Opinion ID: 2353188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Application of the limited view

Text: In Hospitality Management, the court aptly summed up the practical application of the Epstein III approach: what this limited review entails is `an examination of procedural due process and nothing more.'    More specifically, we must determine (1) whether there were safeguards in place to guarantee sufficient notice and adequate representation; and (2) whether such safeguards were, in fact, applied. Hospitality Management, 591 S.E.2d at 619. We therefore undertake an analysis of the facts of this case under this two-prong test. In our opinion, the District Court in Curry had adequate safeguards in place to guarantee sufficient notice to all class members. [21] The court ordered that a list of class members be made from Fairbanks' computer databank, checked against the National Change of Address database, and that individual mailings be sent to everyone on the list. The certifying court further ordered that summary notice be published in an apparent effort to reach any class member who did not get an individual mailing. [22] The notices were appropriately drafted and adequately notified class members of the existence of the suit and settlement, the types of claims covered by it, and the right to opt out of the suit, including instructions and deadlines. The court also appointed a settlement administrator to assist in the administration of the settlement. Moreover, after a fairness hearing was conducted, [23] the District Court held that the notice procedure it had ordered had been complied with and that [it] was the best notice practicable under the circumstances and satisfie[d] the requirements of due process and Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c). [24] Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the issue of the propriety of the notice procedures, including defendant's compliance with them, was fully and fairly litigated in the District Court. Significantly, plaintiff has presented no evidence showing any infirmity with the notice procedure either in the mandate itself or in the manner with which it was complied. [25] The plaintiff argues, however, that under Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974), she was entitled to notice individually addressed and mailed to her because she is a class member[] whose name[] and address[] may be ascertained through reasonable effort. However, our review of the Curry judgment is closely cabined, and we are restricted to a search for procedural error only. [26] To respond to the plaintiff's argument, an inquiry well beyond the bounds of the narrow scope of review that we have adopted would be required. Although we recognize that this is a rigid and exacting test, [27] we believe that because of the limited scope of our review, the plaintiff's argument should be addressed to the USDC that rendered the judgment.