Opinion ID: 741729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of the Act, if Applied, to Jeffries

Text: 67 The parties were requested to brief and argue the impact of the Act, if applied, to Jeffries. Although we need not reach this issue because of our determination that the Act does not apply, we have elected to do so in the interest of completely deciding the issues presented and avoiding any further delay should our retroactivity analysis be altered by the Supreme Court in its pending decision in Lindh. 68 The Act amends 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to provide that no habeas relief may be granted to a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court unless the claimed error: 69 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 70 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 71 The Act requires us to give great deference to the state court's factual findings. Newly amended section 2254(e)(1) states:In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 72 Our sister circuits have examined standards of review under the Act, and we find their conclusions persuasive. State court conclusions of law, addressed by section 2254(d)(1), should be examined de novo. Lindh, 96 F.3d at 869; see Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 768. State court findings of fact must be given deference unless adjudication of the claim 'resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence [presented in the State court proceeding].'  Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 767 (quoting section 2254(d)(2)). Certainly, a state court factual determination is unreasonable if it is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists. Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 769; Moore v. Johnson, 101 F.3d 1069, 1076 (5th Cir.1996). As to more debatable factual determinations, the care with which the state court considered the subject may be important. Lindh, 96 F.3d at 871. [A] responsible, thoughtful answer reached after a full opportunity to litigate is adequate to support the judgment. Id. 73 In this case, there is no debate about whether one of the Washington Supreme Court's critical factual findings was correct. It unfortunately was not. The Washington Supreme Court denied relief on the juror misconduct issue because it found that the misconduct was not reported until over two and a half years after it occurred. See State v. Jeffries, 722 P.2d at 100-01 (Over two and a half years passed between the trial and the time the alleged misconduct was discovered, indicating that the jurors involved did not believe the misconduct to be significant.). Clear and convincing evidence to the contrary of this finding exists: Jeffries submitted an affidavit to the trial court by juror Kathleen Sims dated November 16, 1983, mere days after the jury verdict. Jeffries listed this affidavit as part of his designated appellate record in his direct appeal. Thus, the true facts were part of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings, as required by the Act. 19 Indeed, neither party disputes that the Washington Supreme Court factually erred on this pivotal point. 20 Because the linchpin of the court's reasoning depended upon a demonstrably erroneous factual finding, we must conclude that the Act would not prevent relief. 74 There is an additional reason why the Act would not preclude a federal habeas corpus remedy. In its 1986 decision, the Washington Supreme Court required Jeffries to show actual and substantial prejudice from the alleged juror misconduct. Jeffries, 722 P.2d at 100. This was error under the Supreme Court precedent in existence at the time. When the Washington Supreme Court made its decision, the Supreme Court was applying the harmless error standard found in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), to habeas cases. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). Under Chapman 's harmless error standard, constitutional error ... casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. The Washington Supreme Court erred in requiring Jeffries to shoulder the burden of proof on prejudice, contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 75 Thus, because the Washington Supreme Court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings and was contrary to clearly established federal law, the Act if applied would not preclude the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 21