Opinion ID: 1747920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the lower court err in allowing the state to impeach the testimony of willie charles townsend with two prior burglary convictions?

Text: Before trial, the lower court heard arguments on the motion in limine to exclude impeachment by use of Willie's prior two burglary convictions. The defense argued that the use of such convictions would result in prejudice far outweighing the probative value, while the prosecution argued that the convictions were admissible without a balancing analysis, since they were independently admissible under M.R.E. 609(a)(2) as crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. The lower court held that the convictions would be admissible, stating that ... I think this is the kind of case if presented, the credibility of this individual will be a prime element in the jury's decision, and to withhold the fact he was convicted of two crimes involving veracity, which in my thinking burglary does, would be to withhold from them rules they need to make such a determination... . The court also stated that, I think the need for this evidence outweighs substantially the prejudice that would result... . Whether burglary is a crime involving dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of M.R.E. 609(a)(2) has never been considered by this Court. The comments to Rule 609 state that those are crimes such as perjury or subordination of perjury, false statement, fraud, embezzlement, false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully. This court has only considered whether three specific crimes fit within the parameters of M.R.E. 609(a)(2). In McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84 (Miss. 1988), the Court noted that the State conceded that the crime at issue, arson, was not a crime involving dishonesty or false statement. However, the Court noted that this concession might have been premature, since in some instances, such as insurance fraud, arson might indeed involve dishonesty or false statement. Id. at 88, n. 1. In Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d 577 (Miss. 1988), this Court held that convictions of the manufacture, possession or transportation of untaxed liquor were within the crimes of dishonesty or false statement contemplated by M.R.E. 609(a)(2). The Court quoted, a crime which involves defrauding the revenue stands high in the category of crimes affecting veracity. Id. at 587 (quoting United States v. Apuzzo,, 555 F.2d 306, 307-08 (2nd Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 916, 98 S.Ct. 1470, 55 L.Ed.2d 507 (1978)). Finally, in Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 1335 (Miss. 1990), it was held that a conviction of forgery under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-19-39 was admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). On the precise question of whether theft crimes fit within M.R.E. 609(a)(2), one authority has noted that while the majority of federal courts considering the question have found that such crimes do not fit within the meaning of crimes of dishonesty or false statement contemplated by the rule, the state courts have split about evenly on the issue. Joseph & Saltzburg, Evidence in America, Ch. 43, p. 14 (1987). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has strictly construed the Rule to crimes of the type listed in the comment to our Rule. It has held, for example, that shoplifting is not the type of crime in the nature of crimen falsi covered by the Rule. United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.1978), rh'g. denied, 573 F.2d 85, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853, 99 S.Ct. 163, 58 L.Ed.2d 159. We hold, in accordance with the majority of federal courts, that a burglary conviction is not ordinarily admissible under M.R.E. 609(a)(2) and that convictions under that rule should be limited to crimes in the nature of crimen falsi. Accordingly, the trial court should not have allowed Willie's conviction under that rule. Although the lower court made a finding under M.R.E. 609(a)(1) that it believed the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect, the court did not comply with the requirement that it perform an on the record weighing of five factors: (1) The impeachment value of the prior crimes; (2) the point in time of conviction and the witness' subsequent history; (3) The similarity between the past crime and the charged crime; (4) The importance of the defendant's testimony; and (5) The centrality of the credibility issue. Pugh v. State, 584 So.2d 781, 785 (citing McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss. 1990)). Accord, McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. State, 525 So.2d 809 (Miss. 1988); Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987). We are of the opinion that the impeachment should not have been allowed. First, as stated, burglary is not necessarily a crime affecting veracity. Second, the prior convictions were seven years old, lessening their probative value. Third, the crimes were identical, burglary. When allowable, convictions of prior crimes are to be considered only on the issue of credibility, not to show a propensity on the part of the defendant to have acted on the present occasion in conformity with the criminal character suggested by the previous conviction. McGee, 569 So.2d at 1195 (quoted in Pugh, 584 So.2d at 785). Fourth, the defendant's testimony was crucial to the defense, since he was the only defense witness. Fifth, credibility was central, but as in Jordan v. State, 592 So.2d 522 (Miss. 1991), the low probative value of the convictions on the issue of credibility does not raise the need for the evidence. We are of the opinion that the above considerations weigh favorably for exclusion and the lower court committed reversible error in admitting the conviction into evidence. [1] The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. On the next trial, the lower court should weigh the factors in considering the admissibility of the prior conviction, keeping in mind that the strong case of the State probably would result in a conviction, regardless of its admission into evidence. REVERSED AND REMANDED. DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ., concur. PITTMAN, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by HAWKINS, P.J. and McRAE, J.