Opinion ID: 1652270
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Taped Conversations.

Text: Attorney Scott Drabenstadt (who represented Coffey), testified that he recognized Parker's voice on the taped conversations. According to Drabenstadt, he had spoken with Parker in person between twelve and twenty-four times, and he had also spoken with Parker on the telephone an additional twelve to twenty-four times. Drabenstadt testified there was no doubt in his mind that the voice he heard on the tapes was Parker's. The next witness, Rocky Farmer, a former investigator for the public defender's officethrough whom the tapes were admittedtestified that he was present when the two taped conversations occurred and that he had contemporaneously listened to Stephenson's side of the conversation. Farmer also testified that he listened to the taped conversations with Stephenson. But Farmer also testified he did not know for sure that Stephenson had actually called Parker because he was not familiar with Parker's voice and had no record of the phone number Stephenson called. And Farmer could not say with certainty that the person Stephenson called in the second taped conversation was the same person Stephenson had spoken to in the first taped conversation. In the first taped conversation, Stephenson feigned amazement at reading the medical report, which showed that Baker was shot four times, and asked the other person in the conversation how many shots he squeeze[d] off[,] to which the other person (ostensibly Parker), answered I think it was four. In the other conversation, Stephenson asked the other person in the conversation (ostensibly Parker) whether when you shot him (presumably meaning when Parker shot Baker) was he (Baker) facing you (Parker) or was his (Baker's) back turned, to which the other person responded that the person shot was like sideways and didn't know what was happening. [36] Obviously, the taped conversations are incriminating. But the question before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to play them for the jury. [37]
We must first address Parker's contention that the Commonwealth failed adequately to authenticate the tapes. [38] Authentication of these tapes was complicated because the Commonwealth could not compel either alleged participant in the two conversations to testify since one participant was dead and the other had a constitutional right to refuse to testify. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth contends that the combined testimony of Drabenstadt and Farmer was sufficient to authenticate the tapes. We agree. Although it surprisingly was not discussed by the parties, Parker's voice could be authenticated under Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 901(b)(5), which provides that a voice can be properly identified ( i.e., authenticated) if the proponent of the evidence offers the witness's opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker regardless of whether the witness had previously heard the voice in question firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording.... Drabenstadt testified he had spoken in person and on the phone with Parker many times. So Drabenstadt clearly had heard Parker's voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. So, under the express language of KRE 901(b)(5), Drabenstadt was qualified to express his opinion that the voice on the tapes was Parker's voice; and it was up to the jury to determine what weight to give Drabenstadt's testimony. [39] We reject Parker's contention that Drabenstadt was offering expert or scientific testimony that necessitated a Daubert [40] hearing. Instead, we conclude Drabenstadt was merely offering lay opinion testimony that the voice on the tapes was Parker's. [41] We also reject Parker's argument that the Commonwealth committed reversible error by not providing Parker during discovery with notice that Drabenstadt would testify that he recognized Parker's voice on the tapes. Tellingly, Parker has not cited to any authority that would require the Commonwealth to provide in discovery notice of which witness would identify a voice on a tape recording. And Parker has not pointed to any discovery order by the trial court that would have compelled the Commonwealth to disclose Drabenstadt's planned testimony. This case is markedly different from cases cited by Parker involving identification of a defendant via a lineup for which counsel was not present. [42] In the case at hand, Parker was not required to go anywhere or do anything to further Drabenstadt's voice identification; therefore, the constitutional concerns inherent in a post-indictment visual lineup were not present. [43] Indeed, Parker's attorney conceded that he was on notice that the Commonwealth planned on calling Drabenstadt as a witness. So Parker's counsel had the opportunity to investigate the planned parameters of Drabenstadt's testimony. Additionally, Parker did not seek a continuance in order to have additional time to prepare for his cross-examination of Drabenstadt. Moreover, the Commonwealth played snippets of the two taped conversations for Drabenstadt; and Drabenstadt stated he had heard those tapes before and that he had no doubt the second voice on the tape was Parker's. Additionally, Farmer testified that he was present when the two taped conversations occurred, that he had listened to the tapes with Stephenson close in time to when the conversations occurred, and that the taped conversations played for the jury were the same conversations he helped Stephenson record. Finally, we note that the second person on the tape answered to the name Wee Wee, which was one of Parker's nicknames. [44] In sum, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to authenticate the taped conversations.
Although we have concluded that the Commonwealth adequately authenticated the taped conversations, we must also address Parker's argument that the admission into evidence of those tapes violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. More specifically, Parker contends the statements on the tapes were testimonial, causing their admission to run afoul of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington. [45] The Commonwealth contends that admission of the taped conversations did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment or Crawford because Parker, himself, was responsible for Stephenson's being unavailable as a witness. And, therefore, the statements fall within the hearsay exception set forth at KRE 804(b)(5), which provides that the hearsay rule does not apply to [a] statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. We begin with the conclusion that the taped conversations are hearsay. [46] Even though they were not obtained as a result of any interrogation by the police, we begin by assuming, for argument's sake, that the statements on the tapes were testimonial. [47] Since Parker had no prior opportunity to cross-examine Stephenson on the matter, the statements would normally be excluded. But both Crawford and its progeny recognize the principle inherent in KRE 804(b)(5): a criminal defendant should not profit from ensuring that the declarant is unavailable to testify. As stated by the United States Supreme Court: when defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce. While defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system. We reiterate what we said in Crawford : that the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing... extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds. That is, one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation. [48] The Commonwealth argues that since Parker killed Stephenson, thereby rendering him unavailable as a witness, Parker cannot complain that Stephenson's statements were inadmissible hearsay. Parker's response is that the Commonwealth failed to introduce sufficient proof to show that he killed Stephenson, as borne out by the jury's inability to reach a verdict on that charge. [49] The United States Supreme Court recently issued Giles v. California, [50] which narrows the limits of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception. Under Giles , it is no longer sufficient under KRE 804(b)(5) simply to show that a defendant caused the declarant's absence; rather, the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the confrontation clause is applicable only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying. [51] Or, as Giles has been interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court, [t]he doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing may not be employed to deny an accused his confrontation right absent evidence that, when committing the crime or other wrongdoing, the accused was motivated by the desire to prevent the witness from testifying against him at trial. [52] Under Giles , we must determine not only whether there was sufficient evidence that Parker caused Stephenson's unavailability; but we must further determine whether there was sufficient evidence to show that Parker's motivation in causing Stephenson's absence was to prevent Stephenson from testifying. Unfortunately, the Giles opinion does not provide clear guidance in how to approach these thorny issues. Although we have not yet had occasion in a published opinion to address what impact, if any, Crawford and its progeny, as well as Giles , had on KRE 804(b)(5), we have addressed Crawford's relationship to KRE 804(b)(5) in the unpublished case of Buckman v. Commonwealth. [53] In Buckman, we held that Crawford and Davis were essentially in accord with KRE 804(b)(5). [54] We held the proper procedure was for the proponent of the hearsay evidence in question (a tape of an unavailable witness's statement in Buckman ) to show good reason to believe that the defendant has intentionally procured the absence of the witness, after which the burden then shifts to the opposing party to offer credible evidence to the contrary. We emphasized in Buckman that the proponent of the evidence need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that made the declarant unavailable. [55] We also held that we may only disturb a trial court's decision on this type of question if that decision is clearly erroneous. [56] We believe our decision in Buckman, although unpublished, was sound and contains the proper procedural framework for analyzing these types of issues. [57] Furthermore, we conclude that the procedure used in Buckman is consistent with Giles . Giles left open the proper procedure for trial courts to use when facing a forfeiture-by-wrongdoing claim. A plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Giles opined that it was repugnant to our constitutional system of trial by jury for evidence such as that at issue to be introduced against those murder defendants whom the judge considers guilty (after less than a full trial, mind you, and of course before the jury has pronounced guilt).... [58] Yet the plurality then opined that a trial judge could be allowed to inquire into guilt of the charged offense in order to make a preliminary evidentiary ruling ... when, for example, the defendant is on trial for murdering a witness in order to prevent his testimony. [59] Evidence must be admissible before it can be admitted. Stated differently, a trial courtas the gatekeeper of evidencemay decline to permit a party's presenting evidence, including evidence of forfeiture by wrongdoing, if the trial court finds that evidence to be inadmissible. From a purely procedural standpoint, we believe a trial court promotes justice and judicial economy by engaging any forfeiture-by-wrongdoing issues before trial begins so that the parties and the court can be fully cognizant of the evidence that likely will be presented to the jury. Otherwise, the trial judge and the parties will face a recess in mid-trial to conduct an evidentiary hearing outside the jury's presence on whether the requirements of KRE 804(b)(5) and Giles have been met, [60] with neither party knowing beforehand what evidence it must be prepared either to offer or rebut. Regardless of when the trial court addresses the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing issue, we agree with the California Court of Appeals that a trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the admissibility of the proposed hearsay. [61] In this evidentiary hearing, the proponent of the hearsay must first introduce evidence establishing good reason to believe that the defendant intentionally procured the absence of the declarant, then the burden of going forward shifts to the party opposing introduction of the hearsay to offer credible evidence to the contrary. And as we quoted in Buckman concerning the degree of deference accorded the trial court's ultimate ruling on this admissibility issue, `[w]hen the determination [of admissibility] depends upon the resolution of a preliminary question of fact, the resolution is determined by the trial judge under KRE 104(a) on the basis of preponderance of the evidence and the resolution will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous....' Young v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 148, 167 (Ky. 2001). [62] Turning again to the case at hand, we must first determine whether the Commonwealth met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that Parker either engaged inor at least acquiesced inwrongdoing designed to prevent Stephenson from testifying. We find the Commonwealth met its burden. As mentioned before, Coffey testified that he loaned Parker money and lent him a gun and that Parker gave the money and gun to Warfield to kill Stephenson. Wright also testified that he saw Warfield fleeing the area of Stephenson's murder. We conclude that Giles was satisfied because, although it did not have to do so, the trial courtand later the jurycould certainly have reasonably inferred from all of the unique facts and circumstances of this case that Parker was motivated to kill Stephenson in order to prevent him from testifying that Parker shot Baker. [63] The dual motive of revenge and prevention of future testimony was the central point of the Commonwealth's theory of the case. We next must consider whether Parker has offered credible evidence to the contrary. Parker has not pointed us to any place in the record where he offered such evidence. [64] Instead, Parker merely incorrectly contends that the Commonwealth did not offer evidence sufficient to shift the burden to him. So we conclude that the taped conversations did not violate the Confrontation Clause under Crawford and Giles , meaning that the trial court's decision to admit those taped conversations was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.