Opinion ID: 718656
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Erroneous Rape Shield Instruction

Text: 13 Neumann concedes that the fact that the Wisconsin Appellate Court found the trial court's instruction erroneous under Wisconsin law is not dispositive for purposes of this case because a violation of state law does not necessarily violate the Constitution. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 479, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). However, a state law violation may be so extreme as to rise to the level of a due process violation if it created a serious risk of convicting an innocent person. Eaglin v. Welborn, 57 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 421, 133 L.Ed.2d 338 (1995), citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.Ct. at 482. 14 As a general matter, the trial court's instruction very well could create a risk of convicting an innocent person. The issue at rape trials often comes down to the credibility of the victim against that of the defendant. Where the victim and defendant had a prior sexual relationship, the issue of consent especially may be highlighted. Assuming a defendant raises the defense of consent and introduces evidence of a prior sexual relationship between the defendant and the victim, it is highly destructive to the defense to eliminate such evidence from the jury's consideration. But that is only in the abstract. Neumann's case was very different. 15 After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court's state law error did not create a risk of convicting an innocent man. In other words, the evidence against Neumann was overwhelming. First, in contrast to many date-rape prosecutions, Neumann's defense was not actually that the victim had consented. Instead, Neumann testified that he did not remember any of the events of the night in question because he had been too drunk. Nevertheless, he testified that he never would have raped the victim because he loved her and planned on marrying her. Neumann argues now that the prior sexual relationship was crucial to the case because it was not at all uncommon for them to fight like cats and dogs and soon thereafter engage in consensual, non-violent sexual intercourse. The Wisconsin Appellate Court rightly rejected this argument by pointing out that no evidence was presented which could reasonably support such a depiction of the couple's prior sexual relationship. Neumann, 508 N.W.2d at 61. 16 Neumann takes issue with the district court's finding that the evidence of the couple's prior sexual relationship was not vital to Neumann's defense and therefore the faulty instruction was not unconstitutional. Neumann points us to a line of cases which he says indicates that any state court evidentiary ruling that excludes evidence relevant to a defendant's defense is unconstitutional. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). This is simply wrong. First, this case does not involve the exclusion of evidence but a faulty jury instruction. Second, the faulty instruction limited the jury's consideration of the couple's prior sexual relationship only in so far as it related to consent. The trial court permitted the jury to consider the evidence with respect to the issues of force or violence. The Wisconsin Appellate Court considered this factor to be dispositive in its harmless error analysis because there was no evidence that J.H. had ever consented to sex under the use or threat of violence prior to the assault. Neumann, 508 N.W.2d at 61. We consider this significant in reaching our conclusion that the erroneous jury instruction did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 17 Finally, and most importantly, the Supreme Court, as well as this court, has been resolute in ruling that errors of state law, especially errors based on a trial court's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, do not, in and of themselves, violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67, 112 S.Ct. at 482; Eaglin, 57 F.3d at 501. At bottom, Neumann's claim fails because the jury instruction precluded the jury from considering evidence that was only marginally significant when compared to the overwhelming weight of contrary evidence. J.H.'s prior consent does not imply, by itself, that she consented on the night in question. Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 448-49 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 697, 133 L.Ed.2d 655 (1996). Neumann failed to present any evidence that contradicted the compelling testimony of the various witnesses about the incident. Neumann's argument that the case really came down to his word against the victim's is worthless. As in most rape cases, the key witness, and only eyewitness ... was the victim of the alleged rape. Sandoval v. Acevedo, 996 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 307, 126 L.Ed.2d 255 (1993). But here, there was more--much more. The prosecution presented the compelling testimony of disinterested witnesses who observed Neumann's behavior before and after the rape. Their testimony buttresses J.H.'s testimony. Neumann did not contradict this evidence, he merely claimed that he was too drunk to remember. Even if the jury had been permitted to consider the allegedly vital evidence of the couple's prior sexual conduct vis-a-vis consent, the jury would have returned with the identical verdict. The trial court's instruction did not rise to the level of constitutional error.