Opinion ID: 814569
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seizure of Lawing’s Cell Phone

Text: Lawing also contends his cell phone was illegally seized without probable cause. Accordingly, he argues any evidence discovered subsequent to the seizure should have been suppressed. After stopping the Lexus Lawing was driving, Deputy Naves examined his driver’s license, which did not reflect the name of the driver as Drew. In view of the other information from the CI on the make and color of the car, its precise route and timing, the physical description of the driver, all of which the police had now verified, they undertook to determine whether Lawing was indeed Drew. To do so, officers simply called the telephone number that the CI had earlier used to place the crack cocaine order with Drew. The Supreme Court has stated in appropriate circumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a properly limited ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest or to search for contraband or evidence of crime. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). A court determines the lawfulness of such a limited seizure by balancing the right of the individual to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures with the opposing interests of law enforcement. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). When law enforcement has substantial interests in carrying out a search or seizure, it may carry out minimally intrusive seizures based on reasonable suspicion. Id. at 70304. 12 UNITED STATES v. LAWING At the outset, we note that Lawing, in his brief, characterizes the officers’ actions as a search of his cell phone. The district court, however, found the [o]fficers did not search Lawing’s cell phone for any information. (J.A. 149). We agree with the district court’s assessment, as nothing in the record supports Lawing’s claim that his cell phone was the subject of a search. The police did not attempt to retrieve any information from within the phone. Instead, the officers’ possession of Lawing’s cell phone was limited to quickly determining whether Lawing’s phone would ring when Drew’s number was dialed. Detective Bacote did not seize Lawing’s cell phone to gain information from within the phone and possessed it for no other purpose than confirming Lawing’s identity as Drew. This limited seizure of the cell phone was justified. Although Lawing provided a driver’s license that did not bear the name Drew, the totality of the circumstances afforded the police officers reasonable suspicion to take minimal steps to determine whether Lawing was Drew. This seizure was minimally intrusive, and the strong countervailing governmental interests, Place, 462 U.S. at 706, of preventing the trafficking and distribution of cocaine9 outweighed Lawing’s possessory interest in his cell phone during the brief duration of the stop. Law enforcement’s momentary seizure of Lawing’s phone was permissible in the limited and specific context in which it occurred and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.10 9 The government has a significant interest in preventing the trafficking and distribution of illegal drugs. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 10 In the alternative, as a factual matter, the district court found on this record the officer’s possession of Lawing’s cell phone was irrelevant to the determination of probable cause, because every indication is that the officers would have heard it ring as well on the center console of Lawing’s UNITED STATES v. LAWING 13