Opinion ID: 1615498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Argument in this Case was Improper

Text: In this case, the prosecutor's attack was wrong, unprofessional, and demeaning to a proper sense of justice and the legal system. As this Court previously held, calling Banks the Devil is improper. State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 750 (Mo. banc 1997). The trial court's failure to sustain the objection to the argument compounds the error. There is a long history of precedent dealing with ad hominem attacks generally and this particular argument specifically. As early as 1890 this Court said that calling the defendant the devil was mere personal abuse of the prisoner, and not to be tolerated in any tribunal calling itself a court of justice. State v. Young, 99 Mo. 666, 12 S.W. 879, 884 (1890) (emphasis added). In State v. Barrington, 198 Mo. 23, 95 S.W. 235, 257 (1906), the trial court, sua sponte, directly and severely rebuked counsel in front of the jury, even referring to counsel by name. Id. In light of the trial court's corrective actions, the Court said that the prosecutor's language was not of that low order of abuse and denunciation of defendant as indicated in the decisions which this court has held prejudicial error. Id. In other words, the trial judge's rebuke of the prosecutor cured the prejudice because the remark was not so low that a mistrial was required. An argument could be so improper that not even the sustaining of an objection and a purportedly curative instruction could cure the prejudice. This Court returned to this issue in 1919 when a woman was convicted of running a bawdyhouse. State v. Goodwin, 217 S.W. 264, 266 (Mo.1919). The prosecutor told the jury that she has the devil in her heart and is guilty of white slavery. Id. The trial court sustained the objection. Nevertheless, this Court reversed, saying: The action of the court was wholly insufficient. Trial judges are clothed with abundant authority to conduct the proceedings of their courts with dignity and to prevent appeals to mere passion and prejudice, and it is their duty on proper occasion to exercise that authority with salutary vigor. Id. at 267. The Court held that in the absence of a strong rebuke, prejudicial error occurred. Id. The State insists that the remark in this case was proper and was supported by the evidence. This Court disagrees. The State points to no evidence that Banks was in fact the devil and the crime scene was hell. The remark was pure hyperbole, an ad hominem personal attack designed to inflame the jury. The prosecutor may prosecute with vigor and strike blows but he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. State v. Burnfin, 771 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Mo. App.1989). Trial courts have wide discretion in controlling closing arguments, but they abuse that discretion when they allow plainly unwarranted and injurious arguments. State v. Hahn, 37 S.W.3d 344, 356 (Mo.App.2000). It would have been enough for the prosecutor to say that the state does not find angels as witnesses in crack houses. But the closing argument goes on to compare Banks to these admittedly non-angelic witnesses. And the intended comparison is clear: Banks is even worse (a person having the worst of character) than the state's witnesses. The trial court erred when it overruled Banks' objection to the improper argument.