Opinion ID: 703670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions for Mistrial Based on Improper Remarks

Text: 17 Hager complains that the district court erred in denying his motion(s) for a mistrial based on allegedly improper remarks by the trial judge, a witness, and the prosecutor. The decision to deny a motion for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1569 (10th Cir.1995). We will reverse the district court only if we find there was a clear error of judgment or if the court exceeded the range of permissible choices. United States v. Novak, 918 F.2d 107, 108-09 (10th Cir.1990). We address each of Mr. Hager's allegations in turn. 18 First, Mr. Hager claims that the district court abused its discretion by not declaring a mistrial after the judge mentioned that John Lampkins, an employee heard on some of the tapes at trial, had pleaded guilty. Our review of the record reveals that during opening argument, counsel for a codefendant stated: [T]hese are just a few of the [Timberline] salesmen, but these are the only ones that are charged. The Government wants to bring it against just this group for whatever reason. R. Vol. VII at 37. The prosecution objected stating: The presence or absence of anybody else is not an appropriate matter for comment during argument or any other time during trial. Id. Later that day, when the prosecution was preparing to play a taped conversation involving Mr. Hager, his wife, and John Lampkins, the prosecutor again requested that the court provide an instruction regarding the presence or absence of other individuals that are being mentioned. Id. at 65-66. The court expressed some confusion about this request and ultimately informed the jury that although Lampkins had been named a party in the indictment, he had pleaded guilty. Id. 19 Mr. Hager moved for a mistrial. The district court denied the motion, but proceeded to thoroughly instruct the jury concerning the presumption of innocence and the fact that each defendant was to be judged separately. R. Vol. VIII at 22-24. The court stated: 20 [I]t's particularly important that you follow this instruction. Do not consider my statement about Mr. Lampkins having pleaded guilty in this case as any evidence touching or bearing upon the guilt or innocence of any of these seven defendants. Their case must be based upon what comes out in this courtroom relative to them and not on any other consideration. You must not consider the statements concerning Mr. Lampkins in connection with the guilt or innocence of these defendants. I wanted to make that very plain to you. 21 Id. at 22-23. The court continued, emphasizing the government's burden of proving each defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and asked whether any juror had any hesitation in following the court's instruction. No juror indicated any such hesitation. Id. at 23-24. Furthermore, the trial court again instructed the jury at the end of trial that it may not consider anything about the guilt or innocence of Mr. Lampkins as any evidence touching or bearing upon the guilt or innocence of any one of the defendants who stand trial here. R. Vol. XIII at 251. 22 It is fundamental that a codefendant's or coconspirator's guilty plea may not be used as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt. See United States v. Davis, 965 F.2d 804, 815-16 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1255 (1993); see also United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1525 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 347 (1994). Nevertheless, [i]t has long been the law in this circuit and in other circuits that the trial court may inform the jury that a codefendant has entered a plea of guilty, provided the jury is clearly instructed that such a plea cannot be considered as evidence of the guilt of the remaining defendant or defendants. United States v. Earley, 482 F.2d 53, 58 (10th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973) (where codefendant pled guilty during course of trial). 23 Although in Earley the trial court was informing the jury regarding a codefendant who pled guilty mid-trial, we agree with the district court that there is nothing in the record that would support a material distinction between the circumstances in this case, where Lampkins' guilty plea was entered the day before trial, and the general rule stated in Earley. As the district court noted, the indictment clearly names Mr. Lampkins as a codefendant. R. Vol. I, Doc. 1. Given that there is nothing to indicate that the jury was unaware of this charge, the jury might reasonably have wondered why Mr. Lampkins was named in the indictment but was not a party at the trial, just as they would question the sudden absence of a codefendant during trial. 24 Furthermore, as we have previously stated, a trial court's curative instructions may cure any prejudice where a jury learns of a codefendant's guilty plea. Massey, 48 F.3d at 1569 (citing United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1470 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 846 (1991)); United States v. Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d 411, 416 (10th Cir.1988) (analyzing problem in context of prosecutorial misconduct); see also United States v. Leach, 918 F.2d 464, 468 (5th Cir.1990) (stating that where coconspirator did not testify at trial but his guilty plea was presented to the jury, an appropriate cautionary admonition to the jury might have salvaged the situation), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207 (1991). 25 In this case, the court provided complete and detailed instructions both following its remark and again at the end of trial. Guided by the basic tenet of jurisprudence that juries are presumed to follow their instructions,'  Zafiro v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 933, 939 (1993); see United States v. Coleman, 7 F.3d 1500, 1506 (10th Cir.1993), we conclude that the district court's curative instructions were sufficient to cure any possible prejudice. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Hager's motion for mistrial based upon the court's statement regarding Mr. Lampkins' plea. 26 Mr. Hager next claims that the trial judge should have granted a mistrial because of prejudicial remarks by Mr. Attea, a defrauded Timberline customer and prosecution witness. Mr. Attea, while exiting the courtroom after testifying, gestured toward the defense table and said, gotcha. When defense counsel raised this issue to the court the judge stated that he had not heard or seen anything, but that he would nonetheless caution the jury. R. Vol. X at 139-40. The court proceeded to ask the jurors whether they heard any off-the-stand remarks by Mr. Attea. When some indicated that they had, the court instructed: 27 Let me caution you and tell you that whatever he said is absolutely not to be considered by you in connection with forming a part of the evidence here. That was off the witness stand, whatever he said. I think it had something to do with, in effect--it sounded to me like he must have been derogatory in his attitude and demeanor toward the defendants, and that is improper. It was improper. Had I realized it at the time, I would have had something to say to him about that. 28 Since I understand that some of you may have heard it, please disregard it. It has no part of this proceeding. It must not be used by you as any basis for a verdict, and that's the way it is. Id. at 164. 29 At the end of trial, in its final instructions, the court reemphasized that [s]tatements made by any persons, inside or outside the courtroom, which are not under oath are not evidence and that any offhand comments that may have been made in the hall or in the courtroom while people were not on the witness stand must be disregarded. R. Vol. XIII at 244-45. The court, who was in a position to observe the jury and gauge its reactions to Mr. Attea's comment, was of the opinion that a curative instruction would solve any problem which might have been created, and we agree. Cf. Coleman, 7 F.3d at 1506. The court thoroughly instructed the jury concerning Mr. Attea's improper conduct. As we stated previously, cautionary instructions are ordinarily sufficient to cure alleged prejudice, and jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. See id. That is especially the case in situations such as this, where a witness has made an isolated, one-word remark, and the evidence against the defendant is strong. See United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (3d Cir.1993); United States v. Bello-Perez, 977 F.2d 664, 672 (1st Cir.1992); see also United States v. Arias-Villanueva, 998 F.2d 1491, 1502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 573 (1993). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Hager's motion for mistrial based on Mr. Attea's conduct. 30 Finally, Mr. Hager claims that a mistrial should have been granted because the prosecutor's closing argument referred to the failure of several codefendants to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding prosecutor's comment on defendant's failure to testify violative of self-incrimination clause of Fifth Amendment). We find this argument without merit. Mr. Hager was not prejudiced because he in fact took the stand. See United States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d 846, 850 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850 (1978) (The danger that a jury might infer guilt from an accused's failure to testify simply is not present when he actually does take the stand and testify.); see also Doty v. United States, 416 F.2d 887 (10th Cir.1968) (where prosecutor commented on the failure of 6 of the 8 defendants to testify, court concluded that the prosecutor's comments were improper and prejudicial as to all appellants except the 2 that testified), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971).