Opinion ID: 768314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-Trial Evaluation of Conflict.

Text: 45 The government argues that Levy does not mandate dismissal under the circumstances of this case because the district court did in fact evaluate the conflict--in response to one of Rogers's post-trial pro se motions--and found that Rogers suffered no adverse effect. This argument conflates the district court's initial inquiry obligation (as to which adverse effect is not at issue) with its second obligation to evaluate a conflict and ensure it is either eliminated or waived (an obligation as to which adverse effect can matter). See id. at 153. If the district court had fulfilled its initial obligation, yet made an inadequate inquiry or obtained a defective waiver, reversal would be appropriate only upon a showing of prejudice or adverse effect. See United States v. Lussier, 71 F.3d 456, 463 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Levy, 25 F.3d at 152). Absent the required initial inquiry, however, we have no occasion to consider whether there was an adverse effect; indeed, once it is established that a conflict was seen to be possible and was ignored, we have no occasion to consider whether there was a conflict in fact. 46 This result is compelled by Levy and by the policy choice implicit in Levy that the Sixth Amendment right to non-conflicted counsel is most effectively implemented when the conflict inquiry is conducted sooner rather than later. True, it is easier after trial to identify specific trial episodes in which the conflict may have been in play, and a court can then decide if the defendant in fact suffered an adverse effect or prejudice. But the sorting out of the conflict issues after trial entails findings that, even if they are sound enough be sustained, represent intuitions about why some steps were taken and others forgone, and the impact of what happened. Inevitably, the post-trial inquiry opens avenues for undetected conflicts and constitutional harms that could be foreclosed at the outset by an informed waiver or a substitution of counsel. This Court therefore adopts and applies a firm preference for prophylactic inquiry, in which any conflict is identified and either eliminated or knowingly and voluntarily waived pre-trial, over an avoidably delayed and less certain inquiry after the fact. 47 Because the district court entirely ignored the possibility that Rogers's counsel was operating under a conflict of interest, this Court inquires no further.