Opinion ID: 1351677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presumption of Continuity of Use or Condition

Text: In 1999, the county assessor reclassified the Colvin property as residential. Finding the highest and best use of the property is residential, the district court affirmed the Board's residential classification. Though Colvins initially pursued an appeal of the district court's findings, they dismissed the appeal after receiving a favorable ruling on their 2000 tax assessment challenge. While each new tax year presents a new and separate cause of action, Colvins must overcome the presumption of continuity of use. In the absence of a proven change in the use of their property between 1999 and 2000, we presume the use has remained the same since the 1999 unappealed residential classification was made. See, e.g., Cott, 442 N.W.2d at 82 (if [county assessor] disagreed with the court's decision, he should have appealed, rather than obstinately asserting his right to reclassify the property). [A] classification in one year is competent and persuasive evidence of the property classification in a subsequent year. Id. at 81. Contrary to Colvins' suggestion and the trial court's ruling, this presumption is not one of correctness of the original 1999 reclassification. Rather the presumption is an evidentiary one. When it is admitted that the use of the real property is the same as it was in the prior years when the court adjudicated its classification, there is a strong presumption that no change has occurred. The court should not be obligated to reexamine the same facts again and again. A condition once shown may be presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. Id. We presume the use of Colvins' property has not changed since the reclassification. [2] To succeed on appeal, Colvins must rebut this presumption by proving the use of their property has changed since 1999 and, as such, the property should now be classified as agricultural. See id. When the assessor reclassified Colvins' property as residential, he considered a number of factors regarding the character and use of the property. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 701-71.1(1) (The classification of real estate shall be based on the best judgment of the assessor and he or she should consider the use of the property). Agricultural real estate is land that is in good faith primarily used for agricultural purposes. Id. r. 701-71.1(3). The county assessor is guided by other factors in determining whether a taxpayer is using the property agriculturally in good faith. See, e.g., Bystrom v. Union Land Invs., Inc., 477 So.2d 585, 589 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1985) (quoting Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1977)) (`[U]se' is still the guidepost in classifying land, although other specifically enumerated factors related to use may also be considered.). In addition to actual use of the property, good faith may also include the following: (1) is the parcel set off and awaiting development; (2) what permitted uses does current zoning allow; (3) if the parcel is being offered for sale, or if it were, would it be viewed by the marketplace as other than agricultural; (4) how does the land conform to other surrounding properties; (5) what is the actual amount of income produced and from what sources; and (6) what is the highest and best use of the property. [3] In the 1999 assessment of Colvins' property, the following was shown. Colvins purchased their home on five acres of real property in 1982. They farmed all tillable portions of this land. In 1987, Colvins purchased two more farmable acres of land. They built a farm shed on the property. Since 1983, Colvins raised crops on the acreage. Colvins raised livestock on the property in 1999 and 2000. The county assessor reclassified Colvins' property as residential in 1999. [4] The district court affirmed this finding the highest and best use of Colvins' property is residential. The only change in Colvins' land that occurred between 1999 and 2000 is the value of the land increased. However, Colvins do not challenge the valuation of the property. Evidence that the valuation changed during this time does not show use of the land has changed warranting a new classification. Colvins admit the use and condition of their property has not changed since the 1999 reclassification. The facts show the use and condition of their property remained substantially static. Because Colvins presented no evidence to show the character or use of the land changed in 2000, the district court erred in finding the Board wrongfully classified Colvins' property as residential. There is no injustice in preventing the Colvins from relitigating the reclassification of their property because they had the opportunity to do so in 1999. If Colvins wanted to challenge the residential reclassification they should have pursued the appeal of the 1999 tax assessment. Having not done so, it is too late now to make this challenge absent proof that the use or condition of the land has changed. Because Colvins failed to present evidence to rebut the presumption that the use of the land has remained the same since the 1999 reclassification, we find the district court should have affirmed the Board's residential reclassification.