Opinion ID: 4211658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mooney-Napue Claims Relating to the Four

Text: Eyewitnesses Sanders first argues that the four eyewitnesses who identified him at trial—Malloy, Rogoway, Robinson, and Luna—each provided material, false testimony in violation of his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.15 The clearly established Supreme Court precedent governing these claims is Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Under Mooney, “a conviction obtained through the use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 269 (describing Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112–13). Napue held that the “same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Id. To demonstrate a constitutional violation under Mooney-Napue, Sanders must show: “(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) the false testimony was material.” Reis-Campos v. Biter, 832 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 15 This argument encompasses five claims from his federal habeas petition: claims 1, 2, 6, 8, and 11. 26 SANDERS V. CULLEN 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1447 (2017) (quoting Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2008)).16
In claims 1 and 2 of his federal habeas petition, Sanders alleges that the prosecution suborned perjury and knowingly presented false identification in Tami Rogoway’s trial testimony. On appeal, Sanders no longer uses the word “suborn,” but continues to maintain that the prosecution knew or should have known Rogoway’s identification testimony was false. Rogoway was one of the two customers at the restaurant on the night of the robbery. She testified at trial that she observed the taller robber for roughly eleven seconds over the course of the robbery: three seconds when he first entered through the front door and another eight seconds while she was in the freezer. Sanders argues that Rogoway’s testimony was false because: (1) her identification testimony changed over time; and (2) she was allegedly unable to identify Sanders until after the prosecution arranged for jailhouse informant Leslie White to be released from jail on illegal furloughs and White persuaded Rogoway to lie about her ability to identify Sanders. 16 Sanders argues that he does not have to show that the prosecution knew or should have known the testimony was false to prove a constitutional violation, but he does not cite any clearly established Supreme Court precedent for this point. Even if Sanders is not required to prove prosecutorial knowledge, his Mooney-Napue claims fail because he has not shown that any of the eyewitness testimony was false, as explained in detail below. SANDERS V. CULLEN 27 1. Changes in Rogoway’s Identification Testimony Over Time In the immediate aftermath of the crime, while Rogoway was still in the hospital, she selected photograph No. 132 from the CRASH book (the photo of the man named David Hall) as the taller robber. She initially stated that No. 132 “looked like the tall suspect,” but, upon further questioning, she stated that No. 132 “was the tall suspect.” (Emphasis added). By the time of Sanders’s trial, Rogoway could not remember whether she selected anyone from the CRASH book. Rogoway was given morphine for pain during the initial stage of her treatment, and likely was taking morphine when she viewed the CRASH book. Rogoway did not attend the live lineup on December 23, 1980 because she was still hospitalized, but she viewed a videotape of the lineup on January 2, 1981. The lineup card she used to record her impressions was lost sometime after February 1981 and she gave conflicting testimony at Sanders’s preliminary hearing and trial about whether she selected anyone when she watched the videotape. At the preliminary hearing, Deputy District Attorney Giss asked a series of questions about Freeman’s preliminary hearing and lineup, and then asked “Now, you never picked anyone out of any video tape line-ups; is that correct?” Rogoway answered: “I don’t believe so.” Her response was consistent with the uncontested fact that she did not select Freeman from the lineup. At the end of Rogoway’s testimony, the blackboard was moved so that it no longer blocked Sanders, and Giss asked whether Rogoway could positively identify him as “one of the two individuals involved with the incident that evening.” She answered, “Yes . . . . He was there.” 28 SANDERS V. CULLEN Outside the presence of the jury, the court held a California Evidence Code section 402 hearing regarding the loss of Rogoway’s lineup card.17 Officer Wesselink testified that he was present on January 2 when Rogoway viewed the videotape, that he was responsible for collecting her lineup card and that he recalled Rogoway selected Sanders. Detective Jacques also testified that he recorded Rogoway’s selection in the police log after seeing the lineup card, and similarly recalled that Rogoway picked Sanders. The police log states “videotape of lineups shown to Rogoway and Irvin at [Police Administrative Building]. Both picked Sanders. Neither picked Freeman.” Rogoway testified at the 402 hearing that she selected someone from one of the two lines as the taller robber. During trial, Rogoway watched the videotape of the lineup again and testified that she selected Sanders as the taller robber when she originally saw the tape on January 2, 1981. She further stated that she was “pretty certain” about the identification on January 2. In the courtroom, before the jury, she identified Sanders as the taller robber. The record shows that Rogoway’s in-court identifications of Sanders, at his preliminary hearing and at trial, did not change. She testified inconsistently about whether she selected anyone at the video lineup, but Wesselink’s and Jacques’s testimony at the 402 hearing suggests that it is more likely that she misunderstood Giss’s question at the preliminary hearing than that she gave false, or even inconsistent, testimony. Giss asked Rogoway whether she 17 California Evidence Code section 402(b) permits a California trial court to “hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury . . . .” SANDERS V. CULLEN 29 ever selected anyone at the lineups after asking her a series of questions about Freeman’s preliminary hearing and video lineup. According to the police log, she did not make a selection. The state court could have reasonably determined that Rogoway’s identification testimony did not change and that Rogoway thought Giss was only inquiring whether she selected Freeman from a lineup. More to the point, in order to prevail on these Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, Sanders would have to show that Rogoway gave false testimony, not just that she testified inconsistently over time. This he did not do. 2. Leslie White’s Impact on Rogoway’s Identification Testimony Sanders argues that Rogoway changed her identification testimony due to Leslie White’s influence during illegal furloughs. This argument fails because it does not account for Rogoway’s identification of Sanders at his preliminary hearing, before she began her relationship with White. The furloughs took place between October and December 1981. White testified that his relationship with Rogoway lasted for three months coinciding with the period when he was at the Long Beach City Jail in the fall of 1981. There is no evidence in the record that Rogoway had any interactions with White prior to the time she viewed the lineup on January 2, 1981, or before her identification of him at the preliminary hearing in March 1981. At a sidebar during Sanders’s trial, Deputy District Attorney Giss told the court that Rogoway’s visit to Chino State Prison with Gina Gutierrez—which led to her introduction to Leslie White—took place some time after Sanders’s preliminary hearing. 30 SANDERS V. CULLEN White testified before the grand jury investigating the jailhouse-informant scandal that he told Rogoway false, detrimental information about Sanders during his furloughs, but this could not have influenced the preliminary hearing testimony she had already given, and her identification of Sanders at the preliminary hearing was consistent with her identification of him at trial. Sanders has not shown that Rogoway changed her identification of Sanders, or that White could have influenced her pre-trial identification of Sanders. The state court also could have reasonably rejected this Mooney-Napue claim because Sanders did not show the prosecution knowingly offered false testimony. Sanders points to a note obtained from the District Attorney post-trial pursuant to the Public Records Act and argues that Giss knowingly allowed Rogoway to give false testimony. The handwritten note, allegedly authored by Giss, states: “Les had a conjugal visit with Tami. One regular visit (no forms – police escort).” At best, the note shows that the prosecution was aware of the relationship between White and Rogoway, but that much is clear; Giss testified about the relationship at the pretrial discovery hearing on February 24, 1982. It does not indicate that the prosecution knew, or even suspected, that Rogoway’s identification testimony was false. It is also possible the state court reasonably determined that Rogoway’s identification testimony was not pivotal in the context of the State’s overall case because Michael Malloy’s eyewitness testimony was much stronger. Malloy was the night manager on duty at the time of the robbery and he had a much longer opportunity to observe the taller robber while removing money from the safe and collecting the victims’ wallets, watches, and jewelry. Malloy testified at trial that he “got a good three minute look” at the taller robber SANDERS V. CULLEN 31 while they were in the office getting money from the safe, and that he stared at the robber for roughly half that time. Malloy never wavered in his identification of Sanders and he was a more prominent part of the state’s case, testifying over the course of eight days. The prosecutor also relied heavily on Malloy’s testimony during closing argument. It would not have been unreasonable for the state court to decide that the jury would have convicted Sanders, even without Rogoway’s testimony, based solely on the strength of Malloy’s identification.
In claim 8 of his federal habeas petition, Sanders contends that Michael Malloy’s trial testimony about how he knew to go to the December 23, 1980 lineup was false. Sanders points to an alleged inconsistency between Malloy’s trial testimony and a deposition he gave after Sanders’s trial, in a civil lawsuit Tami Rogoway filed against Bob’s Big Boy restaurant. The district court ruled that the deposition testimony did not contradict Malloy’s trial testimony and that Sanders failed to prove Malloy’s trial testimony was false. We agree with both rulings. In Sanders’s trial, Malloy was asked a series of questions about what he knew before he went to the December 23 lineup: Abramson: Had you heard before you were told that you were going to go downtown to identify anybody, had you heard that there were suspects arrested and in custody for the incident? 32 SANDERS V. CULLEN Malloy: No, I didn’t. Abramson: Did a policeman call you and tell you you had to go downtown to try to identify somebody? Malloy: I don’t recall. Abramson: Well, how did you know you had to go down? Malloy: I believe someone called me, but I don’t know when. Abramson: Okay. Apart from when, do you know who? Malloy: No, I can’t — no, I don’t. Three years after Sanders’s trial, Malloy was asked at his deposition when he first talked to anyone from Bob’s Big Boy after the crime: Attorney: When did anybody from Bob’s talk to you after this incident? Malloy: I believe after I got out of the hospital. Attorney: Who did you talk to? Malloy: David Lind. Attorney: Where? SANDERS V. CULLEN 33 Malloy: I went in a lineup. I went downtown to a lineup. . . . Attorney: Is that the first time you saw Dave Lind after this incident was at the lineup? Malloy: At the lineup. Attorney: Did he talk to you about the incident? Malloy: No. He just told me I was coming downtown for a lineup, identify the guys. Attorney: He called you and asked you if you would come down to the lineup? Malloy: LAPD called me. Attorney: What did Dave Lind — Malloy: Escorted me down. In short, Malloy testified at Sanders’s trial that he could not remember who called to tell him to come to the December 23 lineup, and at his deposition he testified that the LAPD called him and David Lind, the Director of Safety and Security for Bob’s Big Boy, escorted him to the lineup. Whether Malloy’s recollection was accurate or not, the fact that he later recalled being contacted by LAPD about attending the lineup does not come close to demonstrating that his trial testimony was false or that the prosecution knew, or should have known, that it was wrong. Nor does Sanders 34 SANDERS V. CULLEN explain how this detail calls into question Malloy’s identification of Sanders at the video lineup, much less his incourt identification. The state court could have reasonably decided that Sanders failed to prove any of the three MooneyNapue elements with respect to Malloy’s testimony.
In claim 6 of his federal habeas petition, Sanders maintains that Rhonda Robinson’s trial testimony was false because it was inconsistent with testimony she gave at a hearing in Freeman’s case about whether she had seen a photograph of Sanders and Stewart before Freeman’s preliminary hearing. Rhonda Robinson was a Bob’s Big Boy waitress. The shorter robber ordered her to lay on the floor in the kitchen before she was told to enter the freezer. She testified at trial that she observed the taller robber for three to four seconds in the freezer. The district court correctly ruled that there was “no conflict between Robinson’s testimony at Petitioner’s trial and her testimony at Freeman’s trial.” During the December 1981 search of Sanders’s apartment, the police seized a carnival photograph of Sanders and Stewart holding fake guns. The trial court initially ruled that the photograph was inadmissible, but after a detective who participated in the search mentioned it during his testimony, the defense introduced the photograph and the court admitted it into evidence. Defense counsel also called Richard Price, who took the photograph, to testify that in December 1980 he managed a photographic studio near an amusement park where people could pose with props and costumes. Price testified that Sanders and Stewart posed for such a photograph with a replica gun and a toy gun as a gag. SANDERS V. CULLEN 35 In an effort to undermine the reliability of Robinson’s identification testimony, defense counsel questioned whether Robinson and other witnesses saw the gag photo while they were waiting to testify at Freeman’s February 1981 preliminary hearing. The photograph was apparently in a blue notebook inside a cardboard evidence box. Defense counsel Abramson asked Robinson whether she remembered seeing a blue notebook while she was waiting to testify at Freeman’s preliminary hearing, and Robinson answered, “I don’t remember.” Abramson then asked whether she remembered “any of the witnesses going through any notebooks or making comments about any photographs,” to which Robinson answered “Yes.” After a sidebar about a hearsay objection, Abramson inquired whether Robinson remembered the other witnesses “mentioning Ricky Sanders’[s] name” or “suggesting that Ricky Sanders was one of the guys who did this thing.” Robinson again answered “Yes.” The transcript of the sidebar discussion suggests that Abramson asked these questions to explore whether Robinson identified Sanders at trial because she heard other witnesses say that he was one of the robbers, but Robinson was not asked whether she saw the photograph itself. At a hearing in Freeman’s trial held pursuant to California Evidence Code section 402, Robinson was again asked about what happened while she was waiting to testify at Freeman’s preliminary hearing. Robinson said she remembered seeing a cardboard box and that she remembered people looking inside the box. She could not recall who, “but someone opened the notebook, and [the witnesses] saw a photo.” Robinson further testified that it was a blue notebook, and that it contained a photograph of Sanders and a girl “standing together holding a gun.” 36 SANDERS V. CULLEN The only inconsistency between Robinson’s testimony at Sanders’s trial and Robinson’s testimony at the hearing held during Freeman’s case concerns whether she recalled seeing the blue notebook; Robinson did not deny seeing the photograph at either proceeding, and the fact that she remembered seeing the notebook at Freeman’s evidentiary hearing does not show that she lied at Sanders’s trial. Sanders maintains that the prosecution knew Robinson lied about her memory of the notebook because the police showed the photograph to her. But the only evidence he cites to support this argument is Robinson’s testimony at Freeman’s evidentiary hearing, and it only establishes that the police had Robinson wait in the same room with the evidence box and notebook. There is no evidence the prosecution had reason to doubt the testimony Robinson actually gave, that she did not recall the blue notebook. Nor does Sanders explain how Robinson’s memory about the blue notebook might have made a material difference to the jury. She testified at Sanders’s trial that other witnesses made comments about a photograph while they were waiting to testify at Freeman’s preliminary hearing, but she was not asked whether she saw the photograph nor whether the photograph had any impact on her identification of Sanders. As discussed in more detail below, Robinson had already identified Sanders in person, at the December 23, 1980 lineup. The state court could have reasonably determined that Sanders failed to support any of the three Mooney-Napue elements with respect to Robinson’s testimony.
In claim 11, Sanders asserts that Ismael Luna admitted at Freeman’s trial that he testified falsely about his ability to SANDERS V. CULLEN 37 distinguish black people and his ability to identify Sanders. Ismael Luna was a busboy at Bob’s Big Boy, and his father died several months after the crime as a result of injuries he sustained during the robbery. The district court ruled that Luna’s testimony was neither perjurious nor material. We agree with the district court. Luna’s identification of Sanders was always qualified and the jury heard him testify at Sanders’s trial that he had difficulty identifying black people. Luna tentatively selected Sanders from Line 3 at the December 23, 1980 lineup. He wrote on his lineup card, “It seems to be No. 4.” At Sanders’s preliminary hearing, Luna testified that Sanders did not “seem to be” one of the robbers, and that he was “not really sure” whether Sanders was the man he selected at the lineup. He acknowledged that Sanders looked like the man he selected, but with “a little more hair.” At Sanders’s trial, Luna was asked “to look in this courtroom and see if you see one of the two men in this room that was there that night.” Luna responded, “Well, I think he’s there in front of that lady,” and pointed to Sanders. But on crossexamination Luna admitted, “in general, young black men tend to look a lot alike” to him. He said that the man he selected at the lineup looked like the taller robber, while Sanders now looked more like the shorter robber, and he could not say for sure whether Sanders was the same man he selected at the lineup. In her closing argument, defense counsel emphasized that Luna admitted “all black men basically look alike to him.” During Freeman’s trial, Luna was again asked about his selection of Sanders at the lineup. He testified, “it was kind of difficult to identify the black person,” and admitted: “It is very difficult for me to identify black people due to the fact that I don’t live with black people.” Although his testimony 38 SANDERS V. CULLEN at Freeman’s trial more explicitly stated that Luna had trouble identifying black people, it does not demonstrate that the uncertain testimony he gave at Sanders’s trial was false. The state court could have reasonably determined that Luna’s testimony was neither perjurious nor material because he was consistently uncertain. Sanders does not point to any evidence that the prosecution knew or suspected that Luna’s identification testimony was false. Because Sanders failed to prove that any of the eyewitnesses provided material, false testimony or that the prosecution knew they committed perjury, we hold that the state court’s rejection of Sanders’s Mooney-Napue claims relating to Rogoway, Malloy, Robinson, and Luna was neither contrary to clearly established federal law nor objectively unreasonable. We affirm the district court’s denial of Sanders’s habeas petition with respect to these claims. II. Mooney-Napue Claims Relating to Rodell Mitchell and Bruce Woods Sanders also argues that the prosecution knowingly used material, false testimony from two non-eyewitnesses—Rodell Mitchell and Bruce Woods—in violation of Mooney-Napue. This argument encompasses claims 20 and 22. A. Rodell Mitchell’s Allegedly False Testimony Rodell Mitchell was one of the Bob’s Big Boy managers whom Brenda Givens told about her encounter with Stewart at the Los Angeles County Jail. In claim 20, Sanders maintains that Mitchell lied when he claimed that he responded by calling the police and filing an internal incident SANDERS V. CULLEN 39 report. Sanders points to deposition testimony from Detective Stallcup, who participated in the initial investigation of the robbery, and a declaration David Lind gave in Tami Rogoway’s civil suit, to demonstrate that Mitchell’s trial testimony was false. The district court correctly ruled that Sanders’s argument was “conclusory,” and that it did not establish that Mitchell gave false testimony. At Sanders’s trial, Mitchell testified that he called the police after Givens told him about her conversation with Stewart. According to Mitchell, he called the police about fifteen to twenty minutes before the police arrived to ask about a different murder that took place near the restaurant that night. He told the police about his conversation with Givens in his phone call, and pointed out Stewart and Gilcrest to them when they visited the restaurant. Mitchell testified that he called the police more than once and they came to the restaurant multiple times that night. He also said he mailed an incident report to David Lind, head of security for Bob’s Big Boy, sometime after September 27, 1980. David Lind denied receiving such a report. During Rogoway’s civil lawsuit, a police detective testified that he checked logs maintained by the sergeant who served as LAPD Watch Commander on September 27, 1980, and found no record of any report of an impending robbery. He explained that a “robbery call” would have been a “high priority” and “procedure would have been to have something done” such as setting up immediate surveillance of the location and eventually confronting any individuals believed to be involved. 40 SANDERS V. CULLEN The declaration David Lind submitted in the civil suit stated that he had not received an incident report regarding the Stewart robbery threat, and that store manager Kim Clark—as opposed to night manager Rodell Mitchell—would have been the correct employee to file such a report. But according to Lind, this was also not the type of incident that would have triggered a reporting requirement because Bob’s Big Boy only required managers to report incidents occurring on restaurant premises. Stewart allegedly told Givens about her plans to rob the restaurant at the county jail. Neither the detective’s testimony nor David Lind’s declaration show that Mitchell testified falsely at Sanders’s trial. At most, this record demonstrates that the prosecution was aware of Mitchell’s and Lind’s conflicting accounts about the incident report. Nor has Sanders shown how Mitchell’s testimony was material. Givens’s report about her conversation with Stewart at the county jail was corroborated by Givens’s trial testimony and the stipulation concerning what Kim Clark would say if called to testify. Stewart’s visit to the restaurant on the night of September 27 was corroborated by Givens’s and Gilcrest’s trial testimony. Whether Mitchell called the police or filed an incident report were not important facts, and the jury was aware of the inconsistency between Mitchell’s and Lind’s version of events. The state court reasonably denied the Mooney-Napue claim related to Mitchell’s testimony. B. Bruce Woods’s Allegedly False Testimony Bruce Woods was the jailhouse informant who testified at Sanders’s and Stewart’s joint preliminary hearing about Stewart’s August 1980 attempt to solicit their mutual friend to rob Bob’s Big Boy. In claim 22, Sanders contends that SANDERS V. CULLEN 41 Woods provided material, false testimony at Sanders’s trial about statements Sanders allegedly made to Woods in a van after the preliminary hearing, including Sanders threatening Woods’s family. In support of the claim that Woods’s testimony was false, Sanders points to “the grand jury findings about the widespread practice of using jailhouse informants, the sheer improbability that Sanders would have made incriminating admissions to Woods, and the evidence of other misconduct.” The state court reasonably denied this claim because Sanders did not support the claim that Woods lied or that the prosecution knew his testimony was false. We affirm the district court’s denial of Sanders’s habeas petition with respect to the Mitchell and Woods Mooney-Napue claims.