Opinion ID: 2586219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standard for Evaluating Post-conviction Counsel

Text: Having determined that there exists a limited statutory right to post-conviction counsel in Colorado, the next question is what standard of performance should be applied to such counsel. The court of appeals below held that a defendant bears the risk . . . for all attorney errors made in the course of representation. Silva, 131 P.3d at 1090 ( quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). However, we disagree and adopt the Strickland standard for evaluating the effectiveness of post-conviction counsel. Strickland v. Washington created a two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims which places the burden on the defendant to show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Strickland test has been adopted explicitly by this court not only for trial counsel but also for appellate counsel. People v. Valdez, 789 P.2d 406 (Colo.1990). In Valdez, this court held that the purpose of the Strickland test was to ensure that at all critical stages of the adjudicative process a criminal defendant represented by counsel is in fact represented by an attorney of sufficient quality to ensure that the process itself is fundamentally fair. 789 P.2d at 410. Therefore, the test was well-suited for appellate as well as trial settings. Id. We have also indicated in dicta that the test may be equally well-suited to evaluate post-conviction counsel. Breaman, 939 P.2d at 1351. Furthermore, several other states have also adopted the Strickland standard to ensure that their state post-conviction process is fundamentally fair for indigent defendants. See Schertz v. State, 380 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1985); Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006); Commonwealth v. Priovolos, 552 Pa. 364, 715 A.2d 420 (1998); Iovieno v. Comm'r of Corr., 242 Conn. 689, 699 A.2d 1003 (1997). In its decision below, the court of appeals specifically rejected the Strickland standard for post-conviction counsel because the remedy under Strickland requires another post-conviction proceeding. The court feared that this would lead to the spectre of post-conviction proceedings ad infinitum. Silva, 131 P.3d at 1088 (internal citations omitted). As a result, the court adopted an agency theory which placed the risk of any poor performance by post-conviction counsel on the defendant. [5] Id. An agency theory, however, places no requirements on post-conviction counsel to provide even a modicum of effective assistance. As the United States Supreme Court stated, a party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). For that reason, post-conviction counsel must at least be minimally effective in order to give any meaning to the limited statutory right to post-conviction counsel discussed above. The Strickland two-pronged test has well-developed case law to aid in evaluating the minimal effectiveness of counsel. Because of this case law, Strickland can be easily applied to post-conviction counsel as well. Furthermore, the adoption of the Strickland test does not lead to infinite post-conviction proceedings. Under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV), the court is only required to hold further proceedings if the defendant's Crim. P. 35(c) motion has merit. The court can still deny a defendant's subsequent Crim. P. 35(c) motion without further briefing or a hearing if the defendant fails to show that he or she is entitled to relief under 35(c). Therefore, we hold that the Strickland test is the appropriate measure for ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claims.