Opinion ID: 198913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the sentencing enhancement for first degree murder

Text: 50 Sentencing guideline § 2B3.2 sets the base offense level for extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Section 2B3.2 contains a cross-reference provision, § 2B3.2(c)(1), which applies when the extortion scheme results in a murder that occurs outside the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States. In particular, § 2B3.2(c)(1) states: 51 If a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, apply § 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder). Guideline § 2A1.1, in turn, describes the punishment for first degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111. Section 2A1.1 sets a base offense level of 43, which translates into life imprisonment pursuant to the sentencing table in the guidelines. 52 The district court sentenced Hughes to twenty years' imprisonment. It arrived at this sentence by applying the guideline for first degree murder, § 2A1.1, after determining that Hughes's extortion scheme resulted in the murder of McCarthy outside the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and thus triggered the cross-reference found in § 2B3.2(c)(1). Pursuant to § 2A1.1's base offense level of 43, the district court would have sentenced Hughes to life imprisonment, but 18 U.S.C. § 1951 sets the maximum penalty for extortion at twenty years' imprisonment. See USSG § 5G1.1 (Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.). 53 Hughes argues that the district court erred in applying the § 2B3.2(c)(1) cross-reference for three reasons: (A) § 2B3.2(c)(1) is superceded by 18 U.S.C. § 1119; (B) there was insufficient evidence of first degree murder; and (C) McCarthy was not a victim of the extortion scheme within the meaning of § 2B3.2(c)(1). Rejecting each of these arguments, we affirm Hughes's sentence. 54
55 Hughes argues that § 2B3.2(c)(1) is superceded by 18 U.S.C. § 1119. Section 1119 provides that [a] person who, being a national of the United States, kills or attempts to kill a national of the United States while such national is outside the United States but within the jurisdiction of another country shall be punished as provided under sections 1111 [murder], 1112 [manslaughter], and 1113 [attempted murder/manslaughter]. Section 1119 also contains the following limitation: No prosecution shall be approved if prosecution has been previously undertaken by a foreign country for the same conduct. Hughes insists that this limitation prevents calculating his sentence using § 2B3.2(c)(1)'s cross-reference to the first degree murder guideline because he was previously prosecuted for (and convicted of) murder in Mexico. See supra note 1. We disagree. 56 By its own terms, the limiting language within § 1119 speaks only of prosecutions, not sentence enhancements. Moreover, although § 1119 prohibits prosecuting a defendant for murder as provided under section[] 1111, Hughes was not being prosecuted or punished for murder in violation of § 1111, but for extortion in violation of § 1951. If Hughes had been prosecuted and punished for murder, he would have received the death penalty or life imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 1111, not twenty years' imprisonment, the statutory maximum for extortion. 57 It is well-established that a defendant's sentence may be enhanced pursuant to the sentencing guidelines for conduct underlying a prior prosecution, conviction, and punishment. As the Supreme Court explained in Witte: 58 To the extent that the Guidelines aggravate punishment for related conduct outside the elements of the crime on the theory that such conduct bears upon the character of the offense, the offender is still punished only for the fact that the present offense was carried out in a manner that warrants increased punishment, not for a different offense (which that related conduct may or may not constitute). 59 Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 402-03 (1995). This is true even where, as in this case, the defendant is subject to separate prosecutions involving the same or overlapping 'relevant conduct' Id. at 404 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The guidelines specifically contemplate multiple prosecutions for different offenses based on the same conduct. See, e.g., USSG § 5G1.3(c). 60
61 Hughes contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that he murdered McCarthy within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1111--i.e., that Hughes killed McCarthy with malice aforethought. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111. Our review of a sentencing court's fact-specific determination of a defendant's role in the offense is limited to clear error. United States v. Alicea, 204 F.3d 480, 485 (1st Cir. 2000). 62 First degree murder is willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing. 18 U.S.C. § 1111. Hughes argues that the evidence equally supports a finding that he committed voluntary manslaughter--i.e., killing [u]pon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 18 U.S.C. § 1112. The government, however, presented strong circumstantial evidence that Hughes planned to murder McCarthy when they met in Mexico. Hughes purchased a gun, devised a plan to transport it to Mexico, surveyed the area of the crime to choose a suitable location to kill McCarthy, and planned for McCarthy to arrive late at night. To sustain a sentencing enhancement, the government need only prove the relevant facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Medina, 167 F.3d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 1999). The district court did not commit clear error in finding that the government met its burden. 9 63
64 Arguing that the district court erred in determining that McCarthy was a victim of the extortion within the meaning of § 2B3.2(c)(1), Hughes encourages us to read that term narrowly to require that the victim be the target of the extortionate demand. We decline Hughes's invitation, concluding instead that § 2B3.2(c)(1) contemplates that there may be victims of an extortion scheme other than the target of the extortionate demand. 65 Application note 7 to § 2B3.2 explains that [i]f the offense involved the threat of death or serious bodily injury to numerous victims (e.g., in the case of a plan to derail a passenger train or poison consumer products), an upward departure may be warranted. (Emphasis added.) In this example, the train passengers are victims of the train derailment extortion scheme even though the extortionate demand is not made of the passengers themselves. Likewise, because Hughes's plan to extort money from ASI included killing McCarthy, McCarthy was a victim of the extortion scheme even though Hughes never demanded that McCarthy pay him any money. 66 Additional support for this conclusion comes from the text of § 2B3.2. Section 2B3.2(b)(2) adds levels to the base offense level for excessive loss to the victim. There, the use of the definite article the to indicate a narrower class of victims makes sense because only the target of the extortionate demand will suffer a financial loss as a result of the extortion scheme. Section 2B3.2(c)(1) uses the indefinite article, referring the sentencing court to the first-degree murder guideline [i]f a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111. In contrast to § 2B3.3(b)(2), the use of the indefinite article suggests a class of potential victims broader than the target or targets of the extortionate demand. 67 There are many precedents for a similar construction of the term victim in other guidelines sections. The Fifth Circuit concluded that a person killed in the aftermath of a bank robbery, though not the target of the robbery itself, was a victim within the meaning of § 2B3.1(c)(1). See United States v. Harris, 104 F.3d 1465, 1474-75 (5th Cir. 1997) (construing a cross-reference provision identical to § 2B3.2(c)(1)). Other courts have declined to construe the term victim narrowly, except where the guidelines employ the definite article. See United States v. Sickinger, 179 F.3d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that increases based on injury to 'the victim' under sentencing guideline for kidnapping, abduction, unlawful restraint, § 2A4.1, are predicated on the risk to a single intended individual, and distinguishing the victim from the phrase any victim found in the robbery guideline) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Malpeso, 115 F.3d 155, 170 (2d Cir. 1997) (under assault-with-intent-to-commit-murder guideline, § 2A2.1(b)(1), holding that phrase the victim refers only to a single intended victim of assault, and distinguishing provisions that employ the phrase any victim); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 412-13 (9th Cir. 1996) (under USSG § 5K2.8, the kidnapped child, not just the father who was the target of the extortionate demand, was a victim.); United States v. Muhammmad, 948 F.2d 1449, 1456 (6th Cir. 1991) (under robbery guideline, § 2B3.1(b)(3), adjustment referring to any victim covered bystander injured during bank robbery despite defense argument that only the bank was the victim of the offense); United States v. Robertson, 872 F.2d 597, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1989) (under USSG § 5K2.8, interpreting victim to include indirect victims of the offense). 68 We conclude, therefore, that the district court properly determined that McCarthy was a victim within the meaning of § 2B3.2(c)(1), and correctly calculated Hughes's sentence using the cross-reference to the first-degree murder guideline. 10