Opinion ID: 1834117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Public Trial Issue.

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court's decision to screen three persons in the courtroom abridged his right to a public trial. U.S. Const. art. VI, XIV; see Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Iowa Dist. Court, 426 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Iowa 1988) (right to public trial is shared by the accused, public, and press). Our review of this constitutional question is de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d 57, 58 (Iowa 1984). On the State's motion, the court ordered the defendant's mother, wife, and sister to sit behind two blackboards during the final portion of the victim's testimony. The purpose was to obstruct the line of view between the victim and the family members while the victim was concluding her testimony. (The defendant's mother was to be a witness at the trial; his sister and wife were mere spectators.) In Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), the Supreme Court established stringent criteria for the total closing of a trial. The court's order in the present case did not amount to a closure, or even a substantial closure, of the trial. Nevertheless, even applying the stringent tests of Waller, we believe the court's screening order was appropriate. Waller required: 1. The party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; 2. the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; 3. the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceedings; and 4. the trial court must make findings adequate to support the closure. Id. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216, 81 L.Ed.2d at 39. First, taking the four criteria in order, the protection of the victim from psychological trauma is an overriding state interest likely to be prejudiced under Waller. See generally Iowa Code ch. 910A (1993) (providing for protection of privacy of child victim). The victim's therapist and a court-appointed special advocate were both heard on the State's motion, and both testified that the victim was nervous, uncomfortable, and traumatized about the idea of talking about the abuse. Additionally, they told the court that defendant's family ostracized the child and shook their heads no during her earlier testimony. Aggregating all of these concerns satisfied the first prong of the Waller test. Second, the closure ordered by the court was no broader than necessary to protect its interest in the victim's mental health and ability to testify. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2212, 81 L.Ed.2d at 39. All spectators were allowed to be present during the child's testimony; three of them simply had an obstructed view. The court also accommodated the defendant's request that the court attendant sit so that he could tell the court if the women had trouble hearing. This quasi-closure took place only during a small portion of the child's testimony. (The trial court estimated that it screened just ten percent of the child's testimony.) The remedy adopted by the court was less restrictive than the statutory remedies of closed circuit television of the victim's testimony, or testimony by deposition, as permitted by Iowa Code section 910A.14. Under the third prong of the Waller test, the trial court consider[ed a] reasonable alternative to closing the proceeding and actually implemented that procedure with the blackboard-wall. Last, the trial court made findings adequate to support the screening. It noted the need to balance the protection of the child against the need to seek the truth through her testimony, free from any signaling or other suggestive conduct on the part of any persons in the courtroom. The court in this case met the requirements of Waller and did not deny the defendant his right to a public trial by the screening of three family members.