Opinion ID: 2292595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the 1997 rape conviction was impermissibly used as both the predicate crime requiring france to register as a sex offender, and as a predicate for the first-degree pfo conviction

Text: France's first argument is that his 1997 rape conviction was impermissibly used as both the predicate offense requiring him to register as a sex offender pursuant to KRS 17.510, and as one of the predicate offenses supporting the first-degree PFO conviction. He argues that this is an impermissible double-enhancement based upon a single conviction. For the reasons discussed below, we agree. In support of his argument, France cites us to Boulder v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 615 (Ky.1980) (overruled on other grounds by Dale v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 227 (Ky.1986)). [4] In Boulder, the defendant was convicted of first-degree assault, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Boulder's classification as a convicted felon was based solely upon a 1976 conviction for first-degree assault. Similarly, the sole felony supporting the second-degree PFO enhancement was the 1976 assault. In finding that the 1976 conviction could not serve as the predicate offense for both the possession of a handgun charge and the second-degree PFO charge, we stated: First, KRS 527.020 takes into account the fact of a previous conviction in fixing a penalty for a felon in possession of a handgun. See State v. Ware, 201 Kan. 563, 442 P.2d 9 (1968). This statute converts non-criminal activity into a criminal offense solely on the basis of a person's status as a felon. Similarly, KRS 532.080 (PFO sentencing) purports to punish a person because of his status as a felon. The utilization of a prior felony to establish an essential element of a crime and then to enhance its punishment is just as illogical as using it to raise a misdemeanor to a felony and then using it to increase punishment by way of KRS 532.080 as disapproved in Heady v. Commonwealth, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 613 (1980). Consequently, [Boulder's] status as a felon which establishes the substantive offense of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon may not be used to trigger enhanced punishment via the persistent felony offender statute. Id. at 618. We are unable to distinguish the double-use of the 1976 assault conviction in Boulder from the double-use of the 1997 rape conviction in the present case. The underlying rationale is the same. The 1976 assault conviction in Boulder was the sole basis triggering the defendant's classification as a convicted felon prohibiting him from possessing a handgun; similarly, the 1997 rape conviction was the sole basis triggering France's classification as a sex offender requiring him to register pursuant to KRS 17.510. In both situations an initial crime triggered a legal classification which required the defendant to comply with certain obligations, the violation of which would be a felony. As the excerpt demonstrates, Boulder held that the same underlying felony creating a legal classification subject to specified conditions could not also be used for PFO enhancement purposes in a subsequent felony prosecution for violating a specified condition imposed by the classification. Application of that principle to the present case compels the result that France's 1997 rape conviction, which triggered his sex offender classification and his corresponding obligation to register as a sex offender, may not also be used for PFO enhancement purposes in a prosecution for violation of his obligation to register. The Commonwealth maintains, however, that even if the 1997 rape conviction was impermissibly used for PFO purposes, then, nevertheless, the error was harmless. As previously noted, in 1997, France received a fifteen-year sentence on the rape conviction, a ten-year sentence on the first-degree burglary conviction, and two eight-year sentences on the second-degree burglary convictions, with all sentences to run concurrently. He served-out the total concurrent fifteen-year sentence on April 29, 2005. For one of the 1997 felony convictions (besides the rape) to be used for PFO enhancement, the serve-out on that felony must have occurred within five years of the commission of the present felony. KRS 532.080(3)(c)(l). France committed his present crime on June 10, 2008, and thus for one of the other 1997 felony convictions to be used against him for PFO purposes, the serve-out of that felony must have been after June 10, 2003. April 29, 2005 falls well within this range. The Commonwealth argues that even if the rape conviction is factored out, nevertheless, at minimum, the 1997 first-degree burglary conviction would still support a PFO conviction, [5] because it was served concurrently with the rape conviction, and, as a matter of law, [6] the serve-out date on that conviction was April 29, 2005, the same as the rape. The Commonwealth contends, therefore, that inclusion of the rape conviction was harmless, because the jury could have found that the serve-out on the burglary was within five years of the failure to register charge. For the reasons stated below, we are not persuaded by the Commonwealth's position. Pursuant to KRS 532.080(3)(c)(1), to convict France of first-degree PFO the Commonwealth was required to prove that he [c]ompleted service of the sentence imposed on any of the previous felony convictions within five (5) years prior to the date of the commission of the felony for which he now stands convicted. It is only required that completion of service of sentence or discharge from probation or parole on any, not each, of the prior convictions shall have occurred within five years of the instant offense. Howard v. Commonwealth 608 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky. App.1980). While reasonable inferences such as performing simple subtraction to calculate defendant's age at the time he committed a prior offense is not prohibited when a jury must decide whether a defendant is a persistent felony offender, Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Ky. 2002), here, because there was no specific testimony upon the issue, the jury would be left to speculate on when the serve-out on any of the three other 1997 burglary convictions occurred. See Lienhart v. Commonwealth, 953 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Ky. 1997) (We cannot conclude, given the applicable statutes and case law, that the date of final discharge determines either the date of [the] commencement or completion of a concurrent sentence which is for a shorter period of time than the original sentence.) We are unpersuaded by the Commonwealth's argument that KRS 532.120(1)(a) compels the result that the sentences on the other three felonies were completed at the same time as the completion of the rape sentence. There is no testimony in the record to support that claim, and France did not have the opportunity to defend against it at trial. [A]n erroneous jury instruction is presumed to be prejudicial; and a party claiming such an error to be harmless bears the heavy burden of showing that no prejudice resulted from it. Sanders v. Commonwealth, 301 S.W.3d 497, 499 (Ky. 2010) (Use of defendant's prior conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia, second offense, as predicate offense to convict him of being a first-degree persistent felony offender was reversible error, even though there was also evidence of other, usable prior felony convictions). In this instance, the Commonwealth has failed to meet its heavy burden. As in Sanders, here, we cannot presume that the inclusion of the [rape] in the [PFO] instruction made no difference to the jury. Id. at 500. We accordingly cannot say with fair assurance that the error did not substantially sway the jury's PFO verdict. Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688-89 (Ky.2009). As such, the error was not harmless. We therefore vacate the PFO conviction and the corresponding sentencing enhancement, and remand for a new PFO sentencing phase.