Opinion ID: 821034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. Sutterfield and the Conspiracy Claim

Text: Ms. Sutterfield first moved for summary judgment on the Chimeras’ conspiracy claim against her, arguing she could not be held liable for conspiracy because she did not act in concert with the deputy sheriffs when they allegedly violated the Chimeras’ constitutional rights. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in Ms. Sutterfield’s favor.
In order to be held liable under § 1983, the party committing the alleged constitutional violation must be a state actor or must be “jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action.” Lee v. Town of Estes Park, 820 F.2d 1112, 1114 (10th -7- Cir. 1987); see also Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1999). The district court concluded that the Chimeras failed to allege facts showing an agreement or joint action between the Sequoyah County defendants and Ms. Sutterfield. We agree with that ruling. Although the Chimeras assert that the record sufficiently establishes that Ms. Sutterfield was a willing participant in a joint action, they do not point to any specific evidence in the record to support their position. Instead, the Chimeras appear to argue that Ms. Sutterfield should be held liable because she was the person who requested assistance from the Sequoyah County Sheriff’s Department—an action that led to the alleged illegal entry, false arrest, and use of excessive force by Deputies Thomas, Oliver, and Davis. But “the mere furnishing of information to police officers who take action thereon does not constitute joint action under color of state law which renders a private actor liable under § 1983.” Lee, 820 F.2d at 1115. The district court properly gave summary judgment to Ms. Sutterfield.6
We also reject the Chimeras’ objection to the admission of certain affidavits attached to Ms. Sutterfield’s motion for summary judgment. In the summary-judgment context, evidence is not required to be submitted “in a form that would be admissible at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Although testimony via affidavit may be inadmissible at trial, affidavits may properly be considered at the 6 At oral argument, counsel for the Chimeras conceded their conspiracy claim was “tenuous at best.” -8- summary-judgment stage on the theory that the same facts may ultimately be presented at trial in an admissible form. See Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1122. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to strike the challenged affidavits. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the Chimeras’ motion for an extension of time to respond to Ms. Sutterfield’s motion for summary judgment. The district court had initially granted a two-week extension to the Chimeras for their response to the summary-judgment motion, but declined to grant any further extensions. In denying the Chimeras’ request for another extension, the district court explained that it “fail[ed] to see how plaintiffs have had inadequate time to conduct discovery on the issues present in the motion. They had almost an entire year after the lawsuit was filed to conduct such discovery . . . .” Appellees’ J.A. at 27. The district court’s ruling was not error. C. The Claims Against the Sequoyah County Defendants The Sequoyah County defendants—Sheriff Lockhart, former Sheriff Philpot, and Deputies Thomas, Oliver, and Davis—collectively moved for summary judgment, arguing they did not violate the Chimeras’ constitutional rights. Alternatively, the Sequoyah County defendants argued they were entitled to qualified immunity as a defense against the Chimeras’ claims. The district court concluded the Sequoyah County defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the merits as to the Chimeras’ claims and did not reach the issue of qualified immunity. -9- 1. Procedural Objections Raised by the Chimeras We first turn to the Chimeras’ argument that the district court erred in not striking photographs attached to the Sequoyah County defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Chimeras argue the photographs were hearsay, lacked proper foundation, and that the defendants could not provide a proper chain of custody. We conclude the district court did not err in declining to strike these photographs. As we noted earlier, evidence at the summary-judgment stage does not need to be presented in a form that would be admissible at trial. In addition, Deputies Oliver and Davis had laid a proper foundation for the admissibility of the photographs at trial because their deposition testimony reflects that these were the digital-camera photographs that Ms. Sutterfield showed to them after they arrived at the Chimeras’ property on December 30, 2008. “When evidence is unique, readily identifiable and relatively resistant to change, the foundation need only consist of testimony that the evidence is what its proponent claims.” United States v. Yeley–Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 683 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). 2. The “Illegal Entry” Claim Against Deputy Thomas The Chimeras have failed adequately to brief, and thus forfeited review of, their “illegal entry” claim against Deputy Thomas. Although the Chimeras reference this claim in a heading, their opening brief contains no argument section that discusses the district court’s decision regarding Deputy Thomas and his alleged illegal entry onto the Chimeras’ property. “[We] routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant's opening brief.” Bronson v. -10- Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007). Mentioning an issue in an argument heading without pursuing it further is insufficient to preserve appellate review. Because the Chimeras’ opening brief does not adequately raise and develop an argument on the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Deputy Thomas on the illegal-entry claim, we conclude the Chimeras have forfeited any argument that the district court erred in giving summary judgment to Deputy Thomas. 3. The Excessive-Force Claim Against Deputy Oliver At oral argument, counsel for the Chimeras stated that the Chimeras were abandoning their excessive-force claim against Deputy Oliver. For that reason, we do not give further consideration to that claim. But we observe that, had the Chimeras’ counsel not announced the claim’s abandonment, review of that issue would nevertheless be forfeited due to inadequately developed briefing on appeal. 4. The False-Arrest Claim Against Deputies Oliver and Davis We next turn to the Chimeras’ false-arrest claim. “[A]n arrest is the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures” and “is reasonable only if supported by probable cause.” Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). “‘Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to have the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Alonso, 790 F.2d 1489, 1496 (10th Cir. 1986)). The existence of probable cause is not measured by “[t]he subjective belief of an individual officer.” United States v. -11- Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 2004). Rather, the inquiry into probable cause turns on “whether a reasonable officer would have believed that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant based on the information possessed by the arresting officer.” Id. at 896-97 (quotations omitted). Deputies Oliver and Davis arrested the Chimeras for violating one of Oklahoma’s breach-of-the-peace statutes. The statute reads: If any person shall willfully or maliciously disturb, either by day or night, the peace and quiet of any city of the first class, town, village, neighborhood, family or person by loud or unusual noise, or by abusive, violent, obscene or profane language, whether addressed to the party so disturbed or some other person, or by threatening to kill, do bodily harm or injury, destroy property, fight, or by quarreling or challenging to fight, or fighting, or shooting off any firearms, or brandishing the same, or by running any horse at unusual speed along any street, alley, highway or public road, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1362.7 The Chimeras do not dispute that they temporarily blocked the access road or that Ms. Chimera was carrying a BB gun. But the breach-of-the-peace statute does not criminalize such conduct, and we see no evidence that the Chimeras engaged in any other behavior that would fall within the statute’s ambit. According to the district court, “there was sufficient probable cause to arrest the Chimeras for breach of the peace because of the threatening nature of their behavior by blocking the road with their vehicle and by the fact Brenda Chimera was brandishing a weapon while blocking Sutterfield from the 7 The Oklahoma Statutes contain numerous provisions dealing with assorted disturbances to public order. Section 1362 is entitled “Disturbance by loud or unusual noise or abusive, violent, obscene, profane or threatening language.” -12- road.” App. at 524-25 (emphasis added). We disagree with this description of the events that took place on the Chimeras’ access road on December 30, 2008. The act of “brandishing” requires more than mere possession. To “brandish” a weapon is defined as “[t]o flourish, wave about (a sword, spear, dart, club, or other manual weapon) by way of threat or display, or in preparation for action.”8 Oxford English Dictionary at 264 (Compact ed. 1981). The word carries with it an element of open menace and impending aggression. Nothing in the record suggests that Ms. Chimera brandished her son’s BB gun before she and her husband were arrested. In her affidavit attached to her motion for summary judgment, Ms. Sutterfield never uses any language stronger than “carrying” to describe Ms. Chimera’s handling of the BB gun that day. See App. at 70-71. Moreover, Deputy Oliver testified at his deposition that he knew the weapon in question was a BB gun and that Ms. Chimera had not pointed or waved it at Ms. Sutterfield. See App. at 249-50. The deputies also never confiscated the offending BB gun. Finally, the photographs that Ms. Sutterfield provided to the deputies depict Ms. Chimera holding the BB gun with the barrel consistently pointing toward or touching the ground. See App. at 208-29. None of the photographs shows Ms. Chimera “brandishing” the BB gun under any reasonable definition of the word. Nor does any evidence indicate the Chimeras threatened Ms. Sutterfield in any way that squares with the conduct prohibited by the Oklahoma breach-of-the-peace 8 To “flourish,” in turn, is “to wave about by way of show or triumph.” Oxford English Dictionary at 1032 (Compact ed. 1981). -13- statute. Ms. Sutterfield told Deputy Oliver and Deputy Davis merely “that the Chimeras had blocked the exit from [her] home.” App. at 71. No one asserts that the Chimeras directed abusive, violent, obscene, or profane language toward Ms. Sutterfield. No one disputes that the Chimeras had a right to be on their property to repair their damaged gate. And none of the photographs Ms. Sutterfield showed to the deputies supports the conclusion that the Chimeras were “threatening” Ms. Sutterfield. Perhaps tellingly, the Chimeras were never formally charged with violating the breach-of-the-peace statute. They were released very soon after being taken to the county jail. It is not even clear from the record whether the arresting deputies wrote a citation to Mr. or Ms. Chimera. If the citations exist, they have not been located. And it also appears that no official report of an arrest was ever made by either of the deputies in question. Because the undisputed record evidence shows the Chimeras were engaged in conduct that is not criminal under the breach-of-the-peace statute, we conclude that Deputies Oliver and Davis arrested the Chimeras without probable cause. We will nevertheless affirm the district court’s judgment in their favor if we determine the deputy sheriffs are entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not “clearly established” at the time of the challenged actions. See Shroff v. Spellman, 604 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir. 2010). “In order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Stearns v. Clarkson, 615 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). It is clearly established under this circuit’s case law that “an officer may not arrest an individual -14- without a warrant unless there is probable cause.” Id. Even so, a defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity for making a warrantless arrest without probable cause “if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest or detain the plaintiff.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Thus, even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.” Id. (alteration and quotation omitted). In this case, the material facts are not in dispute as to what information the deputy sheriffs possessed when they decided to arrest the Chimeras for breaching the peace. They knew the Chimeras had blocked the road while working on their gate. They also knew that Ms. Chimera had been carrying a BB gun, but there was no showing that she had pointed it or waved it at anyone. These undisputed facts would not lead a reasonable officer to conclude that probable cause existed to arrest the Chimeras for a breach of the peace under title 21, section 1362 of the Oklahoma Statutes.9 Because it was unreasonable for Deputy Oliver and Deputy Davis to believe probable cause existed to arrest the Chimeras, they are not entitled to qualified immunity on the false-arrest claim. 9 Under Oklahoma law, an officer may make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor only when the offense is committed in the officer’s presence. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 196; Raymer v. City of Tulsa, 595 P.2d 810, 812 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979). In this case, the Chimeras’ alleged breaches of the peace—blocking the access road and “brandishing” a BB gun—were not witnessed by the arresting deputies. When they arrived on the scene, the access road was clear and the BB gun had been set down by the roadside. It thus appears that the sheriff’s deputies did not comply with Oklahoma law governing warrantless arrests. This case does not present the question of whether an officer’s violation of a state arrest statute can independently give rise to § 1983 liability, but we note in passing that the circuits to have addressed the issue have consistently held that it does not. See, e.g., Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). -15- 5. The Claims Against Sheriffs Lockhart and Philpot For their final point of error, the Chimeras present a scant three sentences of argument concerning their claims against current Sheriff Lockhart and former Sheriff Philpot. Those lines are followed by a string of citations to the record. The Chimeras have not adequately explained or developed this issue. They do not discuss the district court’s decision or offer legal authority to flesh out their argument. “Perfunctory complaints that fail to frame and develop an issue are not sufficient to invoke appellate review.” Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1255 (alterations and quotations omitted). Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the Chimeras have forfeited review of the district court’s summary judgment in favor of both the current Sequoyah County Sheriff, Ron Lockhart, and the former Sequoyah County Sheriff, Johnny Philpot.