Opinion ID: 4555862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Monell Claim Against City of Euclid

Text: The Euclid Police Department’s deadly force training program involved inappropriate and tasteless elements. The presentation materials included jokes trivializing the use of force, such as a graphic showing an officer beating a prone and unarmed suspect with the caption “[p]rotecting and serving the poop out of you.” The presentation linked to a Chris Rock comedy routine in which Rock repeatedly jokes about police beating citizens on grounds of race and shows clips of officers beating suspects. Even the components of the program that can be stomached appear skimped, such as the single genre of factual scenarios used to test officers. But Stewart cannot sue the City of Euclid for its distasteful, perhaps inadequate, training program. A municipality may be held liable for the constitutional violations of its employees when the municipality’s custom or policy led to the violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. But “[o]nly where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city policy or custom that is actionable under § 1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “a municipal policymaker cannot 2While the dissent makes a compelling argument, we think it appropriate to narrowly evaluate the clearly established prong here. Recently, the Supreme Court sharply criticized a circuit for “defin[ing] the qualified immunity inquiry at a high level of generality” in a vehicular flight case. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 311 (2015) (per curiam). See also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589-90 (2018). Additionally, in a previous vehicular flight case, the Supreme Court explained that when an officer’s “actions fell in the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,” we should hold that his conduct did not violate clearly established law. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (citation omitted). Thus, Supreme Court precedent binds us to taking a narrow approach in analyzing this case. No. 18-3767 Stewart v. City of Euclid, et al. Page 12 exhibit fault rising to the level of deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right has not yet been clearly established.” Hagans v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505, 511 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 393 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). The Sixth Circuit more recently explained: When an injury arises directly from a municipal act—such as firing a city official without due process, or ordering police to enter a private business without a warrant, the violated right need not be clearly established because fault and causation obviously belong to the city. But when a municipality’s alleged responsibility for a constitutional violation stems from an employee’s unconstitutional act, the city’s failure to prevent the harm must be shown to be deliberate under rigorous requirements of culpability and causation. The violated right in a deliberate-indifference case thus must be clearly established because a municipality cannot deliberately shirk a constitutional duty unless that duty is clear. Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, Ohio, 858 F.3d 988, 994-95 (6th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted) (quoting Board of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)). Here, Stewart’s rights were not clearly established in the precedent of this circuit or otherwise. Thus, violation of his rights cannot be the “known or obvious consequence” disregarded by the City of Euclid through its training program and the Monell claim fails. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). III. Claims Against Officer Rhodes Under State Law The district court found that Rhodes was entitled to immunity from Stewart’s various state law claims for the same reasons it concluded Rhodes did not violate Stewart’s constitutional rights. We have rejected that analysis. Statutory immunity under Ohio law, which applies to state law claims, is distinct from federal qualified immunity. Roe v. Franklin Cty., 673 N.E.2d 172, 181 n.7 (Ohio. Ct. App 1996). Ohio provides statutory immunity from suit to its police officers unless, among other things, the officer’s “acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Reckless conduct is “characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that No. 18-3767 Stewart v. City of Euclid, et al. Page 13 is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.” Argabrite v. Neer, 75 N.E.3d 161, 164 (Ohio 2016). This court has previously endorsed the view that under Ohio law, “if the trier of fact were to find that [the decedent] posed no immediate threat of harm to anyone else . . . then the officer’s actions in shooting the decedent were reckless at best.” Sabo v. City of Mentor, 657 F.3d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Carpenter v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-99-227, 2003 WL 23415143, at  (S.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2003)). And an Ohio appellate court has explained that the “relevant inquiry before the court [is] whether [the officer], from his own perspective, reasonably had probable cause to believe that he [was] at imminent risk of serious physical harm when he fired his weapon.” Hayes v. Columbus, No. 13AP-695, 2014 WL 2048176, at  (Ohio Ct. App. May 15, 2014) (unreported). As noted previously, a reasonable jury could find facts showing Stewart did not pose an immediate danger of serious physical harm and thus the use of deadly force was unreasonable. And the language of § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) does not appear to require analysis of whether the underlying right has been clearly established in precedent, as does qualified immunity. See, e.g., Bodager v. Campbell, No. 12CA828, 2013 WL 5741005, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2013) (unreported) (“Immunity from state law claims turns not on the federal qualified immunity doctrine, but on R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)”). A jury could find that Rhodes knew firing his gun would cause harm to Stewart and the firing was unreasonable in the circumstances. Thus, Rhodes is not entitled to statutory immunity from the state law claims. The district court did not consider whether—without immunity from suit—Stewart’s various state law claims survive summary judgment. We remand these claims to the district court, which in its discretion may determine whether supplemental jurisdiction should be exercised, see Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1996), and if so, whether the state law claims may proceed to trial. No. 18-3767 Stewart v. City of Euclid, et al. Page 14