Opinion ID: 6216636
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the ETA affects rights in a pending case

Text: {49} New Energy next argues that the ETA violates Article IV, Section 34 of the New Mexico Constitution because it affects the rights of energy consumers in a pending case. In support of this challenge, New Energy asserts that the ETA interferes with proceedings relating to San Juan, the Four Corners Generating Station (Four Corners), and the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (Palo Verde). We disagree. {50} Article IV, Section 34 provides, “No act of the legislature shall affect the right or remedy of either party, or change the rules of evidence or procedure, in any pending case.” In Egolf, we concluded that the enactment of the ETA did not interfere with a “pending case” with respect to San Juan because “abandonment proceedings can only begin with a public utility’s voluntary request for abandonment.” 2020-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 20, 26. Given that conclusion, we see no violation of Article IV, Section 34 under the arguments New Energy presents here. 32 The ETA permits “[a] qualifying utility that is abandoning a qualifying generating facility [to] apply to the [C]ommission for a financing order . . . to recover all of its energy transition costs through the issuance of energy transition bonds.” Section 6218-4(A). New Energy has not shown that PNM voluntarily initiated abandonment proceedings for either San Juan, Four Corners, or Palo Verde before the ETA’s effective date of June 14, 2019. {51} We also do not see any pending case with respect to the Commission’s authority under NMSA 1978, Section 62-16-6(C) (2019) of the Renewable Energy Act. Section 62-16-6(C) authorizes the Commission to “require [a] facility to discontinue serving customers within New Mexico” in specified circumstances. New Energy argues that that the ETA interferes with proceedings relating to PNM’s noncoal-fired generating facilities, such as Palo Verde, because of the authority conferred by this statute. However, it does not appear that the Commission actually invoked its authority under Section 62-16-6(C) prior to the enactment of the ETA. Indeed, we note that the authority granted in Section 62-16-6(C) was first granted by the very same bill that enacted the ETA. See 2019 N.M. Laws, ch. 65, § 31 (amending Section 62-16-6 (2007) and adding the authority granted under Subsection (C)). We fail to see how proceedings relating to Section 62-16-6(C) could be characterized as “pending” at the time of the ETA’s enactment. 33 {52} Thus, as in Egolf, we conclude that the ETA does not affect the rights or remedy of any party in a pending case. We therefore reject New Energy’s challenge to the ETA under Article IV, Section 34 of the New Mexico Constitution. Our decision in Egolf, 2020-NMSC-018, thoroughly and conclusively decided this issue. New Energy’s undeveloped and unsupported assertion that this Court improperly decided Egolf has not convinced us to reconsider that opinion. 4. Whether the ETA impairs contractual or vested rights {53} New Energy alleges that the ETA contravenes Article II, Section 19 of the New Mexico Constitution, which provides, “No ex post facto law, bill of attainder nor law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted by the legislature.” In support of this challenge, New Energy argues that the ETA impairs (1) the modified stipulation between PNM and the Commission with respect to San Juan, as referenced in Egolf, 2020-NMSC-018, ¶ 4; (2) a prior order of the Commission regarding Palo Verde, as reviewed by this Court in PNM v. PRC, 2019-NMSC-012; and (3) a decision by the Commission in Case No. 16-00276-UT to defer review of some issues related to Four Corners. New Energy asserts that energy consumers had contractual or vested rights in this stipulation and these Commission decisions and that the ETA improperly interferes with those rights. We disagree. 34 {54} As an initial step in our analysis under Article II, Section 19, we must determine whether energy consumers possessed either contractual or vested property rights that could have been impaired. See Pierce v. State, 1996-NMSC-001, ¶ 17, 121 N.M. 212, 910 P.2d 288 (noting that the “first inquiry in determining” whether a claimant has a cognizable contract clause claim is whether the claimant had “either contractual or vested rights”); see also Whitely v. N.M. State Pers. Bd., 1993-NMSC019, ¶ 9, 115 N.M. 308, 850 P.2d 1011 (“A prerequisite to a finding that a contract obligation is unconstitutionally impaired is proof of the existence of a contract, the benefits of which are somehow denied to the claimant due to the effect of legislation or other governmental action.”). A vested right is defined as “the power to do certain actions or possess certain things lawfully,” which “may be created either by common law, by statute, or by contract.” Rubalcava v. Garst, 1949-NMSC-035, ¶ 10, 53 N.M. 295, 206 P.2d 1154 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), superseded in part and remanded for inclusion of indispensable parties, 1952-NMSC-057, ¶¶ 1011, 56 N.M. 647, 248 P.2d 207. Such vested rights, when created, are “protected from the invasion of the Legislature by those provisions in the Constitution which apply to such rights.” Rubaclava, 1949-NMSC-035, ¶ 10. {55} Vested rights, however, are “not synonymous with contractual rights.” Pierce, 1996-NMSC-001, ¶ 17. We note that the stipulation and Commission decisions that 35 New Energy claims conferred contractual rights to consumers were made by the Commission pursuant to its authority under relevant provisions of the New Mexico Public Utility Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 62-1-1 to 62-6-28, 62-8-1 to 62-13-16 (1887, as amended through 2021); see § 62-3-3 (specifying “Chapter 62, Articles 1 to 6 and 8 to 13” as the “Public Utility Act”). We do not generally assume that statutes create private rights of a contractual nature, as “this Court presumes that the Legislature is implementing public policy when it enacts a statute, policy which it is free to change in the future.” Bartlett v. Cameron, 2014-NMSC-002, ¶ 19, 316 P.3d 889; see also Pierce, 1996-NMSC-001, ¶ 48 (“We presume that statutes establish current public policy subject to legislative revision rather than creating either contractual or vested rights.”). “To presume otherwise would upset the balance of the separation of powers, and affect the Legislature’s ability to respond to changing economic conditions.” Bartlett, 2014-NMSC-002, ¶ 19. Thus, “[c]ontractual rights are not created by statute unless the language of the statute and the circumstances . . . manifest a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State.” Whitely, 1993-NMSC-019, ¶ 10 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, “[w]e will not infer a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State unless the legislative intent [to do so] is clearly and 36 unambiguously stated.” Pierce, 1996-NMSC-001, ¶ 53 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {56} New Energy has not shown that energy consumers possessed any cognizable contractual or vested rights in the referenced stipulation or Commission decisions for purposes of Article II, Section 19. New Energy does not identify with any clarity what part of the referenced stipulation or Commission decisions may have conferred contractual or vested rights to consumers. This Court will not scour the voluminous records of the Commission’s prior proceedings in an attempt to substantiate New Energy’s generalized contentions. See State v. Torres, 2005-NMCA-070, ¶ 34, 137 N.M. 607, 113 P.3d 877 (“[I]ssues not argued and supported by authority [are] deemed abandoned.”); Rule 12-318(A) NMRA. {57} We also will not assume that the referenced stipulation or Commission decisions conferred contractual or vested rights to consumers. As we have discussed, paragraphs 33-34, supra, energy consumers generally do not possess rights in utility property or a right to a fixed utility rate. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 1950-NMSC055, ¶¶ 13-24; Gas Co. v. PSC, 1984-NMSC-002, ¶ 13. Further, we find no indication of a legislative intent to confer either contractual or vested rights to energy consumers in light of the arguments New Energy presents here. Even though we have recognized that Section 62-3-1 reflects energy consumers’ entitlement to “fair, 37 just[,] and reasonable rates,” ABCWUA, 2010-NMSC-013, ¶ 30, this statute does not clearly express an intent to confer contractual or vested rights to energy consumers. Rather, the Public Utility Act embodies the Legislature’s declared public policy regarding the availability of a public utility’s services. See § 62-3-1(B) (“It is the declared policy of the state that the public interest, the interest of consumers and the interest of investors require the regulation and supervision of public utilities . . . .”). The stipulation and Commission decisions to which New Energy refers therefore were made upon statutes embodying current legislative policy with respect to the regulation of public utilities in New Mexico. This was policy that the Legislature was “free to change” by duly enacting the ETA. Bartlett, 2014-NMSC-002, ¶ 19. {58} New Energy therefore has not shown that consumers possessed cognizable contractual or vested rights in any of the referenced stipulation or Commission orders, and we reject New Energy’s challenge under Article II, Section 19. 5. Whether the ETA is log-rolling or hodge-podge legislation {59} New Energy argues next that the ETA violates the constitutional prohibition against log-rolling or hodge-podge legislation contained in Article IV, Section 16 of the New Mexico Constitution. We find little merit to these arguments. {60} Article IV, Section 16 provides, in relevant part, “The subject of every bill shall be clearly expressed in its title, and no bill embracing more than one subject 38 shall be passed except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification or revision of the laws.” “We have long held that the test of a statute’s constitutional validity under [Article IV,] Section 16 is whether the title fairly gives such reasonable notice of the subject matter of the statute itself as to prevent the mischief intended to be guarded against.” U.S. Brewers Ass’n v. Dir. of N.M. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 1983-NMSC-059, ¶ 11, 100 N.M. 216, 668 P.2d 1093. “The mischief to be prevented [is] hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation, surprise or fraud on the legislature, or not fairly apprising the people of the subjects of legislation so that they would have no opportunity to be heard on the subject.” Martinez v. Jaramillo, 1974-NMSC-069, ¶ 9, 86 N.M. 506, 525 P.2d 866. We are slow to deem the title of an act insufficient under Article IV, Section 16 as “[t]he objections should be grave, and the conflict between the statute and the constitution palpable.” City of Albuquerque v. Garcia, 1973-NMSC-036, ¶ 7, 84 N.M. 776, 508 P.2d 585 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We do not require the title to provide an index or table of contents of the enactment, and it is sufficient if the title “give[s] notice of the subject matter of the legislation and . . . if, applying every reasonable intendment in favor of its validity, it may be said that the subject of the legislative enactment is expressed in its title.” Gallegos v. Wallace, 1964-NMSC- 39 224, ¶ 6, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982, overruled on other grounds by McGeehan v. Bunch, 1975-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 25-26, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238. {61} New Energy argues that the ETA violates Article IV, Section 16 because the title of Senate Bill 489 does not fairly apprise the public that the Act essentially deregulates a public utility with respect to its energy transition costs. As noted previously, we do not necessarily agree with New Energy’s characterization of the deregulatory effect of the enactment. See paragraphs 26-28, supra. But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that this was the ETA’s effect, we conclude that the title of its bill gives reasonable notice of its subject. {62} The ETA was enacted as one part of Senate Bill 489, a bill that contained several measures germane to New Mexico’s revised renewable portfolio standard. 2019 N.M. Laws, ch. 65. With respect to those portions describing the ETA, the title of Senate Bill 489 provides that it is AN ACT RELATING TO PUBLIC UTILITIES; ENACTING THE ENERGY TRANSITION ACT; AUTHORIZING CERTAIN UTILITIES THAT ABANDON CERTAIN GENERATING FACILITIES TO ISSUE BONDS PURSUANT TO A FINANCING ORDER ISSUED BY THE PUBLIC REGULATION COMMISSION; . . . PROVIDING FOR THE TREATMENT OF ENERGY TRANSITION BONDS BY THE COMMISSION; . . . PROVIDING FOR NONIMPAIRMENT OF ENERGY TRANSITION CHARGES AND BONDS . . . . 40 2019 N.M. Laws, ch. 65. We conclude that the information in this title provides reasonable notice that the enactment relates to the regulation of public utilities and authorizes the Commission to approve a financing order allowing a public utility to issue bonds for the abandonment of certain generating facilities. The title does not need to outline every detail of the Act, recite the mechanism for issuing the bonds, or index every cost so financed. We therefore deem the title of Senate Bill 489 sufficient under the circumstances and reject New Energy’s challenge under Article IV, Section 16. 6. Whether the ETA amends other statutes by reference {63} New Energy contends that the ETA improperly amends other sections of New Mexico public utility law “by reference to its title only,” N.M. Const. Art. IV, § 18. We disagree with this contention. {64} Article IV, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution provides, “No law shall be revised or amended, or the provisions thereof extended by reference to its title only; but each section thereof as revised, amended or extended shall be set out in full.” The purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent the Legislature from altering an existing statute without fully setting forth the statute thereby altered; Article IV, Section 18 does not prohibit the Legislature from referring to an existing statute or body of law, which is not altered, when enacting new legislation. State v. 41 Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, ¶ 93, 31 N.M. 220, 243 P. 333 (“[T]his constitutional provision applies only to enactments whose purpose is to amend, extend, or enlarge the provisions of a former law or laws, and thereby change their operation and effect.”). New Energy does not identify with any certainty any legislation that the ETA revises, amends, or extends without setting forth the provisions of the altered legislation in full. {65} New Energy instead argues that various provisions of New Mexico public utility law regarding the Commission’s authority are impliedly, “almost surreptitiously,” repealed or amended through the ETA. However, this Court recognized in State ex rel. Taylor v. Mirabal, 1928-NMSC-056, ¶ 13, 33 N.M. 553, 273 P. 928, that Article IV, Section 18 does not prohibit the amendment or repeal of other statutes by mere implication. Also, “[r]epeals by implication are not favored.” T-N-T Taxi v. N.M. Pub. Regul. Comm’n, 2006-NMSC-016, ¶ 7, 139 N.M. 550, 135 P.3d 814. {66} Further, Article IV, Section 18 does not prohibit the Legislature from enacting a new law that “provide[s] an additional or alternative method” of taking authorized action. State ex rel. State Park & Recreation Comm’n v. N.M. State Auth., 1966NMSC-033, ¶ 45, 76 N.M. 1, 411 P.2d 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We note, without specifically deciding, that it is possible to construe the 42 provisions of the ETA as new legislation that exists either in harmony with or as an alternative to other provisions governing the Commission’s authority to regulate a “public utility in respect to its rates and service regulations and in respect to its securities.” Section 62-6-4(A). We therefore conclude that New Energy has not established that the ETA violates Article IV, Section 18. 7. Whether the ETA is unconstitutional special legislation {67} New Energy’s final constitutional challenge attacks the ETA under Article IV, Section 24 of the New Mexico Constitution, which prohibits special legislation “where a general law can be made applicable.” New Energy asserts that the ETA is special legislation because only San Juan and Four Corners may qualify as a “qualifying generating facility” and that only PNM may qualify as a “qualifying utility” under the Act. Section 62-18-2(S), (T). {68} However, the Constitution “does not exclude special legislation . . . when a law is required and general legislation cannot apply.” Thompson v. McKinley Cnty., 1991-NMSC-076, ¶ 4, 112 N.M. 425, 816 P.2d 494. “There is nothing in the Constitution which would invalidate a legislative act merely because it is special in character provided a local situation exists which under particular facts makes a general law inapplicable.” Albuquerque Metro. Arroyo Flood Control Auth. v. Swinburne, 1964-NMSC-206, ¶ 6, 74 N.M. 487, 394 P.2d 998. In assessing the 43 constitutionality of legislation under Article IV, Section 24, “we give great weight to the [L]egislature’s classification: Only if a statutory classification is so devoid of reason to support it, as to amount to mere caprice, will it be stricken down.” Thompson, 1991-NMSC-076, ¶ 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We are of the view that the classification drawn by the ETA is special, but is not “so devoid of reason” that the classification “amount[s] to mere caprice.” Id. Although the language of the ETA is general, in practice the Act only applies to a limited class of public utilities abandoning coal-fired generating facilities in New Mexico. Given the unique nature of the class and issues involved, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the circumstances surrounding a public utility’s abandonment of its coal-fired generating facilities are of such a special character that a general law could not be made to apply. We therefore reject this constitutional challenge to the ETA and turn to the sole error that New Energy alleges in the Commission’s final order. C. Statutory and Factual Dispute about Section 62-18-4(B)(5) {69} New Energy challenges the Commission’s finding that PNM provided “a memorandum . . . from a securities firm . . . that the proposed issuance satisfies the current published AAA rating.” Section 62-18-4(B)(5). New Energy points out that the memorandum PNM provided in satisfaction of this requirement was authored by a senior advisor at Guggenheim Securities, LLC, and contained a boilerplate 44 disclaimer suggesting that “[t]he views expressed herein are solely those of the author(s) and may differ from the views of other Representatives of Guggenheim Securities.” The Commission accepted this memorandum in satisfaction of the statutory requirement, despite the existence of this disclaimer. {70} New Energy suggests that this finding was in error, as the memorandum so provided was authored by an employee of a securities firm and not authored by the firm itself. The Commission disputes this claim of error, noting that the senior advisor consistently testified that he was authorized to represent Guggenheim in the proceedings and that he was acting within the scope of his authority. {71} We conclude that the Commission’s finding that this memorandum satisfied the requirements of Section 62-18-4(B)(5) is based upon a reasonable interpretation of the statute and is supported by substantial evidence in the record. In light of the whole record on this issue, the Commission reasonably found that the senior advisor possessed actual or apparent authority to speak on behalf of the securities firm. Cf. Diversified Dev. & Inv., Inc. v. Heil, 1995-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 29, 31, 119 N.M. 290, 889 P.2d 1212 (reviewing the requirements for an agent’s actual or apparent authority to speak on behalf of a principal). We therefore reject New Energy’s challenge and affirm the Commission’s final order on the claim of error so presented. 45