Opinion ID: 1901644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Third Party Perpetrator

Text: Throughout his trial, Brown introduced evidence designed to demonstrate that Peter Guerard, the father of Pam's youngest children, was her murderer. This evidence, he asserts, was relevant to the jury's determination of whether the state proved its case against Brown beyond a reasonable doubt. At the close of the evidence, Brown requested that the following instruction be given to the jury. In this case the defendant has introduced evidence that another party, Peter Guerard, was responsible for the murder of Pamela Plante. The defendant does not need to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that Peter Guerard committed this crime. In fact, the defendant need not even prove that there's a strong possibility that Peter Guerard committed this crime. That's because only the state has the burden of proof. But if an examination of the evidence concerning Peter Guerard causes you to have you have [ sic ] a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, then you must find the defendant not guilty. The trial judge declined to honor Brown's request. Brown maintains that this was error, because the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law and because without this instruction, the jury may have begun its deliberations persuaded that Brown carried the burden of proving Guerard's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm a trial justice's instructions to the jury when they adequately cover the law and, when viewed as a whole from the perspective of a jury that is composed of ordinary, intelligent lay people, the instructions do not reduce or shift the state's burden of proof. State v. Ensey, 881 A.2d 81, 95 (R.I.2005). A trial justice's refusal to grant a particular request for jury instructions does not constitute reversible error if, overall, the judge's charge to the jury fairly covers the requested instruction. State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1008 (R.I.2005). Moreover, we review the validity of an instruction by examining the challenged portion, not in isolation, but in the context of the entire charge. Id. Although the trial justice did not adopt the particular language that Brown requested, he told the jury that [t]he burden of proof is on the state    [i]t never shifts to the defendant    [t]he defendant need not prove anything. The trial justice also instructed the jurors to consider all the evidence presented, and reminded them of the presumption of innocence to which Brown was entitled. He explained that the presumption of innocence would leave Brown only if all twelve jurors decided that the state has, in fact, proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. After thoroughly reviewing the trial justice's instructions to the jury, we are convinced that he did not commit error in refusing to instruct the jury in exact accord with Brown's request. We are satisfied that the instructions that were given, when viewed as a whole from the perspective of a jury composed of ordinary, intelligent lay people, made it clear that the state had the burden of proving Brown's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of the crimes charged and that the burden of proof never shifted to Brown to prove his own innocence. The instructions given accurately reflected the law and adequately covered the requested instruction. Therefore, the trial justice did not commit error.