Opinion ID: 2633469
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The information presented to the grand jury was insufficient to satisfy article I, sections 10 and 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution.

Text: Article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution provides in relevant part that [n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime[ ] unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury or upon a finding of probable cause after a preliminary hearing held as provided by law. [20] We have said that an indictment must be specific enough to ensure that the grand jury had before it all the facts necessary to find probable cause. State v. Israel, 78 Hawai`i 66, 73, 890 P.2d 303, 310 (1995) (citing State v. Kane, 3 Haw.App. 450, 457, 652 P.2d 642, 647 (1982)). Furthermore, HRS § 806-34, see supra note 19, states that an indictment must set forth the details of the transaction involving the defendant with so much detail of time, place, and circumstances... as are necessary to identify the transaction, to bring it within the statutory definition of the offense charged, to show that the court has jurisdiction, and to give the accused reasonable notice of the facts. This requirement is grounded in article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution, which requires that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. [21] In order to honor this right, an indictment must apprise the accused of the charges against him, so that he may adequately prepare his defense. State v. Vanstory, 91 Hawai`i 33, 44, 979 P.2d 1059, 1070 (1999) (quoting State v. Sword, 68 Haw. 343, 345, 713 P.2d 432, 434 (1986)). Nevertheless, we have not yet identified which of the substantive components set forth in HRS § 701-114(1), see supra note 9, must be factually alleged in the indictment to ensure that the due process requirement of article I, section 14 is fulfilled and, pursuant to article I, section 10, to ensure that the grand jury has before it all the facts necessary to find probable cause. Israel, 78 Hawai'i at 73, 890 P.2d at 310.
An indictment must enable a grand jury to determine that probable cause exists that the accused committed a violation of the charged offense both as to the elements of the offense and the concomitant culpable state of mind. See Ontai, 84 Hawai`i at 63, 929 P.2d at 76 (Probable cause is established by `a state of facts as would lead a person of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.') (quoting State v. Chung, 75 Haw. 398, 409-10, 862 P.2d 1063, 1070 (1993)); State v. Araki, 82 Hawai'i 474, 482, 923 P.2d 891, 899 (1996) (Probable cause has been established when it can be said that a reasonable and prudent person viewing the evidence would have a strong suspicion that a crime has been committed.); Kane, 3 Haw.App. at 458, 652 P.2d at 648 (holding that the grand jury had sufficient facts to find probable cause that the defendant had committed a violation of HRS § 134-9, relating to firearms possession); State v. Okumura, 59 Haw. 549, 550, 584 P.2d 117, 119 (1978) (A grand jury indictment must be based on probable cause. . . [, meaning such facts necessary] to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of guilt of the accused.) (Internal citation omitted.). Because conscientiously entertain[ing] a strong suspicion of guilt of the accused necessitates establishing a likelihood that (1) all elements of the charged offense are present and (2) the accused possessed the requisite state of mind as to each element of the charged offense, an indictment must, ipso facto, aver facts sufficient to permit the grand jury to find probable cause both as to the elements of the charged offense and to the accused's state of mind.
In addition to alleging the elements of the charged offense, the plain language of HRS § 806-34 requires that an indictment aver facts sufficient to show that the court has jurisdiction. In turn, HRPP Rule 12(b)(2), see supra note 6, allows motions to dismiss based on jurisdictional defects at any time during the pendency of the proceedings. Indeed, jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the person of the accused is a fundamental and indispensable prerequisite to a valid prosecution. Adams v. State, 103 Hawai`i 214, 221, 81 P.3d 394, 401 (2003) (citing State v. Meyers, 72 Haw. 591, 593, 825 P.2d 1062, 1064 (1992) (citations omitted)). Venue too must be established for an indictment to be sufficient, though, under Hawai`i law, venue rides the coattails of jurisdiction: HRS § 806-16 (1993) states that [i]t shall not be necessary to state any venue in the body of any indictment, but the jurisdiction named in the margin thereof shall be taken to be the venue for all facts stated in the body of the indictment. Finally, article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution requires that, [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, or of such other district to which the prosecution may be removed with the consent of the accused.... (Emphasis added.) A plain reading of this language supports the conclusion that proper venue must be ascertained before a prosecution at trial may lawfully proceed. [22]
It is true, as the prosecution urges, that an indictment need not allege facts solely related to negating defenses that may be raised by the accused. State v. Adams, 64 Haw. 568, 571, 645 P.2d 308, 309 (1982) (It has long been held that indictments need not anticipate and negate possible defenses; rather, it is left to the defendant to show his defenses at trial.). It is equally true that the statute of limitations is a waivable affirmative defense. See Adams v. State, 103 Hawai`i at 226, 81 P.3d at 406 (citing Acevedo-Ramos v. United States, 961 F.2d 305, 307-09 (1st. Cir.1992) (concluding that statute of limitations is a waivable affirmative defense)); Timoteo, 87 Hawai'i at 115-16, 952 P.2d at 872-73 (holding that [the defendant] waived the statute of limitations for the time-barred lesser included offense of simple trespass by requesting that the trial court instruct the jury on it). Nevertheless, while statutes of limitation may be invoked, and waived, as affirmative defenses, that is not the sum total of their nature or function. As set forth in HRS § 701-114(1)(e), the timeliness of the prosecution in satisfaction of HRS § 701-108 constitutes a baseline substantive component that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial; silence by the defendant on the issue of timeliness does not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving that component. Rather, facts establishing timeliness, like facts establishing jurisdiction, must be averred in order to fulfill due process notice requirements. [23] This court's holding in Kaakimaka implicitly established this proposition. In Kaakimaka, the defendant was charged, inter alia, with conspiracy to commit second degree murder, in violation of HRS § 705-520 (1993), [24] three years and eleven months after the victim's murder. Pursuant to HRS § 701-108(2)(c), see supra note 3, prosecution for conspiracy to commit second degree murder, as an unclassified felony, had a statutory limit of three years. Therefore, in an effort to preserve the conspiracy charge in the face of the three-year limit, the prosecution alleged that the conspiracy included an underlying felony of concealment of murder which ran continuously past the date of the murder such that the statute of limitations had not expired by the time of the indictment. This court held that because concealment was not an identifiable underlying felony offense set forth in the HPC, as required by HRS § 705-520, see supra note 24, the indictment was insufficient. 84 Hawai'i at 293, 933 P.2d at 630. This court demanded specificity as to which particular felony underlay the conspiracy charge because of the correlative nature of punishment for a conspiracy conviction, where the grade and class of the conspiracy is contingent upon the grade and class of the most serious underlying offense that is an object of the conspiracy. 84 Hawai'i at 295, 933 P.2d at 632 (citing HRS § 705-526 (1993)). [25] Thus, we ruled that failure to aver an identifiable underlying offense deprives the defendant of notice of the class and grade of conspiracy and, therefore, deprives him or her of notice of the possible punishment and the statute of limitations. Such failure to notify a defendant of the charges he or she must prepare to meet deprives him or her of due process. Id. Our decision in Kaakimaka supports the proposition that an indictment is insufficient if: (1) on its face, it is untimely; and (2) it fails to allege facts that invoke an exception to the standard statute of limitations set forth in HRS § 701-108(2) so that [the accused] may adequately prepare his [or her] defense, Vanstory, 91 Hawai'i at 44, 979 P.2d at 1070, as required by due process. That is because facts necessary adequately to prepare a defense include those that put the accused on notice as to any exception to the applicable statute of limitations upon which the prosecution is relying. We therefore hold that, on the facts before us, when the charged offense is theft by deception, as defined by HRS § 708-830(2), and the prosecution is relying on the tolling provision of HRS § 701-108(3)(a), relating to [a]ny offense an element of which is ... fraud, the prosecution must not only allege the timely date or dates of commission of the offense in the indictment, but also the earliest date of the discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or ... a person who has a legal duty to represent [the] aggrieved party. Inasmuch as the indictment in the present matter failed to aver facts pertaining to the date of discovery of the aggrieved party, DAGS, the circuit court correctly determined that it was insufficient. [26]