Opinion ID: 4270652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: June 4, 2015 Change of Plea Hearing

Text: On June 4, 2015, Benitez stated that he was going to plead guilty on Count One without a plea agreement, but that he was going to maintain his plea of not guilty on Count Two. The government opposed splitting the pleas in this way. The government argued that Benitez could not plead guilty to Count One without admitting that he possessed a firearm during the bank robbery, which would foreclose Benitez’s ability to plead not guilty to the firearm offense in Count Two. In response, the district court suggested that the firearm phrase after “dangerous weapon” in Count One was surplusage. Benitez agreed with the district court, maintaining that he could be convicted of Count One without the government proving that he used an actual firearm. 2 As Benitez reasoned, the government need prove only that Benitez used a dangerous weapon, which could even be a “toy gun.” Accordingly, Benitez could plead guilty to Count One 2 The transcript incorrectly attributes this statement to the government, but the context makes clear that it was Benitez’s counsel who made this statement. 4 Case: 16-10476 Date Filed: 04/27/2018 Page: 5 of 24 (armed bank robbery with a replica of a gun) and not guilty to Count Two (which required an actual firearm). 3 The government disagreed, insisting that Benitez’s use of a firearm was an element of the robbery offense charged in Count One. The district court again questioned the government why the firearm phrase was not surplusage. In response, the government conceded that the firearm phrase did not “enhance” the bank-robbery-with-a-dangerous-weapon offense charged in Count One, but explained that its position at trial would be that Benitez used a firearm. The government acknowledged, however, that its position meant that Benitez could admit at trial that he committed the robbery with a dangerous weapon that was not a firearm and still defend against the firearm charge in Count Two. The district court then asked defense counsel whether, assuming the firearm phrase was surplusage, Benitez would be willing to plead guilty to Count One by admitting that he robbed the bank with a dangerous weapon without specifying that the dangerous weapon was a firearm. Counsel for Benitez answered yes, acknowledging again that a “toy gun” would constitute a dangerous weapon under the bank robbery statute in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). 3 As it is used in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), the term “firearm” means: (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such term does not include an antique firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). 5 Case: 16-10476 Date Filed: 04/27/2018 Page: 6 of 24 The district court gave both parties seven days to file memoranda and scheduled a status conference for July 13, 2015. On June 12, 2015, the government submitted a memorandum positing that the firearm phrase was an element of Count One and that Benitez could not plead guilty to Count One without admitting that he carried a firearm during the robbery. Benitez did not file a memorandum.