Opinion ID: 2417351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecutor's Statements During Arguments

Text: Tokar complains next of twenty-one different statements made by the prosecutor, without defense objection, during the opening and closings. He alleges that they caused his death sentence to be unconstitutionally based on caprice and emotion. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). Only three of the statements were presented to the motion court for post-conviction relief. All three of the statements were made in closing argument during the penalty phase. Complaints concerning the other eighteen statements are waived. Rule 29.15(d); State v. Twenter, 818 S.W.2d 628, 641 (Mo. banc 1991). Trial counsel did not object to these statements at issue. Tokar does not argue that any of these statements amounted to plain error. Therefore, Tokar is left to argue ineffective assistance of counsel. At Tokar's hearing for post-conviction relief no evidence was presented regarding these claims. The motion court ruled that the failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
The first statement in issue is the prosecutor's reference that the jurors might pray that their children will not have to experience what the Douglass children went through with the murder of their father. Tokar correctly argues that the statement improperly personalizes the argument and is error. State v. Raspberry, 452 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Mo. banc 1970). However, this alone does not justify reversal. Under Strickland , Tokar must still prove that trial counsel's failure to object did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney and that he was prejudiced. Tokar does not meet either of these standards. Tokar introduced no evidence regarding trial counsel's failure to object to this argument, despite questioning them regarding other issues at the post-conviction relief hearing. In many instances seasoned trial counsel do not object to otherwise improper questions or arguments for strategic purposes. It is feared that frequent objections irritate the jury and highlight the statements complained of, resulting in more harm than good. Without further evidence on this issue, Tokar has not overcome the presumption that the failure to object was a strategic choice by competent counsel. In addition, Tokar has not established that prejudice resulted to the extent that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1337 n. 10 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038, 110 S.Ct. 3301, 111 L.Ed.2d 810 (1990), the Eighth Circuit adopted the following factors to address in ascertaining whether error results in prejudice during a penalty phase closing argument: 1) measure what type of prejudice arose from the prosecutor's argument; 2) examine what the defense counsel did in his argument to minimize the prejudice; 3) review the jury instructions to see if the jury was properly instructed in the case; and 4) consider all of the aggravating and mitigating information to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing phase would have been different. While the argument made by the prosecutor was improper, it was an isolated reference and the only improper argument that Tokar has established on appeal. See Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1325 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 825, 112 S.Ct. 89, 116 L.Ed.2d 62 (1991) (explaining that a single improper argument may not be sufficiently prejudicial to fatally infect the sentencing proceedings). The jury was properly instructed at the close of the penalty phase. The level of aggravating circumstances in this case overcomes any reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing phase would have been any different in the absence of this remark by the prosecutor when considered in the context of the trial as a whole.
Tokar also challenges the prosecutor's argument that: We, of course, sincerely believe that the death penalty is warranted in this case and, of course, we believed that from the start. And we ask in this case that if you find the aggravating circumstances that you find both.... You ought to say in your verdict, in my opinion, in our opinion, based on the evidence, that this was outrageously wanton, vile and inhuman. Tokar complains that this second statement impermissibly contains the prosecutor's personal opinion, with words such as we and I. However, when such opinion is based on evidence, a prosecuting attorney's opinion of the accused's guilt is permissible. State v. Moore, 428 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Mo.1968); State v. Paglino, 319 S.W.2d 613, 625 (Mo.1958). Moreover, each of these statements merely reflected the obvious. One could not reasonably expect a prosecutor to present a case that he or she did not believe. Failure to object to this statement does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The third statement at issue is the prosecutor's argument that: There has been absolutely no remorse exhibited. The only regret this defendant has shown through this evidence is his regret that those young kids didn't meet the same fate as their father ... Tokar claims that reference was improper. However, during the punishment phase, a prosecutor may comment on the lack of evidence of remorse of the defendant to show the nature of his character. State v. Six, 805 S.W.2d 159, 166 (Mo. banc 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 871, 112 S.Ct. 206, 116 L.Ed.2d 165 (1991). Moreover, the statement refers to evidence in the record. Stickley testified that Tokar had, in fact, stated he wished he would have killed the kids so no one could testify and say that we were there. A prosecutor can always argue reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d at 460. Failing to object to this statement does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Moreover, the alleged mistakes in this case do not equate to the egregious errors, each compounding the other that we found in State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902 (Mo. banc 1995). In that case, we reversed the defendant's sentence of death and remanded the cause for a new sentencing proceeding because defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor's repeated argument of facts outside the record, personalization of the argument, and misstatement of the law. Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902-03. The statements argued here simply do not compare. Tokar has not established that his attorneys failed to exercise customary skill and diligence in failing to object to these statements, nor has he shown that he suffered any prejudice therefrom. The trial court's determination on these issues is not clearly erroneous. These points are denied.