Opinion ID: 2293201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Counsel at Second Postconviction-Relief Hearing

Text: With respect to the first issue, applicant contends that he should have been provided counsel at his second postconviction-relief proceeding. On September 25, 2009, applicant filed a second application for postconviction relief accompanied by a motion to appoint counsel. Concomitantly, applicant filed a stipulation that he was proceeding pro se, reinforced by a motion to proceed pro se. The applicant now alleges that the hearing justice erred because he declined to appoint counsel, even in the face of the fact that applicant had filed a motion to proceed pro se along with a stipulation alerting the court that he was pro se. To support his argument, applicant cites Bryant v. Wall, 896 A.2d 704, 708 (R.I. 2006). In Bryant, the applicant was pursuing his first application for postconviction relief, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. Id. at 706. Despite the fact that it was the applicant's first application for postconviction relief, we held that [b]ecause a person may waive his constitutional right to counsel in a criminal case, we see no reason to question his right to waive his statutory right to counsel in a civil case. Id. at 709. In light of that holding, we can divine no earthly reason why the right to appointed counsel cannot be waived in a successor application. The applicant also maintains that the hearing justice ran afoul of the mandates of Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000). He argues that the hearing justice failed to comply with the requirements of Shatney in this second application for postconviction relief because he did not have the benefit of appointed counsel and he was not provided with an opportunity to respond to the dismissal of his application. Shatney requires that a postconviction-relief applicant is entitled either to a hearing on his application or to a judicial determination that his appointed counsel's no-merit conclusion entitles that attorney to withdraw   . Id. at 136. After reviewing the transcript from the postconviction-relief hearing, we are satisfied that applicant was afforded a hearing on his application in accordance with Shatney. See Shatney, 755 A.2d at 136. At the hearing, the justice considered and reviewed two of the allegations applicant raised. [3] After the state responded to applicant's contentions, the hearing justice provided applicant an opportunity to respond to what had been said by the state and the court. Therefore, we see no merit to this argument advanced by applicant. See Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1017 (R.I.2008); see also Otero v. State, 996 A.2d 667, 671 (R.I.2010) (denying a contention that there was a procedural defect in a postconviction-relief hearing during which the hearing justice asked the applicant whether he had any questions about what was said at the hearing and then gave the applicant an opportunity to be heard on the claims thereafter dismissed). We are hard-pressed to assign error to the hearing justice's decision to allow applicant to proceed pro se in accordance with the motion that he himself had filed with the court. In addition, the fact that applicant failed to alert the Superior Court justice to the fact that he desired to be represented by counsel at any time during the hearing leads us to conclude that no error was committed by the hearing justice.