Opinion ID: 1095914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Sufficiently Prove

Text: Intracorp and Bradly also contend that the trial court reversibly erred in refusing to grant them a JNOV or a new trial, at least as to Adams's fraud cause of action, because, they argue, Adams failed to sufficiently prove the suppression of a material fact. This contention, of course, is merely an assault on the sufficiency of the evidence. Initially, we note that a strong presumption of correctness attaches to a jury verdict in Alabama, if the verdict passes the sufficiency test presented by motions for directed verdict and JNOV. Christiansen v. Hall, 567 So.2d 1338, 1341 (Ala.1990); Alpine Bay Resorts, Inc. v. Wyatt, 539 So.2d 160 (Ala.1988). This presumption of correctness is further strengthened by a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial. Christiansen, 567 So.2d at 1341. Denying, and to a more limited extent granting, a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, Jawad v. Granade, 497 So.2d 471, 477 (Ala.1986). This Court will not reverse a judgment based on a jury verdict on a sufficiency of the evidence basis unless the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, shows that the verdict was plainly and palpably wrong and unjust. Christiansen, 567 So.2d at 1341. Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the verdict was plainly and palpably wrong or unjust. This Court has stated that a cause of action for suppression of a material fact under § 6-5-102, Ala.Code 1975, has four elements: (1) a duty to disclose facts; (2) concealment or nondisclosure of material facts by the defendant; (3) inducement of the plaintiff to act [or to refrain from acting]; and (4) action [or a refraining to act in a way that the plaintiff would otherwise act] by the plaintiff to his injury. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 759 (Ala.1986). We conclude that Adams presented substantial evidence [2] of each of these elements. First, as to the duty to disclose, § 6-5-102, Ala.Code 1975, states, in pertinent part, The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case. (Emphasis added.) Adams does not argue that a confidential relationship existed, but rather that the particular circumstances of the case imposed an obligation to disclose. This Court has stated that A duty to speak depends upon the relation of the parties, the value of the particular fact, the relative knowledge of the parties, and other circumstances. Deupree v. Ruffino, 505 So.2d 1218, 1222 (Ala.1987), quoting American Bonding Co. v. Fourth National Bank of Montgomery, 206 Ala. 639, 641, 91 So. 480 (1921). Further, this Court has held that a case-by-case, flexible approach must be used in determining if a duty to disclose exists under the particular circumstances of the case. Jim Short Ford Sales, Inc. v. Washington, 384 So.2d 83 (Ala.1980). In this case, Adams presented evidence that Intracorp policy required a rehabilitation specialist to fully disclose to a client (injured party) the extent of Intracorp's relationship with that person. Specifically, Adams points to three portions of Intracorp's Rehabilitation Specialist Resource Guide (hereinafter, Resource Guide), Intracorp's written policy statement and manual for its rehabilitation specialists. One portion of the Resource Guide states, [W]e are obligated to state clearly what our role will be in the assessment and rehabilitation process.... This is especially important when there is no intent to provide rehabilitation services beyond a file review, client interview, or assessment. Resource Guide at 9.2. Another portion of the Resource Guide states, The client should always be aware of the limits of our relationship. We are obligated to provide full and complete disclosure of our involvement. Resource Guide at 9.2. Further, the Resource Guide states: Rehabilitation counselors who provide services at the request of a third party will clarify the nature of their relationships to all involved parties. Rehabilitation counselors employed by third parties as case consultants or expert witnesses, where there is no pretense or intent to provide rehabilitation counseling services directly to clients beyond file review, initial interview and/or assessment, will clearly define, through written or oral means, the limits of their relationship. Resource Guide at 9.13. Thus, it was Intracorp's stated policy to fully inform clients of its relationship with them and of any limitations in the services that Intracorp could render to them. Intracorp, then, by its own business policy, had an obligation to disclose to Adams the limited nature of its undertaking for CIGNA. That is, because of the particular circumstances of this case, especially the stated company policy, we conclude that Intracorp and Bradly had a duty to disclose to Adams that CIGNA had hired them to perform only an initial evaluation. Stated differently, we conclude that Intracorp and Bradly had a duty to disclose to Adams that they had not been hired by CIGNA to perform the full range of services discussed in the services brochure provided to Adams in response to his query about the kinds of services Intracorp planned to provide him. Second, we find that Adams presented substantial evidence as to the nondisclosure or concealment element also. In answer to Alexander's written and specific inquiry about the types of services Intracorp would provide for Adams, Bradly referenced Intracorp's brochure (reprinted above) which outlined a plethora of rehabilitation services. If Adams was not to receive these services, it was incumbent on Intracorp and Bradly to specifically inform Adams to this effect. Furthermore, at the evaluation session, Adams specifically asked Bradly whose interest she served, and although she responded by saying that she served the insurance company's interest, she also stated that after this initial meeting she would serve his interest. When Adams asked her this question, Bradly had an opportunity to fully disclose to Adams the limited nature of Intracorp's undertaking. The evidence is clear that she did not do so. Third, as to inducement of the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting, it is undisputed that Adams did not seek other rehabilitation services, even governmentally provided services. We conclude that Adams's inaction was reasonable under the circumstances and particular facts of this case. Fourth, and finally, as to injury, there was evidence that Adams was delayed in returning to the workforce because he was not rehabilitated sooner. In short, Adams was not informed of Intracorp's limited undertaking, he specifically requested to know what type of services Intracorp proposed to provide, he was referred to Intracorp's brochure, and Intracorp and Bradly failed to inform him that those services would not be provided. We conclude that Adams was justified in relying on Bradly's answer to his inquiry, and that he was injured by failing to act as he would have acted absent Intracorp and Bradly's failure to disclose. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment entered on the jury's verdict. AFFIRMED. HORNSBY, C.J., and SHORES, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.