Opinion ID: 2515735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of prior crimes or civil wrongs

Text: The State introduced Hendrickson's testimony about a prior incident involving an older daughter which occurred over a year before, when the couple was living in Texas. Hendrickson related that she and Decker had been drinking; that she became intoxicated and threw up on the bed; and that she went to take a shower. Her daughter then began to cry and scream. Decker brought the child into the bathroom, and when Hendrickson reached for the infant, Decker pulled the child away, put his hand on her throat, and said that he could kill her at any time. The State contended that the evidence was relevant under K.S.A. 60-455 to show that the current incidents were not accidents. Decker countered that the prior incident was too dissimilar from the current allegations, so that the only relevance of the evidence was to show a propensity for violence, i.e., the prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. The district court disagreed, finding that the prior incident was factually similar; that the evidence was relevant to show lack of accident which was a disputed material fact; and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. K.S.A. 60-455 generally prohibits evidence that the defendant committed a crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion to prove the defendant's general disposition to commit crimes or civil wrongs and thereby provide a basis for inferring that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she is currently being prosecuted. However, such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. K.S.A. 60-455. If evidence of a prior crime or civil wrong is proffered, this court has required the trial court to implement certain safeguards to eliminate the danger that the evidence will be considered only to prove the defendant's mere propensity to commit the charged crime. State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 48, 144 P.3d 647 (2006). Recently, we explained: Evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs committed by a criminal defendant is admissible if relevant to prove one of the eight material facts listed in K.S.A. 60-455 or some other material fact not listed in the statute, if the trial court determines (1) the relevance exists; (2) the material fact is in issue; and (3) the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. In addition, to avoid error, the trial court must give a limiting instruction informing the jury of the specific purpose for admission. State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, Syl. ¶ 3, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). Here, the trial court performed the three-part analysis, making a relevance inquiry as to an identified material fact that was in issue and then weighing probative value and prejudicial effect. See Gunby, 282 Kan. at 56-57, 144 P.3d 647. The probative element of relevance under a K.S.A. 60-455 analysis is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, with the party alleging an abuse of discretion bearing the burden of proof. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, Syl. ¶ 5, 186 P.3d 713. Citing to State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 169 P.3d 1069 (2007), Decker principally challenges the district court's collateral finding that the two incidents were factually similar. He argues that in the first incident, Decker was not the primary caretaker of the child; Decker was drinking; Decker was accused of choking, not shaking, the child; the child did not die; and Decker and Hendrickson were fighting at the time. Decker contends that the only possible similarity between the incidents is the involvement of one of Decker's children, albeit not Risha. First, we would note that the similarity finding in Garcia was actually part of the relevance inquiry and was required because the disputed material fact relied upon in that case was identity. Garcia, 285 Kan. at 15, 169 P.3d 1069 (relevance issue is whether the 60-455 evidence is similar enough to the present crimes charged to help prove identity). Here, the 60-455 evidence was not offered to prove identity, but rather the disputed material fact was whether the injuries were inflicted accidentally, i.e., absence of accident. Nevertheless, even where prior crimes have been used to prove identity, the cases have emphasized that the crimes need not be identical, only similar. Garcia, 285 Kan. at 15, 169 P.3d 1069; see also State v. Moore, 274 Kan. 639, 647, 55 P.3d 903 (2002) (Under K.S.A. 60-455, prior offenses need not be identical in nature to the offense for which the defendant is on trial. Similarity is sufficient.); State v. Johnson, 222 Kan. 465, 469, 565 P.2d 993 (1977) (When the trial court determines there is a similarity of offenses, which similarity has relevance in proving specific matters in issue, the prior offense may then be admitted.). In picking out differences between the Texas and Kansas scenarios, Decker conveniently overlooks a strikingly similar element. In both incidents, Decker grabbed an infant by the neck. In this case, Decker admitted that he grabbed Risha by the neck, albeit he said that it was done accidentally while trying to break the child's fall from a couch. The explanation coincidentally explained the bruising on Risha's neck. Indeed, Decker had an accidental explanation for all of the child's injuries. Therefore, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the Texas incident was relevant to show that Risha's injuries were not accidentally inflicted. See Reid, 286 Kan. 494, Syl. ¶ 5, 186 P.3d 713 (An appellate court reviews a trial court's determination of the probative element of relevance of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence under an abuse of discretion standard; the burden of proof is on the party alleging discretion was abused.).