Opinion ID: 2795022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Viewpoint Discriminatory Regulations

Text: “Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382; Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004). Viewpoint-based regulations are even more suspect, as they “raise[] the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991); see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). As a result, these regulations receive the strictest of scrutiny. “In the ordinary case it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is content-based and, in practice, viewpoint-discriminatory.” Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667. Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act bars the registration of disparaging speech. Under this law, it is possible to register trademarks that refer to a certain group in a positive, or non-disparaging manner, but not trademarks that refer negatively to the same group. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (finding that an ordinance forbidding the use of “fighting words” that insulted “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” was viewpoint discriminatory because certain fighting words could be used only by those arguing in favor of tolerance, not their opponents). Section 2(a) discriminates against disparaging or offensive viewpoints. 2 Under this analysis, § 2(a) is presump- 2 It is incorrect to imply that the Lanham Act treats “laudatory” and disparaging trademarks the same. The Lanham Act always prohibits registration of disparaging marks. In contrast, the Lanham Acts prohibits the registration of “merely descriptive” marks unless or until they 18 IN RE TAM tively invalid, and must satisfy strict scrutiny to be found constitutional. Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether strict scrutiny attaches to restrictions on commercial speech that are viewpoint discriminatory, there is reason to believe it is an issue worth considering. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664. This uncertainty is likely of no consequence, however, because it seems likely that section 2(a) cannot survive even the intermediate scrutiny that any restriction on commercial speech receives under Central Hudson.