Opinion ID: 799033
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Robbins qualified as an expert

Text: We first consider whether the district court abused its discretion when it ruled that Robbins was not qualified to testify as an expert. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides the touchstone for expert testimony. That rule, which reflects the Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), reads as follows: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Fed.R.Evid. 702. Under this rule, expert witnesses must be qualified to testify to a matter relevant to the case. Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 293 (6th Cir.2007). [A] proffering party can qualify their expert with reference to his `knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.' Id. The defendants sought to qualify Robbins based on his record of participation in numerous class actions and multi-plaintiff cases. But the district court refused to qualify him as an expert, citing concerns about qualifying Robbins, or any witness, as an expert on an area of the law solely on the basis of work experience in a particular area. Gallion, 257 F.R.D. at 148. The court supported its ruling by quoting Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 163 F.Supp.2d 743 (E.D.Mich.2001), where the district court noted that something more than time in practice would be required to qualify an attorney as an expert in a given specialty, id. at 749 n. 7. Cunningham and Gallion argue that the district court's refusal to qualify Robbins as an expert was erroneous because, under the plain language of Rule 702, experience alone may be enough to qualify a witness as an expert. To a certain degree they are rightexperience alone may be enough. Indeed, the text of Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the basis of experience. Fed. R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's notes (2000 amendments); see also Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156, 119 S.Ct. 1167 ([N]o one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized expertise.). But may does not mean must. Whether a proposed expert's experience is sufficient to qualify the expert to offer an opinion on a particular subject depends on the nature and extent of that experience. Compare United States v. Lupton, 620 F.3d 790, 799 (7th Cir.2010) (noting that a proposed expert's thirty-year distance from the day-to-day goings-on in the brokerage world and lack of experience with the statutes and contract at issue in this case call into question the extent to which [he is qualified] to render an opinion on the industry standards of practices among local real-estate brokers), with First Union Nat'l Bank v. Benham, 423 F.3d 855, 862-63 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that an attorney with over 36 years of experience practicing in the area of mergers and acquisitions was qualified to provide expert testimony on the issue of legal malpractice in that field). The question in the present case, therefore, is whether Robbins's experience litigating complex business matters was sufficiently extensive and specialized to qualify him as an expert on complex litigation, class actions, and mass-tort cases. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156, 119 S.Ct. 1167. In deciding that he lacked the necessary qualifications, the district court noted that Robbins did not show that he had written or spoken professionally on any of the issues on which he [sought] to offer opinions. Gallion, 257 F.R.D. at 148. Without these or other differentiating factors, the court reasoned, there is nothing to set Robbins apart from any other lawyer with experience as an advocate in a particular area of law, and [s]urely, not every lawyer with such experience qualifies as an expert in his or her practice area. Id. We agree that not every lawyer with experience as an advocate in a particular area of law necessarily qualifies as an expert in his or her practice area. But Robbins's experience, which consisted of nearly 30 years in business litigation and included involvement in numerous class actions and multi-plaintiff cases, is far more substantial than the typical attorney's. And any deficiencies in his professional background or credentials could have been probed on cross-examination the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). We therefore have grave doubt about the soundness of excluding Robbins's testimony on the basis that he was not qualified as an expert. The district court, however, provided an alternative basis for excluding Robbins's testimony that is distinct from his potential lack of sufficient expertise. Because we think that this alternative basis fits more readily within the court's broad discretion to make admissibility determinations, see Surles, 474 F.3d at 295, we will assume without deciding that Robbins qualified as an expert. We now turn to the court's alternative basis for excluding his testimony.