Opinion ID: 1938175
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: WHETHER BYROM WAS DENIED HER SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT BOTH THE GUILT AND SENTENCING PHASES OF THE TRIAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON AND THE CORRESPONDING PORTIONS OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION.

Text: ¶ 6. Michelle Byrom first argues she was denied effective assistance of counsel. We have previously addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel and the standard provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674). The focus of the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. (citation omitted) . . . [A] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Stringer, 454 So.2d at 477 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674). Defense counsel is presumed competent. Id. Then, to determine the second prong of prejudice to the defense, the standard is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991). This means a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. The question here is: whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer  including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidencewould have concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. There is no constitutional right then to errorless counsel. Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss. 1991) (right to effective counsel does not entitle defendant to have an attorney who makes no mistakes at trial; defendant just has right to have competent counsel). If the post-conviction application fails on either of the Strickland prongs, the proceedings end. Neal v. State, 525 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1987); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426 (Miss.1991). Davis v. State, 743 So.2d 326, 334 (Miss. 1999) (citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Miss.1996)). Brown v. State, 798 So.2d 481, 493-94 (Miss.2001). Byrom's ineffective assistance of counsel argument includes four sub-parts.
¶ 7. Byrom alleges her counsel exercised unreasonable judgment in not actively pursuing a change of venue and/or order denying the same. This Court considered the issue of failure to grant the motion for change of venue on direct appeal. We could find no motion for change of venue in the record, and there was no indication that such a motion had been presented to the trial judge or ruled on. However, we still considered this issue on its merits. There is no evidence in the record, nor demonstrated by Byrom in her brief, that the failure to move her trial to another county was prejudicial to her case. A motion for a change of venue is not automatically granted in a capital case. There must be a satisfactory showing that a defendant cannot receive a fair and impartial trial in the county where the offense is charged. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-35 (Rev.2000). See also Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 65 (Miss.1998). Moreover, the trial judge took steps, suggested and condoned by Byrom's counsel, to preserve the jury's impartiality. Byrom, 863 So.2d at 851. ¶ 8. Thus, while we find the change-of-venue issue to be procedurally barred, we discuss it further here only from the standpoint of Byrom's claim that her trial counsel's failure to pursue a change of venue resulted in Byrom receiving trial representation which was legally ineffective. ¶ 9. Byrom begins with a discussion of ineffective assistance of counsel decisions from the United State Supreme Court. She then starts a new section entitled Ineffective Assistance of Petitioner's Counsel After Wiggins v. Smith ,  referring to Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Byrom provides little discussion on how Wiggins is relevant to her claim based on a change of venue. ¶ 10. Byrom cites numerous decisions from this Court and other jurisdictions on the applicable standards for change of venue in criminal cases involving potentially prejudicial publicity, including Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203 (Miss.1985); and, Johnson v. State, 476 So.2d 1195 (Miss. 1985); see also Grayson v. State, 806 So.2d 241 (Miss.2001) (affirming denial of change of venue in capital case). Byrom argues that pervasive and prejudicial publicity existed in her case. She attaches newspaper articles from the local press at the time of her trial. She also points to voir dire, where over forty individuals stated they were aware of the case through the media or other sources. Other members of the venire had already formed opinions about the case, and also some venire members had family members who were potential witnesses. Byrom finally asserts that the court's limited voir dire in open court was insufficient to establish the effect of pre-trial publicity. ¶ 11. The State argued Byrom's jury was selected on November 13, 2000. Included in the articles attached by Byrom were from the Northeast Mississippi Daily Journal dated November 14, 2000, the Daily Corinthian dated November 15, 2000, the Tishomingo County News dated November 16, 2000, the Daily Corinthian dated November 16, 2000, and the Daily Corinthian dated November 17, 2000. The State argues that because these articles were published after the jury was selected and sequestered, they cannot serve as a basis for the argument that the jury was prejudiced by publicity. ¶ 12. The State next discussed two undated articles from the Tishomingo County News. The State claims that the first article must have been published in August 1999, as it dealt with Joey Gillis's preliminary hearing, which took place on August 2, 1999. The State claims the second article was published in June 1999, shortly after Edward Byrom, Sr.'s murder on June 4, 1999. The State argues that these articles do not amount to the kind of publicity which would have warranted a change in venue, even if they had been presented to the trial judge. ¶ 13. The State also addresses Byrom's allegation that [a]t least two individuals who responded that they had pretrial knowledge of the case were actually seated on the jury. The record references cited by Byrom point to Shelia Cooley and Donna Durham as the jurors in question. A review of the record reveals that during voir dire, both Cooley and Durham stated that they did not know what happened in the case; both stated that they would not be influenced by what they had heard; and, both stated they would rely only on the trial evidence in making their decisions. ¶ 14. The State answers Byrom's allegation that Connie Lorella Dexter knew Byrom but did not respond when asked by the court. The State points to voir dire where the trial court specifically calls on Ms. Dexter, and she answers that [o]ur children played baseball in the same base-ball summer league. Her connection to Byrom was just seeing them on the base-ball field. Dexter denied this would cause her any problem serving as a juror in this case. ¶ 15. After a thorough review of the record, we find no justifiable reason necessitating a change of venue in this case. Stated differently, as we found on direct appeal, the trial court certainly committed no error in failing to change venue in this case. Therefore, trial counsel's failure to aggressively seek a change of venue could hardly be deemed to rise to the level of rendering ineffective assistance. Thus, it follows that Byrom's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to pursue a change of venue is without merit.
¶ 16. Byrom next makes a general argument of law, citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), as the most recent definitive pronouncement from the United States Supreme Court concerning ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The United States Supreme Court found Wiggins received ineffective assistance of counsel where his trial counsel had failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence of Wiggins's background, including physical and sexual abuse committed by his mother, by a series of foster parents, and by a Job Corps supervisor, as well as evidence of mental retardation. 539 U.S. at 516-18, 123 S.Ct. at 2533. Counsel for Wiggins failed to make this investigation even though the State made funds available for this purpose. 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. at 2536. Trial counsel instead attempted to show that Wiggins was not responsible for the murder in question. 539 U.S. at 519, 123 S.Ct. at 2534. The Supreme Court stated: In finding that Schlaich and Nethercott's investigation did not meet Strickland's performance standards, we emphasize that Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case. Both conclusions would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel at the heart of Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. We base our conclusion on the much more limited principle that strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable only to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Id., at 690-691, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. A decision not to investigate thus must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances. Id., at 691, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Under Wiggins, counsel may make strategic decisions to introduce, pursue or ignore certain evidence, but these decisions may amount to ineffective assistance if made based on an inadequate or unreasonable investigation. ¶ 17. Byrom further argues that the key element in Wiggins is the Supreme Court's use of the phrase prevailing professional standards. After appearing to argue that Wiggins set a new standard in ineffective assistance cases, Byrom states that the United States Supreme Court specifically made it clear that Wiggins does not create new law but simply readopts and clarifies the import of Strickland.  Byrom then cites numerous cases from other states and the federal courts where counsel was found to be ineffective. Of particular import, however, is that Byrom did not raise ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Likewise, in her PCR petition Byrom did not raise ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Likewise, in her PCR petition before us today, Byrom asserts no specific ground of her trial counsel's ineffective assistance, but instead makes the general assertion that Wiggins somehow changes the procedure for appellate review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims pursuant to Strickland. We disagree and thus find this issue to be without merit.
¶ 18. Byrom specifically argues that trial counsel failed to conduct any investigation of her background, such as her medical, educational, employment and training, family histories, and religious and cultural influences. Byrom complains that counsel did not call a single witness, including Byrom, herself, during the guilt phase. She states that she and Kenneth Dimitro could have rebutted any notion of a good relationship between Edward Byrom, Jr. and the deceased. ¶ 19. The State answers first that the issue as to Edward Byrom Jr.'s testimony should be barred, because Byrom failed to specifically state where in the appeal record Edward, Jr. ever testified that his relationship with his father was good. The State then cites Junior's testimony, where he recounts arguments with his father consisting of punches, threats to use guns and baseball bats, shouting, cursing, and alcohol abuse, with Junior primarily the recipient of this abuse. The State argues that because there was no testimony that Junior led a normal home life, Byrom's trial counsel was not ineffective for failure to rebut such a notion. ¶ 20. Byrom next argues trial counsel did not present a single witness in the sentencing phase. The defense instead submitted reports from Dr. Ben Kitchens and Dr. Keith Caruso. According to the reports, Dr. Kitchens saw Byrom in 1997, 1998 and 1999. Michelle no doubt had several medical/physical problems such as lupus, depression, high blood pressure and alcohol abuse. ¶ 21. Dr. Caruso, a psychiatrist, reported that at the time of the death of Michelle's husband, Michelle suffered from major depression, alcohol dependence, Munchausen's Syndrome, physical abuse, borderline personality disorder, lupus, pneumonia, anemia, chronic pain and hypertension, among other problems. As we noted on Byrom's direct appeal, people who suffer from Munchausen's Syndrome intentionally injure themselves in an attempt to garner sympathy. However, persons suffering from this disorder are different from malingerers in that Munchausen sufferers will be aware of their deceits but unaware of their motivations. Byrom, 863 So.2d at 845, n. 1. Byrom was using nine different medications at the time of her husband's murder. Dr. Caruso's report provided a relevant personal history which contained reports of physical and sexual abuse by her alcoholic stepfather during her teen years, including that she was used by him as a prostitute; that she ran away from home at fifteen and worked as a stripper before meeting the victim and marrying him; that Edward Sr. became increasingly physically abusive, particularly when drinking; that he was unfaithful to her on numerous occasions; that he physically and psychologically abused their son; and, that she became increasingly dependent on alcohol and purposely injured herself so she could be admitted to a hospital to escape the abuse for a short time. Dr. Caruso stated that a combination of her physical and psychological problems, along with the number of drugs she was taking and her alcohol abuse, led to a feeling of helplessness which resulted in her believing that violence was a solution to her problems. ¶ 22. Byrom claims several family members were available to testify, but were not called; and, that her trial counsel never discussed the case with them, or that they were not allowed to attend the trial. Byrom specifically cites the affidavits of her brother, Kenneth Dimitro; her mother, Betty Polstalwait; her sister-in-law, Doranna Dimitro; her brother, Louis Dimitro; her niece, Leighanne Bundy; her sister, Helen Marie Garnett; and her own affidavit. We provide here a summary of these affidavits. ¶ 23. Kenneth Dimitro, stated he was never contacted by Byrom's attorneys; that Edward Sr. was a drunk; that Byrom's nature was that she would not complain to her family about her personal life; that Byrom would never commit suicide because she had too much to live for; that Byrom came from a big family, and all the siblings stuck together; that their stepfather was an abusive drunk who sexually abused Byrom, so she ran away from home as a teenager; and, that he (Kenneth) would have testified for Byrom. ¶ 24. Betty Polstalwait stated no one contacted her about Byrom's case and she thus did not attend Byrom's trial; that Byrom was a good child; that Michelle had a normal childhood, except for leaving when she was a teenager; and, that Byrom had a drinking problem but she was not a mean person. ¶ 25. Doranna Dimitro stated she was not contacted by Byrom's attorneys prior to or during the trial; that Byrom would try to hide the fact that she was abused by the victim because she was humiliated; that Byrom would drink and take drugs to escape from reality; that Junior and Byrom were protective of each other; that Sunny Phillips, one of Byrom's attorneys, said she did not want to try the case but was forced to; that none of Byrom's lawyers ever told them anything about the case; that they tried to get transcripts of the trial but had thus far been unable to do so; and that she was not allowed to attend trial or read a newspaper, but instead, she stayed at the hotel. ¶ 26. Louis Dimitro stated that Byrom was a good and helpful person; that she hid her husband's abuse of her from her family, and thus became secluded; that she drank to escape reality; that he (Louis) found out about Byrom's arrest from the chaplain at the jail; that Byrom's attorney contacted him twice by phone, but never interviewed him or asked him about Byrom's life; that Edith, the victim's mother, never blamed Byrom for her son's death; that he and his siblings had an average home life except for their stepfather, who physically abused all of the children, and sexually abused Byrom, causing her to leave home at age fifteen; that one of Byrom's attorneys told certain family members to attend the trial, but once they arrived at the courthouse, they were not allowed to attend the trial; that Byrom was schizophrenic and bi-polar, in addition to having lupus; that Byrom's marriage with Edward, Sr. was very abusive; and, that Edward, Sr. once got Louis's girlfriend real drunk and took advantage of her. ¶ 27. Leighanne Bundy stated she lived with Byrom and the victim for about one and one-half years; that Byrom was like a second mother to her; that she (Leighanne) witnessed Byrom's bad marriage and the abuse of Byrom and Edward, Jr. at the hands of Edward, Sr.; that Edward, Sr. had violent mood swings, particularly when he was drinking; and, that she (Leighanne) was a host, along with Edward, Jr., at some of the parties at the house where Byrom and Edward, Sr. would go to a local motel. ¶ 28. Helen Marie Garnett stated she did not care for Edward Byrom Sr. because he sexually assaulted her, but she never told Byrom; that Byrom and Edward, Sr. had a decent relationship; that Edward, Sr. and Edward, Jr. had a bad relationship; that Byrom was a really good person; that Edward, Jr. was a good boy and he and her daughter, Leighanne, were very close; and, that had anyone asked her, she would have testified, but Byrom's lawyers never talked to her. ¶ 29. In her affidavit, Byrom stated her marriage to the victim was terrible because he was violent and jealous and physically abusive toward her and Edward, Jr.; that she began drinking to deal with the abuse; that she left home when she was a teenager to escape an abusive stepfather; that she remembered talking to her attorneys 2-3 times before the trial, and she probably spent 1-2 hours with her attorneys discussing her case; that her attorneys decided not put on any witnesses, saying Leighanne Bundy was too young and Helen Marie Garnett's brain problem was too extensive; that one of her attorneys, Terry Wood, told her that if the judge sentenced her then she would go to jail for 6 months to 2 years; that her attorneys did not explain that she was eligible for the death penalty, and she didn't realize that she could get the death penalty until the sentencing phase; that the judge kept making comments to the jury that she deserved the death penalty; and, that she wanted to testify but one of her attorneys, Terry Wood, told her she would not make a good witness. ¶ 30. Byrom also attached several dozen pages of medical records from her treatment in 1998 at Helen Keller Hospital in Sheffield, Alabama. The records reveal that Byrom evidently suffered from lupus at the time. ¶ 31. In its Response, the State attached the affidavits of Terry L. Wood and Sonya (Sunny) Phillips, Byrom's trial counsel. Both affidavits contain the following language: I fully discussed the matter of the waiver of the jury during the sentence phase of the trial with Michelle Byrom. While I did suggest this trial strategy to Ms. Byrom, the ultimate decision was hers. Although she stated that she fully understood ramifications of the decision to waive the jury for sentencing, I cannot be certain she did so. The trial court further explained the ramifications of waiving the jury to Michelle Byrom in open court and she stated that she understood the rights she was waiving. ¶ 32. Both affidavits discuss interviewing potential witnesses, some of whom were Byrom's family members. Terry Wood states that he had lengthy discussions with Byrom's family members regarding the case, but that he could not remember their names. He also stated that he arranged for these out-of-state family members to be present in Iuka during the trial. ¶ 33. Sonya Phillips stated that she specifically spoke with the following family members: Renee Copeland, (who did not submit an affidavit), Louis Dimitro, and Leighanne Garnett (Bundy). Phillips also stated that she arranged for these family members, along with Helen Garnett, to be present in Iuka at the time of the trial so that they could be called as witnesses if they were needed. The affidavits of Wood and Phillips each contain the following language: Because of events during the trial of this case I decided, as a matter of trial strategy, not to call these witnesses before the court during the sentencing phase of the trial. ¶ 34. The State argues first that the affidavits of Kenneth Dimitro, Betty Polstalwait, Doranna Dimitro, Louis Dimitro, Leighanne Bundy, and Helen Marie Garnett, are procedurally faulty, as the affidavits were apparently signed by the affiants in Tennessee or Michigan, but notarized by a Rankin County, Mississippi, notary public, who would have no authority to administer an oath outside the state of Mississippi. Indeed, a review of these affidavits reveals the affidavits of Kenneth Dimitro, Betty Polstalwait, Doranna Dimitro, and Louis Dimitro begin with the phrase State of Tennessee, County of Rutherford, and the affidavits of Leighanne Bundy and Helen Marie Garnett begin with the phrase State of Michigan, County of Monroe. However, all six of the affidavits are notarized by a Rankin County, Mississippi notary public. ¶ 35. The State further argues the affidavits contain much hearsay, speculation, irrelevant and contradictory statements. The State opines that some statements in the affidavits are not credible. The State further points out that several of the affiants admit to having been in Iuka during the trial, and were obviously kept away from the trial by defense counsel so they could be called as witnesses, if necessary. The State argues it is obvious why some of these affiants were not called as witnesses, such as Helen Garnett's unexplained brain problem or Leighanne Bundy's attendance at certain parties at the Byrom house while Byrom and Edward Sr. were away. ¶ 36. The failure of defense counsel to call any witnesses, particularly at sentencing, is admittedly perplexing. The generic statements in the defense attorneys' affidavits that they did not call the family witnesses because of trial strategy is not helpful. The affidavits of the family members reveal at least clues as to why some may not have been called. The trial judge was provided with doctors' reports at the sentencing phase of the trial, and these reports set out Byrom's life and physical and mental condition in sad detail. The gist of the family members' testimony from the affidavits was that Byrom was a good person who had lived a difficult life and that whatever she did was because she was sick and in a terrible situation. However, to argue that this testimony, which was already known to the trial judge, would have been any more convincing or persuasive if presented through witness testimony, is, at best, speculative. Thus, from the record before us, when we necessarily apply the Strickland criteria, we are unable to conclude that trial counsel's investigation was unreasonable or ineffective, or that their failure to call the family members amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we find Byrom's argument that her trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation for the guilt-innocence phase and the sentencing phase is without merit.
¶ 37. During closing argument at the guilt phase of the trial, the assistant district attorney stated: [A]nd as Mr. Ralph Dance testified, Mr. Gillis is in jail awaiting trial. That was his testimony. Defense counsel did not object. This issue was raised on direct appeal. This Court found the matter was procedurally barred because of the lack of objection. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we still discussed the merits of the issue and stated: There was ample evidence presented at trial regarding Gillis's involvement in this crime, including Byrom's and Junior's statements, and the disputed comment by the prosecutor was nothing more than a comment on that evidence, which had been received without any objection from Byrom. Finally, Byrom has failed to assert, or even demonstrate, that she suffered any prejudice as a result of these comments. Byrom, 863 So.2d at 873. ¶ 38. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, for the reasons stated, we find Byrom's argument that her defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance due to their failure to object to the prosecutor's comments during the State's closing argument of the guilt phase of the trial is without merit. ¶ 39. In sum, Byrom claims her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to actively pursue a change of venue; (2) failing to generally conduct an investigation of her case; (3) failing to conduct an adequate investigation in preparation for the guilt-innocence phase and the sentencing phase of her trial; and, (4) failing to object and preserve for appeal purposes the prosecutor's improper comments during the guilt phase of the trial. We have determined each of these arguments is without merit because, in her efforts to meet the Strickland criteria, Byrom has failed to demonstrate that her trial counsel's actions were deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of her case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss. 1984) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). We thus find Byrom's argument that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel at her trial is without merit.