Opinion ID: 2278146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis of Andrews' Challenge to his Mandatory Sentence of Life without Parole

Text: Pursuant to § 565.020, the punishment for first degree murder shall be either death or imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole. . . . In Roper v. Simmons , the United States Supreme Court held that it was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence an individual under the age of 18 to death. 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Because Roper removed the possibility of sentencing a minor to death, § 565.020 makes life without parole the only sentence available for a minor found guilty of first degree murder. Citing Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), Andrews argues that this mandatory sentence is unconstitutional because it violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In Graham, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the constitution permits a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide offense. Id. at 2018. The Court looked at the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society in answering this question. Id. at 2021 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). It then determined that sentencing a minor to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime was cruel and unusual punishment because the lessened degree of culpability that minors have makes them less deserving of the most severe punishments. Graham, id. at 2026 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183). Andrews argues that this reasoning should be extended to § 565.020 because it results in minors receiving a mandatory, non-discretionary sentence of permanent incarceration for committing first degree murder. Andrews' argument is flawed because Roper expressly and Graham implicitly recognize that life without parole is not cruel and unusual punishment for a minor who is convicted of a homicide. In Roper, the Court responded to the argument that the possibility of the death penalty was necessary to deter minors from committing homicides by noting that the punishment of life without parole is a severe enough sanction to serve as deterrence. 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183. In Graham, the Court recognized that a line existed between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the individual. 130 S.Ct. at 2027 (internal citations omitted). Defendants who commit nonhomicide offenses, therefore, are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murders. Id. Even defendants who commit crimes that cause serious bodily harm to another individual cannot be compared to murders with regard to the severity and irrevocability of their crimes. Id. By illustrating the differences between all other juvenile criminals and murderers, the Court implies that it remains perfectly legitimate for a juvenile to receive a sentence of life without parole for committing murder. 130 S.Ct. at 2027. The chief justice further notes that there is nothing inherently unconstitutional about imposing sentences of life without parole on juvenile offenders. 130 S.Ct. at 2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). In his reply brief, Andrews acknowledges that life without parole when imposed on a minor for a homicide is not unconstitutional. He then argues that Missouri's statutory scheme still violates the Eighth Amendment because it imposes mandatory life without parole without any discretion to impose any alternative sentence. Andrews relies on language from Graham that [a]n offender's age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed. 130 S.Ct. at 2031. However, the flaw in this argument is the fact that § 211.071.6(7) requires that the proceedings in the juvenile division of the circuit court consider [t]he age of the child in addition to other relevant factors. Therefore, Missouri's statutory scheme expressly considers the youthfulness of the child before he or she is exposed to the possibility of a mandatory life without parole sentence for first degree murder. [6] Andrews has failed to demonstrate that Missouri's imposition of mandatory life without parole on a juvenile for committing first degree murder clearly and undoubtedly violates the Eighth Amendment of the constitution.