Opinion ID: 697267
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: 2 Superior is an employment service which supplies workers, primarily for clerical and light industrial positions, to other companies on a temporary basis. On September 16, 1992, pursuant to Sec. 707(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-6(e), EEOC Commissioner Joy Cherian issued a written and sworn Commissioner's Charge (the Charge) of unlawful gender discrimination addressed to Superior at its Williamsville, New York address. The Charge stated the Commissioner's belief that Superior, 3 since at least February 7, 1990, has violated and continues to violate Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by discriminating against persons because of their sex. 4 Specifically, the unlawful discriminatory practices include, but are not limited to: 5 1. Classifying and/or referring employees and applicants for employment in a way that deprives or tends to deprive them of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affects their status as employees, because of their sex. 6 2. Failing and/or refusing to refer for employment or otherwise discriminating against individuals on the basis of their sex. 7 The persons aggrieved include all individuals who are, have been, or may in the future be affected by the unlawful employment practices complained of herein. 8 The Charge stated that it pertains to all of Superior Temporary Services, Inc. facilities in New York. 9 The Charge was filed by the Commission with its New York District Office on September 23, 1992, and docketed as Charge No. adm-hk-wngi that office forwarded a copy of the Charge to Superior on October 1, 1992, along with a Notice of Charge of Discrimination, and an Initial Data Request seeking information relevant to the Charge. All of these documents identified Superior as the company alleged to have engaged in gender discrimination. An accompanying letter from the District Office dated October 2, 1992, addressed to Superior, referenced Charge No. yob-bc-bjby Commissioner Joy Cherian vs. Superior Temporary Services, Inc., and stated that a copy of the Commissioner's Charge was enclosed. The second and third paragraphs of the cover letter, however, mistakenly referred, respectively, to a different company and to classifications based on race and national origin. 10 Superior refused to produce any information, stating that the Data Request was ineffective because it was untimely and duplicated a prior subpoena with which Superior had fully complied, issued with respect to conditions that had been remedied. Thus, in a letter from its counsel, Superior stated that a subpoena had been issued by EEOC's Buffalo, New York office in 1991 for access to the books and records at the Company's Buffalo office, and that [t]he only things that caused any concern were two 'de minimus' [sic ] type situations which were promptly discontinued. (Letter from Basil Tzetzo, Esq., to EEOC dated October 26, 1992, at 1.) 11 In fact, however, the 1991 subpoena referred to in Superior's letter related to a charge alleging only age discrimination by Superior's Buffalo office in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq. (1988) (ADEA). Thus, EEOC, which had informed Superior in April 1992 that it had terminated the ADEA investigation after finding no violation, responded that the current Charge is different. The Commission pointed out that the current Charge alleges violations of Title VII, not the ADEA; that it covers all of Superior's New York facilities, not just its Buffalo office; and that it alleges ongoing violations between 1990 and the present, not just in 1991. The Commission expressed its willingness to work with Superior to avoid any unnecessary duplication of the 1991 investigation. Superior refused to comply with the Data Request. 12 In November 1992, EEOC issued the administrative subpoena duces tecum at issue here (the Subpoena) for the requested documents. In December 1992, Superior petitioned EEOC to revoke or modify the Subpoena; the Commission denied the petition and informed Superior of that decision on April 2, 1993. Superior persisted in its refusal to produce the requested documents, and in August 1993 EEOC applied to the district court for enforcement of the Subpoena. In opposition, Superior argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the Subpoena, contending principally (a) that EEOC had failed to notify and defer to the appropriate state agency as required by Sec. 706(d) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(d), (b) that the Charge gave Superior inadequate notice, (c) that the Charge was untimely because it was filed more than 300 days after the conduct that was investigated in 1991, and (d) that the Commission was guilty of laches in seeking enforcement. Superior also submitted an affidavit from the manager of its Buffalo and Rochester, New York offices stating that the Company's history would not support a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination because there were very few instances of its having filled job orders on an impermissibly restrictive basis except where the customer-client has claimed a bona fide occupational reason. (Affidavit of Carol Riley, dated March 8, 1994 (Riley Aff.), p 11.) The affidavit stated, inter alia, that [t]he only instance of any substance of gender discrimination in Superior's history was one in which a customer-client claimed that women were better able to do small assembly and packaging work (id. p 13); that [a]ll of these events were isolated events that had been corrected by the company (id. p 14); and that [e]xcept for those few events that occurred several years ago, [Superior] has never[ ] recruited, qualified, assigned, nor promoted or demoted or terminated personnel on the basis of sex (id. p 18). 13 As to Superior's first procedural contention, the Commission replied, inter alia, that the New York State Division of Human Rights (NYSDHR) had been notified of the Charge and that under the Commission's work-sharing agreement with NYSDHR, NYSDHR does not request an opportunity to act on charges filed by a Commissioner. As to the allegedly inadequate notice, the Commission pointed out that although the District Office's cover letter had in one place mistakenly mentioned another company instead of Superior, Superior had been sent the Charge itself and a Notice of Charge, neither of which left any room for doubt that Superior was the target of the inquiry. The Commission also argued that the Charge was timely because it alleged an ongoing violation, and that the Commission had been proceeding with all reasonable dispatch. 14 In a ruling from the bench on April 29, 1994, the district court rejected Superior's arguments and granted EEOC's application, ordering Superior to comply with the Subpoena. It found that EEOC had properly notified NYSDHR of the charges against Superior and concluded that, in light of that notice and the work-sharing agreement, Sec. 706(d) had been satisfied. It also found that the Charge was timely because it alleged a continuing violation. 15 As to the adequacy of the notice given to Superior, the court found that 16 [t]he charge sets forth the alleged discriminatory practices and the allegation that those practices are directed against individuals based on their sex. It sets forth that discriminatory practices include failing and/or refusing to refer persons for employment based on their sex; and sets forth the relevant time frame involved. 17 (Hearing Transcript, April 29, 1994 (Tr.), at 47.) The court concluded that [t]he charge provides Superior fair notice of the existence and the nature of the charges against it. (Id.) The court rejected the Company's claim that the October 2 cover letter's inadvertent references to allegations of race and national origin discrimination by a different company made the notice to Superior inadequate. It also rejected the contention that EEOC was required to provide Superior with additional information: 18 EEOC is simply attempting to investigate a charge that Superior has been engaged in ongoing employment practices which violate [T]itle VII.... This investigation is at the most preliminary of stages, and has effectively been kept there by the actions of Superior. 19 (Tr. at 48-49.) 20 An order and a judgment were entered granting EEOC's motion to enforce the Subpoena; this appeal followed.