Opinion ID: 621801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: David Cain's Choice-of-Counsel Claim

Text: In addition to the challenges to his RICO and extortion convictions discussed above, David Cain raises a number of appellate arguments that are not applicable to either of his codefendants. Most significantly, he argues that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel of his choice when his retained attorney, Angelo Musitano, was disqualified by the magistrate judge overseeing pretrial proceedings. The government argues that Cain forfeited this argument by failing to appeal the magistrate's order disqualifying Musitano, while Cain suggests that the forfeiture doctrine is inapplicable to a deprivation of the defendant's right to counsel of his choice, which the Supreme Court has defined as structural error. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-50, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). We need not resolve whether a structural error may be forfeited, a question that remains open in this Circuit and in the Supreme Court, see Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1432, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009), because we conclude that, in any case, the disqualification was not reversible error. Cain's Sixth Amendment claim arises from an incident that occurred over a year before the case went to trial. During a June 2006 status conference, the government informed Magistrate Judge Schroeder, who was overseeing pre-trial proceedings, that it intended to call Musitano as a grand jury witness in connection with potential witness tampering charges against Cain. The government alleged that Cain had been involved in influencing Timothy Smider, a witness against Cain in a parallel state court prosecution, to provide perjured affidavits recanting statements that he had made that inculpated Cain. Because Musitano, who also represented Cain in the state case, had introduced the affidavits in court, the government sought his testimony to establish that the affidavits had been in Cain's possession and that Cain had intended that they be filed in an official proceeding, an element of the offense. At the time of the June 2006 conference, the government had not yet issued a subpoena to Musitano and represented that it would not be prepared to do so for several weeks. Nonetheless, Judge Schroeder expressed concern that if, at a later date, circumstances required that Musitano be replaced, the case would be significantly delayed. For his part, Musitano agreed that the issue of his eligibility to participate in the case need[ed] to be resolved. Although it was suggested that Cain might prospectively waive any conflict that might arise pursuant to our procedure under United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1982), the judge expressed his belief that if Musitano were compelled to testify pursuant to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, it would create a per se, unwaivable conflict. The judge had good reason to believe that Musitano might be required to testify. Cain's prior lawyer, George Muscato, had been compelled to testify in a related case regarding his knowledge of an earlier recantation by Smider, after the district court concluded that the testimony was not protected by attorney-client privilege. Ultimately, Judge Schroeder elected to defer a decision on whether Musitano should be removed from the case until the government had served him with a subpoena. In the meantime, the judge appointed another attorney, Dan Henry, for the limited purpose of meeting with Mr. David Cain and advising him, and forbade Musitano from speaking directly with Cain or Henry regarding the conflict issues. When the parties returned for the next conference two weeks later, Musitano informed the court that he had received a subpoena to testify before the grand jury. Henry reported that he had spoken with Cain regarding the conflict and the potential for resolving it through some form of stipulation, but that he had ultimately concluded that a stipulation could not accomplish the desired goal, since the government had represented that it would seek to compel Musitano's testimony in any event. Henry also expressed the view that because Musitano's testimony would be used to establish an element of the offense, any conflict was unwaivable. After further discussion, Judge Schroeder agreed that, given the government's position that a stipulation would be inadequate to eliminate the need for Musitano to testify, the conflict was unwaivable. Although the judge acknowledged that the witness tampering charges might ultimately be brought as part of a separate indictment, he concluded that Musitano's ability to represent his client effectively would be compromised if he were simultaneously serving as a witness against him, even in a separate proceeding. Accordingly, over Cain's objection, the judge disqualified Musitano and appointed Henry as permanent counsel in his place. The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Implicit in this guarantee is the principle that, in most cases, a criminal defendant may be represented by any counsel who will agree to take his case. United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1982). The right to counsel of one's choice is not an absolute one, however. United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir.1979). The Sixth Amendment also embraces a right to effective assistance of counsel, which includes the right to be represented by an attorney who is free from conflicts of interest. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981). Where the right to counsel of one's choice conflicts with the right to an attorney of undivided loyalty, the determination of which right is to take precedence must generally be left to the defendant, who may make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a conflict-free lawyer if he desires to continue the representation. See United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1982). Nonetheless, there exists a narrow class of so-called per se conflicts that are not susceptible to waiver. Such conflicts may not be waived because, while the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Our decision in United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir.1994) sets out the analysis that a district court confronted with the specter of conflicts of interest must follow in order to determine whether the right of the defendant to counsel of his choosing should be honored in a particular case. At the initial, inquiry stage, the court must investigate the facts and details of the attorney's interests to determine whether the attorney in fact suffers from an actual conflict, a potential conflict, or no genuine conflict at all. Id. In satisfying its inquiry obligation, the district court may rely on the representations of counsel as to his interest in the case and how any potential conflict might be cured. Id. at 154. If the court is satisfied at the inquiry stage that there is no actual conflict or potential for one to develop, its duty ceases. Id. Where the court determines that an actual or potential conflict exists but that it would not fundamentally impair the lawyer's representation, the district court should address the defendant directly and determine whether he wishes to make a knowing and intentional waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel in conformity with the procedures set out in Curcio, 680 F.2d at 888-90. Finally, if the initial inquiry establishes that the conflict is such that no rational defendant would knowingly and intelligently desire the conflicted lawyer's representation, the district court must immediately disqualify him. Levy, 25 F.3d at 153. No waiver of the conflict is possible and, therefore, no Curcio hearing is required. Although we have emphasized that the class of cases in which an attorney conflict is truly unwaivable is a very narrow one, United States v. Perez, 325 F.3d 115, 126 (2d Cir.2003), we have also recognized that district courts have broad latitude in making a decision whether to disqualify a defendant's chosen counsel, United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir.1993). This is particularly true in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Wheat. In that case, the Court considered whether the district court had properly rejected a substitution of defense counsel on the ground that the substitute attorney had an unwaivable conflict owing to his representation of two codefendants and potential witnesses in the case. Although all three defendants had agreed to waive their rights to conflict-free counsel, the district court concluded that the conflict was unwaivable and denied the request for substitution. The Supreme Court ultimately approved that decision, rejecting the defendant's argument that the district court's refusal to allow the substitution violated the Sixth Amendment. The Court observed that two important interests may impose limits on a defendant's right to waive attorney conflicts: (1) the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment, which is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant, and (2) the independent interest of federal courts in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. 486 U.S. at 159-60, 108 S.Ct. 1692. These interests, as well as the potential for gamesmanship on the part of the defendant who waives a conflict only to later claim ineffective assistance, weigh heavily in favor of affording the district court substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses. Id. at 163, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Given the difficulties of the decision, the uncertainties involved where the conflict has yet to fully materialize, and the need for the district court to rely on its instinct and judgment based on experience in making the [disqualification] decision, the Court concluded that although judges must recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner's counsel of choice, the evaluation of whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case evince a conflict so serious as to be unwaivable is a discretionary one that is best left primarily to the informed judgment of the trial court. Id. at 163-64, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Accordingly, on the facts before it, the Court held that, [v]iewing the situation as it did before trial . . . the District Court's refusal to permit the substitution of counsel in this case was within its discretion and did not violate petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Consistent with the deferential approach dictated by Wheat, we have identified only two post- Wheat cases in which we reversed a trial court's decision with respect to disqualification. Moreover, given the Court's admonition that the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant, it is unsurprising that both of those cases arose in the context of a defendant's post-conviction challenge to the district court's refusal to disqualify the convicted attorney. United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir.1993), citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (alterations omitted); see also United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.2002). It thus appears that, although we have considered challenges to the disqualification of counsel on the basis of a per se conflict in at least four cases since Wheat, we have never concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying a conflicted attorney. [10] See, e.g., United States v. Arrington, 867 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1989); Tineo v. Kelly, 870 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.2004). Our decision in Jones is particularly instructive here. In that case, the district court found that the defendant's attorney suffered from an unwaivable conflict where there was a possibility that the lawyer himself would become a target of the grand jury investigation that had produced the indictment of his client, and at a minimum would be called to testify against the defendant. 381 F.3d at 117-18. Although the defendant argued on appeal that the conflict could have been resolved by stipulation, we concluded that a stipulation broad enough to cure the potential conflict would have not been forthcoming, since it would have required the defendants essentially to admit guilt. Id. at 121. On this basis, we concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying the defendant's attorney: The risk that he would become a witness at trial was enough alone to allow the district court to reach this determination under an abuse of discretion standard. We could not expect the district court to rule otherwise where it seems more likely than not that a number of conflicts will materialize. Whether or not they materialize, defendant []would have a strong argument on appeal that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. 381 F.3d at 121. That reasoning is equally applicable here. Although Musitano was not a potential target of the grand jury investigation and his testimony may well have been less central to the prosecution than the testimony that would have been offered by the lawyer in Jones, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the risk that Musitano would become a witness against his client was sufficient to justify his disqualification. [11] The fact that Judge Arcara ultimately concluded that it was unnecessary to compel Musitano to testify does not undercut this analysis. Viewing the situation as it did before trial, particularly in light of the prior experience of Muscato's compelled testimony and the parties' agreement that a stipulation would be ineffective, we cannot say that the district court exceeded the broad latitude which must be accorded it in making this decision. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163-64, 108 S.Ct. 1692.