Opinion ID: 2403621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Permanent Guardianship Order and Visitation

Text: Having concluded that S.B.'s motion was timely filed, we now consider her claim that the magistrate judge's guardianship order violated her visitation rights by, first, placing D.B. in a location that is inaccessible to her, second, giving the C.'s the discretion to cease visitation if she acts inappropriately, and third, requiring her to enter therapy and undergo a medication assessment as a condition for continued visitation. The proper disposition of a neglected child, including the question whether a non-custodial parent should be granted visitation rights, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court; the exercise of that discretion is reviewable only for abuse. [10] In re Ko. W., 774 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.2001) (citing In re D.M., 771 A.2d 360, 370 (D.C.2001)) (other citations omitted). Judicial discretion must, however, be founded upon correct legal principles, and a trial court abuses its discretion when it rests its conclusions on incorrect legal standards. In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 75 (D.C.1991) (citations omitted). An informed choice among the alternatives requires that the trial court's determination be based upon and drawn from a firm factual foundation. Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 364 (D.C.1979). Just as a trial court's action is an abuse of discretion if no valid reason is given or can be discerned for it, so also it is an abuse if the stated reasons do not rest upon a specific factual predicate. Id. (citing Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 821 (D.C.1978)) (other citation omitted). We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in placing specific conditions on S.B.'s visitation. [11] First, there was ample evidence for the magistrate judge to conclude that D.B. should live with the C.'s, her paternal grandparents, in New Jersey. The testimony demonstrated that the C.'s have provided D.B. with a loving and stable home for two years; they take her to school, doctor's appointments and soccer games; they buy her presents and supply her day-to-day needs; and that, in general, she is flourishing in New Jersey. By contrast, S.B. presented absolutely no evidence that she is unable to travel to New Jersey or that she even wants to visit with D.B. more than three times per year. Moreover, S.B. failed to explain why she never accompanied her mother, M.D., on any of her four trips from Washington, D.C., to New Jersey. Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that S.B. is unable to travel to New Jersey, we would note that the guardianship order requires the C.'s to take D.B. to see her mother in the District of Columbia at least three times per year. [12] This requirement is consistent with Dr. Galler's recommendation that S.B. be limited to four supervised visits with D.B. per year. Second, there is no evidence supporting S.B.'s contention that the C.'s will misuse their discretion to improperly prevent S.B. from visiting her daughter. D.C. testified that she does not want to interrupt the relationship between D.[B.] and her parents, and that she believed that D.B. should have a good relationship with her mother and with her father. D.C. explained that she would like to see the visitations continue between [S.B. and D.B.] because this will help D.[B.] to develop a more emotional attachment to her mother. Moreover, while Ms. Calaway, the CFSA supervisor, testified that the relationship between S.[B.] and the C.'s may have interfered with setting up visitation in some instances, there is no evidence showing that the C.'s were responsible, or that their relationship with S.B. will necessarily foreclose future visitations. Third, there was sufficient evidence for the magistrate judge to condition S.B.'s visitation with D.B. on her willingness to enter weekly therapy and undergo a medication assessment. Dr. Galler diagnosed S.B. with borderline personality disorder, and testified that she has almost no insight into herself and to [her] problems, that she has no, very little or almost no, capacity to empathize and understand the workings of other people's minds even, and that [s]he cannot control her angry outbursts ... [or] her hurtful comments. Importantly for the magistrate judge's consideration, S.B.'s inability to control her anger or her hurtful comments appears to extend to her relationship with her daughter. For example, D.C. testified that during one telephone visit, S.B. actually used profanity on the phone, which upset D.[B.] terribly to the point that D.[B.] hung the phone up. Dr. Galler concluded that without proper treatment and medication, it was unlikely that S.B. was capable of acting appropriately around her daughter. Given the strength of Dr. Galler's testimony, and that S.B. offered no evidence to contradict his expert opinion or demonstrate that she was capable of behaving appropriately when visiting with her daughter, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the magistrate judge to require S.B. to attend weekly therapy and undergo medication assessment. We cannot say that the conditions imposed by the magistrate judge do not rest upon a specific factual predicate. Johnson, supra, 398 A.2d at 364. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. So ordered.