Opinion ID: 1214314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Dr Joseph Wyatt

Text: The Appellant also contends that the testimony of Dr. Wyatt regarding the battered woman's syndrome and the relevant underlying facts from within the Appellant's history of abuse was improperly limited. We have consistently held that an expert is permitted to explain in detail the factual basis for his opinion. State v. Duell, 175 W.Va. 233, 332 S.E.2d 246 (1985). As the questioning of Dr. Wyatt began to encompass particular instances of abuse, the prosecution raised the concern that such hearsay evidence should be admissible only for a limited purpose. The lower court sustained the prosecution's objection, [5] and Dr. Wyatt subsequently testified concerning the general nature of the comments by the Appellant regarding her relationship with Mr. Brown. Thus, the lower court did not preclude Dr. Wyatt from testifying regarding the factual underpinnings of his conclusions. The court simply noted that any hearsay evidence which was encompassed therein was being introduced only for the limited purpose of allowing Dr. Wyatt to educate the jury regarding the foundations for his medical conclusions. This same type of exchange transpired regarding medical records, and the lower court noted that such hearsay evidence could not be used as direct evidence of Mr. Brown's abusive behavior, but could be used to build the foundation for Dr. Wyatt's conclusions. We have consistently maintained that rulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely within the sound discretion of a trial court. In syllabus point two of State v. Franklin, 191 W.Va. 727, 448 S.E.2d 158 (1994), we explained: `The action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such action amounts to an abuse of discretion.' Syllabus Point 10, State v. Huffman, 141 W.Va. 55, 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955). Syl. pt. 4, State v. Ashcraft, 172 W.Va. 640, 309 S.E.2d 600 (1983). [E]videntiary decisions of a trial court are entitled to substantial deference. McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229, 235 n. 5, 455 S.E.2d 788, 794 n. 5 (1995) We have previously permitted introduction of evidence regarding the battered spouse syndrome, and the lower court in the present case admitted substantial evidence on this issue offered by the Appellant. In syllabus point five of State v. Steele, 178 W.Va. 330, 359 S.E.2d 558 (1987), for instance, we held that [e]xpert testimony can be utilized to explain the psychological basis for the battered woman's syndrome and to offer an opinion that the defendant meets the requisite profile of the syndrome. [6] Conferring the right of introduction of evidence upon a defendant, however, does not translate into authority to engage in an unlimited foray into the issue. The court still possesses the right to limit the testimony; when it becomes duplicative, the court may refuse to accept additional witnesses. Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. See State v. Ludwick, 197 W.Va. 70, 475 S.E.2d 70 (1996); State v. Brown, 179 W.Va. 681, 371 S.E.2d 609 (1988). The lower court in the present case exercised its right to limit testimony in that manner. We find no clear error in the lower court's decisions regarding admissibility of evidence, and we therefore affirm those decisions.