Opinion ID: 2106660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Closing Arguments Unfairly Prejudiced Defendant's Case

Text: Defendant complains next of four statements made by the assistant State's Attorney during closing arguments. Each of the statements was intended to persuade the jury that Williams and defendant planned to shoot Simenson when he opened the trunk of the white car. Defendant correctly observes that his participation in the planning was essential to the State's accountability theory of liability against defendant. Defendant insists that the prosecutor's statements were not grounded in fact or in any reasonable inferences arising from the evidence admitted at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. In pertinent part, counsel for the State argued: He knew what was going to occur from his signal to Elton Williams. He knew Elton was going to come out shooting, and he wanted to get out of the way of the shots.    Why did he do that? Because he knows the moment the trunk comes up pursuant to their preconceived plan, the fireworks is going to start   .    Gregory Shaw is behind the wheel ready to let him in the trunk, ready to take off, and prepared to have Elton Williams come out of that trunk and shoot any police officer who tries to apprehend them.    That none of these actions could have been accomplished without the complete complicity of Gregory Shaw and that the murder was a preplanned situation with regards to Gregory Shaw and Elton Williams that, if the trunk opened, Mr. Williams would take care of business. Defendant concedes that defense counsel failed to raise contemporaneous objections to any statement but the third. As to the first, second and fourth passages quoted above, defendant relies on the plain error doctrine to earn appellate review. As previously explained, we apply the plain error doctrine only where the evidence of defendant's guilt is closely balanced, or where the alleged error is so substantial or so fundamental as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill.2d 201, 239-40, 191 Ill.Dec. 84, 623 N.E.2d 329 (1993); 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a). Convincing evidence was admitted at trial of defendant's accountability for knowing and intentional murder. Chaney, Evanoff and Smith recounted defendant's actions during the car stop at the intersection of Theodore and Burry. When told to go to the back of the white car by Officer Simenson, defendant sat on the trunk of the automobile, although he was not directed to do so. When Simenson told him to get off the white car, defendant slowly slid off, but remained leaning against it. Moreover, when Simenson said he was going to open the trunk and ordered defendant to walk to Simenson's police car, which was parked immediately behind the white car, defendant bent forward at the waist in order to lie on the hood of Simenson's car. As before, defendant was not directed by Smith or Simenson to do this. These acts, combined with defendant's utter failure to alert the police to the presence of an armed man in the trunk of the white car, give rise to legitimate inferences that defendant not only knew that Williams intended to shoot the person who opened the trunk of the automobile, but also that defendant and Williams preplanned a signal to be delivered by defendant to Williams that the trunk was about to be opened. From the foregoing, we find that the evidence supporting a theory of accountability for intentional and knowing murder was not closely balanced. Nor can we conclude that admission of the statements worked a substantial or fundamental unfairness on defendant: the State's closing argument was consistent with facts admitted at trial. Therefore, the plain error doctrine does not apply to the first, second and fourth statements. In the alternative, defendant contends that his lawyer's failure to object to the State's remarks amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show (1) that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that the attorney's deficient performance resulted in prejudice to defendant. Williams, 181 Ill.2d at 320, 229 Ill. Dec. 898, 692 N.E.2d 1109, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 699 (1984). Because defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test, the failure to satisfy either element precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. Williams, 181 Ill.2d at 320, 229 Ill.Dec. 898, 692 N.E.2d 1109. We can dispose of defendant's ineffective-assistance charge on the prejudice prong alone. Any objection to the prosecutor's remarks would rightfully have been denied, since each statement was justified by evidence admitted at trial. Had defense counsel objected, therefore, the result would have been no different than the effect of his failure to object. No prejudice resulted from the defense attorney's purportedly ineffective assistance. As to the third statement, [2] we are reminded that, generally, courts accord wide latitude to the prosecutor during closing argument, provided counsel grounds his argument in the evidence or in inferences fairly yielded by the evidence. People v. Enis, 163 Ill.2d 367, 407, 206 Ill.Dec. 604, 645 N.E.2d 856 (1994); Edgeston, 157 Ill.2d at 240, 191 Ill.Dec. 84, 623 N.E.2d 329; People v. Owens, 102 Ill.2d 88, 105, 79 Ill.Dec. 663, 464 N.E.2d 261 (1984). The remarks by the State that defendant now calls into question were reasonably implied by the State's proof. No error occurred. Equally unavailing is defendant's insistence that the only evidence supporting defendant's alleged accountability for Simenson's murder was introduced at the aggravation/mitigation phase of defendant's sentencing hearing, and not at the guilt/innocence phase of defendant's trial. Defendant refers to the testimony of Timothy Beavers, who testified in aggravation on behalf of the State. Beavers averred that, while incarcerated with defendant at the Will County jail in October 1994, defendant told Beavers that defendant and Williams robbed two persons on September 28, 1994, and that they took between $100 and $200 from one of those individuals. In his testimony, Beavers also recounted defendant's statements that defendant and Williams decided to hide Williams in the trunk of their get away car because the police would be looking for two people, not one. According to Beavers, defendant further told him that, in the event defendant and Williams were stopped in their flight by the police, Williams would take care of business. Beavers interpreted this phrase as do whatever you got to do. Beaver's testimony may have been anticipated by the prosecutor when he used the phrase take care of business in his closing argument at the guilt phase. Nonetheless, the colloquialism is sufficiently commonplace that the attorney might not have used it as a reference to Beavers' statements. At the time the jury heard the prosecutor's argument, Beavers had not yet testified, so any impact the State intended by use of take care of business would have been lost on the jury. Most importantly, the State furnished more than adequate proof during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial that defendant aided and abetted Williams in Simenson's murder. Our review of the record satisfies us that take care of business at best emphasized the elements of accountability that the State had already proved beyond a reasonable doubt.