Opinion ID: 59627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Departmental Reorganization

Text: Sampath also argues that her reassignment as manager of the software side 15 of the IS department during its temporary reorganization constituted an adverse employment action, and thereby provides a separate ground for her discrimination claim. To show an adverse employment action, an employee must demonstrate “a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). “[T]he employee’s subjective view [of this] is not controlling.” Id. Rather, the employment action at issue “must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person” under the same circumstances. Id.; see also Doe v. Dekalb County School Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1453 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Any adversity must be material; it is not enough that a transfer imposes some de minimis inconvenience or alteration of responsibilities.”) (addressing an ADA claim). Sampath does not dispute that her salary, benefits, and hours remained unchanged. The change in her job responsibilities was minor. She would have supervised only three fewer employees under the new structure, which was only intended as temporary in the first place. Although she asserts that her title was changed, the record reflects no such change. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the change in Sampath’s employment was not sufficiently serious to constitute an adverse employment action. Accordingly, her discrimination claim fails on this ground as well. 16