Opinion ID: 1561769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sexual Abuse Mitigation

Text: Anderson argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to uncover and present mitigating evidence that Anderson was sexually abused as a child. We note that the State's postconviction expert found the abuse allegations credible, and we also assume their credibility for the purpose of this analysis. Nonetheless, we conclude that trial counsel's performance was not deficient, in large part because Anderson himself was a barrier to the discovery of this evidence. We also conclude that the absence of this mitigation did not satisfy Strickland 's requirement of prejudice. [A]n attorney has a strict duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of a defendant's background for possible mitigating evidence. State v. Riechmann, 777 So.2d 342, 350 (Fla.2000). However, when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. At the evidentiary hearing, Anderson presented the testimony of his cousin, Raymond Green, who spent time with Anderson while they were growing up. Raymond testified that another cousin, Michael Green, sexually abused both of them, and he recounted a particularly violent episode when Anderson was about six years old. Anderson did not provide his trial counsel or his trial mental health expert any information about the abuse. Both trial counsel testified that had they known about the abuse, they would have presented the evidence during the penalty phase. Although Anderson chose not to reveal this information to his attorneys or to any experts until the postconviction stage, he asserts that had counsel been more thorough, counsel would have uncovered this information while preparing for trial. Before trial, to aid the defense in developing mitigation, Anderson was given a forensic assessment form to fill out. The form contained a wide variety of questions designed to elicit information about the defendant's background, including, among other areas, his family history, history of drug use, physical and mental health history, educational history, and history of any physical, mental, or sexual abuse. Anderson's lead trial counsel testified that he had never had a client be more thorough in completing the form than Anderson. Anderson's answers, though, denied sexual abuse. For example, in a section where Anderson was given a list of criteria and asked to underline each one that was a problem during his childhood, he did not underline a traumatic event, witness to violence, or most importantly, sexually molested. In a section on family history, Anderson described his childhood as normal, and where Anderson was asked [d]oes client think he/she was abused or neglected as a child, Anderson answered, no. In light of pointed answers like these and Anderson's failure to discuss the abuse with trial counsel or his trial mental health expert, counsel was not deficient for failing to uncover the sexual abuse. The failure to present sexual abuse mitigation was also raised in Morton v. State, 995 So.2d 233, 240 (Fla.2008). There, Morton argued that trial counsel was deficient for not presenting evidence that, as a child, he was sexually abused by his stepfather. Id. at 239. Counsel was aware that Morton was physically abused and that his stepfather sexually abused Morton's sister, but there was no evidence that Morton was sexually abused. Id. In fact, Morton specifically denied being sexually abused. In determining that Morton's ineffective assistance of counsel claim had no merit, this Court said, Thus, we conclude that counsel in the instant case was not deficient in failing to present evidence of this abuse, particularly when the victim of the alleged abuse denied that he was ever assaulted. Id. at 240; see also Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1110 (Fla.2006) (We cannot conclude that trial counsel was deficient for failing to pursue such mitigation when Davis himself failed to inform either counsel or mental health experts about this matter.). Because Anderson did not inform his trial counsel or his trial mental health expert about the sexual abuse and, when given the opportunity, he denied any abuse, he has not shown that trial counsel's performance was deficient. Therefore, he is not entitled to relief on this claim. However, even if we were to conclude that counsel's performance was deficient, Anderson is still not entitled to relief as he has not satisfied Strickland 's required showing of prejudice. In sentencing Anderson to death, the trial court found four aggravating factors, including CCP and prior violent felony. We have said that CCP and prior violent felony are among the weightiest of aggravators. Deparvine v. State, 995 So.2d 351, 381 (Fla.2008). Also, the trial court found as aggravating factors that Anderson committed the murder for pecuniary gain and that he had a prior felony conviction and committed the murder while on community control for that conviction. Moreover, Anderson murdered Young during the course of a bank robbery that he orchestrated to avoid being sent to a restitution center for failing to pay his outstanding restitution for grand theft. The record reflects a comprehensive plan, replete with instances of deception. Anderson visited the bank in the days leading up to the robbery, deceiving the manager and employees as to his true intent. Anderson obtained two loaded revolvers and took them with him to the bank on the morning of the offense. At that time, Anderson was still in disguise as a student seeking to show his appreciation to the bank employees for their help. Until the moment when Anderson walked back into the bank with the revolvers, he feigned a legitimate presence there. Out of ten shots fired, six of them were fired from the single-action revolver which required that the hammer be cocked each time before it was fired. Nine of the shots hit the victims, who also suffered blunt trauma in the incident. Anderson was caught while trying to steal the bank's surveillance equipment. Even if trial counsel were deficient in failing to present evidence of Anderson's childhood sexual abuse in mitigation, our confidence in Anderson's death sentence would not be undermined. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly denied postconviction relief on this claim.