Opinion ID: 1190325
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Involving Informant Testimony

Text: Defendant contends the penalty phase testimony of the jailhouse informant regarding defendant's statements about stabbing and raping women, and about all women being potential victims, was improperly admitted. He claims use of uncorroborated informant testimony unconstitutionally undermines the reliability of the penalty determination. We have already rejected this contention. ( People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1250, fn. 13.) In addition, the independent evidence of defendant's crimes corroborated the informant's testimony. ( People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 624, fn. 10.) (6) Defendant also contends the court should have excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352, and that it was impermissible evidence of future dangerousness. We find, however, no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 19 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) Evidence of statements from defendant's own mouth demonstrating his attitude toward his victims was highly probative. Contrary to defendant's argument, the record shows that the court properly weighed the probative value against the prejudicial effect. Although we have generally condemned expert predictions of the defendant's future dangerousness because of their inherent unreliability ( People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 774 [175 Cal Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446]; see People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 882 [277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906]), we have consistently upheld prosecution argument of future dangerousness based on the evidence. ( People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 549 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) The evidence was properly admitted. (7) Defendant finally contends the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that evidence of his oral admissions should be viewed with caution. We reject the contention for two reasons. First, the instruction was given at the guilt phase; at the penalty phase, the court told the jury that it would be given the guilt phase instructions to use if applicable in the penalty phase.... This sufficed even if the instruction had been required. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 846.) Second, there is no sua sponte duty to give the instruction at the penalty phase. ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 782-784 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].)