Opinion ID: 203882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to Instructions on Count II The Substantive Offense

Text: Gonzalez lodges three challenges to the instructions relating to Count II, finding fault with an instruction relating to each of the three potential bases for finding him guilty of the substantive offense. Gonzalez challenges the adequacy of the court's instruction on constructive possession, the instruction on Pinkerton liability for the criminal conduct of co-conspirators, and the aiding and abetting instruction.
Gonzalez argues that the trial court erred by (1) omitting from its instruction an element of constructive possession that requires a defendant to act knowingly, and (2) failing to inform the jury that a defendant must have dominion over the object being constructively possessed, a concept that appellant characterizes as the recognized right or authority, in his criminal milieu, to exercise control over [the item]. The government contends that the instructions as given clearly conveyed to the jury the principle that any kind of possession, either actual or constructive, must be knowing and intentional, and that it was entirely appropriate for the court to use the word control instead of dominion. The parties agree that our review is for plain error. The court's instruction stated, in relevant part: [The relevant statutory section] says it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to distribute, or to possess with the intent to distribute, a controlled substance. ... The second thing that the Government must prove is that Mr. Gonzalez had the specific intent to distribute that cocaine, not only possessed it, but he had the intent to distribute it. And the third thing the Government has to prove is that, in doing so, Mr. Gonzalez acted knowingly and intentionally. ... When a defendant has indirect power and control over a substance, the defendant may be said to have constructive possession over that substance. Even though the substance is not on his person or within his immediate reach, if he has the ability to exercise power and control over it, he has constructive possession of that substance. Indirect control may exist when the object or substance is readily accessible to the defendant, and he has the power and ability and intention to exercise control over it. ... As I've said, in order to establish possession, there has to be evidence that the defendant had both the intention and the power to exercise control over the substance, either by himself or in conjunction with others. (emphasis added).
Defendant's argument that the court erred by omitting the word knowingly in its constructive possession instruction is meritless. As the excerpts above demonstrate, the court twice used the phrase knowingly and intentionally in describing the elements of the offense, and proceeded to elaborate on the meaning of possession. The fact that the court did not use the word knowingly specifically to modify its description of constructive possession is insufficient to establish error under these circumstances. The court's instructions were clear that, regardless of how the government established possession, it still had to prove that it was knowing and intentional. Moreover, the court's description of constructive possession specifically included the requirement that defendant have the power, ability, and intention to exercise control over [the substance] (emphasis added). It is unclear to us how a defendant could intentionally exercise control over an object without doing so knowingly. Our decision on this issue comports with our holding in United States v. Hallock, 941 F.2d 36 (1st Cir.1991). There, we rejected the defendant's argument that the district court erroneously omitted the knowledge and intent elements of constructive possession, concluding that the court had elsewhere made abundantly clear to the jury that proof of the defendant's knowledge and intent was required to convict. Id. at 42. We also noted that Hallock had been charged with possession with intent to distribute, but did not argue on appeal that the jury misunderstood the `intent to distribute' part of the crime. Id. at 43. Thus, his argument  the same one Gonzalez now advances  was logically inconsistent: under his theory, the jury found he possessed [certain containers] without knowing that they contained cocaine, but went on to find that he intended to distribute the cocaine that was in them. Id.
We also reject appellant's contention that by failing to use the word dominion, the court omitted an essential element of the offense. We have stated generally that [w]ithin wide margins, the district court maintains discretion in the precise manner that it explains legal concepts to the jury. McFarlane, 491 F.3d at 59. More specifically, we have recognized that the definition of constructive possession may or may not include dominion as a separate concept, stating that `[c]onstructive possession' is commonly defined as the power and intention to exercise control, or dominion and control, over an object not in one's `actual' possession. United States v. Zavala Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 7 (1st Cir.1994) (emphasis added). We have even rejected a defendant's contention that the district court [improperly] used the conjunction `or' rather than `and' in the phrase dominion or control, noting that [a]t times, we have used the conjunctions `and' and `or' interchangeably in this very context. United States v. Rogers, 41 F.3d 25, 30 & n. 5 (1st Cir.1994). In Rogers, we explained that, because dominion is generally defined to include the concept of control, the instruction properly conveyed to the jury the notion that there could have been no conviction absent a finding of control. Id. at 30. The same is true here. The court emphasized that, to justify a finding of constructive possession, appellant must have had the power and ability to exercise control over the substance at issue. We discern no meaningful difference between the instruction as given and one which would have included the word dominion.
Gonzalez argues that the court's instruction on the liability of members of a conspiracy for substantive offenses committed by their co-conspirators (i.e., Pinkerton [8] liability) was confusing and would have caused the jury to believe that it could find liability for the criminal conduct of co-conspirators even without sufficient proof of the underlying offense. He claims that the confusion arose because the court first told the jury that it would explain the law regarding liability for the underlying substantive offense, but instead went on to describe the requirements for a conspiracy conviction. The court stated: In order to find that someone who's guilty of conspiracy to commit an offense is also guilty of the offense, the government has to prove five things ... Third, [the government] has to show that the offense was committed pursuant to the conspiracy. ... Now, I know it's a little bit confusing and you may be asking yourselves what's the difference between finding someone guilty under the aiding and abetting theory and finding someone guilty under the conspiracy theory. Although the two offenses are similar in some respects, there is a big difference between finding somebody guilty on what others have done based on the aiding and abetting theory as opposed to finding someone guilty of a substantive offense based on what co-conspirators have done. The difference is this: proof of aiding and abetting, as I told you earlier, requires evidence that the crime was actually committed by someone. The defendant can't be guilty of aiding and abetting an offense that was never committed, whereas, proof of a conspiracy does not require a showing that the unlawful act that was the object of the conspiracy was committed. (emphasis added). This instruction, Gonzalez contends, would lead the jury to believe that he could be found guilty of the substantive offense (Count II) without proof that the offense had been committed. The government counters that the court correctly stated the applicable law: that in order for the jury to find Pinkerton liability, the government had to prove five elements, one of which was that the offense was committed pursuant to the conspiracy. Moreover, the court had already given a lucid description of the five elements of liability, and said repeatedly (at least six times) that proof of all five was required to convict Gonzalez. Our review is for plain error. We agree with appellant that the court's statement that proof of a conspiracy does not require showing that the unlawful act that was the object of the conspiracy was committed was confusing. This statement is accurate only as to criminal liability for the offense of conspiracy, which is not what the court said it was discussing. Nevertheless, we reject appellant's claim of plain error under the circumstances. The Supreme Court has held that instructions that might be ambiguous in the abstract can be cured when read in conjunction with other instructions. Jones, 527 U.S. at 391, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 16 (1st Cir.2003) (finding no plain error in instruction which incorrectly characterized the applicable standard as a subjective one but later clarified that the government bore the burden of proving that defendant's statement was objectively threatening). Despite the original ambiguity of the court's statement, the court cured the ambiguity by explicitly distinguishing in the next two sentences between liability for conspiracy and liability for the substantive underlying offense. The court stated: You can be guilty of conspiracy even though the act was not committed. Obviously, you can't be guilty of the act that was the object of the conspiracy unless the act was committed. Given this language, it is highly unlikely that the potential ambiguity cited by Gonzalez, when read in the context of an otherwise correct ... instruction, misled the jury. ... This is especially so given the clarifying instruction that immediately followed the passage to which [defendant] objects. United States v. Bailey, 405 F.3d 102, 110 (1st Cir.2005) (holding that an extraneous reference to liability for failure to act  a theory the government had not argued  in an otherwise comprehensive, seven-paragraph instruction on aiding and abetting was not plain error, particularly in light of subsequent clarification). Furthermore, in explaining to the jury that the defendant could be found liable for the substantive offense under one of the theories  as a principal, as an aider and abettor, or under a Pinkerton theory  the court eliminated any ambiguity in its earlier instructions by emphasizing the fact that a conviction based on a Pinkerton theory required the government to prove the five elements he had already set forth. (You could find him guilty of the 500 gram charge if he actually possessed the 500 grams with intent to distribute, or if he aided and abetted others in doing so, but you can't find him guilty on the basis that he is guilty of conspiracy unless you find that these five things have been shown.)
The court instructed the jury that, in order to establish aiding and abetting liability, the government had to prove three elements. First, it had to show that at least one of [the substantive offenses which Gonzalez was accused of aiding and abetting] was actually committed. The court continued: The second thing the Government has to prove is that this defendant assisted in the commission of that crime or caused it to be committed. And third, the Government has to show that the defendant intended to assist in the commission of that crime or to cause it to be committed. ... [T]he Government doesn't have to prove that the defendant personally committed the crime, what it must prove is that someone committed the crime, and that the defendant willfully did something to assist in the commission of that crime. Now, I said willfully. Assisting in the commission of a crime is willful if it's done knowingly and voluntarily and with the intent to help facilitate the commission of the crime. And again, mere presence where a crime is committed is not by itself sufficient to prove that a defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting. It's a factor you can consider, but by itself it doesn't prove that the defendant aided and abetted. There must be evidence that the defendant did something to facilitate the commission of a crime. In other words, putting it about as briefly as I can, the defendant must be a participant in the crime and not merely a spectator. Gonzalez argues that this instruction failed to require a jury finding that he consciously shared the principal actors' knowledge of the underlying criminal act. He asserts that this error impermissibly allowed the jury to convict him without evidence of specific intent. In support of this argument, he cites the following instruction on aiding and abetting, which he timely proposed, and which is drawn substantially from the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts for the First Circuit: To aid and abet means intentionally to help someone else commit a crime. To establish aiding and abetting, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) someone else committed the charged crime and (2) that [defendant] consciously shared the other person's knowledge of the underlying criminal act, intended to help him/ her, and [willfully] took part in the endeavor, seeking to make it succeed. [Defendant] need not perform the underlying criminal act, be present when it is performed, or be aware of the details of its execution to be guilty of aiding and abetting. But a general suspicion that an unlawful act may occur or that something criminal is happening is not enough. Mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are also not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. See Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the First Circuit § 4.02 (1998), available at http://www.med. uscourts.gov/practices/crpji.97nov.pdf. Because this is one of appellant's preserved objections, we review his claim that the instructions embodied an error of law de novo and his claim as to the form of instruction for abuse of discretion. As we have already noted, the Pattern Instructions, although often helpful, were not prepared or mandated by this court, United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 300 n. 7 (1st Cir.2008), and [t]here is no single prescribed way to get the aiding and abetting concept across. Id. at 300. In order to establish aiding and abetting liability, the government must prove, first, that the principal committed the substantive offense charged, and second, that the accomplice became associated with [the principal's criminal] endeavor and took part in it, intending to assure its success. United States v. Matos-Quinones, 456 F.3d 14, 20 n. 5 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234-35 (1st Cir.1995)). While we have acknowledged that [t]he challenge in aiding and abetting cases is framing [the intent element] for the jury, id., we have explicitly declined to require the shared intent language found in some of our opinions and in the First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions. See Urciuoli, 513 F.3d at 299. Instead, we have observed that a showing that the defendant consciously shared the principal's knowledge of the underlying criminal act, and intended to help [him] is one way for the government to fulfill its burden to show that a defendant participated in the venture and sought by his actions to make it succeed. United States v. Geronimo, 330 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 218 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir.2000)). Here, the court's instruction certainly sufficed to inform the jury that Gonzalez could only be guilty of aiding and abetting if he had `willfully' [done] something to assist in the commission of [the] crime. The court further stated that assistance in the commission of a crime was willful if it was done knowingly and voluntarily and with the intent to help facilitate the commission of the crime. To the extent that the jury's verdict rested on aiding and abetting, it thus reflects its conclusion that Gonzalez knowingly and voluntarily assisted in the commission of a crime, with the intent to facilitate the criminal conduct. There is no substantive distinction between this formulation and the language in defendant's proposed instructions that requires the accused to consciously share the principal's intent. Appellant's argument that the failure to use this particular phrase permitted the jury to convict the defendant of aiding and abetting liability without finding the requisite intent is unfounded. Affirmed.