Opinion ID: 1435953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the toliver issue

Text: The kind of issue raised by appellant as to Toliver evidence deserves only a brief analysis, because the facts herein are a textbook example of evidence that is admissible under Toliver. The trial court denied appellant's pretrial motion to exclude the early portions of Officer Moomau's testimony, i.e., his description of appellant's very first approach to a man in a car. The trial judge correctly denied the motion to exclude such testimony. The following factors compel our conclusion. In Toliver, supra, we held that the Government is entitled to present evidence of other, uncharged crimes when relevant to explain the immediate circumstances surrounding the offense charged. 468 A.2d at 960. Such testimony is admissible `[to] complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context. . . .' Id., quoting McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed.1972). The admission of so-called Toliver evidence is an exception to the rule that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible except for certain limited purposes, such as proof of motive or identity. Id.; see Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 16, 331 F.2d 85, 90 (1964). The facts at hand closely track the type of evidence that was correctly admitted in Toliver itself. There, the appellant was arrested after being observed from a police narcotic observation post exchanging small white packets for money with six separate individuals. Soon thereafter, a police arrest team moved in, and as they approached, saw appellant throw a small white object to the ground. The object was retrieved and appellant was placed under arrest. Toliver, 468 A.2d at 959. In the instant case, the trial court ruled that the testimony of Moomau should be characterized as Toliver evidence. The trial judge concluded, I am going to allow the government to bring that information out through the officers, because it pretty much explains why they were there and what their observations were. Having readily sanctioned the admission of the pre-arrest observations in Toliver, there is certainly no basis for reversing the trial court's ruling herein. The common law of this jurisdiction now abounds with affirmances in criminal appeals that are very similar to the instant case. We need not recapitulate all of those citations. It suffices to say that numerous convictions have been affirmed by this Court where the disputed Toliver evidence was at least as indicative of alleged or suspected criminal conduct, even if it did not recite the underlying facts of such activity. For example, in Ford v. United States, 396 A.2d 191 (D.C.1978), a drug conviction was affirmed where police testified that the appellant was the subject of an outstanding warrant at the time of his arrest. This testimony explained why the police first approached him, i.e., to execute the warrant. Id. at 193. In Green v. United States, 440 A.2d 1005 (D.C.1982), we affirmed a conviction for possession of marijuana where the police testified to observation of two different marijuana sales made by defendant prior to his arrest. The sales themselves were arguably more egregious than the offense for which appellant therein was actually arrested. Yet, we found that their probative value outweighed any prejudice to the defendant in placing in context and making comprehensible to the jury the actions of the police in approaching, arresting, and searching appellant . . . . Id. at 1007. In Toliver itself, there were six pre-arrest exchanges, not just one ambiguous contact with a man in a car. Toliver, supra, 468 A.2d at 959. Here, the first incident recounted by Moomau was temporally well connected to the acts that actually precipitated the arrest. All of his observations elapsed within a maximum window of 20 minutes. Consequently, we do not see herein a problem caused by an inordinate lapse of time between the arrest and the initial observations. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 586 A.2d 720, 723-25 (D.C.1991) (evidence of seven-month-old prior acts of domestic violence held inadmissible because of lack of close temporal relationship); Holmes v. United States, 580 A.2d 1259, 1266-67 (D.C.1990) (prior robberies more than one month old deemed to be too old to be contemporaneous or intimately entangled with the crime charged). In his brief, the appellant complains: There was no showing that the government needed such evidence to successfully prosecute its case, since the defense established by its own evidence that Durham had given the drugs to Thomas and had recovered $50.00 from him. That transaction was admitted by the defendant, but his explanation of the event was at variance with a finding of distribution, claiming that he was merely returning drugs given to him for his personal use. That the other crimes evidence was highly prejudicial to the defense, under the circumstances, is obvious. Nothing was obvious. We disagree that there was no need for the Government to seek to use the entire testimony of Officer Moomau. The testimony of Officer Moomau was manifestly relevant for the purpose of explaining to the jury exactly how appellant came to the attention of the police and how Officer Moomau was personally in a position to see the specific acts that prompted the arrest. Probative value is not a minor matter. Because the Government bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Government has the common sense obligation to bring forth basic evidence of how the crime was observed and by whom. It is unrealistic to expect the Government to truncate its case-in-chief by utilizing only bare bones testimony about an arrest team stopping a citizen merely because of the word from an officer far away. The arrest need not be tersely described for the jury as a non sequitur, an event that erupted out of the blue. Because of its high burden of proof, the Government is entitled to present a thorough set of facts, to refine its case-in-chief to rationally anticipate a factual issue that may create a reasonable doubt in the minds of jurors. The use of Toliver evidence can serve this purpose, as it illuminates the practical context of the arrest itself. In drug cases, Toliver evidence (from the Government's standpoint) could ostensibly ward off the image of police officers stopping a citizen for no reason. This is an especially sensitive consideration where the officers who actually arrest the particular citizen are not the same officers who witnessed the crime itself. We discount appellant's suggestion, as quoted above from his brief, that it was not necessary for the Government to present the first portion of Moomau's testimony. After all, the Government could not rely on the possibility that appellant would testify to a story that conveniently dovetailed into much of what Moomau had reported. Even where, as here, defense counsel proffers his client's testimony during the opening statement, the defense is not required to present any evidence at all. For this reason, a defendant or his lawyer can always have a change of strategy during the trial. There is always a risk that the defense will rest at the end of the Government's case-in-chief, leaving the Government unable to present a truly cohesive story to the jury. The prejudice claim is weak, particularly in the hindsight of appellant's testimony. The jury was not left without an alternative explanation of what had occurred on the street. Once all of the testimony had been presented, the jury simply found that appellant's testimony was not sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. It is common, if not typical, that the nature of Toliver evidence casts some type of suspicion upon the particular defendant. This alone, however, is not grounds for refusing to admit such evidence. A balancing must occur, and the trial judge herein made that balancing decision in favor of the fundamental and clear-cut probative value of the testimony in issue. The determination of whether other crimes evidence is relevant and admissible to explain the surrounding circumstances of a crime, and whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Parker v. United States, 586 A.2d at 724. Here, there was no abuse of discretion. Appellant received a fair hearing, and the facts support the trial court's balancing of the interests of appellant and those of the appellee. Durham's complaint on appeal is completely lacking in merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from hereby is Affirmed. RUIZ, Associate Judge, dissenting in part: [1] In this appeal we are confronted with a question we have not yet answered concerning the meaning of distribution in D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(1) (1998). I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the crime of drug distribution includes the conduct of a person who, having been given drugs, returns the drugs to the original transferor. That conclusion, although supportable by a literal application of the language of the statute, is nonsensical and leads to the absurd result that, if the transferee in this case had kept the cocaine handed to him, he would have been liable only for possession of cocaine, which is punishable as a misdemeanor by up to 180 days' incarceration and a fine of not more than $1,000, see D.C.Code § 33-541(d); but, because he tried to undo the transaction, by returning the drugs to the person who distributed the cocaine to him, he becomes liable for distribution of cocaine, which is a felony punishable by up to thirty years' incarceration and a fine of up to $500,000, see D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(2)(A). Nothing in our precedent compels this incongruous result, which is contrary to a reasonable interpretation of the statute consistent with legislative intent. At the outset, it is important to recognize what is and is not at issue on appeal. At trial, appellant requested the trial court to instruct the jury that, If you believe the defendant's theory of the case [that he was merely returning drugs which he rejected as payment by another of a debt owed to him], you must find him not guilty of Count I, Distribution of Cocaine. The trial court denied the request, not because there was not sufficient evidence to support the defendant's version of events, [2] but because the trial court concluded that there was no legal basis for the instruction. If the trial court's conclusion was wrong, we must reverse. As the Supreme Court has noted, a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988) (citations omitted). Unless there is no factual or legal basis for the requested instruction, the trial court must instruct on the defendant's theory of the case. See Doby v. United States, 550 A.2d 919, 920 (D.C. 1988). Thus, we are faced with a pure issue of law. [3] Appellant was charged with and convicted [4] of distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine [5] pursuant to D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(1), which provides that it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or possess, with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance. The statute defines distribution as the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another other than by administering or dispensing of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship. D.C.Code § 33-501(9) (emphasis added). This court, in turn, has defined transfer in the familiar, dictionary sense of that word, as `to carry or take from one person or place to another.' Long v. United States, 623 A.2d 1144, 1147 n. 6 (D.C.1993) (quoting PHILIP B. GOVE, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2426-27 (1986)). As the majority correctly states, we have construed and applied literally the term distribute in a number of situations. See Malloy v. United States, 605 A.2d 59, 61 (D.C.1992) (per curiam) (holding that unlawful distribution had taken place where the appellant, who claimed that he was only the custodian of drugs owned by another, admitted to possessing drugs as a mule for transportation to another city to be given to the dealer who had entrusted the drugs to him, because a sale or exchange of money for drugs is not required under the statute); Wright v. United States, 588 A.2d 260, 262 (D.C. 1991) (upholding an instruction that the defendant's admission that he intended to share drugs with a friend was evidence of an intent to distribute, concluding that giving or sharing drugs with another constitutes distribution under the law, and an intention to share is evidence of intent to distribute); Chambers v. United States, 564 A.2d 26, 31 (D.C.1989) (holding defendant's testimony that he bought cocaine with intention to share it with friends sufficient to prove intent to distribute). In Long, supra, appellant was convicted of possession of heroin with the intent to distribute. See 623 A.2d at 1147. Appellant had testified at trial that he bought the heroin with money to which he and four companions had contributed to purchase and share the heroin for their use. The court held that Long's acknowledged plan to buy the drugs in order to then share the drugs with his friends was evidence of intent to distribute. In reaching that conclusion, we reviewed and adopted the reasoning in United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.1977), in which the court concluded that there was no intent to distribute in a situation where two defendants, a man and his fiancée, bought drugs together at the same time for personal use, only one received the drugs from the seller, and immediately handed to his fiancée her share of the drugs, which both sampled on the spot. See id. at 1151. [6] We distinguished the situation in Long from that in Swiderski because in Long the appellant had purchased the drugs by himself  albeit with some of the money contributed by others  and then had given them to his friends. The facts in Long, in other words, were not meaningfully different from those in Wright and Chambers, supra, in which we had held that the intent to share drugs with others for personal use constitutes intent to distribute. Although we distinguished Swiderski on its facts, in Long we expressly decline[d] the government's... invitation to reject the reasoning of the Court of the Second Circuit in Swiderski. See Long, supra, 623 A.2d at 1150-51. Unlike the situation in Long, Wright and Chambers, here there is no transfer to a third party  the friends who were to share in personal use in those cases. The only two actors here are Thomas, the initial distributor, and appellant, the intended recipient of the drugs, who, after rejecting the drugs because of their poor quality, returned them to Thomas. To the extent that Long is instructive, it supports appellant's argument because, by approving the reasoning in Swiderski, in Long we recognized that there is a difference, significant to the distribution statute, between a purchase of drugs that are subsequently transferred to other third party users (the case in Wright, Chambers and Long ), and the facts in Swiderski, which involved a joint simultaneous purchase by two buyers acting as a unit, even though in Swiderski only one buyer received the drugs and actually transferred them to his co-purchaser. [7] In other words, in Long we approved the Swiderski court's refusal to apply a literal interpretation of the term distribution without regard to the underlying facts. Although the facts in Swiderski are not entirely on point, [8] its rationale is more applicable to this case than that of Wright, Chambers or Long because Swiderski, like this case, does not involve a subsequent transfer to a party outside of the parties engaged in the initial transfer of drugs. If the two joint purchasers in Swiderski were considered as one for the purpose of rejecting the notion that there was a distribution between them, a fortiori, the actions of a single transferee in sampling, and after rejecting the drugs, returning them to the distributor, cannot be compartmentalized into separate transactions. [9] The start to interpreting a statute is, of course, the statutory language. `Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' In re G.G., 667 A.2d 1331, 1333 (D.C.1995) (quoting West End Tenants Ass'n v. George Washington Univ., 640 A.2d 718, 726 (D.C.1994)). Even where the words of a statute are unambiguous, however, we do not give effect to a plain language interpretation which is `plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole.' Id. (quoting Tenants Ass'n, supra, 640 A.2d at 726 n. 14) The court must determine the meaning of the language `in accordance with the legislative intent and common understanding to prevent absurdities and to advance justice.' Id. (quoting 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.08 (5th ed.1993)). This approach is required by the doctrine of separation of powers, which cabins our judicial function to give effect to the legislature's intent. See District of Columbia Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 198, 348 F.2d 808, 810 (1965). There is no dispute that the legislature intended to treat those who deal in drugs for their own personal use differently from those who deal in drugs as entrepreneurs, i.e., for the purpose of passing it on to others, most usually for profit. We have characterized the difference as whether the conduct is a link in the chain of distribution  rather than an endpoint  in the drug trade. See Long, supra, 623 A.2d at 1149. This legislative intent is evident from distinctions in the statute drawn between possession and distribution, and the widely different penalties that can be imposed upon people involved in the drug trade, depending on whether they are convicted of possession, a misdemeanor, or found guilty of distribution or possession with intent to distribute, which are felonies. Such a disparity in sanction reveals that the legislature considered that distribution is different in nature from, and much more serious than, mere possession of drugs. As we stated in Long, the purpose of the statute was to introduce a system in which the penalty for prohibited conduct is graded according to the nature of the offense and the schedule of the substance involved. 623 A.2d at 1150 n. 13 (quoting COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON BILL 4-123, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT OF 1981, 5) (April 8, 1981) (emphasis added). It is therefore important to elucidate the reasons underlying the distinctions created by the legislature to determine whether the conduct in this case is of the nature of the crime of possession or that of distribution, as the legislature conceived them. In conducting this inquiry we must bear in mind that the legislature considered that there are significant differences between the two and that distribution, which carries a much stiffer penalty, is a more serious crime. Thus, to the extent that the statutory language can be read so that the conduct at issue in this case could come within either the crime of possession or that of distribution, it is also part of our judicial role, in effectuating the legislature's intent, to apply the rule of lenity and include the conduct within the less serious offense of possession so as not to create penalties not contemplated by the legislature. See Riggs Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1262 (D.C.1990). [10] Because there are only two actors in this transaction, the government is unable to argue, as it did in Lowman v. United States, 632 A.2d 88 (D.C.1993), that appellant acted as an aider or abettor of the seller or somehow acted as an agent for a distributor in approaching a buyer. [11] See 632 A.2d at 89. Nor can appellant be described as an inherent part of the seller's drug operation as in Malloy, where the drugs were transported from one location to another for the benefit of the seller. See supra note 9. The appellant in this case simply cannot be said to have been acting for either a third-party seller or buyer; rather he was acting for himself, a principal on the receiving end of the transaction. As in Lowman, however, the government makes the argument, which the majority finds persuasive, that appellant's handing back the drugs constitutes distribution because it facilitated the seller's future distribution of cocaine. According to the government, by rejecting the cocaine tendered to him, and handing the drugs back to Thomas, appellant ensured that the drugs would remain available in the stream of commerce for distribution to others. Presumably, the government believes that if this description of the effect of the appellant's actions is accurate, it would be sufficient to be deemed distribution under the statute. The government's theory is flawed on both counts, however, because it is neither accurate nor sufficient under the statute. First, the underlying thesis that someone who refuses to accept drugs encourages the drug trade by making it necessary to recruit others, may, as an economic matter, be logical, but it is invalid in the context of a criminal offense. Drug distributors obviously need consumers (those who possess drugs for personal use), but the dealer's need for customers does not convert consumers into links in the drug trade within the meaning of the distribution statute. They are end users, who, as in this case, sometimes accept drugs on approval. See Long, supra, 623 A.2d at 1149 (`Purchasers who ... acquire drugs. . . for their own purpose ... do not perform any service as links in the chain; they are ultimate users.') (quoting Swiderski, supra, 548 F.2d at 451). Second, even if there were some theoretical basis for the government's argument, it is insufficient to satisfy the legislature's clear design that there is a significant line between those who distribute drugs and those who possess them. Under the government's all-encompassing theory of distribution by facilitation, even a passerby who rejects drugs offered casually on the street facilitates the drug trade by refusing to buy drugs, ensuring that the rejected seller will have to move on to another hoped-for customer. Cf. Lowman, supra, 632 A.2d at 96 (SCHWELB, J., dissenting) (noting that under the government's theory of facilitation, [e]very purchaser of drugs makes it easier, by his or her conduct, for a seller to sell.) This reed is much too slim to support the conclusion that a person who is and acts as a consumer, is transformed into a distributor by literal application of the word transfer. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would reverse Durham's conviction for distribution.