Opinion ID: 797514
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions in a traditional public forum

Text: 27 Pleasant Grove concedes that its restriction on speech in the park is content based. 5 By requiring that monuments meet the city's historical relevance criteria, the city excludes monuments on the basis of subject matter and the speaker's identity. 6 Because the city's restrictions are content based, they may not be analyzed under the less exacting intermediate scrutiny applied to content-neutral restrictions regulating the time, place, or manner of expression in public forums. Id. 28 We must therefore determine whether Pleasant Grove has demonstrated that application of its historical relevance criteria will, more likely than not, be justified by the asserted compelling interests. Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 1219; see also Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 665, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 159 L.Ed.2d 690 (2004) (When plaintiffs challenge a content-based speech restriction, the burden is on the Government to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.); Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir.2005) (A municipality has the burden of justifying its regulation [of speech] even on a motion to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance.). Even though the injunction in this case is disfavored and Summum's request is therefore analyzed under a heightened standard, in the context of a First Amendment challenge, Pleasant Grove bears the burden of establishing that its content-based restriction on speech will more likely than not survive strict scrutiny. See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666, 124 S.Ct. 2783 (As the Government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question of [the restriction's] constitutionality, [the moving party] must be deemed likely to prevail unless the Government has shown that [the moving party's] proposed less restrictive alternatives are less effective than [the restriction].); Leavitt, 256 F.3d at 1072-73 (placing the burden on the government to justify its speech restrictions in a preliminary injunction hearing). 29 Because Pleasant Grove argued below that the relevant forum is nonpublic in nature, it did not assert a compelling interest that would justify excluding Summum's monument. The only interest Pleasant Grove asserted is an interest in promoting its history. The city's failure to offer any reason why this interest is compelling is sufficient for Summum to meet its burden in demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. See Pac. Frontier, 414 F.3d at 1235 (affirming district court's conclusion that city failed to meet its burden in justifying its regulation at preliminary injunction stage); see also S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir.1998) (finding that plaintiff had established substantial likelihood of success on the merits when county did not offer any reason why its interests were compelling). 7 30 But even if we assume that Pleasant Grove's stated interest is compelling, the city has also failed to establish that the content-based exclusion of Summum's monument is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve the city's interest in promoting its history. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995). As the Supreme Court has explained, defining a governmental interest this narrowly (i.e., the promotion of the city's history in this particular park) turns the effect of the regulation into the governmental interest. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991) (explaining that this sort of circular defense can sidestep judicial review of almost any statute, because it makes all statutes look narrowly tailored). 31 Furthermore, the city may not use content-based restrictions to advance a particular ideology. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (holding that state's interest in promoting appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism was not ideologically neutral and therefore not compelling enough to outweigh an individual's free speech rights). The city may further its interest in promoting its own history by a number of means, but not by restricting access to a public forum traditionally committed to public debate and the free exchange of ideas. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 700, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that government may not assert broad control over speech or expressive activities in a public forum, but must alter the objective physical character or uses of the property, and bear the attendant costs, to change the property's forum status). 32 In addition to the city's stated interest in promoting its history, the 2004 city resolution governing monuments in the park contains aesthetic and safety justifications for the speech restriction. 8 Cities have substantial interests in the aesthetic appearance of their property. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981). To further these interests, Pleasant Grove may pass a reasonable content-neutral resolution regulating the time, manner, or place of speech in the park. For example, it could ban all permanent displays of an expressive nature by private individuals. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (noting a ban on all unattended displays as a possible content-neutral restriction in a traditional public forum); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792, 796, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (holding that city's regulation of sound levels in park was a content-neutral and narrowly tailored means of serving city's interest in the peaceful character of park and privacy of residential area). 33 Here, however, the city has furthered its objectives by passing a content-based resolution, which excludes all speech that does not meet its historical relevance criteria; the resolution is therefore subject to strict scrutiny. We need not decide whether the city's interests in aesthetics and safety are compelling because the resolution is not narrowly tailored to achieve its stated interests. The city has not offered any reason why monuments with its preferred historical content will preserve park space and reduce safety hazards more effectively than monuments containing other content. See Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1267 (11th Cir.2005) (holding city's sign code unconstitutional because not narrowly tailored to serve the general purposes of aesthetics and traffic safety); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (noting that, by allowing content-based exemptions, the government may diminish the credibility of [its] rationale for restricting speech in the first place). Rather, the distinction between monuments with particular historical content and monuments lacking this content bears no relationship whatsoever  to the resolution's stated interests in aesthetics and safety. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (finding that ban on commercial newsracks lacked reasonable fit with city's interests in aesthetics and safety); see also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 792, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (holding state's generalized interest was insufficiently related to its chosen means). The city may not burden speech that does not present the danger the regulation seeks to address: Where at all possible, government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted regulation. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 265, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986). Summum's monument is similar in size, material, and appearance to the Ten Commandments monument already displayed in the park. The city's exclusion of the monument based on its content cannot be justified by an interest in aesthetics or safety. 9 34 Because Pleasant Grove has not demonstrated that application of its historical relevance criteria is more likely than not to be justified by its stated interests, we conclude that Summum has established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and proceed to a determination of whether Summum has satisfied its burden under the remaining three factors necessary for a preliminary injunction.