Opinion ID: 2606360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Quitog's Motions To Dismiss Count I

Text: On August 2, 1995, Quitog filed a motion to dismiss Count I for violation of [the] double jeopardy clause and/or collateral estoppel, or, alternatively, for judgment of acquittal due to prosecution's confession of error. Observing that [t]he underlying sentiment for applying double jeopardy principles rests on the premise that it is inherently unfair to allow the government with all of its resources and power to have more than one bite at the apple, Quitog argued, inter alia, that because the DPA himself conceded that the evidence could not support an attempted murder conviction, the [trial] court must dismiss Count I of the Complaint. Otherwise, the failure to do so would violate the principles that the double jeopardy clauses ... were designed to protect. On August 5, 1995, Quitog filed a second motion to dismiss Count I. In this motion, Quitog urged that the retrial of Count I should be dismissed on Double Jeopardy ground[s] because (1) he neither requested nor initiated the mistrial and, in Quitog's view, (2) the attempted second degree murder charge had been brought in bad faith, as reflected in retrospect by the DPA's concession that he was not guilty of that offense. [18] Quitog's two motions were consolidated for hearing, which commenced on September 8, 1995. Quitog called the DPA who had tried the case against him as a witness, and the following colloquy transpired: [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL:] ... [W]hat is your present employment, please? [BY THE DPA:] Deputy Prosecutor, City and County of Honolulu. Q. And how long have you been so employed? A. Eight years. Q. And prior to that, have you had any other experience as an attorney? A. I was in civil practice for three years. .... Q. Are you still with the Prosecutor's Office? A. Yes. Q. You tried this case, State of Hawaii versus Maxie Quitog, on or about the first week of May of 1995; is that correct? A. I tried the case. I don't recall the date. Q. And one [count] of [the complaint in] the case concerns the charge of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree? A. Yes. Q. And I understand that after you ... closed your case, there was a chambers conference that you had attended along with the Defense with [the trial court]? .... A. Yes. Q. And it is my further understanding that prior to that chambers conference, you made certain representations to the Defense . . . in regards to dropping the count of Attempted Murder in the Second degree? A. Not dropping it. I thought of reducing it. Q. Would you please provide for the record exactly what that offer or representation was to the Defense. A. My recollection was that [it was] trying to work out a deal whereby [the prosecution] would reduce the charge of Attempted Murder to Assault in the First Degree. Q. And did you seek to get approval from anyone from your office? A. Yes. That was denied. .... Q. ... You took a certain proposal to your supervisors, and why did you do that? A. I thought it was fair. Q. And can you explain to the Court why you thought it was fair. A. Based on the evidence, I thought [it] was fair. Q. Did you also feel that it was consistent with the state of the evidence, that there was insufficient evidence as to the [charge of] Attempted Murder in the Second Degree? A. I think it was a borderline case, but in looking at the entire case, the reasons for what happened, the nature of the injury, I thought an Assault One would be something fair to cop to. Q. Did you also feel that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the Attempted Murder in the Second Degree charge? A. Yes. Q. And you told that to your supervisor? A. Yes. Q. And you also told it to the jury? A. Yes, in closing argument. Q. You feel that your position is consistent with the ethical rule that you are bound by? A. Referring to my role ... as a Prosecutor to seek justice? Q. Yes. A. Yes. [19] Q. Now, in that chambers conference when you basically tried to make a representation to the Defense about reducing that charge, did you make ... known to [the trial court] your offer to reduce the charge from Attempted Murder in the Second Degree to Assault One? A. I believe I did, yes. Q. Can you ... place on the record exactly what happened at that chambers conference? A. I believe I indicated my attempt to resolve the case through a plea agreement by seeking an Assault in the First Degree charge, and then I think I also invited the [trial] [c]ourt to enter a Judgment of Acquittal as to the Attempted Murder in the Second Degree count and let me go to closing argument on Assault in the First Degree, and my recollection was that [that] was denied because, given the law, in other words, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the [prosecution], that there was sufficient evidence at that time to allow the charge to go to the jury. Q. This is at the end of your case? A. Yes. Q. The Defense had not put on its witnesses? A. Right. .... Q. ... [Y]ou basically were stuck with not being able to fulfill what you believe was your ethical obligation as a Prosecutor to seek justice, correct? A. Well, I was not allowed to go to closing argument with what I thought was a proper charge. Q. But you went to closing argument and you told the jury that it should find for the Defense not guilty as to Count One, Attempted Murder in the Second Degree? A. Right, but guilty of Assault in the First Degree. Q. And you stand by that decision because you feel that it fulfills your obligation to seek justice and be fair? A. I stand by that decision, but my decision is not the decision of my office. I need permission from my supervisor before a plea approval can be approved. Q. You did need approval to state your position to the jury, correct? A. Well, frankly, I got into trouble with my office for that. Q. That's a different matter. The question I have is, based upon your understanding of the scope of your responsibility as a [DPA], you have the discretion to make the kind of call that you made on May 8, 1995, when you told the jury that Mr. Quitog is not guilty of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, right? A. No, I don't have that discretion. I did it contrary to what my office wanted because I believed that that was the proper charge and I believed that, in my role to seek justice, that was the proper thing to do. I went out on a limb. Q. I note that you are not going to be trying this case ... again? A. Yes. Q. And it is your personal conviction not to try this case and get another deputy to stand in here? A. ... I didn't think it would be proper given my office's position and my belief as to what the proper charge would be for me to proceed with this case. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Mr. [DPA]. No further questions. [BY SUBSTITUTE DPA]: No further questions. No questions at all. (Emphases added.) The substitute DPA declined either to call any witnesses or to advance any oral argument in opposition to Quitog's motions to dismiss Count I, opting instead to submit... on the record. Defense counsel's oral argument in support of the motions included the following: I have heard of cases ... where, at opening statement, ... certain positions had been taken by the Plaintiff where there is ... insufficiency of the evidence,... [t]rial [c]ourts have been affirmed in dismissing counts right at the gecko [sic; probably get-go]. In this case, there is more than that. There is a [DPA] who felt... at the end of ... his case[] that the charge should not go to the jury; however, there was a lesser [included offense] that could go. There was an attempt, at least, to put forward before the [trial court,] as well as before his supervisors[,] an attempt to seek justice[;] and in this [DPA's] viewpoint,... there was not enough evidence to go to the jury. The [trial court] denied the motion in the case. The [trial court] did not grant it as a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal at the end of this case, and Defense proceeded, and there was another motion ... as to Judgment of Acquittal. More importantly, Judge, ... at the end of the case on both sides, this [DPA] took [a] position that [is] inconsistent with the [substitute DPA's] position now. [The DPA], based upon his view of his ethical obligation, told the jury that Mr. Quitog is not guilty of Count One, Attempted Murder in the Second Degree. ... ... [I]n my view, Judge, I have never seen a case where a[DPA] has done such a right thing and has told the jury[,T]hat is justice.] And it troubles me to see it ... proceed again within the Government that took that position [with] the jury [in] the first trial.... [T]o have another ... jury ... review this issue is very, very troubling in light of the position taken by the Government .... .... ... [I]t appears to me[,] just as a matter of law of the case, that the [prosecution], after taking a position, should be precluded from changing its position in this case (Emphases added.) The hearing was continued to September 22, 1995, at which time the trial court orally denied Quitog's motions to dismiss Count I and scheduled the matter for retrial, ruling as follows: The court ... denies both of those motions. First addressing double jeopardy, [ Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 78 Hawai`i 21, 889 P.2d 705 (1995),] says double jeopardy protects against three distinct abuses. A second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, or multiple punishments for the same offense. And none of those situations is present in this case. We had a hung jury. The Court declared a mistrial[,] finding that there [was] a manifest necessity because of the hung jury. In terms of collateral estoppel, that is sort of a corollary to the double jeopardy. And looking at cases both in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions, as well as the Federal Court, I don't believe collateral estoppel prevents the [prosecution] from retrying a defendant when there has been a hung jury. The same holds true when you're dealing with asking for a judgment of acquittal due to a[n] alleged prosecution's confession of error. I think the [prosecution's memorandum] in opposition addresses that in terms of the difference between confessing to facts and confessing to law and those distinctions. The Court finds that the prosecution's ... memorandum in opposition is persuasive in that regard. So both of the motions regarding double jeopardy ... are denied. The trial court' findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in its written orders, filed on November 1 and 2, 1995, denying Quitog's motions substantially tracked the reasoning of its oral ruling. Thereafter, Quitog filed the present interlocutory appeals. [20]