Opinion ID: 769467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act

Text: 35 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. SS 551-559, 701-706 (2000), governs decision-making by most federal agencies. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE S 1.1 (3d ed. 1994). Its provisions provide[ ] the statutory structure upon which federal administrative law is built. Id. Central to the administrative scheme is the APA's guarantee of judicial review by federal courts of final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. 5 U.S.C. S 704 (2000). The definition of agency for APA review purposes comprises each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, except a number of specified authorities, including Congress, the courts, territorial and district governments, military agencies in the time of war, and political party agencies. 5 U.S.C. S 701(b) (2000). Agencies that do not fall within the APA's exceptions are covered by its review provisions. 7 36 The final actions of a covered agency are reviewable except to the extent that (1)statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. S 701(a) (2000). In this case, we must therefore determine (1) whether S 2242(b) of the FARR Act expressly precludes review of the Secretary of State's decision in an Article 3 challenge to extradition, and (2) whether the Secretary's determinations under the FARR Act were made discretionary by Congress. 37 The FARR Act does not preclude judicial review of the Secretary's implementation of the Torture Convention, although it may limit judicial review of the regulations she promulgates. See FARR Act S 2242(d) ([n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in the regulations [promulgated by the Secretary], no court shall have jurisdiction to review the regulations adopted to implement this section . . . ) This statement appears to preclude a facial challenge to the extradition procedures set out in the Department of State's regulations. We need not address the provision's validity, however, because this case does not concern a challenge to the regulations. It is instead a challenge to the way the statute is being implemented in this case. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra, Vol. 2 at SS 15.1, 15.14 (noting that challenges to agency rules and regulations are distinct from petitions for review of final agency actions). 8 38 Having determined that review of the Secretary of State's decisions regarding extradition of a fugitive who claims he will be tortured if returned are not precluded by statute, we must determine whether these decisions constitute agency action . . . committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. S 701(a)(2) (2000). If so, APA review is not available. 5 U.S.C. S 701(a)(2) (2000). The Supreme Court has explained that S 701(a)(2) precludes review only if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). We recently applied this standard to find that our court had jurisdiction to review the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision not to reopen an alien's case. In Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 208 F.3d 838, 842-846 (9th Cir. 2000), we held that even though the agency was given discretion to decide the circumstances in which it would reopen a case, such discretion did not shield the BIA's action from review, since the agency itself had established a standard for reopening. 39 Under the FARR Act, the agencies are given a mandatory duty to implement Article 3 of the Torture Convention, under which the United States shall not expel, return (`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. Torture Convention, Article 3. In the extradition context, this means that the Secretaryof State may not surrender any fugitive who is likely to face torture upon return. The FARR Act imposes a clear and nondiscretionary duty: the agencies responsible for carrying out expulsion, extradition, and other involuntary returns, must ensure that those subject to their actions may not be returned if they are likely to face torture. A reviewing court would have a clear standard against which to measure the Secretary's actions under the Heckler rule. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830. 40 Although the statute imposes a mandatory duty on the Secretary to implement the FARR Act, the regulations promulgated by the Department of State indicate that the Secretary's duty is discretionary. See 22 C.F.R. S 95.4 (2000) (Decisions of the Secretary concerning surrender of fugitives for extradition are matters of executive discretion not subject to judicial review.) We generally defer to an agency's construction of the statute it administers. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). We are required, however, to reject those interpretations that are contrary to Congressional intent. See id. at 843 n. 9 (The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.) We therefore reject the argument, advanced by the government, that these regulations preclude judicial review of the Secretary's extradition decisions. 41 Congress indicated its preference for agency enforcement of the U.S. obligations under the Torture Convention in the FARR Act. This scheme is consistent with Article 3 of the Torture Convention, which states that the competent authorities are required to ensure that extraditees are not returned if there are substantial grounds for believing that the fugitive would be in danger of being subjected to torture. What would be contrary to both the statute and the Convention, is a finding that the Secretary's decisions are wholly discretionary. Article 3 is written in mandatory, not precatory language: [n]o State Party shall . . . extradite a person likely to face torture. 9 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441 (1987) (discussing the difference between precatory and mandatory treaty language). The FARR Act is similarly forceful: U.S. agencies are directed to implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the Torture Convention. FARR Act, S 2242(b). As a principle of statutory construction, we generally construe Congressional legislation to avoid violating international law. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 829 (9th Cir. April 10, 2000) (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) and discussing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-118 (1804)). In this case, the most straightforward construction is perfectly consistent with international law. 42 Finding that the Secretary's duty to implement the FARR Act is non-discretionary and that the statute does not preclude review, we hold that a fugitive fearing torture may petition for review of the Secretary's decision to surrender him 10 .Courts reviewing such petitions will be required to set aside the Secretary's extradition decisions if they are found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(a) (2000).