Opinion ID: 1058661
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vileness Statutory Aggravator

Text: As a prerequisite to recommending a sentence of death, a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. Code § 19.2-264.2. In this case, the Commonwealth presented evidence on both the vileness and future dangerousness aggravators. The jury found both aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teleguz claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the vileness aggravator. He argues that the evidence of vileness is insufficient because he did not commit the murder and the only evidence that can attribute vileness to him is the evidence that he instructed the perpetrators to cut Sipe's throat. According to Teleguz, this direction alone does not support a finding that the actual acts performed to accomplish the murder are attributable to him. Further, while recognizing that the issue whether the acts committed by the actual murderer can be imputed to him is an open question, Teleguz argues that such imputation should not be allowed. In Lewis v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 302, 593 S.E.2d 220, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 904, 125 S.Ct. 201, 160 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the defendant was convicted of capital murder for hire of her husband. We approved the jury's finding of vileness because Lewis' actions, as the mastermind of the murder plot, constituted depravity of mind, an element satisfying the statutory definition of vileness. Id. at 316, 593 S.E.2d at 228. In Lewis, the defendant's actions included planning the murder to acquire her husband's money and life insurance proceeds, and, although he was still alive after the attack, taking his wallet from his person and waiting 45 minutes to call the police. Id. at 305-11, 316, 593 S.E.2d at 221-25, 227. Like Lewis, Teleguz was the mastermind of the murder for hire plot. He planned the murder to avoid his responsibility of supporting his child; directed and approved the purchase of the murder weapon; took the perpetrators to the victim's home; directed the murder be committed in the apartment without regard to the well-being of his child who would likely be present; and directed the actual manner of the murdercutting the victim's throat. Teleguz's specific directions for the manner in which Sipe was to be murdered are evidence of his depravity of mind. Furthermore, directing the manner of a murder necessarily includes knowledge of the expected physical attributes of the murder. In this case, the fatal wound was a deep stab wound to Sipe's neck which resulted in massive external and internal bleeding, causing Sipe to drown in her own blood. Depravity of mind, as used in Code § 19.2-264.2, is a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation. Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 245, 427 S.E.2d 394, 409, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848, 114 S.Ct. 143, 126 L.Ed.2d 105 (1993) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 25, 419 S.E.2d 606, 619-20, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958, 113 S.Ct. 421, 121 L.Ed.2d 343 (1992)). The facts in this case support a finding of such depravity of mind and thus satisfy the statutory predicate of vileness. The trial court therefore did not err in denying Teleguz's motion to strike the vileness statutory aggravator. In light of this holding, we need not address Teleguz's arguments regarding whether the actions of the perpetrator can be imputed to Teleguz.