Opinion ID: 197226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Loss of the Pipe Barge and Pipeline

Text: 25 El/Cap promised to repair the holes in the pipe barge before allowing it to leave its yard in New York. C&G argued that the failure to make these repairs was a legal cause of the loss of the pipe barge and pipeline. El/Cap, however, argues that no jury could have found it liable for the loss of the pipe barge because, even if El/Cap promised to repair the pipe barge and failed to do so, the principal of East Coast Marine, John Szegda, removed the pipe barge from El/Cap's dock and subsequently assured the other towing companies that the pipe barge was seaworthy. According to El/Cap, such actions on the part of Szegda must be viewed as breaking the chain of causation. We disagree. 26 El/Cap does not deny on appeal that the jury could conclude that the pipe barge ultimately sank as a result of damages that El/Cap had promised to repair. Thus, it is legal (or proximate) causation, and not factual causation, that is at issue. El/Cap's argument regarding legal causation is that East Coast Marine's assurances to later towers that the barge was seaworthy cuts off El/Cap's liability. That East Coast Marine would try to complete the tow of that pipe barge to Maine was certainly foreseeable. And, furthermore, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Szegda's assurances of seaworthiness to the later towers were based on his belief that El/Cap had in fact repaired the pipe barge as promised. Although El/Cap did not affirmatively indicate to Szegda or C&G that it had fixed the pipe barge such that it was seaworthy, it remained silent. El/Cap concedes that Dennis Elberth acquiesced in the removal of the pipe and barge from [El/Cap's] sea wall. Appellant's Brief at 18. This acquiescence, in the wake of a promise to repair the barge before permitting it to continue to Maine, may have led a rational jury to conclude that El/Cap breached its duty of care with regard to the pipe barge. Thus, despite the general rule that an owner of a tow is responsible for warranting its basic seaworthiness, 9 we agree with the following statement made by the district court in the course of denying El/Cap's motion for a directed verdict: 27 [T]here is a basis upon which the jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that El/Cap should not have released that pipeline in New York, especially after it had made a commitment to Mr. Todd that it would not do so until the repairs had been made. 28 Tr. at 318. It was within the province of the jury as factfinder to determine that El/Cap's acts and omissions proximately caused the sinking of the pipe barge and pipeline, even though El/Cap was not towing the barge when it sank. We note that El/Cap presented its argument regarding superseding causes of damage at closing argument. The jury's verdict, apparently granting full damages, can therefore be regarded as a rejection of this argument. 10 29 All of these considerations lead us to conclude that the denials of El/Cap's motions for directed verdict and new trial are not tantamount to abuses of discretion. Because we do not displace the jury's finding of liability as to the pipeline and pipe barge, we also decline El/Cap's invitation to adjust the jury's damage determination to reflect no liability for the loss of the pipeline and pipe barge. 11