Opinion ID: 8704056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count IV)

Text: To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under District of Columbia law, “a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2) either intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Kassem v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 513 F.3d 251, 255 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting Larijani v. Georgetown Univ., 791 A.2d 41, 44 (D.C. 2002)). With respect to the first element, the conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Kotsch v. District of Columbia, 924 A.2d 1040, 1045—46 (D.C.2007). By contrast, “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities” do not surpass the high threshold of sufficiently “outrageous” conduct. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 248 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (quoting Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D.C.1998)). Moreover, “employer-employee conflicts” generally do not rise to the level of outrageous conduct necessary to sustain a viable IIED claim. Kassem, 513 F.3d at 255 (citing Duncan v. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., 702 A.2d 207, 211-12 (D.C.1997)); Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowne, Inc., 705 A.2d 624, 628 (D.C.1997) (“In the employment context, we traditionally have been demanding in the proof required to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.”). In this case, Hancock’s IIED claim is premised entirely on WHC’s termination of her employment and its alleged failure to accommodate her triage-based restrictions in December 2007, as outlined above. She argues that those actions, coupled with Ms. Russell’s and/or Ms. Nesmith’s alleged remarks that (1) “[she] will no longer work [t]here after today” and (2) asking whether she would rather “sue the hospital” or “keep [her] job,” are sufficient to maintain her IIED claim. (PL’s Opp’n at 26-28). The Court disagrees. To begin with, Hancock herself rightly recognizes that these kinds of “employer-employee disputes” generally cannot suffice as “outrageous” conduct — in fact, she expressly concedes that “the mere discharge of an employee is not considered extreme and outrageous conduct.” (Id at 27). In addition, the D.C. Court of Appeals has rejected IIED claims asserting purportedly “outrageous” conduct in excess of what Hancock alleges here. See, e.g., Kerrigan, 705 A.2d at 628 (finding allegations that plaintiffs supervisor “targeted him for a sexual harassment investigation, manufactured evidence against him in order to establish a false claim of sexual harassment, leaked information from the investigation to other employees, and unjustifiably demoted him,” were insufficient to establish outrageousness); Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 307 (D.C.2000) (finding allegations that plaintiffs employer “wrongfully denied her tenure, reassigned her students and grants, requested that she vacate her office ..., and otherwise discriminated against her” to be inadequate). Despite all this, Hancock insists that her IIED claim is viable because “she became disabled as the result of the surgeries she underwent at the hands of Defendant’s employees.” (PL’s Opp’n at 28). In so arguing, Hancock cites to Drejza v. Vaccaro and assert that the “outrageous” nature of WHC’s arises from its “knowledge that [she was] peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress.” Drejza, 650 A.2d 1308, 1313 (D.C.1994). According to Hancock, because WHC was the cause of her disabil ity — vis-a-vis the surgeries performed at the Hospital — WHC’s subsequent refusal to accommodate that disability and discharge of her employment elevated what might otherwise be non-actionable conduct to a sufficiently outrageous level to sustain her claim. The Court finds this novel argument unpersuasive. To be sure, this case is a far cry from the facts in Drejza, wherein the D.C. Court of Appeals found that a police officer’s allegedly derisive behavior toward a violent rape victim— within one hour after the crime was committed — created a jury question as to whether the officer’s conduct was sufficiently “outrageous.” Id at 1315-17. By contrast, at the time Hancock claims that WHC failed to accommodate and wrongfully terminated her, she had already been living with her disability for more than an entire year and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that she was particularly vulnerable or emotionally sensitive in December 2007. In short, no reasonable jury could conclude that WHC’s employment-based actions were sufficiently extreme or outrageous to sustain Hancock’s IIED claim. Accordingly, the Court will grant WHC summary judgment on this claim.