Opinion ID: 1170899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Denial of Doyle's Motion for a Continuance

Text: On September 11, 1986, four days prior to Doyle's third trial, the State moved to amend the information and add the name of Albert Farrar, an informant incarcerated with Doyle. It is undisputed that the State had been aware of the testimony that Farrar would give since early August. The trial court heard and granted the State's motion on September 12. At that time, Doyle moved for a continuance in order to obtain evidence with which to impeach Farrar. The trial court denied Doyle's motion, but ordered the State to provide Doyle with any information it possessed regarding Farrar. Farrar was not called as a witness until September 17th  the third day of trial. Doyle maintains that the trial court in refusing to grant a continuance in the face of the State's last minute disclosure of its witness denied him assistance of counsel. We disagree. It is well settled that [t]he granting of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the [trial] court. Dixon v. State, 94 Nev. 662, 664, 584 P.2d 693, 694 (1978) (citations omitted). Absent the showing of a clear abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial court will not be disturbed. Walker v. State, 89 Nev. 281, 510 P.2d 1365 (1973). In Walker we addressed a similar situation. There, defense counsel learned on a Friday that the State intended to call a rebuttal witness the following Monday. The defense sought a continuance in order to obtain impeachment witnesses; however, the trial court denied the request. In considering whether the trial court had abused its discretion, we noted: It has been held that it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance where the testimony sought is to be used for impeachment purposes. Id. at 284, 510 P.2d at 1367 (citing State v. Cotton, 103 Ariz. 408, 443 P.2d 404 (1968)). After indicating that the defense had a full weekend to find impeachment evidence, we held that the trial court had not abused its discretion. Id. In the instant case, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to amend the information and add the name of Farrar three days prior to trial. The trial court ordered the State to produce all information that the State possessed regarding Farrar, and the State did not call Farrar as a witness until the third day of trial. Moreover, Doyle had the benefit of a courtappointed investigator. Under these circumstances, we cannot say as a matter of law that six days was an inadequate time in which to gather evidence to impeach the witness. Our review of the trial record does not establish that the court's ruling denied Doyle assistance of counsel. The defense on cross-examination brought out Farrar's prior convictions, his history of being an informer in both the California prison system and in Nevada, as well as his reputation of being a disciplinary problem at the Clark County Detention Center. The defense inquired into the circumstances surrounding Farrar's contacts with Doyle and with the prosecutor's office. The defense also questioned Farrar about past instances where Farrar had lied to authorities and about a report that characterized Farrar as approaching the development of a sociopathic personality, having a limited ego development, and being motivated solely by his own needs and desires. Still, while we conclude that the trial court, in refusing to grant a continuance, neither abused its discretion nor denied Doyle assistance of counsel, we do not condone the prosecution's failure to reveal its witness until shortly before trial. Prosecutor Harmon had known of Farrar since early August; yet, he did not disclose the witness until September 11. During oral argument Mr. Harmon attempted to justify his non-disclosure by stating that Farrar, fearing for his safety while at the Clark County Detention Center, had conditioned his testimony for the State upon his California parole being reinstated. When questioned whether he could have relocated Farrar to another detention facility, thus ensuring Farrar's safety, Mr. Harmon admitted that relocation would have been possible, but claimed that budgetary considerations influenced his decision against it. It is the prosecutor's duty to promptly disclose the names and addresses of his witnesses. Owens v. State, 96 Nev. 880, 882, 620 P.2d 1236, 1238 (1980) (citing NRS 173.045(2)). While Mr. Harmon argued that Farrar was not a prosecution witness until the terms upon which he had conditioned his cooperation had been satisfied, [1] we believe that Mr. Harmon should have informed the defense of Farrar's potential testimony upon learning of it. If fulfilling his obligation to the defense, while at the same time ensuring Farrar's safety, required Mr. Harmon to relocate Farrar at additional expense, the State should have incurred the costs. Budgetary considerations, while always a factor in criminal prosecutions, are not a sufficient justification for denying an accused the opportunity to gather evidence in order to confront witnesses against him.