Opinion ID: 2364258
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction over the Petition for Judicial Review

Text: The Idaho Constitution allows the Legislature to delimit the district courts' appellate jurisdiction. Idaho Const. art. V, § 20. [3] Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless expressly authorized by statute. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1). Without an enabling statute, the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Williams, 149 Idaho 675, 678-79, 239 P.3d 780, 783-84 (2010) (dismissing a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because no statute authorized an appeal); Taylor v. Canyon Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 431-32, 210 P.3d 532, 539-40 (2009) (same); cf. Regan v. Kootenai Cnty., 140 Idaho 721, 726, 100 P.3d 615, 620 (2004) (holding that a reviewable final order is necessary for subject-matter jurisdiction). Respondents filed a petition for judicial review in the district court to challenge the ITD's decision to grant the overlegal permits. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA), I.C. §§ 67-5201 to -5292, governs judicial review of agency actions. Gibson v. Ada Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 139 Idaho 5, 7, 72 P.3d 845, 847 (2003) (citing I.C. § 67-5270(1)). Idaho Code § 67-5270, subsections 2 and 3, allow petitions for review in two different scenarios but neither applies here. None of the parties raised the issue of whether the district court had jurisdiction under § 67-5270 to consider Respondents' petition for judicial review. Nonetheless, the courts are obligated to ensure their own subject-matter jurisdiction and must raise the issue sua sponte if necessary. Highlands Dev. Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 960, 188 P.3d 900, 902 (2008).
Idaho Code § 67-5270(2) provides that [a] person aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter, provided the petitioner exhausts the available administrative remedies and complies with other procedural requirements. [4] I.C. § 67-5270(2) (emphasis added). A contested case is then simply defined as [a] proceeding by an agency . . . that may result in the issuance of an order. I.C. § 67-5240. Thus, for jurisdiction to exist under subsection 2, Respondents must be challenging a final agency action that is not an order in a contested case as that term is defined by statute. An order is an agency action of particular applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons. I.C. § 67-5201(12); see also IDAPA 04.11.01.005.12 (stating that an order is an agency action of particular applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons).
Determining whether the definition of an order applies requires a two-step analysis. Westway Constr., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 139 Idaho 107, 112, 73 P.3d 721, 726 (2003). First, to have an order, the Legislature must have empowered the agency to determine the particular issue. Id. The Legislature has enabled the ITD to issue, in its discretion, permits for vehicles traveling on the highway exceeding the legal weight or size. I.C. § 49-1004(1). This includes the power to limit the time of use and operation. . . and may contain any special conditions and require any undertaking or other security that the ITD deems necessary. Id. § 49-1004(1)(a). Pursuant to this grant of authority, the ITD has adopted a variety of rules and standards to govern the permit process, including specifically that applicants provide a written plan for moving overlegal loads down the highway. IDAPA 39.03.09 to .23. Thus, the Legislature has enabled the ITD to make a determination in this case. Second, the decision must determine the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more persons. Westway Constr., 139 Idaho at 112, 73 P.3d at 726. This Court has already found that ITD encroachment permits are orders because they determine the legal rights and interests of the applicant seeking to access their property from a state highway. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 239, 207 P.3d 963, 970 (2009). Similarly, the overlegal permits here would grant to ConocoPhillips the right to transport its overlegal coke drums down a state highway, in addition to imposing numerous public-safety requirements. See IDAPA 39.03.09.200 (specifying the extent of the ITD's authority to issue permits). Because the permits are an order as defined by the IAPA, they were orders issued in a contested case. Subsection 2 does not permit review of the ITD's order because it is instead meant to enable challenges either to an agency rule or an agency's compliance with a legal duty. Overall, the IAPA contemplates three distinct types of agency actions that could be reviewed by a court: (1) rules, (2) orders, and (3) the performance of a duty placed on the agency by law. I.C. § 67-5201(3). [5] Subsection 2, however, rules out reviewability for orders in contested cases, so it must therefore only permit judicial review of rules or the agency's performance of a legal duty. The distinction between an order and a rule turns primarily on applicability: orders like judicial decreesaffect identified parties; ruleslike statutesaffect classes of persons. Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: A Primer for the Practitioner, 30 Idaho L.Rev. 273, 284 (1993) (emphasis omitted). Unlike a generally applicable rule, the permits particularly affect only ConocoPhillips's right to move a load down a state highway. The permits are therefore an order, not a rule, and are not reviewable under subsection 2 because they were orders in a contested case. Similarly, there are other duties that are imposed on the ITD by statute or judicial mandate, such as, for example, the obligation to adopt a uniform system of traffic-control devices. Id. at 289; I.C. § 49-201(3). A failure or deficiency in performing this duty would also be an agency action reviewable under subsection 2. Again, however, the permits at issue in this case affect ConocoPhillips's particular rights, privileges, and duties. They are therefore an order, not the product of an improperly performed duty. Respondents contend that by issuing the permits, the ITD incorrectly fulfilled its duty to ensure the public's safety and convenience. This in reality is just a substantive challenge to ITD's order that questions whether the ITD correctly applied the standards governing special permits. Consequently, no jurisdiction is available under I.C. § 67-5270(2).
The Dissent asserts that this is not a contested case because the ITD utilized informal procedures in processing the case. A person aggrieved by an agency action other than an order in a contested case is entitled to petition for judicial review. I.C. § 67-5270(2). This was a contested case even though the ITD only followed informal procedures because the IAPA both authorizes and expressly encourages state agencies to resolve issues informally. Formal procedures, such as notice, a hearing, or a formal record are not part of the definition of an order in a contested case. The IAPA provides that an informal disposition may be made of any contested case by negotiation, stipulation, agreed settlement, or consent order. I.C. § 67-5241(1)(c). It goes on to specifically state that [i]nformal settlement of matters is to be encouraged. Id. The statute represents a conscious legislative effort to encourage informal dispute resolution related to all kinds of agency action. Gilmore & Goble, supra, 30 Idaho L.Rev. at 280; see also Act of April 8, 1992, ch. 263, § 25, 1992 Idaho Sess. Laws 783, 802 (adding I.C. § 67-5241). However, an agency cannot unilaterally decide to utilize informal procedures to the exclusion of formal proceedings. Unless all parties agree to the contrary in writing, informal proceedings do not substitute for formal proceedings and do not exhaust administrative remedies, and informal proceeding [sic] are conducted without prejudice to the right of the parties to present the matter formally to the agency. IDAPA 04.11.01.103. Although the ITD has adopted substantive standards for issuing special permits, the Attorney General promulgates rules of procedure for agencies to use when executing their general functions, including adjudicating contested cases. Id. § 67-5206(2), (4). These rules apply unless an agency has devised its own procedural scheme, which the ITD has not. Id. § 67-5206(5). The ITD rules also specifically state that appeals in special-permit applications are governed by the Attorney General's rules. IDAPA 39.03.11.003. The Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General (the Rules) can be found at IDAPA 04.11.01.000 to .999. The Rules allow informal proceedings to be followed in contested cases before an agency. IDAPA 04.11.01.100. Unless prohibited by statute, the agency may provide for the use of informal procedure at any stage of a contested case. IDAPA 04.11.01.101. There is ample authority supporting an agency's decision to handle a dispute informally. The Dissent asserts that only formally adjudicated cases are contested cases under the IAPA. To the contrary, no statute or rule makes formal proceedings a prerequisite to a contested case. A contested case is defined both by statute and by the Rules as a proceeding by an agency . . . that may result in the issuance of an order. Id. § 67-5240; see also IDAPA 04.11.01.005.06 (stating that a contested case is a proceeding which results in the issuance of an order). Moreover, Rule 50 states that the rules governing both informal and formal proceedings apply to agencies in contested cases. IDAPA 04.11.01.050. Following the plain text of the statute, this Court has twice stated that there are only two elements to a contested case: (1) the agency must be empowered to determine the particular issue, and (2) the action must fit the statutory definition of an order. Lochsa Falls, 147 Idaho at 237, 207 P.3d at 968; Westway Constr., 139 Idaho at 111-13, 73 P.3d at 725-27. This Court has never otherwise suggested that only formally adjudicated cases are contested cases. See Barron v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 135 Idaho 414, 417, 18 P.3d 219, 222 (2001) (stating that  all proceedings by an agency . . . that may result in the issuance of an `order' are governed by the IAPA (emphasis added)); Dupont v. Idaho State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 618, 622, 7 P.3d 1095, 1099 (2000) (I.C. § 67-5240 defines any proceeding that may result in an order as a contested case, unless otherwise provided. (emphasis added)). Whether formal procedures were followed is irrelevant to the definition of a contested case. The Dissent nonetheless contends that there was no contested case because the ITD stated that it declined to initiate one and indicated that it did not regard ConocoPhillips's application for a permit as a contested case. The Dissent cites I.C. § 67-5241(1)(a), which does provide that an agency or a presiding officer may decline to initiate a contested case. Again, however, it does not matter whether the agency regards a proceeding to be part of a contested case or not. Proceedings that result in the issuance of an order are contested cases. I.C. § 67-5240. Idaho Code § 67-5241(1)(a) does not state that an agency may decline to follow the required statutory procedures in a contested case. It states that an agency may decline to initiate a contested case. It recognizes that some agencies have a prosecutorial function and, when exercising that function, have discretion to decline to prosecute. Agencies can have both prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. As IDAPA 04.11.01.420 states, [w]hen statute assigns to an agency both (1) the authority to initiate complaints or to investigate complaints made by the public, and (2) the authority to decide the merits of complaints, the agency is required to perform two distinct functions: prosecutorial/investigative and adjudicatory. The prosecutorial function includes deciding whether or not to issue a complaint. As IDAPA 04.11.01.420.01 states, [t]he prosecutorial function includes presentation of allegations or evidence to the agency head for determination whether a complaint will be issued. . . . A complaint charges a person with a violation of the law. All pleadings charging other person(s) with acts or omissions under law administered by the agency are called `complaints.' IDAPA 04.11.01.240.01. The filing of a complaint initiates a contested case. See IDAPA 04.11.01.210 (Pleadings in contested cases are called applications or claims or appeals, petitions, complaints, protests, motions, answers, and consent agreements.). Idaho Code § 67-5241(1)(a) simply provides that an agency has discretion to decline to prosecuteto decline to initiate a contested case. For example, under the Idaho Bar Commission Rules (I.B.C.R.), Bar Counsel investigates all grievances that allege violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. I.B.C.R. 504(b), 509(a). Bar Counsel has a number of options when handling a grievance, including the power to seek formal charges. I.B.C.R. 509(c). Yet, after an informal investigation, Bar Counsel often chooses to simply disregard the matter, to issue an informal admonition, or to privately reprimand the charged attorney. I.B.C.R. 509(b), (c). While all of these actions would constitute the agency's disposition in a dispute, none involves an order that determines the attorney's legal rights, duties, or privileges. These actions would reflect the presiding officer's decision to decline to initiate a contested case under I.C. § 67-5241(1)(a). The Dissent also argues that, since apparently no application was filed with the ITD until the day it issued the permits, no contested case was ever initiated. It cites Rule 200 for the proposition that an application is the initial pleading that commences a contested case. This position ignores the plain text of Rule 200, which simply provides that representatives for service must be named in [t]he initial pleading of each party at the formal stage of a contested case.  IDAPA 04.11.01.200 (emphasis added). The rule on its face does not require any pleading to commence a contested case, but merely governs how pleadings are filed in the formal stage of a contested case. ConocoPhillips did not have to file an application to initiate a contested case. Therefore, because the issuance of the permit was an order in a contested case, this Court does not have jurisdiction under I.C. § 67-5270(2).

Subsection 3 states that [a] party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case decided by an agency . . . is entitled to judicial review under this chapter, again if some additional procedural requirements are met. I.C. § 67-5270(3) (emphasis added). `Party' means each person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party. Id. § 67-5201(13). Rule 150 states that [p]arties to contested cases before the agency are called applicants or claimants or appellants, petitioners, complainants, respondents, protestants, or intervenors. IDAPA 04.11.01.150. People who seek any right, license, award or authority from the agency are called `applicants' or `claimants' or `appellants.' IDAPA 04.11.01.151. To oppose an applicant, anyone can petition to become an intervenor under Rule 156, a blanket term that applies to a person who does not fall into a specific category and who is nonetheless permitted to participate as a party. [6] IDAPA 04.11.01.156. Persons petitioning for intervenor status are admitted as parties if they can demonstrate a substantial interest in the proceeding. IDAPA 04.11.01.350, .353. Respondents were not admitted as parties at any time; neither did they seek admission. Respondents sent a number of written comments and objections to the ITD to oppose ConocoPhillips's application for an overlegal permit, but never filed as intervenors or any other kind of party. Despite the fact that ConocoPhillips and the ITD had undergone months of discussion over this matter, Respondents simply filed a petition for judicial review just as the ITD was preparing to issue the overlegal permits. They therefore were not parties entitled to judicial review under I.C. § 67-5270(3). [7] Allowing only a party, and not simply any interested person, to petition for judicial review of an order is a natural corollary to the exhaustion doctrine, which requires all petitioners to exhaust their administrative remedies before appealing to the district court. See I.C. § 67-5271 (imposing exhaustion requirement). The exhaustion doctrine flows from a number of important policy considerations, such as providing the opportunity for mitigating or curing errors without judicial intervention, deferring to the administrative processes established by the Legislature and the administrative body, and the sense of comity for the quasi-judicial functions of the administrative body. White v. Bannock Cnty. Comm'rs, 139 Idaho 396, 401-02, 80 P.3d 332, 337-38 (2003). Being admitted as parties would have enabled Respondents to actively participate in the application process at the agency level. Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 334, 707 P.2d 441, 445 (1985). If Respondents had formally intervened, the agency could have brought its expertise to bear in considering the parties' competing interests, heard Respondents' evidence and testimony, and corrected substantive mistakes. Instead, Respondents sought to circumvent the administrative process by going directly to the district court to block ConocoPhillips's overlegal permits from issuing. Counsel for Respondents suggested at oral argument that, since the ITD and ConocoPhillips were undergoing an informal application process, the Respondents could become parties by informally opposing the permits. Neither the IAPA nor the Rules, however, recognize or create a classification of informal parties. Although the IAPA expressly encourages parties and agencies to reach informal dispositions, I.C. § 67-5241(1), a person asserting party status must still be admitted or rightfully be seeking admission as a party, id. § 67-5201(13). The law distinguishes between informal and formal proceedings merely to specify what procedures the agency must undergo in adjudicating a contested case, such as appointing hearing examiners and building a formal record. See IDAPA 01.11.01.100 (stating that [i]nformal proceedings are proceedings in contested cases . . . to be conducted using informal procedures such as a proceeding without a formal record, designation of parties, hearing examiners, or other formal procedures). Persons seeking admission must still file a protest, a petition to intervene, or another similar pleading to be admitted as a party. IDAPA 04.11.01.250, .350, .353. Because Respondents never sought to be admitted as parties, it is irrelevant whether the proceedings were in a formal or informal phase. The Dissent suggests that Respondents may be entitled to party status as petitioners, complainants, or protestants even without filing any pleadings. Even if someone could become a party without filing any pleadings, and even if Respondents had filed a pleading to initiate formal proceedings, they would not have been eligible for party status under any of these categories. First, petitioners are persons who seek to modify, amend or stay existing orders or rules of the agency . . . or to otherwise take action that will result in the issuance of an order. IDAPA 04.11.01.152. If Respondents had participated in the agency proceedings, they would have been opposing an application or, in other words, opposing the issuance of an order. They would not have been seeking to modify or stay an existing order. Second, complainants are persons who charge other person(s) with any act or omission. IDAPA 04.11.01.153. Respondents would not be charging ConocoPhillips with violating any rule or regulation, but would be opposing their application for a permit. Last, protestants are persons who oppose an application or claim or appeal and who have a statutory right to contest the right, license, award or authority sought by an applicant. IDAPA 04.11.01.155 (emphasis added). While Respondents certainly oppose an application, they have no specific statutory right to do so, and have never asserted as such. As explained above, Respondents might have sought to be admitted as intervenors if they could demonstrate a substantial interest in the proceeding, but they took no steps to do so. IDAPA 04.11.01.350, .353. Respondents are not entitled to party status unless granted leave to intervene, and were therefore never wrongly denied the opportunity to take part in formal agency proceedings.
A party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case can seek judicial review. I.C. § 67-5270(3). Not only must the person seeking judicial review be a party, but there must be a final order. It does not appear in this case that there is yet a final order that is subject to judicial review. The only document in the appellate record that could be a final order is the Memorandum of Decision issued on August 20, 2010, by Alan Frew, Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles, Idaho Transportation Department. For that to be a final order, it must fit within one of three definitions, and it does not.