Opinion ID: 2222834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of eighteen to twenty-one year olds.

Text: Persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one were excluded from the 1971 list of jurors for Walworth county. Defendant contends that the moment the twentysixth amendment became law in April, 1971, the jury list which had already been completed was invalidated and should have been modified so that this age group would have been represented by the time of defendant's trial in August of 1971. But it is clear that after a change making new classes of potential jurors eligible for jury service a reasonable period of time should be allowed to adjust the jury lists. In the case of Glasser v. United States [32] the United States Supreme Court was asked to consider the contention that an Illinois grand jury had illegally excluded women therefrom, the jury having brought in indictments against the defendants which later developed into convictions. The supreme court noted that it was not until July 1, 1939, that two acts of the state of Illinois providing for women jurors became effective and that the Illinois grand jury had been summoned on August 25, 1939. [33] The supreme court held that the jury was not defective due to the short period of time between the Illinois acts and the summoning of the jury: [W]e are of opinion that, in view of the short time elapsing between the effective date of the Illinois Acts and the summoning of the grand jury, it was not error to omit the names of women from federal jury lists, where it was not shown that women's names had yet appeared on the state jury lists. [34] A like result occurred in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in York v. United States. [35] In York, a defendant, convicted for having transported a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce, contended that both the grand and petit juries intentionally and systematically excluded women. The court of appeals pointed out that legislation, implementing an earlier enacted Missouri constitutional amendment prohibiting jury disqualification based upon sex, was enacted on April 2, 1946, and became effective on July 1, 1946. The defendant was tried in federal district court in September, 1946, with all male jurors impaneled from lists which had been compiled in June, 1946. Quoting Glasser v. United States , the court of appeals held that adding women to the lists in the fall of 1946, after defendant's trial, was not an intentional and systematic exclusion of women from the jury. [36] This court has also spoken to the issue of the amount of time which should be allotted to effect changes in jury procedures. In Ray v. Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Ry., this court held proper a trial court's overruling a motion challenging the array of jurors for lack of compliance with the statute in their selection. [37] The court noted that the statute was changed three days after the commencement of the term of the trial court and stated: ... When jurors have been drawn and designated according to law to serve at a term of court, a mere change in the method of obtaining jurors, thereafter made, will not affect those already drawn, but they will continue, notwithstanding such change in the law, legal jurors for the term unless excused or discharged by the court. [38] We conclude that although this particular jury list was not invalid for excluding eighteen to twenty-one year olds, jury lists prepared after a reasonable time following the adoption of the twenty-sixth amendment must not systematically exclude the newly enfranchised young voters.