Opinion ID: 1953868
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District court jurisdiction for judicial review.

Text: The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 17A, provides that a party in an administrative contested case who does not file an application for rehearing must file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within thirty days after the issuance of the agency's final decision. Iowa Code § 17A.19(3). For judicial review of agency action other than a decision in a contested case, the petition may be filed at any time petitioner is aggrieved or adversely affected by that action. Id. If the board's decision regarding reinstatement of the protest of assessment is other agency action, there is no express statutory time limitation for filing a petition. If, on the other hand, the board's decision to deny reinstatement is a final decision in a contested case, Purethane would have thirty days from issuance of the decision to petition for judicial review. While we hold that this controversy is a contested case, the board's argument that Purethane failed to petition for judicial review within thirty days of issuance of the board's decision must fail. A contested case is defined as a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by Constitution or statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. Iowa Code § 17A.2(2); 701 I.A.C. § 7.1(17A). This evidentiary hearing is `an oral proceeding whose purpose is to determine disputed facts of particular applicability known as adjudicative factsthe who, what, when, where, and why of particular individuals in specified circumstances.' Allegre v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 349 N.W.2d 112, 114 (Iowa 1984) (quoting Bonfield, The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Iowa L.Rev. 285, 294 (1977)). If a hearing is not required, or the hearing required is not an evidentiary hearing, the adjudication will be categorized as other agency action. Id.; Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd., 330 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Iowa 1983). Our legislature has delegated to the director of the department of revenue and finance the power to establish rules necessary to carry out the agency's duties, including rules for practice and procedure before the department. Iowa Code § 421.14. 701 Iowa Administrative Code section 7.11(2) outlines the department's rules for petition for reinstatement of a dismissed protest. This section provides: The review unit shall review the application [which sets forth the facts upon which the protester seeks reinstatement] and notify the protester whether the application is granted or denied. If the review unit denies the application to reinstate the protest, the protester has thirty days from the date the application for reinstatement was denied in which to request, in writing, a formal hearing before the administrative law judge on the dismissal. When a written request is received, the issue of the contested case proceeding shall be limited to the question of whether the protest shall be dismissed or not. Thereafter, the rules of the department pertaining to contested case proceedings shall apply in all dismissal proceedings. 701 I.A.C. 7.11(2) (emphasis added). According to department of revenue and finance rules, a controversy regarding a dismissal of a protest of assessment is a contested case and a formal evidentiary hearing is provided. As a party to a contested case, Purethane is entitled to the procedural due process rights afforded in sections 17A.10-.17 and .19. Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 276 ([t]he importance of the distinction [between a contested case and other agency action] lies in the procedural due process which attaches to contested cases.); see also Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman v. Rolfes, 454 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Iowa 1990) (court holds agency investigation was not a contested case which entitled the individual investigated the procedural due process rights associated with formal agency adjudication); Farmers State Bank, Kanawha v. Bernau, 433 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Iowa 1988). While Purethane is held to the thirty-day appeal limitation found in section 17A.19(3), we make note of the heightened procedural due process to which parties in contested case proceedings are entitled to determine whether Purethane filed its petition within thirty days after issuance of the agency's final decision. The Iowa State Board of Tax Review does not have any agency rules regarding the form or timing of notice to a party of a board's decision in an appeal from the department of revenue and finance. The board has no rules for entering or filing final decisions. In the absence of rules, we scrutinize the board's notice procedure to determine whether it provided Purethane with adequate notice. Iowa Code section 17A.16 provides minimal guidelines which administrative agencies must follow regarding a final decision or order in a contested case. This section requires that [p]arties shall be promptly notified of each proposed or final decision or order by the delivery to them of a copy of such decision or order in the manner provided by section 17A.12, subsection 1. That subsection states, In a contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice in writing delivered either by personal service as in civil actions or by certified mail return receipt requested. We find that the board's notice was not prompt nor reasonable as required by these sections. The chairman of the board of tax review signed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order on the Purethane protest on November 28, 1990. The order was mailed certified to Purethane's attorney on December 11, 1990, thirteen days later. Only seventeen of the thirty days remained for Purethane's attorney to petition for judicial review. The board cannot hold its order for nearly half of the statutory appeal period and claim that its notice was either prompt or reasonable. In the absence of a file or entry system by which the public and parties to a controversy before the board of tax review can learn of the board's decision, due process requires the statutory appeal period begins to run when the board decision is officially made available as a public record. In McCubbin Seed Farm Tours, Inc. v. Tri-Mor Sales, Inc., 257 N.W.2d 55 (Iowa 1977), this court determined the date which controls the beginning of the statutory appeal period for an appeal from district court action. A summary judgment order bore the date November 18, 1975. The date the trial court signed the document was unknown. The judgment was filed on November 25, 1975. On December 19 the appellant filed notice of appeal. The appellee argued that the appellant did not timely perfect its appeal, because the appellant filed its notice thirty-one days after the date on the judgment. The appellant argued that it had timely appealed twenty-four days from the date the judgment was filed. We held that the controlling date for appeal purposes was the date the judgment was entered, citing Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 120 and 227. Id. at 57. Implicit in these rules are that, on the date of entry of judgment, the decision is entered on the record. Entry gives public notice, and particularly notice to the parties involved, of the action taken by the court. In the present case, the board's order was signed on November 28, 1990, but this date does not represent the date the order became available to the public or the parties. In Saemisch v. Ley Motor Co., 387 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1986), we considered the meaning of the words issue to the complainant and after issuance by the commission of a release-to-sue letter under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Iowa Code § 601A.16(2) and (3) (1985). Iowa Code section 17A.19(3) (1987) provides a petition for judicial review must be filed within thirty days after issuance of the agency's final decision. In Saemisch, an action under the Civil Rights Act must be initiated within ninety days after issuance by the commission of a release [giving the complainant the right to commence an action in district court]. Id. at 357-58. The complainant in Saemisch commenced his action under the Civil Rights Act within ninety days from the date he received his right-to-sue letter, but ninety-four days from the date the commission mailed the letter. We held that the complainant's ninety days began to run on the date the letter was mailed to the complainant by certified mail. We considered the dictionary definition of issue, which is to cause to appear or become available by officially putting forth or distributing or granting or proclaiming or promulgating. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1201 (1969). We also noted this legal definition, to send forth; to emit; to promulgate; as, an officer issues order, process issues from a court. Black's Law Dictionary 745 (5th ed. 1979). Based on our decision in McCubbin and Saemisch, the correct date which the board's order issued for purposes of determining the statutory appeal period is the date in which the order is put forth to the public and parties. Absent board rules which make decisions public by filing and entry, this date means the date the order is mailed by certified mail. Beginning the appeal period on the date of certified mailing does not violate due process. Saemisch, 387 N.W.2d at 359; cf. Eves v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm'n, 211 N.W.2d 324 (Iowa 1973). Purethane filed its petition for judicial review of the board's decision within thirty days of the December 11, 1990, certified mailing date. We find the district court had jurisdiction to hear Purethane's appeal.