Opinion ID: 496195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: withholding to protect national security:

Text: EXHIBIT (b)(3)
10 The national security exemption is invoked here on the theory that, while the individual entries are not classified or (therefore) withholdable, the aggregation is withholdable on the compilation theory. 11 The national security exemption concerns matters that are 12 A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. 13 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(1) (1982). In conformity with this requirement, Executive Order 12,356 provides for the classification of information which either by itself, or in the context of other information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to national security. While AFSC does not contest the validity of the compilation theory, 1 it does argue that DoD is obliged to produce those portions of the requested material which can be segregated from the information whose disclosure would damage the national security. Apart from its segregability contention, AFSC also contends that in light of the factual record, the compilation theory does not apply here because DoD's judgment that national security reasonably could be expected to be damaged cannot be respected. 14
15 The standard to be applied in assessing DoD's decision to withhold has been described as follows by the District of Columbia Circuit: 16 Because  '[e]xecutive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of public disclosure,'  however, courts are required to  'accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of a disputed record.'  Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C.Cir.1982) (quoting S.Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1974), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1974 pp. 6267, 6290). Accordingly, an agency is entitled to summary judgment if its affidavits describe the withheld information and the justification for withholding with reasonable specificity, demonstrating a logical connection between the information and the claimed exemption, id. at 970, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C.Cir.1981). 17 Abbotts v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 766 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C.Cir.1985). We adopt that standard here. 18 DoD's concern here is that, by looking at all of the TAB entries, a person could draw useful inferences about the direction of U.S. research into weapons or defensive technologies. AFSC responds that, when a project begins to approach fruition it will stop appearing in the TABs, as it will if DoD concludes that the project is not worthy of further exploration. DoD acknowledges this, but contends that the disappearance of a given project from the TABs will still give those seeking such information help in ascertaining what projects should be the target for their own intelligence work. AFSC's rejoinder to this contention is that 19 one would have no way of determining whether [the subject's disappearance from the TABs] was because research had been terminated (or for what reasons), or because it had reached fruition, so that further reports were classified Top Secret and/or their titles were themselves classified. 20 Appellant's Br. at 11. 21 We do not find this a satisfactory rejoinder. Even if a hostile nation could not tell which of the two alternatives was correct, it would be able to infer that one of them was. This would enable it to concentrate its intelligence resources on those areas which were likely to be most important.
22 AFSC correctly observes that, in response to an FOIA request, an agency must disclose segregable portions of otherwise nondisclosable material. See Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945 (D.C.Cir.1979). AFSC goes on to argue, however, that the segregability doctrine requires DoD to disclose all material that is not itself classified. Many of the titles contained in the TABS are not classified, and AFSC concludes that DoD must disclose those titles. We believe that acceptance of the compilation theory requires that this argument be rejected. 23 By invoking the compilation theory, DoD argues that material which could not harm the national security when disclosed by itself can be withheld if its disclosure--along with other material whose disclosure alone would also not harm the national security --might endanger the national security. See Halperin, 452 F.Supp. at 50. AFSC's insistence that everything which is not classified must be disclosed essentially ignores the compilation theory because it ignores the danger to which the compilation theory points--that information harmless in itself might be harmful when disclosed in context. The fact that the material withheld is not itself classified does not in turn require disclosure if the compilation theory is invoked, because the theory itself is only relevant when the material withheld is not classified. If the material were classified it could be withheld without reference to the compilation theory. 24 The compilation theory can be based on a number of different problems which might be caused by the publication of unclassified data. Neither plaintiff nor defendant has explored this issue, but we find it useful to separate out the problems we can think of in order to explain our holding and to give direction to the district court on remand. While we attempt here to define the different problems to which the compilation theory is a response, we are far from certain that our list is exhaustive. 25 First, as Halperin suggests, the sequence in which documents were generated might reveal damaging information which the documents themselves do not disclose. Revealing the whole series, therefore, complete with the dates on which the individual documents were written, might be damaging even though disclosure of any one (or perhaps two) documents would not be. The doctrine of segregability suggests, however, that if this is the problem DoD is worried about we should respond to it by deleting the dates of the reports, or by otherwise making it impossible for a reader of the information disclosed to determine the order in which individual reports were written. 26 Second, as the parenthetical in the last paragraph suggests, there is a slippery slope problem lurking in the background of the compilation theory. Disclosure of one entry in a TAB would likely not do significant damage to the national security, and the same would seem to be true for two entries, and for three. At some point, however, the compilation theory suggests, the number of entries becomes so large that a viewer could arrange the entries to get a picture of the nation's national defense research program, much as a jigsaw puzzle's picture can be guessed although not all the pieces are in place. The doctrine of segregability suggests that we should order the release of that number of reports which can be disclosed without the whole picture becoming guessable. We are most reluctant to determine, however--as a matter of law, which is how the issue must eventually be resolved--what the number of entries is that at which the picture becomes guessable. That judgment, it seems to us, is within DoD's expertise. DoD has exercised that expertise, via its proffered affidavit, in a way we do not find implausible or unreasonable, and we will not disturb its conclusion. 27 We note that the affidavit of AFSC's expert, Johnson, states that 28 a significant number of the entries in the TAB also appears in substantially the same form in the National Technical Information Service catalog, Government Reports Announcements/Entries, which is available at public libraries across the United States. 29 App. at 153. It is not clear what is meant by a significant number of entries. Nor is it clear from the affidavit in what form the entries are set forth in the public catalog. 2 At all events this conundrum points to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and hence raises a question as to the propriety of summary judgment. 3 We identify an even more serious problem in the next section of this opinion.
30 Finally, as the last possible problem to which the compilation theory points, DoD argues that a knowledgeable reviewer of the TABs could make valuable and damaging inferences from the presence in the TABs of reports on related topics. This depends, of course, on how much information each of the TAB entries contains. That depends in turn on whether the TAB entries contain summaries of the reports--a question which we are unable to answer on the record as it now stands. If the TABs do contain abstracts, and if they are the parts of the TAB entries which convey damaging information, then perhaps the TABs could be disclosed after the abstracts had been deleted. On the other hand, it is possible that even the titles of the reports contain enough damaging information that their disclosure--without a summary of the report--would harm the national security. We remand so that the district court can determine which of these statements is correct. 31 AFSC's expert stated in affidavit that very few reports [whose titles are contained in TABs] are summarized, and that most TAB entries don't even contain a full abstract. Most include just a title, dates, report numbers, descriptors and other details that are not likely to shed any light on the details of the report itself. Affidavit of David T. Johnson, Director of Research, Center for Defense Information, at 2, 4-5, Appendix at A-152, A-155-56 (emphasis added). This testimony was based on Johnson's review of four of the 26 TABs released during 1983 (the first year for which AFSC has requested all TABs). 4 32 DoD's expert Paul Robey, in contrast, gave significantly different information on the number of TABs containing abstracts. Robey, who is Deputy Administrator of the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), provided the following information in his affidavit: 33 DTIC does not keep archival copies of individual TAB issues, therefore, an exact or average number of abstracts is not available. In 1983, DTIC ran a computer review of the beginning and ending sequence identifying numbers assigned to the technical reports announced in the 1983 TABs. The computer identified 12,334 numbers within the range representing 12,334 technical reports or entries. Of the 12,334 entries, 9,083 or approximately 74% included an abstract. The file from which these numbers were derived changes periodically and the numbers given here may not reflect what was originally published in the 1983 TABs. Some of the identifying numbers, known as AD numbers, may have been cancelled or replaced. 34 App. at 148-149. 35 We are unable to see how the statements by AFSC's and DoD's expert witnesses can be deemed consistent with one another. AFSC's witness says that only very few TAB entries contain abstracts. DoD's witness implies that 74% of them do so, but he actually says only that 74% of the entries in the file contain abstracts. He does not say that the entries appear in the TABs in the same form as they appear in the file upon which he bases his testimony; as noted above, the affidavit is based upon the file, not the TABs of which DTIC, Robey's agency, did not have archival copies. We are therefore not certain of the number of TABs Robey is claiming contain abstracts. But the clear implication of his affidavit is that 74% of them do so. Summary judgment on defendant's behalf can be sustained, therefore, only if this difference between the two experts is immaterial. 36 As the quotation from Abbotts makes clear, see supra p. 434, FOIA's legislative history instructs the courts to defer to DoD's judgment that the national security would be endangered by the disclosure sought here. That judgment is based on information, experience and expertise to which we are not privy, and we will not lightly override it on the basis of our own understanding of what does or does not constitute a danger to the country's security. In light of the deference to which DoD is entitled, we may be obliged to respect its judgment about the danger of disclosure even if most of the TABs do not contain abstracts. We believe, however, that it is unnecessary for us to decide that issue now. 37 Because the record is unclear at this stage as to the fraction of TABs containing abstracts, we have some difficulty concluding that there is a significant possibility that the TABs' disclosure will indeed harm the national security. We would be more comfortable deferring to DoD's judgment on this point if the record showed clearly--or if there were a factfinding--that a significant percentage of the TABs contain abstracts. If that were the case it would be much easier to understand why DoD has exercised its judgment as it has, and we would doubtless be obliged to affirm the judgment on DoD's behalf. We will therefore vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand to the district court to permit resolution of the disagreement between plaintiff's and defendant's expert on the issue of the percentage of TABs containing abstracts, and if it appears that it is small, what danger there may be of disclosure in that event. 5 See also discussion supra at p. 446 & nn. 2, 3.