Opinion ID: 3163630
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Utilize Forensic Experts

Text: Boyd argues that defense counsel’s decision not to hire a forensic expert to assist him in challenging the DNA and bite-mark evidence was unreasonable and allowed the State to present its expert testimony virtually unchallenged. At the time of Boyd’s trial, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.250 provided that “[a] defendant offering no testimony in his own behalf, except his own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument before the jury.” McAvoy v. State, 501 So. 2d 642, 643 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Florida courts have deemed “a defense attorney’s casespecific tactical decision not to present evidence because of a desire to retain the first and last closing argument” to be a reasonable trial strategy. Cole v. State, 700 So. 2d 33, 36 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). However, counsel’s general practice or blanket policy to preserve the closing argument “sandwich” without examining the surrounding circumstances and potential defenses of the particular case is per se deficient. Id. In this case, the record reflects that defense counsel filed a pretrial motion to grant defendant the concluding argument to the jury pursuant to then-applicable Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.250. Throughout the course of trial, defense counsel was vigilant in ensuring that the defense did not admit any exhibits in - 34 - order to preserve the trial court’s grant of the closing argument “sandwich.” And, other than Boyd’s testimony, the defense did not admit any evidence. The record further shows that, using his experience as a former medical examiner, defense counsel Ongley thoroughly cross-examined each of the State’s forensic expert witnesses to expose the shortcomings of their conclusions, and echoed those points during the defense’s first closing argument. Also, as previously discussed, Boyd stressed during direct examination of his own testimony, and defense counsel Laswell reiterated in the second closing argument the defense’s theory, that law enforcement planted incriminating evidence against Boyd in an attempt to frame him for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of Dacosta in this case. Likewise, the defense elicited cross-examination testimony from the State’s witness that law enforcement personnel ordered Boyd’s girlfriend to vacate the apartment unit where the murder occurred and the forensic evidence was collected, and also that law enforcement maintained unfettered control of the premises for several days. In light of the above, Boyd failed to show from the record evidence that, in exercising a reasonable trial strategy, counsel did not perform the minimum requirements of professional conduct. See Branch v. State, 952 So. 2d 470, 478-79 (Fla. 2006) (agreeing with trial counsel that his ability to cross-examine the State’s witnesses coupled with the importance of the right to present first and last closing arguments were sufficient reasons to avoid the presentation of pathologist and - 35 - blood splatter expert, especially given that defense emphasized at trial that defendant did not commit the crime, and that neither postconviction expert identified any substantial factual mistakes made by State’s experts). Because, therefore, he cannot establish the deficiency prong under the Strickland standard, we deny Boyd relief as to this subclaim.