Opinion ID: 2624992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: In-person testimony is a valuable tool for evaluating the credibility of witnesses.

Text: Here we deal with the second of the Mathews factors. In terms applicable to this case, do telephone hearings create an unacceptable risk of an erroneous deprivation of a person's right to drive? This turns in large part on the value of the live testimony of a party. The significance of live testimony and demeanor evidence has been long recognized. Blackstone explained that, [by] examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, ... and this [method] only, the persons who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, understanding, behaviour, and inclinations of the witness. [16] This method was also indeed familiar among the antient Romans ... [a]nd this, or somewhat like it, was continued as low as the time of Hadrian. [17] Courts have emphasized the advantages inherent in a traditional hearing in which witnesses testify in the presence of the trier of fact. For example, in Mattox v. United States, the United States Supreme Court noted that personal examination and cross-examination of the witness provides the accused with an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.[ [18] ] In this state, we have also recognized the uniqueness of the trial court's position to judge credibility. In Alaska Foods, Inc. v. American Manufacturer's Mutual Insurance Co., we held that when there has been oral testimony, and the trial judge has observed the witnesses in person, we must pay some deference to his judgment as to credibility to the extent that his findings are based on such oral testimony ... because ... we cannot have the advantage that the trial judge has had of basing a judgment as to credibility on the demeanor of the witnesses that appear before him.[ [19] ] Other states have long traditions acknowledging the special abilities of the fact finder. In Durant v. Rogers, the Illinois Supreme Court held: It is a rule, that the jury shall be the sole judges of the credibility of a witness. They see them on the stand, mark their demeanor, perceive many small matters which escape less observant eyes, and are in the best position to judge of credibility, and they have an undoubted right to find in favor of the testimony of one when weighed against that of the other.[ [20] ] The unique ability of the hearing officer or trial court to evaluate credibility has, for example, a strong influence on the standard of review. According to Evans v. Evans, this court reviews findings of fact for substantial evidence because the trier of fact is in the best position to evaluate the witnesses' credibility and their testimony. [21] Deference to those who actually observe witnesses is codified at Alaska Civil Rule 52(a): Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. This court consistently grants deference to trial courts where credibility is at issue, as for example in Kohl v. Legoullon, where we noted that [t]he trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses. [22] Similarly, in Crook v. Mortenson-Neal, we recognized that the superior court was in the best position to evaluate the defendants' demeanor and credibility. We, therefore, defer to the court's view as expressed in the quoted finding. [23] This case law indicates that in-court testimony has persuasive characteristics absent from testimony given out of the presence of the trier of fact. [24] Where the witness's truthfulness is disputed, demeanor can be important. [25] In such cases, denying an in-person hearing denies a party an opportunity to present evidence in the most effective way possible. We do not wish to overstate the benefits of communicating in person, nor the drawbacks of telephone communication. We live in an era when efficiency often dictates that many communications be machine-facilitated. When the technology employed is operating well, such communications are at least good enough to transmit basic information. But the potential for empathy and nuanced understanding is much greater in person-to-person communications than in any of the various forms of telecommunicating. Likewise, when a party is denied an in-person hearing before a trier of fact, there is a risk that the party will be less able to convey the message that his story is the truth. We recognize that legal authority supports the use of telephone hearings and testimony in many circumstances. For example, Alaska Civil Rule 99 allows one or more parties, counsel, witnesses, or even the judge to participate telephonically in any hearing or deposition for good cause and in the absence of substantial prejudice to opposing parties. [26] In Matter Involving Triem, we rejected the contention that a committee chairperson's telephone participation in a bar disciplinary hearing violated the defendant's due process rights, adding that [t]he routine nature of such appearances belies [the litigant's] due process concerns. [27] Most recently, in Silvers v. Silvers , we found an abuse of discretion where the trial court refused to allow the defendant to testify by telephone in a civil trial. [28] These authorities show that the convenience afforded by telephone participation is not generally outweighed by the values associated with in-person participation. But, except for Triem, which is distinguishable on other grounds, [29] they do not hold that a party who desires to present testimony in person to the trier of fact does not have that right.