Opinion ID: 743510
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count 4--Carrying a Firearm During a Crime of Violence

Text: 27 Federal law makes it a crime to carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis added). It is well settled that to prove a violation of § 924(c)(1), the Government must prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant ... 'carrie[d] a firearm.' Second, it must prove that the ... carrying was 'during and in relation to' a 'crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.'  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2053, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993). We deal here with the meaning of in relation to. 28 In Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138, the Supreme Court broadly sketched the meaning of in relation to in § 924(c)(1). Recognizing that the phrase is expansive, the Court nonetheless distinguished between a firearm that has some purpose or effect with respect to the crime of violence--in which case § 924(c)(1) liability would be triggered--and those situations in which the presence of a firearm is the result of accident or coincidence--in which case § 924(c)(1) liability would not be triggered. Id. at 237-38, 113 S.Ct. at 2058-59. The Smith Court found that the firearm must facilitate or have the potential of facilitating a crime of violence before § 924(c)(1) liability attaches. Id. at 238, 113 S.Ct. at 2059 (internal quotations omitted). 29 Of course, the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), which defined use, does not affect Smith or alter our understanding of in relation to in § 924(c)(1). Accordingly, we recently applied the Smith Court's definition of in relation to in United States v. Tolliver, 116 F.3d 120 (5th Cir.1997) (on remand from the Supreme Court), where we found evidence sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the defendant used a pistol in relation to a drug conspiracy. There, the evidence showed that at the time the defendant possessed the pistol (which was in his apartment), he was surrounded by drug records, a cache of assault weapons, and was in the presence of a co-conspirator. Id. at 126. Under these facts, we concluded that the defendant's use of the firearm was not accidental and that it was or could have been used to facilitate the drug conspiracy. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied sub nom., Castillo v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1466, 137 L.Ed.2d 681 (1997), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1467, 137 L.Ed.2d 681 (1997), we held that the in relation to prong of § 924(c)(1) was satisfied because the defendants' use of firearms was not accidental; it was part and parcel of the conspiracy to murder federal agents. Id. at 736. 30 Here, the Government in Count 4 charged Polk with knowingly carrying a pump shotgun in relation to the crimes of violence alleged in Counts 1-3. Proof on this count consisted of the presence of a shotgun in Polk's front seat during a meeting with Grier. At that meeting (which was tape recorded and played for the jury), Polk and Grier discussed the acquisition of plastic explosives and weaponry to be used to blow up IRS buildings across the country. However, because Counts 2 and 3 specify the Austin IRS building (and not IRS buildings around the country), the evidence at the Grier-Polk meeting provides evidentiary support only for the offense charged in Count 1. Indeed, there is no evidence suggesting that Polk discussed blowing up the Austin building at the meeting with Grier. Thus, the conviction on Count 4 sticks only if Polk carried the shotgun in relation to the crime of attempt charged in Count 1. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Polk carried the shotgun in relation to the crime of attempt. 31 Polk could not have carried a firearm in relation to the crime charged in Count 1 (attempt) because the Count 1 offense was not completed until after the date the Government claims Polk violated § 924(c)(1). Count 4 of the indictment charged Polk with carrying a pump shotgun during and relation to a crime of violence on or about April 6, 1995. However, consistent with the position taken by the Government, we have concluded that the evidence sufficient to support Polk's conviction for attempt consisted of actions and events which took place well after April 6, 1995. As such, a reasonable jury could not have concluded that Polk carried the shotgun in relation to the crime of attempt because (1) that crime was not completed until after April 6, 1995, and (2) the Government failed to produce any evidence that Polk carried the shotgun at each step of the Count 1 offense. 32