Opinion ID: 75652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: justiciability: ripeness and standing

Text: 25 The defendants contend that this case should be dismissed because the plaintiffs have no standing to bring their claims and because, at least with respect to the claims against the Bar, their claims are not ripe. Both ripeness and standing are doctrines relating to the justiciability of the plaintiffs' claims. We have noted that [j]usticiability . . . encompasses both constitutional and prudential concerns. Hallandale Prof'l Fire Fighters Local 2238 v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 759 (11th Cir. 1991). In that decision we explained: 26 The constitutional aspect of the justiciability analysis focuses on whether an actual case or controversy as required by Article III is presented, while the prudential part asks whether it is appropriate for this case to be litigated in a federal court by these parties at this time. 27 Id. at 759-60. For reasons relating more to prudential concerns, we conclude that the claims against the Bar are insufficiently ripe to be litigated. We also conclude, however, that the plaintiffs do have standing to pursue their claims against the JIC.
28 Only the Bar has raised a ripeness argument, and it arises from the nature of the advisory opinion that underlies the plaintiffs' claims against it. That opinion was an informal one issued by the Office of General Counsel, as distinguished from a more formal one issued, or reviewed and approved, by the Disciplinary Commission pursuant to Rule 18 of the Bar's Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Rule 18 provides an administrative procedure the plaintiffs could have used to obtain a formal advisory opinion from the Disciplinary Commission (comparable in formality to the one issued by the JIC), which might have obviated the need for any litigation. Instead of seeking to resolve or crystallize matters that way, the plaintiffs charged ahead into court with this lawsuit. 29 Similar to the standing doctrine, [t]he ripeness doctrine involves consideration of both jurisdictional and prudential concerns. Digital Properties, Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997). We have described the ripeness doctrine as follows: 30 The ripeness doctrine prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements. . . . To determine whether a claim is ripe we must evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. 31 Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted). In other words, [c]ourts must resolve . . . whether the claim is sufficiently mature, and the issues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by the court. Digital, 121 F.3d at 589 (citations and quotations omitted). 32 As guidance in considering and applying the fitness and hardship prongs of the ripeness analysis, the Supreme Court has indicated that we must consider the following factors: 33 (1) whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit from further factual development of the issues presented. 34 Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 1670 (1998). See also Ala. Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1982) (listing four similar factors). 35 We begin by considering the second and third of the Ohio Forestry factors - the need for factual development, and the interference with administrative procedures - both of which relate to the fitness of the plaintiffs' claims for adjudication at this time. We have noted that claims are less likely to be considered fit for adjudication when they venture beyond purely legal issues or when they require speculation about contingent future events. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995). Likewise, concern over interference with an agency's decisionmaking process before it has the opportunity to finalize its policies implicates the fitness of a case for adjudication. As the Supreme Court said in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner: 36 [I]t is fair to say that [the] basic rationale [of the ripeness doctrine] is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. 37 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515 (1967) (footnote omitted). 38 Consideration of both of these concerns leads us to conclude that the plaintiffs' claims against the Bar are not mature for adjudication at this time. First, although it may appear that the plaintiffs' claims involve a pure question of law (whether the Bar's advisory opinion comports with the First Amendment), an important factual issue must be resolved first - what the actual policy of the Bar is concerning the questionnaire. The informal opinion of the Bar's general counsel does not establish the Bar's policy. The general counsel can say whatever he wants, but unless the Disciplinary Commission agrees, his unofficial statements are not the official policy of the Bar. The Alabama Supreme Court has vested exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction over members of the Bar in the Disciplinary Commission and Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar, with review by the Supreme Court of Alabama. Ala. R. Disciplinary P. 1. Only the Disciplinary Commission may initiate formal disciplinary charges, see Ala. R. Disciplinary P. 16, 17 & 19, or issue advisory opinions that are binding on and enforceable against the Bar itself. See Ala. R. Disciplinary P. 18. Therefore, despite the legal appearance of the questions involved in the plaintiffs' claims, the unresolved, fundamental factual issue of what the Bar's official position is in regard to the questionnaire counsels strongly against finding ripeness. 39 Furthermore, allowing Alabama's agency charged with overseeing lawyer discipline to formulate and crystallize its policies without undue interference from the federal courts is a good thing, and that also weighs strongly in favor of the conclusion that the plaintiffs' claims against the Bar arepremature. This case is similar to Digital, in which we found, in light of the basic rationale for the ripeness doctrine discussed in Abbott Laboratories, that the plaintiff did not pursue its claims with the requisite diligence to show that a mature case or controversy exists. 121 F.3d at 590. In that case, which also involved a First Amendment challenge, the plaintiff had been informed by a zoning department employee that a proposed use for a building was impermissible. Instead of speaking with the employee's supervisor or attempting to get a variance, however, the plaintiff filed suit. In finding that the claim was not ripe, we stated that, [a]t a minimum, Digital had the obligation to obtain a conclusive response from someone with the knowledge and authority to speak for the City regarding the application of the zoning scheme to Digital's proposal. Id. We explained that: 40 In order for the city to have applied the ordinance to Digital, a city official with sufficient authority must have rendered a decision regarding Digital's proposal. . . . As the Supreme Court held in Abbott, a basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine is to protect the [administrative] agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. 387 U.S. at 148-49, 87 S. Ct. at 1515. Digital's impatience precluded the formation of a concrete case or controversy. Without the presentation of a binding conclusive administrative decision, no tangible controversy exists and, thus, we have no authority to act. 41 Id. We explained that the plaintiff in Digital had only presented a potential dispute, which was founded upon its anticipated belief that [the city] would interpret [its zoning ordinances] in such a way as to violate Digital's First Amendment rights. Id. at 590-91. We concluded that [u]nder the facts at issue, Digital, in its haste to preserve its perceived First Amendment rights, failed to present a mature claim for review. Id. at 590. 42 The same rationale leads us to conclude that the plaintiffs in this case jumped the gun in bringing their claims against the Bar. The Bar's Disciplinary Commission - the only body permitted to formalize official policies on behalf of the Bar - did not approve, and was not asked to review, the informal opinion issued by the Bar's Office of General Counsel. The plaintiffs do not dispute that the Bar rules provide a procedure by which any attorney, after receiving an advisory opinion from the Bar's general counsel, can obtain review from the Disciplinary Commission, a review that will establish the Bar's formal position. Nor do the plaintiffs offer any explanation for their having failed to seek that review. 7 A formal advisory opinion, or concurrence in the general counsel's opinion, by the Disciplinary Commission pursuant to the Rule 18 procedure would have constituted a definitive statement from the authoritative body concerning the Bar's enforcement policy. By foregoing that option and rushing into federal court to seek an injunction, the plaintiffs have not allowed the Bar to formulate a final policy, but instead have asked the district court and now this Court to speculate, without any evidentiary basis, that the Bar's Disciplinary Commission would agree with the general counsel's opinion concerning the application of the Canons of Judicial Ethics to candidates responding to the Christian Coalition's questionnaire. The ripeness doctrine is designed to prevent federal courts from engaging in such speculation and prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily reaching constitutional issues. 43 Before concluding the ripeness analysis, however, we must also consider the hardship to the plaintiffs from withholding adjudication at this time. 8 We have recognized that [p]otential litigants suffer substantial hardship if they are forced to choose between foregoing lawful activity and risking substantial legal sanctions, and a party does not have to risk probable criminal sanctions in order to bring a justiciable pre-enforcement challenge. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1524. Therefore, if a party is to suffer an immediate and direct impact from a challenged policy, a case is more likely to be considered ripe. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Callaway, 530 F.2d 625, 631 (5th Cir. 1976). 44 In Ohio Forestry, the Supreme Court discussed the types of hardship that might cause a case to be considered ripe. 523 U.S. at 733-736, 118 S. Ct. at 1670-71. First, the Court noted that hardship might be present where a policy results in adverse effects of a strictly legal kind. Id. at 733, 118 S. Ct. at 1670. The Court explained that such effects are not present if the challenged policies do not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing anything; they do not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or authority; they do not subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability; they create no legal rights or obligations. Id. Second, the Court stated that an important consideration in modern ripeness cases is whether the challenged policy inflicts significant practical harm upon the interests that the [plaintiff] advances. Id. at 733-34, 118 S. Ct. at 1670. Such practical harm is not likely to be present where a plaintiff will have ample opportunity later to bring its legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more certain. Id. at 734, 118 S. Ct. at 1670. Finally, the Supreme Court said that a court should consider whether the plaintiff pointed to any other way in which the [policy] could now force it to modify its behavior in order to avoid future adverse consequences. . . . Id. at 734, 118 S. Ct. at 1671. 45 The plaintiffs in this case have failed to show that they would suffer the types of hardship discussed in Ohio Forestry if adjudication is withheld until a more mature case can be presented. Given the non-binding, informal nature of the general counsel's advisory opinion, it is clear that the plaintiffs have not suffered any adverse effects of the strictly legal kind. The plaintiffs are in exactly the same position after the advisory opinion was issued, legally speaking, as they were beforehand. In both cases, their conduct was constrained by the Canons of Judicial Ethics (and the Bar Rule of Professional Conduct which incorporates those canons and applies them to attorneys who are judicial candidates), whatever they mean, and not by any informal advisory opinions of the Bar's general counsel. 46 Whether the plaintiffs have shown hardship in the practical sense or hardship resulting from being forced to modify behavior presents a closer question. The plaintiffs argue that practical harm occurred because their speech was chilled as a result of the general counsel's advisory opinion, but under the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude the plaintiffs have not shown sufficient hardship to warrant our exercise of jurisdiction over their otherwise premature claims. 9 By focusing on practical harm, the Supreme Court showed us that the hardship prong is inherently fact-sensitive, and we should look for actual prejudice to the plaintiffs from withholding adjudication. The plaintiffs in this case can show no actual prejudice from our withholding adjudication of their claims against the Bar, because the JIC's advisory opinion cautioning judicial candidates not to respond to the Christian Coalition's questionnaire was issued before the Bar's Office of General Counsel issued its advisory opinion. The JIC's opinion was a formal advisory opinion issued by the body authorized to initiate formal charges against Alabama's judges. In light of that opinion, and without regard to the general counsel's informal advisory opinion, any judicial candidate intent on avoiding disciplinary action relating to the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics would have avoided answering the questionnaire as a result of the JIC opinion. There is no reason to assume that any candidate would ignore the more formal JIC opinion, but suddenly alter his or her behavior in response to an informal, non-binding opinion issued by the Bar's Office of General Counsel. 10 Therefore, the general counsel's informal advisory opinion, standing alone, caused no practical harm to the plaintiffs. 47 Our conclusion that the plaintiffs in this case suffered no hardship as a result of the general counsel's informal advisory opinion is necessarily a narrow one, limited to the facts of this case. We need not and do not decide whether the plaintiffs would have presented a ripe claim against the Bar if the JIC had not previously issued its opinion or if other facts were different. Because we conclude that the plaintiffs' claims were significantly unfit in light of the fact that the Bar's Disciplinary Commission had not been given the opportunity to consider, establish, and announce the Bar's actual enforcement policy, and bearing in mind the ripeness doctrine's basic rationale of allowing agencies to formulate final policies without judicial interference, we conclude that the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed as unripe. We will remand for that purpose. 11
48 With the Bar out of the case, we turn now to the JIC's contention that the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims against it. We review de novo whether a plaintiff has standing to bring suit in federal court. See Wilson v. State Bar of Ga., 132 F.3d 1422, 1427 (11th Cir. 1998). 49 This Court has held that three requirements must be satisfied for standing: 50 [A] plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 51 White's Place, Inc. v. Glover, 222 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has described these three requirements as the irreducible minimum of the constitutional standing requirements. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S. Ct. 752, 758 (1982). The burden is on the party seeking to exercise jurisdiction to allege and then to prove facts sufficient to support jurisdiction. White's Place, 22 F.3d at 1329. 52
53 We have recognized that [t]he injury requirement is most loosely applied - particularly in terms of how directly the injury must result from the challenged governmental action - where First Amendment rights are involved, because of the fear that free speech will be chilled even before the law, regulation, or policy is enforced. Hallandale, 922 F.2d at 760 (capitalization altered). Moreover, [w]e will not force a plaintiff to choose between intentionally violating a law to gain access to judicial review and foregoing what he or she believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid criminal prosecution. White's Place, 222 F.3d at 1329. But even in a First Amendment context the injury to the plaintiff requirement cannot be ignored. Hallandale, 922 F.2d at 760 (capitalization altered). 54 The plaintiffs argue that they suffered an injury in fact because the JIC advisory opinion had a chilling effect on their exercise of their First Amendment rights. In the case of the plaintiffs who were candidates, this alleged injury resulted in self-censorship. The Christian Coalition's alleged injury was its inability to receive speech from a willing speaker. 12 We have recognized on several occasions that the chilling effect on speech and resulting self-censorship are types of injuries which may suffice for standing purposes. In another case involving a challenge to bar association rules, we explained that: 55 In the First-Amendment realm, plaintiffs do not have to expose themselves to enforcement in order to challenge a law. Rather, an actual injury can exist when the plaintiff is chilled from exercising her right to free expression or forgoes expression in order to avoid enforcement consequences. In such an instance, which is what is alleged here, the injury is self-censorship. 56 Wilson, 132 F.3d at 1428 (citations and quotations omitted). 57 In order to have standing in this context, however, the plaintiff must show that he or she had an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution. Id. (emphasis added). See also ACLU v. Florida Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that courts have asked whether the plaintiff is seriously interested in disobeying, and the defendant seriously intent on enforcing the challenged measure). This Court has stated that a plaintiff has standing if he demonstrate[s] a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement.Jacobs v. Florida Bar, 50 F.3d 901, 904 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding standing to challenge bar rules restricting advertisements) (quotation omitted). In ACLU, we held that in order for a plaintiff alleging that his speech was chilled to have standing, he or she must show that either (1) he was threatened with prosecution; (2) prosecution is likely; or (3) there is a credible threat of prosecution. 999 F.2d at 1492 (noting also that likelihood of disciplinary action was an important factor in determining whether plaintiff's speech objectively was chilled). 58 This requirement comes from the Supreme Court's recognition that [a]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14, 92 S. Ct. 2318, 2325-26 (1972). Therefore, if no credible threat of prosecution looms, the chill is insufficient to sustain the burden that Article III imposes. A party's subjective fear that she may be prosecuted for engaging in expressive activity will not be held to constitute an injury for standing purposes unless that fear is objectively reasonable. Wilson, 132 F.3d at 1428. 59 We conclude that the plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that their First Amendment rights were chilled as a result of the JIC's advisory opinion. The chill was evidenced by the unwillingness of the judicial candidates to respond to the Christian Coalition questionnaire, or their withdrawal of previous responses, following the issuance of the JIC's advisory opinion, and the Christian Coalition's concomitant inability to receive responses from otherwise willing speakers. The fact that speech was chilled is undisputed by the JIC, although it does dispute the cause of the chill - arguing that the Canons of Judicial Ethics rather than its advisory opinion caused any chill. 60 We conclude that the chill resulting from the JIC's advisory opinion satisfied the injury in fact requirement and was objectively reasonable because the advisory opinion created a sufficiently credible threat of prosecution. As the Alabama Supreme Court recently noted, [t]he Alabama Constitution vests enforcement of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics in the JIC. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, ___ So.2d ___, No. 1001119 (Ala. May 15, 2001). If the JIC determines that a reasonable basis exists for a finding of an ethics violation, the JIC may file a complaint with the Court of the Judiciary. Id. After the JIC files charges with the Court of the Judiciary, the charged judge is suspended from serving as a judge until a final resolution is reached. Id. Therefore, under Alabama law, the JIC is an investigatory body analogous to a grand jury, and its charging decisions have substantial and immediate impact on Alabama judges. Matter of Samford, 352 So.2d 1126, 1129 (Ala. 1977). Under these circumstances, the formal advisory opinion of the enforcement body with authority to bring charges against judges created an objectively reasonable chill on the First Amendment rights of the Alabama judicial candidates who are the plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, those individual plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact, which in turn caused an injury in fact to the Christian Coalition plaintiff. 61
62 The next two steps in the standing analysis ask whether the injury in fact is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and whether it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. White's Place, 222 F.3d at 1329. For the same reasons that led us to conclude that the chilling effect on the plaintiffs' speech was objectively reasonable, we also conclude that the injury suffered by the plaintiffs is both traceable to the JIC's advisory opinion and redressable by the relief sought by the plaintiffs. Regardless of the (still uncertain) meaning of the underlying canons, it was the declaration of the JIC - the body authorized to enforce the canons and initiate disciplinary charges against judges - through its formal advisory opinion that caused the threat of prosecution to become credible and made the chill on speech objectively reasonable. Therefore, the plaintiffs' injury was traceable to the JIC's advisory opinion. 63 A properly crafted declaratory judgment and injunction ensuring that the enforcement authority would not enforce the canons in a manner inconsistent with the First Amendment would redress the plaintiffs' injury and eliminate any unjustified chill. Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims against the JIC.