Opinion ID: 1266115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Variance in an Individual Case

Text: While we have concluded that a district court can consider a variance on the basis of a fast-track argument, under what circumstances would such a variance be deemed reasonable? A generalized argument to a district court that a defendant should be sentenced below the Guidelines range because of fast-track disparity is alone not sufficient to justify such a variance. [12] This type of argument does not enable a court to consider the validity of fast-track disparities as applied to an individual defendant and impose a sentence in a tailored manner under the sentencing factors. See Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. However, a defendant is not required to show that he is exactly similarly situated to a particular fast-track defendant in another district. To justify a reasonable variance by the district court, a defendant must show at the outset that he would qualify for fast-track disposition in a fast-track district. For example, a defendant's serious criminal history may disqualify him in most fast-track districts. This type of showing would also be an instrumental factor for a district court in determining under § 3553(a) whether a Guidelines range sentence is greater than necessary to meet the sentencing objectives. The Government, obviously, would be free to contend to the contrarythat the defendant would not qualify in a fast-track district or that the adjusted range would be different than that suggested by the defendant. In this case, Arrelucea stated in his sentencing brief that he qualified for a departure in fast-track districts, and that if he were to receive a 4-level reduction ... his [G]uideline[s] sentencing range would be 30 to 37 months, instead of his 46 to 57 month non-fast-track range. Overall, based on the totality of the § 3553(a) factors and Arrelucea's circumstances, he argued that a sentence between two and three years would be appropriate. The Government responded that Arrelucea did not show that he is similarly situated to other defendants found guilty of similar conduct. [13] Additionally, a defendant must demonstrate that he would have taken the fast-track guilty plea if offered (and, in so doing, waived his appellate rights, including his habeas rights but for ineffective assistance of counsel). For example, in Arrelucea's case the sentencing record shows that he would have accepted a fast-track plea if the Government had offered him one. He offered to accept a plea agreement and waive his appellate (and, we presume, his habeas) rights if the Government would stipulate to a four-level departure at sentencing. The Government, of course, rejected this offer. Moreover, at the sentencing hearing defense counsel informed the District Court that Arrelucea would have accepted a fast-track plea. We do not require a more extensive showing. Requiring anything more than what Arrelucea did in this case would create an insurmountable obstacle for a defendant because the point in affording a sentencing judge discretion to consider the disparity created between fast-track and non-fast-track districts as part of the compendium of § 3553(a) sentencing factors is that this type of plea is not available to a defendant in a non-fast-track district. As is conventional sentencing practice, the Government would be free to argue that a variance below the Guidelines range on the basis of fast-track disparity would not comport with the § 3553(a) factors.