Opinion ID: 1698155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Law Self-Representation by a Defendant

Text: The United States Supreme Court has determined that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the constitutional right of self-representation and may forego the right of assistance of counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. In so holding, the United States Supreme Court clearly stated that it is incumbent on the trial judge to examine the defendant to determine whether the waiver of this important right is made knowingly and intelligently before allowing the defendant to proceed without the assistance of counsel. To implement the United States Supreme Court decision in Faretta, we adopted Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d), which states, in pertinent part: (2) A defendant shall not be deemed to have waived the assistance of counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry has been made into both the accused's comprehension of that offer and the accused's capacity to make an intelligent and understanding waiver. (3) No waiver shall be accepted if it appears that the defendant is unable to make an intelligent and understanding choice because of a mental condition, age, education, experience, the nature or complexity of the case, or other factors. In Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893, 105 S.Ct. 269, 83 L.Ed.2d 205 (1984), this Court affirmed the convictions of a criminal defendant who had represented himself at trial. In that case, we described the defendant as obstreperous and given to contumacious behavior. Id. at 257-58. We determined that the defendant burdened and delayed the court by his vacillation in not unequivocally choosing between court-appointed counsel, proceeding pro se, or obtaining his own counsel of choice. Id. at 258. While we found that the defendant's actions amounted to a waiver of his right to appointed counsel, we noted that the trial judge did conduct an appropriate Faretta -type inquiry. In that decision, we emphasized that a defendant who, without  good cause, refused appointed counsel is presumed to be exercising the right to self-representation and that the trial court should forthwith proceed to a Faretta inquiry. Id. at 258 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 185, 102 L.Ed.2d 154 (1988), we recognized that when one such as appellant attempts to dismiss his court-appointed counsel, it is presumed that he is exercising his right to self-representation. However, it nevertheless is incumbent upon the court to determine whether the accused is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel, and the court commits reversible error if it fails to do so. This particularly is true where, as here, the accused indicates that his actual desire is to obtain different court-appointed counsel... . Id. at 1074 (citations omitted) (first emphasis added). Because the trial judge in Hardwick had conducted an appropriate inquiry, we found no error. Finally, in Amos v. State, 618 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1993), we explained that a Faretta inquiry is necessary even when the defendant is very familiar with the criminal justice system. See also Taylor v. State, 610 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (surveying similar Florida cases); Burton v. State, 596 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).