Opinion ID: 2585478
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fundamental purposes of adoption

Text: The basic purpose of an adoption is the welfare, protection and betterment of the child, and adoption courts ultimately must rule on that basis. ( Reeves v. Bailey (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1022-1023, 126 Cal.Rptr. 51.) While the child's best interest is an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition, obviously overall [i]ts purpose is to maximize a child's opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult. ( Adoption of Michelle T. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 699, 704, 117 Cal.Rptr. 856.) That there are a variety of costs ... if a legal relationship with a second parent is not established costs that can be both financial and emotional is well recognized. (Doskow, The Second Parent Trap, supra, 20 J. Juv. L. at p. 9.) Second parent adoption can secure the salutary incidents of legally recognized parentage for a child of a nonbiological parent who otherwise must remain a legal stranger. Second parent adoptions also benefit children by providing a clear legal framework for resolving any disputes that may arise over custody and visitation. Our explicitly recognizing their validity will prevent uncertainty, conflict, and protracted litigation in this area, all of which plainly are harmful to children caught in the middle. [15] Unmarried couples who have brought a child into the world with the expectation that they will raise it together, and who have jointly petitioned for adoption, should be on notice that, if they separate, the same rules concerning custody and visitation as apply to all other parents will apply to them. In addition, second parent adoptions offer the possibility of obtaining the security and advantages of two parents for some of California's neediest children, including many with special needs for whom a second parent adoption may constitute the closest conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and child available. ( Adoption of Barnett, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 377, 6 Cal.Rptr. 562, 354 P.2d 18.) The same is true as regards thousands of others in foster care for whom it is state policy to seek permanent adoptive placement. [16] We need not review here the nonlegal benefits of adoption for children, parents, and society as a whole, nor need we assume, either as a policy or factual matter, that adoption is necessarily in a child's best interest ( Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 845, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216) in every case. We may observe, however, that neither the Court of Appeal nor any party or amici curiae has suggested that, where an adoption would be in a child's best interests, second parent adoption differs categorically from other types of independent adoption in its ability to achieve adoption's practical ends. Amicus curiae Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund suggests that to affirm the statutory permissibility of second parent adoption would offend the State's strong public interest in promoting marriage. We disagree. This case involves independent adoption, a procedure that is not limited to married persons. Unmarried persons always have been permitted to adopt children. (See 1 Ann. Civ.Code, § 221 (1st ed. 1872, Haymond & Burch, commrs. annotators [any adult may adopt any eligible child]; Fam.Code, § 8600 [same].) More generally, Justice Brown argues at some length that our decision today trivializes family bonds. (Cone. & dis. opn. of Brown, J., post, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 706, 73 P.3d at p. 560; see generally id. at pp. 706-708, 73 P.3d at pp. 560-562.) To the contrary, our decision encourages and strengthens family bonds. As Justice Scalia has noted, the family unit accorded traditional respect in our society ... includes the household of unmarried parents and their children. ( Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) 491 U.S. 110, 123, fn. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91.) [17] Justice Brown purports to discern a legislative insistence that the adopting parent have a legal relationship with the birth parent (cone. & dis. opn. of Brown, J., post, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 707, 73 P.3d at p. 561), but she cites no authority for the existence of such a requirement, and we know of none. Established legislative policy `bases parent and child rights on the existence of a parent and child relationship rather than on the marital status of the parents.' ( Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal.4th 84, 89, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776 [discussing Uniform Parentage Act]; see also § 7602 [The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents].) The Court of Appeal recited that in 1997 and 1998, the Legislature considered, but did not adopt, a bill that would have provided that two unmarried adults may adopt a child, thereby implying that the Legislature had considered and rejected the possibility of such adoptions. (See Assem. Bill No. 53 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) §§ 1, 2 (hereafter Assembly Bill 53).) Not so. Although the Court of Appeal's remark correctly describes Assembly Bill 53, a bill introduced in that session, it misleads to the extent it invites readers to assume the Legislature's inaction on the bill reflected a rejection of its substance. Assembly Bill 53 dealt with adoption by single persons, as well as by unmarried couples, and was promulgated to nullify a proposed CDSS regulation that the bill's proponents perceived would inhibit both. (See Assem. Bill 53, § 1, subd. (c) [Excluding potential adoptive parents on the basis of marital status is not in the best interests of the children who are eligible for adoption].) The proposed regulation giving rise to Assembly Bill 53 would have barred agency recommendation of any adoption by an unmarried person or persons. (See Notice of Proposed Changes in Regulations of the California Department of Social Services (CDSS); Cal. Reg. Notice Register 96, No. 29, p. 446, proposing adoption of Cal.Code Regs., tit. 22, § 35124.) [18] Promulgated in response, Assembly Bill 53 would have added to the Family Code a new section explicitly restating what is already implicitly provided in sections 8600 and 8601, i.e., that any otherwise qualified single adult or two adults, married or not, may adopt a child. (See Assem. Bill 53, § 2.) After the proposed regulation was withdrawn, the responsive bill (i.e., Assembly Bill 53), which had passed the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary by a vote of 10-4, died in the inactive file. (Assem. Bill No. 53, Assem. Final Hist. (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.).) Sharon argues that reversal of the Court of Appeal's decision will permit CDSS to authorize unusual adoptions, e.g., involving multiple parties, far removed from those contemplated by the Legislature. Justice Baxter also expresses concern that our decision will lead to new and even bizarre family structures (cone. & dis. opn. of Baxter, J., post, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 705, 73 P.3d at p. 560), while Justice Brown inexplicably refers to our supposed irretrievabl[e] committment] to ... the-more-parents-the-merrier view of parenthood (cone. & dis. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 706, 73 P.3d at p. 561). Nonsense. While CDSS has for some time treated section 8617 as waivable, such scenarios have not materialized. Our explicit recognition in this case of the legal ground for second parent adoptionsa nonmandatory construction of section 8617 that comports with judicial precedent and ratifies administrative interpretation and practice in which the Legislature has acquiescedobviously cannot be taken as authority for multiple parent or other novel adoption scenarios. Nothing we say in this case can validate an adoption that is not in the child's interest, omits any essential statutory element, or is in violation of a public policy the Legislature may express. CDSS's construction honors the established principle that the beneficiary of a statute may waive it, is consistent both with judicial precedent and discernible legislative intent, and serves the best interests of California's children. In sum, adherence to the Court of Appeal's construction of section 8617 as precluding second parent adoption would unnecessarily eliminate access to a duly promulgated, well-tested adoption process that has become routine in California (Eskridge & Hunter, Sexuality, Gender and the Law (1997) p. 866) and that is fully consistent with the main purpose of the adoption statutes to promote the welfare of children `by the legal recognition and regulation of the consummation of the closest conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and child' ( Department of Social Welfare v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 6, 81 Cal. Rptr. 345, 459 P.2d 897).