Opinion ID: 175302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Special Needs Test

Text: The use of the special needs test would be problematic. The test was developed in cases outside of the law enforcement context and the Supreme Court has been leery of applying it to criminal cases. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001). The Court's language in Ferguson renders the government's suggestion that special law enforcement interests can be distinguished from ordinary law enforcement purposes questionable at best. [4] Id.; see also Friedman, 580 F.3d at 853(noting that [b]ecause the `special needs' exception applies only to non-law enforcement purposes, and the State's interest here is the use of data for purely law enforcement purposes, the `special needs' exception is inapplicable); and United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir.2006) (commenting that [c]rime prevention is a quintessential general law enforcement purpose and therefore is the exact opposite of a special need). We need not, however, determine whether the DNA collection provision could meet the special needs test because our precedent directs us to apply the totality of the circumstances test. In United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir.2007), we held: Taking our cue from Samson [ v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006)], we reaffirm that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, id. at 2201 n. 4, and adopt the general Fourth Amendment approach, which examin[es] the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a search is reasonable. Id. at 2197(quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a search is reasonable `is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy, and on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' Id. (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587). See also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832(We today reaffirm the continuing vitality of Rise [ v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995)]and hold that its reliance on a totality of the circumstances analysis to uphold compulsory DNA profiling of convicted offenders both comports with the Supreme Court's recent precedents and resolves this appeal in concert with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.). Accordingly, we review the mandatory DNA collection provision under the totality of the circumstances test.