Opinion ID: 1834087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: swift & company

Text: Brogdon has cross-appealed from the peremptory instruction of the circuit court in favor of Swift & Company. He asserts that Lewis and Gooch were not independent contractors, but the agents and servants of Swift, and that therefore Swift is also liable. The rules of the place of the wrong determine the difference between an independent contractor and a servant or agent. Accordingly, the law of the State of Louisiana is determinative of whether Lewis and his employee Gooch were also employees of Swift, or whether Lewis was an independent contractor. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 387 at 474-75 (1934); Leflar, Conflict of Laws §§ 110-115 (1959); Scoles, Goodrich on Conflict of Law § 98 at 182 (1964); Reese and Flesch, Agency and Vicarious Liability in Conflict of Laws, 60 Col.L.Rev. 766, 775-79 (1960). An examination of numerous Louisiana cases indicates that the Louisiana courts look essentially to the same tests and factors that the vast majority of jurisdictions, including Mississippi, consider in determining whether a relationship is that of master and servant or contractee and independent contractor. The leading Louisiana case is Amyx v. Henry & Hall, 227 La. 364, 79 So.2d 483 (1955). At the time of the accident the truck of Lewis, doing business as Mid-State Trucking Company, was hauling boxes of iced chickens, shipped by Swift pursuant to a Motor Carrier Trucking Agreement between it and Lewis. Swift used other contract haulers in addition to Lewis under similar agreements. To carry out this contract, Lewis purchased and had available a truck with a dry-pack van specially made for hauling such products. The truck belonged to Lewis, who provided repairs and fuel. Swift gave Lewis a considerable amount of hauling business, so this truck was used exclusively to carry out the Swift contract. Between trips the truck was left at the Farmer's Market, near the Swift plant, for the convenience of both Swift and Lewis. For hauling these frozen chickens, Swift paid Lewis according to distance and weight. Gooch, the driver, averaged three interstate round trips a week. Since the time of delivery was an important part of the result to be achieved by the shipper, bills of lading given Lewis frequently stated the time for delivery of the products at their destinations. Lewis was paid each week by Swift on the basis of the deliveries made during the week. The Swift check was payable to Lewis, and he in turn paid Gooch twenty percent of it for driving the truck. Swift did not control hiring and firing of the driver of the truck, but it expected Lewis to furnish a competent driver. Gooch had been driving this truck for Lewis, hauling shipments for Swift, since 1964. The circuit court was correct in granting a peremptory instruction for Swift. Under the Louisiana cases, the relationship between Swift and Lewis would be that of shipper and independent contract carrier. The terms of the contract, the method and time of payment, ownership of the tools and equipment, the right to hire and fire vested in Lewis alone, the shipper looking to the results and not the details of accomplishing them, and the lack of any control or right to control by Swift of the details of performance of Lewis' contract with Swift support the foregoing conclusion. Moreover, assuming arguendo that there existed factual issues for definition of this relationship, they were submitted to the jury on the first trial, and it found in favor of Swift. However, we do not reach that aspect of this case, as we think the circuit court on the second trial correctly rendered judgment for Swift. Affirmed on direct and cross-appeals. PATTERSON, INZER, SMITH and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.