Opinion ID: 457070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-indictment Delay and Prejudice

Text: 16 AML emphasizes that approximately 45 months elapsed from the time the FDA completed its initial investigative report in March 1980 to the time that the grand jury indicted AML in December 1983. During that period of time, Partucci left for Argentina. AML claims that it has been substantially prejudiced in presenting a defense because of the loss of Partucci's testimony. AML asserts that Partucci would have testified that no officer or director of AML participated in, had knowledge of, or directed the unlawful practices at RPC; that Partucci intentionally concealed such practices from AML; and that Partucci engaged in these practices for his benefit. 17 The district court, although indicating that it thought the delay was unreasonable and prejudicial, decided not to rule prior to trial on AML's motion to dismiss the indictment. App.Vol. III at 931. Following the trial, the district court declined to overturn the jury's verdict, apparently concluding, among other things, that AML had not been denied its right to a fair trial. App.Vol. VI at 2502-03 and 2510. We agree that AML has not been denied its right to due process. 18 The seminal cases regarding when pre-indictment delay deprives a defendant of due process are United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). In Marion, the Court found that a 38-month delay between the end of the criminal scheme charged and the time of the indictment did not violate defendants' right to due process. The defendants, asserting no specific prejudice other than that which might potentially result from the passage of time, argued that the delay violated their right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and their right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court first held that the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial provision has no application until a defendant becomes an accused, which occurred in that case when the defendants were indicted. 404 U.S. at 313, 92 S.Ct. at 459. The Court went on to emphasize that the primary guarantee against the bringing of overly stale charges is the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 322, 92 S.Ct. at 464. 3 The Court pointed out, however, that a statute of limitations does not fully define the rights of a defendant with respect to events prior to indictment and confirmed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment has a role to play. The Court noted the concession of the Government that the Fifth Amendment would require dismissal if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay ... caused substantial prejudice to appellees' rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused. Id. at 324, 92 S.Ct. at 465. The Court declined to elaborate further regarding the circumstances under which a showing of actual prejudice would require dismissal of an indictment, stressing that such a determination would involve an assessment of the facts in each case. Finding that the defendants had neither alleged nor proved actual prejudice and that there was no showing that the Government had intentionally delayed for tactical advantage, the Court held that the defendants had not adequately demonstrated that the Government had violated due process. 19 In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), which involved a 17-month delay during which two witnesses died, the Supreme Court elaborated on the requirement of a showing of actual prejudice set forth in Marion. The Court, reversing the lower court's dismissal of the indictment, stated that while proof of actual prejudice makes a due process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication, it does not automatically make the claim valid. Id. at 789, 97 S.Ct. at 2048. In evaluating a due process claim, the Court directed that consideration be given to the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. Id. at 790, 97 S.Ct. at 2049. The Court noted the Government's further concession, going beyond its tactical delay concession in Marion, that a due process violation might also be found on a showing of prosecutorial delay incurred in reckless disregard of circumstances, known to the prosecution, suggesting that there existed an appreciable risk that delay would impair the ability to mount an effective defense. Id. at 795, n. 17, 97 S.Ct. at 2051, n. 17, quoting Brief for United States at 32-35. Finding that the Government had been engaged in a good-faith continuing investigation, the Court held that to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been prejudiced somewhat by the lapse of time. Id. at 796, 97 S.Ct. at 2052 (emphasis added). 20 The Supreme Court's decisions in Marion and Lovasco may be read as establishing a two-pronged inquiry when pre-indictment delay is alleged to violate due process. First, a court must assess whether the defendant has suffered actual prejudice, and the burden of proving such prejudice is clearly on the defendant. If the threshold requirement of actual prejudice is met, the court must then consider the Government's reasons for the delay, balancing the prejudice to the defendant with the Government's justification for delay. United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010, 102 S.Ct. 2305, 73 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1982). The basic inquiry then becomes whether the Government's action in prosecuting after substantial delay violates fundamental conceptions of justice or the community's sense of fair play and decency. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2049, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). 21 Applying this two-pronged analysis in the case before us, we find that AML was prejudiced only slightly, if at all, by the loss of Hugo Partucci's testimony. First, there is no showing that Partucci would have waived his Fifth Amendment right and have testified at the trial. Second, the content of Partucci's testimony remains highly speculative. AML contends that his testimony would have aided the defense in that he would have testified that no officer or director of AML directed him to violate the law, but that remains far from clear. According to the testimony of Mili Lamas at a pre-trial hearing, Partucci told Lamas in 1983 that he had never received an order from AML to do anything unlawful, but he also told her that he had done nothing wrong at RPC. In light of his statement to Lamas, it seems just as possible that Partucci's testimony might have been inculpatory of AML rather than exculpatory--that he might have continued to deny his wrongdoing and have attempted to place the blame on AML. Finally even assuming that Partucci would have testified as AML contends that he would, his testimony could not have significantly aided AML. Even if Partucci had testified that no officer or director directed him to engage in unlawful practices, such testimony would not have exonerated AML because AML's conviction was based not on the actions of its officers or directors but on the fact that its corporate agents, acting within the scope of their authority, committed criminal acts for which AML is liable as a matter of law. 22 Assuming some slight prejudice to AML, it seems clear that there is no violation of due process when the Government's reasons for the delay are considered. The government contends that the delay was justified by the lengthy administrative review process at the FDA which is not necessarily geared toward a criminal investigation, by the time required for Government attorneys to become familiar with a complex case involving a federal regulatory scheme, and by manpower problems in the United States Attorney's office in Richmond. The Government also argues, and we agree, that at least a portion of the delay was attributable to additional investigative activities required when the case actually reached Government prosecutors at the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's Office. While such reasons may not suffice where the actual prejudice to the defendant from the delay is substantial, we find that there is no due process violation when these reasons are considered in light of the slight, possibly nonexistent, prejudice suffered by AML. While the Government could possibly have acted with more dispatch in this case, we do not believe that any portion of the delay was occasioned by deliberate or bad faith acts or omissions on the part of Government employees or prosecutors. The wheels of government bureaucracy may, at times, seem to turn at a frighteningly slow pace, but careful investigation and consideration prior to the bringing of criminal charges is generally a wise policy. Certainly there is no indication that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage, United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S.Ct. 455, 466, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), or even that the delay was incurred in reckless disregard of circumstances ... suggesting that the delay would impair the ability to mount an effective defense. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 795 n. 17, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2051 n. 17, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). Consequently, we find that AML has suffered no violation of its due process rights because of prosecutorial delay prior to indictment.