Opinion ID: 1700483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Receipt of Testimony.

Text: At all times during and prior to the date Brower wrote cancelled on the Tom-Har stock of Schuessler and Meginnis, § 9-504 read in pertinent part: (1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.... . . . . (3) ... [R]easonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor.... Under that version of § 9-504, compliance with the notice requirement was a condition precedent to the secured creditor's right to recover a deficiency which the creditor had the burden of pleading and of proving. Mason State Bank v. Sekutera, 236 Neb. 361, 461 N.W.2d 517 (1990); Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974). Thus, if the actions Brower took on behalf of Sports Courts constituted a disposition of the Tom-Har stock, Sports Courts would not have been able to recover a deficiency judgment in the underlying case on the note executed in its favor by Tom-Har, Schuessler, and Meginnis. In that connection, we should note that Sports Courts contends that even if Brower's actions constituted a disposition of the stock without proper notice, neither he nor his firm may use that prior negligence on their part to insulate them from liability on their subsequent negligence in permitting the underlying case to be dismissed. Because, as becomes clear later, we need not concern ourselves with that contention, we do not do so. There being no dispute as to the actions Brower took in connection with the capital stock of Tom-Har, whether those actions constitute a disposition of the stock as contemplated by § 9-504 resolves itself into a matter of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law. See Sylvis v. Walling, 248 Neb. 168, 532 N.W.2d 312 (1995). We have previously pointed out that expert testimony is relevant and admissible only if it tends to help the trier of fact understand the evidence or to determine a fact issue and that expert testimony concerning the status of the law does not tend to accomplish either of these goals; as a consequence, expert testimony concerning a question of law is generally not admissible in evidence. Schmidt v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 245 Neb. 776, 515 N.W.2d 756 (1994); Kaiser v. Western R/C Flyers, 239 Neb. 624, 477 N.W.2d 557 (1991); Sasich v. City of Omaha, 216 Neb. 864, 347 N.W.2d 93 (1984); Neb.Evid.R. 401, 402, and 702, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 27-401, 27-402, and 27-702 (Reissue 1989). See, also, State v. Thomas, 236 Neb. 553, 462 N.W.2d 862 (1990) (expert testimony generally not admissible as proof counsel was ineffective). Thus, the district court erred in receiving the opinion of a law professor concerning the status of the law.