Opinion ID: 199098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conspiracy to Transport Stolen Property in Interstate Commerce

Text: 39 The jury also found Martin guilty of conspiracy to transport stolen goods interstate, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §a2314 11 and 18 U.S.C. § 371, 12 as charged in count 14. Again, a conviction for conspiracy does not require that the defendant was successful in the underlying offense, see Giry, 818 F.2d at 126, but only that an agreement to commit the underlying offense existed, see Echeverri, 982 F.2d at 679, and that at least one co-conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, see United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1014 (1st Cir. 1993). To be found guilty of a conspiracy to transport stolen goods interstate, Martin must have agreed to transport goods, wares, [or] merchandise, with a value of $5,000 or more, in interstate or foreign commerce, and known the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 214 (1985) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2314). Although intangible, purely intellectual property does not fall within the auspices of § 2314, intangible components of tangible items may contribute to the $5,000 value requirement. See United States v.Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 & n.14 (10th Cir. 1991). 40 The indictment for conspiracy to transport stolen goods was based in part on Martin's July 21 request for a copy of x-Chek software and his July 22 acknowledgment that Camp would be sending him additional test kits. See Brief for Appellant 31 (admitting that the evidence at trial established . . . two instances on which Dr. Martin requested 'property,' as opposed to 'information.'). Martin received a large package from Camp in the mail after sending these two e-mails. However, Martin claims that (1) this evidence is insufficient to establish the existence of anagreement with Camp to transport stolen property; and (2) that the property in question did not meet the $5,000 value requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. 41 Martin first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the existence of an agreement between Camp and himself with respect to stolen property. For the same reasons that a rational jury could plausibly have found an agreement to steal trade secrets, we conclude that the same rational jury could have found an agreement between Camp and Martin by which she would send him property from IDEXX. However, the question remains whether that agreement (1) covered stolen property in violation of §a2314, and (2) covered property with a value of more than $5,000. 42 For property to be stolen under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, the defendant must have known it to be stolen, converted or taken by fraud. Although the prosecution introduced testimony that IDEXX only provided x-Chek for free under a license agreement with its customers, Martin claimed that, based on Camp's previous e-mail communication, he believed the software was free. 13 However, in a conviction challenged for sufficiency of the evidence, we must give the jury's finding great weight, asking only whether a reasonable or rational jury could have plausibly found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Echeverri, 982 F.2d at 677; United States v.Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir. 1992). In this case, given that three months had passed since Camp had described x-Chek as free, that she had originally discussed it in connection with customersatisfaction, that the free label occurred at the end of a lengthy e-mail, and that Martin was a scientist who had surely dealt with companies such as IDEXX before, a jury could certainly have concluded that he knew that such companies did not provide major software packages for free to those who were neither customers nor potential customers, and that Martin knew the software had been stolen or converted from IDEXX. 43 Moreover, with respect to the free test kits, the evidence is much stronger that Martin knew that they had been stolen, converted or taken by fraud. First, when Camp sent Martin the original set of kits, she told him not to say where [he] got them, and not to mention them to her relatives, because all rules are null-and-void now that Idexx has been acquiring kits from its competitors by sneaky means. Even though Camp noted that it was part of her job to send free kits to potential customers, Martin was clearly not a potential customer, and could not plausibly have believed that this mandate applied to his spy sending free kits to him. 14 Furthermore, Martin admitted that, in the future, he would have to buy the kits, suggesting that he did not really believe he was entitled to obtain them for free. 44 Finally, the jury could have plausibly concluded that Martin's July 21 request to Camp to absorb as much information, physically and intellectually, as you can, included a request to send him physical goods such as test kits and software. Martin had already received items from Camp, and was at the time expecting further items, such as the x-Chek software. Although Martin is correct that § 2314 does not apply to purely intangible information, the theft of which is punishable under copyright law and other intellectual property statutes, see United States v.Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1991), § 2314 does apply when there has been some tangible item taken, however insignificant or valueless it may be, absent the intangible component, id. at 1308 n.14. Given that at this time Camp had already sent Martin numerous tangible items, he would have been on notice that any request to absorb information might (and likely would) produce tangible material that he would receive. 45 As for Martin's claim that the value of his requests did not meet the $5,000 floor, there is evidence that the value of the x-Chek software approached $2,500, and that individual diagnostic kits ranged from $1,500 to $2,200. Furthermore, there is evidence that Martin was aware of the potential cost of test kits. 15 Whether the actual items received exceeded the statutory value or not (and there is strong evidence that they in fact did), a jury could plausibly have concluded that Martin, with sufficient knowledge of the kit price, had requested items that would likely have exceeded $5,000 and thus satisfied the value prong of the conspiracy charge. 16