Opinion ID: 1030914
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The Hague Convention seeks to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as secure protection for rights of access. Hague Convention, pmbl., 19 I.L.M. at 1501. To secure the return of an abducted child under the Hague Convention, a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been wrongfully removed. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(A). Specifically, the petitioner must establish that: (1) the child was habitually resident in the petitioner's country of residence at the time of removal; (2) the removal was in breach of the petitioner's custody rights under the law of his home state; and (3) that the petitioner had been exercising those rights at the time of removal. Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.2001) (citing Hague Convention, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 2, 19 I.L.M. at 1501). Consequently, if we affirm the district court's finding on the habitual residence issue, the remaining issue regarding Andrew's custody rights will become moot and not require consideration by this court. Thus, the crux of the issue on appeal is whether the district court's determination that the quadruplets' habitual residence was the United States at the time they were removed from Australia is clearly erroneous. The framers of The Hague Convention intentionally left habitual residence undefined, and intended that the term be defined by the unique facts in each case. See Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir.2004). Federal courts have developed a two-part framework to assist in the habitual residence analysis. Under this framework, the first question is whether the parents shared a settled intention to abandon the former country of residence. See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir.2001); Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1252 (We summarize the approach suggested in Mozes . . . and adopt it as our own. . . . The first step towards acquiring a new habitual residence is forming a settled intention to abandon the one left behind. It is not necessary to have this settled intention at the time of departure, as it could develop during the course of a stay originally intended to be temporary.) (internal citation omitted); Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir.2005) (We agree [with Mozes ] and conclude that courts should begin an analysis of a child's habitual residence by considering the relevant intentions. Focusing on intentions gives contour to the objective, factual circumstances surrounding the child's presence in a given location. This allows an observer to determine whether the child's presence at a given location is intended to be temporary rather than permanent.). The second question under this framework is whether there was an actual change in geography coupled with the passage of an appreciable period of time, one sufficient for acclimatization by the children to the new environment. Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1078). These two questions are addressed separately below.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Mozes v. Mozes has served as a guide for federal courts in determining parental intentions in Hague Convention cases. See Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at 622; Gitter, 396 F.3d at 131-32; Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255; Whiting, 391 F.3d at 548-49; Silverman, 338 F.3d at 899. In Mozes, the Ninth Circuit recognized that [d]ifficulty arises, of course, when the persons entitled to fix the child's residence no longer agree on where it has been fixeda situation that, for obvious reasons, is likely to arise in cases under the Convention. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076. The Mozes court divided these cases into three broad factual categories. In the first category are cases where the court finds that the family as a unit has manifested a settled purpose to change habitual residence, despite the fact that one parent may have had qualms about the move. Id. In the second category are those cases where the child's initial translocation from an established habitual residence was clearly intended to be of a specific, delimited period. Id. at 1077. In these cases, courts have generally refused to find that the changed intentions of one parent led to an alteration in the child's habitual residence. Id. The third category of cases is comprised of [i]n between cases where the petitioning parent had earlier consented to let the child stay abroad for some period of ambiguous duration. Id. at 1076-77. Following Mozes, another category of cases developed. In this category are those cases where courts have refused to find a change in habitual residence because one parent intended to move to the new country of residence on a trial or conditional basis. See Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at 625-26; Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1254; Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135; McKenzie v. McKenzie, 168 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (E.D.N.Y.2001). In cases where there is a dispute regarding a child's habitual residence, the representations of the parties cannot be accepted at face value, and courts must determine [habitual residence] from all available evidence. Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135 (considering the subjective intentions of parents to determine whether the parents shared an intent to adopt a new country of residence for their children); Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 (same). Federal courts have considered the following factors as evidence of parental intent: parental employment in the new country of residence; [8] the purchase of a home in the new country and the sale of a home in the former country; [9] marital stability; [10] the retention of close ties to the former country; [11] the storage and shipment of family possessions; [12] the citizenship status of the parents and children; [13] and the stability of the home environment in the new country of residence. [14] In the case at bar, Andrew argues that Kristina's conduct before the move to Australia indicates that she intended that the move would be indefinite. Specifically, Andrew points to the following conduct: Kristina's sale of her cherished personal items; her failure to tell her family and friends that her move to Australia was conditional; her statement to family and friends on the day before she departed that [t]his is our last night in the U.S.; and her completion of permanent residency applications for herself and Gabi. We find that the district court properly considered this conduct and correctly determined that much of this evidence is equivocal as these actions would be appropriate even if Kristina and the Children were planning on living in Australia temporarily, as per the Custody Order, or on a trial basis. J.A. 363. Andrew also places great emphasis on the letters that Gabi received from teachers and friends with statements wishing her good luck on her new life in Australia, and saying goodbye, good luck, and I will miss you. The district court also considered this evidence in its analysis and properly concluded that the weight that Andrew places on these letters is undermined by the fact that Kristina sought permission from Gabi's school to allow her to miss the first portion of the spring semester and return to school in March. Moreover, the district court appropriately determined that the following facts support the conclusion that Kristina intended that the move to Australia would be conditional: Kristina left many possessions behind in North Carolina; Kristina reserved round trip tickets for herself and the children; Kristina and the children traveled with Australian tourist visas that limited their stay in Australia to three months; and Kristina maintained her local financial accounts, North Carolina Medicare insurance, and the lease and insurance on her vehicle. Moreover, the record supports the district court's determination that Kristina never intended to abandon the United States as the quadruplet's residence after the family arrived in Australia. This determination is supported by the fact that Kristina sought to return to the United States just five weeks after she arrived in Australia. Although Kristina did fill out permanent Australian residency applications for herself and Gabi, the district court determined to be plausible her testimony that she only did so because Andrew took a number of measures to prevent her from leaving Australia. Moreover, in light of the district court's determination that Kristina's testimony was credible and Andrew's testimony was not credible, we cannot conclude that the district court was clearly erroneous in its conclusion that there was no shared parental intent to abandon the United States as the quadruplets' habitual residence. Accordingly, the district court's finding that there was no shared parental intent to abandon the United States as the quadruplets' habitual residence is not clearly erroneous.
Once parental intent has been considered, federal courts next determine the extent of the child's acclimatization to the new country of residence. The question here is not simply whether the child's life in the new country shows some minimal degree of settled purpose, but whether the child's relative attachments to the countries have changed to the point where [ordering the child's return] would now be tantamount to taking the child out of the family and social environment in which its life has developed. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1081 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Federal courts have considered school enrollment, [15] participation in social activities, [16] the length of stay in the relative countries, [17] and the child's age [18] to determine the extent of a child's acclimatization to the new country of residence. The district court determined that the quadruplets never became acclimatized to Australia during their two-month stay. We agree with this finding, as there are several objective factors supporting the district court's conclusion. [19] First, the quadruplets were not receiving therapy for their developmental disabilities in Australia despite the fact they were receiving therapy when they lived in the United States. Second, the quadruplets did not attend school or participate in social activities in Australia. And, finally, the quadruplets' developmental disabilities made it very unlikely that they became acclimatized during their two-month stay in Australia.