Opinion ID: 796039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 48 We first address Joseph's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. See, e.g., United States v. Aarons, 718 F.2d 188, 189 n. 1 (6th Cir.1983) (Where the sufficiency of the evidence is properly before us, we consider that issue first because it is determinative of whether the appellant may be retried.). In a due-process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, clearly established Supreme Court precedent provides that the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 49 Joseph argues that the state court unreasonably applied Jackson in that there was no evidence of the critical element of the capital specification: being the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder. In the habeas context, [t]he Jackson standard must be applied `with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.' Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 2781). Thus, we turn to the Ohio courts' definition of the capital specification at issue here. 50 As we have already noted, the correct version of the single capital specification with which Joseph was charged requires the defendant to be the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2929.04(A)(7) (1987). The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this element to require the defendant to be the actual killer. State v. Taylor, 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 612 N.E.2d 316, 325 (1993); State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 571 N.E.2d 97, 122 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 99, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992); State v. Penix, 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 N.E.2d 744, 746 (1987); see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (acknowledging this interpretation). Other formulations of actual killer are that the defendant personally performed every act constituting the offense of aggravated murder, State v. Sneed, 63 Ohio St.3d 3, 584 N.E.2d 1160, 1168 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 983, 113 S.Ct. 1577, 123 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993); see also State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 703 N.E.2d 1251, 1264-65 (1999) (approving a similar instruction), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 846, 120 S.Ct. 118, 145 L.Ed.2d 100 (1999); State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 702 N.E.2d 866, 884 (1998) (same), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1042, 119 S.Ct. 2407, 144 L.Ed.2d 805 (1999), or directly caused the death, State v. Stallings, 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 731 N.E.2d 159, 173 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 836, 122 S.Ct. 89, 151 L.Ed.2d 51 (2001). However, it is not enough that the defendant simply ha[d] hands-on involvement in a homicide. State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 819 N.E.2d 215, 240-41 (2004); see also State v. Skatzes, No. 15848, 2003 WL 24196406, at  (Ohio Ct.App. Jan.31, 2003) (unpublished opinion) (explaining that it is not enough for the defendant to be an escort or a mere provider of a weapon.). 51 There have been many cases where the evidence has been sufficient to show that the defendant was the actual killer. When the victim died of gunshot wounds, there was evidence that the defendant fired the shots. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 839 N.E.2d 362, 370, 377 (2006); State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 781 N.E.2d 88, 96-97, 105 (2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 907, 123 S.Ct. 2256, 156 L.Ed.2d 118 (2003); State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 776 N.E.2d 1061, 1073, 1093 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1037, 123 S.Ct. 2079, 155 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2003); State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 767 N.E.2d 216, 241 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1023, 123 S.Ct. 533, 154 L.Ed.2d 433 (2002); Stallings, 731 N.E.2d at 173; State v. Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 709 N.E.2d 1166, 1177 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1120, 120 S.Ct. 944, 145 L.Ed.2d 820 (2000). When the victim died of head trauma, there was evidence that the defendant struck the blows. See Skatzes, 819 N.E.2d at 231-32, 241. When the victim died of knife wounds, there was evidence that the defendant stabbed the victim. See State v. Stojetz, 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 705 N.E.2d 329, 337 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 999, 120 S.Ct. 455, 145 L.Ed.2d 376 (1999). Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the principal-offender/actual-killer element to mean that the defendant personally inflicted the death blow(s). 8 52 In rejecting Joseph's Jackson claim, the Ohio Supreme Court cited the following evidence. Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 293. First, there was evidence of motive, as Joseph was jealous of the relationship between Wireman and Young. Second, Joseph admitted that he and Bulerin were out driving Forest's white Cutlass on the night of the murder, and a matching vehicle was seen near Wireman's house. Third, Young's body was found buried on Joseph's grandparents' property, wrapped in material (Visqueen) available to Joseph, near a mask like one owned by Joseph. Fourth, [Young] suffered two stab wounds, either of which could have been fatal, and the knife always kept in the car was missing the morning of the disappearance. The state points to no additional evidence in its briefs before this court, and there is none apparent in the record. 53 It is immediately apparent, however, that none of this evidence shows that Joseph personally inflicted either stab wound. This fact does not present an obstacle to conviction in a case where the defendant was the only person either present when the victim was murdered or otherwise involved in the crime, the logic being that he is the only person who could have actually committed the murder. But when the defendant and a coconspirator are present at the time and place of the murder, there must be evidence showing that the defendant struck the fatal blow(s). See State v. Cunningham, 105 Ohio St.3d 197, 824 N.E.2d 504, 512, 531 (2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 110, 163 L.Ed.2d 122 (2005); Taylor, 612 N.E.2d at 325. 54 All indications are that Joseph was neither alone with Young on the night of the murder nor the only person involved in the crime; Bulerin was both present and involved in other ways. Indeed, the very evidence cited by the Ohio Supreme Court to implicate Joseph also implicates Bulerin. The evidence that placed Joseph at the scene (witnesses saw Forest's car in front of Wireman's home) also put Bulerin at the scene, as the two men were driving around together in Forest's car the night of Young's disappearance and murder. 9 Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 289. The fact that Young's body was wrapped in Visqueen implicates Bulerin as well as Joseph, as both had access to the material. Id. at 289. And the fact that Young's body was discovered on Joseph's grandparents' property also implicates Bulerin as well as Joseph, as two days after the murder, both men talked to a coworker about hauling trash to that property. Id. at 290. There was other evidence of Bulerin's involvement, too: both Joseph and Bulerin often borrowed Forest's car and kept items in it, id. at 288, 289, and Bulerin changed the tires of Forest's car the day after Young's disappearance even though they were new, id. 55 There was also evidence that Joseph and Bulerin, who shared a residence, id. at 288, were close. As Chief Justice Moyer demonstrated in dissent, their relationship supplied Bulerin with ample motive to kill Young: 56 [T]estimony was presented that the co-defendant Bulerin . . . was highly involved with martial arts, and protective of his kid (Joseph). Forest confirmed that Bulerin had indicated that he would either snap your neck or put a bullet through your head and throw you out alongside the road if you ever screwed with or messed with him or Joseph. Joseph's mother testified that, on one occasion when her son was ill, Bulerin told her not to waste [her] time in attempting to take Joseph home with her because she wasn't going to get [her] son. She testified that Bulerin had threatened to break into her home and take something, or kill her dogs. At Joseph's mitigation hearing, Bulerin's ex-wife testified that, while she could not believe Joseph actually killed Young, she could believe that behavior of Bulerin. 57 Id. at 301 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (second and third alterations in original). 10 In light of all this evidence connecting both Joseph and Bulerin to the murder, it is not surprising that the two men were jointly indicted. Id. at 290. Indeed, the state's entire theory of the case was that the two acted together. 58 Of course, the evidence of Bulerin's presence at the scene and other involvement does not rule out the possibility that Joseph was the actual killer. It means, however, that actual killing cannot be attributed to Joseph simply because he was involved and present at the scene. See Cunningham, 824 N.E.2d at 512, 531; Taylor, 612 N.E.2d at 325. Because either of the two knife wounds in Young may have been fatal, the state had to prove that Joseph personally inflicted at least one of the wounds, but it offered no evidence of this whatsoever. In fact, the state conceded this very point during its closing argument: The State of Ohio can't tell you. I wish I could. I wish I could tell you exactly what happened. I don't know who struck the death blow. 11 J.A. at 3907 (Trial Tr. at 1976). Thus, the evidence showed at most that Joseph ha[d] hands-on involvement in a homicide, Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 819 N.E.2d 215, 240-41, which is insufficient to prove that he was the actual killer. 59 In light of the clear line of precedent requiring proof that Joseph was the actual killer, the equally clear precedent that the actual-killer element requires proof that the defendant personally inflicted the death blows in a situation where (as here) the defendant and a coconspirator are both present at the scene, and the total absence of such proof (accompanied by the state's concession that it could not offer such proof, to boot), we conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision was an unreasonable application of the due-process standard of Jackson v. Virginia. 11