Opinion ID: 1820813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: On this record appellant contends the case should be submitted to the jury as to the question of mental incapacity of the testator.

Text: The test established, under many decisions, as to testamentary capacity is: the testator must: 1. understand the nature of the instrument he is executing; 2. know and understand the nature and extent of his property; 3. remember the natural objects of his bounty; 4. know the disposition he desires to make. We have approved this test in many cases. Some of the recent decisions are: In re Estate of Groen, 245 Iowa 634, 638, 62 N.W.2d 143; In re Moeller's Estate, 247 Iowa 174, 73 N.W.2d 15, 19; Gillette v. Cable, 248 Iowa 7, 79 N.W.2d 195; Grahlman v. Grahlman, 248 Iowa 535, 81 N.W.2d 673. Under the testimony, Mr. Burrell met this test. His careful preparation for the making of the will was evidence that he understood the nature of the instrument. He made the arrangements for Mr. Mossman to come to his home to make the will. He arranged for two of his close friends to be present as witnesses to the will. He told Mr. Mossman what he wanted in the will. After it was written it was read to him and he stated it was exactly as he wanted it. The testimony is replete with evidence that he knew the extent of his property. He only had three items of property. One was his undivided one half interest in 603 acres of land owned jointly with his brother. After his stroke and the physical handicap which developed he decided not to manage the farms, but to rent his undivided one half interest to his brother. There was testimony that he kept a keen interest in the farming project in that he continually wanted to go to the farms especially to see the cattle. His second item of property was his home. He was completely cognizant as to the home because he lived in it until his death. The third item of property was his bank account. He kept complete control of it until his death. Offered in evidence as exhibits were 146 checks signed by him between May of 1954 and July 25, 1955, which was after the date of the execution of the will. Every check was signed in firm, steady handwriting. He knew the natural objects of his bounty. He left $500 to his great-grandson. It is true he did not leave anything to his granddaughter, the contestant herein, but he was fully aware of the fact that he had a granddaughter. He had Mrs. Hillgeson write letters to her continually and he would sign the letters. On December 7, 1957, which was twenty days before his death, he signed a check for $10 as a Christmas gift to his two great-grandchildren, Mark and Janice Flack, which was mailed to the granddaughter. It is an exhibit in the case. Janice was his great-granddaughter who was born about a year after the execution of the will. Testator very definitely knew how he wanted to leave his property. In the presence of three witnesses and the attorney he told the attorney what he wanted in his will. When his niece raised a question with him as to whether he was sure the will was the way he wanted it he answered in very positive, somewhat expressive and definite language that it was. Failure to call witnesses, expert or non-expert, or failure to ask questions of witnesses who are closely and intimately acquainted with testator as to question of mental incapacity, militates against contestant. In re Estate of Ransom, 244 Iowa 343, 57 N.W.2d 89; In re Estate of Ruedy, 245 Iowa 1307, 66 N.W.2d 387; Renze v. Renze, 247 Iowa 25, 72 N.W.2d 490; Bowles v. Bowles, 248 Iowa 930, 81 N.W. 2d 15; Grahlman v. Grahlman, supra. According to letters offered as exhibits in the case testator had several doctors during the course of his illness, resulting from the paralytic stroke. Not one doctor was called to testify concerning his mental condition. If testator was subject to serious mental incapacity the person who would know this, above all other persons, would be his doctor. Contestant called the brother of the testator, his banker, and four close friends, one of whom cared for him in the last two years of his life. They all visited him often. Not one of these witnesses was interrogated as a non-expert witness as to his mental condition. A doctor as an expert witness can testify on the basis of his personal contact and observation of the testator, or on the basis of a hypothetical question involving all the facts as to the testator's condition. The rule as to a non-expert witness was clearly stated in Gillette v. Cable, 248 Iowa 7, 79 N.W.2d 195, 199: A non-expert witness may testify to unsoundness of mind only after stating sufficient facts to support the conclusion. (Emphasis ours.) Neidermyer v. Neidermyer, 237 Iowa 685, 689, 690, 22 N.W.2d 346; Ipsan v. Ruess, 239 Iowa 1376, 1379, 35 N.W.2d 82; In re Estate of Ransom, 244 Iowa 343, 358, 359, 57 N.W.2d 89; In re Estate of Heller, 233 Iowa 1356, 1363, 11 N.W.2d 586; Olson v. Olson, 242 Iowa 192, 204, 46 N.W.2d 1, 40 A.L.R.2d 1. It is probable the trial court would not have accepted the opinion of non-experts, on the basis that there were not sufficient facts to support the conclusion. At any rate a vital link in the chain to support mental incapacity was absent. V. The elements generally considered in connection with presence of undue influence are: dominance over testator; condition of testator's mind as to whether or not he is subject to such dominance; general character of the disposition of his property; activity of dominant agent in connection with making of the will. In re Ransom's Estate, supra; In re Estate of Sinift, 233 Iowa 800, 10 N.W.2d 550; Perkins v. Perkins, 116 Iowa 253, 90 N.W. 55; 95 C.J.S. Wills § 463 b (1); Grahlman v. Grahlman, supra. An analysis of the testimony does not sustain the presence of these elements in the case at bar. The dominant personality as between Mr. Burrell and Mrs. Hillgeson was the testator. It is true that for a period of twelve years between his stroke and his death he suffered from the effects of the stroke and was almost constantly confined to his home and to his chair. However, as his friends testified he was a strong-minded man, he was cross and on occasions would become angry, but he always dominated the situation. This situation also pertained as to whether his mind was subject to dominance as to the element of disposition of his property. The evidence does not disclose any activity on the part of Mrs. Hillgeson in connection with the execution of the will. Outside of the attorney and his secretary, contestant tendered the testimony of ten witnesses. No witness offered any testimony as to any activity of Mrs. Hillgeson in connection with influencing testator to make the will which was made by him. The only testimony is to the contrary. She asked a question, heretofore shown, the general purport of which was that there was a question in her mind as to whether his will should be made as he had made it, and directed his attention to this doubt on her part. He drastically and profanely rejected her doubts. VI. In a will contest case, the evidence must disclose more than a scintilla of evidence to justify the trial court in submitting the case to the jury. Bales v. Bales, 164 Iowa 257, 145 N.W. 673; In re Kenny's Estate, 233 Iowa 600, 10 N.W.2d 73, 76; 95 C.J.S. Wills § 462 b (1); In re Kenny's Estate, supra, we said: This court is committed to the doctrine that a mere scintilla of evidence will not sustain the burden of proof. In Bales v. Bales, supra, this court stated: It was formerly considered necessary in all cases to leave the question to the jury if there was any evidence in support of the case, but it is now settled that the question for the judge is, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any that ought reasonably to satisfy the jury that the fact sought to be proved is established. This rule has been adopted and followed in this state for many years. [164 Iowa 257, 145 N.W.2d 680.] The evidence offered by contestant in this case fails to measure up to the rules as established in many decisions of this court in requiring submission to a jury. It fails to extend beyond a scintilla of evidence as to both contentions of mental incapacity and undue influence. The ruling and the judgment of the trial court in sustaining the motion for a directed verdict is approved, and the case is affirmed. Affirmed.