Opinion ID: 1130843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: use of defendant's statements at trial

Text: Defendant objects to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to police on two grounds. The first is that his arrest on the 72-hour parole hold was an illegal pretext arrest used solely to elicit damaging statements from him in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The second is that his statements were not made pursuant to a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. When reviewing a trial court's decision to admit a confession, we must determine if, based upon the totality of the circumstances, using the confession was proper. [7] The trial court's factual determination will be overturned only if it is clearly erroneous; the court's legal conclusions based upon those factual findings are reviewed under a correction of error standard. [8]
We first consider whether defendant's arrest on the parole hold was an unconstitutional pretext arrest. Defendant claims that he was arrested for the sole purpose of gathering evidence against him on the murder charge, not for the purpose of accomplishing a valid arrest on the parole hold. Defendant cites to evidence in the record showing that the arresting officers intended to question him about the murder while he was in custody on the parole hold. This, he argues, constitutes an improper motive on the part of the police and renders his subsequent statements tainted. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the police had a legitimate reason to detain defendant on the parole hold. Further, the trial court found that the fact that the officers were aware that defendant was a suspect in Church's murder at the time he was arrested did not make it an improper pretext arrest. We agree with the trial court's reasoning. An arrest may not be used solely as a pretext to search for evidence of another crime. [9] However, if police have a valid right to arrest an individual for one crime, it does not matter if their subjective intent is in reality to collect information concerning another crime. [10] Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred `turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him [or her] at the time,' and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken. [11] If the police action would have been taken against an individual even absent the `underlying intent or motivation,' there is no conduct which ought to have been deterred and thus no reason to bring the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule into play for purposes of deterrence. [12] In other words, if the alleged pretext arrest could have taken place absent police suspicion of the defendant's involvement in another crime, then the arrest is lawful. Here, defendant's parole officer initially told defendant that he could remain in Cedar City and look for employment. However, the officer subsequently discovered that defendant was living with Wood, another parolee, in violation of parole guidelines. After discussing defendant's situation with another parole officer, the two officers decided to detain defendant on a 72-hour parole hold. Thus, the officers did have a valid, independent reason to detain defendant separate from the murder investigation. In fact, police officers actually went to the apartment in Cedar City to arrest defendant on the parole hold on the afternoon of November 22, after the murder had taken place but before they knew anything about the crime. Although the officers were unable to locate defendant at that time (he was with Wood, hitchhiking back to Cedar City after disposing of Church's car in Salt Lake City), they would have arrested him if he had been found. [13] Based on defendant's living situation and his unauthorized return to Cedar City, the arrest on the 72-hour parole hold was proper. The arrest was not rendered invalid solely because the officers had a separate motive for arresting him, especially where defendant would have been arrested even if the murder had not taken place. Hence, we affirm the ruling of the trial court on this issue.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it determined that the waiver of his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Specifically, he alleges that at the time he originally waived his rights (after initially invoking his right to have counsel present), he was incompetent and incapable of making a valid waiver. Miranda warnings are intended to guard against the inherently coercive nature of a custodial police interrogation by fully informing the suspect of the state's intention to use any self-incriminating statements to secure his [or her] conviction. [14] Once the accused has been advised of his or her rights, he or she may waive these rights, but must do so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. [15] Under this standard, a waiver must have been the product of a `free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception' and executed with `full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and [of] the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' [16] Further, once an accused has invoked the right to counsel, he or she cannot be subject to further interrogation until counsel is provided, unless the accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. [17] The record reveals that defendant was interviewed several times by different police officers. At the first interview (on the morning of November 24), conducted by Sgt. Charles Stewart, defendant invoked his right to counsel after being advised of his rights. The interview was terminated immediately thereafter. Later that day, defendant initiated contact by asking to speak to a police officer. He spoke with two officers, Lt. Norman Hulet and Officer Richard Dickenson, and was again read his Miranda rights. Lt. Hulet testified that defendant said that he understood his rights and wanted to speak to the officers anyway. Lt. Hulet also testified that defendant seemed to be in good health and did not appear to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs and that although defendant jumped around a lot and was confusing at first, he then became calmer and was able to relate most of the events of his involvement. Defendant made several telephone calls during the course of the interview and was provided with food and refreshments. Later on the evening of November 24, defendant was again interviewed by Sgt. Stewart. After he was again advised of his Miranda rights, the following colloquy took place: Stewart: Do you understand each of these rights that I have explained to you? Archuleta: Yeah. Stewart: Having these rights in mind, do you want to talk to us now? Archuleta: Yeah, I can talk. On November 27, 1988, Sgt. Stewart sought to interview defendant again. However, about ten minutes into the interview, defendant again requested to have his attorney present, and the interview was immediately terminated. Finally, on December 2, defendant voluntarily sought to speak to Sgt. Stewart, and after waiving his Miranda warning again, he gave another statement. The record reveals that the officers involved scrupulously honored defendant's rights, including his desire to terminate the various interviews. The sessions did not begin again until defendant voluntarily initiated contact, was read his Miranda warning, and waived his rights. We therefore affirm the trial court's ruling that the statements were given voluntarily and that the statements were not the result of intimidation, coercion, or deception. The record also supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights before he made any statements to police. According to the testimony of the officers who interviewed him, defendant was competent at all times and, as the trial court noted, was quite familiar with the criminal law system and showed no sign of fatigue or illness. We therefore decline to disturb the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the statements. [18]