Opinion ID: 2070962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Life Qualified Voir Dire Open-Ended Questions Discretionary

Text: In Delaware, voir dire is conducted by the judge. Prior to jury selection, Manley requested the Superior Court to conduct a probing and open-ended voir dire, in an effort to identify any prospective jurors whose viewpoints about the death penalty might substantially impair their ability to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment. The Superior Court denied that request. It decided to ask the following two life qualifying questions: Do you believe that anyone who takes another person's life automatically forfeits his right to live? In the event that the jury found either defendant guilty in this case of first degree murder, would you automatically vote in favor of the death penalty regardless of the presence of any mitigating circumstances and regardless of Court's instructions on the law? In denying Manley's request for open-ended voir dire, the Superior Court stated, in part: This [jury voir dire ] is not a set script. I mean, I've discovered that some of the answers, you know, automatically, I think, common sense, lead to other questions that aren't even on here. Okay, and while I choose not to give such an open ended initial question as what are your views on the death penalty, I know  I mean we could go on ... that issue. The statute directs the court to focus on whether they have any conscientious scruples against the imposition of the death penalty and, if they do, whether they can set those scruples aside and obey the rule of law. Now, I think that's the heart of the matter for which the court has to direct its questions to the jury in this voir dire, but I  I know in other cases I have gotten answers, well, I'm not sure. You know, you do open up the doors there. What do you mean you're not sure? Explain what you mean. And they might go into, well, my philosophical position is  and I'm not going to interrupt them and say, excuse me, just limit your answer, you know. And I'm not foreclosing that in this case in the sense that if it seems to follow that that question is a logical successor to the answer which has been given by the prospective juror, I'll certainly ask that question and others like them. The record reflects that the Superior Court conducted individual voir dire of 204 prospective jurors over six days, before seating the twelve jurors and four alternates in Manley and Stevenson's joint trial. Exactly 100 prospective jurors were excused for cause for a variety of reasons. Consequently, 104 prospective jurors were asked voir dire questions about the death penalty. Eighteen (18) jurors (17.3%) were excused for cause by the Superior Court because they were not deemed to be life qualified. Conversely, 19.2% (20 jurors) were excused for cause because they were not deemed to be death qualified. The primary purpose of voir dire examination is to elicit prospective jurors' bias or prejudice. DeShields v. State, Del. Supr., 534 A.2d 630, 634 (1987). The goal is to secure for the defendant and the State an impartial jury that will be able to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented at trial and follow the court's instructions on the law. Id.; Hughes v. State, Del.Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1041 (1985). The standard for excluding a juror for cause, as a result of the juror's views on capital punishment, is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (citation omitted); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229-30, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). See also Jackson v. State, Del. Supr, 684 A.2d 745, 749 (1996); DeShields v. State, 534 A.2d at 634. The record reflects that the Superior Court conducted the life qualifying inquiry required by Morgan. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 n. 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The Superior Court asked generally whether each prospective juror believed that one person who kills another automatically forfeits his right to live. The Superior Court also asked specifically whether each prospective juror would, upon finding Manley or Stevenson guilty of first degree murder, automatically vote to impose the death penalty. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 723, 734-36, 112 S.Ct. at 2226-27, 2232-34. A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do and is not qualified to sit on the jury. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2229. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85-86, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2276-77, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). In Manley's case, the record reflects that when a prospective juror expressed a constitutionally unacceptable view in response to the life-qualified inquiry required by Morgan, the trial judge asked whether the juror could set that view aside, be impartial, and follow the court's instructions on the law. Manley challenges the Superior Court's follow-up questions and has characterized them as improper rehabilitation. The [United States] Constitution... does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2230. In interrogating a prospective juror about his or her view of the death penalty, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that open-ended questions requiring the juror to articulate those views in his or her own words are preferable. State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 590 A.2d 624, 637 (1991). Nevertheless, open-ended questioning is not required in order for the voir dire to be constitutionally adequate. See State v. Kreutzer, Mo.Supr., 928 S.W.2d 854, 864 (1996). See also United States v. Tipton, 4th Cir., 90 F.3d 861, 878 (1996). In order to identify unqualified jurors, the [ v ] voir dire must be probing enough to reveal jurors' prejudices ... so that counsel may exercise their challenges in an informed manner. State v. Miller, 197 W.Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535, 550 (1996). The voir dire conducted by the Superior Court in Manley's case was adequate for the trial judge to ascertain whether each prospective juror would be impartial. It also was sufficient to enable Manley's attorney to evaluate each juror for the purpose of either making a motion to excuse a juror for cause or exercising a peremptory challenge. Accordingly, we hold that the Superior Court properly exercised its discretion in conducting voir dire of the individual jurors in Manley's capital murder trial.