Opinion ID: 2599595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crabtree's Guilty Plea Supports, Rather Than Distinguishes, the Application of State v. Aho

Text: The majority admits Crabtree's due process rights would have been violated if the offenses for which the community placement was imposed had occurred before July 1, 1988, but attempts to circumvent its own rule on the basis of the charging information and guilty plea factual averments. Majority at 818. But far from establishing a factual distinction between Aho and the present case, the substance of the information and facts upon which this guilty plea was based embodies the identical factual predicate upon which Aho was decided. See Aho, 137 Wash.2d at 741, 975 P.2d 512. Admitting the charging information's deficiency, the majority bases its claim Crabtree was not prejudiced by relying on an equivalent statement on plea of guilt wherein he admitted he committed rape of a child and child molestation between June 1, 1988 and August 31, 1988. Majority at 818 (emphasis added). According to the majority [t]his constituted an admission of criminal acts between July 1 and August 31. Id. Of course it didn't, it admitted acts between June 1 and August 31. We held in Aho the defendant may have been convicted of an offense occurring before July 1, 1988 specifically because the charging period, set forth in the jury instructions, included a substantial period of time before July 1998. Aho, 137 Wash.2d at 743, 975 P.2d 512. The majority is simply wrong when it contends the relevant documents prove the offenses occurred within the statutory period, or show Crabtree committed sexual offenses after July 1, 1988. Majority at 819. To the contrary, all of the documents upon which the conviction was based, e.g., the charging information, factual statement by the defendant, guilty plea, and judgment and sentence, suffer from exactly the same infirmity as the jury instruction at issue in Aho by including a substantial period of time before the effective date of the statute. See Aho, 137 Wash.2d at 743, 975 P.2d 512. None of these documents offers any clue as to whether the crimes were committed a month before the effective date of the statute or a month after. The majority's opinion is particularly disturbing in light of the policy behind CrR 4.2(d) which protects defendants who are in the position of voluntarily pleading guilty with an understanding of the nature of the charge, but who do not realize that the conduct does not actually fall within the charge. Majority at 818-19.