Opinion ID: 2831116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Multiple Conspiracies v. Single Conspiracy

Text: Turning now to the jury charge, the Defendants argue that the district court erred in declining to give a multiple conspiracies instruction. Similarly, they argue that the indictment varied from the government's case at trial, as the indictment charged only a single conspiracy. Jury Instruction This court reviews a district court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction of this nature for abuse of discretion. United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 139 (1st Cir. 2008). The trial court's failure to give a proffered instruction will not be reversed unless that instruction is (1) substantively correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually given; and (3) concerned an important point such that the failure to give it seriously undermined the defendant's ability to present a particular defense. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this third requirement, reversal is not required unless a defendant suffers substantial prejudice. Id. Here, the Defendants requested that the district court instruct the jury that it was possible to find that multiple conspiracies existed in this case, since, according to the Defendants, the evidence indicated that the Defendants were - 83 - involved in different schemes within their individual housing projects.39 The court declined, noting that besides the fact that the Defendants had not submitted any proposed jury instructions for the court to consider, the evidence did not support giving the instruction in any event.40 A trial court should grant a defendant's request for a multiple conspiracy instruction if, on the evidence adduced at 39 Apparently the Defendants did not actually submit a proposed instruction to the court. But generally, a defendant's proposed multiple-conspiracies instruction would go something like this: Where persons have joined together to further one common unlawful design or purpose, a single conspiracy exists. By way of contrast, multiple conspiracies exist when there are separate unlawful agreements to achieve distinct purposes. In deciding whether a single overall conspiracy as charged in the indictment has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt you should look at whether there were multiple agreements reached, whether there were additions or withdrawals of alleged conspirators, and most significantly, whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the alleged conspirators directed their efforts toward the accomplishment of a common goal or overall plan. See, e.g., United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 449 n.68 (1st Cir. 1994) (alterations omitted). 40 While the government suggested at oral argument that it opposed a multiple-conspiracies instruction, the written record is silent on whether the government objected to the Defendants' request for the instruction. - 84 - trial, a reasonable jury could find more than one such illicit agreement, or could find an agreement different from the one charged. United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 449 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, [a] single conspiracy exists where the totality of the evidence demonstrates that all of the alleged co-conspirators directed their efforts towards the accomplishment of a common goal or overall plan. Id. at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted). Determining the number of conspiracies in a particular case depends on a variety of factors including the nature, design, implementation, and logistics of the illegal activity; the participants' modus operandi; the relevant geography; and the scope of coconspirator involvement. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Problematic for the Defendants is that even if we assume without deciding that the district court should have given the instruction, they have not shown us how they suffered substantial prejudice from the court's failure to do so. In the context of alleged multiple conspiracies, the defendant's main concern is that jurors will be misled into attributing guilt to a particular defendant based on evidence presented against others who were involved in a different and separate conspiratorial scheme. Id. The prejudice we must guard against, therefore, is evidentiary spillover resulting from trying defendants en masse for distinct and separate offenses committed by others. Id. Thus, while the - 85 - Defendants insist that the evidence showed the existence of an individual conspiracy within each housing project, and that the Defendants' conduct went to benefit those smaller conspiracies and not La ONU, the prejudice we examine is not whether a defendant's conduct might be attributable to a different conspiracy, but rather, whether the conduct of a person from that different conspiracy would be attributable to the defendant. The Defendants do not at all address this prejudice standard; nor do they provide any developed argument as to what specific conduct of other drug dealers (who were involved in other drug conspiracies) might have been attributed to them, such that the jury would not have convicted them without such evidence.41 To the extent the Defendants intended to argue that all the drug-trafficking activities that came up at trial must be attributed to an organization other than La ONU (with the reason being that La ONU did not engage in its own drug trafficking), we have already rejected their position that La ONU was not a drug-trafficking conspiracy. The Defendants continuously overlook the overwhelming The only specific conduct the Defendants point out is a 41 couple of murders committed by a person named El Jincho. They claim that Jincho acted on his own in committing those murders and that they were not La ONU-sanctioned. However, the Defendants do not explain why we should assume that Jincho was not acting on La ONU's behalf. As they conceded earlier in their brief, there was trial testimony that Jincho was a La ONU leader and that he ordered that at least one of the murders be committed in retaliation for someone stealing drugs from the organization. - 86 - evidence that members of La ONU-controlled housing projects collaborated with each other for the benefit of the greater La ONU good. As we concluded above in our discussion of the RICO count, the evidence convincingly indicates the existence of a single, unified conspiracy in which all the defendants participated. See Brandon, 17 F.3d at 450. Variance In a similar vein, we reject the Defendants' argument that the trial evidence impermissibly varied from the indicted charges. A variance occurs when the crime charged remains unaltered, but the evidence adduced at trial proves different facts than those alleged in the indictment. United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 116 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a defendant asserts a claim of variance premised on the notion that multiple conspiracies existed and that his activities were not part of the charged conspiracy, the initial question is one of evidentiary sufficiency. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). And we have already explained that the evidence was sufficient to find these Defendants guilty of the single La ONU conspiracy. On to the last issue.