Opinion ID: 423507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admissibility of coconspirator statements

Text: 16 One of the principal contentions of error concerns the admission of the testimony of out-of-court statements made by members of the conspiracy. The court permitted Rossi, Welkie, and other witnesses to testify about statements made by the other conspirators on the theory that these were coconspirator statements admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 2 17 A coconspirator statement may be admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) if it meets three conditions: (1) there must be independent evidence establishing the existence of the conspiracy and connecting the declarant and defendant to it; (2) the statement must have been made in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) it must have been made during the course of the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir.1981). Because appellants claim these requirements were not met as to at least some statements, we consider each requirement in turn. A. INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY 18 1. Necessity of an in limine hearing. 19 In United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 457 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032, 100 S.Ct. 703, 62 L.Ed.2d 668 (1980), we held that as a prerequisite for the submission of coconspirator statements to the jury, the court must determine that the government has established the existence of the alleged conspiracy and the connection of each defendant with it by a clear preponderance of the evidence independent of the hearsay declarations. 3 This determination is to be made by the court before the coconspirator statements are submitted to the jury. See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct. 2836, 61 L.Ed.2d 283 (1979). 20 Appellants contend that before allowing the introduction of any coconspirator statement the district court should have held a preliminary hearing at which the determination referred to above should have been made. 4 In United States v. James, 590 F.2d at 581-82, on which they rely, the Fifth Circuit expressed its preference for requiring the government to establish the existence of the conspiracy and each defendant's participation in it by independent evidence before admitting any coconspirator declarations. Even that court has clarified that while preferable, this is not a mandatory procedure. See United States v. Montemayor, 703 F.2d 109, 116-17 (5th Cir.1983). 21 Our approach has not been dissimilar, but we have emphasized that the control of the order of proof at trial is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d at 456; See United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 195 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 928, 28 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971); see also United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d at 658 n. 2 (Unlike the Fifth Circuit, this court [the Ninth Circuit] has declined to express a 'preference' for pretrial determination of admissibility of the coconspirator's statements). In Continental Group, the government had been allowed to introduce coconspirator statements without a prior showing of a conspiracy based on independent evidence, subject to the requirement that the government make such a showing by the close of its case. We held that such a procedure, while it should be carefully considered and sparingly utilized, was not an abuse of discretion in a complex conspiracy case involving multiple defendants and a large amount of interrelated testimony. 603 F.2d at 457. 22 In this case, the district court denied appellants' motion for a pre-trial hearing on the admissibility of coconspirator statements on the ground that it would involve a mini-trial, but stated, 23 that at the request of the defendant at any time prior to testimony by a co-conspirator, the court will determine whether there is or is not sufficient threshold evidence of a conspiracy of which defendant was a member or what specifically must still be proved and the government, of course, will be required to submit such further evidence or else suffer the possibility of a mistrial. 24 The court is of the opinion that Rule 104(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not demand more. 25 We cannot say that in the circumstances of this case the district court erred or that its refusal to hold a pre-trial hearing under Fed.R.Evid. 104 was an abuse of discretion. 5 26 2. Adequacy of the Trial Court's Findings. 27 Appellants claim that the court failed to make the determination of a conspiracy in which they participated before submitting the coconspirator statements to the jury. However, in the course of various rulings during the trial, the trial judge stated that he had made such a determination. 6 In addition, at the charging conference the judge stated that he had made the determination that there was threshold evidence of the conspiracy ... rather early in the case, the second or third day. Tr. 4712. In light of the trial judge's statements, we reject appellants' contention that no such determination was made. Moreover, we have held that even in the absence of explicit findings by the trial court, the necessary threshold determination is implicit in the court's decision to send the case to the jury. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 633 F.2d at 665; United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d at 460; see also United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940, 947 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 859, 101 S.Ct. 160, 66 L.Ed.2d 75 (1980); United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 233 n. 4 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074, 96 S.Ct. 858, 47 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976). 28 Appellants claim that the court used the wrong standard of proof in making the required threshold determination. We, along with most other circuits, require that the prosecution must lay a foundation for the admission of coconspirator hearsay by establishing the existence of a conspiracy including the defendant by 'a fair preponderance of independent evidence.'  United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir.1976); see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 633 F.2d at 665. Accord United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1129, 1133-36 (7th Cir.1978); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1977). But see United States v. James, 590 F.2d at 580-81 (substantial evidence standard); United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927, 98 S.Ct. 1494, 55 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (prima facie standard). See generally 1 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 104, at 104-52--104-55. Appellants contend that the district court used the lesser prima facie standard. It would have been error had the district court reduced the burden on the government in this manner. See United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d at 627; United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d at 812. However, we believe the trial court was aware of and applied the correct standard, notwithstanding the references to prima facie case which the court made on two occasions in this long trial. 29 During a side-bar conference early in the trial the judge stated: 30 The Court: I found there was sufficient threshold evidence of a conspiracy. But, nevertheless, that does not permit [sic] other attacks on credibility or showing the conspiracy never existed or anything else. The mere fact I make a determination means a prima facie case. 31 [Stillman's Attorney]: Has the Court made a determination as a prima facie case without having a 104 hearing? 32 The Court: I find there is. 33 Tr. 432g-h (emphasis added). 34 The only other reference to which appellants have directed our attention appears in the charging conference during a discussion as to the difference between the preponderance standard and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which was relevant to the court's proposal to submit the threshold determination to the jury. The court stated: 35 As I read this, that preponderance of the evidence is for my thinking when I first make the determination that there was threshold evidence of the conspiracy which I made rather early in the case, the second or third day. I think I told you people that I had considered it and on the basis of things produced up to then, I thought there was prima facie evidence of a conspiracy or threshold evidence of a conspiracy so as to justify the introduction. 36 I think that is what that has to do with it. But then to go on and say whether an individual defendant is part of the conspiracy is something the jury has to find beyond a reasonable doubt. 37 Tr. 4712-13 (emphasis added). 38 These two references to a prima facie case, though troubling, do not persuade us that the district court adopted an improper standard. The first reference was made in a context unrelated to the issue of standard of proof and seems to us a slender reed upon which to base a claim of reversible error. The second reference, while imprecise, is insufficient to support the conclusion that the district court employed the wrong standard. When read in full context, it demonstrates that the court understood that it had to find evidence of a conspiracy by the preponderance standard. The references to the preponderance standard by both the court and counsel during this colloquy reinforce our view. 39 We are not prepared to seize on one or two isolated phrases to conclude that the court misunderstood the standard that it was to apply. Appellants' present emphasis on the court's passing remarks seems to us an attempt to invest them with greater significance than they merit or than they were understood to have at the time. Significantly, appellants' attorneys registered neither surprise nor objection to either statement. They did not seek clarification from the court; indeed, Stillman's attorney repeated the phrase prima facie case in his response to the first statement. In United States v. Pappas, 611 F.2d 399 (1st Cir.1979), the First Circuit considered a similar claim of error in a case where the district court had clearly articulated a prima facie standard despite the circuit's adherence to a preponderance standard. The court held that since counsel had failed to object to the judge's ruling at trial, it could review only for plain error. After noting that there was more than sufficient evidence to justify a ruling under the proper ... standard, the court concluded that the failure to apply the correct standard did not rise to the level of plain error, stating that it is possible--indeed in the circumstances it seems likely--that his articulation of an incorrect standard was a slip of the tongue which would have been quickly rectified had the error been brought to his attention. Id. at 405. Even were the trial court in this case to have employed the wrong standard we also would be inclined to view it as harmless error, since we are persuaded that the evidence of conspiracy and each defendant's participation was sufficient to satisfy the preponderance standard. 40 Appellants also claim that it was error to instruct the jury that only after it was satisfied by independent evidence of a defendant's membership in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt could it consider the out-of-court statements of coconspirators. Appellants contend that by giving this charge, the court improperly delegated its responsibility for making the necessary threshold determination to the jury, and so confused the jury as to render its verdict meaningless. 41 As we stated above, the district court made the threshold determination required by Rule 801(d)(2)(E) before allowing the coconspirator statements to go to the jury. Since this determination is for the court, it was unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury that it could only consider the coconspirator declarations if it too determined, based on evidence aliunde, that a given defendant was a member of the conspiracy. Once the coconspirator statements are admitted they should go to the jury without special instruction. United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d at 627; United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.1971); see also United States v. James, 590 F.2d at 577-80. 7 42 However, while the trial court's instruction was superfluous, we do not believe that it caused appellants any prejudice. In United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d at 459, we rejected a challenge to an almost identical charge, stating: 43 No court has held, however, that an instruction that gives the jury an opportunity to second-guess the court's decision to admit coconspirator declarations, otherwise inadmissible as hearsay, is reversible error prejudicing the defendant. To the contrary, it has been generally held that, so long as the court fulfills its responsibility to make the initial determination, such a charge only provides a windfall to the defendant. 44 Furthermore, defendants did not object to this portion of the charge; at the charging conference Stillman's attorney conceded that the instruction was more favorable to defendants than they were entitled. Tr. 4710. At trial it was the government which objected to the instruction now challenged by appellants. Tr. March 4, 1981 (charge of court), at 54-55. We find that the error in instructing the jury to make a superfluous finding was not prejudicial. 45 In summary, we are satisfied that the district court understood its obligation to make a finding based on evidence aliunde of the existence of a conspiracy of which each defendant was a member before allowing the jury to consider any coconspirator declarations against that defendant. It would, of course, have been preferable for the court to have more clearly articulated on the record its determinations and the bases for them, but we have never made that an absolute requirement. United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d at 457, 460. It is also true that the court was not always as precise or as clear as it might have been. But this was a complex trial, with a record running to several thousand pages. Having reviewed the record as a whole, we are not prepared to conclude that the occasional confusion evidenced in the record was such as to constitute reversible error. 46 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence Aliunde. 47 We must still review the evidence to determine if the district court had reasonable grounds to make its finding. United States v. Continental Group, 603 F.2d at 460; United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d at 196. We do not understand appellants Ghassan, Judith, and McFayden to seriously challenge the sufficiency of the evidence aliunde to support a finding of their participation in the conspiracy; in any event, we are satisfied that it was more than sufficient to do so. Appellant Stillman, however, does vigorously contest the finding of his participation in the conspiracy. The evidence aliunde as to him is substantially less, but we conclude that it was nevertheless sufficient to support the court's finding. 48 The threshold evidence offered by the government need not be overwhelming. The preponderance standard simply requires the prosecution to present sufficient proof leading the trial judge to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d at 812 n. 8. Furthermore, in reviewing the district court's determination of proof of a defendant's participation in a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence aliunde, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 999 (3d Cir.1980). 49 Both Stillman and the government are in agreement that the strongest independent evidence against him was Welkie's testimony that during the July meeting with Stillman in Detroit, Ghassan told Welkie to get a package from their hotel room which Welkie knew to contain heroin, and that when he returned with the package Stillman told him to deliver it to an unidentified man whom Welkie had previously seen with Stillman and whom Welkie characterized as Stillman's friend. Stillman contends that this was insufficient to permit the trial court to make the threshold determination of Stillman's participation in the conspiracy. He claims that even this testimony could not be properly relied on because Welkie's description of the unidentified man as Stillman's friend was not shown to be based on his personal knowledge. However, the inculpatory aspect of Welkie's testimony lies not in the precise relationship between Stillman and the unidentified man, but rather in the fact that Stillman directed Welkie to deliver a package which Welkie knew to contain heroin to the man. As to that, Welkie's testimony makes clear that he was speaking from personal observation. 50 We find similarly unpersuasive Stillman's contention that Welkie's testimony must be discounted because the trial court improperly limited his impeachment of Welkie and generally failed to consider Welkie's credibility in making its preponderance finding. While Stillman's cross-examination of Welkie was limited in some respects, there was ample cross-examination as to the two principal matters Stillman relies on as impeaching, i.e., Welkie's prior inconsistent statements to government officials and to the grand jury and his use of drugs. Since these matters were placed in evidence, we believe that any additional cross-examination by Stillman would have been merely cumulative. We find no support for Stillman's suggestion that the trial court failed to consider Welkie's credibility in making its determination based on a preponderance of the evidence. We will not assume that the court ignored a portion of the evidence before it simply because its ultimate determination was unfavorable to appellant. 51 In addition to Welkie's testimony as to the delivery of the package there was additional independent evidence, albeit largely circumstantial, of Stillman's participation in the conspiracy. This evidence included testimony of the repeated meetings between Stillman and various members of the conspiracy coinciding with the heroin importations, Rossi's testimony that on one of the trips to Detroit for a meeting with Stillman he saw heroin in the trunk of Ghassan's car, and Welkie's testimony that on another trip to Detroit, Ghassan obtained some heroin from Welkie, then met with Stillman, and was shortly thereafter seen by Welkie with between $30,000 and $35,000 in cash in his hotel room. Mere association with those who have conspired cannot alone support a conviction for conspiracy. United States v. Torres, 519 F.2d 723, 725-26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 457, 46 L.Ed.2d 392 (1975). On the other hand, the timing and circumstances of a meeting or series of meetings may be sufficiently suspicious to permit a reasonable inference of complicity in the criminal enterprise. See United States v. Gonzalez, 700 F.2d 196, 203 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Baldarrama, 566 F.2d 560, 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 844, 99 S.Ct. 140, 58 L.Ed.2d 145 (1978); United States v. Torres, 519 F.2d at 726. Moreover, the issue before us is not whether the evidence aliunde was sufficient to support a judgment of conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether the government has satisfied the far lesser burden to make a threshold showing of conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. 52 The only independent exculpatory evidence to which Stillman directs our attention is his impeachment of Welkie. In United States v. Provenzano, supra, appellant similarly argued that the only evidence aliunde against him came from a biased liar. We rejected that contention on the ground that, on appellate review, the witness's statements must be accepted as true for the purpose of determining the sufficiency of evidence. 620 F.2d at 999. We concluded that [a]lthough the evidence is not overwhelming, and while it comes from only one witness whose veracity was certainly open to question, it was sufficient to establish a conspiracy and to tie [appellant] to that conspiracy. Id. at 1000. In this case, we have not only Welkie's testimony, but substantial circumstantial evidence based on the testimony of Rossi and others. We therefore conclude that the district court could reasonably have found Stillman's participation in the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence aliunde. B. IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY 53 The second requirement for the admission of out-of-court statements by coconspirators is that they be made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Appellants claim that the district court failed to observe this requirement as to a number of statements. 54 The most sweeping challenge on this ground is Stillman's contention that virtually all of the out-of-court declarations attributed to Ghassan were inadmissible as coconspirator statements because Ghassan was acting as a government informant when he made the statements, and hence they were not in furtherance of the conspiracy. It is undisputed that Ghassan, both prior to and during the period of the conspiracy, had acted as a confidential informant for both the DEA and Pennsylvania authorities. In fact, the basis of Ghassan's defense was that he had been acting as a government agent when he engaged in the actions charged in the indictment. The government contended that as to the events charged in the indictment, Ghassan was acting on his own. The trial court was aware of Ghassan's theory of defense at the inception of the trial. 8 Thus, when it admitted Ghassan's statements, it implicitly rejected Stillman's claim that Ghassan's statements were not in furtherance of the conspiracy. 9 The jury reached a similar conclusion under the higher beyond a reasonable doubt standard since its verdict reflected its rejection of Ghassan's informant defense. 10 55 Stillman makes a similar challenge to the admission of a taped telephone call which Rossi placed to Ibraham at the instigation of the government shortly after Rossi's initial August 12 arrest. Its purpose was apparently to lure Ibraham back to the United States from Beirut. Stillman argues that since Rossi was concededly acting on behalf of the government at the time he placed the call, the conversation did not meet the in furtherance requirement of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The trial court instructed the jury that because Rossi was acting as a government agent at the time he made the phone call, Rossi's statements could not be considered as evidence against any of the defendants and should be disregarded, but that Ibraham's statements, or anything said by Rossi and adopted by Ibraham, could be considered. 56 Stillman argues that the evidence was highly prejudicial because it included a statement by Rossi that he had attempted to contact Stillman after learning of the arrest of some of the conspirators, but that Stillman would not talk to him because it looks like Marshall's [Stillman] scared or something. Stillman claims that the statement created a false implication of Stillman's consciousness of guilt because Rossi had never attempted to contact Stillman. Stillman's Brief at 34. To meet that concern, the court specifically called the jury's attention to the fact that Rossi had testified that he had not met or spoken to Stillman. 57 The primary significance of the Ibraham-Rossi conversation was not the statement on which Stillman focuses but instead was Ibraham's repeated mention of Stillman's name in connection with raising bail money for the arrested conspirators, which suggests his association with them. Since this fact was both relevant and probative, and could not have been considered if Rossi's half of the conversation was excised, the court did not err in admitting it, particularly in view of its cautionary instructions. See United States v. Smith, 623 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir.1980). 11 58 Both Stillman and Judith claim that certain out-of-court statements should not have been admitted because they constituted narratives of past events and thus were not in furtherance of the conspiracy. Judith challenges the admissibility of Ghassan's statements to Welkie and Rossi that when he and Judith returned from Beirut on July 4 they had been checked well at customs, but that the heroin concealed in their baby's diaper and Judith's vagina had not been found. Stillman challenges Ibraham's statement to Ghassan, Judith and Welkie, as recited by Welkie, that Stillman owed them a lot of money for the last shipment of heroin and would have to pay up before he could get another package. Statements between conspirators which provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among them, or inform each other of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the conspiracy and are admissible so long as the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are met. See United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir.1981); United States v. Goodman, 605 F.2d 870, 878 (5th Cir.1979). Such statements are more than mere narratives of past events. See United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir.1979). They differ from the statements made in United States v. Provenzano, supra, relied on by appellants, which had been made to non-members of the conspiracy who had no need to know about the matters disclosed. 59 We are somewhat more troubled by Judith's testimony that when Ghassan was in the Erie County Jail following his arrest, he told her to try to raise money for his bail by contacting Stillman, who owed them $250,000 for heroin, if she could not get an advance from one of their business customers. Stillman contends that because the conversation took place after Ghassan's arrest, it was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. However, the arrest of a conspirator does not necessarily terminate his or her involvement in the conspiracy. See United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014, 69 L.Ed.2d 394 (1981). Ghassan's revelation to Judith of his relationship with Stillman was for the purpose of enabling her to collect money owed as a result of the heroin transactions. The in furtherance requirement must be given the same practical interpretation as the pendency requirement. The distribution of the proceeds of a conspiracy is one of its central objectives, and statements which are directed to that purpose must be considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Fortes, 619 F.2d 108, 117 (1st Cir.1980); United States v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1082, 1089-90 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S.Ct. 107, 62 L.Ed.2d 70 (1979); United States v. Patton, 594 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir.1979). 12 C. DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONSPIRACY 60 Appellants contend that the conspiracy charged in the indictment terminated with the arrest of Ghassan, Welkie, McFayden and Bunner on July 31 and immediately following, and that any conversations thereafter fail to satisfy the final prerequisite for admitting coconspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because they were not made during the course of the conspiracy. This contention is based on a misconception. As we have already indicated, the requirements that a statement must be in furtherance of and during the course of the conspiracy are closely linked. The arrest of some of the conspirators, even its principal member, does not necessarily terminate the conspiracy. See United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d at 1269-70 (conspiracy may continue even when all but one coconspirator have been arrested); United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d at 209. 61 A conspiracy is presumed to continue until its objective is achieved. United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958, 90 S.Ct. 431, 24 L.Ed.2d 422 (1969). Even after the arrests of Ghassan, Welkie, McFayden and Bunner, most of the conspirators remained at large. 62 Where evidence demonstrates that conspirators remain fully capable of carrying out their purpose, notwithstanding the arrest of one of them, it cannot be said that the conspiracy is terminated as a matter of law.... The fact that the conspiratorial object was postponed or slowed down does not unequivocally show that the conspiracy was terminated. 63 United States v. Smith, 600 F.2d 149, 153 (8th Cir.1979) (quoting United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1237 (8th Cir.1978) (Lay, J., concurring)). 64 In this case, there was no evidence of abandonment of the conspiracy; in fact there was affirmative evidence that the conspiracy did indeed continue. After Ghassan's arrest there was an importation of heroin involving Abedeen, Rossi and Dugan, which had previously been arranged by and was at the behest of Ghassan. As with previous importations, the heroin was obtained from the coconspirators in Lebanon. Furthermore, Rossi continued to try to sell the heroin on behalf of the coconspirators until his final arrest on October 2. The conspirators remained in contact with each other and hoped to use funds from that heroin for the release from custody of those arrested. Under these circumstances we cannot assume that the conspiracy terminated until at least Rossi's October arrest. 13 Just as a defendant must produce evidence showing that s/he withdrew from a conspiracy, see United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793, 803-04 (3d Cir.1982); United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 548 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866, 100 S.Ct. 137, 62 L.Ed.2d 89 (1979), so also must defendants show that the conspiracy terminated, such as by demonstrating that its ends had been so frustrated or its means so impaired that its continuation was no longer plausible. D. PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT 65 Stillman contends that under the rules, a foundation of personal knowledge is required before coconspirator statements can be admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Fed.R.Evid. 602 provides that [a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. However, it is clear from the Advisory Committee Notes that the drafters intended that the personal knowledge foundation requirement of Rule 602 should apply to hearsay statements admissible as exceptions under Rules 803 and 804 but not to admissions (including coconspirator statements) admissible under Rule 801(d)(2). 14 See McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 262, at 628 (2d ed. 1972); cf. Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc., 588 F.2d 626, 630-31 (8th Cir.1978) (personal knowledge requirement does not apply to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D)). Accordingly, we reject Stillman's argument. 15 E. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 66 Stillman contends that even if the coconspirator statements were properly admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence, their admission violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The circuits are divided as to whether a determination that coconspirator statements are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is ipso facto determinative that the requirements imposed by the Confrontation Clause are also satisfied. Compare United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 n. 3 (7th Cir.1977) (congruent) and Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129, 93 S.Ct. 948, 35 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973) (congruent) with United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 660 & n. 5 (9th Cir.1981) (not congruent) and United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 37-38 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct. 1236, 59 L.Ed.2d 467 (1979) (not congruent). See also United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir.1981) (treating the Rule 801 inquiry and the Confrontation Clause inquiry as the same); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349-50 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1981) (treating the two inquiries as distinct). We have not yet ruled on this issue. 67 Although the Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rules stem from the same roots, the Supreme Court has never equated the two. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86, 91 S.Ct. 210, 218, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). If the language of the Confrontation Clause giving a criminal defendant the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him were to be applied literally, it would preclude use of any hearsay. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-63, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). The Supreme Court has stated, however, that both history and policy militate against such a literal application. Id. at 63, 100 S.Ct. at 2537. Instead the Court has held that the Confrontation Clause restricts the range of admissible hearsay by imposing a two-prong requirement: first, the government must normally show that the declarant is unavailable and that the hearsay testimony is thus necessary; and, second, the statement must bear sufficient indicia of reliability to demonstrate its trustworthiness. Id. at 65-66, 100 S.Ct. at 2538-2539. 68 We need not decide in this case the extent to which the government must show the declarant's unavailability when it seeks to introduce coconspirator statements. It is conceded that the declarants were either physically unavailable because they had not yet been apprehended, as in the case of Ibraham and Abedeen, or practically unavailable because they were co-defendants who chose not to testify, as in the case of Ghassan and McFayden. 69 Instead, Stillman argues that the statements fail to meet the reliability prong of the Ohio v. Roberts test. The government does not suggest that no reliability inquiry is appropriate. However, it quotes the Supreme Court's statement that [r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539, and argues that Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) is just such a firmly rooted hearsay exception. On several grounds we believe that coconspirator statements are not encompassed in the hearsay exception[s] to which the above quotation applies. 70 In the first place, coconspirator statements are not technically hearsay. The hearsay exceptions are embodied in Rules 803 and 804, and are specifically denominated as such. In contrast, the Federal Rules of Evidence categorize coconspirator statements along with admissions as [s]tatements which are not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2). Thus the rule permitting their admission is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 71 In the second place, and more significantly, the rationale for admitting evidence under the rules covering hearsay exceptions is different from that used to admit coconspirator statements. Evidence falling within the hearsay exceptions is admissible because of its special trustworthiness. See McCormick, supra, § 262, at 628; 5 Wigmore on Evidence §§ 1420, 1422. Admissions, on the other hand, are not admitted because of confidence in their inherent reliability. They are instead admitted because a party will not be heard to object that s/he is unworthy of credence. See McCormick, supra, at 628-29. As explained by the Advisory Committee, Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule .... No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2) Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules. 72 Rule 801(d)(2) treats coconspirator statements as a category of party admissions. It does so because of the legal fiction that each conspirator is an agent of the other and that the statements of one can therefore be attributable to all. United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d at 626. In effect, the Rules have adopted the agency rationale, although the framers recognized that this theory is at best a fiction. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules. 73 If there is no assumption that a coconspirator statement is per se trustworthy, a Rule 801 inquiry cannot be viewed as necessarily equivalent to a Confrontation Clause inquiry. It must be separately ascertained whether coconspirator statements sought to be admitted are attended by adequate assurances of reliability. As the Court stated in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), the evidentiary rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values but the overlap is not complete. Statements which satisfy one may not satisfy the other. We cannot, as the government would have us do, abdicate our responsibility to preserve constitutional values to the rule writers, whether federal or state. On the other hand, since the Confrontation Clause is equally applicable in state trials, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), we must be cautious not to use the Confrontation Clause as a vehicle for imposing what are merely our evidentiary preferences on the states. In fact, the plurality opinion in Dutton which distinguished between the separate inquiries suggested that the federal evidentiary rule on coconspirator statements was more limited than required by the Confrontation Clause. See 400 U.S. at 82, 91 S.Ct. at 216. 74 We agree with the government that in many, if not most, instances a coconspirator statement which is admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) will also be sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Nelson, 603 F.2d 42, 46 (8th Cir.1979) (absent some unusual circumstance coconspirator statements which satisfy Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) do not violate the Confrontation Clause). The Ninth Circuit has identified the following factors as relevant to the Confrontation Clause inquiry: 75 (1) whether the declaration contained assertions of past fact; (2) whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and role of the participants in the crime; (3) whether it was possible that the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection; and (4) whether the circumstances under which the statements were made provided reason to believe that the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89, 91 S.Ct. at 219-220. 76 United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d at 661 (footnote omitted). The court also stated that, All four elements need not be present in order to satisfy the confrontation clause. In some circumstances, a statement may be admitted over confrontation clause objections even if it does not pass scrutiny under each prong of the Dutton test. Id. 77 Stillman suggests that the Confrontation Clause requires that a declarant have personal knowledge before the coconspirator statement will be admissible. Although personal knowledge is not a requirement for admission as a coconspirator statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), see text at II. D., supra, it cannot be disregarded in the separate though parallel analysis under the Confrontation Clause. It is, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in Perez, one of the significant, albeit not necessarily indispensable, factors which should be considered in determining whether the content and circumstances of the challenged statement bear sufficient indicia of reliability to vouch for its trustworthiness. 78 Our review of the record convinces us that the challenged evidence satisfies the reliability requirement of the Confrontation Clause. The out-of-court statements by Ghassan, Ibraham, and Abedeen contain numerous indicia of reliability. They appear to have been based on first-hand knowledge, they were made under circumstances which suggest little incentive for prevarication, 16 and they were corroborated by additional evidence. 79 Stillman claims that DEA agent Schmotzer's testimony that McFayden told him on several occasions that he was having difficulty obtaining heroin because Ghassan was delivering it to Stillman instead was not reliable because not based on McFayden's personal knowledge. We agree that the basis for McFayden's information is unclear, but even if his statements were erroneously admitted, this did not constitute reversible error. These statements were largely duplicated by other properly admitted evidence. Rossi testified that, as they were leaving a meeting with Schmotzer and McFayden, Ghassan and Ibraham stated that they wished they had not left the heroin behind in Detroit (where they had met with Stillman) since they felt that they could make a better sale to Schmotzer. In view of this testimony, the admission of McFayden's statements could not have impermissibly prejudiced Stillman. 80 Accordingly, although we are cognizant that admission of coconspirator statements in a complex conspiracy trial with multiple defendants must be carefully monitored by the district court at all stages of the trial in order to avoid undue prejudice to the defendants, we find no reversible error in their admission in this case.