Opinion ID: 439951
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Former Stewardesses

Text: 84 In Laffey I, NWA argued that the district court erred, in its 1974 Remedial Order, in granting relief pursuant to Title VII in the form of backpay to stewardesses whose employment with [NWA] [had] terminated more than ninety days prior to the first filing by an employee of [a] ... charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 567 F.2d at 472. NWA's argument was based upon the settled rule that only those employees who could have filed charges with the Commission individually when the class filing was made are properly members of the ... class. Id. NWA reasoned that the discrimination in this case could not be deemed continuing as to those who left [NWA's] employ more than ninety days prior to the class filing with the [EEOC], id. at 473, and that, as a result, those employees were not entitled to recover as members of the Title VII class. 85 The Laffey I court agreed with NWA's contention in this respect: 86 A severing of the employment relationship ordinarily terminates a discrimination against the severed employee, and activates the time period for filing charges with the Commission concerning any violation which occurred at separation or which may have been continuing up to the date thereof. To hold otherwise would effectively read the timely-filing requirement out of the statute. 87 Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Laffey I opinion directed the district court, on remand, to exclude from the Title VII recovery those employees whose connection with NWA was dissolved more than ninety days before the class filing with the [EEOC], while retaining those terminated stewardesses who would have brought themselves within the Equal Pay Act class .... Id. at 476. 88 After remand, NWA then sought the exclusion of two additional groups of ex-stewardesses: those on leaves of absence on the 90th day prior to the filing of the first EEOC charge and who, subsequent to that date, left the employ of NWA without having returned to work as stewardesses; and those who were employed by NWA at least until the 90th day prior to the first EEOC filing, but who had transferred to non-stewardess positions. The district court denied NWA's requested exclusions in an order dated June 6, 1980. J.R.E. 162. This denial was based on the district court's understanding that Laffey I had resolved this issue. See District Court's Order of February 19, 1981, denying reconsideration of its June 6, 1980 order. J.A. 172, 173. 89 NWA challenges the June 6, 1980 order, arguing that the district court misunderstood Laffey I. Downplaying the fact that Laffey I dealt explicitly only with terminated stewardesses, NWA claims that a truer indication of that court's mandate was its recognition that only those employees who could have filed charges with the Commission individually when the class filing was made are properly members of the litigating class. 567 F.2d at 472. This language, NWA argues, empowered the district court to consider its claims that certain stewardesses, other than those in the terminated group expressly dealt with in Laffey I, had no viable claims allowing their inclusion in the class. NWA traces the district court's failure to so interpret the mandate of Laffey I to its overly wooden reliance on the phrase 'left the Company's employ ....'  NWA Brief at 61. 90 Without reaching the merits of NWA's arguments against inclusion of the two disputed groups of stewardesses, we hold that the district court correctly construed the Laffey I mandate. NWA had the opportunity in Laffey I to raise the issue of the status of these two additional groups of class members, just as it had the opportunity to raise the issue of the terminated stewardesses. NWA simply and indisputably failed to do so. Its failure to raise these arguments constituted a waiver of them. See supra at pp. 1089-1090. Moreover, as to the law of the case, in Laffey I the court affirm[ed], 567 F.2d at 478, the award of backpay to all class members except those whose connection with [NWA] was dissolved more than 90 days before the class filing with the Commission. Id. at 476 (emphasis added). NWA's attack on the district court's December 1980 ruling is thus barred by the principles of waiver and law of the case. 91