Opinion ID: 6499669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Individual Retaliation Claim

Text: Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee “because he has made a charge, testiﬁed, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” Igasaki v. Illinois Dep’t of Financial and Professional Regulation, 988 F.3d 948, 959 (7th Cir. 2021), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To defeat summary judgment, Lesiv must oﬀer evidence from which a reasonable jury could ﬁnd: “(1) he engaged in an activity protected by the statute; (2) he suﬀered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018). The evidence presented “must be considered as a whole, rather than asking whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself …. Evidence is evidence. Relevant evidence must be considered and irrelevant evidence disregarded.” Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). Ultimately, the inquiry comes down to one question: “Does the record contain suﬃcient evidence to permit a reasonable fact ﬁnder to conclude that retaliatory motive caused” the materially adverse action? Lord v. High Voltage No. 21-2496 9 Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). Lesiv engaged in statutorily protected activity by testifying in his brother’s discrimination lawsuit. Our analysis focuses on the requirements for a materially adverse action and causation. We address each in turn. 3
For a retaliation claim, a materially adverse action is deﬁned as an action “that a reasonable employee would ﬁnd to be materially adverse such that the employee would be dissuaded from engaging in the protected activity.” Poullard, 829 F.3d at 856. That standard is easier to satisfy than the comparable standard for Title VII discrimination claims, which is “limited to discriminatory actions that aﬀect the terms and conditions of employment.” Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006). Still, even for a retaliation claim, the actions must rise above “trivial harms,” such as “petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience,” which do not qualify as materially adverse. Id. at 68. Context is often key in distinguishing between material actions and petty 3 In Ortiz, we directed district courts to stop focusing on the difference between direct and indirect evidence of employment discrimination and to consider the evidence as a whole instead. 834 F.3d at 763–65. We have since clarified that a plaintiff can still invoke the McDonnell Douglas framework to evaluate circumstantial evidence. See Lewis, 909 F.3d at 867 (“We did not reject or alter the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in Ortiz; we simply clarified that there are not separate classifications of evidence to be evaluated under different standards, and we eliminated unhelpful surplus tests.”); see also, e.g., McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc., 940 F.3d 360, 370 (7th Cir. 2019) (plaintiff invoked the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas to bring a retaliation claim). Lesiv has not invoked McDonnell Douglas here. 10 No. 21-2496 slights. See id. at 69 (“[T]he signiﬁcance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances.”). As we focus on this element of Lesiv’s claim, we must assume the employer acted with a retaliatory motive. Illinois Central is arguing that even if Lesiv could prove that it acted because Lesiv testiﬁed in his brother’s lawsuit, assigning Lesiv to work the RIP track alone and suspending him without pay after he refused would not be actionable. The question is whether a reasonable jury could ﬁnd that either of those actions would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity in the future. The answer is yes for each action.
Grayer assigned Lesiv to work the RIP track as punishment. While the parties dispute whether Lesiv had a partner when Grayer made the assignment, the parties agree that the relief supervisor ordered Lesiv to work the RIP track alone. And as Lesiv testiﬁed, the relief supervisor never clariﬁed that he had a partner originally as they tried to contact Grayer, spoke with Duggan, or after he completed his statement about his confrontation with Grayer. As noted above, carmen do not work the RIP track by themselves, and doing so could be dangerous. Putting these facts together and giving Lesiv the beneﬁt of conﬂicting evidence on summary judgment, the relief supervisor directed Lesiv to work an unusual and inherently dangerous assignment that Grayer himself described as punitive. Such an unusual and dangerous work assignment can qualify as a materially adverse action. We have held that a No. 21-2496 11 jury could ﬁnd that retaliating against an employee by assigning her unusually dangerous duty would deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. In Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2007), a police oﬃcer sued for retaliation. She oﬀered evidence that after she complained of discrimination, she was singled out for inherently more dangerous work assignments. We reversed summary judgment for the employer, ﬁnding that the dangerous assignments could amount to materially adverse actions. Id. at 655. Similarly here, by providing evidence that he was singled out for an unusually dangerous work assignment, Lesiv met his burden for defeating summary judgment on this issue. Accord, Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment for employer; change in work schedule that resulted in more dangerous work assignment could qualify as materially adverse employment action). 4 Illinois Central’s attempt to distinguish Lewis is not persuasive. It points out that the Lewis plaintiﬀ actually worked the dangerous assignments while Lesiv never ended up completing his. The argument overlooks why Lesiv did not end up working the RIP track by himself: he refused and was later suspended for that refusal. Granted, Duggan ultimately suggested that Lesiv work the light track, but that was not until 4 At the later trial in Lewis, the jury found for the employer on the retaliation claim, and we affirmed. We determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that the actions Lewis complained of were not inherently more dangerous than her prior assignments and were “merely part of her job.” Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dep’t, 590 F.3d 427, 445 (7th Cir. 2009). The fact that the jury later decided against Lewis has no bearing on whether a reasonable jury also could have found in her favor. A disputed fact is one that a jury could—but is not required to—find for the non-moving party, as Lewis illustrates. 12 No. 21-2496 after Lesiv refused to work the RIP track alone and demanded to speak to someone other than the relief supervisor about the situation. Illinois Central proposes a rule under which, if an employee refuses a dangerous retaliatory assignment, the employer could avoid liability as a matter of law even if the employer then punished the employee for refusing the dangerous retaliatory assignment. We reject that proposed rule. The Supreme Court has cautioned against categorical rules for retaliation claims. See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 175 (“Given the broad statutory text and the variety of workplace contexts in which retaliation may occur, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is simply not reducible to a comprehensive set of clear rules.”); Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 69 (“[A] legal standard that speaks in general terms rather than speciﬁc prohibited acts is preferable, for an act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Courts need to focus on whether, under the particular circumstances, a reasonable jury could ﬁnd that the employer’s actions would dissuade reasonable employees from asserting rights under Title VII. Having to choose between insubordination and an unreasonably dangerous assignment could produce such dissuasion. At the very least, the question should be left for a jury to decide. 5 5 To be sure, we have held that unfulfilled threats do not typically constitute materially adverse actions. See, e.g., Poullard, 829 F.3d at 856–57 (threats of unspecified disciplinary action did not constitute adverse actions); see also Lewis, 909 F.3d at 870 (collecting cases). Those cases are readily distinguishable from the facts here. First, in this case, it was the employee—not the employer—who stopped the adverse action from materializing. Viewing the facts most favorable to Lesiv, we assume that Grayer did not intend merely to threaten this assignment but instead No. 21-2496 13
After Lesiv refused to work the RIP track, he was suspended indeﬁnitely without pay for insubordination. It is well-established that unpaid suspensions can constitute materially adverse actions for retaliation claims. See, e.g., Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 72–73 (jury made a reasonable conclusion that an unpaid, indeﬁnite suspension lasting thirty-seven days was materially adverse); Whittaker v. Northern Illinois University, 424 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] suspension without pay … would constitute an adverse employment action.”). 6 Illinois Central’s attempts to dismiss the suspension as immaterial are not persuasive. For one, it asserts Lesiv’s suspension was not materially adverse because he was suspended for only two days. But to reiterate, all unpaid suspensions— regardless of the length—could constitute adverse employment actions. Benuzzi, 647 F.3d at 665 (“[S]uspensions without pay … undoubtedly satisfy the materially adverse meant for Lesiv to work as ordered. Second, and critically, after Lesiv refused the assignment, he was suspended, thus effectively trading one adverse action for another. Finally, even if we thought this situation resembled an “unfulfilled threat,” Poullard cautioned that threats can sometimes qualify as materially adverse actions. See 829 F.3d at 856–57 & n.3. An unusually dangerous assignment that forces an employee to choose between insubordination and the danger could qualify as one of those exceptions. At least, we are not persuaded to hold as a matter of law that it could not. 6 Unpaid suspensions also qualify as adverse actions in Title VII discrimination claims. E.g., Ellis v. CCA of Tennessee LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 650 (7th Cir. 2011) (three-day suspension could qualify as adverse employment action for discrimination claim); Russell v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois at Chicago, 243 F.3d 336, 341 (7th Cir. 2001) (same for fiveday suspension). 14 No. 21-2496 standard.”). Two days is not too short to qualify as a matter of law. See Nagle v. Village of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1113, 1121 (7th Cir. 2009) (three-day unpaid suspension could support retaliation claim); Lloyd v. Swifty Transportation, Inc., 552 F.3d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 2009) (same); see also Appleton v. City of Gary, Indiana, 781 F. App’x 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Appleton’s one-day suspension and her reduction in hours could constitute adverse employment actions.”). Illinois Central’s argument also misses the key fact that courts evaluate suspensions for this purpose when they are imposed on the employees, not after later internal or union reviews are completed. Cf. Nagle, 554 F.3d at 1121 (rejecting argument that suspension was not materially adverse because it was later found to be improper: “[a]fter all, no one knew whether the suspension would be reversed or upheld” when ﬁrst imposed and served). Here, Duggan told Lesiv “he was being removed from service.” Lesiv reasonably understood at the time that his suspension was without pay and for an indeﬁnite period. A jury could easily ﬁnd that such a suspension would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity even if it ultimately did not last very long. Second, Illinois Central argues the suspension was not materially adverse because, after Lesiv was reinstated, he was quickly paid for the time he missed. But an employer cannot make an unpaid suspension “paid” after the fact to avoid liability under Title VII as a matter of law. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 73 (“[A]n indeﬁnite suspension without pay could well act as a deterrent, even if the suspended employee eventually received backpay.”); Nagle, 554 F.3d at 1121 (explaining that “reimbursement of lost pay” after an unpaid suspension “is not suﬃcient to defeat [a plaintiﬀ’s] Title VII retaliation No. 21-2496 15 claim”); cf. Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e decline to endorse a rule that would allow employers to escape liability by merely reinstating the aggrieved employee months after termination, whenever it becomes clear that the employee intends to pursue her claims in court.”), abrogated on other grounds by Ortiz, 834 F.3d 764– 65. Again, we will not speculate that Lesiv’s paycheck was not aﬀected, especially since Illinois Central has not made the case itself. In fact, Illinois Central argued in the district court that a delay in pay does not constitute an adverse employment action. That argument presupposed that his pay was indeed delayed. As explained, an employer cannot avoid summary judgment by paying the employee retroactively for the suspension. And as for the precise timing of the backpay, as to which our record is silent, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment needs to respond only to arguments the moving party actually made, not others that the moving party might have made but did not. See, e.g., Costello v. Grundon, 651 F.3d 614, 635 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The nonmovant is not required to present evidence on an issue not raised by the movant.”); Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2006) (“As a general matter, if the moving party does not raise an issue in support of its motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not required to present evidence on that point, and the district court should not rely on that ground in its decision.”); Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 765 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The party opposing summary judgment has no obligation to address grounds not raised in a motion for summary judgment.”). If Illinois Central thought the timing of the backpay was material to its motion for summary judgment, it had a responsibility to oﬀer speciﬁc 16 No. 21-2496 evidence about the timing and how it might have aﬀected Lesiv’s paycheck. 7 To summarize, for purposes of summary judgment, Lesiv’s solo RIP track assignment and suspension satisfy the materially adverse action requirement. Whether a reasonable employee would ﬁnd these actions to be materially adverse in this context such that the employee would be dissuaded from engaging in the protected activity is at least a question for the trier of fact.
We turn now to the causation element of the individual retaliation claim. Here, we eliminate the assumption that Illinois Central acted with a retaliatory motive and consider whether Lesiv has presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment on this issue. He has not. To meet his burden on causation, Lesiv needed to oﬀer evidence that a retaliatory motive was a “but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” Gracia v. SigmaTron International, Inc., 842 F.3d 1010, 1019 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013). “This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have 7 Illinois Central relies on Nichols v. Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2007), to argue that Lesiv’s suspension was not materially adverse. That case is easily distinguishable. In Nichols, after a violent encounter with a civilian, the employer placed the plaintiff police officer on paid administrative leave pending a fitness-for-duty examination. We held that the action was not materially adverse as a matter of law. Id. at 786–87. Such paid administrative leaves for police investigations are routine after many types of incidents. They are not comparable to a disciplinary suspension of uncertain duration without pay. No. 21-2496 17 occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360. Lesiv has not met his burden on causation for one simple reason: none of the relevant supervisors knew that Lesiv had engaged in protected activity by testifying in his brother’s lawsuit. Knowledge of the protected activity is necessary to show causation for a retaliation claim. E.g., Eaton v. J.H. Findorﬀ & Son, Inc., 1 F.4th 508, 512–13 (7th Cir. 2021) (aﬃrming summary judgment for employer; for a retaliation claim to reach the jury, “the plaintiﬀ must ﬁrst produce evidence that the defendant had actual knowledge of the protected activity,” and it is “not suﬃcient that a decision-maker could have or even should have known about the employee’s complaint”). A supervisor simply cannot retaliate against an employee for engaging in protected activity if the supervisor was not aware of the protected activity in the ﬁrst place. Accord, Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2006). Lesiv correctly conceded at oral argument and in the district court that the record does not indicate that Grayer or Duggan knew that Lesiv had testiﬁed in a deposition as part of his brother’s lawsuit three months before the materially adverse actions took place. That concession resolves the issue. E.g., Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 897 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2018) (aﬃrming summary judgment for employer because plaintiﬀ did “not establish[] a genuine dispute about the decisionmakers’ knowledge”); Nagle, 554 F.3d at 1121–22 (aﬃrming grant of summary judgment for employer; plaintiﬀ failed to oﬀer evidence decision-maker had knowledge of his protected activity, which “doom[ed] his claim”). Lesiv cannot meet his burden on causation to survive 18 No. 21-2496 summary judgment because he cannot oﬀer evidence of knowledge on the part of his supervisors. So while we disagree with the district court on the issue of a materially adverse action, in the end the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Illinois Central on this claim.