Opinion ID: 2101346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contrary Intention Must Be Ascertained from the Will Itself

Text: Probably the biggest mistake made by the Majority is their ignoring of Jaekel Estate, [] 424 Pa., supra, which is directly in point and controlling and isn't even mentioned by the Majority. It wipes out the standards and criteria upon which the Majority rely and fixes the law in accordance with the clear language of the Wills Act, which the Majority have overlooked or ignored. In Jaekel Estate, which involved the question of whether the decedent's daughter exercised her power of appointment, the Court said (pages 437, 438-439): This statute [Wills Act of 1947, Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 89, § 14(14), 20 P.S. § 180.14] presently controls. Section 14(14) provides that: `In the absence of a contrary intent appearing therein, [] wills shall be construed as to real and personal estate in accordance with the following rules: . . . .' The burden of demonstrating with clarity that the donee-testator has manifested a contrary intent in the will [] is placed upon those who challenge the exercise of the general appointive power: Thompson v. Wanamaker's Trustee, 268 Pa. 203, 214, 110 A. 770 (1920). Moreover, this `contrary intent' must `appear' in the will itself. In Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Scott, 335 Pa. 231, 6 A. 2d 814 (1939), this Court stated: `This [the 1917 statutory] presumption may be overcome, moreover, only by the presence in the will of language clearly indicative of a contrary dispositive intent, or of a form or method of disposition inconsistent with an exercise of the power. The contrary intent must appear from the will itself, not from extraneous circumstances. [] This appears from the words used in the statute and from the decisions which have construed it: [citing authorities].' (at p. 235) (Emphasis supplied). In Thompson v. Wanamaker's Trustee, 268 Pa. 203, 214, 110 A. 770 (1920), it was stated: `. . . the rule is ordained that he who, in any instance, denies that a general devise executes a general power of appointment, must prove by what appears on the face of the will that it was testator's clearly expressed intention the devise in question should not do so. [citing authorities].' From an examination of the statutory language it is clear beyond question that the `contrary intent' required to rebut the statutory presumption of the exercise of the power of appointment must appear in the will itself; unless within the four corners of the will such `contrary intent' can be demonstrated, application of the statutory presumption is mandated. The Court then analyzed and reviewed the conflict of prior decisions in this Court and in the Courts of our sister States, and in summary said (pages 444, 445): In In Re Deane's Will, 4 N.Y. 2d 326, 175 N.Y.S. 2d 21 (1958), the Court of Appeals, construing the provisions of the New York statute, held that the presumption provided by that statute could be rebutted `only by the express language or the necessary implication of the express language of the will itself.' (p. 332) and the Court refused to permit consideration of any evidence dehors [] the will as to the donee's statements of intent or the family background and proof of the relations between the party [sic], stating: `. . . the proof to rebut the statutory presumption must be found in the will itself, as the statute expressly says, and there was nothing in this will to that effect.' (p. 333). See also: In Re Estate of Hopkins, 46 Misc. 2d 273, 259 N.Y.S. 2d 565 (1964). The language of § 14(14) of the Wills Act, supra, is clear beyond question. Therein the legislature has provided explicitly [] that the statutory presumption shall prevail unless a contrary intent appears in the will itself. Under this legislative mandate we seek to find a contrary intent not in any facts or circumstances outside the will itself; our search is limited to the four-corners of the will. By reason of the terms of this statute we are confronted with a situation where we cannot adopt the usual `arm chair approach' in the construction of the will. . . . The very able judge in the court below did consider extrinsic evidence as an aid in construction of the instant will; in this respect the court below erred. The Majority have made several additional mistakes, each of which is fatal to their desired interpretation. They transform and pervert gossip of friends and common knowledge into knowledge on the part of the testator (the daughter's father); there was no direct testimony that testator knew or believed that his daughter could not have any natural children! Furthermore, the testimony as to the testator's unproved knowledge amounted at best only to hearsay gossip, and this hearsay gossip is inadmissible even by a Procrustean stretch of the pedigree or family history exception. The second additional error is that the Majority ignore what is really common knowledge  that a wife can and frequently does, ten years or more after marriage, have one or more children by her (same) husband when the previous belief by her and among her family and friends was that she was incapable of having any children. Cf. Dickson Estate, 378 Pa. 48, 50, 105 A. 2d 156. Finally, the Majority place great reliance on the word children, when his daughter had only one child and that child was subsequently adopted. How the word children aids the Majority's interpretation when there was no adopted child at testator's death, and only one child (and that one adopted) at his daughter's death, passes my comprehension. Moreover, if the testator at the time he drew his will had meant and intended to include in his gift his daughter's adopted child Paul, why would he have said children, if any ?