Opinion ID: 159310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Caldwell 2 violation

Text: Petitioner argues that the prosecutor, during his second-stage closing argument, improperly diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility as to its sentencing decision. See Caldwell , 472 U.S. at 323, 328-29. In her closing argument, defense counsel indicated that the prosecutor wanted the jurors to execute petitioner. In response, the prosecutor asserted . . . You’re not the executioners. See, [defense counsel’s] wanting to put a guilt trip on you, make you feel emotional. Tell you, you have to live with this the rest of your life. I am, too. You would not even consider this evidence. You wouldn’t be able to consider this evidence, if I hadn’t prepared the case, and made the decision to ask for the death penalty, and made the argument -- .... . . . that if you return a verdict of guilty and give him the death penalty, I’m going to have some responsibility in that myself. . . . [A]t least I made some decisions that got it here; and it wouldn’t have gotten here, had I not made those decisions. .... 2 Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320 (1985). -19- . . . [Petitioner’s] the man that brought you in here. He’s responsible for all this. Not me, not you. And you will have to live with this decision in this sense. I did or did not do what was right, but you don’t have to live with the decision that you’re going to execute him. You’re not. You’re not killing him. You’re not executing him. .... . . . You’re deciding whether he should be given the death penalty. Trial tr. at 858-59. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined that [w]hen read in isolation, the prosecutor’s remarks . . . would seem to violate Caldwell . However, when read in context of the entire closing argument, it is clear that the prosecutor was responding to the argument of defense counsel and did not in any way mislead the jury in an attempt to insulate them from their decision or diminish[] their responsibility in determining the appropriate punishment. Pickens , 850 P.2d at 343. The state court’s application of Caldwell was not unreasonable. See Moore v. Gibson , 195 F.3d 1152, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor’s remarks indicating that jurors were only one little cog in community and that prosecutor had to determine initially that case was appropriate capital case before it could be brought before jury did not mislead jurors concerning their responsibility for determining punishment); Sellers v. Ward , 135 F.3d 1333, 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) (no Caldwell error where prosecutor suggested he approved of death penalty and many hurdles had to be jumped before capital proceeding occurred); see also, e.g. , Fox v. Ward , 200 F.3d 1286, 1300 (10th Cir. 2000). -20- Even if these remarks did violate Caldwell , there is not a “substantial possibility that the prosecutor’s statements, taken in context, affected the sentencing decision.” Hopkinson v. Shillinger , 888 F.2d 1286, 1295 (10th Cir. 1989), overruling on other grounds recognized by Davis v. Maynard , 911 F.2d 415, 417 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Moore v. Reynolds , 153 F.3d 1086, 1113 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 1266 (1999).