Opinion ID: 1189662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory amendments

Text: As we noted in Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 1111, in September 1981, the Legislature added to the Penal Code sections 28 and 29, which abolished diminished capacity and limited psychiatric testimony. It amended section 22 on the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication, section 188 on the definition of malice aforethought, and section 189 on the definition of premeditation and deliberation. Other sections not relevant here were also amended. Thus, Penal Code section 28, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part that evidence of mental illness shall not be admitted to show or negate the capacity to form any mental state, but is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged. Subdivision (b) of section 28 abolishes the defenses of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, and irresistible impulse as a matter of public policy. Penal Code section 29 provides that any expert testifying in the guilt phase of a criminal action shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states, which include, but are not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes charged. The question as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states shall be decided by the trier of fact. Penal Code section 22 was amended to reflect the abolition of diminished capacity. It provides that evidence of voluntary intoxication is not admissible to negate the capacity to form any mental state, but it is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged. In addition, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 188 to define further the element of malice required for the crime of murder. This provision, which I maintain is dispositive of the issue before us, reads as follows: Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. [¶] When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or implied malice as defined above, no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought. Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is included within the definition of malice.  (Italics added to indicate 1981 addition.) We also noted in Saille that [a] provision abolishing the defense of diminished capacity was also included in the initiative measure adopted in June 1982 and known as Proposition 8. Section 25 was added to the Penal Code as part of Proposition 8. Subdivision (a) of section 25 provides: `The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal action, as well as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an accused person's intoxication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be admissible to show or negate capacity to form the particular purpose, intent, motive, malice aforethought, knowledge, or other mental state required for the commission of the crime charged.' (54 Cal.3d at p. 1112.) Neither party herein has argued that the foregoing provision is relevant to the issue of the survival of the imperfect self-defense doctrine.