Opinion ID: 2293442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Alternative Causes of Stamenkovic's Emotional Distress

Text: Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding relevant evidence which offered alternative and relevant explanations for Stamenkovic's emotional distress. Here, too, we review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion. See Knight, 725 A.2d at 477.
Appellants argue that they should have been permitted to introduce evidence of Stamenkovic's real estate holdings to show that [his] private real estate activities were a source (if not the source) of the stress in his life, and that the crushing debt load that was caused by the purchase of five condominium units as investments could explain his motive for filing suit in the first place. Appellants claim that the trial court should have allowed them to further develop this line of questioning by providing details about the timing and sequence of his purchases and the severity of his debt and the strain that it placed him under. Stamenkovic's activities outside his employment with Campbell were relevant to his motive for suing; to the source of his claimed distress; [ ] to whether the purported harassment affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment; and whether he suffered any emotional harm at all while at Campbell-Crane. According to appellants, in limiting their ability to pursue this line of inquiry, the trial court committed reversible error. We agree with Stamenkovic that appellants overstate the effect of the trial judge's exclusionary ruling. The trial court initially granted Stamenkovic's motion in limine to preclude appellants from introducing any evidence of [Stamenkovic's] alleged wealth, debt, financial situation, and real estate holdings. At trial, Campbell testified that Stamenkovic had told her that the depression and anxiety he suffered were due to the stress of owning several condominium units. Stamenkovic confirmed this was so, but explained that he had lied to Campbell about the causes of his distress to hide the fact that it was actually her sexual harassment that was causing him anxiety. After this testimony, appellants asked the judge to reconsider the pretrial exclusionary order. The trial court then allowed questioning about Stamenkovic's anxiety and financial distress related to his real estate investments. In direct response to counsel's proffer, the trial judge allowed appellants to introduce evidence, as the trial judge informally put it, that Stamenkovic purchased five [condos], sold one, made some money, and he lied to [Campbell] about it. Campbell, for example, testified that Stamenkovic was interested in investing in real estate in New York. At one point, Campbell said, Stamenkovic was trying to get a third mortgage on three pieces of property and asked [Campbell] how he could get closer to $50,000, the cutoff point for refinancing his mortgages. However, she testified, he had never achieved a command of English enough to justify the kind of salary he needed for his mortgage; was very upset about his mortgages and very worried about his finances. Similarly, in appellants' cross-examination of Stamenkovic, he confirmed that he had owned five condominium units at one time, and still owned, at the time of trial, four condominium units, including one in Miami Beach, Florida. Notwithstanding the trial court's limitations, appellants were able to elicit evidence of Stamenkovic's worry over his real estate investments. Thus, even though the trial court restricted the amount of detail [10] appellants would have preferred, they were not harmed as they were able to introduce evidence from which the jury could inferas appellants' counsel urged them to do in closing argumentthat any emotional distress Stamenkovic suffered was due to causes other than Campbell's harassing conduct, or, alternatively, that the fact that Stamenkovic was involved in these activities showed he was not the emotional wreck he claimed to be as a result of Campbell's harassment.
Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in not allowing them to introduce evidence regarding Stamenkovic's illegal bookmaking operation as an alternative source of stress. Campbell claimed that after the close of discovery, an expert performed a forensic examination of the computers in the Campbell-Crane offices that revealed Stamenkovic's extensive bookmaking activities while on the job. Subsequently, on October 3, 2007, appellants sought leave to file a Rule 26(b)(4) statement to identify an expert witness to testify about the examination, claiming that evidence of the gambling operation ought to be allowed under the after acquired evidence doctrine. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995). This doctrine allows for the introduction of evidence of an employee's wrongdoing that has been found subsequent to termination of the employment in order to calculate and reduce damages. The Supreme Court in McKennon stated that [o]nce an employer learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a legitimate discharge, we cannot require the employer to ignore the information, even if it is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit against the employer and even if the information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit. Id. The consequence is that the employer is not liable for reinstatement or front pay from the time that the employee could have been lawfully terminated. Id. Appellants claimed pre-trial, in their motion to file a Rule 26(b)(4) statement, that, had Campbell known about Stamenkovic's alleged gambling operation while on the job when it occurred (before his employment was terminated), she would have been justified in terminating his employment and his final damages for lost wages would have been reduced. This argument was rejected by the trial court, reasoning that by the time Campbell found out about the gambling operation, Stamenkovic had already mitigated his damages by securing other employment, thereby eviscerating the only basis of relevance offered. We need not address the merits of the trial court's reasons for excluding the evidence because, on appeal, appellants do not reiterate the claim made at trial concerning damages, but rather contend only that the trial court should have allowed evidence of the gambling operations as an alternative stressor that might have caused Stamenkovic emotional distress. This argument, however, was only raised post-trial, in appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, and thus must be reviewed for plain error. See, e.g., Cox v. United States, 898 A.2d 376, 382 n. 6 (D.C.2006). On this record, where there is ample evidence that Stamenkovic was subjected to egregious sexual harassment, and the jury did hear about Stamenkovic's financial worries related to his real estate investments, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing, sua sponte, to admit the new evidence of Stamenkovic's gambling activities as another potential source of emotional distress.