Opinion ID: 1799020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The tribal courts of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians lack subject matter jurisdiction over the present course of action.

Text: The case sub judice is not the first word in Mississippi on the subject of the jurisdictional parameters of the tribal courts of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989), the United States Supreme Court dealt with the Mississippi chancery court adoption of two minor children, the unmarried parents of whom were both enrolled members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. The children were born in Harrison County, Mississippi and the parents both executed consent-to-adoption forms. The band sought unsuccessfully before this court to vacate the adoption and appealed ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court which found that even though the natural parents had both consented to the adoption, that Congressional intent and tribal interests outweighed any individual rights possessed by the parents and that pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, the rights of the Band, not the welfare of the children, should prevail. The adoption decree, which had been upheld by this Court, was reversed and the issue was ultimately, upon remand, transferred to the tribal court. Holyfield grants exclusive jurisdiction of adoption proceedings concerning Indian children to the tribal courts pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act. Specifically Section 1911(a) of this act states in full as follows: An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any state over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child. Holyfield is consistent with prior U.S. Supreme Court renderings which establish that tribal courts have authority to punish tribal offenders, to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members of the Band. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). Montana must be read in conjunction with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) in which the United States Supreme Court held that Oliphant, a non-Indian, could not be tried within the tribal court even though the incident occurred on tribal territory. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 198, 98 S.Ct. at 1016. The Court stated that Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their diminished status as sovereigns ... (and) have lost any right of governing every person within their limits except themselves. Id. at 209, 98 S.Ct. at 1021. Montana states that Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258 (citations omitted). Montana further adds A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security or the health or welfare of the tribe. Id. at 566, 101 S.Ct. at 1258 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has further fleshed out the Montana analysis to state that an Indian tribe has no inherent sovereign powers over the activities of nonmembers outside the above named two exceptions. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 124 L.Ed.2d 606 (1993). Bourland in fact states that after Montana, tribal sovereignty over nonmembers `cannot survive without express congressional delegation.' Bourland, 508 U.S. at 695 n. 15, 113 S.Ct. at 2320 n. 15. [3] The Montana rule was most recently applied, consistently with Bourland, by the Supreme Court in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997). Before applying the above line of decisions to the present case, we note initially that the parties cite no congressional authority granting jurisdiction to tribal courts over common-law tort cases between non-Indians. We first confront the question of whether this case deals with consensual relationships with the tribe or its members through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. We answer this question in the negative. The case at bar concerns a tort action, not a contract, lease or other arrangement. No consensual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the Band of Choctaws or any of its members. All of the parties are non-Indians. Any potential contract (or other arrangement) at issue in this case concerns relationships between the parties to this action, not the Band or any of its members. Next we find that the conduct of the parties to this action does not threaten or have any direct effect on the political integrity, economic security, health or welfare of the Band. Regardless of the outcome of this litigation, the Band will still own the casino; continue to act pursuant to the terms of its present contract with Boyd; and no threat to its political integrity may be discerned from the facts presented to us. The appellee has presented no facts establishing adverse consequences to the health or general welfare of the Band. Finally, no direct effect on the economic security of the Band can be predicted under the facts known to us. To the contrary, the only economic interests which can be directly affected by this litigation are the interests of the parties to the litigation. Neither the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians nor any of its members are parties. We therefore find that the tribal courts of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians lack jurisdiction of this cause of action. In so finding, the question of comity becomes moot. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PRATHER and SULLIVAN, P.JJ., and PITTMAN, McRAE and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur. BANKS, J., concurs in part with separate written opinion joined by DAN LEE, C.J. SMITH, J., dissents with separate written opinion.