Opinion ID: 505483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: availability of equitable estoppel

Text: 7 The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether Sec. 2000e-16(c)'s 30-day limit is a jurisdictional requirement or is, instead, a statute of limitations subject to equitable estoppel. The question is one of first impression in this court. 5 However, in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the analogous 90-day (now 180-day) time limit for filing a Title VII claim against a private employer with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was not jurisdictional and was, like a statute of limitations, ... subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. Id. at 393, 102 S.Ct. at 1132. The Court based its decision upon (1) Congress's having expressed the time limit in a provision (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e)) entirely separate from the one that defines the jurisdiction of the courts (Sec. 2000e-5(f)), 455 U.S. at 394-95, 102 S.Ct. at 1133; (2) legislative history, id. at 394-95, 102 S.Ct. at 1133; (3) prior cases reflecting an assumption that the filing requirement was not jurisdictional, id. at 397-98, 102 S.Ct. at 1134-35; and (4) Title VII's remedial purpose, id. at 398, 102 S.Ct. at 1135. 8 The circuit courts have extended Zipes to Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day limit for filing Title VII claims in district court against private employers. See e.g., Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir.1983); Rice v. New England College, 676 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir.1982); Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356, (D.C. Cir.1982). Indeed, the Supreme Court in Zipes had rested its treatment of Sec. 2000e-5(e) in part on its having previously treated Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1)'s time limit as non-jurisdictional in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 811 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2490 n. 9, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980). Zipes, 455 U.S. at 398, 102 S.Ct. at 1135. 9 Although closely analogous, the question before us today differs from those resolved in Zipes and Gordon. The time limit in question governs the filing of Title VII claims against the government. Extension of equitable tolling to such claims is not automatic by any means, for the government enjoys sovereign immunity, and waivers of such immunity are narrowly read. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 106 S.Ct. 2224, 2229, 90 L.Ed.2d 841 (1986); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S.Ct. 269, 273, 1 L.Ed.2d 306 (1957). 10 In a slightly different context, however, we extended Zipes to claims against the government. In Saltz v. Lehman, 672 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir.1982), we found that the EEOC 's 30-day time limit (29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.214(a)(1) (1987)) for bringing Title VII complaints to the attention of the agency Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor (EEO Counselor) was subject to equitable tolling. 6 After recognizing and resolving the concern that the time limit was jurisdictional, the court rejected equitable tolling on the specific facts of the case. Since dismissal without any reference to those facts would have been appropriate if the untimeliness were jurisdictional, and a court is responsible to determine its own jurisdiction regardless of the parties' views, Saltz represents a holding on the jurisdictional point even though the defendant conceded that the rule was subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 208-09. See also Jarrell v. United States Postal Service, 753 F.2d 1088, 1091 (D.C. Cir.1985) (reading Saltz to hold that the EEOC's 30-day rule was subject to equitable tolling, and remanding for application of the doctrine); cf. Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 545 (D.C. Cir.1983) (similar reading of Saltz in dictum). 11 Although the language in Saltz is broad enough to encompass all time limits for all Title VII suits where the government is the employer, e.g., Saltz, 672 F.2d at 209 (Title VII's time requirements are subject to equitable modification), the case does not explicitly address the time limit here in question--the one established by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c). The present case might be distinguished from Saltz on the basis of differences in either (1) the language and structure of the controlling provisions (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c) and 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.214(a)(1)), or (2) the status of the provisions (here a statute, in Saltz a mere agency regulation). We conclude that neither distinction is compelling. 12 Courts have taken exceptionally emphatic language as a sign of legislative intent that a time limit should be jurisdictional. For example, in King v. Dole, 782 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C. Cir.1986), this court relied on the clear and emphatic character of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7703(b)(2)--[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, any such case filed ... must be filed within 30 days.... Compared with the phraseology considered in Saltz ([t]he agency may accept the complaint for processing in accordance with this subpart only if [the aggrieved employee] brought [it] to the attention [of the EEO Counselor] within 30 calendar days ...) or Zipes ([a] charge under this provision shall be filed within [one hundred and eighty] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred), the words of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c) certainly have no special ring: Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action ... an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint ... may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title.... 13 Moreover, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(d) states that the provisions of Secs. 2000e-5(f)-(k) (which define the jurisdiction of the district court, provide for appeals, attorneys' fees, etc., in actions against private employers) govern Title VII actions against federal government employers. This structural point is relevant for two reasons. First, the Court in Zipes found significance in the time limit's being placed in a provision separate from the sections governing jurisdiction, see p. 1054 supra, and the structure is similar here. Second, the cross-reference from Sec. 2000e-16(d) to Sec. 2000e-5(f)-(k) suggests a parallelism between Sec. 2000e-16(c) and Sec. 2000e-5(e); the latter is what the Court held non-jurisdictional in Zipes. Thus, the statutory language and structure do not suggest that Sec. 2000e-16(c) is any more jurisdictional than Sec. 2000e-5(e) or 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.214(a)(1). 14 Nor does the difference between statute and regulation seem controlling. Most of the courts that have discussed whether the time limits in Title VII actions against the government are jurisdictional have not distinguished between 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c) and 5 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.214(a)(4). 7 Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir.1980), is the only case in which a court has differentiated between the two for the purpose of deciding an equitable tolling issue. Although binding Ninth Circuit precedent held Sec. 2000e-16(c)'s time limit to be jurisdictional, Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 2234, 56 L.Ed.2d 402 (1978), the panel in Cooper v. Bell found 5 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.214(a)(4) to be subject to equitable extension. The court noted that although Sec. 2000e-16(c) required exhaustion of administrative remedies, and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(b) authorized the Civil Service Commission to promulgate regulations to effectuate the statute's policies, Congress did not premise district court jurisdiction on timely filing of an administrative complaint. The time limit was solely the creature of the Civil Service Commission--merely an administrative procedural requirement. 628 F.2d at 1213. 8 15 The only other court to expressly consider whether the regulatory status of 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.214(a)(1) might justify special treatment has rejected that notion. In Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir.1984), the court, viewing Sec. 2000e-16(c)'s time limit as jurisdictional in light of the federal government's sovereign immunity, extended that view to the EEOC's regulatory time limit. It reasoned that [v]alid administrative rules legislative in nature have 'the force and effect of law,'  id. at 1146 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 1714, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979)), and concluded that 5 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.214(a)(4) was  'as binding on the courts as any statute enacted by Congress,'  725 F.2d at 1146 (quoting Production Tool v. Employment & Training Administration, 688 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir.1982)). Although we disagree with Sim 's apparent view that Sec. 2000e-16(c) is jurisdictional, we agree that 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.214(a)(1)'s regulatory status is not a critical support for its being subject to equitable tolling. It is clear that in holding 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.214(a)(4) subject to equitable estoppel in Saltz v. Lehman, this court did not distinguish it from other statutory Title VII time restrictions. It in no way relied upon the fact that the time limit was promulgated by an agency rather than by Congress. We are not persuaded that we should introduce such a distinction at this point. 16 In finding the Title VII filing limit non-jurisdictional, we do not suggest, of course, that it may be disregarded with impunity. The court's equitable power to toll the statute of limitations will be exercised only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances. The Supreme Court has suggested in Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (per curiam), that courts may properly allow tolling where a claimant has received inadequate notice, ... where a motion for appointment of counsel is pending and equity would justify tolling the statutory period until the motion is acted upon, ... where the court has led the plaintiff to believe that she had done everything required of her, ... [or] where affirmative misconduct on the part of a defendant lulled the plaintiff into inaction. Id. at 151, 104 S.Ct. at 1725-26 (citations omitted). We think the present case justifies application of equity without in any way bending those principles.