Opinion ID: 1202058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Committee's Opinion

Text: The Committee agrees that Canon 3C(4)  the analogue to § 455(f)  applies to us. Letter from the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States to Judges Winter and Walker, Docket No. 1934, at  (Mar. 22, 2007). But it goes on to conclude that curative divestment is possible only if made immediately upon assignment of the case to the judge, id. at  ([A]ppellate judge . . . [may] take action equivalent to opting out after the opt-out period expires); once a judge has spent substantial time on a case, he may not opt-out. No consideration is given by the Committee to when the judge learns of the potential conflict. We believe the Committee has it backwards. Plainly, § 455(f) is meant to conserve judicial resources. We do not see how this purpose is served by requiring recusal of a judge who, unaware of the conflict, has devoted substantial time to a case, but permitting a judge who has not worked on the case to continue to serve on an appeal, at a time when reassignment entails few or no costs. Cf. Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 1031 (5th Cir.1998). The Committee argues that because our interest is that of a party, it must necessarily be an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome. But this assumes an anomalous set of circumstances: Section 455(f) applies, but curative divestment is per se impossible. Moreover, under the Committee's logic, § 455(f) would preclude a judge who might otherwise be recused because he is an officer, director, or trustee of a party, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i), from promptly resigning and continuing to participate in the case. But surely the fact that a judge may be a trustee of a party, such as a legal organization like the American Bar Association or an artistic organization like the New York Museum of Modern Art, does not necessarily warrant recusal if the judge is willing promptly to resign the offending position. Finally, the Committee has excepted Rule 23(b)(2) class actions from the ambit of its recusal rule. See Letter from the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States to Judges Winter and Walker, Docket No. 1934, at  (Mar. 22, 2007). This conclusion must depend, at least in part, upon the insubstantiality of a Rule 23(b)(2) class member's interest. See In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 929-30 (5th Cir.1984) (noting that under Rule 23(b)(2) a judge-cum-class-member might be a party in a certain sense but would not have to answer for attorneys' fees). This same logic would seem to dictate that possession of a small financial interest and possession of a small financial interest giving rise to party status should be treated in similar fashion: neither requires recusal provided the judge divests himself of the interest. While we afford the Committee's non-binding recommendation a certain quantum of deference, the Committee is tasked only with construing the Code of Conduct. See United States v. Lauersen, 348 F.3d 329, 336 (2d Cir.2003). We are responsible for construing § 455(f) in light of the following circumstances: (1) we learned that we were class members after preparing for oral argument more than five months after the close of the period in which claims could have been filed, and (2) we promptly (i.e., the following day) informed the parties in open court that we renounced any interest we could receive as class members. To paraphrase Judge Posner, [b]efore [we] discovered [we] had a financial interest, [we] could have had no incentive to favor [either party]; . . . now, when [we] ha[ve] no interest [having divested ourselves of any right to claim settlement funds], [w]e cannot enrich [ourselves] by favoring [either party]. Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 714 (7th Cir.1986) (Posner, J.). We believe our decision not to recuse is authorized by § 455(f), strikes the appropriate balance between securing the interests of impartiality and its appearance and reducing the practical costs that unnecessary recusal entails, and does not diminish public respect for the judiciary.