Opinion ID: 168372
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Email Evidence

Text: 27 Mr. Bishop next presents two arguments that the court's admission of an email he wrote to Ms. Black requires that he be re-tried for Counts two through seven. First, he argues that the government violated Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not promptly disclosing this evidence, and that because of this violation, the district court should not have admitted the email into evidence. Second, Mr. Bishop contends that the district court should have found that the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. We examine each alleged point of error in turn.
28 To sanction a party for failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 16, a district court may order that party to permit the discovery or inspection[,] ... grant a continuance[,] prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed evidence[,] or enter any other order that is just under the circumstances. FED. R.CRIM.P. 16(d)(2). We will not disturb a district court's decision to apply, or not to apply, a particular sanction absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 1999). 29 Mr. Bishop contends that the government did not comply with Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that [a] party who discovers additional evidence or material before or during trial must promptly disclose its existence to the other party or the court if (1) the evidence or material is subject to discovery or inspection under this rule; and (2) the other party previously requested, or the court ordered, its production. FED.R.CRIM.P. 16(c). 30 Here, Ms. Black had testified on direct examination that Mr. Bishop sent her emails that threatened to hurt her if she testified that the gun was his, and that tried to convince her to take the blame for the gun. During cross-examination on the same day as direct examination, Mr. Bishop's attorney asked questions about Ms. Black's relationship with Mr. Bishop to show that any threats contained in the emails were not linked to her potential testimony against Mr. Bishop, but rather were made in response to their recent break-up. Following this cross examination and after court had recessed for the day, Ms. Black provided the government with three additional, previously undisclosed emails to rebut Mr. Bishop's attorney's cross examination. 31 When Mr. Bishop's counsel continued his cross examination on the following day, the government had not yet provided him the additional emails. Rather, the government waited until its redirect examination, when it simultaneously sought to admit the emails and provided them to Mr. Bishop's counsel. Mr. Bishop objected to the admission of one of the emails at trial (after the other two emails had been admitted without objection), but the district court overruled this objection. Mr. Bishop then asked for a recess to review the emails prior to his re-cross examination, and the district court granted this request. Following the recess, Mr. Bishop's attorney indicated that he was ready to proceed with re-cross examination. He did not request additional time to review the new email evidence. 32 Although, as the district court implied, it may have been better practice for the government to provide the emails immediately when trial began on the second day, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to grant a short continuance rather than exclude the email. Even assuming that the government's failure to disclose the email at the beginning of the second day of trial constituted a violation of Rule 16, Rule 16(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures gives the district court broad discretion in imposing sanctions on a party who fails to comply with [the Rule]. United States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059, 1060 (10th Cir. 1988). A court may grant a continuance, refuse to admit the non-compliant evidence, or enter any other order that is just under the circumstances. FED. R.CRIM.P. 16(d)(2)(D). Despite this broad grant of power, the district court's exercise of discretion should be guided by several factors; and if a sanction is imposed, it should be the least severe sanction that will accomplish prompt and full compliance with the court's discovery orders. Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1060 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). It would be a rare case where, absent bad faith, a district court should exclude evidence rather than continue the proceedings. U.S. v. Golyansky, 291 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002). 33 Nothing in the record indicates that the continuance the district court granted Mr. Bishop was not sufficient to cure any prejudice that may have resulted from the government's failure to provide his counsel with the email as soon as trial resumed. Additionally, Mr. Bishop never argued before the district court or on appeal that the government acted in bad faith. Finally, Mr. Bishop's counsel made no indication at trial that the time allotted for continuance was insufficient for him to review the email with his client and formulate a strategy for re-cross examination of Ms. Black. We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exclude the email in question and, instead, providing time for Mr. Bishop's counsel to review the new evidence and incorporate it into his re-cross examination.
34 We also review a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct only for an abuse of discretion. We engage in a two-step process in reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct. First, we determine if the conduct was improper. Second, we determine if any improper conduct warrants reversal. United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 769 (10th Cir.1999). In the second step, we consider the curative acts of the district court, the extent of the misconduct, and the role of the misconduct within the case as a whole. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 35 Mr. Bishop essentially argues that the government's failure to produce the emails as soon as trial resumed constituted prosecutorial misconduct and that the incriminating nature of the email evidence requires us to grant a new trial. We do not agree. First, assuming without deciding that the government should not have delayed in producing the emails, we do not believe any misconduct that occurred was egregious or extensive, or played a significant role in the case. The district court found that [w]hile the government did not disclose the new emails to the defendant before the beginning of the second day of trial, the emails were produced to defendant approximately twenty minutes into the proceedings. Rec. vol. I, doc. 62, at 10 (Dist. Ct. Order, dated Apr. 4, 2005). Additionally, Mr. Bishop does not assert that the curative measure taken by the district court—the recess granted to enable Mr. Bishop's trial counsel to review the emails and prepare his re-cross examination—was insufficient to cure any prejudice resulting from the alleged misconduct. Finally, we reiterate that Mr. Bishop's trial counsel did not request extra time to review the emails, nor does he assert on appeal that the district court did not provide him with sufficient time in recess to review the new evidence. We therefore hold that any alleged misconduct does not warrant a new trial.