Opinion ID: 2613579
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the superior court adequately consider whether A.R. has a parent or relative willing to provide care for her?

Text: C.K. and O.R. next argue that a court may assert CINA jurisdiction under AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) only if no parent, relative, custodian, or guardian is willing to care for the child. Relying on In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996), they contend that even if they abandoned A.R., the court erred in finding that she is a child in need of aid because they and two of C.K.'s relatives are willing to care for her. DHSS, on the other hand, argues that a finding of physical abandonment provides an independent basis for CINA jurisdiction, regardless of whether a parent or relative is willing to provide care for the child. DHSS urges us to interpret the abandonment clause in subsection (A) of AS 47.10.010(a)(2) as if it were a separate subsection like subsections B through F. We disagree with the interpretation of subsection (A) suggested by DHSS. The legislature's use of the word including to join the physical abandonment clause with the rest of the subsection indicates that it considered abandonment to be one example of the failure or lack of willingness to provide care that is the focus of the subsection. See In re S.A., 912 P.2d at 1241; see also id. at 1245 n. 3 (Eastaugh, J., dissenting) (stating that subsection (A) uses the word including to introduce physical abandonment as one circumstance in which there is no eligible person caring or willing to provide care for the child). Furthermore, the legislature's placement of the abandonment provision in the same subsection as the caring or willing to provide care clause rather than in a separate subsection strongly suggests that the two provisions should be read in conjunction rather than independently. [5] DHSS argues that the reference to a parent, guardian, custodian, or relative who is caring or willing to provide care in subsection (A) does not fit completely with the emphasis on parental conduct in the abandonment provision of that subsection. DHSS also points out that under previous versions of Title 47 abandonment formed an independent basis for assertion of jurisdiction over the child and for termination of parental rights. See Ch. 40, § 1, SLA 1967 (former 47.10.080(c)(3)(B)); Ch. 145, art. I, § 4 SLA 1957 (former AS 47.10.010(a)(4)). These considerations, however, do not provide a sufficient basis for us to ignore the current language and structure of the abandonment provision and construe it as independent from the rest of subsection (A). Rather, we conclude that subsection (A) is better harmonized with the balance of the section by reading the abandonment provision as subsidiary to the caring or willing to provide care clause. DHSS argues that this conclusion allows a parent to defeat a finding of physical abandonment by mere words. It states that [u]nder S.A., [AS 47.10.010(a)(2)](A) now applies only to that rare child who has no adult in her life who can, on advice of counsel, make the minimal gesture of somehow communicating to the court, `I am willing to care for this child.' We disagree with DHSS's characterization of our holding in S.A. We held in that case only that a child may not be adjudicated CINA under AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) on the grounds that the child's parent or caregiver is unable to care for the child if the parent or caregiver is willing to care for the child. S.A., 912 P.2d at 1242. Thus, S.A. simply forbids the court to consider ability in determining an individual's willingness to care. 912 P.2d at 1242. There is nothing in our opinion in S.A. that prohibits a court, when assessing the willingness of an individual to provide care for a child, from looking at actions or other objective criteria as well as mere words. Therefore, we interpret subsection (A) to mean that a determination that a parent physically abandoned a child may also support a finding that the parent is not willing to provide care for that child. Indeed, we believe that in many cases the abandonment of a child demonstrates more clearly than testimony the parent's unwillingness to provide care. Thus, contrary to DHSS's argument and the suggestions of C.K. and O.R., parents cannot defeat a court's finding of abandonment simply by stating that they are willing to care for a child. Rather, a court, just as it does under the first prong of the abandonment test, must look to objective conduct in determining whether a parent is willing to provide care. This same approach applies as well to relatives who assert a willingness to provide care. [6] DHSS also argues that a failure to rule that abandonment provides an independent basis for CINA jurisdiction is contrary to evidence of the legislature's intent in drafting subsection (A). Under our sliding scale approach to statutory interpretation, the plainer the language of the statute the more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative intent must be. State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208 n. 4 (Alaska 1982). As discussed above, the legislature's use of including to link the care or willing to provide care clause with the physical abandonment clause strongly indicates that it intended the latter to be subsidiary to the former. For us to interpret the subsection as DHSS suggests, the legislative history would have to show convincingly that the legislature intended the two clauses to be read independently. The legislative history relied on by DHSS  a memorandum from the attorney for the Children's Code Revision Task Force to Representative Terry Gardiner analyzing the bill revising AS 47.10.010  does not show such an intent. It merely states that the task force that drafted the current version of subsection (A) believed that the issue of abandonment should be addressed when the court establishes CINA jurisdiction rather than when it terminates parental rights. Nowhere does the memorandum indicate an intent one way or the other regarding the relationship of the abandonment provision with the rest of subsection (A). Therefore, we do not find it persuasive. In light of this interpretation of subsection (A), we hold that the trial court properly found that C.K. and O.R., despite their statements to the contrary, are not willing to provide care for A.R. The same conduct that supports the court's finding of abandonment also provides sufficient evidence for the conclusion that their expressed willingness to care for her is not genuine. This leaves the question, however, of whether the court adequately considered the possibility that A.R. has relatives willing to care for her. Testimony at the termination trial indicates that two of C.K.'s aunts, one in Texas, who has custody of two of C.K.'s older children, and one in California, expressed willingness to care for A.R. Although the record on this point is not clear, it appears that DHSS did little to determine whether A.R. might be placed with either of these relatives. DHSS never requested a home study to determine the appropriateness of placing A.R. with the aunt in Texas, relying instead on a social worker's informal statement that any request for such a placement would be denied. DHSS did request a study regarding placement with the aunt in California. Due to some confusion in DHSS's request, however, the response from California was unclear. While the California agency initially denied the request, it seems that it did not realize that DHSS was looking for a permanent rather than a temporary placement. DHSS therefore renewed its request for a study, but at the time of trial it had not received a response. We consider this record to be insufficient to support the superior court's finding that no relatives are willing to provide care for A.R. We therefore reverse the superior court's finding on this point and remand for additional findings as to whether C.K.'s aunts are willing to care for A.R. In making these findings, the court should not construe our opinion in S.A. to mandate a purely subjective approach to determining the willingness of these relatives to care for A.R. The court may properly determine whether these relatives are unavailable because of the restrictions of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, AS 47.70.010, any other relevant provision of state or federal law, or some other reason making placement infeasible.