Opinion ID: 43731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Packers and Stockyards Act Claims

Text: Mims argues that the district court erred by granting Cagle’s motion for summary judgment on his Packers & Stockyards Act Claims. Mims argues that after joining the UPGA and refusing to sign the arbitration contract, his performance declined. Mims argues that the decline in his performance can be attributed to Cagles’ retaliation toward Mims for joining the UPGA and refusing to sign the arbitration contract. Mims argues that he produced evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact of each of the following: (1) Cagle provided him with sick and unhealthy birds in retaliation for joining the UPGA in 1998, and for refusing to sign an arbitration contract in 1999; (2) Cagle delayed feed deliveries in retaliation; (3) Cagle engaged in various dishonest weighing practices that 1 Cagle disputes this, but for the purpose of summary judgment we take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 5 damaged Mims during the entire course of its relationship with Mims; and (4) the arbitration contract that was offered by Cagle violated the PSA because it was unconscionable and constituted a bait and switch.2 The Packers and Stockyards Act prohibits unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practices or devices with respect to live poultry.” 7 U.S.C. § 192. We assume arguendo that Mims is entitled to a jury on his PSA claim if he could produce evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue with respect to any of his factual allegations. However, we conclude that Mims has not produced sufficient evidence such that a rational juror could find in his favor on any of these factual allegations. 2 Mims also argues that Cagle failed to move for summary judgment on all grounds that formed the basis for Mims' PSA claim, and therefore the district court inappropriately granted summary judgment on these claims. Specifically, Mims states that the following allegations that could support a PSA claim were not addressed by Cagle or the district court: (1) termination of Mims’ contract without economic justification; (2) Cagle's ceasing to place flocks with Mims during late 2000 without cause; and (3) Cagle's making of false statements to Mims' employer Tyson and pressuring him to terminate his relationship with Mims. However, Cagle discussed each of these issues in the factual statement of its brief in support of summary judgment, and stated, An analysis of the ‘evidence' presented by plaintiff makes clear that he has not proven any of his laundry list of alleged discriminatory acts. Cagle's statement that Mims has not proven any of his laundry list of alleged discriminatory acts constitutes a motion for summary judgment on all grounds that could serve as the basis of his PSA claim. We conclude that the district court properly found that Mims lacked sufficient evidence to support his PSA claim. There is nothing to indicate that Cagle made false statements to Tyson. Cagle stopped placing flocks with Mims at Mims’ request. Termination of a contract without economic justification is insufficient to sustain a claim under the PSA absent a showing of anticompetitive effect. See London v. Fieldale Farms Corp., __F.3d.__, 2005 WL 1279147 at  (11th Cir. June 1, 2005). 6 Mims claims that Cagle provided him with sick and unhealthy birds in retaliation for joining the UPGA in 1998, and for refusing to sign an arbitration contract in 1999. Mims makes the vague and conclusory statement that “it was made clear to [him]” that some people had lost farms for being a problem, but admits that he does not know of any farmers who lost their farm, and he does not cite any specific instances of coercion, harassment, or discrimination. Mims and some of his employees provided deposition testimony stating that Mims received a significant number of “bad looking birds”; however, both Mims and his employees testified that this occurred both before and after Mims joined the UPGA and refused to sign the arbitration contract.3 Furthermore, Mims had not recorded any problem on his chick delivery reports. While Mims provided some weak evidence4 suggesting that Cagle may have had some control over where particular flocks were placed, he produced no evidence suggesting that Cagle targeted him to receive poor flocks or even suggesting a likelihood of it. In short, Mims produced insufficient 3 We also note that Mims' own expert produced a regression analysis that suggested, at best, Mims' membership in the UPGA could explain only 1% of Mims' decreasing performance. 4 The strongest of this evidence was an affidavit from a former chick bus driver who worked for Cagle from 1996-97. The driver’s affidavit merely stated that he recalled chick deliveries being changed from one farm to another and being told that certain houses were not ready and he needed to take the chicks to another farm. He also noted that most farms would receive chicks from one to three breeder flocks, but that one particular grower received chicks from a variety of different breeder flocks and often complained about the chick quality. 7 evidence suggesting that he received more bad birds than other growers because of retaliation. Next, Mims alleges that Cagle delayed feed and chick deliveries, and terminated Mims' contract in retaliation for Mims' participation in the UPGA and for his refusal to sign a contract that included an arbitration clause. The only evidence Mims offers to support this claim is the affidavit of a former feed mill manager who stated that, at the request of his managers, he would create feed credit tickets so as to change weekly settlements, and that he believed that the managers were “manipulating the growout settlements to help certain growers and hurt other growers.” The former feed mill manager also stated that managers would discuss the leaders of the growers’ association during management meetings, and would have discussions about pressuring growers who would not sign a contract with the arbitration clause to sign the contract. However, nothing in his affidavit provides evidence of any retaliation against Mims, and as noted below, there is not other evidence which might create a jury question. Mims, however, offers nothing more than his personal belief that his growout settlements were inaccurate. Mims did not document times that he ran out of feed, but merely states that it happened often. The one instance that Mims could recall running out of feed for a significant period of time happened due to a bomb 8 threat at the Cagle plant, and occurred in 1995, well before he joined the association or refused to sign the arbitration contract. Mims only testifies to one instance in which he was charged for feed he did not receive. The instance involved confusing circumstances, and Mims offers nothing to suggest that the charge was anything more than a reasonable mistake. Mims argues that Cagle delayed flock deliveries in retaliation, but the only delay he cites happened after Mims had indicated that he did not want a bird placement, subsequently changed his mind, and Cagle had advised him to make repairs to his farm before it would place another flock. We simply do not see how a reasonable juror could conclude that Mims was retaliated against on the basis of this evidence. Mims states that his flock supervisors issued harsher reviews after Mims joined the association, but Mims does not point to any false statements on those reviews, but merely objecting to what he considered to be “nitpicking.” Similarly, with respect to the termination of Mims’ contract, there is little to indicate that Cagle terminated Mims’ contract for any reason other than it perceived him to be a poor manager. Third, Mims alleges that Cagle engaged in various dishonest weighing practices that damaged Mims during the entire course of its relationship with him. Mims states that he is “unable to point to specific instances of improper weighing 9 because it was Cagle’s policy and practice to prevent growers from discovering its fraudulent weighing practices by requiring appointments to observe the weighing process.” Cagle had a policy that “[a]ny grower wanting to see their birds weighed must have authorization from management to enter the property” for “proper security at our operation.” Mims states that requiring appointments to view weighings violated federal regulation 9 C.F.R. § 201.108-1(e)(4) because it impeded the “unfettered observation” to which the growers were entitled. § 201.108-1(e)(4) states that growers are entitled to observe balancing, weighing, and recording procedures, and precludes weighers from denying growers that opportunity. Mims admitted that he could have scheduled an appointment to watch his birds being weighed, but that he never did so. Nothing in 9 C.F.R. §201-108- 1(e)(4) suggests that requiring appointments for security purposes is precluded or even discouraged. As such, this does not constitute evidence that Cagle misweighed Mims’ birds. The only other evidence Mims presents with respect to misweighing relates to procedures at the plant before 1996.5 In 1996, Cagle, working with the Grain 5 We also note that insofar as this evidence could alone support a claim for a violation of the PSA, such a claim would likely be precluded by the statute of limitations. We decline to rule on this issue, but we note that other circuits have applied a four year statute of limitations to PSA claims and this evidence does not create an issue of fact during the four years prior to 2001, when Mims filed this claim. See Jackson v. Swift, 53 F.3d 1452, 1460 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that district court did not err by applying Sherman Act's four-year statute of 10 Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, modified its problematic weighing procedures, reimbursed growers who may have been underpaid (including Mims), and took a loss on growers who were potentially overpaid. Cagle disclosed the results to growers, and Mims does not produce any evidence indicating that his compensation was insufficient. Finally, Mims argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on his PSA claims because the arbitration contract that was offered by Cagle was unconscionable and constituted a bait and switch. Mims’ argument is that he received periodic pay increases in 1994 and 1997 pursuant to the same type of contract that he was provided initially, but that in order to receive the pay increase in 1999, he had to sign the contract with the arbitration clause, which he refused to do. This is hardly a “bait and switch” scheme. Mims’ original contract did not suggest he would receive periodic pay increases, and there is nothing to indicate that Cagle knew it might provide the option of the arbitration contract in 1994 when it originally contracted with Mims. Additionally, Mims provides nothing to suggest that the offer of the contract itself was unconscionable, other than that he lost the benefit of a pay increase because he refused to sign it. limitations, rather than two-year limitations period of Agricultural Fair Practices Act (“AFPA”) to claimed PSA violations). 11