Opinion ID: 1953592
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: might have prejudged the case because of prior participation as an accuser, investigator, fact finder or initial decisionmaker. [Id. at 351, 235 N.W.2d 352.]

Text: I believe situations two and three warrant this judge's disqualification. I initially note that both of the applicable Crampton situations presuppose the involvement of a party or petitioner. Id. Although the Governor was not a party to this action, Judge Giddings insisted that he was a party. The judge persistently unified the interest of the department and the Governor without a rational basis and over repeated objections of the department's counsel. The judge continually rejected defense counsel's suggestion that there was no unity of interest between the Department of Corrections and the Governor. [11] For purposes of disqualification, the Court must focus on the judge's perception. Because the judge objectively demonstrated his erroneous belief that the Governor was a party and acted consistently with that belief, it obviously affected the department's interest. [12] My conclusion that the judge determined that the Governor was a party is not merely subjective, but clearly supported by uncontroverted statements on the record. The dissent does not conclude, contrary to the majority's assertion, that the Governor was a party to this litigation. He was never a litigant. It was Judge Giddings who repeatedly stated on the record that the Governor was a party and acted consistently with that belief in his continual pursuit of the Governor. This in no way suggests that the Governor was ever a party in fact. Furthermore, the majority has incorrectly characterized the dissent's discussion as an attempt to manipulate the status of the Governor in this lawsuit. The dissent has only illuminated how Judge Giddings manipulated the Cain litigation to obtain control over the Governor to the prejudice of the department. In fact, the department was prejudiced by the judge's determination that Governor Engler was a party because the department then became responsible to represent a nonparty. [13] At several of the hearings, the department's attorney was unable to determine what interests he represented, clearly prejudicing the department's ability to construct its defense. This was complicated by Judge Giddings' ruling on the morning of September 30, 1994. On that day, Judge Giddings released his opinion on the issue of disqualification, declaring abruptly and without explanation that the Governor was not a party: At this point, Governor Engler is not a party to these proceedings. Nor is he personally affected by them. The ... rule [of Clemens v. Bruce, 122 Mich.App. 35, 329 N.W.2d 522 (1982) ] would require disqualification where the Court becomes enmeshed in other matters involving petitioner (the Department of Corrections), not some third party such as the Governor. This unexplained switch at the eleventh hour does not, however, eviscerate Judge Giddings' previous statements, evidencing his belief that the department and the Governor were the same entity. [14] Therefore, I believe that the fact that Judge Giddings perceived the Governor to be a party and conducted the trial accordingly biased the department's ability to defend sufficiently to permit analysis of the case pursuant to the situations enunciated in Crampton, supra .
Under situation three in Crampton, Judge Giddings was obligated to disqualify himself if he became `enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner....' Crampton, supra at 351, 235 N.W.2d 352, quoting Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 423 (1971). In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a trial judge should have recused himself because he lost a civil rights action brought by the same petitioner [15] facing contempt in a subsequent action. The Court concluded that [t]rial before `an unbiased judge' is essential to due process. Id. at 216, 91 S.Ct. at 1780, citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 205, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1484, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465, 91 S.Ct. 499, 505, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971). In isolation, Judge Giddings' conduct appears somewhat innocuous. However, each incident must not be considered in a vacuum; rather, they should be considered in relation to the judge's overzealous pursuit of the Governor. I agree with defense counsel that Judge Giddings' actions over an eleven-month period demonstrate that he became enmeshed in matters far beyond the scope of the Cain litigation and resulted in a violation of the department's due process right to an impartial decisionmaker. This conclusion is first supported by the fact that Judge Giddings recommended substantive changes to plaintiffs' motion to show cause why Mr. Truscott and Governor Engler should not be held in criminal contempt. [16] Initially, Judge Giddings recommended that plaintiffs separate their motion into individual counts. Next, he suggested that plaintiffs should not proceed against John Truscott, suggesting that the motion to show cause be brought only against Governor Engler. Finally, and most egregiously, he advised plaintiffs to consider including reference to inaccuracies in Governor Engler's letter of August 12[, 1994,] to the Attorney General. In doing so, the judge unmistakably recommended another ground on which plaintiffs could proceed against the Governor. [17] Judge Giddings unified the interest of the Governor and the department for purposes of this litigation and proceeded to assist plaintiffs in drafting a motion to hold the Governor in contempt. [18] This illustrates how the judge clearly became enmeshed in matters involving the Governor. He, in fact, became so enmeshed that he assisted a party before the court. Several actions of Judge Giddings before his assistance of plaintiffs further demonstrate that he became enmeshed in other matters involving Governor Engler and the department. The judge first filed a letter of complaint against the Governor with the Attorney Grievance Commission on October 21, 1993. Next, in November 1993, Judge Giddings appointed a spokesperson for the male prisoners. His purported basis for the appointment was that we have only gotten one side on most instances because of the practical problems. Id. However, after indicating that the Governor had released an untrue statement to the press, he candidly stated: This is a release ... that went to every newspaper. The more recent one went, as far as I can determine, to every major newspaper in the State.... I have to be able to respond to all of those. I shouldn't have to respond to any of them. That's not my job. I'm not a litigant. It's not my job. I would like to say to the newspaper person, hey, get your fanny down here. The court file is there. Read the Court file. [Emphasis added.] This makes it clear that the spokesperson was not only appointed to be the voice of the prisoner litigants, but also to be the voice of Judge Giddings. This was an explicit and improper manipulation of the litigation to respond to the criticism of Governor Engler. Additionally, Judge Giddings entered media contact orders on June 2 and 30, 1994. In his order dated June 2, 1994, the judge, sua sponte, ordered that any written remarks or press releases made by employees or agents of the state regarding the Cain litigation must be faxed to plaintiffs' spokesperson, to a member of plaintiffs' class, and to plaintiffs' counsel at the same time the remarks are made to the public. The order required the same of plaintiffs in regard to any press releases made by them. This was another attempt to obtain jurisdiction and control over the Governor (a person he perceived to be a party) and to address matters clearly outside the scope of the litigation. Each of these actions by Judge Giddings had one improper goal: to obtain control of the Governor in such a manner as to control the Governor's public opinion of the Cain litigation. [19] The judge's efforts unnecessarily consumed considerable time and judicial resources. Irrespective of whether the Governor's comments may be viewed as improper, the judge was sworn to proceed and remain focused on the merits of the case before himwhich he had increasingly become unable to do. Instead, he expended judicial resources to assert jurisdiction over the Governor to the obvious prejudice of the department. Defendant's reliance on Clemens, supra, a subsequent decision applying Crampton, is persuasive. Clemens affirms that the present set of facts warrant disqualification of Judge Giddings. In Clemens, the Court of Appeals followed Crampton and held that the risk of actual prejudice on the part of the judge required disqualification without a showing of actual prejudice. The record in Clemens reflected a serious dispute between the plaintiffs' attorney and the trial judge regarding appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. The plaintiffs' attorney filed a complaint against the judge with the Judicial Tenure Commission. The complaint remained pending at the time of trial. The court held that these facts warranted disqualification of the trial judge because, under Crampton, the judge had been the target of personal abuse or criticism from a party before him, and the judge had become enmeshed in other matters involving the petitioner. Similar to the present case, the facts of Clemens suggested such a risk of actual prejudice on the part of the judge that due process required his disqualification.... Id. at 38, 329 N.W.2d 522. [20]
Crampton states that the risk of an impartial decisionmaker is too great where the judge `has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him,' id. at 351, 235 N.W.2d 352, quoting Withrow, supra at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464. The Court relied on Mayberry, supra at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 505, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a judge who is vilified ... necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy, rendering the judge unlikely to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication. Id. at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 505. Quoting Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539, 45 S.Ct. 390, 396, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925), the Court stated that `[t]he judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal, but he should not bend backward and injure the authority of the court by too great leniency. The substitution of another judge would avoid either tendency....' Mayberry, supra at 464, 91 S.Ct. at 504. Additionally, the judge should not himself give vent to personal spleen or respond to a personal grievance. These are subtle matters, for they concern ingredients of what constitutes justice. Therefore, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. [ Id. at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 505, quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954).] I hasten to add, however, that a judge cannot be driven out of a case. Mayberry, supra at 463, 91 S.Ct. at 504. Accordingly, I do not premise my conclusion that Judge Giddings should be disqualified on the basis of the criticism leveled by the Governor, but rather on the inappropriate means by which Judge Giddings retaliated. The public comments Governor Engler made in regard to the Cain litigation and specifically in regard to Judge Giddings quite evidently struck at `the most vulnerable and human qualities' of the judge's temperament. Mayberry, supra at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 505, quoting Bloom, supra at 202, 88 S.Ct. at 1482. Such criticism does not itself violate a litigant's due process rights sufficient to disqualify the judge. However, Judge Giddings' repeated attempts to respond to the Governor's comments through plaintiffs did violate defendant's due process rights. While the comments made by the Governor arguably may have been inappropriate, Judge Giddings was sworn to impartially focus on the issues before the court and bring the litigation to a reasonably swift and completely fair resolution. The facts indicate that Judge Giddings was unable to surmount the public criticism and discharge his obligation by divorcing himself from the acrimonious political climate that had arisen. Accordingly, on these facts, I agree that it is generally wise where the marks of the unseemly conduct have left personal stings to ask a fellow judge to take his place. Mayberry, supra at 464, 91 S.Ct. at 504.