Opinion ID: 862630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: L.R.3rd 1213, 1215, (1976).

Text: Mr. Lewis (the contractor) had a duty to volunteer information as to the contents of the fill and underlying soil. Lewis v. Anchorage Asphalt Paving Co., 535 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Alaska 1975); Rippy v. Phipps, 475 P.2d 646 (Colo.App.1970); Wurst v. Pruyn, 250 La. 1109, 202 So.2d 268 (1967); Greneaux v. Castle I, Inc., 404 So.2d 309 (La.App.1981) (For the contractor has expert knowledge of such things, or should have, and he must bring these things to the attention of the owners, who have no knowledge of such affairs. 404 So.2d at 311) (quoting Wurst v. Pruyn, supra; Luxurious Swimming Pools, Inc. v. Tepe, 177 Ind.App. 384, 379 N.E.2d 992, 996 (1978) ; Dixon v. Ledbetter, 262 Ark. 758, 561 S.W.2d 294 (1978). George B. Gilmore Co. v. Garrett, 582 So.2d 387, 393 (Miss. 1995). ¶7. We have also found that In 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 491, p. 992, it is said A party to a contract may waive provisions for his benefit; and likewise there may be a waiver of conditions precedent or severable stipulations. See also Moore v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 176 Miss. 65, 166 So. 395; Tower Underwriters, Inc., v. Culley, 211 Miss. 788, 53 So.2d 94; Oden Construction Co. v. Helton, 218 Miss. 41, 65 So.2d 442; 12 Am.Jur. pg. 918, Sec. 354. A waiver may be inferred from the actions and conduct of the parties. Waiver usually results when there is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 492, p. 995. . . . Mariani v. Hennington, 229 Miss. 212, 226, 90 So.2d 356, 362 (1956). ¶8. In this case, a directed verdict for the contractor would have been appropriate under this notice and waiver analysis. As previously pointed out in George B. Gilmore Co., supra, this Court held that a contractor has a duty to warn as to the content of the fill and underlying soil. In the case sub judice, it is clear that the contractor, via its subcontractor, warned the owners of the unstable soil fill around the gas tanks, and that the concrete would not be adequately supported. The duty to notify the owners was fulfilled. Thereafter, the actions of the Appellants in instructing the contractor to proceed constituted a waiver of any defect in the pouring of the concrete caused by the insufficient fill and compaction of the underlying soil. Judge McMillin, writing the Court of Appeals dissent in this case, aptly addressed this premise as follows: . . . In this case, we have an issue of an act by the contractor that, in itself, is neutral in terms of negligence. Pouring concrete over poorly compacted soil, knowing that the concrete will not last as long as it would if the underlying soil were better compacted, is not, in itself, a negligent act. It may be a poor decision from a business standpoint if one hopes to enjoy the use of the poured concrete for an extended period of time, but that does not necessarily make the act negligent. In the same context, an owner's decision, in the midst of a construction project, to forego the added expense of further soil compaction efforts and merely hope that adding steel reinforcement to the overlying concrete will provide the usability the owner desires -- even in the face of informed opinion that this is not the likely result -- does not invoke considerations of competing negligence that is a necessary consideration in a comparative negligence case. ¶9. The case went to the jury. The jury found for the contractor. Even if the instruction which caused the Court of Appeals to reverse was not proper, it was not reversible error. In Wallace v. J.C. Penney Co., 236 Miss. 367, 109 So. 2d 876 (1959), this Court found that an assumption of risk instruction was error because it eliminated any distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence. This Court affirmed despite the error because [N]o judgment shall be reversed on the ground of misdirection to the jury ... unless it shall affirmatively appear, from the whole record, that such judgment has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 236 Miss. at 373, 109 So. 2d at 878 (quoting Miss. Sup. Ct. R. 11). As the Court explained, [E]rror in instructions is not prejudicial as against an unsuccessful plaintiff who has no cause of action, who is not entitled to recover in any event, or who fails in his evidence to support the cause of action. . . . 236 Miss. at 373, 109 So. 2d at 878 (quoting 3 Am. Jur. Appeal & Error § 1112). See also M.R.C.P. 61. ¶10. In the instant case, the jury's verdict is not a miscarriage of justice. As also pointed out by Judge McMillin in his dissent, what else could the subcontractor, and hence the contractor, do? The owner was told - the duty was satisfied - and the owner chose to proceed. The owner failed to prove that the contract was wilfully breached and failed to show that the contractor was negligent or grossly negligent. ¶11. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals with the result that the judgment of the Leake County Circuit Court is reinstated and affirmed. ¶12. REVERSED. PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., SMITH, WALLER AND COBB, JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SULLIVAN, P.J. BANKS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.