Opinion ID: 1193581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal of jury instruction and denial of argument pertaining to alleged outrageous police practices.

Text: The trial court rejected the following jury instruction offered by appellant. Any person, except the issuer, who sells a credit card, or any person who buys a credit card from a person other than the issuer is guilty of the crime of sale or purchase of a credit card. Appellant wanted to indicate that the undercover officers themselves engaged in illegal activity when they purchased and sold the regularly issued credit card. Brown argued that the credit cards were not props but rather legitimate credit cards, the purchase and sale of which even by police officers in the course of their duties constitutes a crime. The trial court did not err in refusing appellant's proffered instruction. That instruction, reproduced above, was very similar to instruction number five which was given to the jury. [1] Both instructions were virtually identical to the proscription of the statute, NRS 205.710, which reads: Any person, except the issuer, who sells a credit card, or any person who buys a credit card from a person other than the issuer is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. A refusal to give a proffered jury instruction is not error if the instructions given properly cover the subject matter of the offered instruction. Cranford v. State, 76 Nev. 113, 349 P.2d 1051 (1960). The trial court committed no error. Appellant next claims prejudice in that he was denied an opportunity to argue the allegedly outrageous police practices to the jury. He claims that because no statutory exemption is provided to permit law enforcement officers to engage in this form of transaction there exists no immunity and that the behavior then becomes outrageous police practices. Russell, supra, suggests that some tactics by law enforcement officers may be so outrageous that they in effect deny due process. See, also, United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 104. Whether such tactics violate fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice is a matter of law within the province of the court alone and the trial court could, as here, properly conclude that such violation did not occur. Russell, supra, 411 U.S. at 432, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1643; Sparkman v. State, 88 Nev. 680, 504 P.2d 8 (1972). The judgment of conviction is affirmed. BATJER, C.J., and MOWBRAY, THOMPSON and GUNDERSON, JJ., concur.