Opinion ID: 2330409
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Continuation of the Restraining Order

Text: We next address whether the trial court's continuation of the restraining order was unsupported by the evidence. In its final order, the trial court incorporated the restraining order issued in March 2005 and continued it pending further order of the court. The petitioner argues that after the July 2000 incident, there was no contact to warrant any restraint. The respondent counters that the court justifiably found that a present threat exists. Although no statute is cited in the order, on appeal, both parties presume it was issued under RSA 458:16. We proceed, therefore, under the same assumption. RSA 458:16 provides, in pertinent part: I. After the filing of a petition for divorce, . . . the superior court may issue orders with such conditions and limitations as the court deems just which may, at the discretion of the court, be made on a temporary or permanent basis. . . . Said orders may be to the following effect: (a) Directing any party to refrain from abusing or interfering in any way with the person or liberty of the other party. (b) Enjoining any party from entering the premises wherein the other party resides upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result. . . . . (d) Enjoining any party from harassing, intimidating or threatening the other party. . . . RSA 458:16, I. The trial court found that [c]redible evidence was . . . offered at trial that on July 14, 2000 the Petitioner physically assaulted the Respondent. The court further found that [t]he Respondent is genuinely in fear for her safety as a result of the acts and credible threats of the Petitioner, and that the petitioner made additional threats to the respondent after the July 2000 incident. At trial, the respondent testified to these threats and her fear of the petitioner. Dr. Shulik also testified that he had some concerns as to whether [the petitioner] was trying to frighten his wife, that the petitioner did not accept the separation, and that the petitioner had admitted to him that he had violated a previous restraining order. The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence before it. See Choy, 154 N.H. at 713, 919 A.2d at 806. A review of the record reveals that the trial court reasonably could have found that there was a continuing need for a restraining order. We cannot say that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion.