Opinion ID: 1920277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: General Maritime Tort Law

Text: As a general proposition, `[a] maritime claim brought in common law state courts ... is governed by the same principles as govern actions brought in admiralty, i.e., by federal maritime law.' Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So.2d 634, 637 (La.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 819, 113 S.Ct. 65, 121 L.Ed.2d 32 (1992). Thus, with admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law. See New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 25, 20 L.Ed. 90 (1870). However, the general maritime law is not a complete or all-inclusive system. When new situations arise that are not directly governed by legislation or admiralty precedent, federal courts may fashion a rule for decision by a variety of methods. Federal courts may, and often do, look to state statutory law and to precepts of the common law which they borrow and apply as the federal admiralty rule. Moreover, federal courts may apply state law, as such, to a case with the admiralty jurisdiction if the occurrence is maritime but local and there is no need to fashion a uniform admiralty rule. Finally, federal courts may apply state law and regulations to supplement the general maritime law when there is no conflict between the two systems of law, and the need for uniformity of decision does not bar state action. Schoenbaum, supra, at § 4-1, pp. 158-59. It is well settled that by virtue of the savings clause `a state, having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents as it sees fit so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the substantive maritime law.' Green, 593 So.2d at 637. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the uniformity principle does not preclude the application of state law in admiralty; rather, the decision whether to apply state law in cases within admiralty jurisdiction must be based upon balancing state and federal interests: [T]he fact that maritime law is  in a special sense at least ...  federal law and therefore supreme by virtue of Article VI of the Constitution carries with it the implication that wherever a maritime interest is involved, no matter how slight or marginal, it must displace a local interest, no matter how pressing or significant. But the process is surely rather one of accommodation, entirely familiar in many areas of overlapping state and federal concern, or a process somewhat analogous to the normal conflict of laws situation where two sovereignties assert divergent interests in a transaction as to which both have some concern. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739, 81 S.Ct. 886, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961). Therefore, state law may be applied where the state's interest in a matter is greater than the federal interest. Green, 593 So.2d at 638. Further, [t]his principle, applying the state rule in a matter within the admiralty jurisdiction when the state interest outweighs the federal interest, has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. (citing, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1960) (allowed City of Detroit to impose the requirements of its smoke control regulations on vessels coming to the city, even though vessel owners met federal standards); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 61 S.Ct. 687, 85 L.Ed. 903 (1941) (allowed state survival action to supplement maritime law); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit, 264 U.S. 109, 44 S.Ct. 274, 68 L.Ed. 582 (1924) (allowed state court to compel arbitration under arbitration provision of maritime contract reasoning that because it was a valid clause under admiralty law, it was proper to substitute a different and more effective remedy); Cf. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 81 S.Ct. 886, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (the U.S. Supreme Court utilized an interest balancing approach but concluded that the need for a uniform rule regarding contracts required allowing the federal rule to prevail)).