Opinion ID: 1693799
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Introducing a Controlled Substance into a Detention Facility

Text: The defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a judgment of acquittal on the charge that he introduced a controlled substance into a detention facility. Specifically, he claims his counsel should have argued the offense was a specific intent crime and his counsel was ineffective in failing to argue his submission to police authority at the time of his arrest negated any finding that he voluntarily introduced the drugs into the jail. We review ineffective assistance claims de novo. State v. Williams, 574 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Iowa 1998). The defendant has the burden to prove his trial counsel breached an essential duty and he was prejudiced as a result. See McPhillips, 580 N.W.2d at 755.
It does not appear this court has previously addressed whether Iowa Code section 719.8 is a general or specific intent crime. [3] We have previously addressed the distinction between general and specific intent crimes. When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a further consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent. State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Eggman v. Scurr, 311 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 1981)). The term specific intent describes a special mental element above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime. See Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d at 294. A review of the statutory language reveals that the offense criminalizing the introduction of controlled substances into a detention facility does not require an intent to do any further act or achieve some additional consequence other than the prohibited conduct of introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility. It is a general intent crime, and counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the defendant's intent.
The defendant argues that his submission to police authority at the time of his arrest and his subsequent transport to the county jail negated any finding that he voluntarily committed the offense of introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility. He claims his trial counsel was ineffective in not pursuing a directed verdict on this basis. The defendant also argues that in order to avoid a charge of introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility he was required to admit his possession of the drugs before he entered the jail. He contends this severely and impermissibly burdened his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. With respect to both of the defendant's arguments, we find this case is governed by our decision in State v. Elliott, 557 N.W.2d 887 (Iowa 1996). In Elliott the police responded to a report of gunfire at the defendant's residence. Elliott was arrested for discharging a firearm within city limits and was transported to the police station. At the station, it was discovered he had a gun in his possession and he was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. While the defendant's possession of the weapon was legal while he was present on his own property, it became a criminal offense once he was removed from the premises. We rejected Elliott's claim that his ability to act voluntarily was negated by his submission to police authority. Id. at 889. We noted that the defendant could have disclosed the existence of the gun before his continued possession of it became illegal. Id. Similarly, the defendant in the case at bar had the option of disclosing the presence of the drugs concealed on his person before he entered the jail and became guilty of the additional offense of introducing controlled substances into a detention facility. The defendant contends that to require him to admit his possession of the drugs would have impermissibly burdened his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. We disagree. The criminal process includes many situations which require a defendant to make difficult judgments regarding which course to follow. See State v. Gay, 526 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 1995) (defendant incarcerated in Illinois was not denied due process where he was forced to either waive his constitutional right to an extradition hearing or be convicted for failing to appear in an Iowa criminal proceeding). Sometimes the choices faced by a defendant may have the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights but that does not mean such choices are prohibited. Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not always forbid requiring him to choose. The deciding factor is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved. Id. (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held a defendant was not compelled to incriminate himself merely because he had to make a choice which implicated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 217, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1472, 28 L.Ed.2d 711, 732 (1971) (the policies underlying the privilege against compelled self-incrimination are not offended when defendant in capital case yields to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging his case on guilt); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1896-97, 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 450-51 (1970) (privilege against self-incrimination not violated by requiring defendant to give notice of alibi defense and alibi witnesses). The defendant in Elliott was faced with essentially the same situation that confronted the defendant in this case. Had Elliott disclosed the existence of the gun before being removed from his own property he could have avoided incurring the concealed weapons charge. However, in doing so he would have disclosed the location of evidence relevant to the firearms offense of which he had already been charged. We held that requiring the defendant to choose between avoiding the commission of the carrying weapons offense and his right not to incriminate himself on the other charge did not engender a constitutional transgression. Elliott, 557 N.W.2d at 889. We are not persuaded that the circumstances of this case would warrant any different result, and we conclude trial counsel breached no duty in failing to raise this issue.