Opinion ID: 78594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Instructions on the Presumption and Insanity

Text: Williams also takes issue with the following instructions on the presumption: By law every person over the age of fourteen is presumed to be responsible for his or her acts. That is to say that every person over that age is presumed to have sufficient mental capacity to appreciate that certain types of conduct are criminal or are acts which are against the law. Thus this presumption is a fact in the case which must be considered by the jury along with other evidence. In applying these propositions you must consider all the evidence in determining the question of insanity at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes. In making your determination you may reject any or all expert testimony even though it is without conflict. Vol. III, Tab P-1 at R-603-04. The relevant instructions on insanity are follows: It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for any crime that at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense the defendant as a result of severe mental disease or defect was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. Severe mental disease or defect does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. Vol. III, Tab P-1 at R-602-03. Williams argues that these instructions suggested to the jury that because he is over the age of fourteen, it should presumed that he intended to commit capital murder. Williams further argues that because the jury instructions also required him to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is insane, the defense of insanity acts as a rebuttal to the presumption of intent. He therefore, argues that the presumption unconstitutionally shifted the burden to prove intent to him. After review of these instructions, we find this argument unpersuasive. Williams cites to Sandstrom v. Montana as an example of a proscribed presumption. See 442 U.S. 510, 521, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2458, 61 L.Ed.2d 39. In Sandstrom, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's state of mind or intent that is an element of a crime cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent. 442 U.S. at 522, 99 S.Ct. at 2458 (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978)) (emphasis omitted). A jury instruction which creates a burden-shifting presumption or a conclusive presumption is unconstitutional. Id. at 523-24, 99 S.Ct. at 2459 (citation omitted). Further, an instruction must not relieve the government of its burden of proving each and every element of the crime. Id. at 523, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (citation omitted); accord Parker v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 776 (11th Cir.2003) ([I]t is a commonplace of criminal law that a conviction violates due process if the jury did not have to find the elements necessary for a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (holding that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged). After reviewing the challenged presumption, we find that the principles set forth in Sandstrom were not violated for two reasons. First, in Sandstrom, the Supreme Court rejected conclusive presumptions that relieved the State of its burden to prove intent. 442 U.S. at 523-24, 99 S.Ct. at 2459 (citation omitted). In this case, however, Williams' argument is misplaced. We agree with the district court that the challenged presumption invokes a presumption of sanity, and not a presumption of intent as Williams suggests. The ultimate decision on the issue of intent was left to the trier of fact alone, and the trial court's simple mention of the presumption of sanity (not intent) did not invade the jury's fact-finding function. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523, 99 S.Ct. at 2459. Indeed, the instruction that a person is presumed to possess sufficient mental capacity to appreciate that his conduct is wrongful is a presumption of sanity. See Vol. III, Tab P-1 at R-603-04. Alabama law has long recognized the presumption of sanity, and we agree with the district court that Williams has failed to show that the presumption of sanity is unconstitutional. [15] Second, we reject Williams' contention that the presumption of sanity shifts the burden to prove intent to him. He argues that when read together, asserting an affirmative defense of insanity acts as a rebuttal to the presumption of sanity because he has to prove that he is insane by clear and convincing evidence. Williams asserts that if we examine the jury instructions in this manner, the charge violates principles of Sandstrom. Williams' argument is not only extraneous, but also it is a misunderstanding of Alabama law, and we find it groundless. In Archie v. State, Alabama summarized its principles on the issue of sanity as the following: 1. [b]y statute, there is a presumption of sanity extending to all persons over the age of 14. 2. The defense of insanity is an affirmative defense. The burden of proving this defense rests upon the defendant and never shifts to the State. 3. The burden upon the defendant is to establish the issue of legal insanity by [clear and convincing evidence] and to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury. 875 So.2d 336, 341 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (alterations in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted). [16] After review of the jury instructions and in light of Alabama law, we find that the presumption of sanity does not shift the burden of proving intent to Williams, nor do we find that asserting the affirmative defense of insanity acts as a rebuttal to the presumption of sanity. Rather, Alabama law allows the defendant to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was incapable of forming the requisite intent to commit capital murder. This is an opportunity for the defendant to explain why and how a mental disease could render him unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts even though his actions may appear to be deliberate and purposeful. See Ala.Code § 13A-3-1(a). Indeed, the burden to prove this by clear and convincing evidence is on the defendant. However, when asserting the affirmative defense, the burden remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams intended to commit capital murder. The two burdens are not mutually exclusive, and both parties have to carry their burden irrespective of the other. Because we find that neither the presumption of sanity nor the affirmative defense of insanity shifted the burden to prove intent, counsel were not ineffective for failure to object to these instructions. Accordingly, the State court did not apply Strickland in a manner that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law.