Opinion ID: 1292234
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is Balough required to comply with FNSBCO fencing requirements?

Text: Balough argues that even if [her] property were a junkyard, the point remains that at the time of the rezone from GU-1 to RR, [she] was not required to comply with the requirements of FNSBCO § 18.50.130. Balough notes that the requirements of FNSBCO 18.50.130 only apply to junkyards when they are conditional uses. She claims that, because her junkyard was a permitted use in the GU-1 zone and not a conditional use, her junkyard is expressly exempted from the junkyard requirements of the Zoning segment of the FNSB CodeTitle 18. Therefore, Balough concludes, it is ludicrous to condition [her] grandfather rights on compliance with the junkyard requirements of FNSBCO § 8.16.030, which is contained in the Health and Safety segment of the FNSB Code. Balough's argument is not well taken. FNSB has never attempted to enforce FNSBCO 18.50.130. Rather, all correspondence and hearings regarding Balough's junkyard refer to Balough's compliance, or lack of compliance, with FNSBCO 8.16.030. Balough is correct in her assertion that FNSBCO 8.16.030 is contained within the Health and Safety section of the FNSB Code of Ordinances. But that is no indication that Title 8's definitions of junk and junkyard, and its fencing requirements, do not apply to junkyards that are permitted uses within a certain zoning district. Rather, that fact suggests that the definitions and fencing requirements apply to all junkyards, for health and safety reasons, regardless of the zone in which they are located. Balough also argues that requiring a permitted use junkyard to comply with FNSBCO 8.16.030 renders superfluous the requirements of FNSBCO 18.50.130, which apply only to conditional use junkyards. While FNSBCO 18.50.130(C) repeats part of the fencing requirements listed in FNSBCO 8.16.030, the ordinance puts many additional requirements on junkyards operating under conditional use permits, including: (1) the junkyard cannot be within 500 feet of certain buildings; (2) the junkyard must have direct access from a major collector or arterial street; (3) the type of screen the junkyard owner anticipates using to obscure the public view must be specified in the conditional use application; and (4) [a] drainage plan specifying the method of disposing of surface runoff from the site shall be subject to the approval. [34] Clearly, the ordinance setting out specific standards for conditional use junkyards would not be rendered superfluous by requiring all junkyards to abide by the few requirements enumerated by the Health and Safety title's junkyard ordinance. Balough's argument that she was not required to comply with FNSBCO 18.50.130, while correct, is irrelevant. 3. Is the Board of Adjustment's decision to deny Balough grandfather rights supported by substantial evidence? Deciding whether there is substantial evidence to support the BOA's revocation of Balough's grandfather rights involves a two-step process. First, this court must decide what requirements Balough was required to meet for her junkyard to be considered a nonconforming use within the RR zoning district. Second, the court must decide whether she met those requirements. a. Must Balough's junkyard have been in compliance with FNSBCO 8.16.030 to be a nonconforming use? FNSBCO 18.56.020 provides, in part, that [a]ny nonconforming ... use ... which existed lawfully prior to the effective date of the ordinance codified in this title or any... use ... which has become nonconforming upon the adoption of the ordinance codified in this title ... may be continued, subject to the restrictions in this chapter. [35] Balough argues that her junkyard was a lawful use within the GU-1 zone, and that therefore she met the requirements of FNSBCO 18.56.020 and was wrongfully denied nonconforming/grandfather status. Balough defines lawful use as an authorized type of use. She argues that whether the junkyard was a lawful use within the GU-1 zoning district is a completely separate question from whether or not the junkyard was in compliance with the regulations governing that use. If the lawful use junkyard was not in compliance with the regulations governing the operation of junkyards, Balough argues, FNSB cannot deny grandfather rights; rather, it may only require her to bring the junkyard into compliance. FNSB argues that there is a difference between a lawful use and a permitted use. While a junkyard is a permitted use within a GU-1 zoning district, FNSB argues, a junkyard is only a lawful use if it is in compliance with the junkyard ordinance (FNSBCO 8.16.030). Because Balough's junkyard was not in compliance with the junkyard ordinance, FNSB argues, it was not a lawful use, and therefore she was correctly denied grandfather rights. The crux of the issue is this: Does the phrase existed lawfully prior to the effective date, contained within FNSBCO 18.56.020, mean that the junkyard need only have been an authorized use in the GU-1 zoning district in order to be considered a nonconforming use within the RR zoning district, or does it mean that the junkyard must have been in complete compliance with all FNSB code ordinances as of January 15, 1993, the day the Borough Assembly rezoned the area from GU-1 to RR? This presents a question to which we apply our independent judgment since the issue now addressed is a pure question[ ] of statutory construction which do[es] not involve agency expertise. [36] We conclude that for a junkyard to be a nonconforming use under FNSBCO 18.56.020, it must have existed as a lawful use prior to the effective date, or adoption, of the ordinance which declared the use no longer lawful. Whether a use is a lawful use in the first instance, and whether it is a permitted use once its lawfulness is established, are separate questions. A junkyard is a lawful use under GU-1 zoning. It is a non-conforming use under RR zoning. Yet to be lawful, both permitted junkyards under GU-1 and nonconforming junkyards under RR must comply with FNSBCO 8.16.030, which provides that junkyards shall [not] be established or continued unless certain conditions are met. (Emphasis added.) The terms permitted and lawful are not one and the same; the FNSB Code does not use the terms interchangeably. Rather, the term lawful is used in both the definitions of nonconforming use and permitted use. Lawful, therefore, could not merely mean permitted, without rendering the definition section of the Code tautological, i.e., by defining a lawful use as a use which is lawful. FNSB argues that interpreting FNSBCO 18.56.020 to require compliance with the entire code is consistent with the generally accepted rule that the illegality of a prior use will result in a denial of protected status for the use under a nonconforming use exception. [37] There is a split among jurisdictions regarding how strictly courts should apply this general rule. The diversity of opinion arises as to just what renders a pre-existing use unlawful. [38] Some courts have concluded that only a noncompliance with an ordinance which regulates the use of land will disqualify an individual's property from attaining the status of a legal nonconforming use. [39] Other courts, however, strictly apply the general rule and hold that any contravention of an ordinance, whether or not the ordinance relates to the land, is sufficient to deny nonconforming status. [40] In this case, the ordinance requiring junkyards to meet certain requirements regulates the use of that land. Thus, for Balough's junkyard to become a grandfathered nonconforming use, it must have been in compliance with FNSBCO 8.16.030 on January 15, 1993. However, that provision cannot be read in isolation. By its terms the ordinance contemplates the establishment or continuation of a junkyard. In other words, it contemplates that if a junkyard is not operating in compliance with its provisions, the junkyard will not be permitted to continue unless it is brought into compliance. Thus, while the ordinance relates in fact to the use of the land and is not merely a licensing ordinance, that does not end the inquiry. Balough's noncompliance with the junkyard ordinance does not automatically lead to the conclusion that her junkyard was unlawful and hence not entitled to protection under FNSBCO 18.56.020. If a property owner is using his or her property for a lawful use, but is not in compliance with regulations covering that use, due process requires that zoning boards assess the immediate prospect of compliance before denying nonconforming use status. Next we consider whether Balough was operating her junkyard in compliance when FNSB changed the zoning. After that we look to whether due process required that she get a chance to bring the junkyard into compliance before losing nonconforming use status. b. Did the Board of Adjustment have substantial evidence to conclude that the junkyard did not comply with FNSBCO 8.16.030 on January 15, 1993? The BOA reached the following conclusions: 1. The Board concludes that for a use to be a lawful use on the date of a rezone, the use must comply with all of the applicable use regulations in the zoning district where the property is located. FNSB 18.06.010.B.150. The Board interprets all of the applicable use regulations to mean that the owners were required to comply with the junkyard regulations under FNSB 8.16 in order to qualify as a conforming use under Title 18 of the Borough Code. 2. The junkyard did not comply with FNSB 8.16.030, an applicable use regulation in the General Use zone, on January 15, 1993, the effective date of the rezone. On January 15, 1993, the junkyard was not a conforming use under FNSB 18.06.010.B.150. A use which was not a conforming use on the date of a rezone does not have grandfather rights. FNSB 18.56.020. 3. The junkyard did not exist lawfully prior to January 15, 1993, the effective date of the rezone. Junkyards are not lawful uses in RR zoning districts. As discussed above, for a junkyard to be a nonconforming use in a RR zoning district means that the junkyard may continue operating even though there has been a zoning change and junkyards are no longer lawful. But it may only do so if it lawfully existed in the GU-1 district. The BOA concluded that for a junkyard to have lawfully existed in the GU-1 district, it must have been in compliance with FNSBCO 8.16.030. The BOA thus had to determine whether Balough's fence was in compliance with those junkyard regulations in order to determine whether she was properly granted nonconforming use (grandfather) status. It concluded that she had not been in compliance and therefore denied her nonconforming use status. FNSBCO 8.16.030 states that No junkyard or auto wrecking yard shall be established or continued unless such junkyard or auto wrecking yard is completely obscured from view of any traveled or occupied location within five hundred feet from any boundary of the junkyard or auto wrecking yard, within a building or within a continuous solid fence no less than eight feet in height. The fence may be of evergreen planting or other natural planting or topography of sufficient density to provide a year-round screen. The BOA's conclusion that Balough's junkyard did not comply with the requirements of FNSBCO 8.16.030 was based on the following facts: (1) [t]he wooden fence [had] not been completed on the west and south sides of the junkyard; (2) the fence was not continuous; (3) the fence did not completely obscure the junkyard from view; (4) the vegetation on the west side of the fence did not obscure the junkyard from view; and (5) the fence was less than eight feet in height in some places. We conclude that the BOA had substantial evidence to find that Balough's junkyard did not comply with the junkyard ordinance. We interpret the ordinance to mean that Balough's junkyard would be in compliance if it met any one of three requirements: [41] (1) the junkyard is completely obscured from view; (2) the junkyard is contained within a building; or (3) the junkyard is contained within a continuous solid fence no less than eight feet in height. [42] The BOA had substantial evidence to conclude that Balough's junkyard met none of these three requirements. First, neighbors testified that the junkyard was not completely obscured from view. Second, the junkyard is not contained within a building. Third, the BOA heard testimony that the fence surrounding the junkyard was not continuous, and also testimony that the fence was not eight feet in height in all places. Although Balough testified that the fence was eight feet high in all places on January 15, 1993, and Nutter testified that he felt that the junkyard was completely obscured from view, reasonable minds could still conclude that the testimony of the neighbors, the photographs, and the video tape were more persuasive. Specifically, the BOA could reasonably have concluded that Balough's testimony was less credible than the neighbors, and that, because Nutter did not walk the perimeter of the junkyard and closely examine the fence, his testimony should be given less weight. Looking at the agency record as a whole, and giving the BOA the necessary deference, we conclude that the BOA had substantial evidence to conclude that Balough's junkyard did not conform with any of the three requirements set out in FNSBCO 8.16.030, and, therefore, should not be granted nonconforming use status as it then stood.