Opinion ID: 773640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Text and Structure of the Statute

Text: 15 Our analysis is governed by fundamental principles of statutory construction. A basic guide to the meaning of statutory language is the context of the statute as a whole. [W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. INS v. Cordoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, [s]tatutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect. Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997). 16 The provision immediately preceding §§ 1252(f)(2) states that no court other than the Supreme Courtshall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of this subchapter . . . . 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(f)(1) (emphasis added). It is clear from this language that Congress did not view the terms enjoin and restrain as synonymous. If Congress had intended the term enjoin  to cover the entire universe of judicial power over immigration proceedings, there would have been no need to include the phrase or restrain. Under the INS's interpretation, this second term is reduced to mere surplusage. If restrain has any operative meaning, as we must presume it does, Congress's omission of this term from §§ 1252(f)(2) must be significant. The only construction that saves §§ 1252(f)(1) from surplusage is that enjoin refers only to the class of actions properly defined as injunctions, not to the full range of judicial action. 17 Section 1252(b)(3)(B), the only provision in the statute containing the term stay, confirms this reading. This section states, Service of the petition on the officer does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court's decision on the petition, unless the court orders otherwise. Here, Congress used the specific term stay to describe a hold on deportation pending a decision on a petition for review. Yet Congress did not use the term stay in §§ 1252(f), although it could have easily done so. Just as Congress added the termrestrain to §§ 1252(f)(1), it could have written §§ 1252(f)(2) to limit courts' power to enjoin or stay the deportation of an alien. But it did not do so, and we will not lightly conclude that this omission was an oversight. 18 Moreover, if Congress had intended to limit courts' power to stay deportation proceedings pending petitions for review, the most logical place to include that provision would have been in §§ 1252(b)(3)(B) itself, the provision governing stay orders. It would be quite strange to announce the abolition of automatic stay orders in §§ 1252(b)(3)(B), but announce the replacement standards in §§ 1252(f)(2). Indeed, if §§ 1252(f)(2) has the effect that the INS claims, all of §§ 1252(b)(3)(B) would be reduced to surplusage. If §§ 1252(f)(2) clearly means that courts can only issue stays of deportation upon a showing that the order was prohibited as a matter of law, there would be no need to state in §§ 1252(b)(3)(B) that stays are not automatic. 19 The heading of §§ 1252(f) is also instructive. This heading describes the purpose of the section as a [l]imit on injunctive relief. As the Supreme Court has explained,By its plain terms, and even by its title, that provision is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief. It prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive relief against the operation of §§§§ 1221-1231, but specifies that this ban does not extend to individual cases. Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1999) (emphasis added). The clear concern of the section is limiting the power of courts to enjoin the operation of the immigration laws, not with stays of removal in individual asylum cases. 1 20 This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court's analysis of IIRIRA in American-Arab, which addressed 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), the provision that immediately follows §§ 1252(f). Section 1252(g) provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.  The Court read this provision narrowly and held that it did not cover the universe of deportation claims. American-Arab, 525 U.S. at 482. The section referred to three discrete actions, no more and no less. The Court found it implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings. Not because Congress is too unpoetic to use synecdoche, but because that literary device is incompatible with the need for precision in legislative drafting. Id. 21 Similarly, we will not lightly assume that Congress intended the term enjoin in §§ 1252(f) as shorthand for the term stay. Congress knew very well how to use the term stay when it wanted to, and it is not plausible that here, and only here, Congress meant enjoin to include the entire universe of court actions that have a prohibiting or restraining effect. 22 The INS suggests that construing §§ 1252(f)(2) in light of other provisions in the statute is contrary to the statute's command that §§ 1252(f)(2) applies [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law. But this phrase cannot be sensibly read as foreclosing resort to other sections of the statute in an attempt to determine the meaning of the term enjoin.  Rather, the phrase means that §§ 1252(f)(2)'s standard for granting injunctive relief in removal proceedings trumps any contrary provision elsewhere in the law. It says nothing about what interpretive techniques are appropriate to determining whether a stay is included within this category of injunctive relief. 23 Finally, we note the Supreme Court's command that, when possible, we interpret statutes so as to preclude absurd results. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992). The INS's interpretation of §§ 1252(f)(2) would limit the courts' ability to issue stays of deportation except when the petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the removal order is prohibited as a matter of law. However, the courts of appeal review the legal determinations of the BIA de novo. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In any case raising legal issues, INS's interpretation would require a more substantial showing for a stay of deportation than it would for a reversal on the merits. This would effectively require the automatic deportation of large numbers of people with meritorious claims, including every applicant who presented a case of first impression. 24 Moreover, adherence to the rigid standard the INS urges would essentially duplicate the decision on the merits, requiring the petitioner to show a certainty of success. Such a standard would require full-scale briefing at the beginning of the appellate process, often before the petitioner has even received a copy of the administrative record. In those cases in which a motions panel grants the stay on the basis that the INS's order is clearly prohibited as a matter of law, the issue before the merits panel would be the same issue that a motions panel had previously resolved in favor of the petitioner. None of these results are at all sensible as a matter of judicial administration or of the detailed structure the statute establishes for review of BIA decisions. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252.