Opinion ID: 1201386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: foote's statements against interest

Text: Henry sought to admit, under Rule 804(b)(3), Ariz.R.Evid., the following portions of a recorded statement that Foote gave to a detective six months after the murder: Foote: Okay. He [the victim] got outa the truck an' had my arm aroun' him, uh, I believe he had his arm aroun' my shoulder. Patterson: You had  what arm did he have around your shoulder? Foote: His right arm. He was on my left side I recall. An' we left the berm, walked him up to the spot, helped set him down. Patterson: Okay. When you say the spot, that's up the berm, inta the desert about twenty feet ... Foote: point  point A where the blood was. Patterson: Okay. You helped him all the way there by yourself? Foote: Yes. Patterson: Okay. Ho  how do ya know that? Foote: Uh, because I recall HENRY talking ta me from behind. Patterson: You mean jist immediately behind you or? Foote: Uh, I don't recall how far. Uh, he  he coulda still been settin' in the truck. Patterson: Okay. So he  in  in your mind, he was maybe back by the truck? Foote: Yes. Patterson: Okay. An' then what did you do, jis' drop the ol' man? Foote: No, I jis'  I jis' help set him down an' he  if I recall, he was kina down an' wa' holdin' (inaud.) isself up wi' one elbow. The trial judge refused to admit these excerpts in evidence. The issue before us is whether he abused his discretion. United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884, 895 (9th Cir.1981); State v. Grijalva, 137 Ariz. 10, 14, 667 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Ct.App. 1983). Henry argues that these were statements against Foote's interest. Three elements must exist to admit a statement against the declarant's interest offered to exculpate the accused: (1) the declarant must be unavailable; (2) the statement must have been at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true; and (3) A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Rule 804(b)(3), Ariz. R.Evid.; State v. Lopez, 159 Ariz. 52, 764 P.2d 1111 (1988); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 734 P.2d 563 (1987); State v. Mejias, 163 Ariz. 531, 789 P.2d 398 (Ct.App. 1990). The first two elements are met. The record supports the trial judge's finding that Foote was unavailable because he would have asserted his 5th Amendment privilege if called upon to testify. See Lopez, 159 Ariz. at 54, 764 P.2d at 1113. The state also concedes that Foote's statements sufficiently tended to subject him to criminal liability. Because the third element is lacking, however, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the statements. The only corroborating evidence was Henry's self-serving testimony that Foote alone dragged the victim backwards up the berm. Without more, and in the face of substantial contradictory evidence, such testimony is generally insufficient to meet the corroborating circumstances requirement. See United States v. Rodriguez, 706 F.2d 31, 40 (2d Cir.1983) (applying Rule 804(b)(3), Fed.R.Evid.); United States v. Tovar, 687 F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (8th Cir.1982) (same); Grijalva, 137 Ariz. at 14-15, 667 P.2d at 1340-41. Virtually all of the other evidence contradicted Foote's statements, including the tracker's uncontroverted testimony that two people supported the victim as they dragged him forward up the berm, as demonstrated by the front-facing footprints on either side of the toe drag marks at the scene; the blood on Henry's clothes and lack of it on Foote's clothes; and Foote's extreme intoxication at the time, which casts considerable doubt on his recollection of the events and on the likelihood that he stabbed the victim without getting any blood on himself. Foote's statements were neither spontaneous, nor were they ever repeated. They were made months after the crime during questioning by police. They were not said to anyone close to Foote (to whom such admissions might be more naturally expected). Furthermore, the record suggests that Foote fabricated the statements because Henry had threatened him and his family. Our conclusion might be different had Foote admitted killing the victim, or unequivocally stated that Henry was asleep in the back of the truck when he decided to drag the man into the desert and kill him. But here Foote simply surmised, prompted by a detective's suggestion, that when he helped the victim up the berm, Henry coulda maybe been back as far as the truck because he remembered hearing his voice from behind. See United States v. Perez, 963 F.2d 314, 316 (10th Cir.1992) (statement that tended to incriminate declarant, but not necessarily exculpate defendant, properly excluded). While the issue of trustworthiness raises questions of veracity, reliability and credibility, which are traditionally reserved to the finder of fact, LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 28, 734 P.2d at 570, we conclude here that no reasonable person could have believed Foote's statements under the circumstances. Id.; State v. Lopez, 159 Ariz. at 54-55, 764 P.2d at 1113-14. Additionally, Foote's statements would not have exculpated Henry from the felony murder charge because we have concluded elsewhere in this opinion that the underlying felony convictions are supported by substantial evidence.