Opinion ID: 4535302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hyde Amendment Application

Text: Following that dismissal, Reyes-Romero timely applied to the District Court for attorney’s fees and costs under the Hyde Amendment. 7 Relying heavily on the findings in the Court’s 6 After the dismissal, DHS officers served Reyes-Romero with an NTA, initiating new removal proceedings in Immigration Court. Before the IJ, Reyes-Romero conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, CAT relief, and cancellation of removal. The IJ denied his applications and ordered him removed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. His petition for review before the Sixth Circuit remains pending. Reyes-Romero v. Barr, No. 1903784 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2019). 7 Hyde Amendment awards are subject to “the procedures and limitations . . . under section 2412 of title 28,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app., one of which is that the application must be filed “within thirty days of final judgment,” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). That thirty-day deadline “begins when the government’s right to appeal the order has lapsed.” Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, the District Court granted Reyes-Romero’s motion to dismiss the indictment on July 2, 2018; the Government’s window to appeal closed on August 1, 2018, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(B); and Reyes-Romero moved for a Hyde Amendment award on August 7, 2018. 17 opinion resolving the parties’ motions to dismiss, ReyesRomero argued the Government had pursued an “egregious” prosecution that was “vexatious, frivolous, [and] in bad faith.” App. 1052–53 (citation omitted). The District Court awarded Reyes-Romero fees and costs, a decision it reached in five steps: First, because the Government did not appeal the order resolving the motions to dismiss, the Court deemed any “findings and conclusions in that . . . Opinion and Order final.” App. 4. Second, the Court determined that in assessing “the position of the United States,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app., it would consider not only “the litigation position of the [Department of Justice (DOJ)] through th[e] . . . U.S. Attorney’s Office” but also “the actions taken (or not taken) by the federal agency upon which the criminal case is based”—that is, DHS, including “the actions of DHS Officers in 2011.” App. 26–27. Third, borrowing a phrase used in the indictment, the Court deemed the deficiencies in Reyes-Romero’s immigration forms so apparent that it was “frivolous” for the Government to prosecute him on the ground that he “had been previously . . . removed from the United States pursuant to law.” App. 31 (citation omitted). Fourth, although the Court acknowledged that the Government’s arguments on § 1326(d)(3)’s prejudice requirement “did not brush up against any prosecutorial misconduct” and “were largely reasonable and based in law,” it reasoned that “this ‘good’ . . . [does not] sufficiently outweigh[] the ‘bad.’” App. 42. Finally, the Court found that the Government’s behavior “before and during the criminal prosecution . . . demonstrated conscious wrongdoing,” making the prosecution one brought “in bad faith” under the Amendment. App. 28. So the Court ordered the Government to pay Reyes-Romero’s costs 18 and attorney’s fees, which it later calculated as $73,757.00. This appeal followed.