Opinion ID: 199159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentencing enhancement (Stein)

Text: 66 The district court found that Stein was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor for the purposes of U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c), and accordingly added two levels to her base offense level. Stein argues that the evidence does not support the district court's conclusion. Because a sentencing court's role-in-the-offense determination is necessarily fact-specific, we review deferentially and only for clear error or mistake of law. See United States v. Alicea, 205 F.3d 480, 485 (1st Cir. 2000). 67 The government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Stein's role satisfies the requirements of 3B1.1(c). See id. at 485. A two-level increase pursuant to 3B1.1(c) is justified 68 if the sentencing court supportably finds that (1) the criminal enterprise involved at least two complicit participants (of whom the defendant may be counted as one), and (2) the defendant, in committing the offense, exercised control over, organized, or was otherwise responsible for superintending the activities of, at least one of those other persons. 69 United States v. Cruz, 120 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc). In determining whether the defendant qualifies for the enhancement, the Sentencing Guidelines instruct courts to consider seven factors: 70 the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control exercised over others. 71 U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 cmt. (n.4). This list of factors is representative rather than exhaustive. United States v. Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 1995). 72 Stein opposed this enhancement in objections to the presentence report (PSR) and at sentencing. On appeal, Stein makes a very brief and general argument that the sentencing enhancement was erroneous because there was no evidence that she supervised or managed Otis's criminal conduct. We perceive no clear error. 73 The court could have reasonably found that Stein, together with Golenbock, devised and carried out a plan to conceal the Wellfleet property from bankruptcy creditors and the trustee by having Otis hold it for them in trust. Stein signed the backdated deed of the Wellfleet property to Otis. Stein met with the bankruptcy attorney, provided the information for her filing and attended the meetings of creditors. After they conveyed title to Otis, Stein and Golenbock forwarded the tax forms to her. 74 The testimony of Stein's and Golenbock's secretaries reflects that Stein as well as Golenbock exercised continuing decision-making authority with respect to the Wellfleet property. Stein paid or authorized the payment of bills, sometimes with handwritten directions on the bills. And with Golenbock, Stein received tax documents and insurance forms at her address. Stein and Golenbock made the arrangements with the real estate broker when the property was being sold. When the proceeds for the sale of the Wellfleet property were issued to Otis, amounting to more than $70,000, Otis signed them over to accounts from which Stein benefitted. 75 It is true that there is little evidence that Stein alone -- i.e., acting separately from Golenbock - directed Otis's activity related to the concealment. However, Stein does not contend that two organizers cannot act jointly to direct the activity of another, and we have found no authority so stating. Hence, we perceive no clear error in the district court's determination that Stein was a leader, supervisor, organizer or manager of Otis. 76