Opinion ID: 4118870
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant’s Statement to Parole Officer

Text: Parole Officer Craig Jackson testified about defendant‘s good behavior leading up to his release from CYA. During his last year there, defendant had no serious disciplinary infractions, had a job, attended classes in victim awareness and anger management, and expressed understanding of the seriousness of his conduct. Defendant‘s maturity level increased. He demonstrated insight into the reasons for his actions and understood how he could avoid violence in the future. In the context of this testimony, Officer Jackson related that defendant told him ― ‗he often reacted aggressively in order to gain stature among his peers and to make himself feel good.‘ ‖ Defendant now argues this statement was inadmissible under factor (b). We disagree. The statement reflected defendant‘s insight into why he had committed the many factor (b) offenses presented over the preceding days. It was relevant context for these offenses and admissible as a surrounding circumstance. (See People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) It was also relevant as a projection of defendant‘s state of mind with respect to the Beeson murder, and thus admissible as a circumstance of this crime under section 190.3, factor (a). (See People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 224.) Finally, ―[e]vidence of statements from defendant‘s own mouth demonstrating his attitude toward his victims was highly probative‖ on the issue of future dangerousness. (People v. Payton, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) 3. Expert Testimony on Antisocial Personality Disorder and Future Dangerousness Defendant contends the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to crossexamine his expert witness about antisocial personality disorder and future 81 dangerousness. Given the scope of the expert‘s direct examination, these topics were properly raised for impeachment. The defense called Jamie Candelaria-Greene, Ph.D., an expert in learning disabilities and special education. At the outset of her testimony, the court read a standard instruction explaining that an expert‘s opinions should be assessed in light of the expert‘s qualifications and the supporting facts and reasons. Dr. Candelaria-Greene had reviewed defendant‘s school, medical, probation, and CYA records but had not met with defendant before the trial. Based on her record review, she testified that defendant suffered from ADHD. Defendant had never received medication or counseling for that condition. Defense counsel specifically asked if the expert was aware of studies examining the effects of giving prisoners ADHD medication, such as Ritalin. She described ―an excellent study‖ in which Colorado adult prisoners who showed classic signs of ADHD were given Ritalin and counseling. After six months, their recidivism rate ―plummeted‖ from the nationwide average of 50 to 60 percent down to 10 percent. Those still in prison were better able to participate in hobbies and vocational education, ―but most of all, there was a greater degree of safety associated with . . . the prisoners and those around‖ them. Defense counsel also asked her about the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV). She confirmed she was familiar with the DSM-IV and explained that it is used for diagnosing psychiatric conditions, including ADHD. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked about the DSM-IV requirements for diagnosing antisocial personality disorder. The expert eventually agreed that defendant had been repeatedly diagnosed with a conduct disorder and fit the other DSM-IV requirements for antisocial personality disorder. She did not actually give her own diagnosis that defendant had this disorder. Much of her testimony was based on hypothetical questions, and she repeatedly protested that she was not a psychologist. Defendant objected that Dr. Candelaria-Greene was not qualified to testify about the contents of the DSM-IV. The court found the 82 questioning proper because the expert testified on direct examination that she had relied on the DSM-IV in reaching her conclusions. At defendant‘s request, however, the court gave a limiting instruction explaining that any reports referenced or read during the expert‘s testimony were not admitted for truth but only to show the basis of her opinions. The prosecutor also asked about defendant‘s history of violent incidents in school and CYA. The expert agreed that, without a change in environmental conditions, past violence is the best predictor of future dangerousness. In particular, she testified that defendant‘s potential for future violence was high given his past behavior. Defendant objected at sidebar that the subject of future dangerousness was beyond her expertise. The court overruled this objection, observing that the ―linchpin‖ of her direct examination testimony was that defendant would be safe around others in prison if he were treated with Ritalin and counseling. Having raised the subject of defendant‘s future violence in prison, the court ruled the defense could not insulate it from cross-examination. (See People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1211, disapproved on another ground in People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 459.) When the court later described its ruling on the record, defendant‘s attorney clarified his objection. He said, ―There is no question that we raised it and that it was proper to discuss future dangerousness.‖ Instead, he meant to object that questions about material in psychiatric reports were beyond her area of expertise. This concession fatally undermines defendant‘s challenge to the crossexamination on future dangerousness. (People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 434-435.) In any event, the claim lacks merit. ― ‗While the prosecution is prohibited from offering expert testimony predicting future dangerousness in its case-in-chief [citation], it may explore the issue on cross-examination or in rebuttal if defendant offers expert testimony predicting good prison behavior in the future. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Jones, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1260.) Defendant raised the issue when he elicited testimony that ADHD prisoners treated with 83 medication and counseling exhibited ―a greater degree of safety‖ than was otherwise expected of them. Having chosen to raise this subject, the defense could not reasonably insulate it from cross-examination. (People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1211.) Defendant‘s challenge to cross-examination based on the DSM-IV is similarly unavailing. We rejected this same claim in People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 679-680. There, after a defense expert testified that the defendant suffered an anxiety disorder and an atypical personality disorder, the prosecutor used the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual to demonstrate on cross-examination that defendant met the requirements for a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. (Id. at p. 679.) We held this questioning was within the bounds of appropriate impeachment. (Id. at pp. 679-680; see People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 207 [―Because the defense experts relied on the DSM-IV to reach their opinions, the prosecutor was permitted to explore their familiarity with the DSM-IV on cross-examination‖].) Defendant attempts to distinguish Seaton and Mills because those cases involved no dispute about the expert‘s qualification to render a psychiatric opinion. He argues Dr. Candelaria-Greene was not qualified to diagnose antisocial personality disorder. However, defendant himself offered her expert diagnosis of ADHD based on the criteria in the DSM-IV. ―When, as here, a mental health expert offers a diagnosis, this opens the door to rebuttal testimony questioning that diagnosis or suggesting an alternative diagnosis. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 359; see People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 883.) We have never held that cross-examination must be confined to questions about the precise diagnosis an expert offers. Nor do our cases require that prosecutors present alternate diagnoses through rebuttal testimony, instead of cross-examination. Either way, the evidence is permissible as impeachment of the expert‘s opinion. (See People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 884.) Finally, it would be anomalous to hold that deficiencies in an expert‘s qualifications 84 somehow shield her opinions from vigorous testing on cross-examination. Indeed, those deficiencies were themselves an appropriate topic of cross-examination. (Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a).)27 4. Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendant claims the prosecutor committed several acts of misconduct, violating his rights to a fair trial and penalty determination. ―Improper comments by a prosecutor require reversal of a resulting conviction when those comments so infect a trial with unfairness that they create a denial of due process. [Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not reach that level nevertheless constitutes misconduct under state law, but only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the court or jury. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1031.) None of the challenged incidents constitutes prejudicial misconduct. a. Epithets Defendant complains the prosecutor committed misconduct when he used two epithets. In opening statement, the prosecutor referred to defendant and Patterson as ―evil men.‖ Defendant objected the next day. The court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor not to use that characterization in the remainder of his opening statement. The second epithet occurred during the crossexamination of Dr. Candelaria-Greene. The prosecutor asked a hypothetical question about assessing an unwilling subject, whom he referred to as a ―violent jerk.‖ The court sustained defense counsel‘s objection and told the prosecutor to rephrase the question. The prosecutor then described in detail all the personality 27 In his reply brief, defendant argues the court in its gatekeeper role has a duty to vet proffered expert opinions. (See Evid. Code, §§ 801-802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 769.) Once again, defendant ignores that the challenged testimony was elicited on crossexamination. The prosecutor did not ―proffer‖ Dr. Candelaria-Greene‘s opinion. Rather, he impeached the opinions she offered on direct examination by demonstrating that the records she reviewed supported an alternative diagnosis. We need not further discuss defendant‘s analysis of the Sargon precedent. 85 attributes he was referring to with the shorthand ―jerk.‖ The defense raised no further objection. For a prosecutor‘s remarks to constitute misconduct, it must appear reasonably likely in the context of the whole argument and instructions that ― ‗the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.‘ ‖ (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 667.) To the extent defendant‘s objections were preserved, the mild and fleeting descriptions here do not rise to the level of misconduct. In People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1172, the prosecutor repeatedly called the defendant ― ‗evil‘ ‖ in closing argument. We found no misconduct, noting that several more derogatory epithets have been found within the range of permissible argument. (Ibid.; see e.g., People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 84 [defendant called an ― ‗insidious little bastard‘ ‖]; People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 537 [defendant called a ― ‗perverted murderous cancer‘ ‖].) Similarly, in People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 168, we concluded opening statement descriptions of the defendant as ― ‗monstrous,‘ ‖ ― ‗cold-blooded,‘ ‖ and a ― ‗predator‘ ‖ were fair comment on what the prosecutor expected the evidence would show. Moreover, the jury was instructed that opening statements are not evidence but merely reflect counsel‘s prediction of what the evidence will show. With respect to the hypothetical question that insinuated defendant was a ―jerk,‖ the jury was also instructed that questions of counsel are not evidence. Considering these admonitions, and the ample evidence of the murder‘s brutality and defendant‘s callous behavior afterward, it is not reasonably likely that the prosecutor‘s description of him as ―evil‖ or a ―violent jerk‖ improperly inflamed the jury. (See People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 84.) b. Closing Argument Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct three times in closing argument by referencing facts not in evidence. 86 First, the prosecutor challenged Dr. Candelaria-Greene‘s credibility by observing that her opinions contradicted those of many experts whose reports she had reviewed. The experts who had evaluated defendant in person all concluded his potential for future violence was high. In contrast, the prosecutor argued, Dr. Candelaria-Greene ―wouldn‘t even sit down with him face-to-face. Now[,] whether that‘s a [sleight]-of-hand legal strategy or she didn‘t want to be in the same room with him, don‘t know. But she wouldn‘t even sit in the same room with him.‖ Defendant did not object to this statement and therefore forfeited a claim of misconduct. ―As a general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same ground— the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.‖ (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841.) The claim also fails on the merits. Defendant complains that the prosecutor‘s remarks about why Dr. Candelaria-Greene may have failed to meet with defendant were pure speculation. But the challenged remarks were not phrased as assertions. By expressly stating that he did not know why the expert failed to meet with defendant, the prosecutor conceded the reasons he was offering were merely reasonable possibilities. His point was that no conceivable reason justified offering an opinion without an in-person evaluation. In context, it is not reasonably likely the jury would have misunderstood his comments as asserting a definitive reason for the lack of a face-to-face meeting. Second, defendant contends the prosecutor implicitly attacked his character when he argued: ―Where are the family members? They‘re here in the community; they‘re local; they‘re around. Where are they? Why didn‘t they come in here and tell you something?‖ Because defendant did not object to these remarks, he forfeited any claim of error. (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 960.) Moreover, we have held that argument about the absence of a defendant‘s 87 family members from trial does not constitute misconduct, but permissible comment on the defendant‘s failure to call logical witnesses. (People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1173-1174.) The argument here was within appropriate bounds. Third, defendant complains the prosecutor‘s closing argument exaggerated the pleasures of prison life. After describing the trauma Beeson‘s family endured, the prosecutor compared the defendants‘ life in custody: ―They go on. They have their life in jail, their card games, their basketball games. . . . [¶] There‘s a social life, their jobs, schools, educational opportunities.‖ Defense counsel objected at sidebar that no evidence had been presented on the conditions in state prison. The court sustained the objection but allowed the prosecutor to argue about evidence that was presented on the conditions in CYA and county jail. When argument resumed, the prosecutor stated: ―You‘ve heard from evidence what life is like in jail and what life is like in the California Youth Authority. You get to play sports, basketball, card games, make home-made alcohol; there‘s marijuana, cookies, and enchiladas, canteen privileges. There are . . . telephones, there are letters, there are visits. There‘s sex. You‘ve heard evidence that a full life exists behind bars. Maybe not the life . . . you would like to think of, but . . . if you get yourself a life sentence out of this trial, you get to have that institutional life, and you‘ve heard evidence about jail and about the California Youth Authority, and that includes all those things, things to look forward to. Most of the same things that we all have in our lives now, although they‘re in a different form.‖ He then stressed that defendants had taken all of these joys of life from Beeson and destroyed her family. Although defendant objected, and his objection was sustained, he did not ask the court to admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor‘s argument. Accordingly, he forfeited this challenge on appeal. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 753.) In any event, it was unlikely the jury would have misunderstood the prosecutor‘s initial argument to be about state prison 88 conditions. After the sidebar, he repeatedly referenced specific evidence the jury had heard about conditions in both CYA and county jail. Moreover, defense counsel‘s final argument dispelled any prejudice that may have arisen. While not permitted to discuss any specific prison where defendant might be sent, defendant‘s attorney argued that the prosecutor‘s ―country club theory‖ of prison life ―never gives us any detail about such things as lack of freedom, lack of choice, even lack of basic privacy. With the toilet and wash basin in the cell, people have likened it to living their entire lives in a bathroom.‖ He also described the small size of the cell and the fact that defendant would have little contact with his family or the outside world. Separately, defendant claims the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to argue that there was no evidence of an emotional disturbance. Killing while under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance may be considered in mitigation under section 190.3, factor (d). In the course of discussing all mitigation factors, the prosecutor simply pointed out that no evidence had been presented in support of factor (d). Defendant does not dispute the truth of this point but claims the argument implicitly suggested jurors could consider absence of the mitigating factor as a factor in aggravation. It is true that ―the absence of this mitigating factor is not itself aggravating.‖ (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1223; see People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290.) However, the prosecutor never invited the jury to draw this improper inference. On the contrary, after arguing that no mitigating evidence had been presented regarding defendant, the prosecutor stated: ―I want to be absolutely clear. I‘ve talked to you about evidence has to be used in categories . . . . I‘ve talked to you about aggravating factors. There is not an aggravating factor that in any way says lack of mitigation. So the fact that there‘s no mitigation for Norman Patterson, that is not an aggravating factor. Okay. It‘s important that you apply this evidence properly. . . . [¶] So the absence of mitigation is not an aggravating factor.‖ This argument was appropriate and the court did not err in allowing it. 89 c. Rebuttal Argument Defendant raises three complaints of misconduct in the prosecutor‘s rebuttal argument. Each of these claims was forfeited by lack of an objection and, on the merits, fails to establish prejudicial misconduct. First, defendant contends the prosecutor attacked the integrity of defense counsel by pointing out their positions throughout the trial. He reminded jurors that at the guilt phase defense counsel had argued defendant was innocent and had falsely confessed. The prosecutor then observed, ―Now you are being told by the same attorney for the same defendant, oh, well, he did do it. Okay. You guys are right. We tried to fool you last time.‖ Still speaking in the role of defense counsel, the prosecutor said, ―It‘s as though it is whatever we can say to try and fool you and beat you. Whatever we can say to try and trick you into making a mistake as a jury, to get you to make the wrong decision that will favor the defendants. [¶] We will say anything to you, anything whatsoever.‖ The prosecutor then briefly explained the concept of lingering doubt and stressed that it should not apply because, in saying they did not contest the guilt phase verdict, the defendants‘ lawyers were acknowledging their clients‘ guilt. He continued: ―So, to the extent that you heard arguments to the contrary at the end of the guilt phase, you were being intentionally misled.‖ The prosecutor then urged jurors to be skeptical of defense counsel‘s penalty phase arguments, contending they would say anything to persuade the jury to return the more lenient sentence. Defendant failed to raise a timely objection to this argument and therefore forfeited his claim of misconduct. (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1215.) On the merits, the remarks did not result in prejudicial error. Personal attacks on the integrity of opposing counsel can constitute misconduct. (People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820.) ―It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation]. Such attacks on counsel‘s credibility risk focusing the jury‘s attention on irrelevant 90 matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom.‖ (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.) However, ―the prosecutor has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing counsel‘s tactics and factual account.‖ (Ibid.) The prosecutor‘s remarks here highlight the inconsistency in defense counsel‘s positions about the truth of the confession. Although counsel nominally accepted the jury‘s verdict that defendant gave a true confession, he argued the police had promised defendant he could avoid the death penalty by confessing and told the jury, ―You, in fact, are the only ones who can give Grayland the benefit of his bargain . . . .‖ We have upheld prosecutorial arguments suggesting defense counsel‘s ―job‖ is to confuse the jury and say anything necessary to obtain a favorable verdict. (See People v. Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 1216-1217; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538.) Although the remarks here were somewhat harsher, in that the prosecutor characterized counsel‘s arguments as intentionally misleading, he did not claim defense counsel had fabricated a defense or deceived the jury about the evidence they were to consider. (See People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 961.) In any event, even if the comments were unfair to defense counsel, they ―did not comprise a pattern of egregious misbehavior making the trial fundamentally unfair.‖ (People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 820.) Nor was it reasonably possible they affected the verdict. (See People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 804; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 525-526.) Even though the remarks were directed against all of the defense lawyers,28 the jury reached different verdicts for defendant and Patterson. Next, defendant claims the prosecutor improperly asked jurors to place themselves in the victim‘s position and argued the facts of other cases. 28 Defendant and Patterson were each represented by two attorneys throughout the trial. 91 Defendant‘s attorney had argued Beeson‘s death was merely an impulsive murder and not ―the worst of the worst,‖ such as a terrorist bombing, sniper killing, or one involving kidnapping or sexual assault. In response, the prosecutor asked the jury to imagine the experience of someone murdered by a bomb or a sniper. Those victims are instantaneously killed and ―never knew what hit them.‖ Then he asked the jury to think about everything Beeson experienced: being held down on the floor, hit in the face with a shotgun, ―having a belt put around your neck . . . . having two men holding you down on the floor with their knees and each one has an end on that belt and they are pulling and yanking . . . . [¶] Think about fighting for your life because you want to live.‖ He then argued Beeson suffered more than the 167 people who died instantly in the Oklahoma City bombing. After the court sustained an objection to argument about other cases, the prosecutor rephrased his point only slightly, stating, ―She suffered more than a hundred victims suffered in a bomb blast . . . .‖ Finally, he asked the jury to think about how painful the stabbing must have been and how frightened Beeson must have felt. Defendant now argues it was misconduct for the prosecutor to suggest that jurors adopt Beeson‘s position. Because he did not object below, however, the trial court had no opportunity to consider the objection, admonish the jury, or curtail argument along these lines. (See People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 845-846.) A failure to object and request an admonition will be excused only if an objection would have been futile or an admonition would not have cured the harm. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1201.) Defendant has shown neither; therefore the objection is forfeited on appeal. (People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 753.) The claim also fails on the merits. Although it is inappropriate at the guilt phase for a prosecutor to appeal to sympathy by inviting the jury to view the case through the victim‘s eyes (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1406-1407), such appeals are entirely appropriate at the penalty phase. (People v. Wash, supra, 92 6 Cal.4th at p. 263.) The prosecutor encouraged jurors to think closely about the suffering Beeson endured during defendants‘ long and brutal attack in response to defense counsel‘s minimization of the murder as a ―rash, impulsive killing with weapons at hand.‖ ― ‗To the extent that the argument was inviting the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the victim, we have found such an appeal appropriate at the penalty phase because there ―the jury decides a question the resolution of which turns not only on the facts, but on the jury‘s moral assessment of those facts as they reflect on whether defendant should be put to death. . . . In this process, one of the most significant considerations is the nature of the underlying crime. [Citation.] Hence assessment of the offense from the victim‘s viewpoint would appear germane to the task of sentencing.‖ ‘ ‖ (Id. at pp. 263-264; see People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 283-284.) Nor did the prosecutor‘s argument encourage the jury to subordinate their reason to emotion. (See Wash, at p. 264.) Finally, defendant complains the prosecutor ignored the court‘s ruling when he revised his comparison to the Oklahoma City bombing to describe a generic bombing with ―a hundred‖ victims. Defendant did not renew his objection, thus forfeiting his claim on appeal. (People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 753.) In any event, this brief reference to bombing victims did not rise to the level of misconduct. Although the precise crime the prosecutor had in mind was clear from his previous statement, he technically complied with the court‘s ruling by rephrasing his remark to refer to a generic bombing. No misconduct occurred.