Opinion ID: 8704089
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count IX

Text: Count IX alleges that DIA retaliated against Plaintiff by issuing him a poor performance appraisal in May 2008. See Compl., ¶ 59. The Agency argues that, as there were no objectively discernible consequences resulting from the performance appraisal, the appraisal itself cannot constitute a materially adverse employment action as a matter of law. See Mot. at 14. The Agency’s position is consistent with clear governing law. In this Circuit, a “thick body of precedent ... refutes the notion that formal criticism or poor performance evaluations are necessarily adverse actions.” Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 458 (D.C.Cir.1999). Rather, because “job-related constructive criticism ... ‘can prompt an employee to improve [his] performance’ ... performance reviews typically constitute adverse actions only when attached to financial harms.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C.Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“‘[F]ormal criticism or poor performance evaluations are [not] necessarily adverse actions’ and they should not be considered such if they did not ‘affect[ ] the [employee’s] grade or salary.’ ”) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, even the cases Plaintiff relies on here are readily distinguishable. In support of his position, Plaintiff cites Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179 (D.C.Cir.2007), Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513 (D.C.Cir. 2002), and Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 815 (D.C.Cir.2001). See Opp. at 11-12. -In each case, the D.C. Circuit held that a poor performance evaluation could be materially adverse where the plaintiffs “sufficiently alleged loss of a ‘tangible, quantifiable award’ which had been received ‘nearly every year’ ” prior to the plaintiffs’ protected activity. Weber, 494 F.3d at 185 (quoting Burke, 286 F.3d at 522). Alford, on the contrary, presents no evidence that he is similarly situated to these individuals. Even as his Opposition cites these cases, Plaintiff neither shows that he suffered a tangible harm of any kind from his poor evaluation nor presents evidence of the kind of history of strong performance (and receipt of concomitant performance awards) that typified the Weber, Burke, and Russell plaintiffs. As a result, the Court is again unable to find that Plaintiff experienced a materially adverse employment action in the form of his May 2008 performance review and will thus grant summary judgment to DIA on Count IX.