Opinion ID: 1320428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement

Text: In Syllabus Point 3, Board of Education of the County of Berkeley v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 160 W.Va. 473, 236 S.E.2d 439 (1977), we held that: It is presumed that an arbitration provision in a written contract was bargained for and that arbitration was intended to be the exclusive means of resolving disputes arising under the contract; however, where a party alleges that the arbitration provision was unconscionable or was thrust upon him because he was unwary and taken advantage of, or that the contract was one of adhesion, the question of whether an arbitration provision was bargained for and valid is a matter of law for the court to determine by reference to the entire contract, the nature of the contracting parties, and the nature of the undertakings covered by the contract. Our review of the Agreement shows it to be six pages long, single-spaced. In summary, the Agreement requires the Petitioner to waive her right to trial by jury for any disputes that arise between Petitioner and TeleTech, including disputes arising after termination of Petitioner's employment. The only exceptions to the requirement of arbitration are workers' compensation claims and suits filed by TeleTech for injunctive relief. The Arbitration Agreement states that the consideration for the Agreement is the mutual exchange of promises by the Company and the Employee to arbitrate their disputes and, in addition, that Employee acknowledges that his or her offer of and continued employment is consideration for his/her promises contained in this Arbitration Agreement. Having fully considered the Agreement, we find it to be a contract of adhesion. The entire Agreement is boiler-plate language that was not subject to negotiation and there is no contention in the record that the Petitioner had any role or part in negotiating the terms of the Agreement. In State ex rel. Saylor v. Wilkes, 216 W.Va. 766, 773, 613 S.E.2d 914, 921 (2005), we found a similar arbitration agreement to be a contract of adhesion, noting that it was a [s]tandardized contract form offered ... on essentially [a] `take it or leave it' basis ... [leaving the] weaker party ... no realistic choice as to its terms. However, the fact that the Agreement is a contract of adhesion does not necessarily mean that it is also invalid, and to determine its validity we look to other factors. See State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 211 W.Va. 549, 557, 567 S.E.2d 265, 273 (2002), citing American Food Management, Inc. v. Henson, 105 Ill.App.3d 141, 61 Ill.Dec. 122, 434 N.E.2d 59, 62-63 (1982), where we noted that: Adhesion contracts include all form contracts submitted by one party on the basis of this or nothing[.] Since the bulk of contracts signed in this country, if not every major Western nation, are adhesion contracts, a rule automatically invalidating adhesion contracts would be completely unworkable. Instead courts engage in a process of judicial review[.] Finding that there is an adhesion contract is the beginning point for analysis, not the end of it; what courts aim at doing is distinguishing good adhesion contracts which should be enforced from bad adhesion contracts which should not. Having determined that the Agreement is a contract of adhesion, we turn to the issue of whether the Agreement is unconscionable or was thrust upon [the Petitioner] because [she] was unwary and taken advantage of[.] Syllabus Point 3, in part, Board of Education of the County of Berkeley v. W. Harley Miller, Inc . We have previously held that A determination of unconscionability must focus on the relative positions of the parties, the adequacy of the bargaining position, the meaningful alternatives available to the plaintiff, and `the existence of unfair terms in the contract.' Syllabus Point 4, Art's Flower Shop, Inc. v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West Virginia, Inc., 186 W.Va. 613, 413 S.E.2d 670 (1991). As we have noted in our summary of the background of this matter, the record reflects that the Petitioner was notified by TeleTech that she would be offered a position and instructed to report for a new employee orientation. During one segment of this orientation, the Petitionerand all other prospective employeesmet with TeleTech's human resources representative. This segment lasted approximately one and one-half to two hours and it was during this segment that the Petitioner was presented with the Agreement at issue. Having fully considered the record, we do not find the Agreement to be unconscionable. [3] The Agreement requires arbitration in Morgantown, West Virginiathe place of the Petitioner's employmentand not Denver, Colorado, as the Petitioner has argued. [4] The Petitioner also has not argued that the Agreement was unconscionable because the arbitrator would be selected from Denver, Colorado. Further, there is no proof in the record before us that the Petitioner is exposed to exorbitant costs as a result of the Agreement as TeleTech is paying all costs associated with the Arbitration in excess of what the Petitioner would have been required to pay to maintain her civil action in the circuit court.