Opinion ID: 8414984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tilcon

Text: The district court correctly held that Tilcon, the operator of the rock processing facility, has no LHWCA liability because it did not employ Volk or own the Barge. See 33 U.S.C. § 905. The district court also correctly held that the general maritime claims asserted against Til-con fail because Tilcon is not an owner of the Barge and because Volk is not a seaman. Tilcon had no duty to provide a seaworthy vessel or to provide maintenance and cure because it did not own the Barge. See Oxley v. City of New York, 923 F.2d 22, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that a vessel owner has a duty to supply a seaworthy vessel); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441, 121 S.Ct. 993, 148 L.Ed.2d 931 (2001) (“A claim for maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship.”). Further, Volk is not entitled to maintenance and cure because he is not a seaman. See 1B-IV Benedict on Admiralty § 44 (2015) (“Longshoremen, of course, have never been entitled to maintenance and cure.”). The district court erred, however, in dismissing Volk’s New York state law claims against Tilcon for negligence, gross negligence, and violations of N.Y. Labor Law § 200. The district court determined that these claims failed because the alleged hazard—the presence of excess stone on the margin deck of the Barge— was open and obvious. The district court’s holding in this regard was based on an error of law. New York law utilizes a comparative negligence scheme, meaning the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are not complete defenses as a matter of law. See Integrated Waste Servs., Inc. v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 113 F.3d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen New York, by statute, adopted comparative negligence, it abolished not only contributory negligence as a complete defense, but also assumption of risk. Under the statute, liability is split between plaintiffs and defendants based on the relative culpability and causal significance of their conduct.” (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411)); see also Payne v. United States, 359 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[U]nder New York law the open and obvious nature of a dangerous condition ... does not absolve the landowner of its general duty of care.”)- Even assuming the condition was open and obvious, a factual question exists as to the relative fault of the parties. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Tilcon on these state law claims was error.