Opinion ID: 2298886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: COOLBAUGH v. VINCENTI (V-80-103E)

Text: The respondent represented D.K., the defendant in a child abuse/neglect case involving the defendant's four children. Trial of this matter before the Superior Court, Union County, began on September 16, 1979, and continued to December. During this proceeding, respondent's in-court conduct, his out of court conduct towards lawyers, witnesses and bystanders in the courthouse, and his written communiques and applications relative to the D.K. proceeding reached a level of impropriety that mandated the filing of a 22 count ethics complaint. The specific instances of in-court misconduct are fully detailed in the lengthy ethics complaint and, to a lesser degree, in the presentment filed by District V, and need not be fully detailed herein. It is sufficient to note examples of respondent's numerous improprieties here. He was frequently sarcastic, disrespectful and irrational, and accused the Court on numerous occasions of, inter alia, collusion with the prosecution, cronyism, racism, permitting the proceedings to have a carnival nature, conducting a kangaroo court, prejudging the case, conducting a cockamamie charade of witnesses and barring defense counsel from effectively participating in the proceedings, conducting a sham hearing, acting outside the law, being caught up in his own little dream world, and ex-parte communications with the prosecutor together with other equally outrageous, disrespectful and unsupported charges. These and other comments were made frequently throughout the proceedings and continued at length. The Committee specifically found that the respondent's conduct exhibited a constant and deliberate disregard of the minimum standards of conduct expected of a member of the bar through his repeated discourteous, insulting and degrading verbal attacks on the judge and his rulings, and that these repeated discourses substantially interfered with the orderly process of the trial. The Committee discounted respondent's claim that his conduct was the result of zealously protecting his client's cause as well as the emotional undercurrent of the litigation. To the contrary, the Committee concluded that the pervasiveness of the irrational, intemperate and improper conduct compelled the determination that the respondent's perception of the lawyer's role and his relationship to the court was, at the least, misguided. The Committee concluded that the respondent, in his court appearances, was guilty of unprofessional conduct in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), DR 7-106(C)(6), and DR 8-102(B) [prohibiting, respectively, conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, conduct that adversely reflects on one's ability to practice law, undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal, and the knowing making of false accusations against a judge]. In addition to verbal attacks in the courtroom, respondent engaged in collateral actions that the Committee determined were designed to gain advantages in the pending litigation by demeaning and harassing both the judge and opposing counsel. This conduct includes the forwarding of a letter to both the Deputy Attorney General representing the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) and the Assistant Public Defender who was the statutory law guardian to the four children. Within that letter, respondent demanded that these attorneys remove themselves from the case because of what he perceived to be their breach of confidentiality of the case. He further advised that he had asked their superiors to remove them from the case. He did, indeed, forward that letter to both the Attorney General and the Public Defender. The charged improprieties had no basis in fact. To the contrary, any improprieties that occurred at the meeting in question actually were of his doing. See discussion of out-of-court behavior below. In another instance, the respondent reviewed a witness's files while she was testifying and failed to return them thereafter. The Deputy Attorney General located the files on the counsel table and returned them to the witness, at the witness's request. The respondent, in open court, then accused the Deputy Attorney General of stealing the files, and accused her of being a bald-faced liar, and a thief, a liar and a cheat. He also filed an ethics complaint against the Deputy Attorney General for her actions. The Committee concluded that in these two incidents, respondent was in violation of DR 7-102(A)(1) and (5), and DR 7-106(C)(6) [governing the representation of a client within the bounds of the law and proscribing certain trial conduct]. Even more egregious were the respondent's activities with regard to evaluation of respondent's client by a court appointed psychologist. Respondent's client had paid $300 to Dr. Bennett, the psychologist, at the time of evaluation. Although the trial judge had arranged the appointment, he did not discuss compensation with Dr. Bennett until after respondent objected to his client being charged. The Judge agreed that the State should pay the fee, and on November 26, 1979, so advised the psychologist. When Dr. Bennett appeared to testify on November 29, 1979, he gave respondent a check for $300, thus returning the fee inadvertently received from the respondent. Despite the fact that the misunderstanding regarding payment for the evaluation had been resolved, respondent proceeded to subpoena the trial judge to testify and moved for the Judge's disqualification, stating that the matter involved    a possible collusion between a witness (and) the Court. Additionally, he called Dr. Bennett an extortionist psychologist, and alleged an appearance of impropriety since    the individual that sits on the stand extorted money from my client on the advice of this Court. In addition to making these claims in open court, in his appeals to the Appellate Division and the Supreme Court, the respondent further alleged that the trial judge had participated in extortion as well as cronyism, bias, prejudice, racism and religious bigotry during the trial, again without any basis in fact. The respondent's improprieties continued. The respondent directed the following letter, dated December 13, 1979, to the trial judge, the text of which is set forth below: I wish to extend my sincerest good wishes for your speedy recovery from the obvious breakdown you suffered in chambers yesterday, Tuesday, December 11, 1979. Hopefully, with some rest and relaxation from your most taxing schedule, you will be in a position to resume your judicial duties more appropriately than exhibited on the eleventh. If, however, you feel somehow justified in pressing your demand for written recommendations, I must supply them, if for no other purpose than to demonstrate my client's continuing bona fides herein. I must admit, with no small degree of trepidation, that we have no confidence in your rationality vis-a-vis this case. Your activities on the eleventh and throughout the trial clearly demonstrate an irrational predisposition to chastise Mr. D.K. and defense counsel. The cronyism I wrote of in our motion for new trial continues unabated. You have simply closed your mind to our position and have retreated into a dream world not unlike the somnambulist in that early German classic story at the turn of the century. How do we make any kind of recommendations to you while you sleep-walk through your judicial duties. How does one get through to you. Regrettably, we have no faith in your ability to preserve your objectivity herein, for whatever reason(s) I don't know. Mr. D.K.'s recommendations as to disposition are as follows without detailing the charade you are conducting: 1. Give him back his kids forthwith. 2. He, the children, the KXs, T. and B.P., and P.P. ought to agree to have counseling aimed at retrieving their emotional equilibrium which has been so assaulted by this Court and the State for much too long. 3. Re-establish by some appropriately reasonable means the control and authority of Mr. D.K. over his children which you have so blatantly and for too long disregarded. 4. Allow Mr. D.K. to prescribe the mode, method and style of life for his kids, including their religion until their majority. 5. Recognize your own participation in the State's oppression of a member of a bona fide religious minority, the Jehovah's Witnesses, as my people's constitutional right to freedom of religion. I must inform you that I have made an application to the Hon. ____ in response to your attorney's application to quash our subpoena of you to remove you from this case, once again. Parenthetically, your overly strong protest of that subpoena belies your professed inadvertent participation in Bennett's extortion. There is no better proof of your irrational conduct herein than your continued refusal to disqualify yourself and testify under oath as to the extortion episode. Your refusal to control your people, Ms. Rem, and the Division is only fitting when viewed in light of your refusal to control yourself. I would respectfully suggest that you await Judge ____ order before adding further insult to the injuries perpetrated upon Mr. D.K. by entering any dispositional order herein. The statements made by respondent in that letter speak for themselves. In a further display of impropriety, the respondent included the following accusations against the trial judge in his Specification of Trial Errors that accompanied his motion for a new trial following conclusion of the fact-finding phase of the bifurcated child abuse proceeding: 1. Improper coaching of the Deputy Attorney General; 2. Continuous coaching of the Law Guardian; 3. Usurpation of the presentation of the State's case to establish the elements of that entire case; 4. Cross examination of defense witnesses to discredit them; 5. Disregard for the perjury of the State's witnesses; 6. Bias and prejudice in favor of the State; 7. Over-interest, concern, cronyism and improper contact between the Court, Deputy Attorney General, law guardian and legal staff of the trial court; 8. Obvious racism in the Court's application of racial tests with regard to the children's schooling; 9. Perfidy by the Court and State in failing to properly enumerate the bases for allegations of abuse and neglect; 10. Carnival nature of the atmosphere in the courtroom. The Committee concluded that these various written and oral statements violated DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) and (6) [misconduct]; DR 7-102(A)(1) and (5) [representing a client within the bounds of the law]; and DR 8-102(B) [prohibiting the knowing making of false accusations against a judge]. In addition to respondent's outrageous in-court conduct and equally outrageous written applications and communications, respondent, on numerous occasions, also engaged in reprehensible behavior towards witnesses, potential witnesses, opposing counsel, and other attorneys outside the courtroom but inside the Courthouse. A sampling of the improprieties follows: 1. On September 26, 1979 outside the courtroom, respondent and Assistant Public Defender Eisert were discussing the issues of visitation. Argument ensued, during which, among other obscenities, respondent told Eisert to go screw himself and fuck off, and referred to Eisert as asshole, schmuck and schmuckface, all in the presence of a number of individuals, some of whom were involved in the case. 2. On October 31, 1979, Deputy Attorney General Rem and Eisert agreed to meet with respondent, at his request, for a settlement conference. The Lawyer's Lounge was selected. In addition to addressing insults at Rem, respondent referred to a female attorney, also in the lounge, as Miss Wrinkles, Miss Bags and old bag, and stated to her: Shove it up your ass and go fuck yourself. It was following this meeting that respondent addressed his written removal request, discussed supra, to opposing counsel and their superiors. 3. Respondent on several occasions either unnecessarily subpoenaed individuals to testify or threatened those under subpoena by opposing counsel. 4. On December 6, 1979, in the Courthouse corridor, after attempting to intimidate a witness by directing her to answer everything he asked, while his secretary wrote down her responses, respondent advised an attorney named Pearson who was standing with the witness but not involved in the proceeding to just keep your god damn nose out of my business. His conversation thereafter was peppered with the phrase fuck you. Eisert, who at that point asked respondent's secretary if she was recording the obscene remarks, was charged by respondent, who pressed a Bic pen into Eisert's chest. About 1/2 hour later, respondent approached Pearson, demanding his card, indicating that it was needed to file an ethics complaint. When Pearson refused to give respondent a card, respondent persisted in his demands in a loud manner, punctuating the demands with questionable phrases, including shmuckface, fuck-face and shit-head. He continued in this manner for sometime, adding to his action by poking his finger in Pearson's chest. Prior to removing himself from the area, respondent intentionally bumped Pearson with his stomach and then his shoulder, and thereafter advised Pearson that he could take his law firm and shove it up my ass. Respondent's performance did not conclude there. While Eisert, Pearson and Rem were conversing in the Courthouse, respondent approached, stating loudly that Rem should not be believed since    she's a bald-faced liar. He then called Rem fuckface, and while walking away again made the suggestion    shove it up your ass. Within the next several minutes, respondent twice approached the group, each time pushing into Rem, causing her to lurch against a desk in the hallway. The Committee concluded that these actions of the respondent were designed to ridicule, embarrass and harass the individuals concerned, and in the case of his adversaries, his conduct was designed to intimidate them in the performance of their duties. The Committee therefore found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6).