Opinion ID: 2135031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the roster signed by Johnson was sufficient to release Association and City from liability.

Text: The circuit court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in part because Johnson executed a release of the Defendants from liability for injuries which she sustained as a result of participation in the softball activity. A release is contractual in nature and governed by the law of contracts. Erck v. Bachand, 69 S.D. 330, 335, 10 N.W.2d 518, 520 (1943) (citations omitted). The essential elements to a contract are: (1) Parties capable of contracting; (2) Their consent; (3) A lawful object; and (4) Sufficient cause or consideration. SDCL 53-1-2. Johnson argues on appeal that summary judgment was improperly granted because there was a material issue of fact regarding her consent. According to Johnson, at the time she signed the paper containing the release, she thought she was signing a roster, and therefore, there was no consent to release. Our standard of review of summary judgment is settled. In reviewing a grant or a denial of summary judgment under SDCL 15-6-56(c), we must determine whether the moving party demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and showed entitlement to judgment on the merits as a matter of law. The evidence must be viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party and reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party. The nonmoving party, however, must present specific facts showing that a genuine, material issue for trial exists. Our task on appeal is to determine only whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied. If there exists any basis which supports the ruling of the trial court, affirmance of a summary judgment is proper. Lamp v. First Nat'l Bank, 496 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1993) (citing Waddell v. Dewey County Bank, 471 N.W.2d 591, 593 (S.D.1991) (citations omitted)). To be valid, a release must be fairly and knowingly made. Paterek v. 6600 Ltd., 186 Mich.App. 445, 465 N.W.2d 342, 344 (1990) (citations omitted). A release is not fairly made and is invalid if the nature of the instrument was misrepresented or there was other fraudulent or overreaching conduct. Id. (Citation omitted). See also Dombrowski v. City of Omer, 199 Mich.App. 705, 502 N.W.2d 707, 709 (1993). In Paterek, the injured player claimed on appeal that there was an issue of material fact regarding whether the nature of the document which he signed was misrepresented as a roster, as opposed to a release. 465 N.W.2d at 344. While the Michigan Court of Appeals held that there was no genuine issue of material fact and the plaintiff's claim was barred by the release, beneath the relevant release language in Paterek was the statement I have read the above terms of this contract, understand them and agree to abide by them. I, the undersigned player, acknowledge that I have read and understand the above contract. Id. The Court in Paterek distinguished Kropff v. City of Monroe, 128 Mich.App. 450, 340 N.W.2d 119 (1983), which held that the trial court erred in granting the motion for accelerated judgment and resolving the factual dispute as to whether a release signed by the injured player was presented as a roster, not as a release. In distinguishing Kropff, the Paterek Court noted that the release in Kropff did not contain a plain and clear statement, directly before the signature lines, stating that the player acknowledged reading and understanding the contract. 465 N.W.2d at 345 (emphasis added). In this case, as in Kropff, the release did not contain a plain and clear statement directly before the signature lines. Rather, the release was at the bottom of the roster, beneath all of the signatures of the team members. Compare Dombrowski, 502 N.W.2d at 711 (There might be some validity to plaintiff's argument had the document been entitled `Rope Climb Sign-up Sheet' and contained a vague reference advising participants to read the reverse side before signing, with a clause waiving liability being printed on that reverse side in two-point type and written in such legalese that it would take a lawyer several hours to decipher.) According to Johnson's deposition, while she acknowledges signing a roster, she did not sign what she perceived to be a waiver or release. And Ronald Jeffries, the team's coach, testified that he did not explain the release to any of the players. Rather, he told the players that this was the roster which they needed to sign before they could play. Compare Id. at 710. ([H]ad Tremble handed the document to plaintiff stating that it was merely a sign-up form and of no consequence, then, perhaps, rescission would be appropriate on the basis that plaintiff's signature on the release form had been induced by fraudulent misrepresentation.) Whether Johnson was aware she was signing a release and releasing the Defendants from liability for injuries which she sustained as a result of participation in the softball activity is a factual question. In granting the Defendants' motion, the circuit court resolved this factual question. This was error. If a court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, engages in fact-finding, reversal is required. Kropff, 340 N.W.2d at 120. Summary judgment should not be granted unless the moving party demonstrates a right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy. Silingo, 458 N.W.2d at 383 (citation omitted). Controversy exists as to whether Johnson consented to the release. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists. We reverse and remand for trial. AMUNDSON, J., concurs. WUEST, J., concurs in result and concurs specially. MILLER, C.J., and, HENDERSON, J., dissent.