Opinion ID: 2602242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to suppress witness identifications

Text: ¶ 21 Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution in denying his motion to suppress the identification testimony of Gunderson and Moss. Defendant argues that, pursuant to the federal due process standard, the pretrial photo array presented to them was impermissibly suggestive. He also contends that the identifications violated the Utah due process standard because they were unreliable, especially because the witnesses' mental faculties were impaired by marijuana. The State insists that the photo array was not impermissibly suggestive and therefore not violative of federal due process. The State also advocates that the witnesses' testimony about the photo array was reliable because Gunderson and Moss had an opportunity to view the assailant, because Moss was not under the influence of marijuana, and because the two witnesses independently identified the defendant. We hold that the photo array was reliable and not impermissibly suggestive and therefore not violative of the Utah or United States Constitutions. Because the witnesses' testimony was reliable and based on untainted, independent foundations, it was not error by the trial court to deny defendant's motion to suppress and admit testimony of the photo array identifications. ¶ 22 The standard for reviewing a trial court's decision to admit eyewitness identification testimony requires us to consider the record evidence and determine whether the admission of the identification is consistent with the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991). Whether a pretrial photo array violates a citizen's constitutional right to due process is a question of law, which we review for correctness. Id. at 781 n. 3. At the same time, however, because this question of law requires the application of the record facts to the due process standard, we incorporate a clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations. Id. We apply this same standard of review to both the federal and the state analyses.
¶ 23 The linchpin of determining whether the admission of eyewitness identification testimony violates the federal Due Process Clause is reliability. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). Where witnesses have identified a defendant in a pretrial photo array, we apply a two-part test in determining the reliability of the identification. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah 1994); State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989). We must determine, given the totality of the circumstances, whether the pretrial photo identification procedure used by law enforcement unduly tainted the in-court identifications, that is, whether the procedure used was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1111 (quoting Thamer, 777 P.2d at 435 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968))). If the photo array was impermissibly suggestive, a subsequent in-court identification may still be admissible, but it must be based on [an] untainted, independent foundation to be reliable. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1111 (quoting Thamer, 777 P.2d at 435 (citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243)). [6] ¶ 24 The pretrial identification procedures used by Officer Merino in this case were not impermissibly suggestive. As a result, irreparable misidentification was not substantially likely. The photo array did not emphasize defendant's photo over the others. See Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1111. The photos Officer Merino assembled were all photos of African-American males with light complexions and goatees. Some appear to have somewhat different skin tones, and the amount and style of facial hair differ somewhat among the photos. Nonetheless, Officer Merino presented Gunderson and Moss with six photos of light-complected African-American males, all of whom had similar goatee-style beards. Also, defendant's photo was neither first nor last in the group presented to the witnesses. Officer Merino further explained to the witnesses that the assailant might or might not have been included in the group presented, that the hair and facial hair of the individuals photographed might have been different from how they looked at the time the photo was taken, and that the lighting of the photo might have altered actual skin tone. Moreover, Officer Merino ensured that the two witnesses viewed the photos separately. Neither Gunderson nor Moss was permitted to stand near the other while he or she was viewing the photos. Gunderson stood near the apartment building and away from Moss while she viewed the photos, and Moss stood near the apartment building and away from Gunderson when he looked at the photos. Given these procedures, the pretrial photo identification procedure did not taint the in-court identifications. The procedure was not impermissibly suggestive, and we therefore conclude the identifications were reliable and federal due process was not violated. As a result, we need not, and do not, address whether the subsequent in-court identifications were sufficiently based on untainted, independent foundations to be reliable.
¶ 25 The standard for determining whether defendant's right to due process as guaranteed by article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution was denied is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identifications were reliable. See State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ¶ 26, 44 P.3d 794; State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (The ultimate question to be determined is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable.). In Long, this court laid the foundation for a separate Utah constitutional due process analysis of the reliability of eyewitness identifications, Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779 (construing Long ), and in Ramirez we explained the analytical model to be used by a trial court in determining the admissibility of arguably suggestive eyewitness identifications under article I, section 7, the Utah due process provision. 817 P.2d at 779. In Utah, the analysis for determining whether an in-court identification has been unduly tainted by an out-of-court identification such that it violates due process is two-fold: Utah courts examine the procedural actions taken by law enforcement officials in assembling and presenting a photo array to witnesses for due process, and Utah courts also make a preliminary determination on whether the identification is sufficiently reliable such that its admission and consideration by the jury will not violate defendant's right to due process. See id. at 780. ¶ 26 With respect to the first step of the state due process analysis, for the reasons outlined previously, see supra ¶ 24, we conclude that the procedural actions taken by Officer Merino in assembling and presenting the photo array were not impermissibly suggestive. With respect to the second step, trial courts have a critical responsibility to scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional defects, and failure to do so would leave protection of constitutional rights to the whim of a jury and would abandon the courts' responsibility to apply the law. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778. The danger of abdicating this responsibility in cases where eyewitness identification is an issue is great because of the probability that such evidence, even though thoroughly discredited[,] has a powerful effect on a jury. Id. at 779 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 490). Even if law enforcement procedures are appropriate and do not violate due process, eyewitness identification testimony must still pass the gatekeeping function of the trial court and be subject to a preliminary determinationwhether the identification is sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. Id. at 778-79. ¶ 27 Since Long we have used five factors as a test for analyzing, as a preliminary constitutional matter, whether an eyewitness identification is sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. See, e.g., Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ¶¶ 26-63, 44 P.3d 794; State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, ¶ 18, 20 P.3d 265 (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493)); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 42, 993 P.2d 837 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). The factors are as follows: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the witness' degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the witness' capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness' identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. Long, 721 P.2d at 493. While these factors provide guidance, the list is certainly not an exhaustive or exclusive list of factors that may be considered in determining whether an identification is reliable, and, therefore, not violative of due process. ¶ 28 We conclude that the pretrial photo identification was sufficiently reliable such that defendant's due process rights were not violated by permitting the identification testimony of Gunderson and Moss. Both Gunderson and Moss had an adequate opportunity to view the assailant. Gunderson had an opportunity to view the assailant initially at the door, then later in the living room when the assailant demanded access to the safes, and in the bedroom where the assailant had directed Gunderson before fleeing. The attention of both Gunderson and Moss was focused on the assailant. Whether their attention was focused on the features of the assailant or whether their vision was blurred by fear or other factors is debatable, but it is clear that the focus of the witnesses attention was not on another event or occurrence such that the assailant was not the focus of their attention. They were not casual or passing observers. The witnesses' capacity to observe the event, particularly their physical and mental acuity, is debatable. Gunderson was smoking and under the influence of marijuana; Moss had not been smoking marijuana. The witnesses' identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter. Gunderson, according to Officer Merino, identified defendant as the assailant immediately, and without hesitation or equivocation. When asked to describe his certainty to Officer Merino, Gunderson said, I'm positive. Moss immediately identified defendant and indicated her level of certainty as seven on the ten point scale. Officer Merino's procedures militate against concluding that the witnesses' identification was the product of suggestion. Officer Merino took care not to suggest that the witnesses identify one photo over another: he did not place defendant's photo first or last; he required Gunderson and Moss to look at the pictures separately; and he explained to both of them that the assailant might or might not be in the array, that the hair and facial hair might have changed, and that the photo lighting might have altered skin tones. Finally, the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witnesses would perceive, remember and relate it correctly does not clearly influence us either way. Whether a traumatic event helps or hinders in identification is debatable. ¶ 29 In addition to the Long factors, we note that the witnesses provided accurate descriptive information to investigating officers which Officer Merino used to assemble the photo array: the approximate height, build, complexion, and facial hair of their assailant. In particular, Gunderson and Moss provided officers with the moniker the assailant used to identify himself, Six Nine, and Officer Merino used this information in particular to obtain a photograph of defendant from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. ¶ 30 We cannot know for certain whether the witnesses' attention was completely focused on identifying features of the assailant, nor can we determine whether the witnesses were mentally and physically sharp. Whether, because of the nature of the event the witnesses in this case were more perceptive or less perceptive, is also a point of debate. Our determination, however, is only whether the proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable such that it can be presented to the jury for their deliberation. Courts need not, nor should they, step into the province of the jury and decide the ultimate matter of identification for the jurors. Courts must simply decide whether the testimony was sufficiently reliable so as not to offend defendant's right to due process by permitting clearly unreliable identification testimony before the jury. In sum, given the above facts, the witness identifications were not so unreliable as to warrant exclusion of the identification testimony from consideration by the jury. As a result, we hold that admission of the identification testimony of Gunderson and Moss did not violate defendant's state constitutional right to due process.