Opinion ID: 6221666
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Copyright Infringement Claims

Text: Having concluded that the Athletic Department is an arm of the state, we must next address whether its sovereign immunity is abrogated from the copyright infringement claims. Because the Athletic Department is an extension of TAMU, we will now refer to the entity as TAMU.
In Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020), the Supreme Court recently addressed whether the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA) validly abrogated the states’ immunity from copyright infringement suits. 6 The CRCA provides that a state “shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment [or] any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court” for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 511(a). Though Congress used clear language to abrogate immunity, the Court held that Congress had no authority to do so under Article I, which empowers Congress to protect copyrights, or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to enact “reasonably prophylactic legislation” aimed at preventing states from violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1004 (citations omitted). With respect to Section 5, the CRCA failed the “congruence and proportionality” test because the evidence of actual constitutional injury—that is, willful copyright infringement by 6 The Fifth Circuit addressed this question many years ago and concluded that the CRCA was not a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 605 (5th Cir. 2000). 13 Case: 20-20503 Document: 00516201715 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/14/2022 No. 20-20503 states—was “exceedingly slight.” Id. at 1007. Congress therefore lacked authority to broadly abrogate the states’ immunity from copyright infringement suits. Appellants argue, however, that Allen did not foreclose abrogation of sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits where a state’s violation of the CRCA independently constitutes an actual violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, they allege that TAMU committed two independent violations of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) deprivation of property without due process, and (2) takings. Appellants cite to United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), which held that “insofar as Title II [of the Americans with Disabilities Act] creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.” Id. at 159 (emphasis in original) (reviewing whether state violated prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, which is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Thus, Georgia arguably set forth two categories of abrogation: (1) where a statute validly abrogates sovereign immunity for all claims, and (2) where a statute is not a valid prophylactic abrogation of all claims, but does abrogate sovereign immunity for those claims based on conduct constituting an actual violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the statutory remedy would be congruent and proportional as applied to that case. See id. (directing lower courts to determine “on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid”). Appellants contend that this case falls in the second category. 14 Case: 20-20503 Document: 00516201715 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/14/2022 No. 20-20503 In support of their position, Appellants cite to National Association of Boards of Pharmacy v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (“NABP”), 633 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011), where the Eleventh Circuit applied Georgia in a copyright infringement suit, observing that “[i]t is well established that § 5 grants Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 1315 (citing Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158). There, however, the court ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the copyright infringement amounted to a violation of procedural due process, concluding that a pre-deprivation process was not feasible under the facts alleged and that adequate post-deprivation remedies were provided by the State. Id. at 1318–19. Appellants also point to oral argument in Allen, where the State of North Carolina conceded that even if the Supreme Court held that the CRCA was not a valid prophylactic abrogation of state immunity, Georgia would still provide a remedy for copyright infringement constituting an actual violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39–40, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877) (“[W]henever a plaintiff can reasonably allege that there has been intentional copyright infringement and there are not adequate remedies, then, under this Court’s Georgia decision, they can bring a direct constitutional claim. We don’t dispute that.”). Further, after Allen was decided, the district court on remand recently held that the plaintiffs’ copyright infringement claim could still proceed because “[a]lthough the Supreme Court ruled that the CRCA was unconstitutional insofar as it attempted to abrogate sovereign immunity prophylactically . . . the statute remains whenever plaintiff alleges both a constitutional violation as well as a statutory violation. Therefore, plaintiffs can still use the CRCA as a basis for its Georgia claim [alleging that defendants’ conduct amounted to an unconstitutional taking].” Allen v. Cooper, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2021 WL 3682415, at  (E.D.N.C. Aug. 18, 2021). 15 Case: 20-20503 Document: 00516201715 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/14/2022 No. 20-20503 ii. Actual Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment We need not decide whether Georgia extends to copyright infringement cases, because even assuming it does, Appellants fail to allege that TAMU’s conduct constitutes an actual violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the copyright infringement claim against TAMU for deprivation of property without due process cannot survive dismissal. To come within the reach of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause, a violation must (1) be “intentional, or at least reckless,” and (2) lack adequate post-deprivation state remedies. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1004. For due process purposes, copyrights are a form of property. Id. Appellants sufficiently allege that the infringement was intentional—Marquardt directed his secretary to retype the Gill Biography, remove any copyright information, and change its title and byline to indicate that TAMU owned the work, and then shared it with his colleagues for approval and publication. However, meaningful post-deprivation state remedies are available to redress the injury. Though no tort remedies are available under Texas law, 7 Appellants have a viable takings claim against TAMU for copyright infringement under the Texas Constitution. More expansive than the federal Takings Clause, the Texas Takings Clause provides: “No person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 17. The Clause 7 Texas has not waived its immunity from tort claims arising out of copyright infringement allegations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(1) (providing for limited waiver of governmental immunity for claims of property damage, personal injury, or death proximately caused by wrongful or negligent conduct of governmental employee arising out of (1) use of publicly owned motor-driven equipment or motor vehicle, (2) premises defects, and (3) conditions or uses of certain property). 16 Case: 20-20503 Document: 00516201715 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/14/2022 No. 20-20503 itself waives sovereign immunity for a valid takings claim brought in state court. Texas v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007). Though the Texas Supreme Court recently held that a public university’s single act of copyright infringement—i.e., displaying a photograph on its website without the owner’s authorization—did not constitute a per se taking, it nevertheless left the door open for a copyright owner to bring a regulatory takings claim against the State for infringement. Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous., -- S.W.3d --, 2021 WL 2483766, at  (Tex. June 18, 2021); see also id. (Busby, J., concurring) (“Nothing in the Court’s opinion should be understood to indicate a view on [whether a state’s copyright infringement could in some circumstances require compensation] because Olive has alleged no claim under the ‘damaged’ or ‘applied’ prongs of the Texas Takings Clause.”). Accordingly, because Appellants are not foreclosed from pursuing a takings claim in state court, TAMU did not violate their procedural due process rights. See McClure v. Biesenbach, 355 F. App’x 800, 805 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Post-deprivation process is adequate if it allows the prospect of compensation for the loss.”) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986)). Moreover, the copyright infringement claim against TAMU for its taking of property fails to survive dismissal as well. The Fifth Amendment provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Takings Clause is made applicable to the states by incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017) (citing Chicago Burlington & Q.R.C. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). The Supreme Court has not addressed whether copyrights are a form of property 17 Case: 20-20503 Document: 00516201715 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/14/2022 No. 20-20503 protected by the Takings Clause. 8 And we need not decide this issue because Appellants have failed to plausibly allege a taking. The Supreme Court has explained that a “basic distinction” exists between “individual torts” and “appropriations of a property right.” Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2078 (2021); see also, e.g., Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1922) (“[W]hile a single act may not be enough, a continuance of them in sufficient number and for a sufficient time may prove [the intent to take property]. Every successive trespass adds to the force of the evidence.”). This court has illuminated the principle that not all torts (i.e., infringements) rise to the level of a taking. In Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1337 (5th Cir. 1973), where the widow of Lee Harvey Oswald sought compensation for the taking of property by the United States, we held: We turn finally to the question whether Mrs. Porter can recover for the diminution in value of Oswald’s writings attributable to their publication in the Warren Commission Report. It is, of course, quite plain that the recovery sought here is for infringement by the government of Mrs. Porter’s common law copyright interest in Oswald’s writings. Such infringement is not a “taking” as the term is constitutionally 8 The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that other forms of intellectual property are protected by the Takings Clause. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 359–60 (2015) (patents); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (trade secrets). And, a handful of sister circuits have suggested that copyrights are protected by the Takings Clause. See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[A] rule that the adoption of such a reference by a state legislature or administrative body deprived the copyright owner of its property would raise very substantial problems under the Takings Clause of the Constitution.”); Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989) (suggesting if state remedies do not afford just compensation for copyright infringement, “the Takings Clause of the federal Constitution might at that point enable [owner] to pursue a damage remedy in federal court”). 18 Case: 20-20503 Document: 00516201715 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/14/2022 No. 20-20503 understood. Rather, it has always been held that infringement of copyright, whether common law, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893 (CA 8, 1948), or statutory, Turton v. United States, 212 F.2d 354 (CA 6, 1954) constitutes a tort. Like Porter, Appellants have failed to meet their burden that the purported infringement amounts to a constitutional taking: The alleged direct infringement was the public display of the book for four total days, and the indirect infringement likewise stems from these four days. Appellants have failed to plausibly allege that TAMU continued or repeated any infringement—direct or indirect—such that the claim amounts to a taking for Fifth Amendment purposes. Accordingly, in these circumstances, the copyright infringement claim based on a takings allegation fails.