Opinion ID: 1058175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inadmissible Hearsay and Opinions

Text: After the circuit court sustained Smith's objection and refused the introduction of the report required by Code § 37.2-910, the Commonwealth argued that the treatment records Dr. Dennis submitted along with the report should come in as official business records. Smith objected, stating that the treatment records are all hearsay [and] don't come in under the [business records] exception [to the hearsay rule]. The circuit court overruled Smith's objection, citing Commonwealth v. Wynn, 277 Va. 92, 671 S.E.2d 137 (2009), where this Court stated as follows: Code § 37.2-908(C) provides that an expert witness testifying at an SVPA trial may state the basis for his opinions. Similarly, pursuant to Code § 8.01-401.1, an expert witness may rely upon facts, circumstances, or data made known to . . . such witness in formulating an opinion; those facts, circumstances or data . . ., if of a type normally relied upon by others in the particular field of expertise in forming opinions and drawing inferences, need not be admissible in evidence. Id. at 100, 671 S.E.2d at 141 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [2] Furthermore, in McDowell v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 431, 641 S.E.2d 507 (2007), this Court stated as follows: As a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, [this Court has] adopted the modern Shopbook Rule, allowing in given cases the admission into evidence of verified regular entries without requiring proof from the original observers or record keepers. In many cases, . . . practical necessity requires the admission of written factual evidence based on considerations other than the personal knowledge of the recorder, provided there is a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. The trustworthiness or reliability of the records is guaranteed by the regularity of their preparation and the fact that the records are relied upon in the transaction of business by the person or entities for which they are kept and they are kept in the ordinary course of business made contemporaneously with the event by persons having the duty to keep a true record. The final test is whether the documents sought to be introduced are the type of records which are relied upon by those who prepare them or for whom they are prepared. Id. at 434-35, 641 S.E.2d at 509 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The treatment records at issue in this case easily pass these tests. Dr. Dennis, the Commonwealth's expert witness, testified that department policy required the creation of a master treatment plan for everyone in our treatment program, which is updated at least annually. Such plans list the specific areas of risk and treatment needs for the individual and outline[] the goals of that particular element and treatment and [w]hat the program will provide to meet those goals. A record is made of progress that the individual has made since the last master treatment plan and the objective for the treatment plan in that area. Dr. Dennis stated that documents are also maintained entitled Critical Information Report[s] that are marked by the therapist and contain noteworthy information. In addition, treatment notes are kept that must be completed by the therapist within twenty-four hours outlining the nature of the treatment provided. Dr. Dennis testified further that all these records are maintained in the regular and ordinary course of business for all residents. And he stated that similar records were maintained for Smith in this case. Neither in the circuit court nor in this Court has Smith identified the particular matters he considers as inadmissible hearsay, apparently content with a broadside assertion that [i]t is almost entirely hearsay. That is obviously not true, but Smith may find some comfort in the fact that this was a bench trial, and [a] judge, unlike a juror, is uniquely suited by training, experience and judicial discipline to disregard potentially prejudicial comments and to separate, during the mental process of adjudication, the admissible from the inadmissible, even though he has heard both. Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 213, 216, 279 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1981).