Opinion ID: 1418766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: People to be Controlled.

Text: Almost indistinguishable from the question of the area of control is the extent of control over fishermen, both local and foreign; this is so mainly because the reasoning applied to one area is equally applicable to the other. Appellees urge a restrictive reading of Skiriotes [101] to limit the extra-territorial control over fisheries solely to residents of the State of Alaska. The effect of such a result is obvious from both a conservation and a practical standpoint. If the state has no authority to regulate non-resident fishermen of a migratory fishery species it has no effective authority to regulate the fishery. As noted in the dissenting opinion in Hjelle v. Brooks : [102] The Bering Sea king crab population data obtained by the National Marine Fisheries Service establishes that the present capacity of commercial fishermen to take king crab far exceeds the estimated maximum sustained yield of the Bering Sea Shellfish Area. Biologists generally agree that productivity of this fishery cannot be sustained absent a regulatory scheme such as that which plaintiffs presently attack... . Further, if a state is forced to distinguish between its own citizens and citizens of other states in giving extra-territorial effect to its laws, the state's own citizens can easily frustrate the legitimate objectives of these laws by simply transferring their citizenship to another state. An Alaskan citizen, for example, could easily avoid the effect of Alaska's laws by transferring his citizenship to Washington. This reality is hardly the same as that apparent in international issues since it is considerably more difficult, and less advantageous, for a citizen of one nation to change his citizenship to another nation in order to avoid the effect of his nation's extra-territorial fishing laws. Hence, a narrow reading of the citizenship limitation suggested in Skiriotes could lead to the deliberate frustration of a state's extra-territorial fishing laws. The state suggests, instead, an important and acceptable widening of the usefulness of Skiriotes by its reading of the concept citizen. If only Alaskan citizens may be restricted in their Bering Sea crabbing, the regulation will not be very efficacious in managing the stock. [103] But the state's theory would broaden the Skiriotes concept of citizen to encompass all American nationals, and hence most if not all of the Bering Sea crabbers, because of their numerous nexi with Alaska. The state's theory is based mainly on one case, but it draws on certain general principles of domestic and international law as well. The one case is Jacobson v. Maryland Racing Commission. [104] Jacobson, an owner and trainer of race horses, was licensed as such by the Maryland Racing Commission. A rule of the Commission prohibited resale of a horse claimed in a claiming race for 60 days after that race. Jacobson claimed three horses in a Maryland race and within 60 days sold them in New York. The Commission thereupon suspended his licenses, and Jacobson filed a petition asserting, among other things, that the Maryland rules could not be applied against his out-of-state activities. The court, after pointing out that only by means of a license from the Commission could one engage in racing in Maryland, held Jacobson bound by the Commission's rules. It invoked the very general proposition that acts done outside a jurisdiction which produce detrimental effects inside it justify a state in punishing he who caused the harm as if he had been present at the place of its effect. [105] It also cited Skiriotes and declared: We think that Jacobson had become a racing citizen of Maryland as far as the purposes and effects of the Rules are concerned and that this State acquired sufficient personal jurisdiction over him in matters of licensed racing to permit it to enjoin him by Rule 80 ... and to punish him if he disobeyed that rule. As applied to the crab cases, the state points to the Alaska licenses and numerous nexi of the defendants with Alaska, [106] and posits that the defendants have thereby become crab fishing citizens of Alaska. Although we are not persuaded that the state's creation of the concept of a crab fishing citizen is particularly helpful  or even appropriate  we do find Jacobson to afford sufficient rational precedent to conclude that Alaska's regulations in this case do not amount to more than a proper and logical extension of the state's police power. [107] Therefore, we find that all of the persons herein were properly charged. In order that there is no confusion with regard to our holding, we reiterate that the difference in status between each offender does not affect Alaska's jurisdiction over him. Whether the appellee was an Alaska resident (as is Vinberg), was arrested within the three-mile limit (as was Bundrant), or was arrested on the high seas in the Bering Sea crab area (as was Uri), the State may proceed to enforce its crab regulations herein against said appellee. These cases are reversed and remanded for further consideration in confomity with this opinion. [108] BOOCHEVER and BURKE, JJ., not participating.