Opinion ID: 2232378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mode of Manifestation of Intention

Text: (1) Except as otherwise provided by statute, the manifestation of intention to create a trust may be made by written or spoken words or by conduct. (2) No particular form of words or conduct is necessary for the manifestation of intention to create a trust. and in paragraph b of the comments to Section 24 it is stated: Acts prior to and subsequent to, as well as acts contemporaneous with the manifestation which it is claimed creates a trust, may be relevant in determining the settlor's intention to create a trust. We hold the real estate deeded and the personal property assigned by Eugene K. Butler and his wife Sarah to Robert S. Butler on December 2, 1929, was held by Robert in trust for Hubert, Earle and Robert, and their parents Eugene K. and Sarah Butler. In 1929 Sarah was the vigorous and dominant person as to the transfer of the property. The record clearly discloses she spoke and wrote for herself and her husband. The written or oral statements, circumstances and actions establishing such trust relationship are as follows: 1. Evidence of Margaret Butler as to statements of Sarah Butler, one of the settlors, to her and her husband Hubert about a week before the deeding and transfer of the property to Robert, which evidence appears supra. This evidence of Margaret's is admissible as to Earle's case. 2. The testimony of Earle prior to December 2, 1929, as to what his mother Sarah told him about the conditions under which the property was being transferred to Robert. 3. Earle testified Robert gave him a written statement creating a trust on December 2, 1929, when he received the property. Defendants deny the existence of such a document. This was their assumption. The passage of many years and the death of Robert and his parents made it impossible for defendants to present any direct contrary evidence. Earle had supporting evidence as to his contention. Margaret testified as outlined heretofore and referred to in the foregoing paragraph. As a matter of emphasis we repeat that Sarah said to Hubert and Margaret a written statement as to what Robert was to do was executed. 4. The written agreement between Robert and Earle of May 18, 1932. The trial court held this was an ordinary contract, was without consideration, and not binding on Robert nor his estate. It is our position that this document was a ratification of the trust relationship. Because of the trust relationship no evidence of consideration between Earle and Robert was necessary. If it had been necessary to make the agreement legal, there was other consideration under the terms of the contract than love and affection. 5. The undisputed fact that Robert paid to his parents the sum of $52,258.59 from December 2, 1929, until their death (Eugene in 1931 and Sarah in 1941), out of the property transferred to him, for their care and personal expenses. This constituted a partial compliance with the original trust agreement. 6. The undisputed fact that Robert paid to Hubert the sum of $152,305.67, partly during the life of the parents, and finally in settlement of the Illinois case. This was partial performance of the trust. 7. The evidence by the accountants that Robert established a separate book account as to the Eugene K. Butler property. He also maintained a separate bank account as to the property. This separate book situation was maintained from 1929 to 1946, when Robert gradually transferred the property, or proceeds of any sales, into another account, personal in nature, known as R. S. Butler Company account. The book accounts were clearly identified by the accountants. The evidence was admissible. 8. In December, 1930, Hubert apparently wrote to Robert asking for more money. Defendants were requested to produce the letter, but it had been destroyed or lost. Robert's answer is in evidence. Margaret identified the letter, and Robert's signature. The letter dated December 10, 1930, said: Frankly it is impossible to assist you in any way because of the fact that father's estate must keep what liquid securities there are, intact, to preserve it against all contingent liabilities as, for instance, the inheritance tax, etc. Robert does not claim he owns the property. He still tells Hubert the property was in the Eugene K. Butler Estate. This was evidence of the existence of a Eugene K. Butler property trust. 9. When the property was transferred to Robert on December 2, 1929, he owed Earle $5000, December 14, 1929, he borrowed $4000 more. In 1930 he borrowed another $2500, so that at the end of 1930 Robert's books reflected that he owed Earle $11,500. Sometime later he paid it. Such borrowings by Robert are a contradiction of the claims of defendants herein that the more than $500,000. in personal property transferred to him on December 2, 1929 was a gift to him. If the money was his why should he borrow from Earle? 10. Between 1929 and 1946 the R. S. Butler special account books (as to Eugene K. Butler property) disclose that Robert at times advanced money to himself which he later repaid; another contradiction of absolute ownership of the property by Robert. Starting with the agreement of May 18, 1932, ratifying the written statement of Robert of December 2, 1929, and supported by the statements and circumstances outlined, supra, in our list of 1 to 10 plaintiff Earle established the trust in his favor to the extent of 1/3rd of the net property by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Hardy v. Daum, 219 Iowa 982, 259 N.W. 561; Neilly v. Hennessy, 208 Iowa 1338, 220 N.W. 47; Ratigan v. Ratigan, 181 Iowa 860, 162 N.W. 580, 165 N.W. 85; Pap v. Pap, 247 Iowa 371, 73 N.W.2d 742; Herman v. Edington, 331 Mass. 310, 118 N.E. 2d 865; Kintner v. Jones, 122 Ind. 148, 23 N.E. 701; Jaiser v. Milligan, U.S.D.C.Neb. 120 F.Supp. 599; First National Bank of Ottawa v. Weise, 333 Ill.App 1., 76 N.E.2d 538. V. Many procedural and technical objections have been raised by appellees, requiring our consideration. VI. Sarah Butler made statements to Hubert, Margaret and Earle concerning the plan, purposes and details of the transfer of the property on December 2, 1929. We have heretofore set them out verbatim. Earle also made a statement as to what Robert said to him about dividing the estate. Appellees contend such statements are hearsay and not admissible. In the ordinary course of events the objection would be good. There is a well established exception to the hearsay rule, where statements are made as to a design or plan. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this exception. Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. VI, Section 1725, states: It has already been seen that the existence of a design or plan to do a specific act is relevant to show that the act was probably done as planned. The design or plan, being thus in its turn a fact to be proved, may be evidenced circumstantially by the person's conduct. But, as a condition of mind, the plan or design may also, it is clear, be evidenced under the present exception by the person's own statements as to its existence.    But the principle has no narrow limitations; for example, when an absence from the jurisdiction , by a party or a witness, or the making of a contract or a deed , is to be evidenced by plan or design, the latter is then provable by the person's declarations.    To evidence that design or plan, the person's statements of his existing design or plan are admissible, under the general principle of the present exception. These statements may be found in oral utterances, in letters, in the draft of a will or instructions to an attorney, or in any other form. The admissibility of such evidence, on the analysis just outlined, is entirely settled. (Emphasis ours) This theory is also supported in a statement in 31 C.J.S. Evidence, § 256: Declarations evidencing a particular intent or intention are relevant in very many connections when the legal effect of an act or the animus with which it is done is to be determined; for example, to establish the intention with which goods, money, or negotiable instruments were received, or with which goods, written instruments, or money were delivered to another; to show on whose account money was delivered or received; to show purpose in taking possession of either real or personal property, or otherwise to qualify the act; to show intention as bearing on the abandonment of the ownership of property, the making of a gift, see    or advancement, or the delivery of a deed;   . Krimlofski v. United States, D.C., 190 F. Supp. 734 (Judge Graven) involved the beneficiary in an insurance policy. Deceased designated his wife, mother and father as beneficiaries, in that order, without stating anything as to principal or contingent beneficiaries. Oral evidence was introduced as to statements of deceased as to his intention. Judge Graven quoted an illuminating statement from Wigmore as to the question, as follows: `The truth had finally to be recognized that words always need interpretation; that the process of interpretation inherently and invariably means the ascertainment of the association between words and external objects; and that this makes inevitable a free resort to extrinsic matters for applying and enforcing the document. `Words must be translated into things and facts.'    Perhaps the range of search need not be extensive, and perhaps the application of the document will be apparent at the first view; but there must always be a traveling out of the document, a comparison of its words with people and things.    the words of a document are never anything but indices to extrinsic things, and    therefore all the circumstances must be considered which go to make clear the sense of the words ,that is, their associations with things.'    (Emphasis ours) It is the view of the Court that the testimony offered in the present case relating to statements made by the insured to the effect that he had made his wife the beneficiary of his National Service Life Insurance policy are admissible for the purpose of throwing light upon the question of his intent in regard to the application he filled out on September 27, 1951. They are not offered as evidence of a past act. The evidence of that act is before the Court in the form of the application in question. That application is ambiguous and therefore in its interpretation the intent of the insured becomes a material fact to be proved. Evidence of statements made subsequent to the act in question as to insured's understanding of the effect of the act is circumstantial evidence from which his intent at the time of the act may be inferred. See Moore v. United States, D.C.1955, 129 F.Supp. 456, 458; VI Wigmore, Sec. 1736 at page 117 (3d ed. 1940). VII. Many of defendants' objections are based on the provisions of Section 622.4, commonly known as dead man's statute. This claim is inevitable where about 30 years have passed since the establishment of the trust, and four out of the five persons directly involved have departed this life. We have passed on the question as we have reached most of the evidence. In reaching our evidence we have not taken into consideration any conversations of Margaret or Earle with Robert S. Butler, deceased. In the few places where we have not heretofore passed on the question of violation of Section 622.4, we do not consider there is any decisive testimony as to existence of a trust which is in violation of such statute. VIII. Defendants claim plaintiff Earle Butler's case and claim are barred by the statute of limitations, and by laches. We will consider them together. If not barred by the statute of limitations it logically follows that no question of laches is involved. Earle did not know Robert had repudiated the trust until after Robert's death in 1956. Earle approached Robert Shelton Butler, the executor of the estate of his brother Robert, and asked about division of the property transferred to Robert by their father on December 2, 1929. The executor told his Uncle Earle that no provision had been made in Robert's estate nor in the R. S. Butler Trust for any distribution, and that none would be made except by order of court. Earle then retained attorneys and started this action and filed claim in the Estate in 1957. The Statute did not commence to run until Earle was informed of the repudiation in 1956. Howes v. Sutton, 221 Iowa 1326, 1330, 268 N.W. 164, 166; Long v. Valleau, 87 Iowa 675, 55 N.W. 31, 34, 56 N.W. 748; 2 Perry on Trusts, P. 1468, Sec. 863; Boehnke v. Roenfanz, 246 Iowa 240, 246, 67 N.W.2d 585, 590, 54 A.L.R.2d 1; Zunkel v. Colson, 109 Iowa 695, 698, 81 N.W. 175; Rorem v. Rorem, 244 Iowa 980, 989, 59 N.W.2d 210, 215; 34 Am.Jur., Limitations of Actions, Secs. 107 and 175; 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 19(a); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 178. In Howes v. Sutton, supra, the court said: Against an express and continuing trust time does not run until repudiation or adverse possession by the trustee and knowledge thereof on the part of the cestui. This general principle is laid down in Long v. Valleau, 87 Iowa 675, 55 N.W. 31, [34,] 56 N.W. 748. The court said in its opinion, 87 Iowa 675, at page 684, 55 N.W. 31, 34, 56 N.W. 748, [of the report:] (Emphasis ours) `The property in controversy, if not owned by the defendant, was held by her in trust. She was then, in law, a trustee holding property for the benefit of the real owner,Frank Teabout,and after his death she would hold it in trust for his estate. Now, the general rule is that the possession of property by the trustee, which is subject to the trust, is, in law, the possession of the cestui que trust.' In Boehnke v. Roenfanz, supra, the court stated: It is elementary that as between the trustee and cestui que trust of an express trust, statutes of limitations have no application. Possession by the trustee of trust property is, in law, possession of the cestui que trust. As against an express and continuing trust, time does not run until repudiation or adverse possession by the trustee and knowledge or notice thereof to the cestui. The defense of laches is an equitable defense. It arises only when there has been an unreasonable delay in asserting an equitable remedy. In 30 C.J.S. Equity §§ 112 and 115, the following is stated: Laches in a general sense is the neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law should have been done. More specifically, it is inexcusable delay in asserting a right;    Since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be invoked to defeat justice; and it will be applied only where the enforcement of the right asserted would work injustice. 19 Am.Jur., Equity, Sec. 540, states: If the complainant had no knowledge of the facts giving rise to the cause of action, he cannot be charged with laches. The complainant is not to be deemed to have been in default until there was something to apprise him of the defendant's hostile conduct or invasion of his rights and until he has had an opportunity to institute suit. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 456(b) states:    The doctrine of laches applies to the enforcement of an express trust when, and only when, there has been an open and unequivocal breach or repudiation of the trust.    IX. Statute governing creation of trusts in Real Estate provides: Sec. 557.10, Code of Iowa: Declarations of trust. Declarations or creations of trusts or powers in relation to real estate must be executed in the same manner as deeds of conveyance; but this provision does not apply to trusts resulting from the operation or construction of law.  (Emphasis ours) The trust in the case at bar has been partially performed. The payments were made to the parents of Robert and to Hubert. In Hardy v. Daum, 219 Iowa 982, 259 N.W. 561, it states: It is    the settled rule of law in this state that parol evidence is competent to impress an express trust upon an absolute deed, provided the trust has been wholly or partially executed. Ratigan v. Ratigan, 181 Iowa 860, 162 N.W. 580, 165 N.W. 85; Hayes v. Dean, 182 Iowa 619, 164 N.W. 770; Nolan v. Guggerty, Admrx., 187 Iowa 980, 174 N.W. 706; Kelley, Admr. v. Kelley, 189 Iowa 311, 177 N. W. 45; Neilly v. Hennessy, 208 Iowa 1338, 220 N.W. 47; Johnston v. Jickling, 141 Iowa 444, 119 N.W. 746; Morris Furniture Co. v. Braverman, 210 Iowa 946, 230 N.W. 356; Schurz v. Schurz, 153 Iowa 187, 128 N.W. 944, 133 N.W. 683; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Griffin, 116 Iowa 397, 90 N.W. 84. Likewise, parol evidence may be introduced to establish an oral agreement for the creation of an interest in real estate where the purchase money or any portion thereof has been received by the vendor (Code, section 11286), or where it is established by the oral evidence of the adverse party (Code, section 11288). X. Appellees contend the conditions of Statute of Frauds have not been complied with. Sec. 622.32, Code of Iowa, 1958, I.C.A., provides: Except when otherwise specially provided, no evidence of the following enumerated contracts is competent, unless it be in writing and signed by the party charged or by his authorized agent:    3. Those for the creation or transfer of any interest in lands, except leases for a term not exceeding one year. 4. Those that are not to be performed within one year from the making thereof. In support of their position that the Statute of Frauds has not been complied with, appellees primarily contend that the memorandum of December 2, 1929, and the agreement of May 18, 1932, are not effective, and there was no part performance which can be recognized by a court of equity. Appellees cite Fairall v. Arnold, 226 Iowa 977, 285 N.W. 664, and certain quotations from previous cases in support thereof. Quoting from page 987 of 226 Iowa, page 669 of 285 N.W., where Judge Bliss quoted from the earlier Iowa case of Williamson v. Williamson, 4 Iowa 279, we said: `If a party would take a case out of the statute of frauds, upon the ground of a part performance, it is indispensable that the parol contract, agreement or gift should be established by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony; and the acts claimed to be done thereunder, should be equally clear and definite, and referable exclusively to the said contract or gift. ' While appellees strenuously deny the fact, it appears to this court that part performance of the trust established on December 2, 1929, was established by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony, as heretofore set out. In Volume I, Section 50, of Scott on Trusts, 2nd Ed., the following is stated: Although the cases involving oral trusts are not nearly as numerous as those involving oral contracts, the doctrine that part performance is sufficient to make an oral trust enforceable in spite of the statute of frauds is well settled. There are many cases in which the court has held that because of part performance the oral trust is enforceable   . In Section 46 of Scott, supra, referring to the memorandum of December 2, 1929, and the agreement of May 18, 1932, and the statute of frauds, the text states: 46. What the memorandum must contain. Although the memorandum required by the statute of frauds may be any writing, whether formal or informal, signed by the proper party, it is not sufficient unless it shows with reasonable definiteness, the trust property, the beneficiaries, and the extent of the interests of the beneficiaries or the purposes of the trust. It is sufficient, however, if these things appear in the memorandum with reasonable definiteness.    42.2, of Scott, supra: Since the trustee is the party to be charged with the trust, a memorandum signed by him is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. 42.3, of Scott, supra: A memorandum signed by the transferee is sufficient although signed subsequent to the transfer to him. The document of December 2, 1929, and Exhibit 52 ratifying the trust, describes in detail the Eugene K. Butler real estate by legal description and the personal property which is described as Sundry bonds and securities of the value of approximately five hundred thousand (500,000) dollars. XI. Appellees allege the Clean Hands doctrine bars Earle from relief in this Court of Equity. They contend Eugene and Sarah Butler transferred their property to Robert for two purposes: 1st; to prevent Hubert's creditors from securing any of their property. 2nd; to save inheritance taxes. This case involves only the actions of Earle; not those of his parents, nor of Robert. The specific allegation made by appellees against Earle is that in 1942, when Hubert and Margaret sued Robert, Earle advised Hubert to settle, and failed to tell Hubert and Margaret about the documents of December 2, 1929 and May 18, 1932. We have considered the matter of the documents, supra, in Margaret's case, Division III. Earle's advice to Hubert was in fact a wholesome brotherly gesture. Hubert had sued for one-third of the property transferred to Robert. Earle's recommendation to Hubert was that instead of securing a substantial amount of property, on which his many creditors could pounce, he should settle for a monthly allowance for life which would maintain him and Margaret. In addition to $16,500 cash to pay certain specific items, a settlement of $500 per month for life was arranged. It is true Eugene and Sarah Butler were fearful of Hubert's creditors making some inroads on the Butler fortune. This was doubtless an incentive for transfer of the property to Robert. But Earle had nothing to do with it. There was an inheritance tax proceeding in Chicago as to the Illinois property deeded to Robert. Robert resisted the action, and won it, but at the trial gave testimony hard to believe. Earle had nothing to do with the proceeding; either as a witness or otherwise. The record fails to disclose any incident on the part of Earle where his hands can be called unclean. There are certain well established principles as to the doctrine of unclean hands in equity. The defense of the clean hands doctrine is not favored by the courts. That this is true is shown by the language used in the case of Farmers Educational & Co-op. Union of America v. Farmers Ed. & Coop. Union, 141 F.Supp. 820. The opinion in this case is written by the judge for the Southern District of Iowa in the year 1956. In the opinion, the court said: The defense of unclean hands is reluctantly applied by the courts and is always scrutinized with a very critical eye. Coca Cola v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 41 S.Ct. 113, 65 L.Ed. 189. 1. The acts of Earle, above outlined do not affect the subject matter of this case. 2. Appellees were not prejudiced by any statements or acts of Earle. Barnes v. Barnes, 282 Ill. 593, 118 N.E. 1004, 4 A.L.R. 4; Carr v. Craig, 138 Iowa 526, 116 N.W. 720; Samaska v. Davis, 135 Conn. 377, 64 A.2d 682; Batesville Truck Line v. Marton, 219 Ark. 603, 243 S.W.2d 729; First National Bank of Ottawa v. Weise, 333 Ill. App. 1, 76 N.E.2d 538; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed.) Sec. 399; Thomas v. Klemm, 185 Md. 136, 43 A.2d 193. In Carr v. Craig, supra, this court said: The equitable rule that a plaintiff asking relief must come into equity with clean hands has reference only to the relations between the parties, and arising out of the transaction. `It does not extend to any misconduct, however gross, which is unconnected with the matter in litigation, and with which the opposite party had no concern.' City of Chicago v. Union Stock Yards, etc., Co., 164 Ill. 224, 45 N.E. 430, 35 L.R.A. 281; 1 Pomeroy, Equity (2d Ed.) § 399. The court in Samaska v. Davis, supra, said: That the maxim cannot avail the defendant in this instance is clear; it `only applies to the particular transaction under consideration, for the court will not go outside the case for the purpose of examining the conduct of the complainant in other matters or questioning his general character for fair dealing. The wrong must    be in regard to the matter in litigation.' Lyman v. Lyman, 90 Conn. 399, 406, 97 A. 312, 314, L.R.A.1916E, 643. In Batesville Truck Line v. Marton, supra, the court stated: `The wrong which may be invoked to defeat suit must have an immediate and necessary relation to the equity which the complainant seeks to enforce against defendant or it must in some measure affect the equitable relations between the parties in respect to something brought before the court for adjudication. If the wrong is sought to be merely collateral to the complainant's cause of action it does not constitute a matter of defense.' The court said in First National Bank of Ottawa v. Weise, supra: To permit a party to avail himself of `the clean hands' doctrine obtaining in equity courts, the inequitable conduct must be directed toward the defendant, and affect the equitable relations subsisting between the two parties and arise out of the transaction.  (Emphasis ours) Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, supra, states:  A court of equity is not an avenger of wrongs, committed at large by those who resort to it for relief, however careful it may be to withhold its approval from those which are involved in the subject-matter of the suit, and which prejudicially affect the rights of one against whom relief is sought. The rule does not go so far as to prohibit a court of equity from giving its aid to a bad or a faithless man or a criminal. The dirt upon his hands must be his bad conduct in the transaction complained of. If he is not guilty of inequitable conduct toward the defendant in that transaction, his hands are as clean as the court can require.    The party to a suit complaining that his opponent is in court with `unclean hands' because of the latter's conduct in the transaction out of which the litigation arose or with which it is connected must show that he himself has been injured by such conduct to justify the application of the principle to the case. The wrong must have been done to the defendant himself and not to some third party. (Emphasis ours) In Thomas v. Klemm, supra, the court said: It is an accepted rule that if the alleged wrongful conduct of a complainant appears not to have injured the defendant, the maxim (clean hands) cannot be successfully invoked. XII. Appellees contend the establishment of a trust as to the property deeded and assigned to Robert on December 2, 1929, would be void, as being in violation of our statutory provision against perpetuities. The Iowa Statute is Section 558.68, as follows: Perpetuities prohibited. Every disposition of property is void which suspends the absolute power of controlling the same, for a longer period than during the lives of persons then in being, and twenty-one years thereafter. Appellees' statement is that if the agreement of May 18, 1932, establishes a trust as appellants contend the    agreement might not become possessory within the period of perpetuities. Appellees argue further; Both plaintiffs assert that there was to be no ultimate distribution of principal until the estate tax and inheritance matters had been settled and debts had been paid for E. K. Butler's Estate. It is obvious that no one could foresee when those matters would be definitely terminated; hence, the period might well have exceeded the allowable period of lives in being and twenty-one years. As we are establishing that Earle is a cestui que trust of the trust which was administered by Robert, Earle's 1/3rd share became vested on December 2, 1929. As to his share Robert's only interest was administration and fulfilling certain conditions of the trust such as care of the parents, of Hubert, and payment of inheritance and other taxes. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Garver, 222 Iowa 196, 268 N.W. 568 (also cited by appellees) it is stated: A perpetuity is any limitation or condition which may take away or suspend the absolute power of alienation of an estate for a period beyond life or lives in being twenty-one years thereafter. The rule against perpetuities has no application to vested estates. 21 R.C.L. 288; In re Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 A. 392, 28 A.L.R. 366. In Wagner v. Wagner, 248 Iowa 353, 359, 360, 79 N.W.2d 319, states: The wording of our statute of course does not conform in all respects with the common law rule which was evolved by judicial and not legislative processes. The statement in 70 C.J.S., Perpetuities, § 3 may be accepted as an accurate statement of the common law rule: No interest is good `unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest,   .' We must agree that our statute, though not mentioning the word, does relate to the time of vesting. Our decisions quite generally so assume. See Commentary by Prof. Robert W. Swenson, 36 I.C.A. 747; Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa 92, 106, 61 N.W. 434; In re Trimble's Estate, 234 Iowa 994, 997, 14 N.W.2d 673; Banker's Trust Co. v. Garver, (supra); See also Restatement, Trusts, § 411. Also see Restatement of Trust, Section 62(R): r. Remoteness, administrative powers. Where a trust is created which may continue for a period longer than that of the rule against perpetuities but the trust is valid because all interests vest within the period, administrative powers conferred upon the trustee, such as power to sell, to lease, to mortgage, to invest, are valid, although they may be exercised after the expiration of the period. In Scott on Trusts, Second Edition, 1956, Sec. 62.10(2) it is stated: (2) Duration of trusts. If all the interests under a trust vest within the period of the rule against perpetuities, the fact that the trust may continue beyond the period does not invalidate it. In addition to the above clear precedents as to trusts, we would observe that the arguments of appellees as to inheritance taxes and debts of Eugene K. Butler, not being paid within 21 years after Earle's death, are so iffy and so unlikely, that the possibility of the statute against perpetuities ever becoming effective is in truth nonexistent. XIII. When the net one-third amount due Earle is determined by agreement between the parties, or by decree of a court of equity, the amount shall be the property of Earle as cestui que trust payable from the R. S. Butler Trust. Robert had no authority to transfer Earle's one-third of the Eugene K. Butler property to himself. He had no authority to transfer it from himself to the R. S. Butler Trust. Robert made a provision in the trust agreement for payment of claims against himself, in Article XIV of the agreement, as follows:  Section 1. Upon the death of the Settlor the Trustees shall pay from Trust B all of the Settlor's legal debts, and expenses of last illness and funeral in the event there are insufficient assets in the decedent's probate estate to pay such charges. Earle is also the owner of one-third of the Cameron County, Texas, land not yet sold, and one-third of the oil and mineral rights reserved as to such property when sale of part of the tract was made by Robert. Earle's share, therefore, is one-third of the proceeds of sale of the real property, and one-third of the sale value of the personal property, deeded and assigned by Eugene K. Butler and wife to Robert S. Butler on December 2, 1929; plus one-third of the income of such property throughout the intervening years until final accounting; less taxes, proper expenses, legitimate losses, if any, and the $52,258.25 paid by Robert to his parents. The $152,305.65 paid to Hubert and Margaret, by Robert, shall be considered paid from the other two-thirds of the Eugene K. Butler property. The decision of the trial court is affirmed as to Margaret S. Butler, and reversed as to Edward Earle Butler. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.