Opinion ID: 1345763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: What was the county's policy on grading against traffic, and what decisions were left to the operational judgment of Ario?

Text: With these considerations in mind, I would conclude that the policy of the county was to permit grader operators to grade against traffic, but only under certain circumstances and with the use of certain precautions. Because the policy did not mandate that Ario grade against traffic at the time that this accident occurred, or prohibit Ario from warning that he was doing so, but left those choices to Ario's operational judgment, I would conclude that Ario's decisions were not discretionary and did not qualify for statutory immunity under the discretionary function exception. Although it is clear that various employees of the county considered the question of whether it was permissible to grade gravel roads against traffic, it is less clear precisely what decisions were made on that issue. The majority concludes that a policy decision was made to permit grade operators to choose when to grade against traffic. I would agree with the use of the word permit, because grading against traffic was clearly not mandated, and I would add that the evidence demonstrates that even such permission was conditional. More specifically, Ario's choices not to deadhead, which would have allowed him to grade with traffic, and to grade against traffic without any warning to oncoming travelers, were operational choices that did not balance public policy concerns but basically focused on operating convenience  the extra 4-6 minutes that either measure might add to the completion of the job. Because the county's policy was not formal or written, we must look to several sources to determine what the scope of that policy was. The 1985 memorandum of Joe Varda, relied upon by the county as containing at least a partial statement of the policy, describes grading against traffic in permissive terms (you may) and as being subject to these conditions: [5] (1) If you are operating your equipment with routine care and the normally accepted safety precautions are taken (beacon, working lights, flags, etc.)   . (2) [I]f there are cases where sight distance is short either vertically or horizontally, either an attempt to improve the condition should be made or special precautions should be taken. In other words, the permission did not relieve the operator of the need to use due care in determining what precautions should be taken if he was to grade against traffic. The affidavit of David Skelton confirms the county's view that the Varda memorandum does state the county's policy, presumably including the conditions stated by Varda. Skelton's affidavit also confirms that the policy was permissive, not mandatory (St. Louis County has had a policy for a number of years wherein we allow our grader operators to grade against traffic on gravel roads. (Emphasis added.)). In addition, Skelton's affidavit suggests that the policy includes these further conditions: (1) sign usage where practical; and (2) deadheading where practical. Finally, Skelton's affidavit refers to the county's reliance on a booklet entitled, `Blading Aggregate Surfaces' from the National Association of County Engineers Training Guide Series in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration. Although this booklet advises grading operators to [p]eriodically blade surface of the road against the flow of traffic to eliminate drifting of aggregate onto ends of bridges, culverts, intersections, and railroad crossings[,] it also makes these safety recommendations:  Turn on grader headlights when blading against traffic.      Use signing and proper flaggers where needed to warn traffic of work in progress or as warning if grader is left unattended. From these descriptions of the unwritten policy of the county, I would conclude that the county's grading protocol permitted operators to grade against traffic only when deadheading was not practical and the operators were able to do so with appropriate precautions. This protocol left it to the operators to decide when deadheading was practical and when warning signs were practical. The policy did not require Ario to grade against traffic on the third or fourth pass and did not prohibit Ario from either deadheading after the second pass or placing warning signs after the first, if he was going to grade against traffic. On this record, there is evidence to show that deadheading was practical. According to Ario, he intended to make four passes on this 2-mile segment of County State-Aid Highway 29. At a normal grading speed of 3 miles per hour, the four passes would have taken a total of 2 hours and 40 minutes. Ario's first two passes were on the right side of the road, with traffic. The choice to deadhead before passes three and four would have added only 4-6 minutes to the job, given the ability of the grader to deadhead at 23-30 miles per hour. [6] Ario acknowledged that the only advantage to grading against traffic that he considered was the time saved (4-6 minutes) by not driving to the other end. He did not raise any operational objections to deadheading. Although the county may have been concerned that routine deadheading, by all operators on all jobs, would significantly add to the overall expense of grading and might require a reduction in grading practices, that concern is not presented by these facts. In this circumstance, deadheading was surely practical and would not have added any significant cost. Likewise, the delay to place a warning sign at the north end of the west lane, after Ario completed his first pass to that end, would have been insignificant. In fact, to the extent that Ario considered the time cost of deadheading or placing a warning sign, it was so de minimis as to not amount to a public policy consideration. [7] Further, there is evidence from which one could conclude that the decision to not deadhead, but to grade against traffic without a warning sign, was particularly dangerous in this case because of the time of day and the worsening visibility conditions. Ario testified that when the accident occurred, it was dusk on a day that was already so cloudy that one could not see the sunset. He also said that the road was mostly banked with trees. Because I conclude that the county is not entitled to discretionary function immunity, I would hold that this evidence is sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact on the question of whether Ario's decision not to deadhead, but to grade against traffic without warning, was negligent.