Opinion ID: 1129333
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Undisclosed Police Reports

Text: Smith argues that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose information in police reports and other documents and that the failure to disclose them undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Smith first alleges error regarding the State's failure to disclose that Jones initially was listed as a suspect in the murder. The evidence showed that Jones was so listed shortly after the murder because he lived within a block of the crime scene and had outstanding warrants for his arrest. We find that the evidence is neither exculpatory nor impeaching. See Wright v. State, 857 So.2d 861, 870 (Fla.2003) (rejecting claim that information contained in police files concerning other possible suspects and other criminal activity in the same neighborhood was Brady material that had to be disclosed), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 961, 124 S.Ct. 1715, 158 L.Ed.2d 402 (2004); Carroll v. State, 815 So.2d 601, 620 (Fla.2002) (As noted by the State, the prosecution is not required to provide the defendant all information regarding its investigatory work on a particular case regardless of its relevancy or materiality.). Further, even if it should have been disclosed, it was not material under the Strickler. The bases for Jones's early listing as a possible suspect were known to Smith, and the jury was informed of them as well. Failure to disclose this information does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Smith next argues that the State failed to disclose a police report demonstrating the police contacted Jones's wife, Mellow Jones, in their house-to-house canvassing of the neighborhood both immediately after the murder and a few hours later, with negative results each time. He alleges that the report constituted valuable impeachment evidence. This claim was not raised below and thus is not preserved for our review. In his postconviction motion, Smith claimed generally that counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Mrs. Jones with police reports. He did not claim the documents were not disclosed or allege facts contained in them that would serve as impeachment. The circuit court was correct to summarily dismiss this conclusory claim. Although Smith's newly formulated claim is not preserved, we point out that the police report is neither exculpatory nor impeaching. Contrary to Smith's claim, the report does not contradict the testimony of either Mr. or Mrs. Jones. In his third subclaim regarding nondisclosure, Smith argues that the State failed to disclose a handwritten note of August 9, 1989, (after the first trial but before the retrial) on which he was entitled to question Jones at trial. Written by a prosecutor in the first trial, the note indicates that Jones telephoned her, saying that to prevent him from reuniting with his wife, his daughter had recently falsely accused him of sexually abusing her several years before. He feared arrest and wanted to take a polygraph and have his daughter take one as well. We agree with the circuit court's denial of this claim. See Carroll, 815 So.2d at 620 (stating that prosecution is not required to provide the defendant all information regarding its investigatory work on a particular case regardless of its relevancy or materiality). The note does not provide exculpatory evidence or impeachment material. The note was not relevant either to the retrial or to Jones's motivation to provide testimony. Next, Smith asserts that the circuit court erred in determining that a prosecutor's internal investigation synopsis dated April 4, 1983, did not have to be disclosed and was not material under Strickler. In the document, the prosecutor summarized the testimony of David McGruder, a restaurant employee who saw Smith make a phone call and get in the cab. The prosecutor noted that McGruder was unable to pick Smith out of a photopack. We find that the State should have disclosed the document, but hold this evidence was not material. See Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553, 560 (Fla.1999) (holding that information in state attorney's notes of witness interviews constituted evidence favorable to defense subject to disclosure but was not material to Young's murder conviction). When the prosecutor dictated his synopsis, the police had not yet shown McGruder a photopack actually containing Smith's picture. McGruder did not identify Smith's picture until April 8. That was the first photopack that included Smith's picture. Further, at retrial Smith impeached McGruder on his tardy photopack identification, and the jury heard McGruder's confusing testimony regarding his uncertain identification of the photo. Finally, Smith argues that the State did not disclose a police report about Jones's polygraph test, which Smith could have used to impeach Jones at trial. [5] The circuit court found that Smith did not rebut the State's evidence that such a report was disclosed and further did not demonstrate that polygraph tests were admissible at trial as impeachment evidence. See Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 787 (Fla. 2004) (As for the polygraph tests, their results would not have been admissible at trial without the consent of both parties.); Walsh v. State, 418 So.2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 1982). We agree with the circuit court that Smith failed to establish materiality.