Opinion ID: 1433952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Actions Performed by the Holy See Itself

Text: As to Doe's other causes of action, the Holy See contends that Doe has failed to allege any facts in support of his claims based on the actions of the Holy See itself, rather than of its domestic corporations. We do not agree. Doe has made several allegations regarding actions taken by the Holy See itself  namely, its negligent retention and supervision of Ronan and its failure to warn Doe of Ronan's dangerousness. Doe has also alleged respondeat superior liability against the Holy See for Ronan's actions as an alleged employee of the Holy See. We turn now to those allegations, considering whether they are sufficient to support jurisdiction over the Holy See. We will now examine whether the district court could exercise jurisdiction over the Holy See for these causes of action under the FSIA's tortious act exception.
The district court held that all of Doe's claims, except the one for fraud, come within the exception to immunity for a tortious act or omission of [a] foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her employment. § 1605(a)(2); Doe, 434 F.Supp.2d at 950. We agree in part. Doe's respondeat superior claim based on Ronan's actions comes within the tortious act exception. Doe has clearly alleged that Ronan was an employee of the Holy See, acting within the scope of his employment, when he molested Doe. We conclude, however, that Doe's claims against the Holy See for negligent retention and supervision and failure to warn cannot be brought under the tort exception because they are barred by the FSIA's exclusion for discretionary functions, § 1605(a)(5)(A).

In his complaint, Doe alleges that the Holy See employed priests, including one Father Andrew Ronan and that Ronan was under the direct supervision and control of the Holy See. The Holy See was further responsible for the work and discipline [of] ... priests. According to the complaint, the Holy See on at least one occasion was responsible for controlling where Ronan performed his functions: the Holy See placed Ronan in [the] Archdiocese at St. Albert's Church in Portland, Oregon. The Holy See maintains that Doe has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Ronan was an employee of the Holy See for purposes of the tortious act exception, because the word employee is a legal conclusion we are not required to accept as true. We are highly skeptical of the notion that, under notice pleading, use of the word employee in a complaint is insufficient to establish an allegation of an employment relationship. True, in addition to being a word used in everyday speech, employee does have a common law legal definition. See, e.g., Schaff v. Ray's Land & Sea Food Co., 334 Or. 94, 45 P.3d 936, 939 (2002) (defining employee for purposes of Oregon law). But then, of course, so do the words person, corporation, citizen, and molest, also used in this complaint  and, undoubtedly, in many other complaints filed each year in federal courts  without further definition. Were we to require that every such word used in a complaint be broken down into its constituent factual predicates, we would undermine the purpose of notice pleading  that is, to focus litigation on the merits of a claim rather than on procedural requirements. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.2002). Thus, while we do not accept Doe's legal conclusions as true, we also do not engage in a hypertechnical reading of the complaint inconsistent with the generous notice pleading standard. Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir.2002). Although there is undoubtedly a line beyond which the legal definition of a commonly used term is so complex or contentious that failure to allege each element of the definition would prevent a defendant from understanding the factual basis for the claim, use of the word employee falls well short of that line.
More complicated under Oregon law is the question of whether Ronan's actions were within the scope of employment as the FSIA requires. In Joseph, we indicated that the `scope of employment' provision of the tortious activity exception essentially requires a finding that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to the tortious acts of individuals. 830 F.2d at 1025. This determination is governed by state law. Id.; see also Randolph, 97 F.3d at 327. As it happens, the Oregon Supreme Court has directly addressed whether a church can be liable under respondeat superior for the actions of a priest who sexually assaults a parishioner. In Fearing v. Bucher, 328 Or. 367, 977 P.2d 1163 (1999), the plaintiff alleged that he had been sexually molested by a Catholic priest who used his position as youth pastor, spiritual guide, confessor, and priest to plaintiff and his family to gain their trust and confidence and [b]y virtue of that relationship... gained the opportunity to be alone with plaintiff and sexually assault him. Id. at 1166. Fearing began its analysis from the proposition that, in a respondeat superior action, an employer can be liable for intentional as well as unintentional torts of an employee if committed within the scope of employment. Id. Generally, under Oregon law, three requirements must be met to demonstrate that an employee was acting within the course and scope of employment: (1) the act must have occurred substantially within the time and space limits authorized by the employment; (2) the employee must have been motivated, at least partially, by a purpose to serve the employer; and (3) the act must have been of a kind which the employee was hired to perform. Id. at 1166. Applying these three factors, Fearing stated that the priest's alleged sexual assaults on plaintiff clearly were outside the scope of his employment under the traditional test, but held that the inquiry does not end there. Id. at 1166. Instead, the court went on to ask whether acts that were within [the priest's] scope of employment resulted in the acts which led to injury to [the] plaintiff. Id. (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court concluded that because a jury could infer from the facts alleged that performance of ... pastoral duties with respect to plaintiff and his family were a necessary precursor to the sexual abuse and that the assaults thus were a direct outgrowth of and were engendered by conduct that was within the scope of ... employment, id. at 1168, the complaint satisfied all three ... requirements for establishing that employee conduct was within the scope of employment. Id. at 1167. The Oregon Supreme Court has since clarified that Fearing created a scope of employment test specifically applicable to intentional torts. Minnis v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 334 Or. 191, 48 P.3d 137 (Or. 2002), observed that, in Fearing, there was no question that the first requirement of the within the scope of employment test was met, because the abuse occurred within the time and space limits of the priest's employment. 48 P.3d at 144-45. But because Fearing involved an intentional tort, it was inappropriate to focus on whether the tort itself was committed in furtherance of the employer's objectives or was an act of the kind the employee was hired to perform: Rather, for the purpose of determining whether a complaint meets the second and third ... requirements ..., the focus properly is directed at whether the complaint contains sufficient allegations of employee's conduct that was within the scope of his employment, that is, conduct that the employee was hired to perform, that arguably resulted in the acts that caused plaintiff's injury. Id. at 144-45 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). Minnis thus makes clear that, rather than holding that sexual abuse is not within the scope of employment, Fearing created an alternative test with respect to the second and third factors of the within the scope of employment standard, applicable when a plaintiff has alleged an intentional tort: An intentional tort is within the scope of employment, and can support respondeat superior liability for the employer, if conduct that was within the scope of employment was a necessary precursor to the intentional tort and the intentional tort was a direct outgrowth of ... conduct that was within the scope of ... employment. Fearing, 977 P.2d at 1163. Doe's allegations meet this standard. Doe has asserted that he came to know Ronan as his priest, counselor and spiritual adviser, and that Ronan used his position of authority to engage in harmful sexual contact upon Doe in several places including the monastery and surrounding areas in Portland, Oregon. His allegations are thus very similar to those in Fearing, 977 P.2d at 1166. Under Oregon law, then, Doe has clearly alleged sufficient facts to show that his claim is based on an injury caused by an employee of the foreign state while acting within the scope of his ... employment, as required to come within the FSIA's tortious act exception. § 1605(a)(5). The Holy See is therefore not immune from Doe's respondeat superior claim. [9]
According to Doe's complaint, the Holy See negligently retained Ronan and failed to warn those coming into contact with him, even though it knew or should have known that Ronan had a history of sexually abusing children. The Holy See also failed to provide reasonable supervision of Ronan. Whether or not this alleged negligence otherwise comes within the language of the FSIA's tortious act exception  a question we do not decide  these causes of action may not go forward under that section because they are barred by the exclusion for discretionary functions. The district court thus erred in exercising jurisdiction over these claims. The discretionary function exclusion shields foreign sovereigns from tort claims based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused. § 1605(5)(A). The language of the discretionary function exclusion closely parallels the language of a similar exclusion in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), so we look to case law on the FTCA when interpreting the FSIA's discretionary function exclusion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); Joseph, 830 F.2d at 1026. Extrapolating from FTCA case law, the Holy See is protected by the discretionary function exclusion if the challenged action meets two criteria: (1) it is discretionary in nature or involve[s] an element of judgment or choice and (2) the judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Soldano v. United States, 453 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir.2006) (clarifying that judgments of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield are governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As to the first Gaubert criterion, Doe refers vaguely in his complaint to the Holy See's policies, practices, and procedures of not firing priests for, and not warning others about, their abusive acts. He also refers in his brief to a policy promulgated by the Holy See to cover up incidents of child abuse, which he argues removed an[y] element of judgment or choice from the Holy See's actions to the extent that Appellants were acting pursuant to it. Yet nowhere does Doe allege the existence of a policy that is  specific and mandatory  on the Holy See. Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir.1989) (emphasis in original). He does not state the terms of this alleged policy, or describe any documents, promulgations, or orders embodying it. Nor does the complaint in any other way allege that the Holy See's decisions to retain Doe and not warn about his proclivities involved no element of judgment, choice, or discretion. While the burden of proving the Gaubert factors ultimately falls on the sovereign entity asserting the discretionary function exception, a plaintiff must advance a claim that is facially outside the discretionary function exception in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Carlyle v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir.1982) (Only after a plaintiff has successfully invoked jurisdiction by a pleading that facially alleges matters not excepted by [the FTCA] does the burden fall on the government to prove the applicability of a specific provision of [the FTCA].)). Doe has not pled any actions that fall facially outside the discretionary function exception. As to the second Gaubert criterion, the decision of whether and how to retain and supervise an employee, as well as whether to warn about his dangerous proclivities, are the type of discretionary judgments that the exclusion was designed to protect. We have held the hiring, supervision, and training of employees to be discretionary acts. See Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that plaintiff's claims of negligent and reckless employment, supervision and training of employees fall squarely within the discretionary function exception); see also Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1217 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that decisions concerning the hiring, training, and super[vision] of employees are discretionary). Moreover, failure to warn about an individual's dangerousness is discretionary. [10] See Sigman v. United States, 217 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir.2000) (failure to warn individuals on Air Force Base about potentially dangerous serviceman was a discretionary function, because it brought into play sensitive and competing policy considerations of protecting safety while preserving resources and preventing unwarranted alarm); Weissich v. United States, 4 F.3d 810, 814-15 (9th Cir.1993) (failure of probation officers to warn a prosecutor that probationer was a threat to him was a discretionary decision). The Holy See's failure to present any evidence that its actions were actually based on policy considerations is not relevant to whether the discretionary function exception applies. A foreign state's decision need not actually be grounded in policy considerations so long as it is, by its nature[,] susceptible to a policy analysis. See Kelly v. United States, 241 F.3d 755, 764 n. 5 (9th Cir.2001) (second emphasis added). A policy analysis is one that implements political, social, and economic judgments. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 539, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the case of Father Ronan's alleged abuse, the Holy See might have decided to retain him and not to warn his parishioners because it felt that to do otherwise would have harmed the Church's reputation locally, or because it felt that pastoral stability was sufficiently important for the parishioners' well-being, or because low ordination rates or staffing shortages made it necessary to keep Ronan on. That such social, economic, or political policy considerations could have influenced the decision renders it the kind of judgment that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. In sum, the tortious act exception does not provide jurisdiction over Doe's negligent hiring, supervision, and failure to warn claims because they are barred by the discretionary function exclusion. [11] We therefore cannot affirm the district court's judgment on this ground.