Opinion ID: 1699279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limiting Impeachment Testimony

Text: While defense witness Bosco was testifying on direct examination, without objection from the State, he denied that while he was in Jamestown he had violated any laws, used any controlled substances, or supplied or sold any drugs. Mary thereafter testified that she had observed Bosco smoking controlled substances and that he offered controlled substances to her two or three times. When defense counsel next proposed to call Curt Carlson as a witness, the prosecutor, in chambers, moved on the basis of State v. Larson, 253 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1977), to prohibit further impeachment of Bosco on collateral matters. State v. Larson, supra, 253 N.W.2d at 436, said that the rule had long been that where a witness is cross-examined on a collateral issue, the examiner is bound by the answer given and cannot thereafter introduce testimony of a third party for impeachment purposes. In a footnote it was stated: For the scope of permissible inquiry to impeach a witness, see Rules 607-613, N.D.R.Ev. Rule 607, NDREv, provides: The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him. This rule was adopted by this court on December 1, 1976, some five to six months before State v. Larson, supra , was decided. The comments by the Procedure Committee were, in effect, adopted by this court along with the rules. Citing State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164 (N.D.1974), which said that the voucher rule should be abandoned, the Committee said: This rule [Rule 607, NDREv] does away with the prohibition against impeaching one's own witness. When, during a lengthy discussion of the matter, the trial court learned that Mary proposed to call Curt Carlson, Susan Gardner and John Gardner for the sole purpose of further collateral attacks to impeach Bosco, it ruled that to allow all three additional witnesses would cause confusion for the jury. The court permitted defendant to select only one additional impeachment witness and directed that the testimony be limited to evidence to contradict Bosco's statements that he had not used or attempted to sell controlled substances. Mary elected to use Susan Gardner (Peterson) as an impeachment witness. She testified, without objection, that she saw Bosco use controlled substances quite often and that he supplied her with marijuana. She was permitted to testify that, in her opinion, Bosco was neither trustworthy nor honest. Her testimony was not discredited during cross-examination. In spite of the court's limitation, Mary called additional witnesses who were asked to express opinions concerning Bosco's reputation. There was no objection by the State, but the witnesses declined to express an opinion. The only case in which this court has expressed any comment on limiting witnesses is that of Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97, 101 (N.D.1977). That was a civil case where we said, ordinarily the court has a broad discretion in limiting the number of witnesses. We referred to the annotation in 21 A.L.R. 335. [7] The South Dakota case of Johnson v. Ebensen, 38 S.D. 116, 160 N.W. 847 (1916), also a civil case, stated a general rule which we approve and which applies to our circumstances here: It is the duty of the trial court, of course, to prevent, so far as practicable, the injection of collateral issues into the trial of lawsuits; and, in the matter of impeaching testimony, the number of witnesses that may be used for that purpose and the length of time that may be consumed in that way is left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge, but this discretion should be exercised in the interest of justice and with a view to ascertaining the truth. In an earlier South Dakota criminal case, State v. Madison, 23 S.D. 584, 122 N.W. 647, 649 (1909), it was said that the impeachment of witnesses is a collateral issue, and therefore it was competent for the court to limit the number of witnesses. We conclude that, generally, in criminal prosecutions where the character or reputation of a prosecution witness is relevant and material, the number of impeachment witnesses permitted to testify on that subject may be reasonably limited by the exercise of sound discretion by the trial court. It logically follows that, by the exercise of sound discretion, the trial court may limit the number of witnesses used to impeach one's own witnesses. In reviewing trial court discretionary acts, we apply the standard of abuse of discretion. Mary argues that in a jurisdiction that has adopted the objective theory of entrapment, such as North Dakota, where the focus is on the actions of the law enforcement agents, any limitation of impeachment witnesses is an abuse of discretion. That may very well be true if by focus on the acts of police it is meant that the impeachment of police witnesses becomes the main thrust of the action and the guilt or innocence of the defendant becomes the collateral issue. We know of no case that has so held and we decline to be the first. In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952), the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the use of informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any other betrayals is dirty business and may raise serious questions of credibility and, to that extent, the defendant is entitled to broad latitude to probe credibility. That court also said that departures from primary evidentiary criteria must be justified by some strong social policy. We expressed agreement with a statement of social policy from Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441, 53 S.Ct. 210, 212, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932), in State v. Goeller, 264 N.W.2d 472, 475 (N.D.1978), when we said: `Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises.' If there had not been general agreement between Mary's description of Bosco's persuasion tactics and the description given by Bosco himself, perhaps the limitation imposed by the trial court might be considered abuse of discretion. All the proof in the world that Bosco lied on the witness stand about his own criminal activity is of little concern here, where Mary's own testimony was supportive of his description of the persuasion he used upon her. The persuasive activity by Bosco was nowhere described as outrageous or unconscionable. The legislature has given its approval of reasonable underground narcotics enforcement activities. See § 54-12-14, NDCC. See also H.B. 1048, 46th Legislative Assembly, where the 1979 Legislature supported underground narcotics activity with a $600,000 appropriation. The legislature has prohibited activities that amount to a substantial step toward commission of the crime, § 12.1-06-01(1), NDCC. It has made it illegal to provide substantial assistance to a person intending to commit a felony, § 12.1-06-02, NDCC. One who commands, induces, entreats, or otherwise attempts to persuade another person to commit a particular felony is guilty of criminal solicitation. Section 12.1-06-03, NDCC. All of these prohibitions resulted from the same Legislative Council interim study committee that drafted and recommended the statute on the entrapment defense. The legislative history provides little from which this court can extract legislative intent. It is apparent that the legislature intended that these prohibitions would deter police misconduct. It is possible that an informer's conduct may be punishable as criminal solicitation, for example, and yet not convince a jury that the conduct constitutes entrapment. Obviously, the legislature did not intend to rely solely upon the raising of entrapment as a defense to police the police. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the convictions of Mary Folk for selling controlled substances in violation of §§ 19-03.1-07(4)(b) and 19-03.1-05(4)(m), NDCC. Use of the phrase normally law-abiding persons is the crux of the statutory entrapment defense and was correctly applied by the trial judge in his instructions to the jury. The objection to the admission of hearsay evidence was not sufficiently pursued at trial. The admission of this evidence was, in any event, harmless error and did not affect any substantial right of Mary in presenting her case. Finally, we conclude that the trial court properly limited the number of impeachment witnesses in this case. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PAULSON, SAND and VANDE WALLE, JJ., concur.