Opinion ID: 2268506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: We Vacate The Superior Court's Sanction Against Charles.

Text: The superior court initially assigned Jacqueline half of Charles's total disposable military retirement pay. The court modified its military pension order by requiring Charles, as a sanction for his removing [Jacqueline's] name from the survivor benefits plan, to immediately obtain at his sole expense and maintain at his sole expense survivor benefits for [Jacqueline]. (Emphasis omitted.) Charles contends the superior court erroneously sanctioned him. Without addressing the merits of the dispute, we agree with Charles that the sanction must be vacated. Alaska's trial courts may insure proper efficiency and discipline by exercise of (1) the power of contempt authorized by statute and court rule, (2) the power to impose fines as sanctions authorized by court rule, or (3) the inherent power to punish for contempt. [27] But because the superior court identified neither the nature of the sanction nor a rule on which it relied, we lack a sufficient basis to review the sanction and we therefore vacate it. [28] In the interest of judicial economy, we will nonetheless consider possible bases to impose sanctions to guide the superior court on remand. Civil Rules 70 and 90 provide that the court may hold a party in contempt, [29] and we have held that superior courts are inherently authorized to punish for contempt. [30] The superior court might have held Charles in contempt for not complying with its order concerning Jacqueline's rights under the survivor benefits plan. [31] If so, this contempt was likely criminal, not civil, because the sanction served a punitive, as opposed to a coercive, function. [32] Additionally any contempt was indirect, because the court did not witness Charles facilitating the removal of Jacqueline's name from the survivor benefits plan. [33] A court may not impose indirect criminal contempt sanctions without providing specific procedural safeguards. [34] Here the record does not establish that such safeguards were provided and therefore a sanction for indirect criminal contempt could not stand. Alternatively Civil Rule 95 provides: For any infraction of [the rules of civil procedure], the court, after providing reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard, may withhold or assess costs or attorney's fees as the circumstances of the case and discouragement of like conduct in the future may require; and such costs and attorney's fees may be imposed upon offending attorneys or parties. [35] But in its order the superior court neither identified a civil rule that Charles violated nor characterized the sanction as an award of costs or attorney's fees. [36] Therefore Civil Rule 95 does not seem to be an appropriate basis for the sanction. The superior court may take this matter up on remand, but we note that Jacqueline does not appear to have incurred monetary damages from the temporary extinguishment of the survivor benefits option aside from the costs associated with filing motions and contacting DFAS. [37]