Opinion ID: 2320518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attempted Robbery Properly Admitted

Text: Before the trial, the State indicated that it would seek to introduce evidence, pursuant to D.R.E. 404(b), of a prior uncharged attempted robbery of Ferrell by Monroe, to show additional evidence of Monroe's motive to murder Ferrell. As has been discussed, establishing motive is a permissible purpose for the use of other crime evidence under D.R.E. 404(b). In Getz, we held that evidence of uncharged misconduct can be admitted under D.R.E. 404(b) if: (1) the evidence is material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute in the case; (2) the evidence is relevant to a purpose not inconsistent with the basic prohibition against evidence of bad character or criminal disposition; (3) the uncharged misconduct is proved by plain, clear and conclusive evidence; (4) the act or acts of uncharged misconduct are not too remote in time from the charged offense; (5) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and (6) the jury is given an instruction concerning the limited purpose for which such evidence may be heard. [24] Monroe filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence of an attempted robbery of Ferrell. The Superior Court held a pretrial hearing, at which the State called three witnesses, Ronald Wright, Wisher and Kason Wright. During the pretrial testimony of Kason Wright, the State introduced into evidence a videotaped statement, pursuant to 11 Del. C., § 3507 (section 3507). In that statement, Kason Wright said that he was with Monroe when Monroe attempted to rob Ferrell on January 25, 2006. Based on the combined testimony from the State's three witnesses, the trial judge concluded that the facts of the uncharged attempted robbery were supported by plain, clear and conclusive evidence. The trial judge denied Monroe's motion in limine and ruled that the attempted robbery would be admissible as evidence of motive during Monroe's trial for the attempted murder and actual murder of Ferrell. In making that ruling, the trial judge specifically noted the significance of Karon Wright's section 3507 statement. At trial, Ronald Wright and Wisher testified consistently with their pretrial testimony at the hearing on Monroe's motion in limine. Kason Wright, however, refused to testify at trial, invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Since Kason Wright did not testify, the trial judge properly ruled that his videotaped section 3507 statement was inadmissible at trial. [25] Following his conviction for Ferrell's murder, Monroe moved for a new trial, asserting that the jury did not hear plain, clear, and conclusive evidence of the prior uncharged attempted robbery, and therefore, no evidence of that crime should have been admitted at trial. The trial judge denied Monroe's motion for a new trial, ruling that the testimony of Wisher and Ronald Wright provided the plain, clear, and conclusive evidence that was necessary to show the attempted robbery and Monroe's motive for the attempted murder and the actual murder of Ferrell. In this appeal, Monroe argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. In his motion for a new trial, Monroe did not contend that the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing on his motion in limine was not plain, clear, and conclusive. The only issue raised in Monroe's motion for a new trial was whether the State presented plain, clear, and conclusive evidence of the prior uncharged attempted robbery at trial, since only Wisher and Ronald Wright testified on the subject. Therefore, the Superior Court had to determine whether the evidence presented to the jury during the trial, which did not include either the live testimony or the section 3507 statement of Kason Wright, was plain, clear, and conclusive. In ruling on Monroe's motion for a new trial, the Superior Court recognized that neither Ronald Wright nor Wisher testified that they saw Monroe attempt to rob Ferrell by grabbing his necklace. Only Kason Wright asserted (in his prior out-of-court section 3507 statement) that Main Dane (Monroe) attempted to steal Ferrell's necklace on January 25, 2006. Nevertheless, the Superior Court held that the eyewitness testimony of Ronald Wright and Wisher was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish proof of the attempted robbery by plain, clear, and conclusive evidence, for the following reasons: Despite the fact that neither Wisher nor Ronald Wright actually saw Defendant [Monroe] commit the robbery, both were able to place Defendant [Monroe] at the scene of the necklace robbery. Additionally, Wisher was able to testify that Kason Wright was fleeing up the street while another individual was tussling with Ferrell. Based on this testimony, this court finds that there was plain, clear, and conclusive evidence through the testimony of Wisher and Ronald Wright that tended, if believed by the jury, to show that [Monroe] was involved in the necklace robbery and that the incident could tend to show a motive for [Monroe] to attempt to murder, or to murder, Ferrell. Numerous Delaware cases involving eyewitness testimony have held that the requirement of plain, clear, and conclusive is a credibility question for the jury. [26] It was up to the jury to assess the testimony of both Ronald Wright and Jonathan Wisher, determine the credibility of the testimony, and draw any permissible inferences from that testimony. . . . [27] Even though neither Wisher nor Ronald Wright testified that either saw Monroe rob Ferrell, evidence of that robbery was plain, clear, and conclusive because those two eyewitnesses testified that [Monroe] was present when Ferrell was robbed, and the jury was permitted to assess the credibility of that testimony, draw permissible inferences, including whether [Monroe] had a motive to attempt to murder, or to actually murder, consider other evidence in the trial, and consider whether [Monroe] was, indeed, involved in the necklace robbery. Even without the testimony of Kason Wright, evidence of the prior uncharged necklace robbery was plain, clear, and conclusive. It is well established that eyewitness testimony can be used to satisfy the requirement that evidence of uncharged misconduct be plain, clear, and conclusive. [28] Kason Wright's section 3507 statement, which was not admitted into evidence at trial, would have been direct eyewitness evidence of Monroe's attempt to rob Ferrell. However, Wisher and Ronald Wright's eyewitness testimony was circumstantial evidence of Monroe's attempt to rob Ferrell. We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo to determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [29] For purposes of that inquiry, this Court does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence of a defendant's guilt. [30] Similarly, for purposes of deciding whether evidence of a defendant's prior uncharged misconduct is plain, clear, and conclusive, this Court will not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence. Since that distinction is the only basis for Monroe's argument, we hold that the record supports the Superior Court's finding that Wisher and Ronald Wright's eyewitness testimony constituted plain, clear, and conclusive circumstantial evidence of Monroe's attempt to rob Ferrell.