Opinion ID: 2063931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Counts I & II of the Rosselle's Complaint and the Provisions of the Odometer Act

Text: In both Counts I & II of their complaint, the Rosselles allege violations of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 580.5. 15 U.S.C.A. 1988(b) provided that [n]o transferor shall violate any rule prescribed under this section. ... (Emphasis added). Section 1988(b), then, does not itself impose any direct obligation on transferors to make odometer disclosures; [4] it only requires that transferors follow rules prescribed by the Secretary under the authority of § 1988(a), which imposes a direct obligation on the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe those rules to be followed by transferors under subsection (b). [5] 15 U.S.C.A. § 1989(a), which creates a private cause of action, merely prohibits the violation of any requirement imposed under this subchapter. Thus, even assuming the Secretary violated a requirement of 15 U.S.C.A. 1988(a) by exempting transferors of large trucks from the disclosure requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 580.5, Speedway did no more than follow the rules prescribed by the Secretary, which is all that 15 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b)  and therefore 15 U.S.C.A. § 1989(a)  required. [6] That is, because the plain and unambiguous language of the Odometer Act imposed no obligation on a transferor of a motor vehicle to make any mileage disclosure, but imposed instead only an obligation to follow the rules prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation, we conclude that it was the intent of Congress that transferors of motor vehicles be able to rely on those rules without later being subject to liability because a court has declared one or more of the rules invalid. Speedway was, therefore, entitled to rely on the truck exemption of 49 C.F.R. § 580.6(a)(1)  regardless of its validity  and is now entitled to summary judgment in its favor on Counts I and II of the Roselles' complaint.