Opinion ID: 568512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dr. Kiepfer's Damages

Text: 32 Finally, APIE argues that Dr. Kiepfer failed to establish that he personally had suffered any damages, and that he cannot recover any damages for mental anguish. Neither of these arguments has any merit. 33 The named plaintiff in this action is Richard F. Kiepfer, M.D., in his individual capacity. APIE makes a two part argument: first, it contends that the only evidence of damage presented to the jury was evidence of damage to a professional association, Richard F. Kiepfer, M.D., P.A., of which Dr. Kiepfer is the sole owner. Second, APIE argues that Texas law treats professional associations the same way it treats corporations, and that stockholders and corporations are considered separate entities: one may not recover damages suffered by the other. Thus, the argument concludes, Dr. Kiepfer has proved the wrong damages. He has not proved his damages, which he could recover, but only those of his professional association, which he cannot recover. 34 APIE's argument is not correct. The jury did not award Dr. Kiepfer damages suffered by his professional association. The jury awarded Dr. Kiepfer the damages he personally suffered as a result of the defendants' actions. The fact that evidence of damage to the professional association was introduced to prove damage to his business--which damage must be shown in order to prevail in an antitrust action--and may have been used by the jury to assist in determining what damages had accrued to Dr. Kiepfer personally, does not transform the award into one for damages to the professional association. 4 The award remains one for damages suffered by Dr. Kiepfer as an individual, and there is no basis for setting it aside. 35 Finally, APIE argues that Dr. Kiepfer cannot recover any damages for mental anguish because there was no evidence of mental anguish. Once again, APIE is incorrect. Under Texas law, mental anguish is defined as the emotional pain, torment, and suffering that the named plaintiff would, in reasonable probability, experience as a result of the defendant's tortious behavior. Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex.1986). As APIE points out, this torment and suffering must include more than mere fear, embarrassment, anxiety, anger, or sorrow; standing alone, none of these conditions warrants an award of damages. E.g., Larrumbide v. Doctors Health Facilities, 734 S.W.2d 685, 690 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987, writ denied). Dr. Kiepfer's evidence certainly was sufficient to allow the jury to find that he had suffered more than just embarrassment, anxiety, or anger. Dr. Kiepfer testified that as a result of the defendants' intentional torts, he became an outcast in the San Antonio medical community. Other doctors refused to treat his patients and his wife. The complete loss of his referral practice--which occurred shortly after Dr. Kiepfer was married--forced him and his wife to live on his savings while he looked for work. Presented with evidence of this combination of conditions, the jury was unquestionably justified in concluding that Dr. Kiepfer had suffered compensable mental anguish as a result of the defendants' intentionally tortious behavior.