Opinion ID: 1442874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disposition of the Instant Cases

Text: Applying the agency's statutory interpretation, which we affirm, to petitioners' cases, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners' motions to reopen. Petitioners were all subject to final orders of removal after their initial asylum applications were denied. They were therefore required to properly file a motion to reopen to pursue a new asylum application. Because petitioners filed their requests for relief more than ninety days, indeed several years, after the entry of their final removal orders, their motions to reopen were untimely and, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), they were required to demonstrate that conditions in China had changed. Petitioners requested reopening and asylum based on the birth of a second or third child in the United States. But it is well settled in this circuit that the birth of additional children in the United States is evidence of changed personal circumstances, not changed country conditions within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). See, e.g., Wang, 437 F.3d at 273-74; Guan, 345 F.3d at 49 (Guan's evidence is essentially of changed personal circumstances in the United States based on the birth of her two sons....). Because petitioners failed to satisfy the requirements for a motion to reopen, the BIA did not err in denying their motions or failing to consider their successive asylum applications. Petitioners raise some additional arguments that pertain to their individual cases. We have considered those arguments and find all of them to be without merit.