Opinion ID: 2633743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Application in Kansas

Text: In light of these varying approaches we must determine which approach to follow. Consistent with the reasoning of most other state courts addressing the issue we face today, the Kansas statutory provision setting out the extradition procedure, K.S.A. 22-2710, provides that the alleged fugitive shall be taken before a judge who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender and of the crime with which he is charged, and that he has the right to demand and procure legal counsel. The statute also gives the alleged fugitive the right to test the legality of his arrest. K.S.A. 22-2710 is specific in providing the right personally to the alleged fugitive, stating if the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or they desire to test the legality of his arrest, the judge shall allow the alleged fugitive to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. Hence, the statute is directly contrary to the State's assertion at oral argument that this right can be effectively tested by competent counsel without the alleged fugitive's involvement; the legislature chose to give the right to the alleged fugitive, not simply to make the attorney a type of guardian ad litem. Additionally, K.S.A.2006 Supp. 22-4503(a) specifies that a defendant in an extradition proceeding is entitled to have assistance of counsel at the proceeding. If such defendant is indigent, he or she is entitled to appointment of counsel. See K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 22-4503. Our case law consistently holds that where a right to counsel exists, that right should be meaningful and, when competency is at issue, the court should consider whether the defendant is able to assist counsel in presenting a defense. See generally Brown v. State, 278 Kan. 481, 483-85, 101 P.3d 1201 (2004) (statutory right to counsel creates right to effective assis tance); State v. Reed, 248 Kan. 506, 512, 809 P.2d 553 (1991) (holding that standard for determination of competency is whether the defendant `has sufficient presdrit ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, 80 S.Ct. 788 [1960].). We agree with the majority of states considering the specific issue before us and conclude that the right to counsel and the right to test the legality of the extradition procedure would be meaningless if the alleged fugitive does not possess some level of competency. Clearly, the alleged fugitive's ability to assist counsel may be critical to the outcome of issues where his or her own knowledge is necessary ( i.e., his or her identity as the person named in the extradition papers and his or her presence in the demanding state at the time the offense was committed). We acknowledge the accuracy of the State's argument that inserting competency evaluations into extradition proceedings may cause delay and added expense. We reject, however, the State's assertion that delay or cost is a reason to adopt a different standard. The legislature created an adversarial procedure, and delay and cost are inherent in an alleged fugitive's decision to challenge the validity of the arrest. Testing competency will not unduly burden that proceeding in most cases, and whatever delays and expenses are incurred do not justify reducing the alleged fugitive's right to counsel and right to present a defense in extradition proceedings.