Opinion ID: 2570719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Award of Primary Physical Custody on the Basis of Anticipated Remarriage Was Improper.

Text: Custody determinations must be based on the best interests of the child as determined using the factors listed in AS 25.24.150(c). [5] The trial court must consider each of these factors, but it is only required to discuss relevant factors in explaining its decision. [6] Pertinent factors other than the eight specifically listed in the statute can be considered if they are relevant to determining the best interests of the child. [7] Here, the trial court determined in its written findings that both Brian and Marlene are excellent parents and that only physical distance and Cody's need to attend one school precluded shared physical custody. The court observed that, although Brian and Marlene differed in their parenting styles, both parents had spent equal time with Cody and both had support networks available to them. The court indicated that there had been no child abuse and that complaints about visitation were not significant. The court also found that both Marlene and Brian provide[d] positive environments and living arrangements and that there was no evidence that Cody would be better off with Brian than with Marlene. Finding all these factors essentially equal, the trial court proceeded to award primary physical custody of Cody to Brian based on the benefits of a two-parent household: Brian West and Anne Marie Gould plan to get married. Her background as a nurse is a positive factor which adds to the advantages for Cody in a two-parent household when he is with Mr. West. The significant difference between the parties is in what is ahead and the kind of household provided for Cody. Brian's household will be the better one for Cody's future. In the court's view, then, Brian's plan to marry Anne Marie, who would provide a two-parent household, gave him the advantage over Marlene, who would continue to work and had no plans to remarry. Other states have addressed the question of whether a court's ruling on custody in a divorce proceeding may rest on the assumption that a working parent who remarries will be able to provide superior care to the care provided by a single working parent. We agree with the well-reasoned decisions of other courts concluding that the presumed advantages of a two-parent household ordinarily should not determine an award of custody. [8] When awarding custody, the superior court is charged with determining the arrangement that will serve the best interest of the child in the specific case at hand. A child custody determination cannot be based on an assumption, unsupported by scientific evidence, that a working mother cannot provide such care. [9] Such an assumption unfairly forces divorcing spouses to choose between parenthood and livelihood; and it is likely to disproportionately deprive women of custody, since statistics indicate that divorced men are more likely to remarry a spouse who does not work outside the home. [10] The trial court expressed concern in its oral findings that, once Heather graduated from school and moved away from home, Marlene would need to drop Cody off at his grandparents' home to get ready for school. The court believed that this routine would be disruptive in comparison to the continuity of care that Cody would receive in the two-parent setting of Brian's home once Brian remarried. But the court's concern rests largely on its unexplained assumption that the added physical convenience of in-home care that Cody might receive from his new second parent  Anne Marie Gould  would outweigh the less tangible, but potentially vital emotional benefits he might receive by maintaining his close and already-established ties to Heather and his maternal grandparents. As other courts have observed, determining which parent can better meet the needs of a child in circumstances like these requires more than rudimentary hour-counting or reliance on an assumption that babysitters or extended family are less desirable care givers than stepparents. [11] A presumptive preference for in-home care by a new second parent implicitly treats parenthood as a fungible service, ignores potential stresses associated with stepfamilies, and runs counter to recent scientific evidence. [12] A court may certainly give custodial preference to a two-parent household when case-specific evidence points to the conclusion that the second adult custodian would be advantageous under the particular circumstances actually presented. But in our view, a presumptive preference for the two-parent setting is unwarranted. We thus conclude that, absent case-specific evidence indicating that Anne Marie Gould's in-home care would be of superior benefit to Cody than the care he would receive from his grandparents and sister, Cody's custody should not have been determined by an expressed preference for the advantages of a two-parent household. We turn, then, to the evidence presented at trial. Our review of the trial record reveals no case-specific basis for concluding that Cody's care in Brian's proposed two-parent household would be superior to the care that he would receive in the single-parent setting of his home with Marlene. The record certainly contains substantial evidence indicating that Brian and Anne Marie could provide excellent care. [13] But comparable evidence  accepted by the trial court  indicated that Cody would also receive excellent care from Marlene, Heather, and his maternal grandparents. What the record lacks, however, is specific evidence establishing which of the two possible home settings  a single-parent or two-parent household  would actually be better for Cody. Nor did the trial court appear to see a need for such evidence. As shown in its written findings, the court simply assumed, all other things being equal, that the two-parent household should have the advantage, because it offered Cody more time for in-home care. As we have already indicated above, this is an unfounded assumption. Child custody orders must be based on the best interests of the particular child. Here, we find no sound, case-specific evidentiary basis for concluding that the qualitative benefits of extended-family care that would have been available to Cody with Marlene should be deemed less desirable than the improved physical convenience of the in-home stepparenting that he might experience with Brian. Accordingly, we conclude that it was improper to award primary physical custody of Cody to Brian on the basis of Brian's anticipated marriage to Anne Marie.