Opinion ID: 2572660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Pineda's prior convictions for impeachment purposes

Text: Pineda's criminal record contains two prior felony convictions, one drug related and another involving the making of a terrorist threat. Pineda now challenges a pretrial order in limine that the convictions could be used by the State for impeachment under NRS 50.095(1) [3] should he choose to testify. At trial, Pineda's attorney called Pineda as a witness and introduced the fact of the convictions during his direct examination. Thus, as a threshold matter, the State contends that Pineda waived his right to contest the ruling in limine on appeal because he himself elicited this evidence. Because Nevada law concerning such waivers by a defendant is unclear, we take this opportunity to clarify our views on the issue. The State relies upon Ohler v. United States [4] in support of its waiver argument. In Ohler, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a defendant waives his appellate standing concerning admission of prior convictions when he preemptively introduces the prior convictions after an unfavorable ruling on a motion in limine. [5] Because such orders may be revisited at any time during trial, Ohler notes that `[a]ny possible harm flowing from a district court's in limine ruling permitting impeachment by a prior conviction is wholly speculative.' [6] Several states have adopted this rule, [7] while others have rejected it. [8] States that have rejected Ohler have done so because a trial court is fully aware of the proposed evidence and law when ruling on such evidence in limine, and it is a poor trial tactic for defense attorneys to wait for the prosecution to introduce such evidence on cross-examination. [9] Given the nature of this tactical dilemma, these courts have held that a defendant may under such circumstances appeal a trial court's preliminary ruling conditionally admitting prior bad acts or convictions for impeachment purposes. [10] Given our recent decision in Richmond v. State, we agree that on appeal from a final judgment of conviction, a defendant may properly challenge such a trial court ruling. [11] By way of history, we held in Rice v. State [12] that, because pretrial rulings in limine do not bind a district court and may be reversed or modified at trial, a defendant in criminal proceedings must object to evidence when presented at trial to preserve the issue for appeal. [13] However, in Richmond we modified Rice, concluding that where an objection has been fully briefed, the district court has thoroughly explored the objection during a hearing on a pretrial motion, and the district court has made a definitive ruling, then a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. [14] In the present case, both parties fully briefed the issue, the district court conducted a hearing, and the district court made a definitive ruling to admit both of Pineda's prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes should Pineda choose to testify. Here, had Pineda's counsel waited for the State to introduce the evidence of Pineda's prior felony convictions, he could have tested the validity of that ruling on appeal from the judgment of conviction under Richmond. As a logical extension of Richmond, we now choose to follow those states that allow appellate consideration of the admissibility of criminal convictions for impeachment purposes where the defendant, as a tactical matter, elects to introduce such evidence after having objected to basic admissibility via a fully litigated motion in limine. This approach permits appellate review of whether the impeachment material was properly admitted in the first instance. We also agree with Justice Souter's dissent in Ohler that the majority position creates an anomaly in which a silent defendant who never intended to testify in the first place is given the benefit of appellate review of such a ruling. [15] Having concluded that Pineda did not waive his right to appeal this issue, we now determine whether the district court erred in conditionally agreeing to admit Pineda's two prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes. NRS 50.095(1) and our prior case authority permit impeachment by proof of prior felony convictions which are not too remote in time. [16] Going further, we have held that NRS 50.095 imposes no requirement that such impeachment should be limited to only those felonies directly relevant to truthfulness or veracity. [17] Thus, the decision whether to admit a prior conviction for impeachment purposes rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse. [18] We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in agreeing to conditionally admit the prior convictions. By testifying that he took the life of Jimenez in self-defense, Pineda placed his credibility squarely in issue. This is underscored by his admitted lies to the police at the time of his arrest and his attempts to mislead Woefle during their flight from Reno regarding whose knife was used in the altercation with Jimenez. [19] We have held, however, that prior to the admission of felony convictions for impeachment, a district court must determine whether the probative value of the proposed evidence substantially outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. [20] Pineda contends that the district court did not properly undertake this balancing exercise. The district court determined that Pineda's drug and terrorist threat convictions were probative of Pineda's credibility as a witness testifying in his own defense. Subsequently, the district court attempted to balance the competing interests associated with the introduction of the evidence by offering to redact any mention of the word terrorist from Pineda's second conviction. However, Pineda's counsel expressed concerns over the more personal connotation the remaining verbiage might engender in the minds of the jury and requested that the judge not redact any of the language in the judgment of conviction. We conclude that the district court carefully balanced the probative value of these two convictions against their possible prejudicial effect. Therefore, we conclude that the district court's ruling was not manifestly incorrect. [21]