Opinion ID: 2799489
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Motion for Mistrial

Text: [8,9] Davis moved for a mistrial a second time after Clairday’s testimony allegedly differed substantially from her deposition testimony. Davis alleged that the State had committed a discovery violation when it withheld incriminating statements attributed to Davis. Prior to trial, Davis properly requested the State to disclose “[a]ny and all admissions, statements, confessions or other inculpatory or exculpatory statements or admissions it has procured from [Davis] or any other person relative to this case.” After a proper request by the defendant, the State is required to disclose all material information.11 The failure of the State to disclose such information could potentially impact the defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial to such a degree that a mistrial may be necessary.12 9 Robinson, supra note 5. 10 State v. Daly, 278 Neb. 903, 933, 775 N.W.2d 47, 71 (2009). 11 See State v. Harris, 263 Neb. 331, 640 N.W.2d 24 (2002). 12 See id. Nebraska Advance Sheets 836 290 NEBRASKA REPORTS Davis argues that the State committed a discovery violation and that the district court abused its discretion in overruling Davis’ motion for mistrial. The record before us on appeal, however, presents no evidence that a discovery violation occurred. There is no other evidence to suggest that Clairday actually had any undisclosed contact with the State. In fact, Clairday’s testimony at trial appeared to be a surprise to the State’s counsel as well. During a sidebar, counsel for the State adamantly denied knowing Clairday would testify about additional incriminating statements. We find no reason to disagree with the district court’s determination that no prosecutorial misconduct had occurred. Even if prosecutorial misconduct did occur, the extent to which Davis was actually prejudiced is unclear. We have no way of determining how Clairday’s deposition testimony actually differed from the hypothetical undisclosed statements. Clairday’s deposition testimony is not included in the record on appeal; the deposition testimony can only partially be adduced from Davis’ questions on cross-examination. And, as the district court correctly noted, Davis was able to effectively cross-examine Clairday on her prior inconsistent statements. Davis pointed out several instances where Clairday’s story had changed between when Clairday initially spoke with police, testified at the deposition, and finally testified at trial. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’ motion for mistrial. Davis’ first assignment of error is without merit.