Opinion ID: 614400
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense Counsel's Opening Statement

Text: In opening to the jury, Roberts's counsel did not argue simply that the government would fail to produce sufficient evidence to carry its burden, that Beckford would prove not to be a credible witness, or that the government would offer no evidence to corroborate his testimony. Rather, counsel charged the government with engaging in a reckless prosecution of his client based on bad information that it had failed to corroborate. Trial Tr. at 294. Indeed, counsel charged the government with recklessness five times in the first five paragraphs of his opening. After thus establishing government recklessness as the defense theme, counsel proceeded to argue that portions of Beckford's story regarding the November 5 seizure do not add up, and that if the government would have checked it properly, they would [have] see[n] that. Id. at 295-96. The government first moved to offer Roberts's proffer statements to rebut this charge of recklessness and the implied factual assertion that it had made no effort to corroborate Beckford's information. The proffer statements would have shown that the government had corroboration, from Roberts himself, for critical aspects of Beckford's testimony about the charged drug-trafficking scheme. In opposition, defense counsel asserted that he only argued that portions of Beckford's account did not add up, which did not necessarily reference matters discussed by Roberts in his proffer statements. The district court was not obliged to accept this narrow characterization of the implied fact given that, in his opening, counsel further told the jury that the government's failure to corroborate Beckford with respect to the unspecified portions of his story call[ed] his whole account of what took place that day into serious question, id. at 296, an inference contradicted by Roberts's corroboration of the critical core of Beckford's testimony. Moreover, counsel argued that when the jury drew this inference for itself, it would ask itself how come [the government] didn't see it. Id. Counsel provided the answer: because the agents working on this case were reckless. Id. We need not here decide whether Roberts's proffer statements were admissible to rebut these assertions of a completely reckless prosecution without any kind of verification of Beckford's story, id. at 332, because the district court, acting well within its discretion, denied the government's motion to admit, noting the possibility for unfair prejudice and the early stage of the proceeding. See United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d at 119 (observing that waiver does not mandate receipt of the proffer statements in evidence and noting district court's considerable discretion to exclude even relevant evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403). The court did, however, put the defense on notice that should this theory re-emerge or should some other theory emerge that is contrary to the admissions Roberts made in his proffer statements, the court would allow the government to renew its application. Trial Tr. at 343-44.