Opinion ID: 2216325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: withdrawal of garcia's alford plea

Text: Garcia argues that the circuit court should have permitted him to withdraw his Alford plea before sentencing because he was confused about the consequence of entering the plea. In the alternative, Garcia argues that the circuit court should have allowed him to withdraw his plea after sentencing because he did not understand the elements of the crime to which he pled guilty.
[6,7] This Court will sustain a circuit court's ruling denying a motion to withdraw a plea unless the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 579, 469 N.W.2d 163 (1991). A discretionary determination, to be sustained, must demonstrably be made and based upon facts appearing in the record and in reliance on the appropriate and applicable law. Id. at 579-80 (quoting Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981)). [8-10] A circuit court should freely allow a defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing if it finds any fair and just reason for withdrawal, unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance on the defendant's plea. [7] Id. at 582. But `freely' doesn't mean automatically. Id. A fair and just reason is some adequate reason for defendant's change of heart ... other than the desire to have a trial. Id. at 583. The burden is on the defendant to prove a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the plea by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 584. [11] Garcia asserted at the postconviction hearing that he was confused at the time he entered his plea about the consequences that would stem from entering an Alford plea. [8] Garcia correctly states that confusion is a fair and just reason for withdrawal. Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 485, 247 N.W.2d 105 (1976). Garcia also states that, although his motion to withdraw his plea was not filed until one month after the plea was entered, he realized that he made the wrong decision the same day he entered the plea. [A] swift change of heart is in itself a strong indication that a plea is entered in haste and confusion. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975). Here, the circuit court found that Garcia's claim of confusion as a reason for withdrawing his Alford plea was incredible and therefore found that there was no fair and just reason for the withdrawal of Garcia's plea. This Court held in Canedy that if the circuit court does not believe the defendant's asserted reasons for withdrawal of the plea, there is no fair and just reason to allow withdrawal of the plea. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 585; see also Dudrey, 74 Wis. 2d at 483. Thus, if the circuit court's factual findings were correct, its ruling was supported by law. [12] Examination of the circuit court's order shows that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by finding that Garcia understood the plea negotiation at the time he entered his plea. The circuit court found that Garcia was a reasonably intelligent person who did not enter any special pleas based upon a lack of mental skills. The court also commented on the great facility with the English language exhibited by Garcia at the 1992 and 1993 hearings. Further, the court noted the testimony of Kohler and Radomski. Kohler testified that he never had difficulty communicating with Garcia during any of his more than twenty visits with him prior to trial. Kohler also stated that, until Ms. Ward arrived on the day set for trial, I never really realized he spoke Spanish, to be honest with you. Moreover, Radomski testified that he was with Garcia for sixteen hours in 1987, and he and Garcia conversed in English that entire time, including while Garcia was giving a statement in which he confessed to the shooting. Finally, the court stated that, His perception of all sorts of nuances regarding his rights, regarding his actions, regarding the implications of the questions are remarkably sophisticated. I can't attribute that to the six years that he spent in the Wisconsin State Prison. [13] Garcia argues that the circuit court erred by relying on his fluency in English at the 1992 and 1993 evidentiary hearings to conclude that he spoke English well when the plea was entered because the plea hearing was five years prior to those hearings. It is true that the operative time period for determining the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge is at the plea hearing itself. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 269. Here, the circuit court used the correct time period, relying on the testimony of Kohler and Radomski as well as the testimony of Ward who stated that Garcia understood English quite well and the court's own extensive dealings with the defendant including the court's statement only two months after the trial that [t]he defendant's candor has not been particularly auspicious in this case because we had some discussions, and it's clear from the discussions we've had this morning that the defendant is very facile with the English language. The circuit court used Garcia's ability in the English language in 1992 and 1993 only to highlight the utterly incredible nature of Garcia's claim as to his ability in 1988.
[14,15] A defendant who files a motion to withdraw his plea after sentencing is entitled to withdraw his plea as a matter of constitutional right if he demonstrates that he did not understand the elements of the crimes to which he pled. State v. Carter, 131 Wis. 2d 69, 73-80, 389 N.W.2d 1, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986). We review constitutional questions independently of the conclusions made by the circuit court and the court of appeals. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283. [16] Section 971.08(1), Stats., states that a circuit court in accepting a guilty or no contest plea must [a]ddress the defendant personally and determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment if convicted. [9] In Bangert, this Court outlined three methods that fulfill this obligation. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 268. [10] The State concedes that the circuit court did not follow any of these methods. However, a violation of sec. 971.08 is not itself constitutionally significant. Id. at 261 n.3. [17-19] If a defendant who filed an appeal pursuant to sec. 974.02 and 809.30, Stats. (1993-94), shows that the circuit court did not determine on the record at the plea hearing that the defendant understood the nature of the crimes charged, the burden shifts to the State to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. Id. at 275. In meeting this burden, the State may utilize the entire record to show that the defendant entered a valid plea. Id. at 275. The state may examine the defendant or defendant's counsel to shed light on the defendant's understanding or knowledge of information necessary for him to enter a voluntary and intelligent plea. Id. The court may also look to the guilty plea questionnaire form signed by the defendant to determine if his plea was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. State v. Moederndorfer, 141 Wis. 2d 823, 827-28, 416 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1987). In essence, the state will be required to show that the defendant in fact possessed the constitutionally required understanding and knowledge.... Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 275. [20] After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that the State presented clear and convincing evidence that Garcia understood the nature of the charges. The guilty plea questionnaire that Kohler read to Garcia in English and that Ward translated into Spanish stated that, I have had read to me the criminal complaint and the information in this case, and I understand what I am charged with, what the penalties are and why I have been charged. I also understand the elements of the offense and their relationship to the facts in this case. Further, Kohler assured the court that he had discussed with Garcia the constitutional rights he was waiving on numerous occasions, and that Kohler felt that Garcia understood the plea negotiations. Kohler also testified that he explained the elements of the crimes to Garcia in layman's terms, and did so while Ward was interpreting. Moreover, Garcia told the court that he was entering the plea voluntarily, that he was satisfied with the representation he had been given by Kohler, and that Kohler had explained all of his rights and possible defenses to him. All of this together with what the circuit court found to be the incredible nature of Garcia's testimony and the circuit court's finding that Garcia appears to be manipulating the Court, manipulating the justice system provides clear and convincing evidence that Garcia understood the nature of the charges, and entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. In conclusion, we hold that Alford pleas are acceptable in Wisconsin. We further hold that the circumstances surrounding Garcia's Alford plea do not require that he be allowed to withdraw that plea. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (concurring). I write separately to stress the longstanding law in this state. Despite what the majority touts as the mutuality of advantage of plea agreements, circuit courts are required to scrutinize such arrangements closely. Circuit courts in this state may not involve themselves in the plea agreement process and are not bound by any plea agreement between a prosecutor and a defendant. Before permitting a prosecutor to amend charges to allege a less serious offense and before accepting a defendant's guilty or no contest plea to the amended charges, the circuit court must satisfy itself that the amended charges fit the crime and that the amendments are in the public interest. State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 927, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992). A circuit court has the power to accept or reject a plea agreement reducing or amending charges .... Id., n.11. Furthermore, a circuit court cannot enter a plea of guilty coupled with claims of innocence unless there is a factual basis for the plea and until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.10 (1970). WILCOX, J. (concurring). I agree with the majority that the circumstances surrounding Garcia's Alford plea do not require that he be allowed to withdraw that plea. Majority op. at 867. I also agree with the majority that under the present state of the law in Wisconsin, a trial court may, under the appropriate circumstances, accept an Alford plea. I feel compelled, however, to write separately to express my concerns regarding the use of these seemingly innocuous pleas. Quite simply, I am troubled that a defendant may plead guilty to a charge while continuing to protest his innocence thereto. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, [t]he dual aim of our criminal justice system is `that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) (citation omitted). An Alford plea, in my mind, contradicts this very simple proposition. Further, I believe that the use of Alford pleas in Wisconsin has an adverse effect on the public's perspective regarding justice. [1] In our democracy, the victim of a crime places his or her trust in the criminal justice system. How then does a victim react when he or she hears the defendant plead guilty while all the while maintaining his innocence to the crime? The sense of finality is clearly missing. And what of the defendant? Having chosen to maintain his innocence to the crime, it is unlikely that he will willingly subject himself to the rehabilitative process. An Alford plea may, in some instances foster expediency. As noted correctly by the majority, in many instances the plea allows the state to conserve scarce resources in its battle against crime. [2] It may also serve to shield a defendant from ridicule and embarrassment in cases such as those involving sexual assault. Even granting these so-called benefits, I believe that an Alford plea is a troubling way to finalize the criminal judicial process. I recommend that the trial courts in this state act with great reticence when confronted with an Alford plea.