Opinion ID: 842341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: legal duty in general

Text: There is no dispute among the parties that the substantive law of Michigan governs plaintiffs' claims. [6] In Michigan, the question whether the defendant owes an actionable legal duty to the plaintiff is one of law which the court decides after assessing the competing policy considerations for and against recognizing the asserted duty. Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 22, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981). That is, `[d]uty'is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.' Buczkowski v. McKay, 441 Mich. 96, 100-101, 490 N.W.2d 330 (1992), quoting Friedman, supra at 22 n. 9, 312 N.W.2d 585, quoting Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), § 53, pp. 325-326. [7] Thus, the ultimate inquiry in determining whether a legal duty should be imposed is whether the social benefits of imposing a duty outweigh the social costs of imposing a duty. The inquiry involves considering, among any other relevant considerations, `the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the harm, the burden on the defendant, and the nature of the risk presented.' Dyer, supra at 49, 679 N.W.2d 311, quoting Murdock v. Higgins, 454 Mich. 46, 53, 559 N.W.2d 639 (1997), citing Buczkowski, supra at 100, 490 N.W.2d 330. The most important factor to be considered is the relationship of the parties. [A] duty arises out of the existence of a relationship `between the parties of such a character that social policy justifies' its imposition.' Dyer, supra at 49, 679 N.W.2d 311, quoting Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed.), § 56, p. 374. `The determination of whether a legal duty exists is a question of whether the relationship between the actor and the plaintiff gives rise to any legal obligation on the actor's part to act for the benefit of the subsequently injured person.' Buczkowski, supra at 101 n. 5, 490 N.W.2d 330, quoting Rodriguez v. Sportsmen's Congress, 159 Mich. App. 265, 270, 406 N.W.2d 207 (1987). The duty to protect others against harm from third persons is based on a relationship between the parties. Buczkowski, supra at 103, 490 N.W.2d 330, citing Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed.), § 56, p. 385. Only if the law recognizes a duty to act with due care arising from the relationship of the parties does it subject the defendant to liability for negligent conduct. Friedman, supra at 22, 312 N.W.2d 585. Duty . . . `concerns' `the problem of the relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other.' Buczkowski, supra at 100, 490 N.W.2d 330, quoting Friedman, supra at 22, 312 N.W.2d 585, quoting Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed.), § 53, p. 356. See also Buczkowski, supra at 100, 490 N.W.2d 330 (referring to duty as the relational obligation between the plaintiff and the defendant). [8] In Dyer, this Court focused exclusively on the relationship between the parties to determine whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty. We concluded that because there was only a limited relationship between the parties, only a limited duty could be imposed on the defendant. More specifically, we concluded that because there was only a limited relationship between the defendant physician performing the independent medical examination (IME) and the plaintiff patient, the physician only owed a limited duty to the patient, i.e., a duty to perform an IME in a manner not causing physical harm to the patient. In reaching this decision, we explained that the duty of care in a medical malpractice action has its basis in the relationship between the physician and the patient. Dyer, supra at 50, 679 N.W.2d 311. Because we found that only a limited relationship existed, we did not even address the other factors, i.e., the foreseeability of the harm, the burden on the defendant, or the nature of the risk presented. Consideration of the other factors was unnecessary because when there is only a limited relationship between the parties, only a limited duty can be imposed. In Buczkowski, this Court similarly focused exclusively on the relationship between the parties to determine whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty. We concluded that because there was no relationship between the parties, no duty could be imposed on the defendant. More specifically, this Court concluded that because there was no relationship between the retailer who sold the shotgun ammunition to the intoxicated customer and the bystander who was injured by the use of the ammunition, the retailer owed no duty to the bystander. We explained, Our ultimate decision turns on whether a sufficient relationship exists between a retailer and a third party to impose a duty under these circumstances. Buczkowski, supra at 103, 490 N.W.2d 330. Because we found that no relationship existed, we again did not even address the other factors. This was unnecessary because when there is no relationship between the parties, no duty can be imposed. On the other hand, even when there is a relationship between the parties, a legal duty does not necessarily exist. In order to determine whether a duty exists, the other enumerated factors must also be considered. The foreseeability of the harm is one of these. Just as the existence of a relationship between the parties is not dispositive, that the harm was foreseeable is also not dispositive. A defendant does not have a duty to protect everybody from all foreseeable harms. Although foreseeability is a factor to be considered, other considerations may be, and usually are, more important. Id. at 101, 490 N.W.2d 330. [T]he mere fact that an event may be foreseeable does not impose a duty upon the defendant to take some kind of action accordingly. The event which he perceives might occur must pose some sort of risk of injury to another person or his property before the actor may be required to act. Also, to require the actor to act, some sort of relationship must exist between the actor and the other party which the law or society views as sufficiently strong to require more than mere observation of the events which unfold on the part of the defendant. It is the fact of existence of this relationship which the law usually refers to as a duty on the part of the actor. [ Id. at 101, 490 N.W.2d 330, quoting Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 406, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975).] When the harm is not foreseeable, no duty can be imposed on the defendant. But when the harm is foreseeable, a duty still does not necessarily exist. [9] To summarize, in determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff, competing policy factors must be considered. Such considerations include: the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the harm, the burden that would be imposed on the defendant, and the nature of the risk presented. Where there is no relationship between the parties, no duty can be imposed, but where there is a relationship, the other factors must be considered to determine whether a duty should be imposed. Likewise, where the harm is not foreseeable, no duty can be imposed, but where the harm is foreseeable, other factors must be considered to determine whether a duty should be imposed. Before a duty can be imposed, there must be a relationship between the parties and the harm must have been foreseeable. Once it is determined that there is a relationship and that the harm was foreseeable, the burden that would be imposed on the defendant and the nature of the risk presented must be assessed to determine whether a duty should be imposed. [10]