Opinion ID: 2978494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Darwis’ burden is to show that it is more likely than not that if he were removed to Indonesia, his life or freedom would be threatened because he is ethnic Madurese. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); see I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984). Darwis can meet his burden in two different ways. First, he can show past persecution on a protected ground, which creates a rebuttable presumption that his life or freedom would be threatened if he returned to his native country. Alternatively, he can demonstrate a future threat to his life or freedom on account of a protected ground. On appeal, Darwis attacks three findings of the BIA, namely that Darwis did not suffer past persecution, that Darwis did not establish a pattern and practice of persecution of ethnic Madurese in Indonesia, and that Darwis did not supply sufficient corroboration.2 2 Since we find that Darwis’ claim for withholding of removal fails without considering any lack of corroboration, we need not determine whether the immigration judge was correct in requiring corroboration. 4 A past threat to life or freedom requires the applicant to have suffered past persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). If the applicant successfully demonstrates a past threat to life or freedom, it creates a presumption that his life or freedom will be threatened in the future. In this case, the BIA found that Darwis had failed to show that he was persecuted or that any attacks on him were on account of a protected ground. Persecution is “an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 410 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995)). To show persecution, “[i]t is not sufficient that the applicant has been subjected to indiscriminate abuse . . . Instead, the applicant must establish that he or she was specifically targeted by the government for abuse based on one of the statutorily protected grounds.” Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing with approval a BIA opinion that defined persecution as “the infliction of harm or suffering by the government, or persons a government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a characteristic of the victim”). We believe that the rampant violence in the region around 2001 may be sufficient to show that the actions were taken by a group the government was unable to control. Unlike in Ali, where this Court specifically noted that a State Department report revealed no information of persecution of members of the petitioner’s political party, Darwis has come forward with various documents highlighting violence between the Dayak and Madurese communities. An “Armed Conflicts Report” by Project Ploughshares found that in 2001 “brutal violence erupted between the Dayak and Madurese ethnic groups on the large Indonesian island of Borneo,” noted “reports of atrocities, with 5 government security forces unable to stop the fighting,” and determined that at least 1,000 people died. (J.A. at 118-120). See also International Crisis Group Report, “Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lesson From Kalimantan.” (J.A. at 126-62). Darwis’ problem with his claim for persecution is that very little evidence suggests that the Dayak were intentionally targeting him. His application states that he “was chased by Dayak assailants many times in Kalimantan and was forced to run in fear.” (J.A. at 188). He testified that he believed that the Dayak did not like him because he was prominent through his job as a supervisor. The BIA felt that Darwis was not persecuted because he referenced only two incidents, and in both instances, he escaped unscathed. “We do not find that the respondent established that any harm he himself may have suffered, even in the aggregate, was of such severity as to rise to the level of persecution.” (J.A. at 4). This conclusion of the BIA is amply supported in the record. Furthermore, even if Darwis was persecuted in the past, this finding only raises a rebuttable presumption that his life or freedom would be threatened. Thap v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1). That presumption is rebutted by a finding that the applicant “could avoid a future threat to his or her life or freedom by relocating to another part of the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i)(B). In this case, the presumption is easily rebutted by Darwis’ four years free from ethnic violence in two other cities in the country. While he may have been forced to flee Sambas, he remained in the country for four years in relative peace and safety. In Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 750 (6th Cir. 2006), this Court found that the fact a petitioner who had been directly targeted in the West Bank stayed there for six more years “indicates that her situation in the West Bank was not sufficiently grave to constitute persecution.” 6 The only evidence that Darwis would be in danger of an attack by the Dayak in a different region of Indonesia is his own testimony. He testified that he “thinks” there are problems between the Dayaks and the Madura outside of the Kalimantan region and that he felt in danger when living in Surabaya and Jakarta. He was never attacked in those other cities, never witnessed an ethnically motivated attack on a member of the Madura tribe in either city, and submitted no outside substantiation that this is a nation-wide problem. Darwis’ actual experience outside the Kalimantan region rebuts any presumption created by a showing of past persecution. For the same reason, Darwis’ claim of a pattern or practice of persecution of Madurese people must also fail. In order to show a future threat to his life or freedom on account of a protected ground, Darwis need not prove that he would be singled out for violence upon returning. It is sufficient if he “establishes that in that country there is a pattern or practice of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). The BIA’s findings on this front are amply supported by the record due to the present tense of the requirement. While Darwis submitted substantial evidence about trouble between the Dayaks and Madurese, this information all shows that tensions heightened around 2001, when not coincidentally the events Darwis personally witnessed occurred. While tensions remain high, wide-scale violence is no longer a problem.3 In part, the declining violence is because the Madurese were effectively forced from 3 The 2005 State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices noted: “In Central Kalimantan, relations between indigenous Dayaks and ethnic Madurese transmigrants remained poor in the wake of 2001 interethnic violence. However, at least 30 thousand to 57 thousand displaced ethnic Madurese had returned to Central Kalimantan by year’s end. Despite interethnic tensions, local elections were orderly and relatively peaceful. Relations between the two groups also remained poor in West Kalimantan, where former residents of Madurese descent were obstructed in their attempts to reclaim their property.” (J.A. at 103). 7 Sambas and the surrounding area. While Darwis likely could not return to Sambas, the record amply supports a determination that he can safely return to Indonesia. Darwis’ only evidence to combat the reasonable finding of the BIA is his own testimony that he still believed he was in danger after leaving Sambas. While the immigration judge did find Darwis credible, his mere assertion of fear is not sufficient to meet his burden “that it is more likely than not that he . . . will be persecuted upon return” to Indonesia. Kaba v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). This standard is more stringent than the standard for asylum, which provides that a petitioner need only show a “well-founded fear.” Even under the lower standard for asylum, Darwis would need to provide objective support for his own testimony that he felt fear of Dayak attacks elsewhere in Indonesia. See Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A well-founded fear of persecution thus has both a subjective and an objective component: an alien must actually fear that he will be persecuted upon return to his country, and he must present evidence establishing an ‘objective situation’ under which his fear can be deemed reasonable.”). Neither Darwis nor his outside sources show problems between the Madura and Dayak that today rise to the level of persecution. While Darwis testified that the Dayak and Madura tribes have problems outside of West Kalimantan, only in that region has there been the large-scale attacks that may amount to persecution because the government arguably is unable to control the violence. The confined location of the tension, as well as the apparent thawing of the conflict, means that Darwis cannot show a pattern or practice of persecution of Madurese throughout Indonesia.