Opinion ID: 3002082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: James Ellis

Text: Ellis was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. At trial, the government played recorded telephone calls obtained through courtauthorized wire taps. The government introduced these tapes through Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Special Agent Michael Rehg. Agent Rehg testified as a fact witness regarding the investigation’s progress and events, and as an expert witness to assist the jury in understanding the coded drug language contained in the recorded conversations. Agent Rehg testified that he had been a DEA agent for eight years, and was a Deputy U.S. Marshal for nine years before that (three years of which he was assigned to the DEA). He further testified that he was the lead case agent in this case and that he had overseen the process of obtaining the court-authorized wire taps. Agent Rehg also stated that he had participated in hundreds of drug cases, he had listened to thousands of calls in this case, and his experience gave him knowledge of the meanings of certain coded drug language. 1 (...continued) court not thoroughly addressed these motions, Farmer would likely have a substantively different (and possibly more successful) argument on appeal. 6 Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 Ellis repeatedly objected to Agent Rehg’s testimony, claiming that Agent Rehg was not a qualified expert and that he was unfairly prejudiced by the district court’s decision to allow Agent Rehg to testify both as a fact and expert witness. The district court allowed Agent Rehg to testify in both capacities, but gave the jury cautionary instructions regarding expert testimony. The jury found Ellis guilty of the conspiracy charged, and the United States Probation Department prepared a PreSentence Report (PSR). The PSR determined that Ellis had a total offense level of thirty-eight and a criminal history category of IV, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment. This calculation included a two-level offense increase based on Ellis’s possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The evidence of Ellis’s possession of a firearm came from the proffer of a co-conspirator, Elvin Pawnell, who stated that he had been with Ellis and Farmer on fifteen to twenty occasions in 2005 when they were providing him with cocaine. Pawnell said that Ellis carried a .45-caliber handgun during these meetings; once, Ellis showed him the gun, and on other occasions, Pawnell saw the gun in Ellis’s waistband. Ellis filed written objections to the two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), arguing that his possession of a firearm had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The district court rejected Ellis’s argument and applied the two-level enhancement. The district court Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 7 subsequently sentenced Ellis to 288 months’ imprisonment, which was below his advisory Guidelines range. On appeal, Ellis contends that the district court erred in allowing Agent Rehg to testify as both a fact and expert witness. Specifically, Ellis claims that the district court failed to properly apply Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because it did not conduct a hearing to consider Agent Rehg’s qualifications. Ellis further argues that allowing Agent Rehg to testify in both capacities unfairly prejudiced him. In addition, Ellis argues that the district court improperly applied the two-level enhancement. We review the district court’s decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Goodwin, 496 F.3d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 2002)). Although Ellis appeals under Rule 702, neither Ellis nor the government specifically requested that the district court evaluate Agent Rehg’s qualifications as an expert under Rule 702. See United States v. Moore, 521 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that when neither party specifically asks the district court to engage in the analysis under Rule 702, the district court is not required to do so and does not err in admitting the testimony). Thus, the district court did not err by not inquiring further into Agent Rehg’s qualifications. Regardless, Agent Rehg was undoubtedly qualified. We have held that narcotics code words are an appropriate subject for expert testimony, and that law enforcement officers who have training and experience in drug-related transactions and crimes are qualified to testify as an 8 Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 expert concerning the practices of people engaged in that type of conduct. Goodwin, 496 F.3d at 641 n.2; United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 236 (7th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 654 (7th Cir. 2002). Agent Rehg’s experience included eight years as a DEA agent and nine years as a Deputy U.S. Marshal. He further testified that he had participated in hundreds of drugrelated cases prior to being the lead case agent in this case, that he had listened to thousands of calls involved in this case, and that the use of the narcotics code language was consistent with his understanding of the terms’ meanings. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Agent Rehg to testify as an expert on narcotics code words. So we turn to Ellis’s argument that the district court erred in allowing Agent Rehg to testify in dual capacities. Testimony in the dual roles of both a fact witness and an expert witness can be confusing to a jury, but it is permissible provided that the district court takes precautions to minimize potential prejudice. Goodwin, 496 F.3d at 641. “The potential for prejudice in this circumstance can be addressed by means of appropriate cautionary instructions and by examination of the witness that is structured in such a way as to make clear when the witness is testifying to facts and when he is offering his opinion as an expert.” Goodwin, 496 F.3d at 641-42 (quoting Mansoori, 304 F.3d at 654). At trial, the government played several recorded phone conversations for the jury. After some of the calls, the prosecutor asked Agent Rehg to give his opinion about the Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 9 meaning of various terms used in the calls. Agent Rehg also testified about facts he had obtained through the investigation that were related to the subjects discussed in the recorded calls. While this framework did little to separate out Agent Rehg’s fact testimony from his expert testimony, the district court did take other precautions to minimize any potential prejudice. The district court required the government to establish the proper foundation for Agent Rehg’s knowledge of the coded drug language prior to him testifying to those meanings. The government also prefaced Agent Rehg’s expert testimony by asking him the coded language’s meaning “based on [his] expertise.” 2 Furthermore, the district court gave the appropriate cautionary instruction regarding expert testimony, instructing the jury that it could judge that testimony the same way it judges fact witnesses’ testimony, and could “[g]ive the testimony whatever weight you think it deserves. . . .” The district court also allowed Ellis’s attorney to extensively cross-examine Agent Rehg about the coded drug terms used in the calls, his familiarity with other drug terms, and the factual aspects of his direct testimony. Ellis’s attorney critically questioned Agent Rehg about his expert opinion on the coded language, noting that according to him, “shoes,” “block,” and “chicken” were just a few of many commonly used words 2 We note, however, that the government did not preface each question that elicited Agent Rehg’s expert opinion in this way. Had they done so, the framework of Agent Rehg’s examination would have undoubtedly made clear to the jury the capacity of his testimony. 10 Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 that he claimed meant cocaine. This thorough crossexamination highlighted the parts of Agent Rehg’s testimony that were garnered from his expert opinion, which further clarified the testimonial capacities for the jury. In light of these safeguards, any risk that the jury could have confused Agent Rehg’s direct observations with his expert knowledge of the code words was adequately alleviated. See United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 75960 (7th Cir. 2005). Ellis also argues that the two-level enhancement was improper because: (1) the statements by Pawnell lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and should not have been admitted; and (2) the government failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Ellis possessed a firearm during the conspiracy. The government asserts that Ellis has waived these arguments, and we agree. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, while forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2005). Forfeiture warrants review for plain error only, but waiver precludes any appellate review. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 847. The paramount feature of waiver is a knowing and intentional decision not to assert the right. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848. For strategic reasons, a criminal defendant may elect to pursue one argument while foregoing another. Id. In that situation, the defendant waives the arguments he decided not to present. Id. (citing United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 2001)). Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 11 At the district court, Ellis filed a five-page written objection to the PSR, which included an objection to the enhancement for possessing a firearm. Ellis chose to limit his argument to whether the enhancement violated Blakely v. Washington, because the possession was not proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. He never challenged the reliability of Pawnell’s proffer before now, nor did Ellis ever elect to argue, until now, that the government failed to establish his possession of a firearm during the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence standard. To the contrary, Ellis implicitly asserted that the preponderance of the evidence standard deprived him of his right to a fair trial. See generally Blakely, 542 U.S. at 332-33. In any event, we find no plain error in the district court’s determination that Pawnell’s proffer was reliable and that it alone was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Ellis possessed a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, we affirm Ellis’s conviction and sentence.