Opinion ID: 610843
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Punitive Damages Based on Federal Claims

Text: 47 As Part III.B. sets forth, the jury in the second trial awarded Mr. Morgan $300,000 in punitive damages on his section 1983 claims against Officer Searle. It is well established that a jury may award punitive damages under section 1983 either when a defendant's conduct was driven by evil motive or intent, or when it involved a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others. Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1485 (9th Cir.1991) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1982)). There is no problem with the imposition of some punitive damages in this case. We must decide, however, whether the amount of the imposition in this case comports with the Due Process Clause. 48
49 The Supreme Court recently considered, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), the effect of the Due Process Clause on the award of punitive damages. After noting the growing concern with excessive awards, the Court said that unlimited jury discretion--or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter--in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities. Id. at 15, 111 S.Ct. at 1043. The Court there applied a Due Process analysis, which is described below, to the fairly elaborate Alabama system for imposing and reviewing punitive damages, and found that it comported with Due Process. 50 The Due Process Clause is a federal constitutional standard to be applied in the case of federal as well as state punitive damage awards. Although the Court in Haslip discussed the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's analysis applies equally under the Fifth Amendment. The two Clauses should be applied in the same manner when two situations present identical questions differing only in that one involves a proscription against the federal government and the other a proscription against the States. 7 If state punitive damage awards are subject to the strictures of the Constitution, there is no reason that the standards employed by federal courts to review federal punitive damage awards should escape the scrutiny of the Due Process Clause. It should make no difference whether the imposition of such damages was by a federal or state court or whether on federal or state claims. For this purpose there is only one Due Process Clause. The principles of Haslip are applicable, therefore, to punitive damages imposed by federal courts for violations of federal law. 8 51 The Court in Haslip did not mandate a single standard, applied at a single level, for reviewing punitive damages. Instead, the Court held that the three-stage Alabama punitive damage system comported with the Due Process Clause. Id. at 16-18, 111 S.Ct. at 1044-46. In the Alabama system, the first stage is jury instructions crafted to describe the proper purpose of punitive damages. 9 The next stage is the trial court's review of the jury award for excessiveness. 10 The third stage is appellate court review. 11 A three-stage approach is appropriate in the context of the punitive damage issues in this case as well. 52
53 The Supreme Court did not find that the elements of the Alabama system were necessary to comport with due process, but merely sufficient. 12 Although we adopt a three-stage approach similar to Alabama's, we need not look solely to the substance of its Hammond factors. Instead, we note that the general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15, 111 S.Ct. at 1043. 1. Jury Instructions by the Trial Court 54 As the first stage of scrutiny, a trial court should instruct the jury on the proper role of punitive damages. Haslip said that instructions should be fashioned to describe the proper purposes of punitive damages, so that the jury understands that punitive damages are not to compensate the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant and to deter the defendant and others from such conduct in the future. Id. at 16, 111 S.Ct. at 1044. In the case before us, the trial court performed this task by use of an instruction that focused upon the discretionary nature of the award, the need to punish the defendant, and the need to deter repetition of such conduct. Specifically, the instruction focused on (1) the reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant, and (2) the amount of punitive damages which will have a deterrent effect on the defendant in light of the defendant's financial condition. 13 Although the court could have included instructions detailing that punitive damages are not to be used to compensate the plaintiff, the instructions on compensatory damages made this clear. The instructions in this case were adequate. 55