Opinion ID: 745302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: conveying a weapon as a violent felony under the armed career criminal actct

Text: 41 The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) authorizes an enhanced prison term for a defendant who is (1) convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and (2) has three previous convictions by any court ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In sentencing Romero, the district court concluded that Romero had three prior violent felonies within the meaning of section 924(e)(1). First, on January 31, 1974, a jury convicted Romero of second degree murder. Second, on June 12, 1975, Romero was convicted of forcibly assaulting a law enforcement officer. Third, on December 4, 1981, Romero pleaded guilty to conveying a weapon in federal prison in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (1984). The district court thus sentenced Romero as an armed career offender under the ACCA. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a). 42 On appeal, Romero argues that his prior conviction for conveying a weapon in a federal prison does not constitute a violent felony under section 924(e). We review de novo a sentence enhancement imposed pursuant to section 924(e). United States v. Hill, 53 F.3d 1151, 1153 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 258, 133 L.Ed.2d 182 (1995). The government carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an enhancement is appropriate. United States v. Green, 55 F.3d 1513, 1515 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 324, 133 L.Ed.2d 225 (1995). The ACCA defines a violent felony as: 43 [A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that-- 44 (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or 45 (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 46 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). In determining whether Romero's conveying conviction is a violent felony under the ACCA, we use a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2159, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1461 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 385, 136 L.Ed.2d 302 (1996). 47 At the time of Romero's 1981 conveying conviction, the relevant statute provided: 48 Whoever conveys into such institution, or from place to place therein, any firearm, weapon, explosive, or any lethal or poisonous gas, or any other substance or thing designed to kill, injure or disable any officer, agent, employee, or inmate thereof, or conspires so to do-- 49 Shall be imprisoned not more than ten years. 50 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (1984) (emphasis added). Based on the statutory definition of Romero's conveying conviction, we hold that such an offense inherently presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. It is worth emphasizing that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) only requires that there be a serious 'potential' risk of injury; it does not require proof that any actual injury occurred, nor should it under a categorical approach. United States v. Phelps, 17 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir.1994). With this in mind, we agree with the Ninth Circuit: 51 In a prison setting, the possession by an inmate of a deadly weapon indeed presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm, although disobeying the law, may have a legitimate use intended for the firearm, such as target shooting or collecting. By contrast, we fail to discover a similarly innocent purpose behind the possession of a deadly weapon by a prison inmate. The confines of prison preclude any recreational uses for a deadly weapon and render its possession a serious threat to the safety of others. By its nature, therefore, the possession of a deadly weapon by a prison inmate presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 52 United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir.1993) (concluding that a conveying offense is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2). Thus, we hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Romero's 1981 conveying offense was a violent felony under the ACCA. 53 V. CONVEYING A WEAPON AS A SERIOUS VIOLENT FELONY UNDER THE THREE STRIKES LAW LAW 54 In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act which included a mandatory life imprisonment provision (Three Strikes law). Pub.L. No. 103-322, Tit. VII, § 70001, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)). Under that statute, the district court must sentence to life in prison any defendant who (1) is convicted in federal court of a serious violent felony and (2) has been convicted, on prior separate occasions, of two or more prior serious violent felonies in federal or state courts. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A). Under the Three Strikes law, the term serious violent felony includes: 55 (ii) any other offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another or that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 56 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). Even if a crime meets this definition, however, the crime does not necessarily constitute a strike against the defendant. The statute provides that a crime is a nonqualifying felony if the defendant establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that: 57 (i) no firearm or other dangerous weapon was used in the offense and no threat of use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon was involved in the offense; and 58 (ii) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365) to any person. 59 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3)(A). 60 In this case, the district court concluded that Romero had two prior serious violent felony convictions--the 1974 second degree murder conviction and the 1981 conveying conviction. In accordance with the Three Strikes law, the district court sentenced Romero to three concurrent life sentences for his convictions relating to Count I (conspiracy), Count II (carjacking), and Count IV (interference with interstate commerce), all serious violent felonies within the meaning of the statute. 61 On appeal, Romero argues that his prior conviction for conveying a weapon in a federal prison does not constitute a serious violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). We review de novo a sentence enhancement imposed pursuant to section 3559(c). See Hill, 53 F.3d at 1153 (applying a de novo review to an enhancement under the ACCA).
62 Romero first asserts that his 1981 conveying conviction is not a serious violent felony because the offense does not meet the ten-year maximum penalty requirement. Romero acknowledges that in 1981, the maximum penalty for conveying a weapon in a federal prison was ten years. He argues, however, that the maximum penalty requirement should be measured at the time that Congress enacted the Three Strikes law. Because the maximum penalty for possessing a shank in 1994, when Congress enacted section 3559(c), was five years, Romero asserts that his conveying conviction fails to satisfy the ten-year maximum penalty requirement. 63 We disagree. In determining whether a felony satisfies the ten-year maximum penalty requirement of section 3559(c), the relevant inquiry is the penalty at the time of the conviction, not in 1994 when Congress enacted the Three Strikes Law. Under the plain language of the statute, a strike occurs when a person has been convicted ... on separate prior occasions of a serious violent felony. This language clearly indicates the time of conviction, not the time of the enactment of the Three Strikes Law, dictates what constitutes a strike. 64
65 Romero next asserts that his 1981 conveying conviction is not a serious violent felony because it is not an offense that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). Romero urges us to adopt a categorical approach in this circuit and look only to the statutory elements of his conveying conviction to determine whether his conviction qualifies as a serious violent felony under section 3559(c). See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2159, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (construing a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act); United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1461 (10th Cir.1996) (same). He contends that because the statutory elements of a conveying offense do not require a substantial risk of physical force, the substantial risk requirement is not satisfied. Even if Romero's conveying conviction is a serious violent felony, he argues that it is a nonqualifying offense under section 3559(c)(3). 66 In response, the government argues that we should not look only to the statutory elements of the offense, but should ask, as the statute requires, whether the offense by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). The government asserts that Romero's conveying conviction satisfies this requirement. The government also argues that Romero did not seek to establish in the district court that his conveying conviction was a nonqualifying offense under section 3559(c)(3). Thus, the government contends that the record is insufficient to make this determination on appeal. 67 In determining whether a conviction constitutes a serious violent felony under section 3559(c), the statute indicates that we follow a two-step process. First, we must examine the statute itself to determine whether the offense contains as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or whether the offense by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. If either of these tests are met, the burden shifts to the defendant to avoid a strike by establishing, under the clear and convincing evidence standard, that his conviction is a nonqualifying offense. As such, the defendant must place evidence in the record to establish that no firearm or other dangerous weapon was used in the offense and no threat of use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon was involved in the offense and the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3)(A). 68 We agree with the government that Romero's 1981 conveying conviction is a serious violent felony under section 3559(c). Although the conveying offense does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, it meets the second test contained in the statute--that is, by its nature, [it] involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. As we discussed above, there is no legitimate purpose for a prisoner to carry a weapon designed to kill, injure or disable another. On the contrary, the only reason to carry such a weapon is to use it to attack another or to deter an attack. Either way, the possession involves a substantial risk that physical force will be used while the weapon is in the possession of the prisoner. Thus, the burden shifts to Romero to prove that his conveying conviction is a nonqualifying offense under section 3559(c)(3). 69 We hold that Romero has failed to meet his burden of establishing that his conveying conviction was a nonqualifying offense. The only evidence introduced during the sentencing hearing relating to the 1981 conveying conviction was the Indictment and Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order. Nothing in these documents establishes that Romero's conveying offense was a nonqualifying offense under section 3559(c). Thus, we hold that Romero's 1981 conveying offense is a serious violent felony warranting a mandatory life sentence under section 3559(c). 70