Opinion ID: 2003518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Death Eligibility Under the Multiple Murders Factor Based on Subsequent Murders

Text: Defendant was found eligible for the death penalty under the multiple-murder eligibility factor (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(3)) on the basis of convictions for other murders which occurred after the murder of Vernita Wheat. Defendant argues that because at the time of the Vernita Wheat murder the other murders had not yet been committed, he had no notice of his eligibility for the death penalty, and imposition of the death penalty violates due process. In support of this argument, defendant relies exclusively on Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894. In Bouie, the Court recited the venerable due process axiom that a criminal statute must be `sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' ( Bouie, 378 U.S. at 351, 84 S.Ct. at 1701, 12 L.Ed.2d at 898, quoting Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926), 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328.) We fail to see how that principle was offended here. The relevant statutory provision placed defendant on notice that after the murder of Vernita Wheat, the commission of additional murders in Illinois or another jurisdiction would make him eligible for the death penalty. We further note that this court has previously held that the multiple-murder eligibility factor does not violate due process simply because eligibility may be based on conduct occurring after the murder for which punishment is imposed. See People ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn (1988), 121 Ill.2d 470, 483, 118 Ill.Dec. 387, 521 N.E.2d 864. In a related point, defendant notes that in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill.2d 504, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246, this court held for the first time that a defendant could be found eligible for the death penalty under the multiple-murder factor on the basis of murders committed after the murder for which the defendant was being sentenced. Defendant contends that because Albanese was decided after the Vernita Wheat murder, he did not have notice of this interpretation of the statutory eligibility factor. In Bouie, the Court held that an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law and is forbidden by the due process clause. ( Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54, 84 S.Ct. at 1702-03, 12 L.Ed.2d at 899-900.) However, Albanese hardly represents an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the multiple-murder eligibility factor. Instead, Albanese simply held that under the plain language of the statute, eligibility pursuant to the multiple-murder factor does not depend on the sequence of the murders. ( Albanese, 104 Ill.2d at 533-34, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246.) A judicial decision which merely interprets a statute in accordance with its plain and unambiguous language does not operate like an ex post facto law. Defendant's argument is without merit.