Opinion ID: 215507
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mental Condition

Text: But [t]he same regulation that imposes the requirement of contacting an EEO counselor provides that the time limit shall be extended when the complainant was prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control from contacting the counselor within the specified time. Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir.2008) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2); Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir.1996)). [M]ental disability can be a ground for equitable tolling generally in federal law. Id. For example, courts have held that mental disability can toll the time in which an employment discrimination claimant must file a discrimination suit, file an administrative complaint, or contact an EEO counselor. Id. (internal citations omitted). We have held that a plaintiff seeking tolling on the ground of mental incapacity must come forward with evidence that a mental condition prevented him from understanding and managing his affairs generally and from complying with the deadline he seeks to toll.  Id. at 715 (emphasis added). Courts that have allowed equitable tolling based on mental illness have done so only in exceptional circumstances, such as where the complainant is institutionalized or adjudged mentally incompetent. Lyons v. Potter, 521 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir.2008). We have observed that the standard for tolling due to mental illness is a high one. Id. In Jessie, we rejected the appellant's tolling argument based on mental incapacity, noting that although one of the medical opinions that the appellant submitted mentioned depression, the opinion g[ave] no further information that would shed light on whether the depression affected her ability to understand her legal rights or act upon them. 516 F.3d at 715. Furthermore, the appellant failed to file any medical records or opinions indicating that she was deprived of her reasoning faculties or was incapable of understanding or managing her affairs. Id. Here, to support her claim of mental incapacity, Dr. Wilkie relies on the testimony of Dr. Kathleen Hughes-Kuda, a psychiatrist who opined that Dr. Wilkie seemed pretty stressed and depressed during the period of 2003 to 2005. Dr. Hughes-Kuda also testified that she personally witnessed Bercier's intrusions at Dr. Wilkie's home and saw the stress and depression that the intrusions caused Dr. Wilkie. Dr. Wilkie also relies on the testimony of John Wegerle, a friend, who testified that Dr. Wilkie was depressed and stressed during this time period. But, as in Jessie, neither Dr. Hughes-Kuda's nor Wegerle's testimony satisfies the high standard for tolling due to mental incapacity. Like in Jessie, the testimony describing her disabilities mentions `depression,' but it gives no further information that would shed light on whether the depression affected her ability to understand her legal rights or act upon them. 516 F.3d at 715. And, Dr. Wilkie has filed no medical records or opinions indicating that she was deprived of her reasoning faculties or was incapable of understanding or managing her affairs. Id. Accordingly, Dr. Wilkie's claim for equitable tolling based on mental incapacity fails.