Opinion ID: 769232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invalidity under Section 112, Paragraph 2

Text: 16 Solomon argues that the district court erred in invalidating the claims of the '381 patent under section 112, paragraph 2, asserting that a court evaluates compliance with that provision by comparing the claims to the disclosure in the specification, not by comparing the claims to an inventor's deposition testimony. Solomon alternatively contends that even if the testimony and other evidence are considered, Kimberly-Clark has still failed to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Solomon also asserts that Kimberly-Clark's evidence and arguments really relate to inventorship, not definiteness, and such a challenge should have been raised under section 102(f). Kimberly-Clark responds that the language of section 112, paragraph 2, plainly states that patent claims must specify what the applicant regards as his invention, and that therefore claims may be invalid if inventor testimony conflicts with the recitations of the claims. Kimberly-Clark further contends that based on the evidence it presented, it did succeed in proving that the claims of the '381 patent are invalid under section 112, paragraph 2. 17 We agree with Solomon that the district court erred in invalidating the claims of the '381 patent under section 112, paragraph 2, based on Solomon's deposition testimony. As an initial matter, we note that for a claim to comply with section 112, paragraph 2, it must satisfy two requirements: first, it must set forth what the applicant regards as his invention, and second, it must do so with sufficient particularity and distinctness, i.e., the claim must be sufficiently definite. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2; see also Irah H. Donner, Patent Prosecution ch. 9.VIII, at 933 (2d ed. 1999). 18 During the prosecution of a patent application, a claim's compliance with both portions of section 112, paragraph 2, may be analyzed by consideration of evidence beyond the patent specification, including an inventor's statements to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). See In re Conley, 490 F.2d 972, 976, 180 USPQ 454, 456-57 (CCPA 1974) (noting that the phrase which the applicant regards as his invention in the second portion of section 112, paragraph 2, has been relied upon in cases where some material submitted by applicant, other than his specification, shows that a claim does not correspond in scope with what he regards as his invention.); In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 USPQ 236, 238 (CCPA 1971) ([T]he definiteness of the language employed must be analyzed--not in a vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of the prior art and of the particular application disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art.). 19 It is not inappropriate for the PTO or a reviewing tribunal to consider such evidence extrinsic to the patent application in light of the goals of the examination process and the fact that pending claims can be freely amended to comport with those goals. As we explained in In re Zletz: 20 During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. When the applicant states the meaning that the claim terms are intended to have, the claims are examined with that meaning, in order to achieve a complete exploration of the applicant's invention and its relation to the prior art. The reason is simply that during patent prosecution when claims can be amended, ambiguities should be recognized, scope and breadth of language explored, and clarification imposed. . . . An essential purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the administrative process. 21 In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citation omitted); see In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969). Thus, in the more fluid environment of patent examination, an inventor's statements are relevant to determining compliance with the statute. 22 On the other hand, when a court analyzes whether issued claims comply with section 112, paragraph 2, the evidence considered in that analysis should be more limited. As for the definiteness portion of section 112, paragraph 2, our precedent is well-settled that a court will typically limit its inquiry to the way one of skill in the art would interpret the claims in view of the written description portion of the specification. As we stated in Personalized Media: 23 Determining whether a claim is definite requires an analysis of whether one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification. If the claims read in light of the specification reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention, § 112 demands no more. 24 Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 705, 48 USPQ2d at 1888 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Atmel, 198 F.3d at 1378, 53 USPQ2d at 1227-28 (As a general matter, it is well-established that the determination whether a claim is invalid as indefinite depends on whether those skilled in the art would understand the scope of the claim when the claim is read in light of the specification. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 4 Although we have not specifically addressed the types of evidence that may be considered in analyzing whether a claim complies with the which the applicant regards as his invention portion of that statute, we see no reason for a different standard to apply, as the rationale for reviewing a limited range of evidence under either portion of the statute is the same. 25 A more limited range of evidence should be considered in evaluating validity as opposed to patentability under either portion of section 112, paragraph 2, because the language of issued claims is generally fixed (subject to the limited possibilities of reissue and reexamination), the claims are no longer construed as broadly as is reasonably possible, and what the patentee subjectively intended his claims to mean is largely irrelevant to the claim's objective meaning and scope, see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985-86, 34 USPQ2d 1321, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 38 USPQ2d 1461 (1996). As has been noted in the context of definiteness, the inquiry under section 112, paragraph 2, now focuses on whether the claims, as interpreted in view of the written description, adequately perform their function of notifying the public of the patentee's right to exclude. See United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 233, 55 USPQ 381, 384 (1942) (To sustain claims so indefinite as not to give the notice required by the statute would be in direct contravention of the public interest which Congress therein recognized and sought to protect.); see also 3 Chisum, supra, § 8.03, at 8-14. (The primary purpose of this requirement of definiteness in claims is to provide clear warning to others as to what constitutes infringement of the patent.). 26 It is particularly inappropriate to consider inventor testimony obtained in the context of litigation in assessing validity under section 112, paragraph 2, in view of the absence of probative value of such testimony. In Markman, we addressed the closely related issue of litigation-derived inventor testimony in the context of claim construction, and concluded that such testimony is entitled to little, if any, probative value. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 985, 34 USPQ2d at 1332-33 (holding that inventor testimony as to [t]he subjective intent of the inventor when he used a particular term is of little or no probative weight in determining the scope of a claim (except as documented in the prosecution history).); see also Bell & Howell Document Management v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706, 45 USPQ2d 1033, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The testimony of an inventor and his attorney concerning claim construction is thus entitled to little or no consideration. The testimony of an inventor is often a self-serving, after-the-fact attempt to state what should have been part of his or her patent application. . . .); Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1126, 37 USPQ2d 1816, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (We have previously stated that an inventor's after-the-fact testimony is of little weight compared to the clear import of the patent disclosure itself.) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Voice Techs. Group, Inc. v. VMC Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 605, 615-16, 49 USPQ2d 1333, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that the inventor can not by later testimony change the invention and the claims from their meaning at the time the patent was drafted and granted but stating that the inventor may provide testimony explaining the claimed invention and its development). We reasoned that an inventor is not competent to construe patent claims for the following reasons: 27 [C]ommonly the claims are drafted by the inventor's patent solicitor and they may even be drafted by the patent examiner in an examiner's amendment (subject to the approval of the inventor's solicitor). While presumably the inventor has approved any changes to the claim scope that have occurred via amendment during the prosecution process, it is not unusual for there to be a significant difference between what an inventor thinks his patented invention is and what the ultimate scope of the claims is after allowance by the PTO. 28 Markman, 52 F.3d at 985, 34 USPQ2d at 1335 (citation omitted). We find this analysis equally compelling in the present context, as the determination whether a claim complies with section 112, paragraph 2, is drawn from the court's performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims. Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 705, 48 USPQ2d 1888. Although we recognize that which the applicant regards as his invention is subjective language, see Donner, supra, ch. 9.VIII, at 933, once the patent issues, the claims and written description must be viewed objectively, from the standpoint of a person of skill in the art, see Markman, 52 F.3d at 986, 34 USPQ2d at 1335. 29 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that inventor testimony, obtained in the context of litigation, should not be used to invalidate issued claims under section 112, paragraph 2. 5 Accordingly, we agree with Solomon that the district court erred in using her deposition testimony to invalidate the claims of the '381 patent under that provision of the statute. We have carefully considered Kimberly-Clark's remaining arguments, but find them unpersuasive.