Opinion ID: 27064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 60(b) motion may moot the controversy over

Text: The parties contest the extent to which we the first such motion, we address it first. As have appellate jurisdictionSSnot jurisdiction to entertain the application for COA, but jurisdic- 2 tion over the underlying appeal. If we de- (...continued) termine that we are without jurisdiction over Patrick’s claim. The state’s procedural bar arguthe underlying appeal, we will not grant a ment is based on Patrick’s alleged failure to deCOA. Murphy v. Johnson, 110 F.3d 10 (5th velop the factual basis for his ineffective assistance Cir. 1997) (denial of COA for failing to meet of counsel claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. exhaustion requirement).2 § 2254(e)(2). As the state concedes, this argument was not raised in the district court. Although we may raise 1 this procedural bar sua sponte in appropriate cirRule 59(e) requires such motions to be filed within ten days. Rule 6(a) sets out the method for cumstances, Smith v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 521, 524 calculating this ten-day period. (5th Cir. 2000), we do not find the circumstances of this case appropriate for sua sponte 2 In its brief, the state also raises the prospect of consideration. For one thing, because this is an procedural bar to prevent our habeas review of application for a COA, Patrick has not received (continued...) notice the procedural bar would be at issue. 2 we have said, the district court granted Patrick would have us use rule 60(b) to Patrick’s second rule 60(b) motion for relief circumvent the requirement of rule 4(a)(5). from judgment and entered a final judgment on This we decline to do. Where the “excusable April 17. Patrick timely filed a notice of neglect ” of a party results in failure timely to appeal from this entry of final judgment. The file an appeal, the more specific language of question is whether the entry of a new rule 4(a)(5) must govern over the more judgment, effectively resetting the appellate general language of rule 60(b). Thus, is cases clock for the substantive issues decided in the such as this, the thirty-day time limit of rule August 22 judgment, was an abuse of 4(a)(5), not the one-year limit of rule 60(b), discretion. prevails.4 West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1983); JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)- MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 304.14[5] (3d (5)(A)(i) sets a thirty-day limit on motions for ed. 2001). extension of time to file an appeal. Such ex- tensions may be granted by the district court This conclusion does not doom the entire on a showing of “excusable neglect.” FED. R. application for COA. Patrick’s notice of apAPP. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). The use of rule 60(b) peal is still effective, but only as to the order to extend the deadline in appellate rule 4(a) is denying the first rule 60(b) motion and not as generally prohibited. United States v. O’Neil, to the original judgment denying habeas relief, 709 F.2d 361, 372 (5th Cir. 1983); Chick Kam as to which it is untimely. Choo v. Exxon Corp., 699 F.2d 693, 694 (5th Cir. 1983). In that first motion, Patrick raised six issues: (1) Did the district court use an We recognize that there are cases incorrect standard in reviewing the ineffective permitting a rule 60(b) motion to set a new assistance of counsel claim; (2) was Patrick date for calculating the time to appeal where rule 4(a)(5) is not available. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. USAFORM Hail Pool, Inc., 3 (...continued) 523 F.2d 744, 750-51 (5th Cir. 1975). These judgment, upheld the decision of the district court cases, though, appear to rely on a failure of the to reset the time for appeal by use of a rule 60(b) part y to receive notice of the entry of motion. Id. at 396. We join the Eighth Circuit in judgment.3 refusing to follow this decision. See Zimmer St. Louis Co. v. Zimmer Co., 32 F.3d 357 (8th Cir. 1994). 3 One case that arguably does not fall within 4 this class is Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d 392 (6th There is a minor exception to this scheme, not Cir. 1993). The petitioner in Lewis failed to file a applicable here. Where the party seeking to appeal timely notice of appeal because it was docketed late out of time has been prejudiced by a failure to by the clerk (thus rendering the notice outside the receive notice of the entry of judgment (or ruling on thirty-day window of rule 4(a)). Petitioner’s a motion), the district court may reopen the time attorney failed to notice the late docketing until for appeal, but may only grant such a motion only after the time for filing a rule 4(a)(5) motion had if it is made within 180 days of the entry of lapsed. The court, apparently following cases judgment (or a ruling) and the conditions regarding based on a failure to receive notice of the entry of lack of notice are met. F ED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6). (continued...) Patrick made no such motion. 3 deprived of effective assistance of counsel; denial of rule 60(b) relief from the original (3) did the court improperly deny Patrick judgment would be an abuse of discretion. funds under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) to develop his claims of mental illness and childhood IV. abuse; (4) was he denied due process by the Patrick argues that the district court emrefusal to submit to the jury a definition of ployed an improper legal standard to evaluate “deliberate”; (5) is article 37.071 of the Texas his habeas petitionSSusing the “reasonable jurCode of Criminal Procedure unconstitutionally ists” standard of Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d vague; and (6) did the court’s refusal to define 751 (5th Cir 1996). This standard was “deliberately” contribute to the sentence of explicitly disapproved by the Supreme Court in death, in violation of the Eighth Amendment? Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) Patrick also raises, for the first time on appeal, (opinion of O’Connor, J.). Even if the court a challenge to the jury charge at the sentencing applied the incorrect standard, such error is phase of his trial. harmless if the court reached the right result. Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 257 (5th