Opinion ID: 1233930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Williams Issue

Text: We held in United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130-31 (8th Cir.2007), that after reducing a sentence based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), a district court may not reduce the sentence further based on factors, other than assistance, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): Where a court has authority to sentence below a statutory minimum only by virtue of a government motion under § 3553(e), the reduction below the statutory minimum must be based exclusively on assistance-related considerations. Id. at 1130-31. We pointed out that the text of § 3553(e) states that the section provides only [l]imited authority to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum. Id. at 1131. Further, the body of § 3553(e) spells out that the district court's authority is limited to imposing a sentence below the statutory minimum only so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance. Id. at 1132 (quoting § 3553(e)). A district court would thus exceed the limited authority granted by § 3553(e) if it imposed a sentence below the statutory minimum based in part upon the history and characteristics of the defendant. See § 3553(a)(1). Id. [3] We have revisited the holding in Williams post- Gall and have concluded that Gall has not affected the limitations imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) upon the district court's authority to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum. See United States v. Johnson, 517 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir.2008); United States v. Freemont, 513 F.3d 884 (8th Cir.2008). We adhere to the holdings in those cases. [4] As we read Gall, the Court there was concerned about the heightened standard of review that appellate courts had imposed through the application of concepts such as extraordinary/exceptional circumstances, departure percentages, proportionality review, and the like and said nothing that would indicate that district courts are not bound by the strictures set forth in § 3553(e).