Opinion ID: 196355
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interception of Conversations Relating to Money Laundering

Text: 26 Title III specifies the offenses for which an interception order may issue. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(1)(a)-(o). Money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956 was so specified by legislation that became effective October 27, 1986. Pub.L. 99-570, Title I, Sec. 1365(c), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207-35. As noted, London argues that the initial interception orders authorized the interception of conversations relating to money laundering prior to the date on which money laundering was added to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(1)'s list of offenses. Even if we assume arguendo that the initial interception orders did authorize the interception of conversations relating to money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956 (a position with which the government forcefully disagrees and on which we take no position), London's argument lacks a factual basis. 27 London claims that the district court's initial interception orders issued on October 24, 1986, three days before money laundering became a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(1). The record reveals, however, that the initial interception orders issued on October 28, 1986, not October 24, 1986. Thus, money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956 was an offense for which an interception order could issue at the time of the initial interception orders issued in this case. 28 We therefore reject London's argument that the initial interception orders authorized the interception of conversations relating to money laundering at a time when money laundering was not a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(1). 29