Opinion ID: 1727420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the court erred in failing to sustain the batson challenge raised by the defendant at trial

Text: ¶ 9. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) the Court held that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination during jury selection based solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To establish the prima facie case under Batson, a defendant must show the following: [He] is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice which permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Finally, the defendant must show that the facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. Walters v. State, 720 So.2d 856, 865 (Miss. 1998). The burden then shifts to the State to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for challenging the jurors. Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1296 (Miss. 1994). Finally, the trial court must determine whether the objecting party has met its burden to prove that there has been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory challenge. Walters, 720 So.2d at 865. ¶ 10. We accord great deference to the trial court in determining whether the offered explanation under the unique circumstances of the case is truly a race-neutral reason. Id. [A] trial judge's factual findings relative to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges on minority persons... will not be reversed unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 558 (Miss. 1995). This perspective is wholly consistent with our unflagging support of the trial court as the proper forum for resolution of factual controversies. Id. ¶ 11. Gary contends that the State used its peremptory challenges in an unconstitutional manner, specifically alleging that the State had effectively disenfranchised members of the black race since 8 of the State's 13 peremptory challenges were against black veniremen. Gary also relies on Hatten v. State, 628 So.2d 294 (Miss. 1993), and asserts that the trial court failed to make an on-the-record factual finding that the explanations offered by the State were race neutral. After the State provided reasons for its peremptory challenges, the trial judge made the following statement: With the exception of the gentlemen who is the accountant I would say under the Batson decision that I don't think any of these, both for the State or the defense, were stricken along racial lines or to constitute a jury that is racially consistent ... ¶ 12. Gary argues that a mere conclusive statement made by the trial court as to whether it finds a discriminatory purpose or race neutrality is not the specific finding required by Hatten. We place our trust in the trial judges to determine whether or not a discriminatory motive underlies the prosecutor's articulated reasons ... [A trial judge], in determining which explanations are sufficiently race-neutral and which are not, should have an equally `clear and reasonably specific' explanation for his ruling. Id. at 299. Furthermore, Hatten requires an on the record, factual determination, of the merits of the reasons cited by the State. Id. at 298. Mere broad conclusions at the end of the Batson process will not suffice. However, where a trial judge fails to elucidate such a specific explanation for each race neutral reason given, we will not remand the case for that Batson -related purpose alone. This Court is fully capable of balancing the Batson factors in cases such as this one. Continued remand of such cases only wastes the trial court's limited resources and acts to further delay justice. ¶ 13. Before moving to a review of those race-neutral reasons, we point out that the record clearly illustrates that Gary's counsel offered no rebuttal to the State's explanations for its peremptory strikes. In Bush v. State, 585 So.2d 1262 (Miss.1991), we stated that if a racially neutral explanation is offered the defendant can rebut the explanation. Id. at 1268. If the defendant makes no rebuttal, the trial judge must base his decision only on the explanations given by the State. Id. On appellate review this decision is given great deference, and we will reverse only when such decisions are clearly erroneous. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1349-50 (Miss.1987). Therefore, we review the trial court's ruling on the strikes under a harmless error analysis. ¶ 14. The record shows that the State used eight (8) of its thirteen (13) strikes to dismiss black venire members. The State offered race neutral reasons for all eight (8) strikes. As noted previously, Gary did not rebut any of these reasons. Only now does he raise objections to the probity of these strikes. Nevertheless, a review of the State's explanations clearly illustrates that the dismissal of all eight were, in fact, done for race-neutral reasons. The first was excluded for having written bad checks. The second was excluded for inattentiveness. The third did not complete the juror questionnaire. The fourth was excluded because her daughter-in-law is employed by the district attorney's office. The fifth was excluded for inattentiveness. The sixth was excluded because he failed to disclose that he had been a victim of a crime. The seventh failed to sign the juror questionnaire. Finally, the eighth failed to complete the juror questionnaire. We have previously held all of these explanations to be race-neutral on previous occasions. [3] ¶ 15. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's Batson ruling. Gary's first assignment of error is without merit.