Opinion ID: 901910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether Steichen's sentences were unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.

Text: [¶ 29.] Steichen argues that his sentences are the equivalent of life in prison without parole and are grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed. He claims that the sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article VI, section 23 of the South Dakota Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; S.D. Const. art. VI § 23. He asserts that a life sentence ruins the goal of rehabilitation. Steichen intended to introduce statistics regarding sentences imposed for similar offenses as part of the intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis. Steichen argues on appeal that the habeas court's refusal to permit the introduction of statistics for similar offenses was error. [¶ 30.] It is well-settled that we employ very limited principles in our constitutional review of sentences. These principles include giving `substantial deference[ ] to the legislature's broad authority to determine the types and limits of punishment' and the notion that `the Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.' State v. Dubois, 2008 SD 15, ¶ 41, 746 N.W.2d 197, 210 (quoting State v. Garber, 2004 SD 2, ¶ 28, 674 N.W.2d 320, 327 (additional citations omitted)). For this reason, we seldom disturb sentences that are within the statutory maximum. Id. To review the proportionality of a sentence we consider the intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis: [W]e first determine whether the sentence appears grossly disproportionate. To accomplish this, we consider the conduct involved, and any relevant past conduct, with utmost deference to the Legislature and the sentencing court. If the sentence does not appear grossly disproportionate, no further review is necessary. If the sentence does appear grossly disproportionate, an intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis shall be conducted. We also consider the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; and other relevant factors, such as the effect this type of offense has on society. Id. (quoting State v. Williams, 2006 SD 11, ¶ 12, 710 N.W.2d 427, 432 (citations omitted)) (emphasis added). [¶ 31.] We first consider whether Steichen's sentence appears grossly disproportionate. In Steichen's case, the circuit court considered Steichen's conduct and past conduct during sentencing. Steichen was convicted of multiple instances of sexual abuse against minors. He threatened his victims with death if they told anyone of the incidents of sexual abuse. Further, the habeas court determined that: [Steichen's] presentence investigation and psychosexual evaluation did not show he was amenable to treatment or rehabilitation. In fact, it showed the contrary. It showed that the Petitioner lacked remorse for his actions and failed to accept responsibility. The jury verdict showed that this was not an isolated first offense since he was convicted of sexual offenses against each of the victims on multiple counts. Steichen's sentences were all within the statutory maximums. Thus, giving utmost deference to the Legislature and sentencing court and based on Steichen's conduct and history, we find that Steichen's sentences were not grossly disproportionate to his crimes. See Dubois, 2008 SD 15, ¶ 41, 746 N.W.2d at 210 (citations omitted). For this reason, we do not reach the intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis. [¶ 32.] We affirm on all issues. [¶ 33.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP and ZINTER, Justices, concur. [¶ 34.] SABERS, Retired Justice, concurs specially.