Opinion ID: 1133460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Location of Hill Easement

Text: Having determined that the Hill easement is a valid, appurtenant easement, we turn to the matter of its location. The trial court, applying the principles set out in Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850 (Wyo.1996), determined that the easement was a floating easement which had been located by historic use. R.C.R., Inc. contends the Hills' easement is a permanently floating servitude and, therefore, the court erred when it fixed the location of the easement. Their position is that Edgcomb is factually different from, and should not control the outcome of, the case at bar. In the alternative, R.C.R., Inc. argues that the servient estate should be allowed to fix the permanent location in the first instance. The Easements document does not specify the location of the easement. An express easement which does not state the location of the easement is called a floating easement. Edgcomb, 922 P.2d at 855; Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02[2]. Floating easements, because they are not limited to any specific area on the servient tenement, burden the entire servient estate. Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02[3]. Although R.C.R., Inc. uses the term permanently floating servitude, they do not argue that the Hill easement should remain indefinite and unfixed in its location. Their argument is that the Easements document reserves a right in the servient estate to locate and relocate the easement periodically. In support of its position, R.C.R., Inc. directs our attention to the following language in the granting instrument: Grantor shall have the right to use and enjoy the above described premises and the Grantee shall not interfere with the Grantors' use and occupancy of said land and shall not build, create or permit any obstructions or excavations or ditches which would interfere with the safety or grazing of livestock[.] They believe that the above language, along with the use of the term an access road as opposed to the access road, demonstrates the parties' intent that the easement not be permanently located but, instead, subject to periodic relocation by the servient estate. While the above language limits the Hills' use of the easement so as not to interfere with the Grantors' use and occupancy, we do not find that language susceptible to the broad interpretation assigned by R.C.R., Inc. The instrument does not reserve to the servient estate either the right to locate the easement in the first instance, or the right to unilaterally relocate the easement. Once a court concludes that the location or the dimensions of an easement are not adequately described in the instrument, it generally examines the surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the parties. Edgcomb, 922 P.2d at 855 (quoting Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02[2][b]). The parties are presumed to have intended an easement that is reasonably convenient or necessary under the circumstances. Id. Courts look to various factors to establish a reasonable description of the easement, including the purpose of the easement, the geographic relationship between the dominant and servient estates, and the benefit to the easement holder compared to the burden on the servient estate holder. Id. Use existing at the time the easement was created is considered strong evidence of the intended location and dimensions of the easement.    Use commenced after the execution of the easement to which the servient estate owner acquiesces is also persuasive. Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02[2][b]. The court must be careful to determine the location of the easement on the basis of circumstances at the time the easement was created. Id. The trial court, relying on this court's decision in Edgcomb, determined that the location of the Hill easement was fixed by historic use. Edgcomb involved a floating easement for a power transmission line. Applying the principles set out in the preceding paragraph, this court held that the parties' intent, evidenced by the granting instrument, was that the easement would become definitely located once the line was constructed. 922 P.2d at 855-56. The court determined the easement was defined by the current location of the transmission line. Id. at 855. R.C.R., Inc. believes the case at bar is distinguishable from Edgcomb because multiple routes have been used over the years to access the Rainbow Canyon property. However, at the time the Hill easement was granted in 1979, only one road traversed the Platt property, the road that was constructed around 1960 to provide Mr. Deline access to his land in Rainbow Canyon. That road was referred to as the orange road throughout the proceedings. [4] When Mr. Platt was asked, during his deposition, whether he gave Mr. Hill permission to use a particular road in the written easement, he responded, There was no particular road, because there was only one road. Mr. Platt's testimony is strong evidence that the parties intended the easement to be located on the one and only access road in existence at the time the easement was grantedthe orange road. R.C.R., Inc. argues that the servient estate should designate the location of the easement in the first instance. A number of courts hold, where the location of an easement has not been defined, that the servient estate should designate the location of the easement in the first instance. 4 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, Powell On Real Property § 34.12[2] n.19 and cases cited therein; Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02[2][a]. However, as discussed above, the intent of the parties in this case is that the easement was defined by the access road in existence at the time the easement was created. In any event, Mr. Platt, the Grantor and original servient estate holder, was involved in the construction of the original access road. Sometime in the early to mid-1980s, Mr. Platt relocated a portion of the road, which had often drifted shut in the winter, to the top of a hill where the wind could sweep it bare. The new route, referred to as the purple road, overlapped the orange road to a significant degree, retained the original termini, and was agreeable to the Hills. The Hills accessed their property via the purple road from the time it was built until 1995, when Mr. Gray unilaterally relocated a portion of the road. The relocated segment, designated as the pink road, entered the Rainbow Canyon property at a different location than the purple road, and required the Hills to enter their property from their back yard. The trial court, in its original Judgment, disregarded the pink road and fixed the purple road as the permanent location of the easement. The fact that the permanent location designated by the court, the purple road, deviated slightly from the original route, is inconsequential considering that both parties were in agreement with the move. An easement holder and the servient estate owner may relocate the easement by mutual consent. Ericsson v. Braukman, 111 Or.App. 57, 824 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1992) (quoting Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.03[1][c]). In addition, the court properly disregarded Mr. Gray's unilateral relocation of the road. The general rule, which we adopt here, is that unilateral relocation of an easement is not permitted, absent an express provision in the granting instrument. Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.05[1]. A unilateral relocation rule would introduce considerable uncertainty into land ownership and incite litigation. Stamatis v. Johnson, 71 Ariz. 134, 224 P.2d 201, 203 (1950); see also Davis v. Bruk, 411 A.2d 660, 665 (Me. 1980). In addition, the easement holder could be subject to harassment by the servient owner's attempts to relocate to serve his own conveniences. Davis, 411 A.2d at 665. A handful of courts permit the servient estate owner to unilaterally relocate the easement if the original termini are retained and the easement holder is not materially inconvenienced. Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.05[4]. However, even if we were to apply this exception, the record fully supports the court's decision. Mr. Hill testified that he was not notified about the relocation beforehand, and the new road required him to enter the Rainbow Canyon property through his back yard instead of through his front entrance, which had been specially designed and landscaped. We hold that the trial court properly applied the law to the facts of this case to determine the location of the Hill easement. The Judgment entered by the trial court is affirmed except to the extent it was amended as described in the following section.