Opinion ID: 3169665
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Service Permissibly Construed the 1958 Act

Text: In 1934, Congress passed An Act to Promote the Con- servation of Wild Life, Fish, and Game, and for other Purposes, which authorized the Service “to provide expert assistance to and to cooperate with Federal, State, and other agencies in . . . increasing the supply of game and fur-bearing animals and fish, in combating diseases, and in developing a Nation-wide program of wild-life conser10 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES vation and rehabilitation.” 2 Pub. L. No. 73-121, § 1, 48 Stat. 401, 401 (1934) (“the 1934 Act”). Congress amended the 1934 Act in 1946 to authorize the Service “to provide assistance to, and cooperate with, Federal, State, and public or private agencies and organizations” in fulfilling its previously-articulated goals and to carry out “other measures necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Act.” An Act to Promote the Conservation of Wildlife, Fish, and Game, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 79732, § 1, 60 Stat. 1080, 1080 (1946) (“the 1946 Act”) (emphasis added). Importantly, Congress also required that areas made available to the Service “shall be administered” either “directly,” or pursuant to “cooperative agreements entered into pursuant to the provisions of section 1.” Id. § 4, 60 Stat. at 1081 (emphasis added). The amendment also expressly authorized the Service to promulgate “rules and regulations for the conservation, maintenance, and management of wildlife, resources thereof, and its habitat thereon.” Id. In 1958, Congress again amended the 1934 Act. 1958 Act, §§ 1, 4, 72 Stat. at 563, 567. In so doing, it re-enacted the provisions above in substantially identical form. Id. These provisions remain unchanged. Because Congress did not define the phrase “public or private agencies and organizations” in the 1946 Act, the Service invoked the express rulemaking authority of that 2 In 1939, President Roosevelt transferred two bureaus operating within the United States Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, respectively, to the United States Department of the Interior and in 1940 consolidated them into what later became known as the “Fish and Wildlife Service.” See Reorganization Plan No. III, 54 Stat. 1231, 1232 (1940) (effective June 30, 1940) (consolidated, renamed); Reorganization Plan No. II, 53 Stat. 1431, 1433 (1939) (effective July 1, 1939) (transferred). HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 11 Act in 1960, promulgating a regulation allowing the Service to enter into cooperative agreements on a refuge with any “person”: Cooperative agreements with persons for crop cultivation, haying, grazing, or the harvest of vegetative products, including plantlife, growing with or without cultivation on wildlife refuge areas may be executed on a share-in-kind basis when such agreements are in aid of or benefit to the wildlife management of the area. Title 50—Wildlife: Revision and Reorganization of Title, 25 Fed. Reg. 8,397, 8,413 (Dep’t of Interior Sept. 1, 1960) (“Final Rules”) (emphases added) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 29.2 (2012)). The Service defines a “person” as “an individual, club, association, partnership, corporation, or private or public body.” Id. at 8,398 (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 1.6). These regulations remain unchanged. The Claims Court rejected the Government’s argu- ment that, by authorizing the use of “cooperative agreements” rather than “procurement contracts,” the 1958 Act (which, in amending the 1934 Act, retained the “cooperative agreement” provision of the 1946 Act) exempts the Service’s CFAs from the competitive bid requirements of the CICA. Enacted in 1984, the CICA established a general requirement that executive agencies “obtain full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures” when “conducting a procurement for property or services.” Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2711, 98 Stat. 494, 1175 (1984). The CICA originally did not include a definition of “procurement,” but in 2011 Congress amended the act to define the term. An Act to Enact Certain Laws Relating to Public Contracts as Title 41, United States Code, “Public Contracts,” Pub. L. No. 111-350, sec. 3, 41 U.S.C. § 111, 124 Stat. 3677, 3681 (2011). The CICA now defines “procurement” as “all stages of the process of acquiring property or services, beginning with the process 12 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES for determining a need for property or services and ending with contract completion and closeout.” 41 U.S.C. § 111. As an initial matter, the Claims Court found that the 1958 Act could not have preempted the CICA because Congress passed the CICA in 1984, twenty-six years after the 1958 Act. Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 498. The Claims Court reached the same conclusion with respect to the 1966 Act, id. at 499, which provided that the Service’s regulations “shall continue in effect until modified or rescinded,” 1966 Act, § 4(g), 80 Stat. at 929. And it similarly found that the 1960 regulation, codified at 50 C.F.R. § 29.2, could not preempt the 1984 CICA. Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 501. The Claims Court’s holdings resolve a non-existent conflict. No provision in the CICA’s text indicates that Congress meant to replace the “cooperative agreements” provision of the earlier enacted legislation or the 1960 regulation. §§ 2711–2753, 98 Stat. at 1175–1203. In addition, when Congress amended the CICA in 2011, it intended to complement and clarify its earlier enactments on the same subject matter by providing a definition for “procurement.” See § 2(b), 124 Stat. at 3677 (explaining that “[i]n the codification of laws by this Act, the intent is to conform to the understood policy, intent, and purpose of Congress in the original enactments, with such amendments and corrections as will remove ambiguities, contradictions, and other imperfections”). And nothing in the legislative history accompanying the CICA and the 2011 amendment warrants a different conclusion. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 111-42 (2009), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1468; H.R. Rep. No. 98-861 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445. In the absence of any indication to the contrary in the statute or the legislative history, the Claims Court erred in holding the competitive bidding requirements of the CICA apply to the “cooperative agreements” authorized by regulation pursuant to the 1946 and 1958 Acts. See, e.g., United HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 13 States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (“[I]t can be strongly presumed that Congress will specifically address language on the statute books that it wishes to change.”). Turning to the 1958 Act’s text, the Claims Court found that it did not provide the Service with the authority to enter into the CFAs because the 1958 Act governs only “[cooperative] agreements between the Service and other ‘Federal, State, and public or private agencies and organizations’ to coordinate conservation between these various organizations.” Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 498 (emphasis added) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 661). Because the CFAs at issue were between the Service and “private farmers,” rather “public or private agencies” or “organizations,” the Claims Court found the 1958 Act inapplicable. Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 498. It also determined that the phrase “public or private [agencies and] organizations” unambiguously “describes the types of governmental and private entities that need to coordinate to conserve wildlife” and that it “has nothing to do with cooperative farming agreements between the Service and private farmers.” Id. at 501. It also reasoned that coordination with private farmers does not “make sense within the context of the statute.” Id. at 502. As a result, the Claims Court determined that the statute contained no gap that 50 C.F.R. § 29.2 could fill. Id. We find ambiguity in the 1958 Act’s reference to “public or private agencies and organizations” where the Claims Court did not; its construction cannot stand. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“[P]rior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”). The statute does not define the phrase “public or private agencies and organizations,” so we give the terms “their ordinary, established meaning, 14 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES for which we may consult dictionaries.” Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The definition of “private” includes “belonging to or concerning an individual, person, company, or interest.” Private, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1986) (“Webster’s”). “Organization” involves an “administrative and functional structure of an organization” such “as a business.” Organization, id. A business reflects a “commercial enterprise carried on for profit” and encompasses, among other structures, a “sole proprietorship” like Mr. Hymas’s Dosmen Farms. Business, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (“Black’s Law Dictionary”); see id. (defining “sole proprietorship” as a “business in which one person owns all the assets, owes all the liabilities, and operates in his or her personal capacity”); see also Hymas v. United States, No. 2014-5150, Docket No. 5 at 1 (where Mr. Hymas answered “none” as to whether any parent corporation or publicly held companies own ten percent or more of Dosmen Farms). These terms also have alternative definitions and conceivably could cover other entities. Private, Webster’s; Organization, id.; see also Business Enterprises, Black’s Law Dictionary (describing different business structures). “The existence of alternative dictionary definitions of a term . . . indicates that the statute is open to interpretation.” Info. Tech., 316 F.3d at 1320– 21 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Taken together, we find that the phrase “public or private agencies and organizations” contains ambiguity. Pursuant to Congress’s express delegation in the 1958 Act, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 664, the Service promulgated 50 C.F.R. § 29.2 in 1960 through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The regulation explains that the Service may enter into cooperative agreements with any “person,” 50 C.F.R. § 29.2, which includes “an individual, club, association, partnership, corporation, or private or public HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 15 body,” 50 C.F.R. § 1.6. The Service’s decision to select the term “person” to interpret the ambiguous phrase “public or private agencies and organizations” in 16 U.S.C. § 661 reflects a permissible construction based upon a relevant dictionary definition. See Info. Tech., 316 F.3d at 1321 (“[W]e must defer to a properly promulgated regulation[] if it is ‘based on a permissible construction of the statute.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843)). That Congress has taken no action over the past fifty years to disturb the Service’s interpretation offers further support for our conclusion. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) (affording “great deference” to the agency’s interpretation that the agency maintained for more than eighty years); see also Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 983 (1986) (“[A] congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Claims Court’s holdings do not support a different result. First, the Claims Court concluded that coordination between the Service and private farmers “make[s] [no] sense within the context of the statute,” Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 502, but that ipse dixit statement does not answer why the Service could not coordinate conservation efforts with private farmers consistent with the 1958 Act’s goals, just as it had for the past fifty years. Second, it observed that 50 C.F.R. § 29.2 did not expressly state that the Service promulgated the regulation to interpret the phrase “public or private agencies and organizations” first set forth in section 1 of the 1946 Act (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 661), Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 502; that finding overlooks the Service’s citation in its rulemaking notice of 16 U.S.C. § 664, which in 1960 provided for “cooperative agreements entered into pursuant to the provisions of [16 U.S.C. § 661].” 16 U.S.C. § 664 (1958); see Final Rules, 25 Fed. Reg. at 8,413. Third, the Claims Court relied upon the 16 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES principle of ejusdem generis to find the phrase “public or private agencies and organizations” unambiguous, 3 Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 502, but that canon “comes into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute,” Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581, which the Claims Court did not find. In any event, the Claims Court should have deferred to the Service’s regulation that permissibly construed the ambiguous statute. Finally, that a different Service regulation also contains the term “cooperative agreement” does not diminish the reasonableness of 50 C.F.R. § 29.2, and the Claims Court erred in concluding otherwise. Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 502. Instead, it confirms that the Service broadly interpreted its cooperative agreement authority to encompass both the public and private spheres. See 50 C.F.R. § 25.12(a) (using “cooperative agreement” in the definition of “coordination area”). In sum, the Service permissibly construed the 1958 Act in filling a statutory gap and properly found that the Act authorized it to negotiate cooperative agreements. As we explain in the next subsection, a separate statutory scheme—the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1024, 70 Stat. 1120 (1956) (“FWA”)—also permits the Service to negotiate cooperative agreements. 2. The Claims Court’s Construction Conflicts with the 1998 Act’s Unambiguous Terms and Legislative History After it initially enacted the FWA in 1956 to rename the Service, Congress amended the FWA in 1998 in part to promote volunteer programs and community partner- 3 The canon of ejusdem generis teaches “that where general words follow a specific enumeration of persons or things, the general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981). HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 17 ships for the benefit of National Wildlife Refuges. 1998 Act, 112 Stat. 1574. Pursuant to that amendment, Congress authorized the Service to “enter into [] cooperative agreement[s] . . . with any partner organization, academic institution, or State or local government agency to carry out 1 or more projects or programs for a refuge.” Id. at sec. 5, 16 U.S.C. § 742f(d)(2)(A), 112 Stat. at 1576. In 2004, Congress “clarif[ied] . . . [the Service’s] cooperative agreement authority,” providing that the Secretary of the Interior may negotiate and enter into a cooperative agreement with a partner organization, academic institution, State or local government agency, or other person to implement one or more projects or programs for a refuge or complex of geographically related refuges in ac- cordance with the purposes of this subsection and in compliance with the policies of other relevant authorities, regulations, and policy guidance. National Wildlife Refuge Volunteer Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-327, sec. 4, § 742f(d)(2)(A), 118 Stat. 1271, 1272 (2004) (“2004 Amendments”) (capitalization altered) (emphases added). “[P]rojects or programs” may include efforts to (1) “promote the stewardship of resources of the refuge through habitat maintenance, restoration, and improvement, biological monitoring, or research”; and (2) “support the operation and maintenance of the refuge through constructing, operating, maintaining, or improving the facilities and services of the refuge[.]” 1998 Act, sec. 5, § 742f(d)(2)(B), 112 Stat. at 1576. These provisions remain unchanged. The Claims Court found that neither the 1998 Act nor the 2004 Amendments provide the Service with the authority to negotiate cooperative agreements like the CFAs. It found the 1998 Act’s text focuses on “‘voluntary programs or community partnerships,’” not “contractual arrangements whereby farmer-cooperators use public 18 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES land to grow crops.” Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 499 (quoting 1998 Act, 112 Stat. at 1574). It examined the legislative history of the 2004 Amendments and determined that Congress intended the 1998 Act and 2004 Amendments to expand the Service’s authority to hire more volunteers, not its authority to negotiate cooperative agreements under which cooperators receive compensation in kind. Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 499–500 (examining S. Rep. No. 108-315, at 3 (2004); H.R. Rep. No. 108-385 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1165–66). It also observed that the CFAs “could be considered projects and programs to ‘promote the stewardship of resources of the refuge,’” but declined to adopt such a broad interpretation of the 1998 Act because doing so would mean there was no “meaningful limitation on the types of agreements that the Service could enter into, pursuant to section 742f(d).” Id. at 500 & n.35. Finally, the Claims Court concluded that Congress “could have exempted the Service from the CICA” when it enacted the 2004 Amendments, “but did not do so.” Id. at 500. The Claims Court’s interpretation conflicts with the 1998 Act’s plain text. First, the Claims Court incorrectly construed the 1998 Act’s preamble to concern volunteer activities only. To the contrary, Congress enacted the 1998 Act to promote volunteer programs “and for other purposes.” 1998 Act, 112 Stat. at 1574. In any event, a preamble cannot overcome the statute’s plain language. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 578 n.3 (2008) (“[I]n America the settled principle of law is that the preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where the enacting part is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The statute unambiguously permits the Service to “negotiate and enter into a cooperative agreement” like the CFA with a “person” to implement a “program[]” that (1) “promote[s] the stewardship of resources of the refuge[s] through habitat maintenance, HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 19 restoration, and improvement”; or (2) “support[s] the operation and maintenance of the refuge through constructing, operating, maintaining, or improving the facilities of the refuge[s].” 16 U.S.C. § 742f(d)(2)(A), (B)(i)–(ii); see J.A. 173–203, 212–27 (discussing purposes of the CFAs). The Claims Court’s reading of the legislative history is similarly problematic. When it passed the 1998 Act, Congress identified three broad purposes that included, among other goals, the facilitation of “partnerships between the [National Wildlife Refuge System] and nonFederal entities to promote public awareness of the resources of the System and public participation in the conservation of those resources” and the encouragement of “donations and other contributions by persons and organizations to the System.” 1998 Act, sec. 2(b), 112 Stat. at 1574; cf. id. (explicitly identifying volunteer activities as a separate goal). That Congress later sought to enhance volunteer participation in 2004 does not mean that it did so at the expense of its earlier goals. See Aectra Refining & Mktg., Inc. v. United States, 565 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law and a newlyenacted statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and judicial concepts.”); see also Fausto, 484 U.S. at 453 (“[I]t can be strongly presumed that Congress will specifically address language on the statute books that it wishes to change.”). With respect to the Claims Court’s concerns about meaningful limitations to the Service’s cooperative agreements authority, we find that exercise best left to the Service. We have held that “[o]ur duty is not to weigh the wisdom of, or to resolve any struggle between, competing views of the public interest, but rather to respect legitimate policy choices made by the agency in interpreting and applying the statute.” Suramerica de Aleaciones 20 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1992). We decline to chart a different course today. Finally, the Claims Court’s assertion that Congress could have exempted the Service from the CICA in 2004 (but did not) proffers a false choice. The Service has the authority to negotiate cooperative agreements like the CFAs should it choose to do so. We have held that such agreements need not comply with the CICA in analogous circumstances. See CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 745 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that “agencies escape the requirements of federal procurement law” under the CICA when “using a cooperative agreement”). Taken together, the 1958 and 1998 Acts, as amended, are independent sources that authorize the Service to negotiate cooperative agreements like the CFAs. The Claims Court erred in holding otherwise. B. The Service Properly Construed the CFAs as Cooperative Agreements Having determined that the statutory scheme permits the Service to enter into cooperative agreements, we next must answer whether the Service properly construed the CFAs at issue as “cooperative agreements,” rather than “procurement contracts.” “Whether a contract is a procurement contract or a cooperative agreement is a question of law,” which the court reviews de novo. Id. at 1385 (citing Maint. Eng’rs v. United States, 749 F.2d 724, 726 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). As we explain below, the Service properly construed the instruments at issue as cooperative agreements. Various statutes address legal instruments under federal law. “Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute.” Norfolk Dredging Co. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000)). “A court HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 21 derives the plain meaning of the statute from its text and structure.” Id. (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001)). “If the words are unambiguous, no further inquiry is usually required.” Camargo Correa Metais, S.A. v. United States, 200 F.3d 771, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”). In defining the plain meaning of a statute, courts must avoid “add[ing] conditions” to the applicability of a statute that do not appear in the provision’s text. Norfolk Dredging Co., 375 F.3d at 1111. As previously observed, the Claims Court’s bid protest jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) speaks “exclusively” to “procurement solicitations and contracts.” Res. Conservation, 597 F.3d at 1245 (emphasis added). Because the Tucker Act does not define the term “procurement” in 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), see id. at 1242–45, the court has relied upon the definition of “procurement” in 41 U.S.C. § 111 “to determine whether a ‘procurement’ has occurred pursuant to § 1491(b).” Distributed Sols., Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); 4 see also 41 U.S.C. § 111 (defining “procurement” to cover “all stages of the process of acquiring property or services, beginning with the process for determining a need for property or services and ending with contract completion and closeout”). 4 When Congress amended the CICA and reor- ganized Title 41 of the United States Code in 2011, it moved the definition of “procurement” from 41 U.S.C. § 403(2) to § 111. Sec. 3, § 111, 124 Stat. at 3681. Distributed Solutions cites to the definition under § 403(2). 539 F.3d at 1345. 22 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES The definition of “procurement” in 41 U.S.C. § 111 is not the only provision relevant to our inquiry, nor does a “procurement contract” encompass the entire universe of instruments at executive agencies’ disposal. In 1978, Congress passed the FGCAA in light of its findings that there was “a need to distinguish [f]ederal assistance relationships from [f]ederal procurement relationships,” as well as “uncertainty as to the meaning of . . . ‘cooperative agreement.’” FGCAA, sec. 2, 92 Stat. at 3. In its current form, the FGCAA “prescribe[s] criteria for executive agencies in selecting appropriate legal instruments to achieve (A) uniformity in their use by executive agencies; (B) a clear definition of the relationships they reflect; and (C) a better understanding of the responsibilities of the parties to them.” 31 U.S.C. § 6301(2). Congress intends the FGCAA to “eliminate unnecessary administrative requirements on recipients of Government awards by characterizing the relationship between executive agencies and contractors, States, local governments, and other recipients in acquiring property and services and in providing United States Government assistance.” Id. § 6301(1). To promote these goals, Congress distinguished “procurement contract[s]” from “cooperative agreements” in the FGCAA. Id. §§ 6303 (explaining when executive agencies “shall use” procurement contracts), 6305 (explaining when executive agencies “shall use” cooperative agreements). 5 5 The dissent states that “the FGCAA does not grant the agencies flexibility in determining when to use a particular instrument in government contracting” because 31 U.S.C. § 6303 articulates the circumstances under which an agency “shall” use a procurement contract. Dissent at 5–6. Congress’s use of “shall” in § 6303 is not dispositive. The dissent overlooks Congress’s other directives as to when an agency “shall” use grants and HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 23 In particular, the FGCAA requires that “[a]n executive agency shall use a procurement contract” when “the principal purpose of the instrument is to acquire (by purchase, lease, or barter) property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States Government.” Id. § 6303. By contrast, “[a]n executive agency shall use a cooperative agreement” when (1) “the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value” to the recipient “to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the United States instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease or barter) property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States Government” and (2) “substantial involvement” is “expected between the executive agency and the State, local government, or other recipient when carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement.” Id. § 6305. Pursuant to the authority delegated by Congress, see id. § 6307, the Office of Management and Budget has explained that “determinations of whether a program is principally one of procurement or assistance, and whether substantial Federal involvement in performance will normally occur[,] are basic agency policy decisions” and that “Congress intended the [FGCAA] to allow agencies flexibility to select the instrument that best suits each transaction.” Implementation of Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,860, 36,863 (Office of Mgmt. and Budget Aug. 18, 1978). Congress amended the FGCAA in 1982 without substantive change, An Act to amend the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-162, 96 Stat. 23 (1982), and its provisions remain unchanged. 1. The Claims Court’s Decision Misinterprets the Law cooperative agreements. 31 U.S.C. §§ 6304 (grants), 6305 (cooperative agreements). 24 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES The Claims Court determined that the CFAs consti- tuted procurement contracts because in its view the Service uses them “to obtain the services of farmercooperators to feed migratory birds and wildlife on the Refuges,” which in its “judgment . . . is a procurement.” Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 486 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 111; Distributed Sols., 539 F.3d at 1345; Res. Conservation, 597 F.3d at 1244; RAMCOR Servs. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The Claims Court also determined that this court’s decision in CMS supported its conclusion, finding that in CMS the agreements were used to obtain services from third-parties, not to provide assistance to them. In this case, the intended beneficiaries are the migratory birds and wildlife on the refuges. The farmer-cooperators are intermediaries. The Ad- ministrative Record demonstrates that the Service contracted with farmer-cooperators, not to benefit them financially, but to obtain their services to provide food for migratory birds and wildlife, in exchange for the farmers’ personal use of public- owned lands. The fact that farmer-cooperators may profit from this arrangement does not change their status as intermediaries. As such, the cooperative farming agreements in this case are pro- curements, subject to the Tucker Act. Id. at 487 (footnote and citations omitted). It concluded by observing that 50 C.F.R. § 29.2 could not exempt the CFAs from its Tucker Act jurisdiction because “numerous circuit courts . . . have found uniformly that no Chevron deference is given because the task of determining a federal court’s jurisdiction falls to the court, not an agency.” Id. at 488 (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). The Claims Court’s holdings and Mr. Hymas’s argu- ments rest in large part upon the faulty premise that the HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 25 definition of “cooperative agreement” in the FGCAA is irrelevant and that 41 U.S.C. § 111 contains the only definition that courts may consult to determine (1) whether a particular transaction constitutes a procurement and, consequently, (2) whether the Claims Court has bid protest jurisdiction over a particular claim. See Hymas, 117 Fed. Cl. at 486–88; Appellee’s Br. 29–32, 47– 48. Put another way, the Claims Court and Mr. Hymas would have us look to 41 U.S.C. § 111 as the sole source containing the relevant definitions of “procurement” and “cooperative agreement.” The statute’s text does not support that result, given that it speaks to “procurement” only. What is more, the court did not hold in Distributed Solutions or in CMS that courts must construe instruments pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 111 without regard to other relevant statutes. 6 To have done so would impose an additional condition not present in the statute’s text, see Norfolk Dredging Co., 375 F.3d at 1111, as well as offend the well-established canon that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text “superfluous.” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 253 (explaining that overlapping statutes may be given effect so long as there is no “positive repugnancy” between them). But see 360Training.com, Inc. v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 575, 586–87 (2012) (relying solely upon 41 U.S.C. § 111 and declining to consider the FGCAA to 6 Counsel for both parties acknowledged at oral argument that no authority supports the proposition that 41 U.S.C. § 111 is the only dispositive source for our inquiry. Oral Argument at 17:53–18:15 (Counsel for Mr. Hymas), 29:48–30:26 (Counsel for the Government), http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20 14-5150.mp3. 26 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES determine jurisdiction). It also would mean that Congress sub silentio imposed such a condition upon the courts, effectively hiding an “elephant[] in [a] mousehole[].” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). Our case law counsels against such a narrow ap- proach. For example, the court in CMS considered definitions in the FGCAA in determining that the instrument in question was a procurement contract, rather than a cooperative agreement. 745 F.3d at 1381, 1386. Thus, because we must respect the concinnity between the separate yet interrelated statutes that Congress has enacted, we decline to rely solely upon 41 U.S.C. § 111 for our inquiry. See, e.g., Conn. Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 253. The Claims Court’s construction also ignores the context in which Congress enacted the definition of “procurement” in 41 U.S.C. § 111. Congress legislated against the backdrop of the 1978 FGCAA when, in 2011, it de- fined “procurement” in 41 U.S.C. § 111. “Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law and a newly-enacted statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and judicial concepts.” Aectra Refining & Mktg., 565 F.3d at 1370. Congress presumably did not intend for the term “procurement” in 41 U.S.C. § 111 to conflict with or otherwise override the definitions provided in the 1978 FGCAA, which it enacted to achieve uniformity and clarity in the area. See FGCAA, sec. 2(b)(2), 92 Stat. at 3; Fausto, 484 U.S. at 453 (“[I]t can be strongly presumed that Congress will specifically address language on the statute books that it wishes to change.”). With these precepts in mind, we find that the Service properly construed the CFAs as cooperative agreements, rather than procurement contracts. Under the FGCAA, whether an instrument reflects a “procurement contract” or a “cooperative agreement” turns upon the principal purpose of the relationship. If the Service principally HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 27 intended to “transfer a thing of value” to the private farmers “to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the United States instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or barter) property or services for the direct benefit of or use of the United States Government,” then the instrument is a cooperative agreement. 31 U.S.C. § 6305(1). The Service must also remain “substantial[ly] involve[d]” in the activity. Id. § 6305(2). We find that the CFAs meet this definition. First, the Service principally intended the CFAs to transfer a thing of value (i.e., the right to farm specific refuge lands and retain a share of the crop yield) to carry out a public purpose authorized by law (i.e., to conserve wildlife on the refuges). J.A. 173–203, 212–27. Indeed, the 1958 Act provides that the Service “is authorized to provide assistance to, and cooperate with, . . . public or private agencies and organizations in the development, protection, rearing, and stocking of all species of wildlife, resources thereof, and their habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 661. Likewise, the 1998 Act authorizes the agency to “negotiate and enter into a cooperative agreement with a . . . person to implement one or more projects or programs for a refuge.” 16 U.S.C. § 742f(d)(2)(A). Thus, there is no serious dispute that assisting private farmers to promote wildlife conservation is the sine qua non of the CFAs. Second, the Service remains substantially involved in the activity, advising on decisions related to crop selection, farming methods, pesticide and fertilizer use, and crop harvest. J.A. 173–203, 212–27. The CFAs cannot be construed as procurement con- tracts because the agency did not intend to acquire farming “services” for the “direct benefit or use of the United States Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 6305(1); see 41 U.S.C. § 111 (defining “procurement” as encompassing “all stages of the process of acquiring property or services”). True, the CFAs indirectly benefit the Service since the private 28 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES farmers’ activities advance the agency’s overall mission, but that is true for nearly all cooperative agreements. More importantly, the Service does not directly benefit from the farming services provided pursuant to the CFAs because (1) it does not receive payment from the farmers pursuant to the agreements, see J.A. 79; and (2) “[r]efuge crop shares are all used by wildlife in the field” or retained by the farmers, such that “[t]here are no excess crops for disposition” by the Service, J.A. 82. And as counsel for the Government explained, a traditional procurement would not provide the Service with the flexibility needed to react to exigencies that regularly arise under the cropland management plans on the Umatilla and McNary Refuges, such as decisions regarding what plants to crop, when to harvest them, and how to tend to them. See Oral Argument at 11:05–12:31, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20 14-5150.mp3; see also J.A. 173–203, 212–27 (describing decisions that arise under the plans and the need for flexibility in making them). 7 Our decision in CMS does not, as the Claims Court held, warrant a different conclusion. In CMS, we found 7 The dissent states that “the crop management plans’ description of cooperative agreements being ‘negotiated’ and of the farmer receiving a portion of the harvested crops ‘in return’ for his services strongly suggests a quid pro quo relationship” indicative of “acquisitions” secured through a procurement contract. Dissent at 5. The argument is ipse dixit, and in any case, the natural corollary to that argument is that no negotiation or exchange occurs when “the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value” to the recipient “to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the United States.” 31 U.S.C. § 6305(1). HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 29 that “the proper instrument is a procurement contract” when a federal agency has “created an intermediary relationship with” a third party. 745 F.3d at 1386 (citation omitted). However, the court based that fact-specific determination on its finding that the intermediary did “not receiv[e] assistance from the federal agency,” but rather “provide[d] a service to another entity which is eligible for assistance.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The situation here is quite different. For example, the 1958 Act authorizes the agency to “provide assistance to, and cooperate with” private farmers to promote wildlife conservation, 16 U.S.C. § 661 (emphasis added), and the CFAs allow the Service to provide assistance to those farmers (in the form of permission to farm on the refuges and various crop management decisions) to promote wildlife conservation. Put another way, the Service did not enter into the CFAs to obtain a service from the farmers, but rather negotiated with them to provide assistance that would further the goals of the 1958 and 1998 Acts. 8 Congress intended the FGCAA to provide federal agencies with the “flexibility” to determine “whether a given transaction or class of transactions is procurement or assistance and, if assistance, whether the transaction or class of transactions is to be associated with a type of grant or cooperative agreement relationship.” S. Rep. No. 8 The dissent believes that our decision conflicts with CMS because, like in CMS, “the CFAs here engage third-party farmers merely as intermediaries that help the Service fulfill its mission of feeding migratory birds.” Dissent at 5 (citing CMS, 745 F.3d at 1386). Here, however, unlike in CMS, the Service remains substantially involved in the activity, advising on decisions related to crop selection, farming methods, pesticide and fertilizer use, and crop harvest. J.A. 173–203, 212–27. 30 HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 95-449, at 10 (1977); see also id. (stating that “the mission of the agency will influence the agency’s determination” and that “the agency’s classification of its transactions will become a public statement for public, recipient, and congressional review of how the agency views its mission, its responsibilities, and its relationships with the nonfederal sector”). 9 Because Congress did not require the use of particular instruments in particular situations, it left a gap for agencies to fill, and the Supreme Court has stated that filling such gaps “involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than courts.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–86). Courts should exercise caution before determining that any such decisions go beyond the policy making realm that rests within the agency’s purview. See Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, 966 F.2d at 665. That principle has particular importance in this case, where the Claims Court’s judgment (if permitted to stand) would severely undermine the Government’s ability to negotiate cooperative agreements under appropriate circumstances, as well as frustrate the Service’s attempts to rely upon such agreements to accomplish its statutory goals on over 100 refuges. Oral Argument at 8:00–26 (discussing effect on the Government generally), 10:20–27 (discussing effect on refuges), http://oralarguments.cafc. 9 The dissent takes issue with our citation to legislative history, arguing that § 6303 is unambiguous in its direction that an agency “shall use a procurement contract” when the principal purpose is to acquire services for the direct benefit or use of the United States. Dissent at 6. But we conclude that the CFAs do not have such a principal purpose. Thus, as we explained above, the “shall” language of § 6303—as well as the dissent’s complaint about lack of its ambiguity and our reliance on legislative history—is misplaced. HYMAS v. UNITED STATES 31 uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2014-5150.mp3. C. Cooperative Agreements Are Not Subject to Tucker Act Review With the foundational questions answered, the court must decide whether the Tucker Act confers jurisdiction on the Claims Court to hear Mr. Hymas’s claims. Our jurisprudence explains that the Claims Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b) “exclusively” concerns “procurement solicitations and contracts,” Res. Conservation, 597 F.3d at 1245, and that “agencies escape the requirements of federal procurement law” under the CICA when “using a cooperative agreement.” CMS, 745 F.3d at 1381; see 31 U.S.C. §§ 6303, 6305 (distinguishing procurement contracts from cooperative agreements); COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 271 n.1 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting the distinction between “‘procurement contracts’ and ‘cooperative agreements’” under the FGCAA); accord S. Rep. No. 95-449, at 11 (1977) (explaining that if an award changes from a procurement contract to a grant, it need not comport with federal procurement law). Thus, because the Service properly construed the CFAs as cooperative agreements, the Claims Court must dismiss Mr. Hymas’s action. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514 (“Without jurisdiction, the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”). 10