Opinion ID: 2598556
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: St. Clair's Allegation Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Without Merit.

Text: St. Clair argues that the circuit court erred in denying (1) his motion to dismiss the charges against him with prejudice and (2) his motion for a new trial, because egregious prosecutorial misconductspecifically, the DPA's attempt to elicit testimony from him regarding whether he was more intoxicated when he killed O'Brien than he was on April 15, 1998 denied him a fair trial. For the most part, St. Clair relies on the same arguments that he advances regarding the circuit court's decision to admit the evidence of the April 15, 1998 accident in the first place. The only new argument that he advances is that [i]f no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, then the [circuit c]ourt's action, isolating the jury, admonishing the [DPA] harshly, then directing counsel into chambers, would be difficult to explain. [20] But the fact that a trial court sustains defense counsel's objection to a prosecutor's question does not, in and of itself, indicate that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred of such an outlandish nature that the charges against the defendant should be dismissed. More importantly, there was nothing outrageous in the DPA's behavior in the present matter. As noted supra in Section I, after the circuit court sustained, without elaboration, defense counsel's objection to the DPA's first question regarding St. Clair's relative states of intoxication, the DPA attempted to rephrase her question. When the circuit court sustained defense counsel's objection to the rephrased question, the DPA asked the circuit court for an explanation before proceeding. Thereafter, the DPA scrupulously adhered to the circuit court's ruling prohibiting her line of questioning. Thus, the DPA conducted herself in a responsible manner. In any event, we are unable to discern anything prejudicial in the substance of the DPA's cross-examination. As discussed supra in Section I, evidence that St. Clair was more intoxicated on February 23, 2002 than on April 14, 1998 was adduced at trial independently of the DPA's cross-examination. Thus, the DPA was merely attempting to determine whether St. Clair was aware that he was more intoxicated when he killed O'Brien than when he had his DUI accident on April 15, 1998, and, thereby, elicit further evidence that St. Clair consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct would cause the death of another. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in concluding that [n]o prosecutorial misconduct occurred and, consequently, denying St. Clair's motions to dismiss the charges against him with prejudice and for a new trial.