Opinion ID: 2065975
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Relevancy of MSU's Negligence

Text: Respondent argues that several questions need to be answered to assess correctly whether Respondent voluntarily walked across the icy parking lot, and that, the jury should then determine whether she assumed the risk of her injuries based on the answers to those questions. We disagree. Many of the questions posed by Respondent examine whether MSU was negligent in its failure to clear the parking lot of snow and ice. In an assumption of the risk analysis, however, the defendant's or a third party's negligence is irrelevant. We can assume, for the sake of argument, that Respondent is correct and that MSU was negligent in failing to clear the parking lot and walkways of snow and ice. This assumption does not change our analysis or our conclusion. As this Court has previously explained the assumption of the risk defense exists independently of the conduct of another person, whether the defendant or a third party. Therefore, the existence of a defendant's duty is not an issue because that speaks to the defendant's negligence, which is not required to establish assumption of risk. ADM P'ship, 348 Md. at 102, 702 A.2d at 740. Similarly, in Schroyer, 323 Md. at 282, 592 A.2d at 1123, we explained that in an assumption of the risk analysis, by virtue of the plaintiff's voluntary actions, any duty the defendant owed the plaintiff to act reasonably for the plaintiff's safety is superseded by the plaintiff's willingness to take a chance. We have also explained that [t]he defense of assumption of risk rests upon the plaintiff's consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of harm from a particular risk. Such consent may be found . . . by implication from the conduct of the parties. When the plaintiff enters voluntarily into a relation or situation involving obvious danger, he may be taken to assume the risk, and to relieve the defendant of responsibility. Such implied assumption of risk requires knowledge and appreciation of the risk, and a voluntary choice to encounter it.' Prosser, Torts, § 55, p. 303 (2d ed. 1955). Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275. Respondent also argues that Rountree v. Lerner Dev. Co., 52 Md.App. 281, 447 A.2d 902 (1982), is apposite here. She contends that MSU owed a duty to her daughter because her daughter was a business invitee of MSU and that MSU therefore owed Respondent the same duty, because Respondent was her daughter's guest. In that case, Ginger Rountree exited her apartment building through the only available means of egress in order to go to work. Rountree, 52 Md.App. at 283, 447 A.2d at 903. It had snowed the night before and the stairs were icy and slippery. She went to work late to allow time for the ice to thaw and despite her walking slowly and carefully, still fell on the steps and injured herself. Rountree, 52 Md. App. at 283-84, 447 A.2d at 903-04. She sued the owner and operator of her apartment complex. Rountree, 52 Md.App. at 282, 447 A.2d at 902. The intermediate appellate court determined that Ms. Rountree did not assume the risk of her injuries because she had a right to leave her apartment to go to work, and that the lack of a reasonable alternative route created a jury question as to the voluntariness of her conduct. Rountree, 52 Md.App. at 285-86, 447 A.2d at 904-05. We decline to adopt the reasoning of Rountree because it is inapplicable here. [3] The present case does not involve a situation where Respondent's daughter (a tenant) was trapped inside her dormitory because of ice and snow, and, while trying to leave the dormitory, slipped and fell on the ice. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY. RESPONDENT TO PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.