Opinion ID: 2371675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Staples's Expert Testimony

Text: Appellants assert that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting over objection certain expert testimony of Dr. Staples despite Ms. Burke's failure to designate him as an expert witness in pretrial discovery. Appellants argue that the court's error warrants a new trial. We disagree.
Prior to trial, Ms. Burke deposed Dr. Staples regarding Dr. Higgins's July 2000 MRI report. Dr. Staples testified that he himself had signed the report only as a proofreader, and that he had not personally reviewed or interpreted the July films. Upon then being shown those films at the deposition, Dr. Staples said that Ms. Burke's right internal carotid artery appeared to be blocked or occluded, with ischemia of brain supplied by the artery. Asked to compare the July scan with the December scan, Dr. Staples saw areas of probably [ sic ] infarction in the brain. Ms. Burke designated this deposition testimony in the parties' joint pretrial statement as evidence she intended to offer at trial. In that same statement, appellants listed Dr. Staples as a defense witness and objected to the introduction of his deposition testimony solely on the ground that it would be cumulative of testimony provided in open court. At trial, Ms. Burke called Dr. Staples as a witness in her case-in-chief. Before Dr. Staples took the stand, appellants' counsel objected to Ms. Burke's attempt to use Dr. Staples as an expert witness by getting him to compare [MRI] films that he did not read officially. In the ensuing colloquy, Ms. Burke's counsel represented that he would ask Dr. Staples, what did you see when you looked at the July film, what did you see when you looked at the December film? Appellants' counsel said that's fine, and the objection appeared to be resolved. When Ms. Burke's counsel thereafter asked him about the July 2000 MRI scan, Dr. Staples testified without objection that it looked like there was some abnormal signal in the right internal carotid artery which may be due to narrowing or decreased altered flow. And it would make me wonder about ischemia in the brain. Dr. Staples also acknowledged having stated at his deposition that the findings were suspicious for an occlusion of the internal carotid artery on the right with subsequent ischemia of brain supplied by that artery. Ms. Burke's counsel then asked Dr. Staples for his global view of Ms. Burke's condition, putting together the December and July MRI studies. At that point, appellants' counsel objected that the question impermissibly called for expert witness testimony, given that Dr. Staples first compared the two sets of films at his deposition and not as part of his doctor-patient relationship with Ms. Burke. [3] Ms. Burke's counsel responded that Dr. Goodman would testify that he had discussed the MRI results with Dr. Staples in July 2000 (which Dr. Staples did not recall doing). The court instructed Ms. Burke's counsel to frame the question differently, and he then asked Dr. Staples what he would have told Dr. Goodman, hypothetically speaking, if they had discussed how the December and July films looked side by side. Appellants' objection was overruled and Dr. Staples answered that he would have told Dr. Goodman what he said at his deposition, namely, that Ms. Burke's brain tissue was probably infarcted in certain areas due to blood clots or arterial blockage. Had Dr. Goodman sought his recommendation, Dr. Staples continued, he would have called for additional tests to see if it really was an occlusion or just an area of turbulence or [if there was] some other reason for [the] decreased or abnormal signal in that carotid artery, and also to find out what these peripheral brain lesions were. Dr. Staples conceded that it would be important to find out whether there was an occlusion because it could possibly cause her further stroke[s]. [4]
Rule 26 (b)(4) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties to disclose, in their answers to interrogatories, the relevant `facts known and opinions held' by the expert witnesses whom they expect to call at trial. Gubbins v. Hurson, 885 A.2d 269, 276-77 (D.C.2005). The pretrial disclosure requirement of Rule 26(b)(4) applies only to facts and opinions that the expert `acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial.' Id. at 277 (citing Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 657 (D.C. 1985)). The Rule imposes no obligation to disclose where the `information was not acquired in preparation for trial but rather because [the expert] was an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit.' Id. (citations omitted). While Ms. Burke did not list Dr. Staples by name in her Rule 26(b)(4) statement, she did reserve[] the right to seek expert testimony from any health care provider identified in [her] medical records, which implicitly included Dr. Staples. Even so, however, the statement did not disclose the substance of Dr. Staples's anticipated expert testimony; in particular, the statement did not mention the opinions Dr. Staples expressed at trial when he was asked to compare the December and July MRI scans. Appellants argue, and it appears uncontested, that Dr. Staples formulated those opinions in anticipation of trial and not while acting as Ms. Burke's radiologist or Dr. Goodman's consultant, because the first time Dr. Staples remembered comparing the two scans was at his deposition. Thus, though the point is a subtle one, in admitting Dr. Staples's comparison testimony without recognizing that its substance should have been disclosed in Ms. Burke's Rule 26(b)(4) statement, the trial court may have committed an error of law. [5] See Gubbins, 885 A.2d at 278. Nonetheless, the primary purpose of Rule 26(b)(4) is to prevent unfair surprise and concomitant prejudice. See Gubbins, 885 A.2d at 279. Although appellants contend otherwise, Dr. Staples's comparison testimony neither surprised nor materially prejudiced them. Since Dr. Staples had signed the July 2000 MRI report, and Dr. Goodman recalled reviewing the July films with him, it was entirely predictable that he would be asked about the significance of those films in light of the earlier MRI scan that he himself had interpreted. More important, Dr. Staples's comparison testimony merely reiterated what he previously had said at his deposition. Not only were appellants well aware of the deposition testimony, but also Ms. Burke specifically designated it as potential evidence in the parties' joint pretrial statement. Having objected to the deposition testimony then only on the ground that it would be cumulative of testimony provided in open court, appellants are in no position to complain that Dr. Staples's testimony in open court surprised them. Their objection implies that they expected him to testify as he did. In point of fact, moreover, his comparison testimony added little of consequence to Dr. Staples's interpretations of the December and July MRI scans individually (to which appellants did not object at trial), and it was replicated by the other medical experts who testified at trial. Given the absence of surprise and unfair prejudice, we conclude that Ms. Burke's presumed violation of Rule 26(b)(4) does not entitle appellants to a new trial. See R. & G. Orthopedic Appliances & Prosthetics, Inc. v. Curtin, 596 A.2d 530, 540 (D.C.1991) (adopting harmless error requirement for appellate review in civil cases).