Opinion ID: 2443823
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Circuit Court Judicial Review

Text: Respondent filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County a petition for judicial review of the ALJ's decision. See Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article (S.G.). At the hearing on the petition, Respondent repeated the argument he had made before the ALJ. The MVA, relying on Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 844 A.2d 388 (2004), countered that the location of the stop is not an issue that may be raised at the administrative hearing because it is not listed among the issues set forth in T.R. § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i). That subsection provides that, at the administrative hearing, the only issues shall be: 1. Whether the police officer who stops or detains a person had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; 2. Whether there was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one more drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous substance; 3. Whether the police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised, as required under subsection (b)(2) of this section, of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed; 4. Whether the person refused to take the test; 5. Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing; 6. Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of testing; or 7. If the hearing involves disqualification of a commercial driver's license, whether the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle or held a commercial driver's license. T.R. § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i). The MVA further maintained that, even if the location of the stop may be raised at the administrative hearing, there was sufficient evidence before the ALJnamely the information contained within Officer Karsmith's sworn statementto support the ALJ's finding that the stop of Respondent occurred on a highway or private road used by the public in general. The Circuit Court agreed with Respondent that subsection (a)(2) of the Statute requires the MVA to prove that the stop occurred on a highway or private property that is used by the public in general. The court determined, moreover, that the issue may be raised at an administrative hearing. The court reasoned that the term person, as used in subsection (f)(7)(i)(1) of the Statute, incorporates the language of subsection (a)(2) and thereby requires the MVA to present evidence that the person [] drove or attempted to drive on a public highway or on public use private property. Looking to the record before the ALJ, the court determined that there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that the stop occurred on a public highway or on publicly-used private property. The court reversed the decision of the ALJ and remanded the case to the OAH with directions to reverse the suspension of Respondent's license. The MVA filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted to address the following question: Did the administrative law judge correctly conclude that the implied consent statute, Md.Code Ann., Transp. II § 16-205.1(f), does not require the MVA to prove the exact location when a suspected drunk driver was detained after driving on a highway or private property used by the public in general, before suspending the motorist's license for a test refusal?