Opinion ID: 2162639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: This brings us to the challenged competency of plaintiffs' witness, Ralph West, to testify as an expert.

Text: He, as heretofore revealed, had been employed as a manager of farm mortgage holdings by an insurance company for 21 years. That work required loan values of given properties be evaluated and determined by him. Mr. West, a member of Farm Managers Rural Appraisers, and Iowa State Association of Rural Appraisers, had also effected appraisals for the highway commission, estates, and private individuals. This witness summarized his qualifications by relating he had been engaged in land appraisal work for 21 years, was personally acquainted with the Townsend property, and had heard the testimony of the geologist concerning limestone deposits. On voir dire by defendant, Mr. West stated, only one prior appraisal of limestone laden property had been made by him, and he had no knowledge of geology, rock formations or quarry properties. Defendant objected to any evidence by this witness concerning value of limestone, and requested he be restricted to value of the land as farm property. That objection was overruled. The witness then testified, in appraising property he uses either the market or economic value. He knew of no comparable sales of farms with limestone deposits and related that in appraising plaintiffs' farm he used economic value, defined by him as the best use of the property based on a period of years coupled with average prices and management. When asked to give his opinion of the value of Townsends' land, including existent limestone as testified to by the economic geologist, supra, he stated, as aforesaid, the before and after taking values respectively were $157,000 and $30,000. As best we can determine, defendant now argues Mr. West was not qualified to express an opinion based in part on presence of limestone deposits. In that regard it is well established, in this jurisdiction, the admission or exclusion of expert opinion testimony rests largely in the discretion of trial court, and we will not interfere unless a clear abuse thereof is shown. Dougherty v. Boyken, Iowa, 155 N.W.2d 488, 491; Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, supra, 254 Iowa 1301, 1307, 121 N.W.2d 205; and Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 342, 5 N.W.2d 646. Also, in Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., supra, 232 Iowa at 344, 5 N.W.2d at 655, this court said: An expert's opinion is received because and whenever his knowledge of the subject matter is greater than the jury's, and aids them or is proper or essential to their information   . More recently we defined an expert as one so qualified by study, training, or experience in a particular subject or field of endeavor that he has acquired such special knowledge as will enable him to form a definite opinion of his own on matters which persons lacking knowledge or training cannot correctly decide. Dougherty v. Boyken, supra, at 155 N.W.2d 490. With regard to the matter at hand see also Marean v. Petersen, 259 Iowa 557, 563-564, 144 N.W.2d 906. Unquestionably Mr. West was a professional in the field of land values and had familiarized himself with the Townsend property, including existence of limestone. Under these circumstances we find no abuse of discretion by trial court in permitting this witness to express his opinion relative to value of the property in question. This, in turn, serves to dispose of defendant's objections to the testimony of other expert witnesses called by plaintiff. IV. Defendant next argues the court erred in refusing to grant a new trial because of claimed misconduct of three jurors in driving past plaintiffs' farm. Defendant filed affidavits given by two of these jurors. A court hearing followed concerning this matter. One juror, Melvin Lehrman, stated that during a trial recess he and two other jurors, having some spare time, decided to drive out and locate the Townsend farm. When asked if viewing the property had anything to do with his decision he answered in the negative. Testimony of another juror, Glenn Dierks, was substantially the same as Mr. Lehrman's. Mr. Dierks also said he was not sure they actually saw the subject property. While driving past what they supposed to be the land in question he saw different colored fence posts, assumed by him to denote the presence of a pipeline. The third juror, Delmar Frick, like Mr. Dierks, was not sure he saw plaintiffs' farm. Additionally he said that merely driving past the property did not influence his verdict. Trial court heard this testimony, observed the parties testifying, and found the trial recess trip did not influence these jurors in arriving at a verdict. Dealing with a comparable situation we said in Mead v. Scott, 256 Iowa 1285, 1290, 130 N.W.2d 641, 644: Of course it was misconduct for the three jurors to visit the place of the accident. Rule 194, Rules of Civil Procedure, in pertinent part, provides: `When the court deems proper, it may order an officer to conduct the jury in a body to view any    place where a material fact occurred, and show it to them.' But misconduct of the jury is not a ground for new trial unless it `materially affected    substantial rights' of the `aggrieved party' or `prevented the movant from having a fair trial' (rule 244, R.C.P.). We have held many times that to justify a new trial because of misconduct of jurors it must appear the misconduct was calculated to, and it is reasonably probable did, influence the verdict. Also that the trial court has a good deal of discretion in passing on such a ground. We will not interfere with his ruling unless it is reasonably clear such discretion has been abused. (Authorities cited.) The trial court presumably found the jurors' misconduct probably did not influence the verdict or prevent plaintiff from receiving a fair trial. It does not clearly appear this was an abuse of discretion. Furthermore misconduct on the part of the three jurors in driving past plaintiffs' farm is not alone sufficient to warrant a new trial. It must also appear prejudice resulted therefrom, and defendant was thereby prevented from having a fair trial. See State v. Little, Iowa, 164 N.W.2d 81, 83. Trial court found no prejudice was shown. We agree, and now hold, trial court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on this ground. V. Next to be considered is defendant's contention, trial court erroneously permitted plaintiffs to amend their petition the morning trial commenced. As heretofore stated the amendment increased damages claimed from $29,000 to $125,000, and defendant argues this served to substantially change the issues. We are not so persuaded. Rule 88, R.C.P., 58 I.C.A. provides: Any pleading may be amended before a pleading has been filed responding to it. The court, in furtherance of justice, may allow later amendments, including those to conform to the proof and which do not substantially change the claim or defense. The court may impose terms, or grant a continuance with or without terms, as a condition of such allowance. On the subject at hand we said in Dailey v. Holiday Distributing Corporation, Iowa, 151 N.W.2d 477, 482: A trial court has broad discretion in permitting or denying amendments and unless the discretion is abused we will not interfere. And to allow is the rule, not the exception. See Claeys v. Moldenschardt, Iowa, 148 N.W.2d 479, 483; Durant Elevator Co. v. S. J. Hoffman & Sons, Iowa, 145 N.W.2d 25, 26-27; and Webber v. E. K. Larimer Hardware Co., 234 Iowa 1381, 1389, 15 N.W.2d 286. However, an amendment should not be permitted under rule 88, R.C.P., if it materially changes the issues involved. Determination of damage resulting from a partial taking of plaintiffs' land was the sole issue presented by the original petition. That was the same issue after amendment. We therefore find no abuse of discretion by trial court in permitting plaintiffs to amend. In support hereof see Arenson v. Butterworth, 243 Iowa 880, 891, 54 N.W.2d 557.