Opinion ID: 1391104
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: defendant's motion to elect

Text: In Glenn v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. , 250 S.C. 323, 157 S.E. (2d) 630 (1967), this Court had before it a similar factual situation and held that an election was not required. In Glenn , an employee of Dunean Mills had died from exposure to a concentration of freon gas that had been manufactured and supplied by DuPont. The complaint stated two causes of action: (1) breach of implied warranty, and (2) negligence. We held that: The complaint sets forth only one primary right on the part of the plaintiff and one primary wrong on the part of the [defendant], and seeks a single recovery. The primary right of the plaintiff is to recover damages for the death of the decedent, ... The primary wrong of the [defendant], and the only one alleged, is the causation of the death of the decedent .... Applying the reasoning of Glenn to the case at bar, we hold that the one primary right of the plaintiffs is to recover damages for the burning of the building. The primary wrong on the part of Piper is the causation of the destruction of the building. Counsel submits that the ruling in Glenn should not be applicable here because considerable discovery processes have been used, and now that the parties are apprised of what the evidence will basically be, an election should be required. This argument has little appeal so long as genuine issues of fact remain to be determined as relate to each of the two theories. We think that the trial judge properly refused to require the plaintiffs to elect.