Opinion ID: 707599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Special Verdicts

Text: 41 Appellants contend that the jury responses to special verdicts 1 through 4 were consistent from the outset, and, therefore, that the resubmission contravened their Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. Appellants argue that these four special verdicts plainly indicate that the jury found that their affirmative defenses to the sex discrimination and retaliation claims had been proven; viz., that even if the defendants had not been motivated by gender or retaliation, they would have made the same employment decision. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1794, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving ... that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account.); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (where employer establishes that same employment action would have been taken absent gender discrimination, plaintiff may be awarded attorney fees, as well as appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief, but neither damages nor reinstatement are available); see also Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993) (same affirmative defense applicable to retaliation claim). Only in this way, as American sees it, can special verdicts 2 and 4, respectively, be reconciled with special verdict 8 (finding that defendants had no just cause for the layoff of plaintiff Mary Jane Kerr on November 30, 1992.). 42 Appellants reason to this conclusion from the correct premise that the jury was never instructed, either in the charge or the verdict form, that damages could not be awarded for sex discrimination, nor for retaliation, if it were to find that the defendants would have taken the same employment action in any event. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258, 109 S.Ct. at 1794. Indeed, the special verdict form itself, see supra at p. 6, p F., explicitly instructed the jury to respond to special verdicts 9 (awarding compensatory damages) and 10B (awarding punitive damages) if it answered yes to special verdicts 1, 3, 5 or 7. Any perceived inconsistency between special verdicts 2 and 4, on the one hand, and special verdicts 9 and 10B, was brought about by the absence of an instruction to bypass special verdicts 9 and 10 in the event special verdicts 2 and 4 were answered in the affirmative. An insurmountable obstacle blocks the path to the consistent verdicts scenario posited by appellants. 43 The consistency theory advanced by appellants cannot explain the jury finding (special verdict 8) that there was no just cause for Kerr's dismissal. Appellants assert that the jury could consistently find (a) that an improper factor (sex or retaliation) was present, (b) but that proper reasons accounted for Kerr's dismissal, and (c) that the presence, in this marginal way, of an improper factor could support a finding of no just cause. We do not accept the latter proposition. Under the jury instructions given by the court, defendants would have be[en] deemed to have just cause if the dismissal [had been] made on neutral, non-discriminatory grounds. The finding of no just cause, therefore, demonstrates conclusively that discriminatory intent was a decisive factor in Kerr's dismissal. 44 In our view, therefore, appellants' characterizations of the special verdicts lack the necessary plausibility to demonstrate consistency. Consequently, we now reexamine the special verdicts, and the record, to determine whether there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers consistent. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way. For a search for one possible view of the case which will make the jury's findings inconsistent results in a collision with the Seventh Amendment.). 45 Special verdicts 2 and 4 contain a latent ambiguity which originated in the special verdicts proposed by the defendants at trial; viz., neither special verdict 2 nor 4 precluded an affirmative response in the event the jury decided to respond in the affirmative to both special verdicts 1 and 3. 4 That is, since the jury found that defendants' employment decisions were motivated both by unlawful gender discrimination (special verdict 1) and by unlawful retaliation (special verdict 3), its affirmative responses to special verdicts 2 and 4 did not indicate that defendants had succeeded in establishing their affirmative defenses. Rather, the jury found, in special verdict 2, that defendants would have discharged Kerr even if they had not been motivated, in part, by unlawful gender bias (special verdict 1) because defendants at the same time harbored an unlawful retaliatory motive (special verdict 3). Conversely, even if defendants had not been motivated, in part, by unlawful retaliation (special verdict 3), the jury found in special verdict 4 that defendants would have dismissed Kerr based on their unlawful gender-based motive (special verdict 1). 46 Thus, the inconsistency perceived by appellants is both illusory and impermissible. Id. The jury correctly construed special verdicts 2 and 4--which did not preclude their consideration of the unlawful motives found in special verdicts 3 and 1, respectively--as warranting affirmative responses if the jury were to find that defendants would have dismissed Kerr in retaliation for filing the EEOC claim had they not been motivated to do so on unlawful gender-based grounds; and vice-versa. 47 In so doing, the jury rendered consistent special verdicts all around, notwithstanding the latent ambiguity in special verdicts 2 and 4. There is no inconsistency between either special verdict 2 or 4, on the one hand, and special verdict 8, since the latter asks only whether defendants had just cause for dismissing Kerr (emphasis added), whereas special verdicts 2 and 4 contemplated other unlawful motives for defendants' employment actions as well. Finally, as is obvious, there is no inconsistency between special verdicts 2 and 4, on the one hand, and special verdict 9, since the liability verdicts--special verdicts 1 and 2 (sex discrimination) and 3 and 4 (retaliation), called for jury consideration of a composite compensatory damages award (special verdict 9) on the sex discrimination and retaliation claims. Since the jury responses to special verdicts 1 and 3 found two unlawful motives (i.e., sex discrimination and retaliation, respectively) for defendants' adverse employment actions, the jury could not answer no to special verdict 2 without undermining special verdict 3, nor to special verdict 4 without undermining special verdict 1. The jury's responses to special verdict 8, and to the resubmission, are similarly explained; viz., though there was no alternative just cause for the dismissal, there were alternative unlawful motives. Accordingly, having found defendants liable to Kerr on both the sex discrimination and retaliation claims, the jury rightly proceeded to award damages.
48 Kerr correctly contends that appellants failed to preserve their claims relating to the resubmission. Shortly before the resubmission, the district court asked defendants' trial counsel to state their position regarding the following resubmission proposal: 49 What if we simply ask them, tell us what you meant? Express in writing without telling them one way or the other, what you meant when you answer[ed] questions number two and number four in the affirmative? 50 [Counsel to American]: Your Honor, well, if they're going to be questioned on that verdict form, that they be--I think that the question would be, what did you mean, as stated by your Honor. 51 In all events, any error in the resubmission--and we discern none--was harmless, as the jury merely confirmed its consistent special verdicts and the Seventh Amendment was not infringed. See supra Section II A 1.