Opinion ID: 184657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retroactivity and the PLRA

Text: 13 The inmates urge us to adopt the district court's reasoning that the words any action brought by a prisoner mean any action brought after the enactment of the PLRA. That position was adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246 (6th Cir.1998), and was cited with approval by the district court in its memorandum opinion. They point to the juxtaposition of Sections 802 and 803 of the PLRA, and argue that the explicit application of Section 802 to pending actions shows that when Congress intended a section of the Act to apply retroactively, it did so expressly. See Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191, 1203 (8th Cir.1996) (contrasting congressional treatment of Section 802 and 803 and finding no intent to create retroactive application of Section 803). They argue that taken together, the plain language, the negative inference to be drawn from the absence of retroactivity provisions, and the legislative history all show that the plain meaning of the statute is that it should apply only to actions arising after the passage of the Act. 14 At the very least, they argue, should the court find that there is some ambiguity, applying the three-part test of Landgraf and Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), requires the court to find in their favor because to do otherwise would result in manifest injustice. The inmates cite Watson v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, for the proposition that applying a statute that decreases, rather than increases, attorney's fees to work performed in pending litigation after the passage of the statute is impermissible. 562 F.2d 386 (6th Cir.1977) (interpreting potentially retroactive fee-capping regulation in black lung cases). 15 We are unpersuaded. We do not find in the statute the plain meaning urged by the prisoners. There is simply nothing in the phrase any action that implies, let alone compels, a holding that the statute applies only to actions brought after the passage of the Act. Nor does the language compel resort to legislative history in an attempt to clarify its meaning. We are also not convinced that there is a negative inference to be drawn from a comparison of Sections 802 and 803 of the PLRA. Section 802 of the PLRA amends an entirely different statutory section, 18 U.S.C. § 3626. It is unsurprising that Congress would use differing language to amend different statutory provisions, and the absence of the Section 803 language simply will not bear the burden urged by the inmates. If this case involved a genuine question of retroactivity, that is, if the District were seeking to apply the cap to hours worked before the effective date of the statute, we might find the omission more compelling. But the District advances no such argument, and we join the Eighth Circuit in holding that retroactivity concerns are not implicated when the statute is applied to work performed after April 26, 1996, the date of passage of the PLRA. See Williams v. Brimeyer, 122 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir.1997). 16 When it is applied to work performed after the effective date of the Act, the PLRA raises none of the retroactivity concerns that require the analysis used by the district court because the statute creates present and future effects on present and future conduct, and has no effect on past conduct. Compare Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1203 (holding that the PLRA did not apply to pre-Act work) with Williams, 122 F.3d at 1094 (holding that as applied to work performed after the passage of the Act, there is no retroactivity). The fees at issue were earned after the PLRA passed. The PLRA does not in this case upset vested interests because no right to a fee existed until the work was done. Because we find no retroactive effect, we need [332 U.S.App.D.C. 455] not consider the Supreme Court's extensive analysis of when to permit retroactive application. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). As the Supreme Court stated in Landgraf, normally  'a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.'  511 U.S. at 264, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (quoting Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974)). 17 In Landgraf, the Supreme Court noted that it has adopted a functional definition of retroactivity. See id. at 268-69 & n. 23, 114 S.Ct. 1483. In Miller v. Florida, it stated that [a] law is retrospective if it 'changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.'  482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). To determine if a statute has retroactive effect, the court must decide whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. In determining whether the statute has retroactive effect, the court should consider fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations. Id. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. In this case, the work at issue was not done until after the passage of the Act. The attorneys did not possess a right to payment until they performed the work for which the fees were awarded, and thus had no settled expectations. Simply put, as applied in this case, the PLRA does not impair rights or upset expectations that did not exist prior to its passage, and could not exist after its passage. Because we hold only that the fee limitations apply to work performed after the passage of the Act, there is no need to continue the retroactivity analysis. 18 We stress now the limits of our holding. We do not subscribe to the Fourth Circuit's position that the Act applies to fees awarded after the passage of the Act, regardless of whether the work was performed before the statute was enacted. See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1386 (4th Cir.1997). We find persuasive those cases that have held that the PLRA would have retroactive effect if applied to work performed before the Act was passed. See Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229, 250 (6th Cir.1998) ([A]pplication of the attorney-fee provisions to a fee motion that was pending at the time of the PLRA's passage and that pertained solely to work performed before the statute's passage would undeniably work an impermissible retroactive effect.); Blissett v. Casey 147 F.3d 218, 220-21 (2nd Cir.1998); Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir.1996); Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1203. Even the District conceded before this court that under Landgraf, applying the PLRA to work performed before April 26, 1996 would upset settled expectations and result in manifest injustice. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 277, 114 S.Ct. 1483.