Opinion ID: 1659641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First to be considered is Houston's contention to the effect his challenge for cause regarding prospective juror Harold Morgan should have been sustained.

Text: An examination of the record discloses defense counsel, by a series of suggestive and possibly confusing inquiries initially led Morgan into stating (1) it would be difficult for him to return a verdict of not guilty if Houston's picture was on file with the police, and (2) it was doubtful he could disregard the testimony of an accomplice even though not corroborated. On the other hand this venireman later clearly demonstrated he could base his decision on the evidence presented and would follow instructions given by the court. The foregoing affords no premise upon which to hold Morgan unquestionably entertained a disqualifying prejudice or preconceived opinion regarding defendant's guilt or innocence. Additionally, this court has many times held, trial courts are vested with broad discretionary power in acting on challenges as to a juror for cause. See e.g., State v. Kappos, 189 N.W.2d 563, 565-566 (Iowa 1971); State v. Grove, 171 N.W.2d 519, 520 (Iowa 1969). See generally Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-724, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-1644, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 244 So.2d 200, 225-231 (1971); 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury, §§ 265-269; 50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 267-270. We find no reversible abuse of discretion by trial court in overruling defendant's instant juror challenge for cause.