Opinion ID: 1222879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the statute of limitations the relation back of the proposed amendments

Text: Eldridge's primary argument is that the two counts of the amended complaint which are here in question do not relate back and are therefore barred by the statute of limitations because the amended complaint seeks relief entirely different from that demanded in the original complaint and because the two new counts stated additional facts and new theories of law for recovery of tort damages. Thus, Eldridge claims, the amended counts stated entirely new causes of action against him. He argues that an amended complaint cannot relate back if it sets forth a new cause of action, citing Daniel v. City of Tucson, 52 Ariz. 142, 79 P.2d 516 (1938). Daniel does hold that an amendment which contains a new cause of action will not relate back. Unfortunately for Eldridge, however, Daniel was decided before the adoption of our present Rules of Civil Procedure. The present test for application of the doctrine of relation back is set forth in Rule 15(c), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., which provides that: Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.... [Emphasis added.] Our Court of Appeals previously commented on the meaning and philosophy of Rule 15(c) in the following words: As long as the original complaint provides defendant with adequate notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence upon which plaintiff bases his claim . .., it is reasonable to assume that defendant has knowledge of any claim plaintiff might assert in any capacity arising out of the event in dispute.... Watts v. State, 115 Ariz. 545, 549, 566 P.2d 693, 697 (App. 1977) (quoting 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1501, at 526-27). Further comments appropriate to the problem presented here are contained in Wright & Miller: An approach that better reflects the liberal policy of Rule 15(c) is to determine whether the adverse party, viewed as a reasonably prudent man, ought to have been able to anticipate or should have expected that the character of the originally pleaded claim might be altered or that other aspects of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading might be called into question.       The judicial insistence on notice does not mean that the courts will bar relation back simply because the amended pleading deviates markedly from the original.... The fact that an amendment changes the legal theory on which the action initially was brought is of no consequence if the factual situation upon which the action depends remains the same and has been brought to defendant's attention by the original pleading. Thus, an amendment may set forth a different statute as the basis of the claim, or change a common law claim to a statutory claim or vice versa, or shift from a contract theory to a tort theory, or delete a negligence count and add or substitute a claim based on warranty, or change an allegation of negligence in manufacture to continuing negligence in advertising. Indeed, an amendment that states an entirely new claim for relief will relate back as long as it satisfies the test embodied in the first sentence of Rule 15(c). 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1497 at 499-502 (1971) (emphasis added). These principles have been recognized in Arizona in cases other than Watts v. State, supra. For instance, in Neeriemer v. Superior Court, 13 Ariz. App. 460, 463-64, 477 P.2d 746, 749-50 (1970), the Court of Appeals held that an amendment asserting a claim against a physician for battery would relate back to the time of filing the original complaint which had contained only a count alleging professional negligence. Accord, Schmidt v. Mel Clayton Ford, 124 Ariz. 65, 68, 601 P.2d 1349, 1352 (App. 1979); Johnson v. Nychyk, 21 Ariz. App. 186, 188, 517 P.2d 1079, 1081 (1974); Green Reservoir Flood Control District v. Willmoth, 15 Ariz. App. 406, 409-10, 489 P.2d 69, 72-73 (1971); Arizona Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. O'Malley Lumber Co., 14 Ariz. App. 486, 484 P.2d 639 (1971). The doctrine of relation back under Rule 15(c) also applies to the situation where the amendment changes a demand for equitable relief to one for legal relief. See 3 Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 15.15(2), at 1030 (1980); 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1497, at 494-95 (1971). The authorities cited above compel the conclusion that plaintiff's amended complaint should not be barred by the statute of limitations merely because it added claims for professional negligence and intentional violation of fiduciary duties and sought damages, where none had been claimed in the original complaint. It is only when the amendment seeks relief with respect to a transaction or event which was not the basis of the original complaint that the doctrine of relation back is considered inapplicable. See Barnes v. Vozack, 113 Ariz. 269, 272, 550 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1976), holding that there was no relation back where the original complaint alleged fraud in the sale of stock to plaintiff and the amended complaint alleged fraud in defendant's application for a registration exemption. Under the test of Rule 15(c), Eldridge was entitled to notice of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences out of which plaintiff's claim arose. Having been given notice of these transactions, [4] Eldridge should have been aware he might face claims for intentional wrong and professional negligence arising out of the described transactions. The fact that plaintiff did not pray for any monetary damages against Eldridge in the original complaint does not prevent the relation back of the amendment nor the grant of relief which was not demanded in the original pleading. See Rule 54(d), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. The liberality of the Federal Rules ... invokes the notice pleading concept which would entitle the plaintiff to all damages flowing from the occurrence out of which the action arose.... Cavanagh v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 370, 371 (W.D.Pa. 1960) (citing 28 U.S.C.A. 54(c), [5] Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Some intimations contrary to the test laid down in this opinion can be found in an Arizona case decided after adoption of the current rules in 1939. In Smith v. Pinner, 68 Ariz. 115, 120, 201 P.2d 741, 744 (1948), this Court held that where an original complaint had asserted a cause of action based on contract, an amended complaint seeking tort damages in addition to the contract damages created a new cause of action which would not relate back to the time of original filing and which was barred by the statute of limitations. The opinion in Smith v. Pinner did not mention Rule 15(c) and was based upon Daniel v. City of Tucson, supra, and Kunselman v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 33 Ariz. 250, 263 P. 939 (1928). Both Daniel and Kunselman were decided before adoption of the present rules. For that reason, and because we are convinced that the liberality of the amendment provisions of the existing rules is much preferable to the technicalities of the old procedure, we disapprove of Smith v. Pinner, supra, and will continue to follow the modern view adopted in our later decisions. The orders striking Count IV of the First Amended Complaint are vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS and CAMERON, JJ., concur.