Opinion ID: 783160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process in the Sentencing Context: Supreme Court Precedent Identified.

Text: 44 The Supreme Court has clearly spoken on the question of the standard of proof of facts in sentencing in relation to the constitutional requirement of due process, holding that the preponderance of evidence standard satisfies the requirement. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (Like the [state] court below, we have little difficulty concluding that in this case the preponderance standard satisfies due process.); see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (noting, in connection with the approval of standard under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, that the Court has held that application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process). 45 The Supreme Court also has clearly spoken on the question of the process due one who is alleged to have fail[ed] to abide by the rules governing his parole. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The determination to resentence for the breach of a condition of a sentence is analogous to the determination to revoke the parole of a parolee for failure to comply with the conditions of parole. It is also analogous to the determination to impose a sentence for violation of the terms of probation. All these determinations should be informed by the same considerations. For parole revocation, an opportunity for a hearing must be provided. According to the Supreme Court, 46 [t]his hearing must be the basis for more than determining probable cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation. The parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation. 47 Id. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593. 48 In order to justify the further punishment generated by parole revocation, the following minimum requirements of due process must be filled: 49 (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. 50 Id. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593. The inquiry is said to be a narrow one, and the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence, including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial. Id. 51 We have previously reviewed Supreme Court teaching to arrive at the conclusion that, although due process considerations are implicated in sentencing generally, not all the evidentiary limitations and procedural safeguards are required in the conduct of a sentencing proceeding. See United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 711 (2d Cir.1978). We have gone so far as to hold that Due Process does not prevent use in sentencing of out-of-court declarations by an unidentified informant where there is good cause for the nondisclosure of his identity and there is sufficient corroboration by other means. Id. at 713 (footnote omitted). 52