Opinion ID: 3135277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: DCFS and Fontaine each raise the following two issues in their consolidated appeals before this court: (1) whether, in all cases, a change in circumstances must be proven as a predicate to the best- interests determination whenever modification of a prior dispositional order regarding custody is sought pursuant to section 2–28(4) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/ 2–28(4) (West 2000)), and (2) whether, in the case at bar, the circuit court’s decision to remove Austin from the custody and guardianship of DCFS and to place him in the custody and guardianship of the Wards was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Before addressing these issues, we first examine the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1–1 et seq . (West 2000)). The Juvenile Court Act is a statutory scheme, created by the legislature, the purpose of which is to secure for each minor subject thereto the care and guidance which will best serve the minor’s safety and moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare, and the best interests of the community. 705 ILCS 405/1–2 (West 2000). Pursuant to this statutory scheme, once a child has been adjudicated abused, neglected or dependent (705 ILCS 405/2–21 (West 2000)), the court must determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to be made a ward of the court and the “proper disposition best serving the health, safety and interests of the minor and the public.” 705 ILCS 405/2–22(1) (West 2000). Although dispositional orders are generally considered “final” for the purposes of appeal (see In re W.C. , 167 Ill. 2d 307, 326 (1995)), they are subject to modification in a manner consistent with the provisions of section 2–28 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2–23(2) (West 2000)). Subsection (4) of section 2–28 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2–28(4) (West 2000)) provides: “The minor or any person interested in the minor may apply to the court for a change in custody of the minor and the appointment of a new custodian or guardian of the person or for the restoration of the minor to the custody of his parents or former guardian or custodian.” In In re S.M. , 223 Ill. App. 3d 543, 547 (1992), the court noted that hearings conducted on petitions for a change in custody are simply further dispositional hearings, which must be conducted in accordance with section 2–22(1) of the Act. Thus, “just as the court at the dispositional hearing conducted under section 2–22(1) of the Act ‘shall determine the proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and the public,’ so should a court, hearing a petition [for a change in custody], ‘determine the proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and the public.’ ” In re S.M. , 223 Ill. App. 3d at 547. Accordingly, once a child has been made a ward of the court and a dispositional order has been entered, the court may, at any time, vacate the original dispositional order and enter any other dispositional order that it could have entered under section 2–23(a) of the Act, thereby effecting a change in the custody and guardianship of the minor, if the court finds that to do so would be in the best interests of the child. Change of Circumstances In the case at bar, Fontaine and DCFS maintain that a modification of the dispositional order with regard to custody and guardianship made pursuant to section 2–28(4) of the Act, though not explicitly, implicitly requires a showing that a change of circumstances has occurred as a condition precedent to the best-interests inquiry. In other words, they contend that, as a predicate to the court’s exercise of its authority to change the custody and guardianship of one of its wards, the court must first make a determination that there has been a change in the attendant circumstances of the case. Moreover, DCFS and Fontaine contend that, where DCFS is the custodial guardian of the child, a specific type of “change in circumstances” must be shown, i.e. , that DCFS has failed to fulfill its duties under the Act, and that a finding to this effect, based on sufficient proof, must be made before the court may remove DCFS as the custodial guardian of the minor ward. We disagree. As Fontaine and DCFS point out, when deciding whether to modify a dispositional order, courts have generally considered whether the modification was “warranted by a change in circumstances.” See In re Brandon S. , 331 Ill. App. 3d 757, 760 (2002); In re P.P. , 261 Ill. App. 3d 598, 605 (1994). In In re D.S. , 307 Ill. App. 3d 362, 366 (1999), the court, citing to In re P.P. , stated, “We believe that when a minor is the ward of a court and under its protection, the above cited provisions [705 ILCS 405/2–22(1), 2–23(3)(iii) (West 1994)] give the juvenile court the authority to vacate any dispositional order upon a finding that a change in circumstances has occurred warranting such an action.” Although these cases suggest that a “change of circumstances” may be a significant factor in the decision to modify custody, we do not interpret these cases to mean that the court’s exercise of its statutory authority to modify a dispositional order, particularly with regard to custody, must be predicated on a separate finding of a “change in circumstances” so that the sufficiency of evidence with regard to such a finding is reviewable. Rather, the question of whether a change in circumstances warranting modification of the dispositional order has occurred is a matter which is subsumed in the “best-interests” inquiry. It is self-evident that when a person authorized by statute brings a petition to modify a prior dispositional order regarding the custody and guardianship of a child who has been made a ward of the court, a dispositional order is already in existence. This means that the court has previously considered the various kinds of dispositional orders regarding custody and guardianship which, pursuant to statute, could be entered and determined the proper dispositional order best serving the interests of the ward. 705 ILCS 405/2–23(a) (West 2000). Thus, as a practical matter, a petition to modify the custodial arrangement of a ward of the court will rarely be brought unless a change in circumstances has occurred which the petitioner believes will affect the “best-interests” inquiry. Consequently, the fact that circumstances have not changed significantly would, in the ordinary case, be grounds for a court to find no cause to disturb its earlier best-interests determination. This does not mean, however, that a finding that circumstances have changed is a necessary prerequisite to the court’s exercise of its authority to modify the dispositional order or that the sufficiency of that finding is subject to review. In all cases, it is the health, safety and interests of the minor which remains the guiding principle when issuing an order of disposition regarding the custody and guardianship of a minor ward. The best interests of the child is the paramount consideration to which no other takes precedence. See In re Ashley K. , 212 Ill. App. 3d 849, 879 (1991), quoting In re Violetta B. , 210 Ill. App. 3d 521, 533 (1991). Similarly, we find no support for Fontaine’s and DCFS’s claim that, when DCFS has been named the custodial guardian of a minor child, guardianship may not be terminated unless the court first finds that DCFS has failed to fulfill its duties under the Act. The cases cited by them for this proposition, In re K.C. , 325 Ill. App. 3d 771 (2001), and In re F.B. , 206 Ill. App. 3d 140, 156 (1990), are inapposite. In In re K.C. , six children were removed from the custody of their parents and, after being adjudicated abused and neglected, placed in the care and custody of DCFS. A permanency hearing was set by the court to take place two months later, but never occurred. Thereafter, the caseworkers assigned to the matter ignored numerous orders of the court compelling them to complete an administrative review and to provide the court and the parties with copies of the case plan. When a permanency review hearing finally took place in July 1998, the caseworkers’ testimony showed that necessary services were not being provided and DCFS’s statutory obligations were not being met. As a result, the circuit court directed DCFS to remove the team of caseworkers it had assigned to the case and ordered DCFS to assign a new team of caseworkers to the matter. On appeal, DCFS argued that the circuit court’s order should be reversed because the court lacked authority under the Juvenile Court Act to order DCFS to remove and replace caseworkers. Deciding this issue, the reviewing court held: “[W]here DCFS fails to satisfy its statutory obligation to report, three potential remedies exist: removal of the guardian and the appointment of another (705 ILCS 405/2–28(1) (West 1996)), a mandamus action to compel the performance (705 ILCS 405/2–28(2) (West 1996)), and the initiation of contempt proceedings (325 ILCS 5/8.3 (West 1996)). Before a guardian may be removed or a public agency compelled to perform its duty, however, the court first must be satisfied by proof that the guardian has not performed its duty.” (Emphasis in original.) In re K.C. , 325 Ill. App. 3d at 778. Concluding that DCFS could have been removed because of its failure to fulfill its statutory obligations, the reviewing court held that the circuit court acted within its statutory authority by requiring DCFS to replace the assigned caseworkers. In In re F.B. , DCFS appealed a contempt order that the juvenile court had issued after DCFS had failed to complete a report sought in connection with a mandamus motion brought by the public guardian of Cook County. On review, the court stated: “The purpose of section 2–28 is to enable the court, which has the ultimate responsibility for the children under its jurisdiction, to be apprised of the treatment accorded the children by their guardians. The Act provides that the court may require the guardian to report ‘periodically.’ ” In re F.B. , 206 Ill. App. 3d at 155. The court then concluded: “Under the Act, therefore, the court, after receiving a report , may retain or relieve the guardian, or it may compel a public agency to perform its official duty. In our judgment, it is implicit in the Act that a guardian may not be removed or a public agency compelled to perform an official duty unless the court is first satisfied by proof that the guardian has not performed its duty.” (Emphases in original.) In re F.B. , 206 Ill. App. 3d at 156. We interpret these cases to stand for the simple proposition that, before the failure to perform statutory duties can form the basis for the removal of DCFS as guardian or be grounds for compelling DCFS to perform its statutory duty, there must be proof that DCFS has not, in fact, fulfilled its statutory obligations. In the case at bar the GAL did not ask the court to compel DCFS to fulfill its statutory duty, nor did the GAL seek the removal of DCFS as Austin’s guardian because DCFS had failed to fulfill its reporting duties or other statutorily required obligations. Rather, the basis for the GAL’s motion was the assertion that Austin’s welfare would be better served if a change in custody was made and Austin was placed in the care and custody of the maternal grandparents, the Wards. As a consequence, the court, by deciding that a change in custody was warranted, exercised its statutory authority to determine the dispositional order which would be in Austin’s best interests. Our review of this determination does not require us to consider, as a separate matter, whether a sufficient change in circumstances was proven or whether DCFS was remiss in its duty. The only question when reviewing the court’s decision to change custody is whether it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Manifest Weight of the Evidence The second issue raised by Fontaine and DCFS is whether it was against the manifest weight of the evidence for the circuit court to have removed Austin from the custody and guardianship of DCFS and to have placed him in the custody and guardianship of the Wards. Before addressing this issue, we consider the standards by which we review a determination of this sort. In all guardianship and custody cases, “the issue that singly must be decided is the best interest of the child.” In re Ashley K. , 212 Ill. App. 3d 849, 879 (1991). As the Ashley K . court aptly noted: “A child’s best interest is not part of an equation. It is not to be balanced against any other interest. In custody cases, a child’s best interest is and must remain inviolate and impregnable from all other factors .” In re Ashley K. , 212 Ill. App. 3d at 879. Recognizing that a best-interests determination is often a difficult one, the legislature has identified various factors that help inform the decision. These factors are contained in section 1–3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1–3(4.05) (West 2000)), which provides: “Whenever a ‘best interest’ determination is required, the following factors shall be considered in the context of the child’s age and developmental needs: (a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, and clothing; (b) the development of the child’s identity; (c) the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (d) the child’s sense of attachments, including: (i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued (as opposed to where adults believe the child should feel such love, attachment, and a sense of being valued); (ii) the child’s sense of security; (iii) the child’s sense of familiarity; (iv) continuity of affection for the child; (v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child; (e) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (f) the child’s community ties, including church, school, and friends; (g) the child’s need for permanence which includes the child’s need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives; (h) the uniqueness of every family and child; (i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and (j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child.” Other important considerations when deciding a child’s best interests are “the nature and length of the child’s relationship with the present caretaker” and the effect that a change of placement would have upon the emotional and psychological well-being of the child. In re Violetta B. , 210 Ill. App. 3d at 534. While all of the above-cited factors must be considered, no factor is dispositive. Courts must remain ever mindful that “the overriding purpose of the Act to which all other goals are subordinate is the best interest of the child involved.” In re J.L. , 308 Ill. App. 3d 859, 865 (1999), citing In re Beatriz S. , 267 Ill. App. 3d 496, 500 (1994). Even the superior right of a natural parent must yield unless it is in accord with the best interests of the child. See People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston , 42 Ill. 2d 201 (1969); In re A.H. , 215 Ill. App. 3d 522 (1991); In re Violetta B. , 210 Ill. App. 3d at 533. Under certain circumstances “it is not necessary that the natural parent be found unfit or be found to have legally forfeited his rights to custody, if it is in the best interest of the child that he be placed in the custody of someone other than the natural parent.” People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston , 42 Ill. 2d at 209. That being so, it follows that a close relative need not be shown to be unfit if it is in the best interests of the child that the child be placed in the custody of someone other than the relative. In re Violetta B. , 210 Ill. App. 3d at 533 (“if the best interest of the child conflicts with the statutory preference for placement with a close relative, the best interest of the child should control the placement decision”). When a court is called upon to decide a proper disposition for one of its wards, the court may consider all helpful evidence, even if that evidence would not have been competent for purposes of the adjudicatory hearing, and may rely on such evidence to the extent of its probative value. See In re Perez , 173 Ill. App. 3d 922 (1988). As to the standard of proof, this court recently held in In re D.T. , 212 Ill. 2d 347, 366 (2004), that the proper standard of proof applicable during the best-interests portion of a proceeding to terminate parental rights is the preponderance of the evidence standard. In the case at bar, the matter before the court was not termination of parental rights but, rather, modification of a dispositional order regarding custody and guardianship. Nevertheless, the same best-interests inquiry is required. Therefore, we believe that here, too, the burden of proof must be the preponderance of the evidence. Thus, it was incumbent upon the GAL to show, and the trial court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence that placing Austin in the custody and guardianship of his grandparents was in Austin’s best interests. The best-interests determination is then reviewed under the “manifest weight of the evidence” standard. In re D.T. , No. 96229 (October 21, 2004); see In re Tiffany M. , No. 2–04–0668 (December 1, 2004). This is the standard which this court has always employed, in practice. See In re A.H. , 195 Ill. 2d 408, 425 (2001) (wherein the court states that a best-interests determination “will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion or where the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence,” but reviews the evidence to determine whether the judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence); ( In re Custody of Sussenbach , 108 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1985) (“It is not for a reviewing court to try the case de novo but merely to determine whether the trial court’s transfer of custody constituted an abuse of discretion. In other words, the question for the reviewing court is whether the trial court’s decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence”). See also In re P.P. , 261 Ill. App. 3d 598, 605 (1994) (the court’s determination shall not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence); In re S.M. , 223 Ill. App. 3d at 547 (“the trial court’s exercise of that discretion will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence”). The question before us, then, is whether the Madison County circuit court’s judgment regarding the best interests of Austin is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. We find that it is not. Key to this determination is our finding that the Madison County circuit court erred when, in reaching its best-interests determination, it relied almost exclusively upon its own finding that the Wards did not abuse Austin–a finding which it had no authority to make. In the case at bar, Timothy Berkley, Austin’s guardian ad litem , filed a motion in the Madison County circuit court seeking to modify the court’s January 12, 2000, dispositional order. The GAL asked that Austin be removed from the custody of DCFS and placed in the custody of his maternal grandfather, William Ward. DCFS and Fontaine opposed the motion, arguing that it would not be in Austin’s best interests to be placed in the custody of the Wards because they were the subjects of an “indicated” report of abuse involving Austin. DCFS informed the court that Austin had been placed in relative foster care with the Wards in August 1999, but was removed in March 2000, when Austin was nine months old, because it was discovered that he had suffered a skull fracture. Subsequent examination revealed that Austin also had a healing leg fracture. The Wards had no explanation for how these injuries occurred, despite the fact that, at least with regard to the skull fracture, it was undisputed that Austin sustained the injury while he was in the Wards’ sole and exclusive care. DCFS “indicated” the report of abuse against the Wards in light of all of the evidence, which included the nature of the injuries; the medical reports by Austin’s treating physicians; the fact that, at the time Austin’s injuries occurred, Wendy Ward had been taking prescribed antidepressant medication; and the fact that the Wards admitted using corporal punishment to discipline nine-month-old Austin and his three-year-old and five-year-old sisters, even though, as foster parents, they were prohibited from doing so. On appeal, an ALJ reviewed DCFS’s decision and, based on the testimony of several witnesses, including medical experts, ruled that a preponderance of the evidence supported the finding of abuse against the Wards. The Director of DCFS adopted the ALJ’s opinion. Heather Kocisko, a Central Baptist caseworker who, at the time, was assigned to Austin’s case, supported the motion to change custody. Kocisko prepared a “best-interests” report, which she presented to the Madison County circuit court. In this three-page report, Kocisko expressed her belief that the Wards should be awarded custody of Austin and be allowed to adopt him. This recommendation was based, almost exclusively, upon a repudiation of the ALJ’s findings and her personal belief that the Wards had not abused Austin, even though she had no personal knowledge about the Wards’ treatment of Austin at the time fractures were discovered because she had not been working with the Wards at that time. The Madison County circuit court, after hearing all of the testimony, including statements by the Wards and Fontaine, and after reviewing transcripts of the expert medical testimony heard by the ALJ, issued a written decision. The court ruled that it was in Austin’s best interests to remove DCFS as his custodial guardian and to place him in the custody of the Wards. In reaching this determination, however, the court ruled, without citation to authority, that it was “not bound” by the findings of the ALJ or the ruling of the Director. (footnote: 2) The circuit court further held that it did not consider the ALJ’s opinion or the Director’s final determination as substantive evidence or afford these determinations any probative value. Moreover, the Madison County circuit court conducted what amounted to a collateral review of the indicated finding against the Wards. Citing to the transcripts of the expert medical testimony that were presented to the ALJ, the Madison County circuit court reached conclusions about the credibility of these witnesses that was directly opposite to the credibility determinations of the ALJ, who had the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses testify. The Madison County circuit court also concluded, contrary to the ALJ, that the evidence did not support a finding by the preponderance of the evidence that the Wards had abused Austin. In other words, the Madison County circuit court substituted its own findings and conclusions for the ALJ’s findings and the Director’s final ruling. We hold this was error. When a circuit court must decide whether a change in custody is in a child’s best interests, the circuit court is “not bound” by an administrative determination of abuse, but only in the sense that the administrative determination does not preclude the circuit court from finding that the best interests of the child may be served by returning the child to the custody of the person found to have abused him in the past. To say that a court is “not bound” by the administrative determination does not mean, however, that the court is free to wholly ignore the ruling, afford it no probative value, or substitute its own findings on the matter after conducting a de novo review of the evidence. Review of an administrative agency’s decision, such as the ALJ’s determination here, is available in accordance with the Administrative Review Law. 325 ILCS 5/7.16 (West 2000). The Administrative Review Law provides in section 3–102, “Article III of this Act shall apply to and govern every action to review judicially a final decision of any administrative agency where the Act creating or conferring power on such agency, by express reference, adopts the provisions of Article III of this Act or its predecessor, the Administrative Review Act.  In all such cases, any other statutory, equitable or common law mode of review of decisions of administrative agencies heretofore available shall not hereafter be employed .” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3–102 (West 2000). In the case at bar, the Wards did not ask the Madison County circuit court to review the ALJ’s determination. Rather, the Wards sought judicial review of the ALJ’s ruling in Will County. (footnote: 3) Consequently, the Madison County circuit court had no authority to review the ALJ’s determination. 735 ILCS 5/3–104 (West 2000) (the court first acquiring jurisdiction of any action to review a final administrative decision shall have and retain jurisdiction of the action until final disposition of the action). The Madison County circuit court acknowledged that it had no authority to review the ALJ’s decision, stating in its written order, “This court notes that it is not in the position to administratively review the decision of DCFS and the Administrative Law Judge under the Illinois Administrative Review Act, 735 ILCS 5/3–101 et seq. , and, of course does not do so.” Despite this assertion to the contrary, the circuit court’s written order makes clear that it did, in fact, review the decision. Furthermore, even if the Madison County circuit court had been in a position to review the ALJ’s decision, it did not do so properly. As this court noted in Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services , 209 Ill. 2d 264 (2004), judicial review of an administrative agency decision is limited. Courts may not consider evidence outside of the record of the administrative appeal, reweigh the evidence to determine where the preponderance lies, or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 735 ILCS 5/3–110 (West 2002). An administrative agency’s findings of fact are not to be reversed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board , 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204 (1998). Thus, the Madison County circuit court clearly erred when it reassessed the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before the ALJ and substituted its own determination regarding the indicated report against the Wards for that of the ALJ. We recognize that the Madison County circuit court, when considering what placement would be in Austin’s best interests, unquestionably had a duty to determine the suitability of the Wards to parent Austin. Part of the equation when assessing the Wards’ suitability should have been the existence of an indicated report of abuse against them. The Madison County circuit court did not do this. Moreover, the court considered all of the best-interests factors set forth in section 1–3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act in light of its finding that the Wards did not abuse Austin and that the findings by the ALJ and the Director were in error. Under these circumstances, we are compelled to find that the Madison County circuit court’s determination as to the best interests of Austin was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We further note that the circuit court’s written order shows that the court’s skewed focus on whether the Wards had abused Austin prevented it from properly considering whether the circumstances as they existed at the time of the hearing favored giving custody of Austin to the Wards. Evidence before the court showed that, at the time the motion for a change of custody was brought in March 2002, Austin had been living with Fontaine for almost two years. Nearly two thirds of his life had been spent with Fontaine. Because of the attachments that had formed, Fontaine wanted to adopt Austin and in an adoption action, her application, by law, would be given preference and first consideration. 750 ILCS 50/15.1 (West 2000). Further, as noted earlier in this opinion, once the parental rights of Austin’s mother and father were terminated in May 2001, adoption by Fontaine was the permanency goal selected for Austin by DCFS in June 2001, and approved by the court. The circuit court, however, made no mention of these facts in its best-interests determination. When reviewing the best-interests factors, the circuit court found that Austin was bonded with the Wards and, though placement with them would be disruptive, he would “quickly adjust.” We believe that this finding, which was not based on any expert testimony, failed to take into consideration the fact that the Wards’ contact with Austin over the two years since his placement with Fontaine had been very limited. Although Austin had regular visitation with the Wards, they were supervised visitations, intended primarily to maintain contact between Austin and his siblings. Visits took place every other week for about two hours. There was no evidence that Austin ever had a single unsupervised or overnight visit with the Wards since his removal from their home. Furthermore, Fontaine testified that Austin called Wendy Ward the “mean lady” and displayed regressive and destructive behavior after visits with the Wards. His behavioral problems prompted Fontaine to seek out professional help and, thus, since December 2000, Austin had been seeing a behavioral specialist, whom Fontaine had obtained through Easter Seals. However, neither Kocisko’s “best- interests” report, nor any other document submitted to the court, contained anything about this specialist’s assessment of Austin or a report of his progress over the time of his treatment. The record does contain a “Motion to Supplement the Record,” submitted by DCFS to the Madison County circuit court on April 23, 2002. According to this motion, Austin was seen in April 2002 by the Child Study Center for a developmental assessment and physical examination. Attached to the motion was a report prepared by Constance Blade, a pediatrician, and Cheryl Mroz, a developmental psychologist. According to this report, Austin’s head circumference was “outside the normal range for children of his chronological age,” and Austin had an “asymmetrical red reflex” indicating a possible retinal (eye) problem that could lead to blindness. It was suggested that Austin be evaluated by an ophthalmologist. The developmental assessment indicated impairment to his auditory memory, visual processing, and olfactory processing. The report noted that “all of these findings can be related to the previous head injury” and suggested a neurological follow-up be done. It was also noted that Austin had sleep and behavioral problems that were exacerbated by changes in his schedule and environment. There was no testimony at the hearing regarding this report. During Fontaine’s testimony, she was asked about a recent assessment of Austin. The GAL objected to the line of questioning, arguing that Fontaine should not be allowed to testify about a “bonding assessment” that had been done for the purposes of the hearing. The circuit court sustained the objection. It is unclear whether it was the Child Study Center report that the GAL objected to and the circuit court excluded. However, when deciding whether a change in custody would be in Austin’s best interests, the court made no mention of this report.