Opinion ID: 2435996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amendment to the Statute

Text: A recent amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-103 confirms the validity of divorce decrees entered prior to the expiration of the waiting period set forth in that statute. Chapter 655, Public Acts of 1996, effective March 22, 1996, provides as follows: SECTION 2. Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 36-4-103, is amended by adding the following language as a new subdivision to subsection (c): (1) A divorce decree or order issued prior to the effective date of this act, in which the hearing for such divorce occurred before the specified time periods required by this subsection, shall remain valid and the parties shall remain divorced. Likewise, all other issues resolved in the divorce decree, order or agreement such as distribution of marital property, alimony, child support and custody shall remain valid and in full force and effect. SECTION 3. The provisions of this act are declared to be remedial in nature and the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. It is clear from the language of this statute that the legislature considered that a divorce decree was not void because it was entered upon a hearing held prior to the expiration of the relevant waiting period. The provisions that such decrees shall remain valid and all other issues resolved in the divorce decree ... shall remain valid and in full force and effect, indicate that those decrees are considered to be valid unless subjected to direct attack. Stated conversely, if such decrees were void, they would have no validity that could be perpetuated by statute. This statute by its very language applies to decrees entered prior to its effective date. It is effective to accomplish its stated purpose because it is remedial, and because it does not undertake to disturb vested rights. See: Kuykendall v. Wheeler, 890 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. 1994) ([r]emedial or procedural statutes apply retrospectively ...); Shell v. State, 893 S.W.2d 416, 419-420 (Tenn. 1995). The property in which the plaintiff undertakes to assert an interest was owned by the decedent at the time of his death and is subject to administration. Though the property vested in the beneficiaries on the date of death, it vested subject to the discharge of claims made against the estate. [4] Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-103 (Supp. 1995). Consequently, recognition of the divorce decree as valid will not disturb vested rights. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court. Costs are taxed to Marcus Todd Gentry and Robert Jeffrey Gentry, for which execution may issue. BIRCH, C.J., and DROWOTA, ANDERSON and WHITE, JJ., concur.