Opinion ID: 2084428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juror Claim Fails

Text: A trial judge has wide discretion in deciding how to handle a sleeping juror. [4] In Bialach's case, however, there is no evidence in the record that any juror was ever asleep. In denying Bialach's motion for postconviction relief, the Superior Court concluded that the remarks made by the prosecutor at the end of trial were clearly understood by Bialach's attorney and the trial judge to be facetious rather than serious. [5] The jurist who denied Bialach's motion for postconviction relief was uniquely qualified to make that determination since he was also the judge who presided at trial. Bialach's claim alleging that a juror slept is based upon the United States Constitution. A reversal of his conviction is mandated if Bialach was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury. [6] There is no record evidence at all to support Bialach's allegation that any juror was asleep. Accordingly, we find no violation of Bialach's Sixth Amendment rights. We have also concluded that Bialach's claim that the Superior Court abused its discretion in failing to address the issue of an alleged sleeping juror is procedurally barred because it was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. [7] Moreover, Bialach has failed to overcome the procedural bar by showing either cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice from a violation of his rights [8] or a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. [9] These procedural bars constitute an independent state law basis for affirming the Superior Court's judgment with regard to Bialach's unsubstantiated allegation of a sleeping juror. [10]