Opinion ID: 2306289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: McCrae's Allegations of Error

Text: McCrae raises a number of issues on appeal, which we may deal with more summarily. First, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his severance motions. A trial court may deny a severance motion if there is enough independent evidence of a defendant's guilt-beyond that required for the government to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal-so that the judge reasonably could find, with substantial certainty, that the conflict in defenses alone would not sway the jury to find the defendant guilty. Walker v. United States, 630 A.2d 658, 663 (D.C. 1993). A codefendant's duress defense, by itself, is not a basis for severance, even though a codefendant's presentation of evidence may inculpate the defendant. Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368, 1372 (D.C.1989). Here, as we discuss infra, there was ample independent evidence of McCrae's guilt and any potential prejudice was tempered by the jury instruction that the government must prove the guilt of each defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. See Metts v. United States, 877 A.2d 113, 118 (D.C.2005). McCrae also challenges the trial court's failure to intervene to prevent Miller's counsel from arguing that Miller went to Holmead Place only because of McCrae's threat and that this not only amounted to a confession but it also [was] an implication of [McCrae's] guilt as well that violated McCrae's constitutional rights. [10] He also challenges the trial court's failure to deal with allegedly improper remarks by the prosecution, specifically that the prosecutor paraphrased the testimony of a witness and made general comments about how crew members act. To the extent that McCrae objected at the time, he took no exception to the trial court's corrective actions. On plain error review, we are fully satisfied that no error in these regards existed here that was so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial. Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 357, 360 (D.C.2001) (citations omitted). Finally, McCrae argues there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for conspiracy and AWIKWA. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences[.] Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 264 (D.C. 1997). To sustain a conviction for conspiracy, the government must prove (1) an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime, (2) knowing and voluntary participation in the agreement with the intent to commit a criminal objective, and (3) the commission in furtherance of the conspiracy of at least one overt act by a co-conspirator during the conspiracy. McCullough v. United States, 827 A.2d 48, 58 (D.C.2003). McCrae acknowledges that the government's cooperating witnesses, all members of the 1-7 Crew, testified against him and detailed his involvement. While one of these co-participants did testify, at one point, that there was no plan, his description of the desire of the crew, including McCrae, to retaliate, as well as his testimony about how the group came together on Fuller Street and decided to wear black and arm themselves before going to Holmead Place, itself provided sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction. Moreover, other witnesses testified that McCrae had made the decision to go to Holmead Place that night and led the crew there. Accordingly, the jurors had before them evidence from which they could conclude McCrae was a member of the conspiracy, and we defer to their credibility determination. See Bouknight v. United States, 867 A.2d 245, 251 (D.C. 2005). McCrae also contends, in two sentences, that there was insufficient evidence to convict him for AWIKWA with respect to Officer Montanez, the plainclothes officer who arrived on the scene. Even though Officer Montanez did not identify any individual shooter, the evidence showed McCrae was one of the six gunmen who went to Holmead Place with the intent to shoot anyone they saw there. Therefore, even if Garris, Nicholson, and Marshman were most likely to have shot at Officer Montanez, there is, at a minimum, sufficient evidence to support McCrae's conviction under an aiding and abetting theory of liability. [11] See Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 840 (D.C.2006). For the above reasons, the appellants' convictions appealed from must be, and hereby are, Affirmed.