Opinion ID: 2625770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: As an alternative to his argument that K.S.A. 21-3435 creates a specific intent crime, Richardson argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State presented no evidence on the requisite element of specific intent, i.e., that he engaged in sexual intercourse with the intent to expose M.K. or E.Z. to HIV. We review a sufficiency of the evidence challenge in a criminal case to determine whether, after review of all of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gutierrez, 285 Kan. 332, 336, 172 P.3d 18 (2007). A conviction of even the gravest offense may be sustained by circumstantial evidence. State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 22, 169 P.3d 1069 (2007). Accordingly, if there is evidence to support a finding that each of the elements of a crime has been met, this court should uphold a defendant's convictions even when the evidence was entirely circumstantial. State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 107, 21 P.3d 516, cert. denied 534 U.S. 1047, 122 S.Ct. 630, 151 L.Ed.2d 550 (2001). However, [c]onvictions based upon circumstantial evidence ... can present a special challenge to the appellate court because 'the circumstances in question must themselves be proved and cannot be inferred or presumed from other circumstances.' State v. Williams, 229 Kan. 646, 648-49, 630 P.2d 694 (1981) (quoting 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 91, pp. 150-51 [13th ed.1972]). To establish a violation of K.S.A. 21-3435(a)(1) in this case, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that Richardson knew that he was infected with a life-threatening communicable disease; (2) that Richardson knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse with M.K. and E.Z.; (3) that Richardson engaged in this conduct with the intent to expose M.K. and E.Z. to the life-threatening communicable disease; and (4) that the conduct took place in Lyon County on or about the alleged dates. At trial, the parties stipulated that Richardson knew he had HIV and that he had sexual intercourse with M.K. and E.Z. in Lyon County on or about the dates alleged in the criminal complaint. The State produced evidence by way of Dr. Penn's testimony that HIV is a life-threatening communicable disease. Thus, the only element that can be seriously disputed is Richardson's specific intent. The State argues that the mere fact that Richardson engaged in sexual intercourse while knowing that he was infected with HIV was enough to prove that he intended to expose M.K. and E.Z. to the virus. According to the State, there is no conceivable means by which the State could prove, apart from the act of sexual intercourse itself, that an HIV positive individual who knowingly engages in sexual intercourse with another acts with `intent to expose' the other to the virus. We disagree. Prosecutors are routinely called upon to prove a defendant's specific intent in committing a prohibited act and normally must carry that burden with circumstantial evidence. Here, the State simply made no attempt to prove the requisite circumstances. Interestingly, at the preliminary hearing, the State presented evidence that M.K. and E.Z. did not know that Richardson had HIV when they had sex with him; that Richardson did not use a condom; and that Richardson had falsely represented to E.Z. that he was free from sexually transmitted diseases. These are prime examples of proven circumstances that could support an inference that Richardson intended to expose M.K. and E.Z. to HIV. Inexplicably, the State chose not to present any of this information at trial, and those facts were not included in the parties' stipulation. The State attempts to rectify the evidentiary oversight by arguing that condom use and disclosure of the defendant's infection are irrelevant to proving an intent to expose because K.S.A. 21-3435 is silent on those points, unlike similar statutes in other jurisdictions. For example, Missouri's statute, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 191.677(4) (2008 Supp.), specifically states that [t]he use of condoms is not a defense to a violation of that statute. However, Missouri's statute, unlike K.S.A. 21-3435, criminalizes reckless sexual intercourse by a person infected with HIV. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 191.677(2) (2000). K.S.A. 21-3435(a)(1) not only requires proof that the defendant knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse, but it also requires evidence of a specific intent to expose the defendant's sexual partner to a life-threatening communicable disease. Thus, under our statute, condom use can be germane to the defendant's specific intent. Likewise, the State points to laws in other states which make consent or lack of consent an element of criminal exposure to HIV and argues that the Kansas Legislature's failure to include such language in K.S.A. 21-3435 indicates that consent is not an affirmative defense. Again, the State misses the point. Proof that M.K. or E.Z. did not knowingly consent to engage in sexual intercourse with an HIV infected partner would not be offered to refute an affirmative defense, but rather it would merely be a circumstance in furtherance of establishing Richardson's specific intent to expose his partners to HIV. Further, the State attempts to shift the burden of proof by arguing that Richardson presented no direct evidence of his own belief that a low viral load could not transmit or expose another to the virus and that he failed to demonstrate at trial that the sex with either of these women was consensual. Of course, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crime, including Richardson's specific intent to expose M.K. and E.Z. to HIV. Richardson had no burden to disprove specific intent. Finally, at oral argument, the State asserted that the trial testimony of Richardson's treating physician established that Richardson had been thoroughly educated on the risks of transmitting HIV through sexual intercourse. That knowledge, the State argues, is a circumstance which would support the specific intent element. However, Dr. Penn's testimony was less than definitive on that point. When asked by the prosecutor whether he had discussed with Richardson safe or acceptable practices for engaging in sexual contact, the doctor replied, I think we did early on, but I-I can't give you a time. Subsequently, when questioned by defense counsel, the doctor conceded that his records did not reflect such counseling for Richardson, even though the doctor maintained comprehensive records which should have reflected such a conversation with a patient. In short, the doctor's testimony did not establish the circumstance which the State now asserts. In conclusion, the record reveals that, at trial, the State failed to prove circumstances from which a rational factfinder could reasonably infer that the defendant had the specific intent to expose either M.K. or E.Z. to HIV. Instead, the State has asked us to infer or presume the requisite circumstantial evidence of specific intent from other circumstances or inferences. Such a presumption upon a presumption is insufficient to carry the State's burden. Accordingly, we find the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and reverse in both cases.