Opinion ID: 152493
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant #1 and Defendant #2

Text: The district court did not err insofar as it granted summary judgment on Williams’ claims against Defendant #1, the employee who worked the infirmary admissions desk. Williams has not alleged or offered other evidence that Defendant #1 was competent to give medical care or even to unilaterally admit inmates to the infirmary; he states only that Defendant #1 “worked the infirmary admissions desk at Jester III.” Thus, we necessarily treat Defendant #1, based on the record before the court, as a non-medical prison employee for 8 Case: 09-20470 Document: 00511197153 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/06/2010 No. 09-20470 purposes of the deliberate indifference analysis. Second, Williams alleges that Defendant #1 was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because he or she “refused Williams access to the duty nurse” and “refused Williams admission to the infirmary.” However, like defendant Baker, Defendant #1 cannot be liable for impeding or denying Williams access to medical care because the prison duty nurse, Defendant #2, was in fact notified of Williams’ complaints and circumstances on the same day Williams spoke to Defendant #1: May 19th. Thus, even under Williams’ version of the facts, it does not appear that further discovery would aid his claims against Defendant #1 and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on those claims. However, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing Williams’ claims against Defendant #2, the prison duty nurse. “The mere delay of medical care can . . . constitute an Eighth Amendment violation but only ‘if there has been deliberate indifference [that] results in substantial harm.’” Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). In this case, Williams’ sworn allegations that there was a delay of almost 16 hours in receiving pain medications are uncontroverted. His medical records contain infirmary progress notes beginning only on May 23rd, and the medication compliance records show that he was given Tylenol #3 beginning only on May 20th. Furthermore, severe pain caused by the refusal to immediately treat pain can support a claim of deliberate indifference grounded in delayed treatment. See Harris v. Hegeman, 198 F.3d 153, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1999); see also, e.g., Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We have held that the substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by . . . considerable pain.”). Furthermore, the district court erred by treating Williams’ claims as alleging that Defendant #2 interfered with or otherwise failed to follow an existing medical treatment plan. In Easter, the plaintiff suffered from chest 9 Case: 09-20470 Document: 00511197153 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/06/2010 No. 09-20470 pain, for which a physician had prescribed heart medication (nitroglycerin). When the plaintiff complained of chest pain to the prison nurse, she directed the plaintiff to the prison pharmacy, which was closed. When the plaintiff told the nurse that the pharmacy was closed, “she sent [the plaintiff] back to his cell without providing him any treatment.” Easter, 467 F.3d at 463-64. We concluded that the plaintiff had established the nurse’s deliberate indifference because she “failed to follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Id.; See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (noting that deliberate indifference can be “manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”). Similarly, in this case, Williams has offered competent proof that Defendant #2 knew that he was to receive pain medication and infirmary care, yet failed to follow that course of treatment. Under these alleged facts, Defendant #2 would not be entitled to qualified immunity. “[G]overnment officials acting within their discretionary authority are immune from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective and Reg. Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 889 (5th Cir. 2004). The relevant question is whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the incident. Id. “At the time [Defendant #2] denied [Williams] treatment, the law was clearly established that a prison inmate could demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation by showing that a prison official ‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” Easter, 467 F.3d at 464 (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756). Defendant #2’s conduct was also objectively unreasonable: A reasonable officer in 10 Case: 09-20470 Document: 00511197153 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/06/2010 No. 09-20470 Defendant #2’s position would know that denying a post-operative BKA inmate pain medication would result in substantial pain, and that his or her conduct would violate the inmate’s clearly established constitutional rights. See id. Additionally, because the plaintiff has sufficiently shown that Defendant #2 violated his constitutional rights and would not be entitled to qualified immunity, the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment without adequate discovery, even if only to learn the defendant’s identity—particularly when Williams specifically requested a continuance for additional discovery. See Baker v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 430 F.3d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A trial court cannot rule on a summary judgment motion where adequate discovery has been denied a party.”); Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 167 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a district court may rule on a motion for summary judgment before the completion of discovery but only “[i]f the additional discovery will not likely generate evidence germane to the summary judgment motion”); Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1992) (requiring district court to order discovery in a prisoner suit where it may lead to the identification of unidentified defendants); Murrell v. Bennett, 615 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendants where district court did not allow prisoner adequate opportunity for discovery).3 3 Williams moved below for appointment of counsel, which the district court denied early in the litigation because “the allegations and issues in the complaint have not proven to be beyond Williams’ capabilities at this stage of the proceedings.” The district court also noted that it may reconsider the decision later in the proceedings. Williams contends the district court erred in denying appointment of counsel. Counsel is only warranted in exceptional circumstances, considering: (1) the type and complexity of the case; (2) the indigent’s capability to present his case adequately; (3) the indigent’s capability to investigate his case adequately; and (4) the type of evidence that will be presented by the parties. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982). Williams has proven to be a capable pro se litigant, and this is not an especially complicated case—either factually or legally. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying his request for counsel. The district court may, of course, appoint counsel if it concludes that such a appointment is warranted on remand. 11 Case: 09-20470 Document: 00511197153 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/06/2010 No. 09-20470