Opinion ID: 1735417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Motion for Directed Verdict and New Trial.

Text: ś 112. Walker made a motion for directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief and at the close of his case-in-chief. Following the verdict, Walker filed for a J.N.O.V. or, in the alternative, a new trial. ś 113. Walker claims that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for directed verdict and/or J.N.O.V. and motion for a new trial. Additionally, Walker claims that the State failed to present a prima facie case against him, and the insufficient evidence of his guilt warrants reversal. ś 114. The standard of review for a directed verdict and J.N.O.V. are the same. Shelton v. State, 853 So.2d 1171, 1186 (Miss.2003). A motion for a directed verdict or J.N.O.V. challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, not the weight of the evidence. Id. Since each requires consideration of the evidence before the court when made, this Court properly reviews the ruling on the last occasion the challenge was made in the trial court. McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993). This occurred when the trial court overruled Walker's motion for J.N.O.V. In asking for a judgment as a matter of law, Walker is asking this Court to hold that the verdict reached by the jury may not stand. See Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.2d 31, 54 (Miss.2004). ś 115. As we have previously discussed, there is no basis for concluding that the evidence against Walker was insufficient to support a conviction. See supra Issue III. However, because we find that Walker is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, we must utilize the standard of review for a motion for new trial. A motion for a new trial falls within a lower standard of review than does that of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial simply challenges the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court will reverse the lower court's denial of a motion for a new trial only if, by doing so, the court abused its discretion. [ Gleeton, 716 So.2d at 1088]. We will not order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1983). Likewise, factual disputes are properly resolved by a jury and do not mandate a new trial. McNeal v. State, 617 So.2d 999, 1009 (Miss.1993). Sheffield, 749 So.2d at 127. This Court held in McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 133 (Miss.1987), that it has limited authority to interfere with a jury verdict. The court looks at all the evidence in the light that is most consistent with the jury verdict. Id. ś 116. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker's motion for a new trial. As previously mentioned, Walker confessed to killing Richardson on three different occasions. In Walker's own words, he stabbed and slashed Richardson with a six-inch hunting knife until Richardson bled to death, he attempted to set Richardson's house on fire to destroy any remaining evidence and he stole Richardson's car and other possessions and fled in the direction of Chicago. Moreover, Walker's confessions were confirmed by expert testimony. When Walker was arrested in Arkansas he was in possession of Richardson's car and personal belongings. Over a four-day trial, the jury heard testimony from ten witnessesâ all presented evidence for the State. We are not convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. See Groseclose, 440 So.2d at 300. Consequently, Walker's assignment of error is without merit.