Opinion ID: 2346556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Striking of Appellant's Expert's Testimony at Trial

Text: At the beginning of the trial, the judge clarified that appellant was suing Hoffman for damages it caused to her personal property as a result of its negligent workmanship in conducting repairs from the fire, and Boyd for emotional injury to appellant and damages caused to her personal property as a result of the fire. The court noted that appellant was not making a claim for damages for emotional distress against Hoffman. The appellees made an oral motion to exclude appellant's intended use of expert witnesses listed in the late-filed 26(b)(4) statement, which included witnesses who would testify to property damage from the Stephen A. Rosen Company and Structural Concepts, Inc. After a discussion with counsel regarding the preliminary 26(b)(4) statement that appellant had filed on October 15, 1997, see note 2, supra, the trial judge precluded appellant from calling witnesses listed in the late-filed 26(b)(4) statement. [4] The trial judge ruled that the preliminary statement was totally inadequate as a 26(b)(4) statement . . . [and] more indicative of what you will present and why it [is] being presented. Noting that appellant's counsel was denied an extension by the motions court, it being the law of the case, this [c]ourt cannot go against the order. The court ruled that appellant would be allowed to present expert testimony by J.R. Nickens of the District of Columbia Fire Department because his testimony was not obtained for the purposes of litigation and was thus exempt from the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4). At trial, appellant sought to present evidence on her claim for personal injury (emotional distress) against Boyd and claims for loss of personal property against Hoffman and Boyd. Appellees objected to appellant's attempt to testify as to her property losses on the ground that she had no personal basis of knowledge, but was relying on the opinions contained in reports of Stephen A. Rosen Co. and Structural Concepts, Inc., the expert appraisers whose opinions the judge had precluded. [5] Based on its review of the relevant portions of appellant's answers to interrogatories and her deposition testimony, the trial judge was persuaded that appellant's testimony as to the value of her personal property was entirely dependent on the opinions of experts who were unavailable for cross-examination, and ruled that she could not testify as to the property's value. Because there was no evidence as to personal property damage, the trial judge granted Hoffman's motion to dismiss appellant's claim for loss of personal property. That left only the claims against Boyd for personal injury related to the fire. Officer Nickels testified as to the cause of the fire. Appellant testified briefly as to her property damaged by the fire and also testified as to the emotional injuries she suffered during and after the fire. While she was not permitted to provide an expert medical opinion, she presented evidence by her treating doctor, Dr. Janet Regier, who testified as to her treatment and medications for pancreatitis, pain, hypertension and depression. The case was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in Boyd's favor.