Opinion ID: 744751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Smokeless Tobacco Act

Text: 86 Our inquiry into the scope of the Smokeless Tobacco Act's preemption clause is considerably simpler than the preceding analysis. The Smokeless Tobacco Act provides that 87 No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and health, other than the statements required by [this act], shall be required by any State or local statute or regulation to be included on any package or in any advertisement (unless the advertisement is an outdoor billboard advertisement of a smokeless tobacco product.) 88 15 U.S.C. § 4406(b) (emphasis added). 89 We find dispositive the phrases on any package and in any advertisement, which differ significantly from the broader with respect to language in the FCLAA's preemption provision. Cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520, 112 S.Ct. at 2619 (plurality) (explaining that the clause, with respect to ... advertising and promotion, in the 1969 Act was notably broader than its predecessor, in the advertising, in the 1965 Act); id. at 554, 112 S.Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (suggesting same). Because the Disclosure Act only requires the manufacturers to file certain reports to the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, plainly it does not require a statement of any kind to be included on any package or in any advertisement. 29 Cf. id. at 518, 112 S.Ct. at 2620 (majority opinion) (explaining that similar language in 1965 Act merely prohibited ... particular cautionary statements on cigarette labels ... or in cigarette advertisements). The Smokeless Tobacco Act's express preemption clause, therefore, does not invalidate the Disclosure Act. 90 We observe that our holding is wholly consistent with the Smokeless Tobacco Act's savings clause which preserves, inter alia, state common-law failure to warn claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c); S.Rep. No. 99-209, at 14, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 13 (also stating that Smokeless Tobacco Act is not intended to preempt a State's ability to control the promotion or advertising of tobacco products). If claims directly attacking the adequacy of package labeling and advertising survive the Smokeless Tobacco Act's express preemption clause, then the reporting obligations under the Disclosure Act surely survive as well. 91 We conclude that neither the FCLAA nor the Smokeless Tobacco Act expressly preempts the Massachusetts Disclosure Act.