Opinion ID: 2731239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleyne error and structural error

Text: We note at the outset that Lewis faces an uphill battle with respect to structural error. The Supreme Court has acknowledged a strong presumption that constitutional errors are harmless, and that structural error exists only in a “limited class of cases.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bearing these general principles in mind, we now turn to our decision in Vazquez, which held that the analogous Apprendi error is not structural. The primary difference between the facts of this case and those in Vazquez is the addition of error at the indictment 8 We recognize that Vazquez addressed Apprendi error, but find its reasoning equally applicable to cases implicating Alleyne. See United States v. Lara-Ruiz, 721 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying same standards under both Apprendi and Alleyne error). 16 stage. 9 In Vazquez, the indictment charged a drug quantity that implicated a heightened statutory maximum penalty, whereas the indictment in Lewis’s case failed to charge the “brandishing” element in § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The addition of the indictment error in this case implicates the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury. We relied in Vazquez on the fact that Apprendi error was “grounded in the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury trial guarantees.” Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 101. Alleyne recognized the same. 133 S. Ct. at 2156 (“The Sixth Amendment provides that those ‘accused’ of a ‘crime’ have the right to a trial ‘by an impartial jury.’ This right, in conjunction with the Due Process Clause . . . .”). Although neither specifically acknowledged it, we see no principled reason why the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights recognized 9 Lewis characterizes the error in this case as having occurred at the indictment, trial, and sentencing phases of proceedings. In one sense this is incorrect because the indictment, jury charge, and verdict were all consistent with respect to the “use and carrying” element of § 924. Viewed that way, the error that occurred in this case was limited to sentencing, where the District Court imposed the sentence for brandishing. Error that occurs only at sentencing is not structural. See, e.g., Jones, 527 U.S. at 402-05. As discussed above, however, this “sentencing-error-only” interpretation is inconsistent with our holding in Vazquez that Apprendi error (along with the corollary Alleyne error) is both trial and sentencing error. 271 F.3d at 101-02. Because Lewis does not seriously challenge the application of the harmless error test (and thus concedes that he loses under harmless error review regardless of when that error occurred), we need not resolve the issue today. 17 as potentially harmless in both Vazquez and Alleyne cannot also be read to include the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment. Supreme Court precedent in this area strongly supports our conclusion. Neder, like Vazquez, found that a defective jury instruction on an essential element of the offense was subject only to harmless error review. 527 U.S. at 15. The underlying constitutional error identified in Neder was, of course, the deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on that element. Id. at 12. Although Neder was limited to the Sixth Amendment right and did not consider the grand jury right under the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court nevertheless acknowledged that “most constitutional errors can be harmless.” Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Neder Court, in listing the errors it has deemed to be structural, likewise made no mention of the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment. Id. Recuenco, on the other hand, extended the reasoning in Neder and found no structural error in a situation where the indictment did not charge a required element. 548 U.S. at 222. In fact, Recuenco provides the missing link between this case and our analysis in Vazquez because it recognized that errors in an indictment can be harmless. 10 Because Vazquez 10 We acknowledge that the indictment in Recuenco did mention that a firearm was present, even though the actual charge was only for assault with a deadly weapon. We find this point to be irrelevant, however, because the indictment in this case also contained allegations of brandishing, albeit not in so many words. See discussion at Section III.C., infra. To the extent that the indictments in this case and in Recuenco contained sufficient allegations in substance if not in form, the two cases are indistinguishable. 18 based its holding upon Supreme Court precedent finding that sentencing and trial error are subject to review for harmlessness, Recuenco now allows us to extend that rationale and conclude that omission of a sentencing factor from an indictment is likewise subject only to harmless error review. Because errors occurring at the indictment, trial, and sentencing phases of proceedings are subject to harmless error review individually, we conclude that the three in conjunction likewise can be harmless. See Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103. In short, we see no reason why the differences between this case and Vazquez should be given “constitutional significance.” Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 220. Our conclusion is also supported by Cotton, which ultimately held that the Sixth Amendment petit jury right, like the Fifth Amendment grand jury right, “serves a vital function . . . as a check on prosecutorial power.” 535 U.S. at 634. It went on to state that the Sixth Amendment petit jury right was “at least as important” as the Fifth Amendment grand jury right. Id. The Court, therefore, implied that it would not treat Fifth Amendment indictment error differently than Sixth Amendment trial error because the Fifth Amendment grand jury right is no more sacrosanct—and thus no more worthy of heightened protection—than the Sixth Amendment right that is subject only to harmless error review. Similarly, we are persuaded by the government’s compelling argument highlighting the nature of the Fifth Amendment grand jury right as it compares to the Sixth Amendment right to a petit jury. Specifically, the government notes that, unlike the right to a petit jury: (1) the Fifth Amendment grand jury right has not been deemed so fundamental as to be applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the grand jury is not the final 19 arbiter of the facts, and must only find facts by a preponderance of the evidence; and (3) the petit jury provides far greater protection for the accused by operating in public, relying upon admissible evidence from both the prosecution and the accused, and voting unanimously to convict. The government contends that, based upon the factors listed above, the Sixth Amendment right to a petit jury provides more robust protections that go to the “‘framework within which the trial proceeds,’” and is thus more worthy of protection under the ambit of structural error than the Fifth Amendment grand jury right. Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310). Yet, despite these important considerations, the Supreme Court has never extended the structural error doctrine to include an abridgment of the Sixth Amendment right of the type at issue in this case. See Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 222 (“Failure to submit a sentencing factor to a jury . . . is not structural error.”); Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 (“The omission of an element [from a jury instruction] is an error that is subject to harmlesserror analysis.”). Given the comparative weaknesses in the Fifth Amendment right, the Supreme Court is therefore less likely to find structural error in a situation like Lewis’s. We agree with the government that this consideration weighs in favor of applying harmless error review in this case. Finally, we note that our decision comports with that of every court of appeals to have addressed this issue in the context of Alleyne error. See United States v. Harakaly, 734 F.3d 88, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that “[i]n light of the long line of cases subjecting preserved Apprendi errors to harmless-error review, there would appear to be no basis for finding Alleyne error to be one of those rare cases to which harmless-error review does not apply”); United States v. McKinley, 732 F.3d 1291, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying 20 plain error review of Alleyne error in which indictment and jury charge both involved use or carrying of a firearm, but sentence was for brandishing); 11 United States v. Mack, 729 11 We note that almost none of the decisions Lewis cites in his brief involve Apprendi error—which is the most closely analogous situation to his case. This omission is unsurprising because courts of appeals have “almost uniformly held that the failure of the indictment to include the Apprendi-element, like the failure to submit that element to the jury, [is] subject to harmless error review.” 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 19.3(a) (3d ed. 2007). Indeed, courts of appeals routinely subject Apprendi errors at both the indictment and conviction stage to harmless or plain error review. See United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143, 156 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that Apprendi errors stemming from indictment omissions are reviewed for harmless error); United States v. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that preserved Apprendi errors are reviewed for harmless error); United States v. Mackins, 315 F.3d 399, 40506, 409-10 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing applicability of harmless error review to Apprendi error); United States v. Baptiste, 309 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 2002) (recognizing a change in circuit precedent and applying harmless error review to Apprendi error in indictment); United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 318-21 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting structural error argument and applying harmless error review to alleged Apprendi error); United States v. Jordan, 291 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying harmless error where drug quantity was neither alleged in the indictment nor proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but concluding that record was not sufficient to demonstrate that error was harmless); United States v. Adkins, 274 F.3d 444, 454 (7th 21 F.3d 594, 606-09 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting structural error argument and analyzing Alleyne error for plain error); United States v. Kirklin, 727 F.3d 711, 718-19 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying plain error review to alleged Alleyne error); LaraRuiz, 721 F.3d at 557-58 (recognizing that Apprendi errors (and by extension, Alleyne errors) are not structural, but reversing on ground that defendant failed to meet plain error Cir. 2001) (recognizing that Apprendi errors of failing to allege a drug quantity in an indictment are subject to harmless error review); Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103 (finding that Apprendi error is not a structural defect); United States v. Smith, 240 F.3d 927, 930 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that harmless error review applies to Apprendi errors);United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying harmless error review to alleged Apprendi error). Because courts have consistently analyzed Apprendi errors under the paradigm set forth in Rule 52 (either under plain error or harmless error), that practice is persuasive for finding that structural error is not applicable in the present case. See Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 94 (“Since Alleyne is an extension of the Apprendi doctrine, the same standards should apply to Alleyne errors.”). 22 standard). 12 Absent any authority to the contrary, harmless error review is appropriate in this case. In light of the foregoing, we hold that when an indictment fails to charge a sentencing factor or element of an offense and the jury fails to find the same beyond a reasonable doubt, the resulting Alleyne error is not structural. When properly preserved, such error is reviewed for harmlessness under Rule 52(a).