Opinion ID: 3049934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Paradies and US Infrastructure Decisions

Text: Nonetheless, this does not resolve whether the language in § 666(a)(1)(B) or (a)(2) effectively requires the government to prove a specific quid pro quo to obtain a § 666 conviction. This question has been before this Court twice before but only under plain error review, and even then, we did not squarely answer it. See United States v. US Infrastructure, 576 F.3d at 1212-14; United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1289 (11th Cir. 1996). In Paradies, the defendant claimed that the district court erred in failing to charge the jury that a quid pro quo was an element required to convict under § 666 53 Id. at 1289. This Court did not decide if quid pro quo was an element but concluded there was no reversible jury charge error because the jury charge tracked the statutory language of § 666 and the defendant did not object to the charge. Id. The Paradies Court also rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. The Paradies Court stated: “the evidence at trial was sufficient for a jury to find that Jackson [the official] accepted payments for his votes and his influence upon the City Council and the administration,” and “[s]uch a finding would satisfy any quid pro quo requirement under the statute.” Id. In other words, Paradies concluded that even if § 666 requires a quid pro quo, that requirement is satisfied by showing a series of payments intended generally to influence the official’s decisions. Subsequently, our United States v. US Infrastructure decision involved an appeal from the fifth trial (the USI trial, 05-543) that arose out of the Indictment here. US Infrastructure, 576 F.3d at 1202-03. The defendants in US Infrastructure argued the jury charges on the § 666 counts were erroneous because they did not include their proposed instruction that the jury must find a specific quid pro quo to convict under § 666. Id. at 1213. This Court concluded that the district court “did not commit plain error by refusing [defendants’] quid pro quo [jury] instruction.” Id. at 1214. As its sole basis for this conclusion, US Infrastructure stated this 54 Court had already rejected this argument in two prior cases: “This Court has rejected the argument that the government must ‘show a direct quid pro quo relationship between [the defendants] and an agent of the agency receiving federal funds.’” US Infrastructure, 576 F.3d at 1214 (quoting United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1454 (11th Cir. 1996), and citing Paradies, 98 F.3d at 1289). However, as shown above, Paradies did not actually make a holding to that effect. Neither did United States v. Castro.39 Nonetheless, US Infrastructure itself holds a specific quid pro quo is not required for a § 666 conviction. Because US Infrastructure was only plain error review, we now make the same holding but under de novo review. We begin with the statutory language itself.40 Importantly, § 666(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) do not contain the Latin phrase quid pro quo. Nor do those sections 39 In Castro, the issue was whether § 666(a)(2) required that the bribe-givers intended to enter into a direct exchange with an agent of an entity receiving the federal funds, or if it was sufficient that they offered the bribe to a third-person middleman with the intent to influence that agent by having that middleman authorize that agent to issue payments to the defendants. Castro, 89 F.3d at 1453-54. The Castro Court concluded that “influence” under § 666 could be exercised indirectly and that it was sufficient that the defendants intended to influence the agent by causing a middleman to authorize the agent to issue payments. Id. Although in reaching this conclusion the Castro Court stated, “[w]e reject appellants’ suggestion that the government had to show a direct quid pro quo relationship between [the defendants] and an agent of the agency receiving federal funds,” id., Castro was addressing whether there was a “directness” requirement between the bribe-giver and the agent and did not answer the question before us here. 40 “When construing a criminal statute, [this Court] begin[s] with the plain language; where ‘the language Congress chose to express its intent is clear and unambiguous, that is as far as we go to ascertain its intent because we must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.’” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc)). 55 contain language such as “in exchange for an official act” or “in return for an official act.” In short, nothing in the plain language of § 666(a)(1)(B) nor § 666(a)(2) requires that a specific payment be solicited, received, or given in exchange for a specific official act. To accept the defendants’ argument would permit a person to pay a significant sum to a County employee intending the payment to produce a future, as yet unidentified favor without violating § 666. The requirement of a “corrupt” intent in § 666 does narrow the conduct that violates § 666 but does not impose a specific quid pro quo requirement. In all the trials consolidated in this appeal, the district court’s jury charge, with slight variations, defined “corruptly” as follows: “An act is done ‘corruptly’ if it is performed voluntarily, deliberately and dishonestly for the purpose of either accomplishing an unlawful end or result or of accomplishing some otherwise lawful end or lawful result by an[y] unlawful method or means.” It is acting “corruptly” — dishonestly seeking an illegal goal or a legal goal illegally — that separates permissible from criminal. The addition of a corrupt mens rea avoids prosecution for acceptable business practices.41 41 We do not read the definitional language of “corrupt” to impose a quid pro quo requirement. In any event, the district court charged that definition. It also has been suggested that § 666’s language — a thing of value given with corrupt intent to influence — effectively constitutes a quid pro quo in that the payment is made for influence. This at best would be “quid pro quo light.” Even if one views § 666 this way, the district court charged the language of the § 666 statute. 56 For all of these reasons, we now expressly hold there is no requirement in § 666(a)(1)(B) or (a)(2) that the government allege or prove an intent that a specific payment was solicited, received, or given in exchange for a specific official act, termed a quid pro quo. As to the defendant County employees, the government must show only what § 666(a)(1)(B) says: that a County employee “corruptly” accepted “anything of value” with the intent “to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” of the County. And as to the contractor-defendants, the government must show only what § 666(a)(2) says: that the defendant “corruptly” gave “anything of value” to a County employee with the intent “to influence or reward” that person “in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” of the County. To be sure, many § 666 bribery cases will involve an identifiable and particularized official act, but that is not required to convict. Simply put, the government is not required to tie or directly link a benefit or payment to a specific official act by that County employee. The intent that must be proven is an intent to corruptly influence or to be influenced “in connection with any business” or “transaction,” not an intent to engage in any specific quid pro quo.42 42 The defendant-appellants rely on United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. Aug. 10, 2009) (No. 09-167), 78 57