Opinion ID: 3169763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chavez Failed to Show Pretext

Text: Chavez’s evidence failed to create a jury issue as to pretext. Credit Nation said that it fired Chavez, an auto mechanic, for sleeping while on the clock. In fact, Chavez slept for 40 minutes in a repair customer’s vehicle while on the clock. Chavez admitted to this conduct. Credit Nation also fired another employee for sleeping on the job. Credit Nation’s reason was both a true and legitimate reason. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Chavez’s evidence failed to show that the reason given—sleeping on the job—was pretextual under the McDonnell Douglas framework.3 VI. DISCRIMINATORY INTENT AND “A MOTIVATING FACTOR” Even if she failed to show pretext, Chavez alternatively argues that she still presented sufficient circumstantial evidence that Credit Nation had discriminatory intent and that such intent was “a motivating factor” in her termination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Chavez asserts her termination was motivated not only by a 3 Chavez also argues that her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the district court granted summary judgment to Credit Nation. This argument wholly lacks merit. See Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008) (concluding that where summary judgment is appropriate, no Seventh Amendment violation occurs). 9 Case: 14-14596 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Page: 10 of 22 legitimate reason, but also by an impermissible reason, to wit bias against her transgender status. In this regard, we review (1) the causation standard of “a motivating factor” in § 2000e-2(m); (2) Credit Nation’s arguments about § 2000e- 2(m); and then (3) Chavez’s evidence. A. Section 2000e-2(m)—“A Motivating Factor” Causation Prior to the enactment of § 2000e-2(m), if a plaintiff employee proved the defendant employer had discriminatory intent based on sex under § 2000e-2(a)(1), the defendant could avoid all liability by showing the defendant would have made the same decision to terminate the plaintiff in the absence of discriminatory motive. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 244-46, 258, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1787-88 (1989). This “but for” causation allowed a defendant to avoid liability even if the plaintiff had shown discriminatory intent in the employment decision. After Price Waterhouse, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made the same-decision defense no longer a complete affirmative defense to liability in Title VII discrimination cases that are based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012)). Importantly, if a plaintiff has evidence of discriminatory intent, § 2000e- 2(m) now provides that Plaintiff Chavez may establish causation by showing 10 Case: 14-14596 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Page: 11 of 22 gender bias “was a motivating factor” in her termination, “even though other factors also motivated” her termination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The full text of § 2000e-2(m) provides: Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). Under § 2000e-2(m), Plaintiff Chavez may prevail if she proves that her sex was a “motivating factor” behind her termination, even if there were other, even legitimate, factors motivating that decision as well. See Harris v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1084 (11th Cir. 1996).4 More recently, the Supreme Court has told us that “Section 2000e-2(m) is not itself a substantive bar on discrimination. Rather, it is a rule that establishes the causation standard for proving a violation defined elsewhere in Title VII.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, at __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2530 (2013) (emphasis added). “[B]ut-for causation is not the test”; rather, “[i]t suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the 4 In this regard, the 1991 Act as codified in § 2000e-2(m) legislatively overruled that part of the plurality’s holding in Price Waterhouse which allowed defendants to completely avoid all liability upon proving that they would have taken the same employment action in the absence of discriminatory intent. Harris, 99 F.3d at 1084 & n.4. 11 Case: 14-14596 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Page: 12 of 22 employer’s decision.” Id. at 2523. The Supreme Court has also instructed that (1) the language of § 2000e-2(m) indicates Congress’s intent to confine that provision’s change to the listed five types of discrimination—“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)—and (2) that § 2000e-2(m) does not apply to retaliation claims under § 2000e-3(a). Id. at 2532-33; see also Lewis v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 208 F.3d 1303, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2000) (indicating retaliation is not among the employment practices listed in § 2000e- 2(m)). 5 Further, the Supreme Court recently abrogated the requirement of direct evidence for § 2000e-2(m) cases. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2150 (2003). The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can rely on circumstantial evidence to show mixed motives under § 2000e-2(m). Id. at 101, 123 S. Ct. at 2155. This Court’s own decision in Harris v. Shelby County Board of Education is instructive as to how § 2000e-2(m) applies. In Harris, the plaintiff’s lawsuit, brought under Title VII and § 1983, alleged the defendants discriminated against him by not selecting him as a school principal because of his race. 99 F.3d at 1080. The Harris Court concluded (1) that the plaintiff presented sufficient 5 This Title VII case involves only status-based discrimination based on sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII also prohibits retaliating against an employee for reporting or opposing discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiff Chavez has made no retaliation claims. 12 Case: 14-14596 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Page: 13 of 22 circumstantial evidence to create a jury issue on racially discriminatory intent in the hiring decision, but (2) that the defendant board proved it would have made the same hiring decision even in the absence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 1084-85. This Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on that same-decision, affirmative defense. Id. at 1085. But this Court remanded the Title VII claim to the district court to permit the plaintiff to prove race was “a motivating factor” behind the hiring decision, even though we found, based on overwhelming evidence, that the employer defendant would have made the same decision anyway. Id. (citing § 2000e-2(m)). The Harris Court also pointed out that on remand the remedy for a § 2000e- 2(m) violation was limited by § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 6 Id. Specifically, if a defendant employer proves that it would have taken the same employment action in the absence of the illegal motivating factor, § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides that the court “may grant” certain declaratory or injunctive relief and attorney’s fees and costs 6 The full text of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides: On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e- 2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court-- (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 13 Case: 14-14596 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Page: 14 of 22 directly attributable to the pursuit of a § 2000e-2(m) claim, but “shall not award damages” or order “reinstatement.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); see also Harris, 99 F.3d at 1085 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). In § 2000e-2(m) cases, the employer’s same-decision defense, if proven, effectuates only a limitation on liability, not a complete avoidance of it. See Canup v. Chipman-Union, Inc., 123 F.3d 1440, 1442 (11th Cir. 1997). However, if the defendant fails to carry this same-decision burden, the plaintiff prevails without the remedy limitation in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A). B. Credit Nation’s Arguments Despite the plain language in § 2000e-2(m) and our precedent, Credit Nation in effect argues that Chavez must still prove pretext to recover. Credit Nation in essence asserts that if Chavez cannot show pretext, she cannot show mixed-motive causation under § 2000e-2(m). That argument lacks merit because, as explained above, McDonnell Douglas is one route, but not the only available avenue in sex discrimination cases. See Chapter 7, 683 F.3d at 1255; Lockheed-Martin, 644 F.3d at 1328; Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1320; Harris, 99 F.3d at 1084-85. We recognize this Court has indicated that if a retaliation claim fails at the summary judgment stage under McDonnell Douglas, it also fails under a “mixedmotive” analysis for the same reasons. See Crawford v. City of Fairburn, 482 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that because the plaintiff failed to show the 14 Case: 14-14596 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Page: 15 of 22 non-discriminatory reason for his termination “was pretextual” under McDonnell Douglas, “he has also failed to establish that the City [employer] was motivated by the consideration of an impermissible factor”). However, examined closely, Crawford involved only a retaliation claim, the Supreme Court has told us that § 2000e-2(m) does not apply to retaliation claims, and Crawford is thus not “a motivating factor” case under § 2000e-2(m) and is not applicable here. Alternatively, Credit Nation argues that even if Chavez is not required to show pretext under McDonnell Douglas, she still failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Credit Nation had any discriminatory intent or that her transgender status was “a motivating factor” in Credit Nation’s termination of her employment. We consider below whether Chavez met that burden.