Opinion ID: 1494139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unauthorized Sentence

Text: Upon conviction, Johnson entered into an agreement with the Commonwealth in which both parties agreed to a sentence of five years' imprisonment to be served consecutively with the twenty (20) year sentence he received at the conclusion of his drug trafficking trial, for a total of twenty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, Johnson argues that this sentence violates the maximum term of years he can be sentenced to under KRS 532.110(1)(c), which provides: When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for more than one (1) crime, including a crime for which a previous sentence of probation or conditional discharge has been revoked, the multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court shall determine at the time of sentence, except that: ... The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not exceed in maximum length the longest extended term which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime for which any of the sentences is imposed. In no event shall the aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms exceed seventy (70) years. Johnson's argument is that, because all of the offenses for which he was convicted were Class C felonies, the maximum aggregate sentence that could be imposed would be twenty years' imprisonment. See KRS 532.080(6)(b). This argument is correct as far as it goes. See, e.g., Tabor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 613 S.W.2d 133, 135 (1981). But the argument fails to take into account that Johnson agreed to the sentence as part of a plea agreement. A defendant may validly waive the maximum aggregate sentence limitation in KRS 532.110(1)(c) that otherwise would operate to his benefit. Myers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 42 S.W.3d 594, 597 (2001). Thus, the trial court did not err in imposing the sentence unless it had a duty to determine the validity of Johnson's waiver before accepting Johnson's plea. We conclude that it had no such duty. It has long been established that a knowing waiver of a constitutional right cannot be presumed on a silent record. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938) (Waiver of the constitutional right to counsel must be affirmatively shown on the record and the waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made.) But no constitutional rights are implicated in Johnson's waiver of his statutory right to a maximum aggregate sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. Thus, there are no constitutional prohibitions against presuming that Johnson's waiver was valid in this case. Further, the plea agreement was reached with the advice of defense counsel. And waiver of the maximum aggregate sentence can be the product of trial strategy. Myers, 42 S.W.3d at 598. Thus, in this case, an inquiry into the validity of the waiver would focus primarily on defense counsel's knowledge of the law and defense counsel's rationale for negotiating the agreement. While such an inquiry might avoid the issue recurring on collateral attack, this is not sufficient reason to impose an affirmative duty on the trial court to inquire into the validity of the waiver. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in accepting Johnson's plea and imposing a sentence in conformity with the plea agreement Johnson reached with the Commonwealth.