Opinion ID: 1885466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court's refusal to strike for cause potential jurors effectively abrogated MTC's rights under Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

Text: ¶ 31. MTC requested that thirteen jurors be stricken for cause, but only two were stricken. Five others were removed with MTC's peremptory challenges. [3] The trial court declined to excuse the others. Two of them actually served on the jury, and a third served as an alternate. MTC contends that by failing to strike the jurors for cause, the trial court forced MTC to use its peremptory challenges, and thereby effectively abridged MTC's right to exercise peremptory challenges pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 47(c). ¶ 32. MTC relies upon United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir.1976), where the court reversed a jury verdict for failure to excuse individuals for cause. In Nell, the defense was forced to strike juror Bougher with a peremptory challenge after the trial court refused to strike him for cause even though his strong opinions and prejudices were acknowledged. Id. at 1228. Another juror had personal knowledge regarding one of the claims, and even though he stated he could be impartial, the trial judge did not question him as to the possibility or the depth of his potential prejudice. Id. at 1229. ¶ 33. MTC also cites City of Live Oak v. Townsend, 567 So.2d 926 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1990) in which similar questions were posed during voir dire, but the potential jurors were more adamant and zealous about their opinions, and most of them stated that they would not follow instructions contrary to their opinions regarding eminent domain. Id. at 927. ¶ 34. We have noted that [a] trial court has wide discretion in determining whether to excuse prospective jurors, including those challenged for cause. Smith v. State, 802 So.2d 82, 86 (Miss. 2001). Further, the trial judge due to his presence during the voir dire process, is in a better position to evaluate the prospective juror's responses ... Id. (citing Wells v. State, 698 So.2d 497, 501 (Miss.1997)). Therefore, we will not set aside a determination that a juror is fair and impartial unless the trial judge was clearly wrong. Id. (citing Wells, 698 So.2d at 501). ¶ 35. The circumstances in Nell and Townsend are not comparable to this case. Here, none of the potential juror's expressed rigidness in their opinions. After being polled individually by the judge, they each vowed that they would remain impartial and follow the law and instructions of the court. Ample measures were taken to ensure a fair and impartial jury. See Tighe v. Crosthwait, 665 So.2d 1337, 1339-40 (Miss.1995). Hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike certain jurors for cause; and therefore it did not impede upon MTC's right to exercise peremptory challenges.