Opinion ID: 1224786
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: mere association

Text: The jury was instructed on liability as an aider and abettor in jury Instruction No. 11, which provided: A person who either before or during its commission intentionally aids or abets another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission is criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of the defendant's participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime. See PIK Crim.3d 54.05. Defense counsel submitted the following proposed instruction to the court: Mere association or mere presence in the vicinity of the crime are themsel[ves] insufficient to establish guilt as a participant or aider and abettor. This is not a pattern jury instruction. However, Ninci points out that this is a well-settled principle of law as set out in the Comment to PIK Crim.3d 54.05 and State v. Green, 237 Kan. 146, Syl. ¶ 4, 697 P.2d 1305 (1985). The trial court declined to give Ninci's proposed jury instruction. Ninci alleges that the trial court's failure to instruct on Ninci's theory of defense violated due process and requires reversal of Ninci's convictions. This issue has been addressed before in State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 827 P.2d 733 (1992), and State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 740 P.2d 559 (1987). The Scott court, quoting Hunter, provided: `Although [this court has] held that mere association with principals is not sufficient to establish guilt as an aider and abettor, [we have not] mandated the giving of such an instruction.... [We have] held that the PIK [Crim.2d 54.05] instruction given clearly informed the jury that intentional acts by a defendant must be proved to convict for aiding and abetting and, thus, proof of mere association or presence would be insufficient to convict. Therefore, the refusal to give defendant's requested instruction was not error.' 250 Kan. at 361 (quoting Hunter, 241 Kan. at 639). The Scott court also quoted State v. Crabtree, 248 Kan. 33, 805 P.2d 1 (1991): `Error cannot be predicated on the refusal to give specific instructions where those which were given cover and include the substance of those refused.' 250 Kan. at 361 (quoting Crabtree, 248 Kan. 33, Syl. ¶ 6). Neither Scott nor Crabtree found error in the trial court's refusal to give the defendant's requested mere association instruction. Scott, 250 Kan. at 361; Crabtree, 241 Kan. at 639. Ninci acknowledges the Scott and Hunter cases but contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give his proposed mere association instruction despite these two cases. In support of his argument, Ninci points out that the jury was given the following Instruction No. 9, which is PIK Crim.3d 54.01: Ordinarily a person intends all of the usual consequences of his voluntary acts. This inference may be considered by you along with all the other evidence in the case. You may accept or reject it in determining whether the State has met its burden to prove the required criminal intent of the defendant. This burden never shifts to the defendant. It is true that under Instruction No. 9, the jury was allowed to infer that Ninci intended to do all of the usual consequences of his voluntary act in hanging out with Ford. However, the jury was also allowed to reject this inference if it chose to do so. Even if the jury accepted this inference, it was only allowed to assume that Ninci intended the usual consequences of voluntarily hanging out with Ford. Aggravated battery, robbery, and felony murder are not the usual consequences of hanging out with a friend. Thus, the jury could not and would not assume that Ninci intended to commit these crimes and aid and abet in committing these crimes just because he was hanging out with Ford. PIK Crim.3d 54.05 specifically requires the jury to find that Ninci intentionally aided and abetted in committing these crimes. This made it clear to the jury that mere association with Ford, without intent to aid and abet in the crimes, was not enough evidence to find Ninci guilty of aiding and abetting in these crimes. The Comment to PIK Crim.3d 54.05 has been amended since the trial in this case and provides: Mere association with principals who actually commit the crime or mere presence in the vicinity of the crime is insufficient to establish guilt as an aider and abettor. State v. Green, 237 Kan. 146, 697 P.2d 1305 (1985). This language from Green, however, may properly be refused as an additional instruction by the trial judge, since PIK [Crim.] 3d 54.05 clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting. State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639, 740 P.2d 559 (1987); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361, 827 P.2d 733 (1992). PIK Crim.3d 54.05 (1994 Supp.), Comment. (Emphasis added.)