Opinion ID: 1311164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Scope of Pollution Control Exemption

Text: We must decide whether the County Board's interpretation of WYO.STAT. § 35-11-1103 reflects the intent and purpose of the legislature. In 1991, the legislature removed the responsibility for executing WYO.STAT. § 35-11-1103 for local property from the State Board and gave that responsibility to Wyoming's county assessors. 1991 Wyo.Sess.Laws Ch. 249, Sec. 1; Exxon Co., USA, Docket No. 92-185, p. 5 (State Bd. of Equalization 1993). The construction placed on a statute by the agency charged with its execution is entitled to deference as long as it does not conflict with the legislature's intent. General Chemical, 819 P.2d at 422; State Bd. of Equalization v. Tenneco, 694 P.2d 97, 99-100 (Wyo.1985), and see Exxon Co., USA, Docket No. 92-185, p. 5 (State Bd. of Equalization 1993). We discussed the legislative intent or purpose behind WYO.STAT. § 35-11-1103 in Tenneco and General Chemical. This exemption was obviously intended to provide a tax incentive that would encourage the design, installation and utilization of pollution control equipment and devices for the beneficial public purpose of reducing or eliminating environmental pollution to the extent practical. Tenneco, 694 P.2d at 100. The Tenneco court then held that pollution control equipment is exempt upon acquisition if of a type that is ordinarily designed, installed and utilized primarily for pollution control. Tenneco, 694 P.2d at 100. In the cases before us, the County Board heard evidence that the equipment in question is ordinarily used to produce low sulfur diesel fuel. We repeat our oft-stated rule applied to tax exemptions, and this tax exemption in particular. When interpreting tax statutes, there is a presumption against granting exceptions and in favor of taxation. General Chemical, 819 P.2d at 422. Although WYO.STAT. § 35-11-1103 exempts pollution control devices from taxation, we see no evidence of an intent by the legislature to exempt equipment which is necessary to produce a marketable final product, even if that final product pollutes less when consumed by an end-user and even if environmental regulations require the modification to the final product. Such a reading of the statute would lead to a windfall for the corporate taxpayer, requiring the citizen taxpayers to pick up the tab for modifying, modernizing, or possibly even erecting a plant which produces a final product which pollutes less or meets environmental standards. Frontier and the State Board attempt to broaden the meaning of designed, installed and utilized primarily for pollution control beyond the intent of the legislature. The County Board appropriately applied a narrow construction to the statute. Therefore, we reverse the determination of the State Board of Equalization and reinstate the decision of the Laramie County Board of Equalization.