Opinion ID: 2247066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: Appellant's driving privileges were properly suspended for one year. The statute is constitutional on its face and as applied to appellant.

Text: Appellant argues that the suspension of his driving privileges for one year under Vehicle Code section 13202.6, subdivision (a)(1), was unconstitutional, as well as irrational and inappropriate under the circumstances of the case. We conclude these arguments lack merit, that the statute passes constitutional muster, and that the suspension was legally proper. Vehicle Code section 13202.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides in relevant part that: For every conviction of a person for a violation of Section 594 [vandalism] ... of the Penal Code, committed while the person was 13 years of age or older, the court shall suspend the person's driving privilege for one year, except when the court finds that a personal or family hardship exists that requires the person to have a driver's license for his or her own, or a member of his or her family's, employment or medically related purposes. It is established that the right to drive is not a fundamental right, but a privilege subject to regulation. ( Tolces v. Trask (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 285, 290, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 294.) When called upon to evaluate a substantive due process challenge to a legislative police power measure that does not impinge upon fundamental rights, constitutional principles require the reviewing court to apply the rational basis test. ( Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 185, 189, 228 Cal.Rptr. 169, 721 P.2d 50.) The standard to be applied in determining whether the challenged provision comports with the requirements of due process has been stated as follows: `In the exercise of its police power a Legislature does not violate due process so long as an enactment is procedurally fair and reasonably related to a proper legislative goal. The wisdom of the legislation is not at issue in analyzing its constitutionality, and neither the availability of less drastic remedial alternatives nor the legislative failure to solve all related ills at once will invalidate a statute.' ( People v. Kilborn (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 152, quoting from Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 398, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512.) The burden of demonstrating the constitutional infirmity of the statute lies with the challenger. ( People v. Rodriguez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th, 157, 176, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 676.) The Legislature originally adopted Vehicle Code section 13202.6 for the purpose of deterring youths convicted of a particular form of vandalism (tagging), but it was thereafter amended to include defendants who are convicted of any form of vandalism. (Stats.1990, ch. 712, § 1, pp. 3314-3315; Stats.1994, ch. 909, § 9.) Appellant argues that by enacting Vehicle Code section 13202.6, the Legislature simply cast a net which included some (although perhaps very few) instances of vandalism with respect to which a loss of the driving privilege is totally irrational, and thus a violation of the due process `rational basis' test for upholding the constitutionality of a penal statute. As case authority confirms, however, the Legislature is not required to draft the most narrowly tailored statute to withstand a rational basis analysis. So long as the purpose of the statute is reasonably related to a proper legislative goal, the statute passes the rational basis test. The statutory provision requiring appellant to forgo his driving privileges for one year bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the goal of deterring vandalism. There is a certain logic in depriving a person of the use of his or her car where that person has maliciously damaged the car of another. The statute is clearly constitutional on its face and as applied to appellant.