Opinion ID: 708054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal common law immunity

Text: 78 Karadzic nonetheless invites us to fashion a federal common law immunity for those within a judicial district as a United Nations invitee. He contends that such a rule is necessary to prevent private litigants from inhibiting the United Nations in its ability to consult with invited visitors. Karadzic analogizes his proposed rule to the government contacts exception to the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, which has been broadly characterized to mean that mere entry [into the District of Columbia] by non-residents for the purpose of contacting federal government agencies cannot serve as a basis for in personam jurisdiction, Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1370 (D.C.1978); see also Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 785-87 (D.C.Cir.1983) (construing government contacts exception to District of Columbia's long-arm statute), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104 S.Ct. 2399, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984). He also points to a similar restriction upon assertion of personal jurisdiction on the basis of the presence of an individual who has entered a jurisdiction in order to attend court or otherwise engage in litigation. See generally 4 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1076 (2d ed. 1987). 79 Karadzic also endeavors to find support for a common law immunity in our decision in Klinghoffer. Though, as noted above, Klinghoffer declined to extend the immunities of the Headquarters Agreement beyond those provided by its express provisions, the decision applied immunity considerations to its construction of New York's long-arm statute, N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. 301 (McKinney 1990), in deciding whether the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was doing business in the state. Klinghoffer construed the concept of doing business to cover only those activities of the PLO that were not United Nations-related. See 937 F.2d at 51. 80 Despite the considerations that guided Klinghoffer in its narrowing construction of the general terminology of New York's long-arm statute as applied to United Nations activities, we decline the invitation to create a federal common law immunity as an extension of the precise terms of a carefully crafted treaty that struck the balance between the interests of the United Nations and those of the United States. 81 Finally, we note that the mere possibility that Karadzic might at some future date be recognized by the United States as the head of state of a friendly nation and might thereby acquire head-of-state immunity does not transform the appellants' claims into a nonjusticiable request for an advisory opinion, as the District Court intimated. Even if such future recognition, determined by the Executive Branch, see Lafontant, 844 F.Supp. at 133, would create head-of-state immunity, but see In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir.1988) (passage of Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act leaves scope of head-of-state immunity uncertain), it would be entirely inappropriate for a court to create the functional equivalent of such an immunity based on speculation about what the Executive Branch might do in the future. See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35, 65 S.Ct. 530, 532, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945) ([I]t is the duty of the courts, in a matter so intimately associated with our foreign policy ..., not to enlarge an immunity to an extent which the government ... has not seen fit to recognize.). 82 In sum, if appellants personally served Karadzic with the summons and complaint while he was in New York but outside of the U.N. headquarters district, as they are prepared to prove, he is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the District Court.