Opinion ID: 2073792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Prior Rape Conviction

Text: During its case-in-chief, the State called a police officer to testify about Stwalley's previous rape conviction in Putnam Circuit Court. The State claimed the evidence was admissible under the depraved sexual instinct exception. The defense objected. The trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible on the child molesting and rape counts, but not on the burglary. Stwalley claims the evidence was improperly admitted under the depraved sexual instinct exception. Because the child molesting conviction must be vacated on double jeopardy grounds, we need not consider whether the court erred in permitting the prior rape conviction to be used as evidence of child molesting. We still must consider the admissibility of the prior rape conviction in the present rape charge. While evidence of prior sexual crimes is generally inadmissible to prove the charged crime, certain exceptions to this rule exist. For instance, prior sex crimes may be admissible to show a depraved sexual instinct. Watkins v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 514. The rationale for the depraved sexual instinct exception is to allow the prosecution to bolster the credibility of the witness in a situation where the accusations or acts seem improbable standing alone. Lehiy v. State (1986), Ind. App., 501 N.E.2d 451, aff'd, 509 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind. 1987). Rape of an adult woman is unfortunately not so uncommon as to make its accusation as inherently improbable as are some other more infrequent and bizarre sexual crimes. Thus evidence of prior rape of an adult woman does not necessitate resort to the depraved sexual instinct exception to the usual rules of evidence. Reichard v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 163. Justice Givan stated in Reichard, [T]he prior offenses [of rape] did not involve depraved sexual conduct; therefore, the depraved sexual instinct exception is inapplicable. Id. at 165. The evidence of the prior rape is not admissible under the depraved sexual instinct exception in this rape prosecution. Stwalley's prior rape conviction was improperly admitted. In determining whether this error was harmless, our task is to decide if the error had substantial influence on the verdict, not whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand... . But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-767, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1247-1249, 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1566-1567 (1946). Miller v. State (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (original emphasis). The narrow question is whether the jury's verdict was substantially swayed by the erroneous admission of the prior rape. The trial court admitted only the date and place of conviction, the cause number, and a docket sheet from that earlier prosecution. Factual details of the prior rape were not revealed. In light of these circumstances, we can say with fair assurance that the jury's verdict of rape was not substantially swayed by the error.