Opinion ID: 782716
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Previously Controlling Second Circuit Case Law

Text: 29 UNITE next argues that because Buckhannon did not specifically rule on the propriety of awarding attorney's fees to a FOIA plaintiff who had not obtained judicially sanctioned relief, Second Circuit law approving of such awards in FOIA cases controls this appeal, and requires reversal. UNITE is correct that prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon, a judgment [was] not an absolute prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees under FOIA's fee-shifting provision. Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513. UNITE is also correct that, as a general rule, one panel of this Court cannot overrule a prior decision of another panel. See, e.g., United States v. King, 276 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir.2002). We have recognized, however, that an exception to this general rule arises where there has been an intervening Supreme Court decision that casts doubt on our controlling precedent. See, e.g., Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir.1979). As one of our recent decisions acknowledges, for this exception to apply, the intervening decision need not address the precise issue already decided by our Court. Cf. Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 783-86 (2d Cir.2002) (re-evaluating a prior holding of this Court on the record-access provision of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1), in light of an intervening Supreme Court decision that overruled an earlier Second Circuit decision concerning a different non-disclosure provision of FERPA). We believe that Buckhannon 's rejection of the catalyst theory and its reasoning supporting that rejection are sufficiently broad to support the conclusion we reach today, our prior holding in Vermont Low Income notwithstanding. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 457 (Because Buckhannon controls, the existing law of our circuit must give way.). 30 UNITE contends that construing Buckhannon to preclude fee awards under the catalyst theory in FOIA actions, even though Buckhannon addressed only the fee provisions of the ADA and FHAA, implies a slavish subordination of our judgment to the will of higher-court judges. (Citing Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990) at 226). UNITE maintains that resolution of the question before us should rest on an independent analysis of Buckhannon 's application to FOIA based on statutory language, history, and purpose. We agree, and we believe that our holding today is the result not just of the Supreme Court's recent decision, but also of (1) our examination of the judicial landscape surrounding the award of attorney's fees in general, see, e.g., Kasza, 325 F.3d at 1180, and (2) our independent consideration of FOIA's legislative history. Our assessment of this body of law is undoubtedly affected by Buckhannon, a decision in which the Supreme Court disagreed with almost every circuit that had considered the catalyst theory. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 621, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (Scalia, J., concurring) (acknowledging majority opinion's disagreement with a `clear majority' of the Circuits); see also id. at 602 n. 3, 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. However, our assessment here is also consistent with other decisions addressing the catalyst theory in cases involving fee-shifting provisions not considered in Buckhannon. See, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 456-57; Crabill, 259 F.3d at 667 (Posner, J. ) (suggesting that Buckhannon applies to the fee provision contained in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t). 31