Opinion ID: 1760726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issue of Whether Expert Testimony of Drug Recognition Instructor was Properly Admitted Waived by Failure to Request a Hearing on this Issue.

Text: Burton argues that the testimony of Darrell Cook, a drug recognition instructor, does not satisfy the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). But because Burton failed to request a Daubert hearing in the trial court or demand a ruling from the trial court on Cook's qualifications to present expert testimony, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the issue is properly preserved for our review. However, if the majority believes the issue was adequately preserved, I believe it should have provided guidance to the trial court about the admissibility of the evidence on remand instead of merely caution[ing] the trial court to test this witness and his conclusions per KRE 702. ... (Majority opinion, p. 141). After all, since the case is being remanded on other grounds and since it is highly likely the Commonwealth will again seek to admit Cook's damning testimony, why would the majority strain to find an issue preserved only to decline ultimately to resolve the issue? Without belaboring the facts, suffice it to say that I agree with the majority that the trial court's belief that the Commonwealth was entitled to an expert witness simply because the defense had one was improper. The facile old maxim, what's good for the goose is good for the gander, is not a proper basis for determining the admissibility of expert testimony. But I would refrain from deciding whether the trial court's ultimate decision was correct because I agree with the Commonwealth that this issue was not properly preserved. The majority also fails to decide explicitly whether the trial court's decision to admit the testimony was proper. It is unclear to me why the majority believes it proper to castigate Cook's testimony as being unqualified testimony that improperly invited the jury to speculate that Burton could have been under the influence of ... illicit substances of which there was no evidence [13] while refusing to take the next logical step of holding that the admission of that so-called unqualified testimony was improper. At best, Burton's concerns about Cook's qualification had been arguably raised to the trial court through Burton's earlier written objection, stating that the Commonwealth has not provided a curriculum vitae for Mr. Cook to allow the Court or the defense to determine whether Cook is or is not an expert in his field. But Burton failed to request a Daubert hearing or otherwise demand a ruling from the trial court on Cook's qualifications to testify as an expert witness, thereby waiving the issue. See Dillard v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 366, 371 (Ky.1999) (It is the duty of one who moves the trial court for relief to insist upon a ruling, and a failure to do so is regarded as a waiver.). Frankly, whether Cook was properly qualified to offer expert testimony about Burton's possible drug use based upon others' observations of Burton's behavior and vital signs poses a troubling question. But since an insufficient record has been developed on this question before the trial court, we should refuse to speculate on what an unrequested Daubert hearing might have indicated. Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Ky.2000) (We decline to speculate on the outcome of an unrequested Daubert hearing, or to hold that the failure to conduct such a hearing sua sponte constitutes palpable error); Mondie v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 203, 212 (Ky.2005) (issue of qualification as expert unpreserved where objection was to testimony as lay witness, and no Daubert hearing was requested). [14] What we should not do, however, is stretch our preservation rules past what had been recognized as the breaking point only to refuse to determine explicitly whether the contested evidence should have been excluded. Because the present case is being remanded on other grounds, why did the majority choose to address this issue at all if it did not want to resolve it on its merits? I firmly believe the issue was inadequately preserved for our review and, thus, would summarily affirm because this issue does not lend itself to palpable error review. Tharp, 40 S.W.3d at 368. But, since the majority finds the question to be preserved, I am perplexed as to why it did not choose to resolve this important issue.