Opinion ID: 775317
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appraisal of Robinson's Claim Under the FSIA

Text: 42 The Government of Malaysia is indisputably a sovereign foreign state. It is thus entitled to immunity unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. Cargill Int'l, 991 F.2d at 1016 (citations omitted). It submitted evidence to the district court bearing on the jurisdictional issue. Robinson responded with evidence of his own. 14 We cannot tell from the brief order of the district court, however, whether it dismissed the complaint on the basis of the allegations in the complaint alone or on the basis of undisputed facts or the resolution of issues of fact. We need not return the case to the district court for clarification, however, because we conclude (i) that the allegations in the complaint, taken as true, do not allege a tortious act or omission required to sustain jurisdiction under the FSIA, and (ii) even if the broad allegations could be read sufficiently to allege a non- discretionary tort, Robinson has not met his burden of going forward with evidence together with any undisputed facts showing that under [the non-discretionary torts] exception[] to the FSIA, immunity should not be granted.... Id. (citation omitted). 43
44 We must first inquire whether Robinson pleaded or came forward with evidence sufficient to show that his claim is for a tortious act or omission caused by the Malaysian government. 45 1. New York common law. Under New York law, a landowner must maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568 (1976); Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 437, 354 N.E.2d 794, 795, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (1976). But that duty of care extends only to reasonably foreseeable accidents. See Basso, 40 N.Y.2d at 241-42, 352 N.E.2d at 872-73, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568. In the specific context of a building undergoing construction by independent contractors, this means that unless the owner created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of the condition for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, the owner should have corrected it, the owner owes no duty of care with respect to defective condition[s]. Richardson v. Simone, 275 A.D.2d 576, 576, 712 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (3d Dep't 2000); see also Goodman v. 78 W. 47th St. Corp., 253 A.D.2d 384, 677 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1st Dep't 1998) (holding that the owner of property who retained an independent contractor did not owe any non-delegable duty of care to the plaintiff, who had slipped and fallen on the adjoining sidewalk). The only exceptions to this general absence of a common law duty of care on the part of owners are (i) for negligent hiring or supervision, (ii) for work that is inherently dangerous, and (iii) where the employer bears a specific non-delegable duty. Goodman, 253 A.D.2d at 386, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 119. 46 Robinson's complaint alleges that his injuries were caused by the recklessness, carelessness and negligence of the [Malaysian government] in the ownership, operation, maintenance and control of the premises 313 East 43rd Street, New York, New York. Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 11. The complaint does not allege nor is there evidence to suggest that the Malaysian government or any of its employees or agents left the white substance on which Robinson alleges he slipped on the floor of the premises. Indeed, both parties assume that one of the contractors, Howell or Walsh, did. And the complaint does not allege that the Malaysian government in any relevant sense employed either of these third parties. 47 Furthermore, there is neither an allegation nor evidence in the record that indicates that the Malaysian government had actual or constructive notice of the condition. And neither the allegations nor the evidence suggests that the Malaysian government engaged in negligent hiring or exercised supervisory control over Walsh or Howell, that construction at the premises was inherently dangerous, or that the Malaysian government breached a specific non-delegable duty to Robinson thereby causing his injury. 48 The sole duty that Robinson alleges Malaysia breached is that of a landowner to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition, free from dangerous and hazardous conditions for all persons lawfully thereat.... Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 8. The proper question at the jurisdictional threshold is whether this claim is cognizable as a tortious act or omission caused by the Malaysian government under New York law. Under the principles of New York law outlined above, it is not. 49 Finally on this score, we note that the conclusory nature of Robinson's allegations alone would give us pause before we would allow them to sustain jurisdiction. See Zappia, 215 F.3d at 253 (finding, on appeal from a Rule 12(b)(1) motion under the FSIA, conclusory allegations in the plaintiff's affidavit insufficient to sustain jurisdiction); accord Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 536-37 (5th Cir. 1992) (We would not allow such generalized... allegations against an American government entity [under the FTCA] to provoke massive discovery.... It is unimaginable that FSIA would authorize broader exposure to suit of a foreign government instrumentality....) (citations omitted); see also Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., 148 F.3d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing to allow conclusory non-fact-specific jurisdictional allegations to permit the plaintiff to obtain extensive discovery on that issue). To sustain federal jurisdiction on generic allegations of negligence... caused by a dangerous and defective condition, Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 10, absent an assertion or evidence of a factual predicate for such jurisdiction, would invite plaintiffs to circumvent the jurisdictional hurdle of the FSIA by inserting vague and conclusory allegations of tortious conduct in their complaints -- and then to rely on the federal courts to conclude that some conceivable non-discretionary tortious act falls within the purview of these generic allegations under the applicable substantive law. This is at odds with the goal of the FSIA to enable a foreign government to obtain an early dismissal when the substance of the claim against it does not support jurisdiction. 50 We therefore hold that Robinson has neither pleaded nor come forward with evidence sufficient to show that his claim is for a tortious act or omission caused by the Malaysian government. 51 2. New York labor law. On appeal, Robinson also invokes New York Labor Law §§ 200(1) and 241(6). 15 As far as we can tell, this theory was not raised before the district court. In the absence of manifest injustice, we will not hear such an assertion. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v Consulate General of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d 152, 162 (2d Cir. 2000), and section IV of this opinion, below. 16
52 Because we conclude that Robinson's claim is not for a tortious act or omission caused by the Malaysian government, a jurisdictional prerequisite, we affirm the district court's dismissal on that basis. We do not reach the question of whether the alleged conduct of the Malaysian government was discretionary for purposes of the FSIA.