Opinion ID: 1975122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: defense of privilege

Text: ¶ 29. Hamdan's second argument is that his conduct was privileged under Wis. Stat. § 939.45(1), (2), and (6). Hamdan maintains that this court's holdings in State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999), and State v. Nollie, 2002 WI 4, 249 Wis. 2d 538, 638 N.W.2d 280, which significantly limited the defense of privilege for CCW offenses, are now suspect by virtue of the adoption of Article I, Section 25. [6, 7] ¶ 30. Hamdan's reliance on § 939.45(1) and (2) clearly fails. Wisconsin Stat. § 939.45(1) permits a defendant charged with a crime a defense of privilege [w]hen the actor's conduct occurs under circumstances of . . . necessity so as to be privileged under s. . . . 939.47. Wis. Stat. § 939.45(1). [10] Hamdan claims that the unpredictable nature of violence in the neighborhood immediately surrounding his store subjects him and his family to risks that make it necessary for him to keep a concealed weapon in his store. This may be true. However, the defense of necessity, by its plain language, exists only when a defendant acts in response to natural physical forces, not human forces that pose potential dangers. See State v. Olsen, 99 Wis. 2d 572, 576, 299 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1980); see also Drane v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 208, 211 n.4, 138 N.W.2d 273 (1965). The existence of random, albeit frequent, criminal conduct in one's vicinity does not qualify as a natural physical force under the law. See Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 666-67. [8] ¶ 31. Similarly, § 939.45(2), which incorporates by reference the privileges of self-defense, defense of others, defense of property, and protection against retail theft, is not available to Hamdan. [11] In Nollie, we refused to recognize a privilege to carry a concealed weapon without satisfying the stringent requirements of statutory self-defense. [12] Nollie, 249 Wis. 2d 538, ¶ 27. We held that the defendant's assertions that he was in a high crime neighborhood, that he was in a vulnerable position while changing his tire, and that he was faced with a potential threat (four young men were allegedly nearby, being loud and profane) were insufficient to constitute an imminent and specific threat under the self-defense privilege statute. Nollie, 249 Wis. 2d 538, ¶ 23-25. ¶ 32. Hamdan argues that the concerns that inspired him to carry a concealed weapon in his store were specific and imminent, based on his past experiences with crime and the high incidence of crime in the neighborhood, thus making his actions privileged. Nollie made it clear, however, that such general assertions are insufficient to support a defense of privilege. As we stated, To allow an individual to claim self-defense under such circumstances would essentially allow anyone walking in a `high crime neighborhood' to conceal a weapona situation that . . . would eviscerate the legislature's intent in making carrying a concealed weapon a crime. Id., ¶ 26. [13] ¶ 33. We have little doubt that the dangers facing Hamdan while operating his store were genuine. However, he did not face specific and imminent threats on the night of November 26, 1999, merely because of the location of his store in a high-crime neighborhood and his past victimization by criminal activity. The statutory elements of sections 939.48 and 939.49 contemplate the actual presence of an unlawful interference, which was absent in this case. [14] ¶ 34. Finally, Hamdan relies upon § 939.45(6), which provides for a defense when the actor's conduct is privileged by the statutory or common law of this state. He asserts either a common law privilege, such as the one this court recognized in State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996), [15] or a statutory privilege based upon Article I, Section 25. [9] ¶ 35. In Coleman we recognized a narrow common law privilege to the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm. This privilege requires a defendant to prove multiple factors. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 210-211. [16] However, in Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 671, we declined to apply the Coleman test to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon. In Dundon, the manager of a gas station was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon after he placed a handgun in his waistband while transporting money from his station to a bank. Id. at 657-58. The defendant asserted that he was privileged to carry a concealed weapon based upon his prior experiences as a victim of assault. The court declined to link the privilege under Coleman to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon or to find any common law privilege to CCW offenses. Id. at 677. In doing so, we noted that, in 1878, the legislature repealed the exact type of privilege sought by Dundon. Id. at 671-72. It is now recognized that the holding in Dundon forecloses application of the Coleman privilege to CCW offenses. See Nollie, 249 Wis. 2d 538, ¶ 18. The adoption of a constitutional amendment recognizing the right to keep and bear arms does not affect the soundness of the preceding analysis. [10] ¶ 36. Notwithstanding the absence of a common law privilege, Hamdan maintains that Article I, Section 25 provides a basis in law to support a statutory privilege. If we assumed that the Wisconsin Constitution could serve as the basis for a statutory privilege under § 939.45(6), we would still conclude that the constitution would have to spell out the scope of the privilegethe nexus between the privilege and the specific criminal conductto be applicable. Article I, Section 25 recognizes a right to keep and bear arms generally, but it does not express a privilege to exercise that right in a particular manner or particular circumstance. These are essential attributes of a statutory privilege. Article I, Section 25 does not create a statutory privilege to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon. ¶ 37. Under the facts of this case and in the context of the CCW statute, we do not believe that modifying the principles underlying the law of privilege, as codified in Wis. Stat. § 939.45 and interpreted in prior decisions of this court, is the appropriate method of effectuating the rights guaranteed under Wisconsin's right to keep and bear arms amendment.