Opinion ID: 2349535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer

Text: The city sought to amend its answer on two occasions. It originally filed motions to amend on September 17, 2001, in this case, as well as in other pending tax appeals, filed by Granoff Realty II Limited Partnership (Granoff Realty II). In its motions, the city attempted to add the following affirmative defense: Defendant asserts the defense of R.I.G.L. § 44-5-15 and § 44-5-16 in that Plaintiff has failed to submit a true and exact account under oath within the statutory time period and/or the defense of R.I.G.L. § 44-5-26 and 44-5-27 in that Plaintiff has failed to properly perfect its appeal. The motions to amend were heard on October 10, 2001, by a motion justice [4] and denied in all cases. The city then filed a petition in this Court seeking a writ of certiorari, which was denied. Granoff Realty II's case was tried first, and on April 2, 2002, judgment was entered in favor of Granoff Realty II, from which the city appealed. In an opinion issued on May 30, 2003, we rejected the city's argument that the motion justice abused his discretion by denying the motion to amend. Granoff Realty II, Limited Partnership v. Rossi, 823 A.2d 296 (R.I.2003) (per curiam) ( Granoff Realty ). The same reasoning is persuasive in the case before us now. In Granoff Realty, we recognized that, although leave to amend a pleading lies within the sound discretion of a trial justice, Rule 15(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure [5] liberally permits amendment absent a showing of extreme prejudice. Granoff Realty, 823 A.2d at 298 (quoting Wachsberger v. Pepper, 583 A.2d 77, 78 (R.I.1990)). Accordingly, leave to amend should be denied only when the nonmoving party can establish that it would be unduly prejudiced by the amendment. Id. (citing Wachsberger, 583 A.2d at 78-79). The city acknowledges that Granoff Realty is dispositive of any claim of error that its original motions to amend were wrongly denied at the hearing on October 10, 2001. It asserts, however, that it renewed its motion to amend its answer at the commencement of trial, and that the trial justice erred by summarily denying it without explanation. The trial justice did not independently consider the motion to amend, the city argues, nor did she articulate her reasons for denying it. The city further contends that Weybosset Hill failed to show that it would suffer extreme prejudice if the answers were amended. As we said in Granoff Realty, 823 A.2d at 298, leave to amend a pleading generally is liberally permitted. However, a court need not grant leave to amend a pleading when doing so would unduly prejudice the nonmoving party. Id. Moreover, [t]he question of prejudice to the party opposing the amendment is central to the investigation into whether an amendment should be granted. Faerber v. Cavanagh, 568 A.2d 326, 329 (R.I.1990). At the hearing on October 10, 2001, Weybosset Hill argued that it would be prejudiced if the motion to amend was granted because it would have to examine the accounts entered for the relevant tax years to find whether any of the city's claimed inadequacies, inaccuracies, or omissions were substantial. Since Weybosset Hill's case was, at that date, set for trial in two or three weeks, it asserted that it would be prejudiced if, in addition to preparing for trial, it had to prepare new issues questioning the adequacy of its accounts. In her decision, the trial justice reviewed the city's original answer, and noted that the record was devoid of any evidence indicating that Defendant asserted this defense prior to trial with the specificity and particularity required by [Super.R.Civ.P.] 9(c). [6] Without specifically commenting on the city's motion to amend filed on the eve of trial, she denied its Rule 52(c) motion based on [Weybosset Hill's] alleged failure to comply with the statutory requirement. The city now argues that these findings did not constitute an independent exercise of discretion or an explanation of why the trial justice departed from the policy that amendments should be allowed liberally. We conclude, however, that her failure to mention specifically the city's renewed motion to amend was not an abuse of discretion. We previously have held that [e]ven brief findings and conclusions are sufficient if they address and resolve the controlling and essential factual issues in the case. Donnelly v. Cowsill, 716 A.2d 742, 747 (R.I.1998) (quoting Anderson v. Town of East Greenwich, 460 A.2d 420, 423 (R.I.1983)). We agree with the trial justice. Employing our highly deferential standard to the findings of fact of a trial justice sitting without a jury, deBourgknecht v. Rossi, 798 A.2d 934, 937 (R.I.2002) (per curiam), we hold that Weybosset Hill demonstrated prejudice sufficient to oppose the city's motion to amend, and that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial justice to deny the motion. Our reasoning in Granoff Realty, 823 A.2d at 298, bears repeating: The plaintiff may well have been extremely prejudiced had the city been granted leave to amend, considering the lateness of defendant's motion, its proximity to trial, and the significant work plaintiff would have needed to undertake to prepare for the new legal issue. The fact that trial actually did not commence until six months after the hearing on the motion is irrelevant because, at the time of the hearing, the trial was scheduled to commence within a week. In this case, the renewed motion to amend was filed but a week before the trial began. Moreover, we conclude that the trial justice's ruling was correct under the law of the case doctrine, which provides that ordinarily, after a judge has decided an interlocutory matter in a pending suit, a second judge, confronted at a later stage of the suit with the same question in the identical manner, should refrain from disturbing the first ruling. Ferguson v. Marshall Contractors, Inc., 745 A.2d 147, 151 (R.I.2000) (quoting Taveira v. Solomon, 528 A.2d 1105, 1107 (R.I.1987)). Nevertheless, [this] doctrine does not apply when the second motion is based on an expanded record. Goodman v. Turner, 512 A.2d 861, 864 (R.I.1986). It is incumbent upon the moving party, however, to bring to the court's attention material that significantly extends the record. See Salvadore v. Major Electric & Supply, Inc., 469 A.2d 353, 356 (R.I.1983). In the case now before us, the record indicates that the city filed its second motion to amend on May 2, 2002. When the matter was reached for trial on May 9, 2002, it did not press the motion, or even bring it to the trial justice's attention, until midway through the first day of testimony. Although the trial justice did not say that she was applying the law of the case doctrine, we conclude that she quite properly denied the motion to amend.