Opinion ID: 1179776
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues at Penalty Trial.

Text: As previously noted, the prosecution presented aggravating evidence that on August 14, 1981, defendant fired rifle shots at a victim hiding in the yard of a home on Priscilla Lane. James Barger, who lived in a neighboring house, testified that he saw the shots fired by a young Hispanic male who was wearing a long overcoat on a summer night. Barger detained the shooter at gunpoint, but a crowd of youths assembled, and the gunman walked away with them. Barger followed, keeping the shooter in sight until the police arrived. Barger then pointed out the gunman to a responding officer, Paul Llano. Defendant, wearing a long overcoat, was arrested at the scene. Barger testified he identified the shooter in a parole revocation hearing about two and one-half months after the shooting incident. However, Barger could not identify defendant at the penalty trial. At the conclusion of Barger's direct examination, defense counsel sought a delay of Barger's cross-examination so the prosecutor could determine whether tapes or transcripts of the revocation hearing were available. Counsel stressed he was not citing the prosecutor for a discovery violation because the prosecutor had represented he just learned of Barger's prior testimony when talking to the witness before he took the stand. The prosecutor confirmed that he was not previously aware Barger had testified at a revocation hearing. The court delayed Barger's cross-examination until the following morning. The next day, the prosecutor reported that all tapes and records of defendant's 1981 Youth Authority revocation hearing had been routinely purged after three years as provided by law. Defendant, allowed to address the court, represented that the dismissal of the revocation charges occurred because Barger's testimony at the revocation hearing was disbelieved. Counsel moved for a penalty mistrial, and alternatively to strike Barger's direct testimony. Among other things, counsel asserted that loss of the revocation tapes and transcripts deprived the defense of effective cross-examination of Barger. The defense motions were denied. Defendant first argues that use of the Priscilla Lane incident as aggravating evidence under section 190.3, factor (b), was invalid because dismissal of the revocation charges arising from this incident was tantamount to an acquittal of the underlying offenses. [27] Defendant raised no such challenge at trial, and it fails in any event. (26) Juvenile proceedings are not criminal prosecutions. (Cf. People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 861 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270] [juvenile wardship adjudication is not criminal conviction].) (27) In any event, dismissal of revocation charges, even on the merits, does not mean the parolee or probationer has been acquitted of any offense. Indeed, a merits dismissal of adult revocation charges would not preclude relitigation of the same allegations in a criminal prosecution. (See Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335 [272 Cal. Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 2 A.L.R.5th 995] [failure of proof at revocation hearing does not raise double jeopardy, res judicata, or collateral estoppel bars against subsequent criminal trial].) Defendant's claim must therefore be rejected. Defendant next asserts that Barger's testimony should have been stricken for two related reasons. First, he insists, the prosecutor improperly elicited that evidence without informing the defense of Barger's prior testimony or furnishing the defense with its contents. Second, he argues that loss of the tapes of Barger's prior testimony denied him his Sixth Amendment confrontation right to effective cross-examination. Neither claim has merit. As defense counsel conceded at trial, no record evidence contradicts the prosecutor's representation that he had little advance knowledge of Barger's prior testimony at a revocation hearing. Moreover, earlier notice on this specific issue would have made no material difference, since the tapes had been lawfully destroyed in the ordinary course long before defendant committed his capital crimes. [28] (28) Nor did loss of the tapes require the striking of Barger's trial testimony under the confrontation clause. Defendant had no separate Sixth Amendment right, greater than his due process right under California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479, to the preservation of official records. While recorded prior testimony may have fortuitous impeachment value, the state has no constitutional obligation to maintain such records indefinitely in case they later become relevant for impeachment in another proceeding. And their loss or destruction in the ordinary course cannot mean that the witness is barred from testifying under oath on the same subject at a later date. Barger disclosed on the stand that he had identified the perpetrator in the prior revocation hearing but could not identify defendant now. Defense counsel had a full opportunity to highlight Barger's current uncertainty and to question Barger about circumstances which might undermine the prior identification. In doing so, counsel presumably had the assistance of defendant himself, who was present at the prior hearing. There was no Sixth Amendment violation.
Officer Llano testified that after arresting defendant in connection with the shooting incident of August 14, 1981, he placed defendant and another suspect in the backseat of his patrol car and tape-recorded their conversation. On the recording, according to Llano, defendant threatened to return and kill Barger. (29) Defendant complains that evidence of the threat against Barger should have been excluded because it was not included in the statutory notice of aggravating evidence filed by the prosecution. (See ง 190.3.) The error, he asserts, violated his rights to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, while defendant objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds, he never raised a notice objection. Hence, the claim is waived on appeal. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 51; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 626, fn. 34 [268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].) In any event, the contention lacks merit. The notice of aggravating evidence stated that the prosecution intended to introduce evidence of the circumstances underlying [defendant's] arrest for the August 14, 1981, shooting assault against Andrew Benanato, as referenced in Sacramento Police Department report #81-49647. The police report, which was subject to defense discovery, contained reference to the tape-recorded threat uttered by defendant after he was placed under arrest. [T]he prosecutor is not prevented from introducing all the circumstances of a duly noticed incident or transaction simply because each and every circumstantial fact was not recited therein. (See, e.g., People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 424-425 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) The notice is sufficient if it gives defendant `a reasonable opportunity' to prepare a defense to the allegations. ( Howard, supra, at p. 425.) ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 258.) Here, the notice of aggravation fairly apprised the defense of all the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest for the August 14, 1981, incident which might be introduced in aggravation, and there was no unfair surprise. Defendant's claim of a notice violation must therefore be rejected.
Richard Lam was on duty in a Chief's Auto Parts Store when it was robbed by two men on the evening of February 16, 1987. Ten months later, he identified defendant as one of the robbers from a police lineup of five photographs. He positively identified defendant at the November 1989 penalty trial. Before the jury heard Lam's testimony, he was examined in a preliminary voir dire hearing under People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423]. [29] During cross-examination in the Phillips hearing, Lam disclosed that several days earlier, Jeanne Flannery, a process server from the district attorney's office, had presented him with a subpoena to appear as a witness. Flannery volunteered the information that defendant had already been convicted of murder and rape and was now in the penalty phase of his capital trial. Lam's testimony was needed, Flannery said, to show that defendant's conduct had been going on for awhile. At the conclusion of the Phillips hearing, the court admitted Lam's identification testimony. When cross-examined during his jury testimony, Lam again recounted his conversation with Flannery. At the conclusion of Lam's jury testimony, defense counsel moved to strike his identification of defendant, and alternatively for a mistrial, on grounds that the identification had been tainted by Flannery's remarks. These motions were denied. The court admonished the prosecutor to warn Flannery against improper commentary in the future, but it concluded that Lam was a strong and very definite witness who was not influenced by Flannery's words. (30a) On appeal, defendant again asserts that Flannery's comments amounted to an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure in violation of his federal constitutional right of due process. (E.g., Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.Ct. 1967].) Flannery's remarks prejudiced Lam's in-court identification, defendant suggests, by disclosing that defendant was already a convicted murderer and rapist, thus making Lam less reluctant to testify against him. We do not accept the premise of undue suggestion. Flannery would have been better advised to avoid unnecessary conversation with Lam about his appearance as a witness. However, her casual explanation of the reason for the subpoena she was serving provided only information of which any prospective witness in a capital penalty trial would presumably be, or become, aware. It is unrealistic to assume that such a witness would or should remain ignorant of the reasons for his testimony. On the contrary, one served with a subpoena requiring his presence in court would be expected to ascertain why that appearance was necessary. Indeed, once advised from the subpoena itself of the name of the case in which he was required to testify, the witness could presumably learn the details of its progress and purpose from the public media. Nor is it conceivable that the witness would take the stand unaware that his duty was truthfully to disclose whatever personal knowledge he had about the person on trial. Lam was subpoenaed because he had already identified defendant as one of the Chief's Auto Parts robbers. Flannery only advised that the man Lam had previously identified was now at the penalty phase of trial in another matter, and that Lam was being called as a witness to confirm his identification. Nothing Flannery said was calculated to obtain such an identification from an uncertain witness. If knowledge such as Flannery imparted were deemed to raise a constitutional issue of impermissible suggestion, the identification testimony of all but the most willfully uninformed penalty witnesses would be at risk. We see no due process implications in the conversation between Lam and Flannery. Even if Flannery's statements were unduly suggestive, we must uphold the trial court's decision to permit jury consideration of Lam's in-court identification. (31a) When an eyewitness has been subjected to undue suggestion, the factfinder must nonetheless be allowed to hear and evaluate his identification testimony unless the `totality of the circumstances' suggests `a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.' ( Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 106 [53 L.Ed.2d 140, 149, 97 S.Ct. 2243], quoting Neil v. Biggers (1972) 409 U.S. 188, 199 [34 L.Ed.2d 401, 411, 93 S.Ct. 375]; Manson, supra, at p. 116 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 155], quoting Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 384 [19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253, 88 S.Ct. 967].) No such likelihood appears here. The factors to be considered include (1) the witness's opportunity to view the suspect at the time of the crime, (2) the witness's degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of any prior description by the witness, (4) the level of certainty displayed by the witness at a suggestive confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. ( Neil v. Biggers, supra, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 [34 L.Ed.2d 401, 411-412].) Here, it is undisputed that Lam saw the robbers on two separate occasions in a well-lit store. Moreover, he was no mere casual observer ( id. at p. 200 [34 L.Ed.2d at pp. 411-412]), but a crime victim subjected to a close, extended encounter with the perpetrators. These factors weigh in favor of the reliability of his identification. Defendant asserts, however, that Lam described the robbers inaccurately after the holdup and was uncertain in his original identification from a photo lineup itself tainted by undue suggestion. Defendant also notes that the photo identification was delayed until 10 months after the Chief's Auto Parts robbery, and that Lam's identification in court, which occurred after Flannery's suggestive remarks, was separated from the crime by nearly 3 years. The time lapses weigh against reliability to some degree. However, the record does not strongly support defendant's other claims. Lam originally described two men from five feet six inches to five feet eight inches tall, and from one hundred sixty-five to one hundred eighty-five pounds. At trial, Lam said the shorter robber, whom he identified as defendant, was five feet four or five inches tall and weighed one hundred forty to one hundred sixty pounds. These estimates are not so disparate as to cast particular suspicion on Lam's reliability at trial. Moreover, the evidence, viewed as a whole, indicates the photo lineup was neither suggestive nor seriously uncertain. Defendant's claims of a suspect photo identification are based primarily on selected excerpts from Lam's testimony. For example, at the Phillips hearing, Lam indicated that before he viewed the photos, the officer told him a suspect in the February 1987 robbery had been arrested, and Lam thus had the impression this suspect's photo would be in the group. Lam also conceded he identified defendant's photo as possibly one of the two robbers. And Lam acknowledged he was more certain of his face-to-face identification at trial than of his photo identification. Both at the Phillips hearing and before the jury, Lam estimated he looked at the photos for up to 20 minutes before making his decision. Before the jury, however, Lam retracted some of his prior testimony. Lam said his prior memory about possible suggestive circumstances in the photo identification was in error. As he now remembered, the officer only told him the suspect might be in here, he might not. Accordingly, Lam testified, he never had the impression that the suspect's photo would be included. This version of events was corroborated by Sacramento Police Officer Ronald Wong, who conducted the photo lineup. Wong testified he told Lam that the lineup could or could not contain a photo of the suspect, and that he's under no obligation to select any of the photos shown to him. Wong, a veteran of such procedures, also disputed Lam's estimate of the time taken to select defendant's photo. Wong said that a witness typically selects a photo, if at all, within five minutes or so, and he did not recall Lam taking an unusual amount of time. If Lam had taken 15 or 20 minutes, Wong stated, he would have noted the indecision in his report. Wong further testified that in his report, he ranked Lam's certainty of identification as eight on a scale of one (lowest) to ten (highest). Moreover, Lam consistently stated that he selected defendant's photo in part because it depicted a distinct feature he had observed in the shorter robber โ a bad case of acne. Defendant implies that reliance on this unusual feature somehow detracts from the reliability of Lam's photo identification, but we conclude otherwise. In our view, Lam's recollection and use of a distinct aspect of the robber's appearance enhances, rather than undermines, the inference that his photo identification was accurate. (Cf., e.g., Neil v. Biggers, supra, 409 U.S. 188, 201 [34 L.Ed.2d 401, 412] [rape victim testified there was something about assailant's face I don't think I could ever forget].) Finally, Lam insisted on the stand that after seeing defendant in person for the first time since the Chief's Auto Parts robbery, he had no doubt defendant was one of the robbers. Lam unequivocally denied any influence from Flannery's comments. Though Lam knew that defendant had been convicted of violent felonies, and though Lam understood that his testimony might help send defendant to the gas chamber, Lam emphasized that Flannery never said defendant's guilt of the Chief's Auto Parts robbery had been proven. Lam further stressed his understanding that his evidence was relevant only [i]f [defendant] was the person that robbed me. (30b) Weighing all these circumstances, we conclude that neither Flannery's comments to Lam, nor any other aspect of the identification process, caused a `very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.' ( Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. 98, 116 [53 L.Ed.2d 140, 155].) (31b) Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh.... [E]vidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature. ( Ibid. ) Defendant's claim that Lam's testimony should have been excluded or stricken must therefore fail.

The trial court instructed, in the words of former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (now CALJIC No. 8.88), that [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. Defendant urges this instruction improperly informed the jury that death was compelled if aggravation outweighed mitigation. He asserts the court should have instructed sua sponte that the jury could return a verdict of life imprisonment without possibility of parole even if it found that aggravation outweighed mitigation. The error, he claims, misled the jury about its sentencing discretion and deprived him of his rights to due process and a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, defendant's failure to request a clarifying instruction waives that claim. (E.g., People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1192; People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 52.) (32) In any event, we have repeatedly held that the language of former CALJIC No. 8.84.2, taken directly from our majority opinion in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541-542, footnote 13 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], is not inadequate or misleading. By advising that a death verdict should be returned only if aggravation is so substantial in comparison with mitigation that death is warranted, the instruction clearly admonishes the jury to determine whether the balance of aggravation and mitigation makes death the appropriate penalty. (E.g., People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th 281, 315-316; People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1244-1245.) Hence, there was no need for the additional instruction defendant now suggests. (See, e.g., People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1192.)
(33) Defendant claims the court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte that the penalty jury must not follow the guilt phase instruction to render a just verdict regardless of the consequences (CALJIC No. 1.00). This failure, defendant asserts, diminished the jury's sense of responsibility in determining whether defendant should suffer the death penalty. Defendant therefore asserts violations of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair jury trial, and a reliable penalty determination. We are not persuaded. As defendant concedes, the jury received a blanket cautionary admonition to [d]isregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial. (Italics added.) Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed that it could consider, in mitigation, [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it may not be a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.  (Italics added.) An addendum was attached to this particular instruction that [y]ou must disregard any jury instructions given to you in the [guilt] or innocence phase [of] this trial which conflicts with this principle. Defendant points to no argument of counsel which sought to exploit the notion that CALJIC No. 1.00 remained applicable at the penalty phase. Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility the jury was misled about the nature and scope of its sentencing task. (See People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 183 [19 Cal. Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331].)
(34) Defendant requested an instruction that the jury must assume a sentence of death meant defendant would be executed, while a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant [defendant] will spend the rest of his life confined in state prison and will not be paroled at any time. The instruction was not given. The omission was entirely proper under California law, since the proffered instruction is inaccurate. The Governor may ameliorate any sentence by use of the commutation or pardon power, and it is thus `incorrect to tell the jury the penalty of ... life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out' [citation]. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1277 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251], quoting People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 130 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37].) However, defendant claims the omission of this instruction was federal constitutional error under an intervening United States Supreme Court decision, Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154 [129 L.Ed.2d 133, 114 S.Ct. 2187]. We find Simmons inapposite. In Simmons, a recidivist's prior felony convictions rendered him statutorily ineligible for parole if he suffered a further conviction for a violent crime. In his subsequent trial for a capital offense, the jury understood that he would suffer life imprisonment if not sentenced to death. However, the trial court prohibited defense counsel from inquiring about prospective jurors' understanding of life imprisonment, and the court barred all reference during the trial to the defendant's ineligibility for parole. When arguing for the death penalty, the prosecutor emphasized that defendant Simmons represented a future danger to society if left alive. In multiple opinions, seven members of the United States Supreme Court concluded that the resulting death judgment must be reversed. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg reasoned that, at least where the prosecution makes defendant's future danger to society a capital penalty issue, the due process clause gives the defendant the right to explain or deny the prosecution's theory by informing the jury of the actual duration of prison confinement if a life sentence were imposed in lieu of death. ( Simmons v. South Carolina, supra, 512 U.S. 154, ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 133, 141-146, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2192-2196].) The plurality also rejected the contention that the jury in the Simmons trial must have inferred ineligibility for parole when told that the term life imprisonment should be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning and that parole was not to be considered. ( Id. at pp. ___-___ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 141-146, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2196-2198].) In a separate opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, expressed similar views. ( Id. at pp. ___-___ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 149-151, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2200-2201] (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) Defendant claims that because the prosecutor emphasized his future dangerousness in closing argument, the instruction he requested was necessary under Simmons. Defendant is mistaken. The due process deficiencies in the Simmons trial do not exist in a California capital penalty trial. Every California penalty jury is specifically instructed that it must choose between two possible sentences, death or confinement in [the] state prison for a term of life without [ the ] possibility of parole. (ง 190.3, italics added; CALJIC No. 8.88 (5th ed. 1988); former CALJIC No. 8.84.2.) Indeed, the plurality opinion in Simmons itself noted that California is one of seventeen states in which a capital penalty jury is expressly informed of the defendant's ineligibility for parole, and one of nine states in which a capital jury's only sentencing alternatives are death or life without parole. ( Simmons v. South Carolina, supra, 512 U.S. 154, ___, fn. 7 [129 L.Ed.2d 133, 144, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2195].) Nothing in Simmons indicates that once the jury knows the defendant is ineligible for parole under the sentencing scheme it is required to apply, it must receive further instructions designed to deflect concern that events which might actually occur in the future, such as commutation or pardon, would nonetheless allow the defendant's release. Nor does Simmons suggest the jury must be instructed in a manner that affirmatively conceals the possibility of commutation or pardon. We decline to infer such a federal constitutional requirement. Defendant's claim of error must therefore be rejected. [30]

(35) Defendant claims that during the separate jury trial on the prior prison term enhancement alleged in the complaint (ง 667.5), the prosecutor committed deceptive and reprehensible conduct warranting a penalty reversal. The prosecutor, defendant insists, withdrew a meritorious objection to defendant's testimony on irrelevant issues, thus creating an opportunity to conduct a prejudicial cross-examination of defendant. We find no basis to overturn the penalty judgment. The relevant facts are as follows: Prior to commencement of the penalty phase, defendant received a jury trial (ง 1025) on the noncapital enhancement allegation that he had suffered a prior conviction and prison term (ง 667.5) for shooting at an inhabited dwelling (ง 246). Before the enhancement trial began, defendant moved to strike the prior conviction as constitutionally invalid. Defendant claimed his guilty plea in the prior case was not voluntary and intelligent because he was unaware it might have enhancement consequences in a future prosecution. The trial court denied the challenge. At the ensuing jury trial, the prosecution rested after presenting evidence on the truth of the enhancement allegation. Defense counsel then began an opening statement indicating that defendant would be called as a witness on the issue of the prior's validity. The prosecutor objected that validity was irrelevant. The court overruled the objection, stating that it could not prevent argument, though it might later exclude irrelevant evidence. At the conclusion of the defense statement, the court asked the prosecutor, outside the jury's presence, whether [y]ou were going to make some objection to ... [defendant's] testimony. The prosecutor responded that he withdr[e]w the objection [i]f [defendant] wants to testify. Defendant took the stand. On direct examination, he insisted that when he pled guilty to the charge of violating section 246, no one told him the conviction could be used against him in a later case. Defendant further stated he would not have pled guilty had he understood this consequence. The prosecutor then cross-examined defendant at length. Seeking to attack defendant's claim that he would not have pled guilty but for his ignorance of the consequences in a later case, the prosecutor asked sharp questions about defendant's experience with the juvenile and criminal justice systems, and about the facts underlying the charges to which defendant had entered a plea. On three occasions, defense objections to argumentative questions were sustained, but no admonition was sought or given. [31] Other objections by the defense, made on grounds that cross-examination was exceeding its permissible scope, were denied. In his argument, the prosecutor urged that neither the validity of the prior conviction nor the truth of the underlying charges was relevant. The defense had insisted on addressing those issues, said the prosecutor, but why it was necessary to go into that, I don't know. Later, when defense counsel tried to tell the jury it would be allowed to determine whether the prior conviction was valid, the prosecutor objected successfully, and the court admonished the jury it would be told to find only whether defendant suffered a conviction and a prison term as alleged. The instructions themselves made no reference to the issue of validity. After the jury retired, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. Counsel accused the prosecutor of withdrawing his initial objection to defendant's testimony so he could use that testimony as a vehicle for opening up new areas of criminal conduct behind the [prior prison term] allegation and conviction in the [section] 246 proceeding. Counsel further complained that after expressly waiving objection to evidence on the issue of validity, the prosecutor improperly sought to block the defense from arguing the relevance of that evidence. The prosecutor responded that whether or not he objected to testimony, the law is plain that the validity of a prior is not for the jury, but a question of law for the court. Counsel was put on notice, the prosecutor suggested, when an initial objection to counsel's argument was made, and defendant must take the consequences of counsel's decision to put defendant on the stand anyway. The motion for mistrial was denied. On appeal, defendant claims the prosecutor sandbagged the defense, thus violating his ethical duty to obtain a conviction only by fair means. We are not persuaded. The record leaves little doubt that the prosecutor took full advantage of an unexpected opportunity to subject defendant to vigorous cross-examination. However, the prosecutor engaged in no deceitful or unethical tactics to achieve that opportunity. On the contrary, the prosecutor made clear at the outset his correct belief that any testimony by defendant about the circumstances of his plea of guilty to the section 246 charge would be irrelevant. The defense, for its own purposes, nonetheless decided to present such evidence. [32] Even if the prosecutor ultimately failed to object, the consequences of the defense decision cannot be laid at the prosecutor's door. Moreover, once defendant testified that he had pled guilty in ignorance of the consequences, the prosecutor was entitled to assume this claim might affect the jury as the defense intended. Hence, he properly sought to rebut the claim by showing that defendant was somewhat experienced in the justice system, and that his plea was determined by the truth of the charge and the strength of the evidence. In any event, there was no prejudice warranting reversal of the penalty judgment. The prosecutor's sparring with defendant actually produced very little information not otherwise disclosed. For example, the penalty jury would have known in any event of defendant's conviction under section 246. That it also learned defendant's version of the circumstances of this violent crime could have had but a marginal effect. [33] During the cross-examination of defendant, there was some mention of a 1979 Youth Authority parole, and of your trial for robbery with the use of a knife out at juvenile hall. But these references appear to concern the Daniel Rypich robbery, the facts of which were presented in full at the penalty phase. Under the circumstances, and given the ample valid evidence of defendant's violent criminal career, there appears no reasonable possibility that the challenged cross-examination affected the penalty verdict. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) [34]
(36) In his penalty phase arguments, the prosecutor urged at some length that defendant was not deserving of sympathy or mercy, and he challenged the jury to consider whether the defendant deserves to live. Defendant contends these arguments suggested that sympathy and mercy were irrelevant to the penalty determination, contrary to the rule that defendant is entitled to consideration of any sympathetic evidence in mitigation. (See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 114-117 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 11-12, 102 S.Ct. 869]; People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d 841, 863.) Defendant's counsel failed to object and request an admonition, though an admonition would have cured any harm. Hence, the contention is waived on appeal. (E.g., People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1184, fn. 27; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 33-34.) [35] In any event, we see no impropriety. The prosecutor merely argued that the mitigation doesn't really amount to much in its totality, that sympathy for defendant would rob the murder victim of the sympathy he deserved, and that the jurors had promised to follow the law and decide the case on the evidence, not on the distraction of the sympathy that might pull at your heart strings. Yet the prosecutor never suggested that the jury was prohibited from considering defendant's mitigating evidence in a sympathetic light, and the jury was expressly instructed that it could do so. The prosecutor himself told the jury at one point that in the guilt phase, they said you're instructed not to consider sympathy, but here you should. If sympathy is based on the evidence and you find that evidence exists, then, you must consider it ..., evaluate it for what it's worth, and then, compare it to the aggravation. (Italics added.) The prosecutor's argument was entirely proper. (E.g., People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 163-164 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561]; People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 839-840.) Nor do we accept defendant's claim that by suggesting defendant did not deserve to live, the prosecutor implied there was a presumption that anyone guilty of a special circumstance murder should be sentenced to death. The prosecutor merely argued that the balance of aggravating and mitigating evidence in this case favored death over the alternative of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Delores Garcia testified for the defense that she loved defendant and intended to marry him regardless of his fate. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited her understanding, based on her study of prison rules, that if defendant received a sentence of life without parole, she and her children could visit him over weekends in a private space. Defense counsel later argued to the jury that the love Garcia had expressed for defendant was a reflection that he had some good qualities. In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor suggested that Garcia's testimony had nothing to do with the proper sentence for defendant. The prosecutor questioned whether it is appropriate to consider sending the defendant to state prison for life where he may engage in the reward of conjugal visits with his wife, where he may engage in the reward of visiting with his family at Christmastime and other times, maybe receive the disability payments that Mr. Enomoto talked about. Defendant claims the references to conjugal visits and other possible benefits of prison life were improper. Trial counsel's silence waives the issue on appeal, and it lacks merit in any event. Defendant first suggests there was no evidence to support the reference to conjugal and family visits. However, it was clearly based on Garcia's testimony that she had studied up on prison rules, understood she and her children would be eligible to make such visits, and intended to do so. Defendant also asserts the argument went beyond the relevant sentencing factors, which are limited to the circumstances of the capital offense and the character and background of the offender. (See ง 190.3.) However, rebuttal argument is not limited to the statutory sentencing factors. (E.g., People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 791 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) Here, the prosecutor sought only to place Garcia's mitigating testimony in its proper perspective, and to remind the jurors that the sentence defendant sought would allow him to enjoy benefits and relationships, as with Garcia, which he had forever denied his victim. As such, the argument was proper. [36] Defendant asserts we have condemned penalty argument which suggests the defendant will receive a free ride unless sentenced to death. But the case on which he principally relies, People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443 [47 Cal. Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641], is materially distinguishable. There, capital defendants were already under indeterminate life sentences for other crimes, and the prosecutor argued that another indeterminate life term would therefore mean nothing. We deemed such an argument misleading, because it implied the Adult Authority would violate its duty to take the second sentence into account when deciding the total length of actual confinement. ( Id. at p. 450.) No such vice appears here. Defendant's claim of misconduct lacks merit.
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Garcia whether defendant ever indicated that he feels it's unfair that Mr. Waltrip will never be able to get married and enjoy a family, like he can, even though he's in prison? (Italics added.) This question was deliberately misleading, defendant insists, because the prosecutor knew, and had succeeded in keeping from the jury, that Waltrip was a homosexual who was HIV positive at the time of his death. The claim is waived for failure to object, and it lacks merit in any event. The question sought only to learn whether defendant regretted depriving a young person of the opportunities of life in general, which defendant himself might continue to enjoy in some measure even while incarcerated. The prosecutor asked no further questions and made no argument stressing Waltrip's lost chance for marriage and fatherhood. To the extent the jurors noticed the brief reference of which defendant complains, they would necessarily have assumed the question was rhetorical, intended only to pursue the obvious and general theme of injustice as between murderer and victim. No misconduct appears.
(37) Defendant claims the prosecutor improperly invoked the Bible and religious law in support of the death penalty, thus breaching the separation of church and state, diminishing the jury's sense of sentencing responsibility, and injecting extraneous matters into the sentencing determination. Defense counsel's failure to object waives the issue. In any event, we are unpersuaded on the merits. At the outset of his opening argument, the prosecutor observed that the penalty issue is not about whose side God is on, because you see, the Bible can be enlisted on both sides. Exodus 20:13 commands that you shall not kill, the prosecutor noted, but other passages in Exodus suggest that one who kills willfully shall be put to death. The prosecutor reflected that some might believe God determines punishment in the life hereafter, but jurors must follow the law of California, as applied to the evidence in this case, and go no further. He suggested that each juror might draw upon any faith personal to yourself for the strength necessary to go through this very difficult process. Thus, the prosecutor merely exhorted jurors who might harbor strong religious views that they must not resort to religious canons to decide the appropriate penalty. He noted that religious laws were in conflict, and, in any event, that secular law must govern over any religious beliefs. This restrained commentary did not invoke religious authority as supporting or opposing the death penalty ( People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th 155, 194; see also People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 260-261 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107]) and thus did not cross the line between permissible and improper argument. (E.g., People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 450, 515-516; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1325 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].)
(38) Defendant asserts the prosecutor improperly diminished the jurors' sense of sentencing responsibility when he completed his rebuttal argument with the following comment: You did not start this process. Remember, it is the defendant that is responsible for a decision of death by his killing of Mr. Waltrip on May 23, 1987, not you. He, alone, is responsible for your confrontation with death that you must make. He, alone, is responsible, because he, alone, suddenly, violently, callously, and undeservedly murdered John Waltrip. [ถ] And, now, is the time to determine the consequences of that act. [ถ] Thank you. Defendant's failure to object waives the issue, but it lacks merit in any event. The prosecutor sought only to emphasize that the moral blame for the crimes and their consequences rests with defendant, not with the jurors, and this is not improper. ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 247 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302].) [37] Indeed, the prosecutor made clear that because of the defendant's conduct, the jury must indeed now confront and make a penalty decision. The prosecutor never intimated that the jurors had only a minimal role in the sentencing process or could shift their sentencing responsibility elsewhere. (See Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 1, 9-10, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 2010].) No misconduct occurred.
(39) Defendant challenges the prosecutor's argument that defendant's extrajudicial expressions of remorse were insincere and reflected only a selfish personal concern about the penal consequences of his crimes. In defendant's view, this argument constituted Griffin error ( Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229]) because it was a comment on defendant's exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination, as reflected in his failure to express remorse on the stand. Defendant also claims the prosecutor committed Boyd error ( People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 771-776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]) by invoking a nonstatutory aggravating factor, and Davenport error ( People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290) by misrepresenting the absence of mitigation as aggravating. The claims are waived for failure to object, and they are unmeritorious in any event. The prosecutor merely anticipated the predictable defense argument that defendant's expressions of remorse to friends and relatives after the Beacon crimes were factors in mitigation. The prosecutor never mentioned defendant's failure to testify, and he never hinted that the extrajudicial expressions of remorse were less sincere because defendant had failed to confirm them on the witness stand. Nor did the prosecutor suggest that the absence of remorse was an independent factor in aggravation. He simply argued that defendant's expressions of remorse were worth nothing. No impropriety occurred.
Defendant complains of the prosecutor's vigorous attack on the testimony of the defense expert, Dr. Globus, who opined that defendant suffered from organic brain damage. Among other things, the prosecutor accused Dr. Globus of misapplying the results of brain scans performed on defendant. In this regard, the prosecutor suggested that Dr. Globus's job was to save [defendant's] life, now. He's part of a forensic team. The prosecutor claimed he [did] not fault the defense team for doing anything to save their client's life. However, he asked, Where's the beef, Doctor? Where's the evidence of it? See, it doesn't exist. It's not in his tests. All the possibilities in the world could happen, but they didn't. No. Doctor Globus, go some place else and sell your tonic water to another forum. Defendant's failure to object waives the claim, but it must be rejected in any event. (40) As previously discussed ( ante, at p. 162), counsel may mount colorful attacks on the credibility of opposing lay and expert witnesses. Such an attack is not improper simply because it includes epithets intended to ridicule the witness's testimony. Thus, where counsel claims that an expert's conclusions are illogical, he may illustrate the point by describing them in such derisive terms as tonic water. Nor is counsel prohibited from mentioning the witness's possible bias or interest supported by the evidence. Accordingly, it is not wrong to argue that an expert's conclusions are so implausible as to suggest a lack of impartiality. And counsel is not precluded from reminding the jurors that the expert's findings support the goals of the party who called him, and may therefore not be objective. (41) Defendant urges the prosecutor improperly disparaged opposing counsel (see, e.g., People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1302) by implying that counsel had suborned false testimony by Dr. Globus to save their client's life. However, we see nothing so sinister in the prosecutor's argument. At most, he suggested that the defense team may have sought an expert whose technical opinions would be favorable to defendant's case. Since expert opinions are generally subject to reasonable debate, an attorney's good faith selection of a favorable expert does not reflect adversely on counsel's ethics or integrity. An argumentative reminder that defense counsel may have chosen Dr. Globus for this reason is not equivalent to an insinuation that counsel suborned perjury or engaged in deception. (Cf., e.g., People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129] [argument that `it's [defense counsel's] job to throw sand in your eyes' not improper]; cf. People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 845 [97 Cal. Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564] [insinuation that defense lawyer assisted client to concoct false story was misconduct].) No improper argument occurred.
(42) An instruction was given that [i]t is appropriate for the jury to consider in mitigation any lingering doubt it may have concerning defendant's guilt. [ถ] Lingering or residual doubt is defined as that state of mind between beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubt. (See People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 146-147 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381].) Defense counsel argued at length that the jury should consider any lingering doubt about whether defendant intended to kill John Waltrip when deciding the appropriate penalty. In his own opening argument, the prosecutor had anticipated this lingering doubt claim. He read the jury the lingering doubt instruction it would later hear, then commented: You may consider this in mitigation in the penalty phase. [ถ] Now, I don't understand that really. You're asked to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond all imaginary doubt, but beyond a reasonable doubt. [ถ] You did not have to consider an area above that. Since you did not have to consider an area above that, it's beyond me how anyone could have any lingering doubt that's defined as existing above a reasonable doubt. At this point, defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was personalizing his argument. Directed by the court to proceed, the prosecutor concluded, So again, for what that is worth, you should consider it, evaluate it and compare it to all of the aggravation, the substantial aggravation in the case in making your decision. Defendant claims this argument improperly expressed the prosecutor's personal views about a legal theory applicable to the case. We agree in principle that an attorney's argument should not disparage instructions with which he disagrees. But the prosecutor did not cross that line here. Though his thoughts were inartfully phrased, the prosecutor sought only to persuade the jurors that little room remained for lingering doubt. Having already found no reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, the prosecutor suggested, the jurors should have difficulty retaining a doubt that was more than merely imaginary. This was not improper. Moreover, the prosecutor quickly abandoned the point when interrupted and thereafter conceded to the jury that it was entitled to consider any remaining reservations it harbored. Under all the circumstances, we find no misconduct. Even if there had been misconduct, we would not find it prejudicial. Defense counsel argued at length why there remained lingering doubt about defendant's intent to kill even though the jury had already determined defendant's guilt. The instructions given confirmed these concepts. Hence, there arose no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled or improperly influenced by the prosecutor's remarks. (E.g., People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 663.)