Opinion ID: 1561620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Racial Composition of the Panel

Text: Price next contends that the racial composition of the venire violated his right to due process. His argument is really in two parts. First, he challenges the venire directly, and, next, he argues that Oliver was ineffective in not raising the issue before voir dire. Selection of a petit jury from a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Danzie v. State, 326 Ark. 34, 930 S.W.2d 310 (1996); Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 194, 925 S.W.2d 402 (1996). It is axiomatic that the prosecutor may not deliberately or systematically deny to members of a defendant's race the right to participate, as jurors, in the administration of justice. Davis v. State, supra ; Sanders v. State, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334 (1989). In order to establish a prima facie case of deliberate or systematic exclusion, a defendant must prove that: (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in venires from which the juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). In Davis v. State, supra , however, we said: We have noted in particular where proof of a systematic exclusion of the distinctive group is completely lacking, there is no basis for a motion to quash the jury panel. 325 Ark. at 196, 925 S.W.2d at 404. The same holds true in the instant case. Price submitted no statistical evidence in support of his motion that systematic exclusion occurred. We affirm the circuit court's ruling denying Price's motion to quash. At his hearing on his motion for a new trial, Price, with his new counsel, also offered no statistical evidence regarding the racial composition of any body relevant to the venire such as the Garland County population, registered voters in Garland county, or the venire itself. Nor did he allege how the argued systemic exclusion had taken place. But, in addition, as the State points out, at the post-trial hearing, Price failed to obtain a ruling from the circuit court on the issue that Oliver was ineffective in raising the question of racial composition of the venire after voir dire rather than before. Regardless of the timing of Oliver's motion to quash, the motion still would have been denied. This court has said: Under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-32-103 (Repl.1994), the jury venire is chosen at random by computer selection from voter registration lists. This court has frequently upheld this process and has stated that it guarantees that there can be no purposeful exclusion of African Americans. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 327 Ark. 692, 942 S.W.2d 231 (1997). We have also noted that [w]hile it is clear that juror selection may not be the result of discrimination against groups defined by race, color, creed, or sex, the Supreme Court has made it equally clear that this does not mean that each jury must have on it persons representative of each distinctive group in the population from which it is chosen. Mitchell v. State, 299 Ark. 566, 568, 776 S.W.2d 332, 333 (1989). MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 405, 978 S.W.2d 293, 300 (1998). Given the multiple decisions from this court upholding the method by which a venire is randomly selected, we cannot say that prejudice accrued to Price on this ground, absent some evidence of systematic exclusion. Neither Oliver nor Price's new attorney, Louis Etoch, presented any proof in this regard. Accordingly, Oliver's performance was not deficient in this regard. The circuit court did not err in denying Price a new trial on this ground. Affirmed.