Opinion ID: 754090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Employer Liability For Retaliation

Text: The Board Members assert, first, that the trial court erred in denying their renewed motion for JAML or new trial, because no evidence was adduced at trial that the Board Members knew or should have known about the alleged retaliation against Cross. They state that they can find no decision of this court applying a respondeat superior or vicarious liability standard to a retaliation claim, and that Cross's claims clearly do not involve claims of quid pro quo harassment. Rather, they argue that the knew or should have known test is applicable to a retaliation claim by analogy to the holdings of this court in hostile environment sexual harassment cases under Title VII, such as Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir.1997), and Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir.1997). However, Cross points out that in Davis and other cases in which this court has discussed retaliation claims, this court has never held that proof that the employer knew or should have known of the retaliation was an element of the claim. Cross likens retaliatory conduct by a supervisory employee, such as the Chief of Police here, to quid pro quo harassment, because it is the Chief's power as an agent of the employer that allowed him to retaliate. She argues further that application of the knew or should have known standard to retaliation claims would effectively emasculate Title VII, because there would be no entity liable for retaliation where a governmental board or entity delegates daily operations to members of a command staff, and application of such a standard would also make meaningless the distinction between suing Board Members in their official capacities and suing them in their individual capacities. Courts are split on, or at least uncertain about, the standard for liability of an employer for retaliation that violates Title VII. See, e.g., Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 494-95 (7th Cir.1997) (en banc ) (per curiam ) (in a welter of opinions addressing different aspects of employer liability, making clear that a majority of the court agreed on a negligence standard for hostile-environment claims and strict liability for quid pro quo harassment, but not clearly placing retaliation in either category), petition for cert. granted in part, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 876, 139 L.Ed.2d 865 (1998); Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1180 (2d Cir.1996) (panel decision discussing the application of agency principles for employer liability for co-worker practices, including retaliation, applying a knew but did nothing standard); and compare Davis v. Palmer Dodge West, Inc., 977 F.Supp. 917, 925 (S.D.Ind.1997) (relying on a concurring opinion in Jansen, supra, for the proposition that it was clear in the Seventh Circuit that courts must hold an employer to a strict liability standard for quid pro quo harassment, and a heightened negligence standard for hostile environment and retaliatory harassment by a supervisor); with Gary v. Washington Area Transit Auth., 886 F.Supp. 78, 88 (D.D.C.1995) (holding that, [i]n a retaliation case, as in a the quid pro quo case, the employer should be held strictly liable). Although it is clear in this circuit that different standards apply to employer liability for hostile environment and quid pro quo cases, see, e.g., Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir.1997), it isn't clear into which category retaliation generally, and retaliation by a supervisor specifically, falls. 1 Retaliation under Title VII Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because he or she has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or has made a charge of harassment, or has participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The elements of a claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII are the following: (1) the plaintiff filed a charge of harassment or engaged in other protected activity; (2) the plaintiff's employer subsequently took adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to the plaintiff's protected activity. Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Inc., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir.1997) (citing Cram v. Lamson & Sessions, Co., 49 F.3d 466, 474 (8th Cir.1995)); Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060 (8th Cir.1997) (The elements of a retaliation claim under § 1981 and Title VII are (1) protected activity, (2) subsequent adverse employment action, and (3) a causal relationship between the two. See Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 259 (8th Cir.1996) (§ 1981 retaliation claim); Kobrin [v. University of Minnesota], 34 F.3d [698,] 704 [ (8th Cir.1994) ] (Title VII retaliation claim).); Harris v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Army, 119 F.3d 1313, 1318 (8th Cir.1997) (To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, [the employee] needed to show: 1) she complained of discrimination; 2) the [employer] took adverse employment action against her; and 3) the adverse action was causally related to her complaint.); Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir.1997) (also describing these elements of a prima facie showing of retaliation); Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir.1997) (To prove unlawful retaliation, [the employee] must show that she complained of discrimination, the [employer] took adverse action against her, and the adverse action was causally related to her complaint, citing Marzec v. Marsh, 990 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir.1993)); Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir.1997) (also describing these elements as establishing a prima facie case of retaliation). Once this prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, and, if the employer meets that burden, the presumption of retaliation disappears. Manning, 127 F.3d at 692 (citing Jackson v. Delta Special Sch. Dist. No. 2, 86 F.3d 1489, 1494 (8th Cir.1996)); Harris, 119 F.3d at 1318 (also citing Jackson ); Moschetti v. Chicago, Central & Pacific R. Co., 119 F.3d 707, 709 (8th Cir.1997) (explaining this burden-shifting analysis, citing Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1332 (8th Cir.1996)); Montandon, 116 F.3d at 359. The factfinder is then left to determine if [the employee] presented evidence capable of proving that the [employer's] proffered reasons for termination were a pretext for illegal retaliation. Harris, 119 F.3d at 1318; accord Moschetti, 119 F.3d at 709; Montandon, 116 F.3d at 359. 2 Standards for employer liability for harassment Cross is correct that the cases cited just above do not appear to require proof that the employer knew or should have known of the retaliation as an element of a retaliation claim. Yet, as this court pointed out in Davis, this court has consistently required proof that the employer knew or should have known of harassment, yet failed to take proper remedial action--even when the harassment was by a supervisory employee--in order to hold the employer liable for a sexually hostile environment. Davis, 115 F.3d at 1368 (citing Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir.1997); accord Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 138 F.3d 733, 736-37 (8th Cir.1998) (reiterating the knew or should have known standard for hostile environment sexual harassment by a supervisor, and rejecting a standard imputing liability where the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to further the harassment where the supervisor had no direct authority over the victim); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir.1996); Callanan v. Runyun, 75 F.3d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir.1996); and Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir.1992)). In Davis, this court held that the district court had abused its discretion in not instructing the jury on the knew or should have known employer liability standard on the plaintiff's hostile environment claim. See id. at 1369. Even so, in Davis, this court did not then apply the knew or should have known standard to the plaintiff's retaliation claim. Id. Instead, the court considered whether the employer took adverse action against the plaintiff. Id. This court's decision in Smith, a decision cited in Davis as applying the knew or should have known standard to a hostile environment claim, is perhaps still more instructive, because in that case not only was the plaintiff's supervisor the alleged harasser on the plaintiff's hostile environment claim, but he was also the person whose conduct was alleged to be the basis for the plaintiff's retaliation claim. See Smith, 109 F.3d at 1265-66. Although this court required proof that the employer knew or should have known of the hostile environment harassment by the supervisor to hold the employer liable on the hostile environment claim, this court did not require proof that the employer knew or should have known of a supervisor's retaliation, but did nothing, for the plaintiff to prevail on her retaliation claim. Smith, 109 F.3d at 1265-66. Instead, the court apparently imputed the retaliatory conduct of the supervisor--which in that case involved negative comments about the plaintiff to prospective employers--directly to the employer. Id. In Davis, this court noted that the knew or should have known standard for employer liability in hostile environment cases was in contrast to the standard applicable in quid pro quo cases: In the situation of quid pro quo sexual harassment by a supervisor, where the harassment results in a tangible detriment to the subordinate employee, liability is imputed to the employer. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2410, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). Davis, 115 F.3d at 1367; accord Todd, 138 F.3d at 736 (also noting this distinction, relying on Davis ). A number of courts have explained why this should be so. In Reinhold v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 135 F.3d 920 (4th Cir.1998), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that whether the employer knew or should have known of the harassment was always an element of a sexual harassment claim, but that this requirement is automatically satisfied where the sexual harassment was of the quid pro quo variety and is committed by one of the employer's supervisors, because the retaliator was acting as the employer. Reinhold, 135 F.3d at 931-32. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that  '[w]hen a supervisor requires sexual favors as a quid pro quo for job benefits, the supervisor, by definition, acts as the company.'  Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 115 F.3d 1548, 1552 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.1989)). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, too, has explained that, [b]ecause the quid pro quo harasser, by definition, wields the employer's authority to alter the terms and conditions of employment--either actually or apparently--the law imposes strict liability on the employer for quid pro quo harassment. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213, 114 S.Ct. 2693, 129 L.Ed.2d 824 (1994). 3 The nature of retaliatory action and the standard for employer liability A review of decisions of this court reveals that employment actions that are sufficiently adverse to sustain a retaliation claim are also often actions in which the retaliator wields the employer's authority--either actually or apparently--to effect the retaliation, which must take the form of a material employment disadvantage. See, e.g., Manning, 127 F.3d at 692 (employment actions that were sufficiently adverse to sustain a retaliation claim include tangible change in duties or working conditions that constituted a material employment disadvantage, or an ultimate employment decision, such as termination, demotion, reassignment, but not merely hostility, disrespect, or ostracism); Kim, 123 F.3d at 1060 (sufficiently adverse actions include discharge, reduction of duties, actions that disadvantage or interfere with the employee's ability to do his or her job, and papering of an employee's file with negative reports and reprimands); Montandon, 116 F.3d at 359 (sufficiently adverse actions include termination, demotion, transfers involving changes in pay or working conditions, and negative evaluations used as the basis for other employment actions); Davis, 115 F.3d at 1369 (retaliation took the form of transfer to a less desirable position, because that position offered little opportunity for salary increases or advancement); Smith, 109 F.3d at 1265-66 (retaliation took the form of negative references to prospective employers). It would follow that employer liability would also be imputed for such retaliatory acts, because in such circumstances, the retaliator is, by definition, acting as the employer. This court's recent decision in Todd is not to the contrary. See Todd, 138 F.3d at 736-37. In Todd this court found it was reversible error for the district court to instruct a jury that the employer could be held liable for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor if the supervisor used his actual or apparent authority to further the harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of his supervisory powers. Id. The court found it to be contrary to the statute and principles of agency law to impose liability upon an employer for the wrongful act of a supervisor acting well beyond the scope of his duty, particularly when the harassment complained of was a one-time act committed outside the workplace that the employer could not have anticipated. Id. at 737-38. The court therefore reiterated the applicability of the knew or should have known standard. Id. However, the case before the court in Todd was one of hostile environment sexual harassment, not retaliation, and the court held the knew or should have known standard was appropriate where the supervisor had no direct authority over the victim. Id. Here, Chief Bishop had direct authority over the Cross and the record supports the conclusion that he used his actual or apparent authority, and acted within the scope of his duty, to effect retaliation, rather than simply to harass Cross. Consequently, in this case, where the retaliation took the form of investigations, transfers, and suspensions by Chief Bishop, the retaliation was effected by using the Chief's authority--actual or apparent--to act as the employer, that is, by using his delegated authority from the Board to manage the Department. In such a situation, it was not plain error for the trial court not to require proof that the Board Members, Cross's actual employer, knew or should have known of the retaliation. Imposing liability in the absence of proof that the employer knew or should have known of retaliation did not result in any miscarriage of justice. Rush, 56 F.3d at 922. It is also possible that the retaliator could be so high in the employer's hierarchy that, employing common-law agency principles as directed by the Supreme Court, see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72, 106 S.Ct. at 2408, the retaliatory conduct would necessarily be imputed to the employer. Cf. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d at 625, 633-34 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that an employer will be liable for sexual harassment by one of its supervisors if the supervisor was at a sufficiently high level in the company, citing the Restatement of Agency, and its prior decision in Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63-64 (2d Cir.1992)). Here, where the retaliator was the Chief of Police, the person to whom the Board had delegated responsibility for the actions of the Department, the retaliatory conduct of the Chief would necessarily be imputed to the Board. Thus, on this ground also, it was not plain error for the trial court not to require proof that the Board Members knew or should have known of the retaliatory conduct in order to hold the Board Members liable for the retaliation, as no miscarriage of justice resulted. Rush, 56 F.3d at 922. We can envision the circumstance, however, in which a supervisory employee who engages in retaliation is neither so high in the hierarchy that his or her conduct is necessarily imputed to the employer, nor does the retaliatory conduct in which the supervisor engages necessarily involve wielding the actual or apparent authority of the employer. Thus, the standard of employer liability applicable to a retaliation claim may well depend upon both the status of the retaliator and the nature of the retaliatory conduct. In the circumstances of this case, however, we hold that, where a supervisory employee with the power to hire, fire, demote, transfer, suspend, or investigate an employee is shown to have used that authority to retaliate for the filing of a charge of sexual harassment, the plaintiff need not also prove that the employer participated in or knew or should have known of the retaliatory conduct to hold the employer liable. Indeed, in the circumstances where the employer is a board, and that board delegates authority to an individual to run day-to-day operations of a department, application of the knew or should have known standard to the members of the board would have the effect of insulating the employer from Title VII liability. Thus, it was not plain error for the trial court to deny the Board Members' motion for JAML on the ground that no evidence had been adduced that the Board Members knew or should have known of the retaliation against Cross, because no such proof was required in this case. Furthermore, we find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a reasonable finding on each of the required elements of Cross's retaliation claim. Stockmen's Livestock Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d at 1243; HBE Corp., 135 F.3d at 554; Meisner, 133 F.3d at 656; Hathaway, 132 F.3d at 1220; Ryther, 108 F.3d at 844. Consequently, there is no other ground for overruling the trial court's denial of the Board Members' post-trial motion for JAML. 6