Opinion ID: 77919
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Santamaria's Application

Text: Having reviewed the requirements for asylum, we turn to the central question presented by this appeal: whether the recordwhich reflects that Santamaria (1) received numerous death threats from members of FARC, (2) was assaulted near her home, dragged by her hair out of her vehicle, and struck by individuals identifying themselves as members of FARC, (3) was traumatized by FARC's torture and murder of her family groundskeeper who refused to give information on her whereabouts, and finally (4) was kidnapped by members of FARC and beaten with the butts of their guns, after witnessing one person's murdercompels a finding that Santamaria suffered past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac count of her political opinion. We conclude with little difficulty that it does. As we did in Mejia, we begin by noting that the IJ in this case made no adverse credibility finding. 498 F.3d at 1257. Rather, the IJ explicitly found that Santamaria's testimony was credible and was supported by documentary evidence, including a police report obtained on August 1, 2000, and a summary of her medical treatment arising out of her two encounters with FARC in which she sustained physical injury. We therefore accept Santamaria's testimony as credible.
Taking Santamaria's testimony as true, we are compelled to conclude that Santamaria suffered past persecution. The record reflects that Santamaria's life was repeatedly threatened by members of FARC over the course of two years. In July of 1999, members of FARC yanked her by the hair out of her vehicle, injured her, and specifically warned Santamaria that her continuing political activities in support of the Colombian government would earn her death. When she defied those warnings, FARC targeted her again. Its members painted red graffiti explicitly referencing the political organization she founded. Despite those warnings, Santamaria continued her democratic efforts, but under attempted disguise. Two months later, when FARC's efforts to locate Santamaria failed, her family groundskeeper was tortured and killed as a penalty for not revealing her whereabouts. [7] Then, when FARC finally tracked down Santamaria at a local grocery, she was beaten, kidnapped, and warned of her imminent murder. FARC's efforts to locate Santamaria continued after she fled to the United States. We think that these events, taken together, constitute extreme mistreatment. In so concluding, we reject the government's contention that Santamaria did not endure past persecution because the record reflects no significant physical attacks. (Resp. at 15 n. 8.) Even if Santamaria's physical injuries were relatively minor, we have not required serious physical injury where the petitioner demonstrates repeated threats combined with other forms of severe mistreatment. E.g., Ruiz, 479 F.3d at 766 & n. 2 (kidnapping); Sanchez Jimenez, 492 F.3d at 1233 (attempted murder); Mejia, 498 F.3d at 1255 (assault with firearms resulting in a broken nose). Santamaria suffered the trauma of repeated death threats, two physical attacks, the murder of a family friend, and a kidnapping cut short only by a harrowing escape. These acts are sufficiently extreme to constitute persecution. Based on this undisputed testimony before the 1J, we are compelled to find that Santamaria endured past persecution. 2. The Record Compels a Finding that Santamaria's Persecution. Was On Account of Her Political Opinion. Moreover, the record compels the conclusion that Santamaria's persecution was on account a her political opinion. The record reflects that Santamaria's attackers made painfully clear that their motivation for their threats and violence towards Santamaria was her support of the Colombian government and her work with various democratic organizations. As such, the facts in this case are closely akin to Mejia and Ruiz, where members of Colombia's Liberal Party were similarly targeted, threatened, and either physically assaulted or physically detained by members of FARC on the basis of their political opposition to FARC. [8] See Mejia, 498 F.3d at 1255; Ruiz, 479 F.3d at 766 & n. 2. Because substantial evidence does not support the finding that any persecution Santamaria suffered was not on account of her political opinion, we reverse the IJ's finding in this regard. Having established past persecution on account of her political opinion, Santamaria is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 3. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the IJ's Independent Finding that Santamaria Failed to Demonstrate a Subjective Fear of Future Persecution. Because the record compels the finding that Santamaria suffered past persecution, we must vacate the IJ's conclusion that Santamaria failed to establish entitlement to asylum based upon a well-founded fear of future persecution. Having demonstrated past persecution, Santamaria is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that she has demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution. In any event; substantial evidence does not support the factual finding on which the IJ based this conclusion: that Santamaria did not subjectively fear future persecution. The IJ based this finding on an understanding that Santamaria returned to her country five times after the persecutory acts occurred, and thus could not have feared persecution, ( See Admin. Rec. at 2 (The respondent traveled back to her country, five times, and also visited the Dominican Republic, after these events, which she claimed she would be killed for if she returned. . . . [T]he Court does not understand, how it is that the respondent traveled not one, not two, not three, not four, but five times back to her country if she contends that she would be harmed there at this time.).) We think the IJ is mistaken on both' factual and legal grounds. As a factual matter, the record reflects that most of Santamaria's travels to the United States occurred before the most severely persecutory acts occurred, and not after these events. She left and returned to. Colombia on three occasionsbetween August and September of 1999after only her first face-to-face encounter with FARC in July of 1999, but before she observed the Death to Help With Love graffiti, learned of Mario's murder, and was forcibly kidnapped and beaten by approximately ten FARC rebels, Thus, the record reflects that Santamaria traveled to the United States and returned only once after the most devastating acts of oppression occurredthe murder of Mario and the kidnapping and beating of Santamaria in December of 1999. [9] As a legal matter, we conclude that the IJ erred in determining that, despite Santamaria's credible testimony that she feared persecution if she returned to Colombia, her acts in previously returning to Colombia on various occasions after traveling abroad nullified her proof of subjective fear of future persecution. We cannot endorse the principle espoused by the IJ that the voluntary return to one's home country inherently negates a fear of persecution there. Cf. Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 89 n. 5 (2d Cir.2006) (In light of strong attachments to their home countries, refugees may venture abroad in a state of uncertainty about the permanence of their departure, hoping that the persecution will abate so that they can return home.). Santamaria's testimony reflects that she returned to Colombia in an effort to remain with her family and work against those responsible for her persecution and the persecution of others. Courage does not negate fear. We have repeatedly held that the subjective component [required to show a well-founded fear of future persecution] is generally satisfied by the applicant's credible testimony that he or she genuinely fears persecution. Sanchez Jimenez, 492 F.3d at 1232 (quoting Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289). Here, Santamaria testified that she feared persecution upon her return to Colombia and that her fear has compelled her to stay in the United States despite knowing that her mother lies seriously ill in a hospital in Bogota. The IJ found Petitioner's testimony generally credible and did not specifically discount her testimony concerning her fear of return to Columbia. [10] Because the record fails to distinguish fortitude in the face of danger from the absence of fear, Santamaria's credible testimony is sufficient to establish a subjective fear of persecution. See Singh v. Moschorak, 53 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.1995). In sum, we vacate the IJ's determination that Santamaria did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. By demonstrating past persecution, Santamaria is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that she has demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution. Moreover, substantial evidence does not support the IJ's conclusion that Santamaria failed to demonstrate that she subjectively feared persecution on the basis of her political opinion upon her return to Colombia. 4. Remand is Proper. As stated, because Santamaria demonstrated that she suffered past persecution on account of political opinion, she is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. The government may rebut this presumption if it shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that either (1) the conditions in the country have changed or (2) the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating within the country if, under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i). The IJ in this case made no findings regarding whether the government showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions of the country have changed or that Santamaria could avoid future persecution by relocating within the country. Accordingly, we remand for a determination of these questions in the first instance. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam); see also Arboleda, 434 F.3d at 1223 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (outlining what the IJ should consider in evaluating whether petitioner could reasonably relocate within Colombia); Sanchez Jimenez, 492 F.3d at 1237-38 (same).