Opinion ID: 2563933
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Murder of Caroline Gleason

Text: (9) Defendant asserts that the police officers persuaded defendant that she would receive lenient treatment if she confessed to murdering Gleason. An involuntary confession may not be introduced into evidence at trial. ( Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 483 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 92 S.Ct. 619].) The prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's confession was voluntarily made. ( Id. at p. 489; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 659 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].) In determining whether a confession was voluntary, `[t]he question is whether defendant's choice to confess was not essentially free because his [or her] will was overborne.' ( People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29].) Whether the confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. ( Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 693-694 [123 L.Ed.2d 407, 113 S.Ct. 1745]; People v. Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 576.) `On appeal, the trial court's findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but the trial court's finding as to the voluntariness of the confession is subject to independent review.' ( People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 114 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164].) During the initial interview, Palo Alto Police Detective John Lindsay and Redwood City Police Sergeant Jon Sherman interrogated defendant for approximately two and one-half hours. After Lindsay provided defendant with admonitions required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602], defendant agreed to speak with the officers. Lindsay began by informing defendant that she had been arrested pursuant to a warrant related to a Los Altos burglary, but that he also wanted to speak with her concerning her possible involvement in a homicide committed at 777 California Avenue in Palo Alto. Later, Sergeant Sherman told defendant that if she cooperated during the interview, the officers would try to explain this whole thing with, with Los Altos P.D. as [best] we can. He continued: I have no control over that. I'm in Redwood City here. Um, and, and I don't know what entailed um, in that case involving you in the burglary. I wish I could so I could explain it to you more fully. Uh, so that you know exactly where your [ sic ] stand is (unintelligible). I would hope that you would try to push that away so that we could get through with what we're doing right now. Can you do that for us? Defendant replied: Yeah. I guess so. Later during the interview, the officers strategically confronted defendant with items recovered from her residence such as the key to the building where Gleason's body was found, and Gleason's pager. Sergeant Sherman also informed defendant that defendant's neighbor had called defendant on Gleason's pager number, and that a video surveillance camera revealed that she had been present at the 7-Eleven convenience store where the victim's ATM card was used. Defendant denied involvement in the Gleason homicide. Detective Lindsay then told defendant that what happened out there at 777 California was probably an accident and that there could be mitigating circumstances: What if she scared you? She confronted you. Or maybe there was someone else with you. Lindsay continued: It's like a cancer. And what you've gotta do is to go out and purge yourself of that. You've got to get that off your shoulders. Not just for you but, for Jackie, for those three kids. You've got an incredible weight on your shoulders right now. An incredible weight that you've been carrying around for quite some time. And it's time. Soon after, defendant confessed to the burglary of the premises at 777 California Avenue and to Gleason's murder. (10) `Once a suspect has been properly advised of his [or her] rights, he [or she] may be questioned freely so long as the questioner does not threaten harm or falsely promise benefits. Questioning may include exchanges of information, summaries of evidence, outline of theories of events, confrontation with contradictory facts, even debate between police and suspect. . . . Yet in carrying out their interrogations the police must avoid threats of punishment for the suspect's failure to admit or confess particular facts and must avoid false promises of leniency as a reward for admission or confession.. . .' [Citation.] ( People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 115.) The foregoing statements by Sergeant Sherman demonstrate that defendant's confession to the murder of Gleason was not prompted by any express or implied promise of leniency. First, the officer's statement that he would help defendant in explaining this whole thing to the Los Altos police did not constitute a promise of leniency when considered in the context both of defendant's prior questions as to why she was arrested and Sherman's subsequent disclaimer of any control over (or information concerning) the Los Altos burglary investigation. In this context, Sergeant Sherman simply stated that he would attempt to obtain more information pertaining to the Los Altos burglary in order to assist defendant in determining her status with respect to that crime. Second, we conclude that defendant's confession was not prompted by Sergeant Sherman's comments. Defendant confessed approximately one hour after his comments were made. During the interview, defendant was confronted with incriminating evidence that had been recovered at defendant's residence as well as other information linking her to the murder of Gleason, which apparently prompted her to confess to this crime. Defendant also contends that Detective Lindsay's assurances that the police merely were attempting to understand defendant's motivation in committing the crimes impermissibly coerced her to confess. To the contrary, Detective Lindsay's suggestions that the Gleason homicide might have been an accident, a self-defensive reaction, or the product of fear, were not coercive; they merely suggested possible explanations of the events and offered defendant an opportunity to provide the details of the crime. This tactic is permissible. ( People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 115.) Moreover, any benefit to defendant that reasonably could be inferred from the substance of Detective Lindsay's remarks was `merely that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct,' because the particular circumstances of a homicide can reduce the degree of culpability, and thus minimize the gravity of the homicide or constitute mitigating factors in the ultimate decision as to the appropriate penalty. ( Ibid. ) Defendant's confession to the Gleason homicide was not coerced by threats or false promises, but was given freely and voluntarily.