Opinion ID: 1608431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Jurisprudential Criticism of Language in Reasonable Doubt Instruction

Text: Despite the fact that courts have consistently concluded that the giving of a reasonable doubt instruction with language similar to the instruction in this case does not constitute reversible error, there has been significant criticism of both the firmly convinced and the real possibility language. Such criticism has come in cases both where courts find that the giving of the instruction is not reversible error but caution against use of the language and, in at least one case, where the court found the giving of the instruction to constitute reversible error. With regard to the real possibility language, courts have cautioned that the language may be perceived as shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not find use of the real possibility language to constitute reversible error in United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d at 52, but the court suggested caution in the use of such language as it may provide a basis for confusion and may be misinterpreted by jurors as unwarrantedly shifting the burden of proof to the defense. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the `hesitate to act' language suggested in other pattern instructions on reasonable doubt would be preferable to the real possibility language. Id. We note that the Nebraska pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt, NJI2d Crim. 2.0, recited above, contains hesitation language similar to that found preferable by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 973 (4th Cir.1987), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit made the following observations regarding the confusion engendered by defining reasonable doubt in terms of a real possibility that the accused is not guilty: The [trial] court did not explain the difference that it perceived between a possibility and a real possibility. It failed to tell the jury that the accused did not have the burden of showing a real possibility of innocence. Implying the evidence must show a real possibility of innocence to justify acquittal trenches on the principle that a defendant is presumed to be innocent. If the court believed that the jury could understand its concept of a real possibility and allocate the burden of proof on this issue, there was no reason for it to question the jury's ability to understand the prosecution's obligation to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite these concerns, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the instructions taken as a whole properly described the prosecution's burden and that the impropriety in using the real possibility language as well as the firmly convinced language did not affect the substantial rights of the accused. The Hawaii Court of Appeals has held that an instruction similar to the one given in this case violated the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution. State v. Perez, 90 Hawai'i 113, 976 P.2d 427 (Haw.App. 1998) (affirmed with respect to reasonable doubt instruction, reversed in part on other grounds by 90 Hawai'i 65, 976 P.2d 379 (1999)). While the Hawaii court indicated that the real possibility and certain other language of the instruction was problematic, it determined that the firmly convinced language was the most compelling deficiency in the instruction. Noting that it is possible to be firmly convinced of a fact, yet still retain a reasonable doubt, the Hawaii court determined that use of the firmly convinced language reduced the reasonable doubt standard to one akin to the standard applied where the burden of proof required is that of clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 128, 976 P.2d at 442. The Hawaii court noted that its pattern instruction defined clear and convincing evidence as evidence which `produces a firm belief about the truth of the allegations which the parties have presented' and noted that clear and convincing is a lower standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis omitted.) Id. The Hawaii court stated that the term `firmly convinced' was so similar to the term `firm belief of conviction' that use of the phrase firmly convinced lowered the standard of proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to the lesser standard of clear and convincing evidence and that therefore the language in such instruction failed to correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. Id. at 129, 976 P.2d at 443. With reference to the Hawaii court's analysis, we note that Nebraska's civil pattern jury instruction, NJI2d Civ. 2.12B, provides, Clear and convincing evidence means evidence that produces a firm belief or conviction about the fact to be proved. See, also, Fales v. Norine, 263 Neb. 932, 942, 644 N.W.2d 513, 521 (2002) (clear and convincing evidence is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of the fact to be proved); In re Estate of Mecello, 262 Neb. 493, 633 N.W.2d 892 (2001). The Nebraska civil pattern jury instruction NJI2d Civ. 2.12B also states that clear and convincing evidence means less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we note that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit warned of the dangers in attempting to define reasonable doubt in United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 1446, 43 L.Ed.2d 762 (1975), and overruled on other grounds, United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535 (7th Cir.1977). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that the words reasonable doubt were ordinary English words of common acceptance and stated that [b]ecause of the very commonness of the words, the straining for making the clear more clear has the trap of producing complexity and consequent confusion. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433,.