Opinion ID: 4528310
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victim’s Criminal History

Text: [¶8] In a chambers conference on the second day of the trial, Paquin’s counsel raised the issue of his wish to cross-examine the victim using nonspecific criminal history that the victim had disclosed in an arbitration statement as part of his civil lawsuit against the Catholic Church. Counsel acknowledged that all Paquin knew about the criminal history was based on the arbitration statement. When the State objected, the court advised defense counsel that “[y]ou can’t go on a fishing expedition before the jury. . . . I have to 5 base my ruling on [M.R. Evid.] 609,3 so do you know what [the victim’s] conviction history is, what he was convicted of and for what?” Counsel answered, “No.” [¶9] Defense counsel then requested that the State produce the victim’s criminal history as “something that should be discoverable in this case, something that they should provide us.” The State objected on the ground that it had already provided in discovery all of the information it had, and argued that a request for discovery on the second day of trial concerning information previously known to Paquin was “not appropriate.” The court sustained the State’s objection and ruled that Paquin would not be allowed to inquire on cross-examination about the victim’s self-reported convictions “unless [counsel has] some specific information about his . . . criminal history.” [¶10] Paquin acknowledges that “Maine’s discovery rules contain no provision specifically requiring the production of the criminal history record of a complaining witness who testifies at trial,” and he does not assert that the State failed to produce any discovery explicitly required by M.R.U. Crim. P. 16 or by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),4 and its progeny. Rather, Paquin 3 Maine Rule of Evidence 609 governs the impeachment of a witness by evidence of a criminal conviction. 6 urges us to hold that Rule 16 implicitly requires the State to produce the criminal history of a complaining witness who testifies at trial because, he argues, the State is always in constructive possession of that information and it “is potentially impactful on the outcome of [the] trial.”5 [¶11] “We afford the trial court substantial deference in overseeing the parties’ discovery . . . .” State v. Silva, 2012 ME 120, ¶ 8, 56 A.3d 1230. “Only when the defendant can establish that the effect [of an alleged discovery violation] is so significant as to deprive him of a fair trial will we vacate on that basis.” Id. Furthermore, in considering Paquin’s discovery request made during trial concerning a matter of which he was aware, the court was entitled to consider the potential delay involved. See id. ¶¶ 5, 9. Without deciding if or when the State is ever required to do so, we conclude that on this record the trial court did not err in ruling that the State was not required to produce the victim’s criminal history mid-trial. [¶12] Maine Rule of Evidence 16(a)(2)(D), the automatic discovery rule invoked by Paquin, requires the State to produce “[a] statement describing any 4We recently explained that “[t]he due process concepts articulated in Brady require the State to disclose to the defendant evidence that is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching.” State v. Reed-Hansen, 2019 ME 58, ¶ 13, 207 A.3d 191 (quotation marks omitted). Paquin does not argue “that the State is required to produce such records of every witness, only 5 those, such as [the victim in this case], on [whose] testimony its case depends.” 7 matter or information known to the attorney for the State that may not be known to the defendant and that tends to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt as to the crime charged.” (Emphasis added.) Here, Paquin knew prior to trial that the victim had a self-reported criminal history. When the court inquired: “And this was information that you received in discovery earlier in the case?” counsel answered, “Sure.” [¶13] Furthermore, Paquin made no showing that he requested from the State or otherwise attempted to obtain the victim’s criminal record prior to trial,6 and he proffered no specific dates of conviction or other information that would allow the court to determine the admissibility of the purported convictions pursuant to M.R. Evid. 609(a)-(b), such as whether they were punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or whether their elements established dishonesty, see M.R. Evid. 609(a). [¶14] In sum, given this record the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to compel the State to obtain the victim’s criminal history during the trial, nor in ruling that Paquin could not cross-examine the victim concerning 6 Paquin points to M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(c)(1), which requires the State to produce, upon the defendant’s written request, specified items “that are material and relevant to the preparation of the defense.” The record does not contain any such request from Paquin. Had he timely requested the victim’s criminal history pursuant to the rule and the State declined to comply, the court would have had the authority, in its sound discretion, to issue an appropriate order. See Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 1999 ME 196, ¶ 17, 742 A.2d 933 (noting “the considerable discretion vested in the judge” in making a discovery ruling (quotation marks omitted)). 8 his nonspecific, self-reported criminal history. See Silva, 2012 ME 120, ¶ 8, 56 A.3d 1230.