Opinion ID: 1113193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Voir dire comments about defendant's neat courtroom appearance and victim's absence.

Text: During general voir dire of a panel which included Jurors Barnett, Renz, Boado, Reinelt, and Sanchez, the prosecutor remarked that it would be proper to consider sympathetic factors in defendant's favor, but that defendant would be appearing in court dressed up and decent and had over six years to get ready for today. The prosecutor continued in a similar vein that [w]hat you're not going to have is ... the victim appear[ing] in court, and it's easy to lose โ. At this point, defense counsel interrupted with an objection, which was sustained. Counsel did not request an admonition, however, and none was given. (9) Defendant asserts that these comments were misconduct calculated to inflame the jurors, dispel sympathy generated by defendant's respectful courtroom appearance, call attention to a nonstatutory aggravating factor (i.e., the homicide victim's death), imply defendant's connivance against the judicial system, and penalize his exercise of his constitutional jury trial rights. The contention is barred. As defendant concedes, trial counsel failed to preserve a direct claim of misconduct because, although he objected to the prosecutor's remarks, he did not also request an admonition that would clearly have cured any harm. ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 689 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217]; People v. Beivelman (1968) 70 Cal.2d 60, 75 [73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 447 P.2d 913]; see People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.) Defendant asserts that the trial court should have intervened sua sponte to prevent or cure misconduct by the prosecutor. Our cases hold the contrary ( People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 321 [261 Cal. Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121]; People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 335-336 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082]), and defendant offers no persuasive reason to reconsider them. Defendant also suggests the claim is cognizable in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the appellate record does not eliminate the possibility that counsel's omission was tactical. (See People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 425-426.) For all that appears, counsel may have been willing to forgo an appellate claim in hopes that a successful objection alone would ameliorate the prosecutor's remarks without highlighting them further. [13] In any event, the prosecutor's comments, brief in duration, did not call attention to anything jurors would not readily infer in any event. The jurors already well knew that the victim was dead and that the murder had taken place several years previously. They would certainly assume that defendant would groom neatly for court and that his appearance had changed since the crime was committed. [14] By sustaining defense counsel's objection, the court immediately signalled that the prosecutor's remarks were improper. The incident occurred at the outset of trial proceedings, long before deliberations began. Just before the jury retired, it received instructions, among others, to disregard evidence that had been stricken, and to avoid speculation about gaps caused by successful objections. For these reasons, any omission by counsel does not undermine confidence in the penalty judgment. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-698]; see People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) Hence, there is no basis for reversal.