Opinion ID: 728079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1), Interstate Commerce and Related Arguments

Text: 8 Blais makes four related arguments regarding section 922(g)(1) and the issue of whether his conviction is pursuant to a proper exercise of the power of the federal government. Citing Lpez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, Blais argues that: (1) the statute under which he was charged and convicted is unconstitutional; (2) his indictment was defective for lack of any allegation of effect on interstate commerce; (3) the jury was improperly instructed in a manner that omitted any element of substantial effect on interstate commerce; and (4) the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the Government's failure to meet its burden to show an effect on interstate commerce. 9 In Lpez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), which prohibited a person from possessing a gun while in a school zone. Lpez, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; see United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389 (1st Cir.1996). The Court held that in passing section 922(q), Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause because that statute was 10 not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. 11 Lpez, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. Blais's argument with respect to section 922(g)(1) is essentially that: (1) the statute provides that it is unlawful for a felon 12 to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearms or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce, 13 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) (emphasis added); and (2) this court should not assume that Congress must have meant affecting interstate commerce when it said affecting commerce with respect to firearm possession by a felon. As a result, claims Blais, he was charged pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. 14 However, Blais's challenge to the statute's constitutionality is foreclosed by previous decisions of this court. Since Lpez, this court has twice ruled that a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), is hopeless on ... the law. United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 49 (1st Cir.1996) (citing Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977) (discussed in United States v. Lpez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995))); United States v. Abernathy, 83 F.3d 17, 19 (1st Cir.1996) (rejecting post-Lpez Commerce Clause-based challenge to power of Congress to enact §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(k) and quoting Bennett 's description of hopeless[ness]); see also United States v. Joost, 92 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir.1996). The implication of our holding in Bennett is that Scarborough is still good law after Lpez. Bennett, 75 F.3d at 49. We state that here more fully. In so doing, we are in accord with the other circuit courts that have confronted similar post-Lpez challenges to section 922(g)(1). See United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir.1996) (stating that [n]othing in Lpez suggests that the 'minimal nexus' test should be changed); United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296-97 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 497-98 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Hinton, 69 F.3d 534, 1995 WL 623876 (per curiam) (unpublished decision 4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1026, 134 L.Ed.2d 104 (1996); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 966, 133 L.Ed.2d 887 (1996); United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1364, 134 L.Ed.2d 530 (1996); United States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 938, 133 L.Ed.2d 864 (1996); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n. 2 (9th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir.1996) (upholding the statute under plain error review). We also note in passing that, confronting a Lpez-based challenge, this court also has upheld charges for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) as constitutional, and that statute's language, like the language Blais challenges, also makes it unlawful for a felon to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition. United States v. Daz- Martnez, 71 F.3d 946, 953 (1st Cir.1995). 15 Given the constitutionality of the statute, we believe that the indictment and the jury instructions are similarly valid, since both tracked the language of the statute in question. Furthermore, the district court read to the jury both the statute and the indictment and specifically instructed the jury that as one of the elements of the crime in question, the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm had been in or affecting interstate commerce. The district court stated that [t]he Government may meet its burden with respect to this element by proving a connection or link between interstate commerce and the possession of the firearm. The court went on to state that [i]t is sufficient for the Government to satisfy this element to prove that the firearm, allegedly possessed by the Defendant, had[,] at some time previously, travelled across a state line--a proposition supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 575, 97 S.Ct. at 1969 (holding, under the predecessor statute to § 922(g)(1), that proof that the possessed firearm previously travelled in interstate commerce was sufficient to establish an adequate interstate nexus). 16 Blais also argues that the district court should have allowed his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the government's sole evidence on the element of affecting interstate commerce was the out-of-state manufacture of the handgun. Having already rejected his arguments about Lpez's alteration of the Scarborough standard of minimal nexus, we conclude that the evidence proffered by the government was sufficient to meet its required showing of minimal nexus with interstate commerce. See McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390 (evidence that a gun had previously travelled in interstate commerce before felon's possession held sufficient to meet required showing for minimal nexus). As a result, we uphold the district court's denial of Blais's motion for a judgment of acquittal.