Opinion ID: 1101227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Reference to Prior Bad Acts in Closing Argument

Text: ¶ 16. During closing arguments, defense counsel stated: Let me tell you what else. When Dian Lavender testified, Judge Montgomery had already instructed the lawyers to tell your witnesses don't talk about anything that is improper. Don't talk about other cases. Don't do that. Dian Lavender, she comes in and what does she do? Nobody asks her a question or anything. She said, Oh, I did drugs with Monte. Why is she doing that? She is wanting to make you think he is a bad person. She is wanting to avoid the judge's order. Now, I don't know whether she did it after the lawyers told her not to or I don't know whether they just didn't tell her not to. But whichever way it was done, it was wrong.       [T]he prosecutor brings in somebody like Dian Lavender, whom they want to teach, anything to get yourself off, buddy. Say whatever you can to please the prosecutors to get yourself off. When she sat on the stand and said I'm going over to his house all the time but I'm not making sexual advances toward him, look at Monte. Look at her. Do you believe that is true? She says she's on speed and she's on cocaine and she is going over to his house all the time. She is not making any sexual advances, but she is here and reforming her life. If she is reforming it, she would have told the truth when she testified. ¶ 17. After defense counsel rested, the prosecution stated the following during its closing argument: Then you're told [by defense counsel] that, well, she got on the witness stand, Dian Lavender, and she blurted out this business of drug use and other evidence that the State is trying to cook up things to get on Monte Crosswhite. That is more illegal State activities. It is shameful and you shouldn't do these things because itonce again, trying to get you to think about anybody other than Monte Crosswhite standing over that stove. Well, ladies and gentlemen, I rather suspect that the lady said what she did because she was telling the truth. Defense counsel objected to the prosecution's representation that the witness was telling the truth. In response, the prosecution noted that defense counsel previously opened the door to comment concerning Dian Lavender during his closing argument. The trial judge overruled the objection and defense counsel now raises this issue claiming reversible error. ¶ 18. In Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1288 (Miss.1994), this Court found no reversible error in the bolstering of the State's witness during closing argument. The prosecution's closing argument contained the following statements: He ... took the witness stand; he testified truthfully; he will get that reduced charge now no matter what. I'm bound by that. I am committed. So, yes, I believed him. I believed him enough to do that, and I still believe him. Id. Regarding these statements, we found [w]hen viewing the closing argument in its entirety, the brief reference to the statement can hardly be said to be error. Foster, 639 So.2d at 1289. ¶ 19.Defense counsel asserts the District Attorney completely negated the trial judge's earlier admonishment to disregard the evidence when he mentioned Lavender's comment regarding prior drug use in his closing argument. However, defense counsel seems to have lost sight of the fact that he negated the admonishment first. ¶ 20. The prosecution responded to the attack on Lavender's credibility by stating I rather suspect ... she was telling the truth. The language used in this instance is not as persuasive as that used in Foster. ¶ 21. The present case is also distinguishable from Tubb v. State where we held a prosecutor's comments during closing argument as to the truthfulness of witnesses may constitute reversible error. Tubb v. State, 217 Miss. 741, 743-45, 64 So.2d 911, 912-13 (1953). Unlike the facts presented in the present case, the district attorney in Tubb stated that he knew the witnesses testified truthfully due to the fact that he had personally investigated the case. Clearly a comment such as that in Tubb would prejudice the jury. The comment made by the prosecution in the instant case did not infer personal knowledge that Crosswhite had previously used drugs. Any prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's comment was invited by defense counsel and did not amount to the denial of a fair trial. Therefore, we find no reversible error in the ruling of the trial judge.