Opinion ID: 1898254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Murray v. Laird Revisited

Text: The Chancery Court found in the case of the March 29, 1967, deed, that a confidential relationship did exist and that a presumption of undue influence arose as to the execution of the March 29, 1967, deed. The major factual circumstance generating this finding was Mary's service as guardian of Matt's estate from February 5, 1959, until May 6, 1968. In this the Court was correct. A legal relationship such as that found here may often undergird a finding of ultimate fact that a confidential relationship exists. See Costello v. Hall, 506 So.2d 293, 296-97 (Miss. 1987). The Court further found that Mary had successfully rebutted the presumption of undue influence. The Court relied on the testimony of Elaine Arnold and Ebbie Patt, Jr. Arnold testified that in the spring of 1965 Matt had declared to her, in private, his intention to give his land to Mary and her husband. Patt testified that in 1982 Matt told him, in the presence of Matt's sister, Iva, that he had given his land to Mary because she had taken care of him. The Chancery Court stated: There appear to be no hard and fast rules to say what evidence is sufficient to rebut a presumption of undue influence. It is persuasive to this court, however, that the grantor disclosed his intention to a disinterested person prior to executing the deed and subsequently acknowledged to another disinterested person some fifteen years later that he had made such a deed. We can understand how the Court reached its conclusion that there appear to be no hard and fast rules. In the recent case of Murray v. Laird, 446 So.2d 575 (Miss. 1984), this Court described a three prong test: When the circumstances give rise to a presumption of undue influence, the burden of going forward with the proof shifts to the grantee/beneficiary to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) good faith on the part of the grantee/beneficiary; (2) grantor's full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences; and (3) advice of (a) a competent person, (b) disconnected from the grantee and (c) devoted wholly to the grantor/testator's interest. Murray, 446 So.2d at 578. Other cases have stated the test more loosely, particularly the third prong. The independent advice prong of Murray has been read too strictly. Considering the heavy burden placed upon one seeking to overcome the presumption of undue influence, we find it necessary to redefine the third prong of the Murray test. This we do to the end that the power our law vests in property owners to make bona fide inter vivos gifts not be practically thwarted by often impossible evidentiary encumbrances. We declare that the appropriate third prong of the test is a requirement that the grantee/beneficiary prove by clear and convincing evidence that the grantor/testator exhibited independent consent and action. A quick summary of this state's law relative to the proof necessary to rebut a presumption of undue influence will show that the reading Murray has been given overstates the rule requiring independent consent and action by turning it into a seemingly uncompromising requirement of independent advice. Independent advice is but one way independent consent and action may be shown. Therefore, the factors listed in Murray, in the discussion of the independent adviser's role, 446 So.2d at 579, should be treated as factors that may be considered where independent consent and action is proven by independent advice. The history makes clear the point. In the seminal case of Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190 (1858), this Court held that to rebut successfully a presumption of the invalidity of a will or deed, procured by a guardian from a ward, the grantee/beneficiary must demonstrate the fullest deliberation on the part of the grantor and abundant good faith on the part of the grantee/beneficiary. Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. at 258-59. Almost seventy years later, in Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161, 110 So. 583 (1926), this Court adopted the language of 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.) § 957, which states that a presumption of the invalidity of a transaction between parties to a fiduciary or confidential relationship can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of good faith, of full knowledge, and of independent consent and action. The Ham Court went on to hold that the evidence failed to establish that the grantor had full knowledge of the value of the property conveyed, of the relation of the consideration therefor thereto, and that it was executed of his own independent consent and action. Ham, 110 So. at 585. It is important to note that the Ham opinion uses the independent consent and action language. In the next sentence the Court adds: The usual method of proving independent consent and action in such cases, and probably the only way it can be clearly proven, is by showing that in making the deed the grantor acted on the advice of a competent person disconnected from the grantee and devoted wholly to the grantor's interest. [citations omitted] Ham, 110 So. at 585. While this is indeed a strong suggestion, this Court has not demanded routinely, a showing of independent advice in the cases that have followed. Since Ham, some cases have required a showing of independent advice. See Watkins v. Martin, 167 Miss. 343, 147 So. 652, 654 (1933); Wofford v. Wofford, 244 Miss. 442, 459-61, 142 So.2d 188 (1962); In re Will of Moses, 227 So.2d 829 (Miss. 1969); Jones v. Singley, 242 So.2d 430, 435 (Miss. 1970); Hendricks v. James, 421 So.2d 1031, 1043-45 (Miss. 1982). Other cases have cited only the Ham rule that evidence of good faith, of full knowledge and of independent consent and action are necessary, omitting any reference to the Ham independent advice language. See McElveen v. McElveen, 233 Miss. 672, 677, 103 So.2d 439, 442 (Miss. 1958); Thomas v. Jolly, 251 Miss. 448, 454, 170 So.2d 16, 20 (Miss. 1964); Jones v. Jones, 246 So.2d 486, 487 (Miss. 1971); Mansell v. Gross, 345 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Miss. 1977). In Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 725, 726, 115 So.2d 683, 688-89, 691 (Miss. 1959), this Court, cited both relevant portions of Ham, then held that the presumption could be overcome only by clear evidence of good faith, full knowledge and independent consent and action, and that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the grantor had acted with a deliberate and independent purpose of his own. In Manning v. Hammond, 234 Miss. 299, 304, 106 So.2d 51, 54-55 (Miss. 1958) and Leggett v. Graham, 218 So.2d 892, 895 (Miss. 1969) this Court, without citing Ham, stated that the presumption of undue influence could be rebutted with evidence of independent action. Most recent cases have followed Murray. See Harris v. Sellers, 446 So.2d 1012 (Miss. 1984); Kelly v. Shoemake, 460 So.2d 811 (Miss. 1984); Matter of Launius, 507 So.2d 27 (Miss. 1987). Since Murray, however, this Court has had occasion to state the three part test simply as that requiring good faith, full knowledge, and independent consent and action. See Estate of Lawler v. Weston, 451 So.2d 739, 743 (Miss. 1984). As stated above, we declare that independent consent and action is the appropriate third prong of the test. We are led to this view by our historical review of this state's common law and, as well, by common sense. The three prongs of Murray, as hereby modified, are quite useful in determining whether a grantee such as Mary has proven the negative: the absence of undue influence. These prongs should not be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements that ought be rigidly exacted in every case. Undue influence is a practical, non-technical conception, a common sense notion of human behavior. As helpful as Murray may be to identify factors that ought be considered, common sense counsels against rigid, inflexible multi-part tests, particularly as the parties our law saddles with proof of the negatives are laymen, not legal technicians. Better that the scope of equitable principles be imperfectly defined than that justice be overborne by the weight of artificial rules. [1] Murray recognizes these premises. We note four statements made by the Court in Murray v. Laird . Counsel asks for guidelines from this Court; however, this Court cannot set forth guides that fit all situations. Of necessity, each case must be determined individually on its merits.       However, from case decisions some affirmative and positive factors emerge that may be considered as significant to overcome the inference of the presumption.       The Court recognizes that prior disclosure of a donation is not a prerequisite to its validity; but the disclosure of intent made prior to execution of an instrument helps dilute the undue influence presumption.       Even after all testimony relating to these named factors is received, it is still to the trier of fact to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the worth of their testimony. Murray, 446 So.2d at 578-79. Applying the slightly modified Murray test, this Court must now determine whether the Chancery Court's finding that Mary had successfully rebutted the presumption of undue influence was manifestly erroneous and against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. See Part III above.