Opinion ID: 766385
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the Evidence

Text: 22 The Supreme Court has stated that district courts must conduct a two part inquiry when reviewing administrative decisions brought under 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(2): 23 First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized education program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligationsimposed by Congress and the courts can require no more. 24 Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-207 (1982). The parties agree that this inquiry governed the district court's review, but they disagree as to whether the district court exceeded the scope of its inquiry. 25 The Guests argue that the district court only had subject matter jurisdiction to review evidence relating to the 1995-1996 school year and the recommended IEP for the 1996-1997 school year. The district court, however, heard evidence and decided issues concerning the 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 school years. The Guests contend, therefore, that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction when it considered evidence beyond the administrative record developed for the September 1996 administrative hearing and decided issues arising after the administrative hearing. 26 The Guests' position equates subject matter jurisdiction to administrative exhaustion and links both to the administrative record. The administrative scheme of the Act requires that parents or guardians dissatisfied with their child's identification, evaluation, or placement under the Act can request an administrative due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §1415(b)(1)(2). If the parents or guardians are dissatisfied with the results of the hearing, they have the right to appeal the decision to a federal district court. See 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(2). Every court that has considered the question has considered this statutory scheme as a requirement for the exhaustion of remedies. Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1989). 27 Reviewing courts are statutorily required to review the administrative record from below. See 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(2). The Supreme Court has stated that the statutory requirement to review the administrative record implies that the federal court give due weight to the administrative proceeding. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. The Sixth Circuit expanded upon this requirement in Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340 (6th Cir. 1989) saying that [i]n order for a reviewing court to accord 'due weight' to state administrative proceedings, the court must accommodate the procedures contemplated by the Act so that there is an administrative record to review. 879 F.2d at 1344. In Doe v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the district court should not have considered the propriety of an IEP proposed for the 1987-1988 school year when the plaintiffs failed to request a due process hearing first. See id. 28 This Court has previously given sound and important policy rationales for the administrative exhaustion requirement: 29 States are given the power to place themselves in compliance with the law, and the incentive to develop a regular system for fairly resolving conflicts under the Act. Federal courts--generalists with no expertise in the educational needs of handicapped students--are given the benefit of expert factfinding by a state agency devoted to this very purpose. Such a mechanism is necessary to give effect to a fundamental policy underlying the [IDEA]: that the needs of handicapped children are best accommodated by having the parents and the local education agency work together to formulate an individualized plan for each handicapped child's education. Were federal courts to set themselves up as the initial arbiters of the handicapped children's educational needs before the administrative process is used, they would endanger not only the procedural but also the substantive purposes of the Act. 30 Crocker, 873 F.2d at 935. 31 Plaintiff-Appellee Metro Board disputes that this is a question of subject matter jurisdiction and argues instead that 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(2) is controlling: 32 In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the recordsof the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate. 33 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(2). Metro Board argues that the additional evidence it offered was properly admitted for the purpose of deciding whether the original proposed IEP for the 1996-1997 school year was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefit. 34 The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of what additional evidence may be considered by the district court upon review of an administrative proceeding in Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn. v. Cook, 915 F.2d 232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit declined to adopt the narrow position that additional evidence is admissible only in limited circumstances, such as to supplement or fill in the gaps in the evidence previously introduced. Cook, 915 F.2d at 234. Instead, it adopted a broad interpretation of the term additional. 'Additional,' in its ordinary usage, implies something that is added, or something that exists by way of addition. To 'add' means to join and unite; the limitation on what can be joined inherent in the term 'supplement' is not present in the term 'add.' Id. 35 In conducting its review of the district court's decision, this Court is mindful both of the administrative exhaustion doctrine and of the statutory mandate to accept additional evidence. Evidence arising from events occurring during the 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 school years was properly admitted by the district court, but only for the purpose of deciding whether the proposed IEP for the 1996-1997 school year was reasonably calculated to lead to educational benefits. SeeRowley, 458 U.S. at 206-207 (reasonably calculated standard); Fuhrman v. East Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1040 (3d Cir. 1993) ([E]vidence of a student's later educational progress may only be considered in determining whether the original IEP was reasonably calculated to afford some educational benefit.). The court holds, therefore, that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction to the extent it used additional evidence to rule upon issues beyond those presented to the ALJ. 36 The district court lacked authority to evaluate the appropriateness of later proposed IEP's because the Guests did not first seek a due process review of those hearings. See Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d at 1344. The district court committed error, therefore, to the extent it admitted evidence for the purpose of evaluating the later proposed IEPs. The district court exceeded its jurisdiction when it adjudicated the propriety of the Guest's proposal to send Joel to a private, residential facility. Similarly, the district court committed error when it admitted evidence concerning the parents' request for unrestricted observation of Joel at school and when it denied that request in its ruling. Those issues were not before the ALJ in 1996, and the Guests have failed to otherwise exhaust their administrative remedies. The Guests should have been required to seek an impartial due process hearing before bringing those issues before the district court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415; see also Crocker, 873 F.2d at 935; Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1344;