Opinion ID: 1936059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preliminary disposition

Text: The first issue we address is Snyder's assertion that the trial court committed an error of law when it refused to grant his request for a court appointed physician pursuant to the drug dependent statute 35 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 780-118(a). As discussed more fully, infra, if the court had granted Snyder's petition, the court would have appointed a physician to determine whether Snyder should receive rehabilitative treatment in lieu of subjecting him to the criminal prosecution and penalties of the driving under the influence statute, with the final decision on rehabilitation or prosecution resting with the district attorney. We hold that the rehabilitative provisions of the drug dependent statute are not applicable as a preliminary disposition to persons charged with driving under the influence. [2] Our conclusion is based on an analysis of the driving under the influence statute. In determining the application of a statute, our primary objective is to discern the legislative intent behind that statute. 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1921(a) (Purdon 1988). The primary method of determining the meaning of a statute is simply to look at the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statute as written by the Legislature. Id. at § 1921(b). However, where the meaning is not clear on the face of the statute, the courts are instructed to look at other factors in determining legislative intent. Thus, in construing the legislative intent behind a statute the court may look to (1) the occasion and necessity of the statute, id. at § 1921(c)(1); (2) the circumstances in which it was enacted, id. at § 1921(c)(2); (3) the mischief to be remedied, id. at § 1921(c)(3); and (4) the object to be attained by the law, id. at § 1921(c)(4). See Moon Township v. Police Officers of Moon Township, 508 Pa. 495, 498 A.2d 1305 (1985). In addition, the court may consider the former law on the same subject, 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1921(c)(5) (Purdon 1988); Commonwealth v. Wescott, 362 Pa.Super. 176, 523 A.2d 1140, appeal denied, 516 Pa. 640, 533 A.2d 712 (1987), as well as what the consequences of a particular interpretation would be. 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1921(c)(6) (Purdon 1988); Tyler v. King, 344 Pa.Super. 78, 496 A.2d 16 (1985). Moreover, we must recognize that in construing the statute there is a presumption that the legislature did not intend unreasonable or absurd results. 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1922(1) (Purdon 1988); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979). In interpreting statutes we also consider the rules of construction governing situations where two statutes are at issue. In such cases, a court attempts to construe the statutes in harmony if possible. Appeal of Yerger, 460 Pa. 537, 333 A.2d 902 (1975); Commonwealth v. Smith, 375 Pa.Super. 419, 544 A.2d 991 (1988) (en banc). However, where a general statute and special statute are in conflict, the special prevails unless the general was enacted later in time and the Legislature intended the general provision to prevail. 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1933 (Purdon 1988). Additionally, where two general statutes are in conflict, the one enacted on the later date prevails. Id. at § 1936 (Purdon 1988); Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver County, Society of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977). The primary statute before us is a provision of the driving under the influence statute, 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 3731 as amended in 1982 and 1984 (DUI statute). The circumstance for amending the DUI statute was the need to respond to the grim situation of death and serious injury caused by intoxicated drivers on our roads and highways. See generally, Comment, The New Pennsylvania Drunk Driving Law: Last Call for the One-For-The-Road Era, 87 Dick.L.Rev. 805 (1983). Much of the motivation for the new law was provided by citizens groups such as the Mothers Against Drunk Drivers. Id. It is clear from an examination of the prior law under § 3731, that the object to be attained by the wholesale amendments of 1982 was a more thorough and exacting means for dealing with intoxicated drivers in an effort to limit the carnage they caused. Id. at 813-817. Thus, for example, under the prior § 3731(d) [a]ny person violating any of the provisions of this section [was] guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree. 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 3731(d) (Purdon 1977) (amended 1982). Under current § 3731(e), violators are guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree with provisions for a minimum fine and mandatory terms of imprisonment. We thus see the circumstances that gave birth to the current driving under the influence laws and the evil they seek to control. We will now examine the consequences, reasonableness and integrity of interpreting § 3731 to include Snyder's reading which would incorporate the preliminary disposition provisions of the drug dependent statute into the DUI statute. The language in the DUI statute which gives rise to appellant's argument provides for preliminary disposition in the form of Accelerative Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) or any other form of preliminary disposition for certain persons charged with DUI. 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 3731(e)(2). See also id. at §§ 1548, 3731(e)(7), (8). Appellant urges us to find that the language any other form of preliminary disposition includes preliminary disposition under the drug dependent statute. The driving under the influence statute does not define or describe what is meant by other forms of preliminary disposition. ARD is the only form of preliminary disposition expressly named in section 3731 and in the related statutes. Snyder insists that the preliminary disposition of the drug dependent statute, section 780-118(a) is applicable to him, an individual with repeated DUI convictions. The relevant portion of the drug dependent statute provides: Disposition in lieu of trial or criminal punishment If a person charged with a nonviolent crime claims to be drug dependent or a drug abuser and prior to trial he requests appropriate treatment, including but not limited to, admission or commitment under the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 in lieu of criminal prosecution, a physician experienced or trained in the field of drug dependency or drug abuse shall be appointed by the court to examine, if necessary, and to review the accused's record and advise the government attorney, the accused and the court in writing setting forth that for the treatment and rehabilitation of the accused it would be preferable for the criminal charges to be held in abeyance or withdrawn in order to institute treatment for drug dependence or for the criminal charges to be prosecuted. The government attorney shall exercise his discretion whether or not to accept the physician's recommendation. Like ARD, as limited by the driving under the influence statute, the drug dependent statute is aimed at nonviolent offenders in cases where treatment or rehabilitation may be preferable in lieu of criminal prosecution. See infra. Moreover, as with ARD, the choice to pursue a disposition under the drug dependent statute is subject to the discretion of the prosecuting attorney. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 175, 176. Under the DUI statute, ARD is a highly restricted form of preliminary disposition. See 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ 3731(e)(6), (7) (governing additional conditions for ARD under the drunk driving laws and circumstances for revocation of ARD). Further, under section 3731(d) persons are not eligible for ARD where (1) previously they have been found guilty of a charge brought under section 3731 or accepted ARD under that section within the last seven years; (2) there has been a 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1542 (Purdon 1977) violation relating to habitual offenders; and (3) an accident occurred in relation to the current charge that resulted in death or serious injury. Id. at § 3731(d). [3] It is thus clear from the face of the statute that ARD is only available to first time non-habitual offenders who have not been involved in a serious accident. Snyder requests that we interpret the language, any other form of preliminary disposition in the driving under the influence statute to include preliminary disposition under the drug dependent statute. His interpretation, however, undermines and works at cross purposes with ARD. Under Snyder's reading of the statute, defendants with multiple DUI convictions would be eligible for preliminary dispositions under the drug dependent statute where they would be ineligible for acceptance into ARD. We can discern no reason why the Legislature would have intended this broad and conceivably less restrictive route of preliminary disposition in face of the fact that the Legislature has continued to enact more stringent penalties for DUI violations. We further find that where the Legislature has carefully constructed a specific statutory role for preliminary dispositions, namely ARD, it would work an unreasonable result to allow application of an analogous and less restrictive form of preliminary disposition for which the Legislature did not expressly provide in the absence of a convincing rationale to do so. In essence, we find that the preliminary disposition provision of the more general drug dependent statute is not applicable as a preliminary disposition under DUI. See Commonwealth v. Waters, 361 Pa.Super. 154, 522 A.2d 60, appeal denied, 515 Pa. 621, 531 A.2d 430 (1987) (special newly enacted statute applying to drunk drivers must be construed to take precedence over more general statute permitting probation for drug or alcohol dependency enacted over ten years earlier); 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ 1933, 1936. We observe that the inapplicability of the drug dependency statute does not in any way limit the possibilities for therapeutic treatment for substance abusers who drive under the influence. Under 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1548, the courts have been given a wide mandate to order treatment for those drivers found to be involved with controlled substances or alcohol. Section 1548(a) requires all persons convicted of a DUI violation or offered ARD thereunder to be evaluated using the Court Reporting Network to determine the extent of the person's involvement with drugs or alcohol. Section 1548(c) therein provides: Based on the results of evaluation and any additional information and evidence, the court may in addition to any other requirements of the court or this title determine and require, as part of sentencing or condition of parole, probation or Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other preliminary disposition, that the person successfully complete a prescribed program of individual or group intervention or supervised inpatient or outpatient treatment or any other combination of these programs or treatments for a period of up to two years in duration. It is clear that a complete range of therapeutic programs is available for all levels of DUI offenders under the DUI statute. Thus again, we find no rationale for applying the generally worded and less circumscribed drug dependent statute in circumstances where the Legislature has set forth special statutes expressly dealing with the treatment of those who drive under the influence. In sum, for all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that a preliminary disposition under the drug dependent statute, 35 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 780-118(a), is inapplicable where a person is charged with driving under the influence.