Opinion ID: 669894
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inadequacy-of-Warning Claims

Text: We review the district court's determination concerning the preemption of the FRSA de novo. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Swanson, 533 F.3d 618, 621 (8th Cir.2008). We are mindful of our general reluctance to find preemption when interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law. Id. The federal regulations that address the adequacy of warning devices are found at 23 C.F.R § 646.214(b)(3) and (4). According to section 646.214(b)(3)(i): Adequate warning devices ... on any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices are to include automatic gates with flashing light signals when one or more of the following conditions exist: (A) Multiple main line railroad tracks. (B) Multiple tracks at or in the vicinity of the crossing which may be occupied by a train or locomotive so as to obscure the movement of another train approaching the crossing. (C) High speed train operation combined with limited sight distance at either single or multiple track crossings. (D) A combination of high speeds and moderately high volumes of highway and railroad traffic. (E) Either a high volume of vehicular traffic, high number of train movements, substantial numbers of schoolbuses or trucks carrying hazardous materials, unusually restricted sight distance, continuing accident occurrences, or any combination of these conditions. (F) A diagnostic team recommends them. 23 C.F.R § 646.214(b)(3)(i). Where a crossing does not exhibit the factors listed in section 646.214(b)(3)(i), which require the crossing to be equipped with automatic gates and flashing lights, the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of FHWA [Federal Highway Administration]. 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(4). BNSF introduced the uncontroverted affidavit of Ellis Tompkins, the custodian of records for the Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR). Tompkins's affidavit and supporting documents indicated the following: The B Street Crossing where Grade's accident occurred was equipped with a reflectorized crossbuck sign. The crossbuck sign was installed pursuant to a 1978 agreement between the NDOR, BNSF's predecessor BN, and the FHWA to add reflectorized crossbuck signs to certain crossings within Nebraska. BN installed the reflectorized crossbuck and was reimbursed for 90% of its cost by federal funds from the FHWA. In the time since the crossbuck's installation, neither the NDOR nor the FHWA has considered whether the crossing required any additional warning devices. Grade's complaint alleges that the crossbuck sign was inadequate because, although not required by federal regulation, additional warning devices, such as a flagman or lookout, should have been in place at the crossing. Additionally, Grade's claims (f), (g), and (h) appear to allege that the B Street Crossing should have complied with section 646.214(b)(3)(i), as he alleges the crossing should have been equipped with automatic gates and flashing lights. In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 357-59, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000), the Supreme Court determined that when a crossing warning device has been installed using federal funds, any state claim alleging the inadequacy of that warning device is preempted irrespective of whether the warning device complied with section 646.214(b)(3) or (4). According to Shanklin, it is the use of federal funds in the installation of a warning device rather than the compliance with federal regulations that triggers preemption. 529 U.S. at 357-58, 120 S.Ct. 1467. Because the B Street Crossing was equipped with a warning device using federal funds, under Shanklin, all of Grade's claims, including the claims alleging the crossing device was not in compliance with section 646.214(b)(3), are preempted. Grade argues Shanklin is no longer good law because of a 2007 Amendment to the FRSA preemption section, 49 U.S.C. § 20106. Congress amended section 20106 in response to a group of cases arising out of a 2006 Minot, North Dakota accident in which a train derailed and released more than 222,000 gallons of toxic gas into the air, resulting in injury to many people. See Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co. (Lundeen II), 532 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir.2008). Federal courts that heard the Minot derailment cases, including ours, found that the plaintiffs' state causes of action were completely preempted by the FRSA. Id. at 687-88. These decisions caus[ed] a stir on the political front. Id. at 688. In response, Congress passed the 2007 Amendment to the FRSA, which states: Nothing in [the FRSA] shall be construed to preempt an action under State law seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property damage alleging that a party  (A) has failed to comply with the Federal standard of care established by a regulation or order issued by the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security matters), covering the subject matter as provided in subsection (a) of this section; (B) has failed to comply with its own plan, rule, or standard that it created pursuant to a regulation or order issued by either of the Secretaries; or (C) has failed to comply with a State law, regulation, or order that is not incompatible with subsection (a)(2). 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1)(A)-(C). The Amendment was retroactive to the date of the Minot derailment. 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(2); Lundeen II, 532 F.3d at 688. Grade argues that the 2007 Amendment renders Shanklin bad law and prevents his inadequacy-of-warning claims from being preempted. We find, however, that the 2007 Amendment has no effect on Shanklin inadequacy-of-warning claims. In the Minot derailment cases that the 2007 Amendment sought to address, the plaintiffs' claims were based on a theory that the railroads had negligently failed to inspect the rail track. See Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co. (Lundeen I), 447 F.3d 606, 614 (8th Cir.2006), superseded by statute, 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1)(A)-(C), as recognized in Lundeen II, 532 F.3d at 688. The FRSA regulations governing inspection of tracks place ongoing duties on railroads. For example, [e]ach railroad that operates railroad freight cars ... shall designate persons qualified to inspect railroad freight cars for compliance with the FRSA. 49 C.F.R. § 215.11(a). Similarly, federal regulations establish a specific inspection protocol including how, 49 C.F.R. § 213.233(b), when, §§ 213.233(c) &.237(a)-c, and by whom, §§ 212.203, 213.7 and .233(a), track inspections must be conducted.... Lundeen I, 447 F.3d at 614. [F]ederal and state inspectors determine the extent to which the railroads, shippers, and manufacturers have fulfilled their obligations with respect to ... inspection. Id. [R]ailroads face civil penalties for violations. Id. Based on this extensive regulatory scheme governing inspection, we and other courts found that state claims arising from the Minot derailment were completely preempted. See, e.g., Id. at 614-15; Mehl v. Can. Pac. Ry., Ltd., 417 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1116-18 (D.N.D.2006). The 2007 Amendment clarified that the FRSA does not preempt claims like those asserted in the Minot derailment cases that allege a railroad has failed to comply with a Federal standard of care. The legislative history of the 2007 Amendment indicates it was intended to clarify the preemptive effect of the FRSA, not to change it, and indeed the Amendment refers to itself as a clarification. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b); H.R.Rep. No. 110-259, at 351. Because the Amendment is a clarification and not a change, its application is limited to cases in which a plaintiff brings a negligence claim that alleges a railroad failed to comply with an ongoing, federal standard of care. In such cases, a plaintiff's claims are not preempted. However, where a plaintiff brings a claim alleging a violation of a federal regulation that does not create an ongoing, federal standard of care, the Amendment does not apply, and the plaintiff's claims are governed by pre-Amendment preemption cases. The warning-device regulations under which Grade brings his claims do not create an ongoing, federal standard of care under which the railroad is expected to act. Rather than imposing a federal standard of care under which a railroad is expected to act, the warning regulations take the ` final authority to decide what warning system is needed ... out of the railroad's and the state's hands.' Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir.2008). The warning regulations `displace state and private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained.' Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 353, 120 S.Ct. 1467 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 670, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993)). If a crossing presents those conditions listed in [23 C.F.R § 646.214(b)(3)(i) ], the State must install automatic gates and flashing lights, if the (b)(3) factors are absent, (b)(4) dictates that the decision as to what devices to install is subject to FHWA approval. Id. at 354, 120 S.Ct. 1467. Unlike the inspection regulations at issue in the derailment cases, the warning regulations place no ongoing duty on the railroads with which the companies are expected to comply. The State may demand the railroad's assistance in the installation of warning devices, but the regulations themselves place no duty on the railroads to act and thus do not outline a federal standard of care with which the railroads must comply. The regulations place the responsibility for implementing adequate warning devices on the State, thereby preempting any cause of action alleging a railroad failed to properly install an adequate warning device. The railroad could not, as a matter of law, fail to comply with § 646.214(b)(3) or (4). Henning, 530 F.3d at 1215. Because we agree with the Tenth Circuit that the warning regulations do not create a federal standard of care under which the railroad is expected to act, the 2007 Amendment has no effect on the prior case law relating to those regulations. As such, Shanklin was not overruled by the 2007 Amendment, and it is controlling. Under Shanklin, because the B Street Crossing warning system was paid for in part by federal funds, Grade's warning claims are preempted. In addition to his argument that his warning claims are no longer preempted based on the 2007 Amendment to the FRSA, Grade argues his claims are not preempted based on the local-condition savings clause under the FRSA. Under the savings clause, claims that would otherwise be preempted under the FRSA are not preempted where a claim is brought under a state law necessary to address an essentially local condition. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2)(A)-(C); Duluth, Winnipeg, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Orr, 529 F.3d 794, 796 (8th Cir.2008). Grade argues that a local condition existed at the B Street crossing, specifically, heavy fog and ice, making it necessary for extra warnings to be in place. The local-condition savings clause does not apply where a condition is statewide in character or is capable of being adequately addressed in the national standards created by the Secretary of Transportation. Duluth, Winnipeg, & Pac. Ry. Co., 529 F.3d at 798. In Duluth, the plaintiffs alleged five local conditions existed that warranted heightened safety expectations: 1) the track was in close proximity to a lake; 2) the soil surrounding the crossing was swampy; 3) propane tanks were located too close to the track; 4) churches and businesses were located extremely close to the track; and 5) extreme seasonal temperature changes occurred in the region. Id. at 797-99. We found these conditions were insufficient to establish a local condition. Id. at 798-99. In implementing the national regulations, the Secretary of Transportation was surely aware that fog would exist along railroad tracks on many occasions and that ice storms would occur. These conditions are not uniquely local in character and could be adequately addressed at the national level. Thus, the local-condition savings clause does not apply, and the district court was correct in determining that Grade's inadequacy-of-warning claims were preempted by the FRSA.