Opinion ID: 1698106
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The telephone conversation.

Text: The lower court found that Renick had previously talked to the assistant director of the Ethics Commission by telephone and obtained his verbal approval of Renick's business dealings with Benton, Inc., stating: It has been brought to the attention of the Court by the Defendant's Answer, that is his affirmative defenses set out in his Answer, and by his Answers to Interrogatories that prior to him and Mr. Akin taking the action they did with the manufacturing company, he contacted the Mississippi Ethics Commission and talked with a high official there. The official is named in the pleadings. It has been brought out in oral argument that this person was a high official in the Mississippi Ethics Commission at that time. The contention is strong that the Mississippi Ethics Commission approved everything that the Defendant did prior to him doing so. If this had been able to be refuted, surely the Court would have an affidavit from that person before it or some other evidence or pleading that would refute what now before the Court is undisputed. We have consistently held that we will not disturb a trial judge's findings of fact unless the trial judge was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. Omnibank of Mantee v. United Southern Bank, 607 So.2d 76 (Miss. 1992); Melchiors v. Melchiors, 607 So.2d 1237 (Miss. 1992); Walters v. Patterson, 531 So.2d 581 (Miss. 1988). Where the trial judge's findings of fact are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record, this Court will not reverse. Allied Steel Corp. v. Cooper, 607 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1992); Crowe v. Smith, 603 So.2d 301 (Miss. 1992). However, if the record is devoid of such credible evidence and the trial judge's ruling is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we will not hesitate to reverse. In the case at bar, the evidence reveals that there is no dispute as to the fact that a conversation did take place between Renick and a high-ranking official with the Mississippi Ethics Commission. The appellants even admit that this conversation led Renick to believe his actions were proper. However, the appellants contend that any permission given by the Ethics Commission official was in response to an entirely different factual scenario and further contend that the official informed Renick that this oral opinion was not binding and that Renick needed to get a written opinion, a fact Renick denies. Based on the admissions of the appellants in response to discovery propounded by Renick and on the affirmative defenses set forth in Renick's answer, the lower court found that everything done by Renick had been cleared through the Ethics Commission. However, a review of the record reveals that the only evidence supporting such a conclusion is the affirmative defense set forth in Renick's answer and the following request for admission by Renick and the appellants' response: REQUEST NO. 1: That during the month of March, 1989, in the office of the Honorable Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, in the presence of Attorney General Mike Moore, Assistant Attorney General Larry Clark, Attorney Roger Wicker, and Attorney Terry L. Jordan, that the Defendant, William Jackson Renick, offered unto the office of the Attorney General, through his attorneys, to subject himself to a lie detector test, and that the following provisions were to apply: a. That William Jackson Renick had stated that on September 16, 1985, that he had a telephone conversation with Charles Brown, then the Assistant Ethics Commission Director, and that he then received a verbal clearance to participate in the business ventures as set forth in the complaint. RESPONSE: The Plaintiffs admit to the March, 1989, meeting, to its participants, to the offer by the Defendant to take a lie detector test and to the Defendant's allegation that a prior conversation with Charles Brown, former Ethics Commission Assistant Director, had caused him to believe that his conduct was permissible. The Plaintiffs deny any remaining requests for admission contained within Request No. 1a. b. That the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi informed persons present that Charles Brown admitted that he had received such a telephone call and had advised the Defendant Renick, I don't see any problems with it, and that the only statements not in agreement is that it is the contention of Charles Brown that he further said, you need to get a written opinion, to which the Defendant Renick, states as untrue. RESPONSE: The Plaintiffs deny the specific wording quoted by the Defendant in this Request and admit that Charles Brown, without benefit of any other facts, tentatively approved the Defendant's proposal to do business with a firm located in the County Industrial Park, also advised the Defendant's that his was not an official opinion and further explained to the Defendant the statutory procedure for obtaining such an opinion. Any remaining requests for admission contained within Request No. 1b are denied. The record is devoid of any other evidence supporting the lower court's conclusion that Renick cleared his actions with the Ethics Commission. The lower court did say that based on oral argument the contention was strong that the official in question was a high-ranking official with the Ethics Commission and approved all of Renick's actions. However, a transcript of this oral argument is not part of the record and the fact that Renick talked to a high-ranking official with the Ethics Commission is not disputed by any party. However, there is no other evidence before this Court supporting the lower court's finding of fact. Therefore, we find that the lower court erred in concluding as a matter of fact that Renick cleared his conduct with the Ethics Commission before taking any action.