Opinion ID: 524685
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cause for Default

Text: 20 The Sandstrom claim was available 3 when Gene filed his first state habeas petition, but no Sandstrom claim was presented at that time. As cause for this default, Gene cites his illiteracy and lack of ability to understand the state habeas proceedings. In reviewing this argument we must face this fact: Gene, still acting pro se, raised the Sandstrom issue in his second petition. This is not a case where an issue is intrinsically beyond the pro se petitioner's ability to present. 21 On Gene's claim of inability to understand the state habeas proceedings, we assume that a pro se habeas petitioner who lacked the mental capacity to understand the nature and object of habeas proceedings and to present his case for habeas relief in a rational manner would have cause for omitting a claim in such proceedings. But a person's being illiterate does not mean that the person lacks good sense. Nor does lack of formal education make a person mentally incompetent. There is no right to legal counsel in collateral proceedings, Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1437-38 (11th Cir.1985); thus, the failure to act or think like a lawyer cannot be cause for failing to assert a claim. Although Gene did not mention it in his appellate briefs (Gene filed a brief pro se and his court-appointed counsel also filed a brief; both were well done), in his pleadings to the district court Gene alleged that his I.Q. was well below average. Because no evidentiary hearing was held by the district court, we accept this allegation at face value; but because not every mental deficiency amounts to incompetency, the allegation is insufficient. See McCune v. Estelle, 534 F.2d 611, 612 (5th Cir.1976) (low intelligence does not equal mental incompetence). 22 Moreover, we would find no support for an argument that Gene is mentally incompetent in the sense of being incompetent to stand trial. No one has ever asserted that Gene was mentally incompetent when he was originally tried for murder. In addition, we have read the transcript of Gene's state habeas hearings where Gene spoke for himself. Although he did not perform at these hearings as a competent lawyer would, his performance appears rational in every way: he knew where he was; he knew why he was in court; he stated his contentions plainly; the contentions were not absurd; and he responded directly to questions. In these circumstances, Gene's general mental condition is not legal cause for his default. 23 The state does not dispute Gene's illiteracy, and we have no reason to doubt it. But the Supreme Court has suggested that cause ordinarily turns on some objective factor external to the petitioner. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2646, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). Gene's illiteracy does not explain why he failed to raise this issue in his first state habeas petition. We know that illiterates, using scriveners, can and often do assert arguably valid claims; Gene in his second petition advanced pro se the Sandstrom claim. Gene said at his second state habeas hearing that he lost contact with a jailhouse lawyer during the first habeas proceedings, but he does not assert that Georgia or his custodians unduly obstructed his efforts to get other help or to handle his case--including asking for more time--as he saw fit. The Ninth Circuit has already rejected the argument that illiteracy equals cause for a default in collateral proceedings even when the petitioner loses the help of a jailhouse lawyer. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986). To find cause in this case would, in effect, establish a per se rule of cause based on illiteracy. 4 24 Because of the wide variety of contexts in which procedural defaults can occur, the Supreme Court has not given the term 'cause' precise content. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2909, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984). Per se rules of cause would not allow the necessary flexibility to address the varied contexts in which procedural defaults can occur. 25 To hold that illiteracy is cause for state procedural default would allow those petitioners who happen to be illiterate to engage in forum shopping. Claims could be reserved for federal court if the petitioner perceived that the federal fact-finder might be more sympathetic to those claims than the state fact-finder. See Presnell, 835 F.2d at 1579. To the extent that state courts would not get the first chance to review petitioners' claims, the exhaustion doctrine would be undermined, and the importance of state collateral review would be reduced. See id. Particularly in the light of the secondary and limited role of federal collateral proceedings as devices of constitutional protection for state prisoners, these federalism concerns, stressing the proper role of state courts in preventing unconstitutional confinements and the importance of finality of state convictions, are due great respect. 5 26 Nor do we sense any inequity in requiring an illiterate pro se petitioner to raise all issues--that lie within his ability to raise at all--in his first petition. Even representation by the most competent lawyer is no guarantee that all colorable issues will be raised. We hold parties represented by counsel responsible for their lawyers' mistakes. See Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645. Where, as here, a pro se petitioner is able to raise an issue, it would be inequitable to give him a second bite at the apple when he initially defaults the issue while we deny a second chance to the petitioner whose counsel fails to raise the issue. Furthermore, as we noted earlier, the states have rights to reasonable rules of finality. 6