Opinion ID: 2354141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: How a requester may rebut the agency's showing of an adequate search

Text: ¶ 62 Once an agency submits affidavits or declarations in an attempt to show that it conducted an adequate search for records, the requester may respond in several ways (or not at all). ¶ 63 First, if the agency fails to establish through reasonably detailed affidavits that its search was reasonable, the FOIA requester may defeat summary judgment merely by showing that the agency might have discovered a responsive document had the agency conducted a reasonable search. Maynard, 986 F.2d at 560 (emphasis added). ¶ 64 Second, if the requester identifies specific deficiencies in the agency's response, summary judgment should not be granted. CareToLive, 631 F.3d at 341-42. For example, if the agency's own responses show another place where responsive records might be found without an unreasonable burden on the agency, summary judgment should not be granted. See, e.g., Valencia-Lucena, 180 F.3d at 326-27 (if a review of the record raises substantial doubt, particularly in view of `well defined requests and positive indications of overlooked materials,' summary judgment is inappropriate; here, the search was inadequate because the record itself revealed `positive indications of overlooked materials' (quoting Founding Church of Scientology, 610 F.2d at 837)); Campbell, 164 F.3d at 28 (search held inadequate where it was evident from the records disclosed by the agency that a search of another records system would be apt to turn up requested documents). However, even if an agency's affidavits or declarations are initially deficient, courts generally will request a supplement before ordering discovery. Reich v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 784 F.Supp.2d 15, 24 (D.Mass.2011); accord Wolf, 569 F.Supp.2d at 9. ¶ 65 Third, if the agency has made a prima facie showing of adequacy, as described, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff-requester to provide `countervailing evidence' as to the adequacy of the agency's search. Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 314 (D.C.Cir.2003). For example, if the requester is able to show circumstances indicating that further search procedures were available without the [agency's] having to expend more than reasonable effort, then summary judgment would be improper. Miller, 779 F.2d at 1385. An agency cannot limit its search to only one or more places if there are additional sources that are likely to turn up the information requested. Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68; see also Campbell, 164 F.3d at 28. A requester might also produce countervailing evidence that places the agency's identification or retrieval procedure genuinely at issue, thus making summary judgment improper. Founding Church of Scientology, 610 F.2d at 836. ¶ 66 However, an agency's failure to turn up a specific document does not, in and of itself, render the search inadequate. Lahr, 569 F.3d at 987; Rein, 553 F.3d at 364; Morley v. C.I.A., 508 F.3d 1108, 1120 (D.C.Cir.2007); Iturralde, 315 F.3d at 315; Zemansky, 767 F.2d at 571. Even if the requester identifies specific documents internally referenced in documents released to the requester, and these are not sent to the requester, this, in and of itself, does not establish that the agency's search is inadequate; attacking the competency of the search method because it did not turn up known and identified documents does not establish the search was inadequate because the standard of reasonableness does not require absolute exhaustion of the filesrather, this standard requires a search reasonably calculated to uncover materials requested. Miller, 779 F.2d at 1384-85; see also Ray v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549, 1558 (11th Cir.1990) ([t]he adequacy of an agency's search for documents requested under FOIA is judged by a reasonableness standard ... the agency need not show that its search was exhaustive), rev'd on other grounds, U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 112 S.Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991). That a document once existed does not mean that it presently exists or that the agency that created a file has retained the document. Miller, 779 F.2d at 1385; Williams, 177 Fed.Appx. at 233. ¶ 67 Moreover, a requester's `mere speculation that as yet uncovered documents might exist' ... is not enough to `undermine the determination that the agency conducted an adequate search for the requested records.' Morley, 508 F.3d at 1120 (quoting Wilbur v. C.I.A., 355 F.3d 675, 678 (D.C.Cir.2004)); accord Steinberg, 23 F.3d at 552; SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1201; Moore v. F.B.I., 366 Fed.Appx. 659, 661 (7th Cir.2010); Jones-Edwards v. Appeal Bd. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 196 Fed.Appx. 36, 38 (2d Cir.2006) (unpublished); cf. Baker & Hostetler, LLP v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 473 F.3d 312, 318 (D.C.Cir.2006) (a requester's assertion that an adequate search would have yielded more documents is mere speculation insufficient to rebut affidavits describing the agency's search process). ¶ 68 If the requester fails to present any countervailing evidence or apparent inconsistencies in the proof, and provided the agency has submitted appropriate affidavits or declarations, the agency's affidavits or declarations generally will be sufficient to show compliance with obligations under FOIA. Trentadue v. F.B.I., 572 F.3d 794, 807 (10th Cir.2009); Rugiero, 257 F.3d at 547; Becker v. I.R.S., 34 F.3d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1994); Grand Cent. P'ship, 166 F.3d at 489. ¶ 69 However, and finally, the requester can still prevent summary judgment in favor of the agency, once the agency has demonstrate[d] that it has conducted a reasonably thorough search, by producing evidence that the agency's search was not made in good faith. Maynard, 986 F.2d at 560; see Pietrangelo v. U.S. Army, 334 Fed.Appx. 358, 360 (2d Cir.2009) (requester can rebut agency's adequate affidavits by a showing of bad faith sufficient to impugn the agency's affidavits or declarations). However, a mere assertion of bad faith, alone, is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. C.I.A., 177 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Maynard, 986 F.2d at 560 (the presumption of good faith cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents). A mere assertion does not meet the nonmoving party's burden to respond to a moving party's facially adequate affidavits. ¶ 70 As the majority recognizes, this federal framework is appropriate under the PRA. Indeed, it is entirely consistent with the purposes and provisions of the PRA. RCW 42.56.550 provides a speedy remedy for a requester to obtain a court hearing on whether an agency has violated the PRA. Quick judicial review upon motion and affidavit is authorized, allowing a requester to avoid expensive and prolonged PRA cases that could impede citizens' use of the act. See O'Neill v. City of Shoreline, 170 Wash.2d 138, 154-157, 240 P.3d 1149 (2010); RCW 42.56.550(1); WAC 44-14-08004(1); Brouillet v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 114 Wash.2d 788, 801, 791 P.2d 526 (1990). Under RCW 42.56.550, such a case may be initiated by a motion to show cause, placing the burden on the agency to show cause why it has not violated the PRA. RCW 42.56.550(1). Under RCW 42.56.550(3), a judicial de novo hearing on challenged agency action may be conducted based solely on affidavits. Like under FOIA, under the PRA the burden of showing compliance with the act is on the agency. RCW 42.56.550(1). ¶ 71 Thus, similar to the procedure described by federal courts, the PRA expressly contemplates an expedited review where the adequacy of an agency's search can be quickly decided. ¶ 72 Moreover, the fact that the summary judgment procedure is used in federal court to decide the adequacy of records search is not an impediment to applying the same procedure in this state. We have held that summary judgment is an appropriate procedure in PRA cases, relying on RCW 42.56.550(1) and (3), the specific PRA sections providing that a trial court may conduct a hearing based solely on affidavits and use of in camera review. Spokane Research & Def. Fund v. City of Spokane, 155 Wash.2d 89, 106, 117 P.3d 1117 (2005). In fact, many Washington cases have involved both a motion to show cause, as provided for in RCW 42.56.550(1), and a grant of summary judgment (in whole or in part). See, e.g., Spokane Research & Def. Fund, 155 Wash.2d 89, 117 P.3d 1117; Soter v. Cowles Pub'g Co., 162 Wash.2d 716, 174 P.3d 60 (2007); Oliver v. Harborview Med. Ctr., 94 Wash.2d 559, 618 P.2d 76 (1980); Gronquist v. Dep't of Corr., 159 Wash.App. 576, 247 P.3d 436 (2011); Guillen v. Pierce County, 96 Wash.App. 862, 866, 982 P.2d 123 (1999), rev'd in part on other grounds, 537 U.S. 129, 123 S.Ct. 720, 154 L.Ed.2d 610 (2003); cf. Newman v. King County, 133 Wash.2d 565, 947 P.2d 712 (1997) (public records case decided on summary judgment); Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash.2d 243, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (same). ¶ 73 Accordingly, when the adequacy of an agency's search for a responsive record is at issue in an action under the PRA, a summary judgment motion on the issue may be made by either party, just as under FOIA, and the agency could submit affidavits or declarations in an attempt to show that it conducted an adequate search and produced all nonexempt responsive records it found. Indeed, the agency itself could commence the action. See Soter, 162 Wash.2d at 749-56, 174 P.3d 60 (an agency is entitled to seek judicial review of disputed requests for disclosure). ¶ 74 In addition to being consistent with the PRA, the federal approach to determining the adequacy of an agency search is also consistent with summary judgment standards. For example, mere speculation will not suffice to rebut an agency's prima facie showing of an adequate search. A nonmoving party in a summary judgment may not rely on speculation [or] argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain, rather, after the moving party submits adequate affidavits, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts that sufficiently rebut the moving party's contentions and disclose that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists. Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wash.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986); see Greenhalgh v. Dep't of Corr., 160 Wash.App. 706, 714, 248 P.3d 150 (2011) ([m]ere allegations, argumentative assertions, conclusory statements, and speculation do not raise issues of material fact that precludes a grant of summary judgment to an agency on the issue of whether it has complied with a public records request under the PRA). When an agency makes a prima facie showing it has conducted an adequate search, the requester must rebut that showing, and must do so by more than mere speculation.