Opinion ID: 4552833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Venue Claim

Text: On appeal Hagar contends that the Northern District of Ohio was an improper venue and that the district court “did not have jurisdiction to impose a criminal judgment against him” -10- No. 19-3591, United States v. Hagar because he did not send the emails to Ohio and did not know that they would be forwarded by individuals or automatically re-routed to the Eaton headquarters in Beachwood, Ohio, or the Goodyear Headquarters in Akron, Ohio. Hagar asserts that he should have been prosecuted in Oregon. Hagar has a right to be tried in the state and district where he committed his crimes. See U.S. Const, art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const, amend. VI; Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. But criminal offenses “begun in one district and completed in another,” may be “inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a); see also United States v. Brika, 416 F.3d 514, 527 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying a “substantial contacts” venue test). Defects in venue generally must be asserted before trial. United States v. Grenoble, 413 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2005). A court may not consider an untimely venue claim unless a defendant shows “good cause” for his untimeliness. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3). However, if a venue defect is not apparent on the face of the indictment, a defendant may bring that challenge in a motion for acquittal at the close of the government’s case. See United States v. Ramer, 883 F.3d 659, 682 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 2019). If the venue challenge is properly preserved in the Rule 29 motion, we review the trial court’s denial of that motion “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Grenoble, 413 F.3d at 572. Hagar did not bring a pre-trial change of venue motion, and he did not try to show “good cause” for that failure. He merely mentioned venue in his second speedy trial motion. He has therefore failed to preserve any facial challenge to venue. Grenoble, 413 F.3d at 573; Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(i) and 12(c)(3). -11- No. 19-3591, United States v. Hagar In his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, Hagar argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction over this case because the emails and correspondence occurred outside of the Northern District of Ohio and suggested that the case could only be tried in Oregon. He did not argue for a judgment of acquittal on venue grounds. The two concepts are distinct. See, e.g., United States v. Obak, 884 F.3d 934, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2018). He therefore forfeited the venue argument. See United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1356–57 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that when a defendant raises specific arguments in a Rule 29 motion, he forfeits arguments not made). And, even if he had not forfeited his venue claim,4 it would fail because one of the victims, C.B., worked in Beachwood, Ohio at Eaton’s headquarters. Hagar sent threatening emails to C.B.’s Eaton email address. She received and reviewed them at her office in Beachwood, Ohio.5 Thus, venue was proper because the emails were sent from Oregon to C.B. in the Northern District of Ohio. See United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 483 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (holding that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Tennessee, where victims received threatening YouTube video via the internet sent from the Western District of Tennessee); see also United States v. Singer, 782 F.3d 270, 278 (6th Cir. 2015), abrogated on other grounds by Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709 (2016) (holding that in a mail fraud case venue is proper where the mail was sent or received). Further, our “substantial contacts” test is also satisfied. See Brika, 416 F.3d at 527. “That test takes into account a number of factors—the site of the defendant’s act, the elements and nature of the crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district for accurate fact finding.” Id. (cleaned up). Eaton and Goodyear are both headquartered in the 4 The government acknowledges that it is possible to view Hagar’s “jurisdictional” challenge as raising venue. 5 Additionally, Count 1 of the superseding indictment referenced those messages because R.G., the cyberstalking victim, was related to C.G. -12- No. 19-3591, United States v. Hagar Northern District of Ohio and dealt with the effect of Hagar’s actions from their respective Ohio headquarters. Thus, the “locus of the effect” of Hagar’s conduct was felt in both Oregon and the Northern District of Ohio. See id. Several of the witnesses and much of the evidence was also located in Ohio. That Hagar did not know his messages were “re-routed” or forwarded to the Northern District of Ohio is irrelevant. See United States v. Houston, 683 F. App’x 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2017) (observing, in a case involving interstate threats, that the “route” the defendant’s threats took after he pronounced them were relevant to determining where “he would be subject to prosecution,” regardless of the defendant’s knowledge that the communications would be routed across state lines). That C.B. did not see all of the messages because Eaton’s security office shielded her from them also does not matter. Cf. Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 483 (holding that the interstate threats statute “prohibits a communication containing any threat regardless of whether the threat reaches the target”) (cleaned up). In short, the government’s evidence easily satisfied the preponderance of evidence standard that venue was proper in the Northern District of Ohio. See Grenoble, 413 F.3d at 572 (a district court’s decision to deny a properly preserved venue motion is reviewed de novo, and the government must show by a preponderance of evidence that venue was proper).