Opinion ID: 186146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The second phase of litigation

Text: After remand, the Cruzes, in April 2000, filed an amended complaint asserting two class-action claims. The complaint described the ‘‘Claim I’’ class as consist[ing] of all persons who during the period beginning two years prior to initiation of this suit, December 20, 1994, and ending on the date of Final Judgment herein (the ‘‘Claim I class period’’) (a) checked their baggage for transport for an international air journey to 7 or from the United States in whole or part performed by American, (b) sustained the loss of or damage to their checked baggage in circumstances where American is made liable for such loss/damage under Warsaw Article 30(3), (c) gave timely notice of such loss/damage consistent with Warsaw Article 26 or applicable carrier tariff rules, (d) made claim for the fair value of such loss/damage, and (e) suffered the non-processing or rejection of their claim because of their alleged failure to comply with the requirements of defendant’s 30–day Rule. Claim I sought, inter alia, a declaration that American’s ‘‘application of its 30–day rule to checked baggage claims’’ was unlawful and an injunction preventing American from applying the 30–day rule to the claims of future passengers, and noting damages. The complaint defined the ‘‘Claim II class’’ as consist[ing] of all persons all persons [sic] who during the period beginning two years prior to initiation of this suit, December 20, 1994, and ending on March 3, 1999 (the ‘‘Claim II class period’’) (a) checked their baggage for transport for an international air journey to or from the United States in whole or part performed by American and without the weight of that baggage having been recorded on the passenger’s combined passenger ticket and baggage check, (b) sustained the loss of or damage to their checked baggage in circumstances where American is made liable for such loss/damage under Warsaw Article 30(3), (c) gave timely notice of such loss/damage consistent with Warsaw Article 26 or applicable carrier tariff rules, (d) made claim for the fair value of such loss/damage, and (e) thereafter received from American for such claim a payment of compensation less than the claimed fair value of such loss/damage, being an amount (usually $634.90 but sometimes $907) which American asserted was the limit of its liability for such baggage loss/damage under Warsaw’s Article 22(2) liability limit and its tariff rules. 8 Claim II asked the district court to award this class compensatory damages equal to the fair value of their lost or damaged bags. Claim II also alleged that American had typically (as it did with Beato Cruz) settled the Claim II class members’ damages claims for $634.90 per bag, based on American’s representation that this figure was the limit of its liability under the Warsaw Convention. As discussed, those settlement offers (70 pounds times $9.07) erroneously assumed that, for a single bag, the maximum weight provided in American’s tariff was 70 pounds, not 100. American moved for partial summary judgment, arguing, as it had before the first appeal, that the Claim I plaintiffs lacked standing to obtain a declaration that American’s 30– day rule was unlawful and an injunction preventing American from applying that procedure to future customers. As to Claim II, American argued that Beato Cruz’s claim was barred by the two American claim-release forms he signed. The Cruzes, for their part, moved to certify both Claim I and Claim II as class actions. In their reply to American’s opposition to the Cruzes’ motion to certify the two classes, filed on November 3, 2000, the Cruzes for the first time requested an additional form of relief under Claim I, one mentioned in neither their complaints nor their previous certification and summaryjudgment documents. The Cruzes asked the district court to declare that American had an obligation to ‘‘process’’ the Claim I class members’ claims without regard to American’s (since repudiated) 30–day rule, and for American to offer the Claim I class compensation. The Cruzes requested that the district court issue an injunction requiring American to do both of those things. The district court granted American’s partial summaryjudgment motion. The court decided to address American’s summary-judgment motion before addressing the Cruzes’ certification motion. As to summary judgment, the court concluded that Beato Cruz had released his claim for money damages by cashing the $634.90 check. Cruz had argued that this release should be rescinded on grounds of misrepresenta- 9 tion or mutual mistake. American, Cruz claimed, mistakenly represented to Cruz in the letter accompanying the $634.90 offer of settlement that the maximum weight of his bag, as defined in American’s tariffs, was 70, not 100, pounds. As a result, American had underestimated the maximum extent of its Warsaw Convention liability to him. The district court rejected that argument, in part because American pointed to Cruz’s deposition testimony showing that this mistake or misrepresentation did not contribute in any material way to Cruz’s decision to sign the release. Cruz’s testimony at his deposition was that, at the time he cashed the $634.90 check, he was represented by his present attorney and believed that he could successfully sue American for more than this amount even after he signed the release. The district court also agreed with American that none of the Claim I putative class representatives had standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy American’s misapplication of the 30–day rule to them. That relief, the court reasoned, only would address American’s prospective application of the rule, and therefore would not redress the putative representatives’ actual injury – their lost bags. Moreover, the court continued, the possibility that these same plaintiffs would again fly on an international American flight, lose their bags, and have the 30–day rule again applied to them was simply too speculative an injury to establish Article III standing. The district court did not address whether the Cruzes had standing to seek relief under their newly articulated theory – specifically, whether they had standing to seek a declaration and injunction ordering American to ‘‘process’’ their claims and make offers to them. Having dismissed much of the Cruzes’ case on the merits, the district court directed the Cruzes to file a new class-certification motion in light of the trimmed-down posture of the case. The Cruzes filed exactly three post-summary-judgment motions. First, they renewed their motion to certify the Claim I class. They claimed that their complaint, even after the district court’s summary-judgment ruling, still presented three common issues: (1) whether American was legally obligated to compensate the Claim I class members; (2) 10 whether the district court should issue an injunction requiring American to process their damages claims on their merits without regard to the 30–day rule; and (3) whether the Cruzes were entitled to a declaration that the Warsaw Convention liability limit did not apply to those class members whose baggage weight American did not record on their claim tickets. Second, the Cruzes requested that the district court reconsider its summary-judgment ruling. The sole ground on which the Cruzes sought reconsideration was that the district court had mistakenly granted American summary judgment as to the Claim II representatives’ claims. Specifically, they repeated their argument that the release signed by the representatives, contrary to the district court’s ruling, was fatally tainted by American’s misrepresentation of the deemed weight of their bags. That motion, however, did not challenge the district court’s ruling that the Cruzes lacked standing to assert their Claim I injunctive claims. Because the Cruzes interpreted the district court’s summary-judgment ruling to have implicitly denied their motion to certify the Claim II class, the Cruzes did not formally renew that motion in their reconsideration petition. Finally, the Cruzes filed a motion they styled as a ‘‘contingent motion for disclosure and notification.’’ This motion asked the district court to direct American to disclose to the Cruzes the identities of the Claim I putative class members and to invite them to intervene as plaintiffs, assuming the district court concluded that ‘‘the existing complement of plaintiffs seeking to serve as the [Claim I] class representatives requires supplementation or substitution.’’ The district court denied all three motions. As for the Cruzes’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the district court noted that it had already ruled that the Cruzes lacked standing to challenge ‘‘the legitimacy of the 30–day rule.’’ Thus, the court concluded, the Cruzes only had standing to seek damages for their lost bags. On the issue of damages, the district court declined to certify a class. The court relied primarily on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 23(a), which requires that there be ‘‘questions of law or fact common to the class’’ before a court may certify a class. The court reasoned that the class members’ claims for damages did not present a common issue. Resolution of any individual damage claim, the court said, would require a detailed, individualized inquiry into the value of each person’s lost luggage, miring the court in an ‘‘unmanageable series of mini-trials that would destroy the efficiency rationale undergirding Rule 23.’’ For substantially the same reason, the court concluded, alternatively, that the Cruzes’ remaining damages claims did not present ‘‘question[s] of law or fact [that] predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.’’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). The district court also denied the Cruzes’ motion for disclosure and intervention and their motion for reconsideration of its earlier summary-judgment ruling. Following the district court’s disposition, the Cruzes settled their individual damages claims with American. The district court accordingly entered an order granting American judgment on Beato Cruz’s Claim II claim and dismissing the Claim I and Claim II class claims with prejudice. This appeal followed.