Opinion ID: 661460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Columbia's Liability for Hostile Work Environment

Text: 26 Karibian also contends that the district court erred when it held that Columbia could be liable under a hostile work environment theory only if she satisfied the standard applied in Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.1992). In Kotcher, we said that the plaintiff must prove that the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it. 957 F.2d at 63. Karibian contends that this standard is not applicable to all claims of hostile work environment, and that a different standard obtains here. Columbia responds that the standard described in Kotcher governs an employer's liability in this and every hostile work environment case. Again, Karibian has the better argument. 27 A hostile work environment exists [w]hen the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment.'  Harris, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 370 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2404, 2405). Whereas liability for quid pro quo harassment is always imputed to the employer, a plaintiff seeking to establish harassment under a hostile environment theory must demonstrate some specific basis to hold the employer liable for the misconduct of its employees. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 62. Unfortunately, the specific basis of employer liability for a hostile work environment remains elusive. 28 In Meritor, the Supreme Court declined to announce a definitive rule on employer liability in hostile work environment cases. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72, 106 S.Ct. at 2408. Meritor did, however, make two things clear: employers are not always liable for the hostile work environment created by their employees. Id. And, lack of notice and the existence of complaint procedures do not automatically insulate an employer from liability. Id. Beyond these alpha and omega rules, the Court declined to offer further enlightenment. Instead, we are instructed to be guided by common law principles of agency. Id. 29 A rule of employer liability deriving from traditional agency principles cannot be reduced to a universal, pat formula. It will certainly be relevant to the analysis, for example, that the alleged harasser is the plaintiff's supervisor rather than her co-worker. See, e.g., Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir.) (contrasting standard of employer liability in cases of co-worker harassment from that applicable in cases of supervisor harassment), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 831, 121 L.Ed.2d 701 (1992); Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir.1985) (suggesting that a notice requirement may be necessary in cases of co-worker harassment, but not in cases of harassment by supervisors). Yet, even such a distinction will not always be dispositive. For example, we held in Kotcher, that the employer was not liable for the hostile work environment caused by the plaintiff's supervisor absent notice or the failure to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint. 957 F.2d at 63. We went on to caution, however, that we were not dealing in absolutes and that the Kotcher rule would not necessarily apply in all cases; we noted, for example, that [a]t some point ... the actions of a supervisor at a sufficiently high level in the hierarchy would necessarily be imputed to the company. Id. at 64. 30 We have not yet had occasion to address the proper standard of employer liability where, as here, the plaintiff's supervisor created a discriminatorily abusive work environment through the use of his delegated authority. Common law principles of agency suggest that in such circumstances the employer's liability is absolute. 31 The Restatement of Agency notes that an employer will be liable for the torts of its employees committed while acting in the scope of their employment, or, if not acting in the scope of employment, if the employee purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation. Restatement (Second) of Agency Secs. 219(1) & (2)(d) (1958). Hence, when a supervisor makes employment decisions based on an employee's response to his sexual overtures, it is fair to hold the employer responsible because the supervisor is acting within at least the apparent scope of the authority entrusted to him by the employer. Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. 32 We hold that an employer is liable for the discriminatorily abusive work environment created by a supervisor if the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to further the harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the agency relationship. See Restatement (Second) of Agency Sec. 219; 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.11(c); see also Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 579 (10th Cir.1990); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (11th Cir.1987); Watts v. New York City Police Dep't, 724 F.Supp. 99, 106 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.1989). In contrast, where a low-level supervisor does not rely on his supervisory authority to carry out the harassment, the situation will generally be indistinguishable from cases in which the harassment is perpetrated by the plaintiff's co-workers; consequently, the Kotcher standard of employer liability will generally apply, and the employer will not be liable unless the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63. See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.11(d); see also Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1189 (2d Cir.1987); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1104 (2d Cir.1986). Cf. Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 579 (employer not liable absent evidence that supervisor ever invoked [his] authority in order to facilitate his harassment of plaintiff). 33 Applying these principles, we agree with Karibian that Columbia would be liable for Urban's alleged harassment regardless of the absence of notice or the reasonableness of Columbia's complaint procedures. The essence of Karibian's hostile work environment claim is that her supervisor capitalized upon his authority over her employment to force her to endure a prolonged, violent and demeaning sexual relationship. If the factfinder accepts Karibian's allegations, Columbia is liable to Karibian because Urban abused his delegated authority to create a discriminatorily abusive work environment. 34 Our conclusion that Columbia would be liable on a hostile environment claim for the harassment alleged by Karibian follows naturally from our earlier conclusion that Karibian stated a valid claim for quid pro quo harassment. Under the latter, courts have universally held employers liable for the actions of the supervisor because [t]he supervisor is deemed to act on behalf of the employer when making decisions that affect the economic status of the employee. From the perspective of the employee, the supervisor and the employer merge into a single entity. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 62. See also Carrero, 890 F.2d at 579 (in quid pro quo cases the harassing employee acts as and for the company, holding out the employer's benefits as an inducement to the employee for sexual favors); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.1989) (When a supervisor requires sexual favors as quid pro quo for job benefits, the supervisor, by definition, acts as the company.); Henson, 682 F.2d at 910 (in a quid pro quo case, the supervisor uses the means furnished to him by the employer to accomplish the prohibited purpose). It would be a jarring anomaly to hold that conduct which always renders an employer liable under a quid pro quo theory does not result in liability to the employer when that same conduct becomes so severe and pervasive as to create a discriminatorily abusive work environment. 35 Columbia argues that holding it liable for Urban's harassment is contrary to the standard of employer liability we applied in Kotcher. We disagree. In Kotcher, the gist of the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim was that her supervisor subjected her to repeated vulgar comments and gestures. 957 F.2d at 61. We held that the employer would not be liable for the supervisor's misconduct unless the employer provided no reasonable avenue for complaint, or unless it knew of the supervisor's misconduct but did nothing about it. 957 F.2d at 63. As support for this standard of liability, we relied on Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1104 (2d Cir.1986), in which the harassment was perpetrated by the plaintiff's co-workers. In both Kotcher and Snell we simply applied the law of agency to the facts before us and concluded that liability for the misconduct alleged could not be imputed to the employer. In neither Kotcher nor Snell, however, did the harasser use his actual or apparent authority to further the harassment alleged. Thus understood, our holding today is complementary to Kotcher, not inconsistent with it.