Opinion ID: 1318519
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of AS 09.45.730 and the Treble Damages Award

Text: MEA contends that the superior court erred in applying AS 09.45.730 to this simple breach of contract action. Section 09.45.730 [2] provides in part: A person who cuts down, ... a tree, ... without lawful authority, is liable to the owner of that land, ... for treble the amount of damages which may be assessed in a civil action. However, if the trespass was casual ... or the defendant had probable cause ... only actual damages may be recovered. MEA seeks to limit the scope of this statute in a number of ways. First, it argues that the statute's primary purpose is to deter those who pursue their own objectives on a public right of way from disregarding the adjacent landowner's interest. Second, MEA urges the court to apply common law principles governing the imposition of punitive damages to this statute. MEA additionally argues that the statute does not even apply because the scope of the easement granted by Weissler encompassed MEA's actions. Alternatively, MEA claims that the statute does not authorize treble damages for merely negligent conduct. It argues that negligence falls within the statutory exception that allows only single damages for casual or involuntary trespass. Finally, it claims it had probable cause to cut beyond the four foot boundary. We reject all of MEA's contentions. Its actions fall squarely within the scope of AS 09.45.730's treble damage provision.
MEA contends that [t]he primary purpose of [this] statute is to protect the trees and vegetation on property near public rights-of-way from damage or destruction by those making use of the public right-of-way. It offers no support for this allegation and we find none in the statute or Alaska case law. In Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282, 286 (Alaska 1981) (treble damages proper where state cut trees beyond those necessary for the construction of the roadway, even though the cutting was within the scope of the easement) we held that only the amount of trees reasonably necessary to construct the roadway may be cleared. Andersen involved a 100 foot easement dedicated for use as a public roadway. Id. at 284-85. Nothing in the opinion, however, suggests that the statute only applies to such public right-of-way cases. MEA's construction of the statute would allow the most willful of trespassers, i.e. those who enter onto timber land to cut and sell another's merchantable timber, to be liable for only single damages. We decline to limit the statute to the narrow confines suggested by MEA.
MEA claims that common law standards governing punitive damages should apply to AS 09.45.730. Such standards require a showing of malice before a court may award punitive damages. See e.g., Alaska Northern Development, Inc. v. Alaska Pipeline Service Co., 666 P.2d 33, 41 (Alaska 1983). MEA relies on the section in Andersen in which we declined to allow prejudgment interest on the treble damages portion of the award because those damages were punitive. Andersen, 625 P.2d at 289. It reasons that because we characterized the treble damage provision as penal, common law punitive damages principles apply. Therefore, MEA argues that since Weissler did not show actual malice, punitive damages were improper. Here, however, the court did not make a discretionary award of general punitive damages. Rather, it found that MEA trespassed and that the cutting of the trees bordered on recklessness. Section 09.45.730 explicitly sets forth the rule and the exceptions for treble damages awards. It provides that: A person who cuts down ... a tree ... on the land of another ..., without lawful authority, is liable to the owner of that land ... for treble the amount of damages. ... (Emphasis added). The Oregon Supreme Court specifically addressed the scope of liability and punitive damages in 1889. That court construed the Oregon statutes [3] upon which AS 09.45.730 was modelled. [4] The court stated: The appellants' counsel insists that this statute is penal in its character, and does not apply to an unintentional trespass... . If said section 338 of the [Civil] Code stood alone, the court would be called upon to construe it, and it might in that case adopt the construction contended for by the counsel; but we are spared that labor, as said section 339 . .. points out the circumstances under which no more than single damages can be recovered. The legislature, by the latter section, has given a construction to the former one,  has prescribed the cases in which such trespasser shall be liable for single damages only,  and leaves him in all other cases liable to treble damages, as prescribed in the former section ... . Lowenburg v. Rosenthal, 22 P. 601, 604 (Or. 1889) (emphasis added). The Oregon construction is sensible. MEA must, therefore, show that it falls within the exceptions to the treble damages provision.
MEA is liable for treble damages if it trespassed without lawful authority, and the trespass was not casual or made with probable cause.
MEA asserts that it did not trespass because it had Weissler's permission. It contends that the easement gave it authority to trim beyond the four foot path. The easement provided MEA with authority: To inspect and make such repairs, changes, alterations, improvements, removals from, substitutions and additions to its facilities as the Association may from time to time deem advisable, including, by way of example and not by way of limitation, the right to increase or decrease the number of conduits, wires, cables, hand holes, manholes, connection boxes, transformers and transformer enclosures; to cut, trim and control the growth by chemical means, machinery or otherwise of trees and shrubbery located within ____ feet of the center line of said line or system, or that may interfere with or threaten to endanger the operation and maintenance of said line or system (including any control of the growth of other vegetation in the right of way which may incidentally and necessarily result from the means of control employed)... . Weissler's consent to enter and cut trees extended only to the four foot easement. The trial court correctly concluded that MEA exceeded the scope of the consent by clearing beyond the four foot easement. According to the Restatement of Torts, One whose presence on land is pursuant to a consent which is restricted to conduct of a certain sort, is a trespasser if he intentionally conducts himself in a different manner, as where one licensed to go on another's land and cut and remove trees not less than six inches in diameter cuts trees four and five inches in diameter. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 168 comment d (1965) (emphasis added). [5] The Reporter's Notes to Section 169 [6] mention the well-recognized rule that one who has a private easement of way becomes a trespasser when he goes beyond its boundaries. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 169 reporter's notes (1966). A recent Washington case applying its timber trespass statute dealt with a situation analogous to the case at bar. That case discussed whether the holder of a utility easement may be held liable for treble damages when the easement holder deviates from the location of that easement without first obtaining permission of the landowner and damages trees and shrubs. Tatum v. R & R Cable, 30 Wash. App. 580, 636 P.2d 508, 510 (1981). The defendant in that case contended it substantially complied with the easement because it chose a less expansive route and destroyed fewer trees than it would have on the easement. Id., 636 P.2d at 510-11. The trial court, however, found that the path chosen by the [defendant] substantially deviate[d] from the easement, both in terms of its location and its width. Id. at 511. The trial court imposed treble damages upon the defendant and the appellate court upheld the verdict as supported by substantial evidence. Id. The appellate court noted that the defendant had neither obtained permission to vary from the easement nor made an effort to ascertain its location. Id. at 511. These two factors supported the verdict. MEA claims that the scope of consent went beyond a mere four foot easement. However, the trial court concluded that while the written easement did not have four feet filled in, Mr. Weissler clearly had an agreement with MEA that it was supposed to be four feet, and that when MEA cut further than four feet it was a trespass or a taking that wasn't done with consent. It is undisputed that MEA's employees did not seek permission from either MEA or Weissler to enlarge the cutting area. In reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, we may only reverse if such findings are clearly erroneous. Martens v. Metzgar, 591 P.2d 541, 544 (Alaska 1979). The trial court's findings here are not clearly erroneous. Mr. Weissler testified that he received assurances that the clearing would only be four feet. Buzby, MEA's employee, testified that the work order indicated a four foot clearing. Marilyn McRae Purcell, original owner of the land in question, testified that she accompanied Weissler to MEA after the clearing took place and spoke to an MEA employee. That employee told Weissler that the clearing was only to be four feet, two feet on either side of a center line. Against this evidence MEA can only point to Buzby's belief that they were doing the Weisslers a favor and MEA's belief that the easement authorized cutting such trees as MEA deemed advisable. MEA thus exceeded the scope of the easement Weissler granted. We therefore affirm the trial court's finding that MEA trespassed without lawful authority.
MEA asserts that any such trespass was casual [7] and hence only single damages should be awarded. We have not previously interpreted casual in the Alaska tree trespass statute. MEA contends that the trial court found MEA's excessive cutting to be the result of negligence and mistake and hence the court should have found the clearing to be casual. MEA, however, mischaracterizes the trial court's findings. At the beginning of her oral findings, Judge Cutler did say that this was not a case where people were recklessly cutting down other people's trees without regard for them. Nevertheless, the court later described MEA's conduct as negligence verg[ing] on recklessness. In its written findings, the court concluded that [t]he treble damages statute should apply because of the negligent and near reckless conduct of the [d]efendant. MEA does not contest the finding of negligence. Rather it argues that negligence should be included in the definition of casual, and hence exempted from the treble damages provision. We disagree. The phrase casual or involuntary comes directly from the tree trespass statute in New York's Field Code of 1848. [8] In the mid-nineteenth century, casual meant casualty. See Viall v. Carpenter, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 285, 286 (Mass. 1860) (discussing casual and involuntary as used in Massachusetts statute governing tender of amends in trespasses to land. See R.S. ch. 105, § 12 (1836), codified as amended in 41 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 242, § 8 (West 1959)). Casualty, in turn, meant accident or negligence and contrasted with designedly and under a claim of right. Viall, 82 Mass. at 286. [9] At first blush, the common law definition of casual supports MEA's argument. Closer inspection of the statute and case law, however, reveals that the negligence signified by casual does not include a mistaken belief in the authority to cut trees. In Viall, the court noted that English common law distinguished trespasses committed under a mistaken belief in authority to enter from merely casual or involuntary trespasses: Under a similar statute in England ... it has been held that a trespass committed by mistake is not within the terms of the statute, because the act was voluntary. In such case, the entry on the land, being intended, was deemed not to be within the statute, although it might have been made under an erroneous impression as to the right of the tortfeasor in the premises... . If a party enters on land ex intentione, the law holds him responsible for all the consequences of his acts, and treats him as a wrongdoer, if he fails to justify his entry. It is only when by a casualty or without design he commits a trespass, that the law seeks to protect him ... . Id., (citations omitted, initial emphasis in original, final emphasis added). Thus, a trespass committed under a negligently mistaken belief in the right to cut [10] would not be casual since the trespasser intends to cut. Where the trespass is unintended, it is casual. For example, a bulldozer operator grading a road negligently swerves and plows down some trees. Since the operator had no intent to enter or cut the trees, the destruction occurred as a casualty. The operator is liable for single damages only. Or, an excavator negligently sets off dynamite and injures trees. Since the excavator intended no destructive entry, the damage occurred as a casualty. Or, a car careens negligently out of control and destroys a prize hedge. Again, the driver did not intend to enter the land or harm the hedge. In such examples, the defendants had no intent to enter or to cut the trees. Casual negligence thus means negligent conduct not involving an intent or design to enter or harm trees. Casual refers to whether the trespasser intended to cut, not the reason for an intended cutting. Once a trespasser forms an intent to enter the land, the trespass becomes willful and the plaintiff may recover treble damages. Iacobelli Construction v. Western Casualty and Surety, 130 Mich. App. 255, 343 N.W.2d 517, 521 (1983) (construing casual and involuntary in Michigan's tree trespass statute). MEA's negligent decision to exceed the scope of Weissler's permission to cut cannot qualify as casual negligence. MEA's agents intended to cut the trees under a mistaken belief that Weissler would approve. Since MEA's agents intended to cut, their actions were not casual.
MEA further argues that it had probable cause to cut Weissler's trees. The statute awards only single damages where the defendant had probable cause to believe that the land on which the trespass was committed was the defendant's own or that of the person in whose service or by whose direction the act was done... . AS 09.45.730. [11] Probable cause here means an honest and reasonable belief. Curlee v. Donaldson, 233 S.W.2d 746, 754-55 (Mo. App. 1950) (interpreting Missouri's tree trespass statute). By definition, a negligent mistake as to authority cannot qualify as probable cause since negligence involves unreasonable conduct. Taken literally, the probable cause section would shield MEA from treble damages. Everyone involved honestly, reasonably and correctly believed that the land involved belonged to Weissler. Probable cause however, refers to authority to enter and cut on the property. Where a defendant honestly and reasonably believes that authority exists to cut the trees, a plaintiff recovers only single damages. For example, suppose that a logger honestly, reasonably but mistakenly relies upon a boundary marker when cutting. The boundary marker actually sits a few feet onto the adjoining parcel. Since the logger has intended to cut up to the boundary, the tree destruction is willful and not negligent or casual. Absent the probable cause section, the adjoining owner arguably could recover treble damages even though the logger was innocently mistaken. [12] The probable cause section thus protects defendants who honestly and reasonably stray onto another owner's property. The same construction should apply when a defendant has authority to be on only one portion of a person's property, but strays onto another. The probable cause section shields only those defendants who honestly and reasonably exceed the scope of the owner's permission to enter and cut on that owner's land. Without such a construction, a defendant could maliciously cut every tree on that owner's property and pay only single damages since the defendant believed the cutting occurred on that owner's land. Here, MEA's negligence verg[ing] on recklessness negates any probable cause to cut the affected trees. MEA's negligence in believing it could cut the trees made its mistake unreasonable. The probable cause exclusion will not limit MEA's liability. According to the proof sequence utilized by the Washington courts construing a similar statute, MEA had the burden of proof on the affirmative defenses of casual trespass or probable cause. Seattle First National Bank v. Brommers, 89 Wash.2d 190, 570 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1977). See also Longview Fibre v. Roberts, 2 Wash. App. 480, 470 P.2d 222, 224 (1970). The Washington Supreme Court has stated: Once the plaintiff has proven trespass and the damages, the burden shifts to the defendant to show the trespass was casual or involuntary. Brommers, 570 P.2d at 1039. Washington's approach is appropriate. It is similar to the burden of proof allocations we have used in mineral trespass cases. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Anderson, 629 P.2d 512, 527 (Alaska 1981). The tree trespass statute mandates treble damages unless the trespasser exempts him or herself. This situation is also analogous to those in which a defendant bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense. MEA did not meet this burden. The evidence sustains the conclusion that MEA's cutting of trees in excess of the granted easement was not casual or the result of a reasonable mistake. Therefore, the trial court properly awarded treble damages.