Opinion ID: 839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: “This Court reviews a dismissal of a claim for lack of jurisdiction by the Court of Federal Claims de novo.” Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A six-year statute of limitations exists for claims against the government 2009-5046 4 brought in the Court of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2501. This limitation is “jurisdictional” in nature and is not subject to equitable tolling or waiver. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134 (2008). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2501, any claim for relief must be “filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” “[A]n action for money arises under the Military Pay Act in the unusual case in which, on the plaintiff’s legal theory, ‘there is a clear-cut legal entitlement’ to the promotion in question, . . . [or] when the decision not to promote the service member leads to the service member’s compelled discharge.” Smith v. Sec’y of the Army, 384 F.3d 1288, 1294-95 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “[C]laims of entitlement to disability retirement pay generally do not accrue until the appropriate military board either finally denies such a claim or refuses to hear it. The decision by the first statutorily authorized board that hears or refuses to hear the claim invokes the statute of limitations.” Chambers v. United States, 417 F.3d 1218, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Here, the Court of Federal Claims determined that Cronin’s first claim, failure to promote, accrued on October 1, 1994 (the date that she was initially scheduled for promotion), and that her disability claim with respect to nine of the ten conditions accrued on January 19, 1996 (the date of the first PEB decision). Because these claims accrued more than six years before the filing date of Cronin’s complaint, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed them as barred under the statute of limitations. The Court of Federal Claims did not, however, address the applicability of the statutory tolling provision of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, which states: “The period of a servicemember’s military service may not be included in computing any 2009-5046 5 period limited by law . . . for the bringing of any action or proceeding in a court . . . by or against the servicemember . . . .” 50 U.S.C. app. § 526(a). In its supplemental brief, the government acknowledges that tolling did occur while Cronin was on active duty (ending May 31, 1996), but that no tolling occurred while she was on TDRL (ending October 1, 2000). Cronin argues that the time she spent on TDRL should be included in the period of “military service” under 50 U.S.C. app. § 526(a), and that her complaint was timely because she filed it within six years of her permanent retirement. To our knowledge, only one federal appellate court has addressed this issue, and it held that the comparable tolling provision of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 does apply while a service member is on the TDRL. Mason v. Texaco Inc., 862 F.2d 242, 245 (10th Cir. 1988). 1 The government argues that Mason was wrongly decided. In the government’s view, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act “equates ‘military service’ with ‘active duty,’ and terminates the tolling period upon release from active duty.” Def.’s Suppl. Br. 2. But “active duty” is not the only category of service listed in the Act’s definition of “military service.” Also included within this definition is “any period during which a servicemember is absent from duty on account of sickness, wounds, leave, or other lawful cause.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 511(2)(C). It was under this latter category that the Tenth Circuit in Mason held that a statute of limitation is tolled while a service member is on TDRL. 862 F.2d at 245 (“We hold that placement on the ‘temporary disability retired list’ constitutes ‘absen[ce] from duty on account of sickness’ under the Act . . . .”). 1 On December 19, 2003, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq., was enacted as a recodification of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940. The tolling provision was not substantially changed. 2009-5046 6 The government further argues that the “absence from duty” provision relied upon by the Tenth Circuit “refers to ordinary absences from active duty, such as convalescent leave” and other “temporary illnesses [that] do not rise to the level of a disability.” Def.’s Suppl. Br. 4. But the government cites no authority for this assertion. In fact, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected a very similar argument—“that the absence contemplated by section 101(1) [of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act] is only a short-term furlough, sick leave, or stay in sick bay.” Cruz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 308 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In rejecting this argument, the district court held that the tolling provision did apply while the service member was on TDRL, reasoning that “[t]he protection of a serviceman who is unable to attend to his affairs, whether because he is stationed away from home in active service or is recovering from injuries incurred while in such active service, is the very purpose the Relief Act is designed to serve.” Id. at 1057. We are unwilling to decide this issue, a question of considerable importance and raised sua sponte on appeal, without the benefit of the trial court’s reasoned opinion on the matter. Although our review is de novo, it ought not to function as an independent analysis in the first instance. We therefore vacate the decision of the Court of Federal Claims to the extent that it dismissed any of Cronin’s claims as barred by the statute of limitations, and remand for a determination as to the applicability of 50 U.S.C. app. § 526(a) to the period when Cronin was on TDRL. If the trial court determines that the statute of limitations was tolled during this period, then it should also consider whether Cronin’s retirement annuity should be recalculated. We leave to the trial court’s sound 2009-5046 7 discretion whether to request pro bono representation of Cronin for purposes of the proceedings on remand.