Opinion ID: 853428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Problem of Joint Representation of Both Defendants

Text: Latta asserts that she received ineffective assistance by reason of Studtmann's joint representation of Roger and her. She contends that the joint representation created an impermissible conflict and resulted in actual prejudice to her at trial. In order to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim based on an actual conflict of interest, a defendant who does not object to joint representation at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-49, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Strickland added, without much explanation, that, once a defendant has demonstrated an actual conflict and an adverse effect on his lawyer's performance, the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim is presumed. 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In addition to the right to effective counsel, the Sixth Amendment also gives an accused the broad, if not wholly unrestricted, right to select counsel. This case presented the trial court with the tension between these two co-existing rights.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the assistance of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses a right to counsel of one's choice. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Thus, joint representation is not a per se violation of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. Hanna v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482-83, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)). Moreover, it is clear that under some circumstances a defendant may properly waive the right to conflict-free representation, Ward v. State, 447 N.E.2d 1169, 1170-71 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983) (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 1173), and the courts recognize that a defendant may benefit from joint representation: A common defense often gives strength against a common attack, Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-83, 98 S.Ct. 1173 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)). A challenge to joint representation of criminal defendants is often presented by the State and opposed by the defendants. That is what occurred in the Lattas' trial. Midway through the joint trial, the State moved for a mistrial, arguing, among other things, that the testimony of a trooper had given rise to a conflict of interest. The trooper testified that Latta had admitted to setting the fire and the State contended this implicated her more than Roger. Studtmann told the court it was the Lattas' choice for him to continue representing them. The trial court followed up by questioning Latta and Roger regarding joint representation: THE COURT: Mr. Latta, could I ask you a couple of questions? MR. LATTA: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Did you and Mr. Studtmann talk about representation of both you and your wife, Mrs. Latta? MR. LATTA: Yes, sir. He said if there's no conflictwhat is that THE COURT: Of interest? MR. LATTA: interest, there would be no problem in him representing both of us. THE COURT: All right. Mrs. Latta are you of thedo you have the same answers to those questions? MRS. LATTA: Yes, I do. THE COURT: In your discussions, did you talk about any risk that could be involved in joint representation? MRS. LATTA: Yes, we did. THE COURT: Okay. And I understand from Mr. Studtmann that both of you want him to represent you? MRS. LATTA: Yes, that's correct. MR. LATTA: Yes. THE COURT: As both of youboth of you want him to represent you as your attorney? MR. LATTA: Yes. THE COURT: Is that true, Mr. Latta? MR. LATTA: Yes. THE COURT: And is that true, Mrs. Latta? MRS. LATTA: Yes. The trial court denied the State's motion. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159-62, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), this situation presents the trial court with a direct conflict between the defendant's claim to counsel of her choice and the risk that either a direct appeal or a postconviction court will find the joint counsel to have been ineffective despite the defendants' insistence on joint representation at trial. This difficulty is illustrated by a comparison of Hanna with the Court of Appeals' decision in Latta's case. In Hanna, as here, the State moved to disqualify defense counsel jointly retained by five co-defendants. The defendants had been advised of the risks of joint representation by defense counsel, a magistrate, and independent counsel, but voluntarily and knowingly waived the conflict of interest. The trial court nevertheless granted the State's motion to disqualify counsel. 714 N.E.2d at 1164. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion because the State had not established a conflict sufficient to override the defendant's choice of counsel. Hanna, 714 N.E.2d at 1168. Thus, in Hanna, the Court of Appeals reversed because the trial court granted the State's motion to disqualify counsel, and Latta's conviction was reversed because the trial court denied the State's motion.
Relying on Hanna, the Court of Appeals concluded that Latta had not waived her right to object to joint representation because the trial court had not sufficiently performed its duty of ensuring Latta's right to a fair trial in accordance with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Latta, 722 N.E.2d at 393 n. 3. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue principally in terms of waiver. However, Hanna also noted that the court has an independent interest in ensuring a fair trial and may, in some circumstances, properly refuse a defendant's waiver of his right to conflict-free representation. 714 N.E.2d at 1164-65 (quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (`[W]here a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver, and insist that defendants be separately represented.')). As Wheat noted, this is true of both an actual and a serious potential for conflict. 486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Even if we were to conclude that Latta's waiver of Studtmann's conflict was knowing and voluntary, the issue remains whether her initial waiver may serve to waive all future conflicts and any ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on these conflicts. Justice Marshall, concurring and dissenting in Cuyler, thought it impossible to waive all potential conflicts, especially where a waiver is obtained in the early stages of trial before it is feasible to contemplate all of the possible conflicts. 446 U.S. at 354 n. 1, 100 S.Ct. 1708. But the United States Supreme Court has given us no further clear guidance on this point. Hanna observed that the State has an independent interest in a fair trial, 714 N.E.2d at 1164-65, but that cannot override the defendant's right to proceed pro se, which is surely also a hazardous choice. Sherwood v. State, 717 N.E.2d 131, 137 (Ind.1999) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). Wheat also cited the institutional interest in a fair proceeding. Arguably the proper inference from Wheat is that this institutional interest justifies overriding the defendant's choice of joint counsel but still permits a waiver to preclude a later claim of ineffective assistance. Wheat itself expressly reserved this issue for another day, as it noted, without passing judgment on, the apparent willingness of Courts of Appeals to entertain ineffective-assistance claims from defendants who have specifically waived the right to conflict-free counsel. 486 U.S. at 161-62, 108 S.Ct. 1692. The post- Wheat federal circuit decisions have split on the question of whether a waiver eliminates further claims based on conflict. Compare United States v. Hall, 200 F.3d 962, 965-67 (6th Cir.2000) (reversing conviction on direct appeal because of ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest even though the trial court had repeatedly warned defendant of conflict, and stating that the defendant's waiver does not bind the courts), and United States v. Swartz, 975 F.2d 1042, 1049 (4th Cir.1992) (a waiver obtained pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c), which places a duty on the trial court to inform defendant of potential conflicts where defendant is jointly represented, may not serve to waive all conflicts of interest that arise throughout the course of that defendant's criminal proceedings), with United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 63-64 (7th Cir.1992) (any ineffective assistance claim based on conflict of interest is barred where defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives conflict).
In Wheat, the five-Justice majority reaffirmed the well established presumption in favor of counsel of defendant's choice. 486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692. The United States Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's grant of the prosecution's motion to disqualify joint counsel, and held the trial court should be given wide discretion in this area. Id. at 162-63, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun in dissent, agreed that the trial court should be given wide discretion, but found that discretion abused by a grant of the government's effort to deny the defense joint counsel of their choice. Id. at 173, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Thus, although seven Justices differed in outcome on the facts in Wheat, there was broad agreement that the trial court must be given latitude in its efforts to navigate the Scylla and Charybdis posed by the conflicting Sixth Amendment rights to counsel of one's choice and to competent counsel. We conclude that trial court discretion is necessary because of the tension between these two important rights that must be resolved by the trial court at a time when all relevant information is typically unavailable due to both attorney-client confidences and reluctance to expose trial strategies in advance. It does not follow, however, that because a trial judge may properly refuse a waiver even if the waiver is knowing and voluntary, a trial judge must do so. Although a fair trial is the ultimate goal, we believe an important step in evaluating whether the actual conflict or serious potential for conflict is sufficient to override the defendant's express choice of counsel is an assessment of the defendant's apprehension of the dangers of joint representation. Even if the defendant's consent to joint representation is ultimately determined to preclude a subsequent claim of ineffective assistance grounded in conflict, trial courts should still make appropriate inquiry. And, regardless of the ultimate resolution of the issue left open in Wheat, we think the presumption of deference to the defendant's choice is strengthened by confidence that it is an informed and individual choice by the defendant. Thus, the trial court should attempt to discern whether the defendant knew enough to make the choice an informed onea rational reconciliation of risks and gains that are in the main understood. United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1387-88 (7th Cir.1988). Although we resolve this appeal on grounds unrelated to the joint representation, because the issue was addressed by the Court of Appeals, we do so as well. In this case, the trial court's questioning was quite brief. It established in conclusory terms that Latta had been informed of the risks associated with joint representation and that she wished for Studtmann to represent her, but did not develop any record as to what her understanding of those risks was. At the postconviction hearing, Studtmann testified that he had explained the risks of joint representation to the Lattas rather at length, and discussed the idea of separate counsel with them at the time he moved for separate trials. A trial court may be hard pressed to know how much questioning is enough to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of a defendant's right to conflict-free representation. Id. at 1387 (It is ... always possible to say that the judge could have mentioned one more thing.). Frequently the initiative to terminate joint representation before or at trial comes from the prosecution, not from a disgruntled defendant or from the court on its own motion. The reasons for this are typically tactical. A splintered defense is more likely to produce a plea agreement with weaker links in the defense chain and may ultimately produce that result as to all if some defendants become potential witnesses for the State. Evaluation of the degree of understanding of the risk of joint representation is made more difficult for the trial court because it cannot explore each defendant's understanding of the pros and cons of this arrangement in detail without intruding on both client confidences and the attorney's work product. Here we have only the conclusory testimony at trial that the Lattas discussed the risks, and their attorney's testimony in the postconviction proceeding that this was done rather at length. Accepting Latta's waiver is consistent with the recognition that the Sixth Amendment provides not only the right to counsel, but the right to counsel of one's choice. Indeed, four Justices in Wheat took the view that accepting the waiver and allowing joint representation was constitutionally required under the circumstances of that case. 486 U.S. at 165-66, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting); 486 U.S. at 172-73, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although not an absolute right, the right to counsel of one's choice is not one with which courts should be eager to interfere: Lawyers are not fungible, and often the most important decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense is the selection of an attorney. In situations where a defendant is able to retain counsel privately, `the choice of counsel rests in his hands, not in the hands of the state.' Hanna, 714 N.E.2d at 1165-66 (citations omitted). A defendant's exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to control the choice of counsel may ultimately prove disastrous. Nevertheless, we have recently held in another context that unwarranted interference with that Sixth Amendment right may, as in Hanna, require reversal. See Sherwood, 717 N.E.2d at 132 (imposing hybrid representation on a defendant who waives his right to counsel and chooses instead to exercise his right to represent himself violates the Sixth Amendment).
The first issue for the postconviction court was whether, under these circumstances, it was within the trial court's discretion to accept Latta's waiver of conflict-free representation. We think the defendant's waiver should be presumed valid, and the burden in postconviction proceedings is on the defendant to prove otherwise. If there is evidence supporting the conclusion of an uninformed, or worse, improperly influenced waiver, the postconviction court must assess the defendant's appreciation of the risks. If knowing and voluntary, the waiver is at least entitled to a very strong presumption of validity, and may be conclusive, because it invokes her right to counsel of her choice. If the waiver does not preclude a subsequent claim of ineffective assistance, there remains the issue, as Cuyler put it, of whether an actual conflict of interest adversely affected [the] lawyer's performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348-49, 100 S.Ct. 1708. If so, prejudice under Strickland is presumed. The trial court's investigation of the level of Latta's understanding of these risks was cursory at best. The postconviction court made no finding as to that understanding. Because we find Latta's counsel to have been ineffective irrespective of these issues, we need not resolve them on appeal. However, we caution trial courts in similar circumstances that it is prudent at least to inquire in greater detail as to the defendant's understanding of potential areas of conflict. Here, these included the risk that defenses may not be fully aligned, and that evidence exculpatory of one may be inculpatory of another.
The Court of Appeals, despite finding Latta's waiver to be based on an incomplete probing by the trial court, held that the failure to object waived the issue on appeal. Notwithstanding that waiver, the Court of Appeals concluded that the proceedings in the trial court constituted fundamental errorerror so egregious that the entire proceeding was underminedand was therefore available in postconviction proceedings despite waiver. There are several problems with this analysis. The principal case cited by the Court of Appeals for finding fundamental error is Whittle v. State, 542 N.E.2d 981 (Ind.1989), overruled on other grounds by Scisney v. State, 701 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. 1998). Whittle held that the defendant's claim of inadequate inquiry by the trial court into the propriety of joint representation was waived on direct appeal because there was no objection to the joint representation raised by any party at trial. 542 N.E.2d at 985. Whittle did not find fundamental error. Rather that decision went on to address the merits of the ineffective assistance claim that was based on the joint representation. In so doing, the decision cited and applied Strickland and Cuyler as well as cases from this Court announcing the same standards. That claim was not held to have been waived. Rather, it was rejected because Whittle failed to show an actual conflict (the defenses were common) or an adverse effect. 542 N.E.2d at 986-87. Fundamental error is permitted to preserve certain egregious claims of error even if they were not objected to or were available but not raised on appeal. Baird v. State, 688 N.E.2d 911, 916 (Ind. 1997). Ordinarily, however, fundamental error analysis has no application in postconviction proceedings. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is permitted in postconviction proceedings for the reasons explored in Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind.1998). The flaw the Court of Appeals identified in Latta's conviction is at bottom ineffective assistance of counsel based on impaired counsel arising from joint representation. Latta consented to the joint representation. The issue as to that claim is whether that consent waived any claim of ineffective assistance. If it did, Latta cannot complain on appeal or in postconviction about the consequences of her election to proceed with joint counsel. If the waiver was defective, she has her claim of ineffective assistance and it is properly asserted in postconviction proceedings. Cuyler expressly sets forth the standard to follow where an ineffectiveness claim is based on counsel's conflict of interest. Because it involves balancing the conflicting Sixth Amendment interests, the merits of the claim may depend on the circumstances leading up to the defendant's consent to joint representation, but it has nothing to do with fundamental error.