Opinion ID: 6221797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maine’s Uniform Premarital Agreement Act

Text: [¶29] Maine’s UPAA authorizes individuals to enter into premarital agreements, see 19-A M.R.S. § 604, and it applies to all premarital agreements executed in Maine after September 28, 1987, see Est. of Martin, 2008 ME 7, ¶ 13, 938 A.2d 812. The UPAA “must be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to [its] subject . . . among states enacting it.” 19-A M.R.S. § 611. [¶30] Section 604 of Maine’s UPAA provides that parties may validly contract in a premarital agreement with respect to (1) their rights and obligations to property, (2) the right to buy, sell, or use property; (3) the disposition of property upon the occurrence of specified events; (4) spousal support; (5) the making of a will or trust; (6) a death benefit; (7) the choice of law governing the agreement; and “(8) [a]ny other matter . . . not in violation of public policy.” See 19-A M.R.S. § 604. In addition to specifying the matters that can be the subjects of premarital agreements, section 604 also specifies that a 15 premarital agreement cannot adversely affect the “right of a child to receive support.”6 Id. [¶31] Because section 604 explicitly precludes parties from contracting as to matters that affect the “right of a child to receive support” but does not mention attorney fees, Riemann contends that the public policy parameters for premarital agreements are already defined by section 604. He argues that, based on application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,7 the absence of any mention of attorney fees implies that a premarital agreement concerning attorney fees is allowed by statute and does not violate public policy. Section 604(8) provides, however, that parties can contract to “[a]ny other matter” only if the agreement as to that matter does not violate public policy. Id. § 604(8). Thus, the Legislature did provide a guard against parties 6 Maine’s UPAA is closely modeled on the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (1983). Maine’s legislative history does not clarify what qualifies as “support” as that term is used in the UPAA. Other jurisdictions interpret “support” within the meaning of their own codifications of the UPAA to mean economic child support. See In re Marriage of Best, 901 N.E.2d 967, 970-71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); In re Marriage of Erpelding, 917 N.W.2d 235, 238-39 (Iowa 2018). The Uniform Laws Annotated explains that it “makes clear that an agreement may not adversely affect what would otherwise be the obligation of a party to a child.” Unif. Premarital Agreement Act § 3 cmt., 9C U.L.A. 44 (1983), superseded by Unif. Premarital and Marital Agreements Act 9C U.L.A. 13-30 (Supp. 2021). 7 This maxim is a rule of statutory interpretation “that [the] express mention of one concept implies the exclusion of others not listed.” Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Me. 1994). 16 contracting as to other matters that, although not specifically prohibited by section 604, violate public policy. [¶32] Riemann alternatively argues that section 608 of the UPAA provides the only circumstances under which a premarital agreement is voidable under the Act. See 19-A M.R.S. § 608. Section 608 provides that a premarital agreement is unenforceable when either (1) it was not executed voluntarily or (2) a court determines that it was unconscionable upon execution and that, before execution, one party lacked knowledge or disclosure of the other party’s financial circumstances. See id. In support, Riemann points to our decision in Estate of Martin, in which we said that “enforcement of a premarital agreement should only be denied under [the] circumstances” outlined in section 608. 2008 ME 7, ¶ 16, 938 A.2d 812. Riemann misapplies section 608 in the case now before us and overreads our holding in Estate of Martin, in which we interpreted section 608—not section 604, which we construe here.8 [¶33] Like section 608, our case law thus far has addressed concerns for only the parties’ circumstances or positions at the time a premarital agreement 8 In Estate of Martin, our statement that “the Legislature intended the enforceability of premarital agreements to be determined based on section 608” was in the narrow context of our conclusion that the common law had been superseded by the standards in section 608 “for purposes of determining whether [the Probate Code’s] requirement of ‘fair disclosure’ ha[d] been met.” 2008 ME 7, ¶¶ 9, 17, 17 is executed. See Hoag v. Dick, 2002 ME 92, ¶¶ 3, 16, 799 A.2d 391; Est. of Martin, 2008 ME 7, ¶¶ 18-19, 938 A.2d 812. But unlike section 608 and those cases, the public policy concern raised here with respect to a waiver of the right to seek attorney fees is prospective because, regardless of the parties’ circumstances at the time they executed a premarital agreement, those circumstances may later be affected disproportionately such that one party is unable to pursue or defend litigation that involves the best interest of a child. [¶34] Furthermore, any reading of section 608 as providing the only circumstances in which a premarital agreement is unenforceable would directly conflict with section 604(8), which permits parties to contract to other matters in a premarital agreement only if those matters are not against public policy. See 19-A M.R.S. § 604(8); see also Lehigh v. Pittston Co., 456 A.2d 355, 361 (Me. 1983) (“[C]ontracts against public policy . . . [are] void and unenforceable.”). [¶35] Accordingly, we conclude that a waiver in a premarital agreement of the right to seek attorney fees is valid under the UPAA’s catch-all provision 938 A.2d 812. The parties in Estate of Martin did not dispute the premarital agreement on public policy grounds. 18 as “[a]ny other matter” only to the extent that its application does not violate public policy.9 See 19-A M.R.S. § 604(8).