Opinion ID: 217826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the inmates' claims

Text: We begin with the inmates' claims, each of which was dismissed by the district court as time-barred or unexhausted. Although there are seven remaining inmate plaintiffs on appeal, the plaintiffs assert arguments for only five inmates in their opening brief. We limit our review to inmates Scott Collins, David Spooner, Donnie Dacus, Kevin Iloff, and Gregory Mourland. See Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 136 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir.1998) (This court will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued in appellant's opening brief. (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the opening brief, the plaintiffs also limited their arguments to various challenges related to the chaplaincy hiring policy itself, and our review is similarly cabined by those allegations. [4] See id. To survive a motion to dismiss, the inmates' claims must be both exhausted and timely. We determine whether an inmate's claim has been exhausted by reference to the prison's own grievance requirements, Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir.2009), which necessitate that the inmate describe the problem and action requested, 15 Cal.Code Regs. § 3084.2(a). While an inmate need not articulate a precise legal theory, a grievance [only] suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought. Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. The district court correctly concluded that the claims by Spooner, Iloff, Dacus, and Mourland failed to alert CDCR that the grievance sought redress for the wrongs allegedly perpetuated by the chaplaincy-hiring program itself. Spooner's grievance stated that CDCR did not have a full-time chaplain, but did not suggest a full-time chaplain was required, instead proposing that Spooner himself serve as an inmate minister. Iloff's grievance alleged religious discrimination in the form of unequal access to worship spaces. Dacus similarly grieved of inadequate access to sacred items and generally inadequate accommodations of minority religions. Mourland alleged insufficient access to Wiccan vendors of religious materials. These grievances give notice that inmates allege the prison policies fail to provide for certain general Wiccan religious needs and free exercise, but do not provide notice that the source of the perceived problem is the absence of a paid Wiccan chaplaincy. See Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. We therefore affirm the district court's finding that the inmates' challenges to the paid-chaplaincy policy are unexhausted because the grievances did not provide notice that the program in and of itself burdens the exercise of their religion. The district court found that the grievances exhausted the inmates' claims based on prison accommodation of their religious needs [5] but not based directly on the chaplaincy program. Collins, however, was more specific in his grievance. In a grievance related to his hospitalization from March 31, 2002 through April 9, 2002, Collins alleges he requested that the prison's administration contact and allow visitation by clergy of [his] own Wiccan faith. This was denied... because [his] chaplain was not a regular paid chaplain at San Quentin, i.e., not Christian/Protestant/Catholic, Muslim, or Native American. This grievance was sufficient to put CDCR on notice that the paid-chaplaincy hiring policy was the root cause of Collins's complaint and thus preserved his ability to challenge that policy. Collins was not required to articulate the precise legal theory upon which his claim was based in the administrative grievance process. See Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. The plaintiffs conceded that claims arising before January 1, 2003 were time-barred. Collins's complaint is time-barred unless he can `show a systematic policy or practice that operated, in part, within the limitations perioda systematic violation.' Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 973-74 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Douglas v. Cal. Department. of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 822 (9th Cir.2001)). The district court correctly concluded that Collins's complaint was based on a discrete incidentthe denial of chaplain services while he was hospitalized in 2002and thus cannot be classified as a continuing violation. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). Collins never filed a grievance citing repeated denials of chaplaincy services as a result of the policy, nor did Collins refer back to his hospitalization in subsequent grievances during the limitations period. Because Collins failed to inform CDCR that the paid-chaplaincy program caused him any harm during the limitations period, he cannot succeed on his continuing violation claim now. See Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 638-39 (9th Cir.2002) (to exhaust a continuing violation claim, a plaintiff must put the agency on notice of the continuing nature of the claim). That the prior grievance was related to his current claim is insufficient. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the inmates' claims at issue in this appeal.