Opinion ID: 4118870
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statistical Arguments

Text: Apart from individual and comparative juror analyses designed to ferret out pretext, defendant insists discrimination must have occurred because it was statistically improbable that no African-Americans would serve on a jury in Alameda County. He notes that while African-Americans comprised only about 6 percent of the panel, the prosecutor used 30 percent of his peremptory challenges against them, excusing 100 percent of the African-American panelists called into the jury box. In regard to whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been established under Batson‘s first step, we have observed that the excusal of all members of a particular group may suggest impropriety. (People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 422; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 119.) Statistical evidence about the underrepresentation of certain groups in the venire may also be relevant to this prima facie showing. (See Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 169-170 & fn. 5.) Here, however, the trial court found a prima facie case had been established and proceeded to the second and third steps of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry. The existence of a prima facie case is therefore not in dispute. The only dispute here concerns whether the court properly found that the inference of discrimination was rebutted by the race-neutral justifications given for the strikes. (See Johnson, at p. 168.) 41 We are aware of no case holding that statistical evidence about the underrepresentation of particular groups on a venire, or jury panel, can be sufficient to undermine a trial court‘s considered findings at the third step of a Batson/Wheeler analysis. By the third step, the court has already found that exclusion of jurors from a particular group requires explanation. (See Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 173.) The question at the third step is not whether the defendant can plausibly urge systematic exclusion, but whether any particular panelist was, in fact, excused due to group bias. (See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 549.) Defendant argues the Supreme Court‘s discussion of the percentage of African-American panel members struck in Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. at pages 240 to 241, supports the relevance of statistics to third step inquiries. The high court did discuss these facts as relevant background. However, its conclusion that at least two panelists were dismissed because of manifest racial prejudice was not based solely on statistics but also on a close analysis of the voir dire responses of dismissed panelists and seated jurors, the use of racially discriminatory practices such as ―shuffling‖ the jury panels, disparities in the prosecutor‘s questioning of African-American panelists, and a systemic policy of the district attorney‘s office to exclude African-Americans from juries. (Id. at pp. 241-264.) While statistical facts may retain some relevance at Batson‘s third step as part of the universe of evidence bearing on the plausibility of asserted justifications for a strike (see id. at pp. 251-252), no case has suggested such facts alone could be sufficient to establish pretext. Defendant complains that his jury consisted of eight Caucasians, two Asians and two Latinos, whereas, ―if race were not an issue . . . one would have expected five white jurors, three Asian jurors, two Latinos, [and] two blacks.‖ However, we have long held that ―no litigant has the right to a jury that mirrors the demographic composition of the population, or necessarily includes members of his own group, or indeed is composed of any particular individuals.‖ (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 277.) Nor does the Sixth Amendment demand such a 42 precise correlation between the demographics of the community and a particular jury. ―Although a defendant has a right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community as a means of ensuring his or her right to an impartial jury, he or she has no right to a jury that reflects the racial composition of the community. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 119-120.) As the Supreme Court has explained, ―[t]he Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).‖ (Holland v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 474, 480.) Finally, to the extent defendant‘s statistical arguments urge that the venire was not representative, the claim has not been preserved for appeal. Defendant neither objected to the panel nor moved to quash the venire. (See People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 634.) Nor has he attempted to support the claim by showing that the jury selection process in Alameda County results in the systematic exclusion of African-Americans. (See Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364; Lewis, at pp. 634-635.)