Opinion ID: 882451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court err in considering whether Kenyon's termination was for good cause?

Text: As discussed above, respondents' motion for summary judgment was based on § 2-9-111, MCA, immunity regarding the wrongful discharge claim and lack of genuine issues of material fact on the age discrimination claim. The District Court granted summary judgment to respondents on the age discrimination claim, concluded that immunity under § 2-9-111, MCA, did not apply, and went on to grant summary judgment to Laws and the County on the wrongful discharge claim based on its determination that Kenyon was terminated for good cause as defined by § 39-2-903(5), MCA, and pursuant to § 39-2-904, MCA. Kenyon argues that the court erred in ruling on good cause under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act. The District Court's good cause discussion and conclusion followed immediately upon its consideration of Laws' long-term dissatisfaction with Kenyon's work performance in the context of the age discrimination claim. The court concluded that Laws' difficulties with Kenyon's work performance constituted good cause for her termination under § 39-2-903(5), MCA. The District Court correctly noted that respondents' motion was for summary judgment on all claims, not merely partial summary judgment. It determined that Kenyon had the burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact in response to the motion. The record reflects, however, that respondents' motion and supporting arguments on the wrongful discharge claim differed significantly from those relating to the age discrimination claim. Respondents premised their motion on the former on entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by virtue of § 2-9-111, MCA, immunity; as discussed above, the motion on the latter was premised on an absence of genuine issues of material fact. The good cause issue as it related to the wrongful discharge claim was not raised or argued by either party. The court was bound by the issues presented to it. Custody of C.S.F. (1988), 232 Mont. 204, 208, 755 P.2d 578, 581. By granting summary judgment on the basis of an issue not before it, the court effectively denied Kenyon notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. Hereford v. Hereford (1979), 183 Mont. 104, 108, 598 P.2d 600, 602. We conclude that the District Court improperly considered good cause and hold, therefore, that it erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of good cause as defined in § 39-2-903(5), MCA.