Opinion ID: 4551288
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Gehrmann as an organizer

Text: Though the district court imposed two levels under § 3B1.1(c), and twice recited that any of the four listed statuses (leader, organizer, manager, or supervisor) activate that subsection, the dissent accuses us of inventing an issue by considering under the plain-error standard whether Dr. Gehrmann acted as an organizer. Dissenting Op. at 10. This suffers a big problem. Dr. Gehrmann himself has briefed his position about why he should not qualify as an organizer, and the government has 12 See also United States v. Davis, 339 F.3d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that we may “affirm the rulings of the lower court on any ground that finds support in the record” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Taylor, 97 F.3d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that, despite the district court’s failure to make specific findings on an issue, “we may address it because ‘we are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court’” (quoting Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir. 1988))). 13 The dissent contends that our approach is distinguishable from Yurek’s, because there we relied on the district court’s “explicit finding” to conclude that the wife satisfied prong three. Dissenting Op. at 9. But the dissent ignores that in Yurek, this “explicit finding” contradicted the sentencing decision the district court had made. 925 F.3d at 447. The dissent points to no district-court findings showing that it would not have applied § 3B1.1 if evaluating Dr. Gehrmann as an organizer, and we see none. 16 responded with reasons why he should. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 8–9, 11–12, 14– 15; Br. for Appellee at 10, 23–26. And Dr. Gehrmann has not complained that the district court failed to find that he qualifies as an organizer. Cf. United States v. Wilfong, 475 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Although the district court did not specifically find that Wilfong organized or led his co-conspirators,” the findings showed “at a minimum, Wilfong was properly subjected to an adjustment under § 3B1.1(a) for his role as an organizer in the conspiracy.”). Dr. Gehrmann misperceives what it takes to show he was an organizer of the criminal activity. He argues that to be an organizer “requires control and a hierarchy among the participants in the conspiracy toward the commission of the offense.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 11. But no such control is necessary to qualify as an organizer. See United States v. Valdez-Arieta, 127 F.3d. 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Marquez, 833 F.3d at 1222–23 (“To qualify as an organizer . . . no control is necessary.” (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 1304 (10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court’s findings as supplemented by undisputed facts show that Dr. Gehrmann acted as an organizer—and that he has not shown a reasonable probability that he would be resentenced without the two levels for his aggravating role as an organizer. Specifically, as noted, the district court found that “this thing was cooked up between Carlson, Gehrmann, Davis later joined in[.]” Appellant’s App. vol. III at 628:24–629:1. In this kernel lies the reason Dr. Gehrmann qualifies as an organizer under § 3B1.1—he organized the criminal activity with Dr. Carlson, and 17 those two recruited Dr. Davis into the criminal activity. Further, he and Dr. Carlson “coordinat[ed] and overs[aw] the implementation of the conspiracy[.]” Wardell, 591 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Valdez-Arieta, 127 F.3d at 1272) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Levine, 983 F.2d 165, 168 (10th Cir. 1992) (“To find that a defendant was an organizer or leader under § 3B1.1, we consider defendant’s recruitment of accomplices, control over accomplices, organizing the enterprise and exercising decision-making authority.” (citations omitted)). No one challenges these underlying facts, and the background section of this opinion pulls from the record to establish each conclusively. Yet the dissent accuses us of stepping outside our appellate role and finding facts. 14 But this ignores the court’s role when reviewing under the plain-error standard. Our plain-error cases involving § 3B1.1 demonstrate this. For instance, in Uscanga-Mora, a drug defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court had not adequately explained its reasons for applying a two-level adjustment under § 3B1.1(c). 562 F.3d at 1292–93. The district court had simply concluded that “sufficient evidence” supported the defendant’s status as “either an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor in this activity.” Id. at 1292. 14 As we consider the organizer issue, it is worth remembering that for small conspiracies like this one, the divisions between leader, organizer, manager, and supervisor are not so ironclad: “In relatively small criminal enterprises that are not otherwise to be considered as extensive in scope or in planning or preparation, the distinction between organization and leadership, and that of management or supervision, is of less significance than in larger enterprises that tend to have clearly delineated divisions of responsibility.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. background. 18 Because the defendant had raised no concern with the procedural adequacy of the explanation in the district court, we reviewed for plain error. Id. at 1293. We ruled that the defendant could not show “a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 1295 (quoting Cook, 550 F.3d at 1298) (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that “[w]hatever the perceived inadequacy of the district court’s recitation of its reasons, the district court’s sentencing decision was amply supported by evidence the government proffered at sentencing-evidence that was neither contested nor countered by the defense.” Id. Because the defendant “received a sentence merited by the evidence,” and because we could not say that but for the claimed error the sentence would be different, we affirmed. Id. (citations omitted); see also Marquez, 833 F.3d at 1220–23 (reviewing a procedural adequacy-of-findings appeal on plain error for a § 3B1.1(c) adjustment, in which the district court applied the adjustment on “significant evidence,” and affirming after reviewing the record evidence and concluding it supported the adjustment). 15 The dissent also protests that we have failed to consider Dr. Gehrmann’s responsibility in relation to his coconspirators’. Dissenting Op. at 14–15. The dissent contends that Dr. Gehrmann is no more responsible than Dr. Carlson. Id. This may well be so. After all, the district court thought “Dr. Carlson and Dr. Gehrmann were 15 See also Taylor, 97 F.3d at 1363–65 (affirming drug sentence despite district court’s not finding supporting relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(2) after finding enough evidence in the record to support such a finding). 19 in this together up to their elbows,” and it was unsure it could “draw a big distinction between the two.” Appellant’s App. vol. III at 667:6–8. But here is what matters— both of them are more responsible than another participant, Dr. Davis, whom they recruited into the tax-fraud conspiracy they created. If the dissent is saying that Dr. Gehrmann cannot qualify for an aggravating role unless he is the sole person to do so, its position runs afoul of the Guidelines’ command: “There can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4; see also United States v. Snow, 663 F.3d 1156, 1163 (10th Cir. 2011) (upholding § 3B1.1(c) adjustment because defendant’s conduct met criteria to deem him an organizer and noting that, “[e]ven if his son met many of these criteria as well, as previously noted more than one person may qualify as an organizer of a criminal conspiracy”). Finally, the dissent contends that defendants qualifying as supervisors or managers “tend to profit more from [the criminal activity] and present a greater danger to the public and/or are more likely to recidivate.” Dissenting Op. at 17 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. background) (internal quotation marks omitted). But this is just one factor among many, and the aggravating-role status matters less here where the criminal enterprise is small. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. background. Second, the dissent emphasizes the district court’s application of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors—Dr. Gehrmann’s community support and lack of criminal history. Dissenting Op. at 17. But these considerations are no more relevant to this appeal than is the district court’s being most troubled by Dr. Gehrmann’s “never accept[ing] 20 responsibility in a meaningful way for what happened.” Appellant’s App. vol. III at 674:17–18. All those factors together led the court to vary downward, but they do not bear on the aggravating-role determination. II. The District Court Had Sufficient Evidence to Support Enhancing Dr. Gehrmann’s Sentence Under § 3B1.1(c). Dr. Gehrmann asserts that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his § 3B1.1(c) adjustment. Because Dr. Gehrmann preserved this objection by objecting to “either subsection,” id. at 621:10–11, we review the district court’s decision to apply the adjustment for clear error and will affirm if its “account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” even if we “would have weighed the evidence differently[,]” Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d at 1296 (quoting United States v. Spears, 197 F.3d 465, 469 (10th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As spelled out in this opinion, we conclude that the district court had sufficient information to apply the adjustment based on Dr. Gehrmann’s qualifying as an organizer. Thus, this challenge also fails.