Opinion ID: 2329200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Testimony of Tyrus Hines

Text: Finally, we consider the testimony of Tyrus Hines, a friend of both the victim and the defendant. The defendant challenges the admissibility of two separate portions of Hines' testimony. First, the defendant challenges portions of the following exchange between the state and Hines: Q. Did [the victim] state to you in the time leading up to her murder her state of mind regarding [the defendant]? A. Not really. She justbasically, she wasshe wanted to get away from him, like. She ain't want to be around him, be with him no more. Q. Did she say why she needed to do that? What her state of mind was? A. Why she needed to do it? She never really said why. She justthey was arguin', fightin', I guess. Q. I can't hear you, sir. A. They were arguin', fightin', I guess. Arguing a lot. To refresh his recollection, Hines was then shown a copy of a statement he had given the police. Afterwards, the following exchange occurred between the state and Hines: Q. Does that refresh your recollection about what [the victim] said to you? A. Yeah. Q. What did she say to you? A. She saidat what point? Basically, she was scared. Q. How does she describe her being scared? What was she scared of? A. Of [the defendant] killin' her mother and brother. Q. Excuse me. A. Of [the defendant]. She was scared of [the defendant]. Q. [The defendant] doing what? A. Killin' her, her mother or brother, or even her. The defendant did not object to this testimony at the time it was offered but did request that it be stricken in his motion to strike and for a curative instruction. See footnote 10 of this opinion. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted the evidence for the following reasons: (1) the testimony stated the reason for the victim's state of mind; (2) the declaration was a reference to past events and was an implied accusation of the defendant; (3) the victim's fear was irrelevant; and (4) the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. The defendant contends that the state improperly asked for the reason that the victim wanted to get away from the defendant, and that Hines' response that they was arguin,' fightin,' I guess, improperly supplied that reason. In light of Hines' statement that [s]he never really said why immediately preceding that response, however, it was within the trial court's discretion to conclude that the challenged response was nothing more than speculation on Hines' part, rather than a statement made by the victim. The defendant also contends that the state asked for the reason for the victim's state of mind by asking What was [the victim] scared of? The state's question was not, why was the victim scared, which would have been a request for the reason for the victim's state of mind. Furthermore, the witness' response did not refer to any specific act of the defendant as the reason for the victim's fear. See part I A 2 of this opinion. Nor can we discern any reference to past events or an implied accusation of the defendant in the statements of the victim. The evidence was relevant and more probative than prejudicial for the reasons explained in part I A 1 of this opinion. Although the defendant now refers to Hines' testimony as shocking, his failure to object at the time the testimony was offered leaves us with the impression that the testimony was less shocking than the defendant would have us now believe. Certainly, it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to strike the testimony when the defendant subsequently requested that it do so. The defendant also challenges the admissibility of two voice mail messages left on Hines' cellular telephone by the victim on the day she was murdered. The messages were introduced, as follows, during Hines' testimony in both voice and transcript form: Elizabeth, um, give me a call, I'm at my house now. Um, cause I've got to leave here soon or something, because I don't trust him. He keeps calling me trying to find out where the fuck I'm at, so give me a call like as soon as you can. Bye. Tyrus, it's Elizabeth, give me a call as soon as possible. I'm trying to get ahold of you and you're not picking up your phone, um? This little shit is go'n on. I can't even, I'm like not at my house right now because I can't be at my house right now, so give me a call when you get this message. When the state initially offered the voice recording into evidence, the defendant objected as follows: Your Honor, no probative value whatsoever. Not relevant. Got nothing at all to do with anything that my client may or may not have done. It's the victim's phone calls to Mr. Hines. My client is not identified. There's a reference to `him.' There's a reference that she can't hang out at her house.... There's a reference to `him' or `he' and a reference to the fact that she can't hang out at her own house. Nothing tying my client to anything. I would object based on relevance and lack of probative value. After the state responded that the victim's state of mind could be inferred from her statements and was relevant, the trial court admitted the recording into evidence with the instruction that it was offered to show the state of mind of the victim. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted the evidence for the following reasons: (1) the messages contained facts and events; (2) the messages contained the reason for the victim's state of mind; (3) the evidence was not offered exclusively to show the victim's state of mind; (4) the victim's state of mind was irrelevant; and (5) the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. The defendant contends that the victim's references to being at her home and to the defendant's repeated telephone calls in the first message and to [t]his little shit ... go'n on in the second message make the messages inadmissible under our holding in State v. Dehaney, supra, 261 Conn. at 359, 803 A.2d 267. The defendant misinterprets the holding in Dehaney. As discussed in part I A 2 of this opinion, we concluded that the statements of facts and events in the Dehaney affidavit were inadmissible because they referred ... to specific acts of alleged prior misconduct by the defendant. Id. The messages in the present case do not refer to similar acts on the part of this defendant. The defendant's arguments concerning exclusivity and relevance are consistent with the arguments he made with respect to Ross' testimony, and we reject those arguments for the same reasons discussed in part I A 1 of this opinion. The defendant also contends that this evidence was particularly prejudicial because the recordings were of the victim's voice only hours before her death, resulting in a greater emotional impact on the jury. The trial court had the opportunity to hear the voice messages and to gauge their emotional impact on the jury. We cannot say that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to determine that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial in this instance.