Opinion ID: 2001864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Dr. Collins' Testimony

Text: Dr. Jerome Collins testified as Henriksen's only expert witness that as a result of Cameron's abusive behavior, Henriksen was suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome. When asked whether he had consulted with anyone else regarding his diagnosis and treatment of Henriksen, Dr. Collins testified, over objection, that another psychiatrist, Dr. Carlyle Voss, prepared a diagnostic evaluation that agreed with his opinion on virtually all aspects of the case. The trial court admitted this testimony regarding Dr. Voss's report, notwithstanding its hearsay nature, pursuant to M.R.Evid. 703. Two subsequent references to Dr. Voss's report were also admitted: one on direct examination [10] and one in closing arguments. [11] Cameron argues that Dr. Collins' testimony about the substance of Dr. Voss's opinion was hearsay that should have been excluded and this prejudicial error calls for a new trial. Although we agree that this evidence should have been excluded, we find its admission harmless error. See M.R.Civ.P. 61. Once the trial court has determined that an expert is qualified to render an opinion relevant to the pending case, it must then determine whether the opinion is based on a proper factual foundation. State v. Thompson, 503 A.2d 689, 692 (Me. 1986); see also M.R.Evid. 703 & 705. Rule 703 reads in full as follows: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. (emphasis added). A trial court's decision to admit opinion evidence pursuant to Rule 703 will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. McLellan v. Morrison, 434 A.2d 28, 30 (Me.1981). In the case before us, the parties agreed that Dr. Collins was a qualified licensed doctor who is qualified and licensed and practices in the area of psychiatry. Dr. Collins' opinion also met the requirements of Rule 703 because it was supported by, among other things, Dr. Voss's report. The report of another physician constitutes facts or data ... of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. M.R.Evid. 703; see McLellan, 434 A.2d at 30 (In conferring with another medical expert, [the expert witness] was merely following a procedure similar to consulting a medical textbook to obtain a confirmation of his own tentative conclusion.). Pursuant to Rule 703, Dr. Collins could testify that he relied on Dr. Voss's report in order to establish the factual foundation necessary for the admissibility of his opinion. Testimony regarding the substance of Dr. Voss's report, however, is not necessary to establish factual foundation under Rule 703 and remains hearsay not within any exception. See M.R.Evid. 801-804. Rule 703 does not make the substance of Dr. Voss's report admissible and, therefore, admitting Dr. Collins' testimony about the substance of the report was error. The trial court's error in admitting this evidence, however, was harmless. See M.R.Civ.P. 61. [12] From Dr. Collins' testimony that he relied on Dr. Voss's report which was properly admitted, a jury could infer that Dr. Voss's report essentially supported Dr. Collins' opinion. Therefore, the admission of evidence confirming that Dr. Voss agreed with Dr. Collins was cumulative and thus its admission constitutes harmless error not requiring reversal. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS and CLIFFORD, JJ., concur.