Opinion ID: 1057914
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State v. Layman

Text: Melissa Ann Layman1 (“Layman”) and Ginger R. Powers (“Powers”) began a romantic relationship in 1999 and lived together intermittently over the next several years. Unfortunately, their relationship was marked by several incidents of domestic violence. On July 7, 2003, Layman and Powers had a physical altercation that resulted in Powers’ death. According to Layman, Powers was jealous of Layman’s ex-husband and began an argument. Layman contends that she attempted to retreat from the argument but Powers pursued her and made repeated threats to kill her. Powers then began to hit Layman in the face and head. Layman relates the remainder of the struggle as follows: I told her that I was going to call the police and she went into a rage saying she was not going to jail again. Then she said she was going to get a knife and kill me. She continued to hit me and pull my hair. I started struggling with her and we fell off the bed still fighting. . . . She kept hitting my head against the floor . . . . As we rolled around the floor fighting my hand touched a cord that was laying on the floor. I 1 The defendant spells her surname “Laymon.” W e adopt the spelling “Layman” as used in the indictment and in accordance with the policy adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals. -2- grabbed the cord and it went around her neck. We continued to struggle and then she was just still. Layman then left the house and did not tell anyone what had happened. On July 9, 2003, two days after Powers’ death, Layman returned to her home and moved Powers’ body to a different room.2 The next day, Layman told her family what had happened, and they contacted the police. An autopsy revealed that Powers died of asphyxiation resulting from “blunt traumatic injury to the nasal bone.” There was no evidence of strangulation. The prosecutor later informed the doctor performing the autopsy that a cord had been placed around Powers’ neck. The doctor informed the prosecutor that strangulation was not inconsistent with his findings because of the state of decomposition of the body. On August 5, 2003, a grand jury indicted Layman for voluntary manslaughter and reckless homicide. Layman and the State reached a plea agreement in which it was agreed that Layman would plead guilty to reckless homicide and that proceedings against her would be diverted pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-15-105 (2006).3 Under the plea agreement, the State agreed to nolle prosequi4 the voluntary manslaughter charge. The nolle prosequi provision was essential to the plea agreement because Layman would be ineligible for pretrial diversion if the voluntary manslaughter charge remained. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105(a)(1)(B)(iii)(j) (2006). At the first of two hearings regarding the plea agreement, the trial court expressed reluctance to allow pretrial diversion of a case in which violence resulted in the loss of life. At the second hearing, the trial court formally rejected the plea agreement. The parties then filed an application for pretrial diversion and a supporting memorandum of understanding. The memorandum of understanding included a “notice”5 of nolle prosequi regarding the voluntary manslaughter charge. In the “notice” of nolle prosequi, the district attorney stated that the “State cannot prove knowing killing as opposed to recklessness.” At the resulting hearings, the prosecutor continued to assert that the State could not prove the mental element of the voluntary manslaughter charge. The trial court expressed its view of a judge’s role in reviewing a nolle prosequi stating, “I have to accept a nolle prosequi . . . unless I know there is clear and convincing evidence that the activity in the indictment [is] such that . . . the defendant may constitute a danger 2 Layman’s statement does not provide an explanation for moving the body. The prosecutor stated that Layman moved the body in the hope that it would be more easily discovered in another room. 3 No significant changes have occurred in the language of the pertinent provisions of the statute since 2003 when the offense was allegedly committed. 4 “The Latin phrase ‘nolle prosequi’ literally means ‘I am unwilling to prosecute.’” State v. Harris, 33 S.W .3d 767, 769 n.3 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (N.D. Cal. 1984)). This Court has defined nolle prosequi as the formal entry of record in which the district attorney general terminates the prosecution of a case. Id. 5 Because, as discussed below, a prosecutor’s request to nolle prosequi requires permission of the court, we will treat the “notice” as a motion to nolle prosequi. -3- to the community.” The trial court later stated, “I cannot find by clear and convincing evidence that this woman would again constitute a threat to the community because I do not think that is [the case] here. It is just the opposite.” However, at the final hearing on the matter, the trial court expressed a concern for the precedent that would be set by allowing diversion and a desire to assure the public that the courts take seriously the “taking of life.” As a result, the trial court rejected the request to nolle prosequi, concluding that it would be in the “manifest best interest of the general public” to have the voluntary manslaughter charge tried by a jury. At the March 3, 2004 hearing, the trial court engaged in a prolonged and wide-ranging exchange with several members of Powers’ family. The family members’ statements contained hearsay, were not made under oath, and were not subject to cross-examination. Counsel for Layman moved to have the family members’ statements stricken from the record, and the trial court rejected the motion. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court allowed unidentified people to express opinions regarding the facts of the case, the threat Layman poses to society, and appropriate methods of punishment. None of those who offered statements were placed under oath or cross-examined. At the final hearing on the matter, the trial court discussed at length the standard for rejecting a nolle prosequi with the attorney for Powers’ family, who argued vigorously that the charges against Layman should not be diverted. On appeal, both the State and Layman argued that the trial court erred by rejecting the nolle prosequi of the voluntary manslaughter charge. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the prosecutor’s assessment that the evidence was insufficient to prove voluntary manslaughter. Furthermore, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that due to the seriousness of the crime of voluntary manslaughter, “the dismissal of the indictment is clearly contrary to the manifest public interest” and, therefore, held that the trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss the voluntary manslaughter charge. In addition, Layman argued that the trial court denied Layman’s due process right to a fair hearing by considering the opinions and arguments of Powers’ family members and their attorney. The Court of Criminal Appeals examined article I, section 35 of the Tennessee Constitution, which guarantees victims of crime “[t]he right to be heard, when relevant, at all critical stages of the criminal justice process as defined by the General Assembly.” Finding that the hearings in question were “critical stages of the criminal justice process,” the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the statements of Powers’ family were consistent with the purposes of the Victims’ Bill of Rights.6 The Court of Criminal Appeals also found significance in the fact that the trial court did not consider the statements of the various family members as evidence or rely upon the pleadings filed by their attorney. The Court of Criminal Appeals therefore rejected Layman’s due process argument and affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects. 6 Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-38-101 to -406 (2006). No significant changes have occurred in the language of the pertinent provisions of the statute since 2003 when the offense was allegedly committed. -4-