Opinion ID: 2065493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bomb Scare

Text: Following evacuation of the jury panel due to a bomb scare, counsel for Lumpkin requested the empanelling of a new jury. That request was denied. Alternatively, counsel requested an individual voir dire for each member of the panel on their reactions to the bomb scare, which he feared they would attribute to the defendants. This request also was denied, although the court offered to voir dire the panel collectively. Counsel rejected that suggestion, continuing to demand an individual voir dire. The trial court enjoys broad discretion in conducting a voir dire, see Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931); Harvin v. United States, D.C.App., 297 A.2d 774 (1972), and the exercise of that discretion is limited only by the essential demands of fairness. Aldridge v. United States, supra, 283 U.S. at 310, 51 S.Ct. 470; Harvin v. United States, supra, at 777. [A]bsent abuse . . . of discretion, and a showing that the rights of the accused have been substantially prejudiced thereby, the trial [court's] rulings as to the scope and content of voir dire will not be disturbed on appeal. United States v. Robinson, 154 U.S. App.D.C. 265, 269, 475 F.2d 376, 380 (1973). While a voir dire on the bomb scare might have been advisable to determine if the impartiality of the panel members had been threatened, collective questioning, as the court proposed to do, would have sufficed. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request for an unnecessarily time-consuming individual voir dire.