Opinion ID: 27814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether Ronald Green had three prior convictions

Text: 21 Ronald Green was sentenced to mandatory life for conspiracy (count 1) and distribution of cocaine base (count 6) pursuant to the recidivist provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), one prior conviction makes the range twenty years to life; two prior convictions make the sentence mandatory life. Prior convictions must be felony drug offenses that are final, i.e., all times for appeal and filing for certiorari have expired. This court reviews the application of sentencing provisions and the sentencing guidelines de novo and the facts supporting those applications for clear error. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 877. 22 Green argues that because the offenses used occurred after the beginning of the conspiracy they are not prior convictions. 5 Because the conspiracy was a continuing offense that began in 1990 and continued until May 1998, see United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir.1994) and United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 167 (5th Cir.1998), the offenses can be considered prior and enhance Green's sentence for conspiracy. 23 Green further argues that the three narcotics convictions the government used to enhance his sentence pursuant to § 841(b) were actually only one offense because they occurred within minutes of each other. On September 14, 1990, a police officer observed Ronald Green sell crack to individuals in a Ford LTD. Minutes later Green sold to an undercover officer not related to the persons in the Ford. Shortly after this second trade another narcotics agent spoke to a Mr. Caesar about a trade. Caesar called Green over to the vehicle to complete the sale. Green pled guilty to the three counts on June 15, 1992, and was sentenced to six years in prison. 24 The Fifth Circuit has adopted the reasoning of United States v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir.1994), that separate convictions constitute only one offense when the violations occur simultaneously but more than one when they occur sequentially. United States v. Ressler, 54 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir.1995). United States v. Barr explicitly adopted this test for determining whether two separate convictions constitute a single act of criminality for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 130 F.3d 711 (5th Cir. 1997). 25 Hudspeth states that when considering whether multiple convictions arose out of `separate and distinct criminal episodes,' [the court should look] to the nature of the crimes, the identities of the victims, and the locations. 42 F.3d at 1019. Among other cases, Hudspeth cites United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir.1990), which held that burglaries of three stores in one shopping mall by one defendant in the same night constituted three separate offenses. The Tisdale court reasoned that [a]fter the defendant `successfully completed' burglarizing one business, he was free to leave. The fact that he chose, instead, to burglarize another business is evidence of his intent to engage in a separate criminal episode. 921 F.2d at 1099. 26 Though the three offenses here occurred within minutes of each other, they are distinct because they were sales to different individuals and each transaction was complete in and of itself. They were only related in that they occurred at the same place within a short period of time and defendant was the seller in all three. We affirm the sentence enhancement on the conspiracy charge.