Opinion ID: 531329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing to Apply for Counsel Fees

Text: 1. Justiciability 10 Under Article III of the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States is limited to the resolution of cases or controversies arising under the Constitution or Laws of the United States. This limitation has long been interpreted to require that a litigant have standing to challenge the action. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 757, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). If standing is lacking, then federal court is not an appropriate forum for adjudication of rights. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936). Although standing issues are frequently far from pellucid, it is at least clear that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). 11 Since we find that, with regard to Issues I, II, III, and VII, appellant is asserting rights of his former clients rather than his own, we hold that he has no standing to bring these appeals. 2. Standing 12 Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, in federal civil rights actions, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. Section 1988 was enacted to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances. H.R.Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976). 13 The prevailing party language makes it patently obvious that it is the prevailing party, not the party's counsel, who is entitled to be awarded fees. 3 Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 n. 19, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 1539 n. 19, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986) (the language of the Act, as well as its legislative history, indicates that Congress bestowed on the 'prevailing party ' a statutory eligibility for a discretionary award of attorney's fees....). See also Brown v. General Motors Corp., 722 F.2d 1009, 1011 (2d Cir.1983) (Under the Act it is the prevailing party rather than the lawyer who is entitled to attorney's fees.); White v. N.H. Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 703 (1st Cir.1980) (under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, any award of attorney's fees goes to prevailing party rather than to attorney), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 445, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982). Since the award of attorney's fees belongs initially to the prevailing party, only the party, and not the attorney, has standing to appeal any such grant or denial. Thus, the instant appeal must be dismissed. Soliman v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 822 F.2d 320, 323 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 732, 98 L.Ed.2d 680 (1988). 14 In this case, it is clear that it is only Swanger who is appealing the award of attorney's fees. Moreover, after reviewing the brief submitted to this court by the plaintiffs, it is unfortunately equally obvious that the instant appeal was not only unauthorized by them, but it was not made for their benefit. Had it been argued by the plaintiffs, we would be tempted to discuss whether attorneys' fees could be assessed against Swanger. 4 E.g., Soliman, 822 F.2d at 323 (where appeal brought by attorney over client's statement that it was without permission, sanctions were appropriate). 15 As the Model Rules of Professional Conduct make plain, a lawyer has an obligation to abide by a client's decisions ... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1983), as adopted by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Local Rule 211.4(B) (1984). Swanger clearly acted inappropriately in making this appeal over the objections of his former clients. 16