Opinion ID: 2119657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: admissibility of results of blood test

Text: In his fifth assignment of error, Prescott argues that it was error for the county court to receive into evidence the results of the blood test finding his blood alcohol content to be .093. The basis for this argument is Prescott's contention that the State did not establish compliance with title 177. To be considered valid, blood tests under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,197 (Reissue 2004) shall be performed pursuant to methods approved by the Department of Health and Human Services. [27] Any deficiencies in the techniques used to test the blood alcohol level in DUI cases generally are of no foundational consequence, but only affect the weight and credibility of the testimony. [28] Under title 177, a technique is defined as a set of written instructions which describe the procedure, equipment, and equipment preventive maintenance necessary to obtain an accurate alcohol content test result. [29] A method, however, is the name of the principle of analysis. [30] Prescott's first argument is that the person who drew his blood failed to put the full date or time on the tubes of blood she drew from him and thus failed to comply with title 177. Title 177 does provide that the following shall be listed on the label of the specimen container: name of person tested, date and time of collection, and initials of person collecting specimen. [31] A review of the record shows that title 177 was complied with. The initials of the collector are on the container, as is the time of collection. The date, but not the year, is also on the label. But the year, along with the month and day, is on the security seal on the container. And that month and day match those on the label and also match the whole date listed on the requisition form also in the record. Moreover, any deficiency in the date would go to the weight of this evidence and not to its admissibility. Prescott next contends that § 005.02 of title 177, chapter 1, was not complied with in that there was insufficient evidence presented to show that the specimen container in which his blood was collected contained an anticoagulant. But the collector of the specimen testified that there was such an anticoagulant in the tube, as it was placed there by the manufacturer. Prescott also argues that there was insufficient evidence that the hospital was properly certified to test his blood. Prescott relies on § 60-6,201(3) and State v. Trampe, [32] to support this argument. The technologist testified that the hospital was certified and that, in addition, she had a permit to test blood in the manner in which she did. Neither § 60-6,201(3) nor Trampe explicitly provides that an actual copy of the certification is necessary. And both § 60-6,201(3) and Trampe relate to certification in the context of the collection of a specimen by a person who does not hold the proper permit: In certain instances, medical personnel of a properly certified facility can take samples without a permit, and in those situations, more evidence of certification might be necessary. Neither Trampe nor § 60-6,201(3) holds what Prescott claims they do. Prescott's argument on this point is without merit. Prescott next asserts that the technologist was required under 177 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 006.04C1c, to [i]ntroduce at least 0.050 ml volume of specimen into the sample cartridge when testing a sample under the radiative energy attenuation method and that there was no testimony that the technologist did so. Prescott is correct that there was not testimony on this point. However, the technologist did testify that she conducted all testing as required by title 177. And as noted above, title 177 does require a .050 milliliter volume of specimen. We conclude that the technologist's testimony was sufficient to show that the proper volume of specimen was introduced. [33] Finally, Prescott contends that the technologist's permit did not authorize her to conduct testing via the radiative energy attenuation method that was used in this case. But under title 177, one of the approved testing methods for a Class A permit, which the technologist in this case had, was the radiative energy attenuation method using the analyzer employed in this case. Prescott's argument that the technologist was not authorized in this case is without merit. Prescott's fifth assignment of error is without merit.