Opinion ID: 2762758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Bell’s Closing Statement

Text: Finally, DM maintains that the district court erred in denying DM’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial and in not finding that Bell’s closing argument—in which Bell’s counsel repeatedly accused DM of being a thief and stealing from Bell—was abusive and improper.
Since DM did not object to Bell’s closing statement, this court reviews for plain error. United States v. George, 201 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2000); 18 Case: 13-40878 Document: 00512875149 Page: 19 Date Filed: 12/18/2014 No. 13-40878 c/w 14-40545 Schleunes v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 528 F.2d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1976). “Reversal is appropriate if the error is (1) plain, (2) affects the appellant’s substantial rights, and (3) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Alaniz, 591 F.3d at 776. A court has discretion to grant a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 “where it is necessary to prevent an injustice.” United States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In determining the effect of statements made during closing argument, we consider the record as a whole and not merely isolated remarks.” Daniel v. Ergon, Inc., 892 F.2d 403, 411 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
The district court’s denial of DM’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial was not plainly erroneous. A closing statement may implicate the interest of substantial justice when counsel’s assertions are “either false or without basis in the record.” Wallner v. Ziegler, 470 F. App’x 230, 233 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Hall v. Freese, 735 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also Alaniz, 591 F.3d at 779 (finding no plain error where statements “were sufficiently based on the record”). Bell’s closing statement does not contain material facts not in evidence and does not rise to the level affecting substantial justice. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 284–86 (5th Cir. 1975) (ordering new trial where closing argument contained an “untrue admission”). Evidence was presented at trial from which the jury could find that DM’s conduct was willful and that DM stole the copyrights from Bell. The jury heard evidence of DM’s shifting defense theories, and evidence that DM falsely created documents announcing that Alvert Music transferred ownership to DM. The jury also heard testimony from DM’s principals from which the jury could determine credibility. Bell’s counsel’s statements that DM stole the copyrights were not without basis in the record. 19 Case: 13-40878 Document: 00512875149 Page: 20 Date Filed: 12/18/2014 No. 13-40878 c/w 14-40545 Further, any prejudice from Bell’s closing statement was minimized. First, any prejudice was offset by the district court’s instruction that “[s]tatements and arguments of the attorney are intended only to assist you in understanding the evidence and the parties’ contentions and are not evidence of the facts or instructions on the law.” See Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 631 F.3d 724, 732–33 (5th Cir. 2011); Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 848 F.2d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 1988). Second, the disputed statements went to DM’s willfulness in infringing, an element that had little or no effect on the jury’s verdict. The jury was only deciding damages, so there was no risk that the allegedly improper statements influenced a determination of liability. Further, while the jury did find DM’s infringement of Whoomp! to be willful, this finding increased the amount of statutory damages only. 7 A prevailing plaintiff in a copyright infringement action must elect to recover either actual damages or statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a). Here, Bell elected actual damages, which are not affected by willfulness. Thus, it was not plain error for the district court to allow Bell’s closing statement and not to grant DM’s motion for a new trial.