Opinion ID: 624999
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Privilege Standard

Text: All evidentiary privileges asserted in federal court are governed, in the first instance, by Federal Rule of Evidence 501. [8] Federal privilege law, as conceived by Rule 501, is determined by the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. Fed.R.Evid. 501. The beginning of any analysis under Rule 501 is the principle that `the public has a right to every man's evidence.' Carman, 114 F.3d at 793 (quoting Hardwicke, L.C.J., quoted in 12 Cobbett's Parliamentary History, 675, 693 (1742)). Thus, in the development of testimonial privileges, courts start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (quotations omitted). Accordingly, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). The Supreme Court has recognized one such exception from every man's evidence, the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In Jaffee, the Court held that confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15, 116 S.Ct. 1923. As relevant here, a testimonial privilege protecting confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her patient `promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.' Id. at 9-10, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)). That is, discussions in the course of therapy likely facilitate an atmosphere of confidence and trust conducive to meaningful treatment. Id. at 10, 116 S.Ct. 1923. Effective psychotherapy ... depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment. Id. Protecting these confidential communications from compelled disclosure at trial further serves the public as well by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem. Id. at 11, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance. Id. In Jaffee, the Supreme Court extended the psychotherapist-patient privilege to licensed social workers in addition to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists for the same reasons noted above. Id. at 15, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The Court reasoned that licensed social workers provide a significant amount of mental health treatment and their clients often include individuals who may not otherwise be able to afford the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist. Accordingly, the Court held counseling sessions with a social worker serve the same public goals and thus conversations and notes taken during counseling sessions are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501. Id. at 16, 18, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The Court rejected a balancing component . . . [m]aking the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure. Id. at 17, 116 S.Ct. 1923. Very basically, in this case the district court held that the statements Ghane made to Gluhovsky during the ER intake interview and examination were not protected by the privilege because Gluhovsky was not a licensed psychotherapist and Gluhovsky did not participate in the diagnosis and treatment of Ghane under the direction of Dr. Houghton. The court further held that even though Ghane's statements to Dr. Houghton fell squarely within the psychotherapist-patient privilege, they were nonetheless admissible under a dangerous patient exception. And, finally, the district court held that even if this circuit declined to acknowledge the dangerous patient exception to the privilege, Ghane knowingly and voluntarily waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege with a full understanding of the attendant circumstances. We address each of the district court's holdings in turn.