Opinion ID: 369291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 21 Appellant contends that there is no federal question involved in this action, and that the district court was without jurisdiction. He argues that pre-emption is only a federal defense to a potential state claim made under the Act, citing Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248, 73 S.Ct. 236, 242, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952). There, a carrier sought judgment declaring that it was engaged in interstate commerce and enjoining the Public Service Commission of Utah from interfering with its interstate shipments. The Court stated: 22 The plaintiff is seeking to establish a defense against a cause of action which the declaratory defendant may assert in the Utah courts. Respondent here has sought to ward off possible action of the petitioners by seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that he will have a good defense when and if that cause of action is asserted. 23 Relief was denied. 24 That case is distinguishable, however. There, the majority concluded that there was no proof of any threatened or probable act by the state commission which might cause the irreparable injury essential to equitable relief or which could serve to create the actual controversy necessary for declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Here, an actual conflict exists created by the conflicting positions taken by appellant and the Bank Board. See First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n of Boston v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417, 423 n. 8 (1st Cir. 1979). 25 Both the state and federal regulations are currently in effect, subjecting the associations to conflicting requirements   . 26 An actual justiciable controversy is thus presented.Pre-Emption 27 Appellees argue and the district court held that the state act does not apply to federal savings and loan associations since the field of regulatory control is pre-empted by federal regulations. 28 Pre-emption of state legislation by federal acts arises from the Supremacy Clause, U.S.Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Courts begin their analysis of a potential pre-emption issue with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States (are) not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that (is) the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). However, implicit pre-emption can be found where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that there is no room for state action. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157, 98 S.Ct. 988, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978). 29 Appellant urges that there is no pre-emption. He finds no conflict between the state and federal regulations. More importantly, he argues that the federal statutes which provide the authority for the Bank Board's regulations specifically call for no pre-emption of state statutes that provide equal or greater protection to borrowers. 30 The state act and the regulations of the Bank Board can be divided into two groups. First are the substantive nondiscrimination provisions those conferring substantive rights upon borrowers to be free from discriminatory practices in the lending of money or extending of credit. No dispute presently exists as to those. We are not faced with a suit by a borrower against a federal association charging a violation of a substantive state regulation. If the nonpre-emption intent of the Civil Rights Acts (that the applicant should have the benefit of what, in the judgment of the Federal Reserve Board is the greater protection afforded) is to be given effect, it would apply to those substantive rights. Whether pre-emption exists as to them is a question we need not and do not reach. 31 Constituting a second group are the procedural aspects of the Act and the federal regulations those providing for regulatory control over the lending institutions to insure that the substantive rights of borrowers are respected. These include regulations providing for monitoring, for enforcement and complaint resolution mechanism and for notice. It is the regulatory authority of appellant over the federal associations in these respects that is here in dispute. 32 In our judgment the regulatory control of the Bank Board over federal savings and loan associations is so pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory control. As this court noted in Meyers v. Beverly Hills Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1974): 33 Pursuant to its valid statutory authority, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has promulgated comprehensive regulations covering all aspects of every federal savings and loan association 'from its cradle to its corporate grave.' People of State of California v. Coast Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n., S.D.Cal.1951, 98 F.Supp. 311, 316. 34 The broad regulatory authority over the federal associations conferred upon the Bank Board by HOLA does wholly pre-empt the field of regulatory control over these associations. If state-conferred rights are to be enforced against the federal associations by any regulatory body (a question we do not reach), enforcement must be by the Bank Board. 35 Judgment affirmed.