Opinion ID: 204040
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Procedure

Text: The Defendants also raise a number of issues with respect to the district court's management of the trial.
Vázquez separately contends that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to grant a mid-trial severance based on his attorney's alleged conflict of interest. Vázquez argues that he was discouraged from testifying by his counsel as a result of this asserted conflict, affecting the outcome of the proceedings. As background, Francisco Dolz, counsel for Andino, informed the government during its case-in-chief that Angel Tapia, counsel for Vázquez, had admitted to doctoring minutes concerning the Welfare Account. The government filed a sealed motion informing the district court of the allegation, and requested a hearing. The court held a hearing that same day, with Dolz testifying that Tapia had admitted to him that Tapia's handwriting appeared on the doctored minutes. The district court ordered Tapia to respond, and the next day Tapia declared that the allegation was totally untrue, but that the allegation created a conflict of interest that required severing Vázquez's case mid-trial. The district court denied the motion, finding no conflict, but further required Tapia to respond to the allegation in writing. Tapia filed a sworn statement, stating that I have never told attorney Francisco Dolz expressions to the effect that I have altered any minute or any document of any kind of the [Union], and further stating that the allegation was based on a misunderstanding. Vázquez appeals the denial of his mid-trial severance motion. Since a mid-trial severance is ... an extraordinary measure, we will overturn [a denial for severance] only if [the court's] wide discretion is plainly abused. United States v. Sotomayor-Vázquez, 249 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.2001) (citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, where, as here, a defendant claims that a conflict of interest warrants a new trial, he must show that the lawyer could have pursued a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic and that the alternative strategy or tactic was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other interests or loyalties. Id. at 15 (quotation marks omitted). Vázquez contends that Tapia's conflict of interest, particularly his purportedly doctoring the Welfare Account minutes, caused Tapia to discourage Vázquez from testifying. However, Vázquez's claim of intimidation has no support in the record, and Vázquez does not cite to any. Furthermore, Vázquez failed to file any pro se motion contending that Tapia discouraged him from testifying, or claimed that he was prevented from doing so. In any event, the proper vehicle for relief for ineffective assistance of counsel is a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not direct appeal. Cf. United States v. Genao, 281 F.3d 305, 313 (1st Cir.2002) ([W]e do not entertain ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal absent an evidentiary record that allows us to evaluate the fact-specific allegations. The preferable vehicle for such claims is a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.) (citation omitted). Given the lack of any record support to substantiate Vázquez's claim, and the process afforded to Vázquez by the district court, it is hard to see any abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in denying a severance. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever mid-trial.
García and Vázquez both argue that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to grant them a new trial based on an alleged misstatement made during the prosecution's closing argument. As we noted earlier, during the strike in 2004, the Union paid each of its members $300 every two weeks. In its rebuttal closing argument, the prosecution argued that (1) this money came from the Union Account; (2) the Union Account contained Health Plan funds; and (3) the Plan thus helped pay for the strike, even though its funds were not meant for that purpose. The prosecutor further stated: I did my math. And it's approximately $5.8 million that the [U]nion dished out for those picketing workers on the lines, the striking people, the people that were out. And I'm not saying that those people don't deserve to get monies. I'm saying not from health care funds. Where did the [U]nion get $5.8 million during the strike? Where did the [U]nion get the money to pay Héctor René Lugo and all these people? None of the defendants contemporaneously objected to this line of argument during the closing itself, but they all objected at a sidebar afterward. They claimed that the argument was false because, according to them, the money for the picketing workers came from a Union strike fund, not from Health Plan funds. The district court overruled the objection. As García and Vázquez preserved their claim, we review de novo whether the prosecution's remarks were improper. United States v. Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d 12, 38 (1st Cir.2003); see also United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 393 (1st Cir.2007) (We review de novo whether a challenged statement by the prosecutor during closing argument was improper.) However, we review for manifest abuse of discretion a district court's refusal to grant a new trial. United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir.2006). Even if the remarks are improper, we affirm unless they prejudiced the defendant. United States v. Joyner, 191 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir.1999). We consider the following factors in considering prejudice: (1) the severity of the prosecutor's misconduct, including whether it was deliberate or accidental; (2) the context in which the misconduct occurred; (3) whether the judge gave curative instructions and the likely effect of such instructions; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the defendants. Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d at 38 (quotation omitted). García and Vázquez contend that the government's remarks at closing were improper, claiming that (1) the Union paid the striking workers from Banco Santander [Account] No. XXXXXXXXXX; (2) that the account belonged to the Union, not the Health Plan; and (3) the Plan thus did not help pay for the strike, and the prosecution, in arguing to the contrary, had misstate[d] evidence and misl[e]d the jury. In response, the government contends that Banco Santander No. 1310003987 was the Union Account, as defined in the indictment, and, since the Plan funds were diverted to that Account, the government's remarks were factually accurate. Even if improper, the remarks had no effect on the trial outcome, as the case concerned not how the striking workers were paid, but whether the Defendants paid themselves with money they knew did not belong to them. At best, this is a stray remark that is too inconsequential to warrant reversal. See United States v. Martínez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 119 (1st Cir.2002). Finally, as correctly noted by the government, the district court instructed the jury that closing statements are not evidence. Accordingly, we see no reversible error.
Caraballo, Andino, and Urbina argue that the district court abused its discretion in declining to grant them a new trial based on their post-trial allegations that Lugo and others discouraged them, through threats and harassment, from testifying. As background, the Defendants were found guilty on June 16, 2006. Six months later, during a December 6, 2006 sentencing hearing, Urbina alleged for the first time that Lugo and other unnamed individuals had issued veiled threats that had discouraged him, Caraballo, and Andino from testifying at trial on their own behalf. Urbina further asserted that he, Caraballo, and Andino would have testified that they were not at the purported board meetings concerning the loans from the Union to the Health Plan. On February 2, 2007, Caraballo, Andino, and Urbina moved for a new trial, arguing that the alleged threats constituted newly discovered evidence under Rule 33(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court denied the motion, finding that any threats had not been serious enough to dissuade the defendants from testifying and that their decision not to testify was in fact a strateg[ic] one. Caraballo, Andino, and Urbina renew their arguments on appeal, and contend that they are entitled to a new trial. We review a district court's denial of a new trial motion for manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Del-Valle, 566 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir.2009). The remedy of a new trial must be used sparingly, and only where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Id. (citing United States v. Conley, 249 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir.2001)). A defendant who seeks a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence bears a `weighty burden' of establishing that: (1) the evidence was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to lack of diligence by the defendant; (3) the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the emergence of the evidence will probably result in an acquittal upon retrial of the defendant. Id. There was no abuse of discretion. First, if their claims of threats were true, then obviously they would have known about the threats during trial. Thus, their evidence cannot be newly discovered, as they cannot claim that the threats were unknown or unavailable to [them] at the time of trial. See United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir.1980). Second, they cannot show any prejudice. This is because their claim that they would have testified that they did not participate in purported board meetings concerning the loans from the Union to the Health Plan would have supported the government's theory that these meetings never occurred and that minutes over those loan meetings were doctored.