Opinion ID: 2615014
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Count 5: Federal Court Litigation

Text: Count 5 of the bar complaint alleges that respondent's institution and maintenance of the federal suit against Harris and others [9] seeking an injunction to prevent enforcement of the $7,586.25 judgment for attorney's fees imposed against him by the state trial court in the Abril v. Harris litigation discussed in count 1 violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. Respondent alleged in the federal court: That the tenor and effect of the aforesaid Order and Judgment of the aforesaid Superior Court, and the intent of the defendants herein, was to deny [respondent] his right to due process of law and his right to represent, as an attorney at law, a person of a minority group or class in a legal malpractice action by subjecting the plaintiff to recriminations therefore, and by conspiring to assess attorneys' fees against him without any notice or an opportunity to be heard thereon, and by conspiring to apply, under color of law, a statute of the State of Arizona [A.R.S. § 12-349], in a retroactive fashion, with the intent to deprive the plaintiff of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. On February 26, 1987, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the state court judgment was not reviewable by the federal district court. In reply to respondent's response, defendants requested attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for a defense to a civil rights action which was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. On April 20, 1987, respondent filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, stating that [b]y reason of the fact that the plaintiff now has sufficient funds to post a supersedeas bond to protect his property while he seeks redress in the State appellate courts, and, therefore, the issues raised by the plaintiff in his lawsuit are now moot and plaintiff's action should be dismissed. Accordingly, plaintiff requests that the court issue an Order dismissing this action without prejudice with each party to bear their own costs. Defendants opposed respondent's motion for voluntary dismissal, again requesting attorney's fees and arguing that the whole purpose of his Federal suit was to delay the state court proceedings until Plaintiff was able to secure funds to post the bond, in violation of Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On May 20, 1987, the federal judge dismissed the action with prejudice, and granted defendants an award of $500 towards their attorney's fees, for the following reasons: The court also finds sanctions are appropriate against the plaintiff under Fed. R.Civ.P. 11. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges the defendants conspired with the Superior Court judge to assess fees against the plaintiff personally. The complaint fails to specify however, how the defendants conspired with the judge nor at oral argument could he adequately propound a plausible theory. A reading of the complaint merely shows the defendants wished to execute on the state court judgment against the plaintiff. It is clear that plaintiff had no basis to allege that a conspiracy existed and therefore sanctions are appropriate under Rule 11.... (Emphasis added.) The committee found that the only basis for the federal court lawsuit was Respondent's penurious state and that there is no evidence that the named defendants and the Superior Court judge engaged in a conspiracy, and found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. The commission adopted the committee's findings, further stating that it believed respondent had a full and fair opportunity to argue about an award of attorney's fees in the Abril matter. On appeal, respondent argues that the federal suit was not frivolous because case law exists to support his theory that imposition of attorney's fees against a lawyer personally without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard violates due process. See, e.g., Tom Growney Equip., Inc. v. Shelley Irrigation Dev., Inc., 834 F.2d 833, 835-37 (9th Cir.1987). He also argues that the federal court dismissed his suit not for failure to state a claim, but because of the abstention doctrine of Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 6-8, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1523-24, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). [10] Respondent's arguments overlook the fact that the underlying basis for his federal suit was an allegation, unfounded by any evidence, of a conspiracy between the superior court judge and the defendants to violate his due process rights, which was not an objectively reasonable legal theory under the facts. Additionally, respondent has freely admitted that his subjective purpose in bringing the federal suit was to delay enforcement of the state court judgment until he could raise funds for a supersedeas bond, and when this was accomplished, he sought dismissal of the federal action. We have no difficulty in adopting the findings of the committee and commission as supported by clear and convincing evidence, and find respondent in violation of E.R. 3.1 and 4.4 on count five of the bar complaint.