Opinion ID: 2241934
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence

Text: Defendant's next contention is that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to investigate the allegations in her post-trial motion that the statements of nine new witnesses show that her conviction was based solely upon the perjured testimony of codefendant Marva Golden. Further, defendant argues that the testimony of these new witnesses would substantiate her theory that Golden acted alone in hiring Eddie Williams to kill Valerie McDonald. Defendant urges this court to grant her a new trial or, in the alternative, remand for a full evidentiary hearing to establish the materiality of the new witnesses' statements. After their arrest, defendant and Golden were incarcerated at the Cook County jail. While defendant was subsequently released on bond, Golden remained in custody at the jail until she was transferred to a state penitentiary after testifying in defendant's case. Once defendant was convicted, she was returned to the jail. Shortly thereafter, defendant met nine women inmates who informed her of discussions they had previously had with Golden in which Golden claimed defendant was not involved in Valerie McDonald's murder. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was supported by affidavits and court-reported statements of these new witnesses. The trial court denied defendant's motion, finding that the newly discovered evidence merely sought to discredit the trial testimony of Golden and, thus, was cumulative of the trial testimony of Iris Harrison. To warrant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the evidence: (1) must be of such conclusive character that it would likely change the result on retrial; (2) must be material to the issue but not merely cumulative; and (3) must have been discovered since the trial and be of such character that it could not have been discovered sooner through the exercise of due diligence. People v. Molstad, 101 Ill.2d 128, 134, 77 Ill.Dec. 775, 461 N.E.2d 398 (1984), quoting People v. Baker, 16 Ill.2d 364, 374, 158 N.E.2d 1 (1959). This court has held that a motion for a new trial predicated on newly discovered evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge and denial of such a motion shall not be disturbed upon review absence a showing of an abuse of discretion. People v. Miller, 79 Ill.2d 454, 464, 38 Ill.Dec. 775, 404 N.E.2d 199 (1980), quoting Baker, 16 Ill.2d at 373-74, 158 N.E.2d 1. Moreover, the trial court can dispose of a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence without holding a full evidentiary hearing, as long as that decision is not an abuse of discretion. See People v. Kellick, 102 Ill.2d 162, 176-77, 80 Ill.Dec. 54, 464 N.E.2d 1037 (1984). The State contends that the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for a new trial. The State argues that the newly discovered evidence can, at best, be viewed as impeachment of a prosecution witness, which is an insufficient basis for granting a new trial. See People v. Holtzman, 1 Ill.2d 562, 568, 116 N.E.2d 338 (1953). Further, the State argues that the newly discovered evidence is merely cumulative of the trial testimony given by Iris Harrison and, thus, is insufficient to warrant a new trial. See Miller, 79 Ill.2d at 464-65, 38 Ill.Dec. 775, 404 N.E.2d 199. This court, in People v. Holtzman, 1 Ill.2d 562, 568, 116 N.E.2d 338 (1953), determined: A distinction is to be drawn between evidence which impeaches a witness in the sense that it affects the credibility of the witness, and evidence which is probative in that it presents a state of facts which differs from that to which the witness testified. Newly discovered evidence, the effect of which is to discredit, contradict and impeach a witness, does not afford a basis for the granting of a new trial. If, however, it contradicts a witness by showing facts, a new trial may be ordered when it appears that such new evidence has sufficient probative force or weight to produce a result different from that obtained at the trial which has been had. A thorough analysis of defendant's proposed new evidence reveals that it does not contradict Golden by showing a set of facts different from her testimony. Initially, we note that the testimony of several of the new witnesses does not involve any claims that Golden falsely implicated defendant. Rather, these witnesses simply claim that Golden was angry with defendant and said she was going to testify against her. The testimony of the remaining new witnesses, at most, consists of descriptions of out-of-court statements made by Golden which had some inconsistencies with her trial testimony. Generally, a prior inconsistent statement of a witness is not admissible as substantive evidence but, rather, is admitted solely for its impeaching effect upon the credibility of the witness. People v. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d 314, 358-59, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636 (1994); People v. Collins, 49 Ill.2d 179, 194, 274 N.E.2d 77 (1971). Defendant's new evidence could only have been admitted to discredit, contradict, and impeach Golden. Thus, the newly discovered evidence is insufficient to warrant a new trial. Miller, 79 Ill.2d at 464-65, 38 Ill.Dec. 775, 404 N.E.2d 199; Holtzman, 1 Ill.2d at 568, 116 N.E.2d 338; see also People v. Woodrome, 237 Ill.App.3d 220, 233-34, 178 Ill.Dec. 230, 604 N.E.2d 486 (1992) (new evidence of codefendant making out-of-court statement that defendant was not involved in crime held insufficient to warrant a new trial); People v. Wicks, 15 Ill. App.3d 318, 322, 304 N.E.2d 134 (1973) (new evidence attacking credibility of codefendant held insufficient to warrant a new trial even though testimony was only evidence of defendant's guilt). Defendant argues that her case is strikingly similar to that of People v. Cotell, 298 Ill. 207, 131 N.E. 659 (1921), in which this court granted a new trial after the defendant discovered new evidence attacking the credibility of an accomplice who testified against him. Cotell, 298 Ill. at 217-18,131 N.E. 659. Contrary to defendant's assertion, Cotell is readily distinguishable from the instant case. Although the new evidence in Cotell did impeach the testimony of the accomplice witness, it went further than impeachment. The accomplice testimony was the only evidence connecting the defendant to the crime. As this court observed, the new evidence presented facts which went to the very foundation of the State's case. Cotell, 298 Ill. at 217, 131 N.E. 659. In contrast, in the instant case, the State presented substantial evidence of defendant's involvement in the murder besides Golden's testimony. Moreover, the record in the instant case reveals that the trial court expressly determined that, contrary to Cotell, the testimony of the nine new witnesses added no new facts but, rather, merely attempted to impeach and discredit Golden. The trial court's decision was not an abuse of discretion. We also cannot say that the trial court erred by determining that the new evidence was merely cumulative. A determination that newly discovered evidence is cumulative involves a finding that such evidence adds nothing to what is already before the jury ( Molstad, 101 Ill.2d at 135, 77 Ill.Dec. 775, 461 N.E.2d 398), and that, had the new evidence been introduced at trial, it would not have changed the result ( Ostendorf v. International Harvester Co., 89 Ill.2d 273, 284, 60 Ill.Dec. 456, 433 N.E.2d 253 (1982)). In the instant case, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the new testimony of the nine inmates was merely cumulative to the trial testimony of Iris Harrison. Harrison testified to a discussion she had in jail with Golden in which Golden described the murder of Valerie McDonald. Harrison testified that during this conversation, Golden stated that if she was going to go to prison then she was going to take defendant with her. Harrison also testified that Golden said defendant had nothing to do with the murder. Likewise, the basic premise of the testimony of the new witnesses was that Golden had made statements in jail prior to defendant's trial to the effect that, although defendant was not involved in the murder, Golden was nonetheless going to implicate defendant in her testimony. This theory of defense was extensively developed through cross-examination of Golden and the direct testimony of other witnesses. Further, defense counsel strenuously argued this theory during closing statements. Finally, the trial judge that denied defendant's motion for a new trial also presided at defendant's trial and heard Golden and Harrison testify, as well as all the other evidence. He could reasonably conclude that this newly discovered evidence added nothing to what was already before the jury. Defendant argues that the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative because some of the testimony provides information regarding Golden's motive to falsely implicate defendant, which was not included in Harrison's testimony. Defendant cites the offered testimony of Ann Young, who heard Golden say she was going to put the murder on defendant so Golden would not get life in prison. Defendant's argument does not have merit. Evidence showing Golden had a bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely would be admissible only for purposes of impeaching Golden. See People v. Triplett, 108 Ill.2d 463, 475, 92 Ill.Dec. 454, 485 N.E.2d 9 (1985); People v. Norwood, 54 Ill.2d 253, 258-59, 296 N.E.2d 852 (1973) (promise of leniency made to prosecution witness admissible to impeach his or her credibility); see also M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 607.7, at 359-60 (5th ed. 1990). As we have already determined, newly discovered evidence offered to impeach a prosecution witness is an insufficient basis for granting a new trial. Moreover, defense counsel extensively cross-examined Golden about the plea agreement she had accepted in order to avoid the death penalty. Therefore, any new evidence which tended to show Golden's motive to testify falsely would also be cumulative. Defendant also cites People v. Cihlar, 111 Ill.2d 212, 218, 95 Ill.Dec. 297, 489 N.E.2d 859 (1986), for the proposition that the significant number of new witnesses she offers should preclude a determination that the evidence is merely cumulative. However, Cihlar does not support defendant's argument. Cihlar involved newly discovered testimony of several witnesses which attacked the reliability of the victim's identification of the defendant as her assailant. Unlike the instant case, the victim's testimony in Cihlar was the only evidence connecting the defendant to the crime. In addition, the victim's testimony was completely uncontradicted at trial. Cihlar, 111 Ill.2d at 217-18, 95 Ill.Dec. 297, 489 N.E.2d 859. In contrast, defense counsel attempted to extensively contradict Golden's testimony. Thus, the Cihlar holding is not applicable to the instant case. The new evidence defendant offered is substantially cumulative and affects only the credibility of Marva Golden, a matter that was already placed before the jury by the testimony of various witnesses and her cross-examination by defense counsel. As this court has previously stated: Applications for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are not looked upon with favor by the courts, and in order to prevent, so far as possible, fraud and imposition which defeated parties may be tempted to practice, as a last resort, to escape the consequence of an adverse verdict, such application should always be subjected to the closest scrutiny by the court, and the burden is upon the applicant to rebut the presumption that the verdict is correct and to show there has been no lack of diligence. Holtzman, 1 Ill.2d at 569,116 N.E.2d 338. Judged by these standards, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial.