Opinion ID: 1949597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor's Comments on Defendant's Guilt or Credibility

Text: [¶11] Clark alleges that the prosecutor made eleven comments during her closing argument or her rebuttal to his closing argument that were improper statements of her personal opinion. Not all references to the credibility of a defendant are improper and, in this case, seven of the challenged statements were fair comments on the evidence presented. In four instances, however, the prosecutor argued that Clark lied to the jury, in the courtroom, during his testimony. [2] [¶12] Because Clark made no objection to any of the statements at the time they were made, we review Clark's current claims of prosecutorial misconduct for obvious error. M.R.Crim. P. 52(b); see id. Error is obvious only when it is so highly prejudicial and so taints the proceedings as virtually to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. The obvious error test requires the reviewing court to apply its best judgment to the entire record of the case to determine whether unobjected-to instances of prosecutorial misconduct created, in [their] probable effect upon the jury[,] a seriously prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice. See State v. Dube, 598 A.2d 742, 744 (Me.1991); State v. Borucki, 505 A.2d 89, 94 (Me.1986) (quotation marks omitted). The particular circumstances, weighed with careful judgment, will determine whether the obviousness of the error and the seriousness of the injustice done to the defendant thereby are so great the Law Court cannot in good conscience let the conviction stand. Dube, 598 A.2d at 744 (quotation marks omitted). [¶13] When viewed in the context of the record in this case, the comments of the prosecutor were not so highly prejudicial, nor the proceedings so tainted, as to deprive Clark of a fair trial. See Pelletier, 673 A.2d at 1330; Dube, 598 A.2d at 744. The issue in this case was not whether Clark had shot and killed Robert Wagner; Clark testified during the trial that he had done so. The issue before the jury was whether that killing occurred in self-defense, as Clark claimed. The record overwhelmingly supports the ultimate factual findings that, not only did Clark shoot and kill Wagner, but that Clark did not do so in self-defense. The strength of the State's case, which included all of Clark's admitted actions, referenced above, as well as forensic evidence presented through the medical examiner, convinces us that Clark has not demonstrated that any error or impropriety prejudicially affected his substantial rights. [¶14] Moreover, the trial court repeatedly informed the jurors that comments made in closing argument are not evidence. See State v. Langill, 567 A.2d 440, 442 (Me.1989) (stating that the trial court cured any impropriety caused by the prosecutor's statements when it instructed the jury that any statements or comments made by the lawyers in the case are not evidence and that the jury is the judge of the facts); see also Young, 2000 ME 144, ¶ 7, 755 A.2d at 548-49 (noting the crucial role of the trial court as a check to prosecutorial excesses, it being in the best position to assess the `feel' of the trial and to take the necessary corrective action when misconduct occurs to undo the prejudice) (citing Robert W. Clifford, Identifying and Preventing Improper Prosecutorial Comment in Closing, 51 Me. L.Rev. 241, 244, 257-67 (1999)); Borucki, 505 A.2d at 94 (stating that an appellate court must be reluctant to reverse a judgment on the basis of an error not brought to the attention of the trial court).