Opinion ID: 195233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The First Half of the Chapter 93A Claim.

Text: 48 Appellant's initial charge--that ELC, by blaming the collapse of the deal on Cretco's financial plight rather than on its own empty coffers, misrepresented its reason for refusing to proceed with the sale and leaseback--need not detain us. Although Judge Torres found that ELC had not informed appellant that its participation in the deal would hinge upon the availability of funding, there is no credible evidence that ELC ever made express representations to the contrary. Thus, even if we assume the truth of the charge, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that ELC's conduct in this respect descended to the level of rascality required for a successful chapter 93A suit. See, e.g., Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515-16 (1st Cir.1988) (explaining that, [i]n Massachusetts, the litmus test for transgression of chapter 93A involves behavior which falls within 'the penumbra of some ... established concept of unfairness' ) (quoting Massachusetts cases); Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 8 Mass.App.Ct. 498, 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1979) (explaining that objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce in order to support a chapter 93A action); see also Maruho Co. v. Miles, Inc., 13 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir.1993); Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1513 (1st Cir.1989); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979); Rex Lumber Co. v. Acton Block Co., 29 Mass.App.Ct. 510, 562 N.E.2d 845, 850 (1990). Whether or not full disclosure during arm's-length business negotiations is more likely the exception than the rule, a failure fully to disclose, standing alone, while sometimes actionable in tort, ordinarily will not transgress chapter 93A. So it is here. 49