Opinion ID: 6109968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alleged Constitutional Challenges

Text: Lastly, we will briefly address the intervenor's constitutional challenges. First, the intervenor argues that the cumulative effect of the canvasser registration requirements violates its rights under the First Amendment and the Arkansas Constitution. Both of these challenges were addressed in McDaniel v. Spencer , 2015 Ark. 94 , 457 S.W.3d at 641. There, the appellant argued that section 7-9-601 impermissibly limited its rights under article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution. However, we specifically stated: The State clearly has an interest in ensuring that sponsors are aware of the identity of people who are being paid to solicit signatures from citizens as well as how to locate them should problems arise and to have assurance that the persons so employed are aware of the applicable laws and do not have a criminal history that calls into question their ability to interact with the public in a manner consistent with those laws. These requirements aid in the proper use of the rights granted to the people of this state. Combined with the minimal burden placed on paid canvassers and sponsors, the requirements of section 21 do not act as an unwarranted restriction on the rights of the people under article 5, § 1. Spencer , 2015 Ark. 94 , at 6, 457 S.W.3d at 648. Likewise, we rejected the argument that section 7-9-601 violated the appellee's right to free speech. Spencer , 2015 Ark. 94 , at 8, 457 S.W.3d at 650.  Intervenor points out that since our decision in Spencer , the General Assembly has amended the statute twice to include additional requirements--namely, that a sponsor must retain its records for three years and to submit a final list of current residential addresses of each canvasser as well as a signature card. The record-keeping provision of section 7-9-601(e) is not implicated in this case. Additionally, the final canvasser list and signature cards are not a basis for our decision in this case. We therefore do not address intervenor's assertion that these two additional requirements render the statute unconstitutional. Second, the intervenor argues that the term current residence address as used in section 7-9-601 is unconstitutionally vague. However, once again, we specifically addressed this issue in Spencer and concluded that when the term current residence address is juxtaposed with permanent domicile address, it is sufficiently clear to put canvassers and sponsors on notice as to what information is required. Spencer , 2015 Ark. 94 , at 6, 457 S.W.3d at 649. We decline to readdress our decision here. Lastly, the intervenor argues that the procedures in this case were fundamentally unfair and violated its due-process rights because it had only eleven days to defend the certification and the scope of review was too broad. Due process requires that, at a minimum, a person be given notice and a reasonable opportunity for a hearing before he or she is deprived of property by state action. Owings v. Econ. & Med. Servs., a Div. of Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. , 302 Ark. 475 , 478, 790 S.W.2d 438 , 439 (1990). Here, there is no dispute that the intervenor obtained a hearing in front of the special master to address the contested issues. To the extent that the intervenor argues that the eleven-day window to challenge the petition was inadequate, it has not cited any specific authority stating that the time it was provided was insufficient. See Roberts v. State , 324 Ark. 68 , 71, 919 S.W.2d 192 , 194 (1996) (We do not consider an argument, even a constitutional one, when the appellant presents no citation to authority or convincing argument in its support and it is not apparent without further research that the argument is well taken.). Finally, the intervenor argues that this court should adopt a new standard of review in our review under article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution. However, the intervenor has not presented sufficient evidence that we should overturn our prior holdings, much less that the standard we employ is unconstitutional. See Thiel v. Priest , 342 Ark. 292 , 300, 28 S.W.3d 296 , 300 (2000) (We will uphold our previous decision unless a great injury or injustice will result.).