Opinion ID: 2622141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of Lying-in-wait Special Circumstance

Text: Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of an adequate period of watching and waiting to support the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding for Raymond August's murder. [9] We conclude the evidence was sufficient. A sufficiency of evidence challenge to a special circumstance finding is reviewed under the same test applied to a conviction. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 790, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Reviewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the record must contain reasonable and credible evidence of solid value, such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) The prosecution relied solely on a theory of premeditation for the underlying murder of August. The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, and he does not challenge that conclusion. Evidence of lying in wait was provided primarily by Rodney Stokes, at whom defendant shot just before murdering August. (See ante, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 202-203, 158 P.3d at 768-769.) At the time of the capital crimes, the elements of the lying-in-wait special circumstance required an intentional killing, committed under circumstances that included a physical concealment or concealment of purpose; a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act; and, immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage. [10] (Section 190.2, former subd. (a)(15); People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 554-555, 557, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244 and waiting element is to distinguish those ( Morales ).) The purpose of the watching cases in which a defendant acts insidiously from those in which he acts out of rash impulse. (See People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 24, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591 ( Moon ).) This period need not continue for any particular length `of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.' [11] ( Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 433-434, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992.) `The element of concealment is satisfied by a showing that a defendant's true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions or conduct. It is not required that he be literally concealed from view before he attacks the victim.' ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 500, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754 ( Hillhouse ).) The factors of concealing murderous intent, and striking from a position of advantage and surprise, are the hallmark of a murder by lying in wait. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 164, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) Defendant here was convicted of August's premeditated murder. In order to convict him of first degree murder, the jury was instructed it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's intentional killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated. The facts of this case and the jury's conclusion that defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation dispel any inference that he killed as a result of rash impulse. Even a short period of watching and waiting can negate such an inference. ( Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 24, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591.) The facts here are more than sufficient to establish that after the assault on Stokes, defendant turned his attention to a new target. He selected August, the driver of the only other nearby car on the road ahead of him, as his next victim. He approached and concealed his deadly purpose by pulling up alongside of August and induced him to slow down. August did so, just as Stokes had. This process may not have taken an extended period, because defendant did not have to wait long until his next target became available. But there is no indication of rash impulse. To the contrary, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant acted to implement his plan of luring a victim of opportunity into a vulnerable position by creating or exploiting a false sense of security. The jury could also reasonably conclude that August was taken by surprise. He did not flee, but slowed down and drove side-by-side with defendant, just as Stokes had done. Once the intended victim slowed down, the time to act became opportune. Defendant stopped watching and started shooting. Such behavior is completely consistent with, and provides substantial evidence for, the watching and waiting element of the lying-in-wait special circumstance.