Opinion ID: 2595083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Voir Dire

Text: Defendant contends that during voir dire the prospective jurors were not adequately questioned to determine whether their attitudes regarding capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair'  their ability to determine whether defendant should be sentenced to death. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) He claims the trial court conducted a perfunctory and cursory inquiry into the prospective jurors' views on capital punishment by asking leading questions unlikely to uncover bias. On this issue, he notes, defense counsel posed no questions to 11 of the jurors who were chosen for the trial, and asked only one question of the twelfth juror. As a result, he claims, he was not tried by an impartial jury, as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and the jury's penalty decision did not satisfy his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable penalty determination. To the extent defendant contends the trial court inadequately questioned prospective jurors on their attitudes toward the death penalty, he has not preserved the issue for appeal because he did not object on this ground at trial. ( People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 413, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) In any event, the court adequately questioned the prospective jurors. Following a procedure recommended by this court in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, the court questioned the jurors individually and in sequestration. After asking prospective jurors to describe their views on the death penalty, the court asked whether they would automatically convict defendant so they could get to the penalty stage or would automatically find the special circumstance allegations not true to avoid the question of penalty; whether they would in every case vote to impose the death penalty or would in every case vote to impose a sentence of life without possibility of parole; and whether they had moral, religious, or philosophical beliefs that would impair their ability to decide the case. Counsel were then permitted to ask follow-up questions. There was no constitutional violation in this procedure. (See People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 413, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) Defendant also appears to claim his trial attorneys were incompetent because, with one exception, they asked no follow-up questions of the prospective jurors who were later selected for the trial, to further probe their attitudes on the death penalty. But counsel did ask follow-up questions to other prospective jurors who were not selected. In not questioning the prospective jurors who were later chosen to serve on the jury, defense counsel may well have made a reasonable tactical decision. We find no evidence of incompetence. (See generally People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 818-819, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 587, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 289-290, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.)