Opinion ID: 2536666
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether substantial evidence supported the challenged findings

Text: Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [13] We will not reweigh evidence or choose between competing inferences reasonably drawn from evidence. [14]
The manager found that Button was convicted in January 2004 of a misdemeanor in Skagway for improper use of evidence of vehicle registration or certificate of title, [15] and that Button was convicted in March 2003 of violating an HBC prohibition on soliciting on public property. [16] Button argues that these findings were not supported by substantial evidence because the judgment and order relied upon by the manager were inadmissible hearsay that was not within any exception to the hearsay rule. The Alaska Administrative Code does not require hearing officers at administrative hearings to follow the Alaska Rules of Evidence. [17] The strict rules of evidence governing admissibility of hearsay in judicial proceedings do not apply to administrative hearings, and we will not reverse an administrative judgment based on hearsay unless the hearsay was inherently unreliable or jeopardized the fairness of the proceedings. [18] A hearing officer may reasonably rely on a certified copy of a record of conviction. [19] Button does not claim that the evidence of his convictions was unreliable, and we conclude that admitting the convictions into evidence did not jeopardize the fairness of the adversarial hearing. Also, the convictions were properly relied upon under the manager's explanation that hearsay could be used only to supplement or explain direct evidence. Button admitted to having been convicted of soliciting for tours in Haines, and to committing the conduct underlying the Skagway conviction. Button's own admissions provided substantial direct evidence to support the findings, even absent consideration of the hearsay evidence.
Two of the manager's factual findings and one finding made in the first instance by the assembly concerned operation of Button's catamaran during the summer of 2004:(1) on one occasion, Button asked a customer to drive Button's catamaran and pose as a potential buyer to circumvent Coast Guard safety regulations; (2) in August [Chilkat Cruises fast ferry Captain Mark] Mitcheltree witnessed Button captaining his ocean tour with an overloaded boat; and (3) Button admitted that on numerous occasions he used a customer as a crew member to overload his catamaran and circumvent Coast Guard safety regulations. Button argues that all three findings were unsupported by substantial evidence. Button argues that the first finding was unsupported by substantial evidence because the manager relied on inadmissible hearsay, a letter from the customer, Daniel Downing. Downing's letter was properly considered because hearsay is admissible at administrative hearings [20] and because it served to supplement or explain direct evidence. Downing's letter stated that on the morning of a trip he had booked with Button, Downing was told by Button that he did not have a captain for the trip and was asked by Button to run the boat, taking two other clients along with him. The letter further stated that Button told Downing that if he ran the boat under the idea that [he] was `test driving it as a prospective buyer' then [Button] could go around the Coast Guard since they watch him so closely. Downing declined. Button admitted at the hearing that he had asked Downing if he wanted to captain the boat and that Downing had declined. Button did not deny at the hearing Downing's allegation Button told Downing to pose as a potential buyer to circumvent Coast Guard regulations that require the boat to be captained by a licensed operator [21] and that limit the number of passengers. [22] Downing's letter served to supplement and explain Button's own admissions and was therefore properly considered. Together, Button's testimony and the letter are substantial evidence supporting the finding that Button asked Downing to pose as a potential buyer in order to circumvent Coast Guard safety regulations. Button argues that the second finding was unsupported by substantial evidence because he contends that he was not captaining the boat and that the boat was not overloaded. Substantial evidence did not support the findings of overloading. There was some evidence permitting the manager to find that Button was captaining the boat. [23] But there was no evidence the boat was overloaded on that occasion. There was instead evidence Button had five passengers on board that day. [24] This evidence established that Button's boat was not overloaded, [25] and there was no contrary evidence. The finding that Button captained an overloaded boat was therefore unsupported by substantial evidence. It appears that the numerous occasions component of the third finding was made by the assembly independent of the manager's findings of fact. We review the assembly's finding applying the same substantial evidence standard that we apply to the manager's findings. Button argues that because he admitted to using a passenger as a crew member one time only, the assembly's finding that he admitted he did so on numerous occasions was not supported by substantial evidence. Button did admit at the hearing that he had asked a passenger to pose as a crew member on one occasion, in order to circumvent Coast Guard regulations. The manager's finding that Button used a passenger as `crew' so he could overload his boat was therefore supported by substantial evidence. But there was no evidence Button admitted to doing so on more than one occasion. Substantial evidence therefore did not support the numerous occasions part of the third finding.
The manager made two additional findings: (1) in June 2004 Button pressured Captain Mitcheltree to exceed the capacity of Captain Mitcheltree's fast ferry in order to transport some of Button's passengers; and (2) Button admitted he stopped in the middle of a public roadway and impeded the flow of traffic, in violation of the Haines Tour Operator Code of Conduct. Button argues that the first finding was not supported by substantial evidence because the evidence was as consistent with an inference that he merely appealed to Captain Mitcheltree or reasonably requested boarding, as it was with an inference that he pressured Captain Mitcheltree. The evidence was undisputed that in June 2004 Button attempted to secure passage for several of his tour customers on Captain Mitcheltree's ferry, but was unable to get all of them on board because the ferry was full. Captain Mitcheltree testified that Button put a couple of little girls in front of me and was like these two little girls don't take up much room ... why can't you take a couple of little kids. Captain Mitcheltree described this as a pressure situation in which Button was trying to make him feel like the bad guy. Button admitted at the hearing that it [c]ould've happened. This was substantial evidence from which the manager could have concluded that Button pressured Captain Mitcheltree, and could have rejected Button's characterization that he reasonably requested boarding. We will not reweigh the evidence or choose between competing inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence. [26] Button next argues that the public roadway finding was not supported by substantial evidence because much of the evidence the manager relied on was inadmissible hearsay. The record contains several complaints that Button stopped in the middle of the road. The clerk testified that she received these complaints. Button admitted at the hearing that he stopped two or three times in or on the road to pick people up or let people off. The hearsay evidence supporting this finding was not unreliable. [27] The manager therefore properly considered the complaints and the clerk's testimony to explain or supplement Button's own admissions. That evidence was substantial evidence supporting the finding that Button stopped in the middle of the road.