Opinion ID: 206195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identifying Probable Cause to Search Multiple-Occupancy Premises

Text: To protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fourth Amendment states that no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. As has long been recognized, probable cause is a fluid conceptturning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contextsnot readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317; accord Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d at 156-57. Nevertheless, it is generally understood that probable cause to search is demonstrated where the totality of circumstances indicates a `fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.' Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d at 156 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317). This required nexus between the items sought and the particular place to be searched protects against the issuance of general warrants, instruments reviled by the Founders who recalled their use by Crown officials to search where they pleased. Stanford v. State of Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965) (discussing how abusive use of general warrants contributed to Revolution and, thereafter, to demand for Fourth Amendment); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (same); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.1, at 7 (4th ed. 2004). Particularity concerns frequently arise in circumstances where the description in the warrant of the place to be searched is so vague that it fails reasonably to alert executing officers to the limits of their search authority, see generally Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. at 485-86, 85 S.Ct. 506; Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925); Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir.1994), or where the place described in the warrant does not comport with the place confronting officers when they attempt execution, see generally Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987); United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519, 524 (2d Cir.1994). A different particularity concern is presented in cases like this one, where a warrant particularly describes the place to be searched1015 Fairfield Ave, being a multi family dwellingbut a question arises as to whether the breadth of that description outruns the probable cause supporting the warrant. See 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(a), at 578. Such cases fall at the confluence of the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and particularity requirements, which courts and commentators have construed to demand that a search warrant for a multiple-occupancy building be supported by a showing of probable cause as to each unit. See id. § 4.5(c), at 591 & n. 94 (collecting cases and concluding it is constitutionally permissible for a single warrant to authorize the search of more than one subunit in a multiple-occupancy building when there has been a probable cause showing as to each subunit included); id. § 4.5(b), at 580 ([I]n the absence of a probable cause showing as to all the living units so as to justify a search of them all, a search warrant directed at a multiple-occupancy structure will ordinarily be held invalid if it describes the premises only by street number or identification common to all the subunits located within the structure. (footnotes omitted)). This court effectively recognized this principle in United States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1975), when it concluded that the district court had properly held a warrant to search an entire building invalid on overbreadth grounds where probable cause existed only with respect to specific floors. [6]