Opinion ID: 1313347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: threshold question in qualified immunity analysis

Text: First, we must address whether Shearer's allegations, taken as true, state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). The majority avoids this threshold question, merely stating that Shearer's petition, when liberally construed, alleges the violation of a constitutional right. However, alleging the violation of a constitutional right is not equivalent to stating a legally cognizable claim for the violation of such a right. A theory of recovery is not itself a cause of action. Olsen v. Olsen, 248 Neb. 393, 534 N.W.2d 762 (1995). Thus, the mere invocation of due process is not sufficient to pass the threshold. In Siegert, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the analytical framework for determining whether a plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to overcome a defendant's defense of qualified immunity asserted in a motion for summary judgment. 500 U.S. at 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789. The plaintiff, a former government employee, had received an extremely unfavorable review from his supervisor. That review caused a potential employer to deny the plaintiff a position. The plaintiff brought an action against his former supervisor, alleging, inter alia, that the supervisor's review was a malicious, defamatory statement that infringed the plaintiff's liberty interests, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The supervisor asserted the defense of qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that if the supervisor's alleged defamatory statement was malicious, the supervisor's statement violated the plaintiff's due process rights. The appellate court nonetheless determined that the allegations in the plaintiff's petition were insufficient to state a claim, due to the `heightened pleading standard' in defamation actions. 500 U.S. at 227, 111 S.Ct. 1789. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the supervisor should be granted qualified immunity. The Supreme Court, noting that the court of appeals had relied on a heightened pleading standard, held that the plaintiff's claim failed at an analytically earlier stage of the inquiry into qualified immunity: His allegations, even if accepted as true, did not state a claim for violation of any rights secured to him under the United States Constitution. 500 U.S. at 227, 111 S.Ct. 1789. The Court determined that the court of appeals had erred in assuming, without deciding, that if the plaintiff satisfactorily alleged that the supervisor's unfavorable review was written with malice, a constitutional claim would be stated. A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is `clearly established' at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all. 500 U.S. at 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789. In analyzing the qualified immunity question, the Court first addressed whether the plaintiff had stated a legally cognizable claim for the violation of a constitutional right. The Court held that the plaintiff's reputation was not constitutionally protected, even if the alleged defamatory statements were maliciously made, and that the plaintiff had failed to state such a claim. The Court never reached the question of whether the right, alleged by the plaintiff to have been violated, was clearly established. Indeed, the Court could not have determined whether the right was clearly established when that right did not exist. Siegert demonstrates the distinction between the existence of a constitutional right and whether the existence of that right is clear to a government official. To state a claim for the violation of a constitutional right, that right must exist. If there is no such right, or if the alleged facts, taken as true and construed most favorably to the plaintiff, would not entitle the plaintiff to relief for the violation of a constitutional right, a court need not proceed to the next step in a qualified immunity analysis. It is the next step that determines whether that right was clearly established when the conduct occurred. This analysis was affirmed in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1714 n. 5, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), wherein the Court stated: [T]he better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all. Normally, it is only then that a court should ask whether the right allegedly implicated was clearly established at the time of the events in question.... Justice STEVENS suggests that the rule of Siegert should not apply where, as here, the constitutional question presented is both difficult and unresolved. ... But the generally sound rule of avoiding determination of constitutional issues does not readily fit the situation presented here; when liability is claimed on the basis of a constitutional violation, even a finding of qualified immunity requires some determination about the state of constitutional law at the time the [defendant] acted. What is more significant is that if the policy of avoidance were always followed in favor of ruling on qualified immunity whenever there was no clearly settled constitutional rule of primary conduct, standards of official conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both of officials and individuals. An immunity determination, with nothing more, provides no clear standard, constitutional or non-constitutional. In practical terms, escape from uncertainty would require the issue to arise in [future suits] .... [T]herefore the better approach is to determine the right before determining whether it was previously established with clarity. (Emphasis supplied.) (Citations omitted.) Consequently, the threshold question in a qualified immunity case is not whether the plaintiff has alleged, in a colloquial sense, the violation of a constitutional right, but, rather, whether the plaintiff's allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to state a legally cognizable claim for the violation of such a right. See, Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1994); Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir.1994). This threshold inquiry is purely a question of law ... and though this inquiry takes place in the context of a qualified immunity defense, the same rules governing dismissal of complaints apply. We must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.... A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim[] that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Emphasis supplied.) Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d at 1254. See, also, Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733 (10th Cir.1997); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642 (10th Cir.1988). If the plaintiff is unable to marshal evidence indicating that the conduct complained of violated the law as presently interpreted, it is unnecessary to consider whether the law was clearly established at the time such conduct occurred. (Emphasis supplied.) Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 696 n. 21 (10th Cir. 1990). Because the majority failed to do so, I analyze whether Shearer's allegations, taken as true, stated a legally cognizable claim for the violation of a constitutional right.