Opinion ID: 2076678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: expert testimony as to defendant's mental state at the time of the murder

Text: In the instant case, defendant tried to prove several mitigating factors. One of the factors he tried to prove was that the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(c)(2). The defendant argues that, by allowing Dr. James Cavanaugh, the prosecution's expert witness, to opine that the defendant was not acting under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder, he was denied a fair sentencing hearing. Defendant asserts that, by allowing an expert to testify on an ultimate issue of fact, the trial court allowed the doctor to usurp the jury's duty as a sentencing body. We cannot agree. Since the defendant himself raised the issue of his mental condition at the time of the offense, it was not improper for the State to try to disprove his assertion. Dr. Cavanaugh was a qualified expert in psychiatry; he had reviewed all of the defendant's psychiatric records and other relevant materials from which he could formulate an opinion. This court has held that an expert may give an opinion on a fact which is an ultimate issue of fact for the jury or judge to determine. In People v. Covey (1966), 34 Ill.2d 195, a psychiatrist gave his opinion as to whether the defendant was sexually dangerous, within the meaning of a new statute. The defendant urged that the expert's testimony invaded the province of the court as the trier of fact since it was an opinion as to an ultimate fact in issue. This court held: While the question of whether an individual is a sexually dangerous person is one of fact, it is one which, by its nature, cannot be answered by a court or jury without hearing the opinions of those having peculiar and special knowledge in the fields of mental disorder and sexual aberration. In any event, as given in this case, the opinion of the psychiatrist was nevertheless an opinion only, and it still remained the function of the court to determine the issue from all the facts before it. 34 Ill.2d 195, 197. In the instant case, Dr. Cavanaugh's testimony was properly admitted. The defendant's contention that because there is no legal or medical definition of the word extreme, the doctor was not qualified to testify as to its meaning is illogical. The doctor was giving his opinion as to whether, from all the data he had reviewed, the defendant was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. The admission of his testimony was proper. Since his opinion was just that, an opinion, the jury was still to make the ultimate determination. The defendant was not precluded from presenting expert testimony to the opposite effect on this issue. Defendant also asserts that it was improper for Dr. Cavanaugh to testify that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense, since insanity was not at issue at the sentencing hearing. Since defendant himself raised the issue of his mental state at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor, it was proper for Dr. Cavanaugh to give his opinion as to the defendant's sanity.