Opinion ID: 887841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Evidence Seized from the Table and the Bed

Text: ¶ 28 McCord first observed the evidence seized from the table and the bed during his initial entry. Neither Lewis nor the State disputes that this entry, prompted by the exigent circumstance of a fire, was lawful. Indeed, we recognized in Loh that [a] burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry `reasonable.' Indeed, it would defy reason to suppose that firemen must secure a warrant or consent before entering a burning structure to put out the blaze. Loh, 275 Mont. at 474, 914 P.2d at 601 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1950, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), in turn citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037-38, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). ¶ 29 It is also undisputed that the evidence McCord observed on the bed and the table was in plain view. Thus, contrary to the District Court's analysis, the initial entry and McCord's observations of the evidence on the table and the bed did not constitute a search. Finally, no one disputes that the incriminating nature of the pieces of evidence was immediately apparent in the context of the surrounding circumstances. Thus, McCord was entitled to seize the evidence on the bed and the table during the course of his initial entry. See e.g. Delao, ¶ 15. He did not do so, however. Rather, he seized this evidence on his second entry. The question, therefore, is whether he could do so lawfully without a warrant. ¶ 30 The State maintains that McCord's second entry into the structure after he went to his patrol car to retrieve his camera was merely a continuation of his initial entry. Approximately two minutes passed between the time that McCord left the structure, retrieved his camera from his patrol car, and re-entered the structure. Therefore, the State contends that McCord's reentry to photograph and seize the evidence was nearly contemporaneous with his initial plain view observations. ¶ 31 In response, Lewis contends that McCord's second entry was not a continuation of his first entry; rather, he maintains that it was an entirely separate entry. In this regard, Lewis directs our attention to ¶ 41 of Bassett, where we stated that [i]n this case, there were two separate reasons for entering the house, and there thus must be two entirely separate justifications for each entry. Based on this language, Lewis argues that because there was a separate entry by McCord, there must be a separate justification for that second entry. Lewis reasons that if McCord was concerned about the destruction of evidence by efforts to suppress the fire, he should have seized the items during his initial entry. Additionally, Lewis maintains that McCord had limited, if any knowledge about fires, or fire investigation. Both Hassler, and the Lewistown Assistant Fire Chief testified that they try (tried) to keep the scene intact when doing suppression. Thus, according to Lewis, McCord's concern about destruction of evidence was based upon speculation. ¶ 32 We agree with the State that McCord's seizure of the table and bed evidence during the course of the second entry was lawful for the following two reasons. First, we observe that exigent circumstances existed to justify McCord's second warrantless entry and the corresponding seizure. Exigent circumstances are those circumstances that `would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other person, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of a suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.' Cassady, ¶ 33 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Anyan, 2004 MT 395, ¶ 34, 325 Mont. 245, ¶ 34, 104 P.3d 511, ¶ 34). McCord testified that he believed that efforts by the Lewistown Rural Fire Department to suppress the fire could destroy the evidence he had observed on the table and the bed because I didn't know how much water they were going to use. I didn't know what was going to happen. Given these circumstances, we hold that it was reasonable for McCord to believe that efforts to suppress the fire might destroy the relevant evidence that he had observed in plain view and, thus, that exigent circumstances justified his second entry and the seizure of the evidence. In reaching this conclusion, we reject Lewis's suggestion that McCord needed to have special knowledge about firefighting or fire investigation in order to ascertain whether there was a risk that the evidence would be destroyed. The standard is what a reasonable person would believe under the circumstances; and under the circumstances presented here, a reasonable person would believe that entry into the structure was necessary to prevent the destruction of the evidence on the table and the bed. ¶ 33 Second, we agree with the State that McCord's second entry was a continuation of his initial entry into the structure. McCord was lawfully in the structure, the evidence on the bed and the table was in plain view, and the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent. However, the incriminating nature of the evidence was only apparent when viewed as it was arranged on the table and the bed. More specifically, it was the strategic positioning of the cigarettes inside the matchbooks and the location of the toilet paper, which together appeared to be a fuse, that made this evidence immediately incriminating. Had McCord simply collected the evidence upon his first visit, the incriminating nature of the evidence would have been destroyed. Thus, it was appropriate for him to photograph the evidence before seizing it. Additionally, according to McCord's approximation, only two minutes passed between the time that he left the structure after his initial entry and the time that he re-entered. Finally, we note that McCord did not seize or photograph any more evidence than he had observed during his initial entry. Thus, we conclude that McCord's second entry was not clearly detached from the initial exigency and warrantless entry, Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 1951, and we hold that McCord's second entry, therefore, was a continuation of his initial entry. ¶ 34 For these reasons, we reverse the District Court's order granting Lewis's motion to suppress the evidence obtained by McCord during his second entry into the structurenamely, the physical evidence seized from the bed and the table and McCord's photographs of that evidence.