Opinion ID: 2602047
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Defendant's Execution-impact Evidence

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated state law and his constitutional rights when it excluded an expert's testimony about the impact defendant's execution would have on his son and stepson. Defendant argues that the testimony should have been permitted as mitigation evidence indirectly relevant to his character. We disagree. During the penalty phase, the defense indicated its intent to have Dr. Kaser-Boyd testify about the effect defendant's execution would have on his children. The prosecutor indicated she would object to such testimony because it would be speculative and would constitute irrelevant execution-impact evidence. After some discussion between counsel and the court, defense counsel asked the court to defer ruling so that he could talk with Dr. Kaser-Boyd to get a better sense of the possible testimony. The next morning, defense counsel told the court Dr. Kaser-Boyd would testify that, when a child loses a parent for any reason, there is a feeling of abandonment and grief . . . that often can interfere with normal development and result in feelings of anxiety or distrust, whereas those feelings would be less if the defendant were sentenced to life without parole. The prosecutor objected to the proposed testimony because it would constitute impermissible execution-impact evidence and would be speculative. The prosecutor also argued that the effect that losing one's parent would have on a child was not a proper subject for expert testimony because the jury was capable of considering the impact on its own. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection and excluded the evidence, but it made clear that the defense would still be able to solicit testimony from Dr. Kaser-Boyd regarding defendant's character, nature, and potential for future contribution. [9] (10) We conclude the trial court did not err. The impact of a defendant's execution on his or her family may not be considered by the jury in mitigation. ( People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 366-367 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229]; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1000 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171]; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 454-456 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442] ( Ochoa ).) In Ochoa, we explained it is a defendant's background and character, and not the distress of his or her family, that is relevant under section 190.3. (19 Cal.4th at p. 456.) We distinguished between evidence that [a defendant] is loved by family members or others, and that these individuals want him or her to live . . . [and evidence about] whether the defendant's family deserves to suffer the pain of having a family member executed. ( Ibid. ) The former constitutes permissible indirect evidence of a defendant's character while the latter improperly asks the jury to spare the defendant's life because it believes that the impact of the execution would be devastating to other members of the defendant's family. ( Ibid. ) In arguing that the trial court erred when it excluded part of Dr. Kaser-Boyd's testimony, defendant contends it constituted permissible evidence of defendant's character. We disagree. As defense counsel told the trial court, Dr. Kaser-Boyd intended to testify that defendant's execution would have a damaging effect on his children and the children would have a feeling of abandonment and loss requiring therapy and intervention. Such testimony, rather than illuminat[ing] some positive quality of the defendant's background or character ( Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 456), was impermissible execution-impact evidence intended to make the jury feel sympathy for . . . defendant's family. [10] (19 Cal.4th at p. 456.) Defendant alternatively argues that, even if the testimony constituted execution-impact evidence, the trial court should have nonetheless allowed it. Defendant acknowledges we rejected an identical claim in Ochoa, but he argues our decision was wrongly decided for several reasons. None is persuasive. Defendant first asserts that Ochoa conflicts with the high court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808 [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597]. There, the high court held that victim-impact evidence is admissible during the penalty phase. ( Id. at pp. 811, 829.) Defendant argues the high court's decision contains an implicit recognition capital defendants have the right to introduce execution-impact evidence. To the contrary, the high court made clear, consistent with Ochoa, that a defendant must be allowed to introduce mitigating evidence concerning his own circumstances.  ( Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 822, italics added.) As we have explained, execution-impact evidence is irrelevant under section 190.3 because it does not concern a defendant's own circumstances but rather asks the jury to spare defendant's life based on the effect his or her execution would have on his or her family. ( Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 456.) We further concluded that nothing in the federal Constitution requires a different result ( Ochoa, at p. 456) and defendant identifies no reason to reconsider our conclusion. Defendant next argues section 190.3, which permits the prosecutor and defendant to introduce evidence as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, should be construed to permit execution-impact testimony as evidence relevant to mitigation and sentence. We rejected this construction in Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at page 456, and we see no reason to revisit the issue. Defendant's argument rests on the use of the word mitigation in statutes governing determinate sentencing (§ 1170) and probation (§ 1203). Neither statute is analogous to section 190.3. Unlike those statutes, section 190.3 identifies examples of matters relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence including, but not limited to, the circumstances of the present offense, any prior felony conviction ..., and the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. We concluded that, [ i ] n this context, what is ultimately relevant is a defendant's background and characternot the distress of his or her family. ( Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 456, italics added.) The statutes cited by defendant have no bearing upon this court's construction of section 190.3. We conclude the trial court did not err when it excluded the portion of Dr. Kaser-Boyd's testimony concerning the effect defendant's execution would have on his children. [11]