Opinion ID: 2559012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to challenge absence of medical examiner's testimony

Text: Appellant next claims that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to adequately challenge the Commonwealth's failure to produce at trial Fredric N. Hellman, M.D., the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on the victim and drafted the autopsy report. Appellant argues that his counsel's default denied him his constitutional right to confrontation, which he asserts he preserved at trial by refusing to stipulate to Dr. Hellman's testimony. [15] Appellant relatedly alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately challenge the trial court's error in permitting the deputy medical examiner, Ian C. Hood, M.D., to testify as to the cause of the victim's death. Appellant recognizes that Dr. Hellman did not testify at trial because he had since become a medical examiner at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology outside of Washington, D.C. But, appellant claims that this circumstance was not sufficiently compelling to justify Dr. Hellman's absence. Appellant relies upon Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 322 A.2d 653 (1974). Appellant acknowledges that trial counsel objected to Dr. Hood testifying in lieu of Dr. Hellman, but claims that counsel should have extended the challenge by moving for a mistrial. The Commonwealth responds that appellant's claim lacks arguable merit. The Commonwealth notes that Dr. Hood was present during the victim's autopsy and supervised the procedure; he personally viewed the victim's body repeatedly; he reviewed the case with Dr. Hellman both before and after the autopsy; and he testified at trial as to his own observations, opinions, and conclusions. The Commonwealth also argues that because Dr. Hood was cross-examined in detail by appellant's trial counsel, there was no violation of appellant's confrontation rights. The Commonwealth cites two cases where a pathologist and a medical examiner were permitted to testify even though, unlike here, the respective witnesses had not even personally examined the victims' bodies: Commonwealth v. Smith, 480 Pa. 524, 391 A.2d 1009, 1012-13 (1978), and Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 391 Pa.Super. 100, 570 A.2d 532, 534 (1990). In the Commonwealth's view, McCloud is inapposite because in that case, the prosecution attempted to prove the cause of death by simply entering the autopsy report on the basis that the report was admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. In short, the Commonwealth asserts that here, it presented a live witness at appellant's trialthe supervising medical examiner of the autopsywho had observed the procedure, drawn his own conclusions as to the victim's cause of death, and was subject to cross-examination by the defense. Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends, appellant has not established: that Dr. Hellman would have testified differently; that Dr. Hood's testimony was in error; or even that a different cause of death was possible, given that the victim was found in a bloody bathtub with fluid in her lungs and pulmonary edema. The Commonwealth adds that since appellant's trial counsel did in fact object to Dr. Hood's testimony, his ineffectiveness on this point cannot be established; nor, similarly and derivatively, can direct appeal counsel be found ineffective. The PCRA court held that because Dr. Hood was present at and supervised the victim's autopsy, he testified as to his own observations, opinions, and conclusions. The court also concluded that McCloud was inapposite and that appellant had not shown actual prejudice. We see no error in the ruling below. McCloud, indeed is inapposite. In that case, this Court held that the Commonwealth's attempt to read into evidence certain portions of the medical examiner's autopsy report was not permissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule and that without the examiner's testimony, reversible error had occurred. This Court noted that, in the criminal context, medical information may be admissible under the business records exception for the legitimate purpose of establishing the fact of hospitalization and the treatment given, but not to prove medical opinion as to an essential element of a crime, such as the cause of death. 322 A.2d at 656 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mobley, 450 Pa. 431, 301 A.2d 622, 624 (1973)). The two cases cited by the Commonwealth are more relevant. In Smith, the defendant argued that the Commonwealth did not lay a proper foundation for testimony as to cause of death by a pathologist who had not been present at the gunshot victims' autopsy and had not seen the bodies personally, but who had inspected the victims' vital organs after the fact and had also relied upon the autopsy report of the deputy coroner who had performed the autopsies. The deputy coroner also testified, but limited his testimony to his qualifications and the facts he observed in performing the autopsies and did not supply any medical opinions. This Court concluded that the deputy coroner was qualified to produce a report based upon the facts he observed during the course of the autopsies. Moreover, and to the point here, this Court held that the report, in combination with the pathologist's own observations of the gunshot victims' vital organs, was a proper basis from which the pathologist could draw conclusions with a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to the cause of death. 391 A.2d at 1012-13. Similarly, in Mitchell, the Superior Court rejected a Confrontation Clause challenge where the examiner who prepared the autopsy report had moved out of the country and was not available to testify, but the examiner who did testify relied upon the facts presented in the report and from them drew his own conclusions as to the cause of death. See 570 A.2d at 534. In this case, Dr. Hood testified as follows during direct examination: Q: During the period, on the day in fact when Miss Manigault was brought to the Medical Examiner's Office for postmortem examination, did you have an opportunity to view the body? A: Yes. Q: Did you supervise the postmortem examination which was in fact performed by Dr. Hellman, who was a fellow at that time? A: I was present and looked over the case as he did it. The attending pathologist at the Medical Examiner's Office who was assigned for signing out cases that day was Dr. Hoyer, and his signature appears at least one place in this report. The principle [sic] person who did the autopsy was in fact Rick Hellman.    Q: Have you had an opportunity since that time to review both the slides, all the appropriate documents and all the materials that are involved in the postmortem examination of Sheila Manigault? A: Yes. I went over this case with him before the autopsy and after. Q: After speaking with Dr. Hellman and reviewing the appropriate documents, did you view the slides as well? A: Yes. Q: Viewing the slides, were you able to reach an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to the cause of death of Sheila Manigault? [Defense counsel objected and was overruled by the court.] A: I have no doubt that this lady died, as is documented here, from the effects of being beaten, scalded and finally drowned. N.T., 11/7/91, at 83-85. Dr. Hood also indicated in his testimony that a great many of the injuries inflicted on the victim had occurred before her death. See id. at 86-88, 93-94. Dr. Hood further noted that he lacked an independent specific recollection of every detail of this particular autopsy, in light of the fact that six other autopsies were occurring at the time, but that the autopsy was sufficiently unusual that it sticks in my mind. N.T., 11/13/91, at 17. In light of the testimony above and the decisions in Smith and Mitchell, which held that a medical expert who did not perform the autopsy may testify as to cause of death as long as the testifying expert is qualified and sufficiently informed, appellant's claim that trial counsel should have requested a mistrial lacks merit. Dr. Hood, who was qualified to render an opinion on cause of death, viewed the victim's body personally and consulted with Dr. Hellman both before and after the autopsy itself. Moreover, this circumstance is a far cry from McCloud, upon which appellant bases his claim. We also agree with the PCRA court that appellant has not shown Strickland prejudice. He has not shown that Dr. Hellman's testimony would have differed from that of Dr. Hood at all, or that cross-examination of Dr. Hellman would have revealed such different information that there is a reasonable probability of a different verdict. Instead, appellant confines himself to the procedural aspects of his complaint. Because appellant has not established ineffective assistance of trial counsel, his derivative claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel similarly fails.