Opinion ID: 2588264
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Retroactivity of city charter amendments

Text: The protections of due process only attach when there is a deprivation of a protected property or liberty interest. [6] Property interests are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. [7] Employees who may be terminated only for cause have a constitutionally protected property interest and are entitled to due process before being deprived of that interest. [8] However, merely having an expectation of continued employment does not create a property interest. [9] A contract also can be the basis of a property right, [10] and the state may not pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. [11] It is uncontroverted that from the time Pressler completed his probationary period after being hired in 1971, until June 30, 1997, he had a property interest in his employment-first by virtue of his status as a civil servant, and later by the provision in the Reno City Charter which allowed removal only for cause. [12] During the 1997 legislative session, the City proposed changes to its charter, including removal of the for-cause provision. Pressler contends the conduct underlying his termination occurred when he was protected by the charter's for-cause provision and that the amendment to the charter did not convert him to an at-will employee. He further contends that the changes to the charter could not be applied retroactively because he had an employment contract with the City based on the charter provision in effect when he accepted his appointment. Conversely, the City alleges that Pressler became an at-will employee on July 1, 1997, and that the city manager could properly terminate Pressler for no reason. [13] We conclude that the City's argument lacks merit. We have previously concluded that when the Legislature does not state otherwise, statutes have only prospective effect. [14] Here, the statute does not provide for retroactive application, and the legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended it to have only prospective effect. When the bill draft was requested, one of the senators asked the city's legislative relations administrator if the changes [were] considered a housekeeping measure with no expectation of controversy and received an affirmative response. [15] The serious implications of the change if applied to current employees, as evidenced by this controversy, would appear to be more than a housekeeping matter and arguably would raise some controversy. On the other hand, a prospective application of the change would arguably be less controversial and more in the line of a housekeeping matter since affected employees would have been aware of their status at the inception of their employment. In addition, one senator questioned whether notice of the appeals process would be provided to the employee before acceptance of the appointment, while another questioned whether employees would be given notice that they were not afforded the for-cause protection when they accepted appointments, [16] both of which indicate that the legislators envisioned only a prospective application. Further, senators asked various questions which indicated concern regarding decreased protection for affected employees. [17] Based on the presumption that statutes apply prospectively unless otherwise stated and on the legislative history, we conclude that the city charter amendments apply only prospectively. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that Pressler was an at-will employee. We conclude that as a matter of law, Pressler could be removed only for cause as provided by the city charter at the time he accepted his appointment. [18]