Opinion ID: 1844462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Successive Application for Post-Conviction Relief

Text: ¶ 7. We first turn to Chase's Successive Application for Post-Conviction Relief, his Motion to Amend the Successive Application, and the State's response, and analyze each in light of Atkins. ¶ 8. Chase's Successive Application essentially asserts that Chase is mentally retarded and, therefore, exempt from the death penalty. The State is aggressively opposed to both Chase's Successive Application, and his proposed motion, for several reasons. 1. Deficiencies in the Successive Application. ¶ 9. The State alleges numerous deficiencies in Chase's Successive Application. We find each should be separately addressed. Was the Successive Application Prepared for Chase, or a Different Prisoner? ¶ 10. Attached to the Successive Application is Chase's proposed Motion to Vacate Death Sentence which Chase hopes to pursue, provided his Successive Application is successful. The proposed Motion to Vacate Death Sentence included a discussion of certain test scores, alleged testing by Dr. Mark Zimmerman, school records, and testimony of a sister who refers, not to Ricky but, to Ronnie. Additionally, the motion cites to an attached affidavit from Dr. Mark Webb, dated February 4, 1998. However, the motion also cites to affidavits of Dr. Zimmerman and Sandra Chase, neither of which is attached. The motion also states, Chase alleges that Dr. Zimmerman examined him at Parchman on December 31, 2002. ¶ 11. The State responded to the Successive Application by alleging that Chase (or the lawyer who filed the Successive Application on Chase's behalf) used an Emergency Application filed with this Court in January 2003 on behalf of another death row inmate, Ron Chris Foster, [5] and simply substituted Chase's name for Foster's in the text of the Application. According to the State, [n]one of the factual information contained in this proposed motion relates to Ricky Chaseit is all copied verbatim from the Foster memorandum. ¶ 12. As additional support for its contention that Chase's Successive Application was not prepared for Chase, the State filed the affidavit of Mary Tucker, property officer at the Mississippi Correctional Facility located at Parchman. Tucker's affidavit stated that she had reviewed the inmate visit records, and that Dr. Zimmerman did not visit Chase on December 31, 2002. This, the State claims, supports its allegation that counsel for Chase used the petition filed on behalf of Foster, and substituted Chase's name for Foster's. ¶ 13. Apparently, after studying the State's allegations for approximately six weeks, counsel for Chase found them to be meritorious. On September 3, 2003, Chase filed a Motion to Amend Successive Application for Leave to File for Post-Conviction Relief. Attached thereto was the Amended Successive Application and a new (unsigned) Motion to Vacate Death Sentence. In the Motion to Amend, counsel stated that she inadvertently failed to remove several paragraphs specific to the Foster petition.... ¶ 14. By way of attempted explanation, Chase's attorney, Cynthia Stewart, claims that she had not had significant involvement in Chase's case prior to filing the motion. Characterizing Stewart's claim as disingenuous, the State points out Stewart's considerable involvement, including that she was sole counsel for Chase on state post-conviction review. [6] ¶ 15. The Motion to Amend claims that the amendment will not prejudice the State, and that [t]he amendment is necessary in the interest of justice to correctly state the facts on which Chase relies in his Atkins claim. We agree. Did Chase Fail to Comply With the Requirements of MISS.CODE ANN. § 99-39-11(3)? ¶ 16. The State also urges us to find that Chase failed to verify the documents pending before us. Specifically, the State claims that the successive application filed by Chase fails to comply with the dictates of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-11(3), which states: (3) The motion shall be verified by the oath of the prisoner. The State informs us that it finds no verification by Chase of the motion to amend or the attached application or proposed petition. ¶ 17. We find no requirement of verification in MISS.CODE ANN. § 99-39-11(3). Nor do we find anywhere any requirement of verification of an application to this Court for leave to proceed in the trial court, or of a motion to amend the application. However, verification of the Motion to Vacate Death Sentence is required by MISS.CODE ANN. § 99-39-9(3). Although Stewart did not even sign the Motion to Vacate Death Sentence attached to the Successive Application, she did sign the Motion to Vacate Death Sentence attached to the Motion to Amend the Successive Application. However, the verification required by statute was not included, and Stewart did not sign the Certificate of Service. ¶ 18. The provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-27(2) (Supp.2003), clearly require the petitioner to attach to the Application (and any successive application) filed with this Court, the original and two (2) executed copies of the motion proposed to be filed in the trial court.... Since verification of the Motion to Vacate Death Sentence is statutorily required, execution of the motion is not complete until it is verified. Absent substantial compliance with the requirements of MISS.CODE ANN. § 99-39-9(4) (Supp.2003), a prisoner sentenced to death faces possible dismissal of his application and motion. Id. ¶ 19. This oversight is inexcusable particularly in a death penalty case. Nevertheless, we see nothing to be gained in this particular case by returning the Motion and Application for verification, and we are loathe to dismiss Chase's Application and Motion due to errors by his counsel. See Puckett v. State, 834 So.2d 676, 678 (Miss. 2002) (when a party is prohibited from exercising right to proceed by circumstances clearly beyond his control, and due process and fundamental fairness issues are present, relief is justified). We therefore now proceed to evaluate the Motion to Amend Successive Application and the proposed Motion to Vacate Death Sentence. ¶ 20. The argument presented by Chase's counsel in support of the Motion to Vacate Death Sentence, is as follows: Ricky Chase meets the test for mental retardation under any standard. Dr. Mark Webb, who was the original expert on Chase's first post-conviction petition, evaluated Chase's medical records for mental retardation. Webb's affidavit reports that Ricky Chase is mildly mentally retarded with a 77 on the verbal, but only a 64 on the performance part of the test, indicating mild [mental] retardation and a learning disability.... The records reviewed include medical records from Hardy Wilson Memorial Hospital, records of Dr. Ray Pate and records of a psychological examination done by Dr. John Perry. Thus Chase meets all three of the criteria used in all of the tests cited by the Court in Atkins. The conclusion is inescapable: Ricky Chase cannot be sentenced to death consistent with the Eighth Amendment and Atkins. ¶ 21. Counsel for Chase supports the Motion to Vacate Death Sentence with the affidavit of Dr. Webb, claiming that Dr. Webb was the original expert on Chase's first post-conviction petition.... However, Dr. Webb's affidavit is dated February 4, 1998, six months after this Court denied Chase's first post-conviction petition. See Chase v. State, 699 So.2d 521 (Miss. 1997). Therefore Dr. Webb's affidavit could not have been previously submitted to this Court. Since this misrepresentation does not affect Chase's substantive argument, we find it to be harmless as to Chase. ¶ 22. Dr. Webb is a practicing psychiatrist who was requested to review Chase's medical records in order to give an opinion with regard to Ricky Chase's mental functioning. Dr. Webb reviewed: (1) Chase's medical records from Hardy Wilson Memorial Hospital, (2) the records of an examination given by Dr. Ray Pate, and (3) the records of a psychological evaluation done by Dr. John Perry. ¶ 23. Based upon his review of those records, Dr. Webb provides the following opinions: 1. Chase scored a 77 on the verbal portion of the WAIS-R but only a 64 on the performance portion of the test. 2. The difference of thirteen points is indicative of a learning disability as well as a deficiency in adaptive behavior. 3. Chase's performance on the sub-parts of the WAIS-R, that difference being greater than 10%, is significant. 4. Ricky Chase suffers from mild mental retardation. 5. Chase would be easily swayed by persons in authority. 6. Chase's disabilities would call into question the veracity of any statement that Chase made under stress. 7. Chase's disabilities would call into question his ability to make a knowing and voluntary statement. ¶ 24. Finally, Dr. Webb states, to a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty that further evaluation of Chase is necessary, and that, in order to evaluate Chase's disability, he would need to interview Chase, review additional medical records, perform a full medical and legal history, and conduct research into the psychological and psychometric aspects of the materials presented by counsel for Chase. ¶ 25. The State, not impressed with the presentation or argument advanced by Chase, responds with several arguments. The State's Attack on Chase's Factual Presentation. ¶ 26. The first is that Chase has not made a sufficient showing for remand, and he is not entitled to an Atkins hearing, because merely claiming to be mentally retarded does not suffice. As support, we are directed to Johnson v. State, 508 So.2d 1126 (Miss.1987), where Johnson, a death row inmate, attempted to stop his imminent execution by claiming insanity under MISS.CODE ANN. § 99-19-57(2)(b). Johnson attached to his motion the affidavits of a clinical psychologist and a psychiatrist. Without discussing the contents of the affidavits, this court, stated that Johnson failed to establish to a reasonable probability that he is presently insane. Accordingly, this Court found that Johnson fell short of the evidentiary showing required of a proponent of this claim. Johnson, 508 So.2d at 1127. ¶ 27. Although Johnson may be persuasive in future cases, it involved a claim of insanity, wherein the law has been settled for many years. The defendant and his counsel were on notice of the requirements of law long before the trial. Here, neither Chase nor his counsel could have known the holding in Atkins prior to trial. Nor did they have benefit of the procedural guidance offered in this opinion. Therefore, Johnson is inapposite here. The State's Attack on Dr. Webb. ¶ 28. The State next turns to Dr. Webb, tacitly conceding that he claims Chase is mentally retarded. Nevertheless, the State attacks the credibility of his opinion, and the appropriateness of his affidavit, pointing out five deficiencies that we are urged to consider. They are that Dr. Webb: 8. has never seen, examined or tested Chase; 9. is a psychiatrist, rather than a psychologist; 10. fails to identify any single area of deficiency in specific adaptive behaviors; 11. offers only conclusory statements in his affidavit; 12. does not state that Chase's claimed deficiencies manifested prior to age eighteen. ¶ 29. These are valid points and, no doubt, will be repeated to the trial judge at the hearing. However, as stated supra, our function in this case, given the lack of notice to Chase of the Atkins decision, as well as the unavailability to Chase of the procedural requirements discussed infra, is to determine whether Chase is entitled to a hearing, rather than to weigh the credibility of evidence to be presented at that hearing. ¶ 30. That is not to say that we are without authority to decide the merits of a successive application and a motion for post-conviction relief. See MISS.CODE ANN. § 99-39-27(7) (Supp.2003) (Supreme Court, in its discretion, may grant or deny any or all relief requested in the attached motion, or allow the filing of the motion in the trial court). ¶ 31. Here, we find that due process requires us to allow the motion to be filed in the trial court, enabling Chase and the State to fully present to the trial judge evidence as required by Atkins. ¶ 32. Having attacked the credibility of the opinions offered by Dr. Webb, the State addresses the three-prong test for mental retardation. The State's Attack on Chase's Claim of Mental Retardation: Criterion ASubaverage Intellectual Functioning. ¶ 33. Both definitions of mental retardation cited in Atkins discuss subaverage intellectual functioning. This criterion is measured by what is commonly referred to as intelligence quotient, or IQ. [7] The State concedes that, as tested [8] by Dr. Perry, Chase's full scale IQ of 71 is within the range of possible mental retardation. However, the State cites the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (4th Edition, 1994) [9] for the proposition that a diagnosis of mental retardation requires evaluation of both IQ and adaptive functioning. Thus, it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with IQ's between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior. Conversely, Mental Retardation would not be diagnosed in an individual with an IQ lower than 70 if there are no significant deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning. DSM-IV, at 40. Stated differently, persons in the upper (cutoff) IQ range of 71 to 75, must have exhibited significant deficits in adaptive behavior for a legitimate diagnosis of mental retardation. Conversely, persons with lower IQ's, but no significant impairment in adaptive functioning, may not be mentally retarded at all. ¶ 34. Other than pointing out that Dr. Perry stated Chase did not seem to be performing his best on the tests, the State offers no argument to rebut Chase's claim that his Full Scale IQ of 71 indicates subaverage intellectual functioning, and is within the range which can indicate mental retardation. The State's Attack on Chase's Claim of Mental Retardation: Criterion BSignificant Limitations in Adaptive Functioning. ¶ 35. The second requirement for mental retardation, according to Atkins, is a finding of significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two ... skill areas.... Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242. It is in this area that the State launches its most passionate attack. The State begins by conceding that Dr. Webb claims Chase has a deficiency in adaptive behavior. However, Dr. Webb fails to identify from the specific adaptive behaviors listed in Atkins, any single specific area (much less two specific areas, as required by Atkins ) of deficiency. This, claims the State, renders Dr. Webb's affidavit totally conclusory on the issue of Chase's possible mental retardation and further demonstrates that Dr. Webb's affidavit is not of the quality or kind useful in this case. ¶ 36. Contrasting the dearth of evidence that Chase is mentally retarded, the State directs our attention to the opinions of John W. Perry, Ph.D., a psychologist, and Ray Pate M.D., a psychiatrist, both of whom provided opinions to trial counsel. Those opinions were discussed in great detail in this Court's opinion on Chase's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Chase, 699 So.2d at 527-29. For our purposes here, suffice it to say that neither doctor specifically found Chase to be mentally retarded. ¶ 37. The State provides us with a great deal of what it characterizes as evidence that Chase is not deficient in adaptive functioning, beginning with an analysis of Chase's testimony at trial, at the suppression hearing, at the hearing on the motion to revoke change of venue, and at the guilt phase of the trial. ¶ 38. Numerous portions of Chase's testimony are cited to demonstrate that Chase speaks and reasons too well to be mentally retarded. Certain words, phrases, analogies, and detailed, coherent and lengthy responses are pointed out. ¶ 39. The State points to numerous examples where Chase read well, spoke well, reasoned well, [10] provided lengthy, [11] complicated answers to questions, and demonstrated insight into his life, the crime, and the situation he was in. The State then offered its opinion that [m]entally retarded people do not have this type of insight into their situation. ¶ 40. The State offers other evidence that Chase does not suffer severe limitations in adaptive functioning. He was never in special education classes, never failed a grade in school, and played quarterback on the football team. He completed a welding course with the Job Corps, became a certified welder, and worked as a welder and, when he wasn't welding, he did yard work and washed cars. ¶ 41. Finally, the State observes that Chase cooked for his mother, had a girlfriend and other friends, and had no deficits in his social skills. ¶ 42. Again, while all of these arguments, if properly offered and admitted, would certainly be persuasive and interesting to the trial judge at the hearing, it is our function here only to determine whether to allow the hearing to take place. The State's Attack on Chase's Claim of Mental Retardation: Criterion CNo Manifestation of Retardation Prior to Age Eighteen. ¶ 43. As a final assault on Chase's claim to Atkins protection, the State points out that Dr. Webb's opinion does not address whether Chase's claimed deficiencies in intellectual functioning manifested prior to age eighteen, as required by both definitions of mentally retarded adopted by this Court in Foster [12] and Russell. [13] See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242, citing Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 5 (9th ed.1992) (discussed infra. ) ¶ 44. We agree that the failure to provide evidence that mental retardation manifested prior to age eighteen would be fatal to Chase's Motion to Vacate Death Penalty.