Opinion ID: 2167438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Instructions and Special Interrogatory.

Text: Scalise challenges the district court's marshalling instruction (number 16) and also instruction number 17 as well as the special interrogatory. The statute under which Scalise was charged provides: [I]t is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.... . . . . b. Violation of this subsection with respect to the following controlled substances... is a class B felony ... . . . . (7) More than five grams but not more than five kilograms of methamphetamine.... Iowa Code § 124.401(1)( b )(7). The marshalling instructionnumber 16required the State to prove three elements: (1) on the date in question, Scalise knowingly possessed methamphetamine, (2) she knew that the substance was methamphetamine, and (3) she possessed the methamphetamine with the specific intent to deliver it. An additional instructionnumber 17provided: If you find the Defendant guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance, To Wit: Methamphetamine, With Intent to Deliver, you must then determine the amount of the mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. I have attached a question which must be answered, and by doing so, you will determine the degree or seriousness of the crime. In answering the question, the State must prove the amount of the mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. You will check the blank next to the appropriate amount on the verdict form. The special interrogatory provided: If you find the Defendant guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance, To Wit: Methamphetamine, With Intent to Deliver, as contained in Verdict Form No. 1, you must answer one of the following in accordance with your findings: 1. We find the amount of methamphetamine to be more than five grams. ________________________ Jury Foreperson 2. We find the amount of methamphetamine to be five grams or less. _________________________ Jury Foreperson The jury answered the first interrogatory, finding the amount of methamphetamine was in excess of five grams. Scalise points out that the marshalling instruction only required the jury to find she possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. And instruction number 17 only required the jury to determine the amount of methamphetamine. Scalise argues that neither instruction number 17 nor the special interrogatory required the State to prove her possession of the statutory amount as well as her intent to deliver that amount. Finally, she contends that trial counsel's failure to object to the instructions on this basis resulted in a failure to preserve error and for that reason she was denied effective assistance of counsel. The State counters by arguing it was not required by the statute under which Scalise was charged to prove Scalise intended to deliver more than five grams of methamphetamine. Therefore, according to the State, the instructions and special interrogatory did not have to reflect Scalise's interpretation of the statute. For reasons that follow, we disagree. The statuteIowa Code section 124.401(1)( b )(7)clearly requires the State to prove that a defendant charged under the statute possessed with intent to deliver the specified amount of controlled substance for which the defendant is convicted. The statute clearly indicates a higher charge for larger amounts of controlled substances where there is a violation of this section with respect to  the larger amount. The statute unambiguously requires that the violation be with respect to and then sets out the specific amount of drug. In short, there must be possession with intent to deliver with respect to the specified amount of the drug. See Henriksen v. Younglove Constr., 540 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Iowa 1995) (When the text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the court should not search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute....). Although we agree with Scalise's interpretation of the statute, we reject her contention that the instructions and special interrogatories, which were based on Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions 2300.2 and 2300.7, do not reflect her interpretation of the statute. We review jury instructions to determine if they are correct statements of the law and are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Liggins, 557 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Iowa 1996). In our review, we read all of the instructions together, not piecemeal or in artificial isolation. State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Iowa 1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 79 (Iowa 2002). Additionally, the district court may phrase the instructions in its own words as long as the instructions given fully and fairly advise the jury of the issues it is to decide and the applicable law. Liggins, 557 N.W.2d at 267. With those principles in mind we turn to the instructions and special interrogatory. As mentioned, instruction number 16 required the State to prove that (1) Scalise knowingly possessed methamphetamine, (2) she knew the substance was methamphetamine, and (3) she possessed it with the specific intent to deliver it. The jury could proceed to instruction number 17 only if they found Scalise possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. Under instruction 17, the jury was told that if they found that Scalise possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver then they were to determine the amount in the special interrogatory. In the special interrogatory, the jury was again told that if they found Scalise guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, they were to determine if the amount was more than five grams or less than five grams. We think that when read together, the instructions and the special interrogatory leave no doubt that the jury was to determine the amount of methamphetamine Scalise possessed as well as her intent to deliver that amount. The word it in element three (she possessed it with the specific intent to deliver it ) of the marshalling instructions refers to what she possessed5.87 gramswhen arrested. Moreover, Scalise's interpretation of the instructions and special interrogatory reads out of instruction number 17, the phrase, with intent to deliver. Additionally, the special interrogatory gave the jury the choice to determine that less than the total amount possessed was possessed with intent to deliver. The conclusions we reach mean, of course, that Scalise fails on her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Greene, 592 N.W.2d at 29 (counsel not ineffective for failing to purse a meritless issue).