Opinion ID: 195655
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court's Failure to Define Reasonable Doubt

Text: Appellants Flynn, Kenney, and Neal argue that the court's jury instructions, which failed to define the term reasonable doubt and used the phrase by medium of admissible evidence,11 violated their due-process rights to a fair trial and undermined confidence that their convictions rested upon proof comporting with the constitutional minimum. This Court has clearly held that an instruction which 11 The district court judge used this phrase in the following context: The law in the United States of America presumes each defendant to be innocent of crime, and this presumption of innocence can be overcome only when the government, by medium of admissible evidence, satisfies its burden of convincing the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of each defendant as to every element of the offense with which that defendant has been charged. -24- uses the words reasonable doubt without further definition adequately apprises the jury of the proper burden of proof, so long as the phrase is not buried as an aside. United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 646 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988). This Court is satisfied that the instructions rendered in this case fully satisfy constitutional requirements and comply with Olmstead.12 The judge reiterated the 12 In addition to the instructions listed in n.11, supra, the court further instructed the jury as follows: Moreover, the law never imposes upon a defendant the burden or duty of testifying or producing any evidence, so a reasonable doubt may arise not only from the evidence produced but also from a lack of evidence. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt as to each defendant every essential element of the offense with which that defendant is charged. Each defendant has the right to rely upon the failure of the prosecution to establish such proof, and each defendant may also rely upon evidence brought out on cross-examination of witnesses presented by the prosecution. The court then concluded its instructions as follows: To sum up then, you should treat each charge made with respect to each defendant separately and give to each of such charges the same careful and thorough consideration you would wish to have given to each of you were you charged with the offenses set forth in this indictment. As I have indicated to you, the burden in each instance which is placed upon the government is to prove each element of the offenses with which each defendant is charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and in the event the government fails to sustain its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to any essential element of any offense charged -25- government's burden of proof a number of times; explained that the government must satisfy this burden with respect to each element of the offense with which each defendant is charged; and told the jurors to consider the evidence separately and impartially against each defendant. See n.12, supra. When read in context, the phrase by medium of admissible evidence would be interpreted by a reasonable juror to mean that the government must satisfy its burden of proof through admissible evidence.13 against each defendant, it has failed in its burden of proof as to each defendant and that defendant is to be acquitted. . . . So, if any reasonable doubt remains in your minds as to the guilt of any defendant after impartial consideration of all of the evidence with respect to such defendant, it is your duty to find that defendant not guilty. You should analyze what the evidence in the case shows with respect to each element of each offense charged against each defendant and determine the issue as to whether the government has sustained its burden of proof with respect to each such element. 13 The first definition of medium found in Webster's dictionary is something in a middle position or a middle condition or degree. The second definition is a means of effecting or conveying something. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987). Appellants argue that the trial court's instructions led jurors to interpret medium along the lines of the first definition. We note that during the Rule 30 sidebar regarding objections to the instructions, Appellants did not request that the district court clarify the sense in which it used the word medium. In addition, we find that a reasonable juror would have interpreted medium in accordance with the second definition where the judge used beyond a reasonable doubt in the same sentence and made clear that the latter standard represented the Government's burden of proof: this presumption of innocence can be -26- Appellants ask the Court to reconsider its holding in Olmstead in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. The opinions cited by Appellants, however, do nothing more than provide support for Olmstead. The cases all involve judicial attempts to define reasonable doubt and recognize that attempts to imbue the phrase with exact definition are fraught with pitfalls. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994)(holding that instructions, taken as a whole, correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt despite the use of such terms as moral evidence, moral certainty, and substantial doubt); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993)(holding that a constitutionally deficient instruction defining reasonable doubt cannot be harmless error); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990)(holding that a defendant's due-process rights were violated where a judge instructed jurors that reasonable doubt was equivalent to a grave uncertainty and an actual substantial doubt and that jurors could convict if morally certain of a defendant's guilt). In Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. at 1248, Justice O'Connor noted that the court did not condone the use of such terms as moral certainty in defining reasonable doubt but went on to find that the instructions placed the terms in a context overcome only when the government, by medium of admissible evidence, satisfies its burden of convincing the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of each defendant as to every element of the offense with which that defendant has been charged. -27- correctly conveying the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt. She also noted that: [T]he Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course (citation omitted). Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, (citation omitted), the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof (citation omitted). Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243. Because we find that nothing in the Supreme Court cases cited by Appellants brings into question the holding in the Olmstead case, we affirm the district court's instructions. B. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Guilty Verdicts of Flynn and Kenney on Counts Involving the Dress Barn Robbery Appellants Flynn and Kenney challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their guilty verdicts on Counts 10, 11, and 22, involving the robbery of a Dress Barn employee while she attempted to deposit about $763 into a night deposit box. Counts 10 and 11 alleged that Flynn and Kenney conspired and interfered with commerce by threats or violence in committing the Dress Barn robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Count 22 involved the use and carriage of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). In reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the -28- Government, deferring to the jury's verdict if the evidence can support varying interpretations, at least one of which is consistent with the defendant's guilt. United States v. Browne, 891 F.2d 389, 393 (1st Cir. 1989). Viewed in this light, the evidence must be of such a quantum that a reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but the evidence need not compel such a finding. Id. As the basis for their challenge, Appellants point primarily to inconsistencies in identification testimony between the bank employee and co-conspirator Thomas McQueeny. The bank employee testified that the robber was wearing a white styrofoam woodworker's mask that stood out from his face and that he was wearing a Patagonia jacket and a pair of jeans. McQueeney, on the other hand, indicated that Kenney was wearing a white painter's mask made of cloth and a blue runner's suit.14 Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the identification testimony supports the jury's guilty verdict. 14 The remaining evidence consisted of additional testimony by McQueeny who stated that he and Flynn watched Kenney try on a white cloth painter's mask and that, at Flynn's request, he dropped Kenney off near First National Bank on the night of the robbery carrying a bag with the mask, the gun, and the gloves. He also testified about an argument the next morning during which Flynn scolded Kenney for robbing women with only $600. The employee was unable to identify Kenney but was able to testify to his approximate height and age. She also testified that he carried a handgun similar to the semi-automatic admitted by the Government as Exhibit 42 and that the stolen proceeds belonged to a business involved in interstate commerce. Co-conspirator Brian Raineri testified, indicating that he had discussions with Flynn on how to rob night depositories, and co-conspirator Richard Ferguson testified that Kenney later admitted to robbing a couple of night depositories. -29- McQueeney indicated that he dropped Kenney off with a white painter's mask and a gun near the scene of the robbery; the employee testified that her assailant was wearing a white carpenter's mask and carrying a gun similar to Government Exhibit 42. McQueeney also supplied evidence of conspiracy, testifying that Flynn watched as Kenney tried on the mask, directed McQueeney to drop Kenney off near First National Bank, and argued with Kenney the following morning for targeting women with only $600. Kenney later admitted to co-conspirator Ferguson that he robbed some night depositories. While the evidence may not compel guilty verdicts, this Court finds that it is of a sufficient quantum that a reasonable trier of fact could find Appellants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the counts involving the Dress Barn robbery. Hence, the Court affirms Flynn's and Kenney's convictions on Counts 10, 11, and 22. C. The Court's Denial of Flynn's and Kenney's Motions to Set Aside Verdicts and to Grant New Trial Appellants Flynn and Kenney argue that the district court abused its discretion by denying their motions to set aside verdicts and to grant a new trial, arguing that joinder of charges against them resulted in prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 14.15 Appellants argue that joinder was initially 15 Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 provides in relevant part: If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election of separate trials of -30- proper but became prejudicial when the district court dismissed the RICO counts at the close of the Government's case for failure to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. Assuming that initial joinder was proper under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b),16 the district court has considerable latitude in treating motions based on prejudicial joinder under Rule 14, and its resolution of severance questions will be overturned only if that wide discretion is plainly abused. United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 308 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 986 (1992); see also United States v. McLaughlin, 957 F.2d 12, 18 counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires . . . . 16 Because Appellants do not argue that initial joinder was improper and did not move for severance of offenses or defendants before trial, their appeal does not implicate Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). See Appellant Kenney's Brief at 27 (stating that joinder in the present case was proper at the commencement of trial). Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b) provides: Joinder of Defendants. Two or more Joinder of Defendants. defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. The Court will note only that initial joinder is generally held to be proper where, as here, the indictment includes RICO counts that link all defendants to the conspiracy, United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990), and [embrace] all of the acts and transactions upon which the other . . . counts [are] based. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 245 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990)(quoting United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829, 833 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981)). -31- (1st Cir. 1992)(We review a trial court's denial of a severance motion for abuse of discretion and reverse only if denial deprived defendant of a fair trial, resulting in a miscarriage of justice). When severance has been refused, appellants shoulder the burden of making a strong showing of prejudice that the joinder of offenses or defendants served to deprive them of a fair trial. Id; Natanel, 938 F.2d at 308 (citing United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1985)). Appellants argue that prejudice resulted because the jury was exposed to certain evidence that would otherwise have been inadmissible against them without the RICO counts. They specifically point to testimony by officials of the New Hampshire State Police who observed them on numerous occasions surveilling armored trucks in preparation for the First N.H. robbery. Appellants argue that this testimony would not have been admitted but for the RICO counts and that it prejudiced the jury in considering the remaining counts against them. The admissibility of the surveillance testimony, however, was not limited to the RICO counts, as Appellants argue, but was relevant to Counts 3, 4, 5, 16, 17, 18, and 19, involving conspiracy to commit bank robbery and other bank robbery charges. Appellants also give no clear indication, other than conclusory statements, of how this surveillance testimony was so material and significant as to make a prejudicial finding likely on other unrelated counts. Appellants make a more general spillover argument, -32- asserting that evidence admitted at trial relating to the whole series of robberies linked by the RICO counts made it impossible for the jury to consider each defendant and each offense separately. There is always some prejudice in any trial where more than one offense or offender are tried together -- but such 'garden variety' prejudice, in and of itself, will not suffice. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir. 1990). Here, the district court sought to minimize the possibility of prejudice by giving limiting instructions in the course of trial and instructing the jury at the beginning and end of the closing charge to consider the evidence against each defendant separately with respect to each count of the indictment. See nn. 11 & 12 supra. That the jury was able to follow these instructions is demonstrated by its selective verdict,17 which provides reasonably good assurance that no injurious spillover effect occurred. Natanel, 938 F.2d at 308. The Court also notes that evidence at trial was presented in a compartmentalized fashion to assist the jury in distinguishing between the various crimes and defendants; i.e., the first fifteen days of trial covered the First N.H. robbery while successive days treated each of the other predicate acts in turn. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court affirms the 17 The jury found Appellants not guilty on Counts 8, 9 and 21, involving the night deposit robbery of a restaurant employee, but guilty on counts involving the five remaining robberies. Finding Appellant Neal guilty of money laundering and accessory after the fact, the jury found him not guilty of conspiracy to rob First N.H. -33- trial court's denial of Appellants' motions to set aside the verdicts and for a new trial.