Opinion ID: 1315235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: invasion of defendant's privacy

Text: On Parks's first assignment of error, the Commonwealth argues that Parks does not have standing to challenge Patrolman Wright's search of the North 5th Street premises because he lacked any legitimate expectation of privacy. Parks contends that the fact that he maintained a leasehold on the property is sufficient to establish his privacy interest against warrantless police intrusion into the building. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court abandoned separate inquiry into a particular defendant's standing to contest an allegedly illegal search and seizure in favor of a test for the presence of an expectation of privacy. Now only by examining the totality of the circumstances can a decision be rendered as to whether a reasonable or legitimate expectation of freedom from government intrusion exists. See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). If Parks did not exhibit such dominion and control over the premises at 408 North 5th Street as would justify the conclusion that he had an expectation of privacy, he cannot assert Fourth Amendment protection. Not disputed is the fact that Parks was the nominal lessee of the property at 408 North 5th Street. Yet Parks himself stated he had no knowledge of any of the events that went on in the building and that his purpose for renting the building was to get his son off the street and set him up in a business. The son directed Parks to stay off the premises; he did not want him down there. [2] Parks's only apparent use of the building involved his storing of some furniture there. The record is devoid of any evidence that Parks ever attempted to regulate any activity there. Such circumstances are not indicative of a legitimate expectation of privacy. Further, it is well settled that the Fourth Amendment guarantee cannot be invoked vicariously, that is, one has no standing to challenge an invasion of the privacy of a third party. See Rakas v. Illinois, supra 439 U.S. at 133-34, 99 S.Ct. at 425-26. See also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1570, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Similarly, it was held in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 967, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), that a defendant who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence seized in a search of a third person's premises has not had his Fourth Amendment rights violated. These principles were recently reiterated in United States v. Payner, ___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980), and United States v. Salvucci, ___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). In United States v. Payner, supra , the Court said: This Court discussed the doctrine of standing to invoke the [Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule in some detail last Term.... We reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional rights.... And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party. (Citations omitted.) Id. at ____, 100 S.Ct. at 2444. In United States v. Salvucci, supra , the Court said: While property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered, in determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated ... property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of this Court's inquiry. In Rakas, this Court held that an illegal search only violates the rights of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. (Citations omitted.) Id. at ____, 100 S.Ct. at 2553. We conclude that Parks did not have any legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises at 408 North 5th Street and therefore had no standing to assert Fourth Amendment protection.