Opinion ID: 489887
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Corporation Counsel Miller

Text: 45 Haynesworth's complaint asserted liability against Assistant Corporation Counsel Miller on the ground of direct complicity in the prosecution alleged, and on the further ground of supervision and promotion of the retaliatory policy. 143 The District Court dismissed the claims against Miller in the belief that he enjoyed complete prosecutorial immunity from suit. 144 We concur in this determination, but are constrained to elaborate upon the principles underlying the application of prosecutorial immunity in this case. Accordingly, we discuss the legal theory of policymaking liability asserted against Miller, the sufficiency of the complaint in charging liability, and the bases for our conclusion that, notwithstanding Haynesworth's allegations, Miller is absolutely immune from liability therefor. 46
47 Governmental officials may also be held personally liable in damages for constitutional infringements resulting from their establishment of unconstitutional policies. 145 5] In contrast to supervisory or training liability, policymaking liability rests upon the official's misfeasance rather than his nonfeasance. 146 For an official to be held accountable on this basis, he must actually prescribe policy--formally or de facto 147 --that encourages improper means or ends. To succeed on a policymaking theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official against whom liability is asserted has the power--vested either formally or as a practical matter--to formulate policy, and has exercised that policymaking authority to generate improper practices. As in the case of supervisory liability, a plaintiff seeking to recover against a policymaking official must demonstrate a causal connection between the policy established and the wrong committed against him. 148 48
49 The complaint adequately sets forth a cause of action against Miller, both for direct participation in the retaliatory prosecution alleged and for his policymaking role. With regard to the latter, the complaint points to Miller's responsibility for establishing and implementing policy for the Corporation Counsel, 149 and his promotion and pursuance of an agenda of retaliatory prosecution. 150 But while we find that the complaint's allegations of wrongdoing against Miller meet the requirement of particularity, we conclude that he is absolutely immune from this suit. 50
51 As an officer of the District of Columbia, Miller has at least qualified immunity from suit for all activities undertaken within the scope of his duties as Assistant Corporation Counsel. 152 Haynesworth initially contends that, regardless of the protection otherwise applicable, Miller's conduct was so palpably beyond the scope of his authority that the cloak of official immunity should be cast aside. 153 Haynesworth directs our attention to a decision by this court 154 and a prior directive of the Corporation Counsel's Office, 155 both reflecting disapproval of the practice of retaliatory prosecution, and argues that Miller's actions taken in derogation of these authorities do not merit immunity. We believe Haynesworth presumes a sphere of protected activity far narrower than that countenanced by the caselaw. 52 The Supreme Court has staked out expansive boundaries for official immunity, so that a governmental employee forfeits protection only when he acts manifestly or palpably beyond his authority. 156 Under this standard, the conduct at issue did not destroy Miller's immunity. As Chief of the Law Enforcement Section, Miller possessed authority to establish and implement policies governing criminal prosecutions. 157 Since Haynesworth's claim for damages against Miller rests on the establishment and implementation of prosecution policy, the activities challenged fall clearly within the realm of official immunity. And Miller does not lose this protection simply because his exercise of authority impinged upon Haynesworth's constitutional rights; if an allegation of unconstitutional action sufficed to remove the immunity shield, immunity would never be available in Bivens actions and only seldom in suits under Section 1983. 158 Nor are we constrained to cast immunity aside simply because Miller may have contravened a thirteen-year-old policy directive. Even assuming that the policy statement might otherwise have still been in force during the period relevant here, it is entirely plausible that the power to amend outdated directives reposed within the parameters of Miller's general policymaking authority. Accordingly, we conclude that the conduct challenged was not so far afield of Miller's official duties as to deprive him of the immunity applicable. 53 We must now ascertain the nature of the immunity that attaches to Miller's activities, and a great deal turns on this determination. If Miller enjoys only qualified immunity for the conduct at issue, then additional pleadings are necessary to evaluate whether he is entitled to protection in this case. 159 Accordingly, if qualified immunity carries the day, the District Court's disposition of the complaint against Miller under Rule 12 was erroneous. If, on the other hand, Miller is entitled to absolute immunity for the establishment and implementation of prosecution policies, then Haynesworth's suit against him is defeat[ed] at the outset, 160 and the dismissal of the complaint was correct. 161 In order to decide whether Miller's activities fall within the narrow ambit of absolute immunity, we must carefully consider the caselaw and the policies underlying the immunity doctrine. It is this task to which we now attend. 54 --The Scope of Absolute Immunity 55 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 162 the Supreme Court ruled that a state prosecutor was absolutely immune from liability for constitutional violations allegedly arising from his initiation and maintenance of a criminal prosecution. 163 Such conduct, the Court reasoned, was functionally equivalent to the acts of a judge in a criminal proceeding 164 --acts which had earlier been held to merit absolute protection under Section 1983. 165 The Court concluded that the policies underpinning the extension of complete immunity to judges and prosecutors at common law also necessitated absolute protection from constitutional claims asserted against prosecutors acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. A substantial threat of vexatious litigation could hinder vigorous performance of the prosecutor's public duties, and this inhibition would have an adverse effect on the functioning of the criminal justice system. 166 Moreover, since sufficient alternative safeguards exist to defuse the threat of prosecutorial misconduct, the systemic benefit of recognizing a civil remedy against the prosecutor would be slight in comparison to the harm likely to result from the chilling of prosecutorial discretion. 167 56 The Court subsequently held in Butz v. Economou 168 that certain activities by members of executive agencies are absolutely shielded from liability because of the functional similarities between their official duties and those of a judge or prosecutor. 169 Again the Court pointed to the likelihood that official energies would be diverted by the threat of suit, 170 and the availability of alternative mechanisms to ward off misconduct. 171 Its analysis of the officials' activities led the Court to conclude that they too warranted absolute protection. 57 The Imbler Court did not hold, however, that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for all conduct within the scope of his authority. Rather, the Court determined only that complete protection from liability is appropriate when the prosecutor acts in the capacity of an advocate. 172 While the Court adverted to several circuit court decisions extending only qualified immunity to prosecutors engaged in investigative activities, 173 it did not decide whether non-advocatory conduct merited lesser protection. The Court also declined to delineate the parameters of the protected realm of advocacy, holding only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune.... 174 Although the Court recognize[d] that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom, it did not address the difficult questions of demarcation that absolute immunity claims could pose. 175 58 In the wake of Imbler, this circuit and others have resumed their practice of according only qualified immunity to prosecutors functioning in their administrative or investigative capacities, 176 and thus frequently have been forced to confront more squarely the difficult questions left open by the Supreme Court. As we have heretofore noted, [d]elineation of the precise scope of protected advocatory conduct beyond the boundaries established in mbler has proved to be exceedingly difficult, 177 and divergent approaches to the problem have been employed in the circuits. 178 But at bottom these decisions turn upon the same concerns that guided the Supreme Court in Imbler and Butz: the centrality of the challenged conduct to the criminal justice system; 179 the substantiality of the threat of vexatious litigation, and the extent to which that threat would inhibit performance of important public duties; 180 and the availability of alternative mechanisms to safeguard against prosecutorial misconduct. 181 The courts have drawn rough boundaries around the class of absolutely-immunized prosecutorial activities, and have treated functions such as filing charges, 182 plea-bargaining, 183 presenting evidence, 184 and negotiating parole 185 as falling within the protected sphere, and those such as executing search warrants, 186 interrogating suspects, 187 disseminating information to the press, 188 and storing evidence 189 as meriting only qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has loosely endorsed the circuits' practice of applying the functional test of Imbler to distinguish absolutely-protected prosecutorial conduct from those activities accorded lesser protection. 190 59 --Prosecutorial Policymaking and Advocacy 60 We now must apply the somewhat nebulous doctrine of prosecutorial immunity to the facts of the present case. Our first and simplest task is to determine whether the Imbler Court spoke directly to the conduct at issue. If we find no explicit reference, we nonetheless must consider whether Miller's activities fall under the umbrella of advocacy advertently to the criteria developed in Imbler and Butz. Our judgment will be informed by rulings of this court and other circuits mapping out the area of absolute immunity, but we recognize that this case presents a unique species of prosecutorial conduct 191 that must be assessed on its own under the standards of Imbler. 61 Haynesworth alleged harm resulting both from promulgation of a general agenda of retaliatory prosecution and from implementation of that policy against him in a criminal proceeding. We do not hesitate to extend to Miller absolute protection from liability for the latter conduct, since Imbler explicitly held that initiation of a criminal prosecution is absolutely protected from a suit for damages. 192 As to the formulation of general policies on prosecution, however, we find Imbler provides less clear guidance regarding the degree of immunity that should attach. It thus becomes necessary to compare Miller's behavior with the activities in question in Imbler and to summon the policies that led to the grant of absolute immunity therein. 62 First, we find Miller's conduct to be functionally analogous to the activities immunized absolutely in Imbler. In that case, the Court noted the systemic importance of the decision to initiate the prosecution; 193 we find no meaningful distinction between a decision on prosecution in a single instance and decisions on prosecution formulated as policies for general application. 194 Both practices involve a balancing of myriad factors, including culpability, prosecutorial resources, and public interests; 195 both procedures culminate in initiation of criminal proceedings against particular defendants, and in each it is the individual prosecution that begets the asserted deprivation of constitutional rights. 196 The decision to focus prosecutorial energies upon particular classes of law violations or violators clearly bears many features in common with a decision to commence a single proceeding. We find in this resemblance ample reason to invoke the broad protections of Imbler herein. 63 Analysis of Miller's conduct with reference to Imbler's underlying principles leads to the same result. There is no doubt that, were we to decline to insulate prosecutorial policymaking, an abundance of vexatious litigation would result. As we observed in Gray v. Bell, 197 [t]he prosecutor is far more likely to be the target of vindictive hostility once he has initiated criminal proceedings. 198 Since general prosecutorial policies culminate in the initiation of particular criminal actions, those policies raise the same spectre of invidious lawsuits as individual decisions to inaugurate single prosecutions. Indeed, the threat to the policymaker may be amplified; he or she, as policymaker, faces the risk of recrimination from the potentially larger number of parties prosecuted in accordance with the agency directive. The threat of litigation is very real, and indubitably would inhibit the performance of prosecutorial duties. 199 64 Additionally, there are alternative safeguards sufficient to check official misconduct in the formulation of prosecutorial policies. Those policies will frequently result in criminal proceedings, 200 and therein the defendants will be accorded the full panoply of trial and appellate mechanisms to attack suspect practices. 201 Furthermore, prosecutors are subject to professional discipline, public censure, and perhaps even criminal penalties for unsavory acts; 202 and to the extent that policy decisions have wider impact than conduct in individual prosecutions, they are more likely to produce a backlash. The rationale underlying absolute immunity does not require perfect substitutes for the remedy of civil damages; 203 rather, it demands no more than that available mechanisms adequately reduce the likelihood of misconduct. We think that test is satisfied herein. 65 We are mindful that our determination that Miller is absolutely immune may leave a genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress, 204 but we realize, as the Court did in Imbler, that  'the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative.'  205 Were we to extend only qualified immunity to promulgation of standards of prosecution, we would deter the formulation of policy, 206 thereby jeopardizing individual defendants and the criminal justice system as a whole. Given the means currently available to deter misconduct in this area, we view the additional protection afforded by the civil remedy for damages as insufficient justification to tie the prosecutor's hands in this regard. We thus affirm the District Court's ruling that absolute immunity attaches to Miller's policymaking activities, and we find that Haynesworth's complaint against him was properly dismissed.