Opinion ID: 811878
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Valenzuela’s Failure to Exhaust

Text: The district court concluded that Mr. Valenzuela had failed to exhaust his claims because he did not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in tribal court. Mr. Valenzuela argues that the district court was incorrect. He asserts that he exhausted all tribal court remedies and that “[a]ny further attempts to exhaust tribal remedies would be futile and result in irreparable damage.” Aplt. Br. at 18. First, Mr. Valenzuela argues that he waived his right to appeal in his written plea agreement and therefore had no tribal court remedies to exhaust. We agree with the district court that Mr. Valenzuela’s appeal waiver does not excuse his failure to pursue habeas corpus relief in the tribal court. The appeal waiver did not expressly waive Mr. Valenzuela’s right to collaterally attack his conviction in tribal court. See United States 11 v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1181-83 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that waivers of § 2255 collateral attack rights must be expressly stated to be enforceable). That step was necessary to exhaust Mr. Valenzuela’s claims. Next, Mr. Valenzuela contends that his failure to file a habeas petition in tribal court should be excused because he had no appointed counsel and “did not know of the existence of any option to file a tribal court petition.” Aplt. Br. at 16-17. Again, we agree with the district court that this argument lacks merit. At the time Mr. Valenzuela pled guilty, ICRA did not provide the right to appointed counsel. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006); Poodry, 85 F.3d at 882. In addition, ignorance of the law is not a valid excuse for failing to satisfy procedural requirements. See Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is well established that ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.” (quotations omitted)). Finally, Mr. Valenzuela notes that the Nation’s code provides that “‘[a] party may file with the [tribal] court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.’” 6 Tohono O’odham Code, ch. 3, § 10, R. 24 (emphasis added). He contends that this language is permissive, not mandatory, and that he therefore was not required to pursue a writ of habeas corpus in tribal court. But whether the Nation’s habeas corpus provision is permissive or mandatory is beside the point. Such relief was available to Mr. Valenzuela. Under the tribal exhaustion rule, “[u]ntil petitioners have exhausted the remedies available to them in the Tribal Court system, it [is] premature for a federal court to consider any relief.” Nat’l 12 Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[A]ll available tribal court remedies must first be exhausted.”). Thus, before filing his § 1303 petition, Mr. Valenzuela was required to exhaust the Nation’s available habeas relief to allow the tribal court “a full opportunity . . . to rectify any errors it may have made.” Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857. Because Mr. Valenzuela did not exhaust tribal remedies that were available to him, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his petition.4