Opinion ID: 1624645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether neal received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Text: ¶ 37. With new appellate counsel, Neal lists eight allegations of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel. We quote this list, verbatim: 1. [defense counsel] promised in opening intruders had killed Lakeshia and threatened Neal if he told investigators, but never again touched on this subject at all; 2. failed to object to Crawford v. Washington hearsay used to develop motive and culpability; 3. failed to cross-examine witnesses on the crime scene to develop support for post-mortem decapitation and use autopsy concluding such; 4. failed to object to jury instruction that did not include decapitation and cause of death; 5. failed to move for a change of venue; 6. failed to call Neal to testify in support of intruder defense; 7. failed to make timely objections and demand adverse rulings from the court; 8. failed to request lesser included manslaughter and mutilation instructions. ¶ 38. The State argues that Neal's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim cannot be raised on direct appeal because the claims are incapable of showing deficient performance based upon the four corners of the record. McGregory v. State, 979 So.2d 12, 21 (Miss.Ct.App.2008). Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) states that [i]ssues which may be raised in post-conviction proceedings may also be raised on direct appeal if such issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record. But if the appellant is represented by counsel who did not represent the appellant at trial, the failure to raise such issues on direct appeal shall constitute a waiver barring consideration of the issues in post-conviction proceedings. Id. ¶ 39. The comment more fully explains that: Rule 22(b) allows the appellant to raise post-conviction issues on direct appeal where the issues are fully apparent from the record of the trial, and failure to raise such issues constitutes a waiver. Under this provision, issues such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to evidence offered by the state or to argument by the state must be raised on direct appeal. Other post-conviction issues which cannot be raised at the time of appeal because they involve actions or inaction outside the record are not waived since they cannot practically be raised without further development or investigation. Miss. R.App. P. 22 cmt.; see also Havard v. State, 928 So.2d 771, 782-84 (Miss.2006). ¶ 40. This Court also has detailed the appropriate standards of review and tests for determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel: a defendant must prove that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency was so substantial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Wilcher v. State, 479 So.2d 710, 713 (Miss.1985); Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984). This Court looks at the totality of circumstances to determine whether counsel's efforts were both deficient and prejudicial. Carney v. State, 525 So.2d 776, 780 (Miss.1988); Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 839 (Miss.1983). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance [is] highly deferential. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. There is a strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Carney, 525 So.2d at 780; Gilliard v. State, 462 So.2d 710, 714 (Miss.1985). Only where it is reasonably probable that but for the attorney's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different, will we find that counsel's performance was deficient. Dickey v. State, 662 So.2d 1106, 1109 (Miss.1995); Reed v. State, 536 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Miss.1988). Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 989 (Miss. 1998). ¶ 41. Neal's first argument is that his trial counsel provided the framework of a defense theory during his opening statement, but he never mentioned that theory again. It is true that during his opening statement, defense counsel explained how armed intruders entered the home, held Neal at gunpoint, and then shot and decapitated Cleveland. He told the jury that Neal initially had told this same story to investigators. This initial theory of defense was not explored by the defense during cross-examination of the State's witnesses or during Neal's case-in-chief. ¶ 42. Just because certain issues may properly be raised on direct appeal,... we still must make a determination as to whether certain issues should be addressed on direct appeal, or be left for another day for post-conviction relief proceedings. Havard, 928 So.2d at 784. The specific issue here is whether or not defense counsel's failure to address the intruder theory during Neal's case-in-chief constituted ineffective assistance. There is no way to definitely analyze this question without information outside the record. There could be several reasonable explanations for why defense counsel never revisited the intruder theory, including the fact that Neal did not take the stand. Because this issue involves questions of inaction by trial counsel and would require information outside the record, it cannot properly be addressed at this time. It more appropriately would be raised in post-conviction-relief proceedings. ¶ 43. As for the remaining seven assertions made by Neal in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, none constitutes ineffective assistance. Neal's assertions that defense counsel failed to object to hearsay and jury instructions and failed to make timely objections are all protected as within the realm of trial strategy. The decision to `make certain objections fall[s] within the ambit of trial strategy and cannot give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.' Spicer v. State, 973 So.2d 184, 203 (Miss.2007) (quoting Powell v. State, 806 So.2d 1069, 1077 (Miss.2001)). Likewise, Neal's claim that defense counsel failed to cross-examine witnesses to develop a post-mortem-decapitation theory falls within the ambit of trial strategy. See Wilcher, 863 So.2d at 762. Neal's allegation that defense counsel was deficient for failing to move for a change of venue does not require reversal. This Court has held that defense counsel is under no duty to attempt to transfer venue; therefore, the decision not to seek a change of venue would fall within the realm of trial strategy. Brawner v. State, 947 So.2d 254, 262 (Miss.2006). Neal's claim that it was error for counsel not to request the lesser-offense manslaughter and mutilation jury instructions fails, as this Court has stated that trial counsel's decision to not request a jury instruction falls under the category of trial tactics, which are not subject to review. Smiley v. State, 815 So.2d 1140, 1148 (Miss.2002) ¶ 44. Finally, the fact that defense counsel never called Neal to testify in support of an intruder defense does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial judge questioned Neal in chambers about whether or not he wanted to testify. Neal and his defense counsel spoke privately about the matter, and Neal determined that he wished to remain silent. The record also indicates that defense counsel discussed the possibility of testifying versus not testifying with Neal on several occasions, and Neal felt that it was in his best interest not to testify. Neal agreed with these statements while in chambers. Defense counsel cannot be held in error for failing to call a defendant to testify when the defendant makes an informed and voluntary decision to remain silent. Gray v. State, 887 So.2d 158, 168 (Miss.2004). None of Neal's contentions requires reversal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.