Opinion ID: 2763468
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Roviaro

Text: Defendant may also have been contending below that discovery regarding the informant may have been helpful for reasons other than a Franks hearing. Suggesting not know whether the name “Frank” was an alias or the suspect’s real name. Id., Vol. 3 pt. 2 at 230. Brice explained that drug dealers often use street names to conceal their identities. See id. at 230‒31. 15 that the informant could support a claim of mistaken identity, he invoked Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62, which requires disclosure of an informant in limited circumstances where the defendant’s need for information to prepare his defense outweighs the government’s need to protect its sources. We review for abuse of discretion a denial of a motion to compel discovery regarding a confidential informant. See United States v. Moralez, 908 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir. 1990). The balance under Roviaro did not favor disclosure in this case. In general, “[d]isclosure of an informant is not required . . . where the informant is not a participant in or a witness to the crime charged.” Moralez, 908 F.2d at 567. And in particular, disclosure is rarely necessary when, as here, the informant’s role was only as a tipster who provided probable cause for a search. See id. at 568. There was no special reason for disclosure here. As the court below stated, “Defendant’s only colorable argument . . . is that there has been a case of mistaken identity which could reduce or eliminate some or all of the charges against him.” R., Vol. 1 pt. 2 at 290. But there is no dispute that Defendant was the person who answered the door at the first location searched and was closely connected to the cocaine powder found there. It is utter speculation—and, worse, irrelevant—that he may not have been the “Black male” mentioned in the affidavit. Because the informant had nothing relevant to say regarding Defendant’s guilt of the charged offense, there was no need to question him. Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1265, 1274‒76 (10th 16 Cir. 2009), in which the informant was “the government’s star witness” at trial, id. at 1267, is misplaced. Moreover, as previously noted, the magistrate judge questioned the informant under oath. He determined that “the confidential informant provided no information that would assist defendant in this case.” R., Vol. 1 pt. 2 at 290. Nothing more was required. As we have said, “[A]n in camera hearing is the appropriate procedural vehicle for determining whether the informant’s testimony would lend significant credence to [the] defense.” Gaines v. Hess, 662 F.2d 1364, 1369 (10th Cir. 1981) (informant had arranged drug sale between defendant and police officer and was present at the sale); see United States v. Martinez, 487 F.2d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cortese, 614 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir. 1980) (denying release to defense attorney of notes of in camera testimony because “disclosure to attorneys is likely to compromise the policy behind the informer privilege”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying any further disclosure regarding the informant.