Opinion ID: 161070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consent To Search For The VIN

Text: 24 Next, in light of our holding that the search for an additional VIN was impermissible under Class and Miller, we turn to the issue of whether the search was nevertheless justified by Mr. Caro's consent. The district court concluded that Mr. Caro gave his valid consent to Trooper Avery's request to search for the door VIN. However, because the district court ruled that the VIN search was justified by the suspicion of a stolen vehicle, and failed to identify that search as legally problematic, it did not conduct a taint analysis of Mr. Caro's consent. See United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 562 (10th Cir. 1994). 25 We have held that a search that is preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation may still be valid if the defendant's consent to that search was voluntary in fact under the totality of the circumstances. Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 881. When there has been such a violation, the government bears the heavy burden of showing that the primary taint of that violation was purged. Id. To satisfy this burden, the government must prove, from the totality of the circumstances, a sufficient attenuation or 'break in the causal connection between the illegal detention and the consent.' United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting McSwain, 29 F.3d at 562 n.2). As we examine the totality of the circumstances, no single fact is dispositive, but the factors set forth in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975), are especially important: (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal detention and consent, (2) any intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of any official misconduct. Gregory, 79 F.3d at 979. 26 First, with respect to the issue of attenuation, there is no question that at the time Trooper Avery asked for Mr. Caro's permission to look for a VIN inside the vehicle, he was still in possession of Mr. Caro's driver's license, the vehicle registration, and the citation for excessive window tint. He also did not inform Mr. Caro that he was free to leave or to refuse consent to the inspection. We have held that although these are not prerequisites for establishing voluntary consent, they are particularly worth noting. Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 882 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 432 (1991)). 27 Next, the three Brown factors also indicate a lack of voluntary consent. There was certainly no lapse of time between the Fourth Amendment violation and Mr. Caro's alleged consent (the first Brown factor), or any intervening circumstance (the second). See United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 543-44 (10th Cir. 1994). As for the third Brown factor, it is true that Trooper Avery's conduct in this case was less obviously deliberate and flagrant than that of officers in other cases, see Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 883, and McSwain, 29 F.3d at 563. However, as stated in section (I), supra, and as shown on the videotape of the traffic stop, Trooper Avery failed to admit on direct examination that at the time he asked to look for a VIN inside the car, he had already determined that the dashboard VIN appeared valid. This lends credence to Mr. Caro'ssuggestion that Trooper Avery detained the vehicle with a quality of purposefulness, and asked to inspect the additional VIN on the hope that something might turn up. Aplt's Br. at 19 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 605). 28 Based upon the totality of the circumstancesthe absence of attenuation, along with the lack of voluntariness under Brownwe hold that Mr. Caro's consent to the VIN inspection was insufficient to purge the taint of his unlawful detention. Any evidence discovered by Trooper Avery as a result of the VIN inspection must therefore be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 29