Opinion ID: 4123371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial‐Misconduct Claim

Text: Delatorre first argues that the prosecutor committed mis‐ conduct when he reneged on his promise to provide a plea agreement. But Delatorre did not raise this claim in the dis‐ trict court at trial or on his direct appeal. Instead, he raised this claim for the first time on collateral review in his § 2255 motion. Any claim that could have been raised originally in the trial court and then on direct appeal that is raised for the first time on collateral review is procedurally defaulted. Hale v. United States, 710 F.3d 711, 713–14 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a claim that was not raised in the trial court or on direct appeal was “doubly defaulted” on collateral review). Thus, Delatorre’s prosecutorial‐misconduct claim is procedurally defaulted.2 2 The district court did not consider procedural default, and it is unclear from the record whether the government ever made this argument be‐ fore this appeal. As we noted in Doe v. United States, the government’s failure to raise a procedural‐default argument in the district court might (continued…) No. 15‐1632 7 Procedurally defaulted constitutional claims are not con‐ sidered on collateral review unless the petitioner shows ei‐ ther (1) actual innocence or (2) cause and prejudice. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). Delatorre makes no argument for actual innocence. We therefore restrict our analysis to the cause‐and‐prejudice standard. See McCoy v. United States, 815 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2016). To excuse a procedural default for cause and prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate both (1) good cause for his failure to raise the defaulted claim before collateral review and (2) actual preju‐ dice stemming from the violations alleged in the defaulted claim. Theodorou v. United States, 887 F.2d 1336, 1340 (7th Cir. 1989). To establish “cause,” Delatorre argues that he was una‐ ware during his trial and on direct appeal that the govern‐ ment’s failure to offer a plea agreement, as allegedly prom‐ ised, amounted to a constitutional violation. He does not ar‐ gue, however, that he was unaware of any of the facts giving rise to that potential claim. In fact, he knew before his trial (…continued) result in a waiver of that argument. 51 F.3d 693, 698–99 (7th Cir. 1995). We need not consider that issue here, however, because Delatorre never argued that the government waived its procedural‐default argument. Id. at 699. In fact, like the defendant in Doe, Delatorre “devote[d] a signifi‐ cant portion of the reply brief establishing ‘cause’ for the default.” Id. We think that “[i]t is apparent, then, that [Delatorre] has conceded the gov‐ ernment’s assertion of procedural default (or, at the risk of being tedious, waived any argument that the government waived its defense of waiv‐ er).” Id. It also doesn’t matter that the district court did not consider pro‐ cedural default: “We may affirm on any basis fairly presented in the rec‐ ord.” Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 2016). 8 No. 15‐1632 even began that the government allegedly promised him a plea agreement and that he was never presented with that plea agreement: he was thus aware of all of the facts giving rise to the alleged violation. Nothing occurred after his trial or direct appeal that altered his potential claim. Thus, the proper time to raise that argument was at the district court before he was convicted and then again on direct appeal, not for the first time on collateral review. The fact that Delatorre may have been subjectively unaware of the constitutional ramifications of the government’s inaction is not sufficient “cause” justifying a procedural default. See id. at 1340–41 (holding that a defendant who was aware of all of the facts giving rise to the claimed constitutional violation before sen‐ tencing could not establish “cause” for his procedural de‐ fault). Delatorre also argues that his prosecutorial‐misconduct claim—like most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel— is so inextricably linked to extrinsic evidence that it could not have been properly considered on direct appeal. He ar‐ gues that this also provides “cause” for his procedural de‐ fault. We disagree. Delatorre is correct that “[a] reviewing court on direct appeal is limited to the record of trial and cannot consider any extrinsic evidence.” Galbraith v. United States, 313 F.3d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to prove that his counsel per‐ formed deficiently and that this deficiency caused him prej‐ udice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “The evidence introduced at trial [in the case giving rise to the claim of ineffective assistance], however, will be devoted to issues of guilt or innocence, and the resulting record in No. 15‐1632 9 many cases will not disclose the facts necessary to decide ei‐ ther prong of the Strickland analysis.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003). Thus, claims of ineffective as‐ sistance, by their very nature, are almost “invariably doom[ed]” on direct review because they often require aug‐ mentation of the record with extrinsic evidence, which can‐ not be considered. United States v. Gilliam, 255 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Godwin, 202 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2000)). We thus permit these claims, in most in‐ stances, to be raised for the first time on collateral review. United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Massaro, 538 U.S. 500). Delatorre’s prosecutorial‐misconduct claim, on the other hand, does not, by its very nature, require augmentation of the record. The only reason extrinsic evidence is required to prove his claim is because he failed to raise this claim in the district court in the first place. Had he raised this claim at the proper time—in the district court before he was convicted— his evidence supporting that claim would have been in the trial record and could have been considered on direct ap‐ peal. His prosecutorial‐misconduct claim is not akin to an ineffective‐assistance‐of‐counsel claim in this regard, and we refuse to reward Delatorre for his creation of an evidentiary issue. Because Delatorre has provided no plausible “cause” for his failure to raise his prosecutorial‐misconduct claim before collateral review, we decline to excuse the procedural default and do not address the merits of that claim. 10 No. 15‐1632 B. Ineffective‐Assistance‐of‐Pretrial‐Counsel Claim Delatorre’s ineffective‐assistance‐of‐counsel claim is re‐ lated to his prosecutorial‐misconduct claim. Like with his first claim, he again relies on an alleged promise made by the prosecutor to provide him with a plea agreement that included a maximum recommended sentence of twenty‐five to thirty years. According to Delatorre, his pretrial counsel— Morelli—rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance when he failed to secure that allegedly promised plea agreement. We first briefly note that this claim does not suffer from the same procedural default as the prosecutorial‐misconduct claim even though it, too, was raised for the first time in De‐ latorre’s § 2255 motion. As discussed above, ineffective‐ assistance‐of‐counsel claims, by their very nature, are almost “invariably doom[ed]” on direct review. Gilliam, 255 F.3d at 437 (quoting Godwin, 202 F.3d at 973). Thus, we generally permit a petitioner to raise these claims for the first time on collateral review, “regardless of whether the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal.” Gaylord v. United States, 829 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504). We follow that general rule here and excuse De‐ latorre’s failure to raise this argument on direct appeal. We now turn to the merits of this claim. To succeed on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Delatorre had to demonstrate both el‐ ements of the test announced in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. First, he had to show that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, meaning that it “fell below an ob‐ jective standard of reasonableness” measured “under pre‐ vailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. Second, he had to No. 15‐1632 11 show that he suffered prejudice because of this deficiency, meaning that there was “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceed‐ ing would have been different.” Id. at 694. The district court concluded that Delatorre had failed to establish either ele‐ ment. We agree. We begin our discussion with deficient per‐ formance and then move to prejudice.
Delatorre has failed to establish that Morelli’s representa‐ tion was constitutionally deficient. When analyzing deficient performance, we apply a “‘strong presumption’ that coun‐ sel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasona‐ ble professional assistance.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The cen‐ tral question in this analysis is not whether counsel’s con‐ duct “deviated from best practices or most common cus‐ tom,” but instead, “whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms.’” Sussman v. Jenkins, 636 F.3d 329, 349–50 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105). In other words, a counsel’s representation “need not be perfect, indeed not even very good, to be constitutionally adequate.” McAfee v. Thurmer, 589 F.3d 353, 355–56 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dean v. Young, 777 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1985)). It must merely be reasonably competent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Delatorre is correct that his Sixth Amendment right to ef‐ fective counsel “extends to the plea‐bargaining process.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 144 (2012) (“In today’s criminal justice sys‐ tem … the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the un‐ folding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a de‐ 12 No. 15‐1632 fendant.”). The Supreme Court has held that an attorney who fails to make a meaningful attempt to inform his client of an existing written plea offer, Frye, 566 U.S. at 149, or ad‐ vises his client to reject a highly favorable plea offer “on the grounds [the client] could not be convicted at trial,” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163, has performed deficiently under the Sixth Amendment. Delatorre cannot rely on these cases, however, because he was never formally offered a plea agreement. Instead, Delatorre’s claim of deficient performance cen‐ ters on his attorney’s inability to secure a plea deal that in‐ cluded a maximum recommended sentence of twenty‐five to thirty years. In making this argument, Delatorre again focus‐ es on the prosecutor’s alleged promise to provide him with a plea agreement. True enough, the prosecutor did suggest that, if Delatorre continued to cooperate, the government would then offer him a plea agreement. But even if we as‐ sume that this suggestion was a “promise” of a plea deal, it was explicitly conditioned on Delatorre’s continued coopera‐ tion. Because Delatorre ceased cooperating, the government did not offer him a plea agreement. So the government did not breach any promise. Morelli’s representation was entirely reasonable under the circumstances. Before he began representing Delatorre, Delatorre had already made incriminating statements to Ri‐ vera—who again, was acting as a government informant. Moreover, Delatorre had already confessed to the authorities his involvement in at least three of the murders. Delatorre’s options were thus already “rather limited” by the time Mo‐ relli began representing him. Delatorre v. United States, No. 13 C 1355, 2015 WL 1176820, at  (March 11, 2015). In fact, Mo‐ relli believed that the government had more than enough No. 15‐1632 13 evidence to convince a jury to convict Delatorre of at least some of the crimes for which he was charged. In Morelli’s opinion, the prosecutor was willing to negotiate with Dela‐ torre only because he was one of the first gang members to come forward and speak with the government. In an effort to secure the most favorable plea agreement possible, Morel‐ li therefore instructed his client—on numerous occasions— to cooperate fully with the government. “[T]he successful negotiation of a plea agreement in‐ volves factors beyond the control of counsel, including the cooperation of his client, clearly absent here, as well as the cooperation of the prosecutor, who has no obligation to offer such an agreement.” United States v. Hall, 212 F.3d 1016, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000). Morelli cannot be faulted for Delatorre’s re‐ fusal to cooperate, especially in light of his repeated efforts to encourage his client to do so. Moreover, he cannot be faulted for the government’s decision not to reward an un‐ cooperative defendant with a plea agreement. The govern‐ ment is not required to offer any defendant such an agree‐ ment. Id. Delatorre’s arguments that Morelli’s representation was anything but competent are unavailing. Under the cir‐ cumstances, Morelli’s representation was not constitutionally deficient. In fact, it was quite reasonable.
Even if we believed that Morelli’s representation was constitutionally deficient, we would still reject Delatorre’s ineffective‐assistance‐of‐counsel claim because he also can‐ not establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of Morel‐ li’s representation. To demonstrate prejudice, Delatorre had to show a reasonable probability that “the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent ad‐ 14 No. 15‐1632 vice.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out‐ come.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Because Delatorre’s preju‐ dice argument centers on his attorney’s inability to secure a plea agreement for him, Delatorre had to show—at a mini‐ mum—that the prosecutor would have actually offered him a deal had his attorney been competent. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 147–49 (discussing the prejudice standard in cases where the defendant alleges that he did not receive the benefit of a plea agreement because of his attorney’s deficient performance). He has failed to meet this burden. As discussed above, it was Delatorre’s stubborn refusal to continue cooperating that prevented him from securing a plea deal, not his attorney’s performance. Nothing in the record indicates that the prose‐ cutor would have provided Delatorre, an uncooperative de‐ fendant, with a plea deal had Morelli performed any differ‐ ently. In short, Delatorre did not suffer prejudice from his attorney’s performance.