Opinion ID: 76395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the MDLEA

Text: 13 Rendon contends that the indictment under the MDLEA, should have been dismissed based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction because no nexus with the United States was proved. Consequently, he argues that there was no personal jurisdiction over him for sentencing because his seizure was neither in the territorial waters of the United States nor in United States Customs waters. He further challenges the constitutionality of 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903 facially and as applied because it allows prosecutions and punishment under conditions where allegedly there is no jurisdiction. He specifically argues that § 1903(f) removes the determination of jurisdiction as an element of the offense from the jury and places it solely on the trial judge, thereby violating Rendon's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights based on United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 2313, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). 14 Our review of a district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction as well as statutory interpretation is de novo. Asociacion De Empleados Del Area Canalera (ASEDAC) v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 329 F.3d 1235, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2003). In interpreting the meaning of a statute, it is axiomatic that a court must begin with the plain language of the statute. United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir.2000). Under the MDLEA, a `vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States' includes ... a vessel without nationality. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(A). Additionally, a `vessel without nationality' includes ... a vessel aboard which the master or person in charge makes a claim of registry, which claim is denied by the flag nation whose registry is claimed or a vessel aboard which the master or person in charge makes a claim of registry and the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality. Id. at § 1903(c)(2)(A), (C). 15 Under the plain statutory language, Rendon's argument that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is unavailing. We addressed the jurisdictional and constitutional challenges to the MDLEA that Rendon raises in United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 909, 123 S.Ct. 1484, 155 L.Ed.2d 231 (2003), which is factually analogous. In Tinoco, a vessel was intercepted in international waters, flew no flag, contained no registration documentation or identifying markings, and Colombian officials were unable to confirm its registration. See id. at 1092-94. This Court concluded that the vessel in Tinoco comported with the vessel without nationality under § 1903(c)(2)(C), and, consequently, was stateless. See id. at 1116. Because stateless vessels do not fall within the veil of another sovereign's territorial protection, all nations can treat them as their own territory and subject them to their laws. United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 373 (9th Cir.1995). 16 Significantly, [s]ection 1903(c)(1)(A) states that `a vessel without nationality' is included within the definition of a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1112 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(A)). Additionally, we noted that Congress, under the `protective principle' of international law, may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over vessels in the high seas that are engaged in conduct that `has a potentially adverse effect and is generally recognized as a crime by nations that have reasonably developed legal systems.' 2 Id. at 1108 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 939 (11th Cir.1985)). Further, this circuit and other circuits have not embellished the MDLEA with a nexus requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 1527 (11th Cir.1989) (rejecting facial challenge to MDLEA based on a lack of a meaningful relationship to the United States); United States v. Stuart-Caballero, 686 F.2d 890, 891 (11th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (rejecting facial challenge to predecessor statute for lack of nexus requirement and collecting cases); United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir.2002) (determining that to the extent the Due Process Clause may constrain the MDLEA's extraterritorial reach, that clause does not impose a nexus requirement); United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 402-03 (3d Cir.2002) (recognizing that other courts of appeal have held that no nexus is needed between a defendant's criminal conduct and the United States in order for there to be jurisdiction, even when the vessel at issue is registered in a foreign country (as opposed to being stateless) and collecting cases); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir.1999) (holding that due process does not require the government to prove a nexus between a defendant's criminal conduct and the United States in a prosecution under the MDLEA when the flag nation has consented to the application of United States law to the defendants). 3 17 Rendon also argues that venue in the Middle District of Florida was improper because his offense was not committed in that district. 4 When a crime over which a federal court has jurisdiction is not committed within any state, the Constitution directs that the defendant shall be tried at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Section 1903 provides that a defendant charged with a violation of that section shall be tried in the United States district court at the point of entry where that person enters the United States, or in the federal district court for the District of Columbia. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f). Venue was proper in the Middle District of Florida because it is uncontested that Rendon's entry into the United States occurred within that district. 18 Further, Rendon also ignores that, by enacting § 1903(f), Congress exercised its established authority to regulate drug-related activities on the high seas. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1110 n. 21. A federal district court has personal jurisdiction to try any defendant brought before it on a federal indictment charging a violation of federal law. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659-70, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2191-97, 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1984). Consequently, the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Rendon initially to try him for violation of the MDLEA and, subsequently, to sentence him following his plea did not violate due process. 5 See United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938-41 (11th Cir.1985) (concluding that there was no due process violation when predecessor statute provided clear notice that drug trafficking aboard vessels was prohibited and conduct prohibited was condemned by all nations). 19 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), Rendon also argues that the district judge's deciding subject matter jurisdiction as a preliminary question of law deprived him of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to have a jury determine him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crimes charged. It is precisely the statutory language that removes the issue of jurisdictional determination from being an element of the offense for the jury to decide: All jurisdictional issues arising under this chapter are preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the trial judge. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f). By adding to the MDLEA the jurisdiction and venue provision, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f), Congress... plainly indicated that whether a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States is not an element of the offense, but instead is solely an issue of subject matter jurisdiction that should be treated as a preliminary question of law for the court's determination. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1105. Based upon Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 S.Ct. 531, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927), we recognized: 20 [S]tatutory jurisdictional requirements like the one in the MDLEA do not fit into the traditional definition of what constitute offense elements. Hence, the § 1903 jurisdictional requirement is not an essential ingredient or an essential element of the MDLEA substantive offense, and, as a result, it does not have to be submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 21 Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1109-10. Furthermore, we specifically distinguished the applicability of Gaudin in the MDLEA context: 22 Gaudin never stated that all factual determinations must go [to] the jury. Rather, Gaudin stands for the proposition that elements of an offense that involve factual determinations, or mixed determinations of law and fact, must go to the jury. If the factual determination has no bearing on an element of the offense, the principles laid down in Gaudin do not apply.... Hence, although fact-bound determinations may be involved, that does not automatically mean that the 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903 jurisdictional issue has to be decided by the jury.... [T]he jurisdictional requirement goes only to the court's subject matter jurisdiction and does not have to be treated as an element of a MDLEA substantive offense. 23 . . . . 24 In sum, we reject the appellants' argument that the MDLEA, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f), is unconstitutional under Gaudin and other related cases. Although the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial require that each element of a criminal offense be submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Congress made clear through the 1996 amendment to the MDLEA that the jurisdictional requirement is not an element of a § 1903(a) substantive offense, but rather is an issue that goes only to the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. We also have concluded that Congress had the flexibility under the Constitution, at least with respect to the statutory jurisdictional requirement at issue in this case, to decide that the jurisdictional issue should be solely one of subject matter jurisdiction for the court to decide, and not an element of the MDLEA substantive offense. This is because the jurisdictional provision here is not a traditional element, or otherwise an essential ingredient of a criminal offense. 25 Id. at 1110-12 (citations and footnote omitted). 26 Rendon's drug trafficking activities are within the ambit of the grant of exterritorial jurisdiction provided by the MDLEA. Because the United States intercepted the go-fast boat in international waters, the boat flew no flag, contained no identification markings or registration documents, and Colombian officials were unable to confirm Rendon's assertion of Colombian registry, the boat was without nationality under § 1903(c)(2)(C) and, therefore, was `subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.' 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(A). Because Rendon's entry into the United States was Jacksonville, Florida, pursuant to § 1903(f), venue was proper in the Middle District of Florida. Rendon's argument that subject matter jurisdiction is an element of the charged crimes, and, consequently under Gaudin, to be decided by a jury is foreclosed by Tinoco, where we decided that § 1903(f) does not violate a defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, Rendon's arguments relating to subject matter jurisdiction are without merit. 27