Opinion ID: 426379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 28 Defendants attack the court's jurisdiction on two fronts. They contend that the district court's ruling that the RICARDO was stateless had an insufficient foundation and that since the RICARDO was not shown to be stateless it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States within the meaning of Sec. 955a(a). In addition they contend that even if the RICARDO was stateless, it was not subject to prosecution in United States courts because there was no showing of any nexus between the United States and the RICARDO. While we reject the latter contention, we find some merit in the first.
29 The district court cited four factors that led it to conclude that the RICARDO at the very least, ... when seized, was a vessel 'assimilated to a stateless vessel,' and at best, ... was a vessel without nationality. (9/30 Tr. at 30.) The first two factors--that when first sighted the RICARDO was flying no flag, and that after being sighted the RICARDO changed course and headed away from the United States mainland--are, by themselves, wholly inadequate to support a finding of statelessness. The third factor--that flags of several states were found aboard the RICARDO--also is inconclusive. The RICARDO was observed flying only the Venezuelan flag, and its crew claimed that it was of Venezuelan nationality. 8 There was no evidence that it at any time sail[ed] under any flag other than that of Venezuela, using those other flags according to convenience within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention on the High Seas. Further, Ensign Willis testified that he did not consider it unusual to find flags of several countries on the RICARDO because it is common practice for a ship of one nationality to fly the flag of another country, in addition to that of its own country, upon entering the foreign country's port. Thus, the finding of the flags of several states aboard the RICARDO did not provide a sound basis for concluding that the RICARDO was assimilated to a ship without nationality. 30 The propriety of the court's conclusion that the RICARDO was stateless thus depends upon whether the district court properly relied on its fourth factor, the Venezuelan Certificate showing that the vessel's Venezuelan registration had expired in 1980. Despite its claim at the suppression hearing that it relied only on Fed.R.Evid. 803(8) as the basis for admissibility of the Certificate, the government here invokes both Rule 803(8) and Rule 803(10). We conclude that neither of these exceptions to the hearsay rule authorized the district court's receipt of the document into evidence. 31 Fed.R.Evid. 803(10) provides that the following category of evidence is not excluded by the hearsay rule: 32 (10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry. 33 At the hearing the district court ruled that the Venezuelan Certificate did not qualify as an absence of public record, and we believe this ruling was correct. What is envisioned by Rule 803(10) is a statement that, after a diligent search of the records regularly kept by a public office or agency, a certain record, entry, report, etc., has not been found. United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 26-27 (2d Cir.1983). From such a statement the factfinder may infer that an event that normally would be reflected in the public record did not occur. Instead of a certification of an absence of record, the Venezuelan Certificate is principally a potpourri of descriptions of existing records (e.g., confirming that the RICARDO had been registered in Venezuela), speculation (stating that the RICARDO evidently sailed clandestinely from Venequelan [sic] port), description of official action (the Maritime Authority has found grounds for the expiration of [the RICARDO's] registration), and statement of legal conclusion (in view of the expiration of its registration, as of May 21, 1980, [the RICARDO] could not invoke the Venezuelan nationality to protect its status under any circumstance, particularly in situations involving a crime or infraction). Only after the descriptions of existing records, speculation, past government actions, and legal conclusion does the Venezuelan Certificate make a statement that could possibly be construed, in part, as certifying the absence of a record: it states that [r]einstatement of the RICARDO's status as a Venezuelan vessel would have required the renewal of its documents, after justifying its absence and receiving a favorable decision from the Venezuelan authorities, something that did not ever take place. Assuming that this means that there is no record of a request for reinstatement, a statement that Venezuelan records reveal no application for reinstatement is virtually meaningless standing alone. Its significance depends on the Certificate's earlier statements, most particularly on that describing the Venezuelan authority's revocation of the RICARDO's registration: without knowing of the revocation, one cannot draw an inference of nonregistration from a failure to seek reinstatement. Hence we regard the Venezuelan Certificate as inappropriate for receipt in evidence under Rule 803(10), and we reject the government's attempt to invoke that rule on this appeal. 34 Nor do we find the Venezuelan Certificate admissible under Rule 803(8), the rule under which it was offered in the district court. Rule 803(8) provides that certain types of records and reports are not excluded by the hearsay rule: 35 (8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 36 An examination of the Certificate reveals that both as a whole and in pertinent part the Certificate runs afoul of Rule 803(8)(C)'s exclusion of factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law against defendants in criminal cases. 37 First, we note that the Certificate, made by the District Director General of Water Transportation, does not fit within either part (A) or part (B) of Rule 803(8), as it sets forth neither the activities of an office or agency nor matters observed by the District Director General. Rather, the Certificate purports to report the factual findings of the District Director General as a result of his investigation into the RICARDO's status in his exercis[e of] the attributes conferred upon him by law. Further, the very part of the Certificate on which the court focused for its finding that the RICARDO's Venezuelan registration had expired, i.e., the statement that the Maritime Authority has found grounds for the expiration of its registration as of May 21, 1980, indicates that the Maritime Authority made an investigation resulting in its finding that grounds existed for the revocation of the registration. We thus conclude that neither the Certificate as a whole nor the part of the Certificate disclosing the revocation of registration was admissible against the defendants under Rule 803(8)(C). Further, since the reason for Rule 803(8)'s nonauthorization of the use of investigative findings against defendants in criminal cases is to avoid abridgment of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, see Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C) advisory committee note; United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 69-84 (2d Cir.1977), admission of such investigative findings against defendants in criminal cases is also not authorized by Rule 803(24), the catchall exception for trustworthy hearsay. Id. at 78. 38 Nor do we see that the contents or circumstances of the Certificate should inspire any particular confidence in its trustworthiness. The Certificate contains obvious speculation as to the RICARDO's evident[ ] clandestine[ ] movement, and has an aura of eagerness to deny the RICARDO the ability to invoke the Venezuelan nationality to protect its status ... in situations involving a crime or infraction. Most importantly, the Certificate, which does not identify the Maritime Authority that apparently revoked the RICARDO's registration, also does not state when that Authority took its action, and there is nothing to indicate that the finding of grounds for expiration was not made after the Coast Guard intercepted the RICARDO and inquired as to its registration. If the Maritime Authority's action did precede the Coast Guard's involvement with the RICARDO, one might expect the Certificate to contain a plain statement that the RICARDO was unregistered in Venezuela on June 27 when it was boarded by the Coast Guard. The absence of such a straightforward statement and the silence of the Certificate as to the date of the Authority's action are circumstances suggesting that the Certificate lacks the trustworthiness necessary to support its admission as proof that the RICARDO was stateless on June 27. 39 In sum, we conclude that the Certificate was improperly received by the district court to show the RICARDO's statelessness. As none of the other evidence presented by the government established that fact, there was no substantial basis for the court's ruling that the RICARDO was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States within the meaning of Sec. 955a(a). We therefore remand to the district court for such further proceedings on defendants' jurisdictional challenges as may be appropriate. If the government adduces no new evidence sufficient to show that the RICARDO was stateless, the indictment must be dismissed.
40 Defendants contend that even a proper finding that the RICARDO was stateless would not establish that the vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States since international law prohibits a state's exercise of penal jurisdiction over a stateless vessel on the high seas unless there is some nexus between the state and the vessel. We disagree with defendants' interpretation of international law. 41 First, we note that in enacting statutes, Congress is not bound by international law. Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 316, 34 S.Ct. 429, 431, 58 L.Ed. 617 (1914); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S.Ct. 456, 458, 31 L.Ed. 386 (1888). If it chooses to do so, it may legislate with respect to conduct outside the United States, in excess of the limits posed by international law. As long as Congress has expressly indicated its intent to reach such conduct, a United States court would be bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.1972). Accord, United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 371 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 165, 74 L.Ed.2d 136 (1982). 42 Our review of the language and history of Sec. 955a et seq. persuades us that, assuming that the RICARDO was stateless, Congress intended these sections to reach the conduct of the defendants in this case. In Sec. 955a(h), Congress expressly stated its intention to reach acts committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. In addition, in the legislative history of Sec. 955a, there is evidence that Congress had as a primary goal the ability to reach stateless possessors of narcotics who could not be proved to have intent to distribute the narcotics in the United States. The Senate Report accompanying H.R. 2538, which noted the technical amendments the Senate Committee made to the bill before it was enacted as Sec. 955a, stated that the bill [was] intended to address acts committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. S.Rep. No. 855, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2785. Experts who testified at the hearing on H.R. 2538 noted that many drug traffickers responsible for transporting drugs that ended up in the United States were able to travel with impunity over the high seas because of the then-existing requirement that the traffickers intend to distribute the drugs in the United States before being subject to prosecution there. The difficulty of proving intent allowed many such traffickers to go free, although their wares were in fact intended to be distributed in the United States. Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement: Hearings on H.R. 2538 Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1979) (Hearings ) (statement of Peter B. Bensinger, Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration); id. at 65, 68 (statement of Michael P. Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, Southern District of Florida). Section 955a was enacted to close this loophole. Thus, the House of Representatives Report accompanying H.R. 2538 observed that United States jurisdiction was to be extended to vessels without nationality on the high seas, and that [a]ny person on board such a vessel, of either U.S. or foreign citizenship, is prohibited from ... possessing with the intent to ... distribute any controlled substance. H.R.Rep. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979). The Report noted that [t]he intent to distribute need not be within the United States. Moreover, the intent element may be inferred by proof of a presence of a large quantity of the narcotic or dangerous drug, giving rise to the inference of trafficking, id. at 10, and that it would not be necessary to prove that the vessel or the controlled substance was bound for the United States, id. at 12. Congress's explicit intention, therefore, was to extend the reach of Sec. 955a to foreigners on stateless vessels on the high seas who possess large quantities of narcotics that they may or may not intend for distribution in the United States. 43 Defendants point out that despite this explicit intention, Congress also expressed its intention that Sec. 955a be consistent with the strictures of international law, see, e.g., H.R.Rep. at 11 (section [955a] is designed to prohibit all acts of illicit trafficking in controlled substances on the high seas which the United States can reach under international law), 9 and they argue that international law permits the extension of the jurisdiction envisioned by Congress only if there is some nexus between the vessel and the state seeking to assert jurisdiction. Defendants' argument fails, however, since it apparently was Congress's understanding--and correctly so--that international law does not provide such protection to vessels that are stateless. 44 One of the basic principles of international law is that all nations have an equal and untrammelled right to navigate on the high seas. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 748, 74 L.Ed.2d 967 (1983); see Convention on the High Seas Art. 2. With this right, of course, comes responsibility. To preserve all nations' freedom to travel on the high seas and to avoid conflict among nations, Article 2 of the Convention provides that each state must exercise its right with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. 45 To enforce compliance with these principles among individual ships traveling on the high seas, Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention provide that a ship has the nationality of the state whose flag it flies and that the ship is subject to that state's jurisdiction. Each state has the responsibility of fixing the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.... [I]n particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. Id. Art. 5. To eliminate any confusion over which state has jurisdiction over a ship, Article 6 provides that a ship may sail under the flag of only one state and that while doing so, it is generally subject to that state's exclusive jurisdiction. A ship may not change flags during a voyage except when a real transfer of ownership or registry occurs, and a ship that flies under the flags of more than one state, claiming the nationality of whichever it deems convenient, is considered to be a ship without nationality that may not claim the protection of any of the nationalities in question. Id. 46 The suggestion underlying these principles is that a stateless vessel, which does not sail under the flag of one state to whose jurisdiction it has submitted, may not claim the protection of international law and does not have the right to travel the high seas with impunity. There is ample evidence that Congress properly understood that these principles were consistent with its desire that Sec. 955a reach stateless vessels on the high seas whether or not the narcotics carried were intended for distribution in the United States. During the hearings on H.R. 2538, Congress was repeatedly presented with statements by experts, reflecting what was apparently a common understanding among those interested in the bill, that the United States could, consistent with international law, assert jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas. See, e.g., Hearings, supra, at 48 (statement of Peter B. Bensinger, Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration) (We can, under both international law and United States case law, assert jurisdiction over these [stateless] vessels ....); id. at 51 (statement of Robert Chasen, Commissioner of the United States Customs Service) ( 'Stateless' vessels ... also present prosecutorial problems, although permission to board is not required.); id. at 55 (statement of Morris D. Busby, Director of Ocean Affairs, OES Bureau, Department of State) (There is also an exception [to international law] which allows us to board a vessel on the high seas which is without nationality ....). 47 In light of these principles and Congress's manifest intentions, courts have agreed uniformly that stateless vessels on the high seas are, by virtue of their statelessness, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. United States v. Marino-Garcia, supra, 679 F.2d at 1382-83 (construing Sec. 955a); United States v. Howard-Arias, supra, 679 F.2d at 371 (same); United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397, 403 (9th Cir.1979) (construing 14 U.S.C. Sec. 89(a)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2162, 64 L.Ed.2d 794 (1980); United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir.1979) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S.Ct. 664, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir.1979) (same); see United States v. Monroy, 614 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir.) (implicitly construing 14 U.S.C. Sec. 89(a)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892, 101 S.Ct. 250, 66 L.Ed.2d 117 (1980). As the court in Marino-Garcia put it, 48 [v]essels without nationality are international pariahs. They have no internationally recognized right to navigate freely on the high seas.... Moreover, flagless vessels are frequently not subject to the laws of a flag-state. As such, they represent floating sanctuaries from authority and constitute a potential threat to the order and stability of navigation on the high seas.... 49 The absence of any right to navigate freely on the high seas coupled with the potential threat to order on international waterways has led various courts to conclude that international law places no restrictions upon a nation's right to subject stateless vessels to its jurisdiction.... Thus, the assertion of jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas in no way transgresses recognized principles of international law. 50 679 F.2d at 1382 (citations omitted). 51 We find inapposite the authorities invoked by defendants in their effort to show that a nexus must exist before the United States may exercise jurisdiction over a stateless vessel on the high seas. The nexus requirement has been applied only to a vessel that is registered with, and is flying the flag of, one state to whose jurisdiction it has submitted. See, e.g., United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (5th Cir.1978). See also Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States Secs. 18, 28, 33, 34 (1965). In such cases, international law requires the state seeking to assert jurisdiction to show a nexus between it and the foreign vessel that is sufficient to justify supplanting the flag state's normally exclusive jurisdiction granted by Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas. Only a limited number of such nexuses have been found to be sufficient to warrant permitting a state to assert jurisdiction over another state's vessel. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States Secs. 18 (vessel engaged in illegal activity intended to have an effect in the state), 33 (vessel engaged in an activity that threatens the state's security or governmental functions), 34 (vessel engaged in a universally prohibited activity, such as piracy) (1965). See United States v. Marino-Garcia, supra, 679 F.2d at 1380-82. But we find no authority in international law for requiring any nexus where the ship otherwise would be subject to the jurisdiction of no state. 52 We conclude, therefore, that international law provides no bar to an assertion of jurisdiction over a stateless vessel by the United States pursuant to Sec. 955a(a), even absent proof that the vessel's operators intended to distribute their cargo in the United States. Accord, United States v. Marino-Garcia, supra, 679 F.2d at 1383; United States v. Howard-Arias, supra, 679 F.2d at 372. Consequently, we conclude that a properly supported finding by the district court that the RICARDO was stateless would, in itself, be sufficient to establish the court's jurisdiction over the defendants. 53