Opinion ID: 2087167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of Craig

Text: I am of the opinion that the mandatory construction of the ballot-initialling requirement is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. I conclude that the Craig exception to such construction should apply to the ballots in this case. It is established that the right to vote, which includes the right to have a vote counted ( Craig, 39 Ill.2d at 195, 233 N.E.2d 345), in an election of general interest is a fundamental right. Any legislation which operates to impair a person's right to vote on grounds other than residency, age, or citizenship, can stand only if it can survive strict scrutiny analysis. ( Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education (1990), 142 Ill.2d 54, 74, 153 Ill.Dec. 177, 566 N.E.2d 1283 (and cases cited therein).) Further: Under a standard of strict scrutiny, the court must conclude that the means employed by the legislature to achieve the stated goal were necessary to advance a compelling State interest. Too, the statute must be narrowly tailored, that is, the legislature must use the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of the legislative goal. Fumarolo, 142 Ill.2d at 73, 153 Ill.Dec. 177, 566 N.E.2d 1283. The mandatory construction of the ballot-initialling requirement is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case for two reasons. First, it is not necessary to apply the mandatory construction here to achieve the legislative goal of preserving the integrity of the election. I reject the idea that in-precinct balloting is more susceptible to fraud than absentee balloting. It is true that a ballot box can be stuffed with forged in-precinct ballots while the polls are open. However, a ballot box can be stuffed also with forged absentee ballots after the polls are closed. On the day of an election, an election authority sends cast absentee ballots, with their accompanying absentee ballot applications, to their respective precinct polling places. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, pars. 192.1, 198.) After the polls close, an election judge determines if each absentee ballot was cast by a qualified voter in the precinct. If so, the election judge, at that point, initials the cast absentee ballot and deposits it in the ballot box with the in-precinct ballots. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 46, par. 199. This process shows that absentee balloting is as susceptible to fraud as in-precinct balloting. Both types of ballots receive similar treatment by an election judge. In the context of either absentee or in-precinct balloting, an election judge verifies a voter's identity, residence, and receipt of only one ballot. The election judge then places both types of ballots in the common ballot box. Thus, an election official at a polling place has as much opportunity to stuff a ballot box with forged absentee ballots as with forged in-precinct ballots. I further note that a mandatory construction of the ballot exclusionary rule could actually threaten the integrity of an election. A mandatory construction of such a ballot requirement would often permit unscrupulous election officers to invalidate elections at will. State ex rel. Wahl v. Richards (1949), 44 Del. 566, 581, 64 A.2d 400, 407. In the present case, the majority acknowledges that the trial court dismissed for lack of proof McDunn's allegation of fraud in the primary. (156 Ill.2d at 296-97, 189 Ill.Dec. at 422, 620 N.E.2d at 390.) Absent allegations of fraud, if it is not necessary to exclude uninitialled absentee ballots to preserve the integrity of an election, then it is not necessary to exclude uninitialled in-precinct ballots. Second, the mandatory construction of the ballot-initialling requirement was not the least restrictive means to preserve the integrity of this election. The mandatory construction is an unconstitutional burden that disfranchises an innocent, qualified voter based on the failure or omission of an election judge. If the legislature can enact a law whereby election judges can effectively disfranchise all of the voters of a precinct, where those voters are not at fault, then the constitutional right to vote is of small consequence. Moyer v. Van De Vanter (1895), 12 Wash. 377, 382, 41 P. 60, 61. The court in Moyer recognized a distinction between the obligations placed upon the individual voter and those matters which relate to the duties of election officers. ( Moyer, 12 Wash, at 382, 41 P. at 61.) The court reasoned: The individual voter may well be called upon to see that the requirements of the law applying to himself are complied with before casting his ballot, and if he should willfully or carelessly violate the same, there would be no hardship or injustice in depriving him of his vote; but if, on the other hand, he should in good faith comply with the law upon his part, it would be a great hardship were he deprived of his ballot through some fault or mistake of an election officer in failing to comply with a provision of the law over which the voter had no control. (Emphasis added.) Moyer, 12 Wash, at 382-83, 41 P. at 61. It is an unnecessary burden to require each in-precinct voter to know the ballot-initialling requirement and to search his or her ballot for an election judge's initials. Contrary to the majority's assertion (156 Ill.2d at 318, 189 Ill.Dec. at 433, 620 N.E.2d at 401), a voter's constitutional right to have his ballot counted should not depend on his ability to detect the failure or omission of an election judge. Indeed, the majority refers to the presumption that election officials perform their statutory duties. (156 Ill.2d at 318, 189 Ill.Dec. at 433, 620 N.E.2d at 401.) This is all the more reason for an innocent voter not to search his ballot for an election judge's mistake or omission, but rather to rely on the presumption that the election judge had given him a legal ballot. The court in Moyer recognized that less restrictive means existed to protect the integrity of an election. If an election judge is determined to have violated an Election Code provision, the judge can be punished and in this way the law can be rendered effectual without going to the extent of depriving the voter of his right to have his vote counted in consequence of such violation. Moyer, 12 Wash. at 384, 41 P. at 62. I lastly note that these views are not new to this court. In Slenker v. Engel (1911), 250 Ill. 499, 95 N.E. 618, this court ruled that certain ballots could not be counted because they lacked the initials of an election judge. ( Slenker, 250 Ill. at 510-11, 95 N.E. 618.) Dissenting, Chief Justice Carter stated in pertinent part: A voter should not be deprived of his vote by a mistake of election officers where he is not at fault, and the ballot itself, or other evidence in the record, shows that the ballot is genuine, delivered by the judges to the voter and by him voted, and that the lack of the judges' initials was caused by mistake. The initials of a judge in his handwriting are for the purpose of identifying the ballot, but if the ballot can be fully identified, even in the absence of the initials, and it is shown that it was cast by a legal voter, it should be counted. Slenker, 250 Ill. at 511-12, 95 N.E. 618 (Carter, C.J., dissenting). I would reverse the appellate and trial courts. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.