Opinion ID: 1298515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the court have discretion over whether to remove a judge finally convicted of a crime punishable as a felony, or is he automatically removed from office?

Text: There is no specific legislative intent to aid us on this issue. The electorate adopted article 6.1 in 1970 as part of the so-called Modern Courts Amendment, without any statement of intention as to the clauses in question. The publicity pamphlet distributed to the voters together with the proposed constitutional amendment is silent on the question posed. [5] Article 6.1 apparently is modeled after a similar provision in the California Constitution, and neither our research nor the submissions of counsel produced any relevant history or constitutional interpretation. This being so, we struggle with the actual unclear text and interpret it as best we can to accomplish the obvious goals underlying the constitutional provisions. See Baker v. Gardner, 160 Ariz. 98, 101, 770 P.2d 766, 769 (1988). We discern a textually prescribed, logical progression for dealing with judicial disciplinary cases. When a judge is first charged by indictment or information with a crime punishable as a felony, art. 6.1, § 2 disqualifie[s] [the judge] from acting as a judge, without loss of salary.... When convicted, but before the conviction becomes final, the judge's disqualification automatically continues. [6] Upon conviction, section 3 provides that this court may suspend [the] judge from office without salary.... If his conviction is reversed the suspension terminates, and he shall be paid his salary for the period of suspension. If he is suspended and his conviction becomes final the supreme court shall remove him from office. (emphasis added). Of course, the use of the words may and if indicates the constitution gives the court some discretion. See Roller Village, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 195, 198, 741 P.2d 328, 331 (Ct.App. 1987). The Commission argues the only discretion the constitution gives the court is to decide between suspension with salary or without salary. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, the constitution does not itemize suspension with salary as an available sanction. Second, and more importantly, we are unable to conceive of any difference between disqualification with pay  which automatically occurs under section 2 when the charges are filed  and suspension with pay. The judge, having been charged, was in effect already suspended with pay when he was disqualified under section 2. Thus, as we read section 3, after conviction this court has discretion to suspend the judge without salary, or permit the continuation of the disqualification with salary. If we suspend, and the conviction then becomes final, removal from office is mandatory. Ariz. Const. art. 6.1, § 3 ( if [the judge] is suspended and his conviction becomes final, the supreme court [then] shall remove him from office). [7] We believe such a reading of the constitution is the only one providing a sensible construction to the last sentence of section 3 by giving meaning to may, if, and shall. This interpretation follows the constitutional text and furthers its objective of providing for the removal of judges under the guidance and final determination of the Supreme Court.... ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, Statement in Behalf of Propositions 102 and 103, at 11 (1970). Because removal is mandatory after suspension without salary, this court should impose suspension if, because of the inherent nature of the crime or the facts surrounding it, the criminal conduct warrants removal from office. If the judge has been suspended without pay and the conviction becomes final, the judge is to be removed from office without further consideration of the case, i.e., summary removal. If, however, the nature of the crime or the underlying facts were such that summary removal would not be the eventual appropriate sanction, this court may simply continue the judge on disqualified status. A judge continued as disqualified is not automatically removed from office on conviction. This does not mean that the judge suffers no eventual discipline, because art. 6.1, § 4 permits the imposition of judicial discipline on a variety of grounds, including `conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.' Biggins, 153 Ariz. at 446, 737 P.2d at 1084 (quoting Ariz. Const. art. 6.1, § 4). Having concluded this court has discretion over whether to suspend and, thus, remove respondent now that his conviction is final, we now consider how we should exercise that discretion in this case.