Opinion ID: 566829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction over Transferred Claims

Text: 9 The Company first contends that after the district court's order transferring a portion of the claims to federal district court in Indiana, the North Carolina district court lacked jurisdiction over those claims and, therefore, could not grant Wilson's voluntary dismissal with respect to them. It argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 382 U.S. 362, 86 S.Ct. 522, 15 L.Ed.2d 416 (1966), requires a finding that the Middle District of North Carolina lost jurisdiction over the transferred claims when the transfer order was entered, not when the files were physically transferred. Koehring, however, is distinguishable. In Koehring, the Fifth Circuit directed a district court to transfer a case to another jurisdiction. The district court ignored the Fifth Circuit's order and granted a motion to dismiss. In response, the Fifth Circuit ordered an instanter transfer of the case. In determining that the transfer occurred when the instanter order was entered by the Fifth Circuit, not when the files were transferred, the Supreme Court emphasized the extraordinary circumstances of the case, stating: 10 Although a federal appellate court does not ordinarily itself transfer a case to another district, but remands to the District Court for that purpose, the extraordinary action in this case was taken as a result of extraordinary circumstances. 11 .... 12 We do not read 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), providing that a district court may transfer any civil action, as precluding an appellate court, where unusual circumstances indicate the necessity thereof, from effecting a transfer by direct order. 13 Koehring, 382 U.S. at 364, 365, 86 S.Ct. at 523, 524. No such extraordinary circumstances exist in the instant case. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Koehring in the same way: 14 [U]nlike the situation in Koehring, there has been no extraordinary intervention by an appellate court, with an explicit assertion that its transfer order is instanter. The Illinois federal district court also made no similar express assertion, as did the court in Koehring, that its transfer order was to be effective at the moment of entry of the order, and further there is no suggestion that any urgency existed here. 15 Robbins v. Pocket Beverage Co., 779 F.2d 351, 355 (7th Cir.1985); see also Semro v. Halstead Enter., Inc., 619 F.Supp. 682, 682-83 n. 1 (N.D.Ill.1985). 16 The general rule, which was not disturbed by Koehring and which we adopt, is that jurisdiction is not conveyed from the transferor court to the transferee court until the record is physically transferred to the transferee court. Robbins, 779 F.2d at 355; Semro, 619 F.Supp. at 682-83 n. 1.; Sheldon v. Amperex Elec. Corp., 52 F.R.D. 1, 5 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 146 (2nd Cir.1971). Simply stated, some court should have jurisdiction over a case at all times, and this rule helps ensure the maintenance of that principle. Semro, 619 F.Supp. at 682-83 n. 1; Sheldon, 52 F.R.D. at 5. It is conceded that the record was never physically transferred to the Southern District of Indiana. We conclude, therefore, that the North Carolina district court retained jurisdiction of those claims which it initially attempted to transfer to the Indiana district court.