Opinion ID: 864887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the chancery court properly granted

Text: SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ¶9. Central to the Stuckeys’ argument that genuine issues of material fact still exist is their assertion that a sworn complaint, in and of itself, represents admissible evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The Stuckeys maintain that the chancery court 7 erroneously overlooked the statements and factual inferences contained within the four corners of their thirty-three page complaint and misapplied the law by granting summary judgment. Conversely, Provident urges that while a complaint must be considered by the trial court on a motion for summary judgment, the court only considers the allegations contained therein. ¶10. The procedure governing summary judgment is unequivocal and its function as well as purpose is entrenched in this Court’s precedent. The comment to Miss. R. Civ. P. 56 reads in relevant part as follows: The purpose of Rule 56 is to expedite the determination of actions on there merits and eliminate unmeritorious claims or defenses without the necessity of a full trial....Rule 56 provides the means by which a party may pierce the allegations in the pleadings and obtain relief by introducing outside evidence showing that there are no fact issues that need to be tried...[I]n addition to providing an effective means of summary action in clear cases, it serves as an instrument of discovery in calling forth quickly the disclosure on the merits of either a claim or defense on pain of loss of the case for failure to do so. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56 cmt. In Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1983), the first case addressing Miss. R. Civ. P. 56 after our enactment of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, we clearly explained our Rule 56 summary judgment procedure by quoting portions of the Comment of the Advisory Committee which had assisted this Court in the drafting our rules of civil procedure: The motion for a summary judgment challenges the very existence of legal sufficiency of the claim or defense to which it is addressed; in effect, the moving party takes the position that he is entitled to prevail as a matter of law because his opponent has no valid claim for relief or defense to the action, as the case may be. 8 Rule 56 provides the means by which a party may pierce the allegations in the pleadings and obtain relief by introducing outside evidence showing that there are no fact issues that need to be tried. Brown, 444 So. 2d at 362 (emphasis added). In Brown a creditor brought an action against debtor for the repayment of the balance due on a loan. Id. at 361. In defense, the debtor asserted a series of affirmative matters alleging that the creditor had violated the Truth In Lending Act. Id. In finding summary judgment appropriate, we concluded that the debtor’s allegations amounted to mere denials and that her response to the creditor’s motion to dismiss was “woefully inadequate”. Id. at 364. In so concluding, we read the “unmistakable language” of Rule 56 as providing “that mere denial is insufficient to create an issue of fact....This is true whether the denial be in pleadings, briefs or arguments. Only sworn denials providing a credible basis therefore in evidentiary fact will suffice.” Id. Citing federal precedent, we ultimately held: Our Rule 56 mandates that the party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] be diligent. “Mere general allegations which do not reveal detailed and precise facts will not prevent the award of summary judgment.” Liberty Leasing Co. v. Hillsum Sales Corporation, 380 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1967). The party opposing the motion is required to bring forward significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of the triable issue of fact. Union Planters National Leasing, Inc. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 1982). This Carolyn L. Brown [debtor] has wholly failed to do. 444 So.2d at 364 (emphasis added). ¶11. The Stuckeys have clearly misapprehended the fact-driven purpose and function of summary judgment in favor of the much different Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. While the two rules provide for dismissal 9 of actions, their bases are completely different. Accordingly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests legal sufficiency, and in applying this rule “a motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of the claim.” Missala Marine Services, Inc. v. Odom, 861 So.2d 290, 294 (Miss. 2003). Quite differently, Rule 56 tests the notion of well-pled facts and requires a party to present probative evidence demonstrating triable issues of fact. In Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247 (Miss. 1985), we clearly stated: The summary judgment movant has a burden of persuasion; a burden to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried. Pearl River County Board v. South East Collection, 459 So.2d 783, 785 (Miss. 1984); Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983). The party opposing the motion must rebut, if he is to avoid entry of an adverse judgment, by bringing forth probative evidence legally sufficient to make apparent the existence of triable fact issues. Smith v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Grenada, 460 So.2d 786, 792 (Miss. 1984). 481 So.2d at 252. ¶12. Summary judgment, as defined under both our state and federal rules of civil procedure, is a mechanism by which a moving party is able to pierce the allegations made in the opponent’s pleadings and, quite simply, place the non-moving party (opponent) in a position of having to convince the trial court via discovery documents (depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, etc.) and/or sworn affidavits that there are genuine issues of material fact which require resolution by a plenary trial before the trier-of-fact. In this way, summary judgment roots out mere accusation and conjecture in favor of merit and ultimately functions to force a non-movant to present some modicum of material evidence. While 10 summary judgment is not a substitute for the trial of disputed fact issues, it is an effective rule of procedure which forces parties to produce evidence sufficient to convince a trial court that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Brown, 444 So.2d at 362. ¶13. In this case, the Stuckeys have included a litany of allegations in their sworn complaint which, if supported, would produce genuine issues of material fact for trial. However, the Stuckeys have mistakenly relied solely on their sworn complaint in an effort to avoid summary judgment. In support of their sole reliance on their sworn complaint, the Stuckeys cite easily distinguishable case law as holding that a sworn pleading is admissible evidence. In Simon v. Desporte, 150 Miss. 673, 116 So. 534 (1928), a case cited by the Stuckeys, Sophie Desporte sued Joe Simon in the Circuit Court of Harrison County for breach of contract due to Simon’s failure to execute and deliver a deed to Desporte subsequent to her payment to Simon of the stated consideration under the deed. Prior to institution of the circuit court action, Desporte had commenced a chancery court action by filing a sworn bill of complaint which contained allegations inconsistent with the evidence which she offered during the circuit court trial. Simon sought unsuccessfully to introduce this sworn chancery court pleading to rebut the evidence presented by Desporte during the circuit court trial. Desporte claimed that she had signed the chancery court bill of complaint under oath without reading it. We held that the circuit judge improperly excluded this evidence. 116 So. at 535. In so holding, we stated that “admissions in a pleading sworn to by the party in whose behalf it was filed are admissible against him in another action.” Id. at 535 (citations omitted). While we fully adhere to our 11 holding in Simon and agree that in the proper context an admission made by a party-opponent in prior litigation can be used as evidence, we find that Simon is wholly inapplicable to the case sub judice. A party attempting during trial to introduce as evidence for impeachment purposes a party-opponent’s sworn admission is altogether different than parties attempting to rely on their own sworn allegations, that and that, alone, in an effort to save themselves from summary judgment. ¶14. So that there be no misunderstanding, the express provisions of Rule 56(c) and our case law interpreting this rule mandate that the trial judge, in considering a motion for summary judgment, must inter alia review and consider “the pleadings.... on file.” Certainly, the trial judge must consider the pleadings, whether they be sworn or unsworn. Although disputed by the Stuckeys, we find clearly from the record before us that the chancellor in today’s case did in fact consider inter alia the Stuckeys’ sworn complaint and their unsworn amended complaint en route to granting Provident’s motion for summary judgment. ¶15. We can thus state with confidence that the chancellor dutifully complied with the Rule 56 provisions by considering inter alia the Stuckeys’ pleadings. The provisions of Rule 56(e) which caution practitioners that they “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [their] pleadings,” clearly do not mandate a grant of summary judgment if there is no response to the summary judgment motion; however, Rule 56(e) does caution that if the non-moving party fails to respond, “summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against [the nonmoving party].” (Emphasis added). We can also state with confidence that our learned trial judges have on many occasions, in compliance with Rule 56 and our case law, quite 12 appropriately denied summary judgment motions even though the non-moving party failed to respond to the motion. The non-moving party merely failed to respond at his/her peril, and survived the motion anyway. ¶16. However, the Stuckeys propose that the allegations contained in their sworn complaint should be deemed as creating genuine issues of material fact because they, themselves, believe these allegations to be true. Again, this assertion is contrary to the spirit of Rule 56, and our case law interpreting our summary judgment procedure. ¶17. In Dennis v. Searle, 457 So.2d 941 (Miss. 1984), this Court was confronted with the propriety of a chancery court’s grant of summary judgment, when the trial court had before it for consideration several documents, including a sworn complaint. Dennis had sued the Searles in chancery court on theories of fraud and breach of contract after Dennis discovered termite infestation in the house which he had purchased from the Searles. In due course, the Searles filed a motion for summary judgment. Although we affirmed the chancellor’s grant of summary judgment on the fraud issue, we reversed the chancellor’s grant of summary judgment on the contract theory, finding that the Searles failed to carry the required burden of establishing the non-existence of genuine issues of material fact, or that they were otherwise entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on Dennis’s contract claim. En route to our decision in Dennis, we stated: At that time [of the summary judgment hearing], [the chancellor] had before him the sworn complaint [footnote omitted here but discussed later] and amended complaint, the admissions made in the answer of the Searles, the deposition of Norman George Dennis taken June 16, 1982, the affidavit of Patty Palmer dated 13 July 9, 1982, the affidavit of Norman George Dennis dated September 11, 1982, the affidavit of Entomologist Stephen R. Leker dated September 9, 1982.