Opinion ID: 1980089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: post-verdict communications with jurors

Text: One further matter deserves comment. In its order denying plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, the trial court criticized the current lack of guidelines concerning post-verdict communications with jurors by attorneys and their investigators. The lower court stated that it may be appropriate at this time to set forth certain guidelines which should be followed in cases of alleged jury bias or misconduct. The court went on to state: The current practice seems to permit litigants to approach jurors and subject them to interrogation by attorneys and their investigators concerning their conduct as jurors. The better practice would be to bring a matter of juror bias or misconduct to the attention of the Court so that examination could occur in the presence of counsel and the trial judge to assure proper safeguards. A record could then be presented to the appellate court if the decision is appealed. The State of Minnesota has such a procedure which[,] rather than permit the promiscuous interrogation of jurors by a litigant, brings the matter to the attention of the trial court permitting further examinations under proper safeguards. [Citing Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Company, 258 Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301 (1960), and its progeny.] Our courts have a responsibility to protect jurors from extensive ex parte interrogation by an attorney (or the attorney's representative) who has reason to believe that juror misconduct has occurred. [24] As we discussed in Section I, our policy preventing examination of the mental processes of jury deliberations is long-standing and is accorded great weight. Our rule prevents use of juror affidavits to impeach a verdict except where the alleged misconduct is based upon extraneous prejudicial information, outside influence, or a chance verdict. The purpose of our rule is clear: The jury must be unfettered in its discussions and protected from annoyance and harassment. But when a rule prevents the use of certain evidence obtained from a juror but does not reasonably limit the gathering of the evidence, the protections provided by the rule often become illusory. In light of the strong policy considerations underlying Rule 606(b), the great potential for harm, and the recent increase in attempts to impeach jury verdicts, [25] it may be necessary to develop an appropriate rule concerning access to jurors following their rendering of a verdict. But absent extraordinary circumstances, we do not believe it appropriate to change on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis rules of procedure or evidence that have been formally adopted; we have a procedure in place for doing so under which full opportunity for discussion and comment is afforded to the entire profession and to the public. Changes in rules are normally accomplished through the Joint Procedure Committee, a standing committee of the Supreme Court. See NDRPR § 8. Change by committee will not be as quick, but the benefit of speed is easily overcome by the greater benefit resulting from thorough deliberation and the combined wisdom of a broad spectrum of the bench and bar. [26] The judgment, the order denying the motion for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the order denying costs and disbursements to plaintiffs and granting taxation of costs against them are affirmed. MESCHKE, J., and GLASER, HODNY and PAULSON, District Judges, concur. GLASER, HODNY, and PAULSON, District Judges, participated in place of ERICKSTAD, C.J., and GIERKE and LEVINE, JJ., disqualified.