Opinion ID: 1379033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissible for other purposes

Text: Under the collateral source rule, evidence showing an injured worker receives payments from collateral sources such as social security is indeed inadmissible to reduce the injured plaintiff's damages. Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wash.2d 802, 804, 585 P.2d 1182 (1978). The policy behind the rule is that the wrongdoer should not benefit from collateral payments made by third parties to the person he has wronged. Id. Certainly the majority would be correct in its analysis and outcome if the evidence in question were offered to mitigate a damage award. However, this evidence is offered for another purpose, and in Washington and nearly every other jurisdiction, evidence of collateral source benefits is admissible for other purposes, where relevant. See Alston v. Blythe, 88 Wash.App. 26, 40, 943 P.2d 692 (1997) (Evidence showing payments from a collateral source is inadmissible to reduce a claimant's damages. Such evidence may, however, be relevant for some other purpose.) (citing Ciminski, 90 Wash.2d at 804, 585 P.2d 1182 and Fleming v. Mulligan, 3 Wash.App. 951, 954, 478 P.2d 754 (1970) (footnote omitted)). [1] For example in Fleming evidence of collateral payments was admissible for the limited purpose of testing plaintiff's accuracy concerning the time he was absent from work. In this respect, collateral source benefits evidence is similar to many other types of evidence which are inadmissible for one purpose yet admissible for another. [2] Courts have long recognized that collateral source benefits evidence may be admissible to show the worker's motivation for exaggerating injury and desiring not to return to work. The American Law Reports annotation discussing the precise point at issue in this case summarizes relevant case law: [M]ost courts have recognized that, insofar as it tends to establish a motivation for inactivity unrelated to physical incapacity, evidence of a personal injury plaintiff's receipt of collateral source benefits during the period of his alleged disability is relevant to the basic issue of the extent of his injuries. William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence that Injured Plaintiff Received Benefits from a Collateral Source, on Issue of Malingering or Motivation to Extend Period of Disability, 47 A.L.R.3d 234, 238 (1973). Law review comments are in accord [3] as are most courts. For example, in Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1, 483 N.E.2d 793 (1985) the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held evidence that the injured worker was receiving more money in benefits than he did in wages while working was admissible for the purpose of showing motive not to work. Likewise, in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 555, 590 A.2d 914, 927 (1991), the Connecticut Supreme Court held evidence that the injured worker received more in benefits than he did in wages is admissible for the limited purpose of showing that the plaintiff's absence from work was not the result of disability but that the plaintiff was a malingerer who was motivated by her financial situation to remain out of work. In Nasser v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 435 Mich. 33, 457 N.W.2d 637, 651 (1990), the Michigan high court similarly ruled evidence of the collateral sources of insurance is offered [and is admissible] to prove malingering or exaggeration of injuries by plaintiff, rather than in mitigation of damages. For other examples see Blacha v. Gagnon, 47 Mich.App. 168, 209 N.W.2d 292, 296 (1973) ([E]vidence of receipt of benefits from a collateral source may be introduced to show the existence of a motive for remaining away from work.); Kish v. Board of Educ., 76 N.Y.2d 379, 558 N.E.2d 1159, 1162, 559 N.Y.S.2d 687, 690 (1990) (evidence of collateral benefits is inadmissible unless it is centrally relevant to issues in substantial dispute bearing on the legitimacy of the claim of permanent disability for example, plaintiff's motivation for not working and defense claims of exaggeration or malingering.); Burke Enter., Inc. v. Mitchell, 700 S.W.2d 789, 796, 57 A.L.R.4th 1167 (Ky.1985) (Nor is the tortfeasor entitled to introduce evidence at trial of such [collateral source disability] payments, except to corroborate other evidence, if there is any, that establishes malingering.); Soucy v. Martin, 121 R.I. 651, 402 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1979) (`the collateral source rule should [not] be an absolute prohibition to the introduction of evidence that a plaintiff was paid by his employer during the period of alleged disability when such evidence is offered to show that plaintiff was not disabled....') (quoting Bookbinder v. Rotondo, 109 R.I. 346, 285 A.2d 387, 393 (1972)); Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc., 4 Cal.3d 725, 484 P.2d 599, 605, 94 Cal.Rptr. 623, 629, 47 A.L.R.3d 224 (1971) (evidence of collateral source benefits is admissible where the evidence carries substantial probative value as proof that the plaintiff is a malingerer.); Leizear v. Butler, 226 Md. 171, 172 A.2d 518, 520 (1961) ([T]estimony [of collateral source benefits] is admissible if there is evidence in the case of malingering or exaggeration of injury but is inadmissible if there is no such evidence or if the question is asked for the real purpose of mitigating the liability of the defendant.) (Citations omitted.). Washington previously joined the growing family of jurisdictions which allow this evidence. In Ladley v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 73 Wash.2d 928, 934, 442 P.2d 983 (1968), this court held evidence of collateral benefits was admissible to show an injured worker's lack of motivation to return to work. The majority's attempt to distinguish Ladley is unpersuasive. Cf. Majority at 804.