Opinion ID: 1669566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: nuclear cameras as component parts

Text: Willis-Knighton has two types of nuclear cameras installed on its premisesa GE Medical and an ADAC Laboratories nuclear camera. The first issue this court is called upon to address is whether these cameras, otherwise distinct movables, are component parts of the hospital building and therefore immovable property. The classification of the cameras as a component part of immovable property, and therefore immovables themselves, is important because pursuant to the relevant ordinances, only repairs to tangible personal property [4] are subject to sales and use tax. Clyde Juneau Co., Inc. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales and Use Tax Com'n, 28,433 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/26/96), 677 So.2d 610, 611-612. If the nuclear cameras are component parts of the hospital building, and thus immovables, Willis-Knighton is not subject to sales and use tax on repair and maintenance contracts for those cameras. To determine whether property is movable or immovable for purposes of the sales and use tax, it is appropriate to turn to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code. South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Barthelemy, 94-0499 (La.10/17/94), 643 So.2d 1240, 1243. As we explained in South Central Bell, the application of property law concepts in the tax context is an exception to the general rule that tax laws are sui generis. It is based on the reasoning that the use of common law terminology in the tax laws was not intended to import the common law into Louisiana for purposes of sales and use tax law, nor to require the development of an entirely new body of property law for sales and use tax purposes only, but, rather the terminology was intended to be interpreted consistently with our civilian property concepts embodied in the Civil Code. Id. In this instance, whether otherwise movable property, such as a nuclear camera, has become a component part of an immovable and therefore subject to the laws governing immovable property is determined by application of Civil Code articles 465, 466, and 467. Those articles provide as follows: Art. 465. Things incorporated into an immovable Things incorporated into a tract of land, a building, or other construction, so as to become an integral part of it, such as building materials, are its component parts. Art. 466. Component parts of buildings or other constructions Things permanently attached to a building or other construction, such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations, are its component parts. Things are considered permanently attached if they cannot be removed without substantial damage to themselves or to the immovable to which they are attached. Art. 467. Immovables by declaration The owner of an immovable may declare that machinery, appliances, and equipment owned by him and placed on the immovable, other than his private residence, for its service and improvement are deemed to be its component parts. The declaration shall be filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable is located. Pursuant to these articles, things may become a component part of an immovable in one of three ways: by incorporation into a building or other construction (Article 465), by permanent attachment thereto (Article 466), or by declaration of the owner (Article 467). [5] 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: PROPERTY, § 142 (4th ed.2001). In the instant case, both lower courts relied on LSA-C.C. art. 466 and the concept of permanent attachment embodied therein to determine whether Willis-Knighton's nuclear cameras were immovables and, as such, free from taxation on repair and maintenance contracts, in the process coming to entirely different conclusions on the same basic law and facts. The disparity in results is troubling, yet understandable. As it turns out, Article 466 is at the epicenter of a debate that raises serious questions about civilian methodology in general and specifically about the role of pre-revision jurisprudence in interpreting a revised Civil Code. Lovett, 48 Loy. L.Rev. at 620. Its proper interpretation, as evidenced in the diametrically opposed federal court decisions of Equibank v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir.1985) and Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. General Star Indemnity Co., 179 F.3d 169 (5th Cir.1999), has spawned a civilian cause-celebre, resulting in extensive academic commentary and debate [6] that pits some of Louisiana's most well-respected scholars and academicians (notably Professors A.N. Yiannopoulos and Symeon Symeonides) against Judge Jacques L. Wiener, Jr. and the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. [7] Lovett, 48 Loy. L.Rev. at 620. At the heart of this debate is the extent to which jurisprudence pre-dating the 1978 revision of Title 1 of Book II of the Civil Code of 1870 (the Code's property law articles governing the distinction between movables and immovables) survived that revision and the status of such jurisprudence in the civilian methodology. In other words, the debate pits civilian purists who would see the Civil Code as a comprehensive enactment designed to be complete within its area of application and intended to break with the past against pragmatists who would look to former Civil Code articles and pre-revision judicial decisions to find in these texts another layer of legal sources that amend or modify the text of the revised Civil Code, in effect rendering the Code more like a digest than a true Civil Code. The opposing sides of what Professor Lovett characterizes in his law review article as the Great Debate about the purity of Louisiana's civil law system are epitomized in the competing interpretations accorded LSA-C.C. art. 466 in the Equibank and Prytania Park decisions. In Equibank, the owners of a St. Charles Avenue mansion failed to pay their income tax and defaulted on their mortgages. Pursuant to its federal tax lien, the I.R.S. seized the home and removed several expensive chandeliers. The plaintiff, a bank that held a second mortgage on the home which primed the I.R.S. lien, demanded that the I.R.S. return the chandeliers, contending that they were component parts of the house and thus subject to the priming second mortgage. The district court ruled in favor of the I.R.S., but the court of appeal reversed. In doing so, however, both courts looked to Article 466 and the testimony of Professor Yiannopoulos, who was called as an expert by the I.R.S. to testify in the district court. Professor Yiannopoulos testified that Article 466 sets forth two ways in which a thing becomes a component part. First, under paragraph one of the article, a thing that fits within a listed category (plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical, or other installation) is a component part as a matter of law, regardless of its degree of attachment. Second, under paragraph two of the article, a thing is a component part if its removal would cause substantial damage to itself or to the immovable to which it is attached. In accordance with this disjunctive interpretation of Article 466, Judge Henry A. Politz, writing for the Equibank court, applied paragraph one of Article 466 independently of paragraph two. Finding that the chandeliers were in fact removed without substantial damage to them or to the house to which they were attached, the court determined that they could not be considered component parts under the second paragraph of Article 466. The focus of the opinion then turned to paragraph one and whether, under that paragraph, a chandelier is an electrical installation. Article 466 does not define electrical installation. However, the court found guidance for its resolution of this issue in what is now commonly known as the societal expectations theory. The societal expectations theory actually finds its genesis in Lafleur v. Foret, 213 So.2d 141 (La.App. 3 Cir.1968), an opinion authored by then-Judge Albert Tate, Jr. which interpreted pre-revision Civil Code provisions. [8] In that case, in determining whether window air-conditioning units were immovables by nature under former LSA-C.C. art. 467, Judge Tate noted that the list of items enumerated as being immovables by nature in the former code article is not exclusive, and that the task when dealing with non-enumerated items is to determin[e] what class or type of non-enumerated movables are to be included within Article 467's coverage and thus susceptible of immobilization by its provisions. Id. at 147. Judge Tate declared that the proper standard to apply in the case here (where the parties have not specified their subjective intent on the matter) is a determination of whether the non-enumerated item, is, according to contemporary objective standards, a component of the immovable. Id. at 148. Under that test, Judge Tate explained, the court looks to (i) contemporary views as to conceptions of components in light of current house construction practices, and (ii) the degree of connection or attachment to the building. Id. It was this language the Equibank court relied on, in addition to language in the Expose des Motifs [9] and in Professor Yiannopoulos' Civil Law Treatise on Property, to conclude that the views of the public on which items are ordinarily regarded as part of a building must be considered in defining those items which the legislature meant to include within the term electrical installation. Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1179. In classifying the chandeliers as immovables, the court posed the near-rhetorical question: Does the average, ordinary, prudent person buying a home expect the light fixtures to be there when he or she arrives to take possession? Does that person expect the room to become illuminated when the light switch is thrown or should that person reasonably expect no response to the switch and, upon looking up, reasonably expect to see only a hole in the ceiling with the interior house wiring sticking out of the electrical workbox? In our view, the societal expectation is to have the lights go on. Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1180. [10] Over the next fifteen years, the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Article 466 in Equibank, and its resort to the consideration of societal expectations along with its declaration of the disjunctive nature of the two paragraphs of Article 466, gained acceptance in the federal courts, which in turn influenced Louisiana's intermediate state appellate courts. [11] One notable example of the way in which Louisiana's intermediate appellate courts were influenced by Equibank is found in the decision of the second circuit in Hyman v. Ross, 26,096 (La.App. 2 Cir.1994), 643 So.2d 256. In that case, the court of appeal applied the Equibank rationale and added Professor Symeonides' explanation of Article 466. In an article published in the Louisiana Law Review, [12] Professor Symeonides acknowledged that a literal reading of Article 466 strongly suggests that its two paragraphs are closely interdependent, and that the second paragraph is but a guide for applying the first paragraph, and more particularly for defining the meaning of the phrase `permanently attached.' Symeonides, 46 La. L.Rev. at 687. Nevertheless, he postulated that although a literal interpretation of the article is plausible, it would be historically and functionally incorrect. Id. According to Professor Symeonides, the paragraphs originated from different articles of the Civil Code of 1870, and those articles contemplated different degrees of attachment. Therefore, the phrase permanently attached in paragraph two refers to physical permanence, whereas the same phrase in paragraph one refers to temporal permanence. Temporal permanence means that the item is viewed by the community as permanently serving the immovable even though it might be only loosely attached. Thus read, Symeonides explains, paragraph one of Article 466 is consistent with its source provision, former Article 467, and the second paragraph is likewise consistent with its source provision, former Article 469, and the jurisprudence interpreting those former code articles. The Hyman court concluded that heating and air conditioning units installed in motel rooms were component parts as a matter of law under paragraph one of Article 466. Applying Symeonides' interpretation, the court reasoned that the units were attached indefinitely and therefore permanently attached in a temporal sense. The court also reasoned, following Equibank, that the societal expectation is that the units are component parts because a purchaser of the motel would expect them to remain; otherwise a large gaping hole would be left in the outside wall of every room. As illustrated by Hyman, the Equibank decision became the unofficial guide for interpretation of LSA-C.C. art. 466. Its rationale, with the judicial gloss added to the clear words of the article, remained the dominant theory, but did not go entirely unquestioned. See, Boggs v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F.Supp. 72 (E.D.La.1989). [13] Then, in 1999, the U.S. Fifth Circuit rendered its landmark decision in Prytania Park, repudiating the Equibank analysis in its entirety. The underlying legal dispute in Prytania Park concerned a claim for insurance coverage by the owners of a New Orleans hotel that had been damaged by a fire. The hotel was insured by a policy issued by General Star Indemnity. The policy covered (1) loss or damage to the building, including permanently installed fixtures and machinery, at full replacement value, and (2) loss or damage to furniture at actual cash value. In hopes of getting full replacement value, the owners of the hotel submitted a claim including custom built furniture that had been attached by screws and bolts to the walls of the guest rooms. The insurer paid only part of the claim, refusing to pay for the fixtures attached to the wall at full replacement value. The owners filed a breach of contract action seeking to recover the portion of their claim that was unpaid. In determining whether the furniture could be considered permanently installed fixtures within the meaning of the insurance policy, the court of appeal turned to LSA-C.C. art. 466 to analyze whether the furniture had become permanently attached, i.e., a component part of the building. For the first time, the court, through Judge Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., interpreted Article 466 literally, holding that its two paragraphs are interdependent, with paragraph two defining how the items in paragraph one must be attached. Specifically, the court ruled that the list of items in the first paragraph of Article 466 is an illustrative, ejusdem generis list of movables that are susceptible of component part status by virtue of permanent attachment. Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd., 179 F.3d at 179. Because the damaged hotel furniture was not a plumbing, heating, cooling or electrical installation, the court reasoned that it could only be considered a component part of the hotel building if it was an other installation. Assuming for the sake of argument that the furniture could be classified as an other installation, the court nevertheless went on to hold that the furniture failed to satisfy the second condition for classification as a component part because, as a matter of undisputed fact, removal of the furniture would not cause substantial damage either to itself or to the building. Since the furniture was not permanently attached within the contemplation of the article's second paragraph, the court held that it could not be included in the owner's insurance claim as permanently installed fixtures for which full replacement value was owed. In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals roundly criticized the rationale of Equibank and its importation of the societal expectations test. First, the court noted that a plain reading of Article 466 does not justify the Equibank court's interpretation of the article as having created two disjunctive categories of permanently attached component parts, commenting that Equibank requires an imaginative parsing of th[e] article to visualize an otherwise invisible disjunctive between the article's first and second paragraphs. Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd., 179 F.3d at 181. Citing Professor Symeonides' law review article (discussed supra in connection with Hyman ) acknowledging that `a literal reading' ... of article 466 requires application of the `permanently attached' test to all installations, both the four nominate categories and all others that are `sufficiently similar ... thereto,' Id. at 181 n. 34, the court of appeal rejected a disjunctive interpretation of Article 466 in favor of a literal plain meaning approach to the problem of classifying component parts. Second, the court of appeal completely rejected the societal expectations test, calling its pedigree murky at best. Id. The court noted that neither the text of the revised article nor its official revision comments mention the concept of societal expectations. It then noted that the sole allusion to prevailing ideas in society in the Expose des Motifs occurs in that text's introductory discussion of historical distinctions between movables and immovables and that this statement is qualified by the Expose's observation that in contemporary civil law physical notions of mobility and inherent characteristics determine this distinction. Id. Further, after reviewing the records of the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute with respect to revised Article 466, the court noted that the notion of societal expectations did not surface in the drafting session devoted to Article 466. Id. Finally, the court of appeal theorized that the Equibank court never actually adopted the theory and that its discussion of societal expectations was merely for the sake of argument and to turn that theory back on ... Professor [Yiannopoulos]. Prytania Park, 179 F.3d at 182 n. 35. In effect, the Prytania Park decision called into question the validity of the judicial and doctrinal theory that had emerged following the Equibank decision, rejecting the societal expectations test and interpreting Article 466 in a more literal and unitary fashion. Judge Wiener's opinion in that case has sparked much criticism from the commentators, most notable among them Professor Yiannopoulos. [14] It has received little attention in Louisiana courts, and in fact was not even mentioned in connection with the instant case, the dispute here centering on how to apply the societal expectations test and not whether to apply it. In the only occasion this court has had to address the code article, it did not directly confront the issue of the proper interpretation to be given Article 466 in light of the Equibank/Prytania Park split. In Showboat Star Partnership v. Slaughter, 00-1227 (La.4/3/01), 789 So.2d 554, this court demonstrated ambivalence on the issue, in effect sending mixed signals. Showboat Star Partnership addressed whether certain gaming equipment was a component part of a riverboat casino and thus exempt from state sales and use taxes under an exemption for equipment and machinery incorporated into and made component parts of a vessel. Because the relevant statute did not define component parts, this court turned to Article 466 for guidance. The court began by acknowledging that judicial interpretations of Article 466 have not been consistent, but noted that the courts generally have applied a societal expectations analysis. Showboat Star Partnership, 00-1227 at 7, 789 So.2d at 558. In a lengthy footnote, the court reviewed the jurisprudential development of the societal expectations analysis and noted that the analysis was generally followed by the courts until the Fifth Circuit questioned the reasoning of the Equibank decision in Prytania Park. Showboat Star Partnership, 00-1227 at 7, 789 So.2d at 559 n. 4. The court did not expressly disapprove of the Prytania Park analysis; it simply criticized the Fifth Circuit for attributing the origin of the societal expectations test to Equibank and not to Lafleur. While the court ultimately conducted a societal expectations analysis to conclude that the average prudent business entity buying a vessel would not expect, in the absence of specific contractual provisions to the contrary, gaming equipment to be permanently attached to the vessel when the buyer took possession, Showboat Star Partnership, 00-1227 at 9, 789 So.2d at 560, the court went on to consider the permanent attachment standard of the second paragraph of Article 466. In doing so, the court remanded the case to the district court for it to determine whether certain items, such as signs and surveillance equipment, constituted component parts because some of the items appeared to be attached electrically and thus not easily moved, suggesting by implication that, in the end, the permanent attachment standard might prevail over the societal expectations analysis. Showboat Star Partnership, 00-1227 at 11, 789 So.2d at 561 n. 10. The instant case presents this court with the opportunity to directly address the differing interpretations accorded Article 466 by the jurisprudence and to dispositively resolve the conflict presented by the Equibank and Prytania Park decisions. After extensive review of the issue and the thoughtful arguments on both sides of the debate, we find that the proper approach to interpreting Article 466 is that reflected in the Prytania Park decision, and that to properly resolve the issue before this court, it is neither proper nor necessary to resort to a societal expectations analysis. The reasons that dictate this conclusion are as follows. First, civilian methodology and the civil code instruct that the sources of law are legislation and custom, and that legislation is the superior source of law. LSA-C.C. arts. 1, 3. Legislation, which is defined as the solemn expression of legislative will, LSA-C.C. art. 2, is to be interpreted according to the rules set forth in the Civil Code. Chief among those rules is the admonition in LSA-C.C. art. 9 that [w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. Additionally, LSA-C.C. art. 11 instructs that [t]he words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning. Thus, we begin, as we must, with the words of the law. Dumas v. State, Department of Culture, Recreation & Tourism, XXXX-XXXX, p. 11 (La.10/15/02), 828 So.2d 530, 536. In this case, a plain reading of the text of Article 466 supports the conclusion that the two paragraphs of the article are not disjunctive, but interdependent. The article states: Things permanently attached to a building or other construction, such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations, are its component parts. Things are considered permanently attached if they cannot be removed without substantial damage to themselves or to the immovable to which they are attached. A straightforward reading of the language, absent any judicial gloss based on jurisprudence interpreting the pre-revision law, supports the conclusion that the two paragraphs are interdependent, with the second paragraph defining how the items enumerated in the first paragraph must be attached. Indeed, it makes little sense, as Professor Symeonides suggests, to define the phrase permanently attached as having two different meanings (temporal and physical) for purposes of the same code article. A disjunctive reading of the two paragraphs, such as Professors Symeonides and Yiannopoulos advocate, is appropriate only if one resorts to historical source material to effectively re-write the article. Indeed, in his law review article, Professor Symeonides acknowledges that to literally support his interpretation of the article, the second paragraph of Article 466 would have to be re-drafted to read as follows: Things permanently attached to a building or other construction so that they cannot be removed without substantial damage to themselves or to the thing to which they are attached, are likewise its component parts. Symeonides, 46 La. L.Rev. at 689. Of course, Professor Symeonides argues that such a re-writing of the article is not necessary in light of Equibank, which he postulates to have corrected the legislature's poor choice of words in drafting the article. Although hesitant to disagree with two eminent scholars, we are constrained to follow the unambiguous words of the code article. Additionally, we find the problem with the approach of Professors Yiannopoulos and Symeonides is that it assumes that Article 466, when adopted as part of the revision of the code articles on property law, did not change the law and that pre-revision jurisprudence continues to be relevant in interpreting the article. There are two important legislative sources that severely undermine this assumption. First, and foremost, the only positive law to address the issue, the enabling legislation that created the revised articles found in Title 1 of Book II of the Civil Code, Act 728 of 1978, expressly declares at Section 1: Title 1 of Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, containing Articles 448 through 487, relative to things, is hereby revised, amended, and reenacted, substituting therefor new Articles 448 through 476. 1978 La. Acts No. 728, § 1, at 1900 (emphasis added). Section 3 of the Act further provides that [a]ll other laws or parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed. 1978 La. Acts No. 728, § 3, at 1943. This language indicates that former Articles 467, 468, and 469 fall into the category of articles that have not been expressly repealed, but are subject to implicit repeal to the extent to which their content is irreconcilable with that of the new article. Lovett, 48 Loy.L.Rev. at 667-668. The Official Revision Comments to Article 466 reveal the extent to which the content of former Articles 467, 468 and 469 is irreconcilable with that of the new article. The pertinent portions of those comments provide: (a) The text of this provision is new. It is based in part on Article 469 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. It changes the law. .... (d) According to Article 467 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, things that the owner of a building has attached to or actually connected with the building for the use or convenience of the building are immovables by nature. This provision has been suppressed. Unity of ownership of the building and of the movables is no longer required; moreover, the test of use or convenience of the building is abrogated. Immobilization takes place under Article 466 when movables are permanently attached to a building or other construction. (e) According to Article 469 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the owner is supposed to have attached to his tenement or building forever such movables as are affixed to the same with plaster, or mortar, or such as cannot be taken off without being broken or injured, or without breaking or injuring the part of the building to which they are attached. The substance of this provisions [sic] has been reproduced. Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting Article 469, therefore, continues to be relevant. These Comments suggest that, contrary to the argument of Professors Symeonides and Yiannopoulos, Article 466 was intended to represent a break from the old law, and that its historical sources remain largely irrelevant. Indeed, Comment (d) advises that former Article 467, along with its test of use or convenience of the building, is suppressed. Comment (e) advises that the substance of Article 469, which created the presumption of attachment through the principle of substantial damage, has been reproduced and therefore jurisprudence interpreting that article continues to be relevant. Reading these two Comments together leads one to conclude that while former Article 469 and its jurisprudential gloss remain relevant, former Articles 467 and 468 have been repealed by implication and thus, their judicial interpretations are not relevant. The significance of this conclusion becomes apparent when one remembers that it was the pre-revision interpretation of former Article 467 in Lafleur that gave birth to the societal expectations analysis. The Lafleur decision and its societal expectations language undeniably existed when the property law revisions were being drafted, but the analysis is not mentioned anywhere in the language of Article 466, in the Comments thereto, in the Expose des Motifs accompanying the revision, or in any other potentially relevant article in the code. It is not mentioned in the records of the Louisiana State Law Institute dealing with the drafting of Article 466. Civilian methodology instructs that where the law does not lead to ambiguous or absurd results, it must be applied as written. LSA-C.C. art. 9. The plain text of Article 466 does not reference societal expectations in determining whether an item is a component part of a building. Rather, it employs a straightforward, practical, bright-line test: permanent attachment, as defined by the article. As Professor Lovett notes in his law review article: [T]he Prytania Park interpretation of Article 466 offers one clear, easily applied, practically black letter rule that courts and litigants can employ with little need to use complex or highly technical expert testimony. By relying on a terse and lapidary rule, as opposed to a more flexible standard, this approach tends to promote the classic civilian priority of certainty in the law and forces parties who desire to alter the Code's classification of movables as either component parts or as separate movables to do so in negotiation and in carefully drafted and perhaps more detailed agreements. Lovett, 48 Loy. L.Rev. at 712. Advocates of the Equibank approach to Article 466 have argued that a strict application of the article would lead to absurd consequences because loosely attached but relatively inexpensive items that are often considered part of a private residence, such as doors, gutters, shutters and ceiling fans, could be considered separate movables. [15] In truth, the determination that such items are separate movables does not create an absurd result, but simply necessitates a more careful drafting of documents transferring or alienating the property. Arguably, the chief impediment to adopting an interpretation of Article 466 consistent with Prytania Park is the body of intermediate state court jurisprudence that has developed in the wake of Equibank. Reliance on jurisprudence constante, however, is misplaced as will be noted infra. Furthermore, we are a civilian jurisdiction in which legislation, the solemn expression of the legislative will, is the superior source of law. [16] LSA-C.C. art. 2. Jurisprudence constante [17] carries considerable persuasive authority, Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 00-0947, p. 14 (La.12/19/00), 774 So.2d 119, 128, but is not the law. We must be ever mindful that once this court has ruled on an issue we should be extremely reluctant to change our position, as both the legislature and society in general should be able to rely on the finality of our pronouncements. Stability and predictability in the law demand such a result. We cannot ignore the fact that it was a federal court, in Equibank, that introduced this interpretation of Article 466 to Louisiana. Significantly, prior to Equibank, Louisiana courts interpreting revised Article 466 generally ignored pre-revision decisions interpreting the former code articles (including Lafleur ) and focused exclusively on the question of substantial damage. See, National Companies v. Bridgewater, 398 So.2d 29, 33 (La.App. 4 Cir.1981) (holding that a cotton press was a component part of immovable property because it would be substantially damaged upon removal); Simmons v. Board of Commissioners for Port of New Orleans, 442 So.2d 836, 839 (La.App. 4 Cir.1983) (holding that a fence containing a gate was not a component part of a wharf because it had been removed without substantial damage). It was only after Equibank that intermediate state appellate courts began to adopt the disjunctive interpretation of Article 466. With the exception of our ambivalent comments in Showboat Star Partnership, this court has never definitively spoken on the issue of the proper interpretation of LSA-C.C. art. 466; therefore, the only basis for applying jurisprudence constante would be intermediate state appellate courts adopting a decision of an intermediate federal court. This is a slender reed to support an argument in favor of jurisprudence constante in this case. [18] The advantage of applying the Prytania Park approach over the Equibank analysis and its societal expectations test is illustrated when one turns to the facts of the present case. In this case, in resolving the issue of whether the nuclear cameras are component parts of Willis-Knighton's building, the court of appeal first determined that the two paragraphs of Article 466 are separate and distinct and should be applied independently to determine whether a particular object is a component part. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, 37,914 at 9, 862 So.2d at 364. Finding that nuclear cameras are neither enumerated in the first paragraph of Article 466 nor deemed to be permanently attached under the second paragraph, the court went on to apply the societal expectations test, presumably in an effort to determine whether such cameras could be included among the other installations referenced in the first paragraph of Article 466. Id., 37,914 at 10, 862 So.2d at 365. As one attempts to apply this test, the elusive and nebulous nature of the societal expectations inquiry is revealed. In the district court, there was expert testimony to the effect that nuclear cameras are a necessary component of a hospital and that one would expect to see such cameras in any full service hospital. Pursuant to this testimony, the district court concluded that ordinary societal expectation would include nuclear cameras. The court of appeal reversed this determination, holding that the district court erred in finding that society expects a hospital to contain nuclear cameras. The court of appeal held that the proper inquiry is whether a commercial building must contain a nuclear camera to meet societal expectations. This obviously is not the case. Id., 37,914 at 11, 862 So.2d at 365. In effect, the court of appeal determined that under the societal expectations test, the use of a particular building is irrelevant; rather, the proper inquiry is whether the community views the item as permanently serving the immovable itself, and not the use to which it is being put. The problems with the court of appeal's analysis are two-fold. First, in phrasing the societal expectations test in terms of whether the item permanently serves the immovable itself, the court of appeal, in effect, resurrects the requirement of former Article 467 that the item be attached to the building for the use or convenience of the building, a requirement that the Revision Comments to Article 466 specially state has been suppressed. See, Article 466, Revision Comments (d). Second, the court of appeal's analysis raises evidentiary problems. In the district court, there was expert testimony as to what one would expect to find as a component part of a hospital. The court of appeal discounts this testimony entirely and instead substitutes its own subjective assumptions about what society expects and what notions prevail in society to conclude that society does not expect to find nuclear cameras in commercial buildings. Such a process does little to insure certainty in the application of the law. Further uncertainty and lack of predictability are interjected when one attempts to apply the societal expectations test in different settings. For example, in the context of a residence, it might be relatively easy to establish what items society might expect to find as component parts. In a more complex setting, involving a commercial or industrial construction for example, the inquiry becomes more difficult. A question arises as to what segment of society is to be consulted for its expectations: the average man or woman on the street, or some more sophisticated party, such as a prospective purchaser of the property. With its near-rhetorical inquiry, the societal expectations test interjects too much open-endedness, flexibility, and discretion in an area of the law that demands certainty and predictability. [19] The societal expectations test, with no basis in legislation, requires excessive, unfettered judicial rule-making. On the other hand, if the Prytania Park analysis is applied, the inquiry becomes very simple. First, we look to the first paragraph of Article 466 to determine if nuclear cameras are plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations. Assuming that the cameras can broadly be classified either as electrical or other installations, the next inquiry becomes whether they are permanently attached, i.e., whether they cannot be removed without substantial damage to themselves or to the immovable to which they are attached, as specified in the second paragraph of the article. In this case, Wesley Smith, Willis-Knighton's Director of Clinical Engineering, testified that the nuclear cameras are installed in a room, the floor of which has to be specially prepared due to the cameras' weight. The cameras are placed on epoxy foundations and bolted to the floor. They are hard-wired to the hospital's electrical system. Nevertheless, Mr. Smith testified that to remove the cameras, it is only necessary to remove the bolts and disconnect the wiring, necessitating some minor repair of the sheetrock and the replacement of floor tile. Under questioning, he conceded that removal of the cameras substantially damages neither the cameras nor the hospital building. Because the testimony in this case does establish that the cameras can be removed without substantial damage to themselves or to the hospital building, they cannot be considered component parts as a matter of law. This approach is clear, straightforward, limits judicial discretion, and produces certainty and predictability in the law, a result that is certainly desirable in an area such as property law. Of course, the determination that the nuclear cameras are not component parts of Willis-Knighton's building because they are not permanently attached within the meaning of LSA-C.C. art. 466 does not necessarily end the inquiry. When the 1978 revisions to the Civil Code articles governing immovables were enacted, a substantive change was effected in that the former classification of immovables as either (1) immovables by nature, (2) immovables by destination, or (3) immovables by their object was eliminated. Immovables are now classified only as corporeal and incorporeal. Expose des Motifs, p. 10; Student Symposium, The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1978 Regular Session, 39 La. L.Rev. 101, 166 (1978). With respect to corporeal immovables, the Civil Code now specifically defines component parts as things incorporated into a building so as to become an integral part of it (LSA-C.C. art. 465) and things permanently attached to a building (LSA-C.C. art. 466). [20] Hence, it is not sufficient merely to look to LSA-C.C. art. 466 to determine if the nuclear cameras are component parts of Willis-Knighton's building. We must also examine LSA-C.C. art. 465. That article directs that [t]hings incorporated into a tract of land, a building, or other construction, so as to become an integral part of it, such as building materials, are its component parts. Article 465 has not given rise to controversy and, in fact, has received little attention in the jurisprudence or in legal commentary. Its application has been viewed as largely fact-driven. See LSA-C.C. art. 465, Revision Comments (c) (Incorporation is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of facts.) While the article does not specifically define what is meant by the term incorporated, [21] it does provide an example of the type of items-building materials-that may be incorporated into an immovable so as to become an integral part of it. Enumerated items are a guidepost for determining what non-enumerated items are to be included in the meaning of a phrase. See Cox Cable New Orleans, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 624 So.2d 890, 894 (La.1993) citing Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So.2d 1127 (La.1979) ([T]he meaning of words or phrases may be ascertained by the words or phrases with which they are associated. Words of general meaning should be applied only to such classes of things of the same general kind as those specifically mentioned.). A general characteristic of building materials (the most common examples that come to mind are bricks, nails, sheet rock, and roofing tiles [22] ) is that once placed in a building, they lose their identity as separate things and become merged in the building to the extent that they become a part of it. Consequently, it can be argued that the test for determining whether an item has become a component part of an immovable by incorporation is whether it has lost its identity as a movable and become a part of the immovable. Indeed, this is the test suggested by paragraph (c) of the Comments to Article 465. ([Incorporation] may be regarded as established when movables lose their identity or become an integral part of the immovable.). It is similar to the approach advocated in the Expose des Motifs : In Article 465 (1978), things incorporated into a tract of land or a building, so as to become an integral part of it, are designated as its component parts. Incorporation may be regarded as established in cases in which movables lose their identity, removal of the things would result in damage to them or to the immovable, and in cases in which the things incorporated would be of little or no value after removal. Further, this approach has been adopted by the pre-revision jurisprudence, which, as the Comments to Article 465 suggest, continues to be relevant. See Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 176 La. 499, 512-513, 146 So. 35, 39 (1932) (concurring opinion by O'Neil, C.J.), cited in Revision Comments (b). In this case, it is doubtful that the nuclear cameras can be considered to fall within the same general class of items as building materials. [23] The testimony establishes that they do not lose their identity as separate things once attached to the hospital building, they can be removed without damage to themselves and without substantial damage to the hospital building, and they can be re-sold once removed. [24] Given these facts, the cameras cannot be classified as component parts under Article 465. In the final analysis, we agree with and affirm the court of appeal's determination that Willis-Knighton's nuclear cameras are not component parts of its hospital buildings and thus are not immovables within the contemplation of the Civil Code articles governing immovable property. However, we reject the societal expectations test as a means of determining component parts of immovables under Article 466 and also reject a disjunctive reading of the two paragraphs of Article 466 as creating two independent types of component parts. In Louisiana, legislation is superior to any other source of law. LSA-C.C. art. 2. We apply legislative provisions as written because this court cannot and should not ignore the plain expression of legislative will evidenced in the clear and unambiguous words of LSA-C.C. art. 466. As part of the 1978 revisions of the Civil Code articles concerning immovables, Article 466 now requires only that a component part of a building be permanently attached, and for the first time specifically defines that which is permanently attached.