Opinion ID: 186833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 2 Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), which is codified at title 5, chapter 71 of the U.S.Code, authorizes most federal employees to collectively bargain over the conditions of [their] employment. See 5 U.S.C. § 7102(2). The collective bargaining rights of doctors and nurses employed by the VA, however, are more limited. In Colorado Nurses Ass'n v. FLRA, 851 F.2d 1486 (D.C.Cir.1988), we held that the Secretary of the VA had the authority to set the conditions of employment for these employees by regulation and that VA medical professionals did not have a right to mandatory collective bargaining. Colo. Nurses, 851 F.2d at 1492. Following that decision, in 1991 Congress passed a new statute providing that: 3 Except as otherwise specifically provided in this title, the authority of the Secretary to prescribe regulations under section 7421 of this title is subject to the right of Federal employees to engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment through representatives chosen by them in accordance with chapter 71 of title 5 (relating to labor-management relations). 4 Department of Veterans Affairs Health-Care Personnel Act, Pub.L. No. 102-40, title II, § 202, 105 Stat. 187, 200 (1991), codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7422(a). Chapter 71 of title 5 governs federal employees' labor relations generally, including grievance procedures under collective bargaining agreements. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7121-7123. In other words, 38 U.S.C. § 7422(a) gives VA medical professionals the right to bargain according to the rules set out in chapter 71 of title 5, subject to limitations specifically provided in title 38. Title 38 imposes three substantive limitations on the VA nurses' bargaining rights under title 5: 5 Such collective bargaining (and any grievance procedures provided under a collective bargaining agreement) in the case of employees described in section 7421(b) of this title may not cover, or have any applicability to, any matter or question concerning or arising out of (1) professional conduct or competence, (2) peer review, or (3) the establishment, determination, or adjustment of employee compensation under this title. 6 38 U.S.C. § 7422(b). The third of these limitations — matters concerning employee compensation — is at issue in this case. In addition, Congress authorized the VA Secretary to determine whether a matter is subject to collective bargaining or instead falls under one of the three listed exceptions. As applicable to this case, the statute provides that [a]n issue of whether a matter or question concerns or arises out of . . . the establishment, determination, or adjustment of employee compensation under this title shall be decided by the Secretary and is not itself subject to collective bargaining and may not be reviewed by any other agency. Id. § 7422(d). The VA Secretary has delegated this § 7422(d) authority to the Under Secretary for Health. 7 Pursuant to their collective bargaining rights under 38 U.S.C. § 7422(a) and chapter 71 of title 5, operating room nurses at the VA Medical Center in Asheville, North Carolina are represented by the plaintiff Union, AFGE Local 446. The Asheville Medical Center is subject to a nationwide collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the American Federation of Government Employees and the VA. In February 1999 AFGE Local 446 filed a grievance. The Union claimed that, under the CBA, operating room nurses at the Medical Center were entitled to premium pay for any hours worked at night or on weekends. The Medical Center disagreed. The grievance went to arbitration, and in December 1999 the arbitrator ruled in favor of the Union. The arbitrator concluded that operating room nurses were entitled to premium pay for night and weekend work, and ordered appropriate back pay dating to the filing of the grievance. The details of the grievance, which are not relevant to the question of the district court's jurisdiction over this lawsuit, are discussed at greater length in section II of this opinion. 8 An arbitrator's award may be appealed to the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), but in this case the Medical Center waited too long before filing its appeal, 1 and the FLRA dismissed the appeal as untimely. The Medical Center refused to recognize the award. It is an unfair labor practice (ULP) for a federal agency to fail to comply with a valid arbitration award, see Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 976 F.2d 1409, 1413 (D.C.Cir.1992), so to enforce the award the Union filed a ULP charge with the FLRA. In September 2000 the FLRA served a ULP complaint on the Medical Center. 9 Meanwhile, by letter of February 14, 2000, the Medical Center had requested a determination from the VA that the arbitrator lacked the authority to rule on the Union's grievance, on the grounds that 38 U.S.C. § 7422(b) excludes matters concerning the determination of employee compensation from the bargaining and grievance process. Several months later, the VA Under Secretary for Health returned the Medical Center's request for a § 7422 determination. The Under Secretary instructed the Center to first attempt to resolve the matter through consultation with the Union, pursuant to the collective bargaining guidelines then in effect between the AFGE and the VA. Negotiations failed, and in October 2000 the Medical Center again requested a ruling from the Under Secretary. 10 With this request still pending with the Under Secretary, the FLRA General Counsel prepared to seek judgment against the Medical Center in the ULP proceeding. On March 5, 2001, the General Counsel moved for a summary judgment to enforce the arbitration award. Also on March 5th, the VA Under Secretary issued a Decision Paper ( § 7422 Decision). The Under Secretary found, [u]nder the authority in 38 U.S.C. 7422(d), that the arbitrator's decision and the subsequent ULP proceeding before the FLRA concern[] the establishment, determination, or adjustment of employee compensation. 11 With the § 7422 Decision in hand, the Medical Center opposed summary judgment in the FLRA proceeding and sought dismissal of the Union's attempt to enforce the arbitration award. The Medical Center argued that the FLRA lacked jurisdiction over the Union's complaint, and that the Under Secretary's § 7422 Decision conclusively decided the issue because a question decided by the VA under § 7422(d) is not itself subject to collective bargaining and may not be reviewed by any other agency. 38 U.S.C. § 7422(d). The FLRA agreed and dismissed the complaint. The FLRA held that its jurisdiction could be challenged at any stage in its proceedings, and that because the Under Secretary has made a § 7422(d) determination, the Authority lacks jurisdiction over this matter. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, VA Med. Ctr., Asheville, N.C., 57 F.L.R.A. 681, 2002 WL 1019134, at  (Jan. 31, 2002) ( VAMC Asheville ). 12 The Union did not seek judicial review of the FLRA decision, for reasons that will be discussed below. Instead, in April 2002 it filed this lawsuit against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and the Under Secretary for Health in their official capacities — collectively, the VA — on the theory that the Under Secretary's § 7422 Decision was unlawful. If the § 7422 Decision were declared unlawful by the district court, the Union reasoned, then the arbitration award would be enforceable against the Medical Center, and the operating room nurses at that facility would finally receive their premium pay for night and weekend work. 13 The Union and the VA filed cross motions for summary judgment. The VA also sought dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised in the Union's complaint. In July 2005 the district court granted the VA's motion to dismiss. AFGE, Local 446 v. Principi, 404 F.Supp.2d 14, 28 (D.D.C.2005) ( Local 446 ). The district court concluded that, although the Union claimed to be challenging the legality of the Under Secretary's § 7422 Decision, the Union's Complaint is properly characterized as a claim seeking review of the January 31, 2002, FLRA decision in the ULP proceeding, which dismissed Plaintiff's administrative complaint. Id. at 21. Judicial review of such an FLRA order is established by 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a), which provides that an aggrieved person — here, the Union — may seek review of an FLRA order involving an unfair labor practice in the United States Court of Appeals. See id. at 20-22. And because the Union's FLRA case involved VA medical professionals whose bargaining rights were established and limited by 38 U.S.C. § 7422, subsection (e) of that statute specifically requires that a petition for judicial review authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7123 be brought in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. at 21. 14 District courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to review challenges to FLRA orders, AFGE v. Loy, 367 F.3d 932, 935 (D.C.Cir.2004), so the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the FLRA's January 31, 2002 order dismissing the ULP complaint. Review of that order, the court concluded, could be had only in the D.C. Circuit. Local 446, 404 F.Supp.2d at 23. Having found that the Union's complaint was actually an appeal of the FLRA ruling, the district court concluded that the Union had failed to adequately set forth any claim challenging the merits of the Under Secretary's determination. Id. at 27-28. For the reasons explained below, we reverse the district court's jurisdictional determination.
15 This court reviews the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Doe v. Metro. Police Dep't, 445 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C.Cir.2006). First, the Union argues that the district court mischaracterized its complaint. According to the Union, this lawsuit is not a veiled attempt to appeal the January 31, 2002 FLRA order. Rather, it is a straightforward claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to set aside agency action — the Under Secretary's § 7422 Decision — that the Union contends is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise unlawful. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Second, the Union argues that the district court did have jurisdiction over its complaint. The VA acknowledges that the legality of final agency action is presumptively subject to judicial review, see Transactive Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232, 236 (D.C.Cir.1996), but argues that in this case the Union was required to bring its claims against the VA in this court, not the district court. We agree with the Union on this issue, and hold that the district court erred in dismissing the Union's complaint.
16 As emphasized by the district court, the Union did not seek review of the January 31, 2002 FLRA order in the D.C. Circuit, although it was authorized to do so under 38 U.S.C. § 7422(e) and 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). The reason is simple: petitioning for review of that order would have been to no avail, because the D.C. Circuit lacked the authority to grant the relief sought by the Union. The Under Secretary's decision that a matter arises out of a collective bargaining exclusion may not be reviewed by any other agency. 38 U.S.C. § 7422(d). The Federal Labor Relations Authority and the Department of Veterans Affairs, of course, are separate agencies. The FLRA therefore lacked authority to review the § 7422 Decision, and on review of the FLRA's dismissal this court could not have concluded otherwise. 17 It is true that district courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction over matters within the exclusive purview of the FLRA. AFGE v. Loy, 367 F.3d 932, 935 (D.C.Cir.2004). The district court concluded, under Loy, that the FLRA had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims raised in this lawsuit. Local 446, 404 F.Supp.2d at 21-22. The rule from Loy does not apply in the instant case, however, because the legality of the disputed § 7422 Decision is expressly outside the FLRA's purview. Because the Union is presumptively entitled to judicial review of its claim that the Under Secretary's § 7422 Decision was unlawful, and because the D.C. Circuit could not provide that review on a petition for the review of the FLRA decision dismissing the ULP complaint, Loy does not provide a basis for the district court dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction.
18 Notwithstanding any mistaken reliance on Loy, the VA contends that the district court nonetheless reached the right result in dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The VA argues that the Union was required to bring such a challenge directly to the D.C. Circuit. On this theory, the district court correctly dismissed the Union's lawsuit, not because it was a veiled appeal of the FLRA order, but because the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Union's challenge to the Under Secretary's § 7422 Decision. 19 To resolve this question we must analyze the scope of 38 U.S.C. § 7422(e), which concerns judicial review of disputes involving VA medical professionals. As discussed above, under title 38 these VA employees are entitled to bargain collectively in accordance with chapter 71 of title 5, [e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in [title 38]. 38 U.S.C. § 7422(a). One of the exceptions to the rights provided under title 5 is found in § 7422(e): 20 A petition for judicial review or petition for enforcement under section 7123 of title 5 in any case involving employees described in section 7421(b) of this title or arising out of the applicability of chapter 71 of title 5 to employees in those positions, shall be taken only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 21 Id. § 7422(e). As it concerns petitions for review of FLRA orders, the effect of § 7422(e) is simply to channel all such petitions involving VA medical professionals to the D.C. Circuit, as opposed to any other United States court of appeals. Thus — as noted above — had the Union sought judicial review of the January 31, 2002 FLRA order, § 7422(e) would have required the Union to file that petition for review in this court. Such a petition for judicial review would be brought under section 7123 of title 5 (which authorizes judicial review of unfair labor practice claims involving arbitration awards, see 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a)(1)), and would involve VA employees described in section 7421(b) (which include registered nurses, see 38 U.S.C. § 7421(b)(5)). 38 U.S.C. § 7422(e). In contrast, a party whose right to judicial review of an FLRA order arises directly under title 5 may choose to seek review in the circuit in which the person resides or transacts business or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (emphasis added). 22 That much should not be controversial. The controversy is over the meaning of the phrase petition for judicial review as it is used in § 7422(e): A petition for judicial review or petition for enforcement under section 7123 of title 5 in any case involving employees described in section 7421(b) of this title or arising out of the applicability of chapter 71 of title 5 to employees in those positions must be brought in the D.C. Circuit. The VA argues that § 7422(e) applies not only to petitions authorized under 5 U.S.C. § 7123, but also to all other disputes that aris[e] out of the applicability of chapter 71 of title 5 to [VA medical] employees. On this argument, the Union's claims in this lawsuit were required to be brought in a petition for review filed in the D.C. Circuit because the Union's claims aris[e] out of the applicability of chapter 71 of title 5 to the Asheville operating room nurses. In defense of their reading of subsection (e), the VA asks us to read § 7422 as a whole. It makes sense — the argument goes — that subsection (e) would govern all challenges to the VA's authority, established in subsection (d), to settle disputes concerning the collective bargaining exclusions enumerated in subsection (b). 23 While plausible at first glance, the VA's intuition is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute. On the VA's reading of subsection (e), the term petition for judicial review refers to two types of petitions: petitions under section 7123 of title 5 in any case involving employees described in section 7421(b) of this title, and petitions arising out of the applicability of chapter 71 of title 5 to employees in those positions. In other words, according to the VA, subsection (e) provides that [a] petition for judicial review or petition for enforcement must be taken in the D.C. Circuit if that petition is brought under section 7123 of title 5 in any case involving employees described in section 7421(b) of this title, and a petition must also be taken in the D.C. Circuit if that petition aris[es] out of the applicability of chapter 71 of title 5 to employees in those positions. 24 The statute does not support such an unwieldy construction. To the contrary, the term petition for judicial review refers only to one type of petition: petitions authorized under section 7123 of title 5. It is clear that both petition for judicial review and petition for enforcement are so authorized. Section 7123(a) provides that aggrieved persons may obtain judicial review of specified final FLRA orders. Section 7123(b) provides that the FLRA may petition for the enforcement of any order of the Authority. And § 7123(c) contains rules applicable to a petition under subsection (a) of this section for judicial review or under subsection (b) of this section for enforcement. Accordingly, the first fifteen words in § 7422(e) must be read together: A petition for judicial review or petition for enforcement under section 7123 of title 5 must be taken in the D.C. Circuit if that petition is from any case involving employees described in section 7421(b) of this title or arising out of the applicability of chapter 71 of title 5 to employees in those positions. Subsection (e) does not apply to every case . . . arising out of the applicability of chapter 71 of title 5, because any case does not refer to all cases, but only to those cases involving final FLRA orders that are subject to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 7123. 25 Our construction of this statute is supported by a recent decision in a very similar case. In AFGE, Local 2152 v. Principi, 464 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.2006), the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that challenges to the VA's § 7422(d) authority must be brought in the D.C. Circuit. Though subsection (e) is not a model of clear draftsmanship, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that [t]he plain language of § 7422(e) refers only to petitions for review or petitions for enforcement under § 7123 of title 5. Id. at 1054. Read properly, § 7422(e) merely channels 5 U.S.C. § 7123 petitions to the D.C. Circuit in certain cases involving VA employees; it does not establish the D.C. Circuit's jurisdiction to review, in the first instance, all cases involving the application of title 5 to VA medical professionals. Congress did not preclude judicial review of the VA's § 7422(d) authority, and because § 7422(e) does not establish the D.C. Circuit as the forum for such challenges we hold that the district court erred in dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal law, and the Union properly filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.