Opinion ID: 2602167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: brookside's rejection of prospective buyer

Text: ¶ 28 In his cross-petition Peebles argues that the court of appeals erred in upholding the jury's finding that Brookside did not unreasonably withhold approval of Southworth's residency in the Park. The Residency Act requires that approval of a prospective buyer of a mobile home may not be unreasonably withheld. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(4)(2000). Peebles asserts that Brookside's withholding of approval was per se unreasonable as Brookside refused to meet with Southworth to allow her to fill out a residency application. ¶ 29 We find no error in the court of appeals' ruling on this issue. The court of appeals used the correct standard of review in addressing this issue: `[W]e view the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict, and assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment. . . . [W]e will upset a jury verdict only upon a showing that the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the [cross] appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the outcome of the case.' Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2000 UT App 314, ¶ 37, 14 P.3d 105 (quoting Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah 1996)). ¶ 30 In appealing the jury verdict, the Peebles have failed to properly marshal all evidence supporting the jury verdict and explain how, in spite of this evidence, the jury verdict should be overturned. See, e.g., Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998) ([T]he one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. (citations omitted)). The Peebles argue that because the Residency Act requires that approval of prospective purchasers may not be unreasonably withheld, § 57-16-4(4), a refusal to meet with or accept an application from a prospective resident violates the Residency Act as a matter of law. The Peebles further argue that Brookside's refusal to meet with Southworth is the only evidence they need to marshal to overturn the jury's verdict. We do not agree. ¶ 31 The Peebles do not adequately address evidence in the record that Brookside had allowed Southworth to begin the application process by sending a credit report to the Park and that the Park had looked at the report. Alan Glover, the owner of the Park, testified that he had seen Southworth's credit report and that it could not verify Southworth's income and employment, two items which were very important in considering rental applications. While the Peebles argue that Southworth was prepared to discuss and explain her credit report deficiencies, they do not address evidence suggesting that Southworth's testimony could have been disbelieved by the jury. As the court of appeals noted, the jury was free to disbelieve [Southworth] and to believe Brookside's witnesses to the contrary. Brookside, 2000 UT App 314 at ¶ 38, 14 P.3d 105. ¶ 32 Despite the Peebles' efforts to have us hold otherwise, this review does not require us to determine the parameters of what is reasonable for purposes of section 57-16-4(4) of the Residency Act. The fact that the jury found that Brookside's withholding of approval was reasonable, and that this finding is supported by some evidence, is enough to permit us to uphold the jury verdict. See Billings, 918 P.2d at 467-68. By failing to marshal this evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency, the Peebles have failed to meet their marshaling burden. See Child, 972 P.2d at 433. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' holding on this issue.