Opinion ID: 2724234
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Objection and Preservation for Appeal12

Text: As a threshold matter, we must first determine whether, under Rule 103(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,13 Shannon properly objected to the government’s cross-examination and preserved that objection so that we can exercise plenary review, or whether we must only review the alleged Doyle violation for plain error. We thus turn to the record. 12 We evaluate de novo a Fifth Amendment violation under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), unless the defendant failed to object at trial. Gov’t of the V.I. v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2010). In that case, we review only for plain error. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 1996). 13 Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that “[a] party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party” and, if the evidence is admitted, the party objecting “states the specific ground [for the objection], unless it was apparent from the context.” Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). 18 From a plain reading of the trial transcript, it is clear that the government asked Shannon about his post-arrest silence. When Shannon’s counsel attempted to object, he was emphatically overruled: Q: Did you ever direct anyone to come to the authorities and say, listen, you need to know about [Williams]? [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, may we have a side- bar, please? THE COURT: No. [Defense counsel]: I object to that. THE COURT: Overruled, if that’s an objection. [Defense counsel]: It’s a comment. THE COURT: He’s asking the question. Did you ever tell anybody about Williams. (App. at 1474.) Upon being directed by the District Court to answer the government’s question, Shannon did answer, but his counsel continued objecting and was, again, overruled: A: I told my lawyer about Williams. Q: Did you ever direct anyone to bring that information to law enforcement? [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, it’s a Fifth Amendment comment. I object. I would like a side-bar. THE COURT: You’re overruled. A: No. No. Q: You waited until you took the stand and then you told us about [Simpson, Williams, and Middlebrooks]; right? 19 A. Yes, sir. [Defense counsel]: I renew my objection, Your Honor. (Id.) Defense counsel’s consternation was fully justified, as the questions the government asked Shannon are patently beyond the bounds set in Doyle. They are indeed textbook examples of a Fifth Amendment violation. Notwithstanding the obvious error that the government’s questioning created at trial, and despite the specific and repeated objections from Shannon’s attorney, the government now contends that the objections were “insufficient to alert the court of the right he was asserting because defense counsel did not even tell the court that Shannon had invoked Miranda.” (Gov’t’s Br. at 22.) Repeating that line of attack at oral argument, the government claimed that the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) who prosecuted the case did not understand Shannon’s objection “because frankly Doyle wasn’t mentioned, Miranda’s not mentioned.” (Oral Arg. at 23:48-56.) The government thus asks that we adopt a bright-line rule that would require defense counsel to explicitly cite Doyle or its progeny when objecting to the government’s questions about a defendant’s post-arrest silence, as one of our sister circuits has recommended.14 (See Gov’t’s Br. at 22 (“In Shannon’s 14 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. O’Brien stated that objecting counsel should either “point to Doyle or a counterpart case or ... articulate an objection that was in substance close to the 20 case, defense counsel never mentioned Doyle in the district court. ... This was insufficient to alert the court of the right he was asserting because defense counsel did not even tell the court that Shannon had invoked Miranda – much less inform it that his objection had anything to do with Miranda – until after the trial was over.”).) We decline that invitation. To begin with, the government’s claim that it did not understand the objection is belied by the record. Besides the fact that defense counsel explicitly stated the grounds for his objection as being based on the Fifth Amendment, the colloquy among the AUSA, defense counsel, and the District Court after the defense rested makes clear that the government understood the nature of Shannon’s objection. Before closing arguments, defense counsel asked that the District Court provide “a very intense cautionary instruction on the government comment on my client’s silence.” (App. at 1489.) When the Court replied that Shannon “waive[d] [his] Fifth Amendment rights when [he] t[ook] the witness stand,” defense counsel rightly corrected the Court and explained that taking the witness stand does not waive a defendant’s right to be free of questioning about his postarrest silence. (Id.) While the government now pleads rationale of Doyle” to preserve the objection. O’Brien, 435 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2006). What appears to have motivated the court in O’Brien, however, was the fact that defense counsel in that case gave “the wrong ground” for an objection. Id. That is not the case here. Shannon’s counsel clearly objected and said, “Fifth Amendment comment.” (App. at 1475.) 21 ignorance, the AUSA arguing before the District Court apparently understood that defense counsel was objecting to the inquiry into post-arrest silence. In fact, the AUSA responded by stating that “[o]nce [the defendant] gets on the witness stand and presents his side of the story, he’s putting that out there and he waited a year to do that.” (Id. at 148990.) Although defense counsel continued disputing the propriety of the government’s inquiry into Shannon’s silence, the District Court declined to give any curative or cautionary instruction. Given that background, it beggars belief to hear the government now argue that the Fifth Amendment issue was not preserved for review. It was preserved, and the argument to the contrary actually borders on frivolous. We therefore will review the issue de novo and not, as the government requests, for plain error. Gov’t of the V.I. v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2010).