Opinion ID: 1328542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's Religious Beliefs

Text: Lastly, defendant complains that the circuit court impermissibly permitted the State to elicit, on cross-examination, evidence regarding defendant's religious beliefs. On direct examination by defense counsel, the defendant testified as to his prior occupation as pastor of the Paw Paw Bible Church. He also stated that, on two occasions when Joshua was spending the night in his home, Joshua asked him to show him how to masturbate; using Joshua as an example, the defendant demonstrated this process for him. When asked why he instructed the child in this manner, the defendant replied: I kind of thought as a pastor to this child, he had asked me the question and I felt that I would be obligated to show him because he didn't understand what he was doing because the other kids were talking about it and he probably wouldn't learn it from somewhere else. During cross-examination, the State asked the defendant whether he viewed his instruction of Joshua as a sin, based upon the defendant's religious beliefs. Defense counsel objected, and the trial court overruled this objection. The State also inquired as to whether the defendant believed God had forgiven him for his actions, and defense counsel objected. Again, the trial court overruled the defendant's objection. Before this Court, the defendant contends the evidence of his religious beliefs, elicited by the State, was inadmissible. The State maintains the trial court properly admitted evidence of the defendant's religious beliefs because such evidence was relevant to his intent and motive for his actions. The defendant testified, on direct examination, that he had instructed Joshua in conjunction with his role as the boy's pastor. The State asserts this evidence opened the door to the line of questioning allowed on cross-examination. Thus, the State was permitted to ask the defendant to further explain his motive and intent with regard to the underlying charges. [24] The defendant's assignment of error regarding his religious beliefs involves evidentiary rulings rendered by the trial court. Our practice is to review a trial court's rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. We recently explained this standard of review in Syllabus Point 1, in part, of McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229, 455 S.E.2d 788 (1995): The West Virginia Rules of Evidence... allocate significant discretion to the trial court in making evidentiary and procedural rulings. Thus, rulings on the admissibility of evidence ... are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Absent a few exceptions, this Court will review evidentiary and procedural rulings of the circuit court under an abuse of discretion standard. Therefore, we will reverse the trial court's rulings admitting evidence in this case only if we determine the trial court abused its discretion in admitting such evidence. We find the cross-examination was proper. Ordinarily, the scope of cross-examination is limited to facts and circumstances connected with statements elicited on direct examination and those matters affecting credibility. In West Virginia trials, the scope is even broader for parties: A party may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. W.Va.R.Evid. 611(b)(1). In determining whether the scope of cross-examination has been violated, broad discretion is given to the trial court, and we will not disturb that ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. Richey, 171 W.Va. 342, 298 S.E.2d 879 (1982); State v. Hankish, 147 W.Va. 123, 126 S.E.2d 42 (1962). After reviewing the defendant's entire testimony on direct examination, we are unable to say that the State exceeded the scope of proper cross-examination even under the more narrow rule limiting cross-examination. See W.Va.R.Evid. 611(b)(2) (narrowing scope of cross-examination for non-party witnesses). Much of the defendant's testimony on direct was offered to create the impression that he, in his capacity as a religious leader, was teaching the victim how to perform specific sexual acts. Thus, if one characterizes the defendant's direct examination as an attempt to create the impression on the jury that his conduct was religiously motivated and not for his own sexual gratification, the State's inquiry as to the truth or falsity of that impression is not clearly beyond the scope of cross-examination. The defendant's real complaint is that the State achieved its goal so easily, illustrated by the defendant's acknowledgment on cross-examination that his actions were not condoned by his religious beliefs. [25] In this context, questions as to whether the defendant's criminal conduct was inconsistent with his religious beliefs constituted proper impeachment directly reflecting on his truthfulness pursuant to Rule 611(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. The defendant argues further that admitting this testimony was a direct violation of Rule 610 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. Rule 610, which is inapposite here, provides: Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced. Clearly, this rule is intended to prevent jurors from forming an opinion about a witness's general character for truthfulness based on his or her religious beliefs. As Professor Charles McCormick states: This reason of course is that there is no basis for believing that the lack of faith in God's avenging wrath is today an indication of greater than average untruthfulness. McCormick On Evidence § 46 at 171-72 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.1992). In essence, Rule 610 simply forecloses such inquiry or evidence as a means to establish the character or disposition of a witness toward truthfulness or untruthfulness. Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 6.17 at 548 (1995). If, however, evidence of religion is offered for purposes other than impairing or enhancing a witness's credibility, Rule 610 does not require its exclusion. See 1 Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers § 6-10(C) at 766 (3rd ed.1994) ([s]uch beliefs, however, may be relevant and admissible on some other grounds, for example, to show that the witness has an interest in the case). Thus, Rule 610 was never intended to insulate the jury from all information about religious affiliations or religious beliefs that may otherwise become relevant in the case. As we have done in the area of Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and liability insurance evidence under Rule 411, we now provide guidance in this area. For religious belief or affiliation evidence to be admissible, the trial court must make the following findings: (1) the evidence of religion is offered for a specific purpose other than to show generally that the witness's credibility is impaired or enhanced; (2) the evidence is relevant for that specific purpose; (3) the trial court makes an on-the-record determination under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) the trial court, if requested, delivers an effective limiting instruction advising the jury of the specific purpose(s) for which the evidence may be used. If these elements are met, we, as an appellate court, will presume that the complaining party was protected from undue prejudice. In this case, the evidence was offered for the more limited purpose of demonstrating that the defendant was not being truthful regarding his motive for performing sexual acts on the victim. In this situation, the nature of a witness's religious beliefs is not being offered as a general basis for believing or disbelieving the witness. Rather the evidence is offered specifically to refute the defendant's avowed motive for his conduct that directly bears on his truthfulness as a witness. Thus, we expressly find that the first two factors were met. Although not raised at trial, the defendant contends for the first time on appeal that his religious beliefs were inadmissible because such evidence was highly prejudicial and not relevant to the charges against him. Citing W.Va.R.Evid. 401 (definition of relevant evidence); W.Va.R.Evid. 402 (relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible); W.Va.R.Evid. 403 (exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time). Having scrutinized the testimony, we are persuaded that, as the defendant maintains, it was prejudicial to some degree. But that is not the end of the road. All evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must be avoided. See State v. Peacher, 167 W.Va. 540, 574-75, 280 S.E.2d 559, 581 (1981); State v. Rector, 167 W.Va. 748, 758-59, 280 S.E.2d 597, 603-04 (1981). Thus our inquiry must proceed. In ruling on the objection that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, the trial court had to compose a balance between the probative value of the evidence as a whole and the risk of unfair prejudice attendant to keeping it before the jury. Although the evidence was prejudicial in a sense, it was plainly probative to shed light on the direct testimony of the defendant as to his motivation for helping the young victim learn to masturbate. In this regard, the defendant asserts that such evidence is inadmissible because he did not contend that his instruction of Joshua constituted a religious rite or practice. On cross-examination of a criminal defendant, however, the prosecution is not limited to the exact words of a defendant but may cross-examine on any fair inferences arising from the direct examination. We find it was proper for the State to attempt to prove that the defendant's pastoral responsibilities were religiously inconsistent with this conduct. While the question is arguably a close one, we are unprepared to say the evidence's unfairly prejudicial impact substantially outweighed its probative worth. Only rarely, in extraordinary circumstances, will we from a vista of a cold appellate record reverse a trial court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. This is not such an occasion. As a general rule, [w]hen the defense open[s] up the question ... the prosecution [is] properly allowed to counteract that evidence ... even if in doing so the evidence offered [makes] the defendant appear as an unsavory character. Beck v. United States, 317 F.2d 865, 870 (5th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 972, 84 S.Ct. 480, 11 L.Ed.2d 419 (1964). Not only is the unfair prejudice claim somewhat attenuated, but, in circumstances such as these, the prejudice can be dissipated by a trial court's firm, carefully worded, and oft-repeated instructions to the jury forbidding it from considering the evidence in violation of the mandates of Rule 610. In this case, no limiting instruction was requested and none was given. The issue of lack of a limiting instruction not being preserved, we find no error.