Opinion ID: 3000946
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: handing it to the person;

Text: (ii) leaving it at the person’s office with a clerk or other person in charge, or if no one is in charge leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office; or 5 (...continued) notice of the application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application. (emphasis added). Nos. 06-3779 & 06-4169 15 (iii) if the person has no office or the office is closed, leaving it at the person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion residing there. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(A). In-hand delivery is, therefore, a specifically approved method of service under the Rules. Spamhaus’ conclusory allegation that “no authorized representative of Spamhaus has ever been properly served with in-hand delivery of any document,” Appellant’s Br. at 17, without more, does not defeat the proof of service provided to the district court, nor does it require this court to remand to allow further factual development in the face of a certificate of service by an officer of the court. Nor has Spamhaus cited any precedent in support of its contention that the record must contain more specific evidence “demonstrating how . . . service was purportedly perfected.” Id. at 16-17. Moreover, although a party is not required to file a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court to raise challenges to the entry of a default judgment, this court has recognized that when a party does so, the failure to raise certain defenses specifically may waive those defenses for purposes of appeal of the underlying judgment. See Swaim, 73 F.3d at 718-19. Although our cases applying this rule have dealt with issues of personal jurisdiction, service to bring a party into the action and capacity to be sued, id., the logic employed in those cases applies with equal force to the particular defense of failure of notice under Rule 55(b). In each case, the request made on appeal from the underlying default judgment is that we remand for factual findings that would justify relief from the judgment because the district court has the special competence to make those findings of fact. See id. Sensibly, then, when a party chooses to move for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) in the 16 Nos. 06-3779 & 06-4169 district court, that party should raise those defenses which require factual development that it anticipates raising in an appeal taken from the underlying judgment. As we stated in Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1996), this approach promotes the twin concerns of juridical efficiency and respect for the unique factfinding capability of a district court. . . . This is not to deny our jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from a default judgment, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but when a party chooses to utilize the attention and limited resources of a district court in a motion under Rule 60(b), we think it just and proper that it be required to put before the district court whatever infirmities support setting aside the default judgment. This brings to bear the district court’s factfinding function and unique knowledge of the case and maintains the court of appeals’ role as a forum for resolving disputed questions of law—not fact. Id. at 719. In its 60(b) motion in this case, Spamhaus never asserted that e360 had failed to comply with the notice requirements of Rule 55 and that this failure justified relief from judgment. Its only contention regarding service of process was a failure of service to bring it into the case, in connection with its argument that the district court lacked in personam jurisdiction. Spamhaus now seeks an opportunity to offer countervailing proof on the issue of service of the motion for default judgment; that is an argument that Spamhaus should have addressed to the district court in the first instance when, as here, a Rule 60(b) motion challenging the default judgment also was filed. Nos. 06-3779 & 06-4169 17 Because the jurisdictional challenges Spamhaus now seeks to raise have been waived and neither the district court nor this court has the duty to resurrect them, the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment of liability nor in denying the motion for Rule 60(b) relief. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment on liability.