Opinion ID: 1775658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fact vs. Opinion

Text: Casso initially argues in this court that the statements in issue are mere opinions, and thus not defamatory. He relies on Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 805 (1974), where the Supreme Court explained: Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. We do not decide this point, however, because Casso has failed to preserve this issue for our determination. Nothing in his motion for summary judgment, or in Brand's reply, suggested to the trial court that the statements in question were mere opinions, and therefore, not actionable. Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other response.  (Emphasis added.) Thus, all theories in support of a summary judgment, as well as all opposing issues, must be presented in writing to the court at the hearing. As this court stated in Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983): It is axiomatic that one may not be granted judgment as a matter of law on a cause of action not addressed in a summary judgment proceeding. In his motion for summary judgment, Casso did assert that the statements were absolutely or conditionally privileged, but he limited this claim by a specific reference to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 5432 ( repealed 1985). That statute, now codified as Section 73.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, applies only to fair, true and impartial accounts of various official proceedings or to the reasonable and fair comment on or criticism of an official act by a newspaper or other periodical. The statute simply has no applicability to a private defendant like Casso. By waiting until his application for writ of error in this court, Casso waived this theory. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979).