Opinion ID: 1682617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying taggart's post trial motions

Text: ¶ 8. We are mindful of the fact that in his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.), Taggart not only attacked the legal sufficiency of the overall evidence adduced at trial, he also asserted trial court error in denying his motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the State's case-in-chief, and in denying his proposed jury instruction D-1, which stated [t]he Court instructs the jury to find the Defendant not guilty on all counts. Our cases are legion on this issue. The appropriate inquiry on appeal in considering the trial court's denial of a J.N.O.V. motion is whether the evidence shows `beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction.' Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss.2005) (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968)). Stated differently, [w]e must, with respect to each element of the offense, consider all of the evidencenot just the evidence which supports the case for the prosecutionin the light most favorable to the verdict. The credible evidence which is consistent with the guilt [of the accused] must be accepted as true. The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Matters regarding the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence are resolved by the jury. We may reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 808 (Miss.1987) (citations omitted). Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Miss.1998) (quoting Franklin v. State, 676 So.2d 287, 288 (Miss.1996)). Our standard of review for the trial court's denial of directed verdicts and peremptory instructions is the same as that for the trial court's denial of a J.N.O.V. `[A]ll evidence introduced by the State is to be accepted as true, together with any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.' Wall v. State, 718 So.2d 1107, 1111 (Miss.1998) (quoting Brown v. State, 556 So.2d 338, 340 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 9. According to the appropriately given jury instructions, (1) in order to find Taggart guilty of rape, the jury had to find that on or about September 6, 2005, Taggart had forcible sexual intercourse (penis of the male is inserted into the vagina of the female) with the victim; (2) in order to find Taggart guilty of kidnapping, the jury had to find that on or about September 6, 2005, Taggart forcibly seized and confined the victim with intent to cause her to be secretly confined, or with intent to cause her to be imprisoned against her will; and (3) in order to find Taggart guilty of armed robbery (robbery using a deadly weapon), the jury had to find that on or about September 6, 2005, Taggart feloniously took $55 cash from the presence or person of the victim, being the personal property of the victim, against her will by putting the victim in fear of immediate injury by the exhibition of a deadly weapon (the knife), and that the victim parted possession with her cash money only because of being in fear of immediate injury to her person being inflicted by Taggart. In each element instruction, the jury also was informed that if the State failed to prove any one or more of the elements of the offense charged, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must find Taggart not guilty of that particular criminal offense. ¶ 10. With our appropriate standard of review in mind as we consider the trial judge's denial of Taggart's motion for a directed verdict, peremptory instruction and J.N.O.V., we turn to the record before us in today's case. In reviewing the evidence, as well as the reasonable inferences which might be drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we note here certain facts: Taggart bound the victim and forcibly raped her, using the exhibition of the knife and threat of bodily harm to her and her niece if she resisted; DNA testing from the rape kit showed the presence of semen, but no sperm, in the victim's vagina, but Dr. Scales testified that the absence of sperm in the semen was consistent with the male donor not reaching ejaculation (the victim testified that she did not think Taggart had ejaculated inside of her [b]ecause it was only semi-firm and just because he didn't look like he had had an orgasm.); by constantly exhibiting the knife Taggart forced the victim to get in her car with him to drive to Winona, where the woods get thick; the two of them left in the victim's car against her will, with her driving; and the victim made an ATM withdrawal of $55 and gave Taggart the cash because he had a knife stuck in my side. Thus, based on the status of the record in this case, and considering the applicable law, we find that the trial judge committed no error in denying Taggart's motion for J.N.O.V., again acknowledging that contained within Taggart's J.N.O.V. motion were assertions that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict and his submitted peremptory not guilty instruction.
¶ 11. As we recently stated in Jones v. State, 918 So.2d 1220, 1235 (Miss. 2005): That as a matter of law the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be overruled and denied in no way affects and little informs the trial judge regarding his disposition of the motion for a new trial. Jesco, [Inc. v. Whitehead], 451 So.2d [706] at 714 [(Miss.1984)](Robertson, J., specially concurring). As with a j.n.o.v. motion, our law is well-settled concerning our review of the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial: A motion for a new trial, however, falls within a lower standard of review than does that for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. [ Sheffield v. State, ] Id.[, 749 So.2d 123] at 127[ (Miss.1999)]. A motion for a new trial simply challenges the weight of the evidence. Id. This Court has explained that it will reverse the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial only if, by doing so, the court abused its discretion. Id. (quoting Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d at 1088). We will not order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. Id. (quoting Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1983)). This Court has also explained that factual disputes are properly resolved by a jury and do not mandate a new trial. McNeal v. State, 617 So.2d 999, 1009 (Miss.1993). Holloway v. State, 809 So.2d 598, 605-06 (¶ ¶ 21-22) (Miss.2000). Ginn v. State, 860 So.2d 675, 685 (Miss. 2003). See also Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 844 (Miss.2005), and URCCC 10.05. Id. at 1235. ¶ 12. As horrendous as the acts inflicted upon the victim by Taggart are, this case is no different than the numerous jury trials conducted daily in this state and in each state of this nationthis case, like all others, contains conflicting testimony. This is unquestionably a case of she saidhe said. She said she was forcibly raped, kidnapped and robbed by him at knife-point. He said he was engaging in consensual rough sex with her and that none of these acts of rape, kidnapping and armed robbery occurred, but instead they were fabrications by her because of her unhappy married life. The cold hard facts are that this was a classic jury case. The jury had before it this conflicting testimony of the witnesses, as well as the exhibits and the jury instructions, and it was the responsibility of the jury to make findings of fact and then apply the law as given by the trial judge to the facts to reach a proper verdict as to each of the four counts of the indictment. With this in mind, we are convinced that the guilty verdicts of the jury concerning the counts charging Taggart with rape, kidnapping and armed robbery are beyond the authority of this Court to disturb. Stated differently, we are in no way convinced that the jury verdicts were so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow these verdicts to stand would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. Therefore, the trial court did not commit error in denying Taggart's motion for a new trial. ¶ 13. In sum, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Taggart's motion for J.N.O.V. and his separate motion for a new trial. Therefore, this first issue is without merit.