Opinion ID: 2538750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appealable Judgment

Text: A party may appeal a final judgment or any final order made after judgment which affects a substantial right. Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAPs) 2.2(a)(1), (13). In a criminal proceeding, a final judgment `ends the litigation, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wash.2d 70, 88, 980 P.2d 1204 (1999) (quoting Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 79 Wash.App. 221, 225, 901 P.2d 1060 (1995), aff'd, 130 Wash.2d 862, 929 P.2d 379 (1996)). See also State v. Siglea, 196 Wash. 283, 285, 82 P.2d 583 (1938) (As a prerequisite to an appeal in a criminal case, there must be a final judgment terminating the prosecution of the accused and disposing of all matters submitted to the court for its consideration and determination.); State v. Liliopoulos, 165 Wash. 197, 199, 5 P.2d 319 (1931). Definitions included in the RAPs are controlling, but in the absence of a provided definition, this court will give a term its plain and ordinary meaning ascertained from a standard dictionary. See State v. Watson, 146 Wash.2d 947, 954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002). The term final judgment is not defined in the RAP. Therefore, we turn to Black's Law Dictionary, which provides the following definition: A court's last action that settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney's fees) and enforcement of the judgment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (7th ed.1999). In our view, an order of dismissal without prejudice does not fit within this court's definition of final judgment, nor does it fit under Black's definition. We say that because an order of dismissal without prejudice in a criminal matter does not bar the State from refiling charges against the defendant within the applicable statute of limitations. Because the legal and substantive issues are generally not resolved when a dismissal without prejudice is ordered, there is a lack of finality. An order of dismissal without prejudice `leaves the matter in the same condition in which it was before the commencement of the prosecution.' State v. Corrado, 78 Wash.App. 612, 615, 898 P.2d 860 (1995) (quoting 12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2218 (1984)). We agree with Division Two's rejection of Division One's decision in Rock. For its holding, the Rock court improperly relied on State v. Knapstad, 107 Wash.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986), in which this court reviewed an order of dismissal without prejudice appealed by the State. The Rock court erred when it concluded that [n]o reason appears why, if the State's appeal is proper, a defendant's appeal would be improper. Rock, 65 Wash.App. at 657-58, 829 P.2d 232. The Rock opinion fails to recognize that per RAP 2.2(b)(1), the State or local government may appeal a decision that dismisses an indictment or information. Thus, it was proper for us to accept review of the Knapstad case. The RAPs provide no similar rule for the individual whose criminal charges have been dismissed without prejudice. The Rock court's assumption, therefore, was unfounded.