Opinion ID: 2588259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Peremptory Challenge Based on Religious Training

Text: During jury selection, the defense accused the prosecution of exercising its peremptory challenges to excuse seven of eight prospective African American jurors because of their race, in violation of the federal and state Constitutions. (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84-89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) By asking the prosecutor to explain her peremptory challenges, the trial court here implicitly found that defendant had made a prima facie showing of racial bias. The prosecutor then gave reasons for the challenges. The trial court found the reasons to be neutral and persuasive and concluded there had been no exclusion based on race. On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court's ruling as to the prosecution's exclusion of six of the seven African American prospective jurors challenged by the prosecution. Defendant challenges the ruling only as to the seventh African American prospective juror, Eric S., claiming that the prosecutor's primary ground for challenging Eric S. was that he had been raised a Jehovah's Witness. The prosecutor, believing that Jehovah's Witnesses are taught not to pass judgment, was concerned that Eric S.'s early religious training would render him unwilling to vote for death. In addition, the prosecutor said she had challenged Eric S. because he gave abrupt answers suggesting he resented being questioned. For example, when defense counsel asked him to explain his jury questionnaire statement that he considered the death penalty appropriate for certain crimes, Eric S. replied, I feel that it's fairly clear. Thereafter, when the prosecutor asked if Eric S. could look defendant in the eye and vote for death, Eric S. replied, Sure. The prosecutor asked again, and Eric S. replied, I said yes. Without giving a specific reason, the prosecutor expressed doubt that Eric S. would get along with the other jurors. The prosecutor's final objection to Eric S. was that he seemed reluctant to serve as a juror. He was sitting on the edge of his seat ... holding his backpack ready to get out of here. The vice that Wheeler seeks to address is the exclusion of any juror based on the presumption that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. ( People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1215, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 276, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) Although this court has described the protections against group exclusion as including religious affiliation, the United States Supreme Court has only applied Batson to forbid group exclusion based on race or gender. ( J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89; see Davis v. Minnesota (1994) 511 U.S. 1115, 114 S.Ct. 2120, 128 L.Ed.2d 679 (dis. opn. of Thomas, J.) [peremptory challenge to African American juror because juror was a Jehovah's Witness].) The United States Supreme Court has set out a three-step process that is required when a party claims that an opponent has improperly discriminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges. The first step is for the complaining party to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. If the complaining party does so, in step two the burden of production shifts to the opponent to advance a race-neutral explanation. If a race-neutral reason is tendered, in step three the court decides whether the complaining party has proved purposeful racial discrimination. ( Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 384, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) The reasons advanced by the challenging party at step two need not be tactically sound or even plausible; absent a discriminatory intent inherent in the proffered reasons, those reasons will be deemed race neutral. ( Purkett v. Elem, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769.) Only at step three is the persuasiveness of the reasons relevant. At that stage implausible or fantastic justifications may ... be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. ( Ibid. ) Here, at step one, the trial court implicitly found the defense made a prima facie case of racial discrimination. ( People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 75, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) We assume substantial evidence supports that determination. ( People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 384, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) The prosecutor then came forward (step two) with various reasons for excusing Eric S. that did not reveal any racial intent. The prosecutor objected to Eric S. because of his possible reluctance to vote for death, his attitude toward the court and counsel, his possible inability to get along with other jurors, and his seeming reluctance to serve. The court properly deemed these reasons to be race-neutral. ( Purkett v. Elem, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769.) Defendant challenges only the third step in the processnamely, whether the prosecutor's reasons were persuasive and not merely a pretext for discrimination. The defense did not object below that the prosecutor challenged Eric S. because Eric S. was raised as a Jehovah's Witness. Defense counsel argued to the trial court, in essence, that the prosecutor's religious justification was merely a pretext for race-based exclusion. (See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., supra, 511 U.S. at p. 145, 114 S.Ct. 1419 [peremptory challenge must be based on a juror characteristic other than race or gender and proffered explanation may not be pretextual].) Excusing prospective jurors who have a religious bent or bias that would make it difficult for them to impose the death penalty is a proper, nondiscriminatory ground for a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 76, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; see People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 118-119, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Here, the prosecutor indicated her concern that Eric S. might harbor an anti-death bias based on his early religious training. (See U.S. v. Stafford (7th Cir.1998) 136 F.3d 1109, 1114.) The trial court found that concern to be a valid position. Religion was not, however, the only reason the prosecutor gave. Eric S.'s attitude was also a concern. The transcript before us does not reveal Eric S.'s tone or body language. In that respect the trial court was far more able than we are to evaluate whether Eric S. was, as the prosecutor described him, smart alecky and anxious to get out of the courtroom. When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its conclusion. ( People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1197-1198, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) Here, the trial court rejected defendant's claim of pretext. The prosecutor's reasons for excusing Eric S. are not inherently implausible and find support in the record. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's Wheeler/Batson motion claiming prospective juror Eric S. was excluded because of his race.