Opinion ID: 2071519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Uniformity Directive

Text: On January 15, 1998, the Attorney General issued its most recent amendments to the plea agreement Guidelines. Those amendments resulted from this Court's mandate in State v. Gerns, 145 N.J. 216, 678 A. 2d 634 (1996). In Gerns, supra, this Court heard arguments on the issue of impermissible sentencing disparities under the Attorney General's Guidelines. Id. at 231, 678 A. 2d 634. Although specifically addressing the question of whether a defendant who signs a plea agreement calling for cooperation in state investigations can satisfy that agreement by good faith efforts that produce nothing of value to the State, the Court noted the significance of the defendant's disparity claims: [T]he arguments and the statistical data proffered in support of the claim of sentencing disparity are impressive.... [T]he indicia of grave sentencing disparities are sufficient to engender a concern over the potential for sentencing disparity. That concern must be addressed in light of the Code's overriding commitment to assuring uniformity in criminal sentencing.... [ Id. at 231, 678 A. 2d 634.] Furthermore, in remanding on the primary issue in the case and in anticipation of the defendant's resentencing, the Court urged the prosecutor and the trial court in the exercise of their respective discretion to be especially mindful of the problem that is posed by the potential of disparity. Id. at 232, 678 A. 2d 634. However, the Court chose not to resolve the disparity issue in the context of that case and instead directed the Attorney General to undertake a review of statewide sentencing practices and experience under the Guidelines and to furnish the Court with the results of that review. Id. at 232, 678 A. 2d 634. The Attorney General promulgated the Uniformity Directive in response to that command. Uniformity Directive, supra, § I. The Uniformity Directive acknowledges that sentencing disparity is reflected in the range of sentences contemplated by standardized plea offers that have been promulgated by the twenty-one county prosecutors. Ibid. The Directive also recognizes that, in some counties, defendants charged with a third-degree school zone offense are routinely sentenced to an eighteen-month period of parole ineligibility, while in other counties, similarly situated individuals receive 364 days in county jail as a condition of probation. Ibid. Furthermore, when parole laws and early release practices are taken into account, that latter sentence may be reduced to as little as ninety days of incarceration, which some counties even allow defendants to serve solely on nights or weekends. Ibid. The Uniformity Directive notes that parole laws account for much of the disparity highlighted in Gerns, supra . However, the Directive also argues that, because of differences in resources and in the nature of the drug problem in different counties, it is neither possible nor desirable to achieve absolute statewide uniformity in plea negotiation practices. Ibid. As a result, the Uniformity Directive, unanimously approved by the County Prosecutors' Association, seeks to restrict the range of permissible sentencing outcomes, but only by establishing a new base minimum plea offer. Ibid. The Directive provides that Section II.3 of the 1992 Guidelines is superseded to the extent that it conflicts with Section III of the current Directive. Id. § II. Whereas Section II.3 states that the minimum period of parole ineligibility for a school zone offense shall be probation conditioned on 364 days in jail, the new Section III requires that the minimum parole ineligibility term for an offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 shall be one year. Id. § III. Similarly, for violations involving less than one ounce of marijuana, Section II.3 of the 1992 Guidelines provides that a prison term may be waived entirely, while Section III of the Uniformity Directive states that the standardized plea offer may not be less than 364 days of incarceration as a condition of probation. Ibid. Although the Uniformity Directive succeeds in raising the base minimum plea offer for a school zone offense, the Directive does no more to promote uniformity in plea agreement policies. Section III clearly states: Nothing in this Directive shall be construed to preclude a county prosecutor from establishing and implementing a plea policy that provides standardized offers ... with a period of parole ineligibility greater than one year. Id. § III. Furthermore, the Directive maintains that [e]xcept as expressly provided, ... all of the provisions of the previously-issued Attorney General plea directives ... shall remain in full force and effect. Id. § IV. Therefore, despite the Directive's attempts to address disparity, Section II.4 of the 1992 Guidelines remains in effect and the Directive continues to allow for varying plea policies among the counties.
In the Vasquez/Lagares line of cases, we noted that disparate sentencing fails to comport with the Legislature's intent, in enacting the Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 to 98-4 and the CDRA, that there be uniformity in sentencing. Sentencing uniformity is one of the fundamental goals of the Code of Criminal Justice (Code). The Legislature lists among the purposes of the sentencing provisions of the Code the intent to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment, and to give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on conviction of an offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2. State v. Roth , the first case to address in detail the standards that guide sentencing under the Code, stated, [i]t is our view that the Code established an entirely new sentencing process. It displaced standards established under prior decisional law, created presumptive terms of imprisonment, and limited the discretionary power of sentencing courts. 95 N.J. 334, 340, 471 A. 2d 370 (1984). The Court continued, [t]he central theme of the Code's sentencing reforms is the replacement of the unfettered sentencing discretion of prior law with a structured discretion designed to foster less arbitrary and more equal sentences. Id. at 345, 471 A. 2d 370. The Court emphasized that the paramount goal of sentencing reform was greater uniformity. Id. at 369, 471 A. 2d 370. In State v. Hodge, the Court repeated these sentiments. 95 N.J. 369, 471 A. 2d 389 (1984). The Court in that case stated that there can be no justice without a predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing. We must not forget that the driving force behind sentence reform was the tragic disparity in sentences inflicted upon defendants under the old model. Hodge, supra, 95 N.J. at 379, 471 A. 2d 389. Governor Brendan Byrne, upon signing the new law, also commented, [t]he Criminal Code is intended to make sentencing more definitive.... It is designed to reduce the possibility of one judge giving a stiff sentence and another a light sentence for similar crimes. Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 354, 471 A. 2d 370 (citing Statement of Gov. Byrne (Aug. 10, 1978)). To meet those goals, the Code offers specific sentencing instruction to judges, including detailed guidelines and rules. In particular, the Code provides for a range of permissible sentences for each degree of crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a); certain mandatory minimum punishments, such as under the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c); the imposition of a mandatory extended term of imprisonment for certain crimes within specified permissible ranges, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a); a presumption of imprisonment for all first and second degree offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d); a list of specific aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered in sentencing, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a),(b); a list of authorized sentencing dispositions, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2; and a list of the grounds upon which a defendant must be sentenced to a mandatory extended term, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3. While the Code still affords discretion to individual judges in deciding among different factors and choosing a sentence within a permissible range, that discretion is guided by specific standards which apply on a uniform, statewide basis. Consistent with this statutory scheme, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged the dominance, if not paramountcy, of uniformity as one of the Code's premier sentencing goals. State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 571-72, 560 A. 2d 634 (1989) (citing State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 400, 555 A. 2d 559 (1989); Hodge, supra, 95 N.J. at 379, 471 A. 2d 389; State v. Hartye, 105 N.J. 411, 417, 522 A. 2d 418 (1987)); see also State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 231-32, 680 A. 2d 634, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 540, 136 L.Ed. 2d 424 (1996) (invalidating defendant's sentence where a co-defendant charged with the same or similar crime received slightly less onerous terms); State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 255 A. 2d 264 (1969) (same). The goals of sentencing uniformity are also evident in the CDRA. In the Declaration of Policy for the CDRA, the Legislature recognized the need for fair and certain punishment and that the imposition of a uniform, consistent and predictable sentence for a given offense is an essential prerequisite to any rational deterrent scheme. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1(a), (c). To guard against sentencing disparity, the Legislature, in enacting the CDRA, had made sweeping revisions to the predecessor law contained in the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, N.J.S.A. 24:21-1 to -53. Bridges, supra, 131 N.J. at 407, 621 A. 2d 1; see also Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Criminal Justice, A Law Enforcement Response to Certain Criticisms of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, at 12 (Sept. 17, 1990) (The act itself was an explicit legislative response to sentencing practices under the predecessor drug law.). Historically, vast sentencing discretion in the State's drug laws [had] fostered unjustified differences in the way similarly situated defendants [were] treated. Governor Thomas H. Kean, Blueprint For a Drug-Free New Jersey, at 24 (Oct. 1986). Therefore, the Legislature believed that the CDRA's consolidation of drug offenses and provisions into the penal code, which established degrees of crimes and definitive sentencing ranges and presumptive terms for each degree, would limit courts' sentencing discretion, and [would] ensure more uniform, consistent and predictable sentencing practices. Bridges, supra, 131 N.J. at 408, 621 A. 2d 1 (citing Assembly Judiciary Committee, Statement to Assembly Bill No. 3270 (Dec. 18, 1986)). The mandatory minimums and presumptive terms that exist throughout the CDRA, and in particular in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 for school zone offenses, were a result of that reform.