Opinion ID: 864422
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: were the findings of the trial court based on

Text: SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE? ¶29. Next, Donaldson appeals alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. He claims that the findings were based on an improper application of the MUTCD and a failure to properly consider the credibility and persuasiveness of his witnesses. Because it failed to specifically refer to the MUTCD in its findings, he argues that the trial court failed to apply the proper standard of care and must be reversed. ¶30. For support, Donaldson emphasizes the testimony from several witnesses. First, the testimony from county supervisor Mason Trigg who admitted the placement of signs was generally determined by personal observation rather than according to the MUTCD. Second, Donaldson focuses on the testimony from the accident investigator and a resident who resides near the curve. Both of these witnesses testified that numerous wrecks had occurred on that same stretch of road and that it was generally known to be dangerous. ¶31. Again, Donaldson emphasizes the testimony of Exnicios and the fact that he was the the only expert to testify regarding the applicable standard of care. Exnicios’s opinion was that even if the court adopted 10 the position of the county, the warnings provided motorists were inadequate.3 In his opinion, the inadequacy resided in the fact that the warnings failed to account for the severity of the turn. Despite Exnicios’s testimony, there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the trial court. ¶32. The county presented several witness regarding the warnings posted at the time of the accident. Both a current and former county supervisor and several county road workers testified regarding signs present the day of the wreck. This was in addition to the testimony from the State Aid Engineer regarding installation of other warnings that he supervised.4 Thus, Donaldson’s argument shifts to one of credibility rather than the sufficiency of the evidence. ¶33. Alternatively, the county argues that regardless of whether it breached its duty of ordinary care, there was substantial evidence that the breach was not the proximate cause of the accident. This includes: evidence regarding Donaldson’s failure to take adequate caution under the road conditions, especially considering the load he was hauling; testimony from several witnesses who stated that just prior to the wreck, they noticed that he was in a hurry and specifically warned him to be cautious; and testimony from Chester King, who found Donaldson after the wreck, that only moments before Donaldson had passed him from behind at a high rate of speed. ¶34. When a trial judge sits without a jury, an appellate court must review the record and accept all evidence that would reasonably support the judgment, together with any reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence. Yarbrough v. Camphor, 645 So.2d 867, 869 (Miss. 1994). This Court must let stand trial judge's findings of evidentiary or ultimate fact when substantial evidence in the record 3 According to the county, at the time of the accident there was a “standard curve sign” (without warning motorists to reduce speed), a “slippery when wet sign,” and a railroad crossing sign. 4 The Mississippi Department of Transportation provides State Aid engineers for counties that are without a county engineer. 11 supports those findings, or when findings are not clearly erroneous. Crowe v. Smith, 603 So.2d 301, 304 (Miss. 1992). ¶35. This Court determines that the findings of the trial court were based on sufficient evidence. Both parties presented conflicting evidence regarding the presence of warnings and had several witness testify in support of their arguments. Because it observes the witnesses first hand, the trial court is in the best position to assess the persuasiveness of a witness and to decide what weight to afford that witness's testimony. Amiker v. Drugs For Less, Inc., 796 So.2d 942, 947 (Miss. 2000). ¶36. Donaldson requests that this Court reverse the trial court based on its failure to expressly refer to the MUTCD in its findings and based on the testimony of Exnicios. Failure to refer to the MUTCD does not rise to the level of a reversible error, and because there was considerable evidence and testimony rebutting Donaldson’s claims, this Court is unable to find that the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous. IV. DOES THE MTCA VIOLATE PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL? ¶37. Mississippi Tort Claims Act cases are tried without a jury. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-13(1). Donaldson alleges that the MTCA denies his right to a jury trial provided by the state constitution, which provides in part: “[that] the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 31. ¶38. Because Donaldson failed to raise this issue with the trial court or to give notice to the Attorney General, this issue is procedurally barred. When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged notice must be given to the Attorney General. Miss. R. Civ. P. 24(d); M.R.A.P. 44(a). See also Barnes v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 733 So.2d 199, 202-03 (Miss. 1999). Further, except in unusual circumstances, this Court should not consider any matter which has not first been presented to and decided 12 by the trial court. Id. at 202. “The law is well settled that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered unless the point is specifically pled.” Id. The failure to raise the issue at trial and to notify the Attorney General renders the issue procedurally barred.