Opinion ID: 1896184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the police officers had probable cause to effectuate a search and seizure.

Text: ¶ 13. Walker contends that his consent to the search of his truck was tainted, as a matter of law, by the unlawful detention during which it was elicited, and that his detention became unreasonable and unduly excessive in scope at the point when the officers shifted the focus of their investigation from the improper equipment to the possibility of locating contraband within the vehicle. He further argues that the police officers could not have seen any contraband in plain view. ¶ 14. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution contain almost identical language expressing a person's right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. Floyd, 749 So.2d at 114. The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops such as the stop of a vehicle. Id. ¶ 15. A search is not unreasonable when it is based on probable cause. Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Godbold v. State, 731 So.2d 1184, 1189 (Miss.1999); Craig v. State, 739 So.2d 410, 412 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). ¶ 16. Two exceptions to the rule that a search cannot be conducted without probable cause are as follows: When a driver voluntarily consents to a search of his or her vehicle, there is no need for a search warrant. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043-44, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Luton v. State, 287 So.2d 269, 272 (Miss.1973). If police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (referencing the plain view doctrine). ¶ 17. Sergeant Steve Stewart of the Southaven Police Department testified that he pulled in after Officer Smorowski had stopped Walker's vehicle: While [Walker] was speaking with Officer Smorowski on the stop on the Krystal lot, I observed a Wal-Mart bag on the front passenger floorboard which contained several boxes of antihist[amine] tab[let]s or ephedrine and possibly some batters in that pack. It seemed like multiple boxes.    I first explained to [Walker] why I was there because of the call that we had received and asked him did he have any Sudafed in the truck, and he advised that he had purchased several boxes for his store; and then I asked him would he mind if I looked, and he said, Yeah, sure. Go ahead. That's all I have in there. ¶ 18. Walker testified that when he got out of his vehicle after Officer Smorowski pulled him over, he left the driver's side door open. This testimony undermines Walker's claim that Sergeant Stewart could not have seen anything inside the vehicle in plain view. ¶ 19. The Court of Appeals has recently addressed this exact factual situation: After an investigatory stop, the police officer observed a shopping bag containing ephedrine on the back seat. The driver consented to a search of the car. When a driver voluntarily consents to a search of his vehicle, there is no need for a search warrant. Burchfield v. State, ___ So.2d ___, 2004 WL 1244746  (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citing Luton v. State, 287 So.2d 269, 272 (Miss.1973)). Here, Walker put on absolutely no evidence that he did not consent to the search. He only contends that the stop was unlawful. Because we find that the investigatory stop was based on a reasonable suspicion, we also find that, after the ephedrine was seen in plain view, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle.