Opinion ID: 2343191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: stephens's former testimony (# 2)

Text: Although we agree with Appellant's contention that the trial court erred when it permitted the Commonwealth to introduce a transcript of Stephens's testimony in a March 1992 preliminary hearing as to escape charges brought in Oklahoma against Appellant and Reese, we find the error harmless in this case because Appellant himself testified at trial to the same significant facts. At that preliminary hearing, Stephens testified that, on September 20, 1991:(1) he was laying there on the couch, watching the Michael Landon story on T.V. when he got up to turn the stove down and [Appellant] just come in right on top of me and knocked me flat in the floor; (2) Appellant then took a .357 Ruger off the end of the couch and held Stephens and his mother at gunpoint and [t]old me that if he had to he would blow my head off. That he didn't want to hurt me, but he would; (3) Appellant held the handgun pointed [r]ight square in my face and cocked the hammer on it several times; and (4) Reese and Appellant subsequently took the keys to a pickup truck from Stephens's mother and left in the pickup  with Reese driving and Appellant on the passenger side. The record reflects that Stephens died before Appellant's case came to trial, and it is thus likely that his prior sworn testimony would be admissible under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule, KRE 804(b)(1). We need not address that question, however, because Appellant's crime was committed prior to the July 1, 1992 effective date of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, and the transcript was thus not admissible at Appellant's trial unless it would have been admissible under evidence principles in existence prior to the adoption of [the Kentucky Rules of Evidence] KRE 107(b). See also Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 842. And, under pre-KRE law, former testimony was not admissible at a criminal trial unless the testimony was given at a previous trial of the same offense ... on the same charge[.] RCr 7.22. See also Commonwealth v. Bugg, Ky., 514 S.W.2d 119, 121 (1974); Commonwealth v. Howard, Ky.App., 665 S.W.2d 320, 323 (1984). Accordingly, the trial court erred when it permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the transcript. To support his claim that he was prejudiced by the introduction of Stephens's former testimony, Appellant references the Commonwealth's trial court description of it as obviously a critical and key item of evidence in this matter. We find it clear from the context of the Commonwealth's statement that it believed the evidence to be significant because it placed the murder weapon in Appellant's hands. From our review of the record, however, we conclude that, regardless of whether the Commonwealth believed that the transcript was critical evidence at some point in the proceedings, the transcript became far less critical, if not insignificant, after Appellant himself took the stand and admitted that he had taken the handgun from Stephens's home. While Appellant described himself as somewhat of a reluctant participant in the events, he admitted that he had pushed Stephens down, grabbed the handgun, threatened Stephens with it, and left with it in his possession, and he further admitted that the testimony of Reese and Stephens to those same facts was accurate. In fact, Appellant's trial counsel had conceded as much during his opening statement in stating: There are some other facts that there is no dispute about.... They went to Texas together after stealing some items from a man named Stephens. From that point on there is going to be plenty of dispute. And the defense's culpability-phase closing argument closes the door on Appellant's suggestion that there was a substantial dispute at trial as to what had occurred at Stephens's home: We heard about the Stephens' house. No question Michael St. Clair and Dennis Reese burglarized that house. Broke in on Mr. Stephens and his mother. No question. No question Michael grabbed the gun and held Mr. Stephens at gun point. No question that they left out of there with a .357 Ruger and a green pickup truck that belonged to the Stephens[.] It is worthy of note that the only reference to Stephens's former testimony in the Commonwealth's culpability-phase summation concerned Appellant's possession of Stephens's handgun and the Commonwealth's argument further demonstrates the complete lack of factual dispute on that question: Let's look at the gun. Dennis Reese said the gun was in St. Clair's hand at the moment of the burglary; .357 Ruger Black Hawk. Vernon Stephens said that. Why Michael St. Clair even said that. Although Appellant's account of the events was not identical to Stephens's former testimony, the men agreed on the significant facts  e.g., that Appellant left in a pickup truck with Stephens's .357 Ruger Black Hawk handgun. In contrast, the differences in their accounts were minor and inconsequential. In his brief, Appellant fails to mention his own testimony regarding the crimes he committed at Stephens's home, and Appellant thus offers no indication of how he was prejudiced by the erroneous introduction of Stephens's former testimony. We discern no prejudice and find the error harmless. RCr 9.24.