Opinion ID: 1255546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Effect of Failure To Suppress Allegedly Illegal Evidence

Text: Mierz claims that his attorney's failure to move to suppress the evidence obtained by the Wildlife agents' entry into the yard constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. Mierz argues that because [a]ll the evidence used to convict [him of assault] arose out of the unlawful and violent entry of the agents into his home and their violent assault upon his person, the exclusionary rule would have barred admission of such evidence. Pet. for Review at 13. [7] The Court of Appeals stated in dictum that a Fourth Amendment violation was present because the officers had no statutory authority to make a warrantless arrest, the padlocked, fenced-in back yard was a constitutionally protected curtilage and the entry was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement. Mierz, 72 Wn. App. at 790-93. [8] We do not need to decide whether Mierz's backyard coyote run was a constitutionally protected curtilage. Nor do we find it necessary to decide whether an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies. [9] Similarly, we do not reach a state constitutional argument. [10] Instead, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the evidence of Mierz's assaultive behavior was properly admitted regardless of any alleged Fourth Amendment violation under the facts of this case. This view is consistent with the rule first articulated in State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 804 P.2d 577 (1991), where a defendant shot a law enforcement officer in the back, and claimed a constitutional defect invalidated the officer's right to be on the property. The defendant claimed that he could not be convicted of aggravated first degree murder under RCW 10.95.020(1) because the officer was not engaged in official duties. The Hoffman court determined that even an officer effecting an arrest without probable cause may still be engaged in `official duties', provided the officer is not on a frolic of his or her own, and the officer is entitled to be protected by the law from assault. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 100. This court adopted a liberal view of official duties in Hoffman for purposes of charging a person with a crime. We see no reason to adopt a restrictive view of official duties in deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule to Mierz's assaultive behavior. Officers would be subject to attack if their allegedly unlawful entry onto property or improper arrest forecloses admission of evidence of assaults upon them. In State v. Aydelotte, 35 Wn. App. 125, 132, 665 P.2d 443 (1983), the Court of Appeals held that an assault against police officers following an illegal entry is outside the scope of the exclusionary rule, because it is sufficiently distinguishable from any initial police illegality to be purged of the primary taint (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). The court agreed that excluding such evidence would allow one whose home has been illegally entered to respond with unlimited force and, under the exclusionary rule, ... be effectively immunized from criminal responsibility. Aydelotte, 35 Wn. App. at 132 (quoting State v. Burger, 55 Or. App. 712, 716, 639 P.2d 706, 708 (1982)). Even if one assumes the illegality of the entry there is no showing that the evidence sought to be suppressed is an exploitation of the primary illegality. There is no simplistic but for analysis that applies in this area of the law. United States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir.[), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 1004] (1971). These are not cases where the illegal entry leads to the seizure of evidence which produces an admission from a defendant.... Nor are they cases where the illegal entry gives an officer knowledge of prior or ongoing criminal activity and hence bars testimony as to such evidence. What is present here is simply an attempt to suppress evidence which is a result of allegedly wilful acts of misconduct by [defendants] whose provocation and perhaps ultimate defense may be found in the fact of the entry itself. The exclusionary rule does not reach that far. Commonwealth v. Saia, 372 Mass. 53, 58, 360 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1977), quoted in State v. Aydelotte, 35 Wn. App. 125, 133, 665 P.2d 443 (1983). Mierz urges us, however, to adopt Division Three's analysis in State v. Apodaca, 67 Wn. App. 736, 839 P.2d 352 (1992). There, officers wrongfully, but peaceably, talked their way into an apartment to question the owner of a car involved in an accident. While conversing about the accident, the owner lunged for a dresser drawer containing his loaded gun. Applying the exclusionary rule, the court reversed Apodaca's conviction for attempted assault solely because the evidence of the assault arose following the officer's illegal entry into the residence. We reject this result. The result in Apodaca would have been the same had the citizen reached the gun and shot one of the officers. An identified law enforcement officer who oversteps constitutional bounds, without any threat of deadly harm to a defendant or exploitation of his or her position, should not have to pay the ultimate price. If suppression is proper in Apodaca or in Mierz's case, one day we would have to suppress evidence where an officer is murdered. Mierz, 72 Wn. App. at 794. Any benefit provided by exclusion of evidence in these cases comes at too high a price. Given the complexity and nuance of Fourth Amendment law, in many cases the law enforcement officer and the citizen may both have sincere or reasonable beliefs about the lawfulness of the entry or arrest. Encouraging citizens to test their beliefs through force simply returns us to a system of trial by combat. The proper location for dealing with such issues in a civilized society is in a court of law. Here, even assuming the entry or arrest were not legal, the evidence of the assault did not arise due to exploitation of any unconstitutional entry or arrest. Mierz's commands to his dogs to attack persons known by him to be law officers was unjustifiable. There was no violence or threat of violence by the Wildlife agents before or at the time they entered the yard and arrested Mierz. They did not draw guns. They announced their purpose, gave Mierz several chances to prove he had permission for the coyotes, several times sought his help in safely caging the coyotes, and in general demonstrated a concern for order and safety. They did not enter the yard to arrest Mierz until he locked up the coyotes and threw away the key. [8] We hold that the evidence of Mierz's assaultive behavior was properly admitted. Even if the entry or arrest by law enforcement officers was unlawful, the exclusionary rule does not foreclose admission of evidence of the assaults where the officers are identified as such, are performing official duties in good faith, and there was no exploitation of any constitutional violation. Apodaca is overruled to the extent that it conflicts with this decision.