Opinion ID: 3212672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cell Phone Location Testimony

Text: Ridley also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district judge allowed a non‐expert FBI agent to testify about a map showing the locations of Ridley’s and Johnson’s cell phones the day before and day of the robbery. The defense did not object to the testimony at trial, however. We find no plain error. As part of the investigation, the FBI obtained the cell phone records for Ridley and Johnson. The records showed that Ridley’s phone was in southern Illinois near Hoyleton in the early hours of May 7. Johnson’s phone records showed a similar pattern. Ridley and Johnson had also called each other several times on May 6 and 7. Special Agent Dolan, who has special technical training in interpreting the raw data provided in the cell records, used those records to create a map that showed call locations. The finished map was intended to be, as FBI Special Agent Nich‐ olas Manns put it colorfully, “agent‐proof,” that is, clear enough that technical expertise would not be required to ex‐ plain or understand it. The government presented the evi‐ dence not through Dolan but through Manns. Manns testified that “the records provide what we call cell site data, which … when we use the phone it touches towers and the towers transfer, etc., so we’re able to tell from those towers where the phone” was located. Manns added that the “FBI has specialized agents that are very good at analyzing these phone records,” but also noted that the records were “pretty self‐explanatory.” Manns also said he was “not real No. 15‐1309 7 tech savvy” but that the map was easy to understand. The map was then admitted into evidence without objection. Manns explained the map and various cell locations on May 6 and 7 placing Ridley’s cell phone in the vicinity of the rob‐ bery. Again, the defense did not object. When a party makes a timely objection to admitting evi‐ dence, we review the decision for abuse of discretion, giving considerable deference to the trial judge on the spot. E.g., United States v. Wantuch, 525 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2008). But because Ridley did not object to this testimony by Agent Manns, we review only for plain error. United States v. Chris‐ tian, 673 F.3d 702, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2012) (also involving Agent Manns, coincidentally). This means Ridley must demonstrate an obvious and prejudicial error that caused a “miscarriage of justice, in the sense of seriously affecting the fairness, integ‐ rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 708, quoting United States v. Orr, 622 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993); United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936). In challenging this testimony by Agent Manns, the defense had two principal strategies available at trial. First, it could raise no objection but then challenge Manns’ credibility and expertise on cross‐examination and in closing argument. That’s what happened. Ridley’s lawyer questioned Manns as to inferences he was drawing from the cell phone location data, trying to inject doubt into his testimony. That strategy did not work, and we assume that Manns’ testimony contrib‐ uted to the jury’s guilty verdicts. With the benefit of hindsight, Ridley now wants a chance to try the second strategy that was available at trial: try to ex‐ 8 No. 15‐1309 clude the testimony by Agent Manns by challenging his qual‐ ifications. It’s not hard to understand, though, why a trial at‐ torney would not make this objection. If it had been sustained, the government could have fixed the problem easily by call‐ ing Agent Dolan, who prepared the map and had more tech‐ nical expertise. The defense then would have had to try to challenge a better qualified witness. By allowing the defense to pursue its own strategy on this point, rather than interven‐ ing to bar some of Agent Manns’ testimony, the district court did not commit a plain error. We have addressed similar problems in cases raising Con‐ frontation Clause issues for the first time on appeal. For ex‐ ample, in United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2008), a defendant raised a Crawford challenge to a government wit‐ ness’s testimony relaying a colleague’s findings. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). We found no plain error, ex‐ plaining that a proper objection against this witness’s testi‐ mony would have left the defendant worse off because the government then could easily have produced the better qual‐ ified colleague who could speak directly to technical aspects of the trial with greater authority. Moon, 512 F.3d at 361. And when the defense chooses not to seek the readily available fix for the arguable evidentiary problem, enabling the defense to cross‐examine the less credible witness, we are especially re‐ luctant to find plain error when that strategy does not pay off. See United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 728 (7th Cir. 2013) (determining that there was no plain error if “it may be to de‐ fendants’ advantage to accept the hearsay version of evidence … . The lack of a demand for testimony by an available de‐ clarant leads to the conclusion that the appellate argument is strategic rather than sincere.”), quoting Moon, 512 F.3d at 361. See also Melendez‐Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 328 No. 15‐1309 9 (2009) (“It is unlikely that defense counsel will insist on live testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast doubt upon the forensic analysis.”). Allowing Agent Manns’ testimony was not a plain error.1