Opinion ID: 2216612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether E-Filing Outside Business Hours Results in an Untimely Application

Text: We next turn to whether the Attorney General's electronic transmission of an application for rehearing, transmitted at 5:34 p.m. on the last day of filing, was timely filed, and therefore whether the appellate court has jurisdiction over the Attorney General's appeal. The timeliness of the Attorney General's application for rehearing turns on whether the Commission's rules require filing during business hours. Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, and must be construed under the same standards which govern the construction of statutes. Union Electric Co. v. Department of Revenue, 136 Ill.2d 385, 144 Ill. Dec. 769, 556 N.E.2d 236 (1990). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Kownacki, 221 Ill.2d at 460, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243. Thus, de novo review is also required here. In interpreting an agency regulation, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the agency, in this case, the Commission. MD Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Abrams, 228 Ill.2d 281, 287, 320 Ill.Dec. 837, 888 N.E.2d 54 (2008). The surest and most reliable indicator of intent is the language of the regulation itself. MD Electrical, 228 Ill.2d at 287, 320 Ill.Dec. 837, 888 N.E.2d 54. In determining the plain meaning, we consider the regulation in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the Commission in enacting it. MD Electrical, 228 Ill.2d at 287, 320 Ill.Dec. 837, 888 N.E.2d 54. Where the language of the regulation is clear and unambiguous, we must apply it as written, without resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction. MD Electrical, 228 Ill.2d at 287-88, 320 Ill.Dec. 837, 888 N.E.2d 54. The regulation at issue states that [t]he filing of an electronic document is effective upon acceptance of the complete document and, if applicable, any required original paper verification or affidavit pages by the Chief Clerk of the Commission. 83 Ill. Adm.Code § 200.1040(b) (added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000). The Attorney General argues that the Commission's regulation does not require filing during business hours. AT & T contends that the regulation requires physical acceptance of any electronic filing. AT & T further reasons that there can be no acceptance if the chief clerk or his personnel are not present in the building. AT & T therefore concludes that electronic documents must be filed during business hours when Commission personnel are present. Looking first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language, we note that acceptance means favorable reception, or the act of accepting. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 11 (2002). Accept means to receive with assent. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 10 (2002). These definitions suggest that acceptance requires something more than mere transmittal, but the word acceptance alone does not provide guidance as to how a document may be accepted. However, the word acceptance does not stand alone. The regulation, read in its entirety, establishes that electronic documents may be accepted by the Chief Clerk of the Commission. Neither party argues that Chief Clerk, as used in this regulation, means only the chief clerk. AT & T acknowledges that the regulation extends at least to the chief clerk's personnel, who may also accept e-filings. This position reflects the reality of modern administrative agencies that department heads must necessarily delegate certain authority and responsibility in order for the agency to function properly. Both parties agree that the intent of the regulation was not to require the chief clerk to personally accept every e-filing. Because Chief Clerk cannot be read literally, the language of the statute gives rise to an ambiguity as to who, or what, may accept electronic filings. An ambiguity exists where the regulation is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. See General Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Vehicle Review Board, 224 Ill.2d 1, 13, 308 Ill.Dec. 611, 862 N.E.2d 209 (2007). AT & T reasonably interprets Chief Clerk to mean the chief clerk or a member of his staff. However, interpreting chief clerk to refer to the office of the chief clerk, and not to any particular person, an interpretation more in line with that of the Attorney General, is also reasonable. Implementing an e-filing system, like delegating responsibility to the chief clerk's staff members, serves the same purpose of promoting efficiency, and reducing the burden on the Commission's employees. Under that interpretation, the Commission e-docket system is authorized to accept filings from the various parties having business with the Commission. We find the regulation ambiguous because on its face it contains no indication whether filing requires actual physical acceptance by a human being in the chief clerk's office. If the language of a particular regulation is ambiguous, we then look to the purpose and necessity of the regulation, the evils sought to be remedied and the goals to be achieved. Alvarez v. Pappas, 229 Ill.2d 217, 231, 321 Ill.Dec. 712, 890 N.E.2d 434 (2008). In doing so, we view all provisions of an enactment as a whole. J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill.2d 182, 309 Ill.Dec. 6, 863 N.E.2d 236 (2007). In this case we look to the Commission's formal rules for electronic filing, enacted on October 15, 2000, in their entirety. When there is still doubt as to a regulation's meaning, we also properly consider extrinsic matters in order to determine legislative intent. Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill.2d 414, 426, 269 Ill.Dec. 452, 781 N.E.2d 249 (2002). In its Overview of Electronic Filing, the Commission affirms its commitment to facilitating the filing, distributing, and accessing of documents electronically, subject to the Commission's Rules of Practice. 83 Ill. Adm.Code § 200.1000 (added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000). The Commission allows all documents initiating a proceeding, or filed in a docketed proceeding, to be filed electronically. 83 Ill. Adm.Code § 200.1045 (added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000). The Commission's rules also provide for service by electronic means. 83 Ill. Adm.Code § 200.1050 (added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000). The rest of the Commission's regulations reinforce this overall purpose of facilitating e-filing. For example, the Commission's e-filing system accepts a variety of document formats. Although the Commission encourages parties to submit documents in PDF format, it will accept both Microsoft Word and Corel WordPerfect documents, as well as ASCII text. 83 Ill. Adm.Code § 200.1010 (added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000). The Commission also accepts two spreadsheet formats. 83 Ill. Adm.Code § 200.1010 (added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 16, 2000). Thus, while the Commission's rules do not require parties to file electronically, the rules reflect the Commission's intent to encourage, rather than restrict, the practice. The Commission's rules do contain restrictions on electronic filing. For example, only registered account holders may use the system, and only members of the service list for a docketed case may file documents electronically in that case. 83 Ill. Adm.Code § 200.1020 (added at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000). However, these practices ultimately encourage electronic filing by instilling confidence in the security and efficiency of the system. In light of the regulations' emphasis on facilitating e-filing, we cannot say that the regulations themselves indicate an intent to restrict e-filing to business hours. Still, AT & T suggests that the disclaimer printed on the Attorney General's electronic receipt confirming the transmission of its application for rehearing reveals the intent of the Commission to restrict filing to actual office hours because a person must physically review the filing. The disclaimer reads: Electronic file(s) are not officially filed with the Illinois Commerce Commission until reviewed for compliance with Commission rules and accepted by Commission personnel. The disclaimer refers to acceptance by Commission personnel. However, this statement is equally applicable to in-person filings and mail filings. Neither are officially filed until reviewed for compliance. What is different between in-person and mail filings is when they are deemed filed. While both must be reviewed for compliance before being officially filed, in-person filings must be made during business hours, while mail filings do not. The disclaimer therefore says nothing about whether e-filings must be transmitted during business hours. Instead, the disclaimer indicates that a document will not be officially filed at all if it does not comply with Commission rules. Because the disclaimer does not suggest that a document transmitted after business hours will be deemed filed the following day, the disclaimer cannot provide guidance as to the Commission's intent. Even if the regulation and disclaimer could be interpreted to require actual physical acceptance, it would prove to be an unworkable standard. The burden of timely filing rests on parties to an action, who are responsible for the proper formatting and delivery of filings. Agencies and courts need not issue reminders. Along with the parties' responsibility to adhere to deadlines, however, comes the assurance that a filing will be deemed filed when submitted, even if not checked for compliance until later. In re Estate of Davison, 102 Ill.App.3d 644, 645, 58 Ill.Dec. 280, 430 N.E.2d 222 (1981) (Delivery alone has been held to constitute filing since the person filing has no control over the officer who receives documents), citing Dowie v. Chicago, Waukegan & North Shore Ry. Co., 214 Ill. 49, 73 N.E. 354 (1905). Requiring physical acceptance undermines the reasoning in Dowie, because e-filers have no control over the physical acceptance of documents by Commission personnel. A physical-acceptance standard gives rise to uncertainty as to whether an electronically submitted document has been filed. We note in particular the example raised by the Attorney General, of a filing transmitted at 4:59 p.m. If Commission personnel are unable to review and accept that filing until the following morning, under a physical-acceptance rule the document will not be filed until that following morning. Similarly, a brief filed at 5:01 p.m. and reviewed by Commission personnel working late would be deemed filed that same day. The physical-acceptance standard eliminates the parties' ability to know, in advance, what time their documents will be deemed filed, as they have no control over the chief clerk's personnel. Uncertainty of that kind does not occur with either in-person filings or mail filings. In-person submissions are officially filed when received at the principal office of the Commission. 83 Ill. Adm.Code § 200.70(a) (amended at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000). Filing by mail is official based on the cancellation mark of the United States Postal Service, or upon delivery to a private express courier service. 83 Ill. Adm.Code § 200.70(a)(1) (amended at 24 Ill. Reg. 16019, eff. October 15, 2000). The Commission's regulation and disclaimer, read literally to require physical acceptance of an electronic filing, would place e-filers at a comparative disadvantage. AT & T suggests that using the Commission's business hours sufficiently reduces the potential for uncertainty. We agree with AT & T that imposing a 5 p.m. deadline is perfectly compatible with e-filing, and acknowledge AT & T's extensive list of other agencies and jurisdictions that have imposed rules and regulations providing for such a deadline. However, in the absence of a specific regulation, we cannot read a 5 p.m. deadline into the Commission's rules. Indeed, the extent to which other jurisdictions have enacted business hours deadlines also serves to underscore the Commission's own decision not to issue an explicit rule. Rather, the Commission chose the word acceptance, which, standing alone, does not fairly imply a 5 p.m. deadline. AT & T's interpretation requiring physical acceptance would undermine the expressed intent of the Commission to facilitate and encourage the use of electronic filing. We do not depart from the plain language of the regulation by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent. See Rosewood Care Center, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 226 Ill.2d 559, 567, 315 Ill.Dec. 762, 877 N.E.2d 1091 (2007). The entirety of the Commission's enactment seeks to expand, rather than limit, the ability of parties to make use of the e-docket system. Insisting on a deadline of 5 p.m. would have the opposite effect, limiting the use of e-filing. When faced with a tight deadline, a 5 p.m. rule would encourage attorneys to print, and mail, large documents rather than use the efficient and economical method of electronic filing that the Commission's rules promote. Accordingly, we hold that the Commission's regulations do not require that electronic documents be transmitted by 5 p.m. on their due date. So long as the document is transmitted prior to midnight of the due date, and otherwise complete under the Commission's rules, that document is timely filed, and the appellate court properly has jurisdiction over subsequent appeals.