Opinion ID: 2764051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assault Instructions

Text: Two instructions were given to the jury on the assault: instruction 7 on assault and instruction 8 on reasonable force. These instructions were not patterned instructions from the Missouri Approved Instructions. Instruction 7 provided in relevant part: As to Count III, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that on or about February 5, 2009, in the County of Montgomery, State of Missouri, the defendant attempted to cause physical injury to Phillip Alberternst by striking him, Second, that defendant did not act as a law enforcement officer lawfully using force to make an arrest as submitted in instruction No. 8, Then you will find the defendant guilty under Count III of assault in the third degree. Instruction 8 provided, in relevant part: One of the issues as to count III is whether the use of force by [Defendant] against [Alberternst] was the lawful use of force by a law enforcement officer in making an arrest. In this state, the use of force by a law enforcement officer in making an arrest is lawful in certain situations. 14 … On the issue of use of force by a law enforcement officer as to Count III, you are instructed as follows: If the defendant was a law enforcement officer making or attempting to make a lawful arrest or what he reasonably believed to be a lawful arrest of Phillip Alberternst for the crimes of Endangering the Welfare of a Child and Manufacturing Methamphetamine and used only such force as reasonably appeared to be necessary to effect the arrest or to prevent the escape of Philip Alberternst, then his use of force was lawful. The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entitled to use force as a law enforcement officer. Unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entitled to use force as a law enforcement officer against Phillip Alberternst, you must find the defendant not guilty under Count III. In essence, instruction 7, in paragraph two, required the jury to find two things: (1) whether Deputy Hunt was acting as a law enforcement officer and, if so, (2) whether he was “lawfully using force to make an arrest as submitted in instruction No. 8.” It was error for the jury to be permitted to determine whether Deputy Hunt was a law enforcement officer. Deputy Hunt’s authority was derived from section 195.505, as he was a member of a multidistrict enforcement group, a police unit that has the power of arrest anywhere in the state. This authority was not a fact issue for the jury to decide as it was a legal question answered by statute. 13 13 The State now concedes Deputy Hunt’s legal authority to arrest the suspect. In its brief on appeal, the State said, “[t]here is little question that Mr. Hunt, a deputy sheriff in St. Charles County, and a member of a multi-jurisdictional enforcement group, had (in the general sense) legal authority to arrest Mr. Alberternst.” 15 Instruction 7 misdirected the jury that Deputy Hunt’s authority was an issue for it to decide instead of presenting his authority as a legal conclusion from which it must determine the second inquiry of paragraph two of instruction 7 – whether Deputy Hunt used reasonable force, as defined in instruction 8, to subdue and arrest the suspect. In other words, the question for the jury was not whether Deputy Hunt had authority, but whether he exceeded it. Instruction 8 purported to be a reasonable force instruction but actually repeated the flaws of instruction 7. It presented the same two-step inquiry, requiring the jury to find that Deputy Hunt’s force was lawful if: (1) “[Deputy Hunt] was a law enforcement officer making or attempting to make a lawful arrest or what he reasonably believed to be a lawful arrest,” and (2) that he “used only such force as reasonably appeared to be necessary to effect the arrest.” As with instruction 7, instruction 8 misdirected the jury to determine whether Deputy Hunt was a law enforcement officer. Permitting the jury to make that determination could result in the jury avoiding the issue of whether Deputy Hunt used only such force as he believed reasonably necessary to effect the arrest. A jury given the two-step inquiry outlined in instruction 8 would only reach the question of reasonable force if it first found that Deputy Hunt was a law enforcement officer attempting to make a lawful arrest. But if the jury believed the State’s theory at trial that Deputy Hunt was acting outside his authority, then it would never have considered the question of reasonable force at all. Given that, as a matter of law, Deputy Hunt had authority as a law enforcement officer to make an arrest, instruction 8 misled 16 the jury because it allowed it to avoid an essential element of Deputy Hunt’s assault conviction – whether he exceeded reasonable force. Instruction 8 should have conformed to the law in section 563.046.1 that a law enforcement officer is “justified in the use of such physical force as he reasonably believes is immediately necessary to effect the arrest or to prevent the escape from custody.” It did not do so and was a misstatement of the substantive law that governs the circumstances of the assault charge against Deputy Hunt. In instruction 8, the jury was asked to consider whether Deputy Hunt was “making or attempting to make a lawful arrest or what he reasonably believed to be a lawful arrest.” The lawfulness of the arrest was dependent on the lawfulness of the forced entry into the residence because if Deputy Hunt unlawfully entered, his very presence in the residence was illegal and so was the arrest. The problem is all the more evident given that the State has admitted that the burglary instructions were erroneous precisely because Instruction 5 did not define “enter unlawfully,” a legal term on which the jury needed guidance. The very same conclusion applies to the use of the legal term “lawful arrest” in instruction 8. The jury was not instructed as to what specific conduct of Deputy Hunt’s would make the entry or arrest lawful or unlawful and was left instead to answer an abstract legal question by roaming freely through the evidence. There is a further problem with the assault instructions. Instruction 5 for firstdegree burglary contained an erroneous definition of the predicate offense of assault. Instruction 5 defined assault as follows: 17 The crime of “assault” occurs when a person knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to cause[] physical injury to another person, or purposely places another person in apprehension of immediate physical injury, or knowingly causes physical contact with another person knowing the other person will regard the contact as offensive or provocative. This was a garden-variety definition of assault without any reference to Deputy Hunt’s position as a law enforcement officer, reasonable force, or instruction 8. As a result, the jury was given two different definitions for the same assault. In summary, instructions 7 and 8 misled the jury in requiring it to make a finding on a legal issue – that Deputy Hunt was a law enforcement officer. Instruction 8 failed to inform the jury that a law enforcement officer is justified in using such physical force as the officer reasonably believes is immediately necessary to effect the arrest. Instruction 8 further failed to instruct the jury that it could convict Deputy Hunt only if he exceeded that force permitted by law – an essential element when a police officer is charged with assault in the line of duty. The instructions were plainly erroneous because it is clear that the trial court misdirected and failed to adequately instruct the jury on assault. Because the jury convicted Deputy Hunt without being required to find all the essential elements of the offense, the errors affected the verdict and manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted. The conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial.