Opinion ID: 4535107
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Evidence and Corroboration

Text: We turn to the question of whether substantial evidence supported the IJ’s and BIA’s determination that Guzman inadequately explained why he failed to corroborate his pastpersecution claim involving his stepfather. Section 1229a(c)(4)(B) as amended by the REAL ID Act provides: Where the immigration judge [in removal proceedings] determines that the applicant should provide evidence [that] corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant demonstrates that the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (sustaining burden of proof for asylum and withholding claims). “A reviewing court may not reverse an agency finding as to the availability of corroborating evidence unless the court finds a reasonable trier of fact would be compelled to conclude that such evidence is unavailable.” Fisenko v. Holder, 336 F. App’x 504, 510 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)). Even when the immigration judge finds an applicant’s testimony to be credible, as here, if “the agency determines that an applicant should provide corroborating evidence, . . . corroborating evidence is required unless the applicant cannot reasonably obtain that evidence.” Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 367 (6th Cir. 2010). The issue in this case, therefore, is not whether the IJ sufficiently explained why corroborative evidence was important. With respect to the issue of Guzman accurately recalling the extent of his stepfather’s connections to governmental authorities, for example, we do not question the IJ’s conclusion that “the Court would not expect a 14-year-old memory would be such that he would know exactly what his step-father did, was involved in or how he was affiliated with the village or town.” A.R. at 45 (IJ Decision at 4). Our review is limited to the question of whether the IJ’s and BIA’s determination that Guzman failed to demonstrate why corroborative evidence was unavailable was supported by substantial evidence. The INA sets forth in unmistakable terms how we review this question: “No court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence, as described in section 1158(b)(1)(B), 1229a(c)(4)(B), or 1231(b)(3)(C) of this title, unless the No. 19-3417 Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr Page 15 court finds, pursuant to subsection (b)(4)(B), that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). Conversely, if we determine that this is “a case where the applicant’s testimony is the only evidence available,” then “the immigration judge’s contrary conclusion”—requiring the applicant to adduce corroborative evidence in order to satisfy his burden of proof—“must be reversed.” Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 368 n.4. As the pages of the Federal Appendix illustrate, we are often confronted with cases in which applicants for relief from removal simply provided no reason to the IJ or BIA for their failure to adduce probative testimony or affidavits from relevant witnesses. See, e.g., Dragnea v. Lynch, 624 F. App’x 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Dragnea gives no reason for [three relevant witnesses’] unavailability. He therefore fails to compel a conclusion that corroborating evidence was unavailable.”); Brushtulli v. Holder, 594 F. App’x 282, 287 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Brushtulli has given no reason why he did not or could not obtain corroborating statements from his uncles or other relatives who were aware of the incidents that occurred when he was a child.”); Yanyun Ni v. Holder, 556 F. App’x 466, 470 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Statements from either or both of these individuals could have substantiated many of Ni’s claims, yet no explanation was offered as to why they were unavailable to provide evidence.”); Ying Chen v. Holder, 580 F. App’x 332, 341 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Chen never provided the IJ or the BIA with any explanation as to why these materials, or other corroborating evidence, were not provided.”); Gjoni v. Gonzales, 168 F. App’x 54, 59 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]t the removal hearing, Gjoni did not provide any reasonable explanation for the absence of this corroborating evidence. Gjoni merely stated that he believed that providing the testimony of his family members to corroborate his account of the persecution he suffered would not further his claim and thus he did not call his brothers as witnesses at the hearing or provide affidavits from his parents or sister.”). This is no such case. As to the only two individuals who, according to the record, had knowledge of the stepfather’s abuse, Guzman provided compelling explanations for their failure to corroborate his testimony. With respect to his sister, Guzman explained that “there’s really no communication” where she lives in Mexico, and she has to walk between 30 minutes to one hour in order to pay for a phone. A.R. at 142 (Hr’g Tr. at 62). Because of this, he only spoke to her No. 19-3417 Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr Page 16 “maybe once a year.” Id. Based on this testimony, which the IJ found credible—and which offered far more by way of explanation than “stating only that he had lost contact with [his sister],” see Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 977 (6th Cir. 2009)—Guzman cannot have been reasonably expected to have solicited and procured an affidavit from his sister.7 This stands in stark contrast to cases in which applicants for relief fail to provide corroboration from relevant witnesses with whom they are in frequent—or at least regular or reliable—contact. See, e.g., Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 363 (“The immigration judge specifically noted the lack of correspondence from his father and siblings in Honduras, with whom he is in regular contact, or testimony from his mother, with whom he lives.”) (emphasis added); Yanyun Ni, 556 F. App’x at 470 (“In her testimony, Ni said she speaks often with her husband in China and also remains in contact with her mother-in-law, with whom her husband and children live.”); Gjoni, 168 F. App’x at 59 (“Affidavits from Gjoni’s immediate family members would not have been difficult for Gjoni to obtain. At the time of the hearing, Gjoni’s brothers lived with him in Detroit. Thus, it would have been easy for any one of the three of Gjoni’s brothers to be called as a witness.”); Kassem v. Holder, 438 F. App’x 378, 381 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Kassem could have corroborated the threats against him by obtaining a statement from his wife, with whom he was in regular contact.”). 7 The dissent suggests that, under § 1252(b)(4), as a precondition to proving that corroborative evidence is unavailable, an applicant must, without exception, “try to obtain corroboration.” Dissent Op. at 36. Yet such a requirement is absent from both § 1252(b)(4) and § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), and for good reason: It may be abundantly clear—as it is in this case—that securing documentary evidence is impossible, that it does not exist, see Toure v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 443 F.3d 310, 325 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006), or simply that the evidence is not “reasonably available,” without a track record of the applicant carrying out futile attempts to secure it. See Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 500–01 (7th Cir. 2005) (faulting the IJ for ignoring objective country conditions that rendered certain court documents not reasonably available). Our precedent is not to the contrary. It is true that in opinions upholding IJ determinations, we have occasionally noted applicants’ apparent failures to attempt to secure certain pieces of corroborative evidence. See, e.g., Lin, 565 F.3d at 977 (denying petition of an applicant who “stat[ed] only that he had lost contact with [a potential corroborator]” and did not attempt to locate him). But especially in the immigration context, where “each case is fact dependent,” Adhiyappa v. I.N.S., 58 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995), an important or even case-dispositive factor in one scenario may be less significant in another. Indeed, never in a published opinion have we held that “reasonable adjudicator[s] would be compelled” to disagree with the IJ’s finding on corroboration only when the applicant puts forth evidence that he attempted to secure the evidence in question. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). There have been—and will be—cases in which the lack of a demonstrated attempt to secure corroborative evidence weighs heavily against the applicant, but this is not one of them, as our discussion illustrates. Guzman’s credible testimony made clear the unavailability of corroborative evidence from his sister (and mother, as discussed below), even if he did not testify that he attempted to secure it. No. 19-3417 Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr Page 17 Other cases in this circuit involving complications in contact between an applicant and a potential corroborating witness do not present the heightened obstacles evident in this case. For instance, the applicant in Dorosh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2004), explained that she had not provided corroboration from her mother in part because “her mother had no telephone and had to go to the post office to call her.” Id. at 383. We upheld the BIA’s decision rejecting this explanation because there was no indication that this hindrance had severely affected the applicant’s ability to communicate with her mother. Indeed, we noted that “[w]hile contact may not have been convenient, regular, or private, it was sufficient to have allowed Petitioner to obtain a previous letter from her mother in which her mother documented her own mistreatment.” Id.; see also Fisenko, 336 F. App’x at 512 (applicant who “testified [that] he feared for his family” failed to “explain why he feared that they would be harmed for statements made in private communications sent to him”); Munoz-Cano v. Sessions, 690 F. App’x 407, 410 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Munoz-Cano submitted a note demanding 600,000 quetzals that his father mailed him but failed to provide a letter from his father explaining how or when the note was received. His father’s ability to send the note undercuts Munoz-Cano’s explanation for the failure to send a letter.”). There is simply no evidence in the record—let alone substantial evidence—that Guzman and his sister were in the type of contact that would make corroboration from her “reasonably available.” Lin, 565 F.3d at 978. We are therefore compelled to conclude that the IJ’s conclusion that Guzman could have received corroborative evidence from his sister because “he was still in contact with [her]” is not supported by substantial evidence. A.R. at 45 (IJ Decision at 4). With respect to Guzman’s mother, the IJ’s decision makes no mention of the principal reason offered by Guzman for why he did not provide a letter from her: She is unable to write. Id. Nor does the decision make note of Guzman’s testimony that (a) his mother, like his stepfather, subjected him to abuse, and that (b) his mother was herself the victim of physical abuse by his stepfather.8 The IJ simply concluded that “he’s in contact with his mother” and 8 The dissent would have us ignore Guzman’s credible testimony that his mother both abused him and has suffered abuse at the hands of his stepfather because Guzman has not explicitly linked these facts to his explanation for lacking an affidavit from his mother. Dissent Op. at 38. We reject this impoverished conception of judicial review. See Nat’l Air Carrier Ass’n v. C. A. B., 436 F.2d 185, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“[W]e point out that judicial review is conducted on the basis of the record as a whole, so that rather conclusory findings can frequently be No. 19-3417 Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr Page 18 faulted Guzman for failing to provide corroboration from her. Id. It is true that Guzman testified that he talks to his mother, who still resides in Mexico with Guzman’s stepfather, and that he had last spoken to her two weeks prior to the hearing. Id. at 127 (Hr’g Tr. at 47). Yet the decisions of the IJ and BIA do not explain how an applicant claiming past abuse can be “reasonably expected,” Abdurakhmanov, 735 F.3d at 347, to submit an affidavit from a partially illiterate individual who has both suffered and inflicted the same abuse about which the applicant credibly testifies. See Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 289 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting the BIA’s conclusion that documentary evidence was “easily accessible” to an applicant, given his “functional illiteracy”). When we have upheld determinations of the IJ and BIA that an individual’s illiteracy was not a bar to providing a corroborative affidavit, see Dissent Op. at 37 (citing cases), we have relied on the affiant’s ability to have their statements transcribed and conveyed to the applicant. For instance, in Hachem v. Holder, 656 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2011), we noted that the applicant had “admitted that while his mother did not know how to write, others in his mother’s household knew how to write and could have provided a statement.” Id. at 433. There are no such admissions here—to the contrary, there is credible testimony that Guzman’s mother still lives with his abusive stepfather. A.R. at 137–38 (Hr’g Tr. at 57–58). Might Guzman have somehow managed to walk his partially illiterate, abused (and abusive) mother through the process of dictating a sworn statement over the phone without her husband finding out? Perhaps. But requiring Guzman to undertake this measure would be plainly excessive. See MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1037 (11th ed. 2014) (defining “reasonably” to mean “not extreme or excessive”). There is substantial evidence that an affidavit from Guzman’s mother redeemed by resort to a detailed factual record.”). Guzman unmistakably presented his claim that the IJ erred in concluding that corroborative evidence from Guzman’s mother was reasonably available both to the BIA, A.R. at 20–21 (Resp. Br. at 7–8), and to this court, Pet. Br. at 15, and the record contains especially compelling reasons for Guzman’s failure to obtain such corroboration. Just as § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) does not require the IJ to make a formal inquiry of why corroborative evidence is unavailable, see supra Part III.A., it does not require applicants to offer a formal explanation in order to carry their burden. For example, had Guzman testified credibly that his mother was deceased, but had not expressly stated, “I cannot provide an affidavit from my mother because she is no longer alive,” we expect that the dissent would not conclude that such an affidavit was reasonably available. Indeed, the dissent appears to recognize—to a limited extent—the absurdity of requiring the victim of abuse to secure an affidavit from his abuser, see Dissent Op. at 38, but suggests that such a requirement would be absurd only when the victim’s legal claim itself rests on the abuse of the would-be affiant. This distinction manifestly lacks significance. No. 19-3417 Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr Page 19 was not reasonably available—not the other way around. We are compelled to conclude that this corroborative evidence was unavailable.9 In contrast to the foregoing, Guzman did not explain why he had not submitted affidavits from his aunt or uncle.10 There is nothing in the record, however, indicating that these individuals could have corroborated his claim about abuse by his stepfather. We have noted the significance of failing to provide corroborative evidence from individuals with knowledge of relevant events. In Irhibayeva v. Holder, 549 F. App’x 421 (6th Cir. 2013), we recounted how an applicant’s “general credibility was brought into question by failing to offer credible, easilyobtained, corroborating evidence from the neighbor, Stepan, who was witness to the incident and with whom [the applicant] claims she still maintains contact.” Id. at 427 (emphasis added). Conversely, we have emphasized the irrelevance of testimony from individuals who lack such knowledge, which the dissent overlooks. Dissent Op. at 40–41. In Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2010), we agreed with the applicant that “some of the requested corroboration, specifically letters from his siblings who were likely too young to understand any threats to their much older brother, and testimony from his mother and a letter from his pastor, who were not in Honduras during the relevant time period, are unlikely to be probative with respect to the likelihood of persecution in Honduras.” Id. at 368. Testimony from Guzman’s aunt and uncles falls into the latter category. Based on the evidence available to the IJ, testimony from Guzman’s aunt or uncle would not have made his past-persecution claim more or less likely to be true. The IJ’s statement that his aunt or uncle 9 To be clear, we do not conclude that the BIA can make further findings of fact before declaring this evidence unavailable. We have remanded for further findings of fact when the BIA has not explained (1) why it was reasonable to expect corroboration in a particular case and (2) why an applicant’s explanations for lack of corroboration were insufficient. See Niang v. Gonzales, 195 F. App’x 371, 377 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Diallo, 232 F.3d at 290). Although the IJ and BIA did not expressly acknowledge Guzman’s reason for failing to provide corroboration from his mother, they did explain that because he was “in contact” with his mother, it was reasonable to expect corroboration from her. A.R. at 45 (IJ Decision at 4); id. at 5 (BIA Decision at 3). Given the lack of evidence supporting this conclusion, our remand does not seek further articulation of the IJ’s and BIA’s rationales. See Shah v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 273 F. App’x 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2008) (declining to remand for further discussion of an applicant’s excuse for lack of corroboration, when the BIA’s refusal to accept this excuse was erroneous “no matter what the BIA’s actual rationale”). 10 Guzman testified that he had multiple uncles, but the IJ’s decision does not clarify which uncle it is discussing. We consider herein references to both uncles. No. 19-3417 Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr Page 20 could have provided corroboration glosses over Guzman’s testimony that when he was one year old, he and his mother moved from Estanzuela Grande, where the Guzman-Vazquez family was located, to a new town six hours away. See A.R. 110 (Hr’g Tr. at 30) (“[M]y family take me away from—my mother take me away from that town to a different town, but—about six hours away so she can . . . for we can survive because they were telling those people that I was next.”); id. at 116 (“My mother take me out of that town when I was one year old.”). His two uncles thereafter apparently retained possession of the family farm in Estanzuela Grande. Id. at 112. One uncle subsequently fled Mexico to escape the violence to which the family was subjected; the other remains in Estanzuela Grande to this day—far from where Guzman suffered abuse at the hands of his stepfather. Id. at 112–14 (A: “On my father’s side I got two [uncles].” Q: “Where is the other uncle?” A: “He’s in United States.” Q: “Do you know why he came to the United States?” A: “Same reason, he not want to get killed.” Q: “Okay. So the other uncle is still in the town, I think you testified that.” A: “Yes. . . . Yes, this is the one he’s living in the town.”). In other words, neither of them left Estanzuela Grande for San Pedro Mixtepec along with Guzman and his mother. Similarly, the aunt of whom the IJ spoke as another potential corroborator lived “about an hour away from where [Guzman’s] dad used to live” in Estanzuela Grande—again, far from where Guzman lived in San Pedro Mixtepec with his stepfather. Id. at 124. There is thus no evidence in the record that these family members lived in San Pedro Mixtepec or had any awareness of the abuse to which Guzman was subjected by his stepfather. Without question, substantial evidence supported a determination that the uncles and aunt could have offered probative statements about external threats of violence facing members of Guzman’s biological family. For example, when asked how he knew that another family had killed both his father and grandfather, Guzman responded, “Because my aunt told me.” Id. at 148. The IJ sensibly pointed to these individuals as knowledgeable of the violence that the Guzman-Vazquez family faced from another family in Estanzuela Grande. Id. at 44 (IJ Decision at 3). But the only probative evidence in the record situates them far from San Pedro Mixtepec, where Guzman suffered child abuse, which is the only claim that we consider in this petition for review; these relatives were undisputedly “not in [San Pedro Mixtepec] during the relevant time No. 19-3417 Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr Page 21 period.” Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 368.11 For these reasons, the IJ’s determination that the aunt’s and uncles’ testimony would have “corroborate[d] otherwise credible testimony” was not supported by substantial evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B). The IJ faulted Guzman for his failure to submit evidence from “all the people that could provide corroboration,” A.R. at 45 (IJ Decision at 4), yet exhaustive review of the record does not reveal any other individuals, apart from those discussed above, whose probative testimony was “reasonably available,” either in written or oral form. For this reason, we disagree with the IJ’s further conclusion that corroboration of Guzman’s claim that his stepfather had a relationship with the police or town management was available. As discussed, letters from Guzman’s sister and mother were not reasonably available, and there is no evidence in the administrative record of other individuals who might have conveyed the relevant documentation of such a relationship to Guzman. Again, we do not question the IJ’s finding that such corroboration was important to verify the recollections of an individual who left home at 14 years old. But an applicant is not required to provide corroborative evidence when he “does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). The IJ’s and BIA’s conclusion that this evidence was reasonably obtainable was not “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 388 (quoting INS v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4))). 11 The dissent conflates corroboration with credibility in arguing that “[l]etters from Guzman’s aunt or uncles confirming that his father had been murdered and that he had moved with his mother to the small town where his stepfather lived would increase the likelihood that he was telling the truth about the abuse too.” Dissent Op. at 41. With respect to a “credibility determination,” the REAL ID Act allows the IJ to consider “any inaccuracies or falsehoods in [an applicant’s] statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). But this component of the statute is irrelevant here, because the IJ explicitly found Guzman to be credible, see A.R. at 43 (IJ Decision at 2), and neither the IJ nor the BIA ruled against Guzman on this claim based on his failure to produce corroborative evidence that his father had been murdered or that he had moved to San Pedro Mixtepec. “[T]he Board’s denial of relief may be affirmed only on the basis articulated in the decision and this Court may not assume that the Board considered factors that it failed to mention in its opinion.” Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2004). The dissent’s approach contravenes this rule. No. 19-3417 Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr Page 22