Opinion ID: 206091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to a Speedy Sentencing

Text: Since Paul did not raise an objection in the District Court relating to his right to a speedy sentencing, we review his claim for plain error. See United States v. Keppler, 2 F.3d 21, 23 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)). In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated the standard for plain error review: [B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [T]o determine whether a defendant has been deprived of [his] due process right to a prompt sentencing, we must consider [1] the reasons for the delay as well as [2] the prejudice to the accused. United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir.2009) (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). These considerations are not evaluated independently as prongs in a multi-part test, but rather as related factors to be weighed in light of each other and the surrounding circumstances. See id. at 199-200.
In considering the reasons for the delay, the Supreme Court has instructed that different weights should be assigned to different reasons. Vermont v. Brillon, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 1290, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (2009) (citation omitted) (in the speedy trial context). While deliberate delay to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the prosecution, more neutral reasons such as negligence or overcrowded courts weigh less heavily but nevertheless should be considered.... Ray, 578 F.3d at 200 (internal punctuation omitted). Courts should also consider the extent to which the defendant should bear responsibility for the delay. See id. In the instant case, a large portion of the roughly four year delay before sentencing was due to the government's inability to provide the Probation Department with certain evidence for calculating restitution and to allow a new Assistant United States Attorney to familiarize himself with the case. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that this was an intentionalor anything more than an inadvertentdelay. In any event, negligence on the part of the government does not weigh as heavily as would an intentional delay. The fourth and final year of the delay, however, is attributable solely to Paul's requests for adjournments. In addition, Paul repeatedly attempted to delay the beginning of his prison term even after receiving his sentence. As such, it is clear that Paul was in no immediate rush to receive his sentence or to begin serving it.
To prove a due process violation as a result of a sentencing delay, the prejudice claimed by the defendant ... must be substantial and demonstrable. Ray, 578 F.3d at 200 (citing Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 256 (10th Cir.1986); United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 61 (1st Cir.2003)). A defendant is prejudiced by a sentencing delay when imposing the sentence would interrupt his reintegration into the community in a way that the immediate imposition of sentence would not have. Id. at 201. Paul first argues that the uncertainty of his fate left him in limbo with respect to employment prospects and his ability to make future arrangements for his family. Indeed, delay in sentencing postpones the commitment of the defendant to corrections facilities, may have a detrimental effect on rehabilitation, and suspends the appellate review of error. Ray, 578 F.3d at 198. These harms, however, inevitably accompany any delay in sentencing and do not, in and of themselves, satisfy the substantial and demonstrable prejudice requirement. See id. at 200. Paul also contends that he took steps towards rehabilitation, such as reestablishing ties with his family and helping shareholders recover hidden assets from SLM. In developing this argument, Paul attempts to draw a comparison between himself and the defendant in Ray. This comparison, however, is unavailing. The defendant in Ray waited fifteen years for her sentencing hearing. Ray, 578 F.3d at 187, 200. Believing that her involvement with the criminal justice system was behind her, she obtained employment and paid taxes, married and raised a family, owned a home, and obtained higher education. Id. at 201. On the contrary, however, Paul waited four years for a sentencing hearing, all the while remaining in home detention. Thus, at no time did Paul believe that the matter was behind him, nor did he have the opportunity to fully reintegrate into society. Lastly, Paul claims that his incarceration was detrimental to his autistic son, who had become reliant on Paul during the interim period. The son's doctor reported that the child was very attached to his father, and voiced concern that Paul's incarceration might have a detrimental effect on the child. J.A. 457. The doctor also, however, noted that the effect of Paul's incarceration could have been ameliorated by allow[ing] some time to help prepare [Paul's son] for this transition. Id. Given the several delays in Paul's surrender date, Paul and his son undoubtedly had such a transition period. In sum, Paul does not cite any authority to support a finding of prejudice for family circumstances and has not specifically shown how the delay has prejudiced him in this respect. In Ray, the Court expressly emphasized the narrowness of its holding. Ray, 578 F.3d at 202. Specifically, the Court noted that [e]ven substantial delays in sentencing do not in all circumstances amount to a due process violation, especially when a defendant has not requested timely sentencing and is unable to establish prejudice of the sort implicated here. Id. Paul's is not the unusual case where the dictates of fundamental fairness clearly compel [the Court] to conclude that [the defendant's] rights were violated. See id. Accordingly, Paul's requested relief is denied.