Opinion ID: 199280
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the petitioner convicted?

Text: 13 We review de novo an agency's construction of a statute that it administers, subject, however, to established principles of deference. Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 304 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999)). If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843. Because agency officials acting in the immigration context exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations, deference to administrative expertise is particularly appropriate. Herrera-Inirio, 208 F.3d at 304 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 14 The path that leads to the current definition of conviction is a long and winding one. In 1988, the BIA, in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 551-52 (BIA 1988), attempted to ensure uniformity by creating a three-part definition of conviction. 3 That effort to produce uniformity failed and, in 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA, which, among other things, added the current definition of conviction to the INA. See INA §101(a)(48)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). The current definition of conviction as it relates to immigration is as follows: 15 The term conviction means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where-- 16 (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and 17 (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed. 18 INA § 101(a)(48)(A). 19 In Herrera-Inirio, we held that it was Congress's intent to broaden[] the scope of the definition of 'conviction' beyond that adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Ozkok. 208 F.3d at 305 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 244 (1996)). We stated that [t]his language leaves nothing to the imagination. Id. at 304. 20 We follow that holding in the present case. The statute is clear and unambiguous. Applying the statute, we hold that the petitioner does have a conviction. He does not contest that he pled guilty to the charges levied against him or that the judge ordered punishment in the form of imprisonment. What he does contest is the fact that he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and therefore should not be found to have a conviction. 21 He argues that we should apply the FJDA to his case and conclude that he does not have a conviction for immigration purposes. Such a determination would allow him to remain in this country. The petitioner argues that because he was only seventeen, the offense was a delinquency and not a conviction for immigration purposes. We disagree. The petitioner was adjudicated as an adult in the Rhode Island state court. The BIA held: 22 By the time an alien has been served a Notice to Appear and appears within the jurisdiction of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, he or she has already been adjudicated as an adult or a juvenile within the jurisdiction of the criminal court; the Immigration Court need not enter into this consideration and is free to apply section 101(a)(48) of the Act. Whether or not a state court adjudicates an alien's criminal behavior in juvenile proceedings falls outside of our jurisdiction . . . . 23 We agree. Neither we nor the BIA have jurisdiction to determine how a state court should adjudicate its defendants. Once adjudicated by the state court, as either a juvenile or an adult, we are bound by that determination. 24 It is true that if a juvenile is prosecuted under foreign laws, the BIA will apply the FJDA to determine whether he had a juvenile delinquency or an adult conviction for immigration purposes. See, e.g., Matter of De La Nues, 18 I. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1981); Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 135 (BIA 1981). The petitioner urges us to expand that ruling to cover juveniles prosecuted under state laws, and invites us to adopt a federal standard for determining if a petitioner who commits an offense prior to his eighteenth birthday has a conviction for immigration purposes. The plain language of the statute forbids us from adopting such a standard. If Congress had wanted the INS to follow the FJDA at all times, it would have so stated. We hold that this petitioner has a conviction as defined by INA §101(a)(48). 25