Opinion ID: 1435461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Footprint Identification

Text: At trial Henry Broughter, a fingerprint-identification expert, testified that a footprint found at the crime scene had been made by defendant's sneaker. Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that it was plain error to admit such evidence without first qualifying an expert specifically trained in footprint identification. The State argues that it was not error to admit such comparison testimony because fingerprint-identification expertise is a sufficient basis for making footprint comparisons. The State argues further that it did not need expert testimony in this area, since lay witnesses are perfectly capable of comparing the sole of a shoe with a shoeprint. The admissibility of expert-opinion evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court. A lay witness may give an opinion on matters of common knowledge and observation. State v. Labrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 197, 553 A. 2d 335 (1989) (investigating officer was properly permitted to testify regarding point of impact of two vehicles in automobile-accident case based on his personal observations, even though he was not qualified as accident-reconstruction expert); see Biunno, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 2 to Evid.R. 56 (1990). Although we have never directly addressed the issue, two of our recent cases involved footprint-identification testimony by law-enforcement agents who were not qualified as footprint-identification experts. See State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 53-54, 61, 549 A. 2d 792 (1988) (medical examiner and state police forensic chemist testify to sneaker pattern similarities); State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 215, 239, 463 A. 2d 320 (1983) (similarity between footprint at crime scene and shoe in the defendant's room discovered by police detective). Other jurisdictions considering the issue have generally held that footprint identification does not require qualification of an expert. See generally Annotation, Footprints as Evidence, 35 A.L.R. 2d 856, 881, § 13 (1954) (Later Case Service (1989)) (The comparison of footprints [is] not a matter solely restricted to expert testimony). The rationale underlying such decisions is that shoe-print patterns are often `readily recognizable and well within the capabilities of a lay witness to observe. No detailed measurements, no subtle analysis or scientific determination is needed.' Hutt v. State, 70 Md. App. 711, 523 A. 2d 643, 645-46 (1987) (quoting State v. Hairston, 60 Ohio App. 2d 220, 223, 396 N.E. 2d 773, 775 (1977)). Defendant cites no authority that would lead us to a different conclusion. We therefore reject defendant's contention that the failure to qualify Detective Broughter as a footprint expert rendered inadmissible his comparison of the crime-scene print to defendant's shoe. Our review of the record, however, indicates that Broughter may have been qualified as a fingerprint expert for the primary purpose of bolstering the credibility of his footprint testimony. Broughter's footprint testimony followed his description of the unsuccessful search for defendant's fingerprints in the Sharps' home. He described his effort to collect the shoeprint from the Sharps' hardwood floor using fingerprint-gathering techniques and equipment. Thereafter, he testified that footprint-analysis techniques were generally the same as fingerprint-analysis techniques. Moreover, Broughter's ultimate conclusion that defendant's sneaker had made the bloody impression that was discovered in the Sharps' foyer was based on his expertise and experience in the area of identifying prints. Because we hold that footprint identification is an area in which lay-opinion testimony is acceptable, we believe it would be improper to bolster such testimony by reliance on Broughter's qualifications as a fingerprint expert. We emphasize that we express no disapproval of the methods used to collect the evidence or to display for the jury the similarities between the crime-scene print and the exemplar made with defendant's shoe. Our ruling is narrowly limited to the impropriety of resting Broughter's conclusions about the shoeprint on his expertise in fingerprint analysis, and the possibility that his qualification as an expert in fingerprint analysis served no other purpose than to bolster the credibility of his footprint testimony.