Opinion ID: 2778510
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tibbs

Text: Tibbs argues that his conviction on the Marijuana Conspiracy count was not supported by sufficient evidence, because it was substantially premised on the testimony of Boyd, which Tibbs claims was inadmissible in two ways. Without this testimony, Tibbs says there would have been insufficient evidence to convict. “We review for an abuse of discretion evidentiary rulings of the district court to which a timely objection is made . . . .” United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d 1082, 1093 (11th Cir. 2013). First, Tibbs argues that Boyd should not have been permitted to testify as an expert on drug trafficking slang. “The operations of narcotics dealers, including 15 Case: 13-10300 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 16 of 27 drug codes and jargon, are proper subjects of expert testimony.” United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2009). Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702(c)-(d), “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert . . . may testify . . . if [inter alia] the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” According to the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 amendments to Rule 702, “when a law enforcement agent testifies regarding the use of code words in a drug transaction, . . . [t]he method used by the agent is the application of extensive experience to analyze the meaning of the conversations.” Tibbs contends that the Government failed to establish that Boyd possessed the required “extensive experience.” At the time of trial, Boyd had served in the FBI for seven years. For the two years before trial, he had been based in Alabama, focusing primarily on drug violations and drug-related organized crime. Prior to that, he had served in San Diego, dealing exclusively with drug-related organized crime. He had received extensive training on narcotics and narcotics trafficking, including specific training on drug slang and codes. At the time of trial, Boyd had participated in forty to fifty drug distribution investigations, and all of the cases in his seven-year career had involved marijuana to some extent. He had been involved with at least a dozen wiretaps and had previously heard slang and code words for marijuana. One of the 16 Case: 13-10300 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 17 of 27 ways that he learned the meaning of such words was through interactions with other law-enforcement officers and with numerous cooperating drug informants. The district court acted well within its discretion in determining that Boyd’s experience rises to the level of “extensive.” Tibbs argues that the district court failed to mitigate sufficiently the risk of prejudice presented by Boyd’s dual role as fact and expert witness. When the Government selects as its expert on code the lead agent in the investigation, it “increases the likelihood that inadmissible and prejudicial testimony will be proffered.” United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 2003). “The concern is that ‘particular difficulties, warranting vigilance by the trial court, arise when an expert, who is also the case agent, goes beyond interpreting code words and summarizes his beliefs about the defendant’s conduct based upon his knowledge of the case.’” Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1335 (quoting Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 53). “Although we decline to prohibit categorically the use of case agents as experts,” we admonish prosecutors that the better practice is to avoid doing so. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 56. Here, there was no prejudice from the selection of the lead agent to discuss slang for marijuana. The defendants at trial did not dispute that the wiretapped conversations discussed the distribution of marijuana. They did hotly contest, however, whether the conversations included references to 17 Case: 13-10300 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 18 of 27 cocaine. Since the two appellants charged in the Cocaine Count were acquitted of that charge, this issue does not require further discussion. Second, Tibbs argues that the district court erroneously allowed Boyd to make a voice identification without an adequate foundation. 4 According to Fed. R. Evid. 901, “[a]n opinion identifying a person’s voice -- whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording -- based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect it with the alleged speaker” constitutes “evidence that satisfies the requirement” “of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence.” Such an opinion was offered here. Boyd testified that he had previously spoken with Tibbs in person, and that, in his opinion, it was Tibbs’s voice on the recordings. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s permitting Boyd to make a voice identification of Tibbs. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Boyd’s testimony, and, in light of that testimony, there was sufficient evidence to find Tibbs guilty of conspiring to distribute, or to possess with intent to distribute, marijuana.5 4 The parties dispute whether this argument was preserved. Even assuming that it was, we see no error. 5 Separate from his attacks on Boyd’s testimony, Tibbs argues that the district court abused its discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 403 in admitting, as evidence of Tibbs’s consciousness of guilt, testimony from one of the cooperating defendants that Tibbs encouraged him to refrain from pleading guilty by explaining that “something [was] going to happen” to another of the defendants who was already cooperating with the Government. The implication, presumably, 18 Case: 13-10300 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 19 of 27