Opinion ID: 2588357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Stated Bases for Overruling Tyrell J.

Text: Instead of looking to the high court's Fourth Amendment decisions and its totality of the circumstances analysis for guidance on whether or not the evidence in Tyrell J. required suppression, the majority concludes Tyrell J. should be overruled based on: (1) the conclusion in People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496 ( Sanders ) that the rule in In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734 requires the reasonableness of a search be determined based on the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted (maj. opn., ante, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 435, 146 P.3d at p. 969); (2) Sanders' determination, based on the dissent's observation in Tyrell J., that requiring officer awareness of search conditions would not itself affect the goal of deterrence, because the very existence of a probation search condition should deter further criminal acts (maj. opn., ante, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 435, 146 P.3d at p. 969); and (3) the identification in Sanders of a substantial body of scholarly commentary critical of our Tyrell J. analysis, the gist of which was that Tyrell J. eroded the Fourth Amendment protections for juveniles by giving police an incentive to conduct a warrantless search, unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, in the bare hope that a search condition may exist (maj. opn., ante, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 435, 146 P.3d at p. 969). None of these reasons provides a sound analytical basis for completely rejecting Tyrell J. in favor of an approach that finds a search following a suspicionless detention of a juvenile probationer unreasonable per se if the officer lacks knowledge of an applicable search condition.
In 1970, In re Martinez found that police authorities, who did not know of a defendant's parole status, violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by undertaking an investigative search lacking in probable cause that related to the defendant's suspected criminal activity. ( In re Martinez, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 646, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734.) In so concluding, In re Martinez regarded a parolee's reasonable expectation of privacy far more favorably and expansively than have later United States Supreme Court decisions. For example, In re Martinez stated: The conditional nature of a parolee's freedom may result in some diminution of his reasonable expectation of privacy and thus may render some intrusions by parole officers `reasonable' even when the information relied on by the parole officers does not reach the traditional level of 'probable cause.' ( In re Martinez, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 647, fn. 6, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734, italics added.) In observing that a diminution of Fourth Amendment protection[s] can be justified only to the extent actually necessitated by the legitimate demands of the operation of the parole process ( ibid. ), In re Martinez concluded that unless suspected parole violations are involved, a search by police officers to investigate suspected criminal activity could not be undertaken without probable cause. ( Id. at p. 646, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734.) It is worth noting at the outset that Tyrell J. addressed the analysis in In re Martinez and rejected the reasoning that Sanders adopted. ( Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) Moreover, as Samson, supra, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2193, illustrates, the notions upon which In re Martinez was basedi.e., regarding (1) the perception that a lawfully imposed search and seizure condition results only in some diminution of a parolee's privacy expectations and (2) the perceived invalidity of a parole system that allows suspicionless searches to investigate suspected criminal activity as well as suspected parole violationsare now obsolete. In light of Samson, we should revisit Sanders's adoption of In re Martinez's reasoning that no circumstances other than those known to the officer are relevant to determining whether a search of a parolee is reasonable. (See Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 332, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496.) First, by assessing only the reasonableness of an officer's suspicion in undertaking a particular search, and neglecting to evaluate the actual reasonableness of the search in view of both the officer's actions and the suspect's legitimate privacy expectations, the rule provides an incomplete measure of whether a search does or does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Second, the rule in In re Martinez was articulated at a very different time, when parolees were not viewed as having significantly reduced expectations of privacy. Finally, the rule is inconsistent with the high court's current emphasis on the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry and rejection of bright-line rules. ( Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347.)
The majority agrees with Sanders's conclusion, based on the dissent's observation in Tyrell J., that requiring officer awareness of search conditions would not itself affect the goal of deterrence, because the very existence of a probation search condition should deter further criminal acts. (Maj. opn., ante, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 434, 146 P.3d at p. 969.) I disagree. While the existence of a search condition may deter some juvenile probationers from committing further criminal acts, a bright-line rule requiring officer awareness inhibits the goal of deterrence by materially restricting the lawfully imposed condition that a probationer and his property are subject to a search and seizure by any peace officer at any place at any time. By eliminating any distinction between the reasonable privacy expectations of a juvenile probationer and those of a law-abiding citizen in the context of a search that follows a suspicionless detention, and allowing juvenile probationers with greatly reduced expectations of privacy to escape the consequences of their recidivist misconduct in cases like this, such a rule undermines the state's special need to rehabilitate and reintegrate youthful offenders into productive society.
Tyrell J. reasoned: Because [the officer] did not know whether the minor was subject to a search condition, the officer took the chance that the search would be deemed improper. If it had turned out that the minor was not subject to a search condition, any contraband found in the search of the minor would have been inadmissible in court. Thus, under our interpretation, law enforcement officers still have a sufficient incentive to try to avoid improperly invading a person's privacy. ( Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 89, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) On this score, the majority finds persuasive a substantial body of scholarly commentary criticizing Tyrell J. for erod[ing] the Fourth Amendment protections for juveniles by giving police an incentive to conduct a warrantless search, unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, in the bare hope that a search condition may exist. (Maj. opn., ante, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 435, 146 P.3d at p. 969.) These criticisms are off the mark. The United States Supreme Court has now made it quite clear that the constitutional reasonableness of a search must be determined in view of the totality of the circumstances. I believe the high court most likely would reject a blanket rule of unreasonableness in the context of probationer and parolee searches, for it has repeatedly emphasized that these convicted lawbreakers possess significantly reduced expectations of privacy due to legally imposed search and seizure conditions that provide for suspicionless detentions and searches. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court continues to caution that the exclusionary rule generates `substantial social costs,' including setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. ( Hudson v. Michigan (2006) ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2163.) Because the exclusionary rule exacts a `costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives,' courts must avoid its `indiscriminate application' and impose the rule only `where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.' ( Ibid. ) To the extent no search and seizure condition exists to reduce an individual's legitimate privacy expectations, and the totality of the circumstances do not otherwise support the reasonableness of a search, imposition of the exclusionary rule provides ample incentive to deter police misconduct in proper measure to the attendant social costs. But applying the rule expansively beyond those situations in which a search actually intrudes on a person's reasonable privacy expectations, under the fiction that the search condition did not even exist, as the majority does here, amounts to an indiscriminate application violating the cardinal principle that suppression of evidence should always be our last result, not our first impulse. ( Ibid. ) Finally, I note the majority's categorical rule is sure to result in absurd applications in those situations where an officer is able to verify a juvenile's probationer status only after making a detention. For instance, imagine that an officer in a future case pulls a juvenile's car over for a perceived traffic violation, and thereafter recognizes (or otherwise ascertains) that the juvenile is a probationer subject to a probation search and seizure condition. The officer then conducts an on-the-scene search of the juvenile and his car, and finds contraband. Alternatively, imagine the officer in the instant case discovered the juvenile was subject to a probation search and seizure condition after the car was detained and impounded but before it was searched. Under the majority's rule, the contraband in both situations must be suppressed if the juvenile court determines the initial traffic stop was illegal because it was supported neither by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor by advance knowledge of an applicable search and seizure condition.