Opinion ID: 1099300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Immoderate Rate of Speed

Text: If on remand the prosecutor decides to retry defendant under the same statute and if defendant is again convicted, this court will again be called upon to determine whether La.Rev.Stat. 34:851.6 provides adequate standards to determine the guilt or innocence of this accused under State v. Dousay, 378 So.2d 414 (La.1979), State v. Gill, 441 So.2d 1204 (La.1983), and State v. Liuzza, 457 So.2d 664 (La.1984). Because the lower courts have already ruled on this issue and because we believe those ruling were palpably wrong, we deem it appropriate to address the constitutional issue at this time rather than after a second conviction. La.Rev.Stat. 34:851.6 permits a jury to convict an accused who causes the death of a person by the operation of any watercraft either at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner. (emphasis added). In conformity with this statutory language, the trial judge instructed the jurors that they could convict defendant on each of the three counts if they found that defendant's operation of the watercraft was at an immoderate rate of speed and that the operation of the watercraft in that manner caused the deaths of the victims. [8] (emphasis added). Therefore, a juror could have voted to convict defendant solely on the finding that the speed of the boat was immoderate, even if the juror was not satisfied that defendant was careless, reckless or negligent. The state and federal constitutions require that a criminal enactment contain an ascertainable standard of guilt that is not so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each case. State v. Liuzza, 457 So.2d 664, 665 (La.1984), quoting from Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 at 403, 86 S.Ct. 518 at 520-21, 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966) (the term substantial, as used in the pandering statute to proscribe receiving a certain amount of support or maintenance from the earnings of a person engaged in prostitution, was unconstitutionally vague in that the term failed to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt). In order to decide whether a statute uses terms which adequately mark the boundaries between criminal and non-criminal conduct, a court must determine whether the statutory terms have such a clear meaning that men of common intelligence will not necessarily guess at their meaning and differ as to their application. State v. Union Tank Car, Inc., 439 So.2d 377, 385 (La.1983). The cases pertaining to the constitutional requirement of certainty do not form a seamless web. [9] As this court noted in State v. Jackson, 404 So.2d 952, 953 (La. 1981), words which may be vague and indefinite when considered in the abstract may nevertheless provide sufficient guidance when considered with the particular conduct they are used to describe. See also State v. Liuzza, 457 So.2d 664 (La. 1984). Thus, we must consider the use of the term immoderate rate of speed in the context within which it is used in the statute here at issue. The trial judge defined the phrase immoderate rate of speed as speed in excess of that which is moderate considering the time, place, and circumstances. The term immoderate is otherwise defined as exceeding normal or appropriate bounds; extreme and as not moderate; exceeding just or reasonable limits; excessive; extreme. American Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1982); Random House Dictionary of the English Language (unabridged ed. 1966). Considering the term immoderate as a modifier of the word speed when used in connection with the operation of a watercraft, we conclude that immoderate fails to illuminate with a sufficient degree of clarity the boundary between criminal and non-criminal conduct that the constitutional guarantee of certainty demands. The Legislature cannot impose criminal liability for deaths caused by operation of a watercraft at a speed that merely exceeds that which is normal (or that which is appropriate) without providing more guidance regarding the standards to be used in determining what constitutes a normal, appropriate, or moderate speed in the many and varied contexts in which watercraft are operated on the waterways of this state. [10] The parameters of the term immoderate are simply too broad to give fair notice of the proscribed conduct or to provide ascertainable standards for jurors to determine what conduct is prohibited. The factfinder must necessarily guess at the meaning of immoderate in deciding whether to convict. Because reasonable jurors may differ greatly over whether a particular speed constitutes an immoderate rate of speed under given circumstances unless the term is further defined, this term in the context of this statute is unconstitutionally vague. Our decision that the phrase immoderate rate of speed fails to give fair notice and to provide ascertainable standards of guilt does not require that we declare the statute unconstitutional in its entirety. As this court recently said in State v. Azar, 539 So.2d 1222, 1226 (La. 1989): The unconstitutionality of one portion of a statute does not necessarily render the entire statute unenforceable. If the remaining portion of the statute is severable from the offending portion, this Court may strike only the offending portion and leave the remainder intact. State v. Williams, 400 So.2d 575 (La. 1981). The test for severability is whether the unconstitutional portions of the statute are so interrelated and connected with the constitutional parts that they cannot be separated without destroying the intention manifested by the legislature in passing the act. Cobb v. Louisiana Board of Institutions [237 La. 315], 111 So.2d 126 (La.1958). In this case, as in Azar, the immoderate rate of speed means of committing the offense is clearly separate and distinct from the careless, reckless, or negligent means of commission, and thus can be stricken without affecting the remainder. Thus, the separable portion of the statute remains unaffected by our decision.