Opinion ID: 1636599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reverse discrimination and affirmative action.

Text: The United States Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that reverse employment discrimination against members of a majority group is permissible where necessary to address the results of previous or current discrimination in their favor. E.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 516, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3072, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (Title VII permits employers and unions voluntarily to make use of reasonable race-conscious affirmative action). In response to an assertion that race-conscious affirmative action plans are expressly prohibited by the very language of Title VII, the United States Supreme Court observed in United Steelworkers of America, etc. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979): It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had been excluded from the American dream for so long 110 Cong. Rec. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. Id. at 204, 99 S.Ct. at 2728. Weber upheld the validity of a private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plan because (1) it was designed to break down old patterns of discrimination and to open employment opportunities for minorities in occupations that had been traditionally closed for them and (2) it did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of Caucasian employees. Specifically, the Court noted that the plan did not require the discharge of Caucasian employees, did not create an absolute bar to the advancement of Caucasian employees, and was remedially aimed at a manifest racial imbalance. Id. at 208, 99 S.Ct. at 2730. Cf. Boston Police, supra, 147 F.3d at 23-25 (an ad hoc and admittedly racially motivated promotion of a minority candidate to police lieutenant over a higher-scoring majority candidate did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the action was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, i.e., to remedy the effects of prior discrimination, and (1) the person promoted did not receive a special or unfair benefit by his promotion, since he was qualified for the position; (2) the promotion did not unduly frustrate the legitimate expectations of those not promoted, since (a) there were more candidates for lieutenant than available positions and (b) those not promoted did not have a property right to the promotion; and (3) the promotion did not unduly interfere with any valid governmental policy, since selection on the basis of strict rank order was designed to ensure that candidates were chosen on the basis of their ability to do the job and the person promoted had that ability). An analysis of the effect of an affirmative action plan on a claim of reverse discrimination under the KCRA is governed by the allocation of the burden of proof in a reverse discrimination claim brought under Title VII. Harker, supra, 679 S.W.2d at 229.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), was a Title VII action brought by an African-American employee who claimed that he had been subjected to employment discrimination because of his race. In that case, the United States Supreme Court established the proper order and nature of proof in actions under Title VII, id. at 793-94, 93 S.Ct. at 1820, and established the following tripartite analysis: First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff carries his initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged workplace decision. Third, if the defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff has an opportunity to prove that the legitimate reasons the defendant offered were merely a pretext for discrimination. Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F.2d 585, 588 (10th Cir.1992), citing McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, `[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.' Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The defendant's burden is one of production, not persuasion. Id. at 142, 120 S.Ct. at 2106 (emphasis added). In a typical discrimination case, the plaintiff satisfies the burden to establish a prima facie case by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. In a reverse discrimination case in which the discrimination is the product of an affirmative action plan, the McDonnell Douglas framework must be appropriately adjusted. [2] First, because the plaintiffs are white male[s], [they] clearly do[] not satisfy prong one of the prima facie test. Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir.1999). [I]f strictly applied, the prima facie test would eliminate all reverse discrimination suits. Id. at 454. See also Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir.1999) (Obviously, a White plaintiff can not establish `membership in a minority group' in the same way a Black plaintiff can.); Notari v. Denver Water Dept., supra, at 589 (10th Cir.1992) (it is appropriate to adjust the prima facie case to reflect the reverse discrimination context of a lawsuit because the presumptions in Title VII analysis that are valid when a plaintiff belongs to a disfavored group are not necessarily justified when the plaintiff is a member of an historically favored group.) (quotation omitted); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir.1985) (a prima facie case of `reverse discrimination' is established upon a showing that background circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.) (quotation omitted); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C.Cir.1981) (Membership in a socially disfavored group was the assumption on which the entire McDonnell Douglas analysis was predicated... it defies common sense to suggest that the promotion of a black employee justifies an inference of prejudice against white co-workers in our present society.). Second, reverse discrimination cases that are the product of affirmative action plans are, as here, direct discrimination cases. Chief Jones admitted that he promoted Dreher and Smith over the other equally qualified candidates because they were African-Americans. Appellants do not deny, indeed they admit, that the promotions of Dreher and Smith were racially motivated pursuant to the affirmative action plan mandated by the Fiscal Court, adopted by the Merit Board, and implemented by Chief Jones. Thus, to prove reverse discrimination, there is no need for plaintiffs like Zaring and Hord who challenge an employment decision flowing from an affirmative action plan to resort to indirect evidence to prove discrimination. Because intentional discrimination is a given, plaintiffs like Zaring and Hord meet their prima facie burden simply by proving that `but for plaintiff's race he would have been promoted.` Notari, supra, at 590, quoting Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 794 F.2d 142, 146 (4th Cir.1986) (en banc). See also Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1369 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie case of race discrimination because the evidence does not support an inference that but for plaintiffs' status as whites, one of them would have been promoted.) (quotation omitted); Smith v. Secretary of Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1119 (D.C.Cir.1981) (To state a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas , a plaintiff must make a showing that he would have got[ten] a job or promotion `but for' an illegal act of discrimination.); cf. Aiken v. Hackett, 281 F.3d 516, 519-20 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that Caucasian police officers challenging an affirmative action program lacked Article III standing because they had neither alleged nor shown that the City would have promoted them if the City had used a race-neutral system in its promotions of police officers.). Third, in a reverse discrimination case, the defendant may meet its burden of production by showing that the alleged discrimination was pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan. As noted in McDonnell Douglas, supra , the burden of production may be satisfied by the articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for the employment decision. The existence of an affirmative action plan provides such a rationale. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 626, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1449, 94 L.Ed.2d 615 (1987). Because the defendant's burden is only one of production, the defendant does not carry the burden of proving the validity of the plan. Id. at 627, 107 S.Ct. at 1449. The burden of proving its invalidity remains on the plaintiff. Id. Finally, once the defendant meets its burden of production with the existence of an affirmative action plan, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to prove (1) that the affirmative action plan is invalid or (2) that the defendant's remedial rationale is pretextual. Id. at 626, 107 S.Ct. at 1449. [3] Zaring and Hord do not suggest that Chief Jones's remedial rationale was pretextual, i.e., not the true reason for his decision, so the only remaining issue in this final step is whether Zaring and Hord satisfied their burden to prove that the affirmative action plan was invalid. In accordance with the McDonnell Douglas structure outlined supra, we ordinarily would begin with a thorough analysis of whether Zaring and Hord met their entire prima facie burden by proving causation in addition to intentional discrimination. E.g., Taken, supra, at 1369. Indeed, the trial court entered the judgment NOV in favor of the Fiscal Court because Zaring and Hord did not prove that they would have been promoted but for the application of the affirmative action plan. [4] However, in this case we proceed directly to the second and third steps in the analysis because, as discussed infra, Zaring and Hord did not even begin to meet their burden of proving that the affirmative action plan was invalid.
It is undisputed that the purpose in amending Regulation 7.2(3) was to substitute banding for the rule of three in order to end the manifest imbalance in the number of women and racial minorities in the ranks of sergeant, lieutenant and captain and to facilitate the promotion of these historically underrepresented classes. Thus, the amendment was clearly an affirmative action plan. That evidence triggered the third step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis and shifted the burden back to Zaring and Hord. An affirmative action plan is afforded a presumption of validity and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish its invalidity. Johnson, supra, 480 U.S. at 626, 107 S.Ct. at 1449 (1987). Zaring and Hord do not claim that the concept of banding is either illegal or unconstitutional, presumably because banding has been consistently upheld in the face of every challenge to date. Chicago Firefighters Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 249 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 995, 122 S.Ct. 465, 151 L.Ed.2d 381 (2001); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City and County of San Francisco, 979 F.2d 721, 728 (9th Cir.1992); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.1991). Nor do they advance any theory that the amendment of Regulation 7.2(3) was an invalid exercise of affirmative action. As in Steelworkers v. Weber , supra, at 208, 99 S.Ct. at 2730, (1) the reason for amending Regulation 7.2(3) to adopt banding was to break down the pattern of discrimination evidenced by the four-year record of 0 for 35 and to open employment opportunities for members of minority groups in areas that had been traditionally closed to them; and (2) Regulation 7.2(3) as amended did not trammel the interests of male Caucasian employees such as Zaring and Hord because it was aimed at a manifest racial imbalance and neither required their discharge and replacement by minority employees nor created an absolute bar to their advancement. It simply afforded equally qualified female and minority employees the same opportunity for advancement as Caucasian male employees. Absent any evidence to support a Weber finding that the amendment of Regulation 7.2(3) was an invalid affirmative action plan, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, supra , required entry of a judgment NOV in favor of the Fiscal Court. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment NOV of the Jefferson Circuit Court. LAMBERT, C.J.; STUMBO, and GRAVES, JJ., concur. KELLER, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., concurs in result only without separate opinion. JOHNSTONE, J., dissents by separate opinion.