Opinion ID: 2811841
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 01(a); M.D. Fla. Admin. Proc. I(A), I(D)(1).

Text: Hyppolite contends the district judge erred by failing to advise him he was facing a mandatory-life-imprisonment sentence, and the judge should have submitted his prior convictions and the drug quantities at issue to the jury. Hyppolite’s unpreserved attacks on his conviction and sentence fail under the plain-error standard, because he neither cites any binding case law nor states errors that affect his substantive rights. Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1357 (noting error is not plain unless it is contrary to explicit statutory provisions or binding precedent); see United States v. McKinley, 732 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2013) (recognizing, even if error is plain, a defendant may not be entitled to relief if the evidence of a statutory element of an crime is “overwhelming and uncontroverted,” as in this case). Hyppolite’s counsel argues the district judge erred in imposing a two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises for the manufacturing and distribution of a controlled substance under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2). He alleges the judge erred in assigning a three-level enhancement for being a manager of criminal activity under 33 Case: 13-10471 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 34 of 37 § 3B1.1(b). But Hyppolite abandoned these issues on appeal. His brief recitation of facts and the absence of cited authority do not suffice to preserve the issue. “We have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (determining appellant’s arguments must contain “citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies,” and “simply stating that an issue exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue and precludes our considering the issue on appeal”). “[W]e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, we review de novo its application of the law to those facts, including its interpretation and application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Johnson, 694 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2012). The government presented evidence Hyppolite spent substantial time at and exercised control over an apartment used for the manufacture and distribution of crack cocaine. It also presented evidence Hyppolite supervised at least one participant in the conspiracy. Any possible error was harmless, because Hyppolite’s base-offense level would have been the same with his career-offender enhancement and would have resulted in a mandatoryminimum-life-imprisonment sentence. 34 Case: 13-10471 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 35 of 37 3. Bonita’s Challenge to His Life-Imprisonment Sentence Bonita argues the district judge erred in sentencing him to a mandatory- minimum term of life imprisonment. 15 He contends the judge’s oral pronouncement of a mandatory-life sentence, referencing § 841 (b)(1)(C), conflicts with the written sentence, citing § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and exposes the judge’s intent to sentence him under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(C), which provides a maximumimprisonment sentence of 30 years, not life imprisonment. Bonita alleges the judge’s imposing 10 years of supervised release further evidences this intent and error in his sentencing judgment. “Where there is a discrepancy between the orally imposed sentence and the written order of judgment and committal, the oral sentence controls.” United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 975, 977 (11th Cir. 1990). “If the oral sentence is ambiguous, then, in an attempt to discern the intent of the district court at the time it imposed sentence, the reviewing court may consider extrinsic evidence, 15 In Bonita’s presentence investigation report, the probation office assessed his base-offense level to be 34 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3) for his involvement with at least 840 grams but less than 2.8 kilograms of cocaine base, plus two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a dangerous weapon, for a total offense level of 36. At sentencing, the judge reduced Bonita’s base-offense level to 32, because of his involvement with more than 280 grams but less than 840 grams of crack cocaine. As a career offender, however, Bonita had a total-enhanced-offense level of 37. With a criminal history category of VI, Bonita had a Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Because the government had filed a timely notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851, Bonita confronted a mandatory-life sentence on Count One, which supplanted his otherwise-applicable Guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). His sentence on Count Ten was capped at a 30-year statutory maximum. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), 851. 35 Case: 13-10471 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 36 of 37 including the commitment order.” Id. “The district court is master of a sentence; the district court’s intention controls.” United States v. Kindrick, 576 F.2d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1978). Bonita correctly notes a discrepancy in the district judge’s oral sentencing and the sentencing judgment. But this inconsistency resolves in favor of the judge’s intent to sentence him to life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). A sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) comports with the written judgment, and the district judge made clear at the commencement of the sentencing proceeding that Bonita had been found guilty on Count One in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and 851. The government provided adequate notice showing its intent to seek an enhanced sentence, and the judge found Bonita had been convicted of two prior qualifying crimes. Even if we found this conflict created such ambiguity that it resisted interpretation, the oral pronouncement could not control, because imposing a life-imprisonment sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C) directly conflicts with the law. See United States v. Joseph, 743 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2014). The judge correctly stated at the beginning of the sentencing proceeding the provision under which Bonita was being charged, carefully evaluated the prior crimes serving to enhance Bonita’s sentence, sentenced Bonita to the correct term of life imprisonment after those enhancements, and recognized that this sentence 36 Case: 13-10471 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 37 of 37 was required under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). These factors evidence a clear intent to sentence Bonita to life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). We remand for the limited purpose of correcting the written judgment, because it incorrectly states Bonita received a 30-year sentence as to Count Eleven, when he was convicted under Count Ten, and the judge’s stated intent was to sentence him to life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). See United States v. Wimbush, 103 F.3d 968, 970 (11th Cir. 1997).16 AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART. 16 Bonita’s other sentencing issues are meritless. He argues the district judge erred by basing his sentence on crimes relating to cocaine base instead of cocaine and alleges there was ambiguity concerning the nature of the drug involved. The district judge properly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range and applied § 2D1.1(c)(4) of the Guidelines, based on the quantity of cocaine base involved in his crime. Bonita failed to show the judge inappropriately sentenced him for crimes related to cocaine base rather than cocaine and did not demonstrate he was entitled to relief on this argument. Similarly, the judge did not err or abuse his discretion in sentencing Ductant, because he had made proper determinations regarding the character of Ductant’s crime, his criminal history, and had considered mitigating factors. 37