Opinion ID: 1279175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: The Expert's Testimony Was Necessary

Text: The expert's testimony was necessary for the court's and the jury's understanding of Richard Jahnke's theory of defense In the case at bar, the court denied the defendant's offer to introduce the testimony of the expert when he said: The jury, I believe, is to determine the reasonableness of any fears, and they should determine that by evidence of a person who testifies as to the facts, the situation, and draw their conclusions. This ruling had the effect of not only rejecting the offer of scientific proof at this stage of the trial but it precluded the offer of scientific testimony at any other juncture. Once the trial court had held that the jury did not need scientific testimony in order to aid in the decision-making process, as a practical matter that became the final word on this or any other offer of this type of testimony. It is my judgment that both the court and the jury were in need of explanatory testimony by the psychiatrist and that the court committed reversible error in not admitting it. Since both the county attorney and the presiding judge were trying the case while laboring under the misconception that Richard Jahnke was urging some kind of insanity or mental-incapacity theory, it needed to be explained  not only to the court and county attorney but to the jury  that, while the behavior of Richard Jahnke did not present the ordinary self-defense fact situation, his theory of defense was not concerned with either his intent to commit the act or his mental deficiency. In Smith v. State, supra, this court said: Expert testimony is appropriate when the subject of inquiry is one which jurors of normal experience and qualifications as laymen would not be able to decide without the technical assistance of one having unusual knowledge of the subject by reason of skill, experience or education in the particular field. 564 P.2d at 1199. In this case, it was necessary to explain to the jury that, because Richard Jahnke had been the recipient of the battering and brutalizing that this record reveals this young boy had experienced at the hands of his father, his behavior was  from a psychiatric point of view  the expectable concomitant of that kind of treatment. Therefore, scientific explanation was necessary to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence and determine the essential fact in issue  namely, whether there was a cause-and-effect relationship between the boy's abuse and his behavior and, if there was, whether his conduct was that of a reasonable person behaving in the same or similar circumstances. While it is conceded  as the majority opinion points up  that the question of expert-testimony admissibility is usually a matter of discretion with the trial judge, the testimony cannot be excluded for erroneous reasons because these types of faulty judgments would not bring the court's exercise of discretion into play. See Chrysler Corporation v. Todorovich, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1123 (1978), where we invoked this rule in holding error to prevent cross-examination where the court's reason was erroneous at law. Here, as has or will be seen, the trial court has precluded expert testimony for such erroneous reasons as: There is no need for expert explanation in these fact circumstances; there is no plea of insanity or diminished capacity and thus the testimony is irrelevant; the testimony will invade the province of the jury; and it does not fall within the exception to the hearsay rule. Assuming that these are erroneous reasons for excluding the testimony of Dr. McDonald, it cannot be said that the court has exercised its discretion on any relevant question, including the one which asks whether the testimony will be of assistance to the trier of fact. I would urge that the court's decision on this issue amounted to error as a matter of law, which takes it out of the realm of the abuse-of-discretion rule. At the very least, the rejection of the testimony amounted to an abuse of discretion. The applicable rules of evidence and pertinent case law say that the battered-person syndrome is a subject that is beyond the ken of the lay juror and must be explained through the use of expert testimony. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, supra. Rule 702 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, entitled Testimony by experts, provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Rule 703, W.R.E., entitled Bases of opinion testimony by experts, provides: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Doubts about whether an expert's testimony will be helpful in a case should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility unless there exist strong and compelling reasons favoring exclusion such as time or surprise. 3 Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 702[01], at 702-6. This is so, because the central concern of the rule is: Will the expert testimony    `assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue'? It has been said:    There is no more certain test for determining whether experts may be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would qualify to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 414, 418 (1952). In numerous instances, courts have held it error to have excluded expert testimony in cases of this nature where the proffered testimony goes to the very essence of defendant's theory of defense. In United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 699, 79 L.Ed.2d 165, the defendant appealed from a criminal conviction on five counts of distribution of narcotics. He urged that he was induced by government agents to arrange sales of the narcotics. The appeal raises the question of admissibility of expert psychological testimony in an entrapment defense to establish the defendant's unique susceptibility to inducement. As in self-defense, entrapment requires admission of guilt of the crime charged and all of its elements, including the required mental state. United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504 (3d Cir.1973). The Hill court held it to be error, under Rule 702, F.R.E. (which is identical to Rule 702, W.R.E.), for the trial judge to exclude the expert testimony because expert testimony concerning a defendant's susceptibility to influence may be relevant to an entrapment defense. United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.1977). In Hill, the court said:    An expert's opinion, based on observation, psychological profiles, intelligence tests, and other assorted data, may aid the jury in its determination of the crucial issues of inducement and pre-disposition. This is the purpose ascribed to expert testimony by Federal Rules of Evidence 702, and it appears most applicable to the instant case. A jury may not be able to properly evaluate the effect of appellant's subnormal intelligence and psychological characteristics on the existence of inducement or predisposition without the considered opinion of an expert. Accordingly, if the expert can reach a conclusion, based on an adequate factual foundation, that the appellant, because of his alleged subnormal intelligence and psychological profile, is more susceptible and easily influenced by the urgings and inducements of other persons, such testimony must be admitted as relevant to the issues of inducement and predisposition. 655 F.2d at 516. The Hill court held that this type of testimony would also be admissible under Rule 405(a), F.R.E. (the same as Rule 405(a), W.R.E.), which provides:  Reputation or opinion.  In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. Expert testimony has been permitted upon a variety of subjects related to the nature and type of testimony offered here. In People v. Mathews, 154 Cal. Rptr. 628, 91 Cal. App.3d 1018, 1022 (1979), an expert was permitted to testify upon the subject of rape-trauma syndrome. The admission of a deputy sheriff's testimony as expert testimony on the subject of street-gang customs was approved in People v. McDaniels, 166 Cal. Rptr. 12, 107 Cal. App.3d 898, 904-905 (1980). In State v. Anaya, Me., 438 A.2d 892 (1981), the Maine Supreme Court found that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding testimony related to the battered-woman syndrome. The court said: On appeal, we will reverse a decision based on M.R.Evid. 403 to exclude evidence only if the trial justice abused his discretion in so deciding, State v. Hinds, Me., 437 A.2d 191 (1981). Interpreting the decision below as one based on Rule 403, we find such an abuse of discretion. Both Dr. Bishop's and Dr. Krueger's testimonies were highly probative and more helpful than confusing to the jury. The record shows that Dr. Bishop would have testified that abused women often continue to live with their abusers even though beatings continue, and that a certain substrata of abused women perceive suicide and/or homicide to be the only solutions to their problems. This evidence would have given the jury reason to believe that the defendant's conduct was, contrary to the State's assertions, consistent with her theory of self-defense. We agree with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and various commentators, that where the psychologist is qualified to testify about the battered wife syndrome, and the defendant establishes her identity as a battered woman, expert evidence on the battered wife syndrome must be admitted since it `may have ... a substantial bearing on her perceptions and behavior at the time of the killing, ... [and is] central to her claim of self defense.' Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 639 (D.C. 1979). Since we cannot say beyond the reasonable doubt required to make the error harmless that this evidence would not have affected the jury's consideration of the self-defense claim, State v. True, Me., 438 A.2d 460 (1981), defendant is entitled to a new trial. 438 A.2d at 894. In a wrongful-death action by the deceased's daughter, the defense introduced the testimony of a psychologist who was allowed to testify in considerable detail as to the emotional state of the defendant and the causes of her condition, based on his interpretations of the facts that she had related to him. He was allowed to testify to the role of the man in a battering situation to demonstrate that the defendant was an abused woman whose actions were caused by a long series of episodes of her being beaten by the victim. Morrison v. Bradley, Colo. App., 622 P.2d 81, 83 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 655 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982). In State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980), the defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder of his wife, to which he pled not guilty by reason of insanity. Both the defendant's wife and his daughter testified that he had physically abused them on numerous occasions. The defense called two psychiatrists who testified that the defendant was, in their opinion, legally insane at the time of the crime. In rebuttal, the State called an expert on domestic violence who testified that research did not indicate that mental illness was an important cause of wife-beating, and that, in his opinion, a marriage such as the defendant's would probably fall within the contours of the battered-woman syndrome. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the testimony regarding the battered woman was admissible to rebut the defendant's evidence of insanity, noting that many courts have held that testimony concerning the battered-child syndrome is admissible. State v. Baker, supra, 424 A.2d at 173. In Ibn-Tamas v. United States, supra, the trial court refused to permit an expert to testify where a battered woman had pled self-defense. In reversing and remanding, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals observed that expert testimony is properly excluded if it will be addressed to a subject with respect to which the jury is just as competent to consider. Lampkins v. United States, D.C.App., 401 A.2d 966, 970 (1979). According to the Ibn-Tamas decision, expert testimony is admissible if it treats with subject matter which is beyond the ken of the average layman. The court reviewed the facts of the case, analyzed the offer of proof, pointed out the difference between the battered-woman's plea and the ordinary plea of self-defense and concluded that the expert testimony would have    enhanced Mrs. Ibn-Tamas' general credibility in responding to cross-examination designed to show that her testimony about the relationship with her husband was implausible; and    it would have supported her testimony that on the day of the shooting her husband's actions had provoked a state of fear which led her to believe she was in imminent danger (`I just knew he was going to kill me'), and thus responded in self-defense. 407 A.2d at 634. The testimony, said the court, would have supplied an    interpretation of the facts which differed from the ordinary lay perception (`she could have gotten out, you know') advocated by the government. The substantive element of the Dyas [infra] test  `beyond the ken of the average layman'  is accordingly met here. 407 A.2d at 635. The court then concluded that the exclusion of the proffered expert testimony was reversible error. Thus, it can be readily seen that this kind of expert testimony in the form of either scientific or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact, and the purpose of such testimony will be to give the jury a basis for considering whether the defendant suffered from the battered-person syndrome, not in order to establish a special justification for patricide [17] but as it relates to his or her claim of self-defense.