Opinion ID: 196657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maine Bribery Statute as a Basis for Violation of the Travel Act

Text: 27 We turn next to the substantive counts of interstate travel to facilitate bribery, a crime under Maine law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 and 2. The Interstate Travel Act punishes [w]hoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce ... with intent to ... promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate ... any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform such an act. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a). Bribery in violation of state law is an unlawful activity within section 1952. See United States v. Arruda, 715 F.2d 671, 681 (1st Cir.1983). The Maine bribery statute, charged here, provides in relevant part: 28
29 A. He promises, offers, or gives any pecuniary benefit to another with the intention of influencing the other's action, decision, opinion, recommendation, ... or other exercise of discretion as a public servant.... 30 17-A M.R.S.A. § 602(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). Pecuniary benefit means economic gain, including money or property. Id. § 602(2)(C). 31 Defendants were convicted of traveling between New York and Maine during the spring of 1992 with intent to carry on and facilitate the bribery of Moore, whom they knew was the police chief of the Passamaquoddy Reservation, and thereafter performing and causing to be performed acts to facilitate bribery, and aiding and abetting the offense. Evidence was presented that Cook and Lazore gave Moore tobacco at the end of their first meeting on April 15 (at which he was offered payment for his involvement); Cook paid Moore $1000 (Canadian) for the tobacco delivery on May 2; Boots paid Moore $600 for the delivery on May 16; and defendants discussed with Moore concerns with law enforcement on the reservation and elsewhere which might interfere with their objectives. 14 32 Defendants challenge their convictions for Travel Act violations on two principal grounds: 1) Moore, as police chief of the Passamaquoddy Indian Reservation, was not, they argue, a public servant within the meaning of the Maine bribery statute, supra; and 2) even if a public servant, his official duties did not include enforcing Canadian or federal laws and thus were not influenced. 15 We do not find merit in either contention. 33 Public servant is defined in the Maine criminal code as any official officer or employee of any branch of government and any person participating as juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in performing a governmental function. Id. § 2(21) (emphasis supplied). Government, in turn, is defined as: 34 the United States, any state or any county, municipality or other political unit within territory belonging to the State, the United States, or any department, agency or subdivision of any of the foregoing, or any corporation or other association carrying out the functions of government or formed pursuant to interstate compact or international treaty. 35 Id. § 2(13). Whether the foregoing definitions encompass the police chief of the Passamaquoddy Tribe at Pleasant Point requires consideration of the Tribe's legal relationship with the State of Maine. That relationship is spelled out in the federal Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (Settlement Act), which ratified Maine's Act to Implement the Maine Indian Claims Settlement, 30 M.R.S.A. §§ 6201-6214 (Maine Implementing Act). See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. State of Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 787 (1st Cir.1996); Couturier v. Penobscot Indian Nation, 544 A.2d 306 (Me.1988) (the purpose of the Implementing Act was to serve as a basic, organic document establishing the broad and basic provisions of the relationship between the State and the Maine Indians). 36 Under these acts, the Passamaquoddies are declared to be subject to the laws of the State and to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the State to the same extent as any other person ... therein unless otherwise provided. 30 M.R.S.A. § 6204; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1725(b)(1) (approving the jurisdictional scope set forth in the Maine Implementing Act). However, the Maine Implementing Act also grants powers and duties to the Tribe comparable to those of a municipality (in addition to special authority to regulate internal tribal matters). See 30 M.R.S.A. § 6206(1) (Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Passamaquoddy Tribe ... shall have, exercise and enjoy all the rights, privileges, powers and immunities, ... and shall be subject to all the duties, obligations, liabilities and limitations of a municipality of and subject to the laws of the State); id. § 6206(2) (granting a tribe, its officers, and employees immunity from suit when the respective tribe ... is acting in its governmental capacity to the same extent as any municipality or like officers or employees thereof within the State); Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478, 488 (Me.1983). Tribe-appointed law enforcement officers possess the same powers and are subject to the same duties, limitations and training requirements as other corresponding law enforcement officers under the laws of the State. 30 M.R.S.A. § 6210(4). These powers include shared authority for enforcing state laws within Indian territories (except for laws, not applicable here, over which a tribe may have exclusive jurisdiction). See id. § 6210(4). 37 The Maine legislature has thus explicitly equated, in most respects, the powers and obligations of tribes and tribal law enforcement officers with those of municipalities and corresponding law enforcement officers. See Couturier, 544 A.2d at 308 (tribes share the immunity of municipalities under the Maine Tort Claims Act by operation of section 6202 of the Maine Implementing Act, and this immunity extends to a tribe-appointed police officer acting in a governmental capacity). Since a law enforcement officer employed by a municipality would undoubtedly qualify as a public servant, see 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2(13) & 2(21), so too, we believe, would a tribe-appointed law enforcement officer. The definition of public servant extends, in any event, to a person (whether or not an official officer or employee) participating as juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise performing a governmental function. Id. § 2(21). Moore was charged with enforcing state laws and tribal ordinances within the reservation. We think he fits, therefore, rather easily within the Maine statute's definition of public servant. 38 Defendants' reliance upon United States v. Tonry, 837 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.1988) is misplaced. Tonry may initially appear analogous, because it involved charges of conspiracy to violate and substantive violation of the Travel Act based on interstate travel with intent to bribe the chairman of an Indian tribe. However, unlike the instant case which involves defining public servant under Maine law, the sole question resolved by the Fifth Circuit was whether the tribal chairman was a private fiduciary under Louisiana's Commercial Bribery Statute. Defendants call attention to Tonry because the court indicated that the tribal chairman was not a Louisiana public official within the meaning of another statute targeting public bribery. Yet in that case, the government conceded that issue, given the particular statutory scheme. Here, in contrast, the Maine criminal code defines public servant quite broadly using a functional measure, which is notably absent from the public bribery law referred to in Tonry. More importantly, Maine's criminal laws operate against the backdrop of the Settlement Act which ratified the Maine Implementing Act. See Penobscot Nation, 461 A.2d at 489 (It was generally agreed that the acts set up a relationship between the tribes, the state, and the federal government different from the relationship of Indians in other states to the state and federal governments.). Defendants cannot expect the jurisdictional burdens on the Tribe resulting from these acts to disappear merely because they have become inconvenient. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 75 F.3d at 794. 16 39 Defendants also challenge the predicate state bribery violation on the ground that Moore's official duties excluded enforcing federal or Canadian law and thus could not be influenced. As noted, the statute prohibiting bribery in official matters punishes one who promises, offers, or gives a pecuniary benefit with the intention of influencing the other's action, decision, ... or other exercise of discretion as a public servant. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 602(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). The jury could find on the evidence presented that, as police chief, Moore was responsible for general surveillance of the reservation, and that defendants selected him, in part, with the intention that he divert other officers on the reservation from patrolling areas of smuggling activity. Cf. State v. Beattie, 129 Me. 229, 151 A. 427 (1930) (defendant charged with bribing county sheriff to refrain from seizing liquor and arresting person making an unlawful sale). Moore testified that he normally would have referred smuggling activity to the local district attorney's office and pursued the matter further if so directed. He also testified to having a mutually beneficial working relationship with Canadian authorities which included exchanging information. It may be conceded that his duties did not formally include enforcing federal or Canadian law. But an honest municipal police officer would be expected to keep his eyes open for and report federal and, in present circumstances, even foreign criminal violations; receiving something of value to turn a deliberate blind eye would limit his discretion in his official capacity as tribal police chief. 40 Defendants' related contention that they recruited Moore simply because of his navigational skills and not his status as police chief is undermined by substantial evidence showing that they were aware of Moore's status and concerned with law enforcement activities from the first meeting onward. We conclude that bribery was a legally sufficient foundation for the Travel Act violations, and therefore affirm those convictions. 41