Opinion ID: 2271958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stun Belts

Text: During jury selection, the prosecutor advised the court that he was having lower-back problems that made standing for long periods of time painful, and he raised the possibility of conducting voir dire in the jury room instead of in the courtroom. Mr. Beaman, trial counsel for appellant Peete, commented that the only difficulty will be[,] if we go in the jury room, Your Honor, they will have to take time to strap our clients into harnesses. I'm not sure how visible those harnesses are. The trial judge responded, They have the stun belts. [1] I don't think they have to be very visible. The court then asked, Are you asking for [the defendants] to be present? When counsel Beaman responded in the affirmative, the court said, it may just be easier to do it that way. So I'll talk with the deputies.. . . The record establishes that appellants did wear stun belts during two days of jury voir dire while they sat at one end of a table about fifteen feet away from where individual jurors were seated during their interviews. Acknowledging that their trial counsel neither objected to use of the stun belts nor asked the court to consider other security options, appellants now argue that the trial court plainly erred in directing or permitting use of the belts without making findings on the record to justify use of the devices. They also argue that their lawyers provided ineffective assistance by their failure to object to use of the stun belts, to propose alternatives, to ensure that the belts were not visible to jurors, to ensure that the court made relevant findings, and to ensure that the Marshal's Service rules for use of stun belts were followed. We are not persuaded that the trial court plainly erred in permitting the use of stun belts under the circumstances here. [2] To be sure, the Supreme Court has held that absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion that their use is justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial, the use of visible physical restraints during the guilt phase of a criminal trial violates due process because it undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629, 630, 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). The Court has also recognized that the use of physical restraints can interfere with a defendant's ability to communicate with his counsel. Id. at 631, 125 S.Ct. 2007 ([S]hackles `impose physical burdens, pains, and restraints. . ., tend to confuse and embarrass' defendants' `mental faculties,' and thereby tend `materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional rights.') (citing People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1871)). Several courts of appeals in other jurisdictions have reasoned that stun belts amount to physical restraints, see, e.g., Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 904 (9th Cir.2003); can potentially chill a criminal defendant's consultation with counsel because of the danger of accidental activation of an electrical charge, see, e.g., Durham, 287 F.3d at 1302 n. 2, 1305, 1308; and should not be used unless the trial court makes findings on the record that their use is warranted. See, e.g., United States v. Wardell, 581 F.3d 1272, 1287-88 (10th Cir.2009); see also United States v. Edelin, 175 F.Supp.2d 1, 4-5 (D.D.C.2001). But, critical to our analysis, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has ever held that a stun belt qualifies as a type of physical restraint whose use is subject to the strictures that the Supreme Court set out in Deck, that the reasoning of Deck (which addressed the use of physical restraints during the guilt phase of a trial or during the penalty phase of a capital trial) applies equally to the limited use of restraints during jury selection; or that on-the-record findings are required before stun belts may be used. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court plainly erred in allowing the use of stun belts during the jury voir dire proceedings. [3] We also can find no error in the trial court's denial of appellants' ineffective-assistance claims premised on their counsels' failure to object to the use of stun belts. The cases on which appellants rely to establish that stun belts should be used only where a court has made on-the-record findings justifying their use and that stun belts constitute physical restraints, not only are from other jurisdictions, but also were decided after appellants' trial, which took place in 2000. [4] We cannot conclude that appellants' trial counsel were deficient for failing to anticipate the holding of those cases. Moreover, as the trial court implied on the basis of testimony by Mr. Tun (appellant Mungo's trial counsel) at the 23-110 hearing, defense counsel's willingness to accept the use of stun belts in conjunction with voir dire in the jury room was a tactical decision by counsel, whose objective was for [appellant Mungo] to be able to participate in the jury selection process instead of remaining at counsel table in the courtroom during the voir dire process. Peete testified at the 23-110 hearing that he had the same objective, telling his counsel that he wanted to be involved and wanted to hear what was being said during jury selection. Even if arguendo appellants' trial counsel's failure to object to use of the stun belts or to insist on procedural safeguards amounted to deficient performance, [s]tanding alone, the attorneys' failure to request an inquiry into the justification for the stun belt is not ineffective assistance. Some prejudice is required before a trial counsel's performance falls below the constitutional minimum. Wrinkles v. Buss, 537 F.3d 804, 815 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). On the issue of whether they were prejudiced by their counsel's failure to object, at the 23-110 hearing, appellants presented testimony by Jay Scott, a correctional officer who served on the jury that convicted appellants, who happened to meet appellant Mungo while Mungo was incarcerated, and who told the court that during the voir dire process, he noticed appellants wearing belts that he thought were stun belts. [5] Scott testified that this caused him to think that appellants were some bad criminals who had definitely been in the system before. Asked whether what happened in the jury room during voir dire affected [his] verdict in any way, Scott answered, Yes. The trial court, however, gave little weight to Scott's testimony, finding that his failures of recall about other details of what he saw during voir dire and where he had seen a stun belt previously decreased the value of his testimony. We have no basis to disturb the court's credibility finding as to Scott's testimony, particularly in light of Mr. Tun's testimony that Mungo's jacket covered the stun belt he was wearing and that Tun took steps to ensure that the stun belt was not seen because he understood that it could be prejudicial. Moreover, as the trial court emphasized, although Scott answered yes to the question from Mungo's counsel about whether his verdict was affected by what he saw during the voir dire process, he testified on cross-examination that his view was that [i]f you don't have the evidence, . . . then it's no way you should go to jail, whoever you are, and that he did not make up his mind about appellants' guilt or innocence until he heard the evidence. In light of that testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that appellants failed to show prejudice from their counsel's failure to object to the possible visibility of the stun belts. Appellants also argue that they were prejudiced by their counsel's omissions because the stun belts instilled fear in them, distracted them, and chilled their ability to participate in their defense. They testified that they were told that, if the stun belts were activated, electrical volts would cause them to defecate and urinate on themselves. Counsel Tun testified at the 23-110 hearing, however, that appellant Mungo did talk with him about which jurors to select and which jurors he did not like. [6] Similarly, the transcript of the jury-selection proceedings contains explanations to the court by appellant Peete's counsel, Mr. Beaman, that he sought to strike a juror because of the feelings of our clients with respect to their having viewed him and their having made a gut instinct call and by Mungo's counsel that he struck the same juror at his client's insistence. Further, at the 23-110 hearing, Peete was able to describe in detail why jurors were stricken during the voir dire process, evidencing his ability to concentrate and follow the proceedings despite having been outfitted with the stun belt. Because the record shows that appellants were able to consult with their lawyers while wearing the stun belts, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that appellants failed to show prejudice from their counsel's acquiescence in use of the stun belts. [7] Cf. Martin v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 08-14303, 2009 WL 3073253, at , 2009 U.S.App. LEXIS 21386, at - (11th Cir. Sept. 28, 2009) (holding that trial court correctly found that Martin failed to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland where, although Martin testified that wearing a stun belt affected his decision about whether to testify at his trial and prevented him from being able to communicate with counsel during trial, he also admitted that his decision not to testify was based largely on his lengthy criminal record and his counsel testified that Martin communicated regularly with him throughout trial and would often offer suggestions or point out something about a witness's testimony).