Opinion ID: 2746007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ramos’s sentence

Text: With respect to the legal issues surrounding Ramos’s sentence, two provisions within his plea agreement stand out. First, depending on the nature and extent of Ramos’s cooperation, the plea agreement authorized the government, in its “sole discretion,” to “file a motion for departure 13 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. or reduction of sentence pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and/or Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” R. 196 (Ramos Plea Agreement at ¶ 7.D) (Page ID #518). And second, Ramos waived the right to appeal any sentence determined by the district court, with certain limited exceptions. This provision reads, in full: [T]he Defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal any sentence that is at or below the maximum guideline range as determined by the Court before any upward departure or variance, and the manner in which the sentence was determined on the grounds set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742. The Defendant also retains the right to appeal those objections preserved at sentencing that the Court incorrectly determined the final Guideline range. In addition, the Defendant retains the right to appeal a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum or is based upon an unconstitutional factor, such as race, religion, national origin or gender. R. 196 (Ramos Plea Agreement at ¶ 11) (Page ID #521–22). Unfortunately for Ramos, this appeal-waiver clause prevents us from taking up the merits of his argument that the district court erred in denying the government’s motion § 5K1.1 motion. As we have noted elsewhere, “[i]t is well settled that a defendant may waive any right, even a constitutional right, by means of a plea agreement. Only challenges to the validity of the waiver itself will be entertained on appeal.” United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374, 377 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In order to examine the validity of Ramos’s appeal waiver, we must first determine whether “the claim raised on appeal falls within the scope of the appellate waiver.” Id. at 378. On this issue, the appellant’s brief could not be clearer in demonstrating that Ramos’s challenge falls outside the relevant scope. The first sentence of his argument summary states that “[d]efendant-[a]ppellant argues that that [sic] he is entitled to relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2)”—the very statute singled out in his plea 14 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. agreement—“because the district court imposed a sentence that was the result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.” Appellant Br. at 8. Next, we must examine whether an exception to the appeal-waiver provision applies. This particular provision allows Ramos to retain his right to appeal (1) if his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, (2) if his sentence is based upon some unconstitutional consideration, or (3) if his sentence involves an incorrect determination of the “final Guideline range” despite Ramos’s “objections preserved at sentencing.” R. 196 (Ramos Plea Agreement at ¶ 11) (Page ID #521–22). None of these exceptions applies to this case. First, Ramos was sentenced to sixty months of imprisonment—the statutory minimum. R. 387 (Ramos Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 17, 20) (Page ID #1994, 1997). Second, Ramos has not argued that his sentence is based on unconstitutional considerations. Instead, his argument is that the district judge erred by relying upon the § 3553(a) factors in denying the government’s request for a downward departure under § 5K1.1. Third, and most importantly, Ramos did not preserve his objection for appeal. While we are sympathetic to Ramos’s argument, the plain language of his plea agreement requires that he object to any perceived sentencing errors affecting his “final Guideline range” while at his sentencing hearing. He did not do so. At the beginning of Ramos’s hearing, the government moved for the district court to grant Ramos a downward departure under § 5K1.1 based on Ramos’s substantial assistance. Id. at 4–6 (Page ID #1981–83). After indicating his reluctance to grant the motion, the district judge turned to Ramos’s counsel, asking for a response. Ramos’s counsel stated only that “I would concur with the government’s motion.” Id. 15 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. at 6 (Page ID #1983). After some additional exchange, the judge announced that he would deny the § 5K1.1 motion. Id. at 7–9 (Page ID #1984–86) (“I’m going to deny the 5K1.1 levels, Mr. Bruha. I think you have the ability to utilize a 5K1 motion here, but you’re already, due to your charging decisions, you’re already—due to the nature of the matter before the Court, what you’re doing is you’re manipulating a sentence that I think has already had significant leverage given to it. . . . I don’t very often deny a 5K1, but I think I will in this case. I think there’s grounds for doing that.”). At this point, the district court turned its attention to Ramos’s motion for a variance: The Court: I believe you have a motion for variance here, is that right? Counsel for Ramos: Yes The Court: You may be heard. I think you kind of hear where I’m coming from. Counsel for Ramos: Yes. I did file the motion for a variance, Your Honor, and I think that in looking at Mr. Ramos’s positives . . . . Id. at 9 (Page ID #1986). At no point during the § 5K1.1 discussion did Ramos’s counsel object to the district court’s decision, or even note that the district court appeared to be denying the § 5K1.1 motion based on § 3553(a) factors, rather than on an evaluation of the nature and extent of Ramos’s assistance. Near the end of the hearing, the district judge again gave Ramos’s counsel an opportunity to object. Id. at 20 (Page ID #1997) (“Any objection that defense would note to this sentence?”).3 Again, Ramos’s counsel responded in the negative. Id. (“No legal 3 Ramos points out that the language used here—“Any objection that defense would note to this sentence?”—departs from the language used in Bostic. Appellant Reply Br. at 2–3. In Bostic, we held that, “before adjourning the sentencing hearing,” the district court must “ask the parties whether they have any objections to the sentence just pronounced that have not previously been raised. If the district court fails to provide the parties with this opportunity, they will not have forfeited their objections and thus will not be required to demonstrate plain error on appeal.” 371 F.3d at 872–73 (footnote omitted). Ramos is correct: the phrasing of the district 16 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. objection, your honor.”). Based on these exchanges, we cannot conclude that Ramos retained his right to appeal by preserving his objection at his sentencing hearing. Ramos also argues that he preserved his objection by urging in his sentencing memorandum that the district court should “consider the assistance that he provided as detailed in the government’s motion and brief.” R. 312 (Ramos Sentencing Mem. at 6) (Page ID #1464). However, a sentencing memorandum—written and submitted before one’s sentencing hearing— cannot be considered a suitable way to preserve an objection to actions taken at one’s sentencing hearing. See Vonner, 516 F.3d at 385–86. Additionally, the plain language of the plea agreement states that Ramos may only appeal “objections preserved at sentencing.” See, e.g., United States v. Flowers, 428 F. App’x 526, 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying appeal-waiver provision where plea agreement’s plain terms required that objections be “preserved at sentencing”). As a final matter, we must decide whether the plea was made “knowingly and voluntarily.” United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 764 (6th Cir. 2001). Ramos has offered no evidence to suggest otherwise. On the contrary, the plea agreement’s language states explicitly that Ramos entered the agreement freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. See, e.g., R. 196 (Ramos Plea Agreement at ¶ 16) (Page ID #524). During Ramos’s plea colloquy, he affirmed that he court’s question is not an exact match. But the Bostic court anticipated “the difficulty of parsing a transcript to determine whether during a sentencing hearing . . . a party had a meaningful opportunity to object.” Id. at 872 n.6. Following this logic, we have concluded, in prior cases, that district judges need not repeat the Bostic question verbatim. See United States v. Wilson, 232 F. App’x 540, 545 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding “Now, are there any questions regarding the sentence that I have imposed?” against a Bostic challenge). The district judge’s intent in this case was clear—to seek and put on the record any previously unmentioned objections. 17 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. understood the plea’s terms and voluntarily agreed to them. R. 506 (Ramos Plea Hr’g Tr. 4, 7–8) (Page ID #2669, 2672–73). Nor does Ramos argue on appeal that his plea was made unknowingly or involuntarily. To be clear, our decision today should not be read as an endorsement of the district court’s denial of the government’s § 5K1.1 motion. Had Ramos objected to the district judge’s decision below, his appeal might well have merit. As Ramos has pointed out, the district judge’s decision to deny the government’s § 5K1.1 motion was based exclusively on what have traditionally been regarded as § 3553(a) factors. Tellingly, the district judge did not spend any time discussing the nature and extent of Ramos’s assistance to the government. Section 5K1.1 motions are made only where a defendant provides substantial assistance to the government; in deciding whether to grant these motions, the Sentencing Guidelines advise judges to evaluate “(1) the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance”; “(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided”; “(3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance”; “(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance”; and “(5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.” U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Although we have determined that a sentencing judge may look to factors outside a defendant’s substantial assistance, we have stressed that such factors are secondary, rather than primary, considerations. See United States v. Grant, 636 F.3d 803, 817 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Determining the extent to which a sentence should be reduced would, as a matter of course, include consideration of the defendant’s activities on behalf of the government and how much his assistance helped in the investigation or prosecution 18 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. of another.”) (emphasis added). If Ramos had objected at his sentencing to the district judge’s method of evaluating the merits of the government’s § 5K1.1 motion, the district judge would have had an opportunity to reconsider and utilize the proper methodology. Ramos’s appeal waiver in his plea agreement, however, prevents us from addressing the merits of whether the district judge actually committed legal error in the proceedings below in the absence of an “objection[] preserved at sentencing that the [district judge] incorrectly determined the final Guideline range.” R. 196 (Ramos Plea Agreement at ¶ 11) (Page ID #521– 22). That appeal-waiver provision governs this case, and leads us to deny Ramos’s requested relief.