Opinion ID: 1192266
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: This Court Properly Has Jurisdiction Under the EPCA

Text: The DOE contends that the EPCA does not grant this court jurisdiction to review the denial of a preemption waiver, and that the CEC should have sought judicial review in federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Its argument is based on the following provision of the EPCA governing judicial review: Any person who will be adversely affected by a rule prescribed under section 6293, 6294, or 6295 of this title, may . . . file a petition with the United States court of appeals . . . for judicial review of such rule. 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b)(1). The DOE contends that the CEC is not challenging a rule adopted pursuant to §§ 6293, 6294, or 6295 but instead is challenging the denial of a waiver that was sought pursuant to § 6297(d). Accordingly, argues the DOE, we lack jurisdiction to proceed. Despite the surface plausibility of DOE's argument, we conclude that it does not effectuate the intent of Congress for the review scheme of the EPCA. It is true that review of agency action is typically located in the district courts under the APA absent a specific statutory provision to the contrary. Owner-Operators Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 582, 585 (9th Cir.1991) ([U]nless Congress specifically maps a judicial review path for an agency, review may be had in federal district court under its general federal question jurisdiction.). The provisions of § 6306, taken as a whole, are not consistent, however, with a view that Congress intended default jurisdiction to lie in the district courts for all review except direct challenges to rules adopted under §§ 6293, 6294, or 6295. The EPCA specifically confers jurisdiction on the district courts for two categories of actions under the EPCA: suits to determine state compliance with requirements of the EPCA, and suits challenging the denial of rulemaking to amend a product standard. 42 U.S.C. § 6306(c). These provisions would appear to be unnecessary if Congress intended district court jurisdiction under the APA to apply to every challenge other than direct challenges to rules adopted under §§ 6293, 6294, or 6295. It seems most likely that Congress listed one group of cases to be decided initially by the circuit courts, and another class to be decided in the first instance by the district courts. For unlisted matters, considerations of efficiency, consistency with the congressional scheme, and judicial economy may be employed to determine whether initial review in the circuit courts best accomplishes the intent of Congress. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 741-45, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985). These considerations militate in favor of jurisdiction in this court for the present controversy. First, the denial of CEC's petition for a waiver of preemption is closely intertwined with the exercise of DOE's authority under § 6295. It was the statutory and regulatory adoption of residential washing machine standards for energy efficiency that caused the preemption of CEC's regulations. Denial of the waiver leaves the CEC preempted by the effect of the statute and subsequent DOE energy regulations. To some extent, therefore, CEC is adversely affected by a rule prescribed under section . . . 6295 within the meaning of § 6306(b), which confers jurisdiction on the circuit courts of appeals. [S]tatutes authorizing review of specified agency actions should be construed to allow review of agency actions `which are functionally similar' or `tantamount to those specified actions.' Thermalkem, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1233, 1237 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Vineland Chem. Co. v. EPA, 810 F.2d 402, 405 (3d Cir.1987)). Considerations of practicality and consistency with the congressional scheme also militate in favor of review by the court of appeals. In addressing those considerations, we are aided by the decision of the Second Circuit in NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.2004) ( NRDC 1 ), the only case addressing a similar jurisdictional issue under the EPCA. There, the court reviewed a DOE rule promulgated under section 6295, as well as related orders concerning the effective date of implementation of that rule. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that review of the orders belonged in the district court. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the EPCA does also specifically provide for jurisdiction in the district court in limited circumstances, citing the two inapplicable provisions set forth in § 6306(c). Id. at 192 n. 6. It continued by holding that, when there is a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to the court of appeals, it should be construed in favor of review by the court of appeals. Id. at 193. NRDC 1 also provided several policy reasons why jurisdiction in the court of appeals was appropriate, and those considerations apply equally here. NRDC 1 drew a sharp distinction between [r]ulemaking proceedings [which] do not ordinarily necessitate additional factfinding by a district court to effectuate the review process and the exceptions to review by a court of appeals found in § 6303 . . . [which] ordinarily would entail additional factfinding, as they do not reflect the culmination of a structured rulemaking process with its attendant record. Id. at 193-94 (emphasis added). Holding that the latter exceptions are therefore appropriately reserved for review by the district court, the Second Circuit based its distinction between these two types of cases on the records they would present to their respective courts. Id. at 194, It is quite clear that DOE's denial of a waiver of preemption falls into the category of [r]ulemaking proceedings [which do not] necessitate additional factfinding by a district court to effectuate the review process. Id. at 193. Here, we are presented with a full record upon which the agency has deliberated. No further factfinding is necessary to determine whether the DOE acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting the waiver petition. We should not presume, without supporting evidence, that Congress would intend to implement a review system that created an entirely duplicative process whereby both the district courts and the circuit courts would review the same fully-developed record under the same legal standards. The DOE attempts to differentiate the denial of a waiver of preemption from its normal rulemaking function. It argues that, if it were to adopt water conservation rules under § 6295, [the] DOE must determine national standards in the broad context of the national need for . . . water conservation, but a waiver proceeding is a much narrower inquiry, guided by different statutory factors, which are focused on state or local interests. But the decision to grant or deny a waiver certainly involves consideration of such national factors, and requires an evaluation of whether a waiver is consistent with the goals of the national scheme or frustrates those goals. We discern no qualitative difference in the two types of decisions that militates in favor of initial review of the decisions in different courts. The case of NRDC v. Abraham ( NRDC 2 ), 244 F.3d 742 (9th Cir.2001), relied on by DOE, is inapposite. In NRDC 2, the court held that it lacked original jurisdiction to hear a case challenging a decision arising under the Atomic Energy Act, which did not explicitly provide for direct review in appellate courts. The petitioner in NRDC 2 argued that the court could assert jurisdiction under a different statutethe Nuclear Waste Policy Acteven though the challenged ruling was quite clearly issued under the Atomic Energy Act. Id. at 743. The court appropriately rejected this argument. In our case, however, the question is not whether resort may be had to another statute, but simply whether the EPCA provides jurisdiction in the courts of appeals. NRDC 2 therefore does not apply. Finally, the DOE's attempt to analogize the case of Public Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA, 489 F.3d 1279 (D.C.Cir.2007) also fails, and there is much within that case that suggests that we should find jurisdiction in our case. In Public Citizen, the petitioners sought an order prescribing a motor vehicle safety standard under the Safety Act, but were not granted that order. Id. at 1287 (emphasis omitted). Like to the EPCA, the Safety Act provides that such orders, when issued, are reviewable in the first instance by the courts of appeals. 49 U.S.C. § 30161(a). However, denials of requests to initiate proceedings to consider orders or rules are clearly governed by 49 U.S.C. § 30,162(a)(1), which does not provide for direct appellate review. Public Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1287. The Public Citizen petition was denied at this early stage. The D.C. Circuit held that the plain terms of the statute dictate that judicial review of NHTSA's denial of a petition for rulemaking must begin in district courts-not in courts of appeals. Id. The circumstances here are quite different. We are presented with no comparable statutory command. Moreover, the same policy considerations that support our conclusion are consistent with the result in Public Citizen. The court in Public Citizen rejected jurisdiction when the agency refused to act on a petition, and thus had compiled no record whatsoever. Without such a record, any circuit court would find it difficult or impossible to determine whether the administrative agency had acted legally; a district court with its fact-finding capability was a more appropriate venue. In our case, however, we are presented with a fully-developed record addressing all of the statutory requirements demanded of the CEC. The type of review required of us is qualitatively no different from the sort that we would engage in upon review of a rule promulgated under 42 U.S.C. § 6295, over which we are expressly assigned jurisdiction under the EPCA. For all of these reasons, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to entertain CEC's petition for review.