Opinion ID: 1127405
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Overlap Between Section 190.3 Factors (a), (b), and (c)

Text: (33) Section 190.3 requires the jury to consider the circumstances of the offense (§ 190.3, factor (a)), the presence of violent criminal activity ( id., factor (b)), and prior felony convictions ( id., factor (c)). The jury was instructed in the statutory language. (Former CALJIC No. 8.84.1.) Defendant now claims the court erred by failing to clarify the differences between the above factors, thus allowing the jury to give multiple consideration to the aggravating evidence under all these factors. He also asserts that the instructions erroneously permitted the jury to consider defendant's prior assaults under both factors (b) and (c), and improperly inflated the weight the jury should have given to either prior crime. We have noted that section 190.3, factor (b), concerns crimes other than those for which defendant is being prosecuted ( Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 763; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1125 [31 Cal. Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36] [hereafter Fudge ]), and we have directed that courts should give clarifying instructions to avoid any confusion that may be caused by the above factors. ( Montiel, supra, 5 Cal 4th at pp. 887, 938; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57,106, fn. 26 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) But we have consistently found that the absence of clarifying instructions is harmless ( Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 938), and that the standard instructions do not inherently encourage `double-counting' under section 190.3. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 269; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 703 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217].) Therefore, even if one or more jurors mistakenly consider a particular criminal incident under the wrong factor, there is little risk that a reasonable jury will give a single incident duplicative consideration. ( Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 939; Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) Moreover, both the prosecutor and defense counsel separately explained the proper use of the evidence under the separate factors. Thus, any potential confusion the jury may have faced in light of the instructions was adequately addressed by both counsel's arguments. Accordingly, given the arguments and the absence of any improperly admitted evidence, we find that the court's failure to clarify the scope of each factor did not affect the outcome of the trial.