Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Exclusion of Deanna Lisa Russell's Deposition Testimony

Text: At the guilt phase of the trial, defendant moved for the court to appoint a commissioner to depose Deanna Lisa Russell in Tennessee. (See §§ 1349-1362.) Russell had been defendant's parole officer in that state. Defense counseI asserted that Russell was the person who knew the most concerning efforts to obtain mental health treatment for defendant following his release from prison, and that her testimony would be relevant to mitigating factors at the penalty phase. Counsel explained that Russell was caring for a small infant, and that under these circumstances he did not want to subpoena her to testify at the trial. The prosecutor noted that such a deposition may be read into evidence at trial only if the witness is unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240 (§ 1362), and that Russell was not unavailable under that standard. Nevertheless, reserving the right to object to the admission of the deposition testimony at trial, the prosecutor stated that he had no objection to having the deposition taken, and that he might be willing to stipulate to its admission, depending upon the answers. The court granted defendant's motion but stated it was not ruling on the admissibility of Russell's answers at trial. Defense counsel and the prosecutor were given the opportunity to pose questions to be asked by the commissioner. Russell testified at the deposition that defendant's parole in Tennessee included the special condition that he participate in a mental health program. She assumed the condition was imposed to facilitate readjustment to the community. After she made an initial referral to a mental health program, Russell received a letter from the director of the program. The director requested copies of defendant's latest psychological evaluation, parole board papers, and instructions regarding what information Russell wanted from an evaluation. Russell did not provide this information, because she could not disclose parole records without the written permission of the board of paroles. Therefore, she wrote a memorandum to a supervisor requesting guidance, but did not receive a response. Approximately one month after Russell received the program director's request for information, defendant was given permission to travel to California. When he returned to Tennessee, defendant was granted a transfer of his parole supervision to California. At the penalty phase, defendant's sister-in-law testified that she accompanied defendant to the mental health facility in Tennessee, where defendant was informed he could not receive services until his probation officer provided some kind of paperwork. She and defendant then went to see Russell, who said she did not have the papers and would contact defendant when she received them. Russell never again mentioned the paperwork or mental health treatment to defendant during his subsequent visits with her. Defendant's brother, Enoch, testified that after defendant had wrecked two trucks, Enoch called a physician he knew to seek assistance in getting defendant into the mental health program. In Enoch's opinion, the States of Tennessee and California did nothing to help defendant fulfill his parole condition of receiving mental health care. Defendant subsequently offered a stipulation that Russell's testimony be admitted into evidence and read to the jury. Defense counsel stated that the testimony would help the jury determine exactly why defendant did not receive mental health treatment in Tennessee. Defense counsel conceded that Russell was not unavailable within the meaning of the Evidence Code, that all he could do was offer the stipulation, and that the matter was in the [prosecutor's] hands. The prosecutor refused to join the stipulation, and the trial court declined to admit the testimony. Defendant now contends that Russell's testimony should have been admitted even though it falls within no exception to the hearsay rule. He relies upon his Eighth Amendment right at the penalty phase to have the jury consider all relevant mitigating evidence. ( Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1; Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1.) Defendant also relies upon the principle that a defendant's due process rights are violated when hearsay testimony at the penalty phase of a capital trial is excluded, if both of the following conditions are present: (1) the excluded testimony is `highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial,' and (2) there are substantial reasons to assume the reliability of the evidence. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 704, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278, quoting Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738; see also Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 [the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice].) In seeking admission of Russell's testimony at trial, defendant did not contend that the federal Constitution compelled admission of this hearsay testimony, and he may not do so for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1264-1265, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251.) Defendant claims, however, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advance this argument in the trial court. Therefore, we consider whether defendant was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency in counsel's performance. (See People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 366-367, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) Although the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments confer a right upon capital defendants to present all relevant mitigating evidence to the jury ( Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669), the United States Supreme Court never has suggested that this right precludes the state from applying ordinary rules of evidence to determine whether such evidence is admissible. ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1176, 1178, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 856, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249.) Furthermore, in the present case the excluded deposition testimony simply corroborated the testimony of defendant's brother and sister-in-law concerning defendant's efforts to participate in the mental health program and the reason these efforts were unsuccessful. The trial court's application of the hearsay rule to exclude Russell's deposition therefore did not deprive defendant of his right to present relevant mitigating evidence. Nor did application of the rules of evidence violate defendant's right to due process of law. In Green v. Georgia, supra, 442 U.S. at page 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, evidence highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase consisted of hearsay testimony that the defendant's accomplice had confessed to killing the victim after ordering the defendant to run an errand. The state had used the same testimony to obtain a conviction and death sentence in the accomplice's trial. The high court held that [i]n these unique circumstances, application of the hearsay rule denied the defendant a fair trial on the issue of punishment. ( Ibid.; cf. Chambers v. Mississippi supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 289-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038 [the defendant was denied due process when he could not use a witness's signed confession for impeachment after the witness denied any involvement in the murder].) Thus, in these decisions, the high court found due process violations when the excluded evidence was highly probative of the defendant's innocence. By contrast, we have held that if the exculpatory value of the excluded evidence is tangential, or cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial, exclusion of the evidence does not deny the accused due process of law. (E.g., People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950 [corroborating evidence concerning the defendant's background]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 938, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93 [evidence that unidentified gang members told the defendant's parole officer that they believed the defendant was innocent]; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 55-59, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118 [witness's preliminary hearing testimony of his recollection of police identification procedures]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 838-839, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436 [corroborating evidence regarding the defendant's good relationship with children].) As explained above, in the present case Russell's deposition testimony simply corroborated other testimony presented at trial. Although, as defendant observes, Russell's testimony may have been considered more credible than that of defendant's relatives, its exclusion did not prevent defendant from presenting evidence to the jury regarding his attempt to receive mental health treatment in Tennessee. Moreover, the exculpatory value of this evidence was tangential at best. Defendant left Tennessee for California approximately two months after he was released from prison, and approximately one month after the director of the mental health program requested the paperwork from defendant's Tennessee parole officer. Defendant called his California parole officer as a witness, who testified he had no knowledge of any efforts made in California to ensure that defendant fulfilled the mental health condition of his parole. Thus, to the extent defendant offered Russell's testimony as mitigating evidence to show that his lack of mental health treatment was the responsibility of his parole officers, there was ample evidence admitted at trial that showed the same circumstance. Therefore, even assuming Russell's deposition testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial, [17] it was not highly relevant to a critical issue at the penalty phase. Accordingly, exclusion of this evidence did not violate the Eighth Amendment or deprive defendant of due process of law. Defendant suffered no prejudice from his trial counsel's failure to argue that the testimony was admissible under this theory.