Opinion ID: 2360959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Issue

Text: The trial court dismissed the indictment against Mr. Day, in part, because of unfair and unjust delay. Specifically, the trial court identified the delay as delay in the presentation to a grand jury, and applied the factors set forth in Barker, supra, to determine whether Mr. Day had been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. However, Barker concerns post arrest delay, not preindictment delay. As we said in United States v. Kramer, 286 A.2d 856 (D.C.1972), the speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment has no application until the prospective defendant becomes an accused. Id. at 859 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). It is equally clear that delay from the date of the offense to date the criminal prosecution was begun is not covered by [Super. Ct.Crim. R.] 48(b) on which the trial court also relied. [2] Id. at 860 (citations omitted). Accordingly, Mr. Day's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated by preindictment delay. [3]