Opinion ID: 6330744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing by Court on a Guilty Plea

Text: The first error Jenkins alleges on appeal is the trial court denied him the right to plead guilty and be sentenced by a jury. As Jenkins acknowledges, however, 4 See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(e)-(f) (2015) (providing the trial court shall include in [the trial court's] instructions to the jury for it to consider . . . Statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) The murder was committed while in the commission of the following crimes or acts: . . . (e) robbery while armed with a deadly weapon . . . [or] (f) larceny with use of a deadly weapon). 5 See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b) (2015) (listing ten statutory mitigating circumstances to be considered by the jury if supported by the evidence). subsection 16-3-20(B) of the South Carolina Code (2015) requires that when a capital defendant pleads guilty to murder, he must be sentenced by the trial court and must not be sentenced by a jury. Jenkins initially states this issue as whether the trial court erred by refusing to declare the state's death penalty statute, S.C. Code § 16-3-20(B), unconstitutional to the extent it mandates that the sentencer is the judge and not a jury. We have repeatedly addressed this very argument, and on each occasion, we held this subsection is constitutional. See State v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 146-47, 604 S.E.2d 377, 380 (2004) (holding a defendant is not deprived of his right to a trial by jury when he pleads guilty because—as a predicate to pleading guilty—he must voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial on both guilt and sentencing; distinguishing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002)); see also State v. Allen, 386 S.C. 93, 102, 687 S.E.2d 21, 25 (2009) (same); State v. Crisp, 362 S.C. 412, 418-19, 608 S.E.2d 429, 433 (2005) (same); State v. Wood, 362 S.C. 135, 143, 607 S.E.2d 57, 61 (2004) (same). Jenkins argues the Supreme Court's 2016 decision in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 136 S. Ct. 616, 193 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2016), requires that a jury impose the sentence in all capital cases, effectively overruling Allen, Crisp, Wood, and Downs. In Hurst, the Supreme Court stated, The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. 577 U.S. at 94, 136 S. Ct. at 619, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 508. Hurst is distinguishable from this case, however, for the same reason we distinguished Ring v. Arizona in Allen, Crisp, Wood, and Downs. Hurst dealt with a Florida statute under which the jury renders an 'advisory sentence' of life or death, after which, Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the [trial] court . . . shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death. 577 U.S. at 95-96, 136 S. Ct. at 620, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 509 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2)-(3) (Supp. 2012)). The Florida procedure applied even in cases in which the defendant exercised his right to a trial by jury. As we explained in Allen, Crisp, Wood, and Downs, the situation is different when the defendant makes a valid waiver of his right to a trial by jury as a predicate to pleading guilty. See, e.g., Crisp, 362 S.C. at 418-19, 608 S.E.2d at 433 (The constitutionality of Section 16–3–20(B) . . . rests . . . on whether the statute comports with the right to a jury trial as established by this Court and the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the state and federal constitutions.); Downs, 361 S.C. at 146, 604 S.E.2d at 380 (Ring did not involve jury-trial waivers and is not implicated when a defendant pleads guilty.). Thus, we disagree Hurst has any impact on Allen, Crisp, Wood, or Downs. We once more affirm the constitutionality of the subsection 16-3-20(B) requirement that a capital defendant who pleads guilty to murder must be sentenced by the trial court. Jenkins' more precise and compelling argument, however, is based on a particular discussion the trial court had with him during a pre-trial hearing on March 7, 2019, nine weeks before trial. The trial court conducted the hearing without the Solicitor present pursuant to subsection 16-3-26(B)(1) and (C)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2015).6 As the hearing concluded, the trial court and Jenkins joked with each other about Jenkins' move from SCDC back to the county jail in preparation for trial. Jenkins himself—not speaking through counsel—then asked the trial court whether it was legal for the State to deny him a guilty plea and make him go to trial. Jenkins: I have a question. Is it legal for them to make me go to trial? Court: Make you go to trial? Jenkins: Basically, they made me go to trial. I didn't get no plea or nothing. So, is it legal? Court: I mean, you have the right to plead guilty if you want to plead guilty. Jenkins: Plead guilty to the death sentence? Court: Right. I mean, we are both kind of smiling at each other as we say that, but I mean, there are some people who believe criminal defendants do not have a right to plead guilty. You know, I don't think you can stop somebody from pleading guilty as charged. But, you know -- 6 These subsections permit the trial court to conduct ex parte hearings for purposes of addressing the appointment of counsel and funding. In the March 7 hearing, the trial court heard and resolved Jenkins' concerns about his counsel. Jenkins: So if I plead guilty to the death sentence, I would be on death row? Court: Yeah. Jenkins: Not a chance. Court: Right. . . . We wish to be very clear this was error by the trial court. See generally Crisp, 362 S.C. at 415-16, 608 S.E.2d at 431-32 (discussing the propriety of a trial court's statements to a capital defendant concerning his right to a trial by jury); State v. Owens, 362 S.C. 175, 178, 607 S.E.2d 78, 79-80 (2004) (same). In Crisp and Owens, we relied on a series of four cases in which the trial court made erroneous statements to a defendant concerning his right to testify or to remain silent.7 Crisp, 362 S.C. at 416-17, 608 S.E.2d at 431-32; Owens, 362 S.C. at 177-78, 607 S.E.2d at 79-80. The central premise of these six cases is that while discussing with a defendant a choice the defendant must make about a constitutional right, the trial court may not make an inaccurate statement of law nor inject its personal opinion into the defendant's analysis. In this case, the trial court made an inaccurate statement of law that Jenkins appears to have interpreted as the trial court's personal opinion—formed before hearing any evidence—as to whether Jenkins deserved the death penalty. This is error. The question then becomes whether the error warrants reversal. In Crisp and Owens, we rejected the idea the error in those cases could be harmless, stating in Crisp such 7 See State v. Gunter, 286 S.C. 556, 559-60, 335 S.E.2d 542, 543 (1985) (explaining a trial court must inform the defendant of his choices accurately and stating, A statement by the trial judge which intimates that the jury will ignore his instructions is improper); State v. Pierce, 289 S.C. 430, 434, 346 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1986) (relying on Gunter and stating the defendant had the right to make that decision free of any influence or coercion from the trial judge), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991); State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 332, 336-37, 353 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1986) (relying on Gunter and Pierce), overruled on other grounds by Torrence; Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 467, 397 S.E.2d 87, 87 (1990) (relying on Gunter, Pierce, and Cooper). comments by a trial judge during a guilty plea proceeding are fundamentally erroneous and constitute prejudicial error. 362 S.C. at 417, 608 S.E.2d at 432. In Owens, we recited our discussion of prejudicial error from Pierce, in which the Court explained, It is virtually impossible to determine the actual effect the judge's improper statements had on Pierce. Owens, 362 S.C. at 178, 607 S.E.2d at 80 (quoting Pierce, 289 S.C. at 434, 346 S.E.2d at 710). In each of those six cases— Crisp, Owens, Gunter, Pierce, Cooper, and Butler—however, the trial court made the erroneous statements during the hearing at the conclusion of which the defendant made the choice whether to exercise his right to a jury trial or his right to remain silent. Thus, the prejudicial effect of the trial court's erroneous statements was known by this Court to be present in the mind of the defendant at the time he made the decision about his constitutional right. In this case, on the other hand, the erroneous comments were made on March 7, jury qualification did not begin until May 6, and the trial itself did not start until May 10. On April 26, the trial court heard motions, including Jenkins' Motion to Find S.C. Code 16-3-20(B) Unconstitutional and Allow Defendant to Plead Guilty & Be Sentenced by Jury of His Peers, which Jenkins previously filed in written form on April 22. In the written motion and in arguing the motion, defense counsel said nothing about what occurred at the March 7 hearing. Thus, in the April 26 motion hearing, Jenkins did not make the more precise and compelling argument he makes on appeal; he made only the argument we have repeatedly rejected in holding subsection 16-3-20(B) is constitutional. As our holdings in Allen, Crisp, Wood, and Downs required, the trial court denied the motion. On May 10—the morning of trial and only moments before opening statements— Jenkins again brought up his motion to declare subsection 16-3-20(B) unconstitutional. His counsel stated, We believe that statute is unconstitutional and it takes away a defendant's right to plead guilty and be sentenced by a jury. We think every defendant is entitled to have a jury trial, that every defendant is entitled to have a jury trial on the issue of sentencing in a capital case; this being a capital case. Jenkins still did not mention what the trial court said at the March 7 hearing, again relying only on the argument we rejected in Allen, Crisp, Wood, and Downs. The trial court did not immediately respond. Jenkins' counsel then explained to the trial court, So, what we want to do is -- because we cannot plead guilty and then have a sentencing trial by jury, what we want to do is explain to the jury in this case that we are not pleading not guilty, that we admit guilt as to the issues in this case . . . , but that the only way we could have a jury do the sentencing is to go through this process, which means the State has to present evidence and we have to wait and let the jury hear the aggravating and mitigating factors in order to make their decision. Jenkins' counsel then asked the trial court to inquire of Mr. Jenkins if that is his understanding and if he is on board with that, and whether or not that is okay with him. Because, obviously, this is not something that is commonly done. After confirming both defense counsel believed the strategy to be in Jenkins' best interest, the trial court spoke directly to Jenkins, beginning with a specific reference to the March 7 conversation, You and I have talked before on the record that if you did plea, then I would be the one -- we would have a sentencing trial, but there is no jury, just up to me.[8] I think you said something like, I like you, but not like that, or something like that.[9] We all kind of chuckled about it . . . . 8 We have not been asked to consider nor have we considered whether the trial court's comments at the May 10 hearing—particularly this statement—cured the March 7 error. Rather, as explained below, we simply do not reach this issue because the March 7 error is not preserved. 9 At this point in the transcript, the court reporter indicated the trial judge was laughing. After a lengthy dialogue, the trial court confirmed Jenkins understood the strategy. The trial court then approved the strategy, stating, I think it is a very good strategy, and a very positive strategy. Thus, Jenkins' trial counsel had at least three opportunities to object to the trial court's March 7 error: (1) the March 7 hearing, which—though ex parte—was attended by both defense counsel, (2) the April 26 hearing, and (3) the May 10 hearing. The trial court's playful May 10 recitation of the March 7 conversation indicates he did not realize what he told Jenkins on March 7. In fact, we see no indication in the record that the trial court was ever aware his March 7 comments could have been an issue or could have improperly influenced Jenkins' decision on his constitutional right to not plead guilty. If defense counsel had objected to the March 7 comments at any of the at least three opportunities, the trial court could have taken steps to correct its error. Or, in the unlikely event the trial court actually meant what he said, a different error would be confirmed. The first time Jenkins mentioned the March 7 error, however, was in his brief to this Court. In addition to counsel's obligation to object to the trial court's March 7 error, the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to independently explain to a criminal defendant the law applicable to each significant issue in his case, particularly where the defendant must make an important decision about exercising a constitutional right. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 694 (1984) (From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.). It is inconceivable that defense counsel did not have an extended conversation with Jenkins—probably on more than one occasion— about his right to a trial by jury, and consequently, what the law permitted and required of the trial court if Jenkins decided not to exercise his right to a trial by jury. This is particularly true in this case, where we know the question of a guilty plea was very much on the mind of Jenkins and his lawyers. In those conversations, it is equally inconceivable counsel did not explain to Jenkins that the trial court would be required by law to consider both death and life as options for his sentence, and to do so with an open mind without preconceptions as to which sentence the evidence would warrant the trial court impose. Therefore, as to the first error Jenkins alleges on appeal, we stand by our holdings in Allen, Crisp, Wood, and Downs that the subsection 16-3-20(B) requirement that a capital defendant who pleads guilty to murder must be sentenced by the trial court is constitutional. As to Jenkins' more precise and compelling argument, we find the trial court's March 7 error is not preserved for our review because counsel never brought the error to the attention of the trial court. See State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128, 132, 838 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2020) (It is firmly established law that, ordinarily, an issue must be presented to the trial court or it is not preserved for appellate review. (citing State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003))). On this point, we find it important that the trial court's comments in Crisp, Owens, Gunter, Pierce, Cooper, and Butler not only were contemporaneous with the defendant's decision to exercise the applicable constitutional right, but also the comments were nowhere near so clearly wrong as the erroneous statement that if Jenkins pled guilty, he would, Plead guilty to the death sentence. The trial court's playful demeanor—laughing—at the time of the March 7 comments and when the court recounted the comments on May 10 convince this Court that the trial court had no knowledge of its error. Under the circumstances present here, defense counsel was obligated to point out this error to the trial court. Had counsel done so, we are confident the trial court would have corrected its error. Finally, because the March 7 error occurred nine weeks before trial—nine weeks before Jenkins had to actually decide whether to exercise his right to a trial by jury— we do not know whether the trial court's erroneous comments actually affected Jenkins' decision to exercise his right to a trial by jury. In Owens and Pierce, we found the erroneous comments were prejudicial with specific reliance on our finding, It is virtually impossible to determine the actual effect the judge's improper statements had on [the defendant]. Owens, 362 S.C. at 178, 607 S.E.2d at 80; Pierce, 289 S.C. at 434, 346 S.E.2d at 710. In this case, it is quite possible to determine the actual effect the judge's improper statements had on Jenkins and to determine whether trial counsel's later conversations with him—or the trial court's statements during the May 10 hearing—cured Jenkins' apparent interpretation of the trial court's March 7 comments. That possibility lies in the post-conviction relief process, during which counsel's conversations with Jenkins between March 7 and May 10 can be fully explored, and Jenkins' actual understanding of both what the trial court told him and his right to have a fair and impartial trial court sentence him if he pled guilty can also be fully explored.