Opinion ID: 1114161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: exclusion of the testimony of a defense psychologist

Text: The criteria to be used in determining the admissibility of an expert witness' testimony are set out in Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.C.A. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 529, 54 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977). As stated by the court: (1)    the subject matter `must be so distinctively related to some science, profession, business, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman [emphasis added]'; (2) `the witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth [emphasis added]'; (3) expert testimony is inadmissible if `the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert.' McCormick on Evidence, § 13, pp. 29-31 (2d Ed. 1972) In this case the trial judge used the criteria in Dyas v. United States, supra, in making his ruling. His reasons for rejecting the testimony of the expert witness, Dr. Lenore E. Walker, were set out in detail. Dr. Walker possesses impressive academic and professional credentials and she is the pioneer in the field of the so-called battered woman syndrome. [1] By her own characterization she is the foremost authority on that phenomenon and also describes herself as a feminist psychologist. During extensive voir dire by the State, it was shown that in the introduction of her book, The Battered Woman (1979), Dr. Walker stated at pp. xv-xvi: I think this research has raised more questions for me than it has answered. As a trained researcher, I felt uneasy about stating some of my conclusions in this book. They seemed too tentative to write down in the positive manner which I have used. Yet they are confirmed repeatedly by all the available data so far.    In answer to a follow-up question by defense counsel, Dr. Walker explained the statement from her book as follows: That's why I received the research grant, to study the matter in a much more scientific way.    It was further revealed on voir dire that her research was ongoing and that a deadline for completion was yet in the future. Voir dire was followed by an offer of proof by defense counsel. Appellant's offer of proof indicated that Dr. Walker would testify that: 1) Mrs. Buhrle was a battered woman and a battered woman's behavior differs from that of other women. 2) Mrs. Buhrle was in a state of learned helplessness resulting in loss of free will. 3) Because of learned helplessness, Mrs. Buhrle's ability to walk away from a situation or escape was impaired. 4) Mrs. Buhrle perceived herself to be acting in self-defense. The trial judge ruled that Dr. Walker's testimony was not admissible. The reasons for this ruling were: 1) Voir dire did not adequately demonstrate that the state of the art permitted a reasonable opinion. 2) The reasons for opinions were not adequately explained, were difficult to understand; and therefore, would not aid the jury. 3) Appellant's state of mind at the time of the shooting was not adequately explained; and therefore, this testimony would not aid the jury in its determination. The record indicates that research in the battered woman syndrome is in its infancy; that objectives are difficult to identify; that statistical analysis was in the preparation stage; and that acceptance or recognition of the phenomenon is largely limited to the people who are actively engaged in the research and the people making research grants. In the case at bar the shooting occurred well after the altercation with the victim in which appellant was beaten. Seven days later Mrs. Buhrle went to the victim's motel room and after arguing with him an hour and forty-five minutes she shot him. Insofar as voir dire reveals, this is not the standard battered woman self-defense situation. In explaining her opinions, Dr. Walker did not consider these factors which are departures from the standard battered woman behavior. This is not to deny a battered woman syndrome and all its ramifications. Suffice it to say defendant failed to demonstrate to the trial court that the state of the art would permit a reasonable expert opinion, nor would the proposed opinions, considering omissions in foundation, aid the jury. The quotation from Dr. Walker's book, The Battered Woman, supra, and elsewhere in her voir dire suggests that Dr. Walker may make certain conclusions and state certain theories, then engage in research to attempt to substantiate those theories and conclusions. The trial judge may have concluded that she did this with Mrs. Buhrle. Dr. Walker was vague in her explanation of Mrs. Buhrle's behavior if such behavior did not fit into the pattern of battered women. For example, her explanation of why Mrs. Buhrle took a hunting rifle to the motel and why she hid the gun and gloves after the shooting apparently did not fit into the battered woman syndrome; therefore, these acts were inadequately explained and apparently ignored by Dr. Walker in arriving at an opinion. The trial judge expressed some difficulty in understanding Dr. Walker's explanations and after he had asked several questions of Dr. Walker, said, But you probably answered my question satisfactorily to you, but not to me. I don't understand the answer to my question. This court experienced the same difficulty. It might reasonably be assumed, therefore, that if the trial court and the appellate court had difficulty understanding the expert's explanations, so would the jury. The aura of special reliability and trustworthiness surrounding scientific or expert testimony, particularly calls for trial court discretion. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.1973). In urging the admission of Dr. Walker's testimony, defendant relies principally on Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C.C.A. 1979); and State v. Thomas, Nos. 39698, 40028 (Ohio App., filed July 24, 1980). [2] In both of these cases wives were charged with murder of their husbands. In both, the accused presented a theory of self-defense. Each was convicted after a jury trial; on appeal Ibn-Tamas was remanded and Thomas was reversed. In both cases the accused had sought to call expert witnesses to present testimony on the psychology of battered women, and in both cases the trial judge excluded the testimony. In Ibn-Tamas, supra, the appellate court remanded the case for specific findings on the criteria set forth in Dyas v. United States, supra. In the case at bar the trial judge in fact made specific findings as to the Dyas criteria. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, supra, can also be distinguished in the opinions that the expert proposed to give. The defense proffered expert testimony in Ibn-Tamas, supra, p. 631, for two purposes: To describe the phenomenon of `wife battering,' and to give her opinion of the extent to which appellant's personality and behavior corresponded to those of 110 battered women Dr. Walker had studied. The proposed witness in Ibn-Tamas, supra, was not going to express an opinion on the ultimate question whether Mrs. Ibn-Tamas actually and reasonably believed she was in danger when she shot her husband. Rather, the witness would have merely supplied background data to help the jury make that crucial determination. In the case at bar, however, Dr. Walker proposed to express such opinion. Dr. Walker also expected to express an opinion on whether or not Mrs. Buhrle was in fear of her life at the time of the shooting and whether such fear was reasonable; and she proposed to make the decision for the jury whether Edith Buhrle was capable of retreating at the instant when the victim was shot. Ibn-Tamas and Thomas, supra, can further be distinguished in that the killing occurred during or immediately after a battering incident. The shooting of Kenneth Buhrle occurred a week after an altercation. Finally, defense counsel proposed to ask Dr. Walker if in her opinion Edith Buhrle believed that she was acting in self-defense when she shot her husband. Clearly, in the case at bar, appellant proposed to go far beyond what was proposed in Ibn-Tamas, supra. In State v. Thomas, supra, the appeals court found that the criteria in Dyas v. United States, supra, had been satisfied. They went on to expressly approve the use of expert testimony to substantiate the reasonableness of a claim of self-defense by a battered woman. In our holding here we are not saying that this type of expert testimony is not admissible; we are merely holding that the state of the art was not adequately demonstrated to the court, and because of inadequate foundation the proposed opinions would not aid the jury. The court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the proffered expert testimony.