Opinion ID: 626232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to File an Appeal as Instructed

Text: In reviewing denial of a § 2255 motion for post-conviction relief where a COA has been granted, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Rushin, 642 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir.2011). The district court denied habeas relief on the appeal issue, but it granted COA on this issue because it was not sufficiently certain as to the effect of a waiver of collateral challenges on this ineffective assistance claim. When a defendant waives his right to bring a post-conviction collateral attack in his plea agreement and later brings a § 2255 petition, we determine (1) whether the disputed [claim] falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. U.S. v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir.2009) (applying Hahn analysis to a collateral attack proceeding).
First, Mr. Viera's § 2255 motion falls within the scope of the plea agreement's waiver provision. The waiver not only states that Mr. Viera waives his rights to collaterally attack but expressly names § 2255 motions as waived. See ROA, Vol. 1, at 29. Even if the waiver had only mentioned collateral attack, we would find Mr. Viera's § 2255 motion to be within the scope of the waiver. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 974 (10th Cir.2009) (holding that waiver of a right to appeal or collaterally challenge encompassed a § 2255 motion). The question remains whether his specific claimthe appeal issueproperly falls in the waiver's scope. [2] [A] plea agreement waiver of postconviction rights does not waive the right to bring a § 2255 petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver. United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir.2001). However,  [c]ollateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are characterized as falling outside that category are waivable.  Id. (emphasis added). As we acknowledged in Cockerham, [t]he characterization of a challenge to the validity of a plea is certainly subject to different interpretations and may be quite broad. Id. at 1188. For this reason, we held that it was necessary to address these claims on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they attack the validity of the plea or the waiver. Id. Following that approach, we determined that a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize the insufficiency of evidence for a charge could reasonably be construed... as an argument that his plea was unintelligent because his counsel failed to properly inform him about the potential insufficiency before pleading. Id. at 1190. Accordingly, we concluded that the waiver could not bar that claim and remanded for consideration of its merits. Id. at 1190-91. Turning to the instant case, we are satisfied that the appeal issue here does not relate to the validity of the plea or waiver. In contrast to the claim in Cockerham, Mr. Viera's appeal issue cannot reasonably be construed as an argument that counsel's alleged deficiencies made his plea unintelligent or involuntary. Mr. Viera has not alleged that counsel failed to inform him of his waiver of appellate review, and he certainly has not claimed that any such omission rendered his plea unintelligent. [3] The district court granted COA on the appeal issue because it was uncertain about how to apply United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir.2005), which involved a collateral attack alleging that petitioner's counsel had failed to file an appeal in which petitioner had waived his right to bring a collateral challenge. In Garrett the petitioner was allowed an evidentiary hearing regarding whether he requested counsel to file a notice of appeal despite the waiver. See id. at 1267. But Garrett does not apply here. In Garrett, unlike this case, the government did not argue that the plea agreement waiver barred Mr. Garrett's § 2255 motion. 402 F.3d at 1266 n. 5 (The government has not argued that this waiver bars a § 2255 motion based on counsel's failure to file a requested appeal.). [4] Here, the government raises the waiver issue. We are satisfied that the plea agreement waived Mr. Viera's ineffective assistance claim because counsel's alleged failure to file an appeal does not undermine the validity of the plea or the waiver. See Cockerham, 237 F.3d at 1187.
Second, the district court evaluated the language of the plea agreement and the Rule 11 colloquy and determined the waiver was knowing and voluntary. During the Rule 11 colloquy when Mr. Viera entered his plea, he acknowledged that he understood the waiver of appeal and collateral challenges, that his plea was free and voluntary, and that he was guilty as charged. We agree with the district court that nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Viera's plea or waiver of post-conviction rights was unknowing or involuntary. In his request for COA on another issue, Mr. Viera argues his plea was involuntary because he did not know he would be deported and because he was not eligible for a sentence reduction for completion of a residential drug treatment program. But to the extent this argument is relevant to the appeal issue, our reasons for the denial of COA stated below apply here as well and do not change our view on the voluntariness of the plea.
Finally, Mr. Viera bears the burden of demonstrating that enforcing the waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327. We have held that a miscarriage of justice through enforcement of a waiver occurs only in one of four situations: [1] where the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, [2] where ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [3] where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [4] where the waiver is otherwise unlawful. Id. (quotations omitted). For the same reasons expressed in the district court order, we agree that none of these factors is implicated here. Mr. Viera thus voluntarily entered into a valid plea agreement that waived his right to bring a collateral attack except in limited circumstances not found here, and because enforcement of the waiver does not produce a miscarriage of justice, we affirm the district court's denial of this claim.