Opinion ID: 2512667
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Welfare and Institutions Code Section 602 as a Criminal Proceeding

Text: We now consider the contrary characterization, that for purposes of preemption under title 18 United States Code section 3231, a state wardship proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 is properly viewed as fundamentally criminal. This characterization changes our reasoning, but not our conclusion that section 3231 does not preempt state wardship proceedings. (4) First, it has always been understood that the several states are independent sovereigns possessing inherent police power to criminally punish conduct inimical to the public welfare, even when that same conduct is also prohibited under federal law. [2] The Constitution leaves in the possession of each State `certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power.' ( Heath v. Alabama (1985) 474 U.S. 82, 93 [88 L.Ed.2d 387, 106 S.Ct. 433], quoting Hamilton, The Federalist No. 9 (Cooke ed. 1961) p. 55.) Foremost among the prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal code. ( Heath, at p. 93.) This understanding is at the root of the dual sovereignty exception to the United States Constitution's double jeopardy clause, which recognizes that because individual states and the United States are two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory, each may punish the same act without offending double jeopardy principles. ( United States v. Lanza (1922) 260 U.S. 377, 382 [67 L.Ed. 314, 43 S.Ct. 141].) [3] Thus, Congress may pass a law barring a particular act and imposing a specific punishment, and a state Legislature may pass a state law barring the same act and imposing a different specific punishment, as well as vesting jurisdiction over violations of the state law in its state courts, without encroaching upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts to adjudicate violations of the federal law and impose the federal punishment. [4] (5) Section 3231 embraces these settled principles. It provides in its second sentence: Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof. (Italics added.) Thus, while the section grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over the prosecution of federal offenses, it does not do so over the punishment of acts criminalized by federal law; to the extent state law also establishes sanctions for those acts, state courts retain jurisdiction under their own state laws to hear cases and impose punishment. (See In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 764 [264 P.2d 513].) [5] Second, whether a state Legislature exercises its sovereign power to impose independent state criminal punishment for an act by writing its own statute prohibiting it, or by writing a statute incorporating an existing federal criminal prohibition, is immaterial. The distinction is a purely formal one. A state or territory that elects to incorporate portions of federal criminal law into its own criminal code may establish state jurisdiction to try violations as state crimes without offending section 3231. ( U.S. v. Lee (9th Cir. 2006) 472 F.3d 638, 642-643; cf. People v. Tilehkooh (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1446 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 226] [acknowledging that while a state cannot directly enforce federal criminal law, it can reach conduct subject to the federal criminal law by incorporating the conduct into the state law].) [6] (6) This is, in essence, what Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 does. It incorporates by reference federal criminal law, rendering it a basis for the imposition of independent state sanctions, and grants state courts authority to adjudicate such matters. It recognizes the independent state interest in rehabilitating juveniles within this state who are unable to conform their conduct to the requirements of the lawwhether that law be local ordinance, state statute, or federal enactment. [7] Section 3231 does not deprive state courts of jurisdiction granted under their own state laws to impose independent state sanctions. Jose C. objects that under this interpretation of section 3231, states may augment federal criminal statutes in any way they please, adding on various civil or criminal piggyback remedies or sanctions that might conflict with federal dictates. But whether Congress has preempted state court jurisdiction is not to be confused with whether it has preempted state legislative action. The former involves only the question whether a state court has the power to entertain a particular cause; the latter involves the further question whether a state may enact substantive legislation governing the subject matter of the particular cause. (See Houston v. Moore, supra, 18 U.S. at pp. 24-25 [drawing the identical distinction in the course of concluding that state regulation, but not state jurisdiction, was preempted].) Section 3231, as interpreted in Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. 455, does not preempt jurisdiction over a proceeding that entails adjudication of the elements of an underlying federal criminal statute. Whether it preempts the substantive state enactment imposing an additional civil (or criminal) remedyhere, the authorization of state juvenile sanctions upon a finding a federal crime has been committedis a discrete question we deal with separately below. (See pt. II.B., post. ) Jose C. also relies on two sister-state decisions that have addressed this issue and concluded section 3231 does in fact preempt state court jurisdiction. In State v. Tidwell (1982) 32 Wn.App. 971 [651 P.2d 228], a juvenile was convicted in state juvenile court of violating title 18 United States Code section 241, a federal civil rights statute, after burning a cross on an African-American family's lawn. The Washington Court of Appeals concluded the state court lacked jurisdiction, even in a juvenile proceeding, to determine whether someone had violated federal law. It reasoned that because section 3231 granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over federal offenses, it preempted the Washington statute granting state juvenile courts jurisdiction over violations of federal law. Violations of title 18 United States Code section 241 were offenses only against the federal sovereign and could not be punished by the state. Instead, the state court could consider only a state criminal trespass charge. ( Tidwell, at pp. 230-232.) In Matter of Welfare of J.J.T. (Minn.Ct.App. 1997) 559 N.W.2d 714, 715-716, the Minnesota Court of Appeals followed Tidwell and without any independent reasoning concluded a state court could not declare a juvenile a delinquent based on a petition alleging federal criminal violations. State v. Tidwell, supra, 651 P.2d 228, predates Tafflin v. Levitt 's determination that state courts are competent to decide whether a federal criminal law has been violated, section 3231 notwithstanding, if the proceeding is not itself a criminal prosecution. ( Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. at pp. 464-466.) It also fails to consider whether the Washington Legislature had made, or could make, offenses against federal sovereignty into matters of independent state concern by incorporating federal law into its state juvenile delinquency scheme. Accordingly, we do not find it persuasive. (7) In sum, whether characterized as civil or criminal, wardship proceedings that entail adjudication of whether a federal criminal statute has been violated are not expressly preempted by section 3231. [8]