Opinion ID: 579489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Make Findings on Disputed Facts

Text: 12 Piazza contends that the district court violated Rule 32(c)(3)(D) by failing to make findings regarding disputed facts. If a defendant asserts, with specificity and clarity, that anything within the PSR is incorrect factually, then the sentencing judge must make, as to each controverted matter: 13 (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing. If the sentencing judge fails to make the requisite finding or determination or if the finding or determination is ambiguous, the case must be remanded for resentencing. 14 United States v. Hurtado, 846 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863, 109 S.Ct. 163, 102 L.Ed.2d 133 (1988) (quoting Rule 32(c)(3)(D) and United States v. Garcia, 821 F.2d 1051, 1052 (5th Cir.1987)). 15 This rule protects the defendant from being sentenced on inaccurate information and creates an accurate record of the factors on which the district court relied during sentencing. In addition, the written record addressing each objection is important because officials may consider information in a PSR when making correctional determinations, including the place of the defendant's incarceration and her relationship with correctional agencies after she is released from prison. United States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 765, 767 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. Manotas-Mejia, 824 F.2d 360, 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 957, 108 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed.2d 379 (1987). A failure of the district court to comply with this rule may be raised for the first time on appeal. Manotas-Mejia, 824 F.2d at 368. 16 Here we are confronted with Piazza's allegation that the district court committed reversible error by failing to rule on her controversion of the PSR's allegation that Piazza had been convicted for possession of marijuana. She filed written objections and argued the point at the sentencing hearing. In its brief to this court the government concedes that (1) Piazza's objections were made with sufficient specificity and clarity to trigger Hurtado, and (2) the district court's failure to make an express Rule 32(c)(3)(D) finding on this factual dispute requires that Piazza's sentence be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. See Hurtado, 846 F.2d at 998. Perhaps if the government had devoted less time to waxing poetic in its brief and more to analyzing the transcript of the sentencing hearing, it would not have been so quick to concede the need to vacate and remand. 17 Rule 32(c)(3)(D) is written in the disjunctive. When the defendant disputes a fact contained in the PSR, the district court must articulate either (1) a finding as to the disputed fact, or (2) the court's determination that such a finding is not necessary because the disputed fact will not be taken into account in calculating the sentence. As to the controverted fact of Piazza's marijuana conviction, the court conducted a colloquy with government counsel, defense counsel and Ms. Norris, the probation officer who prepared the PSR. After discussing the marijuana conviction and the question of whether the name Janice Gobel had been an alias used by Piazza or was in fact a roommate who possessed the marijuana in question, Ms. Norris told the court Further, [the conviction] has no bearing on the calculation of the guideline. The court then inquired [the conviction] has no bearing on the calculation of the guideline?, to which government counsel responded, That's correct. The court concluded that part of the colloquy with the statement, So I am going to leave that just as a contested matter. I am not going to rule on that. I am just going to allow that to be carried with the records of the case.... 18 From the portion of the transcript quoted above, there can be no conclusion but that the district court determined that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account at the sentencing. That such a conclusion was legally correct is proved by the facts of the case and the provisions of the guidelines: If the PSR was correct about the prior conviction, the single point was correctly included in calculating the defendant's criminal history; if not, the score would be zero instead of one. But either way, Piazza's criminal history category would be I, producing the same sentencing range of 0-6 months. 19 Rule 32(c)(3)(D) does not require the district court to mouth any particular magic words or to make a talismanic incantation of the exact phraseology of the rule; it suffices that the record reflects that the court expressly adverted to the factual controversy in the PSR and complied with either of the alternative mandates of the rule. Although here the district court neither cited the rule nor expressed its determination in the precise language of the rule, we decline to engage in a game of Simon sez with our overburdened, able and diligent district courts. To vacate and remand this case for resentencing would be to engage in a hollow act and to waste judicial resources which are sorely needed to deal with the ever increasing burden of matters of substance. Given the facts and circumstances of this case we decline to vacate Piazza's sentence and remand for resentencing in more strict but no more effectual compliance with Rule 32(c)(3)(D).