Opinion ID: 1057661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Informer's Privilege

Text: It is common knowledge that law enforcement officers rely frequently on information provided to them by persons working undercover. Sometimes, these persons are other law enforcement officers. Other times, they are lay persons who secretly gather information from and about their friends and neighbors regarding ongoing criminal activity. Maintaining secrecy about who is working undercover is crucial in order to (1) protect the informant from reprisals and (2) continue the flow of information. As recognized by one treatise, Whether an informer is motivated by good citizenship, promise of leniency or prospect of pecuniary reward, he will usually condition his cooperation on an assurance of anonymityto protect himself and his family from harm, to preclude adverse social reactions and to avoid the risk of defamation or malicious prosecution actions against him. The government also has an interest in nondisclosure of the identity of its informers. Law enforcement officers often depend upon professional informers to furnish them with a flow of information about criminal activities. Revelation of the dual role played by such persons ends their usefulness to the government and discourages others from entering into a like relationship. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374 at 762 (McNaughton rev.1961). The United States Supreme Court recognized many years ago that the prosecution may withhold the identity of a confidential informant from the defense: [2] What is usually referred to as the informer's privilege is in reality the Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law. The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) (citations omitted). This Court has also long recognized the informer's privilege. See, e.g., House, 44 S.W.3d at 512; Goines v. State, 572 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tenn.1978); Wallis v. State, 220 Tenn. 400, 417 S.W.2d 781, 784 (1967); Simmons v. State, 198 Tenn. 587, 281 S.W.2d 487, 492 (1955). Tennessee's courts have stressed the public policies served by the privilege: We recognize that the use of informants is a vital, and perhaps indispensable, part of society's defense against the ravages of the illicit traffic in drugs, and that forcing an undercover agent or informer to `blow his cover' is generally not in the public interest. Goines, 572 S.W.2d at 647; see also United States v. Lloyd, 400 F.2d 414, 415 (6th Cir.1968) (The privilege of the Government to withhold the identity of informers is especially important in the enforcement of narcotic laws.). And, as recognized by our Court of Criminal Appeals, This practically universal rule is predicated on public policy and seeks to encourage citizens to assist in crime detection and prevention by giving information to law enforcement officials without unduly exposing themselves to the danger inherent in such laudable activity and to make possible their continued usefulness in future disclosures that the revelation of their identity would probably hamper and prevent. Roberts v. State, 489 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tenn.Crim.App.1972). The privilege is not absolute, but is limited by its underlying purpose and by the fundamental requirements of fairness. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60, 77 S.Ct. 623. [3] Thus, while there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure, id. at 62, 77 S.Ct. 623, disclosure of the informant's identity must be made if relevant and helpful to the accused's defense, [4] or if essential to a fair determination of the prosecution, id. at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623; see also Goines, 572 S.W.2d at 647. For instance, disclosure is required when the informant (1) participated in the crime, (2) witnessed the crime, or (3) has knowledge which is favorable to the defendant. Vanderford, 980 S.W.2d at 397; see also House, 44 S.W.3d at 513 (acknowledging that Tennessee common law generally requires disclosure when the informant was a participant in the crime); State v. Campbell, 549 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tenn.1977) (holding that trial court erred in failing to order disclosure of informant's identity where informant participated in crime); Sharp, 778 F.2d at 1186 n. 2 (noting that disclosure has usually been required when ... the informer was an active participant in the events underlying the defendant's potential criminal liability). Stated succinctly, an informer's identity cannot be concealed from the defendant when it is critical to his case. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). When the informant was, however, a mere tipster or introducer, disclosure has usually been denied. Sharp, 778 F.2d at 1186 n. 2; see also United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1335 (1st Cir.1994) (Where the informant is a `mere tipster,' as opposed to an active participant in the offense charged, disclosure is required only in the exceptional case where it is vital to a fair trial.); People v. Langford, 191 Colo. 87, 550 P.2d 329, 331 (1976) (En Banc) (When all the evidence discloses that the informant was an informant and nothing more, the prosecution should not, as a general rule, be required to reveal his identity.). Similarly, disclosure of an informant's identity to a defendant for trial purposes is not required if the informant only provided information used to obtain a search warrant. See, e.g., Wells v. State, 509 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tenn.Crim.App.1973). A defendant seeking disclosure must establish by a preponderance of the evidence circumstances entitling him or her to the confidential informant's identity. Vanderford, 980 S.W.2d at 397. [5] Mere speculation ... is not sufficient to meet the heavy burden which rests on an accused to establish that the identity of an informant is necessary to his defense. United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066, 1070 (D.C.Cir.1971) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Gonzales, 606 F.2d 70, 75 (5th Cir.1979) (recognizing that mere conjecture or supposition about the possible relevancy of the informant's testimony is insufficient to warrant disclosure). The State is not required to divulge the identity of the informant if the defendant fails to establish the materiality of the confidential informant to his defense. Vanderford, 980 S.W.2d at 397. The trial court's decision whether to order the disclosure of a confidential informant calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62, 77 S.Ct. 623. [6] We agree with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that danger to the informant's life must be given significant weight in striking this balance. United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223, 1232 (6th Cir. 1991). We turn now to the application of these principles to this case and begin our analysis with an examination of the charges brought against Foxx and Ostein.