Opinion ID: 789998
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Due Process Claim as to Gapinski's Identification Testimony

Text: 44 Petitioner Howard argues that admitting the identification testimony of Ken Gapinski, the decedent's brother, denied him due process because the identification resulted from an unnecessarily suggestive lineup and was otherwise unreliable. He argues that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive in two respects. First, he claims that the lineup violated his right to due process because it occurred after Gapinski saw the defendant twice brought into the courtroom and seated at the defense table. Second, Howard argues that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive because the defendant was significantly taller than the fillers in the lineup and was the only one with a short haircut. 45 The Petitioner also claims that Gapinski's identification was not independently reliable such that it could overcome any taint of suggestiveness. He argues that Gapinski had only a limited opportunity to see the killer at the time of the crime, and that stress and anxiety at the time of the shooting may have affected his ability to identify the killer. Howard also argues that Gapinski's description of the shooter, given to police two months after the killing, was too general to be reliable. Finally, Petitioner Howard argues that the three-month gap between the incident and the identification was sufficiently long to reduce the reliability of the identification. 46 The Supreme Court has held that an identification violates a defendant's right to due process where the identification procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive as to run the risk of irreparable mistaken identification. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); see also Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir.1986). It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process. Neil, 409 U.S. at 198, 93 S.Ct. 375. As the Supreme Court has stated, reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). We thus first assess whether the identification was unnecessarily suggestive, then assess whether the identification was nonetheless reliable. If an identification is reliable, it will be admissible even if the confrontation was suggestive. See id; Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 605 (6th Cir.2000).
47 Howard bears the burden of showing impermissible suggestiveness. United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 226, 230 (6th Cir.1992). Unnecessary suggestiveness generally depends upon whether the witness's attention was directed to a suspect because of police conduct. 2-5 Crim. Con. Law § 5.05(2)(b) (2004). In considering this, we look to the effects of the circumstances of the pretrial identification, not whether law enforcement officers intended to prejudice the defendant. Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir.1986). In examining whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the primary evil to be avoided is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Neil, 409 U.S. at 198, 93 S.Ct. 375 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968)). 48 Gapinski testified that he saw Howard at the defense table at two preliminary hearings. In certain circumstances, such a preliminary viewing could be suggestive. See Thigpen, 804 F.2d at 896 (holding in-court identification unduly suggestive where witness saw defendant first in lineup, then in two court proceedings); United States v. Emanuele, 51 F.3d 1123, 1130 (3d Cir.1995) ([T]o walk a defendantin shackles and with a U.S. Marshal at each side-before the key identification witnesses [was] impermissibly suggestive.). But see United States v. Rundell, 858 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir.1988) (Except for the suggestiveness inherent in the witnesses' knowing that appellant was the sole defendant charged with the robbery, there is no indication that the in-court identifications were based on anything other than the witnesses' observations at the time of the crime. Thus, the more important question is whether the identifications based on those observations were reliable even if the in-court confrontation was suggestive.) (citations omitted). 49 With regard to Gapinski, however, we find that the pretrial identification was only minimally suggestive. Gapinski testified that he was present on September 20, 1989, when Howard was brought out of the back of the courtroom and seated next to the defense counsel. He testified: 50 I seen him — I seen the back of him sit down. I was down talking with the family and I really wasn't paying attention to what was going on. They brought him out, they sat him down. I seen the back of his head and it was adjourned and I seen him walking to the other room. 51 J.A. 195-96. As to the second scheduled courtroom proceeding, which took place on September 27, 1989, Gapinski testified only that he saw Howard being brought out from the back and seated at the defense table with the defense attorney. J.A. 196. Other than these descriptions, Howard provides no evidence that Gapinski saw Howard for any significant period of time or that Gapinski was positioned to get a good look at Howard before the lineup. Further, there is no evidence that law enforcement officers said anything to suggest to Gapinski that Howard was the killer. As acknowledged, we find Gapinski's viewing of Howard at the preliminary hearings was suggestive, although only minimally so. 52 The Dissent disagrees with our finding that the identification procedures were only minimally suggestive, characterizing them instead as highly improper. As the cited testimony suggests, however, nothing indicates that Gapinski was ever close to Howard at the preliminary hearings, or that he ever viewed Howard's face at the preliminary hearing, or that he viewed Howard at the preliminary hearing for more than a very short period. 53 The Dissent also argues that the state in its brief concedes that the district court properly concluded that the line-up procedure employed was unduly suggestive. It appears, however, that while the Respondent's brief to us did not contest suggestiveness with regard to Chorney's and Carter's views of Howard, it never conceded the same with regard to Gapinski. Respondent Br. at 16. In any case, whatever Respondent's position, we assess the record. 54 The Dissent relies heavily upon Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893 (6th Cir.1986), to suggest that the procedures here were particularly inappropriate, but Thigpen is distinguishable. In Thigpen, we reviewed a habeas petition challenging Michigan convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm. In the underlying case, two individuals had robbed a gas station. Following the robbery, police followed two sets of footprints to the defendant's house, a house occupied by three Thigpen brothers. According to petitioner Thigpen, he had been at home when his two brothers returned home shortly after the robbery. Id. at 894. Significantly, one of Thigpen's brothers, who had not been arrested, testified that police had overlooked him in their search of the house after the robbery. This same brother later testified that he, not Thigpen, had actually participated in the robbery. Id. 55 In Thigpen, the identifying witness observed the perpetrator for only an extremely brief period during the crime: the second man was directly behind him most of the [five-minute robbery] time, [ ] he turned to look at him briefly only once, and [ ] although the man was not behind him after they moved to the back office, the office was dark and the witness was under a desk. Id. at 896. 56 At the trial of Thigpen's brother and before Thigpen's own arrest, the identifying witness saw Thigpen sit with his brother for extended periods during the trial, including during the witness's testimony at the brother's trial. Id. at 896. In contrast to the present case, the identifying witness saw Thigpen associated with a co-defendant for a significant period of time during the court proceedings before identifying Thigpen as one of the robbers. Finally, Thigpen was decided in 1986, before the heightened deference given state court factual determinations by AEDPA. Given these differences, Thigpen does not undercut our holding. 57 The Petitioner also argues that the lineup was unduly suggestive because he was substantially taller than the other defendants and was the only suspect with the high-fade haircut that the witnesses later said was so distinctive. Under certain circumstances, discrepancies in height may contribute to an impermissibly suggestive procedure. See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442-43, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969). But a height differential, standing alone, is usually not enough to make a lineup procedure suggestive. See, e.g., Millender v. Adams, 376 F.3d 520, 525 (6th Cir.2004). Here, Petitioner claims he was three inches taller than the fillers. On balance, we do not find such a discrepancy to have infected the process. 58 With respect to Petitioner's haircut, unless the witness described the distinctive characteristic to the police beforehand, that characteristic is not a basis for finding a lineup unduly suggestive. See United States v. Gibson, 135 F.3d 257, 260 (2nd Cir.1998) (photo array picturing defendant with goatee not improperly suggestive where defendant did not establish that witness earlier told police that perpetrator wore a goatee); Alexandre v. Senkowski, No. 97-cv-2482, 2003 WL 21822279 at 11, 13, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13648, at - (E.D.N.Y.2003) (no tainted identification in lineup where defendant was only member with flat-top hairstyle, because witness had not previously stated to police that assailant had a flat-top haircut). 59 In this case, as in Gibson and Alexandre, neither Gapinski nor the other witnesses earlier told police about Petitioner's distinctive flat-top haircut. Thus, this aspect of the lineup was not suggestive. Apart from the minimal suggestiveness associated with Howard's presence at the two scheduled preliminary hearings, we find that no suggestiveness attended the lineup.
60 Even if Howard had been able to show the identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive, we nonetheless find reasonable the state court's conclusion that Gapinski's identification of Howard was reliable. As mentioned, reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). 61 In judging reliability, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the factors described in Manson and Biggers: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the defendant at the initial observation; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the defendant; (4) the level of certainty shown by the witness at the pretrial identification; and (5) the length of time between the initial observation and the identification. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375. We must weigh these factors against any corrupting effect of the suggestive identification. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243. 62 As to the first factor, Gapinski had a good opportunity to view the shooter. Gapinski first saw the shooter as the truck was pulling past the porch. During this first viewing, Gapinski was three feet or five or six feet away from the shooter, although he just got a glance then. J.A. 72. 63 Gapinski saw the shooter a second time when the killer began shooting again: I heard two or three shots go off in a kind of quick format and I looked up and I seen him wave the gun and start shooting again. During this second observance, Gapinski saw the killer a split-second again but he could see his face at that time. J.A. 74. Gapinski observed the shooter long enough to [see him] raise his gun and point it to the cab of the truck. J.A. 74. At that point, the shooter was ten or fifteen feet away. J.A. 75. 64 Gapinski observed the shooter a third time after his brother yelled out that he had been shot: He raised, I watched him raise the gun, he started shooting at the cab of the truck and I heard my brother holler . . . and then the truck stopped and me and Tommy jumped up. I stood up and looked towards the porch and [the shooter] was stirring around, picking up something, it looked like shells. J.A. 75. At the time he observed the shooter picking up shells, Gapinski was approximately 30 or 40 ft. away. J.A. 76. As he climbed out of the truck and looked back to the porch, he observed the shooter standing there pretty big. He saw him for about a minute and a half, maybe a little longer, long enough to stand up and jump over the side of the truck. J.A. 72-76. Gapinski also testified that everything was very well lit, [there] was a street light pretty close by too. J.A. 76. 65 Given that Gapinski had three opportunities to view the perpetrator, at times within 3-6 feet, and that he looked at the shooter for more than a minute as the shooter picked up shells, we conclude that Gapinski had a good opportunity to view Howard at the shooting. 66 We turn to consideration of the second factor — whether the witness was attentive. To analyze the sufficiency of an eyewitness's degree of attention, we generally examine the circumstances surrounding the witness's encounter. United States v. Thomas, 116 Fed. Appx. 727, 736 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1104, 160 L.Ed.2d 1064 (2005) (remanding in light of United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)). We find more reliability where a witness was able to view the assailant with a heightened degree of attention, as compared with disinterested bystanders or casual observers. United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 511 (6th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). Generally, we place greater trust in witness identifications made during the commission of a crime because the witness has a reason to pay attention to the perpetrator. See United States v. Meyer, 359 F.3d 820, 826 (6th Cir.2004) (finding heightened degree of attention where witness spoke with robber and studied his features while looking for an opportunity to escape); Crozier, 259 F.3d at 511 (finding heightened degree of attention where robber confronted witnesses with a gun). 67 In this case, the eyewitnesses were participating in a repossession, which by its stressful nature generally demands heightened attention. The early fired gunshot gave Gapinski further reason to be attentive. Finally, in his third viewing of the perpetrator, as he climbed over the side of the truck, Gapinski watched the shooter carefully, both because he knew the man had just shot his brother, and in order to avoid getting shot himself. These facts, taken together, suggest that Gapinski was extremely attentive. 68 The third factor examines the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the defendant. Gapinski first gave a description to the police in August 1989, two months after the shooting. In this case, only cursory notes exist of the police interview of Gapinski. According to those notes, Gapinski told the police that the perpetrator was a black man with tan shorts on. He had a rifle with a clip. The rifle was real short. J.A. 506. Although this description is sparse, it is not inaccurate. Petitioner argues that the police notes do not mention the short flat-top haircut that Gapinski later testified was so distinctive. But Gapinski testified that he noticed the hairstyle during the incident on June 9, 1989 and had simply not described it, stating that he was better at recognizing than describing. He also testified that he recognized the distinctive haircut right away when he first saw the Petitioner in the courtroom. Thus, we find the third factor satisfied. 69 The fourth factor examines the level of certainty shown by the witness at the pretrial identification. Gapinski immediately picked Howard out of the lineup. In court, he testified without equivocation that Howard was the killer. Further weighing in Gapinski's favor is his clean record of reliability, as he had not previously had an opportunity to identify the shooter. See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201, 93 S.Ct. 375 (noting that witness had a good record of reliability, insofar as she had not identified any suspect in previous showups, lineups, and photographic showings). Thus, Gapinski's certainty supports the reliability of his identification. 70 The fifth factor looks at the length of time between the initial observation and the identification. The initial observation happened on June 9, 1989. The identification occurred on September 27, 1989. The trial commenced in March 1990. Three months is not a great length of time between an observation and identification. See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1277, 1286 (6th Cir.1987) (A three to four-month delay between the crime and the identification does not render the identification inherently unreliable.). 71 Under the totality of the circumstances, we find reasonable the state court's conclusion that Gapinski's identification was sufficiently reliable to overcome any suggestive procedure. Most important, Gapinski was closely proximate to the killer at the time of the shooting. Nothing shielded the shooter's features. Gapinski was highly alerted by the gun shots and tense situation. He unequivocally picked out Howard only three months after the crime. His identification was reliable. 72 Our finding here is consistent with past decisions in which we have found identifications reliable. In United States v. Meyer, 359 F.3d 820 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 112, 160 L.Ed.2d 182 (2004), we discussed the Biggers factors against a backdrop similar to the facts presented here. We examined whether a victim had sufficient opportunity to observe the perpetrator of a postal robbery to overcome an arguably suggestive pretrial identification. 2 We found that he did. 73 In Meyer, the witness had observed the perpetrator at close range for the two to four minutes the robbery lasted. The perpetrator had opened the postal driver's door, pointed a gun in the driver's face, and demanded a cash box. The perpetrator then directed the driver to go to the rear of the truck, which the driver did. Id. at 823. While the robber was searching the truck, the driver escaped out the rear, running across the loading dock into the post office. We found these circumstances sufficient for a reliable identification even though the victim could not see the perpetrator's face for some fraction of the incident. Id. at 825-26. We also found it sufficient despite the fact that the driver had given an inaccurate former description of the defendant: He had described the robber as a man in his twenties or thirties, whereas the defendant was in his forties, and he had failed to mention Meyer's grey hair and facial hair. 74 In addition to Meyer, a number of our cases have held identifications sufficiently reliable despite the presence of suggestive procedures. See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1277, 1286-87 (6th Cir.1987) (holding in-court identification sufficiently reliable, even where witness only saw person sitting in car for short period of time, could not testify to vital descriptive details of person he saw in the car, and on other occasions could not identify the defendant as person in car); United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 512 (6th Cir.2001) (in-court identification of robber sufficiently reliable even though witness had described the robber as sixty pounds heavier, the robbery took place over only a ten-minute period, and witness earlier had been unable to describe the robber); United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 226, 232 (6th Cir.1992) (in-court identification admissible even though the witness had given an earlier inconsistent description and had only a couple of minutes to view a robber who was disguised with a ball cap, sunglasses, and a bandage on his nose); Thomas, 116 Fed.Appx. at 731(unreported decision) (bank teller's identification testimony sufficiently reliable even though witness had only a brief encounter with the robber before the commission of the robbery and the witness did not see the actual robbery occur nor had the witness earlier given a description of the robber). 75 In Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431 (3d Cir.1991), the Third Circuit examined similar facts in a habeas petition. There, a police officer escorted the victim to Burkett, who was handcuffed, immediately before a preliminary hearing. The officer then asked the victim if Burkett was the perpetrator. The Third Circuit found the victim's face-to-face confrontation with the perpetrator in her house lasting approximately one-half hour gave her a sufficient basis to overcome any corrupting influence from the preliminary hearing episode. Id. at 1448. 76 Against this precedent, we find that the trial court's decision to admit Gapinski's testimony was not unreasonable under the governing AEDPA standard. We further find the Michigan appellate court's conclusion upholding the ruling reasonable. 77