Opinion ID: 2314684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the court's sustaining of greene's work-product objection to parks' evidentiary proffer

Text: Parks argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to admit into evidence at trial investigator Douglas Wood's testimony and interview notes about Larry Grant's lineup photo identifications, on the ground they were excludible as Greene's attorney work product. See Part II.B.3. The trial court denied Parks' post-verdict motion for a new trial, stating that, even if erroneous, the work product ruling had not influenced the verdict. We agree that the trial court ruling, though in error, was harmless. Although the work-product privilege originated in the context of pretrial civil discovery, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), it applies to criminal proceedings, United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2170, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); In re Sealed Case, 219 U.S.App.D.C. 195, 676 F.2d 793, 810 (1982), and may be invoked during trial as well as pretrial. [28] Moreover, a defendant may invoke the privilege against a criminal codefendant, as well as against the government. This follows from the fact that codefendants' defenses commonly conflict to some extent, and under some circumstances each defendant may introduce evidence unfavorable to the other without requiring a severance. See Ready v. United States, D.C.App., 445 A.2d 982, 986 & n. 8 (1982). In order to encourage thorough investigation and preparation, therefore, the attorney's work product for one defendant must be protected against disclosure at the behest of a potentially adverse codefendant. [29] The work-product doctrine, more specifically, creates a qualified privilege for materials prepared by an attorney (or attorney's agent) in anticipation of trial. Nobles, supra, 422 U.S. at 237-39, 95 S.Ct. at 2169-2170; Super.Ct.Civ.R. 26(b)(3). [30] Initially, there must be a demonstration by the resisting party that the disputed material has in fact been prepared `in anticipation of litigation or for trial,' SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 18 Fed.R. Serv.2d 1302, 1305 (D.D.C.1974) ( quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 26(6)(3)); that is, the party must show that the material is work product. See United States v. AT & T, 86 F.R.D. 603, Guideline No. 14 at 626 (D.D.C. 1979). [T]he burden is then on the party opposing the privilege to establish reasons why the materials should be disclosed. Id., Guideline No. 4, at 609. The showing required to prevail against the privilege depends on whether the material sought is fact work product or opinion work product. If the material is fact work product containing no mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the attorney or attorney's agent, see In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1076 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1981), the party seeking access must show that he or she has a substantial need for the material and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material by other means. FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(3); AT & T, supra, Guideline No. 17, at 631. If, however, the material sought is opinion work product containing fruits of the attorney's [or agent's] mental processes, In re Doe, supra at 1076 n. 2, the party seeking production can overcome the work product privilege only with a showing of extreme necessity. AT & T, supra, Guideline No. 18, at 632; see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02, 101 S.Ct. 677, 688-689, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (need for stronger showing of necessity than substantial need); In re Sealed Case, supra, at 811 (must show extraordinary necessity). If the material sought is a combination of fact and opinion work product, the trial court should view the document in camera to determine what part is fact and what is opinion. See AT & T, supra, Guideline No. 3, at 608. The court should then bifurcate its analysis, applying the appropriate standard (substantial need or extreme necessity) to each part of the work product material. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 524 F.Supp. 357, 361 (D.Md. 1981); see Saunders v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 349-50, 316 F.2d 346, 350-51 (1963). If fact and opinion are blended, the court must apply the extreme necessity test to the material as a whole. In the present case, the trial court erred in ruling that the work-product doctrine barred Wood's testimony. Facts learned during preparation for trial are not themselves work product, even if documents containing the same facts are. See Hickman, supra 329 U.S. at 504, 67 S.Ct. at 390; Ford v. Phillips Electronic Instruments Co., 82 F.R.D. 359, 360 (E.D.Pa.1979); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2023, at 194 (1970); 4B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 26.64[4] at 26-447 n. 15 (1981); Advisory Committee Notes on 1970 Amendments to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3), 48 F.R.D. 487, 501. [31] The question of Wood's notes is more complicated. The notes were work product, since they were documents created by the defense attorney's agent in anticipation of trial. See Nobles, supra, 422 U.S. at 237-39, 95 S.Ct. at 2169-2170. The trial court therefore should have examined them in camera to sort out factual content from opinion content. See Saunders, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 349-50, 316 F.2d at 350-51; AT & T, supra, Guideline No. 3, at 608-609. [32] The notes may have consisted solely of Wood's opinions, in which case the court possibly could have excluded them  without reaching the work product exclusion issue  on the ground that the investigator's opinions, as such, were not admissible evidence. See Nobles, supra, 422 U.S. at 245-46 & n. 4, 95 S.Ct. at 2173-2174 & n. 4 (White, J., concurring) ([M]ost of the material described by the [majority] as falling under the work-product umbrella does not qualify as evidence. A lawyer's mental impressions are almost never evidence. . . .) [33] On the other hand, the notes may have contained facts which were admissible as evidence in Parks' case. [34] Where an attorney's work product, sought at trial, contains admissible evidentiary facts, the seeking party has, by definition, a substantial need for the material. FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(3). See Nobles, supra, 422 U.S. at 245, 95 S.Ct. at 2173 (White, J., concurring); Hickman, supra, 329 U.S. at 515, 67 S.Ct. at 395 (Jackson, J., concurring). [35] Moreover, if the facts are altogether mixed with opinion work product but nonetheless constitute admissible evidence (as determined by the court's in camera inspection), the extreme necessity test also will have been met, on the ground that a party is entitled to the benefit of each discrete evidentiary fact. See Hickman, supra at 511, 67 S.Ct. at 393-394; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra § 2028, at 240. But see note 35 supra. [36] It follows that the trial court erred in excluding Wood's notes as evidence for Parks at trial, without making an in camera inspection to determine admissibility. We agree, however, with the trial court's conclusion (in denying Parks' motion for a new trial) that any error in excluding Wood's notes and testimony was harmless. The court accurately noted in its Memorandum Opinion that Wood's testimony would have been cumulative of the acknowledged misidentification, adding only a scrap of impeachment of Grant (on the question whether the photo was snatched away from him). More specifically, the gist of Wood's proffered evidence already had been introduced into evidence  in Grant's own testimony on cross-examination. Grant then admitted that he picked No. 15, not No. 1 (Parks), every time Wood had shown him the lineup photo, and that he had considered No. 1 to be only a maybe. According to Parks' proffer, Wood's testimony would not materially have differed from Grant's as to the person identified (No. 15). Wood  it is true  would have asserted that Grant did not articulate his feeling that Parks was a maybe, and would have denied that he snatched the photo away from Grant. But even without Wood's evidence, the jurors were fully aware of Grant's equivocation. They knew that Grant had picked No. 15 rather than Parks at the Wood interviews (whether or not he termed Parks a maybe) and that he had picked No. 15 the first time the police showed him the lineup photo. If they nonetheless chose to credit Grant's three positive identifications of Parks (from the lineup photo in November 1979, at the pretrial hearing, and at trial), Wood's testimony would not have detracted enough to alter this result. If, on the other hand, the jurors disbelieved Grant and relied on the testimony of Bedney and the other witnesses, Wood's evidence would not have affected the result, either. Accordingly, we can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), [37] by the erroneous exclusion of this impeachment evidence. [38] Thus, the court's error in excluding Wood's notes under the work-product doctrine without in camera inspection, as well as the error in excluding Wood's testimony, does not permit reversal. [39]