Opinion ID: 170441
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Method of Determining Fee Amount

Text: Second, Appellant advances that attorney's fees awarded under § 1927 should be calculated by a lodestar method, which would limit the amount recoverable to the prevailing rate charged by local counsel. In support, he cites practice under several civil-rights fee-shifting statutes. See, e.g., Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1259 (10th Cir.2005) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 12205); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir.1983) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)), overruled on other grounds by Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S.Ct. 3078, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987). Several district courts have also used the lodestar method for calculating fees under § 1927. E.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs., Inc., 389 F.Supp.2d 443, 447 n. 4 (D.Conn.2005) (The lodestar method is applicable in assessing awards for attorneys fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 as it is when awarding fees under fee-shifting statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988.); Ricks v. Xerox Corp., No. 93-2545-JWL, 1995 WL 584444, at  1 (D.Kan. Sept. 29, 1995). The district court in this case rejected this argument, explaining that § 1927 refers to attorneys' fees reasonably incurred while the civil-rights statutes refer to a reasonable attorney's fee. App. 198. We would not so easily assign much importance to this variance in language. However, we have not found, nor have the parties shown us, any authority actually confronting the question whether § 1927 provides straight fee recovery or a lodestar-limited recovery. We hold that the choice belongs to the district court, in the exercise of its discretion, which method to apply in a given case. Section 1927, of course, limits recovery to fees  reasonably incurred. This does not only require a court to lop off hours unreasonably incurred: bringing in expensive out-of-town hired guns to respond to a frivolously multiplicative motion would not be reasonable, and in such a case using the lodestar method would be the better exercise of discretion. On the other hand, a party who has already been the victim of vexatious and dilatory tactics should not heedlessly be revictimized by requiring him to introduce evidence to establish the prevailing local rate for a certain type of litigation. Furthermore, the typical § 1927 situation will differ from the civil rights cases, where it is sensible to encourage litigants at the outset to select reasonably priced counsel. A § 1927 movant has already chosen his counselat what he ordinarily anticipates will be his own expenseand one who chose what he considered appropriate counsel should not be obliged to procure new, cheaper lawyers just to deal with a filing that is, after all, sanctionable. Finding nothing in the record to make us think applying the actual-fee method here was an abuse of the district court's wide discretion in matters of sanctions, we reject this claim of error.