Opinion ID: 2521340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Termination of Joint Tenancies

Text: We turn to the question of how a joint tenancy may be terminated. In that inquiry, we pause to address the notion that the interests associated with the ownership of real property held in joint tenancy are fixed and vested. That principle comes most recently from our decision in Lee's Estate v. Graber where we addressed the issue of whether the gift of a joint interest in real estate held jointly with the donor is complete and irrevocable. 462 P.2d at 493. Answering that question affirmatively, we held that [i]n the case of real property, rights under a joint tenancy are fixed and vested in the joint tenants at the time of the creation of the joint tenancy. Id. at 494. As a result, once a donor creates a joint tenancy, he or she may not convey or otherwise interfere with the property interests vested in the other joint tenant by virtue of the conveyance. Id.; see also First Nat'l Bank of Southglenn v. Energy Fuels Corp., 200 Colo. 540, 618 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1980) (A joint tenant cannot alienate, encumber, or transfer the interest of other joint tenants without their consent.). What Graber restates is the axiom that once a joint tenancy is created, each joint tenant owns a vested interest in the property, which cannot be extinguished or alienated without that particular tenant's consent. Graber does not hold that the right of survivorship itself is irrevocable or fixed and vested and cannot be eliminated without the consent of the other joint tenant or tenants. Indeed, such a holding would fly in the face of years of precedent to the contrary. Even characterizing survivorship as a right is somewhat misleading. Rather, survivorship is an expectancy that is not irrevocably fixed upon the creation of the estate; it arises only upon success in the ultimate gamble survivaland then only if the unity of the estate has not theretofore been destroyed by voluntary conveyance, by partition proceedings, by involuntary alienation under an execution, or by any other action which operates to sever the joint tenancy. Tenhet v. Boswell, 18 Cal.3d 150, 133 Cal.Rptr. 10, 554 P.2d 330, 334 (1976) (internal citations omitted). Thus, in order for an expectancy of a survivorship interest to become a vested right, one joint tenant must survive the death of another joint tenant during the period of time that the joint tenancy remains intact. Hence, the right of survivorship is not fixed in such a way as to constrain a joint tenant from changing his mind and abrogating it. Rather, a joint tenant may unilaterally eliminate the survivorship element of the ownership rights, and by doing so, eliminate his own survivorship rights as well. [2] Stated otherwise, a joint tenant has the absolute right to terminate a joint tenancy unilaterally. Carmack v. Place, 188 Colo. 303, 535 P.2d 197, 198 (1975); see also 7 Powell, supra, § 51.04[1]. In this case, therefore, we are not dealing with whether a joint tenant may sever the tenancy and create a tenancy in common; we are dealing with the question of how that can be accomplished. Historically, whether the severance of a joint tenancy was effective turned on the question of whether the act was sufficient to destroy any of the four unities. Bradley, 525 P.2d at 493. Thus, conveying the property to a third party, [3] transferring legal title into a trust, [4] executing a lien, [5] or foreclosing on a mortgage, [6] were all considered to be effective means of severing a joint tenancy. We also specifically recognized the antiquated convention whereby the joint tenant wishing to terminate a joint tenancy would convey the property to a strawman who would in turn reconvey the property back to the former joint tenant as a tenant in common. Alden v. Alden, 155 Colo. 51, 393 P.2d 5, 6 (1964). The rationale underlying all of these transactions was that because legal title was transferred, the unities of time and title were destroyed, and therefore the joint tenancy, and the survivorship interest associated with it, were destroyed as well. Along these same lines, mortgages, [7] leases, [8] and other encumbrances [9] that did not involve the transfer of legal title were considered insufficient to sever a joint tenancy. Again, the underlying rationale was that because the grantor had not transferred title to the real property, the unities remained intact and the transaction did not sever the joint tenancy. In stark contrast to traditional common law, [t]he modern tendency is to not require that the act of the co-tenant be destructive of one of the essential four unities of time, title, possession or interest before a joint tenancy is terminated. Mann v. Bradley, 188 Colo. 392, 535 P.2d 213, 214 (1975). In Mann, we recognized that a joint tenancy may be terminated by mere agreement between the joint tenants, despite the fact that no property is conveyed or interests alienated. Id. Thus, in determining whether a joint tenancy has been created or severed, we look not to the four unities, but rather to the intent of the parties. Id. at 214-15; see also Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo.App. 115, 532 P.2d 368, 369 (1974). Actions that are inconsistent with the right of survivorship may terminate a joint tenancy. Mann, 535 P.2d at 214-15.