Opinion ID: 776104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of disability insurance benefits.

Text: 29
30 A district court's order affirming, reversing, or modifying the denial of disability insurance benefits is reviewed de novo. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1034-35 (9th Cir. July 23, 2001); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 628 (2000). 31 The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .  42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) (Supp. 2001). A court must affirm the findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence and if the proper legal standard was applied. Aukland, 275 F.3d 1033, 1035 (This court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of benefits when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole); Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997) (The district court properly affirms the Commissioner's decision denying benefits if it is supported by substantial evidence and based on the application of correct legal standards). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Sandgathe, 108 F.3d at 980; Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1990). Whether substantial evidence supports a finding is determined from the record as a whole, with the court weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusion. Sandgathe, 108 F.3d at 980; Clem, 894 F.2d at 330. When the evidence can rationally be interpreted in more than one way, the court must uphold the Commissioner's decision. Aukland, 257 F.3d 1033, 1034-35; Sandgathe, 108 F.3d at 980. 32 B. The ALJ's Decision was Supported by Substantial Evidence and Was Based on the Proper Legal Standard. 33 Mayes bases her argument that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence on Dr. Buehler's herniated disc diagnosis reached five months after the ALJ issued his decision. In Social Security cases, the ALJ has a special duty to develop the record fully and fairly and to ensure that the claimant's interests are considered, even when the claimant is represented by counsel. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). Mayes contends that the ALJ should have developed the record and determined that Mayes had herniated discs even before Dr. Buehler reached his diagnosis. Mayes would improperly shift her own burden to the ALJ. 34 It was Mayes' duty to prove that she was disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(5) (Supp. 2001) (An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Secretary may require). Accord Clem, 894 F.2d at 330 (Clem has the burden of showing that he is disabled). The Code of Federal Regulations explains: 35 you have to prove to us that you are blind or disabled. Therefore, you must bring to our attention everything that shows that you are blind or disabled. This means that you must furnish medical and other evidence that we can use to reach conclusions about your medical impairments(s) and, if material to the determination of whether you are blind or disabled, its effect on your ability to work on a sustained basis. We will consider only impairment(s) you say you have or about which we receive evidence. 36 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a) (2000). Accord 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(c) (2000) (You must provide medical evidence showing that you have impairment(s) and how severe it is during the time you say you are disabled). Mayes did not provide the ALJ with any medical evidence indicating that she had herniated discs until after the ALJ Hearing. 37 The ALJ had no duty to develop the record by diagnosing Mayes' herniated discs. An ALJ's duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. The record before the ALJ was neither ambiguous nor inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision that Mayes was not disabled. 38 For purposes of disability insurance benefits, a qualifying disability is the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 2001); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(b)(4) (2000) (defining disability as including the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s)). Individuals are considered disabled only if their physical or mental impairments are of such severity that they are not only unable to do their previous work but cannot, considering their age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 2001). 39 Mayes was not engaged in substantial gainful activity. Accordingly, the ALJ had to examine other factors to determine the effect of her impairments. A determination of whether an individual's impairments are of a sufficient medical severity to form the basis of eligibility for disability insurance benefits turns on the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 2001); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) (2000). Impairments are severe if they significantly limit a person's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) (2000). Federal regulations include a list of impairments sufficiently severe that an individual qualifies for benefits. See Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404 (2000); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525 (2000) (The Listing of Impairments describes, for each of the major body systems, impairments which are considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity). The ALJ determined that, although Mayes' impairments were severe, they did not meet or equal the severity of any impairment described in the Listing of Impairments. Mayes does not challenge this determination. 40 When the ALJ cannot make a disability determination based on current work activity or on medical facts alone, and when an individual's impairments are severe, the ALJ must review the applicant's residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work she did in the past. Residual functional capacity is what the individual can still do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545 (2000). If the individual can still do the work she did in the past, then the ALJ should determine that she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§§§ 404.1520(e), 404.1561 (2000). If she cannot do the work she did in the past, the ALJ should consider her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience to determine whether she can do other work. If she can do other work, then she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§§§ 404.1520(f), 404.1594(f)(8) (2000); see also Social Security Administrative Rulings 1983-1991 (1992) at 85-15 (If a person has a severe medically determinable impairment which, though not meeting or equaling the criteria in the Listing of Impairments, prevents the person from doing past relevant work, it must be determined whether the person can do other work). 41 The ALJ determined that Mayes could not perform her past relevant work, but that she could perform unskilled sedentary work as a food and beverage order clerk and surveillance system monitor, and unskilled light work as a[n] information clerk and mail clerk, all jobs existing in the national economy. This determination was supported by substantial evidence in the form of testimony by Lawrence Rowan, a vocational expert, as well as medical notes, Mayes' own testimony, and Mayes' mother's testimony. The medical evidence did not show that Mayes was unable to work. Mayes' testimony that she could do many daily activities suggested that she could also work. Mayes' mother testified only that Mayes had difficulty breathing, was anxious and depressed, and that Mayes was frequently sick. Even when pressed for other observations about Mayes, Mayes' mother did not indicate that Mayes was unable to work. 42 Mayes is not contending in this appeal that the evidence before the ALJ was sufficient to establish that she was disabled. Instead, she merely argues that, had the ALJ developed the record and established her back condition, he would have found her disabled. As discussed above, however, it was not the ALJ's duty to develop the record in such a manner. 43 Because the ALJ's determination that Mayes was not disabled was supported by substantial evidence, and because the ALJ applied the correct legal standard, we affirm the ALJ's disability determination, as well as the district court's affirmance of that determination. 44