Opinion ID: 201695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality of a Dismissal Without Prejudice

Text: 7 COFECC argues that the district court's decision compelling the parties to arbitrate, accompanied by dismissal of the case without prejudice, resulted in a judgment that was not final and appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). 5 COFECC's cursory argument is arguably insufficient to warrant our full attention, see, e.g., Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 43 (1st Cir.2003) (Issues raised on appeal in a perfunctory manner (or not at all) are waived.), but since we view the agency's assertion as plainly without merit, we choose to take the opportunity to state so explicitly. 8 In Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86-87, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000), the Supreme Court held that a district court's order directing arbitration and dismissing all of the claims before it was final within the meaning of section 16(a)(3) and therefore appealable. The action in Green Tree had been dismissed with prejudice, and COFECC asserts that the Supreme Court's ruling consequently is inapplicable to dismissals without prejudice. We agree with the reasoning of other courts that have rejected this distinction. See Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir.2005); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir.2002); Salim Oleochemicals v. M/V Shropshire, 278 F.3d 90, 91 (2d Cir.2002); Interactive Flight Techs., Inc. v. Swissair Swiss Air Transp. Co., 249 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001). In brief, these courts concluded that both types of dismissal are equivalent with respect to the Supreme Court's rationale in Green Tree — that the arbitration order plainly disposed of the entire case on the merits and left no part of it pending before the court, 531 U.S. at 86, 121 S.Ct. 513. Cf. Mirpuri v. ACT Mfg., Inc., 212 F.3d 624, 628-29 (1st Cir.2000) (a dismissal without prejudice that entirely terminates the litigation is a final order). We therefore hold that the Municipality's appeal is properly before us. 6