Opinion ID: 1294118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Loss-of-Parental-Consortium Claims.

Text: We now consider whether the district court correctly dismissed the children's loss-of-consortium claims. The court applied section 614.1(9)( a ), quoted above, rather than section 614.1(9)( b ), which provides: An action subject to paragraph  a  and brought on behalf of a minor who was under the age of eight years when the act, omission, or occurrence alleged in the action occurred shall be commenced no later than the minor's tenth birthday or as provided in paragraph  a , whichever is later. Iowa Code § 614.1(9)( b ). The undisputed facts establish that the decedent's three minor children were under the age of eight years at the time of their father's biopsy and were under the age of ten years at the time this suit was filed. Therefore, if paragraph ( b ) governs, their claims for loss of consortium are timely as a matter of law. The defendants contend, however, that paragraph ( b ) applies only when the minor suffered personal injuries from the alleged malpractice. When, as here, the defendants argue, the claim is one for loss of consortium brought by the executor of the decedent's estate, paragraph ( a ) governs. [3] The plaintiff disagrees with this interpretation of section 614.1(9) and suggests as an alternative that section 614.8(2) applies to extend the limitations period for one year from the minor's attainment of majority. See Iowa Code § 614.8(2). We address the latter issue first. Section 614.8(2) provides: Except as provided in section 614.1, subsection 9, the times limited for actions in this chapter, except those brought for penalties and forfeitures, are extended in favor of minors, so that they shall have one year from and after attainment of majority within which to commence an action. Iowa Code § 614.8(2) (emphasis added). The language, [e]xcept as provided in section 614.1, subsection 9, first appeared in section 614.8 in 1997 at the same time the legislature added paragraph ( b ) to section 614.1(9). 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 197, §§ 6-7. It is apparent the legislature intended that medical malpractice actions brought on behalf of a minor be governed by section 614.1(9), not section 614.8. Because section 614.8 does not apply to the present case, we direct our attention to section 614.1(9). As noted above, the defendants claim paragraph ( b ) of section 614.1(9) applies only when the minor was the patient who received the allegedly negligent care. This argument finds no support in the language of the statute, which encompasses medical malpractice actions brought on behalf of a minor with no qualifications or exceptions. `If the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, we do not search for legislative intent beyond the express terms of the statute.' Am. Legion v. Cedar Rapids Bd. of Review, 646 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted). Therefore, a claim brought by an executor or administrator on behalf of the minor for loss-of-consortium damages falls within the scope of the statute. [4] The defendants contend, however, that our feasible joinder rule requires that a minor's loss-of-consortium claim be governed by the same limitations period applicable to the injured or deceased parent's claim. The feasible joinder principle requires that consortium claims be brought with the primary injury or death claim unless the plaintiff can show it was not feasible for the consortium claim to be joined with the primary claim. See Beeck v. S.R. Smith Co., 359 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Iowa 1984). This rule is not based on the idea that the executor or administrator of the deceased parent's estate owns the cause of action. See id. Indeed, our cases make clear that a loss-of-parental-consortium claim is independent of the wrongful death claim and belongs to the child. See In re Estate of Sylvester, 559 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Iowa 1997); Bloomquist v. Wapello County, 500 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1993). The joinder rule is simply designed to reduce a multiplicity of suits and the possibility of double recovery. S.R Smith, 359 N.W.2d at 487. Moreover, this court has specifically refused to make joinder mandatory. See Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202, 209 (Iowa 1984). Based on these principles, we held in S.R. Smith that a child's claim for loss of parental consortium is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to minors, even though the claim should be brought by the injured parent when feasible. 359 N.W.2d at 487. We think the same result is appropriate in a wrongful death case. The child is entitled to any recovery obtained by the executor on the child's behalf, and the executor is merely the conduit for achieving that recovery. The child's claim should be governed by the statute of limitations applicable to minors. Here, that statute is paragraph ( b ) of section 614.1(9). Although this holding may result in a child's claim being prosecuted independently if the wrongful death claim is already barred under paragraph ( a ) of section 614.1(9), we do not think this situation violates the feasible joinder rule, literally or in spirit. Joinder is not required when it is not feasible. Clearly, if the underlying claim for injury or death is barred by the statute of limitations, then it would not be feasible to join a viable loss-of-consortium claim with the underlying claim. Cf. In re Marriage of Hutchinson, 588 N.W.2d 442, 450 (Iowa 1999) (holding joinder of child's loss-of-parental-consortium claim was not feasible where injured parent refused to sue her doctors). Furthermore, there is no possibility of a multiplicity of suits or double recovery when the wrongful death claim has not been and cannot be pursued. In conclusion, we hold section 614.1(9)( b ) applies to the loss-of-consortium claims filed by Christy on behalf of the decedent's minor children. The district court erred in ruling their claims were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in section 614.1(9)( a ).