Opinion ID: 2509517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Issues Relating to the Method of Determining Penalty

Text: CALJIC No. 8.85 lists the factors to be considered by the jury in making its penalty decision. Defendant contends that the trial court should have deleted those factors inapplicable to this case. We rejected that contention in People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 315, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433, People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 421, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708, People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pages 776-777, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250, and in many other cases. Defendant proposed a special jury instruction stating that the only applicable aggravating factors in this case were the circumstances of the murder and other criminal activity involving force or violence. The trial court did not err in rejecting this instruction. We have repeatedly said that a trial court need not specify whether factors are aggravating or mitigating. (See People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1193, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353; People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1230, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068; People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 561, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) In any event, here both the prosecutor and defense counsel said to the jury in closing argument that the circumstances of the crime and other violent criminal activity were the only aggravating circumstances. The trial court rejected defendant's proposed special instruction No. 4, which stated: The absence of prior felony convictions is a significant mitigating circumstance in a capital case, where the accused frequently has an extensive criminal past. The trial court, however, did instruct the jury to consider the presence or absence of any prior felony or misdemeanor conviction. [8] Thus, the jurors were told that they could consider defendant's lack of prior convictions as a mitigating consideration. Whether it was a significant consideration was a matter for the jurors to determine.

CALJIC No. 8.88 explains to the jury how it should arrive at the penalty decision. Defendant asserts this instruction violates his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. He argues that CALJIC No. 8.88's language, directing the jury to determine whether aggravation so outweighs mitigation as to warrant death, is unconstitutionally vague. We rejected that contention in People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1231, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068, and in People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 315-316, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585. The phrase used in CALJIC No. 8.88, or words of similar breadth, are essential to avoid reducing the penalty decision to a mere mechanical calculation. (See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 541, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516.) Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 8.88 is incorrect because it refers to whether the death penalty is warranted instead of whether it is appropriate. In People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980, however, we concluded: By advising that a death verdict should be returned only if aggravation is `so substantial in comparison with' mitigation that death is `warranted,' the instruction clearly admonishes the jury to determine whether the balance of aggravation and mitigation makes death the appropriate penalty. Defendant also contends that CALJIC No. 8.88 does not convey to the jury that a life sentence is mandatory if aggravation does not outweigh mitigation. We disagree. The standard instruction permits a death penalty only if aggravation is so substantial in comparison with mitigation that death is warranted; if aggravation failed even to outweigh mitigation, it could not reach this level. (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 781, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Here, moreover, the trial court gave an additional instruction that made the matter quite clear; the court told the jury: You must return a verdict of life without the possibility of parole if the mitigating circumstances outweigh or are equal to the aggravating circumstances. Defendant further contends that CALJIC No. 8.88 implies that death is the only appropriate sentence if aggravation is so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. He insists that this language is inconsistent with the principle that the jury can return a life verdict even if aggravating circumstances outweigh those in mitigation. (See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 538-541, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516.) There is no inconsistency. A jury is free to return a life verdict even if aggravation outweighs mitigation. But the jury is not free to return a life verdict regardless of the evidence. If aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with mitigating circumstances as to warrant the death penalty, then death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Finally, defendant argues that the instruction failed to inform the penalty jury of the burden of persuasion. There is no penalty phase burden of persuasion. (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312, 417-418, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The trial court correctly rejected defendant's proposed supplemental special instruction L, which would have told the jury that if it had a reasonable doubt as to which penalty to impose, it must return a verdict of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. (See People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1127, 135 Cal. Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 80-81, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 960, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395.)
Defendant's proposed special instruction B stated: The jury has the option to reject death if the evidence arouses sympathy, mercy, or compassion to the point that they jury feels that death is not the proper penalty in this case. This instruction was largely duplicative of defendant's special instruction No. 6, which the trial court accepted. That instruction told the jury that it could consider any sympathetic, compassionate, merciful, or other aspect of Defendant's background, character, record, or social, psychological or medical history, that the Defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. In any event, CALJIC No. 8.88 adequately informed the jurors that they could consider sympathy, mercy, and compassion in deciding whether death was the appropriate penalty. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 343-344, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) Thus the trial court did not err in rejecting Defendant's special instruction B. The trial court also rejected defendant's proposed special instruction H: The weight to be given to the factors in aggravation and mitigation is a matter for each juror to determine ... [and accordingly] one mitigating factor can sometimes outweigh a number of aggravating factors. The trial court gave a jury instruction based on CALJIC No. 8.88, which told the jurors: You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. The instruction then told the jurors: You may, but are not required to return a judgment of death if each of you are persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. In People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 343, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374, we held that such instructions satisfied the constitutional requirement to advise the jury of its sentencing discretion.
During closing argument, the prosecutor read CALJIC No. 8.88 to the jury and commented upon it: There are really two components to this process. One is, is the death penalty appropriate in your mind? And second, do the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, which is our true burden in this case, proving that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. And if it is both appropriate and if the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, then you should vote for death. The trial court overruled defendant's objection that the prosecutor had misstated the law. The prosecutor's argument correctly explained the weighing process under CALJIC No. 8.88: the jury weighs the aggravating circumstances as compared to the mitigating circumstances and determines whether the death penalty is appropriate. (See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 538-539, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516.) It is true that the prosecutor's burden  if such a term applies to a trial in which neither side has the burden of proof  is not merely to show that aggravation outweighs mitigation, but to show it outweighs it to such an extent that death is the appropriate penalty. But there is no indication that the jury was misled thereby. The trial court correctly instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 8.88; we presume that the jury followed that instruction. ( People v. Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 70, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) The prosecutor quoted CALJIC No. 8.88 in his argument to the jury, and he told the jurors that they must decide whether the death penalty was the appropriate punishment whether or not the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. Looking to the instructions and the prosecutor's closing argument as a whole, we conclude that it is not reasonably likely that the jurors were misled. (See People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 848, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 856-857, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.)