Opinion ID: 2709146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Indiana State Claims

Text: Additionally, the bar owners raise four claims under the Indiana Constitution: (1) a privileges and immunities claim based on article 1, section 23, (2) a due process claim under article 1, section 21, (3) a freedom of association claim under article 1, section 9, and (4) a takings claim under article 1, section 23. 1. Due Process, Freedom of Association, and Takings Clause The district court dismissed these three claims, finding that the bar owners had failed to present evidence or argument in favor of them at the evidentiary hearing or in their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and that the claims were thus waived. The bar owners raised these claims briefly in their amended complaint, but did not provide any additional argument in support of them in their brief in support of the preliminary injunction, their reply to the City’s motion to dismiss, or in their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.5 They never cited a case describing Indiana law in these areas, and did not connect the facts they presented to any relevant Indiana constitutional provisions. They also failed to respond to the City’s arguments against these claims in their reply to the City’s motion to dismiss. Because they did not provide the district court with any basis to decide their claims, 5 The bar owners did respond to a very specific allegation concerning their takings claim—that they had failed to exhaust state remedies—in a response to the City’s second motion to dismiss. They did not, however, ever provide any legal basis for the state takings claim, instead focusing their energy on the federal case law. No. 13-1629 19 and did not respond to the City’s arguments, these claims are waived. See Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 173 n.1 (7th Cir. 1993) (argument waived where appellants “failed to develop the argument in any meaningful manner”) (citing Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.3d 694, 703 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Failure to respond to an argument … results in waiver”). 2. Privileges and Immunities Clause The bar owners also claim that the Indiana Privileges and Immunities Clause bars enforcement of the smoking ordinance. While this section of the Indiana Constitution bears similarities to the federal Equal Protection Clause, the Indiana Supreme Court has explained that it “should be given independent interpretation and application.” Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. 1994). Accordingly, that court has developed a twostep analysis for privileges and immunities claims. For a law that provides preferential treatment to one class over another to pass constitutional muster, the disparate treatment must be (1) reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the relevant classes and (2) uniformly available to all persons similarly situated. Id. at 78–80. The first factor requires only that the disparate treatment be reasonably related to the characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236, 239 (Ind. 2003). In this case, the unequally treated classes are the owners of traditional neighborhood bars as compared to the proprietors of cigar and hookah bars. The distinction here, as noted above, is the role tobacco ostensibly plays in each business model. For traditional neighborhood bars, smoking is incidental to the sale of food and alcohol. But for cigar bars and hookah bars, smoking and tobacco sales are their raison d’être. The distinction is thus reasonably related to 20 No. 13-1629 the City’s decision to ban smoking in traditional bars but not cigar or hookah bars. The disparate treatment is also sufficiently available to all persons similarly situated, despite the fact that some traditional bars are clearly more affected by the ordinance. The distinction drawn still means that bars for whom tobacco is an integral part of their business model—and not just an incidental yet important part—can permit smoking within their walls while other bars cannot. Further, even if we do think that the traditional neighborhood bars are more like cigar and hookah bars, the Indiana Supreme Court has refused to invalidate legislation simply because it is marginally over- or underinclusive. See Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80 (quoting Cincinnati, Hamilton, and Dayton Ry. Co. v. McCullom, 109 N.E. 206, 208 (1915)) (“Exact exclusion and inclusion is impractical in legislation. It is almost impossible to provide for every exceptional and imaginary case, and a legislature ought not to be required to do so at the risk of having its legislation declared void …”). The bar owners thus have not stated a valid claim under the Indiana Privileges and Immunities Clause.