Opinion ID: 852345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Incurred Risk as a Defense to Lack of Informed Consent

Text: Indiana Code section 34-18-12-8 in fact provides that [a] patient may refuse to receive some or all of the information appropriate in an informed-consent disclosure. Many jurisdictions recognize either by judicial ruling or statute that a patient may waive her right to informed consent. See, e.g., Arato v. Avedon, 5 Cal.4th 1172, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 858 P.2d 598, 609 (1993) (noting that a patient may validly waive the right to be informed); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash.App. 230, 523 P.2d 211, 219 (1974) (A physician need not disclose the hazards of treatment when the patient has requested she not be told about the dangers....); Del.Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6852(b)(2) (1999) (acknowledging waiver as a defense to lack-of-informed-consent claims); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-406(3)(c) (2008) (same); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1909(c)(2) (2002) (same). But a patient who waives informed consent assumes only those risks associated with nondisclosure. Presumably this would preclude the patient from claiming she would not have proceeded if disclosure had been made. But a waiver of informed consent does not assume risks associated with negligent performance of the underlying procedure or treatment. In any event, there is no evidence that Spar waived her right to informed consent or otherwise assumed the risks related to negligent nondisclosure. Incurred risk was therefore not a defense to Spar's lack-of-informed-consent claim and should not have been submitted to the jury.
We conclude that it was error for the trial court to deny Spar's motion for judgment on the evidence and to instruct the jury on incurred risk. The jury rendered a general verdict, so we are unable to tell whether it found that Dr. Cha was non-negligent or that Spar incurred the risk of injury. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.