Opinion ID: 2588178
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Keller Plaintiffs Have Standing To Challenge the French Defendants' Alleged Constitutional Violation

Text: Standing is a rule of judicial self-restraint based on the principle that courts should not resolve abstract questions or issue advisory opinions. [11] The Keller plaintiffs argue that they have both citizen-taxpayer and interest-injury standing to file suit. The superior court assumed without deciding that the Keller plaintiffs had standing. [12]
To establish citizen-taxpayer standing, plaintiffs must show that the case is of public significance and that they are appropriate plaintiffs. [13] We have held that a plaintiff was not appropriate when the plaintiff was a sham plaintiff with no true adversity of interest; when the plaintiff was incapable of competently advocating his or her position; and when there was another potential plaintiff more directly affected by the challenged conduct who had sued or was likely to sue. [14] We agree with the Keller plaintiffs that they were not sham plaintiffs and that they were capable of competently advocating their positions. And we assume, without deciding, that an alleged violation of the fair and just treatment clause is a matter of public significance. But there is nonetheless a substantial question here as to whether other persons who are more directly affected have sued or are likely to sue. The Keller plaintiffs argue that no other potential plaintiffs who are more directly affected have sued or are likely to sue. At a minimum, this argument ignores the Kiesel plaintiffs, who were more directly affected by the investigation and who actually sued some of the French defendants. As the subpoenaed witnesses, the Kiesel plaintiffs were among the classes of persons in this investigation most obviously protected by the fair and just treatment clause. They did not allege any violation of the fair and just treatment clause in the superior court. But had they thought they were being mistreated, they would have been far more appropriate plaintiffs to make that claim than the Keller plaintiffs, none of whom self-identified as either a witness or a target of the investigation. We have held that an appellant did not have citizen-taxpayer standing when a more directly affected plaintiff had already filed suit based on closely related claims, even though the claims were not identical. [15] We likewise reject the Keller plaintiffs' argument that no other plaintiffs more directly affected by the challenged conduct have sued. In addition to the subpoenaed plaintiffs, as of October 9 when we issued our dispositive order there was at least one other potential plaintiff who was directly affected by the investigation and who was fully capable of suing. The Keller plaintiffs concede that Governor Palin was arguably more directly concerned, but argue that she is unlikely to sue. They argue that the governor stated that she would cooperate with the investigation, and that this, along with the fact that she was in the middle of a national election campaign, indicated that she was not going to bring suit. [16] Their interpretation of the citizen-taxpayer standing test is too literal. Even if the governor did not intend to sue, there is no indication that, if she thought her rights were being violated, she would be unable to do so. The Keller plaintiffs do not contend that the governor or any other potential plaintiffs were somehow limited in their ability to sue. That individuals who are more directly affected have chosen not to sue despite their ability to do so does not confer citizen-taxpayer standing on an inappropriate plaintiff. We have denied citizen-taxpayer standing on similar grounds before. In Kleven v. Yukon-Koyukuk School District a former employee who filed a grievance but resigned before it was resolved sued to challenge his former employer's grievance process. [17] We held that the employee lacked citizen-taxpayer standing because the remaining employees were in a better position to raise the complaints and because we had no reason to believe that current . . . employees would be indisposed to press legitimate grievances. [18] That decision did not hinge on the likelihood that the current employees would sue. Here there is no reason to believe that any potentially implicated executive branch officials, including the governor, would be unwilling to sue if they thought their rights were being violated during the investigation. We therefore reject the Keller plaintiffs' argument that no other plaintiff more directly affected by the challenged conduct is likely to sue. Comparing other potential parties' claims with those of the Keller plaintiffs reveals how indirectly, if at all, the investigation affected the Keller plaintiffs. The fair and just treatment clause was written to avoid the excesses which [the delegates] felt were characterized by the conduct of Senator Joseph McCarthy, including vilification, character assassination, and an intimation of guilt by association. [19] Witnesses in the investigation, targets of the investigation, or any executive branch employee potentially implicated in Monegan's dismissal could have been appropriate plaintiffs in an action to enforce the constitution's protection. [20] Such persons would be in a position to be vilified, have their characters assassinated, or be found guilty by association during an investigation that was not fair and just. But there is no indication the Keller plaintiffs might personally be exposed to any such abuses of legislative power; they do not claim that they were potential witnesses or investigative targets, or that the investigation would somehow implicate them in Monegan's dismissal. As the French defendants argue, it appears the Keller plaintiffs are attempting to assert the individual rights of potential or imaginary third parties. We have never before allowed citizen-taxpayer standing to be used in this way. The Keller plaintiffs assert that we did so in State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska. [21] But we did not discuss citizen-taxpayer standing in that case. Instead, we held that the plaintiffs had interest-injury standing and third-party standing, both of which are distinct from citizen-taxpayer standing. [22] As we have noted before, [g]enerally, a litigant lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of another. [23] We have recognized third-party standing, but not citizen-taxpayer standing, as an exception to this rule. [24] The Keller plaintiffs do not rely on third-party standing, but invoke citizen-taxpayer standing in attempting to achieve the same result. We decline to allow the use of citizen-taxpayer standing as a substitute for third-party standing here.
The Keller plaintiffs alternatively argue that they had interest-injury standing to sue. To establish interest-injury standing plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [25] and an interest which is adversely affected by the complained-of conduct. [26] The degree of the injury need not be great: an identifiable trifle is sufficient to establish standing to fight out a question of principle. [27] The Keller plaintiffs contend that their complaint articulates an `identifiable trifle' sufficient to confer standing, but they do not specify what their actual injury was. In a section of their brief unrelated to the issue of standing, the Keller plaintiffs contend that they and Alaskans face damaged reputations if the investigation continues. They do not develop this argument further, and in oral argument on appeal asserted only that they had citizen-taxpayer standing. It is not self-evident that the investigation was likely to cause the Keller plaintiffs any sort of harm, nor was the nature of any possible harm so self-evident that we must take judicial notice of it. Any claim of interest-injury standing based on reputational harm is not adequately briefed and is therefore waived on appeal. [28] The Keller plaintiffs also seem to argue that they have interest-injury standing because the subpoenaed plaintiffs in the consolidated case had interest-injury standing. But the standing of the Kiesel plaintiffs does not confer standing on the Keller plaintiffs. Each party's standing is evaluated independently, and one party's standing does not confer standing on another. [29] Because the Keller plaintiffs allege no plausible injury to their own interests, they lack interest-injury standing. Given the Keller plaintiffs' lack of standing to bring this suit, we do not consider whether it was error for the superior court to hold that the Keller plaintiffs' complaint raises nonjusticiable political questions.