Opinion ID: 155144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I asked who it was, he said it was John [Juan].

Text: 23 Q. And after you heard that, what happened? 24 A. I was going to open the door, he just pushed his way in. 25 Q. And was the door locked with a chain? 26 A. If I can remember right, yeah, it was, yes. 27 Q. You say he pushed his way in, what do you mean by that? 28 A. He pushed his way in. I opened the door, I didn't have it all the way open and he pushed his way in. 29 R. Tr. 10/31/89 p.m. at 3-4. 30 After describing Juan's entry and the way he brandished a gun in her face, Darlene was asked, 31 Q. Okay. Did anyone else come in through the front door besides the individual with the gun? 32 A. Yeah, he pushed the door back and I was standing half behind the door, half my body behind the door, holding it and then Augustine Daniel Roybal came in. 33 Q. And how did he tell--do you remember the exact words? 34 A. He came in. I just said, Come in. 35 Q. Did you call him by name, or-- 36 A. Just told him to come in. 37 Id. at 4-5. 38 Upon cross examination by Juan's attorney, the following testimony was elicited from Darlene: 39 Q. Now when the people entered your apartment on February 3d at 2:00 in the morning, you testified on direct that they pushed the door open? 40 A. Yes. 41 Q. Could you see Goro--Daniel at that time? 42 A. No, he was behind the wall. 43 Q. And they pushed the door open even though you had a chain lock on; isn't that right? 44 A. Yes. 45 Q. But on September 12th, you talked about how the door frame had been broken; isn't that right? 46 A. Yes. 47 Q. So, the chain lock was broken at that time? 48 A. It wasn't broken in, just the frame of the door. 49 Q. So there was a lock attached to the chain lock too, at that point? 50 A. Yeah, it was attached to the wall, but it wasn't tight enough. 51 Q. You told Chris Schultz on February 3d that you let them in? 52 A. I can't remember exactly everything that's happened. 53 Id. at 37. 54 The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in the calendar notice proposing summary affirmance of petitioner's conviction for aggravated burglary, relied on a representation in the docketing statement recounting testimony by Darlene Rodriguez that the men forced their way in. See R. Vol. I, tab 6, Exh. C at 2. The calendar notice concluded that, the jury was entitled to believe this trial testimony and disbelieve the statement to Schultz, thereby providing substantial evidence of the element of unauthorized entry. Id. The Court of Appeals adopted this reasoning in its memorandum opinion. See id., Exh. E at 1. 55 Despite the occasionally confused quality of the testimony regarding the circumstances of petitioner's entry into the apartment, we find that the record fairly supports the jury's finding that petitioner made an unauthorized entry into the dwelling. When viewed in a light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found the element of unauthorized entry beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318. Intent to Commit Any Felony or Theft 56 Turning to the intent issue, petitioner argues that there was no evidence to establish that, at the time of entry, he shared his brother's criminal intent and that he did not help, encourage or cause the crime committed by his brother. He maintains he was merely present at the scene. We disagree. Despite evidence in the record tending to show that petitioner did not condone the shooting, there is also evidence that his participation was instrumental in facilitating the crime and that he intended to commit theft, aggravated assault, or some other felony at the time of entry into the apartment with his brother. 57 Immediately after petitioner's brother left the hallway to confront Mimo in the bedroom, petitioner took Darlene to the kitchen and told her that if she left the apartment she would be shot by persons waiting outside. R. Tr. 10/31/89 p.m. at 5-6. Petitioner refused to allow Darlene to leave the kitchen, even to be with her children in the bedroom. Id. at 23. Darlene told Officer Schultz that, after the first shot was fired, she tried to get out of the kitchen but was prevented from doing so by petitioner. Id. at 39. She had wanted to call the police but could not because she was being held by petitioner. R. Tr. 11/1/89 at 35. 58 In addition to keeping Darlene from interfering with the assault, there is also evidence that petitioner did nothing physically in order to interrupt the assault. After the first shot was fired, petitioner ran back to the bedroom and stood an arm's length from his brother but did nothing other than question his brother about the shooting. R. Tr. 10/31/89 p.m. at 24. Further, while his brother held a gun to Mimo's head, petitioner took Mimo's pants which supposedly held keys to a car. R. Tr. 11/1/89 at 37. Darlene testified that the men had said, in her presence, that they wanted the keys to the car. Id. 59 Finally, Darlene's sister, Dana, testified that she was familiar with petitioner's voice and that she heard him say, Give it to him or he'll shoot, as petitioner's brother and Mimo were arguing. Id. at 43. 60 In its calendar notice, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, citing New Mexico law, noted that the fact that a theft was committed allows the jury to infer the requisite intent. R. Vol. I, tab 6, Exh. C at 2. We are bound by this interpretation of state law. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691. Further, the court concluded that from the evidence of what his brother did to the victim the jury could infer defendant's shared intent to commit aggravated assault. Id. The Court of Appeals relied on this analysis to conclude that defendant and his co-defendant forced their way into the house under circumstances indicating they shared an intent to commit crimes inside. Id., Exh. E at 2. This finding of fact is presumptively correct because it is fairly supported by the record, see Lujan, 2 F.3d at 1035. In addition, our review of the record reveals evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner intended to commit a felony upon entering the apartment. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 61 A § 2254 petitioner has a heavy burden in attempting to set aside a state conviction based on an erroneous jury instruction. Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 979, 984 (10th Cir.1995). 62 A state conviction may only be set aside in a habeas proceeding on the basis of erroneous jury instructions when the errors had the effect of rendering the trial so fundamentally unfair as to cause a denial of a fair trial. The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal. The question in this proceeding is not whether the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned, but whether the instruction so infected the trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. The degree of prejudice from the instruction error must be evaluated in the context of the events at the trial. 63 Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 64 Petitioner does not argue that any of the instructions given to the jury were erroneous. He contends, instead, that two of his proposed instructions should have been given and that their omission denied him a fair trial. As noted above, even the heavy burden faced by a habeas petitioner who complains about an alleged erroneous instruction becomes heavier when the error alleged is the omission of a proffered instruction. 65 The first instruction petitioner contends should have been read to the jury can be summarized as telling the jury that petitioner's mere presence at the crime scene and knowledge that a crime was being committed was not enough to convict him as an aider and abetter. 3 The New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded that, because the instruction on accomplice liability told the jury they would have to find that the defendant intended that the crime be committed and had to have helped or encouraged it, petitioner's mere presence point was made, albeit in the positive. The court stated, [i]t was, therefore, unnecessary to tell the jury that, if defendant was merely present and did not share the intent of the principal and did not help the principal, the jury should find him not guilty. R. Vol. I, tab 6, Exh. E at 2. We agree and find no constitutional infirmity in the trial court's refusal to give petitioner's mere presence instruction. 66 Similarly, there was no violation of constitutional magnitude in the trial court's refusal to give petitioner's tendered specific intent instruction which stated, inter alia, that the government [sic] must prove that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law. Appellant's Brief in Chief at 15 n. 6. The intent instruction was not a uniform instruction and, according to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, did not accurately state New Mexico law, where specific intent is not a specific purpose to violate the law but simply an intent to achieve a further consequence. R. Vol. I, tab 6, Exh. C at 3. We are bound by this state court construction of state law. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691. Additionally, each substantive crime instruction given included the idea that the intent to achieve further consequences must be proven. See, e.g., Record Proper, Vol. I at 85 (aggravated burglary instruction). 67 The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.