Opinion ID: 1516216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Death Qualified Jurors[23]

Text: Declaring that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing, appellant claims that his sentencing jury was partial because the jury was not life-qualified and that death-qualified jurors were improperly excluded for cause. Appellant argues that his trial counsel was partially responsible for the jury's supposed partiality because he did not conduct any voir dire concerning jury bias against imposition of a life sentence or rehabilitate jurors whom the trial court dismissed. Appellant also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective when he accepted jury members without specifically life-qualifying them. Appellant also argues that direct appeal counsel should have litigated these issues, and declares he had no strategic or tactical reason for doing otherwise. In response, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court properly dismissed jurors for cause who expressed an inability to impose the death penalty or to follow the trial court's instructions on the law. The Commonwealth asserts that there is no legal authority to support appellant's claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally obliged to specifically life-qualify all jury members. The PCRA court held that the record revealed no instance where the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing a juror for cause, as each of the specific jurors appellant cites expressed doubts about his or her ability to vote for the death penalty. As to appellant's claim that all jurors must be life-qualified, the lower court noted this Court's authority that a selection of a fair and impartial jury does not require such an inquiry. Moreover, the court found that appellant offered no evidence that the jury ultimately seated in fact was unfair or partial. The decision to disqualify a juror is within the discretion of the trial court, a decision which will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 543 Pa. 429, 672 A.2d 293, 299 (1996). Any person may be excluded from a jury who holds views on capital punishment that prevents or substantially impairs that person from adhering to the trial court's instructions on the law. Robinson, 864 A.2d at 488; Commonwealth v. Lark, 548 Pa. 441, 698 A.2d 43, 48 (1997). A juror's bias need not be proven with unmistakable clarity. Commonwealth v. Morales, 549 Pa. 400, 701 A.2d 516, 525 (1997). For instance, in Morales, we held that a juror expressed sufficient doubt about his ability to impose the death penalty when he said, I'm not certain that I could judge someone fair enough to give them the death penalty. Id. We also found no error in excluding a juror who did not feel comfortable having to make a decision about someone else's life and who always doubts whether imposing the death penalty is correct. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 545 Pa. 233, 681 A.2d 130, 137 (1996). If a defendant wishes to life qualify jurors on voir dire, he must be permitted to do so. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2233, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 579 Pa. 490, 856 A.2d 806, 813 (2004). However, there is no requirement that trial counsel life-qualify jury members and counsel cannot be rendered ineffective for failing to do so. Robinson, 864 A.2d at 487-88; Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 862 A.2d 74, 79-80 (2004); Commonwealth v. Speight, 578 Pa. 520, 854 A.2d 450, 459 (2004); Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588, 819 A.2d 33, 50 (2002). Here, the trial court was within its discretion to exclude jurors who expressed reservations about imposing the death penalty and trial counsel had no constitutional obligation to attempt to change the jurors' views. [24] Furthermore, since existing precedent does not impose a requirement that trial counsel must life-qualify each juror, appellant's claim that counsel was ineffective in this regard is frivolous.