Opinion ID: 2616316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Holding period for competency evaluation.

Text: Defendant finally asserts he was held beyond the maximum period allowed for determination of competency under RCW 10.77.090, and accordingly charges against him must be dismissed. RCW 10.77.090 provides for a maximum of two 90-day periods and one 6-month period. The first 90-day period begins when the court finds ... the defendant is incompetent ... The court so found on December 20, 1973, and defendant was duly committed for 90 days. Defendant was found incompetent at the hearing required at the end of this period, and committed for the second 90 days beginning March 19, 1974. At the end of the second 90-day period there was an incompetency hearing before a jury on July 16 and 17, 1974. Although there was a short delay between the end of the second 90-day period and the hearing, neither defendant nor his counsel objected to the delay, and RCW 10.77.090 provides for dismissal only at the end of the 6-month period. The jury found defendant incompetent and because they also determined (in addition to other statutorily required findings) there was a substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency within a reasonable period of time (RCW 10.77.090(3)), defendant was committed for the final 6-month period. [6] The record appears to show that the 6-month period began July 19, 1974, the date of the commitment order, and ended shortly before trial, which began July 29, 1975. Although the latter period is slightly over 1 year, the Superior Court did not have control over defendant from August 8, 1974, when defendant appealed the July 19, 1974, incompetency finding, until February 7, 1975, when the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal pursuant to defense motion. This means defendant was held under control of the Superior Court only a maximum of 10 days in excess of the 6-month period. He was found competent and tried 10 days after the 6-month period ended. There is no evidence, nor does defendant claim, the short delay prejudiced his case. In view of the fact defendant's rights were not prejudiced and the essential purpose of determining competency was fulfilled, we find the Superior Court substantially complied with RCW 10.77.090. See Kansas City v. Board of County Comm'rs, 213 Kan. 777, 518 P.2d 403 (1974). We have considered defendant's other contentions and find them to be without merit. The judgment and order are affirmed. WRIGHT, C.J., and ROSELLINI, HAMILTON, STAFFORD, UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, and HICKS, JJ., concur.