Opinion ID: 870353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Remand Following Coupe I

Text: On remand, the court, on May 14, 2009, issued a Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order to First Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed September 27, 2007 as to Condemnation 2 (Supplemental FOFCOL as to Condemnation 2). The court's findings listed numerous traffic studies and plans conducted by the County and the State of Hawai'i, which recognized the public need for a roadway to bypass the M&amacr;malahoa Highway and that an arterial highway in the area of the [Bypass] would relieve unacceptable traffic congestion of the M&amacr;malahoa Highway. Furthermore, the court's findings, in part, stated as follows: 19. The Coupes contend that Condemnation 2, like Condemnation 1, was driven by the County's desire to comply with its obligations under the Development Agreement. No evidence supporting this contention was presented at trial, and the [c]ourt finds passage of Resolution No. 31-03 (Condemnation 2) evidences the County's desire to get the Bypass built for public purposes. 20. The Coupes contend that construction of the Bypass Highway was necessary to provide access to Hokuli'a. Oceanside already had public access to M&amacr;malahoa Highway through Haleki'i Street. The Bypass Highway, which bisects Hokuli'a and connects with other public roads at both ends beyond the Hokuli'a property, does provide improved access to Hokuli'a for development of a luxury subdivision, but that does not negate the County Council's predominant purpose by enacting Resolution No. 31-03 to obtain the Bypass Highway for broader public purposes, consisting of an additional traffic corridor for those traveling through the region (as opposed to those traveling to and from Hokuli'a). 21. A highway to bypass the M&amacr;malahoa Highway is a piece of regional infrastructure for the benefit of those residing in the Kona area and has thus been determined to serve the public interest. 22. Notwithstanding the [c]ourt finding that Condemnation 1 was invalid because the County delegated its condemnation power to Oceanside, the County's predominant purpose in entering into the Development Agreement with Oceanside as referred in Condemnation 1 is the construction of the Bypass for public use. (Emphases added.) The court concluded in part that the Bypass was not of a predominantly private character[,] the County's public purpose [was] not `irrational' with `only incidental or pretextual' public purpose benefits[,] the adoption of Resolution No. 31-03 was rationally related to the need for the Bypass[,] and therefore the resolution was not pretextual: 13. The [court] concludes that the use (Bypass) was not of a predominately private character. The Bypass is a much needed road for the public benefit. A number of studies and plans prepared by the County and State of Hawai'i determined a public need long before the County and Oceanside entered into the Development Agreement. 14. The [court] concludes that the government's stated public purpose is not irrational with only incidental or pretextual public purpose benefits. The totality of the factual circumstances beyond the face of Resolution No. 31-03 does not support [Coupe's] claim of pretext. 15. Despite any ostensible private benefit to Oceanside the actual purpose of Condemnation 2 was for a valid public use. 16. The County Council's adoption of Resolution No. 31-03 was rationally related to the need for the Bypass Highway and the County Council's asserted public purpose and supported by the circumstances beyond the face of the resolution was [sic] not pretextual. (Emphases added.)
On March 20, 2009, Coupe filed a motion for statutory damages not previously claimed pursuant to HRS § 101-27 for Condemnation 1 [hereinafter March 20, 2009 Motion] with the court. This March 20, 2009 Motion requested additional attorneys' fees and costs as HRS § 101-27 damages incurred by Coupe from September 1, 2007 through January 14, 2008 that were not previously included in Coupe's October 11, 2007 Motion, and from February 20, 2009 through March 20, 2009, that were not previously included in Coupe's Coupe II Request to this court. On March 30, 2009, the County filed its objections to Coupe's March 20, 2009 Motion and Oceanside joined. On April 6, 2009, Coupe filed a Reply Memorandum in support of its March 20, 2009 Motion. The Reply Memorandum included an Errata, which amended the requested amounts to $117,069.00 in attorneys' fees, $5,093.81 in costs, $4,949.76 in general excise tax, and $8,564.49 in prejudgment interest. On May 14, 2009, the court issued an order granting Coupe's March 20, 2009 Motion in the amounts of $41,685.00 in attorneys' fees, $3,703.33 in costs, and $1,557.48 in general excise tax. Of the $117,069.00 in attorneys' fees requested in the March 20, 2009 Motion, the court excluded $75,384.00 in attorneys' fees sought for the preparation of the billing records and the preparation of Coupe's fee petition. Of the $4,949.76 in general excise tax requested in the March 20, 2009 Motion, the court excluded $3,392.28 in excise taxes that were associated with the $75,384.00 in attorneys' fees. Of the $5,093.81 in costs requested in March 20, 2009 Motion, the court excluded $1,390.48 in costs that were associated with electronic research, messenger/courier services, and travel and hotel costs. The court denied all of Coupe's request for $8,564.49 in prejudgment interest. In rejecting the $75,384.00 of attorneys' fees associated with preparing the billing records and Coupe's fee petition, the court ruled as follows: WHEREFORE, there shall be no recovery for fees and expenses incurred in litigating the propriety of the fees to be awarded pursuant to Hawai'i Ventures, LLC v. Otaka, Inc., 116 Hawai'i 465, 173 P.3d 1122 (Haw.2007) (holding receivers are not entitled to recover fees and expenses associated with litigation involving the propriety of the fees to be awarded to them because the law imposes on a party the duty to pay her won [sic] fees and expenses in vindicating her personal interests). See also [ Coupe II, 120 Hawai'i at 414-15, 208 P.3d at 727-28] (denying [Coupe's] recovery for the costs it incurred in preparing the Request for fees and the Response). WHEREFORE, $75,384.00 sought for the preparation of billing records for [Coupe's] fee petition and/or preparation of the [Coupe's] fee petitions shall be excluded pursuant to Otaka as objected to by [the] County.