Opinion ID: 3013536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relevant Statutes and Principles

Text: The Jones Act provides for recovery by a seaman or woman for personal injuries suffered in the course of his or her employment in an action at law; it extends to seamen and women the same rights accorded railway workers under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”). See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 456 (1994). Though a plaintiff alleging claims under the Jones Act must prove the traditional elements of negligence – duty, breach, notice, and causation – the standard of proof for 1 Also filed were claims for maintenance and cure, and punitive damages, both of which were resolved by the District Court. 3 causation when asserting negligence under the Jones Act is relaxed, sometimes termed “featherweight.” Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co. S.A.G., 4 F.3d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 1993). “Causation is satisfied if ‘the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury.’” Wilburn v. Maritrans GP, Inc., 139 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957)). Because, “[i]n a Jones Act case, a trial court can direct a jury verdict against a plaintiff only in those extremely rare instances where there is a zero probability either of employer negligence or that any such negligence contributed to the injury of an employee,” Southard v. Independent Towing Co., 453 F.2d 1115, 1118 (3d Cir. 1971) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation omitted), this Court has stressed that cases involving injuries to seamen or women are almost always appropriate for the jury. “Issues of negligence in a Jones Act suit are questions for the jury to determine, and the jury plays a preeminent role in Jones Act cases.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). As to seaworthiness, the owner of a vessel has an absolute and non-delegable duty to provide a seaworthy ship. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). The Supreme Court has articulated the standard as “not perfection, but reasonable fitness.” Mitchell v. Trawler-Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). A claim of unseaworthiness targets a condition – how that condition came into 4 being, whether through negligent behavior or otherwise, is irrelevant to liability.2 “It makes no difference to the shipowner’s liability that he lacked complete control over the instrumentality causing injury, or that he had neither actual nor constructive notice of the unseaworthy condition.” Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping, Inc., 562 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). In this way, the doctrine is a species of liability without fault. Unlike the Jones Act, however, the doctrine of unseaworthiness imposes more than a “featherweight” standard of proof of causation. A plaintiff must “show not only that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury to him, but also that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.” 1B-III Benedict on Admiralty § 28 (2004). As a general rule, contributory negligence by a seaman or woman will not defeat one’s right to recovery; “[c]ontributory negligence is not an absolute defense under maritime law, but rather it is a basis to apportion damage,” American President Lines, Ltd. v. Welch, 377 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 940 (1968). A grant of summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing the grant of 2 Unseaworthy conditions are not limited to physical defects; a method of stowage or an unfit crew can give rise to liability. 5 summary judgment, we must affirm if the record evidence submitted by the non-movant “is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).