Opinion ID: 323055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Comparative Analysis of the Statutory Language Differences

Text: 24 In support of his argument that there is no greater and lesser included offense relationship between the statute section on which defendant was indicted and the section on which he was convicted, 11 defendant Brewster points to four differences in language between the bribery section 201(c)(1) and the gratuity section 201(g): 25 1. The bribery section (c) is broader in that it refers to the receipt of anything of value 'for himself or for any other person or entity,' while the gratuity section (g) is limited to the receipt of 'anything of value for himself.' (Comparative Clause B, p. 67 supra.) 26 2. As to the requisite criminal intent, the bribery section (c) calls for the thing of value to be received 'corruptly,' while the gratuity section (g) merely refers to the acceptance or receipt of a thing of value 'otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty.' (Comparative Clauses A.) 27 3. The bribery section (c)(1) prohibits the receipt of anything of value 'in return for: (1) being influenced in his performance of any official act,' while the gratuity section (g) prohibits the receipt of anything of value 'for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him.' (Comparative Clauses C.) 28 4. The gratuity section (g), unlike the bribery section (c), applies to past official acts as well as future ones. (Comparative Clauses C.) 29 Taking these in reverse order, defendant agrees that the fourth difference is irrelevant in the light of the District Judge's dismissal of the only indictment count which related to a past act. As to the second and third (clauses A and C comparatively) defendant states that the offense defined by the gratuity section (g) is necessarily included within the offense defined by the bribery section (c)(1). 12 It therefore follows that these two differences do not preclude a charge based on the gratuity section being a lesser included offense within the bribery section. These two differences in comparative clauses A and C are, however, important later (Part V) in our analysis of the adequacy of the court's instructions. 30 It is on the difference in clause B, the inclusion in the bribery section of the phrase 'or for any other person or entity' with no equivalent in the gratuity section, that the defendant inveighs most heavily. He asserts that 'the offense defined by 201(g) (gratuity) is narrower than that defined by 201(c)(1) (bribery) and thus is by no means necessarily included within a violation of the latter statute.' 13 And, 'Violation of 201(g) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received something of value 'for himself.' Violation of 201(c)(1) on the other hand requires proof only that the defendant received something of value 'for himself or for any other person or entity. 14 31 First, as a matter of semantics, without recourse to our analysis in United States v. Whitaker, 15 we would think that if the gratuity offense is narrower than the bribery offense (and it is), then the narrower could fit within the greater, i.e., the gratuity offense is a lesser included offense of bribery. However, as defendant Brewster later developed his argument in brief and before the court orally, it appears that what defendant really means is that the bribery charge, being broader, is easier to prove and correspondingly harder to defend against. Therefore, defendant argues, the bribery cannot be a greater offense including the lesser gratuity offense, if the bribery charge is easier to prove and harder to defend. 16 Defendant couples this with a claim that, because the greater bribery charge was the more difficult to defend, he was not called upon the focus on the lesser gratuity charge, as he otherwise might have done successfully since it is easier to defend, and therefore lacked the proper notice we have held essential to the prosecution invoking a lesser included offense charge. 17 32 Second, directly pertinent to the above and dispositive of defendant's argument quoted at note 14 supra, the provision in section 201(c)(1) relating to use of payments received is phrased in the disjunctive, and defendant's analysis proceeds entirely on the face of the two subsections of section 201. However, defendant's argument fails to consider how the indictment must be drawn to be valid, and how the counts were in fact articulated as to defendant Brewster. These further considerations, to which we now turn, dispose of both the theoretical argument that an offense under the gratuity section cannot be a lesser included offense within the bribery section, and also of the argument that the defendant received no notice of the lesser included offense charge. 33