Opinion ID: 2543365
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Counsel at 1992 Penalty Hearing

Text: ¶ 33 The district court thoroughly analyzed the merits of each of Carter's claims of ineffective assistance relating to his 1992 penalty hearing counsel. With respect to claims (1)(a) and (b), which assert that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate available mitigating evidence and for failing to hire a mitigation expert, the district court found that counsel's performance was not deficient in any manner as counsel had presented a substantial amount of mitigation evidence on Carter's behalf. The court explained that counsel presented evidence of Carter's troubled childhood, his failed marriage, a head injury that may have caused brain dysfunction rendering him more prone to violence, particularly when under the influence of alcohol, and the love Carter and his family share with one another. The district court also pointed out that Carter had not shown what additional evidence was available to present to the jury. ¶ 34 We agree with the district court's analysis of this issue. Carter has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance, relating to the mitigation evidence provided, was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. ¶ 35 As to claim (1)(c), Carter's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the trial court omitted two statutory mitigators in its mitigation instruction, the district court dismissed the claim after finding no evidence to support the inclusion of the omitted mitigators in the instruction. The omitted statutory mitigators relate to a finding by the jury that the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person, and that the defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and his [or her] participation was relatively minor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(c), (f) (1990). As the district court explained, the guilt phase jury concluded that Carter was the lone assailant in the murder and there was no evidence that he was under the domination of another person when he committed the murder. Therefore, counsel's failure to object to the court's decision not to provide the instruction when there was no evidence to support the instruction being given does not constitute deficient performance. The district court correctly dismissed this claim. ¶ 36 Carter also alleged, in claim (1)(d), that his 1992 penalty hearing counsel was ineffective for passing juror Nelson for cause. Carter argues that trial counsel should have challenged juror Nelson because he responded to the jury questionnaire by stating (1) that he believed in blood atonement, which he defined as: [i]f you take a life, you must pay for it with your life; (2) that he believed in the religious Curse of Cain doctrine and defined it as a curse of dark skin for Cain killing Able [sic]; and (3) that he believed racial minorities were more likely than Caucasians to commit violent crimes because he believed racial minorities are more prone to live in poverty. In answering the question regarding whether he had any negative feelings or felt any resentment toward people who are accused of or are convicted of a crime, Nelson circled both the yes and no options, explaining his answer was yes, he would have negative feelings toward a defendant if convicted of major crimes. ¶ 37 During voir dire of juror Nelson, Nelson also told the court that his belief in blood atonement would not lead him to impose an automatic death sentence and that his belief in the mark of Cain did not have anything to do with the case, even though the defendant is African-American. Nelson explained his comment that racial minorities were more prone to commit violent acts by saying: Well, I think that those that are in poverty situations are more prone to be involved in drugs and crime and that type of thing. And that could be white people in a, you know, in an area, black people in an area. I think if they are, both don't have some of the same chances that other people do that are a little more well to do, then I think those people are more prone to crime and probably more prone to violen[t] crimes. Regarding the comment that he had strong feelings towards those who are convicted of major crimes, Nelson said: Well, I'm kind of thinking in the middle there, there [are] sometimes where you know more about it and a situation where you definitely have more feelings than you have bad feelings against it, or if it's somebody that you don't know or you don't know really the circumstances around it, then I probably wouldn't have feelings or serious feelings about that, it's more of knowledge I have to that crime or the person committing the crime. Finally, Nelson affirmed that the fact that Carter had been convicted did not cause him to make any prejudgment about the sentence he should receive. ¶ 38 After the court, counsel for Carter, and the State finished questioning Nelson, Nelson was passed for cause. In Carter's petition for habeas corpus, he alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Nelson. The district court analyzed the merits of this claim and concluded that counsel's performance in passing Nelson for cause was not outside the realm of appropriate trial strategy. The court pointed out that counsel had the opportunity to observe the demeanor, attitudes and beliefs of Juror Nelson and to make a direct, informed decision not to challenge him. The district court therefore dismissed this claim. ¶ 39 As explained above, in order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Carter must show (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) that the deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We hold that the district court correctly dismissed Carter's claim that his 1992 penalty hearing counsel was ineffective for passing Nelson for cause because Carter has failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test. ¶ 40 To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Carter must rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). In the context of jury selection, this is a difficult task because the Strickland standard requires the appellate court to make two distinct presumptions when trial counsel does not object to, or remove, a particular juror. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 20, 12 P.3d 92. The first presumption is that counsel's decision not to challenge a particular juror is presumed to be a conscious choice or preference. Id. Second, because the process of jury selection is a highly subjective, judgmental, and intuitive process, counsel's strategic choice to refrain from objecting to a juror is presumed to constitute effective assistance. Id. ¶ 41 These presumptions are appropriate in this context given the inexact nature of the jury selection process. There are a multitude of inherently subjective factors typically constituting the sum and substance of an attorney's judgments about particular jurors. Id. at ¶ 19. Each trial attorney has his or her own unique strategy in determining which prospective jurors they would like to sit on the jury, and when an appellate court reviews an attorney's decisions made during the jury selection process, the appellate court is presented only with the bare transcript. The appellate court does not have the benefit of observing the juror's demeanor, personality, or interaction with others. Furthermore, certain decisions by counsel may even appear counterintuitive. For instance, an attorney may make a reasoned judgment that a prospective juror's consciousness of, and concern for, his or her own potential bias actually provides a more sure foundation for confidence in that juror's reasoning processes. Id. at ¶ 22. ¶ 42 For these reasons, we have noted that appellate review of the strategic decisions of counsel during jury selection becomes an inherently speculative exercise. Id. at ¶ 24. As such, to rebut the presumption of effectiveness, the defendant must show: (1) that defense counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during the jury selection process that the failure to remove a prospective juror was not the product of a conscious choice or preference; (2) that a prospective juror expressed bias so strong or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror; or (3) that there is some other specific evidence clearly demonstrating that counsel's choice was not plausibly justifiable. Id. at ¶ 25 (footnote omitted). ¶ 43 Carter has made no such showing in this case. First, there are no allegations that counsel was inattentive or indifferent to the jury selection process during the 1992 penalty hearing. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that counsel fully participated in the in-chambers voir dire of juror Nelson. Furthermore, Carter's counsel challenged three jurors who expressed views similar to juror Nelson. Only after the extensive voir dire of Nelson did counsel make a strategic choice not to challenge him. ¶ 44 Next, Carter has not shown that Nelson's responses to voir dire demonstrated bias so strong or unequivocal that there was no plausible justification for counsel's decision not to challenge him for cause. When questioned about the responses Nelson supplied on the jury questionnaire, Nelson stated that his religious beliefs would not cause him to impose an automatic death penalty. Nelson also explained his answer regarding whether racial or ethnic minorities were more likely to commit crimes by saying that he believed people in poverty situations, regardless of race or ethnicity, were more likely than others to commit crimes. Nelson also stated that he would be willing to put aside any negative feelings he had towards Carter based on Carter's conviction and apply the law as provided by the trial court. Based on these answers, we do not find such strong bias that there is no plausible justification for counsel's decision not to challenge Nelson. ¶ 45 Finally, Carter has not presented any evidence that there is some other specific evidence clearly demonstrating that counsel's choice was not plausibly justifiable. Id. at ¶ 25. ¶ 46 Because Carter has not shown that counsel was inattentive or indifferent during jury selection, or that Nelson's bias was so unequivocal that there could be no justification for counsel's decision to pass him for cause, or that there is no plausible justification for counsel's decision, Carter has not demonstrated that counsel's performance in passing Nelson for cause was deficient below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. Carter has thus failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. ¶ 47 Standing alone, Carter's inability to satisfy the first prong of Strickland defeats his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. However, even if we assume that the first prong of Strickland was met, Carter has not satisfied the second Strickland prong because he has failed to show that counsel's performance prejudiced him. In order to show prejudice, Carter would have to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Carter has not done so in this case. He has not offered any evidence to show that had counsel challenged juror Nelson for cause there is a reasonable probability that the outcome in this case would have been different. Therefore, our confidence in the outcome is not undermined and the district court properly dismissed this claim.