Opinion ID: 783949
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Substance of the conscious avoidance instruction

Text: 33 Finally, Robles argues that, even if the conscious avoidance instruction was theoretically proper, its content impermissibly diluted the mens rea requirement for the conspiracy charge, i.e., specific intent to engage in the proscribed conduct, and thus allowed the jury to convict on a negligence theory. We need not reach the merits of this contention, however, as Robles' trial counsel specifically requested the charge that was given. See Tuttle v. Equifax Check, 190 F.3d 9, 15-16 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Lavoie v. Pacific Press & Shear Co., 975 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir.1992) (Failure to object to a jury instruction or the form of an interrogatory prior to the jury retiring results in a waiver of that objection.); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 752 (2d Cir.1984) ([N]ot even the plain error doctrine permits reversal on the ground that the trial court granted a defendant's request to charge.)) (other citations omitted); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 (A party who objects to any portion of the instructions ... must inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for the objection before the jury retires to deliberate.... Failure to object in accordance with this rule precludes appellate review....). 34 Even if we were to consider the merits of Robles' challenge to the content of the conscious avoidance instruction, his argument is unavailing. To begin, the conscious avoidance instruction itself made clear that guilty knowledge may not be established by demonstrating that the defendant was merely negligent, foolish or mistaken. See A. 106; United States v. Lalley, 257 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir.2001) (rejecting the argument that a conscious avoidance charge allowed the jury to convict on a negligence theory where charge clearly cautioned that a finding of negligence, mistake, or carelessness was insufficient) (citing United States v. Uphoff, 232 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir.2000)). Moreover, the jury charge, taken as a whole, repeatedly and emphatically instructed the jury that it had to find that Robles intentionally engaged in the charged scheme. See, e.g., A. 97 ([T]he government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Robles knowingly, willfully and unlawfully entered into the conspiracy.... Willfully means to act with knowledge that one's conduct is unlawful and with the intent to do something that the law forbids, ...) (emphasis added). Accordingly, although the conspiracy charge made reference to knowledge of the illegal scheme, it also clearly and conjunctively required a finding of intent to participate. Cf. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d at 156 (Although this definition of `willful' includes references to knowledge, it also clearly and conjunctively requires a finding of intentional purposefulness.). We therefore perceive no error in the substance of the charge. 11