Opinion ID: 174823
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dismissal Was Proper Because Hamdi Fails to State a Constitutional Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted

Text: Hamdi has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because federal district courts are prohibited from reviewing and vacating a removal order, the ultimate relief that Hamdi seeks. Hamdi's complaint can be reduced to the claim that because Hamdi has constitutional rights that his mother's order of removal adversely affects, and because DHS did not consider Hamdi's rights in imposing his mother's order of removal, Hamdi is entitled to relief. His requested relief is that the federal district court should review his mother's order of removal and, taking proper account of his constitutional rights, cancel that removal order. In its arguments below, DHS asserted that § 1252(a)(5) [10] and § 1252(b)(9), [11] precluded the district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over Hamdi's claim. Although we acknowledge that the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252, even apart from § 1252(g) discussed above, are intended to narrow the availability of judicial review of removal orders and for claims arising from a final order of removal, see Kucana, 130 S.Ct. at 838-39; AADC, 525 U.S. at 482-86, 119 S.Ct. 936, we conclude that the scope of the jurisdictional bar in § 1252(b)(9) does not preclude the district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over Hamdi's claim. However, § 1252(b)(9) does operate to preclude the district court from providing the particular relief that Hamdi seeksjudicial review of his mother's order of removal and cancellation of that order. In Nken v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1755, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009), the Supreme Court explained the changes in judicial review of immigration procedures brought on by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, which substantially amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.,: The new review system substantially limited the availability of judicial review and streamlined all challenges to a removal order into a single proceeding: the petition for review. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (barring review of certain removal orders and exercises of executive discretion); § 1252(b)(3)(C) (establishing strict filing and briefing deadlines for review proceedings); § 1252(b)(9) (consolidating challenges into petition for review). Id. Although § 1252(b)(9) has been described as the unmistakable `zipper' clause, AADC, 525 U.S. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 936, its scope reaches only claims for judicial review arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien. § 1252(b)(9). The Supreme Court has contrasted § 1252(b)(9) with § 1252(g), stating that § 1252(b)(9) is a broader jurisdictional limitation for review of the legality of final orders of removal than § 1252(g) and demonstrates the normal manner of imposing such a [general jurisdictional] limitation for all claims arising from deportation proceedings. AADC, 525 U.S. at 482-83, 119 S.Ct. 936; see Muka v. Baker, 559 F.3d 480, 483-85 (6th Cir.2009) (explaining impact of § 1252(a)(5) & (b)(9) to channel judicial review of legality of removal orders). By its terms, the provision aims to consolidate ` all questions of law and fact' that `arise from' either an `action' or a `proceeding' brought in connection with the removal of an alien. Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 9. Indeed, § 1252(b)(9) is a judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring one. Id. at 11. We, like the First Circuit in Aguilar, cannot endorse an interpretation of the arising from language in § 1252(b)(9) that swallow[s] all claims that might somehow touch upon, or be traced to, the government's efforts to remove an alien. Id. at 10. Furthermore, if Congress had intended to accomplish so far-reaching a result, it could have used broader language. Cf. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991) (suggesting that if Congress intended a certain provision of the INA to be read more expansively, it could have used more expansive language). For example, Congress would have used the term related to instead of arising from. See Humphries [v. Various Fed. USINS Employees ], 164 F.3d [936,] 943[ (5th Cir.1999)] (suggesting that related to signifies a somewhat looser nexus than arising from). Id. Here, Hamdi's claim raises his distinct constitutional rights that he alleges his mother's removal order adversely affects. We can decide this issue of Hamdi's constitutional rights separately from the merits of the order of his mother's removal itself because this issue of Hamdi's rights is distinct from the question of whether his mother's order of removal is invalid based on DHS's failure to consider the effects of his potential separation from his mother. See id. at 11 ([R]emoval proceedings are confined to determining whether a particular alien should be deported. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A))). A judicial determination that Hamdi's constitutional rights are violated by separation from his mother is distinct from judicial determination of questions arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien. [12] § 1252(b)(9); see McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 494-96, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991) (distinguishing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984), on ground that granting general federal-question jurisdiction would not have effect of deciding the merits of claims in a proceeding separate from and prior to the prescribed judicial-review process under the relevant statute). This approach does not disregard Congress['s] plain[] inten[tion] to put an end to the scattershot and piecemeal nature of the review process that previously had held sway in regard to removal proceedings, Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 9, and instead is consistent with precedents that have allowed challenges to proceed in the district court because the petitioner did not challenge the order of removal [13] or because an available remedy would not affect the order of removal. [14] See id. at 10-12 (finding support for a bounded reading of [§ 1252(b)(9)] in the fact that certain claims are excluded from the sweep of section 1252(b)(9) by virtue of legislative intent [i.e., habeas review of detention] and judicial precedent [i.e., legality of detention and bail availability]). Even though we conclude that § 1252(b)(9) does not bar Hamdi's claim from proceeding under general federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction, we must still consider the district court's ability to grant the remedy requested. A claim can be sufficient for subject-matter jurisdiction purposes even if it is unsuccessful and possibly verging on the foolhardy in light of prior precedent barring the relief sought. Primax, 433 F.3d at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted). `[T]he possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover' does not defeat a district court's subject-matter jurisdiction, which remains valid so long as `the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and the laws of the United States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another.' Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 685, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). But under the current interpretation of § 1252(b)(9), no federal court has the authority to review the order of removal of the mother Elgharib to determine whether a violation of the child Hamdi's constitutional rights renders the imposition of the mother's removal order invalid or whether the Immigration Court would have decided, in its discretion, not to order Elgharib's removal if it had otherwise entertained the claims now presented by Hamdi. [15] Were we to agree with Hamdi and endorse a different interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) with regard to judicial review of an actual order of removal of an alien, then he would have a claim that could survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Because we cannot endorse such an interpretation under current law, see Kucana, 130 S.Ct. at 838-39; AADC, 525 U.S. at 482-86, 119 S.Ct. 936; Elgharib, 600 F.3d at 600 n. 2, 603-04; Muka, 559 F.3d at 483-85, we conclude that Hamdi has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. [16] No other relief was pleaded, and we can identify no other available relief that would redress Hamdi's injury in fact without running afoul of current precedent interpreting § 1252(b)(9). Therefore, we hold that Hamdi has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the district court did not err in dismissing Hamdi's complaint.
We understand Hamdi's plight, and we are not insensitive to the substantial hardship that he may endure if and when his mother is finally removed from this country. However, for the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's order dismissing Hamdi's complaint with prejudice based on our conclusion that Hamdi failed to state a claim upon which a federal court may grant relief.