Opinion ID: 2771750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Connection with Past Events

Text: The second Princess Cruises factor is “the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event.” 397 F.3d at 1365. To determine “whether the statute or regulation at issue has a significant nexus to relevant past events, we have frequently looked to whether the rule affects ‘primary conduct,’ i.e., the conduct that gave rise to the suit or claim at issue.” Tarver, 557 F.3d at 1375 (quoting Rodriguez, 511 F.3d at 1155). In Tarver and Rodriguez, we found that the amendment of 38 C.F.R. § 3.22 to preclude hypothetical entitlement claims under § 1318 did not have a significant connection to past events. See Tarver, 557 F.3d at 137576; Rodriguez, 511 F.3d at 1155. In Tarver, we explained that, “[l]ike the claimant in Rodriguez, Mrs. Tarver is ‘unable to point to anything she 16 MOFFITT v. MCDONALD would have done differently had she known the effect of the 2000 amendment when she filed her claim.’” Tarver, 557 F.3d at 1375 (quoting Rodriguez, 511 F.3d at 1155). Although the amendment at issue in Tarver “changed the legal standards from those that were applicable when Mrs. Tarver’s claim was filed,” the change “related only to the scope of a survivor’s right to raise a collateral challenge to the agency’s initial assessment of the disability.” Id. at 1376. We explained that “[c]oncerns about retroactivity are at their nadir when the rule change in question is directed only to the scope of collateral review of a prior adjudication.” Id. (citations omitted). Ultimately we concluded that, “even assuming that the second factor provides some support for Mrs. Tarver, the countervailing Princess Cruises factors weigh[ed] heavily against finding that according the regulation retroactive effect would be improper.” Id. (citation omitted). Likewise, in Kernea, we found that there was “nothing Ms. Kernea could have done differently had she known the effect of the 2005 amendment when she filed her claim.” 724 F.3d at 1381. There, the relevant conduct “took place in the 1960s—decades before § 1311(a)(2) was even enacted—when [Ms. Kernea’s] husband filed his disability claims.” Id. We recognized that “Ms. Kernea’s husband might have filed his disability claim ‘earlier or prosecuted it more vigorously in the first instance,’ . . . if he had known that hypothetical entitlement claims would be disallowed.” Id. (quoting Tarver, 557 F.3d at 1375). But because he filed his claims “decades before Congress enacted § 1311(a)(2), before this court decided Hix, and before the VA promulgated § 3.10(f)(3), his failure to conform his conduct to the requirements of amended rule [3.10(f)(3)] cannot be attributed to the change in the law occasioned by that rule.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Applying our reasoning in Kernea, the Veterans Court noted that the relevant conduct here “took place either in MOFFITT v. MCDONALD 17 1946 when Mr. Moffitt filed his initial claim for benefits or 1979 when he filed his request for a total disability rating based on individual unemployability.” Moffitt, 26 Vet. App. at 432. Both claims were filed well before Congress enacted § 1311(a)(2), before this court’s decision in Hix, and before the VA promulgated § 3.10(f)(3). Accordingly, as was the case in Kernea, Mr. Moffitt’s “failure to conform his conduct to the requirements” of amended rules 20.1106 and 3.10(f)(3) “cannot be attributed to the change in the law occasioned by” those rules. Id. (quoting Kernea, 724 F.3d at 1381). We see no reason to disturb the Veterans Court’s analysis. Even assuming, as in Tarver, that “the second factor provides some support” for Mrs. Moffitt because the amended regulations “changed the legal standards from those that were applicable” when her claim was filed, 557 F.3d at 1376, the remaining Princess Cruises factors weigh in favor of applying revised § 20.1106 and § 3.10 retroactively.