Opinion ID: 1945864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Distinction between Having and Exercising Jurisdiction

Text: When considering questions of jurisdiction under the UCCJA, we distinguish between whether jurisdiction exists and whether it should be exercised. See Jordan, 586 A.2d at 1084; Glynn, 532 A.2d at 556. In Jordan, this Court considered whether the Family Court's initial claim of jurisdiction was proper under the UCCJA when the children were physically located in Rhode Island and the father made allegations that his children were subject to physical and emotional abuse by their mother in Florida. Jordan, 586 A.2d at 1083. The parties had been granted a divorce in Florida, and the Florida court had reserved jurisdiction to determine child custody at the time the Family Court claimed jurisdiction. Id. at 1080-81. This Court held that although the Family Court properly could have entertained jurisdiction under the emergency provision of the UCCJA, it improperly exercised jurisdiction. Id. at 1084-85. We reasoned that § 15-14-7 of the UCCJA precluded the Family Court from exercising jurisdiction. Jordan, 586 A.2d at 1084. That section provided that the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because Rhode Island is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons. Section 15-14-7(a). This Court held that the Florida court had properly exercised jurisdiction and that it was improper for Rhode Island also to exercise jurisdiction, thereby creating the type of jurisdictional conflict the UCCJA was enacted to avoid. Jordan, 586 A.2d at 1084.