Opinion ID: 1849994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court erred in refusing to grant ICRR's alternative motion for a new trial.

Text: When a party makes a motion for a new trial, such motion should be granted only when the verdict is contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence. Burnham v. Tabb, 508 So.2d 1072, 1075 (Miss. 1987) (citing Baker Tools Inc. v. Buckley, 500 So.2d 970, 972 (Miss. 1986); Adams v. Green, 474 So.2d 577 (Miss. 1985)). The discretion vested in a trial judge with regard to a motion for a new trial is broad. This Court's authority to disturb is limited to those cases wherein the trial judge has abused his discretion. Burnham v. Tabb, 508 So.2d 1072, 1075 (Miss. 1987) (citing Davis v. Singing River Elec. Power Ass'n, 501 So.2d 1128, 1129 (Miss. 1987); Shelton v. Puckett, 483 So.2d 354 (Miss. 1986)). The railroad readily acknowledges that the jury was properly instructed on the comparative negligence statute in this state. Rather, the basis of the railroad's complaint is that the jury did not follow the law. The jury's failure to comply with the court's comparative negligence instruction, alone, entitles ICRR to a new trial. Appellant's Brief at 36. Here, the railroad complains that the jury should have assigned more blame for the accident to Hilary White's failure to notify the railroad of his plans to cross the track as required by the statute. The railroad argues that the failure to assign more blame to White was manifestly unreasonable and against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree. In this case, the jury was properly instructed as to Mr. White's comparative negligence. Jury instruction 13 informed the jury that if they found both White and the railroad negligent, and that the negligence of both parties contributed to the collision, then the jury must reduce any award that they would otherwise return for the plaintiffs for the actual damages by that proportion of negligence attributed to White. And, there were other instructions that the jury received pertaining to the duty that White was under in crossing the tracks. Furthermore, jury instruction 15 informed the jury that Mississippi law requires any person who desires to cross a railroad track with a Caterpillar to give advance notice to the railroad. Instruction 15 stated that White failed to give this notice and was negligent as a matter of law for such failure. Truly, the jury was correctly and fully instructed on Mr. White's negligence per se and comparative negligence principles. The railroad also alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the expert testimony of Dr. Gary Long and Mr. Henry Buck. Mr. Buck and Dr. Long testified that the railroad crossing at milepost 186 was extra hazardous, and their testimony outlined their reasons for this conclusion. By testifying that the railroad crossing was extra hazardous, the railroad argues on appeal that this testimony invaded the province of the jury. In this case, the experts testified that the railroad crossing was extra hazardous (or dangerous) because of the proximity of the crossing to the curve and the trestle over the ravine. This is not the ultimate issue. The ultimate issue which the jury resolved was whether or not the railroad was negligent in not doing more to warn of its impending approach of trains at the White's crossing. The expert testimony that the crossing was extra hazardous merely assisted the trier of fact in this regard. See Wilner v. Mississippi Export R.R. Co., 546 So.2d 678 (Miss. 1989); M.R.E. 704 (Opinion on Ultimate Issue).