Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claim of Error Relating to Certain Refused Instructions

Text: Defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to give the following instructions on his request. Defense Instruction No. 3: The mitigating circumstances that I have read for your consideration are given to you merely as examples of some of the factors that you may take into account as reasons for deciding not to impose a death sentence in this case. You should pay careful attention to each of those factors. Any one of them may be sufficient, standing alone, to support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case. But you should not limit your consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific factors. You may also consider any other circumstances relating to the case or to DOUGLAS SCOTT MICKEY as shown by the evidence as reasons for not imposing the death sentence. Defense Instruction No. 4: Another factor for your consideration in determining the appropriate penalty is the concept of fairness. Not only must we strive to accomplish equal justice, but, just as importantly, it should clearly appear to all observers as though justice is being accomplished. In this case, Edward Rogers, who is equally culpable as a principal in these crimes, was granted complete immunity from the charges of murder in this case and was further granted immunity from perjury with respect to statements made by him under oath and will not serve any prison sentence whatever. Measured against this, you are given a choice of only two sentencing alternatives  life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death. You may consider the disparity of treatment between Edward Rogers and Douglas Mickey in selecting the sentence to be imposed. (Paragraphing omitted.) Defense Instruction No. 8: You may consider DOUGLAS SCOTT MICKEY'S potential for contributing affirmatively to the lives of his family and friends as a mitigating circumstance. Defense Instruction No. 12: Mitigating factors were not introduced to justify or excuse the offense in question. They may, however, be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriate punishment. Defense Instruction No. 15: You may consider Douglas Scott Mickey's potential for rehabilitation and for contributing affirmatively to the lives of those around him within the prison as a mitigating circumstances [ sic ]; you may also consider the fact that he has presented no custodial problem and is unlikely to do so in the future as a mitigating circumstances [ sic ]. Defense Instruction No. 21: I have previously read to you the list of aggravating circumstances which the law permits you to consider if you find that any of them is established by the evidence. These are the only aggravating circumstances that you may consider. You are not allowed to take account of any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case. (57a) After review, we find no error in the trial court's refusal of the requested instructions quoted above. (58) As we have declared, a court may, and must, refuse an instruction that is an incorrect statement of the law. The same is true of an instruction that is argumentative, i.e., of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1276; accord, People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 805.) As we have also declared, a court may refuse an instruction that is duplicative. (57b) Defense Instruction No. 21 is incorrect. To be sure, the law permits the jury to consider only penalty factors (a) through (j) of section 190.3, and evidence relevant thereto, in determining aggravation. [Citation.] But the factors set out in the list the court delivered omitted [the victim-consent portion of statutory factor (e)]. Therefore, the requested instruction was incorrect in [implying] that the court's list set out the only factors the law permitted the jury to consider. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1275.) Defense Instructions Nos. 4, 8, 12, and 15 are plainly argumentative. No further comment is required. Defense Instruction No. 3 is in part argumentative  to the extent it states that a single mitigating circumstance can carry potentially dispositive weight, but does not say the same as to a single aggravating circumstance. And it is in part duplicative  to the extent it overlaps the instruction that Factors in mitigation may include, but are not limited to, Douglas Scott Mic[k]ey's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. (59) Defendant claims that the trial court did indeed err by refusing the requested instructions. He argues he was entitled to the instructions under People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 189-190 [84 Cal. Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847]. He is wrong. Under Sears, a criminal defendant has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the defense. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 806; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1276.) The instructions here did not do so. (60) Defendant also argues he was entitled to the requested instructions under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as construed in Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586, and its progeny. Again he is wrong. Under those cases, a criminal defendant has a right to clear instructions that guide and focus the jury's consideration of the offense and the offender. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 806; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1277.) Defendant received such instructions. But under those cases, a criminal defendant does not have a right to an instruction  like those here  that invites the jury to draw favorable inferences from the evidence. ( People v. Benson, supra, at p. 806; People v. Gordon, supra, at p. 1277.) (61) Finally, defendant argues he was entitled to the requested instructions under the due process clauses of article I, sections 7 and 15, of the California Constitution and also, apparently, under the analogous provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. His premise is that the instructions were necessary to assure that the penalty phase was fundamentally fair in procedure and basically reliable in result. No such necessity appears.