Opinion ID: 3055099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction to Consider Jurisdiction

Text: Although this would seem to end the matter, it doesn’t. There is yet one more procedural ripple in the Fawcett pond. By its terms, the jurisdictional limitation in Rule 35(a) only prohibits the district court from changing a sentence outside the 14-day window. It does not prevent the district court from 12 Fawcett’s “sentencing” for purposes of Rule 35 more likely occurred on July 1, when the district court entered its order granting the government’s substantial assistance motion and correcting Fawcett’s sentence. See Phillips, 597 F.3d at 1199 n.20. 16 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 17 of 19 reconsidering its jurisdiction, an issue a district court may consider sua sponte. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995) (“The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the district court explicitly stated in its July 26 order, “[b]ecause defendant raises a jurisdictional issue, the Court grants reconsideration.” Indeed, the focus of the district court’s July 26 order was arguably a reconsideration of whether it even had jurisdiction to correct Fawcett’s sentence on July 1, and not solely whether Fawcett was otherwise entitled to Rule 35 relief. To the extent the district court in the July 26 order reconsidered whether it had jurisdiction to correct Fawcett’s sentence on July 1, the district court did not err in concluding it had such jurisdiction on July 1. As we explained in United States v. Lett, 483 F.3d 782 (11th Cir. 2007), “[t]he authority to correct a sentence under [Rule 35(a)] is intended to be very narrow and to extend only to those cases in which an obvious error or mistake has occurred in the sentence.” Id. at 787 (internal quotation marks omitted). We stated that cases have further defined what constitutes “clear error” under Rule 35(a) as “those obvious errors that result in an illegal sentence or that are sufficiently clear that they would . . . ‘almost certainly result in a remand of the case to the trial court for further action.’” Id. at 788 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee’s 17 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 18 of 19 note). Rule 35(a) is “not intended to afford the court the opportunity to reconsider the application or interpretation of the sentencing guidelines or for the court simply to change its mind about the appropriateness of the sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Contrary to Fawcett’s assertions, the district court here “did not simply change its mind; nor did it simply reconsider its calculations under the appropriate guidelines.” See United States v. Yost, 185 F.3d 1178, 1181 (11th Cir. 1999). Rather, it imposed the 35-month sentence on July 1 because the district court determined that the sentence on June 30 was imposed in reliance on the wrong guidelines range. Cf. id. A quick reference to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Sentencing Table made the error obvious, as a two-level departure resulted in a guidelines range of 33 to 41 months, not 27 to 33 months. And the district court acted well within the time frame imposed by Rule 35(a), correcting the sentence the day after the erroneous sentence was ordered and even prior to the entry of judgment. The district court did not err in concluding that it had jurisdiction under Rule 35(a) to impose Fawcett’s 35-month sentence on July 1, 2011.