Opinion ID: 742598
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of the Suppression Motions

Text: 67 Both federal law and state law are designed to harmonize the needs of law enforcement officials with the privacy rights of the individual. Title III requires that wiretap applications include 68 a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 69 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c); see also N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 700.20(2)(d) (McKinney 1995) (containing similar requirement). In United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.1983), we disapproved of the use of wiretap evidence because the affidavit underlying the application for wiretap authorization d[id] not reveal what, if any, investigative techniques were attempted prior to the wiretap request and d[id] not enlighten us as to why this narcotics case presented problems different from any other small-time narcotics case. Id. at 104; see also id. at 102 (discern[ing] no difference between the federal and state case law relating to this requirement); People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 412 N.Y.S.2d 801, 807, 385 N.E.2d 541 (1978) (New York statute was designed to harmonize State standards for court authorized eavesdropping warrants with federal standards), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972, 99 S.Ct. 1535, 59 L.Ed.2d 788 (1979). 70 The requirement that there be disclosure as to the use, success, and potential success of other investigative techniques, however, does not mean that any particular investigative procedures [must] be exhausted before a wiretap may be authorized. United States v. Young, 822 F.2d 1234, 1237 (2d Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 71 [T]he purpose of the statutory requirements is not to preclude resort to electronic surveillance until after all other possible means of investigation have been exhausted by investigative agents; rather they only require that the agents inform the authorizing judicial officer of the nature and progress of the investigation and of the difficulties inherent in the use of normal law enforcement methods. 72 United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1282 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979). In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress wiretap evidence, we accord deference to the district court because [t]he role of an appeals court in reviewing the issuance of a wiretap order ... is not to make a de novo determination of sufficiency as if it were a district judge, but to decide if the facts set forth in the application were minimally adequate to support the determination that was made. United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 231 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990). 73 As to the present case, when the State applied in state court for wiretap authorizations, it explained that it had been investigating the Supreme Team for some years and had nearly exhausted its battery of traditional investigative techniques with little significant success. Using normal techniques, the State had been unable to penetrate the Supreme Team or gain sufficient admissible evidence against any members other than those at the lowest echelons. The Team's leaders had insulated themselves from police contact through extensive use of bodyguards and lookouts, and when the State applied for wiretap authorization it had yet to identify all of the upper and middle level members of the Supreme Team, or to determine where the narcotics and illegal proceeds were kept, or to identify the Team's cocaine suppliers. The State had procured the cooperation of one accomplice, but it hesitated to attempt other undercover infiltration because of the extreme violence in which the Supreme Team engaged against persons it believed were threats to its security. Even by the time the State applied for the Graham wiretap, it was still unable to obtain the physical evidence whose existence could be gleaned from conversations intercepted by wiretap, given both the difficulty of infiltration by undercover officers and the unreliability of cooperating defendants. For example, Hale at one time agreed to cooperate and then at various points refused to cooperate; his history of homicide and drug abuse further decreased his reliability. Thus, the State sought wiretaps in order to identify the Team's leaders and suppliers and to locate their drug storage facilities. We conclude that the district court did not err in ruling that the State met its burden of showing its need for a wiretap. 74 Defendants fare no better in their challenge to the Miller wiretap on the ground that affidavits supporting the application for that tap omitted material information that had been provided by informants who were cooperating with the State. A challenge to the veracity of such an affidavit will succeed only when it establishes intentional or reckless omissions or false statements that are necessary to the finding of probable cause supporting the wiretap authorization. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); see Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 604 (2d Cir.1991). 75 In the present case, the district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether State officers had sought to mislead the state-court judges to induce them to authorize wiretaps. The court found that 76 [t]he credible testimony of assistant district attorneys Quinn and Ruiz and Detective Ryan at that supplemental hearing establishe[d] beyond any doubt that these state officials did not seek to deceive the state court, nor did they act in a suspiciously careless manner in the preparation of the wire tap application. 77 District Court Memorandum dated March 10, 1993, at 1-2. Although the Miller and Graham wiretaps had been suppressed by the state court, the district court found no reason to grant the relief, applying either state or federal law to the resolution of the issues. Id. at 1. Giving due deference to the district court's assessment of witness credibility, we can see no basis for overturning its refusal to suppress evidence on this ground. 78 Finally, the district court properly rejected defendants' contention that they were entitled to suppression because the State, knowing that Graham was engaged in criminal activity with Miller and that Graham's conversations would likely be intercepted, omitted Graham's name from the application for the Miller wiretap. Although the state court, relying in part on state-court decisions, ruled that the State was obligated to identify ... Graham when the Miller warrant was obtained, People v. Graham, Ind. No. QN13137/90, Memorandum Decision at 21 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Nov. 15, 1991), there is no such requirement under federal law. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 435, 97 S.Ct. 658, 671, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (where wiretap meets Title III standards, the failure to identify additional persons who are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial authorization). 79 We have considered all of defendants' challenges to the wiretap evidence and have found them to be without merit. The district court properly denied the motion to suppress. 80