Opinion ID: 6536625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Decision To Exclude The Testimony Of The Older Daughter's Psychologist Was An Abuse Of Discretion.

Text: John had his older daughter examined by a psychologist in September 2017, just before the hearings in this case, and he offered the psychologist's testimony as a hybrid witness at the October 4 hearing. 6 Upon Andrea's objection, the court excluded the evidence, deciding that the report was driven by the litigation and that it was not an emergency counseling session or otherwise authorized by Andrea. 7 It explained in its written order that it declined to permit John to take advantage of overstepping his legal and medical authority. John argues that the exclusion of the psychologist's testimony was erroneous. We review decisions involving the admission of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. 8 A decision constitutes abuse of discretion if it is 'arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or ... stems from an improper motive.'  9  The court's language makes it clear that the exclusion of the testimony was a sanction, intended to punish John for taking the child to see the psychologist without legal authority. The court found that John had violated the earlier custody order granting Andrea sole legal custody by doing so. It explained that its earlier order had been clear that John had no authority to make medical decisions for the children, and that it was not convinced by John's explanation that Andrea had authorized him to arrange counseling for their older daughter months before he brought her to the psychologist. The record supports the superior court's conclusion that John brought his daughter to the psychologist for litigation purposes rather than emergency care. But even though John did not have the legal authority to bring the child to the psychologist, the reality is that the psychologist nevertheless saw her in a clinical setting and developed an opinion relevant to her best interests by doing so. The court made no apparent inquiry into the potential harm to the fact-finding process that would be caused by precluding the psychologist's testimony. This case was a proceeding to determine the custody and protection of two children. Their best interests were paramount. 10 Having seen her as a patient, the psychologist planned to testify about the older child's mental condition after being beaten. This evidence would certainly have been relevant to the child's best interests. And the superior court recognized this, stating that: I don't know why I should be precluded from hearing testimony from a person who has spoken with this child and ... presum[ably] has some professional opinion. Why am I precluded from hearing that simply because [John] violated my order in obtaining it? Nevertheless it chose to exclude her testimony. This exclusion arguably made it harder for the superior court to address the crucial consideration of the child's best interests. Moreover, the superior court's statement in its final custody order demonstrates that it excluded the psychologist's testimony to punish John for violating its earlier order. As noted above, the court explained in its written order that it had declined to permit John to take advantage of overstepping his legal and medical authority. And while the court engaged in a lengthy dialogue about whether Andrea had granted John authority to take the child to a therapist, its ultimate conclusion focuses mainly on John's violation of its earlier order, not the psychologist's qualifications or the value of her testimony. We conclude that the superior court's exclusion of the psychologist's testimony stemmed from an improper motive. A trial court has the inherent power, as well as the duty, to enforce custody orders. 11 But the way in which the superior court chose to enforce the order in this case potentially undermined its primary concern. By excluding the psychologist's testimony, the superior court subordinated the children's best interests to its own interest in sanctioning John for his violation of the earlier order. We thus hold it was an abuse of discretion to punish John by excluding the psychologist's testimony when its inclusion could have served the best interests of his daughter. Because the psychologist's testimony could have affected the superior court's best interests analysis, we vacate the custody decision. 12 We now turn to John's remaining arguments.