Opinion ID: 2507854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized from Jean Brock's Apartment

Text: Before trial, defendant sought to suppress all evidence seized from the warrantless search of Jean Brock's apartment. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in its entirety. Defendant now seeks review of that ruling insofar as it applies to the evidence found in the bedroom he shared with Brock's 16-year-old son, William Galloway. We find no error. About half an hour after defendant's arrest, Detective Larry Garrison asked defendant for permission to search the apartment. Defendant replied that he did not feel he could consent to a search since it was Brock's apartment. When Garrison informed defendant that Brock had already consented to a search, defendant appeared skeptical, so the police allowed Brock to come to the patrol vehicle and personally inform defendant that she had consented to the search. Defendant then agreed to the search and signed a consent form. [3] Our review of the trial court's implied finding that defendant voluntarily consented to the search is limited. The ... voluntariness of the consent is to be determined in the first instance by the trier of fact; and in that stage of the process, `The power to judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings  whether express or implied  must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.' ( People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 107, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135 ( James ).) Defendant contends the trial court's ruling is fatally undermined by the fact that he was arrested and in handcuffs at the time his consent was sought, that he had not received any Miranda warnings ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), and that he had not been informed of his right to withhold consent to the search. He is mistaken. As we have previously explained, the fact that a defendant is under arrest and in handcuffs at the time of giving consent `is but one of the factors, but not the only one, to be considered by the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses and is best able to pass upon the matter' ( James, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 110, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135), even if no Miranda warnings have been given. ( People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 686-687, 224 Cal.Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665.) The same is true when the police fail to advise the defendant of his or her right to withhold consent. ( United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 206-207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242.) That the police asked Brock for her consent to search the apartment and informed defendant of that fact in no way constituted a false inducement[] for defendant's consent or rendered his consent involuntary as a matter of law. After all, it was defendant who conditioned his willingness to consent on Brock's agreement. In any event, the police were entitled to communicate this relevant and truthful information to defendant as he made his decision. (Cf. People v. Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 687, 224 Cal.Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665.) Inasmuch as Garrison made no overt or implied threat of force, his request for permission to search the apartment itself carried the implication that it could be refused, and defendant was hardly a newcomer to the criminal justice system, we find ample support for the trial court's finding that defendant's consent was voluntary. ( United States v. Watson (1976) 423 U.S. 411, 424-425, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598.)