Opinion ID: 2510582
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: May a parent without legal and physical custody seek and obtain a custody change based on the custodial parent's decision to relocate with their child?

Text: California's statutory scheme governing child custody and visitation determinations is set forth in the Family Code (all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated). Under this scheme, the overarching concern is the best interest of the child. ( Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 27 P.3d 289 ( Montenegro ).) For purposes of an initial custody determination, section 3040, subdivision (b), affords the trial court and the family `the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.' ( In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 31, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473 ( Burgess ).) When the parents are unable to agree on a custody arrangement, the court must determine the best interest of the child by setting the matter for an adversarial hearing and considering all relevant factors, including the child's health, safety, and welfare, any history of abuse by one parent against any child or the other parent, and the nature and amount of the child's contact with the parents. (§§ 3011, 3185, subd. (a); see Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 255-256, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 27 P.3d 289.) Once the trial court has entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangementsand the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretakerweigh heavily in favor of maintaining that custody arrangement. ( Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 32-33, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473.) In recognition of this policy concern, we have articulated a variation on the best interest standard, known as the changed circumstance rule, that the trial court must apply when a parent seeks modification of a final judicial custody determination. ( Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 27 P.3d 289, relying on Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 535, 229 Cal.Rptr. 800, 724 P.2d 486.) Under the changed circumstance rule, custody modification is appropriate only if the parent seeking modification demonstrates a significant change of circumstances indicating that a different custody arrangement would be in the child's best interest. ( Ibid. ) Not only does this serve to protect the weighty interest in stable custody arrangements, but it also fosters judicial economy. ( Ibid. ) [4] The Family Code contemplates that, in making a custody determination, consideration of the best interest of the child may lead the trial court to award custody either to both parents (joint or shared custody) or to only one parent (sole custody). If a parent is awarded sole legal custody, that means the parent shall have the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child. (§ 3006.) If a parent is awarded sole physical custody, that means the child shall reside with and be under the supervision of the custodial parent, subject to the power of the court to order visitation for the noncustodial parent. (§ 3007.) Brown argues, in effect, that sections 3006 and 3007 permit a parent with sole legal and sole physical custody to unilaterally supervise and make all decisions regarding a minor child's residence and schooling, thereby conferring a right to relocate with the child without interference from the noncustodial parent. In her view, the Court of Appeal's conclusion that a parent with no legal or physical custody is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to relitigate custody over a proposed move away cannot be squared with these statutory provisions. We are not persuaded. Brown concedes, as she must, that another provision of the Family Code, section 7501, expressly addresses the right of a custodial parent to relocate with a child. By its terms, section 7501 unambiguously provides the right is not absolute and may be curtailed if the move would result in detriment to the child: A parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change the residence of the child, subject to the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child.  (§ 7501, subd. (a), italics added.) Notably, the statute contains no qualifying language purporting to limit its application to parents with only certain custodial rights. Thus, while sections 3006 and 3007 recognize the general right of a parent with sole custody to supervise and make decisions regarding a child's residence and education, section 7501, fairly read, contemplates that even a parent with sole legal and sole physical custody may be restrained from changing a child's residence, if a court determines the change would be detrimental to the child's rights or welfare. Not only does section 7501 undermine any notion of a custodial parent's absolute right to relocate with a child, but so does the lack of any California decision supporting such a proposition. The seminal decision of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th 25, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473, referred to the right of a custodial parent to change the residence of a child as a presumptive right that might not prevail if the move would result in detriment to the child. [5] ( Burgess, at p. 35, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473.) Decisions subsequent to Burgess uniformly acknowledge that, even where a permanent custody order is in place, the custodial parent's right to relocate with a child remains subject to the changed circumstance rule. (E.g., In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1088-1089, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 356, 88 P.3d 81 ( LaMusga ); Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 432-434, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 379; In re Marriage of Campos (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 839, 843, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 300 ( Campos ); In re Marriage of Edlund (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1468-1469, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 671; In re Marriage of Whealon (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 132, 140-141, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 559.) Brown attempts to distinguish Burgess and its progeny on the ground they did not involve a parent with sole legal and sole physical custody. We are not convinced. Like the situation here, some of the cases were decided in the context of a relocation sought by a parent with sole physical custody. (E.g., Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 29, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473 [stipulated order provided for temporary joint legal custody and sole physical custody to mother]; Osgood v. Landon, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 431-432, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 379 [stipulated order provided for joint legal custody, but default judgment awarded sole physical custody to mother]; Campos, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 841, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 300 [judicial custody order provided for joint legal custody and sole physical custody to mother].) Those decisions hold or otherwise acknowledge that an order for sole physical custody may be modified, despite the general importance of maintaining ongoing physical custody arrangements, if relocation with the custodial parent will cause the child to suffer detriment, thus rendering it essential or expedient for the child's welfare that there be a custody change ( Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 38, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473; see also LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1088-1089, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 356, 88 P.3d 81). None of the decisions, moreover, attributes any significance to the presence of a joint legal custody arrangement or the absence of one for sole legal custody. Brown additionally contends that a parent with no custodial rights has no standing to challenge the custodial parent's decision to relocate. That contention lacks merit. As indicated, section 7501, subdivision (a), provides that a custodial parent's right to change the residence of the child is subject to the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child. It is reasonable to infer from this language, as Burgess and its progeny have, that the noncustodial parent may request a court to exercise this power. Conversely, section 7501's language is not reasonably susceptible of a construction that bars a noncustodial parent from doing so. Moreover, we recently recognized in a similar context that an award of sole legal and sole physical custody of a child to one parent does not serve to terminate the other's parental rights or due process interest in parenting. ( In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 227, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842, 96 P.3d 141 ( Harris ).) In Harris, we addressed section 3104's provisions for court-ordered grandparent visitation over the objection of the parent with sole custody. As part of our analysis, we rejected the attempt of a mother who had been awarded sole legal and sole physical custody to liken the noncustodial father to a deceased parent and to equate herself to a sole surviving parent whose right to the custody and control over her child would be infringed by court-ordered grandparent visitation under section 3104. ( Harris, at p. 227, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842, 96 P.3d 141.) Consistent with Harris, we find the award of sole custody to Brown did not terminate any right of Yana to seek relief under section 7501. Indeed, Harris stands as an example that a parent cannot rely on an award of sole custody to shield herself from a court order to which she objects, where such order is supported by the noncustodial parent and is in the best interest of the child. [6] In sum, we conclude that, where a final custody order had awarded sole legal and sole physical custody to the parent seeking to relocate with a child, the noncustodial parent opposing the relocation may seek and obtain a custody modification based on a proper showing pursuant to the changed circumstance rule.