Opinion ID: 1090506
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The HAC Instruction

Text: With regard to HAC, the defense requested that the judge instruct the jury on several points: that the term unnecessarily torturous be defined to include an intent element; that [t]he fact that it might have taken a matter of minutes to die once the process of the homicidal assault began cannot, by itself, support a finding of this aggravating circumstance; and that premeditation does not make a killing `especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' The trial court denied the requests, but granted the defense's requested additional instruction that the actions of the defendant which were taken after the victim was dead or rendered unconscious from which she never regained consciousness should not be considered in determining whether the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. With this addition, the court instructed the jury in accord with the standard instructions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requests. First, HAC does not have an intent element. See, e.g., Buzia v. State, 926 So.2d 1203, 1211 (Fla.) (The intention of the killer to inflict pain . . . is not a necessary element of the aggravator.) (quoting Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110, 135 (Fla.2001)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 184, 166 L.Ed.2d 129 (2006); Bowles v. State, 804 So.2d 1173, 1177 (Fla.2001) (rejecting a claim that the trial court erred in refusing a proposed HAC instruction that included an intent element). Further, in Hall v. State, 614 So.2d 473, 478 (Fla.1993), we approved an instruction mirroring the one given in this case. Thus, we reject this claim.