Opinion ID: 4508211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Tools of Statutory Construction

Text: 1. Statutes Bearing on Similar Subjects ¶41 I start with the theft statute, section 18-4-401, since embezzlement descends directly from larceny, the first theft crime at common law. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 19.1(a), at 57 (2d ed. 2003). In general, a person commits the crime of theft when, under the circumstances listed in section 18-4-401(1), he “knowingly obtains, retains, or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization or by threat or deception.” § 18-4-401(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (1.5), in turn, states that “a thing of value is that of ‘another’ if anyone other than the defendant has a possessory or proprietary interest therein.” § 18-4-401(1.5) (emphases added). ¶42 Significantly, the language in the theft statute is similar to the language in the embezzlement statute. The former uses anything of value “of another,” whereas the latter uses property “of the state.” If a thing of value “of another” includes property in which another has a possessory, but not a proprietary, 10 interest, why doesn’t property “of the state” include property in which the state has a possessory, but not a proprietary, interest? ¶43 I also draw guidance from section 18-4-101, which provides the definitions that apply to all of the crimes against property unless the context requires otherwise. This includes the crimes of theft, robbery, burglary, arson, trespass, tampering, and criminal mischief. In subsection (3), section 18-4-101 provides that “[p]roperty is that of ‘another’ if anyone other than the defendant has a possessory or proprietary interest therein.” (Emphases added.) ¶44 Thus, for example, under section 18-4-506, C.R.S. (2019), a person commits the crime of second degree tampering when he “tampers with property of another with intent to cause injury, inconvenience, or annoyance to that person or to another.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, section 18-4-103(1), C.R.S. (2019), states that a person commits the crime of second degree arson if he “knowingly sets fire to, burns, causes to be burned, or by the use of any explosive damages or destroys, or causes to be damaged or destroyed, any property of another without his consent, other than a building or occupied structure.” (Emphasis added.) ¶45 The language in these statutes is nearly identical to the language in the embezzlement statute. The second degree tampering and second degree arson statutes refer to “property of another,” while the embezzlement statute refers to “property of the state.” Given that “property of another” includes property in 11 which another has a possessory, but not a proprietary, interest, “property of the state” should likewise include property in which the state has a possessory, but not a proprietary, interest. Just as someone accused of second degree tampering or second degree arson may not defend against such a charge by claiming that the victim had a possessory, but not a proprietary, interest in the property in question, so too, someone accused of embezzlement should be precluded from defending against such a charge by claiming that the state had a possessory, but not a proprietary, interest in the property in question. 2 ¶46 The majority attempts to write off these statutory provisions by pointing out both that embezzlement appears in a different article of the criminal code than crimes against property and that the identity of the property owner (the public) “is an essential” element of the former but “largely inconsequential” for purposes of proving the latter. Maj. op. ¶¶ 15, 18. In general, I don’t have a bone to pick 2Interestingly, the “[d]efacing property” statute, which also appears in the article governing property crimes, includes a provision that refers to a cave that is either “public property or the property of another.” § 18-4-509(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. (2019). There is no basis to believe that “public property,” as used there, refers only to property in which the state has a proprietary interest, but that “property of another” refers to property in which someone other than the defendant has a proprietary or possessory interest. See id. 12 with these observations. But they are largely irrelevant to the analysis: Neither advances the ball for the majority or refutes any part of this dissent. 2. Consequences of the Majority’s Statutory Interpretation ¶47 I am also troubled by the majority’s opinion because it will lead to absurd results. After today’s holding, a public employee who knowingly converts to his own use property in which his employer has a possessory, but not a proprietary, interest (such as property held in a fiduciary capacity) cannot be charged with embezzlement. But if the same public employee engages in exactly the same conduct under precisely the same circumstances, except that the government happens to have a proprietary interest in the property converted, he may be charged with embezzlement. ¶48 To illustrate the point, I borrow from a few of the hypothetical examples presented by the People. Assume, for example, that a public employee takes an older model truck owned by the city and uses it unlawfully to drive his children to the park every day for three years, while another public employee takes a new car leased by the city and engages in the same conduct as the first employee. Under the majority’s rationale, the former employee can be charged with embezzlement, but the latter employee cannot. ¶49 Assume further that a government agency collects child support and holds the funds until they can be disbursed to the intended recipients. If a staff member 13 of the agency were to convert some of those funds to his own personal use, he would be exempt from punishment for embezzlement because the government did not have a proprietary interest in the money. The same outcome would result if the funds collected and converted were designated as restitution payments for victims of crime. ¶50 Finally, assume that a public employee takes his agency’s expensive office equipment home and converts it to his personal use. If the office equipment was owned by his employer, he may be guilty of embezzlement, but if, as is often the case, the office equipment was leased, he would be exempt from punishment for embezzlement. ¶51 It is difficult for me to accept that these are the absurd results the legislature envisioned when it referred to “property of the state” in the embezzlement statute. Of course, we are required to presume that the legislature did not intend such absurd results. Carrera, ¶ 17, 449 P.3d at 729 (cautioning that “we must ‘avoid constructions that would . . . lead to illogical or absurd results’” (quoting McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d 379, 389)). III. Conclusion ¶52 In sum, the majority mistakenly determines that the embezzlement statute is clear and unambiguous. It then misconstrues the phrase “property of the state” to exclude property in which the state has a possessory, but not a proprietary, 14 interest. For these reasons, and because today’s opinion will lead to absurd results, I write separately with respect to Part II-B. I therefore respectfully concur in part and dissent in part; I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE COATS joins in this concurrence in part and dissent in part. 15