Opinion ID: 4536271
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Initial Complaints and the First Appeal

Text: The plaintiffs’ second amended complaint (SAC) alleged that TEPCO was negligent in operating and maintaining the FNPP. Six months later, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to name GE and three other manufacturer defendants, claiming they had only recently learned of their involvement. Shortly thereafter, the district court granted in part TEPCO’s motion to dismiss the SAC. It found that the plaintiffs’ claims were not barred by the political-question doctrine, forum non conveniens, or the doctrine of international comity, but granted the motion in part because the plaintiffs failed to state claims for strict design-defect liability and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co., 2014 WL 5465347 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (Cooper I). The court granted leave to amend, including leave to name GE and the other manufacturers as defendants. The plaintiffs then filed their third-amended complaint (TAC) against TEPCO, GE, and three other named defendants. The TAC asserts claims for negligence, strict liability for ultrahazardous activities, res ipsa loquitur, negligence per se, loss of consortium, and survival and wrongful death against all defendants. The TAC also raises strict-liability claims for manufacturing and design defects against GE and the other named manufacturers. COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. 13 GE and TEPCO separately moved to dismiss. Meanwhile, TEPCO moved for reconsideration of the denial of its motion to dismiss the SAC. The district court granted the motion for reconsideration but again denied TEPCO’s motion to dismiss the SAC. Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co., 166 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (Cooper II). The district court certified the issues for interlocutory appeal and denied the pending motions to dismiss as moot. On appeal, we affirmed the denial of TEPCO’s motion to dismiss the SAC. Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1218. We held that none of the arguments raised in TEPCO’s appeal warranted dismissal at that stage of the litigation, but allowed that “[f]urther developments . . . may require the district court to revisit some of the issues.” Id. at 1197; see also id. at 1210 n.12.