Opinion ID: 1349673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: definition of disability

Text: The purpose of the worker's compensation act, M.C.L.  418.101 et seq.; M.S.A.  17.237(101) et seq., is to provide benefits to the victims of work-related injuries by placing the cost of making payments of weekly benefits to disabled employees on the employer. Simkins v. General Motors Corp., 453 Mich. 703, 711, 556 N.W.2d 839 (1996). The employee must prove by competent evidence under M.C.L.  418.301(1); M.S.A.  17.237(301)(1) that he has received a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment in order to qualify for benefits. Id. [6] As a threshold matter in proving an injury in chapter 3 of the act, M.C.L.  418.301 et seq.; M.S.A.  17.237(301)(1) et seq., [7] the employee must demonstrate that the personal injury is a work-related disability. See M.C.L.  418.401(2)(b); M.S.A.  17.237(401)(2)(b). [8] Chapter 3 of the act specifically defines disability: As used in this chapter, disability means a limitation of an employee's wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training resulting from a personal injury or work related disease. The establishment of disability does not create a presumption of wage loss. [M.C.L.  418.301(4); M.S.A.  17.237(301)(4).][ [9] ] The sentence defining disability separates the definition of a disability from the concept of wage loss. Hence, there are two relevant inquiries to determine if an employee is entitled to worker's compensation benefits: (1) whether an employee has proven that a disability exists, and (2) if the employee proves that a disability exists, whether the employee has proven that the disability resulted in a wage loss. Because wage loss is not presumed, an employee who demonstrates that he has suffered a disability must establish that this disability has resulted in a wage loss. However, in examining the first sentence defining disability, we find that the language is ambiguous because it may reasonably be interpreted to mean either that (1) an employee is disabled only if he suffers a reduction in his wage-earning capacity in all the work he could perform within his qualifications and training before the injury, [10] or (2) an employee is disabled if there is at least a single job within his qualifications and training that he can no longer perform because this would be a limitation of his wage-earning capacity. Defendants argue that the first interpretation is the proper one, and plaintiffs contend that the second is the proper one. The definition was added by the Legislature to the worker's compensation act by 1981 PA 200, effective March 31, 1982, and the Legislature then amended the definition in 1987 PA 28. Hence, we briefly examine the state of the law before the 1981 amendment, the change the Legislature created in 1981, and the change it intended in 1987.

The worker's compensation act was initially enacted in 1912 by the Legislature. See Sobotka v. Chrysler Corp. (After Remand), 447 Mich. 1, 17, 523 N.W.2d 454 (1994) (Boyle, J., lead opinion). Before the amendment of 1981, disability was not defined in chapter 3 of the act. The following definition appeared in chapter 4: As used in this act: (a) Disability means the state of being disabled from earning full wages at the work in which the employee was last subject to the conditions resulting in disability.[ [11] ] In 1979, two years before the Legislature amended the act to create a new statutory definition of disability, this Court explained that disability was defined as the `inability to perform the work claimant was doing when injured.' Powell v. Casco Nelmor Corp., 406 Mich. 332, 350, 279 N.W.2d 769 (1979), quoting 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,  57.53, p. 10-129, and citing Allen v. Nat'l Twist Drill & Tool Co., 324 Mich. 660, 663, 37 N.W.2d 664 (1949) (quoting the definition of disability from  417.1, the precursor of subsection 401[a]). Before 1981, the Court developed a distinction between skilled and unskilled labor, see Hutsko v. Chrysler Corp., 381 Mich. 99, 103, 158 N.W.2d 874 (1968), [12] even though the statute did not provide for it. In Leitz v. Labadie Ice Co., 211 Mich. 565, 572, 179 N.W. 291 (1920), the Court explained the difference between these two kinds of work: [W]e think it may safely be said that, as generally used and understood, [common labor] signifies that kind of unskilled manual labor with or without simple tools, which is commonly done by the masses of working people in lines of employment necessitating no special trade or previous training before engaging in them beyond what can be quickly learned and effectually performed by the laborer while employed at regular wage under direction of those in charge; as distinguished from that class of skilled and less common manual labor to perform which previous experience, apprenticeship, study, practice or manual training in some special calling, handicraft or trade is required. This distinction between skilled and unskilled labor was important for determining whether there was a partial or total disability under this chapter of the act. See Welch, Worker's Compensation in Michigan: Law & Practice (3d ed.),  8.8, p. 8-8. Although Michigan case law does not clearly define total and partial disability, see, e.g., 33 Michigan Digest 2d, Workers' Compensation,  846, pp. 119-120,  856, pp. 123-124, through our holdings we established the general rules governing the meaning of disability in the context of skilled and unskilled labor. [13] A skilled employee was totally disabled if he was unable to perform his skilled position as a result of his injury, even if he was able to earn wages at another kind of employment. See MacDonald v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 268 Mich. 591, 593, 256 N.W. 558 (1934). [14] In contrast, an unskilled employee, or, in other words, an employee working at common labor, was only partially disabled when he was unable to perform his previous job but still able to perform other work within his employment of common labor. See Miller v. S. Fair & Sons, 206 Mich. 360, 364-366, 171 N.W. 380 (1919). In order to prove total disability, the unskilled employee had to be unable to perform all the jobs within his employment of common labor. See Leitz v. Labadie Ice Co., 229 Mich. 381, 385-386, 201 N.W. 485 (1924). [15] Thus, the general rule from case law regarding total and partial disabilities was that an employee is totally disabled if he cannot perform all jobs within his field of employment and is partially disabled if he can still perform some jobs within his field of employment. See Welch, Worker's Compensation (3d ed.), supra,  8.8, p. 8-8. [16]
In this context, the Legislature added the provision defining disability, subsection 301(4), to the worker's compensation act in 1981 PA 200, effective March 31, 1982. [17] There have been conflicting indications on the meaning of this amendment. We determined that the 1981 revisions were designed to modify the expansive interpretations of the act given by this Court. See Dean v. Chrysler Corp., 434 Mich. 655, 666, 455 N.W.2d 699 (1990). According to the Senate Analysis Section, SB 595, January 7,1982, p. 6, this new provision was designed to tighten the definition of disability. Moreover, one of the arguments advanced against the new definition was that it unjustly penalizes disabled workers, giving them no compensation for injuries which seriously diminish their wage-earning ability if they can find any other kind of work. Id. The legislative intent underlying the amendment, therefore, suggests that the Legislature meant to create a narrow definition of disability, which is consistent with the interpretation of the provision urged by defendants. Conflicting positions have been taken regarding the possible interpretations of the 1981 amendment. In Dohm v. Whirlpool Corp, 1989 Mich. ACO 16, 17, the WCAC expressly rejected the interpretation that an employee must be unable to perform all his work in his field before finding disability. Yet, four years later, in an en banc opinion, the WCAC concluded that the 1981 change was a dramatic new concept for determining compensable disability by establishing a new focus on wage-earning capacity. Grier v. Yellow Freight Systems, 1993 Mich. ACO 2218, 2224. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the definition from the 1981 amendment was a codification of the definition of disability that this Court developed in its precedent. See Murdock v. Michigan Health Maintenance Organization, 151 Mich.App. 578, 583, 391 N.W.2d 757 (1986). [18]
The statute was amended by 1987 PA 28, which inserted the phrase work suitable to his or her qualifications and training in place of the employee's general field of employment. According to the Senate Fiscal Agency, SB 67, May 26, 1987, p. 1, the revision was enacted to narrow the definition of disability: Many people believe that the Act's definition of disability (a limitation of an employee's general field of employment resulting from a personal injury or work related disease) is too broad and, thus, allows an individual to remain designated as disabled even though the individual could work in another capacity for which he or she was trained and qualified but which was not in the employee's general field of employment. [Emphasis added.] In support of the revision, the Senate Fiscal Agency noted that Professor Theodore St. Antoine, who had recommended this change in a 1984 report to Governor James J. Blanchard, indicated that this change would reassure those who believe that the State's definition of `disability' is a major flaw in our compensation system. Id. at 2. [19] This Court examined the meaning of the 1987 revision last term in Michales v. Morton Salt Co., 450 Mich. 479, 485-492, 538 N.W.2d 11 (1995), in reviewing the parallel definition of disability under subsection 401(1) for occupational diseases. We opined that the revision was designed to narrow the scope of an employee's eligibility for worker's compensation benefits. Michales, supra at 490, 538 N.W.2d 11. We explained, by relying on Welch, Worker's Compensation in Michigan: Law & Practice (rev. ed.),  8.10, p. 8-11 and  8.11, pp. 8-14 to 8-15, that this revision operated to reduce the number of positions in employment that could give rise to a claim of disability by redefining the relevant job pool from the broad category of field of employment to the smaller category of work suitable to [an employee's] qualifications and training. See Michales, supra at 490-491, n. 17, 538 N.W.2d 11. [20] This understanding of the way in which the Legislature narrowed the definition is predicated analytically on the interpretation that an employee is disabled whenever he is rendered unable to perform a single job within the category of jobs he is suited to perform, even if the number he continues to be able to perform is numerous and equally well paying. In contrast, under defendants' interpretation, the 1987 amendment would only operate to narrow the definition of disability if it increased the number of available positions as the relevant job pool for determining whether an employee has suffered an injury. In examining whether an employee can still earn money, if there are more positions that the Court can consider, the employee will have a more difficult time proving that he can no longer earn the same wage for those positions. See Grier, supra at 2224. [21] Under either analysis, the Legislature evidenced an intent in its 1987 amendment to eliminate the judicially created distinction between skilled and unskilled employment. See Welch, Worker's Compensation (3d ed.),  8.11, p. 8-12. [22] By our reasoning in Michales, we suggested that the Legislature intended to provide a definition of disability that is consistent with one urged by plaintiffs. Yet, our understanding of the legislative intent from Dean of the 1981 amendment suggests that the narrow interpretation of disability now urged by defendants was the proper one. Although this background of the statute is helpful in explaining the history of our approach to conflicting interpretation, it does not provide a clear answer to the question before us.
We recently rejected the interpretation of the provision that we now reconsider in Rea v. Regency Olds, 450 Mich. 1201, 536 N.W.2d 542 (1995). In Rea, the Court of Appeals had held that an employee is `disabled' ... if the employee suffers from any limitation in wage-earning capacity in work suitable to the employee's qualifications and training. 204 Mich.App. 516, 523, 517 N.W.2d 251 (1994). [23] On the basis of this definition, it concluded that the plaintiff was disabled under the statute: [Plaintiff] has suffered a limitation in his ability to perform work suitable to his qualifications and training, in particular the work he was previously doing for defendant. He is disabled even though he may be capable of performing other unskilled work which falls within his medical restrictions. [204 Mich.App. 524, 517 N.W.2d 251.] Hence, according to the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff was injured because he was not able to perform a single position suitable to his qualifications and training, i.e., his previous position. We reversed the Court of Appeals decision in an order by stating: It is not enough for the claimant claiming partial disability to show an inability to return to the same or similar work. If the claimant's physical limitation does not affect the ability to earn wages in work in which the claimant is qualified and trained, the claimant is not disabled. [450 Mich. 1201, 536 N.W.2d 542 (emphasis added).] In rejecting the Court of Appeals interpretation, we noted that an employee must prove more than the fact that he is unable to perform his previous job or other similar work within his qualifications and training; he must prove that his physical limitation has affected his ability to earn wages in work for which he is qualified and trained.
In reexamining our order in Rea, we are now persuaded that the Legislature must have intended, in 1981, to adopt the definition of disability as argued here on appeal by plaintiffs, as the Court of Appeals concluded in Rea, for one basic reason. Given the ambiguity in 301(4) and examined in the context of our precedents, the language of the statute logically sustains this interpretation of the definition of disability. Subsection 301(4), as previously stated, requires the employee to prove a disability, i.e., that he is eligible for compensation, and then prove wage loss, i.e., that he is entitled to an award. This language codifies the prior approach in Michigan that injury is not compensable without wage loss. If the employee establishes a disability, he must further prove a wage loss because wage loss will not be presumed. See subsection 301(4). However, in order to prove a wage loss, under the language of the statute and on the basis of our longstanding interpretation of related precedent, most recently confirmed in Sobotka, the employee must establish a reduction in earning capacity. [24] With this conclusion, the definition of disability in subsection 301(4) cannot then be logically interpreted as a reduction of wage-earning capacity as long as wage loss is also measured by a reduction in wage-earning capacity. See Lawrence v. Toys R Us, 453 Mich. 112, 121, 551 N.W.2d 155 (1996) (Levin, J., plurality opinion). [25] Subsection 301(4)'s second sentence eliminates the possibility that disability and wage loss are defined the same way when it provides that proof of a disability does not create [a] presumption of wage loss. As a consequence, the Legislature must have instead intended a different meaning for disability. The only other meaning that the ordinary words of the statute may sustain is the definition urged by plaintiffs: an employee is disabled whenever he can no longer perform a job suitable to his qualifications and training as a result of his injury. This conclusion is consistent with our analysis in Michales. Total disability arises from an injury, i.e., incapacity for work resulting from a personal injury is total under subsection 351(1), when an employee proves that he is unable to perform all work suitable to his qualifications and training as a result of his injury. [26] A partial disability arises from an injury, i.e., incapacity for work resulting from a personal injury is partial under subsection 361(1), when an employee proves that he is unable to perform a single position within his qualifications and training.