Opinion ID: 76518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States v. Chitty

Text: 23 All three Defendants argue that in Chitty, we adopted the reasonable foreseeability principles of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946) in regard to sentencing in drug conspiracy cases. The Defendants also argue that the district court should have made individualized findings as to the quantities of drugs that were reasonably foreseeable to each Defendant based on their respective level of participation, as required by United States v. Beasley, 2 F.3d 1551, 1552 (11th Cir.1993). 2 24 In Chitty, 3 we held that the same principles of reasonable foreseeability that apply in United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.3 4 also apply to a statutory sentence for a conspiracy charged under 21 U.S.C. § 846, which is subject to the penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. 841(b). 15 F.3d at 162. We stated that a conspirator is only responsible for conspiracy activities in which he is involved, and for drugs involved in those activities, and for subsequent acts and conduct of co-conspirators, and drugs involved in those acts or conduct, that are in furtherance of the conspiracy and are reasonably foreseeable to him. Id. 25 Chitty is consistent with the decisions of our sister circuits that have considered this issue. See United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d 72 (4th Cir.1993); United States v. Ruiz, 43 F.3d 985 (5th Cir.1995); United States v. Swiney, 203 F.3d 397 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Young, 997 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir.1995). 26 The rule under Chitty is that, in determining a defendant's penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, the drug quantity must be reasonably foreseeable to that defendant where the effect of the quantity is to require the imposition of a statutory mandatory minimum sentence. See Irvin, 2 F.3d at 77-78 (comparing the Sentencing Guidelines with the statutory sentencing scheme, and reconciling the difference between the two by concluding that Sections 846 and 841(b) contain a requirement that courts apply the Pinkerton principles of reasonable foreseeability); Martinez, 987 F.2d at 925-26 (surveying the legislative history of § 846 and determining that the Guidelines, as amended in 1988, incorporated the Pinkerton standards of reasonable foreseeability; such incorporation is not inconsistent with § 846, which only requires that a conspirator be sentenced to the same penalty applicable to the underlying conduct). 27 In relation to O'Neal's statutory sentence, the district court made a determination that this defendant should be held and is responsible for ... fifty grams of crack cocaine, since it is and was reasonably foreseeable that crack cocaine in that amount was being distributed. (R.21 at 15.) By making this individualized finding, the district court satisfied Chitty's requirement. 28 Regarding Jeffery Sapp's sentence, the district court adopted the factual findings found in his presentence report. (R.22 at 9.) In the presentence report, Jeffery Sapp's probation officer discussed reasonable foreseeability in relation to § 1B1.3 and concluded that all of the drugs within the scope of the conspiracy were reasonably foreseeable to Jeffery Sapp. As Chitty requires a reasonable foreseeability finding identical to that in § 1B1.3, we are satisfied that the district court made a proper individualized finding on Jeffery Sapp's culpability within the scope of the conspiracy. 29