Opinion ID: 2548669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Error in Admission of Fire Investigator's Report

Text: [¶31] Mr. Morrow, one of the fire investigators, prepared a written report of his cause and origin inquiry. The State sought its admission in evidence, and the district court admitted it over Strickland's objection. [¶32] Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. We will not overturn a trial court's discretionary decision unless the court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason and could not rationally conclude as it did. Decisions of the trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal. Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 2000). [¶33] Strickland contends that admission of that report violated W.R.E. 803(8)(B). The primary premise of that rule is that the listed items are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (8) Public records and reports.  Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the State in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. W.R.E. 803(8)(B) (emphasis added). Strickland contends that Morrow was an other law enforcement personnel under the circumstances presented here and, therefore, the report was inadmissible. This matter was not clearly enough developed below for us to conclude dispositively that the report at issue was admissible or inadmissible. Professor Michael H. Graham's discussion of the issue suggests that the report was not admissible: Records in any form setting forth matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel are admissible as a hearsay exception under Rule 803(8)(B). The exclusion in Rule 803(8)(B) applies to observations made by police officers and other law enforcement personnel made at the scene of the crime, at the apprehension of the accused, or otherwise in connection with an investigation and not to records of routine, ministerial, objective nonevaluative matters made in nonadversarial settings. The reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases. The limitation applies only to a public record or report offered by the prosecution in a criminal case; thus public records or reports containing statements of matters observed first-hand pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which there was a duty to report are admissible when offered by the criminal defendant. 30B Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 7049, at 480-88 (Interim ed. 2000) (footnotes and quotation marks omitted). [¶34] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-9-109 (LexisNexis 2001) (amended 2003) provides: § 35-9-109. Investigation of fires; notification to fire marshal; powers of fire marshal. (a) The county fire warden or chief of the fire department of a city, town, or fire district shall investigate the cause, origin and circumstances of each fire occurring in the city, town, or district by which property has been destroyed or damaged in excess of five hundred dollars ($500.00). The investigation shall be commenced within two (2) days. The state fire marshal may direct the investigation. (b) The officer investigating a fire shall notify the state fire marshal and within one (1) week of the fire shall furnish him a written statement of all facts relating to its cause and origin, and other information required by forms provided by the state fire marshal. (c) The state fire marshal may investigate the origin or circumstances of any fire or explosion or any attempt to cause a fire or explosion. (d) In performing the duties imposed by this act [§§ 35-9-101 through 35-9-130], the state fire marshal may: (i) Enter and examine any building or premises where any fires or attempt to cause fires occurred; (ii) Enter any building adjacent to that in which a fire or attempt to cause a fire occurred; and (iii) Take full control and custody of the buildings and premises until his examination and investigations are completed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(vi)(E) (LexisNexis 2003) provides: (vi) Peace officer includes the following officers assigned to duty in the state of Wyoming: . . . (E) Any duly authorized arson investigator employed by the state fire marshal. [¶35] It appears that the report should not have been admitted, but because of the lack of development of this issue below and rather cursory briefing in this appeal, we decline to definitively answer the question of whether Mr. Morrow was a law enforcement personnel under the circumstances of this case. Of this we are certain, W.R.A.P. 9.04 and W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) mandate that [a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing court. Assuming for purposes of argument that the district court erred in admitting the report as evidence, we conclude that the error was harmless. The focal point of the testimony in this case was the evidence gathered by the fire investigators. Mr. Morrow as well as Mr. Carpenter gave detailed testimony on direct examination, and the cross-examination was equally as detailed. The testimony was not complicated, and the report was relatively brief. The error, if any, was harmless, and Strickland has failed in his burden to persuade us that it was prejudicial under the circumstances of this case.