Opinion ID: 2982483
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to a Fair Trial by a Jury of his Peers

Text: Darwich next argues that the Government’s peremptory challenge to the only “Arabic” juror violated his rights as outlined in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). “In Batson v. Kentucky . . ., the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race.” United States v. Simon, 422 F. App’x 489, 493 (6th Cir. 2011). When a party raises a Batson challenge, courts must perform a three-step analysis. First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. . . . Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the 12 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. . . . [A]s a final step, reviewing courts must assess the prosecutor’s credibility, weigh the strength of the prosecution’s asserted justification against the defendant’s prima facie case, and determine whether a defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination in light of all relevant circumstances, including comparative juror analysis and arguments related to pretext. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “On direct review, ‘the trial court’s decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal’ and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Odeneal, 517 F.3d 406, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Darwich claims that: (1) he objected to the Government’s peremptory challenge to the only “Arabic” juror in the venire based on discrimination; (2) the district court overruled his objection on the ground that another Arabic speaking juror remained; and (3) in doing so, the district court accepted the Government’s explanation for its strike without a meaningful review. In order to review this claim, we require a transcript of voir dire. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 required Darwich to include the transcript in the record, or if it was unavailable, prepare a statement from his recollection as to what occurred during voir dire, serve it upon the opposing party, and submit it to the district court for settlement and approval to be made part of the record. Smith v. Yarrow, 137 F. App’x 778, 780 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), (c)).8 Because voir dire was not ordered transcribed in this case, Darwich had a duty to provide a statement of recollection pursuant to Rule 10(c). Id. He did not. 8 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 provides, in relevant part: (b)(2) Unsupported Finding or Conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary 13 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 Absent a transcript or statement of recollection, we cannot verify that Darwich “made a proper objection, preserving the issue for appeal[,] or examine the explanation, if any, the district court may have provided for its decision on the record.” Id. Accordingly, the record before us does not allow for a review of this claim, and therefore, the issue is waived. See id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also, Lane v. City of Jackson, 86 F. App’x 874, 874 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding the appellant waived his sufficiency of the evidence claim where he did not supply the court with a trial transcript, move for the preparation of a transcript at the government’s expense, or prepare an appropriate statement of evidence under Rule 10(c)); Alhasan v. Pizza Hut of America, 70 F. App’x 828, 829 (6th Cir. 2003) (same).
Darwich also argues he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury chosen from a fair cross-section of the community. “‘Whether a defendant has been denied his right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community is a mixed question of law and fact, which to the evidence, the appellant must include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion. ... (c) Statement of the Evidence When the Proceedings Were Not Recorded or When a Transcript Is Unavailable. If the transcript of a hearing or trial is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including the appellant’s recollection. The statement must be served on the appellee, who may serve objections or proposed amendments within 14 days after being served. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments must then be submitted to the district court for settlement and approval. As settled and approved, the statement must be included by the district clerk in the record on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), (c). 14 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 we review de novo.’” United States v. Suggs, 531 F. App’x 609, 618 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The Sixth Amendment requires that a jury venire represent a fair cross-section of the community. Id. To show a prima facie violation of this requirement, [a defendant] must demonstrate “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). Exclusion is “systematic” if it is “inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized.” Id. at 366, 99 S.Ct. 664. Once a defendant establishes a prima facie case, the government has the burden to justify the “infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible with a significant state interest.” Id. at 368, 99 S.Ct. 664. Id. at 619. Darwich claims he asserted a fair cross-section objection at the same time that he asserted his Batson objection. Without a transcript of voir dire, however, we cannot determine whether Darwich in fact made a proper objection that is preserved for appeal. Nevertheless, even assuming he did, his claim fails on the merits. Darwich claims that his jury pool did not consist of a fair cross-section of eligible Arab and Muslim peers and that the jury selection procedures in the Eastern District of Michigan systematically exclude Arab and Muslim citizens from the district’s jury pools. Darwich’s claim fails because he has not presented any evidence of the elements required to establish a prima facie violation. Rather, his entire argument is based on conclusory allegations. Darwich does 15 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 state that his jury pool included only one prospective Arab juror and one juror who claimed to speak Arabic, but “[i]t is incumbent upon the defendant to show more than that a particular jury panel was unrepresentative.” Id. at 619 (citation omitted). Because Darwich failed to provide any evidence that a “systematic underrepresentation was ‘inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized[,]’” he cannot establish that he was denied his right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. We therefore decline to vacate his conviction and sentence on this ground. Id.9