Opinion ID: 792413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ochoa's Failure to State a Prima Facie Case

Text: 154 Even if we adopted the dissent's unsupported view that the government could determine the ethnicity of potential jurors, we would still reach the same result here because, as a matter of law, Ochoa failed to establish a prima facie case under Batson. In that regard, we note that the district court denied his challenge without determining whether there was a sufficient pattern of strikes by the government to create an inference of discrimination. But the record on appeal contains the necessary statistical information for a thorough prima-facie-case analysis, which we will now undertake. 38 155 In order to determine whether a Batson objector like Ochoa has established a prima facie case of discrimination, courts must consider all relevant circumstances. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; Novaton, 271 F.3d at 1002; Lowder, 236 F.3d at 636. This Court has cautioned that the mere fact of striking a juror or a set of jurors of a particular race does not necessarily create an inference of racial discrimination. Lowder, 236 F.3d at 636; Novaton, 271 F.3d at 1002. While statistical evidence may support an inference of discrimination, it can do so only when placed in context. Lowder, 236 F.3d at 638; Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d at 1298. For example, the number of persons struck takes on meaning only when coupled with other information such as the racial composition of the venire, the race of others struck, or the voir dire answers of those who were struck compared to the answers of those who were not struck. Lowder, 236 F.3d at 636-37 (emphasis in original); see also Novaton, 271 F.3d at 1002 (same); Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d at 1298 (evaluating the strike pattern in light of the racial composition of remaining potential jurors); Stewart, 65 F.3d at 925 (stating that no particular number of strikes against blacks automatically indicates the existence of a prima facie case, and considering, inter alia, the number of struck black jurors as a percentage of the black venire members). 156 In determining whether the totality of the circumstances shows a pattern that creates an inference of discrimination, this Court has considered a number of factors. First, whether members of the relevant racial or ethnic group served unchallenged on the jury. See Lowder, 236 F.3d at 638 ([T]he unchallenged presence of jurors of a particular race on a jury substantially weakens the basis for a prima facie case of discrimination in the peremptory striking of jurors of that race.); Novaton, 271 F.3d at 1002, 1004 (same); King, 196 F.3d at 1335 (finding that not only was there no pattern of discriminatory strikes, there was a sort of `antipattern' where the State accepted one black juror and then struck the second of three black venire members); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1578 (11th Cir.1995) (Although the presence of African-American jurors does not dispose of an allegation of race-based peremptory challenges, it is a significant factor tending to prove the paucity of the claim.); Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d 1404, 1412 (11th Cir.1995) (same); Stewart, 65 F.3d at 926 (same). 157 Similarly, we have considered whether the striker struck all of the relevant racial or ethnic group from the venire, or at least as many as the striker had strikes. See Lowder, 236 F.3d at 637 ([T]he number of jurors of one race struck by the challenged party may be sufficient by itself to establish a prima facie case where a party strikes all or nearly all of the members of one race on a venire (citing United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir.1991))); cf. Dennis, 804 F.2d at 1210-11 (affirming finding of no prima facie case where the government did not use all of its strikes and thus did not attempt to exclude all blacks, or as many blacks as it could, from the jury); Allison, 908 F.2d at 1537 (same, where the prosecutor preserved three black jurors, even though he had enough peremptory challenges to strike all the black jurors). 158 Second, we have considered whether there is a substantial disparity between the percentage of jurors of a particular race or ethnicity struck and the percentage of their representation on the venire. Lowder, 236 F.3d at 637. For example, in Lowder, we concluded that there was no prima facie case of discrimination where the plaintiffs used both of their peremptory strikes against white jurors. In so holding, we stated that there was no significant disparity between the plaintiffs' 100% rate of challenging white jurors and the 80% representation of white jurors on the venire. Id. On the other hand, in Stewart, we upheld a finding of a prima facie case based in part on the fact that, in exercising three peremptory challenges against black jurors, the defense struck 75% of black venire members. 65 F.3d at 925. 159 Third, this Court has considered whether there is a substantial disparity between the percentage of jurors of one race [or ethnicity] struck and the percentage of their representation on the jury. 39 Lowder, 236 F.3d at 637; Novaton, 271 F.3d at 1002. 160 Applying these three factors here leads to the conclusion that the totality of the circumstances does not reveal a pattern of discrimination. 40 Here 44 of the 82 venire members (54%) identified themselves as Hispanic. The government used five of its nine peremptory strikes (56%) against Hispanic jurors. 41 Ochoa used seven of his thirteen peremptory strikes (54%) against Hispanic jurors. Six of the seventeen jurors or alternates (35%) were Hispanic. 42 161 The district court allotted the government six strikes for the selection of the twelve jurors and three strikes for the selection of five alternate jurors, for a total of nine strikes. The government used five of its six strikes against Hispanics in selecting the first twelve jurors and used none of its three strikes against Hispanics in alternate selection. The defense used five of its ten strikes against Hispanics in selecting the jury panel and two of its three strikes against Hispanics in selecting alternate jurors. 162 The government's strikes occurred in this manner. After accepting a Hispanic (No. 399), 43 it used its first strike against a Hispanic juror (No. 051). The government then accepted another Hispanic (No. 232) who served on the jury, before striking a second Hispanic (No. 221). It then accepted a third Hispanic who was subsequently struck by the defense (No. 146). The government then used its third and fourth strikes against Hispanic jurors (No. 234 and 379). 44 Its fifth and sixth strikes were then used against a non-Hispanic (No. 009) and a Hispanic juror (No. 124), respectively. After the government exhausted its strikes, seven more jurors were placed on the jury, including two more Hispanics (No. 447 and 246). 163 Then, during the selection of alternates the government used each of its three strikes against non-Hispanic jurors, while accepting (1) one Hispanic (No. 511) who was subsequently struck by the defense; (2) one Hispanic (No. 420) whom the court struck or cause; and (3) one Hispanic (No. 620) who served as an alternate. After the government exhausted its alternate strikes, two more Hispanics were made alternates (No. 568 and 583), one of whom ultimately served on the jury. 45 164 Nothing in these statistics suggests that the government employed a pattern of discrimination. Rather, the government's jury-selection choices reflect a sort of anti-pattern. See King, 196 F.3d at 1335. While the government struck five Hispanics, it also accepted at least six Hispanics along the way. 46 Thus, as to the first statistical factor discussed above, the unchallenged presence of six Hispanic jurors and the government's anti-pattern striking manner vitiates Ochoa's Batson claim. 165 Concerning the second factor, the government's strike rate against Hispanics was proportional to the composition of the venire. The venire was 54% Hispanic, and the government used 56% of its peremptory strikes against Hispanics. This factor also undercuts Ochoa's claim. 166 As to the third factor, we recognize that the percentage of Hispanics who ultimately served on the jury (35%) was lower than the percentage of Hispanics in the venire (54%). That result, however, was dictated by the district court's 21 for-cause strikes against Hispanics more so than the government's five strikes against Hispanics. Further, the defense used seven of its thirteen peremptory challenges against Hispanics. Given that the government struck only five of the 44 Hispanics on the venire and the district court and Ochoa together struck 28 of the 44, the 35% factor was not the result of the government's striking pattern. 47 167 Each factor suggests that the government's five peremptory challenges against Hispanics, viewed in context, do not reveal a pattern of discrimination. We thus conclude that Ochoa's Batson claim lacks merit as a matter of law, and a remand on that issue is unnecessary. 168 Ochoa's remaining claims are also without merit. Accordingly, in Ochoa-Vasquez we AFFIRM Ochoa's conviction and sentence. We REVERSE the orders denying Ochoa access to sealed records in that case and REMAND them for reconsideration in light of the above. In Bergonzoli, we AFFIRM the order striking Ochoa's motion to unseal records.