Opinion ID: 1588673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unqualified Jurors

Text: Knese argues that his counsel, was ineffective for not striking two jurors as biased and unqualified. Counsel has been a member of the Missouri bar since 1967, minus a nine-and-a-half-year disbarment. He tried over 20 criminal casesincluding several capital cases. In preparation for voir dire, counsel reviewed the questionnaires completed by the venire. However, he did not review those received on the morning of trial. Two of these were from (eventual) jurors Dennis K. Gray and Richard R. Maloney. The questionnaires requested opinions on crime and the death penalty. Graythe foremanbelieves our laws are way too soft on criminals. His solution to crime is to build more jails, and give out longer sentences and fewer paroles. Regarding the death penalty he stated: make executions public. If a criminal knew he was being executed in a public square in front of thousands of people, he might [think] twice about committing a murder. Maloney stated that he disfavored endless appeals, parole boards, good time, and clergy to pamper a killer, and wrote: if he is found guilty, do it. Counsel did not read these questionnaires until after trial. He testified that when he read Gray's responses: I about vomited; I missed it and there is no chance that I would have left [Gray] on a jury if I would have seen it ahead of time. Gray would have been my first strike ... the mistake in this case, I believe, is the most egregious mistake I've ever made in the trial of a case. It could well have had catastrophic consequences for my client and there's no excuse for it. Counsel did not question Gray directly. The court collectively asked the venire one question about following the court's instructions: Is there anybody that could not follow the Court's instructions with respect to the range of punishment? Basically folks, that is what I'm asking you is the death penalty question. Is there anybody here that feels that they could not follow the Court's instructions? See State v. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d 596, 611 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S.Ct. 549, 142 L.Ed.2d 457 (1998). Gray did not respond to the court's question. As for Maloney's questionnaire, counsel testified that he was flabbergasted; for any criminal defense lawyer ... to leave a man who responds like he did ... is just an egregious error, and especially in a case like this; he does not have a ghost of a chance of being fair andfair and impartial. Counsel would have struck Maloney. He did not question Maloney directly. As a member of the venire, Maloney did not respond to the general questionasked by the courtquoted above about following the court's instructions. A defendant has a right to a fair and impartial jury. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 18(a). One aspect of this right is adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2230, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992); State v. Clark, 981 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Mo. banc 1998). To that end, a veniremember should be asked if he or she holds any prejudices or biases that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980). This inquiry is meant to reveal whether a juror can set aside any prejudices and impartially fulfill his obligations as a juror. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 421-22, 105 S.Ct. 844, 850, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-77, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784-85 (1968). Here, counsel did not complete the initial inquiryreading the questionnairesto determine whether Gray and Maloney were qualified to be jurors. Their responses suggestalthough not conclusively establishingthat they would automatically vote to impose death after a murder conviction. See State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 460-61 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1054, 120 S.Ct. 598, 145 L.Ed.2d 497 (1999). At a minimum, counsel should have read the questionnaires, and voir dired to determine whether they could serve as jurors. Failure to do so is ineffective assistance of counsel. This complete failure in jury selection is a structural error. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 2057, 95 L.Ed.2d 622, 640 (1987); cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 (1991). On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court, as a per se rule, requires vacating a death sentence imposed by a jury whose composition is affected by Witherspoon error. Gray, 481 U.S. at 660, 107 S.Ct. 2045. In this post-conviction proceeding, Knese must show by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Mo. banc 2002). Here, there is reasonable probabilitysufficient to undermine confidence in the outcomethat Knese was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to read the questionnaires and voir dire the two jurors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984). The error in this case affected penalty phase only. Nothing in either questionnaire indicated a predisposition by Gray or Maloney to automatically vote for guilt or innocence. The judgment is reversed as to the penalty phase, and the case is remanded.