Opinion ID: 3012412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Greg's Third-Party Retaliation Claim

Text: In arguing that Mercy unlawfully retaliated against Greg for the protected activity of his father, Greg maintains that as a matter of statutory construction, the anti-retaliation provisions are violated even if the person retaliated against did not himself engage in protected conduct. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has filed an amicus brief in support of this position. Mercy responds that the anti-retaliation provisions only prohibit retaliation against a person who himself engaged in protected activity.
In determining whether retaliation against a person who has not himself engaged in protected conduct is actionable, we first consider the ADA, 42 U.S.C. S 12203(a), ADEA, 29 U.S.C. S 623(d), and PHRA, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat.S 955(d), each of which contains similar language prohibiting retaliation. We have yet to decide squarely whether these provisions make actionable retaliation against someone who has not himself engaged in protected conduct. Among the other courts that have addressed the issue no consensus has emerged. Some courts have answered the question definitively in the negative -- i.e., a plaintiff may not present an anti-retaliation claim without personally participating in protected activity. See, e.g. , Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996). But other courts have expressly acknowledged the viability of third-party retaliation claims. See, e.g., EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1212 (E.D. Cal. 1998); De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D.D.C. 1978). The plain text of the anti-retaliation provisions requires that the person retaliated against also be the person who engaged in the protected activity: Each statute forbids discrimination against an individual because such individual has engaged in protected conduct. By their own terms, then, the statutes do not make actionable discrimination against an employee who has not engaged in protected activity. Read literally, the statutes are 10 unambiguous -- indeed, it is hard to imagine a clearer way of specifying that the individual who was discriminated against must also be the individual who engaged in protected activity. Furthermore, although there is no Third Circuit opinion squarely deciding the issue, the language of our opinions has at times reflected this literal understanding of the statute. For instance, in Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1997), we stated that [i]n order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation, . . . [the plaintiff] must show . . . that she engaged in protected activity. . . . Id. at 177 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, Greg and the EEOC are correct that a literal reading of the anti-retaliation provisions is at odds with the policies animating those provisions. The antiretaliation provisions recognize that enforcement of antidiscrimination laws depends in large part on employees to initiate administrative and judicial proceedings. There can be no doubt that an employer who retaliates against the friends and relatives of employees who initiate antidiscrimination proceedings will deter employees from exercising their protected rights. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit sagely observed, To retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his family is an ancient method of revenge, and is not unknown in the field of labor relations. NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987). Allowing employers to retaliate via friends and family, therefore, would appear to be in significant tension with the overall purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions, which are intended to promote the reporting, investigation, and correction of discriminatory conduct in the workplace. See De Medina, 444 F. Supp. at 580 (concluding that tolerance of third-party reprisals would, no less than the tolerance of direct reprisals, deter persons from exercising their rights under Title VII). This case, therefore, presents a conflict between a statute's plain meaning and its general policy objectives. In general, this conflict ought to be resolved in favor of the statute's plain meaning. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the 11 language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.). The preference for plain meaning is based on the constitutional separation of powers -- Congress makes the law and the judiciary interprets it. In doing so we generally assume that the best evidence of Congress's intent is what it says in the texts of the statutes. See 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 135, S 46:03 (6th ed. 2000). To be sure, however, there are cases in which a blind adherence to the literal meaning of a statute would lead to a patently absurd result that no rational legislature could have intended. Following the letter, rather than the spirit, of the law in such cases would go against the court's role of construing statutes to effectuate the legislature's intent. See United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 1994) (It is the obligation of the court to construe a statute to avoid absurd results, if alternative interpretations are available and consistent with the legislative purpose.). We do not believe, however, that this is such a case. Although we think, as explained above, that recognizing third-party retaliation claims is more consistent with the purpose of the anti-discrimination statutes, we cannot say that prohibiting such claims is an absurd outcome that contravenes the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. See In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 741 (3d Cir. 1993) (In the absence of clearly expressed contrary legislative intent, the statutory language must be regarded as conclusive.). Rather, while we do not find them particularly convincing, there are at least plausible policy reasons why Congress might have intended to exclude third-party retaliation claims. For instance, Congress may have thought that [i]n most cases, the relatives and friends who are at risk for retaliation will have participated in some manner in a coworker's charge of discrimination, thereby having themselves engaged in protected activity. Holt , 89 F.3d at 1227. If this is true, then the occurrence of pure third-party retaliation will be rare, so that not allowing claims to proceed in these few instances would not necessarily defeat the plain purpose of the anti-discrimination laws. 12 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983). Put differently, barring third-party retaliation claims will not render the antiretaliation provisions completely meaningless, since they still prohibit the practice of retaliating against an employee for the employee's own protected activity, which may be the most common form of retaliation. Moreover, Congress may have feared that expanding the class of potential anti-discrimination plaintiffs beyond those who have engaged in protected activity to include anyone whose friends or relatives have engaged in protected activity would open the door to frivolous lawsuits and interfere with an employer's prerogative to fire at-will employees. In light of these plausible explanations for excluding third party retaliation claims, we cannot say that adherence to the statute's plain text would be absurd, and we therefore conclude that the District Court was correct to reject as a matter of law Greg's third-party retaliation claims brought under the ADEA, the PHRA, and the first anti-retaliation provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. S12203(a).
As an alternative basis for his third-party claim Greg also relies on the second anti-retaliation provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. S 12203(b), which reads: It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter. We have noted that the scope of this second anti-retaliation provision of the ADA arguably sweeps more broadly than the first. Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc. 162 F.3d 778, 789 (3d Cir. 1998). In particular, unlike the first provision, the text of this provision does not expressly limit a cause of action to the particular employee that engaged in protected activity. 13 This provision contains language similar to that found in section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employerto interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in exercising their rights guaranteed under the Act. In Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1990) (in banc), we enforced an order of the National Labor Relations Board that interpreted section 8(a)(1) to prohibit an employer's retaliation against a supervisory employee (who was otherwise unprotected by the Act) for protected activity engaged in by her close relatives. We noted that the firing of a close relative could have a coercive effect on the employees engaging in protected activity, id. at 407, instilling fear that the exercise of their rights will give the company a license to inflict harm on their family. Id. at 409. Our sister courts of appeals have also recognized that section 8(a)(1) prohibits the firing of a close relative of an employee who engages in activity protected by the NLRA. See, e.g., Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114, 127-28 (D.C. Cir. 2001); NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co. , 823 F.2d 1086, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 1987). Our interpretations of the NLRA can serve as a useful guide to interpreting similar language in the ADA, as both are part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995). The texts of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA and the ADA's second antiretaliation provision are essentially similar -- each makes it illegal for an employer to coerce or interfere with an employee exercising his rights under the act. In view of this fact, as well as the similar policies underlying the two provisions, it seems sensible to hold, as we now do, that Greg may assert his third-party retaliation claim under this section of the ADA just as he would be able to do under the NLRA.5 Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court's _________________________________________________________________ 5. We recognize that the ADA's second anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful to coerce . . . any individual whereas section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it unlawful to coerce employees. One could read the reference to any individual as limiting causes of action to those individuals who have themselves engaged in protected activity under the 14 order granting summary judgment to Mercy to the extent that it was based on the Court's view that Greg's thirdparty retaliation claim was not cognizable under the ADA's second anti-retaliation provision. As noted above, because the District Court did not address the second and third prongs of Greg's retaliation claim -- adverse employment action and causation -- we do not do so on appeal.