Opinion ID: 1427135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Evidence murder was premeditated.

Text: (11a) Defendant argues that the evidence of premeditation and deliberation is insufficient to sustain a verdict of first degree murder. We disagree. [11] (12) People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942] ( Anderson ) isolated three categories of circumstantial evidence which, in appropriate combination, might justify the finding that an intentional killing was calculated rather than impulsive. The first concerns planning  facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that [he] was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing.... The second involves motive  facts about the defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a `motive' to kill.... The third focuses on methodology  whether the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a `preconceived design' to take his victim's life in a particular way for a `reason' which the jury can reasonably infer.... (Pp. 26-27, all italics in original.) Evidence in only one of these areas most often is insufficient. Where fewer than all three indicia are present, we require at least extremely strong evidence of (1) [planning] or evidence of (2) [motive] in conjunction with either (1) or (3) [deliberate manner of killing]. (P. 27.) (13) The fact that a slaying was unusually brutal, or involved multiple wounds, cannot alone support a determination of premeditation. Absent other evidence, a brutal manner of killing is as consistent with a sudden, random explosion of violence as with calculated murder. (Pp. 24-25; People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 48 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v. Smith (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 51, 64 [108 Cal. Rptr. 698], overruled on other grounds, People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 324 [149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308].) (11b) Here the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, suggests that defendant met and photographed Robin, devised and executed a scheme to abduct her, kept her in his car by force or fear, drove her a considerable distance from urban surroundings to a rural area, then took her on foot away from the road to an even more secluded spot where others were unlikely to intrude. ( Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15, 27.) The jury could conclude he carried a knife with him to the death scene and used it to kill Robin. Dana Crappa testified that Robin's body was all cut up. A Kane Kut knife containing human blood, and a towel with wipe stains of type A blood, were found nearby. There was a set of similar knives at defendant's home. Of course, use of a deadly weapon is not always evidence of a plan to kill. (E.g., Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15, 21-22 [knife].) Moreover, as defendant points out, not all planned conduct with the victim is actively directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, [a] killing.... ( Id., at p. 26.) Defendant suggests his conduct prior to the homicide was highly ambiguous ( id., at p. 31) and, however felonious, showed no preconceived  intention to kill his victim ( id., at p. 33, italics in original). However, when one plans a felony against a far weaker victim, takes her by force or fear to an isolated location, and brings along a deadly weapon which he subsequently employs, it is reasonable to infer that he considered the possibility of homicide from the outset. (Compare, e.g., People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 850 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776]; People v. Hillery (1965) 62 Cal.2d 692, 704 [44 Cal. Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382]; cf., People v. Quicke (1964) 61 Cal.2d 155, 158-159 [37 Cal. Rptr. 617, 390 P.2d 393].) Thus, there is substantial evidence of a planned killing  the most important prong of the Anderson test. The record also discloses a plausible motive for the killing. Apparently there were no eyewitnesses to the abduction except defendant and his victim. If defendant saw Dana Crappa drive by as he walked up the ravine at Marker 11 with Robin, he may not then have attached any significance to the encounter. According to Robert Dove, defendant felt safe even after his arrest because nobody seen me take her, and they would never find the bike. The evidence thus suggests that defendant had committed a serious felony, kidnaping, on the victim and believed she was the only person who could implicate him. [H]ence he could [surmise] that by killing her ..., he would eliminate the only [witness] to his [crime]. ( People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d 841, 850.) Finally, Dana Crappa's description of the body  all cut up  conveys the impression of multiple stab wounds. Damage to the teeth and jaw also indicated a blow to the head with a blunt object. When considered in light of the planning and motive evidence, this brutal method of killing supports the inference of a calculated design to ensure death, rather than an unconsidered explosion of violence. (See Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15, 29-30.) [12] Under all the circumstances, we find ample evidence of premeditation and deliberation. [13]
(14a) Defendant filed a pretrial motion under section 995 to set aside the information on grounds that the preliminary hearing had failed to establish probable cause. He challenges the court's refusal to strike on this ground the charge and special circumstance of kidnaping. (15) Illegalities in pretrial commitment proceedings, other than those which are jurisdictional in the fundamental sense, are not reversible error per se on an appeal from the subsequent trial. Rather, defendant [must] show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination. ( People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [165 Cal. Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941].) (16) Defendant suggests that a failure of evidence at the preliminary hearing is a jurisdictional defect. Such, of course, is not the case; were it so, the jurisdictional exception would swallow the rule. Prior to Pompa-Ortiz, People v. Elliot (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498 [6 Cal. Rptr. 753, 354 P.2d 225] had established that all material errors in pretrial commitment proceedings were jurisdictional, since they meant defendant had been illegally committed. In overruling Elliot, Pompa-Ortiz rejected the prior case's uncritical use of the term `jurisdiction' in the context of matters correctible by pretrial writ, rather than to mean legal power to hear and determine a cause. Under Pompa-Ortiz, only an absence of this latter kind of jurisdiction can furnish grounds for reversal per se after a fair trial. (27 Cal.3d at pp. 528-529.) An evidentiary deficiency at the preliminary hearing does not meet that standard. The statutes have long provided that lack of probable cause at the preliminary hearing is waived for all purposes if not timely pursued prior to trial. (§§ 995, 996, 999a; Elliot, supra, at p. 505.) It follows that a failure of probable cause is not an unwaivable jurisdictional defect in the commitment which warrants reversal, or a quashing of the information, even though defendant's trial was fair. [14] (14b) Defendant claims he was prejudiced at trial by the superior court's failure to strike the kidnaping charge for lack of probable cause. At the preliminary hearing, jail inmate Ricky Rodriguez provided the only direct evidence on the kidnaping charge; his description of alleged conversations with defendant suggested that Robin had not been kept in defendant's car by force or fear. The People urged to the magistrate that no proof of force or fear was necessary to show kidnaping. The magistrate demurred, correctly citing People v. Stephenson, supra, 10 Cal.3d 652, and People v. Camden, supra, 16 Cal.3d 808, but still bound defendant over on kidnaping charges. At trial, the People produced inmates Robert Dove and Herrera, who testified that defendant admitted keeping Robin in his car forcibly. Defendant urges that the People thus misled the magistrate, then improperly changed the facts at trial to fit the law. However, the People are not bound at trial by the factual theories, evidence, or testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing. (But cf., Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 [26 L.Ed.2d 387, 396-397, 90 S.Ct. 1999]; Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 588 [150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916] [general value of preliminary hearing as defense discovery tool].) Defendant does not claim he was surprised at trial by the use of Dove and Herrera rather than Rodriguez, or by their different testimony. If error occurred on the section 995 motion, we can find no prejudice.
(17a), (18a), (19a), (20a) As in the trial court, defendant urges strenuously that evidence of prior uncharged conduct was improperly admitted and considered as evidence of his guilt. He relies on the general rule against use of prior conduct to show a disposition to commit the crime charged. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subds. (a), (b).) He also argues the prior crimes should have been excluded in any event as more prejudicial than probative. ( Id., § 352, subd. (b).) In response, the People invoke the statutory exception which allows admission of prior conduct to show motive, ... intent,... plan, ... [or] identity, ... (Id., § 1101, subd. (b).) The jury was instructed that it could consider the evidence on each of those issues. (See fn. 19, post. ) We conclude that the prior acts were inadmissible on all of these theories, and that the error was prejudicial on all charges. We summarize the challenged evidence. Witnesses testified that on the morning of September 25, 1968, defendant stopped Tali S., an eight-year-old girl who was walking to school along Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles. He offered her a ride, and she entered his car. When he proposed a short detour to his nearby home, she panicked but could not get out of the moving auto. Inside the house, defendant showed her a psychedelic poster of forests and trees. Meantime, a witness who had followed defendant called the police. They arrived 10 minutes later and saw defendant, unclothed, peering out the front window. They broke down the door. Tali was found lying on the kitchen floor, naked, unconscious, and barely breathing. She had a severe head wound and blood was coming from her vagina. There was a steel bar over her neck. The house was full of photography equipment. Defendant escaped through the rear door and became a fugitive. In 1972, he was returned to California and convicted of violating Penal Code section 288 (child molesting). Defendant was paroled on the section 288 conviction in August 1974. On the morning of October 13, he approached Julie J., a small, undeveloped 13-year-old, as she was waiting for a bus to school in Huntington Beach. According to her testimony, he ingratiated himself with conversation, and, after some hesitation, she accepted his offer of a ride to school. They passed her building, and she asked several times to be let out. At first, defendant said he was checking an apartment in the area and wouldn't take long, but he finally told her rudely to be quiet. She became frightened. When defendant stopped at the cliffs overlooking the beach (apparently the same general area where he photographed Robin Samsoe), Julie tried to get out and run, but defendant had come around to her door, and he grabbed her arm. He steered her on foot to a spot along the cliffs, forced her to smoke marijuana, and seized her leg when she tried to leave. He then put his arms around her, gave her a French kiss, and asked if she liked boys and was passionate when she was loaded. The incident ended when a ranger arrested them both for the marijuana violation. Defendant's parole was revoked. He was returned to prison until 1977, when he was paroled again. According to defendant's taped confession, not challenged on this appeal, he picked up Monique H., who was hitchhiking in Riverside County on February 12, 1979. Monique was a well-developed 15-year-old. The two drove to defendant's residence and spent the night together, engaging in consensual sex. The next morning, they went to some mountains, where defendant took pictures of Monique in the nude, and of the two performing simulated sex acts together. At some point, Monique became frightened and began to scream and struggle. Defendant tied her up, stuffed a T-shirt in her mouth, beat her unconscious, and raped her vaginally and anally. He said he had not planned the violence, but was incoherent and frightened about a situation that had gotten out of hand. Ultimately, he drove Monique back to civilization, where she notified the police. (21) The rule excluding evidence of criminal propensity is nearly three centuries old in the common law. (1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 194, pp. 646-647.) Such evidence is [deemed] objectionable, not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much.  (Italics added.) Inevitably, it tempts the tribunal ... to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge. ( Id., at p. 646; quoted in People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 773, fn. 6 [80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841].) (22) California's codification of the common law rule (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)) is absolute where it applies. However probative to common sense, evidence must be excluded under section 1101, subdivision (a), if the inference it directly seeks to establish is solely one of propensity to commit crimes in general, or of a particular class. ( People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 317 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].) [15] (23) This absolute rule of exclusion does not apply to prior conduct, even if criminal, which is relevant to prove more than mere criminal predisposition. The test of relevance is whether the evidence tend[s] logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference, to establish any fact[s] material for the people [such as identity, intent, plan, motive, preparation, or opportunity] or to overcome any material matter sought to be proved by the defense. ( People v. Peete (1946) 28 Cal.2d 306, 315 [169 P.2d 924], cert. den., 329 U.S. 790 [91 L.Ed. 677, 67 S.Ct. 356], rehg. den. (1947) 329 U.S. 832 [91 L.Ed. 705, 67 S.Ct. 490], cert. den., 331 U.S. 783 [91 L.Ed. 1815, 67 S.Ct. 1185].) However, because other-crimes evidence is so inherently prejudicial, its relevancy is to be examined with care. It is to be received with extreme caution, and all doubts about its connection to the crime charged must be resolved in the accused's favor. ( People v. Sam (1969) 71 Cal.2d 194, 203 [77 Cal. Rptr. 804, 454 P.2d 700]; Peete, supra . ) (24) Moreover, because of its inflammatory impact, evidence of other offenses sometimes must be excluded [e]ven if [it] is relevant under a theory ... that does not rely on proving disposition.... ( People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d 303, 318.) Thus, it is inadmissible if not relevant to an issue expressly in dispute ( Thompson, supra, at p. 315), if merely cumulative with respect to other evidence which the People may use to prove the same issue ( People v. Guerrero (1976) 16 Cal.3d 719, 724 [129 Cal. Rptr. 166, 548 P.2d 366], quoting People v. Schader, supra, 71 Cal.2d 761, 775), or if more prejudicial than probative under all the circumstances. ( Thompson, supra, at p. 318; People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 246 [70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 444 P.2d 91].) (17b) The fundamental issue in this case was the identity of Robin Samsoe's abductor and killer. The People contend that evidence of defendant's prior crimes was admissible on that question since the similarity of the earlier offenses to the current ones suggests strongly that the same person committed them all. We cannot agree. (25) Where the prosecution seeks to fix responsibility for a particular crime on defendant by showing a consistent modus operandi, there must be common marks which, considered singly or in combination, support the strong inference that the current crime bears his signature. ( People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 756 [114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267], cert. den. (1975) 420 U.S. 924 [43 L.Ed.2d 393, 95 S.Ct. 1118], overruled on other grounds, People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12; People v. Sam, supra, 71 Cal.2d 194, 204; Haston, supra, 69 Cal.2d 233, 247.) (17c) The People point to various common elements in the charged and uncharged offenses here. They note that defendant's pattern is to approach underage girls, engage them in conversation, entice them into his automobile, restrain them by force when they wish to leave, and take them to remote locations, often scenic outdoor settings, where he assaults them and commits forcible sexual acts. In many instances, the People emphasize, he uses photography as a ploy to gain the victims' cooperation. But the alleged similarities break down under examination. Monique H. was never restrained in defendant's car by trick, force or fear. Neither outdoor settings nor the use of photography figured in the Tali S. incident (though there was camera equipment in the house). The People's strained theory that defendant supplied those elements by showing Tali a psychedelic poster of forests and trees is not persuasive. There was no element of photography at all in the Julie J. incident. In none of the three cases was photography used as an introductory ploy, and there seems nothing consistent or unusual in the techniques defendant used to ingratiate himself. Despite the People's suggestion that locale was important to defendant, the sites of his offenses were widely scattered and dissimilar. Moreover, defendant's pattern of sexual conduct in the other cases was not consistent or distinctive. He gave Julie J. a French kiss but made no further physical advances before he was arrested. Monique H. was physically mature, and the acts committed on her occurred only after lengthy sessions of consensual sex. Most importantly, Robin was killed, while the earlier victims were not. [16] To the extent a pattern can be found in these incidents, it is entirely unremarkable. The similarities noted by the People must be common to a substantial portion of the population of child molesters. By definition, their victims are children, who must be induced to submit under circumstances in which escape or detection is unlikely. The use of charm or deception, and transportation to places of privacy, are logical means of accomplishing those aims. So, tragically, is violence. The People have not convinced us that a peculiar pattern in defendant's past conduct establishes his identity as Robin's killer by setting him apart from the general class of violent sex offenders against children. (18b) Nor can admission of the prior crimes be justified by their asserted relevance to the question of defendant's intent when he approached Robin and her friend at the beach. Aside from modus operandi, the prosecutor urged the jury to consider the crimes on the theory that this intent was an intermediate fact bearing on the ultimate issue of identity. (See People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d 303, 315, and fn. 14.) [17] However, in seeking to connect the events on the beach and the charged crimes, he simply assumed the critical fact at issue, namely that defendant actually [did] get Robin ... to go with him. The beach encounter certainly has some relevance on the question of identity. It is suspicious that, within hours before her disappearance, defendant had approached Robin, a child he did not know, and had hurried away when another adult intervened. There is no question that evidence of this encounter was properly admitted. However, the prior crimes add nothing valid to that evidence. They exhibit no specific points of probative similarity which might suggest that defendant's approach to Robin was a precursor to her unobserved abduction some hours later. In fact, they invite such an inference, if at all, only by exposing defendant's penchant for child molestation. To that extent, the prosecutor's theory of intent was but a euphemism for proving the identity of Robin's killer by establishing defendant's general disposition to commit similar crimes. Of course, any effort to use prior crimes for that purpose is expressly forbidden by Evidence Code section 1101. ( Thompson, supra, at pp. 320-321; see also People v. Guerrero (1976) 16 Cal.3d 719, 728 [129 Cal. Rptr. 166, 548 P.2d 366].) (19b) For similar reasons, the evidence could not be bootstrapped in on the theory that it showed defendant's plan or scheme. Mere use of those words adds nothing to a case for the admission of prior offenses. The proffered evidence must still be analyzed to determine whether it proves something material, disputed, and beyond bare disposition. ( Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 315-318.) There was no contention in this case, nor could there be, that Robin's kidnap and murder were part of a single conspiracy, conception, or plot of which the 1968, 1977, and February 1979 incidents were also integral components. (See, e.g., People v. Covert (1967) 249 Cal. App.2d 81, 85-86 [57 Cal. Rptr. 220].) Rather, plan or scheme was used here synonymously with the theories of admissibility already discussed. Indeed, both the prosecutor's argument and the modified instruction employed the phrase characteristic method, plan, or scheme as though it was interchangeable with modus operandi on the one hand, and with defendant's intent in approaching Robin on the other. Accordingly, no different rules apply to use of the prior-crimes evidence than those we have previously outlined. [18] (20b) Finally, we reject any implication that the prior crimes were admissible to establish a motive for premeditated murder. Common sense indicates that one who commits a felony upon another wishes to avoid its detection. That may lead him to the calculated murder of his victim. Here, the jury could consider the possibility that defendant killed Robin in cold blood to prevent her from naming him as her kidnaper. (See discussion, ante. ) However, the prosecutor argued in effect that defendant's prior crimes increased his incentive to eliminate Robin as a witness, since they might result in more severe punishment for the current offense. We cannot accept the notion that evidence of past offenses is admissible on this basis. If it were, one's criminal past could always be introduced against him when he was accused of premeditated murder in the course of a subsequent offense. The accused's mere status as an ex-criminal would place him under an evidentiary disability not shared by first offenders. The prejudicial effect of the prior-crimes revelations would vastly outweigh their slight and speculative probative value. It is just such dangers which the restrictions on evidence of past offenses seek to avoid. People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171 (cert. den., 395 U.S. 968 [74 Cal. Rptr. 262, 449 P.2d 198], cert. den. sub nom. Robinson v. California (1972) 406 U.S. 971 [32 L.Ed.2d 671, 92 S.Ct. 2416]) is not contrary. There, defendants shot and killed a police officer during a routine automobile stop. This court held that the jury could hear evidence of outstanding uncharged offenses for which defendants feared apprehension. (Pp. 186-189; see also People v. Robillard (1960) 55 Cal.2d 88, 100 [10 Cal. Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086], cert. den. (1961) 365 U.S. 886 [6 L.Ed.2d 199, 81 S.Ct. 1043], overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 648-649 [36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810].) In cases like Durham and Robillard, the motive of escape is central, and it can be shown in no other way. Here, the issue of witness elimination was before the jury in any event; speculation that defendant was also worried about the implications of his past record is remote and cumulative. Under these circumstances the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior crimes. [19] (26) We cannot say the error was harmless. The other evidence that defendant kidnaped and killed Robin was fairly strong, but not overwhelming, and it was largely circumstantial. Besides defendant's approach to Robin, and his placement at the crime scene by Dana Crappa, the People's case centered on (1) his admissions to jailhouse informants whose credibility was hotly disputed, (2) his guilty behavior in travelling to Seattle, where he rented and filled a storage locker, (3) his possession in the locker of earrings the victim might have worn, and (4) discovery of the Kane Kut knife near Robin's body. Defendant presented a plausible alibi based in part on telephone calls he allegedly made or received in his home at crucial times; bills confirmed the calls were made. He also mounted a vigorous challenge to the credibility of Dana Crappa and pointed up material inconsistencies in her testimony. There was no knife missing from the Kane Kut set in his residence. Under these circumstances, the jury may well have been influenced by improper consideration of the other crimes, which were highly prejudicial in their nature, in deciding that defendant was the person who abducted and killed Robin. It thus appears reasonably probable that, absent the instructional error, a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [299 P.2d 243], cert. den. (1957) 355 U.S. 846 [2 L.Ed.2d 55, 78 S.Ct. 70].) Accordingly, we set aside the convictions of murder and kidnaping, and the related finding of kidnaping as a special circumstance.