Opinion ID: 739321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of Leading Questions

Text: 29 Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing defense counsel continually to ask leading questions of Tessmer and Jabe. Appellant's argument is that even though the attorneys for the appellees were technically cross-examining Tessmer and Jabe, it was cross-examination in form only, not in substance. 30 Federal Rule of Evidence 611(c) provides: Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. The advisory committee notes to that rule provide additional guidance on the leading-questions issue: 31 The purpose of the qualification ordinarily is to furnish a basis for denying the use of leading questions when the cross-examination is cross-examination in form only and not in fact, as for example the cross examination of a party by his own counsel after being called by the opponent.... 32 FED.R.EVID. 611(c) Advisory Committee Notes. 33 In the present case, appellant called Tessmer and Jabe to the stand in her case-in-chief. Because they were adverse parties, leading questions were permitted on direct examination. And because what followed was technically cross-examination, the district court again allowed leading questions. To this end, the court stated, you can raise [the leading-question] objection, but there's nothing wrong at all with [defense counsel] standing up and cross examining witnesses which you call to the stand, and I intend to be sure, if he wants to, that he continues to do that. J.A. at 520. 34 It appears that the advisory committee notes were intended to address the precise factual situation in the present dispute. The notes suggest that a district court should be hesitant blindly to authorize the use of leading questions when it is cross-examination in form only. Appellant's argument, however, loses much of its force when the specific questions at issue are analyzed. It is elementary that a leading question is one that suggests an answer. See, e.g., 3 J ACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, p 611, at 611-77 (1996). Appellant points to one line of testimony involving Tessmer that, in her view, is particularly egregious. See Appellant's Br. at 39-40. Unfortunately for appellant, in this line of questioning, Tessmer responds to one of the questions by stating, I really don't know how to answer that, and he responds to another by stating I'm not quite sure I understand. Far from suggesting an answer to the witness, this particularly egregious line of questioning confused the witness such that he did not even know what the question was. Moreover, a district court's decision to allow leading questions when a party is cross-examining his own witness is a matter ... within the court's traditional discretion to control the mode of interrogation, Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626, 635 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801, 99 S.Ct. 44, 58 L.Ed.2d 94 (1978), and we review that decision only to determine whether there has been a clear abuse of discretion. See Chonich v. Wayne County Community College, 874 F.2d 359, 368 (6th Cir.1989). We are convinced that in the present case, no clear abuse of discretion occurred.