Opinion ID: 152880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Richards Properly Convicted Of Obstruction Of Justice?

Text: Richards claims that he was erroneously convicted of obstruction of justice because 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), [5] the statute under which he was charged, only covers the destruction of physical evidence, and not the charged conduct of providing false oral responses under oral questioning from CA's outside counsel and the SEC. [6] Richards Br. 18. The government argues that Richards's challenge is barred by his guilty plea, and that, in any event, § 1512(c)(2) covers all obstructive conduct, not just destruction of physical evidence. While the government may be correct that § 1512(c)(2) applies to testimonial evidence, we need not reach this issue of first impression in this circuit, because we find that any defect asserted is non-jurisdictional and was waived by the guilty plea. A plea of guilty waive[s] any and all non-jurisdictional defects in the indictment. United States v. Moloney, 287 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir.2002). To challenge the court's jurisdiction, the defendant who has pleaded guilty must establish that the face of the indictment discloses that the count or counts to which he pleaded guilty failed to charge a federal offense. Hayle v. United States, 815 F.2d 879, 881 (2d Cir.1987). Thus, to attack a conviction post-plea, a defendant must establish that the district court lacked the power to entertain the prosecution. Id. at 882; see United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (defining jurisdiction as the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case). Richards claims that he has met this burden by showing that § 1512(c)(2) does not proscribe false testimony, thereby establishing that he did not violate a federal statute. However, regardless of whether Richards's false testimony violated § 1512(c)(2), it plainly violated § 1503(a), and the indictment charges at least that offense. Because the indictment created federal jurisdiction under § 1503(a), Richards's claim has no jurisdictional significance and thus is waived by his guilty plea. Section 1503(a) provides, in relevant part, that [w]hoever corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice is guilty of a criminal violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). In United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995), the Supreme Court interpreted this subsection as a catchall intended to prohibit all obstructive behavior. See id. (referring to subdivision four of § 1503(a) as far more general in scope than the remainder of the subsection). Courts in this circuit have likewise given § 1503's omnibus clause a generally non-restrictive reading. See, e.g., United States v. Rosner, 352 F.Supp. 915, 919 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (noting that the omnibus clause embraces the widest variety of conduct that impedes the judicial process); see also United States v. Solow, 138 F.Supp. 812, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (characterizing the omnibus provision as all-embracing). Other circuits' readings of § 1503's omnibus clause have been as broad as, or even broader than, the reading in this circuit. [7] However, § 1503(a) only prohibits false testimony that has a direct nexus to an official government proceeding. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600, 115 S.Ct. 2357. In endorsing a nexus test, the Supreme Court stated that [t]he action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court's or grand jury's authority.... [T]he act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings. In other words, the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice.... [I]f the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct. Id. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The nexus limitation is best understood as an articulation of the proof of wrongful intent that will satisfy the mens rea requirement of `corruptly' obstructing or endeavoring to obstruct. United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 170 (2d Cir.2006). Thus, statements made to investigating agents who might or might not testify before a grand jury are insufficient to violate § 1503(a), because false testimony given in anticipation of a purely hypothetical judicial proceeding is not covered by § 1503(a). See United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 87-88 (2d Cir.2004); see also United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 109 (2d Cir.2002). Nevertheless, a defendant does not need to know with certainty that his conduct would affect judicial proceedings, nor does his conduct need to actually obstruct justice. Instead, the defendant's conduct must only have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 1503(a) applies where a defendant inten[ds] to obstruct justice but is foiled in some way. Id. at 601-02, 115 S.Ct. 2357. Here, Richards's conduct easily falls within the ambit of § 1503(a). Richards lied to the SEC in an attempt to impede the SEC's ongoing investigation, which Richards knew was not simply an agency fishing expedition or an ancillary proceeding that might or might not result in criminal proceedings. Id. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. Richards concedes that he knew that criminal proceedings were not merely possible when he made his false statements, but that the government predicted that criminal charges would be brought against him prior to his SEC interview. See Richards Br. 10; see also Post-Argument Letter from Stephen Richards to the Court, dated Sept. 26, 2008 (Richards Letter), at 1 (Richards testified ... at the [USAO] under the ... belief that admitting knowledge of the 35 Day Month would incriminate him in securities fraud.). Richards thus plainly entertained ... expectations during his interview at the USAO that his false statements to the SEC would impede impending criminal proceedings brought against him. Schwarz, 283 F.3d at 109; see United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir.1998) (finding nexus to exist where defendant's conduct, which pre-date[d] the empaneling of the grand jury,... corruptly endeavored to obstruct the due administration of justice). [8] [I]t is clear that if the representations made by Richards had been believed, the grand jury would have been thrown completely off the trail that it was pursuing with respect to Richards. United States v. Jespersen, 65 F.3d 993, 1001 (2d Cir. 1995). Therefore, there was a sufficiently close relationship in time, causation, [and] logic between Richards's conduct and likely judicial proceedings to satisfy § 1503(a)'s nexus requirement. United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the indictment fully apprised Richards of the elements of his offense under § 1503(a). Specifically, the indictment stated that Richards well knew and believed that certain of the statements he made during the interviews were false and that he otherwise concealed during the interviews information which he knew to be material to the Government Investigations. Richards further well knew, and in fact intended, that his false statements and concealment of material information would have the effect of obstructing and impeding the Government Investigations. As the government correctly notes, [t]he citation of a statutory section number ... is not a part of the offense, and ... an allegedly erroneous statutory citation is not a jurisdictional defect. Gov't Br. 11; see Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(3) (Unless the defendant was misled and thereby prejudiced, neither an error in a citation nor a citation's omission is a ground ... to reverse a conviction.). The failure of the indictment to specify § 1503(a), as opposed to § 1512(c)(2), is therefore not grounds for vacating Richards's guilty plea. [9] Richards's remaining arguments, the government also correctly notes, are mere corollaries of [his] ... claim that [he] pleaded to a `non-offense.' Gov't Br. 13-14. For example, Richards argues that his guilty plea should be vacated because he was misinformed of the elements of [his] crime, since, according to Richards, § 1512(c)(2) does not reach testimonial evidence. Richards Br. 19 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998)). But Richards's argument rests on the flawed premise that the indictment charged him with a nonoffense. That is not the case here; at most, the charge should have been brought under § 1503(a) instead of § 1512(c)(2), and the indictment fully stated the elements of an offense under that section. Vacating Richards's plea is therefore unnecessary, as Richards does not stand[] convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (internal quotation marks omitted). In any event, because there was no jurisdictional defect in Richards's obstruction charge, his guilty plea waived any ancillary claims based on that charge.