Opinion ID: 2310793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Refreshing Recollection

Text: Whether a witness's recollection may be refreshed by a writing or by other means depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. As we said in Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 612 A.2d 258 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 931, 113 S.Ct. 1312, 122 L.Ed.2d 700 (1993): While it is true that in many circumstances, an examining attorney must first establish that a witness's memory is exhausted before refreshing the recollection of that witness, see 6 L. McLain, Maryland Evidence § 612.1 (and cases cited therein), laying such a foundation is not an absolute prerequisite. Instead, the question of whether a witness's recollection may be refreshed by a writing or some other object depends upon the particular circumstances.... Bankers Trust Co. v. Publicker Industries, Inc., 641 F.2d 1361, 1363 (2d Cir.1981) (There is no required, ritualistic formula for finding exhaustion of memory.) State v. Greenlee, 72 N.C.App. 269, 324 S.E.2d 48, 51-52 (1985) (prosecuting attorney did not improperly impeach State witness merely by attempting to refresh her memory upon realizing that her in-court testimony was contradictory to her prior statement); Walker v. State, 445 So.2d 955, 957 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (witness for State in a rape prosecution could refer to a writing for purpose of refreshing his recollection without first, as condition precedent, showing that it was necessary for his recollection to be refreshed); Reproductive Health Services, Inc. v. Lee, 660 S.W.2d 330, 335-36 (Mo.App.1983) (holding that where witness' testimony concerned five separate incidents of trespassing over a period of approximately ten months, involving various defendants, ... trial court could, in the exercise of its discretion, permit witness to employ written list to refresh her recollection without any specific statement on her part that she needed the list to refresh her recollection.); People v. Verodi, 150 Cal.App.2d 137, 150-51[,] 309 P.2d 568, 576-77 (2d. Dist.1957) (holding that in murder prosecution, district attorney's referring witness' attention to memorandum, previously prepared by witness, for purpose of refreshing witness' recollection and correcting a perfectly obvious omission was proper, even though witness had stated prior to seeing memorandum, that he had testified to everything which had been and that he did not need the memorandum to refresh his recollection.); C. McCormick, Evidence § 9 at 33-34 (4th ed. 1992) (The witness may believe that she remembers completely but on looking at the memorandum she would be caused to recall additional facts. As the Chinese proverb has it, `The palest ink is clearer than the best memory.' On the other hand, there is the ever-present danger that a suggestible witness may think that she remembers a fact because she reads it. It seems eminently a matter for discretion, rather than rule.); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 765 at 145 (Chadbourn rev. (1965)) (The forgoing rules [on present recollection revived] should not be treated as dogmas of inherent efficiency. They are merely crude rules-of-thumb, worthy of the adoption for the general purpose.... The trial court's discretion should control.) 6 L. McLain, Maryland Evidence § 612.2 (under Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, [o]nce a witness has been asked to testify or testified to a certain matter, if the witness' memory appears to be incorrect or incomplete, counsel may attempt to refresh the witness' recollection.). Id. at 672-74, 612 A.2d at 279-80 (alterations in original); see also Dorsey Bros., Inc. v. Anderson, 264 Md. 446, 453, 287 A.2d 270, 274 (1972); Butler v. State, 107 Md.App. 345, 354-55, 667 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (1995); Baker v. State, 35 Md.App. 593, 602 n. 10, 371 A.2d 699, 705 n. 10 (1977); see, e.g., United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772, 777 n. 3 (8th Cir.1997); Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816, 826 (2000); State v. Bruno, 236 Conn. 514, 534-35, 673 A.2d 1117, 1129 (1996). We also recognize the large amount of freedom that an attorney has when choosing an object with which a witness's recollection can be refreshed. It is important to note the distinction between the admission of a memorandum into evidence as past recorded recollection and a memorandum or other item used only to revive present recollection. The limitations and concerns present for past recollection recorded have little bearing on present recollection revived. As the Court of Special Appeals has said: When dealing with an instance of Past Recollection Recorded, the reason for the rigorous standards of admissibility is quite clear. Those standards exist to test the competence of the report or document in question. Since the piece of paper itself, in effect, speaks to the jury, the piece of paper must pass muster in terms of its evidentiary competence. Not so with Present Recollection Revived! By marked contrast to Past Recollection Recorded, no such testimonial competence is demanded of a mere stimulus to present recollection, for the stimulus itself is never evidence. Notwithstanding the surface similarity between the two phenomena, the difference between them could not be more basic. It is the difference between evidence and non-evidence. Of such mere stimuli or memory-prods, McCormick says, at 18, [T]he cardinal rule is that they are not evidence, but only aids in the giving of evidence. When we are dealing with an instance of Present Recollection Revived, the only source of evidence is the testimony of the witness himself. The stimulus may have jogged the witness's dormant memory, but the stimulus itself is not received in evidence. Baker, 35 Md.App. at 598-99, 371 A.2d at 702-03 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original). Generally, an attorney is given wide latitude with choosing the item to be used to refresh a witness's memory. This is because the item is not admitted into evidencethe memory that is triggered, and ultimately testified about, is the admitted evidence. In respect to notes taken of statements made by a person deceased at the time of trial, the attorney was permitted to refresh his recollection in our early case of Waters v. Waters, 35 Md. 531 (1872), even though the notes themselves may not have been admissible. We said: [I]t cannot be understood as deciding that the notes of the testimony taken by a Judge or counsel are per se evidence. Such notes are mere memoranda, which may be used to refresh the memory of the witness who took them; but are not of themselves evidence.... Id. at 540; see also Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 377, 247 A.2d 530, 538 (1968) (where a witness used a written, but not signed, confession to refresh his recollection [w]e [found] no merit in the appellant's contention that it was error to permit the State's witness to refresh his recollection.), vacated on other grounds by, 408 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 2851, 33 L.Ed.2d 747 (1972); Askins v. State, 13 Md.App. 702, 711, 284 A.2d 626, 631 (1971) ([T]he predominate view today seems to be that ... any memorandum or other object may be used as a stimulus to present memory, without restriction by rule as to authorship, guarantee of correctness, or time of making.). Judge Learned Hand noted in United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1946), that: When a party uses an earlier statement of his own witness to refresh the witness' memory, the only evidence recognized as such is the testimony so refreshed; and the party may not put the statement in evidence, although the other side may do so, and apparently the jury may call for it, sua sponte.... Anything may in fact revive a memory: a song, a scent, a photograph, and allusion, even a past statement known to be false. Id. at 967 (footnote omitted); see State v. Souza, 708 A.2d 899, 903 (R.I.1998) ([A]ny writing or object may be used in an effort to refresh a witness's recollection.); see also Wilson v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. 1987); Maryfield Plantation, Inc. v. Harris Gin Co., 116 Ga.App. 744, 159 S.E.2d 125 (1967). While we have not addressed the issue, the fact that a document used to refresh recollection might not otherwise be admissible, or even that it was obtained improperly, has been held by other jurisdictions to be no bar to its being used to refresh recollection. In State v. Poirier, 694 A.2d 448, 450 (Me.1997), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held: [A]t the very most, the notes were used to refresh the memory of the witness. In such circumstances, the fact that a document is not admissible does not prevent its use as a means of refreshing the recollection of a witness.... [t]he only question is whether a document... is generally calculated to revive the witness's memory. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 449 A.2d 1280, 1299 (1982), aff'd in part, dismissed in part on other grounds by Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir.1987), permitted letters that had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, to be used to refresh recollection. In respect to the defendants' assertion that the letters could not be used, even for memory refreshment, because they were unconstitutionally obtained, the New Jersey court said: This [the defendants'] rationale ignores the established distinction between a document that is evidential and one used to refresh a witness's recollection. Once a proper foundation has been laid, a witness may examine any document to refresh his memory. The oft-quoted statement of Lord Ellenborough in Henry v. Lee, 2 Chitty, 124, 124 (1814), sets forth the general rule: [I]f upon looking at any document he can so far refresh his memory as to recollect a circumstance, it is sufficient; and it makes no difference that the memorandum is not written by himself, for it is not the memorandum that is the evidence but the recollection of the witness. Preliminarily the trial court must decide whether the memorandum does refresh the witness's recollection. It may decline to permit its use where the danger of undue suggestion outweighs the probable value of the evidence. In making this decision the trial court may consider the nature of the memorandum and the witness's testimony, including cross-examination, by which counsel may test the witness's credibility that his memory has been revived. The admissible evidence is the recollection of the witness, and not the extrinsic paper. The test is whether the witness puts before the court his independent recollection and knowledge. Id. at 122-23, 449 A.2d at 1299-1300 (citations omitted). Documents, otherwise confidential, have been held to be permitted to refresh the recollection of a witness. The Supreme Court in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 231-35, 60 S.Ct. 811, 848-49, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940) in reference to use of grand jury testimony to refresh recollection, said: The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to permit defense counsel to inspect the transcript of grand jury testimony used to refresh the recollection of certain witnesses called by the government.... .... ... As once stated by Judge Hough, The bald fact that the memory refreshing words are found in the records of a grand jury is not a valid objection. Normally, of course, the material so used must be shown to opposing counsel upon demand, if it is handed to the witness.... Grand jury testimony is ordinarily confidential. But after the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it.... If the record showed that the refreshing material was deliberately used for purposes not material to the issues but to arouse the passions of the jurors, so that an objective appraisal of the evidence was unlikely, there would be reversible error. Likewise there would be error where under the pretext of refreshing a witness' recollection, the prior testimony was introduced as evidence. But here the grand jury testimony was used simply to refresh the recollection on material facts .... [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis added.] But see National Dairy Products Corp. v. United States, 384 F.2d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1967) that places some limits on the disclosure of grand jury testimony to defendants, [21] i.e., but, nonetheless noted the Supreme Court's statement in United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., supra [356 U.S. 677] at 683[, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958)] that `problems concerning the use of the grand jury transcript at the trial to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility   ' are `cases of particularized need where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly.' The Court also observed that the developments in the area of disclosure of grand jury minutes were entirely consistent with the realization that disclosure, rather than suppression of relevant legal materials, normally promotes the proper administration of criminal justice. [Some citations omitted.] See also Post Houses, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 384 F.2d 463 (3d Cir.1967); Commonwealth v. Silva, 401 Mass. 318, 328, 516 N.E.2d 161, 168 (1987) (witness permitted to refresh his recollection by utilizing transcripts of his grand jury testimony); State v. Krause, 260 Wis. 313, 50 N.W.2d 439 (1951). There are arguments that support that opposing counsel must be afforded an opportunity to review even confidential documents used to refresh memory, and, in some circumstances, such documents may be available for jury inspection. Wigmore notes: On a general principle ... the writing must be shown to him [the opponent] on request. 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, § 762 (Chadbourn rev.1970). Wigmore then quotes from older opinions: EYRE, L.C.J., in Hardy's Trial, 24 How. St. Tr. 200, 824 (1794): It is always usual and very reasonable, when a witness speaks from memorandums, that the counsel should have an opportunity of looking at those memorandums, when he is cross-examining that witness. R. v. Ramsden, 2 Car. & P. 603 (1827).... TENTERDEN, L.C.J.: You put the paper into the witness' hands to refresh his memory. It is very usual for the opposite counsel to see it and examine it, and I think he has a right to see it. KINDERSLEY, V.C., in Lord v. Colvin, 2 Drewr. 205, 208 (1854): If a paper is put into the hands of a witness to refresh his memory, if after that nothing comes of it, if nothing more be done, then the other party has no right to look at it. But if anything further is done, if the witness is asked and answers questions about the document or the facts referred to in it, then at law the party on the other side has a right to see the document.... [E]very document produced should, I think, be shown to both sides. Wigmore states that there are some circumstances where writings used to refresh recollection have been required to be shown to the jury, although not admitted as evidence per se. § 763. Writing used to revive recollection is not part of testimony; yet the jury may see it, to determine the propriety of its use. It follows from the nature of the purpose for which the paper is used ... that it is in no strict sense evidence. In this respect it differs from a record of past recollection.... Nevertheless, though the witness' party may not present it as evidence, the same reason of precaution which allows the opponent to examine it ... allows the opponent to call the jury's attention to its features, and also allows the jurymen, if they please, to examine it for the same end. In short, the opponent, but not the offering party, has a right to have the jury see it.... When confronted with a situation similar to that in the instant case, a cross-examiner attempting to refresh a witness' testimony, Wigmore says: § 764. Cross-examiner's use of writing to revive recollection . Where the effort to refresh the witness' memory comes originally from the cross-examining party, several distinct questions may arise. (1) Must the witness accede to the request and see if his memory is refreshed by the paper handed him? It seems entirely proper to require him, in the trial judge's discretion, to do this. (2) When this is done, the paper so used must in fairness be shown to opposing counsel, and read aloud or shown to the jury if he should so desire. (3) A paper thus desired to be used will usually be one containing a prior inconsistent statement of the witness; in this case, the rules will apply that the inconsistent statement is not equivalent to independent testimony ... and that the paper containing it must (in the jurisdictions following The Queen's Case ) first be shown to the witness before asking him upon its contents. [Some citations omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] A witness's PSI from a prior conviction, under circumstances such as those here present, would be acceptable to refresh the witness's recollection about the past offenses, especially when the witness claims to have forgotten the nature of the crimes for which he has been and is presently imprisoned, and where, as here, the issue of whether the prior assault was against a member of the same sex was argued as being relevant and material to whether the witness had made an unwanted sexual attack against his cell mate. That issue was argued as being squarely relevant to the issue of credibility, not only of the witness, but of the defendant as well.