Opinion ID: 2231413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bench Trial: Was the Error Reversible?

Text: Having recognized that the trial court committed error in admitting into evidence defendant's prior conviction of aggravated battery to impeach his testimony, we must next determine, under our plain-error rule, whether reversible error occurred. Absent reversible error, there can be no plain error. Herron, 215 Ill.2d at 187, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467; People v. Johnson, 208 Ill.2d 53, 64, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405 (2003). Under the plain-error doctrine, a defendant may persuade a reviewing court to excuse a procedural default and consider unpreserved error where: (1) the evidence is closely balanced so as to preclude argument that an innocent person was wrongfully convicted; or (2) the alleged error affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 335, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521. In this case, defendant argues that the evidence presented at his trial was closely balanced. We agree. We acknowledge that the court conducted a bench trial. Of course, the rules of admissibility of evidence are the same whether a trial be had with or without a jury. People v. Arendarczyk, 367 Ill. 534, 538, 12 N.E.2d 2 (1937). However, when a trial court is the trier of fact a reviewing court presumes that the trial court considered only admissible evidence and disregarded inadmissible evidence in reaching its conclusion. People v. Robinson, 30 Ill.2d 437, 439, 197 N.E.2d 45 (1964); People v. Wallenberg, 24 Ill.2d 350, 354, 181 N.E.2d 143 (1962). Thus, although error occurred, we must determine whether the error is such that would require reversal of defendant's convictions. See, e.g., Sims, 192 Ill.2d at 628-29, 249 Ill.Dec. 610, 736 N.E.2d 1048 (assuming error, court found it to be harmless, reasoning that absent reversible error, there could be no plain error). We conclude that the trial court's erroneous admission of defendant's prior conviction to impeach his testimony constitutes reversible error. We base our conclusion on both the law and the record before us. As a matter of law, we must presume that the trial court considered defendant's prior conviction only with respect to the purpose for which it was competent. People v. Lacey, 24 Ill.2d 607, 611, 182 N.E.2d 730 (1962). However, Montgomery 's 10-year time limit rendered defendant's prior conviction incompetent to impeach his testimony. When the evidence was admitted, it served no proper legal purpose. Therefore, there is no basis upon which we can presume that the trial court's evidentiary ruling does not require reversal. See People v. Jackson, 202 Ill.2d 361, 371, 269 Ill.Dec. 481, 781 N.E.2d 278 (2002). As a matter of fact, the presumption that a court in a bench trial considered only competent evidence in reaching its finding may be rebutted where the record affirmatively shows the contrary. People v. Gilbert, 68 Ill.2d 252, 258-59, 12 Ill.Dec. 142, 369 N.E.2d 849 (1977). After defendant testified, the following colloquy occurred: THE COURT:    Defense, any other witnesses? [Defense Counsel]: No. We will rest. THE COURT: All right. State? [Prosecutor]: Yes, Judge. By way of rebuttal, State is offering the certified copy of conviction of this defendant under 90 CR 1551101. This is the certified copy of conviction.    [Defense Counsel]: For the record I think we would object. [Prosecutor]: The charge is, Judge THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on. Go ahead. [Prosecutor]: The charge for which he was found guilty was aggravated battery. Four years Illinois Department of Corrections. THE COURT: And that sentence was on December 14th, 1990? [Prosecutor]: That's correct, Judge. THE COURT: Okay. And your objection. [Defense Counsel]: I thinkWell, there is a question of the ten years, when it begins. Is it from the conviction or does it come when the person is released from custody if they receive a custodial [Prosecutor]: Based upon timing after release from custody in jail, Judge. THE COURT: Okay. And since that is the issue, when were you released from custody? [Prosecutor]: Some time after December 14th, 1990, Judge. It's a 1990 conviction, therefore, the case arouse [ sic ] in 1990 and he was given four years Illinois Department of Corrections. In any event, we have not reached December 14th, 2004, so it'she was given the four years Illinois Department of Corrections, Judge, when this case THE COURT: Right. This case was in December of 2000, correct? [Prosecutor]: On March of 2000. THE COURT: On March of 2000. [Prosecutor]: When this case sprung into being. We agree we are outside however THE COURT: At the time of the incident it was inside of ten? [Prosecutor]: Yes. THE COURT: Your objection will be overruled in regards to that certified copy coming into evidence. The court then heard closing arguments prior to convicting defendant of the charged offenses. `Where an objection has been made to the evidence and overruled, it cannot be presumed that the evidence did not enter into the court's consideration. The ruling itself indicates that the court thought the evidence proper.' People v. Hampton, 96 Ill.App.3d 728, 731, 52 Ill.Dec. 330, 422 N.E.2d 11 (1981), quoting People v. De Groot, 108 Ill.App.2d 1, 11, 247 N.E.2d 177 (1968); see People v. Alford, 111 Ill.App.3d 741, 744, 67 Ill.Dec. 340, 444 N.E.2d 576 (1982); People v. Fair, 45 Ill.App.3d 301, 306, 4 Ill.Dec. 15, 359 N.E.2d 848 (1977). In this case, the above-quoted colloquy shows that the trial court considered defendant's prior conviction to fall within Montgomery 's 10-year time limit. Indeed, the court actively participated with the State in searching for the erroneous date. We must conclude that the trial court improperly considered this incompetent evidence and, consequently, committed reversible error. [3]