Opinion ID: 787941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Absence from Conferences about Juror Misconduct

Text: 44 Defendants Williams and Onaghinor also contend that their judgments of conviction should be vacated because Judge Larimer met with defense counsel, and then juror number three, to discuss how to handle any juror misconduct outside the presence of the defendants. Again, no objection was raised at trial regarding Judge Larimer's meeting with defense counsel and juror number three outside the presence of the defendants. Nevertheless, defendants now claim that his decision was plain error requiring reversal. 45 Defendants claim that their absence from Judge Larimer's discussions with and about juror number three violated their constitutional right, as well as their statutory right, to be present. A criminal defendant's constitutional right to be present at various stages of his trial is rooted in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and, when confrontation is not at issue, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, meanwhile, provides that a defendant must be present at every trial stage, Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a)(2), but not at stages where [t]he proceeding involves only a conference or hearing on a question of law. Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(b)(3). 46 In Gagnon, the Supreme Court reviewed a trial judge's private in camera conference with a juror after the juror had expressed concern that one of the defendants, Gagnon, had been seen sketching the jury during trial. 470 U.S. at 523, 105 S.Ct. 1482. After the sketch had been brought to the trial judge's attention, the judge announced that he would speak to the juror. Id. at 523-24, 105 S.Ct. 1482. He did so on the record in chambers, in the presence of Gagnon's counsel but not Gagnon or his co-defendants. On appeal, Gagnon and his co-defendants claimed that the in camera meeting with the juror violated their rights to be present. Id. at 525, 105 S.Ct. 1482. In rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court recognized that [t]he mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right. Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482 (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 125-26, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (Stevens, J. concurring)). It then held that the conference at issue, a short interlude in a complex trial, was not the sort of event which every defendant had a right personally to attend under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 527, 105 S.Ct. 1482. The Due Process Clause only guarantees a defendant the right to be present at a given stage of his trial to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence. United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 438 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir.1989)); see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). As the Supreme Court observed, the defendants could have done nothing had they been at the conference, nor would they have gained anything by attending. Indeed, the presence of Gagnon and the other respondents, their four counsel, and the prosecutor could have been counterproductive. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. 1482 (citation omitted). 47 As in Gagnon, Judge Larimer's meeting with juror number three did not deprive defendants of any constitutional right or statutory right. In the defendants' absence, Judge Larimer was able to speak candidly with juror number three and ascertain the extent of juror misconduct — the first step in a fair and just hearing. Had defendants been present, they could not have assisted. Indeed, their presence may have prevented juror number three from speaking openly. Defendants' absence from Judge Larimer's subsequent meeting with defense counsel, where they discussed how to proceed in light of juror number three's comments, similarly had no adverse effect on defendants or the fairness of the trial. These meetings were more akin to hearings on an issue of law to which a defendant has little to contribute than to stages of trial at which a defendant has a due process or statutory right to be present. In sum, Judge Larimer's private, on the record meeting with juror number three, followed by reading and discussing the transcript of that meeting with defense counsel, was neither a due process violation nor a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43; it was an efficient way to assess the extent of any juror misconduct and formulate an appropriate response. 48 Moreover, even if defendants were correct that either Judge Larimer's conference with juror number three, or his subsequent meeting with counsel, was a trial stage at which they had a right to be present under either the Due Process Clause or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, defendants waived their right by remaining silent. Before Judge Larimer met with juror number three, he met with defense counsel to discuss how he should proceed. Neither defense counsel objected to his proceeding outside the presence of defendants. After Judge Larimer completed his conference, defense counsel was silent again. So too were defendants. Indeed, no one at any point objected to Judge Larimer's decision to meet privately on the record with juror number three in an effort to speak candidly and thereafter read the colloquy to the defense counsel. Defendants'total failure to assert their rights to attend the conference with the juror sufficed to waive their rights under Rule 43. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. 1482. If a defendant is entitled under Rule 43 to attend certain `stages of the trial' which do not take place in open court, the defendant or his counsel must assert that right at the time; they may not claim it for the first time on appeal from a sentence entered on a jury's verdict of `guilty.' Id. (emphasis added). 49 Defendants seek to distinguish Gagnon on the ground that they were not made aware that stages of the trial were proceeding without them until after Judge Larimer had met with juror number three and defense counsel. The requirement that the objection be made by the defendant or his counsel suggests that the right may be waived or procedurally forfeited by the failure of counsel to object. Id. at 529, 105 S.Ct. 1482. But even passing over that fact, in the context of this case, defendants' argument carries little weight. After the transcript of the ex parte interview with juror number three was read to defendants' counsel and before the juror was excused, counsel discussed the issue with defendants. If defendants had so desired, they could have asked to have the transcript read back to them so that they could have suggested additional questions. If the defendants' absence from the meetings had been in error, it could have been remedied immediately following the meetings. A rule allowing the defendants, as well as their trial counsel, to stay silent at trial and then claim on appeal that their absence constitutes reversible error will only encourage sandbagging. See Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir.1999); Nieblas v. Smith, 204 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir.1999). 50 Onaghinor and Williams also argue that the in camera interview with juror number three deprived them of the assistance of counsel. They contend that by excluding counsel from his in camera meeting, Judge Larimer prevented defense counsel from adequately investigating any potential jury taint and thus prevented adequate representation. We disagree. Before meeting with juror number three, Judge Larimer discussed his proposed course with counsel. Counsel did not object. After the meeting, he had the court reporter read back his entire colloquy to counsel and offered them a chance to suggest further action. Again, they did not object. Nor did they suggest a different course or further questions that should be asked of juror number three. 51