Opinion ID: 1466624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: blood alcohol test results.

Text: Appellant asserts that his blood alcohol test results should have been suppressed because Stack refused his request to contact an attorney prior to testing. [1] Stack testified that he brought Appellant to the hospital between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. on August 20, 2001, and read Appellant the implied consent warning pursuant to KRS 189A.105(2)(a). Appellant expressed his desire to consult with an attorney prior to taking the blood test but Stack refused. Stack described the conversation as follows: A: He just told me he didn't want to take the test until he talked to his lawyer. Q: So, when he asked you for a lawyer you took that as a refusal. Is that correct? A: No. Then I said he don't get a lawyer unless you take my test and he said, well, I'm not taking your test. Q: So, if you take the test you get a lawyer and if you don't take the test you don't get a lawyer. Is that right? A: Yes. It's in the implied consent. Stack either seriously misconstrued the meaning of the implied consent statute or was unaware that it had been recently amended. KRS 189A.105(3), effective October 1, 2000, provides: During the period immediately preceding the administration of any test, the person shall be afforded an opportunity of at least ten (10) minutes but not more than fifteen (15) minutes to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney and shall be informed of this right. Inability to communicate with an attorney during this period shall not be deemed to relieve the person of his obligation to submit to the tests and the penalties specified by KRS 189A.010 and 189A.107 shall remain applicable to the person upon refusal. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to create a right to have an attorney present during the administration of the tests, but the person's attorney may be present if the attorney can physically appear at the location where the test is to be administered within the time period established in this section. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, Stack's contention that Appellant could not contact an attorney until and unless he agreed to take the test was erroneous. The statute clearly provides that a person has a right to at least attempt to contact an attorney before the administration of the test. Appellant asserts that this violation of KRS 189A.105(3) requires suppression of the blood test results. This would be a better argument if he had actually consented to the blood tests and was claiming that the violation of the statute negated his consent. See, e.g., Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1214 (Alaska 1983) (application of exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of right to counsel provided in implied consent law will serve to deter future illegal police conduct); State v. Juarez, 161 Ariz. 76, 775 P.2d 1140, 1145 (1989) (en banc) (police refusal to permit DUI arrestee to consult counsel before consenting to breath test violates constitutional right to counsel); State v. Spencer, 305 Or. 59, 750 P.2d 147, 156 (1988) (same). But see Beach v. Commonwealth, Ky., 927 S.W.2d 826, 828 (1996) ([E]vidence should not be excluded for the violation of provisions of a statute where no constitutional right is involved.) (interpreting KRS 189A.103(5)). C.f. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1953, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) (taking of handwriting exemplars not critical stage of criminal proceedings entitling defendant to assistance of counsel). However, the issue here is not whether Stack's error negated Appellant's consent, for Appellant did not consent to the taking of his blood sample. Rather, the sample was obtained involuntarily pursuant to a search warrant. KRS 189A.105(2)(b) reads: Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction from issuing a search warrant or other court order requiring a blood or urine test, or a combination thereof, of a defendant charged with a violation of KRS 189A.010, or other statutory violation arising from the incident, when a person is killed or suffers physical injury, as defined in KRS 500.080, as a result of the incident in which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis added.) Thus, a warrant may issue under this statute if the accused is charged with a qualifying offense which resulted in death or physical injury. Commonwealth v. Morriss, Ky., 70 S.W.3d 419, 421 (2002). At the conclusion of the field sobriety tests the videotape clearly records Stack advising Appellant, You are under arrest for DUI. Although the subsequent arrest citation prepared by Stack charged Appellant not with DUI but with murder in violation of KRS 507.020(1)(b), he was charged with violating KRS 189A.010 at the time the search warrant was obtained. Even if he had been charged with murder, that offense would qualify as an other statutory violation arising from the incident. KRS 189A.105(2)(b). Since Mrs. Rains died as a result of the incident, either charge authorized the issuance of the search warrant. The statute does not condition the issuance of the warrant on the arrestee's refusal to consent to the blood test. [2] Obviously, once the warrant was served, the blood sample could be drawn with or without Appellant's consent. Thus, the refusal to grant Appellant's request to contact an attorney resulted in no prejudice in this case. Other than refusing to take the test, Appellant made no incriminating statements while at the hospital. An attorney could only have advised Appellant whether to consent to the blood test. Once the warrant was served, the consent issue became moot. Even though Stack's refusal to allow Appellant to attempt to contact an attorney was wrongful, the error was rendered harmless by the issuance of the warrant and did not require suppression of the blood test results. Appellant's secondary claim with respect to the blood test is that the results should have been suppressed because of Stack's alleged perjury about the events leading to the administration of the test. While Stack testified at the pretrial suppression hearing that he did not remember whether he had placed Appellant under arrest at the scene and testified at trial that he had not done so, the videotape of the field sobriety tests clearly shows that Stack placed Appellant under arrest for DUI at the conclusion of those tests. However, Stack's erroneous testimony does not rise to the level of perjury. Perjury requires proof that a person made a materially false statement which that person did not believe. KRS 523.020(1). There is no proof that Stack did not believe what he was saying during the suppression hearing or at trial was true. Thus, we are unable to conclude that his testimony was perjurious as opposed to merely mistaken. We also are unable to perceive how Appellant was prejudiced by this testimony.