Opinion ID: 1249059
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Review Under Substantial Proof of a Material Fact Standard

Text: The question of jurisdiction has bedeviled the government's attempted appeal in this case, as the government has resisted having to go beyond a bare certification to provide any useful degree of specificity that would help us (and Grace) evaluate the materiality of the excluded evidence. Nonetheless, having given the government the chance to support its certification with substance, we now address its compliance with § 3731 in light of the parties' supplemental briefing. Preliminarily, we first decline Grace's suggestion that we dismiss this appeal based on the government's apparent reluctance to comply with our certification requirements. The failure [timely] to file the certificate does not oust our jurisdiction but does require us to decide whether to exercise our discretion under F.R.App. P. 3(a) to dismiss the appeal. United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Becker, 929 F.2d 442, 444-45 (9th Cir.1991) (allowing government to file a late § 3731 certificate as an exercise of discretion). As in Gantt and Becker, we exercise our discretion to excuse the government's late showing given that it has now been forthcoming, and there is no indication that Grace will be prejudiced by our consideration of the government's appeal. See Gantt, 194 F.3d at 997 ([T]hough the government's oversight has led to a considerable waste of judicial resources, the defendant has suffered no prejudice.). Second, we reject the government's contention in its supplemental brief that it need only show that one excluded witness or one excluded document or study the government's experts intend to reply [ sic ] upon at trial is `substantial proof' of a fact material to the Superseding Indictment. (Emphasis in original). The only support the government cites for this proposition is our earlier statement that the court must interpret the requirement that the evidence suppressed be `substantial proof of a fact material' in a way which facilitates rather than hinders the government's ability to seek review in this court. Adrian, 978 F.2d at 491. The materiality of one item of evidence does not necessarily justify our jurisdiction to review all of the excluded evidence. The purpose of the materiality requirement is to force federal prosecutors to consider whether the appeal is taken for a proper purpose before they force a defendant to relitigate the evidentiary issue. Gantt, 194 F.3d at 997; see also id. (Unfortunately, some government attorneys from time to time treat the § 3731 certification requirement as a mere formality. . . .). Allowing a single item of evidence to carry the burden for what could be a wide ranging review of a district court's evidentiary rulings would not only undercut the government's obligation to be selective in its invocation of interlocutory appeal, but also invite the appellate court into refereeing what is in most cases an area of dispute committed to the discretion of the district court. Thus, we hold that each type of excluded evidence must meet the liberally construed § 3731 requirement that it be substantial proof of a material fact in order to be the subject of a proper interlocutory appeal. Third, contrary to Grace's argument, excluded evidence need not be persuasive as to the ultimate charge but rather only persuasive in establishing the proposition for which the government seeks to admit it. Adrian, 978 F.2d at 491 (emphasis added). In keeping with the liberal interpretation of § 3731, so long as the proposition is relevant to the government's case, that will suffice. Finally, we make no determinations regarding admissibility of any of the apparently excluded evidence, but rather leave that issue for the district court. See id. (emphasizing that the court was only assuming that the evidence would be admissible in its § 3731 analysis).