Opinion ID: 877316
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The factual data used to justify the

Text: higher penalty must consist of specific, identifiable conduct of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceedings. 3 9 5 U.S. at 7 2 5 - 7 2 6 . Unfortunately the sentencing court and this Court somehow ignored the application of these standards to this case. The three reasons announced by the sentencing court and given the green light by this Court for increasing the punishment to death are: (1) that defendant testified at his second trial permitting an assessment of his character; (2) that Christine Fetters gave considerable information relating to defendant's activities in planning the crime and in relation to his conduct after the commission of the crime; and ( 3 ) that the constitutionality of the death penalty at the first trial was in doubt, but now all doubts have been resolved. None of these stated reasons comply with the Pearce standards. A. THE DEATH PENALTY JUDGMENT ITSELF ADMITS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH PEARCE. In a footnote at page 9 of the death penalty judgment, the sentencing court admitted its noncompliance with Pearce and set forth its reasons for departing from the Pearce standards: This increase in sentence from the 100 years previously given admittedly raises a question for - - consideration upon review. ~ o2r F 2Carolina h v. Pearce, 3 9 5 U.S. 711, 8 9 S.Ct. 0 7 , allows for the imposition of a greater sentence in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may throw some light upon the defendant -- information may come and such -- to - judge's attention from evidence adduced - the - - second trial itself, as well as other at the sources. At the same time, in requiring that a more severe sentence must be accompanied by a showing of the reasons for the incGease in- severity, the reasons .. . ' must be based upon the objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.' (Emphasis added by District Court.) The question then is whether the judge can act only upon subsequently occurring conduct or whether he can act upon new information concerning past conduct which was not known to the judge at the time of the prior sentencing. I have interpreted the Pearce decision as being aimed at preventing vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction, and therefore have concluded -- that the evidence necessary to justify a - - more severe sentence ---- can come fromnew information about - defendant's conduct - - commission the in the - of - crime, i.e. past conduct as well as from the new conduct occurring after the original proceeding. Admittedly, there - - - - new conduct relevant has been no - Shea.) to - J. that issue - - - case. (Emphasis added by in this By his own admission, the sentencing judge relied on conduct of the defendant which preceded the first sentencing, but chose to give Pearce his own special interpretation in order that he could consider this information. This interpretation flies in the face of the Pearce standards. We thus have a situation where the sentencing court openly admitted that it did not comply with Pearce but declared that it really did not matter because it was not vindictive, and that Pearce was aimed only at vindictiveness. At least, however, the sentencing court did not attempt to rationalize its decision by asserting that the United States Supreme Court had later retreated from strict enforcement of the Pearce standards. It simply ignored the Pearce standards. On the other hand, the majority opinion has misinterpreted and misapplied three postPearce cases and would have us believe that the United States Supreme Court has already abandoned the standards set forth in Pearce in 1969. Each of the cases cited and quoted by the majority can be understood only in the peculiar circumstances existing in each case. The United States Supreme Court did not apply the Pearce standards in Colten v. Kentucky, supra, and in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, because the legal structure existing in the appellate process and later sentencing process satisfied the Court that vindictiveness as a factor in the imposition of a higher sentence, was deminimis. On the other hand, contrary to the implications of the majority opinion, in Blackledge v. Perry, supra, the Supreme Court extended the Pearce standards by applying them' to a prosecutor who was permitted by state law to charge a defendant with a higher degree of crime if the defendant appealed his conviction to a higher court. A brief analysis of each of these cases is in order. B. THE MAJORITY HAS MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPLIED THREE DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. In Colten v. Kentucky, supra, the situation involved a two-tiered trial system. A defendant convicted at the lower court and sentenced, had an absolute right to appeal to the higher court and have his case tried again. The lower court found defendant guilty and fined him $10; the defendant appealed to the higher court; he was found guilty after a trial de novo, and the fine was increased to $50. He claimed that this was retaliatory sentencing and thus prohibited by Pearce. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the threat of vindictiveness was de minimis where defendant was entitled to a complete retrial of the facts without reference to what happened at the lower court or to the fact of the appeal itself. Here, it was the system itself upon which the Supreme Court focused, not on whether there was actual vindictiveness demonstrated by the record. -67-