Opinion ID: 4535302
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Interactions between DOJ and DHS

Text: We likewise see no signs of bad faith in AUSA Hallowell’s inability to tell the District Court whether, if the prosecution were dismissed, DHS would detain Reyes-Romero or seek reinstatement of the 2011 removal order. In asserting that he could not “speak for DHS . . . or what [it] would do” in future immigration proceedings against Reyes-Romero, App. 617, AUSA Hallowell was faithfully representing our precedent to the District Court. See United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 443–44 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that an AUSA cannot bind DHS in future immigration proceedings absent DHS’s consent). Had the Court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, any relevance of the 2011 order would have been left to DHS in the first instance (in deciding whether to pursue a new NTA or seek reinstatement) and, if necessary, to other administrative adjudicators and a different Article III court. To be sure, it is possible for an AUSA, after having obtained “prior authorization from [DHS],” Justice Manual, supra, § 9-73.510, to come to a binding agreement with respect to future immigration proceedings against a noncitizen defendant. But an AUSA lacks the power to do so on his own. More important, whether and under what circumstances he reaches out to DHS to explore such an arrangement is committed to his discretion—he is not bound to do so. And even if he does seek authorization from DHS, he cannot demand that the agency give it, and if the agency declines the AUSA cannot be held responsible. When viewed through an objective lens, therefore, the absence of such an arrangement between DOJ and DHS with respect to future proceedings against Reyes-Romero also does not support an inference of bad faith. 47 Two related issues must be addressed. First, we do not consider significant that DHS and DOJ were to some extent “intertwin[ed] . . . in this case,” App. 37 (emphasis omitted), insofar as DOJ and DHS kept in contact about Reyes-Romero or a line-level DHS official was present at counsel table for all but one of the hearings before the District Court. Coordination between DOJ and other executive departments is by no means unusual, but it does not obviate the line between those departments or between a criminal prosecution and subsequent administrative proceedings. We therefore see no support for the notion that the Government here attempted to use its collaboration with DHS as both a sword and a shield against ReyesRomero. Second, we are equally unpersuaded that the AUSA exhibited bad faith by focusing on the criminal offense with which Reyes-Romero was charged, the evidence necessary to prove that offense, and the elements of Reyes-Romero’s affirmative defense. Those were, after all, the only live issues over which the District Court had jurisdiction. Even so, AUSA Hallowell did his best to assist the Court in its consideration of matters well beyond that jurisdiction, most notably the effect that various dispositions might have on future immigration proceedings against Reyes-Romero. The AUSA’s responsiveness, candor, and professionalism in answering unanticipated questions bespeak good faith on his part and in the “position of the United States,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app. And in general, the AUSA offered candid and accurate assistance to the tribunal; was forthright about the weaknesses in the case; and, once he had received additional evidence bolstering Reyes-Romero’s arguments on prejudice and once the prosecution had exhausted more time and resources than was expected, sensibly 48 reevaluated it and decided dismissal was in the best interests of justice. There is much to commend in the way the prosecution litigated this case, and certainly nothing of the “dishonest purpose or moral obliquity,” Manzo, 712 F.3d at 811 (citation omitted), required to justify a Hyde Amendment award.