Opinion ID: 1201113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Law Dram Shop Action.

Text: Though pleadings should be construed liberally and not technically and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should rarely be granted, a complaint may be dismissed if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling the plaintiff to relief. Au v. Au, 63 Haw. 210, 626 P.2d 173, aff'd, 63 Haw. 263, 626 P.2d 173 (1981). The question posed here is whether this court, after balancing the policy considerations to allow recovery against those factors limiting liability, should rule that Sheraton Hotel owed a duty to Appellants under the guidelines established in Ono. See Cootey v. Sun Investment, Inc., 68 Haw. ___, 718 P.2d 1086 (1986); First Insurance Co. of Hawaii v. International Harvester Co., 66 Haw. 185, 659 P.2d 64 (1983). The facts of Ono are as follows. On May 19, 1973 on Maui, Samantha Scritchfield drank at the Sand Trap tavern owned by defendant H. Jon Applegate, drove away, and crashed into the car in which plaintiff Masaichi Ono was riding. Ono was injured, and Scritchfield died. Ono sued Scritchfield's estate and Applegate averring that the Sand Trap had negligently served liquor to an already intoxicated Scritchfield and had negligently allowed her to leave the premises intoxicated. The jury returned a verdict finding Scritchfield 75% at fault and the Sand Trap 25% at fault. 62 Haw. at 132-33, 612 P.2d at 536. On appeal, we affirmed ruling 1) Ono was within the class of persons protected by HRS § 281-78(a)(2)(B); and 2) the Sand Trap's statutory violation breached the standard of care so was evidence of negligence which could be used to prove causation. 62 Haw. at 138, 612 P.2d at 539. By establishing a common law dram shop action, a commercial liquor supplier could be held accountable for the failure to refrain from providing liquor to an intoxicated person. Id. at 136 n. 5, 612 P.2d at 538 n. 5. Ono emphasized the need to deter violations of HRS § 281-78(a)(2)(B), prevent the reasonable foreseeable consequences of the violations (i.e. drunk driving accidents), and compensate innocent third parties. 62 Haw. at 137-38, 612 P.2d 538-39. Some confusion, however, has resulted over whether Ono extends the availability of a common law dram shop action to an inebriated liquor consumer. That is, to ensure that liquor licensees would honor their responsibilities to the public [not to sell alcohol to already drunken customers], do liquor consumers who are injured because of their intoxication possess a common law dram shop action against the commercial liquor sellers who violate HRS § 281-78(a)(2)(B)? Note, Ono v. Applegate: Common Law Dram Shop Liability, 3 U.Haw.L.Rev. 149, 158 (1981). We now answer no. We agree with the majority of jurisdictions that have passed on this issue and emphatically reject the contention that intoxicated liquor consumers can seek recovery from the bar or tavern which sold them alcohol. Drunken persons who harm themselves are solely responsible for their voluntary intoxication and cannot prevail under a common law or statutory basis. Wright v. Moffit, 437 A.2d 554 (Del. 1981). In Allen v. County of Westchester, 109 A.D.2d 475, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1985), the decedent became drunk at a community college bar, fell, and sustained fatal injuries. The trial court denied the defendant county's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's common law negligence claims. The appeals court reversed reasoning: [N]o cause of action for decedent's conscious pain and suffering exists as against the county. To allow recovery in favor of one who has voluntarily procured a quantity of liquor for his or her own consumption with full knowledge of its possible or probable results would savor too much of allowing [said] person to benefit by his or her own wrongful act (see, Buntin v. Hutton, 206 Ill. App. 194, 199). A contrary holding in this case would result in a policy with far-rippling effects. The creation of such a policy, in our view, is better left to the legislative process. Id. at 480, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (emphasis added). The Allen reasoning is highly persuasive. HRS §§ 281-78(a)(2)(B) and 281-78(b)(1) were created to protect the general public from drunk driving accidents, not to reward intoxicated liquor consumers for the consequences of their voluntary inebriation. See Wright, 437 A.2d at 557. Liquor consumers are not within the class of persons for whose benefit HRS §§ 281-78(a)(2)(B) and 281-78(b)(1) were enacted. Sheraton Hotel's statutory violations did not create a cause of action in favor of Appellants. See Sager v. McClenden, 296 Or. 33, 672 P.2d 697 (1983). We realize a bar or tavern owes a duty to avoid affirmative acts which increase the peril to an intoxicated customer. Thrasher v. Leggett, 373 So.2d 494 (La. 1979). But, in the absence of harm to an innocent third party, merely serving liquor to an already intoxicated customer and allowing said customer to leave the premises, of itself, does not constitute actionable negligence. Miller v. City of Portland, 288 Or. 271, 604 P.2d 1261 (1980). [3] We also recognize that a significant minority of jurisdictions have imposed a common law duty or have interpreted their dram shop statutes to allow a suit by an injured liquor consumer against the parties who furnished the liquor. See Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965). These jurisdictions have ruled that a tavern keeper owes a duty not to serve an already intoxicated patron more liquor where unreasonable risk caused by drunken conduct is readily foreseeable, Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 84 N.J. Super. 372, 202 A.2d 208 (1964), so the causal connection between the defendants' unlawful failure to stop providing alcohol to an inebriated consumer and the consumer's later harm is a jury question. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). The defendant can then raise the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk to reduce or negate fault. Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983); Bissett v. DMI, Inc., 717 P.2d 545 (Mont. 1986). Based on a thorough review of the relevant caselaw, though, we adhere to the majority view and restrict the applicability of Ono.