Opinion ID: 1599516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: This Court's Jurisprudence Interpreting Section 775.021(4)(b)(2)

Text: More than twenty years ago, this Court recognized that there was considerable confusion in the law of this state concerning the proper method of construing criminal statutes in light of the prohibition against double jeopardy. See Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161, 164-68 (Fla.1987), superseded by statute, ch. 88-131, § 7, Laws of Fla. In an attempt to alleviate some of the confusion, we set forth rules of construction to address the issue of whether a single act could be the basis for multiple convictions: The first is that specific, clear and precise statements of legislative intent control and courts never resort to rules of construction where the legislative intent is plain and unambiguous. [ Carawan, 515 So.2d] at 165. The second step, absent a specific statement of legislative intent in the criminal offense statutes themselves, is to apply section 775.021(4), [6] codifying Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), to the statutory elements of the criminal offenses. We added judicial gloss by assuming that the legislature does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes, and that the courts should not mechanically apply section 775.021(4) so as to obtain unreasonable results. Carawan, 515 So.2d at 167. Subsection 775.021(4) was to be treated as an aid in determining legislative intent, not as a specific, clear, and precise statement of such intent. To assist in this analysis, courts are to make a subjective determination of whether the two statutory offenses address the same evil. Id. at 168. The third rule or step is the application of the rule of lenity codified as section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (1985).[n. 4] We recognized that application of the rule of lenity in subsection (1) might lead to a result contrary to that obtained by applying the statutory elements test of the offenses per subsection (4). We opined that the two rules only come into play when there is no specific statement of legislative intent in the criminal offense statute itself, i.e., when there is doubt about legislative intent. Thus we concluded that, by its terms, the rule of lenity controls and prohibits multiple punishments for the two offenses, even if each contains a unique statutory element and are separate offenses under subsection 775.021(4). [N.4] (1) The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused. § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1985). State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 615 (Fla. 1989), superseded by statute, ch. 88-131, § 7, Laws of Fla. However, during the next legislative session following Carawan, the Legislature effectively overruled Carawan by amending section 775.021(4) to include a specific statement of legislative intent: (4) (a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial. (b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this rule of construction are: 1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof. 2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute. 3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense. Ch. 88-131, § 7, Laws of Fla. (additions underlined). In the years since the statutory amendment, we have endeavored to give meaning to subsection (4)(b)(2), such that criminal defendants, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and lower courts can easily interpret this statutory exception to the Blockburger test. In Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153 (Fla.1994), this Court considered whether robbery with a weapon and grand theft of an automobile constituted degree variants of the same core offense under subsection (4)(b)(2). This Court determined that Sirmons's dual convictions for these offenses, arising out of a single taking of an automobile at knife point, violated double jeopardy. This Court reasoned that the dual convictions were impermissible under subsection (4)(b)(2) because the offenses were aggravated forms of the same underlying core offense of theft, distinguished only by degree factors. Id. at 154. In doing so, this Court relied on earlier decisions in which it found that dual convictions for other crimes that were also aggravated forms of theft violated double jeopardy. See id. at 153-54 (citing State v. Thompson, 607 So.2d 422 (Fla.1992); Johnson v. State, 597 So.2d 798 (Fla.1992)). Three years later, in State v. Anderson, 695 So.2d 309 (Fla.1997), this Court held that the prohibition against double jeopardy was violated where the defendant was charged and convicted of both committing perjury in an official proceeding and providing false information in an application for bail, based on a single lie. Id. at 310. This Court extended its holding in Sirmons, concluding that two offenses can be considered degree variants of the same underlying crime, even if they are not denoted in the same statutory chapter. Anderson, 695 So.2d at 311. However, in Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17 (Fla.2001), this Court narrowed its holding in Sirmons when it approved a decision affirming the defendant's convictions for attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery, and felony causing bodily injury: Extended to its logical extreme, a broad reading of Sirmons and the second statutory exception would render section 775.021 a nullity. Indeed, the plethora of criminal offenses is undoubtedly derived from a limited number of core crimes. In no uncertain terms, the Legislature specifically expressed its intent that criminal defendants should be convicted and sentenced for every crime committed during the course of one criminal episode. See § 775.021(4)(b). The courts' exceptions for homicides, which are discussed below, and theft, where the nature of the crime is often defined by degree of the violation, are consistent with the limited statutory exception. However, extension of this exception to multiple convictions for attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery, and felony causing bodily injury would contravene the plain meaning of section 775.021. Gordon, 780 So.2d at 23. While emphasizing the continued viability of the `core offense' construction of the second statutory exception[,] the Court adopted an approach articulated by Justice Shaw in his dissenting opinion in Carawan, whereby courts must discern what primary evil a specific offense is intended to punish to determine whether offenses are degree variants of the same offense. Gordon, 780 So.2d at 23-24. Justice Shaw noted: The primary evil of aggravated battery is that it inflicts physical injury on the victim; the primary evil of attempted homicide is that it may inflict death, there is no requirement that the state prove any physical injury. The two statutes are not addressed to the same evil. The relationship between aggravated battery and attempted homicide is different than that between aggravated battery and actual, not attempted, homicide. Carawan, 515 So.2d at 173 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Applying the primary evil test in Gordon, this Court found that the separate evils of intending to kill (attempted murder), seriously injuring someone (aggravated battery), and injuring someone during the commission of a felony (felony causing bodily injury), are sufficiently different that they warrant separate punishment. 780 So.2d at 23. Thus, the Court concluded that no double jeopardy violation occurred because the offenses were not degree variants of the same underlying offense. Id. at 25. This Court again applied the primary evil test in State v. Florida, 894 So.2d 941 (Fla.2005), to dual convictions for aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and attempted second-degree murder with a firearm. [7] The Court concluded: The primary evil of aggravated battery is an intentional, nonconsensual touching or striking, whereas the primary evil of attempted second-degree murder is the potential of the defendant's act to cause death. The evil of battery omits lethal potential, and the evil of attempted second-degree murder omits victim contact. Id. at 949. Based on the offenses' distinct primary evils, the Court found that the offenses were not degree variants of the same core offense, and thus no double jeopardy violation occurred. Id. This Court most recently applied the second statutory exception in State v. Paul, 934 So.2d 1167 (Fla.2006). There, the Court considered, inter alia, whether the defendant's dual convictions for lewd and lascivious conduct by rubbing his penis on the victim's stomach and lewd and lascivious conduct by intentionally exposing his penis to the victim, arising out of the same act, resulted in double jeopardy. Id. at 1174. [8] Finding that each of the offenses required separate elements that the other did not, the Court proceeded to determine whether any of the statutory exceptions applied. Id. at 1174-75. The Court concluded that the first and third exceptions did not apply. Id. at 1175. As to the second exception, the Court noted that both offenses stemmed from the same crime of lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of a child, but found that the crimes were not intended to punish the same evil: [O]ne forbids lewd or lascivious exhibition; and the other prohibits lewd or lascivious touching. Id. Thus, the Court found that the two crimes were not degree variants of the same core offense and subsection (4)(b)(2) did not apply. Id. Justice Cantero wrote a special concurrence in Paul in which he expressed his discomfort with the Court's continued reliance on the primary evil or same evil test articulated in Carawan, but abrogated by statutory amendment. Id. at 1176 (Cantero, J., specially concurring). Justice Cantero concluded that by looking beyond the statute to determine whether two offenses seek to punish the same evil, the majority defied legislative intent because the plain language of the statute does not mention the same evil test. Id. Rather, the statute simply prohibits separate punishments for crimes that `are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute. ' Id. (quoting § 775.021(4)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (1999)). Therefore, Justice Cantero reasoned, [t]he Legislature intend[ed] to disallow separate punishments for crimes arising from the same criminal transaction only when the statute itself provides for an offense with multiple degrees. Paul, 934 So.2d at 1176 (Cantero, J., specially concurring). The dissent in Paul asserted that Justice Cantero's approach came closer to the statutory language than the primary evil construction of the second exception, 934 So.2d at 1180 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but urged a return to the Sirmons line of precedent and an interpretation of the second exception that exempts from the presumption of multiple convictions those statutory offenses that are degree variants of a common core offense. Id. at 1182. The dissent concluded that the offenses of lewd or lascivious conduct by exhibition and lewd or lascivious conduct by touching are separate evils within the meaning of Florida and Gordon, which found battery and attempted murder to be separate evils, but they derive from the same core offense of lewd or lascivious conduct involving children. Id. at 1180.