Opinion ID: 306223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: appellant's c.o. claim

Text: 22 Appellant contends that on three separate occasions he expressed beliefs that qualified him for conscientious objector status, that knowledge of his statements should be imputed to his Local Board, that the Local Board should have furnished him a Selective Service Form 150 and reopened his classification, and that the failure to do so invalidates his induction order. 23 The three statements were made under the following circumstances: 24 Examining Center. On June 1, 1970, prior to the date his induction orders were mailed to him, appellant underwent an armed forces physical examination. During the examination he was interviewed by a moral waiver clerk about his prior criminal record. According to appellant's testimony at trial: 25 Well, I went inside a room, and everybody who had a record, and she asked us to fill out a form and tell them what the record was, and whether we were arrested at that time, and what we were arrested for. She asked some of us that if we have any objection to the war, and I said, when she asked, I said that I didn't believe in killing or violence and that, and that I would not go into the service if I were called. (N.T. 89) 26 Appellant testified further that the clerk was writing down part of what she was told. 27 Statement to F.B.I. Agent. After appellant failed to report in September 1970, his file was transferred to the U. S. Attorney, who requested an F.B.I. investigation. On October 20, 1970, an F.B.I. agent interviewed appellant in California. According to appellant's testimony at trial, he informed the agent of his conscientious opposition to armed forces service: 28 Q. And did he ask you about your views in regards to fighting and going into the United States Army? 29
30 Q. And what did you explain to him? 31 A. Well, I told him I would not fight in the Army or any other Army right now, and that I just didn't believe in violence. 32 Q. And that you could not serve? 33 A. Yes. 34 Q. And did you also indicate to him that you were against any form of killing? 35 A. Yes. 36 Q. And did he question you excessively to your beliefs as to war and killing and the like? 37 A. Yes. 38 Q. Did you make it very clear to him your beliefs in that regard? 39 A. Yes, I think so. (N.T. 91-2). 40 California Draft Board. According to appellant's trial testimony, he visited a draft board in Santa Ana, California, in October 1970, and during the visit there he expressed his views regarding conscientious objection. (N.T. 92-4). Appellant did not testify, however, about the specific statements that he made or to whom he spoke. 41 We believe that in none of these three instances should knowledge of appellant's statements be imputed to his Local Board. 42 The Selective Service System is a complex administrative system. We recognize that proper functioning of the system relies upon each registrant's use of established procedures to present his claims and objections to his local board. Where a registrant has expressed his conscientious objection to persons other than the members or agents of his local board, to persuade a court to impute knowledge of those statements to the local board requires some strong factor or set of factors to countervail the strong interest in proper functioning of the system. No such factors are present here. 43 The moral waiver clerk at the examining center was questioning appellant about his prior criminal record for the purpose of determining whether his prior record disqualified him for service in the armed forces. The F.B.I. agent was questioning appellant after being requested to do so by the U.S. Attorney's office in connection with the appellant's failure to report for induction in September 1970. The California draft board had been approached by appellant, according to his testimony, in connection with his wish to transfer his records to California. In none of these instances, we believe, was there a duty to transmit appellant's statements to the Local Board in Pennsylvania, nor do we believe that there could be any reasonable expectation that the statements would be transmitted to the Board. 44 Nor do we find any other factor in this case to warrant imputing to the Local Board knowledge of appellant's statements. Cf. United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Holmes, 426 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 402 U.S. 969, 91 S.Ct. 1644, 29 L.Ed.2d 134 (1971). We note that at the same time that appellant was allegedly making these statements, he wrote to his local board on several occasions, and in none of those letters did he indicate his conscientious objector beliefs. 45 Because we believe that knowledge of appellant's statements should not be imputed to his Local Board, and because he never otherwise indicated his conscientious objector views to his Local Board, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the views expressed would have constituted a prima facie claim for conscientious objector status, or whether reopening of appellant's classification would be barred by the decision in Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 91 S.Ct. 1319, 28 L.Ed.2d 625 (1971).