Opinion ID: 1759881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CLAIMS RAISED IN THE INITIAL RCr 11.42 MOTION

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing or relief pursuant to RCr 11.42. Appellant contends that trial counsel's performance was deficient in ten areas, and that evidence outside the record is necessary to establish the validity of his claims, thus requiring an evidentiary hearing. RCr 11.42 requires a hearing if the answer raises a material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record. RCr 11.42(5); Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742, 743 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049, 114 S.Ct. 703, 126 L.Ed.2d 669 (1994). If the record refutes the claims of error, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. Id. A hearing is also unnecessary where the allegations, even if true, would not be sufficient to invalidate the conviction. Brewster v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 723 S.W.2d 863 (1986). Even in a capital case, an RCr 11.42 movant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Stanford, supra at 743. (citing Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 803 S.W.2d 573, 576 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 844, 112 S.Ct. 140, 116 L.Ed.2d 106 (1991)). Having laid that foundation, we will address each of Appellant's claims regarding the effectiveness of his trial counsel. 1. Appellant contends that trial counsel spent an aggregate of one hour with him prior to trial and failed to keep him advised of developments in the case. However, this issue was raised and rejected on direct appeal to this Court, wherein we stated that the trial strategy used by Bowling's counsel had a better chance of success than any of which the trial judge could think of in light of the strong evidence of guilt presented by the prosecution. Bowling, supra at 180. Therefore, Appellant is precluded from relitigating the issue in his RCr 11.42 motion. Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788 S.W.2d 500 (1990). 2. While Appellant maintains his innocence, he alleges that defense counsel failed to properly investigate the possibility of asserting an Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED) defense. Appellant claims that, had counsel informed him of the availability of an EED defense, he might have chosen to abandon his claim of innocence and have instead pursued the EED defense because he could have introduced two types of evidence to establish such a defense: 1) that his mental state in the days just prior to the murders was abnormal; and 2) that there was the requisite triggering event necessary to establish the defense. [3] The Commonwealth aptly points out, and we agree, that the wealth of evidence regarding EED was before the court at the end of the penalty phase and was not even sufficient to warrant an instruction on EED as a mitigating factor. Moreover, we are not inclined to embrace Appellant's theory that he would have abandoned his claim of innocence. 3. Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to disclose the name of a witness to the car accident that immediately preceded the shootings, and that trial counsel failed to take any additional steps to locate the witness. Appellant explains that the witness could have testified as to how the accident affected Appellant, thereby presenting the triggering event evidence necessary for an EED instruction. Appellant presents no evidence that the Commonwealth knew of the witness's identity. Furthermore, defense counsel argued that the automobile accident presented sufficient evidence to support an EED instruction based upon the unchallenged conclusion that the collision occurred prior to the shootings. It was not the lack of evidence pertaining to the collision, but rather the lack of evidence showing the effect the collision had upon Appellant that precluded the EED instruction. 4. Appellant claims that he was denied effective counsel when lead counsel was indicted during trial. He alleges that counsel was distracted and even had a breakdown, and directed another member of the defense team to cross-examine witnesses until he could regain control of himself. As a result, Appellant concludes that impeachment and cross-examination were limited due to the role reversal. Also, Appellant believes that knowledge of the impending indictment may have played a role in the inadequate investigation of his case. Appellant concedes that none of this was made part of the trial record. With no evidence that counsel's indictment had any negative implications on Appellant's trial, we cannot conclude that Appellant was denied effective counsel in this respect. 5. Appellant further contends that defense counsel failed to adequately investigate several other people who had a motive to commit the murders. However, Appellant's argument is based upon vague rumors and unsupported claims. Regardless of counsel's actions in this particular area, we are of the opinion that the mere existence of other potential suspects could do nothing to diminish the impact of the Commonwealth's overwhelming proof against Appellant. Moreover, we agree with the Commonwealth that such claim is particulary offensive when Appellant alleges to know the identity of the actual killer yet continues to withhold the information. 6. Appellant next claims that counsel failed to locate Norman Pullins, a witness to the shooting who gave a description of the shooter that was inconsistent with Appellant's appearance. The record indicates that counsel, in fact, made extraordinary efforts to locate Pullins, and even requested a continuance until he could be found. In response, the Commonwealth agreed to allow Pullins' taped statement to be introduced and played for the jury. Thus, Pullins' description of the gunman was provided to the jury without risking the possibility of an in-court identification or other potentially damaging testimony to Appellant. 7. Appellant further claims that counsel failed to controvert the Commonwealth expert's psychological profile of Appellant. In all actuality, however, it was this profile that aided Appellant in his case more than his own psychologist's profile. To controvert it would have damaged his case. Nonetheless, an unfavorable report does not require counsel to search until an expert supporting the defense theory can be found. 8. Appellant also contends that defense counsel failed to investigate potential mitigation evidence, specifically that, at an early age, Appellant had a growth removed from his head, and that there was a history of mental disorders in Appellant's family. This argument, as well, is clearly refuted by the record. In the penalty phase, counsel introduced extensive evidence pertaining to Appellant's family history of mental illness, his childhood, his marital history, and his deteriorating mental condition in the period leading up to the murders. Counsel presented strong evidence upon which the jury could have reduced Appellant's sentence, had it seen fit to do so. The jury simply weighed the evidence and chose not to reduce the sentence. 9. Appellant next argues that defense counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to conclusions drawn by the Commonwealth in its closing statement that Appellant stalked and waited for the victims and therefore acted with premeditation. Again, this issue was addressed by this Court in Appellant's direct appeal in which we held that the closing arguments by the prosecution were based on the evidence and the reasonable inferences from the evidence. Bowling, supra at 178-179. No further review is appropriate. 10. Appellant finally claims that the Commonwealth made a clandestine deal with a witness, Clay Brackett, in exchange for his testimony. Appellant has no basis for such an allegation, and we have no reason to speculate that such an arrangement existed. Having reviewed each allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we conclude that Appellant has failed to demonstrate any claims which are not refuted by an analysis and review of the trial record. Many of Appellant's claims are nothing more than bald assertions without any factual basis. Such does not justify an evidentiary hearing pursuant to RCr 11.42. Similarly, none of Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel entitle him to relief under RCr 11.42. The standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), was adopted by this Court in Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986). Strickland requires a movant to show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, supra at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. In addition, Strickland mandates that judicial scrutiny be highly deferential. A court making this evaluation must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. A court in considering an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury and assess counsel's overall performance throughout the case in order to determine whether the `identified acts or omissions' overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance. Id.; Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2589, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). Under Strickland it is not enough that counsel erred and Appellant's trial reached an unfavorable result. Instead, Appellant must demonstrate that, absent counsel's errors, there exists a reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different verdict. Id. Strickland, supra, at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. We do not believe that in light of all of the circumstances, counsel's performance was outside of the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.