Opinion ID: 1096134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony of Dr. Harriet Hampton

Text: At trial Dr. Hampton was asked what M.J. told her about what happened. Counsel for Jones objected to the answer as hearsay. Dr. Hampton was allowed to answer the question and she stated that M.J. indicated to her that her daddy had touched her vaginal region and that she had sucked Dad's drooper. Dr. Hampton was then asked whether she had formed an opinion concerning whether abused children tell the truth about what happened to them. Counsel for Jones objected. The trial court allowed Dr. Hampton to answer the question. Dr. Hampton answered the question, Yes. Dr. Hampton's testifying as to what M.J. told her is clearly hearsay. M.R.E. 801(c). Such a statement is inadmissible unless it fits within one of the hearsay exceptions. There is no indication in the record of the basis for the admission of the statements by Dr. Hampton, but the only applicable exception is 803(4). This exception states: (4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. M.R.E. 803(4) (as it read at the time of trial). This exception generally admits statements of causation and fault but has been expanded to include the identity of the perpetrator in child abuse cases. Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 North Carolina Law Review 257, 264 (1989). This was noted by this Court in Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d 1366 (Miss. 1989), where it was stated: many courts, State and Federal, with evidence rules similar to ours, admit statements by child sexual abuse victims to physicians and psychologists while being examined, diagnosed, and treated following an incident of sexual abuse under exceptions analogous to M.R.E. 803(4). However, for the most part, physicians and psychologists have been allowed to testify only about the incident, as related by the child, and not about the identity of the assailant is reasonably pertinent to treatment, such as in cases where the child has been sexually assaulted by a member of the family. In such cases, the need to remove the child from the situation becomes a pertinent part of the treatment. See, e.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985); U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980); U.S. v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.1979); State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801 (1987). See also, Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338 (Miss. 1989). Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d at 1370. There is a two-part test for admitting hearsay statements under 803(4). First, the declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment; and second, the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment. U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir.1985). M.J.'s statements to Dr. Hampton were made during the examination to determine whether M.J. had been abused. Dr. Hampton asked M.J. questions of her medical history which is consistent with promoting treatment. Dr. Hampton stated that a general medical history is important as well as what the allegations of abuse were. Dr. Hampton had found from her physical examination that M.J.'s hymen had been torn and had some scarring. These findings were consistent with M.J.'s statements. M.J.'s statements about what happened to her fit within the exception. However, M.J. did not simply indicate to Dr. Hampton what had happened to her but also identified who did it. Statements concerning who committed the act seldom sufficiently relate to the diagnosis or treatment. U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir.1980). However, as stated above, statements by a child abuse victim that the abuser is a member of the victim's immediate household are reasonably pertinent to treatment, as treatment encompasses treating emotional and psychological injuries and is also relevant to prevention. U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d at 436-437. Jones, though M.J.'s natural father, was not a member of M.J.'s immediate household. He only saw M.J. during infrequent visitation. Does this make the expansive reading of 803(4) applicable to M.J.'s identification of him as the perpetrator? Renville expanded the exception to include identification of the perpetrator if in the immediate household in child abuse cases on the principles that such cases involve more than physical injury, as the physician must be attentive to treating the emotional and psychological injuries which accompany the crime because of the identity of the abuser. Physicians also have an obligation to prevent an abused child from being returned to the abusive environment. The obligation is most immediate when the abuser is a member of the victim's immediate household. It was believed then that statements of identity to a physician by a child sexually abused by a family member are of a type physicians reasonably rely on in composing diagnosis and course of treatment. U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d at 437, 438. Though Jones was recognized by M.J. as her real daddy, he was not a member of M.J.'s immediate household. Jones only exercised infrequent visitation with M.J. The concerns expressed in Renville, the treatment of emotional and psychological injuries, and preventing further abuse, are not as immediate in this case for those reasons. The identity of the perpetrator was not pertinent to the treatment of M.J. Therefore, this circumstance does not fall within the expansive reading of 803(4). Under these facts, the statements to Dr. Hampton identifying the perpetrator were inadmissible under the medical diagnosis and treatment and error. However, a review of the record reveals that the admission of this testimony does not provide grounds for reversal. The record shows that M.J. identified Jones as the perpetrator and that Kathy Booth testified, without objection, that M.J. identified Jones to her as the perpetrator. In light of these identifications of Jones as the perpetrator, the admission of Dr. Hampton's testimony is merely cumulative. It told the jury nothing that M.J. and Kathy Booth did not also tell them. The error is harmless. M.R.E. 103(a). Jones also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Hampton to comment on the truthfulness of M.J.'s testimony. The following is the testimony of Dr. Hampton's that is at issue: Q. Have you formed an opinion over the years concerning whether children that come in with this kind of problem tell the truth about what happened to them? BY MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I object to that. BY THE COURT: I'll let her answer that yes or no. A. Children do not fantasize about experiences that they have not encountered. BY MR. BROWN: I object to the answer as being  BY THE COURT: Sustained. BY MR. BROWN:  opposed to the Court's ruling. BY THE COURT: Sustained. BY MR. MITCHELL: I think the Court ruled that you could answer the question in a yes or no answer. A. Would you repeat the question? Q. From your experience of examining children like [M.J.] who have evidence that they have been sexually abused, is your experience that they tell the truth? A. Yes. Q. Did you form an opinion in this particular case as to whether [M.J.] had been sexually abused? A. Physical findings support the history of vaginal manipulation. Jones contends that this testimony was an impermissible comment on truthfulness, or improper bolstering. In Williams v. State, 539 So.2d 1049 (Miss. 1989), we noted that opinion testimony as to a witness' truthfulness is of dubious competency. Id. at 1051. In Goodson v. State, 566 So.2d 1142 (Miss. 1990), we said there is no reason to believe an expert's opinion as to the truthfulness of a child is any more admissible than the results of a lie detector test, and noted that a majority of courts preclude such testimony. Id. at 1153; Compare, Griffith v. State, 584 So.2d 383, 386 (Miss. 1991); House v. State, 445 So.2d 815, 822 (Miss. 1984) (involved a hypnotist's opinion concerning the accused truthfulness). To the extent that Dr. Hampton's testimony may have been an opinion of M.J.'s truthfulness, allowing it was error. There is a further problem with Dr. Hampton's opinion testimony. It lacked relevancy in the form in which it was given. The initial question asked generally whether sexually abused children, not M.J. specifically, tell the truth about what happened to them. Dr. Hampton's answer was just as broad as the question and did not deal with M.J. specifically. The trial court restricted Dr. Hampton to a yes or no answer and she answered yes to a general question. Whether children generally tell the truth or not about sexual abuse is not relevant as to whether M.J. told the truth about what happened to her, as it does not make it more probable or less probable that M.J. was telling the truth. See, M.R.E. 401. The one question that dealt specifically with M.J. was not whether M.J. was telling the truth but whether Dr. Hampton had an opinion as to whether M.J. was sexually abused. Dr. Hampton responded that the physical evidence indicated vaginal manipulation. Both the question and the answer were proper. The testimony of Dr. Hampton was not relevant, as it was not connected to M.J. Compare, West v. State, 553 So.2d 8, 20 (Miss. 1989) (expert gave free floating lecture on necrophilia without connecting it to the accused). Realistically, Dr. Hampton's opinion implied an opinion of M.J.'s truthfulness and in this it was error as well. On the other hand, the opinion in the form of a single word, Yes, and read in context does not strike us as particularly potent. The admission of this testimony was error, but it was harmless error, as no substantial right of Jones was affected. M.R.E. 103(a).