Opinion ID: 172793
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Order Compelling Attorney Testimony

Text: To hold that Pinson waived his attorney-client privilege with respect to his § 2255 claims, however, does not end the analysis. As the Ninth Circuit observed in Bittaker, the court must impose a waiver no broader than needed to ensure the fairness of the proceedings before it. 331 F.3d at 720. It is not entirely clear that that occurred in this case. In its request for an affidavit from Pinson's attorney, the United States argued that because Pinson had raised questions as to the effectiveness of his defense counsel by virtue of certain specific acts or omissions, he had waived attorney-client privilege and that the court should order the attorney to produce a detailed affidavit outlining information in response to the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel cited in defendant's [§] 2255 motion. (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 75 at 2.) [1] In granting the motion, the district court ordered the attorney to provide an affidavit addressing the issues raised in defendants [sic] § 2255 Motion. (Dist.Ct.Doc. No. 76.) We find the potential scope and lack of specificity in the district court's order in this case a bit troubling. In compelling a new declaration from Pinson's attorney, the order did little to indicate precisely what information the attorney was required to disclose, other than to refer generally to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Perhaps the order could have been more narrowly tailored. While compelling a new declaration or the production of notes from an attorney in a case such as this is not per se unreasonable, such a requirement should ideally be carefully tailored to protect prisoners' Sixth Amendment rights. Cf. Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1168 n. 4 (affirming where district court ordered production of counsel's notes, then conducted in camera review of the notes to determine whether and to what extent [prisoner's] communication presumptively protected by the attorney-client privilege is relevant to the specific ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised by [prisoner] in his habeas petition). Nevertheless, we find no abuse of discretion, see Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1112 (10th Cir.2001) (noting that district court determinations regarding waiver of attorney-client privilege are reviewed for abuse of discretion), and we conclude that Pinson has failed to satisfy AEDPA's substantial showing requirement for granting a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).