Opinion ID: 1351510
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Rape-murder Special Circumstance

Text: (29) Defendant contends we must reverse the rape-murder special-circumstance finding because there was insufficient evidence that defendant killed Mrs. Hunter in order to facilitate or advance the rape. He argues the evidence demonstrates at best that he went to the victim's home to rob her, commenced beating her when she began screaming, and then decided to rape her as an afterthought after he saw her lying on the floor. Thus, he reasons, there was insufficient evidence that he killed Mrs. Hunter in order to advance an independent felonious purpose with respect to the rape. The pertinent statutory language requires proof that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in ... the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit the following felonies: ... [¶] (iii) Rape in violation of Section 261. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) In People v. Green [(1980)] 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], a case in which the `felony murder' special circumstance of the 1977 death penalty law was construed, this court held that the special circumstance was inapplicable to cases in which the defendant intended to commit murder and only incidentally committed one of the specified felonies while doing so. We explained in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279], however, that when the defendant has an independent purpose for the commission of the felony, and it is not simply incidental to the intended murder, Green is inapplicable. ( People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 608 [268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127]; see generally People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 499-503 [244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803].) The evidence here supports the inference that after defendant raped the victim, he realized she could identify him since he lived just down the street from her, and therefore killed her to prevent her identification of him as her assailant. Indeed this was precisely the theory of the case which the prosecutor presented to the jury in closing argument, [14] and the jury was properly instructed on the law in this regard. [15] We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the rape-murder special circumstance consistent with the rule in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].