Opinion ID: 204775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: NRC's Refusal to Grant a Closed Hearing

Text: Throughout the proceedings, SLOMFP sought identification and access to any security studies or other data relied upon by the NRC in reaching its [FONSI] conclusion. Understanding that its request could involve classified or sensitive information, petitioner sought protected access to these materials in a closed hearing. The NRC refused. SLOMFP contends that the NRC's refusal to grant its repeated requests for access to sensitive information in a closed hearing violated NEPA and the AEA. Because NEPA requires the NRC to engage environmental considerations to the fullest possible extent in its decision-making process, and the AEA entitles parties to participate in the agency hearing process, SLOMFP believes the NRC violated its statutory obligations and misread the Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger. We disagree. Neither NEPA nor the AEA requires a closed hearing, and the NRC did not abuse its discretion by concluding that holding one would present unacceptable security risks.
[T]he only procedural requirements imposed by NEPA are those stated in the plain language of the Act. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 548, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) ( Vermont Yankee ). NEPA contains no hearing requirement. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 F.2d 50, 56 (D.C.Cir.1990). Nor does NEPA alter the procedures agencies may employ in conducting public hearings; it instead merely prevents agencies from excluding as immaterial certain environmental issues from those hearings. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). SLOMFP contends that a combination of (1) the NRC's NEPA obligation to consider environmental factors and (2) petitioner's statutory rights as an AEA interested party nevertheless entitle it to a closed hearing and access to FOIA-exempt documents. As far as NEPA goes, petitioner's argument misreads Weinberger and our remand in Mothers for Peace. The Supreme Court has explained that NEPA's twin aims oblige an agency to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action and to  inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). These aims are not necessarily coextensive, however, as NEPA's public disclosure requirements are expressly governed by FOIA. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143, 145, 102 S.Ct. 197; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). [3] Thus, in a given situation a federal agency might have to include environmental considerations in its decisionmaking process, yet withhold public disclosure of any NEPA documents, in whole or in part, under the authority of an FOIA exemption. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143, 102 S.Ct. 197; accord Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1034. In Weinberger, the Supreme Court held that the Navy was not required to prepare and disclose a hypothetical EIS concerning the operation of a Hawaiian facility capable of storing nuclear weapons. 454 U.S. at 143-47, 102 S.Ct. 197. Nearly all information related to storing nuclear weapons was classified, the Court explained, and thus exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 1. Id. at 144-45, 102 S.Ct. 197. Because the Navy could neither confirm nor disconfirm that nuclear weapons were stored at the site in question, and therefore whether it even had proposed such storage, the Court held that the Navy's NEPA compliance was beyond judicial scrutiny. Id. at 147, 102 S.Ct. 197. Even had the Navy been required to prepare an internal EIS for a proposed project, it need not have disclosed it to the public. Id. at 146, 102 S.Ct. 197. To be sure, this case differs from Weinberger in certain respects. Here, it is not the fact of the proposed project (Diablo Canyon ISFSI) that FOIA exempts from disclosure, but rather certain data underlying the NRC's analysis (e.g. classified terrorist attack scenarios). Thus, the Commission's NEPA compliance is not beyond judicial scrutiny hereat least, not as it was in Weinberger. Still, Weinberger 's animating principle applies. As we explained in Mothers for Peace, Weinberger held that the Navy was required to perform a NEPA review and to factor its results into its decisionmaking even where the sensitivity of the information involved meant that the NEPA results could not be publicized or adjudicated.  449 F.3d at 1034 (emphasis added). The same is true of the FOIA-exempt materials the NRC used in its NEPA process here. The NRC may satisfy NEPA even as it withholds FOIA-exempt materials; it must consider environmental consequences in its decisionmaking process, even if it is unable to meet NEPA's public disclosure goals by virtue of FOIA. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143, 146, 102 S.Ct. 197. Weinberger did not distinguish the public at large from parties to a NEPA hearing, as SLOMFP invites us to do. We decline to second-guess the Commission's determination that closed hearings could not be conducted in a meaningful way without substantial disclosure of classified and safeguards information. See, e.g., CLI 08-1 at 2. Indeed, in Mothers for Peace, we suggested that the NRC could satisfy NEPA by permitting SLOMFP to contribute to the decisionmaking process without giving petitioner access to sensitive information: For example, that the public cannot access the resulting information does not explain the NRC's determination to prevent the public from contributing information to the decisionmaking process. The NRC simply does not explain its unwillingness to hear and consider the information that Petitioners seek to contribute to the process, which would fulfill both the information-gathering and the public participation functions of NEPA. [The NRC's security-related] arguments explain why a Weinberger -style limited proceeding might be appropriate, but cannot support the NRC's conclusion that NEPA does not apply. 449 F.3d at 1034 (first and third emphasis added). On remand, the NRC recognized its obligation to consider all information relevant to its NEPA decision, even as some of the information could be withheld under FOIA or the Commission's statutory obligations to protect national security information. See, e.g., CLI 08-1 at 2. NEPA does not require the Commission to disclose sensitive information in a closed hearing.
SLOMFP also urges that NRC's denial of a closed hearing violates the AEA. Having concluded that NEPA does not require such a hearing, our AEA inquiry is straightforward. Section 189(a) of the AEA grants public hearing rights upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by a Commission licensing proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A). But the Act nowhere describes the content of a hearing or prescribes the manner in which this `hearing' is to be run. Union of Concerned Scientists, 920 F.2d at 54. Appellate courts have, accordingly, deferred to the Commission's procedural rules. See id.; see also Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir.2009) (noting the broad responsibility reposed in the NRC, free of close prescription in its charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the statutory objectives (quoting Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C.Cir.1968))). Furthermore, as the Commission's final order explains, the AEA's general provisions do not override NEPA's specific non-disclosure provisions. CLI-08-26 at 17. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that general and specific provisions, in apparent contradiction, whether in the same or different statutes, and without regard to priority of enactment, may subsist together, the specific qualifying and supplying exceptions to the general. United States v. Navarro, 160 F.3d 1254, 1256-57 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512, 3 S.Ct. 357, 27 L.Ed. 1012 (1883)). In apparent recognition that the AEA alone does not require a closed hearing, SLOMFP suggests that the requirement derives from NEPA. This NEPA-based argument fails, as we have explained. Neither NEPA nor the AEA requires the closed hearing and access to FOIA-exempt documents sought by petitioner. The decision to grant a special hearing remains in the Commission's discretion, subject to the statutory mandates of NEPA and the AEA.
Throughout the proceedings below, the NRC maintained that: (1) information the Commission must consider in its NEPA decisionmaking may be withheld from public disclosure under FOIA exemptions, under Weinberger [4] ; (2) the NRC has a statutory obligation under the AEA to protect national security information; (3) meaningful hearings on the range of conceivable terrorist scenarios could not be conducted without substantial disclosure of classified and safeguards information on threat assessments and security arrangements; and (4) any benefit to be gained in this case from further disclosure is outweighed by the risks inherent in disseminating security-related information, even under a protective order. See CLI-07-11 at 149-151; CLI-08-1 at 2, 5, 9, 15-17, 20-21; CLI-08-5 at 174-177; CLI-08-8 at 193, 196-97, 201-202; CLI-08-26 at 16-23. The NRC's orders reasonably interpret NEPA, the AEA, and its own regulations. As outlined above, neither NEPA nor the AEA requires a closed hearing. Furthermore, by regulation, the Commission will not grant access to restricted data or national security information unless it determines that the granting of access will not be inimical to the common defense and security. 10 C.F.R. § 2.905(h). While the orders we review did not expressly reference this regulation, the NRC referred to its statutory duty to protect national security information and concluded that hearings could not be conducted without disclosure of threat assessments and security arrangements, and that the risks of permitting protected access to FOIA-exempt information outweighed the benefits. See, e.g., CLI-08-1 at 2, 20-21. We will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if, as here, the agency's path may reasonably be discerned. Pub. Citizen, 573 F.3d at 923 (quotations omitted). [5] It may be that the Commission has procedures for holding the closed hearings SLOMFP seeks, see CLI-08-1 at 21, and that petitioner's attorney and expert have the appropriate security clearances. But where no statute or regulatory provision requires such a hearing, the Commission retains discretion over how to balance its duties under NEPA and the AEA. SLOMFP does not contest the NRC's FOIA exemption claims or charge the NRC with violating its own regulations. Under these circumstances, the NRC reasonably determined that holding closed hearings in this and other NEPA/terrorism matters presents substantial risks without an offsetting benefit to its NEPA decisionmaking process. We are mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition against imposing additional procedures on agencies' NEPA decisionmaking. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548-49, 98 S.Ct. 1197. Instead, we must determine whether the agency complied with the procedures mandated by the relevant statutes. Id. at 549 n. 21, 98 S.Ct. 1197. The NRC has done so here, and its decision not to provide a closed hearing was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).