Opinion ID: 1169839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Positions Of The Parties And The Necessity Of Meaningful Appellate Review

Text: As indicated in section I. of this opinion, supra, and pursuant to HRS § 286-260, Gray appealedunsuccessfullyto the district court for judicial review of the Director's lifetime administrative revocation of his driver's license on the grounds, inter alia, that the Director had acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner and committed an abuse of discretion. On further appeal to this court, see supra note 9, Gray argues that the Director, through the Administrative Review Officer and the ADLRO hearing officer, committed an abuse of discretion by failing to consider or articulate any reasons for the particular period of administrative revocation imposed pursuant to HRS § 286-261(b). Gray's contention presupposes, of course, that the Director possessed the statutory discretion to impose a period of administrative revocation upon him, in accordance with HRS § 286-261(b)(4), other than for life. In this connection, we have held in the past that every decision governed by the Hawai`i Administrative Procedure Act (HAPA), HRS ch. 91, must explicate its findings and decisions in writing. The parties and the court should not be left to guess, with respect to any material question of fact, or to any group of minor matters that may have cumulative significance, the precise finding of the [administrative] agency. In re Application of Terminal Transp., Inc., 54 Haw. 134, 139, 504 P.2d 1214, 1217 (1972) (emphasis added). See also In re Application of Hawaii Elec. Light Co., Inc., 60 Haw. 625, 642, 594 P.2d 612, 623 (1979) ([F]indings of ultimate facts must be supported by findings of basic facts which in turn are required to be supported by the evidence in the record. (Citations and footnote omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)). We recognize that administrative license revocation proceedings conducted pursuant to HRS §§ 286-258 and -259, see supra notes 6 and 7, are not governed by the contested case requirements of HAPA. HRS § 286-263 (1993). [10] Nevertheless, as the Intermediate Court of Appeals recently observed, [t]here are very practical reasons for requiring an [administrative] agency's findings and conclusions upon all material issues of fact, law, or discretion to be stated in its decisions. Rife v. Akiba, 81 Hawai`i 84, 87, 912 P.2d 581, 584 (App.1996) (emphasis added). The reasons have to do with facilitating judicial review, avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assuring more careful administrative consideration, helping parties plan their cases for rehearing and judicial review, and keeping [administrative] agencies within their jurisdiction. ... [T]he most prominent reason ... is the facilitation of judicial review. Id. (quoting K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 16.05 (1958) (footnotes omitted)) (emphasis added). Therefore, even though HARDLA does not, as a facilitator of judicial review, expressly require a written record of the reasons forming the basis for determining the period or term of an arrestee's administrative driver's license revocation, we believe that HRS §§ 286-258, -259, -260 and -261, see supra notes 4, 6, 7, and 8, imply such a requirement; the requisite scope of the written record depends, of course, upon: (1) whether HARDLA accords the Director any discretion to departin either an upward or downward mannerfrom the periods (or any of them) enumerated in HRS § 286-261(b); [11] and (2) whether, if HARDLA authorizes only an upward departure, the Director actually opts to depart from the enumerated period applicable to the class of persons to which the arrestee belongs. [12] In stark contrast to Gray's position, the Director argues on appeal that, just as a judge sentencing a criminal defendant to a certain penalty that is within the range of authorized punishment need not state the reasons why he [or she] picked a particular level of punishment within the range, ... there is no reason why the [Director], authorized to impose a lifetime revocation, must state why he [or she] imposed the full life-time revocation. [13] The foregoing argument, however, does not comport with the case law of this court. Indeed, within the context of criminal cases, we have recently noted that: The authority of a trial court to select and determine the severity of a penalty is normally undisturbed on review in the absence of an apparent abuse of discretion or unless applicable statutory or constitutional commands have not been observed. State v. Valera, 74 Haw. 424, 439, 848 P.2d 376, 383, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 853 P.2d 542 (1993). In other words, while a sentence may be authorized by a constitutionally valid statute, its imposition may be reviewed for plain and manifest abuse of discretion. Admittedly, the determination of the existence of clear abuse is a matter which is not free from difficulty[,] and each case in which abuse is claimed must be adjudged according to its own peculiar circumstances. Generally, to constitute an abuse[,] it must appear that the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. State v. Kumukau, 71 Haw. 218, 227-28, 787 P.2d 682, 688 (1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Murray, 63 Haw. 12, 25, 621 P.2d 334, 342-43 (1980). In order to facilitate appellate review for abuse of a trial court's sentencing discretion, and [w]henever a defendant is qualified for sentencing alternatives and the sentence imposed is unsatisfactory to the defendant, we strongly encourage and recommend that ... the sentencing court... state its reasons for imposing the particular sentence. State v. Lau, 73 Haw. 259, 265, 831 P.2d 523, 526 (1992). State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai`i 127, 143-44, 890 P.2d 1167, 1183-84 (1995) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (emphasis added). We believe that the policy considerations expressed in Gaylord potentially apply with equal force to the Director's decisions regarding periods of administrative driver's license revocations imposed pursuant to HRS § 286-261(b). As discussed above, the need for a record adequately reflecting the Director's reasons for determining these periods is particularly acute if HARDLA vests in the Director the discretion to depart from the default modes enumerated in the various subsections of HRS § 286-261(b). Such discretion, if completely unfettered, would raise substantial due process concerns. [14] As we held in the context of criminal sentencing, unguided sentencing discretion exposes a convicted defendant to arbitrary and capricious government action.... What process is due to the defendant may be determined only upon a balancing of the interests of the defendant and the state, but the state does not have an interest in sentencing the defendant without any guarantees whatever against arbitrary and capricious action by the state's agent. State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 71, 88-89, 588 P.2d 394, 405 (1978). Because of the necessity that a HARDLA record facilitate, rather than impede, judicial review pursuant to HRS § 286-260, see Rife, 81 Hawai`i at 87, 912 P.2d at 584, and because due process concerns would preclude the unfettered exercise of discretion (if, indeed, HARDLA accords any) in determining the term of an arrestee's administrative driver's license revocation, it therefore follows that the administrative record in this case must adequately reflect the Director's reasons for revoking Gray's driver's license for life. Accordingly, we look to that administrative record to ascertain whether it does. Tracking verbatim the language of HRS §§ 286-258(d), -259(e), and -261(b)(4), the Director entered the following decision and order: 1. The Director concludes that there existed reasonable suspicion to stop the motor vehicle driven by [Gray]. 2. The Director concludes there existed probable cause, the physical signs of intoxication and the failing of the field sobriety tests, to believe that [Gray] drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of the motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor. 3. The Director concludes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [Gray] drove, operated, or was in actual physical control, of the motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 4. [Gray] had a blood alcohol content of.10% or more. 5. [Gray's] ten (10) year driving record preceding the date of arrest May 4, 1994 shows three (3) prior alcohol enforcement contacts, as defined in HRS Section 286-251. 6. Pursuant to HRS Section 286-261, the period of revocation imposed on [Gray] is a period of LIFE. (Emphasis in original.) There is no question that the foregoing conclusions were adequately supported by the administrative record in this case. Moreover, Gray does not dispute that he had three prior alcohol enforcement contacts within the ten years preceding the arrest that precipitated the administrative revocation of his driver's license in the present matter. Thus, pursuant to HRS § 286-261(b)(4), the Director clearly had the statutory authority to revoke Gray's driver's license for life. See supra note 4. Accordingly, if HARDLA mandates the period of administrative revocation enumerated in HRS § 286-261(b)(4), then the administrative recordin its present formis as complete as it can be and, as such, is susceptible to meaningful appellate review. On the other hand, if, on the record before him, HARDLA accorded the Director any discretion regarding the period of Gray's administrative revocation, then, as the appellate court, we would be left to guess, see In re Application of Terminal Transp., 54 Haw. at 139, 504 P.2d at 1217, the reasons why the Director opted for a lifetime revocation of Gray's driver's license, thereby hamstringing meaningful appellate review. See supra note 14.