Opinion ID: 1869289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Grant Directed Verdict for Possession of Burglary Tools

Text: Appellant also argues that the trial court committed error when it failed to direct a verdict in his favor regarding possession of burglary tools because there was insufficient proof that his screwdriver was used in the burglary; knives were also recovered from Smith; and there was no evidence as to what tool was used. However, there was evidence that the bar was broken into, and the bar's co-owner testified that the door, pool tables, storage cabinets, and the cash register drawer were damaged. Latches secured by padlocks on the metal liquor cabinets had been pried off. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that Appellant's screwdriver was intended for his use in the burglary, or that he had knowledge that it was intended to be used by Smith for this purpose. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991), sets out the test for a directed verdict as follows: On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Id. A person is in possession of burglar's tools when ... he possesses any tool, instrument or other thing adapted, designed or commonly used for committing or facilitating the commission of an offense involving forcible entry into premises or theft by a physical taking under circumstances which leave no reasonable doubt as to his: (a) Intention to use the same in the commission of an offense of such character; or (b) Knowledge that some other person intends to use the same in the commission of an offense of such character. KRS 511.050(1). Here, Appellant did not dispute that his co-defendant, Smith, was in possession of burglary tools, but he denied that he had participated in the burglary. Appellant argues that even though he was apprehended near the scene of the burglary with stolen goods and a screwdriver, there was merely a possible inference that the screwdriver used was a burglary tool, and that this conviction therefore fails the Sawhill scintilla of evidence test. See Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1983). Even-though it was before the current statute, Kentucky's highest court long ago persuasively addressed the argument raised by Appellant: the tools or implements and other things in the possession of the defendant, in this character of prosecution, need not be articles especially manufactured and designed for the use of burglars alone, but they may be any tools, implements, or things which in the language of the statute are used by burglars for housebreaking, forcing doors, windows, locks, or buildings, etc., although they may be such as are adapted for use in the accomplishment of lawful and legitimate purposes. If the language of the statute should be construed so as to require that such tools, etc., should be specially manufactured and designed for burglarious purposes, we doubt if any defendant could ever be convicted under the statute, not only because, as we surmise, that there is no such manufacturing establishment, but also because of the great difficulty which the commonwealth would encounter in proving that fact, to say nothing about the strained construction of the statute which that interpretation would require. If the tools are such that they may be used to commit burglary, and the circumstances be such as to lead a reasonably prudent man to believe beyond doubt that the intention of their possessor was to use them for that purpose, the offense is complete. We feel that this interpretation of the statute is so plain as to need no fortification of authorities. But all the courts before which the question has been presented, so far as we are able to learn, have adopted the same view.... Commonwealth v. Riley, 192 Ky. 153, 232 S.W. 630, 632-33 (1921); see also KRS 511.050 cmt (Substantial difficulty exists with this element because tools or instruments used by burglars are not peculiarly designed for that purpose. To minimize this difficulty, KRS 511.050 describes the items as things that are `adapted, designed or commonly used' for purposes of forcible takings and intrusions. With this description, it should be obvious that almost all burglar tools will have a legitimate, noncriminal purpose. (This means that the offense has some inherent danger for innocent persons.) That danger is minimized by the third element. Once possession of such instruments is shown, conviction is appropriate only after proof of the existence of circumstances which leave no reasonable doubt as to the possessor's criminal intention or knowledge of another's intent.). Given that when Appellant was apprehended near the bar he was in possession of stolen goods, that numerous parts of the bar had been damaged and pried open, and that he was in possession of a screwdriver, there was more than a mere scintilla of evidence that he had used the screwdriver as a burglar's tool. [F]acts may be established by circumstantial evidence. Gregory v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Ky.1980); Goss v. Personnel Bd., 456 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Ky.1970); see also Little v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Ky.1968) (We have held many times that a criminal conviction may be sustained on the basis of circumstantial evidence.). [A]n inference from circumstantial evidence is a conclusion drawn on the basis of probabilities. Goss, 456 S.W.2d at 826. [A]n inference from circumstantial evidence may vary in strength according to the degree of probability reflected by it, being strong enough in one case to require a directed verdict while in another case having only enough strength to create a jury issue. Id. Given the evidence against Appellant in this case (far more than a mere scintilla of evidence under Sawhill ), the question of whether he was in possession of burglar's tools was a question for the jury, and it found that he was. Additionally, Appellant admits in his brief that he was taking Smith where he could sell the stolen goods, and the jury could also have inferred that he had knowledge that Smith (who pled guilty to the burglary) intended to use the screwdriver in the burglary, in which case Appellant was also guilty of possessing burglar's tools under KRS 511.050. Therefore, under the evidence as a whole, it was not clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, and Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal regarding possession of burglar's tools. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.