Opinion ID: 1877277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: open space corridor

Text: ¶ 21. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 236.45, the City adopted a more restrictive ordinance, MGO § 16.23(8)(f), which provides that the City may require a developer to dedicate land for public sites or open spaces, or may require the developer to reserve such an area of land for five years, after which time the City must either acquire the reservation or release it. [18] The City clearly has the power to condition plat approval on the donation of land, see Jordan, 28 Wis. 2d at 618, or on the provision of open space or greenspace, Gordie Boucher, 178 Wis. 2d at 97. It is likewise clear that compensation is not always required in such circumstances. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391. [19] Moreover, in this case, the City concedes that it will be required to pay full compensation to the Hoepkers if it decides to physically acquire the property encompassed by the open space corridor during the five-year reservation period. Therefore, the only question before us is whether the open space corridor condition constitutes a temporary [20] regulatory taking for which just compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, [21] applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383. [6] ¶ 22. A regulatory taking does not involve an actual physical occupation of property. Instead, where a regulatory taking claim is made, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) a government restriction or regulation is excessive and therefore constitutes a taking of property; and (2) any proffered compensation is unjust. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). Both elements must be ripe before a claim is justiciable. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194 (1985). ¶ 23. In regard to the first element, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 186. As the Court has explained: It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essential prerequisite to its assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property. A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone too far unless it knows how far the regulation goes. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 348. Thus, the Court has stated that its precedent uniformly reflect[s] an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it. Id. at 351. ¶ 24. As to the second element, the Supreme Court has explained: The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation. Nor does the Fifth Amendment require that just compensation be paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a `reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation' exist at the time of the taking. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 194 (citations omitted). Therefore, no constitutional violation occurs until a landowner is denied just compensation. Id. at 194 n.13. Accordingly, the Court has determined that if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation. Id at 195. [7] ¶ 25. In the present case, the City has not made a final determination as to approval of the Hoepkers' plat. More importantly, the dimensions and exact location of the open space corridor are presently unknown. Since it is impossible to ascertain the nature and extent of permitted development on the Hoepkers' land, we cannot determine whether the City's actions are excessive and therefore constitute a taking. Consequently, the first element is not ripe. ¶ 26. Additionally, the legislature has established a procedure for inverse condemnation through which an individual may seek compensation for a regulatory taking. See Wis. Stat. § 32.10. The Hoepkers have not utilized this procedure. Thus, the second element also is not ripe. ¶ 27. Since the Hoepkers' temporary regulatory takings claim is not ripe, we do not reach the merits of this claim. [22] However, we also conclude that it is unreasonable to require the Hoepkers to wait until the final plat approval process for details as to the size and location of the open space corridor, because [t]he purpose of a preliminary plat is to assure the subdivider that he is proceeding in an acceptable manner before he spends the money to have a final plat made. Lakeshore Development Corp. v. Plan Comm'n of Oconomowoc Lake, 12 Wis. 2d 560, 568, 107 N.W.2d 590 (1961) (quoting IV Wisconsin Legislative Council Reports, at 20 (1955)). Therefore, on remand, the City must provide the Hoepkers with specific details as to the size and location of the open space corridor. ¶ 28. In conclusion, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 236.45 does not authorize the City to condition plat approval on annexation, because this would contravene the procedures established by the legislature in ch. 66 by allowing the City to coerce the Hoepkers into agreeing to annexation. In addition, we conclude that the Hoepkers' temporary regulatory takings claim is not ripe for adjudication. Therefore, we remand this case to the circuit court, with directions to remand it to the City for further proceedings on the Hoepkers' application for preliminary plat approval. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded.