Opinion ID: 1601643
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the law of the case doctrine, libel verdicts, and independent appellate review.

Text: The trial court, in effect, independently reviewed the record to determine whether the jury's verdict conformed to the constitutionally mandated burden of proof regarding falsity. In contrast, the Court of Appeals implicitly relied on the law of the case doctrine to reverse the trial court's directed verdict by adverting to its prior summary judgment ruling that a cause of action exists for defamation by implication. This Court noted in CAF Investment Co v Saginaw Twp, 410 Mich 428, 454; 302 NW2d 164 (1981), that the law of the case doctrine [a]s generally stated, [provides that] if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same. The law of the case doctrine exists primarily to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit. [12] In this sense, the law of the case doctrine is an analytical cousin of the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion. However, as Justice Holmes recognized almost a century ago, unlike the later doctrines, the law of the case doctrine merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power. [13] We do not here question the generally sound principles of efficiency, comity, and finality that animate the law of the case doctrine. However, in a libel case affecting constitutionally protected public discourse, the law of the case doctrine should not have precluded a second review by a subsequent Court of Appeals panel. Indeed, in such cases the law of the case doctrine must yield to a competing doctrine: the requirement of independent review of constitutional facts. [14] The determination on summary judgment that the plaintiffs' complaint stated a cause of action for defamation by implication should not have abrogated the appellate court's duty to independently review the record to determine whether, in fact, the plaintiffs carried their burden of proof at trial regarding falsity at the posttrial directed verdict stage. [15] The application of the law of the case doctrine in this case clearly contravened the principle enshrined in the celebrated case of New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270; 84 S Ct 710; 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964), that discourse on matters of public interest should remain uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.... Sullivan announced that appellate courts must conduct an independent review of the record to ensure that no forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression has occurred in libel cases involving the issue of actual malice. Id. at 285. [16] Sullivan mandated that reviewing courts in libel cases `examine for [themselves] the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see ... whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment ... protect.' Id. The Supreme Court strongly reiterated the requirement of independent review in Bose Corp v Consumers Union of United States, Inc, 466 US 485, 505, 514; 104 S Ct 1949; 80 L Ed 2d 502 (1984). Bose held that the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determination of actual malice in a case governed by New York Times Co v Sullivan .  The Bose Court reasoned that [t]he question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of `actual malice.' Id. at 511. Similarly, in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc v Connaughton, 491 US 657, 686; 109 S Ct 2678; 105 L Ed 2d 562 (1989), the Supreme Court reviewed the entire record to determine if the evidence supported a finding of actual malice. The Court reaffirmed that [t]he question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law. Id. at 685. The Court reiterated that [o]ur profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of libel carve out an area of 'breathing space' so that protected speech is not discouraged. Id. at 686. [17] We recognize that, unlike the instant case, the cases from Sullivan to Harte-Hanks involved public figures and, accordingly, mandated independent review for the issue of actual malice. In Gertz v Welch, Inc, 418 US 323; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974), the Court held that the actual-malice standard of liability for actual damages articulated in Sullivan does not govern cases, such as the instant one, that involve a media defendant's report on a matter of public interest concerning a private-figure plaintiff. However, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc, supra at 768-769, the Supreme Court held that where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false. In abrogating the common-law presumption of falsity in libel cases, the Court in Hepps created an issue of constitutional fact regarding whether a plaintiff carries the burden of proving falsity. We therefore conclude that an independent appellate review of the burden of proof with regard to falsity in private-figure, public-interest cases deters forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression as a logical corollary to independent review of actual malice. Sullivan, supra at 285. The Court recognized in Hepps, that imposing liability for true statements amounts to the imposition of liability without fault proscribed by Gertz. A jury verdict against the great weight of the evidence regarding the falsity requirement, unreviewed by a court, would therefore comprise a forbidden intrusion on protected speech, in the same way as would a failure to review for clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. [18] In Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 427 Mich 157; 398 NW2d 245 (1986), this Court, following Gertz, rejected the actual-malice standard of liability in cases involving private-figure plaintiffs and a media defendant's report on matters of public interest. [19] Our rationale in Rouch in part rested on an acknowledgment of the even greater protection afforded defamation defendants by the burden of proof as to falsity. Id. at 198. That protection would indeed ring hollow if, at least in cases implicating public-interest subject matter and media defendants, no effective review existed to ensure compliance with the burden of proof. [20] The Court of Appeals application of the law of the case doctrine accordingly fails to accord the necessary breathing space to protected speech. The principle of independent review logically extends to determining whether a plaintiff satisfies the burden of proving falsity. Id. A remand in this case of plaintiffs' libel claims for further proceedings on the merits would normally flow from our determination that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the law of the case doctrine to reverse the trial court. [21] However, in the interest of clarifying the operation of constitutional principles under the facts of this case, of judicial economy, and of the long-suffering litigants, we bypass this customary procedure and conduct an independent review and analysis of the record in the following sections.