Opinion ID: 199022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Guideline Interpretation

Text: 22 We begin, as with other questions of statutory and regulatory interpretation, with the plain language of the disputed guideline. See United States v. McMinn, 103 F.3d 216, 221 (1st Cir. 1997) (Our construction is guided by conventional interpretive principles.); see also United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 847 (6th Cir. 2000) (It was proper for the district court to take a plain language approach in its interpretation of § 3B1.4, because courts must treat the sentencing guidelines as if they were a statute, and follow the clear, unambiguous language if there is no manifestation of a contrary intent.) (opinion of Clay, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Lewis, 93 F.3d 1075, 1080 (2d Cir. 1996) (Interpretation of the Guidelines is similar to statutory construction.). 2 23 The guideline at issue in this case states: If the defendant previously was deported after a... conviction... for an aggravated felony increase 16 levels. The guideline's plain language militates in favor of the government's position. The language suggests that the relevant time is the time of deportation: deported after a... conviction, and not the time of sentencing. The guideline speaks of time, not possession or status. In other words, the guideline (and statute) might have dealt with aliens who have a previous aggravated felony conviction or are convicted felons, and then are convicted of re-entry. The guideline, however, is in the past tense, which suggests that the present status of the aggravated felony conviction is irrelevant. It is impossible to alter the historical fact that the defendant was convicted, and then deported. 24 The same is true of the statute itself, which speaks of an alien whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). By all indications, the relevant time under the statute is the moment of removal, not of sentencing. 25 This conclusion is in accord with that of the Tenth Circuit in the only reported decision to address this problem. 3 In United States v. Cisneros-Cabrera, 110 F.3d 746 (10th Cir. 1997), the court ruled that subsequent vacatur of the previous aggravated felony was irrelevant to the application of § 2L1.2(b). The court did so exclusively by resort to the plain language of § 2L1.2(b) and § 1326(b). It stated: 26 Given the clarity of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2), the district court's consideration of [defendant's] vacated state conviction to enhance his sentence was appropriate. [Defendant] does not deny he was deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony, and under § 2L1.2(b)(2), no more is required. Thus, while true most other sentence enhancement provisions consider only those convictions valid at the time of sentencing, in this case, the relevant time frame for determining whether the sentence enhancement should apply is specifically provided by statute. 27 Cisneros-Cabrera, 110 F.3d at 748. 28 Review of other statutes that depend on prior convictions supports our conclusion with respect to the language of the statute. The guidelines concerning calculation of a defendant's criminal history score contain an explicit exception for convictions subsequently vacated. Application Note 6 to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 states: Sentences resulting from convictions that (A) have been reversed or vacated because of errors of law or because of subsequently discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, or (B) have been ruled constitutionally invalid... are not to be counted. Other guidelines that provide sentence enhancements based on prior convictions explicitly incorporate by reference the above limitations. For example, Application Note 5 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, dictates that, when considering enhancement under the guideline for possession of a firearm, 'prior felony conviction(s),' are defined in § 4B1.2. 29 More importantly, the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1994) (ACCA), bars the use of [a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside...., see § 921(a)(20) (providing definitions for § 924), as does the guideline that pertains to the Act. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, Application Note 3 (cross-referencing definition of convictions set out in § 4A1.2). 30 The absence of an explicit exception for vacated convictions in § 2L1.2(b) and the statute compels a result here that is different from the result that would obtain under the ACCA or § 4A1.2. Congress (in the ACCA) and the Sentencing Commission (in § 4A1.2) have both manifested an ability to state unambiguously when vacated convictions are to be disregarded for purposes of punishment. Because the guidelines elsewhere make such an exception explicit, we are unable to read one implicitly into § 2L1.2(b). 31 Our interpretation of the statute is in accord with the interpretive method used by the Supreme Court in the analogous Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485(1994). In that case the Supreme Court considered whether the ACCA should be read to permit defendants to challenge the constitutionality of convictions used for sentencing purposes. Id. at 490. The Court answered this question in the negative, noting that related statutes explicitly permitted such challenges, but the ACCA did not. The Court found this omission deliberate and dispositive, stating: The language of [the Drug Act] shows that when Congress intended to authorize collateral attacks on prior convictions... it knew how to do so. Congress' omission of similar language in [the ACCA] indicates that it did not intend to give defendants the right to challenge the validity of prior convictions under this statute. Id. at 492. Cf. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991) ([W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.) (quoted in Custis, 511 U.S. at 492). 32 The First Circuit faced an similar interpretive question in United States v. Josleyn, 99 F.3d 1182, 1198-99 (1st Cir. 1996). In that case, the defendant argued that a guideline enhancement for abuse of a position of trust should not apply to commercial bribery cases. As support for his position, he noted that because the guidelines mandated that the enhancement could not apply to public bribery cases, they should not apply to private bribery. We rejected this position, stating: 33 The absence of an explicit provision restricting the application of the abuse-of-trust enhancement in commercial bribery cases severely undercuts the analogy urged by [the defendant]. See United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 673-74 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle in this sentencing context). Furthermore, the Sentencing Commission took pains throughout the Guidelines to specify the circumstances in which courts should not impose enhancements for abuse of trust. 34 Josleyn, 99 F.3d at 1198-99. For similar reasons, we refuse to adopt Luna's view of the instant guideline. 35 In addition, the commentary to § 2L1.2(b) implies that Luna's now-vacated conviction should still be considered. Application Note 4 states: An adjustment under subsection (b) for a prior felony conviction applies in addition to any criminal history points added for such conviction in Chapter Four, Part A.... Application Note 4 makes clear that under § 2L1.2(b), prior convictions are distinct from convictions considered under § 4A1.2. Convictions that the court may consider pursuant to § 4A1.2 are limited to those that have not been vacated; those that the court may consider under § 2L1.2(b) carry no such limitation, and are to be considered in addition. 36 Diaz argues that the instant case is controlled by our decision in United States v. Cuevas, 75 F.3d 778 (1st Cir. 1996). In Cuevas we considered the question of whether a plea of nolo contendere constituted a conviction for purposes of § 2L1.2. According to a state statute, such pleas could not be introduced in any later proceeding, provided that the defendant had successfully completed probation on the nolo plea. See id. at 780 & n.5. We held that conviction under § 2L1.2 was a matter of federal law, and that the state law did not control. See id. at 781. 37 Contrary to Luna's assertions on appeal, we did not hold that § 4A1.1-2 provides the definition for the term conviction in the re-entry guideline. We did not go that far. See Cuevas, 75 F.3d at 780-81. We described the criminal history guideline as provid[ing]... guidance, id. at 782, and instructive, if not dispositive, id. at 782 n.10. Even if we were to agree, which we do not, that Cuevas turned on application of § 4A1.1-2 to § 2L1.2, that still would not bind us in the instant case. Cuevas defined conviction but did not deal with the exclusions from the definition that are at issue in the instant case. 4