Opinion ID: 454502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Greenway and Dimich's Theory of the Case

Text: 65 At the close of all evidence, defendants Greenway and Dimich requested the trial court to submit to the jury an instruction of their theory of the case under Counts 1, 3 and 4. 8 In refusing to give the instruction, the court stated that the instruction would be an absolutely perfect argument and a good lead into [defendants' closing] argument. Record Vol. 14 at 1033. 66 On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to give their instruction and rely on cases from this Circuit which hold that where there is any evidentiary support whatsoever for the availability of a legal defense, and the trial court's attention is specifically directed to that defense, it is reversible error for the court to refuse to charge the jury concerning that defense. See, e.g., United States v. Timberlake, 559 F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th Cir.1977). Our cases do not hold, however, that a defendant is entitled to a judicial narration of his version of the facts, even though such narrative is, in one sense of the phrase, a 'theory of the defense.'  United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231, 244 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002, 101 S.Ct. 1711, 68 L.Ed.2d 205 (1981). One of the main purposes of the jury charge is to provide a framework for the argument by counsel. Thus, to determine whether the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction violates a defendant's due process right to a fair trial, the charge must be examined in the full context of trial including the final arguments of counsel. United States v. Fooladi, 746 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1362, 84 L.Ed.2d 382 (1985); see United States v. Gray, 751 F.2d 733, 735-36 (5th Cir.1985). 67 Our review of the record in the case sub judice indicates that Greenway and Dimich were given ample opportunity to present their theory of the case to the jury, and in fact did so. During closing argument, defendants' counsel forcefully maintained that the evidence had failed to show that Greenway and Dimich were members of a single overall conspiracy, stating: [the] evidence, ladies and gentlemen, suggests, I believe, more than just a reasonable possibility that these men had no agreement here, that these men's agreement was somewhere else. Record Vol. 15 at 1133. In addition, defense counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Greenway and Dimich ever acquired possession of the marijuana because they never had a chance to control the marijuana, to drive the marijuana away, to have anything to do with really ... controlling the marijuana. Id. at 1115. Finally, in relation to Count 4 (the Travel Act violation), counsel for defendants argued that [t]here is simply no proof that [Greenway and Dimich] did anything in connection with the alleged travel between Memphis and Dallas. Id. at 1117. It is clear that the substance of defendants' requested instruction 9 on their theory of the case was effectively presented by defense counsel during closing argument. 68 Furthermore, our examination of the record reveals that the court's actual charge 10 to the jury in no way undercut defendants' theory of the case. Viewed as a whole, the trial, charge and defense counsels' closing argument squarely placed defendants' theory of the case before the jury. See Fooladi, 746 F.2d at 1030. The trial court's failure to give defendants' requested instruction of what they characterized as their theory of the case did not deny them a fair trial.