Opinion ID: 2973338
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Lowe claims on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions on any of the counts of the indictment. Lowe made an oral motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 29 for judgment of acquittal after the government rested its case, but failed to renew it at the end of the presentation of evidence and did not file a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal. Our review is therefore limited to determining whether a “manifest miscarriage of justice” has occurred. See United States v. Khalil, 279 F.3d 358, 368 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 1998). In entertaining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict a defendant, we must uphold a jury verdict if, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Khalil, 239 F.3d at 368 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1969)). But the standard for finding a miscarriage of justice is higher still—we may find a miscarriage of justice only if the record is “devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.” Price, 134 F.3d at 350.
In order for a jury to convict a defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that the defendant has a prior conviction for a felony punishable by imprisonment of more than one year, the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment, and the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce. United States v. Smith, 320 F.3d 647, 655 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1023 (2003); United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1987 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Moreno, 933 F.2d 362, 372 n.1 (6th Cir. 1991). The government can prove possession through direct or circumstantial evidence, which are to be accorded the same weight, and circumstantial evidence alone can support a guilty verdict. See United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 746 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir. 1984). 9 The indictment charged Lowe with possession of both the .38 revolver and the shotgun; at issue here is only whether Lowe knowingly possessed them. Possession can be either actual or constructive. Smith, 320 F.3d at 655. The defendant may be found to have constructive possession where, although he does not have actual possession, he has the power and intention at a given time to exercise control over the firearm. United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir. 1973). We have found that dominion over the house in which firearms are present is sufficient for a defendant to be “in possession” of the firearms. See United States v. Whitehead, 415 F.3d 583, 589 (6th Cir. 2005). Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we find that there is sufficient evidence here to show that Lowe possessed the firearms. As the government noted, the jury was given a choice between accepting Lowe’s interpretation of the evidence or that of the law enforcement officers. Lowe explained to the jury that he was a first-time visitor to the house and had no idea that any drug-dealing activity went on there. The officers, on the other hand, viewed Lowe’s actions as very consistent with those of a person who was familiar with the premises and had been there before, pointing to (1) Lowe’s testimony that he propositioned a woman for sex and went inside the house with her to carry it through; (2) the fact that Lowe admitted people into the home and shut the door behind them; and (3) Lowe’s testimony that the “true occupant” of the home (Buddy or Tone) trusted him with his possessions, which the evidence demonstrated included both weapons and illegal drugs. The jury was free to believe the officers’ interpretation of this evidence, as well as the officers’ testimony that drug traffickers often rotate on and off in shifts, which would explain the absence of “Tone” at the house and the presence of Lowe, and the government’s argument that narcotics traffickers do not lightly entrust others with their drugs or the premises in 10 which they keep them. The jury, therefore, could reasonably have found that Lowe exercised dominion over the home, including the firearm. B. Possession of Cocaine With Intent to Distribute To obtain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the government was required to show that Lowe (1) knowingly or intentionally, (2) possessed, (3) with the intent to distribute, (4) a controlled substance. United States v. Monger, 185 F.3d 574, 577 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999). Possession may be either actual or constructive, United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 150 (6th Cir. 1996), and intent to distribute may be inferred from the fact of possession of a large quantity of a drug alone. See United States v. White, 932 F.2d 588, 590 (6th Cir. 1991). For all of the reasons which we have concluded that the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Lowe was in possession of the firearms, we conclude that he was in possession of the 24 bags of packaged cocaine. He also, however, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to show that he had the intent to distribute, noting specifically that his fingerprints did not appear on the packages of cocaine or on the drug paraphernalia. In United States v. Clark, 56 Fed. App’x 217 (6th Cir. 2003), we stated in an unpublished opinion that [i]t is unnecessary for the government to prove that the defendant knew either the type or the amount of the controlled substance that was possessed. . . .Sufficient evidence was presented to prove [the defendant’s] knowing possession of the cocaine. As the driver of the rental car and the holder of the key, [the defendant] had constructive possession of a large quantity of cocaine and his intent to distribute could thus be inferred without other evidence, such as fingerprints. Id. at 219. Here, the fact that Lowe possessed the bags of cocaine, their quantity, the fact that they were divided up in convenient sale-sized packages, the scale, the presence of firearms, and the fact that a witness stated that she went to the residence to buy drugs specifically from Lowe, taken 11 together, is sufficient for a jury to infer that Lowe possessed the cocaine with the intent to distribute it. The lack of his fingerprints on any of the equipment or the packages of drugs does not mandate the reversal of his conviction. See Clark, 56 Fed. App’x at 219.