Opinion ID: 779089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendants' Statutory Interpretation Challenges

Text: 108 To the extent pertinent to these actions, the Superfund Amendments to CERCLA provide as follows: § 9658. Actions under State law for damages from exposure to hazardous substances 109 (a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substance cases 110 (1) Exception to State statutes 111 In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute. 112 (2) State law generally applicable 113 Except as provided in paragraph (1), the statute of limitations established under State law shall apply in all actions brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility. 114 .... 115 (b) Definitions. 116 As used in this section — 117 (1) Subchapter I terms 118 The terms used in this section shall have the same meaning as when used in subchapter I of this chapter. 119 (2) Applicable limitations period 120 The term applicable limitations period means the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought. 121 (3) Commencement date 122 The term commencement date means the date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable limitations period. 123 (4) Federally required commencement date 124 (A) In general 125 [With exceptions not relevant here,] the term federally required commencement date means the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. 126 42 U.S.C. § 9658. Subchapter I of CERCLA defines facility to include any landfill, storage container, [or] motor vehicle and any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed. Id. § 9601(9). The term release includes leaking, emitting, discharging, escaping, leaching, dumping, and disposing of hazardous substances into the environment, id. § 9601(22); the term environment includes ambient air and navigable waters of the United States, id. § 9601(8). 127 The language of § 9658(a)(1), specifying that the applicable state limitations period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of an earlier date provided by state law, makes it indisputably clear that Congress intended, in the cases to which § 9658 applies, that the FRCD preempt state law accrual rules if, under those rules, accrual would occur earlier than the date on which the cause of the personal injury was, or reasonably should have been, known to be the hazardous substance. Accord Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Reilly Industries, Inc., 215 F.3d 830, 840 (8th Cir.2000). Cf. ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v. Prime Technology, Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 360 n. 5 (2d Cir.1997) (Under 42 U.S.C. § 9658, if a claim is brought under state law for property damages caused by hazardous chemicals and state law does not provide a discovery rule, the state statute of limitations cannot begin to run until the plaintiff knew or should have known that the damages were caused by hazardous chemicals.); Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 28 F.3d 1089, 1091 (11th Cir.1994) (same). 128 In arguing that the district court misinterpreted § 9658, defendants do not dispute that the section has preemptive effect on claims that are within its intended scope; but they contend (1) that survival claims are not within its scope because the word plaintiff in § 9658(b)(4)(A)'s phrase the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) should be read to refer to the person who suffered the personal injury, rather than to the individual bringing the lawsuit, and (2) that wrongful death claims are not encompassed by § 9658 because they are not, under New York law, claims for personal injury[] or property damages. 129 In construing a statutory provision, we look first to see whether it is clear or is instead ambiguous. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). We determine whether the provision is ambiguous by examining its language, the context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. See id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. If the provision is precise and unambiguous, we generally need look no further. See, e.g., id. at 340, 117 S.Ct. 843; Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. Hammon, 150 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir.1998) (If the statutory terms are unambiguous, our review generally ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words.). If the statute is ambiguous, we look to legislative history as a means of determining congressional intent. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Auburn Housing Authority v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir.2002). 130 We conclude that these principles require rejection of defendants' contention that § 9658 does not encompass survival and wrongful death claims, for we find that its language unambiguously encompasses the former, and that, in light of the statutory scheme as a whole, it was meant to encompass the latter. 131
132 The scope of the FRCD is set in subsection (a)(1) of § 9658; by its terms, the section applies to  any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance ... released into the environment from a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (a)(1) does not use the term plaintiff. Nor does it specify by whom such personal injury actions must have been brought or state any limitation as to the persons on whose behalf the actions may have been brought. The absence of any such limiting provisions suggests that the scope of the section is sufficiently broad to encompass not only a suit brought by the person injured, but as well a suit brought by a person who has the right to represent the person injured, such as his guardian or the executor of his estate. Absent any such qualifications of the phrase any action brought, which on its face is all-encompassing, the implication of subsection (a)(1) is that § 9658 is meant to apply to any personal injury or property damage claim asserted by any person on whom state law confers standing to assert it. 133 Nor do we see in the language of subsection (b)(4)(A), which does use the word plaintiff in defining the FRCD in terms of the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) the cause of the injury, id. § 9658(b)(4)(A), any intimation whatever that the plaintiff must be the person who suffered the injury or that the person who suffered the injury must be the person who discovered its cause. Had Congress intended to limit the scope of the FRCD in this way, it could more simply have drafted this subsection to refer to `the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that his or her personal injury ... was caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance.' Instead, subsection (b)(4)(A) refers to knowledge of the plaintiff that the hazardous substance caused the personal injury ... referred to in subsection (a)(1).  Id. § 9658(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added). Given subsection (a)(1)'s broad scope, encompassing any [personal injury] action brought, we think it plain that Congress meant the FRCD to have potential application whenever a claim for personal injury is brought by any person who, under state law, has standing to bring such a claim. 134 Defendants' contention that this interpretation is impermissible because it allows for an open-ended limitations period, hinging on the fortuity of when the cause of injury is discovered, is wide of the mark. The Federal Commencement Date is not wholly subjective, for it is defined not only as the time at which the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the cause, but also as the time at which the plaintiff reasonably should have had that knowledge. The latter sets an objective standard, and if the two dates differ, § 9658(b)(4)(A) implicitly makes the FRCD the earlier. 135 Defendants also argue that reading the term plaintiff to mean the person who brings the suit will facilitate abuse by allowing a decedent's heirs to have the suit instituted by one who only recently learned the cause of the decedent's injuries, in order to make the suit timely despite the fact that a myriad of others (including the decedent) may have discovered it much earlier. (Defendants-Third-Party-Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants' brief on appeal at 88-89.) This contention is likewise unpersuasive, as § 9658(b)(4)(A)'s objective standard for accrual will apply if there was sufficient information that a plaintiff reasonably should have known the cause of the injury earlier than he actually knew. In any event, defendants' speculative policy concerns cannot override the clear provisions of the statute. 136 In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in ruling that survival claims are within the scope of § 9658. 137
138 Defendants' contention that the FRCD does not apply to wrongful death claims presents a somewhat closer question on the surface but is ultimately unpersuasive. Defendants argue that, although New York law characterizes survival claims as personal injury claims, it does not so characterize wrongful death claims, and hence the latter are not actions brought under State law for personal injury[] or property damages within the meaning of § 9658(a)(1). Given the possible variations among the laws of the several states, that phrase is not entirely free of ambiguity; but in light of Congress's intent in creating the Federal Commencement Date, we conclude that wrongful death claims under New York law were meant to be encompassed by § 9658. 139 As discussed in Part II.B. below, the FRCD was introduced as one of the 1986 Superfund Amendments to CERCLA. Section 301(e) of CERCLA, as originally enacted in 1980, required Congress to obtain a study of the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to man and the environment caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1) (emphasis added). After reviewing the commissioned study, congressional committees noted that the report, prepared by a distinguished panel of lawyers, concluded that because of the accrual dates selected by state law, certain State statutes deprive plaintiffs of their day in court. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962 (1986) (FRCD Conf. Rep.), at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354; Report of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R.Rep. No. 99-253(I) (1985) (FRCD House Rep.), at 105, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2887. The congressional committees recognized that [i]n the case of a long-latency disease, such as cancer, a party may be barred from bringing his lawsuit if the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the first injury — rather than from the time when the party `discovers' that his injury was caused by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3354; see also FRCD House Rep. at 105, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2887. As a result, the FRCD was introduced to address[] the problem identified in the 301(e) study, by provid[ing] for a Federal commencement date for State statutes of limitations which are applicable to harm which results from exposure to a hazardous substance,  defining that commencement date as the date the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, that the personal injury referred to above was caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3354 (emphases added). Thus, Congress's focus was on hazardous wastes' harm to man, 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1), and its intent was to make the FRCD applicable to claims for harm which results from exposure to a hazardous substance, FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3354. 140 Given this background, we see no valid basis for inferring that Congress meant § 9658 to distinguish between an action for wrongful death, as maintainable under New York law, and an action brought by a living victim. A living victim in a personal injury action may recover for, inter alia, damages for lost future earnings. See, e.g., Lopez v. Kenmore-Tonawanda School District, 275 A.D.2d 894, 895, 713 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (4th Dep't 2000) (mem.). Such a recovery would usually to some extent benefit the victim's dependents. If the victim has died, damages for his lost future earnings are recoverable only in a wrongful death action. Compare Sand v. Chapin, 238 A.D.2d 862, 863, 656 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (3d Dep't 1997) (mem.) (lost future earnings not recoverable in survival action), and N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 11-3.3 Practice Commentaries at 346 (McKinney 2001) (permissible recovery in survival action includes only damages accruing until [the decedent's] death), with Parilis v. Feinstein, 49 N.Y.2d 984, 985, 429 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166, 406 N.E.2d 1059 (1980) (mem.) (in a wrongful death action, recovery is permissible for loss of support, voluntary assistance and possible inheritance), and N.Y.E.P.T.L. §§ 5-4.3(c)(ii) and (iii) (factfinder in a wrongful death action must consider the amount of income taxes the decedent would have been required to pay from the sum that would otherwise be available for the support of persons for whom the action is brought). 141 Indisputably, the claim by a living victim for future earnings lost as a result of the injuries he suffered from exposure to hazardous wastes is one for personal injury within the meaning of § 9658(a)(1). Yet under defendants' proposed interpretation of the FRCD, wrongful death claims by the decedent's distributees for relief paralleling that which would have been available to the victim had he lived, including claims seeking their respective shares of the decedent's earnings lost as a result of that exposure, would not be within the scope of § 9658. Quite clearly then, under defendants' view of the FRCD, a company whose handling of hazardous wastes caused personal injury would be financially better off if its victim died. We conclude that this was not Congress's intent.