Opinion ID: 1234593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Exclusion of Professional Engineer Expert Witness

Text: Prior to opening arguments, but after a jury had been selected, the parties argued several motions in limine. Significantly, respondents moved to exclude the testimony of one of appellant's expert witnesses, Robin Harrison, a professional engineer from California. Appellant had specially retained Harrison as an accident reconstruction expert and his expert testimony was also critical for the foundation of several exhibits that had been prepared. Harrison's trial testimony was going to be presented by videotaped trial deposition, and the recording of the deposition had been done in California. Pursuant to South Carolina Code Section 40-22-30, the trial court granted respondents' motion to exclude Harrison's testimony because he was not a South Carolina licensed professional engineer. Appellant argues that the trial court misconstrued the statute and erred by excluding Harrison. This presents a novel issue of law. When reviewing a novel question of law, we are free to decide the issue with no particular deference to the lower court. E.g., I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 411, 526 S.E.2d 716, 719 (2000); Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 340 S.C. 367, 372, 532 S.E.2d 269, 272 (2000). Title 40, Chapter 22 of the South Carolina Code governs the licensing of professional engineers and land surveyors. Section 40-22-20 defines the practice of engineering as follows, in pertinent part: Practice of engineering means any service or creative work, the adequate performance of which requires engineering education, training, and experience in the application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences to such services or creative work as consultation, investigation, expert technical testimony.... S.C.Code Ann. § 40-22-20(22) (Supp.2005) (emphasis added). Prior to 2000, however, the definition of the practice of engineering did not include the phrase expert technical testimony. See S.C.Code Ann. § 40-22-10(4) (2001). Section 40-22-30 prohibits an individual from engaging in the practice of engineering in South Carolina without being registered pursuant to Chapter 22. S.C.Code Ann. § 40-22-30 (Supp.2005). Violation of this section is a misdemeanor subject to a penalty of imprisonment up to six months and/or a fine up to $2,000. S.C.Code Ann. § 40-22-200 (Supp.2005). The trial court found that Harrison was not competent to testify in a South Carolina court because the plain language of the statute prohibits a person from practicing engineering without a South Carolina license, and that practice includes giving expert technical testimony. Appellant argues that the purpose of the statute is not to restrict the admission of expert testimony in state court litigation, but rather to protect South Carolina consumers from unqualified people holding themselves out as engineers. In addition, appellant asserts that the trial court's decision is not in harmony with Rule 702, SCRE, which governs expert testimony. [8] We agree with appellant. Regarding statutory construction, all rules are subservient to the one that the legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute. Kiriakides v. United Artists Commc'ns, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 440 S.E.2d 364 (1994). Nonetheless, however plain the ordinary meaning of the words used in a statute may be, we will reject that meaning when to accept it would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature or would defeat the plain legislative intention. Id. The plain language of the statute uses the words expert technical testimony which arguably applies to expert testimony offered in a court of law. Thus, the statutory language suggests that only South Carolina licensed professional engineers are permitted to give expert engineering testimony in this State. We find, however, that this result could not have reasonably been intended by the Legislature. First, we agree with appellant that one of the primary purposes of Section 40-22-30 is to shield South Carolina consumers from those who are not properly credentialed pursuant to this State's standards, but who nevertheless hold themselves out to be professional engineers. In the instant case, however, Harrison's role was as an expert witness in accident reconstruction engineering. His credentials, which include his status as a California licensed professional safety engineer as well as his education in mechanical engineering, go to his qualifications as an expert witness, rather than as a professional engineer offering services in South Carolina. In other words, Harrison's services were being offered to a South Carolina jury, not to the State's citizens seeking traditional professional engineering services. Second, to accept the trial court's interpretation would clearly contravene Rule 702, SCRE, which states that if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify. Pursuant to Rule 702, Harrison plainly qualified as an expert witness; to permit his exclusion would therefore effect a significant limitation on Rule 702. Without clear indication from the Legislature that the 2000 amendment was, in fact, intended specifically to limit Rule 702 in this way, we decline to adopt that interpretation. Respondents contend that because the professional engineer statute is more specific than Rule 702 and was enacted more recently, the statute should control. See Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401, 403, 438 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1993) (Generally, specific laws prevail over general laws, and later legislation takes precedence over earlier legislation). However, we reiterate that it cannot be ignored that the effect of the 2000 amendment radically alters the scope of Rule 702. By applying the engineer licensing statute literally, no out-of-state engineer could ever be an expert witness in a South Carolina state court if the testimony is even remotely related to engineering. This singling-out of one type of expert witness seems to us to be an absurd result, and therefore we reject respondents' argument. Kiriakides, supra . Furthermore, if we held that exclusion of an out-of-state professional engineering expert is proper under the statute, the result would be to limit the truth-seeking duty of the courts of this State. We can envision numerous litigation scenarios where a party's position might only be supported by the expert testimony of an engineer licensed and practicing outside the state of South Carolina. Yet, experts are intended to assist juries. We refuse to endorse an interpretation of the professional engineer licensing statute which has the potential of either preventing out-of-state experts from testifying in South Carolina courts or imposing the unreasonable burden of getting licensed in this State simply to be permitted to provide forensic testimony. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision to exclude appellant's expert witness in accident reconstruction engineering from testifying at trial.