Opinion ID: 216967
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Probity

Text: To determine if evidence of other acts is probative of intent, we look to whether the evidence relates to conduct that is `substantially similar and reasonably near in time' to the specific intent offense at issue. United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 721 (quoting United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir.1985)). This court has repeatedly recognized that prior drug-distribution evidence is admissible [under Rule 404(b)] to show intent to distribute. United States v. Ayoub, 498 F.3d 532, 548 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Jenkins, 345 F.3d at 938 (collecting cases)); United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 443 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Ayoub ); see also United States v. Love, 254 Fed.Appx. 511, 518 (6th Cir.2007) (same). As the Government asserts, there is ample support for its position. For example, in United States v. Mauldin, 109 F.3d 1159 (6th Cir.1997), the defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine as well as firearms charges after police discovered the drugs in his vehicle during a Terry stop. The defendant contended he did not commit the charged crime. This court allowed the government to introduce evidence that the defendant previously sold some cocaine. Because the government was obligated to prove that Mauldin possessed the cocaine and that he did so with the specific intent of distributing it, the evidence of a similar act of possession was admissible. Id. at 1161 (citation omitted). This court also found the evidence more probative than prejudicial because [b]oth events occurred near the same location, the prior sale was for a substantial quantity of drugs, and the amount of money involved was inconsistent with personal use. Id. In United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350 (6th Cir.1997), the defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The defendant denied possession. The government introduced evidence of four prior drug transactions. The Myers court ruled the evidence admitted for a proper purpose, citing Johnson, 27 F.3d at 1192-93. In Ayoub, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of four prior controlled buys of marijuana from Ayoub at his home, which occurred four years prior to the charged offense. This court held the evidence was admissible to show identity of the possessor of the guns and drugs and intent to distribute the drugs. Ayoub, 498 F.3d at 548. [1] Nevertheless, as this court recently recognized, on the question of whether proof of a defendant's prior convictions was probative of specific intent, [o]ur precedents are hard to reconcile on this point. Jenkins, 593 F.3d at 485 (comparing Johnson, 27 F.3d at 1192 (stating that where the crime charged is one requiring specific intent, the prosecutor may use 404(b) evidence to prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent) with Bell, 516 F.3d at 444 (stating that to be probative of a defendant's present intent to possess and distribute, his prior convictions for drug distribution must be related in some way to the present crime for which the defendant is on trial)). Hardy relies chiefly on Bell. See Bell, 516 F.3d at 441-46 (holding that four prior state drug convictions were improperly admitted because they were for offenses that occurred several years previously and were not alleged to be part of the same scheme to distribute drugs or to involve a similar modus operandi  and as such, were not probative of whether Bell intended to possess and distribute drugs on the charges at issue). [2] However, as the Government points out, Bell is inconsistent with prior precedent and is therefore not controlling. See, e.g., Dupont Dow Elastomers, LLC v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that [w]hen a later decision of this court conflicts with the holding of a prior decision, it is the earlier case that controls); Salmi v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1985) (A panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.). Given this Circuit's precedent, it cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion on the issue of probity.