Opinion ID: 2570573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Malice (guilt phase)

Text: Leonard makes two primary claims challenging the malice instructions. First, Leonard claims that the implied malice instruction created an unconstitutional presumption that improperly shifted the burden of proof. The instruction provided, Malice may be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. The instruction is nearly identical to 200.020(2); the instruction differs only in that it uses the word may instead of shall. This court recently held that substitution of the word may for shall in the instruction is not only permissible, but preferable. Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. ___, 6 P.3d 481, 482-83 (2000). This court observed that use of may in the instruction eliminates the issue of a mandatory presumption. Id. at ___, 6 P.3d at 483. Second, Leonard also claims that the instructions were insufficient to define malice. Leonard specifically asserts that the implied malice instruction contains language so vague and pejorative that [it] is meaningless without further definition, and it should have been eliminated in favor of less archaic terms which define the conscious disregard for life from which malice may be implied. Leonard notes that the California Supreme Court has criticized similar language defining implied malice in California's own statute. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353, 363-64 (1966), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood, 18 Cal.4th 470, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869, 882 n. 12 (1998); Cal.Penal Code § 188 (West 1999). However, the statutory language is well established in Nevada, and we conclude that the malice instructions as a whole were sufficient. This court has characterized the statutory language abandoned and malignant heart as archaic but essential. Keys v. State, 104 Nev. 736, 740, 766 P.2d 270, 272 (1988). This court held that similar instructions accurately informed the jury of the distinction between express malice and implied malice. Guy v. State, 108 Nev. 770, 777 & n. 2, 839 P.2d 578, 582-83 & n. 2 (1992). Further, this court has held that language in the malice aforethought instruction is constitutional that refers to a heart fatally bent on mischief and acts done in contradistinction to accident or mischance. See Leonard, 114 Nev. at 1208, 969 P.2d at 296. This court concluded that [a]lthough these phrases are not common in today's general parlance, ... their use did not deprive appellant of a fair trial. Id. Absent some indication that the jury was confused by the malice instructions (including the instruction on malice aforethought and express malice), a defendant's claim that the instructions were confusing is merely speculative. See Guy, 108 Nev. at 777, 839 P.2d at 583. Leonard has not shown that the jury was confused in the instant case.