Opinion ID: 3036350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pennsylvania Courts’ Interpretation and

Text: Application of the Consumer Protection Law’s Private-Plaintiff Standing Provision The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has consistently interpreted the Consumer Protection Law’s private-plaintiff standing provision’s causation requirement to demand a showing of justifiable reliance, not simply a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the harm.4 In Weinberg v. Sun Co., it held that plaintiffs bringing a private suit under 4 A mere causal connection can be established by, for instance, proof that a misrepresentation inflated a product’s price, thereby injuring every purchaser because he paid more than he would have paid in the absence of the misrepresentation. See Weinberg v. Sun Co., 777 A.2d 442, 445 (Pa. 2001). A justifiable-reliance requirement, by contrast, requires the plaintiff to go further—he must show that he justifiably bought the product in the first place (or engaged in some other detrimental activity) because of the misrepresentation. See id. at 446. 9 Consumer Protection Law § 201-2(4)(v)5 and (ix)6 must allege that they relied on the defendant’s deceptive conduct. 777 A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. 2001).7 The standing provision applicable to the Attorney General, by contrast, contained no such requirement. Id. at 445–46.8 Thus, unlike the Attorney General, who is 5 This subsection prohibits “[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation or connection that he does not have.” 6 The subsection prohibits “[a]dvertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.” 7 The Supreme Court did not cite to the specific subsections at issue, but a review of the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in the case reveals that these were the subsections involved. See Weinberg v. Sun Co., 740 A.2d 1152, 1165–66, 1169–70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), rev’d in part, 777 A.2d 442 (Pa. 2001). 8 The provision authorizing suits by the Attorney General or a District Attorney states: Whenever the Attorney General or a District Attorney has reason to believe that any person is using or is about to use any method, act or practice declared by section 3 of this act [73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-3] to be unlawful, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, he may bring an action in the name of the Commonwealth against such person to restrain by 10 responsible for protecting public interests, a private plaintiff could not “pursue an advertiser because an advertisement might deceive members of the audience and might influence a purchasing decision when the plaintiff himself was neither deceived nor influenced.” Id. at 446. The Court further noted that the Consumer Protection Law’s “‘underlying foundation is fraud prevention,’” id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 816 (1974)), and that “[n]othing in the [statute’s] legislative history suggests that the legislature ever intended statutory language directed against consumer fraud to do away with the traditional common law elements of reliance and causation.” Id. Applying these broad principles, the Court held that private purchasers of Sunoco Ultra® gasoline who sued Sunoco under the theory that its advertisements about Ultra® were misleading must allege that they “purchased Ultra® because [they] heard and believed Sunoco’s false advertising.” Id. at 444–46. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed Weinberg in its subsequent decision in Yocca, 854 A.2d 425. In that case, season ticket holders to games of the Pittsburgh Steelers sued the team under the Consumer Protection Law for allegedly making false statements in its brochure soliciting season ticket purchases. Id. at 427, 432. They pressed claims under Consumer Protection Law § 201-2(4)(vii), (ix), (x), and (xi), as temporary or permanent injunction the use of such method, act or practice. 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-4 (emphases added). 11 well as the post-1996 catch-all provision. See Plaintiffs[’] Third Amended Class Action Complaint in Civil Action at 18–19, Yocca, No. GD 01-016041 (accusing the Steelers of, inter alia, “[e]ngaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding”). Drawing no distinctions among these substantive subsections of the Consumer Protection Law, see 854 A.2d at 438–39, the Supreme Court held that the purchasers of season tickets failed to state a claim under the statute because they could not show justifiable reliance, id. Reaffirming its holding in Weinberg, the Court stated that “[t]o bring a private cause of action under the [Consumer Protection Law], a plaintiff must show that he justifiably relied on the defendant’s wrongful conduct or representation and that he suffered harm as a result of that reliance.” Id. at 438 (citing Weinberg, 777 A.2d at 446). The purchasers could not make such a showing because even if they relied on the misleading brochure in purchasing the season tickets, that reliance would not have been justifiable: they signed a purchase agreement after reading the brochure, and that agreement explicitly stated that its terms superseded all of the parties’ previous representations and agreements. Id. at 439. Thus the ticket holders had “explicitly disclaimed reliance” on anything said in the brochure. Id. In Toy, 928 A.2d 186, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated the Consumer Protection Law’s private-plaintiff standing requirement of justifiable reliance. There, a lifeinsurance policyholder sued the insurance company under 73 Pa. 12 Cons. Stat. § 201-2(4)(ii),9 (v),10 (vii)11 and (xvii) (the catch-all provision) 12 of the Consumer Protection Law for allegedly misrepresenting its life insurance policy as a retirement plan. Id. at 189–90. Once again interpreting the private-action standing provision in 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2, the Court stated that under Weinberg “a plaintiff alleging violations of the Consumer Protection Law must prove justifiable reliance.” Id. at 202 (citing Yocca, 854 A.2d 425); see also id. at 208 (“In summary, this Court concludes that . . . [our] decision in Weinberg stands for the proposition that . . . a plaintiff alleging violations of the Consumer Protection Law must prove the common law fraud 9 This subsection prohibits “[c]ausing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services.” 10 It prohibits, among other things, “[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have.” 11 This proscribes “[r]epresenting that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another.” 12 Even though the case was decided after Yocca, the policyholder in Toy sued under the catch-all provision as it stood prior to 1996 (the year in which the words “or deceptive” were added to the provision). Toy, 929 A.2d at 188 n.1, 190 n.4. Thus, the catch-all provision at issue in Toy merely prohibited “any other fraudulent conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.” Id. at 190 n.4 (emphasis added). 13 element of justifiable reliance . . . .” (citation omitted; emphasis added)). The Supreme Court mentioned its justifiable-reliance requirement most recently in Schwartz v. Rockey, 932 A.2d 885, 897 & n.16 (Pa. 2007). In the course of deciding whether to import common-law punitive damage principles into the Consumer Protection Law’s treble damages provision, it noted that the “justifiable reliance criterion [of the Consumer Protection Law] derives from the causation requirement which is express on the face of section 9.2.” Id. at 897 n.16. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has followed suit. In Debbs, 810 A.2d at 156–58 (citing Weinberg, 777 A.2d at 446), the Court held that reliance (which, under Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, must be justifiable) was required under, inter alia, the post-1996 catch-all subsection (xxi) of § 201-2(4). Sexton v. PNC Bank, 792 A.2d at 607–08 (citing Weinberg, 777 A.2d at 446), held similarly.