Opinion ID: 610149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the void for vagueness doctrine as applied to the term

Text: 10 COCAINE BASE IN 21 U.S.C. § 841 11 Sanders argues that the court should declare 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) void for vagueness as it applies to his convictions for distributing and aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine base. Section 841(a)(1) provides that: 12 it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally--1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.... 13 Section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) provides for sentencing under § 841(a)(1) if a defendant is convicted of a violation of subsection (a) involving fifty grams or more of a mixture or substance ... which contains cocaine base. (Emphasis added). Moreover, § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) permits a convicted defendant to be sentenced for a violation of § 841(a) involving five grams or more of a mixture or substance ... which contains cocaine base. (Emphasis added). The statute mandates a substantially longer sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base than for a similar amount of simple cocaine. United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 753-55 (7th Cir.1991); Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Sanders contends that the district court erred in calculating his sentence by applying the more severe penalties for offenses involving cocaine base under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3) as opposed to those involving simple cocaine. 14 Sanders asserts that because federal case law to date has not developed a uniform definition for cocaine base, the statute is unconstitutionally vague because his conduct may or may not fall within § 841(a)(1) depending on how cocaine base is defined. Sanders has the burden of demonstrating that § 841(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Cherry, 983 F.2d 748, 754 (7th Cir.1991). In challenging a statute as void for vagueness, the defendant-appellant is initially required to establish that § 841(a)(1) fails to define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983); United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d 720, 726 (7th Cir.1992). More importantly, Sanders must establish that the statute fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern the discretion of law enforcement officials. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 103 S.Ct. at 1858-59; Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d at 726. The defendant-appellant does not argue that § 841 fails to define the criminal offenses for which he was convicted, rather he contends that the § 841(a)(1) prohibition against distributing cocaine base fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern the discretion of law enforcement officials because the federal courts have not arrived at a uniform, consistent definition of what constitutes cocaine base. It is true that neither the statute nor the Sentencing Guidelines contains a definition of cocaine base, United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412, 416 (9th Cir.1991), and that the circuit courts are not in complete agreement on the substance's identifying characteristics. Compare United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1134-35 (1st Cir.1992) with Shaw, 936 F.2d at 416. However all the circuits which have addressed the question agree that cocaine base includes crack. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir.1992); Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d at 1134-35; Shaw, 936 F.2d at 416; United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1033 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 974 (1991); United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Brown, 859 F.2d 974, 976 (D.C.Cir.1988). 15 In the instant case, the record clearly reveals that the substance sold in two of the drug buys arranged by Sanders was crack. Specifically, chemist Avedesian stated at Sanders' trial that the cocaine base (which Avedesian said is known as crack) Ellis bought from Sanders on March 8, 1991 was chemically distinguishable from cocaine hydrochloride or powder cocaine because: 16 cocaine hydrochloride, normally the powder comes in the salt form which makes it soluble in water. Cocaine base or crack is missing the hyrdochloride, a salt, which would make that cocaine base, just [the] plain form of the cocaine, and its insoluble in water. 17 Similarly, chemist Rees, who analyzed the cocaine base that Ellis purchased from Sanders on April 5, 1991 testified: [b]asically cocaine is a drug that by itself is in basic form and in order to handle it easier or for different ways of taking it you would make it into a salt[;] and cocaine base normally is smoked so the only difference is chemical.... According to Rees, cocaine base is crack. 18 The defendant failed to introduce any evidence at trial to contradict Avedesian's or Rees' testimony that the substance Sanders sold to Ellis was other than cocaine base or cocaine with its salts removed. The substance at issue is not some new form or derivative of cocaine which was not originally contemplated by Congress. Moreover, we have stated that for sentencing purposes, § 841(b) prescribes elevated penalties for the possession with intent to distribute cocaine [base] in crack form, regardless of whether the defendant knew the amount or nature of the controlled substance ... United States v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216, 221 (7th Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Collado-Gomez, 834 F.2d 280, 281 (2nd Cir.1987) (upholding same and noting that the 1986 Amendments to § 841(b)(1) did not alter the elements of substantive offense, which require the government to prove that a defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance per 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969, 108 S.Ct. 1244 (1988)). 19 Sanders attempts to confuse the meaning of cocaine base in § 841 by claiming that cocaine base could also mean rock cocaine. In the sentencing hearing, Sanders testified that rock cocaine is cocaine that is cooked with water and baking soda and is about 98% pure cocaine, whereas crack cocaine consists of cocaine mixed with speed, Xylocaine, Novocaine, Vitamin B-12, and baking soda. He testified that he used rock cocaine before his arrest, and that the people in the East St. Louis, Illinois area would rarely sell crack since the majority of cocaine was in the rock form. Because Sanders testified that he used rock, rather than crack cocaine, he maintains that § 841(a)(1) is inapplicable to his role in arranging two cocaine base transactions. However, he fails to explain how his testimony, that he personally used rock cocaine, advances his argument that § 841(a)(1) is void for vagueness as it applies to his convictions for distributing and aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine base. The government argues that Sanders' testimony concerning the different additives in rock and crack cocaine is irrelevant because the defendant was not qualified as a chemist to testify that he sold rock, rather than crack cocaine. Thus, the government concludes that Sanders' self-serving testimony regarding his rock cocaine usage was insufficient to establish that the use of the term cocaine base in § 841(a)(1) is void for vagueness. Our review of Sanders' testimony at the sentencing hearing reveals that he never testified that he sold rock, rather than crack cocaine, to Officer Ellis. He merely stated that he used rock cocaine in the past and is familiar with the manner in which one cooks rock cocaine with baking soda and water. Sanders admitted that he is not a chemist and that the laboratory reports might have found that the drugs he sold were cocaine base. Even if we were to accept Sanders' definition of cocaine base, the Act is not vague in Sanders' case because the cocaine he sold to Agent Ellis, when analyzed, was found to constitute cocaine base (i.e. crack). We hold that Sanders has failed to meet his burden of establishing that 21 U.S.C. § 841 is void for vagueness.