Opinion ID: 1218109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: extraordinary dereliction in production of transcript

Text: The first issue before us in this case is whether the State was extraordinarily derelict in producing the appellant's trial transcript, thereby entitling the appellant to acquittal of his first degree murder charge, or, in the alternative, a new trial. The appellant contends that he has been denied his right to an appeal and due process of law because the trial transcript of his second trial was not completed until approximately two years after the completion of his trial. He contends that this delay in the production of his trial transcript is tantamount to a complete denial of the transcript. The State, on the other hand, maintains that the appellant has failed to provide the necessary record to determine the appellant's allegations of extraordinary dereliction. The State further asserts that this claim would be more appropriately raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. It is fundamental that due process requires the State to afford a defendant a trial transcript upon timely request. See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnson v. McKenzie, 159 W.Va. 795, 800, 226 S.E.2d 721, 724 (1976). The standard which this Court has adopted to determine if a defendant has been denied due process with respect to his right regarding appeal is whether there has been extraordinary dereliction on the part of the State in production of the trial transcript as determined by the particular facts of the individual case. State v. Pettigrew, 168 W.Va. 299, 303, 284 S.E.2d 370, 373 (1981); Rhodes v. Leverette, 160 W.Va. 781, 793, 239 S.E.2d 136, 144 (1977). In syllabus point 6 of Rhodes, we elaborated on what may constitute extraordinary dereliction: Factors to be considered in determining whether there has been extraordinary dereliction are: the clarity and diligence with which the relator has moved to assert his right of appeal; the length of time that has been served on the underlying sentence measured against the time remaining to be served; whether prior writs have been filed or granted involving the right of appeal; and the related question of whether resentencing has occurred in order to extend the appeal period. While extraordinary dereliction on the part of the State does not require a showing of malice or ill will, certainly if such is shown it would be a significant factor. Accord, syl. pt. 3, State v. Pettigrew, 168 W.Va. 299, 284 S.E.2d 370 (1981). In applying the above factors to the facts in the case now before us, we conclude that the State has not been so extraordinarily derelict as to justify the setting aside of the appellant's conviction. Although it is apparent from the record that the appellant clearly asserted his right of appeal at the outset, and further pursued his claim by filing a writ of habeas corpus with this Court, a consideration of the remaining factors in Rhodes mitigates against the granting of the requested relief. The appellant has served minimal time on his life sentence. [4] This can be contrasted sharply to the circumstances found in Johnson v. McKenzie, 160 W.Va. 385, 386-87, 235 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1977), in which the Court granted an unconditional discharge of a prisoner who had served just three months short of his minimum sentence. See also State v. Pettigrew, 168 W.Va. at 304, 284 S.E.2d at 374. We are aware that the appellant has been resentenced in order to extend his time for appeal, but under the facts of this case, are of the opinion that the State's action does not constitute extraordinary dereliction. The delay in the completion of the trial transcript was the result of a number of circumstances peculiar to the case before us, namely the change of venue in the case and the voluminous size of the transcript itself, none of which circumstances evidenced any malice or ill will on the part of the State. Although a defendant should not be made to suffer from the exercise of his right to seek a change of venue, some problems of delay were attributable to practical problems of court administration resulting from the change of venue. See State ex rel. Mastrian v. Tahash, 277 Minn. 309, 311, 152 N.W.2d 786, 788 (1967). Certainly another problem was the sheer volume of the transcripts from both of the appellant's trials, which undoubtedly required a considerable amount of time for transcription. In light of the above and again noting the absence of any evidence of malice or ill will on the part of the State resulting in the delay in producing the transcript, we cannot say that the appellant has been deprived of any due process rights. In State v. Pettigrew, 168 W.Va. at 305, 284 S.E.2d at 374, we quoted approvingly the Minnesota Supreme Court's language in State ex rel. Mastrian v. Tahash, 277 Minn. 309, 312-13, 152 N.W.2d 786, 789 (1967), a habeas corpus proceeding, in which there had been a three-year delay in furnishing a transcript: Although, as we have said, the delay encountered by relator was unfortunate, we cannot say that it was unreasonable or oppressive in a constitutional sense. Whether or not his rights were grounded on either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment, those rights are necessarily relative and are consistent with delays that are neither purposeful nor oppressive. Moreover, even if we were to say that relator's constitutional rights were infringed by this delay, the remedy is in correction of the error and not in the reversal of his conviction or his discharge from confinement. What relator rightly seeks is adequate and effective appellate review upon the merits of his original conviction and that he will now have. (citations omitted)