Opinion ID: 2625644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: coca's opinion and the parties' certiorari arguments

Text: ¶ 6 COCA affirmed the trial court's decision. It concluded that Oklahoma's choice-of-law rule requires that Texas law govern this cause. That rule-applicable in automobile vehicle insurance cases-was earlier announced by this court in Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co. [7] It provides the validity, interpretation, application and effect of the provisions of a motor vehicle insurance contract should be determined in accordance with the laws of the state in which the contract was made, unless (1) those provisions are contrary to Oklahoma's public policy or (2) the facts demonstrate another jurisdiction has the most significant relationship with the subject matter and the parties. [8] ¶ 7 Bernal urges both Bohannan exceptions apply to her cause. She first asserts Charter's policy exclusion  of a vehicle that is [o]wned, furnished or available for the regular use of the insured or any family member [9]  from the policy's definition of an uninsured motor vehicle violates Oklahoma's public policy. According to Bernal, because UM coverage must, for Oklahoma policies, follow the person rather than the vehicle, Charter's exclusion violates this state's public policy and is hence unenforceable. For support of this position she brings to the court's attention Lewis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co , a decision by COCA, Div. III. [10] ¶ 8 Charter responds the public-policy exception is inapplicable where a foreign insurance policy does not operate to deprive an insured of UM benefits due under a policy issued and paid for in accordance with Oklahoma law. For support it cites to Bohannan and two COCA decisions: Herren v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., [11] and Burgess v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co. [12] These cases are cited for the proposition that the public-policy exception is not triggered where neither Oklahoma insurance coverage was implicated nor benefit denied under its terms. COCA agreed with this reasoning and declined to follow Lewis. [13] It ruled the public-policy exception was not invocable. This was so because (1) proceeds from Billy's Oklahoma UM coverage were paid to the estate and (2) payment or nonpayment of Charter's UM benefit is independent of the former coverage. The application of Texas law hence violates no Oklahoma public policy. ¶ 9 Bernal further urged Oklahoma has more significant contacts to the subject matter and to the parties than does Texas. [14] COCA ruled this second exception-the significant relationship clause-was likewise uninvocable in today's cause. Citing to language found in Bohannan, it noted that in first-party UM coverage, location of the insured automobile does not rise to greatest significance but rather the place of performance and the place of contracting are to be accorded greatest significance in this choice-of-law area pervaded by state statutes. [15] Hence, the fact that Oklahoma was the place of the accident and Billy was an Oklahoma resident was not sufficient to give Oklahoma the most significant relationship status to the subject matter and to the parties. ¶ 10 Lastly, according to Charter, even if application of the Bohannan rule were to reveal Oklahoma's substantive law applies here, the result would be immaterial because the terms of 36 O.S.2001 § 3636 [16] do not govern today's cause. [17] ¶ 11 On certiorari, Bernal urges (1) COCA's decision is in conflict with the teachings of Lewis, and (2) COCA's analysis under the significant relationship test was insufficient in light of the review required by Bohannan. [18]