Opinion ID: 1959540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: By Contract

Text: In addition to his claim under statute, Taylor and the LCEA assert a cause of action under a contractual theory. As stated, teacher transfer may be a proper subject of negotiation in the collective bargaining process. The more significant question here is whether an arbitration clause in a negotiated agreement reached pursuant to the EPNA applies not only to tenured teaching duties but coaching responsibilities as well. The collective bargaining agreement between the Board and LCEA was entered into pursuant to the EPNA. The act is designed. to prescribe the legitimate rights and obligations of boards of education and their professional employees.  Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-5-601(b)(1) (emphasis added). Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-603 bestows upon professional employees entitlements to self-organization, to form, join or be assisted by organizations, to negotiate through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of professional negotiations. Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-5-603. The EPNA defines Memorandum of agreement as a written memorandum of understanding arrived at by the representatives of the board of education and a recognized professional employees ' organization, which Shall be presented to the board of education and to the membership of such organization for ratification or rejection. Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-5-602(6) (emphasis added). The term professional employee is defined as any person employed by any local board of education in a position which requires a license issued by the department of education.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-602(11) (emphasis added). Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-612 explains that the scope of a memorandum of agreement shall extend to all matters negotiated between the board of education and the professional employees ' organization; provided, that the scope of such agreement shall not include proposals contrary to . . professional employee rights, among other things. (emphasis added). Clearly then, the statutory protections of the EPNA are limited in their application to professional employees. Principals, teachers, and supervisors must possess a valid license from the Tennessee Board of Education as a pre-requisite for employment in a local school system. Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-5-101(a) (2002); Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-5-108 (Supp.2007). No person shall be employed to teach . . . or receive pay [without] . . . a license from the commission or state board. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-403(a). Conversely, nowhere in the EPNA is it stated that its protections and guidelines apply to nonprofessional or non-licensed positions. Coaching and equivalent positions in public elementary or secondary schools do not require such a license in the same regard as the teaching profession. Our interpretation, therefore, is that any contractual protections emanating from the EPNA are relevant to persons only in their status as professional employees and not in their status in non-licensed positions. Our construction of the EPNA is consistent with the specific language of the Master Contract in Lawrence County, which covered the period between July 1, 2000 and June 30, 2003. The agreement prescribe[s] the legitimate rights of the Board of Education's professional employees to establish procedures which are designed to meet the special requirements and need of public education. Area I, Article II defines the phrase professional employee as including any personnel employed by the Board in a position which requires a certificate issued by the State Department of Education for service in public elementary and secondary schools of Tennessee supported, in whole or in part, by local, state, or federal funds. The terms teacher and employee are defined as any person included in the negotiating unit. The Grievance Procedure section, found in Area I, Article V, states that a `Grievance' shall mean any claim by a teacher or the Association that there has been a violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of the terms of this agreement. The grievance procedures and appropriate steps are then thoroughly addressed. The fourth step of the procedure explains, in part, that an arbitrator shall have no power to alter the terms of [the] agreement. Area III, Article 4 of the Master Contract speaks to the subject of teacher transfer under the caption Vacancies, Transfers and Reassignments. The terms require the Director, [12] if requested, to offer reasons for a transfer and establish that those transfers recommended by [a] principal should be neither arbitrary nor capricious, as is the traditional scope of review under the statutory law. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-5-510 (2002); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-301(FF). The Transfers and. Reassignments section states that [i]f an administrative request for a transfer is made, the superintendent shall offer reasons why the transfer was necessary, if requested by the teacher. It further mandates that transfers cannot be made for arbitrary or capricious reasons. Subsequent paragraphs, Area V, Articles 2 and 3, pertain to the personnel file of and complaints against a teacher, setting out procedural guidelines for the investigation of complaints. Further, the Due Process section of the agreement at Area V, Article 4(c) provides that [n]o tenured teacher shall be discharged, nonrenewed, suspended, reduced in rank or compensation or deprived of any professional advantage without just cause. The term professional advantage is not defined. Coaches and/or coaching positions are referenced in two places in the Master Contract. As to salary and benefits, Coaches' and Band Directors' Supplements shall be paid in accordance with [their] supplement schedule. (Appendix C). Appendix C provides that supplements for coaches will be calculated as a percentage of total salary. Otherwise, no language in the Master Contract grants any particular rights to coaches. As stated, the arbitrator [13] in this instance ruled that the terms of the Master Contract applied to Taylor, that coaching duties qualified as a professional advantage, an obviously arguable point under the contractual terms, and that any removal of those duties qualified as a disciplinary action. The arbitrator also ruled that the failure on the part of the Director to assign coaching responsibilities in 2001-2002 and to treat Taylor as the incumbent for the following year was without an appropriate basis. We interpret the EPNA and the Master Contract differently than did the arbitrator. Both the contractual terms, with numerous references to professional employee, and the provisions of the EPNA lead us to conclude that the collective bargaining agreement between the LCEA and the BOE, including the arbitration clause, does not apply to the coaching aspect of a tenured teacher's employment. [14] Thus, Taylor's coaching status was not covered by the Master Contract and instead was governed by a series of one-year terms, applicable to all positions for which no license is required, as prescribed by law. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-2-301(b)(1)(FF). This statute specifically confers on the director of schools the authority to hire persons for which no teaching license is required and limits the term of employment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-2-301(b)(1)(EE), (FF). [15] The EPNA affords no assistance. Thus, Taylor's coaching assignment was not protected by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. In summary, we reiterate several important principles relating to the collective bargaining process: (1) the Board of Education is the supreme power in the school system; (2) the Board of Education assigns duties to the director; (3) the director acts for the Board of Education; (4) the director's authority over personnel decisions must be exercised consistent with the Board of Education's policies and collective bargaining agreements; (5) the delegation of authority to the director over personnel matters does not alter, diminish, or supersede the authority of the Board and teachers to negotiate effective agreements under the EPNA; (6) all acts of the director must be consistent with the Board's contracts; (7) the director's power to transfer tenured teachers under Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-510 must be exercised in a manner compliant with any existing collective bargaining agreement; (8) the collective bargaining agreement is limited in scope to personnel in their positions as professional employees; (9) transfers or assignments are permissive subjects of bargaining that the Board maybut is not required tonegotiate; (10) such subjects of bargaining govern personnel only as to their professional employee status; (11) professional employees who assume duties for which no license is required are governed in that supplemental capacity by year-to-year contracts; and (12) such year-to-year appointments are not entitled to the benefits of the collective bargaining process. Thus, we are constrained to hold that our statutes preclude an education association, as the bargaining unit for the licensed professional employee, from representing teachers in their capacity as coaches. Taylor's claim under the collective bargaining agreement squares with the arbitrator's interpretation that relieving a tenured teacher of coaching duties is equivalent to a transfer. He argues that because transfers must be in accordance with any locally negotiated agreement, the termination of his coaching responsibilities was a breach of contract. While his removal as basketball coach may have been a transfer, however, as indicated by the several cases cited in the preceding section, it was not governed by the transfer provisions of the negotiated agreement. The arbitrator's ruling that the Master Contract governed the renewal of Taylor's coaching contract was erroneous. It is important to note that while public policy considerations generally favor the arbitration of collective bargaining disputes, an arbitrator's decision cannot act in contravention of statutes. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-5-313, the Uniform Arbitration Act, a trial court may vacate a decision where the arbitrator exceeds their powers. Arbitrators `exceed their powers' when they go beyond the scope of authority . . . granted by the arbitration agreement. Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc., 914 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Tenn.1996) (quoting Intn'l. Talent Group, Inc. v. Copyright Mgmt., Inc., 769 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988)). The director of schools has the power to name the coaches in our schools. An arbitrator interpreting a locally negotiated agreement may not intercede in that regard. To the extent that an arbitrator's award interferes with the authority of a director of schools to appoint coaches, the award is unenforceable. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-5-313(a)(3) (stating that an arbitrator's decision may be vacated where the arbitrator exceeds powers). In these unique circumstances, however, the judge upheld the arbitrator's decision not because of its correctness, but because the. BOE had unanimously approved the recommendations at its meeting in June of 2002. In our view, the judge made an accurate assessment in that regard. Even though the terms of the Master Contract did not afford Taylor any entitlement to relief, the BOE, as the supreme authority within the local school system, gave vitality to his claim by adopting the arbitrator's interpretation. It had the statutory authority to do so. It is our conclusion, therefore, that to the extent of the terms approved by the BOE, Taylor has the right to sue under contract.