Opinion ID: 1340542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Va.Code, 27-6A-1 to 27-6A-8

Text: The defendant asserts that W.Va.Code, 27-6A-2, as enacted in 1974 and prior to its amendment in 1979, is applicable to his case and that it expressly requires dismissal of the criminal charges. W.Va.Code, 27-6A-2(c) provided, prior to amendment in 1979: (c) If the individual is found initially to be incompetent to stand trial with no substantial likelihood of obtaining competency, or if after such improvement period [of up to nine months] the individual is found to be incompetent to stand trial, the criminal charges shall be dismissed. The dismissal order may be stayed for ten days to allow civil commitment proceedings to be instituted pursuant to article five of this chapter. The 1979 amendment to this statute added a subsection (d) and made distinctions between felony and misdemeanor cases: (c) If the individual is indicted for a misdemeanor and is found to be incompetent to stand trial with no substantial likelihood of obtaining competency, or if after such improvement period the individual is found to be incompetent to stand trial, the criminal charges shall be dismissed. The dismissal order may be stayed for ten days to allow civil commitment proceedings to be instituted pursuant to article five of this chapter. (d) If the individual is a defendant in a felony case and is found initially to be incompetent to stand trial with no substantial likelihood of obtaining competency, or if after such improvement period the individual is found to be incompetent to stand trial, then the director of health shall institute against the individual civil commitment proceedings pursuant to article five of this chapter and the criminal charges shall be dismissed. If the individual is committed pursuant to article five of this chapter, then the director of health shall cause the individual's competency to stand trial to be reviewed every six months during the period of his civil commitment, and shall report his findings to the court of record after every such review. If the director of health finds that the individual is competent to stand trial, then a hearing shall be held by the court of record in accordance with subsection (a) of this section. If, after such hearing, the individual is found competent to stand trial, he shall be tried; if, after such hearing, the individual is found incompetent to stand trial, he shall be recommitted for the period of his commitment as ordered pursuant to article five of this chapter, with mandatory review of his competency to stand trial every six months in accordance with this subsection. If said individual becomes competent to stand trial, the director of health shall notify the prosecuting attorney of the county where the criminal charges were brought against the individual. Thus, the 1979 version of this specific section, W.Va.Code, 27-6A-2, explicitly requires, in a case involving an individual charged with a felony, that there be a review of such individual's competency to stand trial every six months and explicitly mandates a trial on a felony charge whenever the individual becomes competent to stand trial. The situation of a person charged with a crime who is incompetent to stand trial is analogous in certain respects to that of a juvenile accused of a crime. In both situations the statutes afford procedural protections to a person under a disability as a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the circuit court to try the person as a competent adult. In State v. Bannister, 162 W. Va. 447, 453-54, 250 S.E.2d 53, 56-57 (1978), this Court held that an amendment to a statute making it easier in certain types of cases to transfer juvenile proceedings to criminal jurisdiction did not apply retroactively to juvenile cases pending at the time of the amendment, where the alleged criminal offense was committed prior to the effective date of the amendment. The Court relied upon the general rule that a statute is presumptively prospective in operation, unless expressly or by necessary implication made retroactive. Similarly, in this case the alleged criminal offense occurred prior to the effective date of the 1979 amendment to W.Va.Code, 27-6A-2. Nothing in the 1979 amendment indicates legislative intent that the statute be applied retroactively. Accordingly, it will not be applied to the defendant's case. [4] Nonetheless, the 1974 version of W.Va. Code, 27-6A-1 to 27-6A-8, does not forever bar further prosecution of a person charged with a crime who is initially found to be incompetent to stand trial with no substantial likelihood of obtaining competency or who is found to be incompetent to stand trial after the six-to-nine month improvement period. W.Va.Code, 27-6A-5 [1974] provides for periodic review of a person's competency to stand trial. [5] W.Va. Code, 27-6A-5 [1974] also provides for the person's commitment to a mental institution to be terminated and for the return of the person to the custody of the sheriff for trial, whenever a court, after a hearing, finds that the person is competent to stand trial: The periodic review of a person who has been found incompetent to stand trial shall include a clinical opinion with regard to the person's competence to stand trial, which opinion shall be made a part of the patient's medical record. If any person previously found incompetent to stand trial is later determined to be competent, the director of mental health shall notify the court of record, which shall promptly hold a hearing on the person's competency to stand trial. Any person found incompetent to stand trial may at any time petition the court of record for a hearing on his competency. Whenever a hearing is held and the court of record finds that the person is competent to stand trial, his commitment, if any, to a mental health facility shall be terminated and the court of record shall order his return to the custody of the sheriff for trial. However, if the person requests continued care and treatment during the pendency of the criminal proceedings against him and the mental health facility agrees to provide such care and treatment, the court of record may order the further hospitalization of such person.
Although the statutory law in this State authorizes the accused to be brought to trial on a felony charge whenever the accused attains competency to stand trial, such statutory law, on this jurisdictional point, must comport with procedural due process under The Constitution of West Virginia. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers. W.Va. Const. art. III, § 10. [6] The constitutional guaranty of due process is the primary constitutional protection against prejudice to the defense caused by passage or lapse of time. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 704 (1982). [T]he [due process] right [to an investigation and a trial without unreasonable delay] itself arises from the substantial prejudice that is presumed to affect a defendant's ability to respond to charges against him [or her] when the charges are [grossly] time-worn and stale. State ex rel. Leonard v. Hey, ___, W.Va. ___, ___, 269 S.E.2d 394, 398 (1980) (eleven-year delay between commission of the crime and the indictment). The effects of less gross delays upon a [criminal] defendant's due process rights must be determined by a trial court by weighing the reasons for delay against the impact of the delay upon the defendant's ability to defend himself. Syl. pt. 2, id. In Leonard, this Court, in discussing the effect of the lapse of time upon due process rights, assume[d] no incapacity existed that prevented prosecution[.] ___ W.Va. at ___, 269 S.E.2d at 395. A similar point was made in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). That case involved an unusual state statutory procedure which authorized the prosecutor to take a nolle prosequi with leave, enabling the prosecutor, under state law, to restore the suspended case to the trial docket at any time in his or her discretion. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the statute violated the defendant's speedy trial rights. On the other hand, the court distinguished and implicitly approved other states' statutes allowing removal of the indictment from the trial docket with leave to reinstate for trial at an indefinite future date but which, under state law, apply only to situations in which the defendant cannot be brought before the court or where he has consented to the removal. 386 U.S. at 221 n. 5, 87 S.Ct. at 992 n. 5, 18 L.Ed.2d at 7 n. 5 (emphasis added). Cited as an example of a case involving a constitutional procedure was Rush v. State, 254 Miss. 641, 647-48, 182 So.2d 214, 216 (1966), in which the defendant was in a mental institution due to incompetency to stand trial at the time the indictment was indefinitely retired to the files, that is, suspended without dismissal. The leading case on the prejudicial effects of a lengthy delay in bringing an accused to trial due primarily to the incompetency of the accused to stand trial is Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir.1957). In that case the defendant had been tried (for assault with a deadly weapon) five times, two trials having ended in mistrial and two convictions having been set aside for trial error. The primary defense was insanity at the time of the offense. The third conviction, which was before the court in this case, resulted in a sentence of one to three years. At the time of the court's opinion in this case, about eight years had elapsed since the indictment. Having been adjudicated incompetent to stand trial between the first and second trials, between the third and fourth trials and between the fourth and fifth trials, the defendant had been confined in a mental hospital for a total period of about one year and had been confined in jail for about six years. On the record before the court the defendant appeared to have been sane at the time of the offense and competent at the time of the first trial, which resulted in a conviction. Not until two years after the first conviction did the prosecution finally confess error (because of the total lack of any instruction on the elements of the offense charged). During this two-year period of time the defendant developed prison psychosis and was committed for the first time to a mental hospital to restore his competency to stand trial. Thereafter, the defendant, like the defendant in the case now before this Court, had recurring episodes of psychosis. Noting the dearth of psychiatric evidence on the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense, and the extreme difficulty in making such a determination after so many years, the court held that the defendant's speedy trial rights had been violated, reversed the last conviction and ordered dismissal of the indictment. Considering the pattern of violence characterizing the defendant since his adolescence, the court suggested that the prosecution should institute civil commitment proceedings. The court in Williams made the following analysis, which is particularly pertinent in the present case: To hold that delay occasioned by the accused's mental incompetence to stand trial always requires dismissal of his indictment would be to ignore the `rights of public justice.' On the other hand, to resume the prosecution of the accused after long delay may in some circumstances violate his rights beyond the requirements of public justice. To sustain its right to try the accused seven years after the crime, the Government must show ... that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.... Undeniably the bulk of the seven-year delay in bringing appellant to the trial which resulted in his present conviction was a direct or indirect consequence of his mental incompetency. The accused's incompetency necessarily slows the judicial process. Such delay is inevitable.... . . . . Whether or not the Government unreasonably extended the delay, we are agreed that the delay in this case was beyond the ordinary and that the extraordinary delay resulted in serious prejudice to appellant. When prosecution is delayed because of the accused's mental incapacity to stand trial, the difficulty of determining whether the accused was mentally responsible at the time of the crime is increased. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. When the fact at issue is as subtle as a mental state, the difficulty is immeasurably enhanced. Courts must on occasion risk the increased difficulty of proof. But the interest of justice requires that there be no difficulty which is reasonably avoidable. There is a duty to minimize the difficulty so that the judgment, when ultimately reached, may be relied on as the closest approach to truth of which the judicial process is capable. That duty rests upon the accused as well as upon the Governmentupon the accused because his is the burden, in the first instance of making some showing of insanity, [citations omitted]; upon the Government because it has the burden, once there has been some showing of insanity, of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was not the product of mental illness. 250 F.2d at 21-23. See also Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1968). Our law on the burden of proof on the issue of insanity at the time of the offense also places evidentiary burdens on both the prosecution and the accused: There exists in the trial of an accused a presumption of sanity. However, should the accused offer evidence that he was insane, the presumption of sanity disappears and the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense.' Syllabus Point 2, State v. Daggett, ___ W.Va. ___, 280 S.E.2d 545 (1981). Syl. pt. 3, State v. Bias, ___ W.Va. ___, 301 S.E.2d 776 (1983). Therefore, a lengthy delay in bringing the accused to trial, where, as here, the primary defense is insanity, presumptively causes prejudice to the State and to the accused in meeting their respective evidentiary burdens. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), recognizes the disadvantages to the State and the advantages to the accused that sometimes result from delay: [D]eprivation of the right [to a speedy trial] may work to the accused's advantage. Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. And it is the prosecution which carries the burden of proof. 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d at 111-12. A particular case from another state which is remarkably similar to the present case before us is People v. Von Wolfersdorf, 66 Misc.2d 904, 323 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Dutchess County Ct.1971). In that case the accused had been released from an institution for the criminally insane and committed to a civil hospital for the mentally ill, as a result of a federal habeas corpus proceeding in which the federal district court applied the same rationale employed in Jackson v. Indiana and State ex rel. Walker v. Jenkins, discussed supra in subsection II. A. of this opinion. After obtaining this relief as to type of custody, the accused subsequently in the New York state court sought dismissal of the indictment. The court denied such relief. In doing so it observed: The defendant again claims that the lapse of time between the indictment and the present date [nearly twenty years] is such that it demands a dismissal of the indictment. Admittedly, the reason for the delay in the trial is solely because of the defendant's confinement in an institution and his unavailability for trial due to his mental incompetency to stand trial. The People have not in any way caused the delay, or contributed toward it, but to the contrary are prohibited from proceeding until he is mentally capable of standing trial, ... . . . . While the defendant has been confined in [the institution for the criminally insane] and now [in the civil hospital for the mentally ill] for nearly twenty (20) years, such period is not in excess of the possible life sentence he would receive were he convicted, ... This defendant cannot be said to be deprived of a speedy trial by reason of his incompetency to stand trial [citation omitted]. 66 Misc.2d at 908, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92 (emphasis added). [7] We, too, have consistently held that `[a]n accused person, although he may have been sane at the time of the acts charged, cannot [properly] be tried, sentenced or punished while mentally incapacitated.' Syl. pt. 1, State v. Arnold, 159 W. Va. 158, 219 S.E.2d 922 (1975), overruled upon other grounds in syl. pt. 4, State v. Demastus, 165 W. Va. 572, 270 S.E.2d 649 (1980). Syl. pt. 2, State v. Swiger, ___ W.Va. ___, 336 S.E.2d 541 (1985). See also State v. Cheshire, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 292 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1982) (this bar to prosecution is a fundamental guaranty of due process); State v. Milam, 159 W. Va. 691, 697, 226 S.E.2d 433, 438 (1976). Being a bar to trial, an accused's incompetency to stand trial, regardless of the duration thereof, will not, as a matter of due process, ordinarily require dismissal of an indictment for a felony. The State must, however, show that the accused suffered no substantial prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay attendant to the attainment of competency to stand trial. [8] Our holding on this point is consistent with W.Va.R.Crim.P. 48(b), which provides in pertinent part: If ... there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment.... [9] The delay which is inherent in the attainment of competency to stand trial by an incompetent accused is not an unnecessary delay, but a constitutionally required delay. In this case, the bulk of the delay prior to the trial in 1980 was due to the defendant's numerous and, in a couple of instances, very lengthy escapes from the state mental hospitals. The delay after 1980 was due to appeal of the conviction and reevaluation of the defendant's competency to stand trial. The primary defense here is insanity at the time of the alleged crime. The State has the burden of proof on the issue of insanity; the passage of time has likely prejudiced the State in carrying this burden. The defendant also has evidentiary burdens with respect to the insanity defense, and the eighteen-year delay here presumptively has prejudiced the defendant's ability to present such defense. Prior to trial the State must show, and the trial court must find, that any substantial prejudice to the defendant's ability to present his insanity defense was not attributable to the State. [10]