Opinion ID: 178849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: money damages and the suits in admiralty act

Text: In addition to challenging the government's earlier interpretation of the shipping regulation, ACT seeks monetary damages, alleging that its bid was wrongly rejected by USAID in favor of substantially lower bids submitted by foreign flagged carriers. The district court dismissed this claim on the ground that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity in this case. Because this case does not fall within the exception to sovereign immunity in the SAA, we affirm. As a general rule, [t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, ... and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 422, 116 S.Ct. 981, 134 L.Ed.2d 47 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). The SAA's sovereign immunity exception provides as follows: In a case in which, if a vessel were privately owned or operated, or if cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a civil action in admiralty could be maintained, a civil action in admiralty in personam may be brought against the United States or a federally-owned corporation. 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a). Whether the United States has waived sovereign immunity in connection with shipping under the Food for Peace program is a question of first impression for our court. As the text of the SAA makes clear, the waiver of sovereign immunity applies only where a private party would be liable under admiralty law for the same conduct. See Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that the SAA waiver of sovereign immunity applies in any case in which, if a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained (internal quotation marks omitted)). ACT's alleged injury is that USAID wrongly rejected ACT's bid in violation of the federal laws governing cargo preference and food safety. But those lawsthe Cargo Preference Act and the Food Security Actregulate only the government's conduct. Because a private party could not be liable under either the CPA or FSA, the statutory waiver is inapplicable here. As the district court succinctly stated, the fatal flaw of [ACT's] argument is that no private person could be sued for a violation of the cargo preference laws or the federal regulations implementing them. The relevant statutes and regulations are directives to be followed by the Government, not private persons. Simply put, these laws regulate government, not private, conduct. An analogous situation arises in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which provides a waiver of sovereign immunity if a private person[] would be liable to the claimant. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). On the basis of this language, courts have held that the FTCA applies only if state law would impose liability on private persons under similar circumstances. Woodbridge Plaza v. Bank of Irvine, 815 F.2d 538, 543 (9th Cir.1987). The case of Westbay Steel, Inc. v. United States, 970 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.1992), is instructive. Westbay was a subcontractor of a construction company, Kardan Construction, Inc. (Kardan), that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) hired to construct an airport service station. Id. at 649. Kardan and proposed sureties executed a payment bond to comply with the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3131 (formerly 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a)), and an FAA officer approved the sureties. Westbay, 970 F.2d at 649-50. The Miller Act provides that a federal contracting officer should not approve a contract without ensuring adequate surety. 40 U.S.C. § 3131. When the contract fell through, Westbay filed suit against the United States under the FTCA, alleging that the FAA contracting officer negligently approved the sureties. Westbay, 970 F.2d at 649-50. We held that the contracting officer's alleged negligent approval of the surety bond was not cognizable under the FTCA. See id. at 651. Because the Miller Act governs only the actions of federal employees, there was no analogous private conduct for the failure to use reasonable care in the approval of sureties and the FTCA thus did not apply. See id. at 650-51. The same rationale applies here. Nor are we persuaded by the cases cited by ACT, as they involve situations in which a plaintiff would have a claim under maritime law were a private party in the government's shoes. See Asta Eng'g, Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed.Cl. 674 (2000) (seeking cancellation of government contract with third party because it interfered with plaintiff's own contract with government), abrogated on other grounds by Red River Holdings, LLC v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 768 (2009); N. Metal Co. v. United States, 350 F.2d 833 (3d Cir.1965) (considering an action to recover sum of money allegedly deducted from payment in bad faith); Gen. Marine Constr. Corp. v. United States, 738 F.Supp. 586, 587 (D.Mass. 1990) (alleging harm resulting from failure of dredge inspectors to appear in a timely manner). In sum, because a private party would not have been subject to the CPA or FSA or their implementing regulationsand because ACT would therefore have no claim against a private party in the government's shoesthe government has not waived sovereign immunity under the SAA. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the claim for damages.