Opinion ID: 2977508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Factfindings

Text: White claims that, in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), his relevant conduct should have been limited to 50 grams of cocaine since the special interrogatory submitted to the jury was limited to that inquiry. This contention is without merit. The two counts in the superseding indictment both alleged that an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) applied. Conviction under this provision increases the potential maximum sentence from 10 years to life in prison when the offense involves “50 grams or more of a mixture or substance . . . which contains cocaine base.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Because the jury found in the special interrogatory beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, the district court did not violate Booker or Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), by imposing a sentence above the 10-year maximum sentence for crack cocaine offenses. This Court -12- has consistently held since Booker that district judges can make judicial factfindings under the pre- Booker preponderance of the evidence standard to calculate the appropriate guideline range. See United States v. Brika, 487 F.3d 450, 459 n.3 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 341 (2007); United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005). This Court has also held that a district court does not err in imposing a sentence based on judicially found facts so long as the sentence is at or below the statutory ceiling set by the jury’s verdict. See United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 304 (2008); United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 427-28 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court did not err in imposing sentence based on judicial factfindings to a preponderance of the evidence “where the findings at sentencing operated solely to narrow the 10-years-to-life statutory sentencing range previously triggered by the jury’s drug quantity findings”). The en banc Court recently reaffirmed these principles in United States v. White,___ F.3d___, No. 05-6596, 2008 WL 5396246, at -5 (6th Cir. Dec. 24, 2008). Thus, the district court did not err in finding White’s relevant conduct was more than 500 grams but less than 1.5 kilograms based upon a preponderance of the evidence standard.