Opinion ID: 2631120
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Habeas Petitioner May Assert Fundamental Error Even If the Claim Could Have Been Raised on Appeal

Text: {9} The State asserts that because all of the facts underlying his Parish claim were known or knowable to Petitioner at the time of trial, Petitioner should be precluded from raising the issue in a habeas petition. Just recently, we addressed this preclusion argument in Campos v. Bravo, 2007-NMSC-021, 141 N.M. 801, 161 P.3d 846. In that case, we reiterated that fundamental error may be corrected in a habeas proceeding even though the record was adequate to address the petitioner's claim on direct appeal. Id. ¶ 7. We take this opportunity to do so again. {10} Similar to Campos, the facts underlying Petitioner's habeas claim were known or knowable to him at the time of his trial, and the record was adequate to address the issue on direct appeal. See id. ¶ 8. Petitioner's claimed error lies in the jury instructions  obviously an error that was knowable at trial. Additionally, although Petitioner's trial occurred before Parish, that case simply reiterated existing law. See Parish, 118 N.M. at 43-45, 878 P.2d at 992-94. Thus, contrary to the State's assertion, Petitioner's habeas claim is entitled to review, but, because Petitioner should have raised this claim on direct appeal, review is only for fundamental error. {11} The State insists that making new rules of criminal procedure retroactive defeats the ends of justice, and, thus, principles of finality should trump Petitioner's habeas claim. Yet Parish did not announce a new rule of criminal procedure, so any discussion of retroactive application of that case is irrelevant. Petitioner is claiming that his conviction was fundamentally unjust because he was denied due process at his trial when he was convicted without the jury having found all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (explicitly holding that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged); State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 662, 808 P.2d 624, 632 (1991) ([T]he failure to instruct the jury on the essential elements of an offense constitutes fundamental error.). Petitioner's claim is cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, even when it could have been raised on direct appeal.