Opinion ID: 782716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: UNITE's Other Arguments

Text: 20 UNITE makes several arguments suggesting that FOIA's language, legislative history and purpose distinguish its fee provision from those under consideration in Buckhannon and render Buckhannon 's reasoning inapplicable to fee applications made by plaintiffs in FOIA actions. We address these arguments below. 21
22 UNITE's primary contention on appeal is that a party that substantially prevails (or a substantially prevailing party) under FOIA is necessarily different from a prevailing party as that term is construed in Buckhannon. Providing selective nonlegal dictionary definitions of the term substantially, UNITE argues that FOIA's substantially prevails language expands the scope of parties who may recover fees to include those who are entitled to recover under the catalyst theory. Several considerations leave us unconvinced. 23 First, this argument was presented and squarely rejected by the D.C. Circuit in Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers. See 288 F.3d at 455. Moreover, although Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers is the only federal appellate decision addressing FOIA's substantially prevails language in the wake of Buckhannon, several post- Buckhannon decisions considering similar language in other fee-shifting provisions support the D.C. Circuit's view that the addition of the term substantially does not affect the Supreme Court's analysis in Buckhannon. Addressing language in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 that allows for an award of fees to a prevailing or substantially prevailing party, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e), the Ninth Circuit held in Kasza v. Whitman, 325 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.2003), that a plaintiff was not a `prevailing party' (and thus [could not] be a substantially `prevailing party') because she did not gain by judgment or consent decree a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties. Id. at 1180 (quoting the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e)). In addition, one of the few post-Buckhannon cases upholding an award of attorney's fees under the catalyst theory acknowledged that the difference between a prevailing party and a party that has substantially prevailed is inconsequential. Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 307 F.3d 1318, 1322 & n. 4 (11th Cir.2002) (upholding a fee award under the catalyst theory where the fee-shifting statute at issue permitted an award of attorney's fees to a party  whenever the court determines such award is appropriate  (quoting the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g))). 24 Finally, we are not at all sure that the nonlegal dictionary definitions of substantial offered by UNITE support its argument. Addressing the plain meaning of substantially in the context of the ADA, which defines a disability as an impairment that  substantially limits one or more major life activities, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis added), the Supreme Court recently highlighted several definitions of the term substantially that undercut UNITE's argument. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-97, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). Among the definitions presented by the Court in Toyota was one from Websters Third New International Dictionary, which defined substantial as considerable in amount, value, or worth and another from Oxford English Dictionary, which defined the term to mean [o]f ample or considerable amount, quantity, or dimensions. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In view of these definitions, the Court held that `[s]ubstantially' in the phrase `substantially limits' suggests `considerable' or `to a large degree.' Id. at 196, 122 S.Ct. 681 (citation omitted). These definitions of substantial and the Supreme Court's interpretation of that term indicate that the term substantially as used in FOIA's fee-shifting provision alters the amount or degree of recovery necessary to obtain fees — not the method or manner in which the recovery must be obtained. In rejecting the catalyst theory, the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon limited the methods of recovery that may give rise to an award of fees; it did not change the amount of recovery required. Accordingly, any difference between the term prevailing party, as analyzed in Buckhannon, and the term substantially prevail[ing] party, as used in FOIA, is not significant to our analysis.
25 UNITE also argues that FOIA's legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to permit fee awards under the catalyst theory. FOIA's legislative history has been recounted by this Court before. In Vermont Low Income, Judge Friendly described Congress' deliberations over the threshold requirement for an award of attorney's fees under FOIA. See Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 512-13. The version of the bill originally recommended by the House Committee on Government Operations provided for an award of fees, in the discretion of the court, to a complainant in instances where the court issues an injunction or order against the Government agency. Id. at 512 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As passed by the House, however, the bill broadened a party's eligibility for a fee award to cases in which the United States... has not prevailed. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Senate bill, as Judge Friendly described it, changed the emphasis by permitting an assessment of fees in cases where the complainant has substantially prevailed and by listing four factors for a court to consider when exercising its discretion to award fees: the benefit to the public, if any, deriving from the case, the commercial benefit to the complainant and the nature of his interest in the records sought, and whether the government's withholding of the records sought had a reasonable basis in law. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Conference Committee's version, which ultimately passed into law, incorporated the substantially prevailing standard from the Senate proposal, but eliminated the four criteria discussed above. See id. at 513. Based on this legislative record, UNITE maintains that the House's rejection of a version of the bill that awarded fees where the court issues an injunction or order against the Government agency demonstrates Congress' intent that a FOIA complainant need not secure judicially sanctioned relief to be eligible for an award of attorney's fees. 26 While Judge Friendly made a forceful case on this score, we are guided in our view of FOIA's legislative record by the Supreme Court's consideration of a similar legislative history argument in Buckhannon. At the petitioners' urging, the Buckhannon Court examined the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which, the petitioners argued, supported a broader reading of the term prevailing party — one which encompassed the catalyst theory. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Taking up this argument, the Court pointed to the House Report to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which states that [t]he phrase `prevailing party' is not intended to be limited to the victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits. Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 7 (1976)). The Court also referenced the Senate Report, which explains that `parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.' Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5, (1976), U.S. Code Cong & Admin.News 1976, p. 5912.). Further, the Court noted that both Reports made explicit reference to an Eighth Circuit decision describing the catalyst theory. See id. (citing Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.1970)). 27 In spite of this record, the Buckhannon Court dismissed the petitioners' argument as insufficient, concluding that, in view of the American Rule that courts may not award fees absent explicit statutory authority, the legislative history cited was at best ambiguous as to the availability of the `catalyst theory' for awarding attorney's fees. Id. at 607-08, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The legislative history underlying the passage of FOIA is no more persuasive than that recounted in Buckhannon. Indeed, one of the Reports cited in Buckhannon explicitly states that the term prevailing party was not intended to be limited to those acquiring a judgment on the merits, yet that did not prevent the Supreme Court from ultimately concluding that some form of judicially sanctioned relief is required to support an award of fees. See id. at 607, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 7 (1976)). In contrast, none of the Reports in FOIA's legislative history references awarding fees in the absence of a judgment. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 456. Buckhannon 's characterization of what we believe to be a more persuasive legislative record as ambiguous and insufficient convinces us that the legislative history underlying FOIA is inconclusive. Id. 2 28
29 UNITE next argues that because Buckhannon did not specifically rule on the propriety of awarding attorney's fees to a FOIA plaintiff who had not obtained judicially sanctioned relief, Second Circuit law approving of such awards in FOIA cases controls this appeal, and requires reversal. UNITE is correct that prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon, a judgment [was] not an absolute prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees under FOIA's fee-shifting provision. Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513. UNITE is also correct that, as a general rule, one panel of this Court cannot overrule a prior decision of another panel. See, e.g., United States v. King, 276 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir.2002). We have recognized, however, that an exception to this general rule arises where there has been an intervening Supreme Court decision that casts doubt on our controlling precedent. See, e.g., Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir.1979). As one of our recent decisions acknowledges, for this exception to apply, the intervening decision need not address the precise issue already decided by our Court. Cf. Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 783-86 (2d Cir.2002) (re-evaluating a prior holding of this Court on the record-access provision of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1), in light of an intervening Supreme Court decision that overruled an earlier Second Circuit decision concerning a different non-disclosure provision of FERPA). We believe that Buckhannon 's rejection of the catalyst theory and its reasoning supporting that rejection are sufficiently broad to support the conclusion we reach today, our prior holding in Vermont Low Income notwithstanding. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 457 (Because Buckhannon controls, the existing law of our circuit must give way.). 30 UNITE contends that construing Buckhannon to preclude fee awards under the catalyst theory in FOIA actions, even though Buckhannon addressed only the fee provisions of the ADA and FHAA, implies a slavish subordination of our judgment to the will of higher-court judges. (Citing Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990) at 226). UNITE maintains that resolution of the question before us should rest on an independent analysis of Buckhannon 's application to FOIA based on statutory language, history, and purpose. We agree, and we believe that our holding today is the result not just of the Supreme Court's recent decision, but also of (1) our examination of the judicial landscape surrounding the award of attorney's fees in general, see, e.g., Kasza, 325 F.3d at 1180, and (2) our independent consideration of FOIA's legislative history. Our assessment of this body of law is undoubtedly affected by Buckhannon, a decision in which the Supreme Court disagreed with almost every circuit that had considered the catalyst theory. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 621, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (Scalia, J., concurring) (acknowledging majority opinion's disagreement with a `clear majority' of the Circuits); see also id. at 602 n. 3, 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. However, our assessment here is also consistent with other decisions addressing the catalyst theory in cases involving fee-shifting provisions not considered in Buckhannon. See, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 456-57; Crabill, 259 F.3d at 667 (Posner, J. ) (suggesting that Buckhannon applies to the fee provision contained in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t). 31
32 Finally, in a policy-oriented argument, UNITE predicts that if FOIA plaintiffs are not permitted to qualify for fee awards under the catalyst theory, recalcitrant agencies will be able to avoid such awards by releasing the requested records at the eleventh hour. The petitioners in Buckhannon advanced a similar argument, contending that in the absence of the catalyst theory, defendants seeking to avoid an award of attorney's fees would be able to do so by unilaterally mooting an action just prior to judgment. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The Court rejected the petitioners' claim, noting that it was entirely speculative and unsupported by any empirical evidence. Id. We agree and find UNITE's argument on this front unavailing. We would add that this is a policy argument best addressed to Congress.