Opinion ID: 2981267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Facts Involving the Fair-Trial Claim

Text: Wilkens protests that the trial-courtroom conditions violated his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although he attended his trial unshackled and in plain 2 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden clothes, two guards in Department of Corrections uniforms sat behind him because he was serving time for other convictions. (The parties dispute how near the guards sat, and the last state court to comment on the issue simply noted that the guards sat “near defendant.”) His trial counsel objected to the presence of the guards in Department of Corrections uniforms and suggested that the judge permit the guards to appear in plainclothes or county uniforms. The court noted the objection but declined to act. While the jury deliberated, trial counsel’s investigator approached the alternate juror, who remained outside the jury room in a public waiting area. According to trial counsel’s affidavit, the alternate juror confided to the investigator and the trial counsel that the jurors noticed the Department of Corrections insignia on the guards near Wilkens, noticed shackles discarded in the jury box, speculated that Wilkens was in prison, and discussed possible verdicts prior to the close of proofs. Using this information, trial counsel moved for a new trial, again objecting to the presence of uniformed guards. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Wilkens shifted his argument, objecting to the “presence” of “prison guards” rather than their uniforms. The state appellate court accordingly ruled on whether the prison guards’ “being in the courtroom” denied Wilkens his fair-trial rights, concluding that it did not. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. On habeas review, Wilkens shifts his objection back to the uniforms. Because his defense turned on pitting his credibility against the credibility of the victims, he claims that any indicia of 3 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden his incarceration inherently prejudiced his case. He also claims that he suffered actual prejudice, because an alternate juror confirmed that the jurors noticed the prison guards and shackles and deduced his incarceration from these clues. The government responds that fairminded jurists could disagree about whether the uniformed guards and shackles sufficiently affected the proceedings to render the trial unfair. B. Facts Involving the Ineffective-Assistance Claim Wilkens faults his trial counsel for failing to move to suppress his statements to Detective Peto regarding his previous encounters with M.C. He claims that such incompetence violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. During the investigations leading to Wilkens’s arrest, Peto and another detective visited Wilkens at his home. Shortly after Wilkens invited them in and consented to a search of his home, the three of them sat around his kitchen table and began to talk. According to Peto, Wilkens volunteered, “I know what this is about. It’s a woman. [M.] is her name,” and explained that he had paid her for sex, driven her to a field, and used her services. Wilkens recalls the situation differently. Though he acknowledges that he invited the detectives in and that he signed a consent search form, he claims that the detectives questioned him aggressively throughout their kitchen-table conversation and ensuing search, refusing to relent until he provided the answers they wanted. He purportedly denied any dealings with M.C. or other 4 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden prostitutes. Because of the allegedly adversarial nature of the questioning—the rapid-fire accusations and the detectives’ refusal to let him out of their sight or allow him to speak to his roommate—he argues that the detectives should have advised him of his Miranda rights and that his counsel should have moved to suppress the statements. Having failed on direct appeal, he now raises the same argument on habeas review, contending that the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by concluding that the detectives’ questioning and his counsel’s failure to move for suppression did not violate his constitutional rights. II. Whether the Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine Applies Because Wilkens currently serves concurrent sentences for other convictions, the government requests that we decline review of this case under the concurrent-sentence doctrine. See Dale v. Haeberlin, 878 F.2d 930, 935 n.3 (6th Cir. 1989) (“According to this doctrine, accepted by this court, an appellate court may decline to hear a substantive challenge to a conviction when the sentence on the challenged conviction is being served concurrently with an equal or longer sentence on a valid conviction.”). We apply this discretionary doctrine only to those situations “where it is clear that there is no collateral consequence to the defendant and the issue does not otherwise involve a significant question meriting consideration.” United States v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536, 541 (6th Cir. 1992). Because the Michigan Parole Board may consider the “number and frequency of prior criminal convictions” and must consider the “number of prior convictions for sex offenses” in 5 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden determining parole, see Mich. Admin. Code r. 791.7715(2)(a)(ii), 791.7716(3)(b)(v), refusing to adjudge the constitutionality of Wilkens’s conviction may affect his parole opportunities. We therefore decline to apply the concurrent-sentence doctrine. Cf. United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952, 959 (2d Cir. 1980) (considering the effect on parole as one potential collateral consequence counseling against application of the concurrent-sentence doctrine).