Opinion ID: 2466508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence: the burks' exception

Text: Before the death penalty can be imposed in Kentucky, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one aggravating factor, and the jury must designate any aggravating factors in writing. KRS 532.025(3). The prosecution carried this burden during the sentencing phase of Eldred's first trial. The jury found, in writing, the aggravating factor of murder for hire. This clearly distinguishes the instant case from both Bullington and Rumsey . In Rumsey , the trial court entered written findings denying the existence of each of the statutory aggravating factors. Rumsey at 211, 104 S.Ct. at 2310, 81 L.Ed.2d at 171. In Bullington , the Missouri sentencing statutes in effect at the time only required the jury to make written findings concerning aggravating factors if the death penalty was imposed. Bullington at 434, 101 S.Ct. at 1860, 68 L.Ed.2d at 276 (citing Mo.Rev.Stat. § 565.012.4 (1978)). It is fairly clear from reading Bullington and the case below, State Ex Rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo.1980), that the jury did not include in its verdict any determination as to the existence of aggravating factors. This distinction is extremely important and relevant. The Bullington Court found that Missouri's capital sentencing procedure created sentencing standards by which it could be determined objectively whether the prosecution had proved its case. Bullington at 444, 101 S.Ct. at 1860-61, 68 L.Ed.2d at 282. The Bullington Court relied on the inclusion of these sentencing standards to distinguish Bullington from other cases that have considered the application of double jeopardy principles to sentencing. Id. We conclude that the sentencing standards that the Bullington Court referred to are the state's burden to prove the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. In support of this conclusion, we note that the Bullington Court framed the issue before it as whether the reasoning of Stroud is also to apply under a system where a jury's sentencing decision is made at a bifurcated proceeding's second stage at which the prosecution has the burden of proving certain elements beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty may be imposed.  Bullington at 432, 101 S.Ct. at 1854-55, 68 L.Ed.2d at 274 (emphasis added). We find further support in Rumsey : The trial court entered findings denying the existence of each of the seven statutory aggravating circumstances, and as required by state law, the court then entered judgment in respondent's favor on the issue of death. That judgment, based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence, amounts to an acquittal on the merits and, as such, bars any retrial of the appropriateness of the death penalty. Rumsey at 211, 104 S.Ct. at 2310, 81 L.Ed.2d at 171 (emphasis added). Thus, in Rumsey there was an express finding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case that the death penalty was an appropriate sentence, and there was an implied finding of the same in Bullington . However, in this case, there was an express finding by the jury that the prosecution had carried its burden that death was an appropriate sentence for Eldred. Therefore, the insufficiency of evidence exception of Burks has no application to this case or to Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure when there has been an express finding of the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.