Opinion ID: 6111649
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: In challenges under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, we review “de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454, 477 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2009)). When a defendant also argues that he was entitled to a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, the district court’s decision “is reviewed for abuse of discretion and granted only ‘in the extraordinary circumstances where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.’” United States v. LaVictor, 848 F.3d 428, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 593 (6th Cir. 2007)). Under Rule 29, notwithstanding the jury verdict, “the court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). “[A] defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden.” Emmons, 8 F.4th at 478 (quoting United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 589 (6th Cir. 2006)). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 477–78 (quoting United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 800 (6th Cir. 2010)). “All reasonable inferences must be made to support the jury verdict.” LaVictor, 848 F.3d at 456 (citing United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2010)). “Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction and such evidence need not remove every reasonable Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 19 hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 1999)). When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we cannot “reweigh the evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute [our] judgment for that of the jury.” Emmons, 8 F.4th at 478 (quoting United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2015)). Defendants challenge each of their convictions.
Both Defendants argue that their conspiracy convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 were not supported by sufficient evidence. Those sections prohibit conspiracies to distribute a controlled substance or possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. “[T]o sustain a conviction for drug conspiracy under section 846, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) an agreement to violate drug laws; (2) knowledge of and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 710 (6th Cir. 2007)). “An agreement can be tacit, not formal, and the ‘government may meet its burden of proof through circumstantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 567 (6th Cir. 1999)). In § 846 conspiracy cases, “circumstantial evidence that may establish that ‘a drug sale is part of a larger drug conspiracy’ includes advance planning, ongoing purchases or arrangements, large quantities of drugs, standardized transactions, an established method of payment, and trust between the buyer and seller.” Id. (quoting United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 680–81 (6th Cir. 2009)). For starters, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that each “Polo” drug deal was “part of a larger drug conspiracy.” Williams, 998 F.3d at 728. “Polo” drug deals required significant advance planning. Drugs were individually packaged and prepared in advance so that runners could make multiple sales before needing to replenish their stock. When customers called either “Polo” phone, they were directed to a specific location where a runner was nearby or waiting for them. “Polo” continuously sold drugs for many years. Customers often bought drugs from “Polo” hundreds of times over the course of three to four years. The sales were standardized. Indeed, customers used nearly identical procedures to buy drugs from “Polo.” “Polo” also handled large quantities of drugs. A single “Polo” runner would sell Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 20 between 150 and 200 individual bags of drugs each day. The method of payment was consistent; each individual plastic bag of heroin consistently cost $20, and customers paid the runner in cash each time. Finally, customers found “Polo” to be a reliable system, and both the person answering the “Polo” phones and the runners came to recognize loyal customers. Even though the evidence sufficiently showed that the “Polo” conspiracy existed, the government still had to prove that each Defendant joined that conspiracy. “[O]nce the existence [of] a conspiracy is shown, the evidence linking an individual defendant to that conspiracy need only be slight.” United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 233 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 514 (6th Cir. 2004)). We address each Defendant in turn. a) Demarco Tempo The evidence sufficiently showed that Tempo was a member of the “Polo” conspiracy. Tempo went by the nickname “Polo,” and two insider witnesses testified that Tempo led all “Polo” operations. Dennis saw Tempo package and prepare drugs for sale. Tempo controlled the “Polo” phones. Records tie him to the x5598 “Polo” number as early as 2009. Geolocation data puts the x5598 phone, the x3399 phone, and Tempo in the same place on multiple occasions, and police found both of those phones in Tempo’s car when they arrested him. The only way that customers could buy drugs from “Polo” was by calling one of those two phones. Dennis saw Tempo answer his phones and immediately send runners to meet customers. While some customers said that multiple people answered the “Polo” phones, many said the same person answered most of the time. The same person answered each time Officer Villerot called to set up an undercover buy, and Villerot later identified that speaker as Tempo. The jury could have weighed this evidence and concluded that Tempo personally controlled those phones, the key to “Polo’s” success. Witnesses also saw Tempo at the scene during some sales. One saw a runner hand money from a drug deal directly to Tempo. Alexander said that he did that himself. Tempo oversaw runners in other ways too. Tempo gave Alexander a phone to use for drug deals and told him that selling drugs was “grown-men business.” (Alexander Test., R. 705, Page ID #4038). Even if Tempo never engaged in the hand-to-hand drug deals himself, the evidence Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 21 sufficiently supports a finding that Tempo agreed with others—including runners and customers—to violate drug laws and that he knew about and participated in the “Polo” conspiracy. Tempo makes three specific arguments challenging this finding. Each is meritless. First, he argues that the government’s evidence “showed the existence of multiple conspiracies, not a single conspiracy as charged in the indictment.” (Def. Tempo Br. at 25). He argues that this mismatch between the indictment and the evidence was a prejudicial variance. Because Tempo did not raise this argument at trial, we review this allegation of a variance for plain error. Caver, 470 F.3d at 235. “A variance to the indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” Id. “Within the context of a conspiracy, a variance constitutes reversible error only if a defendant demonstrates that he was prejudiced by the variance and that the ‘indictment allege[d] one conspiracy, but the evidence can reasonably be construed only as supporting a finding of multiple conspiracies.’” Id. at 235–36 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1982)). “We ‘review the evidence as to the number of conspiracies in the light most favorable to the government, considering ‘the existence of a common goal, the nature of the scheme, and the overlapping of the participants in various dealings.’” Williams, 998 F.3d at 730 (quoting United States v. Williamson, 656 F. App’x 175, 183 (6th Cir. 2016)). Tempo asks us to focus on the relationship between him and the customers. He argues that this case presents a “rimless” wheel-and-spoke conspiracy “in which various defendants enter into separate agreements with a common defendant, but where the defendants have no connection with one another, other than the common defendant’s involvement in each transaction.” (Def. Tempo Br. at 26–27 (quoting Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 203 (4th Cir. 2002))). But “[a] single conspiracy does not become multiple conspiracies simply because each member of the conspiracy did not know every other member, or because each member did not know of or become involved in all of the activities in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Caver, 470 F.3d at 236 (quoting Warner, 690 F.2d at 549). Tempo’s argument ignores middlemen and runners like Mr. Howard and Alexander—with whom Tempo coordinated. Even if each “Polo” member did not know every other member or participate in Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 22 every aspect of the conspiracy, the evidence sufficiently shows that “Polo” operations were interdependent and relied on a steady customer base, runners and middlemen, and higher-ups to answer the “Polo” phones, ensure runners had sufficient supplies, and choose the locations for deals. Thus, the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was a single conspiracy to distribute and sell controlled substances based on evidence of “a regular pattern of distribution for a large quantity of drugs.” Caver, 470 F.3d at 236. Second, Tempo argues that he never conspired to distribute fentanyl in particular. But this proposition is both factually and legally flawed. Legally, “knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy includes that the defendant ‘was aware of the object of the conspiracy and that he voluntarily associated himself with it to further its objectives.” Williams, 998 F.3d at 729 (quoting United Sates v. Hodges, 935 F.2d 766, 772 (6th Cir. 1991)). “[T]he government need not prove mens rea as to the type and quantity of the drugs in order to establish a violation of §§ 841 and 846.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 439 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2003)). Therefore, even if Tempo was not personally aware that “Polo” was selling fentanyl, or cutting heroin with fentanyl, evidence showed that he “conspired to violate drug laws,” even if he did not conspire to distribute fentanyl specifically. See Williams, 998 F.3d at 728–29. Factually, the evidence showed that Tempo did know that “Polo” sold fentanyl. Dennis testified that—while doing repairs for Tempo at a suspected stash house—someone put a substance in his mouth and spit it out, saying, “That’s that fentanyl, I don’t want none of that shit.” (Dennis Test., R. 713, Page ID #5171). Tempo responded by saying, “That’s that strong[;] [t]hat’s what everybody want.” (Id.) We will not reweigh the weight and credibility of Dennis’ testimony, see Emmons, 8 F.4th at 478, and a rational jury could have relied on his testimony to conclude that Tempo was aware that “Polo” laced heroin with fentanyl or sold pure fentanyl. Finally, at base, Tempo asks us to reweigh the evidence and reevaluate the witnesses’ credibility. Tempo highlights that Dennis and Alexander only testified to get lesser sentences in their own criminal cases and that “the rewards for these individuals were so substantial that they could not help but conform their testimony to the government’s theory of the case.” (Def. Tempo Br. at 29). He further suggests that Officer Villerot’s voice-identification testimony— Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 23 identifying Tempo as the person answering the x3399 number during eighteen controlled purchases in 2016 and two controlled purchases in 2013—was not reliable because Officer Villerot had “only two brief contacts with Mr. Tempo and no expertise in voice identification.” (Id. at 28). But “determining the credibility of witnesses is a task for the jury, not this court.” United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 532 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Eaton, 784 F.3d 298, 305 (6th Cir. 2015) (refusing to entertain the defendant’s argument that the jury should not have relied on inconsistent testimony from two “admitted perjurers” because “[t]he jury was entitled to believe the trial testimony of the two [witnesses]”). b) Kenneth Sadler Although a closer call, sufficient evidence also supported Sadler’s conspiracy conviction. Sadler argues that no rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew about and intended to join the “Polo” conspiracy or that he participated in that conspiracy. “Knowledge and participation can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct, but mere association with members of the conspiracy is not enough to support such an inference.” United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 334 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1990)). “To be sure, knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy includes that the defendant ‘was aware of the object of the conspiracy and that he voluntarily associated himself with it to further its objectives.’” Williams, 998 F.3d at 729 (quoting Hodges, 935 F.2d at 772). The defendant must be aware of the conspiracy’s “ultimate purpose.” Id. (quoting United States v. Sliwo, 620 F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 2010)). In a sprawling drug conspiracy like “Polo,” “it is enough to show that each member of the conspiracy realized that he was participating in a joint venture, even if he did not know the identities of every other member, or was not involved in all the activities in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Martinez, 430 F.3d at 332–33. As discussed above, there is sufficient evidence demonstrating the existence of a “Polo” conspiracy. The question as to Sadler is whether there was even a “slight” connection tying him to that conspiracy. See Caver, 470 F.3d at 233 (“[O]nce the existence [of] a conspiracy is shown, the evidence linking an individual defendant to that conspiracy need only be slight.” Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 24 (citing Henley, 360 F.3d at 514)). A rational jury could have found that Sadler knew the “ultimate purpose” of the conspiracy—to sell controlled substances—and that he intended to join and participated in the conspiracy. As early as 2009—before the start of the alleged conspiracy—Dennis saw Sadler with Tempo as Tempo cut up heroin and packaged it for sale. Evidence also showed that Sadler wanted to be involved with “Polo.” At times, Sadler got angry when Tempo entrusted other people, but not Sadler, with more responsibility within “Polo” operations, and Sadler fought with Tempo over control of the “Polo” phones and customer base. This evidence shows Sadler’s agreement with “Polo” members and his intent to join the conspiracy. Evidence also showed that Sadler actually participated in the conspiracy. After police arrested Tempo on June 14, 2016, geolocation data showed that the x3399 “Polo” number moved to 15652 Eastburn, an address that Sadler often visited (and possibly where he resided), and where his children lived with their mother. When Officer Villerot called the x3399 number trying to set up another undercover purchase on June 15, 2016, a man answered the phone and directed Officer Villerot to a location. Ultimately, Officer Villerot abandoned this undercover purchase. Around the same time, officers saw Sadler leave the Eastburn house in a black Escalade that officers had previously seen near “Polo” drug sales. Officers pulled Sadler over and found both “Polo” phones in the car. When police searched the 15652 Eastburn residence, they found a digital scale, a large bag with drug residue, sandwich bags, Noscapine—which is a popular heroin cutting agent—documents with Sadler’s name on them, and a firearm and ammunition. The jury heard evidence that these objects are commonly associated with drug trafficking.5 While these facts may not be enough, standing alone, to support the jury’s conviction, together, this evidence shows that Sadler sought out more involvement and leadership within “Polo” and that he attempted to take over “Polo” operations after many “Polo” 5The government also points to evidence from two undercover drug purchases involving Sadler in 2012. During a “short term investigation,” an informant with the Sterling Heights Police Department bought $120 worth of heroin from Sadler. (Modrzejewski Test., R. 706, Page ID #4279, #4286). Sadler argues that this evidence was inadmissible. As discussed below, the district court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence. See infra Part II.B.1. Ultimately, however, there was sufficient evidence of Sadler’s involvement in the conspiracy even absent this fact. Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 25 members were arrested on June 14, 2016. Combined, this amounts to sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Sadler’s arguments do not undermine these key facts. Sadler points out that Alexander never saw Sadler involved with any “Polo” deals, and Tempo never used Sadler as a runner. But this evidence does not mean that Sadler could not have knowingly and intentionally joined the “Polo” conspiracy, nor does it preclude his involvement in other ways. See Martinez, 430 F.3d at 332–33. The combination of Sadler’s desire for leadership within “Polo,” his possession of drug trafficking paraphernalia, and his possession of the “Polo” phones provided sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Sadler was a co-conspirator. 2. Drug Distribution Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death Tempo next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his five charges under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). He raises two issues in this regard: (1) whether he can be held liable for every “Polo” drug distribution under § 841(a), and (2) whether “Polo” drugs caused the death and injuries of the four overdose victims as required under § 841(b)(1)(C). a) Distribution Section 841(a)(1) prohibits the knowing or intentional distribution, or possession with the intent to distribute, of a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). There is no dispute that heroin, fentanyl, and crack cocaine are controlled substances. See § 812. As the district court instructed, there were three ways the government could have proven that Tempo was guilty of this crime: The first is by convincing [the jury] that [Tempo] committed or participated in this crime. The second is by showing that [Tempo] aided and abetted the commission of the charged offense. The third is based on the legal rule that all members of a conspiracy are responsible for acts committed by the other members, as long as those acts are committed to help advance the conspiracy, and are within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the agreement. This is often called “Pinkerton Liability.” (Jury Instrs., R. 662, Page ID #3580). Sufficient evidence would allow a jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Tempo was liable under any of these three theories. Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 26 First, the facts show that Tempo acted as a principal—meaning a jury could have found him personally liable for distributing “Polo” drugs. The applicable statute defines “distribute” as “to deliver,” which in turn “mean[s] the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance . . . , whether or not there exists an agency relationship.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(8), (11). “Although distribution may involve the actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance, ‘distribution’ includes other acts perpetrated in furtherance of a transfer or sale, such as arranging or supervising the delivery, or negotiating for or receiving the purchase price.” United States v. Colon, 268 F.3d 367, 377 (6th Cir. 2001). “Although it may be unusual for a person to distribute a controlled substance without at least momentarily possessing the controlled substance, it is not impossible.” Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1296–97 (10th Cir. 2000)); see also United States v. Waller, 503 F.2d 1014, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding constructive transfer when a mother told her daughter to hand the drugs to the buyer). Under this theory, the jury could have found that Tempo constructively distributed all of the drugs “Polo” sold because he planned and coordinated “Polo” drug deals. Tempo answered the “Polo” phones to set up buys; Tempo told runners to go meet customers; witnesses identified Tempo as the head of the “Polo” operation; and Tempo gave runners phones to use while selling drugs. This evidence sufficiently shows that Tempo led “Polo” operations and constructively participated in all “Polo” sales. Moreover, distribution accounts for the actions of agents. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(8). Thus, a jury could have found Tempo directly responsible for drug sales that “Polo” members conducted on Tempo’s behalf or at his behest. Second, the jury could have found Tempo liable for aiding and abetting “Polo” drug sales. “To prove that [a defendant] aided and abetted drug transactions . . . the government must establish that [he] participated in the venture as something [] he wished to bring about and sought to make succeed.” Williams, 998 F.3d at 735 (quoting United States v. Ward, 190 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 1999)). For the same reasons listed above, the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Tempo aided and abetted each “Polo” sale, including sales to the overdose victims. Finally, the jury could have concluded that Tempo was liable as a co-conspirator under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). “The Pinkerton doctrine permits conviction of Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 27 a conspirator for the substantive offenses of other conspirators committed during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 1990). “The doctrine holds that a member of a conspiracy is liable for ‘substantive offense[s]’ committed by his co-conspirators, even if he did not participate in them, as long as: (1) the offenses are ‘done in furtherance of the conspiracy,’ (2) they ‘fall within the scope of the unlawful project,’ and (3) they are reasonably foreseeable ‘consequence[s] of the unlawful agreement.’” United States v. Hamm, 952 F.3d 728, 744 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647–48). Certainly, “Polo” drug sales meet these requirements; the entire point of “Polo” was to sell drugs. As discussed above, the jury’s conclusion that Tempo was a member of the “Polo” conspiracy was also supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore, under each of these three theories, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Tempo was liable for each “Polo” sale— including the sales to the overdose victims. b) Resulting in Death or Serious Bodily Injury While § 841(a)(1) states the offense, § 841(b)(1)(C) imposes an enhanced sentence. Section 841(b)(1)(C) imposes a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence if a defendant violates § 841(a)(1) and “death or serious bodily injury results from the use of [the distributed] substance.” § 841(b)(1)(C). The death-or-injury-results enhancement “is an element that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014) (citing Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 115–16 (2013)). In Burrage, the Supreme Court held that, “at least where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury, a defendant cannot be liable under the penalty enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) unless such use is a but-for cause of the death or injury.”6 Id. at 218–19. “[B]utfor causation exists where use of the controlled substance ‘combines with other factors to 6“An independently sufficient cause is not quite the same thing as a but-for cause.” Hamm, 952 F.3d at 738 n.3 (citing Antony Honoré & John Gardner, Causation in the Law, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/). Although suggesting that an independently sufficient cause would satisfy the “results from” requirement, the Supreme Court in Burrage did not address that question. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210. Here, there is likely sufficient evidence that heroin and/or fentanyl were sufficient independent causes of the victims’ overdoses. Even so, there is also sufficient evidence that those substances were the but-for cause of the victims’ overdoses. Thus, we need not reach the issue of independent sufficient cause at this time. See Hamm, 952 F.3d at 738 n.3. Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 28 produce’ death [or serious bodily injury], and death [or serious bodily injury] would not have occurred ‘without the incremental effect’ of the controlled substance.” United States v. Volkman, 797 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211). The government does not need to prove that the defendant directly delivered the drug to the injured or deceased person or even that a co-conspirator handed the drug to that person. United States v. Davis, 970 F.3d 650, 656 (6th Cir. 2020). Rather, “[t]he statute requires the government to prove only that the specific drug underlying a defendant’s violation of § 841(a) is the same drug that was the but-for cause of the victim’s death.” Id. The causation inquiry thus has two parts for each victim: (1) did the victim use “Polo” drugs, and (2) were those drugs the but-for cause of the victim’s overdose. Before turning to these victim-specific questions, Tempo argues that the government cannot establish causation without a blood test identifying the substances in the victim’s body at the time of the overdose. Of the four overdose victims involved here, only one—Anoosh Baghdassarian—received a blood toxicology test,7 and only one received a urine toxicology test. The district court rejected this argument and concluded that “there is no legal requirement that blood tests be admitted to establish that a serious bodily injury or death resulted from the use of a substance distributed by Tempo.” United States v. Tempo, No. 16-cr-20414, 2019 WL 5896138, at  (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2019) (citing Cockrell v. United States, No. 14-cv-175, 2017 WL 1088339, at  (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2017)). We likewise decline to adopt a bright-line rule that but-for causation under § 841(b)(1)(C) requires evidence from blood toxicology tests. This is a matter of first impression before us, but our sister circuits have found but-for causation in overdose cases even without blood tests. See United States v. Harris, 966 F.3d 755, 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding but-for causation based on victims’ testimony and recollection); United States v. Lewis, 895 F.3d 1004, 1006–07, 1009 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding but-for causation based on medical expert testimony and lab-tested paraphernalia found at the scene). Only the Fifth Circuit has directly addressed this question. United States v. Cockrell, 769 F. App’x 116, 118 (5th Cir. 2019). In Cockrell, the Fifth Circuit found that, even despite “the lack of medical testing of the victims,” the victims’ positive reactions to Narcan showed that they overdosed on 7The hospital ran a blood test on Jennifer Pointer, but it was not a blood toxicology test. Her doctors ran standard blood tests because she had pneumonia at the time. Dr. Mills relied on Pointer’s urinalysis tests—not the blood tests—to determine what drugs were in her system. Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 29 opioids. Id. We agree with this conclusion. The absence of blood tests here does not undermine the jury’s finding that “Polo” drugs caused the victims’ overdoses. We must therefore determine whether sufficient evidence showed that each victim used “Polo” drugs and that those drugs caused the victim’s overdose. We have already presented many of the relevant facts. See supra Part I.A.4.
Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Yako overdosed on drugs she bought from “Polo.” She and her friend, Randy Odish, both testified that they bought heroin from “Polo” on February 20, 2016, shortly before Yako overdosed. Phone records showed that Odish called the x3399 number that evening. Immediately after using those drugs, Yako “passed out,” “[h]er lips [turned] bluish-purple,” and “she [began] bleeding from her mouth.” (Odish Test., R. 717, Page ID ##5443–44). When the paramedics arrived, she was taking only six breaths per minute, which is not life-sustaining. The paramedics and the doctors at the hospital administered two doses of Narcan, at which point Yako became fully alert. Dr. Mills testified that her medical condition was consistent with an opioid overdose—either heroin or fentanyl— and, without medical attention, she would have died. In arguing that this evidence is insufficient, Tempo highlights that Odish’s memory was clouded by past drug use, that he was a convicted felon, and that he had previously lied to law enforcement. He also highlighted inconsistencies in Yako’s testimony about whether she or Odish called the “Polo” phone. But these arguments amount to “non-reviewable credibility questions.” United States v. Whyte, 795 F. App’x 353, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2019). Tempo also argues that there were no phone records produced for either Odish’s phone or Yako’s phone that evening. This is simply incorrect. Evidence showed that Odish’s phone had “seven contacts” with the x3399 “Polo” number on February 20, 2016. (Witt Test., R. 726, Page ID #6393). Finally, Tempo argues that “because Yako injected Xanax all day long on February 20, 2016, that drug could have independently caused” her overdose. (Def. Tempo Br. at 31). Yako admitted that she used Xanax that day, but the jury was entitled to credit Dr. Mills’ conclusion that Yako’s positive reaction to Narcan “shows that it was an opioid intoxication,” and that Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 30 “[t]here was no other explanation for [her reaction to Narcan].” (Mills Test., R. 703, Page ID #3865). The jury could have concluded that this evidence established but-for causation despite Yako’s Xanax use. See United States v. Smith, 656 F. App’x 70, 74 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding sufficient evidence of but-for causation when victim had “numerous substances in her body, including a lethal dose of oxycodone,” which was the drug the defendant allegedly distributed).
Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Grzywacz overdosed on drugs he bought from “Polo.” Grzywacz called the x5598 “Polo” number eight times on the day he overdosed. He used the drugs right away, and the next thing he remembers is waking up in the ambulance. When the paramedics arrived, he was taking only four breaths per minute, which is not life-sustaining. Paramedics administered Narcan, and Grzywacz’s breathing immediately improved. Dr. Mills testified that his medical condition was consistent with an opioid overdose and that he likely would have died without medical intervention. Again, Tempo asks us to discredit Grzywacz’s testimony because he is “a twice convicted felon,” he is a “daily heroin user,” and he seemingly received a lesser sentence in his own criminal case after he cooperated against Tempo. (Def. Tempo Br. at 31). Again, we do not entertain such credibility arguments. See Emmons, F.4th at 616. Tempo also highlights that Grzywacz “us[ed] the same syringe for over a month” to inject drugs. (Def. Tempo Br. at 32). He thus argues that “[t]here was no way to determine if residue of prior uses of other drugs remained in the syringe barrel or needle, and if they contributed to [Grzywacz’s] overdose.” (Id.) We generally reject these kinds of arguments as mere “speculative possibilities already rejected by the jury.” United States v. Assfy, — F. App’x —, No. 20-1630, 2021 WL 2935359, at  (6th Cir. July 13, 2021) (quoting United States v. Simer, 835 F. App’x 60, 65–66 (6th Cir. 2020)). But, even if residue from other drugs got mixed up in the needle, that finding does not preclude but-for causation, which is met “where use of the controlled substance ‘combines with other factors to produce’” the overdose. Volkman, 797 F.3d at 392 (quoting Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211). Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 31
A rational jury could similarly conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Pointer overdosed on drugs she bought from “Polo” on both March 17 and March 30, 2016. Pointer testified that she bought heroin from “Polo” at the intersection of Bradford Avenue and Bringard Drive on the day of her first overdose—March 17, 2016. She went home and snorted an entire $20 bag of heroin with her boyfriend. She testified that she did not buy drugs from any other dealer that day, and she did not use any other drugs. Paramedics arrived and found Pointer unresponsive and barely breathing with drug paraphernalia around her. They administered two doses of Narcan, and Pointer became responsive after the second dose. At the hospital, doctors administered a urine drug screen, which was positive for opiates and cocaine. Dr. Mills testified that Narcan would only have been effective if Pointer had overdosed on opiates; it would not have reversed a cocaine overdose. Dr. Mills concluded that Pointer’s March 17, 2016, overdose was consistent with a heroin or fentanyl overdose and that, without medical treatment, it was “[m]ore likely than not [that] she would have died.” (Mills Test., R. 703, Page ID #3873). Tempo argues that Pointer was also taking Adderall and Suboxone at the time, which “alone could have caused her overdose.” (Def. Tempo Br. at 32–33). He further argues that Pointer’s urinalysis drug test was “not reliable.” (Id. at 33). But—for the same reasons as discussed above with Yako and Grzywacz—a rational jury could find that the urinalysis results, along with Dr. Mills’ testimony, demonstrated that the “Polo” drugs were the but-for cause of Pointer’s overdose. See Volkman, 797 F.3d at 392. On March 30, 2016, Pointer reported using Boose’s phone to call the x3399 “Polo” number. Phone records confirm that Boose’s phone called the x3399 number three times that day. Initially, police and paramedics arrived to treat Boose for an overdose. When police arrived, Pointer was still conscious. Police searched Pointer and found “a small fold paper, which is consistent with the packaging for heroin.” (Steiber Test., R. 717, Page ID ##5504–06). Officer Steiber seized the substance, and test results concluded that it was 0.028 grams of pure fentanyl, which is “nine to ten times the lethal dose of fentanyl to your average adult.” (Mills Test., R. 703, Page ID #3877). After Steiber handcuffed Pointer and put her in the back seat of the squad car, she fell unconscious. Paramedics administered two doses of Narcan, and after the Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 32 second dose, Pointer became responsive. Pointer’s urinalysis tested positive for amphetamine, cannabinoids, and cocaine—but not opiates. Even so, Dr. Mills testified that Pointer’s responsiveness to Narcan indicated that she had overdosed on opioids and that, unlike heroin, fentanyl “is not detected by that particular [urinalysis] drug screen.” (Mills Test., R. 703, Page ID ##3874–75, ##3877–78). He testified that the cocaine and amphetamines “played no role” in her overdose. (Id. at Page ID #3878). He said that her medical condition was “consistent with an opioid poisoning” and that, without medical attention, “she could have died.” (Id. at Page ID #3875, #3878). Tempo points to the physical evidence to prove that Pointer’s second overdose did not involve drugs from “Polo.” He alleges that, because Pointer’s drugs were in a folded piece of paper, and not a small plastic bag like those used in all “Polo” sales, the drugs likely came from another source. But Pointer testified that she bought the heroin from “Polo” in a small plastic bag. She then took it out of the bag, placed it into a piece of paper, crushed it up, and snorted it out of the piece of paper. While Pointer did make some inconsistent statements about her practice of repacking her drugs into paper folds, the jury was justified in crediting her testimony that she bought drugs from “Polo” and repackaged them into a paper fold. For the same reasons as discussed above, Pointer’s positive drug test for cocaine does not preclude but-for causation. See Volkman, 797 F.3d at 392. Indeed, Dr. Mills testified that the cocaine and amphetamines “played no role” in her overdose. (Mills Test., R. 703, Page ID #3878).
Finally, sufficient evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that “Polo” drugs caused Baghdassarian’s death. Baghdassarian died on March 30, 2016. The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy concluded that Baghdassarian died of a fentanyl overdose. Paramedics found Baghdassarian in her room at her mother’s house with drug paraphernalia around her. Paramedics attempted to revive her with Narcan, but they were unsuccessful, and the doctors declared her dead when she arrived at the hospital. The blood toxicology report showed eleven nanograms of fentanyl per milliliter and fifteen nanograms of alprazolam (Xanax) per milliliter. The Xanax dosage was at a safe, therapeutic level, whereas Baghdassarian’s fentanyl levels were three times higher than a fatal dose of three nanograms. Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 33 There is also sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Baghdassarian overdosed on fentanyl from “Polo.” Tomic testified that, on March 29, 2016—the evening before Baghdassarian died—he drove to Baghdassarian’s house, she came outside and got into Tomic’s car, they called “Polo,” and they bought drugs somewhere near Six Mile Road. Baghdassarian took her share of the drugs inside her house without using any while in Tomic’s car. That was around 3:30 or 4:30 p.m. on March 29. Baghdassarian’s mother testified that she saw Baghdassarian meet with Tomic in his car and that, for the rest of that evening and the following morning, she never saw Baghdassarian leave the house or meet with anyone else. Later that night, police stopped Tomic and arrested him for drug possession. The police seized the drugs that Tomic bought with Baghdassarian, and lab results showed that they were pure fentanyl. Even though Tomic thought they bought heroin, “Polo” occasionally sold pure fentanyl to unknowing customers. Based on these facts, a rational jury could have concluded that Tomic and Baghdassarian purchased drugs from “Polo” and that those drugs caused Baghdassarian’s overdose the next morning. Tempo argues that the government “failed to show that [Baghdassarian] obtained the heroin from the Polo group.” (Def. Tempo Br. at 33). First, he notes that Baghdassarian’s last contact with a “Polo” phone was on February 14, 2016, and Tomic’s last contact was on March 6, 2016. However, sometimes Baghdassarian used a phone application (“app”) to contact “Polo,” and contacts through an app would not appear on the phone records. The jury could have inferred that the significant history of phone contacts between Baghdassarian, Tomic, and the “Polo” phones—amounting to over 1000 contacts—showed a pattern of using “Polo” to obtain drugs and indicated that the two bought drugs from “Polo” on March 29, just as Tomic said they did. Furthermore, while there are discrepancies between Tomic’s and Baghdassarian’s mother’s testimony as to when Tomic bought the drugs and whether Baghdassarian went with him, the jury could have weighed the evidence and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Baghdassarian died after overdosing on drugs that she and Tomic bought from “Polo.” 3. Drug Possession with Intent to Distribute Near a School Both Defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence to support their drug possession convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 860. Section 860 doubles the penalties for Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 34 certain drug crimes that occur within 1000 feet of a school. § 860(a). Defendants were charged with possessing cocaine and heroin at 19504 Strasburg. On June 14, 2016, officers searched that property and found 16.7 grams of cocaine, 138.3 grams of crack cocaine, razor blades, a digital scale, and plastic bags with a white powder residue. Neither Defendant contests that 19504 Strasburg is within 1000 feet of a school. Therefore, the question is whether each Defendant committed the underlying drug crime—possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute—while at this property. The underlying offense requires proof that the defendant: “(1) knowingly, (2) possessed a controlled substance, (3) with intent to distribute it.” United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 645 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 897 (6th Cir. 2006)). “[T]he government need not have provided evidence of actual possession; proof of constructive possession suffices.” United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 150 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. White, 932 F.2d 588, 589 (6th Cir. 1991)). “Constructive possession requires that a person knowingly have power and intention to exercise control over an object.” United States v. Critton, 43 F.3d 1089, 1096 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir. 1973)). Control over the substance can be “either directly or through others.” Welch, 97 F.3d at 150 (quoting United States v. Reeves, 794 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1986)). However, “proof of the ‘mere presence’ of the defendant in proximity to the controlled substance, by itself, is insufficient evidence to establish possession with intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting White, 932 F.2d at 589–90). a) Demarco Tempo A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Tempo possessed these drugs with the intent to distribute. This case is similar to Welch, where we upheld a distribution conviction because “[t]here was extensive evidence of [the defendant’s] involvement in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and specifically his having sold cocaine from a [specific] crack house.” 97 F.3d at 150. Here, 19504 Strasburg was a suspected “stash location” for “Polo” operations, and it operated “almost like a dispatch center.” (Bankowski Test., R. 708, Page ID #4357). Although 19504 Strasburg appeared to be vacant, Tempo exerted some control over the property. He hired William Dennis to do repairs on the house. While working there, Dennis saw Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 35 people cutting up drugs, measuring them, and placing them in small plastic bags. Several witnesses saw Tempo at the property with other known “Polo” members and large quantities of drugs. While at the property, Tempo answered his phone and told runners to go meet customers. This evidence sufficiently shows that Tempo constructively possessed the substances found at 19504 Strasburg. See United States v. Sheppard, 149 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding conviction under constructive possession theory when, among other facts, the defendant “was seen several times at the house in which the drugs were found” and “a large number of people were seen coming and going from the house”); United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 311–12 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding constructive possession with intent to distribute when drugs were found in large quantities along with items like scales, razor blades, packaging materials, and the defendant’s own possessions); Wettstain, 618 F.3d at 586 (finding possession with intent to distribute when the defendant “receive[d] a phone call” and directed another person to retrieve the drugs to make a sale).8 b) Kenneth Sadler The government’s only argument in support of the jury’s guilty verdict against Sadler is that Sadler is liable as a co-conspirator under Pinkerton. “The doctrine holds that a member of a conspiracy is liable for ‘substantive offense[s]’ committed by his co-conspirators, even if he did not participate in them, as long as: (1) the offenses are ‘done in furtherance of the conspiracy,’ (2) they ‘fall within the scope of the unlawful project,’ and (3) they are reasonably foreseeable ‘consequence[s] of the unlawful agreement.’” Hamm, 952 F.3d at 744 (quoting Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647–48). As discussed above, Sadler was a co-conspirator in the “Polo” operation. See supra Part II.A.1.b. Sadler also had ties to the Strasburg property; police surveillance showed Sadler coming and going from the house between May and June 2016. Based on Sadler’s status 8As each of Tempo’s Rule 29 challenges fails, his argument that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial under Rule 33 also fails. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that, “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the [district] court may vacate any judgment or grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. Here, Tempo’s Rule 33 motion presented the same arguments as his Rule 29 motion. Because his Rule 29 arguments fail, so to do his Rule 33 arguments, even under Rule 33’s different standard. See United States v. Bowens, 938 F.3d 790, 796 (6th Cir. 2019). Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 36 as a co-conspirator, his presence at the Strasburg property on multiple occasions, and the evidence discussed above about drug activity at the house, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that possession with the intent to distribute at 19504 Strasburg was a foreseeable crime within the scope of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, Sadler is liable for this substantive offense under Pinkerton. See Martin, 920 F.2d at 348–49. 4. Felon in Possession Sufficient evidence supports Sadler’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. “The elements of the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm are: 1) a prior felony conviction; 2) knowing possession of a firearm; and 3) the firearm must have traveled in interstate commerce.” United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). Sadler does not dispute that he is a convicted felon or that the gun he allegedly possessed travelled in interstate commerce. Thus, if a reasonable jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Sadler possessed the firearm at issue, his conviction will stand. “Possession may be ‘either actual or constructive and it need not be exclusive but may be joint.’” United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Covert, 117 F.3d 940, 948 (6th Cir. 1997)). “Constructive possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and it is not necessary that such evidence remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Coffee, 434 F.3d at 895–96 (citing Craven, 478 F.2d at 1333). “Proof that ‘the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located’ is sufficient to establish constructive possession.” Id. at 896 (quoting United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir. 1998)). “However, presence where a firearm was found, without more, is insufficient to establish ‘knowledge, power, or intention to exercise control’ over the firearm.” Id. (quoting United States v. Arnold, 434 F.3d 396, 403 (6th Cir. 1993)). The government charged Sadler with possession of a .40 caliber Smith & Wesson handgun found on June 15, 2016, during a search of 15652 Eastburn. Police saw Sadler leaving that house earlier that day. Sadler’s children lived at the home with their mother, and police found some of Sadler’s belongings in the house. Police found the firearm on the top shelf of a Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 37 kitchen cabinet. A forensic scientist identified Sadler’s DNA on the firearm. After his arrest, Sadler told police that “he was taking full responsibility for the firearm . . . that w[as] found in the residence on Eastburn Street.” (John Pickett Trial Test., R. 706, Page ID #4208). Even without unequivocal evidence that Sadler owned or resided at the Eastburn property full-time, this evidence is sufficient to establish constructive joint possession. See Coffee, 434 F.3d at 896– 97 (finding constructive possession despite conflicting testimony about the defendant’s primary residence at the time of the search). 5. Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice Sufficient evidence supported Sadler’s conviction for conspiring to obstruct justice. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512, it is a crime to conspire to use “the threat of physical force against any person . . . with intent to . . . influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding.” § 1512(a)(2)(A), (k). The government charged Sadler with conspiring to threaten William Dennis. To sustain this conviction, Sadler must have agreed with another person to threaten Dennis in hopes of preventing or influencing his testimony at trial. Although the government’s evidence on this charge is circumstantial, that does not preclude the jury from finding Sadler guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Ledbetter, 929 F.3d 338, 355 (6th Cir. 2019) (upholding conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice based on circumstantial evidence alone). There are three key pieces of evidence here: Sadler found out who would be testifying against him at trial;9 Sadler and his mother then called Dennis’ mother—Francine Leatherwood—and discussed Dennis’ future testimony; and immediately after that call, an unknown person called Dennis’ mother and said, “Tell William to shut up or one of y’all are going to go missing.” (Francine Leatherwood Test., R. 791, Page ID #7875). Sadler argues that “there was absolutely no testimony from any witness, including William Dennis Sr., that Mr. Sadler ever threatened [Dennis] or directed anyone to threaten him.” (Def. Sadler 19-2221 Br. at 14). “But that misses the point at this stage, where all inferences must be made in favor of the prosecution and the evidence need not ‘exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.’” Ledbetter, 929 F.3d at 355 (quoting Johnson v. 9As discussed below, this evidence was admissible. See infra Part II.B.2. Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 38 Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 992 (6th Cir. 2000)). A jury could infer intent based on the timing of the calls in relation to Sadler’s discovery that Dennis would testify. It could further infer an agreement to threaten Leatherwood with physical force by the back-to-back calls from Sadler and the threatening caller. The timing of these events could have led the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Sadler had agreed with the unknown caller to threaten Leatherwood with the use of physical force. 6. Witness Tampering A person commits a substantive offense under § 1512 when he or she “uses . . . the threat of physical force against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to . . . influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A). The jury found Sadler guilty of tampering with two witnesses: Dennis and Alexander. a) William Dennis Sr. Sufficient evidence showed that Sadler used threats of physical force with the intent to influence or prevent Dennis’ testimony in this trial. After learning that Dennis would testify in this case, Sadler and his mother called Dennis’ mother, asking whether she knew that her son was testifying and commenting on his decision to testify. An unknown caller immediately called Leatherwood back and said: “Tell William to shut up or one of y’all are going to go missing.” (Francine Leatherwood Test, R. 791, Page ID #7875).10 Around the same time, Sadler sent a Facebook message to Dennis’ sister—Andrea Leatherwood—saying, “That’s crazy how your brother are main witness, but we telling on him. Little bro turn in his grave, that’s how shit . . . .” (Andrea Leatherwood Test., R. 791, Page ID ##7890–91). Sadler argues that his statements were not threats and that, even if they were, there was no evidence indicating that Dennis found out about the threats. First, his statements that Dennis would “turn in his grave” and that, if Dennis did not “shut up . . . [,] one of y’all are going to go missing” satisfy the threats-of-physical-force requirement. See United States v. Thompson, 10Having concluded that this statement was made as part of a conspiracy, see supra Part II.A.5, Sadler would be liable for this substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator under the Pinkerton doctrine, see supra Part II.A.3.b. Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 39 758 F. App’x 398, 411–12 (6th Cir. 2018) (defendant’s statement that “I’m going to get her,” when referring to the witness, satisfied “threat” requirement). Second, for purposes of § 1512 liability, it does not matter that Sadler made the threats to Dennis’ family members, or that Dennis may not have heard about them. The statute encompasses threats “against any person,” id., even if not made directly to the witness and the witness never learned of the threat, see United States v. England, 507 F.3d 581, 589 (7th Cir. 2007) (upholding conviction when the defendant threatened the witness’s father even though the witness never heard about the threat). b) Amacio Alexander There is also sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Sadler threatened Alexander. On June 19, 2016, Sadler approached Alexander while Alexander was at his aunt’s house. Sadler drove up to the house in a black truck and, without getting out of the vehicle, approached Alexander and said, “Take back what you said. Don’t go to court or your family going to see your face on a T-shirt.” (Alexander Test., R. 705, Page ID #4064). Alexander believed this was a reference to “memorial T-shirt[s]” and believed it was a death threat. (Id.) The geolocation data on Sadler’s phone confirmed that he was near Alexander’s aunt’s house around the time of this incident. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could have found that Sadler threatened Alexander with the intent to prevent him from testifying.