Opinion ID: 767509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Suspicion for Detention

Text: 25 Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), police officers may stop and briefly detain an individual for investigative purposes if they have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion must be supported by particular and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant an intrusion. United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 840 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized . . . hunch'. The Fourth Amendment requires 'some minimal level of objective justification' for making the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, [t]his reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable cause standard[.] United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1993). 26 The presence or absence of reasonable suspicion must be determined in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting a police officer, including all information available to the officer at the time of the decision to stop a person. United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1992). Factors that ordinarily constitute innocent behavior may provide a composite picture sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion in the minds of experiencedofficers[.] United States v. Holloway, 962 F.2d 451, 459 (5th Cir. 1992). 27 Reasonable suspicion is a question of law, to which we apply de novo review. Silva, 957 F.2d at 159. 28 Here, the precise issue is whether Goodson's physical appearance fit the description of the BOLO sufficiently to give rise to reasonable suspicion that he was the suspected assailant. We hold that, because Goodson's physical appearance is a disputed issue of fact, the district court could not make a determination of reasonable suspicion on summary judgment. 3 29 The BOLO gave reasonable suspicion to stop and, because of the violent nature of the suspected crime, frisk a tall, heavy-set, white man dressed as a cowboy. To have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Goodson based on the BOLO, Gaines would have to harbor a reasonable belief that Goodson matched the description in the BOLO. If Goodson was dressed as he claims-in a paint-splattered, long-sleeved button-down shirt, khaki pants, no belt, velcro tennis shoes, and a baseball cap-then he would not have been dressed as a cowboy and would have matched the BOLO in only the vaguest of its terms. 4 The BOLO would not give Gaines reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk any tall, heavy-set, white man. Such a description would simply be too vague, and fit too many people, to constitute particular, articulable facts on which to base reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding no reasonable suspicion where the suspect matched the following partial description:black male, 5 feet 6 inches to 5 feet 9 inches tall and weighing between 150 and 180 pounds, with a medium afro hair style, who was wearing jeans and a long denim jacket.); United States v. Rias, 524 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding no reasonable suspicion where the suspects matched the following description: two black men driving a black or blue Chevrolet). 30 Moreover, reasonable suspicion derives from particular, articulable facts and the inferences from those facts. If Goodson was dressed as he claims, at least two inferences that Gaines would have had to draw from Goodson's physical presence further undercut any reasonable suspicion that Goodson committed the assault on Violet Road. First, to have been the assailant, Goodson must have changed his clothing between Violet Road and Leopard Street. Such behavior would be very strange from someone who reportedly was heading to another cowboy bar. 31 Second, the assailant described by the BOLO allegedly threw his wife out of his car. Yet Goodson was walking along a desolate street, something he hardly would be doing if he had a car. 5 Therefore, toconclude that Goodson matched the BOLO, Gaines would have to infer that Goodson parked or left his car somewhere and began walking in a direction away from the nearest cowboy bar on a deserted street-behavior, again, that would be exceptional from an individual reportedly headed to a cowboy bar. 32 On the other hand, if Goodson was dressed as Gaines claims-in a long-sleeved button down shirt, khakis, cowboy boots, a belt with an over-sized belt buckle, and a baseball cap-then Goodson would have met the description in the BOLO with sufficient specificity to give rise to reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him. The factual dispute over Goodson's physical appearance is thus crucial to the issue of qualified immunity. 6 33 Additionally, one other factual dispute bears on the question of reasonable suspicion. Gaines alleges that he asked Goodson for identification twice and told Goodson that he was a suspect in an assault. Goodson's belligerent response and refusal to identify himself, Gaines says, is what led Gaines to frisk him. Goodson, on the other hand, claims that Gaines first sought to frisk him and never asked for identification or revealed that Goodson might be a suspect in an assault. 7 To have reasonable suspicion to frisk Goodson, Gaines would have to point to particular, articulable facts indicating that Goodson was armed or posed a danger. See Sanders, 994 F.2d at 203 (A police officer may conduct such a limited search if 'a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.' (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)). If Goodson met the description in the BOLO, then Gaines would have reasonable suspicion to suspect Goodson of having committed an assault, and would therefore have reasonable suspicion to frisk him. 34 If Goodson did not match the BOLO with sufficient specificity, however, Gaines could not rely on the BOLO to provide reasonable suspicion to frisk Goodson. 8 Gaines could approach Goodson, as he could approach anyone on the street, and ask permission to ask questions or ask for identification. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991) ([E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questionsof that individual . . . [and] ask to examine the individual's identification . . . as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their request is required. (citations omitted)); United States v. Cooper, 43 F.3d 40, 145 (5th Cir. 1995) ([A] consensual encounter . . . . may be initiated by the police without any objective level of suspicion.). Gaines could not, however, begin his encounter with Goodson by frisking him. 9 Therefore, if Gaines did ask for identification and Goodson refused, then Goodson's physical appearance has less bearing on the issue of qualified immunity; if, however, Gaines sought, without preliminary questioning, to frisk Goodson, then Gaines would have to have had reasonable suspicion, and Goodson's physical appearance is of paramount importance. 35 The factual disputes over Goodson's attire and Gaines's initial remarks are therefore critical to the question of qualified immunity. Though Goodson has clearly alleged a stop and frisk without reasonable suspicion, we are unable to determine whether Gaines acted in an objectively reasonable manner without resolving these factual disputes. 36 The lower court erred when it focused too closely on the fact that reasonable suspicion is a question of law. This is obviously true, but, even though the district court will determine at trial as a matter of law whether reasonable suspicion existed, the district court cannot draw conclusions of law from disputed facts at the summary judgment phase. This principle was set forth in Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d at 1056, which squarely controls this case. There, we rejected the defendant's claim to summary judgment on the qualified immunity issue because [d]ivergent versions of what happened have been offered by Appellants and Johnston. Id. at 1058. We held that, because a genuine dispute as to the material and operative facts of this case exists, . . . . [s]ummary judgment is inappropriate unless plaintiff's version of the violations does not implicate clearly established law. Id. at 1061. See also Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 432 (5th Cir. 1997) ([W]e will not consider disputed facts in determining whether the officers had, or reasonably believed that they had, probable cause to search Hart's home or to arrest her.); Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994); Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 1993). 37 Goodson has submitted sufficient evidence suggesting that he was not dressed like a cowboy and that Gaines attempted to frisk him without any preliminary questioning to survive summary judgment on this aspect of the issue of qualified immunity. Whether Goodson's evidence is more credible than Gaines's is a question for the trier of fact. On summary judgment, we do not make such determinations; rather, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, here Goodson. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of qualified immunity on this issue and remand for a trial on the merits. 38 We caution that our holding today is extremely narrow. We express no opinion as to whether Gaines and Perez acted in an objectively reasonable manner or whether they ultimately will be entitled to qualified immunity. Our only holding is that we cannot tell, at the summary judgment stage of the case where we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Goodson, whether Gaines and Perez acted in an objectively reasonable manner. At trial, however, a very differentpicture may result than the one painted by the summary judgment record because [Goodson] must prove the issues that this opinion assumes in his favor, and the jury can choose to credit certain facts over others, which we cannot do in reviewing a denial of summary judgment. Gutierrez, 139 F.3d 451.