Opinion ID: 1136887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the trial court err by allowing at trial confidential statements made by fisher to his wife?

Text: Prior to trial, Fisher's attorney filed a Motion in Limine based on M.R.E. 504(b) to prohibit any marital communications that were to be confidential. The trial court denied the motion. At trial Fisher's wife, Rhonda, testified to a conversation between Derrick and her that took place before Derrick's aunt, Shirley Anderson. During which, Rhonda stated that Fisher denied it [having sex with his niece] right there at the time. Rhonda testified shortly after this statement that later on that day Derrick admitted the truth to me. No contemporaneous objection was made at that time. Sometime later during Rhonda's testimony, defense counsel objected on the basis of the marital privilege to prohibit Rhonda from testifying at that point to what Fisher had admitted. Fisher argues that Rhonda's statements in which she stated he admitted it [the abuse] to her were confidential and barred by the marital privilege, which he invoked before trial, during trial and in a Motion for a New Trial. Fisher cites the Comment to Rule 504 [r]ule 504(b) states the general rule. One spouse can prevent the other from testifying regarding the confidential communication in either a civil or criminal proceeding. Fisher also cites several pre-rule cases that state one spouse is incompetent to testify against the other. He also relies on Bayse v. State, 420 So.2d 1050 (Miss. 1982), where a police officer was allowed to testify to Mrs. Bayse's statements made to the police after a murder that incriminated her husband, and this Court reversed on the issue of spousal privilege. The Court referenced § 13-1-5 as the applicable statute insofar as the privilege asserted was concerned. Basically, the Court said that Mrs. Bayse was not competent to testify but labeled this a privilege. The State maintains first that Fisher did not make a contemporaneous objection at the time the controversial statements were made. See Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S.Ct. 1986, 95 L.Ed.2d 826 (1987). Additionally, the State argues that because Fisher's attorney cross-examined Rhonda concerning the statements made by the defendant, he is doubly barred from raising this issue on appeal. See Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d 1366, 1373 (Miss. 1989) (where the Court held that it was improper for the defendant's attorney to re-cross the witness concerning the objectionable testimony and then ask for a mistrial). In the alternative, the State argues that the objectionable statement (he denied it right there) was made before the aunt, therefore, not subject to the privilege. MISS. R. EVID. 504(a); Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 894 (Miss. 1989), cert. granted, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (remanded to MS Supreme Court for reconsideration of death sentence concerning aggravating circumstances). They argue that no contemporaneous objection bars consideration of the second objectionable statement (later on that day Derrick admitted the truth to me). In addition, the State notes a conceptual contradiction between M.R.E. Rules 504 and 601(a)(2). Rule 601(a)(2) states in pertinent part: (a) In all instances where one spouse is a party litigant the other spouse shall not be competent as a witness without the consent of both, except as provided in Rule 601(a)(1) or Rule 601(a)(2): (2) Either spouse is a competent witness and may be compelled to testify against the other in any criminal prosecution of either husband or wife for a criminal act against any child, ... The State argues, on the one hand, the spouse can be compelled to testify and, on the other hand, at the same trial be prohibited from giving relevant testimony. Here, Fisher's attorney specifically moved the court prior to trial to exclude all privileged confidential communications between Fisher and Rhonda. We have held that a specific motion in limine overruled by the trial court will sufficiently preserve the error when no objection was made. Kettle v. State, 641 So.2d 746, 748 (Miss. 1994). Cross-examination of Rhonda was Fisher's attorney's only recourse. Id. He did not waive the objection by cross-examining her. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5 (1972) (Supp. 1995) excepts from spousal incompetency a spouse's testimony in the criminal prosecution of the other for a criminal act against any child. This statute essentially states the same rule as M.R.E. 601(a)(2) which the State maintains is in conflict with M.R.E. 504, the marital privilege. We take this opportunity to note the difference between the marital privilege and spousal incompetency. Rule 601(a)(2) abolishes spousal incompetence to testify in certain circumstances. The non-offender spouse may be called to testify, but the other spouse may still invoke the privilege regarding confidential communications that do not fall into an exception set out in 504(d). Dycus v. State, 396 So.2d 23, 28 (Miss. 1981) (where the Court held although former spouses are not disqualified from testifying against each other as to events during the marriage, they may not reveal marital communications made with the expectancy of privacy.) As the privilege stands today, the statement made by Fisher to Rhonda in which he denies the activity is removed from the privilege. It was made in front of a third person, Shirley Anderson, and thus not a confidential communication. Shell, 554 So.2d at 894. Rhonda's statement that Derrick later told her the truth would be a violation of M.R.E. 504. This statement was made privately to Rhonda, and there is no indication of a third party also hearing it. This was a confidential statement to his wife that when admitted constituted prejudicial error. The error necessitates reversal and a new trial. Miss. R. Evid. 601(a)(2) indicates an obvious growing concern about sexual and violent abuse against children. Today, we amend the exceptions in M.R.E. 504(d) to reflect the same concern. The authority to adopt and amend the Mississippi Rules of Evidence is an inherent power of the judicial branch of government. See MISS. CONST. ART. 6, § 144 (1890); Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338, 1345-1346; Hudspeth v. State Highway Comm'n, 534 So.2d 210, 213. The amendment to Rule 504(d) shall read: (d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule in a proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime against (1) the person of any minor child or (2) the person or property of (i) the other spouse, (ii) a person residing in the household of either spouse, or (iii) a third person committed in the course of committing a crime against any of the persons described in (d)(1) or (2) of this Rule. Rule 504(d) as revised shall apply prospectively upon publication in West's Southern Reporter.