Opinion ID: 2494734
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and whether the circuit court erred when it denied Sanders's Motion for a New Trial.

Text: ¶ 18. Sanders contends that his conviction on Count II, the murder of his grandmother, was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. When this Court is asked to review the denial of a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. [2] Sitting as a thirteenth juror, we will disturb a verdict only when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. [3] The motion, however, is addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. [4] Sanders does not dispute his role in killing his grandparents, but, rather, the finding that he was legally sane when he did so. In insanity defense cases, perhaps more than any other, a jury's verdict ought to be given great respect and deference. [5] ¶ 19. The Court of Appeals did not find merit in this assignment of error. [6] First, the Court of Appeals addressed the unusual circumstances of these seemingly inconsistent verdicts and the jury's asking whether Sanders could walk as a free man were he acquitted on the basis of insanity. [7] On the matter of inconsistent verdicts, the Court of Appeals said, the fact that the defendant `was found not guilty by reason of insanity should not have an effect on this Court's analysis of inconsistent verdicts.' [8] The Court also noted the United States Supreme Court's precedent in United States v. Powell for the proposition that [c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment. [9] And the record reveals that the jury acted within its purview despite the apparent inconsistent result, as the jury was presented with count-specific options regarding the form of the verdict and was allowed to choose one form for Count I and another for Count II. On the matter of the question from the jury, Sanders hints that the question is indicative of jury prejudice or bias. A jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court. [10] The jury was properly instructed on the method for determining legal sanity. Sanders did not cite any authority for his assertion that the jury's note clearly evinces that the jury chose to convict Sanders . . . in order to ensure that he would never `be able to walk as a free man.' Sanders, and our colleagues in the dissent, have engaged here in mere speculation, which we will avoid. ¶ 20. In sum, the Court of Appeals said, [w]hen analyzing the weight of the evidence that supports a jury's verdict, we are simply prohibited from considering, in any way, what the jury did on another count. It is irrelevant and immaterial. It is as if it never happened. [11] We agree with the well-reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeals on this point. We will not consider the jury's deliberation or its conclusions on another count of the indictment, because doing so would be speculative and unreliable. Like the Court of Appeals, we will examine the evidence presented at trial, as we would do in any other case in which the issue of weight has been raised. ¶ 21. We are asked to determine whether the jury's determination that Sanders was legally sane was against the weight of the evidence. Mississippi follows the M'Naghten [12] Rule for determining legal sanity. Under the M'Naghten Rule, a defendant may not be held criminally liable for his actions at the time of the alleged crime if he was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind that either (a) he did not understand the nature and quality of his act, or (b) if he did understand the nature and quality of his act, he did not appreciate that the act was wrong. [13] In applying this rule, the accused is presumed sane; and therefore, the burden is initially on the defendant to introduce evidence creating a reasonable doubt of his sanity. [14] However, once the defendant has overcome this initial burden, it is the State's burden to present sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. [15] Though expert opinions frequently are used in cases in which the defendant claims insanity, expert opinions of psychiatrists are not conclusive upon the issue of insanity, which is, rather, a question to be resolved by the jury. [16] ¶ 22. All three experts testified that they believed Sanders to have understood the nature and quality of his acts at the time. There is no indication in the record anywhere that Sanders did not understand that he was killing another human being. The only question is whether the evidence preponderates heavily against the jury's necessary determination that Sanders knew that the killing of his grandmother was wrong. On this point, there was conflicting evidence. ¶ 23. Dr. John McCoy, who treated Sanders at Mid-South, testified that Sanders was the most mentally-ill patient at the hospital and that he thought Sanders did not know right from wrong when he killed the Crawfords. Dr. Mark Webb testified that Sanders's paranoia had prevented him from understanding that his actions were wrong. ¶ 24. On the other hand, Dr. McCoy testified that Sanders had admitted that he was not hallucinating when he killed his grandmother. Dr. William Lott testified that, despite the fact that Sanders had not been medicated for schizophrenia for years, Sanders did not appear to be psychotic when Lott interviewed him in 2007. Dr. Lott further testified that symptoms of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder can wax and wane, so diagnosed persons have periods of lucidity and know right from wrong. Further, the dying-declaration testimony of Elma was that her grandson had walked upstairs to her bedroom after killing her husband, had shot her, and then had hid the phone before leaving with the shotgun. Sanders then had eluded police for nearly twenty years. These facts and evidence suggest Sanders knew his conduct was wrong. ¶ 25. In Laney, the defendant, who had shot a uniformed police officer, offered an expert witness who testified that he did not know that the killing was wrong at the time. [17] And the record was uncontradicted that Laney was a diagnosed schizophrenic and allegedly believed that God had instructed him to shoot the officer. [18] The expert witness testified, however, that he thought that the defendant knew that shooting a uniformed police officer was against the law and would meet with the disapproval of society. [19] We would not reverse Laney's conviction, even though, according to testimony, he knew that killing a man was wrong legally, but he felt if God commanded him to do this, that it was right. [20] It has long been our law that [a] man is not to be excused from responsibility, if he has . . . knowledge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and criminal, and will subject him to punishment. [21] ¶ 26. In Yarbrough v. State , we said that the issue of insanity is for the jury to determine, and that we must abide by its verdict. [22] There, we affirmed the conviction and life sentence of a fifteen-year-old with a history of mental illness who had stabbed a classmate at school. And in Hunter v. State , where three experts testified that the defendant had believed his victim to be the devil's wife, we declined to disturb the jury's finding of legal sanity, saying, [i]n the context of M'Naghten  given the fact that there is testimony on both sides of the issuea jury's verdict on the insanity issue is essentially conclusive and unreviewable. [23] ¶ 27. Sanders cites Hawthorne v. State [24] as an example in which we have reversed a jury determination of legal sanity. There, however, the appellant was able to produce eyewitnesses, who described his bizarre behavior contemporaneous with his crime, and the State produced no expert witness, while the defense produced several. [25] Even the State acknowledged in Hawthorne the record held little evidence to show that the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong. [26] In this case, there was ample, credible evidence on both sides of the M'Naghten issue from which the jury made a decision. ¶ 28. Despite the expert testimony of Drs. McCoy and Webb and Sanders's history of mental illness, there is reasonable evidence to conclude that Elma was slain in an effort to avoid responsibility for the death of W.D. and not in a paranoid delusion. Only after arguing with and killing his grandfather did Sanders proceed upstairs and shoot his grandmother. Then he pulled the phone from the wall and hid it under a sofa before fleeing the scene. Just because a person is schizophrenic does not mean that person is M'Naghten insane. [27] And, while no evidence of the circumstances surrounding this tragedy suggests that Sanders was in a paranoid delusional state of mind on the morning of these killings, his calculated flight and evasion of authorities immediately thereafter show deliberation and a guilty conscience. ¶ 29. In the past we have said that the subjective aspects of sanity or insanity present difficult problems. [28] This is especially true where, as here, the defendant has a documented history of mental illness. However, the jury weighed the conflicting testimony of experts and Sanders's history of mental illness against his seemingly calculated flight. After being properly instructed regarding the burden of proving whether or not Sanders was legally sane, the jury found him guilty. To do so, the jury necessarily had to make a judgment concerning one of the most difficult questions of factlegal sanitywith which a jury may be presented. We are in no position to make a better judgment than the jurors, so we cannot say that Sanders's conviction was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. This issue is without merit.