Opinion ID: 853449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pressure on a Juror

Text: After deliberations, the jury announced to the trial court that it found Mickens guilty. Upon polling the jury, however, the court discovered that Juror # 12 still had some uncertainty in her mind about the verdict. The court instructed the jury to continue deliberations. The same juror later informed the bailiff that a juror was threatening her and calling her names. The trial court conducted an inquiry of Juror # 12. Juror # 12 told the court: The other black female in the jury has been very angry at me because I'm not deciding what their side is deciding and she's been calling me names. She's been saying I'm immature. And basically, putting me under a lot of duress. (R. at 334.) Upon questioning by the court, the juror indicated that she understood that how one decides to vote on a verdict is an individual decision and said she was taking it very seriously. (R. at 335, 336.) Then, at Juror # 12's request, the court replayed some testimony from the trial and instructed the jury to maintain civility during deliberations. (R. at 336, 338-39.) After the testimony was replayed, another juror sent a note to the court stating that Juror # 12 was not logical and not following the request of the Court. (R. at 344.) The bailiff told the court that Juror # 12 had said that she wished to be taken off the Jury. (Id.) The court conducted another inquiry of Juror # 12. Juror # 12 indicated that it was actually other jurors who wanted her off the panel, but that the jury's deliberations were now being conducted in a reasoned way and that she wished to continue serving. The judge instructed her to rejoin the other jurors and continue deliberations. After further deliberations, the jury again found Mickens guilty on both the murder and handgun charges. The court polled the jurors individually, and each juror confirmed agreement with the verdict. Mickens asserts that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury when the trial court denied his request for a mistrial based on juror misconduct during deliberations. On appeal, a trial judge's discretion in determining whether to grant a mistrial is afforded great deference, because the trial judge is in the best position to gauge the surrounding circumstances of an event and its impact on the jury. Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ind.1989). We therefore review the trial court's decision solely for abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. State, 270 Ind. 613, 388 N.E.2d 493 (1979). After all, a mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only justified when other remedial measures are insufficient to rectify the situation. Szpyrka v. State, 550 N.E.2d 316, 318 (Ind.1990) (citing Lee v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1165 (Ind.1988)). To prevail on appeal from the denial of a motion for mistrial, the appellant must establish that the questioned conduct was so prejudicial and inflammatory that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. Gregory, 540 N.E.2d at 589. The gravity of the peril is determined by considering the misconduct's probable persuasive effect on the jury's decision, not the impropriety of the conduct. Id. The trial judge in this case proceeded in a thorough and thoughtful way, confronting an unusual set of circumstances. He conducted two separate inquiries of the beleaguered juror to confirm the importance of the verdict being an individual decision, admonished the jury to maintain civility during their deliberations, and polled the jurors independently after the verdicts were announced to verify that the result was truly an individual decision. The affected juror assured the trial court that she understood how she voted was an individual decision, (R. at 335, 345-46), and she agreed with the jury's verdict, (R. at 349-50). Because the juror did not indicate any hesitation or unwillingness to continue deliberating in this matter, and certainly, she knows that she doesn't have to go the route that the other Jurors do, the court denied Mickens' motion for mistrial. (R. at 340, 342.) This approach focused on the right questions, similar to those at issue in a case in which two jurors received mysterious and possibly intimidating phone calls. Rodriguez, 270 Ind. at 616, 388 N.E.2d at 495. The jurors assured the court that the phone calls would not affect their decision in the case, and the court specifically admonished the jurors to not allow the calls to influence them during deliberations. We concluded that any prejudicial effect these calls might have had on the jury was cured by the court's inquiries and admonishments. Id., 270 Ind. at 617, 388 N.E.2d at 496. We reach the same conclusion in the case before us today. The road here was a little bumpy, but the trial judge was satisfied that the verdict represented the impartial and separate judgment of all the jurors. The court justifiably denied Mickens' motion for mistrial.