Opinion ID: 1462250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: State v. Frazier and State v. Shaw

Text: The majority in Frazier and Shaw determines that [w]hen the administrative judge or his designee postpones a case beyond the 180-day deadline because of court unavailability, there is a violation of  591 and Rule 746 only if it is demonstrated that the change of trial date, or the period of time until a new trial date, represented a clear abuse of discretion. It concludes that [n]o such abuse of discretion was shown in the present cases. In my view, court unavailability can, under certain circumstances, constitute good cause for postponement of a criminal case beyond the 180-day period prescribed by Art. 27,  591 and Md.Rule 746. Unavailability of a court resulting from chronic court congestion, in and of itself, ordinarily does not constitute good cause; whereas unavailability of a court resulting from nonchronic court congestion ordinarily constitutes good cause. Because, in my view, in Frazier and Shaw the unavailability of a court resulted from chronic court congestion, there was no good cause for postponement. Therefore, I, unlike my colleagues, find that an abuse of discretion was shown in these cases. The terms chronic court congestion and nonchronic court congestion are derived from the ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial (1980), and its accompanying Commentary. Standard 12-2.3 provides in pertinent part: The following periods should be excluded in computing the time for trial: ..... (b) the period of delay resulting from congestion of the trial docket when the congestion is attributable to exceptional circumstances.... The Commentary to ABA, Speedy Trial Standard 12-2.3(b) at 28-29 provides in pertinent part: Although it is appropriate to allow added time under certain exceptional circumstances, such as those that result in the unavailability of the prosecutor or the judge at the time the trial is scheduled, delay arising out of the chronic congestion of the trial docket should not be excused.... Under the Supreme Court balancing test, docket congestion may be considered. ..... Although it is fair to expect the state to provide the machinery needed to dispose of the usual business of the courts promptly, it does not appear feasible to impose the same requirements when certain unique, nonrecurring events have produced an inordinate number of cases for court disposition. Thus, when a large-scale riot or other mass public disorder has occurred, some leeway for additional time is required to ensure that the many resulting cases will receive adequate attention from the prosecutor's office, defense counsel (possibly a single defender office), and the judiciary. (Footnotes omitted). Thus, although the term exceptional circumstances has not been expressly defined, the Commentary describes exceptional circumstances as congestion arising from unique, nonrecurring events that create a particular scheduling problem or produce an inordinate number of cases for court disposition. Events such as the illness or death of a prosecutor, defense counsel or judge on the day a trial is scheduled, or riots or other public disturbances are illustrative of such unique, nonrecurring events. Courts in some jurisdictions having statutes or rules similar to Art. 27,  591 and Md.Rule 746 that have considered the circumstances in which court congestion constitutes the requisite cause for postponement have determined, as stated by the majority, that chronic court congestion is ordinarily not regarded as good cause for postponement, [but] nonchronic congestion does not preclude a finding of good cause. [3] Illustrative is the case of People v. Forrest, 72 Mich. App. 266, 273, 249 N.W.2d 384, 388 (1976), where the Court of Appeals of Michigan said: In the case at bar the people have not made an affirmative showing of unavoidable delays which might justify this inaction. A mere recitation of the factor of a crowded docket, without more, cannot warrant visiting on the incarcerated defendant a longer imprisonment than might otherwise be in store. If congestion and delay result from inadequate court staffing or funding, the inevitable results of those delays must fall upon the people, who have the power to remedy court congestion. The rationale underlying the view that chronic court congestion does not ordinarily constitute good cause was expressed in the Commentary to ABA, Speedy Trial Standard 12-2.3(b) at 29 as follows: ... (1) the defendant can be prejudiced by delay, whatever the source; (2) such delays are contrary to the public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases; (3) if congestion excuses long delays, there is insufficient inducement for the state to remedy congestion; and (4) the calendar problems that arise out of trying to make maximum use of existing facilities do not ordinarily require time beyond that otherwise allowed. But, while delay because of failure to provide sufficient resources to dispose of the usual number of cases within the speedy trial time limits is not excused, the standard does recognize congestion as justifying added delay when `attributable to exceptional circumstances.' (Emphasis added.) Thus, it has been recognized that if chronic court congestion ordinarily constitutes good cause for delay, the purposes of statutory prompt trial requirements will be undermined. It is for this reason that I am persuaded that chronic court congestion ordinarily should not be regarded as good cause for postponement. This conclusion is also supported by the historical development of Maryland's statutory prompt trial requirements. [4] The requirement that criminal cases be tried promptly is deeply rooted in our English law heritage. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). This requirement first appeared in the Magna Charta of 1215 and is presently embodied in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the constitutions of almost all of the 50 states. See, e.g., Md. Declaration of Rights, Art. 21. By 1960, court systems throughout the United States had become burdened by chronic court congestion manifested by overcrowded dockets, backlogs, and unavailability of courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. This chronic court congestion inevitably caused delay in the trial of criminal cases. As stated by the American Bar Association in 1968: Congestion in the trial courts of this country, particularly in urban centers, is currently one of the major problems of judicial administration. Notwithstanding the usual rule that criminal cases have priority over civil cases, this congestion has created serious difficulties for the administration of criminal justice. The continued pressures upon existing resources have been such that it is extremely difficult to dispose of all criminal cases with promptness and with due regard for fair procedures. Several approaches to this problem are possible and desirable. The most obvious, but perhaps the most difficult, is that of finding means for reducing the amount of criminal conduct, such as by attacking poverty and other crime stimuli. Another is to overcome society's reluctance to provide the necessary resources ÔÇö more prosecutors, judges, courtrooms, and court personnel ÔÇö for prompt processing of all cases reaching the courts. Still other approaches involve the structuring of improvements in criminal procedure, particularly by advancing the efficiency of the process while at the same time ensuring its fairness and effectiveness. ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial at 1 (Approved Draft 1968) (emphasis added). Recognizing that chronic court congestion inevitably causes delay in the trial of criminal cases, Maryland, like many other states, adopted the approach of enacting statutes and promulgating court rules requiring that criminal trials be held within a prescribed period of time. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Colum.L.Rev. 846, 847 (1957). By ch. 212 of the Acts of 1971, the General Assembly declared a legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges.... State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 316, 403 A.2d 356, 359, on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334, 403 A.2d 368 (1979). That act required that all criminal cases be tried within six months unless the trial was postponed for extraordinary cause. These requirements were subsequently embodied in former Md.Rule 740, effective 1 June 1972. Nevertheless, because these requirements were held to be directory, not mandatory, Young v. State, 15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, summarily aff'd, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 (1972), the legislative policy, designed to obtain the prompt disposition of criminal charges, was largely unheeded and, therefore, not implemented. Hicks, 285 Md. at 317, 403 A.2d at 360. In 1977, this Court promulgated Md.Rule 746 which required that all criminal cases be tried within 120 days unless the trial was postponed for extraordinary cause. Subsequently, in Hicks, 285 Md. at 334-35, 403 A.2d at 369, we overruled Young. There, we made it clear that [t]he provisions of Rule 746 are of mandatory application, binding upon the prosecution and defense alike; they are not mere guides or bench marks to be observed, if convenient. Hicks, 285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360. Additionally, we made it clear that dismissal of the criminal charges is the appropriate sanction where the State fails to bring the case to trial within the 120-day period prescribed by the rule and where `extraordinary cause' justifying a trial postponement has not been established. Hicks, 285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360. We expressly stated that the dismissal sanction was a prophylactic measure designed to insure compliance with the requirements imposed on the State regarding prompt trials of criminal cases. Hicks, 285 Md. at 337, 403 A.2d at 370. By employing the sanction of dismissal in all criminal cases that are not tried within the statutorily prescribed time period, unless the requisite cause is shown, this Court attempted to create an incentive for trial courts to design and implement efficient and fair procedures that would eliminate delay caused by chronic court congestion. Thus, we put teeth into the requirements governing prompt trials. Hicks, 285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360. Subsequently, considerable concern arose as to the practicability of the principles articulated in Hicks. In 1979, this Court amended Md.Rule 746 to prescribe a 180-day period, rather than a 120-day period, for the trial of all criminal cases. By ch. 378 of the Acts of 1980, the General Assembly amended Art. 27,  591 to prescribe a 180-day, rather than a six-month, period for the trial of all criminal cases and a good cause rather than an extraordinary cause standard for postponement. As the majority recognizes, the legislative history of the 1980 amendment clearly intended to expand those circumstances furnishing the requisite cause for postponing a trial date beyond 180 days. Indeed, Delegate John A. Pica, Jr., a sponsor of one of the proposals to change extraordinary cause to good cause said: What we are really doing here is attempting to amend the law in order to offer the courts some leeway in the disposition of an extremely heavy case load. ..... The growth of the number of cases being brought into criminal court has dramatically increased, resulting in crowded and backlogged court dockets. The Hicks decision suggests that a defendant's confinement out of state may be extraordinary cause but that crowded court dockets may not. ..... The third, and perhaps best alternative, H.B. 615, allows a court to do what they do best ÔÇö to consider all the circumstances and grant delay of the trial based upon the facts of the case, and without harm or prejudice to the defendant. The bill accomplishes this result by removing the extraordinary cause requirements for a postponement and replacing it with the requirement of showing `good cause' for a change in trial date. Testimony on H.B. 351, 614 and 615 before the House Judiciary Committee, 12 February 1980. Although Delegate Pica indicated concern that under Hicks crowded court dockets may not be regarded as extraordinary cause, he did not, however, suggest that chronic court congestion, in and of itself, should constitute good cause. I agree with the majority that the 1980 amendment clearly indicated a legislative intent that crowded court dockets may constitute sufficient cause for trying a case beyond the 180-day deadline. In my view, however, that amendment does not show that the General Assembly intended that chronic court congestion, in and of itself, should constitute good cause. Rather, particularly in light of Delegate Pica's testimony, that amendment shows that the General Assembly intended that the question whether court unavailability constituted good cause ÔÇö whether it resulted from chronic or nonchronic court congestion ÔÇö like every other question relating to good cause, should be determined by the administrative judge's exercise of discretion based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Finally, the legislative history of the 1980 amendment also reveals that the General Assembly consistently rejected the notion of restricting the application of the dismissal sanction or eliminating it entirely. Thus, the General Assembly evidenced its intent that the prophylactic sanction of dismissal be retained. The basic approach adopted by the General Assembly is clear. All criminal cases were to be tried within the statutorily prescribed time period unless postponed for good cause. The administrative judge was authorized to determine on a case-by-case basis whether court unavailability constituted good cause ÔÇö whether it resulted from chronic or nonchronic court congestion. The sanction of dismissal was to be retained as an incentive for trial courts to continue to implement efficient and fair procedures that would eliminate delay caused by chronic court congestion. Manifestly, the 1980 amendment to the statutory prompt trial requirements did not alter the General Assembly's purpose of eliminating delay caused by chronic court congestion. In 1980, this Court amended Md.Rule 746 to conform to the statute. In 1982, in Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982), we reaffirmed the principles established in Hicks that put teeth into the requirements governing prompt trials. My review of the historical development and legislative history of Maryland's statutory prompt trial requirements compels me to conclude that chronic court congestion, in and of itself, ordinarily does not constitute good cause for postponement. This conclusion is also supported by the existing interrelationship between the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement and the statutory prompt trial requirements. I agree with the majority that  591 and Rule 746 were not intended to be codifications of the constitutional speedy trial right but stand `on a different legal footing.' Nevertheless, in my dissenting opinion in Hicks I expressed the view that the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement and the statutory prompt trial requirements are interrelated. There, I said: It is clear, therefore, that statutory prompt trial requirements are intended to, and do in fact, broaden the scope and applicability of the Sixth Amendment requirement and increase its effectiveness in reducing delay by mandating that trials be held more promptly than is required by the Sixth Amendment. Those statutory requirements implement, effectuate, and `put teeth' into the Sixth Amendment. Given this interrelationship, it would be, in my view, incongruous to interpret a statutory requirement as being narrower in scope and applicability and, therefore, less effective than the Sixth Amendment requirement. Hicks, 285 Md. at 327, 403 A.2d at 365 (Davidson, J., dissenting). I adhere to the view that the statutory prompt trial requirements were intended to implement the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement and to increase its effectiveness in reducing delay. [5] If this objective is to be effectuated, the statutory prompt trial requirements must be interpreted as being broader in scope and applicability than the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement. This Court has repeatedly recognized that under the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement the responsibility for delay caused by chronic court congestion manifested by overcrowded dockets, unavailability of courts, and scheduling problems rests upon the courts and, therefore, that unintentional delay caused by chronic court congestion is inexcusable and must be weighed against the State. Wilson v. State, 281 Md. 640, 652, 382 A.2d 1053, 1063, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 839, 99 S.Ct. 126, 58 L.Ed.2d 136 (1978); Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 12, 367 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2177, 53 L.Ed.2d 225 (1977); Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521, 529, 531, 350 A.2d 628, 633, 634-35 (1976); Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 114-15, 345 A.2d 62, 74 (1975). Thus, in Epps v. State, 276 Md. at 114-15, 345 A.2d at 74 (1975), we stated: [A] delay in affording a criminal defendant a `speedy trial' because of over-crowded court dockets and scheduling problems, the responsibility for which rests upon both the courts and the prosecutors, cannot be classified as wholly `neutral' and must be included within the period of delay in determining whether there has been a denial of this constitutional right. Consequently, this Court has recognized that under the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement, the State has a duty to provide a prompt trial even though chronic court congestion exists and its failure to do so is inexcusable. Under the statutory prompt trial requirements, the State has a duty to provide a prompt trial unless there is good cause for postponement. If chronic court congestion is regarded as good cause then, under the statutory prompt trial requirements, the State has a duty to provide a prompt trial unless chronic court congestion exists. Such an interpretation leads to the conclusion that under the statutory prompt trial requirements the State has no duty to provide a prompt trial when chronic court congestion exists. Thus, its failure to provide a prompt trial is, excused. Indeed, that failure not only is excused, but is itself a justification for delay. Thus, the State's failure to comply with a standard of the Sixth Amendment requirement is transformed into a justification for delay. This transformation narrows the scope and applicability of the statutory prompt trial requirements and makes them less effective in reducing delay than the Sixth Amendment requirement. Such a result is incongruous. For this reason, too, I am persuaded that chronic court congestion ordinarily does not constitute good cause for postponement. The majority, without defining the term chronic court congestion, finds that in Baltimore City the proportion of criminal cases which must be postponed by the administrative judge beyond the 180-day deadline ... is less than two percent and, therefore, that [t]he Circuit Court for Baltimore City is not `chronically congested.' It concludes that under these circumstances the unavailability of a court, in and of itself, constitutes good cause for postponement beyond the statutorily prescribed time period. There is, however, nothing in the legislative history to indicate that the General Assembly intended that all criminal cases be tried within 180 days, except for two percent of the cases. [6] More important, the record shows that in both Frazier and Shaw the only reasons assigned for the postponement beyond the statutorily prescribed time period were premised upon the unavailability of a court and the number of cases on the move list. Thus, there is nothing to show that the unavailability of a court that caused the postponement in Frazier and Shaw resulted from unique, nonrecurring events. There is nothing to show that the unavailability of a court was caused by an abrupt and unexpected increase in the number of criminal cases filed, or by a sharp and unexpected decrease in the number of available judges. Rather, the unavailability of a court here resulted from the ordinary recurrent events associated with the regular procedures utilized to handle the usual business of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Therefore, there was nothing to show that the unavailability of a court was caused by anything other than what I define as chronic court congestion. Accordingly, there was nothing to show that the postponements in Frazier and Shaw were caused by anything other than chronic court congestion. Under these circumstances, the majority's application of the principle announced in these cases, in my view, establishes that chronic court congestion that causes delay, in and of itself, constitutes good cause for delay. Such a result is untenable. In determining that the court unavailability, resulting from chronic court congestion in Frazier and Shaw, in and of itself, constitutes good cause for delay, the majority has, in my view, undermined the purpose of both the General Assembly and this Court ÔÇö to eliminate the delay caused by chronic court congestion. It has obviated the necessity for the administrative judge to exercise his discretion in determining whether court congestion constitutes good cause for delay. It has impeded the right of society and the accused to have all criminal cases tried within 180 days, notwithstanding the existence of chronic court congestion. In so doing, it has restricted the applicability of the dismissal sanction, thus destroying the incentive for trial courts to comply with the statutorily prescribed time period. In short, the majority has extracted the teeth that this Court in Hicks inserted into the requirements governing prompt trials of criminal cases. Although I agree with the majority's principle that court unavailability can, under certain circumstances, constitute good cause for postponement, I do not agree with the majority's application of that principle here because it is both illogical and destructive of the purpose of the statutory prompt trial requirements. In my view, under the present circumstances, the unavailability of a court resulting from chronic court congestion did not constitute good cause for a postponement in either Frazier or Shaw. Consequently, there was an abuse of discretion in granting these postponements. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial courts' judgments dismissing these cases. [7]