Opinion ID: 2541515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Provided Mitchell Stored His Weapon in His Vehicle's Glove Compartment, His Discharge Was Contrary to KRS 527.020(8)

Text: Mitchell asserts a cause of action for termination in violation of public policy under KRS 527.020(8). [1] KRS 527.020 is a criminal statute, which prohibits the carrying of a concealed weapon. KRS 527.020(1). The statute then proceeds to describe exceptions. KRS 527.020(8) applies generally to all persons: [2] A firearm or other deadly weapon shall not be deemed concealed on or about the person if it is located in a glove compartment, regularly installed in a motor vehicle by its manufacturer, regardless of whether said compartment is locked, unlocked, or does not have a locking mechanism. No person or organization, public or private, shall prohibit a person from keeping a firearm or ammunition, or both, or other deadly weapon in a glove compartment of a vehicle in accordance with the provisions of this subsection. Any attempt by a person or organization, public or private, to violate the provisions of this subsection may be the subject of an action for appropriate relief or for damages in a Circuit Court or District Court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.) When the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction or interpretation and the statute must be given its effect as written. McCracken County Fiscal Court v. Graves, 885 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Ky.1994) (quoting Lincoln County Fiscal Court v. Dep't of Public Advocacy, 794 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Ky.1990)); see also Griffin v. City of Bowling Green, 458 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky. 1970). The words of KRS 527.020(8) are clear and unambiguous. It forbids a public organization, such as a university, from prohibiting the possession of a firearm in the glove compartment of a vehicle. There can be no other reasonable interpretation of the statutory language. Provided Mitchell stored his weapon in his vehicle's glove compartment, UK violated KRS 527.020(8). The statute also provides Mitchell with a cause of action for appropriate relief or for damages in a Circuit Court or District Court of competent jurisdiction. Mitchell's discharge was therefore contrary to KRS 527.020(8), provided his weapon was in fact stored in the glove compartment of his vehicle. Because there is also evidence in the record that Mitchell stored his weapon in his vehicle's armrest, [3] we now consider the applicability of KRS 527.020(4).