Opinion ID: 2994259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Review Magistrate’s

Text: Recommendation Kruger’s counsel filed objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, admitting that she should have requested a second extension of time as soon as she realized she would not meet the deadline, but contending that the sanction of dismissal was too harsh. Despite the fact that in Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 241-42 (7th Cir. 1996), we clearly set out the method for calculating the date Kruger’s objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation were due, both parties and the district court failed to use the Lerro method. In this case, the magistrate judge mailed his recommendation to the parties on October 15. Under Rule 72, a party has 10 days after service to file objections. Lerro, 84 F.3d at 241-42. Rule 6(a) excludes Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays from the 10-day count. Id. at 242. Rule 72 also requires a magistrate judge to serve his recommendations on the parties, and, because in this case the magistrate judge did so by mail, Kruger had an additional three calendar days to file his objections as provided in Rule 6(e). Id. Here, because there were two weekends in the relevant 10-day period, 10 days plus three days turned into 17 calendar days. Id. In addition, because the 17th day fell on a Sunday, Rule 6(a) permitted Kruger to file his objections the next day on November 2. Id. Thus, Kruger missed the deadline by one day, filing his objections on November 3. The district court recognized that Kruger’s objections had merit, but concluded that, because they were not timely filed, it did not have to consider them or review the magistrate judge’s recommendation before adopting it. But, as Kruger points out, the 10-day deadline is not jurisdictional; thus, the district court was not barred from considering the late objections. See Hunger v. Leiniger, 15 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 1994). In reaching its decision, the district court overlooked the fact that we declined to extend our rule barring appeal when objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation are not filed with the district judge to a case in which the filing was not egregiously late and caused not even the slightest prejudice to the appellees. Hunger, 15 F.3d at 668. In Hunger we concluded that objections filed three weeks after the magistrate issued his recommendation were not egregiously late. By comparison, Kruger filed his objections only a day late. Moreover, the SSA does not assert that it was prejudiced by Kruger’s late filing. Under Hunger, the district court should have considered Kruger’s objections. This would have obligated the district judge to review de novo anything Kruger objected to in the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). But even without considering the objections, the district judge should have reviewed the magistrate judge’s recommendation for clear error. Id. Under either the de novo or clear error standard of review, the district court should have rejected the recommendation because, as we will explain, the district court did not give Kruger’s counsel the requisite warning before dismissing his case for failure to prosecute.