Opinion ID: 22771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 11 In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Aubin, 87 F.3d 141, 144 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. McDow, 27 F.3d 132, 135 (5th Cir. 1994) (also noting that the reviewing court must accept all reasonable inferences which tend to support the jury's verdict). The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, and the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence. United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1551 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1156 (1995). 12 Dadi first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conspiracy charge. Under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government must prove that (1) two or more persons conspired to pursue an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant knew of the unlawful objective and voluntarily agreed to join the conspiracy with the intent to further the objective; and (3) one or more of the members of the conspiracy committed an overt act in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. See United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1519 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Campbell, 64 F.3d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). The government must prove the same degree of criminal intent as is necessary for proof of the underlying substantive offense. See United States v. Bordelon, 871 F.2d 491, 493-94 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 838 (1989). In Pettigrew, all the evidence pointing toward the agreement and intent elements of the crime was circumstantial. The court affirmed the conviction because the evidence was such that a rational juror could infer both these elements of the offense. See Pettigrew, 77 F.3d at 1519. 13 Dadi argues that here there was no evidence of an agreement, citing Mackvandian's testimony that there was no agreement to defraud a bank, and that he was unaware that any of the checks involved in the scheme were counterfeit. Dadi also cites the testimony of Yvette Reyes that she never agreed to defraud a bank. But these disclaimers must be weighed against all the evidence of activity from which an unlawful agreement may be inferred. 14 The government, of course, contends that the evidence indicating a conspiracy outweighs Mackvandian's and Yvette Reyes' disclaimers. Several pieces of evidence support this argument: for example, Dadi and Khayambashi had a close relationship; Dadi recommended Khayambashi to the Wallis State Bank; Dadi's fingerprints were found on counterfeit checks drawn on Khayambashi's account; and checks drawn on that account were passed through Homa Dadi's account. Dadi assisted Mackvandian and Khayambashi in acquiring bank accounts through which counterfeit checks were later funneled. Mackvandian also admitted at trial that he thought he and Dadi were using other people's money without their knowledge or consent. And Dadi received most of the profits from the transactions involving the counterfeit checks. 15 In some situations, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fraudulent intent. See Crowe v. Henry, 115 F.3d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Ryan, 213 F.3d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 2000) (Intent to defraud can be proven by circumstantial evidence and by inferences drawn from the scheme itself.). Fraudulent intent may be found from circumstantial evidence that one party arranged matters with another party in such a way as would facilitate the commission of fraud, especially where the evidence further shows that the first party gained money or advantage at the expense of the second. Crowe, 115 F.3d at 297. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the circumstantial evidence available in this case is more than sufficient to support an inference that Dadi was guilty of the § 371 conspiracy. 16 Dadi next argues that there was insufficient evidence to show specific intent to defraud a bank or that he voluntarily participated in an agreement to defraud a bank. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1344, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowing[ly] execute[d] or attempt[ed] to execute a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises. Campbell, 64 F.3d at 975. 17 The bank fraud charge is premised on the $95,728 check that was deposited in the account of Stella Reyes at the Texas Commerce Bank. Dadi argues that because Mackvandian and Yvette Reyes testified that they never agreed with Dadi to defraud a bank, and because there was no proof that Dadi knew the $95,728 check was counterfeit, there was insufficient evidence of bank fraud. These assertions do nothing to explain what Dadi thought he was doing when he deposited a $95,728 Southern Polymer check he claims he didn't know was counterfeit, into the bank account of a deceased woman, and later withdrew funds from that account. This evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury of Dadi's guilt. 18 Dadi also disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to support the aiding and abetting charges. To convict under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, the government must prove that the defendant 'knowingly engage[d] or attempt[ed] to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity.' United States v. Dupre, 117 F.3d 810, 821 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)). To prove that a defendant aided and abetted the commission of a criminal offense, the government must show that the defendant intentionally associated with, and participated in, the criminal venture and acted to make the venture succeed. See United States v. Beuttenmuller, 29 F.3d 973, 981 (5th Cir. 1994). 19 Most of the counts at issue involve banking transactions by Mackvandian. Because Mackvandian is implicated as a counterfeiter and as a participant in this scheme, Dadi argues that---to the extent that Mackvandian's testimony implicated Dadi---Mackvandian's testimony is not credible. This assertion is unavailing on appeal. The credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury and its determinations demand deference. See United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 567 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000). 20 Dadi also argues that the only evidence against him is his familial relationships with Homa Dadi, Yvette, Yvonne and Stella. However, Dadi is asking this court to ignore persuasive evidence that he assisted others in procuring bank accounts for the purpose of depositing and withdrawing funds from counterfeit checks. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict appears to support an inference that the elements of the aiding and abetting charge were present.