Opinion ID: 1621727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury in numerous ways

Text: ¶ 68. Watts next complains that the circuit court's instructions to the jury during both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial were constitutionally deficient. The assignments of error are barred because of Watts' failure to object to the complained of instructions at trial or even raise them in his motion for a new trial. Berry v. State, 703 So.2d 269, 277 (Miss.1997). Moreover, he fails to cite any authority or provide any meaningful argument in support of most of the objections he now raises to many of the instructions. Brown, 690 So.2d at 297; McClain, 625 So.2d at 781; Baine, 604 So.2d at 255. ¶ 69. Procedural bar notwithstanding, Sentencing Instruction No. 2 erroneously instructed the jury that it had only two sentencing options: life in prison or the death penalty. A third option, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, should have been presented pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. §§ 97-3-21 and XX-XX-XXX. Watts, therefore, is entitled to resentencing proceedings. ¶ 70. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-21(1994) provides that Every person who shall be convicted of capital murder shall be sentenced (a) to death; (b) to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary without parole; or (c) to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary with eligibility for parole as provided in Section 47-7-3(1)(f). Prior to trial, the parties' attorneys discussed with the circuit court the various sentencing alternatives available under the revised statute. Finding that Watts had only two sentencing options available to him, the circuit court stated: Well, my position would be when we instruct the jury that since this occurred prior to the statute being enacted that gives the jury the right to impose life without parole that we will not put the []without parole[] in the possible verdict, because that was enacted after this crime was committed.       The jury will just strictly be instructed in the penalty phase, if we get to that, that they only have two options. And that is life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections or the death penalty. And parole will not be a factor in their determination. ¶ 71. Like the circuit court, the State contends that the law is not applicable to Watts because the crime for which he was convicted was committed on December 19 or 20, 1993, before the law was enacted. However, Chapter 566, section 5 of the Laws of Mississippi, 1994, refutes that assertion, providing expressly that [t]he provisions of this act shall apply to any case in which pre-trial, trial or resentencing proceedings take place after July 1, 1994. Watts' trial was held on August 5, 1996, more than two years after the effective date of the statute. That the offense with which he was charged occurred before the July 1, 1994 date is immaterial. The circuit court committed reversible error in finding that Watts was not eligible for presentation to the jury of the option of a sentence of life in prison without parole, pursuant to the terms of § 97-3-21. West v. State, No. 94-DP-01200-SCT, Slip op. at 15 (Miss. August 11, 1998). ¶ 72. Because the case must be reversed for re-sentencing proceedings, we also note that Watts contends that circuit court erred in refusing to grant his Sentencing Instruction No. D-10, which provided as follows: The Court instructs the jury that there are two possible punishments at this phase of the trial, death and life imprisonment. Your sentence of death means that you have ordered that James Earnest Watts be executed by lethal injection; Your sentence of life imprisonment means that you have sentenced Mr. Watts to spend eighty-five (85%) percent of his natural life in prison. The instruction is an incorrect statement of the law. It therefore was properly refused. Chase, 645 So.2d at 861. It improperly states that there were two only options for sentencing Watts. Moreover, it incorrectly articulates the possibility of parole. See Puckett v. Abels, 684 So.2d 671, 678 (Miss.1996)(finding that Senate Bill 2175, as applied to the possibility of parole of offenders who were sentenced on or after July 1, 1995 but committed crimes before July 1, 1995, was an improper ex post facto law). Accordingly, the circuit court correctly refused to grant the instruction. ¶ 73. We further note that Sentencing Instruction No 5, despite Watts' contention to the contrary, passes constitutional muster. Sentencing Instruction No. 5 reads as follows: The court instructs the jury that in considering whether the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. An especially heinous, atrocious or cruel capital offense is one accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of murders the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant James Earnest Watts A/K/A Squirrel, utilized a method of killing which caused serious physical or mental pain on the body of Vanessa Nicole Lumpkin before her death, or that a lingering or torturous death was suffered by Vanessa Nicole Lumpkin at the hands of James Earnest Watts A/K/A Squirrel, then you may find this aggravating circumstance. The language used in the second paragraph of the instruction, which describes an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel murder as one which is accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of murdersthe conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim, has been found to provide a proper limit on the language condemned in Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990). This Court, too, has found the language of the instruction about which Watts complains to be constitutional. Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 356 (Miss. 1997); Evans v. State, 1997 WL 562044, 725 So.2d 613 (Miss.1997); Lester v. State, 692 So.2d 755, 797-98 (Miss.1997); Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 1087, 1109-10 (Miss. 1997); Brown v. State, 690 So.2d 276, 294-95 (Miss.1996). ¶ 74. In Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114 (Miss.1991), this Court found that when considering whether a crime could be considered especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, barbarity sufficient to satisfy this aggravating circumstance can be demonstrated by showing that the defendant utilized a method of killing which caused serious mutilation, where there is a dismemberment of the corpse, where the defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death, or where a lingering or torturous death was suffered by the victim. Id. at 152 ( quoting Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 357 (Miss.1988), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1075, 110 S.Ct. 1800, 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990)). Although this aspect of Pinkney was not addressed in the United States Supreme Court's review of the case, similar limiting language to that used in Sentencing Instruction No. 5 was approved in Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) and Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). See also Jackson, 684 So.2d at 1236-37; Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1270 (Miss. 1993); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171 (Miss.1992). The language in Sentencing Instruction No. 5 has sufficiently refined and narrowed the aggravating circumstance of `heinous, atrocious or cruel' and channeled in a principled way the jury's sentencing discretion, excluding the arbitrary and the capricious to the extent reasonably practicable and has fairly facilitated proportionality review. Hansen, 592 So.2d at 152. ¶ 75. There further is no merit to Watts' charge that Sentencing Instruction No. 4 improperly instructed the jury that the number of aggravating and mitigating factors is wholly immaterial to the sentencing decision. Sentencing Instruction No. 4 provides: The Court instructs the jury that in [the] weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances the number of each is wholly immaterial and must not be so considered by you, but instead, that you must consider the same in terms of their individual importance and effect upon your minds as jurors. That is to say, by way of example, that one of either of such circumstances, standing alone, may, if it satisfies your minds as jurors, outweigh all multiple other circumstances. Watts concedes that Sentencing Instruction No. 3, submitted by the State, is a far more accurate statement of the law. That instruction provided as follows: The Court instructs the jury that it must be emphasized that the procedure you must follow is not a mere counting process of a certain number of aggravating circumstances versus the number of mitigating circumstances. Rather, you must apply your reasoned judgment as to whether this situation calls for life imprisonment or whether it requires the imposition of death, in light of the totality of the circumstances present. This Court considers whether the instructions given to the jury, read as a whole, fairly announce the law of the case. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss. 1997). Read together, the instructions fairly advise the jury that the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors is not a mere numbers game. Lester, 692 So.2d at 800-01. ¶ 76. Watts further complains that his eighth amendment rights were violated by use of the term sentiment in Sentencing Instruction No. 2 as well as by the language, You should consider and weigh any mitigating circumstances as set forth later in this instruction, but you are cautioned not to be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. He does not elaborate. We have found that the language given in the instruction is acceptable. Blue, 674 So.2d at 1225; Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 677 (Miss. 1991). ¶ 77. Finally, Watts contends that the catch-all mitigating factor language in Sentencing Instruction No. 2 could be construed by reasonable jurors to mean that they had discretion under the law to decide not to consider non-statutory mitigating circumstances when deciding defendant's sentence. The complained of language reads: 7. Any matter, any other aspect of the defendant's character or record, and any other circumstance of the circumstance brought you during the trial of this cause, which you, the Jury deem to be mitigating on behalf of the defendant; This is a proper catch-all instruction and as such does not foreclose the jury from considering any and all mitigating factors. Berry, 703 So.2d at 287; Lester, 692 So.2d at 799; Gray v. State, 375 So.2d 994, 1003-04 (Miss.1979). See also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990)(catch-all instruction did not unconstitutionally limit jury's consideration of mitigating factors). There is no merit to Watts' assertion that the instruction instructs the jury to ignore non-statutory mitigating factors; rather it allows the jurors to consider other mitigating evidence. Evans, 1997 WL 562044, at , 725 So.2d 613.