Opinion ID: 457822
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Floor Amendment & Sponsors' Remarks

Text: 97 The parenthetical grew out of two Senate floor amendments sponsored by Senators Chiles and Gurney of Florida. 26 The Secretary argues that the Chiles-Gurney amendments, which included color of law language, were intended simply to insure that Cuban refugees would be entitled to SSI, and that the color of law provision should be given an accordingly limited interpretation. 98 One of the amendments added the language or otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law to the SSI eligibility provisions. The other added a general definition of that language which was made expressly applicable throughout the various provisions of the Act amended by the bill. This definition provided that the term 'alien permanently residing in the United States under color of law' shall include an alien refugee who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of the application of the provisions of section [1153(a)(7) ] or section [1182(d)(5) ] of [Title 8]. The Senate approved the amendments by voice vote. When H.R. 1 was reported out of the House Conference Committee, however, it contained the language of the parenthetical as ultimately enacted, rather than the Chiles-Gurney language. 99 The Secretary cites the following remarks of Senator Chiles: 100 [The amendments] simply make clear in the bill that it would not detract from the rights to benefits of Cuban refugees, of which 12,000 reside in Florida. They are receiving benefits presently under the existing system [of state-administered federal categorical grants], but there has been some question as to whether, under this bill, they would be eligible. These amendments would make it clear that they are eligible. 101 118 Cong.Rec. 33959 (1972). She also cites the following remarks of Senator Gurney: 102 [T]hese amendments which we are introducing at this time are designed to prevent a great and unintended economic hardship being placed upon the people of Dade County, Fla. 103 I know that the Finance Committee and its distinguished chairman did not intend this result, however, the effect of the limiting language concerning aliens which appears ... on page 466 of the [Senate Finance C]ommittee report does just that. 104 Id. It is the Secretary's argument that these remarks indicate that the amendments as proposed and the language as enacted were intended to restrict the meaning of the color of law language to cover only refugees. 105 This is--at most--a very slender reed on which to hang the Secretary's request that we find the Amendment at issue in conflict with the underlying statute. Contemporaneous remarks of a sponsor of legislation are by no means controlling in the analysis of legislative history. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 1517 n. 15, 71 L.Ed.2d 715 (1982). More to the point, such remarks are of little or no import where, as here, the legislature has subsequently included other language--albeit similar--in the law as enacted. To permit clear statutory language to be materially altered by the remarks of the Senate sponsors before the bill achieved final form would open the door to the inadvertent, or perhaps even planned, undermining of the language actually voted on by Congress and signed into law by the President. Regan v. Wald, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 3036, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984). 106 Furthermore, even assuming that the two Senators from Florida intended the color of law definition to limit the eligible aliens to refugees, the language of their own amendments stated otherwise. Their language provided that the phrase should be interpreted to include an alien refugee [who is here pursuant to section 1153(a)(7) or section 1182(d)(5) of Title 8]. (Emphasis added). As discussed supra, the word include is not restrictive; it precedes an example of the members of a group. The fact that the language of the amendment identified refugees as members of the group of aliens permanently residing in the United States under color of law does not indicate that aliens who are not refugees are necessarily excluded from that group. 107 We therefore find that the Secretary's arguments regarding the legislative history of Section (B)(ii) are without merit. 27 Based on our examination of the language of the provision and our review of its legislative history, we find that the phrase, under color of law, is designed to be an open vessel--to be given substance by experience. 28 We agree with the district court's conclusion that the color of law provision is inherently elastic, and we reject the Secretary's restrictive interpretation. 29 B. Paragraph 3 of the Consent Decree 108 The Secretary also argues that the Amendment goes beyond the scope of the original decree by conferring SSI eligibility on aliens who were not eligible under the original p 3 as correctly construed. She contends that terms agreed to in the original decree do not support the extension of benefits to the class covered by the Amendment. As discussed below, we find that this argument is based on an incorrectly narrow interpretation of the decree which must be rejected. The Secretary also argues that if the consent decree is not accorded the narrow interpretation she urges, then the decree itself is ultra vires because it exceeds the scope of the statute. We reject this argument as well. 109 Paragraph 3 of the original decree lists several categories of aliens who will be considered to be permanently residing in the United States under color of law, and provides that any other alien residing in the United States with the knowledge and permission of the INS, whose departure the INS does not contemplate enforcing, is also permanently residing in the United States under color of law. 110 The Secretary maintains that this language is properly interpreted to cover only those aliens as to whom there has been an official determination or authorization, embodied in a letter, that the alien is legitimately present in the country for an indefinite period of time. Although she concedes that the knowledge and permission language of the paragraph permit[s] a much broader reading, she argues that the government never contemplated such a ... reading. 111 The Secretary bases her argument in part on the well-established principle that a consent decree may be interpreted in light of the circumstances surrounding the ... order. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 238, 95 S.Ct. at 935. She asserts that in this instance the decree originated out of, and should therefore be limited to, the facts presented by Berger and Mena, the two beneficiaries named in the decree. This argument has no merit whatsoever. Paragraph 3 is so written as to make untenable any limitation of its scope to the particular facts presented by the parties named in the decree. 112 The Secretary also relies on the maxim that a decree must be interpreted in light of the technical meaning words used may have had to the parties. Id. She contends that [t]he limited holding of Holley ... is obviously the 'technical meaning'  of the words used in the consent decree here, and that under Holley the broad language of p 3 should be given the limitation she proposes, that is, that an official letter be a prerequisite to SSI eligibility under the decree. 113 In Holley, decided during the year before the consent decree was entered, the court determined that where an applicant for AFDC benefits is an alien parent who has official assurance that she will not be deported at least until her children are no longer dependent upon her, the parent is permanently residing in the United States under color of law and is thus eligible for AFDC under the governing regulations. 30 The court indicated that it considered plaintiff to be a member of a minuscule sub-class of aliens who, although unlawfully residing in the United States, are each individually covered by a letter ... stating that the [INS] 'does not contemplate enforcing ... [the alien's] departure from the United States at this time.'  Holley, 553 F.2d at 849. Far more significant for the purposes of our analysis here, however, is the fact that the court found it appropriate to give an expansive interpretation to the phrase under color of law, and to adopt an interpretation of the phrase permanently residing in which the conception of permanent more closely resembled lasting or enduring, than forever. We therefore find that, on balance, the decision in Holley cuts against the Secretary's argument. 114 In addition, although Holley involved an alien who had received a letter stating that no action to deport her was contemplated, we find no indication in the language of the decree before us that the receipt of such a letter is a prerequisite to color of law status. While p 3 echoes the language of the letter in Holley--that is, the phrase, does not contemplate enforcing, etc.--the glaring absence of any mention in the decree that a letter to this effect would be required is fatal to the Secretary's position. 115 Finally, the government's contemporaneous interpretation of Holley lends support to an expansive view of the consent decree, rather than a restrictive one. The petition for certiorari in Holley--which was denied just four months before the decree was filed--was opposed by the United States, as amicus on behalf of respondent Holley. 31 In its amicus brief, the government argued that the phrase residing under color of law includes those aliens whose residence in the United States is continued by virtue of official permission or acquiescence. (Emphasis added). The government also observed that the INAct provisions listed in the parenthetical--8 U.S.C. Secs. 1153(a)(7) and Sec. 1182(d)(5)--were merely illustrative examples, and further stated that they obviously forbid any narrow reading of the word permanently. 116 Thus, viewed in the context in which it was drawn up, see ITT Continental Baking, 420 U.S. at 238, 95 S.Ct. at 935; United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 665 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083, 102 S.Ct. 638, 70 L.Ed.2d 617 (1981), the consent decree appears to have been entered into by the parties with the expectation that the language of p 3 would be construed expansively, and the Secretary's argument to the contrary must be rejected. We agree with the district court that the plain meaning of [p ] 3 ... clearly goes beyond [her] limited interpretation. 32 Furthermore, based on our analysis of the legislative history of Section (B)(ii), supra, we find no reason to believe that such an expansive reading of p 3 brings the decree into conflict with the underlying statute. We therefore reject the Secretary's argument to that effect. C. Paragraph 3 under the Amendment 117 Having rejected the Secretary's arguments under the statute and the original decree, we turn briefly to the challenged Amendment to confirm that it comports with our conclusions regarding the underlying statute. We are satisfied that it does. 118 The Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that p 3 of the consent judgment filed on June 13, 1978, is modified to include the language set out in the margin (amended p 3). 33 Amended p 3 essentially reiterates the language of the original p 3, and then sets out a non-exclusive list of eleven categories of aliens falling within the color of law provision. Finally, it states the circumstances under which an alien will be considered as one whose departure the INS does not contemplate enforcing. 119 We reject the Secretary's specific challenges to the Amendment on the grounds set out in the margin, 34 and note that we find the Amendment otherwise in conformity with both the letter and the spirit of the underlying statute and the original decree. In particular, the concept of permanence incorporated in Section (B)(ii) is in no way slighted in the decree or the Amendment. 35 Rather, both the decree and the Amendment reinforce the permanently residing language of the statutory provision. Both are, of course, to be read in light of the approach to permanence taken in Holley. There, the court gave great weight to the INAct's definition of permanence, and observed that the INAct provisions in the parenthetical in Section (B)(ii) are instances where the alien is permitted to stay in the United States not necessarily forever, but only so long as he is in a particular condition. 553 F.2d at 851. The provisions of the Amendment are written so that they may be executed in accordance with the same standard. D. Requiring the Issuance of Regulations 120 The Secretary also contends that the district court lacked the power to order her to promulgate regulations implementing the provisions of p 3 as amended. We find that the court acted within its authority in so doing. We believe, however, that the court overstepped its authority when it required that certain language be contained in the regulations. We therefore affirm the district court's action with the proviso that the order must be modified to exclude the requirement, set out in p 4, that specified language appear in the regulations issued. 36 121 The Secretary asserts, citing 42 U.S.C. Secs. 405(a), 1383(d)(1) (1982), that [p]rescription of final regulations ... usurps the Secretary's statutory grant of authority to promulgate regulations, see also 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1302 (1982), and that requiring their promulgation is therefore not a remedy the court has the power to provide. Plaintiffs assert that, pursuant to a finding of noncompliance by the Secretary, the court was empowered to direct her to promulgate regulations in accordance with the decree. 122 The question before us is whether the Secretary may continue to operate under regulations which do not comport with a judgment of the court entered upon consent of the parties. In reaching our conclusion that the district court's directive to promulgate regulations was proper under the circumstances, we are particularly persuaded by three considerations: (1) the Secretary had already promulgated regulations regarding SSI eligibility prior to the court's order; (2) the district court had found that the Secretary was not in compliance with the original decree; and (3) the Secretary had given her consent to the terms of the original decree. We address these factors below. 123 First, the Secretary has already chosen to promulgate regulations on the very issue of SSI eligibility which is before us. See supra note 20. Further, she has revised these regulations since the entry of the consent decree. Indeed, the fact that the regulations promulgated subsequent to the decree did not comport with the decree indicates that the court was, in effect, forced to order that further regulations be promulgated to ensure compliance with the terms of the decree. 124 Thus, the balance between the powers of the court and the powers of the executive is not at issue here. This is not an occasion in which the Secretary had chosen to refrain from taking any action. See Heckler v. Chaney, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1651-52, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (agency refused to take certain investigatory and enforcement actions). Nor is this a situation in which the Secretary had already decided against proceeding by rulemaking, in favor of proceeding by another means. Cf. Pressley v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 437 F.2d 716, 721-22 (D.C.Cir.1970) (court urged, but did not require, the agency to formulate regulations instead of proceeding solely by individual adjudication); see generally Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1031, 1055-56 (D.C.Cir.1979) (traditionally, agency rather than court determines whether to proceed by means of rulemaking, individual adjudication, or a combination). Nor is it a situation in which the Secretary had pursued rulemaking proceedings, but ultimately determined that a final rule should not be adopted. WWHT, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 656 F.2d 807, 818-19 (D.C.Cir.1981) (agency denied a rulemaking petition after it had terminated rulemaking proceedings on the same matter without adopting a rule). Nor, finally, is it a situation in which the Secretary asserts that rulemaking proceedings on this issue would be administratively infeasible or inappropriate, or would consume an inordinate amount of time or agency resources. Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 606 F.2d at 1045-46 (discussing various pragmatic considerations weighing against judicial review of agency's decision not to adopt regulations regarding a given activity); see generally Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv.L.Rev. 507, 562-68 (1985). 125 Second, the failure of the Secretary to promulgate appropriate regulations was part and parcel of a failure to effectuate the substantive terms of p 3 of the decree, as well as a failure to comply with the procedural terms of p 5 of the decree. Paragraph 5 of the decree is reasonably interpreted to require the promulgation of appropriate regulations. When the court found that the Secretary had failed to otherwise effectuate the eligibility standard incorporated in p 3, the court was authorized to require her to issue regulations to effectuate that standard. 126 Under its power to take reasonable steps to enforce its orders, see, e.g., Class v. Norton, supra, the court was entitled to require that the Secretary promulgate regulations so as to come into compliance with the decree. Further, the plaintiffs who had bargained for the terms of the decree, and agreed to cease litigating on the basis of the decree were entitled to have the decree enforced as written. 127 In ordering the promulgation of regulations, the district court asked no more than that the Secretary meet its responsibilities by adopting a fair ... rule within a reasonable period of time. British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 564 F.2d 1002, 1013 (2d Cir.1977). The law simply will not tolerate the denial of rights by unwarranted official inaction. Id. at 1010. Thus, the Secretary has merely been required to redraft her regulations to bring them into conformity with a court order to which she has consented. Cf. Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694, 726 (D.C.Cir.1985) (agency ordered to redraft regulations to bring them into conformity with statute). 128 Finally, the fact that the Secretary gave her consent to the original judgment is of considerable significance in evaluating her argument that the court does not have the power to require her to promulgate regulations. Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1127-28 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2668, 81 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984). The judgment in this case, entered on consent, was itself an agreement by the Secretary to do certain acts. Having given her consent to terms which are understood to include the promulgation of regulations, she cannot now object to the terms as if they had been imposed upon her against her will. 129 In Gorsuch, the appellate court considered the argument that, in approving a consent decree, the district court had impermissibly limited the agency's discretion to determine the procedures and criteria it would use in preparing to promulgate regulations pursuant to the Clean Water Act. The court observed at the outset that the issue of infringement of agency discretion [which] ... normally arises in the context of a judicial order disposing of a case on its merits ... is framed somewhat differently here because the Decree was entered with [the agency's ] consent. Id. (footnote omitted). Because the consent decree in Gorsuch was largely the work of the agency and the other parties to the litigation rather than the work of the district court, the appellate court concluded that the requirements imposed by the Decree do not represent judicial intrusion into the Agency's affairs to the same extent they would if the Decree were 'a creature of judicial cloth.'  Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 141, 102 S.Ct. 197, 200, 70 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981)). 130 Although the district court did not err in ordering the promulgation of regulations, the court's requirement that the Secretary include the language of p 3 as amended in her regulations intruded unnecessarily into the administrative sphere. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20, 73 S.Ct. 85, 86, 97 L.Ed. 15 (1952) (the lower court intruded on an administrative function in ordering the agency to strike an unlawful section of a license). Therefore, while we uphold the district court's requirement that the Secretary promulgate regulations which are in accordance with the decree, we find that the requirement that specified language be included in the regulations must be deleted.