Opinion ID: 1711506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: absolute discharge as a remedy

Text: Our inquiry does not end with the determination that §§ 43-271 and 43-278 provide to juveniles a statutory right to a prompt adjudication hearing. The Court of Appeals held that even if all juveniles subject to a § 43-247(1), (2), or (3)(b) petition have a statutory right to a speedy adjudication pursuant to § 43-271 or § 43-278, the use of the word shall in those statutes is merely directory, thus absolute discharge for the State's failure to comply is not mandated. As a general rule, in the construction of statutes, the word shall is considered mandatory and inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Payne v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 249 Neb. 150, 542 N.W.2d 694 (1996). However, while the word shall may render a particular provision mandatory in character, when the spirit and purpose of the legislation require that the word shall be construed as permissive rather than mandatory, such will be done. State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, 247 Neb. 29, 524 N.W.2d 788 (1994). The Court of Appeals concluded that even if the juveniles in question did have a statutory right to a prompt adjudication hearing, this right was not violated when the statutory 6-month limit of § 43-271 is merely directory and not mandatory. For a juvenile to receive discharge from a petition, the Court of Appeals held he or she must show that they were prejudiced by the delay. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on In re Interest of C.P., 235 Neb. 276, 455 N.W.2d 138 (1990). In In re Interest of C.P., this court determined that the use of the word shall in § 43-278 (Reissue 1988) was directory and not mandatory. The language of the former § 43-278 was identical to what is now the second paragraph of § 43-271, the statute at issue in the instant appeal. This court held because shall was directory, failure of the State to provide an adjudication hearing within the statutory 6-month limit did not require discharge from the petition, when the subject of the petition had not indicated how she had been prejudiced by the delay. However, significant factual and legal distinctions exist between In re Interest of C.P. and the instant case. The interest at stake in In re Interest of C.P. was the termination of parental rights for a mother with a long history of neglect and abuse. In view of the fact that the juvenile's best interests are the primary consideration in an adjudication hearing, we reasoned it would be absurd to construe the language in § 43-278 as mandatory, when the result would be to return a sexually abused child to the party who abused her for the sole reason that an adjudication hearing was held 181 days after a petition was filed. Although our reasoning is persuasive within the factual context of In re Interest of C.P. an abusive mother seeking to obtain an absolute discharge from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courtthere are different interests at stake in the present case where it is the juveniles who seek absolute discharge from a delinquency petition after remaining unadjudicated in the juvenile court system. Several other states have considered the question of whether the use of the word shall is mandatory or directory in the context of speedy adjudication statutes. The courts of two states have held the use of the word shall in its speedy adjudication statutes is mandatory. See, In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 414 A.2d 934 (1980); Sanchez v. Family & Children Services, 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976). In In re Russell C., supra , the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded interpreting the word shall as mandatory is consistent with the goals of guaranteeing children their constitutional rights and encouraging the use of rehabilitative and treatment resources in a manner consistent with the protection of the public interest. However, a majority of jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue have held speedy delinquency adjudication statutes to be directory out of concern for the juveniles' best interests, while balancing the juveniles' right to a prompt and fair adjudication. We are persuaded by the reasoning of those jurisdictions. In In re Armour, 59 Ill.2d 102, 104-05, 319 N.E.2d 496, 498 (1974), the Illinois Supreme Court, in finding its speedy delinquency adjudication statute to be directory, stated: Society is interested for its own sake as well as for the minor's individual welfare in guiding and rehabilitating. These interests cannot always be served by a mechanical adherence to rote or formula.... We do not consider that the legislature intended that should an adjudicatory hearing not be held precisely within 30 days that the minor should be discharged or be abandoned, as it were, and that society's effort to correct, to rehabilitate and to guide should come to a halt. See, also, In Interest of A.E.O. III, 437 N.W.2d 238 (Iowa 1989); In re T.K., 11 Kan.App.2d 632, 731 P.2d 887 (1987); State in the Interest of C.B., 173 N.J.Super. 424, 414 A.2d 572 (1980), cert. denied 84 N.J. 482, 420 A.2d 1303; In re Therklidsen, 54 Ohio App.2d 195, 376 N.E.2d 970 (1977); In re J.V., 154 Vt. 644, 573 A.2d 1196 (1990). First of all, we are compelled to conclude that a delinquent child in need of treatment 180 days after the filing of a delinquency petition is likely to require treatment on the 181st day as well. Clearly, a rigid and legalistic interpretation of a juvenile's statutory right to a speedy delinquency adjudication would often be contrary to a juvenile's best interests and, ultimately, contrary to the public interest. This is particularly true in cases where the juvenile is not in custody during the 180-day period, and remedial treatment is readily available after the adjudication. We have long recognized that a juvenile court proceeding is not a prosecution for crime, but a special proceeding that serves as an ameliorative alternative to a criminal prosecution. See In re Interest of A.M.H., 233 Neb. 610, 447 N.W.2d 40 (1989). The purpose of our statutes relating to the handling of youthful offenders is, as in other states having juvenile court systems, the education, treatment and rehabilitation of the child, rather than retributive punishment. The emphasis on training and rehabilitation, rather than punishment, is underscored by the declaration that juvenile proceedings are civil, rather than criminal, in nature. Instead of a complaint or indictment we have a `petition.' The hearing never results in a conviction, but may lead to an `adjudication of delinquency.' Where confinement of the delinquent child is indicated as the proper treatment, the child is not sentenced to prison but, instead, is `committed' to a `training school.' The adjudication of delinquency does not carry with it any of the civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from conviction of crime, nor is the child considered to be a criminal because of such adjudication. Id. at 614, 447 N.W.2d at 43 (quoting Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Civ.App.1969)). Moreover, §§ 43-271, 43-277, and 43-278, the provisions of our juvenile code which define a juvenile's right to a prompt adjudication, do so without specifying a sanction for noncompliance. A legislative enactment providing that an act be accomplished within a specified time period, with no sanction for failure to comply with that mandate, is directory. In re Interest of C.P., 235 Neb. 276, 455 N.W.2d 138 (1990). We are not persuaded by the juveniles' assertion that §§ 43-271 and 43-277's reference to § 29-1207, a portion of the statutory right to a speedy criminal trial, compels the absolute discharge of a juvenile from a delinquency petition which remains unadjudicated 6 months after filing. Section 29-1207 is only incorporated into the juvenile code to serve as a method by which computation of the 6-month period after the petition is filed shall be made. In and of itself, § 29-1207 does not mandate a criminal defendant's discharge if not brought to trial within the prescribed time. Instead, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1208 (Reissue 1995) mandates that an adult offender will be entitled to absolute discharge if not brought to trial within the prescribed time, and § 29-1208 has not been incorporated into the juvenile code. That being so, § 29-1207 cannot be considered as authority for the juveniles' claim that absolute discharge from a delinquency petition is statutorily mandated when a juvenile is not adjudicated within the required time period. Instead, § 29-1207(4)(a) through (e) requires a juvenile court judge to exclude from the 6-month period specifically identified periods of delay resulting from, for example, other proceedings concerning the juvenile, continuances granted at the request of the juvenile, or the absence or unavailability of the juvenile. In addition, § 29-1207(4) provides for the exclusion of (f) Other periods of delay not specifically enumerated herein, but only if the court finds that they are for good cause. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that §§ 43-271 and 43-278 are directory and do not require absolute discharge of a juvenile not adjudicated within the prescribed time period. However, we are mindful that the foremost purpose and objective of the Nebraska Juvenile Code is to promote and protect the juvenile's best interests. In re Interest of Lisa O., 248 Neb. 865, 540 N.W.2d 109 (1995); In re Interest of D.D.P., 235 Neb. 864, 458 N.W.2d 193 (1990). It is rarely in the best interests of a juvenile to have his or her case languish unadjudicated in the juvenile court for more than 6 months or 90 days in the case of a status offender. As in adult court, unreasonable delay at the adjudication stage may affect the quality and quantity of evidence presented, impairing the juvenile's defense and preventing a fair hearing. Further, in the event the juvenile is found to have committed the delinquent act or is adjudicated as a status offender, the delay is oftentimes detrimental to the youth's rehabilitation. See In Interest of C.T.F., 316 N.W.2d 865 (Iowa 1982). We therefore hold that it is within the sound discretion of the juvenile court to determine whether absolute discharge of a juvenile petition is in the best interests of a juvenile, taking into consideration (1) the factors set forth in §§ 43-271 and 43-278, (2) the right of the juvenile to a prompt and fair adjudication, and (3) the future treatment and rehabilitation of the juvenile in the event of an adjudication. The benchmark of this determination is the protection of the best interests of the juvenile. See In re Interest of Lisa O., supra . We further hold that an appellate court's review of the juvenile court's prompt adjudication determination shall be de novo on the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the juvenile court. Prompt adjudication determinations are initially entrusted to the discretion of the juvenile court and will be upheld unless they constitute an abuse of discretion. With the above standard of review in mind, we examine the record de novo to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in dismissing the 10 separate petitions in the instant case. The court administrator for the Douglas County Separate Juvenile Court testified on behalf of the State. The court administrator testified that the juvenile court caseload had dramatically increased in the past 10 years. During this time, both the county attorney and the public defender had added staff to handle the increase. However, there had not been a substantial increase in the number of juvenile court judges or number of judicial hours spent deciding juvenile matters. The court administrator also testified that his office had been active in doing whatever it could to reduce the backlog of cases. On cross-examination, the court administrator testified that much of the time an entire juvenile courtroom was not in use and that a retired district judge was readily available to fill any judicial void. The court administrator further testified that there had been no attempt to bring in a juvenile court judge from Sarpy County to help reduce the Douglas County caseload and that most of the procedures implemented by his office to reduce the backlog of cases were instituted no sooner than mid-October 1994. The juvenile court made findings that the juvenile docket was congested and that there was a need for additional judicial resources. However, the necessary relief had not been forthcoming at the time of the discharge, and, in spite of everyone's best interests, the juvenile court found that everyone's efforts had not been enough to keep up with the demand. The juvenile court went on to find that the juveniles in the instant cases were prejudiced by the delay in adjudication because significant restraints are placed on a juvenile's liberty once the State files a delinquency petition against him or her. The juvenile court judge stated: [A] petition from the county attorney stops that child dead in their tracks to appear for court because if they don't [sic] contempt can be cited against that child. In addition, the juvenile court noted that if a child failed to appear, they could eventually be placed in the Youth Development Center or be placed outside their home. The State presented no evidence that would allow the juvenile court to make findings regarding specific causes of delay as enumerated in § 29-1207(4)(a) through (f) and the extensions attributable to such causes with respect to a particular juvenile. At best, the evidence adduced by the State only allows this court to conclude that in general, there was a crowded docket in the Douglas County Separate Juvenile Court at the time of the discharge. No evidence was adduced concerning the rehabilitation needs, future treatment, or best interests of the juveniles in the case at bar. The juvenile court concluded that a crowded docket alone was insufficient as good cause to extend the 6-month period prescribed in § 43-271 or the 90-day period prescribed in § 43-278. Based upon our de novo review of the entire record, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's findings, nor with the juvenile court's use of the remedy of absolute discharge based on the circumstances of these juvenile cases.