Opinion ID: 5097344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims against Assistant Warden Steele

Text: Stewart’s lawsuit also alleged that Assistant Warden Steele, in both his individual and official capacity, violated Stewart’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to ensure that he received proper medical treatment. 2 As with Dr. Mesrobian and Wexford, Stewart must demonstrate that Steele knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Once again, we will assume for the purposes of summary judgment that Stewart had a serious medical need. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Stewart, Stewart sent four letters to Steele through the prison mail system and had one brief in-person conversation with him which Stewart describes a being “just a few seconds long.” R. 413-4 at 8:19. Although there are no copies of the letters in the record and Steele denies receiving them, we must assume that letters sent through a prison mail system were received by the addressee. Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Placing the note in the prison mail system supports an 2 Stewart asserts that his claim is not one of failure to intervene, but rather a direct claim that Steele failed to ensure that Stewart received adequate medical care. (Reply brief at 11). 16 No. 19-2994 inference of receipt.”) 3 We can assume, therefore, that Steele was aware of Stewart’s complaint, not only from the letters, but from the conversation as well. In addition, Stewart pointed to evidence that Steele was aware that Stewart had filed a complaint through the non-emergency grievance process and that the grievance had progressed through this process. Stewart cited no evidence that the non-emergency grievance was not being addressed adequately or in the usual manner. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts, a nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011). Stewart argues, however, that when a non-medical prison official is aware of a risk of serious harm to a prisoner that is not being addressed, he cannot blindly rely on the fact that the prisoner is being treated by medical staff. For this he cites Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999). We agree with Stewart, but conclude that this not a case where a prison administrator turned a blind 3Steele argues that Stewart waived this argument by failing to allege it with enough specificity in his statement of facts in that he failed to state that he mailed the letters through the prison mail system until this appeal. Steele is splitting hairs on this issue. It is true that in his original statement of facts Stewart does not mention that he placed the letters in the prison mail system, but in his Statement of Additional Facts, he states that he mailed the letters to Steele, and cites to his deposition testimony in which he testified that he placed the letters in the prison mail system. R. 420 at 3 (citing R. 413-4 at 10:15-11:10). In either case, given the fact that he was incarcerated, stating that he mailed letters to Steele was sufficient to put the defendants on notice that he was making a claim of mailing letters through the prison mail system. If there had been any doubt, the Statement of Additional Facts referenced his deposition testimony in which he makes this detail clear. No. 19-2994 17 eye to a medical treatment failure. In Reed a prisoner with serious medical needs stated that every Friday, when he returned from treatment at the outside hospital, he was unable to retrieve his identification badge until Monday and thus was not permitted to receive food or medication for several days each week. Id. at 851. He sent complaints to the superintendent and other prison officials and filed grievances, and they acknowledged their receipt, stated that they would review the policy, but for two years did nothing to resolve the problem. Id. Prison administrators can rely on medical personnel unless they have “reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008). Stewart has not presented any evidence that Steele turned a blind eye to mistreatment. To the contrary, the facts demonstrate that the medical personnel were evaluating each one of Stewart’s requests and deciding whether, at that particular time, Stewart required an exemption. Steele is an expert in running a prison and making decisions about safety concerns, but he is not a medical professional. He cannot assess how Stewart’s unique medical concerns might interface with the safety concerns. It seems reasonable for him to delegate that assessment to the medical personnel, and because the medical personnel were evaluating Stewart and granting and denying requests based on his medical conditions, Steel was not blindly relying on medical personnel. A complicated assessment of carpal tunnel syndrome or a rotator cuff injury is beyond the expertise of a prison administrator. In contrast, in the Reed case, it does not take a doctor to know that denying food and medication to a person with serious medical needs would create a risk of harm. The failure to act, in the Reed case was well within the 18 No. 19-2994 province of the administrators of the prison, as when and how a prisoner receives his security badge is not a medical decision. In this case, the prison administrators were not indifferent by depending on medical personnel to make medical assessments. Stewart also claims that IDOC (through Steele in his official capacity) should have had more specific and directive policies regarding who should receive black box exemptions and that failure to create and implement such policies violate prisoners’ constitutional rights. We cannot say that IDOC violated the Constitution by allowing medical providers to evaluate each requestor individually. Each prisoner presents a unique set of medical conditions and individualized experiences with pain. Allowing for an individual medical assessment is not evidence that IDOC failed to implement policies in a way that added up to deliberate indifference. Finally, we do not find sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that IDOC had an unconstitutional custom or practice of not giving black box exemptions to inmates with conditions like that of Stewart. As we noted above, Stewart himself sometimes received an exemption and sometimes did not. This is evidence that the IDOC did not have an unconstitutional custom or practice of not giving black box exemptions to inmates with conditions like Stewart’s. For the reasons described above, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.