Opinion ID: 775028
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Timeliness of Anthis' and Schleter's Charges

Text: 26 Because the EEOC does not have independent authority to bring claims for monetary relief, it may only maintain its suit for damages if it can establish that a charge of discrimination was filed timely. Anthis and Schleter were the only NGSC employees who filed charges. They filed those charges on December 29, 1997. Because Indiana is a non-deferral state for purposes of establishing the statutory period within which an employee must file charges of age discrimination, see Daugherity v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 970 F.2d 348, 350 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992), Anthis' and Schleter's charges had to be filed within 180 days of the unlawful employment practice, see 29 U.S.C. sec. 626(d)(1). This 180-day period began on July 2, 1997, and the EEOC must demonstrate that a discriminatory act occurred subsequent to that time. 27 As early as 1994 or 1995, Anthis and Schleter were on notice that the ERP discriminated against them. Around that time, they discussed the fact that they, being sixty years old, would receive lower early retirement benefits than a fifty-five-year-old teacher with the same number of years of service. However, neither indicated to NGSC that he was considering retirement nor did either file charges with the EEOC. The ERP was terminated by NGSC at the May 29, 1997 negotiation meeting between NGSC and the Union. Based on this information alone, it appears that the discriminatory acts occurred before the 180-day period and that the charges therefore were untimely. 28 Nevertheless, under the continuing violation doctrine, the EEOC may 'get relief for a time-barred act by linking it with an act that is within the limitations period.' Miller v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Speer v. Rand McNally, 123 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 1997)). A continuing violation may exist when the employer has an express, openly espoused, discriminatory policy that was in effect during the limitations period. See Place v. Abbott Labs., 215 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 768 (2001); Stewart v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 117, 121 (7th Cir. 1982). However, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply when a time- barred incident cannot be linked with an incident that occurred within the statutory period or when the time-barred incident alone should have triggered the plaintiff's awareness that his rights had been violated. See Simpson v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 196 F.3d 873, 875-76 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999). 29 The Supreme Court has explained that a facially discriminatory policy discriminates each time that it is applied. See Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 912 & n.5 (1989). 8 The Court also has made clear, though, that the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (emphasis in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (holding that the limitations period on the plaintiff's discrimination claim began to run from the time he was given notice that he would not receive tenure, not from the time he actually was terminated); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam) (holding that the limitations period began to run from the time the plaintiffs were given notice of their termination, even though the plaintiffs continued to work after that date). We have held that, in the context of mandatory retirement programs, the statute of limitations runs from the date the employee is given notice that he will be forced to retire upon reaching a certain age, despite the fact that the employee is not taken off the payroll until some time after the notification date. See Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1984) (as amended); see also Kuemmerlein v. Bd. of Ed. of the Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 894 F.2d 257, 259-60 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the plaintiffs received notice of their termination, not on their actual termination date); Mull v. Arco Durethene Plastics, Inc., 784 F.2d 284, 290 (7th Cir. 1986) ([T]he significant date for purposes of Ricks and the limitations period is that date upon which the employee receives notice of termination and not the date upon which the termination becomes effective.). The reasoning underlying this principle is that the employee is aware that he has been discriminated against at the time the employer makes clear to him that he will be subjected to the discriminatory policy. The employee's eventual termination at a later date is an inevitable consequence of the discriminatory decision to terminate him; it is not in itself a separate discriminatory act. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257-58. Indeed, [m]ere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination. Id. at 257; cf. Florida v. Long, 487 U.S. 223, 239 (1988) (It is not correct to consider payments of [pension] benefits based on a retirement that has already occurred as a sort of continuing violation.). 30 Without addressing this body of case law or providing support for its own proposition, the EEOC asserts that the retirement of David Specht on August 1, 1997, constitutes a discriminatory application of the ERP within the limitations period sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the continuing violation doctrine. Specht submitted a formal letter of intent to retire on March 31, 1997. He retired on August 1, 1997, after teaching through the end of the summer school session. Based on Specht's payments, it appears that his benefits had been calculated under the ERP. He received his first payment on October 1, 1997. 31 The precedent we have just discussed establishes that, with respect to retirement plans, the discriminatory act occurs on the date on which it becomes clear that the employee will retire pursuant to the terms of the discriminatory plan, regardless of whether he continues to work past that date. Cf. Mogley v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 289, 290 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that the limitations period began to run from the time the employee received a letter notifying him that he could accept early retirement rather than face termination, even though his retirement was not effective until seven months later). Notably, the EEOC has offered no evidence to indicate that an employee's last day of employment has any effect whatsoever on the application of the ERP or the calculation of the employee's benefits. Cf. Long, 487 U.S. at 239 (holding that, in the pension fund context, the discriminatory act is the calculation of benefits fixed under a contract between the employer and retiree and that each payment of benefits did not constitute a continuing violation). Indeed, the evidence of record, including the testimony of Heck and Nixon, as well as various documents, suggests the contrary. 32 According to the terms of the ERP, a teacher electing to take early retirement had to notify NGSC of his intent to claim the early retirement benefit no later than June 1 of the school year preceding the year he wished to begin receiving benefits. R.149, Ex.6 at 41. Specht provided this notification in March 1997 when he gave Nixon his letter expressing his intent to retire under the ERP. At that time, Specht was on notice that he was retiring pursuant to the discriminatory ERP and that the amount of his benefits would be less than those of younger retirees. It was on this date that the discriminatory act occurred, and Specht's subsequent retirement in August was merely an inevitable consequence of that act. Thus, Specht's August retirement does not establish that the ERP was applied in August, and it does not support a continuing violation. 33 The EEOC offers the retirement of one other teacher, Noel Loftin, in its attempt to establish a continuing violation. However, the EEOC's argument with respect to Loftin is more flawed than its argument concerning Specht. In early May 1997, Loftin expressed to Nixon his intent to retire and was told that NGSC was not accepting retirements at that time. During subsequent phone conversations and at the May 29, 1997 meeting, Nixon and Heck discussed the need to create some kind of a retirement plan for [Loftin] that was not the current contract. R.148 at 26 (quotation marks omitted). During May and June 1997, Loftin and NGSC negotiated an individualized early retirement agreement, and, on June 19, 1997, Loftin tendered his resignation. On June 24, 1997, Loftin accepted an early retirement benefit package of $64,958.16 (he would have received $64,958.15 under the ERP), and, on June 30, 1997, he retired. Like Specht, he received his first payment on October 1, 1997. 34 Although the EEOC contends that Loftin's retirement extended the application of the ERP into the limitations period, its argument fails because Loftin's benefits were calculated under a separately negotiated agreement in June 1997. Loftin's final benefits package was only one cent greater than the benefits package he would have received under the ERP; however, the EEOC has offered no evidence to suggest that age was indeed a factor in determining Loftin's early retirement benefits, as it would have been under the discriminatory ERP. In addition, all of the negotiations, including Loftin's acceptance of the benefits agreement, took place prior to July 2, 1997. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest either that Loftin's retirement occurred under the ERP or that he retired within the relevant statutory period. 35 This record will not support a determination that either Specht or Loftin retired under the ERP within the limitations period. Therefore, the EEOC is unable to demonstrate that there was a continuing violation that would render Anthis' and Schleter's charges timely. Because no other teacher filed charges, the EEOC has no timely filed charge on which to base its claims for monetary damages. 9 Consequently, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for NGSC on those claims.