Opinion ID: 1685770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Meaning of Developmental Period

Text: As noted above, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(a)(3) requires that mental retardation (a sub-71 I.Q. and deficits in adaptive behavior) be manifested during the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of age. The trial court construed the language of the statute as providing two time frames during which the mental retardation may manifest: either during the developmental period or by age eighteen. Because the phrase developmental period is not defined within the statute, the trial court based its interpretation on the testimony of the Defendant's mental health expert, Dr. Brown, who defined the developmental period as extending from birth up through roughly . . . between ages 24 to 26. Under that definition, the trial court found that the third prong of the statute had been satisfied. On appeal, the State argued that the phrase or by eighteen (18) years of age modified the preceding phrase, the developmental period. The Court of Criminal Appeals, after performing an exhaustive analysis of the language of the statute, judicial precedent, and legislative history, concluded that the phrase developmental period was limited by the phrase by eighteen (18) years of age. Accordingly, for a defendant to meet the third prong of section 39-13-203(a), the mental retardation must have manifested no later than the age of eighteen. This question is one of statutory interpretation, purely a question of law, which we review de novo. Collins, 166 S.W.3d at 725. As previously noted, when construing a statute we attempt `to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope.' Houghton, 90 S.W.3d at 678 (citation omitted). Legislative intent is determined `from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute's meaning.' Osborn, 127 S.W.3d at 740 (citation omitted). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain language in its normal and accepted use. Boarman, 109 S.W.3d at 291. This Court presumes that the General Assembly used each word in a statute deliberately, and that the use of each word conveys a specific purpose and meaning. State v. Jennings, 130 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Tenn.2004) (citing Bryant v. Genco Stamping & Mfg. Co., 33 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tenn.2000); Crowe v. Ferguson, 814 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tenn. 1991)). Accordingly, we must give effect to every word, phrase, clause, and sentence in constructing a statute. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 828 (Tenn.1996)). If, however, the plain language of a statute is ambiguous, the Court will look beyond the statutory language to determine the legislature's intent. Id. (citing Perrin v. Gaylord Entm't Co., 120 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Tenn.2003), and Lavin v. Jordon, 16 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tenn.2000)). In this case, we concede that the language of the statute is arguably ambiguous and susceptible of two interpretations. On the one hand, the use of the connecting word or suggests a disjunctive intent that the phrase developmental period encompasses a time frame different from the phrase by eighteen (18) years of age. This is the interpretation adopted by the trial court. [9] On the other hand, the General Assembly's use of a comma before the word or can also suggest that the phrase by eighteen (18) years of age is intended to explain developmental period. This is the interpretation adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Either interpretation is reasonable. Because of this ambiguity, it is necessary to look beyond the words used in the statute to the legislative history of the statute. See Jennings, 130 S.W.3d at 46. The recordings of the legislative debates on the proposed bill indicate that including a limitation on the definition of mental retardation that required it to be manifested before the age of eighteen was discussed and thoroughly considered by members of the various subcommittees and the General Assembly. At House Judiciary Committee hearings, the bill sponsor represented the definition of mental retardation as the standard definition of mental retardation recognized by the American Association on Mental Retardation. Tenn. House Jud. Comm., Debate on House Bill 2107, March 13, 1990. The definition conveyed to the Committee at that time require[d] that it be diagnosed during the developmental period under eighteen years of age. Id. There was specific discussion regarding the reason for requiring diagnosis before age eighteen. As explained by the sponsor at that time, ninety-nine percent of the mentally retarded population was diagnosed before eighteen years of age. He stated, This is a defect that you are born with and this would certainly cover most instances. When addressing concerns by one member of the Committee concerning older defendants who might never have received formal diagnosis, the sponsor acknowledged that the proposed legislation would not cover every conceivable situation, but that the age-limiting provision was part of a compromise. At a Senate Judiciary Committee meeting later that same day, Roger Blue, an expert in mental retardation, testified: The definition as spelled out in this legislation is the accepted definition of the American Association on Mental Retardation, which is a universally accepted definition used in the field. The substantial subaverage intelligence is one of three things that have to exist for someone to be considered to have mental retardation as opposed to other types of handicaps. The reference to subaverage intelligence, the general level I.Q. used in testing . . . generally the I.Q. of 70 and below is considered to be substantially subaverage intelligence. It also has to be accompanied by a deficit in adaptive behavior. It also has to have occurred during the developmental years, which means you are either born with it or in early childhood develop it. Tenn. Senate Jud. Comm., Debate on Senate Bill 1851, March 13, 1990. Mr. Blue explained that by the time a person will have reached the age of eighteen, there should be a paper trail or a diagnosis or some evaluation already there. Id. Later debates during the House Session included additional discussion about the provision requiring diagnosis or manifestation before the age of eighteen. See Tenn. House Session, Debate on House Bill 2107, April 5, 1990. The bill sponsor reiterated that the provision requiring that mental retardation be established prior to the eighteenth birthday was a point of compromise. Id. He emphasized that under the language of the bill, mental retardation had to be diagnosed before the eighteenth birthday. A defendant suffering from a defect or impairment occurring after the eighteenth birthday would not fall under the language of the bill. Id. He conceded that the legislation would not address all scenarios, but was limited to mental retardation as it existed from birth. Id. Similar discussion occurred during the Senate Session. The Senate sponsor referred to the critical time as the developmental period, . . . which is to say by the age of eighteen. Tenn. Senate Session, Debate on House Bill 2107, April 12, 1990. Several hypothetical fact scenarios were raised regarding situations involving older defendants who might not have I.Q. test results predating the age of eighteen. Id. The bill sponsor clarified that even in a situation where there was no I.Q. test, if a defendant presented evidence of a current I.Q. of 70 or below and could present expert testimony that he was operating or functioning at that same level before age eighteen, then he could meet the criteria under the statute. Id. Based on the legislative history it is clear that the Legislature did not intend for the term developmental period to extend beyond eighteen years of age. Furthermore, while the issue concerning alternative definitions of developmental period has never been expressly raised in this Court, previous analysis of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 indicates that the Court has consistently considered the definition of mental retardation to require manifestation of the condition prior to the age of eighteen. In Van Tran, we analyzed the statute in the context of deciding whether execution of the mentally retarded violated the state and federal constitutional provisions against cruel and unusual punishment. 66 S.W.3d at 797-99. Within the analysis of the definition of mental retardation, the Court cited to the definition included in the DSM IV, which, like the statutory definition, requires that the intellectual and adaptive deficits manifest themselves by the time the person is eighteen years of age. Id. at 795. More recently, we analyzed the definition of mental retardation in Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn.2004). Acknowledging that the condition of mental retardation was difficult to define accurately, we nevertheless cited with approval the definition accepted by the American Association on Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association and approved by the United States Supreme Court in Atkins: At present . . . the most widely recognized definitions of mental retardation include two basic characteristics: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning accompanied by related limitations in two or more adaptive skill areas (such as self-care, communication, or social skills), and manifestation of the condition before age 18. Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 457 (emphasis added) (citing to Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242). Part of this Court's analysis included a comparison of the definition in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(a) to that in Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-1-107(17), the statute defining mental retardation in the context of eligibility for social services. Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 458. Section 33-1-107(17) provides: Mental retardation means substantial limitations in functioning: (A) As shown by significantly sub-average intellectual functioning that exists concurrently with related limitations in two (2) or more of the following adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work; and (B) That are manifested before eighteen (18) years of age. Tenn.Code Ann. § 33-1-107(17) (Supp. 2003). Noting the lack of reference to a particular numerical I.Q. score in the latter provision, and the fact that the latter provision was in existence at the time the General Assembly adopted section 39-13-203(a), we concluded that the definition in section 39-13-203(a) was intended to apply a more restrictive standard to defendants in capital prosecutions. Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 458. The Defendant's argument that the word or should be applied in the disjunctive sense to give alternative interpretations of developmental period, as opposed to in the restrictive sense to limit the outer bounds of developmental period to age eighteen, is inconsistent with our conclusion in Howell that the criminal statute was intended to be more restrictive. We have also considered statutes and case law in other jurisdictions that have addressed the definition of mental retardation in the context of death penalty cases. There are a few jurisdictions that have not expressly defined developmental period at all. See Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (West, Westlaw through July 1, 2007) (requiring only that the condition be manifested and documented during the developmental period, without defining that term); Ga.Code Ann. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess.) (requiring only that the condition be manifested during the developmental period, without defining that term); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-105.01(3) (Westlaw through 2006 Sess.) (containing no limit on the age or time period during which the condition must be diagnosed); Nev.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 174.098.7 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.) (requiring only that the condition be manifested during the developmental period, without defining that term); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-2.1 (West, Westlaw through June 28, 2007 Spec. Sess.) (containing no limit on the age or time period during which the condition must be diagnosed); Franklin v. Maynard, 356 S.C. 276, 588 S.E.2d 604, 605 (S.C.2003) (adopting the definition of mental retardation contained within the statute making it a mitigating circumstance, S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(10) (2003), which requires manifestation during the developmental period, but does not define that term). Three states define the developmental period as extending to age twenty-two. [10] See Ind.Code Ann. § 35-36-9-2 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Sess.) (providing that the condition manifest before the age of twenty-two); Md.Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-202(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Sess.) (providing that the age of onset is before the age of twenty-two); Utah Code Ann. § 77-15a-102 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation) (providing that the condition manifest prior to age twenty-two). The majority of jurisdictions, however, either expressly by statute or by interpretation through case law, define mental retardation as a condition that manifests before the age of eighteen, in accord with our decision today. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(K)(3) (Westlaw through 2007 legislation) (providing that the onset of the condition occur before the defendant reached the age of eighteen); Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-618(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation) (providing that the condition manifest in the developmental period, but no later than eighteen years of age); Cal.Penal Code § 1376(a) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Sess.) (providing that the condition manifest before the age of eighteen); Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 1-1g(b) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Sess.) (defining developmental period as the period of time between birth and the eighteenth birthday); 11 Del.Code Ann. § 4209(d)(3) (Westlaw through 2007 laws) (providing that the condition manifest before the individual became eighteen years of age); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.137(1) (West, Westlaw through June 26, 2007) (providing that the condition be manifested during the period from conception to age eighteen); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2515A(1)(a) (Westlaw through 2007 Sess.) (providing that the onset of the condition must occur before age eighteen); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/114-15(d) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Sess.) (providing that the condition must have manifested by the age of eighteen); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-4623(e) & 76-12b01 (Westlaw through 2006 Sess.) (providing that the age of onset of the condition must be prior to eighteen years old); La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.5.1(H)(1) (Westlaw through 2006 Sess.) (providing that the onset must occur before the age of eighteen); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.030.6 (West, Westlaw through June 26, 2007) (providing that the condition is manifested and documented before eighteen years of age); N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27(12)(e) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2007 legislation) (providing that the condition was manifested before the age of eighteen); N.C. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Sess.) (providing that the condition manifest before the age of eighteen); 21 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 701.10b(B) (Westlaw through 2007 Sess.) (providing that the condition be manifested before the age of eighteen); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-26.1-.2 (Westlaw through 2007 Sess.) (providing that the condition must have been manifested and documented before the age of eighteen); Va.Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Sess.) (defining the condition as originating before the age of eighteen); Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 10.95.030(2)(a), (e) (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation) (defining the developmental period as the period of time between conception and the eighteenth birthday). See also United States v. Nelson, 419 F.Supp.2d 891, 894-95 (E.D.La.2006) (adopting the AAMR and DSM IV definitions of mental retardation, which require onset before the age of eighteen); United States v. Cisneros, 385 F.Supp.2d 567, 570 (E.D.Va.2005) (adopting the AAMR and Virginia Code definitions of mental retardation, which require onset before the age of eighteen); Ex parte Perkins, 851 So.2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002) (defining developmental period as before the age of eighteen); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 368 (Ky. 2005) (implicitly adopting the AAMR and American Psychiatric Association requirement, approved in Atkins, that the age of onset must be before the age of eighteen); Lynch v. State, 951 So.2d 549, 556 (Miss. 2007) (accepting the AAMR definition that requires the condition manifest before the age of eighteen); State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (2002) (adopting the clinical definitions for mental retardation cited by the United States Supreme Court in Atkins, i.e., requiring onset before the age of eighteen); Commonwealth v. Miller, 585 Pa. 144, 888 A.2d 624, 630 n. 7 (Pa.2005) (requiring onset of the condition before the age of eighteen); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Tex. Crim.App.2004) (adopting the AAMR definition that requires onset of the condition occur prior to the age of eighteen). Based on an exhaustive review of the legislative history of the statute, this Court's prior understanding of the terms, and a survey of other jurisdictions, we conclude that the language during the developmental period, or by the age of eighteen does not include the years past the age of eighteen. Under the definition of mental retardation as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(a), both the significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (as evidenced by I.Q. scores of 70 or below) and deficits in adaptive behavior must be manifested by the age of eighteen.