Opinion ID: 1427690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gale's Motion for Summaries of Expected State Expert Witness Testimony

Text: Gale begins this argument by again admitting he has no general federal or state constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case and that no statute or rule of this court entitles him to discovery. We agree with his analysis to that point. See Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559-60, 97 S.Ct. at 845-46, 51 L.Ed.2d at 42; Hubbard, 618 P.2d at 554-55. See also W.R.Cr.P. 18(c) (defendant has a right to the statement of a state witness after testimony is given). Instead, he relies on the idea that a trial court possesses some degree of inherent due process authority to grant a specific discovery request in a criminal case to insure fairness. Gale builds on this general conclusion by referencing American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, by citing a federal case involving civil discovery, and by citing this court's holdings in Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103, 104-05 (Wyo. 1983), and Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 1982) for the proposition that when a prosecution utilizes scientific or quasi-scientific methods which may impact upon the assessment of credibility at trial, it is important to insure that the defense has adequate pretrial opportunity to prepare to confront the evidence at trial. This may require pretrial discovery that goes beyond the generally applicable rules of procedure. We do not necessarily disagree with Gale that the trial court does have a certain degree of due process discretion to grant exceptional criminal discovery requests to insure fairness. However, his assertion that under the facts of this case the trial court abused that type of discretion by denying him summaries of prospective testimony from state expert witnesses lacks authority. The American Bar Association Standards and the federal civil discovery case referenced by Gale are inapposite in this fact situation and of no consequence. As for Gee and Chapman, while those cases might stand for the above proposition when the case involves enhancing witness testimony through hypnosis, that specific application of due process does not automatically extend every discovery request by a criminal defendant beyond the bounds of W.R.Cr.P. 18. The issue here is whether Gale received a fair trial. Under this issue Gale has to prove that by denying his motion for the summaries of potential state expert witness testimony, the trial court rendered this trial unfair and abused its discretion. In Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986), this court defined judicial discretion as a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Under this standard, Gale's challenge must be considered in light of evidence in the record indicating: (1) Gale was notified that the state would call certain expert witnesses at trial and that Gale has not alleged he was denied the opportunity to interview those individuals; (2) Gale was allowed to cross-examine extensively the state's expert witness at trial; and (3) Gale also offered substantial testimony of his own expert witness in rebuttal. Against this backdrop, we have difficulty understanding Gale's claim that he was denied a fair trial in this regard or how the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Gale's motion to compel the production of summaries of the testimony potential state expert witnesses might give at trial. Applying the Martin definition of abuse of discretion, we conclude Gale has shown no abuse of discretion under this issue.