Opinion ID: 1985339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Washington's Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: Keys's first contention, that the trial court should have upheld Washington's assertion of privilege, is foreclosed by the settled rule that a defendant ordinarily does not have standing to complain of an erroneous ruling on a witness's claim of privilege. See Lyons v. United States, 683 A.2d 1080, 1084 (D.C.1996); Ellis v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 42-43, 416 F.2d 791, 799-800 (1969). See also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-76, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). Keys argues that Ellis and Lyons recognize an exception to this standing rule, to wit that a defendant who is adversely affected in fact by an erroneous judicial ruling on a witness's claim of privilege does have standing to challenge that ruling. Lyons, 683 A.2d at 1084 (quoting Ellis, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 44, 416 F.2d at 800). Keys contends that he comes within this exception on the theory that if the court had upheld Washington's privilege claim, the government would have had to grant her immunity; and then Washington supposedly would have testified, as she told the prosecutor over the lunch break, that Keys did not possess a weapon when he broke into her apartment on September 16. Keys misconstrues the exception to the no-standing rule that Ellis announced and that Lyons acknowledged. That exception is more limited than Keys makes it out to be. Under Ellis, whether a defendant has standing to challenge an erroneous ruling on another witness's claim of privilege turns not merely on whether the defendant was adversely affected by the ruling, but also on whether the court, in rendering its ruling, exceeded its authority and usurped a prerogative that Congress has withheld from the courts. Id., 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 41, 416 F.2d at 798. Thus, Ellis held that notwithstanding the general rule against standing, a defendant could complain where the trial court chose to compel testimony from a witness whose Fifth Amendment privilege the court recognized as valid  but only because courts lack authority to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution in exchange for their testimony, since the law enforcement powers are lodged exclusively in the executive branch. Id., 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 40 n. 9, 416 F.2d at 797 n. 9. Nor did this court's opinion in Lyons expand the narrow Ellis exception to the no-standing rule. Keys points to the statements in Lyons that [t]he Ellis court also recognized, however, that when a judge erroneously rejects a witness' claim of privilege, the reasons which underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights ... are outweighed by the need to protect ... fundamental rights . . . . (citations omitted); and that the Ellis exception to the no-standing rule ... is inapplicable in the instant case because there was no erroneous ruling on the Fifth Amendment waiver issue. Lyons, 683 A.2d at 1084 (holding that evidence supported trial court's ruling that each witness had knowingly and voluntarily waived his privilege). Taken out of context, these statements might seem to indicate, as Keys contends, that the Lyons court conceived the Ellis exception to be broader than did the Ellis court itself. But that would be a misreading of the opinion. The Lyons court undertook to follow Ellis, not to enlarge upon it. That the Lyons court allowed standing only to challenge judicial usurpation of authority is demonstrated by the specific language with which the court articulated the exception to the no-standing rule. Quoting Ellis, the court stated that `a defendant adversely affected in fact has standing to bring such departure from the judicial province to the appellate court for review and correction.' Lyons, 683 A.2d at 1084 (quoting Ellis, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 44, 416 F.2d at 800) (emphasis added). No broader exception has been recognized. Accord, Isler v. United States, 731 A.2d 837, 840 n. 6 (D.C.1999); Bright v. United States, 698 A.2d 450, 458 (D.C.1997). Properly understood, the Ellis exception is of no benefit to Keys in this case. In requiring Washington to testify, the trial court did not act outside the scope of its authority or usurp a prerogative that Congress has withheld from the courts. Ellis, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 42, 416 F.2d at 798. Rather, the trial court simply evaluated Washington's claim on its merits and ruled that she did not have a valid basis for asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to testify. We do not wish to imply that the court erred in so ruling. [5] But whether or not the court erred, its ruling was within the judicial province. Keys therefore has no standing to challenge that ruling on appeal.