Opinion ID: 1695189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence concerning mack arthur king's psychiatric examination violated his right to due process and effective assistance of counsel under the united states and mississippi constitutions.

Text: King contends that the court-appointed psychiatrists' failure to disclose their opinions regarding his need for medication for headaches and dizziness, as well as his low level of intelligence, violated the rule set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). While we conclude that this issue is procedurally barred, we discuss it on the merits for future guidance. In Brady, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196. The prosecutor in Brady failed to disclose a statement to the defendant that his co-conspirator admitted that he (the co-conspirator) killed the victim. The defendant did not learn of the statement until he had been tried, convicted and sentenced and his sentence affirmed. United States v. Spagnoulo sets forth a four-prong test to determine whether a Brady violation has occurred mandating a new trial. To establish a Brady violation a defendant must prove the following: (1) that the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence); (2) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Spagnoulo, 960 F.2d 990, 994 (11th Cir.1992), citing United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.1989), ( cert. denied ), 493 U.S. 932, 110 S.Ct. 322, 107 L.Ed.2d 312 (1989). Before reaching the question of whether the information was exculpatory, this Court must determine whether the psychiatrists were members of the prosecutorial team, and, as such, had a duty under Brady to disclose exculpatory evidence. This Court has never addressed that question. However, under our case law, persons other than prosecuting attorneys have been found to be members of the prosecutorial team for Brady and discovery purposes. This Court pointed this out in a footnote in Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 25-26 (1983). Another familiar excuse is that the police had the information but the prosecuting attorneys were not aware of it. This will not do. When police officers have been in possession of discoverable information for nine months, the State is entitled to no consideration because the district attorney or his assistant did not look at the file until the night before trial. The State, in the present context, is a team consisting of the attorney, the law enforcement officers of the jurisdiction in which the case is brought, all other cooperating law enforcement officials  municipal, county, state or federal, the prosecution witnesses, and any other persons cooperating in the investigation and prosecution of the case. What is known or available to any one or more is deemed to be known by or available to the State. All are collectively the State for present purposes. See United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir.1973). When responding to requested or ordered discovery under Rule 4.06, the State, as here collectively defined, should disclose all information it could obtain with due diligence or upon reasonable inquiry. And, discovery responses should be supplemented when, as trial approaches if, (a) the information previously furnished appears incomplete, misleading or downright incorrect or (b) the State comes into possession of new information within the scope of the discovery request as allowed. Gallion v. State, 396 So.2d 621, 622, 624 (Miss. 1981). (emphasis added). King cites several cases to support his contention that psychiatrists, and other persons, are recognized as state actors for constitutional purposes. King relies on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.1973), and Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir.1985). King argues that because the psychiatrists, as state actors, were in possession of information concerning his level of intelligence and need for medication, the State is deemed to have been aware of such information and should have disclosed the information to him. The State's failure to apprise him of the existence of the psychiatrists' findings violated Brady, King argues. King is correct in stating that Smith stands for the proposition that a psychiatrist may be recognized as a state actor for some constitutional purposes. However, King fails to realize that psychiatrists are not members of the prosecutorial team merely because they conduct an examination to determine a defendant's competency to stand trial. In Smith, the Court noted that the psychiatrist went beyond merely reporting his findings regarding Smith's competency to the court. The psychiatrist was called at the sentencing phase of the trial and he testified (a) that Smith is a very severe sociopath; (b) that he will continue his previous behavior; (c) that his sociopathic condition will only get worse; (d) that he has no regard for another human being's property or for their life, regardless of who it may be; (e) that [t]here is no treatment, no medicine ... that in any way at all modifies or changes this behavior; (f) that he is going to go ahead and commit other similar or same criminal acts if given the opportunity to do so; and (g) that he has no remorse or sorrow for what he has done. Smith, 451 U.S. at 459, 101 S.Ct. at 1871, 68 L.Ed.2d at 367. Outside of the presence of the jury, Dr. Grigson stated: (a) that he had not obtained permission from Smith's attorneys to examine him; (b) that he had discussed his conclusions and diagnosis with the State's attorney; and (c) that the prosecutor had requested him to testify and had told him, approximately five days before the sentencing hearing began, that his testimony probably would be needed within the week. Id. The Smith Court stated that it was Dr. Grigson's testimony at the penalty phase that changed his role and he became essentially like that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a post arrest custodial setting. Smith, 451 U.S. at 467, 101 S.Ct. at 1875, 68 L.Ed.2d at 372. The instant case is distinguishable from Smith. The most critical difference is the level of participation of the psychiatrists in the instant case was limited to examining King and reporting their findings to the court. Unlike the psychiatrist in Smith, the psychiatrists who examined King did not testify against him during the penalty phase of his trial. In fact, they were not called at trial. As stated above, the Smith Court recognized the psychiatrist in that case as a member of the prosecutorial team, not because he examined Smith to determine his competency to stand trial, but because he testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase regarding Smith's future dangerousness. Since the psychiatrists in the case at bar merely reported to the court that King was competent to stand trial, Smith does not mandate that this Court recognize them as state actors for constitutional purposes. King also cites Deutsch. In that case, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether a personnel file could have been used for impeachment purposes. In Deutsch, the defendants were convicted of offering to pay a postal employee $50 for each credit card that the postal worker intercepted in the mail and giving a postal employee money to induce him to act in violation of his lawful duty. The defendants appealed. The government's whole case rested on the testimony of the postal employee. The defendants sought the production of the postal employee's personnel file for insight into the character of said prospective witness. The U.S. Attorney responded, This office does not have the personnel file of D.F. Morrison. The court ruled [T]he prosecutors cannot be compelled to disclose something which it does not have. Furthermore, the Post Office Department does not appear to be an arm of the prosecution as contemplated by Brady.  At trial, the postal employee claimed the defendants gave him money to purchase credit cards. One of the defendants testified that he gave the postal employee a loan to help care for his sick wife. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit stated that the defendants should have been given an opportunity to attack the postal employee's credibility. In reversing, the Fifth Circuit stated: We find no reference in Brady to an arm of the prosecution. It was a Post Office employee who had been sought to be bribed. The government cannot compartmentalize the Department of Justice and permit it to bring a charge affecting a government employee in the Post Office and use him as its principal witness, but deny having access to the Post Office files. In fact it did not deny access, but only present possession without an attempt to remedy the deficiency ... . . We do not suggest that the government was obliged to obtain evidence from third parties, but there is no suggestion in Brady that different arms of the government, particularly when so closely connected as this one for the purpose of the case, are severable entities. Deutsch, 475 F.2d at 57. The instant case is distinguishable from Deutsch. Unlike the government's case in Deutsch, the State's case did not rest on the information obtained by the psychiatrists who examined King. Additionally, the psychiatrists were not principal witnesses in King's case. In fact, they were not called as witnesses against King. Moreover, the close connection that existed in Deutsch between the Post Office and the Department of Justice did not exist in the instant case. Of greater significance is the fact that Deutsch does not stand for the proposition that a prosecutor is deemed to possess information in the hands of a state or federal agency, merely because they are governmental agencies. Rather a prosecutor is deemed to possess information in the hands of all members of the prosecutorial team, both investigative and prosecutorial personnel. The former Fifth Circuit in United States v. Antone, in refusing to draw a distinction between different agencies under the name government, stated that the focus should be on the prosecution team which includes both investigative and prosecutorial personnel. 603 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir.1979). Following the Fifth Circuit's lead, the court in Meros stated, the requirement that the government possess the evidence can be satisfied if the evidence was in the possession of the prosecutor or anyone over whom the prosecutor had authority. 866 F.2d at 1309. In the instant case, the prosecutor had no control over the psychiatrists. In fact, the mental examination conducted by the psychiatrists was not done at the behest of the prosecutor. It was the trial court that commanded the psychiatrists to conduct the examination after a request by King's counsel. This Court holds that the psychiatrists were not members of the prosecutorial team for Brady purposes. Consequently, King fails part I of the Spagnoulo test. He also fails the other parts of the test as well. As discussed in greater detail below, the information in the psychiatrists' report, though useful as to King's punishment, was not favorable to him on the issue of guilt. Additionally, with reasonable diligence King could have obtained the information. More importantly, King did not demonstrate that a different result would have been reached had the information been disclosed. Thus, King's Brady contention must fall. King relies on Blake v. Kemp for the proposition that a trial judge's order for a psychiatric examination places a duty upon the prosecution to release all evidence relating to the defendant's mental state to both the defense and the examining psychiatrist despite the absence of a defense request for such information. Thus, King argues that the State was obligated to disclose not only information bearing on his intelligence, but on his need for medication as well. In Blake, the defendant killed his girlfriend's daughter by dropping the child off a bridge. Within six or seven hours after the baby's death, Blake gave a full taped confession to the investigating officer after adequate warnings had been given. All I know is I did wrong and in another way I did right. At least the baby don't have to suffer about it because the mama and/or the real father ain't fit to have a child like that. The baby is too good for any one of us. She is in a better place now. Blake, 758 F.2d at 527. Blake also wrote the following note, which was delivered to the jailer: To Whom That Every Read This Letter, I have done the right thing by turning myself in, but I have a promise to keep my little girl Tiffany. I told her that I would join her soon. But now the time has come too for me to go to her. She came to me and said she wanted me now. So I must go because I promised Tiffany and I love her. That we'll be together on the other side. So you see and understand that I never lost her cause she is wait (sic) for me. I'm just sorry that Jackie won't be there with us. Me and Tiffany will live in peace now forever. I will go to her now. May god forgive me for all my sins. Joseph James Blake. Id. Two weeks after Blake wrote the note, the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination for him. The State failed to disclose the taped confession and note to the examining psychiatrist and Blake's attorney. The psychiatrist found that Blake was competent to stand trial. The psychiatrist, however, was unable to reach a conclusion regarding Blake's sanity because Blake lacked memory about the particular incident. The Blake Court held that the statements at least raise sufficient question as to Blake's sanity that they should have been presented to the psychiatrist early enough to allow adequate consideration of them in preparation of his evaluation. Id. at 530. King's reliance on Blake is ill-founded. The most critical distinction between Blake and the instant case is in Blake the defendant's confession was in the possession of the prosecutor. That is, the confession was given to law enforcement officials. It is elemental that law enforcement officials involved in the investigation of a crime are members of the prosecutorial team.