Opinion ID: 2550875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: General Due Process Analysis

Text: Having examined and rejected Respondent's multiple specific due process arguments, we pause finally to note that there is absolutely no other basis for any argument that a due process violation existed in this case. Kansas Supreme Court Rule 211(b) (2004 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 275) requires the formal complaint in a disciplinary proceeding to be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the respondent of the alleged misconduct. The complaint in this case was sufficiently clear. In all other respects, Respondent was provided abundant due process of law in these proceedings. Respondent's many motions, along with the Disciplinary Administrator's responses and Respondent's replies, were duly considered by the hearing panel, which issued a prehearing report, ruling on each issue and addressing any due process concerns. The panel also provided for a 3-day hearing, as Respondent desired, with a fourth day left open if needed. The Disciplinary Administrator objected to only two of the forty individuals Respondent sought to have testify. These two, Chief Justice McFarland and Justice Luckert, did not have any information relevant to the charges against Respondent. The panel also went through the witness list with both Respondent and the Disciplinary Administrator. Its refusal to allow a number of suggested witnesses because they had no information, or had only irrelevant information, was sound. The panel specifically allowed Respondent to call 18 of his initial 40 witnesses, and stated it would allow testimony of the others if there was a showing that they had relevant testimony to offer. The fact that certain witnesses never testified was due to Respondent's failure to ensure their appearance or to his voluntary decision not to call them. Regarding Respondent's request to subpoena records and witnesses, the panel referred Respondent to Supreme Court Rule 216 (2004 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293) and to K.S.A. 60-245 and informed him that, while he could use whatever authority those statutes provided him, neither the panel nor the Disciplinary Administrator's office would issue subpoenas on his behalf. The Disciplinary Administrator objected to the introduction of records on the basis that they contained confidential information pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 222 (2004 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 322) and were not relevant to the charges against Respondent. The panel noted that it was not passing on the admissibility of the records or witnesses within the prehearing order. The panel denied Respondent's motion to dismiss based on hardship from delay, finding that the hardship, if any, was the result of Respondent's voluntary decision not to accept legal work. The panel recognized that Respondent had been informed and clearly understood that he was under no obligation to refrain from practicing law during the pendency of this proceeding. Moreover, much of the delay was due to the extensive number of prehearing motions filed by Respondent, which the hearing panel reviewed and to which it responded. The panel also denied Respondent's motion to dismiss based on alleged bad faith prosecution and the Disciplinary Administrator's alleged conflict of interest. After reviewing the motion, the Disciplinary Administrator's response, and Respondent's reply, the panel heard argument at a prehearing conference. It attributed the conflict of interest allegation to Respondent's unsupported belief that the Disciplinary Administrator was and is part of a conspiracy regarding adoption cases in Kansas. Respondent was also allowed an in camera review of possible disciplinary complaints against four attorneys representing adoptive parents, in order to evaluate his allegation of bias. The panel concluded that any complaints were not relevant and would fail to establish a connection between the lawyers' treatment by the Disciplinary Administrator's office and the alleged conspiracy. In summary, Respondent received all the process he was due and more. He had notice of the proceedings; he had an opportunity to be heard, to present testimony, to confront and cross-examine witnesses; he had a right to counsel if he so desired. There was no violation of due process in this proceeding.
Respondent also alleges that the Disciplinary Administrator and the disciplinary committee instituted these proceedings in bad faith. He argues that no action should be taken against him because there is substantial evidence of prosecutorial misconduct requiring the conclusion that these charges were brought in bad faith. In support of this allegation, Respondent appears to rely on his answer to the first ethics complaint, in which he argued that he had civil probable cause under Bergstrom v. Noah, 266 Kan 829, 974 P.2d 520 (1999); and that the court had been deceived through fraud, which has the effect of voiding an adoption. To prove this, I needed the records or to determine they did not exist. In Bergstrom, this court held that attorneys had probable cause to bring an action under Kansas antitrust statutes and could not be held liable for malicious prosecution. That case cited Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 276, 607 P.2d 438 (1980), for the proposition that, `[t]o maintain an action for malicious prosecution of a civil action the plaintiff must prove the following elements: (a) That the defendant initiated, continued, or procured civil procedures against the plaintiff. (b) That the defendant in so doing acted without probable cause. (c) That the defendant acted with malice, that is he acted primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings are based. (d) That the proceeding terminated in favor of the plaintiff. (e) That the plaintiff sustained damages.' Bergstrom v. Noah, 266 Kan. 829, 836-37, 974 P.2d 520 (1999). Respondent fails to allege or prove a single one of the elements necessary to establish a malicious prosecution claim, and, but for his cite to Bergstrom, his argument also is completely unsupported by legal citation. Thus this argument also is rejected. We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the hearing panel. We hold that Respondent has violated the following rules: KRPC 1.1 relating to competence; KRPC 3.1 relating to meritorious claims; KRPC 3.3(a)(1), relating to candor toward the tribunal; KRPC 3.4(c) relating to fairness to opposing party and counsel; KRPC 4.4, relating to respect for rights of third persons; and KRPC 8.4(c), (d), and (g), misconduct. We also have considered the hearing panel's analysis of the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards): (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state; (3) the potential or actual injury caused by the misconduct; (4) and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Respondent violated his duty to his clients to provide competent representation. He violated his duty to refrain from interfering with the administration of justice. He violated his duty to the legal profession to maintain personal integrity. He violated these duties intentionally. As a result of his misconduct, Respondent caused actual injury to the adoptive parents of Baby C; to Vincent, their counsel; and to the legal system and the legal profession. Respondent's behavior cost Baby C's adoptive parents more than $20,000. Vincent forgave the parents an additional $10,000 in attorney fees. In addition, the personal anxiety and stress experienced by the adoptive parents in their experience with the legal system was dramatically increased due to Respondent's conduct. Furthermore, the legal system itself suffered injury as a result of Respondent's misconduct. The Kansas Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the District of Kansas wasted valuable resources because of Respondent's absolute incompetence and interference with the administration of justice. Finally, the legal profession has been damaged by Respondent's false accusations against members of the judiciary; attorneys; court personnel; and other state, county, and municipal employees. We also adopt the hearing panel's findings regarding the following aggravating factors: pattern of misconduct; multiple violations; lack of acknowledgment of wrongdoing or remorse. Even at oral argument, Respondent refused to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct. This court also adopts the panel's findings regarding certain mitigating factors in this case: Respondent has no previous disciplinary record. Further, although Respondent repeatedly engaged in reprehensible conduct, it does not appear that he was motivated by dishonesty or selfishness. The panel acknowledged that at the time Respondent first engaged in misconduct, he had only been practicing law for 4 months. He was certainly inexperienced. However, Respondent persisted in his misbehavior up to the date of his oral argument before this court. Whether this is due to ignorance or stubbornness, the public must be protected from his further practice. As noted above, the panel recommended disbarment. Respondent seeks dismissal of this action. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer's course of conduct demonstrates that he or she does not understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and the lawyer's conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.51. Furthermore, disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on his or her fitness to practice. ABA Standard 5.11. We have performed the exhaustive review of the record urged by Respondent at oral argument. It provides a wealth of evidence supporting the panel's recommendation and none supporting Respondent's plea for dismissal. We therefore unanimously adopt the hearing panel's recommendation of disbarment. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondent Bret D. Landrith be and he is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, that his privilege to practice law in the state of Kansas is revoked, and that the Clerk of the Appellate Courts of Kansas strike the name of Bret D. Landrith from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice in the state of Kansas. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this opinion shall be published in the official Kansas Reports, that the costs herein be assessed to the respondent, and that respondent forthwith comply with Supreme Court Rule 218 (2004 Kan. Ct. P. Annot. 301). McFARLAND, C.J., and LUCKERT, J., not participating. LOCKETT, J., Retired, LARSON, S.J., and BUSER, J., assigned. [1]