Opinion ID: 2659296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Secondary References

Text: After concluding that the Eagles jersey could be a “primary reference,” the district court determined that the V2 jersey and another reference known as the “Sporty K9” jersey were “so related to the primary reference” that they could serve as “secondary references” that would motivate the skilled artisan to make the claimed design. MRC, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 809. The district court found that both jerseys suggested the use of a V-neck pattern and non-mesh fabric on the side panels—the first two differences described above. MRC argues that the district court erred by failing to explain why a skilled artisan would have chosen to incorporate those features of the V2 and Sporty K9 jerseys with the Eagles jersey. We disagree. It is true that “[i]n order for secondary references to be considered, . . . there must be some suggestion in the prior art to modify the basic design with features from the secondary references.” In re Borden, 90 F.3d at 1574. However, we have explained this requirement to mean that “the teachings of prior art designs may are: (1) that the V2 jersey does not contain an “interlock” fabric panel; (2) it has “drop” sleeves while the claimed jersey has “raglan-style” sleeves; and (3) the V2 jersey lacks any ornamental surge stitching. MRC, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 807. A side-by-side comparison of the two designs demonstrates that of those three differences, only the ornamental surge stitching truly alters the “overall visual appearance” of the design. Moreover, the ornamental stitching on the claimed design is suggested by the seam lines on the V2 jersey, further minimizing the difference in overall appearance. Thus, either the “Eagles” jersey or the V2 jersey could have served as a “primary reference” for purposes of the obviousness analysis. 12 MRC INNOVATIONS, INC. v. HUNTER MFG., LLP be combined only when the designs are ‘so related that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one would suggest the application of those features to the other.’” Id. at 1575 (quoting In re Glavas, 230 F.2d 447, 450 (CCPA 1956)). In other words, it is the mere similarity in appearance that itself provides the suggestion that one should apply certain features to another design. 4 In re Borden also discussed what is required for a reference to be considered sufficiently “related” for that test to apply. There, we noted that the secondary references were “closely akin” to the claimed design, and relied heavily on the fact that “the two missing design elements [were] not taken from unrelated references, but [were] found in other dual-chamber containers.” Id. Thus, those references could be used “to bridge the small gap between 4 MRC argues that this conclusion is “clearly im- proper” in light of our recent decision in High Point, 730 F.3d 1301. However, that case is not on point. There, we faulted the district court for failing to explain the reasoning behind its determination that a given “primary reference” was “basically the same as the claimed design,” and so we remanded for the district court to do a side-by-side comparison of the designs and determine if they create the same visual impression. Id. at 1314. The district court here did exactly that, when it listed five specific features that rendered the Eagles jersey “basically the same” as the patented design and explained that the three minor differences did not defeat the similarity in overall visual appearance. See supra Section I.A. High Point did not address the situation presented here, where the district court relied on the visual similarity between the patented design and the various secondary references to conclude that the secondary references would have suggested particular design modifications to a skilled designer. MRC INNOVATIONS, INC. v. HUNTER MFG., LLP 13 the [primary] container and Borden’s claimed design.” Id. So too, here, the secondary references that the district court relied on were not furniture, or drapes, or dresses, or even human football jerseys; they were football jerseys designed to be worn by dogs. Moreover, as discussed above, the V2 could easily have served as a primary reference itself, so similar is its overall visual appearance to that of the claimed design and the Eagles jersey. See supra n.3. We therefore agree that those references were “so related” to the Eagles jersey that the striking similarity in appearance across all three jerseys would have motivated a skilled designer to combine features from one with features of another. With respect to the only remaining difference between the Eagles jersey and the ’488 claimed design—the presence of additional ornamental surge stitching running down the rear of the jersey—the district court acknowledged that no prior art reference contained exactly that same stitching on the rear of the jersey, but nevertheless concluded that this was not a “substantial” difference that created a patentably distinct design, but rather was a “de minimis change[] which would be well within the skill of an ordinary designer in the art.” MRC, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 809 (citing In re Carter, 673 F.2d 1378, 1380 (CCPA 1982)). MRC argues that adding any ornamental feature to a primary reference that is not suggested by the prior art is, by definition, more than de minimis. 5 But our case law 5 Alternatively, MRC argues that, at the very least, the differences between the prior art and the claimed design are not insignificant as a matter of law, but rather give rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to how the designs would be viewed by an ordinary designer. However, as explained below, we believe that, even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to MRC, no 14 MRC INNOVATIONS, INC. v. HUNTER MFG., LLP plainly contradicts that position; on numerous occasions we have invalidated design patents despite the inclusion of ornamental features that were entirely absent from prior art designs. See, e.g., In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d at 1217 (different shape of fluting on finger grips and different shape of pincers were de minimis differences in design for tweezers); In re Carter, 673 F.2d at 1380 (modifications to the waistband of an infant garment were “de minimis changes which would be well within the skill of an ordinary designer in the art”); In re Chung, No. 001148, 2000 WL 1476861, at  (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2000) (two small depressions in the design of a cigarette package were de minimis changes); In re Cooper, 480 F.2d 900, 901-02 (CCPA 1973) (affirming Board’s conclusion that numerous changes to the design of a prior art building— including a single rather than double door and the addition of windows—were de minimis because the overall impression was still a building that looked like a barrel). Here, the Eagles jersey had already disclosed the use of ornamental surge stitching. The only additional step needed was to extend the stitching down the sides of the rear of the jersey. Moreover, the V2 jersey plainly suggested the addition of vertical lines down the rear of the jersey through the use of the seams between the two types of fabric. We agree with the district court that adding ornamental surge stitching on top of a preexisting seam was an insubstantial change that would have been obvious to a skilled designer. 6 reasonable fact-finder could find in MRC’s favor on this issue. See supra at 14. 6 To be clear, we do not intend to suggest that mere- ly because one prior art reference used ornamental surge stitching, any use of such stitching would have been a de minimis change. Rather, the addition of the surge stitchMRC INNOVATIONS, INC. v. HUNTER MFG., LLP 15