Opinion ID: 412715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Baldwin's Damage Testimony

Text: 29 In its appeal Joy argues that the district court erred by excluding Baldwin's testimony concerning the percentage of Joy's losses attributable to hearth problems. The court concluded that Baldwin's lack of personal knowledge made his non-expert opinion about percentages mere speculation and unbelievable. App. at 147a. 20 The court, therefore, held his testimony inadmissible. 21 30 In diversity cases, the admissibility of nonexpert opinion testimony is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Pollard v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 598 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 232, 62 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); Fed.R.Evid. 101. 22 Under the federal rules, opinion testimony by a lay witness is admissible if his opinion or inferences are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 701; Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball International, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 403 (3d Cir.1980). That rule reflects the modern trend to allow the admission of opinion testimony, provided that it is well founded on personal knowledge and susceptible to specific cross-examination. Teen-Ed, 620 F.2d at 403; 11 J. Moore, supra, Sec. 701.02; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 701 (1981). In the instant case, Lindberg does not argue that Baldwin's estimates would not be helpful in understanding his other testimony or determining a fact in issue. See Teen-Ed, 620 F.2d at 403-04. Thus the admissibility of Baldwin's testimony under Rule 701 must rest on whether it was rationally based on his perceptions as plant supervisor for Joy. 31 The requirement of Rule 701 that lay opinion be rationally based on the perception of the witness reflects the general limitation embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 602 that in order to testify on a subject a witness must have personal knowledge of the matter. Teen-Ed, 620 F.2d at 403; 11 J. Moore, supra, Sec. 701.10; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, p 701. 23 We have previously stated: 32 We recognize initially the primary rule of evidence that a witness ought to state only those facts of which he has personal knowledge. 'The law requires that he who deposes to a fact should have the means of knowing it.' State v. Allen, 1 Hawks 9 (1820).... [W]hat the witness represents as his knowledge must be an impression derived from his own senses. And this impression must be gauged by the geographic proximity of the witness to the event, the length of time involved, and the existence of proper conditions for the exercise of powers of observation and perception. 33 United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 526 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846, 92 S.Ct. 148, 30 L.Ed.2d 83, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct. 327, 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971). That same analysis must be applied when deciding whether a witness's opinion is rationally based on his perception for the purpose of Fed.R.Evid. 701. The court is in essence requiring that the best evidence available--first-hand knowledge versus second-hand knowledge--be presented to the jury for use in its deliberation. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, p 602. 34 We recognize that a trial court's determination of admissibility may be overturned only for clear abuse of discretion, Pollard v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 598 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 232, 62 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); see Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371, 1373 (11th Cir.1981). We reluctantly hold, however, that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in striking Baldwin's testimony insofar as he, based on his personal knowledge, testified to the percentage of downtime due to hearth problems. The record reveals that Baldwin, in his position as Supervisor of Production Control, had extensive personal knowledge of Joy's plants, its on-going heat treating processes, and the two furnaces in question. Baldwin testified in great detail to the work done by Joy at its Reno plant. App. at 42a-46a. He testified that he was directly involved with the negotiations for the furnaces, app. at 46a; Transcript of August 12 at 36-39, with the purchase and installation of the furnaces, app. at 46a; Transcript of August 12 at 39-44, and with the operation of the furnaces on a day-to-day basis, app. at 46a, 47a, 48a, 75a. He testified that as supervisor he attended production meetings where problems with capacity at any work center, including the two furnaces, were discussed. App. at 47a. 24 He specifically testified about the hearth problems, app. at 50a, 52a-55a, 59a-60a, and about his observations of what was happening in heat treating on a day-to-day basis, app. at 46a, 75a. 35 This undisputed testimony indicates Baldwin had sufficient personal knowledge of Joy's heat treating facility to make an estimate of what amount of downtime was due to the hearth problems. His opinion was rationally based on his knowledge, as a personal observer, of Joy's furnace operation. His inability to state precisely why a furnace was inoperable at a particular time was the proper material for effective cross-examination rather than a basis to hold his testimony completely inadmissible. 25 See United States v. Jackson, 688 F.2d 1121 at 1125 (7th Cir.1982). As long as a witness' opinion is rationally based on his perception, that testimony is not barred by Fed.R.Evid. 701.