Opinion ID: 1540460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Own Conduct Requirement of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c

Text: At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on various grounds. As part of that motion, defendant urged the court to dismiss the murder count and preclude the State from continuing to seek the death penalty. With regard to preclusion of the death penalty, defendant argued that the State had failed to prove that she committed the homicidal act by her own conduct in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c. Defendant's argument with respect to the own conduct requirement consisted of two principal points: (1) it was Ricky Flores, not defendant, who inflicted the various punishments, including the death blow; and (2) the Legislature, in formulating the own conduct requirement, expressed its intent to narrow the death-eligible class to those persons who wielded the instrumentality of death or who struck the death blow. According to defendant, the Legislature intended to exclude from the death-eligible class defendants whose culpability was premised on a theory of accomplice liability. The State argued that defendant's reading of the legislative history was too narrow. If the Legislature had wanted to limit the death-eligible class to those who strike the fatal blow, the State argued, it would have required that the murder be committed by one's own hand, rather than by one's own conduct. According to the State, then, the own conduct requirement encompassed the defendant's actions over a period of time in bringing about Theresa's death, namely, defendant's conduct in directing Ricky Flores to inflict the punishments that ultimately resulted in the victim's death. In denying defendant's motion to preclude the State from seeking the death penalty, the trial court relied on its interpretation of the legislative history, as well as the Code's definition of conduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14. The trial court also concluded that if the jury were to find defendant guilty of murder, it could reasonably conclude that she had committed the homicidal act by her own conduct. During pre-charge proceedings, defense counsel urged the trial court to instruct the jury that it could find that defendant had committed the homicidal act by her own conduct only if persuaded that her conduct was the immediate, clear, and present cause of death. The trial court denied that request, and charged the jury as follows: If you find the defendant guilty of murder, you must then determine whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt whether the defendant committed the homicidal act by her own conduct. The State must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: One, that the defendant participated in an act or series of acts which caused the death of Theresa Feury. Two, without the defendant's participation in that act or series of acts, Theresa Feury would not have died. Three, the defendant intended to cause the death of Theresa Feury or to cause serious bodily injury to Theresa Feury which resulted in her death. In keeping with the trial court's instructions, the jury returned separate verdicts with respect to the murder count: (1) that defendant was guilty of knowing and purposeful murder; and (2) that she committed the homicidal act by her own conduct. On appeal, defendant continues to argue that the evidence failed to establish that she committed the homicidal act by her own conduct. In addition, she argues that the trial court's charge with regard to that requirement was improper. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c provides, in pertinent part, that [a]ny person convicted under [ N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2)] who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value shall be sentenced in accordance with the Act's capital punishment provisions. (Emphasis added). In State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40 (1988), we for the first time interpreted the meaning of the own conduct requirement. The victim in Gerald died as a result of multiple beatings administered by more than one person during the course of a burglary. Because the medical testimony failed to establish whose blows resulted in the victim's death, Gerald argued that he was not death-eligible. He contended that the death penalty was proper only for an actor who `directly causes death by his own conduct, without reference to the acts of co-defendant.' Id. at 92. We agreed that a defendant must be the direct and immediate cause of death in order to satisfy the own conduct requirement but rejected defendant's contention that the single relevant concern [was] whether the defendant's conduct, standing alone, caused the victim's death. Id. at 92 (emphasis added). Instead, we concluded that the relevant inquiry is whether or not the defendant actively and directly participated in the homicidal act, i.e., in the infliction of the injuries from which the victim died. The critical elements are that defendant in fact acted, and the immediacy of his conduct to the victim's demise. Id. at 97. Although this case is unlike Gerald in that it does not involve death by multiple beatings, our interpretation in that case of the own conduct requirement is relevant here. In Gerald, we held that in order to satisfy the own conduct requirement, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct was the direct and immediate cause of death. Our decision to limit the death-eligible class in this manner was based on our interpretation of the legislative history of the Act. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 93-96. As we noted in Gerald, Senator John Russo, chief sponsor of the bill, intended that only two class of murderers be subjected to the death penalty: `[(1)] the actual perpetrator of the murder, the one who wields the gun or the knife    that results in death    [and (2)] the one who hires one to commit murder....' Id. at 94 [(quoting Capital Punishment Act: Hearings on S. 112 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (1982) at 2 (hereinafter Committee Hearing )]. Although the Code and the common law have abolished the distinction between principal and accomplice, we noted in Gerald that by adopting the own conduct requirement the Legislature reinstated the distinction for purposes of capital punishment. 113 N.J. at 96. We were persuaded that it was the Legislature's intent to preclude death-eligibility where a defendant's murder conviction was based on a felony murder charge or a theory of accomplice liability, unless, as N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 expressly provides, defendant hired another to commit the murder. Other than that very narrow murder for hire exception, only the principal, i.e., the triggerman, shall be death-eligible. Consequently, we concluded that [a]n accomplice who neither takes part in the infliction of the fatal wounds nor hires another to commit the murder may properly be convicted of murder, but may not be sentenced to death for his or her conduct. Id. at 93. However, the Legislature made clear its intention that [b]ecause the triggerman `is the fellow that ended somebody's life,' he alone should face a possible death sentence. Id. at 95 (quoting Committee Hearing at 18). In Gerald we concluded that although the imputation of liability for the conduct of another suffices for a murder conviction, the defendant's `own conduct' in the commission of the murder is a prerequisite to imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 96. It must be pointed out that the own conduct requirement is a triggering device used to determine whether a defendant will be death-eligible. Failure to satisfy the own conduct requirement does not render a murder conviction invalid. Moreover, we recognize that the federal constitution does not require us to conclude that an accomplice cannot be death-eligible. In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed. 2d 127 (1987), the Supreme Court recently limited the application of the rule announced in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1140 (1982), where the Court had held that it was disproportionate to impose the death penalty on a person convicted of felony murder without finding an intent to kill. In Tison, the Supreme Court distinguished Enmund on the grounds that the defendant in the latter case had been a minor participant, while the defendants in Tison were major participants in the events leading to the murders. The Court noted that the Tison brothers helped their father and his cellmate escape (these two shot the victims), knew of the danger involved, supplied guns, and flagged down the victims' car. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Tison brothers had been more than minor participants in the killings. The Court held in Tison that the defendants, who had been convicted under Arizona's felony-murder law and accomplice liability statutes, were properly deemed death-eligible, and thus affirmed their death sentences. As noted earlier, our death penalty scheme disallows the result reached in Tison, unless a defendant has hired another to commit murder. It is well-established that states are free to provide greater protection in their criminal justice system than the federal constitution requires. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3459-60, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1171, 1188-89 (1983); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 167. Under our statute, the Tison brothers would not be subject to the death penalty. In light of our interpretation of the own conduct requirement, we must examine the evidence in this case to determine whether it is sufficient to establish that Moore actively and directly participated in the homicidal act, i.e., in the infliction of the injuries that caused the victim's death. We are compelled to conclude that the facts in evidence do not support the jury's findings that Moore committed the homicidal act by her own conduct. The State recognizes that Moore did not inflict the fatal blows that resulted in the victim's death. Nonetheless, the State argues that Moore was the architect behind the death of Theresa Feury, a death whose cause cannot be properly limited to the moment the victim fell and hit her head on the bathtub. Rather, the State urges the Court to view Moore's participation in causing the death of Theresa Feury in light of her entire conduct over a period of time: The homicidal act need not be, as clearly demonstrated by this case, a single act of stabbing or shooting but may equally occur by a series of acts and omissions. The one responsible for that series of acts and omissions, as was Marie Moore so found to be by the jury's verdict, is to be justly deemed the perpetrator of that murder, the one who committed it by her own conduct regardless that the last physical act culminating in death (i.e. the lifting up of Theresa Feury on her knees to then fall and strike her head and the subsequent wrapping of Feury) was not by defendant's own hand. If the medical evidence established that Theresa Feury's death was caused by starvation or her weakened medical condition, or by asphyxiation resulting from her being wrapped and stuffed in a crawl space while alive, we would agree with the State that a jury could find that Moore by her own conduct caused Theresa's death. Under those facts, a jury could find that Moore actively and directly participated in the infliction of the injuries from which the victim died. The medical evidence presented in this record, however, does not support that finding. According to the medical examiner, the victim died as a result of blows to the head and face caused by striking the tub. Marie Moore did not deal the victim those fatal blows. Even the prosecutor conceded that point during legal argument: There is no question about the fact that when Theresa Feury died it wasn't ... at her hand. There is no question about that fact. That Moore solicited and then directed Flores' participation does not alter the result we reach today. By limiting death-eligibility to the actual triggerman, the Legislature expressly rejected the notion that one who solicits another to kill without payment or promise of payment should be death eligible. See Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 92-97. Given our disposition of the own conduct issue in the instant case, we find it unnecessary to address at length defendant's claims with regard to the trial court's own conduct jury charge. We find however that the jury charge given in this case was improper. It made the defendant eligible for the death penalty by virtue of her role as an accomplice. Supra at 97-98. Accordingly, in this case, we find that the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to preclude imposition of the death penalty based on the State's failure to prove that she had committed the homicidal act by her own conduct.