Opinion ID: 1792572
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Heading: Whether Kruse's Sentence Was Improperly Altered by the District Court.

Text: Iowa Code section 692A.2(1) provides [a] person who has been convicted of a criminal offense against a minor . . . shall register as provided in this chapter. Persons convicted and placed on probation are required to register with the sheriff of the county of their residence within five days pursuant to Iowa Code section 692A.3. A [c]riminal offense against a minor is a statutorily defined term. The applicable statute defines such an offense as follows: 5. Criminal offense against a minor means any of the following criminal offenses or conduct: a. Kidnapping of a minor, except for the kidnapping of a minor in the third degree committed by a parent. b. False imprisonment of a minor, except if committed by a parent. c. Any indictable offense involving sexual conduct directed toward a minor. d. Solicitation of a minor to engage in an illegal sex act. e. Use of a minor in a sexual performance. f. Solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution. g. Any indictable offense against a minor involving sexual contact with the minor. h. An attempt to commit an offense enumerated in this subsection. i. Incest committed against a minor. j. Dissemination and exhibition of obscene material to minors in violation of section 728.2. k. Admitting minors to premises where obscene material is exhibited in violation of section 728.3. l. Stalking in violation of section 708.11, subsection 3, paragraph b, subparagraph (3), if the fact-finder determines by clear and convincing evidence that the offense was sexually motivated. m. Sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of section 728.12. n. Enticing away a minor in violation of section 710.10, subsection 1. o. An indictable offense committed in another jurisdiction which would constitute an indictable offense under paragraphs a through n. Iowa Code § 692A.1(5) (emphasis added). Kruse insists that the charge to which he ultimately pled guilty was not a criminal offense against a minor because the elements of the crime as set forth in his written guilty plea did not refer to any sexual involvement with the victim. This contention ignores the fact that his written plea recited that the Minutes of Testimony accurately describe what happened in all significant aspects. The minutes of testimony that accompanied the trial information set forth the testimony of the victim attesting to the fact that Kruse had forcibly removed her underwear and had sexual intercourse with her. The action the district court took in sustaining the report of Kruse's alleged probation violation did not require an amendment to the sentence that had been imposed following his plea of guilty. This is because determination of whether a particular conviction is a criminal offense against a minor need not be determined by the judgment of conviction. A judgment of conviction for certain offenses, because of the required elements of the crimes, will leave no doubt that the offense falls within one of the definitions of criminal offense against a minor contained in section 692A.1(5). In contrast, other convictions, such as the assault for which Kruse was convicted, will require a resort to information dehors the fact of conviction in order to determine if the offenses fall within a section 692A.1(5) definition. In either case, it is the operative command of the statutes, i.e., Iowa Code sections 692A.2 and 692A.3, that impose the registration requirement on the convicted party rather than the judgment of the court. When a person has been convicted of a criminal offense against a minor and is not incarcerated, Iowa Code section 692A.5 contemplates that prior to release or sentencing of the convicted person the court will obtain fingerprints and a criminal history and inform the person concerning the sex-offender registration requirements. The State concedes that this was not done in the present case prior to sentencing, but urges that such omission does not relieve Kruse of the requirement to register as a sex offender as required by law. We agree with that contention. Within ten days of his sentencing, Kruse was advised by his probation officer of his duty to register as a sex offender and signed an agreement to do so. We are satisfied that, notwithstanding the absence of a specific instruction from the court concerning Kruse's registration requirement, it was not improper for his probation officer to conclude from available credible information concerning the facts of the crime that Kruse was required by law to register as a sex offender. At the hearing on the application to revoke probation, Kruse was allowed to challenge the conclusion of his probation officer that his offense constituted a criminal offense against a minor as defined in section 692A.1(5). Our goal in interpreting statutes is to determine the legislature's intent. State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004). We do not speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart from the words used in the statute. State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996). We apply a plain and rational meaning consistent with the subject matter of the statute if the statutory language is clear. City of Fairfield v. Harper Drilling Co., 692 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Iowa 2005); State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003). We agree with the district court's conclusion that, because paragraphs ( c ) and ( g ) of subsection (5) of section 692A.1 contain the words [a]ny indictable offense, these definitions include offenses in which sexual conduct was involved, but which do not require sexual conduct as an element for conviction. We also agree with the district court that, given the concessions contained in Kruse's plea of guilty, resort to the minutes of the victim's testimony was proper in determining whether the assaultive conduct fell within the definition of a [c]riminal offense against a minor.