Opinion ID: 2606433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the right to an interpreter

Text: (1a) We turn first to the appropriate standard of review for violations of the right to an interpreter. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14.) [1] We considered this right in People v. Aguilar (1984) 35 Cal.3d 785 [200 Cal. Rptr. 908, 677 P.2d 1198], but did not there adopt a particular standard. In Aguilar, we stressed the importance of the presence of an interpreter throughout the proceedings for those who do not understand English. An interpreter is necessary so that a defendant can understand and fully participate in the proceedings when he is charged with a crime. There are three roles which an interpreter may play: (1) interpreting the questions to and answers of non-English-speaking witnesses; (2) advancing the `non-English-speaking defendant's understanding of the colloquy between the attorneys, the witness, and the judge;' and (3) enabling the non-English-speaking defendant to consult with his English-speaking attorney. ( People v. Aguilar, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 790, quoting Chang & Araujo, Interpreters for the Defense: Due Process for the Non-English-Speaking Defendant (1975) 63 Cal. L.Rev. 801, 802.) Deprivation of an interpreter may cause the proceedings in significant part to be incomprehensible to a defendant. There are three separate possible tests for reversal if an interpreter is improperly denied: (1) per se reversal, (2) the standard enunciated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065], and (3) the test applied to violations of state constitutional rights ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]). We will conclude that per se reversal is not appropriate and that a Chapman approach best serves the varied constitutional interests at issue. Application of the per se standard requiring automatic reversal for a violation of a constitutional right normally is dependent upon the fundamental character of the right invaded or the impossibility of assessing prejudice. ( People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744-745 [209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994].) This test has not been applied to all deprivations of constitutional rights, even federal constitutional rights (see Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 21-22 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 708-709]; People v. Taylor (1982) 31 Cal.3d 488, 499 [183 Cal. Rptr. 64, 645 P.2d 115]), and we believe that it similarly is unnecessary here. In so concluding, we do not intend to diminish the importance of the right to an interpreter where required. However, our consideration of the panoply of constitutional rights implicated in the use of or denial of an interpreter, and the fact that the violation of these rights does not automatically lead to substantial prejudice, leads us to believe that a different standard is appropriate. Moreover, if a defendant can demonstrate, either on the record or through habeas corpus, that a fundamental right has been infringed, the denial of which as a general rule would lead to automatic reversal, then he may still obtain such relief on that basis. However, we agree with the Court of Appeal that circumstances may exist in which there could be no prejudice resulting from the absence of an interpreter. (See People v. Nieblas (1984) 161 Cal. App.3d 527, 530-531 [207 Cal. Rptr. 695].) [2] Courts and commentators have consistently named several constitutional interests which may be implicated in the right to an interpreter. They include the right of a defendant to due process, to confrontation, to effective assistance of counsel, and to be present at trial. Our review demonstrates that violation of these rights which may be affected when an interpreter is wrongfully withheld do not necessarily require automatic reversal. For example, we recently reviewed claims that a defendant had not been personally present during portions of his trial. We reiterated that `[W]hen the presence of the defendant will be useful, or of benefit to him and his counsel, the lack of his presence becomes a denial of due process of law.' [Citations.] The burden is upon defendant to demonstrate that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a fair and impartial trial. [Citation.] ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 309-310 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]; see People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 955 [171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240]; People v. Boehm (1969) 270 Cal. App.2d 13, 19.) More than a showing of defendant's absence thus is necessary to require reversal. Similarly, the violation of the right to consult counsel may result in reversal only where the breach has had a material effect on the regularity of the trial. (See generally People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) [3] So, too, as we recently restated, It is well settled ... that [even the fundamental] right of confrontation is not absolute. ( People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 515 [194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 668 P.2d 738].) [4] The denial of an interpreter in any given case may take many forms and may affect any, all or none of these other constitutional rights. Violations of article I, section 14, may range from complete failure to provide an interpreter to the momentary absence of an interpreter at an inconsequential moment in the proceedings. Normally, where violations of state constitutional rights are under consideration, the test is whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) However, here, numerous federal constitutional rights may be affected and we therefore adopt a Chapman approach under which a federal constitutional error may be deemed harmless only if the appellate court is able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 711].) In utilizing this standard it is our task to examine the entire record and `if ... it appears reasonably possible that the error might have materially influenced the jury in arriving at its verdict,' the judgment must be reversed. ( People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 219-220 [60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15].) ( People v. Taylor, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 499-500.) In addition, a court must weigh the impact of the error not only on the decision of the jury, but also on the course of the trial. ( People v. Spencer [(1967) 66 Cal.2d 158,] 163 [57 Cal. Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715].) ( People v. Stritzinger, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 520.) In viewing the applicable harmless-error standard, the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated that in Chapman, it had rejected the argument that errors of constitutional dimension necessarily require reversal of criminal convictions. To that end, the court observed, `we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. ___, ___ ( Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. ___ [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 469, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3105].) Although some errors require reversal without regard to the evidence in the particular case ( id. at p. ___ [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 470, 106 S.Ct. at p. 3106] citing Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23, fn. 8), the court observed that if the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless error analysis. ( Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. ___ [94 L.Ed.2d at p. 471, 106 S.Ct. at pp. 3106-3107] [harmless error standard applied to instruction embodying an unconstitutional presumption]; see also cases described at p. ___ [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 469, 106 S.Ct. at p. 3105], applying harmless error analysis to claims ranging from denial of a defendant's right to be present at trial [ Rushen v. Spain (1983) 464 U.S. 114, 118 (78 L.Ed.2d 267, 273, 104 S.Ct. 453) ( per curiam )] to failure to permit cross-examination regarding a witness's bias [ Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. 673 (89 L.Ed.2d 674, 106 S.Ct. 1431)] and permitting admission of identification by a witness which was obtained in violation of the right to counsel [ Milton v. Wainwright (1972) 407 U.S. 371 (33 L.Ed.2d 1, 92 S.Ct. 2174)].) We first consider whether error occurred because of the practice followed here. The Standards for determining the need for a court interpreter appearing as section 18 of the Standards of Judicial Administration are informative. Subdivision (a) provides in relevant part that [s]eparate interpreters may be needed for each non-English speaking party. (Italics added.) In other words, the Judicial Council's recommended rules, adopted effective July 1, 1979, five years following enactment of the pertinent part of article I, section 14, of the Constitution, did not mandate separate interpreters for each party but rather commented that such a service may be necessary. Myriad problems have arisen despite the guidance of the judicial standards. (2) We believe that the best and preferred means of avoiding further confusion is to require that each defendant have assigned to him an interpreter who remains at his side throughout the proceedings, unless such assistance has been waived. (See Aguilar, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 794-795.) By so providing, speculation regarding possible adverse consequences arising out of shared or absent interpreters can be avoided. (3a) With the Chapman standard in mind, we now turn to the error urged in the case before us and review the record as a whole to determine whether we can ascertain that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Although initially Barbaro asserted before the Court of Appeal that it was reasonably possible that the interpreter who remained at the table acted for only one defendant, he now argues, as does his codefendant Juan, that the sharing of the interpreter constituted a violation of his rights. Both defendants contend that the procedure utilized may have impaired their right to communicate with counsel and to confront the witnesses against them. First, the close proximity of defendants and counsel necessitated by a shared interpreter increased the risk that the other defendant and his counsel might overhear consultations, thus possibly restraining free exchange. Second, if the interpreter was utilized for discussions with counsel by one defendant, that practice may have deprived the remaining defendant of his right to a simultaneous and complete translation of the proceedings and also may have affected the remaining defendant's ability to communicate with his attorney. While both defendants were technically deprived at times of the assistance of separate interpreters, nothing in the record shows that at any point while this situation existed, either defendant's ability to communicate or comprehend was impeded. [5] Although at various times during the appeal defendants have made generalized assertions that their defenses were at odds because the underlying conduct of which each was accused was so different, they have suggested neither an actual nor a potential specific conflict in their defenses. Nonetheless, they urge that the situation of the shared interpreter should be analogized to that where joint counsel is appointed. However, where no objection is made to shared counsel, reversal is appropriate only if an actual conflict is demonstrated or if a potential conflict exists and the record supports `an informed speculation' that appellant's right to effective representation was prejudicially affected. ( People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 105 [197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835].) In other words, some grounds to believe that prejudice occurred must be discernible. In light of the failure to point to any potential or actual conflict, we decline to find that the use of a shared interpreter was in this case error on grounds analogous to those used in analyzing issues involving joint representation. Any additional claim in this regard dependent upon nonrecord information may best be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding if appropriate. Unlike the situation in Aguilar, where the use of defendant's interpreter to translate for a witness left the defendant isolated at counsel table, unable to consult his attorney and adrift in a babble of voices, nothing in the record demonstrates any difficulties arising from the shared use of an interpreter while a second interpreter assisted a witness who spoke the same language as defendants. This is not to say that such difficulties could not or even did not arise. The record simply is barren of any indication of actual interruption of either defendant's communication or comprehension. [6] In some instances, in contrast, problems arising from failure to afford one interpreter per defendant will be discernible from the record. For example, in People v. Menchaca (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 1019 [194 Cal. Rptr. 691], the court judicially noticed that a witness and his interpreter may speak to each other at relatively close range (p. 1024), and that a defendant might therefore be unable to hear. The Menchaca court in finding reversible error also expressly observed that defense counsel had voiced his apprehensions about the procedures followed. The defense specifically objected to the borrowing of defendant's interpreter for service as a witness interpreter, and it was manifest from the record that on occasion, counsel was unable to understand the initial English translation of a witness's answer. ( Ibid. ) Similarly, in United States ex rel. Negron v. State of New York (E.D.N.Y. 1970) 310 F. Supp. 1304, 1308, footnote 3 (affd. (2d Cir.1970) 434 F.2d 386), the trial court pointed out that during the habeas corpus proceedings the defendant had expressly testified that he could not hear the Spanish-speaking witnesses or their interpreters and counsel at the original trial had so stated to the jury during closing arguments. Moreover, as the circuit court observed, defendant had been given only summaries at intervals during the trial and was left to sit in total incomprehension as the trial proceeded. (434 F.2d at p. 390.) (4) Thus, among possible indications of actual interference with defendant's rights which may appear on the record are remarks by counsel, the court, or defendants themselves. In other instances, the fact that a defendant who does not speak English has been left without means of communication or comprehension will be equally obvious without reference to express remarks made during the proceedings. Nonetheless, in some cases, even where some deprivation is shown, the absence of a personal interpreter may be found harmless because the proceedings which took place while the interpreter was absent may be insubstantial or concern matters which are not possibly prejudicial to the defendant, or because there is no allegation that the deprivation actually affected any of the defendant's rights. (3b) Because there is nothing on the face of the record here showing an interference in consultations between counsel and defendants or in defendants' ability to comprehend fully the witnesses' testimony, we conclude that reversal is not mandated. [7] This is not a case where all means of communication or comprehension were absent; rather, an interpreter was at all times available and at hand. The question is whether speculation that some material interruption in access to the interpreter may have occurred is sufficient to require reversal. No actual claim of interference is made. No assertion is made that defendants were actually affected by sharing an interpreter. Of course, habeas corpus may be utilized to offer any relevant evidence not appearing on the face of the record. If such evidence indicates restraints upon defendants' free exercise of their right to counsel or infringement upon any other constitutional right, defendants may well be entitled to relief.