Opinion ID: 540159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court's Comments to the Jury

Text: 34 Before the district judge instructed the jury, he told them that he would make some commentary on the evidence in the case. He told the jurors that they were not bound by his comments. He then reviewed the evidence, separating it into hard evidence and other evidence. He told the jury that they might very well expect that the Augusta police department's timekeeping abilities were in good shape and were accurate. The court stated that there was definitely hard evidence that Jenkins was in the main bank building at the time of the robbery, but that there was other evidence about where he might have been. The court noted that Jenkins had denied stealing the money while under oath, and that his denial was consistent with his earlier statements. The court urged the jury to determine whether lack of security, appropriateness of the Sizemore security system, Jenkins' financial status, and the negligence of other bank employees were issues central to the case, or whether the more important issues were whether money was stolen and whether Jenkins had it. The court concluded the commentary by stating that your consideration on matters of fact is to determine whether or not the government has proven, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant was the person who stole money, if any, from the possession of First Union Bank. 35 Jenkins argues that the judge's commentary suggested to the jury (1) that they should accept the testimony of the police officers; (2) that Jenkins was in the bank during the theft; and (3) that Jenkins should have had a satisfactory explanation for the money found in his attic. Jenkins argues that the commentary was prejudicial to him and played a part in his conviction. We disagree. 36 In Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933), the Supreme Court stated that a trial judge is not limited to giving abstract instructions. He may 37 assist the jury in arriving at a just conclusion by explaining and commenting upon the evidence, by drawing their attention to the parts of it which he thinks important; and he may express his opinion upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted to their determination. 38 Id. at 469, 53 S.Ct. at 699. This Court has held that a trial judge may comment on evidence so long as he instructs the jury that it is the sole judge of the facts and that it is not bound by his comments.... United States v. Hope, 714 F.2d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir.1983). Of course such discretion is not without limits; the judge may not distort or add to the evidence, and should make commentary only with great care. Quercia, 289 U.S. at 469, 53 S.Ct. at 699. The district court must be sure that its remarks do not prejudice the jury against the defendant; [j]uries are extremely sensitive to every word and intimation given by the judge. United States v. Cox, 664 F.2d 257, 259 (11th Cir.1981); see also United States v. Hope, 714 F.2d at 1088. 39 The trial judge's comments in Jenkins' case did not stray from neutrality. United States v. Bertram, 805 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Harris, 720 F.2d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir.1983). The judge informed the jury that they were responsible for finding facts and making credibility determinations. He told the jury that they were not bound by his comments. He told them that the police department kept accurate time, and that there was substantial evidence regarding Jenkins' whereabouts during the robbery. Finally, the judge pointed out to the jury that some of the evidence presented might be irrelevant and might serve to distract them from the task at hand. Nowhere did the judge tell the jury that Jenkins was guilty or that he had failed to make a showing on a particular point. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in making comments to the jury.