Opinion ID: 2978087
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendants’ Qualified Immunity Claims

Text: Generally speaking, the rationale underlying the qualified immunity doctrine is that, “where an official’s duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken ‘with independence and without fear of consequences.’” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). “Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. Like absolute immunity, the qualified immunity privilege entitles a party to “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” and thus “is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id. (emphasis in original). In light of these interests, the Supreme Court has concluded that the denial of a defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity “easily meets” the Cohen requirements: Such a decision is “conclusive” in either of two respects. In some cases, it may represent the trial court’s conclusion that even if the facts are as asserted by the defendant, the defendant’s actions violated clearly established law and are therefore not within the scope of the qualified immunity. In such a case, there will be nothing in the subsequent course of the proceedings in the district court that can alter the court’s conclusion that the defendant is not immune. Alternatively, the trial judge may rule only that if the facts are as asserted by the plaintiff, the defendant is not immune. At trial, the plaintiff may not succeed in proving his version of the facts, and the defendant may thus escape liability. Even so, the court’s denial of summary judgment finally and conclusively determines the defendant’s claim of right not to stand trial on the plaintiff’s allegations, and because “[there] are simply no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid the trial the defendant maintains is barred,” it is apparent that “Cohen’s threshold requirement of a fully consummated decision is satisfied” in such a case. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977). Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527. Thus, pursuant to Mitchell, “federal appellate courts have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals considering ‘the legal question of qualified immunity, i.e., whether a given set of facts violates clearly established law.’” Farm Nos. 07-2115/2116/2117 Moldowan v. City of Warren, et al. Page 12 Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 531 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 1999)); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996). In considering the denial of a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity, however, our jurisdiction is limited to resolving pure questions of law. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 (addressing denial of a claim of qualified immunity, but only “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law”). We lack jurisdiction to consider “a district court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313; Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1998) (“A defendant who is denied qualified immunity may file an interlocutory appeal with this Court only if that appeal involves the abstract or pure legal issue of whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff constitute a violation of clearly established law.”). In light of this jurisdictional limitation, “a district court’s determination that there exists a triable issue of fact cannot be appealed on an interlocutory basis, even when the finding arises in the context of an assertion of qualified immunity.” Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 742 (6th Cir. 2006). To permit an appeal in such circumstances “would interject appellate review into a district court’s determination that the evidence is sufficient for trial, a nonfinal adjudication for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Id. at 743. “Under Johnson, therefore, a determination that a given set of facts violates clearly established law is reviewable, while a determination that an issue of fact is ‘genuine’ is unreviewable.” See v. City of Elyria, 502 F.3d 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2007); This jurisdictional limitation requires that, if “the defendant disputes the plaintiff’s version of the story, the defendant must nonetheless be willing to concede the most favorable view of the facts to the plaintiff for purposes of the appeal.” Berryman, 150 F.3d at 563; Meals v. City of Memphis, 493 F.3d 720, 726-27 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] defendant is required to limit her argument to questions of law premised on facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”); Sheets v. Mullins, 287 F.3d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 2002) (“In this circuit, it is well established that, for appellate jurisdiction to lie over Nos. 07-2115/2116/2117 Moldowan v. City of Warren, et al. Page 13 an interlocutory appeal, a defendant seeking qualified immunity must be willing to concede to the facts as alleged by the plaintiff and discuss only the legal issues raised by the case.”). “Once a defendant’s argument drifts from the purely legal into the factual realm and begins contesting what really happened, our jurisdiction ends and the case should proceed to trial.” Berryman, 150 F.3d at 564 (finding lack of jurisdiction to consider defendants’ appeal to the extent that defendants “attempt[ed] to persuade us to believe their version of the facts”); Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Thus, to the extent that the denial of qualified immunity is based on a factual dispute, such a denial falls outside of the narrow jurisdiction of this Court.”). In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), however, the Supreme Court recognized an apparent exception to this jurisdictional limitation when it considered and rejected a district court’s denial of summary judgment even though the district court had found genuine issues existed as to material facts. In reaching that conclusion, and without addressing the issue of jurisdiction, the Court found that a video of the incident rendered the plaintiff’s version of the facts “so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him.” Id. at 380. In trying to reconcile Scott with the Supreme Court’s edict in Johnson, this Court has concluded that “‘where the trial court’s determination that a fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly and demonstrably false, a court of appeals may say so, even on interlocutory appeal.’”3 Wysong v. Heath, 260 F. App’x 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3rd Cir. 2007)). It also is important to note that a district court’s stated basis for denying an immunity claim “does not necessarily foreclose this Court’s jurisdiction over [a party’s] appeal.” City of Elyria, 502 F.3d at 490; see also Christophel v. Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A defendant’s right to appeal the denial of qualified immunity does not turn on the phrasing of the district court’s order.”). Rather, “‘regardless of the district court’s reasons for denying qualified immunity, we may exercise jurisdiction 3 In Wysong, this Court found that the plaintiff’s admission in his deposition that no factual dispute existed fell within this exception and warranted reversal of the district court’s finding of disputed material facts. 260 F. App’x at 853-54. Nos. 07-2115/2116/2117 Moldowan v. City of Warren, et al. Page 14 over the . . . appeal to the extent it raises questions of law.” Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689-90 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1157) (emphasis in Williams). After reviewing Defendants’ various qualified immunity claims, we conclude that, while these appeals predominantly raise questions of law that are capable of appellate review at this juncture, they also present some issues of fact that Johnson dictates are beyond the scope of our jurisdiction. Where the parties ask us to resolve factual disputes, we set those issues aside for resolution by the trial court. See Gregory, 444 F.3d at 742-43 (“To the extent that an appellant on interlocutory appeal argues issues of fact and law on appeal, this Court will only entertain pure issues of law.”).