Opinion ID: 622534
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the rluipa action

Text: Sharp's RLUIPA Action sought injunctive relief and money damages against Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. The Magistrate Judge held that Sharp's claims for injunctive relief were mooted by his transfer from SCI-Pittsburgh and SCI-Greene to SCI-Dallas, and that RLUIPA does not permit recovery against Defendants in their official or individual capacities. On appeal, Sharp is challenging only the Magistrate Judge's denial of his RLUIPA claim against Defendants in their individual capacities. The issue of whether RLUIPA permits actions against State officials in their individual capacities is one of first impression for this Court. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that RLUIPA does not permit such actions. RLUIPA permits plaintiffs to obtain appropriate relief against a government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2. [G]overnment, in pertinent part, is defined as: (i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State; (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and (ii) any other person acting under color of State law [.] 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A) (emphasis added). Sharp argues that the express language of RLUIPA, in particular the separate references to an official and any other person acting under color of State law, supports his position that Congress intended the statute to permit relief against government employees in their individual capacities. In particular, Sharp asserts that, by the any other person acting under color of State law language, Congress purposefully tracked its § 1983 language. Sharp concludes that because § 1983 permits recovery against a government employee in her individual capacity, so too must RLUIPA. Sharp, however, overlooks the constitutional underpinnings of RLUIPA. In fact, the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuitsthe only circuits we are aware of that have addressed this issue in precedential opinionshave rejected arguments similar to Sharp's and held that RLUIPA does not permit actions against government employees in their individual capacities. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 886-89 (7th Cir.2009); Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186-89 (4th Cir.2009); Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 327-29 (5th Cir.2009); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271-75 (11th Cir.2007), abrogated on other grounds, Sossamon v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1654, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011) (abrogating Smith as to the claim against government employees in their official capacities). Congress enacted RLUIPA pursuant to its spending power under Article I of the Constitution. [14] When Congress enacts legislation pursuant to its spending power, it may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds and essentially create a contract between the federal government and the State recipient. Smith, 502 F.3d at 1273; see also Nelson, 570 F.3d at 887 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981)). As a result, the statute may, as a condition of the funding, subject the grant recipient to liability in a private cause of action, but the spending power cannot be used to subject individual defendants, such as state employees, to individual liability in a private cause of action. Smith, 502 F.3d at 1274; see also Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 329. Thus, non-recipients of the funds, including individuals who are state officials, generally cannot be subject to private liability for monetary damages. See, e.g., Nelson, 570 F.3d at 888-89 (stating that permitting suits against government officials in their individual capacity would raise serious questions regarding whether Congress had exceeded its authority under the Spending Clause); Rendelman, 569 F.3d at 189 (concluding that the RLUIPA's definition of government did not clearly convey Congress's intent to impose a condition of individual liability pursuant to the Spending Clause); Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 329 (Congressional enactments pursuant to the Spending Clause do not themselves impose direct liability on a non-party to the contract between the state and the federal government.); Smith, 502 F.3d at 1273-74 (drawing an analogy to the court's Title IX jurisprudence, which does not permit suits against individuals because Title IX was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause). Moreover, when Congress desires to impose a condition under the Spending Clause, it is Congress's burden to affirmatively impose the condition in clear and unmistakable statutory terms. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital, the Supreme Court stated that [t]he legitimacy of Congress's power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract. ... There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. Id. (internal citations omitted). Here, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that RLUIPA does not permit an action against Defendants in their individual capacities. Pennsylvania, not Defendants, was the direct recipient of any federal funds. Thus, RLUIPA cannot impose direct liability on Defendants, who were not parties to the contract created between Pennsylvania and the federal government. [15] Further, RLUIPA does not unambiguously signal Congress's intent to impose a condition of individual liability. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Sossamon v. Texas which reviewed the related issue of whether States, by accepting federal funds, waived sovereign immunity under RLUIPAis particularly instructive. In Sossamon, the Court held that States did not consent to waive their sovereign immunity with respect to RLUIPA suits for damages against State employees in their official capacities. See 131 S.Ct. at 1655. The Court reasoned that RLUIPA's authorization of `appropriate relief against a government,' § 2000cc-2(a), [was] not an unequivocal expression of state consent to waive sovereign immunity to suits for money damages. Id. at 1658-59. Rather, the Court found RLUIPA's appropriate relief language to be open-ended and ambiguous about what types of relief it includes, thereby precluding any finding that the States consented to waive sovereign immunity. Id. at 1659. Similarly here, it cannot be said that RLUIPA's appropriate relief language unambiguously signaled Congress's intent to impose a condition of individual liability. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge did not err when she entered judgment against Sharp and for Defendants on the RLUIPA Action.