Opinion ID: 800059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Re-Asserting the Right to Counsel After a Faretta Waiver

Text: Before reviewing the state court's decision to determine whether it was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, we next address whether a criminal defendant can re-assert the right to counsel after previously waiving it. The state court's rejection of Rodgers' claim turned on the application of the California standard governing the reappointment of counsel previously waived. Therefore, our finding that the right to counsel for a new trial motion is clearly established does not end our inquiry. This Court must also determine whether the denial of Rodgers' request for counsel to file such a motion because he previously waived his right to trial counsel was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. While the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel at all critical stages has been long established, the Supreme Court has also recognized that a criminal defendant has a reciprocal constitutional right to `proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.' John-Charles v. California, 646 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). As we have previously acknowledged, the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed a criminal defendant's ability to re-assert his right to counsel ... after a previous waiver of that right during trial.... Ignacio, 360 F.3d at 1056. However, applying the Supreme Court's general governing principles described above, we previously determined it is clearly established federal law that a defendant's reassertion of the right to counsel at a separate, post-trial proceeding cannot be denied simply on the grounds that the defendant has previously waived that right. Id. at 1059. We abide by our earlier holding. In Robinson v. Ignacio , a case with strikingly similar facts to this case, a habeas petitioner alleged the state trial court should have allowed him to revoke his waiver of trial counsel and should have appointed counsel when he requested representation for sentencing. Id. at 1056. Recognizing the Supreme Court's rule that the right to counsel can be waived, we held: Because the right to counsel is so central to our concepts of fair adjudication, we are reluctant to deny the practical fulfillment of the righteven once waivedabsent a compelling reason that will survive constitutional scrutiny.... Therefore, although we recognize the right to counselonce waivedis no longer absolute, we start with the strong presumption that a defendant's post-trial request for the assistance of an attorney should not be refused. Id. at 1058 (quoting Menefield, 881 F.2d at 700) (emphasis added). We then emphasized that trial courts have discretion to deny requests for the appointment of counsel in some instances, such as when requests are made on the eve of trial for purposes of delay. Id. (citing Menefield, 881 F.2d at 700). But, there is a substantial practical distinction between delay on the eve of trial and delay at the time of a post-trial hearing. Id. Indeed, post-verdict continuances [are] far less likely to `substantially interfere with the court's or the parties' schedules.' Id. (quoting Menefield, 881 F.2d at 700-01). Therefore, absent extraordinary circumstances, a defendant's post-trial revocation of his waiver should be allowed unless the government can show that the request is made `for a bad faith purpose.' Id. (citing Menefield, 881 F.2d at 701). As explained in Ignacio, the conclusion that a defendant retains his right to re-assert the right to counsel post-trial is `foreordained by the Sixth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.' Id. at 1058 n. 7 (citing Bell, 190 F.3d at 1092-93). Numerous other federal circuit courts have also held that a trial court must give due consideration to a request for counsel at a post-trial proceeding, despite a previous waiver of trial counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir.1991) (holding trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by refusing to appoint counsel to represent defendant at sentencing); United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 643 (7th Cir.1989) (holding defendant's express revocation of an earlier waiver of counsel at sentencing requires at least an inquiry by the district judge into the defendant's representional desires); United States v. Holmen, 586 F.2d 322, 324 (4th Cir.1978) (holding it was error to not have appointed counsel at the sentencing stage following the withdrawal of waiver of trial counsel); Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 834, 840 (8th Cir.1955) (holding that a request for counsel prior to sentencing after a waiver of trial counsel requires the court to inquire whether the waiver has been revoked). Five federal circuits have interpreted the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to mean that the right to counsel is so integral to the fair administration of our justice system that a defendant who has waived his right to counsel may nonetheless re-assert it; no circuit court has ruled to the contrary. Ignacio, 360 F.3d at 1059. Given these convergent holdings, as well as the general principles underlying the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, it is clearly established federal law that a defendant's reassertion of the right to counsel at a post-trial proceeding cannot be denied simply on the grounds that the defendant has previously waived it. Ignacio, 360 F.3d at 1059. Although we recognize Robinson v. Ignacio as binding on this Court, we must address a recent case that, at first glance, calls Ignacio 's holding into question. In John-Charles v. California , this Court applied a narrower interpretation of the clearly established requirement and addressed the appeal of a habeas petitioner who requested the appointment of counsel during trial after initially waiving his right to trial counsel. 646 F.3d at 1250-51. As in Ignacio, we observed that the Supreme Court in Faretta left open the question of whether and under what conditions a defendant who validly waives his right to counsel has a Sixth Amendment right to reassert it later in the same stage of his criminal trial. Id. at 1249 (emphasis added). Specifically, we held: In short, the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated a constitutional right to post-Faretta reappointment of counsel during trial. It has not defined the standard of review that should apply to trial courts' handling of such issues. And it has not spoken on whether a trial court's error in ruling on a reappointment request is structural or trial error. This silence compels us to defer to the state court's reasonable attempts to fill the void. Id. at 1251 (emphasis added). Rather than overruling Ignacio, we carefully distinguished it, repeatedly emphasizing that the claim in John-Charles involved the re-assertion of the right to counsel during trial not during a separate, post-trial proceeding. Id. at 1252. In fact, we confirmed that Ignacio did not purport to address the question of whether a selfrepresented defendant has a right to reappointment of counsel once trial proceedings have begun, rather than during a subsequent proceeding. Id. (emphasis added). The narrower interpretation of Section 2254's clearly established requirement in John-Charles stemmed from two Supreme Court decisions indicating that its precedent must be closely on point or give a clear answer to the question presented to qualify as clearly established federal law. Id. at 1248 (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 128 S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008) and Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006)). However, unlike this case, those two cases involved novel situations in which the Supreme Court was silent. See Wright, 552 U.S. at 125, 128 S.Ct. 743 (finding it was not clearly established law that counsel's participation by speaker phone [in a plea hearing] should be treated as a `complete denial of counsel.'); Carey, 549 U.S. at 77, 127 S.Ct. 649 (holding there was no clearly established law regarding the prejudicial effect of spectators' courtroom conduct on fair trial rights). Because this intervening Supreme Court authority defining the scope of AEDPA review is not clearly irreconcilable with our decision in Robinson, we are not free to reject the prior opinion of this court as having been effectively overruled. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). Ignacio therefore compels our conclusion that it violates clearly established federal law to deny counsel in a posttrial, pre-appeal proceeding simply because the defendant has previously exercised his right to represent himself. We are not persuaded that Rodgers' claim differs from that of the petitioner in Ignacio merely because it deals with a new trial motion rather than sentencing. In all material aspects, Rodgers' claim is indistinguishable from that in Ignacio, in which we focused not on attributes inherent in sentencing proceedings, but rather on the basic characteristics present in all posttrial proceedings. In fact, a motion for new trial and sentencing are the main elements of a post-trial proceeding. For this very reason, we previously recognized: It is not surprising that a criminal defendant, having decided to represent himself and then having suffered a defeat at trial, would realize that he would be better served during the remainder of the case by the assistance of counsel. A criminal defendant may initially assert his right to self-representation for reasons that later prove unsound. The accused may doubt the willingness of an appointed attorney to represent his interests. More often, the accused may have a baseless faith in his ability to mount an effective defense. The lure of self-representation may, however, exact a significant price; lost at trial, the defendant may miss important opportunities and even create gaping holes in his own case. The accused has little recourse against the failings caused by his own inartfulness. Menefield, 881 F.2d at 700 (emphasis added). Indeed, forcing criminal defendants to stumble through post-trial proceedingssentencings or otherwiseserves neither the individual nor our system of adversarial justice well. Id.