Opinion ID: 1193843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: potential discovery violation and possible error

Text: ¶ 23 We turn next to Thomas's second issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to cross-examine Thomas using a letter allegedly withheld from the defense in violation of Thomas's discovery request. Thomas complains that the trial court improperly ruled that the September letter could be used for impeachment purposes and erroneously overruled Thomas's objections of surprise and lack of discovery.
¶ 24 In the past, we have stressed the importance of recognizing that the prosecution has a duty to provide discovery materials to the defense on request. State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993) (citing Utah R.Crim. P. 16(a); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1242-43 (Utah 1993)). Furthermore, rule 3.8(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct dictates that a prosecutor shall [m]ake timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense. [3] The State's duty to make such disclosures extends to unrequested information that is or may be exculpatory. Hay, 859 P.2d at 7 (citations omitted). ¶ 25 Thomas also asserts that the letter was exculpatory in nature, complaining that the State was able to transform an exculpatory letter into an impeachment device simply by concealing the letter until after Thomas's testimony. It is unclear, however, whether this letter was clearly exculpatory in nature. At any rate, the State has long had an open file policy pursuant to which documents and evidence are generally given to defense counsel soon after the State receives them. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 640 (Utah 1995) (stating that particular evidence in State's files available to defendant through State's open file policy); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 526 (Utah 1994) (stating that under prosecutor's open file policy, defense received all evidence and documents simultaneously with prosecutor receiving it); Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1243 (State provided defense with copies of evidence pursuant to an open file policy); State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 854 (Utah 1988) (Howe, J., dissenting) (Prosecutors generally open their files to defense counsel for discovery.). Whether the September letter was exculpatory or inculpatory in nature, it should have been turned over to Thomas. At trial, the State insisted it provided Thomas's prior counsel with at least... the disclosure that the State possessed the [September] letter and strongly believed the State sent a copy of the September letter to his former counsel as well, although no record existed in the file. Despite the State's beliefs and its insistence to the contrary, we have no documentary evidence before us that indicates Thomas's defense counsel  either past or present  ever received the September letter. We therefore find that the State acted improperly in not furnishing a copy of the letter to Thomas's subsequent counsel.
¶ 26 Thomas further contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed the September letter to be used at trial. Based upon the concept that the trial court is best situated to determine what, if any, impact an alleged error will have on the proceedings, see State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998); Hay, 859 P.2d at 6; State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989); State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988), we will reverse only where an error is so prejudicial and so substantial that, absent the error, it is reasonably probable that the result would have been more favorable for the defendant. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 276; Hay, 859 P.2d at 7; Gardner, 789 P.2d at 287; State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1989); Speer, 750 P.2d at 190. In other words, the mere possibility of a different outcome occurring without the evidence is not enough; instead, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.  State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). ¶ 27 Here, the September letter was not a critical factor in proving the State's case; apparently the State was not even planning on using the letter before hearing Thomas's testimony. The jury heard the testimony of both victims regarding the extent and manner of the abuse and the identity of their abuser. The jury also heard the testimony of Thomas's own mother regarding the handwriting and signature in the confession letter as well as her testimony concerning Thomas's oral confession to her. Additionally, Thomas does not suggest in what way he may have altered his defense had he known the State possessed the letter, save that he would not have testified. By testifying, he was able to present an alternate story to the jury, to rebut the evidence presented against him, and to allow the jury to judge the credibility of the evidence. Furthermore, the September letter itself was not admitted into evidence; the jury heard only that the letter claimed the confession letter was a lie and was written solely to determine whether his mother would turn the confession letter over to the police. In light of the overwhelming amount of evidence presented to the jury, there is little likelihood that the outcome of the case would have been any more favorable to Thomas absent the September letter; our confidence in the verdict is not undermined. We therefore conclude that neither the prosecutor's failure to provide a copy of the letter to defense counsel or his use of the letter in cross-examining defendant was prejudicial, but instead amounted to harmless error.