Opinion ID: 24837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Has Contributed to or Is Contributing to

Text: 34 Second, the district court did not err as a matter of law in interpreting the contributing to prong of § 6972(a)(1)(B). In addition, its finding that the City satisfied the requirements of the provision was not clear error. In so concluding, we first lay out the basic framework that will guide our analysis and then examine the evidence relating to each dump. 35
36 The RCRA does not define the term contribute or any variation thereof. This silence compels us to 'start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 121 S. Ct. 513, 519 (2000) (stating that [b]ecause the [statute] does not define [a term] or otherwise suggest that the ordinary meaning of [the term] should not apply, [the Supreme Court accords] the term its well-established meaning); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995); cf. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989) (adopting plain language meaning for the RCRA notice requirement in § 6972(b)). 37 Webster's Dictionary defines contribute as to have a share in any act or effect. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 496 (unabridged) (1963); see also Oxford English Dictionary 849 (2d ed. 1989) (to have a part or share in producing [an effect]); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 410 (3d ed. 1992) (to help bring about a result). 22 38 Our sister circuits have drawn upon the plain meaning of the word contribute and on the legislative history as well to interpret the contributing to phrase under the analogous § 6973 provision. 23 See, e.g., Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383 (The relevant legislative history supports a broad, rather than a narrow, construction of the phrase 'contributed to.'); United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984) (Congress's intent, then, was to establish a standard of liability by incorporating and expanding upon the common law.). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit aptly summarized congressional intent regarding interpretations of phrases such as contributing to: 39 [Congress has mandated] that the former common law of nuisance, as applied to situations in which a risk of harm from solid or hazardous wastes exists, shall include new terms and concepts which shall be developed in a liberal, not a restrictive, manner. This ensures that problems that Congress could not have anticipated when passing the [RCRA] will be dealt with in a way minimizing the risk of harm to the environment and the public. 40 Waste Indus., 734 F.2d at 167. (citations omitted). 24 Therefore, we follow our sister circuits' lead and interpret contribute to mean have a part or share in producing an effect. 41
42 As to the fault standard under which such contributions are held actionable, we note that the one circuit that has addressed this specific issue has held that the RCRA imposes strict liability, i.e., liability imposed without regard to the defendant's negligence or intent to harm. Cf. United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 741 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating, in a case arising under § 6973 (see supra note 22), that Congress intended to impose liability without fault or negligence and specifically on past non-negligent off-site generators and transporters); Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1377 (citing Northeastern and stating that § 6973 has been interpreted to impose strict liability). 25 Some other courts have also come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Zands II, 797 F. Supp. at 809-10. 43 We have no reason to consider here whether strict liability may be a basis for liability under the RCRA. 26 The district court did not hold the City strictly liable for the waste that it generated and that was deposited in the Deepwood and South Loop 12 dumps. In the case of the South Loop 12 dump, the City did not dispute that it used the site as a municipal dump. In the case of the Deepwood dump, the district court found, and we agree, that there is a compelling case on the record that the City's actions were negligent, i.e., that the City failed to exercise due care in selecting or instructing the entity actually conducting the disposal of the City's waste. 27 44
45 We now examine the evidence regarding each dump and conclude that the district court did not commit clear error in finding that the evidence established § 6972(a)(1)(B) contributing to liability for the City. 46
47 The RCRA creates, at the very least, a duty on the part of generators not to dispose of their waste in such a manner that it may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. Negligent oversight of disposal is actionable under the RCRA. 28 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. As described supra in Part I.A, the City contracted with Billy Nabors and Dallas Demolition to conduct demolitions of City property. These City contractors dumped loads of debris at the Deepwood dump. The City's contracts with Dallas Demolition did not specify that waste materials generated by the City's activities must be properly disposed of in a legal landfill. The City was aware that Dallas Demolition engaged in illegal dumping and operated its own unauthorized waste site. Furthermore, the City's attorneys were informed that Dallas Demolition dumped at the Deepwood dump. However, even after the City's attorneys had learned that Dallas Demolition had been dumping illegally in Dallas, the City continued to work with Dallas Demolition. 29 The district court did not clearly err in finding that this lax oversight of its contractors and their disposal of City waste is evidence of the City's contributing to liability. Cf. Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1099 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that federal government agencies contributed to open dumping by generating solid waste, contracting for its disposal and, in some instances, transporting solid waste to dumps operated in violation of federal law (emphasis added)). 48 The City argues that there is no evidence in the record that the City's waste actually went into the Deepwood dump. The City asserts, instead, that the contracts simply demonstrate that it could have used Billy Nabors or Dallas Demolition to haul trash, but that there is no evidence that it actually did do so (and, even if it did utilize these haulers, that the City's particular waste was taken to the Deepwood dump). We find little merit in this argument. 49 First, the district court reasonably inferred that the City's waste went into the Deepwood dump, and on this record, this inference is not clear error. The City Council allocated funds for the demolition actions, and the City Council, subsequent to a bidding process, awarded specific contracts to Dallas Demolition and Billy Nabors, even after City attorneys knew that they were dumping illegally at the Deepwood dump. Given that the City specifically hired these contractors to perform certain jobs, a logical conclusion is that the City used them for those jobs. A mere assertion from the City that the jobs might not have been performed is insufficient to alter this conclusion. 50 The City's actions therefore snugly fit the failed to exercise due care in selecting or instructing the entity actually conducting the disposal statement from S. Rep. No. 96-172, at 5 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5023. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 30 This situation also closely parallels an example considered in a 1979 House Committee Report and a 1979 Senate Report, i.e., that a generator of solid waste is subject to liability even when someone else conducted the disposal at the generator's request. See S. Rep. No. 96-172, at 5 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5023; H.R. Comm. Print No. 96-IFC 31, at 31 (1979). 51 Therefore, the district court did not err in assessing § 6972(a)(1)(B) liability against the City based on the City's negligent actions regarding the disposal of its waste. 31 52
53 The City does not dispute that it used the South Loop 12 site as a municipal landfill from 1964 until at least 1972. An owner of South Loop 12 fenced the site and hired a guard to stop the City from dumping because the City would not properly cover the refuse it had dumped there. 32 The City's primary argument is that because its use ended in 1972 and because the RCRA was not enacted until 1976, it cannot be held liable under § 6972(a)(1)(B). We do not agree. 54 Section 6972(a)(1)(B) is clear that it applies to both past and present acts, as the adjectives past and present are specifically included. We have also previously confirmed that [w]e understand [the] language [of § 6972(a)(1)(B)] to provide a claim for injunctive relief based on either past or present conduct. Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1576 (5th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (the activities at issue in the case had also occurred before 1976); Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 739 (stating that the analogous provision of § 6973, see supra note 22, specifically applies to past generators and transporters and rejecting the defendant's argument that pre-1976 dumping should not be a basis for RCRA liability); see also infra Part III.B.3 (explaining that although the endangerment must currently exist, the actions causing the endangerment may have occurred wholly in the past); cf. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 & n.2 (1987) (noting that Congress intentionally used language that explicitly targets wholly past violations when it created § 6972(a)(1)(B)). 55 In short, the disposal of wastes [as wholly past acts] can constitute a continuing violation as long as no proper disposal procedures are put into effect or as long as the waste has not been cleaned up and the environmental effects remain remediable. Gache v. Town of Harrison, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1041, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (rejecting the defendant city's argument that it had not dumped any materials in years and thus should not be held liable); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981) (rejecting defendants' argument that the RCRA could not be applied to its activities, which ceased in 1972), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). The continued presence of this municipal waste in the South Loop 12 dump (so long as it presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, see infra Part III.B.3) is actionable under § 6972(a)(1)(B). 56