Opinion ID: 2994932
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill Conference of Teamsters & Employers Welfare

Text: Fund v. Mrowicki, 44 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 1994). The district court found that the terms of the CBA unambiguously obligates RNA to contribute to the Funds on behalf of its owner-drivers. See Mazzei v. Rock-N-Around Trucking, Inc., No. 99 C 1975, 2000 WL 152137, -5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2000). RNA disputes the district court’s finding with respect to this issue. Instead, RNA contends that the CBA unambiguously establishes that RNA does not have to contribute to the Funds on behalf of its owner-drivers. We review the district court’s interpretation of the CBA de novo. See Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Kroger Co., 226 F.3d 903, 910 (7th Cir. 2000). We will enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement if those terms are unambiguous. See Young v. N. Drury Lane Prod., 80 F.3d 203, 205 (7th Cir. 1996). The CBA is unambiguous if it is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. Moriarty v. Svec, 164 F.3d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, if we find no ambiguity in the terms of the CBA, then, in determining its meaning as a matter of law, we need not review extrinsic evidence suggesting how those terms should be interpreted. See Mrowicki, 44 F.3d at 459. Article 16 of the CBA, entitled Health and Welfare and Pension, obligates RNA to contribute into a trust . . . for the payment of Health and Welfare or Pension benefits . . . for an employee covered by this Agreement. In Article 1, employee is defined as the employee or employees in the classifications of work covered by the CBA. While this definition does not address whether RNA’s owner-drivers are considered covered employees, Article 24, entitled Owner-Drivers, explains that OwnerDrivers operating their own vehicles and who are not certified carriers with proper Illinois Commerce Commission authority are covered within the terms and conditions of this Agreement, including Union security, hours, wages, overtime, Health & Welfare and Pension and working conditions. CBA sec. 24.1 (emphasis added). Article 24 clearly extends RNA’s responsibilities under Article 16, Health and Welfare or Pension, to the terms of employment for RNA’s owner- drivers. Therefore, we find that there can be no mistaking the fact that the CBA attempts to impose an obligation on RNA to contribute to the Funds for each of its owner-drivers. Furthermore, we agree with the district court’s determination that this interpretation of the CBA is straightforward and not inconsistent with other provisions therein. Mazzei, 2000 WL 152137, at . RNA disagrees, arguing that sections 24.1-4 and 24.3 conflict with our interpretation and demonstrate that the terms of the CBA do not obligate it to contribute to the Funds on behalf of its non-certified owner- drivers. Section 24.1-4 explains that non- certified owner-drivers, the group of individuals at issue in this case shall receive the full wages, supplemental allowance, and all working conditions provided in this Agreement and shall receive as a minimum salary after payment of all direct and indirect operating expenses (including contributions to the Health & Welfare Fund and Pension Fund) the sum equal to the amount he would have received for the time he would have worked as an hourly or percentage rated driver. CBA sec. 24.1-4. This provision concerns the income of the owner-drivers and tells us nothing about who must contribute to the Funds. Thus, it is not in tension with our finding that 24.1 places the obligation to contribute to the Funds on RNA. Section 24.3, which addresses the terms of employment for a different group of drivers than the owner-drivers at issue in this case, states that [c]ompanies who hire owner operators who are members of the Union and are Certified Carriers with proper Illinois Commerce Commission authority and who drive their own trucks and perform work exclusively for the Employer shall be covered by Article 16- Health & Welfare and Pension and it shall be the Employer’s responsibility to make contributions on their behalf. CBA sec. 24.3. RNA contends that the use of such specific language in defining its duty with respect to the certified owner-operators, in contrast with the lack of such language in section 24.1, is a clear indication that RNA has no such duty with respect to the owner-drivers at issue in this case. We do not agree. While section 24.3 can be read to be a more specific explanation of RNA’s obligation to contribute than section 24.1, it does not contradict or detract from the clear directive of 24.1 incorporating RNA’s obligations under Article 16 into the terms of employment for the non- certified owner-drivers at issue in this case. Thus, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the CBA unambiguously requires RNA to contribute to the Funds on behalf of its owner-drivers. C. Legality of the Contributions Called for in the CBA Having found that the CBA obligates RNA to contribute to the Funds on behalf of its owner- drivers, we must now evaluate the legality of these contributions under the LMRA. When Congress was formulating the LMRA, it was concerned with corruption of collective bargaining through bribery of employee representatives by employers, with extortion by employee representatives, and with the possible abuse by union officers of the power which they might achieve if welfare funds were left to their sole control. Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425-26, 79 S. Ct. 864, 3 L. Ed. 2d 915 (1959). To address these concerns, Congress included section 302(a)(1) of the LMRA, which prohibits employers from paying any representative of any of his employees. 29 U.S.C. sec. 186(a)(1). However, because Congress had to balance its fears of misuse and bribery with organized labor’s demand for a system of employee welfare funds financed by employer contributions and administered by union officials, see Arroyo, 359 U.S. at 426, the LMRA provides an exception to this prohibition with respect to money . . . paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer. 29 U.S.C. sec. 186(c)(5). This exception is limited, however, as it does not allow an employer to contribute to a trust fund on behalf of, or for the benefit of, individuals that are not employees of the contributing employer. See Ill. Conference of Teamsters & Employers Welfare Fund v. Mrowicki, 44 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 407, 97 S. Ct. 679, 50 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1977)). Nevertheless, in Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. at 407, the Supreme Court held that the LMRA permits employer trust fund contributions, regardless of the employment status of the employer’s workers, when the amounts of such contributions are measured by the number of hours worked by that employer’s workers as opposed to being given simply on behalf of or for the benefit of the employer’s workers. Id.; see also Mrowicki, 44 F.3d at 461 (citing Walsh, 429 U.S. at 407-10) ([A] clause in a collective bargaining agreement making an employer liable for payment of trust fund contributions based on the hours worked at a job site by individuals other than its own employees [does] not violate sec. 302 of the LMRA.); Todd v. Benal Concrete Constr. Co., 710 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that in Walsh the Court held that contributions may reflect work performed by employees of . . . independent subcontractors, but only if the amounts are ’measured by’ the number of hours worked). Therefore, we will first examine the manner in which the CBA requires RNA to contribute to the Funds to determine if such contributions are permissible regardless of the employment status of RNA’s owner-drivers. Section 16.1 of the CBA obligates RNA to contribute fixed weekly amounts, set out in section 16.2, to a trust for the payment of Health and Welfare or Pension benefits . . . for an employee covered by this Agreement, in accordance with the requirements set forth in the