Opinion ID: 900396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Guilty Plea Waives Right to Remove Judge

Text: [¶ 9.] Although some situations will permit late filing of affidavits for change of judge (SDCL 15-12-28), parties waive the right to disqualify judges to whom they submit argument or proof in support of a motion or application[.] SDCL 15-12-24. [1] The question here is whether a guilty plea is a submission. Our procedural rules give no explicit answer. [¶ 10.] Out-of-state authority provides little assistance because other jurisdictions have dissimilar recusal statutes. In reviewing those cases, nonetheless, we see that some courts find a distinction between a defendant offering a guilty plea and a court accepting that plea. Those decisions are based on statutory language allowing removal of a judge before a matter is called for trial or a contested issue is determined. [2] Our rule makes the triggering event the submission of argument or proof. Although it was not until after his change of judge request that Burgers' plea was accepted, it was before the request that his plea was submitted. [¶ 11.] South Dakota law expressly sanctions delayed acceptance of a guilty plea. Under SDCL 23A-7-14 (Rule 11(f)), [t]he court shall defer acceptance of any plea except a plea of nolo contendere until it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the offense charged or to which the defendant pleads. (Emphasis added.) The court may not enter a judgment unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for any plea except a plea of nolo contendere. SDCL 23A-7-2 (Rule 11(a)). Furthermore, the court may accept or reject the [plea] agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report. SDCL 23A-7-9 (Rule 11(e)(2))(emphasis added). These enactments contemplate no change of judge while acceptance of a plea is delayed. On the contrary, deferment allows a judge further time to consider the matter. [3] Here, both sides agreed to reserve inquiry into the factual basis until the sentencing date. [¶ 12.] In State v. Chamley, 1997 SD 107, ¶ 42, 568 N.W.2d 607, 619, we held that the submittal of motions and an attempt to argue their merits constitute a waiver of the right to seek recusal. Waiver affixed though the court made no ruling on any pending motion. Id. Likewise, we interpret the recusal waiver rule as not requiring a court to accept a plea before it is considered a submission. A guilty plea is proof on an application which a court may reject, accept, or defer. With a plea of guilty the prosecutor's burden of proof is relieved, and thus the plea is itself proof or its equivalent. [¶ 13.] Here, we are interpreting our own rules, not legislative enactments, but we see no reason to depart from established canons. Our aim in interpretation, discovering intent, should not be limited to reading bare language; we must also reflect upon the purpose of the [rule], the matter sought to be corrected and the goal to be attained. De Smet Ins. Co. of South Dakota v. Gibson, 1996 SD 102, ¶ 7, 552 N.W.2d 98, 100 (citations omitted). The purpose behind our peremptory recusal rules is to allow removal of a judge without stating any reason if a party entertains concern about a judge's impartiality. Once a party puts a matter before a judge, however, judicial economy and fairness to the other parties require that it remain there. Presiding Judge Meierhenry did not err in disallowing the affidavit for change of judge.