Opinion ID: 853042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Search of the Truck

Text: Kubsch complains the trial court erred by admitting into evidence over his continuing objection various items seized from his truck, including a cellular telephone, a package of duct tape, and a receipt from a Meijer department store. Acknowledging the items were seized as the result of a consent to search, Kubsch contends the search was not valid and even if valid the search exceeded the scope of the consent. Also, insisting that he was in custody at the time the consent was given, Kubsch argues the police failed to scrupulously honor his invocation of his right to remain silent under Miranda. Thus, the argument continues, any evidence seized was the fruit of the poisonous tree and should not have been admitted at trial.
The record shows that Kubsch talked to police on two separate occasions on the day the bodies were discovered. On the first occasion Kubsch was advised that his home was a crime scene and was asked to accompany police to the Special Crimes Unit to answer routine questions. Upon arrival, Kubsch was seated in the lobby. At the time, police had discovered only two bodies at Kubsch's home: Rick and Aaron Milewski. Detective Michael Samp testified, at that point I needed to ask some questions and try to ascertain what was going on. R. at 830. Although not under arrest, Kubsch was advised of his Miranda rights. R. at 844. However, Detective Samp was clear that Kubsch wasn't a suspect. He wasn't under arrest. R. at 846. During the course of the subsequent interview, Kubsch told Detective Samp that he wanted to talk with his wife's mother. At that point Detective Samp testified, I said that was fine, that he wasn't under arrest, that he could go ahead and go. And he got up, and I opened the door for him, and he walked out. R. at 831. About an hour after Kubsch left the interview room, police were informed that the body of Kubsch's wife had also been discovered in the parties' home. Deciding to let Kubsch know about the discovery, Detective Samp directed another officer, Detective Mark Reihl, to find Kubsch and escort him back to the station. He did so, and upon entering the interview room, Kubsch was advised that the officers wanted to ask some more questions. In response Kubsch replied, Can I tell you this one thing [ ] I know this is routine for you guys but at this point I really don't want to answer anymore questions. R. at 914. Detective Reihl then asked for permission to search Kubsch's truck. Kubsch agreed and signed a consent to search form. The following colloquy describes the events occurring thereafter: Q. [Prosecutor] After you had him complete [the consent to search] form, what happens with Mr. Kubsch?    A. [Detective Samp] So then I explain to him the fact that Beth had been found dead, and knowing that, did that change anything, did he want to talk to us, and he said, yes, he didn't want to talk to us, so at that point he was free to leave. Q. [Prosecutor] In fact did he leave? A. [Detective Samp] Yes. R. at 839-840. Under Miranda `interrogation must cease' when the person in custody indicates that `he wishes to remain silent.'  Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). Also, under the Indiana Constitution a person in custody must be informed of the right to consult with counsel about the possibility of consenting to a search before a valid consent can be given. Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995). [5] However, these Miranda safeguards do not attach unless there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody.' Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ind. 1995) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)). Here, focusing on the fact that he was initially driven to the police station in the back of a locked squad car and that he was returned to the station for a second interview after invoking his right to remain silent, Kubsch contends he was in custody during the time he was questioned by the officers. These facts are not controlling. Rather, to determine whether a defendant is in custody we apply an objective test asking whether a reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe themselves to be under arrest or not free to resist the entreaties of the police. Torres v. State, 673 N.E.2d 472, 474 (Ind.1996) (quotation omitted). Further, a person is not in custody where he is unrestrained and ha[s] no reason to believe he could not leave. Huspon v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Ind.1989). We conclude that no reasonable person in Kubsch's position would have believed that he was under arrest. Not only did he have reason to believe he could leave, he was unrestrained and actually did leave, after both the first and second interview. Despite Kubsch's arguments to the contrary, he was not in custody when he gave police consent to search his truck.
Pointing to his allegedly vulnerable mental state, stating he had no prior experience with police, and alleging subtly coercive police questions, along with asserting trickery, deceit and misrepresentation, Kubsch contends that his consent was not voluntary. Br. of Appellant at 27-29. Generally, a search warrant is a prerequisite to a constitutionally proper search and seizure. Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind.1994). In cases involving a warrantless search the State bears the burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement. Short v. State, 443 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind.1982). A valid consent is such an exception. In turn, a consent to search is valid except where procured by fraud, duress, fear or intimidation or where it is merely a submission to the supremacy of the law. Martin v. State, 490 N.E.2d 309, 313 (Ind. 1986). Despite Kubsch's assertions to the contrary, the record before us simply does not support the view that the consent Kubsch gave police was the product of fraud, duress, fear or intimidation. Further, Kubsch makes no claim that he was merely submitting to the supremacy of the law when he consented to the search of his truck. Accordingly, we conclude that Kubsch's consent was freely and voluntarily given.
Relying on the police request to look inside his truck, and his response yes-over at the house, R. at 915, Kubsch contends that even if his consent to search were voluntarily given, the evidence seized as a result still should have been suppressed because the search exceeded the scope of the consent. According to Kubsch: (i) the search should have been conducted at the location where the truck was parked, and thus police had no authority to impound the truck in order to conduct a search; and (ii) the search was limited only to looking inside the truck. It is true that a consensual search allows a suspect to limit or restrict the search as he or she chooses. Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 964 (Ind.2001). However, the scope of a consensual search is measured by objective reasonableness and is determined by what a typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. Id. (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)). Here, in addition to the verbal exchange between Kubsch and Detective Samp, the consent to search that Kubsch signed provided in pertinent part: I grant permission for ... a search, [and] hereby authorize, consent and allow Special Crimes to conduct a complete search of my motor vehicle which is ( located at ) (described as) corner of Prism Valley, 1994 Geo Tracker. The above mentioned person(s) and any others needed to assist them are hereby authorized by me to take from my ... motor vehicle any merchandise, personal property, or chattels that may be involved in the investigation they are conducting. R. at 919 (emphasis added). It is clear that a complete search of Kubsch's truck would encompass considerably more than simply looking inside the vehicle. Also, we agree with the trial court that Kubsch's statement yesover at the house was not tantamount to saying, you can search it but only if you search it where it sits. R. at 263 (emphasis in original). Rather, it is apparent that Kubsch's response was intended to assist the police in locating the vehicle, rather than to restrict or limit the scope or location of the search to be conducted. In searching Kubsch's truck, the police did not exceed the scope of the voluntary consent. We conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence the items seized as a result of the search.