Opinion ID: 2637824
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Conduct an Inquiry into Possible Juror Bias

Text: During jury selection, Prospective Juror No. 684037, who was later empanelled and selected as foreperson, stated in her juror questionnaire that she was a lead clerk in the Santa Barbara County Probation Department at Santa Maria's juvenile hall and had worked there for 20 years. In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror No. 684037 stated she recognized defendant's name because he had been at juvenile hall. During the initial voir dire of Prospective Juror No. 684037, however, the parties did not question her about her employment or knowledge of defendant. Instead, they focused on her views concerning the death penalty. She stated that if defendant were found guilty of murder and special circumstances, she probably would lean towards the penalty of death before hearing any evidence at a penalty phase. Later, in response to questioning by the court, she said she would be able to follow the law and consider both a life sentence and the death penalty before she reached a verdict in the penalty phase. Defense counsel challenged Prospective Juror No. 684037 for cause, claiming that she was biased in favor of the death penalty and that she appeared to hesitate when she told the court that she could consider either penalty before reaching a verdict. The trial court denied the challenge. Later, defense counsel informed the court that he wanted to question Prospective Juror No. 684037 about her knowledge of defendant based upon one of her answers in her juror questionnaire, and the trial court agreed. When asked, Prospective Juror No. 684037 said it would be difficult for her to serve on the jury because she knew defendant and because of the severity of the charges. The court then excused the other prospective jurors from the courtroom, so the court could question Prospective Juror No. 684037 confidentially. Prospective Juror No. 684037 explained she was totally aware that defendant had an extensive juvenile record, and indicated she believed defendant had not made good choices in his life. She did not know so much about defendant that it would affect her ability to be impartial, however. Her job at juvenile hall was primarily clerical, and she supervised children while they were waiting for their court interviews. She did not know anything about defendant's family background and, although she must have interacted with defendant while performing her duties at juvenile hall, she did not remember anything specific about him. Defense counsel again challenged Prospective Juror No. 684037 for cause, arguing that, although it did not appear that she knew the precise nature of defendant's juvenile record, she nonetheless knew that he did something to get put in juvenile hall, and that's not knowledge that a juror should properly have for the guilt phase of the trial. The prosecutor argued that Prospective Juror No. 684037 had made clear that her knowledge of defendant would not influence her and that her situation was similar to that of someone who had read about the case in the newspaper, but is able to put that information aside and decide the matter on the evidence presented at trial. The trial court denied the challenge. The following day, on May 12, 1998, Prospective Juror No. 684037 was sworn in as Juror No. 12, with trial scheduled to begin a week later. Sometime between May 12 and May 15, 1998, Juror No. 12 had contact with district attorney investigator Tom Barnes. According to a memorandum from Barnes to the prosecutor dated May 15, 1998, Barnes called the Santa Maria juvenile hall in an attempt to locate defendant's juvenile disciplinary reports and spoke with Juror No. 12. Juror No. 12 informed Barnes that, according to her supervisor, Barnes needed a court order to access those reports. Barnes consulted with a deputy district attorney, and, less than 30 minutes after their first conversation, he again called and spoke with Juror No. 12. At that time, Juror No. 12 admitted to Barnes that she was a juror on defendant's case, and Barnes told her that he thought it was unusual that one side or the other hadn't excused her. According to Barnes's memo, Juror No. 12 somewhat jokingly, then asked [i]f I could get her off the jury, and Barnes responded he could not, and ended the call. Barnes later called back Juror No. 12 and told her it would be improper for her to be involved in this matter any further and asked to speak with her supervisor. According to Barnes's memo, he was put in contact with another worker for further assistance. On May 19, 1998, just before opening arguments, the parties discussed Barnes's contact with Juror No. 12 at an in camera proceeding. The prosecutor explained that the contact was inadvertent, as Barnes's aim in calling juvenile hall was to locate defendant's disciplinary reports. Defense counsel agreed the contact was innocent, but expressed concern about Juror No. 12's comment about wanting to get off the jury. Defense counsel asked the court to inquire whether Juror No. 12 was willing and able and fit for further duty in light of the comment. The trial court denied the request, reasoning that Juror No. 12's comment merely reflected a normal desire not to be a juror and did not relate to her qualifications as a juror. As the trial court put it, if the court required an inquiry of Juror No. 12, she'd just tell us she doesn't want to be here . . . and so would the [other] 14, 13 [jurors], if we could ask them. Juror No. 12 later became the foreperson during the guilt phase jury deliberations. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an inquiry into Juror No. 12's contact with Barnes and that this alleged error resulted in a biased juror sitting on his case, thereby prejudicially influencing his guilt and penalty phase verdicts. Defendant further argues that, based upon her voir dire, the court was already on notice that Juror No. 12's competency was in doubt and that Barnes's declaration, therefore, triggered a duty to conduct an inquiry. He argues this failure undermined his right to due process and a fair and reliable sentencing determination by an impartial jury, in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 7, 16, and 17 of the California Constitution.
(1) Section 1089 provides in part: If at any time . . . a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order the juror to be discharged . . . . In construing this statute, we have held that `[o]nce a trial court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist, it is the court's duty to make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary to determine whether the juror should be discharged.' ( People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1409 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 368, 157 P.3d 973], quoting People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 821 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204]; see also People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 520 [224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251], overruled on other grounds in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445].) But not every incident involving a juror's conduct requires or warrants further investigation. `The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconductlike the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a jurorrests within the sound discretion of the trial court.' ( People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225], quoting People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 343 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846].) `[A] hearing is required only where the court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would constitute good cause to doubt a juror's ability to perform his duties and would justify his removal from the case.' ( Ibid. ) Defendant complains a hearing was necessary in order to determine whether Juror No. 12 wanted to get off the jury due to her knowledge that defendant had a juvenile record, her belief that he had made poor choices, or the severity of the charges. Defendant argues these factors also may have caused her to question whether she could remain an impartial juror, and thus caused her to ask Barnes for assistance in being removed from the case. [5] We disagree. The mere fact that Barnes contacted Juror No. 12 does not, by itself, constitute good cause that cast doubt on her ability to serve as a juror. Barnes did not give Juror No. 12 any additional information about defendant's case, and the contact was inadvertent. The court does not abuse its discretion simply because it fails to investigate any and all new information obtained about a juror during trial. ( People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 313, 343.) Moreover, the areas into which defendant claims the court should have investigated either had already been covered during the voir dire of Juror No. 12 or simply were not relevant to her ability to be impartial. During voir dire, she explained that her contact with defendant had been limited and unremarkable and that she had no knowledge of him that would interfere with her ability to be fair and impartial. The fact that she regarded the charges as severe is unremarkable considering the nature of the case and given that, at the time, Santa Maria had not had a death penalty prosecution in 10 years. Nothing in her statements to Barnes implied her beliefs had changed since the parties questioned her during voir dire. Instead, she merely made a light-hearted inquiry as to whether she could be removed from jury service. Defendant also argues the trial court should have conducted an inquiry because Barnes's contact with Juror No. 12 may have reinforced her knowledge of defendant's juvenile record. But defendant did not raise this issue before the trial court. Instead, he only questioned why she had expressed the desire to get off the jurya desire, as the trial court correctly pointed out, that any juror might possess. Even if defendant had preserved this issue, the claim would lack merit, as does his claim that the trial court was duty bound to conduct an inquiry, because defendant fails to present evidence of actual bias on the part of the juror. `Before an appellate court will find error in failing to excuse a seated juror, the juror's inability to perform a juror's functions must be shown by the record to be a demonstrable reality. The court will not presume bias, and will uphold the trial court's exercise of discretion on whether a seated juror should be discharged for good cause under section 1089 if supported by substantial evidence.' ( People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 807 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938], quoting People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 659 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213].) The record before us does not show that Juror No. 12's interaction with Barnes caused her to learn more about defendant's juvenile record. Therefore, defendant fails to show that she was unable to fulfill her functions as a juror. ( Jablonski, at p. 807.) Accordingly, we find no prejudice in the trial court's decision not to investigate further and to retain Juror No. 12. [6]