Opinion ID: 805640
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Excluded Witnesses

Text: Gordon attempted to call four (4) IRS employees from whom he sought to elicit testimony as to what representations to the IRS, or lack thereof, would be material. The district court excluded the witnesses and/or restricted their testimony on two grounds: First, that Gordon failed to comply 6 Stansfield said that Mynatt procured some of the documents from a subpoena to LMHA. While this statement was not based on personal knowledge, Gordon did not object on this ground, and in any event, the record demonstrates that this was invited error. 16 with the disclosure requirements of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(c);7 second, that it was the role of the jury to apply the law to the facts and decide whether the statements were material. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 141. The testimony elicited from the IRS witnesses would have fallen into two categories, both properly excluded. To the extent that Gordon essentially sought to introduce legal conclusions about materiality in the guise of expert testimony, that testimony was properly excluded. “Generally, an expert may not state his or her opinion as to legal standards nor may he or she state legal conclusions drawn by applying the law to the facts.” Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1328 (10th Cir. 1998). “Expert testimony on the law is excluded because the trial judge does not need the judgment of witnesses.”8 United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Second, to the extent that Gordon sought to elicit testimony as to whether the IRS would have issued a lien subordination certificate for Beach Rd., that testimony is not probative of whether Gordon’s statements were material.9 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the IRS witnesses. We do not reach the district court’s other ground for excluding the evidence.
7 Gordon argues for the first time in his reply brief that even if he did not comply with FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(c), the district court should have allowed the testimony. He cites to Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2007) for the proposition that exclusion of a witness based only on failure to comply with discovery requirements can violate a defendant’s right to present a complete defense. We do not take up this argument. See United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 517 (6th Cir. 2001). 8 Gordon did not attempt to qualify the IRS employees as experts. 9 See VI.C.1., infra, for an analysis on the legal definition of materiality. 17 During his case-in-chief, Gordon introduced letters purportedly written by his deceased accountant, Thomas Benecke (“Benecke”). Gordon offered the letters to support his contention that he relied on Benecke’s advice to his detriment. The Government did not object to the admission of the letters. Instead, the Government called Benecke’s widow, Anna Benecke, as a rebuttal witness. Anna Benecke testified that several of the signatures on the letters did not belong to her husband. Moreover, at least one of the letters listed Benecke’s business address incorrectly. During 2004, Benecke moved offices; however, a letter dated March 8, 2003 bore the address of his new office more than one year before he moved. The same letter stated that Benecke was unable to complete Gordon’s accounting because of a hospital stay and illness. Anna Benecke denied that her husband had a hospital stay during this period. A lay witness may testify as to the authenticity of handwriting “based on a familiarity with it that was not acquired for the current litigation.” FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2). Gordon sought to rebut Anna Benecke’s rebuttal testimony with the opinion of a handwriting expert. Gordon made this request at trial and in his motion for new trial. The Government was prepared to call a handwriting expert to support Anna Benecke’s testimony that the signatures did not belong to her late husband. Gordon did not have a handwriting expert on hand nor were the documents evaluated prior to trial by such an expert. The district court did not allow either expert to testify. Gordon securing expert review of the documents would have significantly delayed the trial. Further, Gordon submitted the letters, not the Government. More importantly, Gordon agreed not to call an expert if the Government agreed not to call its expert but to simply rely on Anna’s testimony. 18 At the hearing on Gordon’s motion for new trial, Gordon attempted to introduce testimony from a police officer who he represented to the district court was a handwriting expert. Analysis from a handwriting expert did not constitute newly discovered evidence; it was an attempt to relitigate an issued decided against him at trial. The district court did not err in handling Gordon’s handwriting expert request.