Opinion ID: 44882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Upon receipt of MCI’s appeal, we certified the following jurisdictional 5 question to the parties for further briefing:1 Whether the district court’s remaining rulings in its December 22, 2005, order dispose of all of the claims as to all of the parties or are otherwise final or interlocutorily appealable. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292; Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204, 12 L.Ed. 404 (1848); Lockwood v. Snookies, Inc. (In re F.D.R. Hickory House, Inc.), 60 F.3d 724, 726-27 (11th Cir. 1995); Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098, 1101 (11th Cir. 1995); Altantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 37576 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 767 F.2d 1495, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983). MGI responded that we had jurisdiction because the district court’s order was final as to MGI’s claim. MGI alternatively maintained that we had jurisdiction under any of the several exceptions to the finality rule. Specifically, MGI argued that its claim was entirely separate from the other issues in the case and that the court’s order conclusively determined its interest because the property could now be sold to another party. The Estate responded that we are without jurisdiction because the court’s order was an interlocutory order that did not fall within any of the exceptions to the final order rule. To be appealable, an order either must be final or fall into a specific class of interlocutory orders that are made appealable by statute or jurisprudential 1 We also issued a jurisdictional question concerning potential intervenors: “Whether the district court’s order denying the Conrad Angelino’s and Edwin Melendez’s motion to intervene is immediately appealable.” We do not address that issue here, however, as the parties have agreed that it is not relevant to the instant appeal. 6 exception. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292; Atl. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 375-76 (11th Cir. 1989). “A final decision is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983) (quotation omitted). If, however, the district court certifies for immediate review an order that disposes of one claim or party in a multi-party lawsuit by stating that there is no just reason for delay and entering a judgment, we have jurisdiction provided that the order is a final order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Am. Family Life Assurance Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 629, 630 (11th Cir. 1986). There are three judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: (1) the collateral order doctrine; (2) the doctrine of practical finality; and (3) the marginal finality rule. Atl. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 890 F.2d at 375-76; In re Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc., 796 F.2d 1435, 1437 (11th Cir. 1986). We conclude that jurisdiction is not provided here under either the doctrine of practical finality or the marginal finality rule. Thus, the only issue is whether we have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. “Under the collateral order doctrine, a court may exercise appellate jurisdiction if the challenged order: (1) conclusively determines a disputed 7 question; (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.” United States v. Bowman, 341 F.3d 1228, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2003); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 92 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atl. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 890 F.2d at 376. An order is considered effectively unreviewable if the appellant would suffer irreparable harm or would not be able to obtain an adequate remedy if unable to seek appellate review until the entry of a final judgment. Bowman, 341 F.3d at 1237. Given the facts in this case, we determine that we have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine because (1) the order at issue resolved a disputed question concerning MGI’s contractual rights to the ranch, (2) the question was separate from the merits of the government’s underlying civil forfeiture action, and (3) the order will not be effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment because a judgment in the underlying forfeiture action would be an insufficient remedy for MGI where the ranch would be sold to another party.