Opinion ID: 1989359
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exceeding the Scope of Defense Argument

Text: Appellants argue that the prosecutor improperly exceeded the scope of their arguments by arguing in rebuttal the aiding and abetting theory. Generally, the prosecutor should not develop new arguments on rebuttal. Hall v. United States, 540 A.2d 442, 448 (D.C.1988) (citing Moore v. United States, 120 U.S.App. D.C. 173, 175, 344 F.2d 558, 560 (1965) (other citation omitted)). However, this is not an inflexible rule, leaving to the trial court to determine, in its discretion, how far the rebuttal may extend. Id. (citing Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997, 1003 (Del.1982)). A principal purpose of the rule is to protect the defense from surprise. Id. Here, the argument was not a surprise, as the government had addressed its aiding and abetting theory in its opening argument. Thus, appellants had at least an opportunity to respond to it following the initial argument, even if not to the rebuttal. None of the appellants addressed the aiding and abetting issue in closing argument. In Hall, in assessing a similar argument, we found it crucial to finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling that the defense counsel had touched slightly upon the alibi theory that the government argued in rebuttal. 540 A.2d at 448-49. Indeed, we said that if defense counsel had said nothing at all about it, it would have been a different case. Id. Here, however, it seems clear that the defense found no reason to address the aiding and abetting argument when it had the opportunity. In light of the arguments appellants made, which essentially challenged the credibility of the witnesses and value of the evidence as grounds for reasonable doubt, it seems that defense counsel made a rational judgment not to address directly the government's aiding and abetting theory. Under these circumstances, unlike those in Hall, we do not consider it controlling to our decision that the defense may not have opened the door to the argument. This is not a case where the prosecutor made only perfunctory remarks in opening argument, reserving the real argument until rebuttal so as to deprive appellants of any chance to address critical points. See Bailey, supra, 440 A.2d at 1003. [11] Therefore, we find no basis for reversal.