Opinion ID: 608078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Political Discharge

Text: 18 A public employee may not be discharged, demoted, or disciplined for political activities or beliefs, unless political affiliation or belief is an appropriate job qualification for the particular position. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). Assuming, without deciding, that political affiliation was a motivating factor for O'Connor's discharge, see Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); see also Acosta-Sepulveda v. Hernandez-Purcell, 889 F.2d 9, 12-13 (1st Cir.1989); Rosado v. Zayas, 813 F.2d 1263 (1st Cir.1987), we affirm the grant of summary judgment against O'Connor, since we conclude that political affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the Superintendent position. 19 Although [t]he difficulties in determining whether a government employee is protected from a politically motivated discharge are considerable, Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1214 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc), the test we apply is familiar. First, we inquire whether the overall functions of the employee's department or agency involve decision making on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation, Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir.1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014, 107 S.Ct. 1888, 95 L.Ed.2d 496 (1987); see also Rodriguez-Burgos v. Electric Energy Auth., 853 F.2d 31, 35 (1st Cir.1988); Goyco de Maldonado v. Rivera, 849 F.2d 683, 684-85 (1st Cir.1988). Second, we decide whether the particular responsibilities of the plaintiff's position, within the department or agency, resemble those of a policymaker, privy to confidential information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally appropriate requirement for continued tenure. Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242. Among the indicia material to the second element are  'relative pay, technical competence, power to control others, authority to speak in the name of policymakers, public perception, influence on programs, contact with elected officials, and responsiveness to partisan politics and political leaders.'  Id. (quoting Ecker v. Cohalan, 542 F.Supp. 896, 901 (E.D.N.Y.1982)); see also Mendez-Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1st Cir.1987); see generally Stott v. Martin, 783 F.Supp. 970, 976-82 (E.D.N.C.1992) (collecting First Circuit case law following Jimenez Fuentes ). 20 The summary judgment record establishes beyond peradventure that the Department handled matters potentially subject to partisan political differences, Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1258, not unlike governmental departments in larger municipalities. See Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 641 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946, 106 S.Ct. 313, 88 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985) (cautioning against unduly myopic view of the role of politics in the seemingly apolitical context of universal provision of services). 21 The primary function of any local government entity is the provision of services such as police and fire protection, public schools, hospitals, transportation, and libraries, as well as quasi-utility functions such as water, garbage, and sewage services. Elections often turn on the success or failure of the incumbent to provide these services, and, as campaigns develop, the opposing sides put forth varying proposals about how best to provide services. While the ultimate goal of all sides might be the same, there is clearly room for principled disagreement in the development and implementation of plans to achieve that goal. 22 Id. Here, the Department's role in the life of the Town plainly parallels the Water Department's role in Tomczak, which repeatedly has been cited in this circuit as a benchmark for evaluating the political responsibilities of public employment. See, e.g., Collazo Rivera v. Torres Gaztambide, 812 F.2d 258, 260 (1st Cir.1987) (finding administration of agrarian reform programs, by Puerto Rico's Regional Housing Administration, at least as important to partisan political goals as the provision of water discussed in Tomczak); see also Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 867 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir.1989) (finding no evidence of comparable responsibility between Water Director's position in Tomczak and plaintiff's position as Administrative Aide to the Assistant Director of Public Works in Town of Moca, Puerto Rico); Roman Melendez v. Inclan, 826 F.2d 130, 133 (1st Cir.1987) (finding duties of Regional Manager in Puerto Rico's General Services Administration analogous, in general character, to that of Water Director in Tomczak ). 3 It also offers clear confirmation of Tomczak's continuing validity: by all accounts, as the district court pointed out, the 1990 elections for Town Selectman turned in large part on the Department's failure to assure safe drinking water to Town residents. 23 Moreover, whatever difficulties we might face in applying the second prong of the Jimenez Fuentes test to subordinate positions within the Department, see, e.g., Cordero, 867 F.2d at 14-15 (finding political affiliation inappropriate job requirement for assistant director of public works), the Superintendent's inherent responsibilities under the Town Charter, as the person responsible for the administration of all departments within the scope of his duty, plainly  'had a bearing on the partisan goals and policies'  of the Department as a whole. Rodriguez-Burgos, 853 F.2d at 35 (quoting Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1263). O'Connor protests that, in practice, his position involved little managerial responsibility, and he was in fact essentially a working foreman. As we have held, however, the actual past duties of the discharged employee are irrelevant if the position inherently encompasses more expansive powers and more important functions that would tend to make political affiliation an appropriate requirement for effective performance. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1258 (emphasis added). Accordingly, absent ambiguity in the official job description, the analysis must focus upon the powers inherent in a given office, as opposed to the functions performed by a particular occupant of that office. Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242; see also, e.g., Batistini v. Aquino, 890 F.2d 535 (1st Cir.1989); Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1258; cf. Stott, 783 F.Supp. at 976 n. 6 (noting that the Jimenez Fuentes court did review plaintiffs' testimony about their actual duties, and concluding that such testimony may be useful in filling gaps left by the official job description and in amplifying the responsibilities listed in the description ... [though not] to belittle the job into one with less significant responsibilities). 24 The district court carefully, and in great detail, analyzed the job description for the position of Superintendent, and its unchallenged findings--that seventeen of twenty-three listed duties are policymaking, representative, or personnel functions--comport with our common sense judgment on the matter. See Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242. As the district court correctly determined that O'Connor's political affiliation was an appropriate criterion for the position that he held, we affirm its grant of summary judgment on the political discharge claim.