Opinion ID: 477929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Process of Selecting a Limitations Period: Garcia

Text: 10 Federal civil rights statutes, such as Sec. 1981 5 and Sec. 1983, contain no statute of limitations. Rather, federal courts are guided in their determination of the appropriate statute of limitations to apply to federal civil rights actions by a companion statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1982). Section 1988 directs federal courts to examine federal law and, to the extent that federal law provides no applicable rule of decision, to examine state law. 6 The Supreme Court has described this as a three-step process:First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States so far as such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect.    If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second step by considering application of state common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the forum state.    A third step asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.    11 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942-43, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (citations omitted). See also Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2928-2929, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984). Thus courts are to look to state law for guidance if federal law provides no statute of limitations. 7 12 Application of Sec. 1988's borrowing principle, originally referred to as a search for the most appropriate or most analogous state statute of limitations, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1797, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975), however, led to confusion over which state statute of limitations is most analogous. The lower courts were confused as to whether the characterization of the claim was an issue of federal or state law and whether the characterization of the claim ought to turn on the particular facts of the case. See Garcia, 471 U.S. at 274 & n. 33, 105 S.Ct. at 1946 & n. 33; Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 192-94 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.2d 297 (1985). 13 The courts in this jurisdiction have also struggled with the issue of which statute of limitations applies to Sec. 1981 claims. 8 This court held, in Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 994 (D.C. Cir.1973), that the District's three-year personal injury statute applied. After that case was decided, however, the District of Columbia enacted the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1978, D.C. Code Sec. 1-2501 et seq. (1981). That statute is governed by a one-year statute of limitations. See Davis v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 449 A.2d 278, 281 (D.C.C.A.1982). The authority in this jurisdiction is now split on which of the two statutes controls. 9 14 Our resolution of these issues is guided by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1985). In that case a plaintiff brought a Sec. 1983 claim against a police officer, alleging that he had been beaten by the defendant. 471 U.S. at 263, 105 S.Ct. at 1940. The district court refused to dismiss the suit on timeliness grounds, concluding that the claim was governed by the New Mexico statute of limitations that governed all claims not otherwise specifically provided for. On appeal, after exhaustively reviewing all of the ways in which Sec. 1983 claims have been characterized by each of the federal circuits, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Sec. 1983 claims were best characterized as personal injury claims. The Supreme Court affirmed. 15 The Court began its analysis by examining the borrowing principle of Sec. 1988. The Court emphasized that the characterization of the federal claim is a matter of federal law. Id. at 270 & n. 22, 105 S.Ct. at 1944 & n. 22. Thus a particular state's characterization of a federal claim for purposes of determining which statute of limitations is applicable is not binding on a federal court. 10 Id. 16 The Court then analyzed the particular character of Sec. 1983 claims. It noted that Sec. 1983 provides a remedy for a broad range of injuries. Id. at 272-73, 105 S.Ct. at 1945-46. A single claim under Sec. 1983 could be characterized as any one of a number of state causes of action. Allowing courts to select an appropriate statute of limitations on an analysis of the particular facts of each claim    inevitably breeds uncertainty and time-consuming litigation that is foreign to the central purposes of Sec. 1983. Id. at 272, 105 S.Ct. at 1945. 17 The simplicity of the admonition in Sec. 1988 is consistent with the assumption that Congress intended the identification of the appropriate statute of limitations to be an uncomplicated task for judges, lawyers and litigants, rather than a source of uncertainty, and unproductive and ever increasing litigation. Moreover, the legislative purpose to create an effective remedy for the enforcement of federal civil rights is obstructed by uncertainty in the applicable statute of limitations, for scarce resources must be dissipated by useless litigation on collateral matters. 18 Id. at 275, 105 S.Ct. at 1946-47 (footnote omitted). Consequently, the Court concluded that Sec. 1988 is fairly construed as a directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations. Id. at 275, 105 S.Ct. at 1947. 19 The Court then turned to the Tenth Circuit's exhaustive[ ] review[ ], id., of the different ways that Sec. 1983 claims have been characterized by each of the federal circuits. The Court examined the historical context of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, noting the campaign of violence in the South that motivated Congress to enact the statute. The Court also noted that the unifying theme of the Civil Rights Act was the Constitution's command that all persons be accorded the full privileges of citizenship and that no person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or be denied the equal protection without due process of law or be denied the equal protection of the laws. A violation of that command is an injury to the individual rights of the person. Id. at 277, 105 S.Ct. at 1948. Finally, the Court quoted the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir.1972), to explain why this analogy is persuasive: 20 In essence, Sec. 1983 creates a cause of action where there has been injury, under color of state law, to the person or to the constitutional or federal statutory rights which emanate from or are guaranteed to the person. In the broad sense, every cause of action under Sec. 1983 which is well-founded results from 'personal injuries.' 21 471 U.S. at 278, 105 S.Ct. at 1948. Consequently, the Court concluded that Sec. 1983 claims are most appropriately characterized as personal injury actions. Id. at 278, 105 S.Ct. at 1949. 22