Opinion ID: 166199
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Registration Approach

Text: 44 Courts employing the Registration approach interpret the Act using the plain language of Title 17, as we have done. We are in good company. Indeed, even well before the 1976 Act, Judge Learned Hand concluded that the plain language of Title 17 allows copyright owners to sue for infringement only after a copyright is actually registered by the Copyright Office. See Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 640-41 (2d Cir.1958) (the text of the [statute] denies the right to sue for infringement `until the provisions of this title with respect to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with'. . . . Since the owner must submit an application and pay the required fees in order to make a deposit, 17 U.S.C. § 202.3(b) (1952 ed. Supplement V), we can think of no other added condition for `registration' but acceptance by the Register.). 45 A number of courts have found this approach the better reading of the Act. For example, the Eleventh Circuit in M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1488 (11th Cir.1990), held, in dismissing an infringement action as premature, that the registration requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an infringement suit. While this is the only circuit court decision to reach the issue, a number of district courts have adopted the Registration approach. For example, in Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F.Supp.2d 362, 368 (D.Md.2005), the district court agreed in construing § 411 that actual registration is a jurisdictional prerequisite, because the term application is used in the same section [as the term registration] and is clearly something separate and apart from registration. Another district court, focusing on a different provision of the Act, recognized that Section § 410(a)'s requirement of `examination' would be meaningless if filing and registration were synonymous. Robinson v. Princeton Review, Inc., 1996 WL 663880,  (S.D.N.Y.1996). Lastly, the district court in Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1056 (C.D.Cal.2004), found that the Register's discretion to refuse copyright registration drives an iron wedge between mere application and actual registration as the sine qua non of registration. 6 46 While we generally agree with these courts in construing the Act, we have one minor disagreement concerning the issuance of the certificate. A few courts have held that the Act requires an applicant to first obtain the paper certificate from the Copyright Office as a prerequisite to filing an infringement action. See, e.g., Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F.Supp.2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C.2002) (finding copyright owners cannot sue for infringement until they receive a certificate of registration from the copyright office); Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp., 315 F.Supp.2d at 1055 (same). In our view, however, the language of the foregoing sections demonstrates that registration is separate from the issuance of a registration certificate and that a court's jurisdiction does not turn on the existence of a paper certificate, but rather on the fact of registration, however it is demonstrated. We believe that statutory language commands this result for two reasons. 47 First, § 410(a) says after the Register of Copyrights determines that . . . the material constitutes copyrightable subject matter it shall register the claim and issue a certificate. The and issue a certificate phrase in § 410(a) highlights the fact that registration does not occur upon issuance of a certificate of registration, but rather independently of, and before, the issuance of a certificate. The paper certificate does play an important role in judicial proceedings, however. Under § 410(c), the certificate is prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright, a considerable benefit to a plaintiff in an infringement action, but it is not required for registration to occur. 48 Second, the conspicuous absence of the words certificate or certification in § 411 dictate that registration is separate from the issuance of a certificate of registration. If the opposite were true, § 411 would prevent copyright owners from suing until they received their paper certificate, which seems contrary to the overall thrust of the provision. 7 As we noted, although the paper certificate has evidentiary value, it does not drive the existence of federal jurisdiction. Therefore, suits for infringement can be brought when a copyright is registered, and such registration occurs when the Copyright Office approves the application.