Opinion ID: 1735055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: does operative petition allege compensable injury resulting from occupational disease?

Text: The trial judge concluded that the underlying condition leading to Zach's death was mental stress and that whether it be deemed from an `accident' or an `occupational disease' [it] must be accompanied by a prior physical insult to the physical structure of the body under Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942). Because of its remand, the review panel found it unnecessary to address the issue of whether one must show violence to the physical structure of the body in order to recover for an occupational disease. The Court of Appeals did not specifically address this issue. Because we have concluded that injury caused by a mental stimulus is not compensable as an injury caused by accident, we must address the alternative theory that Zach sustained a compensable injury as a result of an occupational disease. Bekelski did not address this issue because the case was decided in 1942, and the Legislature did not amend the compensation act to include occupational disease until 1943. See 1943 Neb. Laws, ch. 113, § 1, p. 397. The issue turns on the meaning of the first two sentences of § 48-151(4). The first sentence provides: Injury and personal injuries mean only violence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. § 48-151(4). The second Sentence states: The terms include disablement resulting from occupational disease arising out of and in the course of the employment in which the employee was engaged and which was contracted in such employment. § 48-151(4). The question is whether both sentences, or only the second, apply to injuries caused by occupational disease. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. An appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Nebraska Liq. Distrib. v. Nebraska Liq. Cont. Comm., 272 Neb. 390, 722 N.W.2d 10 (2006); Young v. Midwest Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Neb. 385, 722 N.W.2d 13 (2006). A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless. Gilbert & Martha Hitchcock Found. v. Kountze, 272 Neb. 251, 720 N.W.2d 31 (2006); Salts v. Lancaster Cty., 269 Neb. 948, 697 N.W.2d 289 (2005). The first sentence of § 48-151(4) defines the terms injury and personal injuries without distinction as to cause, i.e., accident or occupational disease. The use of the word only limits the definition to disease or infection naturally resulting from violence to the physical structure of the body. The second sentence refers to the terms defined in the first sentence, i.e., injury and personal injuries, and states that they include disablement resulting from occupational disease. The plain meaning of the two sentences, read together, is that disability due to occupational disease is compensable only if it results from violence to the physical structure of the body. Although not presented with the precise issue before us in this case, we stated in Ludwick v. TriWest Healthcare Alliance, 267 Neb. 887, 894, 678 N.W.2d 517, 523 (2004), that under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, an injury has occurred as the result of an occupational disease when violence has been done to the physical structure of the body and a disability has resulted. We noted, for clarification, that the concept of disability is the same in both accident and occupational disease cases. Ludwick, 267 Neb. at 895, 678 N.W.2d at 524. The cases in which we have recognized a compensable injury caused by an occupational disease have involved some type of physical stimulus constituting violence to the physical structure of the body. See, e.g., Ludwick, supra (reaction to latex exposure); Morris v. Nebraska Health System, 266 Neb. 285, 664 N.W.2d 436 (2003) (same); Jorn v. Pigs Unlimited Inc., 255 Neb. 876, 587 N.W.2d 558 (1998) (respiratory dysfunction caused by exposure to hog dust); Berggren v. Grand Island Accessories, Inc., 249 Neb. 789, 545 N.W.2d 727 (1996) (seizure disorder caused by exposure to industrial solvents). We conclude that under current Nebraska law, a compensable injury caused by an occupational disease must involve some physical stimulus constituting violence to the physical structure of the body. Because the injury in this case is alleged to have resulted entirely from a mental stimulus, no claim is stated for injury caused by occupational disease.