Opinion ID: 1611682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflict with Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)?

Text: Belisle argues that in not disclosing the proffer the State did not disclose the most significant piece of impeachment evidence with respect to its star witness, Annette Belisle. Belisle's brief at 6. Belisle argues that the State's failure to disclose the proffer is grounds for reversal; thus, Belisle argues, the Court of Criminal Appeals' refusal to reverse the conviction conflicts with Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). The State counters that the proffer was irrelevant because it was associated with a plea agreement that was rendered void and that Belisle was not prejudiced by his late discovery of the proffer. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the State's failure to disclose the proffer did not amount of reversible error, stating: Here, the document that was not disclosed to the defense was based on the first plea agreement that the State had with Annette, which was rendered void when she withdrew that plea. Also, both of Annette's plea agreements were based on her testifying truthfully at her husband's trial. There is no indication, as Belisle argues, that the prosecutor had compiled a transcript for Annette to follow at trial. Nor is there any indication that the defense was not given a copy of Annette's statement to police. Annette was thoroughly cross-examined about her plea agreement and repeatedly said that the State had told her to testify truthfully. Under the facts of this case, there is no indication that the late disclosure of the document affected the outcome of the trial. Belisle, 11 So.3d at 296. Belisle argues that this holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Giglio v. United States , in which the Supreme Court of the United States held: ... Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. [83], at 87[(1963)], held that suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial `irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' See American Bar Association, Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and the Defense Function § 3.11(a). When the `reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule. Napue [ v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)]. 405 U.S. at 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763. However, the Supreme Court also noted in Giglio: We do not, however, automatically require a new trial whenever `a combing of the prosecutors' files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict ....' United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (C.A.2 1968). A finding of materiality of the evidence is required under Brady, supra, at 87. A new trial is required if `the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury....' Napue, supra, at 271. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763. Impeachment evidence, however, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Thus, under Giglio, the progeny of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), [3] reversal is required when the State (1) suppresses (2) evidence favorable to a defendant and (3) that evidence is material. [4] Therefore, in order to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicts with Giglio, we address each element.
Belisle argues that regardless of the status of the plea agreement, the proffer was impeachment material to which the defense was entitled. The State argues that it was not required to disclose the proffer because Annette had withdrawn from the plea agreement for which the proffer was created. We agree that the proffer was discoverable evidence that was suppressed. First, one of the State's attorneys stated at trial that he did not dispute that [the proffer] should have been turned over to the defense. Absolutely. [5] Second, the State signed the proffer on April 29, 2002, at which time the trial court had already entered an order entitling Belisle to discover [a]ll records, notes, memoranda, and documents in the possession of the state relating to the grant of immunity, promises, consideration, threats or any other inducements to any individual to obtain information or testimony about this crime by the State and any of its law enforcement or other agencies. [6] Under both the terms of the order [7] and Rule 16.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., [8] the State had a continuing duty to disclose the requested discovery as it became available. Therefore, the State's argument that it was not required to disclose the proffer because the plea agreement it accompanied was later rendered void is incorrect. At the time the plea agreement was made and the proffer was signed, the State was obligated to disclose the proffer because it relat[ed] to the ... promises, consideration, [and] threats ... to any individual to obtain information or testimony. Therefore, we conclude that the proffer was subject to the discovery order and was suppressed.
Belisle contends that the proffer is a `script' on which the State's key witness relied at trial [that] is unambiguously favorable to the defense. Petition at 9. The State argues however, that the proffer was irrelevant and not favorable to the defense because the evidence contained in a null and void profferdetailing an agreement that was no longer in existencewas not relevant to Annette's credibility and, thus, not favorable to the defense. [I]mpeachment evidence is favorable evidence. Jefferson v. State, 645 So.2d 313, 316 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (Impeachment evidence ..., as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.). We have further held that exculpatory evidence, regardless of its trustworthiness or admissibility, should be disclosed.... Ex parte Brown, 548 So.2d 993, 994 (Ala.1989). The proffer begins by stating that the truth is as follows, and then outlines expected testimony, emphasizes specific passages, threatens to reinstate capital charges if Annette does not cooperate fully, and lastly notes that [i]t shall be unacceptable and a violation of the terms of this agreement for Annette Belisle to `forget' or `fail to recall' testimony previously provided and/or mentioned specifically herein. Even if the original plea agreement and accompanying proffer were no longer in effect, the proffer certainly casts doubt on Annette's testimony and the State's handling of the case. Therefore, regardless of its admissibility, the proffer is impeachment material favorable to Belisle.
Last, but perhaps most importantly, we must determine whether the evidence was `material.' Jefferson, 645 So.2d at 316. Belisle argues that impeaching Annette Belisle ... was critical to the defense. Belisle's brief at 9. The State argues that even if the proffer should have been disclosed, the Court of Criminal Appeals was correct that `[u]nder the facts of this case, there is no indication that the late disclosure of the documents affected the outcome of the trial.' State's brief at 19-20 (quoting Belisle, 11 So.3d at 296). The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. [9] The same rule applies when the State discloses Brady material in an untimely manner. See Coral v. State, 628 So.2d 954, 979 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (Tardy disclosure of Brady material is generally not reversible error unless the defendant can show that he was denied a fair trial. (citing United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir.1978); Ex parte Raines, 429 So.2d 1111 (Ala.1982); and McClain v. State, 473 So.2d 612 (Ala.Crim.App.1985))). First, the issue of materiality distinguishes Belisle's case from Giglio. In this case, the proffer was discovered and used by the Belisle during trial, and it contained no undisclosed promises or threats. In Giglio, however, defense counsel discovered new evidence [during the pendency of the defendant's appeal] indicating that the Government had failed to disclose an alleged promise made to its key witness [Taliento] that he would not be prosecuted if he testified for the Government. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150-51, 92 S.Ct. 763. Furthermore, the facts of Giglio also indicate that Taliento testified at trial that he had received no promises for his testimony, and that [i]n summation, the Government attorney stated, `(Taliento) received no promises that he would not be indicted.' Giglio, 405 U.S. at 152, 92 S.Ct. 763. Because the facts of Giglio are distinguishable from those in this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in this case does not conflict with Giglio. Even if the facts of Giglio were not distinguishable, however, Belisle still has failed to demonstrate that had the proffer been disclosed sooner, the outcome of his trial would have been different. The gravamen of Belisle's arguments is that the proffer destroys [Annette's] credibility... and casts suspicion on the State's investigation and handling of the case, Belisle's brief at 11, and that the State's failure to disclose the proffer prevented [Belisle] from formulating a key part of his defense. Belisle's brief at 12. Belisle's second argument has been previously addressed by this Court. Appellant's argument that the information would have enabled more effective preparation for trial was rejected in United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. [97,] at 112 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. at 2401 n. 20 [(1976)], on the grounds that an argument could always be made that knowledge of the prosecutor's case, both incriminating and exculpatory, would help defense counsel in preparation of the case for the defense. Therefore, the proper focus is upon the materiality in the nondisclosure or delayed disclosure of exculpatory information in determining the denial vel non of defendant's rights of due process and fair trial .... Ex parte Raines, 429 So.2d 1111, 1113-14 (Ala.1982). [10] Thus, Belisle is not entitled to a new trial simply because having the proffer would have enabled him to more effectively prepare for trial. Belisle also argues that the proffer was material because Belisle's theory of defense was that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the crime because its main witness, Annette Belisle, was lying to gain her freedom. Impeaching Annette Belisle therefore was critical to the defense of this case. Belisle's brief at 9. He also argues that the revelation of this agreement committing her to a specific version of facts would have undermined the State's attempt to shore up Annette's credibility and would have `put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in the verdict.' Belisle's brief at 19 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). We disagree. Belisle did not initially have access to the proffer; thus, he could not at that time attack Annette's alleged scripted testimony. The record, however, indicates that Belisle had many other components of that proffer by which he could similarly impeach Annette: Belisle was aware of and cross-examined Annette on the fact that she was testifying as part of a plea agreement with the State; he was aware of the original plea agreement with which the proffer was associated; and he used Annette's various previous statements given to State detectives to impeach her. Additionally, once the defense was made aware of the proffer, it was admitted into evidence, and defense counsel had the opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine Annette regarding it. [11] Moreover, the defense also presented other impeachment testimony from three inmates who had been incarcerated with Annette: Kitty Hyatt, Valerie Wheeler, and Juanita Pitts. Kitty Hyatt testified that Annette said she was present at the murder but that she had not struck the initial blow. Valerie Wheeler testified that she overheard Annette say that Annette had hit the victim with a can of peas and that the man with her had hit the victim with an iron bar. Juanita Pitts testified that Annette said that she struck the initial blow with a can and then asked Belisle to help. Thus, although Belisle did not originally have the proffer in his possession, Belisle was certainly able to establish that Annette had incentive to lie (and had lied to investigators), to demonstrate that Annette was not a credible witness, and, once the proffer was disclosed, to cast suspicion on the State's investigation and handling of the case. Although the proffer both was suppressed and was favorable to Belisle, so as to meet those two elements, we cannot conclude that it was material. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals does not conflict with Giglio and Belisle is not entitled to a reversal.