Opinion ID: 168391
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Additional Arguments Regarding Eligibility

Text: 27 Ms. Hackworth makes two additional arguments in support of her eligibility for FMLA leave notwithstanding the 50/75 provision. First, she argues that the 75.6 surface mile distance between Progressive's Norman and Lawton worksites should be considered within 75 miles, thereby rendering her eligible for FMLA leave. The common meaning, however, of the word within as being below the number or amount mentioned contradicts Ms. Hackworth's argument. Oxford English Dictionary Online (from the 2d print ed.1989). In using the term within 75 miles, Congress, at most, intended that, in order to be an eligible employee, one's employer must employ an aggregate of at least 50 people at worksites which are a distance of 75 miles or less from one another. Being that the Norman worksite is 75.6 surface miles away from the Lawton worksite, those two worksites cannot be considered within 75 miles of one another. 28 Second, Ms. Hackworth asserts that the intent of the 50/75 provision is not advanced by its application in this matter, and consequently, she requests that we make an exception in this case and find that she is an eligible employee. She contends that application of the mileage limitation in this case does not advance the intent of the 50/75 provision because Progressive is [in] no way prejudiced by conceivably having a Lawton employee drive an extra six-tenths of a mile to fill in for Hackworth at the Norman site and because Progressive could have filled Hackworth's position ... with an employee from any of the offices in Oklahoma, ... because the Norman site was not essential to Hackworth's job duties. Aplt. Br. at 21, 22. Even assuming, without deciding, that the intent of the 50/75 provision is not furthered by its application in this case, that in no way changes the fact that Congress included the 50/75 provision in the FMLA as a limitation on the class of eligible employees, and that the authority to create an additional exception to that provision lies with Congress, not the courts. See Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed.Cir.2001) (If [] an exception is to be created, Congress, not this court, must create it.); United States v. Petrov, 747 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.1984) ([W]e think it is for [C]ongress, and not this court, to create exceptions to [a] statute's clearly expressed, broad coverage.).