Opinion ID: 2681508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extending Bivens Action

Text: Having determined that this case raises a new context, we must decide whether to extend a Bivens remedy. We first ask “whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the constitutionally recognized interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.” Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 621 (2012) (quoting Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Then, we ask whether, in our own judgment, “special factors counsel[] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; see also Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 621.
There is no question that Appellants lack any alternative remedy for their Fifth Amendment right. An alternative, existing process merely has to “provide roughly similar incentives for potential defendants to comply with [the constitutional requirements] while also providing roughly similar compensation to victims of violations.” Engel, 710 F.3d at 705 (alteration in original) (quoting Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 625). According to the Mexican government, the Appellants cannot sue Agent Mesa in Mexican courts, because, as long as “Agent Mesa avoids travel to Mexico, any effective and enforceable remedy against him can only come from the U.S. courts.” Br. of Gov’t of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae for Appellants 16. The Appellants may not sue Agent Mesa under state law either, because plaintiffs “ordinarily cannot bring state-law tort actions against employees of the Federal Government.” Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 623 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2679(b)(1) (“the Westfall Act”) (substituting the United States as defendant in tort action against federal employee)); Osborn v. 33 Case: 11-50792 Document: 00512681077 Page: 34 Date Filed: 06/30/2014 No. 11-50792 Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 238, 241 (2007). Besides, as discussed above, an individual in Hernandez’s position will never be able to recover under the FTCA because of the application of the foreign-country exception. See supra Part II.A.11 Appellants also do not appear to lack an alternative remedy as a result of Congress’s deliberate choice. Congress has not chosen to skip over a remedy within an “elaborate, comprehensive scheme” that otherwise would cover Appellants’ alleged constitutional violation. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385 (1983); see also Zuspann v. Brown, 60 F.3d 1156, 1161 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Congress created a comprehensive review of veterans’ benefits disputes and explicitly precluded judicial review of veterans’ benefits disputes, so that Congress’s failure to create a remedy against individual Veterans Affairs employees was “not an oversight”). In particular, the elaborate system of remedies and procedures under the immigration system are not relevant to this case. In Arar v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit suggested but did not decide that Congress’s “substantial, comprehensive, and intricate remedial scheme in the 11 The Westfall Act also shows that Congress intended to make a Bivens remedy available in most circumstances. The Westfall Act of 1988 expanded officer immunity by making an FTCA claim against the United States an exclusive remedy, see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), but Congress also implicitly ratified the availability of an action for damages against federal officers for constitutional violations—that is, a Bivens action—even where FTCA claims are available, see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (the exclusiveness of a remedy under the FTCA “does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government . . . which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States.”). Courts have recognized that this provision expresses Congress’s intent to preserve Bivens actions. See, e.g., Simpkins v. D.C. Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 371–72 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that § 2679(b)(2)(A) provides an “exception for Bivens actions against government employees”); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 208 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Wood, J., concurring in the judgment), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013); see also James E. Pfander and David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 Geo. L.J. 117, 132–38 (2009) (arguing that Congress “joined the Court as a partner in recognizing remedies in the nature of a Bivens action [based on] the Westfall Act’s preservation of suits for violation of the Constitution and [on] the considerations that led to its adoption.”). As a result, Congress has indicated an intent to preserve the availability of Bivens actions at least in those instances where an alternative remedial scheme does not preclude it. 34 Case: 11-50792 Document: 00512681077 Page: 35 Date Filed: 06/30/2014 No. 11-50792 context of immigration” might preclude a Bivens remedy for a noncitizen who alleged that federal officials illegally detained him, ordered his removal to Syria, and encouraged and facilitated his interrogation under torture. 585 F.3d at 572. In Mirmehdi v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that “Congress’s failure to include monetary relief [ under the Immigration and Nationality Act for constitutionally invalid detention] can hardly be said to be inadvertent” in light of the frequent attention Congress has given the statute. 689 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2336 (2013). But unlike those contexts—extraordinary rendition and wrongful detention pending removal proceedings, respectively—it is far from clear that Congress intended for the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide remedies (or purposefully omit them) for a situation like that in the case presented. Quite plainly, even though Agent Mesa is an immigration law enforcement officer, see 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (providing law enforcement powers of immigration officers); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5 (giving law enforcements power to border patrol agents), this is not an immigration case. After all, Agent Mesa’s alleged conduct foreclosed any possibility that Hernandez would access the remedial system for removal that Congress designed. Even had Hernandez survived, he could not have been detained by a U.S. immigration official, because he was in Mexico. Congress has not made it clear through its regulation of immigration that it intends for persons injured by Border Patrol agents—be they citizens or not—to lack a damages remedy for unconstitutional uses of force. Defendants Cordero and Manjarrez alternatively contend that federal law enforcement agencies provide some remedy by conducting criminal investigations of the incidents. They point to federal homicide statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1112, and criminal civil rights statutes, id. § 242. Far from an adequate alternative, these procedures fail to redress the alleged harm to Appellants, and at most represent a mere “patchwork” of remedies insufficient 35 Case: 11-50792 Document: 00512681077 Page: 36 Date Filed: 06/30/2014 No. 11-50792 to overcome Bivens. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 554. Thus, for those in the Hernandez family’s shoes, it is a Bivens remedy or nothing. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
We proceed to step two of the Bivens framework, which requires us to exercise our judgment in determining whether “any special factors counsel hesitation.” We see none. Bivens itself provided little guidance on what qualifies as a special factor. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. Since then the Supreme Court and our sister circuits have identified a handful of “special factors.” See Arar, 585 F.3d at 573 (describing “special factors” as “an embracing category, not easily defined”). For example, one class of special factors focuses on Congress’s express or implied “concerns about judicial intrusion into the sensitive work of specific classes of federal defendants.” Engel, 710 F.3d at 707. The Supreme Court has especially emphasized this rationale in military contexts. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987) (no Bivens action for injuries arising out of or in the course of activity incident to military service); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (holding that “necessarily unique structure of the military” is a special factor counseling against providing Bivens remedy). Other circuits have relied on that rationale to refuse to extend Bivens suits in a variety of cases arising from actions taken by our government in its War on Terror. See, e.g., Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012) (holding that constitutional separation of powers and lack of judicial competence counsel hesitation in implying Bivens action for enemy combatants held in military detention); accord Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 200 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 773 (D.C. Cir. 2011). One circuit has even extended that reasoning to immigration-related cases. Mirmehdi, 689 F.3d at 982. Another species of special factor is the workability 36 Case: 11-50792 Document: 00512681077 Page: 37 Date Filed: 06/30/2014 No. 11-50792 of the cause of action. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 555 (doctrinal workability of cause of action). This case does not implicate any of these special factors. Agent Mesa did not act in a military setting; nor did his actions implicate national security. Given the similarity of this case to the original Bivens remedy and the relative workability of the doctrine, we find no reason to hesitate in extending Bivens to this new context. The only argument that might cause us to decline to extend a Bivens remedy is the Ninth Circuit’s identification of “immigration issues” writ large as necessarily creating a special factor counseling hesitation. Mirmehdi, 689 F.3d at 982. Yet, as our discussion of alternative remedies indicates, however, we think this case does not present an “immigration” context. Moreover, even if we did treat this case as involving an “immigration issue,” we would not follow Mirmehdi’s analysis. In a case brought by aliens challenging their illegal detention prior to removal proceedings, the Ninth Circuit concluded that claims pertaining to immigration “‘have the natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the security of the nation,’ which further ‘counsels hesitation’ in extending Bivens.” Id. (quoting Arar, 585 F.3d at 574). First, we decline to follow Mirmehdi, because the opinion unjustifiably extends the special factors identified in Arar well beyond that decision’s specific national security “context of extraordinary rendition.” Arar, 585 F.3d at 574. As the Second Circuit remarked with more than a dash of understatement, Arar “is not a typical immigration case.” Id. at 570. In fact, the government’s treatment of Arar was so anomalous that the court concluded it could not rely on the provisions of the governing immigration statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act, for any of its holding. See id. at 571, 573. Second, even while we acknowledge Congress’s significant interest in shaping matters of immigration policy, which “can affect trade, investment, 37 Case: 11-50792 Document: 00512681077 Page: 38 Date Filed: 06/30/2014 No. 11-50792 tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation,” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012), that fact alone does not give us cause to hesitate, let alone halt, in granting a Bivens remedy. The Supreme Court has recently written to emphasize the strong national interest Congress has in protecting aliens from mistreatment.12 See id. The Court noted that immigration policy concerns the “perceptions and expectations of aliens in this country who seek the full protection of its laws,” acknowledged that the “mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad,” and reaffirmed that “‘[o]ne of the most important and delicate of all international relationships . . . has to do with the protection of the just rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in another country.’” Id. at 2498–99 (alteration in original) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)).13 This strong national commitment to aliens’ rights not only militates in favor of a uniform, federal policy, as the Court concluded in Arizona v. United States; it also militates in favor of the availability of some federal remedy for mistreatment at the hands of those who enforce our 12 We note that Sergio’s alienage does not amount to a special factor counseling hesitation. Our circuit has previously recognized that an alien may be entitled to a damages remedy against federal officers. See Martinez–Aguero, 459 F.3d at 621–22 & n.1 (recognizing a Bivens remedy for an alien); see also Vance, 701 F.3d at 203 (rejecting alienage as special factor). The reason for this position is clear: to treat alienage as a special factor for not providing a damages remedy would be to double count our reasons for not providing a substantive right: having settled that Appellants are entitled to bring a claim for substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment even though Hernandez was an alien, we see no additional reason to hesitate in granting a remedy for that right. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 246 (“[A]lthough a suit against a Congressman for putatively unconstitutional actions taken in the course of his official conduct does raise special concerns counseling hesitation, we hold that these concerns are coextensive with the protections afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause.”). The same goes for extraterritoriality. Having already concluded that the right applies extraterritorially, we think it is improper to treat the location of the injury as a factor counting against extension of the remedy. 13 Although the Supreme Court was not called upon to decide whether these same interests also extend to aliens outside the United States who are under the control of U.S. officers within the United States, we think the principle would be no different. The same concern for the protection of the rights of aliens applies with equal force here. 38 Case: 11-50792 Document: 00512681077 Page: 39 Date Filed: 06/30/2014 No. 11-50792 immigration laws. Where those who allege mistreatment have a right but lack a remedy, as here, the Supreme Court suggests that Congress would want some remedy to be available. Third, the case before us involves questions of precisely Bivens-like domestic law enforcement and nothing more. Mirmehdi implies that cases in the immigration context necessarily involve more than the “mere ‘disclosure of normal domestic law-enforcement priorities and techniques,’” 689 F.3d at 983 (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti–Discrim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490 (1999)). The Mirmehdi court asserts such cases “often involve ‘the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and . . . foreign-intelligence products.’” Id. (quoting Reno, 525 U.S. at 490). But nothing in this case bears out that assertion. To accept that conclusion would require us to abandon our prior case law, in which we have permitted Bivens actions to proceed against immigration officers. See Martinez–Aguero, 459 F.3d at 621–25; Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1374. We find no reason for giving immigration officers special solicitude now. In fact, this case presents a scenario not unlike that in Bivens. Just as the Seventh Circuit explained in extending a Bivens remedy for alleged Brady violations under the Due Process Clause, providing a remedy for a claim of gross physical abuse by a federal law enforcement officer presents “no great problem of judicial interference with the work of law enforcement, certainly no greater than the Fourth Amendment claim in Bivens.” See Engel, 710 F.3d at 708; cf. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Supreme Court should cease to extend Bivens actions beyond the “precise circumstances that [Bivens] involved”). In Bivens, the plaintiff brought his lawsuit against federal agents for their warrantless search of his apartment, but also for the unreasonable use of force in arresting him. See 403 U.S. 388, 389 (“[Bivens’s] complaint asserted that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, and that unreasonable force was employed in making the arrest; fairly read, it 39 Case: 11-50792 Document: 00512681077 Page: 40 Date Filed: 06/30/2014 No. 11-50792 alleges as well that the arrest was made without probable cause.” Here, too, Appellants allege the use of unreasonable force by federal agents. The only difference is that—for the reasons stated above—the Appellants must avail themselves of the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, “the legal standards for adjudicating the claim are well established and easily administrable.” Engel, 710 F.3d at 708; see Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 555 (“defining a workable cause of action” may be a special factor). Relatedly, we foresee no “deluge” of potential claimants availing themselves of this particular Bivens action. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 248 (rejecting argument that implying Bivens action would cause a deluge of claims). The standards for extraterritorial application of the constitutional right and the substantive definition of that right are so stringent that the creation of a damages remedy will already limit the size of any potential class of claimants under this Bivens action. Therefore, we extend a Bivens action in this specific context in which an individual located abroad asserts a right to be free from gross physical abuse under the Fifth Amendment against federal law enforcement agents located in the United States based on their conscience-shocking, excessive use of force across our nation’s borders.14