Opinion ID: 2050023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Garage Floor

Text: On appeal, Beaulieu argues that: (1) his implied warranty that the garage would be built in a workmanlike manner had expired in June, 1978, when the Parsons served their complaint; (2) the Parsons failed to give him timely notice of the defects in the garage floor; and (3) either the Parsons and Beaulieu reached an accord and satisfaction in March, 1975, barring the Parsons' claim, or the Parsons waived their claim by accepting the garage with knowledge of its defects. In Gosselin v. Better Homes, Inc., Me., 256 A.2d 629, 639 (1969) we held: Notwithstanding the absence of an express provision respecting the quality of the work to be done or the manner of its performance in any oral or written construction contract, the law implies therein an undertaking to perform the work in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike manner, .... Beaulieu contends that because the custom among contractors in the Durham area is to guarantee their work for no more than one year, the implied warranty that the garage floor would be built in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike manner expired one year after the garage was completed. It is true that a contractor does not guarantee that his work will be perfect for all time; he warrants that what he builds will be constructed in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike manner. Wimmer v. Down East Properties, Inc., Me., 406 A.2d 88, 93 (1979). Defects which later become apparent are evidence that may indicate that the building was not constructed in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike manner. The warranty of workmanlike performance does not expire after an arbitrary time period. Rather, as time passes, it becomes more likely that defects which arise would arise even though the contractor's work was of the quality that would be done by a worker of average skill and competence, and it is therefore less likely that the contractor breached his warranty of workmanlike performance. In the instant case, the evidence shows that the garage floor cracked during the first winter after Beaulieu completed construction. Defects occurring within such a short time period are competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that the garage was not installed in a workmanlike manner in that a slab was laid without a frost wall .... Whether a buyer of new construction must give notice within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered a breach of warranty is an unanswered question in this state. [3] Beaulieu did not raise the issue of notice at trial. [4] By failing to do so, Beaulieu waived his right to argue on appeal that the Parsons' failure to give him timely notice of the breach bars the Parsons from any recovery. See Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., Me., 401 A.2d 148, 153 (1979); Harrington v. Inhabitants of Town of Garland, Me., 381 A.2d 639, 642-43 (1978). The trial court found that the Parsons were estopped from collecting any alleged overcharges. In December of 1974, Beaulieu presented the Parsons with a bill for $1,495. The Parsons objected; Beaulieu then presented a reduced bill for $1,023.40 which the Parsons finally paid in March, 1975. Beaulieu now argues that this sequence of events resulted in an accord and satisfaction barring the Parsons' recovery for the breach evidenced by the defective garage floor. [5] Assuming, as Beaulieu contends, that the trial court intended to find an accord and satisfaction between the Parsons and Beaulieu, the question of what claims the parties intended to satisfy is presented. The trial court awarded damages for Beaulieu's breach of warranty in constructing the garage, yet also found an accord and satisfaction of some claims because of payment of the reduced bill. Obviously, the trial court must have found that the Parsons' claim for damages from the breach was not among the claims which the parties intended to satisfy. Where an accord and satisfaction is alleged, the question of what the parties intended is one of fact. Larsen v. Zimmerman, 153 Me. 116, 121, 135 A.2d 270, 273 (1975). The burden of proof is upon the party asserting that an accord and satisfaction of a particular demand was reached. Bryson v. Kenney, Me., 430 A.2d 1102, 1104 (1981). While there is evidence that the Parsons were aware of cracks in the garage floor in the winter of 1974-75, no evidence indicates that they communicated this knowledge to Beaulieu. Neither the original bill nor the reduced bill referred, on its face, to claims for damages; rather, the Parsons' objections to the original bill centered mainly on labor charges connected with antenna, telephone wire, paint, water heater, spreading gravel, closet. Thus, there is competent evidence supporting the trial court's exclusion of the Parsons' damage claim from those claims upon which the parties reached an accord and satisfaction. Beaulieu also argues that the Parsons waived their claim for damages when they paid the reduced bill in that they then accepted the garage with knowledge of its defects. It is alleged and admitted in the pleadings that on or about June 24, 1974, Beaulieu agreed to construct a slab foundation and garage. The garage was constructed in the fall of 1974; the first cracks appeared in the winter of 1974-75. Beaulieu agreed to construct the garage and its concrete slab foundation for $2,500; the reduced bill paid by the Parsons in March, 1975, was for extra work not contemplated in that contract. Thus, there is no evidence to show that payment of the reduced bill was an acceptance of the garage. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.