Opinion ID: 1934652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claimed improper focus on Prost's interaction with Greene and failure to credit expert testimony.

Text: Prost argues that the trial judge failed adequately to consider the interaction and interrelationship of the [children] with [their] parent or parents, D.C.Code § 16-914(a)(3), but instead focused inordinately on the negative aspects of Prost's relationship with Greene. We reject this argument, which itself focuses unduly on the absence of findings or evidence that Prost ever displayed any untoward behavior in her relationship with Matthew and Jeffrey. Prost's argument is not so much that the judge failed to consider, and indeed make findings as to, each parent's relationship with the children as it is that she highlighted Prost's hostile relationship with Greene, particularly during the last year they lived in the marital home, without evidence that this affected the health and well-being of the children. As the trial judge recognized, however, the interaction of parents with each other can relate directly to the children's best interests, especially as concerns a factor that was paramount for the judge: which parent would predictably cooperate most in according the other a regular and substantial role in the children's lives. The judge found it to be overwhelmingly in the children's best interests that they spend substantial time with both their parents.... It is basic law that, where custody must be given to one parent rather than the other, [t]he court does not abuse its discretion by [nonetheless] determining that the best interest of the child requires developing the best possible relationship with both parents. 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 621(b) (1986) (footnote omitted). Conduct [by the custodial parent] which interferes with the fulfillment of children's need for the guidance and love of [the non-custodial parent] may have a serious effect on the welfare of the children. Kahn v. Kahn, 252 A.2d 901, 903 (D.C.1969). Indeed, some jurisdictions by statute require a court, in determining custody, to consider a parent's willingness and ability to promote a positive relationship between the children and the other parent. See Katheryn Katz, Custody Disputes Between Parents, in 2 CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE, 10-1, § 10.06[2], at 10-115 & n. 44 (John P. McCahey et al. eds. 1994) (citing statutes). The trial judge's discussion of the relationship of Prost and Greene related directly to this issue. The judge cited behavior by Prost toward Greene both before and after the parties' separation [14] causing her to fear that Prost would limit the children's contact with Greene regardless of any court order. [15] We cannot say, as a matter of law, that this concern was outweighed by Prost's evidence (through Dr. Noshpitz) that the mother and children inter se revealed a tender sense of unity. Moreover, beyond the judge's concern about future visitation, there is support in the record for her finding that Prost is much more emotionally volatile and unstable than [Greene], [16] a finding undeniably relevant to the children's best interests. D.C.Code § 16-914(a)(5) (the mental... health of all individuals involved). We qualify this conclusion, however, by reference to our discussion in part III.D., infra. The judge was also within her authority in rejecting Dr. Noshpitz's recommendation that Prost be awarded sole custody. Dr. Noshpitz, who initially had been retained by both parties to evaluate the family relationship, testified that while Greene is a more talented child handler than Prost, Prost would be better able than Greene to give the children a kind of stability, a kind of predictability, a kind of regularity, a structure, a sort of evenness of living.... Dr. Noshpitz's methodology and conclusion, however, were criticized by another psychiatrist, Dr. Miller, who noted particularly his failure to interview the children at greater length. [17] Partly on this basis, the trial judge found that Dr. Noshpitz had paid inadequate attention to the children's current psychological status and relationship to each parent. Moreover, the judge reasoned: [A]s important as are structure and order, they are not the be-all and end-all. At least as important ... are the lessons that children learn from the intensive presence, participation and involvement of a parent in their lives, from the frequent and sincere demonstrations of a parent's love and concern for them, from a parent's efforts to help them solve their problems, and from their observation that a parent enjoys being with them and, indeed, has fun with them. On the basis of her familiarity with the entire record, including Dr. Noshpitz's report and testimony, the judge found that [o]n all of these fronts, the evidence is clear, defendant has it way over plaintiff. The trial court may not arbitrarily disregard[], disbelieve[] or reject[] an expert's uncontradicted testimony. Rock Creek Plaza-Woodner Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, 466 A.2d 857, 859 (D.C.1983) (quoting Medical Service of the District of Columbia v. Llewellyn, 208 A.2d 734, 736 (D.C.1965)). Nevertheless, once there is some basis in the record for the judge's refusal to accept an expert's conclusion, we will not pit our judgment against that of the finder of fact who saw and heard the witness testify. Richbow v. District of Columbia, 600 A.2d 1063, 1066-67 (D.C.1991). The judge's refusal in the circumstances to be bound by Dr. Noshpitz's recommendation was not an abuse of discretion.