Opinion ID: 1760837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Evidence of Other Murders Previously Committed

Text: ¶ 21. The prosecutor also asked Goode if he had asked Snelson why he shot Stephen Goode. Charles Goode testified that while leaving the scene of the incident, he expressed to Snelson that he could not believe that Snelson had shot Stephen Goode. The prosecutor responded, saying [a]ll right. Goode then testified that Snelson said: [d]on't worry about it. That's my third or fourth. To this testimony, the defense objected and moved for a mistrial. ¶ 22. The defense stated that the statement made by Goode was a violation of the motion in limine and implied that the prosecution elicited the testimony from Goode. The court sustained the defendant's objection, and overruled the motion for a mistrial. The trial court further instructed the jury to disregard the statement, and continued with the prosecution's direct examination of Goode. ¶ 23. The appellant asserts that the prosecutor elicited this testimony and that the court's attempt to cure the prejudice resulting from this testimony was too little too late. The state asserts that this portion of Goode's testimony was unresponsive. While the State suggests that Goode's statement was unresponsive, a review of Goode's prior statements leads ineluctably to the conclusion that the response was the only one which could have been anticipated for the question asked. After being arrested Goode gave a voluntary custodial statement, in which he explained the crime. At one point during his statement, Goode related that he asked Snelson why he committed the murder. The investigator taking the statement asked: What did he say? Goode stated that Snelson told him that Stephen Goode wasn't the first one that he had killed, and that Stephen was his number four. ¶ 24. During the motion in limine, the defense requested that Snelson's alleged statement regarding his participation in other murders not be presented to the jury. The court ruled that it would make a ruling during the trial if such statement was offered and objected to. During the trial, after Goode described his version of events leading to the killing, the prosecutor asked the witness if he had said anything to Snelson as to why he shot Stephen Goode. Charles Goode informed the prosecutor that he expressed to Snelson that he could not believe that he had committed the crime. The prosecutor interjected, [a]ll right and Goode continued his testimony, informing the jury that Snelson told him that it was his third or fourth murder. There was an objection and it was sustained. However, the motion for mistrial was overruled. ¶ 25. Later, during a hearing in chambers, the court expressed its concern that the statement had been made in the presence of the jury. The court informed the defense that it would poll the jury at the defense's request to determine whether the jury could disregard such a statement. The defense, however, requested that the court not do so for fear that it would only bring more attention to the statement made by Goode. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury that it was to disregard all evidence which was excluded by the Court from consideration during the course of the trial. Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether the jury can disregard the prejudicial statement. ¶ 26. This Court on numerous occasions has held that where the trial judge sustains an appellant's objection to the testimony of a witness and instructs the jury to disregard the same, prejudicial error does not result from that testimony. Shelby v. State, 402 So.2d 338, 340 (Miss. 1981) (citing Herron v. State, 287 So.2d 759 (Miss. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972, 94 S.Ct. 3179, 41 L.Ed.2d 1144 (1974)); Wallace v. State, 466 So.2d 900, 906 (Miss. 1985); Mack, 650 So.2d at 1318. However, each case must stand on its own facts in determining whether particular error constitutes reversible error. Henderson v. State, 403 So.2d 139, 140 (Miss. 1981); Carleton v. State, 425 So.2d 1036, 1041 (Miss. 1983). A determination of whether such an error is incurable, resulting in a mistrial, rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Logsdon v. State, 183 Miss. 168, 170, 183 So. 503, 503 (1938). This Court has held on various occasions that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting the defendant's request for a mistrial. ¶ 27. In Barlow v. State, 233 So.2d 829, 831 (Miss. 1970), this Court ruled that comments made by the district attorney during his cross-examination of the defendant, an elected Justice of the Peace being prosecuted for embezzlement, were prejudicial in nature to the extent that they constituted reversible error. The district attorney asked the following questions: Q: So wouldn't you agree with me that a justice of the peace making that kind of money at the expense of the taxpayer ought to be honest? ... . Q: You made enough money there that you could have been honest? Id. This Court stated: [t]hough both questions were objected to and the objections were sustained by the court as being improper, the effect nevertheless was to prejudice the jury and thus this is reversible error. Id. ¶ 28. In Henderson, Ricky Scott, a defense witness, was improperly asked on crossexamination by the district attorney whether he had been indicted for burglary. Henderson, 403 So.2d at 140. The witness had previously answered, No on direct examination to the question by his attorney, Have you ever been convicted of a felony? Id. Also presented was the impropriety of the district attorney inquiring on cross-examination of the co-indictee, Michael Henderson, whether the jury had convicted him for the same offense of armed robbery on which the defendant was being tried. Id. Before an objection could be interposed, the witness answered, Yea, because of you... . Id. The trial court sustained the objection but overruled the motions for a mistrial, and instructed the jury to disregard the questions asked by the district attorney and the answers thereto. Id. This Court reversed the conviction, stating: ... when the improper conduct is compounded by the district attorney after having heard the court's admonishment to the jury on a prior occasion with reference to the same subject matter, the prejudicial effect on the jury is sometimes so great that we have no alternative but to reverse the conviction and sentence and remand the case for a new trial. In this case, the district attorney, after hearing the court's lengthy admonition to the jury to disregard his improper question with reference to Ricky Scott's indictment for the burglary of a dwelling, he thereafter, by a question, advised the jury that the appellant's co-indictee and twin brother, Michael Henderson, had been previously convicted for his participation in the same offense for which the defendant was on trial... . Id. at 141. ¶ 29. In Williams v. State, 539 So.2d 1049 (Miss. 1989), the defendant was convicted under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-23 (1972) of gratification of lust. Dr. Donald Guild, a psychiatrist who had interviewed the child, testified for the defense as to, among other things, the child's propensity for truthfulness. Id. at 1050. During the cross-examination of Dr. Guild, the district attorney moved to introduce a video tape made of the child in the office of Dr. Brenda Chance, a social worker who had been counseling the child for several months prior to trial. Id. at 1051. The motion was overruled and the jury was instructed to disregard any references to the video tape. Id. Subsequently, on numerous occasions throughout the trial, the prosecutors moved for the introduction of the video tape. Id. Each motion was denied. Id. This Court stated that ... although the jury was instructed to disregard the remarks regarding the video tape at the first mention thereof, it cannot be said with confidence that the repeated subsequent references to the video tape did not influence the jury. Id. at 1052. ¶ 30. In the instant case, after hearing the court's instruction to the jury to disregard the statement made by Goode, the prosecutor refrained from making further references to the alleged confession by Snelson. Furthermore, at the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury that it was to disregard all evidence which was excluded by the Court from consideration during the course of the trial. However, it is this Court's view that the introduction of Snelson's alleged remarks to Goode after the commission of the crime had such a prejudicial effect that it cannot be concluded that such remarks did not influence the jury. ¶ 31. In Kearney v. State, 68 Miss. 233, 8 So. 292 (1890), the appellant was convicted of the murder of James Fossett and sentenced to capital punishment. During the trial, Dr. R.A. Quin was introduced as a witness by the defendant to prove, among other things, the character of the defendant for peace or violence. Id., 68 Miss. at 236, 8 So. at 293. On cross-examination by the district attorney, and over the objections of the defendant, the district attorney was permitted to ask the witness the following question: Do you know whether or not he [the defendant] has ever killed a man before? Id. Over objection the witness was permitted to answer: I have heard that he had. Id. ¶ 32. In holding that the testimony should not have been admitted and reversing the trial court's decision, this Court stated: [t]he manifest purpose of the testimony was to show either the motive of the accused in killing Fossett, or to attack his character for peace. In neither aspect should it have been admitted. The fact that the accused had on a previous occasion killed a man, could not prove any of the circumstances under which, or the act by which Fossett was killed, nor throw any light upon the intent with which the accused killed him. The defendant was upon trial for a distinct offense, and that offense not of the character of those in which it is admissible to prove an unlawful purpose by showing guilt of the same character on another and independent occasion... . [I]t has never been held that the malice necessary to the crime of murder may be shown by evidence of the prior, independent and disconnected killing of another person. Id., 68 Miss. at 237-38, 8 So. at 293. ¶ 33. In instances such as this we must apply the familiar maxim that one cannot unbake an apple. It cannot be concluded that such testimony did not inflame or improperly influence the jury. The court erred in failing to declare a mistrial.