Opinion ID: 536574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence of Events Occurring in 1984 and Early 1985

Text: 17 Prior to trial, James Westbrook's counsel made a motion to suppress evidence of all transactions that took place in Texas. The court declined to rule on this motion before trial, and stated that it would rule on objections made at the time the challenged evidence was offered. At trial, several witnesses testified about drug transactions that took place in Texas between James Westbrook and other individuals. James's counsel did not object to any of this evidence as being outside the scope of the crimes with which he was charged. Two government witnesses testified that these transactions occurred before any plan or conspiracy had begun. Over James's objection, testimony was also admitted that James had brought a handgun with him to a spring, 1985 drug transaction at LeWayne Matthies' trailer home. 18 James alleges that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of events that occurred in Texas in late 1984 and early 1985, before the first cook in South Dakota. James contends that this evidence was not relevant to prove the existence of the conspiracy or his participation in it because, as the government's own witnesses testified, these events occurred before the formation of any conspiracy. He argues instead that the Texas transactions are other bad acts whose admissibility is governed by Fed.R.Ev. 404(b), but that the jury was not given any limiting instructions to this effect. 19 The court first notes that no objection was raised at trial regarding admission of evidence of the Texas transactions. In this circumstance, James Westbrook cannot now claim that admission of this evidence was reversible error. United States v. Wagoner, 713 F.2d 1371, 1376 (8th Cir.1983); United States v. Price, 464 F.2d 1217, 1218-19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1040, 93 S.Ct. 522, 34 L.Ed.2d 489 (1972). This court can therefore only consider whether admission of evidence of the Texas transactions was so prejudicial as to amount to plain error. United States v. Wagoner, 713 F.2d at 1376. 20 Evidence of other bad acts or crimes is not admissible to prove character, but may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Fed.R.Ev. 404(b). If such evidence is allowed, the trial court must specify under which clause of Rule 404(b) it is being admitted, and should instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which it may be considered. United States v. Harvey, 845 F.2d 760, 762 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir.1988). However, evidence which is probative of a crime with which a defendant is charged, and not solely of some other uncharged crimes, is not evidence of other bad acts. United States v. Cerone, 830 F.2d 938, 948 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied 486 U.S. 1006, 108 S.Ct. 1730, 100 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988); United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 913 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Caspers, 736 F.2d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir.1984). 21 Count IV of the indictment charged James Westbrook with possessing and distributing amphetamine in or about Spring 1985. Testimony that James sold amphetamine in the spring of 1985 is highly relevant to whether he committed this offense and is not introduced as evidence of other bad acts. Even though the jury ultimately acquitted James of this count, the government still had the right to introduce evidence of his conduct in an attempt to prove that he was guilty of this charge. United States v. Caspers, 736 F.2d at 1249. 22 Counts I and II of the indictment charged James with conspiracy to possess, distribute, and manufacture amphetamine [c]ommencing in the Fall of 1984 and continuing through the date of this indictment, in the State and District of South Dakota. The existence of a conspiracy is a legal issue that the government had the burden of establishing to the jury. Opinion testimony that the conspiracy did not begin until late 1985 did not foreclose the government from introducing evidence that the conspiracy in fact began at the time that James began to associate with the South Dakota group. Evidence showed that James became acquainted with the South Dakota residents beginning in late 1984 and on several occasions sold them amphetamine, which in turn was distributed in South Dakota. These transactions very closely preceded trips made by James, Shelia and Ray Tyler to South Dakota, where the Texans met the same group of South Dakota residents and proceeded to manufacture and distribute their own amphetamine. Therefore, evidence of the Texas transactions is also relevant to prove the conspiracy charges against James Westbrook, and the trial court did not err in admitting it. 23 James contends that, even if evidence of events occurring prior to late 1985 is admissible, evidence of his possession of the handgun is irrelevant to the charges against him and that its admission was reversible error. The trial court has the discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and will not be reversed absent a clear showing that it has abused its discretion. United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897; United States v. Caspers, 736 F.2d at 1248. This court has previously recognized that weapons are a tool of the trade for narcotics dealers. United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir.1986); Lyons v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 737, 739 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Simon, 767 F.2d 524, 527 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1013, 106 S.Ct. 545, 88 L.Ed.2d 474 (1985). Evidence relating to weapons is admissible to prove narcotics violations. United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157. The fact that James Westbrook brought a gun with him to one drug transaction is relevant to show his involvement in drug activities, and was properly admitted to prove the charges against him. 24