Opinion ID: 1668303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: layne-western's appeal

Text: On cross-appeal, Layne-Western also claims that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in its favor on the negligence action brought by Lindsay. At the end of trial, Lindsay's remaining allegations against Layne-Western were that Layne-Western was negligent in the following particulars: (1) failing to adequately and properly design, select and install proper and sufficient materials, drill, fabricate, assemble and install the ground water monitoring wells for their intended use; (2) failing to adequately and properly investigate, examine, inspect, sample, test, analyze, and study the subsurface soil and hydrogeological conditions on the premises; (3) failing to consult with, retain, or engage the services of a trained, qualified, and competent hydrogeologist regarding the subsurface soil and hydrogeological conditions at the premises; (4) failing to perform its work in a reasonably good and workmanlike manner; (5) failing to warn and notify Lindsay of the risk and danger of pollution and contamination of aquifer and ground water that would result from the manner and materials that Layne-Western used in installation of the ground water monitoring wells; and (6) failing to provide and install the proper and sufficient materials in the ground water monitoring wells in compliance with the applicable federal laws and industry standards. Rather than building the wells which it contracted to build, the wells designed by Lindsay's own engineer, it appears that Lindsay would have had Layne-Western undertake all the investigation and testing necessary to design and build the wells and then design and build them. In order to establish these duties, Lindsay relied on the testimony of one of its expert witnesses, Roy Elliott. Elliott testified that a well driller would want to either retain or talk to a geotechnical engineer, a geologist, or a hydrogeologist about the circumstances at the site and whether the acid could move into areas where he is going to advance a drill, or where he is going to remove fluids or where he is going to place a well. He also said that a driller would want to make sure that they are not drilling into any contamination and driving it around either down with the bits or letting it drain someplace. However, the value of the opinion of an expert witness is no stronger than the facts upon which it is based. Mutual of Omaha v. Broussard, 233 Neb. 916, 448 N.W.2d 600 (1989). In any event, the question of whether a legal duty exists for actionable negligence is a question of law dependent on the facts in a particular situation. Schmidt v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 245 Neb. 776, 515 N.W.2d 756 (1994). For actionable negligence to exist, there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury, a failure to discharge that duty, and damage proximately resulting from the undischarged duty. Id. `[D]uty' is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is always the sameto conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk.... A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another. Id. at 786, 515 N.W.2d at 763. The facts in this case are that Layne-Western was hired by Christiansen, not Lindsay. There is no evidence of a contract between Layne-Western and Lindsay. It is the law in Nebraska that in the absence of a binding agreement, express or implied, there is no privity of contract between a subcontractor and a landowner who employs the general contractor who hired the subcontractor. See, Barnes v. Hampton, 198 Neb. 151, 252 N.W.2d 138 (1977), disapproved on other grounds, Van Pelt v. Greathouse, 219 Neb. 478, 364 N.W.2d 14 (1985); Boyd v. Benkelman Public Housing Authority, 188 Neb. 69, 195 N.W.2d 230 (1972). Thus, there is no privity of contract between Layne-Western and Lindsay. In Nebraska, the general rule is that one not a party to a construction contract cannot, for injuries received after the acceptance of the completed work by the contractee, maintain an action in tort for the negligent performance of the contract. Stover v. Ed Miller & Sons, Inc., 194 Neb. 422, 231 N.W.2d 700 (1975). In Stover, a general contractor hired the defendant subcontractor to perform excavation work. The contract between the parties explicitly provided that the general contractor and not the subcontractor would be responsible for shoring the walls of the excavation. The subcontractor completed the excavating work and left the jobsite. Later, employees of the general contractor, including the plaintiff, began working on the shoring job. During the progress of the shoring work, one wall of the excavation collapsed and the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging that the defendant was negligent in failing to shore the walls. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On appeal, finding first that there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant and second that the defendant had no duty to do the shoring work, this court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. In the case at hand, it is undisputed that Lindsay hired Gilmore to design the well and to oversee its construction. Moreover, Gilmore was contractually obligated to observe the applicable laws, many of which were drafted in order to prevent the contamination of ground water. That Gilmore failed to design a well that would prevent contamination does not impose additional responsibilities upon Layne-Western. Layne-Western contractually agreed with Christiansen to build four monitoring wells for $10 a foot. Given the limited evidence of the oral contract Layne-Western had with Christiansen, it cannot be said that Layne-Western had the extensive duties which Lindsay alleges Layne-Western had. Since as discussed in the previous section, the work performed was accepted, Lindsay cannot maintain an action for the negligent performance of a contract against Layne-Western. Although we have never had occasion to adopt the rule, other jurisdictions faced with similar cases have held that an independent contractor owes no duty to third persons to judge the plans, specifications, or instructions which he has merely contracted to follow unless they are so obviously dangerous that no competent contractor would follow them. See, Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill.2d 203, 23 Ill.Dec. 574, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978); Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Building Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924); Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company, 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965); Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Company, 221 F.Supp. 129 (N.D.Ind.1963); Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 936, 71 S.Ct. 855, 95 L.Ed. 1364. Lindsay has not alleged or proved that the plans and specifications were so obviously dangerous that no competent contractor would follow them. Layne-Western, therefore, was under no duty to judge the plans provided or redesign the well. Layne-Western only had a duty to follow them, which it did in all material respects. That the annular spaces were filled with more bentonite than the plans called for is of no consequence. Lindsay's own expert, Elliott, testified that the change in the amount of bentonite was not a cause of the contamination. Under the facts of this case, as a matter of law, Layne-Western did not owe the duties to Lindsay which Lindsay alleged. In the absence of any duty, Layne-Western could not be held liable. The district court should have granted Layne-Western's motion for a directed verdict at the close of all evidence.