Opinion ID: 2588728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The current statutory scheme.

Text: ¶ 8 The exception to confidentiality applicable here  10 O.S. Supp.1999 § 7307-1.2(C)(2)  provides: The confidentiality requirements of subsection A of this section for juvenile court and law enforcement records shall not apply: Upon the charging of an individual pursuant to Section 7306-1.1 of this title. Title 10 O.S. Supp.1997 § 7306-1.1 provides that individuals between the ages of thirteen and seventeen who commit a list of particularly egregious crimes shall be considered as adults. [9] ¶ 9 It is uncontested that Rotramel was charged with one or more of the crimes enumerated in 10 O.S. Supp.1997 § 7306-1.1. Nevertheless, the respondents and Rotramel all contend that subsection (C)(2) should be read literally. Under their interpretation, confidentiality restrictions are removed under 10 O.S. Supp.1999 § 7307-1.2(C)(2) only when charges are actually brought under § 7306-1.1, i.e. when a juvenile between the ages of thirteen and seventeen is charged under the statute. World Publishing asserts that the Legislature intended its reference to § 7306-1.1 in 10 O.S. Supp.1999 § 7307-1.2(C)(2) to merely provide a list of those serious crimes justifying the lifting of the confidentiality requirements for juvenile court and law enforcement records. We agree. ¶ 10 Legislative intent [10] controls statutory interpretation. [11] Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective [12] considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each. [13] The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its intent and that it intended what it expressed. [14] Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and end [15] championing the broad public policy purposes underlying them. [16] Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are rules of statutory construction employed. [17] However, where the statutory language is ambiguous or uncertain, a construction is applied to avoid absurdities [18] remembering that the Legislature is not deemed to have created an absurdity or done a vain and useless act. [19] Where inept or incorrect language has been utilized, the words are applied consistent with the real or obvious purpose of the legislative enactment. [20] ¶ 11 Subsection 7307-1.2(C)(2) provides that once an individual is charged pursuant to [21] 10 O.S. Supp.1997 § 7306-1.1, the juvenile court and law enforcement records of the individual are no longer confidential. This is the only exception to confidentiality within subsection (C) referring to an individual rather than to a juvenile. The respondent judge, Office of Juvenile Affairs and Rotramel argue that the subsection is inapplicable here because it relates only to juveniles charged pursuant to the provisions of § 7306-1.1. ¶ 12 The argument is unconvincing in two respects. First, juvenile is a defined term within the Juvenile Code. [22] A juvenile is any person under eighteen except for persons charged with the crimes specified in 10 O.S. Supp.1997 § 7306-1.1. [23] Pursuant to the statutory definition of juvenile, no person charged with any of the acts listed in § 7306-1.1 is a juvenile for purposes of the Juvenile Code. The statutory exception to confidentiality in subsection 7307-1.2(C)(2) refers to individuals rather than to juveniles. If we were to ignore the difference in the language utilized and to adopt the construction urged, the exception would be a nullity. It would not be applicable to persons charged with committing the serious crimes enumerated in 10 O.S. Supp. 1997 § 7306-1.1 because the individuals are not juveniles within the meaning of the statutory definition. It would not apply to Rotramel because he was over eighteen when charged. Further, to hold that Rotramel's records would be accessible  if charged at seventeen rather than after majority  would create an absurdity. Essentially, such a construction would expose a juvenile and cloak an adult, both of whom engaged in the same activities  under a statutory scheme that generally provides juveniles with the protection of anonymity. [24] There is simply nothing in the Juvenile Code or in the specific provisions at issue indicating the Legislature intended such an unbalanced result. ¶ 13 Second, an argument that only those individuals charged under 10 O.S. Supp.1997 § 7306-1.1 may have their records disclosed is likewise unconvincing. In Oklahoma, all crimes are statutory. [25] The essential elements of a crime are the statutory provisions defining the offense. [26] Generally, notice of the charged crime is given by a charging document, an information, filed against the defendant. [27] Although an information need not allege each element of a crime to withstand a due process attack, it must give the defendant notice of the charges sufficient to mount a defense. [28] Charging statutes are those legislative provisions which define the crime committed and its elements. [29] Charges are brought pursuant to the specific statute covering the offense. [30] ¶ 14 Despite the assertion that the statute cannot apply to Rotramel because he was not charged pursuant to its provisions, § 7306-1.1 has none of the attributes of a charging statute. It does not define an offense or any of the elements thereof. Rather, it provides that certain persons charged with a laundry list of serious crimes shall be considered as adults. In the literal sense, individuals are not charged pursuant to § 7306-1.1 at all. Young people, who are accused of the enumerated crimes, are charged under the applicable criminal provisionnot under 10 O.S. Supp.1997 § 7306-1.1. [31] ¶ 15 Although 10 O.S. Supp.1999 § 7307-1.2(C)(2) may be inartfully drawn, it is clear that the Legislature has determined there are certain offenses, even when committed by individuals under the age of eighteen, which are treated, for confidentiality purposes, in the same manner as a comparable offense committed by an adult. These offenses are enumerated in 10 O.S. Supp. 1997 § 7306-1 .1. Pursuant to the statutory definition of juveniles contained in 10 O.S. Supp.1997 § 1301-1.3(4), persons charged with any crime specified in § 7306-1.1 are not juveniles within the meaning of the Juvenile Code. When these three statutory provisions are considered together, it is clear that the Legislature has determined that individuals who stand accused of particularly serious offenses should be charged as adults and have their records open to the public. Therefore, we hold that when an individual is charged with one of the crimes enumerated in 10 O.S. Supp.1997 § 7306-1.1, the general confidentiality requirements of 10 O.S. Supp. 1999 § 7307-1.2(A) do not apply to the person's juvenile court and law enforcement records.