Opinion ID: 2600757
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims under the Human Rights Act.

Text: {8} Mr. Trujillo claimed that NORA discriminated against him in violation of the Human Rights Act when it fired him because of a medical condition. Under the Human Rights Act, an employer is prohibited from discharging any person otherwise qualified because of ... medical condition. Section 28-1-7(A). In interpreting our state Human Rights Act, we have previously indicated that it is appropriate to rely upon federal adjudication for guidance in analyzing a claim under the Act, with the following reservation: Our reliance on the methodology developed in the federal courts, however, should not be interpreted as an indication that we have adopted federal law as our own. Our analysis of this claim is based on New Mexico statute and our interpretation of our legislature's intent, and, by this opinion, we are not binding New Mexico law to interpretations made by the federal courts of the federal statute. Smith, 109 N.M. at 517, 787 P.2d at 436; see Kitchell v. Pub. Serv. Co., 1998-NMSC-051, ¶¶ 5-8, 126 N.M. 525, 972 P.2d 344 (relying on federal authority to aid in the interpretation of the phrase otherwise qualified in relation to a claim of discrimination based on medical condition). For this claim, the closest federal counterpart would be the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (ADA), a federal statute prohibiting discrimination against persons with a disability. The Tenth Circuit has stated that in order to maintain a disability discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he [or she] is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he [or she] is qualified ...; and (3) that the employer terminated him [or her] because of the disability. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir.1995). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Although the New Mexico statute uses the terms medical condition or handicap rather than the ADA term disability, we believe in the context of this case that the terms can be viewed as interchangeable.
{9} NORA argues that Mr. Trujillo did not present sufficient evidence of a medical condition to support a claim under the terms of the Human Rights Act. The applicable regulations of the New Mexico Human Rights Division define a medical condition as any medical condition as defined by an appropriate medical authority through documentation, or by direct witness of a clearly visible disablement. Rules & Regulations, N.M. Dep't of Labor, Human Rights Division, I(A)(26) (Nov. 11, 1988) (superceded 1998). {10} NORA's objections to the jury verdict are twofold. First, they argue that the symptoms reported by Mr. Trujillo in February and March were insufficient to establish that he had a medical condition. Second, they contend that the medical evidence presented by the psychiatrist and neurologist was improperly admitted at trial because it was not relevant to the time period in question. We agree with both. {11} At trial Mr. Trujillo testified about feeling ill on the morning after the billing department seminar on February 9 and described feeling exhausted, dizzy, and disoriented as well as experiencing some numbness in his arm. His original doctor did not testify, but her treatment notes were admitted into evidence over objection as unauthenticated. We agree with NORA that the medical records should not have been admitted. See Rule 11-803(F) NMRA 2001 (providing an exception to the hearsay rule for documents prepared and kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness). Additional medical evidence was presented through the psychiatrist who first saw Mr. Trujillo in October 1995 and who also relied upon the medical records of the doctor who had treated him. The psychiatrist testified that because the earlier diagnostic tests had ruled out a physical cause for Mr. Trujillo's problems, she concluded that Mr. Trujillo must have had a psychiatric illness. Although she considered Mr. Trujillo medically healthy when she saw him in October, he was depressed about losing his job, and she thus recommended an antidepressant and medication for anxiety. Based on what Mr. Trujillo had reported to her, she concluded Mr. Trujillo's illness on February 9 might have been an acute anxiety attack. The remaining medical evidence was introduced through the deposition of the neurologist who had performed the EEG and MRI on Mr. Trujillo. His medical conclusions were also based on the medical records of the psychiatrist who had testified and a neuropsychologist who examined Mr. Trujillo in May 1995. {12} Our review leads us to conclude that, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the verdict, Mr. Trujillo failed to present sufficient evidence to show that he suffered from a medical condition at the time NORA discharged him. Although he testified to the symptoms he experienced during February and March, the nature of his condition was never identified or diagnosed at the time. Further Mr. Trujillo's problems existed for a short period; by March 13 he had been cleared to return to work by his doctor. In a letter dated March 31, 1995, this doctor stated that although her initial diagnosis of his illness was a transient ischemic attack-like syndrome, the diagnostic testing revealed that Mr. Trujillo had not suffered a stroke and was, in fact, at low risk of stroke. She also stated that he was very capable of returning to full-time employment. Mr. Trujillo did not claim at trial to have suffered a relapse of these symptoms. Being ill is not synonymous with having a medical condition. We do not believe that the Legislature intended that the phrase medical condition in Section 28-1-7(A) include temporary illnesses with minimal residual effects. We hold that a jury could not have properly determined that Mr. Trujillo suffered from a medical condition under the Human Rights Act at the time he was fired by NORA and therefore the question of a violation of the Human Rights Act should not have been submitted to the jury. {13} Consistent with our interpretation of Section 28-1-7(A), several courts have held that a temporary injury with minimal residual effects cannot be the basis for a sustainable claim under the ADA. See, e.g., Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. North Am. Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a thirty-eight day absence from work after a heart attack did not support claim that plaintiff was substantially limited in ability to work); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that temporary psychological impairment with no residual effects was not of sufficient duration to be a disability under the ADA); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995) (determining that a back injury of limited duration which was later remedied was not sufficient to constitute a disability); Blanton v. Winston Printing Co., 868 F.Supp. 804, 807-08 (M.D.N.C.1994) (holding that a temporary knee injury with minimal residual effects cannot provide a basis for an ADA claim). {14} We also determine that it was error for the trial court to have admitted the psychiatrist's testimony regarding Mr. Trujillo's medical status at the time of treatment as opposed to the time of the adverse employment claim. The fact that Mr. Trujillo was eventually diagnosed as depressed in September 1995 is irrelevant to this case. The employment action affecting Mr. Trujillo occurred in March 1995, and we evaluate his medical claim based on how the alleged condition manifested itself at that time. See Cameron v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 39 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1046 (N.D.Ill.1998) (concluding that medical records that pertain to plaintiff's condition after the employment decision did not shed light on [plaintiff's] condition at the relevant time); cf. Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.1999) (stating that the determination of whether employee is a qualified individual under the ADA must be based on his or her capabilities as of the time of the employment decision). The psychiatrist did properly testify regarding her opinion of Mr. Trujillo's symptoms on February 9; this testimony was relevant to the issue of whether Mr. Trujillo suffered from a medical condition. Again, however, even viewing this testimony in a light most favorable to Mr. Trujillo, this testimony established nothing more than a temporary illness rather than a medical condition protected by the Human Rights Act.
{15} NORA also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the claim of failure to accommodate. Under the Human Rights Act, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to refuse or fail to accommodate to an individual's physical or mental handicap or medical condition, unless such accommodation is unreasonable or an undue hardship. Section 28-1-7(J). It appears that the accommodation claim was based on Mr. Trujillo's doctor having issued a certificate to return to work for half time for one month. {16} NORA argues that the certificate was inadequate to put it on notice that Mr. Trujillo was requesting an accommodation under the Human Rights Act. Mr. Trujillo responds that NORA should have known about his medical condition and thus regarded the medical release for half-time work as a request for accommodation. Mr. Trujillo accuses NORA of acting in bad faith for refusing to engage in an interactive process to determine whether the alleged condition could be reasonably accommodated. Mr. Trujillo relies upon Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1172 n. 10 (10th Cir. 1999), for this proposition. However, we do not read Midland to support such a claim, and we are unpersuaded by this argument. We note the Court in that opinion made the following observation: In general, the interactive process must ordinarily begin with the employee providing notice to the employer of the employee's disability and any resulting limitations, and expressing a desire for reassignment if no reasonable accommodation is possible in the employee's existing job. Midland at 1171-72 (footnote omitted). In so concluding, the Court relied upon Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir.1996), which stated that [a]n employee has the initial duty to inform the employer of a disability before ADA liability may be triggered for failure to provide accommodations. Midland, 180 F.3d at 1171 n. 9. Although the certificate did ask for a reduction in Mr. Trujillo's hours, it did not offer a diagnosis of his illness and how it limited his ability to work, or suggest any accommodation that his illness might require. Under the facts of this case, the terse language of the return to work certificate was insufficient to put NORA on notice that Mr. Trujillo was requesting an accommodation for a medical condition under the Human Rights Act. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that an employer cannot be held to have imputed knowledge of an illness in the following circumstance: Where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations, are not open, obvious, and apparent to the employer, as is often the case when mental disabilities are involved, the initial burden rests primarily upon the employee, or his health-care provider, to specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations, and to suggest the reasonable accommodations. Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir.1996). Moreover, the failure to accommodate claim must fail because, as discussed above, Mr. Trujillo failed to demonstrate that he had a medical condition which is a necessary predicate for an accommodation request.
{17} Even if we were to conclude that Mr. Trujillo had a medical condition on the day of his discharge, his claim under the Human Rights Act could not succeed because no evidence was presented at trial that NORA discriminated against him because of his health. The fact that NORA was aware of Mr. Trujillo's health problems is not sufficient to show that they regarded him as having a medical condition or that he was fired for that reason. See Webb v. Mercy Hosp., 102 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir.1996) (An employer's knowledge that an employee exhibits symptoms which may be associated with an impairment does not necessarily show that the employer regarded the employee as disabled.). {18} The Human Rights Act states that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate because of a medical condition. [A]n employer cannot fire an employee `because of' a disability unless it knows of the disability. If it does not know of the disability, the employer is firing the employee `because of' some other reason. Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112). No evidence was introduced at trial that Mr. Trujillo's health was a factor in the decision to fire him. Mr. Trujillo did not testify that he thought he had been fired for health reasons. The letter placing him on administrative leave and the termination letter discussed a number of reasons NORA was dissatisfied with Mr. Trujillo's job performance; the shortcomings described by NORA predate his illness. There is no evidence that NORA regarded Mr. Trujillo as suffering from a medical condition. Neither at trial nor on appeal has Mr. Trujillo pointed to any evidence that NORA's decision to terminate him was based on anything but concerns about his work performance. {19} Mr. Trujillo contends that because NORA failed to take the necessary actions to find out about his medical condition that they should be charged with that knowledge. Under the facts of this case, this contention is without merit because it would require this Court to impute knowledge to NORA at a time when even Mr. Trujillo's doctors had not diagnosed his illness. Instead, the diagnostic testing had apparently eased the initial concerns of the treating doctor to the extent that she had cleared Mr. Trujillo to return to work. As the Court stated in Miller v. National Casualty Co., 61 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir.1995), an employer is not obligated to divine the presence of a disability from [the employee's] extended absence from work and the company's knowledge that she [or he] was in some sort of stressful ... situation. Similarly, we do not think that knowledge of a medical condition may be imputed to an employer under the Human Rights Act.