Opinion ID: 2448565
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Unruh's Claim under the Statute of Limitations

Text: ¶ 15 The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims consists of two limitations periods: a three-year period and a one-year discovery period. RCW 4.16.350(3). Cacchiotti argues that Unruh filed her claim more than three years after the last alleged act or omission, three years after Unruh's 18th birthday, and one year after Unruh discovered she had a cause of action. At the Court of Appeals, Unruh's opening brief focused on application of the discovery rule rather than the three-year limitations period. There is no need to consider the discovery rule, however, if Unruh's claim is timely under the three-year statute of limitations. So, our analysis begins there. ¶ 16 The three-year limitations period commences at the time of the last act or omission that allegedly caused the injury. See Caughell v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 124 Wash.2d 217, 229, 237 n. 6, 876 P.2d 898 (1994). In this case, the alleged negligence began in 1995 when Cacchiotti applied braces to Unruh's teeth, and it continued until at least August 1999 when the braces were removed. Although Unruh continued seeing Cacchiotti until November 2000, the alleged negligence appears to have ceased in August 1999 with the removal of the braces. We will assume for purposes of analysis that the limitations period was triggered in August 1999. [6] ¶ 17 Although the three-year limitations period began running in August 1999, it was immediately tolled due to Unruh's minority. The tolling statute in effect at the time, former RCW 4.16.190, tolled the statute of limitations for minors in medical malpractice cases. Gilbert, 127 Wash.2d at 375, 900 F.2d 552. Unruh turned 18 on January 3, 2004, and the three-year limitations period began running on that date. ¶ 18 On November 16, 2006, Unruh served Cacchiotti with a 90-day notice of intent to sue, which extended the time for filing the lawsuit for 90 days. Former RCW 7.70.100(1). [7] On January 12, 2007, within the 90-day window, Unruh made a request for mediation under RCW 7.70.110, which tolled the three-year limitations period for an additional year. On September 27, 2007, within the one-year tolling window, Unruh filed her claim. The lawsuit was therefore timely under the three-year limitations period. ¶ 19 Cacchiotti takes issue with every step of this analysis. First, he argues that the 2006 nontolling amendment to RCW 4.16.190 eliminated the effect that Unruh's minority had on tolling the statute of limitations. Second, Cacchiotti argues that, even if the statute of limitations was tolled during Unruh's minority, the 90-day notice of intent to sue did not bridge the gap between the time when the three-year limitations period would have expired (January 3, 2007) and when she sent her request for mediation (January 12, 2007). Third, he argues that, even if the statute of limitations was tolled until Unruh sent her request for mediation, the request itself did not toll the limitations period for an additional year because it was defective. None of Cacchiotti's points is winning.
¶ 20 On June 7, 2006, the legislature amended RCW 4.16.190 to eliminate tolling for minors in medical malpractice cases. LAWS OF 2006, ch. 8, § 303. At that time, Unruh was no longer a minor. Cacchiotti nonetheless argues that the amendment applies retroactively to eliminate tolling during Unruh's minority. [8] We disagree. ¶ 21 A statute that imposes a new limitations period is presumed to run prospectively, unless the legislature intends otherwise. 1000 Virginia Ltd. P'ship, v. Vertecs Corp., 158 Wash.2d 566, 584, 146 P.3d 423 (2006). Thus, when a claim accrues before the statute goes into effect, the new limitations period begins to run on that claim from the effective date of the statute's enactment. Hanford v. King County, 112 Wash. 659, 662, 192 P. 1013 (1920) ([T]he limitation of the new statute, as applied to pre-existing causes of action, commences when the cause of action is first subjected to the operation of the statute....); Merrigan v. Epstein, 112 Wash.2d 709, 717, 773 P.2d 78 (1989) (`[T]he new limitations law operates ... on causes of action which accrued prior to the change in law, but the new period of limitation starts to run from the effective date of the statute which makes the change.' (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lewis H. Orland & David G. Stebing, Retroactivity in Review: The Federal and Washington Approaches, 16 Gonzaga L.Rev. 855, 882 (1981))); Torkelson v. Roerick, 24 Wash.App. 877, 879, 604 P.2d 1310 (1979) ([A] new statutory limitation may operate on a claim that has accrued prior to the amendment of the statute of limitation by beginning to run as of the effective date of the amended statute.). `Th[is] same principle has been applied to tolling statutes.' Merrigan, 112 Wash.2d at 717, 773 P.2d 78 (quoting Orland & Stebing, supra, at 882). ¶ 22 Our analysis in Hanford is illustrative. Hanford suffered injuries on March 1, 1919 when he was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by King County. Hanford, 112 Wash. at 659-60, 192 P. 1013. On June 11, 1919, the legislature enacted a new law requiring plaintiffs to present claims of damages to the board of county commissioners within 60 days of the claim accruing. Id. at 660-61, 192 P. 1013. If the claim was not timely presented, the plaintiff could not file a lawsuit. Id. at 661, 192 P. 1013. Hanford did not properly present his claim to the King County board of commissioners until June 28, almost 120 days after his claim had accrued. Id. at 660, 192 P. 1013. Still, we rejected the argument that Hanford was barred from pursuing his claim. Id. at 662, 192 P. 1013. We held that the new statute applied to Hanford's claim prospectively and that the 60-day period was not triggered until the date of the statute's enactment, June 11, 1919. Id. In other words, Hanford had sixty days after the statute went into effect in which to file a claim. Id. ¶ 23 The same rule was applied to a new tolling provision in Torkelson. 24 Wash.App. at 879, 604 P.2d 1310. Torkelson turned 18 in October 1970 and was injured in an automobile accident a few months later. Id. at 878, 604 P.2d 1310. At the time of the accident, RCW 4.16.190 tolled the statute of limitations until a plaintiff reached the age of 21. Id. But in August 1971, the legislature amended RCW 4.16.190 to eliminate tolling after the age of 18. Id. at 878-79, 604 P.2d 1310. The court held that the new tolling provision applied to Torkelson's claim prospectively. Id. at 880, 604 P.2d 1310. Even though Torkelson turned 18 back in October 1970 and was injured shortly thereafter, the court held that the amended statute's elimination of tolling did not operate on her claim until the date of enactment, i.e., August 1971. Id. Torkelson therefore received the full three years from August 1971 to file her claim under the statute of limitations. Id. ¶ 24 The application of this rule to the present case is straightforward. Unruh's claim accrued in August 1999 when Cacchiotti removed her braces, but former RCW 4.16.190 immediately tolled the statute of limitations because Unruh was a minor. On January 3, 2004, Unruh turned 18 and the three-year limitations period began to run. Though the legislature eliminated tolling for minors in medical malpractice cases in 2006, the amendment operates on Unruh's claim only from the date of enactment. The amendment cannot reach back in time to eliminate the effect of Unruh's minority in tolling the statute of limitations between August 1999 and the time she turned 18 in January 2004. Because Unruh was already an adult by the time the legislature eliminated tolling for minors in 2006, the nontolling amendment simply has no effect on her claim. ¶ 25 Cacchiotti does not cite any evidence of legislative intent indicating that the nontolling amendment to RCW 4.16.190 should apply retroactively, particularly when the effect would be to undo what was already accomplished under the former law. We hold that the nontolling amendment to RCW 4.16.190 applies from the date of its enactment and does not eliminate tolling during Unruh's minority. [9]
¶ 26 Under former RCW 7.70.100, Unruh was required to serve Cacchiotti with a 90-day notice of intent to sue before filing her lawsuit. The statute is clear that service of the notice of intent to sue extends the time for commencing the action: If the notice is served within ninety days of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action must be extended ninety days from the service of the notice. Former RCW 7.70.100(1). ¶ 27 Unruh served Cacchiotti with the 90-day notice of intent to sue on November 16, 2006. The three-year limitations period was set to expire on January 3, 2007, less than three months later. Accordingly, service of the notice of intent to sue tolled the statute of limitations for 90 days from the date of service, or until the middle of February 2007. ¶ 28 At oral argument before this court, Cacchiotti asserted that the notice of intent to sue did not toll the statute of limitations because it would require us to stack separate tolling provisions. In Cacchiotti's view, the statute of limitations cannot be tolled by both the notice of intent to sue and the later request for mediation. We reject this novel and unsupported proposition. ¶ 29 The statute of limitations for medical malpractice cases in RCW 4.16.350(3) contains no prohibition against tolling by one or more separate statutory provisions. Had the legislature intended such a restriction, it could have included one. See, e.g., RCW 11.40.051(2) (prescribing limitations period for claims against a decedent and noting that [a]n otherwise applicable statute of limitations applies without regard to the tolling provisions of RCW 4.16.190 (emphasis added)). Moreover, neither the statute governing notice of intent to sue, former RCW 7.70.100, nor the statute governing request for mediation, RCW 7.70.110, purports to serve as the exclusive tolling provision for medical malpractice cases. Restricting tolling to only one of these statutes would ignore the sound policy that underlies application of other applicable tolling provisions. Unruh's notice of intent to sue under former RCW 7.70.100 tolled the statute of limitations for 90 days.
¶ 30 Even though the statute of limitations was tolled due to Unruh's minority and her 90-day notice of intent to sue, she still needs the tolling provided by her request for mediation in order for her action to be timely. [10] Cacchiotti does not dispute that, as a general proposition, a request for mediation under RCW 7.70.110 tolls the statute of limitations for one year. He argues, however, that Unruh's request was defective because she served it on his insurance representative rather than on him personally. This argument requires us to interpret RCW 7.70.110 to decide whether a request for mediation can toll the statute of limitations when it is not served directly on the defendant. ¶ 31 In any question of statutory construction, we strive to ascertain the intention of the legislature by first examining a statute's plain meaning. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then we give effect to that meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Id. Plain meaning is discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007) (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-12, 43 P.3d 4). ¶ 32 RCW 7.70.110 states in its entirety: The making of a written, good faith request for mediation of a dispute related to damages for injury occurring as a result of health care prior to filing a cause of action under this chapter shall toll the statute of limitations provided in RCW 4.16.350 for one year. Cacchiotti argues that it would be unreasonable to interpret RCW 7.70.110 to permit a request for mediation on anyone other than the defendant. Unruh counters that, because the statute does not specify to whom a request must be made, it is reasonable to interpret RCW 7.70.110 to allow a request on the defendant or the defendant's authorized agent. ¶ 33 The unstated but apparent purpose of RCW 7.70.110 is to facilitate settlement of disputes through mediation. Implicit in this purpose is the notion that the defendant receives notice of the request for mediation. Nothing in the plain language of the statute restricts the method of giving notice to personally serving a request for mediation on the prospective defendant. Cacchiotti's argument thus requires us to stray from settled principles of statutory construction and read into RCW 7.70.110 a limiting requirement that is not present. Cf. Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003) (noting that we will not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them). ¶ 34 We construe RCW 7.70.110 to toll the statute of limitations when a request for mediation is made on the defendant or the defendant's authorized agent. Under this interpretation, the defendant will receive notice that the plaintiff has requested mediation under RCW 7.70.110 and will have an opportunity to assent to the request. This reading of RCW 7.70.110 is also consistent with the procedural informality of the statute. Unlike its companion provision, former RCW 7.70.100, which outlined specific procedures for serving the 90-day notice of intent to sue, RCW 7.70.110 does not contain detailed service procedures. It requires only that the request for mediation be written and be made in good faith. RCW 7.70.110. ¶ 35 Cacchiotti contends that, even if a request served on a defendant's agent is proper under the statute, no agency relationship existed here. Whether an agency relationship exists is generally a question of fact for the jury. O'Brien v. Hafer, 122 Wash. App. 279, 281, 93 P.3d 930 (2004). But the record convinces us that Cacchiotti's insurance representative took responsibility for the defense of the suit from the very beginning. Unruh initially directed her correspondence to Cacchiotti by serving him with the 90-day notice of intent to sue under former RCW 7.70.100. Shortly after, Cacchiotti's insurance representative contacted Unruh's counsel purporting to act on Cacchiotti's behalf, and they began discussing resolution of the case. [11] Unruh's counsel followed up on their discussions by directing a letter to the representative and requesting mediation under RCW 7.70.110. The insurance representative then responded by letter stating, You have requested mediation based on RCW 7.70.100 and, therefore, we agree that the statute of limitations is tolled for one year by RCW 7.70.110. CP at 318 (emphasis added). The parties later agreed to a mediation date, but Cacchiotti ultimately decided not to mediate. ¶ 36 Unruh persuasively argues that the only reasonable conclusion, based on the course of correspondence and Cacchiotti's assent to the mediation, is that the insurance representative was acting as Cacchiotti's agent. Cacchiotti counters that authority to act as an agent cannot be inferred from the acts of the insurance representative alone. But, Cacchiotti's argument would essentially require Unruh to prove what only Cacchiotti knowswhether the agent who initially responded to Unruh's notice of intent to sue was actually representing Cacchiotti. We reject Cacchiotti's attempt to undermine the agency relationship between him and the insurer responsible for providing his defense. Unruh's request for mediation tolled the statute of limitations for one year, and her filing of the lawsuit in September 2007 was therefore timely. [12]