Opinion ID: 4402103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: campaign finance provision

Text: We begin with the self-funding restriction, repealed in 2017 by the Kentucky legislature, which limited the amount a candidate could personally loan his own campaign. See § 121.150(13) (repealed 2017). Though this court found the provision wholly unconstitutional in Nos. 17-6456/6505 Schickel, et al. v. Dilger, et al. Page 4 Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 673 (6th Cir. 2004), Schickel and Watson nevertheless worry that KREF may yet enforce the statute. To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must show, among other things, an “injury in fact.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). In a pre-enforcement challenge, such as here, a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement by alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). “A threat of future enforcement may be ‘credible’ when the same conduct has drawn enforcement actions or threats of enforcement in the past.” Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 609 (6th Cir. 2014). Here, the legislators have not shown a credible threat of prosecution. KREF has not enforced this provision since Anderson struck it down. Indeed, “if a statute is unconstitutional on its face, the State may not enforce the statute under any circumstances.” Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 193 (6th Cir. 1997). The legislators cite several alleged enforcements, but all involve other provisions—§§ 121.180 and 121.150(1), (6), (12), and (20)— not this one. Cf. Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1049 (6th Cir. 2015) (history of past enforcement against others established injury in fact). Nor have the legislators shown that KREF has any intention to enforce this provision. At its 30(b)(6) deposition, in its motion for summary judgment, and during oral argument before this panel, KREF explicitly disavowed enforcement against the legislators for any violations of this provision. The legislators’ case does not resemble those it cites to support its position. Thus, because there exists no credible threat of prosecution, the legislators lack standing to challenge this provision. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claim on standing grounds.