Opinion ID: 4540186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Mendoza argues that he should have been acquitted of all charges because the Government did not present sufficient evidence to support his convictions. Mendoza contends that the Government failed to establish that he had either actual or constructive possession of the drugs or the firearms seized from the residence. Specifically, he avers that his friendship with Valle, the fact that he would occasionally sleep at his house, including at the time of the search, and the fact that he was sleeping in the room where the backpack was found is not enough to show that he knew -14- the contraband was in the residence and that he had the intention and power to exercise control over it. According to Mendoza, the Government failed to establish that he trafficked drugs or possessed guns outside of the residence, or that he had any knowledge that Valle was involved in such criminal activity. Further, he avers that his written statement did not admit possession of all of the contraband but only of the marijuana found in his pants and on Valle's dresser and thus the statement did not provide a basis for the Government's broad interpretation. Mendoza also contends that the Government failed to present evidence that Mendoza knew about the illicit nature of the substance in the capsules and decks, and of circumstances which would directly or implicitly indicate that they would be trafficked. While the jury could infer from the testimony of Agent Vidal that the drugs and paraphernalia were used for drug trafficking activities, his argument goes, none of the evidence suggests that Mendoza had any relationship with the items, and there was no evidence to counter the possibility that both stashes of drugs belonged to Valle. Mendoza further posits that because the Government did not provide any evidence to establish that he was involved in drug trafficking, there was no basis for a finding of the in furtherance of element of the firearms crime. Thus, -15- he claims that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion for acquittal. We disagree.
Because Mendoza preserved his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we assess his claims de novo. United States v. Rodríguez-Torres, 939 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2019). This means we review the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and decide whether that evidence, including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom, would allow a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged count or crime. United States v. Velázquez-Aponte, 940 F.3d 785, 798 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Díaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d 116, 120 (1st Cir. 2017)). We will not re-weigh the evidence[] or second-guess the jury's credibility calls. United States v. Acevedo-Hernández, 898 F.3d 150, 161 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Santos-Soto, 799 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 2015)). Nor do we have to be convinced that the government succeeded in eliminating every possible theory consistent with the defendant's innocence. Id. (quoting United States v. Trinidad-Acosta, 773 F.3d 298, 310-11 (1st Cir. 2014)). We reverse only if the -16- defendant shows that no rational factfinder could have found him guilty. Rodríguez-Torres, 939 F.3d at 23.
To make out a case of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government has to prove that the defendant[] knowingly and intentionally possessed, either actually or constructively, a controlled substance with the specific intent to distribute. United States v. García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d 124, 130 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. López-López, 282 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2002)). Actual possession means immediate, hands-on physical possession. United States v. Padilla-Galarza, 886 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2018). On the other hand, constructive possession is shown by proving that the defendant had dominion and control over the area where the contraband was found. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1397 (1st Cir. 1992)); see also García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d at 130 (Constructive possession exists when a person knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object either directly or through others. (quoting United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 501 (1st Cir. 2005))). Constructive possession does not require actual ownership, United States v. Ridolfi, 768 F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir. -17- 2014), and can be established through circumstantial evidence, United States v. Howard, 687 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2012), although the mere presence or association with another who possessed the contraband is insufficient, United States v. Hicks, 575 F.3d 130, 139 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 67 (1st Cir. 2008)). As to the intent-to-distribute element, [a]n inference of intent to distribute may be drawn from the circumstances surrounding possession, including the drug's quantity (i.e., whether it is too large for personal use only), the drug's purity, the defendant's statements or conduct, or the number of people involved and their relationship to the defendant. United States v. Bobadilla-Pagán, 747 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2014). The evidence in this case is sufficient to permit a jury to reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mendoza knowingly possessed the heroin and crack cocaine with intent to distribute. To begin, the jury learned that Mendoza had admitted in interviews with Agent Pérez and Agent del Valle that all of the items seized during the search belonged to him and Valle.18 The Government also presented the handwritten statement that Mendoza gave to the agents, which read: The bags that were seized in the pants and 18We explain below why Mendoza's statements did not have to be suppressed. -18- the money are mine. The ones seized in the house are [Valle's] and mine. [Colón] has nothing to do with this or anything that was seized inside the house, like the drugs, the weapons, et cetera. Agent Pérez and Agent del Valle both testified that the written statement was consistent with the admissions that Mendoza had verbally given to them earlier regarding his ownership of all the contraband. While Mendoza disputes that he confessed to possessing everything seized instead of only the marijuana found in his jeans and on the dresser in Valle's room, the jury chose to believe the officers' testimony and drew its own reasonable inferences from the written and verbal statements, which we are not to disturb. See United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 259 (1st Cir. 1982) ([I]f the evidence can be construed in various reasonable alternatives, the jury is entitled to freely choose from among them. (citing United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296, 302 (1st Cir. 1975))). Moreover, additional evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, shows that Mendoza had possession of the backpack containing the rifle, crack cocaine capsules, and empty baggies found in the child's bedroom where Mendoza was sleeping and where a number of other items that belonged to him were also found, such as his shoes, Percocet pills, watch, necklace, and clothing. Mendoza himself admitted that he had been -19- dating Colón's niece and that he had slept in the child's bedroom on several occasions. A jury could reasonably infer from these facts, including Mendoza's ownership of certain items and personal belongings and their proximity to the backpack in the closet, that Mendoza exercised dominion and control over the bedroom and had the ability and intention to exercise dominion or control over the contraband found within it. See United States v. Bristol-Mártir, 570 F.3d 29, 39 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining jury can infer constructive possession from defendant's dominion and control over an area where narcotics are found (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 2006))). Moreover, the fact that Valle was in charge of the residence and could thus also be the owner of the items does not negate possession by Mendoza because constructive possession can be joint. See Hicks, 575 F.3d at 139. Consequently, the jury could find that Mendoza constructively possessed the cocaine, rifle, and paraphernalia. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the empty capsules found in one of the stolen cars' trunks were identical to those filled with crack cocaine found hidden in the backpack located in the room where Mendoza slept. Next to those empty capsules were also Mendoza's sneakers. These facts further support the jury's finding that the items belonged to Mendoza. -20- Similarly, the jury could have inferred that Mendoza had constructive possession of the pistol and heroin found on top of the kitchen cabinet. The Government presented evidence that the contraband was in plain sight and in a common living area of a home Mendoza visited and stayed at several times, and therefore, was accessible to Mendoza. The evidence also showed that Mendoza, Valle, and Colón were close friends, that Mendoza on average felt comfortable in the house, and that he and Valle smoked marijuana in the living room area. Therefore, the jury could reasonably infer that Mendoza knew those items were there and that he had the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over the pistol, heroin, and the other items found together with the pistol either directly or through [Valle and Colón], and consequently, that he had constructive possession of such items. García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d at 130. The record also supports the jury's finding that Mendoza intended to distribute the drugs. Agent Pérez testified that he found forty plastic capsules holding crack cocaine hidden in the backpack and sixty aluminum wrappings (the decks) of heroin in a plastic bag on top of the kitchen cabinet bound with cash and a pistol. Agent Pérez also told the jury that he had found over a thousand empty capsules like the ones used to hold the crack cocaine in the trunk of one of the stolen cars, and that these -21- were used for distribution of a controlled substance. The jury was entitled to believe these statements, see United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d 581, 595 n.6 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that we do not assess the credibility of a witness, as that is a role reserved for the jury (quoting United States v. Troy, 583 F.3d 20, 24, (1st Cir. 2009))), and in any event, it could infer from the number of individual packages that the drugs were intended for distribution rather than for personal use. See United States v. Ayala-García, 574 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2009) ([A] large amount and individual packaging of drugs is sufficient to demonstrate an intent to distribute for purposes of section 841(a)(1).). Agent Vidal's expert testimony that the crack capsules found in the backpack were typical packaging of crack capsules to be distributed, [for] retail further confirmed Mendoza's intent to distribute. He also explained generally how heroin was packaged for distribution and told the jury that, based on the packages found in the residence and the amount, that it was for distribution rather than for personal use. Agent Vidal further testified that when drugs are possessed for distribution, one might also find paraphernalia, like the plastic baggies and empty plastic vials found here, to process [the drugs]. Moreover, the evidence showed that $129 in cash were found together with the heroin decks and another $266 were found in Mendoza's pants. A loaded rifle -22- and pistol were also found with the crack and heroin, respectively, and Agent Vidal explained that keeping money together with drugs, and using guns for protection, were common behaviors for people who possess drugs for distribution. The jury was entitled to believe Agent Vidal's testimony, see Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d at 595 n.6, and from these facts, the jury could reasonably infer an intent to distribute. Considering all the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Mendoza's convictions on Counts Two and Three. Accordingly, his first attempt to undermine the jury's verdict falls short, and we turn to his second claim.
To convict Mendoza for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the Government had to prove that he 1) committed a drug trafficking crime; 2) knowingly possessed a firearm; and 3) possessed the firearm in furtherance of the drug trafficking crime. See United States v. Alverio-Meléndez, 640 F.3d 412, 419 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 2009)); see Bobadilla-Pagán, 747 F.3d at 35. We already determined that there was sufficient evidence to convict Mendoza -23- of possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute -- namely, that he committed a drug trafficking crime, see United States v. Luciano, 329 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute is a drug trafficking crime) -- so the first element is satisfied. The second element is similarly met as we have concluded that the jury reasonably could infer Mendoza's constructive possession of the drugs, and the same possession analysis applies to the firearms. See United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 398 (1st Cir. 2007) (In order to prove possession of a firearm, the government must show actual possession or constructive possession.). Therefore, at this stage we must address whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the third element of the offense: that Mendoza possessed the firearms seized in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. To satisfy the in-furtherance requirement, the government must establish 'a sufficient nexus between the firearm and the drug crime such that the firearm advances or promotes the drug crime.' Rodríguez-Torres, 939 F.3d at 30 (quoting United States v. Gurka, 605 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2010)). In assessing whether the requirement has been satisfied, we analyze the evidence from both objective and subjective standpoints. Bobadilla-Pagán, 747 F.3d at 35. The objective factors include: (1) the proximity of the firearm to drugs or contraband; -24- (2) whether the firearm was easily accessible; (3) whether the firearm was loaded; and (4) the surrounding circumstances. Id. (citing Pena, 586 F.3d at 113). Evidence of subjective intent might include a showing that a defendant obtained a firearm to protect drugs or proceeds, but even if that evidence is lacking, the jury may infer intent from the objective circumstances. Id. We find that there was sufficient evidence to support Mendoza's conviction on this count too. To establish the nexus between the firearms and the drug crimes, the Government provided evidence showing that both firearms were loaded and located in close proximity to the drugs. The rifle was inside the backpack with the crack cocaine capsules, and the pistol was bound together with the heroin and cash, along with additional ammunition. Moreover, Mendoza had access to these items. The rifle was in the closet in the child's bedroom where he spent the night on more than one occasion and where he was sleeping at the time of the search. The pistol, which was in plain view, was placed on top of a cabinet and could easily be reached by standing on a chair. The Government also offered the testimony of Agent Vidal, who told the jury that firearms were essential in drug trafficking businesses because they promote the continuation of the[] business to maximize earnings. And although there was no evidence that any drug transaction occurred, the jury could -25- rationally infer from this evidence that the firearms could be used by Mendoza to protect the activity reflected by the drugs and money. See Ayala-García, 574 F.3d at 16 (noting that [w]hen guns and drugs are found together and a defendant has been convicted of possession with intent to distribute, the gun . . . may reasonably be considered to be possessed 'in furtherance of' an ongoing drug-trafficking crime); Robinson, 473 F.3d at 400 (finding that evidence was sufficient to show that possession of firearms was in furtherance of a drug crime where firearms were hidden in an accessible place and loaded); see also id. at 399 ([A] sufficient nexus is more readily found in cases where the firearm is in plain view and accessible to the defendant during a drug trafficking offense.). The jury was free to weigh the Government's and Mendoza's versions of the events and, considering the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it reasonably found that Mendoza possessed the firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Thus, his additional attempt to discredit the verdict also falls short. Accordingly, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported Mendoza's convictions on all counts.