Opinion ID: 2075877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity

Text: On May 22, 1987, Dawson's counsel filed a pre-trial motion for a change of venue. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 21(a). Dawson contended, in part, that extensive prejudicial pretrial publicity precluded him from receiving a fair and impartial trial in Kent County, where the crimes had occurred. That motion was denied. Throughout the subsequent pre-trial proceedings, including the jury selection process, Dawson's counsel renewed his motion for a change of venue. On each occasion, that motion was denied by the Superior Court. A change of venue will be granted only upon a showing of reasonable probability of prejudice. [9] McBride v. State, Del. Supr., 477 A.2d 174, 185 (1984) (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1522, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966)). To make such a showing, a defendant must present evidence of highly inflammatory or sensationalized pre-trial publicity sufficient for the court to presume prejudice. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1014. In the absence of showing inherently prejudicial pre-trial publicity, the defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice through voir dire. Id. at 1015. Accord McBride v. State, 477 A.2d at 185-86. Whichever path is chosen, the decision to grant or deny a request for change of venue is a matter for the reasonable exercise of the trial court's discretion. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1015 (citing Parson v. Delaware, Del.Supr., 222 A.2d 326 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 935, 87 S.Ct. 961, 17 L.Ed.2d 807 (1967)). Dawson asserted both bases for relief in his motion requesting a change of venue. Initially, Dawson's counsel argued that the highly inflammatory and sensational nature of the pretrial publicity was sufficient to create a presumption that Dawson could not obtain a fair trial in Kent County. The record reflects that news of Dawson's escape and the murder of Madeline Kisner was broadcast on various television and radio stations serving Kent County. In addition, many articles concerning the prison escape and the murder appeared in both The News Journal and The Delaware State News, the two major papers of general circulation in Kent County. The Superior Court reviewed the news media accounts submitted by Dawson's counsel, including an article printed in The News Journal on June 5, 1988, the day before jury selection was scheduled to begin. The Superior Court concluded that the news accounts were largely informational in scope and insufficient to give rise to a presumption of prejudice in the venire panel which had been summoned for jury duty. The record supports that decision. A rational factfinder could reasonably conclude that Dawson had not presented evidence of highly inflammatory or sensationalized pre-trial publicity sufficient for the [Superior] [c]ourt to presume prejudice.... Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1014-15. Compare Rideau v. State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963); McBride v. State, Del. Supr., 477 A.2d 174 (1984). It is well established that routine pre-trial publicity of a criminal case will not justify granting a motion for change of venue. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1014. Alternatively, Dawson's counsel argued that, even if prejudice could not be presumed from the news media accounts, actual prejudice was demonstrated during the voir dire of the venire panel. The record reflects that it took almost four full days to impanel the jury. During this time, there was individual voir dire of one hundred thirty persons, from two jury panels, before the jury of twelve and the four alternates were chosen. At the beginning of the Superior Court's session each day and at the end of the jury selection process, Dawson's counsel presented the trial judge with his own statistical evaluation, which demonstrated that a high percentage of the potential jurors indicated they had some knowledge or read something in the newspaper about the case. [10] The Superior Court was not persuaded to grant the motion for a change of venue on the basis of that statistical analysis. [11] The accused's right to a trial by a jury of his peers is fundamental to our criminal justice system. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1641, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). An essential ingredient of that right is that the jury consist of impartial jurors. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). However, the right to a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors, does not require that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 721-22, 81 S.Ct. at 1642. Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145, 57 S.Ct. 177, 185, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936). Prior knowledge of the facts and issues of the case, or even a preconceived notion of guilt or innocence, will not automatically disqualify a prospective juror if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based upon the evidence presented in court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1643, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); Dutton v. State, Del.Supr., 452 A.2d 127, 137 (1982). The Constitution lays down no particular test and there is no ancient and artificial formula for ascertaining a juror's mental attitude of appropriate indifference. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724-25, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1643-44, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). However, the method that has been consistently relied upon historically to ascertain a juror's mental attitude is voir dire. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2892, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. No. 14,692g, p. 49, 51 (No. 14,692g) (CC Va.1807) (Marshall, C.J.)). The purpose of voir dire examination is to provide the court with sufficient information to decide whether prospective jurors can render an impartial verdict, based upon the evidence developed at trial, and in accordance with the applicable law. Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d at 136; Parson v. State, Del.Supr., 275 A.2d 777, 780 (1971). The fact that a high percentage of prospective jurors had some knowledge of information about Dawson's case did not establish per se that an impartial jury could not be impanelled in Kent County. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). However, the situation did require the trial judge, through a careful use of voir dire, to determine what information each juror ha[d] heard or read, the source of the information and how it ha[d] affected his or her attitude toward the defendant and the case at hand. It is only after acquiring such knowledge that the judge is in a position to accurately evaluate a juror's responses and his eligibility to serve. Hughes v. State, Del.Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1042-43 (1985). Defendants in capital cases have a right to have jurors questioned individually in order to intelligently determine who should be challenged for cause and who should be challenged peremptorily. Steigler v. State, Del.Supr., 277 A.2d 662 (1972), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 939, 92 S.Ct. 2872, 33 L.Ed.2d 760 (1972). [12] The applicable Delaware statute provides: When a juror is called in a capital case, he shall be first sworn or affirmed upon the voir dire and then asked, under the direction of the court, if he has formed or expressed any opinion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner at the bar ... If his answer to the question be in the affirmative, he shall be disqualified to sit in the case, unless he shall say, upon his oath or affirmation, to the satisfaction of the court, that he feels able, notwithstanding such an opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence, in which event he shall be a competent juror, if not otherwise disqualified, challenged, or excused. 11 Del.C. § 3301. In Dawson's case, the voir dire examination of the venire panel was conducted individually. After following the requirements of the Delaware statute and the holdings of Dowd, the Superior Court concluded that each juror who was seated in Dawson's case could lay aside his or her impression[s] or opinion[s] and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 723, 81 S.Ct. at 1643 (citations omitted). The trial court's finding of impartiality is entitled, even on direct appeal, to special deference. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 724, 81 S.Ct. at 1643; Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984). However, the trial court's finding of juror impartiality, notwithstanding prior knowledge or impressions, cannot foreclose inquiry as to whether, in a given case, the application of [the] rule [of Dowd ] works a deprivation of [the defendant's] life or liberty without due process of law. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 723, 81 S.Ct. at 1643. When appropriate, as in highly publicized cases, this Court has a duty to independently evaluate the voir dire testimony of the impanelled jurors. Id.; Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d at 1041. The standard for appellate review of this issue is set forth in Irvin v. Dowd . The trial court's finding of impartiality ought not be set aside by the reviewing Court unless the error is manifest. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 723, 81 S.Ct. at 1643. The trial judge is in a unique position to evaluate jurors' assurances of impartiality because demeanor plays a crucial role in the determination of impartiality. Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d at 1041; Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); Dutton v. State, Del. Supr., 452 A.2d 127, 137 (1982). A juror may not be able to speak for his own bias simply because he is unaware of its existence. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221-22, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). See also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1031, 104 S.Ct. at 2888; Young v. State, Del.Supr., 407 A.2d 517, 520 (1979). In Dawson's case, the trial judge conducted a voir dire examination designed to elicit answers which [would] provide an objective basis for his evaluation of each juror. Gray v. State, Del.Supr., 441 A.2d 209, 219 (1982) (citing Young v. State, Del. Supr., 407 A.2d 517, 521 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2163, 64 L.Ed.2d 794 (1980)). The trial judge did not merely go through the motions. Id. The record reflects that the trial judge's determination of impartiality was made in Dawson's case only after an extended individual voir dire proceeding designed specifically to identify biased veniremen. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1038, 104 S.Ct. at 2892. Compare Hughes v. State, Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 1034 (1985); Parson v. State, Del.Supr., 275 A.2d 777 (1971). It is fair to assume that the method we have relied on since the beginning, e.g., United States v. Burr , usually identifies bias. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1040, 104 S.Ct. at 2893. The party seeking a change of venue has the burden of tendering cogent proof that a fair trial could not be had in the county in which the indictment was returned. McBride v. State, Del.Supr., 477 A.2d 174, 184 (1984). Neither the voir dire testimony or the record of pre-trial publicity in Dawson's case reveal the wave of public passion that would have made a fair trial unlikely in Kent County. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1040, 104 S.Ct. at 2893; Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 728, 81 S.Ct. at 1645; Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d at 1046. After an independent evaluation, we conclude that Dawson has not demonstrated a reasonable probability or reasonable likelihood of prejudice against him, by the jury that was impaneled as a whole, in Kent County. McBride v. State, 477 A.2d at 185. We find no manifest error in the Superior Court's decision to deny Dawson's motion for a change of venue, based upon prejudicial pre-trial publicity. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 723-24, 81 S.Ct. at 1642-43.