Opinion ID: 499041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing to Seek Declaratory Relief

Text: 47 If Haase establishes the existence of the policy, he will have standing to seek declaratory relief if he can show that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of his experience. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109, 103 S.Ct. at 1669. 48 Lyons held that a plaintiff who had been subjected to an allegedly unlawful chokehold lacked standing to seek an injunction against the police department's use of chokeholds. Lyons' standing depended on his ability to show a likelihood of future harm. 461 U.S. at 105, 103 S.Ct. at 1667. Lyons, however, could not prove he would be stopped by the police again, and if stopped, subjected to an illegal chokehold. Id. at 105, 103 S.Ct. at 1667. 49 In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), plaintiffs sought an injunction against various claimed unconstitutional practices of the Philadelphia police department. The Court held that the plaintiffs had not established standing; no injury was made out by allegations concerning what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the future because of that known policeman's perception of departmental disciplinary procedures. 423 U.S. at 372, 96 S.Ct. at 605. 50 Finally, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), held that plaintiffs who sought to enjoin allegedly unconstitutional practices of state judges lacked standing. There was no evidence that the named plaintiffs would again be subject to the practices complained of. The claimed future injury--that plaintiffs might violate the law, might be charged, might be tried before the defendants, and might be subjected again to discriminatory practices--was speculative and conjectural. 414 U.S. at 497, 94 S.Ct. at 676. 51 Although Lyons and its predecessors involved injunctive relief, whereas Haase seeks declaratory relief, we do not distinguish Lyons on this basis. Lyons did not have standing because he failed to establish a sufficient likelihood of future injury. 461 U.S. at 105, 103 S.Ct. at 1667. This conclusion, premised on the injury requirement of Article III, would not be affected by the form of relief requested. Lyons cites cases dealing both with injunctive and with declaratory relief. 461 U.S. at 102-05, 103 S.Ct. at 1665-67. For example, the Court found Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969), which dealt with standing to seek a declaratory judgment, directly apposite. 461 U.S. at 104, 103 S.Ct. at 1666. 52 Lyons, Rizzo, and O'Shea define the threshold test that Haase must meet. A common thread binds these cases: more than a nebulous assertion of the existence of a policy is required to establish standing. The plaintiffs must not only demonstrate its existence but also that they are likely to be subjected to the policy again. Here, Haase may be able to satisfy this requirement. If he proves that the policy exists, that he is likely to travel again to Nicaragua, and that he is likely to be subjected to the policy upon his return, then the threat of repetition will be established. 53 Finally, the threat of repetition must be sufficiently real and immediate, Golden, 394 U.S. at 109, 89 S.Ct. at 960, to meet Article III's injury requirement. Otherwise stated, the threat must be realistic[ ]. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109, 103 S.Ct. at 1669. Although Golden's immediacy requirement is partly related to the likelihood of future injury (cf. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 104, 103 S.Ct. at 1666), it is also a temporal limitation. Zwickler's vague claim that the former Congressman might be a candidate again sometime in the future, 394 U.S. at 109, 89 S.Ct. at 960, was too remote and speculative to establish standing. Similarly, it will not do for Haase to assert generally that he might one day return to Nicaragua. More immediate and concrete plans are necessary.