Opinion ID: 2621488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Language of Section 1166 Can Be Reasonably Construed to Apply to Convictions by Guilty Plea.

Text: [I]n any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute's words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] ( People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) Where statutory language is clear and unambiguousi.e., it has only one reasonable constructionjudicial construction is generally unnecessary. ( Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 775, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 952 P.2d 641 ( Hughes ); People v. Moroney (1944) 24 Cal.2d 638, 642, 150 P.2d 888.) However, where a statute is ambiguousi.e., it has more than one possible construction that is reasonable we consider extrinsic evidence of the Legislature's intent beyond the statute's words. ( Hughes, supra, at p. 776, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 952 P.2d 641.) Section 1166 has more than one reasonable construction, and is therefore ambiguous. Given the statute's use of the term verdict, the majority's construction of section 1166that it applies only to jury verdictsis arguably reasonable. However, under a long line of California cases, the term verdict can also be reasonably construed as encompassing guilty pleas. In People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 685-686, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 50 P.3d 355 (Statum), we recently held that section 1238, subdivision (a)(6), authorizes the People to appeal where a defendant pleads guilty to a felony charge and the trial court later reduces the conviction to a misdemeanor and imposes a jail sentence. Section 1238, subdivision (a)(6), provides that the People may appeal from [a]n order modifying the verdict or finding by reducing the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed or modifying the offense to a lesser offense. (Italics added.) In finding this section applicable, we concluded in Statum that the reduction of a defendant's conviction by guilty plea is an `order modifying the verdict . . . by . . . modifying the offense to a lesser offense.' ( Statum, supra, at p. 688, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 50 P.3d 355, italics added.) We based this conclusion on the principle that [a] guilty plea is the `legal equivalent' of a 'verdict' [citation]. . .. ( Id. at p. 688, fn. 2, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 50 P.3d 355.) Thus, we held in Statum that a Penal Code statute's use of the term verdict rendered the statute applicable to convictions by guilty plea, not, as the majority here concludes, inapplicable. Our Courts of Appeal have similarly construed the term verdict in section 1238 since 1962, 45 years before we decided Statum. ( People v. Eberhardt (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1119-1124, 231 Cal.Rptr. 387; People v. Hames (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1238, 218 Cal.Rptr. 701; People v. Gaines (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 508, 514, 169 Cal.Rptr. 381 [statute applies because guilty plea is tantamount to a verdict]; People v. Thatcher (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 830, 831-832, 63 Cal. Rptr. 492; People v. Orrante (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 553, 557, fn. 1, 20 Cal.Rptr. 480 [statute applies because [a] plea of guilty is the equivalent of a verdict of a jury].) Thus, the language of section 1166 is ambiguous because it has more than one reasonable construction. Notably, the majority expressly concedes that the language of section 1166 is ambiguous. After discussing Statum, the majority states: We concede that, in many contexts, a guilty plea is not different from a guilty verdict. . .. (Maj. opn., ante, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 847, 62 P.3d at p. 85.) The majority also states that the term verdict in other Penal Code provisions may be reasonably construed to include guilty pleas. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 848, 62 P.3d at p. 86.) The majority also implicitly concedes the statute's ambiguity by concluding that section 1166 has only one reasonable construction when viewed in its statutory context (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 845, 846, 848, 62 P.3d at pp. 83, 84, 86), i.e., its placement within the Penal Code. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 845, 62 P.3d at p. 83.) A statute's placement within the statutory scheme is one of the extrinsic aids we look to only after concluding that the statute is ambiguous . . .. ( Hughes, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 776, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 952 P.2d 641; see also Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 582, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 896 P.2d 171[[w]hen the words are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including the statutory context]; People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441[[w]hen the statutory language is ambiguous, courts consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including the context in which the language appears].) Thus, by basing its construction on section 1166's placement within the Penal Code, the majority implicitly concedes that the statute's language is ambiguous.