Opinion ID: 3015202
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourth Amendment Due Process Claim

Text: Shuman alleges that the Penn Manor Defendants deprived him of his due process rights under the Fourth Amendment as a result of the school’s investigation into the incident between Shuman and Becker. Shuman’s Fourth Amendment claim stems from what he alleges was an unlawful seizure – i.e., when he was held in the administrative offices of Penn Manor High School from approximately 10:15 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. on December 10, 2001. Shuman does not challenge whether the intrusion was justified at its inception, which entailed the initial removal of Shuman from class or the initial questioning by Gale. Shuman concedes that these intrusions were justified due to Becker’s allegations against him. Rather, Shuman alleges that the problem arose as the intrusion continued, where, according to Shuman, no further investigation was being done and he was detained for approximately three and one-half hours. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. CONST . amend. IV. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment extends this constitutional guarantee to searches and seizures by state officers, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960), including public school officials, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). “The Fourth Amendment’s ‘principal concern . . . is with intrusions on privacy,’ and therefore when the infraction deals not ‘with the initial decision to detain an accused and the curtailment of liberty that such 9 a decision necessarily entails, but rather with the conditions of ongoing custody following such curtailment of liberty,’ then the claim invokes principles of substantive due process.” Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977)). A seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes when “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988). Based upon Shuman’s uncontroverted testimony, he was told to remain in the conference room under Gale’s direction for several hours and was not free to leave. He thus appears to have been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Doe v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding student held to tree with tape for five minutes seized within meaning of Fourth Amendment); cf. Gottlieb, 272 F.3d at 172 (finding momentary use of physical force by teacher not seizure within meaning of Fourth Amendment). Nonetheless, that Shuman was “seized” is but the first part of the analysis. It must still be determined whether the seizure constituted a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. With limited exceptions, a search or seizure requires either a warrant or probable cause. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (“[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41 (“Ordinarily, a search -- even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant -- must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.”). One such limited exception was recognized by the Supreme Court in T.L.O. with respect to searches of students in public schools: 10 [T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. T.L.O. thus established that searches conducted in public schools are governed by the reasonableness standard, and “what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place . . . . ‘balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.’” Id. at 337 (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 528). T.L.O. solely addressed the standard applied to searches in public schools, however, and thus left open the appropriate standard governing seizures in that context. At oral argument, we asked the parties to brief for the Court the appropriate standard governing seizures in this context. The Penn Manor Defendants vigorously argued that we should adopt the “arbitrary, capricious, or for the purpose of harassment” standard, applied by the California Supreme Court in In re Randy G, 28 P.3d 239 (Cal. 2001), a case brought by a California public school student alleging a seizure by his school in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Penn Manor Defendants contend that this reduced standard should be applied in light of the different and distinct interests implicated by a search rather than a seizure, particularly the heightened level of intrusion that a search entails. Furthermore, because the reasonableness standard applies in the criminal context to police investigatory searches, the Penn Manor Defendants contend that a reduced standard should correspondingly apply in the public 11 school context. We decline to follow the Penn Manor Defendants’ suggested approach. Relying upon T.L.O., other courts of appeals to consider the issue have concluded that reasonableness is the appropriate benchmark to determine whether a seizure in the public school context survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny. These courts of appeals have largely rested their decisions upon their recognition of the unique responsibilities public schools bear, particularly with regard to disciplinary matters. In Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit adopted a reasonableness approach holding that “in the context of a public school, a teacher or administrator who seizes a student does so in violation of the Fourth Amendment only when the restriction of liberty is unreasonable under the circumstances then existing and apparent.” The Fifth Circuit also adopted this standard in Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1995), specifically noting that “while school officials are subject to the limitations of the [F]ourth [A]mendment, the reasonableness of seizures must be determined in light of all of the circumstances . . . .” See also Doe, 334 F.3d at 909 (“In applying the Fourth Amendment in the school context, the reasonableness of the seizure must be considered in light of the educational objectives [the school viceprincipal] was trying to achieve.”); Milligan v. City of Slidell, 226 F.3d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Balancing renders essential a consideration of the context in which a Fourth Amendment right is asserted. Because this case involves the rights of students in a public school . . . the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school.”); Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir. 1989) (“We believe that the same considerations which moved the Supreme Court to apply a relaxed Fourth Amendment standard in cases involving school searches support applying the same standard in school seizure cases.”). 12 We join these courts of appeals in finding seizures in the public school context to be governed by the reasonableness standard, giving special consideration to the goals and responsibilities of our public schools. There is simply no Third Circuit or other federal precedent which supports an application of the more lenient “arbitrary, capricious, or for the purpose of harassment” standard advocated by the Penn Manor Defendants. The reasonableness standard is also consistent with the reduced liberty interest afforded students in the public school setting. While “[w]e know that students do not completely surrender their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), . . . ‘the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school.’” Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1013 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995)). Compulsory attendance laws automatically inhibit the liberty interest afforded public school students, as the law compels students to attend school in the first place. See id. “Once under the control of the school, students’ movement and location are subject to the ordering and direction of teachers and administrators.” Id. We thus turn to the question of whether the school’s seizure of Shuman was reasonable in light of the circumstances. Shuman complains that he was forced to remain in the small conference room outside of Gale’s office from 10:15 a.m. until approximately 2:00 p.m. This detention lasted no more than four hours. During that time, Shuman was allowed to do his agricultural science work and was able to leave the room to eat lunch in the cafeteria and to get a drink of water; however, he was not otherwise permitted to come and go freely or to attend his regularly scheduled classes. The purpose of Shuman’s detainment was for the school to investigate the incident of sexual misconduct, including Becker’s accusations, and to determine an appropriate punishment. In light of the serious nature of Becker’s accusations, or at a minimum, the misconduct which 13 Shuman admitted to, it was reasonable for the school to detain Shuman to investigate this behavior. Cf. Hassan, 55 F.3d at 1080 (finding confinement of misbehaving student for fifty minutes in room at juvenile detention center during school-sponsored field trip reasonable in light of presence of other potentially dangerous juveniles).