Opinion ID: 2435258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Offensive Use Doctrine

Text: The offensive use line of cases are subsets of sanctions cases. Even if a party has a valid reason to avoid discovery, such as an evidentiary or constitutional privilege, that party, when appropriately ordered by the trial court, must elect whether to maintain the privilege or risk suffering a sanction. E.g., Republic Ins., 856 S.W.2d at 161; Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex.1985) (orig. proceeding); Henson v. Citizens Bank of Irving, 549 S.W.2d 446, 449 (Tex.App.Eastland 1977, no writ); Ginsberg, 686 S.W.2d at 107 (holding that a court may force the party avoiding discovery to choose between maintaining the privilege and risking a sanction or revealing the privileged information) (approving Henson, 549 S.W.2d at 449). The theory underlying the offensive use line of cases is that a plaintiff who is seeking affirmative relief should not be permitted to maintain the action, and at the same time maintain evidentiary privileges that protect from discovery outcome determinative information not otherwise available to the defendant. This Court, in Republic Insurance v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.1993), defined three elements necessary to conclude whether an offensive use of an evidentiary privilege is occurring: A. a party must be seeking affirmative relief; B. the party is using a privilege to protect outcome determinative information; C. the protected information is not otherwise available to the defendant. 856 S.W.2d at 161. These steps identify situations where it would be unfair to allow a party to both seek relief and deny to the defense essential evidence. Once an offensive use is shown, alternative steps follow which define the courses of action a trial court may then take: Upon a finding of offensive use, the plaintiff either 1. waives the privilege or 2. risks sanction from the trial court. The parties agree that the Republic Insurance standard governs in determining whether an offensive use occurs when a civil plaintiff asserts his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Association argues that the court of appeals misapplied the Republic Insurance test and therefore erred in finding that none of the prongs of the test were satisfied. We agree.
The first prong of the Republic Insurance test asks whether the party asserting the privilege is seeking affirmative relief. In Republic Insurance, the party exercising the privilege was seeking declaratory judgment which did not implicate any affirmative relief. The court of appeals below, however, attempted to reason by analogy that this prong of the Republic Insurance test applied to the facts in this case. 862 S.W.2d at 790. It held that by seeking an abatement, Denton was not seeking affirmative relief as contemplated by Republic Insurance. See Republic Insurance, 856 S.W.2d at 163. We disagree. Denton was seeking damages as a part of his claims. The first element is satisfied.
The second prong of the Republic Insurance test requires that the privileged information sought must be such that, if believed by the factfinder, in all probability it would have been outcome determinative of the cause of action asserted.... The confidential communication must go to the very heart of the affirmative relief sought. Id. The court of appeals reviewed the questions asked and the documents sought at the June 11, 1992 deposition and determined that while some of the questions in response to which Denton asserted his privilege were outcome determinative, others were not. 862 S.W.2d at 790. The court of appeals reviewed the questions asked and the documents sought at the June 11, 1992 deposition and determined that while some of the questions in response to which Denton asserted his privilege were outcome determinative, others were not. 862 S.W.2d at 790. The court then held that since all questions were not outcome determinative, the second prong of the Republic Insurance test was not satisfied. This conclusion is incorrect. First, we note that at the discovery hearing, the trial court narrowed the scope of the questions it ordered Denton to answer to only those questions that pertained to the claims made by Denton against the Association. It was thereafter that Denton, again, asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. These questions tracked the language used in Denton's petition. For example:  What information do you allege that Billy Don Ivey gave the Travis County District Attorney's office?  What misinformation or false statements do you allege that [Jerry] Moore, a defendant in this action, disseminated about you to members of the board of directors of the [Association]?  What false and misleading information did Jerry Moore give the Travis County District Attorney's office?  What false and misleading information do you contend that defendant Charlie Adams gave the Travis County District Attorney's office?  What false and misleading information do you contend that defendant Frank Holland gave the Travis County District Attorney's office?  What false and misleading information do you contend that defendant Mary Pat Becnel gave the Travis County District Attorney's office?  What false and misleading information do you contend that defendant Jack Pate gave the Travis County District Attorney's office?  What false and misleading information do you contend that defendant Bob Gorsky gave the Travis County District Attorney's office?  What other employees of the Texas Department of Public Safety Officers Association do you contend gave false and misleading information to the Travis County District Attorney's office?  What miscellaneous gossip ... do you contend [was used] to violate your right to privacy?  What public humiliation and emotional distress do you contend that you suffered as a result of the defendants?  What business relations and contracts did you contend were the subject of interference...?  Have you seen a physician with respect to the emotional distress alleged by you...?  Are you aware of any such misinformation [disseminated to the Association]?  Describe ... the lost business opportunities as a lobbyist that you have suffered as a result of defendants. Several of these questions go directly to the heart of Denton's claims. They asked Denton to specify either what tortious acts the defendants committed, or how he was injured. We hold that the second prong was satisfied. Republic Insurance, 856 S.W.2d at 163.
Finally, the court of appeals also erred when it used an all-or-nothing approach in considering the third prong. This prong of the Republic Insurance test examines whether the information sought could be obtained without requiring the plaintiff to forgo his privilege: [D]isclosure of the confidential communication must be the only means by which the aggrieved party may obtain the evidence. Id. The court of appeals concluded that because some of the privileged information sought could be obtained from other sources, the third prong was not satisfied. 862 S.W.2d at 791. The court, however, also recognized that some of the requested information sought could only be obtained through Denton. Id. This is enough to satisfy the third prong.