Opinion ID: 1561466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Standard of Review for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Text: Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. A court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986) (citations omitted). Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court's factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court's legal conclusions de novo. See Sochor, 883 So.2d at 771-72. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. The defendant carries the burden to overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). [S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). The Court need not reach both Strickland prongs in every case. [W]hen a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong. Preston v. State, 970 So.2d 789, 803 (Fla.2007) (quoting Whitfield v. State, 923 So.2d 375, 384 (Fla.2005)). 1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Concerning Andrew Salter Within this framework, we turn first to the claim that counsel was ineffective for not identifying, locating, and presenting Andrew Salter to testify that he was in the vicinity for several hours that morning and did not see Hurst or his car. The postconviction court correctly found that trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to pursue investigation of Salter and not to call him at trial, but to use another witness's testimony about Salter's presence on the scene to suggest that a suspicious person was in the area at the time of the crime. At the evidentiary hearing, Hurst's trial counsel testified that he did know of the presence of an individual at the scene and initially attempted to identify that person. However, he explained: [F]rankly, it became, in my opinion, an advantage not to know who he was and to simply argue that he was a strange, suspicious black guy out there on a place, and I inferred that it was earlier than it really was, and it gave me an out, which supported my theory and argument in the case.... I didn't want him identified to the jury. I'd rather him be the strange black guy out on a parking lot. Moreover, we agree with the postconviction court's conclusion that failure to present Salter did not prejudice Hurst because Salter's testimony was not exculpatory. When he testified at the evidentiary hearing, Salter could not say exactly when he arrived at the Wendy's lot. Additionally, he was gone for an uncertain period of time both when he went home and returned and when he went to a nearby Winn-Dixie. He testified that he did not watch the Popeye's parking lot carefully between 7:30 and 8:20 a.m., when the murder likely occurred. Salter testified that he saw no cars in the Popeye's lot that morningnot even the victim's car, which arrived sometime before 7:55 a.m., which he would have seen if he had been carefully observing the lot. Thus, it appears that Salter's testimony would have been of little assistance to Hurst, while the idea of a suspicious, unidentified black male in the vicinity that morning provided more benefit to the defense. The trial court's finding that counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision not to locate and present Andrew Salter is supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, relief is denied on this claim. 2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Concerning Hurst's Trip to Wal-Mart We turn next to the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut the prosecutor's closing argument, in which he reminded the jury that Hurst never said in his taped statement to police that he went to Wal-Mart on the morning of the murder. The trial court correctly found that the record supported the truth of the prosecutor's statementHurst did not tell the investigator on tape that he went to Wal-Mart. Defense counsel Arnold correctly noted that objecting to this true statement would have been unwarranted and that emphasizing to the jury that Hurst went to Wal-Martwhere he bought new tennis shoes on the morning of the murderwas essentially a double-edged sword. While it supported his sworn alibi notice, which included a reference to Hurst having gone to Wal-Mart to buy tennis shoes, it also supported the State's contention that Hurst needed new shoes because his had been discarded due to blood from the murder. We agree with the postconviction court that counsel's decision not to object to the prosecutor's argument was a reasonable strategic decision. Because reasonable strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct, Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1048, relief is denied on this claim.