Opinion ID: 586928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vocational Experts

Text: 15 Ehrhart raises two challenges to the manner in which the ALJ interpreted evidence provided by the vocational experts. At the outset, we observe that a vocational expert is not a required or even essential part of a disability benefits hearing. The decision whether to employ the services of a vocational expert is entirely within the discretion of the ALJ. § 404.1566(e). While the specialized knowledge of a vocational expert might prove helpful in certain cases, Orzel v. Finch, 445 F.2d 150, 154 (7th Cir.1971), we only require that there be reliable evidence of some kind that would persuade a reasonable person that the limitations in question do not significantly diminish the employment opportunities otherwise available. Warmoth v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 1109, 1112 (7th Cir.1986) (citations omitted). The record before us suggests that the ALJ reached his conclusion by considering the evidence and consulting the grids. Although the vocational expert testimony provided specific information on the number of available jobs suitable for Ehrhart, it served mostly to reinforce the ALJ's finding of no disability. Be that as it may, Ehrhart attacks the use of the vocational expert testimony on two separate grounds, which we consider in turn.
16 Ehrhart first alleges that the ALJ posed an improper and incomplete hypothetical question to Dr. Fisher, the vocational expert who testified at the hearing. In particular, Ehrhart contends that the ALJ did not incorporate all of his nonexertional impairments into the hypothetical question, including information contained in four psychiatric reports attesting to his inability to concentrate, memory loss, confusion, ability to perform activities within a schedule and maintain regular attendance; ability to complete a normal work day and work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; moderately limited ability to interact appropriately with the general public or to set realistic goals. Appellant's Brief, at 21. 17 In his hypothetical question to Dr. Fisher, the ALJ inquired whether Ehrhart could perform any skilled or semi-skilled light jobs, considering the limitations of his age, education, work experience, and ability to perform only low stress, light work that would not expose him to extremes of temperature, crowds, repetitive pushing, pulling, climbing, or many complex instructions. Tr. 61-62, 64. The vocational expert testified that Ehrhart's nonexertional limitations did not significantly compromise his ability to perform in a full range of sedentary and light work functions. He elaborated that Ehrhart is capable of working as a general office clerk, a bank teller, a timekeeping clerk, or a payroll clerk. Numerous jobs in these fields exist in the region where Ehrhart lives, according to Dr. Fisher's testimony. Tr. 16-18, findings 11-12; See also §§ 404.1567-1569; Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Table Nos. 1 and 2, Rules 201.15, 202.15. 18 The hypothetical question posed by the ALJ was proper because it reflected Ehrhart's impairments to the extent that the ALJ found them supported by evidence in the record. All that is required is that the hypothetical question be supported by the medical evidence in the record. Meredith, 833 F.2d at 654. Moreover, even if the hypothetical question omitted any medical evidence that accurately reflected Ehrhart's impairments, the vocational expert indicated that he had reviewed the documentary evidence prior to the hearing. Tr. 60. When the record supports the conclusion that the vocational expert considered the medical reports and documents, his responses are probative of both residual functional capacity and which jobs a claimant reasonably can perform, even if the hypothetical question itself does not take into account every aspect of the claimant's impairments. Meredith, 833 F.2d at 654; Waite v. Bowen, 819 F.2d 1356, 1361 (7th Cir.1987). 19 Nothing in the record indicates that Dr. Fisher was unable to understand the medical reports, unfamiliar with them, or remiss in considering all of the information at his disposal. Nor did the ALJ neglect to include in his question relevant evidence of Ehrhart's impairments. Substantial evidence supported the hypothetical question, which contemplated Ehrhart's heart condition as well as limitations precluding him from doing more than light work, working in temperature extremes, or performing repetitive or enervating motions. Furthermore, the question considered Ehrhart's mental impairments and their related effects on his memory and ability to carry out stressful jobs requiring complex directions. In short, the ALJ considered Ehrhart's mental impairments in his hypothetical question. The responses of the vocational expert therefore provided a reliable assessment of Ehrhart's residual functional capacity and which jobs would be appropriate for him.
20 Ehrhart argues as well that the ALJ accorded much more weight to the testimony of Dr. Fisher than to John Holland, a vocational expert based in New York who did not testify at the hearing. Appellant's Brief, at 18. Specifically, Ehrhart argues that the ALJ omitted from consideration limitations described by Holland, including his depression, difficulty concentrating, recurrent irritability, and vulnerability to stress. As discussed above, however, the ALJ considered these limitations but determined from the medical evidence that they were not disabling. In addition, Ehrhart argues that the ALJ did not acknowledge Holland's conclusion that he possessed insufficient transferable skills to engage in substantial gainful activity. Dr. Fisher, in contrast, testified that Ehrhart has in fact retained skills that qualify him for a number of positions available in the local economy. 21 In essence, Ehrhart suggests that the ALJ erred by failing to adopt the conclusions of Holland. This argument is unconvincing. The ALJ considered Holland's analysis, but based his decision on objective evidence indicating that Ehrhart had transferable work skills, Tr. 62-63, could engage in a variety of activities, Tr. 66, and was psychologically fit to partake in many gainful enterprises. Tr. 237. If it is the case that he gave greater weight to Dr. Fisher's testimony, the ALJ was well within his right to do so. He observed the witnesses directly, and those intangible, unarticulable elements that constitute 'credibility' unfortunately leave no trace that can be discerned in this or any other transcript we must review. Imani, 797 F.2d at 512. Furthermore, resolution of evidentiary conflicts lies within the exclusive domain of the ALJ, including the reconciliation of contradictory vocational expert testimony. Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir.1990) (citing Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir.1987) and Reynolds v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir.1988)). Holland based his report on medical information current through September 1984, Tr. 422--evidence that bears only limited relevance to Ehrhart's present application for benefits. Understandably, then, the ALJ indicated in his decision that he gives greater weight to the vocational expert who testified at the hearing than the vocational analysis submitted which was based on unknown evidence, perhaps that just more favorable to the claimant. Tr. 16. Cf. DeFrancesco, 867 F.2d at 1043.