Opinion ID: 2178431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for acquittal made and argued in chambers outside the presence of defendant.

Text: The record indicates that at the end of the first day of trial at 5:26 p. m. the case was recessed until the next day. Anticipating that the State would officially close its evidence in chief upon resumption of the trial, the defendant's attorney on his own initiative, with the State's attorney participating, argued to the Presiding Justice in chambers a motion for judgment of acquittal respecting the several accusations for which the defendant was being tried. The Court denied them all. Upon the start of the trial on the following day, the State officially rested. The defendant did not renew his motion in open court, but proceeded to introduce his evidence. Defendant now complains that the Court committed reversible error when it heard and ruled upon his motion for acquittal under Rule 29(a), M.R.Crim.P., in chambers in his absence. Noting that the defendant's motion was premature and, after the State had rested, could have been renewed in open court and argued in the absence of the jury if such request had been made, and observing that the alleged irregularity was prompted by defendant's trial counsel and that the claimed impropriety of such Court action was never suggested at the trial level but raised for the first time on appeal, we would ordinarily not consider such issues except that in the instant case a trial practice is involved which may possibly affect the defendant's fundamental rights to a fair trial. State v. Fernald, 1968, Me., 248 A.2d 754; State v. Smith, 1944, 140 Me. 255, 37 A.2d 246. The right of an accused criminal defendant to be present at his trial is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution of Maine, Article 1, § 6 and the reference constitutional provision further mandates that the trial be a public one at which the accused has the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. Similar rights are secured to an accused by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States applicable to the States through the Fourteenth. Rule 43, M.R. Crim.P., provides that: The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury, and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules.    This rule, as was its predecessor statute, 15 M.R.S.A. § 1204, repealed on December 1, 1965, serves to implement our constitutional provisions and is merely declaratory of basic principles of our common law. In State v. Fernald, supra, we held that a criminal defendant had no absolute right to be present at bench conferences and that the record disclosed no apparent prejudice to the defendant due to his absence from such conferences. The Court then further said [t]here is no reason to believe that the defendant could have assisted his counsel at these conferences or that his absence in any way denied him the substance of a fair trial. In Martin v. State, 1962, 228 Md. 311, 179 A.2d 865, the Maryland Court held that a motion for a directed verdict concerns an argument on an issue of law only and is not a stage or step of the criminal proceedings which requires the defendant's presence under either the State or Federal Constitutions. In State v. Peters, 1965, 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642, the same result was reached upon the accused's complaint that he was not present when his attorney moved to dismiss the information for failure of proof at the close of the State's case in chief. The Court pointed out that a defendant's constitutional and statutory right to be present at trial did not encompass proceedings before the court involving matters of law only. The right of a criminal defendant to be present throughout his trial must be interpreted in the light of his constitutional privilege providing him with the right to defend and be heard and to be confronted by the witnesses against him and embodies due process only to the extent that his presence is necessary for a fair and just hearing of his cause. People ex rel. Lupo v. Fay, 1963, 13 N.Y.2d 253, 246 N.Y.S.2d 399, 196 N.E.2d 56; Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1934, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674. He must be deemed to have the absolute right to hear everything the jury hears, so that his may be the opportunity to confront his accusers and advise with his counsel where evidentiary facts are involved. United States v. Johnson, 1942, 3rd Cir., 129 F.2d 954. On the other hand, through the constitutional mandate of a public trial, the criminal defendant is accorded protection against possible abuse of the judicial process and the arbitrary use of judicial power. A public trial may benefit him in that witnesses may testify more truthfully and the publicity thereof may cause him to obtain information of volunteer witnesses who otherwise would have been unknown to him. See, 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 258. While this right of public trial is in a broad sense for the protection of the public generally, it is in a very special sense a privilege accorded to the individual member of the public who has been accused of crime. United States v. Sorrentino, 1949, 3rd Cir., 175 F.2d 721. Furthermore, the scope of the constitutional term public trial does not encompass a conference between court and counsel in chambers respecting arguments and ruling on a motion for acquittal. The subject matter of the chamber conference was solely a question of law, which could not have been properly heard in the presence of the jury. The trial of the action, so far as the term public trial is concerned, consists in the proceedings for the impaneling of the jury, the opening statements of counsel, the presentation of evidence, the arguments of counsel, the instructions to the jury and the return of the verdict, and from none of these proceedings was the public excluded. See, People v. Teitelbaum, 1958, 163 Cal. App.2d 184, 329 P.2d 157, cert. den. and app. dismd. sub nom. Teitelbaum v. California, 359 U.S. 206, 79 S.Ct. 738, 3 L.Ed. 2d 759. We hold that the defendant's absence from chambers when his motion for judgment of acquittal was made and argued did not constitute a denial of defendant's constitutional right of public trial and to be present at every stage of his trial, nor a violation of Rule 43, M.R. Crim.P. We are of the view however that the better practice would be for the trial courts to hear such motions in open court in the absence of the jury. However, if in the sound discretion of the trial judge such motions should on occasion be heard in chambers, the better practice again would be to require the defendant's presence.