Opinion ID: 74381
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reclassification Claims

Text: According to Fulton County employment practices, a Department head may seek an upward reclassification of an employee's classified position when the supervisor believes the employee is performing the duties of a higher level position. From the beginning of her tenure on December 14, 1992, to the advent of this lawsuit in April 1994, Sheriff Barrett reclassified four sworn officers, all of whom were black. The jury determined that Sheriff Barrett did not reclassify Plaintiffs Sergeant Bolt and then-Acting Sergeant Smith in whole or in part because of their race. Bolt argued that Sheriff Barrett discriminated against him on the basis of race by not reclassifying him as a lieutenant despite the fact that he performed the tasks of a lieutenant for thirteen months after the retirement of Lieutenant Hicks. Smith too alleged that Sheriff Barrett discriminated against him by not reclassifying him to the position of sergeant even though he became an acting sergeant in 1991, carried out the responsibilities of a sergeant, and received the Sergeant-of-the-Year Award.35 Defendants offered two non-discriminatory reasons for not reclassifying Bolt. Defendants contended that Bolt presented no evidence that Sheriff Barrett knew of his desire to be reclassified, and that Bolt did not complete the lieutenant's exam. Defendants' explanation that Bolt failed to inform Sheriff Barrett of his desire to be reclassified could be a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for failing to reclassify him if the sworn officers who were reclassified had informed the Sheriff of their desire to be reclassified. However, the record does not demonstrate that those four reclassified officers expressed any interest to Sheriff Barrett in being reclassified. Defendants' other proffered explanation for failing to reclassify Bolt also is inadequate. Bolt's failure to complete the lieutenant's exam affects only his eligibility for promotion to the position of classified 35 Smith was reclassified as a classified sergeant in July 1994. 55 lieutenant; it does not alter his eligibility for reclassification, which is based solely on his performance of the duties of the higher position, and does not require completion of the formal requirements for promotion. A reasonable jury could have disbelieved these reasons and found the real reasons for the failure to reclassify to be race-based discrimination. As stated previously, the evidence of Sheriff Barrett's intentional race discrimination against Bolt, combined with evidence of Barrett's understanding that such discrimination violated federal law, is sufficient to sustain the jury's award of punitive damages as well. A reasonable jury could have concluded that Sheriff Barrett intentionally discriminated against Bolt with knowledge that doing so violated Bolt's federally protected rights. See discussion supra section IV-A1. As for Smith, the Defendants argue that the jury in its special verdict form concluded that Smith should have been reclassified as of November 1992, before Sheriff Barrett assumed office. They contend, therefore, that Sheriff Barrett cannot be held liable for Smith's not being reclassified. Defendants' argument is unpersuasive. The fact that the jury determined that Smith should have been reclassified as of November 1992, does not mean that the jury could not also have reasonably found that Sheriff Barrett should have reclassified him upon taking office soon thereafter. The jury could have concluded that because Smith was qualified for reclassification in November 1992, Sheriff Barrett should have known this fact when she took office in December and should have reclassified him as soon as she had the power to do so. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of the jury's verdict of compensatory damages and injunctive relief for Smith but order that Smith's backpay be recalculated from December 14, 1992, when Sheriff Barrett took office, instead of from November 1992.36