Opinion ID: 2320566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: In reviewing a grant of a summary judgment motion, `we must assess the record independently . . . [and view it] in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.' Kelley v. Broadmoor Coop. Apartments, 676 A.2d 453, 456 (D.C.1996) (quoting Walton v. District of Columbia, 670 A.2d 1346, 1353 (D.C.1996) (reference omitted)) (alteration in the original). A motion for summary judgment is properly granted where the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Byrd v. Allstate Ins. Co., 622 A.2d 691, 693 (D.C.1993) (quoting Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)) (footnote omitted) (alteration in the original). It has long been settled in the District of Columbia that an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all. Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc., 657 A.2d 770, 771 (D.C.1995) (citation omitted). Although Ms. Dantley acknowledges that she had no express contract with Howard University, she alleges that she had an implied contract by virtue of language in the Handbook and the Workforce Restructuring Plan. To support her allegation of an implied contract with Howard, Ms. Dantley relies principally upon Yesudian. Applying our decision in Sisco v. GSA National Capital Fed. Credit Union, 689 A.2d 52 (D.C.1997), the Yesudian court declared: The Handbook's statement that [t]his document is not to be construed as a contract also fails to meet the Sisco standard. Although it states an ultimate conclusion, it does not contain language clearly reserving the employer's right to terminate at will, which Sisco requires to make the promises of the Handbook like this unenforceable at law. Sisco, 689 A.2d at 55. . . . When taken together with other provisions of the Handbook that clearly limit Howard's right to terminate to specific causes or events, Sisco, 689 A.2d at 55, the disclaimers asserted by Howard do no more than produce the kind of ambiguity that creates a jury question as to whether the Handbook constitutes a promise of continued employment to [regular] employees terminable only for cause in accordance with its provisions, id. at 56. 332 U.S.App. D.C. at 72, 153 F.3d at 747 (footnotes omitted). While we are mindful of the Roberts footnote, our subsequent ruling in Strass v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic, 744 A.2d 1000, 1013 (D.C.2000), not only is consistent with Yesudian, supra, but contains binding authority. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971). In Strass, [1] we adopted the proposition that: Not in every case will a contractual disclaimer clause be adequate to relieve an employer of obligations specified in its regulations. 744 A.2d at 1012 (citing Greene v. Howard Univ., 134 U.S.App. D.C. 81, 88, 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (1969)). We reversed the trial court, asserting: This court has held that a personnel manual that states specific preconditions that must be met before employment will be terminated is sufficiently clear to rebut the presumption of at-will employment. While there is language in Kaiser's policy manual that it is not a contract, this qualifier is rationally at odds with other language in the document. Construing the document as a whole, a jury could conclude reasonably that the employer intended to be bound by its terms. . . . We recognize that Sisco allows that an employer, by disclaimer, may negate the reasonableness of the employee's expectation that the employer will be bound. However, that does not answer the question whether the disclaimer in this case, considered with reference to the entire document, effectively relieved Kaiser of any and all obligations which the policies set forth. A jury question was raised as to this issue. Strass, supra, 744 A.2d at 1013-14 (citing Greene, supra, 134 U.S.App. D.C. at 87-88, 412 F.2d at 1134-35) (other citation and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, under both Strass and Yesudian, supra, a disclaimer which is rationally at odds with other language in the document, here the Howard University Handbook, is not dispositive as to whether an implied contract exists, if when construed as a whole, a jury could conclude reasonably that the employer intended to be bound by [the] terms [of the Handbook].. . . Strass, supra, 744 A.2d at 1013-14. Because of its mistaken impression that the footnote in Roberts, supra, which is set forth above, controlled the outcome of Ms. Dantley's case, the trial court did not determine: (1) whether the disclaimer in the Howard University Handbook is rationally at odds with other language in that document; or (2) whether there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute which would preclude summary judgment in favor of Howard University. With respect to the first issue, our review of the record reveals disagreement between Ms. Dantley and Howard University as to whether termination of Ms. Dantley resulted from an abolishment of position under § 1.11(D) or a reduction in force under § 1.11(E) of the Howard University Handbook. [2] These sections of the Handbook, and any other relevant provisions, must be examined to determine whether the disclaimerthat the Handbook is not to be construed as a contractis rationally at odds with [these provisions or] other language. [3] In addition, with regard to the second issue concerning the existence of genuine issues of material facts in dispute, Howard University maintains that: Even if credence is given to [Ms.] Dantley's assertion that the Employee Handbook is a contract, and further assuming that Section 1.11(E) and not Section 1.11(D) of the Handbook applies to the 1994 workforce restructuring, and that Section 1.11(E) of the Handbook incorporates by reference the Workforce Restructuring Plan, there still was no breach, and the Superior Court properly granted summary judgment. In contrast, Ms. Dantley asserts that she was not terminated in accordance with the Howard University Handbook or the Workforce Restructuring Plan, and thus, there was a breach of the implied contract. [4] She also claims that she was not an at-will employee since she was hired before July 1999, and one of Howard University's agents issued a March 31, 2000, memorandum, stating that non-faculty, non-union employees hired before July 1, 1999 are not at-will employees. But the March 31 memorandum also indicates that the at-will policy does not change Howard University's right to abolish jobs for lack of funds, reorganization, restructuring, or `when the best interest of the University will be served.' Whether there are genuine issues of material fact relating to these or other arguments articulated by Ms. Dantley and Howard University must be determined in the first instance by the trial court. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.