Opinion ID: 1356292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Palmer's Inadequate Allegations of Prejudice

Text: Because we find that the factual allegations underlying Palmer's contention that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective are insufficient to show that he is entitle[d] ... to federal habeas relief, id. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933, we conclude that the District Court's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion. [4] The Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)] standard is applicable when a petitioner claims his attorney was ineffective by denying him his constitutional right to testify. Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir.2009) (citation omitted). The Strickland test has two prongs: the petitioner must show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The first prong requires a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id.; see also Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 430 (3d Cir.2007). Strickland 's second prong requires a petitioner to show that the errors were sufficiently serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Palmer's petition comes up short because it fails to make an adequate showing of prejudice. See id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered. ... If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.). As we have noted, Palmer's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel turns on his contention that his attorney failed to advise him of his right to testify in his defense and failed to inform him that such a decision was Palmer's to make. Palmer's contentions concerning his attorney's allegedly deficient conduct are fleshed out in the affidavit Palmer submitted in support of his habeas petition. What is not fleshed out in the petition, however, is a factual basis suggesting that Palmer was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged conduct. Palmer's affidavit states merely that he would have taken the stand to testify on [his] own behalf to explain [his] side of what really happened if [he had been] allowed to do so. (App.87b.) The brief he submitted in support of his application for post-conviction relief adds precious little to this bare-bones statement. In a conclusory fashion, Palmer asserts that because [he] was contending self-defense, it was crucial for him to explain his version of the events, especially[] since the requisite determination that the jury had to make[] was `did the petitioner use force in the reasonable belief that such force was necessary to prevent his death or serious injury,['] and there is nobody who could explain what his mental state was better than the petitioner. ... (App.87r.) In sum, we know that Palmer wished to testify, and we know the legal theory toward which his testimony would have been directed (self-defense), but we know nothing about the facts to which Palmer would have testified. Palmer's stated desire to tell his side of the story and his conclusory invocation of the words self-defense are not sufficient to show that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We have repeatedly emphasized that bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not afford a sufficient ground for an evidentiary hearing on a habeas petition. Campbell, 515 F.3d at 184 (citation omitted); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 298 (3d Cir.1991). Other circuits have likewise recognized that a habeas petitioner's nonspecific or conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not compel district courts to convene evidentiary hearings in order to delve into the unelaborated factual basis of a habeas petition. See, e.g., Anderson, 425 F.3d at 858-59; Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094, 1102 (7th Cir.1976). Palmer's petition contains no factual matter regarding Strickland 's prejudice prong, and his reference to the legal theory of self-defense is precisely the sort of unadorned legal conclusion that, without supporting factual allegations, we have consistently found insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Campbell, 515 F.3d at 184; Zettlemoyer, 923 F.2d at 298 n. 12; cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (in the civil pleading context, courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation) (quotations and citations omitted). Zettlemoyer is on point. In that case, the petitioner contended that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to develop the facts of his ineffective assistance claim, in which he asserted that his attorney had failed to call witnesses who would have provided unspecified testimony related to his diminished-capacity defense. See Zettlemoyer, 923 F.2d at 298. As in this case, the petitioner in Zettlemoyer identified a witness whose testimony his attorney failed to present and a legal theory toward which the witness's testimony would have been directed, but the petitioner gave no indication of what the contents of the testimony would have been. See id. We explained that the petitioner had failed to set forth facts to support his contention and held that an evidentiary hearing was not called for. Id. at 298, 300-01; see also Campbell, 515 F.3d at 184 (where petitioner fails to allege what this witness would have been able to say that would have been of help to him, an evidentiary hearing is not mandated); Wells, 941 F.2d at 259-60. The same conclusion is compelled here. By stating merely that he would have taken the stand to testify on [his] own behalf to explain [his] side of what really happened, (App.87b), and that this testimony would have addressed the subject of self-defense, Palmer failed to present factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief under Strickland 's prejudice prong. [5] Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933. In Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 59 (1st Cir.2007), the court recognized that an attorney's failure to inform his client of his right to testify could be prejudicial. The court explained that a defendant's testimony could be crucial in any trial, and it could be difficult for us to determine whether or not a jury would have found his testimony credible. Id. (citations omitted). This is particularly true when the only witness the defendant proffers is himself. The Supreme Court has recognized that the most important witness for the defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). After all, if there were no other witnesses, who would be in a better position to advise the factfinder as to the relevant facts in support of a claimed defense? On the other hand, the mere assertion of self-defense is not sufficient to raise a plausible showing of prejudice sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. If so, every defendant charged with homicide would make such an assertion. In Owens, the court particularized the needed showing when it stated that a defendant who was not informed by counsel or the court of his right to testify and who would have offered genuinely exculpatory testimony would have been prejudiced by the failure to have been informed of his right to testify. Owens, 483 F.3d at 59 (emphasis added). Although the showing that a defendant must make need not be onerous, it must be sufficiently detailed to be genuinely exculpatory. Id. In New Jersey, the assertion of self-defense requires a jury (1) to discern whether the defendant had a subjective belief at the time that deadly force was necessary and then (2) to determine whether that subjective belief was objectively reasonable. State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 940 A.2d 269, 274-75 (2008); see N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:3-4. There are several further caveats to this rule, such as a duty to retreat. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:3-4(b). In this case, it is undisputed that defendant was the only person who drew and fired a gun. (App.35.) In order to have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing, Palmer had the obligation to show his testimony would have been genuinely exculpatory as long as it was not refuted by the existing record. See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933. Palmer did not make any such showing, and it follows that the Court did not err in denying Palmer a hearing.