Opinion ID: 748412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counsel's Silence Constitutes a Cronic Violation

Text: 176 Counsel's failure to make a closing argument during the penalty phase of the trial denied Gerlaugh representation by counsel at a critical stage of the sentencing proceeding in violation of the basic constitutional principles set forth in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Such a violation necessarily calls into question the reliability of the proceeding; under Cronic we must presume that Gerlaugh suffered prejudice as a result and are required to reverse his death sentence. According to the majority, however, counsel's abandonment of his client by failing to make a closing argument at the penalty phase cannot by itself establish a Cronic violation because it is not appropriate to segregate counsel's oral presentation on behalf of his client at the sentencing stage of the proceeding from the other measures taken on his behalf. Op. at 1036. My colleagues' position is directly contrary both to established law and to basic Sixth Amendment requirements. Instead of viewing the second half of Gerlaugh's bifurcated trial as an inseparable whole for the purposes of Cronic, as the majority insists upon doing, the law requires us to treat closing argument as a critical stage of the proceeding in and of itself. It does not matter that the absence of closing argument occurred at the penalty phase of the proceeding as opposed to the guilt/innocence phase. Both phases provide the opportunity for closing argument, and closing argument is essential both times; counsel's abandonment of his client during that critical stage of either phase constitutes a violation of Cronic. 177 As we plainly stated in United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir.1991), counsel's abandonment of his client during closing argument causes a breakdown in our adversarial system of justice ... that compels an application of the Cronic exception to the Strickland [prejudice] requirement. If a defendant is effectively without the benefit of counsel during closing argument, a fundamental breakdown in the adversarial process has occurred and it simply does not matter what counsel may have done prior to that point or what effect or lack of effect the reviewing court thinks that a closing argument might have had on the outcome of the proceeding. 178 Swanson 's conclusion that an attorney's abandonment of his client during closing argument constitutes a fundamental error that in and of itself requires reversal is in keeping with the fact that the requirement of adversarial advocacy extends not only to counsel's presentation of exculpatory evidence, but also to his presentation of a closing argument. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 2553-54, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975). As the Swanson court concluded, there is a constitutional obligation on defense counsel to function as the Government's adversary at the time of that argument. Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1074. 179 In Herring, the Supreme Court made clear that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses the right to have defense counsel present a closing summation, thus recognizing the extraordinary significance of counsel's closing argument in the adversarial process. If a defendant has been denied the opportunity to make a closing argument, his criminal conviction cannot stand, regardless of whether such an argument would have succeeded in persuading the factfinder of the defendant's position. Id.  'The constitutional right of a defendant to be heard through counsel necessarily includes his right to have his counsel make a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in his favor, however simple, clear, unimpeached, and conclusive the evidence may seem.'  Id. at 860, 95 S.Ct. at 2554 (quoting Yopps v. Maryland, 228 Md. 204, 178 A.2d 879, 881 (1962)) (emphasis added). 180 The Swanson decision is likewise consistent with the heightened need for reliable proceedings in capital cases. Not every person who has been convicted of murder deserves to be executed. One of the principal purposes of a capital trial is to identify those who should be sentenced to death for their crimes, and those who should not. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991-92, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion). There is no more important hearing in law or equity than the penalty phase of a capital trial. In a process already plagued by arbitrariness, the right to counsel ensures that the results of penalty-phase proceedings are as reliable as possible. The determination of who should live and who should die is arrived at by means of an adversarial hearing in which the government's position that the defendant should be sentenced to death is put to the test by defense counsel. Closing argument is an essential part of that proceeding, a part at which vigorous advocacy is the sine qua non. The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective.... In a criminal trial, which is in the end basically a factfinding process, no aspect of such advocacy could be more important than the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each side before submission of the case to judgment. Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S.Ct. at 2555. 181 Herring makes clear that regardless of the fact that counsel presented evidence or made legal objections during a proceeding, the absence of a closing argument in itself requires reversal. The majority's attempt to rely on the presentation of witnesses or the advancement of legal objections is thus simply irrelevant. The flaw that renders Gerlaugh's sentencing unconstitutional is the failure of counsel to provide representation at a critical stage of the proceeding--closing argument. That failure alone requires reversal under Cronic, regardless of what else may have transpired. 182 The adversarial process is simple, and it works when it has two sides. But when there is only one side to the argument, the truthfinding purpose of the trial breaks down and the results are presumptively unreliable.
183 The majority carries its inability to distinguish Cronic from Strickland error to its logical conclusion. It applies a harmless error test to counsel's performance. Not only is this harmless error analysis in conflict with Cronic and Swanson, but it is also at odds with the more basic proposition that certain kinds of error are so fundamental that we must presume prejudice. It is apparent that an attorney's abandonment of his client at a critical stage in the proceeding constitutes a structural error as defined in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Such an error not only alters the basic framework of a criminal trial, it also undermines values that are fundamental to our system of justice. See United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1207-10 (9th Cir.1995) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (elaborating on the nature of structural errors), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 303, 136 L.Ed.2d 221 (1996). Thus, the majority has seriously erred in subjecting to harmless error analysis counsel's abandonment of Gerlaugh at a critical stage of his capital trial. 5 184 Closing argument is one of the most important stages in a criminal trial. It is the moment at which the parties tie all of the evidence together, illuminate the significance of the evidence to the factfinder, and argue why the evidence supports their respective positions. It is the time at which the parties emphasize certain facts and explain away others. It is an opportunity for the parties to remind the factfinder of things that might have been forgotten along the way. For a defendant in a capital trial, it is the last clear chance to persuade the trier of fact that he should not be executed. Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S.Ct. at 2555. And it is no less a part of a trial's basic framework if the evidence is presented in the context of a bench trial instead of a jury trial. See id. at 863 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. at 2556 n. 15 (flatly rejecting the contention that there is insufficient justification for the right to make a closing argument in bench trials, and suggesting that summations may be even more important if there is only one factfinder). 185 Additionally, final arguments further one of the most significant values in a criminal trial, the adversarial process itself. Without question, the adversarial process is the hallmark of our system of justice. An attorney's desertion of his client at a critical stage of the proceeding undermines the very premise of this process--that the issues and the evidence will be clarified and sharpened by vigorous presentations from both sides. When a defendant is abandoned at this moment, as Gerlaugh was, there has not been simply an error in the presentation of evidence: there has been an alteration in the very framework of the trial. When that alteration occurs in a capital trial, the unacceptable and unconstitutional consequences are at their most egregious. 186