Opinion ID: 895305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Civil Service Statutes as Contract

Text: In their cross-petition, the Firefighters assert that certain provisions of Local Government Code Chapter 143 likewise constitute a contract between the City and the Firefighters. Chapter 143 creates a civil service classification system for emergency service personnel in those qualifying municipalities that vote to adopt it. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 143.002(a); Wilson , 10 S.W.3d at 666. The Firefighters argue that, when the City voted to “opt-in” to Chapter 143, the statute became an offer by the City that the Firefighters accepted by performing. In order to qualify as a contract, the document or documents must evidence the parties’ intent to be bound. See Owen v. Hendricks , 433 S.W.2d 164, 166–67 (Tex. 1968). That intention must be manifested in a way that justifies a promisee’s understanding that a promise has been made to him. See Montgomery Cnty. Hosp. Dist. , 965 S.W.2d at 502. Because Chapter 143 was written by the Legislature, not by the City, we cannot presume that it is a communication of intent by the City. Rather, we must examine the manner in which the City adopted Chapter 143 to determine whether the City communicated an intent to be bound to any potential promisees. Although the original City Ordinance adopting Chapter 143 is not part of the record, we note the reference to Chapter 143 that currently appears in the Houston Code of Ordinances is as follows: At an election held in the city January 31, 1948, this Act was adopted by a majority vote of the votes cast at the election. It differs in many important respects from the city’s civil service charter provisions (Art. Va of the foregoing charter) and no action should be taken in the matter of civil service, whether pertaining to policemen and firemen or to other employees without first consulting ch. 143 . . . since some of its provisions touch upon the entire subject of composition of the city’s civil service commission and of the executive administration of the civil service functions. Houston, Tex., Code of Ordinances app. B. Unlike the Ordinances discussed above, which make specific, detailed promises to the Firefighters, the above statement is addressed to City policy makers and the City’s civil service commission. It is a warning to them that the City, having elected to be governed by the Civil Service Act, must comply with it, or risk adverse consequences in court. See Wilson , 10 S.W.3d at 668 (“As long as the Civil Service Act governs [the city], however, it must adhere to the Act[] . . . .”). In other words, it fails the basic contract requirement of communication of an offer to the offeree. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24; Restatement of Contracts § 23 (“[I]t is essential to the existence of an offer that there should be a proposal by the offeror to the offeree . . . .”). Accordingly, we cannot say the City has adopted Chapter 143 in a manner that communicates a promise or an offer to the Firefighters. We thus conclude that Chapter 143 does not, in itself, constitute a contract entered into by the City, and so cannot be a “contract subject to this subchapter” for purposes of section 271.152’s waiver of immunity. We of course do not hold that a statute cannot be incorporated by reference into a contract—as mentioned above, the trial court may conclude that at least some portions of Chapter 143 were incorporated by reference into the unilateral employment contract at issue here. Rather, we hold that when a municipality adopts Chapter 143—without sufficient manifestation of an intent to be contractually bound in the ordinance or other instrument by which it is adopted—Chapter 143 does not, in itself, constitute a stand-alone municipal contract. 1 6