Opinion ID: 2281579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Primary Basic Reparations Obligor

Text: In 1974, the General Assembly of Kentucky enacted the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) in an attempt to effect, inter alia, the following purposes: (2) To provide prompt payment to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to whose negligence caused the accident in order to eliminate the inequties which fault-determination has created; (3) To encourage prompt medical treatment and rehabilitation of the motor vehicle accident victim by providing for prompt payment of needed medical care and rehabilitation; .... (5) To reduce the need to resort to bargaining and litigation through a system which can pay victims of motor vehicle accidents without the delay, expense, aggravation, inconvenience, inequities and uncertainties of the liability system; .... (8) To correct the inadequacies of the present reparation system, recognizing that it was devised and our present Constitution adopted prior to the development of the internal combustion motor vehicle. KRS 304.39-010. Given these straight-forward purposes, it is apparent that the General Assembly was principally concerned with the ability of motor-vehicle-accident victims to promptly recover reparations. With this principle in mind, this Court recently interpreted the MVRA so as to give effect to the Legislature's desire that motor vehicle tort victims receive prompt payment in the event that two insurance companies become entangled in a priority dispute. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 326 S.W.3d 803, 806-07 (Ky.2010). In Shelter, we held that where both policies (one covering the vehicle and one covering the driver) claim to provide only excess coverage, the spirit and intent of the MVRA mandates that the policy covering the vehicle and vehicle owner take priority over that of the permissive driver. Id. Our holding there reflected this Court's concern with uncertainty and potential delays and more importantly the possibility that a tort victim would not receive prompt reparations when two insurance companies become embroiled in a priority dispute. Id. To hold otherwise in that case would have confounded the clear legislative purpose of the MVRA. Here, once again, we are asked to determine an is sue of priority, but, under different circumstances. Rather than addressing two excess clauses as we did in Shelter, this Court now faces the question of whether the vehicle owner's insurance should take priority over the driver's insurance when BRB are owed to an injured third party. We again hold that, per the policies established in the MVRA, priority lies with the vehicle owner. This Court has consistently adhered to the maxim that a statute should be read according to its plain meaning. Spencer v. Estate of Spencer, 313 S.W.3d 534, 541 (Ky.2010). Applying this rule to the case at bar, we conclude that a plain reading of the MVRAparticularly a provision specifically relating to priority (KRS 304.39-050)compels the conclusion that National is indeed the primary obligor of basic reparations benefits. KRS 304.39-050 provides in pertinent part: Priority of applicability of security for payment of basic reparations benefits The basic reparation insurance applicable to bodily injury to which this subtitle applies is the security covering the vehicle occupied by the injured person at the time of the accident or, if the injured person is a pedestrian, the security covering the vehicle which struck such pedestrian. If the reparation obligor providing such insurance fails to make payment for loss within thirty (30) days after receipt of reasonable proof of the fact and the amount of loss sustained, the injured person shall be entitled to payment under any contract of basic reparation insurance under which he is a basic reparation insured and the insurer making such payments shall be entitled to full reimbursement from the reparation obligor providing the security covering the vehicle, (emphasis added). As is clear, KRS 304.39-050 contemplates the possibility of two insurers: (1) those covering the vehicle; and (2) all others. It is also clear that where a vehicle is secured by an insurance policy, but operated at the time of injury by a driver who is insured by a second policyseparate and apart from the vehicle's insurancethe insurance covering the vehicle occupied by the injured person at the time of the accident will take priority over other insurance. Id; see Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So.2d 3, 5 (Fla.1972); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 522 S.W.2d 809, 821 (Mo. 1975) (stating that the general rule places primary liability on the insurer of the owner of the automobile). Therefore, in this case, because National was the insurer of the vehicle occupied by the injured person at the time of the accident, we hold that National was indeed the primary obligor of BRB per the plain instructions of KRS 304.39-050.