Opinion ID: 2639129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Postjudgment Proceedings On Smedsrud's Motion For New Trial Cured The Trial Court's Error In Totally Failing To Consider Smedsrud's Premises-Liability Theory At The Postremand Summary-Process Stage

Text: ¶ 22 After certiorari was granted this court directed the parties to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. This had to be done because it appeared that the trial judge rested the post-Smedsrud I summary judgment solely on the § 109 time bar, leaving utterly unresolved the premises-liability issue. [37] It was not until the parties' show-cause briefs were filed that it became clearly apparent the premises-liability theory was in fact injected into the case in postjudgment stages and then seemingly resolved against Smedsrud in the course of postjudgment rulings upon his new-trial motion. In those postjudgment proceedings, Owner's response to the motion challenged for the first time on remand Smedsrud's legal basis for his premises-liability claim by injecting Owner's want of notice (of the harm-dealing condition on the premises). [38] The trial court's denial of Smedsrud's new-trial motion leaves for us a clear record-trail indication that both the motion and Owner's argument were indeed reached for consideration. By its denial the trial court had in fact ruled out as unsupportive of Smedsrud's claim both theories of liability  that advanced by the plaintiff and that pressed for him by Owner  and left no unresolved issues. Albeit at a postjudgment stage, the trial judge did consider Owner's challenge to premises liability before denying Smedsrud's new-trial quest. The appeal hence comes here from a judgment [39] rather than from an intermediate order. It is hence invulnerable to dismissal as falling short of disposing of all tendered prejudgment issues. [40]