Opinion ID: 1243098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hawai`i's Forfeiture Scheme

Text: As previously indicated, under HRS § 804-51, execution upon a judgment of forfeiture shall issue forthwith upon the expiration of thirty days from the date the surety receives notice of the judgment of forfeiture [hereinafter, thirty-day search period], unless the principal or the surety (or both) files a motion or application showing good cause why execution should not issue upon the judgment, HRS § 804-51, prior to the expiration of the thirty-day search period. Problematically, Hawai`i's forfeiture statute does not specify what constitutes good cause why execution should not issue upon the judgment. Nor has this court had prior occasion to construe good cause in the context of Hawai`i's forfeiture statute. As previously stated, the circuit court denied Aloha's motion to set aside because it believed that good cause has to be shown in facts prior to her fleeing ... or [not] appearing in court or facts, extenuating circumstances or good cause at the time that she did not appear in court [.] (Emphases added.) We believe the circuit court's interpretation of Hawai`i's forfeiture statute was unduly restrictive. HRS § 804-51 further provides that, [i]f the motion or application, after a hearing held thereon, is sustained, the court shall vacate the judgment of forfeiture and, if the principal surrenders or is surrendered pursuant to section 804-14 [8] or 804-41 [9] , return the bond or recognizance to the principal or surety, whoever shall have given it, less the amount of any cost, as established at the hearing, incurred by the State as a result of the nonappearance of the principal[.] HRS § 804-51 (emphasis added). In our view, good cause why execution should not issue upon the judgment of forfeiture may be satisfied by the defendant, prior to the expiration of the thirty-day search period: (1) providing a satisfactory reason for his or her failure to appear when required; or (2) surrendering or being surrendered.
Since there is no reason for penalizing... sureties where it appears that they are unable, through no fault of their own or of the principal, to perform the conditions of the bond, forfeitures of bail bonds will generally be vacated ... where it appears to the satisfaction of the court that uncontrollable circumstances prevented appearance pursuant to the stipulations in the bond, [or] that the default of the principal was excusable[.] 8 Am.Jur.2d Bail and Recognizance § 184 (1980) at 707; see, e.g., Makeig v. State, 802 S.W.2d 59, 62-63 (Tex.App.1990) (Generally, sufficient cause [to set aside a forfeiture] is a showing that the party did not break his [or her] recognizance intentionally, with the design of evading justice, or without a sufficient cause or reasonable excuse, such as unavoidable accident or inevitable necessity preventing his [or her] appearance.). In accordance with the general rule, we hold that the phrase good cause why execution should not issue upon the judgment encompasses a showing of a satisfactory reason for a defendant's failure to appear when required.
In 1989, the legislature amended HRS § 804-51 to require the court to give written notice to the surety upon forfeiture of any bail bond and to allow the surety thirty days, as opposed to the then-existing ten days, to move to set aside the bail forfeiture. See Sen.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 857, in 1989 Senate Journal, at 1127-28. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported that: This bill [S.B. No. 1061, which became part of Act 289 that amended HRS § 804-51] is to address the situation where a bail bondsperson is not informed for some time after the defendant fails to make a court appearance. Allegedly, the first several days are crucial to a bail bonds[person's] ability to find a defendant. Bail bonds[persons] maintain that if the information that the defendant has not appeared for court is obtained immediately, then the bonds[person] has a good chance of finding the defendant before he [or she] leaves Hawaii. The present statute allows for a bail bonds[person] to have the bail forfeiture set aside, but only within ten days after the defendant has failed to appear for court. Bail bonds[persons] claim that they are not even informed within this ten-day period that the defendant has failed to appear for court. Your Committee sees a need to balance both the interest of the bail bonds[persons] with that of the prosecution and the court in order to promote fairness to all parties involved in the process. In such regard, in the event that the bill [sic] forfeiture is vacated by the court, your Committee believes that it is appropriate that the prosecution and the court be reimbursed for the costs incurred by them. In such regard, your Committee has added the following provisions to this bill: If the motion or application, after a hearing held thereon, is sustained, the court shall vacate the judgment or forfeiture and, if the principal surrenders or is surrendered pursuant to Section 804-14 [10] or Section 804-41 [11] , return the bond or recognizance to the principal or surety, whoever shall have given it, less the amount of any costs, as established at the hearing, incurred by the State as a result of the non-appearance of the principal or other event on the basis of which the court forfeited the bond or recognizance. Id. (emphases added). The legislative history clearly demonstrates the legislature's intent to allow a surety the opportunity to locate the principal before execution of the judgment of forfeiture actually occurs, and, if the principal surrenders or is surrendered during the thirty-day search period, the surety would be entitled to return of the bond, less costs. Such an intent is consistent with the principal that the primary purpose[] of bail in a criminal case is not to punish a defendant or surety, nor to increase the revenue of the State, but rather to honor the presumption of innocence, to allow a defendant to prepare his [or her] case, and to ensure the defendant's presence in the pending proceeding. State v. Seybert, 231 Mont. 372, 753 P.2d 325, 326 (1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Diaz, 811 F.2d 1412, 1415 (11th Cir.1987) (purpose of bond is, inter alia, to secure the presence of defendant to answer charges). Moreover, whenever a defendant surrenders or is surrendered, returning the bond to the surety, less costs, provide[s] the [surety] with an incentive for securing the arrest of the defendant. If no part of the penalty of the bond could be remitted, there would be no inducement to the [surety] to have the defendant arrested and brought to justice. 8 Am.Jur.2d Bail and Recognizance § 174 (1980). Thus, based on our review of HRS § 804-51 and its legislative history, we hold that good cause why execution should not issue upon the judgment of forfeiture may be shown by the defendant surrendering or being surrendered prior to the expiration of the thirty-day search period.