Opinion ID: 2687578
Heading Depth: 2
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Heading: Analysis of Political Question Doctrine.

Text: 1. Overview of political question doctrine. The federal political question doctrine arises largely from the United States Supreme Court case of Baker. In that case, the United States Supreme Court laid out six considerations for determining whether a political question was present: [(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S. Ct. at 710, 7 L. Ed. at 686. The high-water mark of the federal political question doctrine appears to be matters involving foreign affairs, determinations of the propriety of congressional enactments, and matters related to the legislative process. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226, 236–38, 113 S. Ct. 732, 734, 739–40, 122 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7, 13–14 (1993); 57 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06, 100 S. Ct. 533, 536–38, 62 L. Ed. 2d 428, 430–32 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). The federal political question doctrine has been the subject of extensive commentary. Some question whether there is any legitimate basis for it. See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J. 597, 600 (1976) (“[T]here may be no doctrine requiring abstention from judicial review of ‘political questions.’ ”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1031, 1031 (1984) (noting commentators have “disagreed about [the federal political question doctrine’s] wisdom and validity”);. Other commentators have defended the federal political question doctrine. See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97 (1988). It has also been observed that since Baker, the doctrine has fallen into disuse in the United States Supreme Court. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court?: The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 263 (2007). Since Baker, the federal political question doctrine has been invoked successfully in only three cases. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1778, 158 L. Ed. 2d 546, 560 (2004) (holding gerrymanding claim nonjusticiable); Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226, 113 S. Ct. at 734, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 7 (concluding question whether the Senate rule regarding impeachment is constitutional is nonjusticiable); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5–6, 10, 93 S. Ct. 2440, 2443, 2446, 37 L. Ed. 2d 407, 413, 415 (1973) (holding determination of adequacy of national guardsmen training exclusively vested in Congress). Even if one is inclined to adopt a political question doctrine of some kind, there is a question of scope. The six considerations listed by Justice Brennan in 58 Baker, see 369 U.S. at 217, 825 S. Ct. at 710, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 686, are both opaque and elastic. Some commentators advocate consideration of all of them, usually in descending order of importance as recognized by the plurality opinion in Vieth, see 541 U.S. at 278, 124 S. Ct. at 1776, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 558. Others urge a narrower approach through what has been termed the “classical” model, which emphasizes, if not requires, a constitutionally based commitment of power to another branch of government. See Amelia Thorpe, Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation and the Political Question Doctrine, 24 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 79, 80 (2008). It is important to note, however, that the United States Supreme Court has made clear that the federal political question doctrine does not apply to state courts. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1005 n.2, 100 S. Ct. at 538 n.2, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 430 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“This Court, of course, may not prohibit state courts from deciding political questions, any more than it may prohibit them from deciding questions that are moot, so long as they do not trench upon exclusively federal questions of foreign policy.” (Citation omitted.)). Whether and to what extent state courts should adopt the federal political question doctrine is a question of some controversy. Several decades ago, Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde remarked that “there are hardly any state analogues to the self-imposed constraints on justiciability, ‘political questions,’ and the like.” Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 Yale L. J. 227, 248 (1972). While Linde’s observation may be overstated, Helen Hershkoff has noted that state courts do tend to hear an array of questions that would be considered nonjusticiable in federal court. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1833, 1863 (2001). Two former state supreme court 59 justices have observed the significant differences between separation of powers under state constitutions as compared to under the Federal Constitution. See Christine M. Durham, The Judicial Branch in State Government: Parables of Law, Politics, and Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1601, 1603 (2001) (“State constitutions have a tradition independent of federal law in the allocation of power among the branches of state government and in their development and understanding of republican principles.”); Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1543, 1558 (1997) (“State courts are regularly called upon to enforce state constitutional obligations that, for sound reasons of federalism, federal courts have declined to enforce.” (Footnote omitted.)). If so, the federal political question doctrine might have limited value for state courts. In some state courts, the doctrine seems to be met with some skepticism. See Backman v. Secretary, 441 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Mass. 1982) (“[W]e have never explicitly incorporated the [political question] doctrine into our State jurisprudence . . . . [T]his court has an obligation to adjudicate claims that particular actions conflict with constitutional requirements.”). Other state courts, however, have cited federal precedent solely as if the doctrine were binding on state courts, mixed federal and state cases without any clear delineation, and even simply used the label “political question” without meaningful case citation or analysis. See Christine M. O’Neill, Closing the Door on Positive Rights: State Court Use of the Political Question Doctrine to Deny Access to Educational Adequacy Claims, 42 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 545, 560–76 (2009) (categorizing cases according to citation methodology). The political question doctrine has rarely provided the basis for a holding in our cases. One exception is Dwyer, a case in which we 60 considered whether the Iowa Senate’s policy on release of certain longdistance phone records fell within the constitutionally granted power to the Senate to determine its own rules of proceedings. 542 N.W.2d at 493. We held that because of the demonstrable constitutional commitment to the Senate of the power to make its own rules in article III, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution, the lawsuit filed by the newspaper to obtain the records raised a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 494, 501. Similarly, in State ex rel. Turner v. Scott, we considered an action brought by the attorney general to remove Scott from his Senate seat. 269 N.W.2d 828, 828 (Iowa 1978). Relying upon article III, section I of the Iowa Constitution (which vests authority upon each house to judge the qualifications of its own members) we held that the case presented a political question that should be resolved by the Senate. Id. at 830–31. The holdings in Dwyer and Scott are consistent with the narrower classical model of the political question doctrine, which focuses on the textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of decision-making power to another branch of government, the first Baker factor, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S. Ct. at 710, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 686. As is often the case, however, the plaintiffs do not question whether the political question doctrine applies in state court and whether we should adopt a political question doctrine for Iowa that departs from the federal approach. In somewhat similar circumstances, where a party does not suggest a different standard under Iowa law, we adopt for the purposes of the case the federal standard, reserving the right to apply the standard differently than under the federal cases. See, e.g., State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 150 (Iowa 2012) (“Even where a party has not provided a substantive standard independent of federal law, we reserve the right to apply the standard presented by the party in a fashion 61 different than the federal cases.”); NextEra Energy Res. LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 815 N.W.2d 30, 45 (Iowa 2012) (“Even in cases where a party has not suggested that our approach under the Iowa Constitution should be different from that under the Federal Constitution, we reserve the right to apply the standard in a fashion at variance with federal cases under the Iowa Constitution.”); State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 650 (Iowa 2012); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009); In re Det. of Hennings, 744 N.W.2d 333, 338–39 (Iowa 2008). We reserve the right to apply the federal standards differently because the six factors in Baker are not clearly defined and are open-ended. As a result, within the Baker framework, there is a wide range of permissible analysis on each of the factors. We therefore proceed to utilize the federal Baker approach, reserving the right to apply these standards in a fashion different from federal precedent. 2. Discussion. From any perspective, it is clear that there is no textual constitutional commitment of the issues raised in this case to another branch of government. The first and most important factor of the Baker formula is thus plainly not present and cuts markedly against any application of the political question doctrine here. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Anchille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Although no one factor is dispositive, Justice Brennan, the author of Baker, has suggested that the first [factor] . . . is of particular importance . . . [and the absence of this factor] strongly suggests that the political question doctrine does not apply.” (Citation omitted.)). We now move to the second factor, namely, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards to resolve the issues. Tort law, however, including the law of nuisance, has evolved over the centuries. The law has devised a number of doctrinal approaches to accommodate 62 difficulties in proof associated with complex environmental and toxic tort cases. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 Yale L.J. 350, 370 (2011). As a result, the United States Supreme Court has never found a lack of judicially manageable standards in a tort suit involving private parties. Id. at 412. The caselaw generally stands for the proposition that actions for damages are relatively immune to efforts to dismiss based upon the political question doctrine. See, e.g., Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Monetary damages might but typically do not require courts to dictate policy . . . nor do they constitute a form of relief that is not judicially manageable.”); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Damage actions are particularly judicially manageable.”); Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 679–80, 683 (E.D. La. 2006) (holding demand for damages justiciable); Mallinckrodt, Inc., 706 S.W.2d at 221 (“[I]ndividual tort recoveries . . . are not precluded by the political question doctrine. Appellants are not trying to establish standards that conflict with legislative determinations; they are seeking compensation for injuries.” (Citation omitted.)). To the extent the science is obscure and complex, the burden of proof of all elements of causation remains on the plaintiffs. The mere fact that a case is complex does not satisfy this factor. As noted by the Second Circuit in AEP, courts have successfully adjudicated complex common law public nuisance claims for more than a century. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 326; Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting the political question doctrine does not arise because the case “is unmanageable in the sense of being large, complicated, or otherwise difficult to tackle from a logistical standpoint”). 63 Turning to the third factor, there is no need for an initial policy determination by another branch of government. Indeed, the tort law itself represents an initial policy determination, namely, that certain plaintiffs who demonstrate necessary harm to the use and enjoyment of their real property may be entitled to damages and injunctive relief. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 331; McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1364–65; Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49 (“The fact that the issues before us arise in a politically charged context does not convert what is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a non-justiciable political question.”). With these major factors removed, the remaining factors generally fall out of the equation. None of the remaining Baker factors are very strong in any approach to the political question doctrine and they certainly do not provide a basis for nonjusticiability in this case. As is apparent from the above analysis, none of the Baker factors apply in this case with much force. We therefore conclude that this case is not subject to dismissal under the political question doctrine.