Opinion ID: 4021145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The law of eminent domain

Text: ¶80 “Eminent domain is the right of the state to take private property for public use.” Section 70-30-101, MCA. This power is “constitutionally grounded” and it “derives from the power of sovereignty,” and “the power of the state for the perceived common good of the public as a whole.” Montana Talc Co. v. Cyprus Mines Corp., 229 Mont. 491, 501, 748 P.2d 444, 450 (1987). However, the Montana Constitution also endows all persons with the right to acquire, possess, and protect private property. Mont. Const. art II, § 3. For this reason, the Montana Constitution limits the state’s power of eminent domain such that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation to the full extent of the loss having been first made to or paid into court for the owner.” Mont. Const. art II, § 29. Furthermore, “[t]he due process rights of the party whose property is taken for public use are protected by the statutes providing the procedures for eminent domain.” Montana Talc, 229 Mont. at 501, 748 P.2d at 450. Although our constitution and statutes provide certain protections to private property owners, the Defendants provided no legal authority in support of their contention that the private property right is elevated in the constitution above the right of eminent domain, nor has this Court located any such authority. We observed as much in Mountain Water I when we noted “the absence of a declared policy by the Legislature giving greater or lesser weight to public ownership as compared to private ownership of a water system.” 38 Mountain Water I, 228 Mont. at 413, 743 P.2d at 596. Rather, the constitutional right of eminent domain presumes the existence of private property and provides protections to private property owners in the event of a taking. ¶81 In Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Railway, 16 Mont. at 536, 41 P. at 243, and again in Montana Talc, 229 Mont. at 497, 748 P.2d at 448, we stated that “the state has an inherent political right, pertaining to sovereignty and founded on what has been expressed to be a ‘common necessity and interest,’ to appropriate the property of individuals to great necessities of the whole community where suitable provision is made for compensation.” We cautioned, however, that “vigorous compliance with procedures required for eminent domain is commanded.” Montana Talc, 229 Mont. at 498, 748 P.2d at 448. ¶82 Among those protective statutory procedures is § 70-30-111, MCA, which outlines the facts that must be found by a preponderance of the evidence before condemnation is ordered. Specifically, a District Court must find the following facts before allowing condemnation: (a) the use to which the property is to be applied is a public use pursuant to 70-30-102; (b) the taking is necessary to the public use; (c) if already being used for a public use, that the public use for which the property is proposed to be used is a more necessary public use; (d) an effort to obtain the property interest sought to be taken was made by submission of a final written offer prior to initiating condemnation proceedings and the final written offer was rejected. Section 70-30-111(1), MCA. It is finding (c)—that the public use for which the water system is proposed to be used by the City is a more necessary public use than the use to which it is currently put by Mountain Water and Carlyle—that is disputed in this case. 39 As we said above, it is well established that in a condemnation action, the question of whether public or private ownership of the property is “more necessary” is a fact-specific, judicial determination. Section 70-30-111, MCA; Mountain Water I, 228 Mont. at 410-11, 743 P.2d at 594; State ex rel. Livingston, 90 Mont. at 196, 300 P. at 918; Helena, 26 Mont. at 476, 68 P. at 802; Butte, Anaconda & Pac. Ry., 16 Mont. at 538, 41 P. at 243. As a result, we review this factual finding for clear error, and we will not disturb the finding unless it is not supported by substantial credible evidence. Montana Power, 272 Mont. at 227, 231-32, 900 P.2d at 890, 893. ¶83 Before reviewing the District Court’s factual findings against the backdrop of the