Opinion ID: 3064166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jenkins

Text: 12 Jenkins raises two issues on appeal: (1) the district court erred in determining that the government had presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for distributing crack cocaine on October 3, 2005, which was Count 6 of the indictment; and (2) the district court erred by holding that it did not have the authority to consider the cocaine base versus powder cocaine disparity at sentencing.
Relying on United States v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d 551 (11th Cir. 1990), Jenkins argues that the government presented insufficient evidence to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Count 6. He argues that the government presented no evidence that he knew that Dell was delivering cocaine to Henry on October 3, 2005, because it merely presented CS Myron Drayton’s testimony of the following sequence of events: (1) Drayton met with Henry at the Pit, where they discussed a crack purchase; (2) Henry then met with Dell alone; (3) Dell and Jenkins left the Pit and returned; (4) Dell met again with Henry; and (5) Henry delivered crack cocaine to Drayton. Jenkins argues that the evidence shows that Dell left the Pit to obtain cocaine that Henry supplied to Drayton, but not that Jenkins knew that Dell intended to do so. 13 We review de novo a district court’s denial of a properly preserved motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Byrd, 403 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005). We “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices drawn in the government’s favor.” Id. “‘A conviction must be upheld unless the jury could not have found the defendant guilty under any reasonable construction of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999)). To sustain the conviction under § 841, the government must have proven, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, that Jenkins knowingly distributed five grams or more of crack cocaine. See United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 139192 (11th Cir. 1989); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Section 2 “provides that anyone who ‘aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures’ the commission of an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal for the offense.” Hamblin, 911 F.2d at 551. “To prove aiding and abetting, the government must demonstrate that a substantive offense was committed, that the defendant associated himself with the criminal venture, and that he committed some act which furthered the crime,” and “the government must show that the defendant shared the same unlawful intent as the actual perpetrator.” Id. 14 In Hamblin, we reversed a defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) when the government failed to present evidence that the defendant knew that his codefendant was planning on bringing a weapon to a bank robbery. Hamblin, 911 F.2d at 551. With respect to a later robbery, however, we found that the jury reasonably could find that, based on the defendant’s knowledge of the use of the firearm in the original robbery, he knew his codefendant would use a firearm during the later robbery. Id. Because Jenkins was involved in his codefendants’ cocaine base distribution business for years before October 3, 2005, and had participated in a practically identical sale of crack cocaine before, the jury could infer that Jenkins knew that his codefendants were distributing crack cocaine when he participated in the delivery on October 3, 2005. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
Jenkins argues that, under Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), the district court erred by finding, at his sentencing hearing, that it was unable to consider the disparity between the guideline sentences for crack versus powder cocaine when sentencing him. We review the final sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness. United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 15 2005). In reviewing a sentence, we are required to “evaluate whether the sentence imposed by the district court fails to achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court stated that, when sentencing a party, “[t]he [district court] may determine . . . that . . . a within-Guidelines sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing.” 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 564. The Supreme Court further held that “it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes.” Id. at __, 128 S.Ct. at 576. We since have held that remand of a case for limited re-sentencing, “to permit the district court to reconsider the § 3553(a) factors in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Kimbrough,” is necessary when the district court failed to consider the disparity between the guideline sentences for crack versus powder cocaine because it “concluded that it lacked authority to consider the crack/powder sentencing disparity in reaching an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Stratton, 519 F.3d 1305, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2008). 16 Because the district court ruled that it was unable to consider the sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine cases when imposing sentence on Jenkins based on our precedent that since has been overruled, we vacate and remand Jenkins’s case to the district court for limited re-sentencing.