Opinion ID: 2467838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the doctrine of virtual representation

Text: One of the basic questions in this case is whether Dr. Cooper, in bringing the first suit without the joinder of his wife, acted as a representative of the community; whether he virtually represented his wife in that action. If the doctrine has vitality, the dismissal with prejudice of that first suit would be binding upon the wife, Mrs. Dolores Cooper, and res judicata as to the second and instant suit. Under the doctrine of virtual representation, a suit naming only the husband as a party is nonetheless binding on the wife. Starr v. Schoellkopf Co., 131 Tex. 263, 113 S.W.2d 1227 (1938); Gabb v. Boston, 109 Tex. 26, 193 S.W. 137 (1917); Jergens v. Schiele, 61 Tex. 255 (1884); Cooley v. Miller, 228 S.W. 1085 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, judgmt adopted); Hall v. Aloco Oil Co., 164 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ.App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd); 30 Tex.Jur.2d Husband and Wife § 167. The basis for virtual representation is the husband's power of sole management of the entire community. Section 5.22 of the Family Code takes away the husband's sole right to manage all of the couple's community property. When joint management community property is involved, the husband and wife are now joint managers. The wife is her husband's equal with respect to management; she stands in the same position as any other joint owner of property. While another section [2] provides that a spouse may sue and be sued without the joinder of the other, neither spouse may virtually represent the other. The rights of the wife, like the rights of the husband and the rights of any other joint owner, may be affected only by a suit in which the wife is called to answer. If one of the spouses wishes the other to represent him or her, Section 5.22(c) of the Family Code permits that arrangement provided the consenting spouse authorizes that representation by a power of attorney or other agreement in writing. No such writing is in evidence here. Dolores Cooper was not a party to the first suit; the doctrine of virtual representation was abolished by the new Family Code; there was no writing authorizing her husband to represent her. Accordingly, her interest in the Coopers' joint management community property is untouched by the judgment of dismissal with prejudice of the first suit.