Opinion ID: 797916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sindima's Sentence

Text: 19 Sindima's thirty-six month sentence was twenty-six months greater than the ten-month high end of the advisory Guidelines range applicable to his violations of probation. We find it instructive, for purposes of comparison, that Sindima's criminal record put him in the minimum criminal history category: I. Had he been, by stark contrast, a career criminal with a criminal record placing him in the maximum category, VI, the high end of his range would have been twenty-seven months, nine months shorter than the sentence the district court imposed upon him. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 7B1.4(a) (setting forth a Guidelines range of 21-27 months for a Grade B violator with criminal history category VI). Similarly, had Sindima's conduct fallen within the most serious of probation violations—crimes of violence, drug or firearms crimes, and crimes punishable by more than twenty years' imprisonment—the high end of the applicable Guidelines range would have been eighteen months, half the length of incarceration imposed upon him by the district court. Id. Sindima's sentence therefore strikes us as marginal. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 135. The statement of reasons given by the district court does not on the present record support the severity of the sentence. We do not foreclose the possibility that there may be reasons that impelled the court to impose it which, if identified, would persuade us that the sentence was appropriate. 20 The first articulated basis for the length of the district court's sentence was that the defendant engaged in egregious conduct despite being given a substantial break at the time of his original sentencing. But the Sentencing Commission has indicated that while the three-tiered system for probation violations is based on the defendant's actual conduct, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1 cmt. n. 1, sentences for probation violations are not intended to punish defendants for the conduct underlying the violation as if that conduct were being sentenced as new federal criminal conduct. Id. at Chap. 7, Pt. A.3(b). The Commission adopted the policy, instead, that the primary goal of a revocation sentence ought to be to sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision, in order to account for the breach of trust inherent in failing to appreciate the privileges associated with such supervision. Id. Thus, at revocation the court should sanction primarily the defendant's breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at § 7B1.3(f) (indicating sentence for probation violation to be served consecutively with any other sentence imposed). 21 Thus, it seems to us, when the district court relied on Sindima's recidivism in the face of the substantial break he received in his original sentence to impose a sentence substantially in excess of the advisory Guidelines maximum, Tr., Apr. 13, 2006, at 17, it was relying on a factor for which the Guidelines range was designed to account: Sindima's breach of the district court's trust that he would abide by the terms of his probation in return for having avoided incarceration. When a factor is already included in the calculation of the [G]uidelines sentencing range, a judge who wishes to rely on that same factor to impose a sentence above or below the range must articulate specifically the reasons that this particular defendant's situation is different from the ordinary situation covered by the [G]uidelines calculation. United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir.2006). Accordingly, it may well have been reasonable for the district court to have imposed a non-Guidelines sentence based upon section 3553(a) factors already accounted for in the Guidelines range. The Guidelines `can point to outcomes that may appear unreasonable to sentencing judges in particular cases.' Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 133 (quoting United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir.2006) (en banc)); see also United States v. Pickett, 475 F.3d 1347, 1353 (D.C.Cir.2007) (noting that district courts sentencing defendants ought to evaluate how well the applicable Guideline effectuates the purposes of sentencing enumerated in § 3553(a)). But we cannot properly conduct our review absent an explanation by the district court of why a Guidelines sentence did not sufficiently account for those factors in Sindima's case. We do not know why the district court thought that the breach of trust inherent in Sindima's probation violations warranted a sentence of the magnitude imposed. 22 The district judge did emphasize that Sindima's probation violation was not an isolated bad judgment call and that it constituted an egregious scheme involving a calculated pattern of fraudulent activity on a repeated basis, the same type of conduct for which he had been placed on probation in the first instance. Tr., Apr. 13, 2006, at 17. We do not doubt that these considerations are relevant in assessing the severity of Sindima's breach of trust. But we are instructed by the Sentencing Commission's policy to consider the conduct underlying the violation only to a limited degree, U.S.S.G. Chap. 7, Pt. A.3(b), and by our prior case law that where a district court imposes its sentence based on factors incompatible with the Commission's policy statements, the sentence may be substantively unreasonable absent a persuasive explanation as to why the sentence actually comports with the § 3553(a) factors, Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 134. The district court was required to consider the policies articulated by the Sentencing Commission related to the purposes of punishing probation violators. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(B); Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 134. The district court's stated reasons do not give us sufficient confidence that it did so. We understand that Sindima's repeated fraudulent conduct may very well have rendered reasonable a variance above the ten-month high end of the advisory range. But in light of the overall scope of the conduct involved, the limited criminal history of the defendant, and the relevant advice of the Guidelines, we cannot understand the striking size of the variance imposed in this case absent a more persuasive explanation for it. 23 We do not find the district court's statement of its second ground for Sindima's sentence, his personal characteristics, sufficiently compelling, either. The district court's decision to sentence the defendant to less than the statutory maximum of five years on the basis of defense counsel's submissions as to Sindima's character tells us little about why the statutory maximum sentence might have been reasonably considered or why a sentence of thirty-six months was reasonable under the circumstances. 24 We therefore conclude that on the present record, we are not confident that the grounds upon which the district court relied are sufficiently compelling [and] present to the degree necessary to support the sentence imposed. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 137. We therefore remand the case to the district court. If the district court determines that the same sentence as that which is now in effect is indeed warranted, it may reimpose such a sentence accompanied by a statement of reasons that is sufficiently compelling. Id. If, however, in light of the foregoing discussion, it determines that a different sentence is called for, it may impose that sentence accompanied by a statement of the reasons for it. The court should also record its reasons for the sentence in its written judgment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). 25 We urge the district court to act within sixty days after the amended date of this decision. After an amended judgment is issued by the district court, jurisdiction may be restored to this court by letter from any party, and the Clerk's Office of this court shall set an expeditious briefing schedule and send such proceeding to this panel for disposition. See United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir.1994).