Opinion ID: 795598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: insufficient evidence: maintaining drug premises

Text: 48 Lastly, Ross challenges his conviction for opening and maintaining the premises at 183 Sixth Street for the purpose of distributing and using cocaine base between September 1, 2001 and January 1, 2002 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 14 To convict, the government was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) opened or maintained a place; (2) for the purpose of distributing or packaging controlled substances; and (3) did so knowingly. United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 672 (2d Cir.1996) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Hamilton, 334 F.3d 170, 180-81 (2d Cir.2003) (discussing elements of § 856(a)(1) offense). Conceding that the 183 Sixth Street apartment was being used for the distribution and use of cocaine base and that he was aware of such use, Ross focuses his argument on the alleged inadequacy of the government's proof that he, as opposed to Marcus Snow, opened or maintained the premises. 49 Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross opened or maintained the apartment at 183 Sixth Street, even if the jury could conclude that Marcus Snow did the same. Oliver Jackson, the owner and landlord, testified that he showed the two-bedroom apartment at 183 Sixth Street to Ross and Marcus Snow together and that he provided a set of keys for both of them. Ross filled out the rental application and paid the $475 security deposit; while Snow paid the $475 for the first month's rent, Jackson collected the October rent from Ross. Jackson saw both of them moving in and saw both of them inside the apartment on occasions when he visited the premises. Furthermore, when officers raided the apartment, they observed Ross and another male fleeing the premises, neither wearing a coat, and one without shoes. Inside, officers found photographs depicting Ross and Snow in close proximity to drug paraphernalia and what a jury could conclude were drug proceeds. 50 In response to this evidence, Ross points to the lack of any testimony that he participated in any drug sales at 183 Sixth Street during the time period charged or that he personally possessed any controlled substances or contraband when police arrested him at the apartment. He also points to the absence of physical evidence linking him to the residence, coupled with evidence suggesting that he was not responsible for the apartment, including his driver's license listing a different address and the stipulation that his mother would testify that he did not live at 183 Sixth Street. He claims that these evidentiary deficiencies preclude a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was responsible for the opening and maintenance of the crack house at 183 Sixth Street. 51 We reject Ross's initial argument because neither the sale of narcotics nor the possession of such are elements of the instant offense, so long as the premises were being maintained for one of the forbidden purposes, which Ross does not contest. See Hamilton, 334 F.3d at 180. Nor is evidence required that Ross actually lived at the premises; all that is required is that he have opened or maintained it. See Becerra, 97 F.3d at 672;21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). Likewise, we reject Ross's second argument, which essentially asks us to re-weigh the evidence presented at trial, since such weighing is the province of the jury, and not of this court. See Morgan, 385 F.3d at 207. While the evidence presented here was not as overwhelming as that put on by the government in other § 856(a)(1) prosecutions we have reviewed, see Becerra, 97 F.3d at 672, it was sufficient to submit the charge to the jury.