Opinion ID: 2212272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extension of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications Between Defense Counsel and a Psychiatric Consultant Engaged by the Defense

Text: Initially, this court must determine whether the attorney-client privilege should be extended to communications made to or made by an expert witness, here a psychiatrist, whose engagement by the defense is necessary to the preparation of an insanity defense. No Illinois case has decided that precise issue. This court has observed that a privileged or protected communication does not have to be made directly to the attorney rather than an agent of the attorney, because the privilege `protects communications to the attorney's clerks and his other agents (including stenographers) for rendering his services. The assistance of these agents being indispensable to his work and the communications of the client being often necessarily committed to them by the attorney or by the client himself, the privilege must include all the persons who act as the attorney's agents.' 8 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 2301, at 583 (McNaughton Rev. ed. 1961). (Emphasis in original.) Knippenberg, 66 Ill.2d at 283-84, 6 Ill.Dec. 46, 362 N.E.2d 681. See also State v. Hitopoulus (1983), 279 S.C. 549, 550, 309 S.E.2d 747, 748 (holding that psychiatrist was, in effect, the attorney's agent for    transmission to the attorney of confidential facts); People v. Hilliker (1971), 29 Mich.App. 543, 548, 185 N.W.2d 831, 833 (attorney-client privilege extends to confidential communications made to the attorney by an agent on behalf of the client, such as a doctor or psychiatrist).
The attorney-client privilege derives from traditional principles of common law. (See, e.g., People v. Adam (1972), 51 Ill.2d 46, 280 N.E.2d 205.) The work-product doctrine is embodied in Supreme Court Rule 412(j)(i), which governs the attorney's right to the secrecy of the attorney's notes and legal strategies. (134 Ill.2d R. 412(j)(i).) This rule protects from disclosure an attorney's work product to the extent the documents or memoranda contain the opinions, theories or conclusions    of defense counsel or his staff. See also Monier v. Chamberlain (1966), 35 Ill.2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410. The State argues in this appeal that the application of the privilege to defendant's communications with psychiatrists is unwarranted because a doctor is neither an extension of the defense attorney nor a mere conduit for information. We acknowledge that the secretary who types clients' documents and attorneys' notes performs a markedly different function from that of a physician who evaluates the mental condition of the client. Clerks, typists, and secretaries are typical examples of the attorney's ministerial agents for purposes of the privilege; doctors and other experts perform functions that differ in kind. While an expert is not an employee of an attorney in the same sense as are the staff members of a law firm, a defense attorney who believes his client's mental condition is critical to an insanity defense will require assistance from a specialist in the field of psychiatry. As a matter of due process, when the mental capacity of an accused forms the defense to the crime charged, the courts have held that the defendant is entitled to psychiatric assistance, which may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense. ( Ake v. Oklahoma (1985), 470 U.S. 68, 80, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1095, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 64; accord People v. Kegley (1988), 175 Ill.App.3d 335, 125 Ill. Dec. 42, 529 N.E.2d 1118.) In People v. Nichols (1979), 70 Ill.App.3d 748, 27 Ill.Dec. 21, 388 N.E.2d 984, the appellate court held that the trial court committed reversible error by denying the defendant's request for funds to retain a psychiatrist for a possible insanity defense; the fact that two doctors had already examined defendant as to his fitness to stand trial was held not to satisfy the need for an examination specifically to explore an insanity defense. In Knippenberg, this court held that an investigator's interview with the client, at the request of defense counsel, is protected by the attorney-client privilege. Knippenberg emphasized that lawyers have a duty to fully investigate their clients' cases; the court rejected the State's contention that an investigator is not necessary or essential to communication between the defendant and his attorney: [R]ealities of practice often require an attorney's use of investigators. Knippenberg, 66 Ill.2d at 284, 6 Ill.Dec. 46, 362 N.E.2d 681. The appellate court in the case at bar found that the rationale of Knippenberg applies with equal force to a psychiatrist or psychologist who, like Dr. Rossiter, is retained by defendant or defendant's attorney in order to assist counsel in the evaluation, preparation, or presentation of an insanity defense. Accordingly, under that holding, Dr. Rossiter's communications with defendant are protected by the attorney-client privilege absent a waiver of the privilege. (226 Ill.App.3d at 718, 168 Ill.Dec. 680, 589 N.E.2d 1080.) The appellate court then distinguished the instant case from the situation in People v. Speck (1968), 41 Ill.2d 177, 200, 242 N.E.2d 208. In Speck, this court held that the attorney-client privilege was not violated when the State called a fingerprint expert, who had consulted with the defense, to testify regarding the prints found at the crime scene. The expert did not reveal the contents of any conversation he had with defense counsel or defendant but merely gave his opinion that certain fingerprints found in the victims' residence belonged to Speck. The expert's testimony was based solely on his visual comparisons of the prints found at the crime scene to prints that were known to be defendant's. Unlike the expert's testimony in Speck, in the case at bar the opinion of the psychiatrist as to Knuckles' sanity will almost invariably result in large part from confidential communications with the defendant which would be directly or indirectly revealed if the psychiatrist testified on behalf of the State. 226 Ill.App.3d at 718, 168 Ill.Dec. 680, 589 N.E.2d 1080. Our research indicates that most courts presented with the issue have applied the attorney-client privilege to disclosures that defendants make to psychiatric experts retained by their attorneys to aid in the preparation of the defense. ( E.g., United States v. Alvarez (3d Cir.1975), 519 F.2d 1036; Houston v. State (Alaska 1979), 602 P.2d 784; People v. Lines (1975), 13 Cal.3d 500, 531 P.2d 793, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225; Miller v. District Court (Colo.1987), 737 P.2d 834, 836; State v. Toste (1979), 178 Conn. 626, 424 A.2d 293; State v. Pratt (1979), 284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421; People v. Hilliker (1971), 29 Mich. App. 543, 185 N.W.2d 831; State v. Kociolek (1957), 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417; Ballew v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1980), 640 S.W.2d 237. See also Pouncy v. State (Fla.App.1977), 353 So.2d 640; Ursry v. State (Fla.App.1983), 428 So.2d 713; Marano v. Holland (1988), 179 W.Va. 156, 366 S.E.2d 117.) In contrast, a few jurisdictions hold that a client's communications to a defense-retained psychiatrist are not shielded by the attorney-client privilege. See State v. Craney (Iowa 1984), 347 N.W.2d 668 (rejecting argument that the sixth amendment provided a constitutional attorney-client privilege and further holding that state statute did not shield client's revelations to psychiatrist); State v. Carter (Mo. 1982), 641 S.W.2d 54 (narrowly construing statute barring disclosure of communications made to attorney by client) (three judges dissenting). In States that have codified the attorney-client privilege by statute, the better-reasoned decisions acknowledge the common law roots of the privilege as well as the constitutional concerns that may arise if a criminal defendant is forced to reveal information gathered as part of the defense investigation. (See, e.g., Miller v. District Court (Colo. 1987), 737 P.2d 834, 837; State v. Pratt (1979), 284 Md. 516, 519, 398 A.2d 421, 423; Ballew v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1980), 640 S.W.2d 237, 239-40.) In Miller, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to communications between the client and a defense-retained psychiatrist, even though the Colorado attorney-client statute does not expressly include psychiatrists in its listing of agents that are subject to the privilege. In contrast to the above, Missouri's highest court has limited Missouri's statutory attorney-client privilege to communications made between the client and attorney only, stating that the attorney-client privilege is created by statute. ( State v. Carter (Mo.1982), 641 S.W.2d 54, 57.) The court in Carter held that admission of adverse testimony of a defense-retained psychiatrist was not within the statutory privilege, did not violate the work-product doctrine, and did not deprive defendant of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Three justices in Carter dissented, however, in two separate opinions. As to the scope of the Missouri attorney-client provision, the dissenters observed that the statute simply embodied the common law attorney-client privilege. The dissenters observed that Missouri precedent had already applied the attorney-client privilege to defense communications with an insurance adjuster; therefore, the statute did not bar the extension of the privilege to defense-retained psychiatrists. ( Carter, 641 S.W.2d at 64 (Seiler, J., dissenting, joined by Welliver & Bardgett, JJ.).) One of the dissenters noted that the majority's ruling would cause attorneys to render ineffective assistance of counsel, Carter, 641 S.W.2d at 66-67 (Welliver, J., dissenting). We believe that Illinois should accord the common law attorney-client privilege the scope necessary to meet the complexities of modern legal practice. This court's opinion in Knippenberg reflects that view. Testimonial privileges are, by their nature, inconsistent with the search for truth. ( E.g., People v. Sanders (1983), 99 Ill.2d 262, 270, 75 Ill. Dec. 682, 457 N.E.2d 1241.) Privileges will prevent otherwise relevant and admissible evidence from being disclosed. Accordingly, if we were to accept the argument that the relevance of the evidence justified its admission, notwithstanding the attorney-client privilege, no claim of privilege could ever prevail. The exception would devour the rule.
We further recognize that a restricted application of the attorney-client privilege may erode Federal or State constitutional rights. Several cases from other jurisdictions have observed that the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel may be jeopardized by the forced disclosure of communications between the defendant and a psychiatrist engaged by the defense attorney. E.g., United States v. Alvarez (3d Cir.1975), 519 F.2d 1036, 1046-47 (defense counsel should not be forced to run the risk of inadvertently creating government witnesses through counsel's investigation of possible insanity defense); State v. Pratt (1979), 284 Md. 516, 520, 398 A.2d 421, 423 (While never given an explicit constitutional underpinning, the privilege is    closely tied to the federal, as well as [Maryland's], constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel and could, if limited too severely, make these basic guarantees virtually meaningless); cf. Noggle v. Marshall (6th Cir.1983), 706 F.2d 1408, 1413-15 (holding that while both Federal and most State courts agree that psychiatric experts retained by the defense are shielded by the attorney-client privilege, the difficult question under the Sixth Amendment did not require the Ohio State court to give the privilege constitutional stature under the rubric of effective assistance of counsel); Marano v. Holland (1988), 179 W.Va. 156, 170, 366 S.E.2d 117, 131 (upholding application of attorney-client privilege but declining to reach sixth amendment issue as it seems somewhat obscure). This court previously has observed that a violation of the attorney-client privilege may indeed result in the denial of effective assistance of counsel as well as a fair trial. ( Knippenberg, 66 Ill.2d 276, 6 Ill.Dec. 46, 362 N.E.2d 681.) After finding that grave and inexcusable prejudice resulted from the State's use of information obtained from a defense-retained investigator who interviewed the defendant, this court stated: `[T]he essence of the Sixth Amendment right is    privacy of communication with counsel.' ( Knippenberg, 66 Ill.2d at 285, 6 Ill.Dec. 46, 362 N.E.2d 681 quoting United States v. Rosner (2d Cir.1973), 485 F.2d 1213, 1224.) We see no reason to depart from that view. We find that reference to the sixth amendment in such opinions as Alvarez, Pratt and Miller helps to preserve the vitality of the attorney-client privilege by underscoring the unique place the privilege holds in our jurisprudence. (See State v. Kociolek (1957), 23 N.J. 400, 413, 129 A.2d 417, 424-25 (applying the privilege to communications between an attorney and a scientific expert retained to aid in the presentation of the defense, a confidential employment).) In Kociolek the court reviewed the history and purpose of the attorney-client privilege at length, noting that the ancient common-law privilege, in this country and in England    [was] deemed a basic civil right, indispensable to the fulfillment of the constitutional security against self-incrimination and the right to make defense with the aid of counsel skilled in the law. The court further observed that the privilege is an accommodation of competing public interests and that, although not given express constitutional security, is essentially interrelated with the right to counsel and immunity from self-incrimination. Kociolek, 23 N.J. at 413-14, 129 A.2d at 425. The privilege against self-incrimination and the policy considerations at issue here are analogous to those which underlie a defendant's right to remain silent. In the course of a criminal investigation, a defendant may be the best or even the only witness to a crime. Without his testimony successful prosecution may be impossible. In such a situation, the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination could scarcely be more at odds with the general principle that the public has a right to every man's evidence. (8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).) As the United States Supreme Court has stated, The privilege against self-incrimination enjoined by the Fifth Amendment is not designed to enhance the reliability of the factfinding determination; it stands in the Constitution for entirely independent reasons. ( Allen v. Illinois (1986), 478 U.S. 364, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 2995, 92 L.Ed.2d 296.) Accordingly, it is no argument against a claim of the privilege to say that granting the claim would decrease the reliability of the factfinding process. Allen, 478 U.S. at 375, 106 S.Ct. at 2995, 92 L.Ed.2d at 308.