Opinion ID: 4527065
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants’ Pre-Assault Claim

Text: In addition to their individual Title IX claims, Appellants allege that UC maintained a “policy of deliberate indifference to sexual misconduct” that “created a sexually hostile environment for [Appellants]” and heightened the risk that Appellants would be sexually assaulted. UC argues that this pre-assault theory of Title IX liability “fails as a matter of law” because it is “contrary to . . . Supreme Court precedent.” The district court dismissed this claim because it found Appellants’ argument that UC’s “level of awareness or deficiency of response with respect to the general problem of sexual violence is enough to establish either actual knowledge or deliberate indifference for the purposes of a Title IX claim” without sufficient basis in our case law. To the KARASEK V. REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA 33 district court’s credit, we have never directly addressed preassault Title IX claims. We hold that such a claim is a cognizable theory of Title IX liability. Because we clarify the standard applicable to such claims, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ pre-assault claim and remand for further proceedings. As explained above, a plaintiff asserting a Title IX claim based on sexual harassment committed by a faculty member or peer must demonstrate that the school had “actual knowledge” of the harassment and responded with “deliberate indifference.” See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. This ensures that a school is “liable in damages under Title IX only for its own misconduct,” and not that of third parties. Id. at 640. But the calculus shifts when a plaintiff alleges that a school’s “official policy” violates Title IX. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. In that context, the school has “intentionally violate[d] the statute.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 642. A school need not have had actual knowledge of a specific instance of sexual misconduct or responded with deliberate indifference to that misconduct before damages liability may attach. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; see also Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]here the official policy is one of deliberate indifference to a known overall risk of sexual harassment, notice of a particular harassment situation and an opportunity to cure it are not predicates for liability.”). Thus, a pre-assault claim should survive a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff plausibly alleges that (1) a school maintained a policy of deliberate 34 KARASEK V. REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA indifference to reports of sexual misconduct,5 (2) which created a heightened risk of sexual harassment that was known or obvious (3) in a context subject to the school’s control, and (4) as a result, the plaintiff suffered harassment that was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to [have] deprive[d] the [plaintiff] of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. We find persuasive the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). There, the University of Colorado hosted talented high school football players on campus each fall. The recruits were to be shown “a good time” and “were paired with female ‘Ambassadors.’” Id. at 1173. Some recruits were “promised an opportunity to have sex,” and there was evidence that the coaching staff not only knew of this conduct, but encouraged it. Id. at 1173–74. The university was aware of prior complaints of sexual misconduct by recruits and had been warned by the district attorney that the university needed to supervise the recruits and implement sexual assault prevention training. Id. at 1173–74, 1179–84. The plaintiffs were two women who were sexually assaulted by football recruits. Asserting a preassault claim, the plaintiffs argued that the university had a history of responding with deliberate indifference to reports of sexual assaults occurring in its football recruiting program. 5 We do not hold that deliberate indifference to reports of past sexual misconduct is the only form of pre-assault conduct that could result in an institution’s Title IX liability. Rather, we focus on the sufficiency of such allegations because they are what the FAC articulates. We do not have occasion to consider whether other forms of pre-assault conduct could amount to an official policy of deliberate indifference that is actionable under Title IX. KARASEK V. REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA 35 Id. at 1174–75, 1177. The district court granted summary judgment to the university, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish “actual notice” and “deliberate[] indifferen[ce].” Id. at 1174. The Tenth Circuit reversed. It held that “when [a Title IX] violation is caused by [an] official policy,” the “notice standards established . . . in Gebser and Davis” do not apply because, in that case, “the institution itself, rather than its employees (or students), [is] the wrongdoer.” Id. at 1177–78. Because the “risk of . . . [sexual] assault” in the football recruiting program was “obvious,” the failure to remedy that risk constituted an official policy of deliberate indifference that violated Title IX. Id. at 1178, 1180. UC reads Simpson to require that the risk of sexual harassment be a “specific problem in a specific program.” Based on that understanding, UC argues that Appellants’ allegations of a heightened risk of sexual harassment throughout UC’s programs cannot survive. We disagree. To be sure, Simpson involved a particular program. But Simpson’s reasoning, and the reasoning of Gebser and Davis, supports imposing Title IX liability when a school’s official policy is one of deliberate indifference to sexual harassment in any context subject to the school’s control. Of course, it may be easier to establish a causal link between a school’s policy of deliberate indifference and the plaintiff’s harassment when the heightened risk of harassment exists in a specific program. But we will not foreclose the possibility that a plaintiff could adequately allege causation even when a school’s policy of deliberate indifference extends to sexual misconduct occurring across campus. Applying the framework we have set forth, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of the pre-assault claim. Allegations 36 KARASEK V. REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA that UC had actual knowledge or acted with deliberate indifference to a particular incident of harassment are unnecessary to sustain this theory of liability. Instead, all Appellants need allege are facts demonstrating the four elements we have articulated above. What the FAC does allege is troubling. The FAC describes a report issued in 2014 by the California State Auditor that details deficiencies in UC’s approach to sexualmisconduct complaints. See CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR, REP. NO. 2013-124, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014). The Auditor found that, over a five-year period, UC “resolved 76 percent of Title IX complaints from students using the early resolution process” in a generally inadequate manner. Id. at 53. For example, UC could not “demonstrate that [it] consistently informed students of what to expect as the university investigated their complaints.” Id. at 55. UC also failed to “provide regular updates on the status of [its] investigations to students.” Id. at 57. It did not “consistently complete investigations in a timely manner.” Id. at 61. And it “did not notify all student complainants of the outcome of an investigation and the subsequent disciplinary action against the accused.” Id. at 59. Further, the Auditor found that UC did not sufficiently educate its employees and students about preventing sexual harassment, which led to the “mishandl[ing]” of sexual-misconduct complaints and “put[] the safety of [its] students at risk.” Id. at 15, 30. The FAC also highlights an incongruity between UC’s public statements and its handling of sexual-misconduct complaints. In February 2014, Denise Oldham—UC’s Title IX Officer—stated in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that she “could not imagine a situation where” using an KARASEK V. REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA 37 early resolution process for cases involving sexual assault “would be appropriate.” If Oldham’s premise is correct—that early resolution is not an appropriate mechanism for resolving sexual-assault claims—UC’s conduct during the period in question appears inexplicable. According to the FAC, of the five hundred cases of sexual misconduct reported to UC’s Office for the Prevention of Harassment and Discrimination in 2012, only two were resolved through a “formal process.” Similarly, of the fourteen sexualmisconduct complaints reported to UC’s Center for Student Conduct in 2013, all “were resolved through the . . . informal resolution process.” Finally, the FAC alleges that UC had a powerful incentive to resolve cases through an informal process. The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act requires UC to annually publish the number of “criminal . . . sex offenses, forcible or nonforcible,” that were “reported to campus security authorities or local police agencies” and that occurred on or around campus during the prior two years. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(i). According to the FAC, UC “takes the position” that “it is not required to report the offense” pursuant to the Clery Act “if the matter is resolved informally.” Assuming that is true (as we must, at this stage), it is plausible that choosing to resolve sexual-misconduct complaints through an early resolution process enables UC to escape these statutory disclosure requirements. UC argues that Appellants’ allegations are less probative of an official policy than the evidence mustered by the plaintiffs in Simpson. We agree that the allegations here are much broader than the specific problem of sexual assault in the University of Colorado’s football recruiting program. But 38 KARASEK V. REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA UC’s argument misses the mark. We are here on a motion to dismiss. Simpson involved a motion for summary judgment, after the parties had conducted discovery. Thus, the question is not whether Appellants’ allegations are comparable to the evidence produced in Simpson. Rather, the question is whether Appellants plausibly allege that UC had a policy of deliberate indifference that heightened the risk of sexual harassment on campus, resulting in the assaults Appellants experienced. Ultimately, we leave to the district court to decide, in the first instance, whether Appellants’ allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under the principles we have set forth. We reiterate that Title IX does not require UC to purge its campus of sexual misconduct to avoid liability. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. A university is not responsible for guaranteeing the good behavior of its students. The element of causation ensures that Title IX liability remains within proper bounds. To that end, adequately alleging a causal link between a plaintiff’s harassment and a school’s deliberate indifference to sexual misconduct across campus is difficult. Whether the FAC plausibly alleges such a link—or any of the four elements—is an issue for the district court to decide upon remand. And the district court retains the discretion to allow Appellants to amend their complaint if “justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In short, we vacate that portion of the district court’s dismissal order addressing Appellants’ pre-assault claim and remand for further proceedings. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.