Opinion ID: 446770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Bifurcation of Trial on Liability and Damages

Text: 54 Kaiser next argues that because the liability jury did not distinguish among the alleged anticompetitive acts in its determination of causation, the damages jury could not know from what acts they could attribute damages. Thus, Kaiser contends, the issues on liability could not be separated from the issues on damages. We believe that Kaiser has confused the questions of causation and calculation of damages. Causation is an element of liability in this case. See REA v. Ford Motor Co., 560 F.2d 554, 557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923, 98 S.Ct. 401, 54 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). The liability jury properly found causation from only those acts which could evince the defendants' willful acquisition or maintenance of a monopoly. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowling Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 697, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977). In finding causation, the jury must find the nexus between the act and the injury. Once a jury has properly found causation of antitrust injury from unlawful activity, however, the damages in this case may be determined without strict proof of what act caused which injury as long as the damages are not based upon speculation or guesswork. MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1161 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 234, 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983). 55 Here, this result follows because it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to segregate and attribute a fixed amount of damages to any one act. The plaintiffs' basic injury was that Columbia was driven out of business. Further, the theory of the section two violation here is not that any one act in itself is unlawful, but that all the acts taken together show the willful acquisition or maintenance of a monopoly which damaged and forced Columbia out of business. When the antitrust injury is of an indivisible nature, the courts have permitted a relaxed standard of proof in calculating damages. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565-67, 101 S.Ct. 1923, 1929-30, 68 L.Ed.2d 442 (1981); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 698, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 1409, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962). When the antitrust injury is of an indivisible nature, and the jury properly found that that injury was caused by the defendants' monopolization or attempt to monopolize, and when the plaintiffs' proof of damages does not require distinguishing the various acts by the defendants, then it is unnecessary to segregate the damages according to the specific causes, and therefore, the issues in the liability trial are not so interwoven with the issues in the damages trial as to require a retrial of both. 56