Opinion ID: 1756817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Storer's Directed Verdict

Text: At trial, Mrs. Green produced measurements made at the scene following the accident. They revealed that the peak of the house was 18 feet, 1 inch from the pavement. The Storer cable was 14 feet and ½ inch from the pavement. The distance between the APCo secondary line and the street was 17 feet, 2 inches. The distance between the Storer cable and the APCo secondary line measured 37½ inches. Both the National Electrical Safety Code and Storer's own construction standards required a minimum distance of 18 feet between the street and the television cable. In addition, the National Electrical Safety Code required a minimum of 40 inches between the Storer cable and the APCo secondary wire. Approximately one year before the accident, Storer had transferred its cable at the intersection from the pole that had previously supported it to a concrete pole owned and maintained by APCo. According to testimony, Storer attached the cable to the highest available pre-drilled hole on the concrete pole; however, the Storer employee who transferred the cable noted a possible road clearance problem and made notations to that effect on the blueprints for the transfer. There was also evidence that Storer did not contact APCo regarding the clearance problem or the inadequate distance between its cable and APCo's secondary line. Storer concedes that it installed and maintained its cable at a height lower than that required by the National Electrical Safety Code. However, it contends here, as it did before the trial court, that Mrs. Green has offered no evidence that Storer Cable's admitted transgression of the above regulations proximately caused Mr. Green's accident. We agree. As this Court has often explained, [t]he proximate cause of an injury is the primary moving cause without which it would not have occurred, but which, in the natural and probable sequence of events, produces the injury. City of Mobile v. Havard, 289 Ala. 532, 538, 268 So.2d 805, 810 (1972); see also, Mobile City Lines, Inc. v. Proctor, 272 Ala. 217, 130 So.2d 388 (1961); Smith v. Alabama Water Service Co., 225 Ala. 510, 143 So. 893 (1932). A proximate cause issue is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by a jury. Davison v. Mobile Infirmary, 456 So.2d 14 (Ala.1984); Sungas, Inc. v. Perry, 450 So.2d 1085 (Ala.1984); Hall v. Booth, 423 So.2d 184 (Ala.1982). It becomes a question of law, however, when there is a total lack of evidence from which the factfinder may reasonably infer a direct causal relation between the culpable conduct and the resulting injury. Davison, 456 So.2d at 24; see also Graham v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 So.2d 938 (Ala.1988). In this case, the plaintiff concedes that the electrical current in the Storer cable, if any, was very negligible; therefore, Curtis Green's electrocution was in no way caused by electrical current in Storer Cable's television cable. Brief of Appellant, at 33. Moreover, Mrs. Green produced evidence that it was customary for those engaged in the business of moving houses to station someone on the roof to raise low-hanging wires encountered during the move. The plaintiff's evidence also revealed that both the Storer cable and the 110-volt line were considerably lower than the peak of the house. Thus, there was no evidence from which to conclude that Green would not have been on the house but for the position of the Storer cable. Furthermore, the plaintiff's eyewitness testified that Green had already successfully completed the procedure for raising the Storer cable, and was engaged only in moving the APCo secondary wire when the accident occurred. Under the plaintiff's own version of the facts, there was a complete absence of evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the accident happened because of the position of the Storer cable. Consequently, Storer was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed as to Storer.