Opinion ID: 3002949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motions for Leave to Amend

Text: Adams also contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a § 1983 malicious prosecution count and state‐law malicious prosecution and abuse of process counts against Rotkvich (“the first motion”), as well as his subsequent motion for leave to add the City of Des Plaines as a defendant and assert a state‐ law claim for respondeat superior liability against it (“the second motion”). The district court denied those motions based on the untimeliness and futility of the proposed amendments. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), district courts must give parties leave to amend pleadings “when justice so requires.” However, a court may refuse to give leave to amend based upon undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, or futility. Winters v. Fru‐Con Inc., 498 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2007). We review a district court’s denial of a litigant’s request for leave to amend a pleading for an abuse of discretion. Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 583 (7th Cir. 2008). We will find an abuse of discretion if there was no justifying reason for the district court’s refusal to give leave to amend. Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008). No. 08‐1456 Page 5 The district court concluded that the first motion, filed by Adams six weeks before trial was to begin, should not be granted because it was made on the eve of trial and was based on events he became aware of fourteen months earlier when he was acquitted on the criminal battery charge. While delay alone is not reason enough to deny a motion to amend, “‘the longer the delay the greater the presumption against granting leave to amend.’” Id. (quoting King v. Cooke, 26 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 1994)). Moreover, “‘[e]leventh hour additions are bound to produce delays that burden not only the parties to the litigation but also the judicial system and other litigants.’” Id. (quoting Campbell v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 1990)). Therefore, the district court was well within its discretion to deny his first motion because the amendments would have required reopening discovery and postponing the imminent trial. Regarding the second motion, which was filed two weeks before trial was set to begin, the district court denied Adams’s request for leave to amend because the claim against the City for respondeat superior liability could have been brought much sooner. That conclusion was not an abuse of discretion. The claim against the City accrued over two‐and‐a‐half years earlier in May 2005, when Rotkvich and Lalowski allegedly committed batteries against Adams. The court reasonably concluded that Adams needlessly deferred pleading the basis for that claim until a mere two weeks before trial was set to begin and that amendment would have caused an unwarranted protraction of the litigation. In sum, the district court’s denial of Adams’s motions for leave to amend was justified; therefore, we find no abuse of discretion. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the court’s alternate determination that the proposed amendments would have been futile. C. Exclusion of Evidence of Acquittal on the Battery Charge Adams next argues the district court erred by granting the defendants’ motion to exclude evidence of his acquittal on the criminal battery charge in October 2006.6 He says the evidence should have been admitted so the jury would not be left to wonder if it might be finding in favor of a person who had been convicted of battery against a police officer. In granting the defendants’ motion, the district court was concerned the evidence of Adams’s acquittal would be prejudicial to the defendants because the jury might conclude the underlying events (i.e., the detention and interrogation) were also tainted. The court also stated that the admission of the acquittal could be prejudicial to the defendants because the 6 See supra note 3. No. 08‐1456 Page 6 standard of proof in the criminal case was beyond a reasonable doubt. During the trial, the district court instructed the jury to disregard the outcome of the criminal trial. We review a district court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Maher v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 817, 823 (7th Cir. 2008). “Evidence of acquittal in a criminal action is generally irrelevant and inadmissible in a civil case involving the same incident ‘since it constitutes a negative sort of conclusion lodged in a finding of failure of the prosecution to sustain the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 755 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1989)). Therefore, and in light of the potential prejudice the evidence of Adams’s acquittal posed to the defendants, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it from the trial. In addition, the district court directed the jury to not be concerned with the outcome of the criminal trial. We generally presume that a jury heeds the court’s instructions. United States v. Jackson, 540 F.3d 578, 598 (7th Cir. 2008). Therefore, that instruction was sufficient to address Adams’s concern that the jury might speculate whether it would be finding in favor of a person convicted of a criminal offense arising out of the underlying events. D. Jury Instruction and Special Interrogatory on Probable Cause Next, Adams contends that the district court erred in instructing the jury that an arrest is constitutional when an officer has probable cause to believe a motorist has committed a traffic offense. He argues that the instruction did not apply because he was not arrested by the police during the River Road incident (in spite of the fact that he was handcuffed, read his rights, and taken to the police station in a squad car). We review a court’s jury instructions de novo to determine whether, taken as a whole, they accurately informed the jury of the applicable law. Huff v. Sheahan, 493 F.3d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 2007). One of the § 1983 claims Adams lodged against the defendants from the River Road incident was for false arrest. A false arrest is an unreasonable seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Ienco v. Angarone, 429 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2005). “Because the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a § 1983 false‐arrest claim,” Montano v. City of Chicago, 535 F.3d 558, 568 (7th Cir. 2008), the defendants requested an instruction that they did not violate Adams’s constitutional rights if they had probable cause to arrest him for a traffic offense. Relying on Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001), the district court instructed the jury that “[u]nder the Constitution, if a police officer has probable cause to believe that a motorist has committed a traffic offense, the motorist may No. 08‐1456 Page 7 be placed under arrest, handcuffed, and taken to the jail without violating the constitutional rights of the motorist.” A person is considered to be under arrest when, under the relevant circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed he was free to leave. DeLuna v. City of Rockford, Illinois, 447 F.3d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir. 2006). Certainly a reasonable person in Adams’s shoes would not have thought he was free to leave after being handcuffed, read his rights, and transported to the police station in a police car; therefore, the district court correctly concluded that Adams had been placed under arrest. Because Adams had brought claims for false arrest against the officers involved in the River Road incident and because probable cause is an absolute defense to such claims, the instruction given by the district court was appropriate.7 Adams also claims the special interrogatory asking the jury if probable cause existed to arrest him during the River Road incident should not have been posed because it made the jury decide an issue of fact that was not necessary to reach a verdict. We review a district court’s decision to give a special interrogatory for an abuse of discretion. Bularz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 93 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1996). The district court did not abuse its discretion in posing the special interrogatory to the jury. Contrary to Adams’s assertion, the 7 Adams’s contention that this instruction was improper because he was not actually arrested on River Road is curious, inasmuch as he was stopped, handcuffed, read his Miranda rights, and taken to the police station in a squad car. He argues instead that the stop was an investigative one governed by the reasonable suspicion standard from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Adams is correct that he was not arrested and that a reasonable suspicion instruction was appropriate, any error was harmless. Probable cause is a higher standard than reasonable suspicion. United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 458 (7th Cir. 2004). Because the jury determined that probable cause existed to arrest Adams for speeding, it necessarily follows that there was reasonable suspicion for the stop. Therefore, even if the district court’s instruction was improper (it was not), any error was harmless. Adams also complains that the court’s instruction permitted the officers to evade liability even though the real reason for the stop was not the commission of a traffic offense but rather for investigative purposes. However, an officer’s subjective reasons for making a stop do not render the stop invalid as long as the facts known to the officer gave him probable cause to believe an offense had been or was being committed. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–55 (2005). No. 08‐1456 Page 8 special interrogatory asked the jury to decide an issue that was necessary to the determination of his claims for false arrest: whether probable cause existed to arrest him for a criminal offense. E. Denial of Motion to Exclude the Term “Traffic Stop” Adams also claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to bar the defendants, their attorneys, and their witnesses from using the term “traffic stop” in describing the events of May 19, 2005. However, he failed to develop this argument on appeal; therefore, he has waived it. Hojnacki v. Klein‐Acosta, 285 F.3d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 2002). F. Order of Sanctions Adams also asks that we vacate the district court’s order that granted the defendants’ motion for sanctions against him for various violations of the local rules. Again, however, he has waived the argument by failing to develop it.