Opinion ID: 867561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Arizona's substantial interest

Text: ¶ 17 We first look to see if Arizona has any substantial interest in maintenance of the claim. RESTATEMENT § 142(2)(a) (1988). This accident occurred in Arizona, the injury occurred in Arizona, and the allegedly negligent or wrongful conduct that produced the accident and injury occurred in Arizona. Arizona has a significant interest in regulating conduct within the state and particularly in deterring wrongful conduct. See DeLoach, 192 Ariz. at 33 ¶ 19, 960 P.2d at 633 ¶ 19; Landi v. Arkules, 172 Ariz. 126, 131, 835 P.2d 458, 463 (App.1992) (Arizona has a basic public policy interest in regulating conduct within its borders.); Brandler, 154 Ariz. at 99, 740 P.2d at 961 (Arizona has substantial interest in deterring future tortious conduct); see also Ledesma, 816 F.2d at 486; Hurtado, 114 Cal.Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d at 672. ¶ 18 Thus, we believe Arizona has a substantial interest in permitting the present action in this forum even though no party is a domiciliary of Arizona. DeLoach noted the important basic policies underlying tort lawto deter wrongful conduct and compensate victims for their loss .... DeLoach, 192 Ariz. at 33 ¶ 19, 960 P.2d at 633 ¶ 19. Defendants point out that we have stated that the state of injury does not have a strong interest in compensating injured non-residents. Bryant v. Silverman, 146 Ariz. 41, 45, 703 P.2d 1190, 1194 (1985) (emphasis added). ¶ 19 But the issue in Bryant was whether to apply Arizona's substantive law of compensatory and punitive damages in an Arizona wrongful death action brought by an Arizona plaintiff against an Arizona corporation arising from an accident in Colorado. In Bryant we noted that Colorado, the state of injury, has less interest and less ability to control conduct than does the state of residence. Id. However, we held Arizona's substantive law of damages applied, even though the accident occurred in Colorado. But the fact that the airplane accident occurred in Colorado was fortuitous; Arizona, the state in which the misconduct occurred, had a greater interest or opportunity in deterrence. Id. Bryant therefore does not control or affect the choice of law rules for statutes of limitations set forth in RESTATEMENT § 142 and articulated in DeLoach. Finally, in the present case, Arizona is both the state of injury and the state of misconduct. Bryant certainly does not support the theory that Arizona has no substantial interest in regulating or deterring conduct within its borders. See RESTATEMENT § 142 cmt. g (1988). ¶ 20 Thus, we cannot say there is no substantial local interest that would be served by entertaining the claim in Arizona. On the contrary, our interests in regulating conduct within the state, deterring wrongful conduct in the state, and providing a forum to adjudicate claims arising from such conduct not only exist, they are much more than slight. In toto, Arizona has substantial interests that would be served by entertaining the claim, thus satisfying the test of RESTATEMENT § 142(2)(a) (1988). See DeLoach, 192 Ariz. at 33 ¶ 19, 960 P.2d at 633 ¶ 19.