Opinion ID: 544294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The failure to mention specific intent

Text: 42 Mr. Martinez raises several challenges to the attempt instruction in the case. That instruction read as follows: To attempt an offense means wilfully to do some act in an effort to bring about or accomplish something the law forbids. Tr. at 538. Mr. Martinez first contends that the attempt instruction, like the aiding and abetting instruction, was deficient because it did not mention specific intent. Again, because Mr. Martinez did not make this objection at trial, we must review the instruction only for plain error. McNeese, 901 F.2d at 608. 43 This argument is similar to Mr. Martinez' argument regarding the omission of specific intent in the aiding and abetting instruction, and for similar reasons we decline to accept it. The instructions as a whole informed the jury of the mental state the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction. Moreover, the attempt instruction at issue, which was identical to the Seventh Circuit's pattern instruction on attempt, conveyed the notion of intent by use of the term willfully. Nevertheless, Mr. Martinez argues that the district court erred by failing to define willfully at some point within the jury instructions. The term willfully does not appear in either 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846, the statute under which Mr. Martinez was convicted, or 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1), the statutory section implicitly referenced by 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 in this case. 13 Mr. Martinez contends, however, that, because willfully in this case incorporates the notion of specific intent rather than the ordinary, everyday meaning of the term, the district court erred in not defining willfully. In support of this proposition, Mr. Martinez cites United States v. Sherwood, 770 F.2d 650, 653-54 (7th Cir.1985), in which the court concluded that it was not plain error to omit a definition of willful in jury instructions regarding the statutory offense of bail jumping, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3150. Although the bail jumping statute did include the term willful, this court in Sherwood concluded that, because the term willful in the bail jumping statute had been interpreted to have its ordinary, everyday meaning rather than a legalistic meaning that incorporates the notion of specific intent, there was little danger that the jury would be confused by failure to define the term. Id. at 654. In explaining the difference between ordinary, everyday meaning and legalistic meaning, the court explained that, under the bail jumping statute, the term willful means only that the  'person charged ... knows what he is doing. It does not mean that, in addition, he must suppose that he is breaking the law.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875, 880 (2d Cir.) (quoting American Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir.1925)), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 910, 86 S.Ct. 250, 15 L.Ed.2d 161 (1965)). 44 The Sherwood court also noted that any danger of a miscarriage of justice resulting from a failure to define willful was further mitigated by the strong evidence in support of the finding that Sherwood did act willfully in jumping bail. Such strong evidence, combined with the plain and ordinary meaning assigned to the term willful within the bail jumping statute, led the Sherwood court to conclude that the failure to define the term willful was not plain error. 45 We believe that Sherwood supports our conclusion that the failure to define willful in Mr. Martinez' case did not constitute plain error. First, as we have noted, the term willful does not appear in the statute that defines Mr. Martinez' charged offense. Thus, in general, the term need not be defined in the jury instructions. See Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit Sec. 6.03 (1980); Sherwood, 770 F.2d at 653-54; United States v. Streich, 759 F.2d 579, 584-85 (7th Cir.) (even though district court instructed the jury that willfulness was one of the elements of assault upon a federal officer with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 111, the trial judge committed no error in refusing to define willfulness because the term was not an element of the statutory offense), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 860, 106 S.Ct. 172, 88 L.Ed.2d 142 (1985). Second, as we have stated earlier, the elements instructions given at the beginning of the jury charge, supra p. 681, adequately stated the mental state that the prosecution had to prove in order to secure a conviction. Third, we conclude that the evidence that Mr. Martinez did act willfully was so strong that any failure to define the term had no prejudicial effect on him. See Sherwood, 770 F.2d at 654; United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 363 (7th Cir.1986) (where the defendant claimed, despite substantial evidence to the contrary, that he did not know of or participate in a conspiracy to import drugs, the court held that the district court's omission of a detailed definition of willfully was not plain error because nothing turned on the fine points of willfulness). Here, the evidence of Mr. Martinez' willful participation was plentiful: he had ordered numerous hydraulic jacks for use in constructing Mr. Valencia's elaborate storage compartments for cocaine; he had flown across the country in pursuit of these mechanical parts; he had participated in constructing one of these compartments; and he had transported substantial sums of money and assisted Mr. Valencia in the transaction through which an attempt was made to purchase a large quantity of drugs. This strong evidence of Mr. Martinez' willful participation, combined with the other factors, leads us to conclude that the district court's failure to define the term willful was not plain error. 46