Opinion ID: 1922704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense of Premises Instruction

Text: [¶ 17] The justification statutes frequently use terms such as reasonably believes [5] or reasonable ... force. [6] However, care must be taken to assure that any justification instruction does not lower the mens rea standard required for conviction. When a justification is generated, proving the negative of the reasonableness issue is not enough to support a conviction. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 101(3) (Supp.2002). [7] Thus, in an aggravated assault case, State v. Smith, 472 A.2d 948, 951 (Me.1984), we held that: Even though a factfinder might determine it objectively unreasonable for a defendant to believe that unlawful force is imminently threatened, or that the degree of counter-force applied is necessary, self-defense is not negated. Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 101(3), the state, when prosecuting a defendant for a crime such as assault for which recklessness suffices, must further prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either belief is reckless, i.e., a gross deviation from what the reasonable and prudent person would believe. See also State v. Davis, 528 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Me.1987). [¶ 18] Proof of at least reckless conduct is required to support an assault conviction. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207(1) (1983 & Supp.2002). Proof of intentional or knowing conduct is required to support a criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon conviction. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 209(1) (1983). Simply negating the reasonableness of a belief related to a justification, or even demonstrating that the belief was reckless, would be insufficient to support a conviction for a crime where proving mens rea requires proof of intentional or knowing action. To overcome the defense of premises justification for a criminal threatening charge, the instruction must indicate that the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either that Forbes knew that he was not threatened with imminent physical harm or that he knew that his threatened use of his firearm was not necessary to defend himself. Accordingly, the trial court erred in stating its defense of premises instruction in terms of reasonableness and in advising the jury that the criminal code does not tell us or give us a standard of reasonableness. That is for you to determine....