Opinion ID: 161699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Stolen Gun Sentence Enhancement

Text: 34 Walters next contends that the district court erred in applying a two-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to 2K2.1(b)(4) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Section 2K2.1(b)(4) requires a two-level enhancement if any firearm was stolen, or had an altered or obliterated serial number. The enhancement under subsection (b)(4) for a stolen firearm . . . applies whether or not the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the firearm was stolen . . . . USSG 2K2.1, cmt. n. 19. 35 Walters argues that: (1) the government's failure to turn over the FBI 302 report pertaining to the chain of custody of the gun constitutes a violation of his due process rights, and therefore the district court erred in considering this evidence, or, alternatively, Walters should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) he should be entitled to withdraw his plea under an estoppel defense to the plea agreement based on Utah contract law; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support an inference that the gun was stolen.
36 This court reviews de novo whether a violation of a defendant's due process rights occurred. United States v. Fria Vazquez Del Mercado, 223 F.3d 1213, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, Fria Vazquez Del Mercado v. United States, 531 U.S. 1027 (2000). Walters advances two theories for his argument that the government violated his due process rights by failing to disclose the report discussing the chain of possession of the gun. First, he argues that the government's failure to disclose the report indicating the gun was stolen, after it had turned over Van Roosendaal's report stating it was not, is antithetical to the fundamental maxim of fairness that sits [a]t the very core of the Due Process clause. Second, Walters contends that the government's failure to disclose this evidence constitutes a Brady violation. 37
38 Walters argues that it is fundamentally unfair for the government to make an affirmative representation that the gun was not stolen, to contend that it was operating under an open file policy, and then to fail to forward a subsequent report showing that the gun was likely stolen. Walters fails to cite any authority for his position, and we could not find any ourselves. Furthermore, this claim that the government violated due process by failing to turn over evidence is, in essence, merely re-packaging and seeking to extend Brady. In the absence of any authority, we decline to extend Brady and, instead, turn to that claim itself. 39
40 We repeat: To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the prosecutor suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; and (3) the evidence was material. Gonzales v. McKune, 247 F.3d 1066, 1075 (10th Cir. 2001). Walters fails to establish that the suppressed report was favorable or material. As to the former, Agent Montefusco's report tracing the gun's chain of possession from Richard M. Gowers to Ryan to Walters is not favorable to Walters. The report certainly is not exculpatory; in no way does it justify, excuse or clear Walters from guilt for the crime to which he pled guilty possessing a firearm by a person convicted of domestic violence. The report is irrelevant as to that crime, and it is inculpatory as to the sentencing enhancement for possessing a stolen gun, USSG 2K2.1(b)(4). 41 Walters argues that this report contains favorable evidence because it would have enabled him to impeach Robbie Gowers as a thief and drug user. Impeaching Robbie is irrelevant (and, therefore, immaterial) to both Walters's conviction and the stolen gun enhancement. There is no objective evidence that had the government disclosed the report to Walters before he changed his plea, Walters would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. See Avellino, 136 F.3d at 256. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Walters could have used this report thoroughly to discredit Robbie's testimony at trial, that fact would have had no effect on the jury's deliberations regarding whether Walters was guilty of illegal possession of a firearm by a person convicted of domestic violence or whether Walters possessed a stolen firearm in violation of USSG 2K2.1(b)(4). Therefore, there is no reason to believe that had Walters possessed this report he would not have pled guilty. 42 Walters counters that when he was considering his decision to change his plea [from not guilty to guilty] he did so under the mistaken belief that the 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement would not apply. However, he does not establish that anyone gave him assurances that the 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement would not apply. Further, reporting to Walters that a computer check did not reveal the gun stolen is far from an assurance that the gun was not in fact stolen. Walters's affirmative responses to the district court's questions at his change-of-plea hearing are instructive: 43 COURT: I presume, Mr. Walters, that you believe there is some benefit to you entering a plea of guilty . . . . Whatever benefit you believe exists, however, is not a reason to plead guilty. You should plead guilty only if you are guilty and for no other reason. Do you understand that? 44 WALTERS: Yes. 45     46 COURT: Do you understand that the maximum possible penalty of the crime to which you are entering a plea of guilty, [in] violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 922(g)(9), is: Ten years of imprisonment, and a fine of $250,000, or both . . . ? 47 WALTERS: Yes. 48      49 COURT: Do you understand that if your attorney or anyone else has attempted to estimate or predict what your sentence will be, that their estimate or prediction could be wrong? 50 WALTERS: Yes. 51 COURT: No one, not even your attorney or the government, can nor should give you any assurance of what your sentence will be because that sentence cannot be determined until after the probation office report is completed and I have ruled on challenges to the report and determined whether I believe there are grounds to depart, up or down, from the guideline range. Do you understand that? 52 WALTERS: Yes. 53 COURT: You also fully understand that even if your sentence is different from what your attorney or anyone else told you that it might be, or if it is different than what you expect, you will still be bound to your guilty plea and you will not be allowed to withdraw your plea of guilty? 54 WALTERS: Yes. 55       56 COURT: Do you understand that . . . I am completely free to disregard the government's recommendation or position and to impose whatever sentence I believe is appropriate under the circumstances and guidelines and you will have no right to withdraw your plea? 57 WALTERS: Yes. 58 COURT: Do you understand then that if the sentence is more severe than expected but within the guidelines, you cannot withdraw the plea? 59 WALTERS: Yes. 60 COURT: I find that the defendant understands the charge against him and understands the rights he's waiving by agreeing to the plea agreement. 61 Walters does not allege that this Rule 11 colloquy was insufficient or that, besides his Brady claim, he entered his guilty plea involuntarily or with insufficient knowledge. It is well established that a defendant's dissatisfaction with the length of his sentence generally is an insufficient reason to withdraw a plea. See United States v. Elias, 937 F.2d 1514, 1520 (10th Cir.1991). 62 Therefore, we reject Walters's claim that the government's failure to turn over Agent Montefusco's report regarding the gun being stolen violated Brady. 2. Equitable Estoppel Claim 63 Walters further argues that the trial court erred by not invoking the principle of equitable estoppel to bar the government from relying on Agent Montefusco's report to support this sentence enhancement. Walters contends he relied on both the government's first representation that the gun was not stolen and the government's failure to correct that misunderstanding when he pled guilty. 64 This argument fails for several reasons. First, Walters failed to raise this argument to the district court, so we review only for plain error. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 388 (1999). It is clear that the district court did not commit plain error by failing to invoke the principle of equitable estoppel sua sponte to exclude the subsequent report on the gun being stolen. Second, Walters's reliance was not reasonable given the district court's thorough Rule 11 colloquy which expressly warned Walters that he should not plead guilty on the basis of estimations of the length of the sentence he could receive. Finally, this argument strikes us as simply a recycled version of his previous arguments which we reject above. He has not distinguished it in any way, and therefore it appears to fall within Brady. Yet, as we concluded above, the government did not violate Brady because the report was neither favorable nor material. 65 3. Walters's Remedies for the Government's Apparent Misconduct 66 At the close of sentencing, the district court noted that it was very troubled by the series of events in this case wherein the United States failed to disclose appropriately . . . information to [Walters] as the law would have required. We, too, are troubled by the series of non-disclosures by the government. Walters failed to avail himself, however, of two available remedies at the district court level. First, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(2) provides, 67 If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [regarding discovery], the court may . . . prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 68 This rule seems tailor-made for this case. Second, Walters could have sought to withdraw his plea, arguing the government's non-disclosures constituted a fair and just reason for withdrawal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e). At oral argument, Walters's counsel stated that he considered, but rejected, moving to withdraw the plea. Perhaps he had good reason to do so. We do not know what off-the-record negotiations took place to secure his plea or what strategic decisions his counsel made which led him to not seek to withdraw the plea. To be sure, however, at the district court level Walters had the tools to remedy what he now contests was government misconduct. 4. Factual Finding that Gun was Stolen 69 The district court found that the gun was stolen. In the context of applying 2K2.1(b)(4), this court has interpreted the term stolen to mean all felonious takings . . . with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny. United States v. Rowlett, 23 F.3d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417 (1957)). The evidence shows that Robbie took the gun from his father, Richard Gowers. Robbie then either loaned or sold the gun to Montoya. Montoya, in turn, traded the gun to Ryan for a quarter-ounce of methamphetamine. While it may be unclear who in this chain of possession first had the requisite intent to deprive Richard Gowers of the rights and benefits of ownership, it is indisputable that one or more of them did. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the gun was stolen. 70 Consequently, we affirm the district court's two-level enhancement for unlawful possession a stolen gun under USSG 2K2.1(b)(4). 71 D. Possessing a Gun in Connection with Another Felony Sentence Enhancement 72 Sentencing Guideline 2K2.1(b)(5) instructs a court to increase by four levels a defendant's base offense level [i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense. USSG 2K2.1(b)(5). The district court applied this enhancement, finding that Walters possessed Gowers's gun in connection with the felony of unlawfully possessing Center's stolen truck. The court found that possessing the gun had the potential to facilitate the offense of keeping the stolen truck because it emboldened Walters to maintain possession of the truck vis-a-vis Mr. Center or anyone else for that matter. (Citing United States v. Routon, 25 F.3d 815, 817-19 (9th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Hunt, No. 97-3267, 1998 WL 223267, at -3 (10th Cir. May 5, 1998))). 73 We have explained that the in connection with requirement of 2K2.1(b)(5) is analogous to the in relation to requirement of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), which is satisfied if the government shows that the weapon facilitates or has the potential to facilitate the . . . offense, but is not satisfied if the weapon's possession is coincidental or entirely unrelated to the offense. United States v. Gomez-Arrellano, 5 F.3d 464, 466-67 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing the expansive reading of 924(c) in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993)); see also United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1006 (10th Cir.1998). 74 Here, police discovered the gun under the front seat of the truck, the very thing the district court found Walters illegally possessed and wanted to protect from Center and others. Walters admitted at his change-of-plea hearing that he possessed the gun while driving the truck. Center confronted Walters at least once in an attempt to get his truck back. Avery knew Walters carried a gun, and given Walters's penchant for flaunting weapons and his well-known reputation for violence, it is highly likely that others knew he had a gun as well. Walters somehow obtained the truck from Perry perhaps by collusion, perhaps by coercion. Taking these facts and observations together, we hold that the district court did not clearly err when it concluded that the gun had the potential to facilitate Walters's unlawful possession of Center's stolen truck. Therefore, we affirm the district court's application of the four-level enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(5). 75 E. Downward Departure for Victim's Conduct under USSG 5K2.10 76 In his objection to the PSR, Walters argued that if the district court enhanced his base offense level under 2K2.1(b)(5) it should also reduce the sentence under 5K2.10 (Victim's Conduct) because Center's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the behavior that led to the 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement. The government conceded at oral argument that this issue was properly raised and preserved for the district court. It is undisputed that the district court did not rule on this motion by Walters; it seems to have slipped through the cracks. The government argued on appeal that the district court could not, as a matter of law, depart downward on the ground asserted by Walters. 77 Walters is entitled to have the district court consider in the first instance whether 5K2.10 applies. See R. Eric Peterson Constr. Co. v. Quintek, Inc. (In re R. Eric Peterson Constr. Co.), 951 F.2d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that as a general rule, an appellate court does not consider issues not ruled upon below, and thus it is appropriate to remand the case to the district court to first address this issue). Therefore, we REMAND for consideration of the applicability of Sentencing Guideline 5K2.10.