Opinion ID: 3178473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guilt-Phase Closing Argument

Text: We first address Cardona’s claim that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to make improper comments during the guilt-phase closing arguments. The context for the numerous improprieties that pervaded the prosecutor’s closing argument is the very nature of the case itself, which involved the tragic death of a three-year-old boy who suffered extensive injuries prior to and leading up to his death. Clearly, the graphic evidence of Lazaro’s extensive injuries and ultimate death would be a cause for sympathy to the jurors who were to decide the guilt or innocence of Cardona, the child’s mother. 4. Because we are granting a new trial, we need not address Cardona’s claim under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which has now been applied in Florida by the United States Supreme Court in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). -9- Yet, a bedrock principle of our criminal justice system is that every effort must be made in any trial—regardless of whether the case involves such heartwrenching circumstances—to ensure that the jurors base their decision, not on sympathy for the victim or prejudice against the defendant, but solely on the facts elicited during trial and the law instructed by the trial court. The State’s burden is to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. When the State instead uses closing argument to appeal to the jury’s sense of outrage at what happened to the victim and asks the jurors to return a verdict that brings “justice” to the victim, the State perverts the purpose of closing argument and engages in the very type of argument that has been repeatedly condemned as antithetical to the foundation of our criminal justice system that guarantees a fair trial to every accused. In Ruiz v. State, this Court explained the role of attorneys in every criminal trial, emphasizing in particular the important role of the prosecutor: A criminal trial is a neutral arena wherein both sides place evidence for the jury’s consideration; the role of counsel in closing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing that evidence, not to obscure the jury’s view with personal opinion, emotion, and nonrecord evidence. 743 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999). Further, The power and force of the government tend to impart an implicit stamp of believability to what the prosecutor says. That same power and force allow him, with a minimum of words, to impress on the jury that the government’s vast investigatory network, apart from the orderly machinery of the trial, knows that the accused is guilty or has - 10 - non-judicially reached conclusions on relevant facts which tend to show he is guilty. Id. (quoting Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1969)). The role of the attorney in closing argument is “to assist the jury in analyzing, evaluating and applying the evidence.” Id. (citing United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1978)). While “wide latitude is permitted in closing argument, . . . this latitude does not extend to permit improper argument.” Gore, 719 So. 2d at 1200 (citation omitted). Closing argument “must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant.” Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985). A prosecutor must not “unduly create, arouse and inflame the sympathy, prejudice and passions of [the] jury to the detriment of the accused.” Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 421 (quoting Barnes v. State, 58 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1951)). In this case, defense counsel lodged a significant number of objections in the closing arguments alone and unsuccessfully sought a mistrial twice. We review trial court rulings regarding the propriety of comments made during closing argument for an abuse of discretion. Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 377 (Fla. 2008). Where the comments were improper and the defense objected, but the trial court erroneously overruled defense counsel’s objection, we apply the harmless error standard of review. See Snelgrove v. State, 921 So. 2d 560, 568 (Fla. 2005); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 956-57 (Fla. 2003). This standard involves - 11 - placing “the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 466 (Fla. 2006) (citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)). The most troubling aspect of the prosecutor’s closing argument in this case was the repeated references to seeking “justice for Lazaro,” culminating in the statement that the “only verdict” that would provide this “justice” was a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. But the improprieties hardly stopped there. In addition to the erroneous “justice for Lazaro” comments, other clearly improper arguments were made, including repeatedly denigrating the defense case and calling parts of the defense’s presentation “diversionary tactics”; and making personal attacks on the defendant, such as calling Cardona a “drama expert” and comparing her to a character on a “telenovela.” We emphasize that the defense raised numerous objections to the clearly improper arguments, often at its own peril, and the trial court compounded the error by continually overruling these objections. In total, the defense counsel lodged fifty-eight objections throughout the State’s closing and rebuttal closing arguments, including both general and specific objections—almost all of which were overruled. Only four defense objections were sustained and, in one instance, - 12 - the prosecutor actually repeated an improper comment after the trial court had sustained a defense objection. Cardona also moved for a mistrial twice based on some of the comments, but those attempts were all unsuccessful.