Opinion ID: 2625
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Avoiding Absurdity

Text: The declared purposes of the statute include: To prohibit causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition products, and their trade associations, for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearms products or ammunition products by others when the product functioned as designed and intended. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1). In drafting the PLCAA, Congress found: Businesses in the United States that are engaged in interstate and foreign commerce through the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, importation, or sale to the public of firearms or ammunition products that have been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce are not, and should not, be liable for the harm caused by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse firearm products or ammunition products that function as designed and intended. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(5). We think Congress clearly intended to protect from vicarious liability members of the firearms industry who engage in the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, 30 distribution, importation, or sale of firearms. Preceding subsection (a)(5), Congress stated that it had found that [t]he manufacture, importation, possession, sale, and use of firearms and ammunition in the United States are heavily regulated by Federal, State, and local laws. Such Federal laws include the Gun Control Act of 1968, the National Firearms Act, and the Arms Id. Control Act. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(4). We think the juxtaposition of these two subsections demonstrates that Congress meant that lawful design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, importation, or sale of firearms means such activities having been done in compliance with statutes like those described in subsection (a)(4). This conclusion is supported by the interpretive principle that statutory exceptions are to be construed `narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [general rule].' Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989)), overruled on other grounds by Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). In the broader context of the statute as a whole, Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, resort to the dictionary definition of applicable  i.e. capable of being applied  leads to a far too-broad reading of the predicate exception. Such a result would allow the predicate exception to swallow the statute, which was intended to shield the firearms industry from vicarious liability for harm caused by firearms that were lawfully distributed into primary markets.