Opinion ID: 2489306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Elements of Section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes

Text: This Court has previously recognized that [t]he Legislature is vested with the authority to define the elements of a crime. Reynolds v. State, 842 So.2d 46, 49 (Fla.2002). For that reason, we begin our analysis of whether Delgado committed the crime of kidnapping in order to commit or facilitate the commission of the underlying felony of auto theft with an examination of the plain language of section 787.01(1)(a)2. See GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 785 (Fla.2007) (The plain meaning of the statute is always the starting point in statutory interpretation.). As stated above, section 787.01(1)(a)2. provides that [t]he term `kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ... [c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony. Based on a plain reading of this statutory provision, its language can be broken down into two essential components: (1) a forceful, secretive, or threatening act by the defendant that confines, abducts, or imprisons another person against his or her will; and (2) engaging in such conduct with the specific intent to commit or facilitate the commission of an underlying felony. Therefore, [k]idnapping requires proof of both confinement and criminal intent underlying the confinement. Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 955 (Fla.2007). Stated differently, to establish a kidnapping under this provision, the State must also prove that the unlawful confinement occurred with a specific intent. Crain, 894 So.2d at 73. Because the language of the statute requires an overt act on the part of the defendant, and because that act must be performed with a specific intent to commit or facilitate the commission of an underlying felony, clearly a defendant must first have knowledge of an intended victim in order to effectuate his or her intent. See State v. Giorgetti, 868 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla. 2004) (recognizing, in the context of criminal offenses, that because of the strength of the traditional rule that requires mens rea, offenses that require no mens rea are generally disfavored and that the United States Supreme Court has virtually created a presumption in favor of a guilty knowledge element absent an express provision to the contrary (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994))); see also Lovette v. State, 636 So.2d 1304, 1307 (Fla. 1994) (upholding kidnapping conviction due in part to the fact that defendant  intended that the victims be confined in a closet to complete the robbery of a store by leaving undetected (emphasis added)); Polite v. State, 973 So.2d 1107, 1113 (Fla. 2007) (interpreting Florida's resisting-an-officer-with-violence statute and stating that the word resisting as used in the statutory language, by its very nature ... implies an element of knowledge, i.e., an awareness that another is exerting force and an intent to counter that force in opposition). Such knowledge should arise either before or during the commission of the underlying felony used to support the kidnapping charge. Accordingly, where a defendant is charged with kidnapping under section 787.01(1)(a)2., the State must prove that the defendant was first aware of the victim's presence in order to kidnap that victim with a specific intent to commit or facilitate the commission of an underlying felony. See § 787.01(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. It is only after the evidence satisfies the preceding statutory elements that courts may then address whether the Faison test's three prongs apply. With these principles in mind, we turn to the Third District's decision in Delgado.