Opinion ID: 2069959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Commonwealth Witness Robles

Text: Johnson raises four distinct claims stemming from the testimony of Commonwealth witness Robles. Johnson contends that: (1) the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose a bail report and other evidence that Robles paid off police; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively cross-examine Robles; (3) this Court used the incorrect materiality standard for determining whether the Commonwealth violated Brady by not turning over a letter in which Robles stated that he would do anything to get out of jail; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to procure the Robles letter. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, one must show: (1) that the [underlying] claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and, (3) that, but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999). Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 566 Pa. 312, 780 A.2d 649 (2001). Regarding the first sub-issue, failure to disclose the bail report and other evidence that Robles paid off the police, this evidence is not material. It is well settled that a Brady violation exists only where the prosecution failed to disclose material evidence that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). [F]avorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.... A reasonable probability [is a probability sufficient to] undermine confidence in the outcome. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Johnson cites to a bail report on Robles, that Johnson contends could have helped him impeach Robles. According to Johnson, the report states that his bail is conditioned upon his appearance at court proceedings, reporting any changes of address, and undergoing drug testing and counseling. We fail to see how this report, if it had been disclosed to Johnson, would have changed the result of the proceeding. In his question to this Court, Johnson refers to other evidence that the police paid off Robles, but he does not cite to any such evidence in his argument. Johnson also posits that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Robles in this regard, but the Record indicates otherwise. Attorney Adams specifically asked Robles the following question: They gave you bail because you agreed to testify, is that correct? Trial N.T., 11/20/97, page 523. Robles responded: No, they gave me bail because I met whatever requirements I needed to make bail. Id. We refuse to find counsel ineffective because he did pursue this argument. The other two allegations of Johnson in this regard stem from this Court's discussion of the Robles letter on direct appeal, wherein we stated that it was not material pursuant to Brady. Johnson correctly notes that we did not employ the proper standard for analyzing his claim. In Johnson I, we stated that where a defendant makes a general request for exculpatory evidence, then the evidence is considered material only if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. Johnson I, 727 A.2d at 1094. However, the Supreme Court has abolished the distinction between general and specific discovery requests and now determines materiality by questioning whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555. As it relates to the facts of this case, the difference between the two standards does not come into play in the case sub judice and, therefore, Johnson did not suffer any prejudice as a result of our error. Likewise, as we have determined that Johnson has failed to meet his burden of proving materiality pursuant to Brady, he cannot establish the requisite prejudice to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.