Opinion ID: 1727420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction of accessory after the fact

Text: ¶ 23. In the present case, Gary submitted an instruction regarding accessory after the fact. Instruction D-14 read as follows: The Court instructs the jury that an accessory after the fact is one who conceals, receives, relieves, aids or assists any person, knowing that such person has committed a felony, with intent to enable such a person to escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, after the commission of such felony. The Court further instructs the jury that CEDRICK GARY is not required to establish that he was an accessory after the fact to your satisfaction, but if the evidence or lack of evidence in this case raises in the minds of the jury reasonable doubt as to whether the Defendant was only an accessory after the fact, then, in that event, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and may not convict CEDRICK GARY of the crime of armed robbery, and therefore, it would be your sworn duty to return a verdict of not guilty. When this instruction was submitted, the State objected by stating there was no evidence that he was an accessory after the fact.... Gary argued that the instruction was a valid instruction under Gangl v. State, 539 So.2d 132 (Miss.1989). After hearing argument by counsel, the court ruled as follows: Let me say that I think that obviously that the instruction is a valid instruction as has been perceived by our Supreme Court, but I think that you also have to consider the factual situation, and in this particular case there are insufficient factual situations before this jury for this court to grant this particular instruction. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the State does not challenge the validity of the instruction itself, but asserts that its use here would have been improper because no evidence was provided at trial to support the instruction. ¶ 24. When reviewing challenges to jury instructions, whether granted or denied by the trial court, this Court applies the following standard: Jury instructions are to be read together and taken as a whole with no one instruction taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case, however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 842 (Miss. 1991) (citations and footnote omitted)(emphasis added). Furthermore, the standard for determining whether an evidentiary basis exists is as follows: [A] lesser included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge_and ultimately this Court_can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused, and considering all reasonable references which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense (and conversely not guilty of at least one essential element of the principal charge). Harper v. State, 478 So.2d 1017, 1021 (Miss.1985). If a rational or a reasonable jury could have found Gary not guilty of the principal offense charged in the indictment yet guilty of the lesser-included offense, then the lesser-included offense instruction should have been granted. Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, 664 (Miss. 1997). ¶ 25. In support of his assertion that this instruction should have been given, Gary relies on Hester v. State, 602 So.2d 869 (Miss.1992), and specifically cites the following in his brief: Even though based on meager evidence and highly unlikely, a defendant is entitled to have every legal defense he asserts to be submitted as a factual issue for determination by the jury under proper instruction of the court. Where a defendant's proffered instruction has an evidentiary basis, properly states the law, and is the only instruction presenting his theory of the case, refusal to grant it constitutes reversible error. Id. at 872 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). In the present case, however, accessory after the fact was not Gary's sole theory of defense. Instruction D-15 was also given by the Court and reads as follows: The Court instructs the jury that under the laws of the State of Mississippi, duress is a defense to the crime charged in the indictment. Accordingly, if you find that Cedrick Gary's actions, if any, were the result of duress created by Terry Robertson, then it is your sworn duty to find Cedrick Gary not guilty to the crime of Armed Robbery. ¶ 26. Throughout his trial testimony, Gary asserts that his actions were the result of being scared and that he was simply following Robertson's instructions. Nowhere in the record does Gary, or anyone else, ever indicate that he only assisted after the crime was completed. Instead, Gary contended throughout his trial that he was acting under duress and should be held innocent of the crime charged. Gary's testimony at trial, where he admitted that he punched Rhodes (who then handed over the money) and stole the truck, supports participation during, not after, the offense. There is no other version of the transaction which would support an accessory after the fact instruction. ¶ 27. [L]esser offense instructions should not be granted indiscriminately, and only where there is an evidentiary basis in the record. Gangl, 539 So.2d at 136. Upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gary, this Court finds no evidentiary foundation was placed before the jury which would have enabled it to find Gary participated only as an accessory after the fact. Accordingly, Gary's argument that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the accessory after the fact instruction is without merit.