Opinion ID: 2508462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: State v. Roggenkamp

Text: Recognizing Michael Roggenkamp's conviction or acquittal hinged on the definition of reckless, V Roggenkamp Verbatim Report of Proceedings (May 25, 2001) at 108, the trial judge opined the rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences standard precluded him from considering Roggenkamp's mental state, instead focusing his concentration on the act itself: 1. Recklessness, as defined in WPIC 90.05, focuses on the act itself rather than the mens rea. Reckless driving as defined in the relevant statute [RCW 46.61.520(1)(b) and RCW 46.61.522(1)(a)] is shaded towards the negligent driving standard as opposed to the non-negligent or non-vehicular homicide or vehicular assault definition of recklessness, which requires proof of willfulness or wanton conduct. However, ordinary negligence in operating a motor vehicle does not render a person guilty of vehicular homicide. Recklessness under these standards is easier to prove than the willful or wanton standard, which incorporates a greater focus on the mental state of the person. RCP at 126 (Conclusions of Law 1) (emphasis added). The trial judge correctly recognized the willful or wanton standard examines the defendant's mental state, considering the inherently subjective components of those terms. See Adkisson v. City of Seattle, 42 Wash.2d 676, 682-83, 258 P.2d 461 (1953). That the trial judge specifically admitted the prosecution's burden was easier to prove because of the rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences standard demonstrates the reasonable possibility a different result would have been reached had the trial judge followed the willful or wanton standard. Therefore reasonable doubt exists as to whether the legal error was harmless.