Opinion ID: 1202641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requisite Culpability

Text: Here, the district court held that plaintiffs had not failed to establish the requisite culpability on the part of defendants. In McQueen, this Court recognized that in instances where there is opportunity for reflection and unhurried judgments, a plaintiff must show that the state acted with deliberate indifference. McQueen, 433 F.3d at 469 (quoting Bukowski v. City of Akron, 326 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir.2003)). In order to show deliberate indifference, the state actor must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. However, circumstantial evidence may be used to show that the risk was so obvious that the official had to have known about it. Id. (quoting Bukowski, 326 F.3d at 710). In the present case, the district court held that [p]laintiffs fail[ed] to present any evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would establish defendants were aware of facts regarding Mr. Powers from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm to Daniel existed and that defendants drew the inference. Arledge, 2007 WL 4302410, at , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73394, at . On appeal, plaintiffs argue that when the record is considered as a whole, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The plaintiffs argue they have shown evidence of the following: (1) the defendants were aware that Stephen Powers owned a gun; (2) the defendants did not inspect the gun; (3) Wears warned defendants that the trailer park was drug-infested; (4) defendants were aware that Daniel had a drug problem; (5) Wears stated she did not want Daniel placed with Powers and that a juvenile magistrate judge would support her recommendation; (6) Wears warned the defendants that kids go to the Powers's trailer often; and (7) after Daniel was placed in the Powers' trailer, Wears warned defendants that she had drug abuse concerns about the Powers' trailer. Even assuming the facts above to be true, no evidence suggests that defendants actually drew the inference that Daniel was subject to a substantial risk of serious harm. Thus, the question is whether these facts are sufficient to show that the risk was so obvious that the [defendants] had to have known about it. McQueen, 433 F.3d at 469. The district court did not think so, finding that defendants cannot show that the risk of such a violent act by Mr. Powers was so obvious that defendants had to have known about it. In hindsight, it appears the defendants were aware of many facts that would cause a reasonable person to pause before placing a juvenile in the Powers' custody. However, when we look at the totality of the circumstances, which the plaintiffs advocate, it does not appear that plaintiffs can show the requisite culpability on the part of defendants. Tornichio's and Looser's depositions make clear they inspected the Powers' trailer and found it to be a relatively happy place that was familiar to Daniel because his sister lived there and he had obviously stayed there in the past. Daniel made it clear to Tornichio and Looser that he would not run away from the Powers' trailer. As defendants concede, more investigation could have been done regarding Daniel's placement with the Powers, but given the facts known to them, or so obvious they should have known of them, it is not clear that defendants could have drawn, or obviously must have drawn, an inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling that plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite culpability to maintain their action. Having agreed with the district court's finding that the requisite culpability cannot be shown, it is not necessary for us to discuss the other elements of plaintiffs' state custody and state-created danger claims.