Opinion ID: 2981683
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: TCPA Violation

Text: The TCPA declares as unlawful “[e]ngaging in any . . . act or practice which is deceptive to the consumer or to any other person.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104(b)(27). After correctly noting that “[a] deceptive act or practice is a material representation, practice or omission likely to mislead a reasonable consumer” and that negligent misrepresentation suffices for deception, Davis, 325 S.W.3d at 162 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), the district court concluded that Invacare violated the TCPA for the same reasons that it found a breach of contract and intentional misrepresentation. Invacare cursorily contests this ruling, relying on its prior arguments against the breach-of-contract and intentional-misrepresentation claims. Absent any new arguments, we - 18 - Nos. 11-5820/11-5844/11-6044/11-6050 Naylor Med. Sales & Rentals, Inc., et al. v. Invacare Continuing Care, Inc., et al. conclude that this challenge fails for the same reasons stated in our discussion of the breach-ofcontract and intentional-misrepresentation claims. Express representations in a negotiated contract disclaiming the use of finders and finder’s fees would likely mislead a reasonable person into trusting that no finder would claim entitlement to a fee and that no deal facilitator’s incentives depend specifically on the close of the sale. And given that the district court did not clearly err in inferring reckless intent from the fact that Invacare’s leadership discussed disclosing McDaniel’s finder’s fee to Underwood but ultimately declined to do so, it follows that the court did not clearly err in deeming this omission negligent. Because “[w]hether a particular act is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact,” Davis, 325 S.W.3d at 162 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we uphold the district court’s determination of deception as sufficiently supported to overcome clear-error review.