Opinion ID: 2195115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defective AWIMWA Indictments

Text: Appellants Palacio and Bolanos argue that their indictments for AWIMWA were defective because there was no indication in the indictment that the grand jury considered whether there were any mitigating circumstances that would have excused their conduct. If the AWIMWA indictments were defective, then the trial court's error in failing to dismiss the AWIMWA counts was severely prejudicial because neither appellant had attained the age of majority, and each would have been in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Division of the Superior Court, which affords far more protection and rehabilitation to juveniles than adults receive in the Criminal Division. D.C.Code § 16-2301.02 (1981). Accordingly, appellants argue that their ADW and AAWA convictions should be reversed. For the reasons discussed below, we reject appellants' argument. In Cain v. United States, 532 A.2d 1001, 1004 (D.C.1987) this court held that an indictment must allege all essential elements of the crime charged. We reasoned that all the essential elements must be alleged in a proper indictment so that the indictment accurately reflects the intent of the grand jury and the facts on which the grand jury based its probable cause determination. Id. Thus, a proper indictment for an AWIMWA charge would indicate that the grand jury determined probable cause existed for each of the following elements: (1) defendant assaulted the complainant; (2) defendant did so with specific intent to kill the complainant; (3) there were no mitigating circumstances (in cases where there is sufficient evidence of provocation); and (4) that at the time of the commission of the offense the defendant was armed. Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1114 (D.C.1995). Palacio and Bolanos argue that the indictments charging them with AWIMWA are defective because the indictments fail to allege that the grand jury found probable cause to believe that there were no mitigating circumstances. Appellants' argument fails, however, because this court has held that a jury need not be instructed on the issue of mitigation unless either the defendant or government has generated some evidence of that factor. See Bostick v. United States, 605 A.2d 916, 918 (D.C. 1992) (quoting Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 41 n. 17 (D.C.1990)) (internal alterations omitted). In a grand jury proceeding, the government ordinarily is not obligated to present a grand jury all evidence that is favorable to an accused. Miles v. United States, 483 A.2d 649, 654-55 (D.C.1984) (internal citation omitted). Thus, because the government did not submit evidence of provocation or mitigating circumstances, the grand jury did not need to find probable cause as to that element. Nevertheless, appellants argue that this general rule is subject to the exception that where a prosecutor is aware of substantial evidence negating a defendant's guilt which might reasonably be expected to lead a grand jury not to indict, his failure to disclose such evidence to a grand jury may lead to a dismissal of the indictment. Id. at 655. Appellants' reliance on this court's dictum in Miles is misplaced, especially in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent holding in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46-47, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992). In Williams, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, relying on the supervisory powers of the judiciary, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petitioner's indictment because the government withheld exculpatory evidence from the grand jury. Id. at 39, 112 S.Ct. 1735. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a district court may not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment because the government failed to disclose to the grand jury substantial exculpatory evidence in its possession. Id. at 45, 112 S.Ct. 1735. In reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on the traditional role and function of the grand jury. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained that the function of the grand jury is not to determine guilt or innocence, but to assess whether there is adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge, id. at 51, 112 S.Ct. 1735, and because the grand jury's role is to only examine the foundation of the charge laid by the prosecutor, the accused does not have a right to testify or have exculpatory evidence presented. Id. at 51-52, 112 S.Ct. 1735. In addition, this court has favorably cited to the Williams' holding in several of our cases. See Bruce v. United States, 617 A.2d 986, 993 (D.C.1992) (In general . . . courts will not entertain the contention that the evidence before the grand jury was insufficient to indict.); Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 400, 414 (D.C. 1993) (King, J., concurring) (noting that although not required to do so, the prosecutor presented potential exculpatory evidence to the grand jury). Based on these authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to dismiss the AWIMWA indictments. However, even assuming, without deciding, that the prosecutor had an obligation to present mitigating evidence to the grand jury, our review of the record indicates that there were no mitigating circumstances or other evidence presented at trial that would have led the grand jury not to indict. Therefore, appellants' argument that the indictments were defective, because the indictments failed to allege that there was no mitigation, is without merit.