Opinion ID: 2492253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Motion to Compel Arbitration

Text: As noted, the party seeking to compel arbitration has the initial burden of proving the existence of a written contract calling for arbitration and proving that that contract evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce. See I.C.E. Contractors, Inc., supra . Parker's entire argument in moving the trial court to compel arbitration is set forth below, verbatim: Upon granting Parker['s] ... motion to intervene, the Court should compel G & S to arbitrate all disputes between G & S and Parker ..., including those claims included in Parker['s] ... counterclaim. Section 17 of the Alabama Subcontract Agreement (hereinafter the `Subcontract', a copy of which is attached as Exhibit `B') provides that all disputes, controversies, and claims between Parker ... and G & S be settled by binding arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (`AAA'). Parker correctly states that the contract contains a provision calling for arbitration; G & S does not dispute this. However, Parker wholly failed to allege that the contract evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce; in fact, Parker failed to even mention the phrase interstate commerce in its motion to compel arbitration. In its opposition to G & S's motion to reconsider, Parker did state that a provision requiring arbitration of disputes between the parties and which involves interstate commerce is specifically enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. However, Parker's statement regarding interstate commerce was merely a recitation of the law applicable to a ruling on a motion to compel arbitration; it was not a specific allegation that the transaction in this case involves interstate commerce. Also, the contract does not show on its face that the transaction involves interstate commerce. Notably, the contract fails to state that either Parker or G & S engages in business outside Alabama; instead, the contract merely states that both Parker and G & S have their principal offices in Alabama. See Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Inc., 879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala.2003) (holding that a transaction involved interstate commerce, in part, because one of the parties to the transaction engaged in commerce in both Alabama and Georgia); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57, 123 S.Ct. 2037, 156 L.Ed.2d 46 (2003) (holding that Congress's Commerce Clause power extended to the transaction in that case because, among other things, one of the parties to the transaction engaged in business throughout the southeastern United States). Furthermore, Parker submitted no evidence showing that any materials, supplies, or equipment used in the project were purchased from businesses in other states. See Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato, 968 So.2d 1, 4 n. 1 (Evidence that a builder obtained materials and components for a house from out-of-state suppliers is sufficient to establish that a transaction for the construction and sale of a house sufficiently involved interstate commerce for purposes of the [Federal Arbitration Act]. (citing Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So.2d 313, 315-17 (Ala.2003))). Moreover, because the hearing in this case was not transcribed, nothing presented at that hearing may form the basis for reversing the trial court's denial of Parker's motion to compel arbitration. See generally Gotlieb v. Collat, 567 So.2d 1302, 1304 (Ala. 1990) ([T]his Court is limited to a review of the record alone, and the record cannot be changed, altered, or varied on appeal by statements in briefs of counsel.... The appellants bear the burden of ensuring that the record on appeal contains sufficient evidence to warrant reversal.). In short, Parker has failed to show on the record that it met its burden of supporting its motion to compel arbitration. Therefore, insofar as it denied the motion to compel arbitration, the trial court's order is due to be affirmed. In Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. v. Beavers, 674 So.2d 1260, 1265-66 (Ala.1995), this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration, stating: Jim Burke's motion to compel arbitration fails even to allege that the transaction involves interstate commerce; the closest it comes is to say that `when an agreement substantially affects interstate commerce and contains specific provisions requiring arbitration of disputes between the parties, that agreement is specifically enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.' This is a general statement of the law, not an allegation that the transaction in question involves interstate commerce. Attached to the motion is a copy of the contract, but it does not show on its face that the transaction involves interstate commerce, certainly not so plainly as to require a reversal of the denial of the motion. Codefendant American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida asserted in its answer that it was `a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the State of Alabama,' but this fact is not cited in the record as a ground for granting Jim Burke's motion. A hearing was held, but it was not transcribed; thus, nothing presented at that hearing can be cited as a basis for reversing the denial of arbitration.