Opinion ID: 2374905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Fifth AmendmentDouble Jeopardy

Text: [¶ 41] Appellant next argues that imposing multiple sentences for the same act violates his right to be free from double jeopardy under both the United States and Wyoming Constitutions. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Wyoming Constitution guarantee that a person will not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same criminal offense. Although the language of the respective double jeopardy provisions is dissimilar, they have the same meaning and are co-extensive in application. Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1350 (Wyo. 1977). We have followed the federal courts' interpretation of the United States Constitution in stating that the double jeopardy provisions of both Constitutions provide an accused three protections: 1) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal; 2) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction; and 3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. Meyers v. State, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 9, 124 P.3d 710, 714 (Wyo.2005) (citing Pope v. State, 2002 WY 9, ¶ 14, 38 P.3d 1069, 1072 (Wyo.2002)). In this case, Appellant argues that his sentence falls within the third category, the protection against multiple punishments. [¶ 42] In instances where the protection against multiple punishments is implicated and multiple convictions are based on violations of different statutes, a double jeopardy claim is analyzed under the same elements test described in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), which Wyoming adopted in State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1131 (Wyo. 1993). That test asks whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. However, in cases that involve two violations of the same statute, the same elements test does not apply. Instead, when two violations arise from the same statute, we look directly to the intent of the legislature to determine the appropriate unit of prosecution. See Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 865 (Wyo.1992). In these situations, we have held that statutory construction and legislative intent will control the determination whether, when there are multiple victims from a single act or course of conduct, there is only one crime or as many crimes as there are victims. Id. at 864; Tuggle v. State, 733 P.2d 610, 612 (Wyo.1987); Vigil, 563 P.2d at 1352-53; see also United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 125 n. 3 (2d Cir.2004) (Ordinarily, courts apply the so-called `Blockburger test' to determine whether or not two charged offenses constitute different crimes. That analysis is inappropriate in this case, because there is only one statute at issue, and so, nothing to compare. Rather than determining whether one act falls within two distinct statutes, as in Blockburger, we are asking whether two acts constitute one statutory offense.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 949, 125 S.Ct. 364, 160 L.Ed.2d 266, and cert. denied, 543 U.S. 960, 125 S.Ct. 430, 160 L.Ed.2d 324 (2004); United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 952 (D.C.Cir.1999) (Where two violations of the same statute rather than two violations of different statutes are charged, courts determine whether a single offense is involved not by applying the Blockburger test, but rather by asking what act the legislature intended as the `unit of prosecution' under the statute.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1005, 120 S.Ct. 1272, 146 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000). [¶ 43] This Court has never specifically decided whether a violation of Wyoming's aggravated vehicular homicide statute includes as many separate offenses as there are victims when multiple deaths result from a single automobile accident. However, we find guidance in two Wyoming cases that have addressed the issue in the context of other crimes. In the first case, Vigil, the appellant shot a gun at an automobile carrying five occupants and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all five charges of assault with a deadly weapon. 563 P.2d at 1346. The appellant challenged the judgment on double jeopardy grounds, despite the fact that he received only one sentence. In holding that a separate crime was committed with respect to each victim, we reasoned that because the statute at issue referred to an assault or battery upon any human being, using the singular form of the noun, the statute was intended to protect individual persons. See id. at 1351-52. We noted that although the offenses arose from the same event, each involves a separate victim and courts are protective of the individual citizen subjected to the criminal conduct of another. Id. at 1351. We also noted that many cases from other jurisdictions hold that killing by culpable negligence several human beings in one automobile accident constitutes as many separate offenses as there are victims and consecutive sentences are proper. Id. at 1352 (citing cases that stand for the proposition that, under a vehicular homicide statute, the killing of a human being is the gravamen of the offense as opposed to the act of unlawfully operating a vehicle). [¶ 44] In the second case, Amrein, the appellant was convicted on eight counts of cruelty to animals for failing to provide livestock with proper food, and was given eight consecutive sentences. 836 P.2d at 863. The appellant argued that his right against double jeopardy was violated because his sentences resulted from a single continuous criminal act. Id. We ultimately found that the statute was ambiguous and invoked the rule of lenity in holding that it was error for the appellant to have been sentenced on more than one conviction. Id. at 865. We found the statute ambiguous because, although it referred several times to the singular noun and pronoun (as in any animal, it, and the animal), the statute also used the plural animals in the opening clause and the modifier any when referring to animal. Id. Adding further support for the decision, we noted that [a]s a general proposition, with few exceptions, in crimes against the person, when contrasted with crimes against property, there are as many offenses as individuals affected. Id. at 864 (quoting Vigil, 563 P.2d at 1352). [¶ 45] In the present case, we find that the aggravated vehicular homicide statute includes as many separate offenses as there are individuals affected by the defendant's conduct. The focus of the statute, as in other homicide crimes, is on the resulting death of the victim, which indicates that the legislature intended to protect each individual citizen from harm. We agree with the courts that have addressed this issue and determined that the resulting death of the victim is the gravamen of the offense, as opposed to the act of unlawfully driving an automobile. See, e.g., Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1186 (Fla.2003) ([T]he gravamen of the offense of DUI manslaughter is not a traffic violation, but the killing of a human being.); Commonwealth v. Meehan, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 1028, 1029, 442 N.E.2d 43 (Mass.App.Ct.1982) ([T]he gravamen of the offense is the killing of a human being as distinguished from unlawful operation of a motor vehicle.); Murray v. United States, 358 A.2d 314, 321 (D.C.1976) (The gravamen of the crime [of negligent homicide] is not the act of operating a motor vehicle negligently; rather, it is the killing of a human being.); State v. Whitley, 382 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Mo. 1964) (The gravamen of the offense [of manslaughter] is the killing of a human being, and the statute by its terms contemplates that there shall be as many offenses as there are human beings killed, whether by one or several acts.). [¶ 46] An examination of the language of the vehicular homicide statute also leads us to the conclusion that the legislature intended to protect the lives of each individual. The statute states that a person is guilty if he causes the death of another person. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i). Comparing this language to the statutes at issue in Vigil and Amrein, we find that the legislature's use of another person in the singular form of the noun evidences an intent that each death caused under the statute constitutes a separate unit of prosecution. Indeed, this is also consistent with our finding in Tuggle that the word another, when used in an aggravated assault and battery statute, is a singular term and thus means each time `another' is affected by said crime, it is a separate offense. The obvious intent of the legislature was to protect each individual. 733 P.2d at 612. Accordingly, we hold that each death that results from a violation of the vehicular homicide statute constitutes a separate unit of prosecution and that separate convictions and sentences for each death resulting from a single accident do not violate Appellant's right against double jeopardy.