Opinion ID: 2976589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: “We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1033 (1999); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (“Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “A defendant making such a challenge bears a very heavy burden.” Spearman, 186 F.3d at 746. “[I]t is well-settled that uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may support a conviction in federal court.” Id.
Dedman claims that the government did not present sufficient evidence so that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 286. We disagree. Section 286 provides: “Whoever enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy to defraud the United States, or any department or agency thereof, by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or allowance of any false, fictitious or fraudulent claim, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 286. We have never before fully elaborated upon the elements of a violation of § 286. Our only attempt at identifying the elements that the government must prove was in an unpublished order one decade ago. In that case, we said that “[t]o sustain the conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 286, the government must prove that: 1) there was a conspiracy to defraud the United States; 2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy and intended to join it; and 3) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.” United States v. Franklin, No. 97-6137, 1998 WL 808253,  (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 1998) (unpublished order) (citing United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F.3d 426, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1995)). We believe that our attempt in Franklin was not sufficient because the first element tautologically restates the crime rather than separating out any individual elements. It was perhaps for that same reason that the Fifth Circuit, the circuit upon which we relied in Franklin, subsequently expanded upon the set of elements necessary to support a conviction under § 286. In United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 633 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit held that “[t]o obtain a conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States under § 286, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entered into a conspiracy to obtain payment or allowance of a claim against a department or agency of the United States; that the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; and that the defendant knew at the time that the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent.” 6 We recognize that some of the rationales used to defend such laws have come under fire recently. For a general discussion of potential problems with laws that restrict relationships between consenting adults, even those that are related, see Note, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the “Sexual Family,” 119 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2006). No. 06-6124 United States v. Dedman Page 12 The Fifth Circuit’s Leahy approach is not the only one available. The Eleventh Circuit has also offered its interpretation: “This court will sustain a conviction for conspiracy to submit false claims to the United States, if the government proved the existence of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective, the defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy, and the commission of an overt act in furtherance of it.” United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1194 (11th Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2446 (2007). With the exception of the addition of an overt-act requirement, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach strikes us as suffering from the same malady of vagueness as our approach in Franklin. After considering our sister circuits’ efforts, we conclude that best approach is a hybrid of the Franklin and Leahy approaches. Accordingly, we clarify that the elements necessary for a conviction under § 286 are: (1) the defendant entered into a conspiracy to obtain payment or allowance of a claim against a department or agency of the United States; (2) the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; (3) the defendant knew or was deliberately ignorant of the claim’s falsity, fictitiousness, or fraudulence; (4) the defendant knew of the conspiracy and intended to join it; and (5) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.7 Because the district court’s instructions to the jury were not in contradiction with our clarification of the elements necessary to convict under § 286, we proceed to address Dedman’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. There is no doubt that the government introduced sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction as to elements one, four, and five. The invalidity of the marriage satisfies the second element. As to element three, however, Dedman contends that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence because it did not establish that she knew that the marriage was illegal and, therefore, she could have not known that the claim was false. The logical puzzle that Dedman provides us is this: if she knew that the marriage was illegal in Arkansas, why did she travel to Arkansas in the first place, if the marriage would have been legal in her home state of Kentucky? See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.010(1) (prohibiting marriage “between persons who are nearer of kin to each other by consanguinity, whether of the whole or half-blood, than second cousins”). Dedman’s argument, while certainly creative, does not establish that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain her conviction. What Dedman’s challenge asks us to determine is whether knowledge that a claim is false, fictitious, or fraudulent requires evidence establishing that Dedman knew that the claim was illegal. We conclude that actual knowledge of the illegality of a claim is not required; deliberate ignorance of the falsity of the claim is sufficient to establish knowledge of the false, fictitious, or fraudulent nature of the claim. While the government was not required to produce evidence establishing that Dedman knew that the law forbade the type of claim she was making, the government was required to introduce evidence that she suspected that her claims were false yet did nothing to investigate the legality of her actions. Although it may seem contradictory that a defendant could not know that a claim was illegal but still believe it was likely she was violating the law, the scienter requirement for a 7 The government does not need to prove an overt act under 18 U.S.C. § 286. Although an overt act is required under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, the language of that statute specifically requires that “one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 371. In contrast, when a statute does not require an overt act, we do not read that requirement into the statute. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (holding there is no overt-act requirement for the RICO conspiracy statute because “[t]here is no requirement of some overt act or specific act in the statute before us, unlike the general conspiracy provision”). Section 286, like the RICO conspiracy provision, does not require an overt act. No. 06-6124 United States v. Dedman Page 13 conviction under the similar 18 U.S.C. § 2878 demonstrates that such a state of knowledge is indeed possible. For instance, we have upheld convictions under § 287 where knowledge of falsity was not established at all, but where the government instead established deliberate ignorance. United States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]his circuit has repeatedly upheld the district court’s knowledge instruction on the basis that it prevents a criminal defendant from escaping conviction merely by deliberately closing his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging in unlawful conduct. Accordingly, we hold that the instruction on deliberate ignorance was not erroneous.” (citations omitted)). Other circuits have adopted a similar standard. United States v. Patient Transfer Serv., Inc., 413 F.3d 734, 742 (8th Cir. 2005) (“There was evidence at trial that Wise actually knew that the billing practice being used at PTS was not proper or deliberately avoided investigating whether it was.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255, 258-59 (7th Cir. 1991) (“You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion and indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a strong suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone had withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of what he would learn, you may conclude that he acted ‘knowingly’ . . . .” (quoting approvingly from the district court’s instructions)); United States v. Precision Med. Labs., Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1978) (“‘(Y)ou may find Mr. Gall acted willfully and knowingly if you find that the claim was false and that Mr. Gall knew that the claims were false, or that he acted with a deliberate disregard of whether the claims were true or false; in other words, that he closed his eyes to the truth here . . . .’” (quoting approvingly from the district court’s instructions yet noting that the “willfully” language only increased the burden for the government even though it was perhaps unnecessary)).9 Although the cases regarding § 287 are only instructive to us when considering the requisite scienter for § 286, these § 287 cases demonstrate that deliberate ignorance can establish knowledge of falsity. In such cases, the defendant certainly does not know that what she is doing is illegal, but the defendant still has some sense that what she is doing is wrong and makes no effort to determine the propriety of her actions. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we believe that the totality of Dedman’s actions—a pattern of skulking and scheming—establish that she had a sense that what she was doing was wrong, yet closed her eyes to that fact and proceeded with her plan. Accordingly, the government adduced sufficient evidence to show that Dedman knew or was deliberately ignorant of the falsity of her claims. The government presented evidence sufficient that a rational factfinder could conclude that Dedman was at least deliberately ignorant of the falsity of her claim, if not possessing actual knowledge of the falsity. Although the reasons for holding the wedding in Arkansas, as opposed to Kentucky, might not be immediately clear, we disagree with the dissent’s view that “[t]he likelihood that Dedman picked Arkansas knowing or even suspecting that the marriage would be void simply defies common sense.” Dissenting Op. at 21. In fact, we believe that the trip to Arkansas is the government’s strongest evidence in support of the conclusion that Dedman was deliberately ignorant of the falsity of her claims. Holding the marriage in Arkansas was plainly done to hide the existence of the marriage from those in Kentucky who might know them. It is likely that, recognizing the absurdity and likely illegality of her claims, Dedman assumed that the marriage 8 That statutory provision directs that: “Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than five years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in this title.” 18 U.S.C. § 287. 9 The circuits, however, do not have unanimous agreement as to the appropriate standard. For instance, the Ninth Circuit sets quite a high standard and states that “[t]o be false, a claim must not only be inaccurate but consciously so.” United States v. Barker, 967 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1991). In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has used the seemingly lesser standard of whether the defendant had the “intent to deceive.” United States v. Martin, 772 F.2d 1442, 1444 (8th Cir. 1985). No. 06-6124 United States v. Dedman Page 14 would be equally void and equally false in Arkansas as in Kentucky. Thus, Dedman likely viewed the choice between Arkansas and Kentucky as a choice between two locations in which the marriage would be illegal, and she picked the location that was farther from her home and her neighbors. In that case, a rational juror could believe that Dedman suspected the falsity of her claims and could view the trip as an attempt to assure secrecy for the relationship by procuring the illicit nuptials far from home, where the participants would not be known. In addition to the location of the marriage, the government presented additional evidence that would support a finding of deliberate ignorance on the part of Dedman. For instance, the government presented testimony from both Holland and a family friend that suggested that Dedman carefully orchestrated the marriage in order to obtain money from the SBP, including a statement from a family friend about Dedman’s comment that she had “solved the situation with the annuity.” J.A. at 172 (Green at 171:13-22). Nothing presented during the trial controverted this damaging testimony. A rational juror could conclude that, because the marriage was Dedman’s idea, she at least possessed some knowledge of the rules governing the SBP and thus understood the fraudulent nature of what she was trying to accomplish. Furthermore, the government provided uncontradicted evidence to establish that once Dedman turned on Holland, Dedman called various government agencies to inform them that Holland was defrauding the government. A rational juror could easily conclude that this indicates that if Dedman did not know that her SBP claim was false, she was at least pretty sure that it was false. In addition, when the government began to investigate the claims, Dedman invoked the phrase “a person of insurable interest,” which is a term taken right out of the statute governing the SBP. J.A. at 189 (Quellhorst at 27:8-14); 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b). From that fact, a rational juror could certainly conclude that Dedman had more than a passing familiarity with the SBP’s legal regime. It is, therefore, apparent to us, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, that a rational juror could certainly conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence presented that Dedman did possess knowledge of the falsity of the SBP claims. The heart of the dissent’s disagreement with our holding today is not over a question of law but of fact. The dissent claims that “there is no evidence that the defendant knew or was deliberately ignorant of what made her claim legally false.” Dissenting Op. at 23. We disagree. As we have just indicated, there is no shortage of proof supporting a finding that Dedman was deliberately ignorant of the falsity of her claims, particularly when we take the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we are bound to do. Furthermore, the dissent errs when it claims that Dedman’s bad intent “provides no proof” supporting her conviction, id., because her bad intent is probative as to whether she acted in deliberate ignorance of the falsity of her claims. That she intended to collect the SBP funds and did so suspecting that her claims were false—what could collectively be called her bad intent—is what triggers the finding of deliberate ignorance and satisfies the third element of a § 286 offense. Before moving on, it is worth clarifying the distinction between our holding here and the government’s sham-marriage argument that we previously discussed. The government, in its shammarriage theory, claimed that a jury could convict Dedman for a violation of § 286 solely on the basis of her nefarious intent. In other words, the government claimed that she was guilty simply because Holland and Watson did not enter their marriage out of love; the government’s argument did not depend upon a court finding the marriage invalid. Our conclusion in this section that there was sufficient evidence to establish that Dedman knew or was deliberately ignorant of the falsity of the claim—and therefore sufficient evidence to convict Dedman—does not rely on the government’s theory. As we stated at the beginning of this section, a conviction under § 286 requires that the government prove five elements: (1) the defendant entered into a conspiracy to obtain payment or allowance of a claim against a department or agency of the United States; (2) the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; (3) the defendant knew or was deliberately ignorant of the claim’s falsity, fictitiousness, or fraudulence; (4) the defendant knew of the conspiracy and intended to join it; and (5) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. Our focus in this section No. 06-6124 United States v. Dedman Page 15 has been the third element; in contrast, the purpose of the government’s sham-marriage theory was to make element two unnecessary. Our interpretation of the elements of § 286 requires both actual fraud (satisfied by the invalidity of the marriage) and knowledge or deliberate ignorance of the falsity or fraudulent nature of the claim (which we have discussed in this section). Dedman’s intent to create a sham marriage helps to establish that she knew or was deliberately ignorant of the falsity of the claim. The government’s sham-marriage theory, however, addresses only Dedman’s intent, making it necessary for us to consider whether the marriage was valid. Accordingly, the fact that the marriage was a sham (i.e., the couple did not live or act as a married couple) might be probative of the knowledge or deliberate ignorance component of § 286 but would not be sufficient for us to uphold this conviction. It should, therefore, be apparent that Dedman’s conviction is in part the result of bad luck. Had Dedman, with the same intent, taken Holland and Watson to marry in Kentucky instead of Arkansas, the marriage would have been valid and there would have been no false claim. In fact, under the law we apply in this case, any person with nothing but the worst motives could enter into a marriage that lasts for over a year immediately preceding death and qualify for the SBP without triggering a violation of § 286; there could be no false claim as long as the marriage was valid. Such a hypothetical case, however, is not before us. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Dedman’s conviction under § 286.
Dedman also alleges that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. That statute provides: Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully— (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). “A violation of § 1001 is comprised of five elements: (1) the defendant made a statement; (2) the statement is false or fraudulent; (3) the statement is material; (4) the defendant made the statement knowingly and willfully; and (5) the statement pertained to an activity within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.” United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 1998). In order to convict Dedman, the government provided evidence of three different statements that Dedman made: (1) a statement about Holland’s location, (2) a statement about Holland’s disability, and (3) a statement about when Dedman first learned about the marriage between Holland and Watson. When instructing the jury on the § 1001 claim, the district court told the jury that “[t]he government does not have to prove all three of these for you to return a guilty verdict on this charge. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any one of these ways is enough. In order to return a guilty verdict, all twelve of you must agree that at least one, and the same one, of these has been proved.” J.A. at 70 (Instruction No. 27). Dedman now challenges the sufficiency of the government’s evidence, claiming that the statement about Holland’s location was not material, the statement about Holland’s disability was not proved to be false, and the statement about when Dedman first learned about the marriage may have been a misunderstanding on Dedman’s part. Even if Dedman is correct as to the comments regarding Holland’s location and Holland’s disability, we conclude that there No. 06-6124 United States v. Dedman Page 16 was sufficient evidence for a jury to convict Dedman for false statements regarding when she first learned of the marriage. If the government alleged three false statements but two lacked sufficient evidence, how do we know which false statement the unanimous jury used? We are certainly concerned that the jury may have relied upon an unsupported statement, but our precedent requires that we presume that the jury used the false statement that was supported by sufficient evidence, and that we uphold a conviction where there was sufficient evidence for at least one of the alleged false statements. In 1953, we addressed a similar issue when we concluded that when “[t]he indictment charged that the statement was false in five different respects,” then “[i]f the Government’s evidence proved that it was false in only one of the respects charged, it was nevertheless a false statement, and such proof would have sustained a verdict of guilty.” Stevens v. United States, 206 F.2d 64, 66 (6th Cir. 1953) (upholding a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001). Stevens, however, did not resolve the issue at hand because it dealt with one statement that was in false in several different ways, while the instant case deals with several different allegedly false statements that were grouped into one count of the indictment. In 1970, the Supreme Court suggested that courts should uphold verdicts when multiple acts are alleged in one count and there is sufficient evidence as to one of the acts. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 419-21 (1970) (“The general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive . . . the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.” (footnote omitted)). Turner, however, was not dispositive of the issue before us, because the statute at issue, 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a), covered multiple forms of behavior that would trigger a violation (purchasing, selling, dispensing, or distributing narcotics), and the indictment alleged acts under each; in contrast, in the case at hand, only one form of a violation was alleged under § 1001, but the indictment identified many possible false statements. Thus, Turner left open the exact question before us. In 1989, in United States v. Naserkhaki, 722 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Va. 1989), the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that a general verdict under § 1001 must be reversed if there is a chance that the jury may have relied upon insufficient factual grounds: Since only one of defendant’s misstatements satisfies Section 1001’s materiality requirement, and since the jury rendered a general verdict, it is not possible to determine whether the verdict rests in whole, or in part, on the immaterial misstatement. Accordingly defendant’s conviction is infected with error and cannot stand. Abundant authority requires that “a general verdict must be set aside if the jury was instructed that it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict may have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground.” Id. at 249 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 881 (1983)). The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. In 1991, citing the same cases that Naserkhaki called its “abundant authority,” compare id. with Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 54-57 (1991), all eight participating Justices agreed that there was no basis for “set[ting] aside a general verdict because one of the possible bases of conviction was neither unconstitutional as in Stromberg [v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931),] nor even illegal as in Yates [v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957),] but merely unsupported by sufficient evidence.” Griffin, 502 U.S. at 56; id. at 60-61 (Blackmun, J. concurring in the judgment). The reason that the Supreme Court found this untroubling was that, although jurors would not be well equipped to identify a legally deficient argument, “when they have been left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory,” there is little danger, “since jurors are well equipped to analyze the evidence.” Id. at 59. “[J]urors can rely on their own intelligence and experience to save them from relying upon a factually inadequate theory.” United States v. Henning, 286 F.3d 914, 921 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, as long as there is no evidence to the contrary, we are to “presum[e] that jurors convicted on the factually sufficient theory.” Id. at 922. No. 06-6124 United States v. Dedman Page 17 According to our precedent, if there was sufficient evidence to support one of the false statements that the government alleged, then we must presume that the jury relied on that false statement, and we must uphold the conviction. We conclude that there was ample evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Dedman was lying when she said that she found out about the marriage only in 2004. The testimony of Holland, Green, and the federal investigator all suggested that Dedman knew about the marriage from the moment of the nuptials, and that evidence was never controverted. Although the government investigator conceded that it was possible Dedman misunderstood the question and meant only that she first learned about the illegality of the marriage in 2004, the jury could have decided easily that Dedman understood the question. We, therefore, reject Dedman’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction under § 1001.10