Opinion ID: 1907203
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Heading: The Origin and History of Proportionality Review

Text: In Marshall II, we observed that [t]he best way to understand the concept of proportionality review is to understand its origin. 130 N.J. at 124, 613 A. 2d 1059. That observation remains true today. It is helpful, also, to consider the history of proportionality review both in this state and in our sister states to gain perspective on the role of this form of review in New Jersey's death penalty scheme.
Proportionality review arose in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1972), wherein the Court held that a Georgia statute permitting defendants to be sentenced to death at the unfettered discretion of the judge or jury violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 239-40, 92 S.Ct. at 2727, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 350; see also U.S. Const. amend. VIII (Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted). Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, described legal systems that permit ... [the death] penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed as cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightening is cruel and unusual. Furman, supra, 408 U.S. at 309-10, 92 S.Ct. at 2762-63, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 390 (Stewart, J., concurring). Four years later, the United States Supreme Court upheld statutes passed in response to Furman by Georgia, Texas and Florida, finding that the procedural safeguards provided by those statutes would prevent the death penalty from being imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2935, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 886-87 (1976); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed. 2d 929 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed. 2d 913 (1976). The Georgia statute sustained by the Court in Gregg bifurcated capital proceedings into separate guilt-phase and penalty-phase trials, and provided that during the penalty phase the judge or jury would hear evidence of mitigating and aggravating factors. 428 U.S. at 163-64, 96 S.Ct. at 2920-21, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 869-70. The defendant could be sentenced to death only if the judge or jury found that at least one of the statutory aggravating factors was present and outweighed the mitigating factors. Id. at 165-66, 96 S.Ct. at 2921-22, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 870. The Georgia statute also provided for direct appeal to the state supreme court which, among other things, was to conduct a proportionality review to determine `[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant'. Id. at 166-67, 96 S.Ct. at 2922, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 871 (quoting Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2537 (Supp.1975)). States seeking to enact constitutional death penalty statutes followed the statute upheld in Gregg like a recipe, careful to include provisions for appellate proportionality review. See infra at 268, 724 A. 2d at 136. Six years later, however, in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed. 2d 29 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that proportionality review was not indispensable to a constitutionally acceptable capital punishment statute. Id. at 45, 104 S.Ct. at 876, 79 L.Ed. 2d at 37.
Gregg did not intend to suggest that only... procedures [similar to the Georgia procedures] would be permissible under Furman or that any sentencing system constructed along ... [such] general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman.  428 U.S. at 195, 96 S.Ct. at 2935, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 887. Nonetheless, in the 1970s and early 1980s, twenty-five states enacted capital punishment statutes that required appellate proportionality review in all capital cases. See Ala.Code § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (enacted 1981); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-46b (enacted 1980); Del.Code Ann. tit. 11 § 4209(g)(2)(a) (enacted 1977); Ga.Code. Ann. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (enacted 1973); Idaho Code § 19-2827(c)(3) (enacted 1977); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 532.075(3)(c) (enacted 1976); La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.9 (enacted 1976); Md. Ann.Code, art. 27, § 414(e)(4) (enacted 1978); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 279, § 71 (enacted 1982); Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (enacted 1977); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.035 (enacted 1983); Mont.Code. Ann. § 46-18-310(1)(c) (enacted 1977); Neb.Rev. Stat. § 29-2521.03 (enacted 1978); Nev.Rev. Stat. § 177.055(2)(d) (enacted 1977); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-4(C)(4) (enacted 1979); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (enacted 1977); Ohio Rev.Code. Ann. § 2929.05(A) (enacted 1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.13(C)(3) (enacted 1976); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(h)(3)(iii) (enacted 1974); S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(C)(3) (enacted 1977); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-12(3) (enacted 1979); Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (enacted 1977); Va.Code. Ann. § 17-110.1(C)(2) (enacted 1977); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.130(2)(b) (enacted 1981); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-103(d)(iii) (enacted 1982). These statutes were passed because of the then widely-held perception that the Supreme Court would not uphold state capital punishment legislation that lacked such provisions. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only The Appearance of Justice?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 140 (1996). After Pulley, nine states repealed their proportionality review requirements. See 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 95-16(West); 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 127; 1992 Md. Laws ch. 331; 1985 Nev. Stat. ch. 527 § 1; 1985 Okla Sess. Laws ch. 265 (West), § 1; 1997 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 1997-28 (West); 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 952; 1998 Va. Acts ch. 872; 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171, § 2. A substantial number of jurisdictions, however, conduct proportionality review today pursuant to express statutory authority. In addition to the twenty-five states that enacted proportionality review provisions in the 1970s and early 1980s, three states passed similar statutes subsequent to Pulley, including Tennessee after having repealed its earlier statute, see N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 630:5(XI) (enacted 1986); N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 470.30 (enacted 1995); Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (enacted 1992). Today, twenty states, including New Jersey, conduct statutory proportionality review. In one state, Florida, the state supreme court has declared the court's intention to conduct comparative review on its own initiative. See Sinclair v. Florida, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla.1995). As might be expected, the absence of any uniform requirements enforceable under the federal Constitution has led, over the years, to variation in the conduct of proportionality review. Thus, for example, the scope of the pool or universe of comparison cases used for proportionality review varies among the states. New York and Washington have defined broad universes encompassing some homicide cases that were not capitally prosecuted. See N.Y. Jud. Law § 211-a; N.Y. Ct. Rules § 510.18 (authorizing collection of case data for every criminal action in which defendant is indicted for first-degree murder); Wash. Rev.Code Ann. §§ 10.195.120, 10.195.130(2)(b) (authorizing collection of case data for every criminal action in which defendant is convicted of aggravated first-degree murder, regardless of whether defendant is capitally prosecuted). Some states have limited the universe of comparison cases to those cases advancing to a penalty-phase trial. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Rhines, 548 N.W. 2d 415, 455-56 (S.D.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1013, 117 S.Ct. 522, 136 L.Ed. 2d 410 (1996) (finding that `[b]ecause the aim of proportionality review is to ascertain what other capital sentencing authorities have done with similar capital murder offenses, the only cases that could be deemed similar ... are those in which imposition of the death penalty was properly before the sentencing authority for determination' ) (quoting Tichnell v. Maryland, 297 Md. 432, 468 A. 2d 1, 15-16 (Md.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 2374, 80 L.Ed. 2d 846 (1984), and citing Flamer v. Delaware, 490 A. 2d 104, 139 (Del.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 198, 78 L.Ed. 2d 173 (1983), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 185, 88 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1985)); Flamer, supra, 490 A. 2d at 139 (declaring it inherently fair, logical and necessary to prevent disproportionate sentencing that this Court compare the sentence below to the facts and circumstances of cases in which a capital sentencing proceeding was actually conducted, whether the murderers have been sentenced to life imprisonment or death); Missouri v. Bolder, 635 S.W. 2d 673, 685 (Mo. 1982) (finding court's inquiry would be unduly slanted were [the court] to compare only those cases in which the death penalty has been imposed and determining as similar [t]hose cases in which both death and life imprisonment were submitted to the jury) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S.Ct. 770, 74 L.Ed. 2d 983 (1983). Other states have defined the universe of comparison cases to include only those cases in which a death sentence was imposed. See, e.g., Sanborn v. Kentucky, 892 S.W. 2d 542, 556 (Ky.1994) (considering all cases in which death penalty was imposed, as required by statute), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 854, 116 S.Ct. 154, 133 L.Ed. 2d 98 (1995); Nebraska v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W. 2d 706, 737 (1986) (finding universe of death-sentenced cases to be a threshold requirement for comparative study), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 206, 98 L.Ed. 2d 157 (1987); South Carolina v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E. 2d 63, 74 (S.C.1982) (relying only on death-sentenced cases because [f]act findings of the trial court ... provide a fundamental line of demarcation and because larger universe would cause court to enter a realm of pure conjecture and to engage in intolerable speculation), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103, 103 S.Ct. 1802, 76 L.Ed. 2d 367 (1983). Similarly, there is considerable variation among the states in respect of the methods used both to select cases for comparison purposes and to make factual comparisons among selected cases. By way of illustration, the Tennessee Supreme Court has identified at least seventeen separate factors to be used in selecting and comparing similar cases including, among others, the means of death, the manner of death, the motivation for the killing, the absence or presence of premeditation, the defendant's prior criminal record or prior criminal activity, the defendant's cooperation with authorities, and the defendant's remorse. Tennessee v. Bland, 958 S.W. 2d 651, 667 (Tenn.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1536, 140 L.Ed. 2d 686 (1998). The Washington Supreme Court considers four factors: (1) the nature of the crime, (2) the aggravating circumstances, (3) the defendant's criminal history and (4) the defendant's personal history. Washington v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 940 P. 2d 546, 562 (Wash.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1192, 140 L.Ed. 2d 322 (1998). In contrast, many courts have issued proportionality determinations without a particularized statement describing the comparative process. See, e.g., DeYoung v. Georgia, 268 Ga. 780, 493 S.E. 2d 157, 168 (Ga.1997) (referring without discussion to appendix listing similar cases where death penalty upheld), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1848, 140 L.Ed. 2d 1097 (1998); Sanborn, supra, 892 S.W. 2d at 556-57 (incorporating by reference list of cases cited in previous decisions and referring to list of five additional cases); Davis v. Mississippi, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1261-62 (Miss.1995) (referring without discussion to appendix with list of capital cases court previously affirmed), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S.Ct. 1684, 134 L.Ed. 2d 785 (1996); Pennsylvania v. Uderra, 550 Pa. 389, 706 A. 2d 334, 342 (Pa.1998) (making passing reference to statistical data without mention of similar cases). Although eleven state supreme courts have vacated death sentences as disproportionate, most have done so rarely. See, e.g., Hall v. Georgia, 241 Ga. 252, 244 S.E. 2d 833, 839 (Ga.1978) (only one aggravating factor and co-defendant received life sentence); Idaho v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 873 P. 2d 800, 806 (Idaho 1993) (no prior criminal record); Missouri v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W. 2d 333, 341 (Mo.1982) (minimal juvenile criminal record, limited education, limited intelligence, substantial alcohol problems, weak follower of co-defendant who received life sentence, and promptly turned himself in to police). The Florida Supreme Court, however, has vacated over thirty death sentences based on proportionality review, see, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 707 So. 2d 683 (Fla.1998); Jones v. Florida, 705 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.1998); Voorhees v. Florida, 699 So. 2d 602 (Fla.1997); Curtis v. Florida, 685 So. 2d 1234 (Fla.1996), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2521, 138 L.Ed. 2d 1022 (1997); Sinclair, supra, and the North Carolina Supreme Court has vacated at least seven death sentences on proportionality grounds, see, e.g., North Carolina v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E. 2d 517 (N.C.1988); North Carolina v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E. 2d 653 (N.C.1987); North Carolina v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E. 2d 713 (N.C.1986). It is perhaps significant that Florida and North Carolina have relatively large death-row populations compared to other states, see Bienen, supra, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology at 169; more important, in those states proportionality review functions as a check against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The experience of other states is instructive, if only because it demonstrates the diverse responses to questions about the conduct of proportionality review. For example, the propriety of courts utilizing quantitative methods has been vigorously debated. Compare Washington v. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d 628, 904 P. 2d 245, 277 (Wash.1995) (noting that quantitative approachcomparing number of aggravating circumstances, victims and prior convictions in similar casescan point to areas of concern and help court to be as objective as possible), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1026, 116 S.Ct. 2568, 135 L.Ed. 2d 1084 (1996), and Governor's Memorandum of Approval of 1995 N.Y. Laws, c. 1, reprinted in N.Y. Correct L. § 650 (approving consideration of statistical evidence in conducting proportionality review to determine whether race is having a significant impact upon the imposition of the death penalty), with Connecticut v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 680 A. 2d 147, 209 (Conn.1996) (rejecting New Jersey Supreme Court's statistical methods as unworkable attempt to quantify the unquantifiable), [1] and Bland, supra, 958 S.W. 2d at 665 (criticizing New Jersey Supreme Court's use of statistics as departure from jurisprudence of individualized consideration). Despite the concerns expressed by some courts about these methods, several states remain committed to a form of quantitative proportionality review to detect possible racial bias. See N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 470.30 (requiring proportionality review if request based on race of defendant or victim); Connecticut v. Cobb, 234 Conn. 735, 663 A. 2d 948, 961-62 (Conn.1995) (recognizing statutory basis for statistical claim of racial disparity in imposition of death penalty); [2] Washington v. Gentry, 125 Wash. 2d 570, 888 P. 2d 1105, 1154 (Wash.) (utilizing proportionality review to examine patterns in death sentencing based on race), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 843, 116 S.Ct. 131, 133 L.Ed. 2d 79 (1995). Yet, statistical claims of racial bias in the administration of the death penalty present legal and methodological issues of exceptional complexity. We keep in mind the dialogue engendered by these difficult questions when considering how we might answer them ourselves. We turn now to our own experience in applying proportionality review in capital cases.
When the New Jersey Legislature reintroduced the death penalty in 1982, it too substantially incorporated the procedural safeguards in the Georgia law sustained by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg, including the provision for proportionality review. See State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 202-03, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987). The New Jersey Capital Punishment Act, L. 1982, c . 111 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3), like the Georgia statute, called for a determination by this Court on [e]very judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of death.... whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e. Later, the Senate Judiciary Committee explained that, at the time the Act was passed by the State Legislature, it was thought that the United States Supreme Court would not uphold a capital punishment law that did not contain such a `proportionality review' provision. Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 950 ( L. 1985, c. 178). As enacted in 1982, the Capital Punishment Act required proportionality review, but did not describe the manner in which it was to be conducted or limit the universe of similar cases to be used for comparison purposes. In response to Pulley, however, the New Jersey Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e to abolish mandatory proportionality review and to require instead that defendants request such review by this Court. L. 1985, c. 178. Then, in 1992, the proportionality review provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e was amended yet again to define the universe of similar cases to be compared to defendant's case as those in which a sentence of death has been imposed. L. 1992, c. 5. This amendment became effective on May 12, 1992, L. 1992, c. 5, and will, if ultimately determined to be valid, limit the scope of proportionality review undertaken by this Court since Marshall II. In Ramseur, we explained that the development of a procedure of review ... [would] be an evolving process, requiring the advice of criminal justice experts ... [and] experts from disciplines outside the law. 106 N.J. at 328, 524 A. 2d 188. Our view of the fundamental purpose of proportionality review would guide this process: Proportionality review has a function entirely unique among the review proceedings in a capital proceeding. Proportionality review, in the context of a capital sentencing scheme, is not appellate review to ensure that the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all the mitigating factors, L. 1985, c. 178, or to determine if the death sentence is disproportionate to the crime in violation of the ban against cruel and unusual punishment. That death is not disproportionate in the sense of being a cruel and unusual punishment is presumed by the nature of the review. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 43, 104 S.Ct. at 875, 79 L.Ed. 2d at 36. Rather, the purpose of review here is of a different sort.... It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime. [ Id. at 326, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting Pulley, supra, 465 U.S. at 43, 104 S.Ct. at 875, 79 L.Ed. 2d at 36).] Therefore, when we conduct a proportionality review, we ask whether the punishment fits the criminal, Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 129, 613 A. 2d 1059, so as to ensure that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, non-arbitrary, and evenhanded manner, fairly and with reasonable consistency, id. at 131, 613 A. 2d 1059. Ramseur also explained that proportionality review provides a mechanism by which death sentences may be monitored, to prevent any impermissible discrimination in imposing the death penalty. 106 N.J. at 327, 524 A. 2d 188. In Marshall II, we spoke of the unique commitment of the people of New Jersey to the elimination of racial discrimination. 130 N.J. at 207, 613 A. 2d 1059. Today, as then, we believe that [t]o countenance racial discrimination in capital sentencing would mock that tradition and our own constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws under New Jersey Constitution Article I, paragraph 1. Ibid. Comparison of like cases presents an opportunity for the Court to monitor whether impermissible factors are present in the capital sentencing system. Marshall II describes in detail the creation of a database and the sorting processes we have used as a basis for comparison of similar cases. Id. at 141-45, 613 A. 2d 1059. We have substantially relied on the Final Report of our first Special Master, David C. Baldus, Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project, Final Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court (Sept. 24, 1991) ( Final Report ). As outlined in Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 152-59, 613 A. 2d 1059, and followed in our subsequent proportionality review cases, we conduct a frequency analysis using statistical methods and a precedent-seeking review consisting of case-by-case analyses of comparative culpability. State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350, 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28, 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66, 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S.Ct. 949, 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996). These methods compare the case at bar to other cases that have been found to have either similar fact patterns or similar levels of culpability and are used to determine whether the sentence imposed on the defendant in the case at bar is disproportionate to the sentences imposed in those similar cases. More specifically, frequency analysis is a statistical approach that determines in three ways which cases have similar levels of culpability: (1) the salient-factors test; (2) the numerical-preponderance-of-aggravating-and-mitigating-factors test; and (3) the index-of-outcomes test. Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 350-51, 645 A. 2d 685. The salient-factors test defines `similar cases in terms of factual comparability,' while the numerical-preponderance-of-aggravating-and-mitigating-factors test compares the raw number of those factors in each case. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 146-47, 613 A. 2d 1059 (citations omitted). The index-of-outcomes test is a regression analysis that determines the culpability levels of defendants `as measured by the presence or absence in the cases of [statutory and non-statutory aggravating and mitigating] factors that appear to influence prosecutorial and jury decisionmaking.' Id. at 147-48, 613 A. 2d 1059 (citation omitted). Precedent-seeking review, on the other hand, compares all relevant statutory and nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating factors present in factually similar cases in order to determine defendant's criminal culpability, or relative degree of deathworthiness. See DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 184-85, 662 A. 2d 442. From the beginning, there has been extensive critical commentary by the Public Defender and Attorney General, along with alternative suggested approaches, on the frequency analysis methodologies accepted by the Court. We have considered that commentary and have chosen in each case to discuss the results of our frequency tests despite their acknowledged deficiencies, with the caveat that ultimately our judgments about the proportionality of death sentences are unquantifiable. Frequency review has always functioned as an adjunct to the detailed comparison of like cases that we undertake in precedent-seeking review and that, as judges, we are by training and experience best equipped to do. [3]