Opinion ID: 844217
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Individual Sequestered Death Qualification Voir Dire

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his request that the court conduct individualized, sequestered voir dire of the jurors regarding their views on the death penalty, in accordance with Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1 [168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301]. Hovey was abrogated by the adoption of Code of Civil Procedure section 223, which provides that [v]oir dire ... shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases. Defendant urges us to reconsider our conclusions that Hovey was abrogated by statute and that individualized, sequestered voir dire is not constitutionally required conclusions we have reaffirmed many timesbut he provides no compelling reason for us to do so. (See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 494 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947]; People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 537-538 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182] ( Stitely ); People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1180 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130]; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46].) (2) Defendant alternatively contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for sequestered voir dire. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 223, the trial court retains the discretion to conduct sequestered voir dire if it concludes that collective voir dire would not be practicable. (See Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 91].) At trial, both defense counsel and the prosecutor requested sequestered voir dire, because both believed that if jurors were questioned individually they were more likely to be candid and less likely to be influenced by responses they heard from other jurors. Neither party, however, cited any particular circumstances of the present case that would justify conducting individual voir dire. Each juror filled out an extensive questionnaire, and was instructed to mark any question addressing sensitive or confidential matters to which he or she wished to respond in private. After the court questioned the jurors who were seated in the jury box, the attorneys were given the opportunity to inquire further. Under similar circumstances, we have held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying individual sequestered voir dire. (See People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1050-1051 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675, 175 P.3d 632].) [2]