Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Victim Impact Evidence (Lewis, Oliver)

Text: Defendants claim the trial court erred under state law by allowing victim impact evidence that was statutorily irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. (§ 190.3, factor (a).) The error allegedly violated defendants' right to due process and to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments Before the penalty phase, Oliver filed written motions to exclude the victim impact testimony and related videotape evidence. The hearing occurred on March 1, 1993, after the court ruled on the admissibility of the crime scene photographs. Lewis joined Oliver in opposing the victim impact evidence. They argued at trial, as on appeal, that it was redundant and inflammatory, and violated both federal and state law. ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 ( Payne ); People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) The trial court disagreed. It subsequently denied their motion to strike the testimony of the first witness to give such testimony. In Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, the high court overruled Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 509, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440, insofar as it barred states from admitting evidence of the specific harm the defendant had caused, namely, the loss to society and the victim's family of a unique individual. ( Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597.) Payne reasoned that the prosecution has a legitimate interest in counteracting the relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant must be allowed to introduce. ( Ibid. ) The federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. ( Ibid. ) State law is consistent with these principles. Unless it invites a purely irrational response from the jury, the devastating effect of a capital crime on loved ones and the community is relevant and admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a). ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 835-836, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436; cf. People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 644-652, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363.) The victim impact evidence presented here satisfied Payne and did not surpass constitutional limits. Nor was such evidence excessive, inflammatory, or otherwise prejudicial under state law. Family members spoke of . . . how they missed having the victims in their lives. ( People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 444, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) The evidence concerned the kinds of loss that loved ones commonly express in capital cases. Moreover, these defendants knew their victims. The whole purpose of the capital crimes was to inflict maximum damage on one family. The jury's consideration of such damage on surviving family members was not unfair or improper. Defendants raise numerous other claims about the proper scope of victim impact evidence. As in prior cases, we reject the claims as follows: (1) Section 190.3, factor (a) is not unduly vague insofar as it allows victim impact evidence as a circumstance of the crime ( People v. Wilson, supra, 36 Cal.4th 309, 358, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758), (2) victim impact testimony is not limited to the victims' relatives or to persons present during the crime ( People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1183, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353), (3) victim impact evidence is not limited to circumstances known or foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the crime ( Pollock, supra, at p. 1183, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353), (4) nothing precludes the children of murder victims (like Peter Luke, Jr.) from describing their loss simply because they are not adults at the time of trial (see, e.g., People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 441, 444, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391), (5) surviving victims (like Peter Luke, Sr.) may describe their physical injuries and other effects of the crime ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 397, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244), and (6) permissible victim impact evidence can include a murder victim's charitable and church activities ( Pollock, supra, at pp. 1180-1181, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353). Defendants further challenge the testimony of Peter Luke, Sr., who was the husband of murder victim Patrinella Luke, and whom Oliver maimed and almost killed. The prosecutor asked Luke, Sr., Is there anything else you would like to tell us? The witness answered, I personally would just like to speak to the jury. It's from me. [¶] Even though  this is not a time where justice is a popular thing. Right is reversed and nobody wants to do the right thing. But I ask you today on my behalf, please just do the right thing. Do the right thing. On appeal, defendants insist Peter Luke, Sr.'s plea violated the Eighth Amendment-based rule barring `the admission of a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.' ( People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th 581, 622, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302, quoting Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 830, 111 S.Ct. 2597.) The Attorney General responds that the witness spoke with appropriate restraint and merely asked the jury to reach the right result. Defendants failed to object to Peter Luke, Sr.'s testimony. Accordingly, they have forfeited the claim on appeal. ( People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 187, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290.) Even assuming such testimony offended the constitutional principle on which defendants rely, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.) Luke, Sr.'s suggestion that the jury should do the right thing was brief, fleeting, and mild. It paled in comparison to other evidence in aggravation, i.e., the circumstances of the capital crime, the tragic impact on the victims, Oliver's extensive criminal and violent history, and Lewis's campaign of fear and violence toward Hudson and her family. The challenged evidence could not have tipped the balance in favor of death.