Opinion ID: 2590136
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Physical Solution

Text: Respondents argue that article X, section 2 of the California Constitution mandates that we accept the trial court's proposed physical solution. The trial court found as follows: Having found that all rights are correlative, a just and fair result is achieved by establishing a physical solution which limits each user to a proportionate equitable share of the total amount available. The court estopped all parties from asserting special priorities or preferences. It concluded it had the authority to draft and impose a physical solution which requires all users to share equitably in the cost and reduction of use, to safe yield. We agree that, within limits, a trial court may use its equitable powers to implement a physical solution. (See, e.g., Peabody, supra, 2 Cal.2d at pp. 383-384, 40 P.2d 486 [court has power to make reasonable regulations for water use, provided they protect the one enjoying paramount rights].) In City of Lodi v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 316, 341, 60 P.2d 439, this court recognized a trial court's power to enforce an equitable solution even if all parties do not agree to it, but cautioned against unreasonably burdening any party. The court observed that a physical solution is generally a practical remedy that does not affect vested rights. Under such circumstances the 1928 constitutional amendment, as applied by this court in the cases cited, compels the trial court, before issuing a decree entailing such waste of water, to ascertain whether there exists a physical solution of the problem presented that will avoid the waste, and that will at the same time not unreasonably and adversely affect the prior appropriator's vested property right. In attempting to work out such a solution the policy which is now part of the fundamental law of the state must be adhered to. ( Id. at pp. 339-340, 60 P.2d 439.) In other words, a prior appropriator ... cannot be compelled to incur any material expense in order to accommodate the subsequent appropriator. ( Id. at p. 341, 60 P.2d 439.) Other cases hold that a physical solution may not violate the constitutional principle that requires water to be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent possible. ( Hillside Water Co. v. Los Angeles (1938) 10 Cal.2d 677, 685-686, 76 P.2d 681.) In Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938) 11 Cal.2d 501, 561, 81 P.2d 533 ( Vail ), this court held that a trial court may not demand that any one party spend large sums of money in order to satisfy a physical solution. (See Allen v. California Water & Tel. Co. (1946) 29 Cal.2d 466, 483-484, 176 P.2d 8 [rejecting proposed physical solution and finding overlying owners entitled to make reasonable use of water without incurring substantial costs].) Thus, although it is clear that a trial court may impose a physical solution to achieve a practical allocation of water to competing interests, the solution's general purpose cannot simply ignore the priority rights of the parties asserting them. (See City of San Fernando, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 290, 123 Cal.Rptr. 1, 537 P.2d 1250.) In ordering a physical solution, therefore, a court may neither change priorities among the water rights holders nor eliminate vested rights in applying the solution without first considering them in relation to the reasonable use doctrine. (See 1 Rogers & Nichols, Water for California (1967) § 404, p. 549, and cases cited.) Respondents unpersuasively argue for imposition of an equitable physical solution that disregards prior legal water rights. They cite the principle that the State Constitution requires the greatest number of beneficial users that the water supply can support, but they omit the requirement that this use be subject to the rights of those with lawful priority to the water. In addition, respondents rely on Vail to support their contention that a physical solution should be based on the trial court's broad equitable powers. But Vail concerned a conflict between riparian right holders, not a situation where one party's rights were paramount to the other's. ( Vail, supra, 11 Cal.2d at p. 508, 81 P.2d 533.) Respondents also rely on Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Wat. Resources Control Bd. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 548, 572, 275 Cal.Rptr. 250. But in that case the court had to decide whether an unconstitutional misuse of water occurred, and it did not adjudicate rights among competing water users, as here. Respondents simply fail to produce compelling authority for their argument that courts can avoid prioritizing water rights and instead allocate water based entirely on equitable principles.