Opinion ID: 2998771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony Concerning Mohammed’s Immunity

Text: Agreement During direct examination of Mohammed, the district court allowed the government to introduce the court’s order granting Mohammed immunity and compelling his testimony. The court specifically stated that introduction of the order was warranted to show that Mohammed’s testimony “can be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.” Johnson now claims that the government exceeded the bounds of the order and “told the jury” that Johnson would be sent to jail if he testified falsely. The prosecutor told the jury no such thing; instead, he merely questioned Mohammed about his understanding of the agreement: Q. So what could happen if you were to not tell the truth today? A. I will be sent to jail. This question was not improper—it was within the bounds of the court’s order. Moreover, the government immediately sought to clarify Mohammed’s comment about being “sent to jail”: Q. Could you at least be prosecuted is what your un- derstanding is? A. Right. Q. Based on what you say here today? A. What did you say? Q. You could be prosecuted based on what you say here today if you were to not tell the truth; is that your understanding? 8 No. 04-2406 A. Right, right, right. This exchange does not, as Johnson claims, constitute improper bolstering of a government witness. On direct examination, the government may elicit testimony regarding the witness’s guilty plea or immunity deal because doing so allows the jury to hear “all relevant aspects of a witness’s testimony at one time.” United States v. Montani, 204 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2000). The government may generally introduce this evidence regardless of whether the witness’s credibility has already been attacked. Id. Here, however, the government introduced this evidence on direct examination because defense counsel had already signaled, in voir dire questioning and in opening statement, that Johnson’s defense would be to attack Mohammed’s credibility. The prosecutor in this case did not, as Johnson claims, suggest that the government’s or the court’s authority rested behind the witness’s testimony. Johnson cites to several cases where other Courts of Appeals have found that the government improperly vouched for the witness, but each is readily distinguishable from the present case. This is not a case where the prosecutor stated outright in closing argument that the witness could not say “whatever he wanted to say” because he would be prosecuted for perjury, and that “the court wouldn’t allow” the government to do anything wrong in the trial. See United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1992). Nor is it the case where a prosecutor, again in closing argument, stated that the witnesses would be in jeopardy if the government or the court did not believe that they were telling the truth. See United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1389 (6th Cir. 1994). Instead, here the government properly questioned Mohammed about his understanding of the agreement he signed with the government. As this Court has stated, “it is not improper for the prosecutor to remind the jury of the deterrent effect the threat of a perjury conviction has upon No. 04-2406 9 the conduct of government witnesses who to obtain a grant of immunity might otherwise be inclined to lie.” United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1983). Because this line of inquiry was proper, there was no plain error. See United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 900 (7th Cir. 1988).