Opinion ID: 209728
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ’811 and ’896 patents: “retaining mechanisms”

Text: Claim 1 of the ’811 patent recites “two retaining mechanisms for supporting a pair of lenses, and defining a frontal plane.” The district court held that this limitation was a means-plus-function limitation under Section 112 ¶ 6. On appeal, Aspex challenges this conclusion. When a claim limitation does not recite a “means,” there is a rebuttable presumption that it is not a means-plus-function limitation. E.g., DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The presumption can be overcome, however, if “the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “To help determine whether a claim term recites sufficient structure, we examine whether it has an understood meaning in the art.” Id. We have also held that a claim term need not recite specific structure; instead, “it is sufficient if the claim term is used in common parlance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to designate structure, even if the term covers a broad class of structures and even if the term identifies the structures by their 9 2007-1380, -1407 function.” Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2004). On appeal, Aspex argues that the claim limitations that require the “retaining mechanisms” to “define a frontal plane” and recite “a bridge connecting the two retaining mechanisms and holding the two retaining mechanisms together” establish that the “retaining mechanisms” are “physical structures.” Appellant’s Br. at 27. But the question is not whether “retaining mechanisms” are physical structures but whether they are sufficiently definite structures. In Massachusetts Institute of Technology & Electronics for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006), this court affirmed the district court’s determination that “colorant selection mechanism” was a means-plus-function limitation. We stated that “[t]he generic terms ‘mechanism,’ ‘means,’ ‘element,’ and ‘device’ typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure.” Id. at 1354. Thus, we noted that “[t]he term ‘mechanism’ standing alone connotes no more structure than the term ‘means.’” Id. We concluded that “colorant selection” had no generally understood meaning in the art that would connote sufficiently definite structure. Id. On the other hand, in Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996), this court reversed the district court’s holding that the claim limitation “detent mechanism” was a means-plus-function limitation. We stated that “‘detent’ denotes a type of device with a generally understood meaning in the mechanical arts, even though the definitions are expressed in functional terms.” Id. at 1583 (noting that dictionaries defined “detent,” among other ways, as a part of a mechanism that locks or unlocks a movement). 10 2007-1380, -1407 This case is more analogous to MIT than Greenberg. Here, “mechanism” is a generic term, and its modifier, “retaining,” is also quite broad, meaning “to hold back, keep, restrain.” E.g., Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1006 (1990) (defining “retain”). Altair’s expert Dr. Leck stated in his expert report that “‘retaining mechanism’ has no common meaning in the eyeglass industry,” and that he had no “mental picture of a specific structure when [he heard] the term.” When David Chao, one of the inventors, was asked whether there was “a commonly recognized structure in the industry for a retaining mechanism,” he testified only that there were multiple types of retaining mechanisms that could retain lenses. Thus, there is no indication in the record that “retaining mechanism” connotes definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art. We affirm the district court’s holding that “retaining mechanism” is a means-plusfunction limitation. Because it is undisputed that the only structure disclosed in the specification for performing the recited functions (i.e., supporting the lenses and defining a frontal plane) are rims, the district court correctly construed this claim limitation as “a structure that keeps the lenses in place using rims.” Aspex argues that even if the district court correctly construed “retaining mechanism,” it erred in concluding that Altair’s rimless configuration was not equivalent to rims. It is undisputed that the sunglasses in the accused products are rimless; instead of rims, holes are drilled in the lenses and pins attach the lenses to the bridge. The district court stated that the function of the “retaining mechanisms” in the claims was to support the lenses and define a frontal plane, but held that even if the pins in the accused products perform this function, the structure of the accused products “differs substantially.” In particular, rims hold the lenses in place by encircling 11 2007-1380, -1407 them whereas the pins in a rimless configuration are drilled through the lenses. Based on this, the district court concluded that the way in which the pins in the accused products accomplish the function is different. Aspex argues that it presented sufficient evidence to establish a disputed issue of material fact as to equivalency. It points to the declaration of David Chao, one of the inventors, who declared that “rims are interchangeable with studs, pins, or screws” and that both pins and rims retain the lenses and attach them to the bridge and/or “end piece.” J.A. at 2939. Aspex also points to Altair’s marketing materials that refer to rimless products as having frames. We conclude that the evidence presented by Aspex was insufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact as to equivalency. We agree with the district court that pins retain the lenses in a substantially different way than rims. Moreover, David Chao’s testimony on which Aspex relies is conclusory. Thus, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the accused products do not infringe the asserted claims of the ’811 and ’896 patents because they do not use “retaining mechanisms” (i.e., rims or their equivalents).