Opinion ID: 660188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: denial of curcio's motion for severance

Text: 38 Curcio argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for severance prior to the second trial because the jury could not  'reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relate[d] to separate defendants in view of its volume and limited admissibility.'  United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. De Larosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1065 (3d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 927, 92 S.Ct. 978, 30 L.Ed.2d 800 (1972)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089, 110 S.Ct. 1831, 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990). Specifically, Curcio argues that he was prejudiced because: (1) the government's case did not include substantial independent evidence of his guilt, and (2) the government introduced testimony against Console on mail fraud counts for which Curcio already had been acquitted at the first trial. Curcio Br. at 29. 39 Motions to sever are governed by Fed.R.Crim.P. 14, which permits the trial court to grant a defendant's motion for severance if it appears that the defendant will be prejudiced by a joint trial with other defendants. 40 It is important to recognize that there are two separate determinations to be made when a defendant on appeal urges that he is entitled to a reversal because the district court denied a pretrial severance motion. Since the district court acted on the basis of the record before it at the time of the motion, we must first determine from that record whether the court abused its discretion in denying the severance. Then, if there was an abuse of discretion, we must consider whether the defendant was prejudiced by the order denying severance. 41 Sandini, 888 F.2d at 305. 42 In determining whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Curcio's motion for severance, we keep in mind that a trial court should balance the public interest in joint trials against the possibility of prejudice inherent in the joinder of defendants, ... [and that] [t]he public interest in judicial economy favors joint trials where the same evidence would be presented at separate trials of defendants charged with a single conspiracy. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568. 8 See Zafiro v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 933, 938, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). In this case, as in Eufrasio, the public interest in a joint trial substantially outweighed the possibility of prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 569. The indictment charged both Curcio and Console with RICO violations related to the Law Firm-Markoff Enterprise, and, as we have discussed, there was substantial independent evidence of Curcio's guilt. See Sandini, 888 F.2d at 307. 9 Thus, we find no basis in the record to indicate that the district court abused its discretion in denying Curcio's motion for severance. 43 Moreover, even if the district court abused its discretion by denying Curcio's motion, to obtain a reversal, Curcio must demonstrate 'clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.'  Sandini, 888 F.2d at 307 (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir.1981)) (emphasis in Sandini). Curcio has not met this heavy burden, as [p]rejudice should not be found in a joint trial just because all evidence adduced is not germane to all counts against each defendant or some evidence adduced is more damaging to one defendant than others. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568 (citing Sandini, 888 F.2d at 307; United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 427 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 725, 98 L.Ed.2d 673 (1988)). 10 Furthermore, the limiting instructions given by the district court prior to the introduction of evidence that the jury could not consider against Curcio helped to compartmentalize the evidence and thus diminished any potential prejudice to Curcio. See, e.g., Console App. at 255-62, 277, 281.