Opinion ID: 2978945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Williamson County Defendants

Text: Rooker-Feldman disposes of the majority of claims against the Williamson County defendants. Several miscellaneous allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint do not fit neatly under this 7 This argument actually goes to the heart of Guffee’s alternative defense, judicial immunity. Reguli attempts to import that framework into a Rooker-Feldman analysis. Plaintiffs are correct that a judicial officer can be found liable for damages if he has acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). However, “the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge. A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Id. at 356. Even under judicial immunity, this challenge would likely fail, since Guffee did not act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 8 Plaintiffs also allege that the “Williamson County Juvenile Court” violated their constitutional rights by incarcerating YKR without an appearance bond on three occasions and twice denying YKR the right to visit or communicate with her parent “in violation of the Rules of the Juvenile Court.” (Amen. Compl. ¶ 83). Plaintiffs offer no support for the proposition that these acts are constitutional violations, nor do they even specify what constitutional right was violated. rubric and must be addressed separately. All of these claims were dismissed on Defendants’ motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and must therefore be reviewed de novo. Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs make several allegations against defendant Martin, a youth services officer of the juvenile court. They allege that Martin “denied due process of the mother” by stating falsely in a phone call the purpose of the August 4th hearing and by presenting evidence “without regard for the due process of the Mother and YKR.” (Amen. Compl. ¶ 74). The phone call from Martin simply does not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, inasmuch as conveying incorrect information about the purpose of the August 4, 2008 hearing did not rise to the level of a due process violation. Reguli eventually appeared and was given a further opportunity to bring YKR to court. She refused, and at that point, the body attachment on YKR was issued. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not asserted in their complaint how this alleged falsehood by Martin created a constitutional injury. The second allegation against Martin, presenting evidence before the referee, is shielded by the doctrine of absolute immunity, which covers “testimony or recommendations given in court.” Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 776 (6th Cir. 2000). This principle also covers the alleged conduct of defendants Bennett and Rounsavall. Those two employees had merely filed petitions in court proceedings, core prosecutorial functions and undoubtedly subject to absolute immunity. In Holloway, this Court held that “social workers are absolutely immune only when they are acting in their capacity as legal advocates – initiating court actions or testifying under oath.” Id. at 775. The allegations against Martin involve his testimony under oath, and the allegations against Bennett and Rounsavall involve their initiation of court proceedings. The final Williamson County defendant is Coffey who entered the school of VRR to investigate the abuse allegations. The claim is not cognizable because the daughter interrogated by Coffey at the school is not a plaintiff in this case. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the questioning of this daughter as an illegal search and seizure. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that “the Mother of a minor child has standing to bring this action as a violation of her (Mother’s) constitutional right of privacy and her right to parent.” (Pls. Br. at 31). The complaint, however, alleges an illegal search and seizure, and Plaintiffs cannot change their theory on appeal. On the merits, Plaintiffs cite no case law indicating that questioning a daughter in school where allegations of abuse have occurred constitutes a constitutional violation. See Williams v. Pollard, 44 F.3d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that two and one-half hour interview of minor child without notifying parent “did not violate a federally protected right”). II. Department of Children’s Services Defendants Defendants Schneider and Spann’s motion to dismiss was granted by the district court on the basis of absolute and qualified immunity. “Whether a defendant is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a legal question that this Court reviews de novo.” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009). Schneider and Spann were employees of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. Agency officials who “perform functions analogous to a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity.” Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)). In Kurzawa, the Court granted absolute immunity to a psychologist and two psychiatrists whose findings following an examination of a minor child “are used by the Department of Social Services and the Michigan courts to determine what environment best serves the interests of the child.” Kurzawa, 732 F.2d at 1458. These actions contrast with the actions of social workers that were not entitled to immunity in Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1989). In that case, social workers were not granted absolute immunity where their actions were “only investigatory or administrative in nature, not prosecutorial, judicial or otherwise intimately related to the judicial process.” Id. at 830. Schneider and Spann emphasize that their actions were “intimately involved in the judicial process.” Id; Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2001). Undoubtedly, some of the accusations against the DCS employees were based on activities that were “intimately involved in the judicial process.” The complaint asserts that when Reguli failed to sign a safety plan, Spann called a judge to request emergency removal of the Reguli children. The complaint also challenges testimony by the DCS defendants before the referee and refers to an in-court interview with the children at the direction of the referee. These acts are entitled to absolute immunity, as is evident from the case relied on by Plaintiffs, Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2000). In Holloway, the Court found that a social worker was not entitled to absolute immunity where her actions were not “testimony or recommendations given in court concerning the children’s best interests as she saw the matter.” Id. at 776. The vast majority of the allegations against Schneider and Spann, however, deal with actions directly related to the court proceedings for which they should be entitled to absolute immunity. The district court found that all the allegations against Schneider and Spann were barred by absolute immunity. We believe that several claims are outside the ambit of actions intimately involved in the judicial process. First, Spann appeared at the home of the Mother to “investigate” YKR’s abuse allegations. Second, both Schneider and Spann threatened removal of the children if Reguli refused to participate in the interview process. These actions, however, are protected by qualified immunity. Plaintiffs cannot “simply identify a clearly established right in the abstract and allege that the defendant has violated it. Instead, the plaintiff must show a substantial correspondence between the conduct in question and prior law allegedly establishing the defendant’s actions were clearly prohibited.” Hughes v. City of North Olmsted, 93 F.3d 238, 241 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have made no such showing, and it is not clear what constitutional rights Schneider and Spann allegedly violated. Plaintiffs make an additional argument that the allegations of abuse by YKR, who was adjudged delinquent in part because she lied to her mother, were not sufficiently “reasonable” to trigger DCS involvement. Reguli’s argument invites us to take the position that a statement by a teenager of abuse is not “reasonable” grounds for starting an investigation merely because the teen has been known to lie about other matters. We do not accept the invitation. The alleged victim made the accusation, and it is preposterous to argue that the agency cannot begin an investigation based on a teenager’s accusations. DCS undoubtedly had a right to begin an investigation, and this Court has previously granted qualified immunity for much more intrusive actions taken by similar agencies. See, e.g., Williams v. Pollard, 44 F.3d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that “it is objectively reasonable for a social worker receiving an abuse referral from school officials to believe that interviewing the child . . . without notifying the parents did not violate a federally protected right”).