Opinion ID: 35404
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland

Text: 8 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Grammas must satisfy the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, Grammas must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. We have described that standard as requiring that counsel `research relevant facts and law, or make an informed decision that certain avenues will not be fruitful.' Conley, 349 F.3d at 841 (citations omitted). Second, Grammas must prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's substandard performance. [T]o prove prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 841-42. And, of course, `any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance,' which constitutes prejudice for purposes of the Strickland test. Conley, 349 F.3d at 842 (citing and quoting Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001), and United States v. Franks, 230 F.3d 811, 815 (5th Cir.2000) (finding prejudice where defendant was sentenced under Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months instead of the proper 57 to 71 months range)). Additionally, [o]ne of the most precious applications of the Sixth Amendment may well be in affording counsel to advise a defendant concerning whether he should enter a plea of guilty. Reed v. United States, 354 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir.1965). 9 (1) Harris's performance fell below an objective level of reasonableness. 10 Failing to properly advise the defendant of the maximum sentence that he could receive falls below the objective standard required by Strickland When the defendant lacks a full understanding of the risks of going to trial, he is unable to make an intelligent choice of whether to accept a plea or take his chances in court. Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d 1167, 1171 (5th Cir.1995). `By grossly underestimating [the defendant's] sentencing exposure ..., [counsel] breache[s] his duty as a defense lawyer in a criminal case to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears desirable.' United States v. Ridgeway, 321 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir.2003) (alterations in original) (citing and quoting United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir.1998)). Grammas contends that he was denied his constitutional right to effective counsel relative to his decision to stand trial rather than plead guilty. He argues that Harris's performance was deficient because, among other things, Harris was unfamiliar with the Sentencing Guidelines and substantially misstated Grammas's exposure if he were to be found guilty at trial. 11 Harris conceded these mistakes. Regarding the prior convictions, the Government's indictment states that one of Grammas's prior offenses was for burglary of a building. In reality, Grammas had been previously convicted of burglary of a habitation — a crime of violence — which raised his base offense level. Harris failed to confirm that the prior conviction related to a burglary of a building, admitting that the defense did rely on that original contention that this was a burglary of a building. Even the most basic research on Grammas's background would have revealed that the prior burglary was a burglary of a habitation. The indictment also alleges a prior felony conviction for escape. This Court decided nearly two years before Grammas's trial that an escape constitutes a crime of violence. United States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d 675, 676-77 (5th Cir.1999). Had Harris realized that either one of Grammas's prior convictions was a crime of violence, Harris would have known that the base offense level would be significantly higher. Harris's mistaken belief that Grammas's prior convictions were not crimes of violence, Harris conceded, may even have gone to affect whether or not we negotiated any type of plea agreement or settlement agreement considering the greater exposure. 3 12 Harris further demonstrated a complete lack of familiarity with the Guidelines. He admits that he used the incorrect section of the Guidelines, and his argument for a base offense level of 8 illustrates this lack of understanding. Sentencing Guidelines 2K2.1 — the section under which Grammas was sentenced — does not even contain a base offense level of 8. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2K2.1 (2001). Harris, based on his misunderstanding of the Guidelines, advised Grammas that he would, at most, be imprisoned for 6 to 12 months if he were to be convicted. 4 Harris's assistance fell well below the objective standard of reasonableness required by Strickland (2) Grammas was prejudiced by Harris's deficient performance. 13 The only remaining issue is whether Grammas was prejudiced by Harris's deficient performance. Grammas's conviction occurred after a unanimous Supreme Court in Glover rejected the Seventh Circuit's rule that a minimal amount of additional time in prison cannot constitute prejudice. Glover, 531 U.S. at 203. The Supreme Court noted that, [q]uite to the contrary, our jurisprudence suggests that any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance. Id. (emphasis added). In a recent case this Court analyzed the prejudice prong by considering whether the petitioner could demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's actions, he would have received a `significantly less harsh' sentence. Ridgeway, 321 F.3d at 515 (quoting Daniel v. Cockrell, 283 F.3d 697, 706 (5th Cir.2002)). However, we noted in Ridgeway that Glover arguably casts doubt on the `significantly less harsh test,' Ridgeway, 321 F.3d at 515 n. 2 (quotations and citations omitted), and implied that the significantly less harsh test only applied in Ridgeway because Glover does not apply retroactively. Ridgeway, 321 F.3d at 515 n. 2. We hold that Glover abrogates the significantly less harsh test, and that any additional time in prison has constitutional significance. Accord Conley, 349 F.3d at 842 (noting that of course, `any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance,' which constitutes prejudice for purposes of the Strickland test) (citing and quoting Glover, 531 U.S. at 203, and Franks, 230 F.3d at 815 (finding prejudice where, as here, defendant was sentenced under Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months instead of the proper range of 57 to 71 months)). 14 Grammas argues that he suffered prejudice because Harris's assessment that Grammas only would face 6 to 12 months imprisonment grossly underestimated Grammas's 70-month sentence. Had he known about his greater sentencing exposure, Grammas maintains, he would have been far more likely to plead guilty (and thereby avail himself of the Guidelines 3E1.1 reduction for acceptance of responsibility) rather than to proceed to trial. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 3E1.1 (2001). Had Grammas decided to plead guilty he likely would have received a 2- to 3-point reduction in base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 3E1.1 (2001); United States v. Baker, 78 Fed. Appx. 318, 321 (5th Cir.2003) (unpublished opinion) (Section 3E1.1 applies `[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.'). 15 Grammas's decision not to plead guilty likely led to a longer term of imprisonment. Grammas faced no statutory minimum term of imprisonment for the two counts of his conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 511(a)(1), 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Grammas's base offense level, given the gun conviction and prior convictions for crimes of violence, was 21; he had a criminal history category of 5; and he was subject to a sentencing range of 70 to 87 months. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 5 Pt. A (2001). The district court imposed the minimum, 70-month sentence. Had Grammas received the 2-point deduction for acceptance of responsibility in Guidelines 3E1.1(a), the Guidelines range would have been 57 to 71 months. Id. ; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 3E1.1(a). Had Grammas pleaded before the Government allocated resources to preparing for trial and received the additional 1-point deduction in Sentencing Guidelines 3E1.1(b), the Guidelines range would have been 51 to 63 months. Id. 16 Because Grammas was convicted after Glover was decided, Glover applies to Grammas's case. Grammas was sentenced to at least 7 and up to 19 months more time than he would have received had he pleaded guilty and qualified for a three point reduction under Guidelines 3E1.1(b). Had Grammas only received a 2-point reduction under Guidelines 3E1.1.(a), he still would have been eligible for a 13-month shorter sentence (the court sentenced Grammas at the absolute bottom of the Guidelines range). Grammas's sentence would not have decreased only if he received the 2-point reduction and were then sentenced to the maximum sentence in that range (i.e., 71-months). While it is impossible to know whether Grammas would have received either a 2- or 3-point reduction, and where within the range he would have been sentenced, Grammas has demonstrated a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different because he would have received a lesser sentence. Conley, 349 F.3d at 841-42 (citations and quotations omitted). Consequently, Grammas has demonstrated that he was prejudiced by Harris's deficient performance, satisfying Strickland 's second prong. 17 The dissent maintains that Grammas was not prejudiced because he was not misled by trial counsel concerning his eligibility for a 2-point reduction under 3E1.1(a). However, the dissent ignores Grammas's argument that the deficient performance of his counsel led to a longer sentence, regardless of whether that sentence was within the statutory limits. Grammas maintains — and the Government does not contest — that had he known of his true sentencing exposure, he would have sought out a plea bargain or would have pleaded guilty to avail himself of the acceptance of responsibility decrease in sentencing. See U.S.S.G. 3E1.1. 18 We find a reasonable probability that, had constitutionally sufficient counsel informed Grammas of his true exposure, Grammas would have pleaded guilty and thereby would have been sentenced to less time in prison. 5 This Court has long recognized that to show prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's actions, he would have received a `significantly less harsh' sentence. United States v. Ridgeway, 321 F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir.2003) (E.M. Garza, J.) (discussing potential prejudice resulting from counsel's alleged failure to inform the defendant of his sentencing exposure if he proceeded to trial instead of pleading guilty, but finding no prejudice because the 120-month sentence the defendant might have received had he pleaded guilty was not significantly less harsh than the 121-month sentence he received after being found guilty at trial). Our holding today recognizes that the Supreme Court's decision in Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) (noting that any amount of jail time has Sixth Amendment significance), abrogates our significantly less harsh test and replaces it with the any amount of jail time test. See supra. The dissent does not challenge our reading of Glover, and aside from the change in law mandated by Glover, this opinion faithfully follows the dictates of this Court as explained in Ridgeway. 19 Tellingly, even after admitting that Grammas's counsel's performance was deficient, and assuming that Grammas was prejudiced by that deficient performance, the dissent contends that this opinion improperly vacates [Grammas's] convictions. The dissent takes the curious position that a defendant whose counsel is deficient in a way that is prejudicial to the defendant — thereby satisfying both prongs of Strickland 's constitutionally ineffective counsel test — can nonetheless be rightly convicted pursuant to a constitutionally valid trial.... That, to us, seems a bizarre result indeed. 20 Perhaps this is another method of arguing that Grammas was not prejudiced by counsel's performance. See supra. However, it seems highly incongruous to assume arguendo that counsel was constitutionally defective and yet still conclude, as the dissent does, that there was no error in adjudication of ... guilt or in the rendering of judgment.... Because a defendant cannot be convicted absent the effective assistance of counsel (or a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of such counsel), see U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), we think it inappropriate to describe a defendant convicted without the effective assistance of counsel (or without a valid waiver) as rightly convicted.