Opinion ID: 2504897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction Over Cases in Which the Death Penalty Can Be Imposed

Text: Under the 1983 Constitution, the Supreme Court has general appellate jurisdiction of all cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed. Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(8). Although the 1983 Constitution altered the language used to describe this Court's general appellate jurisdiction over murder cases, it did not change our jurisdiction to hear and decide appeals involving life-imprisonment murder convictions. The addition or modification of language in a constitution may create a presumption that the framers intended to change existing law, Collins v. American Tel., etc., Co., 265 Ga. 37, 456 S.E.2d 50 (1995), but that presumption may be rebutted if the constitutional history does not support giving a new meaning to the provision. See Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374(2), 418 S.E.2d 27 (1992) (interpreting the equal protection clause). When construing a constitutional provision, we must give words their ordinary meaning. The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the legislative intent, keeping in view the old law, the evil, and the remedy. OCGA § 1-3-1(a). When the language is capable of more than one meaning, we construe the provision so as to carry out the legislative intent. Judicial Council of Ga. v. Brown & Gallo, LLC, 288 Ga. 294, 702 S.E.2d 894 (2010). Both the could-be-imposed language and its constitutional history support interpreting our constitution as giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction over life-imprisonment murder cases. Our homicide statute provides that a person convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, or by imprisonment for life. OCGA § 16-5-1(d) (2011). Under this law, murder is clearly a crime in which a defendant, upon conviction, can be punished by death as compared to other crimes, such as rape, where a sentence of death can never be imposed. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (holding death penalty for rape can no longer be imposed under the Eighth Amendment when the victim is not killed). Thus, direct appeals of murder convictions are subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under our State Constitution. Moreover, the constitutional history of the 1983 Constitution makes clear that the framers intended for the division of jurisdiction between the two appellate courts to remain unchanged, with this Court continuing to hear all appeals from murder convictions, whether a sentence of death or life imprisonment is imposed. Initial drafts of the Judicial Article provided that the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction in all cases imposing a sentence of death, thus giving the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals in life-imprisonment murder cases. See Select Committee on Constitutional Review, Committee to Revise Article VI, Transcripts of Meetings, Oct. 7, 1977, pp. 52-54. The Article VI Committee voted to amend this initial draft to give this Court jurisdiction in all cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed. Id. at 53. The rationale was that habeas corpus cases involving the death penalty should be treated in the same way as direct appeals in death penalty cases. While there were extended discussions about changing the structure of the appellate courts and restricting direct appeals to the Supreme Court, no committee members voiced any dissent to the proposition that the state's highest court should review cases in which the death penalty was imposed. See, e.g., Article VI Committee, Transcripts, Sept. 23, 1977, pp. 14, 62 (voting unanimously for the Supreme Court to retain direct appeals in cases where death penalty is imposed while recommending that its jurisdiction be primarily discretionary). The same unanimity did not apply to appeals in other cases, such as non-death penalty murder cases. The members of the Court of Appeals consistently opposed the provision to redistribute life-imprisonment murder cases to their court, but failed in their motion that all life-sentence murder cases go to the Supreme Court. See Article VI Committee, Transcripts, Oct. 3, 1980, pp. 91-94. The Article VI Committee's final draft recommended that the Supreme Court exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases in which a sentence of death was imposed. Id., Index, Proposed Draft (Oct. 28, 1980), p. 4. The Legislative Overview Committee, however, rejected the committee's recommendation. Select Committee on Constitutional Revision, Legislative Overview Committee, Transcript of Meetings, Aug. 7, 1981, p. 140. Instead, it substituted language from a draft proposed by House Speaker Tom Murphy that added could be imposed to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction in all murder cases in which a life sentence was imposed. Id. at 142. The intent was to leave the jurisdiction of the two appellate courts substantially as it is now, or exactly. Id. at 143. Both the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals agreed to leave the jurisdiction of their courts unchanged, as the following excerpt shows. Chief Justice Jordan: What we wanted to do, Mr. Speaker, and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is here, he and I tried to work it out so that the jurisdiction shall remain exactly as it is now. Chief Judge Quillian: Exactly. ... Speaker Murphy: I took their Number (1), Mr. Chief Justice, in all cases where the sentence of death was imposed, and I added or could be imposed.... Chief Justice Jordan: If the Overview Committee were to adopt the committee's report, then we would accept that.... Governor Busbee: Is there any objection in order to make it the same where we can expedite this just to take (1) of Paragraph II [on exclusive Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction] and make it Paragraph (8) in Paragraph III [on general appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court], and that's the existing law; isn't that right, Judge Quillian? Chief Judge Quillian: That's right. Chief Justice Jordan: I have no objection. Governor Busbee: Both the Chief Justice and the Chief Judge agree. Id. at 143-144. Subsequently, the General Assembly and voters approved the 1983 Constitution with the language that was intended to maintain the existing jurisdiction of the appellate courts. The primary argument against interpreting the could-be-imposed language to include all murder cases is our decision in State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524(1), 322 S.E.2d 711 (1984). In that case, the State appealed the grant of a motion to suppress in a murder case to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court. We concluded that the case was not a case in which a sentence of death could be imposed because the district attorney did not give timely notice that the State intended to seek the death penalty. Nevertheless, as a matter of policy, we determined that this Court should review all murder cases and adopted an order directing the Court of Appeals to transfer to the Supreme Court all cases in which either a sentence of death or of life imprisonment has been imposed upon conviction of murder, and all pre-conviction appeals in murder cases. Id. at 524, 322 S.E.2d 711. As has been pointed out, [f]or a case with such significant consequences, Thornton provides little reasoning for its holdings. State v. Murray, 286 Ga. 258, 264, 687 S.E.2d 790 (2009) (Nahmias, J., dissenting). Neither Thornton nor any subsequent opinion reviewed the could-be-imposed provision's constitutional history as set out in the transcripts of committee meetings related to Article VI. Since Thornton, the justices who have considered the interpretation of the same constitutional language have expressed different views on what it means. Compare Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, 741, 524 S.E.2d 452 (1999) (Benham, C.J., concurring specially) (the phrase `could be imposed'... speaks to the future and is applicable to those cases in which the possibility of the imposition of the death penalty still exists) with State v. Murray, 286 Ga. at 260, 687 S.E.2d 790 (Carley, P.J., concurring) (the language placing appellate jurisdiction in this Court over all cases in which a death sentence could be imposed may be broad enough to include appeals in all murder cases). Although the could-be-imposed language can be interpreted two ways, its constitutional history shows that the framers of the 1983 Constitution intended it to apply to all murder cases, whether the death penalty or life imprisonment was imposed. Relying on this intent, this Court should interpret our State Constitution as giving us jurisdiction over life-imprisonment murder convictions, thus making unnecessary the transfer order adopted in Thornton. Nevertheless, as Presiding Justice Carley has stated, the order has provided a practical, bright-line rule which continues to serve both Georgia appellate courts well. Murray, 286 Ga. at 260, 687 S.E.2d 790 (Carley, P.J., concurring). For these reasons, I would overrule Thornton and Rhyne v. State, 264 Ga. 176, 442 S.E.2d 742 (1994), to the extent they hold that the 1983 Constitution gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over direct appeals in life-imprisonment murder convictions. There are several good policy reasons for defining our jurisdiction more narrowly to limit the number of murder cases that come to this Court by direct appeal, as the discussion among the constitution's framers shows. See generally Article VI Committee, Transcripts, Sept. 23, 1977, pp. 7-71. Any efforts, however, to change our appellate jurisdiction in life-imprisonment murder cases under the 1983 Constitution should be directed to the legislature.