Opinion ID: 1383224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of unadjudicated bad acts

Text: Ferguson contends that the trial court plainly erred in allowing the state to present evidence of unadjudicated bad acts through the testimony of penalty phase witnesses Holly Viehland and Mike Thompson without giving notice of the evidence prior to trial. Because Ferguson did not object to this evidence, he must show plain error under the manifest injustice standard. Rule 30.20. Contrary to Ferguson's contention, he was clearly on notice that the state would call Viehland and Thompson because the state called them as witnesses during the penalty phase at Ferguson's first trial. Although extensive evidence of a serious unconvicted crime is inadmissible in the penalty phase if the state provides no timely notice that it intends to introduce the evidence, it is not plain error to introduce the evidence if it was introduced at an earlier trial. State v. Chambers, 891 S.W.2d 93, 107 (Mo. banc 1994). Ferguson also briefly alleges that the state failed to comply with section 565.005, RSMo 1994, by failing to provide notice of all the statutory aggravators that it intended to prove and the witnesses it intended to call in the penalty phase. This claim, however, is not in the Point Relied On in his brief, and, therefore, it is not preserved for appellate review. In any event, Ferguson cannot claim that he was prejudiced because all of the statutory aggavators submitted to the jury in the second trial were disclosed prior to the first trial. Additionally, Ferguson claims in his point relied on that the admission of unadjudicated bad acts in the penalty phase (other than the two assaults that were specifically instructed on) violates due process because the state is not required to prove those acts beyond a reasonable doubt. Ferguson offers no argument in support of the claim, probably because it has been repeatedly rejected by this Court. State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 331 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 854, 118 S.Ct. 149, 139 L.Ed.2d 95 (1997). The point is denied.