Opinion ID: 2298009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Question Three: Crawford

Text: Also in his motion to reopen a postconviction proceeding, Grandison argues that the following were incorrectly admitted into evidence: (1) reports of Grandison's behavior in prison; (2) victim impact statements; and (3) the former testimony of Helen Kondilidis. Grandison argues that these statements run afoul of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), which should be applied retroactively to cover the happenings at his own trial. The Circuit Court held that Crawford does not apply retroactively to Grandison's trial. It held that Grandison's conviction was final, and as such, his right to appeal had been exhausted. It also held that victim impact statements are admissible in capital proceedings, and that Kondilidis's statements were properly admitted as former testimony. In Crawford, the Supreme Court held: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. at 1369. The Supreme Court then addressed the issue of retroactivity in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1181, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007), which held that the rule in Crawford was procedural, not substantive. As such, Crawford could not be applied retroactively unless it is a watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Id. (quotations omitted). [12] The Court decided that Crawford was not a watershed rule, and therefore, not applicable retroactively. Id. at 417-421, 127 S.Ct. at 1182-84. Whorton, however, applied to Crawford in a federal context. Grandison refers us to Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 282, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1042, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008), which said that retroactivity analysis limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is deemed `nonretroactive.' In his brief, Grandison argues that Maryland should exercise its power, recognized in Danforth, to retroactively apply the rule stated in Crawford, under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights[.] [13] Before and after Crawford, this court has ruled that Article 21 and the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are to be read in pari materia. See Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 555 n. 1, 636 A.2d 463, 467 n. 1 (1994) (The Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are in pari materia.  (citations omitted)); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 74 n. 9, 867 A.2d 314, 320 n. 9 (2005) (This Court often has construed the Confrontation Clause and Article 21 of the MDR to be in pari materia.  (citations omitted)). We see no reason to modify these precedents or depart from the Supreme Court's ruling in Whorton that Crawford is procedural and need not be applied retroactively. [14] We therefore affirm the Circuit Court's denial of Grandison's motion to reopen postconviction proceedings on this question.