Opinion ID: 2630606
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Principles of Statutory Construction Applied to Section 63-30-10(18)(c).

Text: ¶ 20 The court has long held that [w]hen interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince the `true intent and purpose of the Legislature.' State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ¶ 10, 44 P.3d 680 (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). Ascertaining the true intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting section 63-30-10(18)(c) is particularly important in this case. Adherence to the District's interpretation of section 63-30-10(18)(c) would effectively authorize all governmental entities in Utah, regardless of their mission or purpose, to dispose of hazardous materials and hazardous wastes and then claim immunity from any resulting liability. ¶ 21 `When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.' Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ¶ 14, 54 P.3d 1177 (quoting Blackner v. State Dep't of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 12, 48 P.3d 949); State Dep't of Natural Res. Div. of Wildlife Res. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1257. Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, we may look to the statutory scheme to divine legislative intent. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ¶ 25, 4 P.3d 795 (holding that we need look beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity). ¶ 22 Justice Howe and I believe that the meaning of section 63-30-10(18)(c) is ambiguous because this subsection does not specifically mention the state agencies to which it applies. The preamble to section 63-30-10 states that [i]mmunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived ... except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from any of the nineteen governmental activities specifically listed. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1997). Justice Howe and I do not believe, however, that when the legislature carved out exceptions to the waiver of immunity that it intended all governmental entities to retain immunity for all of the activities listed therein. No doubt some of the exceptions in 63-30-10 do apply across the board and a plain language reading of the statute is reasonable as applied to such general exceptions as the exercise of discretionary functions, [5] or harms arising from intentional torts. [6] Such exceptions apply on their face to virtually every state agency, regardless of its specific mission. ¶ 23 The logical consequence of Associate Chief Justice Durrant's plain language reading of section 63-30-10, however, is to permit any governmental entity to escape liability for the conduct of its employees, should an employee negligently act beyond his/her statutory authority in breaking up riots and public demonstrations, [7] managing earthquakes and natural disasters, [8] fighting fire, [9] or intervening in dam emergencies. [10] ¶ 24 We believe that such a construction of the statute is unreasonable and requires us to look beyond the plain language of the statute for guidance. [I]n construing a statute, [we] must assume that `each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.' County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. State Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997) (quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)). Our principal goal must be to give effect to the intent of the legislature. As such, we turn to the legislative history of section 63-30-10(18)(c) to determine what the legislature intended to accomplish when it enacted this provision.