Opinion ID: 2202658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Air Rights Condominium Proposal

Text: Next, is the air rights condominium proposal. The October 24, 1975 letter from Carr's attorney at that time, see supra note 20, to then Corporation Counsel Francis Murphy (now with Wilkes & Artis) read in relevant part as follows: Dear Mr. Murphy: Our firm represents Oliver T. Carr, Jr., who desires to develop the Sealtest Dairy Site at 26th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. for residential, commercial and office uses under the new CR zoning. On October 21, 1975, representatives of Mr. Carr had a preliminary discussion with regard to the proposed development with Messrs. Louis Robbins, Iverson Mitchell, and Semi Feuer of your office, together with Messrs. Kirk White and Steve Sher of the Municipal Planning Office to acquaint them with the proposed development and mixed uses, and to request an opinion from the Corporation Counsel that the building complies with the new CR Zoning Regulations and Condominiums Laws of the District of Columbia. The purpose of this letter is to formally request such an opinion from the Corporation Counsel and to outline the facts involved. . . . It is our opinion that since we are building one building on one lot and the legal title is in one ownership that the proposed building meets all of the requirements of the CR zoning. More particularly, (i) that no rear yard is required since the building fronts on three streets, 26th, Pennsylvania Avenue, and M Streets; (ii) that the provision of private recreation space required for residential use is met by the provision of recreational space for the use of condominium owners over the roof of the first floor parking and retail areas; and (iii) parking limitations are met because the sum total of spaces do not exceed the maximum permitted for the uses contemplated. It is also our opinion that the building will continue to satisfy CR zoning requirements when condominium declaration is filed because of the covenants and easements described below. [Emphasis added.] We would appreciate an opinion confirming that the proposed project does meet the CR zoning requirements conceptually, contingent upon the actual amount of various kinds of space being adequate and verified. In the event there is any problem, of which we are not aware, we would appreciate it if you would contact us so that we may attempt to resolve the problem. In the first place, unlike the height litigation, the air rights condominium proposal would not have affected the amount of rentable space and related parking places permitted as of right after the height litigation. The FAR restrictions on rentable space, see supra note 21, as well as the zoning regulations applicable to parking, see supra note 22, for a building constructed on air rights do not differ from those applicable to a building owned in fee simple. Furthermore, two witnesses testified without contradiction that parking in no way was at issue in the air rights condominium proposal. William Smith, the author of the letter and Carr's trial counsel in the height litigation, see supra note 20, testified at the BZA hearing, explaining the reference to parking as follows: I was saying that in our opinion, this building, this concept we had, would meet all the CR zoning requirements. Therefore, assuming that we met the zoning requirements, they were to go ahead and give us an Opinion as to whether or not an air rights condominium would be legal under the then-existing condominium statute. That was the only reason I referred to the parking. Robert Carr, a vice president of the developer, explained the reference in these terms: I don't think there was any definition then of the precise number of parking spaces that were to be utilized by either the commercial or residential uses. I think that all this says is that it was the intention of the firm to comply with the parking levels set for zoning. The BZA, which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses, accepted this explanation, finding that [t]he October meeting and letter dealt solely with the concept of an air rights condominium. Neither the meeting nor the letter dealt with or had any relation to parking. . . . Parking was not an issue in . . . the condominium question. We see no other plausible interpretation to give the words of the letter, and petitioner has offered none. [24] Nor do we perceive any basis for upsetting the BZA's finding that no information available to Murphy and Mitchell at the time of this transaction would have aided Carr in the special exception case. Decision, January 7, 1981, supra note 19.