Opinion ID: 848643
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The act giving rise to the probation violation may provide a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the legislative sentencing guidelines.

Text: M.C.L. § 771.4, which governs probation and revocation of probation, states: It is the intent of the legislature that the granting of probation is a matter of grace conferring no vested right to its continuance. If during the probation period the sentencing court determines that the probationer is likely again to engage in an offensive or criminal course of conduct or that the public good requires revocation of probation, the court may revoke probation. All probation orders are revocable in any manner the court that imposed probation considers applicable either for a violation or attempted violation of a probation condition or for any other type of antisocial conduct or action on the probationer's part for which the court determines that revocation is proper in the public interest. Hearings on the revocation shall be summary and informal and not subject to the rules of evidence or of pleadings applicable in criminal trials. In its probation order or by general rule, the court may provide for the apprehension, detention, and confinement of a probationer accused of violating a probation condition or conduct inconsistent with the public good. The method of hearing and presentation of charges are within the court's discretion, except that the probationer is entitled to a written copy of the charges constituting the claim that he or she violated probation and to a probation revocation hearing. The court may investigate and enter a disposition of the probationer as the court determines best serves the public interest. If a probation order is revoked, the court may sentence the probationer in the same manner and to the same penalty as the court might have done if the probation order had never been made. This section does not apply to a juvenile placed on probation and committed under section 1(3) or (4) of chapter IX to an institution or agency described in the youth rehabilitation services act, 1974 P.A. 150, M.C.L. §§ 803.301 to 803.309. [Emphasis added.] The sentence at issue in M.C.L. § 771.4 is clearly permissive, not mandatory. It states that if probation is revoked, the court may sentence the defendant as if probation had never been granted. While the sentencing court may sentence the probationer in the same manner and to the same penalty, nothing in the statute requires it to do so. In fact, the statute places an affirmative obligation on the trial court to take only two actions-to provide the probationer with a written copy of the charges constituting the probation violation and to conduct a probation revocation hearing. Thus, the court may continue, extend, or revoke probation. In the event that the court revokes a defendant's probation, it may sentence the defendant in the same manner and to the same penalty as the court might have done if the probation order had never been made. A judge, however, is not required to sentence the defendant in the same manner. [6] Further, the Legislature did not alter our jurisprudence on probation in the statutory codification of sentencing guidelines. [7] That is, a probation violation does not constitute a separate felony. . . . Id. at 482, 628 N.W.2d 484. Rather, revocation of probation simply clears the way for a resentencing on the original offense. [8] Defendant here is thus being sentenced on the original offensepossession of a Molotov cocktail. Without a mandate to impose a sentence on the probationer in the same manner and to the same penalty that could have been imposed if the probation order had never been made, it is perfectly acceptable to consider postprobation factors in determining whether substantial and compelling reasons exist to warrant an upward departure from the legislative sentencing guidelines. [9] Of course, not every probation violation and revocation warrants an upward departure. A trial court has broad latitude in deciding whether to revoke probation. It has less latitude in imposing a sentence in excess of the guidelines. The sentencing court must always follow the requirements set forth in M.C.L. § 769.34, as interpreted in People v. Babcock, 469 Mich. 247, 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003). M.C.L. § 769.34(3) permits a court to depart from the appropriate sentence range established under the sentencing guidelines ... if the court has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for departure. Babcock defines a substantial and compelling reason as requiring an objective and verifiable reason that keenly or irresistibly grabs the court's attention and is of considerable worth. Moreover, Babcock requires that the substantial and compelling reasons articulated by the trial court justify that particular departure. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines were not substantial and compelling because they were already considered when scoring the prior record variables and offense variables.