Opinion ID: 2173929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: construction of the d.c. probation act

Text: The District of Columbia Probation Act, presently D.C.Code 1973, § 16-710, provides the Superior Court with the following authority: In criminal cases in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the court may, upon conviction, suspend the imposition of sentence or impose sentence and suspend the execution thereof, for such time and upon such terms as it deems best, if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public and of the defendant would be served thereby. In each case of the imposition of sentence and the suspension of the execution thereof, the court may place the defendant on probation. . . . We must first look at the language of the statute by itself to see if the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning. United States v. Young, D.C.App., 376 A.2d 809 (1977). The words of the statute should be construed according to their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them. United States v. Thompson, D.C.App., 347 A.2d 581 (1975). The statute allows the court, where granting probation, to impose sentence and suspend the execution thereof. The ordinary sense and meaning of these words is that the commencement of service of sentence may be held in abeyance. The words do not mean the service of sentence may begin, stop, and perhaps begin again. The for such time phrase modifies the length of time of the suspension and not the length of the time in jail to be suspended. The statute contains no reference to suspending a part of the sentence. On its face, therefore, the statute does not appear to allow split sentences. Despite the above, resort to legislative history may still be appropriate. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, `[W]ords are inexact tools at best and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how clear the words may appear on `superficial examination.'' Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479, 63 S.Ct. 361, 87 L.Ed. 497 (1943) (citations omitted). Citizens Association of Georgetown, et al. v. Zoning Commission of the District of Columbia, et al., D.C.App., 392 A.2d 1027 (1978) (en banc). Moreover, [w]hether or not the words of a statute are clear is not always clear. Sanker v. United States, supra at 307, quoting Barbee v. United States, 392 F.2d 532, 535 n. 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935, 88 S.Ct. 1849, 20 L.Ed.2d 855 (1968). Where the words of a statute are ambiguous, the judiciary may properly use the legislative history to reach a conclusion. Sanker v. United States, supra at 307, quoting United States v. Public Utilities Commission, 345 U.S. 295, 315, 73 S.Ct. 706, 97 L.Ed. 1020 (1953). It is apparent from the legislative history of the D.C. Probation Act that Congress was not contemplating split sentences when the Act was passed and gave no such authority to either the federal or local court in 1910. Since the language of the present Act is substantially the same as the 1910 Act with respect to any grant of authority to split a sentence, the legislative policy embodied in the original act carries forward into the present Act and we may construe the original and new versions of the Act together. 2 A Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 51.02 at 290 (4th ed. 1973). The original version of D.C.Code 1973, § 16-710, provided that the court shall have power . . . after the imposition of sentence . . . but before commitment . . . to place the defendant upon probation and  may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence, as the case may be, for such time and upon such terms as it may deem best and place the defendant in charge of a probation officer. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 433, 36 Stat. 864 (emphasis added). Thus, if the court suspended the execution of the sentence, it also was to place the defendant in charge of a probation officer (may suspend and . . place). Ziegler v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 71 A.2d 618 (1950). The language also suggests that the suspension of the execution of sentence and the placing in charge of a probation officer was to occur at the same time; the defendant was to be under the charge of the probation officer and on probation at the very time of suspensionnot after any interval of time. Of course, if the defendant must immediately be placed on probation, there could be no split sentence. While the present language of the Act is a bit different, there have been no amendments to change the substance of the above quoted language with respect to the suspension of the execution of sentence and the placing of one on probation. [4] In addition to the original act, we may consider the committee reports as part of the legislative history. F.T.C. v. Manager, Retail Credit, Miami Branch, 169 U.S. App.D.C. 271, 515 F.2d 988 (1975); American Airlines v. C.A.B., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 365 F.2d 939 (1966). The House and Senate reports to this legislation make it clear that the intent of Congress was to allow the courts to suspend the whole sentence, thus granting probation which takes effect immediately. The House Report suggests immediate probation: The principle underlying a probation system is found in the laws of many of the States, where it is permissible to suspend sentence, permitting the defendant to go at large, but to be subject to rearrest and punishment if he should violate the order of the court in that respect. [H.R.Rep. No.1016, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1910).] The Senate report explains probation and parole in the following terms: Probation, in the sense of this act, is a form of qualified freedom granted to persons who have been convicted of violating the law, after sentence has been imposed and before commitment to prison. Parole, in the sense of this act, is a form of qualified freedom granted to persons who have been convicted of violating the law and have entered upon their sentence by going to prison. In both cases the offender is under the regular watch of an officer of the probation commission or board of parole. After fulfilling the requirements of the commission during a period of supervision fixed by that body the offender may be given full freedom. [S.Rep.No.79, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1910) (emphasis added).] The first sentence of the above passage, read alone, is unclear as to whether the probation or just the granting of probation is to occur before commitment. But, the first sentence, when read with the rest of the passage, shows that probation occurs before commitment. Later in the same report, it becomes abundantly clear that Congress was neither contemplating nor authorizing split sentences: The chief purpose for which this probation and parole system is proposed is to save the character of these citizens. . . In taking his first lawless step, the unfortunate may very easily have only responded to bad external influences, to surroundings which are little more than temptations to vice. Arrest, arraignment, trial, and conviction are in the proven experiences of the courts often punishment enough. If the prisoner can be taken in hand at the moment the sentence is pronounced, it is entirely reasonable to expect that in many cases the shame and degradation of his position may be a lever to turn him permanently away from further crime. Probation provides the means for taking advantage of this opening. Parole comes into use in those cases where a period of confinement behind bars is thought to be needed in addition to the experience of trial. [S.Rep. 79, supra at 5 (emphasis added).] Thus, what we refer to today as a split sentencetime in jail on one count, followed by release under supervisioncould only be accomplished within the parole system and not by way of probation. While the legislative history of the D.C. Probation Act clears up any question about the statute, the close relationship of the D.C. statute and the federal statute make a consideration of the federal scheme useful. Indeed, this court has previously recognized that D.C.Code 1973, § 16-710, is substantially the same as the federal provision regarding offenses against the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970). Moore v. United States, D.C.App., 387 A.2d 714, 716 (1978). See Sanker, supra at 310 n. 7.