Opinion ID: 4550523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cruz-Foster, Maldonado, and Robinson

Text: In Cruz-Foster v. Foster, decided in 1991, we first noted the definitional gap in the IntraFamily Offenses Act, observing that “[t]he term ‘good cause,’” as used in D.C. Code § 16-1005(d), “is not defined in the statute.” Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 929. Reasoning that a CPO is injunctive in nature, and that a petitioner seeking a CPO extension is seeking “an injunction which has not been previously granted,” we defined good cause according to the standard for civil injunctive relief, as articulated by the Supreme Court: [T]he moving party must satisfy the court that relief is needed. The necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive. The chancellor’s decision is based on all the circumstances; his discretion is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made to reverse it. To be considered are the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in 23 some cases, the character of the past violations. Id. at 930 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). The dissent mistakenly posits that Cruz-Foster’s definition of “good cause” as a “cognizable danger of recurrent violation” was limited to its facts, post at 64-65 & n.28; however, the language of Cruz-Foster offers no support or indication that its holding can or should be interpreted in as narrow or restricted manner as the dissent suggests. 10 The holding in Cruz-Foster explicitly fills a gap in the Act by defining “good cause” under § 16-1005(d), without caveat or qualification. See Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d 929-31. As to the “character of the past violations,” the Cruz-Foster court clarified that “the past history of the case is critical to the [good cause] determination” because a respondent’s “past conduct is important evidence – perhaps the most important evidence – in predicting [the respondent’s] probable future conduct”; the trial court therefore cannot only “examin[e] the most recent episode” in a case, but 10 We note that, while the dissent rejects one of Cruz-Foster’s central holdings – the definition of “good cause” under § 16-1005(d) – it takes no issue with Cruz-Foster’s other holdings, including the allocation of the burden to petitioner, the preponderance quantum of proof, the evaluation of the entire mosaic, and appellate review for abuse of discretion in CPO proceedings. Post at 59-60, 66-67, 70-72; see also Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 930-32. 24 “must be apprised of the entire mosaic” of the case. Id. at 930 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We then held that, in addition to determining whether there is “good cause,” i.e., a cognizable danger of a recurrent violation, the trial court must – in light of the remedial nature of the Act – consider whether the “balance of the harms” favors extending the CPO, taking into account the potential injury to the petitioner if the CPO is not extended and the potential injury to the respondent if the CPO is extended. Id. at 930-31. Applying these considerations to the facts in Cruz-Foster, we held that the trial court abused its discretion in focusing only on the most recent episodes and in failing to consider the entire mosaic of the case – including the respondent’s previous violation of the CPO, for which he was convicted of criminal contempt and imprisoned, as well as conditions of release in another criminal case that required the respondent to stay away from the petitioner – in its determination of whether there was good cause to extend the CPO, i.e., whether there was a danger of future abuse. Id. at 931-32. We therefore vacated and remanded for the trial court to reconsider and enter “more comprehensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id. at 932. 25 Two years later, in Maldonado v. Maldonado, we applied the logic, though not the terminology, of Cruz-Foster. We held that, in considering a motion to extend an existing CPO, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there was no possibility that the respondent may commit a criminal offense against the petitioner in the coming year, i.e., no cognizable danger of a recurrent violation. Maldonado, 631 A.2d at 43. We concluded that, even though the respondent was incarcerated, there was a chance that he could be released from prison prior to the expiration of the requested one-year CPO extension, and, even if he remained in prison, it was possible for him to threaten or harass the petitioner by telephone, mail, or through third parties, as he had done in the past. Id. On this point, we noted that the CPO “serves as a potential deterrent [of future offenses] and provides a measure of peace of mind for those whose benefit it was issued.” Id. We went on to note that the trial court did not consider the fact that the CPO granted child custody and child support payments to the petitioner, and that both would be jeopardized if the CPO were not extended – meaning it did not balance the potential harms to the parties. Id. at 43-44. Finally, the respondent had consented to the extension of the CPO, thereby rendering the foregoing analysis somewhat academic; we observed that the trial court did not explain its reasons for rejecting the respondent’s consent, which also amounted to an abuse of discretion. 26 Id. at 44. We therefore remanded. Id. In 2005, we decided Robinson v. Robinson, a case in which the parties were in the process of divorcing, the petitioner was still living in the marital home, and the petitioner obtained a modified CPO that ordered the respondent to stay 100 feet away from her – but also allowed him to live in the home next door to her (as both houses had been marital property). Robinson, 886 A.2d at 81-84. The trial court extended the modified CPO for one year, even though the houses were only ten to twelve feet apart. Id. at 83-84. We observed that the trial court’s order “betrays a tension between its finding that potentially ‘tragic violence’ might occur between the parties and its decision to allow [the respondent] to live within twelve feet of [the petitioner],” and that “the Act clearly envisions allowing safety concerns to trump property rights.” Id. at 86. We elaborated: Although ordering a person to vacate his or her home or denying the use of owned property is a serious step, not to be lightly undertaken, when the trial court finds that [criminal] offenses have been committed or are imminent, it can be a necessary measure to ensure peace and safety. Id. We concluded that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not rest its conclusion on correct legal principles, and we therefore remanded for the trial court to consider “the entire mosaic of facts” and the “broad remedial measures 27 available to safeguard [the petitioner’s] safety and peace of mind.” Id. at 87. Though we did not employ the precise nomenclature of Cruz-Foster, we again applied its reasoning: in essence, we held that the trial court had properly found a cognizable danger of a recurrent violation and therefore good cause to extend the CPO, but that it had improperly balanced the harms to the parties in that the provisions of the extended CPO did not adequately reflect the fact that safety concerns may trump property rights. 11