Opinion ID: 2519810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brady Disclosure of Citizen Complaints Over Five Years Old

Text: The trial court here ordered discovery of the names and addresses of witnesses to an incident of police misconduct that predated the arrest in this case by more than five years. (§ 1045(b)(1).) As we have mentioned, section 1045(b)(1) precludes disclosure of such old records. Is the statutory time limitation an absolute bar to disclosure? It is not. The reason is this: Our state statutory scheme allowing defense discovery of certain officer personnel records creates both a broader and lower threshold for disclosure than does the high court's decision in Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. Unlike Brady, California's Pitchess discovery scheme entitles a defendant to information that will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts at trial ( Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 536, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305), that is, all information pertinent to the defense ( City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 53, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73, 850 P.2d 621). The City argues that permitting in chambers review of police officer personnel records to determine whether they contain information that qualifies as material evidence under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, would improperly expand the disclosure of officer personnel records far beyond the disclosure permitted by section 1045(b)(1), because it would allow for disclosure of information not discoverable under the Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305, statutory scheme. The Attorney General, appearing as amicus curiae, advances a different view, which we find persuasive. The Attorney General asserts that the ` Pitchess process' operates in parallel with Brady and does not prohibit the disclosure of Brady information. We agree. As we recently explained in People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482, 36 P.3d 21, the Pitchess procedural mechanism for criminal defense discovery ... must be viewed against the larger background of the prosecution's constitutional obligation to disclose to a defendant material exculpatory evidence so as not to infringe the defendant's right to a fair trial. ( Id. at p. 1225, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482, 36 P.3d 21.) In the Attorney General's view, citizen complaints older than five years that the trial court after in chambers review finds to be `exculpatory,' as defined by Brady,  may be subject to disclosure, notwithstanding the five-year limitation in section 1045(b)(1). The Attorney General points to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 ( Ritchie ), as authorizing trial court review of information that (like police officer personnel records) enjoys a qualified statutory confidentiality to determine whether it includes material exculpatory evidence subject to disclosure under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. In Ritchie, the defendant, who was charged with molesting his 13 year old daughter, sought disclosure of confidential reports of the protective services agency that had investigated the charges. A state appellate court directed the trial court to review the file in chambers, disclose the daughter's statements about the incidents, and allow defense counsel access to the full file for the limited purpose of arguing the relevance of those statements. The prosecution challenged that ruling. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie's attorney was entitled to search the full file for any useful evidence. ( Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 46, 107 S.Ct. 989.) The United States Supreme Court disagreed, but it also rejected the prosecution's contention that because the information in question was privileged under a statute, in chambers review of that information by the trial court was impermissible. ( Id. at pp. 58-60, 107 S.Ct. 989.) The high court noted that Pennsylvania law contemplated situations when disclosure of the privileged information would occur, such as when the protective services agency was directed to do so by court order. ( Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 58, 107 S.Ct. 989.) Thus, Ritchie was entitled to have the [protective services agency] file reviewed by the trial court to ascertain whether it contained evidence that probably would have changed the outcome of [Ritchie's] trial. ( Ibid.) The court stressed, however, that Ritchie could not require the trial court to search through the [agency's] file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence ( id. at p. 58, fn. 15, 107 S.Ct. 989, italics added), that is evidence that could determine the trial's outcome, thus satisfying the materiality standard of Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194,10 L.Ed.2d 215. We find the high court's decision in Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, instructive here, where we must determine the propriety of the trial court's order made after an in chambers review of the confidential personnel files of two arresting officers, directing disclosure of information regarding a citizen complaint made against one of them ten years earlier. Under Ritchie, a trial court that in response to a criminal defendant's discovery motion undertakes an in chambers review of confidential documents can, if the documents contain information whose use at trial could be dispositive on either guilt or punishment, order their disclosure. (Ibid.) This standard was not met here, as discussed below. [3]