Opinion ID: 2977534
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BIA Opinion

Text: The Pepajs’ claims that the BIA violated their due-process rights by not adequately explaining its decision and improperly taking administrative notice of changed country conditions in Albania are equally meritless. As we have noted, “the Board has no duty to write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Scorteanu v. INS, 339 F.3d 407, 412 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, it is important to note that, in the Pepajs’ brief, the Pepajs grossly mischaraterize the BIA’s order denying asylum and withholding of removal. Contrary to the Pepajs’ assertions, the BIA order does not disagree with the factual findings of the IJ, but still uphold the IJ’s decision. Rather, the BIA noted that some of the inconsistencies that the IJ highlighted were not alone sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding, but that other inconsistencies found by the IJ were sufficient. J.A. at 9 (03/20/06 BIA Ord. at 2). Moreover, the BIA did not assume past persecution and decide the case on changed country conditions. The BIA explicitly stated it found no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility finding based on three specific inconsistencies that the IJ noted. Based on this fact, the Pepajs failed to show eligibility for relief. The BIA mentioned changed country conditions only as an alternative, albeit unnecessary, reason to deny the application. Such alternative reasoning does not give rise to a due-process violation. 12 Additionally, a fair review of the BIA order reveals that the BIA “consider[ed] the issues raised, and announce[d] its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it ha[d] heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Scorteanu, 339 F.3d at 412. Specifically, the BIA listed the inconsistencies that supported an adverse credibility finding, complete with citations to the record that illustrated those inconsistencies. Thus, it is factually incorrect to say that the BIA did not explain its reasoning. Furthermore, “[s]everal courts of appeals, including ours, have upheld the practice of an IJ or the BIA taking administrative notice of commonly known facts.” Vasha, 410 F.3d at 874 n.5. It is a commonly known fact that the Democratic Party regained control of the Albanian government as a result of the 2005 elections. See Sulaj v. Mukasey, 287 F. App’x 481, 489 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (noting that “in 2005, Democratic Party leader Sali Berisha was elected as Prime Minister of Albania, and the Democratic Party won a substantial majority of seats in Parliament”). The Pepajs do not appear to dispute this fact, but rather argue that, in the instant case, it was a violation of due process to take administrative notice of changed country conditions because the Pepajs were not given an opportunity to present contrary evidence. Again, the Pepajs misstate the facts. The IJ in his oral decision listed changed country conditions as an alternative basis for denying relief. Although the 2005 elections had not occurred at the time of the IJ’s decision, the Pepajs were on notice that a change in country conditions could be an issue on appeal as a basis to deny relief. Simply because the Pepajs chose not to dispute such an argument before the BIA does not make an otherwise proper action by the BIA a due-process violation. Morever, even if it was improper for the BIA to take administrative notice of the changed country conditions of Albania, the Pepajs cannot show prejudice, a requirement to prove a due- 13 process violation. Vasha, 410 F.3d at 872. The BIA based its denial of the Pepajs’ application on the adverse credibility determination, not the changed country conditions. J.A. at 9 (03/20/06 BIA Ord. at 2); see also Supp. J.A. at 7 (01/05/07 BIA Ord.) (noting that the adverse credibility determination was dispositive in the March 20, 2006 order). As we explain below, this adverse credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the Pepajs cannot meet the prejudice prong of the due-process standard. Therefore, we hold that the BIA did not violate the Pepajs’ due-process rights.