Opinion ID: 786967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The July 29 order was a final decision.

Text: 28 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the finality requirement is to be given a `practical rather than a technical construction.' Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)). Under modern doctrine, a `final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.... The foundation of this policy is not in merely technical conceptions of `finality.' It is one against piecemeal litigation. United States v. One 1986 Ford Pickup, 56 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)). 29 An order can be a final decision for purposes of § 1291 even if it is not the order terminating the primary litigation. Under the collateral order doctrine announced in Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, an order is final if it (1) fully disposes of an issue before the court, (2) resolves an issue collateral to the underlying subject of the litigation, and (3) involves an important right otherwise irreparably lost if review had to await final judgment. See United States v. Poland (In re Derickson), 640 F.2d 946, 948 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam); see also United States v. Friedman, 366 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir.2004) (listing Cohen factors). Furthermore, when post-judgment orders are involved[,][t]he policy against and the probability of piecemeal review is not as decisive a consideration after judgment as before judgment since the underlying dispute is already settled. United States v. Washington, 761 F.2d 1404, 1406 (9th Cir.1985). Indeed, unless such orders are found final, there is often little prospect that further proceedings will occur to make them final. Id.; see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir.1993) (The final-decision rule (28 U.S.C. § 1291) postpones appeal to the final judgment — but what about orders issued after the final judgment? There is no problem when the postjudgment order concludes a discrete, collateral proceeding, such as a proceeding to award attorney's fees for services rendered before the entry of the final judgment.). 30 For these reasons, this court has found post-judgment orders to be final for purposes of § 1291 in a variety of criminal and civil contexts. Post-judgment orders involving attorney fees under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (CJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, have been held to be final within the meaning of Cohen. United States v. Walton (In re Baker), 693 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam); Derickson, 640 F.2d at 948. 7 In Derickson, we noted: 31 The third Cohen factor[,] the involvement of an important right otherwise lost if review had to await final judgment[,] is, of course, inapplicable since Derickson submitted his fee request, following the usual procedure, after entry of final judgment in the underlying case. 32 640 F.2d at 948. Section 1291 also has supported jurisdiction for an appeal from a district court order directing the government to expunge all records of a 20-year-old criminal conviction from its files: [T]o the extent that the district court's order constituted an injunction against the United States and its agencies, the order was a `final decision'.... United States v. G, 774 F.2d 1392, 1393 (9th Cir.1985). Finally, although civil contempt orders entered during litigation cannot be appealed until final judgment is entered, post-judgment orders of civil contempt are appealable immediately under § 1291. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that post-judgment orders of contempt are final and appealable under § 1291); Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that the civil contempt order had acquired all the elements of operativeness and consequence necessary to be possessed by any judicial order to enable it to have the status of a final decision under § 1291) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sportmart, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 601 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1979) ([M]ost post-judgment orders are final decisions within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as long as the district court has completely disposed of the [underlying] matter.). 33 Here, we conclude that the district court's July 29 order refusing to set aside the Standing Order was a final decision, which is appealable under § 1291. As a post-judgment order, it does not implicate concerns about piecemeal review. The order was a final determination of the United States Attorney's obligation to comply with the Standing Order in the present case — an issue that is collateral to Ray's prosecution, conviction, and eventual sentence. As we will discuss in Part IV, the Standing Order was incidental to the sentencing process. The United States Attorney's appeal is therefore similar to appeals involving the question whether fees are to be paid to appointed counsel: Both appeals seek to vindicate rights of a party's representative, rather than of the party itself, yet both issues are sufficiently connected to the underlying criminal case to be cognizable on appeal. 8 34