Opinion ID: 2507343
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The nature of the DPA's conduct

Text: Lopez contends that the DPA's remarks during closing and rebuttal argument improperly commented on his post-arrest silence and, therefore, violated his right to remain silent. There is nothing more basic and more fundamental than that the accused has a constitutional right to remain silent, and the exercise of this privilege may not be used against him. [8] State v. Alo, 57 Haw. 418, 424, 558 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1976). Although the record does not reflect whether Lopez received Miranda warnings from Officer Hawkins or any other police officer at the time or after he was arrested, we hold that the right against self-incrimination attached at least as of the time of the arrest, [9] because the right to remain silent derives from the Constitution and not from the Miranda warnings themselves. United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634 (9th Cir.2000)). Any other holding would create an incentive for arresting officers to delay interrogation in order to create an intervening `silence' that would then be used against the defendant. United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 386 (D.C.Cir.1997). [10] Lopez takes issue with the DPA's comments pertaining to what an innocent person would have done in Lopez's situation when arrested by Officer Hawkins. The DPA's remarks related to the testimony of Officer Hawkins, who confirmed on cross-examination by defense counsel that, when he stopped Lopez for speeding, Lopez told him, [T]he car belongs to a friend and he doesn't know where the paperwork is. On redirect examination by the DPA, the officer testified that Lopez did not disclose his friend's name or address or how he might have acquired the car from his friend. The DPA asked, Did he say anything at all about this friend except [']well, I got it from a friend, I don't know where the paperwork is[']?, to which Officer Hawkins responded, That's all he said. On recross-examination, the officer admitted that he could not recall whether he asked Lopez for his friend's name and information like that. After summarizing Officer Hawkins's testimony during closing argument, the DPA asserted, A person is stopped in a stolen car and he really is innocent, what's the first thing he's going to do? Lopez objected on the ground that the DPA's comments offended his right to remain silent, but the DPA countered that Officer Hawkins's testimony was in evidence, and the circuit court overruled the objection. Continuing, the DPA asserted that an innocent person in Lopez's situation would have told Officer Hawkins, [']Wait a minute, wait a minute, I got it from my friend Greg Ramba, he lives in Makakilo, he fixes cars, he told me I could drive it, wait, wait, wait.['] During his closing argument, defense counsel raised Officer Hawkins's inability to remember whether he asked Lopez for information regarding his friend, apparently to imply that Lopez did not disclose that information because Officer Hawkins probably did not ask. On rebuttal, the DPA responded that the officer wouldn't need to ask[;] an innocent person would just start talking and try to convince the person arresting him that he didn't do it, because a reasonable person in Lopez's position would have said, [']I got [the car] from my friend, Greg Ramba, brah, go talk to him, he'll tell you.['] According to the DPA, Lopez said [n]othing like that. The prosecution asserts that defense counsel's questions during his cross-examination of Officer Hawkins regarding what Lopez did say about his friend opened the door to the DPA's inquiry on his redirect examination of the officer with respect to what Lopez did not say. Lopez responds that he takes issue not with the DPA's redirect of the officer but, rather, with the manner in which the DPA commented on that evidence during closing and rebuttal argument. The prosecution asserts that the DPA's comments on Officer Hawkins's testimony during closing and rebuttal argument were entirely proper, because the testimony was in evidence, and, as such, the DPA could properly discuss the import of [Lopez's] failure to provide [Officer] Hawkins with his friend's name, address, and other information. Although a prosecutor has wide latitude in commenting on the evidence during closing argument, it is not enough that a his comments are based on testimony in evidence; his comments must also be legitimate. See State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 304, 926 P.2d 194, 209 (1996) ([A] prosecutor, during closing argument, is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and wide latitude is allowed in discussing the evidence. It is also within the bounds of legitimate argument for prosecutors to state, discuss, and comment on the evidence. . . . (Citations omitted.)). A prosecutor's comments are legitimate when they draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Iuli, 101 Hawai`i at 208, 65 P.3d at 155 (The prosecution is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. . . . ). In this case, the DPA's comments were not legitimate because, in contravention of Lopez's fundamental right to remain silent, see Alo, 57 Haw. at 424, 558 P.2d at 1016, the DPA argued the unreasonable inference that Lopez was guilty in light of his post-arrest silence, that is, his failure to act like an innocent person and disclose to Officer Hawkins Ramba's name, address, and occupation. See Whitehead, 200 F.3d at 638-39 (holding that the district court erred in permitting the prosecutor to comment on the defendant's post-arrest silence during closing argument by remarking that, after the defendant was arrested, he failed to ask What is going on here?, Why I am being treated like this?, and Why am I being arrested? and by commenting that the defendant didn't say a word because he knew); United States v. Branson, 756 F.2d 752, 753-54 (9th Cir.1985) (holding that the prosecutor improperly referred to the defendant's post-arrest silence during closing argument by asserting that an honest person in the defendant's position would have told the law enforcement officer, I don't know this was counterfeit, I just got it somehow, and that the defendant refused to tell law enforcement where he received the counterfeit bills); Scarborough v. Arizona, 531 F.2d 959, 961 (9th Cir.1976) (finding fundamental error where the prosecutor commented during closing argument that the defendant remained silent after he was arrested and that, if he were arrested for armed robbery, he would have said something ÔÇö if he were not guilty); cf. State v. McCrory, 104 Hawai`i 203, 208, 87 P.3d 275, 280 (2004) (observing that a defendant has no affirmative duty to proclaim his innocence). The prosecution cites two cases in support of its argument that the DPA's comments were entirely proper, to wit, Hauge and State v. Briggman, 21 Ill.App.3d 747, 316 N.E.2d 121 (1974). In Hauge, this court concluded that, because the defendant undertook to `explain away' much of the prosecution's evidence, he virtually invited the prosecutor to cross-examine him and later comment, during rebuttal argument, on his failure to explain away the DNA evidence showing that his blood was found at the scene of the crime. 103 Hawai`i at 57, 79 P.3d at 150. In Briggman, the Illinois Appellate Court held that, because the defendant volunteered on cross-examination that he had been smoking reefers on the night in question, he assumed the risk that his testimony would be subject to elaboration by cross-examination or comment in closing argument and, therefore, the prosecutor's comment during closing argument that he had smoked some reefers was proper. 316 N.E.2d at 127. While these cases permit prosecutorial comment on issues raised by the defendant, we conclude that they are distinguishable. They do not suggest, much less hold, that a prosecutor may argue to the jury that a defendant's failure to disclose facts to the police during and following his arrest may be equated with guilt, which is precisely what the DPA did in the present matter by suggesting that the import of [Lopez's] failure to provide [Officer] Hawkins with his friend's name, address, or other information, was that Lopez didn't do what an innocent person would do. In light of the language employed by the DPA, we think that the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret his remarks during closing and rebuttal argument as comments on Lopez's post-arrest silence and that the comments are consequently improper. See State v. Wakisaka, 102 Hawai`i 504, 515-16, 78 P.3d 317, 328-29 (2003) (holding that, given the language used, the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret the prosecution's rebuttal argument as a comment on [the defendant's] failure to testify, where the prosecutor commented during closing argument that the defendant would know certain facts and that, [i]f he doesn't tell us, we can only look to [the evidence] and see what [the evidence] tells us); State v. Vild, 155 Ariz. 374, 746 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Ct.App.1987) (holding that the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's post-arrest silence because, [w]hile the prosecutor did not flatly state that the [defendant] remained silent after his arrest, his description of what an innocent person would have said when first informed of his arrest for cocaine-related offenses implied that this is what the [defendant] would have said at the time of his arrest or shortly thereafter if his testimony had been true (emphasis omitted)). Accordingly, the ICA erred in concluding that the DPA was legitimately commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. ICA's Lopez mem. op at 10. The nature of the DPA's conduct ÔÇö the first factor ÔÇö weighs in favor of granting Lopez a new trial. See Wakisaka, 102 Hawai`i at 515-16, 78 P.3d at 328-29.