Opinion ID: 1750964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the substantive value of impeachment testimony.

Text: Was it reversible error for the trial judge to exclude from the jury's consideration as substantive evidence the two prior inconsistent statements made by defendant Burditt as those statements were incorporated in the excluded portions of Burditt's deposition and in the excluded separate record of Burditt's testimony on the stand? For the purpose of this discussion the excluded portion of the deposition and the excluded separate record of Burditt's testimony from the witness stand can be considered together. The questions asked and the answers given in both excluded portions are substantially the same. The net effect of both excluded materials is the same. On both occasions Burditt was interrogated regarding these prior inconsistent statements. On both occasions Burditt admitted having made the prior inconsistent statements, but on neither occasion did he adopt the prior inconsistent statements as true. The status of the law regarding the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements is relatively settled. Such statements are generally admissible for impeachment purposes and are also admissible when they constitute an admission by a party opponent. The effect of such prior inconsistent statements when admitted in evidence is not so clear in the law, and in many cases it becomes important to determine whether the prior inconsistent statement is in fact substantive evidence or whether it is admissible merely to impeach. In his handbook on the law of evidence, Professor Charles T. McCormick states the problem as follows: When a witness has changed sides and altered his story or forgets or claims to forget some fact, and his previous statement is received for impeachment purposes, what effect shall be given to the statement as evidence? Under the generally accepted doctrine the statement is not usable as substantive evidence of the facts stated. The adversary if he so requests is entitled to an instruction to that effect, and, more important, if the only evidence of some essential fact is such a previous statement, the party's case fails. Only two escapes from the lethal effect of this doctrine, where the sole witness to a vital fact has turned coat, are revealed by the cases. The first is the rule that when the hostile witness is an adverse party to the present action, his former inconsistent statement has two faces. As an impeaching statement it would not be substantive evidence, but as the admission of a party opponent it comes in under an exception to the rule excluding hearsay and as such is evidence of its truth. McCormick, Evidence, Ch 5, § 39, pp 73, 74. The second escape from the doctrine as described by Professor McCormick is the case wherein the witness adopts his prior statement as true, making his prior statement and his present testimony one and the same. Before we can consider the effect of the two prior inconsistent statements when offered for the purpose of impeaching Burditt, we must first grapple with the problem of whether the two prior inconsistent statements represented admissions of a party opponent, within the rule holding such admissions to be substantive evidence which can be considered by the jury. The problem here is that the admissions of one defendant are not admissible in evidence against a codefendant. [10] Thus, even if Burditt's prior inconsistent statements were admissions, a matter we need not decide, and thus admissible as substantive evidence against Burditt, they were totally inadmissible as to Roby, and where the appeal is taken only against Roby, the plaintiff cannot be said to have been harmed because the extra-judicial statements of Burditt were not received in evidence against Roby. In passing, it should be noted that there has been some confusion in earlier cases in this Court on this question. The following statement appears in the case of Rosenberg v. Mageda, 251 Mich 696, at page 699: The court charged the jury they might consider the statements made by plaintiff in her signed statement as bearing upon the claim she made at the trial. The statements made by a witness out of court, in conflict with her testimony, could be considered as bearing upon her credibility, but not as substantive evidence in the case. Eno v. Allen, 113 Mich 399; Hutchins v. Murphy, 146 Mich 621. To instruct the jury they could so consider such testimony was error. (Emphasis supplied.) The quoted statement from the Rosenberg Case clearly indicates the confusion which has beset our Court in the past. The Court was talking about a statement made by the plaintiff, and the rule applied by the Court is the general rule only when the witness is not a party to the suit. [11] The recent case of Schratt v. Fila, 371 Mich 238, involved a situation very similar to the present case. There, the Court was dealing with the effect of a prior inconsistent statement by one of the defendants where the appeal was taken by another defendant. In the Schratt Case, this Court concluded that Fila in his interrogation had finally admitted the truth of his prior inconsistent statement. And our Court then said, quoting from Perry v. F. Byrd, Inc. (1937), 280 Mich 580, 582, that, Notwithstanding the fact that a written statement is offered solely for impeachment purposes, so much thereof as a witness at the time adopts by admission of the truth thereof becomes substantive evidence. In its opinion in the Schratt Case the Court goes to some length to show that Fila adopted the prior inconsistent statements as true, thus bringing the case within the rule of Perry v. F. Byrd, Inc ., the second escape route described by McCormick. The Court apparently regarded this fact as controlling. The Court recognized that if Fila adopted the prior inconsistent statements as true, they would constitute substantive evidence against the defendant Ziegler. But if Fila had not adopted the prior inconsistent statements as true, the Court apparently believed that they would not amount to substantive evidence against the defendant Ziegler, the only appellant. The Court either did not consider the question of whether the prior inconsistent statements were admissible as substantive evidence because they were admissions of a party, or else the Court assumed that because these were Fila's admissions, they were inadmissible as to the codefendant Ziegler; and in order to determine whether they had substantive evidentiary value as against Ziegler they would have to be tested by the rules governing prior inconsistent statements by persons who are not parties to the record. It is believed that the approach taken in the Schratt Case was the proper one, and that the substantive effect of the prior inconsistent statements of a codefendant who is not a party to the appeal should be governed by the rules having to do with the prior inconsistent statements of a witness who is not a party to the case. If the extrajudicial statements of Burditt were inadmissible against Roby as admissions of Burditt, what was their evidentiary effect when offered for impeachment purposes? As has already been indicated, the general rule followed in this State for many years is that evidence of prior inconsistent statements when offered for impeachment purposes does not constitute substantive evidence unless the truth of the prior inconsistent statements is admitted when the witness is confronted with them on the stand. [12] This rule has been called the orthodox view and is founded on the reason that such statements are hearsay, that their value rests on the credibility of the declarant who was not under oath and not subject to cross-examination when the statement was made. The rule is one of general acceptance. Nevertheless, there has been some criticism of the rule. [13] Judge Learned Hand in his opinion in Di Carlo v. United States (CA 2, 1925), 6 F2d 364, 368, says: `The possibility that the jury may accept as the truth the earlier statements in preference to those made upon the stand is indeed real, but we find no difficulty in it. If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are nonetheless deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in court. There is no mythical necessity that the case must be decided only in accordance with the truth of words uttered under oath in court.' Mr. Justice OTIS SMITH, writing for the Court in the Schratt Case, states at page 245, as follows: We agree with the view stated in McCormick on Evidence, § 39, p 75: `If the prior statement of the witness is contradictory of his present story on the stand, the opportunity for testing the veracity of the 2 stories by the 2 parties through cross-examination and reexamination is ideal. Too often the cross-examiner of a dubious witness is faced by a smooth, blank wall. The witness has been able throughout to present a narrative which may be false, yet is consistent with itself and offers no foothold for the climber who would look beyond. But the witness who has told one story aforetime and another today has opened the gates to all the vistas of truth which the common-law practice of cross-examination and re-examination was invented to explore. It will go hard, but the 2 questioners will lay bare the sources of the change of face, in forgetfulness, carelessness, pity, terror or greed, and thus reveal which is the true story and which the false. It is hard to escape the view that evidence of a previous inconsistent statement, when the declarant is on the stand to explain it if he can, has in high degree the safeguards of examined testimony.' This quotation from Professor McCormick represents an excerpt from a lengthy and most interesting discussion. The substance of the balance of Professor McCormick's remarks is that he believes that the rule which prohibits the use of impeachment testimony as substantive evidence is not a reasonable one. He is not talking about prior inconsistent statements which are adopted by the witness as he concedes that these are already generally held to be substantive evidence. He points out that the prior inconsistent statement because made closer in time to the fact is based upon a fresher memory and for that reason may even be more reliable than the testimony of the witness in court. He finds support in the English Evidence Act of 1938, and also in the Uniform Rules of Evidence; Rule 63, subd 1, admits as an exception to the hearsay rule `a statement previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter, provided the statement would be admissible if made by declarant while testifying as a witness.' [14] In view of such attacks, some re-examination of the settled rule in Michigan is in order. Prior inconsistent statements used for impeachment purposes are not, strictly speaking, exceptions to the hearsay rule. The hearsay rule excludes from evidence extrajudicial statements which are offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the thing said. Prior inconsistent statements offered for impeachment purposes are not offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the thing said. They are offered merely to show that the statement was made. The mere fact of the making of a prior inconsistent statement has value as bearing on the credibility of the witness. Those who argue for the use of such statements as substantive evidence, that is, as tending to prove the truth of the thing said, reason in this fashion: since the principal reason for the hearsay rule lies in the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant on his statement, the reason for the rule falls whenever the declarant is available for cross-examination. Under this line of reasoning, prior consistent statements, as well as prior inconsistent statements, would be admissible substantive evidence whenever the declarant was on the witness stand. The difficulty with this argument is that it does not recognize the real nature of cross-examination. Cross-examination presupposes a witness who affirms a thing being examined by a lawyer who would have him deny it, or a witness who denies a thing being examined by a lawyer who would have him affirm it. Cross-examination is in its essence an adversary proceeding. The extent to which the cross-examiner is able to shake the witness, or induce him to equivocate is the very measure of the cross-examiner's success. Bearing in mind that when the witness adopts the prior statement his prior statement becomes his present testimony, and becomes admissible substantive evidence by settled law, it is readily apparent that the present discussion only relates to those cases where the witness does not adopt his prior statement as true. If he refuses to adopt his prior statement as true, there can be no adversary cross-examination upon it. If he refuses to affirm, no question can be put to him which would shake his own confidence in his affirmation. It is interesting to note that Uniform Rule 63, subd 1, silently concedes its own frailty when it makes reference to the witness being available for cross-examination with respect to the prior statement and its subject matter, rather than cross-examination upon the prior statement. If a prior inconsistent statement is received as substantive evidence though not adopted as true, it is thereby given a special indestructible status far superior to direct sworn testimony from the witness stand. One who would cross-examine upon such a statement is denied even the basic technique of asking the witness to repeat the statement. The would-be cross-examiner is not only denied the right to be the declarant's adversary, he is left with no choice but to become the witness' friend, protector and savior. Though he may be permitted to ask questions in the form of cross-examination, the substance of his effort will be re-direct examination and rehabilitation. The reason is simple. The witness cannot recant! Every cross-examiner tries to bring the witness to the point where he changes his story  literally eats his words  in the presence of the jury. A statement made from the witness stand is not beyond total recall by the witness. Stale friendly cross-examination with respect to a prior extrajudicial statement is no substitute for timely, adversary cross-examination upon a statement. The importance of this distinction is clearly seen when we analyze the case before us. The statement Burditt gave to the police officer, and which plaintiff would have the jury consider as substantive evidence, was as follows: Q. William you said earlier that a woman was on your side when you hit, so would you say that the man in the car was driving?
Trial lawyers are keenly aware of the vulnerability of hadda witnesses and musta witnesses. When a witness says that the driver had to have been speeding, or must have swerved this way or that way, his very choice of verbs betrays that he is stating his conclusions rather than his observations. For the purpose of demonstrating the difference between timely and stale cross-examination, let us suppose that a cross-examiner had been present at the time Burditt made his statement to the police officer. And let us suppose, for the sake of discussion, that the following had taken place: Q. William, you say that the man had to have been driving, is that right? A. Yes. Q. Did you see the man behind the wheel before the accident? A. No. Q. Did you see the man behind the wheel after the accident? A. No. Q. Did you ever see the man in the car? A. No. Q. Why then, do you say that the man had to have been driving? A. Because when I first looked over there after the accident, the woman was lying out of the door on the passenger's side, and if she was on the passenger's side, she must have been the passenger and the man had to have been the driver. Q. Isn't it possible that the man was thrown out of the car from the passenger's side and the woman was thrown across the front seat from the driver's seat? A. Yes, that's possible. Q. Do you still say that the man had to have been driving? A. No, I guess not. Now let us see whether the stale cross-examination of Burditt with respect to his statement, as envisioned by the Uniform Rule and advocated by Professor McCormick, would have the same effect: Q. William, you say that the man had to have been driving, is that right? A. No, I'm not saying that. Q. Well that's what you told the police officer, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. Did you see the man behind the wheel before the accident? A. No. Q. Did you see the man behind the wheel after the accident? A. No. Q. Did you ever see the man in the car? A. No. Q. Why then did you tell the police officer that the man had to have been driving? A. Because when I first looked over there after the accident, the woman was lying out of the door on the passenger's side, and if she was on the passenger's side, she must have been the passenger and the man had to have been the driver. Q. Isn't it possible that the man was thrown out of the car from the passenger's side and the woman was thrown across the front seat from the driver's side? A. Yes, that's possible. At this point, the cross-examiner is stymied. The crucial question which would give the witness a chance to change his story, Do you still say that the man had to have been driving? is meaningless. The witness has already testified that he is not still saying that the man had to have been driving. Instead of a plunge to the jugular, the examiner will have to be satisfied with applying a bandage. It would sound something like this: Q. And isn't this the reason why the story you are telling us today is different from the story you told the police officer? or, Q. And isn't it true that if you had thought of that possibility at the time, you never would have told the police officer that the man had to have been driving the car? By these hypothetical examples we have tried to show the windmill-fighting nature of stale cross-examination with respect to the prior statement. No matter how deadly the thrust of the cross-examiner, the ghost of the prior statement stands. His questions will always sound like attempts to permit the witness to explain why he changed his story before coming to court, with the jury being left to infer that he might have been induced to change his story in the intervening months or years, for some unrevealed and sinister reason. When a cross-examiner on timely cross-examination succeeds in getting the witness to change his story, the integrity of the recantation is apparent, and his original, recanted version no longer stands as substantive evidence. If the only evidence of an essential fact in a lawsuit were a statement made from the witness stand which the witness himself completely recanted and repudiated before he left the witness stand, no one would seriously urge that a jury question had been made out. Scholarly legal writings are useful and necessary. When they challenge the established rules, the courts have an obligation to re-examine those rules and measure the theoretical criticism against the hard facts of a living system of justice. This opinion has been longer than we would have liked, but there seemed to be a need. To summarize then:

The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are affirmed, with costs to the appellee.