Opinion ID: 203584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dennis' Discovery Motions

Text: Dennis additionally appeals the district court's denial of his motion to compel and his motion for extension of time under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).8 This court reviews both motions under an 7 Because Dennis does not dispute much of the conduct that formed the basis of the Molina warning letter, Sylvania still could have partially relied on the conduct in the Molina matter in deciding that Weinberg was the more valuable employee. 8 As noted above, after granting Sylvania's motion for summary judgment, the district court denied both these discovery motions as moot. -17- abuse of discretion standard. Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1996)(It is well settled that the trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on pre-trial management matters, and we review the district court's denial of discovery [and its denial of a Rule 56(f) motion] for abuse of its considerable discretion.)(internal citations omitted)). We note that [a]ppellate courts seldom intervene in discovery questions and that [t]he standard of review in discovery matters is not appellant-friendly. Modern Cont'l/Obayashi v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 196 F.3d 274, 281 (1st Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). The court of appeals will intervene in such matters only upon a clear showing of manifest injustice, that is, where the lower court's discovery order was plainly wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party. Id. In the proceeding below, Dennis moved to compel six documents Sylvania withheld on the basis of attorney client and work product privilege. Four of these documents pertain to the Serrechia complaint and the other two deal with the Molina matter. Dennis argues that these documents are relevant because they could shed light on the misconduct Sylvania partially relied upon for terminating Dennis. We need not reach the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Dennis' motion to compel because Dennis' access to those documents would not have changed -18- the outcome in this case. As we noted above, Dennis has not met his burden of showing that Sylvania's reduction in force rationale for terminating Dennis was pretextual. Dennis does not allege that these documents would yield any information linking Sylvania's reduction in force argument to retaliatory animus.9 We are equally unsympathetic to Dennis' appeal of the district court's ruling on his Rule 56(f) motion. Dennis argues that the district erred by denying him additional time to file his opposition to Sylvania's motion for summary judgment. In particular, Dennis contends that he was awaiting the court's rulings on his motion to compel and needed more time to obtain discovery of Weinberg's personnel documents and other documents pertaining to Sylvania's reduction in force. We have stated that Rule 56(f) serves a salutary purpose within the summary judgment framework. When a party confronted by a motion for summary judgment legitimately needs additional time to marshal the facts necessary to mount an opposition, the rule provides a useful safety valve. Rivera-Torres v. Rey-Hernández, 502 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 2007). Deployed appropriately, '[t]he rule . . . safeguard[s] against judges swinging the summary judgment axe too hastily.' Id. (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. 9 Notably, the Serrechia documents were dated prior to Dennis' deposition in the Green matter; thus, they cannot possibly contain any relevant information relating to Sylvania's alleged retaliatory motives with respect to its reduction in force. -19- N. Bridge Assocs., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir. 1994))(alterations in original). Under Rule 56(f): the litigant must submit to the trial court an affidavit or other authoritative document showing (i) good cause for his inability to have discovered or marshaled the necessary facts earlier in the proceedings; (ii) a plausible basis for believing that additional facts probably exist and can be retrieved within a reasonable time; and (iii) an explanation of how those facts, if collected, will suffice to defeat the pending summary judgment motion. Id. We have warned that Rule 56(f) is not designed to give relief to those who sleep upon their rights and that one who seeks a favorable ruling under Rule 56(f) must demonstrate due diligence both in conducting discovery before the emergence of the summary judgment motion and in pursuing an extension of time once the motion has surfaced. Id. at 10-11. Here, even if the documents Dennis were to obtain through this additional discovery raised a material dispute concerning Sylvania's reduction in force rationale, the request was untimely. The record indicates that on January 25, 2006, Dennis' counsel requested the Commission's October 2005 interview notes with Franz. In these notes, Franz discusses the company's plan to eliminate Weinberg's position and Franz' opinion that she was a more valuable employee. Although Dennis states that Sylvania fails to allege what date Dennis received the copies and that the interview notes (taken by the Commission investigator) do not contain the expanded -20- information revealed during Franz' deposition on November 16, 2006, he does not deny receiving these notes well before Sylvania's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, even if we accept Dennis' contention that he only learned the true extent to which Sylvania relied on the reduction in force rationale during Hunt and Franz' November 16, 2006 depositions, Dennis still did not file his Rule 56(f) motion until more than thirty days after the depositions, and nearly three weeks after Sylvania filed its motion for summary judgment. Regardless of whether Dennis' Rule 56(f) motion was a delaying tactic as Sylvania maintains, Dennis should not be entitled to the benefits of Rule 56(f) given the amount of time he allowed to lapse between his knowledge of Sylvania's reduction in force justification and the filing of his Rule 56(f) motion. Dennis neither suffered any manifest injustice nor any substantial prejudice. For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the district court's order. Affirmed. -21-