Opinion ID: 4201270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State’s Disclosure of Parkin.

Text: ¶35 Long before the State disclosed its intent to call Parkin as a witness, Parkin approached the prosecutor’s office and asked to make an appointment. She told a receptionist that Strang had inquired with her company about obtaining a quitclaim deed to transfer Poat’s property to him. The receptionist informed Parkin that the prosecutor already had evidence of the property transfer to which Parkin referred. Parkin did not mention that she had overheard Strang state falsely that Poat had “no living relatives.” 15 Parkin left without meeting with the prosecutor. The State first learned of Parkin’s knowledge of Strang’s statement on January 2, 2015, when, during a conversation at the courthouse between Parkin’s coworker, Dove, and the prosecutor’s assistant, Dove informed the assistant about the statement. At that point the prosecutor promptly notified Strang that the State intended to call Parkin and Dove as witnesses. Strang did not contact Parkin in the ensuing ten days before trial. ¶36 The District Court reasonably determined, given the evidence, that the State— through no fault of its own—was unaware until January 2, 2015, that Parkin knew about Strang’s comment that Poat had “no living relatives.” Prior to that date, the State did not possess “knowledge of [facts to] which [Parkin] would be testifying.” Van Voast, 247 Mont. at 202, 805 P.2d at 1385. Once the State became aware of Parkin’s knowledge of Strang’s statement, it “promptly” notified the defense and made “an appropriate disclosure.” Section 46-15-327, MCA. Although Parkin approached the prosecutor’s office well before trial, she did not alert that office to her knowledge of Strang’s comment. The District Court reasonably concluded from this that the State’s late disclosure of Parkin “was not willful.” Golder, ¶ 11. As the court noted, Strang had ten days between Parkin’s disclosure and the time of trial to interview her and seek possible rebuttal witnesses. He did neither. The District Court properly considered “the reason why disclosure was not made, whether noncompliance was willful, the amount of prejudice to the opposing party, and any other relevant circumstances.” Pierce, ¶ 20. Strang cannot show a “clear abuse of discretion”; therefore, the court’s decision not to exclude Parkin or to grant a new trial “must be upheld.” Golder, ¶ 11. 16