Opinion ID: 1707305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpretation of La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 9:2794 C

Text: We initially granted certiorari and have now granted a rehearing to determine whether La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 9:2794 C requires a different allocation of trial functions between judge and jury in medical malpractice cases than in other negligence cases. [11] This statute, which was enacted contemporaneously with the Medical Malpractice Act, was designed to benefit health care providers in regard to jury instructions. The principal thrust of the statute is to require the trial judge to instruct the jurors that they are prohibited from presuming that the health care provider was negligent merely because an injury occurred. However, the statute also recognizes an exception to the required giving of this prohibitory instruction. When there is proof of an injury under circumstances from which a rational juror could reasonably infer that the health care provider was negligent, the trial judge does not instruct the jurors that they are prohibited from presuming negligence from those circumstances. Section 2794 C contemplates that the trial judge shall determine the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases. However, the lower courts interpreted Section 2794 C to require that the plaintiff prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence to the judge in order to be entitled to a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Under this interpretation a defendant can persuade either the judge or the jury in order to win the case, while the plaintiff must persuade both in order to prevail. If the Legislature had intended to place this extreme burden on the plaintiff and to alter drastically the traditional allocation of trial functions between judge and jury, it would have done so in express terms. A more reasonable interpretation, and one which is consistent with the general application of res ipsa loquitur, is that the trial judge must determine whether the evidence reasonably permits the jury to infer negligence by the defendant under the doctrine. If the judge concludes that an instruction on res ipsa loquitur is not appropriate under the evidence in the case, then the doctrine is not applicable, and Section 2794 C requires the judge to instruct the jury that injury alone does not raise a presumption of negligence by the health care provider. On the other hand, if the judge concludes that an instruction on res ipsa loquitur is appropriate under the evidence, then the doctrine is applicable, and the instruction otherwise required by Section 2794 C need not be given. [12] In the present case the trial judge determined that reasonable minds could differ on the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence regarding negligent or non-negligent causation of plaintiff's injury. Therefore, the judge should have instructed the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and allowed the jury to decide whether an inference of negligence was to be drawn from the evidence in this case. [13]