Opinion ID: 1891715
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juvenile System Separate from Criminal System

Text: The majority endorses Judge Sharp's argument that the Legislature set[ ] up a separate procedure and system for handling juveniles ... different and apart from the adult system. Majority op. at 1280-81 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 346 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)). In this juvenile system (Chapter 985), Judge Sharp argues, the stated public policy ... is to protect children ... and to insure their care, safety, treatment, education, and rehabilitation. Id. However, such vague notions of a statute's `basic purpose' are ... inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220, 122 S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993)). The majority cannot reconcile this characterization of public policy with section 985.228(4), Florida Statutes (2001), which demonstrates that the purposes of the juvenile justice system go beyond care, safety, treatment, education, and rehabilitation to include punishment as well. The statute authorizes a judge to enter an order stating the facts upon which its finding is based but withholding adjudication of delinquency and placing [the juvenile] in a probation program under the supervision of the department. Id. (emphasis added). It outlines the court's authority over juveniles, such as V.K.E., who are not adjudicated delinquent: The court may, as a condition of the [probation] program, impose as a penalty component restitution in money or in kind, community service, a curfew ... or other nonresidential punishment appropriate to the offense.  (Emphasis added.) This list is not exhaustive and leaves other sanctions within the court's discretion. Moreover, whatever purposes one may infer from Chapter 985, they are inadequate to overcome the words of its text. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 220, 122 S.Ct. 708. Section 985.228(4) does not preclude a court from imposing penalties on juveniles. Despite the public policy underlying Chapter 985, majority op. at 1281 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 346 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)), section 985.228(4) does not preclude a judge from imposing on juveniles the surcharges in sections 938.08 and 938.085. Nevertheless, the majority, again quoting Judge Sharp, advances two additional policy arguments against the imposition of the surcharges. First, it claims that the surcharges bear no rational relationship to the delinquent act in this case. Second, it assumes that in future cases they could be counterproductive. Neither of these claims is sufficient to override the plain language of the statutes. The majority first argues that these surcharges, which fund domestic violence and rape crisis programs, bear no rational relationship to the offense in this casesimple battery. See majority op. at 1278-79 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 345 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)). This rationale implies that a surcharge that funds a program, such as one for domestic violence, cannot be imposed unless the offense triggering the surcharge relates to that program. No law supports this view, and such an interpretation would render several parts of sections 938.08 and 938.085 inapplicable even to adult offenses. Cf. Unruh v. State, 669 So.2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1996) ([C]ourts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.). Many of the offenses triggering the surcharges, enumerated in sections 938.08 and 938.085, are unrelated to rape, sexual assault, or domestic violence. See § 784.011, Fla. Stat. (2005) (assault); § 784.021, Fla. Stat. (2005) (aggravated assault); § 784.03, Fla. Stat. (2005) (battery); § 784.041, Fla. Stat. (2005) (felony battery). Several are inconsistent with the concept of domestic violence, see § 784.082, Fla. Stat. (2005) (assault or battery by person who is being detained in a prison, jail, etc.); § 784.048, Fla. Stat. (2005) (stalking), or the concept of rape, see § 784.085, Fla. Stat. (2005) (battery of a child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling certain fluids or materials). Accepting Judge Sharp'snow the majority'sview would require us to prohibit the imposition of any surcharges, either upon a juvenile or an adult, when the offense is not directly related to the programs being funded. Yet sections 938.08 and 938.085 require that a court shall impose the surcharges at issue when they apply. This obligatory language indicates that the Legislature has deemed the surcharges appropriate even when the offense charged is unrelated to rape, sexual assault, or domestic violence. The majority also adopts Judge Sharp's argument that, [i]f sections 938.08 and 938.085 are applicable to juvenile delinquency cases, then all of the costs and assessments ... in Chapter 938 ... are logically applicable to juveniles. Majority op. at 1280 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 346 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)). The majority also asserts that because most children are not wage earners, it is the parents who will often have to pay these surcharges. This contention resembles a claim that such a result would be unreasonable or ridiculous. We will deviate from a statute's plain language when necessary to avoid an absurd result. [N]o literal interpretation should be given that lends to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion .... State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191, 116 So. 255, 261 (1928). But this exception to the plain meaning rule is intended to be narrow. The United States Supreme Court, for example, rarely invokes such a test to override unambiguous legislation. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). The fact that the surcharges are imposed on juveniles, who often are not wage earners, cannot be considered unreasonable or ridiculous. A court may reasonably contemplate that a juvenile's parent or guardian can assist her in complying with an order to pay surcharges. Moreover, juveniles such as V.K.E. are not incapable of raising these funds themselves. In this case, the surcharges total $352, less than half of the $852.66 of restitution the court ordered (with which the majority apparently finds no problem). Thus, the imposition of the surcharges cannot be considered unreasonable or absurd.