Opinion ID: 796675
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Williams's Appeal

Text: 27 Williams first argues that the District Court erred by failing to comply with the dictates of § 3553(a) in deciding not to resentence him. Specifically, Williams asserts that the District Court improperly stated that it was obligated to impose a reasonable sentence after considering the § 3553(a) factors, when in fact, the District Court's duty under § 3553(a) is to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2). See note 3, ante (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). The sufficient, but not greater than necessary clause is known as the parsimony clause of § 3553(a). See United States v. Ministro-Tapia, 470 F.3d 137, 138 (2d Cir.2006) (discussing parsimony clause). 28 We have recognized that district courts are to impose sentences pursuant to the requirements of § 3553(a)—including the requirements of § 3553(a)'s parsimony clause—while appellate courts are to review the sentences actually imposed by district courts for reasonableness. See Ministro-Tapia, 470 F.3d at 141 (noting our general agreement with this dichotomy); see also United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 n. 1 (6th Cir.2006) ([A] district court's job is not to impose a `reasonable' sentence. Rather, a district court's mandate is to impose `a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes' of section 3553(a)(2). Reasonableness is the appellate standard of review in judging whether a district court has accomplished its task.). 29 We nonetheless decline to order a second Crosby remand for two reasons. First, there is no indication that the District Court actually failed to consider the requirements of the parsimony clause when deciding whether to resentence Williams pursuant to Crosby. To the contrary, the District Court explicitly stated that it was considering all of the § 3553(a) factors in determining whether to resentence defendants, see Williams, 383 F.Supp.2d at 427 (stating, before declining to resentence, I have also considered all the sentencing factors listed at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)), and we presume, in the absence of record evidence suggesting otherwise, that a sentencing judge has faithfully discharged [his] duty to consider the statutory factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 30. Here, on the Crosby remand Williams failed make any arguments to the District Court based on the parsimony clause; as we stated in Ministro-Tapia, where . . . the defendant never argued the parsimony clause in the district court, we do not assume from the court's failure specifically to reference that clause that the court has ignored its mandate. 470 F.3d at 141. 30 Second, Williams has failed to demonstrate that the District Court's reference to the appellate standard of review when deciding whether to resentence him constituted reversible error. See Ministro-Tapia, 470 F.3d at 142 (a `[district] court's reference to imposing a reasonable sentence under the § 3553(a) factors, as opposed to say an appropriate, sensible, or fair sentence under those factors, . . . does not invariably plant the seeds of reversible error' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cruz, 461 F.3d 752, 756 (6th Cir.2006))). There is no indication in the record that the District Court's reference to its duty to impose a sentence that was reasonable affected in any way its assessment of whether resentencing of Williams was warranted; the District Court did not, for example, indicate that while it might have imposed a different sentence under the advisory Guidelines regime created by Booker/Fanfan, it would not resentence because the initial sentence imposed was reasonable. Instead, the District Court explicitly stated that even if it were to resentence Williams under the advisory Guidelines regime, the sentence it would impose would be the same and would not be affected by the fact the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory and not mandatory. Williams, 383 F.Supp.2d at 427. Accordingly, a second remand pursuant to Crosby —the remedy that Williams seeks for the District Court's alleged error—would not achieve any different result. 31 Williams also argues on appeal that the 216-month term of imprisonment imposed by the District Court was unreasonably long, primarily because his age (he is 56 years old) allegedly reduces the risk that he will be a repeat offender if he were released from prison. In addition, Williams contends that his sentence was overly long because of the impact that his sentence is having on his children, and because a shorter sentence would still permit him to pursue necessary educational or vocational training, medical care, and correctional treatment—including treatment for his drug addiction. 32 Although Williams's sentence was substantial, we conclude, upon consideration of the entire record, that his sentence was well within the broad range of reasonable sentences that the District Court could have imposed in the circumstances presented. Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 34. Williams was convicted and sentenced for having a supervisory role in a substantial heroin trafficking conspiracy, and for thirteen separate counts of using the U.S. Mail to facilitate the conspiracy. At his sentencing hearing, the District Court found that Williams had obstructed justice in connection with the conspiracy, a conclusion that we affirmed on appeal. See Peterson, 385 F.3d at 139-43. Moreover, Williams had displayed a history of committing drug-related offenses, cutting against the argument that Williams posed a low risk of re-offending. Finally, the sentence imposed was well below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment that Williams faced for the heroin trafficking conspiracy, and also well below the sentence he could have faced had the District Court chosen to run the sentences on his multiple counts of conviction consecutively rather than concurrently. In sum, Williams's sentence was not unreasonably long.