Opinion ID: 809233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kim Starnes’ Consent

Text: Consent to search must be given “unequivocally, specifically, and intelligently,” and “uncontaminated by any duress and coercion.” Worley, 193 F.3d at 386. This determination requires us to examine the totality of the circumstances, including those “more subtle forms of coercion that might flaw [an individual’s] judgment.” United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (alteration in original)). The consent to search must be “an unequivocal statement of free and voluntary consent, not merely a response conveying an expression of futility in resistence to authority or acquiescing in the officer’s request.” Worley, 193 F.3d at 386 (refusing to find the statement,“You’ve got the badge, I guess you can [search],” free and voluntary). At the suppression hearing, Kim testified that she did not read or fully understand the FBI’s consent form. In the confusion of the events, she believed that her husband was being arrested and charged only for the parole violation, and she did not understand the consequences of permitting a search to look for evidence of a bank robbery. She also testified that she believed her refusal would have been futile, because by the time she was asked to sign the FBI’s consent form, the APA was already searching the apartment and arresting her husband, over their strenuous objections and a 16 No. 11-3446 court order to the contrary. Moreover, Kim testified that she was upset, frightened, and not thinking clearly after a squad of officers entered her apartment in full tactical mode, forced her to the ground, and handcuffed her. Although the handcuffs were removed shortly before Kim gave her consent, she testified that this was a small consolation under the circumstances. The district court’s analysis on this matter is limited to a brief footnote, stating that the court “listened carefully to the testimony of Kim Starnes and rejects the idea that she signed the consent to search based on coercion and duress.” Although this Court typically gives due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of a witness, Blair, 524 F.3d at 749, the district court’s sparse analysis on this dispute leaves much to be desired. Furthermore, the district court’s conclusory statement glosses over persuasive circuit precedent that suggests Kim’s testimony ought to have been taken more seriously given the totality of the circumstances involved. For one matter, we have held that “[h]ostile police action against a suspect’s family is a factor which significantly undermines the voluntariness of any subsequent consent given by the suspect.” United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 1998). Likewise, we have previously found consent involuntary where a resident was asked to permit a search in the middle of the night, during an emotional domestic dispute, just after the officers removed her husband in handcuffs. See Tatman, 397 F. App’x at 164. Under these circumstances, the Tatman court found that it was “quite likely [the signer] did not even read [the] statement contained in the consent form, let alone intelligently consider its meaning.” Id. at 163. Similar issues drive our concerns here. 17 No. 11-3446 In this case, the evidence from government witnesses only underscores the credibility of Kim’s testimony. A full tactical response team, prepped and equipped to perform a “dynamic entry,” descended on the apartment without warning and immediately forced Kim to the ground and handcuffed her upon entry. According to the officers’ testimony, Kim was “visibly shaken,” “upset over the arrest of her husband,” “angry,” and “upset.” This testimony backs up Kim’s account, who described herself as “scared,” “shaken up,” and “confused.” The circumstances are only complicated by the fact that the arrest team involved numerous officers and multiple law enforcement agencies. The APA officers had a completely different legal authority and basis for entering the apartment and arresting Defendant than did the FBI. And while the record is less than clear in some respects, there are serious disputes of fact regarding, inter alia, how much of a search was underway when Kim gave her consent, which agencies were involved, where Defendant was during this period, and whether or not the different searches can be considered clearly distinct from one another. Even if we could divide the searches into separate events and find that Kim consented only to the FBI’s second search of the apartment, we cannot conclude that Kim’s consent was freely and voluntarily given under these highly distressing, fast moving, and confusing circumstances. In particular, we credit Kim’s explanation that she believed her refusal would have no legal effect given that her apartment was already being searched by the time she was asked for her consent. Accordingly, we cannot uphold the district court’s suppression ruling on the basis of consent. 18 No. 11-3446