Opinion ID: 2996634
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII—Disparate Pay

Text: With respect to her discriminatory pay claim, Dr. Hildebrandt, relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), and on our case Wagner v. NutraSweet, 95 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1996), contends that the allegedly discriminatory compensation from 1992 to 7 1997 constituted a continuing violation, and thus her 6 Dr. Hildebrandt presents no argument in her brief with respect to her retaliation claim. Any arguments with respect to those claims, therefore, are waived. 7 In her brief, Dr. Hildebrandt argues that the range is “from 1992 through 1999” because she “claims that her performance evaluation and salary increase in FY99 was the product of unlawful discrimination.” Appellant’s Br. at 36, 40. Yet, Dr. (continued...) 12 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 receipt of paychecks at a discriminatory rate after July 10, 1997, satisfied the statute of limitations. Dr. Hildebrandt’s brief argues that the continuing violation doctrine allows her to recover for the entire period of 1992 through 1997. However, at oral argument, Dr. Hildebrandt affirmatively stated that she was seeking recovery on her Title VII claim only for paychecks she received inside the 300-day charge filing period, that is, those received after July 10, 1997, which reflect the last allegedly discriminatory raise given to her on July 1, 1997. i) Bazemore and its progeny In Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395-96, the Supreme Court stated that “[e]ach week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII.” In Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 1994), and Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1996), we read Bazemore as holding that disparate pay claims were continuing violations: “Pay increases are typically continuing violations, because each paycheck at a discriminatory rate is seen as the basis for a separate claim. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).” 7 (...continued) Hildebrandt has not brought forth any evidence that the 1999 raise or performance evaluation was discriminatory. In 1999, Dr. Hildebrandt received exactly the same performance evaluation and raise as her male coworkers. All of them received a 4.4% raise and all of them received an evaluation of “accomplished.” Defendant’s Ex.38. Similarly, in 1998, all of the employees received the same rating “accomplished,” and no one received a raise due to budget constraints. Thus, 1997 is the last year for which Dr. Hildebrandt has brought forth evidence of disparate treatment in compensation. Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 13 Chambers, 17 F.3d at 1003 (parallel citations omitted); NutraSweet, 95 F.3d at 534 (same). Further, other courts of appeals interpreted Bazemore to hold that pay claims were continuing violations. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that “[m]ost courts appear to treat pay discrimination claims as continuing violations” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). We later seemed to depart from this conclusion in Dasgupta v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 121 F.3d 1138, 1140 (7th Cir. 1997). In that case, we distinguished Bazemore and NutraSweet as cases involving claims “where the illegal act is repeated during the limitations period.” Id. at 1140. We noted: “Any illegal act that takes place in the limitations period is actionable; the limitations bar falls only on earlier acts. A lingering effect of an unlawful act is not itself an unlawful act, however, so it does not revive an already time-barred illegality. . . .” Id. We went on to explain: In Bazemore and NutraSweet, the plaintiffs alleged that during the limitations period they failed to receive the amount of compensation that the law entitled them to. The fact that this level had been determined before the limitations period meant only that the violation of their rights was predictable. If an employer tells his employee, “I am going to infringe your rights under Title VII at least once every year you work for me,” this does not start the statute of limitations running on the future violations, violations that have not yet been committed. This case is at the opposite pole. There were no new violations during the limitations period, but merely a refusal to rectify the consequences of time-barred violations. It is not a violation of Title VII to tell an employee he won’t get a raise to bring him up to the salary level that he would have attained had he not been 14 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 discriminated against at a time so far in the past as to be outside the period during which he could bring a suit seeking relief against that discrimination. Dasgupta, 121 F.3d at 1140. Despite this statement in Dasgupta, we subsequently have recognized that “[d]rawing the line between something that amounts to a ‘fresh act’ each day and something that is merely a lingering effect of an earlier, distinct, violation is not always easy.” Pitts v. City of Kankakee, 267 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002). ii) National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan The Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), has clarified the applicability of the “continuing violation” doctrine. The Supreme Court explained the requirements for two types of acts: discrete discriminatory acts and acts contributing to a hostile environment. As to discrete acts, the Court explained: [D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within the 180- or 300-day time period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred. The existence of past acts and the employee’s prior knowledge of their occurrence, however, does not bar employees from filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed. Nor does the statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim. Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 15 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113. Thus the Supreme Court in Morgan “foreclosed the use of the continuing violation doctrine to incorporate untimely claims for discrete discriminatory actions even though they may be related to a timely claim.” Peters v. City of Stamford, No. 3:99-CV-764 CFD, 2003 WL 1343265, at  (D. Conn. Mar. 17, 2003). However, the Court in Morgan went on to explain that for hostile work environment claims, [t]he timely filing provision only requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a charge within a certain number of days after the unlawful practice happened. It does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116. Not only did Morgan speak to the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine to discrete acts of discrimination, it also offered guidance with respect to what actions might be considered a “discrete act.” According to the Court, the following actions constitute discrete acts: “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.” Id. at 114. More specifically, Morgan gives guidance in the area of equal pay violations. In Morgan, the Supreme Court expressly relied on its statement in Bazemore regarding each paycheck paid at a discriminatory rate as an example of an actionable “discrete act or single occurrence, even when it has a connection to other acts.” Id. at 111 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Notably, the Court did not characterize Bazemore as involving a “continuing violation” or as embracing a continuing 16 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 violation doctrine. Indeed, the Court noted that “in Bazemore . . . although the salary discrimination began prior to the date that the act was actionable under Title VII, ‘[e]ach week’s paycheck that deliver[ed] less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII.’ ” Id. at 2071 (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395). Thus, the Court in Morgan reaffirmed the Bazemore statement that each discriminatory paycheck was a separate discriminatory act that could give rise to a Title VII action. Consequently, reading Bazemore in light of Morgan, a plaintiff cannot make timely any prior time-barred discrete acts of discriminatory pay by filing within the time frame of one discriminatory paycheck. Prior to Morgan, other courts had anticipated its holding and determined that discriminatory paychecks were discrete acts not subject to a continuing violation doctrine. See, e.g., Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that “a claim of discriminatory pay is fundamentally unlike other claims of ongoing discriminatory treatment because it involves a series of discrete, individual wrongs rather than a single and indivisible course of wrongful action”). Indeed, in spite of our statements in NutraSweet and Chambers, we had stated elsewhere in dicta that repeated paychecks at a discriminatory rate were discrete acts. See Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that separate paychecks would be discrete acts and citing to the case law of other circuits, including Pollis, 132 F.3d at 119); see also CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Redisi, 309 F.3d 991, 992 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining the existence of a “contrast between a continuing wrong, such as deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical treatment, and discrete acts, such as consistently underpaying an employee because Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 17 8 of her sex,” in a non-Title VII case decided after Morgan). Cases subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan have recognized that repeated discriminatory paychecks constitute discrete acts and that a plaintiff cannot render timely any time-barred discriminatory paychecks merely by filing with respect to subsequent discriminatory paychecks within the limitations period. See Quarless v. Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 228 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating in a post-Morgan decision that “[b]ecause each paycheck that the Plaintiff received was an (alleged) immediate and individual wrong which gave rise to a separate disparate pay claim, the Plaintiff cannot use the continuing violation doctrine to render timely any disparate pay violations which occurred outside the 300 day statute of limitations”); Inglis v. Buena Vista Univ., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1023 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (extensively discussing 8 The Second Circuit in Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1997), recognized the Supreme Court’s statement in Bazemore that each “ ‘paycheck that delivers less to a [disadvantaged class member] than to a similarly situated [favored class member] is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date’ of limitation.” Id. at 119 (brackets in original) (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395-96). Nevertheless, rather than construing the Bazemore statement as regarding a continuing violation, the Second Circuit explained that “each continuation or repetition of the wrongful conduct may be regarded as a separate cause of action for which suit must be brought within the period beginning with its occurrence.” Id. Consequently, “a cause of action based on receipt of a paycheck prior to the limitations period is untimely and recovery for pay differentials prior to the limitations period is barred irrespective of subsequent, similar timely violations.” Id.; see also Knight v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579, 582 (11th Cir. 1994). 18 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 Bazemore and the precedents of other circuits in light of Morgan, and stating that “[b]ecause each discriminatory paycheck is unlawful, issuance of such a paycheck is a discrete act of discrimination that, like a termination, a failure to promote, or refusal to hire, is easily identifiable, its occurrence can be pinpointed in time, and is itself actionable.” (emphasis added)). Morgan’s foreclosure of the continuing violation doctrine for discrete discriminatory acts clearly requires a reevaluation of our earlier interpretation. Using Morgan as our guide, therefore, we must conclude that each of Dr. Hildebrandt’s paychecks that included discriminatory pay was a discrete discriminatory act, not subject to the continuing violation 9 doctrine. Therefore, Dr. Hildebrandt may only recover for the discriminatory pay received within the statute of limitations period. Mr. Little allegedly gave Dr. Hildebrandt a discriminatory annual raise on July 1, 1997. She filed her charge 300 days after July 10, 1997. Thus Mr. Little’s act of deciding to give Dr. Hildebrandt a discriminatory annual raise is outside of the limitations period and, under Morgan, she cannot reach any paycheck prior to July 10, 1997. However, the same is not true for paychecks received after July 10, 1997, that reflect the July 1, 1997 discriminatory raise. As the Second Circuit, in a post-Morgan decision, recently explained: In Bazemore, the employer’s act of cutting each weekly paycheck was deemed to give rise to a new claim of an unlawful employment practice. . . . The clear message of Bazemore is that an employer performs a separate 9 We note that another panel of this court has reached the same conclusion with respect to Morgan’s effect on discriminatory pay claims. See Reese v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., No. 02-1633, slip op. at 9 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 2003). Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 19 employment practice each time it takes adverse action against an employee, even if that action is simply a periodic implementation of an adverse decision previously made. Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 318 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). The Second Circuit’s commentary is consistent with and helps explain our own distinction in Dasgupta. In Dasgupta we stated that: In Bazemore and NutraSweet, the plaintiffs alleged that during the limitations period they failed to receive the amount of compensation that the law entitled them to. The fact that this level had been determined before the limitations period meant only that the violation of their rights was predictable. If an employer tells his employee, “I am going to infringe your rights under Title VII at least once every year you work for me,” this does not start the statute of limitations running on the future violations, violations that have not yet been committed. Dasgupta, 121 F.3d at 1140. Bazemore and NutraSweet thus must be read as involving the “periodic implementation of an adverse decision previously made.” Elmenayer, 318 F.3d at 134. Such a “periodic implementation” of a decision to discriminate against an individual is a discrete act of discrimination and is distinct from “a refusal to rectify timebarred violations,” which does not constitute an actionable wrong under Title VII. Dasgupta, 121 F.3d at 1140.
Having found that Dr. Hildebrandt’s Title VII pay claim, at least with respect to her 1997 raise, is not barred by the statute of limitations, we turn to the merits of that claim. 20 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 Under Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1). “Proof of intentional discrimination is required under a disparate treatment analysis.” Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1036 (7th Cir. 1998). “A Title VII plaintiff can satisfy her burden of proof by two avenues: (1) she may present direct evidence of discriminatory intent or, because of the difficulty in directly proving discrimination, (2) she may use the indirect, burden-shifting procedure set forth in McDonnell Douglas . . . .” Id. at 1031; see also Bennett v. Roberts, 295 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2002). Dr. Hildebrandt does not bring forward any direct 10 evidence of discrimination. Under the indirect method, 10 At oral argument, Dr. Hildebrandt’s counsel appeared to argue that there was direct evidence of discrimination because “Mr. Little specifically told [the] EEO officer (Theresa Cummings), ‘I will never give Ms. Hildebrandt more than an acceptable evaluation.’ ” This statement does not constitute “direct evidence.” Direct evidence is “evidence that establishes [a fact] without resort to inferences from circumstantial evidence.” Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Util. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 879 (2002). Assuming Mr. Little made the statement as quoted at oral argument, his rationale still could have been a permissible one under the statute. For instance, such a statement does not preclude the possibility that Mr. Little’s grading decision was based on her performance or her inability to get along with others rather than gender. Counsel for Dr. Hildebrandt noted that there was evidence that Dr. Hildebrandt’s work was satisfactory and apparently excellent. But such evidence in combination with Mr. Little’s alleged statement (continued...) Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 21 a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Once she has done so, the employer must then produce a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. If the employer does so, the plaintiff must then present sufficient evidence that would enable a trier of fact to find that the explanation is pretextual. 10 (...continued) would create only an inference of discrimination, which would be indirect rather than direct evidence. More problematic, Mr. Little’s statement to Cummings is not readily found in the record. Dr. Hildebrandt’s counsel provides a citation to the record for this statement; she cites to Ex.6, Cummings Dep., Plaintiff’s Dep. Exs.27-34. Ex.6 is Cummings’ deposition. On pages 40-44 of her deposition, Cummings reviewed and explained the contents of deposition exhibits 27-34. These exhibits are copies of “a questionnaire that [Cummings] gave to the staff” who worked with Dr. Hildebrandt when Cummings was investigating Dr. Hildebrandt’s allegations of discrimination. Ex.6 at 40. None of the questionnaires can be identified by name. Nor could Cummings identify who wrote which one. See Ex.6 at 40-41. None of them state that Dr. Hildebrandt never would get more than an acceptable evaluation. Through a meticulous search of the record, we have found something as near as we can to Mr. Little’s alleged statement. In Plaintiff’s Ex.40, Dr. Hildebrandt wrote to Mr. Little when objecting to one of her evaluations that “[y]ou once made the comment that I would never get above the middle evaluation range, at least not for a long time. . . . I believe this statement to be an unfair reality.” However, this statement is written in response to her 1998 evaluation. In 1997, 1998 and 1999, Dr. Hildebrandt received a rating of “accomplished,” the same rating as that given her male coworkers. Thus, her contention at oral argument and in her brief that Mr. Little said she would never get a rating above “acceptable,” even if true, is contradicted by the fact that she did in fact get a rating over “acceptable” for fiscal years 1997, 1998 and 1999. Reply Br. at 13. 22 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, we must first determine whether or not Dr. Hildebrandt has established a prima facie case. In order to establish a prima facie case for gender discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing her job to her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) that in spite of her meeting the legitimate expectations of her employer, she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees.” Markel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 2002). Our examination of the record reveals that Dr. Hildebrandt has established a prima facie case that the 1997 raise, reflected in each of her paychecks received after July 10, 1997, constituted intentional discrimination. Dr. Hildebrandt has shown each of the required elements of a prima facie case: (1) She is a member of a protected class; (2) in 1997 she was performing her job to her employer’s legitimate expectations as evidenced in her evaluation in 1997 as “accomplished,” Defendant’s Ex.38; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, namely a paycheck reflecting her 1997 salary which was determined with a lower raise than that given her coworkers (see Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth, 315 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that actionable adverse employment actions include “[c]ases in which the employee’s compensation, fringe benefits, or other financial terms of employment are diminished”)); and (4) she was treated less favorably by receiving a lower raise than similarly situated male employees who were also rated as “accomplished.” See Markel, 276 F.3d at 911. The record is unclear as to whether the IDNR brought forth a legitimate non-discriminatory reason and, if so, whether Dr. Hildebrandt was able to rebut that reason as pretextual. But Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 23 the record at the very least indicates that a prima facie case exists.
However, the fact that Dr. Hildebrandt set forth a prima facie case of disparate pay under Title VII does not necessarily require us to remand this claim to the district court for further proceedings. Remand is only necessary if there is a possibility that Dr. Hildebrandt may recover something more for her Title VII disparate pay claim than she already has received for her Equal Pay Act claim. We consider this possibility below. Under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff may recover back wages; she also may recover liquidated damages in the amount of double the backpay award for willful violations. Both “are compensatory in nature.” Broadus v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 226 F.3d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 2000). As explained by the Eighth Circuit in Broadus, “[l]iquidated damages . . . ‘constitute [] compensation for the retention of a workman’s pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages,’ ” id. (quoting Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945)); they are a “ ‘means of compensating employees for losses they might suffer by reason of not receiving their lawful wage at the time it was due,’” id. (quoting Reich v. S. New England Telecomms., 121 F.3d 58, 70 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997)). Properly characterized, therefore, Dr. Hildebrandt recovered $25,000 in backpay and an additional $25,000 in additional compensatory damages on her Equal Pay Act 24 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 11 claim. The damage provisions of Title VII differ from those of the Equal Pay Act. Under Title VII, as originally enacted, a plaintiff may recover equitable relief in the form of backpay and reinstatement, or front pay in lieu of reinstatement. See Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1998). With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a plaintiff also may recover compensatory damages “for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses” and punitive damages if the defendant “engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) & (3). However, punitive damages cannot be recovered against “a government, government agency or political subdivision.” Id. (b)(1). Comparing the recovery Dr. Hildebrandt received on her Equal Pay Act claim with the potential types of recovery under Title VII, we believe that there is at least a possibility of additional recovery should Dr. Hildebrandt prevail on her Title VII claim. As noted above, Dr. Hildebrandt already has recovered backpay and, therefore, is precluded from any further award of backpay. She also received a substantial compensatory award. Given our precedent, it would be difficult for Dr. Hildebrandt to make a showing that she was entitled to additional compensatory damages attributable only to her discriminatory pay. See Webb v. City of Chester, 813 F.2d 824, 837 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) (documenting range of 11 Although Dr. Hildebrandt also sought injunctive relief in the form of a salary adjustment, the district court determined that such relief was not available under the Equal Pay Act. See R.161 at 5-6. Dr. Hildebrandt does not appeal this ruling. Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 25 awards of $500 to $50,0000 for emotional distress damages due to loss of employment). Finally, as a matter of law, Dr. Hildebrandt cannot recover punitive damages against the IDNR, a government agency. See Baker v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1997). However, Dr. Hildebrandt has not recovered any front pay as a result of the Equal Pay Act violation; indeed, the district court explicitly ruled that such relief was not available under the Equal Pay Act. See R.161 at 5-6. Such relief is available under Title VII. See Gumbhir v. Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 157 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[i]t is often appropriate to grant a prospective salary adjustment, or some other form of ‘front pay,’ in an employment discrimination case” and upholding a jury’s front pay award to compensate for discrimination in the form of “below average salary increases”); see also Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1066 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding an award of front pay in failure to promote case). Consequently, because there is at least one type of relief available to Dr. Hildebrandt under Title VII that was not available to her under the Equal Pay Act, we must remand Dr. Hildebrandt’s Title VII disparate pay claim for further 12 proceedings. 12 We note, however, that front pay is an equitable remedy, see Pals v. Schepel Buick & GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2000), and the decision to award or deny front pay is a matter of discretion for the district court, see Sellers v. Delgado Coll., 902 F.2d 1189, 1193 (5th Cir. 1990). We express no opinion on whether the district court should award front pay or, more fundamentally, whether Dr. Hildebrandt’s underlying Title VII claim is meritorious. 26 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690