Opinion ID: 2626390
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable and Mistaken Belief in Consent

Text: In discussing felony-murder-rape instructions bearing on the first degree murder charge, the trial court told counsel that it would not instruct on whether defendant acted with an actual and reasonable, but mistaken, belief that Carol consented to sexual intercourse. (See People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 360-361, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961; People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153-158, 125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337; CALJIC No. 10.65.) According to the court, no evidence supported such a defense, and only straight consent could counter the prosecution's claim that defendant forcibly raped Carol. The court cited defendant's statements to police that Carol agreed to have vaginal sex, and that they only fought afterwards about going to another bar. Defense counsel urged the court to change its mind and to include CALJIC No. 10.65 in its felony-murder-rape instructions. When asked to explain this request, counsel pointed to Carol's intoxicated state. Counsel theorized that, because intoxication presumably impaired Carol's ability to communicate, defendant could have believed she consented to vaginal sex even if she did not. However, the court found no evidentiary support for this view. The court returned to its earlier theme that either defendant murdered Carol in the commission of a forcible rape, or she actually consented to vaginal intercourse and clearly communicated that fact to him. Undaunted, defense counsel also asked for CALJIC No. 10.65 as part of the sodomy-murder special-circumstance instructions. The court said it was not prepared to discuss that matter, and that only the felony-murder-rape instructions were under review at that time. A confusing exchange then occurred in which counsel apparently agreed to save arguments concerning the special circumstance allegation until later (Okay), but in which the court seemed to either misstate or misunderstand counsel's position concerning the requested instruction (I agree with you it doesn't apply to the rape). In any event, consistent with its own views on the subject, the court declined to give CALJIC No. 10.65 as part of the felony-murder-rape instructions. Regarding the latter theory of first degree murder, the lone consent instruction the court ultimately gave was CALJIC No. 1.23.1, which speaks in terms of a sexual act freely, voluntarily, and knowingly performed. (See § 261.6.) Defendant now asserts the trial court erred in rejecting his request for a mistake of fact instruction as to the forcible rape of Carol. Defendant renews his claim that Carol's impaired state might have made it seem like she consented to vaginal sex even if she did not. The court's decision allegedly violated defendant's right to present a defense, to trial by jury, and to due process under the federal Constitution. [19] The mistake-of-fact defense reflected in CALJIC No. 10.65 has two components. First, the defendant must have honestly and in good faith, albeit mistakenly, believed that the victim consented to sexual intercourse. ( People v. Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th 354, 360-361, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961, fn. omitted.) This subjective component involves evidence of equivocal conduct by the victim that the defendant mistook for consent. ( Id. at p. 361, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961.) Second, an objective component asks whether the defendant's mistaken belief regarding consent was reasonable under the circumstances. ( Ibid. ) In order to give such an instruction upon request, the trial court must find substantial evidence supporting each feature of the defense. ( Ibid; see People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 424, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1 [sua sponte duty to so instruct].) Any error was harmless. The trial court ultimately granted defendant's request for CALJIC No. 10.65 in connection with the sodomy-murder special-circumstance allegation. This instruction said that defendant would lack the requisite intent and would not be guilty of the crime of sodomy if he possessed a reasonable and good faith belief that [Carol] voluntarily consented to engage in sodomy. (CALJIC No. 10.65 (1990 rev.).) Jurors unanimously found the special circumstance allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, they necessarily rejected mistake of fact as a defense to unlawful sodomy. Because the rape and sodomy were closely connected in their commission, we conclude that, under any applicable standard, the jury would not have reached a different conclusion under CALJIC No. 10.65 as to first degree felony murder than it reached as to the felony-murder special circumstance. On this basis, we reject the claim of reversible instructional error.