Opinion ID: 779052
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wiretap Act

Text: 18 Konop argues that Davis' conduct constitutes an interception of an electronic communication in violation of the 19 Wiretap Act. The Wiretap Act makes it an offense to intentionally intercept[] ... any wire, oral, or electronic communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). We must therefore determine whether Konop's website is an electronic communication and, if so, whether Davis intercepted that communication. 20 An electronic communication is defined as any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system. Id. § 2510(12). As discussed above, website owners such as Konop transmit electronic documents to servers, where the documents are stored. If a user wishes to view the website, the user requests that the server transmit a copy of the document to the user's computer. When the server sends the document to the user's computer for viewing, a transfer of information from the website owner to the user has occurred. Although the website owner's document does not go directly or immediately to the user, once a user accesses a website, information is transferred from the website owner to the user via one of the specified mediums. We therefore conclude that Konop's website fits the definition of electronic communication. 21 The Wiretap Act, however, prohibits only interceptions of electronic communications. Intercept is defined as the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device. Id. § 2510(4). Standing alone, this definition would seem to suggest that an individual intercepts an electronic communication merely by acquiring its contents, regardless of when or under what circumstances the acquisition occurs. Courts, however, have clarified that Congress intended a narrower definition of intercept with regard to electronic communications. 22 In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir.1994), the Fifth Circuit held that the government's acquisition of email messages stored on an electronic bulletin board system, but not yet retrieved by the intended recipients, was not an interception under the Wiretap Act. The court observed that, prior to the enactment of the ECPA, the word intercept had been interpreted to mean the acquisition of a communication contemporaneous with transmission. Id. at 460 ( citing United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir.1976)). The court further observed that Congress, in passing the ECPA, intended to retain the previous definition of intercept with respect to wire and oral communications, 4 while amending the Wiretap Act to cover interceptions of electronic communications. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462; S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 13; H.R.Rep. No. 99-647, at 34. The court reasoned, however, that the word intercept could not describe the exact same conduct with respect to wire and electronic communications, because wire and electronic communications were defined differently in the statute. Specifically, the term wire communication was defined to include storage of the communication, while electronic communication was not. 5 The court concluded that this textual difference evidenced Congress' understanding that, although one could intercept a wire communication in storage, one could not intercept an electronic communication in storage: 23 Critical to the issue before us is the fact that, unlike the definition of wire communication, the definition of electronic communication does not include electronic storage of such communications.... Congress' use of the word transfer in the definition of electronic communication, and its omission in that definition of the phrase any electronic storage of such communication ... reflects that Congress did not intend for intercept to apply to electronic communications when those communications are in electronic storage. 24 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62; Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F.Supp. 375, 386 (D.Del.1997) ([B]y including the electronic storage of wire communications within the definition of such communications but declining to do the same for electronic communications ... Congress sufficiently evinced its intent to make acquisitions of electronic communications unlawful under the Wiretap Act only if they occur contemporaneously with their transmissions.), aff'd, 172 F.3d 861 (3d Cir.1998); United States v. Reyes, 922 F.Supp. 818, 836 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Taken together, the definitions thus imply a requirement that the acquisition of [electronic communications] be simultaneous with the original transmission of the data.); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F.Supp. 1232, 1236-37 (D.Nev. 1996) (requiring acquisition during transmission). The Steve Jackson Court further noted that the ECPA was deliberately structured to afford electronic communications in storage less protection than other forms of communication. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462-64. 25 The Ninth Circuit endorsed the reasoning of Steve Jackson Games in United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1051. The question presented in Smith was whether the Wiretap Act covered wire communications in storage, such as voice mail messages, or just wire communications in transmission, such as ongoing telephone conversations. Relying on the same textual distinction as the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games, we concluded that wire communications in storage could be intercepted under the Wiretap Act. We found that Congress' inclusion of storage in the definition of wire communication militated in favor of a broad definition of the term intercept with respect to wire communications, one that included acquisition of a communication subsequent to transmission. We further observed that, with respect to wire communications only, the prior definition of intercept — acquisition contemporaneous with transmission — had been overruled by the ECPA. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 n. 11. On the other hand, we suggested that the narrower definition of intercept was still appropriate with regard to electronic communications: [I]n cases concerning electronic communications — the definition of which specifically includes transfers and specifically excludes storage — the narrow definition of intercept fits like a glove; it is natural to except non-contemporaneous retrievals from the scope of the Wiretap Act. In fact, a number of courts adopting the narrow interpretation of interception have specifically premised their decisions to do so on the distinction between § 2510's definitions of wire and electronic communications. 26 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 (citations and alterations omitted). 27 We agree with the Steve Jackson and Smith courts that the narrow definition of intercept applies to electronic communications. Notably, Congress has since amended the Wiretap Act to eliminate storage from the definition of wire communication, see USA PATRIOT Act § 209, 115 Stat. at 283, such that the textual distinction relied upon by the Steve Jackson and Smith courts no longer exists. This change, however, supports the analysis of those cases. By eliminating storage from the definition of wire communication, Congress essentially reinstated the pre-ECPA definition of intercept — acquisition contemporaneous with transmission — with respect to wire communications. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 n. 11. The purpose of the recent amendment was to reduce protection of voice mail messages to the lower level of protection provided other electronically stored communications. See H.R. Rep. 107-236(I), at 158-59 (2001). When Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, it was aware of the narrow definition courts had given the term intercept with respect to electronic communications, but chose not to change or modify that definition. To the contrary, it modified the statute to make that definition applicable to voice mail messages as well. Congress, therefore, accepted and implicitly approved the judicial definition of intercept as acquisition contemporaneous with transmission. 28 We therefore hold that for a website such as Konop's to be intercepted in violation of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage. 6 This conclusion is consistent with the ordinary meaning of intercept, which is to stop, seize, or interrupt in progress or course before arrival. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 630 (1985). More importantly, it is consistent with the structure of the ECPA, which created the SCA for the express purpose of addressing access to stored ... electronic communications and transactional records. S.Rep. No. 99-541 at 3 (emphasis added). The level of protection provided stored communications under the SCA is considerably less than that provided communications covered by the Wiretap Act. Section 2703(a) of the SCA details the procedures law enforcement must follow to access the contents of stored electronic communications, but these procedures are considerably less burdensome and less restrictive than those required to obtain a wiretap order under the Wiretap Act. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463. Thus, if Konop's position were correct and acquisition of a stored electronic communication were an interception under the Wiretap Act, the government would have to comply with the more burdensome, more restrictive procedures of the Wiretap Act to do exactly what Congress apparently authorized it to do under the less burdensome procedures of the SCA. Congress could not have intended this result. As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Steve Jackson Games, it is most unlikely that Congress intended to require law enforcement officers to satisfy the more stringent requirements for an intercept in order to gain access to the contents of stored electronic communications. Id.; see also Wesley Coll., 974 F.Supp. at 388 (same). 29 Because we conclude that Davis' conduct did not constitute an interception of an electronic communication in violation of the Wiretap Act, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment against Konop on his Wiretap Act claims. 7