Opinion ID: 42481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insufficient evidence for jury question

Text: For a public employee to sustain a retaliation claim for protected speech under the First Amendment, the employee must show, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) her speech is on a matter of public concern; (2) her free speech interest outweighed her employer’s interest in promoting efficient public services; and (3) her speech played a “substantial part” in the employer’s decision to 6 discharge her. Anderson v. Burke County, Ga., 239 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001). The County concedes the first two factors, but disputes the third factor. As to that factor, this Court has stated “‘it is neither possible nor desirable to fashion a single standard for determining when an employee has met her initial burden of demonstrating that a retaliatory intent was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating factor’ behind a government employment decision.’” Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Rather, a court must examine the record as a whole to ascertain whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude her protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in the decision to terminate her. Id. “The plaintiff’s burden in this regard is not a heavy one.” Id. In Stanley, this Court identified several relevant factors to consider, including: (1) the temporal proximity between the termination and the protected activity; (2) whether any reasons for the termination were pretextual; (3) whether any comments made, or actions taken, by the employer indicate the discharge was related to the protected speech; (4) whether the asserted reason for the discharge varied; and (5) any circumstantial evidence of causation, including such facts as who initiated any internal investigations or termination proceedings, whether there is evidence of management hostility to the speech in question, or whether the 7 employer had a motive to retaliate. Id. at 1291 n.20. “There is no one factor that is outcome determinative, but all factors must be taken into account.” Id. As to temporal proximity, we have inferred causation “[w]here termination closely follows protected activity.” Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 745 (11th Cir. 1996). However, we have rejected any per se rule as to the length of time necessary to create such an inference. See Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, Fla., 58 F.3d 1554, 1566–67 (11th Cir. 1995). In Stanley, 219 F.3d at 1291–92, we refused to grant such an inference where there was almost a four-year gap between the protected speech and the employee’s termination. There was a one-year gap between Kamensky’s protected speech and Dean’s initial staff analysis, an eighteen-month gap between her protected speech and his initial reorganization proposal, and over a two-year gap between her protected speech and her ultimate termination. As in Stanley, Kamensky cannot show an inference of causation from temporal proximity. As to pretext, Dean offered one primary reason for Kamensky’s termination, the reorganization of the ITS department, but also referred to a second reason, her poor performance. Kamensky offered no evidence to demonstrate these reasons were pretextual. Rather, uncontroverted evidence indicated Dean presented his reorganization plan based on a staff analysis he performed after receiving an 8 operational analysis from an outside firm. Moreover, Dean testified as to Kamensky’s unsatisfactory performance, and Kamensky admitted she had performance problems. As to the other Stanley factors, Kamensky offered no evidence any comments were made, by anyone, indicating her termination was related to her protected speech, and Dean expressly denied he made any such comments. As to specific actions, Kamensky testified Dean reduced her responsibilities and gave her a substandard evaluation after she expressed concerns about the Boston trip. However, Kamensky also admitted that, prior to and during this time, her work performance suffered. Moreover, Kamensky did not offer any evidence Dean confronted her about her protected speech, failed to notify her of his reorganization plan, failed to follow departmental policy, reprimanded her, or singled her out in his plan. Rather, Dean testified he followed departmental policy, notified her of his plan, advised her to apply for a new position, would have hired her had she applied, and recommended reclassification of another employee’s, Deborah Scarborough’s, position in his plan. Kamensky also failed to introduce any evidence Dean’s asserted reasons for her termination ever varied. 9 Lastly, Kamensky failed to introduce sufficient circumstantial evidence of causation. Although it is undisputed Dean initiated the reorganization plan ultimately leading to Kamensky’s termination, Kamensky offered no evidence these actions had anything to do with her speech. More importantly, Kamensky offered no evidence of management hostility towards her speech, nor did she provide any evidence Dean had a motive to retaliate against her. For instance, she offered no evidence Dean came under scrutiny or otherwise suffered because of her protected speech. We conclude Kamensky has failed to show her speech was a motivating factor in her termination.