Opinion ID: 2460345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Level of Certainty

Text: It is only the little, if any, likelihood languagein other words, the level of certainty that is imposedin Ricks and numerous other nonconstitutional error cases that is difficult to reconcile with K.S.A. 60-261. The federal constitutional harmless error standard of Chapman and the Kansas harmless error statutes, K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105, are based on the same measuring point: whether the error affected substantial rights. As we have noted, in Kansas we have used the same substantial rights standard, measured by whether an error changed the result of the trial, regardless of whether we are applying K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 or Chapman. This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the harmless error standard. As the Court made clear in United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004), relief from errorwhether under Chapman, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)/Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) (harmless error), or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) (plain error)is tied in some way to prejudicial effect, . . . [which] mean[s] error with a prejudicial effect on the outcome of a judicial proceeding. See also United States v. Marcus, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2168-69, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[a] and [b] provide a unitary standard for relief from error which turns on whether the error in question affected substantial rights[.]); Neder, 527 U.S. at 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[a] applies to all errors; in applying Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[a]'s harmless error analysis to constitutional errors, reviewing court must `disregar[d]' errors that are harmless `beyond a reasonable doubt'). Under the United States Supreme Court's analysis, although relief for any type of error i.e., constitutional, harmless, or plainis based on the same benchmark, effect on the outcome, the analysis for each type of error is formulated differently to set a higher or lower threshold or level of certainty as to whether the error affected the outcome. In other words, the standard of proof varies by the degree of certainty by which a court must be persuaded that the error did not affect the outcome. See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 86, 124 S.Ct. 2333 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the Court has created too many gradations in the standards of probability relating to the assessment of whether the outcome of the trial would have been different if the error had not occurred); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 653-56, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353, reh. denied 508 U.S. 968, 113 S.Ct. 2951, 124 L.Ed.2d 698 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (harmless error requires the reviewing court to determine whether it has sufficient confidence that the verdict would have remained unchanged even if the error had not occurred; only difference between Chapman and the Kotteakos /Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52 standard is the degree of confidence the reviewing court must have that the error did not affect the outcome); see also (Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error, pp. 34, 43 (1970)) (appellate courts must assess the risk that an error affected the outcome on a sliding scale of probabilities); Walker, Harmless Error Review in the Second Circuit, 63 Brook L. Rev. 395, 399 (1997) (harmless error standards establish the degree of certainty required. . . before a court can declare [an error] harmless). The Chapman harmless beyond a reasonable doubt threshold requires the highest level of certainty that the error did not affect the outcome. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, which quoted Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86, 84 S.Ct. 229, and concluding that under the Kotteakos standard, relief from error is granted only when the error had an actual effect on the outcome; under Chapman, relief from error is required merely because there is a `reasonable possibility' that trial error contributed to the verdict); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) ( Chapman 's constitutional harmless error standard is considerably more onerous than the standard for nonconstitutional errors adopted in Kotteakos, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239). Under federal law, all other nonstructural errors (nonconstitutional errors, errors on collateral review, and plain errors) are subject to a less stringent threshold; such errors must be held harmless where there is no reasonable probability the error affected the outcome. See Marcus, 130 S.Ct. at 2164 (reasonable probability that the error affected outcome, not any possibility, is the appropriate standard for determining whether a plain error affected substantial rights under Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[b]); Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333 (a plain error `affects substantial rights' as used in Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[b] where there is a `reasonable probability' that, but for the error, the outcome would have been different). Which threshold or level of certaintyreasonable probability or reasonable possibilityshould be applied to K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 when nonconstitutional error is involved has not been as clear, however. Recently, the point was addressed in State v. Shadden, 290 Kan. 803, 830, 235 P.3d 436 (2010), in which we relied on Marcus, 130 S.Ct. 2159, to reject the threshold of a `possibility' that an error had affected the outcome of a trial. In Marcus, the United States Supreme Court discussed the harmless error provision of Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52(b), which permits a federal appellate court to recognize plain error that affects substantial rights. The Court detailed four circumstances in which the rule could be applied, one of which is when an error `affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means' it `affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.' Marcus, 130 S.Ct. at 2164. The Court discussed the level of certainty required in this circumstance, stating: In the ordinary case, to meet this standard an error must be `prejudicial,' which means that there must be a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. [Citations omitted.] (Emphasis added.) Marcus, 130 S.Ct. at 2164. Citing Marcus, in Shadden, 290 Kan. at 830, 235 P.3d 436, we concluded the Kansas Court of Appeals had erred in reversing a conviction based on the mere possibility that a nonconstitutional error had affected the outcome of a trial. Based on Marcus, we applied a reasonable probability level of certainty to determine whether the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Synthesizing these various holdings, we conclude that before a Kansas court can declare an error harmless it must determine the error did not affect a party's substantial rights, meaning it will not or did not affect the trial's outcome. The degree of certainty by which the court must be persuaded that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial will vary depending on whether the error implicates a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. If it does, a Kansas court must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no impact on the trial's outcome, i.e., there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. If a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution is not implicated, a Kansas court must be persuaded that there is no reasonable probability that the error will or did affect the outcome of the trial. (Because Ward claims a violation of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the question of whether an error that implicates a right guaranteed by the Kansas Constitution but not the United States Constitution can be declared harmless and, if it can, what level of certainty would apply is not presented in this case and, therefore, is not determined. Likewise, we do not address the analysis to be applied in the context of a collateral review of error. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630-31, 113 S.Ct. 1710). That said, with the clarification that a reasonable probability threshold applies under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105, it is confusing to talk about an error having little, if any, likelihood of affecting a trial's outcome. This language suggests a reasonable doubt threshold, which is the context in which the language originated. In contrast, the wording used by the United States Supreme Court when discussing harmless error in a nonconstitutional error setting does not include the phrase little, if any, likelihood and, therefore, avoids the potential for confusion. The Court considers all errorsconstitutional, harmless, and plainby the benchmark of affecting substantial justice, meaning affecting the outcome of the proceeding. Then, it applies the appropriate level of certainty. Our review of the history that has resulted from the varying wording this court has used persuades us that the analysis under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 should be phrased with similar consistency and without the little, if any, likelihood phrase. In addition, we clarify that our frequent reference, primarily in prosecutorial misconduct cases, to satisfying both harmlessness standardsK.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)should not be read to imply there are two different tests. E.g., State v. Kemble, 291 Kan. 109, 121-22, 238 P.3d 251 (2010) (using language of both standards); State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, Syl. ¶ 2, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004) (discussing basis for statement). Rather, as discussed, there is one benchmark of whether substantial justice is affected with different levels of certainty required.