Opinion ID: 1691181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appropriateness of Penalty in the Present Case

Text: When a court determines the appropriate penalty for disobedience of or disregard for court orders relating to pretrial procedures, one important consideration is whether the misconduct was by the attorney or the client, or both. In Horton v. McCary, 635 So.2d 199 (La. 1994), this court reversed a sanction that granted a default judgment against a defendant whose attorney failed to comply with discovery orders issued by the trial judge. In so ruling, this court emphasized that [b]oth dismissal and default are draconian penalties which should be applied only in extreme circumstances. Id. at 203; see also Barnhill v. United States, 11 F.3d 1360 (7th Cir.1993); Allen v. Smith, 390 So.2d 1300 (La.1980). Generally, such sanctions are proper only for the most culpable conduct in which the client, as well as the attorney, participated in the offense. Horton, 635 So.2d at 203. Noting that the trial transcript contained no evidence that the clients participated in violating the trial court's order, this court observed that this extreme penalty, depriving the litigant of his day in court, was too harsh a result for the litigant's attorney's neglect. [3] While this court in Horton suggested that this most extreme penalty was almost never to be imposed upon a litigant, the court did not say never. Courts seldom invoke the most extreme sanctions except when there is a gross disregard for the authority and the efficient operation of the court and for the attorney's professional obligation to his or her client. See J.A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation, Failure of Party or His Attorney to Appear at Pretrial Conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303 (1999). Each case must be decided upon its own facts and circumstances, and the trial judge is vested with much discretion in determining the penalty for violation of pre-trial or discovery orders. Other important considerations in determining the appropriateness of the penalty for a pre-trial order violation, in addition to the question of whether the client participated in the violation, are the stage of the proceeding at which the violation occurred, the presence or absence of prejudice to the opposing party's preparation of the case, and the nature and persistency of the misconduct that constitutes the violation. A litigant's attorney's non-excusable failure to attend a pre-trial conference at an early stage of the proceeding clearly must be punished if the court is going to maintain control of the proceeding and efficiently and expeditiously dispose of cases; however, the penalty for such a violation obviously should be less than one for repeated violations over a period of time that persistently obstruct the progress of the case and prevent the opposing attorneys from advancing the case and properly preparing for trial. The court of appeal in the present case relied on the decision in Boudreaux v. Yancey, 256 So.2d 340 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971), in which the court reversed the trial judge's dismissal of the plaintiffs action for failure of the plaintiffs counsel to appear for the pre-trial conference. The court of appeal in Boudreaux reasoned that the dismissal was not authorized at the time by La.Code Civ. Proc. arts. 193 or 1551. Id. at 342. Furthermore, the court did not indicate that the client participated in the violation in any manner. [4] Likewise, in Davis v. Byrd Mem'l Hosp., 628 So.2d 1284 (La.App. 3d Cir.1993), the court vacated the trial judge's dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for failure to comply with both a discovery order and a pre-trial order. The court noted that the record contained no evidence of willful disobedience by the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs' attorney was the only offending party. Thus, although the trial judge has much discretion in imposing sanctions for failure to comply with discovery or pretrial orders, the court held that the trial judge abused that discretion. Id. at 1287. In the present case, Means filed the worker's compensation action in August 1983 and then did nothing. After being sued for legal malpractice in July 1994, Means filed an answer and third party demand, but again did nothing. Means was ordered by the court to provide his pre-trial order inserts first by November 8, 1996 and then by December 10, 1996, and he failed to do so even as late as the day of trial on March 31, 1997. His willful and continued disregard for his responsibilities obstructed the entire course of the pre-trial procedure, prevented the opposing attorneys from preparing properly for trial, and would have considerably disrupted the court's docket but for the fact that the case was tried by an ad hoc judge. Also noteworthy is the fact that Means is an attorney who was representing himself in proper person; this is not the case of an unknowing and vulnerable client who may be unjustly harmed by a penalty arising from the failure of his attorney to respond to court-ordered pretrial procedures. While it is understandable that Means was not anxious to be cast in judgment for damages resulting from his virtually undisputed legal malpractice, the trial judge simply could not allow Means to unilaterally and continuously obstruct the movement of the case to trial. Means's repeated and willful acts of disobedience in failing to comply with the trial court's orders rendered appropriate the drastic sanctions imposed by the trial judge. This is precisely the rare case this court contemplated as appropriate for imposition of the harshest penalty. The trial court did not err in granting the motion to circumscribe and imposing penalties appropriate under the facts of this case.