Opinion ID: 2789470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Mental and Emotional Impairments

Text: Medina alternatively claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the penalty phase by failing to obtain and present relevant mitigating evidence of Medina’s possible mental and emotional impairments. Specifically, Medina argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: failing to obtain medical records reflecting the hospitalization of Medina’s brother and maternal aunt, which showed that both were hospitalized with diagnosed schizophrenia; failing to provide EEG and CT scan results to an expert who requested them; and failing to retain an expert to explain to the jury the possible mitigating effect of Medina’s exposure to neurotoxins in glue when he was young. At the penalty phase, counsel has “a professional responsibility to investigate and bring to the attention of mental health experts who are examining his client, facts that the experts do not request.” Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 1999). “Regardless of whether a defense expert requests specific information relevant to a defendant’s background, it is defense counsel’s duty to seek out such evidence and bring it to the attention of the experts.” Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 925 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Medina argues that counsel’s failure to obtain his brother’s and aunt’s medical records and subsequent failure to turn them over to the experts who testified during the penalty phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Medina asserts that had counsel obtained and relayed this information, it could have strengthened his claim that he, too, was schizophrenic. His argument is unpersuasive. 20 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL First, trial counsel did obtain information about Medina’s brother’s diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. During the penalty phase, Dr. Klatte testified that Medina’s brother “had a well-established diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.” Although Dr. Sharma testified in a deposition that he was never given information about Medina’s brother’s mental illness as a “confirmed diagnosis,” he was made aware of the mental illness and he “had assumed or inferred from what [he] was told at that time that more likely than not the diagnosis would have been schizophrenic disorder for his brother.” The “failure” to provide Dr. Sharma with the confirmed diagnosis, even if it constitutes deficient performance, certainly does not meet Strickland’s prejudice requirement, given that Dr. Sharma assumed the diagnosis. Second, Medina is correct that his aunt’s diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia was never provided to Dr. Sharma, but counsel’s failure to provide this information was not deficient performance. The district court credited counsel’s account that he was unaware of the aunt’s mental problems at the time of the penalty phase because neither Medina nor any family member had disclosed the problems. Counsel cannot be faulted for not having information about a second degree relative’s hospital records when his investigation was reasonable and none of Medina’s family members with whom he spoke alluded to the aunt’s mental health problems. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that counsel’s failure to discover an alleged family history of mental illness was not unreasonable where counsel spoke with family members and friends who would have such information but none of them indicated there was any history of mental illness). MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 21 Medina argues that counsel’s failure to provide Dr. Sharma with Medina’s EEG and CT scan results despite Dr. Sharma’s requests for them constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel should have provided the test results to Dr. Sharma, but his failure to do so did not prejudice Medina under the second prong of Strickland. Dr. Sharma had been made aware that “Mr. Medina had undergone a CAT scan, an EEG, brain x-rays, and a neurological examination yielding results within the normal limits.” Dr. Sharma further stated that he had been relying upon a “broken brain” theory during the penalty phase of Medina’s trial, and he conceded that if he had been shown the test results, which were within the normal range, the results would have the potential to contradict the “broken brain” defense. It is thus unclear how Medina would have benefitted at the penalty phase had Dr. Sharma obtained the test results; if anything, Dr. Sharma’s testimony would have been less helpful to Medina had the results been provided. Finally, Medina argues that counsel performed deficiently by failing to request a neurological examination to assess possible brain damage resulting from years of substance abuse. Counsel was aware of Medina’s use of drugs and history of glue sniffing. The district court credited counsel’s account that he passed on information regarding Medina’s glue sniffing to the doctors. Moreover, counsel intended to follow up on the issue with an expert who would do more testing, but Medina refused to see any more experts. As counsel must respect a defendant’s wishes about whether to undergo additional psychological testing, a failure to conduct additional testing is not deficient performance on the part of counsel in such circumstances. Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 1997). And even if Medina were now to present neurological test results bringing some 22 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL new mental deficiency to light, evidence produced after the fact is not necessarily relevant to whether counsel’s actions were reasonable at the time. See Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 584 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by 430 F.3d 1220 (denying habeas relief because “[Petitioner’s] argument turns on a latter-day battle of experts; however, the question is whether counsel did all that he was constitutionally required to do at the time”). Counsel’s investigation into Medina’s brain damage was not deficient.