Opinion ID: 1248491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: New Trials Granted, Prior to the 1933 Amendment, Because Damages Awarded Were Inadequate (or Excessive)

Text: The appellants seek to take the present cases out of the category of cases in which new trials have been granted on the basis that substantial justice has not been done, by pointing out that the only failure of justice that the trial court could have had in mind was the inadequacy of the verdicts, and that this court is entitled to examine the record and determine therefrom whether or not the verdicts are in fact inadequate. While there is evidence that would have supported considerably larger verdicts, we would not hesitate to say that the jury was well within the evidence when it concluded that the amounts awarded would reasonably and adequately compensate the appellants for the damages sustained; and most certainly the awards were not so inadequate as to indicate passion or prejudice. We will, therefore, turn to a consideration of our holdings with reference to the granting of new trials because of the inadequacy of the damages awarded by the jury. Excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice have always been a ground for a new trial in the territory and state of Washington. Our first territorial legislature enacted a law setting forth six grounds on which new trials might be granted, the fifth being Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. Laws of 1854, AN ACT to regulate the practice and proceedings in civil actions, chapter XX, Of New Trial, § 216. No change was made in that wording until 1909. Inadequate damages not only were not specified as a ground for a new trial in the 1854 act but, in 1869, when the legislature passed a new enactment To regulate the practice and proceedings in civil actions, chapter XXI, New Trial, § 279, thereof provided that: A new trial shall not be granted on account of the smallness of damages in an action for an injury to the person or reputation, nor in any other action where the damages shall equal the actual pecuniary injury sustained. That continued to be the law in the territory and state of Washington until 1909, when the section of the statute just quoted was repealed and the fifth ground for a new trial was amended to read: Excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. Laws of 1909, chapter 34, § 1; Rem. Rev. Stat., § 399 [P.P.C. § 78-3]. There was no further change affecting this ground or reason for a new trial until 1933, when the wording was changed to: Damages so excessive or inadequate as unmistakably to indicate that the verdict must have been the result of passion or prejudice. Laws of 1933, chapter 138, § 1; Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 399. Because of the nature of the present cases, we will cite only cases dealing with inadequate damages; but the same rules and reasoning are applicable to cases in which new trials have been granted by trial judges because of excessive damages. Between 1909 and the 1933 amendment, new trials were granted ten times because of inadequate damages. See Aboltin v. Heney, 62 Wash. 65, 113 Pac. 245; Bernard v. North Yakima, 80 Wash. 472, 141 Pac. 1034; Jorgenson v. Crane, 92 Wash. 642, 159 Pac. 796; Nelson v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co., 96 Wash. 43, 164 Pac. 594; Danielson v. Carstens Packing Co., 115 Wash. 516, 197 Pac. 617; Adams v. Anderson & Middleton Lbr. Co., 124 Wash. 356, 214 Pac. 835, 127 Wash. 678, 221 Pac. 993; Shead v. Riser, 136 Wash. 270, 239 Pac. 562; Daigle v. Rudebeck, 154 Wash. 536, 282 Pac. 827; McGinnis v. Brandt, 158 Wash. 656, 291 Pac. 709; Huntington v. Clallam Grain Co., 175 Wash. 310, 27 P. (2d) 583. The only instance in which the action of the trial court in these cases was not affirmed was where we held that the plaintiffs had not made a case for the jury and that the action should have been dismissed. Adams v. Anderson & Middleton Lbr. Co., supra. An examination of the ten cases just cited discloses that, while in some instances we indicated that the damages were grossly inadequate or were so inadequate as to indicate the existence of passion or prejudice, we affirmed an order granting a new trial when the trial judge had said specifically that the damages were not so far inadequate as to indicate passion or prejudice. This was done on the theory that it was the duty of the trial court to see that substantial justice was done. Daigle v. Rudebeck, supra ; see, also, Huntington v. Clallam Grain Co., supra . And we find reasoning through practically all of these cases indicating that, if the damages awarded were inadequate, substantial justice had not been done; and that, if substantial justice had not been done, there could be no review of the order granting a new trial except to the limited extent heretofore indicated. Thus, in Daigle v. Rudebeck, supra , we said: We have frequently held that where the evidence is conflicting, it is entirely within the discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a new trial upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, and we have likewise upheld trial courts in setting aside verdicts and granting new trials where the amount awarded was in the opinion of the trial court inadequate. [Citing cases.] It is the duty of the trial court to see that substantial justice is done, and if he believes that the amount of damages awarded to the prevailing party is inadequate, it is as much his duty to grant a new trial as it would be upon the motion of the defendant, if the amount were excessive. In some but not all of the cases in which new trials were granted because of inadequate damages, the reason which limits the review by an appellate court, i.e., that the trial judge may be motivated by matters and incidents which cannot be made a part of the record, was specifically suggested. We quote from Danielson v. Carstens Packing Co., supra . If we were to assume, as appellant does, that the court granted the motion for new trial because it considered the verdict of the jury to be inadequate, still, we would not interfere because we cannot say from the record that it abused the discretion vested in it. Many things may occur during the trial of a case which are perfectly manifest to the trial court, but which are not and cannot be made a matter of record. (Italics ours.) And from Shead v. Riser, supra : Where the trial court grants a new trial for the reason that the damages are inadequate, this court will not interfere, unless we can see from the record that there was an abuse of discretion. Many things may occur during the trial of a case which are perfectly manifest to the trial court, but which are not and cannot be made a matter of record. (Italics ours.) Although it is not difficult to imagine cases in which everything pertaining to the adequacy or inadequacy of the damages would be in the record, we apparently decided all the cases in this category on the basis that, if the damages were inadequate or excessive, substantial justice had not been done, and that, if substantial justice had not been done, it may have been by reason of matters which could not be made a part of the record, and hence there could be no review (practically speaking) of the order granting a new trial. There can be no question but that, prior to the 1933 amendment, it was well established that, where a new trial had been granted on the ground that damages were excessive or inadequate and there was conflicting evidence on the issue of damages, we would not interfere with the order granting a new trial if there was a case for the jury and evidence on which the jury could have reached a verdict different as to the amount of damages from the one rendered.