Opinion ID: 2634577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Remand for clarification

Text: NRS 38.237(4), part of Nevada's Uniform Arbitration Act, permits a court, upon the filing of a motion to confirm, vacate, modify or correct an arbitration award, to remand the matter to the arbitrator for certain limited action. The arbitrator may correct or modify an award to address mathematical miscalculations or mistakes in the description of a person, thing or property referenced in the award. [7] Remand is also appropriate to correct technical deficiencies in the form of the award [8] or to request the arbitrator to make a decision on a submitted claim that was not addressed in the award. [9] Finally, a remand is also authorized for an arbitrator to clarify an award. [10] HPN contends that, absent one of the statutory grounds enumerated in NRS 38.237, a district court lacks authority to remand a matter to an arbitrator. HPN asserts that the remand in this case does not fall within the statutory guidelines and was improper. We agree. Both parties agree that the award does not contain mathematical miscalculations, description errors, or technical deficiencies. In addition, the parties do not contend that the award failed to resolve all submitted claims. Therefore, only the clarification language of NRS 38.237(4)(c) is at issue. Commentators and case law establish that a remand for clarification is warranted only when an award is ambiguous: [11] There are limits to the reasons for which an award may be remanded to the arbitrators. A remand for clarification is proper when the award itself can be interpreted in a variety of ways, where an award cannot be understood or where it cannot be complied with because a party does not comprehend the relief granted. However, a matter should not be remanded if it is merely to have the arbitrators explain their award. [12] Remands that allow arbitrators to reexamine their decision on the merits are not permitted under the statute or at common law. [13] Neither HPN nor Rainbow ever contended that the award was ambiguous. HPN only argued that the arbitrator's statements regarding a higher mentoring burden demonstrated that the arbitrator had either converted the provider agreement into a partnership, thus exceeding the arbitrator's authority, or that the statements evidenced a manifest disregard of the law. In either case, HPN asserts that the appropriate remedy would be to vacate the award. [14] We therefore conclude that the district court erred in remanding the matter to the arbitrator with instructions to reexamine his decision in light of the district court's conclusion that the contract did not impose any mentoring burden upon HPN. Having concluded that clarification was not warranted in this case, we now turn to HPN's contentions that the award should be vacated because the arbitrator exceeded his authority or manifestly disregarded the law.