Opinion ID: 870353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coupe's Per Se Pretext Argument

Text: Coupe's first argument urges this court to create a per se rule that [c]ondemnations instituted pursuant to a contract which delegates the power of eminent domain are invalid as a matter of law, without inquiry into any benefits which may result from the taking[,] and therefore, any condemnation instituted before [the contract] was repudiated or invalidated is also tainted[.] Coupe maintains that a per se rule is merited to avoid the appearance of government impropriety and bias and to protect the public against serial takings ... [that] would render judicial review futile inasmuch as proof of pretext would be impossible ... as a practical matter, because `[t]he government will rarely acknowledge that it is acting for a forbidden reason[.]' (Quoting Coupe I, 119 Hawai'i at 379, 198 P.3d at 642) (quoting Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 169 (D.C.2007)). It appears that the County does not address Coupe's per se argument. However, Oceanside argues that a per se rule for takings under the public use clause [(a)] has not been adopted by the Hawai'i courts or in any other jurisdiction, [(b)] would infringe on the legislature's discretion to make public use determinations[,] and [(c)] would clash with case precedent. [14] In its reply brief to Oceanside, Coupe contends, in part, that a bright line rule ... does not eliminate judicial inquiry, but rather focuses it where it will be most productive and that any inquiry into legislators' motives would in all likelihood be pointless because the government understands what it must not say to avoid revealing the private influence[.] Article I, section 20 of the Hawai'i Constitution states that [p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Whether a particular use is a public use is a judicial question of law to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Ajimine, 39 Haw. at 550. This court has interpreted the public use clause to authorize takings for a public purpose[.] Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Lyman, 68 Haw. 55, 68, 704 P.2d 888, 896 (1985) (Where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, a compensated taking is not proscribed by the public use clause. (Citing United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680, 16 S.Ct. 427, 40 L.Ed. 576 (1896).)). A challenge to the validity of the asserted public purpose underlying [a] condemnation presents a question of constitutional law, which this court reviews de novo under the right/wrong standard. Coupe I, 119 Hawai'i at 374, 198 P.3d at 637 (citing State v. Cuntapay, 104 Hawai'i 109, 113, 85 P.3d 634, 638 (2004)). As discussed above, in Coupe I, this court instructed that the court may look behind the government's stated public purpose where the purported public purpose may be pretextual. Id. at 375, 198 P.3d at 638. Coupe I relied on Ajimine, which held that `where ... the [l]egislature declares a particular use to be a public use[,] the presumption is in favor of this declaration ... unless such use is clearly and palpably of a private character [.]' Id. at 381, 198 P.3d at 644 (quoting Ajimine, 39 Haw. at 549) (emphasis, ellipsis, and brackets in original). Coupe I indicated that legislative bodies vested with the power of eminent domain have broad discretion in determining what uses will benefit the public and what land is necessary to facilitate those uses[,] and quoted Ajimine for the general rule which states as follows: [W]hen the public nature of a use for which a taking has been authorized by law is disputed, the question as it presents itself to the courts is whether the legislature might reasonably have considered the use public, not whether the use is public. This rule rests on the presumption that a use is public if the legislature has declared it to be such. Id. at 393, 198 P.3d at 656 (quoting Ajimine, 39 Haw. at 549 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)) (emphasis in original) (boldfaced emphasis omitted). Additionally, Coupe I stated that legislative findings and declarations of public use are accorded great weight and are entitled to prima facie acceptance of [the determination's] correctness. Id. at 374-75, 198 P.3d at 637-38. Thus, to overcome this prima facie acceptance, a defendant must show that such a finding of public use `is manifestly wrong.' Id. at 375, 198 P.3d at 638 (quoting Ajimine, 39 Haw. at 550). A contract that delegates a county's eminent domain powers, raises well founded concerns that a private purpose is afoot. However, a per se rule of pretext would threaten the established rule of deference given to the findings and declarations of the government in these cases. Furthermore, a bright line rule would deprive courts of the judicial function recognized in Coupe I. Relying on this court's prior decisions and the majority opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005), Coupe I posited that the decision of the legislature is not `conclusive, for the issue of public use is a judicial question and one of law to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. ' Coupe I, 119 Hawai'i at 384, 198 P.3d at 647 (quoting Ajimine, 39 Haw. at 550) (emphasis in original). Consequently, this court concluded that a court may look behind an eminent domain plaintiff's asserted public purpose to determine whether a purported public purpose is pretextual. Id. Coupe I indicated that whether the Development Agreement was in effect at the time of Condemnation 2 would be a factor in determining pretext. This court explained that the court's conclusion that Condemnation 2's public purpose was valid, based solely on Resolution 31-03, may have elevated form over substance[,] and thus ruled that [d]espite the lack of reference to the Development Agreement in Resolution No. 31-03, it is not apparent from the record whether any or all of the same provisions in the [Development] Agreement that led the court to invalidate Condemnation 1 were still in effect and underlay Condemnation 2, or whether other conditions existed such that the private character predominated. Those issues may be factors relevant to the pretext issue. Id. at 383, 198 P.3d at 646 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Hence, whether any or all of the [] provisions in the [Development] Agreement ... were still in effect at the time Condemnation 2 was executed or whether other conditions [surrounding Condemnation 2] existed that could cause the private character to predominate over the public purpose, were  factors relevant to[,] but not per se dispositive of, the pretext issue. Accordingly, the adoption of a bright-line per se rule would conflict with Coupe I. As observed, Coupe argues that the adoption of a per se pretext rule is necessary because the government will rarely acknowledge that it is acting for a forbidden reason. But, this consideration was identified as an obvious problem in Coupe I. See id. at 379, 198 P.3d at 642 (stating that `[t]he government will rarely acknowledge that it is acting for a forbidden reason, so a property owner must in some circumstances be allowed to allege and to demonstrate that the stated public purpose for the condemnation is pretextual' (quoting Franco, 930 A.2d at 169 (emphasis omitted))). This court addressed that issue by allowing the court to look beyond government findings and declarations in deciding whether the stated public purpose was pretextual. Id. There may be evidence outside of the government's declarations and findings that would prove that the asserted public use was `clearly and palpably of a private character' and that the government's findings were `manifestly wrong[,]' and thus, would enable a defendant to rebut the prima facie acceptance of a public purpose. Id. at 375, 198 P.3d at 638 (quoting Ajimine, 39 Haw. at 550). However, the burden rests on the defendant, who must show that the public purpose asserted in the findings or declarations was `mere pretext[,]' and the `actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.' Id. at 379, 198 P.3d at 642 (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477-78, 125 S.Ct. 2655). (emphasis omitted). Indeed, this court cautioned that such a showing `may be difficult to make[,]' but a defendant was not foreclosed from making such a showing. Id. (quoting Franco, 930 A.2d at 169). Given that this court has decided this issue by allowing a defendant to present evidence of pretext beyond the government's findings and declarations, the fact that a legislative body may not admit that the purpose is for a private benefit does not alleviate the defendant's burden or necessitate a per se rule of pretext.