Opinion ID: 2074633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence and the Identification Procedure as to Mr. Cullison

Text: Mr. Cullison argues that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal, because there was no direct evidence that [he] shot Mr. Wynn, but even the circumstantial evidence was extremely weak. The government responds that [t]he evidence was more than sufficient to show [Mr.] Cullison's guilt of the crimes charged, either as a principal or as an aider and abettor. We review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Patterson v. United States, 479 A.2d 335, 337-38 (D.C. 1984). We defer to the jury with respect to credibility determinations and the weighing of the evidence. See McCoy v. United States, 781 A.2d 765, 768 (D.C. 2001). It is only where the government has produced no evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that this court can reverse a conviction. In re M.I.W., 667 A.2d 573, 575 (D.C.1995) (quoting Gayden v. United States, 584 A.2d 578, 580 (D.C.1990)) (other citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lewis v. United States, 767 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C. 2001). Three government eyewitnesses implicated Mr. Cullison in the murder of Mr. Wynn. Mr. Proctor saw the arrest of Shannon Battle on the day of Mr. Wynn's murder. About twenty minutes later, he observed Mr. Ford, Hartridge and Cullison in a back alley on K Street, S.W., with Mr. Paris. Mr. Hartridge was holding Mr. Paris by his shirt collar, and Mr. Cullison stood within a foot of Mr. Paris and had a gun in his hand. Mr. Proctor eventually left the alley and proceeded to Delaware and K, S.W. where he saw Mr. Wynn lying on the fence, with Mr. Hartridge [s]tanding in front of [him]. Mr. Ford and Mr. Cullison were nearby. Mr. Proctor spoke to Mr. Wynn and Mr. Hartridge and then walked [a]cross the street. He heard gunshots, turned around and saw Mr. Ford shooting Mr. Wynn. More gunshots followed. On the day of Mr. Wynn's murder, Mr. Paris watched the police arrest Mr. Battle, and saw Mr. Hartridge acting wild while talking to the police. Mr. Cullison and Mr. Ford also were present. Mr. Paris went to the alley in back of his Southwest home on Delaware Avenue where he saw the appellants close up. Mr. Ford had a gun and Mr. Cullison had a .38 in his hand. Mr. Paris went home momentarily but left his house a few minutes later. He heard gunshots, spaced apart; the first shots sounded as though they were from a semiautomatic gun and the next from a revolver. Mr. Paris returned inside his home, looked out the widow and saw Mr. Cullison running with a gun in his hand. Ms. Givens was standing near the corner of Delaware Avenue and K Street, S.W. on the day of Mr. Wynn's murder when she heard a gunshot. Upon looking, she saw Mr. Wynn in the middle of the street, turning around in a circle and saying, ouch. After he fell to the ground, Mr. Hartridge and Mr. Cullison were standing [o]ver top of [Mr. Wynn]. Although they had their backs to Ms. Givens, she saw them unloading the gun. Mr. Hartridge and Mr. Cullison went hand-to-hand to each other like they were switching something around. Mr. Hartridge was kicking Mr. Wynn. If reasonable jurors believed the testimony of these witnesses, as they apparently did, and drew reasonable inferences from the testimony, they could reasonably conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Mr. Cullison of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder while armed and the weapons charges lodged against him, either as a principal or as an aider and abettor. See Murchison v. United States, 486 A.2d 77, 81 (D.C.1984). Thus, although the prosecutor misstated evidence by placing a gun in Mr. Cullison's hand on 1 Street two weeks after Mr. Wynn's murder, it is unlikely that that misstatement alone substantially prejudiced him by prompting the jury to convict him of Mr. Wynn's murder solely because he possessed a gun two weeks later on I Street, particularly since the government presented a very strong case against Mr. Cullison based on the testimony of eyewitnesses to the murder of Mr. Wynn two weeks earlier. See Freeman, supra, 689 A.2d at 584. Consequently, we reject Mr. Cullison's sufficiency argument. Mr. Cullison's argument that the identification procedure used with Ms. Lee was unduly suggestive is unpersuasive. His argument in his brief revolves around the testimony of Ms. Lee at trial that she had never seen that boy before in [her] life, that the only person Ms. Lee did not know in the array was Mr. Cullison, and that Sergeant Wagner used unduly suggestive words in showing the photo array to Ms. Lee. However, Mr. Cullison does not mention any procedure used by the police in presenting the photo array to Ms. Lee that was unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification. Smith v. United States, 777 A.2d 801, 805 (D.C.2001). In fact, he does not contend that Mr. Cullison's photo st[ood] out dramatically from the other photos in the array. See Henderson v. United States, 527 A.2d 1262, 1268 (D.C.1987). Sergeant Wagner's testimony revealed that the array had been put together with persons whom Ms. Lee was expected to recognize, and she did. Moreover, Sergeant Wagner uttered no words that would sway Ms. Lee's identification one way or the other. He said that she might recognize people in the photographs in the stack or might not and that persons referred to during the interview might be in the stack or might not. He also asked her to tell him what she knew about each of the persons whose photograph was depicted. Our review of Sergeant Wagner's description of the photo array process and his interview of Ms. Lee satisfies us that the identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification. Smith, supra, 777 A.2d at 805; see Gregg v. United States, 754 A.2d 265, 267-68 (D.C.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 980, 121 S.Ct. 430, 148 L.Ed.2d 438 (2000).