Opinion ID: 469821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right of Association

Text: 23 A group of Rehoboth Beach business owners, including appellant, organized the Rehoboth Concerned Taxpayers Association. Members paid certain tax obligations into an escrow account to persuade the city to change its tax policies. In 1981, appellant chose to run for commissioner to represent the views of the association. According to appellant, the rejection of his nominating petition due to tax delinquency denied a political association access to the ballot. 24 The right of political association derives from the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, petition for redress of grievances and peaceable assembly. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975). There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57, 94 S.Ct. 303, 307-308, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973). Such protection reflects the Supreme Court's recognition that [c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process.... Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32, 89 S.Ct. 5, 11, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). 25 The right of association extends beyond the mere formation of a political group. The right encompasses the availability of political opportunity for the group. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Although the right of association has greatest urgency in election matters, neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute. CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 453 U.S. 367, 101 S.Ct. 2813, 69 L.Ed.2d 706 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). 26 In Anderson v. Celebreeze, the most recent ballot restriction case, the Supreme Court enunciated the following test to determine whether a restriction unreasonably burdens associational rights. 27 [The court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional. 28 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1570. Because the right of association is fundamental, the Court employed a due process balancing test, weighing the magnitude of the burden against the importance of the governmental interest. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 96 S.Ct. 612, 637, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). 29 The Court has recognized that ballot access restrictions may burden both the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 99 S.Ct. 983, 990, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979). However, not all restrictions on candidate eligibility impose constitutionally suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates. Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569. The Court has upheld evenhanded restrictions governing filing deadlines and nominating petitions. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). 30 When election rules present unreasonable barriers for certain political groups, the Court has found constitutionally suspect burdens on the right of association. In Anderson, for example, the filing deadline for independent presidential candidates was constitutionally infirm because it prevented the emergence of an independent candidate after voters became dissatisfied with the candidates provided by two major political parties. The state's interest in providing voters with an extended opportunity to scrutinize presidential candidates was outweighed by the voters' right of association. 31 The non-delinquency requirement of the charter of Rehoboth Beach also operates to exclude certain classes of candidates from the electoral process. Anderson, supra, 460 U.S. at 793, 103 S.Ct. at 1572. Excluded are those who, for economic political or other reasons, have not paid their tax obligations. Appellant claims that this burden is constitutionally suspect because he cannot participate in the association's tax protest and pursue elective office to advance the association's political views. Id. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569. Deibler seeks constitutional protection for his right to seek elective office to promote the association's views, and also for the act of not paying taxes. 32 If appellant had paid his taxes, he would not have been denied the opportunity to represent the views of the association as a candidate. This court has held that First Amendment freedoms are not abridged by the obligation to pay taxes. In Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir.1985), we held that the failure to pay a tax, even as a means of political expression, is without First Amendment protection. See also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982). Where, as here, the ballot restriction of Rehoboth Beach does not inhibit the formation of a political association and does not deny the right of the Rehoboth Concerned Taxpayers Association to advance a representative candidate, the burden is not constitutionally suspect. We hold that balancing the legitimacy of the governmental interests in requiring non-delinquency in the Rehoboth Beach charter is not required because appellant has failed to advance any constitutionally suspect burden.