Opinion ID: 4543961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶8] Bilodeau contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal that he lodged at the close of the State’s case-in-chief, and by denying the motion when he renewed it post-trial. Contrary to Bilodeau’s contentions, a jury could rationally have found each element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented by the State at trial, and therefore the trial court did not err in denying the motion. See State v. Williams, 2020 ME 17, ¶ 19, 225 A.3d 751. [¶9] “A person is guilty of manslaughter if that person . . . [r]ecklessly, or with criminal negligence, causes the death of another human being.” 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A). “A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the person consciously disregards a risk that the 5 person’s conduct will cause such a result.” 17-A M.R.S. § 35(3)(A) (2020). “A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the person fails to be aware of a risk that the person’s conduct will cause such a result.” 17-A M.R.S. § 35(4)(A) (2020). The person’s failure to be aware of the risk or conscious disregard of the risk, “when viewed in light of the nature and purpose of the person’s conduct and the circumstances known to the person, must involve a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation.” 17-A M.R.S. § 35(3)(C), (4)(C) (2020). [¶10] “On appeal, we review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a jury could rationally have found each element of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams, 2020 ME 17, ¶ 19, 225 A.3d 751 (quotation marks omitted)(alteration omitted); see also State v. Lowden, 2014 ME 29, ¶ 13, 87 A.3d 694 (“We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal under the same standard as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence . . . .”). “The jury may draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial.” Williams, 2020 ME 17, ¶ 19, 225 A.3d 751. 6 [¶11] The facts of the case were largely undisputed at trial. Bilodeau admitted that he was driving the car that struck the victim, and it is undisputed that the crash killed the victim. However, Bilodeau contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted recklessly or with criminal negligence, and therefore the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal. See 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A). [¶12] Contrary to Bilodeau’s contentions, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a jury could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bilodeau acted recklessly or with criminal negligence. Bilodeau told law enforcement immediately after the accident that he saw someone or something in the crosswalk as he approached. He confirmed this fact in his own trial testimony. Bilodeau did not attempt to brake. Instead, he piloted his car into the oncoming lane and through the crosswalk in an attempt to bypass the victim. Testimony by an accident reconstructionist with the Maine State Police suggested that Bilodeau did not swerve in a last-ditch attempt to avoid the victim, but rather moved gradually into the oncoming lane. Bilodeau’s car entered the crosswalk straight-on, perpendicular to the path of 7 the crosswalk. The jury could reasonably infer that braking was an alternative and appropriate reaction, given Bilodeau’s speed. [¶13] These facts could reasonably support a conclusion that Bilodeau made a deliberate choice to try to avoid the victim by driving around him, even after he saw the victim in the crosswalk. They do not suggest a panicked swerve made without time to stop the car. On this record, a jury could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bilodeau either failed to be aware of the risk to the victim or consciously disregarded that risk, and that Bilodeau’s failure or disregard grossly deviated from the standard of conduct of a reasonable and prudent person. See State v. Carisio, 552 A.2d 23, 24, 27 (Me. 1988) (affirming conviction for manslaughter where defendant driver purposely ran a stop sign, believing she had sufficient time to avoid victim’s vehicle); State v. Gammon, 529 A.2d 813, 815-16 (Me. 1987) (affirming conviction for manslaughter where defendant driver saw victim’s car stopped in roadway 500 feet ahead but failed to slow below the speed limit before colliding); State v. Hanks, 397 A.2d 998, 1000 (Me. 1979) (affirming conviction for vehicular manslaughter where defendant’s car had mismatched and bald tires, causing it to leave lane of travel and strike oncoming car), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 777 (Me. 1985). The trial court 8 did not err in denying Bilodeau’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case and again when he renewed the motion post-trial.