Opinion ID: 6330595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arson and Arson Conspiracy Convictions

Text: Appellants also appeal their convictions for arson and conspiracy to commit arson, as charged in Counts 17 and 18. They challenge an aspect of the jury instruction on the substantive offense as well as the sufficiency of the proof for the conspiracy offense. We will start with the challenge to the jury charge. “We review challenged jury instructions de novo but will reverse only if all of the instructions, taken as a whole, caused a defendant prejudice.” United States v. Afriyie, 929 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). The defendant has the “burden to show prejudice.” Id. “A jury instruction is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law.” Id. (quotations and alteration omitted). Appellants first argue that the District Court erred by instructing the jury that it could find Appellants guilty of substantive arson as reasonably foreseeable 32 to the illegal gambling conspiracy, based on a theory of liability under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). A Pinkerton charge “informs the jury that it may find a defendant guilty of a substantive offense that he did not personally commit if it was committed by a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, and if commission of that offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiratorial agreement.” United States v. McCoy, 995 F.3d 32, 63 (2d Cir. 2021). For a substantive offense taken by a coconspirator to be reasonably foreseeable, it must be “a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.” United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648). Over Appellants’ objections, the District Court instructed the jury that it could find Gershman or Tsvetkov guilty of substantive arson, as charged in Count 18, if it found that (1) the charged arson, i.e., the arson at the Voorhies Avenue Poker Spot, was committed by a member of the arson conspiracy or the illegal gambling conspiracy, (2) the arson was committed pursuant to a common plan and understanding as part of that conspiracy, (3) the defendant was a member of the conspiracy when the arson was committed, and (4) the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that arson might be committed by his coconspirator. The District Court further defined an offense as being reasonably foreseeable “if it is a 33 natural or necessary consequence of the unlawful agreement.” App’x 2098. This was a legally accurate Pinkerton instruction. But in Appellants’ view, the District Court erred in delivering this instruction because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the illegal gambling conspiracy would lead to the arson. 9 The trial testimony allowed the jury to conclude otherwise. Gershman and Tsvetkov were both at the meeting that planned the arson to protect their illegal gambling operation. At that meeting, Zelinger said that the Voorhies Avenue Poker Spot was a “problem” that “needed to [be] fix[ed]” because it competed with their nearby Coney Island Poker Spot. Id. at 583. The coconspirators then discussed several violent options to deal with this problem, including arson. And the arson plan was in fact adopted at this meeting, with two of the attendees identified as the arsonists. In other words, Gershman and Tsvetkov were both at (and in fact facilitated) a meeting where the attendees discussed how committing arson could “shut down” a competing gambling location and therefore help their own illegal gambling establishment, with the decision made to commit arson by the conclusion of the meeting. A 9 Appellants objected to a Pinkerton charge as to the illegal gambling conspiracy only, not as to the arson conspiracy. 34 rational juror could therefore conclude that the arson was a “natural consequence of the” gambling conspiracy. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648. 10 Appellants resist this conclusion by arguing that the Government’s description of reasonable foreseeability during its closing argument “compound[ed] the erroneous [jury] instruction” by misstating the elements necessary for Pinkerton liability. Gershman Opening Br. 32. During his closing argument, the prosecutor analogized Pinkerton liability to choosing among dinner options with friends: You are with your friends talking about dinner. You suggest Chinese food, but all your other friends suggest pizza. You don’t object. Later that night, your friends buy a pizza. That was reasonably foreseeable to you. That’s a natural consequence of that discussion. App’x 1977. In essence, the prosecutor offered an analogy to show that, even if Appellants did not expressly agree to the arson plot, it was reasonably foreseeable to them that their coconspirators would commit the arson to further the gambling conspiracy after they heard their coconspirators lay out the arson plan and did not 10 The evidence about what happened at this meeting came from a cooperating witness, Yusufov, who testified at trial that he was present at this meeting. Appellants go to great lengths to urge us to reject Yusufov’s testimony, arguing that another testifying attendee did not share Yusufov’s recollection. We will not do so. In reviewing a jury verdict, we “draw[] all inferences in the government’s favor and defer[] to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’ credibility.” Parkes, 497 F.3d at 225 (quotations omitted). 35 object. This analogy did not misstate reasonable foreseeability for purposes of criminal liability under Pinkerton. Moreover, even if there were flaws in the analogy, Appellants do not meet their “heavy burden” of showing that the prosecutor’s misstatement was “so severe and significant as to result in the denial of [the] right to a fair trial.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). “[T]he Government has broad latitude in the inferences it may reasonably suggest to the jury during summation.” Id. at 87 (quotations omitted). And given the legally correct jury instruction and the strong evidence of reasonable foreseeability, the single analogy did not “rise to the level of prejudicial error.” Id. at 86 (quotations omitted). 11 For many of the same reasons, Appellants’ challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their arson conspiracy convictions fare no better. To convict someone for conspiracy, “the government must present some evidence 11 In any event, any error in including the illegal gambling conspiracy in the Pinkerton charge would be harmless. Appellants were found guilty of arson conspiracy, and the arson was clearly a reasonably foreseeable result of that conspiracy. Also, because Appellants cannot overcome harmless error review, we need not address the Government’s argument that Appellants failed to preserve their challenge to the prosecutor’s analogy, thus triggering plain error review. 36 from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it.” Anderson, 747 F.3d at 60 (quotations omitted). The Government may show “the defendant’s knowing participation in a conspiracy through circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted). Relevant circumstantial evidence includes “a defendant’s association with conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy” and “his presence at critical stages of the conspiracy that cannot be explained by happenstance.” Id. (quotations omitted). The Government presented ample evidence to convict Gershman and Tsvetkov of an arson conspiracy. Again, Gershman and Tsvetkov joined in a meeting to discuss how to address the problem they were facing as a result of competition from the Voorhies Avenue Poker Spot. Gershman began the meeting by having everyone turn off their phones, which, as Yusufov explained, Gershman would do whenever they were having “meeting[s] about . . . street stuff.” App’x 583. After Zelinger proposed setting the Voorhies Avenue Poker Spot on fire, Tsvetkov asked who would set the fire, with two other attendees soon being identified as the would-be arsonists. Gershman and Tsvetkov then both “nodded” their assent to the plan. App’x 589. This evidence allowed a reasonable juror to 37 conclude that Appellants agreed with the arson plan. See United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[A] federal conviction may be supported by the uncorroborated testimony of even a single accomplice if that testimony is not incredible on its face.” (quotations and alteration omitted)). Nor did the Pinkerton instruction, as Appellants claim, risk having the jury “mistakenly infer the existence of the arson conspiracy from the combination of the substantive arson and the admitted membership in the gambling conspiracy.” Gershman Opening Br. 36. In making this argument, Appellants point to language in United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974), where we counseled against giving Pinkerton instructions when the jury would need to resort to Pinkerton’s inverse—that membership in the conspiracy must “be inferred largely from the series of criminal offenses committed”—to convict a defendant for conspiracy. See id. at 1342. But as discussed, evidence that Appellants took part in the arson conspiracy was strong—and the evidence of their participation in the gambling conspiracy was overwhelming. Thus, Sperling’s caution does not fit this case. See United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1050 (2d Cir. 1976) (rejecting Sperling challenge when evidence that defendant was a conspiracy member was “overwhelming”). 38 We therefore affirm Appellants’ arson and conspiracy to commit arson convictions.