Opinion ID: 479847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Strict Construction of Penal Statutes

Text: 44 We have previously held that, when there is an ambiguity in a criminal statute, that ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant. United States v. Kroesser, 750 F.2d 833 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 9 This rule of interpretation reflects the sentiment that in a free society men should not languish in prison unless the duly elected representatives of society have expressly and clearly required it. It thus serves the two-fold purpose of requiring legislatures to give fair warning of what conduct is prescribed and insuring that legislatures and not courts ... define criminal activity. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). 45 This principle of lenity is  'not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose.'  Rojas, 671 F.2d at 163 (quoting United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145, 96 S.Ct. 335, 346, 46 L.Ed.2d 333 (1975)). Indeed, the doctrine of lenity should not be invoked until a court seiz[ing] everything from which aid can be derived, ... [is] left with an ambiguous statute. United States v. Noe, 634 F.2d 860, 862 (5th Cir.1981) 10 (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 347, 92 S.Ct. at 522), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 876, 102 S.Ct. 355, 70 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). 46 In the instant case, we deal with exactly such a situation. There is no evident statutory purpose. Cf. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980) (finding ambiguity in pre-1984 version of Sec. 924(c)). We have plumbed every available tool of statutory construction and remain unable to develop a definitive interpretation of Sec. 924(c). Because it is a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment, Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955), we are bound to limit the application of Sec. 924(c). The ambiguous nature of the statute requires us to restrict its ambit. Consequently, we determine that drug trafficking crimes are not crimes of violence within the meaning of Sec. 16(b). Thus, conviction of predicate drug trafficking offenses will not support a conviction under Sec. 924(c).