Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Withholding of Evidence by the Prosecution

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecution suppressed favorable, material evidence by failing to make available to the defense the following: photographs purportedly taken of defendant's genitals; a tape recording of a conversation between baby Amanda's grandmother, Diane Ellison, and her son Jeff; and a Sheriffs Department report listing photographs taken on August 26, 1988, documenting the search of Virginia MacNair's house. The prosecution has a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause to disclose evidence to a criminal defendant when the evidence is both favorable to the defendant and material on either guilt or punishment. ( In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527, citing United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 674-678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481; see also Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.) Evidence is favorable if it hurts the prosecution or helps the defense. ( In re Sassounian, supra, at p. 544, 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.) Evidence is `material' `only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result ... would have been different.' ( Ibid., quoting United States v. Bagley, supra, at p. 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; accord, Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 433-434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490.) Defendant asserts that in a capital case, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is also violated by the prosecution's suppression of material evidence favorable to the defense. As we shall explain, we discern no infringement of constitutional rights in the three instances cited by defendant.
Defendant contends that the prosecution wrongfully withheld from the defense certain photographs of defendant's genitals. The relevant facts are these: On August 31, 1988, the day defendant was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea, the prosecutor asked the trial court to order that defendant's body be examined by the investigating officer and photographed if anything is revealed as a result of the examination. Deputy Public Defender Charles Khum, who represented defendant at the arraignment, objected to the request. He added, however, that in the event the court does sign this, I would like the court to order that I would be allowed to be present at the time that the search is made or that the viewing is made. The prosecutor voiced no objection to such presence, and the trial court then granted the prosecution's request for a physical examination of defendant. More than three years later, after the jury returned a death penalty verdict, defendant moved for a new trial ( 1181), asserting for the first time that during the physical examination in August 1988, photographs were taken of his genitals but withheld from the defense. In a supporting declaration, Deputy Public Defender Klum stated that, together with medical personnel and members of the defense team, he was present at the Antelope Valley Municipal Court's lockup facility for both the physical examination and the taking of photographs, and that he heard comments by those conducting the physical examination that defendant's penis showed no tearing or injuries. Defendant's own declaration stated that in the course of the August 31, 1988, physical examination, photographs were taken of my genital area. In opposing defendant's motion for a new trial, the prosecution presented a declaration by its investigator, Detective Edwin Milkey, that after a cursory examination of defendant's genitals he determined there was nothing remarkable, and thus no photographs were taken, either on August 31, 1988, or at any later time. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial. It ruled that photographs, if any, taken of defendant's genitals during the August 31, 1988, physical examination would not be material on the issue of defendant's guilt in light of the conclusion of those conducting the examination that there was no tearing or injury to defendant's penis. That conclusion was made in the presence of, and heard by, Deputy Public Defender Charles Klum. The Attorney General points out that because the claimed photographs did not exist, there was nothing to turn over to the defense, noting that there is only defendant's self-serving declaration that the prosecution had such photographs. The Attorney General notes that although the declaration of Deputy Public Defender Klum mentions those who were present for the taking of photographs, it does not state that Klum saw anyone take any photographs. We need not resolve the factual dispute. We agree with the trial court that any photographs taken during the August 31, 1988, physical examination would not qualify under the relevant constitutional standard as material evidence. ( Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. 419, 433-434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490; In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th 535, 543, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.) It is not reasonably probable ( ibid. ), given the evidence of defendant's personal culpability in this case, that the jury would have reached more favorable verdicts on guilt or on penalty had it known that photographs taken six days after the rape and sodomy of 18-month-old Amanda Doshier showed no tearing or bruising on defendant's penis.
Also not material to either guilt or penalty was the tape recording of a conversation between baby Amanda's grandmother, Diane Ellison, and her son Jeff that defendant claims was wrongfully withheld from the defense. Ellison and Dennis Morgan, who defendant claimed was responsible for baby Amanda's injuries, had lived together for a while after Morgan's release from Susanville Prison, but later had a falling-out. During direct examination by the prosecutor, Ellison testified that she had assisted the defense investigators by providing them with Morgan's name and telephone number but had given no information about Morgan to the prosecution. Ellison denied she had ever done some favors for defense investigator Paul Ford. She acknowledged, however, that in a fit of temper she might have told her son Jeff that a defense investigator owed her a favor. After a brief recess in the trial, the prosecutor resumed questioning Ellison. Ellison said that a tape recording the prosecution had played during the recess jogged her memory about the conversation she had with Jeff. The prosecutor then asked, Did you in fact make a statement to your son, Jeff, that you were going to call [defendant's] investigators or investigator because they owed you some favors? Ellison replied, In calming a hysterical child down yes, I did. At one point, the prosecutor asked Ellison if she wanted to hear the tape recording again, so you can tell us what about the tape would make you feel [Jeff] was agitated. Defense counsel objected, asserting that the conversation between Ellison and Jeff had been recorded without their knowledge. The prosecutor responded that he was not asking to play the tape for the jury. Outside the jury's presence, the trial court commented that Ellison appeared hostile toward the prosecution and that therefore the prosecutor's line of questioning was highly probative of Ellison's credibility. This exchange followed: The Court: And of course, the tape will not be played in court, in open court, at this time unless the People ask that be done and after I hear it and determine if it is relevant. But I took that last question by [prosecutor] Mr. Foltz merely as an offer to refresh the witness's recollection outside the presence of the jury. [Defense counsel] Ms. Dell: The reason I misunderstood Mr. Foltz is I believe they played it for the witness about a half an hour ago out of the presence of the jury. Mr. Foltz: Excerpts, I believe she said. [Defense counsel] Mr. Bernstein: I would also indicate that under the Penal Code a tape recording that is not consensual is not admissible for any purpose, impeachment, refreshing recollection, it is illegally obtained unless there is some foundation that this was done by virtue of a court order, wire tap or anything of that sort. The Court: I don't want to sit here and argue the merits of Penal Code section 632. I am sure that's what you are referring to, Mr. Bernstein. But if you are going to make that objection, that hasn't been used yet, I will rule on it. Now, nowhere has it been offered into evidence. The tape recording of the conversation in which Ellison told her son Jeff that a defense investigator owed her favors was not introduced into evidence and was not again mentioned until defendant's new trial motion listed it as evidence that the prosecution had improperly withheld from the defense. Defendant now contends that the tape recording was material evidence favorable to the defense that the prosecution wrongfully withheld. We disagree. We are not persuaded that the information on the tape recording was in any way favorable to the defense. Defendant asks that we Mow People v. Shipp (1963) 59 Cal.2d 845, 850, 31 Cal.Rptr. 457, 382 P.2d 577, in which this court, in concluding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecution's withholding of an investigator's report, did so based on an assumption that the unknown contents of the report would have assisted the defense. We see no reason to assume in this case that the contents of the tape recording would have benefited defendant. Here, defense counsel objected to having the jury hear the tape recording, and counsel did not mention the tape recording or its contents when cross-examining Ellison or later upon calling her as a defense witness. These actions by defense counsel strongly suggest that the tape recording of the conversation between Ellison and her son Jeff was not evidence favorable to the defense.