Opinion ID: 3032851
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards. The Board may summarily dismiss

Text: any appeal or portion of any appeal in any case in which: SINGH v. GONZALES 8809 (A) The party concerned fails to specify the reasons for the appeal on Form EOIR-26 or Form EOIR-29 (Notices of Appeal) or other document filed therewith; [or] ... (D) The party concerned indicates on Form EOIR- 26 or Form EOIR-29 that he or she will file a brief or statement in support of the appeal and, thereafter, does not file such brief or statement, or reasonably explain his or her failure to do so, within the time set for filing. . . . 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(A), (D) (2001). The BIA referenced both provisions — subpart (A) and subpart (D) — in support of its order summarily dismissing Singh’s appeal. Prior to an amendment, effective January 13, 1994, BIA regulations did not contain a “briefing sanction” providing that an appeal can be summarily dismissed if the petitioner indicates an intent to file a brief and then fails to do so. However, BIA regulations have long contained a “specificity sanction,” providing for summary dismissal where the party fails to specify the grounds for appeal on the Notice of Appeal form or in a separate document. See Matter of Holguin, 13 I & N Dec. 423, 425-26 (BIA 1969). Singh concedes that his reasons for appeal were not specific and that no brief was filed as promised by his former counsel. He argues, however, that both the specificity and briefing sanctions provided for in BIA regulations operated to deprive him of due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Singh’s argument is not a novel one. Our court has grappled with the BIA’s summary dismissal procedures for nearly 8810 SINGH v. GONZALES a quarter-century. Thus, a brief examination of our prior cases analyzing these procedures is useful.
In Matter of Valencia, the BIA outlined the specificity required to avoid summary dismissal: It is . . . insufficient to merely assert that the immigration judge improperly found that deportability had been established or denied. . . . Where eligibility for discretionary relief is at issue, it should be stated whether the error relates to grounds of statutory eligibility or to the exercise of discretion. Furthermore, it should be clear whether the alleged impropriety in the decision lies with the immigration judge’s inter- pretation of the facts or his application of legal standards. Where a question of law is presented, supporting authority should be included, and where the dispute is on the facts, there should be a discussion of the particular details contested. 19 I. & N. Dec. 354, 355 (BIA 1986). “The purpose of the BIA’s strict specificity requirement is to ensure that the BIA is adequately apprised of the issues on appeal so that the BIA is not left to ‘search through the record and speculate on what possible errors the [petitioner] claims.’ ” Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Matter of Valencia, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 355) (alteration in original). “If the BIA was forced to decipher general statements of error, unsupported by specific factual or legal references, the BIA would have to spend time and resources reconstructing the proceedings before the IJ and building the petitioner’s legal case, in some instances only to conclude that the appeal was utterly without merit.” Id. at 820 (citation omitted). On the other hand, “when the BIA receives ample specific advice about the reasons for an appeal, the SINGH v. GONZALES 8811 BIA can deal promptly with appeals and focus resources on nonfrivolous appeals to reach a correct resolution.” Id. We have, on several occasions, commented on the importance of the specificity requirement and the extent of specificity required. See, e.g., id. at 819-20; Casas-Chavez v. INS, 300 F.3d 1088, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2002); Toquero v. INS, 956 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1992); Escobar-Ramos v. INS, 927 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1991); Martinez-Zelaya v. INS, 841 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1988); Reyes-Mendoza v. INS, 774 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Athehortua-Vanegas v. INS, 876 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1989); Medrano-Villatoro v. INS, 866 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1989); Bonne-Annee v. INS, 810 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1987); Townsend v. INS, 799 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1986). In Reyes-Mendoza we approved the BIA’s strict interpretation, reasoning that the Notice of Appeal form must “inform the BIA of what aspects of the IJ’s decision were allegedly incorrect and why.” 774 F.2d at 1364-65 (concluding summary dismissal was appropriate because a six-word statement on the Notice of Appeal form inadequately informed the BIA of the grounds for appeal). See also Martinez-Zelaya, 841 F.2d at 296. In Toquero we confirmed this approval, finding a description insufficient, and summary dismissal appropriate, where it merely contained “generalized and conclusory statement[s] about the proceedings before the IJ” and failed to specify “the particular details contested.” 956 F.2d at 195 (citations omitted); accord Townsend, 799 F.2d at 182. In Escobar-Ramos we similarly observed that “summary dismissal by the BIA is appropriate if an alien submits no separate written brief or statement to the BIA and inadequately informs the BIA of what aspects of the IJ’s decision were allegedly incorrect and why.” 927 F.2d at 484 (quoting Martinez-Zelaya, 841 F.2d at 296). Yet, even in the context of approving the BIA’s summary dismissal policy in Toquero and Escobar-Ramos, we expressed some discomfort with the potential inadequacy of 8812 SINGH v. GONZALES the warnings contained on the BIA’s Notice of Appeal form. For example, in Toquero we stated: [W]e believe the instructions on the Notice of Appeal are less than clear. For example . . . . [t]he instructions do not set out . . . the specificity standard used by the BIA in deciding to summarily dis- miss an appeal . . . . In fact the form suggests that the alien need not go into much detail by providing only a three-inch space on which to state his claim of error. Moreover, the instructions indicate that the party is not required to file a brief, yet the BIA has developed the practice of considering the written brief in conjunction with the Notice of Appeal in determining whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 956 F.2d at 197 (citation omitted). Likewise, in EscobarRamos we observed that the BIA’s Notice of Appeal form contains the potential for misleading the unwary. It requires the appellant to “Briefly state reasons for this appeal.” . . . The instructions on the reverse side of the form provide that “The Board may deny oral argument and summarily dismiss any appeal in any deportation proceeding in which . . . the party concerned fails to specify the reasons for his/her appeal on the reverse side of the form.” Appellants are informed that “a brief in support of or in opposition to an appeal is not required.” The form then supplies less than three inches of space to provide these reasons for the appeal and does not invite the use of an additional piece of paper. 927 F.2d at 484. Noting the strict specificity requirements outlined by the BIA in Matter of Valencia, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 355, we found “no indication on the face of [the BIA’s Notice of Appeal form] or in the instructions on the reverse SINGH v. GONZALES 8813 side as to the need for this level of specificity.” EscobarRamos, 927 F.2d at 484. However, neither case turned on the “clarity of the [Notice of Appeal form] instructions” alone, but instead depended upon “an inquiry into the actions taken by Petitioner’s counsel.” Toquero, 956 F.2d at 196-97. In Escobar-Ramos this inquiry revealed extraordinary circumstances — namely, the agency’s delay in tendering transcripts, combined with the collapsed roof and flooding of counsel’s law office — sufficient to excuse counsel’s failure to file a brief with the BIA or to request an extension of time. 927 F.2d at 484-85. On the contrary, in Toquero nothing approaching the “extraordinary” was offered. 956 F.2d at 196. See also Escobar-Ramos, 927 F.2d at 486 (noting that in those cases where we upheld the BIA’s summary dismissal “no explanation was offered for the failure to file briefs with the BIA”). Instead, counsel for the petitioner indicated an intention, on the Notice of Appeal form, to file a supporting brief, and he quite simply “failed to follow through with this intention.” Toquero, 956 F.2d at 196. When presented with these facts, we held that counsel had a responsibility to at least file a brief stating why the Notice was adequate, or explaining the reasons for appeal. When counsel for Petitioner did not submit a brief as promised, and then did not respond to the government’s brief, the BIA could reasonably assume that Petitioner had either abandoned his appeal or could not explain the deficiency. Petitioner and his counsel were on notice that the BIA would exercise its power to summarily dismiss the appeal. Thus, counsel’s failure to act justified the BIA’s actions, and weakens any contention that the procedures used in this case violated due process. Id. at 196-97. In Padilla-Agustin, however, our concerns, heretofore merely hypothetical, became concrete, and we had occasion 8814 SINGH v. GONZALES to give teeth to our prior grumblings. 21 F.3d at 977 (“This case is the one described in Toquero: it turns on the ‘clarity of the instructions’ alone.”). In that case the petitioner, Padilla, a 51-year-old native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection and was subsequently ordered to show cause why he should not be deported under former Section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Proceeding pro se and speaking no English, Padilla conceded his deportability, designated Guatemala as the country for his deportation, and applied for asylum, withholding of deportation and voluntary departure. The IJ denied his claims in toto. Id. at 972. Still representing himself, Padilla filed a Notice of Appeal using form EOIR-26; he neither attached a supporting brief nor checked the box on the Notice of Appeal form indicating an intent to do so at a later date. Instead, on the form, he specified the grounds for appeal as follows: “I request my Political Asylum request be accepted because I fled my country in order to save myself because the Political situation I was persecuted. Now if I return I’ll be—mistreated or killed I need the chance to stay in this country until the situation change in my country.” Id. The BIA summarily dismissed Padilla’s appeal, reasoning that Padilla “in no meaningful way identified the basis for the appeal . . . [and] failed to specify any respect in which the immigration judge’s decision [was] incorrect.” Id. (alterna- tions in original). [2] We granted Padilla’s petition for review, concluding that Padilla “did not receive adequate notice of the potential for summary dismissal of his appeal.” Id. at 974. Recalling our prior warnings in Toquero and Escobar-Ramos, we again decried the fact that the form utilized by the BIA enjoined the immigrant to brevity without providing sufficient notice to the unschooled observer of the possibility of dismissal. We stated, “[p]articularly when the alien is representing himself and has language difficulties, as is so often the case and is the case here, a high degree of clarity should be a part of the process accorded.” Id. at 976 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we SINGH v. GONZALES 8815 held that “the concatenation of EOIR-26, the BIA’s strict Notice of Appeal requirements, and the failure to give any advance warning before an appeal is dismissed, can result in a violation of the due process rights of the alien” and “[i]t did so here.” Id. at 977 (emphasis added). We have on other occasions held that the BIA’s strict specificity requirement, when combined with BIA regulations permitting summary dismissal without notice, can operate to violate an alien’s due process rights. Each case involved special circumstances, not present in the instant case, which suggested that a “high degree of clarity” was required. CastilloManzanarez v. INS, 65 F.3d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving a petitioner with language difficulties). See also VargasGarcia v. INS, 287 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving a pro se petitioner). However, in Singh’s case, the BIA did not rely solely on the specificity sanction. Rather, the BIA’s decision summarily dismissing Singh’s appeal relied primarily on Singh’s failure to file a brief after indicating an intent to do so. See In re Sarbjit Singh, A77 827 217, at 1-2 (BIA, March 18, 2002) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D) (2001), and stating, “To date, the respondent has not submitted a brief or offered an explanation for the failure to do so.”).
[3] We have never considered whether the BIA’s summary dismissal procedures violate due process in light of the amended regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D) (2001), that specifically permits the BIA to dismiss an appeal summarily when a petitioner fails to timely file a brief after indicating an intent to do so. See Rojas-Garcia, 339 F.3d at 821; CasasChavez, 300 F.3d at 1090 n.2; Castillo-Manzanarez, 65 F.3d at 796 n.3. [4] We observe, however, that the same potential for confusion that continues to plague dismissal for lack of specificity 8816 SINGH v. GONZALES does not necessarily exist in this context. In each case where we have either bemoaned the potential for confusion or found a due process violation, the ambiguity stemmed from the BIA’s strict specificity requirement, the extent of which was not adequately represented on the face of the BIA’s Notice of Appeal forms. See, e.g., Vargas-Garcia, 287 F.3d at 885 (observing that “EOIR-26 still fails to tell the alien, especially a pro se alien . . . that what is really required is what amounts to a true legal brief complete with reference to authorities— statutes, regulations, cases, etc.”); Castillo-Manzanarez, 65 F.3d at 796 (stressing the importance of clear instructions); Padilla-Agustin, 21 F.3d at 976 (emphasizing that “[p]articularly when the alien is representing himself and has language difficulties, as is so often the case and is the case here, a high degree of clarity should be a part of the process accorded”) (emphasis in original); Toquero, 956 F.2d at 197 (observing that “[t]he instructions do not set out . . . the specificity standard used by the BIA in deciding to summarily dismiss an appeal . . . . [rather] the form suggests that the alien need not go into much detail by providing only a three-inch space on which to state his claim of error”); Escobar-Ramos, 927 F.2d at 484 (finding “no indication on the face of [the BIA’s Notice of Appeal form] or in the instructions on the reverse side as to the need for this level of specificity”). On the contrary, the amended regulation merely permits the BIA to summarily dismiss an appeal if a brief is promised and later not filed. The Notice of Appeal form quite plainly instructs: “Your appeal may be summarily dismissed if you indicate . . . that you will file a separate written brief . . . and . . . you fail to file the brief . . . and do not reasonably explain such failure.” [5] On the facts of this case, we conclude that neither the briefing, nor the specificity sanctions operated to deprive Singh of due process.