Opinion ID: 797699
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Professor Steinberg

Text: 48 Professor Steinberg was qualified as shown not only by his resume, but also by his body of published works. According to his affidavit, prepared in January 2004, he traveled frequently to Burma, including a recent visit in August 2003 and a planned trip in February 2004. The IJ excluded his affidavit solely because he was not present to be cross examined. The presence of the author of a report and availability of the author for cross-examination, however, are not absolute requirements in immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Yang v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (8th Cir.2005) (finding error and remanding where an IJ and the BIA failed to accord weight to an affidavit from a non-testifying, facially qualified country condition expert). As described above, fairness rather than the rules of evidence govern the admissibility of evidence, and the use of a report from a qualified witness, in the absence of any specific objections, is generally fair. The weight IJ's routinely ascribe to reports by absentee authors is shown by reliance on such materials, including the State Department's country reports. Perinpanathan v. INS, 310 F.3d 594, 599 n. 1 (8th Cir.2002) (discussing the value of Department of State country condition reports in the assessment of claimed fears of persecution). Importantly, the government and the IJ in the present case did not suggest that there was any basis upon which to impugn Professor Steinberg's qualifications or to suspect bias. Had the government suggested any basis for its alleged need to cross-examine Professor Steinberg, this issue might merit greater attention. As it stands, however, the IJ's election to exclude the report of a facially unobjectionable expert without any explanation as to why cross-examination was needed is unfair and unsupportable. See, e.g., Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir.2004) (holding in an asylum case that the exclusion of a relevant expert witness's affidavit was arbitrary and required reversal where nothing in [the expert's affidavit] or in her curriculum vitae showed that she was unqualified to give expert evidence). 49 Regarding prejudice, we note that Professor Steinberg's report provided strong corroboration for Petitioner's claims the military regime in Burma conducted surveillance of individuals, mail, and telephone conversations. These claims were also corroborated by statements in the country reports, but Professor Steinberg's report added detail and explained with greater specificity the invasive and pervasive nature of the regime's surveillance practices. 4 The exclusion of his report added to the prejudice against Petitioner because one of the primary bases for finding Petitioner not credible was Petitioner's perceived waffling regarding his family's and his friends' ability or inability to use the Burmese postal system and DHL shipping. Petitioner said that use of the mail was too dangerous and that government agents would read the mail, but he also said DHL packages were less likely to be screened and his family could use the mail system if they paid bribes to the appropriate persons. While it is not unreasonable for a finder of fact to view these statements as inconsistent and rely on such inconsistencies, in part, to find a petitioner not credible, our review for prejudice under the due process argument is not so deferential to the administrative findings. Al Khouri, 362 F.2d at 466. We do not ask whether a reasonable fact finder could agree with the IJ, rather, we ask whether the procedural errors may have affected the outcome. Id. The details added by Professor Steinberg demonstrate that communication is possible but risky and support Petitioner's claims regarding a limited ability to obtain documents and letters due to danger inherent in sending such materials from Burma. This additional corroboration was important to Petitioner's claims. 5 50