Opinion ID: 169685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Anderson's Motion to Amend

Text: Anderson moved to amend her complaint against the media defendants to add a promissory estoppel claim and a tortious or malicious interference with a contract claim. The district court denied her motion, concluding that the new allegations were an effort to avoid the constitutional limitations on her claims. We review the denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. Tool Box, Inc. v. Ogden City Corp., 419 F.3d 1084, 1086-87 (10th Cir.2005). Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend a complaint shall be freely given when justice so requires. A district court may refuse to allow amendment if it would be futile. Lind v. Aetna Health, Inc., 466 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir.2006). `A proposed amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal.' Id. (quoting Bradley v. J.E. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d 892, 901 (10th Cir.2004)). Anderson's proposed amendments would be futile because the two new claims would be subject to dismissal. Anderson's interference claim alleges that she and Blake had an agreement to keep the videotape confidential and that the media defendants induced Blake to breach that agreement. In Oklahoma, tortious or malicious interference with a contract has the following elements: (1) a business or contractual right with which there was interference; (2) the interference was malicious and wrongful, and that such interference was neither justified, privileged nor excusable (emphases omitted); and (3) damage was proximately sustained as a result of the complained-of interference. Morrow Dev. Corp. v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 875 P.2d 411, 416 (Okla.1994). Anderson's claim would fail for lack of any allegation of malice, which requires the intentional performance of a wrongful act without justification or excuse. Id. Anderson does not allege that the media defendants intentionally interfered with the alleged agreement between Anderson and Blake to keep the videotape confidential. Indeed, Anderson does not even allege that the media defendants knew that the agreement existed. While Anderson believes that knowledge of an agreement can be inferred from the videotape's sensitive nature and various state and local policies preventing the public disclosure of confidential material, this evidence may establish, at most, that the media defendants knew that the videotape was protected by state and local law, not that it was protected by an agreement between Blake and Anderson. Anderson's promissory estoppel claim seeks recovery for the media defendants' alleged violation of an agreement between them and Blake to use only a head shot of the attacker on the evening news. Oklahoma has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) version of the cause of action, which provides: A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. § 90(1); Barber v. Barber, 77 P.3d 576, 579 (Okla.2003) (recognizing Oklahoma's adoption of § 90). From this, Oklahoma has distilled the following four elements of promissory estoppel: (1) a clear and unambiguous promise; (2) foreseeability by the promisor that the promisee would rely upon it; (3) reasonable reliance upon the promise to the promisee's detriment; and (4) hardship or unfairness can be avoided only by the promise's enforcement. Barber, 77 P.3d at 579. Anderson's proposed promissory estoppel claim fails because she only alleges emotional distress damages. Oklahoma courts have held that a claim seeking only damages for emotional distress fails in the absence of physical injury. Seidenbach's, Inc. v. Williams, 361 P.2d 185, 187 (Okla. 1961) (It is the settled law in this jurisdiction that mental anguish of itself cannot be treated as an independent ground of damages so as to enable a person to maintain an action for that injury alone.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Anderson only seeks damages for emotional distress without any allegation of physical injury: Plaintiff has been damaged by the actions of the Defendants, become despondent, suffered emotional distress, embarrassment, sleeplessness, anxiety and concern for herself and her children and is entitled to damages against all relevant defendants. Aplt. App. at 26. As Anderson's promissory estoppel claim would be subject to dismissal, her request to amend to raise that claim would be futile.