Opinion ID: 166182
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Mohammed's Statement was Testimonial

Text: 40 Having determined that Mohammed's statement was hearsay, we must next ascertain whether it was testimonial. As the Supreme Court has explained, only testimonial hearsay is subject to Crawford's rule. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. However, in propounding the rule in Crawford, the Supreme Court declined to rigidly define what is meant by the term testimonial. Id. (We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of `testimonial.'). Thus, we are left to go where angels and even Justices fear to tread. See Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir.1993) (If there are areas where angels fear to tread, surely there are places the sight of which make federal judges tremble.) 41 The Crawford opinion is not, however, devoid of guidance for appellate courts considering whether hearsay in a given case is testimonial. To the contrary, the opinion provides relevant guideposts to frame our analysis. In Crawford, the defendant was convicted of assault after stabbing a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38, 124 S.Ct. 1354. At trial, the state played a tape-recorded statement of the defendant's wife describing the stabbing to police officers. Id. at 39-40, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Her statement arguably differed from the defendant's own account. Id. at 39, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The defendant's wife did not testify at trial because of Washington's marital privilege. Id. at 40, 124 S.Ct. 1354. However, over objection, the district court admitted the tape recording of her prior statement as a statement against penal interest. Id. 42 The Court first turned to the historical background of the Sixth Amendment to help determine the breadth of the confrontation right. Id. at 42-51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In the Court's view, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. Id. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Under the civil law, testimony adduced through private examination of witnesses by judicial officers might be used against the defendant at trial without the opportunity for cross-examination. See id. at 43, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Such practices had at times found their way into common-law practice, though not without considerable protest. See id. at 43-45, 48, 124 S.Ct. 1354. It is with this historical practice in mind, whereby formal statements made to government officers might be admitted against the accused, that the Sixth Amendment must be interpreted. Id. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354. As the Court further explained, the text of the Sixth Amendment reflects the founder's especial concern regarding formal, ex parte communications, applying as it does to witnesses, or those who give testimony, against the accused. Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In other words, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object. Id. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 43 Drawing on this historical analysis and the factual circumstances of the case, the Court established a baseline or minimum with respect to the question of what constitutes testimonial hearsay. In the words of the Court, Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal trial; and to police interrogations. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In that the statement at issue in Crawford was made to police officers during interrogation, the Court had little difficulty in concluding that it was testimonial in nature. 44 But what lies beyond the minimum? The Court gave some hint in commenting on other formulations of the core class of `testimonial' statements. Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. For instance, Crawford himself urged a definition that would include ` ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.' Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23). Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, also took note of a formulation previously propounded by concurring Justices that would have included `extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.' Id. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). Finally, amici curiae urged that testimonial statements included those `that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.' Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae at 3). Without endorsing a particular formulation, the Court indicated that all shared a common nucleus. Id. 45 We conclude that the common nucleus present in the formulations which the Court considered centers on the reasonable expectations of the declarant. It is the reasonable expectation that a statement may be later used at trial that distinguishes the flippant remark, proffered to a casual acquaintance, see id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, from the true testimonial statement. Certain factual circumstances surrounding an out-of-court statement give rise to just such an expectation, including formalized settings such as police interrogations, confessions, or the taking of statements under oath. We need not at this juncture define with any certainty the possible universe of circumstances that would lead an objective declarant to believe that his statement might subsequently be used in a criminal investigation or prosecution. We further reject a narrow approach that would limit testimonial statements to those made by witnesses who testify either by taking the stand in person or via government-prepared affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the like. Ahkil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 Geo. L.J. 1045, 1045 (1998). Such an approach is akin to that expressly rejected by the Court in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (rejecting the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony), in that it emphasizes form over substance. Rather, we believe an objective test focusing on the reasonable expectations of the declarant under the circumstances of the case more adequately safeguards the accused's confrontation right and more closely reflects the concerns underpinning the Sixth Amendment. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. L.J. 1011, 1040-43 (1998). Thus we hold that a statement is testimonial if a reasonable person in the position of the declarant would objectively foresee that his statement might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime. 9 46 Turning to the circumstances of this case, we hold that Mohammed's hearsay statement, How did you guys find us so fast?, was testimonial in nature and that its admission at trial violated the rule in Crawford. 10 Although Mohammed had not been read his Miranda rights and was not subject to formal interrogation, he had nevertheless been taken into physical custody by police officers. His question was directed at a law enforcement official. Moreover, Mohammed's statement not only implicated Mr. Thomas, it also implicated himself and was thus loosely akin to a confession. Under these circumstances, we find that a reasonable person in Mohammed's position would objectively foresee that an inculpatory statement implicating himself and others might be used in a subsequent investigation or prosecution. 47 Our conclusion that Mohammed's statement constituted testimonial hearsay forecloses reliance on the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. In abrogating its previous decision in Roberts, permitting the use of statements in criminal trials where admission was firmly rooted in a hearsay exception, the Crawford Court made clear that [w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence. 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Under this clear command, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Mohammed's statement at trial.