Opinion ID: 1314955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Pre-Trial Motion, the Jury's Verdict, and Post-Trial Motions

Text: At the conclusion of the evidence, on September 18, 2006, Coté moved pursuant to Rule 29(a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. The district court denied the motion. On September 20, 2006, after deliberating for less than one day, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Coté then moved pursuant to Rules 29(c) and 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a judgment of acquittal and, alternatively, a new trial. On April 4, 2007, the district court granted Coté a judgment of acquittal and conditionally granted him a new trial in the event that the judgment of acquittal was reversed.
In granting the Rule 29 motion, the district court rejected each of the government's main witnesses on credibility grounds. Despite acknowledging the limited role of the Court in determining credibility in the context of [Rule 29] motions, Coté, 2007 WL1000849, at , the court concluded that [t]he inmate testimony during trial was so exaggerated and vindictive as to be entirely incredible as a matter of law to the extent that it differs from Reimer's testimony, id. at . The court found it was compelled to conclude that Saul's [sic] testimony was blatantly untrue because Teodorovic's face could not possibly have been stomped on in the manner and as many times as Sauls claimed, and the photographs of him in evidence confirm the exaggeration. Id. at . While the court was unprepared to state that the prosecutors presented a witness that they knew would be a liar as to the events which he claimed he saw through a 3/8-5/8' crack between the door and the wall, a fair-minded jury would have disregarded Sauls' testimony in its entirety, and he should not testify if a new trial is held. Id. With regard to Perez, the district court began by noting that [t]his convicted pederast had a long criminal record, before determining that he, too, had exaggerated the number of stomps because his testimony was inconsistent with Reimer's testimony and with the photographs of Teodorovic's face. Id. at . The district court also found incredible Perez's testimony as to the duration of the assault and concluded: Perez, like Sauls, was grossly exaggerated, most likely out of malice, and the credibility and weight to be given to his testimony is at best highly questionable. Id. The court further observed that Turner's testimony was questionable on the ground that he was a convicted felon who had inaccurately placed the location of the assault and who was alone in claiming that Reimer punched Teodorovic while they were tussling on the ground. Id. Apart from the inmate witnesses' testimony, the court found Reimer's testimony was suspect because Reimer was evasive, had seventeen hours of rehearsal time with the Government, and attempted [to] deviat[e] from his testimony in the prior state trial. Id. at . The court explained that Reimer's testimony alone raises sufficient reasonable doubt as to what injuries were inflicted by himself and what injuries, if any, were inflicted by Coté after Reimer had restrained and controlled the prisoner.  Id. at . The court clarified, it cannot be fairly concluded on the totality of the testimonial and other evidence that it was Mr. Coté's applications of force, rather than the initial blow to Mr. Teodorovic's head imposed by Reimer's act in taking him down, that caused the [undisputed] brain trauma. Id. Finally, the district court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Coté acted with the requisite intent. It explained: The State Court jurors got it right when they refused to find criminal intent on a nearly and materially identical record, and were probably right in their verdict that Coté recklessly used more force than hindsight suggests was necessary. This reckless misconduct, for which the state has convicted and punished Coté, does not rise to the level of a violation of [18] U.S.C. § 242. Id.
In the alternative, the district court granted Coté a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court reasoned that it was not satisfied that competent, satisfactory and sufficient evidence in the record supported the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to its earlier evaluations of the evidence and noted that because much of the testimony was patently incredible and defied physical realities portrayed in the photographs, there was a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted. Id. The court also sua sponte held that the jury had not been properly charged on the issue of whether there was intentional criminal conduct in conformity with the facts of the Indictmentnamely, intentional criminal conduct by Coté after Teodorovic was restrained and under Reimer's controland that the defendant should therefore be acquitted or granted a new trial to prevent a manifest injustice. Id. at . According to the district court, [c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances and the evidence adduced at trial tending to suggest, if not confirm, that Teodorovic was not under control when Coté applied force, a serious injustice resulted, as it is entirely possible, if not probable, that a jury would not have convicted if adequately instructed that a conviction must conform to the factual and legal allegations of the indictment. Id. at 13. Further, the court found that the circumstances surrounding the execution by Coté and his counsel of the first statute of limitations tolling agreement were inherently coercive. Id. at 14. For these reasons, the court concluded that, should Coté not be entitled to a judgment of acquittal, he is at least entitled to a new trial. Id. at 20. The government timely appealed the order, and Coté cross-appealed insofar as the court did not dismiss the Indictment on statute of limitations and double jeopardy grounds.