Opinion ID: 1800657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidentiary Hearing Claims

Text: At the evidentiary hearing, Garcia attempted to prove that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present various facts to the jury, including (1) the familial relationship between the State's three main witnesses, (2) a police report containing inconsistent statements by one of those witnesses, (3) the existence of other suspects, and (4) Garcia's alleged intoxication at the time of the crime. [1] The standard that governs ineffective assistance claims is the two-pronged test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): first, Garcia must show that his counsel's performance was deficient  i.e., unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; and second, he must show that the deficiency prejudiced the defense  i.e., that it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial by creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Valle v. State, 778 So.2d 960, 965-66 (Fla.2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Applying this standard, the circuit court found neither deficiency nor prejudice on any of these claims. We review each one separately.
The three witnesses whose testimony connected Garcia to the crime  Feliciano Aguayo, Elizabeth Feliciano, and Rufina Perez  were all related to each other. Aguayo, whose mother is Elizabeth, married Perez's sister. Although this familial relationship was noted on an early police report, Garcia's trial counsel never mentioned it to the jury and could not recall it at the evidentiary hearing. The State, however, repeatedly told the jury that the witnesses were unconnected. Garcia claims his trial counsel was deficient in failing to expose the witnesses' relationship and in failing to argue that they might have fabricated their testimony in hopes of receiving a reward. Nothing in the record suggests that the witnesses actually did conspire to testify against Garcia, or even that they sought remuneration for their testimony. One of the witnesses, Perez, denied hearing about the reward before trial. Another witness, Elizabeth Feliciano, knew of the reward but testified that she neither sought nor received any money. All that Garcia has demonstrated is a familial relationship. Even the strength of that relationship remains unclear. Perez testified that she did not know the Felicianos very well because I never visit them. She apparently knew Aguayo better, but cautioned that their relationship got nothing to do [with] what they say on the others. At the evidentiary hearing, Garcia's trial counsel testified that he would not have emphasized a familial relationship to the jury unless he could have shown that it influenced the witnesses' testimony. Absent any evidence that the relationship did, in fact, influence their testimony, we reject Garcia's ineffective assistance claim on both the deficiency and prejudice prongs.
Garcia alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach Perez with statements attributed to her in a police report from August 1983, seven months after the murders. The report states that Perez, while working in the fields, heard [Garcia] say something like `Night before last I killed some guys and old ladies.' At trial, however, and again in her postconviction deposition, Perez recalled the confession differently. She testified that Garcia spoke of killing women only  not men. She denied that Garcia's codefendant participated in the conversation, as the police report suggested. She also disputed the report's assertion that she refused to give the police a formal statement. She testified that the report, which wrongly referred to her by her former husband's last name, was all lies. The circuit court, while not going that far, agreed that the report was confusing and inaccurate, and dismissed it as having little or no value for impeachment purposes. We reach the same conclusion as the circuit court. The police report contains demonstrable inaccuracies. For example, it mistakenly refers to Perez as Mrs. Feliciano  the name of another main witness  only one sentence before recounting what Perez heard in the fields. The same carelessness could have pervaded other aspects of the report. Moreover, while Garcia would prefer to emphasize the differences between the report and Perez's trial testimony, an effective attorney would have been equally mindful of their similarities. The report states that Perez heard Garcia confess to having stabbed to death a woman, possibly old, and that the woman did not even defend herself. Drawing the jury's attention to this earlier account might have been more harmful than helpful to the defense. Garcia, who failed to question trial counsel about this issue at the evidentiary hearing, clearly has not met his burden of proving deficiency. Additionally, we find no prejudice. More powerful challenges to Perez's testimony  for instance, that she delayed in telling the authorities because she thought Garcia was joking, and that payroll records indicated that Garcia stopped working with Perez before the murders  were presented to the jury, which nonetheless returned a guilty verdict. Our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.
Garcia alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit additional testimony about other suspects  particularly a homeless suspect named John Conners, whose hairs were tested for comparison with dirty hairs found at the crime scene. Trial counsel acknowledged that Conners was a good scapegoat and recalled actively investigating him. He even mentioned Conners at various points in the trial. Yet he feared that by pushing the issue any further, he might inadvertently open the door for the State to explain why all other suspects had been cleared of suspicion, which was because Garcia's codefendant had confessed and implicated Garcia in the murders. Counsel did not want to risk the introduction of this evidence. Also, he feared that if he called the investigators most familiar with Conners, they would stick it to me. Thus, he simply tried to show that Conners's involvement was a reliable possibility. In light of these reasonable strategic considerations, we agree with the circuit court that trial counsel's performance was not deficient. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 913 So.2d 514, 524 (Fla.2005) (Strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.) (quoting Brown v. State, 894 So.2d 137, 147 (Fla.2004)). Also, we note that Garcia has not demonstrated prejudice. As the circuit court explained in rejecting this claim, Garcia has produced no testimony concerning any other suspects.
At trial, Garcia's attorney did not attempt to mount an intoxication defense. He briefly mentioned intoxication, but only to explain Garcia's muddled memory of what happened on the night of the murders. Garcia claims his attorney was ineffective in failing to present the defense. As the circuit court correctly noted, however, an intoxication defense would have undermined Garcia's claim that he had nothing to do with the murders. Trial counsel strategically decided not to present such a defense. We have held that such decisions are not deficient. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 797 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Fla.2001) ([C]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue the voluntary intoxication defense as such a defense would have been inconsistent with [defendant's] theory of the case.).