Opinion ID: 1312244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: escalona-naranjo's section 974.06 motion was properly dismissed

Text: Escalona-Naranjo argues that neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals directly addressed any claim that trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of certain evidence or testimony at trial resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, he contends that the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the sec. 974.06 motion should not be precluded because it is being raised now for the first time and is a distinct issue from those previously considered. In his sec. 974.02 motion for postconviction relief, requesting a new trial, Escalona-Naranjo alleged that he was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial, in part, for the following reasons: (1) The court improperly admitted testimony regarding a search warrant, which evidence was overly prejudicial to the defendant and consisted of impermissible hearsay; (2) The court improperly permitted substantial inadmissible hearsay to be used against the defendant; (3) The court permitted the introduction of substantial evidence of other crimes which were not relevant and which were prejudicial to the defendant; (4) The court improperly admitted the testimony of police officers regarding matters beyond their competence; and (5) The court improperly permitted the introduction of extrinsic evidence of the credibility of a confidential informant, in violation of sec. 906.08(2), Stats. However, in the circuit court's memorandum decision and order, these challenges were directly addressed. In each case, the court noted that either (a) the defendant failed to show that evidence was improperly admitted or (b) no objection was made at trial to the introduction of certain testimony or evidence. The court concluded that the failure to raise a timely objection operated as a waiver of any future challenge to the evidence. Additionally, it must be noted that two companion postconviction motions were filed on the same day as the motion for a new trial. Those motions called for a competency redetermination or, in the alternative, resentencing. In each of those motions, Escalona-Naranjo specifically alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his competency hearing and his sentencing but never alleged ineffective assistance of his trial attorney. [10] Escalona-Naranjo argues that any failure to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in his sec. 974.02 motion for a new trial or on direct appeal does not constitute a waiver, because the issue is one of constitutional dimension. Escalona-Naranjo looks to this court's decision in Bergenthal v. State, 72 Wis.2d 740, 242 N.W.2d 199 (1976), as controlling. During his trial for first-degree murder, Bergenthal requested an in camera inspection of materials possessed by the state, which he claimed were exculpatory. Upon review, the circuit court concluded the materials were not exculpatory and had them sealed in a brown envelope for subsequent appeal purposes. Id. at 746. During postverdict motions, Bergenthal raised 100 claims of error and, for a second time, challenged the failure of the court to disclose the contents of the envelope. On appeal, 99 claims of error were raised, but not the circuit court's failure to disclose the contents of the envelope. Id. at 745-46. Though the court's ruling on the exculpatory nature of the materials in the envelope was not challenged on direct appeal, the materials themselves were not transferred to this court for review when direct appeal was taken. Id. at 746. After this court affirmed Bergenthal's conviction, he challenged the denial of access to the allegedly exculpatory materials in a sec. 974.06 motion. The circuit court denied the motion, stating that the issue had been disposed of on direct appeal and that, therefore, the motion could not be used as a vehicle for a second appeal on grounds already reviewed. Id. at 745. This court disagreed and stated that [e]ven though the issue might properly have been raised on appeal, it presents an issue of significant constitutional proportions and, therefore, must be considered in this motion for postconviction relief. Id. at 748. We now overrule the holding in Bergenthal which stated that although a defendant fails to raise a constitutional issue on appeal, the issue still must be considered when raised in a subsequent sec. 974.06 motion. The plain language of subsection (4) clearly provides when a sec. 974.06 motion is appropriate. First, all grounds for relief under sec. 974.06 must be raised in a petitioner's original, supplemental, or amended motion. Contrary to statements by the dissent, there is no legislative history which restricts original, supplemental or amended motion to a motion brought solely under sec. 974.06. Further, such a conclusion could not be reached even if we were to look of the drafting language of section 8 of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Second, if the defendant's grounds for relief have been finally adjudicated, waived or not raised in a prior postconviction motion, they may not become the basis for a sec. 974.06 motion. The language of subsection (4) does not exempt a constitutional issue from this limitation, unless the court ascertains that a sufficient reason exists for either the failure to allege or to adequately raise the issue in the original, supplemental or amended motion. [11] Even if the Bergenthal court was aware, as the dissent asserts, [12] that the origin of subsection (4) was distinct from the rest of sec. 974.06, it failed to properly address the fact that it was designed as a means to compel a prisoner to consolidate all grounds for relief, including constitutional grounds, in his or her original, supplemental or amended motion. [13] Additionally, the Bergenthal decision appears to rely on Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 502, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974), wherein this court stated: Issues of constitutional dimension can be raised on direct appeal and can also be raised on 974.06 motions. We note, however, that although the defendant in Loop filed a sec. 974.06 motion requesting a new trial, he had not previously filed a sec. 974.02 motion or pursued a direct appeal. As a result, no ground for relief had been either raised or finally adjudicated in an earlier postconviction motion or appeal. In Loop, this court simply held that where a direct appeal is not taken, a defendant is [not] foreclosed from raising an alleged error of constitutional dimension in a sec. 974.06 motion . . .. Id. at 502. In contrast, Bergenthal did appeal, raising 99 claims of error but not challenging the circuit court's ruling on the allegedly exculpatory materials in the sealed envelope. By failing to properly apply sec. 974.06(4), the Bergenthal court allowed the defendant to raise that one remaining issue in a sec. 974.06 motion. As applied in the instant case, subsection (4) clearly does not preclude Escalona-Naranjo from raising, even at this time, an issue of constitutional dimension which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in his original, supplemental or amended postconviction motions. However, Escalona-Naranjo raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in two of his sec. 974.02 motions. At the same time, he already knew that his trial attorney had failed to object to what he believed to be inadmissible evidence. He chose not to make that allegation in those motions and has not alleged any sufficient reason why a court should now entertain that same claim in a sec. 974.06 motion. The dissent criticizes this decision because it treats direct appeals and motions under sec. 974.06 identically in interpreting sec. 974.06(4). They are not to be treated the same for purposes of sec. 974.06(4). Dissenting op. at 190.However, the dissent cites no authority for that proposition. The plain language of sec.974.06(4) states that [a]ny ground...not so raised ... in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent motion . . .. (Emphasis added.) Again, nowhere in the statute is it stated that a sec. 974.06 motion should be treated differently from a direct appeal of a sec. 974.02 motion. We need finality in our litigation. Section 974.06(4) compels a prisoner to raise all grounds regarding postconviction relief in his or her original, supplemental or amended motion. Successive motions and appeals, which all could have been brought at the same time, run counter to the design and purpose of the legislation. Contrary to the assertion of the dissent, we are not foregoing fairness for finality nor do we abdicate our responsibility to protect federal constitutional rights. We simply apply the plain language of subsection (4) which requires a sufficient reason to raise a contitiutional issue in a sec. 974.06 motion that could have been raised on direct appeal or in a sec. 974.02 motion. The dissent fails to explain why it is now unfair to tell Escalona-Naranjo, or other criminal defendants and their attorneys, that constitutional claims which could have been raised on direct appeal or in a sec. 974.02 motion cannot later be the basis for a sec. 974.06 motion. Section 974.06(4) was not designed so that a defendant, upon conviction, could raise some constitutional issues on appeal and strategically wait to raise other constitutional issues a few years later. Rather, the defendant should raise the constitutional issues of which he or she is aware as part of the original postconviction proceedings. At that point, everyone's memory is still fresh, the witnesses and records are usually still available, and any remedy the defendant is entitled to can be expeditiously awarded. [3] In its motion to dismiss Escalona-Naranjo's sec. 974.06 motion, the state's written argument to the circuit court began: When are these cases ever completed? It appears that as long as some lawyer can come up with a new theory the appeals continue. During the process of filing a series of sec. 974.02 postconviction motions in 1986, Escalona-Naranjo had available to him a complete record of the trial and postverdict proceedings. He claimed ineffective assistance of the counsel who handled the competency and sentencing hearings but chose not to raise that same issue with respect to his trial attorney. We conclude that he has not alleged a sufficient reason as to why his allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel could not have been raised when he filed his sec. 974.02 motion for a new trial. The circuit court properly dismissed his motion. By the Court. The order of the circuit court is affirmed. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). For 18 years applications for post-conviction relief under sec. 974.06, Stats. 1991-92, have been filed, litigated, and decided according to the precepts of Bergenthal v. State, 72 Wis. 2d 740, 242 N.W.2d 199 (1976). Today the majority overrules Bergenthal. The majority is able to justify its abandonment of precedent only by misconstruing the statute, by making it appear that the Bergenthal case was erroneously decided. On the contrary, Bergenthal was then and is now sound law. The majority overrules Bergenthal for three reasons: 1) the Bergenthal court's alleged failure to interpret sec. 974.06(4) correctly and to appreciate the origins of sec. 974.06(4); 2) the Bergenthal court's supposed misreading of Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974); and 3) Bergenthal's alleged inconsistency with the goal of finality. None of these reasons for overturning an 18-year-old precedent withstands scrutiny. The majority fails to weigh the value of fairness against the goal of finality and abdicates its responsibility to protect federal constitutional rights.