Opinion ID: 2617087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion for Discretionary Review in Personal Restraint Petition Proceeding

Text: Ms. Shumway argues that she should be granted an extension of time in which to file her motion for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals dismissal of her personal restraint petition. However, Ms. Shumway is unable to demonstrate circumstances that meet the high standard required before such an extension may be granted. RAP 16.14(c), governing review of personal restraint petitions, provides: If the petition is dismissed by the Chief Judge or decided by the Court of Appeals on the merits, the decision is subject to review by the Supreme Court only by a motion for discretionary review on the terms and in the manner provided in rule 13.5(a), (b), and (c). RAP 13.5 requires that a motion for discretionary review be filed within 30 days after the Court of Appeals has filed its decision. In providing Ms. Shumway a copy of the order dismissing her personal restraint petition, the Court of Appeals sent a letter to Ms. Shumway informing her that she could file a motion for discretionary review in this court. Ms. Shumway did not request review at that time. She now seeks an extension of timeof more than one yearfor filing the motion. RAP 1.2(a) generally requires a liberal interpretation of the rules on appeal, and RAP 1.2(c) permits an appellate court to waive the provisions of any court rule in order to serve the ends of justice, subject to the restrictions in rule 18.8(b) and (c). RAP 18.8(b) is a specific exception to the rule of liberality. That rule provides: The appellate court will only in extraordinary circumstances and to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice extend the time within which a party must file a ... motion for discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, a petition for review, or a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court will ordinarily hold that the desirability of finality of decisions outweighs the privilege of a litigant to obtain an extension of time under this section.... Pybas v. Paolino, 73 Wash.App. 393, 401, 869 P.2d 427 (1994), explained the purpose of the rule as follows: RAP 18.8(b), by limiting the extension of time to file a notice of appeal to those cases involving extraordinary circumstances and to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice, expresses a public policy preference for the finality of judicial decisions over the competing policy of reaching the merits in every case. Extraordinary circumstances include instances where the filing, despite reasonable diligence, was defective due to excusable error or circumstances beyond the party's control. Hoirup v. Empire Airways, Inc., 69 Wash.App. 479, 482, 848 P.2d 1337 (1993); Reichelt v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 52 Wash.App. 763, 765, 764 P.2d 653 (1988). The standard set forth in the rule is rarely satisfied. Scannell v. State, 128 Wash.2d 829, 833-34, 912 P.2d 489 (1996) (citing to Reichelt ). See also Schaefco, Inc. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 121 Wash.2d 366, 849 P.2d 1225 (1993). In Reichelt, the Court of Appeals refused to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal which was filed 10 days late. The Court of Appeals rejected the appellant's argument that because one of the two trial attorneys on the case left the firm during the 30 days following entry of judgment, and the firm's appellate attorney had an unusually heavy work load at the time, extraordinary circumstances existed justifying an extension of time to avoid a gross miscarriage of justice. The court considered a lack of prejudice to the respondent as irrelevant and noted that the prejudice of granting an extension of time would be to the appellate system and to litigants generally, who are entitled to an end to their day in court. Reichelt, 52 Wash.App. at 766 n. 2, 764 P.2d 653. In Scannell, this court determined that extraordinary circumstances did exist and we granted an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal. In Scannell we held that the petitioner's confusion over a change in the appellate rules, his reasonable diligence in carefully following the prior rules, and his good faith attempt to timely file his notice of appeal warranted leniency. Scannell, 128 Wash.2d at 834-35, 912 P.2d 489. We cautioned, in Scannell, that other future misinterpretations of the new rules would not be treated with equal leniency. In the present case, Ms. Shumway asks this court to find extraordinary circumstances exist that require an extension of time in order to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice. She explains that she did not file a motion for discretionary review in this court because the attorney who represented her on direct appeal and who informally consulted with her in the preparation of her personal restraint petition may have told her that it was not necessary to ask this court for review in order to pursue a habeas action in federal court. [3] Ms. Shumway does not claim reasonable diligence, confusion about the method of seeking review, excusable error in interpreting the rules, or circumstances beyond her control. She does not claim that she attempted in good faith to secure review. Instead, she argues that she did not believe review in this court was necessary in order for her to present her claims to the federal court. The erroneous advice of an attorney regarding the effect of a Court of Appeals decision on a different action in another jurisdiction is not an extraordinary circumstance, under RAP 18.8(b), which justifies an extension of time of more than one year for filing a petition for review. Reichelt, 52 Wash.App. 763, 764 P.2d 653. There is not a sufficient basis in this case to justify granting a motion for extension of time within which to file a motion for discretionary review. Ms. Shumway has no right to seek discretionary review of the order dismissing her personal restraint petition.