Opinion ID: 1898380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Should the unauthorized seizure of defendant's medical records have resulted in dismissal of his indictment or, in the alternative, a disqualification of the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office?

Text: Prior to trial the State obtained, through the use of grand-jury subpoenas issued by representatives of the prosecutor's office, defendant's medical records of his confinement at veterans hospitals and other institutions. In pretrial proceedings, the Law Division suppressed those records. It refused to disqualify the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office because it was convinced that no harm had been done. Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in refusing to disqualify the prosecutor. Defendant also argues that the seizure of his medical records amounted to misconduct so egregious as to require the dismissal of the indictment. A review of the record indicates that there was no taint or advantage given to the prosecution from the unlawful seizure of the records. Also, the State did lawfully possess the medical records for a period of time. During the pretrial proceedings, defendant filed a notice of intent to pursue an insanity defense and, pursuant to the rules of discovery, supplied the State with a medical report. As part of its preparation to rebut the insanity defense, the State had a psychiatric expert examine defendant. The court ruled that the State was entitled to have the remainder of defendant's medical and psychiatric records as part of discovery and ordered the records turned over to the State. Thus, although the prosecutor improperly obtained these records, he would have later received them in the ordinary course of discovery. See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.4. Defendant relies on our decisions in State v. Sugar (I), 84 N.J. 1, 417 A. 2d 474 (1980), and State v. Sugar (II), 100 N.J. 214, 495 A. 2d 90 (1985), for the proposition that the prosecutorial misconduct violated his fourth-amendment and fifth-amendment rights, as well as the physician-patient privilege. However, the instance of misconduct in this case in no way rises to the level of outrageous conduct in Sugar (I), supra, in which arresting officers unlawfully tape-recorded privileged and confidential conversations between the defendant and his attorney while the defendant was in police custody. Nor is the conduct in any sense equivalent to that in the celebrated case of Daniel Ellsberg, in which the government broke into his psychiatrist's office, suppressed evidence of such conduct, and destroyed documents. In Ellsberg, Judge Byrne found that the totality of the circumstances    offended a sense of justice and dismissed the indictment. United States v. Russo & Ellsberg, No. 93-73 (C.D.Cal. May 11, 1973). However, in Sugar (I), the gravity of that constitutional abridgement did not require the dismissal of the indictment under a fundamental fairness analysis. 84 N.J. at 15, 417 A. 2d 474. Applying the Sugar (I) analysis to this case, because the State would have had access to the records due to defendant's contemplated insanity defense, the prosecution was purged of all taint from [the legal] investigatory excess, which would not require dismissal of the indictment under fundamental fairness. Ibid. Nor was there the secondary Sugar problem, the sixth-amendment claim that defendant had been denied effective assistance of counsel. In this case we do not have an infringement of the attorney-client privilege but of the physician-patient privilege. Defendant claims, however, that the seizure of his medical records had an adverse impact on his relationship with his attorney, which warrants a dismissal of the indictment. In some instances, a deliberate attempt on behalf of a prosecutor to destroy the attorney-client relationship may warrant the dismissal of an indictment; however, absent demonstrable prejudice [to the defendant], or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668, 66 L.Ed. 2d 564, 569 (1981). The record here reveals that the only impairment of the attorney-client relationship created by the State's seizure of the medical records was defendant's unreasonable response in refusing to cooperate with his lawyers after discovering that his records had been disclosed. Furthermore, defendant received new counsel long after this issue arose. The substituted counsel certainly had nothing to do with the seizure of the medical records or with defendant's prior contemplation of an insanity defense. Thus, any alleged impaired relationship with counsel ceased long before trial began. Finally, we find neither a fifth-amendment violation nor an infraction of Evidence Rules 23 and 25 with regard to defendant's claim. Under Evidence Rule 23(1) the accused in any criminal action has a right not to testify or be called as a witness. Because the records were never introduced at trial and defendant was not called to testify with regard to the records, there is no Evidence Rule 23(1) violation. The privilege against self-incrimination embodied in the fifth amendment, New Jersey common law, and Evidence Rule 25 is also inapplicable. Nothing in these medical records incriminates defendant in any way. Thus, defendant's claim must fail. Even though his physician/psychiatrist-patient privilege was violated, defendant waived that privilege when he gave notice that he intended to pursue an insanity defense. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.4; cf. State v. Alston, 212 N.J. Super. 644, 515 A. 2d 1280 (App.Div. 1986) (privilege waived by notice of intent to invoke defense of battered-woman's syndrome). The fact that an insanity defense has been withdrawn is of no consequence. [O]nce privileged material is disclosed, the privilege of nondisclosure is waived. State v. Bishop, 187 N.J. Super. 187, 192, 453 A. 2d 1365 (App. Div. 1982); see Evid. R. 37.