Opinion ID: 792067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Interaction Between the Alabama and the D.C. Cases.

Text: 15 After the Settlement Agreement was filed in the D.C. court, Alabama revived the Alabama case in January 2003, by filing a Motion For Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, And To Have Settlement Agreements Entered Into By Defendant Declared Null And Void. The specific request for relief in this motion was limited to: 16 (A) Enjoining Defendant . . . from initiating the NEPA process, initiating any other process by which information relevant to water allocation decisions is gathered, and from making any decision or determination regarding the allocation of water resources within the ACT and ACF Basins without the consent and involvement of the Plaintiff; 17 (B) Declaring any and all other provisions of the Settlement Agreement that are contrary to the parties' agreement as reflected in the Joint Motion To Stay Proceedings null and void. 18 The Alabama district court, on January 31, 2003, granted the motion to the extent of issuing an order directing the parties to take no actions that would violate this court's September 19, 1990 Order granting the parties' Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings, and set a hearing to consider whatever remaining relief was requested in the motion for the subsequent week. The parties, however, stipulated several times to delay a hearing while the states and the Corps unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate settlement in both the D.C. and Alabama lawsuits. 19 Early in September, 2003, Alabama renewed its original Motion For Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, And To Have Settlement Agreements Entered Into By Defendant Declared Null And Void, and requested an emergency hearing on the first available date. The hearing was set for September 24, 2003. 11 20 On September 22, 2003, the Corps gave the required notice to trigger the end of the 1990 Joint Stay on January 21, 2004. Two days later, the Alabama district court held the hearing resulting in the order appealed here in Alabama I. The pleadings before the court at this time were Alabama's original complaint and its Motion For A Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, And To Have Settlement Agreements Entered Into By The Defendant Declared Null And Void. Although Florida's First Amended Complaint, which had added counts alleging the violation of other statutory acts, had been filed a few days earlier, at the hearing the district judge specifically stated that the question of the other statutory acts claims is not before me at this time. The district court made clear that the only issue to be resolved by the claim for preliminary injunction was whether the 1990 Joint Stay had been violated. 12 Based on the Alabama complaint and its motion, the district court entered the following order on October 15, 2003, which Georgia and the Corps now appeal (Alabama I): 21 [T]he court GRANTS IN PART plaintiffs' motion to the extent it hereby ORDERS the defendants enjoined from (1) filing the settlement agreement in [the D.C. case]; (2) implementing any part of this settlement agreement, and (3) entering into any other new storage or withdrawal contracts affecting the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint river basin without approval of this court. . . . 22 Notwithstanding this order, the district court, on November 24, 2003, ordered as follows: 23 Reflecting the decisions made on the record at the scheduling conference held in this case on Friday, November 21, 2003, the court hereby ORDERS that all activity in this case be STAYED until Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson makes an order in [the D.C. case], deciding the validity of the proposed settlement in that case. 24 The Alabama district court expressly granted the Corps permission to participate in the D.C. district court hearing and to advocate in favor of the settlement agreement. 25 Accordingly, the D.C. court held a hearing on whether to approve the D.C. settlement. All parties to this lawsuit participated. The hydropower customers, water supply providers, the Corps and Georgia argued in favor of the settlement agreement. Alabama and Florida, which had been permitted to intervene, opposed the settlement, arguing that the settlement violated NEPA, the Water Supply Act of 1958 (WSA), 43 U.S.C. § 390b (2003), the Flood Control Act (FCA), 33 U.S.C. § 708 (2003), the Water Resources Development Act of 1988 (WRDA), 33 U.S.C. § 2312 (2003), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (2003). At the hearing, Alabama conceded that it would be bound by the D.C. court's determination. Ultimately, the D.C. court approved the settlement agreement, as follows: 26 [T]his Court concludes that the Settlement Agreement is fair and reasonable, and neither illegal nor contrary to public policy. Execution of the Settlement Agreement, and any implementation thereof, is however, subject to Judge Bowdre's injunction, and to that end, before they may act under the Settlement Agreement, the parties to it must first obtain dissolution of the injunction in N.D. Ala. 13 27 Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F.Supp.2d 26, 35 (D.D.C.2004). 28 Because the D.C. court's order was issued during the pendency of this appeal from the Oct. 15, 2003 Alabama court order (Alabama I), in April 2004 this Court stayed the appeal to permit the Corps, Georgia, and Gwinnett County to file a motion in the Alabama district court seeking dissolution or modification of the preliminary injunction based upon the D.C. [court's] order. After a hearing on these motions to dissolve the injunction, the Alabama district court, on February 18, 2005, declined to dissolve the injunction on the basis of the D.C. order. The district court found that the D.C. court's order had not caused any change in circumstances that would justify lifting the injunction. The district court specifically noted that: 29 This court entered the injunction at issue because Alabama and Florida succeeded on the merits of demonstrating that negotiations that led to the D.C. agreement violated this court's September 19, 1990 stay Order and, therefore, was unenforceable as against public policy; the injunction was necessary to prevent irreparable injury; the potential harm caused by the settlement agreement outweighed any harm the injunction might cause the defendants; and the injunction was not adverse to the public interest. 30 The court recognized that the 1990 Joint Stay was vacated by the Corps' unilateral notice to that effect in September 2003, but accorded that fact no weight because the Corps' transgression had already occurred, and the D.C. court had left to the Alabama court the question of whether the 1990 Stay Order had been violated and, if so, what consequences should attach . . . . The Alabama court then found that the negotiations that led to the [D.C.] settlement . . . did violate the 1990 Stay Order, and the appropriate consequence was a preliminary injunction continuing until the case is resolved on the merits or further order of the court. In addition, the Alabama court rejected Georgia and the Corps' argument that the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion would bar the Alabama court from re-litigating the Other Statutory Claims before the Alabama court because the D.C. court had already determined that the Corps had not violated NEPA or any other federal law. Accordingly, the Alabama court declined to dissolve its order of October 15, 2003, and the Corps and Georgia appeal that ruling as well (Alabama II), with the ARC intervening on appeal.