Opinion ID: 629118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Government's Appeal: Relevant Conduct

Text: 15 The legal determination as to the proper interplay among related guidelines is subject to plenary review. United States v. Schultz, 970 F.2d 960, 962 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1020, 122 L.Ed.2d 167 (1993). Therefore, we review de novo the district court's application of the relevant conduct guideline, U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, to the RICO guideline, U.S.S.G. Sec. 2E1.1. We conclude that the district court erred when it limited relevant conduct to conduct in furtherance of the predicate acts charged against Patriarca. We hold that relevant conduct in a RICO case includes all conduct reasonably foreseeable to the particular defendant in furtherance of the RICO enterprise to which he belongs. 16 We agree with the government that the language of the relevant conduct section, Sec. 1B1.3 2 , and its application to the RICO guideline, Sec. 2E1.1, are clear, and hence must be applied. Section 1B1.3 calls for determining the following guideline elements on the basis of relevant conduct as defined: (1) the base offense level, where the guideline specifies more than one base offense level, (2) specific offense characteristics, (3) cross references in Chapter Two, and (4) adjustments in Chapter 3. The RICO guideline, Sec. 2E1.1 3 , specifies more than one base offense level, including a cross reference to the offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity. See United States v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281, 284 (7th Cir.1992) (reference to underlying racketeering activity in Sec. 2E1.1(a)(2) is a cross reference), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2333, 124 L.Ed.2d 245 (1993); U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.5, application note 1 (cross references may be general, such as to the guideline for the 'underlying offense' ). Therefore, Sec. 1B1.3 requires the base offense level for Sec. 2E1.1 to be determined on the basis of relevant conduct as that term is described in Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1). 17 Section 1B1.3 states that in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, relevant conduct includes all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). This is often referred to as the accomplice attribution element of relevant conduct. Jointly undertaken criminal activity is defined in Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) as a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy. Id. (emphasis added). Here, the RICO enterprise--the Patriarca Family--was a jointly undertaken criminal activity. Thus, Patriarca is potentially liable for the foreseeable criminal acts of others in furtherance of that enterprise even though he did not personally participate in them. 18 The application notes expand on the role of relevant conduct in the case of criminal activity undertaken in concert with others. We quote from application note 2 to Sec. 1B1.3 at length because of the guidance it provides to courts in determining when a defendant is responsible for the conduct of others under the accomplice attribution element of the relevant conduct guideline: 19 In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, subsection (a)(1)(B) provides that a defendant is accountable for the conduct (acts and omissions) of others that was both: 20 (i) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and 21 (ii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. 22 Because a count may be worded broadly and include the conduct of many participants over a period of time, the scope of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant (the jointly undertaken criminal activity) is not necessarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not necessarily the same for every participant. In order to determine the defendant's accountability for the conduct of others under subsection (a)(1)(B), the court must first determine the scope of the criminal activity the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's agreement). The conduct of others that was both in furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant is relevant conduct under this provision. The conduct of others that was not in furtherance of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant, or was not reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity, is not relevant conduct under this provision. 23 In determining the scope of the criminal activity that the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's agreement), the court may consider any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others. 24 Note that the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to jointly undertake, and the reasonably foreseeable conduct of others in furtherance of that criminal activity, are not necessarily identical. For example, two defendants agree to commit a robbery and, during the course of that robbery, the first defendant assaults and injures a victim. The second defendant is accountable for the assault and injury to the victim (even if the second defendant had not agreed to the assault and had cautioned the first defendant to be careful not to hurt anyone) because the assaultive conduct was in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery) and was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity (given the nature of the offense). 25 U.S.S.G. 1B1.3, application note 2. 26 Application note 2 reflects recognition that the accomplice attribution provision of Sec. 1B1.3 operates to hold a defendant responsible for the conduct of others even though a count may be worded broadly and include the conduct of many participants over a period of time. So as to keep the criminal responsibility within bounds, Sec. 1B1.3 requires sentencing courts to ascertain on an individual basis the scope of the criminal activity that the particular defendant agreed jointly to undertake. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, application note 2. To do this, the court may consider any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others. Id.; see United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 488-89 (1st Cir.1993) (members of drug distribution conspiracy may be held accountable at sentencing for different quantities of narcotics, depending on the circumstances of each defendant's involvement); United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir.1992) (the crucial factor in accomplice attribution is the extent of the defendant's involvement in the conspiracy); Wilkens & Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C.L.Rev. 495, 511 (1990) (liability might be justified for those who are at the top directing and controlling the entire operation) (quoting 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law Sec. 6.8, at 155 (1986)). 27 On remand here, therefore, the district court must determine (1) the scope of the joint criminal activity explicitly or implicitly agreed to by Patriarca jointly with others; (2) whether the criminal acts proffered as relevant conduct were in furtherance of this jointly undertaken criminal activity; and (3) whether the proffered acts were reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. These determinations will fix the relevant conduct under Sec. 1B1.3 for purposes of calculating the offense level under Sec. 2E1.1. Such determinations are, of course, all inherently fact-bound. See, e.g. Innamorati, 996 F.2d at 488-89. 28 Rather than applying Sec. 1B1.3 to Sec. 2E1.1 in the straightforward manner discussed above, the district court limited relevant conduct to only those predicate acts that were charged against Patriarca personally--namely, the Travel Act violations. In doing so, the district court improperly treated the term underlying racketeering activity in Sec. 2E1.1(a)(2) as if it otherwise specified that relevant conduct should not apply to each offense of conviction (including the RICO conspiracy count and the substantive RICO count) and instead should apply only to the predicate Travel Act violations. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a) (Unless otherwise specified, ... cross references ... shall be determined on the basis of ... all reasonably foreseeable acts ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction ...) (emphasis added). This was error. Subsection (a) [of Sec. 1B1.3] establishes a rule of construction by specifying, in the absence of more explicit instructions in the context of a specific guideline, the range of conduct that is relevant to determining the applicable offense level.... U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, Background. The background commentary to Sec. 1B1.3 further makes clear that [c]onduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline range. Section 2E1.1--specifically the term underlying racketeering activity--contains no explicit instructions displacing the general rule in Sec. 1B1.3 that relevant conduct includes uncharged conduct. In a RICO case, there is no justification for limiting underlying racketeering activity just to predicate acts specifically charged against one defendant. 4 29 We, therefore, agree with the government that the term underlying racketeering activity in Sec. 2E1.1(a)(2) means simply any act, whether or not charged against defendant personally, that qualifies as a RICO predicate act under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1) 5 and is otherwise relevant conduct under Sec. 1B1.3. Because the reference to underlying racketeering activity is a cross reference, Sec. 1B1.3 comes into play and defines the range of conduct that is relevant.... See U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, Background. It follows that the acts of relevant conduct proffered by the government, all of which are racketeering acts that could have been charged as predicate offenses, come under the heading of relevant conduct for sentencing Patriarca on the RICO counts of conviction, provided they otherwise meet the accomplice attribution standards of Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). 30 To avoid this conclusion, Patriarca cites to application notes 1 and 5 to U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.2. He argues that these application notes show that the term underlying racketeering activity should be limited to the specific predicate acts charged against him. We think that neither application note is applicable here. 31 Application note 1 to U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.2 states the following: 32 This section provides the basic rules for determining the guidelines applicable to the offense conduct under Chapter Two (Offense Conduct). As a general rule, the court is to use the guideline section from Chapter Two most applicable to the offense of conviction. The Statutory Index (Appendix A) provides a listing to assist in this determination. When a particular statute proscribes only a single type of criminal conduct, the offense of conviction and the conduct proscribed by the statute will coincide, and there will be only one offense guideline referenced. When a particular statute proscribes a variety of conduct that might constitute the subject of different offense guidelines, the court will determine which guideline section applies based upon the nature of the offense conduct charged in the count of which the defendant was convicted. (Emphasis ours.) 33 Patriarca relies on the emphasized portion for the proposition that relevant conduct pertaining to composite crimes, like RICO, must be limited to conduct charged in the indictment. It is clear, however, from the full text of the application note, that the note is meant to guide courts in the initial selection of the applicable guideline in Chapter Two, not to limit cross references within a particular guideline. There is no question here that the applicable guideline for RICO convictions is Sec. 2E1.1. Thus, application note 1 to Sec. 1B1.2 provides no support for Patriarca's argument. 34 Application note 5 to Sec. 1B1.2 is equally immaterial to the application of relevant conduct to Sec. 2E1.1. Application note 5 relates specifically to Sec. 1B1.2(d), which states that: A conviction on a count charging a conspiracy to commit more than one offense shall be treated as if the defendant had been convicted on a separate count of conspiracy for each offense that the defendant conspired to commit. Application note 5 in turn provides the following: 35 Particular care must be taken in applying subsection (d) because there are cases in which the verdict or plea does not establish which offense(s) was the object of the conspiracy. In such cases, subsection (d) should only be applied with respect to an object offense alleged in the conspiracy count if the court, were it sitting as a trier of fact, would convict the defendant of conspiring to commit that object offense. Note, however, if the object offenses specified in the conspiracy count would be grouped together under Sec. 3D1.2(d) (e.g., a conspiracy to steal three government checks) it is not necessary to engage in the foregoing analysis, because Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2) governs consideration of the defendant's conduct. 36 U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.2, application note 5 (emphasis added). 37 In arguing that Sec. 1B1.2(d) and application note 5 limit relevant conduct in composite cases, like RICO cases, to conduct alleged in the indictment as predicate acts, Patriarca notes similar language in the application notes to Sec. 2E1.1 and the multiple count rules. Application note 1 to Sec. 2E1.1 states that [w]here there is more than one underlying offense, treat each underlying offense as if contained in a separate count of conviction.... Similarly, the introductory commentary to the multiple count rules provides that [s]ome offenses, e.g., racketeering and conspiracy, may be 'composite' in that they involve a pattern of conduct or scheme involving multiple underlying offenses. The rules in this Part are to be used to determine the offense level for such composite offenses from the offense level for the underlying offenses. Application note 8 to Sec. 3D1.2 refers specifically back to Sec. 1B1.2(d): A defendant may be convicted of conspiring to commit several substantive offenses and also of committing one or more of the substantive offenses. In such cases, treat the conspiracy count as if it were several counts, each charging conspiracy to commit one of the substantive offenses. See Sec. 1B1.2(d) and accompanying commentary. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3D1.2, application note 8 (emphasis added). 38 On the basis of this commentary, Patriarca contends that the only way to apply the multiple count section of the guidelines to a RICO conviction is to use the directions for the more commonly applied conspiracy, and hence the rule of Sec. 1B1.2(d). 6 We disagree. First, the definition of offense contained in the application notes to U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.1 is not limited to charged offenses. Instead, offense is defined to mean the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct under Sec. 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) unless a different meaning is specified or is otherwise clear from the context. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.1, application note 1(l ) (emphasis added). As stated previously, Sec. 2E1.1 does not specify a different meaning; therefore, there is no reason to interpret underlying offense to exclude uncharged conduct. 39 Furthermore, although applying Sec. 1B1.2(d) to RICO convictions has some superficial appeal, there would be insurmountable obstacles to its practical application. First, by its own terms, Sec. 1B1.2(d) is limited to counts charging a conspiracy. Therefore, it is difficult to see how Sec. 1B1.2(d) could apply to a substantive RICO violation (as opposed to a RICO conspiracy). Even overlooking this language, it would be impossible under application note 5 for a court to determine whether it would convict the defendant of conspiring to commit an underlying offense in situations where the defendant is charged with a substantive RICO violation and the underlying offense is not a conspiracy. Thus, Sec. 1B1.2(d) is inapplicable to nonconspiracy offenses such as a substantive RICO violation. 40 There are problems with applying Sec. 1B1.2(d) to RICO conspiracies as well. It seems clear from the plain text of Sec. 1B1.2(d), the application notes, and the official commentary 7 that Sec. 1B1.2(d) was enacted to deal with multiple object conspiracies charged in a single count. A RICO conspiracy, however, is considered a single object conspiracy with that object being the violation of RICO. United States v. Ashman, 979 F.2d 469, 485 (7th Cir.1992) (The goal of a RICO conspiracy is a violation of RICO.) (quoting United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S.Ct. 422, 93 L.Ed.2d 372 (1986)), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Barcal v. United States, 61 U.S.L.W. 3857 (U.S. April 6, 1993) (No. 92-1804). In enacting RICO, Congress intended that  'a series of agreements that under pre-RICO law would constitute multiple conspiracies could under RICO be tried as a single enterprise conspiracy' if the defendants have agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense. 8 United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 224-25 (3d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1192 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949, 102 S.Ct. 1451, 71 L.Ed.2d 663 (1982) (internal citation omitted)), cert. denied sub nom. Ciancaglini v. United States, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 157, 78 L.Ed.2d 145 (1983). 41 Application notes 1 and 5 to Sec. 1B1.2 are not, therefore, material to determining whether relevant conduct must be limited to predicate acts charged against a defendant. Instead, Sec. 1B1.3 determines the range of conduct that is relevant to cross references such as the term underlying racketeering activity in Sec. 2E1.1(a)(2), and the background commentary to Sec. 1B1.3 makes clear that [c]onduct that is not formally charged ... may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range. 42 Because the application of Sec. 1B1.3 to Sec. 2E1.1 is straightforward and unambiguous, the district court erred in resorting to the general principles underlying the guidelines and the general rule of construction that courts should construe statutes to avoid decision as to their constitutionality. See, e.g. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 2664, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989). [C]ourts should strive to apply the guidelines as written, giving full force and effect to the Sentencing Commission's interpretive commentary and application notes. United States v. Zapata, 1 F.3d 46 (1st Cir.1993); accord Stinson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1915, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993); United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51 (1st Cir.1993). Absent specific provision in Sec. 2E1.1 that underlying racketeering activity includes only charged predicate acts, we see no principled basis to read such a limitation into the provision. 43 Even were the application of relevant conduct to Sec. 2E1.1 less clear than it is, we would have trouble accepting the three principles cited by the district court as the rationale for limiting relevant conduct to the predicate acts actually charged against a defendant. The district court felt that the Sentencing Guidelines are closer to a 'charge offense' system than a 'real offense' system of punishment. Patriarca, 807 F.Supp. at 190; U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, 4(a), p. 5. In the court's view, the reason the government did not charge the conduct at issue in this appeal as predicate acts in the indictment is because the government had insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for this conduct. 807 F.Supp. at 191. Because conduct which the prosecutor can prove in court is supposed to impose[ ] a natural limit upon the prosecutor's ability to increase a defendant's sentence, U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, 4(a), p. 5, the court thought that it would be improper for a sentencing court to increase a defendant's sentence on the basis of uncharged predicate acts. 44 Similar arguments have been rejected by this court and virtually every other circuit court to have addressed the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 424 n. 6 (8th Cir.1992) (collecting cases), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1420, 122 L.Ed.2d 790 (1993). While the district court is correct that for the most part, the court will determine the applicable guideline by looking to the charge of which the offender was convicted, United States v. Blanco, 888 F.2d 907, 910 (1st Cir.1989), real offense principles enter into the punishment prescribed in the guidelines through the relevant conduct guideline, Sec. 1B1.3. Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L.Rev. 1, 11-12 (1988). Relevant conduct increases a defendant's sentence, sometimes very significantly, despite the fact that it was not charged in an indictment, e.g., Blanco, 888 F.2d at 910, and even despite the fact that a jury may have acquitted the defendant for that precise conduct. E.g., Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 16-17; United States v. Rumney, 867 F.2d 714, 719 (1st Cir.) (traditional sentencing factors need not be pleaded and proved at trial) (quoting United States v. Brewer, 853 F.2d 1319, 1326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946, 109 S.Ct. 375, 102 L.Ed.2d 364 (1988)), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3194, 105 L.Ed.2d 702 (1989). This is because sentencing factors, including the applicability of relevant conduct, need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 16-17; Galloway, 976 F.2d at 424 n. 6. As noted below, in pre-guideline cases courts likewise took into account untried criminal conduct when exercising sentencing discretion. The fact that the government has not charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt the conduct now asserted as relevant conduct does not prevent the increase in sentence resulting from the relevant conduct guideline. We see no special reason to deviate from this principle when dealing with a RICO conviction. 45 Nor are we as convinced as the district court that sentencing Patriarca on the basis of uncharged relevant conduct might be so unfair as to raise due process concerns. The district court assumed that if Patriarca was held responsible for either the Limoli or Berns murder, Patriarca would face a potential life sentence under the guidelines and the RICO penalty provision. We believe that the district court was mistaken in this assumption. The RICO statute sets the maximum prison sentence at 20 years unless the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. 1963(a) (emphasis added). We agree with the government that the statutory maximum sentence must be determined by the conduct alleged within the four corners of the indictment. Otherwise, a defendant would not know at the time of his arraignment or change of plea what his maximum possible sentence would be on the charged offenses. The charged conduct, if proven beyond a reasonable doubt, constitutes the violation of which a defendant is convicted. Patriarca's charged conduct included no acts such as would result in a life sentence. The predicate acts charged in the indictment were all violations of the Travel Act, which does not carry a possible life sentence. Therefore, while for sentencing purposes within the 20-year maximum Patriarca is liable for uncharged as well as charged relevant conduct, his maximum penalty is fixed at twenty years for each of the RICO counts. 9 The relevant conduct determination here affects only where, within that statutory range, Patriarca should be sentenced. 46 We are also unpersuaded by the district court's concern that sentencing Patriarca on the basis of uncharged predicate acts would be inconsistent with the Sentencing Commission's intention to set up a system which is not administratively unwieldy. Patriarca, 807 F.Supp. at 192. While it is true that considerations of administrative efficiency as well as procedural fairness prompted the Commission to require sentencing courts to determine the applicable guideline by looking to the charge of which the offender was convicted, it is also clear that the Commission intended real offense principles to apply to determine the applicability of various adjustments, including cross references. See Blanco, 888 F.2d at 910. The fact that application of real offense principles may burden a sentencing court with additional fact finding is no reason to ignore the Commission's compromise between real offense and charge offense sentencing. See id. at 911. Sentencing a RICO defendant on the basis of uncharged predicate acts may not, indeed, prove to be impracticable. Drug conspirators are frequently sentenced on the basis of drug transactions committed by coconspirators. In both situations, the court must determine the scope of the criminal activity agreed to by the defendant, the reasonable foreseeability of the conduct proffered as relevant conduct, and whether the relevant conduct was in furtherance of the jointly undertaken activity. To be sure, the wide range of crimes covered by RICO may inject new complexities, but, if so, the remedy lies with the Sentencing Commission. The courts are not empowered to rewrite the relevant conduct guideline. 10 47 Finally, the district court's observation that there are apparently no reported pre-guideline cases in which a RICO defendant was sentenced on the basis of an uncharged murder is not dispositive. There could, of course, have been such cases that went unreported or unappealed. Sentences were not usually the subject of published opinions prior to the guidelines. And courts often used material information from many sources in exercising their discretion to set a sentence within the permissible, often very wide, statutory range. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1362, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1084-85, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949); United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir.) (Any circumstance that aids the sentencing court in deriving a more complete and true picture regarding the convicted person's background, history, or behavior is properly considered. For that reason, ..., other crimes for which the defendant was neither tried nor convicted, and crimes charged that resulted in acquittal may be used by the sentencing court in determining sentence) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956, 108 S.Ct. 350, 98 L.Ed.2d 376 (1987). 48 We conclude that the principles put forward by the district court provide no adequate reason for limiting relevant conduct to charged predicate acts in RICO cases. Because the district court incorrectly interpreted the guidelines, it did not reach a host of other arguments raised by Patriarca in an attempt to avoid the straightforward application of the relevant conduct guideline, Sec. 1B1.3, to Sec. 2E1.1. These arguments include: whether due process and the Confrontation Clause require additional procedures, such as a higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence, in order to hold Patriarca responsible for the proffered relevant conduct; whether due process requires notice of proffered relevant conduct not otherwise disclosed in the indictment prior to the entry of a defendant's plea of guilty; whether sentencing Patriarca for murders that occurred prior to the effective date of the guidelines violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, even though the RICO offense extended beyond that date; whether the relevant conduct guideline exceeds the Sentencing Commission's statutory authority; and whether the government should be estopped from arguing that Patriarca is responsible for the proffered relevant conduct. Several of these arguments have been expressly rejected by this circuit and others. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51 (1st Cir.1993) (Absent bad faith ... the critical time for disclosure of sentence-related information is not prior to the taking of a plea, but prior to sentencing.); United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 739 (1st Cir.1991) (It is well established that the guidelines apply to a defendant whose offense begins before the guidelines' effective date and continues after the effective date.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2301, 119 L.Ed.2d 224 (1992); Galloway, 976 F.2d at 421-22 (rejecting argument that relevant conduct provision is not authorized by the Sentencing Reform Act). However, it is not necessary for us to decide these issues in the first instance. On remand, the district court should consider, and where appropriate, decide those issues that Patriarca chooses to assert again. 49 In a last ditch effort to avoid resentencing, Patriarca contends that the legal issue of how relevant conduct is applied to the RICO guideline has been effectively mooted by the district court's findings concerning the proffered acts of relevant conduct. Patriarca asserts that the in the course of determining whether an upward departure was warranted pursuant to Sec. 5K2.0 and Sec. 4A1.3, the court found, as a matter of fact, that the government had not established his criminal liability for five of the seven relevant conduct allegations--the Limoli and Berns homicides, the Carrozza drug dealing, the Ferrara hit, or the harboring of Alphonse Persico. 11 50 This contention has no merit. The district court expressly stated that because it found that relevant conduct must be limited to charged predicate acts, it was not deciding whether the crimes at issue with regard to relevant conduct were within the scope of the defendant's conspiracy and/or reasonably foreseeable consequences of it. Patriarca, 807 F.Supp. at 196. In discussing the purported conduct in its upward departure analysis, the district court merely stated that it was not persuaded that Patriarca knew of, or personally participated in, these offenses. However, a defendant can be accountable for the acts of his coconspirators under Sec. 1B1.3 without having been personally involved. The standard is whether the acts of coconspirators were in furtherance of the jointly undertaken activity and were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. The seven acts proffered as relevant conduct must be reexamined in light of this standard.