Opinion ID: 1281444
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's conduct and the standard for criminal culpability

Text: Taking a wholly different tack, defendant next contends that she cannot be convicted under either the manslaughter or felony child-endangerment statutes regardless of the availability of a religious exemption. She rests this contention on a claim that the People will be unable to prove the degree of culpability necessary to convict her under either provision, both of which require criminal negligence in the commission of an offending act. ( People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879 [285 P.2d 926]; People v. Peabody (1975) 46 Cal. App.3d 43, 47 [119 Cal. Rptr. 780].) (11) We have defined criminal negligence as `aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless, that is, the conduct of the accused must be such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful man under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life, or, in other words, a disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences.... [Such negligence] is ordinarily to be determined pursuant to the general principles of negligence, the fundamental of which is knowledge, actual or imputed, that the act of the slayer tended to endanger life.' ( People v. Penny, supra, 44 Cal.2d at pp. 879-880.) Defendant makes two arguments for the claim that her conduct cannot, as a matter of law, constitute such negligence. She first contends that the defenses recognized at English common law are available to her under Civil Code section 22.2, which reads: The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State. She cites two English cases from the 19th century in support of the proposition that the common law recognized treatment by prayer in lieu of medicine as legally insufficient to constitute criminal negligence. [14] (12) While we note that common law defenses, with limited exceptions, are unavailable in California ( Keeler v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 631-632), we need look no further than the cases themselves to dispose of defendant's contention. The opinion of the court in Regina v. Wagstaffe (Cen.Crim.Ct. 1868) 10 Cox. Crim. Cas. 530, consists of a vaguely worded jury charge. The court instructed the jury that criminal negligence was a very wide question.... At different times people had come to different conclusions as to what might be done with a sick person.... [A] man might be convicted of manslaughter because he lived in a place where all the community was of a contrary opinion, and in another he might be acquitted because they were all of his opinion.... ( Id. at p. 532.) The court asked rhetorically whether it was intended by God Almighty that persons should content themselves by praying for His assistance, without helping themselves, or resorting to such means as were within their reach for that purpose? ( ibid. ), and concluded with the observation that the defendants appeared sincere and affectionate. Although the defendants were subsequently acquitted, the fact that the jury itself resolved the question of criminal negligence negates the claim that the court in Wagstaffe recognized a legal defense to the charge. Furthermore, its jury instructions merely restated the principle that criminal negligence is a question of fact to be determined in light of contemporary community standards, which at the time made the particular question a close one. The second case cited by defendant makes this point quite clearly. In Regina v. Hines (1874) 80 Cent. Crim. Ct. 309, the court dismissed an indictment for manslaughter against a parent who had exclusively prayed for an ill child. [15] Although the court ruled that the conduct was not criminally negligent as a matter of law, to state the holding is to refute its application 114 years later: the court considered and rejected the proposition that a parent who treated a child by spiritual care instead of calling in a doctor to apply blisters, leeches, and calomel, was guilty of criminal negligence. ( Id. at p. 312.) Were blisters, leeches and calomel the medical alternative to prayer today, quite likely defendant's reliance on Hines would more fully resonate with this court. Medical science has advanced dramatically, however, and we may fairly presume that the community standard for criminal negligence has changed accordingly. Nineteenth-century English common law thus fails to establish a defense, as a matter of law, to charges arising today for criminal negligence in the death of a child treated by prayer alone. [16] (13) Defendant next contends that her actions are legally insufficient to constitute criminal negligence under the definition of that conduct established in the decisions of this court. Emphasizing her sincere concern and good faith in treating Shauntay with prayer, she claims that her conduct is incompatible with the required degree of culpability. Defendant does not dispute, however, that criminal negligence must be evaluated objectively. ( People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296-297 [17 Cal. Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279]; People v. Penny, supra, 44 Cal.2d 861, 880.) The question is whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would have been aware of the risk involved.... ( People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 296.) If so, defendant is presumed to have had such an awareness. ( Ibid. ) The significance of this principle was well illustrated in People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824 [201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894], a case involving a self-styled `healer' who provided `deep' abdominal massages to a leukemic who thereafter died of a massive abdominal hemorrhage. ( Id. at pp. 826, 828.) We observed that There is no allegation made, nor was there any evidence adduced at trial, that [the defendant] at any time harbored any intent even to harm [the victim] in the slightest fashion. ( Id. at p. 834.) Indeed, nowhere is it claimed that defendant attempted to perform any action with respect to [the victim] other than to heal him.... ( Id. at p. 833.) Nonetheless, we determined that the defendant could be charged with criminally negligent involuntary manslaughter. ( Id. at p. 836.) The relevant inquiry, then, turns not on defendant's subjective intent to heal her daughter but on the objective reasonableness of her course of conduct. [17] In view of this standard, we must reject defendant's assertion that no reasonable jury could characterize her conduct as criminally negligent for purposes of sections 192(b) and 273a(1). As the court in People v. Atkins (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 348 [125 Cal. Rptr. 855], observed in affirming the involuntary manslaughter and felony child-endangerment conviction of a parent whose child died for want of medical care, criminal negligence could have been found to have consisted of the [mother's] failure to seek prompt medical attention for [her son], rather than waiting several days. There is evidence she knew, or should have known, that [her son] was seriously injured.... Viewing [the evidence] in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is substantial evidence here of involuntary manslaughter based on the lack of due caution and circumspection in omitting to take the child to a doctor. ( Id. at p. 360.) When divorced of her subjective intent, the alleged conduct of defendant here is essentially indistinguishable. Defendant's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. She first asserts that the various statutory exemptions enacted for Christian Scientists demonstrate a legislative acceptance of the reasonableness of their spiritual care that is incompatible with a finding of gross, culpable, or reckless negligence. As discussed at length above, however, California's statutory scheme reflects not an endorsement of the efficacy or reasonableness of prayer treatment for children battling life-threatening diseases but rather a willingness to accommodate religious practice when children do not face serious physical harm. Indeed, the relevant statute suggest that prayer treatment for gravely ill children is sufficiently unreasonable to justify the state in taking the draconian step of depriving parents of their rights of custody. ( Ante, at pp. 132-134.) The two cases cited by defendant in support of her claim are clearly distinguishable. In People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal. App.2d 433 [8 Cal. Rptr. 863], the court reversed the involuntary manslaughter conviction of a mother who had left her children alone at home where one died in a fire. The court ruled that the mother's conduct did not reflect a course of conduct sufficiently reckless to justify a finding of criminal negligence. ( Id. at pp. 440-441.) In terms of unreasonableness, however, the failure of defendant to seek medical attention for a child who sickened and died over a 17-day period is plainly more egregious than the decision of Mrs. Rodriguez to leave her children alone at home for an afternoon. In Somers v. Superior Court (1973) 32 Cal. App.3d 961 [108 Cal. Rptr. 630], the court granted a writ of prohibition barring the manslaughter prosecution of a police officer who had shot a fleeing youth whom the officer mistook for a felon. The court observed that the situation was tense and menacing because of earlier reports of robberies in the vicinity, that the victim matched the description of a suspect and appeared to be carrying a shotgun, and that the victim continued to flee after the officer had shouted Stop, police. ( Id. at pp. 965, 968-970.) Again, the objective unreasonableness of defendant's course of conduct, compared with the officer's actions in Somers, is of an evidently greater magnitude. In sum, we reject the proposition that the provision of prayer alone to a seriously ill child cannot constitute criminal negligence as a matter of law. Whether this defendant's particular conduct was sufficiently culpable to justify conviction of involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment remains a question in the exclusive province of the jury.