Opinion ID: 2510862
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reust's Claim of Public Policy Violation

Text: APC contends that [i]f a public policy against witness retaliation is to be adopted in Alaska as a basis for a wrongful discharge tort, it should not extend to those instances where an individual has testified falsely or with a reckless disregard for whether his testimony is true or false. Before turning to APC's truthfulness argument, we first address whether the State of Alaska has an explicit public policy against witness retaliation.
In Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc ., we recognized that a retaliatory discharge in violation of an explicit public policy gives rise to a tort as well as a contract claim. [7] We concluded that the State of Alaska has explicit public policies that protect employees who make workers' compensation claims and who serve as whistleblowers. [8] Several Alaska statutes demonstrate that the state also has an explicit policy of protecting witnesses from retaliation. This protective policy is most clearly stated in AS 11.56.510, which makes it a crime to retaliate against a witness by using force, damaging property, or making threats. [9] Other statutes contain witness protection provisions, including the Alaska Occupational Safety and Health Act, [10] the Alaska Human Rights Law, [11] and the Alaska Assisted Living Homes Act. [12] Through these laws, the state has clearly stated a public policy of protecting witnesses from retaliation. Even though APC's alleged conduct probably does not violate the letter of any of these laws, [13] its actions are contrary to the policy reflected in the statutes. Thus, we hold that there is an actionable public policy tort in Alaska for retaliation against witnesses in legal proceedings. In reaching this conclusion, we are persuaded by cases from other jurisdictions that have held various forms of witness retaliation to be contrary to public policy. [14] For example, in Page v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc., the West Virginia Supreme Court held that it is against substantial public policy of West Virginia to discharge an at-will employee because such employee has given or may be called to give truthful testimony in a legal action. [15] The court found support for this policy in state laws prohibiting wilful perjury and false swearing[] or procuring another to do so and prohibiting intimidating or impeding any witness[] or attempting to obstruct or impede the administration of justice in any court. [16] Allowing a tort remedy under these circumstances also furthers the state's interest in maintaining an effective method of judicial dispute resolution. Subjecting employers to tort liability for retaliating against employees who testify in legal proceedings dissuades retaliatory conduct. It also reduces the temptation for employees, fearing adverse responses from their employers, to provide false testimony or disobey a subpoena. [17]
APC argues that if witness retaliation is contrary to Alaska's public policy, the jury should have been instructed that only truthful testimony can be protected. [18] It therefore asserts that the failure to instruct the jury on this requirement is reversible error because it deprived APC of a critical defense. But, as Reust points out, APC never asserted that it terminated Reust because he testified falsely. In Page, the West Virginia Supreme Court addressed this same argument: Appellants argue additionally that Plaintiff's Instruction No. 3 failed to require that the testimony be truthful. While the failure to testify truthfully may present an occasion for further instruction in such cases, we find that appellants were not prejudiced by this omission, since there is no allegation that [the plaintiff] was terminated because her testimony was not truthful.[ [19] ] We agree with this reasoning. Because APC did not offer evidence at trial that Reust's alleged lack of truthfulness when he testified in the Jantz matter was the reason for his termination, APC was not entitled to such an instruction. We also observe that it is unlikely APC preserved this issue. [20] APC claims that the truthfulness requirement was discussed with the superior court during an unrecorded session that dealt with instructions; it points to circumstances supporting that contention, but it fails to establish where it raised the truthfulness issue on the record. [21] As a result, it is impossible for us to decide whether APC adequately brought the issue to the superior court's attention. Such problems must be avoided by conducting all jury instruction sessions on the record. Our disapproval of off-the-record instructional discussions is long-standing. [22] The lack of a record prevents or discourages adequate appellate review. It may prevent an appellant from establishing that a meritorious objection was made. And it may also prevent us from understanding precisely what objection was made and the reasoning of the lower court. Because the objections actually made at trial often differ in subtle but material ways from the objections appellants argue on appeal, the lack of a record may also hamper our ability to affirm a judgment. Likewise, the lack of a record of the trial court's reasoning might deny us an opportunity to be persuaded by the court's own words or the circumstances the court relied on in ruling.