Opinion ID: 172381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Suppression of Mr. Burke's Impeachment of Mr. Wilson

Text: We next review Mr. Burke's claim that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confront those witnesses testifying against him. We conclude that even assuming that the court improperly curtailed Mr. Burke's right to confront Joe Wilson, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The reversal of a conviction is not warranted merely because a litigant can show the existence of a Confrontation Clause error. If the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Burke's conviction need not be overturned. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). When determining whether a Confrontation Clause error is harmless, we have looked to (1) the importance of the witness's testimony in the prosecution's case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of the actual cross-examination; and (5) the overall strength of the State's case. Jones v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 946, 957 (10th Cir.2000). In this case, we are confident that any improper suppression of Mr. Burke's cross-examination of Mr. Wilson was harmless. Most importantly, in the scheme of the government's overall case against Mr. Burke, Mr. Wilson's testimony was of relatively minimal importance, and mostly cumulative. Mr. Wilson did not testify that Mr. Burke sold drugs to him only that Mr. Burke was present at the shared residence while Mr. Johnston was selling drugs. Numerous witnesses testified to the same or similar facts. Kim Meiwes, for instance, testified that she saw Mr. Burke at the house when she purchased drugs from Mr. Johnston. Aple. Br. 14. Similarly, April Sprong testified that she separately purchased drugs from both Johnston and Burke at the shared residence. Finally, Mr. JohnstonMr. Burke's alleged conspiratoralso testified in accord with the state's general theory. The extent of the cross-examination actually conducted also somewhat diminishes the risk of prejudice from any premature suppression of Mr. Burke's line of questioning. For instance, Mr. Burke was able to elicit explicit testimony that Mr. Wilson had never purchased drugs from him. R. V 444-45. Mr. Burke also impeached Mr. Wilson by presenting evidence of his extensive criminal history, including that he had previously been convicted of providing false information to a court. R. V 442; see Jones, 206 F.3d at 958 (finding relevant to the harmlessness inquiry whether the witness in question was impeached through other means). Finally, the state's case was not so weak that further cross-examination of Mr. Wilson reasonably could have been expected to affect the jury's deliberations. Multiple witnesses had testified that drugs were sold at Mr. Burke's home and that Mr. Burke himself engaged in the sale of drugs. In addition, Mr. Johnston testified that he and Mr. Burke obtained drugs from each other on occasion to serve their customers. R. V 342. In the context of this evidence, even the total absence of Mr. Wilson's testimony would have done little to diminish the government's case. We therefore conclude that any alleged Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.