Opinion ID: 2104089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In recent years farm accident cases have come before us with increasing frequency. The problems incident thereto have been thoroughly reviewed.

Text: In Frederick v. Goff, 251 Iowa 290, 100 N.W.2d 624 plaintiff, a farm employee, was injured while filling a silo. He slipped and fell into the hopper auger and fan. He had worked with the equipment for a week. There were some worn parts that caused them to become disconnected. This happened frequently and plaintiff would put them together. Plaintiff and defendant were fully aware of the faulty equipment so the question of warning was not involved. While attempting to engage the worn parts plaintiff was injured. We said: It is a settled rule that an employer must use reasonable care to provide and maintain for his employees reasonably suitable and safe appliances, machinery and tools with which to work. (Citations) (loc. cit. 295, 100 N.W.2d loc. cit. 627) On assumption of risk, we said:    we think assumption of risk does not appear as a matter of law and it was proper to submit this issue to the jury. It is an affirmative defense and the burden to prove it rested upon defendant. (Citations) It is seldom a party who has the burden on such an issue establishes it as a matter of law.    If defendant was negligent in the respect alleged plaintiff did not assume the risk of injury therefrom by continuing in the work unless in the usual and ordinary course of his employment it was his duty to repair the equipment or remedy the defect therein, and even if such were his duty, he assumed no risk therefrom unless the danger from its use was imminent so a reasonably prudent person would not continue in the work.    (loc. cit. 296-297, 100 N.W.2d loc. cit. 628) On proximate cause we quoted with approval: Nor will the fact that some other cause operates with the defendant's negligence to produce the injury relieve the defendant if the injurious result is traceable in some material degree to his want of due care (citations.) And said, In considering the issue of proximate cause we have frequently cited the Swaim case [Swaim v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 187 Iowa 466, 174 N.W. 384] with approval. (loc. cit. 298, 100 N.W.2d loc. cit. 629) We held, loc. cit. 299, 100 N.W.2d 624 that reasonable minds could conclude that defendant's furnishing of defective equipment was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff's injury. That case dealt with faulty equipment with the danger inherent therein known to plaintiff. In the case at bar we have a claim of failure to warn as to danger, instruct as to procedure or supervise the operation. The evidence here from which plaintiff's claim must be viewed is just as strong as in Frederick and what was there said is appropriate here. In Calkins v. Sandven, 256 Iowa 682, 129 N.W.2d 1, plaintiff, a farm employee, tripped and fell. What he tripped over did not appear. As he fell his arm was caught in an opening at the rear of a wagon and injured by the moving bars or flights normally used to move the contents of the wagon. Plaintiff was experienced in farm work. He had worked for defendant about four months but had previously farmed about six years. He had seen the wagon in which he was hurt but was not familiar with the details of its operation. Plaintiff was less familiar with the machine than was his employer. His action for damages was against his employer and the manufacturer of the wagon. We repeated the well established rule that an employer must use reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe place for his employees to work and reasonably safe machinery with which to work. Loc. cit. 694 of 256 Iowa, 129 N.W.2d 1. We said, loc. cit. 695, 129 N.W.2d 1, that the duty of the employer was very similar to the duty of the manufacturer of the wagon. Citing Erickson v. Erickson, 250 Iowa 491, 498, 94 N.W.2d 728, 732 we noted that the machinery was considered part of the place to work. We said: In any event we think a jury question was presented here as to whether Sandven was negligent in failing to provide plaintiff a safe instrument with which to work and failing to warn him of the danger of using the Grain-o-vator. (Citations) loc. cit. 696 of 256 Iowa, loc. cit. 9 of 129 N.W.2d. We quoted from 35 Am.Jur., Master and Servant, section 191, as follows: `   the general tendency is to hold the employer negligent in failing to guard dangerous appliances.    Of course, if it can be shown that an injured employee was not informed of or did not appreciate the danger of the unguarded appliance, it is not to be supposed that a recovery will be denied by any court.' loc. cit. 696 of 256 Iowa, loc. cit. 9 of 129 N.W.2d. II. Defendants argue that they would not be liable for negligence of plaintiff's fellow servant. There is neither a present claim nor evidence in the record to support a charge of negligence against the fellow servant. The fact that he was originally named as a defendant and then dropped is of no significance. Contradictions, if any, in the testimony were for the jury to resolve. IV. Plaintiff called as a witness a district representative for Allis-Chalmers, the manufacturer of the equipment. He described the various types of machines and hitches and how they worked. He told the purpose of a tongue jack (jack stand). He had not seen the particular machine involved and testified from photographs. He said the hitch mechanism did not appear the same as when the machine was delivered by the factory to the dealer. He did not testify as to any increased danger. He made no comparison with other machines as to safety features. He expressed no opinion as to the cause of the accident. His testimony was explanatory of the mechanical equipment about which there was no dispute. We find no error in the admission of his testimony.