Opinion ID: 391163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the skyride is a consumer product

Text: 16 The Act covers more than toasters and other small household appliances. Congress defined the term consumer product expansively to include any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed 17 (i) for sale to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or 18 (ii) for the personal use, consumption, or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise; .... 4 19 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). The statute thus embraces not only merchandise produced for sale to a consumer, but also those articles that consumers do not ordinarily buy, but nonetheless use. The hallmark of the Commission's authority is not the customer's legal relation to a product, but the consumer's physical exposure to it. See H.R.Rep.No.92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1972); Consumer Product Safety Commission v. Chance Manufacturing Co., 441 F.Supp. 228, 233 (D.C.D.C.1977). 20 The term personal use is, of course, modified. The article must be produced for use in or around a ... household or residence, a school, in recreation or otherwise. When the entire second paragraph of the definition is read literally, it encompasses the Skyride; the Skyride is an article ... produced or distributed ... for the personal use ... or enjoyment ... of a consumer ... in recreation. The House Report accompanying the Act substantiates this interpretation. It states that Subpart (ii) also includes: 21 products which are primarily or exclusively sold to industrial or institutional buyers ... so long as they were produced for the use of consumers. 22 H.R.Rep.No.92-1153, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1972) (emphasis and ellipsis in the original). 23 Of course, plaintiffs challenge this reading, 5 but we cannot ignore the usual significance of the language employed, the legislative history of subpart (ii) and the broad remedial policy underlying the Act. 24
25 Steck & Stapf argues that the Skyride is not an article because it is too large to be exchanged between consumers. The only authority cited to support this extremely limited interpretation is Webster's definition of an article as a commodity. Webster's New World Dictionary 42 (1969). If Webster's definition is controlling, it designates the Skyride. The Skyride is certainly a commodity, a tangible item capable of being sold. Moreover, Webster's also defines commodity as article of commerce. If there be a distinctive difference between the words, we are unable to discern it. That Congress found it necessary to exempt aircraft and boats from the definition of consumer product, 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(F)-(G), indicates that size is not a defining limitation to the term article. 6 Be it ever so large, the Skyride is an article. 26
27 The State Fair contends that the Skyride is not distributed because it is not customarily sold directly to consumers. This argument is answered by the words of the provision to which the State Fair alludes. Section 2052(a)(1)(A), describing the first of the nine excepted classes of products excludes from the Commission's authority: 28 any article which is not customarily produced or distributed for sale to, or use or consumption by, or enjoyment of, a consumer. (Emphasis supplied) 29 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(A). We have no cause to ignore the unaccommodating words italicized; the Skyride has been customarily distributed to amusement parks for use ... or enjoyment of consumers. 30 ASG Industries, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 593 F.2d 1323 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979), and Consumer Product Safety Commission v. Anaconda Co., 593 F.2d 1314 (D.C.Cir.1979), cited by the State Fair, are not to the contrary. Each turns on the court's conclusion that housing is not a consumer product. ASG involved architectural glazing materials, while Anaconda involved aluminum wiring circuits, both products incorporated into housing. Consumers do not use these products until they have been incorporated into the exempted structure and are no longer used separately from their use as part of the whole. In both cases, however, Judge Leventhal noted that products customarily ... used by consumers are not exempted. ASG, 593 F.2d at 1328; Anaconda, 593 F.2d at 1322. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, 574 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881, 99 S.Ct. 218, 58 L.Ed.2d 193 (1978). 7 31 The language of Section 2052(a)(1)(A) is unambiguous. ASG, Anaconda and Kaiser confirm that a product customarily distributed for use by consumers is not exempt from the Commission's authority.
32 The statutory phrase for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of the consumer poses perhaps the most difficult question of interpretation raised by the congressional definition of consumer product. In the common sense of the word, consumers use the Skyride, in that they enjoy, hold, occupy, or have some manner of benefit from the product. Black's Law Dictionary 1710 (4th ed. 1968) (defining Non-technical Sense). See 2 E. Weekly, An Etymological Dictionary of Modern English 1574 (1967). Taking the term as defined in Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 978 (1965), a common desk-top reference book, the passenger avail(s) oneself of the ride, for use implies availing oneself of as a means to an end. Not only do passengers literally occupy the Skyride, but they also enjoy it for sightseeing and benefit from being transported. 33 Steck & Stapf argues that, because consumers do not exercise control over the particular gondola in which they ride, they do not use the Skyride. Surprisingly, two courts have accepted this argument. See Robert K. Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 645 F.2d 26, 29 (10th Cir. 1981); Walt Disney Productions v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, No. 79-0170-LEW(Px), slip op. at 6 (C.D.Cal. April 18, 1979), rev'd on other grounds, No. 79-3435 (9th Cir. April 22, 1981). Neither opinion cites any legislative history to support such a narrow and unusual reading of use in contradiction to the common understanding of its meaning. One court has found that no evidence supports their interpretation. Consumer Product Safety Commission v. Chance Manufacturing Co., 441 F.Supp. 228, 233 (D.C.D.C.1977). 34 If we created this requirement sua sponte, we would also ignore that portion of the House Report including as consumer products those products sold to institutions for the use of consumers. The power of consumers to control articles sold to and owned by an institution will usually be limited. 8 Precisely because they cannot control the product, consumers may face even greater risks of injury. It certainly becomes more difficult for them to determine for themselves the risks posed by its use. In the absence of any evidence of a contrary congressional intent, we cannot assume that Congress excluded products falling within the language of the statute and contemplated by the legislative history. 35 We are more troubled by an apparent redundancy in the definition. We find it difficult to imagine a product sold to consumers, but not used by them. 9 Even the restrictive definitions urged by State Fair and Steck & Stapf do not eliminate this redundancy. Ordinarily, we avoid treating statutory language as surplusage. Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. C. D. I. Construction Inc., 640 F.2d 654, 658 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981). In this instance, however, Congress may have tolerated tautology. The Senate version of the Consumer Product Safety Act limited its definition to products sold to consumers. 10 The House bill also used the language now constituting subpart (i), but added the additional language regarding personal use embodied in subpart (ii). 11 In its desire for an assurance of comprehensiveness, ASG Industries, 593 F.2d at 1328, the House employed its more broadly stated definition, H.R.Rep.No.92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1972), without considering to what degree it overlapped the Senate definition. See id. The effort to avoid lacunae by seeking embraciveness may easily result in overlapping coverage. Without any evidence that Congress, in passing the House version, intended sold to have independent significance, we decline to fabricate a tortured distinction.
36 Both plaintiffs assert that the Skyride is used only as a means of transportation, not as a form of recreation. The district court found that the ride was intended for the enjoyment of recreation-minded consumers. 481 F.Supp. at 1077. Plaintiffs have not shown that this finding is clearly erroneous. See Robert K. Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, 484 F.Supp. 1221, 1225 (N.D.Okl.1980), rev'd on other grounds, 645 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1981), which quotes promotional literature describing the Skyride as an attraction in itself. 37 The plaintiffs then pose a more challenging argument. They construe in recreation to modify the immediately preceding language rather than to provide an additional basis for considering an item as a consumer product. The relevant portion of Section 2052(a)(1)(ii) states that a consumer product is used, enjoyed or consumed: 38 in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise.... 39 This interpretation reads the phrase in recreation to refer only to household or school products used in recreation ( ) or otherwise. Plaintiffs urge that, if in recreation provides an independent basis whereby a product becomes consumer, then the word otherwise also provides an independent basis whereby the statute includes every product imaginable. (Plaintiffs provide a parade of spectres for our edification.) Further, according to the plaintiffs, the references to household or residence would be rendered surplusage, subsumed by otherwise. 40 With the court in Chance Manufacturing, we find this interpretation unduly strained. 441 F.Supp. at 233. The insertion of a comma after recreation indicates that the word was part of the preceding series, rather than functioning with otherwise as an independent adjectival phrase and thus limiting consumer products to those used in recreation or otherwise in a household, residence or school. Further evidence that use in recreation provides a separate basis for including a product comes from the list of exceptions to Section 2052(a)(1)'s definition of consumer product. That Congress explicitly exempted aircraft and boats, see 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(F)-(G), indicates congressional belief that these products, having no connection with school or household, would otherwise have fallen within the general definition. 41 We imply no insight as to the precise meaning of the term otherwise in this context. As a matter of diction, it is not redundant with the items in the preceding series because, by definition, it refers only to other items. However, we are not required to read this statute as if it were a wonderfully constructed jig-saw puzzle, with each word having only one precise place, yielding, when assembled, an unambiguous picture. The statute was not so constructed, as the legislative history indicates. It seems likely that otherwise was inserted as an assurance of comprehensiveness, to use Judge Leventhal's phrase. ASG, 593 F.2d at 1328. This case does not require us to announce that any non-industrial product 12 posing hazards to individuals constitutes a consumer product. That issue is simply not before us because the Skyride falls within one of the stated bases of the Commission's jurisdiction. 42
43 The Act authorizes the Commission to acquire free samples of imported consumer products and purchase domestic consumer products at cost. See 15 U.S.C. § 2066, 2076. Steck & Stapf argues that, because the Commission is unlikely to acquire the Skyride in either manner, the ride is not a consumer product. 13 We find this argument unpersuasive. Both sections are permissive; they enable the Commission to obtain sample products, but do not suggest that the Commission's jurisdiction is limited to products that it may thus acquire. Such a limitation would be puzzling. The Commission will usually be fiscally unable to acquire products as expensive or as large as the Skyride. Yet large and costly products pose hazards to consumers indistinguishable from the hazards posed by those that are small and inexpensive. 14 Absent legislative history or other explicit evidence that Congress intended this distinction, we refuse to read it into the statute. 44 Both plaintiffs argue that the narrower definition of consumer product in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., controls the definition contained in Section 2052(a)(1). The Warranty Act defines consumer product for the purposes of this chapter as: 45 tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes. 46 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). Unlike the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Warranty Act is concerned with fraud, the release of financial information, and contractual rights. Because the Warranty Act is concerned only with household products actually sold to consumers, Congress consciously chose to employ a more limited definition. Two acts with different purposes need not be construed in pari materia. United Shoe Workers v. Bedell, 506 F.2d 174, 188-89 & n.96 (D.C.Cir.1974); Latimer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 285 F.2d 152, 157 (5th Cir. 1960). 47 Steck & Stapf also cites definitions of consumer product in the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, see 15 U.S.C. 1459(a), and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 6291(a)(1). In each of these statutes, Congress has chosen to use the same term, consumer product, but to define it differently in each instance. Each definition reflects the basic concerns of the legislation in which it is found. Without any evidence that these different definitions are interrelated, we refuse to assume that each of these different definitions has the same meaning. Indeed, if we did, we would have difficulty deciding which definition controls the others. We conclude that none of the provisions suggested by plaintiffs would limit Section 2052(a)(1)'s definition of consumer product. 48
49 Both plaintiffs rely on legislative history indicating that Congress was concerned with the hazards posed by small household products to argue that Congress was concerned only with small products. See, e. g., 118 Cong.Rec. 21847 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Percy); id. at 31375 (remarks of Cong. Staggers). Without doubt, many congressmen spoke primarily in terms of small household products when discussing the Act. Their statements, while addressing a central concern, do not purport to describe the limits of the Act's reach. The language of Section 2052(a)(1) suggests a much broader scope. A small facet of a larger problem will frequently capture the attention of Congress. Even though much of its discussion may involve the aspect that initially gained congressional attention, Congress, in the end, frequently passes a statute dealing comprehensively with the larger problem. 15 Lacking specific evidence that the expansion of Congressional concern embodied in Section 2052(a)(1)'s language is only apparent, we must give full effect to the language as written. A statute governs all of the circumstances falling within its purview, not only those that prompted its enactment. 50 We find the House Report statement that the statute includes products sold to ... institutional buyers ... for use of consumers, quoted supra, more probative of congressional intent. Unlike the comments cited by the plaintiffs, this language deals directly with the limits of Section 2052(a)(1)' § definition of consumer product, as does the Report's exhortation that we construe the definition broadly. On balance, the legislative history favors the conclusion that the Skyride does not transcend the periphery of the Commission's expansive domain. 51 7. The Policy of the Act Favors Inclusion of the Skyride as a Consumer Product 52 In 15 U.S.C. § 2051, Congress specified the findings and purposes underlying the Act. These statements announce a broad remedial purpose. In addition, several bear specifically on the question before us. The primary justification for creating the Commission is expressed in the second finding. 53
54 (2) complexities of consumer products and the diverse natures and abilities of the consumers using them frequently result in an inability of users to anticipate risks and to safeguard themselves adequately. 55 15 U.S.C. § 2051(a)(2). If small household appliances pose risks beyond the ability of the average consumer to evaluate, a large and far more complicated machine like the Skyride may pose even greater hazards, yet consumers have neither the technical expertise nor any real opportunity to evaluate the risks involved. In reality, only the institutional purchaser can effectively inquire into the risks posed by a product like the Skyride. The House Report statement that the statute includes products bought by institutions for consumer use indicates that Congress was unwilling to rely on the institutional buyer alone to ensure that consumers do not face unreasonable risks. 56 The fourth finding states that local government regulation of unreasonable risks posed by consumer products is inadequate. 15 U.S.C. § 2051(a)(4). This disposes of plaintiffs' contention that Dallas Building Code regulations governing the Skyride exempt the product from the Commission's authority. 16 57 The Act's purposes also favor inclusion of the Skyride. 58
59 (1) to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products;(2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products; 60 (3) to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products and to minimize conflicting State and local regulations; 61 (4) to promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries. 62 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b). An effective Commission investigation improving the safety of the Skyride would serve each of these ends. The relevance of the fourth finding is especially obvious. Consumers have died while using the Skyride; the protection of others who may use them cannot be assured by awaiting a personal injury action to determine fault. The manufacturers and owners whose products have already been involved in serious injuries to consumers bear an especially heavy burden in arguing that the Commission lacks jurisdiction. 17 63 That burden has not been carried here. We hold that the Skyride is a consumer product. 64