Opinion ID: 1060390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: decisions of other states relating to discharge in violation of public policy

Text: Several jurisdictions have grappled with how to balance the competing interests involved in these types of cases. Although the rationales often differed, most of the earlier cases on this subject held that a lawyer could not bring a retaliatory discharge action based upon the lawyer's adherence to his or her ethical duties. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F.Supp. 116 (S.D.Tex.1986); McGonagle v. Union Fid. Corp., 383 Pa.Super. 223, 556 A.2d 878 (1989); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill.App.3d 21, 103 Ill.Dec. 322, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986). This line of cases culminated in Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 145 Ill.2d 492, 164 Ill.Dec. 892, 584 N.E.2d 104 (1991), in which the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the other cases and set forth several rationales why in-house counsel should not be permitted to assert an action for retaliatory discharge. These rationales included (1) that because [i]n-house counsel do not have a choice of whether to follow their ethical obligations as attorneys licensed to practice law, id. at 109, lawyers do not need an action for retaliatory discharge to encourage them to abide by their ethical duties; and (2) that recognizing such an action would affect the foundation of trust in attorney-client relationships, which would then make employers naturally hesitant to rely upon in-house counsel for advice regarding [the employer's] potentially questionable conduct. Id. at 110. In more recent years, however, other states have permitted a lawyer, under limited circumstances, to pursue a claim of retaliatory discharge based upon termination in violation of public policy. The principal case permitting such an action is General Dynamics Corp. v. Rose, 7 Cal.4th 1164, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487 (1994), in which the California Supreme Court rejected the views held by Balla and others and established an analytical framework permitting a lawyer to sue for retaliatory discharge. According to this framework, a lawyer is generally permitted to assert a retaliatory discharge action if the lawyer is discharged for following a mandatory ethical duty or engaging in conduct that would give rise to an action by a non-lawyer employee. Id. at 502-03. However, the General Dynamics Court cautioned that the lawyer bringing the action could not rely upon confidential information to establish the claim and that any unsuccessful lawyer breaching his or her duty of confidentiality was subject to disciplinary sanctions. Id. at 503. Following California's lead, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has also permitted in-house counsel to assert a limited retaliatory discharge action. In GTE Products Corp. v. Stewart, 421 Mass. 22, 653 N.E.2d 161 (1995), the court questioned why the employee's status as an attorney should preclude an action: It thus seems bizarre that a lawyer employee, who has affirmative duties concerning the administration of justice, should be denied redress for discharge resulting from trying to carry out those very duties. Id. at 166 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, while the Stewart Court permitted a limited retaliatory discharge action based upon a lawyer's refusal to violate explicit and unequivocal statutory or ethical norms, it also restricted the scope of such an action to that in which the claim can be proved without any violation of the attorney's obligation to respect client confidences and secrets. Id. at 167. Finally, and most recently, the Montana Supreme Court also held that in-house counsel should be permitted to bring retaliatory discharge actions when necessary to protect public policy. In Burkhart v. Semitool, Inc., 300 Mont. 480, 5 P.3d 1031 (2000), the court discussed the rationales in favor of adopting such an action and noted that while clients have a right to discharge counsel at any time and for any reason, this right does not necessarily apply to in-house counsel. Instead, the court reasoned that by making his or her attorney an employee, [the employer] has avoided the traditional attorney-client relationship and granted the attorney protections that do not apply to independent contractors, but do apply to employees.... Id. at 1039. Moreover, unlike the previous cases recognizing such an action, the Burkhart Court permitted lawyers to disclose the employer's confidential information to the extent necessary to establish a retaliatory discharge claim. Id. at 1041 (relying upon Montana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(2) adopted from the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct).