Opinion ID: 4531389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nicholas Festa

Text: Festa challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his 72-month sentence on a variety of grounds that are easily rejected. First, he argues that the district court failed to consider the plea agreement negotiated by the parties. Not so. The district court explicitly discussed the plea agreement at sentencing—and noted that it was not bound by it. Second, he argues that the court improperly considered a one-level reduction Festa received for global plea efforts as an “aggravating” factor. The record does not demonstrate that the court treated the reduction as an aggravating factor, and in any event, it is permitted to impose a variance based 5 on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines. See United States v. Tutty, 612 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court may depart from the Guidelines based solely on a policy disagreement, even where the disagreement applies to a wide class of offenders or offenses.”) (emphasis omitted). Third, Festa argues that the district court placed unreasonable weight on his recruitment of his cousin into the conspiracy and his disrespect of the law, and did not adequately credit mitigating factors including his lack of criminal history and childhood circumstances. The district court considered these factors and more at sentencing. On this record, we have no reason to question the district court’s decisions concerning the weight it gave to specific factors. See Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289 (finding that the determination of the comparative weight to be afforded to aggravating and mitigating factors “is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge, with appellate courts seeking to ensure only that a factor can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of the circumstances in the case”). Fourth, Festa argues that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for imposing an above-Guidelines sentence. We disagree. The district court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors at sentencing and noted the seriousness of the criminal activity at issue, the duration of the conspiracy, and the need for specific and general deterrence. It also highlighted Festa’s recruitment of his cousin into the conspiracy. We find no reason to doubt that the district court considered the relevant factors appropriately, and we conclude that the district court adequately explained its decision in light of those factors. Nor can we conclude that, as a matter of substantive reasonableness, the district court’s chosen sentence “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189. 6 Finally, Festa argues that the district court failed to sentence him appropriately in light of the sentences it imposed on other defendants in this case. This argument also fails—there is no legal requirement that a court consider or explain sentencing disparities among codefendants. See United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 2008). We have considered Giallanzo’s and Festa’s remaining arguments on appeal and have found in them no basis for reversal. For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 7