Opinion ID: 1277687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reasonable Doubt Instruction for Other Crimes Evidence

Text: The trial court instructed the jury that any factor in aggravation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It also instructed that it was to accept as being conclusively proven that defendant had been convicted of three prior feloniesassault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, battery of a peace officer, and receipt of stolen property. Defendant now contends that the jury would have been confused by this instruction into believing that the conduct underlying these convictions had been conclusively proven, and that the prosecution was not required to prove such conduct beyond a reasonable doubt in order for that conduct to count against defendant as violent criminal activity. In fact, the trial court misstated the law, but did so to defendant's benefit. It is untrue that all factors in aggravation must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; only unadjudicated violent criminal activity must be so proven. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 862, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) When reviewing a supposedly ambiguous jury instruction, `we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.' ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 957, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) In the present case the jury was instructed as to each instance of unadjudicated violent criminal activity charged by the prosecution, and was instructed that it had to believe this beyond a reasonable doubt in order to count the other crimes against defendant in the sentencing process. There was no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have misunderstood to defendant's detriment the scope of this reasonable doubt instruction.