Opinion ID: 4564472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualifying Disabilities

Text: To prevail on a claim of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that she “(1) is disabled, (2) [is] otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, with or without accommodation, and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of…her disability.” Ferrari, 826 F.3d at 891. At issue in this appeal is the first element. Under this element, a plaintiff can prove a qualifying “disability” by demonstrating that she (1) is “actually disabled,” meaning the individual possesses “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual”; (2) has “a record of such an impairment”; or, (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1), (3). Harrison pursues the first and third avenues of element one—that she is “actually disabled” or that she was “regarded” by Defendants “as having such an impairment.” Id. § 12102(1), (3). The district court found Harrison’s evidence insufficient to create a jury issue under either approach. However, in doing so, the district court erroneously relied on Black v. Roadway Express, Inc., 297 F.3d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 2002), which applied a stricter standard for establishing disability that no longer governs following the 2008 amendments to the ADA. 1. “Actually Disabled” under Section 12102(1)(A). To prove that she is “actually disabled” under § 12102(1)(A), a plaintiff must show “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” The statute enumerates a non-exhaustive list of “major life activities,” which include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 9 Case No. 19-1176, Harrison v. Soave Enterprises, L.L.C. and Parts Galore, L.L.C. working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). And, importantly, in accordance with the directives offered by the Code of Federal Regulations, this court has held that “the term ‘major’ shall not be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard.” Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 853 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2)). We adopted this less-strict interpretation because, “[i]n keeping with the remedial purposes of the ADAAA, ‘[t]he definition of disability’ under the ADA ‘shall be construed in favor of broad coverage.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)). “That is because the primary concern of the ADA is ‘whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred,’ not whether an individual’s impairment is a disability.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii)). Under the applicable ADA regulations, we “determine whether a disability substantially limits major life activities” through comparison of “the person claiming a disability to ‘most people in the general population.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). “‘An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict . . . a major life activity’ to be substantially limiting.” Id. at 853–54 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). Similar to the term “major life activities,” “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” Id. at 854 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)). Indeed, a plaintiff need not show that her disability renders her unable to work, see Morrissey v. Laurel Health Care Co., 946 F.3d 292, 300 (6th Cir. 2019), and a plaintiff need not even tell her employer about her specific diagnosis. See id. Rather, it is enough that a plaintiff simply tells her employer that she has certain limitations in relation to her work “because she suffer[s] from a disability as defined by the ADA.” Id. (“[Plaintiff] told [her employer] that she could not work more than twelve hours per shift because she suffered from a disability as defined by the ADA. That was enough.”); see also Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 450 (6th 10 Case No. 19-1176, Harrison v. Soave Enterprises, L.L.C. and Parts Galore, L.L.C. Cir. 1999) (“An employer has notice of the employee’s disability when the employee tells the employer that he is disabled.” (citation omitted)); Cady v. Remington Arms Co, 665 F. App’x 413, 417 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he employee need not use the word ‘disabled,’ but the employer must know enough information about the employee’s condition to conclude that he is disabled. Relevant information could include, among other things, a diagnosis, a treatment plan, apparent severe symptoms, and physician-imposed work restrictions.” (internal citation omitted)). Therefore, framed properly in light of post-2008 ADA law, “the question before us is whether [Harrison] submitted enough evidence to show that she is substantially limited in her ability to [kneel or walk].” Morrissey, 946 F.3d at 300. And, ultimately, based on our case law that properly applies the post-2008 ADA standards for disability, we conclude that Harrison has sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). In Morrissey, for instance, we concluded that the plaintiff had submitted enough evidence to show that she was substantially limited in her ability to walk, stand, lift or bend, even with her admission that she “did not have a specific limitation on the distance she could walk, the amount of time she could stand, the amount of bending she could do, or the amount of weight she could lift.” 946 F.3d at 300. It was enough that plaintiff alleged that, “after an eight-to twelve-hour shift, she had difficulty walking, standing, lifting and bending,” and “she had so much trouble bending over that it was difficult to put on her underwear.” Id. (emphasis added). We also found significant that plaintiff’s daughter submitted an affidavit in which she stated that her mother “did not walk at all or walked with a slight hunch and a pained expression after completing a day of work.” Id. 11 Case No. 19-1176, Harrison v. Soave Enterprises, L.L.C. and Parts Galore, L.L.C. Similarly, in Hostettler, we concluded that plaintiff had sufficiently shown that her mix of postpartum depression and separation anxiety, which impeded her ability to work full-time and required her to ask for a modified work schedule from her employer, constituted a “disability” under the post-2008 ADA. 895 F.3d at 853–54. In doing so, we dismissed defendant’s contention that because plaintiff’s panic attacks were limited to several minute spans at a time, they did not substantially limit any major life activity. Id. at 854. Instead, we found the episodic nature of the disability to “make[] no difference under the ADA,” as “long as the impairment ‘would substantially limit a major life activity when active,” id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)); and in that case, the attacks substantially limited plaintiff’s ability to “care for herself, sleep, walk, or speak, among others.” Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Under the directives of our case law and based on the regulations that direct us to construct the term “substantially limits” “broadly in favor of expansive coverage,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), we conclude that Harrison has satisfied the first element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA. First, Harrison has shown that she has a “physical . . . impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Namely, Harrison presented evidence that in 2010 she suffered an injury to her right knee in the shower, resulting in a damaged meniscus and torn ACL. Thereafter, Harrison was required to have surgery on her meniscus, though she elected not to have her ACL repaired, as it would have required her to stop taking medication that she needed and her doctor informed her she could function without the surgery. The meniscus surgery required her to take two days off of work, undergo a full treatment of physical therapy, and be under the shortterm supervision from a physician. These circumstances qualify Harrison’s knee injury as a physical impairment under the ADAAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A); Barlia v. MWI Veterinary Supply, Inc., 721 F. App’x 439, 445 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Congress amended the ADA in 2008 to state 12 Case No. 19-1176, Harrison v. Soave Enterprises, L.L.C. and Parts Galore, L.L.C. that the term [disability] should be construed ‘in favor of broad coverage . . . , to the maximum extent permitted by the [ADA’s] terms.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)). Second, similar to our evaluation of the plaintiffs’ evidence in Hostettler and Morrissey, we conclude that Harrison has sufficient proof to show that her physical impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), (2)(A). Namely, Harrison testified categorically that because of her torn, unrepaired ACL, she cannot kneel to this day. Indeed, the record shows that she was unable to kneel to look under cars, so she was provided a mirror for her to undertake this task. The statute provides a non-exhaustive list of “major life activities,” including “standing, lifting, [and] bending,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), and regulations add “sitting” and “reaching” as additional examples, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). Kneeling fits comfortably within this list. Moreover, a reasonable juror could determine that the majority of the general population can kneel and does not share Harrison’s physical limitation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(v) (“The comparison of an individual’s performance of a major life activity to the performance of the same major life activity by most people in the general population usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis.”). Therefore, because Harrison’s physical impairment—her knee injury—“substantially limits one or more major life activities,” the district court erred in holding as a matter of law based on the record as it stands that Harrison was not “actually disabled” under § 12102(1)(A). There is a genuine dispute regarding whether she was “actually disabled” under § 12102(1)(A), which necessitates our reversal of the district court’s summary judgment based on this issue. 13 Case No. 19-1176, Harrison v. Soave Enterprises, L.L.C. and Parts Galore, L.L.C. 2. “Regarded As” Disabled under Section 12102(1)(C). Harrison also has sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that she has a qualifying ADA “disability” under the “regarded as having [] an impairment” by her employer prong, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C)), given Defendants’ knowledge of her knee injury. Through the 2008 amendments, Congress liberalized the “regarded as having an impairment” avenue of proving a disability under § 12102. Prior to the 2008 amendments, a plaintiff was required to show that her employer (1) “mistakenly believe[d] that [she] ha[d] a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities” or, alternatively, that the employer (2) “mistakenly believe[d] that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999); accord Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2008). Under both scenarios, it was “necessary that [an employer] entertain misperceptions about the individual;” or in other words, the employer had to “believe either” that the employee “ha[d] a substantially limiting impairment that [she] [did] not have or that [she] ha[d] a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489; accord Daugherty, 544 F.3d at 704. However, in 2008, Congress deliberately relaxed the standard “because it believed that Sutton (among other Supreme Court decisions) unduly ‘narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA,’” and thereby “eliminat[ed] protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.” Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists P.C., 942 F.3d 308, 318 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, § 2(a)(4), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008)). Accordingly, the “regarded as” provision of the ADA now states that, for an employee to make out a “regarded as” claim, the employee must establish: “that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or 14 Case No. 19-1176, Harrison v. Soave Enterprises, L.L.C. and Parts Galore, L.L.C. mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (emphasis added). There is a limitation to this provision, however: “regarded as” impairments “shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor.” Babb, 942 F.3d at 319 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (emphasis added)). Therefore, the “transitory and minor” limitation acts as an affirmative defense of which the employer bears the burden of proving. Id. Ultimately then, “to state the threshold condition of a ‘regarded as’ ADA claim, an employee need only show that [her] employer believed [she] had a ‘physical or mental impairment,’ as that term is defined in federal regulations.” Id. “The employer may then rebut this showing by pointing to objective evidence ‘that the impairment is (in the case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) both transitory and minor.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f)); see Baum v. Metro Restoration Servs., Inc., 764 F. App’x 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2019); Neely v. Benchmark Family Servs., 640 F. App’x 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2016); Bailey v. Real Time Staffing Servs., 543 F. App’x 520, 523 (6th Cir. 2013). Applying the clarified “regarded as” standard to Harrison’s case, we conclude that a genuine dispute of material fact exists with respect to Harrison’s perceived disability, and her employer’s perception of such. The record indicates that Harrison’s employers knew about her injury because: (1) when requesting the accommodation for her injury—the mirror—Harrison referenced her ACL injury to validate the request; and (2) during her firing, Murell referenced Harrison’s ACL injury. This is more than enough evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that in December 2015, Defendants genuinely believed that Harrison had a knee injury that affected her ability to kneel and work—therefore, representing a disability that we deem would qualify as a “physical impairment” under the ADA given it affected Harrison’s “musculoskeletal” 15 Case No. 19-1176, Harrison v. Soave Enterprises, L.L.C. and Parts Galore, L.L.C. system. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii). Furthermore, given that Harrison testified that she injured her knee in 2011, the five-year span between the injury and her termination suggests that the impairment was neither “minor” nor “transitory.” 29 CFR § 1630.15(f). Although Defendants highlight that (1) Harrison could perform other household tasks and (2) Harrison testified that she had no other limitations across other activities, these facts do not necessarily rebut the notion that Harrison’s employers still could have “perceived” her “as having an impairment” and fired her because of that perceived limitation. This is particularly true, given the updated standard under the ADA, which no longer requires the employer to believe the “impairment limits…a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). In light of the above, we hold, in the alternative, that Harrison has sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that she satisfied the “regarded as” avenue of a qualifying ADA disability.