Opinion ID: 1731783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: In its summary-judgment order, the trial court found that the contract between the Raines and Second Avenue was invalid for several reasons: a lack of certainty as to the parties, a lack of mutuality, and estoppel. The court also held that even if the contract were valid, a remedy of specific performance pro tanto would not be equitable in this case. The trial court certified its order as final and appealable as to [Second Avenue's] claim for specific performance pro tanto. Because the question of the validity of the contract is not before us, we do not express an opinion regarding the court's holdings on estoppel, mutuality, or certainty grounds. Specific performance pro tanto has been a recognized remedy in equity from our earliest history. Saliba v. Brackin, 260 Ala. 103, 108, 69 So.2d 267, 271 (1953). The doctrine provides: `[A] vendor whose estate is less than or different from that which he agreed to sell, or who cannot give the exact subject-matter embraced in his contract, will not be allowed to set up his inability as a defense against the demand of a purchaser who is willing to take what he can get with a compensation. The vendee may, if he so elect, enforce a specific performance to the extent of the vendor's ability to comply with the terms of the agreement. . . . ' Saliba, 260 Ala. at 108, 69 So.2d at 270 (quoting Pomeroy's Specific Performance of Contracts § 438, p. 903 (3d ed.)). The decision to grant specific performance rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge. Stringfellow Materials, Inc. v. Lee, 438 So.2d 1387, 1390 (Ala.1983). Moreover, the trial court will be overturned, on appeal, only if shown to be palpably erroneous. Stringfellow Materials, 438 So.2d at 1390. We have held that `[n]either party to a contract is entitled to specific performance as a matter of right,' but `whether relief shall be granted depends upon an equitable consideration of the particular circumstances of each case.' Dendy v. Anchor Constr. Co., 294 Ala. 120, 122-23, 313 So.2d 164, 165 (1975) (quoting Lee v. Crane, 270 Ala. 651, 653, 120 So.2d 702, 703 (1960); and Carlisle v. Carlisle, 77 Ala. 339, 341 (1884)). In the present case, the trial court, after considering the circumstances of this case, held that the court would be causing more problems for these parties than it would solve if it ordered Sam Raine III and Antoinette A. Raine to convey their interest in the property to [Second Avenue. Second Avenue] would then be a joint owner of the property with several people who are perfect strangers to it. Second Avenue points out that this Court dealt with similar circumstances in Pearce v. Third Avenue Improvement Co., 221 Ala. 209, 128 So. 396 (1930). In Pearce, the Court granted specific performance pro tanto when three sellers executed a contract to sell property and the contract was void as to one of the sellers, Pearce. Pearce was a married woman, and her husband had not signed the contract; thus, the tenants argued that, as to her, the contract was void for want of the joinder of her husband. 221 Ala. at 212, 128 So. at 398. The Court enforced the contract as to the remaining two sellers, even though doing so meant that the purchaser would become a cotenant with Pearce. This Court explained: The main objection seems to be that such partial performance will bring about a cotenancy between Mrs. Pearce and strangers, rather than those of her own choice. It is said this should not be done because the other owners never intended such result. In no case of part performance do the parties accomplish what they intend. The entire doctrine rests upon the fact that the vendors have intended and undertaken more than they can accomplish. Equity steps in to say if you cannot live up to the full terms of the contract, you will be held to performance so far as you can. 221 Ala. at 214, 128 So. at 399-400. In Pearce, the Court reviewed a trial court's order granting specific performance pro tanto. The Court afforded the trial court deference and found that the trial court committed no error in ordering specific performance. In this case, however, this Court reviews for palpable error a trial court's decision not to grant specific performance. Although we did not consider a newly created cotenancy among strangers enough to reverse a trial court's order granting specific performance pro tanto in Pearce, we did not hold, and have not held, that a trial court cannot consider such a circumstance in making its initial decision. Therefore, the fact that the trial court considered the potential cotenancy among the Ceravalos and Second Avenue does not constitute palpable error in this case. Moreover, the trial court's order reflects that the trial court considered other aspects of the contractual relationship between Second Avenue and the Raines in refusing to order specific performance. Specifically, the trial court discussed the fact that the contract named the nonexistent entity Cabana Hotel Group, rather than the Raines, as the seller. The court mentioned that no closing had ever occurred, despite the language in the contract indicating that time [was] of the essence. Also, the court discussed Antoinette Raine's statement to Second Avenue and to Arant that no binding sale of the property could be made until the Ceravalos agreed to sign a sales contract. Given the circumstances of this case, we find no palpable error by the trial court in declining to order specific performance pro tanto of the contract. The court properly exercised its discretion in denying the remedy of specific performance against the Raines.