Opinion ID: 2591481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the case law cited by the state in favor of its position is either distinguishable from the current case or erroneously decided

Text: ¶ 24 The State suggests that our interpretation of the Utah Constitution is a radical departure from our prior precedent regarding school trust lands. The State places particularly heavy reliance on two of our prior cases in support of its reading of the constitution: Van Wagoner v. Whitmore [29] and Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands & Forestry. [30] ¶ 25 We believe that our prior case law is generally consistent with the interpretation we set out above, but recognize that certain statements from both Van Wagoner and Consolidation Coal could be construed to be in tension with our holding today. Accordingly, we take this opportunity to clarify the nature and scope of our holding in Van Wagoner and to disavow certain suggestions in Consolidation Coal that were based on an erroneous reliance on United States Supreme Court precedent.
¶ 26 The core of our holding today is that the constitutional appointment of the State as trustee over the school trust lands does no more than impose on the State the ordinary authority and obligations of a trustee. We, as well as the legislature, have recognized this principle in the past. ¶ 27 For example, in National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, we stated that [t]he duties of a trustee apply to the state in administering school trust lands, [31] and cited County of Skamania v. State, [32] a Washington Supreme Court case, in support of the proposition that there was a judicial consensus that states charged with administering school trust lands are under the same obligations as those assumed by a private trustee. [33] ¶ 28 Additionally, the legislature, in enacting the School and Institutional Trust Lands Management Act in 1994, set forth its view of the nature of the State's constitutionally imposed fiduciary obligations as follows: (1)(a) The purpose of this title is to establish an administration and board to manage lands that Congress granted to the state for the support of common schools and other beneficiary institutions, under the Utah Enabling Act. (b) This grant was expressly accepted in the Utah Constitution, thereby creating a compact between the federal and state governments which imposes upon the state a perpetual trust obligation to which standard trust principles are applied. [34] Accordingly, the principle upon which our holding reststhat the constitution imposes on the State the normal authority and obligations of a trusteeis not a radical departure from, but is entirely consistent with, our past pronouncements.
¶ 29 In Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, [35] we refused to apply the limitations period for adverse possession to school trust lands. The State cites Van Wagoner in support of its contention that statutes of limitations can never be constitutionally applied to prevent the State from challenging a conveyance of school trust lands on the ground that it was made for less than full value. But we did not interpret the Utah Constitution in Van Wagoner, and, even if we had, any constitutional rule we set out in Van Wagoner would not govern affirmative conveyance cases. ¶ 30 Even though constitutional concerns regarding school trust lands appeared to play a significant role in our analysis in Van Wagoner, our holding ultimately rested on statutory, rather than constitutional, grounds. In Van Wagoner, we held that, in light of the State's constitutionally imposed duty as trustee over school trust lands, it was not conceivable that the legislature could have intended that the adverse possession statute of limitations apply to school trust lands. [36] And although our reading of the statute of limitations in Van Wagoner was apparently influenced by our view of the constitutional issues presented, [37] we expressly declined to resolve the case on constitutional grounds. [38] Thus, while our decision in Van Wagoner contains dicta regarding this court's opinion of the constitutionality of applying an adverse possession statute of limitations to school trust lands, when stripped down to its essential holding, the opinion speaks only to the question of legislative intent regarding the adverse possession statute. ¶ 31 Furthermore, even if we were to read Van Wagoner as a constitutional case, the analysis from Van Wagoner would not be controlling here given the significant differences in context and governing law. Rather than a mere claim that a passive state has been deprived of title to school trust land solely by a third party's improvement of the land in question, as was the case in Van Wagoner, this case involves an active state's attempt to void its own affirmative conveyance based upon its own failure to negotiate for sufficient consideration. Even if it were correct that the Utah Constitution prohibits the State, as constitutionally appointed trustee, from losing title to school trust lands through adverse possession, it does not necessarily follow that the State may, after affirmatively exercising the authority granted to it as trustee, require another to bear the costs of its mismanagement. ¶ 32 The text of the Enabling Act, upon which the Utah Constitution's treatment of school trust lands is based, confirms this view. While the Enabling Act does not specifically speak to whether affirmative conveyances for less than full value are prohibited, it does speak to the loss of title by preemption: That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which only shall be expended for the support of said schools, and such land shall not be subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other entry under the land laws of the United States, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for school purposes only. [39] The Enabling Act's express prohibition of preemption provides support for reading Van Wagoner to stand for the proposition that statutes of limitations cannot be applied in a way that results in the State losing title to school trust lands through adverse possession. But it provides no support for extending that rule to affirmative conveyances of school trust lands. And given this lack of textual support, coupled with the significant differences in context presented by affirmative conveyance cases, we conclude that Van Wagoner, to the extent it might be construed to set forth a constitutional rule, is limited to the adverse possession context. It simply does not speak to whether a statute of limitations may be applied to bar the State's challenge to its own prior conveyance.