Opinion ID: 3039629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The January 16, February 4, and February 7

Text: Citations are Supported by Substantial Evidence Finally, Cumberland argues that the January 16, February 4, and February 7 citations are not supported by substantial evidence. As the foregoing discussion indicates, we disagree. The ALJ summarized the evidence that supported MSHA’s conclusion that the ventilation system was not functioning properly on January 16.15 Cumberland I, 27 15 “The January 16 ventilation survey confirmed that neither BEP 30A, nor BEP 30, were providing reliable or useful information as to what was occurring in a substantial and important part of the LW49 bleeder system, the #2 entry, and the #3 entry and adjacent rubble zone.... There was virtually no air flow from the #3 tailgate entry into the #2 entry inby the #83 crosscut. The pressure differential and air flow in the #2 entry and the adjacent #3 entry was outby from the #88 crosscut, and there were high methane concentrations in those areas. While the methane that was actually in the #2 entry would be moved outby through BEP 30A into the bleeder entry, the flow in the #3 entry and the adjacent rubble zone would have been toward the face, because the overall pressure differential from the #87 to the #83 crosscut was in that direction. The bleeder system was not moving methane in that substantial portion of the worked-out area away from the 28 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 314. In affirming, the Commission noted that, “MSHA’s survey results indicated that the methane-air mixture in the back corner on the tailgate side of LW49 was not emerging from the inby BEPs. In essence, the back corner of the tailgate was dead airspace.” Cumberland II, 28 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 554. The Commission correctly concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the January 16 citation, since “a reasonably prudent person would have recognized that the bleeder system failed to continuously dilute and move the methane-air mixture from the worked-out area away from the active workings.” Id. Likewise, the ALJ found that LW49's “bleeder system was ineffective on February 4 and 7” and upheld the citations issued on those dates. Cumberland I, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 327. Commissioner Young, supported by Commissioner Jordan, effectively affirmed 16 the holding that Cumberland had violated section 75.334(b)(1) on February 4 and 7, because, in his view, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.17 Cumberland II, 28 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 558-59. active workings.” Cumberland I, 27 FMSHRC at 314. 16 See note 9, supra. 17 Commissioner Young pointed to, inter alia, sudden increases in methane concentrations at or near the explosive range that were detected at the monitoring point at crosscut 85 in the No. 2 tailgate entry, sudden and significant methane increases detected at other monitoring points along the panel’s 29 Though the dissenting Commissioners disagreed, id. at 564, we conclude that the ALJ and Commissioners Young and Jordan were correct in their assessment of the record. For example, the ALJ recounted the following evidence: On both dates, there was a sudden and substantial rise in methane concentrations, not just at the #85 crosscut monitoring point, but virtually throughout the tailgate side of the bleeder system.[18] Cumberland argues that [the MSHA inspector] issued the orders and citations solely because of the readings at the #85 crosscut monitoring point. While he testified to that effect, Cumberland reads too much into his responses to specific leading questions on crossexamination. I find that the better interpretation of his responses was that the crosscut #85 readings were the precipitating factors for issuance of the orders and citations. His testimony, as a whole, evidences that he was tailgate side, and the testimony of MSHA’s expert. Cumberland II, 28 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 559-60. 18 The ALJ also noted that the inspector’s “evaluations of the danger and the effectiveness of the bleeder system on February 4 and 7 were virtually the same, i.e., he was concerned that explosive levels of methane might be coming out onto the face where a number of ignition sources were present.” Cumberland I, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 325. 30 concerned as much about the sudden rise in methane readings within the system, and the absence of any immediate explanation for them, as he was about the crosscut #85 readings themselves. He also considered the unfolding events with an understanding that the bleeder system was fragile. Cumberland I, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 326. The above-quoted portion of the ALJ’s decision addresses imminent danger orders that are not before us on appeal, but it also pertains to the February 4 and 7 citations. Although the imminent danger orders were ultimately vacated, that does not mean that the facts found by the ALJ are irrelevant to the propriety of the February citations. On the contrary, though the standard for issuing a citation is different than that for issuing an imminent danger order, the facts are still the facts, and the facts here were sufficient to justify the issuance of the section 75.334(b)(1) citations on February 4 and 7, even if they could not support imminent danger orders.