Opinion ID: 48706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: use of the stun belt

Text: 176 Fields's next claim is that the district court abused its discretion by requiring him to wear a stun belt at trial. Since Fields failed to object to the stun belt below, our review is only for plain error. Fields contends (1) that the trial court failed to find explicitly that the stun belt was necessary or to exercise its discretion independently from the recommendation of the Marshals Service and (2) that the decision to use a stun belt was substantively unjustified in light of his good behavior during previous court appearances and due to the heightened prejudice restraints may cause a pro se litigant. We hold that the district court committed no reversible error. 177 As to Fields's first argument, we have held that a court may rely heavily on the U.S. Marshal's advice when deciding whether defendants should be shackled during trial. United States v. Ellender, 947 F.2d 748, 760 (5th Cir.1991). Moreover, a district court's failure to assign reasons for physically restraining a defendant—though erroneous—is not reversible error where those reasons are readily apparent to us from the record. United States v. Hope, 102 F.3d 114, 118 (5th Cir.1996). Here, the Marshals Service testified that Fields (1) had a violent criminal history, (2) had been aggressive, volatile, and lewd while in custody, and (3) had a history of escape and escape attempts. The district court's reasons for restraining Fields are readily apparent. 178 Turning to Fields's second argument, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to restrain Fields with a stun belt. Physical restraint may be justified where there is a danger of escape or injury to the jury, counsel, or other trial participants. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir.2003). Fields posed just such dangers. That Fields had not previously misbehaved in court does not eliminate the import of Fields's previous prison escape attempts and history of violence. A trial court need not wait until an obviously dangerous defendant actually injures trial participants or tries to escape from the courtroom before restraining him. In addition, the district court appropriately took steps to minimize any risk of prejudice. Fields was allowed to conceal the stun belt under street clothes. Moreover, the court took into account the special problems that physical restraints might pose under Fields's decision to proceed pro se. It provided that both sides would remain seated before the jury. These steps ensured that the jury would neither see the stun belt nor surmise that Fields was being treated differently from the prosecutors. For these reasons, the court did not abuse its discretion.