Opinion ID: 451972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Abdin Decisions

Text: 18 The injury in Abdin occurred when the plaintiff slipped and fell on the defendant's boat ramp. In addition to the boat ramp, which was open to the public without cost, the defendant maintained a retail and a wholesale business on three separate parcels of land. Relying upon section 375.251, the state trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant. 19 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the applicability of section 375.251(2)(b), which expressly affords no protection to owners and lessees who conduct commercial activity on the 'park area,'  is a question of fact. Abdin v. Fischer, 374 So.2d 1379, 1381 (Fla.1979). It remanded the action for a determination of whether commercial activity was taking place on property which defendants allege is a 'park area.'  Abdin, 374 So.2d at 1381. 20 On appeal after remand, the Fifth District Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant was legally entitled to invoke the protection of section 375.251 because the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to prove the [defendant] liable for [the] plaintiff's injury. Sea Fresh Frozen Products, Inc. v. Abdin, 411 So.2d 218, 220 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (emphasis in original). In other words, no commercial activity was conducted within the distinct park area where the boat ramp was located. The fact that commercial activity was conducted in other areas of the defendant's property did not preclude the defendant from invoking the protection of section 375.251.B. Statutory Construction 21 The Abdin rule is consistent with the purpose of section 375.251. As an elementary principle of statutory construction, we must accord the unambiguous language of the statute its plain meaning. Rickard v. Auto Publisher, Inc., 735 F.2d 450, 454-55 (11th Cir.1984). The clear intent of section 375.251 is, by its terms, to encourage private landowners to make their land available to the public for outdoor recreational purposes. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 375.251(1). 22 The statute seeks to effectuate its purpose by limiting the liability of those landowners who make their land available to the public without charge. Kleer argues that the intent of the exception found at subsection (2)(b) is to deny the statute's protection to landowners who either charge a fee for use of, or conduct commercial activity on, any part of their land. Kleer overlooks two important points. First, the phrase park area denotes something less than the entire parcel of land. Second, under Kleer's construction of subsection (2)(b), a landowner could invoke the protection of the statute only if his entire parcel of land was dedicated to the public, without compensation. Clearly, this construction of the statute would not encourage landowners to make their land available to the public. 23 Kleer's analysis of the statute is contrary both to the plain meaning of the language of the statute and to the express purpose of the statute. The Abdin rule, on the other hand, gives effect both to the express purpose of the statute, as stated in subsection (1), and to the explicit limitation of the statute, as stated in subsection (2)(b). See In re Hall, 752 F.2d 582, 586 (11th Cir.1985). 24 We leave to the courts of Florida further fine tuning of the construction of its statute. Following Florida precedent, we hold that the statute bars suits for injuries sustained in areas of parks where no fee is charged and no commercial activity takes place. 25 AFFIRMED.