Opinion ID: 1148143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dram Shop Claims

Text: The pertinent part of Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-71, states: (a) Every wife, child, parent or other person who shall be injured in person, property or means of support by any intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication of any person shall have a right of action against any person who shall, by selling, giving or otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to the provisions of law, any liquors or beverages, cause the intoxication of such person for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages. In Martin v. Watts, 508 So.2d 1136, 1141 (Ala.1987), this Court stated: Section 6-5-71 creates a civil remedy against persons who, contrary to law, cause the intoxication of another by providing the other person with alcoholic beverages, when the plaintiff is injured because of the intoxication. The term which most narrowly limits this cause of action is the requirement that the providing of the alcoholic beverages be contrary to law. (Emphasis original.) Smoyer argues that because the Chamber of Commerce did not have a license to sell alcoholic beverages, as required by Ala. Code 1975, § 28-3A-3(a)(16), it provided alcoholic beverages to Kyzer contrary to the law. Section 28-3A-3(a)(16) provides that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board may issue a special event retail license to persons for the purpose of selling alcoholic beverages for a period of three days. Alabama Code 1975, § 28-3A-25(a)(15), provides that it is unlawful for any association of persons to sell alcoholic beverages without a license. Although the Chamber of Commerce may have sold alcoholic beverages without a license to do so, the primary issue in this case is whether there was a sale or a providing of alcoholic beverages to Kyzer contrary to the law. A sale is defined in Ala. Code 1975, § 28-3-1(25), as follows: Any transfer of liquor, wine or beer for a consideration, and any gift in connection with, or as a part of, a transfer of property other than liquor, wine or beer for a consideration. (Emphasis added.) Smoyer asserts that a sale occurred between Kyzer and the Chamber of Commerce because Kyzer conferred a benefit upon the Chamber of Commerce by selling admission and drink tickets at the reception and, in exchange for performing these services, received alcoholic beverages. We do not agree. In order to constitute consideration for a promise, there must have been an act, a forbearance, a detriment, or a destruction of a legal right, or a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the promise. Files v. Schaible, 445 So.2d 257 (Ala.1984); Roberts v. Lindsey, 242 Ala. 522, 7 So.2d 82 (1942); and 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 85, at 427 (1964). The evidence is undisputed that Kyzer volunteered his services to the Chamber of Commerce without regard to whether alcoholic beverages would be served to him. Kyzer testified that this was the first function at which he had worked and that he was not aware that complimentary drinks would be served to him when he volunteered his services. The evidence establishes that Kyzer had no intention of volunteering his services in exchange for alcoholic beverages; therefore, there was no sale of alcoholic beverages to Kyzer. Since this Court does not recognize a common law cause of action for negligently dispensing alcohol, Buchanan v. Merger Enterprises, Inc., 463 So.2d 121 (Ala.1984), the summary judgment for the Chamber of Commerce is affirmed. Smoyer also asserts that Cory Jackson, who held the liquor license for the Sheraton, should be liable under the Dram Shop Act for allowing an unlicensed vendor to sell or provide alcoholic beverages at the Chamber of Commerce reception. As previously stated, in order for the Dram Shop Act to apply, a person must have provided alcoholic beverages to another. See Martin v. Watts, supra. In this case, there is no evidence that Jackson or any person under his control provided alcoholic beverages to Kyzer. The record shows that the Sheraton did not furnish the liquor to be served and did not furnish the bartenders for the function. Jackson and the Sheraton's only connection to the Chamber of Commerce function was that the Sheraton rented a reception room to the Chamber of Commerce. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted for Jackson.