Opinion ID: 6499943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Employer/Employee Relationship under FLSA

Text: The FLSA defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee[,]” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), an -3- “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer[,]” § 203(e)(1), 1 and “employ” as “to suffer or permit to work,” § 203(g). This broad definition of employ “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.” Karlson v. Action Process Serv. & Priv. Investigations, LLC, 860 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992)). When an employment relationship is in question, many courts decide whether workers are independent contractors or employees by applying the multi-factor “economic realities” test. Id. The parties, as well as the district court, followed these courts and used the economic realities test here. 2 We assume without deciding that the economic realities test is appropriate in determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor under the FLSA. This test examines six factors regarding the economic realities of the working relationship: (1) “the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer over the business operations;” (2) “the relative investments of the alleged employer and employee;” (3) “the degree to which the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit and loss is determined by the employer;” (4) “the skill and initiative required in performing the job;” (5) “the permanency of the relationship;” and (6) “the degree to which the alleged employee’s tasks are integral to the employer’s business.” Id. at 1093. 1 The statutory definition of employer and employee provides certain exceptions not applicable here. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) and (e)(1)–(4). 2 The FLSA’s definition of “employ,” which is to “suffer or permit to work,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g), was borrowed from early child-labor laws. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 (1947). Our job in interpreting statutes is to determine what statutes meant “at the time of enactment,” Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 491, 493 (2020), which in this case would require looking back at analogous provisions in these older child-labor laws. By examining their meaning, it might become clear whether the six-factor economic-realities test accurately reflects the suffer-or-permit-to-work definition from the FLSA. -4-