Opinion ID: 798849
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denying Leave To Amend the Answer

Text: In December 2008, the district court set March 1, 2009, as the deadline for filing motions for leave to amend the pleadings. The deadline was three-and-a-half months from the time Smith filed its answer. And yet not until two months after the pleadings deadline did Smith commence discovery, when it served the EEOC with requests for admission that the EEOC had not acted on Smith's offer to assist Moncada in her job search before it issued the Notice of Determination. Smith attempted to amend its answer when it received the EEOC's response. While amending its answer was the proper course, as we have found, the district court could find no good cause for Smith's delay and denied it leave to amend its answer. This Court reviews a trial court's denial of leave to amend pleadings for abuse of discretion. [25] Under FED.R.CIV.P. 16(b)(4), a party seeking to amend its pleadings after a deadline has passed must demonstrate good cause for needing an extension. [26] The four factors relevant to good cause are: `(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.' [27] For the first factor, the district court concluded that Smith fail[ed] to provide a plausible explanation for its delay. Smith filed its answer, then waited almost six months before commencing discovery, allowing the pleadings deadline to pass in the meantime. [28] The EEOC had been sending discovery requests for months when Smith finally began. Smith had three-and-a-half months to meet the particularity requirement for its conciliation defense, but it dragged its feet on discovery and now cannot explain why. Moreover, the EEOC's discovery responses were not Smith's initial source of information for its conciliation argument. As the district court observed, Smith at least had enough knowledge of the facts to have filed a Rule 11 motion in December 2008 (well before the pleadings deadline) alleging that the EEOC had completely ignored its offer to help Moncada, and it later filed a specifically worded request for admission on the same ground. Smith's knowledge, or at least its reasonable suspicion, accents its inability to explain the delay. Smith had time to obtain discovery and seek leave to amend by the March 1 deadline. The district court found that Smith's failure to account for its delay was dispositive, outweighing the other three factors for assessing good cause. The district court's determination is well supported and squarely within its sound discretion.