Opinion ID: 2981876
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assumption of Termination

Text: In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants stated that “even if [Ray] could prove her termination was politically motivated, as [Davis and the County] assume she can solely for the purpose of summary judgment, her termination was not a violation of her First Amendment rights” (emphasis added). The defendants also added that they were not waiving their argument that Ray had voluntarily resigned. On appeal, Ray claims that because the defendants had “consistently argued that Ms. Ray quit her job,” they should be barred from assuming that Ray had been subjected to patronage dismissal, because it constitutes a “conflicted factual position tactic.” Ray’s logic is flawed. The burden of proof for patronage cases is set forth in Branti. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. First, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case that she was discharged because of political affiliation. Id. If the plaintiff succeeds in making that showing, the defendant 7 must then show that the position is of a type that would fall within an exception to the rule against patronage dismissals. Id. The assumption that Ray had set out her prima facie case was an assumption made in Ray’s favor.7