Opinion ID: 165952
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of the right to appeal

Text: The government argues that Mr. Allen made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal in his negotiated plea agreement. The plea agreement provided: [D]efendant in exchange for the promises and concessions made . . . knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to: a. appeal or collaterally challenge his guilty plea and any other aspect of his conviction . . . . b. Appeal, collaterally challenge, or move to modify . . . his sentence as imposed by the Court and the manner in -4- which the sentence is determined, provided the sentence is within or below the applicable guideline range determined by the Court. . . . Rec. vol. I, doc. 23, at 5-6. However, Mr. Allen specifically [did] not waive the right to appeal an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines range determined by the Court to apply to this case and . . . his waiver of rights to appeal and to bring collateral challenges shall not apply to appeals or challenges based on changes in the law reflected in Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court cases decided after the date of this agreement that are held by the Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court to have retroactive effect. Id. (emphases added). During his change-of-plea hearing, the district court inquired as to whether Mr. Allen understood that he was giving up his right to appeal, except under limited circumstances. Mr. Allen acknowledged his understanding of the waiver. We strictly construe the scope of appellate waivers, and “any ambiguities in these agreements are read against the Government and in favor of a defendant’s appellate rights.” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Under Hahn, we consider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325 (citation omitted). -5- We have held that a defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is not otherwise unlawful based on the subsequent issuance of Booker. See United States v. Porter, No. 04-4009, 2005 WL 1023395, at  (10th Cir. May 3, 2005) forthcoming 2005) (“[W]e find the change Booker rendered in the sentencing landscape does not compel us to hold [the defendant]’s plea agreement unlawful. . . . To allow defendants or the government to routinely invalidate plea agreements based on subsequent changes in the law would decrease the prospects of reaching an agreement in the first place, an undesirable outcome given the importance of plea bargaining to the criminal justice system.”). However, in contrast to Mr. Allen’s plea agreement, the plea agreement in Porter did not contain the exception for appeals based upon subsequent changes in the law. The government contends that Mr. Allen’s plea bargain forecloses this appeal. It asserts that the Booker court never indicated that its holdings should have retroactive effect, but rather that the holdings applied only to cases on direct review. Mr. Allen asserts that because the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker applies retroactively to cases on direct review, he has not waived his right to appeal. The government’s argument is disingenuous. The Supreme Court in Booker specifically followed its earlier holding in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), when it held it “must apply” its holding “to all cases on direct review.” -6- Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769 (citing Griffith for the proposition that “[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, . . . not yet final” when the rule is announced) (emphasis supplied); see Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323 (“[W]e fulfill our judicial responsibility by instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet final.”). We therefore conclude that Mr. Allen may challenge his sentence under Booker.