Opinion ID: 884792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Commercial Timber

Text: ¶17 George also argues the court erred in valuing commercial timber on the parties' property separately from the real property itself, and in including its value in the marital estate. George urges that, pursuant to Montana law, live trees are considered a part of real property, and argues that their value was included in real estate appraiser John Wicks' property appraisal. George points to that portion of Wicks' testimony in which he states that file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-392%20Opinion.htm (6 of 12)4/20/2007 2:53:31 PM Marriage of Berg he included the value of the timber in his appraisal, and argues the court thus erred in placing an additional value on the property for the commercial timber in the amount of $880,089. George next argues that, even if the court properly concluded that commercial timber could have been removed without harming the value of the land upon which it sat, the court relied on erroneous numbers in determining the value of that commercial timber. ¶18 In ultimately deciding to value standing timber separately from real property, the court relied in part upon testimony from expert John Wells in which he opined that the standing timber alone had a clear cut value of $2,673,948 and that the property had commercial timber with an optimal cut value of $1,760,178. Moreover, the court noted that, although Wicks had included the value of standing timber in his appraisal, he opined that up to 50 percent of the merchantable timber could likely be harvested without reducing the land's value. Following a review of the record, we conclude the court did not err in valuing the standing timber separately from the land upon which it stood, and in finding that the standing timber owned by the parties on their real properties has a value in excess of the appraised value set forth in Wicks' appraisal. ¶19 Although George argues the court relied on erroneous numbers in determining the value of that timber, we again note that the district court has broad discretion in valuing the marital estate in a dissolution proceeding, and may adopt any reasonable valuation of marital property which is supported by the record. Meeks, 276 Mont. at 242-43, 915 P.2d at 834-35. Here, the court's valuation of the timber is supported by sufficient evidence of record, and is not clearly erroneous.