Opinion ID: 848764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the troxel decision

Text: The resolution of this case requires a careful examination of the United States Supreme Court opinions in Troxel v. Granville, supra . The Washington Supreme Court held Washington's nonparental visitation statute unconstitutional. On review, a plurality of the members of the United States Supreme Court ruled that the trial court's application of the statute was unconstitutional. We ... hold that the application of [the Washington statute] to Granville and her family violated her due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters. It did not hold that the statute was unconstitutional. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Thus, the Court left unresolved whether the Washington statute, or similar statutes in other states, could survive in light of the Constitution's protections of the parent-child relationship. Because the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the Washington statute was the subject of the Troxel decision, it is important to review that statute and understand how it was applied. A. THE WASHINGTON STATUTE AND THE OPINION OF THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT Section 26.10.160 of the Revised Code of Washington provides, in relevant part: (3) Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances. The facts in Troxel were that Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel, although never married, had two daughters. After their relationship ended, Brad lived with his parents and frequently brought his daughters to their home for weekend visitations. Two years after Tommie and Brad separated, Brad committed suicide. After his death, Tommie Granville allowed Brad's parents extended visitation with the children. Later, however, she informed them that the visitation would be limited to one short visit each month. The grandparents, the Troxels, brought an action in Washington state court for visitation rights pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code 26.10.160(3), Washington's nonparent visitation statute. They requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks of visitation every summer. Although Granville did not oppose visitation altogether, she asked the court to limit it to one day a month with no overnight visitation. In re Troxel, 87 Wash.App. 131, 133-134, 940 P.2d 698 (1997). The trial court entered an order permitting visitation on one weekend a month, one week each summer, and four hours on each of the grandparents' birthdays. In re Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 6, 969 P.2d 21 (1998). Granville appealed from this decision, and the Washington Court of Appeals remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re Smith, supra . On remand, the trial court, applying the state's best interests test, concluded that visitation was in the best interests of the children. Granville again appealed. This time, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the trial court order and dismissed the petition. It held that nonparents lack standing under Washington's nonparental visitation statute, unless a custody action is pending. Having resolved the matter on the basis of standing, the court had no need to address Granville's constitutional challenge to the statute. [2] In re Troxel, 87 Wash.App. at 138, 940 P.2d 698. The Washington Supreme Court granted the Troxels' petition for review and consolidated their case with similar cases. It then affirmed the Washington Court of Appeals decision on a separate basis. It held that the Troxels had standing to petition for visitation under the Washington act. However, the act was unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringed the fundamental rights of parents to raise their children. In reaching this conclusion, the Washington Supreme Court stated that the act had at least two fatal flaws: (1) it was not limited to situations where there was actual or potential harm to the child, which the Washington Supreme Court held were the limits of legitimate state interference with parental rights, and (2) because the statute allowed any person to petition for visitation rights at any time, it swept too broadly. In re Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 15-21, 969 P.2d 21. The Troxels brought a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted it and affirmed the Washington Supreme Court in a plurality opinion authored by Justice O'Connor. [3] B. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION A review of the various opinions of the justices is helpful for the purpose of determining the consistent rule among them, if any. 1. THE OPINION OF THE COURT Justice O'Connor began the substantive portion of her opinion by noting that demographic changes over the past century have altered traditional notions of the family. Consequently, child rearing responsibilities frequently extend beyond immediate family members to grandparents. In recognition of this change, she noted, every state has adopted a measure protecting the relationship between grandparents as nontraditional caregivers and the children whose lives they shape. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63-65, 120 S.Ct. 2054. While acknowledging that third-party relationships are often beneficial to children, Justice O'Connor also recognized that nonparental visitation statutes place a substantial burden on the parent-child relationship. Id. at 64, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Because parents have a constitutionally protected interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, these statutes risk violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). Justice O'Connor relied on the Court's rich history of protecting the parent-child relationship [4] and concluded that the trial court's application of the Washington nonparental visitation statute was unconstitutional. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75, 120 S.Ct. 2054. She emphasized that the statute is broad in scope and that, when applying it, the trial court had gone to the full extent of the its language in entering the visitation order. Id. at 73-75, 120 S.Ct. 2054. She noted concern that the order gave visitation that exceeded Granville's wishes even though (1) Granville had allowed limited visitation to the Troxels, (2) there was no indication that Granville was an unfit parent, and (3) Granville had made her own legitimate determination of the child's best interests. Id. at 68-72, 120 S.Ct. 2054. 2. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS Justice Souter concurred in the result and in a portion of Justice O'Connor's reasoning. He opined that the Washington Supreme Court's invalidation of the statute was consistent with the Court's jurisprudence on substantive due process. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75-76, 120 S.Ct. 2054. He relied on the fact that the Washington Supreme Court had construed the statute to allow any person to petition for visitation at any time, subject only to a court's unfettered discretion. Justice Souter differed from Justice O'Connor in that he would have held that the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute was conclusive. Thus, the statute was overbroad because it did not limit the discretion of the lower courts. As a consequence, it was invalid in all its applications. Id. at 77-79, 120 S.Ct. 2054, citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 71, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999). Justice Thomas concurred only in the result of the plurality opinion. He stated that, because the Court had found a fundamental interest, strict scrutiny must apply and, under that standard, the statute was invalid. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80, 120 S.Ct. 2054. 3. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS With one exception, the dissenting justices did not argue that a different result was warranted. Rather, Justices Stevens and Kennedy would have vacated the Washington Supreme Court decision because the opinion itself was too broad. Common to both these opinions is a focus on arbitrariness. Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy agreed that the Due Process Clause forbids unreasonable state intrusion into the parent-child relationship. Both justices agreed that, at some point, a parental decision might become so arbitrary that judicial intrusion is warranted. The question for these justices was whether the best interests test, standing alone, is a sufficient indicator of arbitrariness. Because the Washington Supreme Court failed to address this issue, Justices Stevens and Kennedy would have vacated the Washington Supreme Court decision and remanded the case for further findings. Justice Scalia took a different approach. He argued that, while a parent's interest in directing a child's upbringing is among the unalienable rights retained by the people, [5] the right is not enumerated in the Constitution. Accordingly, while a state may have no legitimate power to curtail the right, the Court has no power to enforce it. Justice Scalia would have reversed the Washington Supreme Court decision to the extent that it relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in holding the Washington statute invalid. 4. THE COMPOSITE OPINION The Troxel plurality decision is capable of reconciliation in, at least, one respect. With one justice dissenting and one concurring in the result only, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects parents' fundamental interest in raising their children. Thus, a state may not unduly interfere in the parent-child relationship. At a minimum, state interference in the relationship is not permitted unless a parent has made a decision regarding visitation that is not in the child's' best interests.