Opinion ID: 1377930
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stephens' Facial Challenge Fails

Text: Stephens' facial challenge to § 216 fails because Stephens cannot establish there are no child pornography defendants for whom a curfew or electronic monitoring is appropriate. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751, 107 S.Ct. 2095. One can imagine many defendants for whom curfew and electronic monitoring would be necessary to assure their presence at trial or ensure the safety of the community. An irrebuttable presumption of curfew and electronic monitoring would be appropriate in any case in which a judicial officer conducting a detention hearing would, in fact, find curfew and electronic monitoring to be warranted. See United States v. Gardner, 523 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1030 n. 3 (N.D.Cal.2007) (rejecting a similar facial attack because [t]here are circumstances where [the Adam Walsh] Act can be applied constitutionally e.g., where a court determines all the minimum conditions mandated by the Adam Walsh Act are in fact warranted). District courts across this country have found curfew and electronic monitoring to be appropriate in particular child pornography trafficking cases in order to stem the risk of flight and ensure community safety. See, e.g., United States v. Crites, No. 8:09CR262, 2009 WL 2982782, at  (D.Neb. Sept. 11, 2009). Such cases demonstrate sets of circumstances exist when the mandates of § 216 of the Adam Walsh Act are constitutionally valid. [3] Notwithstanding his inability to clear Salerno 's high hurdle for facial challenges, Stephens insists § 216 must offend the Fifth or Eighth Amendment because all defendants are presumed innocent, yet, under § 216, defendants are not afforded any individualized judicial consideration in deciding whether a curfew or electronic monitoring is appropriate, and a curfew or electronic monitoring will often be more harsh than necessary. Stephens argues that, in Salerno, the Supreme Court praised the procedural protections in the Bail Reform Act, including the right to a hearing and the right to present evidence. Stephens essentially complains the Adam Walsh Act strips judges of the discretion to decide whether a curfew and electronic monitoring are appropriate and impermissibly imposes a one-size-fits-all straightjacket restricting the liberty of accused child pornographers. We believe Stephens misreads Salerno, overestimates the impact of § 216 on the Bail Reform Act, and underestimates the breadth of Congressional power in fashioning bail procedures. Stephens reads Salerno too broadly based upon an apparent misunderstanding of its rationale. In Salerno, the Supreme Court entertained a substantive due process challenge to the procedures of the Bail Reform Act. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741, 751-52, 107 S.Ct. 2095. In concluding the Bail Reform Act did not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court lauded the Bail Reform Act's procedures including a hearing and an individualized determination regarding whether the pretrial defendant was a flight risk or danger to the community. See id. at 751-52, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Nowhere in Salerno, however, did the Supreme Court hold that, as a matter of procedural due process, mandatory conditions of release are always facially unconstitutional. Stephens overestimates the impact of § 216 of the Adam Walsh Act upon the Bail Reform Act. Section 216 does not deprive child pornography defendants of a detention hearing or an individualized determination whether detention or release is appropriate. As relevant here, the only effect of § 216 is to require a curfew and some electronic monitoring. The defendant remains entitled to a detention hearing and a large number of individualized determinationsincluding an individualized determination as to the extent of any mandatory conditions of release. In United States v. Kennedy, 327 Fed.Appx. 706, 707 (9th Cir.2009) (unpublished mem.), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made the following observation about § 216: Many of the terms of the Walsh Act are undefined. For example, a1 condition of electronic monitoring shall be imposed, but the statute does not require or define that condition to be continuous or limited to a particular locality. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). . . . A curfew must be specified, but the statute also does not define it as a certain time of day or night or number of hours per day. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(vii). Because curfew and electronic monitoring remain undefined, the district court possesses many tools in its discretionary toolkit. Finally, Stephens underestimates the breadth of Congressional power in fashioning bail procedures. Salerno, in upholding the Bail Reform Act, afforded Congress great leeway when constructing a legal framework for deciding whether to detain and how to release those charged with federal crimes. And the Eighth Amendment provides an even thinner reed upon which Stephens might base a facial challenge. The Supreme Court has stressed the Excessive Bail Clause does not prevent[] Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545, 72 S.Ct. 525, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952). Congress may ban bail in entire classes of cases, because the Eighth Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable. Id. at 546, 72 S.Ct. 525 (recognizing Congress's power to deny bail to all persons accused of capital crimes). We see nothing in the Supreme Court's relevant precedents to indicate the Adam Walsh Act's much less restrictive mandatory release conditions are facially unconstitutional. Cf. Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1161 (8th Cir.1981) (opining in noncapital cases Congress and the states may reasonably legislate as to the right to bail for certain offenses `provided the power is exercised rationally, reasonably, and without discrimination') (quoting United States ex rel. Covington v. Coparo, 297 F.Supp. 203, 206 (S.D.N.Y.1969)), vacated as moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) (per curiam).