Opinion ID: 1467547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cross-Claims for Contribution

Text: The trial justice erred, however, in calculating the amounts to which Lea and Emery Associates are entitled from each other on their cross-claim for contribution. The justice caused judgment to be entered for Lea against the Associates for twenty-five percent of $25,000.00, the amount for which Lea and the Associates were jointly and severally liable to Emery Waterhouse. Judgment for seventy-five percent of $25,000.00 was awarded to the Associates against Lea. Lea and the Associates are properly liable to each other in contribution for seventy-five and twenty-five percent, respectively, of the entire amount of the judgment, $78,388.43, and not simply for those percentages of the remainder of the judgment after the amount of the Emery Associates' release has been subtracted. The release in the lease between Emery Waterhouse and Emery Associates concerns only those two parties and plays no role in the determination of rights under the cross-claims for contribution between the Associates and Lea. Lea was in no way involved in that release arrangement and should not benefit from it in any way. Fairness, however, dictates that he should also be kept immune from any adverse effect as a result of that contract. We noted long ago that [c]ontribution is not contractual. It is an equitable right founded on acknowledged principles of natural justice and enforceable in a court of law. Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 451, 104 A. 815, 816 (1918). In adopting comparative contribution as the law of Maine, we further emphasized that there is no reason why in logic or in justice the law should expect that the joint tortfeasor should ultimately be required to contribute more  or lessthan a share of the total damages proportionate to his causal fault. Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169, 180 (Me.1971). In two cases analogous to the present case, we applied principles of equity to prevent an unjust result with regard to contribution among parties. In Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963), we held that interspousal immunity would not prevent contribution from a tortfeasor immune from direct suit. Otherwise, we noted, the third party would be unjustly required not only to compensate for his own fault but also to pay the pecuniary equivalent of the husband's wrong. The third party would be penalized because of the marital fact . . . 159 Me. at 296, 192 A.2d at 26. We concluded that the policies supporting interspousal immunity were not sufficiently compelling as to vindicate such an incongruity, 159 Me. at 297, 192 A.2d at 26, and that those policies would, in any event, not be frustrated to any insuperable degree by allowing contribution. 159 Me. at 299-300, 192 A.2d at 28. In Otis Elevator Co. of Maine v. F. W. Cunningham & Sons, 454 A.2d 335 (Me. 1983), we held that a joint tortfeasor, directly liable to the injured person, could seek contribution from another joint tortfeasor who was not adjudged liable to the injured person because of the rule of fault comparison under which that case was tried by agreement of the parties. 454 A.2d at 340. Applying the Bedell analysis, [4] we concluded that policies underlying the Maine version of modified comparative fault had no application to considerations of what is just between joint tort-feasors. 454 A.2d at 340; see also Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., Inc., 259 A.2d 43, 49 (Me.1969) (purposes of workers' compensation act would be frustrated by allowing contribution from a previously immune employer). We stated that once an injured party has been paid his judgment by a joint tortfeasor directly liable to that party, considerations shift solely to concerns of what is fair between tort-feasors whose negligence collectively caused injury to another. 454 A.2d at 339. Relying on Packard, we stated that under the circumstances in Otis, it was more unfair to require a tortfeasor to pay more than his proportionate share of the damages than to require a tortfeasor not adjudged liable to contribute his proportionate share of the damages. 454 A.2d at 340. Emery Waterhouse and Emery Associates entered into a valid contract for the release of the Associates from liability to Emery Waterhouse to the extent of insurance coverage. The fundamental principle of freedom of contract requires recognition of the release provision vis-a-vis the parties to that contract. That principle will not be in any way undermined by refusing to enforce the provisions of that release against Lea, a non-party to the Emery Waterhouse-Emery Associates contract. But, by permitting the Associates to contribute to Lea much less than the Associates' proportionate share of the total judgment, [5] we would frustrate the sound principle that contribution by joint tortfeasors shall be in proportion to their contribution to the damage. Packard, 274 A.2d at 181; see Otis, 454 A.2d at 340. The error is easily corrected by recalculating, on the basis of the total judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff, the amount of contribution to which the Associates and Lea are entitled from each other. See Dongo v. Banks, 448 A.2d 885, 894 (Me.1982). The entry is: Appeal of Gilbert Lea denied in part and sustained in part. Cross-appeal of Emery Waterhouse Company denied. Cross-appeal of Craig C. Milne, Glenn M. Desmond, and David Adams, d/b/a Emery Associates, denied. Judgment of the Superior Court is modified to read as follows: In the complaint of the Plaintiff, The Emery Waterhouse Company, against Craig C. Milne, Glenn M. Desmond, David Adams, d/b/a Emery Associates, and Gilbert Lea, et al., judgment is entered in favor of the Plaintiff, The Emery Waterhouse Company, and against the Defendant, Gilbert Lea, in the amount of $78,388.43, together with interest and costs; as to the amount of $25,000.00 of said judgment of $78,388.43 and not in addition thereto, judgment is entered in favor of the Plaintiff, The Emery Waterhouse Company, and against the Defendants, Craig C. Milne, Glenn M. Desmond and David Adams, d/b/a Emery Associates in said amount of $25,000.00, together with interest and costs, jointly and severally with the aforementioned Defendant, Gilbert Lea. In the cross-claim of Gilbert Lea against Craig C. Milne, Glenn M. Desmond and David Adams, d/b/a Emery Associates, judgment is entered in favor of Gilbert Lea and against Craig C. Milne, Glenn M. Desmond and David Adams, d/b/a Emery Associates, as contribution from said Associates, in such amount, but not exceeding $19,597.11, as Gilbert Lea may pay to The Emery Waterhouse Company on the above mentioned judgment of $78,388.43 against him over and above the sum of $58,791.32, together with interest and costs. In the cross-claim of Craig C. Milne, Glenn M. Desmond and David Adams, d/b/a Emery Associates, judgment is entered in favor of Craig C. Milne, Glenn M. Desmond and David Adams, d/b/a Emery Associates, and against Gilbert Lea, as contribution from said Gilbert Lea, in such amount, but not exceeding $5,402.89, as the said Associates may pay to The Emery Waterhouse Company on the above mentioned judgment of $25,000.00 against them over and above the sum of $19,597.11, together with interest and costs. As so modified, the judgments below are affirmed. All concurring.