Opinion ID: 3202041
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Authority Cited by the Hoschars

Text: The Hoschars cite several cases in support of their argument that Layne and Wilson are not protected by absolute immunity. None of these cases requires reversal or remand. The Hoschars cite Frederick v. New York City, No. 11 Civ. 469 (JPO), 2012 WL 4947806 (S.D.N.Y. October 11, 2012), in which the plaintiff sought to unseal grand-jury minutes to review the testimony of a lay witness who the plaintiff claimed would prove that the defendant police officer, who did not testify before the grand jury, had influenced a photo lineup. Id. at - 2, 4. Frederick held that Rehberg did not preclude use of the lay witness’s grand jury testimony: Rehberg does not create a categorical bar to the use of grand jury testimony as evidence against defendants in malicious prosecution suits brought pursuant to § 1983. Rather, where Rehberg bans ‘using evidence of the witness’ testimony to support any other § 1983 claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution,’ that decision prohibits only the use of a witness’s own grand jury testimony against that witness if he or she subsequently becomes a § 1983 defendant. Id. at . This case, unlike Frederick, involves the use of § 1983 defendants’ own grand jury testimony. Also inapposite is Sankar v. City of New York, No. 07 CV 4726 (RJD) (SMG), 2012 WL 2923236 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012), in which one of the defendant police officers, in addition to testifying before a grand jury, signed a sworn criminal complaint against the plaintiff. Id. at - 3. The Sankar court rejected the defendants’ argument that Rehberg clearly counsels against finding that an officer’s signing of a sworn criminal complaint alone is sufficient to satisfy the initiation prong of a malicious prosecution claim, observing that Rehberg is “inapplicable” because it “did not alter controlling Second Circuit (and New York) law that an officer’s filing of -7- No. 15-5693 David Hoschar et al. v. Chris Layne et al. a sworn complaint is sufficient to satisfy the initiation prong of a malicious prosecution claim,” and that therefore the “[d]efendants’ attempt to convert grand jury testimony into an all-purpose shield from malicious prosecution liability is unpersuasive.” Id. at . The court further observed, “[i]f anything, Rehberg reinforces the distinction between one who simply testifies at a grand jury and does not make the decision to press criminal charges . . . and one . . . who sets the wheels of government in motion by instigating a legal action.” Id. (internal alteration, quotations, and citation omitted.) In the instant case, the Hoschars have not shown that Layne and Wilson signed a criminal complaint or initiated the prosecution; the district attorney general made the decision to submit the matter to the grand jury, which returned the indictment. The Hoschars also cite Marshall v. Randall, 719 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2013), in which the defendant police officers’ statements to the district attorney “resulted in a criminal complaint against [the plaintiff], and their testimony to a grand jury led to [the plaintiff’s] indictment.” Id. at 115. The defendant officers appealed a judgment of liability entered after a jury trial on the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and fair-trial violations, challenging under Rehberg the use of their grand jury testimony at trial. The Second Circuit concluded that the use of grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes did not contravene the rule in Rehberg, approving the district court’s limiting instruction that the grand jury testimony was admitted only to attack credibility and that the jury could not base liability on the grand jury testimony. 719 F.3d at 117. Here, the Hoschars seek to use the grand jury testimony as substantive support for their claim, not as impeachment evidence. The Hoschars also cite Coggins v. Buonara, 776 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2015), in which a defendant officer gave admittedly false testimony before a grand jury and also was alleged to have “knowingly falsified and omitted material facts from police reports.” Id. at 109. After the -8- No. 15-5693 David Hoschar et al. v. Chris Layne et al. officer was charged with perjury and pleaded guilty, the plaintiff brought an action alleging that the officer falsified official documents and conspired to create an untrue version of the events. Id. at 110–11. The Second Circuit dismissed all claims that were dependent on the officer’s grand jury testimony, observing that Rehberg extended absolute immunity “to preparatory activity, such as a preliminary discussion in which the witness relates the substance of his intended testimony” to the prosecutor. Id. at 112 (citation omitted). The Second Circuit allowed the claims unrelated to the officer’s grand jury testimony to go forward, which included that the officer and another defendant officer conspired to create an altered version of what had transpired and falsified police reports, and that the officer falsely represented to the district attorney3 that he had found a weapon and stayed with the weapon until backup arrived. Id. at 113 n.7. Coggins does not assist the Hoschars because, unlike in Coggins, the Hoschars’ claim against Layne and Wilson involves only their grand jury testimony and their preceding discussion with the district attorney general, both of which are clearly protected by absolute immunity under Rehberg. See 132 S. Ct. at 1506–07. Finally, the Hoschars cite Lisker v. City of L.A., 780 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2015). In that case, after spending twenty-six years in prison for second-degree murder, the plaintiff was released when a federal court determined that falsified evidence had been presented at trial. Id. at 1238. The issue was “whether the doctrine of absolute witness immunity, which shields the detectives from suit for their [grand jury] testimony, also extends to their pre-trial actions.” Id. at 1239. The court concluded that absolute immunity did not extend to the defendant’s notes in a “Murder Book” or to the “allegedly falsified reconstruction of the crime scene.” Id. at 1242. 3 The Coggins court observed that were discovery to show that the officer’s statements to the district attorney were “preparatory activity” conducted in advance of his grand jury testimony, the officer would be entitled to absolute immunity for that limited conduct under Rehberg. 776 F.3d at 113 n.7. -9- No. 15-5693 David Hoschar et al. v. Chris Layne et al. Lisker does not assist the Hoschars because they did not allege or present evidence that Layne or Wilson engaged in such pre-trial conduct. Because the federal malicious-prosecution claim rests completely on Layne’s and Wilson’s grand jury testimony, they have absolute immunity under Rehberg and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. -10-