Opinion ID: 1060909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of Defendant's Consent to Search

Text: The defendant next argues that the motion to suppress should have been granted because her detention during the subsequent search of her car and her person was unreasonable and exceeded the scope of a valid Terry stop, thereby rendering her consent to these searches involuntary. The State asserts the investigative detention was reasonable, and the search of her person and automobile were constitutional because based upon consent. We agree. The United States Supreme Court has stated that when assessing whether a detention is too long to be justified as an investigative stop, the proper inquiry is whether during the detention, the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). Applying that standard to the facts in this case, it is clear the detention was not excessive. When Officer Weaver was given conflicting stories by the defendant and Brumley about the purpose of their trip to Memphis, he immediately informed them that the police had information that they were transporting illegal drugs. This exchange occurred less than five minutes after the stop was initiated. The defendant, at that point responded, Well, you can look. You can search. I don't have anything. After the search of the car revealed nothing, Officer Weaver immediately asked the defendant if she had anything on her person. At this point, the stop had been in progress for approximately ten minutes. Again, the defendant responded, No. You can look all you want. Officer Weaver detained the defendant until Travis arrived less than five minutes later to conduct the body search. The contraband was discovered during this search. Clearly, the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly. The detention was not unreasonable. [11] Having so concluded, we also reject the defendant's claim that her consent [12] was involuntary. To pass constitutional muster, consent to search must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by duress or coercion. State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 547 (Tenn. 1992). The defendant's unelicited statements of consent clearly meet this standard.