Opinion ID: 3010393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Amendment Right of Access to

Text: Proceedings and Records The First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings is firmly established. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment provides a public right of access to criminal trials. Tracing the history of open criminal trials from the days before the Norman Conquest, the Court found that criminal trials are covered by a presumption of openness, and, as such, may be closed only if justified by an overriding interest articulated in findings. Id. at 573, 581. The Court has since extended that holding to other aspects of a criminal case, see, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I) (voir dire); Press-Enterprise Co v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II) (preliminary hearing), and we have done the same, affording a public right of access to additional aspects of criminal proceedings, see, e.g., Simone, 14 F.3d at 840 (post-trial hearings to investigate juror misconduct), and to the records and briefs that are associated with those proceedings, see, e.g., Antar, 38 F.3d at 1359-60 (voir dire transcript); United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1986) (Smith II) (transcript of sidebar conference during criminal trial). The Supreme Court has established a two-part inquiry for determining whether a particular proceeding is one to which the First Amendment right of access attaches. This test requires a court to consider both experience and logic. Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. The experience prong requires us to consider whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and the general public. Id. The logic inquiry asks us to determine 11 whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. Id. We have identified six relevant societal interests that a court may consider in evaluating whether, for purposes of the logic prong, public access to the proceeding and records in question enhances their function: promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing the public with the more complete understanding of the judicial system; promotion of the public perception of fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the proceedings; providing a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion; serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny; enhancement of the performance of all involved; and discouragement of perjury. Smith II, 787 F.2d at 114 (summarizing United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982) (Criden II)). Once established under the experience and logic test, a First Amendment right of access is not an absolute right, but rather is a presumptive right. Although rare, closure of a criminal proceeding or records to which there is a presumptive right of access is permitted for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509. We have held that, for a district court to seal a criminal proceeding or records, particularized findings must be made on the record in each case, (1) establishing the existence of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) demonstrating that absent limited restrictions upon the right of access, that other interest would be substantially impaired. Antar, 38 F.3d at 1359. Based on this case law, the newspapers contend that there is a presumptive First Amendment right of access to the sealed briefs and the upcoming hearing. They point first to our language in Simone, in which we noted that [o]n a broad level, we see no reason to suspect that post-trial proceedings as a general category are any different with respect to the First Amendment right of access than the other components of a criminal trial. Simone, 14 F.3d at 12 839. Turning to the Press-Enterprise II test, the newspapers submit that the Criden II factors weigh in favor of access to the papers and proceedings at issue.8 According to the newspapers, the ultimate issue before the district court is whether the government's disclosure of the sentencing memorandum was proper. Therefore, they submit, the papers and the hearing ultimately concern allegations of government misconduct. Viewing the proceedings and related briefing through this lens, the newspapers claim that access to those proceedings and papers will promote the public's perception of fairness; foster an informed public discussion about the operations of the United States Attorney's office; and provide public insight into how the judiciary resolves serious allegations of government misconduct. The newspapers also point out that the district court did not make any particularized findings that closure of the briefs and hearing was necessary to further some compelling interest, as is required under Antar once a court determines that a presumptive right of access exists. Alternatively, they contend that, even if the district court had made particularized findings, there is no compelling interest that would justify the closure of the briefs and the hearing. In response, GTECH and the other parties opposing access (Smith, D'Andrea, and the government) contend that there is no presumptive right of access to the briefs or the hearing.9 They submit that the real issue before the district court is whether the government improperly disclosed grand jury material in violation of Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e). Relying on Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979), and subsections (e)(5) and (e)(6) of Rule 6, they point out that grand jury matters, and papers and proceedings that would disclose grand jury matters have historically been closed to the press and the public. They represent that the briefs and the hearings would reveal not only secret grand jury material that was disclosed by the _________________________________________________________________ 8. The newspapers' brief does not address the experience prong. 9. The uncharged individuals named in the sentencing memorandum have not filed briefs on appeal. 13 government in the sentencing memorandum, but also previously undisclosed (secret) grand jury material that they have brought (or will bring) to the court's attention so that it can make a fully informed decision as to whether the government violated Rule 6(e). The Assistant United States Attorney in particular stated at oral argument: [N]ot only does [Judge Politan] have to [look at undisclosed grand jury material] but the government's position is that he can't make a decision without it.10