Opinion ID: 181698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Burton v. Stewart's Consideration of Final Judgments

Text: Subsequent to our holding in Caldwell, the Supreme Court in Burton had occasion to address the definition of judgment for purposes of § 2244. The petitioner in Burton had received two amended judgments because of resentencing issues. Thus, at successive times he was in custody pursuant to a 1994 judgment, then pursuant to a 1996 judgment, and then pursuant to a 1998 judgment. [19] In December 1998, the petitioner filed his first federal habeas application challenging aspects of his conviction that remained the same for all three judgments. That filing came after his 1998 judgment had been entered but before it became final. Then, after the 1998 judgment became final, the petitioner filed a second federal habeas application challenging his 1998 sentence. The Court had to determine, therefore, whether the petitioner's second habeas application, which challenged his sentence as part of the 1998 judgment, should be considered second or successive under the AEDPA in light of his first petition's challenge to his original conviction. The Burton petitioner insisted that the 1994 judgment, which he thought he was challenging in his first habeas application, had to be considered a different judgment from the 1998 judgment; otherwise, he argued, the AEDPA's statute of limitations would have barred him forever from challenging the 1994 conviction in federal court. The Supreme Court disagreed: Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment. Accordingly, [petitioner's] limitations period did not begin until both his conviction and sentence became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such reviewwhich occurred well after [petitioner] filed his 1998 petition. [20] The Court went on to explain that when the petitioner filed his first habeas application, he was in custody pursuant to the 1998 judgment of a State court, which gave the district court habeas jurisdiction under § 2254, even if, at that point, the 1998 judgment was not final for purposes of triggering the AEDPA's statute of limitations. [21] Therefore, held the Court, the petitioner's second habeas application, which attacked the same judgment, was successive and thus was barred by the AEDPA. [22]