Opinion ID: 194621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Misnaming of Doe in the Immunity Order

Text: Doe argues that the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 6001 et seq. were violated technically when the court ordered John Doe and not John Doe, Jr. to testify before the grand jury, and that strict compliance with the immunity statute is required since Doe's refusal to testify led to his incarceration. He further suggests that the court could not amend its immunity order to clarify that Doe and not his father had been ordered to testify since the decision to -5- grant or withhold immunity is the exclusive prerogative of the executive branch. Finally, he states that he had no obligation to inform the government that it had immunized the wrong person and that he therefore could not have waived any argument by not doing so.2 Doe's arguments are without merit. As counsel for Doe conceded, there is no question that John Doe, Jr. and not his father is the witness who was subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury and who refused to do so on the basis of his privilege against self- incrimination. The first subpoena issued in November 1992 was addressed to John Doe, Jr. In response to that subpoena, Doe's attorney notified AUSA Wyshak by letter that John Doe, Jr. . . . would refuse to answer any questions [before the grand jury] relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege. Doe's refusal to testify prompted Wyshak's application for authorization to seek a court order compelling Doe's testimony. Obviously, the government has some obligation to correctly identify the witness subject to an immunity order. The underlying justification for requiring a witness to give up his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and compelling him to testify under a grant of immunity is 2. In view of our disposition of Doe's misnomer argument, we do not address his waiver argument. -6- that the grant of immunity will protect that witness from prosecution based on his compelled testimony except, of course, for perjury. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449, 453 (1972). Therefore, we assume that a witness, based on his constitutional privilege not to have to incriminate himself, may require the government to show that, if he is compelled to testify under a court order, he is the one who will receive the protection of the immunity granted by the order. If we had any concern that Doe could be prosecuted on the basis of his compelled testimony (except for perjury) because the grant of immunity at issue here did not clearly apply to him, we would likely vacate the contempt judgment. But, on this record, we have no such doubt. Clearly, Doe was the person who had been immunized, and all parties agreed that he was the person immunized. The application submitted to the Department of Justice sought immunity for the John Doe who had Doe's (and not his father's) birthdate and social security number. At the hearing, the court confirmed that it had intended to issue its order to that John Doe, who had been the only Doe active in this matter since the first subpoena had issued in November, and the court specifically told Doe and his counsel that Doe was the one immunized by the order. Furthermore, the government willingly concedes -7- that Doe is covered by the grant of immunity at issue in this case. Since the record plainly shows that the immunity order pertained to Doe and not to his father, the failure of the immunity application and the court's order to include the designation Jr. after Doe's name is of no significance. That this is so is also shown readily by reference to cases amending indictments which misstated the defendants' names. See, e.g., Faust v. United States, 163 U.S. 452, 452 (1896) (indictment naming W.J. Foust instead of W.J. Faust was not material variance); United States v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir.) (district court properly amended indictment of John H. Borton to read John R. Borton where the defendant acknowledged that the grand jury had intended to indict him, the amendment did not change the substance of the indictment, and defendant had not been prejudiced by the amendment), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989); United States v. Young Brothers, Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 693 (5th Cir.) (the court properly amended a misnomer in an indictment where the defendant's rights were not affected and the defendant had been adequately apprised of the charges, preventing surprise at trial or subsequent prosecution for the same offense), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984); cf. United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 477-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (the government had shown that defendant Gaetano Carcone was the Thomas -8- Carcone indicted by showing that the grand jury had intended to indict the person who had the defendant's phone number and address). We do not agree that the court's confirmation that John Doe, Jr. was the John Doe in its order usurped the United States Attorney's right to determine that Doe should be immunized. The record makes clear that the process whereby Doe received immunity was initiated by the United States Attorney pursuant to his determination that Doe's testimony was necessary and that Doe should be immunized. Moreover, we have no doubt that the court could clarify any ambiguity in its own order. A court need not issue a written immunity order under the statute, but may issue an oral order. See United States v. Lach, 874 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1975). If the court may grant an oral immunity order, then certainly it has full authority to clarify orally any alleged ambiguity in a written order it has issued under the statute.3 Finally, we think it apparent from the birth date and social security number that the Department of Justice intended to approve immunity for Doe, rather than his father, and we reject the suggestion that the district court 3. In view of our disposition of this point, we see no need to determine whether the court amended its written order during the hearing as Doe claims, or whether it issued a separate oral order which rendered any alleged defect in the written order . . . a nullity as the government suggests. -9- in any way infringed on the authority of the Department to decide who should be immunized.