Opinion ID: 4394859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: supreme court’s paroline decision

Text: Like this case, Paroline involved a possessor of child pornography images in wide circulation on the internet. In Paroline, the defendant was a possessor and not a distributor or the initial abuser. See 572 U.S. at 439, 134 S. Ct. at 1716. The Supreme Court grappled with the question of what causal relationship must be established between a defendant possessor’s conduct and a victim’s losses for purposes of determining the right to, and the amount of, restitution under § 2259. Id. As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court interpreted § 2259’s statutory language to impose a general proximate-cause limitation. Id. at 448, 134 S. Ct. at 30 Case: 17-12349 Date Filed: 05/08/2019 Page: 31 of 67 1721. The Supreme Court determined that “[r]estitution is therefore proper under § 2259 only to the extent the defendant’s offense proximately caused a victim’s losses.” Id. at 448, 134 S. Ct. at 1722. The difficulty, the Supreme Court explained, comes in applying that causation requirement in a particular child pornography case. Id. at 449, 134 S. Ct. at 1722. This is so because of the “somewhat atypical causal process underlying the losses [a child pornography] victim claims.” Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that it may be “simple enough” for a victim to prove the aggregate losses that stem from the ongoing traffic in her images as a whole. Id. Importantly, the Supreme Court observed that it is more difficult to determine “the ‘full amount’ of those general losses, if any, that are the proximate result of the offense conduct of a particular defendant who is one of thousands who have possessed and will in the future possess the victim’s images but who has no other connection to the victim.” Id. Therefore, in child pornography possession offenses, the Paroline Court recognized that it would be virtually impossible to show that the defendant possessor was a but-for cause of any particular portion of the victim’s losses “where the defendant is an anonymous possessor of images in wide circulation on the Internet.” Id. at 450-51, 134 S. Ct. at 1722-23. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court observed that “[w]hile it is not possible to identify a discrete, readily 31 Case: 17-12349 Date Filed: 05/08/2019 Page: 32 of 67 definable incremental loss [a defendant possessor] caused, it is indisputable that [the defendant possessor] was a part of the overall phenomenon that caused [the victim’s] general losses.” Id. at 456-57, 134 S. Ct. at 1726. And it would undermine the purposes of § 2259 to deny restitution in cases involving possessors of child pornography. Id. at 456-58, 134 S. Ct. at 1726-27. The Supreme Court also recognized that the original abuse crime is compounded by the distribution and possession of images of the victim’s original abuser’s “horrific acts, which meant the wrongs inflicted on her were in effect repeated; for she knew her humiliation and hurt were and would be renewed into the future as an ever-increasing number of wrongdoers witnessed the crimes committed against her.” Id. at 441, 134 S. Ct. at 1717. It does not matter that the victim does not know the name of the possessor because the losses do not flow from any specific knowledge of him; rather, the cause of the victim’s losses “is the trade in her images.” Id. at 456, 134 S. Ct at 1726. The Supreme Court also observed that “the victim suffers continuing and grievous harm as a result of her knowledge that a large, indeterminate number of individuals have viewed and will in the future view images of the sexual abuse she endured.” Id. at 457, 134 S. Ct. at 1726. “In a sense, every viewing of child pornography is a repetition of the victim’s abuse.” Id. at 457, 134 S. Ct. at 1727. “The cause of the victim’s general losses is the trade in her images.” Id. at 456, 134 S. Ct. at 1726. 32 Case: 17-12349 Date Filed: 05/08/2019 Page: 33 of 67 After rejecting a but-for test for proximate cause, the Paroline Court adopted a causation-in-fact standard for cases where: (1) “a defendant possessed a victim’s images”; (2) “a victim has outstanding losses caused by the continuing traffic in those images”; and yet (3) “it is impossible to trace a particular amount of those losses to the individual defendant by recourse to a more traditional causal inquiry.” Id. at 458, 134 S. Ct. at 1727. In that situation, the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant possessor of child pornography should be ordered to pay restitution “in an amount that comports with the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses.” Id. The Supreme Court explained that the award “would not be severe” in a case where the possessor is only one of many thousands of offenders, but also would not be “a token or nominal amount.” Id. at 458-59, 134 S. Ct. at 1727. Rather, the required restitution would be “reasonable and circumscribed” and “suited to the relative size of [the defendant’s] causal role.” Id. at 459, 134 S. Ct. at 1727. Further, the Supreme Court instructed, there is no “practical way to isolate some subset of the victim’s general losses that [the possessor] Paroline’s conduct alone would have been sufficient to cause.” Id. at 451, 134 S. Ct. at 1723. In Paroline, the defendant possessor was one of thousands who possessed the victim’s images. Id. at 450, 134 S. Ct. at 1723. The Supreme Court stressed that even though the victim does not know the possessor, the victim’s “knowledge that her images 33 Case: 17-12349 Date Filed: 05/08/2019 Page: 34 of 67 were circulated far and wide renewed the victim’s trauma and made it difficult for her to recover from her abuse.” Id. at 440, 134 S. Ct. at 1717. “While it is not possible to identify a discrete, readily definable incremental loss he [the possessor] caused, it is indisputable that he was a part of the overall phenomenon that caused her general losses.” Id. at 456-57, 134 S. Ct. at 1726. In other words, the defendant possessor of the images caused in fact part of the general losses, even if “it is impossible to trace a particular amount of those losses to the individual defendant.” Id. at 458, 134 S. Ct. at 1727. The Paroline Court then turned to the question of how district courts are to determine the proper amount of restitution in these “possessor” cases. Id. As a general matter, the Supreme Court stated that a district court “must assess as best it can from available evidence the significance of the individual defendant’s conduct in light of the broader causal process that produced the victim’s losses.” Id. at 459, 134 S. Ct. at 1727-28. The Supreme Court emphasized that this “cannot be a precise mathematical inquiry,” but rather involves the exercise of “wide discretion” and “sound judgment” of the sort district courts typically exercise in the context of criminal sentencing and restitution more broadly. Id. at 459-62, 134 S. Ct. at 172829. The Supreme Court then expressly identified “a variety of factors district courts might consider” in determining a proper restitution amount for possession. Id. at 459-60, 134 S. Ct. at 1728 (emphasis added). 34 Case: 17-12349 Date Filed: 05/08/2019 Page: 35 of 67 As a starting point, the Supreme Court suggested that district courts “determine the amount of the victim’s losses caused by the continuing traffic in the victim’s images.” Id. at 460, 134 S. Ct. at 1728 (emphasis added). Then, to determine the defendant possessor’s relative role in causing those general losses, the district court could consider factors such as: (1) “the number of past criminal defendants found to have contributed to the victim’s general losses”; (2) “reasonable predictions of the number of future offenders likely to be caught and convicted for crimes contributing to the victim’s general losses”; (3) “any available and reasonably reliable estimate of the broader number of offenders involved (most of whom will, of course, never be caught or convicted)”; (4) “whether the defendant reproduced or distributed images of the victim”; (5) “whether the defendant had any connection to the initial production of the images”; (6) “how many images of the victim the defendant possessed”; and (7) “other facts relevant to the defendant’s relative causal role.” Id. The Supreme Court reiterated that these factors should not be used as a “rigid formula,” but should instead serve as “rough guideposts” in determining a restitution amount for the possessor criminal defendant. Id. The Supreme Court noted that “[t]his approach is not without its difficulties,” as it “involves discretion and estimation,” but “courts can only do their best to apply the statute as written in a workable manner.” Id. at 462, 134 S. Ct. at 1729. The Supreme Court emphasized 35 Case: 17-12349 Date Filed: 05/08/2019 Page: 36 of 67 that district courts regularly exercise wide discretion, and there was “no reason to believe they cannot apply th[is] causal standard . . . in a reasonable manner.” Id.4