Opinion ID: 786106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Returning Late from Lunch

Text: 69 Mr. Lucas next asserts that he and his partner Jose Quintana were singled out for written warnings for returning late from lunch when co-workers were returning at the same time or later and they were not written up. Appellant's Br. at 13. Mr. Lucas continues to explain that the evidence is that Francisco Garcia also returned late from lunch at the same time as Lucas 17 and Quintana but he was not written up by Escorcia. Id. Mr. Lucas concludes this argument by stating that the district court ignored this evidence of different, adverse treatment of African-Americans. Id. Even assuming these allegations are true, Mr. Lucas fails to meet his prima facie burden. First, Mr. Lucas failed to explain in his opening brief that he suffered a tangible employment action as a result of his tardiness. 18 Second, Mr. Lucas failed to demonstrate that he was singled out for discipline on the basis of his race. Mr. Lucas identifies three people who, he asserts, were similarly situated in returning late from lunch. Mr. Lucas is an African-American, Quintana, who was also disciplined, is a Hispanic, and the third person, a person not disciplined and allegedly given better treatment, was Francisco Garcia. We are not told whether Francisco Garcia is also a member of a protected class; this fact is apparently not in the record. 19 It was incumbent upon Mr. Lucas to demonstrate that other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated more favorably. See Peters, 307 F.3d at 546. All Mr. Lucas has demonstrated is that he and his Hispanic partner were both disciplined in a similar fashion and another individual of unknown race and ethnicity was not. Mr. Lucas, therefore, has not met his burden with respect to this element. 70 In his complaint, Mr. Lucas also alleged that his discipline for returning late from lunch was retaliation for filing his discrimination claim. R.1 ¶ 43. However, he does not forward this argument on appeal. Although this argument is subject to waiver principles, we also dismiss Mr. Lucas' retaliation argument for similar reasons as his discrimination claim. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under the indirect burden-shifting method, a plaintiff must demonstrate that after filing the charge only he, and not any similarly situated employee who did not file a charge, was subjected to an adverse employment action even though he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner. Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 879, 123 S.Ct. 79, 154 L.Ed.2d 134 (2002); see Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820, 123 S.Ct. 97, 154 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002). 20 Mr. Lucas admits that his partner, Quintana, who presumably did not file a discrimination complaint, also received similar discipline. Stone instructs, however, that the plaintiff has to demonstrate that he, and not any similarly situated employee who did not file a charge, was subjected to an adverse employment action. Stone, 281 F.3d at 644. Mr. Lucas did not satisfy the requirement set forth in Stone. Because Mr. Lucas waived his retaliation claim, and because he failed to meet the standards set forth in Stone to show that he was singled out for adverse employment action, his claim of retaliation was properly dismissed on summary judgment.