Opinion ID: 2789677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO HIS SENTENCE UNDER UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22(e) ¶ 18 Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) provides that “[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.” We hold that the rule encompasses facial constitutional challenges to the sentence that do not implicate a fact-intensive analysis. We also conclude that each of Mr. Houston’s constitutional challenges to his sentence 9 2009 UT 14, ¶ 13, 203 P.3d 984. 10 See State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 13, 274 P.3d 919. 11 Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 19. 12 Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 25, 267 P.3d 232 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court meets these criteria, and therefore his claims are properly brought under rule 22(e). ¶ 19 Under our traditional preservation doctrine, “generally an appellant must properly preserve an issue in the district court before it will be reviewed on appeal.” 13 The issue must have been “presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].” 14 These preservation rules exist both to serve judicial economy and to prevent a defendant from failing to object to an issue in the hopes of reversal of a conviction on appeal. 15 However, “[o]ur preservation requirement is selfimposed and . . . . [c]onsequently, we exercise wide discretion when deciding whether to entertain or reject matters that are first raised on appeal.” 16 We have therefore recognized limited exceptions to the rule, including when the issue arises under exceptional circumstances or where a plain error has occurred. 17 ¶ 20 Rule 22(e) operates as another limited exception to the preservation doctrine.18 In State v. Candedo, we explained that the rule “allows an appellate court to vacate [an] illegal sentence” even if the legality of the sentence was never raised in the proceedings below. 19 We stated that our preservation rules do not apply in the context of a rule 22(e) challenge “because an illegal 13 O’Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ¶ 15, 217 P.3d 704; accord Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 828. 14Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 12 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 15 State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346; see also State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 19, 274 P.3d 919. 16 Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 13. 17 Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶¶ 11–13. 18 Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 20; State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) (“[R]ule 22(e) permits the court of appeals to consider the legality of a sentence even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal.”). 19 2010 UT 32, ¶ 9, 232 P.3d 1008 (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time.” 20 ¶ 21 While it is clear that the preservation rule does not apply to a defendant’s challenge to an illegal sentence, we have had few occasions to discuss what constitutes an “illegal sentence.” In State v. Yazzie, we adopted a definition of “illegal sentence” from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: [An illegal sentence is] one which is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did not authorize. 21 ¶ 22 In Candedo, we elaborated on this definition. We concluded that “if an offender’s sentence is unconstitutional, the sentence is not authorized by the ‘judgment of conviction,’ and is therefore illegal.” 22 In that case, the district court placed Francisco Candedo on nine years’ probation after he pleaded guilty to three felonies arising from his involvement in a 20 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 2009 UT 14, ¶ 13, 203 P.3d 984 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir. 1997)). 22 2010 UT 32, ¶ 13. We disagree with the State that this definition is inconsistent with Yazzie, or that it is otherwise unsupported by legal authority. We squarely rejected these arguments in Candedo. See id. ¶¶ 12–14. We also note that our holding in Candedo—that an illegal sentence encompasses an unconstitutional sentence—is consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s definition and application of this term. See United States v. Groves, 369 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Because the defendant reserved the right to appeal an ‘illegal sentence,’ and because an unconstitutional sentence is ‘illegal,’ we hold that the defendant is entitled to challenge his sentence . . . .”); United States v. Lyman, 261 F. App’x 98, 100 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that an unconstitutional sentence is an example of an illegal sentence). 8 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court fraudulent investment scheme. 23 Rather than object to the length of his probation at sentencing, Mr. Candedo challenged on direct appeal the legality of the duration of his probation sentence under rule 22(e), arguing that his sentence violated his substantive due process rights under the United States Constitution. 24 The court of appeals affirmed Mr. Candedo’s sentence without reaching the merits of his constitutional claim.25 On certiorari review, we determined that the court of appeals erred when it failed to reach Mr. Candedo’s constitutional challenge. 26 We concluded that “[b]ecause an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) includes constitutional violations,” a defendant may raise arguments concerning the constitutionality of the sentence, even if unpreserved. 27 ¶ 23 We again considered the scope of rule 22(e) in State v. Prion, a case in which the defendant raised statutory and double jeopardy challenges to his sentence. 28 We recognized that the Candedo “formulation, if broadly construed, raises the prospect of abuse.” 29 We cautioned that such abuse could arise “if rule 22(e) were construed broadly to sanction a fact-intensive challenge to the legality of a sentencing proceeding asserted long after the time for raising it in the initial trial or direct appeal.” 30 In considering the scope of the rule, we also explained that our rule 22(e) derived from a former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure that authorized a court to correct illegal sentences. 31 We recognized that federal 23 2010 UT 32, ¶ 1. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id. ¶ 2. 27 Id. ¶ 11. We nonetheless affirmed Mr. Candedo’s sentence because we determined that it did not violate due process. Id. ¶ 25. 28 2012 UT 15, ¶ 10. 29 Id. ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 30 Id. 31Id. ¶ 22; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (1984). The federal rule was repealed in 1987. See Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 22 n.8. 9 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court courts traditionally limited challenges under the federal rule to attack sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum, violated double jeopardy, or were facially ambiguous or internally inconsistent. 32 Some circuits appear to have recognized a broader application of the federal rule, such as when the sentence is generally “in violation of the Constitution,” 33 is based on “misinformation of a constitutional magnitude,” 34 or even when the sentence violates another federal rule. 35 ¶ 24 In Prion, we held that the defendant’s statutory and double jeopardy challenges properly fell within the ambit of rule 22(e). 36 Such challenges attacked “facial defects” that “could 32 Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 22 (citing United States v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 1992), and Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962)); see also State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996) (remanding to the trial court under rule 22(e) to correct a sentence enhancement made in violation of the statute). 33 United States v. Hovsepian, 307 F.3d 922, 927–28 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Hill, 368 U.S. at 430 (finding no illegal sentence under rule 35(a) when the sentence was not “legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect”). 34 United States v. Plain, 856 F.2d 913, 916 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (considering a rule 35 motion when a sentencing authority bases the sentencing decision on erroneous factual information)). 35 Cook v. United States, 171 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1948) (vacating a sentence that violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 because the defendant was not present before the court when his sentence was increased). 36 2012 UT 15, ¶¶ 23–24. The concurrence misreads our holding in Prion as limiting rule 22(e) challenges to only those permitted under the antecedent federal rule. Infra ¶¶ 114–31. But we nowhere stated that we were adopting the federal limitation. In fact, reading Prion to adopt such a limitation would require us to have overruled our earlier decisions in Candedo, 2010 UT 32, and State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, 48 P.3d 228 (per curiam). In Candedo, we expressly found that the defendant’s substantive due process claim fell within the scope of the rule: (con’t.) 10 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court easily be corrected without the need for factual development in the original trial court.” 37 We therefore reviewed the defendant’s claims on the merits, ultimately concluding that his sentence violated double jeopardy. 38 ¶ 25 Mr. Houston now brings a host of constitutional claims that we have not previously addressed under rule 22(e). Today, we draw on our previous decisions to articulate the standard for a criminal defendant who brings an unpreserved claim under rule 22(e) that his or her sentence is illegal, and we reiterate the concern expressed in earlier cases that “rule 22(e) claims must be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse.” 39 ¶ 26 We therefore hold that under rule 22(e), a defendant may bring constitutional challenges that attack the sentence itself and not the underlying conviction, 40 and which do so as a facial We therefore hold that the court of appeals erred in failing to reach the merits of Candedo’s substantive due process challenge because the definition of illegal sentence under rule 22(e) is sufficiently broad to include constitutional violations that threaten the validity of the sentence. This holding allows us to reach the merits of Candedo’s claim . . . . 2010 UT 32, ¶ 14. And in Telford, “[a]lthough we rejected Telford’s separation of powers and Eighth Amendment challenges to his sentence, we reached and considered the merits of those challenges under rule 22(e).” Id. ¶ 11 (citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, ¶¶ 3–4) (emphasis added). We would not denigrate our holdings in those cases as “relatively unimportant.” Infra ¶ 121 n.1. 37 Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 22. 38 Id. ¶ 63. 39 Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ¶ 9 (quoting Telford, 2002 UT 51, ¶ 5). 40 See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 859 (“[A]n appellate court may not review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(e) when the substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction.”). 11 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court challenge rather than an as-applied inquiry. 41 This standard comports with previous rule 22(e) decisions of this court. For example, in State v. Telford, we permitted the defendant to bring some unpreserved constitutional challenges to his sentence under rule 22(e) while ruling that other constitutional claims did not properly fall within the scope of rule 22(e) review. 42 We authorized the defendant’s challenge to the indeterminate sentencing scheme under the separation of powers clause of the Utah Constitution.43 We also allowed claims under the cruel and unusual punishments clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions, but only to the extent that the defendant argued for “a per se violation.” 44 In contrast, we concluded that to the extent that the defendant contested the constitutionality “as applied to his particular case, he impermissibly attempt[ed] to employ rule 22(e) to attack his underlying conviction.” 45 Similarly, we prohibited review of claims brought under the Sixth Amendment of the United Sates Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution because those clauses did not relate to sentencing. 46 ¶ 27 Limiting constitutional challenges to facial attacks serves judicial economy. As we recognized in Brooks, “[w]hen the pertinent facts are undisputed and a purely legal question with respect to which the trial court has no discretion remains to be 41 The State argues that such a rule creates an unjustifiable disparity between unpreserved challenges to convictions and to sentences. To the extent that such a dichotomy exists, it is inherent in the rule itself, which allows illegal sentences to be challenged at any time. Moreover, our decision today limits that disparity by restricting constitutional challenges under the rule to only facial attacks. 42 2002 UT 51, ¶¶ 2–5. 43 Id. ¶ 3. 44 Id. ¶ 4; see Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ¶ 11 (recognizing that in Telford we reviewed separation of powers and cruel and unusual punishment challenges on their merits). 45 Telford, 2002 UT 51, ¶ 7 (emphasis added). 46Id. ¶ 6. We ultimately concluded that Mr. Telford’s sentence did not amount to a constitutional violation. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 12 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court decided, nothing is to be gained by remanding the case to the trial court.” 47 The concurrence argues that our standard creates an unworkable rule because even facial challenges can be factintensive. 48 But this argument also misses the mark. In this context, a fact-intensive analysis is one in which “the pertinent legal facts” are disputed or unclear. But where there is a facial constitutional attack, the court need not delve into the record or make findings of fact. Instead, the court is tasked with resolving a legal issue. But that does not mean the analysis will be easy or devoid of any reference to facts. As the opinions in the present case demonstrate, analysis of a purely legal question is often difficult and warrants rigorous debate. The rule we articulate here is not untenable just because it requires hard work by the court. ¶ 28 In the end, finality of judgment and preservation of claims are important, but so too is a criminal defendant’s right to endure only those sentences that can be constitutionally imposed. Because Mr. Houston facially attacks the constitutionality of the statute that authorized his sentence, we hold that he has properly challenged it as an “illegal sentence” under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e). 49 We next turn to the merits of Mr. Houston’s claims. For analytical clarity, we separate his claims into two categories. First, we address his facial constitutional claims, and we analyze the sentence for correctness under rule 22(e)’s exception to preservation. Next, we address Mr. Houston’s claims brought under the framework of ineffective assistance of counsel. We ultimately conclude that all of Mr. Houston’s claims fail and therefore affirm his sentence of life without the possibility of parole. 47 908 P.2d at 860; see also Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 20 (warning against permitting rule 22(e) to “sanction a fact-intensive challenge”); id. ¶ 22 (explaining that facial defects can easily be corrected by an appellate court without the need to remand for factual development). 48 Infra ¶¶ 128–29. 49In light of this limiting construction, we decline the State’s request for us to overrule our holding in Candedo, 2010 UT 32. 13 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court
PAROLE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE UTAH OR THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ¶ 29 We begin by addressing Mr. Houston’s six constitutional challenges to his sentence. Mr. Houston argues that his sentence: (A) is unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court case Apprendi v. New Jersey, 50 (B) is unconstitutional because the sentencing statute does not contain a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof, (C) violates the Utah uniform operation of laws clause and the United States Equal Protection Clause, (D) violates the due process clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions, (E) violates the unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution, and (F) violates the cruel and unusual punishments clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions. We take up each of these issues in turn. A. Mr. Houston’s Sentence Is not Unconstitutional Under Apprendi v. New Jersey ¶ 30 Mr. Houston first argues that Apprendi v. New Jersey 51 renders the sentencing statute unconstitutional. 52 This claim is grounded in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. According to Mr. Houston, his sentence is unconstitutional because Apprendi mandates that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 31 In Apprendi, the New Jersey statutory scheme permitted a judge to impose a sentence beyond the statutory maximum if the judge determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 50 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 51 Id. 52 The concurrence claims that this argument is not a facial challenge. Infra ¶ 128. But Mr. Houston argues that the sentencing statute violates Apprendi’s constitutional protections by allowing the sentencer to impose LWOP, rather than the presumptive twenty year sentence, if the sentencer deems it appropriate. We conclude that this is a challenge on the face of the statute and not to Mr. Houston’s particular circumstances. 14 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court the defendant committed a hate crime. 53 The United States Supreme Court held that this sentencing scheme was unconstitutional because “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 54 ¶ 32 Unlike in Apprendi, however, the sentencing statute under which Mr. Houston was sentenced does not require the judge to make factual findings that increase an offender’s sentence. By pleading guilty to aggravated murder, Mr. Houston admitted all the facts relevant to the offense and became subject to any sentence authorized under Utah law. Under Utah’s sentencing statute, a juvenile defendant guilty of aggravated murder can be sentenced to either life with the possibility of parole or LWOP. 55 There were no factual findings to be made by a jury, only a determination that LWOP would or would not be appropriate. Because the sentencing statute did not permit the jury to impose a sentence “beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,” the Apprendi rule did not apply, and there is no violation. B. The Sentencing Statute Is not Constitutionally Defective for Failing to Include a “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” Standard ¶ 33 Mr. Houston next argues that the sentencing statute is invalid and unconstitutional because it does not articulate a standard of proof for sentencing. 56 Relying on this court’s decision in State v. Wood, 57 Mr. Houston contends that Utah’s sentencing scheme requires that a jury find “beyond a reasonable doubt” that an LWOP sentence is justified and appropriate. We disagree. 53 530 U.S. at 468–69. 54 Id. at 490 (emphasis added). 55See UTAH CODE § 76-3-207(5)(c) (2008). This statute was amended in 2010, but we cite to the version in effect at the time Mr. Houston was sentenced. 56 See id. 57 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982). 15 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court ¶ 34 We begin by examining the language of the sentencing statute at issue. Utah Code section 76-3-207 provides that “the jury shall . . . determine whether the penalty of life in prison without parole shall be imposed . . . . The penalty of life in prison without parole shall only be imposed if the jury determines that the sentence of life in prison without parole is appropriate.”58 ¶ 35 In Wood, we interpreted an earlier version of this statute and held that, in order to impose a death sentence under this section, the sentencing authority must find that (1) the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the sentence is justified and appropriate in the circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.59 Mr. Houston asks us to extend the Wood “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to LWOP sentences. We decline to do so. ¶ 36 We begin by noting that, unlike Mr. Houston’s case, Wood was a death penalty case, and our holding in Wood was premised on the unique nature of a proceeding in which the defendant’s life is at stake. We explained: We reject the proposition that the death penalty may be imposed when there is substantial doubt whether it should be. . . . “Death[,] in its finality, differs from life imprisonment more than a hundred-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that [qualitative] difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” 60 Throughout the Wood opinion, we emphasized the “irrevocable” nature of a death sentence, and the corresponding degree of conviction that a judge or jury must have to impose it. 58 UTAH CODE § 76-3-207(5)(c) (2008). 59 648 P.2d at 83. 60 Id. at 80–81 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 16 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court ¶ 37 In State v. Bell, we returned to our holding in Wood in the context of a different sentencing statute. 61 In Bell, the defendant argued that Utah’s sentencing scheme for aggravated sexual assault was unconstitutional because it did not assign a burden of proof with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining which of the mandatory presumptions should be imposed. 62 We held that the burden of proof rule articulated in Wood does not apply when the jury is not considering death as a possible sentence. 63 We explained that “the choice of death, being unique, justifies requiring the most persuasive reasons and a high degree of subjective certainty. However, those reasons do not have great force in choosing one of three possible sentences, none of which has the finality of death.” 64 ¶ 38 Because a death sentence is uniquely irrevocable and the most severe of all sentences, we have an interest in ensuring that no reasonable doubt remains before we authorize the taking of a human life. But, as we stated in Bell, outside this context, there are no “clear considerations of fairness that militate in favor of a particular standard, except to the extent that one may quarrel with the wisdom of the statute—which is beyond our prerogative.”65 ¶ 39 Here, our legislature has determined that a jury may sentence a defendant to life without parole if it determines that the State has satisfied its burden to demonstrate that this is the “appropriate” sentence to impose. 66 Mr. Houston has not demonstrated that we are constitutionally required to interfere with the legislature’s authority and write a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard into the sentencing statute. 61 754 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1988). 62 Id. at 57. 63 Id. at 59 (distinguishing Wood). 64 Id. 65 Id. 66 See UTAH CODE § 76-3-207(5)(c) (2008). 17 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court C. The Sentencing Statute Does not Violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause ¶ 40 Mr. Houston next argues that the sentencing statute violates the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because the statute “provides no guidance to jurors in determining which sentence to impose.” This, he contends, creates a substantial probability of arbitrary sentencing and disproportionate penalties. ¶ 41 Because we have held that Utah’s uniform operation of laws clause “is at least as rigorous as the federal guarantee,” 67 we first analyze Mr. Houston’s claims under the Utah Constitution. If we determine that the statute survives scrutiny under Utah’s uniform operation of laws provision, then we must conclude that it is constitutional under the United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause as well. 68 ¶ 42 Mr. Houston contends that two juvenile defendants could commit aggravated murder, and, due to the lack of guidance in the statute, a jury could arbitrarily sentence one of the juvenile offenders to life with parole and sentence the other to life without parole. Mr. Houston argues that by failing to narrow in a principled way those who may receive life without parole, the statute disparately treats similarly situated offenders without a rational basis for the disparate treatment. We disagree. ¶ 43 The uniform operation of laws provision of our Constitution requires us to address three questions: (1) “what, if any, classification is created under the statute,” (2) “whether the classification imposes on similarly situated persons disparate treatment,” and (3) whether “the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.” 69 67State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 33 n.5, 233 P.3d 476; see also ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT 36, ¶ 14, 211 P.3d 382 (concluding that uniform operation of laws and Equal Protection claims need only be analyzed under the more rigorous Utah provision). 68 Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 33 n.5. 69 Id. ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court ¶ 44 Examining Utah’s statute in light of these criteria, we conclude that it does not violate the uniform operation of laws clause because it creates no impermissible classifications and it treats all similarly situated defendants the same. ¶ 45 We begin by examining the plain language of the challenged sentencing statute “to determine what classification[, if any,] is created by [the] legislative enactment.” 70 At the time of Mr. Houston’s sentencing, the sentencing statute provided: If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous decision imposing the sentence of death, the jury shall then determine whether the penalty of life in prison without parole shall be imposed . . . . The penalty of life in prison without parole shall only be imposed if the jury determines that the sentence of life in prison without parole is appropriate.71 This statute classifies defendants into two categories—those eligible for a death sentence and those ineligible for a death sentence. And under the language of this statute, all defendants who are ineligible for a sentence of death are similarly situated and are treated equally—they are subject to a jury’s determination that either a sentence of life with parole or a sentence of life without the possibility of parole is the more appropriate sentence based on the jury’s evaluation of a particular case. Although it is true that two defendants who commit aggravated murder may receive different sentences from a jury, this is either because the defendants were not similarly situated (for example, one defendant committed a much more heinous crime) or the jury in the course of its deliberations finds it more “appropriate” to sentence one defendant to a more lenient or more severe penalty. ¶ 46 We conclude that the sentencing statute treats all similarly situated defendants the same and it does not contain any impermissible classifications. It subjects all defendants guilty of aggravated murder to a jury’s determination of what sentence is 70 Id. ¶ 35. 71 UTAH CODE § 76-3-207(5)(c) (2008). 19 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court most “appropriate” given the particular circumstances of each case. Mr. Houston’s argument accordingly fails. D. The Statute Is not Unconstitutionally Vague Under the Due Process Clause of the Utah or the United States Constitutions ¶ 47 Mr. Houston also argues that the sentencing statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process under the federal and state constitutions because it lacks clear standards to guide the jury in sentencing a defendant. Specifically, Mr. Houston claims that the sentencing statute only advises the jury to impose an LWOP sentence if “appropriate,” but it does not provide a standard of proof for aggravating factors, nor does it contain a standard for determining when LWOP is an “appropriate” sentence. He alleges that these deficiencies provided him with no notice as to whether pleading guilty would result in a life sentence with or without parole. Thus, he contends, the lack of standards created a “roll of the dice” as to which sentence he would receive. ¶ 48 We agree that, standing alone, the statutory directive that an LWOP sentence may be imposed if “appropriate” is troubling. The term “appropriate” contributes little or nothing to the solemn task in which it plays a central role. “Appropriate” is defined as “specially suitable” or “belonging peculiarly.” 72 But everyday experience may not equip a juror with the ability to determine when it is “specially suitable” to imprison a juvenile for the remainder of his life. Nonetheless, “we do not interpret the ‘plain meaning’ of a statutory term in isolation.” 73 Instead, we “determine the meaning of the text given the relevant context of the statute.” 74 The sentencing statute supplies guidance to the decision-maker by illustrating examples of aggravating and mitigating factors that should be considered in making this weighty decision. 75 For example, the statute specifically lists “the 72 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 106 (1961). 73 Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 12, 248 P.3d 465. 74 Id. 75 See UTAH CODE § 76-3-207(3), (4) (2008). 20 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court youth of the defendant at the time of the crime” as a mitigating factor to consider. 76 Moreover, the sentencing authority is free to consider “any other fact in mitigation of the penalty.”77 We conclude that this guidance sufficiently contextualizes the “appropriate” standard such that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. 78 E. Mr. Houston’s Sentence Does not Violate the Unnecessary Rigor Clause of the Utah Constitution ¶ 49 Mr. Houston also contends that his sentence violates Utah’s unnecessary rigor clause because “it constitutes unnecessary rigor to sentence a juvenile to die in prison with no hope of parole.” According to Mr. Houston, it is unconstitutional to impose the severe sentence of life without parole on a juvenile due to the immaturity, vulnerability, and undeveloped character associated with youth. 79 Mr. Houston argues that LWOP for juveniles is particularly rigorous because juveniles do not pose a 76 Id. § 76-3-207(4)(e). 77 Id. § 76-3-207(4)(g). 78 Moreover, the trial judge instructed the jurors that it was their “duty to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence in determining the appropriate penalty.” The judge listed several mitigating factors that may be considered in sentencing, including Mr. Houston’s youth and his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. The judge also emphasized that the jury “should not merely add up the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances or factors, or otherwise apply a mechanical rule” to their consideration of the evidence. And finally, the judge explained that the presumptive sentence was life with the possibility of parole and that the “burden rests upon the State to persuade [the jury] that a sentence of life in prison without parole [was] the appropriate sentence” to impose. 79 The concurrence argues that this is an as-applied challenge. Infra ¶ 128. But Mr. Houston does not claim that LWOP constitutes unnecessary rigor given the specifics of his case; he argues that LWOP is unnecessarily rigorous when applied to any juvenile offender, regardless of the facts of the crime. 21 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court great threat to public safety and are amenable to rehabilitation. Although some of these observations about the nature of youth are almost certainly true, they do not implicate the nature and purpose of the unnecessary rigor clause. ¶ 50 Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution provides that “[p]ersons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.” This clause protects arrested or imprisoned individuals from the infliction of treatment during their confinement that is incompatible with the values of a civilized society. 80 “The restriction on unnecessary rigor is focused on the circumstances and nature of the process and conditions of confinement,” not on “the sentence imposed.” 81 This provision is targeted at eliminating “unreasonably harsh, strict, or severe treatment” in prison such as “being unnecessarily exposed to an increased risk of serious harm.” 82 ¶ 51 We hold that the unnecessary rigor clause does not apply to Mr. Houston’s challenge. Mr. Houston does not object to the conditions of his confinement, but rather the length of the sentence imposed by statute. Although a defendant may challenge the length of his or her sentence as unconstitutional, this claim is more properly characterized as a cruel and unusual punishments claim and may not be brought under the unnecessary rigor clause. F. Mr. Houston’s Sentence Does not Violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Utah or the United States Constitution 1. Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the United States Constitution ¶ 52 Finally, Mr. Houston claims that sentencing a juvenile to LWOP violates the cruel and unusual punishments clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions. In support of his federal argument, Mr. Houston cites three recent United States Supreme Court cases: Graham v. Florida, holding that it is unconstitutional 80 State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 124, 322 P.3d 624. 81 Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 17, 184 P.3d 592. 82 Id. ¶ 19. 22 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court to sentence a juvenile to LWOP for a nonhomicide crime; 83 Roper v. Simmons, holding that it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to death; 84 and Miller v. Alabama, holding that it is unconstitutional to impose a mandatory LWOP sentence on a juvenile. 85 Mr. Houston argues that the particular characteristics of youth undermine the penological basis for imposing an LWOP sentence, and that LWOP for a juvenile therefore constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. ¶ 53 We recognize that there are unique characteristics of juveniles that distinguish them from adult offenders, and we conclude that Utah’s sentencing statute treats juveniles in a manner that accounts for these unique characteristics. For example, a juvenile cannot be sentenced to death, regardless of the offense committed. LWOP is neither a mandatory sentence nor the presumptive sentence under Utah’s sentencing statute. And the statute directs the sentencing authority to consider any relevant mitigating circumstances. We therefore hold that Utah Code section 76-3-207 is facially constitutional. We begin by addressing Mr. Houston’s claim under the United States Constitution and then turn to Mr. Houston’s argument under the Utah Constitution. ¶ 54 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 86 We have recognized that “[a] criminal punishment may be cruel and unusual when it is barbaric, excessive, or disproportional to the offense committed.” 87 Moreover, despite 83 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 84 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 85 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 86 The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is incorporated against the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962); State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 33 n.13, 993 P.2d 854. 87 State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Utah 1996) (footnote omitted) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983)). 23 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court an evolving analytical framework, the fundamental principle of the Eighth Amendment remains unchanged: “[C]riminal punishments are prohibited if they are excessive or contravene evolving standards of decency and human dignity.” 88 We also note, however, that sentencing statutes derive from a variety of often imprecise policy considerations. For this reason, we must accord “substantial deference . . . to the prerogatives of legislative power ‘in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.’” 89 For this reason, “absent a showing that a particular punishment is cruelly inhumane or disproportionate, we are not apt to substitute our judgment for that of the legislature regarding the wisdom of a particular punishment or of an entire sentencing scheme.” 90 ¶ 55 The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of LWOP for a juvenile convicted of homicide. 91 But the Court considered related questions in Graham, Roper, and Miller. We find those cases instructive and determine that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the imposition of LWOP for a juvenile homicide offender. ¶ 56 We deferred our consideration of Mr. Houston’s appeal while Miller v. Alabama was pending before the United States Supreme Court. 92 In Miller, two defendants who had committed unrelated murders at the age of fourteen challenged an Alabama 88 State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 76, 20 P.3d 342 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 89State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 290). 90 Mace, 921 P.2d at 1377–78 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 91 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (explicitly reserving ruling on this issue). 92 The parties provided supplemental briefing addressing the effects of the Miller decision on the instant case. 24 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court statute that mandated an LWOP sentence. 93 The Supreme Court announced its decision in 2012, holding that a sentencing scheme that mandates an LWOP sentence for a juvenile constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution.94 The Court explained that the Eighth Amendment requires individualized sentencing procedures for juveniles so that the sentencing authority may consider the mitigating circumstances inherent in youth. 95 Miller did not, however, categorically prohibit LWOP for juveniles. 96 The Court explained that it “[did] not foreclose a sentencer’s ability” to sentence a juvenile convicted of homicide to LWOP. 97 ¶ 57 In Miller, the Supreme Court grounded its decision in an analysis of proportionality. The Court reiterated “the basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense.” 98 This proportionality analysis implicated two lines of cases. The first involves “categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty.” 99 In that line of cases, the Court struck down the death penalty for nonhomicide offenders, 100 juveniles,101 and individuals with severe mental disabilities. 102 Using similar 93 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 94 Id. at 2469. 95 Id. at 2475 (“Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”). 96 Id. at 2469. 97 Id. Id. at 2463 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560) (internal quotation 98 marks omitted). 99 Id. 100 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 469 (2008). 101 Roper, 543 U.S. at 574–75. 102 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 25 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court reasoning, the Court prohibited LWOP for juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes. 103 The second line of cases addresses the mandatory imposition of sentences—in other words, sentencing schemes that leave the sentencing authority without power to consider the individual circumstances of the offense or the offender. 104 For example, the Court invalidated statutes prescribing a mandatory death penalty sentence. 105 The confluence of these two lines of precedent led the Miller Court to strike down Alabama’s mandatory sentencing scheme imposing LWOP. The Court held that, as applied to juveniles, the punishment was severe and Alabama’s statute did not allow for the consideration of possible mitigating factors. 106 Therefore, the Court concluded that mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles could not be sustained under the Eighth Amendment. 107 ¶ 58 Drawing from evidence in Graham and Roper, the Court explained that juveniles “are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” 108 This is because “juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,” and thus “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” 109 Roper and Graham identified three areas of “significant gaps” distinguishing juveniles from adults: First, children have a “lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” leading to recklessness, impulsivitity, and heedless risk-taking. Second, children “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and 103 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 104 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64. 105Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion). 106 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468–69. 107 Id. at 2475. 108 Id. at 2464. 109 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 26 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” 110 These conclusions were informed by science and social science research, including longitudinal studies and brain mapping.111 These decisions also recognized that “the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications” for punishment, particularly regarding rehabilitation and retribution. 112 ¶ 59 But despite this evidence about the characteristics of youth, the Supreme Court has nonetheless narrowly limited its decisions. In Graham, the Court applied its ban on LWOP for juveniles only where the underlying offense was a nonhomicide crime. 113 The Court distinguished homicide crimes from nonhomicide crimes on the basis of “both moral culpability and consequential harm.” 114 Similarly, Miller declined to adopt a categorical bar to LWOP for juveniles; instead, the Court foreclosed only mandatory LWOP sentences because such sentences “prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” 115 And the Court recognized that there could be “appropriate occasions” for imposing LWOP on a juvenile offender, rare as those circumstances may be. 116 Moreover, the Court explained that it did “not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to [impose LWOP] in homicide cases,” so long as the sentencer “take[s] into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a 110 Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70) (internal quotation marks omitted). 111 Id. at 2464–65, 2465 n.5. 112 Id. at 2465. 113 560 U.S. at 82. 114 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70). 115 Id. at 2466. 116 Id. at 2469. 27 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court lifetime in prison.” 117 Thus, though the penological justifications for LWOP may be diminished for a juvenile compared to an adult, such a sentence is not without justification in our criminal sentencing scheme. ¶ 60 We therefore agree with the Supreme Court and with the dissent 118 that juveniles represent a unique class warranting special considerations in sentencing. We believe that the unique characteristics of youth are accounted for, both by Utah law and through federal constitutional protections. We note again that juveniles are not eligible for the death penalty, regardless of the offense committed, under both Utah law 119 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper. 120 Similarly, state law 121 and federal precedent 122 prohibit LWOP for juveniles who commit a nonhomicide crime. And finally, as required by Miller, Utah’s sentencing statute does not impose a mandatory LWOP sentence on juveniles. 123 Instead, the statute provides a presumptive sentence of twenty years; LWOP may be imposed only if ten or more jurors agree it is appropriate.124 ¶ 61 Importantly, our statutory scheme enables the kind of individualized sentencing determination that the Supreme Court has deemed necessary for serious offenses. Utah Code section 76-3-207 permits the sentencer to consider any and all relevant factors which would affect the sentencing determination. The statute directs the sentencing authority to consider aggravating 117 Id. 118 Infra ¶ 258. 119 UTAH CODE § 76-5-202(3)(e). 120 543 U.S. 551. 121 See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 76-5-302(6) (removing the possibility of LWOP for juveniles charged with aggravated kidnapping); id. § 76-5-402(3)(b)(ii) (same for rape); id. § 76-5-405(b) (same for aggravated sexual assault). 122 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 123 UTAH CODE § 76-3-207(5)(c) (2008). 124 Id. 28 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court circumstances and mitigating factors, and it specifically provides a nonexhaustive list of each to aid the sentencer. 125 In fact, the statute specifically directs the sentencer to consider “the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.” 126 We thus conclude that the statute meets the “requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties,” 127 and places particular emphasis on youth as a mitigating factor. ¶ 62 We are not alone in this conclusion. The Supreme Court has explained that “[i]n considering categorical bars to . . . life without parole, we ask as part of the analysis whether objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice, show a national consensus against a sentence for a particular class of offenders.” 128 As the dissent notes, a great majority of states as well as the federal system permit LWOP sentences for juveniles. 129 As of 2010, thirty-nine states allowed such sentences 130 while only six jurisdictions affirmatively prohibited them. 131 In looking to these as an indication of society’s standards, we cannot conclude that the “national consensus” favors the prohibition of LWOP for juveniles convicted of homicide. ¶ 63 In sum, we conclude that imposing LWOP on a juvenile convicted of homicide does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. We therefore deny Mr. Houston’s challenge under the United States Constitution. 125 Id. § 76-3-207(3), (4). 126 Id. § 76-3-207(4)(e). 127 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 128 Id. at 2470 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 61; Roper, 543 U.S. at 563) (internal quotation marks omitted). 129 Infra ¶ 271. 130Brief for Petitioner, Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9647), 2012 WL 92506, at a (combined case with Miller v. Alabama). Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (Alaska, Colorado, Montana, Kansas, 131 Kentucky, and Texas). 29 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court 2. Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Utah Constitution ¶ 64 We next turn to article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that “cruel and unusual punishments [shall not] be inflicted.” In State v. Lafferty, we held that “[a] criminal punishment is cruel and unusual under article I, section 9 if it is so disproportionate to the offense committed that it shock[s] the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.” 132 The concurrence concludes that this determination merits no deference and should be repudiated because it is “an unworkable standard.” 133 We do not agree. The basic concept of article I, section 9 flows from the precept of justice that punishment should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense. Like the Supreme Court, we recognize that “[w]hile the State has the power to punish,” we must “assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” 134 Fines, imprisonment, and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime. 132 Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 73 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 133 Infra ¶ 138. The concurrence bases its argument “most fundamentally” on the fact that “no majority opinion of this court has ever employed a state standard of proportionality that is distinct from the federal standard.” Infra ¶ 142; see also infra ¶ 145 (arguing that because we have treated the state and federal standards as indistinguishable, there is “no independent significance [for] the state standard” and “thus no basis for stare decisis reliance”). We fail to see how this supports the view that our prior pronouncements warrant no respect. While we are certainly not required to adopt a federal interpretation for our state provision, we likewise are not forbidden from doing so. Our jurisprudence does not garner precedential weight if, and only if, we adopt a standard that diverges from federal practice. Such a view contradicts our long-standing practice of looking to federal interpretation for guidance. 134 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. 30 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court ¶ 65 Moreover, it would be inappropriate for us to deviate from our prior jurisprudence in the present case. Both the State and Mr. Houston have relied on the standard announced in Lafferty, and they have grounded their arguments in discussions of proportional punishment. The parties have not asked this court to consider the interpretation Justice Lee now advocates, and therefore the court does not have the benefit of adversarial briefing on the issue. As a general rule, we decline to rule or opine on issues that are not briefed by the parties. 135 We therefore find no reason to depart from the proportionality standard employed in Lafferty. 136 ¶ 66 Because we conclude that a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, we look to federal decisions as a guide in determining whether “a particular punishment is cruelly inhumane or disproportionate.”137 We therefore look to the 135See Utah Safe to Learn–Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ¶ 19, 94 P.3d 217 (“The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Utah 1984) (declining to consider the scope of a state constitutional provision when the issues were not briefed by the parties because they “deserve thorough treatment by counsel and careful consideration by the Court”); see also Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85, ¶ 18 n.4, 293 P.3d 259 (recognizing that it would be “imprudent to now resolve [an] extremely important issue without the benefit of adversarial briefing”); State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 57, 229 P.3d 650 (“[W]here the law . . . is unsettled and we are without the benefit of adversarial briefing on the subject, we would be ill-advised to resolve this case on that basis.”). 136 We also note that our conclusion that Mr. Houston’s sentence does not violate proportionality principles, see infra ¶¶ 66–67, ultimately renders a decision on which standard to apply unnecessary in this case. Mr. Houston’s challenge fails regardless of whether we apply the Lafferty proportionality analysis or Justice Lee’s more limited originalist approach, infra ¶ 210. 137 Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 74 (internal quotation marks omitted). 31 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court characteristics of juveniles that set them apart from adult offenders. We again acknowledge the unique characteristics of youth—its impetuosity, vulnerability to outside influence, and potential for change. 138 We also consider the penological goals of the sentence, recognizing that they may be diminished in the case of juveniles. 139 But we do not conclude that these circumstances render LWOP cruel and unusual for juveniles as a class. Under Utah law, this severe sentence is only permitted for the gravest of offenses and requires at least ten members of the jury to determine that, given the circumstances of the crime and the offender’s background, LWOP is appropriate. Moreover, we note that a majority of our sister states as well as the federal system permit LWOP for juveniles convicted of the most heinous crimes. 140 Applying a proportionality analysis, we conclude that the imposition of LWOP for juveniles convicted of homicide does not violate the Utah Constitution. ¶ 67 We reiterate the hope expressed by the Supreme Court that LWOP sentences for juveniles will be rare. 141 It is the most severe sentence a judge or jury can impose on a juvenile, and it should be carefully considered and reserved for only the most severe crimes and most incorrigible juvenile offenders. But where, as here, we find no constitutional violation, we may not “substitute our judgment for that of the legislature regarding the wisdom of a particular punishment.” 142 We therefore hold that Mr. Houston has not demonstrated that his LWOP sentence violates the cruel and unusual punishments clauses of either the Utah or United States Constitution. ¶ 68 Because we reject each of Mr. Houston’s constitutional challenges to his sentence of life without parole, we conclude that Mr. Houston has failed to demonstrate that his sentence was unconstitutional and therefore illegal under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e). 138 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 139 Id. at 2465. 140 Supra ¶ 62. 141 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 142 Mace, 921 P.2d at 1377–78. 32 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court
THAT HIS COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE ¶ 69 On appeal, Mr. Houston presents seven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during his sentencing proceeding. First, Mr. Houston argues that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to certain statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument, and alternatively that the trial court plainly erred in failing to intervene. Second, he contends that his counsel was ineffective in failing to find and call certain mitigation expert witnesses. Third, Mr. Houston claims that his counsel was deficient in conducting voir dire. Fourth, Mr. Houston argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a change of venue. Fifth, he claims his counsel was deficient for not objecting to certain testimony at the proceeding. Sixth, Mr. Houston contends that his counsel was deficient for not objecting to certain jury instructions. Finally, Mr. Houston argues that even if none of these errors alone is enough to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, the cumulative effect of the errors should nonetheless undermine our confidence in the result of his sentencing proceeding. We determine that Mr. Houston has not established that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. ¶ 70 The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution includes “the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” 143 In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court announced the two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 144 First, the defendant must show that “his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment.” 145 Second, the defendant must demonstrate “that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant.” 146 We have acknowledged “the 143 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 144 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 145 Id.; accord Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 38, 267 P.3d 232. 146 Archuleta, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 38 (internal quotation marks (con’t.) 33 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.” 147 As a result, “we must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”148 ¶ 71 With this framework in mind, we now address each of Mr. Houston’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. A. Mr. Houston Has Failed to Demonstrate that His Counsel Was Ineffective when Counsel Did not Object to the Prosecutor’s Closing Argument or that the Trial Court Plainly Erred by Failing to Intervene ¶ 72 Mr. Houston argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel failed to object to statements made in the closing argument. Alternatively, Mr. Houston contends that the trial court committed plain error for allowing the statements during closing argument. 149 Mr. Houston fails to make either showing. ¶ 73 During the sentencing proceeding, Mr. Houston’s expert neuropsychologist testified that another doctor had diagnosed Mr. Houston with a “conduct disorder” when he was an adolescent. On cross-examination, the prosecution asked the neuropsychologist if she, too, had concluded that Mr. Houston had a conduct disorder. The neuropsychologist explained that she did not conclude that Mr. Houston suffered from a conduct disorder because Mr. Houston was an adult when she evaluated him and “conduct disorder” is not an available diagnosis for an omitted). 147 Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 148State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, ¶ 25, 262 P.3d 1 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 149 Mr. Houston raises this argument under the plain error doctrine because he acknowledges that it was not preserved. See State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ¶ 18, 122 P.3d 566. 34 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court adult. The prosecutor then asked the neuropsychologist if she believed that Mr. Houston was “antisocial.” The neuropsychologist testified that Mr. Houston may show signs of being antisocial, but ultimately she did not conclude that he met the test for an antisocial diagnosis. The neuropsychologist also testified that she did not believe Mr. Houston suffered from psychopathy. In supporting her opinion, the neuropsychologist contrasted Mr. Houston with the well-known serial killer and psychopath Ted Bundy. ¶ 74 In closing argument, the prosecution emphasized the conduct disorder that Mr. Houston was diagnosed with as a child. Mr. Houston argues the State erroneously claimed that Mr. Houston still has the conduct disorder: I think it is important that you look at [the conduct disorder] diagnosis, because what does it say? That diagnosis says, yeah, [Mr. Houston] has depression, but he has a conduct disorder. That means he’s a violent character. He’s a criminal. And they had to take that into consideration as they dealt with him. Then the prosecution challenged the neuropsychologist’s conclusion that Mr. Houston did not suffer from antisocial behavior as an adult: [The defense] expert didn’t even look at [the conduct disorder] as antisocial behavior, . . . didn’t even say that it was [antisocial] despite the fact that [Mr. Houston] had committed three violent acts. ¶ 75 Mr. Houston argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these statements. According to Mr. Houston, the State’s closing argument was “incorrect and inflammatory” because the State “effectively argued—with no basis in the record whatsoever—that [Mr.] Houston is antisocial pathologic, incurably violent.” By not objecting, moving to strike, or in any way addressing these statements, Mr. Houston contends that counsel left the jury “free to equate [Mr.] Houston with Ted Bundy.” We disagree with Mr. Houston’s characterization and conclusions. ¶ 76 First, Mr. Houston’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance when he did not object to the prosecutor’s statements. We have recognized that “[c]ounsel for both sides have 35 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court considerable latitude in their closing arguments. They have the right to fully discuss from their perspectives the evidence and all inferences and deductions it supports.”150 Moreover, “[a] prosecutor has the duty and right to argue the case based on the total picture shown by the evidence.” 151 When we review an attorney’s failure to object to a prosecutor’s statements during closing argument, the question is “not whether the prosecutor’s comments were proper, but whether they were so improper that counsel’s only defensible choice was to interrupt those comments with an objection.” 152 Here, we conclude that the prosecutor appropriately exercised his discretion to emphasize Mr. Houston’s childhood diagnosis of conduct disorder, and to challenge the defense expert’s conclusion that Mr. Houston did not suffer from an antisocial behavior disorder as an adult. The record contained evidence that Mr. Houston was a violent offender and had extensive history with the criminal justice system. The prosecutor was free to draw on this record evidence and question the conclusions of Mr. Houston’s expert. The jury was informed that what lawyers “say during their closing arguments is not evidence” and that the members of the jury should rely “on [their] memory of the evidence” in reaching a sentencing decision. None of the prosecutor’s statements were so inflammatory that “counsel’s only defensible choice was to interrupt those comments with an objection.” 153 ¶ 77 We also disagree that the court plainly erred when it did not address the prosecutor’s statements. We do not impose a duty on the courts “to constantly survey or second-guess the nonobjecting party’s best interests or trial strategy.”154 As stated above, the prosecutor was free to emphasize Mr. Houston’s past 150 State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). 151 State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1291 (Utah 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). 152Bussard v. Lockhart, 32 F.3d 322, 324 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). 153 Id. 154 State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996). 36 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court diagnosis. The prosecutor was also free to challenge the defense expert’s conclusion that Mr. Houston was not antisocial. ¶ 78 Because we determine that neither Mr. Houston’s counsel nor the trial judge had an obligation to object to the State’s closing argument, we conclude that Mr. Houston has failed to meet his burden to show that the prosecutor’s statements necessitate reversal. B. Mr. Houston Has Failed to Show that His Counsel Was Ineffective in Selecting and Presenting Expert Witnesses ¶ 79 Mr. Houston’s second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel concerns his attorney’s selection and presentation of expert witnesses relevant to Mr. Houston’s mitigation defense. Specifically, Mr. Houston claims that his counsel was ineffective in “failing to retain experts qualified to (1) tell the jury why youth is a mitigating factor, (2) rebut self-serving testimony about the supervision provided at YHA, which fatally undermined counsel’s primary theory, and (3) testify as to risk mitigation and rebut the state’s future dangerousness theme.” ¶ 80 “[C]ounsel’s decision to call or not to call an expert witness is a matter of trial strategy, which will not be questioned and viewed as ineffectiveness unless there is no reasonable basis for that decision.” 155 Thus, to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective in retaining and presenting expert witnesses, Mr. Houston must “rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, [counsel’s] action might be considered sound trial strategy.” 156 This is because there are “countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case,” and “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” 157 ¶ 81 At the sentencing proceeding, Mr. Houston’s counsel called a forensic neuropsychologist to testify about Mr. Houston’s mental and emotional development. She explained to the jury 155 State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1993). 156Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ¶ 73, 156 P.3d 739 (internal quotation marks omitted). 157 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 37 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court that there were available treatments to help Mr. Houston confront his mental and emotional issues and to stop his violent reactions to his life circumstances. Our review of the record demonstrates that Mr. Houston’s counsel did not act unreasonably in calling this qualified expert witness or in declining to call any additional expert witnesses on the same issue. 1. Mr. Houston Has Failed to Demonstrate that His Counsel Was Ineffective for not Calling a Human Development Expert ¶ 82 Mr. Houston first argues that his counsel should have called a “human development” expert to testify about the effects of youth on the decision-making process. While such testimony may have been helpful to Mr. Houston’s defense, we conclude that this testimony was not required, and it certainly was not ineffective for Mr. Houston’s counsel not to retain an expert on this topic. ¶ 83 We have stated before that expert testimony is most helpful to explain topics that are “beyond the common knowledge of ordinary jurors.”158 Mr. Houston’s counsel could have reasonably concluded that the jurors would understand from life experience that a seventeen-year-old’s decision-making is not as reasoned as that of an adult. Moreover, throughout the sentencing procedure, Mr. Houston’s counsel emphasized his youth in a manner that fell within the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Therefore, it was not essential for counsel to retain an expert on this issue. 2. Mr. Houston Has Failed to Demonstrate that His Counsel Was Ineffective in Deciding not to Call an Expert to Testify About YHA’s Failure to Treat and Supervise Mr. Houston ¶ 84 Mr. Houston next argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to call an expert to testify that YHA’s failure to properly treat and supervise Mr. Houston was the proximate cause of R.E.’s murder. Mr. Houston argues that the result of his sentencing proceeding would have been different had his counsel called an expert to testify that had “YHA followed industry standards, or enforced its own policies, the crime would not have 158 State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶ 32, 223 P.3d 1103. 38 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court occurred.” Our review of the record indicates that this claim fails for two reasons. ¶ 85 First, like Mr. Houston’s prior claim, no expert was needed to present to the jury facts related to YHA’s deficient treatment and supervision of Mr. Houston because such facts were not beyond the common knowledge of the jurors. During the proceeding, defense counsel successfully elicited this information through questioning of the YHA staff members as well as Mr. Houston’s case worker. 159 For example, the jury heard evidence that YHA did not realize that Mr. Houston was skipping school; that Mr. Houston was engaged in sexual activity that may have resulted in his girlfriend’s pregnancy; that Mr. Houston’s therapist told YHA that she could not contact Mr. Houston for several months; and that Mr. Houston’s mother was upset with the lack of communication from YHA. Thus, the jury was in a position to consider evidence of YHA’s lack of supervision and treatment. ¶ 86 Second, given that testimony concerning YHA’s treatment and supervision was already introduced at the proceeding, it is difficult for us to see how Mr. Houston’s counsel’s decision not to present expert testimony on this issue was unreasonable. Our review of the record demonstrates that counsel’s decision not to seek an expert on this issue was the result of a strategic move consistent with the defense’s theory that Mr. Houston deserved mercy in sentencing for having pleaded guilty and accepting responsibility for his own actions. Presenting an expert to blame Mr. Houston’s crime on the YHA staff would have contradicted this theory. 160 We therefore conclude that Mr. Houston has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel regarding this issue. 159 See State v. Walker, 2010 UT App 157, ¶ 16, 235 P.3d 766 (noting expert testimony is not critical when same information can be elicited on cross-examination). 160 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting that to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 39 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court 3. Mr. Houston Has Failed to Demonstrate that His Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Call a Different Risk Mitigation Expert ¶ 87 Mr. Houston also argues that his counsel should have called a different expert to address risk mitigation because the expert that Mr. Houston’s counsel called was not sufficiently qualified to address these issues. Mr. Houston argues that had this testimony been presented to the jury, it would have made a difference in the outcome of his case because it would have rebutted the State’s “powerful future dangerousness” argument. Again, we disagree. ¶ 88 Our review of the record indicates that the expert Mr. Houston’s counsel called was a licensed neuropsychologist with extensive experience in evaluating criminal defendants. She has a bachelor’s degree in psychology and biology, and master’s and doctoral degrees and postdoctoral training in neurobiology. She has evaluated criminal defendants since 1987, and has treated individuals with obsessive disorders and sexual dysfunctions since 1979. This experience indicates that the neuropsychologist was fully qualified to testify as an expert in this case. Mr. Houston has failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s decision to call and rely on her testimony was unreasonable. ¶ 89 Mr. Houston has also failed to demonstrate that the neuropsychologist’s performance was anything but thorough and competent. The record indicates that the neuropsychologist testified extensively about Mr. Houston’s troubled background and the impact it had on his mental health. Although she testified that Mr. Houston was troubled, she also testified that current medications could treat his disorders and could “really make a difference” in his mental and behavioral health. The neuropsychologist also described in detail how Mr. Houston could benefit from cognitive behavioral therapy and how this type of therapy could help him to develop skills to stop his violent thoughts and reactions. We thus conclude that the neuropsychologist adequately addressed the issue of risk mitigation and Mr. Houston’s future dangerousness, and it was not unreasonable for Mr. Houston’s counsel to rely on her testimony as sufficient. ¶ 90 At its core, we conclude that Mr. Houston’s expert testimony claims are merely an assertion that appellate counsel would have called and retained different experts than those trial 40 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court counsel decided to present to the jury. But we “will not review counsel’s tactical decisions simply because another lawyer, e.g., appellate counsel, would have taken a different course.”161 Mr. Houston’s counsel relied on a common understanding of youth and an expert’s opinion of Mr. Houston’s mental condition instead of calling an expert to explain general development in youth. And his counsel properly questioned YHA staff members to introduce evidence of its inadequate supervision instead of calling an expert to criticize it. These strategic decisions were not deficient and did not deprive Mr. Houston of his constitutional right to counsel. We therefore conclude that Mr. Houston has failed to prevail on any of his claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in seeking, retaining, and presenting expert testimony at the sentencing proceeding. C. Mr. Houston Has Failed to Show His Counsel Was Ineffective During Voir Dire Questioning ¶ 91 Mr. Houston’s next ineffective assistance of counsel claim centers on his counsel’s questioning during the initial juror interviews. Mr. Houston contends that his “[c]ounsel displayed a remarkable ignorance of the law, and rendered extraordinarily ineffective assistance when, during initial juror interviews, [counsel] surrendered the presumption favoring [a sentence of] life with parole.” Specifically, Mr. Houston argues that by asking the jurors if they could “equally” consider imposing a sentence of life with parole and life without parole, Mr. Houston’s counsel abandoned the directive that a juror should sentence a defendant to life with parole unless the State demonstrates that a sentence of life in prison without parole is more appropriate given the defendant’s particular case. According to Mr. Houston, by failing to emphasize the favorable sentencing presumption, “the jurors were free to vote for life without parole based upon any inclination, no matter how slight,” and “this certainly undermines confidence in the result.” We disagree. ¶ 92 We recognize the importance of voir dire questioning as “essential to choosing an impartial jury, and an impartial jury is as 161Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 524 (Utah 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 41 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court essential to a fair trial as is an impartial judge.” 162 Indeed, “[v]oir dire is intended to provide a tool for counsel . . . to carefully and skillfully determine, by inquiry, whether biases and prejudices, latent as well as acknowledged, will interfere with a fair trial if a particular juror serves in it.” 163 While the jury selection process is of great importance, there are many ways to effectively question jurors, and there “are a multitude of inherently subjective factors typically constituting the sum and substance of an attorney’s judgments about prospective jurors.”164 Given that “jury selection is more art than science,” 165 “trial counsel should be given considerable latitude in asking voir dire questions, especially in view of the fact that only counsel will, at the beginning, have a clear overview of the entire case and the type of evidence to be adduced.” 166 Thus, when reviewing an attorney’s questioning and decision to keep or remove a particular juror, we must presume that counsel’s choices were objectively reasonable, “the product of a conscious choice or preference,” and “constitute effective representation.” 167 Mr. Houston has failed to rebut this presumption. ¶ 93 First, Mr. Houston has failed to show that there was anything unreasonable about his counsel’s questioning of the jurors. During voir dire, Mr. Houston’s counsel actively participated and asked the jurors a series of questions to probe their ability to serve as impartial jurors. These questions included whether the individuals could consider the life with parole and life without parole sentences equally, and whether they thought one sentence was too severe or one was too lenient. Our review of the record demonstrates that all of the jurors selected expressed openness to imposing either sentence presented to them and that they were committed to hearing all the evidence before making a 162 State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 33, 992 P.2d 951. 163 Id. ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 164 State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 21, 12 P.3d 92. 165 Id. 166Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 167 Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 20. 42 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court decision. 168 And the excerpts cited by Mr. Houston in his brief only bolster this conclusion. We determine that this openness does not mean the jurors were unable or unwilling to impose the presumptive sentence of life with parole, it simply indicates their ability and willingness to serve impartially. ¶ 94 Second, we conclude that any confusion that may have resulted from Mr. Houston’s counsel’s questions to the jurors was cured by the trial court’s jury instruction to apply a presumption of life with parole, and by counsel’s closing argument, which also emphasized this directive. Immediately before conducting individual jury voir dire, the trial court advised the prospective jurors that the law favored a sentence of life with parole over life without parole: The jury will be presented with evidence for and against a penalty of life in prison without parole. It is presumed that an indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 years and which may be for life will be imposed upon the defendant unless the State persuades you that a penalty of life in prison without parole is the appropriate sentence in this case. ¶ 95 During closing argument, Mr. Houston’s counsel reminded the jury that the presumptive sentence was life with parole and that the State bore the burden of persuading the jury that life without parole was the appropriate sentence. Finally, at 168For example, when Mr. Houston’s counsel asked one juror whether life without parole was too severe, or if she felt life with parole was too light, she responded, “Depends on what you guys present in front of us.” In response to a similar question, another juror responded, “I think you have to learn what the circumstances are. You know, you really can’t judge the person unless you hear all the details.” Other jurors explained that they would consider either sentence appropriate “depending on the circumstances,” or “depending on what we hear” about the evidence. Similarly, other jurors noted that they were willing to consider “either [sentence] fairly” and that before the evidence was presented they “couldn’t say one way or the other right now.” 43 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, the court instructed the jury that “[t]he penalty of life without parole should only be imposed if the jury determines that such a sentence is appropriate” and that the “burden rests upon the State to persuade [the jury] that a sentence of life in prison without parole is the appropriate sentence in this case.” We are convinced that these instructions and reminders from counsel and the court were sufficient to cure any misperceptions that may have been created during Mr. Houston’s counsel’s voir dire questioning. 169 Having concluded that Mr. Houston’s counsel did not act unreasonably during voir dire questioning and that Mr. Houston has failed to show any prejudice from his performance, we reject this ineffective assistance of counsel claim. D. Mr. Houston Has Failed to Show His Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance by Failing to Seek a Change of Venue ¶ 96 Mr. Houston claims that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to seek a change of venue, or to “even conduct a venue analysis” in Mr. Houston’s case. Specifically, Mr. Houston contends that the negative pretrial media attention surrounding his case—including reports of gruesome details about the crime, sympathetic stories about the victim and her family, and “community outcry” against violent sex offenders—made it impossible for Mr. Houston to have a fair proceeding in Davis County. We disagree. ¶ 97 Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, a defendant who “believes that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending” may “ask to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.” 170 Whether counsel should seek a change of venue is a question that must be evaluated under the “totality of the circumstances.” 171 Relevant considerations may include “(1) the standing of the victim and the accused in the community; (2) the size of the community; (3) the 169See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994) (noting that an appellate court will “generally presume that a jury will follow the instructions given [to] it”). 170 UTAH R. CRIM. P. 29(d)(1). 171 State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1989). 44 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court nature and gravity of the offense; and (4) the nature and extent of publicity.” 172 However, recognizing the benefits of hindsight, in posttrial evaluation “the determinative question is whether [the] defendant was ultimately tried by a fair and impartial jury.”173 This is because “pretrial publicity—even pervasive, adverse publicity—does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.” 174 And when a defendant challenges counsel’s decision to seek a change of venue, the defendant must show that the pretrial media coverage was so prejudicial that it was objectively unreasonable for his counsel not to seek a change in venue. 175 Mr. Houston has not made this showing. ¶ 98 Counsel selected twelve jurors and two alternates. The record demonstrates that five of the jurors selected had no knowledge of Mr. Houston and were not exposed to any information about the crimes committed. Of the nine jurors who had heard of the crime, seven indicated that they had not formed an opinion about what Mr. Houston’s punishment should be, and two indicated that they had formed opinions. However, subsequent explanations from those two jurors revealed that they had only formed an opinion about Mr. Houston’s guilt—an issue that, because of Mr. Houston’s plea, was not in dispute. Those jurors thus had not predetermined what Mr. Houston’s punishment should be, only that some form of punishment was appropriate. Both jurors indicated that they could rely on the evidence to determine the appropriate sentence and would be fair and impartial in their decision-making. 176 Moreover, 172 Id. 173Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, ¶ 42, 175 P.3d 530 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 174Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1111 (Utah 1983) (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 175 See Archuleta, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 38 (stating that a defendant must show both objectively deficient performance and prejudice to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). 176 During voir dire, one of the two jurors explained that she did not really understand the question because she did not realize until later that Mr. Houston had pleaded guilty. She stated that (con’t.) 45 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court Mr. Houston’s counsel asked detailed questions of all the jurors, and the jurors’ voir dire answers demonstrated that they could be fair and impartial despite their exposure to any pretrial publicity. ¶ 99 Although Mr. Houston referenced several graphic and detailed newspaper articles about his case, he has failed to identify anything in the record that supports his claim that this pretrial coverage resulted in a biased juror or jury. While it may have been prudent for Mr. Houston’s attorney to seek a change of venue due to the small community and concentrated media attention surrounding Mr. Houston’s case, Mr. Houston’s claim that this pretrial publicity affected his sentence is speculative at best. Because Mr. Houston has not shown that it was objectively unreasonable not to seek a change of venue or that counsel’s decision resulted in an unfair sentencing proceeding, we conclude that this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. E. Mr. Houston Has Failed to Demonstrate that Counsel Was Ineffective for not Objecting to Testimony From a Department of Corrections Officer that Mr. Houston Could Be Paroled Before Serving at Least Twenty Years in Prison ¶ 100 Mr. Houston next argues that his counsel was ineffective when he failed to object, move to strike, or seek a curative instruction to address the testimony from John Ford, an assistant director with the Utah Department of Corrections. Mr. Ford testified that if Mr. Houston was sentenced to life with parole, there was a chance that Mr. Houston could be released before serving at least a twenty-year prison term. ¶ 101 During the sentencing proceeding, Mr. Houston’s counsel called Mr. Ford to testify about Utah’s sentencing system and to explain to the jury the different treatment afforded inmates sentenced to life with parole and life without parole. Mr. Ford also explained that when an individual is sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, it is for an indeterminate term, meaning she did not have any opinion about what his sentence should be because “you have to learn what the circumstances are. . . . [Y]ou can’t judge the person unless you hear all the details.” The other juror explained that she had not formed an opinion because “I haven’t heard . . . enough to.” She also stated that she could fairly consider either sentencing option. 46 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court that after a period of time the Board of Pardons and Parole would hold a hearing to determine when an individual might be paroled. The Board of Pardons would also schedule a future hearing to revisit this determination. ¶ 102 On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Mr. Ford whether the Board of Pardons could release Mr. Houston before he served twenty years in prison if the jury chose to sentence him to life with parole. Mr. Ford responded, “I don’t think [the Board of Pardons] would ever consider doing that. Unless there’s a medical [emergency] or unless [the defendant] is no longer a threat.” After this comment, the prosecutor and Mr. Ford had the following exchange: PROSECUTOR: So generally speaking, you would anticipate the person serve at least 20 years? MR. FORD: At least that and most likely it would be much more than that. PROSECUTOR: But it’s not a guarantee, clearly, because the Board of Pardons has great power? MR. FORD: Yes. ¶ 103 To emphasize the unlikelihood of a release from prison before Mr. Houston served at least twenty years, Mr. Houston’s counsel asked on redirect: “It was asked whether or not I guess in theory somebody could be released prior to 20 years. In theory that’s possible, but not likely?” Mr. Ford responded, “Not likely.” Mr. Houston’s counsel then asked, “Especially where you need a three-person majority [of the Board of Pardons] and you indicated that it’s most likely that the person will spend much more than the 20 years in prison?” Mr. Ford responded, “That’s correct.” ¶ 104 Mr. Houston argues that counsel was ineffective in responding to Mr. Ford’s testimony. Specifically, Mr. Houston argues that counsel should have objected during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Mr. Ford, and that by bringing the issue back up on redirect, counsel only reinforced to the jury that Mr. Houston’s early release was a viable possibility. We find nothing ineffective or prejudicial about Mr. Houston’s counsel’s response to Mr. Ford’s testimony. 47 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court ¶ 105 A formal objection and request for a curative instruction is not the only objectively reasonable response to unexpected or unfavorable testimony. 177 As stated before, there are a variety of ways to competently represent a criminal defendant, and no one method is required for effective representation. 178 Instead of objecting to the prosecutor’s line of questioning, Mr. Houston’s counsel decided to clarify on redirect and emphasize to the jury that the likelihood that Mr. Houston would be released early was extremely limited. When we consider this decision in light of the presumption of competence, we must conclude that Mr. Houston’s counsel was not ineffective and that his decision to emphasize the limited chance of early release on redirect “was the result of conscious trial strategy.” 179 ¶ 106 We further conclude that Mr. Houston has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from his attorney’s response to Mr. Ford’s testimony. Before sentencing, the judge instructed the jury to disregard any testimony about possible early release: “[Y]ou are not to take into account any actions the Board of Pardons and Parole might take in the future. Future decisions of the Board are merely speculative and are irrelevant to a jury’s determination of an appropriate sentence.” This instruction assures us that any improper weight that the jury may have assigned to this line of questioning was properly addressed and cured by the trial judge. 180 177 See State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989) (concluding trial counsel’s decision not to object to unfavorable testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). 178 See Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. 179 Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160. 180 See State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ¶ 50, 27 P.3d 1115 (holding that a jury instruction cured any prejudice that may have resulted from the admission of improper testimony); see also Menzies, 889 P.2d at 401 (noting that an appellate court presumes that the jury follows its given instructions). 48 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court F. Mr. Houston Has Failed to Demonstrate that His Counsel Was Ineffective for not Objecting to the Alleged Double Counting of an Aggravating Factor in the Jury Instructions ¶ 107 Mr. Houston’s next ineffective assistance of counsel argument stems from his counsel’s failure to object to a series of jury instructions. Mr. Houston claims that by not objecting to these instructions, counsel allowed the jury to engage in an improper double counting of aggravating factors during sentencing. We disagree. ¶ 108 Jury instruction number 13 states in relevant part: During the sentencing proceeding, aggravating and mitigating evidence was presented to you with respect to the penalty to be imposed. You are instructed that the terms “aggravating circumstances,” “aggravating factors,” and “aggravating evidence,” used interchangeably, refer to evidence tending to show that the penalty of life without parole is appropriate. Jury instruction number 14 states that “[t]he fact that [Mr. Houston] has pled guilty to the crime of Aggravated Murder is not an aggravating circumstance. . . . However, you may consider as aggravating circumstances the matters that were presented as aggravating circumstances in the charge against the defendant.” And finally, jury instruction number 15 lists “rape” and “aggravated sexual assault” as two possible aggravating circumstances the jury could consider. “Aggravated sexual assault” is defined as when an individual “in the course of a rape . . . , causes bodily injury to the victim or uses or threatens the victim with the use of a dangerous weapon, such as a knife.” Mr. Houston argues that these instructions created overlapping aggravating factors that skewed the weighing process in the minds of the jurors. ¶ 109 During the sentencing proceeding, the judge told the jury that it may find an aggravating circumstance if it concluded that “[Mr. Houston] intentionally or knowingly caused the death of [the victim] while . . . engaged in the submission of or an attempt to commit rape or aggravated sexual assault.” The judge’s instructions made clear that Mr. Houston was charged with and pleaded guilty to aggravated murder because he committed either rape or aggravated sexual assault, but not both. 49 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court These aggravating factors were read to the jury in the alternative, and thus, the jury could find the presence of an aggravating circumstance if it concluded that either rape or sexual assault occurred. The instruction did not direct the jury to count these as separate aggravating factors, and thus, Mr. Houston’s counsel did not err by not objecting to these instructions. ¶ 110 We further conclude that even if there was some confusion surrounding aggravating circumstances in the jury instructions, any confusion did not prejudice Mr. Houston because the jury was instructed to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances not in terms of numbers, but rather in terms of “how compelling or persuasive the evidence is when deciding an appropriate sentence.” To emphasize the directive that the jury should not merely count up the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court stated that “any aggravating factor, standing alone, could be more persuasive than some or all of the mitigating factors in the case. On the other hand, one mitigating factor, standing alone, could be more persuasive than some or all of the aggravating factors.” Therefore, even if Mr. Houston is correct in his assertion that the jurors counted the rape and sexual assault as two separate aggravating factors rather than finding the presence of one or the other, the jurors’ ultimate decision was still based on what they found most compelling or persuasive considering the totality of the circumstances, not the mere number of aggravating factors present in the case. And in evaluating Mr. Houston’s claim of prejudice, we must proceed “on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.” 181 We therefore conclude that Mr. Houston has failed to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient or that any deficiency caused him prejudice. G. Mr. Houston Has not Demonstrated Cumulative Error that Undermines Our Confidence in His Sentence ¶ 111 Finally, Mr. Houston argues that we should reverse his sentence under the cumulative error doctrine because the ineffectiveness of counsel alleged above should undermine our 181 Parsons, 871 P.2d at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted). 50 Cite as: 2015 UT 40 Opinion of the Court confidence in the sentence. To evaluate a cumulative error claim, “we consider all the identified errors, as well as any errors we assume may have occurred.” 182 However, “[i]f the claims are found on appeal to not constitute error, or the errors are found to be so minor as to result in no harm, the doctrine will not be applied.” 183 Because we find that each of Mr. Houston’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims fails, our confidence in the fairness of his sentence is not undermined. Therefore, we find no cumulative error.