Opinion ID: 613553
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Basic Younger Principles

Text: Although Younger itself held that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a federal court may not interfere with a pending state criminal prosecution, 401 U.S. at 54, 91 S.Ct. 746, the Supreme Court has extended Younger abstention to the civil context on numerous occasions. In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982), the Supreme Court laid out a three-part test for determining when to apply Younger to a civil proceeding, holding that abstention is required so long as the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing; (2) implicate important state interests; and (3) provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515. To these three threshold requirements, we recently articulated an implied fourth requirement that (4) the federal court action would `enjoin the proceeding, or have the practical effect of doing so.' AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 978). The case now before us is an unprecedented candidate for Younger abstention and provides us a much-needed opportunity to clarify the scope of what constitutes an important state interest. Though recognizing important state interests in a wide variety of civil proceedings, neither we nor the Supreme Court has held Younger to apply generally to ordinary civil litigation. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (extending Younger to noncriminal judicial proceedings only when important state interests are involved); Miofsky v. Superior Court of the State of Cal., 703 F.2d 332, 338 & n. 9 (9th Cir.1983) (declining to extend Younger to encompass conventional civil litigation). To the contrary, abstention remains an extraordinary and narrow exception to the general rule that federal courts `have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.' New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) ( NOPSI ) (quoting Cohens v. Va., 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)); see Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959); Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 969 n. 2. Consequently, each time we are asked to extend Younger to a new type of state civil proceeding, we must determine whether federal adjudication would offend the doctrine's animating principles, foremost of which is the notion of `comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways . . . . [T]he concept [represents] a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746 (emphases added); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). The key to determining whether comity concerns are implicated in an ongoing state proceedingand thus whether the second Younger requirement is met is to ask whether federal court adjudication would interfere with the state's ability to carry out its basic executive, judicial, or legislative functions. Unless interests vital to the operation of state government are at stake, federal district courts must fulfill their unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them. Miofsky, 703 F.2d at 337, 338 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Polykoff, IAS, Inc. v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987).