Opinion ID: 1161511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Evidence of abandonment: plaintiffs Gerhard, Solomon, and Mettler.

Text: Turning now to the evidence before the trial court on the issue of abandonment, we first examine its sufficiency as to plaintiffs Gerhard, Solomon, and Mettler, who claim as successors of Ashurst stockholders. As to these plaintiffs the trial court ruled that they and their predecessors did not abandon their stock but later abandoned the interests in real property to which they succeeded after Ashurst forfeited its charter. The court found that plaintiffs' predecessors (other than Brandt) defaulted in the quiet title action which Brandt brought in 1917 (action 1870): they failed to include their interests in the estates of those who became deceased, ... they never set foot on the surface of Section 31, ... they never attempted to search for oil nor to lease to others to drill for oil, nor to inquire of the Frusetta-Cornwell-Irvine defendants concerning this property, nor to demand of them some interest in the proceeds of oil leases, nor to have their fractional shares set apart and assessed by San Benito County for tax purposes. Prior to the present controversy, no decrees of distribution in the estates of any of plaintiffs' predecessors had been recorded in San Benito County. Several California cases which have upheld a trial court's determination that a dominant tenant has abandoned an easement created by grant have found sufficient evidence of the requisite intent by evaluating the implications of nonuser in terms of economic exigencies and external realities. ( Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Doelger, supra, 179 Cal. App.2d 222, 232; People v. Ocean Shore R.R., Inc., supra, 32 Cal.2d 406, 419.) Thus, in the Ocean Shore cases, the courts sustained findings of abandonment when the evidence showed that the restoration of service would be prohibitively expensive and that effective competition with other carriers was realistically impossible. ( Lake Merced Golf & Country Club v. Ocean Shore R.R., Co., supra, 206 Cal. App.2d 421; Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Doelger, supra, 179 Cal. App.2d 222; cf. People v. Ocean Shore R.R., Inc., supra, 32 Cal.2d 406, 419.) In Home Real Estate Co. v. Los Angeles Pac. Co., supra, 163 Cal. 710, the railroad had constructed and operated on a track paralleling the unused track on the right of way; the railroad's superintendent testified that `as there were no passengers to travel on [the old line], ... we quit.' In Flanagan v. San Marcos Silk Co., supra, 106 Cal. App.2d 458, the defendant's pipeline, for which it had an easement to carry water, would have needed costly repair work to become serviceable again, and the company had developed alternate sources of supply. Other California cases point out that the dominant tenant's nonuse does not tend to demonstrate the requisite intent merely because the activation of the easement would produce no immediate benefit sufficient to justify the necessary expense. As we pointed out in Faus v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 67 Cal.2d 350 at p. 363, the holder must ... manifest an intent to forswear all future conforming uses of the easement. (Italics added.) Thus in People v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, 172 Cal. 692, we rejected the trial court's finding that the railroad had abandoned its easement: There is no proof that the needs of commerce during this period were such that ... the existing or probable immediate future traffic would have justified the cost of building such tracks.... (P. 699.) In Parker v. Swett (1919) 40 Cal. App. 68 [180 P. 351], the court reversed the judgment for defendants: The evidence of plaintiff's predecessor in interest is to the effect that he never exercised his right to lay the pipe for the reason that he did not require the water during his ownership of the ranch and the installation of a pipe-line was quite expensive. (P. 74.) [29] We have pointed out supra that While nonuse alone does not establish intent, the court may consider the length of the nonuse in ascertaining the existence of such intent. ( Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Doelger, supra, 179 Cal. App.2d 222, 232.) [12] We must determine whether the trial court could reasonably find the necessary intent on the basis of plaintiffs' 47 years of nonuser, [30] their apparent lack of concern with their interests, and their failure to give any visible indication of intent to make future use of the property. Abrams and Brandt purchased the Syncline Ranch in 1905, during an oil boom in the area. They organized Ashurst in order to obtain financial backing for the contemplated exploration for, and production of, oil and gas. After the corporation's dissolution in 1915, however, the oil interests were no longer owned and managed by a unified corporate structure; instead these interests embraced 148 owners, many of whom, as evidenced by the judgment roll in action 1870, could not be located. Any one of these owners individually could have entered upon section 31 and explored for oil and gas. ( Callahan v. Martin, supra, 3 Cal.2d 110, 125-126.) In doing so, however, he would, if unsuccessful, have been compelled to bear the entire expense and risk of the operations. (See Little v. Mountain View Dairies, Inc. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 232, 234 [217 P.2d 416]; cf. McCord v. Oakland Quicksilver Min. Co. (1883) 64 Cal. 134, 149-150 [27 P. 863, 49 Am.Rep. 686].) If he had succeeded in his endeavor, he could not have excluded from section 31 other cotenants who had desired to drill ( Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, supra, 4 Cal.2d 637, 655; Callahan v. Martin, supra, 3 Cal.2d 110, 125-126), [31] and, as to the remaining cotenants, he would have been required to render an accounting for the profits ( Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, supra, 4 Cal.2d 637, 655-657). [32] An extended nonuser, when considered in light of these economic exigencies and external realities ( Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Doelger, supra, 179 Cal. App.2d 222, 232) cannot by itself support the trial court's finding of intent to abandon. Although the acquisition of such an interest in oil and gas may be entirely speculative and the owner may well intend to forsake his interest if the oil boom which induced his purchase collapses, plaintiffs and their predecessors, incurring no significant detriment by retaining their interests, might well have contemplated that the property might again become valuable because of the efforts of others. In order to protect the owner of an unlimited profit a prendre or other incorporeal hereditament against involuntary abandonment under circumstances in which conflicting inferences may be drawn from his nonuser we hold that the trial court must find either that the owner's future use of the right could result only from a palpably unsound business judgment [33] or that the owner has given a further indication of his intent to abandon. Applying this principle, derived from the cases cited supra, to the instant situation we find no substantial evidence to support the finding that plaintiffs Gerhard, Solomon, and Mettler abandoned their interests in section 31.