Opinion ID: 2463945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Penalty Phase Instruction 17 (Clayton's point 8)

Text: In his eighth point Clayton contends that the trial court erred in submitting Instruction 17 because it contained statutory aggravators not supported by the evidence. Clayton failed to object to Instruction 17 at the penalty phase instruction conference or at any prior time. Clayton also failed to set forth the instruction in full in the argument portion of his brief. Rule 30.06(e); State v. Oxford, 791 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1055, 111 S.Ct. 769, 112 L.Ed.2d 789 (1991). This point is not preserved for appeal and review is for plain error. Rule 30.20. Instruction 17 provides: In determining the punishment to be assessed against the defendant for the murder of Christopher Castetter, you must first unanimously determine whether one or more of the following statutory aggravating circumstances exist: (1) whether the defendant was convicted of Assault in the Second Degree on September 14th, 1991 in the Circuit Court of Barry County of the State of Missouri. (2) Whether Christopher Castetter was a peace officer, and whether that murder was committed during the exercise of his official duty. (3) Whether the murder of Christopher Castetter involved depravity of mind, and whether as a result thereof the murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhumane. You can make a finding of the depravity of mind only if you find that the defendant's selection of the person killed was random and without regard to the victim's identity, and that defendant's killing of Christopher Castetter thereby exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of all human life. (4) Whether the murder of Christopher Castetter was committed for the purpose of avoiding the lawful arrest of defendant. You are further instructed that the burden rests upon the state to prove at least one of the foregoing circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. On each circumstance that you find beyond a reasonable doubt, all 12 of you must agree as to the existence of that circumstance. Therefore, if you do not unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the foregoing statutory aggravating circumstances exists, you must return a verdict fixing the punishment of the defendant at imprisonment for life by the corrections without eligibility for probation or parole. The part of the instruction about which Clayton complains is that involving depravity of mind which could only be found if the killing of the victim was at random and without regard to his identity. Clayton asserts that this aggravating circumstance was not supported by the evidence; that a finding that he killed Castetter because he was a law enforcement officer and that he killed Castetter at random and without regard to his identity are mutually exclusive and cannot coexist. Clayton's argument is incorrect. The jury determined that aggravating circumstances numbers 1, 2, and 3 existed beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury did not find the fourth aggravator. Aggravator 2 merely requires a finding that Deputy Castetter was a peace officer and was killed during the exercise of his official duty. Nothing within this finding is necessarily inconsistent with a finding that Castetter was also killed at random and without regard to his identity. Killing a person merely because that person is a law enforcement officer does not negate a finding of randomness, unless a particular purpose is also found specific to the identity of the individual victim. Even had the jury also found aggravator 4, which it did not, the mere fact that Deputy Castetter was killed to avoid Clayton's being arrested by him might have related solely to Castetter's duties as a law enforcement officer and not to his identity as a person. See State v. Cornman, 695 S.W.2d 443, 448 (Mo. banc 1985). Point 8 is denied.