Opinion ID: 196298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: michael murray's role-in-the-offense enhancement

Text: 49 Michael Murray argues that the district court erred by enhancing his base offense level four levels under section 3B1.1(a) due to his aggravating role in the offense. USSG Sec. 3B1.1(a) (Nov. 1993). He argues that the district court's findings at the time of sentencing do not indicate either that he was an organizer or leader, as opposed to a manager or supervisor, or that the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, as required for a four-level enhancement under section 3B1.1(a). 12 50 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(c) (1988) requires that [t]he court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence. At sentencing here, the court stated only that [t]he upward adjustment for Michael Murray 4 levels is appropriate. The Court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he was the principal figure, the organizer, and a 4-level adjustment is appropriate. The court did not, in open court, make specific findings regarding Murray's involvement either by detailing on the record the facts developed during trial supporting its conclusion, or by adoption of findings in the presentence report. Compare United States v. Schultz, 970 F.2d 960, 963-64 (1st Cir.1992) (affirming two-level enhancement under USSG Sec. 3B1.1(c) where the district court stated that the enhancement was agreed upon by this court, and that the largely uncontested facts set forth in the PSR supported the defendant's exercise of control), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1020, 122 L.Ed.2d 167 (1993), with United States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004, 1011-12 (1st Cir.1990) (remanding a four-level enhancement where neither the PSR nor the sentencing transcript indicated the basis for enhancement). 51 In Schultz, we held that the district court managed minimal compliance with Section 3553(c) where the court impliedly adopted the PSR and denoted each element in determining the guideline sentencing range. 970 F.2d at at 963 n. 7. Furthermore, [t]he PSR was the central focus of the issues presented at sentencing. Id. The court in Schultz stressed that the PSR gave substantial support for the district court's findings and for a reasoned appellate review. Id. at 963 n. 7, 964. 52 In the case before us, the district judge adopted the PSR by checking the box on the judgment form before the statement: The court adopts the factual findings and guideline application in the presentence report. While in many simple cases this would be sufficient to impart to the defendant and an appellate court sufficient reasons for imposing a particular sentence, Michael Murray's PSR does not clearly demonstrate why he was considered to be an organizer or leader as distinguished from a manager or supervisor. The PSR discusses the offense conduct over some twenty-two pages, containing some fourteen pages of taped conversations read to the jury. While some statements in the discussion might support a finding that Michael Murray played a leadership role, much in the report would support a finding that James Murray or the Catanos played such a role. The PSR does not come to grips with the issue by explaining specifically, in a case with considerable scope and complexity, why Michael Murray was concluded to be an organizer or leader rather than a manager or supervisor. Without even a minimal analysis of the facts or articulation of its reasoning, the PSR simply states: Michael Murray is regarded as the principle [sic] figure; he was the organizer and paymaster. A role adjustment under Sec. 3B1.1(a) is warranted, and is being applied. The PSR makes no reference to specific evidence supporting that recommendation. 53 The judge's adoption of the factual findings and guideline application by checking the box on the judgment form on the facts of this case does not comply with section 3553(c), which requires a statement of reasons for imposing a particular sentence. The lengthy recitation of evidence in the PSR simply does not focus on the distinction required by the guidelines. If the PSR had set out a clearly stated, unequivocal explanation for holding Murray to be an organizer or leader (which we believe that it did not) the judge's reference to the PSR might be adequate. Further, if witnesses had testified that Murray organized every facet of the drug operation and was the unequivocal leader, the bare finding that he was the organizer or leader might, standing alone, be sufficient. Under the circumstances before us, however, section 3553(c) can only be met by the district court's explanation of why it selected the organizer or leader label, rather than that of manager or supervisor. 54 We underscore that in a case where the PSR findings themselves adequately set forth a meaningful rationale for the sentence, a district judge does not err in adopting such findings. In a case such as that before us, however, with a lengthy chain of transactions and dealings between the several individuals involved, and with a PSR which is overly inclusive and which does not even minimally focus on the specific considerations necessary to differentiate between the two categories, it is necessary that the district judge make sufficient findings to articulate the rationale for the sentencing decision. 55 Unlike McDowell, the case before us concerns not a total lack of findings on the question of the adjustment but, rather, their adequacy. However, we are left in the same position as in McDowell, [w]ithout substantial guesswork, we cannot tell the basis on which the judge determined that the criminal activity was sufficiently extensive to permit the four level upward enhancement. 918 F.2d at 1012. Neither the PSR nor the sentencing transcript discusses Murray's involvement or identifies why he was held to be an organizer or leader as opposed to a manager or supervisor. 56 In short, although the case record may very well support the four-level enhancement: 57 there is nothing in the sentencing record about any of this. Absent explicit findings, it would be overly impetuous for us, on so exiguous a predicate, to jump to the conclusion that [the enhancement requirements were met]. A defendant in the dock, awaiting imposition of sentence, is entitled to reasoned findings, on a preponderance standard, not to an appellate court's assumptions drawn free-form from an inscrutable record. 58 Id. at 1012 n. 8. This is a troublesome, borderline case. We conclude, however, that the requirements of section 3553(c) have not been met because the district judge did not state in open court, with sufficient specificity, the reasons for deciding this particular issue, which substantially impacted Michael Murray's sentence. We are satisfied that justice is best served by remand for further articulation of the reasons for imposing the adjustment in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(c).