Opinion ID: 2520968
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

Text: As this court stated in State v. Peseti, 101 Hawai'i 172, 183, 65 P.3d 119, 130 (2003), the denial of a defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses is subject to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of review. See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (holding same). The erroneous admission of evidence that Philimena told others that Danny was threatening her life may have been harmless. Even without admission of this hearsay testimony, the jury still would have heard testimony that Danny had threatened Philimena's life: Akina testified that when he, Danny, and Philimena went to Smitty's in Kailua, Danny threatened to kill both Philimena and Akina if Philimena left Danny for Akina. Akina heard Danny threaten Philimena, and Danny's threat was admissible under HRE Rule 803(a)(1)(A) as an admission by a party-opponent. This evidence, which was properly admitted, may have been sufficient for the jury to conclude that Danny was not under the influence of an EMED (such that the erroneous admission of hearsay testimony might have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). See Wright, 497 U.S. at 823, 110 S.Ct. 3139 ([W]e think the presence of corroborating evidence more appropriately indicates that any error in admitting the statement might be harmless, rather than that any basis exists for presuming the declarant to be trustworthy.) (footnote omitted). However, we cannot say that admission of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Danny did not dispute that he shot Philimena; the only issue for the jury was his state of mind at the instant he killed her. The hearsay testimony in question went directly to this issue and was intended to rebut Danny's claimed mitigating defense of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Philimena told three people (Akina, Lavea, and Kaonohi) separately, at different times, that Danny was threatening to kill her. Similarly, Philimena told Pasco and Chong separately that Danny caused her bruises; she also described the way in which Danny caused the bruises. This evidence was not duplicative or cumulative. Rather, each of these items of hearsay testimony was separate, independent evidence supporting the conclusion that Danny was not under the influence of EMED at the time he shot Philimena. Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is a strict standard, and under these circumstances we cannot conclude that denial of Danny's right to confront these adverse witnesses was harmless. We thus hold that Danny is entitled to a new trial as a result of these constitutional violations. Although this holding is dispositive of this case, we address Danny's remaining points on appeal to provide guidance to the circuit court on retrial.