Opinion ID: 714955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Damages for the Deprivation

Text: 21 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that [e]very person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a private party who attaches a debtor's assets pursuant to a state's attachment statute would be subject to § 1983 liability if the statute was found to be unconstitutional. According to Lugar, the color of state law requirement was satisfied because the private party, by invoking the assistance of state officers to effect the attachment, became a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents. Id. at 941, 102 S.Ct. at 2756 (quotations omitted). The Lugar court did not reach the issue of qualified immunity for private participants who act jointly with state agents to deprive constitutional rights. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court had established an objective standard for the qualified immunity that would be accorded to government officials. It held that such officials would be shielded in the performance of discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. 22 In Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992), the Court answered no to the question [w]hether private persons, who conspire with state officials to violate constitutional rights, have available the good faith immunity applicable to public officials. Id. at 168-69, 112 S.Ct. at 1834 (quotation omitted). The Court reviewed the policy concerns that require the protection of qualified immunity for public officials and found them inapplicable to private citizens. Among these concerns are the encouragement of fearless decision-making, the recruitment of talented public servants, the vigorous exercise of public authority and the avoidance of distractions from governmental duties. Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. at 1833. 23 In declining to extend the doctrine of immunity to private citizens because the nexus between private parties and the historic purposes of qualified immunity is simply too attenuated to justify such an extension, the Court stated: 24 In so holding, however, we do not foreclose the possibility that private defendants faced with § 1983 liability under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., ... could be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause or that § 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens. Because those issues are not fairly before us, however, we leave them for another day. 25 Id. at 168-69, 112 S.Ct. at 1834. 26 On remand, the Fifth Circuit, addressing the issues left for another day by reference to the concurring and dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court, 27 h[e]ld that private defendants sued on the basis of Lugar may be held liable for damages under § 1983 only if they failed to act in good faith in invoking the unconstitutional state procedures, that is, if they either knew or should have known that the statute upon which they relied was unconstitutional. 28 Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir.) (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 470, 126 L.Ed.2d 421 (1993). In the same opinion, the Fifth Circuit promulgated a seemingly different standard: 29 [We] think that private defendants, at least those invoking ex parte prejudgment statutes, should not be held liable under s 1983 absent a showing of malice and evidence that they either knew or should have known of the statute's constitutional infirmity. 30 Id. at 1120 (emphasis supplied). 31 The Third Circuit, referring to the second standard set out by the Fifth Circuit, stated: 32 We are in basic agreement, but we believe malice in this context means a creditor's subjective appreciation that its act deprives the debtor of his constitutional right to due process. 33 Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1276 (3d Cir.1994). 34 The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Wyatt did establish that § 1983 created a type of tort liability and that the most closely analogous torts were malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164, 112 S.Ct. at 1831. At common law, these torts provided causes of action against private defendants for unjustified harm arising out of the misuse of governmental processes. Id. The two torts seemingly were conflated in the text cited by the Court as reflecting the common law at the time § 1983 was enacted: The law has provided the action of malicious prosecution as a remedy for private injuries from abuse of the processes of the courts. Joel P. Bishop, Commentaries on the Non-Contract Law § 224, at 90 (1889). The text goes on to note the four elements necessary to establish the tort of malicious prosecution: malice, lack of probable cause, favorable termination and damage. Id. §§ 225-227, at 90. 35 A more modern text distinguishes malicious prosecution, called wrongful civil proceedings, from abuse of process, defining the latter as misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton On the Law of Torts § 121, at 897 (5th ed.1984). This text states that the abuse of process tort has but two elements: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Id. at 898. 36 As we understand it, Doehr's claim here is for damages proximately resulting from Di Giovanni's ex parte civil proceeding to attach Doehr's real property, a proceeding that ended favorably for Doehr when the attachment statute was declared unconstitutional. Doehr's claim therefore falls within the definition of malicious prosecution. See 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 2 (1987). We think that malicious prosecution is the most closely analogous tort and look to it for the elements that must be established in order for Doehr to prevail on his § 1983 damages claim. Accordingly, having established that Di Giovanni's attachment proceeding ended in failure, it remains for Doehr to demonstrate want of probable cause, malice and damages. The burden of proof is, of course, upon the plaintiff. 37 In establishing the requisite element of lack of probable cause, reference must be made to the definition existing at the time of the enactment of § 1983. At that time, probable cause was defined as follows: 38 Probable cause--or, as the expression oftener is, reasonable and probable cause--is any such combination of facts and proofs as may fairly lead the reasonable mind to the belief (and the person relying on it must believe) that, in the absence of hitherto unknown qualifying or rebutting evidence, the prosecution or other suit ought to be successful. 39 Bishop, supra, § 239, at 95 (footnotes omitted). It is interesting to note that a more modern definition of probable cause to initiate civil proceedings incorporates similar elements: 40 One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of civil proceedings against another has probable cause for doing so if he reasonably believes in the existence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and either 41 (a) correctly or reasonably believes that under those facts the claim may be valid under the applicable law, or 42 (b) believes to this effect in reliance upon the advice of counsel, sought in good faith and given after full disclosure of all relevant facts within his knowledge and information. 43 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 675 (1977). There is common law authority that it is objectively reasonable to act on the basis of a statute not yet held invalid. See, e.g., Birdsall v. Smith, 158 Mich. 390, 122 N.W. 626, 627 (1909) (holding that [e]very statute should be considered valid until there is a judicial determination to the contrary, and these defendants had a right to act upon such assumption). The case would be different, however, if those who act in reliance on a statute can be shown to know that such [statute] was unconstitutional and would be declared so. Id. 44 The element of malice implicates an evil or unlawful purpose. Bishop, supra, § 232, at 92. It includes the pursuit of the lawful end by the intentionally unlawful means. Id. § 233, at 93. Generally, malice 45 may be shown by proving that the prosecution complained of was undertaken from improper or wrongful motives, or in reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. Impropriety of motive may be established by proof that the defendant instituted the prior proceedings against the plaintiff, for instance, ... for the purpose of obtaining a private advantage against him ...; thus, malice is sufficiently established in an action for malicious prosecution if it appears that the prior suit was commenced in bad faith to vex, annoy, or harass the adverse party. 46 52 Am.Jur.2d Malicious Prosecution § 152, at 277-78 (1970) (footnotes omitted). Malice may be inferred from the lack of probable cause. Bishop, supra, § 235, at 93; Keeton, supra, § 120, at 895. Reliance upon the advice of an attorney may negate malice, however. Bishop, supra, § 236, at 93-94. 47 It seems clear that an action for malicious prosecution or wrongful civil proceeding extends to claims for damages arising from an improper attachment. See Keeton, supra, § 120, at 890. Actual damages that proximately result from the wrongful proceeding are recoverable. Id. at 895. Damages may be sought for interference with property, loss of credit and other tangible and intangible losses arising from the attachment. Id. at 895-96. In connection with the claims in this case, we note that Doehr contends that Di Giovanni failed to release the attachment until some time after it was finally determined that the attachment was based upon an unconstitutional statute. We think that the continuation of the attachment under such circumstances may give rise to a claim for damages provided the other elements of malicious prosecution are established in connection with the failure to discontinue. See 52 Am.Jur.2d Malicious Prosecution § 26, at 203 (1970). 48 We note in this connection our disagreement with the district court's rejection of Doehr's claim for defendant's alleged wrongful attachment and for defendant's tardy release of the attachment after the declaration of unconstitutionality by invoking Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942, 102 S.Ct. at 2756, for the proposition that [t]he use or abuse of an ex parte attachment statute does not present a valid cause of action. Lugar stated that: Petitioner did present a valid cause of action under § 1983 insofar as he challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia statute; he did not insofar as he alleged only misuse or abuse of the statute. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, at a minimum, Lugar does not preclude a § 1983 claim for misuse or abuse of an attachment statute after it has been declared unconstitutional. 49 Because we today announce a new rule to govern damage claims for due process violations under § 1983 where the violation arises from a private party's invocation of a state's statutory remedy, we think that we should remand for further consideration in this case. The parties could not have been aware of the requirements we now impose upon plaintiffs who seek to establish their claims for damages in such a situation. It seems to us only fair to provide Doehr with the opportunity to present evidence in an effort to carry his difficult burden of proof and also to allow Di Giovanni to present any evidence he may desire to adduce. The stipulation entered into by the parties certainly is inadequate to allow a proper determination in this case, given the requirements of the new rule.