Opinion ID: 415603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The reasonableness of Morris' belief

Text: 24 The first element of Morris' claim identified in the district court, that the belief which gave rise to his complaints about the discrimination he perceived was one he in fact held and one which was reasonable, is in essence a requirement that the plaintiff show his complaints to be speech falling within the protection of the First Amendment. Assuming the speech to be so protected, any restriction directed purely at suppressing its communicative content is impermissible save in the most extreme cases involving matters of compelling governmental interest. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). 25 Morris sought to introduce testimony tending to show that there was a basis in fact for his belief that the Authority discriminated against black officers. The trial court, at the Authority's urging, excluded this testimony as irrelevant on the ground that the Authority had already stipulated to the fact that the content of plaintiff's complaints or alleged complaints regarding racial discrimination ... falls within the categories of speech protected by the first amendment, Stipulation No. 1, and to the fact that Morris in fact believed that he had been discriminated against because of his race. Stipulation No. 2. 26 The transcript makes it apparent that the Authority stipulated to the protected status of Morris' complaints in order to prevent Morris from placing the details of the race discrimination complaints he voiced before the jury. Transcript (Tr.) 22. In other words, the Authority made the tactical decision to admit that Morris acted within his First Amendment rights, 14 in order to prevent the admission of evidence that might have made the jury more receptive to Morris' theory of the Authority's motivation in discharging him. 27 The trial court correctly held that the stipulations entered into by the parties eliminated the need to adduce evidence on the question whether Morris' speech was protected by the First Amendment. The purpose and effect of the stipulations was precisely to pretermit any inquiry into whether Morris was justified in voicing his complaints. The defendant stipulated that the speech was protected, Stipulation No. 1, and this was sufficient to dispose of the issue. 15 28 However, we are presented with the fact that the court ultimately did submit to the jury an interrogatory asking whether Morris' belief was reasonable, which the jury answered in the negative. In our view, the interrogatory was superfluous in light of the stipulations, and as a result the jury should not have reached the issue. Accordingly, the trial court should have instructed the jury, in line with Stipulation No. 1, that Morris' speech was entitled to full First Amendment protection, and that the only issues for the jury were the reasonableness of the time, place and manner of complaint, and the motivation for the firing. 29 Thus, although we reject appellant's challenge to the trial court's ruling that the stipulation rendered irrelevant appellant's proffered evidence regarding the reasonableness of his belief, we note that the stipulations should have been sufficient and the issue should not have been presented to the jury. Because we hold that the case must be remanded for a new trial for other reasons discussed below, we need not take the unusual step of reversing on grounds not urged by appellant. At trial upon remand, however, the court should instruct the jury that the parties have stipulated that Morris' complaints to his superiors were speech protected by the First Amendment. 16 30 This ruling does not bar the introduction of testimony as to the nature of those complaints. Such testimony may be relevant, not to the reasonableness of Morris' beliefs, but to the question of the Authority's motivation in firing him. Regardless of the reasonableness of his belief in their validity, if Morris can show that his complaints about discrimination caused his discharge, he will have carried his burden. To the extent that the content of those complaints, as distinct from the mere fact of their having been voiced, makes it more or less likely that Morris was discharged because he exercised his right to speak, that content will be relevant and admissible on the question of motivation.