Opinion ID: 1181055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Automatic Motion for Modification of the Death Verdict

Text: In every case in which a death penalty is returned, the judge must review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances ... and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reason for his findings. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) Defendant urges three grounds of error in the court's ruling on the automatic motion for modification of sentence. First, he contends that the content of a letter which the trial judge sent to the jurors  after they were discharged but prior to the hearing on the motion  reveals that the court had prejudged the merits of the motion, and could not thereafter render a fair and impartial decision. Second, he argues that the court's verbatim adoption of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by the prosecutor reflects a failure to exercise independent judgment in ruling on the motion. Finally, he contends the court improperly found lack of remorse as an aggravating factor in its findings on the motion. a. The Letter (48a) Several days after the jury returned its penalty verdict and was discharged, the trial judge sent the 12 jurors and 4 alternates a letter in which he praised the manner in which they had approached their task and obligations. He indicated his feeling that they were a credit to the criminal justice system, and explained: It was extremely difficult for me to express these thoughts to you upon your discharge. It was an emotional moment; we had spent many hours together and I now feel I must express my gratitude to you. He added:  Your decision is acceptable and shall be followed (italics added). It is this passage which, defendant urges, reveals that the court had prejudged the merits of the automatic motion for modification of his death sentence. At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel expressed concern that what was said in that letter would indicate in any way that the Court had made a decision prior to fully reviewing and hearing everything that was going to be said. The court responded: Thank you. The statement, [`]your decision is acceptable and shall be followed,['] is not indicative of the Court having made up its mind nor is it a statement that would forebear any statements, evidence, testimony that would be offered on behalf of Mr. Belmontes. [¶] I think the statement was made for therapeutic purpose more than a legal purpose (italics added). Counsel did not request the trial judge to recuse himself from hearing the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing the court reaffirmed that it had made an independent finding in affirming the jury's verdict of death. Subsequent to a jury's discharge, it is not improper to thank or praise the jurors for having dutifully served on the jury and conscientiously performed their functions. In a long and complex capital trial such as this was, it is understandable that the court might want to express gratitude to the jurors along these lines. The trial judge's communication to the jurors by letter here was plainly intended to convey such sentiment. However, at the time the court sent the letter, it had not yet fully performed its own functions and obligations under the mandate of section 190.4, subdivision (e). Judgment and sentence had yet to be imposed. The court's remark in the letter: Your decision is acceptable and shall be followed, was patently improper. The court must refrain from making any comment indicating that it cannot, or will not, perform its remaining obligations fairly and impartially under the law. Since the jury had performed its functions and properly been discharged, our concern here is not with the fact that the communication was made to the jurors, but with whether the remark establishes an inference that the court in fact had prejudged the merits of the motion, and therefore could not fairly and impartially perform its statutory obligations in ruling thereon. It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. (Evid. Code, § 664.) (49) `[I]n the absence of any contrary evidence, we are entitled to presume that the trial court ... properly followed established law.' [Citation]. ( Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 [141 Cal. Rptr. 133, 569 P.2d 727].) (48b) Considering the improper remark in the context of the letter in which it was made, together with the court's credible explanation that it was made for therapeutic purpose more than a legal purpose, we conclude defendant has not established that the trial judge ultimately failed to make the independent determination respecting the appropriateness of the penalty verdict, as he was obliged to do under section 190.4, subdivision (e). The court's thorough and detailed findings entered in the record reinforce our conclusion. b. The Findings (50) Prior to the hearing on the automatic motion, the prosecutor requested permission to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in opposition to modification of the death sentence. Defense counsel stated: I have no problem with it, but requested that he too be permitted to do the same. The prosecutor thereafter filed lengthy and detailed proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Defense counsel elected to file points and authorities in support of automatic modification of the death sentence. We find nothing improper in affording both defendant and the People the opportunity to file respective supporting and opposition memoranda in connection with the proceeding. Thoughtfully prepared documents of this type are of great assistance to a trial judge. It is clear from the record that the court relied extensively on the prosecutor's proposed written findings, incorporating whole portions of them almost verbatim into its own findings in the record. The record likewise reflects that the court did not rubber stamp the prosecutor's proposed findings of fact, refusing to subscribe to many of his overly conclusory proposals. For example, the prosecutor proposed that the court adopt the following findings: The defendant, while waiting in the victim's home and while talking to her, considered the alternatives available and decided to go through with the burglary, even though the victim was at home. By disabling the victim, he reasoned, the burglary could be completed unimpeded and by killing her, he decided, he would avoid identification as the perpetrator. The defendant knew from his conversations with Vasquez and the victim, that only Vasquez would be suspected. He knew that no one had seen him arrive at the home. He also knew he could hide out in Stockton or Southern California. Therefore, he concluded, the death of Steacy McConnell would eliminate the only person who could link him to the crime, except for his partners in the criminal enterprise, whom he counted on to maintain silence. These proposed findings of fact were riddled with conclusory inferences of defendant's state of mind; the court quite properly rejected them. The prosecutor proposed a finding that, upon alighting from the Chevy, Bolanos and Vasquez were able to hear the beating taking place inside. Although such was a fair inference to be drawn from the evidence, the court took pains to more accurately paraphrase the trial testimony, finding: As they were outside they were able to hear the sound of thumping taking place inside, according to Ballanos' [ sic ] testimony. The prosecutor also proposed that the court make a finding that after the crime, while in the car, [defendant] then stated that he had killed her to silence a witness. The court more accurately found that: He then stated he had to take out a witness. Our review of the court's detailed findings in the record convinces us that it fulfilled its statutory obligation to independently review the jury's verdict of death. c. Lack of Remorse (51) Defendant argues that the court improperly made a finding that his lack of remorse was an aggravating factor. The prosecutor proposed that the court find: [T]he defendant expressed no remorse of even the slightest degree pretrial, in his guilt phase testimony, in his penalty phase testimony, nor during his closing remarks to the jury at the penalty phase. The court instead made a finding that: The defendant did not express any remorse in the guilt phase of his testimony. In his penalty phase, however, he did indicate to some slight degree his concern for the victim. This finding was included in that portion of the overall findings discussing mitigating circumstances. For reasons already explained, we find that both the prosector, in his argument to the jury, and the trial court, in its own findings on the automatic motion for modification of sentence, did no more than suggest the inapplicability or insubstantial evidence of remorse as a mitigating factor. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 790.)