Opinion ID: 6226542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Reasonableness

Text: Constitutional concerns quenched, we turn to review the sentence's reasonableness. To do so, we engage in our familiar bifurcated inquiry. United States v. Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th 1, 55 (1st Cir. 2021). We start by checking the procedural reasonableness of the sentence. Id. After we do so, we then turn We acknowledge that, even with this reduced sentence, 11 Edward will be 91 years old by the time he is slated for release. - 30 - to evaluate a defendant's arguments that his sentence is also substantively unreasonable. Id.
So we begin with Edward's procedural-reasonableness challenge. A sentence is procedurally unreasonable when the district court commits a procedural error such as 'failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence -- including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.' United States v. Pupo, 995 F.3d 23, 28 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Díaz-Rivera, 957 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2020)). In assessing preserved claims of procedural reasonableness, we apply a multifaceted abuse-of-discretion standard whereby we afford de novo review to the sentencing court's interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines, examine the court's factfinding for clear error, and evaluate its judgment calls for abuse of discretion. Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 55–56 (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Arsenault, 833 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2016)). For judgment calls, we chalk the district court's decision up to an abuse of discretion only when we're left with a definite conviction that 'no reasonable person - 31 - could agree with the judge's decision.' Id. (quoting United States v. McCullock, 991 F.3d 313, 317 (1st Cir. 2021)). If a defendant fails to preserve his procedural-reasonableness claim, though, we then apply the quite formidable plain-error standard. McCullock, 991 F.3d at 317. Edward lodges a single attack on the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. He contends the district court violated his First Amendment rights to maintain and express his beliefs when it relied on those beliefs to increase Edward's sentence. Specifically, Edward takes issue with the district court's emphasis of the fact that, even after his time already served in prison, he continues to believe that the criminal laws are not valid and denies any wrongdoing. Edward's counsel argued to the district court that it was inappropriate for the court to rely on Edward's beliefs in fashioning a sentence. Edward's counsel did not, however, lodge any formal objection to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence on that ground.12 Nonetheless, even assuming favorably to Edward that he preserved his claim of procedural reasonableness, 12 We have also seemed to imply that this particular ground of sentencing error is related to substantive -- not procedural -- reasonableness. See United States v. Alvarez-Núñez, 828 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 2016); but see United States v. Williamson, 903 F.3d 124, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (lumping this ground in as a procedural error). We assume without deciding that a sentencing judge's improper reliance on a defendant's protected First Amendment activity can make out a claim of procedural unreasonableness. - 32 - his claim fails under even the more-defendant-friendly abuse-ofdiscretion framework. In determining how best to fashion a criminal sentence, the sentencing authority has always been free to consider a wide range of relevant material. United States v. Alvarez-Núñez, 828 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820–21 (1991)). This gives the sentencing judge room to conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information [it] may consider, or the source from which it may come. Id. (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)). There are limits to that general rule, though. As relevant here, one of those limits is that a defendant's abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing judge. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993). However, as with most legal propositions, context is key. [T]he Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165 (1992). Accordingly, though the Supremes have found First Amendment error in a sentencing court's review of merely abstract beliefs, see Dawson, 503 U.S. at 167, the Court has also readily permitted consideration of a defendant's - 33 - beliefs when they are relevant to the issues involved, id. at 164; see Alvarez-Núñez, 828 F.3d at 55 (The upshot is that conduct protected by the First Amendment may be considered in imposing sentence only to the extent that it is relevant to the issues in a sentencing proceeding.). For example, the Court has found no error where a sentencing judge considered the elements of racial hatred in the defendant's crime as well as the defendant's desire to start a race war when relevant to the sentencing metrics. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949 (1983) (plurality opinion); see id. at 970 & n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). But it has assigned error to the consideration of a defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood when it had no relevance to the crimes at issue. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166–67. As we've explained, a defendant's beliefs may become relevant at sentencing in a multiplicity of ways. AlvarezNúñez, 828 F.3d at 55-56. Beliefs and associations may legitimately be used to rebut mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant. Id. at 56. Protected conduct may also become relevant to evaluate a defendant's remorse, likelihood of reoffending, or the extent of punishment needed for deterrence. Id. (collecting cases); see United States v. Williamson, 903 F.3d 124, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (finding no First Amendment violation in considering protected activity that bore on the seriousness of [the] offense and on the need to protect the public generally . . . from harm). - 34 - Given that framework, Edward's claim readily fails. Though Edward thinks the district court could not fashion a sentence relying on his beliefs about the authority of the government or the criminal laws, those beliefs are highly relevant to the § 3553(a) factors. See Alvarez-Nunez, 828 F.3d at 55-56. Regarding his crimes, Edward maintained that he didn't do anything wrong concerning his failure to pay taxes, and he said that the law is wrong. When asked directly whether he thought he was violating the law with the months-long standoff, he said no. He told the judge that the laws are not valid. He also questioned the authority of the judge to pass sentence on him under the criminal laws. And Dr. Durand noted in her evaluation that Edward believes that he has been the victim of an unjust system and that his actions were warranted, justified or not unlawful. As the district court amply explained, Edward's statements go beyond simply his beliefs. Rather, the judge saw Edward's statements as a recipe for trouble, suggesting that Edward may be dangerous when released from prison. Those beliefs also, in the judge's view, reflected that Edward did not intend to obey the law. And, as the district judge put it, the problem is not that Edward holds these abstract beliefs: The problem is that he acts on his beliefs, and, by acting on his beliefs, he put in danger multiple individuals. And those concerns played into the court's consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, - 35 - which it said included (among others) the need to promote respect for the law, the need to deter Edward and others from committing the same crimes, and the need to protect the public from further crimes committed by Edward. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). We find no procedural error in the district court's reliance on Edward's beliefs in considering these sentencing factors. See, e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 930 F.3d 858, 868 (7th Cir. 2019) ([T]he court properly considered Mr. Schmidt's white supremacist ideas and hatred for the United States as evidence that he presents a threat of future dangerousness to the community. (cleaned up)); United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082, 1098 (10th Cir. 2012) (Defendant's statements that he would 'continue to fight' and his view that it was 'fine to break the law' were highly relevant to the[] sentencing factors.); United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 992, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2005) (no error in considering the defendant's allocution statements, including about the district court's lack of jurisdiction, because they were relevant to the defendant's remorse and threat to the public on release); United States v. Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397, 417–18 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding no constitutional error where the district court relied on the defendant's specific beliefs that the tax laws are invalid and do not require him to withhold taxes or file returns . . . [because they] are directly related to - 36 - the crimes in question and demonstrate a likelihood of recidivism). Edward further contends that the district court erred in relying on these personal, strongly held beliefs because he, at other points, appeared to show that there should be no concern that he would follow the law upon release. For example, Edward told the court that he will follow the criminal laws even though they're not valid because he has no choice. And he emphasized his good behavior in prison as showing that he has submitted to the government's authority notwithstanding his beliefs. We will not second-guess the sentencing judge's determination of the sincerity of Edward's statements absent a finding of clear error. See United States v. Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d 277, 292 n.15 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d 566, 573 (1st Cir. 2016) ([T]he district court is in the best position to weigh the credibility of a claim of rehabilitation and to balance the sentencing scales in light of such a claim.). Edward has made no effort to demonstrate that standard here, and we at any rate find no error in the district court's assessment. The district court considered Edward's statements and rejected them. Though the judge acknowledged Edward's seemingly good behavior in prison, he suggested that it was not very applicable to determining Edward's potential behavior after release to society because prison is designed to eliminate - 37 - resistance. And the judge also acknowledged Edward's statements that he will follow the law, but emphasized that it was hard to accept that Edward wouldn't break the law again or would follow conditions of release since Edward indicate[d] to this minute that . . . they're not valid laws and that he does not accept the authority of the court. From our vantage, that appraisal was not clearly erroneous.
Satisfying the procedural-reasonableness probe, we turn now to test the sentence's substantive reasonableness. A sentence is substantively reasonable if the 'sentencing court has provided a plausible sentencing rationale and reached a defensible result.' Pupo, 995 F.3d at 29 (quoting United States v. Flores-Quiñones, 985 F.3d 128, 133 (1st Cir. 2021)). This review is highly deferential. United States v. Fuentes-Moreno, 954 F.3d 383, 396 (1st Cir. 2020). We evaluate the reasonability of the overall sentence in light of the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2013). And we recognize that we owe deference to the sentencing court's informed discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence, ever cognizant of the fact that [t]here is more than one reasonable sentence in virtually any case. FuentesMoreno, 954 F.3d at 396 (quoting United States v. Matos-de-Jesús, 856 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2017)). Thus, we will find a sentence - 38 - substantively unreasonable only if it falls beyond the expansive universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes. United States v. Benoit, 975 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Rodríguez-Torres, 939 F.3d 16, 43 (1st Cir. 2019)). In other words, we do not reverse simply because we would have sentenced the defendant differently. Id. Edward submits four reasons his sentence was unreasonable: (1) the district court's reliance on Edward's beliefs; (2) the total sentence as compared to the sentences given his co-defendants; (3) the total sentence considering his advanced age; and (4) the total sentence, taking everything into account, was longer than necessary to achieve the sentencing goals of § 3553(a). We take each in turn, though mindful that a sentence's substantive reasonableness must be eyeballed in light of the totality of the circumstances. See Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d at 20.
First, Edward contends, tacking on to his proceduralreasonableness argument, that the district court's reliance on his beliefs resulted in a substantively unreasonable sentence. But, for the same reasons this failed as a procedural-reasonableness argument, it fails as a substantive-reasonableness argument, too. Onward. - 39 -
Next, Edward contends that there was an unwarranted disparity between the sentence he received and the sentences his co-conspirators received on resentencing. In imposing sentence, a district court must consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Though that is typically concerned with national disparities, we have also considered claims that a sentence is substantively unreasonable because of a disparity relative to a co-defendant's sentence. See United States v. Grullon, 996 F.3d 21, 35 (1st Cir. 2021). Not all co-defendant disparities in sentencing yield a substantively unreasonable sentence. As we've explained, [t]he key word is 'unwarranted' -- that is, § 3553(a)(6) does not ban all disparities, just 'unwarranted' ones. United States v. Romero, 906 F.3d 196, 211 (1st Cir. 2018). A defendant is not entitled to a lighter sentence merely because his co-defendants received lighter sentences. United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wallace, 573 F.3d 82, 97 (1st Cir. 2009)). To make out a well-founded claim of sentencing disparity, a defendant must compare apples to apples. United States v. Mateo-Espejo, 426 F.3d 508, 514 (1st Cir. 2005). Among other things that may throw off a direct comparison, we have - 40 - looked at a co-defendant's cooperation, the nature of her cooperation, and her choice to plead guilty instead of going to trial, see United States v. Reyes-Santiago, 804 F.3d 453, 467 (1st Cir. 2015) (collecting cases), as well as her relative culpability or role in the crime, see United States v. Reverol-Rivera, 778 F.3d 363, 366 (1st Cir. 2015). In the end, cases of identically situated defendants are unusual to say the least. Grullon, 996 F.3d at 35-36. Applying those principles here, Edward's challenge fails. Edward clamors that his co-defendants each received sentences of time served on resentencing even though their original sentences were substantially higher than what they had to that point served.13 Yet Edward fails to grapple with the reasons the sentencing judge gave for the disparity. First, the judge explained that Elaine, Riley, and Gerhard each showed that they had learned during their prison terms that what they had done was wrong. As the judge put it, [t]hey appeared broken by the period of incarceration, leaving 13 At the time of resentencing, Elaine had served 85 months of her 420-month sentence. Mot. on Resentencing at 1 & n.2, United States v. Brown, No. 09-cr-30 (D.N.H. Jan. 16, 2020), ECF No. 311. Riley had served, as best we can tell, around 12 years of his 36year sentence. And Gerhard, too, had served over 12 years of his original 20-year prison sentence. Def.'s Obj. to Resentencing & Sentencing Mem. at 3, United States v. Gerhard, No. 07-cr-189 (D.N.H. Jan. 20, 2020), ECF No. 713. - 41 - the judge with no doubt that there was no risk that any of them would engage in the same behavior. Edward, though, didn't give the judge the same confidence given his comments that he still thinks he did nothing wrong, and about the authority of the law and the courts. Second, Edward acknowledges that he may have been more culpable than his co-defendants but suggests he wasn't moreculpable enough to justify serving almost double time in prison. Yet the district court disagreed. It noted that Edward was the leader and instigator of the entire standoff. It also emphasized that Edward dragged others into his crime to support his standoff, brainwash[ing] one of the co-defendants. Both rationales were supported by the record. Ultimately, the sentencing judge assessed Edward's greater culpability, combined with all the other factors relevant to his sentencing (including his continued belief he did nothing wrong), and concluded that he merited a substantially higher sentence than his co-defendants. He gave a plausible rationale and reached a defensible result relative to Edward's codefendants, so we find no abuse of discretion. See Grullon, 996 F.3d at 36; Reverol-Rivera, 778 F.3d at 367.
Finally, Edward appears to contend that the district court failed to consider his advanced age and the fact that, under - 42 - the average life-expectancy, he has received [i]n effect a life sentence. This argument, too, fails. True, a sentencing court is required to consider a defendant's age as a potential mitigating factor. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (identifying as a sentencing factor the history and characteristics of the defendant). Also true, in general, '[t]he propensity to engage in criminal activity declines with age,' and so persons convicted of a crime late in life may be unlikely to recidivate. United States v. Pacheco-Martinez, 791 F.3d 171, 180 (1st Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 685 F.3d 660, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2012)). But even accepting that, a defendant's age is but one of many factors a sentencing court must consider. See United States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2020); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judge here surveyed all the relevant factors (including the seriousness of the crime, Edward's continued lack of remorse, and his continued rejection of the authority of the laws and the court) and concluded they outweighed this mitigating factor. Indeed, even considering Edward's advanced age, this could well be a case where Edward's crimes (committed when he was already 64 years old), as well as his continued rejection of the authority of the criminal laws, revealed that he may be one of the few oldsters who will continue to engage in criminal activity until he - 43 - drops. Pacheco-Martinez, 791 F.3d at 180 (cleaned up) (quoting Johnson, 685 F.3d at 662). As we have explained time and again, a sentence is not rendered unreasonable simply because the sentencing court didn't apply as much emphasis to some mitigating factors as the defendant hoped. See, e.g., Pupo, 995 F.3d at 32; United States v. DávilaBonilla, 968 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2020). And as we've explained specifically in the context of a nearly identical argument, a weighty sentence given to a defendant of advanced age is not substantively unreasonable where the sentencing judge, considering all the relevant factors, offers a plausible rationale and delivers a defensible result. See Pacheco-Martinez, 791 F.3d at 180 (finding no substantive unreasonableness in spite of the defendant's age because, in part, he ha[d] shown no sign of changing his ways and, at sentencing, expressed no remorse but instead assert[ed] that the court lacked jurisdiction over him); United States v. Angulo-Hernández, 565 F.3d 2, 13 (1st Cir. 2009) (no substantive unreasonableness where the defendant's advanced age was outweighed by the severity of [his] current offense and history of drug crimes). The judge did so here.
All told, the district court, in light of all the circumstances here, provided a plausible rationale and delivered a defensible result. In fact, the result it delivered was a - 44 - sentence substantially below the Guidelines range. See United States v. Cameron, 835 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2016) (It is a rare below-the-range sentence that will prove vulnerable to a defendant's claim of substantive unreasonableness. (quoting United States v. King, 741 F.3d 305, 310 (1st Cir. 2014)). Considering all of Edward's arguments as a whole, we spy no error.