Opinion ID: 614153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Declaratory Judgment Request

Text: The Declaratory Judgment Act states that in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration. 28 U.S.C. § 2201. [T]he central purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act . . . is to provide the opportunity to clarify rights and legal relationships without waiting for an adversary to file suit. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ignacio, 860 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir.1988). The statute is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant to have a case heard in federal court. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995) (quoting Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241, 73 S.Ct. 236, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952)). We review a district court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action for abuse of discretion. Id. at 289-90, 115 S.Ct. 2137. An abuse of discretion occurs if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached . . . where the trial court improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard. Paschal v. Flagstar Bank, 295 F.3d 565, 576-77 (6th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment identifying the authors of the sound recordings and underlying compositions for the musical works entitled `Better' and `Watching Me Leave' as well as a declaration that Crooks was not an author of Better. These requests were quite plainly made in response to the numerous cease-and-desist letters that Plaintiffs received from Defendants. Those letters accused Plaintiffs of, inter alia, distributing bootleg, or unauthorized, recordings of Crooks's music. The district court did not explicitly address the allegations of this claim, instead observing that [f]ederal jurisdiction is inappropriate in a copyright dispute where the primary purpose of the complaint is to secure an interpretation of conflicting assignments and the alleged infringement is prospective under a declaratory relief count or incidental to a claim of ownership. Then, without explaining how this correct statement of the law applied to these allegations, the district court summarily concluded that the declaratory judgment claim does not state a federal claim. Though we recognize that this is a complex issue, we cannot agree. Reading the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, we cannot say that the claim's primary purpose is to resolve conflicting contract rights, as opposed to its stated purpose, i.e., to obtain declarations of authorship. To determine whether the district court erred in determining that no federal jurisdiction existed to provide for adjudication of this claim, we must be clear about the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Eleventh Circuit clearly explained its operation as follows: [I]n the context of a declaratory judgment action, the normal position of the parties is reversed; therefore, we do not look to the face of the declaratory judgment complaint in order to determine the presence of a federal question. Hudson Ins. Co. v. Am. Elec. Corp., 957 F.2d 826, 828 (11th Cir. 1992). Instead, this court must determine whether or not the cause of action anticipated by the declaratory judgment plaintiff arises under federal law. Id. Our inquiry is thus whether, absent the availability of declaratory relief, the instant case could nonetheless have been brought in federal court. To do this, we must analyze the assumed coercive action by the declaratory judgment defendant. Gulf States Paper Corp. v. Ingram, 811 F.2d 1464, 1467 (11th Cir.1987), abrogated on other grounds by King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 217, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991); see also 22A Am.Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 202 (2003). Federal question jurisdiction exists in a declaratory judgment action if the plaintiff has alleged facts in a well-pleaded complaint which demonstrate that the defendant could file a coercive action arising under federal law. Household Bank, 320 F.3d at 1251 (emphasis added). Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer Res., Inc., 542 F.3d 859, 862 (11th Cir. 2008). The questions for us, then, are (1) whether Defendants could have sued Plaintiffs for copyright infringement under the theory that Sevier was not an author or owner of Better or Watching Me Leave and (2) whether such an action would have arisen under federal law. The first question is easy; the answer is surely that Defendants could have sued Plaintiffs for copyright infringement. They threatened [7] to do so on numerous occasions. The question of whether Defendants' possible lawsuit would have arisen under federal law is more difficult because [i]t is settled beyond peradventure that an action does not `arise under' the federal copyright laws merely because it relates to a product that is the subject of a copyright. Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 833 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1987). The question of whether the suit `arises under' the copyright law is considerably more sophisticated. Id. Relying on Peay v. Morton, 571 F.Supp. 108, 112-13 (M.D.Tenn.1983), the district court concluded that this cause of action raised a question of state law and did not arise under federal law. This legal precept has support, as the First Circuit explained: Not all claims of co-ownership will arise under the Copyright Act. . . . For example, at times, whether there is co-ownership may be determined by the terms of a contract governed by state law or through other ownership interests governed by state law and thus not require application of the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 833 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1987) (rejecting federal question jurisdiction where claim of co-ownership, in its very nature and essence, [was] one for breach of contract under state law). Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H. & Co. Kg., 510 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir.2007). However, a question of authorship, rather than ownership, does arise under the Copyright Act: In other cases, such as where co-ownership results from purported statutory co-authorship, the question of co-ownership is governed by the Copyright Act. See 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 12.01[A][1][b] (2007) (endorsing the view that in an action seeking declaratory judgment of plaintiff as co-author and for an accounting, federal jurisdiction is exclusive because copyright ownership by reason of one's status as co-author arises directly from the terms of the Copyright Act itself); see also Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 652-53 (7th Cir.2004) (collecting cases). Id. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has remarked that  exclusive federal district court jurisdiction exists in an action for a declaratory judgment to establish joint authorship of a copyrighted work. Goodman v. Lee (Goodman I), 815 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir.1987) (emphasis added). And Goodman I is not an outlier: All of the federal circuit courts of appeal that have addressed the issue . . . agree that a determination of copyright ownership based on a disputed allegation of co-authorship presents a federal question that arises under, and must be determined according to, the Copyright Act. Cambridge Literary Props., 510 F.3d at 86. Though we have not previously confronted this issue directly, we now join our sister circuits and adopt the prevailing view that disputed claims about whether there is co-authorship require[s] application of the Copyright Act[,] id. at 87-88, which is a dispute properly adjudicated in federal court. On its face, Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claim undeniably seeks a declaration of authorship of sound recordings and musical compositions for two songs. The claim is allegedly brought in reasonable apprehension of litigation, based on numerous communications from Defendants. Indeed, Defendants' numerous cease-and-desist letters, attached to the amended complaint, certainly suggest a dispute over authorshipnamely, whether Sevier or Crooks or both authored the songs in question. They charge Sevier with conduct violative of the Copyright Act without acknowledging his asserted authorship of the songs. [A] determination of copyright ownership based on a disputed allegation of co-authorship presents a federal question that arises under, and must be determined according to, the Copyright Act. Cambridge Literary Props., 510 F.3d at 86; see, e.g., Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 652-53 (holding that a question of ownership based on authorship of comic book characters arose under the Copyright Act). Defendants now claim that the declaratory judgment action cannot be pursued in federal court because they have never disputed Plaintiffs' allegation that Sevier and Crooks are co-authors of the subject works. We are not persuaded. Every time Defendants sent Plaintiffs a cease-and-desist letter alleging copyright infringement, the underlying rationale was that Plaintiffs lacked ownership of any copyright interest in Better and Watching Me Leave. Indeed, their April 26, 2007 cease-and-desist letter explicitly accused Plaintiffs of copyright infringement for the sale of bootleg recordings that were unauthorized by the copyright owners. If, however, Sevier was an author or co-author of the songs, then he was an owner or co-owner, 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), and no claim of infringement could lie against him or his assignee, Severe Records. See Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir.1996). Hence, the letters clearly appear to have been premised on an implied denial of Sevier's authorship or co-authorship. Admittedly, the cease-and-desist letters assert rights other than copyright interests, but it was the accusations of copyright infringement that provoked the declaratory judgment claim. Neither Defendants nor the district court have identified any supposed contractual dispute that is really at the heart of the declaratory judgment claim. Where Defendants persisted in accusing Sevier of copyright infringement despite his assertions of authorship, they can hardly be heard to complain, But we didn't really mean it, when they are haled into federal court on a claim for declaration of non-infringement. Consequently, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, we conclude that Defendants' cease-and-desist letters were premised on an authorship dispute; no other explanation seems plausible from the face of the amended complaint. Such an authorship dispute arises under federal law. It follows that the amended complaint's declaratory judgment claim arises under the Copyright Act and presents a dispute properly justiciable in federal court. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of this claim as an abuse of discretion.