Opinion ID: 515767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rebuttal Argument

Text: 22 Keskey's final argument concerns the government's rebuttal during closing argument. Counts 2 and 3 of Keskey's indictment charged him with making false statements in mortgage notes in order to influence a federally insured savings and loan to lend money to Jack Stilwell. In his opening statement, the Assistant United States Attorney explained that Keskey had notarized the mortgage notes at a closing, which indicated that Stilwell had signed the documents in Keskey's presence. The Assistant United States Attorney claimed that Stilwell would testify that he was not present at the closing and therefore Keskey's notarization was false. After the trial began, however, Stilwell apparently changed his story and the government decided not to call him as a witness. During closing argument, defense counsel suggested that because Stilwell had not testified as the government had promised, Stilwell must have actually attended the closing. In rebuttal, the Assistant United States Attorney argued: 23 He also asked the question, why isn't Jack Stillwell [sic] here as a witness, why isn't he named as a defendant. Well, you don't know why Jack Stillwell isn't here as a witness. There is no evidence as to Jack Stillwell and why he is not here as a witness. You don't know if Jack Stillwell is alive or dead. You don't know if Jack Stillwell would have taken the Fifth. You don't know if Jack Stillwell has had a brain injury and he can't remember anything. You don't know whether Jack Stillwell can even be found. You don't know, and you can't speculate about it, and an argument like, where is Jack Stillwell, asks you to decide the case based upon what isn't in the evidence. 24 Well, you can't speculate about what isn't in the evidence. You have to base your decision upon what is in the evidence. 25 Tr. at 733-34. 26 Keskey did not object to this argument at trial. Therefore, we can only reverse if the argument constitutes plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); Manos, at 1433. 27 Keskey claims that this argument was improper because it encouraged the jury to speculate about facts that were not in evidence. Of course, an attorney's argument is always limited to the facts in evidence, United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 875 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 831, 106 S.Ct. 99, 88 L.Ed.2d 80 (1985), although counsel may make arguments that are reasonably inferred from the evidence. United States v. Doyle, 771 F.2d 250, 258 (7th Cir.1985). 28 Keskey relies on our statement in United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.1978), that an inference that the prosecutor draws from the evidence may be unreasonable enough that the suggestion of it cannot be justified as a fair comment on the evidence but instead is more akin to the presentation of wholly new evidence to the jury, which should only be admitted subject to cross-examination, to proper instructions and to the rules of evidence. Id. at 385. In Vargas, the prosecutor asserted during closing argument that the defendant was able to post and forfeit a $10,000 bond because of the great amount of money he had earned dealing heroin. There was no evidence at trial regarding the source of the $10,000 bond. This court found that the prosecutor's baseless allusion to prior crimes was especially prejudicial and therefore was reversible error. Id. at 387-88. The prosecutor's comments in Vargas were much more prejudicial than those in the present case. 29 Keskey also argues that the government erred by suggesting facts that it knew to be false. Keskey relies on United States v. Dailey, 524 F.2d 911 (8th Cir.1975). In Dailey, the prosecutor argued that the defendant had not called his brother to corroborate his alibi defense because the brother could not do so, although the prosecutor knew that the brother's testimony would not be unfavorable to the defense. The court found that the argument improperly misled the jury. Id. at 917. Unlike Dailey, the prosecutor here did not suggest that Stilwell's testimony would damage the defense. The prosecutor merely attempted to caution the jury not to speculate. The risk that the jury would be misled is not nearly as great in this case as it was in Dailey. Furthermore, Stilwell was not as crucial to the government's case against Keskey as the alibi defense was in Dailey. 30 We believe that the Assistant United States Attorney's rebuttal argument can best be characterized as a valid response to defense counsel's closing argument that Stilwell had not testified because he was in fact at the closing. See United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1392 (7th Cir.1987) (the prosecutor may reply to an argument by the defense that the absence of some witness counts against the prosecution), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1034, 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988); Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 875 (where the defense counsel refers to evidence outside the record, the government may have to respond with an argument that normally would be considered improper). We do not believe that the government's argument was plain error. The Assistant United States Attorney repeatedly told the jury that they should not speculate on matters not in evidence. While it may have been poor judgment for the Assistant United States Attorney to suggest reasons for Stilwell's absence that he knew to be false, it was done in the context of demonstrating to the jurors that they should not speculate about matters not in evidence. The Assistant United States Attorney concluded by reiterating that the jury could not speculate as to why Stilwell had not testified. In that context, we do not believe that the mere fact that the Assistant United States Attorney suggested several false reasons for Stilwell's absence transforms his argument into plain error. The fact remains that Stilwell did not testify. Considering the actual testimony of the other witnesses establishing Keskey's guilt, we do not believe that the government's suggested explanations for Stilwell's absence were so likely to mislead the jury that they resulted in a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1047, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982).