Opinion ID: 2625842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for Change of Venue/Mistrial

Text: ¶ 7 Blakley moved for change of venue based on pretrial publicity. In support, he attached several newspaper articles, along with transcripts of radio stories dealing with his case. Many of these articles referred to him as the alleged baby-killer. At a hearing on the motion, the defendant seemed most concerned with headlines such as Judge Accepts Blakley Confession and Baby Tried to Fight Off Her Attacker Police Interrogation Transcript Revealed. ¶ 8 The trial court denied the motion, finding that although some of the stories verge on yellow journalism and were overly inflammatory, a fair and impartial jury could likely be found. It ruled that Blakley had not met his burden under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.3(b). [1] ¶ 9 On voir dire, the judge questioned each panel member who had seen or heard anything about the case. Without getting into specific details, the court asked every panelist the source of any such information and whether he or she could be fair and impartial despite knowing something about the case. ¶ 10 In total, seventeen prospective jurors were excused because of their admitted inability to be fair and impartial based on pretrial publicity. Approximately twelve prospective jurors were excused solely because of their adverse reaction to the nature of the charges. Two additional panel members were dismissed. One, a former co-worker of Blakley, stated that he could not be fair. The other was a CPS worker who had read the CPS file a week before trial. The judge did not ask any questions concerning information contained in the file. ¶ 11 The trial court denied a renewed motion for change of venue and motion for mistrial, ruling that although some jurors had heard about the case, all avowed they could be fair. He noted that those dismissals occasioned by sensitivity to the nature of the case would have occurred in any county because of the particular issues involved. ¶ 12 The defense asked to individually question each juror who had seen news coverage of the case. The judge denied this request, failing to see how additional information would assist the attorneys in making their peremptory challenges. The defense also asked to question prospective jurors who may have spoken to other members of the panel about the case. That request was denied as well.
¶ 13 Blakley argues that his motion for change of venue should have been granted. The state responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. We examine this ruling for a clear abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice to the defendant. State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 406, 844 P.2d 566, 573 (1992). Our task is to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the publicity attendant to defendant's trial was so pervasive that it caused the proceedings to be fundamentally unfair. State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 630, 832 P.2d 593, 647 (1992) (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975)). ¶ 14 Prejudice may be presumed if publicity was so extensive or outrageous that it permeated the proceedings or created a `carnival-like atmosphere.' Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 631, 832 P.2d at 648. In making this determination a court must review the entire record. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 26, 906 P.2d 542, 559 (1995); State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 564, 566, 858 P.2d 1152, 1167, 1169 (1993). ¶ 15 The defense provided the trial judge with approximately 33 newspaper articles from Kingman, Mohave Valley, Bullhead City, and Lake Havasu City, as well as transcripts of ten radio clips concerning the case. Although some used inflammatory language, we find no evidence that they significantly affected the proceedings or the atmosphere surrounding the trial. Many of the articles appeared at or near the time of the crime in July 1998 or during the pretrial stages, rather than close to the trial which began in February 2000. Based on the record before us, prejudice cannot be presumed. ¶ 16 Therefore, the defendant has the burden of showing actual prejudice. Murray, 184 Ariz. at 26, 906 P.2d at 559. He must demonstrate that the jurors formed preconceived notions concerning the defendant's guilt and that they [were unable to] lay those notions aside. Id. (quoting State v. Chaney, 141 Ariz. 295, 302, 686 P.2d 1265, 1272 (1984)). We have held, however, that [p]rior knowledge of a case, by itself, is ... insufficient to disqualify a juror. State v. Befford, 157 Ariz. 37, 39, 754 P.2d 1141, 1143 (1988). ¶ 17 Blakley argues that he was denied a fair trial because he was not allowed to individually question those panelists who were exposed to pretrial publicity. This court has indicated that [a]n examination of the jurors, through voir dire process, is an effective means by which to determine the effects or influence of pretrial publicity on the jurors. State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 163, 624 P.2d 828, 841 (1981); see also Salazar, 173 Ariz. at 406, 844 P.2d at 573 (court conducted individual voir dire of those prospective jurors who had prior knowledge). ¶ 18 Here, the judge questioned each prospective juror and, although it was in the presence of other panelists, he did it in such a manner as to prevent cross-contamination. [2] Almost as many people were dismissed because of their stated aversion to the nature of the charges as were excused by virtue of exposure to pretrial publicity. Only three members of the final jury had indicated some knowledge of pretrial publicity. Two had seen a short article a few days before trial; the third remembered an article around the time of the crime and a few articles between then and the time of trial. The defendant has not demonstrated actual prejudice. ¶ 19 We are concerned, however, that counsel were not permitted to conduct individual voir dire of the prospective jurors. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.5(d) (The court shall conduct a thorough oral examination of prospective jurors. Upon the request of any party, the court shall permit that party a reasonable time to conduct a further oral examination of the prospective jurors.). Such questioning often helps to elicit more detailed and candid responses. Its scope, however, is not unlimited. The rule goes on to say [t]he court may impose reasonable limitations with respect to questions allowed during a party's examination of the prospective jurors, giving due regard to the purpose of such examination. In addition the court may terminate or limit voir dire on grounds of abuse. Id. ¶ 20 We believe that Rule 18.5(d) required the trial judge to allow the parties some leeway in exploring each panelist's exposure to pretrial publicity and his or her ability to be fair and impartial. Although the failure to have done so was error, because we are reversing on other grounds it is unnecessary for us to determine whether reversal is required under these circumstances, where the trial judge thoroughly explored the pretrial publicity issue to ensure that the defendant could receive a fair trial and that the parties could exercise intelligently their peremptory challenges. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.5(e). In any event, the defendant failed to show what specific areas of inquiry he would have pursued if permitted, the questions he intended to ask, and the information he hoped to gain with further interrogation.
¶ 21 The defendant argues that a mistrial should have been granted because of the statements of two prospective jurors during voir dire. Ms. M., a CPS worker, was not asked anything after stating that she had read the CPS file in this case. Mr. P. indicated that he had previously worked with Blakley and had discussed the case with his co-workers. He was not asked anything more. Both were excused. The defendant contends that he should have been allowed to individually voir dire these two, as well as other panelists with whom they may have spoken. ¶ 22 A denial of a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 304, ¶ 32, 4 P.3d 345, 359 (2000). Both of these prospective jurors were excused for obvious good cause and the judge cut off questioning to avoid cross-contamination. We find no abuse of discretion.