Opinion ID: 2454804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gender-Batson Challenges

Text: Deck next claims that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the state's peremptory strikes of two female venirepersons in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). In Batson , the United States Supreme Court prohibited the use of peremptory strikes to exclude potential jurors based on race, Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and in J.E.B., Batson was extended to prohibit peremptory strikes on the basis of gender. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146, 114 S.Ct. 1419. Missouri has adopted a three-step process for making a successful Batson challenge. State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo. banc 1992). First, the defendant must object to the state's peremptory strike and identify the protected class to which the prospective juror belongs. Id. The state is then required to provide a reasonably specific and clear, race and/or gender-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. If the state provides such an explanation, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the state's explanation was pretextual and that the strike was actually motivated by the prospective juror's race or gender. Id. In evaluating the prosecutor's explanation, the chief consideration is whether the explanation is plausible in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Id. While the presence of similarly-situated white or male jurors is probative of pretext, it is not dispositive. Id. This Court will reverse the trial court's decision on a Batson challenge only upon a showing of clear error. Id. The first of the two gender- Batson challenges involved prospective juror number sixteen, a female, who the prosecutors struck with the following explanation: MR. JERRELL: Your Honor, the first time I laid eyes on ... and heard her speak, I thought she was a very weak juror. In fact, that's what I wrote in my notes during the middle of voir dire. Also her son's been prosecuted ... and I can't even read my own writing, but I don't want any juror on there, at least her, where her son's been prosecuted. MR. WILKINS: Actually it's not her son. Her ex-brother-in-law is in the Department of Corrections for burglary and his son has a current charge pending in our county. MR. JERRELL: I stand corrected. Exactly what my notes say. That's my reasons for [her]. MR. WILKINS: Likewise, Your Honor, I had independent of Mr. Jerrell also written the word weak on [her] and independent of him, also based upon. The prosecutors' responses indicate that prospective juror number sixteen was stricken not because of her gender but because she would be a weak juror and she had relatives who had been or were being prosecuted. An explanation based on a prospective juror's general demeanor, which in this case gave rise to the perception that she was weak, is facially non-discriminatory. State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d 9, 15 (Mo. banc 1996). So too is the fact of the arrest, conviction, or incarceration of a prospective juror's relative. State v. Payne, 958 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Mo. App.1997); State v. Johnson, 930 S.W.2d 456, 461-62 (Mo.App.1996). These explanations were reasonably specific, clear and gender-neutral and thus satisfied the second prong of the Batson analysis. The second gender- Batson challenges involved prospective juror number fifty, a female, who was struck for the following reasons: MR. JERRELL: As for [her], I didn't think much of her either. She does have what we believe to be a prior DWI in Kirkwood, which she never mentioned, from our research on her. I also felt that she was not a strong juror. So that's why we decided to strike her. MR. WILKINS: Quite frankly, she has a prior DWI in the City of Kirkwood. That's what the criminal history record shows. She was very red-cheeked, sixtiesh, sixty-eight, single. My concern, my interest was that that might signal an alcohol habit, problem, whatever. Had nothing to do with the fact that she was female. The prosecutors' responses indicate that prospective juror number fifty was struck from the panel because she had a prior DWI conviction that she did not disclose. As stated, a prior conviction is an appropriate and neutral basis for a peremptory strike. Payne, 958 S.W.2d at 565. Deck argues, however, that the strike was pretextual because the prosecutors chose not to strike a similarly situated male who stated during voir dire that he was arrested and pled guilty to driving while intoxicated. To the contrary, the male prospective juror was not similarly situated to her because he admitted his DWI conviction when the prosecutor asked about prior arrests and convictions during voir dire while she did not. Deck further contends that the prosecutors could not properly base the peremptory strike on her DWI because no information regarding the offense was brought out during voir dire. Deck fails to recognize, however, that lawyers are not prohibited from using information outside the record as a basis for a peremptory strike. See State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Mo. banc 1992) (arrest records may be accessed for use in selecting jury). In sum, Deck has not shown that the prosecutors' reasons for striking these two potential jurors were merely pretextual and that the strikes were motivated by gender. The point is denied.