Opinion ID: 66463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority's Considerations

Text: Even if this case were to be decided based on some kind of balancing test, the majority errs in identifying the considerations  better referred to as factors  that it claims governs Jones Act limitations cases. To begin, the majority essentially fabricates these considerations in a way that meets Pretus's requirements, picking from earlier cases a variety of rules that leads to a reversal of the judgment. [5] Because I fear that later panels and parties will rely on these stated factors and confuse the state of the law, I briefly discuss how they are flawed. The majority's first consideration is the severity of the traumatic event and initial symptoms. Although that is a factor to be examined by any court in similar cases, the majority's statement of the rule is seriously mistaken. It establishes much too high a bar for the severity of injuries. Admittedly, some of our earlier cases have featured plaintiffs with rather serious symptoms, such as memory loss in Clay and blackouts in Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir.1984). But life-threatening or critical injury is not required to put a putative plaintiff on notice. In Crisman, the plaintiff did not black out or have memory loss but only had headaches and respiratory problems. Crisman, 932 F.2d at 414. Pretus's symptoms are not as serious as those in Clay or Albertson but are easily comparable to those in Crisman. Although the majority attempts to portray Pretus as having mere cold-like symptoms, it ignores the severity of those symptoms and fails to mention how Pretus coughed up multi-colored phlegm and had significant chest tightness. A minor sore throat or a couple days' runny nose may not put a plaintiff on notice, but Pretus's symptoms crossed the minor physical annoyance line, see Clay, 828 F.2d at 1106, that we have established. Once this barrier is crossed, severity of symptoms is only a part of our analysis. More serious symptoms such as blackouts and memory loss will make it more likely the plaintiff should have been on notice, but suffering from less serious symptoms will not guarantee that he qualifies for the discovery rule. The majority's next consideration is the plaintiff's correlation of his ultimate injury with the traumatic event. The majority claims that if a plaintiff is suing on symptoms different from the ones from which he initially suffered, limitations is tolled. This is in direct contradiction to our earlier cases. In Albertson, 749 F.2d at 232, the plaintiff argued that limitations were tolled because initially he had suffered from headaches and blackouts, but he was suing based on later-developed ailments such as blisters[,] ... his liver ailment, behavioral disorder, and other psychological problems. We rejected that defense, recognizing that what matters is not when the plaintiff recognized his later-developed, more serious symptoms, but instead when he notices his first symptoms that gave him a reasonable opportunity to discover the critical facts of his injury. Id. at 233. Thus, Pretus may not have discovered the extent of his injuries until later, but the fact that he should have been on notice from his pattern of illness means that limitations were not tolled. This consideration, as identified and applied by the majority, is inapposite and not a part of any proper Jones Act limitations analysis. The majority's final consideration is the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the opinions of medical experts. The majority holds that if a plaintiff has seen a doctor and has been given a clean bill of health, limitations are tolled until he is diagnosed. This court, however, has flatly and repeatedly rejected that rule. In Albertson, we described how the plaintiff met with numerous doctors, none of whom diagnosed his condition. Id. at 227-28. He was finally diagnosed by a doctor more than a decade after he had first seen a physician regarding his symptoms, and he sued immediately after that diagnosis. We nonetheless held that the statute of limitations had run. Similarly, in Clay, the plaintiff had met with doctors to discuss his illness but was not diagnosed until years later. Clay, 828 F.2d at 1105. He too sued immediately, and again this court found that even though his final diagnosis was made only a month before he sued, limitations had run. Id. To prove its stated rule, the majority relies on only one case, Taurel v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 947 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1991). Taurel 's holding, however, is not in conflict with Judge Heartfield's finding that Pretus's suit is time-barred. In Taurel, the plaintiff was tested for asbestos-related problems, but his tests were negative; later, he was diagnosed with asbestosis. Id. at 770-71. This court held that limitations had not run. Id. at 772. That decision, however, was informed by unique circumstances: Taurel had been tested for the same disease with which he was eventually diagnosed. He could not have been any more vigilant. Pretus may have visited a physician during his time on the vessel, but he was not vigilant enough to get tested for his eventual disease based on his pattern of illness. His doctors' notes clarify that the only way to diagnose hypersensitivity pneumonitis (HP) is by finding the kind of pattern Pretus suffered from. Had he approached a doctor, described the pattern to seek treatment for HP, and been told he was not suffering from the disease, this case would then be governed by Taurel, and limitations would be tolled. That is not, however, what happened to Pretus, so the discovery rule does not apply. As I have shown, the majority's considerations are deeply flawed. The first overstates the test for serious injury, and the second and third have been flatly rejected by earlier precedent.