Opinion ID: 808697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADEA Principles

Text: “The ADEA makes it ‘unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.’” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to 4 Ostrow’s complaint also alleged a breach of contract claim. The district court granted in part GlobeCast’s motion for summary judgment as to that contract claim. The parties then settled what remained of the contract claim, and the district court entered final judgment. Ostrow’s contract claim is not at issue in this appeal. 4 Case: 11-16043 Date Filed: 09/17/2012 Page: 5 of 13 individuals who are at least 40 years of age.”). Where, as here, the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence of age discrimination, this Court has applied the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024 (applying framework to ADEA claim). Under this framework, if the plaintiff presents a prima facie case and the employer offers legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the stated reasons were mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court recently clarified that a plaintiff must prove that age was the “but-for” cause for the adverse employment action in order to prevail on a disparate treatment claim under the ADEA. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009); see also Mora v. Jackson Mem’l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that in Gross the Supreme Court “ruled out the idea of a ‘mixed motive’ ADEA claim”). In Gross, the Supreme Court left open the question “whether the evidentiary framework of [McDonnell Douglas] . . . is appropriate in the ADEA context.” Gross, 557 U.S. at 175 n.2, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 n.2. 5 Case: 11-16043 Date Filed: 09/17/2012 Page: 6 of 13 Accordingly, in light of Gross, we apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to determine whether Ostrow presented sufficient evidence that age was the “butfor” cause of GlobeCast’s decision not to renew his employment contract. We do so because Gross did not explicitly overrule use of the McDonnell Douglas framework in ADEA cases involving circumstantial evidence and the but-for causation standard of Gross is consistent with the McDonnell Douglas framework, in which the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. In addition, given that Ostrow’s appeal challenges only the third step of the magistrate judge’s McDonnell Douglas analysis, we assume arguendo that Ostrow established a prima facie case of age discrimination and that GlobeCast proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and address only whether Ostrow presented evidence from which a jury reasonably could find that GlobeCast’s reason was pretext for age discrimination. A plaintiff may show pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff must demonstrate “‘such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the 6 Case: 11-16043 Date Filed: 09/17/2012 Page: 7 of 13 employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.’” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)). A reason cannot be “pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993) (quotation marks omitted); see also Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163. The plaintiff cannot “recast an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute his business judgment for that of the employer,” but instead must “meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Indeed, in deciding whether the plaintiff has shown pretext, we do not sit as a “super personnel department,” and must take care not to second-guess the employer’s business judgment. See id. For this reason,“[t]he inquiry into pretext centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs, and . . . not on reality as it exists outside of the decision maker’s head.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (explaining that the question is not whether the employee actually had performance problems, but “whether her employers were dissatisfied with her for 7 Case: 11-16043 Date Filed: 09/17/2012 Page: 8 of 13 these or other non-discriminatory reasons, even if mistakenly or unfairly so, or instead merely used those complaints . . . as cover for” discrimination).