Opinion ID: 436140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Measure of Actual Damages

Text: 14 First Commodity contends that the instruction given by the trial court based on Missouri Approved Jury Instruction (M.A.I.) 4.01 was inappropriate. M.A.I. 4.01 reads, in full: 15 If you find in favor of plaintiff, then you must award plaintiff such sum as you believe will fairly and justly compensate plaintiff for any damages you believe he sustained [and is reasonably certain to sustain in the future] as a direct result of the occurrence mentioned in the evidence. 16 First Commodity argues that the appropriate measure of damages in this case is the benefit of the bargain rule as embodied in M.A.I. 4.03. This instruction measures the plaintiff's loss as the difference between the represented value of the property and the actual value of the property. Under Missouri law, this is ordinarily the correct measure of damages in a case of fraud. However, Missouri permits the use of other measures of damages where the peculiar circumstances of the fraud make the benefit of the bargain rule an inadequate measure of damages, Central Micro-film Service Corp. v. Basic/Four Corp., 688 F.2d 1206, 1220 (8th Cir.1982) (quoting Schroeder v. Zykan, 255 S.W.2d 105, 110 (Mo.Ct.App.1953)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1191, 75 L.Ed.2d 436 (1983), or where nothing of value is received from the transaction, Salmon v. Brookshire, 301 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Mo.Ct.App.1957). 17 We agree with the District Court that because of the peculiar circumstances of this case the benefit of the bargain rule was not the appropriate measure of damages. First, the record is devoid of any evidence that the options in question had an ascertainable market value or that there was any objective method by which their actual value could have been established. Second, assuming that the options initially had some value that Kerr might have realized, the actions of First Commodity caused Kerr to continue his course of dealing with defendant, and delayed his discovery of the fraud. As the District Court explained in overruling First Commodity's post-trial motions objecting to the instructions on actual damages: 18 The bargain theory was not appropriate in this case because the passage of time [after the purchase prevented the] plaintiff [from] reasonably ... taking action to avoid losses based on defendant's misrepresentations. Even if a sophisticated trader might have been willing to pay good money on a get-rich gamble, so that a theoretical market value could be assigned to the chance, the testimony is that plaintiff's money was lost before he knew what had happened. 19 D.R. at 190-91. (Citation omitted). Thus we believe the District Court was correct in giving to the jury instructions based on M.A.I. 4.01 rather than on M.A.I. 4.03. And even assuming arguendo that error could be found in the instructions, any such error has been rendered harmless by the District Court's remittitur of the jury's award of actual damages. Cf. Beaty v. N.W. Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 312 S.W.2d 369, 372-3 (Mo.Ct.App.1958) (in a property damage action where farmer's crop for 1953 was destroyed, and the judge erroneously instructed jury that it could award damages for 1954 crops as well, error in instructions held not prejudicial where judge granted remittitur).