Opinion ID: 1520503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: denial of the right of allocution

Text: In his petition for post-conviction relief Calhoun alleged: Petitioner was denied his right guaranteed under Art. 27 Section 413(c)(2), then Maryland Rule 772(a); the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to allocute at his sentence. Petitioner was never advised by counsel or the trial court of his unrestricted right to allocute before his sentencing jury. Such a right is fundamental to all criminal defendants, particularly those whose lives hang in the balance. Consequently, he was deprived of his right to do so. Moreover, the failure of the State to adhere to its own law and procedure denied petitioner his right to due process of law and a reliable sentencing procedure. Furthermore, not only is allocution mandated by rule for all non-capital defendants but the practice in Maryland has been to allow allocution by other capital defendants sentenced pursuant to the same procedural rules and statutes as the petitioner. Such discrimination in the allowance of allocution denied the petitioner equal protection of the laws and results in the arbitrary application of the death penalty. The post-conviction judge said: The defendant had not testified during the first phase; nor did he testify in the second phase. As apparently his trial counsel viewed defendant's right to speak only in the context of `testimony,' defendant was not presented by counsel with a decision as to whether he would allocute. The trial judge did not ask defendant if he wished to allocute before the jury. The defendant did not allocute. As a consequence, the jury faced with a life versus death decision retired to consider the defendant's fate having before it the commission of savage crimes (savagery is found here in the execution style premeditated killing of a uniformed police officer by a masked thief fully armed) a prior criminal record of violence, certain evidence questionably admitted tending to show defendant's violent propensities as a prisoner in custody, a minimal amount of evidence in mitigation and without ever hearing the defendant speak. After looking for days upon a black man of large stature and build who according to his counsel (as well as to the observation of this court) appears outwardly `scary,' `menacing,' `cold,' and with `a lack of emotion', the all-white jury retired having little more before it on the other side of a difficult equation it was asked to balance beyond the spectre presented by the defendant's appearance. (Reference to transcript omitted. Emphasis in original.) The post-conviction judge concluded: The Maryland Rules presently in effect which require that defendants in sentencings hearings in both capital and non-capital cases be asked on the record by the trial court whether the right of allocution is desired seem to treat the right of allocution as fundamental. More importantly, the facts in this case and the significance of the right of allocution to the defendant here suggest strongly the only possible answer that can be given. This court holds that the history of the right of allocution and its significance to a defendant  never more important than it is today under the procedure in capital sentencing cases  results in this right being fundamental  so fundamental that only the defendant  not his counsel  can waive the right. It follows that this defendant who was never advised of his right to allocution can not have waived such right. The sentencing procedure utilized here in that it denied the defendant his fundamental right to allocute before the sentencing jury was defective. The sentencing portion of the defendant's trial can not stand. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 413(c)(2) provides, The State and the defendant or his counsel may present argument for or against the sentence of death. In Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 349, 509 A.2d 120, 122 (1986) Chief Judge Murphy said for the Court, [A]llocution is neither synonymous with nor encompassed by the term `argument' .... In Harris the Court said: By chapter 3 of the Acts of 1978, effective July 1, 1978, the General Assembly enacted § 413, the present capital sentencing statute. In response to this enactment, the Court adopted Md. Rule 772A, which substantially tracked the language of § 413 and applied only to capital sentencing proceedings. The rule did not contain any provision as to allocution. The Court also amended Md. Rule 772 to apply only to noncapital cases.[5] Between January 1, 1979, and July 1, 1984, the Maryland Rules did not afford defendants in capital cases a right of allocution. It was during this period that Harris was sentenced to death. The right of allocution in capital cases was not again addressed in the Maryland Rules until the adoption of current Rule 4-343 as part of the comprehensive revision of the rules in 1984.[6] Rule 4-343, which superceded Md. Rule 772A, provides in subsection (d), entitled `Allocution,' that in capital cases, `[b]efore sentence is determined, the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally and through counsel, to make a statement.' [5] Md. Rule 772A was adopted and Md. Rule 772 was amended effective January 1, 1979. [6] Rule 4-343 became effective on July 1, 1984. 306 Md. at 353, 509 A.2d at 124. Calhoun was sentenced during this hiatus in the rules. However, in Harris the Court said: [W]hen Md. Rule 772 was amended to apply only in noncapital cases, thereby removing capital cases from the purview of its allocution provision, the right of allocution in capital cases reverted to the common law of Maryland. 306 Md. at 353, 509 A.2d at 124. The Court concluded in Harris: We conclude that, under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time Harris was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right. If the right so asserted is denied by the court, as here, the sentence must be vacated and a new sentencing proceeding conducted. 306 Md. at 359, 509 A.2d at 127. It is conceded that Calhoun made no request for allocution in the trial court. The post-conviction statute (Code 1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 645A(c) provides: (c) When allegation of error deemed to have been waived.  For the purposes of this subtitle, an allegation of error shall be deemed to be waived when a petitioner could have made, but intelligently and knowingly failed to make, such allegation before trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not said petitioner actually took such an appeal), in any habeas corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, unless the failure to make such allegation shall be excused because of special circumstances. The burden of proving the existence of such special circumstances shall be upon the petitioner. In Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978), Judge Eldridge discussed this statute for the Court. The Court concluded: [W]e believe that the Legislature, when it spoke of `waiver' in subsection (c) of Art. 27, § 645A, was using the term in a narrow sense. It intended that subsection (c), with its `intelligent and knowing' standard, be applicable only in those circumstances where the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst [, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938),] and Fay v. Noia [, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963),] was applicable. Other situations are beyond the scope of subsection (c), to be governed by case law or any pertinent statutes or rules. Tactical decisions, when made by an authorized competent attorney, as well as legitimate procedural requirements, will normally bind a criminal defendant. 284 Md. at 149-50, 395 A.2d at 474. In Harris Chief Judge Murphy said for the Court: [B]ecause the right of allocution is not a fundamental right secured by either the federal or state constitution, it is waived if not asserted by the defendant before sentencing. See Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 487, 425 A.2d 632 (1981); Robinson v. Warden, 242 Md. 171, 172-73, 218 A.2d 217 (1966); see also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468 [471], 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). This principle of waiver is equally applicable to the common law right of allocution, and supercedes the `actual or potential injury' standard of Dutton [ v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914)]. 306 Md. at 357, 509 A.2d at 126. [1] We deem the point waived. Hence, Calhoun is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this issue.