Opinion ID: 2515770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's References to Satan

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he regarded Satan as his savior. We disagree. At the guilt phase, the trial court agreed to delete references to Satan in the September 15 letter, but the court also ruled that these references would be admissible at the penalty phase. (See ante, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 44, 46, 33 P.3d at pp. 465, 466.) Defendant contends that this ruling is erroneous because the references to Satan do not tend to establish any circumstance in aggravation. When this issue was discussed in the trial court, the defense argued that the references to Satan were not relevant to any statutory aggravating factor. The prosecutor replied that the defense would place defendant's character in issue at the penalty phase, and that evidence about defendant's favorable regard for Satan would then be admissible in rebuttal. The court ruled it would allow the references to Satan at the penalty phase under factor k. Defendant is correct that character evidence under section 190.3, factor (k), can only be mitigating, and therefore the prosecution may not introduce evidence of defendant's bad character as part of its case in aggravation at the penalty phase. ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 774-775, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) Once the defendant puts his general character in issue at the penalty phase, however, the prosecutor may rebut with evidence or argument suggesting a more balanced picture of his personality. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 791, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) Here, it was understood that defendant intended to place his general character in issue at the penalty phase, and in this context the trial court's ruling properly permitted the prosecution to respond with rebuttal evidence about defendant's views on Satan. The prosecution elicited additional evidence about defendant's view of Satan during questioning about defendant's threats in January 1988, immediately after his unsuccessful attempt to escape from the Los Angeles County jail, to kill a sheriffs sergeant who had assisted in subduing him. The witness testified, without defense objection, that defendant swore ... to his savior, Satan, that he would Mil the sergeant in a very big way. Absent an objection, the admissibility of this brief reference to Satan is not preserved for appellate review. (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a).) In any event, the evidence was admissible as part of the circumstances of the escape attempt and threats. ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1013-1014, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) Defendant's September 9 letter to his wife, admitted at the penalty phase, included two references to Satan, including a statement that Satan has helped me rejuvanate my energie's in a working way. In objecting to the September 9 letter in its entirety, defense counsel argued that the prosecutor was seeking to get in some enormous prejudicial evidence about Satan which is [sic: has] virtually no probative value. Assuming that this remark is sufficient to preserve a specific objection under Evidence Code section 352 to the September 9 letter's references to Satan, we conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling the objection. Defendant wrote the September 9 and September 15 letters in 1987, four years after killing Tiffany Frizzell and around 15 months before trial began. Thus, the jury could properly consider these letters as bearing on defendant's claimed feelings of remorse at the time of trial. A favorable view of the biblical figure of Satan is generally understood as a symbolic rejection of the values of love and compassion, and as indicating acceptance of the contrary values of hatred and violence, with a consequent rejection of all moral restrictions on crimes such as murder and rape. (See McCorkle v. Johnson (11th Cir.1989) 881 F.2d 993, 995-996.) This abhorrent value system is inconsistent with defendant's claimed remorse and shame for the murders of his two victims, and thus the evidence was properly admitted in rebuttal. (See People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 306-307, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.) If defendant's conception of Satan encompassed qualities consistent with an attitude of remorse, he was free to articulate them.