Opinion ID: 1175624
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Multiple Convictions for Specifically Included Offenses

Text: Defendant's second contention is in some ways the inverse of the first. If we refuse to set aside his lewd conduct convictions on the theory that the offense of lewd conduct is necessarily included in statutory sodomy, he maintains we must reverse his sodomy convictions because sodomy is specifically included in the offense of lewd conduct. He relies primarily on language in People v. Greer, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pages 601-604. In Greer this court first considered the defendant's claim of double jeopardy. He had previously been convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor (former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702) in a separate trial. ( Id. at p. 595.) In the Greer case itself he was charged with statutory rape (former § 261, subd. (1)) and lewd conduct (former § 288), but he claimed the charges were based on the same act that served as the basis for his conviction in the earlier trial. ( Ibid. ) The trial court, however, refused his offer to prove those facts. The defendant argued that the refusal to allow him to offer evidence of double jeopardy was reversible error, and this court agreed ( id. at p. 601). Realizing that on remand the defendant might not be able to prove that his rape and lewd conduct charges were based on the same act as his earlier conviction, and thus that he might not obtain a dismissal of those charges, the court addressed a final issue: whether the defendant could be convicted of rape and lewd conduct if both charges were based on the same act. The defendant claimed he could not be so convicted, and we concluded he was correct. ( Id. at pp. 601-604.) While recognizing that statutory rape and lewd conduct were not necessarily included offenses, this court apparently believed they were analogous because the wording of the lewd conduct statute (former § 288) specifically included the offense of statutory rape as a type of lewd conduct; this statute prohibited any lewd or lascivious act including any of the acts constituting other crimes provided for in part one of [ the Penal ] code. ... (Italics added.) Because statutory rape was provided for in part one of the Penal Code, and thus was specifically included in the offense of lewd conduct, the court decided that it was enough like a necessarily included offense to be treated similarly. ( Id. at p. 604.) Thus, Greer created the rule that specifically included offenses, like necessarily included offenses, could not give rise to multiple convictions. Greer does lend some comfort to this defendant. The present lewd conduct statute (§ 288) is identical in relevant part to the statute considered in Greer. Moreover, today's statutory sodomy provision is specifically included in section 288 in the same manner that the statutory rape provision was included in former section 288. Further, the Court of Appeal in People v. Osuna (1984) 161 Cal. App.3d 429 [207 Cal. Rptr. 641], relied on Greer to reverse a conviction of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (2)) based on the same act as another conviction of lewd conduct (§ 288, subd. (b)). Upon reflection, however, we do not find that Greer 's rule regarding specifically included offenses is controlling. To begin with, strict application of the rule conflicts with the plain language of section 954, which states that the defendant may be convicted of any number of the offenses charged, and which does not contemplate exceptions for specifically included offenses. Additionally, for our purposes the analysis of Greer is not precisely relevant. At the beginning of its discussion the court posed the question whether defendants could be convicted of lewd conduct and rape based on the same act. ( People v. Greer, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 601.) During the discussion, however, it used the terms conviction and punishment interchangeably, suggesting that the court may have actually been addressing the issue of whether multiple punishments, not multiple convictions, could arise from charges of statutory rape and lewd conduct based on the same act. In fact, the court even rephrased the question in terms of punishment, declaring: This court has not considered until now ... whether a defendant may be punished for the same act under both section 288 and another section of part one of the Penal Code. ( Id. at p. 603, italics added.) Finally, the discussion of specifically included offenses was essentially dictum because the court had already determined that the judgment would be reversed on other grounds before it reached this issue. We therefore do not feel compelled to reverse defendant's convictions of statutory sodomy on the ground that sodomy is a specifically included offense within lewd conduct.