Opinion ID: 2232898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of laches defense

Text: ¶ 30 The court of appeals concluded that Coleman unreasonably delayed in bringing his claim before the court because the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel occurred in 1987 and Coleman did not seek relief until 2004, 17 years later. The court of appeals pointed out that: Correspondence between Coleman and postconviction counsel in May 1988 shows that Coleman was aware of a potential suppression issue, was dissatisfied with counsel's decision not to appeal, intended to do his own research into the matter, and possessed the necessary transcripts and records to conduct that research. After that exchange of letters, however, Coleman apparently did nothing. There is no record of any request for court-appointed counsel, nor allegation that Coleman sought pro bono counsel or free legal assistance elsewhere. Nor does Coleman explain why he made no attempt to pursue relief without counsel, although he is literate, [and] presumably had access to his prison's law library.... State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, No.2004AP548-W, unpublished order at 2 (Wis.Ct.App. December 13, 2004). ¶ 31 The State asserts that the petition was filed more than 17 years after Coleman's conviction; the three letters between Coleman and appellate counsel suggest that appellate counsel assessed the merits of possible appellate issues, found them wanting and discussed his findings with Coleman. The letters also show that appellate counsel advised Coleman not to appeal and that Coleman accepted this decision. Furthermore, Coleman does not assert that he asked counsel to appeal and that counsel ignored his request. ¶ 32 The State also asserts that the lack of any record that Coleman tried to do anything relative to an appeal from 1988, when he was given the transcripts, until 2004 when he filed his habeas petition supports the court of appeals' conclusion that the delay was unreasonable. We agree that Coleman has made no showing of why he failed to attempt to bring his concerns before a court on a pro se basis, as so many incarcerated persons have. ¶ 33 Coleman does not dispute any of the facts argued by the State. Instead, he asserts he did not bring his claim before the court sooner because he was without legal knowledge or financial means to hire another attorney for a second opinion on the issue of an appeal until he married a woman with financial resources. We are unpersuaded. While his marriage may have provided the catalyst to bring a habeas petition, that fact does not explain away the uncontroverted fact that Coleman knew of his claim for more than 16 years but he did nothing, year after year. Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that the State has proved Coleman's delay was unreasonable as a matter of law. [12] ¶ 34 However, the State must also prove that it was prejudiced because of Coleman's delay in bringing his claim. Here, the court of appeals assumed that because more than 16 years had passed since appellate counsel and Coleman discussed an appeal, counsel would have little or no recall of why he decided to recommend that an appeal not be filed or what he and Coleman discussed before he concluded that Coleman had agreed to counsel's closing the file. ¶ 35 The court interpreted Coleman's relinquishment of the right to appeal and the delay as follows: He initially accepted counsel's conclusion that he could not meritoriously appeal his convictions. Subsequently, Coleman had no access to appointed counsel, and no means to retain private counsel. It was only after his recent marriage that he could afford to retain the attorney who now represents him before this court. Id. at 1-2. It concluded that Coleman's delay was unreasonable, and then assumed the delay prejudiced the State. Furthermore, the delay of seventeen years greatly prejudices the State, under any reasonable view. As a practical matter, the State cannot obtain counsel's testimony about his decision not to appeal, because counsel undoubtedly has little or no memory of the circumstances of that decision. If Coleman's appeal rights were reinstated, and he prevailed in the ensuing appeal, the delay would certainly preclude a remand for further proceedings on the suppression issue, although that would be the logical remedy. Additionally, if the evidence were ultimately suppressed, the State would have no practical means of retrying Coleman on the remaining evidence. Id. at 2-3 (footnote omitted). ¶ 36 While the court of appeals' assumption may prove true, it is not the only possible outcome that could result from an inquiry of postconviction counsel. Therefore, it cannot be decided as a matter of law. To the contrary, appellate counsel may be able to recall or to reconstruct what happened during his communications with Coleman; what Coleman's response was; and how they reached the ultimate decision not to appeal. If he cannot, then the court of appeals is correct that the State suffered prejudice in being able to meet Coleman's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. But if counsel proves the assumption of the court incorrect, further proceedings on Coleman's claim of ineffective assistance will be required. ¶ 37 Accordingly, we agree with Coleman that based on the record before us, the court of appeals erred when it assumed the State was prejudiced by Coleman's unreasonable delay, instead of requiring the State to prove a factual basis for prejudice. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals decision that laches precludes Coleman's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and we remand the matter to the court of appeals to decide how to develop a sufficient factual record.