Opinion ID: 2754624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jacobs’s Amended Complaint

Text: Even construed liberally, the factual allegations in Jacobs’s amended complaint fail to “suggest intentional race discrimination.” See Davis, 516 F.3d 974. To be sure, Jacobs’s allegations, taken as true, establish that Freitas was a poor supervisor who treated Jacobs badly and terminated Jacobs based on trumpedup accusations.6 But, it is axiomatic that Title VII prohibits only discrimination and is not a “general civility code,” Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 809 (11th Cir. 2010), or “a shield against harsh treatment at the work place.” Succar v. Dade Cnty Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000); see 6 Jacobs’s amended complaint does not allege whether it was Biando or Freitas who made the decision to terminate her. Construing Jacobs’s allegations liberally, we treat both Biando and Freitas as decisionmakers. 6 Case: 13-13405 Date Filed: 11/24/2014 Page: 7 of 9 also Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that Title VII is not concerned with the wisdom of an employer’s decisions, so long as they “were not made with a discriminatory motive”). To be actionable under Title VII, the harassing conduct or the adverse employment action must be because of the employee’s protected characteristic, in this case race. See Reeves, 594 F.3d at 809 n.3 (addressing hostile work environment claim); Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (addressing discriminatory discharge claim). Jacobs, however, did not allege that the reason Freitas mistreated her or falsely accused and then fired her was because she was African American. Even if we liberally construe Jacobs’s amended complaint to infer such a conclusory allegation, Jacobs did not allege any specific facts to support it. For example, Jacobs did not allege that Freitas treated similarly-situated employees who were not African American more favorably or that Jacobs was replaced by an employee that was not African American.7 At a minimum, Jacobs needed to allege enough facts to “draw the reasonable inference” that Freitas’s actions were motivated by racial animus. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A threadbare allegation that an employee believes she was discriminated against because of her race is not enough to “raise a right to relief above the speculative 7 Notably, while Jacobs alleged that Freitas showed favoritism to “other employees,” she did not identify the race of these other employees or allege that the favoritism was based on race. 7 Case: 13-13405 Date Filed: 11/24/2014 Page: 8 of 9 level.” See id. (explaining that mere conclusory statements do not satisfy Twombly’s facial plausibility standard); Davis, 516 F.3d at 974. The only allegation about Freitas that relates at all to race is that Freitas made some comments that African-American women “should get along.” There were no additional allegations, however, to connect these comments to Freitas’s treatment or termination of Jacobs. Such general, race-based comments, unrelated to the complained-of conduct, do not suggest that Freitas singled Jacobs out for harassment or terminated her because she was African American. As to Defendant Snowden, Jacobs’s allegations at best are an attempt to state a racially hostile work environment claim, but fail as well. Jacobs alleged only a one-time altercation, in which Snowden said he was better than Jacobs and tried to fire her. Even assuming Snowden’s accompanying “physical demonstration of racial dislike” indicated his statements were motivated by Jacob’s race, the altercation was an isolated incident that was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998) (stating that isolated incidents that are not extremely serious are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile work environment); see also Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the “mere utterance” of an epithet does not implicate Title VII). Furthermore, as Jacobs’s coworker, Snowden was 8 Case: 13-13405 Date Filed: 11/24/2014 Page: 9 of 9 “without authority” to fire Jacobs. Thus, Snowden’s conduct, while upsetting to Jacobs, did not actually result in an adverse employment action. See Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that an adverse employment action requires a significant change in employment status, such as firing, failing to hire or promote, or significantly changing responsibilities or benefits). For all these reasons, Jacobs’s amended complaint failed to state a facially plausible claim of either discriminatory discharge or a racially hostile work environment under Title VII. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Jacob’s amended complaint without prejudice. 8 AFFIRMED. 8 Because the district court properly dismissed Jacobs’s federal claims, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 108889 (11th Cir. 2004). 9