Opinion ID: 2283422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the failure to warn claims

Text: The Moores contend that they made a submissible case of strict liability for failure to warn in that the Explorer lacked any warnings that the front seats could collapse in rear impacts and were not tested or designed to perform with occupants of Ms. Moore's size. The elements of a cause of action for strict liability failure to warn are: (1) the defendant sold the product in question in the course of its business; (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous at the time of sale when used as reasonably anticipated without knowledge of its characteristics; (3) the defendant did not give adequate warning of the danger; (4) the product was used in a reasonably anticipated manner; and (5) the plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of the product being sold without an adequate warning. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 13. In applying these elements, Missouri law recognizes that a product may be rendered unreasonably dangerous and therefore actionable because of the absence of a warning concerning use or misuse, or because the warning that has been given is informationally deficient. Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. banc 1986). Under our model of strict tort liability the concept of unreasonable danger . . . is presented to the jury as an ultimate issue without further definition. Id. at 378. There is no dispute that the Moores presented substantial evidence with respect to the first and fourth elements in that (1) Ford stipulated that it designed, manufactured and sold the Explorer involved in this case, and (4) there is no dispute that by driving the car, Ms. Moore was using the Explorer in a reasonably anticipated manner at the time of the accident. There also is no dispute that no warnings were given as to whether the seats were designed for a person of Ms. Moore's size or that they were designed to collapse backward in rear-impact collisions. Ford strongly disputes, however, that the Moores adduced sufficient evidence that the Explorer was unreasonably dangerous when used as reasonably anticipated without knowledge of its characteristics. Ford argues that the only evidence the Moores cite as proof that the Explorer was unreasonably dangerous without a warning is the testimony from the Moores' experts that the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous because of its design. It therefore follows, Ford argues, that when the jury returned a verdict in Ford's favor on the Moores' design defect theory, it necessarily also rejected the Moores' only basis for claiming that the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous without a warning of its characteristics. Ford's argument is misplaced. It assumes that a product cannot be unreasonably dangerous, even if it has no warnings of dangers associated with its use, so long as the product's design itself is not defective. But this Court has never specifically held that a finding of a product defect was a necessary predicate to a failure to warn action. Palmer v. Hobart, 849 S.W.2d 135, 142 (Mo.App.1993). This is because design defect and failure to warn theories constitute distinct theories aimed at protecting consumers from dangers that arise in different ways. For example, design defect theories address the situation in which a design is itself inadequate, rendering the product unreasonably dangerous without regard to whether a warning is givensuch as a lawn mower designed without a guard or deflector plate. See, e.g., Keller v. Int'l Harvester Corp., 648 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Mo. App.1983). But many products that otherwise might be dangerous can be used safely if adequate instructions for use are given and if warnings of dangers are adequate. Failure to warn claims are concerned with how a lack of warning about a product, and the user's resultant lack of knowledge about the product's dangers or safe use, may give rise to an unreasonable danger to the consumer. In such a case, it would not be inconsistent for a jury to find that a product's design is not unreasonably dangerous in itself but that, without an accompanying warning imparting knowledge of the product's dangerous characteristics or safe use, the otherwise non-defective product is unreasonably dangerous. As various decisions of the Missouri court of appeals have explained this distinction between design defect and failure to warn theories, [e]ven though a product may be designed and manufactured properly, the lack of an adequate warning, in itself, may render a product defective or unreasonably dangerous within the meaning of the law. Brown v. Bay State Abrasives, 821 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Mo. App.1991); accord Duke v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 418 (Mo.App.1983) (a lack of an adequate warning in itself renders a product defective or unreasonably dangerous within the meaning of product liability law). The facts of Palmer well-illustrate this distinction. Palmer, a part-time worker at a grocery store, sued the defendant manufacturer for strict liability design defect and failure to warn after his hand became lodged in the manufacturer's meat grinder. 849 S.W.2d at 136-37. As in this case, Palmer submitted the standard MAI jury instructions for design defect patterned on MAI 25.04; Palmer also was permitted to submit a claim of failure to warn patterned on M.A.I. 25.05. Id. at 142. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the manufacturer on the design defect claim but in favor of Palmer on the failure to warn claim. Id. at 137. The court rejected the manufacturer's argument that the jury's determination that the grinder was not unreasonably dangerous during normal use concomitantly meant that the grinder could not be unreasonably dangerous without a warning. Id. at 141-42. The court held there was no inconsistency in the two verdicts. Palmer had argued that the design allowed him to put his hand in the grinder and that it should not have done so; he also argued that the warnings given about the risks of putting his hand in the grinder were inadequate to convey the need to disconnect the power and the severity of the danger should he fail to do so. On these facts, the instructions properly permitted the jury to find that the grinder was not unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use, but that the warning [defendant] provided about the hazards associated with the grinder's reasonably anticipated use was inadequate. These two findings were not incompatible with each other. Id. at 142. Dunne v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 679 So.2d 1034 (La.Ct.App.1996), applies this same reasoning to a claim that an exercise bike was unreasonably dangerous because of a failure to warn that it only was intended to support persons up to 250 pounds. Ms. Dunne weighed approximately 500 pounds. When she used the bike in an attempt to exercise, it collapsed, causing her severe injury. Id. at 1036. Although there was no claim that the bike was designed defectively or did not operate as intended, Dunne held that the failure of the manufacturer to warn that the bike should not be used by persons weighing over 250 pounds rendered the product unreasonably dangerous, causing plaintiff's accident and injuries. Id. at 1038. The application to this case of the principles set out in Palmer and Dunne is evident. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Moores and drawing all inferences in their favor, they adduced sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the Explorer was unreasonably dangerous without a warning imparting knowledge of its characteristics despite the finding that the design of the seats themselves was not defective. Louis D'Aulerio, one of the Moores' experts, testified that pull testing he conducted showed that the point of failure for a 2002 Explorer seat is 16,870 inch pounds. Mr. D'Aulerio then calculated the forces that were generated on Ms. Moore's seat in the wreck given the change in velocity, sustained g-forces and her weight. Mr. D'Aulerio testified that although the change in velocity for the collision was as low as 12.8 miles per hour, due to Ms. Moore's weight and other calculations, the Explorer seat endured forces of 15,800 to 19,000 inch pounds. Mr. D'Aulerio testified that this calculation showed that, in rear-end collisions at mild to moderate speeds12.8 to 17.2 miles per hour change in velocitygiven Ms. Moore's weight, the forces in the crash exceeded the seat's capability. The jury was entitled to consider whether the Explorer seat was rendered unreasonably dangerous when not accompanied with a warning of its greater potential to collapse under the circumstances of a low to moderate rear-end collision while carrying a person of Ms. Moore's weight. Ford argues that the type of danger presented by its seats is not amenable to a simple warning because the seat is safe for use by people of Ms. Moore's weight in normal driving conditions and in most accidents, other designs present other dangers, and the risk of danger varies with the type and speed of accident. Ford argues that because the Moores never state precisely what an appropriate warning would have said, such a warning could not realistically be made; the Moores, therefore, failed to make their case of failure to warn. This Court disagrees. Ford does not cite any Missouri law placing the burden on the plaintiff to propose the wording of an adequate warning to make a submissible case. [2] While both Ford and the dissenting opinion note that Indiana apparently does place this burden on plaintiff, Indiana appears to be unique in this regard. Numerous jurisdictions follow the heeding presumption in failure to warn cases, not just Missouri and Indiana, [3] and no other state has been identified that requires proof of the specific language of an adequate warning as an element of plaintiff's claim. Indeed, Washington specifically provides that the plaintiff in a failure to warn case need not prove the exact wording of an adequate warning. Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Products Co., 59 Wash.App. 287, 797 P.2d 527, 531 (1990). The other cases cited by the dissent do not concern whether a plaintiff must propose specific alternative language for a warning, much less require plaintiff to do so, but rather discuss generally the types of issues that may be relevant in a failure to warn case, including the feasibility of giving a warning about the danger at issue. [4] Missouri does not require a plaintiff to create an alternative design to prove a design defect claim; it is enough that plaintiff show that the design used was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748, 794 (Mo.App.2008) (plaintiff need not show what alternative design should be although defendant can show difficulties with alternative designs in defense). This Court rejects the suggestion that this concededly new element must be added to those required already under Missouri law to prove failure to warn. [5] The broad principles the dissent cites concerning relevance and feasibility do not address Ford's real difficulty here, which seems to be in how to phrase its warning. But Ford has not cited any authority that the difficulty of phrasing an adequate warning excuses the failure to give any warning. While the warning alleged to be needed here may take some thought to construct, in the absence of a showing that giving a warning simply would not be technically feasible, any remaining difficulty Ford might have in formulating the precise wording to use in the warning does not negate its need to warn but rather emphasizes the need to do so carefully. [6] The Moores also argue that a warning should have been given about what testing Ford did on its seats and that it should have warned that it did not specifically test the seats with dummies weighing more than 225 lbs. But no case has been cited stating that an adequate warning must inform the consumer of all tests done on all parts of a vehicle. Such a listing more likely would confuse rather than serve the purpose of warnings, which is to impart instructions for use and information about risks that allow the consumer to make an informed decision about how to use the product. Bay State Abrasives, 821 S.W.2d at 533 (risk reduction is the intended function of product warnings). Here, the Moores claim the warning should have told them that the seats were more likely to collapse in certain rear-end collisions if the person in the seat weighed more than 225 pounds. Ford did not contest the fact that, based on its testing, it knew such collapse was more likely. What tests Ford may or may not have run to acquire the knowledge it admittedly already had simply would not have provided an alternative theory of recovery here. [7]
Ford alternatively argues that the Moores did not provide substantial evidence that Ms. Moore was damaged as a direct result of the product being sold without an adequate warning. There are two aspects of proving causation in a failure to warn case. First, of course, the plaintiff must show causation in fact by showing that the product for which there was no warning caused the injuries. Here, there is no question that the seats did collapse and that Ms. Moore received her injuries in the accident. Experts for the Moores testified that those injuries were caused by the collapsing seats, while Ford presented contrary evidence. The evidence clearly presented a jury question whether the collapse of the seats caused Ms. Moore's injuries. Second, the plaintiff must show proximate cause. To do this, plaintiffs must show that a warning would have altered the behavior of the individuals involved in the accident. Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194; accord Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 14. To satisfy this burden, Missouri, like several other states, aids plaintiffs in proving this second part of causation by presuming that a warning will be heeded. Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194. But the presumption that plaintiffs will heed a warning assumes that a reasonable person will act appropriately if given adequate information. Thus, a preliminary inquiry before applying the presumption is whether adequate information is available absent a warning. Id. Moreover, [a]s causation is a required element of the plaintiffs' case, the burden is on plaintiffs to show that lack of [prior] knowledge. Id. Numerous cases have held that when the defense is raised that the injured plaintiff had adequate knowledge of the risks so as to obviate the duty to warn, the question of the adequacy of the knowledge is a question for the jury. Duke, 660 S.W.2d at 418. Here, Ford does not claim that either of the Moores knew at the time they purchased or used the Ford Explorer that the seats were designed to collapse backward in certain rear-end collisions or that Ms. Moore was at greater risk of injury in such a collision as a result. Accordingly, that part of the causation test is not at issue here. If there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff did not already know the danger, there is a presumption that a warning will be heeded. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 14. [T]he term `presumption' is used to mean `makes a prima facie case,' i.e., creates a submissible case that the warning would have been heeded. Id. Such a presumption would make a prima facie case that had Ford given the Moores an adequate warning, the Moores would have heeded it. Ford nonetheless argues that the Moores' testimony about what Ms. Moore would have done had warnings been given was speculative. In support, they cite to Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 908 S.W.2d 757 (Mo.App.1995) ( Arnold II ), in which the plaintiff was prohibited from testifying that he would have taken greater precautions against an explosion had he received a more adequate warning of the risk of explosion because [t]estimony about what a plaintiff might have done under a hypothetical state of facts is speculative and immaterial. Id. at 763. In this case, Ford objected to the Moores' attempts to admit evidence of what they would have done had they received an adequate warning, arguing that such testimony simply constituted speculation about what they would have done in a hypothetical situation. The trial court sustained a number of these objections. The Moores contend this was error. Ford is correct that where, as here, no warning is given, then evidence of what a person would have done had a warning been given inherently is hypothetical in character. Yet, to show causation, a plaintiff must show that the absence of a warning was the proximate cause of the injury. As a matter of logic, to accomplish this a plaintiff must show that she did not have the information the warning would have imparted already and that, if she had the information, it would have affected her conduct. This creates a Catch-22 in which the plaintiff must prove what she would have done had a warning been given to prove causation, but evidence on this issue must be precluded as speculative. This dilemma is avoided in Missouri and other states by the use of a presumption that had an adequate warning been given, it would have been heeded. For that reason, the trial court did not err in holding during the direct examination of Ms. Moore that her testimony as to what she might have done had a warning been given was speculative. Arnold, 908 S.W.2d at 763. The heeding presumption is a rebuttable one, however. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 14. Here, Ford chose to try to rebut it by obtaining concessions from Ms. Moore on cross-examination that she really did not look for warnings and that she would have driven the vehicle once purchased. She agreed that she did not look specifically at this manual or at prior vehicle manuals with the purpose of seeing whether there was a seat weight limit. The Moores did not attempt to question Ms. Moore further about whether she would have looked for or heeded the warning on redirect, after such evidence became relevant once Ford tried to rebut the presumption. [8] Nonetheless, earlier portions of her testimony that did come in without objection, set out at length above, supported the Moores' position that she would have heeded a warning about the risks the seats posed for persons of greater than normal weight. [9] It would be up to a jury to weigh all of this testimony. A jury may find persuasive the implication from Ford's questions that the Moores' testimony was self-serving and should not be accorded much weight. But a jury instead might find it entirely credible. Such a credibility determination is for the jury. Finally, Ford argues that the presumption or evidence that a warning would have been heeded has no relevance or application where, as here, the only way to heed the warning is not to buy or use the product. In such a case, Ford argues, the claim is not really a failure to warn claim but an improper marketing claim. In support, Ford cites the first decision in Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194, which it says held that allegations of failure to warn at the time of purchase are so remote and speculative that as a matter of law they cannot support a failure to warn claim. Ford's reading of Arnold is overbroad. In Arnold, the plaintiff, an automobile repair shop worker, sued the defendant in strict liability failure to warn when the defendant's air compressor ignited gasoline fumes that were not properly ventilated, resulting in injury to the plaintiff. 834 S.W.2d at 192-93. Mr. Arnold argued that had the manufacturer warned that the air compressor was not airtight, the third-party supplier would not have sold the air compressor to the plaintiff's employer, the automobile repair shop, and, therefore, Mr. Arnold would not have been using it. Id. at 193. Neither the supplier nor the repair shop was a party to the lawsuit. Arnold did hold that what the parties refer to as this time of purchase theory of failure to warn was too speculative to support submission. But it did so because the theory depended on the jury deciding what a third partythe shop owner would have done had a warning been given. As Arnold noted, such a piling of inference upon inference as to what persons in the chain of supply would have done ignores any reasonable concept of proximate cause. Id. But, while Arnold noted that the traditional approach to proximate cause in failure to warn cases focuses on the effect of giving a warning on the actual circumstances surrounding the accident, id., it did not purport to bar failure to warn claims involving a direct purchase by a plaintiff, and any such statement would have been dicta in any event. Where, as here, the evidence is sufficient to show that the product was unreasonably dangerous for use by the plaintiff without the additional warning and that had the warning been given at the time of purchase or before use on the day of the accident, it would have been heeded, a submissible case is made. As noted earlier, not only did the Moores testify that they did not know the Explorer seats yielded rearward for persons of Ms. Moore's weight much more readily than for persons of normal weight, they went further by presenting evidence that had they read a warning before purchase, they would not have purchased the Explorer, and had they learned of it later through reading the manual, Mr. Moore would have done everything in his power to prevent his wife from riding in the Explorer. This causation theory is straightforward, not speculative, and does not offend reasonable concepts of proximate cause.
The Moores also contend that they made a submissible failure to warn claim under a negligence theory. Although negligence and strict liability theories are separate and distinct, the same operative facts may support recovery under either theory, particularly in a failure to warn case. Hill v. Air Shields, Inc., 721 S.W.2d 112, 118 (Mo.App.1986). A failure to warn claim sounding in negligence focuses on what the manufacturer knew rather than on the product. The elements of a claim for failure to warn based in negligence are: (1) the defendant designed the product at issue; (2) the product did not contain an adequate warning of the alleged defect or hazard; (3) the defendant failed to use ordinary care to warn of the risk of harm from the alleged defect or hazard; and (4) as a direct result of the defendant's failure to adequately warn, the plaintiff sustained damage. MAI 25.09. As to the first element, Ford stipulated that it designed, manufactured and sold the Explorer involved in this case. With respect to whether the Explorer contained an adequate warning of the alleged hazard, the Moores' testimony established that the Explorer lacked any warnings as to whether the seats were designed for a person of Ms. Moore's weight or that they were designed to collapse backward in rear-end impact collisions. With respect to whether the Moores produced evidence that they sustained damage as a direct result of Ford's failure to warn adequately, the causation elements are the same for both strict liability and negligent failure to warn. Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748, 788 n. 107 (Mo.App.2008). For the reasons noted above, the Moores made a submissible case of causation. The critical issue, then, was whether Ford failed to use ordinary care to warn of harm from the alleged defect in the Explorer. [10] There was sufficient evidence for this question to go to the jury. That someone weighing as much as Ms. Moore would be driving the vehicle was foreseeable; Ford admitted it was predictable that persons weighing more than 220 pounds would use its vehicles. It was also foreseeable that the seats would yield in a rearward manner; one of Ford's experts testified that the Explorer's seats are designed to yield rearward and that the seat in which Ms. Moore was sitting during the crash performed as expected by Ford. The Moores' expert, Mr. D'Aulerio, testified that Ford's design of the Explorer's seat was negligent because it was not capable of remaining upright in a rear-end crash. Based on this evidence, the Moores made a submissible case that the Explorer posed potential dangers and that Ford was negligent in failing to warn of them.