Opinion ID: 1152368
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continuance to Undertake Additional Discovery

Text: Alaska Civil Rule 56(f) allows a party opposing summary judgment to seek additional time to gather and submit evidence to justify the party's opposition. [6] In the present case, the trial court observed that although Rule 56(f) may be invoked simply by submitting an affidavit requesting additional time to oppose the motion, none was filed by the Gambles. As such, the court did not address what it termed the real issue: whether the Gambles had possessed enough time to come up with genuine factual issues to defeat summary judgment. The Gambles argue on appeal that not only did they make such a request, but that a Rule 56(f) continuance should have been granted. We agree. Because the purpose of Rule 56(f) is to provide an additional safeguard against premature grants of summary judgment, we have held that requests made pursuant to Rule 56(f) should be freely granted. Munn v. Bristol Bay Housing Auth., 777 P.2d 188, 193 (Alaska 1989); Jennings v. State, 566 P.2d 1304, 1313 (Alaska 1977). We have emphasized, however, that a litigant seeking relief under Rule 56(f) must  make it clear to the trial court and the opposing party that he opposes the summary judgment motion on this ground. Jennings, 566 P.2d at 1313-14 (emphasis added) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 56(f) relief where no affidavits were submitted and opposition to summary judgment motion made no mention of subsection (f)); see also Munn, 777 P.2d at 193 (reiterating clear request requirement of Jennings ); Brock v. Weaver Bros., Inc., 640 P.2d 833, 836-37 (Alaska 1982) (Assuming that an unambiguous request for additional time was made pursuant to Civil Rule 56(f)....). A request for Rule 56(f) relief need not state what specific facts further discovery will produce. Munn, 777 P.2d at 193. The request will generally be granted if the party provides adequate reasons explaining why the party cannot produce facts necessary to oppose summary judgment within the original time frame, and if the party has not been dilatory in his use of discovery. Id.; see also Braun v. Alaska Commercial Fishing & Agric. Bank, 816 P.2d 140, 145 (Alaska 1991) (affirming denial of request for Rule 56(f) relief where party was on notice of defense and was dilatory in not conducting discovery on that issue); Brock, 640 P.2d at 837 (holding same). We will reverse a Rule 56(f) decision on appeal only when it is evident that the trial court has abused its discretion. Munn, 777 P.2d at 192. Northstore contends that denial of Rule 56(f) relief was appropriate because the Gambles failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the rule. Specifically, Northstore argues that the Gambles failed to file an unambiguous request for relief, that the Gambles never expressed any desire to undertake further discovery, and that after oral argument, the trial court was the first to expressly mention subsection (f). Northstore further contends that even if the Gambles did make a proper request for Rule 56(f) relief, the request should be denied because the Gambles lacked a specific plan for further discovery and were dilatory in their efforts to use discovery. We are unpersuaded by Northstore's view of the case. The Gambles submitted an Affidavit of Attorney in Opposition to the Motion to Amend and Motion for Summary Judgment which did not expressly mention Rule 56(f), but which clearly set forth the Gambles' desire and justification to undertake additional discovery. With regard to the bona fide purchaser defense, [7] the Gambles' attorney Albert Maffei affied: This defense comes as a complete surprise to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not prepare their case in light of that defense since it was not plead [sic]. Now the plaintiffs would be placed in great prejudice if the Motion To Amend were granted. The time for trial is approximately one month from this date. The dates for discovery and for filing motions have expired and plaintiffs are now at a great disadvantage since they did not seek to discover any of the factual matters which might be used in opposition to the defense of bona fide purchaser for value without notice of defects. He continued, If the Court allows the Motion to Amend, it is obvious that plaintiffs must proceed with further extensive discovery. (emphasis added). Maffei reiterated during oral argument: In order to oppose the motion or the defense, if you allow it to be pled, we have to go back and start doing some more deposition and discovery. The affidavit also named two persons whom the Gambles desired to depose: John Niemeyer, Northstore's managing partner; and Ken Klein, an agent for Northstore who handled the sale of the subject property. At oral argument, Maffei stated that the Gambles also wished to depose Ken Kutil, a real estate agent who may have represented Northstore and Marathon jointly. We conclude that the Gambles' actions satisfied the requirement that a party seeking Rule 56(f) relief must make an unambiguous request. Brock, 640 P.2d at 836-37. The Gambles' attorney submitted an affidavit stating that if the court were to reject their waiver argument, the Gambles would require additional discovery; the affidavit further explained that the reason the Gambles required additional time to oppose the motion was their surprise when Northstore raised an unanticipated affirmative defense. Although the Gambles were not required to specify what additional facts they hoped to discover, Munn, 777 P.2d at 193, they nevertheless identified specific people whom they hoped to depose. The trial court should have understood that in making these statements, the Gambles were not simply lending additional support to their waiver argument. That the trial court actually realized that an alternative request for a continuance was being made is evident from Judge Reese's comment that the real issue was not whether the defenses were waived, but whether the Gambles had possessed enough time to come up with genuine factual issues to defeat summary judgment. The trial court may have determined that a party requesting a continuance for the purpose of opposing summary judgment must specifically mention Rule 56(f) or must file a separate motion. However, we have never read either requirement into the rule. See, e.g., Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(f) (Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion....) (emphasis added); Jennings, 566 P.2d at 1313-14 (holding that request for Rule 56(f) relief was properly denied where no mention was made of subsection (f) and party failed to submit any affidavits in opposition to summary judgment); 10A Wright & Miller, supra, § 2740, at 531 (explaining that Federal Rules 56(e) and (f) are meant to be complementary, in that opposing party must either submit affidavits to establish genuine issue for trial under subsection (e) or explain why he cannot yet do so under subsection (f)). Thus, we conclude that the Gambles made an unambiguous request for a continuance with which to undertake additional discovery. We further conclude that Rule 56(f) relief was warranted. There is no evidence that the Gambles were dilatory in their use of discovery. As explained in part III.A. supra, Northstore did not provide the Gambles fair notice of the bona fide purchaser defense until it moved for summary judgment. Therefore, it would be unfair to penalize the Gambles for failing to conduct sufficient discovery on that issue. Moreover, although we conclude in part III.A.1. that the affirmance defense was adequately raised in the answer, given the lack of precision of Northstore's pleadings, the Gambles' failure to isolate the specific theory of affirmance cannot be viewed as conclusive evidence of a lack of diligence on their part. Because we believe that the Gambles complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 56(f) and were not dilatory in their use of discovery, and in light of our previous holdings that requests made pursuant to Rule 56(f) should be freely granted, Jennings, 566 P.2d at 1313, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in not permitting the Gambles to undertake further discovery in order to oppose Northstore's motion. We therefore reverse and remand for additional proceedings. [8]