Opinion ID: 2978563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Dr. Parran’s testimony

Text: Related to the issue of causation, Martinez contends that the district court erred in admitting testimony from Dr. Parran, an addiction specialist who teaches at Case Western Reserve School of Medicine. Dr. Parran testified that the drugs prescribed by Nos. 06-3882/4206 United States v. Martinez Page 27 Dr. Martinez caused the deaths of Lancaster and Knight. Martinez objected to Dr. Parran’s testimony at trial, but the district court overruled the objection. On appeal, Martinez argues that the court impermissibly allowed Dr. Parran to speculate as to the causes of Lancaster’s and Knight’s deaths. We review the district court’s ruling admitting or excluding expert testimony under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999). Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Under Rule 702, the district court must examine the expert witness’s testimony for reliability and relevance. Our review of the district court’s admission of expert testimony must “focus, of course, [] solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate,” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993), and we must confirm that the “factual underpinnings of the expert’s opinions were sound,” Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 1999). However, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. At trial, Dr. Parran testified that Lancaster’s overdose resulted from medication prescribed by Martinez, but on cross-examination he testified that he could not say “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the medicine prescribed caused Lancaster’s death. (JA 2231.) With respect to Knight’s death, Dr. Parran testified that the prescription from Martinez “directly and causally contributed,” such that “if it [had not] been for” that prescription, Knight would not have overdosed. (JA 2219.) First, we observe that this testimony was not admitted in error because it is more than the sort of “unsupported Nos. 06-3882/4206 United States v. Martinez Page 28 speculation” that is prohibited, as it was based on Parran’s examination of the toxicology reports and the patients’ files. See McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 801 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that an “expert’s conclusions regarding causation must have a basis in established fact and cannot be premised on mere suppositions,” and if “based on assumed facts, must find some support for those assumptions in the record”). Thus, we conclude that Dr. Parran’s testimony was not admitted in error. Further, the jury was instructed to consider whether the “course of treatment” proximately caused the deaths of Lancaster and Knight––not simply whether the oral prescriptions themselves resulted in their deaths. Given the evidence from which a rational jury could find that Martinez’s “course of treatment” proximately caused the deaths of Lancaster and Knight, we also conclude that any error in admitting Parran’s testimony was harmless. Baker, 458 F.3d at 520.