Opinion ID: 6500458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Irrelevance

Text: Next, Lama appears to contend that the district court erroneously admitted the pocket calendar because the calendar did not cover any time period within the limitations period here (September 2013–November 2015) and thus was not relevant. He raised this issue below, preserving abuse-of-discretion review, but to the extent Lama injected only a relevancy objection under Rule 401, we spy no error.14 13Lama also slips an argument deep into his brief that Gonpo's counsel maintained in his closing argument that other employees were paid off the books in cash, which Lama says was not based on any evidence. Yet a complaint that a closing argument was not supported by the evidence raises a wholly different error than a complaint that certain evidence was improperly admitted. Lama did not object to this closing-statement remark, leaving it forfeited and thus reviewed, at most, for plain error. See Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1999). And Lama also makes no argument on appeal under that demanding standard, leaving the argument ultimately waived. See Covidien LP v. Esch, 993 F.3d 45, 56 (1st Cir. 2021). 14Lama tries to loop this in as an objection under Rule 406, but we struggle to see how this fits there. - 27 - Rule 401 set[s] a very low bar for relevance. United States v. Rodríguez-Soler, 773 F.3d 289, 293 (1st Cir. 2014). Under that rule, if the evidence has 'any tendency' to make a material fact more or less likely, it is relevant. Id. (emphasis in original); see Fed. R. Evid. 401. That low threshold makes a relevancy-based argument . . . a rather tough sell. Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 49 (1st Cir. 2018). Color us unsold.15 The evidence Lama protests easily vaults the low relevancy bar. Gyatso testified that his schedule in 2013, the period he worked with Gonpo covered by the limitations period here, was the same as his schedule in 2012, the period that the calendar covered.16 The calendar thus served to corroborate Gyatso's testimony that he worked about 57 hours per week in 2013 by pointing to documentary evidence supporting that he had in fact worked those same hours in the past. See United States v. PérezGonzález, 445 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2006) (documentary evidence corroborating witnesses' testimony passes Rule 401's loose test). 15 We note that Lama's arguments on this point, citing no caselaw and not even a rule of evidence, are so underdeveloped that they may even be waived. See Conduragis v. Prospect Chartercare, LLC, 909 F.3d 516, 518 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Freitas, 904 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2018). 16Lama contends in his brief that there is no evidence that Gyatso worked for Lama in 2013, since Gyatso testified that he left somewhere like 2013 in December, 2012. But Gyatso also later testified that he returned to work for Lama in May 2013 at Lama's request and, as Lama recognizes, also testified about how he kept track of and submitted his time in 2013. - 28 -