Opinion ID: 810466
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Evidence of Reverse Discrimination

Text: Plaintiffs first contend that they offered direct evidence of discrimination proving that they were treated disparately from their minority counterparts. Specifically, Plaintiffs cite to (1) the 2003 Anderson memo; (2) Aaron’s public remarks to The Tennessean; and (3) the comments made by Commander Nash, Deputy Chief Pike, and Metro HR representative Sinor in their meetings with Plaintiffs. Direct evidence “is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2006); Grizzell v. City of Columbus Div. of Police, 461 F.3d 711, 719 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir. 2005)). Direct evidence must prove not only discriminatory animus, but also that the employer actually acted on that animus. See Amini, 440 F.3d at 359. For the following reasons, none of Plaintiffs’ proposed evidence meets this standard. 19 Nos. 10-6102/11-5174 The Anderson memo does not constitute direct evidence because it would require multiple inferences to reach a finding of discrimination. First, the memo is three years removed from the events of this case, and from it we would need to infer that Anderson’s opinions in 2003 motivated his actions in 2005–2006. See, e.g., Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025–26 (6th Cir. 1993) (rejecting statements made about the plaintiff nearly a year prior to his layoff). Additionally, Deputy Anderson was not the decisionmaker in the promotions process. Rather, Serpas was responsible for the disputed promotions, and Deputy Anderson only participated in the process by completing supervisor surveys. See Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Statements by nondecisionmakers cannot suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating animus.” (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted)). Next, Plaintiffs point to several statements allegedly made by MNPD spokesperson Don Aaron to local newspapers in 2006 and 2007. Aaron was quoted as stating, “If you have two candidates that are essentially equal and believe that both would make very good supervisors, and if your choice is to make the department more diverse, you would probably elect to include diversity in your choice.” Aaron was also quoted as saying, “The goal of this police department is to mirror the population of the city to the greatest extent possible . . . . When presented with the opportunity to promote bright, qualified minority candidates, you always give those persons consideration.” The district court disregarded these statements as inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff contends that the district court’s evidentiary ruling was incorrect because Aaron’s comments should have been considered a statement by a party-opponent. See Fed. R. Evid 801(d)(2)(A) (a “party’s own 20 Nos. 10-6102/11-5174 statement in either an individual or a representative capacity” is not hearsay if “offered [against] the party”). We need not consider the district court’s evidentiary ruling, because even if admissible, Aaron’s statements are not direct evidence of discrimination. Aaron’s first statement—answering a hypothetical question about “equally qualified candidates”—requires an inference because the statement did not refer to this employment decision. Nor is Aaron’s second comment direct evidence of discrimination, because it would require us to ignore the equally available inference that the department was simply aware of a lack of minorities within its upper ranks. As we have held, however, statements reflecting a desire to improve diversity do not equate to direct evidence of unlawful discrimination. See Plumb v. Potter, 212 F. App’x 472, 477–78 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] jury could find that [the employer] believed it was good to have more women working at the [company], yet still conclude that [the decisionmaker] did not let that personal belief interfere with her decision whether or not to promote a woman over [the plaintiff].”) Finally, the statements allegedly made by Commander Nash, Deputy Chief Pike, and HR representative Sinor do not constitute evidence of direct discrimination because there is no evidence to show that these individuals were decisionmakers in the promotion process. See Smith, 220 F.3d at 759–60. Plaintiffs’ attempt to raise a cat’s-paw argument about these individuals is also ineffective, because it would require us to draw inferences that are inappropriate under direct 21 Nos. 10-6102/11-5174 discrimination analysis.4 See Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 355 (6th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to produce direct evidence of reverse discrimination. 2. Circumstantial Evidence of Reverse Discrimination Because Plaintiffs cannot prove reverse discrimination by way of direct evidence, they must rely on circumstantial evidence. This Circuit applies a modified version of the McDonnell Douglas framework in reverse discrimination cases. See Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 690 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Claims of reverse employment discrimination brought under the THRA also apply our modified McDonnell Douglas standard. See, e.g., Newman v. FedEx, 266 F.3d 401, 406 (6th Cir. 2001). First, Plaintiffs must present a prima facie case for reverse discrimination showing: (1) that the Defendant “is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority;” (2) that they were qualified for the position in question; (3) that they suffered an adverse employment action when they were not promoted; and (4) that they were treated differently than other similarly situated employees. Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603–04 (6th Cir. 2008). If Plaintiffs make out their prima facie case, the burden shifts to Defendants to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason behind their actions. Id. at 603. Once Defendants meet their burden, Plaintiffs must prove that the stated explanation was a pretext for discrimination. Id. 4 The “rubber-stamp” or “cat’s paw” theory of liability involves a situation where a supervisor is influenced by another individual who was motivated by an impermissible bias. It is more appropriately dealt with in circumstantial evidence review. See Arendale, 519 F.3d at 604. 22 Nos. 10-6102/11-5174
Establishing the first prong of the prima facie case in a reverse discrimination claim requires Plaintiffs to show that Defendants are that “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Id. at 603–04. This requirement is not onerous, and can be met through a variety of means, such as statistical evidence; employment policies demonstrating a history of unlawful racial considerations; evidence that the person responsible for the employment decision was a minority; or general evidence of ongoing racial tension in the workplace. See Treadwell v. Am. Airlines, 447 F. App’x 676, 678 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing cases). Indeed, “the mere fact that a racial minority took an adverse action” against the employee is often sufficient to satisfy the background circumstances requirement. Leavey v. City of Detroit, 467 F. App’x 420, 425 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Arendale, 529 F.3d at 603). Plaintiffs allege that a background of reverse discrimination may be inferred from: (1) the 2003 Anderson memo; (2) the statements made by Commander Nash, Chief Pike, and HR representative Sinor in the meetings Plaintiffs requested after being passed over for promotion; (3) the fact that Serpas was “chief for a political entity” and motivated to “appease the population of Nashville”; and (4) two unrelated discrimination cases brought against Metro. The district court found this evidence insufficient to prove background circumstances, because there was no evidence to conclude that Defendants’ actually unlawfully considered race or gender as factors in the making specific employment decisions. Johnson III, 2010 WL 3342211, at . In so reasoning, the district court went too far. The background circumstances element only requires a plaintiff to “support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who 23 Nos. 10-6102/11-5174 discriminates against the majority;” a plaintiff need not prove that the employer’s actions actually were illegally motivated. Boger v. Wayne Cnty., 950 F.2d 316, 324–25 (6th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). Requiring Plaintiffs to show actual discrimination at this stage conflates the background circumstances element with the remainder of McDonnell Douglas’ burden-shifting approach. See Treadwell, 447 F. App’x at 679 (noting that requiring a plaintiff to produce both “the foreground and background evidence to reach a jury” incorrectly collapses the background circumstances prong into McDonnell Douglas’ other elements). As is required on summary judgment, we must draw disputed inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor and conclude that Plaintiffs have met the background circumstances element. Plaintiffs supplied sufficient evidence to raise at least a material issue of fact that there was ongoing racial tension within the MNPD, and particularly, tension surrounding the manner in which promotions were being awarded within the department’s ranks. See, e.g., id. at 678; Boger, 950 F.2d at 324–25; McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1549 (6th Cir. 1996); Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. College, 314 F.3d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs presented depositions by persons at all levels of MNPD’s hierarchy who testified that the department was interested in promoting diversity and that it was acutely conscious of its long history of racial and gender imbalance.5 And while the district court was correct 5 We note the same figure that the consulting company found troubling: that, as of 2003, there were a total of 29 African-American supervisors out of 1,300 sworn MNPD officers. Certainly such a statistic could prompt Defendants to be concerned about the need for greater diversity in the department’s ranks. To a lesser extent, we also take judicial notice of the newspaper articles reflecting dissatisfaction by both minority and majority officers with MNPD’s promotions processes. See “Officers Say Metro Police Promotions Policy Unfair,” The Tennessean, Apr. 2, 2007; “Racial Tensions Escalate—Black & White Cops Feud over Promotions, Nashville Scene, Oct. 2, 2003. 24 Nos. 10-6102/11-5174 that such a focus may only reflect a legitimate desire to comply with equal opportunity requirements, it also presents a context sufficient to meet the background circumstances element. b. Qualifications and Similarly Situated Candidates As to the remaining prongs of Plaintiffs’ prima facie case, Plaintiffs suffered an adverse employment decision when they were passed over for promotion, but Defendants dispute whether Plaintiffs were qualified for promotion and similarly situated to the promoted candidates. These prongs touch on essentially the same issues, so we address them together. Whether Plaintiffs were qualified for promotion and similarly situated to the promoted candidates depends partly upon how we compare the candidates. The district court disregarded the surveys in deciding the qualification issue, but considered them in its similarly situated analysis. We agree with this approach. Under the new scoring procedure, candidates who received the highest scores were placed on the eligibility roster in alphabetical order without revealing the composite scores. We agree with the district court that this procedure meant that all candidates whose names appeared on the roster were deemed qualified for promotion. Johnson III, 2010 WL 3342211, at . Hence, we need not take into account the candidates’ survey scores when considering the qualification element, and we conclude that Plaintiffs have met their burden to prove that they were qualified for promotion. By contrast, a candidate’s score is relevant in deciding whether Plaintiffs were similarly situated to the officers that were selected for promotion. Inclusion on the eligibility roster only qualified a candidate for promotion, but did not guarantee it. Because the chief had the discretion 25 Nos. 10-6102/11-5174 to choose among candidates, a candidate could be passed over for promotion entirely or promoted later than a comparatively lower-scored candidate. Accordingly, the revised system established a two-stage promotions process. Scoring well on the written and assessment tests was not a guaranteed basis for promotion; it only qualified a candidate for promotion. At the second stage, the chief held the sole discretion to choose among candidates. The system did not limit the considerations the chief could take into account, which could conceivably include a wide variety of qualities, including: education, training, length of service, readiness, ability to lead, disciplinary infractions, or a host of other factors. Any of these factors might distinguish Plaintiffs from their promoted peers and render Plaintiffs not similarly situated. We have explained that in failure-to-promote cases we only require a plaintiff to show that he possesses “similar qualifications” to the employee who received the promotion. Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 814 (6th Cir. 2011). During the prima facie stage, our inquiry is not finely distinguished, given that it “is not realistic from a human standpoint” to expect the plaintiff to prove that he has identical qualifications to the chosen candidate. Id. Rather, we perform a “more searching evaluation of the relative qualifications of the two candidates” when examining pretext. Id. at 816. However, even if we granted leniency to Plaintiffs at the prima facie stage, they still have made no effort whatsoever to show that they were similarly situated to the chosen candidates on even the most basic level. Plaintiffs utter failure to address the similarly situated element fatally undercuts their prima facie case, as well as their argument for pretext. 26 Nos. 10-6102/11-5174 Moreover and as noted above, the survey results are appropriately considered when evaluating the similarly situated element. In the instant case, the survey results render Plaintiffs dissimilar from the candidates who were selected for promotion. Serpas ordered the surveys in an effort to capture the supervisors’ opinions as to which candidates were most suited for promotion. These opinions were considered, along with each candidate’s personnel record and overall qualifications, when Serpas made his promotions decisions. And while Serpas did not take notes about his decisions, he testified that he did draw at least one clear line in his reasoning; he did not promote any candidate whose rollup score fell below a “2.0” In fact, no candidate was promoted who fell below that line, and Plaintiffs concede that they scored well below this threshold. As such, they were not similarly situated to those candidates chosen for promotion. See Gaffney v. Potter, 345 F. App’x 991, 993 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that differences in performance ratings render two employees not similarly situated). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ prima facie case fails because they have failed to show that they were similarly situated to the promoted candidates. c. Pretext Although Plaintiffs have not met their prima facie burden, we note that similar deficiencies prevent them from demonstrating pretext. Serpas explained that he did not select Plaintiffs for promotion because of their poor survey results. He testified that the scores demonstrated that those who were familiar with Plaintiffs’ qualifications did not believe they would be as “successful” or “ready” for promotion in comparison to the other candidates. Serpas averred that he did not take race or gender into consideration when 27 Nos. 10-6102/11-5174 deciding whom to promote. Thus, Defendants have provided a permissible, non-discriminatory basis for the adverse employment decision, and Plaintiffs bear the burden of producing a triable issue of fact that the basis was a pretext for reverse discrimination. We have explained that a closer comparison of candidates is appropriate when the parties dispute whether an employee was chosen for promotion based on qualifications versus discriminatory animus. Provenzano, 663 F.3d at 816. In conducting our evaluation, we do not act as a “‘super personnel department,’ overseeing and second guessing employers’ business decisions,” Bender v. Hecht’s Dep’t Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 626 (6th Cir. 2006), but rather simply compare characteristics such as “[d]ifferences in job title, responsibilities, experience, and work record,” in order to make an informed determination about whether an employment decision was based on pretext, Leadbetter, 385 F.3d at 691. As noted above, however, Plaintiffs have provided the Court with none of the information required to draw an informed comparison. Rather, the only pertinent information we have before us shows that both minority and majority candidates with better survey scores were promoted ahead of Plaintiffs. Likewise, candidates with lower survey scores of both races and genders were not selected for promotion. These facts render fatal Plaintiffs’ claims of pretext. Finally, we note that the move to the new promotions procedure was apparently based on a variety of factors. Plaintiffs concede that the test-based promotions method was criticized for a number reasons—one of which was the disadvantage it imposed on minority candidates—but also for other reasons that were not based on race or gender. The MNPD, its officers, and the consulting company that worked on the updated procedure all agreed that the old method did not take into 28 Nos. 10-6102/11-5174 account other factors that critically affected the candidate’s suitability for promotion—including length of service, educational background and training, and the opinions of the candidates’ supervisors. The fact that the survey instructions mentioned these permissible factors, and not those impermissible factors of race or gender, also undermines Plaintiffs’ claims for pretext.