Opinion ID: 1113193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Impeachment of family drug testimony.

Text: Defendant's mother Hortencia, his father Richard, Sr., and his sister Irene all testified in support of his claim that drugs had impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to behave lawfully. (ง 190.3, factor (h).) Both parents recounted that defendant acted in bizarre ways and was often delusional in the weeks before Gregorio's murder. Irene testified that two or three days before the murder, defendant was brought home unconscious from a party. The next morning, she gave defendant two PCP joints, which he smoked. On cross-examination, without objection, the prosecutor obtained admissions from both Hortencia and Irene that though they were witnesses at the 1979 trials, they had not previously testified about defendant's heavy drug use and its effects during the weeks before Gregorio was murdered. Richard, Sr., was not asked about his similar prior testimonial silence, but without objection, the prosecutor attacked all three witnesses on this basis in his closing argument. The prosecutor suggested that whatever the defense tried in 1979 had not worked, so it was taking a different [tack] this time. (24) Defendant claims it was misconduct for the prosecutor to impeach these witnesses with their prior testimonial silence, because they had not been asked about his drug use and intoxicated behavior in their earlier court appearances. The prosecutor transgressed further, defendant insists, by insinuating that the defense had sought to fabricate new evidence. Defendant concedes that his counsel's failure to object waives direct attacks on the misconduct, but he asserts that counsel's inaction was ineffective assistance. A witness may not be impeached by showing that he omitted to state a fact or stated it less fully at a prior proceeding unless his attention was called to the matter at that time and he was then asked to testify concerning the very facts embraced in the questions propounded at the [current] trial. ( Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 675 [255 P.2d 802]; People v. Lewis (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 816, 824 [225 Cal. Rptr. 782].) Defense counsel should have known, and the record implies he did know, [21] that Hortencia, Richard, Sr., and Irene had not previously been examined about defendant's drug use. As defendant suggests, there seems no plausible tactical reason why counsel failed to raise appropriate objections. Nonetheless, we find no prejudice. There was no serious dispute about the gravamen of these witnesses' testimony, that defendant was a serious chronic drug abuser who was grossly intoxicated at the time of the murder. Moreover, the misleading sting of the prosecutor's tactic was diminished in several ways. Defense counsel's redirect examination of Hortencia (see fn. 21, ante, p. 927), though ambiguous, was calculated to advise the jury that Hortencia had never before been examined about defendant's drug-related behavior. When the prosecutor inquired of Irene whether she had mentioned the two PCP cigarettes in earlier testimony, she responded, Nobody ever asked me. Defense counsel elaborated on the point in his redirect examination of Irene. These exchanges gave the jury ample opportunity to conclude that the family's prior silence on drug issues did not mean the current testimony was fabricated. Hence, the prosecutor's unchallenged efforts to impeach the witnesses on this ground do not undermine confidence in the judgment. [22]