Opinion ID: 6534236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Obtaining Property by False Pretenses-Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: [¶21] Having reaffirmed our interpretation of obtain to include both title to and possession of the victim's property[,] Bohling , ¶ 31, 388 P.3d at 510 , we next consider whether sufficient evidence supports Mr. Haskell's conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses. To review insufficient evidence claims, we must accept as true the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it[,] and we cannot consider conflicting evidence presented by a defendant. Bohling , ¶ 33, 388 P.3d at 510 (citing Sweets , ¶ 14, 307 P.3d at 865 ). Also, [w]e do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Sweets , ¶ 14, 307 P.3d at 865 ). [¶22] The State argued at trial that Mr. Haskell was personally obligated to pay the companies for the items he ordered prior to taking office and he therefore received the county's property when the county paid for the items and relieved him of the responsibility of paying. In its appellate brief, the State concedes that, if we apply Bohling , the conviction should be reversed because no property or money passed from the county to Mr. Haskell. [¶23] Our review of the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the State, confirms it does not establish Mr. Haskell obtained title to county property. The State's theory of how Mr. Haskell obtained Sublette County's property is like the prosecution's arguments in Bohling , wherein the defendant did not personally pay for the property at issue. See Bohling , ¶ 40, 388 P.3d at 512 . Instead, he either used a county credit card or charged purchases to an account the county had with a vendor. Id. Addressing the State's argument that sufficient evidence supported Mr. Bohling's false pretenses convictions because the county parted with its money for Bohling's benefit, we concluded: First, there is no evidence that the county gave Bohling any money with the expectation of never getting it back from him. This is not a situation where Bohling personally paid for the items and the county then gave him money as reimbursement. There is no plausible way Bohling could have obtained title to it under the facts of this case. Second, we question how the evidence could possibly have shown that Bohling obtained possession of the money in question. While there is no dispute that he obtained possession of the cameras and other equipment, the record does not reveal any instance where he obtained possession of any county money which paid for these items. Lastly, assuming arguendo that the county had given Bohling money for the specific items purchased, [i]t is generally held that where the victim hands money to the wrongdoer with the understanding that the latter is to spend it only for a particular purpose (thus creating an agency or trust, it would seem) title does not pass to the wrongdoer-he has only a power to pass title by spending it for the specified purpose. [3 Wayne R. LaFave, Subst. Crim. L. § 19.7(d)(2) (2d ed., Oct. 2016 update) ]; see Reid v. Com ., 65 Va.App. 745 , 781 S.E.2d 373 , 376 (2016). Id. ¶¶ 41-43, 388 P.3d at 512-13 . Mr. Haskell's conviction suffers from the same lack of evidence. [¶24] Mr. Haskell received no reimbursement because he did not personally pay for the items he ordered. The county paid the vendors directly for the orders. If the county had provided Mr. Haskell with money to pay for the items, Mr. Haskell's authority would have been to spend the money for those items, rather than keeping and holding title to the money himself. See Bohling , ¶ 43, 388 P.3d at 513 . There is no evidence the county transferred, or intended to transfer, ownership of property or money to Mr. Haskell  based on his misrepresentations. The evidence is therefore insufficient to satisfy all elements of the offense and the jury could not have reasonably concluded the State had proven the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 See id. ¶¶ 40-44, 388 P.3d at 512-13 . The jury's verdict on Mr. Haskell's conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses cannot stand and Mr. Haskell is entitled to the entry of a judgment of acquittal. See Ken v. State , 2011 WY 167 , ¶ 17, 267 P.3d 567 , 572 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Tanner v. State , 2002 WY 170 , ¶ 17, 57 P.3d 1242 , 1247 (Wyo. 2002) ; Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1 , 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) ) (The Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once a reviewing court has found the evidence presented in the first trial legally insufficient to support the conviction. The only 'just' remedy available upon such a finding is an order directing entry of a judgment of acquittal.) Therefore, we reverse Mr. Haskell's conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses and remand it with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on that conviction. 6