Opinion ID: 203259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of state agency decision

Text: The district court admitted into evidence a decision rendered by the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission (MLRC)  a state administrative agency. The MLRC is charged with resolving labor disputes by enforcing Massachusetts labor laws, and its decision addressed whether the Bristol County Sheriff's Department violated various sections of M.G.L. C. 150E. Hodgson argues that the district court erred in admitting the MLRC decision into evidence. He claims (1) the findings of fact in the decision are inadmissible hearsay and (2) that even assuming the decision is otherwise admissible, the district court should have excluded it under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We review a district court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jimenez, 419 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir.2005). We find no abuse here. First, the decision was admissible under the public records exception to the rule against hearsay. See, Fed.R.Evid. 803(8). The public records exception allows a district court to admit public records and reports, in any form, of public agencies setting forth, in civil actions and proceedings ... factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. Id. (C). The Supreme Court has interpreted this `public records' exception to the hearsay rule broadly to include both conclusions and opinions of public offices and agencies. Patterson v. Mills, 64 Fed. Appx. 457, 462 (6th Cir.2003)(citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 162, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988)). Hodgson relies on cases holding that judicial findings of fact in a previous case are inadmissible under Rule 803(8)(c). See e.g., Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1192 (10th Cir.2002); Milan Express v. Averitt Express, 254 F.3d 966, 983, n. 25 (11th Cir.2001). But the Massachusetts Labor Commission is not a court, and its determinations are not stamped with the judicial imprimatur that the findings of a court are. The Commission's findings are thus less likely than those of a court to be given disproportionate weight by a jury. See Herrick, 298 F.3d at 1192. Turning to Hodgson's Rule 403 objection, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the decision. Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. We have emphasized that only rarely  and in extraordinarily compelling circumstanceswill we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir.2005)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Paolitto v. Brown E. & C. Inc., 151 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir.1998)(noting district court in best position to consider how admission of agency report will impact trial). The MLRC's decision was highly probative given both the identity of the parties and the fact that the decision pertained to the same incidents that gave rise to this federal action. The judge was entitled to take that value into account. Moreover, the admission of the decision did not unfairly prejudice Hodgson. As we have stressed in the past, virtually all evidence is prejudicial ... but it is only unfair prejudice against which the law protects. United States v. Pinillos-Prieto, 419 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Any potential for unfairness was mitigated by the district judge expressly instructing the jury that the MLRC's decision involved a different issue and was not binding on the jury.