Opinion ID: 853347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: What Indiana Courts Have Said

Text: Supreme Court. In 1944 (around the time the private attorney general doctrine was born), this Court implicitly acknowledged its common-law authority to create exceptions to the American rule, and stated Indiana's baseline fee rule. Said Justice Shake, The right to recover attorneys' fees from one's opponent does not exist in the absence of a statute or some agreement, though a court of equity may, under some circumstances, allow attorneys' fees to be paid out of a fund brought under its control. Gavin v. Miller, 222 Ind. 459, 465, 54 N.E.2d 277, 280 (1944) (citations omitted)(estate administration case). See also Trotcky v. Van Sickle, 227 Ind. 441, 85 N.E.2d 638 (1949)(denying fees in a nuisance case). In City of Hammond v. Darlington, 241 Ind. 536, 542, 162 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1959), we applied this common fund concept flexibly to award fees to an attorney whose lawsuit prevented the City from paying judgments totaling $950,000. In Kikkert v. Krumm, 474 N.E.2d 503, 505 (Ind.1985), we discussed the obdurate behavior exception to the American rule, but found it inapplicable under the facts presented. The following year, the Indiana legislature codified this exception in what is now Ind.Code Ann. § 34-52-1-1 (West 2001). The General Recovery Rule allows prevailing parties to recover attorney fees if the court finds the other party brought or pursued a frivolous, unreasonable or groundless claim or defense, or acted in bad faith. Id. at § 34-52-1-1(b). Court of Appeals. In a number of cases, our Court of Appeals has referred to the three American rule exceptions listed above, in order to provide context for a case holding. [4] In City of Marion v. Antrobus, 448 N.E.2d 325, 332 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983), the court went so far as to say that Indiana recognized all three exceptions. See also City of E. Chicago v. Broomes, 468 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Ind.Ct.App.1984); Dotlich v. Dotlich, 475 N.E.2d 331, 347 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). In Downing v. City of Columbus, 505 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), however, the court correctly observed that the private attorney general exception had been discussed only in dicta, and never applied in Indiana to award a prevailing party its fees. More recently, in Morgan County v. Ferguson, 712 N.E.2d 1038, 1044 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), the court reversed an award of attorney fees to a plaintiff who had purchased a tax deed that the county issued in error, stating that the private attorney general exception only applies if supported by statutory authority. Id. [5]