Opinion ID: 1951964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Motion to Empanel Separate Guilt- and Penalty-Phase Juries

Text: Before trial, defendant requested that the court bar the State from introducing evidence of defendant's prior criminal record or, in the alternative, that the court empanel separate guilt-phase and penalty-phase juries. The trial court denied defendant's motion. The court found that defendant possessed an extensive criminal record which could be used to impeach him in the event he elects to testify during the guilt phase of the trial. Defendant had been convicted of possession of stolen property, larceny, burglary, robbery, attempt to commit robbery, and unlawful possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes. The court found that use of defendant's criminal record would not prejudice defendant at the penalty phase. The court relied on two considerations. First, the court found that sanitizing defendant's criminal record, as required by State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 625 A. 2d 1085 (1993), would lessen the possibility of prejudice considered in State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 594 A. 2d 232 (1991) and State v. Monturi, 195 N.J.Super. 317, 478 A. 2d 1266 (Law Div. 1984). Under Brunson, supra, a prosecutor may impeach a defendant's credibility by introducing evidence of prior criminal convictions. 132 N.J. at 394, 625 A. 2d 1085. However, if the past crimes are similar to the instant charge, the prosecutor may only inform the jury of the degree of the prior crimes and the dates of conviction. Ibid. Counsel may not specify the nature of the offenses. Ibid. The trial court found that the Brunson decision obviated the need for separate guilt-phase and penalty-phase juries. Second, the court found that selection of a foreign jury would reduce[] the possibility that the jurors will be aware of the exact nature of defendant's crimes by virtue of pretrial publicity. Despite his expressed desire to testify without regard for the trial court's decisions on these issues, defendant did not testify during the guilt phase. Defendant argues that the trial court's ruling prevented him from testifying, denying him his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial, because he was unable to present fully his contention that Gloria Dunn was in fact the trigger person causing Kristin Huggins' death. Defendant contends that the use of his criminal record for impeachment purposes, while proper during the guilt phase of the trial, would have led the jury to improper consideration of that evidence during the penalty phase. During voir dire, six of the jurors who ultimately went on to deliberate expressed the opinion that defendant's criminal record would be a relevant consideration during sentencing. Defendant contends that no limiting instruction would have been effective. Trial courts are authorized to empanel separate guilt-phase and penalty-phase juries in capital murder cases. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(1) provides, in part: Where the defendant has been tried by a jury, the [penalty] proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who presided at the trial and before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, except that, for good cause, the court may discharge that jury and conduct the proceeding before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. Thus, although a single jury is preferable, State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 44, 594 A. 2d 172 (1991) ( Biegenwald IV ), a trial court may, for good cause, empanel two juries. That decision rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 475, 575 A. 2d 435 (1990). One of the purposes of the bifurcated-trial system established by the New Jersey Death Penalty Act is to prevent the jury's determination of death-eligibility from being influenced by evidence relevant only to adjudgement of the appropriate sentence. Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 44, 594 A. 2d 172. Evidence of other crimes has the capacity to prejudice the penalty-phase proceedings of a capital murder case. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A. 2d 232; State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 276-77, 550 A. 2d 117 (1988). With the stakes so high, the possibility of prejudice on the penalty phase persists as a cause for continuing concern. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A. 2d 232. The use of two juries commends itself when guilt-phase evidence is so prejudicial that the same jury could not fairly sit on both phases of the trial. Id. at 133, 594 A. 2d 232 (citing Monturi, supra, 195 N.J.Super. 317, 478 A. 2d 1266). One instance in which the Court has required separate juries is when the State relies on aggravating factor c(4)(a), conviction of another murder. See Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A. 2d 172 (recognizing that our finding that defendant is entitled to voir dire potential jurors on the possible blinding impact of the c(4)(a) factor most likely will require a two-jury system for all capital cases in which the State seeks to prove that factor). Except for that specific category of cases (in which it is inevitable that a reverse spillover will taint the guilt phase of a capital trial), a motion for separate guilt- and penalty-phase juries should be decided at the close of the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding. The statute contemplates that procedure. It is then that a trial court may properly assess whether prejudicial evidence has been presented to the jury. In Monturi, supra, Judge Stern addressed a defendant's pre-trial motion to empanel separate guilt- and penalty-phase juries. 195 N.J.Super. at 321-23, 478 A. 2d 1266. The defendant was accused of two murders and two counts of conspiracy to commit murder as well as a number of unrelated, post-murder crimes. The court found that some evidence necessary to prove guilt of the post-murder offenses would be inadmissible during the penalty phase. Id. at 326, 478 A. 2d 1266. Nevertheless, to prejudge the evidence and order pre-trial that the case be tried to separate juries would be imprudent. Id. at 327, 478 A. 2d 1266. The court withheld decision on the issue of separate juries, suggesting that a court should wait until the end of the guilt phase to decide if the evidence presented was prejudicial in fact or would be admissible in some way during the penalty phase of the proceeding. Id. at 329-30, 478 A. 2d 1266. The potential introduction of Harris' sanitized prior convictions did not pose so grave a risk of prejudice as to warrant before trial the empanelment of two juries. We will not speculate whether the trial court's decision prevented defendant from testifying. There are many factors that influence that decision. Defendant stated that he would testify regardless of the court's decision to admit his criminal record or empanel only one jury. It may be, then, that some other consideration prevented defendant from testifying. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to empanel two juries before trial. Whether a guilt-phase jury's exposure to a Brunsonized version of a criminal defendant's prior record of convictions rises to the level of good cause required under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(1), must remain in the sound discretion of the court. We can envision circumstances in which evidence of other unsanitized convictions, such as child sexual abuse, might pose a potential for impermissible spillover into the penalty phase thus requiring two juries. See Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132-33, 594 A. 2d 232.