Opinion ID: 1759569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Michael converted property belonging to C.A.R. Transportation

Text: The Seays filed a cross-appeal arguing that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of C.A.R. Transportation on the conversion claim against Michael. The Seays argue that Regions never took possession of the equipment at issue, or made demand for it from the date of the foreclosure order on September 16, 2003. After the sale, they claim C.A.R. Transportation obtained two writs of assistance; however, it made no attempt to obtain any order of possession of the equipment to take it out of the Seays' possession for three days. They contend that the equipment in Michael's possession was returned in accordance with the circuit court's order on November 26, 2003. The Seays contend that until the November 21, 2003 possession order, Michael did not interfere with C.A.R. Transportation's rights to the property, in that it had made no effort to obtain the property from his possession, and that such inaction should be viewed and deemed as a consent to his possession. After that time, they claim he was prohibited from moving the property; thus, because he retained it, he did not interfere with C.A.R. Transportation's possession. At the very least, they maintain damages should be mitigated in the case as Michael promptly returned the property before the filing of the conversion counterclaim. C.A.R. Transportation responds that even after the confirmation order and the Seays' motion to set aside, which recognized the sale, Michael continued to dismantle and remove the recently sold equipment and fixtures from the recently sold real estate. It further contends that there is no evidence, nor even an argument, that C.A.R. Transportation or Regions authorized the dismantling and removal of the equipment; thus, it was in no way permissive. It asserts that the Seays lost their possessory rights in the equipment on September 16, 2003, when the circuit court issued its order of possession concerning the equipment. It further maintains that contrary to the Seays' claim otherwise, Michael failed to return certain items to C.A.R. Transportation as referenced by the court's order of February 15, 2005, and thus there was no mitigation of damages. As previously stated, this court has held that in order to establish conversion, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant wrongfully committed a distinct act of dominion over the property of another, which is a denial of or is inconsistent with the owner's rights. See Hatchell, 363 Ark. 107, 211 S.W.3d 516. If the defendant exercises control over the goods in exclusion or defiance of the owner's rights, it is a conversion, whether it is for defendant's own use or another's use. See id. The proper measure of damages for conversion of property is the market value of the property at the time and place of the conversion. See id. In the present case, C.A.R. Transportation was entitled to possession of the equipment at issue as of the date of sale, yet it was denied the property by Michael's actions. Notwithstanding the Seays' claim that Michael eventually returned the equipment, the circuit court clearly found that certain equipment was still outstanding and had not been returned. The property was clearly C.A.R. Transportation's property, and Michael clearly exercised dominion over it when he removed it from the property after the sale; thus, his actions constituted conversion. Moreover, he cannot claim that the court's order directing him not to move the property prohibited him from returning it. The property was C.A.R. Transportation's following the sale, and it was entitled to possession thereof. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in finding for C.A.R. Transportation on its claim of conversion against Michael. Appeal affirmed as modified; cross-appeal affirmed.