Opinion ID: 1478438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim for Punitive Damages

Text: It has been said that punitive damages are not favored, but the rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that a jury may assess punitive damages in the proper case. Wanis v. Zwennes, 364 A.2d 1193, 1195 (D.C.1976) (footnotes omitted). The fact that punitive damages are not a favorite of the law, Price v. Griffin, 359 A.2d 582, 589 (D.C.1976), is reflected in the aggravated nature of the defendant's conduct (and, inferentially, state of mind) that must be shown to justify an award. With regard to a claim of assault such as King alleged (and proved) in this case, we have stated: Punitive damages are not allowable in every case of assault and battery. They are allowable only where there is evidence of actual malice, wanton conduct, deliberate violence, or intent to injure. Wanis, 364 A.2d at 1195. We have used similar formulations elsewhere, stating, for example, that [i]n general, punitive damages may be awarded for tortious acts aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or for outrageous conduct ... in willful disregard for another's rights. Robinson v. Sarisky, 535 A.2d 901, 906 (D.C.1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But while the substantive test for punitive damages is a demanding one, we have repeatedly recognized that a plaintiff's request to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury is governed by the normal test for a triable issue of fact: whether there was evidence from which a jury reasonably could find the required malicious intent or willful disregard of another's rights. Id. at 907; Parker v. Stein, 557 A.2d 1319, 1321 n. 5, 1322 (D.C.1989); Mark Keshishian & Sons, Inc. v. Washington Square, Inc., 414 A.2d 834, 842-43 (D.C.1980). See also Central Armature Works, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 520 F.Supp. 283, 293-94 (D.D.C.1980). In answering that question, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party seeking punitive damages, Robinson, 535 A.2d at 907, bearing in mind that [t]he requisite state of mind need not (and usually cannot) be proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. at 906. Viewing the evidence in this case in accordance with these standards, the jury reasonably could have found that Kirlin's automobile sped up and cut directly in front of King's car, coming to an abrupt stop. King changed lanes, passed Kirlin's car, and pulled into the right curb lane where he parked his car and put on his emergency flashers. Kirlin then rear-ended King's parked car. When King tried to get out of his car, Kirlin rushed him and began punching him repeatedly in the head and face while shouting racial slurs and obscenities. [2] Kirlin did this twice, the second time after returning from his car to call the police on his car phone. The eye-witness Cheryl Glickfeld confirmed that Kirlin immediately flung open his door, came out of it and lunged toward Mr. King and hit him as hard as he could, and that Kirlin was very aggressive, very upset and very agitated. She added that Kirlin was just trying to hurt Mr. King as much as he could. And he punched him and then he kept trying to punch him again. If believed by the jury, this evidence would support a reasonable finding that Kirlin harbored an evil motive toward King and engaged in deliberate violence against him. Indeed, a jury could find that Kirlin initiated a second assault without any provocation. This case is thus quite unlike Wanis, supra, relied on by Kirlin, in which the record contained no evidence that the defendant had struck the plaintiff or manifested an intent to injure her. 364 A.2d at 1195. Glickfeld's testimony here, if credited, permitted the conclusion that Kirlin meant to hurt Mr. King as much as he could. [3] We do not doubt that King's testimony was highly impeachable  and was impeached  by evidence, for example, that he had been involved in previous accidents as a taxicab driver for which he sued and claimed injuries similar to those he now asserts. But his testimony, particularly corroborated as it was, cannot be said to have been inherently incredible, Baltimore v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 490 A.2d 642, 644 (D.C.1985), nor did the trial judge so find. For these reasons, we are constrained to reverse the trial judge's refusal to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury.