Opinion ID: 1258566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the constitutional standard in the present case

Text: In State v. Ivey , this Court clearly, unambiguously, and unanimously stated that the United States and North Carolina Constitutions require an officer who makes a seizure on the basis of a perceived traffic violation to have probable cause to believe the driver's actions violated a motor vehicle law. 360 N.C. 562, 564, 633 S.E.2d 459, 461 (2006) (citing State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 635-36, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999)). The majority relegates this clear standard in Ivey to misinterpretations and only discusses it in passing, stating merely that this Court has occasionally discussed whether a traffic stop was constitutional in terms of probable cause. Ivey's discussion of the standard is indistinguishable from the present case, as the statute under which defendant was stopped is the exact same statute that was at issue in Ivey. The principle of stare decisis is a maxim to be held forever sacred. Commonwealth v. Coxe, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 170, 192, 1 L.Ed. 786 (Pa.1800); see also Allyson K. Duncan & Frances P. Solari, North Carolina Appellate Advocacy § 1-9, at 8 (1989) ([T]he principle of stare decisis proclaims, in effect, that where a principle of law has become settled by a series of decisions, it is binding on courts and should be followed in similar cases.). It has often been stated that [t]his Court has never overruled its decisions lightly. No court has been more faithful to stare decisis.  Rabon v. Rowan Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 20, 152 S.E.2d 485, 498 (1967). Nevertheless, today the majority has failed to adhere to this high principle, thereby casting doubt on the lasting precedential value of this Court's decisions. Rather than rely upon the controlling authority of this Court's prior decisions, the majority has sought out non-authoritative opinions of federal circuit courts with which to justify its departure from our case law. This Court has stated: State courts are no less obligated to protect and no less capable of protecting a defendant's federal constitutional rights than are federal courts. In performing this obligation a state court should exercise and apply its own independent judgment, treating, of course, decisions of the United States Supreme Court as binding and according to decisions of lower federal courts such persuasiveness as these decisions might reasonably command. State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 74, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2292, 90 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986). We have no need to resort to decisions of lower federal courts when this Court's precedent speaks directly and clearly on the issue. When this Court has spoken on an issue, our lower courts should be able to consider the law settled by the opinions of this Court without the need to resort to time-consuming and tedious searches of the decisions of every other court in the nation in anticipation that the law of North Carolina might change on appeal. Moreover, thorough research of the federal circuit court cases cited by the majority shows that reliance upon them is misplaced. Nearly every federal circuit case cited by the majority either relies directly on Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), or cites as authority a circuit court decision that relies on Berkemer for the proposition that reasonable suspicion is the only requirement, regardless of the aim of the traffic stop. [3] One case cited by the majority, United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 714 (9th Cir.2005), goes so far as to parenthetically state that Berkemer held that a traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion. Even a cursory reading of Berkemer would disclose that Berkemer did not address the issue of the required level of suspicion to stop a vehicle. Instead, the relevant issue in Berkemer was whether an individual detained in a routine traffic stop was entitled to Miranda warnings. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 422-23, 104 S.Ct. 3138. In analyzing this Fifth Amendment issue, the Court noted first that traffic stops are usually brief, and second that circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. Id. at 437-38, 104 S.Ct. 3138. Therefore, the Court wrote, In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called `Terry stop,' than to a formal arrest. Id. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (internal citation omitted). Because the Court did not require Miranda warnings during Terry stops, the Court likewise held that Miranda warnings are not required for persons temporarily detained during routine traffic stops. Id. at 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138. In making this analogy the Court stated: No more is implied by this analogy than that most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry. We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop. Id. at 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138. The circuit courts cited by the majority have certainly assumed much more from this analogy, even turning it into a holding that reasonable suspicion is the standard for all traffic stops. Thus, the majority's analysis stands upon cases that perpetuate a faulty reading of a Supreme Court of the United States opinion. [4] The better course of action would have been to simply follow this Court's precedent in Ivey. Although the law of this State was, before today's decision, well settled that probable cause was required to stop defendant for a purported violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-154(a), the State made a lengthy and impassioned argument that probable cause was not required. The State argued, and the majority has agreed, that the standard for traffic stops in North Carolina is reasonable suspicion. In fact, the Assistant Attorney General representing the State at oral arguments said: I am at war with those who say that probable cause is the standard rather than reasonable suspicion! The State is correct that in many situations all that would be required to seize a vehicle and its occupants would be a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. For instance, law enforcement may observe certain facts that would, in the totality of the circumstances, lead a reasonable officer to believe a driver is impaired, such as weaving within the lane of travel or driving significantly slower than the speed limit. It would be difficult in such a situation, when no other traffic violation occurs, for an officer to formulate probable cause that the driver is impaired. In such circumstances, an officer would have reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity (i.e. driving while impaired) was afoot and could stop the vehicle to make reasonable inquiry. The instances in which this Court has applied a reasonable suspicion standard rather than requiring probable cause are those in which further investigation is warranted to confirm or contradict the officer's reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. For instance, in State v. Mitchell, this Court found an officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity when he accelerated through a driver's license checkpoint even after being instructed to stop by the officer. 358 N.C. 63, 69-70, 592 S.E.2d 543, 546-47 (2004). In State v. Foreman, this Court held that an officer had reasonable suspicion to make further inquiries of the occupants of a vehicle that abruptly turned before reaching a roadblock and who were later found parked in a nearby driveway bent or crouched down inside the car. 351 N.C. 627, 628-29, 527 S.E.2d 921, 922-23 (2000). Frequently, this Court has described those stops that can be made upon the basis of a reasonable, articulable suspicion as investigatory stops. See State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 664, 617 S.E.2d 1, 14 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073, 126 S.Ct. 1773, 164 L.Ed.2d 523 (2006); State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 206-07, 539 S.E.2d 625, 630 (2000); State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 238-39, 536 S.E.2d 1, 8-9 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 121 S.Ct. 1131, 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001); State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994). Thus, this Court's precedent makes it clear that in many situations in which further investigation is warranted by the facts, an officer may stop a vehicle on the basis of a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. However, in the case sub judice, no further investigation would have been necessary. The officer indicated that he stopped defendant on the basis of his failure to use his turn signal. Either defendant's actions ran afoul of N.C.G.S. § 20-154(a) or they did not. There was nothing further for the officer to investigate. Because the officer made this stop on the basis of a purported, clearly perceivable, readily observable traffic violation in which further investigation would have been of no value in determining whether a violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-154(a) occurred, the officer was required to have probable cause to believe that defendant violated a motor vehicle law before seizing defendant.