Opinion ID: 1451183
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactive Modification of Child Support

Text: Billy argues that the master and the superior court erred in assessing child support against him for the period of September 1991 through March 1992. He contends that under the court order in effect during that period, Deborah owed him child support. Billy argues that the assessment of child support against him is therefore an impermissible retroactive modification of child support, and that he owes no support for the period preceding Deborah's motion to modify. Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2) [4] prohibits retroactive modification of child support arrearages. The Commentary to Civil Rule 90.3 provides in pertinent part: X. MODIFICATION .... The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, P.L. 99-509, Section 9103(a) (the Bradley Amendment), [5] prohibits retroactive modification of child support arrearages. Rule 90.3(g)(2) [sic] is intended to restate this prohibition, including the exception allowed by federal law for modification during the pendency of a modification motion. The prohibition against retroactive modification limits both requested decreases and increases in child support. See Prohibition of Retroactive Modification of Child Support Arrearages, 54 Fed.Reg. 15,763 (1989). Thus, either the custodial or the obligor parent should promptly apply for a modification of child support when a material change in circumstances occurs. (Emphasis added). Since a supported child's change in residency constitutes a material change in circumstances, the Commentary language suggests that the burden is on the parents to promptly apply for modification in this case. Deborah argues that the requirement to apply for a modification of support should be waived in her case because of the self-executing modification agreement incorporated into the decree of dissolution. She argues that this court should simply give effect to the parties' prior agreement that if the children move back with Deborah at a later date, Bill will pay child support to Deborah. This was the position taken by the master below and approved by the judge. Deborah points out that this case does not involve a retroactive modification of a parent's child support obligation, but rather a shifting of the support obligation when custody shifts. She states that [i]n many cases it is not feasible for the parents to run back into court each time the child changes custody. While Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2) may prohibit a parent from receiving a retroactive modification of his or her arrears in such a situation, it does not prohibit a prior order shifting the child support obligation. [6] We must determine whether the policy reasons for giving effect to an agreement between divorcing spouses over future shifting of child support obligations outweigh the policy reasons behind prohibiting retroactive child support modifications. The commentators to the Department of Health and Human Services' implementation of the Bradley Amendment expressed dissatisfaction with laws allowing a retroactive reduction of child support without placing any diligence requirement on the absent parent to petition in a timely manner to reduce the order. Prohibition of Retroactive Modification of Child Support Arrearages, 54 Fed.Reg. 15,757, 15,758 (1989) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 302, 303 and 305). They also expressed concern that [s]uch laws further permitted arguments to be made about changed circumstances in prior periods at a time when evidence may not have been easily attained or available. Id. Such evidentiary issues may arise not only in cases where the changed circumstances are relevant to arrearages but also in cases such as this where changed circumstances may warrant a shifting in the support obligation. Billy cites a New Jersey case which discussed the special evidentiary considerations involved when a teenage child changes residences, believing that he or she will be happier living with the other parent. Ohlhoff v. Ohlhoff, 246 N.J. Super. 1, 586 A.2d 839, 842 (App.Div. 1991). Ohlhoff pointed out the difficulties inherent in determining whether such changes in the child's residence will be permanent. Id. In the instant case, Billy stated in an affidavit that the change in Scott's residence was considered temporary at the time: SCOTT said he wanted to live with his mother for awhile and we all agreed that a cooling off period might be in order. SCOTT went back to his mother's house, but took no other clothes with him. His dresser is full and he still has all of his things in his closet in my house. He also still receives his mail at my house and I make arrangements to get it to him. Thus, the precise problem with which Ohlhoff was concerned is raised in the Karpuleons' case. Deborah agrees that teenage children may require different treatment by the court; in fact, she asks this court to take judicial notice that older children often change custody on a temporary basis. However, she argues that in many cases it is impractical for the parents to run back into court each time the child changes custody, and that therefore allowing shifting child support orders would be good public policy. The responses to public comments contained in the federal regulations discuss the effect of prospective modifications: Federal law and regulations do not preclude the States from having laws that permit automatic prospective suspension or prospective termination upon the development of specific circumstances such as the emancipation or death of a child. Such modifications by operation of law upon the occurrence of an event known to both parties, if applicable generally to all child support orders in the State, would not appear to contradict the intent of the law. 54 Fed.Reg. at 15,761. A possible temporary change of the child's residence lacks the same legal significance or permanence as death or emancipation of the child. The shifting of the support obligation in this case occurs upon the children mov[ing] back with Deborah, the occurrence of which is a somewhat subjective determination. Yet, to the extent our decision becomes binding precedent, it will meet the contemplated requirement of being applicable to all child support orders in the State where similar circumstances exist. We conclude that Deborah has shown with sufficient certainty that Scott moved in with her in September 1991. We find that the details of when the prospective automatic termination and shifting of the obligation would occur were sufficiently clear that the parties should be held to their agreement in this case. Policy considerations may have dictated a different result if the agreement had not been in writing, or had the timing of the child's change in residence been more nebulous. However, in reaching our decision, we are merely upholding the written agreement between the parties, as incorporated into the decree of dissolution. We also note that our decision will not cause a retroactive modification of the support obligation, but will merely enforce the shifted obligation, as contemplated in the written agreement. [7]