Opinion ID: 1169413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: error in judgment for the dealer on his demurrer to the motorist's evidence

Text: Lastly, Ford and the dealer contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's judgment on the dealer's demurrer to the motorist's evidence. They assert that the issue here is whether an innocent party in the chain of distribution may be held vicariously liable when the responsible manufacturer is before the court and a judgment against the dealer would add nothing to the protection of the motorist. Because of the dealer's co-extensive liability, [22] the trial court clearly erred when it rendered judgment for the dealer on his mid-trial demurrer to the evidence, although it ruled that the proof adduced by the motorist was prima facie sufficient against Ford. While we are urged here that the dealer be held exempted from the purview of its co-extensive liability because Ford, the financially solvent manufacturer charged with having been responsible for the defect, is before the court, we leave the tendered question unsettled. [23] As the trial court's judgment for Ford must stand  and it, for the reasons discussed later, operates to exonerate the dealer ex lege  we need not pause here to consider the dealer's argument for a case-law exemption of innocent suppliers from strict liability. Where, as here, a defect is said to be attributable solely to the manufacturing process rather than to some conduct in the distribution system, a distributor's liability may be termed vicarious. [24] The legal relation occupied by a distributor-defendant vis-a-vis the manufacturer-defendant is here analogous to that between principal and agent or master and servant. When the principal and agent are both sued in an action predicated on the alleged negligence of the agent, for which the principal may be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and no act of independent or concurrent negligence by the principal is either charged or shown, a judgment in favor of the agent, when final, operates ex lege to exonerate the principal. [25] A retrial of this claim solely against the dealer appears precluded not only by an analysis based on vicarious liability, but also by one which would assume that each of the two defendants  Ford and its dealer alike  owed a separate and nondelegable duty to market a safe product. [26] The common basis for tort liability of both defendants was Ford's alleged breach of its duty. The car's defect was attributed solely to Ford's manufacturing process. As Ford defended by denying the flaw's presence, the verdict in its favor constituted a negation that the defect existed. Because Ford's alleged breach clearly was a sine qua non of the dealer's own liability for marketing an unsafe car, Ford's exoneration also served to absolve the dealer. The motorist's sole theory for relief against the dealer was strict liability in tort. She neither alleged nor proved any conduct by the dealer which caused or contributed to the presence of the offending defect in her car. As we find no reversible error in the judgment for Ford, it must be allowed to stand. Because our decision in favor of the manufacturer exonerates the dealer by operation of law, the trial court's mid-trial error in rendering judgment for the dealer is of no avail to the motorist and cannot inure to her benefit. The Court of Appeals' opinion is vacated and the trial court's judgment affirmed. DOOLIN, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE and SUMMERS, JJ., concur. SIMMS, C.J., concurs in Parts I, II and III and concurs in judgment as to Part IV. WILSON and KAUGER, JJ., dissent.