Opinion ID: 1452469
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether appellants' convictions should be reversed because the State violated appellants' First Amendment protections during the guilt phase of the trial

Text: Appellants asserted in their habeas petitions below that the State violated their First Amendment protections during the guilt phase of the trial by arguing that appellants were involved in devil worship. The district court denied the petitions. The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment prevents a state from employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 168, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992). In Dawson, the appellant belonged to a white racist prison gang, and the prosecution introduced this evidence at his sentencing for murder. The evidence, however, had no apparent relevance to the sentencing proceeding: it was not tied in any way to the murder, it did not serve to show that the appellant was a future danger to society, nor was it used to rebut any mitigating evidence. Id. at 166-67, 112 S.Ct. at 1098-99. The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was not relevant character evidence because it was employed simply because the jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible. Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. at 1098. At the second penalty hearing in the instant case, the State presented evidence that Moore and Flanagan held beliefs in the occult and participated in coven activities. Flanagan III, 109 Nev. at 52, 846 P.2d at 1055. The United States Supreme Court vacated this court's decision affirming the sentences imposed at that hearing and remanded for reconsideration in light of Dawson. Upon remand, this court derived the following rule from Dawson: Evidence of a constitutionally protected activity is admissible only if it is used for something more than general character evidence. Id. at 53, 846 P.2d at 1056. The court stated: The prosecution presented evidence that appellants believed that they controlled white magic and black magic, that they controlled other supernatural powers, and that they worshipped the devil. Although these beliefs are offensive to many, they are clearly religious within the broad scope of the First Amendment. Id. at 54, 846 P.2d at 1057. The court concluded that as in Dawson, the prosecution failed to link cult participation or beliefs with appellants' crimes. Id. at 55, 846 P.2d at 1057. As in the second sentencing hearing, the State's closing argument during the guilt phase of the trial also violated appellants' First Amendment rights under Dawson. [1] The evidence was irrelevant to the crimes charged, and the prosecutor improperly used it in the guilt phase simply to demonstrate the appellants' bad character. He implied that devil worship was somehow linked to the crimes, asserting that Flanagan and Moore let their black and their white magic spill over into this conspiracy, but he never presented evidence of such a link. However, we conclude that this error does not require automatic reversal. We decided in Flanagan III that under Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), due process of law requires that the jury's decision to impose death be set aside. This requirement leaves no room for a harmless-error analysis. Flanagan III, 109 Nev. at 57, 846 P.2d at 1058. In regard to death sentencings, we reaffirm this holding in Flanagan III, but we decline to apply it in cases where a Dawson violation has occurred in the guilt phase of a trial. A majority of the United States Supreme Court has indicated that harmless-error analysis of Dawson errors is permissible. In Dawson, the Court stated: The question whether the wrongful admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence at sentencing was harmless error is not before us at this time, and we therefore leave it open for consideration by the Supreme Court of Delaware on remand. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168-69, 112 S.Ct. at 1099. In Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1923, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987), the Court vacated a state court judgment and remanded a criminal obscenity case to the state court to determine whether a jury instruction which violated the First Amendment was harmless error. The Court saw no reason to require a retrial if it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict in this case was not affected by the erroneous instruction. Id. at 502, 107 S.Ct. at 1922. In his concurrence in Dawson, Justice Blackmun suggested that harmless-error review of an error violating First Amendment protections was not appropriate [b]ecause of the potential chilling effect that consideration of First Amendment activity at sentencing might have. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 169, 112 S.Ct. at 1100 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Flanagan III, we in effect followed Justice Blackmun's suggestion in regard to capital sentencings. Of course, admission of irrelevant evidence of constitutionally protected First Amendment activities is also erroneous during a trial's guilt phase, but in light of Pope and the majority opinion in Dawson, we conclude that such error does not and should not require automatic reversal. The character of the defendant is usually a relevant, in fact a primary, issue during the sentencing phase, and there is a tremendous risk that improperly admitted character evidence will influence a jury in setting a punishment for a convicted defendant. This risk is unacceptably high when the defendant has been convicted of murder and faces the death penalty. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991-92, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion) (there is a heightened need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a case). On the other hand, we believe that a jury may not be influenced by improper character evidence during the guilt phase, where a defendant's character is not relevant except in expressly restricted circumstances, and therefore conclude that harmless-error review of guilt-phase Dawson errors is appropriate. This does not mean that the State has an easy task to establish harmless error and avoid reversal in such cases. The harmless-error rule places the burden on the State to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless, i.e., that it did not contribute to the verdict. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In this case, as noted above, the evidence regarding appellants' involvement with the occult was introduced by their co-defendant, Luckett. Admission of this evidence was not error because it was relevant to Luckett's defense theory, but the prosecutor's closing remarks were error because he employed the evidence simply as character evidence. We are unconvinced, however, that the jury gave these remarks much significance above and beyond the evidence of occult involvement that was properly received into evidence. The only evidentiary basis for the remarks was unimpressive testimony by one witness, a coven participant, regarding meetings where adolescent males indulged in fantasies of magical power and importance. The witness gave no evidence of any kind of violence or planned violence at these meetings, and his evidence offered little support for the first prosecutor's references to devil worship and none for finding that involvement in the occult led to the murders. In fact, the jury heard the second prosecutor question whether the subject of white and black magic even had any relevance to the case. Furthermore, the jury was instructed that [s]tatements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case, that it was to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, and that whatever counsel may say, you will bear in mind that it is your duty to be governed in your deliberation by the evidence as you understand it and remember it to be and by the law as given you. The jury was also aware of the self-serving nature of Luckett's evidence of occult activities and his claim that he was compelled to commit the crimes. The jury apparently looked on this evidence with skepticism or found it of little or no importance, convicting Luckett along with appellants and the fourth defendant. We characterized the evidence against Flanagan and Moore as overwhelming in our first opinion in this case. There is no reason to change that characterization now, nor has either appellant disputed the weight of the evidence against him. The evidence included eyewitness testimony regarding meetings held prior to the murders where appellants planned to kill the Gordons and statements made after the murders in which Flanagan admitted to killing his grandmother, Mrs. Gordon, and Moore admitted to killing Mr. Gordon. We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury looked to this evidence in convicting appellants and that the prosecutor's improper remarks did not contribute to the verdict.