Opinion ID: 3010300
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Change of Discipline

Text: Exxon next argues that the arbitrator lacked authority to reinstate Cash because the company's September 28, 1988 letter clearly notified employees that termination was the penalty for violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy. But the Drug Policy requires only that employees submit to testing where cause exists. The arbitrator concluded that it did not; accordingly, based on his findings, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority. Exxon further maintains that the arbitrator lacked authority to change the discipline for a finding of insubordination, and in doing so exceeded his power to interpret the contract. The arbitrator found that Cash's refusal to take the drug test was insubordinate. Although company rules permit Exxon to discharge an employee for insubordination, the arbitrator believed that under these circumstances a discharge would conflict with the requirement that cause support an order to take a drug test. This situation is analogous to the one we faced in Super Tire, 721 F.2d 121. In that case, drinking alcohol during work hours was characterized in the parties' contract as a cause for immediate dismissal. Id. at 122. Yet dismissal also required just cause. Id. The arbitrator determined that although the employee had been drinking during work hours, dismissal was too harsh a punishment because the employee had not been warned that the company would strictly enforce its policy. We reversed the district court's order vacating the arbitrator's determination because we concluded that the terms of the contract were not so clear as to foreclose the arbitrator's interpretation that a warning was required. Id. at 125. In Super Tire, we relied on our earlier decision in Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982). There, a clause in the employment contract provided for discharge of employees absent from work for four consecutive days without good cause. Another section provided that employees shall be discharged only for just cause. Id. at 753. The arbitrator reinstated an employee who had been terminated for being absent from work for 19 days without good cause. The district court vacated the award. We held that the district court erred because [i]t cannot be said with absolute certainty . . . that discharge under this section is `strictly a function of management.' Id. at 756 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584 (1960)). Similarly here, the Agreement stated that insubordination shall constitute cause for which unlicensed personnel may be discharged. App. at 147 (emphasis added). The subsequent September 1988 letter warned that the company's Drug and Alcohol Policy would be strictly enforced. The policy included the provision that employees must submit to drug testing where cause exists. App. at 44. The Chairman found that reading these provisions together, the just cause standard still applied, and because Exxon lacked cause to test Cash, discharge for insubordination would be inappropriate. As in Super Tire and Arco, we cannot say that the arbitrator's reading of the contract is implausible and that his decision to reinstate Cash was beyond the bounds of his authority.