Opinion ID: 1663571
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Almerico and the Common-Law Broker-Agency Presumption

Text: The applicable presumption is commonly formulated as follows: [A]n insurance broker acts as an agent of the insured, not the insurer, where the broker is employed by the insured to procure insurance. The presumption can be overcome by the existence of special circumstances [i.e., indicia of agency] indicating that the broker's arrangement with the insurer was not a standard relationship. 3 Russ & Segalla, supra § 45:5 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted). It is important to note that insurance broker and insurance agent are not synonymous terms: A representative of the insured is known as an  insurance broker.  A broker represents the insured by acting as a middleman between the insured and the insurer, soliciting insurance from the public under no employment from any special company, and, upon securing an order, places it with a company selected by the insured, or if the insured has no preference, with a company selected by the broker. In contrast, an  insurance agent  represents an insurer under an exclusive employment agreement by the insurance company. . . . The distinction between an agent and a broker is important because acts of an agent are imputable to the insurer, and acts of a broker are imputable to the insured. 3 Russ & Segalla, supra § 45:1 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes and internal division omitted); see also Almerico, 716 So.2d at 776-78. Based on its recognition of the sometimes amorphous nature of an insurance broker, this Court held in Almerico that under the provisions of section 626.342(2), Florida Statutes (1989), as well as Florida's common law, civil liability may be imposed upon insurers who cloak unaffiliated insurance agents with sufficient indicia of agency to induce a reasonable person to conclude that there is an actual agency relationship.  716 So.2d at 782 n. 13, 783 (emphasis supplied). [10] In this vein, [c]ourts have found the existence of [indicia of agency] when the insurer characterizes the broker as a representative of the insurer, or when insurers contemplate broker solicitation of their products using the insurer's application and sales brochures. [ See, e.g., Almerico, 716 So.2d at 777 (Evidence of indicia of agency may be demonstrated if the insurer furnishes an insurance agent or agency with any blank forms, applications, stationery, or other supplies to be used in soliciting, negotiating, or effecting contracts of insurance. (internal quotation marks omitted)).] Conversion of a broker to an agent has also been found when an insurer uses a broker as an agent for a single purpose. Finally, an agent licensed to sell insurance products for a variety of insurers as an independent insurance agent, may still be considered the agent of an insurer if the insurer has a written agency appointment agreement expressly authorizing the agent to transact business on behalf of the insurer as its agent. 3 Russ & Segalla, supra § 45:5 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted). Here, the Appellees have not proffered any allegations that R.A. Brandon & Company acted as anything other than an independent insurance broker regarding the parties or transaction involved in this litigation, nor have they proffered any evidence, or even a contention, that Brandon had any contract or agreement with Essex to market and sell Essex's insurance policies. Further, the Appellees had the burden of proof on this issue. See 3 Russ & Segalla, supra § 45:10 (An insured seeking to estop an insurer from denying coverage based on a broker's actions has the burden of proving that the broker was the agent of the insurer.). In fact, Isidoro Farji, Lighthouse's presidentwho has contacted Brandon since 1998 to obtain Lighthouse's insurance coverageindicated during his September 9, 2004, deposition that Brandon acted as Lighthouse's broker for purposes of obtaining insurance coverage concerning the 30th Court property: Q. Did you authorize Brandon and Company to fill out an application and apply for insurance for Lighthouse Intracoastal, Inc.? A. Yes. Q. And did they do that to the best of your knowledge? A. Yes. Q. And you obtained insurance from several different insurance companies for Lighthouse Intracoastal, Inc., based on that application? . . . A. Correct. Dep. of Isidoro Farji at 161-62. Additionally, in reference to Maria Figuerasthe primary Brandon customer representative with whom Isidoro Farji interactedMr. Farji stated that [s]he was getting all the policies for me. Dep. of Isidoro Farji at 188. Finally, Todd Brandonthe Executive Vice President of R.A. Brandon & Companystated during his February 1, 2005, deposition that Brandon acted as a producing or general-lines agent that approached surplus-lines agents on behalf of its clients to obtain surplus-lines coverage where general-lines coverage was unavailable, and that Brandon did not have any type of exclusive relationship with any one surplus-lines insurer. See Dep. of Todd Brandon at 11-18. Therefore, in this case, all of the evidence offered by the parties preceding the entry of the summary judgment in favor of the Appellees indicates that Brandon, an independent insurance broker, acted as Lighthouse's insurance representative-broker for purposes of procuring insurance coverage for the 30th Court property. Relatedly, all applicable evidence indicates that it was MacDuff Underwriters, Inc., not Brandon, that acted as Essex's surplus-lines agent in Florida. See, e.g., Dep. of Jack Miller, Executive Vice President with Essex Ins. at 13; see also §§ 626.913(2), 626.914(1) Fla. Stat. (2003) (defining surplus lines agent, and providing that surplus-lines policies are only placed in Florida  through . . . qualified, licensed, and supervised surplus lines agents resident in this state, for insurance coverages and to the extent thereof not procurable from authorized insurers (emphasis supplied)). In sum, under this Court's Almerico decision and under the common-law broker-agency presumption, Brandon, as an independent insurance broker in this transaction, is presumed to have acted on Lighthouse's behalf for purposes of obtaining insurance coverage. Moreover, the Appellees had the burden of rebutting this presumption by presenting some indicia of agency indicating that Brandon acted not on Lighthouse's behalf, but as an agent for and on behalf of Essex. However, the Appellees have failed to present any evidence, or even a contention, that Brandon acted as an agent for and on behalf of Essex when it received a copy of the Essex CGL policy. Therefore, under Almerico, Brandon's receipt of the Essex CGL policy constituted delivery to its principal, Lighthouse Intracoastal. See 716 So.2d at 776-82; see also 3 Russ & Segalla, supra §§ 45:5, 45:10.