Opinion ID: 1058113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for Appointment of DNA Expert and for a Continuance

Text: Prior to trial, Angel filed a motion seeking funds to employ a DNA expert to review the DNA evidence that the Commonwealth intended to introduce at trial. That evidence consisted of a DNA analysis from blood stains on a shoe recovered from Angel's residence. The analysis showed that the DNA matched the DNA profile of victim V.L. The trial court denied Angel's motion. The trial court also denied Angel's renewed motion to employ a DNA expert as well as his motion, made eleven days before trial, for a continuance to allow Angel to prepare his defense with regard to the DNA evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the failure to grant these motions was error but held that any such error was harmless. Angel, Op. at 2009 WL 743046, -11. Angel's third assignment of error asserts that the Court of Appeals' holding was error. On brief, Angel presents various reasons why the trial court's refusal to grant Angel's motions for a DNA expert and continuance were error. Because the Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the trial court's action in this regard was error, we need not address these arguments. The issue before this Court is whether the error, if any, was harmless. We have previously held that the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), require that the Commonwealth of Virginia, upon request, provide indigent defendants with `the basic tools of an adequate defense,' and, that in certain instances, these basic tools may include the appointment of non-psychiatric experts. Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77, 105 S.Ct. at 1093). We have also held that errors, arising from the denial of a constitutional right are subject to a harmless error analysis. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, 551, 523 S.E.2d 208, 209 (1999). When considering whether an error involving a constitutional right can be held harmless, `the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt;' otherwise the conviction under review must be set aside. Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). Application of this standard requires us to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of by the defendant might have contributed to the conviction. Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. at 827). In reaching such a determination, the Court must consider whether several factors, including (1) the importance of the tainted evidence in the prosecutor's case, (2) whether that evidence was cumulative, (3) whether there is evidence that corroborates or contradicts the tainted evidence on material points, and (4) the strength of the prosecution's case as a whole. Id. Angel argues that the probative value of the DNA evidence presented by the Commonwealth as purportedly linking Angel to V.L. was very high. Angel argues that the identifying evidence was ambiguous and greatly strengthened by the DNA evidence. The only physical evidence linking Angel to the crime against V.L. was the DNA evidence. Finally, Angel argues that the evidence of his confession was weak, as it constituted no more than a serial assent to statements made by the police, concerning events he said took place when he had been drinking heavily. According to Angel, [I]t is reasonably possible that the verdict would not have been the same if a DNA expert had challenged the conclusions regarding the DNA evidence offered by the Commonwealth's witness or the procedures used to analyze the DNA evidence. Thus, Angel argues if he had been given an expert or the time to prepare even without the expert, some or all of the convictions could certainly have been affected. Therefore, according to Angel, the Commonwealth did not meet its burden in demonstrating that the asserted errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. While the DNA evidence is the only physical evidence that links Angel to V.L., the remaining evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the lack of the DNA evidence would not have altered the verdict. Circumstantial evidence including description of a person fleeing the crime scene using a green motorbike matched the description of the perpetrator of an attack shortly before the attack on V.L. and his mode of escape. The victim of the earlier attack positively identified Angel as the attacker. Furthermore, Angel confessed to the attack on V.L. in a recorded statement, which he signed and he wrote a letter of apology to the victim V.L., which was admitted into evidence. The DNA evidence at issue related only to the question of the perpetrator's identity. Considering the remaining evidence of identity of the perpetrator of the attack on V.L. in light of the factors outlined, we conclude that any error in denying Angel's motion for appointment and compensation of an expert was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reach the same conclusion with regard to the denial of Angel's motion for continuance. That request was based solely on a stated need for additional time to review the DNA evidence. The denial of this motion, if error, was harmless error based on the remaining evidence of identity recited above.