Opinion ID: 2749038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statement of Reasons for Decision

Text: ¶ 24. The statute applicable to decisions of boards of abatement requires the board to “state in detail in writing the reasons for its decisions.” 24 V.S.A. § 1535(c). This Court has not previously considered the level of detail required by this provision. ¶ 25. Our most closely analogous decision was in Harris v. Town of Waltham , in which we considered the level of detail required by a similar statute in a board of civil authority decision in a tax appeal. 158 Vt. 477, 613 A.2d 696 (1992). In that case, the taxpayers challenged the appraisal of some of their land on the ground that all of their land had been valued at $160 per acre, but they had conveyed the most valuable parcel from that land. That more valuable parcel, and the parcel they retained, were both valued at $160 per acre, leading taxpayers to conclude that their remaining land was overvalued. Id . at 478. The BCA rejected taxpayers’ appeal, stating, “Appeal denied. Assessment for land is similar to assessments of surrounding land.” Id . (quotation marks omitted). ¶ 26. This Court concluded that under the circumstances, the BCA’s explanation was adequate under the statute providing that if the BCA did not within fifteen days certify in writing its notice of decision, “with reasons,” 32 V.S.A. § 4404(c), the prior year’s grand list of properties remains in place. In reaching its decision, the Court considered several factors. First, the applicable statute had previously required the BCA to “certify in writing its findings in the premises,” id . (1982), and this Court had held in two cases that the requisite findings were absent or inadequate, such that the presumptive continuation of a prior year’s grand-list assessment stood. Harris , 158 Vt. at 481, 613 A.2d at 698 (citing Hojaboom v. Town of Swanton , 141 Vt. 43, 442 A.2d 1301 (1982) and Punderson v. Town of Chittenden , 136 Vt. 221, 388 A.2d 373 (1978)). But following these decisions, the Legislature had amended the statute to eliminate the reference to “findings,” and instead simply call for “reasons.” Id . The Legislature also amended the trigger for holding over the prior year’s grand list assessment to “substantial compliance” with the notice-and-reasons requirement. Id . at 480-82, 613 A.2d at 698-99. We concluded that the Legislature intended to overrule our two prior decisions, at least in part, and to dial back the level of statutorily required detail required in a decision. Id . at 481, 613 A.2d at 698. ¶ 27. Second, this Court was cognizant of the reality that boards of civil authority are made up of volunteer citizens who decide these cases in short timeframes. Id . at 482 n.3, 613 A.2d at 699 n.3. In this context, it is simply unrealistic to expect an enumeration of reasons as detailed as a court or administrative agency would be expected to provide. ¶ 28. Third, the reason offered by the BCA in that case was directly responsive to the only argument made by the taxpayer. Since the taxpayer’s sole argument was that the taxpayer had been discriminated against compared to certain other named landowners, the statement that the taxpayers’ assessment “is similar to assessments of surrounding land,” was a sufficient explanation to comply with the statute. Id . at 482 (quotation marks omitted). As the court explained, “the sophistication of the BCA’s statement matches the sophistication of the taxpayer’s appeal.” Id . at 482 n.3. ¶ 29. Finally, under the statutory regime in effect at the time, taxpayers’ rights were fully protected by a de novo appeal to the State Board of Appraisers. Id . at 482. ¶ 30. In this case, we have a statute that calls not merely for “reasons,” but requires the board to “state in detail in writing the reasons for its decision.” In contrast to the statute governing tax appeals in Harris , this Legislature has not amended the statute to dial back the expectations placed upon boards of abatement, and there is no de novo review process that protects taxpayers’ rights. The Legislature has expressly called for a statement of the reasons for the board of abatement’s decision “in detail.” 24 V.S.A. § 1535(c). These factors support the imposition of a higher standard in the abatement context than applied by this Court in Harris . ¶ 31. On the other hand, the composition of the board of abatement is quite similar to that of the board of civil authority; the same concerns about the sophistication and reasonable expectations of a local, volunteer board that this Court discussed in Harris come into play in this case. Moreover, the broad discretion enjoyed by a board of abatement weighs in favor of more modest expectations of the board’s explanations. See Garbitetti , 2011 VT 122, ¶ 14 (noting that boards of abatement have broad discretion to grant or deny abatement requests, and holding that abatement statute “allows the Board to abate taxes, but does not require it to do so even if the taxpayer falls within one of the categories allowing for abatement”). ¶ 32. With these considerations in mind, we reach the following conclusions. A board of abatement’s decision must provide sufficient explanation to “indicat[e] to the parties, and to an appellate court, what was decided and upon what considerations.” Punderson , 136 Vt. at 225, 388 A.2d at 376 (citations omitted). The writing need not be lengthy, exhaustive, or legalistic, and need not satisfy the standards we would apply to a trial court’s findings. But it must address the arguments raised by the applicant. See Harris , 158 Vt. at 481, 613 A.2d at 699. The more detailed and clear a taxpayer’s own presentation, the greater the board’s duty to respond in kind. See id . at 482 n.3. ¶ 33. With these considerations in mind, we consider the board’s explanations in support of its decision. First, with respect to the taxpayers’ argument that the delinquent-tax collector wrongly declined to accept a payment allocated to a specific property and then unfairly charged interest and penalties on that late payment, the board declined the abatement request “because the delinquent-tax collector could not take a portion of payment towards one parcel on a tax bill, being in the hands of the attorney.” This explanation may or may not reflect an accurate understanding of the law, but it does provide the parties, and a reviewing court, an understanding of the considerations that animated the board’s decision on this question. Had this Court been asked to review the merits of the board’s determination on this question, we would have been able to evaluate whether the law allows or requires the tax collector to take a portion of payment towards one parcel on a tax bill, and could have ruled accordingly. The board’s explanation on this point satisfies the requirements of 24 V.S.A. § 1535(c). ¶ 34. With respect to taxpayers’ argument that the listers improperly and without notice reclassified their property to an inapplicable and less advantageous status, the board stated, “No, it was not proven by the appellant that the Listers had erred.” Especially given that the only information presented to the board on this point was from taxpayers, who supported their claim with reference to documents and legal citations, this response does not meet the above test. It amounts to “you are wrong,” without any explanation why. Taxpayers’ presentation was sufficient to raise a serious question of manifest error, and they are left to wonder what aspect of their position was unpersuasive to the board, or whether the board understood it at all. Likewise, a reviewing court has no basis for determining whether the board’s decision fell within its broad discretion, or whether it amounted to a failure to exercise or abuse of discretion. Garbitetti , 2011 VT 122, ¶ 14 (“[W]e review . . . decision[s] denying abatement for abuse of discretion.”). ¶ 35. With respect to the taxpayers’ arguments that they had unwittingly paid for a .66-acre leach field as if it was an individual property, causing increased assessments from 2005 to 2010, the board responded, “the increased leach field property assessments were addressed by the [listers] [and] had been adjusted at grievance in 2011.” This response reflects that the town agreed to adjust taxpayers’ 2011 tax bill on account of the leach-field issue, but does not in any way address the years 2005 to 2010. In that respect, it amounts to a statement of the board’s decision, but not an explanation of the reason. That is not to say that the board is required to abate the challenged taxes for these years, but it must provide a basic statement of the considerations that underlay its rejection of taxpayers’ request. ¶ 36. In rejecting the request for abatement on account of the foregone house-site allowance, the board wrote, “the elimination of the house site is based on the income and is handled by the State.” Again, the board’s understanding of the law may or may not be correct, but the writing does inform taxpayers, and any reviewing court, of the considerations underlying the board’s rejection of taxpayers’ argument on this basis. A reviewing court could consider the accuracy of the legal understanding underlying the board’s decision on this point, enabling meaningful review. ¶ 37. Finally, in rejecting taxpayers’ evidence that their properties were treated differently from others in the town, the board wrote that “the same cost table/schedule were used to value the appellant’s property as were to the rest of the parcels in town.” This explanation responded directly to the equalization argument, and reflected that because the same cost table and schedule were used for all properties, the board was not persuaded that taxpayers’ properties were unfairly valued. It provides ample basis for what would be a very deferential review, since the question before a reviewing court would be whether any evidence in the record supported the town’s conclusion on this point. See Garbitetti , 2011 VT 122, ¶ 14. ¶ 38. In summary, some, but not all of the board of abatement’s explanations in this case satisfy the statutory requirement that it “state in detail in writing the reasons for its decision[s].” 24 V.S.A. § 1535(c). Reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to remand to the Board of Abatement, Town of Pownal, for a more detailed explanation of the reasons for its denial of taxpayers’ request for abatement on the ground that the misclassification of their property over a course of years amounted to a manifest error or mistake, and its request for abatement on the ground that taxation of their .66-acre leach field from 2005 to 2010 as an individual property amounted to manifest error or mistake. In the alternative, the Board may hold a new hearing on those two issues. Affirmed in all other respects . FOR THE COURT: