Opinion ID: 895269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: House Bill 4 was enacted against a backdrop of urgency, but with legislative police power, unfettered must never be unfretted.

Text: As litigants often discover, in the Legislature a deal is sometimes a raw deal. But unfair does not always equal unconstitutional; even vested rights can be impinged if lawmakers have a good-enough reason. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have lamented the `elephantine mass of asbestos cases' lodged in state and federal courts, [8] branding it a crisis [9] that defies customary judicial administration. [10] In response, the bipartisan civil-justice reforms enacted in 2003's House Bill 4 effected a sea change in the Texas tort landscape; [11] likewise the omnibus asbestos-litigation reforms enacted in 2005's Senate Bill 15. [12] Both measures sought to address perceived flaws in asbestos-related litigationHB 4 by limiting so-called innocent successor liability (immediately and retroactively), [13] and SB 15 via more sweeping reforms for asbestos and silica claims. [14] In upholding a retroactive water regulation in Barshop, we expressly relied on formal and extensive findings that the Legislature made part of the statutory text itself: Based on these legislative findings, we conclude that the Act is necessary to safeguard the public welfare of the citizens of this state. Accordingly, the retroactive effect of the statute does not render it unconstitutional. [15] Chapter 149's enacted text includes no such findings. Instead, Crown Cork relies on the legislative record, contending it amply underscores an urgent public need: protecting imperiled-but-nonculpable companies in order to safeguard the livelihoods of endangered-but-innocent employees, pensioners, and local economies. [16] Nobody disputes the authority of the Legislature to make reasoned adjustments in the legal system. [17] But lawmakers aiming to statutorily prescribe what is constitutionally proscribed must make a convincing case. As the Court carefully explains, the sparse record underlying chapter 149 falls short of what must be shown before someone is made to surrender a constitutional right.