Opinion ID: 2639408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Andre Moore's extrajudicial statements

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted Johnny Davenport's prior written statement to the police describing, inter alia, a conversation in which Andre Moore recounted the Salgado robbery and shooting and which defendant at some point joined. Prior to Davenport's testimony, the defense moved to exclude as hearsay any statements by Davenport concerning what Moore and Lavera had told him. The prosecution argued, and the trial court ultimately agreed, that the statements regarding the Salgado offenses were admissible against defendant as adoptive admissions. Defendant contends this ruling violated state evidentiary law (Evid.Code, ง 1221) and his state and federal constitutional right of confrontation. [6] Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1221, [e]vidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth. Defendant contends Davenport's statement does not establish that defendant was present when Andre Moore spoke of the Salgado offenses; lacking proof, therefore, that defendant knew what Moore had said in this regard, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Moore's statements under the doctrine of adoptive admissions. An even more fundamental problem with treating as an adoptive admission defendant's failure to contradict Moore's recounting of the Salgado offenses is that nothing in Moore's remarks referred to defendant or accused him of anything. There being, in essence, nothing for defendant to deny, a condition of the hearsay exception for adoptive admissions did not exist, and the trial court therefore erred in concluding Moore's remarks were admissible as adoptive admissions. (See People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1011, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1.) The error, however, was harmless under any standard ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837, 299 P.2d 243) in view of the testimony of Rochelle Stewart identifying defendant as one of the shooters in the Salgado killing; Vivian Bivians's testimony placing defendant in the company of Lavera and Moore near the scene, shortly before the murder; and the absence in Moore's statement to Davenport of any mention of defendant as having been present at, or taken part in, the Salgado killing.