Opinion ID: 75478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 17 Section 1252(a)(2)(C) of IIRIRA significantly limits judicial review of a final order of removal. That section states: 18 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title, or any offense covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) of this title for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title. 19 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). We have previously said that this provision strips us of jurisdiction to review a final order of removal of an alien who is removable based on a conviction for an offense enumerated in the statute. Galindo-Del Valle, 213 F.3d at 598; see Le v. United States Attorney General, 196 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999). That said, the jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(2)(C) is worded more broadly than that. By its plain language, it strips us of jurisdiction if the petitioner is (1) an alien (2) who is removable (3) because he committed a criminal offense enumerated in the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added); see Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2001). The third prong of the jurisdiction-stripping provision is the petitioner's commission of a covered offense. Although not the only way, a conviction is one way of establishing the commission of an offense. 20 Because Fernandez-Bernal concedes that he is an alien, we need only determine whether he committed an offense covered in § 1182(a)(2) and, if so, whether he is removable within the meaning of the jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(2)(C). See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); Galindo-Del Valle, 213 F.3d at 598. 6 We have no trouble concluding that he committed a criminal offense covered in § 1182(a)(2). That section covers, among other offenses, violations of any law or regulation of a State ... relating to a controlled substance .... 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). In 1990 Fernandez-Bernal possessed cocaine, a controlled substance, in violation of California law, and in 1991 he pleaded nolo contendere to that charge and was convicted for it. He has undoubtedly committed a criminal offense covered in § 1182(a)(2). 21 We turn next to the question of whether Fernandez-Bernal is removable within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(C). Under that provision, we lack jurisdiction to review Fernandez-Bernal's petition if he is removable by reason of having committed a controlled substance offense. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Fernandez-Bernal was ordered removed by the immigration judge and the BIA pursuant to § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and that provision does not speak in terms of the alien having committed the offense, but instead speaks of the alien having been convicted of it, or having admitted to committing it or acts constituting it. Section 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) provides for the removal of any alien: 22 [C]onvicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of ... a violation (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance .... 23 Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1229a(e)(2)(A). 24 So, Fernandez-Bernal is removable within the meaning of the jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(2)(C) if he is removable for one of the reasons listed in § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). In other words, we lack jurisdiction to review Fernandez-Bernal's petition if he is removable by reason of having been convicted of a controlled substance offense, if he is removable by reason of having admitted committing a controlled substance offense, or if he is removable by reason of having admitted committing acts which constitute the essential elements of a controlled substance offense. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). The jurisdictional inquiry thus merges with the question of removability under § 1182(a)(2): If Fernandez-Bernal is in fact removable under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), then he is removable for the purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(C), and we do not have jurisdiction to review his petition. See Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (the jurisdictional inquiry merges with the merits inquiry); see e.g., Le, 196 F.3d at 1354 (section 1252(a)(2)(C) bars jurisdiction where petitioner was convicted of an aggravated felony, which is one of the offenses enumerated in § 1252(a)(2)(C)); Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1221-23 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2000) (same where pleaded guilty to aggravated felony); Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (same where pleaded guilty to sale or transport of cocaine); Wireko v. Reno, 211 F.3d 833, 835-36 (4th Cir. 2000) (same where convicted of aggravated felony). 25 Fernandez-Bernal is removable within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(C) because at his hearing before the immigration judge and at oral argument before this Court 7 , he admitted, through his counsel, to committing the offense of possession of cocaine. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). It is true that the INS charged him with being inadmissible because it took the position that he was convicted of possession of cocaine in 1991, and that he was ordered removed based on that conviction. However, that does not prevent us from finding Fernandez-Bernal is also removable for the jurisdiction-stripping purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(C) on the alternative basis that he admit[ted] to committing that offense. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Section 1252(a)(2)(C) strips us of jurisdiction if the alien is removable. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). Thus, so long as Fernandez-Bernal is in fact removable under § 1182(a)(2), we lack jurisdiction to review his final order of removal. 8 See Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 793 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2000) ([S]o long as the alien in fact is removable for committing [an offense enumerated in § 1252(a)(2)(C)], this court has no jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the INS originally sought removal for that reason.); Briseno v. INS, 192 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1999) (Because the deportation order was necessarily based on [a crime that qualifies as an 'aggravated felony' under IIRIRA], we have no appellate jurisdiction [under IIRIRA transitional rule § 309(c)(4)(G),] even though the deportation order did not characterize the crime as an aggravated felony or base deportation on that ground.); see also Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1220 ([Section 1252(a)(2)(C)] divests courts of jurisdiction only if an alien 'is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense' .... It does not say that courts lack jurisdiction if the an [sic] alien is found deportable for commission of certain criminal offenses.) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (dictum). But see Xiong v. INS, 173 F.3d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 1999); Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 1997). 26 In Galindo-Del Valle, 213 F.3d at 598, we reached the same conclusion regarding the effect of § 1252(a)(2)(C). There, the alien was ordered removed because he had been convicted of conspiracy to violate a controlled substance law, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and, alternatively, because an immigration officer knew or had reason to believe that he had conspired in the illicit trafficking of a controlled substance, id. § 1182(a)(2)(C). Galindo-Del Valle, 213 F.3d at 595. We concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to review the alien's petition because he admitted at his hearing before the [immigration judge] that he ... pleaded guilty to conspiracy to import methaqualone. Id. at 598. Thus, in Galindo-Del Valle, as in this case, we used the alien's admission that he committed a controlled substance offense to apply the jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(2)(C), even though the INS did not seek removal on the basis of an admission, and even though the removal order did not rely on the alien's admission. 27 Fernandez-Bernal admitted through his counsel, both before the immigration judge and before this Court, that he committed the offense of possession of cocaine while living in California in 1990. Thus, like the alien in Galindo-Del Valle, he is an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2), and § 1252(a)(2)(C) strips us of jurisdiction to review his final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); see Galindo-Del Valle, 213 F.3d at 598. 28 This conclusion, however, does not necessarily mandate dismissal of Fernandez-Bernal's petition. Despite the broad language of § 1252(a)(2)(C), we retain jurisdiction to evaluate constitutional challenges to IIRIRA. Galindo Del-Valle, 213 F.3d at 598; see Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1311, 1316 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 529 U.S. 1036, 120 S. Ct. 1529 (2000) ([Section 1252(a)(2)(C)] deals with operational decisions by the INS and does not foreclose constitutional challenges to the statute itself or other substantial constitutional issues ....). As we explained in Richardson v. Reno, Congress ... intended to make these administrative decisions non-reviewable to the fullest extent possible under the Constitution. 162 F.3d 1338, 1376 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234, 73 S.Ct. 603, 605 (1953)), vacated and remanded by, 526 U.S. 1142, 119 S.Ct. 2016, readopted in part by, 180 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 1999); id. ([A] court of appeals retains jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional attack on this INA statute as part of an alien's petition for review of a final order under the INA.). We turn now to Fernandez-Bernal's constitutional challenge. 29