Opinion ID: 403838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: piner

Text: 10 Defendants argue, and the district court assumed, that our decision in United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979), controls and requires suppression of the evidence seized from the GLOBE TROTTER. We disagree. 11 Piner involved a random stop of a 43-foot sailboat during a routine Coast Guard patrol of San Francisco Bay. As here, the commander acted without a warrant and without probable cause to believe or a founded suspicion that a violation of the law had occurred. Also as in this case, the stop occurred after dark, at approximately 6:30 p. m. But unlike this case, the decision to board in Piner was made solely by the commander on board the Coast Guard cutter, was not pursuant to an administrative plan, and was for the sole purpose of inspecting for compliance with safety regulations. The sailboat was hailed, the Coast Guard cutter identified itself, and the sailboat was ordered to prepare to be boarded. Once on board, one member of the boarding party immediately noticed through an open door bags of marijuana in plain view in a lighted cabin below. 12 We concluded that the search and seizure in Piner constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 13 If the purpose of the random stop is to ascertain and discourage noncompliance with safety regulations, we see no reason why this purpose cannot sufficiently be accomplished during the daylight hours. Thus, reliance on this less intrusive means eliminates the need for stops and boardings after dark where no cause to suspect noncompliance exists. 14 We conclude that the random stop and boarding of a vessel after dark for safety and registration inspection without cause to suspect noncompliance is not justified by the governmental need to enforce compliance with safety regulations and constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. A stop and boarding after dark must be for cause, requiring at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion of noncompliance, or must be conducted under administrative standards so drafted that the decision to search is not left to the sole discretion of the Coast Guard officer. 15 Id. at 361. 16 In deciding Piner, we relied heavily on the Supreme Court's then very recent decision in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Prouse involved a random stop of an automobile for a routine check of driver's license and registration. The Court held that such a random stop at the unbridled discretion of police officers, without even a reasonable suspicion that any laws were being violated, was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 17 At the outset, the Court in Prouse stated that the Fourth Amendment imposes a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of police discretion. Reasonableness implies a balancing of the competing individual and governmental interests. 18 Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 19 Id. at 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396 (quoted in Piner, 608 F.2d at 360). 20 The intrusion must be measured in terms of both  '(the) objective intrusion-the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection-.... (and) the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers-....'  Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656, 99 S.Ct. at 1397 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3083, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)). 21 The governmental interests, on the other hand, must be evaluated in light of alternate mechanisms available, both those in use and those that might be adopted, to accomplish the legitimate government objectives. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659, 99 S.Ct. at 1399. 22 Comparing the facts here with those of Piner, particularly in light of the analysis set forth in Prouse, we find that Piner does not help us determine whether the stop of the GLOBE TROTTER was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The overall intrusion was less here than in Piner, and the governmental interests were greater. 23 On the intrusion side of the balance, the objective intrusion here was essentially the same as that in Piner, but the subjective intrusion was less. The Coast Guard took several specific steps to minimize concern or fright on the part of the GLOBE TROTTER crew. The stripe-lights were energized early, so that defendants would have less reason to be fearful. Radio contact was made almost a half hour before boarding. 3 The defendants could not have had any sense of being singled out arbitrarily, as would the occupants of a car plucked from a stream of traffic. Unlike the stops in Piner and Prouse, this stop was not made on a random basis at the discretion of an officer in the field; rather, Commander Chapman was acting according to an administrative plan directing him to stop all vessels less than 200 feet in length. 4 24 On the other side of the balance, the governmental interests at stake were greater than the justifications offered in Piner. Only the need to enforce compliance with safety regulations was considered in Piner. 608 F.2d at 361. Here, the Coast Guard also had an interest in enforcing compliance with documentation laws. International law obligates the Coast Guard to police the documentation of vessels flying the United States flag in international waters. Convention of the High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, arts. 5 & 10, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2315, 2316, T.I.A.S. No. 5200. Further, the alternative means cited in Piner, restricting administrative stops to daylight hours, is far less practical on the high seas, where efficiency dictates that Coast Guard crews work around the clock. 5 Even if it were practical, it is not clear that use of such an alternative means on the high seas would appreciably diminish the subjective intrusion felt by the crews of boarded vessels. During daylight hours a vessel still is isolated, with no basis for feeling singled out, 6 and no opportunity to feel reassured by the fact that other vessels are being subject to the same routine stop. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657, 99 S.Ct. at 1398 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte). Whatever fear might normally be associated with darkness can be minimized by proper use of stripe lights and the radio, as was done here, such that on the high seas the subjective intrusion need not necessarily be significantly greater at night. 25 Since the intrusion was less here than in Piner, and the governmental interests greater, the balance struck in Piner does not resolve the question whether the stop of the GLOBE TROTTER was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We must balance anew the competing interests at stake.