Opinion ID: 2977979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remble’s Sentence

Text: Remble contends that since his parole for both felony offenses, which occurred outside the fifteen-year time period for career offender status, was revoked at the same time and for the same conduct, only one of those sentences should be counted, and, therefore, he should not be classified as a career offender. The United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 4B1.1(a) designates a defendant as a career offender if: (1) the defendant was at least 18 years old at the time of the instant offense; (2) the instant offense is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. A prior conviction counts if imprisonment exceeding - 11 - Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson one year and one month was imposed within fifteen years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1). “A prior conviction also is counted when any prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, whenever imposed, . . . resulted in the defendant being incarcerated during any part of such fifteen-year period.” United States v. Shannon, 449 F.3d 1146, 1148 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the case of a prior revocation of probation . . . [or] parole . . . [the sentencing court should] add the original term of imprisonment to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation.” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)(1)). Thus, a conviction that is imposed resulting in a sentence of imprisonment for thirteen months or more, and on which the defendant is paroled outside the fifteen-year window, is counted for the purposes of career offender status if the defendant is later incarcerated within the fifteen-year window for breaching the conditions of his parole. Id. (“[T]he court ordinarily should count a conviction that is imposed, and on which the defendant is paroled, outside the window, when the defendant later--within the window--is incarcerated for breaching the conditions of his parole.”) (quoting United States v. Cornog, 945 F.2d 1504,1510 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Parson, 288 F.3d 818, 821 (6th Cir. 2002) (same). Here, if we add the additional time sentenced from Remble’s 1992 parole revocation (resulting incarceration of approximately 28 months) to the 1982 conspiracy to commit robbery offense, and the 1995 revocation (resulting incarceration of approximately 22 months) to the 1984 robbery offense, we are of the view that Remble was incarcerated for both offenses for more than thirteen months within the applicable fifteen-year period of this offense. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that Remble qualifies as a career offender. - 12 - Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson
Remble contends that the district court erroneously calculated his base offense level to be 38. In particular Remble maintains that the district court improperly determined that he was responsible for in excess of 15 kilograms of crack. The Government responds that contrary to Remble’s argument, the testimony elicited at trial provided a sufficient basis from which the district court could conclude that Remble was responsible for the amount determined. A district court’s drug-quantity determination is a factual finding that we review for clear error. United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2004). If the exact amount of drugs is undetermined, “an estimate will suffice, but . . . a preponderance of the evidence must support the estimate.” United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 699 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Approximations are completely appropriate.”). Generally, a defendant involved in a drug-conspiracy is responsible for the drug quantities for which he is directly involved, and any quantity that is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 246 (6th Cir. 2007). However, the district court must make individualized findings for each member of the conspiracy regarding the scope of the conspiracy and the duration and nature of each conspirator’s participation. United States v. Carter, 45 F.App’x 339, 352 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, the district court did not err in determining that a preponderance of the evidence shows that Remble could reasonably foresee that Owens would convert the powder cocaine into crack for resale. At trial, Atkins testified that Remble dispatched him to Ohio to sell drugs and he described a direct buy of crack from Remble in Zanesville. Covington testified that Remble sent him to - 13 - Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson Zanesville to sell drugs, that he sold crack, and that Remble told him Zanesville was a good place to make money, implying that Remble was aware that Zanesville was a good place to sell crack. Owens also testified that although Remble was unaware that Owens was converting the powder cocaine into crack, that conversion was necessary because there was not a market for powder cocaine in Zanesville. Remble and Owens’ drug-trafficking relationship necessitated that Owens sell the drugs as fast as possible, and then deliver the profits to Remble. Given the evidence that Remble sent others to Ohio to sell crack, Atkins’s purchase of crack from Remble in Zanesville, and Remble’s statement to Covington, the district court did not err in concluding that Remble was responsible for the crack cocaine sold by Owens as the sale of crack was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of their drug conspiracy. Caver, 470 F.3d at 246. Thus, we conclude that resentencing is not proper on this basis. However, though not raised on appeal, we conclude that it is necessary to remand for resentencing in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007) and Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009). See United States v. Johnson, 553 F.3d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 2009). In Spears, the Supreme Court held “that district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those guidelines.” Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 844. According to Spears, district courts may reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines “even in a mine-run case where there are no particular circumstances that would otherwise justify a variance from the Guidelines sentencing range.” Johnson, 553 F.3d at 995 (quoting Spears, 129 S. Ct. 843) (internal quotation marks omitted). - 14 - Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson Here, the district court did not have the benefit of that authority when sentencing Remble to life imprisonment. See Johnson, 553 F.3d at 996 (vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding for resentencing in light of Spears); see also United States v. Fox, 548 F.3d 523, 533 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that it is appropriate to vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing if the defendant did not raise the crack-to-powder cocaine ratio as an issue before the district court or initially on appeal) and United States v. Taylor, 520 F.3d 746, 748-49 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). During the sentencing hearing, the district court stated: “[i]t’s the duty of the Court to impose a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the statutory goals of sentencing. The guidelines recommend a sentence of life in prison for Remble.” (Sentencing Hr’g Tr., Supplemental Joint Appendix 37 (emphasis added).) As in Johnson, we cannot determine from the record before us whether the district judge would have imposed the same sentence had she known that she had discretion to vary categorically from the crack-cocaine guidelines based on policy disagreement. Johnson, 553 F.3d at 996 n.1. Further, the district court did not specify the Guidelines used to calculate Remble’s base offense level, although we note that the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) calculated the offense level using the 2005 amendments to the Guidelines. However, the November 1, 2007 amendments to the Guidelines retroactively reduced the base offense levels for crack cocaine. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2007). Even if the district court applies the base offense level as calculated under the 2007 amendment to the Guidelines, the court may still “reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.” Johnson, 553 F.3d at 996 n.1 (quoting Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 843). - 15 - Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson