Opinion ID: 1487998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Motion to Suppress the Search Warrant.

Text: Verrecchia challenges the validity of the search warrant for the barn. He maintains that the supporting affidavit contained numerous misleading statements and unsubstantiated allegations concerning the police surveillance operation. He contends that the existence of those purported misrepresentations and unsubstantiated allegations becomes clear when one compares the affidavit with subsequent trial testimony describing the same surveillance operation. Verrecchia asserts that, by failing to give sufficient weight to those inconsistencies, the motion justice erred when he denied the motion to suppress. [14] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution, prohibit the issuance of a search warrant absent a showing of probable cause. [15] See State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 736 (R.I.1994); see also Rule 41(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; State v. Correia, 707 A.2d 1245, 1249 (R.I.1998); State v. Jeremiah, 696 A.2d 1220, 1222 (R.I.1997). The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the existence of probable cause should be determined pursuant to a flexible totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The Supreme Court in Gates elaborated on this analytical approach as follows: The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a `substantial basis for    conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed. Id. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)). In other words, the approach to the probable cause question should be pragmatic and flexible. See State v. Spaziano, 685 A.2d 1068, 1069 (R.I.1996) (Probable cause is determined under a commonsense test   .); see also Correia, 707 A.2d at 1249; State v. Hightower, 661 A.2d 948, 959 (R.I.1995). The magistrate is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the affidavit presented to him or her. Pratt, 641 A.2d at 736 ([A] judicial officer may draw reasonable inferences from the affidavit in order to reach a determination of probable cause   .). Moreover, as we have previously stated, an affidavit offered in support of a search warrant should not be judged as if it had been drafted by one schooled in the niceties of the law nor should it be interpreted in a hypertechnical manner. State v. Nerney, 110 R.I. 364, 365, 292 A.2d 882, 883 (1972); see also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) ([W]hen a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.); see generally Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984); Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31, 103 S.Ct. 2317. The First Circuit has summarized these principles in plain English as follows: Probable cause exists when the affidavit demonstrates in some trustworthy fashion the likelihood that an offense has been or is being committed. United States v. Santana, 342 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1206, 124 S.Ct. 1478, 158 L.Ed.2d 129 (2004). [16] Our appellate review of probable cause rulings made by judges confronted with motions to suppress is conducted on a de novo basis. See State v. Girard, 799 A.2d 238, 249 (R.I.2002) (`Because probable cause is an issue of constitutional magnitude, this Court reviews de novo such mixed questions of law and fact in accordance with the dictates of Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 [1996]   .'); see also State v. Holdsworth, 798 A.2d 917, 920-21 (R.I.2002); State v. Apalakis, 797 A.2d 440, 443 (R.I.2002); State v. Campbell, 691 A.2d 564, 569 (R.I.1997) (This Court will review de novo legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact insofar as those issues impact on constitutional matters   .). In conducting such a review, however, this Court gives reasonable deference to the trial justice's findings of historical fact. As the United States Supreme Court said in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts   . See Simpson v. State, 769 A.2d 1257, 1265-66 (R.I.2001) (explaining the relationship between our de novo review of the ultimate issue of the infringement of constitutional rights and our deferential stance vis-à-vis findings of historical fact and the inferences drawn from those facts); see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Santana, 342 F.3d at 65 (We review de novo the district court's determination that the facts in the affidavit constituted probable cause.    Any findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.); McKinney v. State, 843 A.2d 463, 466 (R.I.2004); State v. Travis, 568 A.2d 316, 320 (R.I.1990). When it appears that there is a substantial basis upon which a magistrate predicated a probable-cause determination, a reviewing court should give great deference to that determination. See, e.g., Correia, 707 A.2d at 1249 ([W]e, like the trial justice, should give great deference to the issuing magistrate's determination if it appears that he or she had a substantial basis from which to discern probable cause.); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317; State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889, 890 (R.I.1997); Spaziano, 685 A.2d at 1069; Pratt, 641 A.2d at 737; State v. Baldoni, 609 A.2d 219, 220 (R.I.1992). [17] We are particularly impressed by the concise summary of several of the foregoing principles that is to be found in the following passage authored by Judge (now Justice) Anthony Kennedy while he was serving on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case of United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir.1985): For probable cause to exist, a magistrate need not determine that the evidence sought is in fact on the premises to be searched,    or that the evidence is more likely than not to be found where the search takes place.    The magistrate need only conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit. In reviewing the magistrate's determination that there was probable cause, we need find only that there was a substantial basis for the conclusion.    In doubtful cases, the reviewing court should give preference to the validity of the warrant. Id. at 1315. Verrecchia does not dispute that he and the undercover detective actually did meet at the Wal-Mart Plaza and that, when they met, Verrecchia produced an AK-47 assault rifle and a .45-caliber handgun for the undercover detective's inspection and purchase. Furthermore, considering the limited nature of our previous remand to the Superior Court, he is not now challenging the validity of his subsequent arrest. What he does challenge is the validity of the search warrant for the barn in Burrillville. He supports this challenge by comparing Cpl. DelPrete's affidavit with the trial testimony of Trooper Richard C. Ryan of the Rhode Island State Police concerning the police surveillance operation. Verrecchia notes that Trooper Ryan was the only member of the surveillance team to testify; and he argues that there were some inconsistencies between Cpl. DelPrete's affidavit and Trooper Ryan's trial testimony concerning the events that occurred between Verrecchia's first encounter with the undercover detective in Johnston and his subsequent meeting with that detective at the Wal-Mart Plaza. Verrecchia contends that these alleged inconsistencies are fatal to the validity of the search warrant and concludes that the motion justice should have granted his motion to suppress. In the affidavit that he submitted in support of his application for a search warrant, Cpl. DelPrete stated that a confidential and reliable informant (Rossi) had informed the police that Albert Verrecchia was storing a variety of stolen goods, including weapons, in a barn type building located next to the United States Post Office parking lot in Harrisville, Rhode Island. The informant gave the police a telephone number that later was determined to be that of Verrecchia's place of business. On May 9, 1996, Det. Sgt. O'Donnell called the telephone number and asked to speak to Al. The individual who had answered the call identified himself as Al. The undercover detective identified himself as the Ghost and arranged to meet with Al at a specified time and place to discuss the purchase of firearms. The affidavit said that the Ghost was the prearranged code name that the confidential informant (Rossi) had given Det. Sgt. O'Donnell for him to use in dealing with Verrecchia. Corporal DelPrete further said in his affidavit that, at their scheduled meeting, Det. Sgt. O'Donnell told Verrecchia what type of firearms he wished to purchase. [18] Corporal DelPrete also said that Verrecchia told the undercover detective that he would bring a few samples from which the undercover detective could choose. The parties later arranged to meet at 2:30 p.m. that same day at the Wal-Mart Plaza, and they then went their separate ways. The affidavit, which was drafted on the same day as defendant's arrest, states that members of the surveillance team observed Verrecchia place a cardboard box and two duffel bags into his tow truck at his place of business. Shortly thereafter, according to the affidavit, the surveillance team observed Verrecchia drive away in his tow truck. He was next observed parking the tow truck in the United States Post Office parking lot in Burrillville. According to the affidavit, he then entered a wooden barn shaped structure color brown located on the duplex property at 489 and 491 Chapel Street Burrillville, Rhode Island. Later, Verrecchia was seen exiting the barn to retrieve the previously described card board [ sic ] box from his tow truck. According to the affidavit, he then went back into the barn with the cardboard box and later left with the same box and placed it in his vehicle. Verrecchia says that Trooper Ryan's trial testimony concerning these events is at odds with the account given in the affidavit. He alleges that Trooper Ryan did not observe Verrecchia carry anything out of his place of business, and could not positively identify Verrecchia as the empty-handed individual who entered the barn and then left the barn with a long white package. [19] Verrecchia further points out that Trooper Ryan's testimony as to the white package differs from Det. Sgt. O'Donnell's testimony that, at the Wal-Mart Plaza, Verrecchia indicated that the AK-47 was inside a multi-colored box. We have carefully reviewed the record. Applying the above-summarized principles relative to the determination of probable cause, as well as giving reasonable deference to the findings of historical fact made by the motion justice, we conclude that there was a more than sufficient basis upon which the magistrate could find the existence of probable cause. First, the fact that Verrecchia had been observed, earlier on the day in question, engaging in what seemed to be criminal conduct involving firearms (for which apparent criminal conduct he was arrested shortly before the affidavit was submitted) is highly relevant to the magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to search the barn in Burrillvillea building that Verrecchia had been observed visiting shortly before his arrest on firearms charges. When Det. Sgt. O'Donnell contacted Verrecchia and told him that he wished to purchase firearms, Verrecchia arranged to meet with him and set up the transaction. After they met and Det. Sgt. O'Donnell specified the weapons he wanted, Verrecchia drove to a barn, entered it, and then left the barn carrying a package, which he then placed in his tow truck. Shortly thereafter, Verrecchia delivered the requested weapons to Det. Sgt. O'Donnell and was immediately arrested by the police. It was not until after defendant's arrest that the affidavit to support the search warrant for the barn was submitted to the magistrate. We conclude that Verrecchia's arrest under these circumstances was particularly relevant to determining probable cause to search the barn in Burrillville. See United States v. Robins, 978 F.2d 881, 892 (5th Cir.1992) (A nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established through direct observation or through normal inferences.); see also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. McKinney, 758 F.2d 1036, 1043 (5th Cir.1985). Furthermore, although there may be minor inconsistencies between Cpl. DelPrete's affidavit and the trial testimony of Trooper Ryan concerning the events of May 9, 1996, it is clear from the record on balance that Trooper Ryan's testimony does not contradict, but rather corroborates, the affidavit with respect to the critical information that was submitted in support of the application for the search warrant for the barn. In his decision, the motion justice rejected Verrecchia's assertion that the affiant recklessly disregarded the truth, and he stated that [d]espite any deficiencies in information regarding the confidential informant Rossi, Corporal DelPrete's affidavit still established probable cause because the informant's tip was adequately corroborated by independent police work. [20] Our review of the record reveals that both the affidavit and Trooper Ryan's testimony stated that Verrecchia and Det. Sgt. O'Donnell met with each other on May 9, 1996, in the parking lot of a Dunkin' Donuts store on Plainfield Pike, and also said that later on the same day Verrecchia parked his vehicle in the parking lot of the United States Post Office in Burrillville. Furthermore, both the affidavit and Trooper Ryan's testimony referred to a barn located near the post office as the one from which Verrecchia exited carrying what was described in the affidavit as a cardboard box and by Trooper Ryan's testimony as a long package; and both stated that Verrecchia placed that item in his tow truck. The affidavit then said that Verrecchia met with Det. Sgt. O'Donnell later that afternoon at the Wal-Mart Shopping Plaza in Cranston, and that he was arrested upon delivering firearms to the undercover detective. Trooper Ryan testified that, after Verrecchia placed the package in his tow truck, the aerial surveillance team followed Verrecchia from the Burrillville parking lot to his place of business and from there to a Wal-Mart parking lot. Trooper Ryan also testified that he witnessed Verrecchia's arrest. [21] Consequently, having reviewed the numerous factual statements in the affidavit at issue in this case, we hold that there was ample basis for the issuance of the warrant for the search of the barn.