Opinion ID: 150007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Moss was Clearly Better Qualified than Lim

Text: The parties agree that Moss made out a prima facie case of age discrimination and that BMC has asserted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for hiring Lim. The contested issues arise under the pretext stage of the analysis. Moss first asserts that he has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was clearly better qualified than Lim for the Staff Legal Counsel position. To show that he was clearly better qualified than Lim and raise a fact question as to whether discrimination was a factor in BMC's hiring decisions, Moss must present evidence from which a jury could conclude that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question. Deines v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280-81 (5th Cir.1999). [U]nless the qualifications are so widely disparate that no reasonable employer would have made the same decision, id., any differences in qualifications are generally not probative evidence of discrimination, Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 357 (5th Cir.2001). Thus, the bar is set high for this kind of evidence. Id.
Moss first claims that he was clearly better qualified than Lim for the Staff Legal Counsel job based on the higher quality and extent of his legal experience with IT licensing and commercial transactions. BMC responds that despite Moss's excellent qualifications and greater length of experience, Lim's work experience was better suited to the specific needs of BMCparticularly with respect to the OEM transactions for which the Staff Legal Counsel would be responsible. [A]n `attempt to equate years served with superior qualifications . . . [is] unpersuasive.' Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 42 (5th Cir.1996) (quoting Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., 5 F.3d 955, 959 (5th Cir.1993)). Obviously, work experience is one component of defining who is more qualified, but greater experience alone will not suffice to raise a fact question as to whether one person is clearly more qualified than another. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In EEOC v. Louisiana Office of Community Services, this court recognized that the fact that a candidate's experience is recent and specialized in relation to the job at issue is a consideration relevant to qualification, in addition to simple length of experience. 47 F.3d at 1444-45; see also Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 846 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that the hired candidate had significant recent experience in several of the . . . areas that were most relevant to the new position . . . . Most of the work for which [plaintiff] had been primarily responsible during the several years preceding [] the application process simply was not relevant to the new position.). As the district court noted, both Moss and Lim met the basic skills and education requirements for the job. Both had a J.D. from an accredited law school, had five or more years of experience in a transactional IP practice, had a record of advanced legal drafting and negotiating skills in an IP licensing practice, and had demonstrated advanced communication, leadership, and project management skills. A review of the two resumes demonstrates that Moss undoubtedly has more experience and higher-level experience generally. But Moss' undisputedly lengthier tenure of experience fourteen years practicing IT law compared with Lim's five yearsdoes not necessarily demonstrate superior qualifications. Nichols, 81 F.3d at 42. BMC asserts that handling OEM agreements was a critical responsibility of the position. Consequently, BMC claims, because Lim's experience with OEM software transactions was directly on point for the specific needs of the Staff Legal Counsel position, and Moss simply lacked experience with the type of OEM software agreements for which the attorney hired would be responsible, he cannot show that he was clearly better qualified for the position than Lim. Moss argues that, contrary to BMC's assertions, he has extensive experience working on OEM transactions or similar OEM-type transactions. Beyond his own conclusory assertions, Moss advances no evidence that he has experience with OEM transactions. OEM refers to Original Equipment Manufacturer; in the software context an OEM agreement refers to an agreement under which a party licenses software from another company and resells that software as its own or as part of a larger software product it owns or licenses. Moss described his areas of principal expertise as IT outsourcing and systems integration. Although Moss claims that his areas of experience dealt with identical issues which BMC was required to address in handling the transactions that they labeled as `OEM agreements,' his deposition testimony regarding his OEM-type work experience was vague: he discussed his work in broad terms of contract, he had trouble with software-specific technical terminology, and he could not detail how his prior deals involved OEM-type work. He revealed his lack of familiarity with OEM transactions in the software context when he frankly admitted that in order to prepare for his deposition he pulled an OEM license agreement . . . just to see whatin a conventional setting, where the licensee was somebody situated similarly to BMC what they would consider the issues to be. . . I just looked it up on Google. I looked up OEM software licenses. [1] Moreover, Moss forthrightly stated in his deposition testimony that during his interview with Stallworth, [o]nce she went into the business about how the OEM was really the key to the deal, I made it very clear to her that OEM was not an area of specialty for me . . . . [2] He further stated that I [] hadn't spent time with the sole transaction being a deal that you could identify as a self-contained OEM licensing deal. [3] BMC's employment requisition form and job announcement also stated that, in addition to OEM agreements, the Staff Legal Counsel would be responsible for Alliance and Development Outsourcing agreements. Regarding the term alliance in the job announcement, Moss stated that: I didn't know what the heck it meant. . . . they use jargon all the time in the IT industryI wasn't sure what alliance meant. But to the extent it seemed to suggest [] more than one party on the same side of a transaction, where their interests are more or less aligned, yeah, I have done that many times. In the software development industry, according to Stallworth, alliance work is when you use a peer or a similar company's technology for testing and development, [or] compatibility testing. Sometimes it also has a marketing connotation. With respect to Development Outsourcing, Moss stated I don't know that there is such a concept, at least in my lexicon, as development outsourcing. Maybe it means something at BMC. But to me . . . development and outsourcing are two different concepts. . . . I took those not to be a combined term because, to me, that was almost gibberish. At BMC, Stallworth explained, a development outsourcing agreement is an agreement where you engage somebody else to take over your development function . . . the creation of software products. The fact that Moss's experience, however extensive, did not entail familiarity with OEM, Alliance, and Development Outsourcing agreements in the software contextthe specific transactions for which the Staff Legal Counsel would be responsiblewas relevant to the hiring decision. Odom, 3 F.3d at 846. Because Moss lacked experience with the three specific types of transactions that comprised the primary responsibilities of the Staff Legal Counsel, whereas Lim had been performing precisely those types of transactions in her prior job, Moss cannot show that he was clearly better qualified than Lim for the position. Although Moss' accomplishments and qualifications are unquestionably impressive, as this court has stated on numerous occasions: The ADEA was not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second-guessing of employment decisions nor was it intended to transform the courts into personnel managers. The ADEA cannot protect older employees from erroneous or even arbitrary personnel decisions, but only from decisions which are unlawfully motivated. Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1507-08 (5th Cir.1988).
Moss further argues that even if experience or lack thereof as to one particular type of transaction may in some situations be dispositive of a hiring decision, such is not the case here. He asserts that BMC's emphasis on OEM transactions smacks of pretext because BMC overlooked Moss's superior experience as to the other responsibilities covered by the job. An employer's reliance on a previously unmentioned job requirement to justify a challenged hiring decision would raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. See Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the fact-finder could regard an employer's explanation as pretextual when the person promoted became qualified for the position only after a change in the job requirements); Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1132-33 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that the fact-finder might view the employer's explanation as pretextual when the employer's proffered reason for hiring another candidate was not a listed job requirement). Here, for example, BMC also cites Moss's lack of experience with open source licensing and Lim's experience as in-house counsel as influencing their conclusion that Lim was better qualified for the Staff Legal Counsel position. Neither experience with open source licensing nor experience as in-house counsel, however, were listed in the job announcement or BMC's internal job requisition form as responsibilities or desired qualifications; although these qualifications are likely relevant to the position, we do not consider them for purposes of summary judgment. Our review demonstrates that BMC's emphasis on hands-on experience with OEM, Development Outsourcing, and Alliance transactions is supported by the record. Not only were these responsibilities listed in the job announcement and BMC's internal job requisition form, but the affidavits and deposition testimony of Stallworth, Clolery, Lim, and other members of the legal department confirm that experience with these specific agreements was a central and legitimate hiring consideration. Clolery stated that the key responsibility of this position was to handle the very important OEM transactions, both inbound and outbound, that BMC was involved in. Stallworth said that the Staff Legal Counsel was expected to spend approximately 70% of his or her time on managing transactions involving the creation or acquisition of technology for resell to customers through OEM, Alliance, Development Outsourcing, and Resell agreements. The BMC legal department therefore commonly referred to the Staff Legal Counsel position as the OEM Attorney position. Clolery further explained that BMC needed the new hire to get up to speed quickly and Stallworth similarly stated that BMC needed an individual in the Staff Legal Counsel position who could hit the ground running and operate immediately with little supervision. They therefore believed that someone who had previously worked on these specialized types of transactions in the software context would be optimal. Lim confirms that the focus on OEM transactions was genuine: she stated that during her interview Stallworth asked about her software licensing experience and her reseller OEM experience. She explained in her deposition that the primary responsibilities of the job were [n]egotiating OEM agreements and responsibility in general for the legal portions of OEM agreements. . . . oversee[ing] the open source program, the reseller contracts which were the market zone contracts, alliance agreements and general questions from R and D. When she started with BMC she worked mainly on OEM agreements, alliance agreements, market zone agreements. . . . Moss argues that the evidence offered by BMC and relied on by the district court was not proper summary judgment evidence because it consisted of [BMC's] own self-serving statements. But [s]worn affidavits . . . are certainly appropriate for review on a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment and Moss has proffered no evidence suggesting this testimony to be less than truthful. EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir.2007). Moreover, Moss has not asserted in the district court or on appeal that additional discovery would produce a quality or quantity of evidence different from the current summary judgment record. Therefore, as the district court concluded, Moss lacks evidence of pretext, and as a matter of law would not be able to prove that age was the `but-for' cause of the challenged adverse employment action. Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2352.