Opinion ID: 454637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the District Court Abused its Discretion in Refusing to Grant a Severance

Text: 5 Appellants challenge their convictions on numerous grounds, only two of which merit discussion. First, appellant Strachan argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant a severance and mistrial under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Appellant Strachan argues that he was prejudiced by the out-of-court statements of codefendant Marolla, as related by Marolla's landlady. At trial, Marolla's landlady testified that Marolla told her that he had a big dope deal planned with Dave Strachan, and that he would have his rent money in a few weeks once the operation was completed. Marolla's landlady also testified that Marolla told her that he was expecting a phone call from appellant Strachan regarding a boatload of pot coming in. The district court, acting sua sponte, raised the issue of the effect of Marolla's statements on appellant Strachan. On several occasions, the district court gave cautionary instructions that such testimony could be considered only as to Marolla and told the jury to disregard the statements about Strachan. The district court, however, denied appellant Strachan's severance motion because it believed the instructions cured any prejudice caused by the statements. 6 In United States v. Astling, 733 F.2d 1446, 1454 (11th Cir.1984), the court noted: 7 [C]oconspirators should be tried jointly ... and severance is not warranted despite the fact that a defendant may have participated in only a single aspect of the conspiracy.... The trial judge's decision to sever is discretionary; appellants must show that the judge abused his discretion in denying their motions to sever, and they can do so only by demonstrating compelling prejudice. ... Such prejudice can arise from the admission into evidence of an out-of-court statement admissible only against one non-testifying codefendant that implicates another codefendant.... Compelling prejudice, in the Bruton context, may occur even though the judge instructs the jury to consider the challenged evidence only against the proper codefendant. 8 Id. at 1454 (citations omitted). Similarly, the court recognized in Astling that: 9 [T]here are many circumstances in which this reliance [on the effectiveness of limiting instructions] is justified. Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently.... [I]n many such cases the jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard such information. Nevertheless, ... there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored ... [such as] here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. 10 Id. at 1455 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627-28, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)). 11 In determining whether the admission of the out-of-court statements constitutes reversible error, one must determine whether the possible prejudice resulting from the failure of the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is ... so 'devastating' or 'vital' to the complaining defendant to require departure from the general rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting instructions. Id. at 1456 (quoting Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 74, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 2140, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979)). 12 In the instant case, appellant Strachan's defense, presented by way of final argument to the jury, was that he was merely hired by the organizer of the conspiracy, Ian Granger, to perform the legitimate task of piloting a boat from Jamaica to Florida, that he had no prior knowledge of the conspiracy, and that he was essentially coerced into joining the conspiracy. Thus, Strachan argues that the out-of-court statements were particularly prejudicial because they showed that he did have prior knowledge of the conspiracy. We disagree. 13 First, it is important to note that the trial judge's corrective instructions immediately preceded the testimony implicating defendant Strachan. Moreover, immediately after the testimony, the trial judge reiterated the fact that the references ... to Mr. Strachan should not in any way be considered by the jury in your determination of the case as it involves Mr. Strachan. The fact that the corrective instructions were contemporaneous with the out-of-court statements increases the effectiveness of the corrective instructions. The fact that the prosecutor did not argue from the out-of-court statements in closing argument is also significant. See Astling, supra at 1456. 14 One of Strachan's coconspirators, Larry McBride, testified that Strachan had invented the coercion story to tell law enforcement officials if the conspirators were accosted. 2 Moreover, McBride testified as to Strachan's prior knowledge of the conspiracy. Similarly, McBride testified that Strachan knew the secret signals for contacting the coconspirators at the off-loading site. 15 Finally, Chue-Sang testified that Strachan gave the orders as to the precise manner of making the rendezvous with the marijuana suppliers in Jamaica. This included piloting the CALLIOPE to a point offshore from Jamaica, turning off the CALLIOPE's running lights, and stopping the engines. 16 Given this very strong evidence that showed Strachan's knowing participation in the conspiracy, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in holding that the cautionary instructions were sufficient to cure any prejudice that resulted from the admission of the out-of-court statements.