Opinion ID: 527085
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discrimination and Tort Claims

Text: 24 Preemption under section 301 extends beyond claims for breach of contract. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394, 107 S.Ct. at 2430 (Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims 'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.' ). Allis-Chalmers makes clear that 'the pre-emptive effect of Sec. 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations' to encompass suits under state tort law that 'would frustrate the federal labor-contract scheme established in Sec. 301.'  Bale, 795 F.2d at 780 (citations omitted; quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209-10, 105 S.Ct. at 1910-11). Although section 301 does not preempt every employment dispute tangentially involving a provision of a collective bargaining agreement, Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211, 105 S.Ct. at 1911; Newberry, 854 F.2d at 1147, state claims that require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at 1885; DeLapp v. Continental Can Co., 868 F.2d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir.1989), or depend substantially upon analysis of a collective bargaining agreement's terms, Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. at 1915; Newberry, 854 F.2d at 1147, are preempted. 25 Wrongful Discharge In Violation of Public Policy 26 Jackson alleges a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy under Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 (1980), in count five. Jackson claims his wrongful termination violates the state's public policy against racial discrimination. 27 A claim that a discharge violates public policy is preempted ... if it is not based on any genuine state public policy, or if it is bound up with interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and furthers no state policy independent of the employment relationship. Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 1002 (9th Cir.1987) (citations omitted). [A] claim is not preempted if it poses no significant threat to the collective bargaining process and furthers a state interest in protecting the public transcending the employment relationship. Id. at 1001. 28 There is little doubt that California has adopted a public policy against discrimination in the work place. Cal. Gov't Code Sec. 12920 (West 1980) provides in part: 29 It is hereby declared as the public policy of this state that it is necessary to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age. 30 Id. Section 12940 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge the person from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment on the basis of race. Cal. Gov't Code Sec. 12940(a) (West Supp.1989). Additionally, enforcement of the state discrimination statutes would not require interpretation of any of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 237 Cal.Rptr. 884 (1987) (applying federal Title VII analysis to discrimination claim under section 12940). 31 The district court therefore erred in concluding that Jackson's wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim is preempted. In so holding we do not infer, nor need we, that a common law claim of discrimination may be pursued independent of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. See Salgado v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 823 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.1987) (there is no common law cause of action for employment discrimination in California); but see Rojo v. Kliger, 209 Cal.App.3d 10, 257 Cal.Rptr. 158 (FHEA does not displace any causes of action and remedies which are otherwise available), rev. granted, 260 Cal.Rptr. 266, 775 P.2d 1035 (1989). We merely hold that if a common law cause of action does exist, it would not be preempted. 32 Discrimination Under Cal. Gov't Code Sec. 12940 33 Jackson alleges in count one that the conduct of the other employees of SCGC towards him was racially motivated in violation of Cal. Gov't Code Sec. 12940. This claim is not preempted for the same reason his claim for wrongful discharge based on a violation of public policy was not preempted. See Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir.1988) (claim of handicap discrimination under section 12940 not preempted by section 301 because protection against handicap discrimination is defined and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement); see also Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1285, 1286-87 (9th Cir.1989) (age discrimination claim under section 12940 not preempted by section 301 because the right not to be discriminated against is defined under state law without reference to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement); cf. Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 549 (9th Cir.1988) (claim brought under Oregon's discrimination statute not preempted because Oregon's antidiscrimination statute has been construed by the Oregon Supreme Court to involve standards independent of a collective bargaining agreement). 34 Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 35 Jackson alleges in count three that SCGC breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to him under California common law. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1988). 36 A claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is preempted by section 301 when an employee has comparable job security under a collective bargaining agreement. Chmiel, 873 F.2d at 1286; Newberry, 854 F.2d at 1147; Young, 830 F.2d at 999-1000; Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663,667-69 (9th Cir.1985). 37 As Jackson himself recognizes, the collective bargaining agreement permits discharge for cause only, and sets forth in great detail in section 12.03 what conduct will give rise to dismissal. The collective bargaining agreement therefore provides comparable job security and the breach of the implied covenant is preempted. Constructive Wrongful/Tortious Discharge 38 The second count alleging constructive wrongful/tortious discharge is also preempted by section 301. In this cause of action, Jackson alleges that he had a contract of employment with SCGC for an indefinite term, and that he could not be dismissed except for good cause. He again cites to section 12.03 of the collective bargaining agreement in support of his claim. Because this claim requires construction of the terms and conditions of employment set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, it is preempted. Defamation/Libel and Slander 39 Jackson alleges that he was defamed by the statements made by several SCGC employees accusing him of embezzlement, sexual harassment, and poor work performance. Jackson alleges that these statements were made public, although he does not state exactly how. 40 In Tellez v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 908, 108 S.Ct. 251, 98 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987), we held that a defamation claim under California state law was not preempted. Id. at 538. The employee in Tellez alleged that he had been defamed as a result of the distribution of copies of a letter falsely accusing him of buying cocaine on the job. Id. We stated that: 41 This claim neither asserts rights deriving from the collective bargaining agreement, nor requires interpretation of the agreement's terms. California's defamation law establishes nonnegotiable rights and obligations independent of any labor contract. One can sue for defamation regardless of employment status or union membership. 42 Id. 43 As in Tellez, Jackson's claim does not implicate the collective bargaining agreement. Although it is not clear exactly how the alleged accusations were disseminated, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to Jackson, the accusations do not appear to have been made pursuant to any requirements of the disciplinary procedures. Cf. Shane v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir.1989) (finding defamation claim preempted because alleged statements were contained in notices of intent to discipline and discharge notices required under the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore involved interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement). Accordingly, Jackson's defamation claim does not require interpretation of the agreement and is not preempted. 44 Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 45 Jackson's claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress are based on the same conduct alleged in support of his other claims. Several of the actions relied upon by Jackson require analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. For example, the claims that he was accused of unsatisfactory work, of being a trouble maker, harassing other employees, and of other dishonest acts all relate to matters of discipline governed by section 12 of the collective bargaining agreement. Because disputes concerning the employment relationship are governed by the collective bargaining agreement, they are preempted by federal labor law. See Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir.1985); see also Shane, 868 F.2d at 1063; Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir.1988); Young, 830 F.2d at 1002; Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir.); cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986, 108 S.Ct. 504, 98 L.Ed.2d 502 (1987). 46 In contrast to the collective bargaining agreement in Tellez, the collective bargaining agreement here contains detailed provisions governing the types of activities alleged by Jackson in support of his intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. See Hyles, 849 F.2d at 1216 n. 3 (distinguishing Tellez ); see also Shane, 868 F.2d at 1063 (finding of no preemption in Tellez hinged upon the fact that Tellez's CBA 'is silent on work conditions, and vague on disciplining formalities' ). 47 Jackson contends that his emotional distress claims escape preemption under Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977). The Farmer test, however, no longer applies in section 301 cases. See Hyles, 849 F.2d at 1216-17 (Farmer test inapplicable to section 301 cases after Allis-Chalmers ).