Opinion ID: 2633789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lack of Recklessness

Text: In the present case, the Court of Appeals panel distinguished Favela. Unlike the situation in Favela where the sentencing court enunciated factors in addition to a belief that the defendant had been overcharged, here the Court of Appeals panel concluded the only basis for the sentencing court's downward departure was the court's personal opinion the jury should have convicted the defendant of involuntary manslaughter and not second-degree unintentional murder. Blackmon, slip op. at 8. The Court of Appeals panel concluded this personal disagreement was not a substantial and compelling reason for the downward durational departure sentence and stated that [i]f the evidence here was insufficient to support the factfinders' verdict of guilty of second-degree unintentional murder, the district court should have instructed the jury otherwise or entered a directed verdict. Slip op. at 8. We disagree with the Court of Appeals panel's characterization of the sentencing court's comments as a finding of insufficient evidence. At the hearing on a motion for a new trial, the trial court specifically gave deference to the jury as finder of fact. The trial judge, who was also the sentencing judge, found there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict, stating: I can't fault [the jury] . . . because I think circumstantially the evidence existed. As in Favela, the sentencing court attempted to neither dismiss nor amend Blackmon's charge. This conclusion does not resolve the question of whether a sentencing court can rely on a form of recklessness with less culpability than the recklessness required for the crime of conviction as a factor to justify imposing a downward departure sentence, an issue which requires our de novo review. Blackmon argues that as a matter of public policy this should be recognized as a nonstatutory departure factor. Reason defies Blackmon's contention because the presumptive sentence is based on the crime of conviction-unintentional second-degree murder-and the level of intent or recklessness distinguishes the various lesser included offenses. The mere fact that a sentencing judge weighs the evidence regarding an element of the crime of conviction differently than did the jury is not a substantial and compelling reason for departure. To hold otherwise would allow the judge to become a super juror, replacing the collective judgment of the jury with the judge's personal evaluation of the evidence. This substitution of judgment would erode the function of a jury in the trial, which is to determine whether the State has proven the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, Favela did not suggest that a judge could reduce a sentence because of the judge's disagreement with either the charging decision or the jury verdict. Rather, the rationale of Favela was that the sentencing court could and did make findings based upon substantial and compelling departure factors other than the judge's conclusion that a different offense more appropriately fit the facts than did the crime of conviction.