Opinion ID: 1703923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delegation of the Power to Create Criminal Offenses

Text: Defendant also argues that regardless how stringent the standards set by the Legislature, this delegation of power must fail. According to defendant, the creation of crimes, and more specifically of felony offenses, is an inherently legislative task which may not be delegated. As a threshold matter, we recognize that some legislative powers are simply not delegable. Though not specifically mandated by any constitutional provision, this prohibition arises from the basic structure of the government. Certain powers of the legislative branch require exercise by the Senate or the House of Representatives, or both, in order for their purposes to be served. For example, Const 1963, art 11, § 7 grants to the House of Representatives the power to impeach civil officers and to prosecute the impeachment. For the House to assign this impeachment power to a commission or agency would violate the spirit and the principle of art 11, § 7. Here, the nature of the function within the constitutional framework of the government precludes delegation. However, the complexities of modern government necessitate that today many facets of traditionally legislative power be exercised by administrative agencies. Provided that sufficient standards and safeguards, as discussed above, are provided to circumscribe the agencies' use of legislative power, thereby insuring effectuation of legislatively declared policies and a means to check agency action, such delegation of legislative power has been sanctioned repeatedly by this and other courts. See 1 Davis, Administrative Law, § 2.10, p 113, and § 2.04, p 30 (1976 Supp). Defendant correctly notes, and we agree, that the creation of crimes is an inherently legislative task. See United States v Wiltberger, 18 US (5 Wheat) 76, 95; 5 L Ed 37 (1820); 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, § 11, p 124; 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (C. Torcia ed), § 10, pp 31-32. As stated in People v Hanrahan, 75 Mich 611, 619; 42 NW 1124 (1889): To declare what shall constitute a crime, and how it shall be punished, is an exercise of the sovereign power of a state, and is inherent in the legislative department of the government. However, the standard of review of legislative delegation does not differ when the statute involves criminal sanctions. The Legislature is not precluded from including penal sanctions in a statute which declares a legislative policy, articulates guidelines to effectuate the policy, and authorizes an executive agency to implement its purpose. Review of this Court's cases which scrutinized the Legislature's delegation of power to create crimes reveals that such delegation has been permitted if sufficient safeguards protect the public from arbitrary and capricious abuses of delegated discretion. [5] In Senate of the Happy Homes Club of America v Alpena Board of Supervisors, 99 Mich 117; 57 NW 1101 (1894), the Court held unconstitutional a legislative scheme whereby persons arrested for drunkenness would be acquitted upon completion of a private alcohol rehabilitation program. Since each private program could enforce its own rules  as stringent or as lenient as it chose  and compliance with these varying rules automatically resulted in acquittal, the Court found that the Legislature had delegated to private corporations the power to acquit criminals, and thus to enact criminal law. This complete abdication of the legislative role and failure to insure any degree of accountability in the creation of crimes was held unconstitutional. On the other hand, statutory arrangements in which the Legislature provides regulatory guidelines for a subject area and prescribes penalties for violations of rules to be promulgated by an agency placed in charge of the regulatory activity have been approved by the Court. Thus, in People v Soule, 238 Mich 130; 213 NW 195 (1927), the Court reviewed an act which gave the commission of conservation the power to declare open season for birds, fish, and fur-bearing animals. The Legislature had declared that the commission was to regulate the wildlife of the state. Procedures were set forth to promulgate the rules, and penalties (including incarceration) were established for violation of properly promulgated rules. The Court found that this delegation of rulemaking power with attached criminal penalties included sufficient safeguards to avoid a separation of powers challenge. Pragmatically, the Court recognized that management of the state's natural resources required consideration of voluminous data; practical necessity dictated that evaluation of these facts should be left to an executive agency with considerable expertise. This Court concluded: Where the statute provides a punishment for violating the regulations or orders of a commission, the power to create a crime is not delegated to the commission. Id., 139. Therefore, the fact that the agency's rulemaking could have direct penal consequences did not invalidate the delegation of authority. See also Westervelt v Natural Resources Comm, 402 Mich 412; 263 NW2d 564 (1978); Dep't of Natural Resources v Seaman, supra . These cases indicate that the power to define crimes, unlike some legislative powers, need not be exercised exclusively and completely by the Legislature. Provided sufficient standards and safeguards are included in the statutory scheme, delegation to an executive agency is appropriate, and often necessary, for the effectuation of legislative powers. Clearly, the controlled substances act is premised on a legislative design similar to that employed in Soule. The Legislature formulated a comprehensive group of crimes dealing with controlled substances. An index of drugs adjudged dangerous or harmful was compiled, and the drugs were graduated according to potential for abuse. Penalties, including fines and incarceration, were coordinated to reflect the gravity of the offense and the seriousnesss of the controlled substance involved. Finally, the Board of Pharmacy, an eight-member board consisting of six pharmacists and two public members, was given the strictly controlled authority to modify the controlled substances schedule to insure that it reflect current developments in the drug industry. Defendant correctly notes, however, that while the regulatory scheme approved in Westervelt, Soule, and Seaman, supra, included only misdemeanor-level crimes, the controlled substances act creates felonies. While it is true that more serious consequences flow from a felony conviction under the controlled substances act, we find no meaningful distinction between the delegation of power to make rules regarding misdemeanor offenses and the delegation of rulemaking relative to felony offenses. The severity of the penalty does not destroy the accountability of the Legislature nor the safeguards provided to protect the public. Therefore, the Legislature has not unconstitutionally delegated a nondelegable power.