Opinion ID: 1744499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Combined Fault Assessment Form

Text: Cass and World assert that the trial court erred in refusing their request that the case be submitted on a combined fault assessment form. We expressly reserved resolution of this question in Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry and Machine Co., 376 N.W.2d 323, 327 (N.D.1985), because the defendant had failed to preserve the issue in the trial court. Our resolution of the issue, however, follows by implication from our analysis in Mauch. As previously discussed, ordinary negligence is not a defense in a strict liability action, and the ordinary negligence of the plaintiff or a third party is not to be considered in assessing fault. Thus, the ordinary negligence of the plaintiff or a third party cannot be employed to diminish the percentage of fault attributable to the defective nature of the product. Cass and World have not offered a plausible verdict form which would combine fault assessment for the negligence and strict liability theories, yet isolate the determination of strict liability percentages from the ordinary contributory negligence considerations applicable to the negligence cause of action. Nor can we envision a verdict form which would combine fault assessment of the two theories without eviscerating Mauch. Using any combined assessment form, an increase or decrease in the percentage of negligence attributed to Butz or Werner would have a corresponding effect on the percentage of fault left available to assess against Cass and World on the strict liability claim. Mauch clearly prohibits such a result. Strict products liability and negligence are separate and distinct theories of recovery. Mauch, supra, 345 N.W.2d at 345. Strict liability focuses upon the product and its use, whereas negligence focuses on the conduct of the parties. Different defenses are available under the two theories. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that there is no logical method to combine fault assessment under the two theories without effectively blending them to the point of destroying their functions as separate theories of recovery. Our conclusion today is bolstered by our holding in Hoerr, supra, where the appropriateness of using separate fault assessment forms was questioned on appeal, but the defendant had failed to object to the special verdict form in the trial court. We were, however, required to determine the effect of the combined fault assessment form. The defendant argued that the fairest compromise would be to average the strict liability and negligence fault assessments, rather than allow Hoerr to choose to have judgment entered on the theory which provided the greater amount of recovery. We rejected the defendant's contention, and expressly agreed with the following rationale of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in a similar case: `We perceive of no reason to disavow th[e strict liability] verdict merely because the plaintiff was also found entitled to recover due to Fireco's negligence. Where a defendant is found liable on the theory of strict liability, plaintiff's entitlement to recovery should not be diminished or altered because defendant is also liable on another theory of wrongdoing.... When a jury verdict sustains several alternative theories of recovery advanced by a plaintiff, the trial court must [unless plaintiff chooses otherwise] render judgment on the theory which affords the greatest recovery. Mowery v. Fantastic Homes, Inc., 568 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex.Civ.App.1978).' Hoerr, supra, 376 N.W.2d at 328 (quoting Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of New Jersey, 81 N.J. 548, 564-565, 410 A.2d 674, 682-683 (1980)). This rationale supports our conclusion that separate fault assessment forms are proper. We believe that if a combined fault assessment form were used, in many cases a plaintiff's recovery would be diminished or altered because defendant is also liable on another theory of wrongdoing. A combined fault assessment form would effectively require comparison of the defendant's strict liability with the plaintiff's ordinary negligence, which is a factual fault of the accident but is not legal fault under a strict products liability claim. The result could be to improperly diminish or alter the recovery which the plaintiff would have been entitled to under separate fault assessments. We can discern no reason why a plaintiff who can prove two separate causes of action, and thus two separate wrongs by the defendant, should be required to risk diminution of his recovery because he prevails on both theories. If the plaintiff can prove two separate theories he is entitled to have the jury instructed on the separate theories, to have fault assessed separately on each theory, and to have judgment entered on the theory which provides the greater recovery. See Hoerr, supra, 376 N.W.2d at 327-328. Cass and World suggest that a recently enacted statute, Chapter 32-03.2, N.D.C.C., requires that combined fault assessment forms be used in cases such as this. Initially we note that Chapter 32-03.2 applies only to claims accruing after July 8, 1987. Cass and World assert that they do not seek retroactive application of the statute, but rather suggest that the statute is indicative of the state's public policy and should be used to fill the void left from our prior decisions. Cass and World rely upon Davis v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 420 N.W.2d 347 (N.D.1988), to support their argument. In Davis we noted that a later-enacted statute may be indicative of earlier public policy [a]bsent anything contrary. Davis, supra, 420 N.W.2d at 349. As previously discussed, however, Mauch is contrary to Cass and World's interpretation of the public policy expressed in the statute, and adoption of their argument would not merely fill the void but would seriously erode the holding of Mauch. We will not apply the statute retroactively, and we will not adopt the alleged public policy basis of the statute in resolving this case. [4] We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit a combined fault assessment form.