Opinion ID: 866348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Bases For Dismissal

Text: Plaintiffs offer several other reasons why Tilmon-Jones is barred from challenging the district court’s orders of default judgment: (1) her motion is untimely, and (2) it is precluded by a settlement agreement.12
A motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)-(6) must be brought “within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); Gen. Med., 475 F. App’x at 75 (Rule 60(b)(6)); United States v. Dailide, 316 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2003) (Rule 60(b)(4)). “The reasonableness of the delay ‘depends on the facts of a given case including the length and circumstances of the delay, the prejudice to the opposing party by reason of the delay, and the circumstances compelling equitable relief.’” Gen. Med., 475 F.App’x at 76 (quoting Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990)). Under these factors, Tilmon-Jones’s delay in filing her Rule 60(b) motion was not reasonable. Tilmon-Jones had constructive notice of the default judgments as of March 11, 2005, when they were recorded in the United States Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (stating that “[r]ecordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document”); Latin Am. Music Co. v. Archdiocese of San Juan of Roman Catholic & Apostolic Church, 12 Because it found that Tilmon-Jones lacked standing, the district court found it unnecessary to address these additional defenses. We may affirm the district court’s decision for any reason, even one not considered by the district court. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 330 F.3d 747, 750 (6th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs also raised res judicata as an affirmative defense. Because the first two reasons clearly preclude Tilmon-Jones from challenging the default judgments, we will not address res judicata. No. 12-1523 Bridgeport Music, et al. v. Smith, et al. Page 15 499 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A copyright registration certificate in the Copyright Office provides constructive notice as to the ownership of the copyright and the facts stated in the registration certificate.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). See also Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 505 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Constructive notice of a valid copyright is presumed upon registration.”). Moreover, Tilmon-Jones was actively litigating copyright claims to other songs in the Abrims catalogue as early as 2006. Yet she did not file the Rule 60(b) motion until 2011, nearly seven years after the entries of default judgment, and six years after constructive notice. Under these circumstances, Tilmon-Jones’s motion was clearly untimely. Cf. Gen. Med., 475 F.App’x at 75-76 (four-year delay was unreasonable; and cases therein).
The consent order of settlement in the 2006 Action, which dismissed all causes of action and claims as to Boladian and Bridgeport Music with prejudice, incorporated the Memorandum of Consent Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) between the parties. The Agreement states in pertinent part as follows: WHEREAS, the ESTATE, TILMON-JONES, AND HEIRS voluntarily and with full knowledge of their rights and the provisions herein, now desire to settle, compromise and dispose of the District Court Action claims, and any and all other claims they have or might have against COMPANIES including, but not limited to, any claims that may arise in the future pursuant to any newly discovered facts which are not yet known to the ESTATE, TILMON-JONES and HEIRS; .... 5. TILMON-JONES, ESTATE AND HEIRS hereby release and forever discharge Armen Boladian, individually, and Bridgeport as well as their officers, . . . successors and assigns, privies in contract, from all . . . actions, causes of action, charges, complaints, judgments, suits, warranties, covenants, contracts, promises, obligations, liabilities, or claims of any kind, type, or description, whether now known, disputed or undisputed, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or contingent, foreseen or unforeseen, asserted or unasserted, filed or not yet filed, in contract, tort, at law, or in equity, or before any local, state or federal court, administrative agencies or departments, existing at the time of this Agreement, or which subsequently may exist or arise following No. 12-1523 Bridgeport Music, et al. v. Smith, et al. Page 16 execution of this Agreement, that could have been brought by TILMONJONES, ESTATE AND HEIRS pertaining to the causes of action contained in the District Court Action for which this Agreement pertains. 6. . . . TILMON-JONES, ESTATE AND HEIRS acknowledge that they may hereafter discover claims or facts in addition to or different from those which they now know or believe to exist with respect to the District Court Action for which this Agreement pertains, but that it is their intention hereby to fully, finally and forever settle and release any and all released matters . . . known or unknown, . . . which now exist, may exist, or heretofore have existed . . . . “The language of the release is as clear as would be humanly possible to make in this regard.” Taggart v. United States, 880 F.2d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 1989) (characterizing very similar language, “where the language of the agreement expressly and with emphasis releases the releasees ‘from all KNOWN AND UNKNOWN, FORESEEN AND UNFORESEEN bodily and personal injuries . . . .’”). See generally Kellogg Co. v. Sabhlok, 471 F.3d 629, 632 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The scope of a release is controlled by the language of the release.” (applying Michigan law)). The Settlement Order here clearly and unambiguously releases Boladian, Bridgeport, its successors, assigns, and privies in contract from all claims that “could have been brought” by Tilmon-Jones. This would include the present Rule 60(b) motion. Although the 2006 Action did not litigate the alleged copyright infringement of “Smart,” it specifically mentioned the song in Attachment A and described the agreement between Tilmon and Bridgeport. Thus, Tilmon-Jones’s present claim based on “Smart” is barred by the release in the 2006 Action. IV. Attorney’s Fees and Costs Also before this court is Plaintiffs’ motion for damages and costs pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1912. Section 1912 provides that, “[w]here a judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the court in its discretion may adjudge to the prevailing party just damages for his delay, and single or double costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1912. Rule 38 states that “[i]f a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court No. 12-1523 Bridgeport Music, et al. v. Smith, et al. Page 17 and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.” We also have discretion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “to assess excess costs, expenses, and attorney fees directly against an attorney ‘who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.’” Waeschle v. Dragovic, 687 F.3d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1927). “An appeal is frivolous ‘if it is obviously without merit and is prosecuted for delay, harassment, or other improper purposes.’” Vic Wertz Distrib. Co. v. Teamsters Local 1038, 898 F.2d 1136, 1143 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting Dallo v. INS, 765 F.2d 581, 589 (6th Cir.1985)). As our analysis regarding Plaintiffs’ defenses attests, the appeal in this case is all of the above. The conduct of Tilmon-Jones and her counsel was objectively and patently meritless and a waste of judicial resources. Tilmon-Jones maintains that her appeal is not frivolous because the question of whether a nonparty has standing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) was not obviously without merit. This may be true, but it does not obviate the fact that her appeal was utterly without merit because it was untimely and barred by a release. We find that this appeal is frivolous and that sanctions are appropriate. See generally Allinder v. Inter-City Prods. Corp. (USA), 152 F.3d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 1998). V. Conclusion For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Plaintiffs’ motion for damages and costs under Rule 38 and § 1912 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file an affidavit within thirty days of this order setting forth the costs and attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal. Said amounts shall be shared equally by Tilmon-Jones and appellate counsel.