Opinion ID: 835026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grohs Matter

Text: The Bar alleged that the accused engaged in misrepresentation in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) and RPC 8.4(a)(3) when the accused removed Grohs's signature page from the deed on four parcels, attached it to the deed on three parcels, and then recorded the altered deed. As noted, the trial panel concluded that the accused violated RPC 8.4(a)(3), but did not address DR 1-102(A)(3). The accused seeks review of the trial panel's decision that he violated RPC 8.4(a)(3). On de novo review, we consider whether the accused's conduct violated either rule as alleged. DR 1-102(A)(3) provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to    [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.] RPC 8.4(a)(3) provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to    engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law[.] A lawyer engages in conduct involving misrepresentation when the lawyer makes a representation, either directly or by omission, that the lawyer knows is false and material. In re Davenport , 334 Or 298, 308, 49 P3d 91, adh'd to as modified on recons , 335 Or 67, 57 P3d 897 (2002). A lawyer acts knowingly by being consciously aware of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct, but not having a conscious objective to accomplish a particular result. In re Lawrence , 332 Or 502, 513, 31 P3d 1078 (2001). A misrepresentation is material if it would or could significantly influence the hearer's decision-making process. In re Eadie , 333 Or 42, 53, 36 P3d 468 (2001). The accused does not dispute that, if he knowingly attached the signed and notarized signature page from the deed on four parcels to the deed on three parcels and sent it for recording, that such representation was false and material. Neither does the accused dispute that such misrepresentation would reflect adversely on his fitness to practice law. Rather, the accused's sole contentions are that the Bar failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that he acted (1) through direct, personal conduct, or (2) with a knowing state of mind. First, the accused contends that there is no evidence -- and certainly not clear and convincing evidence -- of direct, personal conduct. (Original capitalization omitted.) The trial panel concluded that the accused acquiesced [in] the removal of the notarized signature page from one deed and had it placed on a second deed. According to the accused, that conclusion is contradicted by the trial panel's either/or finding that the Accused or someone in his office  (emphasis added) removed the signature page from the deed on four parcels and affixed it to the deed on three parcels. The accused thus contends that the trial panel's either/or finding of fact cannot support a conclusion by clear and convincing evidence that there was any personal misconduct by the accused. Second, the accused contends that there is no clear and convincing evidence that the accused acted with the requisite mens rea of knowledge. The accused argues that [a]ll the evidence points to a mistake by [the accused]'s office in the filing[.] The Bar disagrees and contends that the accused acted both personally and with the requisite knowledge. The Bar relies principally on the accused's letter in response to the Bar and his deposition testimony, in which the accused was clear and unequivocal that he personally made the substitution after consulting with Grohs. According to the Bar, although the accused later changed his story and claimed that he had no idea how the signature page on the deed on four parcels became attached to the deed on three parcels, the trial panel considered the disparate versions provided by the accused and rejected the new version. The question of what the accused actually knew thus hinges on whether this court believes the accused's letter in response to the Bar and deposition testimony under oath, or his later equivocations and retractions. This court gives weight to the trial panel's express credibility assessments. In re Gustafson , 333 Or 468, 470, 41 P3d 1063 (2002). More specifically, [w]hen a panel's assessment is based on the objective factors involving the intrinsic believability of competing inferences or evidence -- e.g. , the inherent improbability of certain testimony, the existence of corroboration, and so on -- this court owes no deference to that assessment, but the panel's discussion may be enlightening and have persuasive force. When the panel's assessment is based on subjective observations of a witness's demeanor and the manner in which the witness testifies, the trial panel explicitly should state that its findings are demeanor-based, because this court appropriately defers to the trial panel's superior position to assess credibility on that basis. In re Fitzhenry , 343 Or 86, 103 n 13, 162 P3d 260 (2007). The trial panel in this case found that the accused's trial testimony varied from his letter of explanation to the Bar and from what was contained in his deposition. The trial panel also found that Grohs was credible in all her testimony and expressly concluded that, where her testimony differed from that of the accused, Grohs was to be believed. The trial panel did not, however, make other express demeanor-based findings. In contrast to the version of events given by the accused in his letter to the Bar and deposition testimony, Grohs testified at the hearing that she never had a conversation with the accused about attaching her signature from the deed on four parcels to the deed on three parcels. The trial panel found that testimony to be credible, but made no demeanor-based findings. Accordingly, we owe no deference to that assessment. Fitzhenry , 343 Or at 103 n 13. However, Grohs's testimony is corroborated by the accused's billing records and documentation, which do not support that she had such a conversation with the accused. We thus find the panel's credibility finding, based on those objective factors, to have persuasive force. Id. The accused's previous claim in his letter to the Bar and his deposition testimony that he had permission from Grohs to affix the signature page from the deed on four parcels to the deed on three parcels is not credible. (11) However, that finding undermines only the accused's original proffered reason for attaching the signature page from the deed on four parcels to the deed on three parcels, not his concession that he knew about the signature page switch. As noted, in his letter to the Bar, the accused represented that he sought and received Grohs's permission to use the deed she signed previously and substitute the legal description of [the deed on three parcels] in place of the legal description for [the deed on four parcels]. That representation to the Bar establishes the accused's knowledge of the signature page switch, whether he or someone in his office personally switched the pages. When the accused later testified before the trial panel that he did not know how the signature page became affixed, his only proffered explanation for the discrepancy in his version of events was that he had no recollection of switching the pages, but merely had speculated that he discussed saving Grohs a trip to the notary, because he would not ever do anything like that without her agreement. Given that the accused immediately admitted in his letter to the Bar that he was consciously aware of the circumstances surrounding the signature page switch to the Bar, we find that he had the requisite knowledge that the notarized signature page from the deed on four parcels was removed and affixed to the deed on three parcels. Accordingly, the Bar established by clear and convincing evidence that the accused acted with knowledge. Thus, the trial panel correctly concluded that the accused violated RPC 8.4(a)(3). The Bar also proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3).