Opinion ID: 1870908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the court err by refusing jury instruction D-3 on assumption of risk?

Text: Edwards submitted the following instruction on the doctrine of assumption of risk: The court instructs the jury that if you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that plaintiff Ellis knew or should have known that he was placing himself in a position inconsistent with his safety by chasing the vehicle on the narrow, dusty, gravel road, and that he appreciated the danger and that he deliberately and voluntarily chose to expose himself to that danger in such a manner as to assent to the continuance of this dangerous situation for two or three miles or more, then, in that event, the plaintiff Ellis assumed the risk of injury and cannot recover from the defendant and your verdict shall be for the defendant. While there is nothing inherently wrong with the instruction on its face, it was refused because it was found to be not supported by the evidence. Edwards's argument that Ellis was chasing closely behind the fleeing vehicle was not supported by any evidence. Edwards himself was disoriented and never saw the patrol car with which he collided. Ellis, on the other hand, estimated that he was 100 yards behind the fleeing vehicle and that he saw Edwards's pickup exit the dust cloud 40 to 50 yards ahead of his patrol car. Edwards makes much of the distinction as to whether Ellis was pursuing or merely following the fleeing vehicle. The fact is there was absolutely no indication, other than Edwards's bare assertion, that Ellis acted in a manner as to in any way assume the risk of such a collision as occurred. Had the trial court granted Instruction D-3, it would have introduced before the jury matters not presented in evidence. To have done so would have been error. Pevey v. Alexander Pool Co., 244 Miss. 25, 139 So.2d 847 (1962).