Opinion ID: 1455467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Evidence and Statements During Trial

Text: Skerret argues that the Government presented documents that should not have been allowed into evidence and were then impermissibly used during closing arguments by the government. The first document was the indictment, and the second was Rivera Santiago's sealed motion requesting a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Skerret did not object below to either submission, accordingly, we review for plain error. The Government asserts that the indictment was introduced into evidence, not as evidence against Skerret, but to offer some background on Rivera Santiago, whose cooperation in the case earned him a reduced sentence. We agree. It is clear from the trial record that the Government's reference to the indictment, and the reason for presenting it to the jury, was to show the jury what Rivera Santiago did and what he is answering for. Since the indictment was not introduced into evidence to be considered against the defendant, subject to a proper instruction, giving the indictment to the jury for use during deliberations was well within the trial court's discretion. See United States v. McFarlane, 491 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Medina, 761 F.2d 12, 21-22 (1st Cir.1985)). The district court properly instructed the jury regarding the indictment. The district court told the jury: You are going to have a copy of the indictment for the simple reason that you have to follow the written word of the charge to figure out whether it is something that helps you in conducting your deliberations[,] but the indictment as such is not evidence of anything. The very last instruction the jury heard before deliberating was: You will get a copy of the indictment. As I said before, it serves as the guideline, if you will, of what it is that the government charged with the understanding that it is not evidence of guilt or anything else. The district court did not err. Likewise, it was not plain error for the court to admit the § 5K1.1 motion. The purpose of the § 5K.1 motion was to show the jury that Rivera Santiago had benefited from cooperating with the Government and that he had motivation to testify truthfully. The motion also related to Skerret's main theory, which was that Rivera Santiago was lying to obtain leniency. We have held that, under these types of circumstances, it may be appropriate to introduce this kind of evidence. See United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92, 101-102 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 203, 166 L.Ed.2d 164 (2006) (`[A] prosecutor properly may admit a witness's plea agreement into evidence, discuss the details of the plea during closing arguments, and comment upon a witness's incentive to testify truthfully.' (quoting United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1999))); see also United States v. Page, 521 F.3d 101, 107 (1st Cir.2008). In the absence of an objection, the district court cannot be faulted for admitting the indictment and the Government's § 5K1.1 motion into evidence. The Government had a legitimate reason for admitting the evidence, and Skerret's attempt to distort the Government's motive fails. [2] There was no plain error.
Skerret alleges that the Government made improper statements in its closing. The Government stated: And when you decide this matter as judges, remember that you will live with the decision of course. You will live with the honest decision that you put a criminal behind bars. Not just left out in the street, another criminal to continue selling drugs next to the kids because you saw they sold regardless of the kids, not even caring for any of those kids, one of them was even giving money to a little child to take God knows where. So when you live with your conscience you will live with your knowledge as judges of the fact you did justice.... The Government also stated: [Castellano Castro] is an innocent victim, living in one of our housing projects and having to endure the trafficking by these individuals. In the past, we have admonished the Government for making statements `calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury,' United States v. Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d 12, 39 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), in an attempt to obtain a conviction. See Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 1993) (We think it is crystal clear that inflammatory language of this ilk falls well outside the bounds of permissible argument.). We continue to believe that: Cases are to be decided by a dispassionate review of the evidence admitted in court. There should be no suggestion that a jury has a duty to decide one way or the other; such an appeal is designed to stir passion and can only distract a jury from its actual duty: impartiality. United States v. Mendelbaum, 803 F.2d 42, 44 (1st Cir.1986). The statements at issue, however, were made during the Government's rebuttal in direct response to Skerret's statements. Skerret's counsel made the following remarks in his closing arguments: You are going to live with your decision the rest of your life.... Are you really going to rest the rest of your lives with the decision you are about to make on a criminal? On a woman that cannot remember the dates? The Government's response to statements made by defendant's counsel cannot and should not be viewed the same way as statements made by the Government without provocation. In [the] context [of responding to defendant's arguments], we `typically cede prosecutors some latitude in responding to defense counsel....' Hansen, 434 F.3d at 102 (quoting United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2003)). While prosecutor[s] should refrain from arguments [predicting] the consequences of the jury's verdict, United States v. Whiting, 28 F.3d 1296, 1302 (1st Cir.1994) (citation omitted) (second alteration in original), the statement here was simply a response to provocative statements made by Skerret's counsel. Admitting the statement under the circumstances we have before us was not plain error.