Opinion ID: 2331490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Retroactivity of the 1998 Amendments to the APRA

Text: In an effort to further promote access to public information, the General Assembly promulgated amendments to the APRA in 1998 that (1) allow a trial justice to award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff, § 38-2-9(d), and (2) grant a trial justice the power to waive costs charged for search or retrieval if [he or she] determines that the information requested is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understating of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester. Section 38-2-4(e). The defendant asserts that the trial justice erred in waiving plaintiff's costs and awarding it attorneys' fees because those amendments to the APRA did not go into effect until after this action began. We disagree with defendant's contention. In Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council of Rhode Island, 774 A.2d 820, 821 (R.I. 2001), the Emergency Hiring Council (EHC) held a closed meeting to consider the hiring of a hearing officer for the State Building Commission. After being informed that the meeting was closed to the public, Gregory Solas (Solas) filed a complaint alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), G.L.1956 chapter 46 of title 42, and requesting a temporary restraining order to prevent the hiring of the hearing officer until the applicability of the OMA was resolved. See id. The trial justice found that the OMA did apply to the meeting and permanently enjoined EHC from failing to act in accordance with the OMA. See id. at 822. Furthermore, the trial justice granted Solas's request for attorneys' fees pursuant to § 42-46-8(d). See id. On appeal, EHC argued that the trial justice erred in awarding attorneys' fees because Solas filed the action in September 1997, and the amendment to the OMA providing for attorneys' fees did not become effective until July 20, 1998. See Solas, 774 A.2d at 825. This Court found EHC's argument unpersuasive. See id. In making our decision we relied on the axiom that courts should apply the law in effect at the time a decision is rendered even though that law was enacted after the events that gave rise to the suit    [and noted that] `a trial court should apply the law in effect at the time it makes its decision if such application would implement the legislative intent.' Id. at 825-26. Although the amendment providing for the award of reasonable attorneys' fees was enacted subsequent to Solas's filing of his complaint, it became effective before thetrial justice's decision. See id. at 826. Thus, the trial justice properly applied the attorneys' fees provision of the OMA to Solas's case. See id. As in Solas, the attorneys' fees and waiver of costs provisions in § 38-2-9(d) were enacted subsequent to DARE's filing of its complaint but before the trial justice made a final decision. Thus, we conclude that there is no discernible difference between the two situations and hold that the trial justice did not err in applying §§ 38-2-4 and 38-2-9(d) to the present case. Although the trial justice properly applied § 38-2-9(d) [6] to the current action, plaintiff argues that the trial justice should have awarded attorneys' fees from the time the action began rather than from the date the amendment went into effect. We agree with plaintiff's contention. Ordinarily, this Court presumes that statutes and their amendments operate prospectively unless there is clear, strong language or a necessary implication that the General Assembly intended to give the statute retroactive effect. See Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., 637 A.2d 367, 371 (R.I.1994). When, however, a statute lacks such clear, strong language or there is no necessary implication concerning its retroactive application, the distinction between a substantive statute and a remedial, or procedural, statute becomes important. See id. Substantive statutes, which create, define, or regulate substantive legal rights, must be applied prospectively.    In contrast, remedial and procedural statutes, which do not impair or increase substantive rights butrather prescribe methods for enforcing such rights, may be construed to operate retroactively. Id. Again, we refer to Solas for guidance. In Solas, we held that the OMA, which was enacted before Solas initiated his lawsuit, was an existing substantive right available to the citizens of this state at the time [Solas filed this action]. Solas, 774 A.2d at 826. The attorneys' fees provision codified in § 42-46-8(d), however, merely added an additional remedial measure to that already existing substantive right. Solas, 774 A.2d at 826. Thus, an award of attorneys' fees from the time the suit began was appropriate. Id. In the case before us, we conclude that, at the time plaintiff brought this action, the APRA conferred upon the public the substantive right to have access to public records. Section 38-2-9(d) merely provides the additional remedial measure of attorneys' fees to that already existing substantive right. Therefore, the trial justice should have ordered defendant to pay attorneys' fees to plaintiff from May 5, 1995  the date plaintiff filed its complaint  to the date of this decision.