Opinion ID: 2626169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The District Court's Determinations as to Custody, Visitation and the Residency Restriction

Text: [¶ 17] In this case, the parties' Decree which assimilated their negotiated Agreement provided, in relevant part: (1) they would enjoy joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the minor children of the parties, beginning on November 1, 2003, and ending on July 15, 2008; (2) they would alternate annual residential custody until the end of this agreement; (3) the non-custodial parent would have visitation on alternating weekends and two evenings per week; (4) they would alternate custody during the holidays of Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Easter; (5) they would be flexible to arrange a makeup weekend or evening for those missed because of these holidays; and, (6) Mother would maintain a residence during the term of this agreement in Thermopolis or within five miles of Thermopolis (although it was acceptable if Mother moves from Thermopolis during her non-residential years). [¶ 18] After trial, the district court ordered, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) [t]hat it is in the best interests of the minor children to continue with the custody arrangement that has been in place for the minor children for the previous five years subject to slight modification; (2) [t]hat custody of the minor children shall continue to be joint legal custody with shared physical custody alternating on a yearly basis; (3) that [t]he non-residential parent shall have visitation on alternating weekends and two evenings per week; (4) that [t]he parties shall alternate custody during the holidays of Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Easter; (5) that [t]he parties agree to be flexible to arrange a makeup weekend or evening for those missed because of these holidays; (6) that [Father] shall have the children each Labor Day weekend and [Mother] shall have the children on each Memorial Day weekend; and, (7) [t]hat the residency provision set forth in the prior agreement is hereby lifted and any issues of residency of the parents would need to be addressed through a future modification proceeding.
[¶ 19] Wyoming statute specifically allows a district court to fashion a custody plan to include any combination of joint, shared or sole custody which it finds to be in the best interests of the children. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(d). Shared custody arrangements are not preferred, however. Reavis, 955 P.2d at 432; Eickbush, ¶ 11, 171 P.3d at 512; Buttle, ¶ 31, 196 P.3d at 181; Testerman, ¶ 15, 193 P.3d at 1145; Parris v. Parris, 2009 WY 44, ¶ 19, 204 P.3d 298, 304 (Wyo.2009). To validate a shared custody plan, the record must show that, in determining the best interests of the children, a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to determining custody. Id.; Buttle, ¶ 31, 196 P.3d at 181; Pace, ¶ 17, 22 P.3d at 867. The evidence presented by the parties and the trial court's findings must adequately reflect that a shared custody plan favors stability in the children's surroundings and that it is in the children's best interests. Buttle, ¶ 36, 196 P.3d at 182. [¶ 20] Overall, Mother asserts that the trial evidence and testimony demonstrated that continuing with the parties' shared custody arrangement will not promote stability in the children's milieu and is contrary to the children's best interests  particularly with regard to the parties' youngest child, CJMZ. Mother claims that the district court erred or abused its discretion in concluding that the children are doing well under the custody arrangement that has been followed and their lives would not be improved by changing the procedure and it would be in the children's best interests to continue with the custody and visitation schedule outlined in the earlier agreement. [¶ 21] More specifically, Mother insists that the shared custody arrangement does not work because the parties are unable to effectively communicate or cooperate on matters relating to the children's welfare. In particular, Mother cites to select testimony and evidence in the record which she believes establishes that Father intimidates her, that he is domineering, and that he does not permit her to parent without interference. Father counters Mother's arguments by noting that Mother failed to cite any specific occasion where the parties' failure to communicate or cooperate resulted in any material breakdown of the shared custody arrangement in five years. Moreover, Father points to the report of the Guardian Ad Litem which indicates that the parties communicate well with each other. After considering all of the evidence, the district court expressly found that [t]he parents communicate well with the children and reasonably well with each other. [¶ 22] Next, Mother argues that Father does not act in ways to promote the children's best interests when the children are in his care. She refers to the fact that Father has a dog in his home despite his awareness that CJMZ suffers from allergies. Further, Mother claims that Father failed to note CJMZ's allergies on school records, thereby placing the child's safety and welfare in jeopardy. Also, Mother criticizes Father for his failure to procure necessary reading glasses for CJMZ, while the child is in his care. The record shows that, while CJMZ has been diagnosed with certain allergies, CJMZ has not had any allergic reactions to the dog. The child's allergic reactions have subsided over time. CJMZ's allergy condition had long since been updated in the school files. CJMZ's reading glasses usually remain at school so they are not forgotten at home, and there has been no denial of appropriate vision aids by Father. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's weighing of this evidence. [¶ 23] Mother also contends that the shared custody arrangement has left the children with uncertainty and instability. In addition to Mother's subjective view concerning this contention, she claims that the testimony of the children's care provider and their teacher bolsters this conclusion. Mother asserts that CJMZ needed special education services when in the custody of Father, but that those services were no longer necessary when the child was subsequently in her custody. She argues that this proves that CJMZ is particularly sensitive to the instability of the custody situation while in the custody of Father. Father maintains that the shared custody and visitation arrangement has worked well for the children, chiefly due to the length of custody, coupled with the historical fact that both parents reside in the same municipality. The evidence in the record reflects that there was uncertainty and instability noted when the shared custody plan first began in 2003, but the children's care provider and their teacher readily agreed that after the initial adjustment to the custody arrangement, the children appear to have settled into a stable routine. Both witnesses indicated that alternating custody on an annual basis has aided in the children's ability to adjust. The educator acknowledged that CJMZ did utilize special education services when in the custody of Father. However CJMZ has consistently benefited from additional educational support, even though such support was not characterized as special education services. [¶ 24] Father's previous physical aggression was raised by Mother as a factor to which she claims that the district court did not attribute appropriate weight in determining the best interests of the parties' children under the shared custody and visitation plan. [3] Mother relates that Father reportedly physically abused one of his daughters from a prior relationship when she was an early teenager. This incident purportedly occurred in 1992  approximately four years before the marriage of these parties. Mother recounted an incident in 1997 when Father hit the wall or door near Mother's head and he would also shove her with his finger a lot in the chest. The next stated incident involving physical aggression by Father occurred in approximately 2000 when he grabbed NEZ by the shoulder and shook the child for accidentally dropping a video camera. Mother cites to an incident in 2002 when Father smacked CJMZ, who was then age two, because the child was biting Father's leg. In October 2003, Mother described that Father got angry, twisted her arm, and shoved her into a door. Mother further claims that Father was verbally abusive toward her and the children during the marriage. The district court undoubtedly considered this evidence as a factor in its determinations in specifically finding that, [Father] was physically aggressive on a few occasions several years ago. This is not a current problem. Implicit in its findings, the district court acknowledged that all of the incidents cited by Mother occurred before the divorce was completed in 2004, and there were no more recent instances of similar conduct by Father. [¶ 25] Finally, Mother argues that the trial court failed to sufficiently acknowledge that she had custody of the children for the 14 months immediately preceding the trial, which distorted the true picture of the effects of the annual rotation of custody upon them, since the children were then well-behaved, well-adjusted and performing at above-average levels. Nevertheless, the record supports the district court's conclusion, [t]hat the children are doing well under the custody arrangement that has been followed and their lives would not be improved by changing the procedure. The district court did not ignore the fact that Mother had custody for the previous 14 months. It may have given that fact less weight than Mother would like, but Mother has not demonstrated that was an abuse of discretion. [¶ 26] Mother fundamentally disagrees with the district court's determination to continue with the custody arrangement that has been in place for the minor children for the previous five years subject to slight modification. Instead, she steadfastly maintains that she should be granted sole physical custody of the children, subject to visitation rights by Father. To achieve this relief, Mother had the burden of showing the district court that there was a material change in circumstances since entry of the Decree and that the modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c). See Leitner, 402 P.2d at 718-719; Fergusson, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d at 644; Clark, 953 P.2d at 150. Most of the testimony and evidence relied upon by Mother which may tend to support her challenges to the appropriateness of a shared custody and visitation plan pre-dates entry of the Decree. The record is accurately summarized by the district court's finding, [t]hat if this is viewed as a modification action, there has been no substantial change in circumstances. Mother failed in her burden to demonstrate a material change in circumstances subsequent to implementation of the shared custody and visitation arrangement which warrants modification. [¶ 27] The district court's findings reveal that all relevant factors were thoughtfully analyzed and carefully weighed in discerning the best interests of the children before arriving at its conclusions. Accepting the evidence of Father as true, giving all favorable inferences to that evidence, and leaving out of consideration entirely the conflicting evidence of Mother, the record and the trial court's findings fully sustain the overall conclusion that the shared custody plan favors stability in the children's environment and that it is in the children's best interests. See Cranston, 879 P.2d at 351; Buttle, ¶ 36, 196 P.3d at 182. The district court did not err procedurally and it did not abuse its discretion in its determinations.
[¶ 28] Mother refers to a recent opinion where a district court's consideration of a parent's past mistakes made during a child's five and a half year lifetime in determining the best interests of the child in a custody modification proceeding was upheld on appeal. JT v. KD, 2008 WY 104, ¶ 19, 192 P.3d 969, 973 (Wyo.2008). Relying upon this precedent, Mother argues that the district court in this case should have taken more fully into account the evidence in the record indicating that Father has been unable to maintain good relationships with his older children or his grandchildren to more accurately assess the best interests of NEZ and CJMZ. Mother reasons that had the trial court properly considered this evidence, it could not have concluded that Father possesses the parenting skills qualifying him as a fit and competent parent for NEZ and CJMZ, with the ability to strengthen the parent-child relationship. In this regard, Mother points to the evidence of Father's past aggressiveness with his daughter from a prior relationship and his overall inability to deal with teenage children as was historically the case with his other children. [¶ 29] Father initially responds that Mother's contentions are factually unsupported. Father refers to the conflicting evidence in the record concerning the reasons for the problems in the relationships he has had with his older children. Father's eldest daughter, now well into her 30's, testified that she has a really good relationship with her father and that they love each other. The daughter attributed much of the breakdown in the relationships that Father may have had with her and her siblings to Father's former spouse who caused them to move out of Father's home when they were teenagers. Father distinguishes the egregious nature of the parent's past mistakes in JT as being much different than any past mistakes that Mother claims Father made in his relationships with his older children or grandchildren. Father cautions that a parent's entire life, especially events occurring before the birth of the children sub judice, should not be open to scrutiny by a trial court. He suggests that a better approach would be to limit an inquiry into past mistakes to the lifetimes of children who are the focus of the trial court's determinations as to their best interests. [¶ 30] The district court is statutorily required to determine the best interests of the children in fashioning a custody and visitation order. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a). To comply with this mandate, the trial court shall consider, but is not limited to, the ten factors enumerated in the statute. Id. Among the factors required to be considered are, [a]ny other factors the court deems necessary and relevant. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(x). Hence, the only limitation upon what a district court may consider in determining the best interests of a child is such other factors the court deems necessary and relevant. Id. See Selvey v. Selvey, 2004 WY 166, ¶ 18, 102 P.3d 210, 215 (Wyo. 2004). [¶ 31] Although the district court did not make any specific findings concerning Father's relationships with his other children and grandchildren in this case, the record shows that the trial court accepted the testimony on this issue presented by both parties. Further, the district court's findings, in toto, lead to the conclusion that this evidence was obviously considered and given appropriate weight. The district court did not commit any procedural error and it did not abuse its discretion as to the consideration and weight given to Father's relationships with his older children and grandchildren.
[¶ 32] In the parties' negotiated Agreement, as ratified and included into the Decree, Mother and Father agreed to the following residency provision: [Mother] agrees to maintain a residence during the term of this agreement in Thermopolis or within five miles of Thermopolis, although [Father] has no objection if [Mother] moves from Thermopolis during her non-residential years. [¶ 33] At the trial, Mother sought to have the residency provision removed because it adversely impacted her constitutional right to travel or relocate. Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 615-616 (Wyo.1999); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1286-89 (Wyo.1993); Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo.1995); Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 151 (Wyo.1999); Testerman, ¶ 18, 193 P.3d at 1146; Harshberger v. Harshberger, 2005 WY 99, ¶ 12, 117 P.3d 1244, 1250-51 (Wyo.2005). After trial, the district court ordered: That the residency provision set forth in the prior agreement is hereby lifted and any issues of residency of the parents would need to be addressed through a future modification proceeding. [¶ 34] Mother asserts that, despite the court's removal of the residency provision, her right to relocate is nonetheless violated, since the shared custody arrangement still provides for visitation by the non-custodial parent on alternating weekends and for two evenings per week. She claims that this visitation provision exerts pressure upon her to remain in the locality in derogation of her rights because relocation is not recognized as a change in material circumstances warranting modification of a custody order. [4] We disagree with Mother's assertion. [¶ 35] There is nothing in the shared custody and visitation plan or in the order lifting the residency requirement which unconstitutionally requires, or exerts pressure upon, either parent to reside in the same locality. Moreover, Mother is incorrect in her contention that Wyoming case law prevents judicial review of a request to modify a custody and visitation order after a parent relocates: To summarize, our precedent is quite clear that relocation, by itself, cannot be a substantial and material change in circumstances sufficient to justify reopening a custody order. That precept is also applicable to any factors that are derivative of relocation. What Mother has failed to acknowledge in her argument, however, is that our precedent does not preclude the district court from considering the effects of relocation on the children so long as there is some other circumstance that is sufficiently deleterious to the welfare of the children that by itself ... would serve as a substantial and material change in circumstances even in the absence of a relocation. Watt, 971 P.2d at 617; see Gurney, 899 P.2d at 55 (Where a custody order was properly reopened because both parties asserted that joint custody was not working, district court could have reasonably concluded that factors derivative of the relocation could have contributed to parties' inability to agree and communicate.). Furthermore, our cases stress that the rule set forth in Love and its progeny is predicated upon the motivation for the relocation being in good faith. Love, 851 P.2d at 1288-89 (So long as the court is satisfied with the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the move ... removal should be granted.); Watt, 971 P.2d at 614 ( Love and Gurney together capture a rule that a relocation by a custodial parent, where the motivation for the relocation is legitimate, sincere, in good faith, and still permits reasonable visitation by the non-custodial parent, is not a substantial and material change in circumstances.). Harshberger, ¶ 12, 117 P.3d at 1250-1251. [¶ 36] The district court properly removed the residency provision from the shared custody plan. The district court was justified in including visitation in the custody arrangement as being in the children's best interests. No abuse of the trial court's discretion occurred and it committed no procedural errors.