Opinion ID: 2197540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Awarding the Writ of Habeas Corpus Forthwith Violated Richard's Constitutional Rights

Text: This court found in its previous decision that Kirchner had, in effect, sufficiently grasped the opportunity to develop a relationship with Richard. ( See Lehr v. Robertson, (1983), 463 U.S. 248, 262, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614, 627.) However, Kirchner's effort to grasp the opportunity to develop a relationship with Richard does not give Kirchner the right to summarily and arbitrarily deprive Richard of procedures provided to the child under Illinois law which protect Richard's emotional and psychological relationship with the Does. The majority's summary decision to grant Kirchner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus violates Richard's right to procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. As noted previously, the issue of custody is different from the issues of adoption and the improper termination of parental rights. Unlike a termination of parental rights, which is concerned primarily with protecting the rights of parents, a change or modification of an existing custodial relationship is primarily concerned with protecting the child's interest in a healthy, stable environment. Under the Marriage Act and section 20 of the Adoption Act, the Illinois legislature created a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a child's emotional and psychological relationship with nonparent custodians, and has also provided the requisite procedures to prevent the summary or improper severing of this relationship in a way that would be harmful to the child. (750 ILCS 5/601(b)(2) (West 1992); Pub. Act 88-550, eff. July 3, 1994 (adding 750 ILCS 50/20(b)).) By ignoring the child custody procedures provided by the Marriage Act and section 20 of the Adoption Act, the majority has arbitrarily deprived Richard of due process under the law by disregarding the intent of the legislature. On the issue of Richard's constitutional rights, the majority makes two erroneous assertions: (1) that Richard has no constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with the Does, and (2) although children have a due process liberty interest in their family life, that interest is not independent of the child's natural parents' absent a finding of unfitness. (164 Ill.2d at 501, 208 Ill.Dec. at 283, 649 N.E.2d at 339.) Regarding the first assertion, it is true that the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a child has a liberty interest symmetrical with that of a natural parent in maintaining his current relationship. (164 Ill.2d at 499, 208 Ill.Dec. at 282, 649 N.E.2d at 338, citing Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989), 491 U.S. 110, 130, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2346, 105 L.Ed.2d 91, 110-11.) However, this observation acknowledges only those constitutional protections that arise from fundamental rights. Under procedural due process, constitutional protection may arise from liberty interests created by State statute. ( Vitek v. Jones (1980), 445 U.S. 480, 488, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1261, 63 L.Ed.2d 552, 562.) The State of Illinois has conferred upon Richard a liberty interest in his emotional and psychological relationship with the Does. The State cannot deprive Richard of this interest without following the procedures provided by State statute. On the second assertion, the majority has again confused the issues of the termination of parental rights and the determination of custody. In custody litigation, the interests of parents and children often diverge. While the Supreme Court long ago rejected the idea that a child is the mere creature of the State ( Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary (1925), 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 1078), the State does have a substantial interest in providing minors with healthy and stable environments, an interest manifested in the wide variety of child welfare and child protection legislation. ( O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975), 422 U.S. 563, 583, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2497, 45 L.Ed.2d 396, 411 (States are vested with the historic parens patriae power, including the duty to protect `persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves'); quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. (1972), 405 U.S. 251, 257, 92 S.Ct. 885, 888, 31 L.Ed.2d 184, 189; see also Prince v. Massachusetts (1944), 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (States may impinge on parents' first amendment rights to protect the well-being of children through the enforcement of child labor laws).) It was pursuant to the historic power of parens patriae that the State legislature passed the Marriage Act which requires that any child custody determination be in accord with the child's best interests. While the United States Supreme Court has found a substantive due process right in protecting family relationships against State interference (see Pierce, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (parents' right to send children to private parochial schools); Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (right to keep Amish children home after the eighth grade); Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (right of an extended family to live together); Santosky v. Kramer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (right to higher burden of proof in order for the State to terminate parental rights)), all of these decisions rest on the presumption that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. Parham v. J.R. (1979), 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L.Ed.2d 101, 118. The legal presumption that parents will act in the best interests of their children fails in the context of a custody battle. Illinois has long rejected the idea that children are chattel, and has embraced the concept that custody should be adjudicated according to the child's best interest. ( Cohn v. Scott (1907), 231 Ill. 556, 558, 83 N.E. 191 (stating that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration to which the claims of all other persons must yield).) The Illinois legislature has recognized that custody battles, by their very nature, may force competing parties into a struggle that unnecessarily elevates the rights of the competing adult parties to the detriment of the child's interests. (See 750 ILCS 5/601(b)(2) (West 1992); Pub. Act 88-550, eff. July 3, 1994 (adding 750 ILCS 50/20(b)).) This is why in child custody litigation a child of the parties to it becomes a ward of the court [citation], and the court has the authority and the responsibility to act for the child's care, custody and support until it reaches majority. In discharging this responsibility the court's primary concern obviously is not the wishes of the parents but rather the best interests of the child. ( Sommer v. Borovic (1977), 69 Ill.2d 220, 233, 13 Ill.Dec. 1, 370 N.E.2d 1028 (citing Kelley v. Kelley (1925), 317 Ill. 104, 110, 147 N.E. 659, and McDonald v. McDonald (1973), 13 Ill.App.3d 87, 90, 299 N.E.2d 787); see also In re Custody of Menconi (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 394, 73 Ill.Dec. 10, 453 N.E.2d 835 (noting that the superior rights doctrine and the policy of fostering a stable home environment were in direct conflict).) When Daniella terminated her parental rights four days after Richard's birth, she effectively placed Richard in the care of the State of Illinois, and he became a ward of the State. The State now has the duty to care for Richard's health and emotional stability. In the present case, where two parties are competing for the custody of a child, Illinois law properly recognizes that the interests of the adult parties may conflict with the interests of the child. Therefore, custody is properly adjudicated in accordance with the child's best interests rather than the interests of the competing adults. 750 ILCS 5/602 (West 1992). The United States Supreme Court recognizes that [m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. ( Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976), 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843, 49 L.Ed.2d 788, 808.) Further, the Court has repeatedly held that state statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488, 63 L.Ed.2d at 561-62, 100 S.Ct. at 1261; see also Wolff v. McDonnell (1974), 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, (due process mandates the provision of procedures to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of a right created by State statute).) In order for a statute to grant a person a protected liberty interest, the person must `have a legitimate claim of entitlement' to the liberty interest. ( Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex (1979), 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2104, 60 L.Ed.2d 668, 675, quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561.) A liberty interest created by statute includes the right to the requisite procedures necessary to protect that liberty interest. ( Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat (1981), 452 U.S. 458, 463, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2463, 69 L.Ed.2d 158, 164, citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d at 951.) The extent of constitutional due process protection is not limited to the protection of fundamental rights. Therefore, as our Supreme Court has ruled, a person's liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State. The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558, 94 S.Ct. at 2976, 41 L.Ed.2d at 952. In the instant case, the majority has arbitrarily deprived Richard of his statutory right to have his custody determined in a best-interests hearing. Under Illinois law, section 602 of the Marriage Act grants Richard the legitimate claim of entitlement to have his custody determined in a hearing in accordance with [his] best interest. (750 ILCS 5/602(a) (West 1992).) In section 602, the Illinois legislature created a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a child's emotional and psychological relationship with the child's nonparent lawful custodians. Richard's due process liberty interest is the statutory right to have any change in his custody adjudicated in a hearing in accord with his best interests. In a custody hearing, the trial court has broad discretion to tailor custody arrangements to a wide variety of circumstances and modify custody orders. (See 750 ILCS 5/603 (temporary orders); 610 (modification) (West 1992).) Under the Marriage Act and section 20 of the Adoption Act, a best-interests hearing takes place whenever there is a change or modification of custody. A child's right to a best-interests custody hearing is a procedure necessary to protect the child's relationship with his third party legal custodians against summary and arbitrary termination. In protecting Richard's relationship with the Does, the State protects Richard's emotional and psychological well-being. The granting of Kirchner's writ of habeas corpus effectively extinguished Richard's opportunity to receive a best-interests custody hearing. The trial court has jurisdiction under the Marriage Act and section 20 of the Adoption Act to adjudicate Richard's custody. The trial court is also the proper forum to conduct a fact-finding hearing that would result in a custody determination in accord with Richard's best interests. Since this court found that Kirchner's parental rights were improperly terminated, a valid adoption of Richard by the Does could not be granted absent Kirchner's voluntary termination of his parental rights. Termination of parental rights is the necessary prerequisite to granting a valid adoption. However, in a custody dispute, the best interest of the child is of paramount importance. In dispensing with a custody hearing, the majority has placed the emotional and psychological well-being of a small child in danger. (Goldstein, Freud, & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973) (when a child is removed from his or her home, the child's emotional ties to his or her parents are disrupted and the child will likely be traumatized).) One of the purposes of a custody hearing is to provide for an orderly change or modification in custody without exposing the child to risk of undue harm. At such a custody hearing, Kirchner's important rights will be considered along with the other relevant factors. The granting of the writ of habeas corpus to Kirchner, as the majority has done, ignores the State's valid interest in the psychological and emotional health of its children and unconstitutionally deprives Richard of a best-interests custody hearing, granted to him by the Illinois legislature.