Opinion ID: 794838
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Tolling of supervised release

Text: 31 Finally, Ossa-Gallegos challenges the district court's authority to toll the period of supervised release during the time that he remains outside of the United States. Although Ossa-Gallegos recognizes that the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Isong, 111 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 1997), held that the period of a deported alien's supervised release may be tolled until he or she returns to this country, three circuits have since rejected that holding. See United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962 (11th Cir.2004); United States v. Juan-Manuel, 222 F.3d 480 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Balogun, 146 F.3d 141 (2d Cir.1998). Ossa-Gallegos therefore argues that the present case should serve as a vehicle for the reconsideration of Isong through en banc review. 32 In addition to specific, enumerated conditions that courts must place on supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) permits a district court to impose any other condition it considers to be appropriate so long as the condition is reasonably related to correctional or rehabilitative purposes. The majority in Isong concluded that the tolling of a deported alien's period of supervised release is reasonably related to rehabilitative purposes because aliens will generally not be supervised while in their country of removal. 111 F.3d at 431. Tolling of supervised release, according to the majority, is an appropriate way to make supervised release meaningful for defendants who are going to be deported. Id. 33 In dissent, Judge Moore argued that tolling is not a reasonable condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The dissent relied on the explicit statutory provision that the term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment. . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). In addition, the only statutory provision concerning the tolling of supervised release states that supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned. . . unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days. Id. The dissent cited the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) for the proposition that Congress intended for a defendant's incarceration to be the sole instance when tolling of supervised release is permitted. 111 F.3d at 432 (Moore, J., dissenting). Finally, the dissent reasoned that because 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) authorizes the sentencing court to order deportation as a condition of supervised release, the statutory scheme envisions the period of supervised release running during the alien's absence from the United States. Id. 34 The three other circuits to address this issue since Isong have all rejected its holding. They have relied on the reasons articulated by the dissent in Isong, in addition to concluding that the term any other condition in § 3583(d) should be limited to requirements that the defendant himself do or refrain from doing specified acts. Balogun, 146 F.3d at 145. Therefore, tolling, which relates to the timing of the supervised release rather than the conduct of the defendant, should not be viewed as a condition of the release because it relates to something beyond the control of the defendant and is substantively different from all of the other conditions expressly provided for under § 3583(d) and the Sentencing Guidelines. Okoko, 365 F.3d at 966 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 35 Notwithstanding the weight of authority from these other circuits and the strength of the dissent in Isong, we are bound by this circuit's holding in that case. See Salmi v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1985) (A panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.) Under the present state of Sixth Circuit law, therefore, Ossa-Gallegos will face a term of supervised release no matter how long he has been outside of the United States if and when he receives permission to reenter. Ossa-Gallegos, of course, is free to seek en banc review of this case if he so desires.