Opinion ID: 4260664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Admissibility of Photographs. Trotter first asserts that the district court erred in not admitting exhibits 292 and 293, which were photographs of Hines. The district court refused to admit these photographs, contending that “the small amount of relevance is overweighed by [evidence rule] 403 on this.” Neb. Evid. R. 402, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 2016), provides that “relevant evidence is admissible [and] [e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 2016), qualifies that admissibility: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Exhibit 292 is a photograph taken on December 29, 2014, of Hines wearing a gray button-up hooded sweatshirt and holding a black and silver handgun. Exhibit 293 is a photograph taken on December 31 of Hines and another individual. In this latter photograph, Hines is apparently wearing the same gray hooded sweatshirt, now unbuttoned, and is pointing a gun at the camera. The other individual in the photograph is displaying a gang sign. Both photographs are out of focus. Trotter argues that these photographs are relevant, because in them, Hines is wearing a sweatshirt similar to the one which witnesses describe the shooter as wearing and is carrying a gun similar to the one described by those witnesses. There is no merit to Trotter’s assertions. 2 State v. Jones, 297 Neb. 557, 900 N.W.2d 757 (2017). 3 Id. - 397 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports STATE v. TROTTER Cite as 299 Neb. 392 We first observe that Trotter did not argue at trial that these exhibits were relevant because they showed Hines wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt similar to the one worn by the shooter. Thus, Trotter has not preserved that argument for purposes of this appeal. We note, however, that exhibit 235, which was received, is also a photograph of Hines wearing the same sweatshirt. To the extent exhibits 292 and 293 might have been admissible for that purpose, those exhibits would have been cumulative evidence and, on these facts, any error would have been harmless. Nor was the district court’s failure to admit these exhibits because of the depiction of the handgun reversible error. Assuming without deciding that these photographs were relevant, any relevance is minimal. Trotter argued at trial that the photographs were admissible, because the gun depicted was “similar” to the one described by the witnesses. But as the district court noted, the gun in these exhibits was silver and black, while the only testimony at trial about the color of the weapon used by the shooter was that it was black. Nor was there any evidence presented that this handgun was the caliber of weapon used in the shooting or that the gun was even a real gun. The gun used in the shootings was never recovered by law enforcement. Other evidence at trial showed that a bullet matching the caliber of the bullets used in the shootings was found in a couch near Trotter’s possessions in the home where he was living. The uncontroverted testimony at trial was that the shooter was carrying a black handgun. Exhibit 292 depicts a predominantly silver handgun with some black accents. It is not possible to identify the characteristics of the gun shown in exhibit 293. Given these contradictions, the risk of juror confusion is present. Admitting photographs showing a gun that does not match the description offered by any testifying witnesses could confuse the issues presented at trial and have a tendency to mislead the jury. The members of the jury may place more emphasis on exhibits, including a photograph of any handgun, - 398 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports STATE v. TROTTER Cite as 299 Neb. 392 particularly given that the gun used in these shootings was never recovered and therefore was not offered as evidence at trial. Given this risk, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the exhibits by reasoning that “the small amount of relevance [was] overweighed by [evidence rule] 403 on this.” There is no merit to Trotter’s first assignment of error. Sentences. Trotter also argues that the district court’s sentences of a combined 90 to 140 years’ imprisonment was the functional equivalent of a life sentence, which is a violation of the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Miller v. Alabama.4 This argument is without merit. We recently decided State v. Castaneda.5 At issue in Castaneda was whether the defendant’s combined sentence of 105 to 125 years’ imprisonment was an effective life sentence because it did not provide a “‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release.’”6 We rejected that contention in Castaneda, reasoning in that case: [T]he court held a full evidentiary hearing concerning [the defendant’s] resentencing. Before issuing the sentences, the court discussed the individualized factors it was required to consider and how they impacted its decision. Even assuming, without deciding, that a court was required to find a juvenile “irreparably corrupt” before issuing him or her a life imprisonment without parole sentence, [an argument the defendant made on appeal,] the court here gave [the defendant] no such sentence; instead, it sentenced [him] on the low end of the statutory range for each of his eight convictions. Accordingly, [the 4 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). 5 State v. Castaneda, 295 Neb. 547, 889 N.W.2d 87 (2017). 6 Id. at 559, 889 N.W.2d at 96. - 399 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports STATE v. TROTTER Cite as 299 Neb. 392 defendant] received the protections required by Miller for a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense.7 Trotter was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The district court noted at sentencing that it was “clear . . . that [Trotter’s] type of antisocial behavior [was] significantly attached due to the fact of his age as opposed to being predetermined type of behaviors that the doctor would predict would last through adulthood.” Nevertheless, the district court observed that it became “an unworkable situation,” because a sentence with a reduced upper sentence limit “wouldn’t take into account the fact that there [were] two separate victims.” The court then imposed the minimum sentence for each of the convictions against Trotter and ordered those sentences to run consecutively.8 As we found in Castaneda, Trotter received the protections required by Miller for a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense. We conclude that Trotter’s second assignment of error is without merit.