Opinion ID: 2902089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Butler’s Ineffective Assistance Claim

Text: We also granted a COA on Butler’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and raise: (1) Butler’s competence to stand trial, and (2) mitigation evidence regarding Butler’s mental state during the penalty phase of his capital trial. The district court rejected this claim as procedurally defaulted. See Butler, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 828. The claim was not raised in Butler’s initial state habeas proceeding and, relying on then-current precedent, the district court held that Butler could make no claim for ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel for failure to raise the ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Id. at 829–30 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752–53 (1991) (holding there is no constitutional right to an attorney, much less an effective attorney, in state post-conviction proceedings) and Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 241 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[I]neffective assistance of habeas counsel cannot provide cause for a procedural default.”)). After the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that defendants convicted in Texas may attempt to demonstrate that the ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel is cause for failure to raise an IATC claim during state habeas proceedings. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 25 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 26 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 1318–19 (2012) (holding habeas petitioners may show cause for such default in specific circumstances in states that require petitioners to raise IATC claims in initial state habeas proceedings, rather than on direct appeal); Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1915, 1921 (holding Martinez applies to inmates convicted in Texas, because Texas functionally requires petitioners to raise IATC claims in initial state habeas proceedings). Therefore, if Butler’s IATC claim has been procedurally defaulted, whether Butler can show cause and prejudice under the new standards of Martinez and Trevino must be ascertained.
When considering state prisoners’ habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts may not consider the merits of claims that have been dismissed by state courts on state-law procedural grounds which are adequate and independent of the federal, constitutional merits of the claims. See Balentine v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 842, 851 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729). Therefore, the first question we must answer is whether the TCCA’s dismissal of Buter’s IATC claim was based on such an adequate and independent state-law ground, or whether the TCCA’s dismissal of that claim is interwoven with federal law such that a federal court may review it on the merits. If this claim has been procedurally defaulted, Butler must also show cause and prejudice for his failure to present this claim in his first state habeas application. Butler presented the IATC claim in his second state application for habeas corpus. After the state trial court denied Butler’s IATC claim, along with his second habeas application, the TCCA dismissed the claim. Ex parte Butler, No. 41,121-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2004) (unpublished). In doing so, the TCCA found Butler’s Atkins claim in his second state petition “satisfie[d] the requirements of Article 11.071 § 5(a), TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.,” 26 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 27 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 but that “[t]he remaining allegations [in his petition did] not satisfy an exception and [were] dismissed as an abuse of the writ.” Id. at 2. The TCCA’s unpublished order thus dismissed Butler’s IATC claim without specifying whether it did so based on “a state-law procedural ground,” or on the merits in a manner dependent on federal law. See Rocha v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 2010). If the TCCA’s rejection of Butler’s claim was based “on a state procedural rule, and that procedural rule provides an independent and adequate ground for dismissal” apart from the federal, constitutional merits of the claim, that claim has been procedurally defaulted. Id. at 820–21; Canales, 765 F.3d at 564. In this case, Butler claims the TCCA dismissed his IATC claim “based on a state procedural ground that was not independent of the merits of [his] constitutional claim[].” 13 When, as here, “the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the [state court] opinion,” this court must attempt to discern the grounds on which a claim was dismissed. See Canales, 765 F.3d at 564 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983)). Unless it “fairly appear[s] that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal grounds,” we do not accept as “the most reasonable explanation . . . that the state judgment rested on federal grounds.” Id. (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 737). Instead, we look beyond the dismissal order: When the dismissal is silent, this [c]ourt looks to the arguments made in state court to try to determine whether the dismissal was based on independent and adequate state law or whether instead it relied on or was interwoven with federal law. 13 No one disputes that a dismissal for “abuse of the writ” by the TCCA constitutes an adequate basis for decision. “A procedural rule is adequate when it is ‘firmly established and regularly followed,’ even if there is an occasional aberrant state court decision.” Balentine, 626 F.3d at 856 (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1991)). “We have previously held that the [TCCA] regularly enforces the Section 5(a) requirements.” Id. at 856–57. 27 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 28 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 Id. at 565 (citation omitted) (quoting Balentine, 626 F.3d at 854–56). Interpreting the TCCA’s “boilerplate dismissal for an abuse of the writ” is complicated because it did so under Section 5 of Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and any of the three grounds for dismissal of subsequent writs in § 5(a) may involve merits determinations that are not independent of federal law. 14 Id.; see also, e.g., Rocha, 626 F.3d at 835–39; Balentine, 626 F.3d at 854–55. Only § 5(a)(1) and (3) are relevant here, since Butler does not challenge his guilt through his IATC claim. See Balentine, 626 F.3d at 855 (noting § 5(a)(2) was “inapplicable” when a petitioner alleged ineffective investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence). We have previously noted that, in attempting to determine whether a subsequent application is barred under § 5(a)(1), the TCCA engages in a two-step analysis. The TCCA asks whether: 1) the factual or legal basis for an applicant’s current claims [were] unavailable as to all of his previous applications; and 2) the specific facts alleged, if established, would constitute a constitutional violation that would likely require relief from either the conviction or sentence. Id. at 853 (quoting Ex parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). At the first step, dismissing a claim because its factual or legal basis was previously available would be a determination based on adequate and independent state procedural grounds. Id. Dismissing a claim that cannot satisfy the second step of the analysis would involve a “question of federal constitutional law.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the TCCA’s order was silent, only specifying that Butler’s claims were dismissed for failing to “satisfy an exception.” Therefore, as in Balentine, 14 The available “exceptions” are contained within Article 11.071 § 5(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 28 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 29 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 Butler “would have needed to present sufficient specific facts to support one of the following” in his second state habeas petition in order for it to fairly appear to us that the TCCA’s dismissal of this claim was interwoven with its federal merits: (1) the [IATC claim] ha[s] not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously considered application filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the factual or legal basis for the [IATC] claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application; .... (3) by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the state’s favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury in the applicant’s trial under Article 37.071, 37.0711, or 37.072. Id. at 855 (citing § 5(a)(1), (3)). Butler argued in his second state habeas petition that his IATC claim should be considered because he was prevented from conveying necessary facts to his state habeas counsel due to his incompetence at the time the first petition was filed. Butler also argued that his incompetence destroyed the attorneyclient relationship under agency principles, such that his first state habeas petition was not effective. Butler did not cite any authority directly on point for the latter argument. To support his argument that incompetence should prevent procedural default of state habeas claims, Butler cited Ex parte Mines, in which the TCCA held that it was neither constitutionally nor statutorily required that a death-row habeas petitioner “be competent to assist his counsel in filing an application for habeas corpus relief.” 26 S.W.3d 910, 911, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc). In Ex parte Mines, the TCCA appeared to leave open the possibility that a petitioner’s “alleged incompetency might be grounds for the untimely raising of an issue if it could not have been raised earlier 29 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 30 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 because of that incompetency.” Id. at 916 (quoting People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 414 (Cal. 1992)); see also id. at 916 n.33 (collecting cases on either side of this issue). Butler argued this portion of the opinion supported considering his IATC claim on the merits, despite its omission from his first habeas petition. As in Balentine, we do not believe the TCCA “silently accepted one or more” of Butler’s novel arguments to disregard the prior availability of his IATC claim “and then, with equal silence, reached the merits of his [IATC] claim” before rejecting it on the merits, again, in silence. Balentine, 626 F.3d at 855. To state a claim for relief under § 5(a)(3), Butler would have had to show that his IATC claim made him “ineligible for the death penalty,” along the lines of the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception in federal habeas law, or potentially that “no rational juror would have answered the mitigation special issue in the State’s favor” absent the claimed IATC error. Id. at 856 (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), Rocha, 619 F.3d at 402–03, and Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151, 159–60, 161 n.42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). As in Balentine, the TCCA’s order here did not appear to “reach the merits of . . . ineligibility for the death penalty.” Id. Butler’s IATC claim in his second state habeas petition thus did not meet the requirements for either § 5(a)(1) or (3). Accordingly, we hold that the TCCA rejected Butler’s IATC claim based on adequate and independent state grounds and that Butler’s IATC claim was procedurally defaulted. See id. at 855–56.
Although Butler procedurally defaulted his IATC claim, he argues he can demonstrate cause and prejudice for the default and that this court should remand the IATC claim to the district court to determine whether it has “some merit” under Martinez and Trevino. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318 (“To overcome [procedural] default, a prisoner must also demonstrate that the 30 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 31 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 underlying [IATC] claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” (citing Miller–El, 537 U.S. 322)). We have previously remanded cases for further proceedings when the district court or this court initially rejected IATC claims as procedurally defaulted before Martinez and Trevino were decided. See, e.g., Ibarra v. Stephens, 723 F.3d 599, 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (vacating a prior panel decision, granting a COA on an IATC claim, and remanding to the district court for further proceedings on that claim); Cantu v. Thaler, 682 F.3d 1053, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 2012) (vacating an earlier decision dismissing a federal habeas petition and underlying IATC claim as procedurally defaulted and remanding to the district court to “decide in the first instance the impact of Martinez v. Ryan on [the petitioner’s] contention that he had cause for his procedural default”). 15 We have declined to remand such cases when petitioners have not presented at least “debatable” ineffective assistance claims, 16 under AEDPA’s heightened standard when a state habeas court initially reviewed and rejected the ineffective assistance claims, 17 or when a district court had already 15See also Neathery v. Stephens, 746 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 2014) (remanding for a reconsideration of IATC claims under Martinez and Trevino and instructing the district court to determine whether any claims were preserved and if so, the merits of those claims); Ayestas v. Stephens, 553 F. App’x 422, 423 (5th Cir. 2014) (similar); Rayford v. Stephens, 552 F. App’x 367, 368 (5th Cir. 2014) (similarly remanding “for full reconsideration” under Trevino and Martinez, after briefing but before any opinion had been issued); Washington v. Stephens, 551 F. App’x 122, 123 (5th Cir. 2014) (granting COA on IATC claim and remanding for reconsideration in light of Trevino). 16 Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 774 n.11 (5th Cir.) (denying a COA and collecting cases that declined to remand in similar circumstances), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014). 17Escamilla v. Stephens, 602 F. App’x 939, 940 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. petition filed, No. 14-9844 (May 18, 2015). 31 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 32 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 considered and dismissed the petitioner’s claim on the merits. 18 Butler’s IATC claim is dissimilar to the claims in Reed, Escamilla, Newbury, and similar cases because no court has yet considered the merits of the claim or whether Butler may show cause and prejudice under Martinez and Trevino. In this case, we conclude that the trial court should, in the first instance, be allowed to apply Martinez in accordance with Trevino to determine whether Butler can demonstrate cause for his procedural default and whether his claims have some merit under Martinez. See Ibarra, 723 F.3d at 600; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. We therefore VACATE the district court’s dismissal of Claim 2 of Butler’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—Butler’s IATC claim—and REMAND this claim for further consideration. 19