Opinion ID: 770823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: City Council Members

Text: 78 Plaintiffs allege that the council members effectively promoted and ratified the use of excessive force by SIS officers by voting to indemnify SIS officers against punitive damage awards in excessive force cases. For reasons discussed below, we reject the plaintiffs' argument and reverse the district court's denial of qualified immunity for the council members. 79 In Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996), we examined whether council members could be liable under section 1983 for voting to indemnify LAPD officers against punitive damage awards in excessive force cases like those presently before us. We held that the council members were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that a policy of indemnifying punitive damage awards violates constitutional rights. See id. at 918. We observed that: 80 A city council does not violate section 1983 if it indemnifies officers against punitive damage awards on a discretionary, case by case basis, and complies in good faith with the requirements of Cal. Gov. Code S 825(b). 81 Id. Plaintiffs contend that since Trevino the law has been clearly established that a policy of indemnifying punitive damage awards violates constitutional rights. 82 The Cunningham/Soly incident occurred nearly one year before we decided Trevino. As a matter of chronological necessity, it was not clearly established before or at the time of the Cunningham/Soly incident that voting to indemnify officers against punitive damage awards could violate constitutional rights. Thus, even assuming that these decisions somehow promoted the alleged use of excessive force in the Cunningham/Soly incident, the council members are clearly entitled to qualified immunity for lawsuits based on preTrevino decisions to indemnify officers against punitive dam-age awards. 83 The Smith incident occurred approximately four months after we decided Trevino. In order to defeat the council members' motion for summary judgment in the Smith case, Smith must present some evidence that the council members did not implement section 825's indemnification procedure in good faith in the four month window between the Trevino decision and the Smith incident. Smith failed to meet this burden. 84 The council members submitted evidence indicating that they followed Trevino's instruction by evaluating officers' indemnification claims in good faith and on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, the council members point to the following evidence: 85 In Guerra v. City of Los Angeles, the council members deliberated for three days before deciding to indemnify an officer against a punitive damage award in an excessive force case. The council members repeatedly deferred voting until they received additional information and had a chance to confer with their attorney. 86 In Clark v. City of Los Angeles, the council members again held multiple sessions before deciding to indemnify an LAPD officer in an excessive force case. 87 In Tave v. Gates, the council members actually refused to indemnify an LAPD officer against a punitive damage award, despite the recommendation of the City Attorney that they do so. 88 The council members' evidence suggests that they implemented section 825's indemnification procedure in good faith in accordance with Trevino. Indeed, rather than following a policy of rubber-stamping City Attorney recommendations, the undisputed evidence shows that the council members considered each claim on a case-by-case basis. Smith's conclusory allegations cannot withstand the council members' motion for summary judgment. Thus, we reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment.