Opinion ID: 2902089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Butler’s Atkins Claim

Text: Butler’s habeas petitions before the state and federal courts argue he cannot be executed because he has an intellectual disability. In Atkins, “the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of [intellectually disabled] persons,” but it “le[ft] to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences.” Maldonado v. Thaler, 625 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317). In Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals followed the AAMR’s (now AAIDD’s) definition 6 and “require[d] three elements for a finding of [intellectual disability]: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (generally, a full-scale IQ score of 70 or below); (2) deficits in adaptive functioning; and (3) onset before age 18.” Maldonado, 625 F.3d at 233 (citing Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7)). As explained below, we hold Butler has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it was unreasonable for the TCCA to conclude that he lacks the required adaptive functioning deficits. See Matamoros, 783 F.3d at 6 Although some states set their intellectual disability criteria by statute, Texas has not done so. However, Briseno found the AAMR’s (now AAIDD’s) definition similar to that in Texas Health & Safety Code § 591.003(13), now codified at § 591.003(7-a): “‘Intellectual disability’ means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003(7-a) (West Supp. 2014); Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6–8. Briseno adopted this definition for Texas, in conjunction with a separate list of factors courts should consider when making adaptive behavior findings. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7–8. 10 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 216 & n.2; Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7. We therefore need not and do not reach whether Butler has shown the TCCA was also unreasonable in finding he lacks the required intellectual functioning deficits. See, e.g., Henderson v. Stephens, 791 F.3d 567, 580 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Maldonado, 625 F.3d at 233 (citing Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7)).
The State argues in passing that we “should consider the Rule 60(b)(6) issue abandoned by Butler” because he “failed to brief the Rule 60(b)(6) issue” in supplemental briefing. We conclude the matter is adequately briefed, and we proceed to the merits.
The Texas Health and Safety Code defines adaptive behavior as “the effectiveness with or degree to which a person meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of the person’s age and cultural group.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003(1) (West 2010). Finding significant limitations in adaptive functioning is one of the three criteria a petitioner must meet to show intellectual disability under Atkins in Texas. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6–7. The trial court found that Butler failed to show deficits in adaptive behavior. The TCCA denied Butler’s Atkins claim “[b]ased upon the trial court’s findings and conclusions and [its] own review.” Ex parte Butler, 416 S.W.3d at 864. Butler argues the finding of the TCCA and trial court was unreasonable on multiple grounds. Primarily, Butler asserts that Dr. Denkowski’s opinions on intellectual functioning and dubious practices tainted the trial court’s determination of adaptive functioning. According to Butler, this influence led the trial court to make that determination against established scientific principles by: “fail[ing] to (a) examine both strengths and limitations, (b) consider[ing] and [giving] 11 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 overriding weight to a few examples of atypical behavior by Mr. Butler rather than focusing on his typical behavior, and (c) consider[ing] his criminal behaviors as showing adaptive strengths.” In Butler’s view, Atkins and Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), mandate that courts closely follow established scientific and clinical principles when making findings on adaptive function, and the trial court did not do so when it disregarded the Vineland Adaptive Behavior test of Butler’s adaptive skills given by Dr. Denis Keyes, Butler’s expert. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990, 1995 (holding Florida’s mandatory cutoff at an IQ score of 70 for considering a petitioner’s claim for intellectual disability “disregard[ed] established medical practice”). Butler contends that the trial court exacerbated this error by disregarding testimony from Butler’s friends and family about his adaptive limitations, influenced by Dr. Denkowski’s belief that this testimony is not reliable. Even excluding Dr. Denkowski’s testimony on our own review of the evidence, see Matamoros, 783 F.3d at 220, we conclude that we cannot grant relief with respect to the trial court’s methods in examining Butler’s strengths and limitations, considering his criminal behaviors, or relying on the Briseno factors. Neither Atkins nor Hall mandates that courts scrupulously follow clinical guidelines. Instead, the Supreme Court allows states to set their own definitions of intellectual disability. The TCCA has set the standard for Texas by adopting the definition of intellectual disability from the AAIDD, Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7, and by enumerating seven additional factors for courts to consider, see id. at 8–9. 7 7 The factors are: “[1] Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was [intellectually disabled] at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination? [2] Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct impulsive? [3] Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others? [4] Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially 12 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 We have explicitly addressed arguments attacking the Briseno factors as insufficiently tied to clinical standards, even after Hall was decided, holding: Unlike the [IQ-score] cutoff at issue in Hall, the Briseno factors do not conflict with Atkins. . . . Atkins says nothing about what kind of evidence should be considered when determining whether a defendant’s significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning meaningfully limits his adaptive functioning. That question has been left explicitly to the states, and the definition adopted by Texas in Briseno, including the Briseno factors, in no way departs from any of the Court’s pronouncements. Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 218–19 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 318), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 951 (2015). Therefore, the trial court permissibly relied on factors enumerated by Briseno and approved by this court in making findings regarding Butler’s adaptive functioning. See, e.g., Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9; Matamoros, 783 F.3d at 218 & n.6 (noting that the Briseno factors have been criticized as “lack[ing] a scientific basis” but upholding their use, as this court has “previously held that Briseno is a constitutionally permissible interpretation and application of Atkins”). This includes its consideration of Butler’s adaptive strengths alongside his limitations. See Henderson, 791 F.3d at 586 (“Under Briseno, the TCCA was free to weigh all of the evidence, not just the evidence of [the petitioner’s] limitations and [his] expert witness’s testimony, in making its factual determination . . . .”); Williams v. Quarterman, 293 F. App’x 298, 313–14 (5th Cir. 2008) 8 (noting courts may consider adaptive strengths in this analysis and finding no clear acceptable? [5] Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject? [6] Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests? [7] Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?” Id. at 8–9. 8 Although Williams is not “controlling precedent,” it “may be [cited as] persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4). 13 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 error in the district court’s finding of no significant adaptive limitations (citing Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 2006)). Briseno also approved consideration of a person’s criminal behavior in examining adaptive functioning limitations, and we have said that practice does not contravene Atkins or Hall. See generally Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 347 & n.1, 349 (5th Cir. 2011); Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9. Finally, even if we disagreed with the focus of the trial court on some evidence over other evidence or might have made different credibility determinations and findings, that disagreement would not be sufficient to grant habeas relief as to the TCCA’s ultimate rejection of Butler’s petition absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary of its factual findings. See Kinsel v. Cain, 647 F.3d 265, 270 & nn.18– 19 (5th Cir. 2011) (“recognizing that credibility determinations in particular are entitled to a strong presumption of correctness” and that a petitioner must show they were erroneous by clear and convincing evidence (citing Pippin v. Dretke, 434 F.3d 782, 792 (5th Cir. 2005) and Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340). 9
In an attempt to proffer such clear and convincing evidence, Butler seeks to discredit several areas of the trial court’s findings as tainted by Dr. Denkowski’s influence. In other cases involving Dr. Denkowski, we have attempted to set aside Dr. Denkowski’s problematic influence by disregarding his testimony and examining whether, on the rest of the evidence, a petitioner 9 The same applies to the trial court’s rejection of the Vineland exam results. Although the trial court relied in part on Dr. Denkowski’s testimony to reject Dr. Keyes’s interpretation of those results, it also relied on its finding that Dr. Keyes was not credible and on Dr. Keyes’s own comment that Butler’s score on the exam was “spuriously low.” Thus, as Butler suggests, we will consider the information Butler’s friends provided to Dr. Keyes during interviews for the exam, but we do not find clear and convincing evidence in this record that the trial court unreasonably disregarded Dr. Keyes’s interpretation of the results of the Vineland exam. See Kinsel, 647 F.3d at 270. 14 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 15 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 met their burden to show the state court’s determination was unreasonable. See, e.g., Maldonado, 625 F.3d at 236 (“[The petitioner] is not entitled to habeas relief because even disregarding [Dr. Denkowski’s] testimony, he cannot meet his burden . . . .”); Matamoros, 783 F.3d at 220. In Matamoros, we took a twopronged approach. First, we held that we would view the TCCA as the relevant decision maker, excising some of Dr. Denkowski’s influence because the TCCA “explicitly stated that it relied [on] . . . [its] own review” in denying the state habeas petition. Matamoros, 783 F.3d at 220 (citation omitted). Second, in the alternative, we specified that we reviewed “the state court’s decision, not the written opinion explaining that decision.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Maldonado, 625 F.3d at 239. In Matamoros, this approach led us to “conduct our own review of the evidence (excluding Dr. Denkowski’s testimony) and determine whether [the petitioner showed] clearly and convincingly that the [TCCA’s] decision—that [petitioner] did not meet his burden of proof—was unreasonable.” 783 F.3d at 220. We will follow the same approach in this case. In this case, as in Matamoros, the TCCA “den[ied] relief” based both upon the trial court’s findings “and [its] own review.” Ex Parte Butler, 416 S.W.3d at 864. Additionally, on reconsideration, given Dr. Denkowski’s censure, the trial court found that Butler failed to show intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence, “even absent the testimony elicited by Dr. George Denkowski during the habeas proceedings.” Id. at 881 (Price, J., dissenting). As highlighted by the TCCA’s dissenting justices, the trial court in the Trial Court’s 2012 Order gave a disturbingly cursory consideration to the new information about Dr. Denkowski and seemed to continue to rely on his discredited methods. 10 Id. at 880–81 (Price, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 10Id. at 880 (Price, J., dissenting) (noting the trial court reportedly “simply announced from the bench that it would not reconsider its Atkins ruling,” invited the State to submit a 15 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 Trial Court’s 2012 Order as “an only-slightly-reworked version of the original” 2007 Order that did little more than delete the word “credible” before descriptions of Dr. Denkowski’s testimony, such that “[n]either the amendments themselves nor the process by which they were made inspire confidence”). While we do not countenance the trial court’s conduct on remand, we conclude that—even without Dr. Denkowski’s testimony—Butler has not met his AEDPA burden with respect to adaptive functions. 11 (b) Findings Regarding Adaptive Behavior Skill Areas In the Trial Court’s 2007 and 2012 Orders, it found that Butler lacks the required adaptive functioning deficits after considering the Briseno factors and the AAIDD definition of intellectual disability and based on testimony from Dr. Denkowski, Dr. Denis Keyes (Butler’s expert), and Butler’s friends and family members. The TCCA affirmed the Trial Court’s 2012 Order, so that is the decision we review. In making its adaptive function findings, the trial court relied primarily on testimony from Butler’s friends and family about his habits, actions, and adaptive abilities, as well as on observations of Butler during the investigation of his crimes, during his trials, and in prison. Those findings inherently involved credibility determinations and assessments of live witnesses, which Butler can only overcome in this court by showing clear and convincing evidence that those determinations were erroneous. See Kinsel, 647 F.3d at 270. He has failed to meet that burden. The record reveals considerable evidence, discounting Dr. Denkowski, on both sides of the new set of proposed facts and conclusions, did not invite Butler to do the same, and signed the State’s proposed facts and conclusions as its new order, “without a single change”). 11 Although we have thoroughly reviewed the evidence in the record, we will not attempt to summarize it in full here. We will only refer to portions of it as necessary. 16 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 17 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 equation. In light of this conflicting evidence, we do not find clear and convincing evidence that the TCCA’s determination was unreasonable. Following Briseno’s approach, the trial court analyzed Butler’s level of adaptive functioning based on the AAMR diagnostic manual’s definition of adaptive behavior deficits as existing “when an individual has significant limitations in at least two of ten skill areas.” The ten skill areas include “communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, selfdirection, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work.” Matamoros, 783 F.3d at 217 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3). 12 The trial court found strengths in each of these areas that support the TCCA’s decision. In functional academics, the trial court found that Butler subscribed to publications to read in his prison cell and was able to read, write, and order items from the prison commissary without exceeding his balance. Butler communicated proficiently when he confessed to police officers and when he testified in court, he read the newspaper and kept clippings about his crimes, and he gave orders to his victims during the robberies, joked with his fiancée, and effectively explained his absence from duty in the National Guard. Regarding social skills, community use, and self-direction, the trial court found Butler spent time helping elderly neighbors and children, dated and became engaged after a long-term relationship, was described by his fiancée as a “class clown” who was “tender, soothing, and made [her] laugh,” and was previously described by his father as “a normal, active, and trustworthy man.” Butler also 12 See also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 76–77, 81 (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter “AAMR Manual”]; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 49 (rev. 4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter “DSM-IV”] (endorsing the two-of-ten subcategories adaptive functioning framework under its diagnostic criteria for what was then referred to as mental retardation). 17 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 18 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 possessed and drove a car as a teenager and was able to understand and follow traffic rules. Butler sought out jobs and completed basic training in the National Guard, which the trial court found involves “listening to and following instructions, learning how to fire, clean, assemble and dissemble a firearm, keeping one’s uniform orderly, and keeping one’s bunk area clean and neat.” Butler planned and carried out schemes through his crimes, and he avoided capture by watching the news and changing out his license plate to avoid detection. In his daily life, the trial court found Butler could heat up his own meals, drive to and from work and other places, and care for himself in a confinement setting with health care and personal care items found in his cell. Evidence before the trial court also suggested limitations in Butler’s adaptive functioning, but it does not clearly and convincingly outweigh the evidence that Butler lacks the deficits required by Atkins and Briseno. For example, friends and family members reported that Butler had difficulty managing money, including skills like opening a bank account, budgeting, checking for change following a purchase, paying bills, and balancing a checkbook. Butler demonstrated little knowledge of dictionaries and encyclopedias in high school and scored poorly in a class involving life skills and finances. Friends often ordered food for him at restaurants and helped him to apply for jobs and find lodging, transportation, and furniture. Friends and family members said they often had to explain things to Butler repeatedly before he understood. A speech and language pathologist testified that Butler’s testimony at another trial was similar to that of an 8-to-10-year-old child with language impairments and “consistent with the speech of an adult with intellectual disability.” Witnesses described Butler as a shy, withdrawn follower who was made fun of in school, could not play sports because he could not comprehend the rules or strategy, avoided conflicts because he could not 18 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 19 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 resolve them, and had difficulty comprehending jokes and romantic commitments. The trial court questioned the credibility of some of the witnesses; in any event, the evidence in support of Butler’s adaptive function claims was not sufficient to overcome the evidence against those claims in light of the deferential standard we apply. In short, we have little doubt that the Trial Court’s 2007 and 2012 Orders were weakened by reliance on Dr. Denkowski’s testimony. But excising that testimony—and findings dependent on it—leaves behind evidence that supports the TCCA’s finding that Butler lacks significant deficits in adaptive functioning. Under AEDPA, Butler has not met his burden to show the TCCA’s decision to dismiss his Atkins claim was unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Matamoros, 783 F.3d at 220. (c) Briseno’s Constitutionality after Brumfield v. Cain Butler urges in supplemental briefing that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brumfield v. Cain supports a rejection or more careful scrutiny of the Briseno factors in favor of a more clinical approach. See 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2280–82 (2015) (citing clinical standards and disagreeing with a state habeas court’s reliance on considerations similar to the Briseno factors to deny the petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing). Butler attacks each of the Briseno factors as lacking any basis in clinical standards, instead being based on unscientific evidence submitted in the underlying state habeas case in Briseno. The factors do not accurately capture whether an individual is intellectually disabled, Butler avers, because they “begin with a false dichotomy” between intellectual disability and a personality disorder, which is an unscientific assumption. The Supreme Court in Brumfield did not indicate a rejection of the Briseno factors as a whole. The Court simply disagreed with the application of 19 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 20 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 certain similar considerations in that case, which prevented a petitioner from receiving an evidentiary Atkins hearing when there was at least some indication he might have an intellectual disability. Id. at 2281 (observing it was “critical to remember” that to obtain an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner “was not obligated to show that he was intellectually disabled, or even that he would likely be able to prove as much,” only that he could “raise a reasonable doubt as to his intellectual disability” (citation omitted)). As we recently held in Henderson, Brumfield “does not cast any doubt on the constitutionality of the Briseno standard. Unlike the petitioner in Brumfield, [Butler] had an evidentiary hearing at which he presented expert testimony and other evidence in support of his Atkins claim.” 791 F.3d at 586. We hold that under Brumfield, as before, Butler has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the TCCA was unreasonable to find that he lacks the required adaptive functioning deficits. This is fatal to his Atkins claim; therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial and dismissal of Butler’s Atkins claim. See Butler, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 827.