Opinion ID: 2162881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Sindlinger's prior acts and declarations over defendant's hearsay objections.

Text: Defendant objected to the introduction of certain evidence showing that he, Sindlinger and Mark were speculating with other real estate, Sindlinger's early efforts to assist Mark in acquiring the Miller farm at a cheap price, and Sindlinger's later efforts to reassure the other owners concerning the sale price. Defendant asserts these acts and declarations were hearsay as to him, were admissible only under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, and that ultimately there was no proof the conspiracy then existed. He thus asserts this evidence should have been rejected by trial court. Regardless of trial court's preliminary reasons for admitting this evidence, if the hearsay rule can be found inapplicable under any theory, the ruling will be upheld. State v. Leonard, 243 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Iowa 1976); State v. Kidd, 239 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa 1976); State v. Hinkle, 229 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1975) (there is no reversible error if trial court's ruling which admitted the evidence in controversy may be sustained on any ground). Without further extending this opinion by analyzing each objection, we find the testimony and exhibits disclosing the acts of Sindlinger and Mark with reference to the Miller farm, and the activities of these persons and defendant in other real estate speculation, were relevant evidence (without reference to the truth of specific assertions made), reasonably necessary to complete the whole story of the crime charged, Leonard, 243 N.W.2d at 890-91, to prove the intent, purpose and aim of the persons who later conspired, and as bearing on the issue of the existence of the ultimate conspiracy. Thus it was admissible not under the co-conspirator exception, but simply because it did not fall within the definition of hearsay. See State v. Moritz, 293 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Iowa 1980); State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Iowa 1978); State v. Rush, 242 N.W.2d 313, 319 (Iowa 1976) (The distinction between statements offered to prove the truth of a matter asserted and those offered to prove only (1) the fact such statements were made or (2) their effect on the subsequent actions of the hearer, has been recognized by this court.). Admissibility of such evidence is strongly supported by decisions from other jurisdictions. See United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928, 87 S.Ct. 284, 17 L.Ed.2d 210 (1966): Furthermore, events which occur prior to the commission of a crime are often relevant to an understanding of the nature of the crime itself. . . . Here we do not think that the district judge erred by admitting evidence of the continuing series of transactions relating to the purchase of the Hartman farm. The earlier negotiations merged with acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy and were relevant to an understanding of them. They were admissible against all the conspirators once a prima facie conspiracy was proved. Kearns, who may have entered the conspiracy at a later date, took the conspiracy as he found it. See also United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1977) ([A]cts by others (and statements by others, if not offered for the truth) before or after the conspiracy may be relevant in suggesting the existence and aims of the conspiracy charged.); United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111, 1115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 917, 95 S.Ct. 195, 42 L.Ed.2d 155 (1974) (evidence of events prior to the conspiracy admissible to prove the intent, purpose and aim of the parties to the conspiracy); United States v. Milisci, 465 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076, 93 S.Ct. 684, 34 L.Ed.2d 664 (1972) (activities of the person who perfected the conspiracy could be shown even though those activities occurred prior to the date the conspiracy was actually formed); Commonwealth v. Borans, ___ Mass. ___, ____, 393 N.E.2d 911, 929 (1979) (acts and transactions prior to the alleged date of the commencement of the conspiracy are relevant as bearing upon the fact of the conspiracy itself). There was sufficient evidence to permit an inference by trial court that Sindlinger and Mark later conspired to acquire the Miller farm and defraud its owners, whether the substantial evidence test, Kidd, 239 N.W.2d at 864, or the prima facie test, State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 270 (Iowa 1975), is utilized. See State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 15-18, 139 N.W.2d 490, 502-04, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817, 87 S.Ct. 39, 17 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966). The challenged evidence of acts and transactions during that conspiracy and prior to Nettie's death was admissible against defendant under the general rule: Acts or declarations of conspirators, done or made before the accused joined the conspiracy, are adopted by him so as to be admissible against him. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 765 (1961). See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746, 765 (1948); United States v. Sarno, 456 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1972); Jordan v. United States, 428 F.2d 7, 10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 252 (1970). We hold trial court did not err in admitting this evidence and considering it as indicated in the judgment he entered.