Opinion ID: 2552144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: ¶ 12. Bell and Morse rely on Mississippi Code Section 43-21-151 to support their position. The statute states, in pertinent part, that: (1) The youth court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning a delinquent child, a child in need of supervision, a neglected child, an abused child or a dependent child except in the following circumstances: ... (c) When a charge of abuse of a child first arises in the course of a custody action between the parents of the child already pending in the chancery court and no notice of such abuse was provided prior to such chancery proceedings, the chancery court may proceed with the investigation, hearing and determination of such abuse charge as a part of its hearing and determination of the custody issue as between the parents, notwithstanding the other provisions of the Youth Court Law.... Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-151(1)(c) (Rev. 2009); see also Helmert v. Biffany, 842 So.2d 1287, 1290-1292 (¶¶ 14-20) (Miss. 2003). ¶ 13. Mississippi Code Section 43-21-301 (Rev.2009) provides that [n]o court other than the youth court shall issue an arrest warrant or custody order for a child in a matter in which the youth court has exclusive original jurisdiction but shall refer the matter to the youth court. The youth court's jurisdiction of a case continues until the child's twentieth birthday,  unless sooner terminated by order of the youth court.  Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-151(2) (Rev.2009) (emphasis added). ¶ 14. Because the case was initiated in youth court, Bell and Morse argue that the youth court had exclusive and priority jurisdiction of the matter. Although Bell and Morse requested that the case be transferred to chancery court, they argue that the youth court erred in granting their request. ¶ 15. Bell and Morse cite K.M.K. v. S.L.M. ex rel. J.H., 775 So.2d 115 (Miss. 2000), to support their position. In K.M.K., a youth court had placed a child in foster care. Id. at 116 (¶ 2). The foster parents had attempted to terminate the natural mother's visitation rights in youth court without success. Id. at 117 (¶ 4). Thereafter, the foster parents had filed a petition to terminate the natural mother's and father's rights in chancery court. Id. at 116 (¶ 3). The mother had filed a motion to dismiss the action, alleging that jurisdiction was improper in the chancery court. Id. at 117 (¶ 4). The chancellor had denied the mother's motion to dismiss. Id. at 117 (¶ 5). The case came before this Court on interlocutory appeal. Id. ¶ 16. In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that: a chancery court may not exercise jurisdiction over any abused or neglected child or any proceeding pertaining thereto over which the youth court may exercise jurisdiction if there has been a prior proceeding in the youth court concerning that same child. Id. at 118 (¶ 10). The Court further explained that its holding upholds the plain meaning of the statute, prevents forum shopping and potentially conflicting orders, and promote[s] judicial economy by allowing a court already familiar with the parties and situations to hear all petitions dealing with those same parties and situations. Id. at 118 (¶ 12). ¶ 17. The present case is distinguishable. Although the negligence action concerning Baby Dennis initially was brought in youth court, the youth court voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction of the custody matter. Bell and Morse filed their petition for coguardianship in chancery court, one day before the youth-court hearing. At the time, their filing was not an appropriate remedy for seeking relief. But during the youth-court hearing, Bell and Morse informed the youth court of their chancery-court filing and requested that the custody matter be transferred to chancery court. ¶ 18. The youth court very well could have denied Bell's and Morse's request and retained jurisdiction of the case. See Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-151(1)(c) (Rev. 2009). Instead, the youth court agreed with Bell and Morse, finding that it lacked the ability to provide long-term relief to the parties. The youth court did not explain why it could not provide long-term relief. But the Court notes the frequency of periodic review of youth-court orders. For instance, Mississippi Code Section 43-21-613(3)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: Unless the youth court's jurisdiction has been terminated, all disposition orders for supervision, probation or placement of a child with an individual or an agency shall be reviewed by the youth court judge or referee at least annually to determine if continued placement, probation or supervision is in the best interest of the child or the public. For children who have been adjudicated abused or neglected, the youth court shall conduct a permanency hearing within twelve (12) months.... Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-613(3)(a) (Rev. 2009) (emphasis added). This Court has previously held that the intent of durable legal custody is merely to avoid the required annual dispositional reviews by the youth court. In re Sam, 826 So.2d 1266, 1280 (¶ 40) (Miss.2002). Bell was given only temporary custody, which was subject to annual review. Pursuant to Section 43-21-151(2), the youth court terminated its jurisdiction of the case. ¶ 19. Bell and Morse argue that the Mississippi Youth Court Act does not specifically allow the youth court to transfer a case to chancery court, stating that the Act allows transfers only to circuit court. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 43-21-157, 159 (Rev. 2009). We find a lack of caselaw in which a youth court voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction and transferred a custody hearing to the chancery court for resolution. But the Youth Court Act does not specifically prohibit the action. The plain language of the Act does allow the youth court to terminate its jurisdiction of a case. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 43-21-151(2), 43-21-613(3)(a) (Rev.2009). Because the youth court had terminated its jurisdiction, there was no chance of conflicting orders and the like, as expressed in K.M.K. ¶ 20. The Court's holding today does not suggest that youth courts can simply terminate their jurisdiction to get cases out of their chambers. But, in this case, there is no harm in allowing the chancery court to retain jurisdiction. The issue of neglect was not transferred for the chancery court's consideration. The youth court had adjudicated Baby Dennis neglected more than six years prior to its transfer order, and there is no evidence in the record of any further abuse or neglect. The matter transferred involves purely custody. Thus, the chancery court's retention of this case would not run afoul of the youth court's jurisdiction. To the extent that the chancellor considers the neglect charge, it would be considered only in determining to whom to award custody of Baby Dennis. ¶ 21. In light of this, the Court finds that, pursuant to Section 43-21-151(2), the youth court had authority to terminate its jurisdiction of the case. Thus, the case was properly before the chancellor. In his order of dismissal, the chancellor acknowledged that he properly had jurisdiction of the case. Thus, we affirm this part of the chancellor's order.