Opinion ID: 1728613
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Proof of Other Crimes

Text: The last issue raised by the defendant with respect to the guilt phase is whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes in Oklahoma and Florida. The trial court admitted evidence that the defendant shot Charlene Calhoun in Oklahoma, and had been involved in a shoot-out with police in Florida, on the grounds that the evidence was relevant to the issues of the identity and flight of the defendant. It is well settled that in a criminal trial, evidence that a defendant has committed some other crime wholly independent of that for which he is charged, even though it is a crime of the same character, is usually not admissible because it is irrelevant. Bunch v. State, 605 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tenn. 1980). In addition, because of the obvious prejudice of such evidence to the defendant, its admission often constitutes prejudicial error, requiring the reversal of a conviction. Id. However, if evidence that the defendant has committed a crime separate and distinct from the one on trial is relevant to some matter actually in issue in the case on trial, and if its probative value as evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect upon the defendant, then such evidence may be properly admitted. Id. Previous cases have held that evidence of crimes other than that for which the defendant was on trial was properly admitted as being relevant to such issues as the identity of the defendant, State v. Taylor, 669 S.W.2d 694, 697-98 (Tenn. 1983), and the defendant's flight or attempt to evade arrest. State v. Zagorski, 701 S.W.2d 808, 813 (Tenn. 1985). While the defendant admits that his possession of the murder weapon in Oklahoma and Florida was relevant to the murder charges in Tennessee, he contends that the probative value of the details of the offenses committed in those states was outweighed by the prejudicial effect. We disagree. The fact that Charlene Calhoun had been shot with the same gun used to kill Alvin Kennedy was highly relevant and critical to proving the defendant's identity as Kennedy's killer. In addition, the fact that the Whitsett truck was found at the scene of Calhoun's shooting was highly relevant to the defendant's identity as Kennedy's killer because the truck had been seen near Loeb's near the time of the murder. Moreover, the proof regarding the killing of Charlene Calhoun was, for the most part, as circumscribed as possible, with the witnesses usually referring to what happened as a shooting, or alleged shooting. The testimony concerning the defendant's apprehension in Florida was more detailed, with the police officers testifying how the defendant shot at them when the car was stopped, and during the high-speed chase. This testimony, however, was relevant to the defendant's guilt as establishing his flight and connecting him with the murder weapon, thereby establishing his guilt as the person who killed Kennedy. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the probative value of the evidence presented regarding the Oklahoma killing, and the Florida shoot-out, outweighed its prejudicial effect. As a result, we hold that the trial court properly admitted this evidence with respect to the defendant's identity and flight. See Zagorski, 701 S.W.2d at 813; and Taylor, 669 S.W.2d at 698. Next, the defendant contends that even if the trial court properly admitted proof of the other crimes, the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that this proof could only be used on the questions of identity and flight amounted to fundamental error, relying upon our opinion in State v. Reece, 637 S.W.2d 858 (Tenn. 1982). The State, however, contends that the fundamental error rule of State v. Reece is inapplicable, and that the defendant waived the issue because he failed to make a special request for the instructions, failed to object to the court's omission of such instructions, and failed to raise the issue in his motion for a new trial. In State v. Reece, supra , this Court held that where the State's case is weak and prior inconsistent statements admitted for impeachment are extremely damaging, the failure to give a limiting instruction that the statements are only to be considered on the issue of credibility may amount to fundamental error constituting grounds for reversal, even in the absence of a special request. Reece, 637 S.W.2d at 861. This holding, however, was limited to those exceptional cases in which the impeaching testimony is extremely damaging, the need for a limiting instruction is apparent, and the failure to give it results in substantial prejudice to the rights of the accused. Id. Our review of the record convinces us that the fundamental error rule of State v. Reece, supra , is not applicable to this case. An important factor for the Reece court was the fact that the prior inconsistent statements used to impeach were so damaging that the failure to give a limiting instruction, in essence, allowed the jury to consider the impeachment evidence as substantive evidence, and thereby allowed inadmissible hearsay evidence to take precedence over testimony given under oath by the witness on the stand. In this case, the testimony about the defendant's other crimes was relevant to his guilt, and no hearsay problems were involved. Accordingly, although there is a significant possibility of misuse with testimony about a defendant's commission of other crimes, and limiting instructions are critical in preventing the improper and prejudicial use of proof of other crimes, see, e.g., State v. Fisher, 670 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to give limiting instructions with respect to the proof of other crimes. The defendant waived the issue by not requesting a limiting instruction and by not raising the issue in his motion for a new trial, Tenn.R.App.P. 3(e), and the failure to give limiting instructions was neither fundamental nor prejudicial error. State v. West, 767 S.W.2d 387, 396 (Tenn. 1989). In this case, the blame for the failure to give limiting instructions must be laid at the defendant's feet. Laird v. State, 565 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).