Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Impermissible Race Factors

Text: Defendant contends that impermissible race factors affected the prosecutor's decision to seek and the jury's imposition of the death penalty, in violation of his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment, a reliable verdict under the Eighth Amendment, and to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. He relies on the facts that he is Black, Flores is Hispanic, and the murder victims were White, the county in which the trial took place is predominantly White, the prosecutor exercised her peremptory challenges to excuse Black prospective jurors, and the fact that he was the only defendant against whom the death penalty was sought. Defendant also contends the prosecutor used race as a factor even though race was not mentioned when she described her theory of how defendant murdered Bryan during her penalty phase argument. We reject defendant's constitutional challenges because none of these factors demonstrate, directly or circumstantially, that race was a factor in either the prosecutor's decision to seek, or the jury's decision to impose, the death penalty. ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 506, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 772, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Defendant does not argue the evidence against him was insufficient; nor do we so find. Nor did he seek below to change venue, and we have already rejected defendant's claim that the prosecutor impermissibly exercised her peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks from the jury. (See ante, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 92-95, 5 P.3d at pp. 151-154.) Moreover, Flores was statutorily ineligible for the death penalty because of his minority at the time of the crimes. Prospective jurors were voir dired on the issue of racial bias, and defendant's sentence was imposed under procedures that focused the jury's discretion on the particularized characteristics of this individual defendant and the circumstances of the crime. Contrary to defendant's assertion, allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime does not mean there is a strong likelihood that racial prejudice ... infected the [jurors'] deliberations. Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused. ( McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279, 297, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262.) Defendant has failed to make such a compelling showing here.