Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery of Garrison's Psychiatric Records

Text: The primary witness against defendant was Mark Garrison. Defendant contends the trial court's failure to grant him access to Garrison's psychiatric records in order to impeach him at trial violated several of defendant's constitutional rights.
After Garrison contacted the police and volunteered information inculpating himself in the then unsolved 1982 robbery and murder at Barry's Chevron, Attorney Peter Goldscheider was assigned to represent Garrison. Garrison's apparent mental instability led the trial court to appoint Dr. Alfred Fricke, a clinical psychologist, to examine Garrison and determine whether he was competent to stand trial. In a report dated January 31, 1988, Dr. Fricke found Garrison in the throes of a psychotic decompensation and thus incompetent to stand trial. Another appointed expert, Dr. Paul Roller, came to the same conclusion. Garrison was later sent to Chope Hospital for treatment after suffering injuries when another inmate attacked him. On his return to the county jail, Garrison was examined by Dr. George Wilkinson, a psychiatrist associated with Forensic Mental Health Services, a division of the county mental health system that provided mental health services for inmates housed at the San Mateo County jail. Dr. Fricke reevaluated Garrison a few months later and concluded that, with the intervening treatment and medication, Garrison was now sane and competent to stand trial. Garrison then entered into a plea bargain in which he pleaded guilty to first degree murder, was sentenced to a term of 30 years to life in prison, and agreed to testify against defendant. Prior to trial, defendant sought discovery of the records of Dr. Fricke, Dr. Wilkinson and Chope Hospital, generally seeking [a]ll charts, test results, documents, records, memoranda, reports, etc., however recorded, which materials advert to, relate to, pertain to, reflect upon, and otherwise describe the psychiatric and emotional condition of Mark Anthony Garrison. Garrison, through his attorney, Goldscheider, opposed disclosure of the records, claiming they were privileged under the psychotherapist-patient privilege. (Evid.Code, § 1014.) In addition, Goldscheider informed the court that because he had hired both Dr. Fricke and Dr. Wilkinson as defense experts, any documents supporting their diagnoses were also privileged under the attorney-client privilege. ( Id., § 954.) The trial judge took the matter under submission. At a later hearing, Goldscheider formally objected to disclosure of the Chope Hospital records on grounds of psychotherapist-patient privilege, and to disclosure of any records involving Dr. Fricke on both psychotherapist-patient and attorney-client privilege grounds, as well as on grounds of work product. The trial court announced that defendant, through his counsel's declaration in support of the subpoena, had established good cause, and it accordingly would examine in camera Garrison's psychiatric records held by the Peninsula Psychiatric Associates (with whom Dr. Fricke was associated) and Chope Hospital. Goldscheider strenuously objected, claiming there was no authority permitting the court to examine material privileged under the attorney-client privilege, even in camera. When the trial court commented that a point in favor of disclosure was that Garrison's case was already final, Goldscheider disagreed, explaining that Garrison's plea bargain permitted the People to reopen the case if new evidence of his guilt developed. The prosecutor confirmed that Garrison's plea bargain contain[s] a specific condition that if independent evidence is developed showing [he is] the actual killer ... that plea could be set aside and both sides return to the status quo [ante]. The prosecutor, however, asserted that the district attorney's office was prepared to offer use immunity to Garrison, promising not to use information contained in the challenged psychiatric records to reopen Garrison's case or otherwise subject him to further prosecution. The matter was continued at Goldscheider's request to permit him to do further research. The trial court returned to the issue on August 14, 1989. As to the records of Dr. Fricke and Dr. Wilkinson, the court found they were covered by the attorney-client privilege. Rejecting defendant's contention his Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights justified examining the Fricke and Wilkinson records in camera, the trial court held no in camera examination of such records was authorized. The court explained that defendant would have an adequate opportunity to impeach Garrison by exploring the terms of Garrison's plea bargain. As to the records from Chope Hospital, where Garrison had been sent for treatment following an inmate's assault, the court found those records were covered only by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, not by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court informed the parties that it accordingly had examined the Chope Hospital records in camera, but had found no disclosable evidence. Defendant argued that even though Goldscheider had hired Dr. Fricke and Dr. Wilkinson, thereby implicating the attorney-client privilege, the two doctors had examined Garrison by court appointment pursuant to sections 1367 and 1368 to determine Garrison's competence to stand trial. As a result, he argued, any records produced in conjunction with that appointment could not be privileged. After hearing further argument, the court agreed that any work done by Dr. Fricke pursuant to court appointment and preceding his employment by Goldscheider also was potentially disclosable. Whether Dr. Wilkinson had examined Garrison pursuant to a section 1367/1368 appointment was unclear. Although there was some dispute, the court determined that Dr. Wilkinson had been hired by Goldscheider as a defense expert for Garrison in November 1987, that Dr. Wilkinson had examined Garrison in January 1988 in his capacity as a psychiatrist with San Mateo County Forensic Mental Health Services, and that he had never examined Garrison prior to being retained by Goldscheider. In addition, the trial court had appointed Dr. Wilkinson (at Goldscheider's request) to examine Garrison for competency pursuant to sections 1367 and 1368. At a later hearing, Douglas Gray, an attorney in court representing Goldscheider, Dr. Fricke and Dr. Wilkinson, conceded that any psychiatric work undertaken pursuant to sections 1367 and 1368 would not be privileged. Gray stated his belief that Dr. Wilkinson had never examined Garrison pursuant to court appointment under sections 1367 and 1368, but that he may have examined Garrison in his capacity as the psychiatrist on call for Forensic Mental Health Services. This examination might have occurred sometime after Dr. Wilkinson was hired by Goldscheider. The trial court expressed a tentative view that any material flowing from Dr. Wilkinson's contact with Garrison in Wilkinson's capacity as a representative of Forensic Mental Health Services would fall outside the attorney-client privilege, but would be within the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Defendant unsuccessfully sought review of the trial court's decision in the Court of Appeal. Defense counsel later urged the trial court to review its earlier decision finding no disclosable evidence in Garrison's Chope Hospital records. The trial court agreed and released a few pages that indicated a nurse had noted that Garrison's memory, insight and judgment seemed impaired. The next day, Gray appeared and represented that he had combed through Dr. Fricke's notes and reports and segregated those materials associated with Dr. Fricke's examination and diagnosis of Garrison in connection with the section 1367/1368 hearingwhich were disclosableand those that were associated with Dr. Fricke's employment as an expert hired by Goldscheider, which were not. The court made arrangements for defense counsel to obtain copies of the disclosable material. At a subsequent foundational hearing, the trial court reaffirmed its ruling that material generated by Dr. Fricke in connection with his court appointment and the determination of Garrison's competency to stand trial were disclosable, but that anything else was the product of Dr. Fricke's employment as a defense expert and was thus privileged. At a foundational hearing to determine what part, if any, of Dr. Wilkinson's notes was potentially disclosable, Attorney Chris Motley appeared from the county counsel's office, representing Dr. Wilkinson in his capacity as an employee of Forensic Mental Health Services. Motley had Dr. Wilkinson's reports and other material associated with services provided to Garrison by Forensic Mental Health Services. The trial court reviewed the material in camera, considered its relevance, and concluded that, on balance, defendant's right to a fair trial and his need fairly to impeach Garrison outweighed the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The court ordered almost all the material in Forensic Mental Health Services' records disclosed, with the exception of a recent report concerning some trivial matters. Included in the material disclosed were reports by Dr. Wilkinson and two other psychiatrists, Dr. Sayed Hamed and Dr. Aldo Lubrano, and a clinical psychologist, Dr. Richard Hayward. The reports indicated, among other things, that Garrison suffered from episodes of auditory hallucinations and paranoid delusions, but that, with medication, these symptoms diminished. Dr. Wilkinson testified before the jury later that day. He explained that he had examined Garrison, at the suggestion of Dr. Hayward, after Garrison had experienced problems with other inmates, reported hearing voices in his head, and seemed confused and disorganized. Dr. Hayward had examined Garrison at Chope Hospital's psychiatric emergency room, where Garrison had been sent after a fight with another inmate, and had started him on a small dose of Ativan, a mild tranquilizer. Garrison was then returned to the county jail, where Dr. Wilkinson examined him the next day and found that he had difficulty organizing his thoughts and seemed to lose his train of thought. Garrison also reported hearing voices in his head and experiencing paranoid delusions, usually that people in the jail were going to harm him. Dr. Wilkinson suspected Garrison was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, and Garrison agreed to begin taking the antipsychotic drug, Navane, in addition to his Ativan. He later switched to the antipsychotic drug, Haldol. After taking the medication, Garrison reported that he was not hearing voices any more, although he seemed more delusional. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited from Dr. Wilkinson the opinion that Garrison appeared honest, although he qualified that opinion by explaining that he was talking about honesty or dishonesty as a conscious voluntary behavior, not the type of disordered responses he might get when Garrison was psychotic. One of the delusions from which Garrison suffered was that he would miraculously be released from jail. Dr. Wilkinson also admitted that it was difficult to conclude Garrison was suffering from paranoid delusions because he had in fact been actually harmed by another inmate, receiving second degree burns when the inmate threw hot water in his face. He also got into fights while in jail. Following Dr. Wilkinson's testimony, the trial judge stated he was satisfied with his ruling on the privilege question because of the amount of mental health material defense counsel was able to place in the record to impeach Garrison's credibility. Defendant then called Dr. Fricke to the stand. Fricke affirmed he had been appointed by the court to examine Garrison for competence to stand trial. He had interviewed Garrison on December 24, 1987, and submitted a report dated January 31, 1988, concluding Garrison was incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Fricke explained that he had administered, or tried to administer, several psychological tests, the results of which indicated a severe mental disturbance. Reading from his report, Dr. Fricke concluded: Mr. Garrison was psychotic at the time of this evaluation. He was disoriented and showed significant confusion. He showed evidence of thought disorder both in process and in content. He also engaged in bizarre rituals involving hand movements and showed psychomotor retardation [i.e., abnormally slow body movement], was humorless, and spoke in monosyllables. He ... was perseverative [i.e., engaged in repetitive movements] and showed ... gross disorganization in thinking which is clearly a result of his mental state. At a subsequent evaluation in March 1988, Dr. Fricke reported that Garrison had improved significantly and was competent to stand trial.
By denying him full access to Garrison's psychiatric records, defendant claims the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.) [4] Of course, the mental illness or emotional instability of a witness can be relevant on the issue of credibility, and a witness may be cross-examined on that subject, if such illness affects the witness's ability to perceive, recall or describe the events in question. ( People v. Herring (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1072, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 213; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 608, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 (cone. opn. of Kennard, J.).) The trial court determined at the outset that some of the records defendant sought might be privileged by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. (Evid.Code, § 1014.) The court decided it should examine in camera those psychiatric records of Garrison's that were not additionally privileged from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. The court believed it should weigh the need for Garrison's privacy as a patient against defendant's right to cross-examine him to ensure a fair trial. In so ruling, the trial court relied on People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 223 Cal.Rptr. 139, which stated the prevailing rule at the time of defendant's trial. After defendant's trial, however, we disapproved Reber in People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986 ( Hammon. ) We explained in Hammon: The court in Reber believed the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment (U.S. Const, 6th Amend.), as interpreted in Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308 [94 S.Ct 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347] ..., required pretrial disclosure of privileged information when the defendant's need for the information outweighed the patient's interest in confidentiality. In authorizing disclosure before trial, however, Reber went farther than Davis required, with insufficient justification. ( Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1123, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986.) We explained that Davis v. Alaska addressed trial rights, not pretrial disclosure of information, and that a broader reading of Davis is called into question in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39 [107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40] which was handed down shortly after Reber, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 523 [223 Cal. Rptr. 139]. ( Hammon, supra, at p. 1124, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986.) There was no majority opinion in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie , but, after that case, it is not at all clear `whether or to what extent the confrontation or compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment grant pretrial discovery rights to the accused.' ( People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 517-518 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779]....) ( Hammon, supra, at p. 1126, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986.) Under Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1117, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986, psychiatric material is generally undiscoverable prior to trial. Defendant, then, received more discovery than he was legally entitled to, for he received the records generated by Dr. Fricke in connection with his examination of Garrison for competence (Evid.Code, § 1017, subd. (a)), [5] the Chope Hospital records, and those records of Dr. Wilkinson generated in connection with his treatment of Garrison at the San Mateo County jail. Defendant also received virtually all of Garrison's Forensic Mental Health Services records, and he fails to show how denial of access to the few records that were withheld prejudiced him. Despite the amount of psychiatric material the trial court disclosed with which defendant could impeach Garrison, defendant contends his constitutional confrontation rights were nevertheless violated because he was not given access to the material generated by Dr. Fricke and Dr. Wilkinson in connection with their employment by Attorney Goldscheider as defense experts for Garrison. Thus, for example, Dr. Fricke apparently generated some material from examinations of Garrison that were unrelated to the trial court's appointment. Similarly, Dr. Wilkinson apparently treated or examined Garrison at times unrelated to his role as a mental health professional who provided services to the San Mateo County jail. The trial court found those treatment records were privileged by the attorney-client privilege (Evid.Code, § 954) and thus not subject to in camera inspection or a balancing of their importance with defendant's interest in a fair trial. The trial court was correct. At the outset, we note that communications privileged by Evidence Code section 954 include confidential communications made by the client to a physician for the purpose of transmitting such information to the attorney. ( People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 510, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793; City & County of S.F. v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 237, 231 P.2d 26; 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Witnesses, § 122, pp. 378-379.) Thus, communications Garrison made to Dr. Fricke and Dr. Wilkinson in their capacity as defense experts hired by Goldscheider were fully privileged by the attorney-client privilege. Although it is unusual for a potential defendant in a murder case (Garrison) to hire as his own expert both the court-appointed mental health expert (Dr. Fricke) and the expert who has provided mental health services to jail inmates (Dr. Wilkinson), we cannot say on this record that such employment necessarily deprived defendant of his constitutional right to confront Garrison. Communications potentially can be privileged under both the psychotherapistpatient privilege and the attorney-client privilege, and even if the former privilege is waived or otherwise inoperative, the latter privilege will still operate to render the communication confidential and privileged. ( People v. Lines, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 513, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793.) Thus, the attorney-client privilege can apply here even though we conclude the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not apply by virtue of Evidence Code section 1017. The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications ( Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998) 524 U.S. 399, 403, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 141 L.Ed.2d 379) and is one which our judicial system has carefully safeguarded with only a few specific exceptions ( Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 886, 691 P.2d 642). We have held that a criminal defendant's right to due process does not entitle him to invade the attorney-client privilege of another. ( People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1228, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) To the extent defendant claims his right to confrontation or due process entitles him to gain access to the confidential communications between Garrison, his attorney, and his defense experts, he is thus mistaken. Moreover, even if defendant were entitled to disclosure of more psychiatric background material, any error in this regard was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the large amount of material already disclosed and made available to impeach Garrison. The jury was informed that Garrison was psychotic at the time he was arrested, that he was taking tranquilizing medication as well as antipsychotic medication, that he originally was found incompetent to stand trial, that he heard voices in his head (auditory hallucinations), that he was paranoid and believed inmates were intending to do him harm, that he engaged in unusual and repetitious hand movements, and that he was generally confused and disorganized in his thinking. The jury was also informed of the terms of Garrison's plea agreement with the prosecution and the incentive such agreement may have created to divert the majority of the blame for the crime towards defendant. We assume the jury considered these factors in reaching a decision on Garrison's credibility. We conclude any error in failing to disclose more of Garrison's psychiatric records was harmless. Defendant also contends the trial court's denial of full disclosure of Garrison's psychiatric records denied him a fair appeal. Although we have stressed the importance of an adequate record as one of the basic tools of an effective appeal ( In re Steven B. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 1, 8, 157 Cal.Rptr. 510, 598 P.2d 480; see generally Cal. Rules of Court, rule 39.51), that is not to conclude the record is inadequate unless the defendant obtains full disclosure of a third party's psychiatric records. As we have explained, defendant obtained the records underlying Dr. Fricke's competency examination of Garrison, Dr. Wilkinson's treatment records while the doctor worked for Forensic Mental Health Services, and the records from Chope Hospital. In light of this level of disclosure of potentially impeaching material, as well as other information (such as the terms of Garrison's plea agreement) with which defendant could have undermined Garrison's credibility, we disagree that the absence of even fuller disclosure created an insuperable barrier to meaningful appellate review. We have reviewed the sealed records in camera, and nothing contained therein alters our conclusion that further disclosure was not necessary to ensure defendant obtained a fair appeal.