Opinion ID: 1163987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AS 11.20.020 provides:

Text: Second degree arson. A person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of a building or structure of any kind, whether his property or the property of another, not included or described in § 10 of this chapter [arson of a dwelling], is guilty of arson in the second degree, and upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 10 years, or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by both. Relying on the last antecedent rule of statutory construction, [2] appellant argues that the phrase wilfully and maliciously refers only to [a] person who ... sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned ... and does not modify who aids, counsels or procures the burning of a building or structure... . Consequently, a person can be convicted of second degree arson under the statute if he aids, counsels or procures the burning of a building even though he is not shown to have had any specific criminal intent. Appellant argues that the absence of a criminal intent requirement makes the statute violative of the due process clause as an unreasonable exercise of police power. The threshold issue, however, is whether we should consider this issue on appeal since, as the State points out, the alleged constitutional error was not raised at trial [3] and was not included in appellant's statement of points on appeal as required by Supreme Court Rule 9(e). [4] In Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969), however, this court examined appellant's claim that the statute under which he was indicted was unconstitutional in spite of the failure of appellant to object to the indictment. The court stated: [I]f the statute under which appellant was indicted is unconstitutional, it follows that the indictment and judgment of conviction would be vitiated and we should reverse under the plain error rule. (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 640. Similarly, if the statute under which Tarnef was charged is unconstitutional, the resulting indictment and conviction would constitute plain error under Alaska Criminal Rule 47(b). [5] Accordingly, we shall consider the issue although it was not brought to the attention of the trial court. Upon turning to the merits of this argument, we find that while appellant's construction of the statute makes grammatical sense, it is a tortured reading of the statute. The legislature's probable intent can be inferred by reading AS 11.20.020, the arson statute, together with AS 12.15.010. AS 12.15.010 provides: Abrogation of distinctions between accessories and principals. The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal, and between principals in the first and second degree is abrogated; and all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether they directly commit the act constituting the crime or, though not present, aid and abet in its commission, shall be prosecuted, tried, and punished as principals. (Emphasis added.) [6] The most sensible way to construe the second degree arson statute is that the legislature used the words aids, counsels or procures as synonymous with aid and abet. Since AS 11.20.020 prescribes the same punishment for the perpetrator and the person who aids, counsels or procures the burning, this reading is consistent with AS 12.15.010. This does not appear to be a strained reading of the statutory language. It can be inferred that the words aid and abet are used synonymously with various combinations of the words assist, advise, counsel, procure, encourage, incite and instigate. Similarly, in Thomas v. State, 391 P.2d 18 (Alaska 1964), this court approved a jury instruction which read in part: `Aid and abet' means to help, assist, or facilitate the commission of a crime, promote the accomplishment thereof, help in advancing or bringing it about, or encourage, counsel, or incite as to its commission. Id. at 25. If it is conceded that aid, counsel or procures means aid and abet then appellant's argument that the lack of any requirement of specific intent or malice ... makes the statute unconstitutional as an unreasonable exercise of police power evaporates. It is well established at common law and in Alaska that a person cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a crime unless it is shown that he had the specific criminal intent to bring about the illegal end. Thus, in Mahle v. State, 371 P.2d 21 (Alaska 1962), this court stated: An accomplice is generally defined as one who in some manner, knowingly and with criminal intent aids, abets, assists or participates in a criminal act. (Footnote omitted, emphasis added.) Id. at 25. Also in Fajeriak v. State, 439 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 881, 89 S.Ct. 184, 21 L.Ed.2d 155 (1968), the court citing Mahle stated: There is no evidence in the record from which it could be inferred that Benton and Gamradt had in any manner, knowingly and with criminal intent, aided, abetted, assisted or participated with Fajeriak in committing the murder. The trial judge was therefore correct in determining as a matter of law that they were not accomplices. (Footnote omitted, emphasis added.) Id. at 789. Mens rea requirements clearly have a basic place in our system of criminal law. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), the Supreme Court stated: The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 250, 72 S.Ct. at 243, 96 L.Ed. at 293. In Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969), this court noted that except for certain public welfare offenses the general rule is that criminal liability could not be imposed absent a showing of criminal intent. Citing Morissette the court made the following statement which would seem dispositive here: It is true that one will sometimes find felony statutes that are silent on the subject of criminal intent. But these are instances where the states have codified the common law of crimes, and their courts have assumed that the omission of the requirement of criminal intent did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it needed no statutory affirmation. Thus, as to felony-type offenses codified from the common law, the courts have found an implication of intent. Representative of these instances are larceny-type offenses where the state courts have consistently retained a requirement of criminal intent. (Footnotes omitted.) Speidel at 79. That is precisely the situation we face here. It is clear that at common law criminal intent was a necessary element of liability as an aider and abettor. [7] Although Alaska now treats aiders and abettors as principals, the common law intent requirement remains. [8] Accordingly, we hold that although intent is not specifically mentioned in the portion of the second degree arson statute which refers to one who aids, counsels or procures the burning of a building, criminal intent is required as a necessary element of the crime. Finally, it should be emphasized that the judge correctly instructed the jury that it could not find Tarnef guilty under the arson statute unless it found he possessed the requisite criminal intent. [9]