Opinion ID: 1236325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: THE CRITERIA OF BARKER v. WINGO

Text: In Barker v. Wingo the U.S. Supreme Court held that the burden of protecting the right to a speedy trial does not rest solely with a criminal defendant. A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. [3] Thus, the courts must apply a balancing test to determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied in which four factors are to be considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the state; (3) the timeliness of the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. [4] With regard to the prejudice factor the Court identified three interests the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: (i) oppressive pre-trial incarceration; (ii) anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) the possibility the defense will be impaired. [5] This Court has held that in order to weight the prejudice factor in the defendant's favor, he or she must offer specific evidence that one or more of these interests apply. [6] While the contentions of these defendants are similar, the facts in each appeal differ. Therefore, we apply the Barker criteria to each case separately.