Opinion ID: 1457740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: .Sufficiency of Evidence on Count One-Bribery

Text: It is black letter law that in order to convict a defendant the government must prove each element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). We apply a deferential standard in determining whether a jury's verdict rests on sufficient evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we will sustain a defendant's conviction if  any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). An appellant raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden. United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir.1998) (internal quotations omitted). Although we believe that the issue of the sufficiency of evidence to prove bribery is a very close one, we cannot disregard that a jury convicted Ozcelik of bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2). That statute provides that whoever: being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: (A) being influenced in the performance of any official act; (B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or (C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such official or person; ... shall be fined under this title ... or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both.... 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2). The government must prove that the public official took or sought the funds for one of the three purposes enumerated in subsections (A), (B), and (C) in the statute. Under § 201(b)(2), there are three essential elements that must be met: (1) defendant must be a public official, (2) who directly or indirectly demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, and (3) did so specifically for one of the three corrupt purposes set forth in subsections (A) through (C). See United States v. Orenuga, 430 F.3d 1158, 1166 (D.C.Cir. 2005). There is no question that Ozcelik met the first two elements: he is a public official and he received money from Tuncer. [4] The third element goes to Ozcelik's intent. Thus the only disputed issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that Ozcelik received Tuncer's money with a corrupt intent, that is, he did so for one of the three reasons prohibited by statute. The government argues that Ozcelik violated the statute under both subsection (A) and subsection (C), i.e., that he sought the bribe to be influenced in the performance of an official act and that he took the bribe contrary to his official duty to uphold the immigration law. It argues that Ozcelik's consciousness of wrongdoing is reflected by his consistent statements to Tuncer to conceal their arrangement. Section 201(a)(3) defines official act as any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). The government argues that Ozcelik was guilty under this statutory section in two non-mutually exclusive ways. Appellee's Br. at 28. First, he had the corrupt intent to take official action directly by acting in his capacity as a DHS employee [to agree] to take official action to request others in DHS for official aid for Tuncer, and, if need be, to intervene. Appellee's Br. at 28. Second, Ozcelik, as a middleman, agreed to importune other Immigration officials to take official action to assist Tuncer. Appellee's Br. at 28. Both theories require us to consider what is the official action Ozcelik took to fall within the bribery statute. On this record, the jury could find that Ozcelik asked other individuals within DHS to take official action on behalf of Tuncer; thus both theories blend together into one theory of aiding and abetting other unidentified Immigration officials to take official action to alter Tuncer's records. As the government stated at oral argument, there is only one piece of evidence to show that such Immigration officials even existedOzcelik's own statements to Tuncer that he had a friend within the INS who would undertake to alter Tuncer's visa status. We view the issue before us in light of our obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and [to] sustain a jury's verdict if `a reasonable jury believing the government's evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government proved all the elements of the offense[ ].' United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir.1991)). We must defer to the jury's assessment of witness credibility and recognize that the government's proof need not exclude every possible hypothesis of innocence. United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). One who aids and abets another is as guilty of the underlying offense as the principal. United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 191 (3d Cir.1981) (holding that middleman who facilitated bribery of government official was liable as aider and abettor). To prove that Ozcelik aided and abetted another, the government must prove that the other, i.e., the principal (in this case the unnamed friend at INS), committed all of the elements of the offense. United States v. Cades, 495 F.2d 1166, 1167 (3d Cir.1974); see also United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir.1983). Notably, the offense is committed when the official (here, the unnamed INS official) agrees to accept the bribe in exchange for promising to carry out one of the statutory prohibitions (i.e., the promise to alter Tuncer's visa); it is not necessary to actually perform the prohibited act. See Orenuga, 430 F.3d at 1166 (stating that `acceptance of the bribe is the violation of the statute, not performance of the illegal promise') (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972)). The evidence at trial was as follows: Tuncer testified that Ozcelik told him that he would get other authorities at Immigration to change Tuncer's visa status so that he could remain in the country. During the March 23 recorded telephone conversation, Oczelik said that they will give those, they will do the thing for you, they will do the thing from the inside. App. at 979. [5] At the March 24 meeting, Ozcelik stated, the only thing I know is that the person I know will do something for you from the INS. App. at 986. Later in the same conversation, Ozcelik said, At least 3 months, 3 months will have to go by, because these kind of things have a certain way, it will be in the system, there are a lot of people in front of you in the system. He needs to do something within that system, do you understand what I mean? App. at 987. In a later recorded telephone conversation on May 24, Tuncer asked for assurance that Ozcelik had spoken with his friend at the INS and that the friend had undertaken to help. Ozcelik was reluctant to talk about such matters by phone but did confirm that he had contacted the people in question for Tuncer and that Tuncer should be the one receiving news. App. at 999. In addition, Tuncer testified at trial that in one of the earlier, unrecorded telephone conversations, Ozcelik had told him that his case was doable, i.e., easy for him. App. at 220. Tuncer testified that Ozcelik had asked him for $2,300, and Tuncer asked what the money was for. Ozcelik replied that the money was for two of his friends who worked ... at INS and they were going to change some dates within the system for [Tuncer's] visa. App. at 221. If the jury believed that evidence, it could reasonably have concluded that Ozcelik had a contact (or contacts) at INS whom he aided in taking a bribe to violate the contact's official duty. The evidence that the friend had undertaken to adjust Tuncer's visa status was Ozcelik's own statements to Tuncer that his friend was going to adjust the visa within the system for Tuncer. Although there is no evidence that the friend actually adjusted the visa status, there is evidence from which the jury could infer that the friend agreed to adjust the visa, and it was at that point that the crime of the principal was complete. Because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could rationally conclude that Ozcelik had induced a friend at INS to alter Tuncer's status in exchange for a bribe, there was sufficient evidence to support Ozcelik's guilt on a theory of aiding and abetting. Ozcelik argues that there is insufficient evidence because the government could not name a specific official whom Ozcelik aided and abetted and there is no evidence that such unnamed official actually adjusted the visa. Ozcelik raises an intriguing argument. We agree that it is possible that there was no friend at the INS and that Ozcelik was lying to Tuncer by telling him that his friend at the INS would adjust Tuncer's status, when, in reality, Ozcelik intended to keep the money without taking any action to adjust Tuncer's status. Indeed, the only evidence the government produced at trial that the unnamed friend at INS existed was Ozcelik's own statements to that effect. But we are not permitted to assess credibility. And as such, we cannot say as a matter of law that no reasonable juror could accept the government's theory premised upon Ozcelik's own statements. Although we are concerned that the government could not, through its investigation, discover the identity of Ozcelik's acquaintance at INS, that concern does not warrant overturning Ozcelik's conviction. After all, Ozcelik's own words provide the missing link and he did accept the money Tuncer paid for the performance of the official act. Ozcelik proffered an alternative view of the evidence, i.e., that he solicited the money to procure a lawyer named Sol Kodsi to assist Tuncer. Kodsi testified that Ozcelik had requested that he represent Tuncer and that he had told Ozcelik that Tuncer's case would probably cost $2000 plus $300 for the filing fee and mailings. Kodsi testified that if Tuncer brought him $2,300 he would probably more than likely take his case. App. at 588. Kodsi also testified that he had made an appointment with Tuncer through Ozcelik for March 25, 2005. The jury was free to reject Kodsi's testimony, particularly in light of the absence of any evidence that Kodsi ever spoke to Tuncer or that Ozcelik ever communicated any information about Kodsi to Tuncer. Instead, Ozcelik's statements to Tuncer were always in terms of his INS contacts. For example, he stated that they will do the thing for you, they will do the thing from the inside.  App. at 979 (emphasis added). Moreover, although Kodsi testified he was a longtime friend of Ozcelik, Ozcelik had stated in one recorded conversation that he was not very close to the ones who would be helping Tuncer, App. at 991, thereby throwing into question the alleged discussion with Kodsi. Although Ozcelik may have given a viable explanation for the request for funds, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the jury to reject it in favor of the government's theory. Ozcelik argues that the District Court improperly charged the jury on the meaning of official act as used in § 201(b)(2). Because Ozcelik did not object to the jury instructions at trial, and indeed, made a joint request in favor of the very instruction at issue, we review for plain error. United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 260-61 (3d Cir.2001). A plain error is one that affects substantial rights. Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). An error affects `substantial rights' if it was prejudicial in that it affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings. Id. at 261 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770). It is the defendant's burden to establish that the error prejudiced the jury's verdict. Id. Still, [e]ven if the defendant establishes the existence of plain error, Rule 52(b) leaves to the sound discretion of the Court of Appeals the decision whether to correct the error. While the Court of Appeals has the authority to order correction when these elements are met, it is not required to do so. Id. The District Court charged the jury on the definition of official act as follows: An official act means any decision or act or any question or matter which at any time may be pending or which may by law be brought before any public official in his or her capacity or in his or her place of trust. The term quote, official act, includes the decisions or actions generally expected of a public official. These decisions or actions do not need to be specifically described in any law, rule or job description to be considered an quote, official act, end quote. Official acts that violate an official duty also are not limited to those within the official's specific authority. App. at 1149 (emphasis added). The relevant statute defines official act as: any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (emphasis added). The error, Ozcelik claims, is that the District Court improperly substituted the words in his or her capacity for the statutory language, in such official's official capacity. He argues that the substitution eliminated the requirement that he needed to take action in his official capacity and instead implied that he only had to take action in some unspecified capacity. The government contends that the omission of the word official was the stenographer's error, and that at trial the Court read the instruction containing the word official. Indeed, the government filed a motion to correct the record in the District Court, arguing that in fact, the Court had used the word official before capacity when it charged the jury. The Court concluded, based upon the testimony of the court stenographer, that there was a reasonable probability that there had been a mistake in the transcript. In addition, the written copy of the instructions the Court gave the jurors contained the word official and the Court had no recollection of omitting the word official. We defer to the District Court's conclusion that it did read to the jury the word official. Moreover, the jurors had copies of the instructions that contained the word official. Ozcelik has not met his burden of showing that the alleged error substantially affected the outcome of the proceedings.