Opinion ID: 420788
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disparity in the weight of evidence.

Text: 64 Appellant's second theory of prejudice from joint trial relies on United States v. DeRosa, 670 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 353, 74 L.Ed.2d 391 (1982), where we stated that in reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for severance we must be wary of situations where a jury might impute the guilt of some defendants to other defendants. Id. at 898 (citation omitted). Appellant asserts that the evidence against Reynolds was so strong that it spilled over and caused the jury to find Ramirez guilty by association. That contention is unpersuasive. 65 Although appellant is correct when he states that the evidence of Reynolds' participation in the events charged was overwhelming, there is little chance that the evidence against Reynolds spilled over. The guilt or innocence of Ramirez depends on the government's success in convincing the jury that it was Ramirez who was financing and directing the criminal enterprise from behind the scene. Proof on that issue is entirely separate from proof that Reynolds committed the specific acts in the indictment. We find no indication that the jury was unable to compartmentalize the evidence and reach their verdict as to Ramirez on a fair evaluation of the evidence against him. 66