Opinion ID: 2129107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Several days prior to commencement of trial defendant and Karen were officially married. This is conceded by the State.

Text: In the course of investigation a written statement was given by Karen. During his opening statement the prosecutor referred to questioning by officers of the young lady involved in the case. Defense counsel immediately objected, requesting a mistrial if the assistant county attorney persisted in his attempts to infer withholding of information by defendant's wife. The jury was then advised by the court to disregard any statement made relative to information given police by Mrs. Levy. The assistant county attorney was also told he would not be allowed to proceed beyond a showing police officers had talked to Karen. When Mrs. Ayala was testifying, the prosecutor inquired as to what Karen said to her after the shooting. Upon objection interposed the prosecutor was again cautioned by the court. However, Officer Leaming, as a witness for the State, was later shown a written statement purportedly given by Karen and asked to identify it. When defense counsel objected the State's attorney admitted he had no intention of offering the exhibit in evidence. Following this the prosecution inquired of defendant on cross-examination whether he knew where his wife was living prior to June 1964. When objection was voiced the State's attorney remarked, Well, we will get to that when she takes the stand then. Trial court promptly admonished the jury to disregard this statement. Additionally, despite repeated objections and attendant admonitions by trial court, the prosecutor during cross-examination of four defense witnesses attempted to invade the husband-wife privilege, thus compelling defense counsel in presence of the jury to constantly, in effect, reassert the statutory testimonial marital prerogative. Thereafter on rebuttal the State called Mrs. Ayala. Among other things she was asked what Karen said when she came upstairs after the shooting. The question was withdrawn. But shortly the witness was asked if the police were told she had said to Karen, Either you tell them or I will. Objection was sustained and there followed this question and answer: Q. What did you tell the officers or tell Karen Staver in the presence of the officers? A. I told her either she'd tell the officer who did it or else I would. Then, in opening jury argument the assistant county attorney said: This is a circumstantial case and the Court is going to tell you that mostor there is an awful lot of circumstantial cases. There aremost of the crimes are committed not in the presence of eye witnesses, even though there is an indication that this one was, thus forcing the state to try this case on the basis of the rules that existed prior to the evolution of the legal revolution that we're having at the present time. And I'm saying the rules just haven't caught up with the main trend. I don't object to this because I get myI get my duty done to you and to the citizens here when I do the best I can what I have got admissible, and I'm not apologizing to a single one of you. I did the best I could to win my fight and I lost it and I'm sorry. Because I for one believe that the jury, if they are to determine the truth, should have the truth before them, and I don't know how the law can be so anarchistic and archaic as to force us to try the case on When told by trial court, on objection asserted, to change the subject there followed this remark, And again, like I say, trying this case with one arm tied behind my back Defense counsel objected and trial court again advised the subject be changed. Then came this statement by the prosecutor:    we're trying this case under the rules as they exist today, and the law and the rules of evidence that apply to this particular situation. Like I say, I fought and I lost and I'm not bitter about it and I think the Court was right, as the law stands today. If you find that he had the gun in the car at the time he took her home and fired impulsively, it's murder to [sic]. But if you find and if you feel that because of the absence of some of the testimony that may have at one time Objection and another admonition brought forth this remark by the State's attorney: Then again if you find that the State has failed to produce for whatever reasonhow did you like thatsome of the evidence Finally, not content with his prior abortive efforts, the assistant county attorney in course of rebuttal argument, said, All right. This is a murder case and I'm without a witness. I'm short one. There is one person who could have told When stopped from proceeding, the prosecutor asked if defense counsel was suggesting Ben Ayala was still alive. Immediately thereafter the assistant county attorney said, At least to Ben Ayala. But now this particular situation is true in every murder case. We have one witness who knows what happened that is not available to tell you, at least one. Other trial incidents going to conduct of the county attorney's assistant will be later discussed. Section 622.7, Code, 1966, provides in part:  Husband or wife as witness. Neither the husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other, except: 1.            2. In a civil action or proceeding one against the other,    There is no reason to believe the attorney prosecuting the case at bar was not fully aware of this statute, and if he knew not of it when trial commenced, defense counsel and trial court promptly alerted him to its existence. Despite that fact he repetitiously sought to impress upon the minds of the jurors, defendant's wife could reveal vital information if allowed to do so. This was aggravated by continuous reference to the matter in spite of constant objections by defense counsel and futile admonitions by trial court to desist, even to the point of cautioning a mistrial would be declared if the prosecutor continued in his efforts to abuse the statutory husband-wife privilege. Stated otherwise, the county attorney's assistant repeatedly endeavored by insinuations, inferences and innuendoes, both in presentation of evidence and arguments, to indelibly impress upon the minds of the jurors defendant was designedly suppressing his wife's testimony which, if given, would be damaging to him. State v. Chrismore, 223 Iowa 957, 274 N.W. 3, deals with an analogous situation. There defendant's wife, called as a witness by the State, was questioned regarding marriage to accused a few days prior to commencement of his trial, necessitating his assertion of the statutory privilege. In reversing a conviction this court said, loc. cit., 223 Iowa 959-961, 274 N.W. 4: While we do not attribute to the prosecution in this case the motives ascribed to the state's attorney in the case of Moore v. State of Texas, 45 Tex.Cr.R. 234, 75 S.W. 497, 498, 67 L.R.A. 499, 108 Am.St.Rep. 952, 2 Ann.Cas. 878, the following quotation aptly expresses our views upon the situation before us: `The fact that appellant had married Susie Jones the day prior to his trial was also the subject of legitimate inquiry from proper sources. But here the statute expressly prohibits the use of the wife as a witness against her husband; and this though he had married her for the express purpose of suppressing her testimony against him. Miller v. State, 37 Tex. Crim.Rep. 575, 40 S.W. 313; United States v. White, 4 Utah 499, 11 P. 570. It makes no difference at what time the relation of husband and wife begins. The exclusion of their testimony under our statute, and to its fullest extent, operates wherever the interests of either are directly concerned (1 Greenleaf, §§ 334, 336), and this although he married the witness after she was placed under process (Pedley v. Wellesley, 3 Car. & P. 558; State v. Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335 [Gil. 251]). And the question of public policy is not an argument to the contrary. Public policy must be in accord with our statutory enactment. When the marriage ceremony is performed, no matter what the motive was or may be, the witness thenceforward becomes the lawful wife of defendant, and is prohibited under our statute from testifying against her husband, except where the offense is by the husband against her person. It will be observed in this case that the county attorney called the witness in behalf of the state, and asked her several questions in regard to the case, when, upon objection by appellant that she was his wife, the court then asked her the question if she was his wife, and, receiving an affirmative reply, excused her from the witness stand. This whole proceeding seems to have been a spectacular performance to force defendant to object to his wife testifying against him, in order to get the benefit of her testimony thus far in aid of the supposition and theory that appellant had married her to suppress her testimony. The point insisted upon by the state in regard to this whole matter of proving the recent marriage of appellant to Susie Jones was to convince the jury, first, that Susie Jones was the only eyewitness to the homicide for which appellant was being tried; second, that he had married her for the express purpose of suppressing her testimony; and, third, her evidence was of a damaging character to him. Any fact drawn from the wife proving, or tending to prove, that appellant had married her for the purpose of suppressing her testimony was directly against him. The county attorney had no right to call her as a witness against him. It is thoroughly demonstrated by the facts that appellant had married her; and, if the court and the county attorney were not satisfied with the statement of appellant that he had married the witness, it was a matter easily ascertained without calling the wife, and the good or bad faith of appellant in marrying her, and whether the court believed what the defendant testified in regard to it, would make no difference. The fact that she was the wife of defendant put the seal upon her lips, and excluded her being called as a witness against him. The fact that appellant had married the witness, and the further fact that it was done for the purpose of suppressing her testimony, were so intimately blended under the peculiar facts that they could not be separated; and the fact that he had married her was one of the main facts relied upon by the state to show appellant's act in what the state contended was suppressing the testimony of the wife. It is well settled in cases of bigamy that the lawful wife cannot be called to prove her marriage with the accused, nor for the purpose of identifying him. Boyd v. State, 33 Tex.Crim.Rep. 470, 26 S.W. 1080, and authorities cited; Law of Evidence, by Burr W. Jones, Vol. 3, § 752, authorities collated in note 1. See, also, section 753, note 18. There is no question of the injurious effect of this action of the county attorney as sustained by the court, because it tended to uphold with fearful effect the contention of the state that by reason of his marriage with the witness the day before his purpose was to suppress her testimony, and that her evidence was of a seriously damaging effect against him. It was admitted upon the theory that it was a suppression of the testimony, and the wife was the most important witness in regard to the killing; and it would seem that the state placed the wife on the stand to get whatever of benefit there could arise from the objection urged by appellant that she was his wife in support of the theory of suppression of evidence.' See, also, People v. Trine, 164 Mich. 1, 129 N.W. 3, 6. This comment by the court is pertinent to the matter before us. `The statute prohibits testimony by a wife against a husband without his consent. By calling defendant's wife, he was compelled to assert his nonconsent, which was thereby brought to the attention of the jury, who might naturally draw prejudicial inferences.' And the Annotator, 116 A.L.R. 1171, makes this statement: There are conflicting views as to whether it is proper for counsel to comment on the exercise by the opposing party of a privilege with respect to testimony or the calling of a witness. By what seems to be the better rule, it is held improper for counsel to make such comments. This latter view was given our approval in Howard v. Porter, 240 Iowa 153, 156-159, 35 N.W.2d 837. With reference to the foregoing, see also Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75-83, 79 S.Ct. 136, 137-141, 3 L.Ed.2d 125; State v. Leuty, 247 Iowa 251, 254-255, 73 N.W.2d 64; Johnson v. Kinney, 232 Iowa 1016, 1023-1024, 7 N.W.2d 188, 144 A.L.R. 997; State v. McIntyre, 203 Iowa 451, 457-458, 212 N.W. 757; State v. Poston, 199 Iowa 1073, 1074-1076, 203 N. W. 257; State v. Scott, 194 Iowa 777, 781-784, 190 N.W. 370; State v. Van Hoozer, 192 Iowa 818, 820-823, 185 N.W. 588; State v. Moon, 167 Iowa 26, 38-40, 148 N.W. 1001; State v. Nathoo, 152 Iowa 665, 673-674, 133 N.W. 129; State v. Blydenburg, 135 Iowa 264, 271-272, 112 N.W. 634; Jones on Evidence, Fourth Ed., section 734; 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1099b, page 181; and 53 Am.Jur., Trial, section 482, page 389. It is to us apparent the assistant county attorney's constant knowledgeable abuse of the husband-wife privilege was misconduct of such nature as to constitute error. II. On one occasion, after the jury had been sworn and trial commenced, the assistant county attorney produced and made visible to the jury a so-called mug shot of accused. Defense counsel subsequently voiced complaint but requested no court ruling on the matter. During cross-examination of defendant he stated certain military personnel advised him to fill out his Army records showing marital status as single, then when home on leave to secure a court order, and they would change the records to show he was a married person. At this the assistant county attorney posed the question, In other words, they ordered you to commit perjury? Objection was sustained. Also, while Joseph Ayala, father of deceased, was being questioned by the prosecutor, he was asked, Do you think your criminal record gives anybody the right to shoot your son? Defendant's motion for mistrial was overruled, and counsel for the State cautioned by trial court to refrain from similar questions. The foregoing, standing alone, might not constitute prejudicial misconduct, but should be considered in connection with other trial tactics employed by the State's attorney.