Opinion ID: 1374533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the closing argument by the prosecutor constituted reversible error.

Text: Reversible error occurs [w]hen the appellate court is unable to say from the record before it whether the defendant would or would not have been convicted but for  the error committed in the trial court, then the error may not be deemed harmless, and the defendant's right to a fair trial requires that the verdict be set aside and that he be granted a new trial. State v. Martin, 73 Wn.2d 616, 627, 440 P.2d 429 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1081 (1969). The responsibility of the prosecutor in the matter of a fair trial is referred to in People v. Fielding (1899), 158 N.Y. 542, 547, 53 N.E. 497, 46 L.R.A. 641, in these words: Language which might be permitted to counsel in summing up a civil action cannot with propriety be used by a public prosecutor, who is a quasi -judicial officer, representing the People of the state, and presumed to act impartially in the interest only of justice. If he lays aside the impartiality that should characterize his official action to become a heated partisan, and by vituperation of the prisoner and appeals to prejudice seeks to procure a conviction at all hazards, he ceases to properly represent the public interest, which demands no victim, and asks no conviction through the aid of passion, sympathy or resentment. State v. Reed, 102 Wn.2d 140, 146-47, 684 P.2d 699 (1984). [6] A defendant is denied a fair trial if there was a `substantial likelihood' that the comments affected the jury. Reed, at 145. The defendant states that the prosecutor argued that the defense had manufactured a defense and tried to point the finger elsewhere. This argument is in answer to the defendant's assertion that someone else had committed the crime. The prosecutor also commented about the reliability of the grocery store manager. Such comments were fair argument. The defendant asserts that it was unfair of the prosecutor to point his finger at him. However, the defendant was identified independently. The defendant's objections to the other statements of the prosecutor about the evidence presented, we find to have been fair comment and nonprejudicial. The conviction is affirmed. DOLLIVER, C.J., and DORE, PEARSON, ANDERSEN, GOODLOE, and DURHAM, JJ., concur.  BRACHTENBACH, J. (concurring) While I concur with the result, I am concerned about the failure to recognize a serious issue which the majority does not treat adequately. The speedy trial question and a claimed violation of CrR 8.3 are intertwined. Snohomish County law enforcement authorities knew for almost 2 months the precise location of the defendant. Yet no arraignment or any other Snohomish County proceedings were undertaken. The majority apparently holds that the knowledge of its law enforcement officials cannot be imputed to the State. The majority focuses solely upon the knowledge of the prosecutor. No analysis or authority is cited for the proposition that the actual knowledge of law enforcement authorities is not of relevance in determining this issue. This record contains neither sufficient facts nor briefing on what could be a pivotal issue, therefore I would affirm; the majority seems to foreclose the issue. The question should remain subject to further scrutiny in an appropriate case. UTTER, J., concurs with BRACHTENBACH, J.