Opinion ID: 1147679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: due process: investigative functions of commission staff

Text: (3) Petitioner contends in essence that the Commission, which is charged with the duty to take evidence and make findings of fact and conclusions of law incident to making disciplinary recommendations to this court, is not a neutral forum. He argues that the Commission is inevitably influenced by matters outside the record since its own staff makes the initial investigation into, and recommendation to initiate formal proceedings as a result of, complaints regarding the conduct of a judge. This occurs, in the view of petitioner, because the accusatory, investigatory, and adjudicatory functions are combined during proceedings in the Commission. [3] Petitioner asserts more specifically that in the instant proceeding the Commission staff not only initiated correspondence and investigation prior to the decision to institute formal proceedings, but thereafter continued an investigation parallel to that of the examiners from the office of the Attorney General. The director and the chief counsel of the Commission assertedly participated in the investigation. This involvement and the reliance of the Commission on staff during the ensuing proceedings, petitioner asserts, makes the association of the director, the staff, and the members of the Commission too close to allow the adjudicatory process to comport with generally accepted standards of due process. Petitioner identifies no actual bias on the part of the members of the Commission, and offers no authority to support his argument that the procedures to which he objects are constitutionally impermissible. That omission is easily understood for his claim is contrary to existing authority upholding similar due-process-based challenges to administrative adjudication pursuant to procedures in which the relationship between the decisionmaking, investigating, and prosecutorial functions is much closer. (See 1 Koch, Administrative Law and Practice (1985) p. 448, § 6.8; Schwartz, Administrative Law (2d ed. 1983) p. 495 et seq.; 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980) § 18:2, p. 343 et seq.) The Supreme Court rejected a due-process-based challenge to the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions of a medical licensing board in Withrow v. Larkin (1975) 421 U.S. 35 [43 L.Ed.2d 712, 95 S.Ct. 1456]. There the board heard evidence during the investigatory stage, determined if probable cause existed for license revocation proceedings, and subsequently conducted a contested hearing to determine if prohibited acts had occurred and, if so, if the license should be revoked. The Supreme Court recognized that a `fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process' ( id. at p. 46 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 723]), but nonetheless upheld the administrative adjudication procedure. The Supreme Court explained: Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but `our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.' [Citations.] In pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Among these cases are those in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him. The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. ( Withrow v. Larkin, supra, 421 U.S. at pp. 46-47 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 723-724].) After reviewing the several earlier cases in which due-process-based challenges to administrative adjudication had been rejected, the Supreme Court concluded that the procedures under review did not create an unacceptable risk of bias. ( Withrow v. Larkin, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 54 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 727-728].) Manifestly the procedure to which petitioner here objects involves even less potential for biased decisionmaking. The initial investigation is by the Commission staff, but once formal proceedings are instituted the prosecutorial function shifts to examiners from the office of the Attorney General. The special masters appointed by this court then hear the evidence, make findings and conclusions based thereon, and recommend action to the Commission, which itself reviews the evidence, independently makes findings and conclusions, and recommends appropriate discipline to this court. The court, however, is the final decision maker and must itself review the evidence and independently assess its weight and relevance. The procedures do not create an unacceptable risk of bias either on the part of the Commission, or on the part of the court as ultimate decision maker. That during the course of the initial investigation or thereafter the Commission may become aware of the reports regarding the investigation is not a sufficient basis for believing that either the Commission or this court is not, or cannot be, an impartial decision maker. ( McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 519-520 [116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268].)