Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jury Misconduct Allegation

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for new trial based on alleged jury misconduct, failing to adequately investigate the allegation, and denying defendant's request for the jurors' addresses and telephone numbers. None of these claims have merit. On December 18, 1990, the jury returned a verdict of death. On December 20, 1990, Deputy Clerk Laura Clark was questioned on the record by Judge Peterson [11] regarding a jury room conversation she had overheard. According to Clark, on Monday, December 17, 1990, she was using a copy machine located in a foyer adjacent to the room in which defendant's jury was deliberating. She heard two voices, a male and female. The male voice said, The newspaper said that he could get 27 years to life for each count and that there are seven counts. The female voice responded, Yes, that's what the newspaper said. At this point, Clark left the foyer. The following day a reporter's transcript of Clark's statement was given to the parties. On January 4, 1991, defendant filed points and authorities in support of a new trial motion based on Clark's statement, and the prosecutor submitted copies of news stories about the case that had appeared in local newspapers between the time of the guilt verdict on December 7, 1990, and the penalty verdict on December 18, 1990. That same day, a hearing was held in which the matter was further discussed. The prosecutor noted that none of the articles referred to 27 years to life. Counsel knew the jurors' names; their request for the jurors' addresses was denied in the absence of a motion and sufficient showing. Defense counsel also requested that the court conduct its own investigation. That request was denied. The court stated, I'm telling you that what is before me is insufficient to induce me to take any action whatever. If you're going [to] move me, you're going to have to have more. Counsel also made an oral new trial motion, and requested that the court defer ruling until we have done further investigation. The trial court did so. On January 18, 1991, further proceedings were held. Defense counsel indicated that they were continuing to investigate the matter, but had recently been denied funding for an investigator, and had conclusively located only some of the jurors in the telephone book. Other juror's names appeared in the telephone book in duplicate, and counsel had apparently not attempted to ascertain whether any of the names were of the actual jurors. Defense counsel renewed their request for the juror's addresses and telephone numbers. The trial court denied the request, stating that it had reviewed the known newspaper articles and saw nothing either prejudicial or that suggested investigation would find anything prejudicial. I decline on the present showing to release anything. [I]t's incumbent on somebody to find something that somebody said that said `27 to life.' Now, if you come in with that, then I'll infer that that's probably what they heard; and if it's prejudicial, then you've got the lead that you're talking about. And you have to find out did they really hear that, and if they really heard that and it really is prejudicial, then I would have to grant the motion for new trial on the penalty phase. But ... giving it the worst for the jury, they say they read newspapers.... My recollection of the transcript was somebody said that `the newspaper said' and somebody else said, `That's what it said,' and they said `27 to life.' Now, none of those things in my view could or would in any way prejudice the defendant's right to a fair determination of penalty. And as long as that is true, ... if I do anything, I will then be lending credence to something other than that. And since I don't believe in harassing juries without, shall we say, probable cause, whatever the standard may be, I am loath to make such an order because it creates a risk with regard to what I believe the showing so far has been, and it also opens the door a little further to jury harassment. The sentencing hearing, which coincidentally had also been scheduled for January 18, was continued to February 22, with the understanding defense counsel had the option of continuing to investigate the jury misconduct allegations. At the February 22, 1991, hearing, the jury misconduct allegations were not discussed. Defendant never filed a written motion for new trial or sought a ruling on his oral motion for new trial; hence the trial court could not deny such a motion or err in doing so. Nor did the trial court err in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the allegations of juror misconduct. Such a hearing need only be held when `the defense has come forward with evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred.' ( People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 195, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) That was not the case here. Clark's statement was hearsay; she was unable to even identify which jurors were speaking. ( People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1257, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) Moreover, the overheard comments were ambiguous as to who potentially might receive the 27-year-to-life sentence, and may have involved an entirely unrelated case. Indeed, the known newspaper articles during the relevant time period did not contain the phrase 27 years to life. Finally, even if the comments were about Flores, it is difficult to see how such a conversation prejudiced defendant. Counsel was given the opportunity on January 18, 1991, to continue its investigation; for reasons not in the record, it apparently abandoned this effort. Nor did the trial court err in declining to provide the juror addresses and telephone numbers. This case was tried in 1990, prior to the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 237. At that time, defense counsel was entitled to jurors' addresses and telephone numbers if the defendant sets forth a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred, that diligent efforts were made to contact the jurors through other means, and that further investigation is necessary to provide the court with adequate information to rule on a motion for new trial. ( People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541, 552, 261 Cal.Rptr. 1, cited with approval in Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1093-1094, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 979 P.2d 963.) Here, prior to January 18, defense counsel did not contact those jurors whose addresses and telephone numbers they had independently obtained, or attempt to ascertain whether identical names in the telephone book were those of jurors. Moreover, for the reasons that the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing, the trial court expressly and reasonably found nothing either prejudicial or that suggested investigation would find anything prejudicial. The court acted within its discretion in denying the request.