Opinion ID: 697259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The LeBrun article

Text: 15 McDonough argues that the district court abused its discretion in failing to ascertain how much each juror knew of the January 30, 1994 Times Union column by Fred LeBrun or to assess whether jurors exposed to the article could remain impartial. McDonough and the government agree that the district court is required to follow the three-step process we set forth in Gaggi when inquiring into the effects of trial publicity on jurors. The steps are: 16 first, to determine whether the coverage has a potential for unfair prejudice, second, to canvass the jury to find out if they have learned of the potentially prejudicial publicity and, third, to examine individually exposed jurors--outside the presence of the other jurors--to ascertain how much they know of the distracting publicity and what effect, if any, it has had on that juror's ability to decide the case fairly. 17 811 F.2d at 51. 18 The district court clearly followed steps one and two and the first part of step three outlined above. The question is whether, after ascertaining that each juror did not know the content of the article, the court was required to go on to make an additional inquiry into the juror's ability to remain impartial. Citing such cases as United States v. Aragon, 962 F.2d 439 (5th Cir.1992), McDonough argues that the failure to make this additional inquiry was an abuse of discretion. The government responds that the scope of the district court's inquiry was adequate and that defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 19 Defendant's reliance on Aragon is clearly misplaced. There, the district court, [w]ithout even a cursory glance at [an inflammatory] newspaper article, refused to conduct any voir dire of the jurors whatsoever. 962 F.2d at 442. In this case, the district court conscientiously questioned each of the jurors outside the presence of the others. Although two of the jurors had seen the article but had not read it, and one had read only so much of it as to determine that it concerned the instant trial, all reported that they did not know its content. The only juror who admitted having read part of the article indicated that he would not be influenced by it. As to the others, it is difficult to see how jurors who are aware of the existence of a news article, but unaware of its content, could be prejudiced by such awareness. See United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 832-33 (2d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959, 83 S.Ct. 1013, 10 L.Ed.2d 11 (1963); see also 3 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure Criminal 2d Sec. 554, at 254-58 & n. 7 (1982 & 1995 pocket part). 20 In addition, it appears that prior to learning of the alternate juror's ex parte contact with the judge, defendant failed to request any additional inquiry regarding juror impartiality. See United States v. Rivalta, 892 F.2d 223, 229 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 875, 112 S.Ct. 215, 116 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991); United States v. Scopo, 861 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1048, 109 S.Ct. 1957, 104 L.Ed.2d 426 (1989). The trial court is not required to specifically question jurors as to whether they are able to remain impartial. Rivalta, 892 F.2d at 228-29. The court could certainly ascertain, Gaggi, 811 F.2d at 51, that these jurors, who had been given a cautionary instruction and reported that they did not know the content of the offending article, could remain impartial. 21 McDonough argues that the district court nonetheless failed to assess the credibility of the jurors. In denying the motion for a mistrial, the court stated, I have to be guided by what the jurors told me. Whether or not I believe it is of no moment. (emphasis supplied). Defendant, however, did not request a specific credibility finding in the district court. In any event, there is no evidence to refute the jurors' denials, and in the absence of such evidence, the district court was entitled to presume that the jury followed its instructions to avoid contact with news reports about the trial and to limit their exposure if contact was unavoidable. See United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1154 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990). Moreover, the court's denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial is a fair indication that it did not consider the jurors' representations to be unreliable. 22 McDonough also faults the district court for failing to record part of its January 31, 1994 conversation with the alternate juror. He argues that as a result, this court is deprived of a complete record to review. We have previously urged trial judges to make every effort to assure that any communication from a juror, no matter how trivial, is either in writing or recorded in the trial transcript. United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 584 (2d Cir.1994). A complete record of an ex parte juror communication is especially important where it concerns the potentially prejudicial effects of trial publicity. In this case, however, the district court clearly did its best to compensate for the inadvertent temporary absence of the court reporter. A substantial portion of the conversation with the alternate juror was in fact recorded, and the district court, shortly after the conversation occurred, reported to the parties the substance of the unrecorded portion. 23 McDonough also argues that further inquiry of the alternate juror should have been allowed because of the incomplete record. However, the district court's decision not to allow further inquiry of the alternate juror was reasonably calculated to minimize prejudice. The court characterized the alternate juror as teary-eyed, very emotional and babbling, and stated, I am just afraid that if I ask her any more questions, it might steer her one way or another.... She actually told the same story twice. The court also remarked that nothing the alternate juror had said was inconsistent with anything reported by any other juror. Finally, the court remarked that it would reconsider the matter if the alternate juror were called upon to deliberate, which she was not. Cf. United States v. Pappas, 445 F.2d 1194, 1202 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Mischlich v. United States, 404 U.S. 984, 92 S.Ct. 449, 30 L.Ed.2d 368 (1971). Thus, it is a fair conclusion that no prejudice resulted from the court's failure to conduct a further inquiry.