Opinion ID: 1665764
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: report of the referee

Text: This case involves an attorney's representation in an adoption case. Almost all of the information in that underlying case is confidential. Since it was virtually impossible to excise the file during an efficient hearing, the undersigned has sealed this file. Hopefully, this Report is written in a manner which will not require the Report to be sealed. [1]
On February 22, 2005, The Florida Bar filed a two count Complaint against Respondent  Case No. SC05-302. [2] On June 29, 2005, the Bar filed a second Complaint against Respondent  Case No. SCO5-1157. [3] The cases were consolidated. After several case management hearings, the case was tried on the issues of guilt. At the conclusion of the Bar's case, Respondent moved for involuntarily dismissal of Count II of the initial Complaint. The motion was granted orally. Respondent also moved ore tenus for involuntarily dismissal of the second Complaint. The motion was denied. The motion was subsequently renewed. It was granted orally. Both dismissals were rendered on March 30, 2006. As to the surviving Count, a dispositional hearing was held on March 29, 2006. All items properly filed, including pleadings, recorded testimony, exhibits in evidence, and the report of referee, constitute the record in this case and are forwarded to the Supreme Court of Florida.

Respondent is, and at all times mentioned during this investigation was, a member of The Florida Bar, subject to the jurisdiction and Disciplinary Rules of the Supreme Court of Florida.
Having heard the testimony, considered the exhibits, been otherwise advised, and considered the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, I find: Respondent was a shareholder and director of the law firm known as Joyce Dove, P.A. Respondent is director and president of Foundation for Children, Inc. The corporation operated an adoption agency known as Foundation for Children Adoption Agency. Respondent was director of the Agency. Respondent is and was legal counsel for the Corporation and the Agency. The Agency was retained by Adoptive Parents to assist them in the adoption of a child. On or about July 12, 2002, the live in boyfriend of Birth Mother called an adoption hotline to place Birth Mother's seven month old son, Baby Z, for adoption. [Emphasis supplied.] The hotline referred the call to Respondent's Agency. Respondent sent an independently contracted social worker to meet Birth Mother and obtain her signature on documents necessary to proceed with the termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption proceedings. The worker met Birth Mother at her home with her boyfriend five days after boyfriend's initial call. One of the documents Birth Mother signed was a Mother's Interview Affidavit (Bar Exhibit 36). In this, affidavit, she stated that during the last twelve months she lived at .... Oviedo, Florida, the home of her parents, Grandparents. It is uncontested that she and Baby Z had resided at the home Grandparents from birth, November 26, 2001, (Respondent Exhibit 13), until, at least, July 6, 2002. [Emphasis supplied.] Birth Mother testified that Baby Z did not move into the townhouse with her, but stayed at Grandparent's home. (Transcript page 329, line 24 and page 330, lines 6-8) The worker did not obtain a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act Affidavit. [4] [Emphasis supplied.] During the initial meeting, Birth Mother advised the worker that Boyfriend was not the biological father of Baby Z. [Emphasis supplied.] Boyfriend executed an Affidavit of Non-paternity. (Respondent Exhibit 14, page 9) Birth Mother provided the name of Birth Father. [Emphasis supplied.] On July 19, 2002, Respondent filed a Petition for Custody of Minor Child and other documents in the Circuit Court. (Bar Exhibit 15) This Petition states, The birth mother of this child has surrendered her parental rights by affidavit, and named a legal father. The legal father has surrendered his parental rights by affidavit. [5] On July 21, 2002, Respondent's agents, went to Birth Mother's home to pick up Baby Z. The child was not there; Birth Mother drove to Grandparents' home to retrieve him. (Transcript page 330, lines 6-8 and page 332, line 5) [Emphasis supplied.] That day was the first notice that either of the maternal Grandparents received of a contemplated adoption. Immediately, the Grandparents (one or the other or both) began communicating with Respondent's office indicating they objected to the adoption and wanted to assert grandparental rights. [Emphasis supplied.] At times they pretended to be somebody else. They indicated they had retained a lawyer. Thereafter, Respondent was contacted by more than one lawyer on behalf of the Grandparents. However, no lawyer ever formally appeared on their behalf. The Grandparents even wrote to circuit judges without avail. [Emphasis supplied.] Respondent instructed her employees to not communicate with the Grandparents and to only take messages when they called. Respondent did not return the calls. On July 25, 2002, Grandparents once again called Respondent's office and advised that Baby Z had lived with them for over 6 months and that they were, therefore, entitled to certain grandparent's rights. (Bar Exhibit 37) [6] [Emphasis supplied.] On July 23, 2002, Respondent filed a Petition for Court to Accept the Intended Adoption Placement for Minor child. (Bar Exhibit 16) This Petition states, in part, The minor child is currently residing with his birth mother for the purpose of adoption. The birth mother and legal father have surrendered their rights to this child, pursuant to chapter 63, Fla. Stat. (2001). (Emphasis added.) Again, Respondent did not file an affidavit from either the birth father or the alleged legal father [7] allowing for termination of parental rights. [Emphasis supplied.] On July 25, 2002, Respondent filed a Notice of Petition and Hearing to Terminate Parental Rights Pending Adoption without having actually filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights, [8] purportedly providing notice to the birth parents of the hearing scheduled for August 21, 2002, at 1:45 p.m. (Bar Exhibit 26) [Emphasis supplied.] In fact, Respondent failed to provide a copy of the Notice to Birth Mother, Birth Father, the purported legal father, or Grandparents. [Emphasis supplied.] On August 21, 2002, just two hours before the hearing to terminate parental rights, Birth Mother advised Respondent that she had changed her mind about the adoption. (Bar Exhibit 40) [Emphasis supplied.] Notwithstanding said attempted withdrawal of consent, the frequent contacts by the Grandparents, and the absence of any contact with the named biological father, Respondent appeared before a Circuit Court Judge, ex parte, and obtained an executed Order Terminating Parental Rights. [9] [Emphasis supplied.] The Order presented by Respondent repeats the untrue implication that there is a Legal Father. [10] [Emphasis supplied.] The Order contains two additional falsehoods, either of which would have defeated Respondent's efforts to obtain a signed order. [Emphasis supplied.] Specifically, paragraph 6 and the [11] last sentence of paragraph 7 of the Order are untrue. In paragraph 7 Respondent recited, The biological father is unknown. Nevertheless, precisely to the contrary, on the same day, Respondent sent forms to Mississippi counsel under the heading, IN RE: BIRTH FATHER CONSENT FORMS. (Bar Exhibit 14 page 2.) Above Respondent's signature, the letter says, Again, the birthfather's name is. . . . He had been identified by Birth Mother on day one. [Emphasis supplied.] Respondent did not cease her efforts to obtain Birth Father's consent because of an opinion that he was not the birth father. She ceased them because, The maternal grandmother has contacted him . . . trouble is brewing.  (Bar Exhibit 14, p. 44) [Emphasis supplied.] The search for the biological father, which did not begin until the date of the termination of parental rights, was nothing more than a sham. (Transcript p. 769, line 7) [Emphasis supplied.] Respondent acknowledged receiving a letter postmarked August 24, 2002 wherein the Grandparents asserted their claim for priority because the child had lived with them for six months. [12] [Emphasis supplied.] Notwithstanding the foregoing, on October 17, 2002, Respondent filed a Petition for Adoption, (Bar Exhibit 32), on behalf of her clients, Adoptive Parents. Simultaneously, Respondent attended the adoption hearing with her clients and Baby Z. A Circuit Judge signed [13] the Order for Final Adoption. [14] (Bar Exhibit 33) In meeting with her clients and in her presentation to the Court, the Respondent knew, or should have known, that the adoption proceedings were suspect, if not fatally defective. [15] Nevertheless, Respondent did not inform the Court or Adoptive Parents about any of the problems or potential problems. [Emphasis supplied.] Subsequent to the adoption, Birth Mother and Grandparents began litigation seeking the return of Baby Z. That litigation was settled; in essence, the Adoptive Parents were forced to settle for an open adoption, giving Birth Mother and Grandparents visitation rights with Baby Z. [Emphasis supplied.] Adoptive Parents brought a malpractice action against Respondent which has been settled. Adoptive Parents had paid $15,000.00 for the adoption. Of that sum, $1,611.16 was used for out-of-pocket costs. (Bar Exhibit 34B.) Respondent and her carrier returned the entire fee. Respondent contributed her deductible, $5,000.00, towards the settlement. [Emphasis supplied.] PARIENTE, J., dissenting. The message from this Court in both the majority and dissenting opinions is unmistakable and should not only be heard but heeded by all members of The Florida Bar and the publicviolations of the rules of professional conduct that affect children will not be tolerated under any circumstances. Though a lawyer's duty to be truthful to a judge is an essential tenet of an attorney's obligations in any case, the material omission and the false statements of fact in this case involved the fate of a child, which make this lawyer's conduct even more egregious. Although I agree with Chief Justice Lewis that the standards governing lawyer discipline warrant disbarment in these circumstances, I write to emphasize that the three-year suspension imposed by the majority is a very severe sanction. In fact, it is the most serious sanction possible short of disbarment and attests to the fact that this Court unanimously condemns the actions of Ms. Dove.