Opinion ID: 39963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Initial Consent

Text: 13 The district court found, over disputed testimony, that Mendez gave Agent Rivera consent to enter his house. Mendez contends, however, that because his consent did not extend to the other agents present at the scene, the other agents' entrance into his house violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Government responds that Mendez's consent for one (Rivera) was effectively consent for all (six or seven other agents) on the facts of this case and in the absence of any limitation on his consent. 14 The district court did not rule on the scope of Mendez's consent, as the court approved the officers' entry into the house and detention of the Brazilians on a hybrid protective sweep/plain view rationale. Nevertheless, the deficiency can be overlooked, because this purely legal issue was raised in the trial court and concerns undisputed facts. See Ballard v. United States, 17 F.3d 116, 118 (5th Cir.1994)(stating that reviewing court may affirm on grounds other than those relied upon by the district court). The Supreme Court holds that [t]he standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of `objective' reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). Although objective reasonableness is a question of law, factual circumstances are highly relevant when determining what the reasonable person would have believed to be the outer bounds of the consent that was given. United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 667 (5th Cir.2003). 15 The facts preceding Agent Rivera's entry into the Mendez home have been recounted above. In particular, the ICE agent explained his objective—a search for illegal aliens—before entering the house. A reasonable person observing the exchange between Agent Rivera and Mendez would conclude that Mendez authorized a search of his house for people who might be illegal aliens, and that is exactly what transpired. On entry, Agent Rivera immediately noticed seven or eight people sitting in the living room. He ascertained that they did not respond to the English or Spanish languages except to acknowledge one word: Brazil. Believing that the individuals in the living room were the illegal immigrants about whom he had earlier been informed, Agent Rivera called his fellow agents, who then entered to verify who was inside and to determine their alienage. 16 Although the agents characterized their action as a protective sweep, the actions they took to perform the sweep were within the scope of Mendez's original consent. The action the agents took, not the terminology they employed, is what is constitutionally determinative. 1 The agents went from room to room to look for people and then interviewed the people they found to determine their immigration status. At no point during the thirty to forty-five minutes the agents were in the house did they search for physical evidence. The agents' actions were consistent with the scope of consent that Mendez gave to Agent Rivera. 2 17 Mendez's argument that the initial consent he gave Agent Rivera to enter and search his home was specific to Agent Rivera, and was not meant to extend to the other agents present at the scene, is inconsistent with Mendez's actions during the search. It is the defendant's responsibility to limit the scope of the search if he so intends. United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 688 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that the defendant's general consent to search his car gave the officer the authority to search under the hood because the defendant failed to limit the scope of the search). Accordingly, a failure to object to the breadth of the search is properly considered an indication that the search was within the scope of the initial consent. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In the instant case, Mendez made no attempt to limit the scope of his consent and never objected to the additional agents entering his house. From this it can be inferred that the aid given Agent Rivera by the additional agents was within the scope of Mendez's consent. 18 Where the defendant has failed to limit the scope of the search, the question that remains in determining its validity is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the search was reasonable. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250, 111 S.Ct. at 1803. Mendez consented to have a government agent search his house for illegal aliens. Under the totality of the circumstances, the entry of five or six additional agents into his house was not unreasonable. When Agent Rivera stepped into Mendez's house, he immediately saw seven or eight people in the living room. Three other individuals were sitting at the kitchen table. Seriously outnumbered, and knowing that it was likely that several more people could be hidden in the additional rooms of the house, he decided to call in the additional agents. It is eminently reasonable that several agents would be sent into the house to search for additional people and to determine the alienage of those present. While there may well be an upper limit on the number of law enforcement officers who may search a private home under other circumstances, the limit of reasonableness was not reached in this case. 19 Mendez also asserts that, after Agent Rivera left the house and read him his Miranda rights, the consent to search was automatically withdrawn without his having to do or say anything to that effect. This court has never adopted a rule declaring that consent is automatically terminated upon arrest. Rather, consent is a fact-sensitive inquiry dependent on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d 117, 121 (5th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). We agree with the Seventh Circuit, which held that the fact that a person is formally placed under arrest sometime after the first consent does not work as an automatic withdrawal of the consent previously given. United States v. Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146, 150-51 (7th Cir.1996) (citations omitted); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1(c) at 631 (4th ed.) ([A] consent to search is not terminated merely by a worsening of the consenting party's position ...). 20 We conclude that the government agents' initial search for aliens was eminently reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and that the agents acted within the scope of Mendez's consent. Nevertheless, we also agree that the search was valid under the essential rationale employed by the district court. We now turn to a brief analysis of both the protective sweep of Mendez's house and Mendez's later written consent to search.