Opinion ID: 2754957
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Adetokunbo Adejumo

Text: Adejumo pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft based on the use of a stolen credit card, and the district court imposed a sentence of 124 months. Adejumo raises several issues related to his sentence. He asserts the district court erred by imposing a 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, imposing -28- a 3-level enhancement for role in the offense, refusing to allow him to challenge the amount of loss, and calculating his criminal history score. Adejumo first asserts the district court erred in assessing a 2-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. After pleading guilty in federal court in July 2011, Adejumo was released pending sentencing. In October 2011, Adejumo was arrested and charged with domestic assault in connection with an incident involving a former girlfriend, Salan Sarhan. Based on the arrest, his pretrial services supervisor filed a petition to revoke his pretrial release. At the hearing on the petition on October 20, 2011, Officer Elliot Faust testified that approximately twelve hours after the incident, Sarhan reported Adejumo had slapped, choked, and kicked her until she began to black out. The government also introduced photographs Officer Faust had taken of Sarhan when she reported the incident that showed marks on her neck. Sarhan also testified at the October 20 hearing. She remembered being choked and passing out, she remembered Adejumo and another man standing over her when she regained consciousness, but she did not recall who assaulted her because she was intoxicated at the time. Adejumo testified he did not assault Sarhan and was standing over her to protect her from the other people present. He testified he did not know who assaulted Sarhan. The magistrate judge found there was probable cause to believe Adejumo violated state law and revoked Adejumo’s pretrial release. In a written order, the magistrate judge stated that he “expressly” believed the version of events originally reported by Sarhan to Officer Faust the afternoon after the attack and “expressly” did not believe Adejumo. Based on this finding, Adejumo’s PSR recommended a 2-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1 for providing “materially false information to a . . . magistrate judge.” See USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(F). Material evidence is defined as “evidence . . . that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.6. Adejumo objected, denying he falsely testified at the revocation hearing. Adejumo argues the district court erred by relying -29- exclusively on the magistrate judge’s factual findings rather than making its own independent findings when imposing the enhancement. “We review a district court’s factual findings in support of an obstruction of justice enhancement for clear error and its application of the sentencing guidelines to the facts de novo.” United States v. O’Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 836 (8th Cir. 2000). “The government bears the burden of proving the facts necessary to support a finding of obstruction by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Thundershield, 474 F.3d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 2007). The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a 2-level increase if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” USSG § 3C1.1. “A defendant who commits perjury is subject to this enhancement, as is a defendant who provides materially false information to a judge or magistrate.” O’Dell, 204 F.3d at 836 (quotation and internal citation omitted). “A defendant commits perjury if, under oath, [he or she] gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” Id. (quotation omitted). Officer Faust was available to testify at Adejumo’s sentencing hearing. When asked, Adejumo agreed the district court could rely on the transcript from the October 20 hearing to resolve the issue and declined the opportunity for a de novo hearing before the district court. To the extent Adejumo argues the district court’s reliance on the transcript from the October 20 hearing was error, it was invited, and he is now estopped from raising that objection. United States v. Jewell, 614 F.3d 911, 919 (8th Cir. 2010). “The doctrine of invited error applies when the trial court announces its intention to embark on a specific course of action and defense counsel specifically approves of that course of action.” Id. at 920 (quotation omitted). -30- Adejumo also suggests that by relying on the transcript of the revocation hearing, the district court may have found the enhancement applied based on a probable-cause standard rather than making the finding based on a preponderance of the evidence. Adejumo points to nothing in the record, however, to suggest the district court failed to apply the proper standard when imposing the enhancement. Relying on the transcript—as Adejumo agreed it could—the district court made its own independent findings and concluded Adejumo willfully had provided materially false information to the magistrate judge. Because “a district court’s choice between two permissible views of the evidence cannot be considered clearly erroneous,” Thundershield, 474 F.3d at 509, the district court did not err. Adejumo next asserts the district court erred by not giving him a 3-level reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. According to Adejumo, his is an “extraordinary case” warranting a reduction for acceptance of responsibility even with the obstruction-of-justice enhancement because his testimony at the revocation hearing was unrelated to the underlying offense and because he had provided information and assistance to the government but received no sentencing benefit as a result. We review the district court’s denial of an acceptance of responsibility reduction for clear error and will reverse “only if it is so clearly erroneous as to be without foundation.” United States v. William, 681 F.3d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). “Ordinarily, a defendant who obstructs justice is not entitled to the reduction for acceptance of responsibility.” United States v. Hutterer, 706 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). It is only in “extraordinary cases” that a defendant who has been found to have obstructed justice is eligible for the acceptance of responsibility reduction. Id. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to receive both adjustments. In determining whether a case is “extraordinary,” sentencing courts are to look at “the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the [defendant’s] -31- obstructive conduct and the degree of [defendant’s] acceptance of responsibility.” United States v. Honken, 184 F.3d 961, 968 (8th Cir. 1999). “[T]he district court must inquire into the particular circumstances of the defendant’s case: was the defendant’s obstructive conduct a relatively brief or early aberration, or was it a methodical, continued effort to obstruct justice?” Id. at 972. Although it is rare that a defendant who has obstructed justice will nonetheless earn a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, we noted in Honken that a defendant’s “other positive actions” could make his case “extraordinary.” Id. at 973. The types of conduct qualifying as obstructive are numerous and diverse, and the degree to which the obstructive conduct affects the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of a defendant can vary widely. Additionally, a defendant may accept responsibility for the offense of conviction but act in an obstructive way that is substantively unrelated to his offense conduct. The district court in this case concluded that “[b]y perjuring himself regarding a material issue before Magistrate Judge Noel, Adejumo did not exhibit behavior consistent with the acceptance of responsibility,” and therefore his was “not an extraordinary case.” The district court noted that Adejumo “did not voluntarily terminate his obstructive conduct – perjury; nor did he admit it.” Thus, the district court concluded that “[t]he totality of the circumstances does not suggest that Adejumo has demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” While the district court properly considered Adejumo’s conduct at the revocation hearing and whether he voluntary admitted his obstructive conduct, we note several other factors relevant to the Honken analysis the court did not consider. Adejumo timely pleaded guilty and truthfully admitted the conduct comprising the offense of conviction. He attempted to cooperate with the government, meeting with them several times. In a written statement to the probation office dated October 12, 2011, he admitted his conduct as to the offenses of conviction and expressed he was “truly remorseful for the harm he has wrought on all involved, including the Government.” He expressed the same remorse during his allocution at his sentencing -32- hearing. Additionally, the obstructive conduct was unrelated in substance to the offense conduct for which Adejumo pleaded guilty. These are all factors that weigh in favor of a case being considered “extraordinary.” Whether this is one of those extraordinary cases in which a defendant can earn a reduction for acceptance of responsibility even after receiving an enhancement for obstruction of justice is, in our view, a relatively close question. Yet we defer to district courts in these fact-intensive matters, including assessments of credibility and sincerity that the district court is best equipped to consider. With that deference in mind, we cannot say the district court’s decision here was “so clearly erroneous as to be without foundation.” See William, 681 F.3d at 936 (quotation omitted). The district court properly considered that Adejumo neither voluntarily terminated his obstructive conduct nor admitted it. In addition, Adejumo’s false testimony occurred after his guilty plea, a factor we have found “would almost certainly be disqualifying.” United States v. Brown, 539 F.3d 835, 841 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). The district court did not clearly err in denying Adejumo an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. The district court assessed Adejumo a 3-level enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(b) for being a manager or supervisor in a criminal activity involving five or more participants. On appeal, Adejumo does not dispute that his criminal activity involved five or more participants. He contends, however, the district court erred in relying on the evidence presented at the trial of Okeayainneh and Adeniran because he was not present and was not provided an opportunity to challenge the evidence. He further asserts that even if the district court properly relied on the trial testimony, this testimony was insufficient to establish he had control over anyone else or received a larger share of the proceeds. At his sentencing hearing, the government stated its intent to have the court rely on the trial testimony of Adejumo’s co-defendants. The district court gave Adejumo an opportunity to object, but Adejumo acquiesced. Accordingly, we find -33- Adejumo has waived any objection he had to the district court relying on testimony from the trial, precluding appellate review. See United States v. Thompson, 289 F.3d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 2002). In determining the enhancement applied, the district court found, among other factors, that “Adejumo met with and gave direction to recruits and exercised management responsibility over assets of the conspiracy.” Indeed, Manda testified that it was Adejumo who picked him up from the airport when he arrived from Atlanta and paid for his hotel during his stay. Manda brought with him multiple fraudulent documents, which he gave to Adejumo, and it was Adejumo who decided which ones to use each day. Adejumo drove Manda to banks where Manda obtained cash advances using fraudulent credit cards, and Manda turned all of the money over to Adejumo. Adejumo later gave Manda a percentage of the proceeds for his efforts. Adejumo also took Manda to malls to purchase gift cards with the fraudulent credit cards. Manda returned to Minnesota the next month to conduct another week’s worth of similar fraudulent transactions with Adejumo. Another witness, Jacqueline Clack, testified Adejumo was “the mind behind what I was doing.” We conclude the district court did not clearly err in assessing Adejumo a 3-level enhancement for being a manager or supervisor. “A manager or supervisor need only have managed or supervised one other participant” in criminal activity, and “the enhancement may apply even if the management activity was limited to a single transaction.” United States v. Zimmer, 299 F.3d 710, 724 (8th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). At a minimum, Adejumo exercised managerial or supervisory authority over Manda during November and December 2009—within the time period to which Adejumo stipulated he was involved in bank fraud. Accordingly, the district court did not err. Although Adejumo stipulated in his plea agreement that he and others obtained or attempted to obtain in excess of $1 million, he did not concede he was personally responsible for the entire amount, and he did not plead guilty to a conspiracy. At his -34- plea hearing, the government told Adejumo and the court that, while it believed the amount of loss was more than $1 million but less than $2.5 million, Adejumo would be allowed to dispute the loss amount at sentencing. When Adejumo objected to the amount of loss recommended in the presentence report, the government did not contest his ability to do so. At sentencing, however, Adejumo agreed with the court that he was bound by the stipulation in his plea agreement. Because he so agreed, Adejumo is precluded from disputing the loss amount on appeal. See Thompson, 289 F.3d at 526–27. Finally, Adejumo received two criminal history points for committing “the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence” based on the finding that he was on probation for a 2003 conviction for financial-transaction card fraud at the time the instant offense occurred. See USSG § 4A1.1(d). “Instant offense” includes “any relevant conduct.” Id. § 4A1.1 cmt. n.4. Neither party disputes that Adejumo’s probation for the financial-transaction card fraud conviction ended on April 20, 2007. In determining Adejumo’s criminal history, the district court found “[t]he instant offense began in 2006.” Adejumo argues the instant offense did not begin until 2008, as stipulated in the plea agreement. Adejumo concedes he did not raise this argument below, so our review is for plain error. United States v. Goodrich, 754 F.3d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 2014). “Under plain error review, it is the defendant’s burden to prove (1) there was error, (2) that was plain, and (3) affected substantial rights.” Id. “An error is plain when it is ‘clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’” United States v. Martin, 714 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). We ordinarily exercise our discretion to correct the error only if the error “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. Adejumo argues it was plain error for the district court to find offense conduct occurred outside the parties’ stipulation in the plea agreement, which referenced a 2008 start date, without taking evidence or making specific findings to support its -35- decision. Here, we cannot conclude any error on the part of the district court was “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” Even in his objections to the PSR, Adejumo requested the district court find his three prior convictions, including the 2003 conviction, were relevant conduct to the instant offense. The district court declined to do so, finding that the instant offense began in 2006. In Adejumo’s PSR, the relevant dates of his offense are identified as 2006 to 2011, and Adejumo did not object. Jacqueline Clack’s testimony at trial also reasonably supported the district court’s finding. We conclude the start date of Adejumo’s instant offense was subject to reasonable dispute and, therefore, any possible error was not plain.