Opinion ID: 2679998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Financial Award

Text: [¶20] Abby argues that the court should have found that a constructive trust existed as to the stock that Thomas transferred to his mother for the benefit of his son and the assets that Thomas transferred to his daughter, both in violation of the court’s injunction. The record amply supports the District Court’s finding that Thomas’s criminal activity and his dissipation of assets in violation of the injunction amounted to financial misconduct. When the District Court addresses the issue of child support, it will also have an opportunity to reexamine its remedy for the misconduct and its entire financial award.6 See Dostanko, 2013 ME 47, ¶¶ 10, 13, --- A.3d ---. [¶21] Abby contends that the court should have awarded her the assets through a constructive trust despite the apparent change in ownership of them. There are challenges presented, however, when a third party holds property at issue in a divorce proceeding. See Howard v. Howard, 2010 ME 83, ¶¶ 10-18, 2 A.3d 318; see also M.R. Civ. P. 111(a), (c) (limiting the opportunities for joinder and intervention in Family Division actions). In Howard, we described the procedure required when a third party claims an interest in marital property at issue in a 6 We address the financial award because the District Court is likely to revisit the issue on remand, see Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 24, 818 A.2d 1005, and because considering Thomas’s responsibility for child support may necessitate the court’s reconsideration of the fairness of all provisions of the judgment, see Sewall v. Saritvanich, 1999 ME 46, ¶ 26, 726 A.2d 224. 11 divorce. Id. As we articulated, the District Court lacks personal jurisdiction over a non-party to a divorce action. Id. ¶ 12. A party must institute a separate action against a third party to resolve disputes over property, and consolidation of the independent action and the divorce proceeding may be appropriate. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17-18. There is nothing suggested in the record that might have prevented Abby from filing an independent action seeking to impose a constructive trust, but such an action would be required for the court to obtain personal jurisdiction over those to whom Thomas transferred assets.7 [¶22] We also cannot resolve Abby’s claim that a constructive trust exists and that the minor settlement should be reviewed because of the absence of evidence and factual findings regarding the minor settlement. As noted above, the basis for the Superior Court’s approval of the minor settlement is not indicated in the record. We therefore remand this matter for the court to reconsider the financial aspects of the judgment anew. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 7 Of course, the court has the authority to award Thomas’s tools to Abby or award her any interest that Thomas has, now or in the future, in the property that he transferred to third parties. In the alternative, the court may consider modifying its award of reimbursement support pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(C) (2012). Finally, upon a finding of contempt for a violation of the preliminary injunction, see 19-A M.R.S. § 903(3)(A) (2012), the court may impose a monetary judgment against Thomas and leave it to him to unravel the financial transactions at issue. See Dostanko v. Dostanko, 2013 ME 47, ¶¶ 10, 13, --- A.3d ---. 12 __________________________ On the briefs: Donald F. Brown, Esq., Brewer, for appellant Abby L. King Jeffrey C. Toothaker, Esq., Toothaker & Chong, Ellsworth, for appellee Thomas E. King Ellsworth District Court docket number FM-2010-324 FOR CLERKS REFERENCE ONLY