Opinion ID: 2434794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The alleged sentencing errors

Text: Finally, López-Capó argues that the district court committed four errors at sentencing. We review the district court's factual findings made at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir.2008). We review the reasonableness of the defendant's resulting sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); United States v. Bunchan, 626 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir.2010). At sentencing, the district court found that López-Capó was responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of crack, which resulted in a base offense level of 36. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (amended 2011). [14] The court then added two enhancements: one for obstruction of justice, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and one for drug activity near a protected area, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2(a)(1), which yielded an adjusted offense level of 40. Using a CHC of III, the court determined that López-Capó's sentencing guideline range was 360 months to life. The court imposed a sentence at the bottom of that range: 360 months (thirty years) of imprisonment, followed by ten years of supervised release. First, López-Capó argues that the district court committed clear error by applying the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice. The sentencing guidelines allow the court to increase a defendant's offense level by two points if he has willfully obstructed justice, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which includes perjury, United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 92-94, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). A defendant commits perjury when he intentionally gives false testimony under oath on a matter material to the proceedings. Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 19. To impose an enhancement for perjury, the sentencing court must make an independent finding that the elements of perjury have been satisfied. Id. The district court here applied the enhancement after concluding that López-Capó's testimony had been a complete fabrication. The court's findings sufficed to establish that the elements of perjury were met. Id. López-Capó's testimony occurred under oath, in court, and he addressed various matters material to the proceedings. Id. The court found that López-Capó had intentionally fabricated his testimony in an attempt to convince the jury that he had been a student, living off little amounts, just making ends meet, who knew none of the cooperating witnesses and only traveled to Carioca to see his mother. López-Capó had lied through his teeth, the court found, by portraying a world different from Carioca, the world in which he participated, and the world . . . he was supplying narcotics to. When López-Capó's attorney asked, at sentencing, for the specific instances in which López-Capó had lied, the court responded, [h]is whole testimony [was] a big lie. Having reviewed the record, we cannot say we disagree. Where a district court finds that a defendant has fabricated his entire testimony, the court need not delineate every specific instance in which the defendant lied. But here, the court did specifically mention López-Capó's visual expressions and demeanor on the stand, as well as his financial records, which the court found were totally at odds with the testimony that he was portraying. We give those credibility assessments reasonable latitude. Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 19. There was no clear error. Second, López-Capó argues that the district court erred by enhancing his offense level for committing a drug offense near a protected area, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2(a)(1). López-Capó bases this challenge on the government's alleged failure to establish the 1,000-foot requirement or the existence of a protected area. As discussed above, we reject that argument. The evidence was sufficient for the jury, and the district court, to conclude that the relevant activity occurred within 1,000 feet of a protected area. As the court stated at sentencing, it was evident from the evidence that the drug point operated on top almost of the children's playground and that the drug offenses occurred in the Public Housing Project. Again, there was no clear error. Third, López-Capó claims that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court included two recency criminal history points when calculating his CHC, as was then required by U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e), which was subsequently amended. [15] The government's brief entirely fails to address this argument. In López-Capó's pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), the U.S. Probation Office assigned him three criminal history points as a result of his prior criminal activity, to which the Probation Office added two points because López-Capó had committed the instant offense fewer than two years after being released from prison. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (amended 2010). Five criminal history points resulted in a CHC of III, which is what the court used to calculate López-Capó's sentence. López-Capó argues that he should only have been assigned two criminal history points, which would have resulted in a CHC of II. López-Capó was sentenced on April 30, 2010. The U.S. Sentencing Commission had voted earlier that month, on April 7, 2010, to eliminate the recency points required by section 4A1.1(e), but the proposed amendment (Amendment 742) did not become effective until November 1, 2010. See United States v. Adams, 640 F.3d 41, 42 (1st Cir.2011). Amendment 742 is not retroactive. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c). And while we have previously remanded cases for reconsideration of a sentence in light of a later amendment to the guidelines . . . even where that amendment had not been made retroactive, we have chosen not to do so where the district court was made aware at sentencing of the proposed guideline amendment and . . . was unmoved by the prospect of the elimination of the `recency' points. Adams, 640 F.3d at 43. López-Capó filed objections to the PSI, which included notification to the court that the U.S. Sentencing Commission had proposed to amend section 4A1.1(e), and he reiterated at sentencing his objection to the CHC calculation. López-Capó has not distinguished Adams or provided us with any reason to believe that a different result would follow on remand. See id. There was no abuse of discretion. Fourth, López-Capó argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court did not properly consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors to determine whether a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines was warranted. This argument seems to have two prongs: (1) the district court failed to adequately explain why it was denying López-Capó's request for a downward departure; and (2) López-Capó's co-defendants received much shorter sentences than he did. Both claims fail. Addressing the first contention, particularly where the district court sentences a defendant within the guideline range, as was the case here, the court's explanation of the sentence need not be precise to the point of pedantry, United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir.2006), and brevity is not to be confused with inattention, id. at 42. López-Capó provides no actual support for his claim that it is fair to say that there is no evidence that the District Court examined the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) through (5). Our review of the sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the district court considered the PSI, as well as the arguments of both López-Capó and the government. The court carefully explained its calculation of López-Capó's offense level, choosing for the sake of being fair to attribute 1.5 kilograms of crack to López-Capó, though the court had no doubt that López-Capó was responsible for at least 4.5 kilograms of crack. The court then rejected the government's request for a sentence at the upper end of the guideline range (meaning life imprisonment), found that [t]he guidelines, although advisory, adequately reflect the nature of the offence and the characteristics, and noted that the defendant has not given the Court any . . . explanation other than the fact that we have the wrong person basically, that he didn't do it. Thus, the court found that there was nothing on th[e] record that would lead it to give [López-Capó] the benefit of a different calculation under 3553(a). We find the explanation adequate. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) ([W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.); Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d at 40-42. We also reject López-Capó's claim that his sentence was unreasonable because he received a longer sentence than any of his co-defendants. First, López-Capó provides no argumentation or case law in support of the assertion. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17 ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.). Second, López-Capó raised this issue at sentencing, arguing that Rodríguez had only received a sentence of 188 months. The district court responded that Rodríguez had started with the same base offense level as López-Capó but had a lower CHC and fewer enhancements. [W]here the defendant's own sentence has been justified and the basis for a co-defendant's lesser sentence is set forth or is apparent, no more precise calibration of the difference between them is customarily feasible, let alone required. United States v. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir.2006).