Opinion ID: 2653485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-9(l)

Text: Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(l) provides: Before a sentence may be imposed under this section, the jury, in a proceeding under subsection (e), or the court, in a proceeding under subsection (g), must find that: (1) the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b) exists; and (2) any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. Inman contends that Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(l) is unconstitutional because it does not require that the weighing of aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances be done beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 However, this Court has held otherwise. As we discussed in Ritchie v. State, [t]he Supreme Court has now made clear that statutory aggravators in Indiana’s Death Penalty law are the functional equivalent of elements of a crime, and must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). Ring applied to death penalty jurisprudence the doctrine first developed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494, that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial requires that the jury make any finding that “exposes the defendant to a greater punishment.” We believe the pivotal inquiry under Ring and Apprendi is whether exposure to punishment is increased, not whether the punishment should or should not be imposed in a given case. As Ring explained: “If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ring, 536 U.S. at 602. 809 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. 2004) (emphasis added), cert. denied. Despite the Sixth Amendment analysis present in our above-quoted precedent, Inman claims that we reached the wrong result in Ritchie because we used “terminology exclusively within the purview of the Eighth Amendment.” (Inman’s Br. at 13.) According to Inman, this Court’s use of the term “selection decision” and “conclusion that the weighing process is a ‘selection decision’” are improper. (Inman’s Br. at 13, 30.) However, an examination of the Ritchie text reveals that term appears only once in the decision—within a quote from the Nebraska Supreme Court contrasting the Sixth Amendment right to jury determination of facts exposing a defendant to the death penalty with the “selection decision” that follows the balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Ritchie, 809 N.E.2d at 267. Furthermore, to the extent that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors determines whether a life sentence will be imposed, there is no conflating of Sixth and Eighth Amendment principles in Ritchie. Inman himself concedes that “there will certainly be 6 overlap in terminology between the Eighth Amendment analysis and the Sixth Amendment analysis.” (Inman’s Br. at 29.) His contention lacks merit. After Inman waived his right to have a jury make the § 35-50-2-9(l) findings, the trial court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Inman intentionally killed Pedigo while committing or attempting to commit robbery and killed Pedigo while on parole. The trial court then found that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances. 5 Because we concluded in Ritchie that “neither federal constitutional doctrine under Apprendi and Ring nor Indiana state jurisprudence leads to the requirement that weighing be done under a reasonable doubt standard,” the trial court was not required to weigh the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 809 N.E.2d at 266. Thus, the trial court fully complied with Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(l), which we once again uphold as constitutional.