Opinion ID: 765228
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Freedman Factors

Text: 12 In support of their contention that the Rules vest unbridled discretion in the hands of implementing officials, appellants also note the lack of a specified time-period in which the Commissioner must act upon a permit application and of an avenue for prompt judicial review of a permit denial. They rely on a line of Supreme Court cases holding that prior restraint schemes that fail to place specific and reasonable time limits on official decisionmaking and to provide for prompt judicial review of adverse decisions are impermissible. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)). In FW/PBS, the Court explained that [w]here the licensor has unlimited time within which to issue a license, the risk of arbitrary suppression is as great as the provision of unbridled discretion. Id. at 227 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). 13 The district court, because it concluded that the challenged regulations did not amount to a prior restraint, held that the so-called Freedman factors were not applicable. For reasons stated above, the regulations do constitute a prior restraint. Thus, the district court should have considered whether they pass muster under Freedman analysis. 14 In Freedman, the Court invalidated a statute requiring exhibitors of motion pictures to submit films to the State Board of Censors for examination in advance of screening. In order to challenge the statute, Freedman had exhibited a film without prior submission to the Board. Although the state conceded that the exhibited film did not violate statutory standards, Freedman was nevertheless convicted of a statutory violation. See 380 U.S. at 52-53. The issue on appeal was not whether the Board could exercise censorship authority, but whether the lack of temporal limits rendered the censorship scheme an invalid prior restraint. The Court concluded that it did, noting that the lack of time restraints contains the same dangers as does a lack of objective standards -- it gives a decisionmaker essentially unreviewable authority to suppress speech. See id. at 58-59. Accordingly, the Court held that in addition to objective limits on discretion, content-based prior restraints must contain three procedural safeguards. First, the licensor must be required to decide whether to issue the license within a specified brief period during which the status quo is maintained, id. at 59; second, a prompt final judicial decision must be assured, id.; and third, the burden of proving that the expression is unprotected must rest with the censor, see id. at 58, 85 S.Ct. 734. 15 In FW/PBS, the Court made clear that Freedman also applied to content-neutral prior restraint situations. FW/PBS involved a broad challenge to a licensing and zoning scheme passed by the city of Dallas to regulate sexually oriented businesses. The Fifth Circuit, viewing the ordinance as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation, held, inter alia, that the procedural safeguards set forth in Freedman did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that because the ordinance lacked adequate procedural safeguards, it need not reach the question of whether the scheme was content-neutral. See 493 U.S. at 223 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). The Court was divided over how many of the Freedman factors applied. Justice O'Connor, in a section of her opinion for the court joined by two other Justices, stated that because the city did not exercise discretion by passing judgment on the content of any protected speech, the third Freedman factor -- that the censor bear the burden of going to court and the burden of proof once there -- was not applicable. Id. at 229. Justice Brennan, in a concurrence joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, argued that all three Freedman factors applied. See id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., Concurring in the judgment). Thus, six Justices held that the first two [Freedman] safeguards are essential. Id. at 228 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). 9 16 In the present case, the challenged regulations are content-neutral and thus need comply with only the first two Freedman factors. See Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v. Harford County, 58 F.3d 1005, 1010 (4th Cir. 1995); Grand Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, 27 F.3d 1068, 1070 (5th Cir. 1994). With respect to the first factor, Section 1-05(a)(5) in fact contains somewhat specific time limits on agency action. It requires that the Parks Department respond to a permit application no later than 30 days prior to the requested date unless the application was filed within 60 days of the date requested, in which case the Department is to respond as soon as is reasonably practicable. Appellants point out that the Supreme Court has interpreted Freedman to mean that the licensor must make the decision . . . within a specified and reasonable time period. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Because the Rules require only that decisions be made with reference to the requested date, not the application date, appellants contend that the permitted time-period is neither specified nor always reasonable. 17 We are unprepared, on this record, to hold that appellants have shown a clear likelihood of success on the merits of this claim. The Parks Department has defended the validity of this provision by pointing out its need to balance competing requests for permits. It contends that were it to have to act within a set period of time after receiving a permit, it would lose flexibility with respect to last-minute permit applications. Because many important public issues arise on little notice, it argues that such a rule would ill-serve free speech. 18 Although we express no opinion as to the ultimate merits of the Parks Department's argument, it is not plainly unreasonable. Neither Freedman nor FW/PBS involved the problem of competing applicants for limited public fora whose needs vary in their degree of urgency. Circumstances in which a speaker seeks a permit that, if granted, will not affect the ability of others to engage in expressive activity differ materially from circumstances in which the granting of a permit will exclude other speakers whose needs may be more urgent. In the former case, requiring the observance of specific time limits does not limit the speech of others; in the latter, it may. Whether Section 1-05(a)(5) is problematic under Freedman will depend, in significant part, on facts that should be more fully developed at trial, including, inter alia, the number of competing permit requests the Parks Department receives in a given year, the temporal distribution of applications in advance of requested dates, and both applicants' and the Parks Department's need for advance notice and flexibility. 19 We are likewise unprepared, on this record, to invalidate the Rules for failure to specify a time-period in which appeals from permit denials will be resolved or to provide for prompt judicial review thereof. Although either failure, if proved at trial, would constitute a First Amendment violation, the record is incomplete with respect to these issues. For instance, if the Parks Department's demonstrated practice in implementing the Rules is to respond promptly to appeals of permit denials, this practice should be taken into account. 10 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 795-96. Similarly, prompt access to judicial review in state courts would satisfy Freedman, and there is some evidence in the record that such access is available. Thus, in light of the paucity of the evidence in the record on this matter, we cannot say that plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of success on the merits. 20