the court without a jury. The word shall is mandatory. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2085 (unabridged ed. 1993) (shall is used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory). The verb hold means, as pertinent, to take place. Id. at 1078. The text thus requires the hearingthe proceeding itselfto take place before the judge without a jury. The context of ORS 419C.400(1) includes the other subsections of ORS 419C.400. ORS 419C.400(3) provides that evidence bearing on disposition need not comply with rules of evidence, and ORS 419C.400(4) provides that an adjudication is not a conviction of a crime or offense. Those provisions are consistent with a paradigm in which the court, sitting without a jury, hears the matter. The context of ORS 419C.400 also includes the remainder of the juvenile code's provisions on delinquency proceedings. Other such provisions similarly are consistent with a hearing before the court without a jury. For example, new parties, the parents, are added to the proceedings at the dispositional stage. ORS 419C.285(1)(a). In summary, context does nothing to detract from the textual command to hold the hearing without a jury. At the first level of analysis, the legislature's intention is clear. Because ORS 419C.400 specifies a procedure for a juvenile delinquency proceeding, ORCP 51 D does not apply, even if the rules of civil procedure generally govern such a proceeding. The juvenile court lacks authority to empanel any jury to hear a delinquency case. Therefore, the juvenile court in this case committed legal error when it entered an order granting B.C.W.'s motion for an advisory jury. We direct that a peremptory writ issue in SC S43433, requiring the juvenile court to vacate that order. [10] In SC S43551, alternative writ dismissed. In SC S43433, peremptory writ to issue.