Opinion ID: 513936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Claim Under the Treaty of Fort Stanwix

Text: 78 Appellants contend that the Treaty of Fort Stanwix prohibited New York's purchases of Oneida land without the consent of the Confederal Congress. Before turning to the specifics of this contention, we note that it encounters the general objection, set forth above, that the national government lacked the power to impose such a limitation on New York's right to purchase Indian land within its borders. We acknowledge, however, that there is a plausible basis for recognizing power in the Confederal Congress to prohibit those state purchases that would imperil peace with the Indians, and to some extent appellants contend that the challenged New York purchases posed at least a threat to the peace secured by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Even this aspect of the claim encounters a serious objection. To whatever extent Congress's power on matters of war and peace with the Indians included authority to bar state purchases that imperiled peace with the Indians, we have the same concern about adjudicating challenges to the exercise of that power in a treaty as we previously expressed with respect to challenges to the exercise of inherent power arising from external sovereignty: At least in the absence of a statute authorizing federal court adjudication, it would have been up to Congress, not the judiciary, to determine that a particular state purchase posed a sufficient threat to peace to warrant invalidation. It is arguable, however, and perhaps this is appellants' point, that in authorizing and approving the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Congress itself was making the determination that state purchases of Oneida lands would imperil peace with the Indians and for that reason would be prohibited in the absence of the consent of Congress. We will assume that Congress had the power to make such a determination and to implement it with such a prohibition, thereby removing from judicial scrutiny the issue of whether state purchases would imperil the peace. Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court that the treaty does not contain the prohibition for which the appellants contend. 11 79 The textual basis for appellants' claim is Article II, which provides in its entirety: 80 The Oneida and Tuscarora Nations shall be secured in the possession of the lands on which they are settled. 81 Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15 (1846) (Treaty at Fort Stanwix). Manifestly this provision does not say in terms that the Oneidas may not sell their lands to New York without the consent of Congress. Despite the absence of any explicit language to that effect, the appellants' contend that the Treaty should be construed to contain such a limitation. They rely on cases holding that Indian treaties are to be broadly construed in favor of the Indians. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 3069, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-200, 95 S.Ct. 944, 948, 43 L.Ed.2d 129 (1975). We will construe the Treaty with this principle in mind, examining the context in which the provision at issue appears and what can be gleaned concerning its contemporaneous understanding at the time of the negotiations. 82 Before turning to that task, we note three considerations that weigh heavily against the interpretation urged by the appellants. First, to read into the Treaty a general prohibition against land sales to states without approval of Congress would endow the Confederal Congress with authority to override the Legislative Rights Proviso of Article IX(4) by treaty. Under the Constitution, the treaty power cannot override constitutional limitations respecting individual rights, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1230, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957) (plurality opinion), though the relation of this power to state prerogatives is less certain, see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382, 64 L.Ed. 641 (1920). It is highly doubtful that under the Articles of Confederation the reconciliation of national power and state prerogatives was subject to adjustment in favor of national power simply by the use of national treaties. Second, the rule of generous construction has not been applied to divest a state of land it has acquired. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has cautioned that such a construction is not warranted unless the purpose so to do be shown in the treaty with such certainty as to put it beyond reasonable question. United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 209, 46 S.Ct. 298, 306, 70 L.Ed. 539 (1926). Third, though the construction urged by the Oneidas would now inure to their benefit, it surely would not have been to their benefit at the time of the Treaty if their right to be secured in the possession of their lands carried with it a perpetual limitation on their right to sell portions of their lands. 83 The placement of Article II within the Treaty of Fort Stanwix is instructive. This article is one of four operative provisions of the Treaty, all of which are placed after the following introductory language: 84 The United States of America give peace to the Senecas, Mohawks, Onondagas and Cayugas, and receive them into their protection upon the following conditions: .... 85 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, supra, 7 Stat. at 15. Thus, the context of Article II suggests that the guarantee to the Oneidas to be secured in the possession of their lands protected them against interference by the four hostile Iroquois Nations that had sided with the British, and had nothing to do with limiting lands sales to New York. This understanding of Article II is borne out by the statement of the federal commissioners at the concluding session of the negotiations on October 23, 1784. Speaking first to the four hostile nations, they said, We have buried the hatchet, not only between the United States and you, but also between our friendly Indians the Oneidas, Tuscaroras, Mohickans and Cognewaghas and yourselves. Minutes of the proceedings at Fort Stanwix in 1784, Wayne Manuscripts, Indian Treaties 1778 to 1795, B (Historical Society of Pennsylvania) [hereinafter Wayne MSS] (emphasis added). Then, speaking directly to the Oneidas and the Tuscaroras, the federal commissioners continued: 86 Congress has not forgot your fidelity and attachment. They would not have made war with the hostile tribes, without securing your interest but such a peace is now concluded with them as is perfectly agreeable to you. Now you may embrace the last hostile tribes as your brothers who have come home to you again after a long and anxious absence. 87 Id. (emphasis added). 88 The evolution of the Treaty, from its origins to the authorization for its publication, supports the appellees' view of its meaning. As Commander-in-Chief, George Washington set forth his views as to the nature and purposes of a treaty with the Six Nations in his September 7, 1783, letter to James Duane, the chairman of the committee of Congress appointed to confer with him. Washington urged that a treaty should be negotiated, establishing a boundary line for the lands of the Six Nations. He cautioned that private entrepreneurs should not be permitted to purchase Indian land, but recognized that land sales to government would occur: [T]he Indians ... will ever retreat as our Settlements advance upon them and they will be as ready to sell, as we are to buy. 27 The Writings of George Washington 136 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1938). Then, focusing precisely on the issue that has come to dominate this litigation, he added: 89 No purchase under any pretense whatever should be made by any other authority than that of the Sovereign power, or the Legislature of the State in which such lands may happen to be. 90 Id. at 137 (emphasis added). 91 The following month Congress adopted the report of its Committee for Indian Affairs for the Northern and Middle Districts and appointed commissioners to negotiate with the Six Nations. Significantly, the report included an instruction to the commissioners to reassure the Oneidas and the Tuscaroras 92 that they may rely that the lands which they claim as their inheritance will be reserved for their sole use and benefit until they may think it for their own advantage to dispose of the same. 93 25 JCC 687 (Oct. 15, 1783) (emphasis added). In adopting the report, Congress specifically provided that the authorization for a treaty with the Six Nations shall not be construed to affect the territorial claims of any of the states, or their legislative rights within their respective limits. Id. at 693. 94 The notes of one of the Treaty commissioners, Richard Butler, reflect his understanding, just two days before the Treaty was agreed to, that the commissioners were to assure the Oneidas and Tuscaroras that they may rely on the lands which they claim ... till they think fit to dispose of them. Richard Butler's Notes on the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (Oct. 18, 1784), Richard Butler Papers, 3 Frontier Wars Papers (Series U) 290, Lyman Draper Manuscripts (State Historical Society of Wisconsin). 95 When Congress received the Treaty and ordered it published, it adopted language offered by Melancton Smith, a delegate from New York, declaring that no purchases, which have been or hereafter may be made from the Indians, at any treaties held or to be held with them, of their right to soil within the limits of any state, can, ought, or shall be considered as interfering with the right of any such state to the jurisdiction or soil. 28 JCC 426 (June 3, 1785). 96 There is one aspect of the Treaty negotiations that arguably lends support to the appellants' position, but, understood in context, it is insufficient to overcome the contrary evidence. On two occasions the federal treaty commissioners spoke to the leaders of the Six Nations concerning the exclusivity of federal authority. Appellants view these remarks as conveying to the Indians the understanding that all sales of Indian land would require the approval of Congress. Appellees interpret the remarks as indicating only that the federal commissioners had the exclusive authority to negotiate on matters of peace. The first statement was made on October 12, 1784, at the opening of the treaty negotiations. One of the federal commissioners said: 97 [W]e also tell you that we have full authority to transact all business between the United States, and you, and that without the authority of Congress no business can be valid that may be attempted by particular people or States. 98 II The Olden Time 407 (Craig ed. 1846). On October 12, 1784, the Indians were told not to listen to any overtures made to you by any person or body of men or by any particular State not authorized by Congress. Wayne MSS, supra. A Mohawk chief, Aaron Hill, responded on October 17 in remarks that left the ambiguity unresolved: 99 You directed us not to attend to what any particular state might say to us on public business, for that the commissioners or Congress alone were adequate to the purpose. 100 Id. 101 The unsuccessful efforts of New York to negotiate a peace treaty with the Six Nations earlier in 1784 makes it clear that the references in these remarks are to state negotiations over peace, not purchase of land. In March 1783, the New York legislature had formulated a plan to end hostilities with the Six Nations under an arrangement whereby New York would displace the Senecas, the Onondagas, and the Cayugas from the lands they claimed within New York's borders and then negotiate with the Oneidas to exchange their land for land previously owned by the Senecas. H.S. Manley, The Treaty of Fort Stanwix 28-29 (1932). The legislature instructed its Indian commissioners to negotiate with the Oneidas. New York's plan aroused serious concern in Congress that New York's attempt to negotiate peace with the Six Nations by removing some of the tribes from New York's borders would precipitate hostilities. Undaunted, New York's Governor Clinton in April 1784 invited the Mohawks, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas to a meeting to adjust all differences between them, the Oneidas and the Tuscaroras, and New York. A meeting was set for August at Fort Stanwix. Governor Clinton and the New York Indian commissioners met first with the Oneidas and Tuscaroras, assuring them of their friendship. Then, meeting with the four hostile nations, the New York delegation sought to obtain an outright cession of their lands within New York's borders. This demand was refused, and New York's attempt to consummate a separate peace ended in failure. 102 It was this episode that prompted the remarks of the federal commissioners to the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix later in the fall of 1784. In a letter to the President of the Confederal Congress on October 5, 1784, just two days after the first remarks relied on by the appellants, the federal commissioners, writing from Fort Stanwix, gave this report of what had occurred: 103 Tho we gave due information to the Governor of this State of the time & place of holding the treaty, that if he had any business to transact with the Indians he might do it under the patronage of the U.S. But he chose to hold a treaty with the Six Nations before us, & we are told endeavored to make peace with them in the name of this State.... [W]e thought proper to inform the Indians in our conference, that a treaty with an individual State without the sanction of Congress could be of no validity. 104 Papers of the Continental Congress, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. M-247, roll 69, p. 133 (emphasis added). Aaron Hill, the Mohawk Chief, also had the abortive New York peace treaty efforts in mind when on October 17 he acknowledged the advice of the federal commissioners not to deal with a state on public business: 105 We of the Six Nations are fully sensible of the truth of this and we think that no particular State can have a right to treat separately, but that it belongs only to the United States. In consequence of this when the Governor of New York sent a message to us, to assemble us here in order to treat with that State, we requested that it might be a continental treaty as we perceived that the United States formed one general plan. 106 Wayne MSS, supra. 107 Appellants contend that all of this evidence at least raises a question whether the Indians understood the federal commissioners to be assuring them that approval of Congress was needed not only for state peace treaties but also for state land purchases. Furthermore, they argue, [h]ow the words of the treaty were understood by [the Indians] rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of construction, Worcester v. Georgia, supra, 6 Pet. at 582 (McLean, J., concurring), and that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the Indians, Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576, 28 S.Ct. 207, 211, 52 L.Ed. 340 (1908). We agree with these principles but conclude that they do not support the appellants' contention. What are sought to be construed in favor of the appellants are not ambiguous terms of a treaty but ambiguous statements made in the course of negotiating a treaty. If ambiguities in such remarks always required resolution in favor of alleged understandings on the part of Indians, there would be virtually no limit to how far Indian treaties would be extended. We are satisfied, as was Judge McCurn, that the evidence assembled in the District Court does not show that the Six Nations were told that ordinary land purchases by New York, separate from negotiation of a peace treaty, required approval of Congress. Indeed, one of the clearest indications that the Oneidas had no such understanding is their readiness to make the first of the two sales challenged in this litigation, a sale made without congressional assent just eight months after the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. In any event, we also agree that Article II of the Treaty, securing the Oneidas in the possession of their land, would have to be not merely construed but virtually rewritten to prohibit them from selling their land to New York without the approval of Congress. The Treaty claim was properly rejected.