Opinion ID: 2083453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Defendant's Mental Age

Text: Defendant next contends that his death sentence is unconstitutional because he has the mental age of only a juvenile. In support, defendant cites Dr. Gelbort's report, which opined that defendant `thinks' like a thirteen or fourteen year old. Observing that it has been determined to constitute cruel and unusual punishment to execute a defendant who was under 16 years of age ( Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 2700, 101 L.Ed.2d 702, 720 (1988)), defendant reasons that executing a defendant with a mental age under 16 years of age is also prohibited. We disagree. Despite defendant's contentions otherwise, the Supreme Court has previously rejected the concept of mental age as a basis for exculpating a defendant from criminal responsibility. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 339-40, 109 S.Ct. at 2958, 106 L.Ed.2d at 291-92 (mental age should not be adopted as a line-drawing principle in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). The Penry Court noted several limitations of the mental age concept, including that it underestimates the life experiences of mentally retarded adults and that the mental age of the average adult is only that of a 16-year-old. Penry, 492 U.S. at 339-40, 109 S.Ct. at 2958, 106 L.Ed.2d at 291-92. In addition, the Penry Court observed that state courts, including this court, have long been reluctant to rely on the mental age concept. Penry, 492 U.S. at 339-40, 109 S.Ct. at 2958, 106 L.Ed.2d at 292, citing People v. Marquis, 344 Ill. 261, 267, 176 N.E. 314 (1931). Defendant has failed to offer a sound basis why this court should not continue to follow Penry.