Opinion ID: 2791332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive Challenge to Condition Eight

Text: We review substantive reasonableness challenges to conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion where, as here, the defendant objected in the district court. United States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2013). A district court may impose any condition of supervised release “it considers to be appropriate,” as long as certain requirements are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); see also United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 153 (5th Cir. 2009). A condition of supervised release “must be related to one of four factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) the need to protect the public from further crime of the defendant; and (4) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” Ellis, 720 F.3d at 225 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)−(D)). In addition, “the condition cannot impose any ‘greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ to advance deterrence, protect the public from the defendant, and advance the defendant’s correctional needs.” Weatherton, 567 F.3d at 153 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)). Finally, the condition must be consistent with the policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3). Condition eight, as stated in the judgment, provides: 7 Case: 14-60182 Document: 00512992669 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 No. 14-60182 The defendant may not date, engage in a relationship or co-habitat [sic] with an individual who has children under the age of 18 unless approved by the probation officer and third party risk issues have been identified and notification has been provided by the probation officer. Pennington challenges only the condition’s provisions on “dat[ing]” and “engag[ing] in a relationship,” and not its provision on “co-habit[ing].” In light of vagueness concerns, we note that the record of the sentencing hearing makes clear that the terms “date” and “relationship” are used to convey romantic involvement. The district court, in explaining condition eight, stated that it “would require you to have the conversation with probation about your intent to engage in a relationship or cohabit with a mate that had small children so that probation could make your partner, your girlfriend aware of your history and let that person have knowledge of propensity.” Based on this understanding of condition eight, we now analyze Pennington’s arguments that the condition is overly broad and impermissibly vague.
Pennington argues that condition eight involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to protect the public and prevent recidivism. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Pennington’s overbreadth argument depends on a misconstruction of the condition. He argues that under condition eight, he “would have to first get approval to write a letter to someone or if he were to think about striking up a casual conversation with a person anywhere.” Pennington further claims that the condition would apply to his own daughter if she decided to have a child. Pennington overlooks that the terms “date” and “relationship,” as imposed by this sentencing judge, involve romantic engagement. 8 Case: 14-60182 Document: 00512992669 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 No. 14-60182 Understood in the context of this record, condition eight is not overly broad. “Congress has made clear that children . . . are members of the public it seeks to protect by permitting a district court to impose appropriate conditions on terms of supervised release.” United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408, 417 (5th Cir. 2009). Pennington’s previous conviction for fondling the child of a girlfriend points to a concern about the use of romantic relationships to reach children. See Ellis, 720 F.3d at 226 (finding that a restriction on contact with adults who have minor children was “related to public safety” given Ellis’s “proclivity to use close relationships to reach children”). In addition, condition eight is not an absolute ban, but rather a requirement to obtain permission from the probation officer. See Tang, 718 F.3d at 487 (“The restriction on contact with minors . . . is not a greater deprivation than reasonably necessary as Tang can request permission to have contact with minors (or cohabitate with someone having minor children).”). Given these factors, condition eight is not broader than is reasonably necessary to protect the public and prevent recidivism. Our court has previously upheld similar conditions against overbreadth challenges. See Rodriguez, 558 F.3d at 411, 417–18 (upholding a condition prohibiting the defendant from “associating with any child or children under the age of eighteen, except in the presence and supervision of an adult specifically designated in writing by the probation officer”); see also United States v. Byrd, 551 F. App’x 726, 727 (5th Cir. 2013) (under plain error review, upholding a condition prohibiting Byrd from “entering into a relationship with anyone with minor children without approval from the probation officer”); United States v. Cortez, 543 F. App’x 411, 412 (5th Cir. 2013) (under plain error review, upholding a condition “conditionally restricting [Cortez] from dating or befriending anyone with children under the age of 18 who live at home”). 9 Case: 14-60182 Document: 00512992669 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 No. 14-60182 Contrary to Pennington’s argument, condition eight also is not redundant in light of condition six. 2 While condition six limits direct unsupervised contact with children, condition eight relates to romantic relationships with parents of minor children. Although the district court’s purpose for imposing both conditions—to protect children and prevent recidivism—may be the same, the two conditions achieve that purpose in different ways.
Pennington also claims that condition eight is impermissibly vague. “Restrictions on an offender’s ability to interact with particular groups of people . . . must provide fair notice of the prohibited conduct.” Paul, 274 F.3d at 166 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But conditions need not be “precise to the point of pedantry.” Id. at 167. “[C]ategorical terms can provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct when there is a commonsense understanding of what activities the categories encompass.” Id. Under a commonsense reading of condition eight, and in light of the district court’s statements at sentencing, Pennington must obtain permission from the probation officer before cohabiting or becoming romantically involved with another person who has a child under age 18. Contrary to Pennington’s argument, the condition does not apply to a “meeting with a friend” or “striking up a conversation with someone.” Our court, reviewing for plain error a restriction on friendships, noted in dicta that “the term ‘befriend’ is vague and may have been subject to vacatur and remand to the district court for greater 2 Condition six provides: “With the exception of unanticipated and/or incidental contact, the defendant shall have no direct unsupervised contact, including by correspondence, telephone, internet or other electronic communication, or through third parties, with children under the age of 18, except in the presence of an adult who has been approved in advance by the probation officer.” 10 Case: 14-60182 Document: 00512992669 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 No. 14-60182 specificity” had the defendant objected on vagueness grounds in the district court. Ellis, 720 F.3d at 227 n.2. However, the requirement of romantic involvement provides sufficient specificity to put Pennington on notice of when he must notify and seek approval from his probation officer. 3