Opinion ID: 2966640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the claimed errors

Text: Bailey raises a panoply of purported errors by the district court. He begins by challenging the constitutionality of the interstate domestic violence statute and then faults each following step of the proceedings to the court's upward departure from the sentencing guidelines. We address the alleged errors in general in the order that they are said to have occurred, and not by degree of merit, or lack thereof, we find them to possess.
Bailey claims that the second charge of his indictment, alleging violations of the recently enacted interstate domestic violence statute 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a), should have been dismissed because he claims that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. The 9 interstate domestic violence statute is in Title II of the Violence Against Women Act. The statute provides:

els across a State Line or enters or leaves Indian Country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the cause of or as a result of such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner shall be punished as provided in sub- section (b).
person who causes a spouse or intimate partner to cross a State line or to enter or leave Indian Coun- try by force, coercion, duress, or fraud and, in the course or as a result of that conduct, intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to the person's spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in subsec- tion (b). 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a).5 Bailey was one of the first charged under the statute, and so far as has come to our attention, the statute has not been previously challenged in a reported case or in any of the courts of appeals. Two district courts, however, have reached opposite conclusions as to the constitutionality of a part of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, which creates a private right of action against an individual who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender. 6 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c). _________________________________________________________________ 5 We do not deal here with an intimate partner, Mrs. Bailey was Bailey's wife. 6 See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding 42 U.S.C. § 13981, a part of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act to be a 10 Bailey's challenge to § 2261(a) relies on the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez, 63 U.S.L.W. 4343 (1995), which restricted Congress' commerce power. In Lopez the Court reviewed the constitutionality of former 18 U.S.C.§ 922(q), the GunFree School Zone Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone. Lopez, 63 U.S.L.W. at 4343 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(a)(1988 ed., Supp. V)). The Court found that Congress had acted beyond its commerce power in enacting the statute because the statute had nothing to do with `commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, 63 U.S.L.W. at 4346, nor anyjurisdictional element which would insure . . . that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce. Lopez, 63 U.S.L.W. at 4347. Bailey asserts that after Lopez, where Congress is acting pursuant to its commerce power it can regulate the (1) channels and (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, but beyond that it may only regulate (3) activities that are substantially related to commerce. Bailey argues that §2261(a) does not regulate either of the first two categories (channels or instruments of interstate commerce) and thus the Lopez analysis requires that the conduct to be regulated must have more than an interstate nexus, it must directly affect commerce. The government argues that by contrast, the domestic violence statute contains such a provision (by requiring the crossing of a state line) and thus is not subject to what is called the substantially and directly analysis of Lopez. We find it unnecessary to go in detail into the arguments applicable in Lopez, for we think previous decisions of the Supreme Court apply and that the statute in question is valid. _________________________________________________________________ proper exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause); but see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) (holding the same section invalid as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' power). We express no opinion as to the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 13981, a part of Title III of the Act. We are concerned only with the validity of 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a), a part of Title II of the Act. 11 In Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), the Court held valid the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910. In that case, the defendant had been convicted of transporting and causing to be transported and aiding in the transportation of a certain woman from Sacramento, California to Reno, Nevada for the purpose of debauchery, that is to say, that the woman should be the mistress of the defendant. The Court upheld the conviction and stated: The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it has long been settled, is within the regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question. 242 U.S. at 491. In Cleveland v. United States, 392 U.S. 14 (1946), the defendant was convicted of a violation of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 398, which forbade the transportation in interstate commerce of any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose. The defendants had transported women across state lines for the purpose of cohabiting with them as plural wives in violation of law. The Court sustained the convictions and stated: The fact that the regulation of marriage is a state matter does not, of course, make the Mann Act an unconstitutional interference by Congress with the police powers of the States. The power of Congress over the instrumentalities of interstate commerce is plenary; it may be used to defeat what are deemed to be immoral practices; and the fact that the means used may have the quality of police regulations is not consequential. 329 U.S. at 19. The present case is so similar to Cleveland and Caminetti that we think those cases are controlling. The statute requires the crossing of a state line, thus placing the transaction squarely in interstate com12 merce. And it requires the commission of a crime of violence causing bodily injury, which certainly is not different from the immoral purpose forbade in Cleveland and the debauchery forbade in Caminetti. We are of opinion the statute is valid.
Similarly, we reject Bailey's argument that the indictment is multiplicitous. The argument goes that the domestic violence statute is merely a specific version of the kidnapping statute. Bailey argues that the indictment charges him twice for a single course of conduct, i.e. kidnapping, and kidnapping his wife. He claims that although the interstate domestic violence statute requires proof of the additional fact that the victim was his spouse, that in his case this is the only real distinction between the two charged offenses. Therefore, Bailey concludes, § 2261(a) is merely a more specific version of the kidnapping statute, and that employing both would punish him twice for the same offense.7 Bailey argues that under the Rule of Lenity of Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980), where there is multiplicity the more specific statute, here the interstate domestic violence statute, must take precedence and the more general charge of kidnapping must be dismissed. It is well established that two statutes, although punishing the same transaction, are not multiplicitous where each requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not require. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The Court recently reaffirmed this standard for multiplicity. _________________________________________________________________ 7 The federal kidnapping statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1201(a) provides: (a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when- (1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce; . . . shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, and if the death of any person results, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment. 13 If the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Rutledge v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4238, 4239 (1996) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304). Clearly, the domestic violence statute requires proof of several facts which the kidnapping statute does not, the most obvious of which is that the victim be a spouse or intimate partner. Equally apparent is that the kidnapping statute requires proof of the additional element that the defendant held the victim for ransom or reward or otherwise. Although there are other differences between the elements of the domestic violence statute and the crime of kidnapping, these two stated differences satisfy the Blockburger requirement that each statute require the proof of an element which the other does not. Accordingly, we find that the interstate domestic violence statute proscribes conduct distinct from that criminalized by the kidnapping statute. Therefore, Bailey's two-count indictment under the interstate domestic violence statute and kidnapping statute is not multiplicitous and must stand.
Bailey's next argument is that the district courtinappropriately and unconstitutionally protracted the process by which he sought to obtain money for investigators and experts. The argument goes that such protraction required Bailey to expend far more attorney time and resources than are envisioned under 18 U.S.C.§ 3006A and allowed by the United States Constitution. The essence of the argument is that the district court considered Bailey's various requests one at a time instead of all together, not that the necessary services were not provided. The series of motions is referred to in the statement of facts in the early part of this opinion. The rule in this circuit is that 14 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) the district court may grant requests for expert services other than counsel upon a finding that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them. Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106, 1113 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1245 (1992). Three months prior to trial, Bailey had been granted additional counsel. About a month or more before trial, Bailey had had made available to him a forensic psychologist, a forensic pathologist and an addictionologist. And at least a week before trial, the court authorized a blood, hair and fiber expert. Bailey points to no prejudice on account of the dates of authorization of the experts except perhaps that his attorney may have been inconvenienced. The record does not show even that except by argument. We are of opinion the district court did not abuse its discretion in the order or dates of authorization of such services and that without prejudice there can be no constitutional violation. 8 Bailey's argument is without merit. Bailey also argues that the district court erred in disclosing to the prosecution information revealed to it in the ex parte motion made under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. Subsection (e) of that code section provides for application for investigation and expert services through an ex parte application. While the various applications for services were made ex parte, the district court, on April 18, 1995, unsealed the motion papers for the ex parte motions made to secure the services mentioned above. The government, however, correctly points out that with less than a month remaining for trial, the defendant had been detained and the trial had been continued once on motion of the defendant. The defendant had provided no discovery pursuant to the standard discovery _________________________________________________________________ 8 We do not imply that any prejudice which may exist brings on a constitutional violation. 15 order and, although the defense intended to introduce expert testimony with respect to Bailey's mental condition pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2, the notice of intention to use such testimony had not been filed. For that reason, the court unsealed the ex parte motions and ordered both sides to immediately disclose all Jencks statements. Following that, the United States was able to have Bailey undergo a psychiatric examination and the trial proceeded as scheduled on May 16, 1995. The government even agrees that if no ameliorating factors were present in this case, the district court should not have unsealed the ex parte motions. The government argues, however, that under the facts of this case above related, the district court was justified in unsealing the motions, and we agree. In all events, Bailey is unable to point to any prejudice by the unsealing of the motions except that the mental processes of the defense attorneys may have been revealed by them. We do not believe this is sufficient and that a more concrete application to the case must be present to show prejudice, if any there be.
Bailey's last argument with respect to the procedural conduct of the case is that he was denied a motion for a continuance made on May 12, 1995, the Friday before the trial was to begin on Tuesday, May 16, 1995. The argument on appeal is that he did not have sufficient time to utilize an expert which had only been authorized one week prior to trial. The witness we refer to here was what Bailey calls a hair, blood and fiber expert. Bailey moved for such an expert on April 27, 1995, and the court set a hearing on that motion for May 3, 1995. But at Bailey's request, the court rescheduled the hearing for May 5, 1995. Following that hearing on May 5th, although Bailey's attorney was absent from the hearing, the court on May 9th entered its written order authorizing the hair, blood and fiber expert. At this point, it is well to say that Bailey's attorney had previously talked to that expert but did not have the money to pay the expert until after May 5. The attorney had also, previous to May 5, turned over to the expert the evidence of the government with respect to hair, blood and fiber. The motion for a continuance stated that the expert had made a preliminary report but 16 there was not time to make a fuller report before the date the motion for a continuance was filed. Notably, a copy of the report is not a part of the record and apparently it was not shown to the district judge. Also, notably, at oral argument the attorney claimed the expert witness had a convention in Cincinnati during the trial. Of course, the absence of a material witness is a standard reason for continuance. The district court, however, was not notified of the convention in Cincinnati so far as the record we have shows. Also, it is now acknowledged that Mrs. Bailey was in fact in the trunk of Bailey's car, and the only materiality of any testimony the expert witness might have given would go to when she was placed in the trunk, rather than whether she was placed in the trunk. We are also not told what the expert would have testified to had he been called as a witness, which he was not. In view of all of these facts, we are of opinion the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. E. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a change of venue or individual voir dire On April 13, 1995, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(a), Bailey filed a motion for a change of venue to a different division within the district, or alternatively, outside of the Southern District of West Virginia. Bailey claimed that due to the quantity and the prejudicial quality of the press coverage it was impossible for him to obtain a fair trial in that district, and more specifically, in the cities of Charleston or Huntington, West Virginia. At a May 5, 1995 motion hearing, after listening to testimony from members of the press as to the amount of coverage the events had received, the court denied the motion, which Bailey renewed on May 16th during the voir dire examination of the jurors. In considering the motion for a change of venue, the district court complied with the two-step analysis which we discussed in United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991). Bakker calls for first addressing whether the publicity is so inherently prejudicial that trial proceedings must be presumed to be tainted and, if that be not true, then the second step is to conduct a voir dire examination of prospective jurors to determine if actual prejudice exists. Bakker at 732. At the May 5th hearing, representatives of all the press testified: radio, television and newspapers. At that hearing the representatives 17 of the press presented by Bailey repeatedly conceded that the case was given no more, and indeed in some instances less, attention and exposure in the media than other high profile federal cases. There was evidence, for example, that in the intervening six months between the temporary disappearance of the couple and the trial, one local television station aired a total of 15,000 news items, only 30 of which concerned this case. The district court found that the attention received did not rise to the level of presumed prejudice against the defendant, and denied the motion for a change of venue orally on May 5th and entered its order on May 9th. During the empaneling of jurors on May 16th, the district court proceeded to the second step of determining if there was actual prejudice to the defendant from media items. Bakker , 925 F.2d at 732. Here, the parties were permitted in advance to submit questions for potential jurors and there is no complaint that the district court failed to ask any question. The complaint is that the court did not permit the individual examination of the jurors on the issue of pre-trial publicity. In response to the questions asked, some jurors admitted that they would not be able to render an unbiased opinion. They were excused. After most or all of the potential jurors responded by a show of hands that they had heard or read of the case through the press, the court specifically asked the potential jurors if anything they had heard would predispose them to favor one side or the other. After receiving a negative response, the court couched the same question in other language: do any of you feel that you would be unable to reach a verdict in this case solely based on the evidence as it comes in in this courtroom and the law as I give it to you at the -- during and at the conclusion of the case? Again the responses were negative. The court proceeded to excuse two potential jurors who indicated in response to another question that their experience with family violence would bias their opinion. Then, for the first time, the defendant made his request for individual voir dire, and renewed his motion for a change of venue. The court declined to permit individual voir dire and denied the motion. 18 The record shows that the district court conducted thorough questioning that was both fair and impartial. It asked all or substantially all of the questions given to it in advance by the defendant. The record shows that the district court excused every juror whose opinion or inclination showed that he could not render a fair and impartial verdict. The fact that the court did not permit individual voir dire examination of jurors was not error. It is well established that a trial judge may question prospective jurors collectively rather than individually. Bakker at 734. And we note that the district judge did question indi- vidually those jurors whose initial responses were less than satisfactory. Bakker at 734. In conducting voir dire, a district court has broad discretion. United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 969 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3332 (1995). The consideration of a change of venue is also measured under the standard of abuse of discretion. Bakker at 732. In this case, we are of opinion the district court did not abuse its discretion in either instance. It followed the two-step analysis set out in Bakker and the record supports its action. F. Admissibility of Evidence Bailey complains that evidence with respect to the lid and latch on the trunk of his car, of blood and urine in the trunk, photographs of his wife upon her admission to the hospital in Kentucky, and her prognosis for recovery, even if relevant, should have been excluded under Rule 403 because the probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice. We are of opinion the evidence was relevant. Again, this is a matter under Rule 403 committed to the discretion of the district court, and we are of opinion it did not abuse its discretion. United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996). G. Prosecutorial Abuse We are of opinion there was no error in the cross-examination of Dr. Biundo with respect to the cause of anoxia or in the crossexamination of Bailey. Neither do we think there was error in the closing argument of the government. 19 H. Sufficiency of the evidence Finally, as to the merits and procedural aspects of the trial, Bailey argues that the evidence does not support the verdict. We need not discuss this at any great length. We rely on the statement of facts in this opinion and hold that the evidence does support the verdict on each count.