Opinion ID: 1862032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Factor Number Four

Text: ¶ 68. The circuit court determined that the Hearing Examiner stacked the deck against Freeman by not allowing her a de novo review. The Commission argues that the hearing was a trial anew, except for the agent's findings. ¶ 69. CDS supports this conclusion by the Commission and argues that Freeman was in fact given a de novo review, because the Hearing Examiner judged the demeanor and credibility of all of the witnesses and exhibits and determined that the substantial weight of the evidence supported a finding that Freeman did not win the progressive jackpot. See Pearson v. Parsons, 541 So.2d 447 (Miss.1989). In Pearson, this Court said that [i]t is a trial de novo when new and additional evidence is received by the Tribunal in addition to the proceedings below and when the executive committee's findings are not considered as conclusive. Id. at 453. CDS argues that the record indicates that the Hearing Officer heard sixteen hours of testimony from eleven witnesses and reviewed sixteen exhibits. He did allow Freeman every opportunity to put on her case, and did not simply make his determination based only on the Commission agent's report. ¶ 70. Freeman asserts that the circuit court was correct in holding that the Hearing Examiner in effect acted as an appellate court when it said that [t]he burden in this case is upon the Appellant, Ms. Freeman, to establish that the decision of the enforcement agent is not supported by substantial evidence. Clearly, the circuit court is correct that the Hearing Examiner misstated the standard of review. Miss.Code Ann. § 75-76-161 outlines the procedure for reconsideration of the executive director's decision (in this case in the form of the agent's findings). The section fails to specifically state whether the standard of review is de novo or otherwise. See Miss.Code Ann. § 75-76-161 (1991). ¶ 71. However, de novo review is the most likely and fair standard, because this hearing is the first chance for the petitioner to present her formal case to the Commission. Furthermore, Miss.Code Ann. § 75-76-163(2) states that after the hearing, the Hearing Examiner may sustain, modify, or reverse the previous decision, and it specifically requires the Hearing Examiner's decision to be in writing and to include a finding of fact. This type of statutory authority is synonymous with de novo review. Thus, Freeman's burden should have been stated by the Hearing Examiner as a preponderance of the evidence instead. ¶ 72. Despite the Hearing Examiner's misstatement of the standard of review at the reconsideration hearing, he found that the substantial weight of the evidence favors the decision of the enforcement agent. Coupled with the extensive testimony and presentation of evidence, the Hearing Examiner's findings of fact should not be overturned for the harmless error of misstating the standard of review. ¶ 73. CDS and the Commission assert that the opportunity that a patron has to request a hearing and to put on witnesses and evidence before a trier of fact meets the requirements of due process. In Booth v. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 588 So.2d 422 (Miss.1991), this Court stated the due process required in administrative settings, as follows: [A]n administrative board must afford minimum procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under Art. 3, § 14 of the Mississippi Constitution consisting of (1) notice and (2) opportunity to be heard. State Oil & Gas Board v. McGowan, (542 So.2d 244) at 248 ((Miss. 1989)); citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Id. at 428. ¶ 74. The circuit court cited Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), where the Supreme Court found that an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of disability benefits was not required. In so finding, it stated that [t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 902, 47 L.Ed.2d at 33. This Court accepted Mathews in Natural Father v. United Methodist Children's Home, 418 So.2d 807, 810 (Miss.1982). ¶ 75. Freeman was given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in an appropriate manner at the reconsideration hearing. Therefore, we hold that circuit court is reversed and the decision of the Commission reinstated, because the requirements of due process have been satisfied. ¶ 76. However, we note that there are many procedural errors and several coincidences here that are at least suspicious. First, this dispute would have much more easily been resolved if Splash or CDS had properly notified the Commission in accord with the statute. Furthermore, we take this opportunity to stress to the Commission the importance for strictly enforcing the above-cited casino patron dispute statutes in the future to protect patrons. ¶ 77. Second, the video tape exhibits in this case failed to record the alleged winning play of Freeman. Apparently the mere coincidence of a routine tape change at 5:00 p.m. was to blame. Every six hours the tapes are changed and a regularly scheduled change occurred at exactly 5:00 p.m. Other routine tape changes for the surveillance videos occur at 11:00 p.m., 5:00 a.m., and 11:00 a.m. A back-up system would have prevented this mishap. Because the integrity of the gaming industry is at stake in these types of cases, the Legislature and the Commission should consider amending the statutes or mandating further internal regulations to protect patrons including, but not limited to, the following: (1) requiring casinos to lock down (remove from further play) a slot machine which is involved in a casino patron dispute until such time as a Commission agent can investigate; and (2) requiring casinos to immediately notify the Commission and to inform patrons of their rights any time any type of dispute is had with a patron regardless of whether it appears the patron has been satisfied. ¶ 78. In spite of believing Freeman was satisfied, here Jernigan stated that she was concerned about Freeman's friends influencing her at a later time to claim that she had won the jackpot, and that was her reason for requiring the written report from Garner and saving the videotapes. We cannot stress enough that patrons are at the mercy of gaming system and the law, and the judicial system is their only current safeguard.