Opinion ID: 2960272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Void for Vagueness Claim

Text: Huarcaya also claims that both the statute and the regulation violate due process because they are “void for vagueness” as applied to him, arguing that the phrase “meritorious in fact” is undefined and does not appear to have any well-known meaning. Huarcaya’s ability to maintain a void-for-vagueness challenge to a civil regulation that provides immigration benefits is not clear. See generally Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine is chiefly applied to criminal legislation. Laws with civil consequences receive less exacting vagueness scrutiny.”). We need not resolve that issue, nor need we address the government’s claim that Huarcaya does not have a due process interest in adjustment of status, 11 because Huarcaya has failed to establish that the provision is vague as applied to him. “When the challenge is vagueness ‘as applied,’ there is a two-part test: a court must first determine whether the statute gives the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and then consider whether the law provides explicit standards for those who apply it.” United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 549 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir. 2006). Although “meritorious in fact” is not a specifically defined term, Huarcaya did not lack notice as to what was required. The CIS told Huarcaya that he needed to submit more documentation to supplement his first wife’s I-130, and that pictures alone were not enough. Moreover, Huarcaya knew already from the application his second wife successfully submitted and copiously documented for her I-130 petition what he needed to show to prove his marriage. As for the second prong, we agree with the government that marriage-based visa eligibility has always meant that a petitioner had to demonstrate that his marriage was bona fide. Given the guidance supplied by Riero and immigration judges’ familiarity with determining the validity of marriage-based petitions, no real threat of arbitrary enforcement is presented. We therefore find that the regulation is not void for vagueness.