Opinion ID: 2567337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: wayment's public figure status for purposes of her defamation claim

Text: ¶ 17 The determination of a defamation plaintiff's public figure status is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1983). We begin with an overview of the interests at issue in making this determination. We then identify the two categories of public figures and analyze whether Wayment fits within either of these categories.
¶ 18 At its core, an action for defamation is intended to protect an individual's interest in maintaining a good reputation. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994); see Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 973 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that the integrity of an individual's reputation is essential to his standing in society, in his vocation, and even in his family). [2] Before 1964, defamation was a strict liability tort, and a plaintiff would recover from the publisher of a defamatory statement unless the publisher could prove the statement was true. Id. at 971 (noting that pre-1964 law presumed damage to reputation from the defamation itself); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). ¶ 19 The law changed, however, when the United States Supreme Court ruled in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), that state defamation law, like any governmentally sanctioned formulae for the repression of expression, must be bound by standards that satisfy the First Amendment. Id. at 269, 84 S.Ct. 710. The Court reasoned that the First Amendment protects `unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people' even though this interchange may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials, and even though, in such a context, erroneous statements inevitably occur. Id. at 269-71, 84 S.Ct. 710 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)). A strict liability rule in defamation law deprives the critic of official conduct of necessary breathing space, id. at 271-72, 84 S.Ct. 710, by compelling [him] to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions, deterring some true speech along with the false, id. at 279, 84 S.Ct. 710. Concluding that the First Amendment essentially imposes a federal rule on state defamation law, the Court held that a public official could not recover[] damages [under state law] for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Id. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710. In essence, the Court recognized a constitutional privilege for the citizen-critic of government. Id. at 282, 84 S.Ct. 710; see Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 797 P.2d 1083, 1084-85 (Utah 1990); Van Dyke, 663 P.2d at 54-55. ¶ 20 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967), the Court extended this constitutional privilege to defamatory statements concerning public figures who are not government officials. Id. at 163, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result, joined by four Justices). The Court reasoned that, in the modern world, power has . . . become much more organized in what we have commonly considered the private sector. In many situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are now originated and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with the Government. This blending of positions and power has also occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large. Id. at 163-64, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (controlling opinion of Warren, C.J.) (emphasis added); see also id. at 147-48, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (plurality) ([A] rational distinction cannot be founded on the assumption that criticism of private citizens who seek to lead in the determination of . . . policy will be less important to the public interest than will criticism of government officials. (internal quotation omitted)). ¶ 21 The Court in Curtis did not define precisely who should be considered a public figure for purposes of applying the constitutional privilege to state defamation law. In a subsequent opinion, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the Court indicated that the definition of public figure in effect rests on a judicial determination of the proper accommodation between First Amendment concerns and the state interest in compensating individuals for the harm caused by defamatory falsehood. Id. at 341-43, 94 S.Ct. 2997. The Court recognized that the state interest at issue was strong and legitimate with regard to private individuals. Id. at 348, 94 S.Ct. 2997. With regard to public figures, however, the state interest is reduced, in part because such individuals are able to engage in self-help, counteracting defamatory statements through their own access to and use of the channels of effective communication. Id. at 344, 94 S.Ct. 2997. Moreover, in most cases, such individuals have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood and are thus less deserving of state law protection than the average private person. Id. at 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997; see Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979) (considering this normative consideration the more important of the two).
¶ 22 The Court recognized in Gertz that one might be deemed a public figure on either of two alternative bases. 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997. First, an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. Id. These all-purpose public figures occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they may hold sway on any issue with which they choose to become involved. Id. at 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997; see Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1294 n. 15 (D.C.Cir.1980) (noting that truly famous figures may be able to transfer their recognition and influence from one field to another and that [a] person's power to capitalize on his general fame by lending his name to products, candidates, and causes indicates the broad influence he has). Second, and [m]ore commonly, individuals who have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved become public figures for [the] limited range of issues associated with those controversies. [3] Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997. The overarching characteristic of either type of public figureand the underlying rationale for the denominationis that such a person has assume[d] special prominence in the resolution of public questions. Id. at 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997. ¶ 23 Here, the district court ruled Wayment was a public figure but did not specify which type of public figure it deemed her to be. Clear Channel appears to suggest that Wayment, through her broadcast reporting activities and her public appearances at charitable events, has achieved a level of general fame in the Salt Lake community sufficient to qualify her for all-purpose public figure status. [4] Alternatively, Clear Channel argues that Wayment should at least be considered a limited-purpose public figure for purposes of her defamation suit. We address each of these possibilities in turn.
¶ 24 The record before us fails to establish Wayment as a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. The United States Supreme Court in Gertz emphasized that a court must not lightly assume that a citizen's participation in community and professional affairs render[s] him a public figure for all purposes. 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in a widely-cited opinion, concluded that only a well-known `celebrity,' his name a `household word,' could appropriately be deemed an all-purpose public figure. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294 (stating further that the public recognizes [such a person] and follows his words and deeds). The requirements for attaining this status are strict, and few qualify. See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 137 (2d Cir.1984) (concluding that Jackie Collins Lerman, well-known author of racy novels, was not that rare person the Gertz decision identifies as an all purpose public figure). ¶ 25 A defamation defendant who alleges the plaintiff is an all-purpose public figure must provide clear evidence of [the plaintiff's] general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997. Courts have suggested that such evidence might include statistical surveys. . . that concern the plaintiff's name recognition, [p]revious coverage of the plaintiff in the press, whether others in fact alter or reevaluate their conduct or ideas in light of the plaintiff's actions, and whether the plaintiff has successfully been able to shun[] the attention that the public has given him. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295; accord Wilson v. Daily Gazette, 214 W.Va. 208, 588 S.E.2d 197, 205 (W.Va.2003) (holding that there was insufficient evidence to qualify a star high school athlete as an all-purpose public figure). [5] ¶ 26 The facts mustered by Clear Channel in support of Wayment's all-purpose public figure status are these: that Wayment was the KTVX Channel 4 Health Reporter for three years, during which time she broadcast more than a thousand stories and a number of special reports and was featured in hundreds of KTVX promotional spots; that Wayment reported live from local health-related special events such as the Utah AIDS Foundation annual Oscar Night Gala; that Wayment participated in at least four public charitable events (the Utah Diabetes Center Gala, the March of Dimes WalkAmerica, and, twice, the Race for the Cure); that Wayment served on the board of the Candlelighters for Childhood Cancer; that Wayment referred to herself as a local celebrity in her email to Fischer; and that local newspapers covered Wayment's filing of the current lawsuit. ¶ 27 Most of these facts, however, simply demonstrate that Wayment was performing her job as a health reporter and that KTVX was advertising her reports in order to attract viewers to KTVX news broadcasts. [6] Whether Wayment actually considered herself a local celebrity or not, [7] her own opinion sheds little light on that of the public at large. Clear Channel has provided no evidence that Wayment wielded any particular social or political influenceno indication, for example, that members of the public tuned in to KTVX news or attended the four charitable events mentioned simply because of Wayment, nor that they attached more weight to her words or conduct, due to her alleged prominence, than they would to those of other reporters. Additionally, press coverage of a defamation lawsuit is generally disfavored as an indicator of the plaintiff's public figure status. See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295 n. 19 (noting that [t]he court must examine [the facts supporting all-purpose public figure status] as they existed before the defamation was published because otherwise, the press could convert a private individual into a general public figure simply by publicizing the defamation itself and . . . litigation arising out of it (emphasis added)). ¶ 28 If we were to accept these facts as sufficient evidence of general fame in the local community, any reporter would likely qualify as an all-purpose public figure. Clear Channel urges us to make such a blanket rule, arguing that other courts have consistently held media plaintiffs to be public figures. For this proposition, Clear Channel relies on San Antonio Express News v. Dracos, 922 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.App.1996), which held a television reporter to be a public figure without specifying the category of public figure to which he belonged. [8] Id. at 255. Even if the Texas Court of Appeals considered Dracos an all-purpose public figure, however, it did not do so based solely on Dracos's occupation as a journalist. The Texas court considered Dracos more than a television journalisthe was a `commentator' with a `special' news segment that was highly accusatory in nature and involved put[ting public figures] on the rack. Id. at 253, 255. The court emphasized that Dracos had been frequently featured in San Antonio newspapers due to his highly provocative activities. Id. at 253. The evidence before the court included articles describing, for example, Dracos's unsubstantiated accusation that police officials were playing golf during working hours and his taking a wheelchair-bound woman excused from jury duty to confront the judge. Id. at 253-54 (internal quotation omitted). Based on such evidence, the court may reasonably have concluded that Dracos had reached a high level of notoriety in his local community. There is no similar evidence before us regarding Wayment. ¶ 29 The Dracos court noted that journalists and television reporters . . . have often been considered public figures. Id. at 252. However, the cases it cited as holding reporter plaintiffs to be public figures all qualified them as limited-purpose public figures. See O'Donnell v. CBS, Inc., 782 F.2d 1414, 1417 (7th Cir.1986); Falls v. Sporting News Publ'g Co., 714 F.Supp. 843, 847 (E.D.Mich.1989), aff'd 899 F.2d 1221 (6th Cir. 1990); Adler v. Conde Nast Publ'ns, Inc., 643 F.Supp. 1558, 1565 (S.D.N.Y.1986); Rybachek v. Sutton, 761 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Alaska 1988); Knudsen v. Kan. Gas & Elec. Co., 248 Kan. 469, 807 P.2d 71, 78 (1991); Warner v. Kan. City Star Co., 726 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Mo.Ct.App.1987); WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex.1998). [9] Because, as we discuss below, the determination that a defamation plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure requires the identification of a particular public controversy, such a determination may not rest on the plaintiff's occupation alone. See Straw v. Chase Revel, Inc., 813 F.2d 356, 361 (11th Cir.1987) ([N]ot every publisher is automatically a public figure by virtue of his access to a printing press.); Wilson, 588 S.E.2d at 207 (rejecting defamation defendant's assertion that all non-professional athletes are limited purpose public figures). ¶ 30 We therefore decline Clear Channel's invitation to hold Wayment a public figure simply because she is a television reporter and conclude that, in this case, the record fails to establish by clear evidence that Wayment is an all-purpose public figure. [10] We next consider whether Wayment is a limited-purpose public figure with regard to her current defamation action.
¶ 31 As we discussed above, the Supreme Court in Gertz identified a limited-purpose public figure as someone who has thrust [herself] to the forefront of [a] particular public controvers[y] in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997. The first step in analyzing whether a defamation plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure for purposes of her defamation claim is to isolate the particular public controversy related to the defamation. [11] If we are able to identify such a controversy, we then examine the nature and extent of [the plaintiff's] participation in that controversy in order to determine whether she has thrust [her]sel[f] to the forefront of [the] controvers[y] in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351-52, 94 S.Ct. 2997. [12] ¶ 32 In performing this analysis, we keep in mind the competing concerns underlying the public figure doctrine. Where a public controversy exists, there is a First Amendment interest in providing the breathing space necessary to ensure free debate on the issues involved. At the same time, unless the plaintiff has intentionally sought or attained a position of influence with respect to the particular controversy, and thus in some sense waived or rendered unnecessary the full protection afforded by state law, the First Amendment interest in providing breathing space for debate must yield, in part, to the strong state interest in providing a means of recovery from those who engage in defamation. [13] ¶ 33 Most cases holding a reporter to be a limited-purpose public figure have followed this approach. See O'Donnell, 782 F.2d at 1417 (holding that the head of a television station's editorial board was a limited-purpose public figure based on his advoca[cy] of a particular point of view in a controversy over EPA toxic waste burial regulations); Adler, 643 F.Supp. at 1565 (holding that a journalist plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure based on her involvement in the controversy surrounding the magazine Vanity Fair's revival); Rybachek, 761 P.2d at 1014 (holding that a biweekly columnist was a limited-purpose public figure based on the tone and substance of her column and the fact that [she] owned a gold mine herself and held office in various miners associations, which indicated her involvement in controversies over Alaskan natural resources and mining issues); Knudsen, 807 P.2d at 78 (holding that a freelance investigative journalist was a limited-purpose public figure based on his initiating an investigative article on the public's right to use Wolf Creek's cooling lake); WFAA-TV, Inc., 978 S.W.2d at 572 (holding that a reporter was a limited-purpose public figure based on his involvement in [t]he controversy surrounding the [1993 failed ATF] raid of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas). [14] ¶ 34 We now consider whether we can identify a particular public controversy giving rise to the alleged defamation in this case. Clear Channel offers two suggestions in this regard, referring first to the public interest in assisting children who were terminally-ill with cancer and second to the great public interest in news reporter conduct and media bias. However, neither of these suggestions identify a public controversy in the sense intended by Gertz. ¶ 35 We agree with the vast majority of courts that have understood a public controversy, in the context of limited-purpose public figure determinations, to be not simply a matter of interest to the public; it must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some segment of it in an appreciable way. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296; see also Lerman, 745 F.2d at 138 (A public `controversy' is any topic upon which sizeable segments of society have different, strongly held views.). In other words, persons actually [must have been] discussing some specific question. A general concern or interest will not suffice. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297. If the issue was being debated publicly and if it had foreseeable and substantial ramifications for nonparticipants, it was a public controversy. [15] Id. ¶ 36 Neither of Clear Channel's suggestions constitutes a particular public controversy in this sense. Certainly, the treatment of terminally-ill children and media bias both qualify as matters of public concern. However, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979), the Supreme Court made clear that a public controversy is a concept distinct from a matter of public concern. The defamation plaintiff in Hutchinson had received government financing of his research, and the alleged defamation related to this financing. Id. In rejecting the public figure status of the plaintiff, the Court recognized the concern about general public expenditures but noted that this concern is shared by most and relates to most public expenditures. Id. If relevance to such a concern were all that was necessary for someone to qualify as a public figure, everyone who received or benefited from the myriad public grants for research could be classified as a public figure. Id. The Court considered this result undesirable because the 'use of such subject-matter classifications to determine the extent of constitutional protection afforded defamatory falsehoods may too often result in an improper balance between the competing interests in this area.' Id. (quoting Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976)). [16] ¶ 37 Here, in regard to the treatment of terminally-ill children, we see no evidence of any public controversy at all. It appears from the record that Wayment herself saw an unmet need in the current system of care, and her development of the buddy system idea and private communication with a Huntsman employee were intended to alleviate this need. Clear Channel alleges that Wayment aired numerous stories about the plight of these children and their families and that these stories generated public interest and concern. However, the record refers to only one such story, that concerning Tarrin, which aired nearly three years before the alleged defamation occurred. There is no evidence that Wayment's story raised any debatable issues about the treatment of children with cancer or that the public was debating such issues immediately after the story aired, much less that any such debate continued three years later. ¶ 38 Likewise, Clear Channel has not pointed to any particular public controversy simply by stating that the public believes that media bias is undesirable. Cf. Warford v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 789 S.W.2d 758, 767 (Ky.1990) (holding that issues concerning college athlete recruitment did not constitute a public controversy because there was no legitimate controversy or debate about the desirability of NCAA rules violations). Even assuming that Wayment's contact with Huntsman created a conflict of interest, an issue on which we express no opinion, there is no evidence of public debate over Wayment's activities prior to this litigation. Since Wayment was fired before she had actually gone through with her project and her plans were not publicized, it is difficult to imagine that any such debate occurred. We do not think the rumors circulating among the employees at KTVX and other television stations amount to public debate. ¶ 39 Even if they did, however, we could not conclude that Wayment voluntarily thrust herself to the forefront of a controversy over her own or others' unethical activities. Such a conclusion would be equivalent to holding that any individual who engages in activities that attract public attention thereby injects himself into a public controversy over the conduct. The Supreme Court eschewed such a result in Wolston, refusing to hold the plaintiff a public figure based on his failure to appear before the grand jury and citation for contempt even though this behavior attracted significant media attention. 443 U.S. at 167, 99 S.Ct. 2701. The Court explained that the plaintiff did not invite[] a citation for contempt in order to use the contempt citation as a fulcrum to create public discussion about the methods being used in connection with an investigation or prosecution. Id. at 168., 99 S.Ct. 2701 Because the plaintiff did not intend his action to draw attention to himself in order to invite public comment or influence the public with respect to any issue, he was not a limited-purpose public figure. Id. Similarly here, nothing in the record even hints that Wayment sought to create a conflict of interest in order to stimulate public debate on such matters. ¶ 40 We therefore conclude that Wayment is a private figure for purposes of her defamation action. We proceed to address whether Wayment submitted sufficient evidence to support her claims that Fischer and Benedict made the statements at issue.