Opinion ID: 844147
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absence of substantial delay

Text: The first step in assessing whether a claim has been filed without substantial delay is determining whether the claim is presumptively timely. For capital cases, our rules establish a safe harbor for litigants to show their petition has been filed without substantial delay. ―A petition for a writ of habeas corpus 28 [in a capital case] will be presumed to be filed without substantial delay if it is filed within 180 days after the final due date for the filing of appellant‘s reply brief on the direct appeal or within 36 months after appointment of habeas corpus counsel, whichever is later.‖ (Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 1-1.1.) Petitioner filed the present petition in 2004, nine and one-half years after the 1994 due date for the reply brief in the automatic appeal. He thus cannot qualify under the 180-day rule. Moreover, although present counsel was appointed in September 2002 and the petition was filed in May 2004, petitioner is not entitled to rely on the 36-month safe harbor, as the rule (Supreme Ct. Policies, policy 3, std. 1-1.1), read in context, applies only to a petitioner‘s first state habeas corpus petition.16 But even were we to assume the rule is ambiguous in this regard, it has been the rule since 1993, when we decided In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 750, that changes in counsel do not reset the clock for timeliness purposes. (Id. at p. 779.) We conclude the petition before us today obviously is not presumptively timely under our rules. Aside from his ineligibility for the safe harbor provision in policy 3, standard 1-1.1 of the Supreme Court Policies, petitioner argues his claims were filed without substantial delay. ―Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim. A 16 Occasionally this court must, for reasons of ill health, conflict, or other factors, vacate the appointment of habeas corpus counsel and appoint a new attorney to investigate, prepare, and file an inmate‘s first habeas corpus petition. In such cases, our order of appointment will specifically note how long new counsel will have to file the petition and still be entitled to a finding of presumptive timeliness. The appointment of counsel in the present case included no such notation. 29 petitioner must allege, with specificity, facts showing when information offered in support of the claim was obtained, and that the information neither was known, nor reasonably should have been known, at any earlier time. It is not sufficient simply to allege in general terms that the claim recently was discovered, to assert that second or successive postconviction counsel could not reasonably have discovered the information earlier, or to produce a declaration from present or former counsel to that general effect. A petitioner bears the burden of establishing, through his or her specific allegations, which may be supported by any relevant exhibits, the absence of substantial delay.‖ (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780.) Specific allegations should be succinct and to the point; there is no need for them to be lengthy. As discussed in more detail, post, the majority of petitioner‘s claims face procedural bars for which petitioner offers patently meritless explanations. (Our discussion speaks of the ―inadequacy‖ of the allegations, meaning that what petitioner has provided frequently is so patently lacking in weight and merit under our standards that they offer no plausible basis for granting relief.) The claims are based either on the appellate record (and thus the factual basis of the claim was known at the time of his retrial in 1987) or on information known at the time he filed his first habeas corpus petition in 1995.17 The petition alleges that present 17 All of petitioner‘s claims are untimely, with these 16 exceptions: Claim Nos. 123, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138 and 139 (challenges to the constitutionality of the California death penalty law will not be denied as untimely (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 765, fn. 4)); Claim Nos. 125 and 127 (challenges to the efficacy of this court‘s review will not be denied as untimely because they could not have been raised until after this court has ruled on the appeal and first habeas corpus petition); Claim No. 131 (challenge to lethal injection is premature and thus not untimely (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 485)); (footnote continued on next page) 30 counsel did not learn the bases of these claims until they were appointed to represent petitioner by the federal district court in 2001, and that the claims were ―presented as quickly as possible after the legal and factual bases for them became known‖ to counsel. He also alleges that in light of the multiple changes in attorneys over the years,18 he has ―acted as diligently as possible,‖ and that the petition was filed ―as soon as he gathered sufficient legal and factual bases for a prima facie case for each of the potentially meritorious claims.‖ These stock justifications fail to undermine our conclusion the petition is substantially, and fatally, untimely. We reiterate that a petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating timeliness (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 780, 787), and ―[t]he burden . . . is not met by an assertion of counsel that he or she did not represent the petitioner earlier‖ (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 765). ―Were the rule otherwise, the (footnote continued from previous page) Claim No. 132 (claim that prolonged preexecution confinement is cruel and unusual is premature and thus not untimely); Claim No. 143 (claim that cumulative effect of all errors requires relief is not untimely because it incorporates some timely claims). 18 For his first habeas corpus petition in state court, which we denied in 1995, petitioner was represented by Attorneys Thomas Nolan and Andrew Parnes. In 1996, the federal district court appointed Attorney Stanley Greenberg to represent petitioner. A year later, the same court appointed Nicholas Arguimbau as cocounsel. Later in 1997, the federal court granted Greenberg leave to withdraw and appointed Attorney Michael Abzug to replace him. Abzug and Arguimbau filed petitioner‘s federal petition in 1998. Abzug withdrew in 2001, and the federal court appointed current counsel Peter Giannini to replace him. Later in 2001, Arguimbau withdrew and the court appointed Attorneys James Thomson and Saor Stetler as cocounsel. In 2002, this court allowed Attorney Nolan to withdraw and we appointed Giannini, Thomson, and Stetler to represent petitioner in this court. In 2011, we vacated the appointment of Stetler as associate counsel. Petitioner is currently represented by Attorneys James Thomson and Peter Giannini. 31 potential for abuse of the writ would be magnified as counsel withdraw or are substituted and each successor attorney claims that a petition was filed as soon as the successor attorney became aware of the new basis for seeking relief.‖ (Id. at pp. 765-766, fn. 6.) We therefore conclude that with the exception of those claims listed in footnote 17, ante, the claims contained in the petition were all filed after a substantial delay.