Opinion ID: 2480904
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Local Public Entity

Text: Turning to the merits, a divided panel of the appellate court concluded that plaintiff's complaint was not time-barred pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act. Based on canons of statutory construction, the appellate court determined that Bi-State was not a local public entity within the purview of the Act. We disagree. As we will explain, Bi-State is a local public entity within the purview of the Tort Immunity Act, notwithstanding Bi-State's status as an interstate compact entity, and so the one-year statute of limitations provided by section 8-101(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2006)) applies to civil actions against Bi-State. Plaintiff's complaint is therefore time-barred. We conduct our analysis within a familiar analytical framework. The primary goal of construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The most reliable indicator of such intent is the statutory language, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. A statute is viewed as a whole. Therefore, words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be construed in isolation. County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill.2d 593, 603-04, 326 Ill.Dec. 848, 900 N.E.2d 1095 (2008); People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill.2d 264, 279-80, 271 Ill.Dec. 881, 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003). Accordingly, in determining legislative intent, a court may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied and the goals to be achieved, and the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the other. County of Du Page, 231 Ill.2d at 604, 326 Ill.Dec. 848, 900 N.E.2d 1095; Cryns, 203 Ill.2d at 280, 271 Ill.Dec. 881, 786 N.E.2d 139. Further, the canons of statutory construction apply to interstate compacts. 1A N. Singer & J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 32:5, at 723 (7th ed.2009); F. Zimmerman & M. Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 1 (1976) (same); see, e.g., S & M Investment Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 324, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1990). [3] Section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act defines a local public entity as follows: `Local public entity' includes a county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, school district, school board, educational service region, regional board of school trustees, trustees of schools of townships, treasurers of schools of townships, community college district, community college board, forest preserve district, park district, fire protection district, sanitary district, museum district, emergency telephone system board, and all other local governmental bodies. `Local public entity' also includes library systems and any intergovernmental agency or similar entity formed pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Illinois or the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act as well as any not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business. It does not include the State or any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission, university or similar agency of the State. (Emphases added.) 745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West 2006). This court has repeatedly observed that the term local public entity is broadly defined. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill.2d 497, 512, 272 Ill.Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127 (2003); Boyles v. Greater Peoria Mass Transit District, 113 Ill.2d 545, 553, 101 Ill.Dec. 847, 499 N.E.2d 435 (1986); see A. Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. Ill. L.F. 919, 933 (listing, as one of the significant characteristics of the Act, that it applies to every kind of local governmental body); E. Kionka & J. Norton, Tort Liability of Local Governments and Their Employees in Illinois, 58 Ill. B.J. 620, 628 (1970) (same). Illinois courts have widely recognized various public entities as coming within the definition of local public entity, although those entities were not expressly identified in section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act. See, e.g., Carver, 203 Ill.2d at 512, 272 Ill.Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127; Roark v. Macoupin Creek Drainage District, 316 Ill.App.3d 835, 839, 250 Ill.Dec. 358, 738 N.E.2d 574 (2000); Luciano v. Waubonsee Community College, 245 Ill.App.3d 1077, 1083, 185 Ill.Dec. 463, 614 N.E.2d 904 (1993) (collecting cases). [4] The appellate court outlined its analysis as follows: In order for Bi-State to qualify as a `local public entity,' however, it would have to fit within the general catchall category of `other local governmental bodies.' To determine whether the legislature intended to include interstate compact agencies within this general catchall category, we must look at the nature and characteristics of interstate compacts generally and of Bi-State specifically and interpret the Tort Immunity Act in light of those characteristics. 393 Ill.App.3d at 1020-21, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. The flaws in the appellate court's analysis begin with its premise. The appellate court stated that Bi-State could qualify as a local public entity only if it fit within the general catchall category of other local governmental bodies referenced in section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act. 393 Ill. App.3d at 1020, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. The appellate court did not consider whether Bi-State fit within any of the other categories of local public entities listed in section 1-206. Bi-State qualifies as a local public entity because it is a not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business. 745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West 2006). See McQueen v. Shelby County, 730 F.Supp. 1449, 1453 (C.D.Ill.1990) (construing Act, stating that the phrase `any not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business' is itself a specifically enumerated entity which applies to a particular class of organizations). Bi-State is a corporation created pursuant to the United States Constitution; Bi-State has no shareholders and is composed of commissioners who are chosen by Illinois and Missouri government officials; Bi-State is funded with public and user fee revenue; and Bi-State operates, inter alia, a transit system in the public interest. As such, Bi-State falls within section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act, which expressly includes nonprofit public corporations within its definition of local public entity. 745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West 2006). See Barnes v. Chicago Housing Authority, 326 Ill.App.3d 710, 724-29, 260 Ill.Dec. 439, 761 N.E.2d 283 (2001) (recognizing resident management corporation as not-for-profit corporation conducting public business); Smith v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 210 Ill.App.3d 223, 227-28, 155 Ill.Dec. 41, 569 N.E.2d 41 (1991) (same; METRA). Further, significant persuasive authority supports our conclusion that Bi-State is a nonprofit public corporation. The decisions of both federal and state courts may guide our interpretation of compact provisions (see Remick v. Lopes, 203 Conn. 494, 498, 525 A.2d 502, 504-05 (1987)), and the courts of signatory states should promote consistency in interpreting an interstate compact, based on comity (see State ex rel. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Coniglio, 82 Ohio App.3d 52, 55, 610 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 (1993); State v. Hill, 334 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1983)), or because those courts are interpreting the same federal law (see American Sugar Refining Co. of New York v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 55 N.Y.2d 11, 25-26, 432 N.E.2d 578, 584, 447 N.Y.S.2d 685, 691 (1982)). Federal and Missouri courts have recognized: `There is no question that Bi-State operates as a nonprofit corporation in the public interest.' Redbird Engineering Sales, Inc. v. Bi-State Development Agency of Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District, 806 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Mo.App.1991), quoting Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District, 433 F.2d 131, 134 (8th Cir.1970); accord Love 1979 Partners v. Public Service Comm'n, 715 S.W.2d 482, 489 (Mo.1986) (describing Bi-State as a nonprofit public agency). Bi-State is a local public entity because it is a nonprofit public corporation, which is specifically referenced in section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act. As noted, the appellate court did not consider whether Bi-State fell within the section 1-206 category of nonprofit public corporation. Rather, the appellate court concluded that Bi-State was not a local public entity because it did not fit within the section 1-206 category of other local governmental bodies. 745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West 2006). We disagree with this conclusion for a number of reasons. Initially, we note that pursuant to the Compact, Bi-State is expressly a body corporate and politic. 45 ILCS 100/1 (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 70.370 (West 2004). Further, Bi-State was expressly created to perform public or governmental functions. Bi-State's powers include: (1) planning, constructing, and maintaining bridges, airports, and terminal facilities; (2) making plans for the coordination of streets and highways; (3) charging and collecting fees; (4) issuing bonds; (5) receiving contributions from local, state, and federal governments; (6) the power to perform all other necessary and incidental functions; and (7) the power to exercise such additional powers as shall be conferred on it by the legislature of either state and concurred in by the legislature of the other state and approved by Act of Congress. Lastly, Bi-State is local in that it performs its governmental or public functions within its defined district. See 45 ILCS 100/1 (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 70.370 (West 2004); Pub.L. No. 81-743, 64 Stat. 568. Thus, in addition to falling within the section 1-206 category of nonprofit public corporation, Bi-State also constitutes a form of local government body as referenced in section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act and, therefore, a local public entity under the Act. Our conclusion finds support in Grady v. Bi-State Development Agency, 151 Ill. App.3d 748, 750, 104 Ill.Dec. 427, 502 N.E.2d 1087 (1986). There, the appellate court, considering Bi-State's status, relied on the same aforementioned factors to reach a similar conclusion as to Bi-State's status as a local public entity pursuant to section 1-206. Subsequent decisions of the Fifth District have likewise applied the provisions of the Tort Immunity Act to Bi-State. See Cooper v. Bi-State Development Agency, 158 Ill.App.3d 19, 110 Ill. Dec. 257, 510 N.E.2d 1288 (1987); McClintock v. Bi-State Development Agency, 228 Ill.App.3d 382, 169 Ill.Dec. 463, 591 N.E.2d 967 (1992). We note, too, that our determination is faithful to the intent of the legislature. Subsequent to Grady, decided in 1986, the General Assembly has amended section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act six times to include various entities within the statutory definition of local public entity. 745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West 2006). A court presumes that the legislature amends a statute with knowledge of judicial decisions interpreting the statute. Morris v. William L. Dawson Nursing Center, Inc., 187 Ill.2d 494, 499, 241 Ill.Dec. 586, 719 N.E.2d 715 (1999); Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill.2d 445, 458, 227 Ill.Dec. 532, 687 N.E.2d 1014 (1997); In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d 381, 388, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929 (1992). In this case, therefore, we presume that the legislature knew of Grady 's holding when it amended section 1-206 six times in the past 24 years. The legislature's failure to expressly exclude Bi-State from section 1-206 (see Bruso, 178 Ill.2d at 458-59, 227 Ill.Dec. 532, 687 N.E.2d 1014), or expressly add Bi-State to those already listed (see Morris, 187 Ill.2d at 499, 241 Ill.Dec. 586, 719 N.E.2d 715; Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 388, 178 Ill.Dec. 406, 604 N.E.2d 929), indicates legislative acquiescence in Grady 's holding. If the legislature intended to exclude Bi-State from the purview of the Tort Immunity Act, it would have done so expressly, as it did with any entity organized under or subject to the `Metropolitan Transit Authority Act.' 745 ILCS 10/2-101(b) (West 2006). Also, our conclusion is consistent with federal authority. See, supra, at 8. In Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir.1991), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit exhaustively analyzed Bi-State's status to determine whether the agency was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity as an arm of either state. The court concluded: On balance, we believe Bi-State is more like a local governmental entity than an arm of Missouri and Illinois. State law characterizes Bi-State as a local public body. Much like a county, Bi-State's object is to plan, develop, and engage in proprietary functions in a defined region with local governance, for the common good of the communities within the region. The compact does not identify Bi-State as an arm of the states or grant Bi-State sovereign immunity. Although Missouri and Illinois retain control over Bi-State's actions, Missouri and Illinois are not compelled to fund Bi-State. Significantly, nothing obligates Missouri and Illinois to satisfy Bi-State's liabilities and obligations. Barket, 948 F.2d at 1088. Clearly, Bi-State is a form of local government body as referenced in section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act. See F. Zimmerman & M. Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 11 (1976) (stating that interstate compact entities are public bodies with characteristics similar to those of other governmental organs). [5] Notwithstanding the above, plaintiff argues that the appellate court here correctly determined that Bi-State's status as an interstate compact entity prevented it from receiving the protections of the Tort Immunity Act. We disagree. Although the appellate court discussed the general nature of interstate compacts and surveyed the provisions of the Compact (393 Ill. App.3d at 1021-23, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64), the court overlooked dispositive aspects of interstate compacts, including the Compact in the present case, which renders its analysis unpersuasive.