Opinion ID: 1219630
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Identity of the Abuser

Text: The only evidence in the record establishing Shirley Gilman's identity as the abuser of J.S.J. comes from third-party accounts of J.S.J.'s identification of Gilman. [15] Such accounts fall squarely within Evidence Rule 801, which defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Alaska R.Evid. 801(c). Unless the hearsay comes within the ambit of some exception provided by a statute or a rule prescribed by this court, it is inadmissible as evidence. Alaska R.Evid. 802. Inadmissible hearsay assertions in an affidavit cannot be used either to oppose or support a motion for summary judgment. Williford, 783 P.2d at 238 n. 8. Thus, absent an applicable exception to Rule 802, the hearsay nature of the only evidence presently in the record that links Shirley Gilman to the abuse of J.S.J. would be fatal to Broderick's case. Under the facts of this case, however, Broderick's account of J.S.J.'s identification of Gilman falls under the residual exceptions to the hearsay rule found in Rule 803(23) and Rule 804(b)(5). [16] Evidence Rule 803(23) provides: A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, [is admissible] if the court determines that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (b) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (c) the general purposes of these rules and the interest of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. Alaska R.Evid. 803(23). We emphasize that this residual hearsay exception is intended to be used sparingly and only after rigorous application of the requirements of the section to the facts under consideration. Commentary, Alaska R.Evid. 803(23). We conclude, in light of all the facts in this particular case, that the hearsay accounts of J.S.J.'s identification of her abuser meet these requirements. [17] Rule 803(23) entails five requirements for admissibility: (1) the statement which is the subject of the hearsay testimony must have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to that possessed by the specific hearsay exceptions; (2) the statement must concern a material fact; (3) it must be more probative than any other evidence which the proponent can reasonably procure; (4) admission must best serve the general purposes of the evidence rules and the interest of justice; and (5) the opponent must have appropriate notice that the hearsay will be offered. Turning to the first requirement, we must assess whether the circumstances surrounding the identification of Gilman suggest trustworthiness to the same degree as the circumstances giving rise to the established hearsay exceptions. Because the twenty-two situations specified as exceptions under Rule 803 vary greatly in their circumstantial indicia of trustworthiness, this standard is necessarily inexact. In this situation, several factors support the conclusion that J.S.J.'s statements of identification are trustworthy enough to justify their admission in hearsay form. [18] First, the record indicates that the identifications were spontaneous, made without undue suggestions by someone else. State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801, 811 (1987); see also State v. Ryan, 103 Wash.2d 165, 691 P.2d 197, 205 (1984) (spontaneity one factor in determining reliability of out of court statement). At the time that J.S.J. first told her mother of the abuse, Broderick asked her who did it. Although Broderick did suggest a number of individuals  such as J.S.J.'s father, her grandparents and Broderick's boyfriend  the girl named a perpetrator that Broderick did not suggest: [t]he mean lady at the church. When Broderick and Polak took J.S.J. to the church, the girl reacted to Gilman's presence immediately upon seeing the woman. She then told them that Gilman was the mean lady  that's the lady who hurt my wee-wee. J.S.J.'s age at the time of the identifications is also a factor suggesting trustworthiness. The girl was three and a half years old when she identified Gilman as her abuser. As the Eighth Circuit noted under similar circumstances, a declarant's young age is a factor that may substantially lessen the degree of skepticism with which we view their motives. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 441 (8th Cir.1985) (involving eleven-year-old sexual abuse victim); see also United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474, 477 (8th Cir.1985) (four year old victim's age a significant factor supporting the finding that the challenged statements are trustworthy). Expert material in the record reinforces this factor. Phillip Kaufman notes that [c]hildren, up until age 6[,] are unable to practice real deception... . Because of [J.S.J.]'s age, she has few internalized limits and lacks the ability or sophistication to be deceptive, devious or calculating, even over a short period of time. [19] By the same token, no evidence exists in the record to suggest that J.S.J. would have a motive to lie in identifying Gilman as her abuser, even assuming that she had the capability to do so. J.S.J.'s use of childish terminology also gives her identification of Gilman the ring of verity. United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir.1979); see also Robinson, 735 P.2d at 811 (five-year-old's childlike description of [sexual abuse] give her statements the ring and quality of truth). J.S.J. told Broderick and Polak that Gilman was the mean lady  the bad lady  who had hurt her wee wee and her bum bum. She also indicated to Broderick that the mean lady had touched her heart, meaning her breast. J.S.J.'s consistency in linking the mean lady at the church to the abuse is another factor suggesting trustworthiness. Cree, 778 F.2d at 477 & n. 5. Although consistency may sometimes suggest rehearsal, the facts in this case militate in favor of reliability. J.S.J. referred to the mean lady at the church the first time she discussed the fact that she had been abused. [20] Subsequent to that initial revelation, J.S.J. identified the mean lady at the church as her abuser in statements to her mother, to her mother's boyfriend, and to a child psychologist. The fact that the witnesses to J.S.J.'s statements  Broderick and Polak  may be unreliable or motivated by selfish interests is irrelevant to evaluation of the reliability of the statements themselves, which is what concerns us here. Noting that the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness under the residual exception must be equivalent to the guarantees underpinning the specific exceptions, the Seventh Circuit has concluded: The specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are not justified by any circumstantial guarantee that the witness who reports the statement will do so accurately and truthfully. That witness can be cross-examined and his credibility thus tested in the same way as that of any other witness. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir.1979). We agree and reiterate that credibility of witnesses is exclusively within the province of the trier of fact. Grasle Electric, 525 P.2d at 1083. The remainder of the requirements of Rule 803(23) are easily satisfied. J.S.J.'s statements are offered to prove a material fact and there is nothing more probative in a child abuse case than the victim's personal statements regarding the incident. See Robinson, 735 P.2d at 812. Admission in this case serves the interest of justice by giving a jury the opportunity to resolve issues of fact surrounding these grave charges. Notice clearly is not a problem. We conclude, in light of the above, that J.S.J.'s statements are admissible for purposes of proving the identity of her abuser.