Opinion ID: 2977346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.1 Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2008). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. —, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007), the Supreme Court stated that in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the nonmoving party must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Weeks later, the Supreme Court cited Twombly in support of the well-established principle that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice 1 Irwin and Krendl appended outside materials to their motion to dismiss and asked that it be converted into a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), 56. In his response, Gunasekera discussed the standards for summary judgment and for a motion to dismiss. He attached materials to his response. He also included a footnote stating that if the district court converted Irwin and Krendl’s motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, he would demand discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). The district court opinion does not mention this issue and appears to apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard without explicitly rejecting the outside materials. In the context of Rule 12(c)’s identical conversion language, we have held that once outside materials have been presented, the district court need not “further consider or rely upon these outside matters before the obligation to convert is triggered; the plain language of Rule 12(c) does not require these additional steps; it only requires the presentation of matters outside the pleadings and the district court’s failure to exclude such matters.” Max Arnold & Sons, LLC v. W.L. Hailey & Co., 452 F.3d 494, 503 (6th Cir. 2006). In this case, however, we cannot convert Irwin and Krendl’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment because Gunasekera was not afforded the opportunity to obtain discovery under Rule 56(f) as he requested. See J.A. at 26 (Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 4 n.1). Additionally, neither party appeals this issue, so the Rule 12(b)(6) standard outlined above is applicable in this case. Because this case is before us on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we will not consider or discuss any of the outside materials attached by either party. No. 07-4303 Gunasekera v. Irwin et al. Page 6 of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 550 U.S. —, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964). “We read the Twombly and Erickson decisions in conjunction with one another when reviewing a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 295-96 (6th Cir. 2008). Courts in and out of the Sixth Circuit have identified uncertainty regarding the scope of Twombly and have indicated that its holding is likely limited to expensive, complicated litigation like that considered in Twombly. Id. at 296 n.1 (citing cases raising this uncertainty in the Sixth and Second Circuits); U.S. ex rel. SNAPP, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 503 n.6 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Twombly itself suggests that its holding may be limited to cases likely to produce “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming” litigation.” (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973 n.6)). When we review a district court’s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[w]e accept all the Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.” Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”). Accordingly, here we assume that the facts are as Gunasekera alleged in his complaint.