Opinion ID: 475837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the sanction was excessive

Text: 20 We have concluded that Mr. Horecky's delay from October 15, 1986 in making arrangements for the payment of the cost of the reporter's transcript violated Rule 7(b) and 8(f) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure of the United States District Court of Guam. We must now decide whether the sanction of dismissal was too harsh. We review an order dismissing an action as a sanction for lack of prosecution for abuse of discretion. Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 495-96 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1007, 105 S.Ct. 1368, 84 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985). 21 Rule 22 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure of the United States District Court of Guam provides in pertinent part as follows: The Presiding Judge shall have authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with these rules after an appeal has been docketed. We are required to look to the relevant case law of the Ninth Circuit in construing the Rules of Appellate Procedure of the District Court of Guam. Guam R.App.P. 1. 22 We begin our discussion by noting that the violations of the rules were committed by appointed counsel in a criminal case. There is no evidence that the appellant was responsible or aware of his attorney's failure to make arrangements for the payment of the court reporter or the transmittal of a complete record on appeal. We are also mindful of the fact that failure to file a proper request for the payment of the costs of the reporter until January 15, 1986, resulted in a 90 day delay in the prosecution of this criminal appeal. It is also clear from the record, however, that Mr. Horecky filed CJA Form No. 24 the day after being advised by phone by the clerk of the district court that he had failed to do so. Finally, we note that the government offered no evidence at the January 31, 1986 hearing that this delay was prejudicial, and failed to make an appearance at the February 21, 1986 proceedings on the motion to set aside the dismissal of the appeal. In its briefs before this court, the government does not contend that it has been prejudiced. 23 Dismissal of a criminal appeal for the misdeeds of counsel is an extremely harsh penalty. In the context of a civil rights proceeding, we stated [b]ecause dismissal is so harsh a penalty, it should be imposed only in extreme circumstances. Raiford v. Pounds, 640 F.2d 944, 945 (9th Cir.1981) (citing Industrial Building Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.1970)). We do not consider this to be an extreme case. 24 After obtaining an extension of time, counsel made a timely request for a reporter's transcript. His error involved the failure to make a pro forma request for court authorization to pay the cost of the reporter's transcript of a criminal trial. Because the evidence is uncontradicted that appellant is an indigent, the court was under a duty to authorize payment of the costs of a transcript. In fact, the district court granted Reyes in forma pauperis status and appointed counsel on appeal. In Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir.1983), we stated: [d]ismissal, however, is authorized only where the failure to comply is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the party. There is no evidence in this record of willfulness or bad faith. At worst, the record demonstrates ignorance of the requirements of the law or the neglectful failure to perform a perfunctory task. The government failed to offer any evidence to contradict Mr. Horecky's sworn statement that he believed that a proper request for payment of the reporter's transcript had been filed. 25 We have also reversed an order of dismissal based on delay where the record does not show prejudice to the opposing party. Mir v. Fosburg, 706 F.2d 916, 918-19 (9th Cir.1983). More recently, we have held that dismissal of an action is an abuse of discretion where the district court failed to consider lesser sanctions. United States v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. & NME Hospital, Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 913 (9th Cir.1986). The district court dismissed Reyes' appeal without discussing less drastic sanctions or the possibility of taking action against court appointed counsel instead of his client. 26 We have also observed that in considering the appropriateness of a sanction, a court should consider the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.... Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir.1986). The right of an individual to a hearing on the merits of his appeal from a judgment imposing years of imprisonment, as in the matter before us, is a precious entitlement, so long recognized in our law that no elaboration is necessary to explain that it is a favored policy in a democratic society. The District of Columbia Circuit in Christoffel v. United States, 190 F.2d 585 (D.C.Cir.1950) well expressed the concern that we should accord an individual convicted of a criminal offense the right to a hearing on the merits of his appeal notwithstanding his attorney's disregard of the rules of appellate procedure. The court stated in Christoffel: 27 There is nothing in the record to show that the appellant was personally neglectful of the appeal or that he had had, prior to their failure to file the record in time or within time to apply for an extension, any reason to doubt that his counsel would give due attention to the appeal. We think that under these circumstances to dismiss the appeal because of counsel's failure to file the record in time and thereby to subject the appellant to imprisonment without consideration of the substantial questions in the case would be a miscarriage of justice which should not be permitted to occur. 28 Id. at 594. In another portion of its opinion, the District of Columbia Circuit stated: 29 And in a criminal case in which a sentence of imprisonment is involved, there is a public interest against denial of consideration on appeal of substantial questions as to the lawfulness of the conviction. For if the conviction is erroneous it is abhorrent to justice that a defendant shall nevertheless suffer such a penalty for the crime charged. 30 Id. at 590. 31 We conclude that under the circumstances presented by this record, the district court abused its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal of this criminal appeal. The delay in prosecution of the appeal was short. No resulting prejudice has been claimed. Instead, the target of the court's understandable concern for the violation of its rules was the appellant. The district court should have considered imposing sanctions against counsel who was solely responsible for the delay in perfecting the appeal. See Christoffel, 190 F.2d at 594 (court referred the matter of counsel's failure to file a timely record on appeal to the Committee on Admissions and Grievances for consideration of disciplinary action). 32 The order denying the motion to set aside the dismissal of the appeal is reversed. The district court is directed to vacate its order dismissing the appeal, to order preparation of the transcript on appeal, and to consider sanctions against counsel for appellant. 33 REVERSED and REMANDED.