Opinion ID: 111468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Structure

Text: The Court believes this interpretation better harmonizes the two clauses of § 17 with the structure of the entire Act. Ante, at 252. The Court's interpretation, however, would render wholly superfluous § 16 of the Act, which gave explicit congressional authorization to conveyances of Pueblo lands in one extremely narrow set of circumstances. Specifically, § 16 authorized the sale of land found by the Pueblo Lands Board to belong rightfully to a Pueblo if (1) the land be situate among lands adjudicated or otherwise determined in favor of non-Indian claimants and apart from the main body of the Indian land; (2) the Pueblo and the Secretary concurred in the sale; and (3) the land went to the highest bidder for cash. [17] The purpose of this provision was to get the Indian holdings contiguous to one another. 1923 Senate Hearings, at 154 (Sen. Jones of New Mexico). The Court argues vaguely that § 16 was probably considered an isolated element of the Act, and that it somehow uniquely enabled the Secretary to take the initiative in urging consolidation of Pueblo lands. Ante, at 253, n. 26. This unsupported argument is untenable. As the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior emphasized just last year, [i]t is inconceivable that Congress would have authorized the sale of Pueblo lands under the very narrow circumstances of Section 16, and then one section later would have empowered the Pueblos to alienate their lands for any purpose and with no standards or conditions other than Secretarial approval. Such an irrational result could not have been intended by Congress. [18] The error of the Court's interpretation is further exposed by the fact that, since 1924, Congress recurrently has enacted legislation affirmatively authorizing much narrower conveyances of interests in Pueblo lands  legislation that would have had no rational basis if, as the Court concludes, Congress already had authorized unlimited conveyances of Pueblo lands simply upon secretarial approval. For example: (1) In 1928, in response to concern that the existing easement and right-of-way statutes might not technically be applicable to Pueblo lands, Congress enacted legislation clarifying that nine of those statutes, along with the basic Acts of Congress cited in such sections, were fully applicable to the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and their lands. [19] These provisions included numerous procedural and financial safeguards governing such conveyances. (2) Congress in 1933 extended the narrow provisions of § 16 to authorize the sale by the Pueblos and the Secretary of any land that had been taken from a non-Indian claimant by the Pueblo Lands Board. [20] Congress' purpose was to remove the restrictions in the sale of [these] lands; [21] the legislation was designed to authorize alienation of Pueblo lands only in a limited number of situations where necessary to consolidate a tribe's land base. [22] (3) In 1948, Congress authorized the Secretary to grant rights-of-way for all purposes across the lands belonging to the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico, subject to the consent of the proper tribal officials of organized tribes. [23] (4) In 1949, Congress authorized the Pueblos and the Secretary to exchange certain Pueblo lands for those in the public domain [f]or the purpose of consolidation of tribal lands. [24] (5) Similar legislation was enacted in 1961 [f]or the purpose of improving the land tenure pattern and consolidating Pueblo Indian lands. [25] (6) In 1968, Congress authorized the Cochiti, Pojoaque, Tesuque, and Zuni Pueblos to lease their lands for specified purposes for a term of not to exceed ninety-nine years, except for grazing leases which could not exceed 10 years. [26] This authorization created an exception for these Tribes from the statutory provisions applicable to the other Pueblo Tribes, which limit Indian leasing of restricted lands to 25 years. [27] (7) Congress in 1976 enacted legislation to clarify the full applicability of the general right-of-way provisions to the Pueblos; [28] the purpose was to place the New Mexico Pueblo Indians in the same position relative to grants of rights-of-way across their lands as other federally recognized Indian tribes. [29] Each of these enactments would have been meaningless if § 17 already authorized Pueblo leases of unlimited duration and even outright sales of land. The enactments of 1924, 1933, 1947, and 1961 clearly demonstrate that Congress has authorized alienation of Pueblo lands only where necessary to consolidate the tribal base and to improve land tenure patterns  a carefully crafted effort that the Court's interpretation today annuls. Similarly, the enactments of 1928, 1948, 1968, and 1976 demonstrate Congress' intent that leases and rights-of-way on Pueblo lands be subject to the same procedural and financial safeguards that govern such conveyances on Indian lands generally  an intent that is irreconcilable with the notion that § 17 created an entirely independent avenue for alienation of Pueblo title subject only to standardless secretarial approval.