Opinion ID: 2485659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of Clemency Proceeding

Text: In his next claim, Valle contends that he was denied a clemency proceeding and effective assistance of clemency counsel to which he is entitled. [20] We affirm the circuit court's denial of relief because this claim is speculative and insufficiently pled. Valle acknowledges that a clemency hearing was requested by Governor Chiles on February 6, 1992, and that it appears attorney Mark Evans was appointed to represent him during the clemency proceeding. He argues, however, that there is no indication that any clemency investigation or proceeding was actually conducted [d]ue to changes in policies and procedures instituted by Governor Chiles in the early 1990s. Valle's assertion that no clemency proceeding was ever conducted is based on the fact that he does not have any files showing that a proceeding was ever held. However, he acknowledges that clemency counsel was appointed and that he does not have clemency counsel's files. Valle's inability to determine whether he was given a clemency proceeding or whether attorney Evans did in fact represent him appears to be the result of Valle's failure to adequately investigate and present the factual basis for this claim. Although Valle complains that he requested records regarding the clemency investigations and that he cannot more fully plead these facts because he was denied access to those records, he does not assert to this Court that the circuit court erred in sustaining agency objections or that he was improperly denied public records to which he was entitled. [21] Rather, Valle speculates that no clemency proceeding was held because Governor Chiles subsequently changed the policies and procedures and no records reflect that a proceeding was held. However, [p]ostconviction relief cannot be based on speculation or possibility. Maharaj v. State, 778 So.2d 944, 951 (Fla.2000). His alternative claimthat if a proceeding was held, it was not conducted according the executive rules and he was not allowed to participateis also insufficiently pled. Valle does not allege a factual basis for this claim other than the above lack of records. As with his previous clemency allegation, Valle's claim that he was denied effective representation at his clemency proceeding because clemency counsel was incompetent or ineffective is vague and conclusory. Valle does not allege any facts to support this claim, and the documents attached to the postconviction motion do not pertain to Evans' representation of Valle, nor do they support this claim. [22] Again, [p]ostconviction relief cannot be based on speculation or possibility, Maharaj, 778 So.2d at 951, and vague and conclusory allegations on appeal are insufficient to warrant relief, Doorbal v. State, 983 So.2d 464, 482 (Fla.2008). As his final clemency-related claim, Valle argues that, assuming a clemency proceeding was conducted pursuant to Governor Chiles' original request, it did not serve the fail-safe purposes for which clemency is intended because it was done before his postconviction proceedings. In Johnston v. State, 27 So.3d 11, 24 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 459, 178 L.Ed.2d 292 (2010), we squarely rejected this claim: Johnston next contends that the clemency proceeding he was provided in 1987 was inadequate because it was held before the postconviction proceedings were concluded and before his mental health issues and life history were fully developed for consideration in the clemency process. . . . Johnston argues that clemency in Florida does not provide the fail safe that clemency is envisioned to be by the United States Supreme Court. . . . We conclude that the clemency system in Florida performed as intended in providing a fail safe for Johnston. He was given a full clemency hearing in 1987 at which he was represented by counsel. When the death warrant was signed on April 20, 2009, it stated that it has been determined that Executive Clemency, as authorized by Article IV, Section 8(a), Florida Constitution, is not appropriate. Thus, clemency was again considered by the executive branch prior to the signing of the warrant in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's summary denial of relief on all aspects of this claim.