Opinion ID: 3135353
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: m. and 5 a.m.

Text: Contrary to defendant=s claim, there was far more evidence linking him to the stolen license plates than Roth=s bare statement that he had observed defendant in or around a van bearing those plates. Before noticing the stolen plates, Roth had observed the unauthorized van on his company property during the early morning hours. After recognizing the plates on the van as belonging to his company, he reported the theft to police and personally trailed the van and the white car that was following it to the gas station, where the two vehicles parked near each other. Although Officer Henninger could not recall if Roth had indicated whether defendant had exited the van or the car, Roth had identified defendant as one of the men who had been in or around the van bearing the stolen plate and that, itself, was also subsequently determined to be stolen. As the State notes, logic dictates that at least two persons had to have been involved in the theft at Roth=s company to have been able to drive both the van and the white car that followed it. There was no evidence the van or the car stopped anywhere to drop off any passengers or to pick up additional ones between leaving Roth=s company property and parking at the gas station. Thus, logically, the same individuals were in the van and the car when the vehicles left Roth=s company property and when they parked at the gas station. Moreover, Officer Henninger did not recall seeing any other customers at the gas station. -5- One man was observed in the white car parked near the van at the gas station. Defendant was one of two other men who together came out of the convenience store and approached Officer Henninger. Roth identified defendant as one of the men he had previously seen in or around the van. Based on these facts, it was reasonable to infer that the three men were connected with one another and had been personally observed by the eyewitness and identified as the same men who had been in or around the van bearing the stolen license plate. Based on this connection, the brief time that had passed since the theft of the license plate, and the implausibility that anyone had left or entered the vehicles between their departure from Roth=s property and their arrival at the gas station, it was reasonable to conclude defendant was involved in that crime. This particularized suspicion distinguishes this case from Ybarra and Di Re. In Ybarra, the police had a warrant limiting their search to a bar and a bartender. Once at the bar, they expanded the scope of that search to include everyone present, including the defendant, who was found to have narcotics in his pocket. The Supreme Court held the drug evidence should have been suppressed because the defendant=s mere proximity to others who were Aindependently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.@ Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 245, 100 S. Ct. at 342. In this case, more than mere physical proximity connected defendant to the theft of the license plates, and the police did not expand the scope of a previously authorized search. Logic and a credible eyewitness connected the three men present at the gas station to the earlier theft. In Ybarra, the only known connection between the defendant and the bar being searched was the defendant=s presence in the bar at that particular time. Here, defendant was not simply a patron who happened to be at the gas station when it was searched pursuant to a warrant. While particularized suspicion was lacking in Ybarra, the same cannot be said in this case. Similarly, the defendant in Di Re was arrested because he was in the front seat of a car next to the driver, who an informant sitting in the backseat said had given him two gasoline ration coupons later determined to be counterfeit. While in custody, the defendant was found to have a large number of counterfeit gasoline and fuel oil -6- ration coupons in his possession. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 583, 92 L. Ed. at 214, 68 S. Ct. at 223. At the time of the defendant=s arrest, however, the police had no evidence that he had played any role in the driver=s transaction with the informant. Indeed, the informant specifically named only the driver as a participant when the police arrived on the scene. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 592, 92 L. Ed. at 219, 68 S. Ct. at 227. The Court stated that the defendant=s mere presence in the car was not sufficient to justify his arrest and subsequent search. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 592-93, 92 L. Ed. at 219, 68 S. Ct. at 227-28. As in Ybarra, there was no particularized suspicion that the defendant had been involved in any crime. For that reason, Di Re is also distinguishable from the instant case. The special concurrence relies on People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 484 (2005), not cited in the parties= briefs. In Lee, no evidence of any actual criminal activity existed at the time of the defendant=s arrest. The police simply responded to a citizen=s complaint alleging that three men were selling drugs on a corner located in an area designated by the city to be A >high-drug= @ and A >high-gang.= @ Lee, 214 Ill. 2d at 478. The same citizen had previously made other complaints, A[m]ost of them  well-founded,@ according to the police. After parking two blocks away from the named intersection, the police observed the defendant and two other men for three to five minutes. During this time, a van drove up and parked, and the officers saw the three men speak to the driver. Notably, no illegal acts were observed, and the officers noticed nothing indicative of drug-related activities, such as an exchange of money or packages, as required by the statute. A preliminary pat-down search of the men failed to provide any evidence of contraband. Despite the complete absence of any evidence that the men were connected to any drug-related activities, defendant and his companions were arrested. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d at 478-79. Only after being arrested was the defendant found to have cocaine in his pants pocket. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d at 481. Unlike Lee, defendant in this case was undeniably linked to a crime that was readily observable by the officer on the scene. The presence of the stolen license plate on the van established that a theft had actually been committed. While at the gas station, Officer Henninger verified that the plate was stolen, confirming the -7- commission of a crime and corroborating Roth=s statements. He also knew from speaking directly with the complainant at the scene that defendant and the two other men had been in or around the van bearing the stolen plate. In addition, the officer knew Roth had personally followed the van and the car from the scene of the licenseplate theft to the gas station and had not reported anyone entering or leaving the vehicles. The van had also been reported stolen. Officer Henninger continued to investigate the crime when defendant and his companion came out of the convenience store. This court has stated that probable cause exists if the facts and surrounding circumstances are sufficient to justify a reasonable belief by the arresting officer that the defendant is or has been involved in a crime. People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 277 (2005). AThe standard for determining whether probable cause is present is probability of criminal activity, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]@ Lee, 214 Ill. 2d at 485. If there are questions both of whether a crime has even been committed as well as of whether a particular individual committed the crime, additional evidence is required to show probable cause. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d at 485. In Lee, even the existence of a crime was in question, and the defendant=s actions revealed no hint of illegality. With the enhanced evidentiary burden imposed on the State in the absence of a definitive crime, probable cause did not exist in Lee. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d at 485. In contrast, here a crime had undeniably been committed, making the enhanced burden placed on the State in Lee inapplicable. Moreover, here an eyewitness had identified the van bearing the stolen license plate and the white car accompanying it as the same two vehicles he had followed, uninterrupted, from the scene of the theft to the gas station, where the police observed them. The same eyewitness also personally identified defendant as one of three men he had observed in or around the van and the white car. Based on the limited testimony adduced at the suppression hearing, defendant=s presence at the time the license plate was stolen may be logically inferred, as noted previously. In light of the totality of the facts and circumstances, as viewed by an objectively reasonable officer, we believe probable cause existed at the time of defendant=s arrest. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769, 775, 124 S. Ct. 795, 800 (2003) (stating the relevant standard). Having made this determination, we need not address defendant=s additional claim -8- that the appellate court erred by finding the admission of his postarrest statements during the stipulated bench trial to be harmless error. Defendant=s arrest was proper; thus under the facts of this case, the admission of his subsequent custodial statements was also proper. Unlike the appellate court, we need not consider whether the admission of those statements was harmless error because we hold the trial court properly admitted them. The trial court properly denied defendant=s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.