Opinion ID: 2639069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does Smith Apply to Religious Organizations?

Text: Despite its surface simplicity, Smith is not an easy case to understand or apply. The majority correctly quotes the critical passages from Smith: `[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' ( Smith, [ supra, 494 U.S.] at p. 879 [110 S.Ct. 1595], quoting United States v. Lee [(1982)] 455 U.S. 252, 263, fn. 3 [102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).) To permit religious beliefs to excuse acts contrary to law, the Smith court reasoned,' would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. ' ( Smith, at p. 879 [110 S.Ct. 1595], quoting Reynolds v. United States (1879) 98 U.S. 145, 167 [25 L.Ed. 244].) (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 299-300, 85 P.3d at p. 81, italics added.) Since Smith focused exclusively on the individual's free exercise of religion, some courts have reasoned that religious institutions are exempted entirely from the Smith analysis. ( Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. (11th Cir.2000) 203 F.3d 1299, 1303; see Kaplan, The Devil Is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith (2000) 75 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1045, 1070.)
This case involves a religious organization and not an individual. Perhaps more importantly, it does not deal with the denial of a benefit because of a violation of existing law. Rather, it attempts to assess the constitutional implications of a law that requires a religious organization to provide a benefit despite its theological objections. These fundamental differences are simply ignored in the majority's analysis. Under Smith, the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability even if the law requires conduct that contravenes a religious belief, but [i]t does not follow ... that Smith stands for the proposition that a church may never be relieved from such an obligation. ( Catholic University, supra, 83 F.3d at p. 462.) The majority may have made an abortive attempt to deal with this obvious distinction by citing, and dismissing, the so-called ministerial exception. It is true, as the majority notes, that the ministerial exception is not directly at issue here. (See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (7th Cir.2003) 320 F.3d 698 [ministerial exception to title VII]; E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh (4th Cir.2000) 213 F.3d 795 [same]; Combs v. Central Texas Ann. Conf of United Methodist Church (5th Cir.1999) 173 F.3d 343 [same].) Likewise, it is certainly debatable whether the legislative action challenged here invades the narrow domain labeled church autonomy. (See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 [state court impermissibly encroached on church autonomy]; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral (1952) 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 [state statute impermissibly encroached on church autonomy].) And yet, the logic of these cases suggests that the constitutionally protected space for religious organizations is actually broader than these obvious categories. In short, the ministerial exception and the church autonomy doctrine are ways of describing spheres of constitutionally required protection, but these categories are not exhaustive. The court in Catholic University summarized the distinction it was making this way: We conclude from our review of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence that whereas the Free Exercise Clause guarantees a church's freedom to decide how it will govern itself, what it will teach, and to whom it will entrust its ministerial responsibilities, it does not guarantee the right of its members to practice what their church may preach if that practice is forbidden by a neutral law of general application. ( Catholic University, supra, 83 F.3d at p. 463.) In fact, the Legislature apparently takes a similar view of the breadth of Smith because it provided an exemption from the WCEA for churches.
Under venerable establishment clause precedent, however, the exemption itself is problematic. To put it bluntly, the government may generally separate the religious from the secular to decide how it will dispense its benefits, but it cannot parse a bona fide religious organization into secular and religious components solely to impose burdens on the secular portion. As noted, ante, the constitutional basis for the distinction seems indisputable. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that government action may burden the free exercise of religion in two different ways: by interfering with a believer's ability to observe the commands or practices of his faith [citations], and by encroaching on the ability of a church to manage its internal affairs. ( Catholic University, supra, 83 F.3d at p. 460; see, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993) 508 U.S. 520, 531-533, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 ( Lukumi ); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, supra, 344 U.S. at p. 116, 73 S.Ct. 143 [free exercise clause protects power of religious organizations to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine].) If Catholic Charities were a religious employer it would be exempt from the WCEA's requirement to include coverage for contraceptives in its group healthcare policy. Under the act, a religious employer must satisfy all of the following criteria: (A) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity. [¶] (B) The entity primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity. [¶] (C) The entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the entity. [¶] (D) The entity is a nonprofit organization as described in Section 6033(a)(2)(A)i or iii, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. (Health & Saf.Code, § 1367.25, subd. (b)(1).) As the majority notes, Catholic Charities does not qualify as a `religious employer' under the WCEA because it does not meet any of the definition's four criteria. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 292, 85 P.3d at p. 75, italics added.) But Catholic Charities would be a religious employer if the Legislature had not designed the exemption narrowly enough to exclude it. [2] The plaintiffs contend the Legislature has deliberately defined the Catholic Church in a manner entirely inconsistent with Catholic religious teaching, to exclude critical, constitutive elements of the Catholic Church  i.e., the Church's healthcare, social service and educational ministries  from the definition of `religious employer' included in the exemption provisions. The high court `has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.' ( Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos (1987) 483 U.S. 327, 334, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 ( Amos ).) At the same time, acknowledging that churches often regard the community services provided by affiliated nonprofits as a means of fulfilling religious duty and providing an example of the way of life a church seeks to foster ( id. at p. 344, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.)), the court concluded the case-by-case determination of whether an affiliated nonprofit is religious or secular is inappropriate under the free exercise clause. ( Id. at pp. 341-342, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.) [Religion includes important communal elements for most believers. They exercise their religion through religious organizations and these organizations must be protected by the [Free Exercise] Clause.... [R]eligious activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious community].) Even after Smith, it seems quite clear the government may not discriminate among religions ( Larson v. Valente (1982) 456 U.S. 228, 253, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33) or engender a risk of politicizing religion ( id. at pp. 253-254, 102 S.Ct. 1673) or purport to exempt religious but not secular activities ( Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 301, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213; Espinosa v. Rusk (10th Cir.1980) 634 F.2d 477, 480-481, affd. (1982) 456 U.S. 951, 102 S.Ct. 2025, 72 L.Ed.2d 477). In National Labor Relations Board v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago (1979) 440 U.S. 490, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 ( Catholic Bishop ), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certified unions as bargaining agents for lay teachers in church-affiliated schools. The NLRB asserted it was required to decline jurisdiction only when schools were `completely religious' and not just `religiously associated.' ( Id. at p. 493, 99 S.Ct. 1313.) The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the NLRB's standard as a `simplistic black or white, purported rule' which offered no guide to discretion. ( Id. at p. 495, 99 S.Ct. 1313.) `The real difficulty is found in the chilling aspect that the requirement of bargaining will impose on the exercise of the bishops' control of the religious mission of the schools.' ( Id. at p. 496, 99 S.Ct. 1313.) The Supreme Court, after acknowledging that the NLRB's attempt to distinguish between `completely religious' and `religiously associated' was a recognition of its intrusion into areas protected by the religion clauses, construed the National Labor Relations Act so as to avoid deciding whether jurisdiction was constitutionally permissible under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. ( Catholic Bishop, at p. 499, 99 S.Ct. 1313.) Nevertheless, the court expressed concern that NLRB jurisdiction would inevitably involve inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school's religious mission, and the very process of inquiry would impinge on rights guaranteed by the religion clauses. ( Catholic Bishop, at p. 502, 99 S.Ct. 1313.) In Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB (1st Cir.1985) 793 F.2d 383, 387, the NLRB sought to avoid the problem by exempting `pervasively sectarian' schools. The controlling opinion in Universidad Central de Bayamon found board jurisdiction posed just as great a risk as the Supreme Court envisioned in Catholic Bishop, supra, 440 U.S. 490, 99 S.Ct. 1313. For the Board to exercise jurisdiction over an educational institution where `the inculcation of religious values is at least one purpose of the institution' and `to promise that courts in the future will control the Board's efforts to examine religious matters, is to tread the path that Catholic Bishop forecloses.' ( Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB (D.C.Cir.2002) 278 F.3d 1335, 1342 ( Great Falls ), quoting Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB , at p. 402.) In Great Falls, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the NLRB's latest effort  the substantial religious character test  because the multifaceted analysis created the same concerns as the approach rejected in Catholic Bishop. Moreover, the court invoked a long line of precedents which have made it clear that religious tests, inquiries into religious perspectives, or generally trolling through a person's or institution's religious beliefs is `not only unnecessary but also offensive.' ( Great Falls, supra, 278 F.3d at pp. 1341-1342, quoting Mitchell v. Helms (2000) 530 U.S. 793, 828, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660; Amos, supra, 483 U.S. 327, 340, 345, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.).) The court in Great Falls thus suggested a broad exemption which would avoid the pitfalls of having the government determine what is religious or how much religion is sufficient. The court would exempt any school which purports to provide a religious environment; is organized as a nonprofit; and affiliated with, or owned, or operated, or controlled directly or indirectly by a recognized religious organization or entity whose membership is determined at least in part with reference to religion. ( Great Falls, supra, 278 F.3d at p. 1343.) The point of this bright-line test was to avoid delving into religious doctrine or motive and to avoid coercing a religiously affiliated educational institution to alter its religious mission to meet regulatory demands. ( Id. at p. 1345.) This approach responds to a longstanding concern that the religious liberty protected by the Constitution ought not to depend on a determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause. ( Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at p. 307, 60 S.Ct. 900.) Of course, the cited cases are distinguishable. The controversy here does not involve solicitation, or potential chilling effects, religious schools, administrative discretion, or ad hoc determinations. In reality, this case is worse. Here we are dealing with an intentional, purposeful intrusion into a religious organization's expression of its religious tenets and sense of mission. The government is not accidentally or incidentally interfering with religious practice; it is doing so willfully by making a judgment about what is or is not religious. This is precisely the sort of behavior that has been condemned in every other context. The conduct is hardly less offensive because it is codified. Definition may be just as pernicious as ongoing monitoring if its purpose is to suppress or burden religious conduct. ( Espinosa v. Rusk, supra, 634 F.2d at p. 481 [The conception of religion entertained by the City ... was that it had to be purely spiritual or evangelical. Thus, the charitable activity of the church having to do with the feeding of the hungry or the offer of clothing and shelter to the poor was deemed subject to regulation. This broad definition of secular is part of the problem].)
In theory, when religious liberties are at stake, the state is only neutral when it does not choose sides. (Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty (1996) 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313 [[T]he core point of religious liberty is that the government does not take positions on religious questions  not in its daily administration, not in its laws, and not in its Constitution either].) This would mean that the state may not prefer or seek to impose a particular normative view by squelching a competing religious perspective. Genuine neutrality would allow many different and contending voices to be represented in public discourse. (McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the First Freedom?, supra, 21 Cardozo L.Rev. at p. 1262.) In the present controversy, one side posits that sex is an aspect of autonomy, a vital human function in which men and women should be able to engage, enjoying their sexuality free from anxiety. (Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care System: Viagra v. Birth Control (1999) 13 J.L. & Health 171, 181.) This may in fact be the view of a majority of American adults. The Catholic Church's view, in contrast, deems all forms of nonmarital sex immoral, and views sex within marriage as a unitive, procreative, and sacred reflection of a spiritual, emotional, and biological reality that comes complete with reproductive anxiety. (See George & Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination (1995) 84 Geo. L.J. 301-320.) This is a perspective many people would disparage as archaic. Several of the legislators debating the WCEA seemed to think so. [3] The Catholic Church purports to be one of those different and contending voices, a church which has never envisioned a sharp divide between the Church and the world, the spiritual and the temporal, or religion and politics. For the Church, the internal spiritual life of its members and institutions must always move outward as a sign and instrument for the transformation of the larger society. (Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective Bargaining Under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, supra, 49 Vill. L.Rev. at p. 157.) Petitioner complains the narrow exemption was designed to lend the state's considerable weight to the dissenting side of a conflict within the church about the legitimacy of contraceptive practice  under the banner of protecting the `rights' of those who disagree ... and to deny the church exemption based on the allegedly unpopular nature of a church doctrine that diverges from contemporary cultural mores. In petitioner's words, the state's action has the effect of declaring the Catholic hierarchy's stand `heresy' in the eyes of secular culture. Of course, practice always diverges from theory. In contemporary American society, the government does take sides on policy issues. The First Amendment precludes the government from taking sides if the dispute involves internal church governance, but that leaves an area of overlap where the religiously dictated conduct of churches operating in the world comes into conflict with public policy. The question then is whether the coercive force of the law may be brought to bear to compel a religious organization that holds an alternative view, based on religious scruples, to support a hostile and competing vision of the good.
Smith could be read, as the majority apparently reads it, to suggest that religion is not entitled to constitutional protection unless the government action expressly and specifically targets religious expression. Under this interpretation, protection for religious liberty requires proof of religious bigotry, i.e., proof that government officials acted out of anti-religious motives. Thus, Smith  even as modified by Lukumi  would prohibit infringements of religious liberties only if a statute has the object or purpose of ... suppress[ing] religion or religious conduct or involves [o]fficial action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment. ( Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. at pp. 533-534, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) Since this statute imposes a mandate on all employers that provide prescription coverage, it arguably does not target religious conduct. On one level, religious interests and secular interests are treated with equal dignity, and since the mandate provides an escape hatch, Catholic Charities' attempt to claim specifically unequal treatment faces formidable obstacles. Consequently, the majority finds Catholic Charities has failed to prove an anti-religious motive and the statute is neutral.
There is, however, more than one way to look at neutrality. As Lukumi explains it, [f]acial neutrality is not determinative.... The [free exercise] clause `forbids subtle departures from neutrality' [citation] and `covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.' ( Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object. ( Id. at p. 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) [I]f the object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral [citation]; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. ( Id. at p. 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) The Free Exercise Clause `protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment.' ( Lukumi, at p. 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) But equality in the context of religious liberty must be broadly defined. In effect, the general applicability requirement is needed to ensure neutrality across broad categories of regulation. Pursuant to Lukumi, if other activities which cause comparable harm to the same governmental interests are not regulated, the law is not generally applicable. Thus, Lukumi makes it clear that strict scrutiny is required if a law is not neutral  and it considers the question of neutrality broadly. In this case, for instance, defendants argue that Catholic Charities' ability to opt out, i.e., to choose not to provide any prescription coverage, obviates any concern about infringement. Catholic Charities insists it should not be forced to relinquish its vision of appropriate employee relations to preserve its right to object to the use of contraceptives. From the Church's perspective, to demand that contraception be funded, despite bona fide religious objections, is to take sides, to abandon the commitment to public neutrality. In this sense, the WCEA, with its grudging religious exemption, may not be neutral. The majority's response that the WCEA's narrow exemption is an accommodation and not an imposition seems entirely unresponsive. In the whole scheme of things, the risk associated with allowing government to impose a stifling orthodoxy in pursuit of the good society may greatly outweigh the small harm of tolerating heterodoxy in this circumstance. [4] At oral argument, counsel indicated the Catholic Church, including Catholic Charities, employs fewer than 60,000 of California's millions of employees. [5] Some of the Church's employees belong to religious orders and are presumably fully in agreement with the church's position. Some are men, some are women no longer capable of childbearing, and some are spouses of people employed by other companies who are covered by their spouses' health plans. Of the women of childbearing age who remain, and to whom contraceptive coverage is a critical concern, none are faced with a pervasive practice which would prevent them from finding more congenial employment. [6] THE EXISTENCE OF Wcea's mandate  TO Which the vast majority of California employers apparently have no religious objection  enhances their employment options. In fact, the defection of talented female employees may cause Catholic Charities to reconsider its position. Such a result has no First Amendment implications. A substantial amount of federal case law supports Catholic Charities' claim that the Legislature's attempt to draw distinctions between the religious and secular activities of a single religious entity is an impermissible government entanglement in religion. I am inclined to agree. Such an action is constitutionally invalid and that ends the discussion. If, however, the existence of the narrow exemption simply shows the statutory scheme is not neutral in operation or effect, it is invalid only if it fails strict scrutiny.