Opinion ID: 2234512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: transfer from juvenile court

Text: Jon's transfer hearing took place over three days and included the testimony of seven witnesses. At the transfer hearing, Detective Harberts testified on behalf of the State. Harberts testified that after he asked Jon why he had shot the people, Harberts told another officer to place Jon under arrest. At the time, Harberts did not know Jon's age. At the jail, Harberts read Jon his Miranda rights, and Jon told Harberts what had happened that evening. Jon explained that he had received a detention that day for tardiness, and his grandparents were complaining to him about the detention. Jon became angry because his grandparents kept going on about the detention, so after several minutes of criticism, he went into the bathroom. He then left the bathroom and went to his grandfather's bedroom to get his grandfather's gun and ammunition. Jon took the gun and the ammunition back into the bathroom and loaded the gun. Jon saw a Tilex bottle sitting on the bathtub and decided to shoot it. After Jon shot the Tilex bottle, he walked out of the bathroom and down the hall toward the living room. Jon's grandmother, Lila, was in the living room and saw Jon with the gun in his right hand. Lila screamed and backed up. Jon's grandfather, Keith, then came around the corner quickly. As Keith's head came into view, Jon raised the gun and shot Keith in the left side of the head. Keith fell to the floor and Lila attempted to run out the front door. Jon shot Lila in the upper left shoulder and the upper left area of her back. Lila made it out the door, but after going several steps, she fell down by a tree. Jon told Harberts that he chased Lila and attempted to pull the trigger again, but the gun jammed. Jon stood over Lila where she had fallen and attempted to unjam the gun so he could continue shooting her. Jon then went back into the house to get Lila's gun because he wanted to shoot her some more. Jon could not find the gun so he went into his bedroom and changed his clothes. Jon left the house with the gun and the bullets and went to his friend Steve Powell's home. Jon discovered that Steve Powell was not home, so he decided to return to his grandparents' home and give himself up. Harberts asked Jon if he recalled what he had said when Harberts asked Jon why he had shot the two people. Jon said he recalled saying that they pissed me off. I couldn't take it anymore, so I shot them. Harberts then asked Jon if he previously had thought about killing his grandparents. Jon said that he had thought about it a few times. Harberts asked Jon if he had figured out how he would kill his grandparents, and Jon replied that he would use a gun. When Harberts asked Jon if he had thought about killing other people, Jon responded that he had, and said that he would use a gun. Jon explained that he thought about killing other people if people made him mad. Harberts asked Jon if Jon would want to kill him if he made Jon mad. Jon said that he would not want to kill Harberts if he made him mad one time, but if Harberts made him mad several times, Jon would want to kill him. Jon denied any history of mental illness in his family and said that he had not consumed any illegal drugs or alcohol. After Harberts concluded his interview with Jon, he discovered that the tape of the interview did not record and asked Jon if he would do a second interview. Jon agreed, and a tape was made of the second interview. During the second interview, Harberts again read Jon his Miranda rights. Jon generally repeated the statements he had made in the first interview. Jon said that he did not start out the evening planning to kill his grandparents. He began thinking about it when his grandfather was talking to him and telling him that people would not hire him because he was late and that teachers would not like him because he was tardy. Jon said that at that time, it entered my mind that I was getting sick of this. Jon thought about it for 15 minutes before he went and got the gun. Harberts asked Jon if Jon remembered telling Harberts during the first interview that Jon had thought about killing other people. The following exchange then took place: [Harberts]: When I talked to you earlier you told me that at times you thought about killing other people, can you tell me about that? [Jon]: No sir. [Harberts]: You don't remember saying that? [Jon]: I don't want to talk about that. Harberts further testified that on May 10, 1995, he had a conversation with Pastor Davis, the pastor of the church that Jon and his grandparents attended. Pastor Davis told Harberts that, on April 2, 1995, he had a conversation with Keith Cearlock and asked Keith how Jon was doing since he had been expelled. Keith told Pastor Davis that Jon was not doing well and that Lila was afraid that Jon was going to physically harm her. Pastor Davis said that Keith told Jon that if Jon hit him, Keith would not hit back, but instead would get Jon while he was sleeping. Pastor Thomas Bryant then testified on behalf of the State. Bryant is the associate pastor and the principal of Park Meadows. Bryant testified that, on April 19, 1995, he, his wife, and Lila Cearlock were in his wife's office when Lila told them that Jon had slammed her hand down on the table and had shoved her up against the wall during a dispute over a television remote. On April 22, 1995, Bryant had a conversation with Keith concerning the incident with the remote and told Keith that Keith needed to discipline Jon or get him out of the home before somebody was hurt. Keith responded that he sure wouldn't paddle Jon because Jon was too big and strong. Bryant testified that, several times over the preceding year, Keith mentioned that he did not spank Jon anymore because he felt Jon was too big. Bryant testified that, on February 7, 1995, Jon had been expelled from Park Meadows. Bryant explained that there were several incidents leading to the expulsion. Jon had a long history of discipline problems. After Jon was expelled, however, a group of students asked Bryant to reconsider the expulsion. Bryant told the students that they could ask Jon about coming back to school. The students then spoke with Jon and told Bryant that he had said, I have been hurt all my life. I'm not going to be hurt anymore. From now on I will do the hurting. Bryant also had a conversation with Jon about returning to school. When Jon refused to agree to the conditions necessary for his return to school, Bryant told Jon not to turn his back on God. Jon responded that he intended to commit every sin that I want to commit. I'm going to do anything and everything I want to do, and when I hit rock bottom, then I will call on God. The next witness to testify on behalf of the State was Kim Turner, a juvenile probation officer for Logan County. Turner prepared a social investigation report of Jon based upon police reports, interviews with Jon and his mother and father, psychiatric information, and school records. Turner noted that Jon had been hospitalized in the Psychiatric Institute when he was five years old and again when he was six years old. Aside from an evaluation concerning his fitness to stand trial, however, Jon had no other psychiatric treatment or evaluations since he was six years old. Turner said that, when Jon first moved in with his grandparents, records showed that Jon's mother said Jon had become so aggressive that he was unmanageable. The discharge summary from Jon's first stay at the Psychiatric Institute indicated that Jon was assaultive toward his classmates, constantly goading and threatening them. Jon also had admitted that he could harm his mother. Jon's discharge summary from his second stay at the Psychiatric Institute noted that Jon had been quite hostile, threatening, and even aggressive toward peers. In addition, Jon had been aggressive toward his siblings. Turner testified that she did not believe that Jon had an appropriate support system available to him, as his grandparents had been killed and his parents were not an option for placement. Turner checked with a program that takes more violent offenders, but the director of admissions indicated that Jon would not be appropriate for their facility. Turner said that, based upon Jon's lack of support, the lack of a treatment plan, and the nature of his criminal offenses, Jon's chance of rehabilitation was unlikely. She did not think that a plan of rehabilitation could be developed, in light of Jon's inability to change his behavior in the past. Turner testified that, if Jon was committed to the Department of Corrections through the juvenile court, he would go to the reception center for the Juvenile Department of Corrections, which provides treatment for any psychological or psychiatric disorders. The facility also would be able to deal with Jon's ADD. If Jon was sentenced to the Department of Corrections as an adult, he still would first go to the Juvenile Department of Corrections, and would be held there until the age of 21 unless there was some problem. If Jon was a security risk or a real problem, he could be transferred to the adult Department of Corrections at age 17 or age 18. If Jon was sentenced through the juvenile system, he would be released at the age of 21. Turner said that the adult division of the Department of Corrections had the same services available as the juvenile division as far as treatment for any psychiatric or psychological disorders. In Turner's interview with Jon, Jon told her that his grandfather's usual form of punishment was grounding, although in the past his grandfather had used a strap to spank him. Jon did not tell Turner that his grandfather had spanked him on the night of the killings. On cross-examination, Turner said that, in preparing her report, she took into account the fact that Jon had no prior history with the police. Jon's mother, Glenda Ashworth, then testified on his behalf. Glenda said that Jon was put on medication for his ADD after both of his stays at the Psychiatric Institute. The Cearlocks did not like the fact that Jon was on medication and took Jon off his medication. Glenda said that Jon told her that on the night of the shootings Lila had been nagging him all night about his detention. Keith then told Jon that he would never amount to anything, and Jon smarted off. Keith then hit Jon five times with his razor strap. Jon then got the gun and went into the bathroom. While in the bathroom, the gun went off, and the Cearlocks came running down the hall. Jon then stepped into the hallway and shot them. In addition to the foregoing testimony, a report prepared by Dr. Robert Chapman was admitted into evidence at the transfer hearing. Dr. Chapman had conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Jon to determine his fitness to stand trial. Jon told Dr. Chapman that his grandparents constantly were negative and complaining. Jon said that his grandparents did not like Jon's father because Jon's father was not Christian perfect. Dr. Chapman noted that the records from the Psychiatric Institute showed that Jon had been in the institute for three months when he was five years old and for two months when he was six years old. Jon was placed on antidepressant medication during both stays. Jon told Dr. Chapman about the events leading to the murders. Jon told Dr. Chapman that, after Keith hit Jon with the razor strap, Jon went into the bathroom, left the bathroom to get Keith's gun, and then returned to the bathroom and began loading the gun out of anger. Jon then shot a Tilex bottle and came out of the bathroom again. Lila saw Jon and began backing away. Jon told Dr. Chapman, I knew I had to do something or they would call the police. Jon said he panicked, and when Keith came around the corner, Jon shot him. As Lila turned to run, Jon shot her in the back, then tried to shoot her some more but the gun jammed. Jon claimed that although it had been hard for him to remember he had received a spanking from Keith on the day of the murders because he tried to put that stuff out of his mind, he later remembered the spanking and told his attorney. In his interview with Dr. Chapman, Jon denied that he had ever thought about killing his grandparents before. Jon claimed that he retrieved Keith's gun in order to shoot himself. After Jon impulsively shot the Tilex bottle, he knew he had to do something because he believed Keith would kill him. Jon said that he shot Lila because he knew he had to shoot her to get everybody's attention. Jon also admitted to intrusive thoughts of shooting the people at church. Dr. Chapman opined that Jon had not acted in a premeditated manner at the time of the shootings, but instead had acted in a state of sudden and intense passion. The decision to permit prosecution of a juvenile under the criminal law is a matter of judicial discretion, although that discretion is limited and controlled by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1994)). People v. M.D., 101 Ill.2d 73, 83, 77 Ill.Dec. 744, 461 N.E.2d 367 (1984). Under the provisions of the Act in effect at the time of Jon's transfer, a juvenile court judge could enter an order permitting a minor 13 years of age or older to be prosecuted under the criminal laws of the state if the judge found that it was not in the best interests of the minor or of the public to proceed under this Act. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(a) (West 1994) (repealed by Pub. Act 90-590, art. 2001,  2001-15, eff. January 1, 1999, now 705 ILCS 405/5-805 (West 2000)). Pursuant to section 5-4(3)(b) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(b) (West 1994) (repealed by Pub. Act 90-590, art. 2001,  2001-15, eff. January 1, 1999, now 705 ILCS 405/5-805 (West 2000))), a trial court was to consider, among other matters, seven factors in reaching a decision on whether to prosecute a particular minor as an adult. M.D., 101 Ill.2d at 83-84, 77 Ill. Dec. 744, 461 N.E.2d 367. Those seven factors were: (i) whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return an indictment; (ii) whether there is evidence that the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner; (iii) the age of the minor; (iv) the previous history of the minor; (v) whether there are facilities particularly available to the Juvenile Court for the treatment and rehabilitation of the minor; (vi) whether the best interest of the minor and the security of the public may require that the minor continue in custody or under supervision for a period extending beyond his minority; [and] (vii) whether the minor possessed a deadly weapon when committing the alleged offense. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(b) (West 1994). Looking at the statutory factors, the juvenile court in this case found that the grand jury would be expected to return an indictment. The court also found that the alleged offenses had been committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner. Third, the court noted that, if Jon were four months older, he automatically would be transferred to adult court. With regard to Jon's history, the fourth factor, the court stated that Jon had an unusual and a sad life, and that his parents and grandparents had failed him by not seeing that his medication and his treatment for ADD were continued. The court next found that there were not any facilities unique to juveniles that were not available to adults, and that, in any event, even if Jon should be convicted in adult court, he first would go to the juvenile division. As to the sixth factor, whether it was in the interest of the minor and the public that custody continue past Jon's minority, the court observed that if Jon should be convicted in juvenile court, he would be released at age 21 whether or not he was rehabilitated. Finally, the court found that Jon did have a deadly weapon when committing the offenses. The court then stated that after balancing the statutory factors, along with the fact that if Jon stood convicted of a couple first degree murders, that his sentence of mandatory imprisonment would be imposed, the court concluded that it was in the best interest of the public that Jon be transferred to the adult division of the courts. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the transfer from juvenile court to adult court. As noted, Jon argues that the appellate court erred in affirming his transfer from juvenile court to the circuit court. Jon contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in its consideration of the factors set forth in section 5-4 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-4 (West 1994)). Jon argues that a balancing of those factors weighs against transfer. Jon also maintains that the juvenile court misunderstood the sentence that would be imposed if Jon was tried and convicted as an adult. It is clear that the purpose of a transfer proceeding is to balance the best interests of a juvenile offender, particularly as the offender's interests relate to his potential for rehabilitation, against society's legitimate interest in being protected from criminal victimization perpetrated by minors. People v. Clark, 119 Ill.2d 1, 12, 115 Ill.Dec. 613, 518 N.E.2d 138 (1987). In striking this balance, a juvenile court judge is to weigh the facts of the alleged crime, particularly whether the crime was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner. Clark, 119 Ill.2d at 12, 115 Ill.Dec. 613, 518 N.E.2d 138. Jon argues that the juvenile court judge in this case improperly considered that the crime had been committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner. Jon denies that there was evidence he had previously talked about killing his grandparents. In support of this argument, Jon notes that he was not lying in wait for his grandparents, that he actually was contemplating suicide when he retrieved the gun, and that he irrationally shot the Tilex bottle, causing him to panic and believe that Keith would kill him. Jon further claims there was a lack of planning as to how he was going to escape, evidenced by his changing of clothes and walking toward Steve Powell's house. Jon also cites two cases where a juvenile's acts were found to be premeditated, and notes that in those cases, in contrast to his case, the defendants planned the crime, armed themselves, and made specific plans to cover up their conduct. See People v. D.B., 202 Ill.App.3d 194, 147 Ill.Dec. 533, 559 N.E.2d 873 (1990); People v. Beck, 190 Ill.App.3d 748, 138 Ill.Dec. 72, 546 N.E.2d 1127 (1989). Finally, Jon observes that the appellate court in this case conceded that the shooting of Keith was not a planned act. We find sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that the offenses in this case occurred in an aggressive and premeditated manner. In contrast to Jon's statements to Dr. Chapman, Detective Harberts testified that when he first interviewed Jon, Jon told Harberts that he had thought about killing his grandparents a few times previously, and figured he would use a gun. During the second interview, Jon told Harberts that he did not start the evening planning to kill his grandparents, but began thinking about it when Keith was yelling at Jon about his tardiness. Jon never told Harberts that Keith had beaten him with a razor strap prior to the shootings. Jon said that he thought about killing his grandparents for around 15 minutes before he got the gun. Jon also said that he chased Lila out of the house and attempted to shoot her again, but the gun jammed. Jon then went into the house to retrieve Lila's gun so that he could shoot her some more. In a transfer hearing under the Act, the State need only present evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause. People v. Taylor, 76 Ill.2d 289, 304, 29 Ill.Dec. 103, 391 N.E.2d 366 (1979). Here, the State presented evidence that Jon had thought of killing his grandparents before, had thought about how he would kill them, and had thought about killing them for approximately 15 minutes prior to obtaining the gun. With regard to Lila, the State presented evidence that Jon tried to shoot her even after she had fallen, and even tried to find Lila's gun so that he could continue shooting her after Keith's gun jammed. Moreover, although Jon contends that he was so afraid of his grandparents that he acted impulsively, Jon did not tell the officers or Kim Turner that Keith had hit him with a razor strap prior to the murders. Thus, while Jon's actions may not have been as planned as those of the defendants in D.B. and Beck, we find the State's evidence of premeditation was sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause. In addition to the facts of the alleged crime, including premeditation and aggressiveness, a juvenile court judge is to consider the age of the offender and his previous history, is to ascertain the availability of treatment and rehabilitative services for the juvenile, and is to determine whether the best interests of the minor and of the public may require that the minor continue in custody beyond his minority. Clark, 119 Ill.2d at 13, 115 Ill.Dec. 613, 518 N.E.2d 138. This court has declined to prescribe a mathematical formula to govern a judge's discretion in weighing each factor. Taylor, 76 Ill.2d at 305, 29 Ill.Dec. 103, 391 N.E.2d 366. Jon, however, argues that the juvenile court erred in considering these factors. For example, Jon claims that the juvenile court failed to consider his age in light of his sheltered life experiences, his lack of a prior criminal history, and his tragic life. Jon distinguishes his case from those where juvenile defendants were found to be so streetwise and experienced beyond their years that they had ceased being children. See People v. M.D., 101 Ill.2d 73, 86, 77 Ill.Dec. 744, 461 N.E.2d 367 (1984) (juvenile was not a stranger to adult experiences, including drinking alcohol, using marijuana, and having sex); In re L.J., 274 Ill.App.3d 977, 980, 211 Ill.Dec. 209, 654 N.E.2d 671 (1995) (L.J. had life experiences of someone way beyond his age and, in reality, had ceased being a minor). Rather, Jon claims his case is similar to People v. D.B., 202 Ill.App.3d 194, 147 Ill.Dec. 533, 559 N.E.2d 873 (1990), where the denial of the State's motion to transfer was affirmed, based in part upon the fact that the juvenile did not exhibit the experience of someone well beyond his years. Jon also finds close parallels between his case and that of the minor in In re Burns, 67 Ill.App.3d 361, 366, 24 Ill.Dec. 255, 385 N.E.2d 22 (1978), where the court found that the juvenile's history of neglect, deprivation, emotional impoverishment and chaos favored treatment as a seriously troubled adolescent rather than as an adult. While we do not read the trial court's ruling as granting the State's motion for transfer simply because Jon was only four months shy of an automatic transfer, we note that this case is not as similar to D.B. and to Burns as Jon represents. In fact, one highly significant difference is that in both D.B. and Burns, the juveniles did not personally participate in the killing of the victims, but instead were held legally accountable. See D.B., 202 Ill.App.3d at 202, 147 Ill.Dec. 533, 559 N.E.2d 873 (although legally accountable for the murder, respondent did not personally kill); Burns, 67 Ill.App.3d at 364, 24 Ill.Dec. 255, 385 N.E.2d 22 (even though [Burns] may be legally accountable for the murder which occurred, the evidence also suggests that [Burns] did not premeditate, or even take part in, the actual stabbing). Therefore, we are not persuaded that Jon's case is so similar to D.B. and Burns that Jon's transfer was an abuse of discretion. In any event, in reviewing a juvenile court's order transferring a minor, this court does not reweigh the factors. Rather, to affirm an order transferring a minor to criminal court, this court must determine if there was sufficient evidence in the record as to each statutory factor to support the transfer order. Clark, 119 Ill.2d at 18, 115 Ill.Dec. 613, 518 N.E.2d 138. Here, the juvenile court received extensive evidence concerning Jon's history, as presented through the testimony of Kim Turner and Glenda Ashworth, and the report of Dr. Chapman. There was significant testimony concerning Jon's sheltered background, his lack of prior contact with the police, and his shuttling between his mother's home and his grandparents' home. Consequently, there was sufficient evidence in the record as to Jon's age and history. Jon also contends that the juvenile court failed to consider Jon's potential for rehabilitation, and failed to receive and evaluate information about the type of facilities available for treatment and rehabilitation. Jon further claims that the juvenile court failed to make any meaningful analysis of Jon's interest versus society's interests. As discussed, a statutorily proper evaluation of a minor's history also includes receipt and review of information concerning the minor's familial support for any possible treatment or rehabilitation, in addition to any prior involvement in the juvenile justice system. Clark, 119 Ill.2d at 17, 115 Ill.Dec. 613, 518 N.E.2d 138. A juvenile judge also must receive and evaluate information concerning the type of facilities available for the treatment or rehabilitation of the minor, and must evaluate the likely effectiveness of those facilities in light of the history and present circumstances of the minor. Clark, 119 Ill.2d at 17, 115 Ill.Dec. 613, 518 N.E.2d 138. Here, although Jon disputes the juvenile court's weighing of these factors, it is clear from the record that Turner's testimony presented information concerning the type of facilities available for Jon's treatment or rehabilitation, as well as the likely effectiveness of those facilities in light of Jon's history and present circumstances. Turner was of the opinion that Jon did not have familial support for any possible treatment or rehabilitation. In fact, Turner's opinion was that Jon's chance of rehabilitation was unlikely given Jon's lack of support, the lack of a treatment plan, and the nature of his criminal offenses. Turner also stated that Jon would first go to the Juvenile Department of Corrections, where he would receive treatment for any psychiatric disorders and for his ADD. The adult division of the Department of Corrections had the same services available. In light of this information, we find no merit to Jon's claim that the juvenile court failed to consider his sheltered life experiences, his lack of a prior criminal history, and his tragic life. Nor do we find support for Jon's contention that the juvenile court failed to consider Jon's potential for rehabilitation, and failed to receive and evaluate information about the type of facilities available for treatment and rehabilitation. The juvenile court simply found that these factors did not outweigh the factors supporting a transfer. Where a juvenile judge considers evidence on the statutory factors and any other relevant evidence, the resulting decision is a product of sound, judicial discretion and will not be disturbed on review. Clark, 119 Ill.2d at 14, 115 Ill.Dec. 613, 518 N.E.2d 138. We also find no merit to Jon's claim that the juvenile court failed to make any meaningful analysis of Jon's interests versus society's interests. With regard to this factor, the juvenile court noted that there was a lot of argument concerning whether Jon could be rehabilitated before he reached majority, and noted that if Jon went through the juvenile court, he would be released whether he had been rehabilitated or not, and there would be no continued supervision. Although it is clear from the record that Jon had suffered a tragic life and had been failed by his parents and grandparents, the fact remains that he committed two homicides and had admitted to intrusive thoughts of killing those who angered him. Indeed, it is worth noting that in a later version of the Act, the legislature amended the statute on discretionary transfers to add: In considering these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the minor's prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed in this subsection. (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-805 (West 2000). Here, there was sufficient probable cause to establish that Jon's interests did not outweigh society's interest in requiring that Jon continue in custody beyond his minority. In addition to Jon's claim that the juvenile court erred in weighing the statutory factors, Jon also argues that the juvenile court misunderstood the sentence that would be imposed if Jon should be tried and convicted as an adult. The juvenile court stated that if Jon was convicted of a couple of first degree murders, a sentence of mandatory imprisonment would be imposed. Jon notes that if he was convicted of one first degree murder in criminal court, mandatory imprisonment would be imposed (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1) (West 1994)). However, he would face mandatory life imprisonment if convicted of two first degree murders (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1994)). Jon argues that this court's decision in Clark mandates that the court be aware and evaluate a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole upon conviction for two first degree murders. We decline to attribute great weight to the trial court's statement that if Jon should be convicted of a couple of first degree murders, a sentence of mandatory imprisonment would be imposed. As the appellate court observed in affirming the juvenile court's decision to transfer, a court is presumed to know the law regarding a potential sentence, and both the State and defense counsel had informed the juvenile court of the proper sentence. 307 Ill.App.3d 707, 240 Ill.Dec. 725, 718 N.E.2d 206 (unpublished material under Supreme Court Rule 23). Further, this case is distinguishable from our decision in Clark, where we found that there was not one scintilla of evidence in the record of the transfer proceeding that would have apprised anyone that the transfer could result in a term of natural life imprisonment. Clark, 119 Ill.2d at 16, 115 Ill.Dec. 613, 518 N.E.2d 138. Here, in contrast, there is evidence in the record of proceeding that Jon's transfer could result in a term of natural life imprisonment. Consequently, we agree with the appellate court that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion to transfer.