Opinion ID: 66016
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Meriwether’s Case

Text: As noted earlier, on direct appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals expressly rejected Meriwether’s claim that he had not voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to counsel. Meriwether v. State, No. A01A2134, at 3 (Ga. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2001) (unpublished). In affirming Meriwether’s convictions, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that where a defendant lacks good reason for discharging appointed counsel, the trial court does not err in requiring a defendant to choose between representing himself or proceeding with appointed counsel. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals also determined that Meriwether was attempting to use his discharge of appointed counsel Rasnick and employment of other counsel as a dilatory tactic and that the trial court did not err in requiring Meriwether to proceed to trial pro se (with Rasnick as standby counsel) because of Meriwether’s voluntary 33 and knowing waiver of appointed counsel. Id. Our § 2254 review of the Georgia Court of Appeals’ decision is “highly deferential” to the state court’s decision. Marquard v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 429 F.3d 1278, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005); Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002); Wright v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2002). We may not grant federal habeas relief on Meriwether’s right-tocounsel claim, which was clearly adjudicated on the merits in the state court, unless that state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).6
The first issue is whether Meriwether has shown under § 2254(d)(1) that the Georgia Court of Appeals’ decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The phrase “clearly established federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) refers to the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the relevant 6 Because Meriwether filed his petition after the effective date of AEDPA, this case is governed by § 2254, as modified by AEDPA. 34 state court decision, which was 2001 in Meriwether’s case. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2003). Meriwether appears to argue the Georgia Court of Appeals’ decision was an unreasonable application of the clearly established federal law in Faretta because he never affirmatively asked to proceed pro se. Meriwether has not satisfied the standard in § 2254(d)(1) as to that issue. First, as noted in our recent en banc decisions, there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent addressing whether a waiver of counsel occurs when a defendant rejects his appointed counsel without good cause (much less as here, appointed counsel whom the state court noted was highly qualified and had prepared to proceed to trial). See Garey, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 3850284, at  (“The Supreme Court has never confronted a case in which an uncooperative defendant has refused to accept appointed counsel or engage in a colloquy with the court.”); Jones, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 3853313, at  (“Jones cannot meet the requirement of § 2254(d)(1) because the Supreme Court has never confronted a Sixth Amendment challenge involving a defendant who rejects his appointed counsel without good cause.”).7 7 Because clearly established federal law is not the law of the lower federal courts, including this Court, the Garey and Jones en banc decisions do not constitute clearly established federal law for purposes of § 2254(d). See Shere v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., __ F.3d __, No. 07-13768, 2008 WL 3066738, at  (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2008) (stating that “our review is limited to examining whether the highest state court’s resolution of a petitioner's claim is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court” and thus an Eleventh Circuit case “cannot form the basis of habeas relief under 35 Second, the en banc Garey Court already rejected the argument, which Meriwether now makes, that the right to counsel could be validly waived under federal law only in the Faretta context of an affirmative waiver by a defendant because “it forces judges to ignore words, actions, and circumstances relevant to the Sixth Amendment inquiry.” Garey, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 3850284, at . Thus, Garey recognized that a voluntary waiver of the right to counsel validly occurs beyond the context in Faretta when an uncooperative defendant rejects the only counsel to which he is constitutionally entitled. Id. That is what happened here. Meriwether waited until the day of trial to complain to the trial court about his appointed counsel. The trial court told Meriwether he had a fine lawyer representing him and explained to Meriwether his two options: proceed either with Rasnick as counsel or pro se. Like Garey and Jones, Meriwether never affirmatively requested to represent himself, but he rejected his appointed counsel without cause and thereby voluntarily waived his right to counsel through his conduct, the same as if he had affirmatively requested to represent himself. See Garey, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 3850284, at ; Jones, __ AEDPA”); Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). However, Jones and Garey are precedent as to what Supreme Court law is regarding waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and thus aid our analysis of whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent. See Phoenix v. Matesanz, 233 F.3d 77, 83 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Although decisions issuing from this Court are not ‘clearly established’ for the purposes of § 2254(d)(1) because they do not issue from the Supreme Court, they provide significant insight on what constitutes reasonableness for a particular fact pattern.”). 36 F.3d __, 2008 WL 3853313, at . Thus, for all these reasons, Meriwether has not shown under § 2254(d)(1) that the state courts’ determination that he validly waived his right to counsel was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law.
Even if Meriwether’s rejection of his appointed counsel constituted a voluntary waiver of counsel, Meriwether also argues that the record contains no evidence that Meriwether knew of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation and thus the Georgia Court of Appeals unreasonably determined that his waiver of counsel was knowing. Although Meriwether casts this as a § 2254(d)(1) claim, the substance of his claim is that there is no evidence in the record to support the Georgia Court of Appeals’ determination that Meriwether’s waiver was in fact knowing, which is more akin to a § 2254(d)(2) claim.8 8 The state court’s decision in this case, brief as it may be, is an adjudication on the merits to which we must give deference. See, e.g., Wright v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that nothing in the text of § 2254(d)(2) “requires the state court adjudication that has resulted in a decision to be accompanied by an opinion that explains the state court’s rationale”). Furthermore, the state court’s “dispositive ruling may contain implicit findings, which, though unstated, are necessary to that ruling,” Hightower v. Terry, 459 F.3d 1067, 1072 n.9 (11th Cir. 2006), and such findings are entitled to the same deference under § 2254(d) as explicit findings, see Hodges v. Att’y Gen., State of Fla., 506 F.3d 1337, 1347 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. May 28, 2008) (No. 07-11218). Here, the state court determined Meriwether’s waiver was voluntary and knowing. Implicit in that determination was a finding that Meriwether had sufficient knowledge and experience to make a knowing waiver. Thus, we address Meriwether’s claim that he did not have sufficient knowledge or understanding to waive counsel validly. 37 Meriwether’s argument fails for multiple reasons. First, the absence of record evidence of Faretta warnings by the trial court is “not conclusive proof that a defendant’s waiver of counsel was unknowingly made.” Jones, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 3853313, at . The en banc Court in Jones expressly rejected the argument that a defendant’s right to counsel can be knowingly waived only if the trial court itself gives Faretta warnings on the record. Rather, as Jones explained, the “ultimate test of whether a defendant’s choice is knowing is not the adequacy of the trial court’s warning but the defendant’s understanding.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The test for a knowing waiver is the defendant’s understanding and his knowing the risks associated with selfrepresentation, whether from “the trial court, a conversation with his counsel, or his own research or experience.” Id. Second, while the trial court here did not use the phrase “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” per se, the trial court did at length encourage Meriwether to use Rasnick as his counsel and explained to Meriwether in detail all the parts of the trial and what Meriwether pro se would be required to do during the trial. Moreover, the trial court had Rasnick remain as standby counsel throughout the entire trial. Third, the record shows that Meriwether was twenty-eight years old at the 38 time of trial and had a high school education. The record also indicated that Meriwether had a prior conviction for aggravated assault,9 which shows Meriwether had previous involvement with the criminal justice system. Further, the fact that Meriwether threatened to file a complaint with the State Bar association about Rasnick and knew to contact the State Bar to ask whether he could discharge his appointed counsel demonstrates he had some knowledge of the legal system. In addition, Meriwether’s competency in representing himself at trial provides strong evidence that he had some knowledge of the legal system and what self-representation required. At trial, Meriwether questioned his own witnesses and cross-examined the State’s witnesses. He objected to the State’s efforts to admit hearsay testimony from an unavailable witness. At the end of trial, he successfully moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on three counts in the indictment and later he moved for a mistrial and filed several post-judgment motions for relief. The trial court even commented after the first day of trial that Meriwether was “fairly smart” and was “handling [himself] pretty well in the courtroom.” Thus, the state court record supports the state courts’ knowing determination. 9 At trial, the State told the court that Meriwether had a prior conviction for aggravated assault. This is the same offense referenced in Rasnick’s September 13, 1999 letter to Meriwether, which advised him that the State was going to use a 1990 prior felony conviction for shooting another person against him. 39 Fourth, and most importantly, this is a § 2254 case, not a direct appeal, and Meriwether had the burden to show his waiver was not knowing, as found by the Georgia Court of Appeals. Yet, Meriwether testified extensively at the November 13, 2000 post-judgment motions hearing and failed to testify as to what he knew or did not know about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at the time he rejected Rasnick as appointed counsel and waived his right to counsel. Instead, he contends only that the record does not show the trial court adequately advised him of the dangers of proceeding without counsel.10 Thus, in light of the lack of testimony by Meriwether as to his knowledge at the time of waiver combined with the significant evidence supporting the state court’s determination that Meriwether’s waiver was knowing, we conclude that the 10 Meriwether argued for the first time in his state and federal habeas proceedings that he was not aware of all charges or penalties he faced until trial when he received the State’s discovery packet. However, Meriwether’s right-to-counsel claim already was decided in the state direct appeal, and Meriwether did not argue in his brief on direct appeal in state court that his waiver of counsel was not knowing for these reasons. Thus, Meriwether did not exhaust that claim in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). In fact, as already noted in the procedural history, the state habeas court itself held that Meriwether’s right-to-counsel claim was litigated adversely to him on direct appeal and could not be relitigated in the state habeas proceedings. In any event, the record contains some evidence that Meriwether was aware of the serious nature of the charges against him and that he faced a serious penalty, such as: (1) a document dated August 18, 1999–the date Meriwether was released on bond–that is signed by Meriwether and lists six of the eight charges against him (the kidnapping, battery, and four aggravated assault charges); (2) Rasnick’s September 13, 1999 letter advising Meriwether to accept a plea bargain because there was “no way to win” his case and Meriwether probably would be convicted and receive a life sentence; and (3) Rasnick’s September 17, 1999 letter advising Meriwether this was a “serious matter.” See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1066 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1986). 40 Georgia Court of Appeals’ decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.11