Opinion ID: 2088455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Statements by Expert Witness

Text: The defendant next contends that the court erred in excluding from evidence the proposed testimony of a certain expert witness. The defendant presented two psychologists who testified to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the shooting. Before Dr. Frank A. Wood was presented as an expert witness for the defense, the State in an in limine motion sought to exclude his proposed testimony reiterating what was contained in seven of his written statements that were included in a letter to the defendant's counsel. The trial justice excluded the testimony that would have repeated what the witness had said in several of these statements because they stated factual conclusions that were within the jury's prerogative to decide. The relevant statements to which the defendant proposed to have Dr. Wood testify are as follows: 1. Mr. Michaud does indeed appear to have been under the influence of extreme anger at the time of the homicide. Mr. Michaud seemed to be having an understandable reaction to finding his long-term girlfriend with another man. 2. Mr. Michaud does indeed appear to have had considerable alcohol and drug intake immediately prior to the homicide. This would certainly have affected his judgment as to the risk to others from his actions. 5. From my interview with Mr. Michaud, it is my impression that he was operating under extreme anger and was not clearly aware himself of his actions but that he certainly did not intend to cause death. 7. I do not believe that Mr. Michaud's state of mind represented a depraved indifference to what his actions might cause. I feel certain if the victim had been visible to Mr. Michaud he would not have attempted to harm that person. The trial justice by excluding this testimony acted well within his discretion. The nature and form of these statements do not meet the requirements of admissibility set forth in Rule 702 of the Maine Rules of Evidence. Under Rule 702, the justice must consider whether the matter testified to is beyond the ability of the untrained juror to determine it intelligently and whether a person with specialized knowledge can give a helpful opinion. See Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 702.1, at 171 (1976). The rule applies to both legal and factual conclusions. In State v. Flick, 425 A.2d at 171, we stated that a medical professional may not testify to legal conclusions. Under M.R.Evid. 701 and 702, the presiding justice may exclude opinions which state legal conclusions, beyond the specialized knowledge of the expert. He may also exclude opinions which are arguably within the expert's specialized knowledge, but which are so conclusory, or so framed in terms of the legal conclusions to be drawn, that they will not assist the trier of fact (M.R.Evid. 702), or will pose a danger of confusing the jury which outweighs their probative value (M.R.Evid. 403), or if there is an insufficient factual basis to support the conclusions (M.R.Evid. 705(b)). Id. (emphasis in original); see also State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 630-32 (Me.1985). Because the expert witness's disputed proposed testimony contained both factual conclusions that the jury had the capacity to draw without expert assistance and inadmissible legal conclusions, the trial justice properly excluded them. Accordingly, we find no merit to the defendant's contention.