Opinion ID: 1847657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 7. The issue of whether a dismissal of a criminal proceeding on constitutional grounds may be considered a favorable termination necessary to support a subsequent malicious prosecution action comes to this Court on first impression. ¶ 8. In order to prevail in a malicious prosecution suit, the plaintiffs, Cong, Ut, Lan, and Minh, must prove all six elements of the tort by a preponderance of the evidence. The elements of a malicious criminal prosecution are: (1.) The institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or civil; (2.) by, or at the insistence of the defendants; (3.) the termination of such proceeding in plaintiff's favor; (4.) malice in instituting the proceedings; (5.) want of probable cause for the proceedings; and (6.) the suffering of damages as a result of the action or prosecution complained of. Junior Food Stores, Inc. v. Rice, 671 So.2d 67, 73 (Miss.1996); Bankston v. Pass Road Tire Ctr., Inc., 611 So.2d 998, 1004 (Miss. 1992); C & C Trucking Co. v. Smith, 612 So.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (Miss.1992); Page v. Wiggins, 595 So.2d 1291, 1293 (Miss.1992); Strong v. Nicholson, 580 So.2d 1288, 1293 (Miss.1991). ¶ 9. The issue in the present case pertains solely to the third element of the cause of action. The trial judge in the case sub judice dismissed plaintiffs' malicious prosecution action due to lack of favorable termination of the prior criminal proceeding. This Court conducts a de novo review of orders granting or denying summary judgment, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made. Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645, 649-50 (Miss.1998). The trial judge in this case was presented with no binding authority as to the present issue; therefore, whether summary judgment was proper depends upon our ruling. Due to an absence of case law in Mississippi concerning whether dismissal of a criminal action due to speedy trial violations should qualify as a final determination in favor of the plaintiff, it is necessary to examine the views of other states regarding this issue. ¶ 10. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting New York state law, thoroughly addressed the question at hand in Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1051, 140 L.Ed.2d 114, (1998). Although the New York Court of Appeals has not yet decided this precise issue, the Second Circuit found the intermediate state appellate courts have generally concluded that such dismissals on speedy trial grounds are favorable to the accused. Murphy, 118 F.3d. at 949 ( citing Loeb v. Teitelbaum, 432 N.Y.S.2d 487, 77 A.D.2d 92 (2d Dep't 1980); Campo v. Wolosin, 211 A.D.2d 660, 622 N.Y.S.2d 291(2d Dep't 1995)). The rationale in support of this view is as follows: Part of the rationale for viewing a dismissal for the prosecution's failure to prosecute in timely fashion as favorable to the accused is that the failure to proceed to the merits compels an inference of such an unwillingness or inability to do so as to imply a lack of reasonable grounds for the prosecution. Loeb v. Teitelbaum, 77 A.D.2d at 101, 432 N.Y.2d [N.Y.S.2d] at 494; see generally Halberstadt, 194 N.Y. at 10-11, 86 N.E. at 803-04. Further, to view a dismissal for failure to prosecute within the time allowed as a termination not favorable to the accused would have the effect of unfairly compel[ling] one charged with a criminal offense to waive his constitutional or statutory right to a speedy trial in order to preserve his right to civil retribution for a demonstrated wrong. Lenehan v. Familo, 79 A.D.2d at 77, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 476. Id. at 949-50. ¶ 11. The Second Circuit distinguished among the causes of abandonment and how the underlying cause affects whether there has been a favorable termination of the proceedings. Relying on section 660 of the Restatement Second of Torts, the Court found the prevailing view is if the abandonment was the result of a compromise to which the accused agreed, or an act of mercy requested or accepted by the accused, or misconduct by the accused, it is not a termination in favor of the accused for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. Murphy, 118 F.3d at 949. Mississippi has followed this view with regard to an act of mercy, finding no favorable termination where the judge elected to dismiss the charges on the grounds of mercy and leniency. See Stewart v. Southeast Foods, Inc., 688 So.2d 733 (Miss.1996). Also in line with the prevailing view, this Court has held that a dismissal reached as a result of a voluntary settlement or compromise does not constitute a termination in favor of the accused. [1] Jones v. Donald Co., 137 Miss. 602, 102 So. 540, (Miss.1925). ¶ 12. In contrast, the Second Circuit recognized that abandonment brought about by the accused's assertion of a constitutional privilege such as the right to a speedy trial does not fall within the aforementioned categories, ... for the accused should not be required to relinquish such a privilege in order to vindicate his right to be free from malicious prosecution. Murphy, 118 F.3d at 949. ¶ 13. Other states including California, Illinois, and Montana have considered the issue at hand and have concurred with the result reached by New York [2] . The Supreme Court of Montana, citing California law, ruled that a dismissal for lack of speedy trial reflects on the merits and could be considered a termination in favor of the accused. In so holding, the Court reasoned: It is not essential to maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution that the prior proceeding was favorably terminated following trial on the merits. However, termination must reflect on the merits of the underlying action ... A dismissal for failure to prosecute ... does reflect on the merits of the action ... The reflection arises from the natural assumption that one does not simply abandon a meritorious action once instituted. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411, 432 (Mont.1995) ( quoting Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747, 159 Cal.Rptr. 693, 602 P.2d 393, 395 (Cal.1980)). ¶ 14. The record in the instant case contains no indication as to why the prosecution did not provide the defendants in the initial action with a timely and speedy trial. However, according to the Circuit Court's order dismissing the indictments, the prosecution as well as the defendants presented evidence and arguments to the lower court concerning dismissal on the grounds of speedy trial. Since this information was not provided, we may not speculate as to any cause underlying the abandonment of the present case. ¶ 15. The true issue at hand is whether the delay by the prosecution properly reflects on the merits of the case. If so, a determination that dismissal on speedy trial grounds is a favorable termination sufficient to support a malicious prosecution action would be justified by the reasoning of other courts. Although an answer in the affirmative necessarily requires speculation in every case absent findings on the record indicating reasons for delay, we feel the conclusion reached by other states on this issue is the only proper conclusion. ¶ 16. At first glance, it appears that no malicious prosecution action could possibly stand in light of the fact that neither a trial judge nor a jury technically ruled on the merits of the case. The very existence of the tort of malicious prosecution relies on the existence of an innocent defendant who was maliciously accused, wrongly suffered through court proceedings, and was damaged by the process. How, then, can we let the accused sue in a subsequent suit for malicious prosecution if the basis of the claim the innocence of the accusedhas not been proven? On the contrary, how can we allow the prosecution to delay the proceedings long enough to cause the case to be dismissed and then prevent a person wrongly accused from bringing a subsequent suit for malicious prosecution? There is no simple answer, but it is helpful to approach this problem by considering what result should be avoided rather than what result should be reached. We cannot ignore the possibility that the State could wrongly accuse a person, later conclude the case lacks merit, and simply wait for the case to be dismissed rather than endure an expensive and time consuming trial to determine lack of merit. If the accused has been damaged by the process but lacks recourse to compensate those damages, the result would be unjust. Moreover, there lies the possibility that someone wrongly accused would waive the right to a speedy trial in an effort to retain the option of bringing a subsequent malicious prosecution cause of action. This too would bring a harsh result. ¶ 17. By finding that the State's failure to prosecute properly reflects on the merits of a criminal action and therefore qualifies as a termination in favor of the plaintiff, the accused is given the opportunity to have his day in court by way of a subsequent trial. The accused/plaintiff would then carry the burden of proving the elements of malicious prosecution by a preponderance of the evidence. Whether a plaintiff was maliciously prosecuted is a question of fact properly decided by the jury, not the trial judge. ¶ 18. If we were to adopt a different logic which would effectively bar a subsequent malicious prosecution action, there would inevitably be some criminal defendants left with no remedy for a maliciously instituted suit. We believe this result should be avoided.