Opinion ID: 1341169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Jury's Inquiry About Parole.

Text: After retiring to fix Peterson's punishment, the jury returned to the courtroom and through its foreman asked the trial judge whether it was possible to give a life sentence without parole. The judge replied as follows: The only response I can give you on that ... is that it's the function of the jury, duty of the jury, to impose such sentence as they consider just under the evidence and the instructions of the Court. And you should not concern yourself with what may thereafter happen. It may not be a very satisfactory answer, but it's the only one I can give you. Peterson did not object to the answer. Rule 5:21. He concedes that under Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41, 54-55, 286 S.E.2d 172, 179-80 (1982), and Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 247 S.E.2d 704 (1978), the judge's response was correct. He argues, however, that Code § 53.1-151(B1), which became effective July 1, 1982, after Clanton and Hinton were decided and after the Kauffman killing, changed the law by making a person convicted of three separate offenses of armed robbery ineligible for parole. We need not consider the effect of this statutory amendment, because we rely upon and reaffirm the principle enunciated in Clanton and Hinton that it is improper to inform the jury as to the possibility of parole. For this reason, it would have been improper for the trial court sua sponte to have offered a jury instruction based upon the 1982 amendment, even if, as Peterson now contends, the amendment applied to him.