Opinion ID: 415604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admissibility of the prior convictions

Text: 100 The remaining question is whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the prior convictions of Lipscomb, Smith, Green, and Little. We conclude that all of the convictions were properly admitted.
101
102 As an initial matter, we must determine whether Lipscomb has properly preserved his objection to the district court's ruling. Lipscomb did not formally establish on the record that he would have testified at the second trial if the court had excluded his prior robbery conviction. The government therefore argues that Lipscomb waived any objection to use of the conviction to impeach his testimony. 70 We disagree. 103 We have previously assumed without explicitly stating that a defendant does not need to state that he would testify if his prior conviction were excluded in order to appeal a ruling that the conviction is admissible. Jackson, 627 F.2d at 1210; United States v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 779 (D.C.Cir.1978); Smith, 551 F.2d at 356. Most other circuits agree. See, e.g., United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 352 (1st Cir.1981) (explicit); United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1087 & n. 3 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 2335, 68 L.Ed.2d 854 (1981). 71 The government, however, urges us to follow United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir.1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034, 100 S.Ct. 706, 62 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980), which holds that a defendant must establish on the record that he will in fact take the stand and testify if his challenged prior convictions are excluded. 72 We find persuasive the reasoning in Kiendra and Fountain and hold that when a defendant requests an advance ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction, and later decides not to testify, the ruling is reviewable on appeal. 104 First, when a defendant seeks an advance ruling on admission of a prior conviction, it is reasonable to presume that the ruling will be an important factor in his decision whether to testify. See Kiendra, 663 F.2d at 352. 73 Second, advance rulings on admissibility are preferable because [c]ounsel need to know what the ruling will be on this important matter so that they can make appropriate tactical decisions. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 609, at 609-82 (1981), quoted in Jackson, 627 F.2d at 1209. To limit review of advance rulings would undercut the value of such rulings. See Kiendra, 663 F.2d at 352-53. Third, and most important, the Cook rule will probably serve merely as a trap for unwary defendants or defense counsel. Under the Cook approach, a knowledgeable defendant has a strong incentive to state before trial his intent to testify if the prior conviction is excluded. The defendant incurs no risk by doing so, because even if the court excludes the conviction, he can later decide not to testify without penalty. See Fountain, 642 F.2d at 1087 n. 3 (requiring defendants to disclose their intent to testify may amount to nothing more than a pro forma requirement which can only penalize ... unsophisticated defendants).
105 Lipscomb argues that he was never convicted of robbery within the meaning of Rule 609 because he pled nolo contendere while maintaining his innocence pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). 74 We reject this argument. 106 First, Lipscomb did not plead nolo; rather, like the defendant in Alford, he pled guilty while maintaining his innocence. Moreover, even if an Alford plea is somehow analogous to a nolo plea, the legislative history makes it clear that a nolo plea results in a conviction. An early Advisory Committee draft of Rule 609 permitted the district court to admit evidence that [a witness] has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere. 75 The exception for nolo pleas was deleted from the Advisory Committee's final draft and did not reappear. We must presume that Congress knew about and approved the deletion. 107 Second, we concluded in part III that the district court has discretion whether or not to inquire into background facts and circumstances such as the exact nature of a plea. It is implausible that Congress intended to make determinative a fact that the court may never learn about. Third, we see no policy reason why the government can impeach a defendant who does not admit guilt, goes to trial, and is convicted, but cannot impeach a defendant who does not admit guilt but concedes that he will be convicted if he goes to trial and therefore makes an Alford plea. 108 We hold therefore that an Alford plea, like a nolo plea, does not preclude subsequent use of a conviction under Rule 609. Accord United States v. Williams, 642 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.1981) (nolo plea).
109 The district court explicitly ruled that the probativeness of Lipscomb's prior robbery conviction outweighed the prejudice to him. It also partially complied with our request in Smith, 551 F.2d at 357 n. 17, and Crawford, 613 F.2d at 1050, for some indication of the reasons for the finding, explaining that credibility was important to Lipscomb's defense and that someone desperate enough to rob someone is also desperate enough to lie on the witness stand. 76 110 A fuller explanation of the district court's reasoning, including some discussion of prejudicial effect, would have been desirable. Nevertheless, we hold that its decision to admit Lipscomb's prior conviction was not an abuse of discretion. See Jackson, 627 F.2d at 1208-09 (explicit finding of admissibility ... [is not] an absolute requirement the nonperformance of which mandates reversal). 77 Robbery is generally less probative than crimes that involve deception or stealth. But it does involve theft and is a serious crime that shows conscious disregard for the rights of others. Such conduct reflects more strongly on credibility than, say, crimes of impulse, or simple narcotics or weapons possession. 78 The age of the conviction (eight years ago) and Lipscomb's age when it was committed (16) reduce the probativeness of the conviction. On the other hand, credibility was central to the trial, and prejudice was not especially great because the previous crime was not similar to the present one. Cf. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940 (convictions which are for the same crime should be admitted sparingly).
111 Any possible doubt on the propriety of admitting Lipscomb's prior robbery conviction is eliminated by the underlying facts that were submitted to the district court after the close of trial. This additional information shows that Lipscomb, although convicted eight years ago, had been released from prison only a year-and-a-half ago, and was a repeat offender with a more recent burglary conviction which the government had not proffered to impeach his credibility. 79 This subsequent conviction enhances the probativeness of Lipscomb's earlier robbery conviction because it shows that the robbery was not merely an isolated criminal episode from which Lipscomb has since been rehabilitated. Cf. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940 (subsequent legally blameless life affects probativeness of prior conviction). 112 Lipscomb objects to use of this additional evidence because (1) late submission of evidence should be discouraged and (2) defense counsel could have used the evidence to rehabilitate him. 80 The first point is well-taken, and in the future, we expect the government to respond promptly to the district court's request for background facts and circumstances. In this case, however, we are unwilling to punish the government for its good faith belief that it did not have to submit such information. Moreover, even if the district court had misapplied Rule 609(a)(1) at trial, we would not immediately order a new trial but would instead remand to the district court to reconsider whether the prior conviction should have been admitted. See, e.g., Crawford, 613 F.2d at 1053; Smith, 551 F.2d at 366 (both following this approach). The district court would then almost certainly reaffirm its ruling, based on all the evidence, that the convictions were properly admitted. We decline to engage in such a pointless remand. 113 The second point is specious. Defense counsel could have readily obtained the information himself by asking his client a few questions. Moreover, Lipscomb does not explain, and we cannot see, how defense counsel could have used information on Lipscomb's extensive criminal record to rehabilitate him. 81
114 We also find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to permit Little to be impeached by a five-year-old armed robbery conviction. Little's conviction, like Lipscomb's robbery conviction, involves theft and indicates a conscious disregard for the rights of others. In addition, Little was an eyewitness to the arrest; thus, his credibility was important. Moreover, there was presumably less prejudice to Lipscomb from admission of Little's conviction than from the admission of Lipscomb's own conviction.
115 Smith's one-year-old conviction for armed robbery was also properly admitted into evidence. As to probativeness, the conviction was recent, involved theft, and was for a serious crime. Also, Smith's credibility was important because he corroborated Lipscomb's story that Smith had borrowed Lipscomb's car earlier in the week and that on the day of the arrest, Lipscomb had driven Smith to Smith's mother's house, dropped off his girlfriend at her house, and was returning to pick up Smith to take him home when he was arrested. Moreover, prejudice to Lipscomb due to possible guilt by association does not seem especially severe.
116 For Green, as for Smith and Little, credibility was important (Green was an eyewitness to the arrest) and prejudice to the defendant was relatively low. Nevertheless, the district court's decision to admit Green's five-year-old conviction for accessory after the fact to manslaughter is troubling for two reasons. First, one cannot determine much about the degree of probativeness of a conviction for accessory after the fact to manslaughter from the name of the crime. Such a conviction could mean merely that an otherwise law-abiding person had sheltered a close friend or family member and failed to seek out the police to inform them that the person had been involved in a hit-and-run accident or a fight in a bar. Such conduct might not indicate any propensity to lie on the witness stand. On the other hand, the accessory after the fact conviction could be based on actively lying to the police to misdirect an investigation--conduct that is closely related to credibility. Second, the record contains only the court's bare conclusion that probativeness outweighed prejudice to the defendant, with no indication of its reasons. 82 117 It would be a close question whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting Green's prior conviction without explaining its reasons and without any inquiry into the background facts and circumstances. Compare United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir.1977) (no abuse of discretion to admit prior manslaughter conviction where credibility was crucial to the case) with United States v. Gross, 603 F.2d 757, 758 (9th Cir.1979) (per curiam) (abuse of discretion to admit prior narcotics convictions without explanation; government had also offered no theory why the probative value of the convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect). Fortunately, we do not need to resolve that question here. If we concluded that the district court erred, we would normally remand to the court to reconsider, in light of all the evidence, whether the conviction was properly admitted. Here, the district court has already made that determination in ruling on Lipscomb's motion for a new trial. The additional post-trial evidence shows that Green had been part of a group, another member of which had robbed and stabbed an 18-year-old boy; the group members then fled to Green's home. 83 Given this evidence of Green's participation in the crime, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence was properly admitted. 118 We are mindful that the prejudicial effect of impeachment of several defense witnesses by prior convictions may be enhanced because the jury may presume guilt by association from the fact that the defendant associates frequently with convicted felons. However, even considering the cumulative effect of the impeachment of Lipscomb, Little, Smith, and Green, we find no abuse of discretion.