Opinion ID: 1355148
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Indictment and Constructive Amendment

Text: Hunter argues that the district court constructively amended the indictment when it instructed the jury on count three, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and alternatively that count three is void for failing to state a federal offense. Because Hunter did not raise these challenges in district court, we review for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Under plain-error review, before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) `error,' (2) that is `plain,' and (3) that `affect[s] substantial rights.' Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544. The phrase affects substantial rights means in most cases ... that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544. As we explained in United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925 (6th Cir.2004), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) contains two separate offenses: one for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and one for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Use, we explained, is a higher standard of conduct than possession, but in furtherance of is a higher standard of participation than during and in relation to. Thus, in Combs we held that the district court constructively amended count four of the indictment when the defendant was charged with the possession crime, but the jury instructions mixed in the lower standard of participation from the use crime and the court ultimately issued a judgment against Combs for the use offense. Id. at 936. Thus, the district court literally altered the indictment, and Combs was convicted of a crime that was not the subject of his indictment. We held this to be plain error because it directly violated the fifth amendment's guarantee that a defendant be held answerable only for those charges levied by a grand jury. Id. at 935. Likewise, in United States v. Castano, 543 F.3d 826 (6th Cir.2008), we held that a constructive amendment of the indictment occurred when the defendant was charged with a use crime, but the jury instructions, verdict form, and judgment characterized the crime as possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. This not only cross-matched the elements of the distinct possession and use crimes as in Combs, we observed, it omitted the words and in relation to from the correct standard and thus stated an erroneous, non-existent standard of participation. Id. at 837. [2] Because we found these errors to create significant doubt that the jury convicted Castano of an offense that § 924(c) criminalizes, we held the district court committed plain error and reversed Castano's § 924(c) conviction. Id. Hunter's prosecution for count three was rife with errors similar to those we found to be plain in Combs and Castano. To begin with, count three of the indictment incorrectly charged Hunter with a possession offense, as it alleged that Hunter possessed a firearm both during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense and in furtherance of a drug offense. This error in the indictment carried over into Hunter's trial, when the district court erroneously informed the jury that Hunter was charged with possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and mixed in this lower standard of participation in its instructions along with the correct one. This error was compounded in the verdict form given to the jury in this case, which characterized count three as possession of a firearm during a drug offense. The jury subsequently reported a finding of guilt for possession of a firearm during a drug offense, and the district court entered a judgment against Hunter for possession of a firearm during a drug offense. As we noted in United States v. Castano, 543 F.3d 826, 837 (6th Cir.2008), during a drug offense is an erroneous, non-existent standard of participation, and possession of a firearm during a drug offense is a non-existent crime. Assuming that count three of the indictment against Hunter adequately charges him with a crime to begin with, [3] we believe the proceedings at Hunter's trial amended the indictment. Here, as in Combs, the district court erroneously informed the jury that Hunter was charged with possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and mixed in this lower standard of participation in its instructions. More troubling still, as in Castano, the verdict form in this case characterized count three as possession of a firearm during a drug offense, and the jury reported a finding of guilt for possession of a firearm during a drug offense, which is not federal offense. Finally, and beyond both Combs and Castano, the district court here issued a final judgment in a criminal case in count three for possession of a firearm during a drug offense. As we explained in Castano, no such crime exists in federal law. These errors create more than significant doubt that the jury convicted [the defendant] of an offense that § 924(c) criminalizes, Castano, 543 F.3d at 837; they confirm that the jury convicted Hunter of a non-existent offense. Hunter was not indicted for possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, nor could he be. So under Combs and Castano it was plain error to subsequently obtain a jury verdict and judgment against Hunter for the same. Doing so directly infringe[d] upon the Fifth Amendment guarantee to hold [him] answerable only for those charges levied by a grand jury. Combs, 369 F.3d at 935; Castano, 543 F.3d at 835 (quoting Combs ). Accordingly, we reverse Hunter's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).