Opinion ID: 1483627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Due Process Satisfied

Text: In Brown, we held that [a] probationer accused of violation is not entitled to a trial in any strict or formal sense; his entitlement in this regard is limited to `an inquiry so fitted in its range to the needs of the occasion as to justify the conclusion that discretion has not been abused by the failure of the [inquisitor] to carry the probe deeper.' [26] We conclude that if a criminal trial results in an acquittal, due process under the United States Constitution permits the same judge who presided at that criminal trial to consider the same evidence at a subsequent VOP hearing involving the same conduct. [27] We reach that conclusion because the testimony and evidence at any prior trial has already been presented with all of the substantive and procedural constitutional due process protections that are guaranteed in a criminal proceeding. We also reaffirm our holding in Gibbs. Due process requires that the State provide the probationer with counsel [w]hen a violation of probation hearing follows an acquittal after a criminal trial for the same alleged conduct. [28] In addition, in the event that the probationer is not represented by the same attorney who assisted him at the prior criminal trial and the same judge wants to rely on that evidence, due process requires the new attorney to be provided with, and given a reasonable opportunity to review, a transcript of the prior criminal trial, to decide how best to represent the probationer at the subsequent VOP hearing. Here, Cruz was represented at the probation hearing by the same attorney who had successfully represented him at the criminal trial. When the same judge stated that he would consider the sworn testimony and evidence from the prior criminal trial, Cruz's attorney did not object and did not ask for a continuance. The record reflects that the testimony and other evidence presented at Cruz's prior criminal trial was sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Cruz had violated the terms of his probation by possessing cocaine and MDMA. Cruz, who had the assistance of the same counsel at the VOP hearing, has shown no prejudice from the same judge's failure to require the State to present the same evidence that was introduced at the criminal trial a week earlier. Moreover, Cruz disregards the fact that the trial judge was presented with the uncontradicted evidence that Cruz had fled to Texas after his arrest on the new criminal charges, and that a capias had been issued after Cruz failed to appear for a VOP hearing scheduled for July 11, 2007. Those latter facts alone would have been sufficient to warrant revocation of Cruz's probation. [29] Therefore, we hold that Cruz has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating plain error.