Opinion ID: 779230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Simple Assault or Something Else

Text: 10 Yates contends the district court erred in applying the all other cases portion of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a), as opposed to the simple assault portion which carries a lower statutory maximum sentence. Section 111 provides three different maximum sentences for forcibly assaulting an officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties. 4 Where the conduct constitutes only simple assault, the defendant shall be imprisoned not more than one year. [I]n all other cases, the defendant shall be imprisoned not more than three years. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a). Section 111(b) supplies authority for an enhanced penalty for cases where a defendant uses a dangerous weapon or inflicts bodily injury. In such cases, a defendant may be sentenced to a maximum of ten years imprisonment. 11 In the Eighth Circuit, we have not yet examined how the penalty provisions of § 111 interrelate. Our sister circuits generally agree that for practical purposes § 111 creates three distinct categories of conduct: (1) simple assault, which, in accord with the common-law definition, does not involve touching; (2) `all other cases,' meaning assault that does involve contact but does not result in bodily injury or involve a weapon; and (3) assaults resulting in bodily injury or involving a weapon. United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 606 (2d Cir.1999) cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245, 120 S.Ct. 2694, 147 L.Ed.2d 965 (2000); see also United States v. McCulligan, 256 F.3d 97, 102 (3d Cir.2001); United States v. Campbell, 259 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir.2001); United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 321-22 (5th Cir.2000). 12 Relying on these decisions, Yates argues that § 111 creates three mutually exclusive categories of assault: (1) simple assault, (2) assault involving a deadly or dangerous weapon or resulting in bodily injury, and (3) all other cases. Yates contends he cannot be sentenced for assault involving a dangerous weapon because he did not plead guilty to a violation of § 111(b). He also argues that his offense does not fall under the category of all other cases because it did not involve physical contact. Pursuant to Yates's process of elimination, the only penalty available under § 111 is the one-year maximum for simple assault. 13 The first problem with Yates's argument is that it attempts to insert his assault with a dangerous weapon (the truck) into the category of simple assault. We reject this insertion. In all jurisdictions statutes punish, more severely than simple assault, such aggravated assaults as ... `assault with a dangerous [or deadly] weapon.' Wayne R. LaFave, Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.16 (1986). 14 Congress did not define simple assault when it added this language to § 111(a) in 1994. 5 We recognize the settled principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994). The common law offense of simple assault ... requires the showing of an offer or attempt by force or violence to do a corporal injury to another. United States v. Bear Ribs, 562 F.2d 563, 564 (8th Cir.1977). Our sister circuits expressly limit simple assault, in the § 111(a) context, to assaults without physical contact. See, e.g., McCulligan, 256 F.3d at 102-04 (noting common-law assault defined as attempt or offer to beat another, without touching him, or by placing of another in reasonable apprehension of a battery) (citing authorities). 15 Additional limitations are needed in this case to distinguish simple assault from the remaining category of assaults contained in § 111(a), that is, all other cases. At common law, assault was not defined in gradations because physical contact transformed assault into battery. Id. at 102-03. The language contained in 18 U.S.C. § 113 assists us in limiting simple assault and distinguishing it from other grades of assault. See McCulligan, 256 F.3d at 104 (The similar language of [§ 113] ... lends support to the conclusion that `simple assault' equates with traditional common-law assault.). Section 113 sets forth seven separate types of assault based upon particular characteristics or results. Section 113 creates different penalties for each of the following acts: (1) assault with intent to commit murder; (2) assault with intent to commit any other felony; (3) assault with a dangerous weapon; (4) assault by striking, beating, or wounding; (5) simple assault; (6) assault resulting in serious bodily injury; and (7) assault resulting in substantial bodily injury. 18 U.S.C § 113(a). In 1994, at the same time Congress amended § 111(a), Congress amended § 113(a) to include the redesignation of the above subsections. See Sept. 13, 1994, Pub.L. 103-322, Title XXXII, § 170201(c)(4)-(6), 108 Stat.2042 (amendment also added subsection (7)). 16 We hold that, in the context of § 111, the definition of simple assault is conduct in violation of § 111(a), which does not involve actual physical contact, a dangerous weapon, serious bodily injury, or the intent to commit murder or another serious felony. We differ from other circuits to the extent they require proof of actual physical contact to sustain a conviction for any crime beyond simple assault under § 111(a). McCulligan, 256 F.3d at 104 6 ; but see United States v. Chambers, 195 F.3d 274 (6th Cir.1999) (sentencing defendant to 21 months under § 111, where defendant had no contact with officers, but appeared to reach for a concealed weapon). 17 The second problem with Yates's argument is that he attempts to construe forcible assaults in all other cases and those assaults incorporated by § 111(b) as mutually exclusive. We conclude they are not. Based on the definition of simple assault, the remaining assaults in all other cases would include all conduct excluded from the category of simple assault. The conduct proscribed by § 111(b) does not form a third distinct category, but is a subcategory of the all other cases conduct. Our conclusion is supported by the plain language of the statute and the interpretation of the statute both before and after the 1994 amendments. 18 Before the 1994 amendment to § 111(a), we determined, [t]he statute's force requirement... may be satisfied even if the defendant has no physical contact with the officer, as long as his conduct places the officer in fear for his life or safety. United States v. Street, 66 F.3d 969, 977 (8th Cir.1995) (applying 1988 statute); see also United States v. Fallen, 256 F.3d 1082, 1087-88 (11th Cir.2001) (applying 1994 statute, upholding § 111(a) conviction for threatening officers with a firearm from behind a door); Chambers, 195 F.3d at 277 (upholding § 111(a) conviction for threatening officers and reaching into his pocket for a firearm). The 1994 amendment does not now require us to compartmentalize those holdings into the category called simple assault. 19 As before the 1994 amendment, § 111(b) may be applied to defendants found guilty of violating § 111(a) as a sentencing enhancement of up to ten years for those using a weapon or causing bodily injury, although Apprendi changed the method of applying § 111(b). Apprendi requires a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt of use of a weapon or bodily injury as a predicate for imposing a sentence over three years. 20 We agree with the district court that Yates's conduct falls within the category of conduct denominated as all other cases, because the conduct was not a simple assault. A car or truck may be used as a deadly or dangerous weapon. See United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir.1988) (recognizing an automobile may be used as a deadly or dangerous weapon); U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, cmt. n.1; § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(d). The undisputed facts identified in the PSR state that Yates accelerated his truck toward the front passenger quarter panel of the marshals' vehicle and that the deputies swerved away from Yates's vehicle to avoid potentially serious bodily injury or death to themselves. Although there is no written plea agreement, the PSR notes the parties verbally agreed the maximum penalty is not more than 3 years. Yates made no objection to these facts stated in the PSR. 21 Yates's forcible assault on the two United States Marshals, using a deadly or dangerous weapon, cannot be a simple assault. In interpreting § 111, we acknowledge our responsibility to effectuate the Congressional purpose to accord federal officers with maximum protection. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975). We conclude, even though Yates's vehicle made no physical contact with the marshals, § 111 does not require that his conduct be penalized as a simple assault. Yates was fortunate the weapon enhancement was not charged, thus saving Yates from a possible sentence of ten years of imprisonment.