Opinion ID: 1190112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tinker Is Silent About How Content-Neutral Regulations of Pure Speech and Regulations Affecting Expressive Conduct Should be Evaluated

Text: In Tinker, a group of students had arranged to wear black armbands to school to protest the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War. 393 U.S. at 504, 89 S.Ct. 733. Upon learning of this plan, the Des Moines Independent School District adopted a policy prohibiting students from wearing such armbands, apparently fearing the disturbance they might cause. Id. at 504, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733. When the students were suspended for violating the no-armband policy, they filed suit, arguing that the policy violated their rights to free speech under the First Amendment. Id. at 504, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that, [i]n order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Id. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Court further explained: [I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk; and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom  this kind of openness  that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society. Id. at 508-509, 89 S.Ct. 733 (internal citation omitted). In short, the Court made clear that suppressing the expression of unpopular or controversial opinions  even in the name of avoiding potential in-school disturbances  was a violation of the First Amendment unless the school could show that, absent such suppression, the school's orderly operation would be materially and substantially compromised. Id. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733. Despite Plaintiffs' attempt to read Tinker more broadly, this is all Tinker expressly holds. Two things are notable about this limited holding. First, as the Court itself made clear, its substantial interference test applies only to restrictions on pure speech, and does not necessarily apply to school policies placing incidental restrictions on expressive conduct. See id. at 507-08, 89 S.Ct. 733 (The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment.); King v. Saddleback Jr. Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.1971) (declining to employ Tinker analysis to student's claim that policy disallowing long hair for male students violated the First Amendment). Thus, Tinker leaves unresolved the question of how restrictions upon expressive conduct in schools should be evaluated. [25] But see generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (The government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting [pure speech].). Second, the holding itself extends only to viewpoint- based speech restrictions, and not necessarily to viewpoint- neutral speech restrictions. Although these two terms of art had not yet been used by the Supreme Court when Tinker was decided in 1969, see Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976), the Tinker opinion makes clear that the Court's principal objection to the armband prohibition was that it was motivated by a desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that ... accompany an unpopular viewpoint.  393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733 (emphasis added). In essence, the Court found the armband prohibition unconstitutional not simply because it worked to prohibit students from engaging in a form of pure speech, but because it did so based on the particular opinion the students were espousing. Id. at 510-11, 89 S.Ct. 733 (finding it significant that the school authorities did not purport to prohibit the wearing of all symbols of political or controversial significance, ... [but only] the wearing of armbands ... worn to exhibit opposition to this Nation's involvement in Vietnam). Although a slightly more expansive reading of Tinker suggests that its mode of analysis should also be used when a school's regulation is content-based (not only when it is viewpoint-based), [26] no reading of Tinker suggests that viewpoint- and content- neutral restrictions on student speech should also be subjected to  Tinker scrutiny. Indeed, neither this court nor the Supreme Court has ever analyzed a content-neutral restriction on student speech under Tinker; rather, the Tinker test has only been employed when a school's restrictions have been based, at least in part, on the particular messages students were attempting to communicate. [27] It is thus our view that Tinker says nothing about how viewpoint- and content-neutral restrictions on student speech should be analyzed, thereby leaving room for a different level of scrutiny than that employed in either Bethel, Hazelwood, or Tinker when student speech is restricted on a viewpoint- and content-neutral basis. Accord Canady, 240 F.3d at 441-43. [28]