Opinion ID: 2452899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Did the City Council Act Purposely?

Text: Only once in 13 meetings was the prospect of a lease of the golf course to the city as part of a public financing scheme even mentioned. The council cited section 610.021(2) without, apparently, any advice of counsel or any serious attempt to justify the closure under the statutory exception. The transactions discussed in the counsel's closed sessions are precisely the kind that need the disinfecting effects of sunshine mandated by the open meetings law. After the city's voters rejected a bond issue for a golf course, private developers proposed the use of the city's bonding authority in the establishment of a Fulton Golf Course Neighborhood Improvement District to finance the development. A lease of the golf course to the city, where the course was to be operated by the private parties for their own benefit, was simply part of the financing arrangement. The contemplated lease of the golf course to the city in no way qualified for the statutory exception: there was no showing, as the trial court found, that public knowledge would adversely affect the price of the real estate. Most of the closed council meetings did not involve lease, purchase, or sale of real estate by the city of Fulton, but by a private party. The part that affected the city and concerned plaintiff Spradlin was the proposal to use public bonds for financing the golf course development. The obvious fear is not that the lease price will be affected by public knowledge of the impending deal, but that public exposure would enrage the citizenry and thus kill the deal. That is precisely why we have a sunshine law. I agree with the principal opinion that purposely, when used in its ordinary and usual sense, means more than a mere intent to engage in conduct that violates the open meetings law, and that a member of a public governmental body must exhibit a `conscious design, intent or plan' to violate the Act and do so `with awareness of the probable consequences.' (principal opinion, p. 14). (Emphasis added.) The trial court thus must judge defendants' purpose by what they did, not by a pure heart, empty head standard of what they said. To invoke the exception to the open meetings law for a lease, the statute states the requirement as follows: Except to the extent disclosure is otherwise required by law, a public governmental body is authorized to close meetings, records and votes, to the extent they relate to the following: . . . . (2) Leasing, purchase or sale of real estate by a public governmental body where public knowledge of the transaction might adversely affect the legal consideration therefor. (Emphasis added.) The statute unequivocally requires not just that the discussion relate to the leasing of real estate, but also that public knowledge of the transaction might adversely affect the legal consideration. The lease contemplated by this transaction is a lease to the city by the private developers of a golf course being developed with public bond financing. There appears to be no way public disclosure could affect the legal consideration for the lease; the lease was part of the overall financing deal involving the proposed lessor and lessee. The parties to the proposed lease were in the deal together behind closed doors. There was no market for the lease to be affected by public disclosure, for there would only be one eligible lessor, the developer, and one eligible lessee, the city. [3] The inapplicability of the statutory exception seems to be obvious. In Kansas City Star Company v. Shields, 771 S.W.2d 101 (Mo.App.1989) the court upheld a finding of a purposeful violation of the statute where there was no statutory exemption applicable, and in Charlier v. Corum, 794 S.W.2d 676 (Mo.App.1990), the court upheld a finding of purposeful conduct even though the defendant had obtained legal advice that his office was not a public governmental body. See also, Deaton v. Kidd, 932 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Mo.App.1996) (a good faith belief does not negate liability for a purposeful violation). Even if the city council in this case had obtained legal advice to justify its conduct, it would be difficult not to find that its members acted purposely, because the statute is so clear: the section requires showing that public disclosure could adversely affect price, and I can find no evidence that legal consideration for the lease would be affected. However, the determination of whether defendants' conduct is purposeful is a question of fact that should be left to the trial judge upon remand, guided by the principles set forth here.