Opinion ID: 1891504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Simmons' Motion to Suppress Statements and Vehicle Evidence

Text: Simmons argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the statements he made to police because he did not voluntarily accompany authorities to the police station. Simmons also argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence law enforcement officers obtained from his vehicle. This Court has stated that a suppression ruling comes to the reviewing court clad in a presumption of correctness as to all fact-based issues. State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 297, 301 (Fla.2001). Given the evidence before the trial court, we find no error.
The trial judge denied Simmons' motion to suppress, determining that Simmons voluntarily submitted to the interrogation and, in the alternative, that the detectives had probable cause to detain Simmons for a custodial interrogation.
Simmons contends that, given the number of officers that surrounded his parents' Pine Lakes residence on December 7, 2001, a reasonable person in his position would not feel that he or she could decline the detectives' invitation to come to the sheriff's office. Further, Simmons contends that the fact that he was handcuffed and transported in the back of a caged, marked police cruiser belies the contention that he went voluntarily. In support of his argument, Simmons cites to Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985). In Hayes, police approached a burglary-rape suspect on his front porch and asked him to come to the police station for fingerprinting. Id. at 812, 105 S.Ct. 1643. An investigator threatened to arrest the suspect if he did not comply. Id. The United States Supreme Court determined that Hayes' detention was not consensual, and it reversed the conviction and remanded the case because the police did not have probable cause to detain the suspect. Id. at 814, 817-18, 105 S.Ct. 1643. Unlike the defendant in Hayes, the uncontroverted testimony by the officers in this case indicates that Simmons never expressed any reluctance to accompany the detectives to the sheriff's office. The officers did not threaten Simmons with an arrest or try to coerce him in any way. These crucial factual differences distinguish Hayes from the present case. Although Simmons contends that a thundering herd of police officers would render any reasonable person unable to refuse the detectives' invitation, the record shows that most of these officers were not directly involved in any confrontation with Simmons or the conversation between Simmons, Detective Adams, and Detective Purdue. These two detectives were not in uniform and were not armed when they conducted the initial interview at Simmons' parents' home. Moreover, although Simmons was handcuffed and transported in the back of a caged police cruiser, the State presented evidence that these measures were taken for the safety of the police officers involved and that police removed the handcuffs as soon as Simmons reached the sheriff's office. Nothing in the record indicates that Simmons objected to being handcuffed or at any time expressed a desire to terminate the encounter. Our recognition of the propriety of using handcuffs in noncustodial encounters with police is in line with this Court's prior case law. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1, 18 (Fla.2003) (holding that the use of handcuffs during a trip from a police cruiser to an interrogation room did not render a detention custodial when the suspect was told that he was not under arrest). Under the totality of the circumstances, we find no error in the trial court's determination that a reasonable person in Simmons' position would have felt free to terminate the encounter with police. Simmons does not deny that he signed a Miranda waiver before the detectives began to interview him at the sheriff's office, and he never asked to terminate the interview. The two detectives allowed Simmons to use the bathroom when he needed to, and the three even ate dinner together. Moreover, the detectives told Simmons that they would provide a ride home if his family could not come to get him, and they reassured Simmons that he was not under arrest. Given the significant deference that we give to trial courts' fact-finding on motions to suppress, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it accepted the evidence presented by the State and determined that Simmons' December 7 interview with detectives was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.
Even if Simmons was able to successfully argue that his detention was custodial and not voluntary, he would still have to show that the police detained him without probable cause in order to prevail. See Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984) (holding that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence when there was probable cause to support his de facto arrest). In addition to finding that Simmons' encounter with detectives was voluntary, the trial court determined that the police had probable cause to detain Simmons. We have stated that [p]robable cause for arrest exists where an officer `has reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect has committed a felony. The standard of conclusiveness and probability is less than that required to support a conviction.' Chavez v. State, 832 So.2d 730, 747 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Walker v. State, 707 So.2d 300, 312 (Fla.1997)). At the time of the interview, detectives had statements from Simmons' friends and acquaintances that indicated that he was Tressler's boyfriend and that he was the last person seen with Tressler while she was alive. They also had a statement from Mr. Rodriguez that he saw Simmons with Tressler between 10:30 p.m. and 10:45 p.m. on December 1, 2001. Moreover, Simmons' car matched the description of the car that two witnesses saw at about midnight on December 1, from which a woman matching the description of Tressler was attempting to flee. Detectives also had statements from witnesses that Simmons may have beaten Tressler earlier in the week, and they knew that he had previously been arrested for abusing a prior spouse or girlfriend. This Court has stated that [t]he existence of probable cause is not susceptible to formulaic determination. Rather, it is the `probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity [that] is the standard of probable cause.' Doorbal v. State, 837 So.2d 940, 952-53 (Fla.2003) (citations omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Considering the totality of the circumstances and the evidence presented in this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that any custodial detention of Simmons was supported by probable cause.
Simmons also challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle on December 7, 2001, under a search warrant. Simmons alleges that factual inaccuracies plague the affidavit that supported the magistrate's decision to grant the search warrant. Simmons alleges that, after excising those portions of the affidavit that are inaccurate, the State is left with nothing upon which the magistrate could have found probable cause to authorize a search. Deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth in an affidavit that gives rise to a search warrant can, in some instances, lead to suppression of evidence obtained under that warrant. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). However, we have held that an erroneous statement will only invalidate a search warrant if, after excising the erroneous statement, the remaining true statements are insufficient to establish probable cause. See Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 958 (Fla.1996). In the instant case, the trial court ruled that there were, in fact, no intentionally or recklessly false statements. First, Simmons alleges that the affidavit provides an inaccurate description of Detective Brewer's qualifications by stating that Detective Brewer had been a law enforcement officer since 1979 because Detective Brewer's certification lapsed for twenty years while he pursued a career as an attorney. The record, however, indicates that Detective Brewer was a sworn officer at the time that he signed the affidavit and that his experience as an officer dated back to 1979. Further, although Detective Brewer's Florida certification did lapse during the 1980s, his certification as a military police officer continued during this period and never lapsed. Given this evidence, we conclude the trial court did not err in concluding that the portion of the affidavit regarding Detective Brewer's qualifications was not false. Next, Simmons alleges that the affidavit misstates the information that detectives obtained from Ms. Renfro. Detective Brewer's affidavit indicates that a witness observed a woman who matched the description of the victim and was screaming and attempting to flee a white Chevrolet Corsica-type car. Simmons cites to Ms. Renfro's statement to the police, which indicated that the woman that Ms. Renfro saw was in her mid-fifties, had short brown hair, and was wearing a white T-shirt. Because Tressler was actually forty-eight, had long black hair, and was wearing a grey shirt, Simmons argues that Ms. Renfro's description did not match the description of Tressler and that the affidavit is materially false. However, as the trial court properly noted, Detective Purdue testified that Ms. Renfro positively identified Tressler's picture as the same woman she saw in the car. Therefore, despite the slight variations Simmons notes between Ms. Renfro's description and Tressler's actual appearance, the trial court properly concluded that the portion of the affidavit regarding Ms. Renfro's description of Tressler was not misstated. Next, Simmons alleges an inaccuracy in the portion of the affidavit that indicates that Detective Brewer personally observed several visible stains consistent with dried blood in the back of Simmons' vehicle. This is because the trial judge personally examined the sheet and found no blood. While there does appear to be an inconsistency between Detective Brewer's and the trial judge's observations of the sheet, the record does not refute Detective Brewer's testimony that he personally observed blood stains prior to preparing the warrant. The trial court found that the officer's observations and conclusions were not unreasonable considering the circumstances of the observations. The trial court also noted that [t]he observation of the blood-stained sheet may be superfluous under Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), because the initial Fourth Amendment intrusion was the seizure of the vehicle, and a proper analysis would be to review of [sic] the facts as they existed at that time. In Chambers, the United States Supreme Court stated: For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 399 U.S. at 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975. We find no error in the rulings of the trial court. Simmons further alleges that the testimony as to when Detective Brewer signed the affidavit and when the magistrate issued the search warrant indicates that Detective Brewer never saw the vehicle before signing the affidavit. The trial court acknowledged that although there was some question as to when the affidavit and warrant were presented to the magistrate, the trial court did not find the discrepancy in time [to be] any indication of untoward action on behalf of the Lake County[ ] Sheriff's Department. Considering the totality of the circumstances and the deference we give to the trial court regarding factual determinations, we find no error. Based on the analysis concerning Simmons' statements and the search of his vehicle, we also find no merit to Simmons' contention that the arrest of Simmons was the result of police misconduct.