Opinion ID: 6340579
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Workers’ Compensation Policy

Text: ¶ 41. Plaintiff contends that if a jury believed she got injured at work as opposed to outside of work, then the “defense that she was not qualified for light duty under [defendant’s] worker’s compensation policy falls apart.” She asserts there was a dispute of fact as to where she sustained her injury because two of her supervisors told the workers’ compensation carrier that she was injured outside of work. She also claims that her supervisors had no basis for this belief, which further evidenced pretext. ¶ 42. Plaintiff’s argument misrepresents the facts. Assuming that by “defense” plaintiff means defendant’s proffered legitimate reason for terminating her employment, she points to no evidence that defendant ever stated that it fired her because her nonoccupational injury disqualified her from protection under its workers’ compensation policy. As the trial court concluded, defendant met its burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff when it stated in its statement of undisputed material facts attached to its summary judgment motion: As of May 11, 2016, plaintiff had exhausted all of her FMLA/VPFLA leave and she is unable to perform the essential function of her job according to her own physician’s medical restrictions which provided no end date . . . . Mack Molding could not continue to employ[] plaintiff in a position she was not physically capable of performing. The May 20, 2016 termination letter stated that “due to production schedules,” it was “necessary to assign another employee to [plaintiff’s] position.” Plaintiff cannot put words in defendant’s mouth only to claim that they sound suspicious. 3 Plaintiff states that the same pretext arguments also apply to her allegations of FEPA discrimination. Given our conclusion that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under FEPA, we need not consider possible pretext as to that claim. 20 ¶ 43. Even if plaintiff’s argument were based on an accurate portrayal of facts, it would fail. The trial court construed plaintiff’s contention to be that defendant’s denial of her request for light duty deviated from defendant’s ordinary policy or practice, and that this deviation evidences pretext. See Mellin v. Flood Brook Union Sch. Dist., 173 Vt. 202, 212, 790 A.2d 408, 418 (2001) (noting that employer’s response to employment situation that differs from response under employer’s ordinary policy may be evidence of pretext in retaliation cases). On appeal plaintiff does not seek to correct this interpretation, so we consider her argument as framed by the trial court. The court rejected her contention, finding that defendant’s policy of assigning light duty to occupationally injured employees was discretionary, subject to availability of work, and applied only to employees who were currently receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Because it was undisputed that plaintiff was not receiving workers’ compensation benefits, the court reasoned, rejecting plaintiff’s request did not demonstrate a deviation from this policy, let alone a deviation evidencing pretext. We agree and note further that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of how defendant applied this policy to other similarly situated employees. There was no basis for a jury to infer that defendant even occasionally applied the light-duty-assignment provision of its workers’ compensation policy to employees who, like plaintiff, had not applied for or received workers’ compensation benefits. No reasonable jury could find that defendant’s refusal to assign plaintiff to light duty on May 6, 2016 was evidence of defendant retaliating against her for taking four hours of medical leave later on May 6, 2016 or applying for workers’ compensation on May 12, 2016. ¶ 44. Plaintiff relatedly contends that her supervisors told the workers’ compensation carrier, without evidence or investigation, that she was injured outside of work, suggesting defendant’s stated reasons for terminating her were pretextual. This assertion again distorts the record. Given the undisputed facts that plaintiff originally injured her knee outside of work in 2015, and then returned to work and left again multiple times over the next year due to knee pain, 21 there was at least some basis for plaintiff’s supervisors to believe that her absences related to this initial nonoccupational injury. But we need not consider the argument further. Although plaintiff claims the trial court never addressed this contention, she does not indicate whether and how it was preserved, and we will not address it for the first time on appeal. See V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4)(A) (establishing appellant’s duty to explain how arguments were preserved); In re White, 172 Vt. 335, 343, 779 A.2d 1264, 1270 (2001) (“We have repeatedly stressed that we will not address arguments not properly preserved for appeal.”). ¶ 45. Plaintiff additionally argues that defendant assigned her to light duty between October and November 2015 but refused to assign her to light duty in May 2016, suggesting that the workers’ compensation policy is applied “when convenient.” She once again relies on an unsupported factual premise. When plaintiff returned to work in October 2015, she had no medical restrictions other than a time limit of four hours per day. At that time defendant placed her in an existing, established position: finisher. The fact that the finisher position may have been less physically intensive than plaintiff’s previous role as molder does not mean that defendant was applying its workers’ compensation policy to accommodate her. Under its workers’ compensation policy, defendant could assign temporarily injured employees to “[t]ransitional duty assignments” for up to twelve weeks, in its discretion and subject to availability of such work. The policy stated that these assignments were “not permanently assigned positions.” There was no clear suggestion by either party below that defendant was applying its workers’ compensation policy to plaintiff when it switched her from molder to finisher in October 2015. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrated that the finisher position was permanent, as plaintiff ramped up to full-time hours in November 2015 and remained working as a finisher until her injury in May 2016—far beyond the twelve-week maximum of temporary assignments under the workers’ compensation policy. Placing plaintiff in a less physically intensive, but permanent and pre-existing, position was not 22 evidence of defendant selectively applying its policy regarding transitional light-duty assignments.4 ¶ 46. Finally, plaintiff asserts a jury could find pretext in the fact that defendant’s termination letter was dated May 20, 2016, and the letter stated that defendant’s job was not protected because she was not currently on workers’ compensation benefits, yet defendant did not mail this letter until May 24, 2016, the same day the workers’ compensation carrier denied her claim. Plaintiff argues, quoting Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2011), that “[t]he closer two events are, the more likely that the first caused the second.” Id. at 314-15. But plaintiff does not develop this argument at all, and never asserts what event she thinks caused what other event. It was undisputed that plaintiff was not receiving workers’ compensation benefits at any time during May 2016, so the termination letter was accurate whether it was actually written before or after the carrier denied her claim. To the extent plaintiff suggests any improper collusion between defendant and its carrier, she cites nothing in the record to support this notion, nor any legal authority to explain how it might evidence pretext. We see no reasonable connection between the date that defendant mailed this termination letter and plaintiff’s allegations that defendant was motivated to terminate her either because she took medical leave or applied for workers’ compensation.