Opinion ID: 2229967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deficient Performance of Counsel

Text: Defendant's argument regarding the deficient performance of his trial counsel centers upon section 5-8-4(a) of the Code. That section provides, in pertinent part: The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, or where the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12-13 [criminal sexual assault] or 12-14 [aggravated criminal sexual assault] of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1992). This court has determined that section 5-8-4(a) creates two exceptions to the general rule that consecutive sentences may not be imposed for multiple offenses which occur as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. The first exception occurs when one of the multiple offenses is a Class X or Class 1 felony and severe bodily injury is inflicted; the second exception occurs when one of the multiple offenses is a violation of section 12-13 (criminal sexual assault) or 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault) of the Criminal Code of 1961. When a defendant's convictions bring him within either of these two exceptions, the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of section 5-8-4(a) is triggered and consecutive sentences must be imposed. See People v. Wittenmyer, 151 Ill.2d 175, 195-96, 176 Ill.Dec. 37, 601 N.E.2d 735 (1992); People v. Bole, 155 Ill.2d 188, 196-97, 184 Ill.Dec. 423, 613 N.E.2d 740 (1993). In the instant case, defendant was charged by information with three counts relating to the events of April 30, 1994. Count I of the information alleged that defendant committed residential burglary by knowingly entering the home of M.W. without authority and with the intent to commit criminal sexual assault. See 720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 1992). Count II charged defendant with committing criminal sexual assault in that defendant performed an act of sexual penetration of the victim's sex organ with the knowledge that she was unable to give knowing consent. See 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(2) (West 1992). Count III alleged that defendant committed a second act of sexual penetration, again with the knowledge that the victim was unable to give knowing consent. See 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(2) (West 1992). Criminal sexual assault is one of the offenses which triggers the application of the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of section 5-8-4(a). Defendant's initial statements to the police, which were consistent with his subsequent trial testimony, indicate that defendant's actions during the early morning of April 30, 1994, were committed as part of a single course of conduct. Cf. Bole, 155 Ill.2d 188, 184 Ill.Dec. 423, 613 N.E.2d 740 (sexual assaults separated by several days were not committed as part of a single course of conduct). With respect to whether there was a substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective at any time during defendant's alleged crimes, it is clear that no such change occurred during the sexual acts. Furthermore, because the underlying felony for the residential burglary charge was criminal sexual assault, a conviction on the residential burglary charge would indicate, under the facts in this case, that there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective between that offense and the sexual acts. Accordingly, at the time of plea negotiations, it was apparent that defendant would be subject to the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of section 5-8-4(a) if convicted of more than one of the counts with which he was charged. Defendant maintains, however, that during plea negotiations with the State, his attorney did not inform him that he faced mandatory consecutive sentencing. [1] More specifically, defendant asserts that his attorney was unaware of section 5-8-4(a) and its relevance to defendant's case and, as a result, did not explain to defendant the true ramifications of rejecting the State's plea offer. In support of these assertions, defendant points to the following colloquy which took place during his sentencing hearing: [STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Yes Judge. People's recommendation here is 8 years in the Department of Corrections concurrent obviously I believe and the State's making no claim that these are two separate transactions or three separate transactions. The defendant was found guilty THE COURT: Well excuse me Mr. State's Attorney, we'll have to stop right there. I did a little reading on this and my understanding is [based on section 5-8-4(a) and case law] we're dealing here with [mandatory] consecutive sentences. [STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Okay Judge. THE COURT: I'll let [defense counsel] touch on that but that's the law. [STATE'S ATTORNEY]: In any case what the State's arguing for Judge is a term of 8 years in the Department of Corrections.    The State is asking, is recommending a sentence of 8 years in the Department of Corrections and how the Court arrives at that you know the State does stand corrected on the law as earlier stated. That's what the State's recommended. THE COURT: Thank you Mr. State's Attorney. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:    [I]t was never mentioned in the presentence report that it would be mandatory consecutive sentences.    [T]he assumption [was] that consecutive sentences [were] not even a possibility in this case so, we're kind of caught off surprise at this point with your Judge's conclusion that THE COURT: Wait a minute. It's not my conclusion. It's the law.    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:    I would propose at this time because it is a surprise because it's not in the presentence report and because it was never [the State's Attorney's] assumption nor mine that consecutive sentences [were] mandatory in this case. That I would like time to convince this Court otherwise and maybe a short recess at this point or coming back early next week and addressing this very serious issue because I can tell you this if that's the case it seriously impacted our plea discussions at that point before the case even started and I'm not prepared to argue that because it has not been brought to my attention until Your Honor just stated so and it's not in the presentence report. THE COURT: Well the law is the law is the law and whether or not you knew it at the negotiation stage or not really doesn't matter since Mr. Curry was given all his rights and had a jury trial. Negotiations, whatever happened in negotiations doesn't really matter. The law is there whether or not it's in the presentence report or not the law is still there and counsel is supposed to be aware of the law. As further support for his argument that defense counsel failed to inform him that he was subject to the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of section 5-8-4(a), defendant points to the stipulation and affidavit which were attached to his motion to reconsider his sentence. The stipulation states that had [defendant] been called to testify, he would testify that had he known that consecutive sentences were mandatory, he would have accepted the State's plea 4½ years of imprisonment on one count of criminal sexual assault. The affidavit, which was given by defense counsel, reads: During [plea] discussions, both myself and [the State's Attorney] assumed that Mr. Curry was not eligible for consecutive sentences. On the eve of trial, [the State's Attorney] offered to dismiss all remaining charges if Mr. Curry pled to one count of criminal sexual assault and a sentence of 4½ years. I nor anyone from my firm informed Mr. Curry that if he were convicted of more than one offense, consecutive sentences were mandatory. After speaking with [the State's Attorney] regarding the plea offer, I informed Mr. Curry that in my opinion, given his lack of prior criminal record, if convicted of any of these charges in Menard County, it was my belief that there was a substantial possibility that he would receive close to the minimum sentence of four (4) years. Based upon this advice, Mr. Curry rejected the State's plea offer. Mr. Curry informed me after his sentence that had he known that consecutive sentences were mandatory, he would have accepted the prosecutor's offer of a term of imprisonment of 4 1/2 years. Defendant maintains that the discussion at his sentencing hearing, his attorney's affidavit, and his own stipulated testimony firmly establish that during plea negotiations with the State, defense counsel was unaware of section 5-8-4(a) and thus failed to inform defendant of the actual risks associated with rejecting the State's plea offer. This failure, defendant argues, rendered defense counsel's performance during plea negotiations objectively unreasonable under the first prong of the Strickland test. In response, the State maintains that defense counsel's advice to defendant was not unreasonable. According to the State, and the appellate court below, defense counsel's failure to inform defendant about the possibility of receiving consecutive sentences is not indicative of deficient performance when viewed in light of the appellate court precedent which existed at the time of plea negotiations. In order to understand this argument more fully, a brief discussion of the case law interpreting section 5-8-4(a) is necessary. Section 5-8-4(a) provides that when a defendant commits multiple offenses as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, and either of the two triggering events described in the statute occur, then the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively. Section 5-8-4(a) does not specify, however, whether consecutive sentences must be imposed for every offense arising out of the same course of criminal conduct, or whether the imposition of consecutive sentences is limited to those enumerated offenses which trigger the application of the statute. Currently, our appellate court is divided on this issue. The First and Third Districts have concluded that consecutive sentences are mandatory only for the offenses which trigger the application of section 5-8-4(a). See, e.g., People v. Williams, 263 Ill.App.3d 1098, 1108-09, 202 Ill.Dec. 561, 638 N.E.2d 207 (1st Dist.1994); People v. Medrano, 282 Ill.App.3d 887, 894-97, 218 Ill. Dec. 383, 669 N.E.2d 114 (1st Dist.1996); People v. Porter, 277 Ill.App.3d 194, 199, 213 Ill.Dec. 861, 660 N.E.2d 118 (1st Dist.1995); People v. Ivey, 267 Ill.App.3d 310, 204 Ill. Dec. 695, 642 N.E.2d 157 (3d Dist.1994). The Fourth District, on the other hand; has concluded that consecutive sentences must be imposed for all the offenses committed as part of a single course of criminal conduct. See People v. Childs, 278 Ill.App.3d 65, 74-78, 214 Ill.Dec. 807, 662 N.E.2d 161 (4th Dist.1996). In the instant case, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, concluded that defense counsel's performance was constitutionally adequate. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court assumed that the crux of defendant's complaint regarding defense counsel's performance was that counsel failed to inform defendant that he could receive a consecutive sentence for his residential burglary charge. The court noted that under its recent decision in Childs, this failure by defense counsel would render his advice grossly inaccurate. However, the appellate court pointed out that Childs was not decided until long after defendant's plea negotiations had taken place and, thus, could not provide a basis for finding defense counsel's performance deficient. The appellate court also concluded that under the appellate authority which was controlling at the time of the plea negotiations, i.e., Williams, defense counsel's advice did not deprive defendant of effective assistance of counsel. Before this court, the State repeats this reasoning and argues that the case law concerning consecutive sentencing which existed at the time of defendant's plea negotiations precludes a finding that defense counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. We disagree. Defendant is not contending that his attorney failed to advise him of any particular case law interpretation of section 5-8-4(a). Rather, defendant maintains that his counsel was completely unaware of section 5-8-4(a) and, therefore, did not inform defendant of what was evident at the time of plea negotiations, i.e., that because defendant was charged with committing criminal sexual assault, one of the crimes which unequivocally triggers the application of section 5-8-4-(a), defendant would receive mandatory consecutive sentences if convicted of more than one of the offenses with which he was charged. For this reason, the split of appellate court authority represented by Williams and Childs is, at root, irrelevant to defendant's claim and cannot support the State's argument that defense counsel's performance was constitutionally adequate. Furthermore, the State is incorrect in arguing that defense counsel's advice was accurate under Williams. While Williams holds that consecutive sentences are mandatory only for the offenses which trigger the application of section 5-8-4(a), Williams also states that sentences for crimes not enumerated in section 5-8-4(a) may be served concurrently to one another after the consecutive sentences have been served. (Emphasis added.) Williams, 263 Ill.App.3d at 1108, 202 Ill.Dec. 561, 638 N.E.2d 207. Applying Williams ` reasoning to the case at bar, defendant would have to serve his sentence for residential burglary (a crime not enumerated in section 5-8-4(a)) after he served his consecutive sentences for the two counts of criminal sexual assault. Thus, under the express holding of Williams, which was controlling at the time of plea negotiations, and also under the holding of Childs, defendant faced a mandatory minimum 12-year sentence if convicted of the three offenses with which he was charged. Defense counsel did not inform defendant of this fact. Contrary to the State's assertions, defense counsel's failure cannot be justified by the appellate court authority which existed at the time of the plea negotiations. The State also argues that defense counsel's recommendation that defendant reject the State's plea offer was reasonable because counsel thought that, due to M.W.'s dreamlike state at the time of the assault, she would not be able to testify to any time period within which the acts of sexual penetration occurred. According to the State, defense counsel believed that this lack of evidence on timing would preclude a finding that defendant's acts were committed as part of a single course of conduct and would eliminate the possibility of consecutive sentences. See People v. Bell 259 Ill.App.3d 572, 573-74, 197 Ill.Dec. 211, 630 N.E.2d 1335 (1994) (trial court erred in finding that defendant's crimes were part of single course of criminal conduct where there was no testimony as to how far apart in time the acts of sexual penetration occurred and the two victims gave conflicting testimony on the timing of events). We reject this argument for several reasons. First, as the record clearly reveals, defense counsel's only strategy at trial was to show that defendant had awakened M.W. and, therefore, that she was able to consent to the sexual acts. Defense counsel never attempted to establish that the two acts of sexual penetration were committed as separate courses of conduct, and indeed, he could not reasonably have made such an argument in light of defendant's testimony and statements to the police. In addition, defense counsel's sworn affidavit-which is unchallenged by the State-indicates that counsel advised defendant to refuse the plea offer because he believed defendant would receive close to a four-year prison term if convicted of any of the offenses with which he was charged. Counsel's advice was not based on the belief that he could prove that the two acts of sexual penetration occurred during distinct courses of conduct. After trial, at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel did state that there was no time frame in which the two acts of sexual penetration occurred, and that they could have been separated by half an hour or much shorter than that. However, these comments were made only after the trial judge had informed defense counsel about section 5-8-4(a). As such, the statements were little more than an attempt at damage control by defense counsel following his illumination on the law. They were not an indication of a defensive strategy which existed at, or was employed after, the time of plea negotiations. Accordingly, we reject the State's argument that defense counsel's advice to defendant to refuse the plea offer was based on the strategic decision that, at trial, defense counsel would attempt to prove that the acts of sexual penetration were not committed as part of a single course of conduct. A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to be reasonably informed with respect to the direct consequences of accepting or rejecting a plea offer. United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir.1992); Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d, 262, 267 (5th Cir.1981); People v. Correa, 108 Ill.2d 541, 549, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985) (voluntariness of guilty plea depends upon whether the defendant had effective assistance of counsel); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 208-09 (1985) (same). Concomitantly, a criminal defense attorney has the obligation to inform his or her client about the maximum and minimum sentences that can be imposed for the offenses with which the defendant is charged. I ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 4-5.1, Commentary (2d ed.1980); Day, 969 F.2d at 43 (Knowledge of the comparative sentence exposure between standing trial and accepting a plea offer will often be crucial to the decision whether to plead guilty); People v. Blommaert, 237 Ill.App.3d 811, 816-17, 178 Ill.Dec. 531, 604 N.E.2d 1054 (1992); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 547 Pa. 111, 114-18, 688 A.2d 1172, 1174-75 (1997). In the case at bar, defense counsel did not fulfill this obligation. By his own admission, defense counsel was entirely unaware of section 5-8-4(a) and its relevance to defendant's case. As a result, counsel failed to provide defendant with the essential information that he faced a mandatory minimum 12-year prison term if convicted of the three counts with which he was charged. Indeed, by informing defendant that there was a substantial possibility he would receive close to a four-year sentence if convicted of any of the three counts, defense counsel affirmatively misstated the consequences of rejecting the plea offer and made unequivocal, erroneous, misleading representations ( Correa, 108 Ill.2d at 552, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307). Defense counsel's recommendation to reject the State's plea offer was not the product of a defensive strategy or judgment which was proven to be unwise only in hindsight. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95 (noting the deference which must be given to tactical decisions made at trial). Rather, counsel's advice was predicated on an understanding of sentencing law which was plainly erroneous when viewed at the time of plea negotiations. Based on the facts before us, we conclude that defense counsel's performance during plea negotiations was objectively unreasonable and fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. See Blommaert, 237 Ill.App.3d at 816-17, 178 Ill.Dec. 531, 604 N.E.2d 1054 (significantly erroneous advice regarding sentencing range to which defendant was subject constituted constitutionally deficient assistance); Day, 969 F.2d at 43-44 (same); Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 605 A.2d 103 (1992) (same); Commonwealth v. Napper, 254 Pa.Super. 54, 60, 385 A.2d 521, 524 (1978) (same).