Opinion ID: 1852391
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Brackin's Negligence Claim Against Rutledge and the ACUL

Text: At the close of Brackin's case-in-chief, the trial court also entered a judgment as a matter of law as to Brackin's claim of negligence against the ACUL and Rutledge. [32] Brackin argues that the trial court erred because, she says, she offered substantial evidence in support of her negligence claim. Brackin alleges that, although Rutledge initially owed her no duty because Rutledge had been retained by FSCU to investigate the loan improprieties, Rutledge then undertook an investigation of Brackin. Therefore, Brackin asserts, Rutledge was obligated to perform that investigation properly and adequately. We reject this argument for two reasons. In order to have survived the motion for a judgment as a matter of law, Brackin must have produced substantial evidence indicating that Rutledge owed her a duty, that Rutledge breached that duty, and that Brackin was damaged as a proximate cause of that breach. Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So.2d 665, 679 (Ala.2001). Because Rutledge was acting as an agent of the Trimmier Law Firm and of FSCU when she conducted her investigation, she owed a duty to her principals  the Trimmier Law Firm and FSCU  to properly perform her investigation. She did so. Brackin has not cited any authority for the proposition that Rutledge owed Brackin a duty to avoid uncovering damaging information about her while performing that investigation. Second, we find no evidence in the record tending to establish that Rutledge's investigation improperly caused Brackin harm. Thus, we find no evidence of a breach of any duty owed to Brackin. Because there was no evidence that Rutledge owed any duty to Brackin, Brackin failed to present a viable negligence claim against Rutledge or the ACUL. We affirm the judgment as a matter of law in favor of the ACUL and Rutledge on Brackin's negligence claim.