Opinion ID: 464791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Department's Interpretation of Its Statute

Text: 39 If the Union had challenged only the Department's decision not to take enforcement action against Kawasaki and the Tate firm, or even against this entire genus of practices, our task would be completed. The Union has, however, consistently challenged the Department's legal determinations made in its Statement of Reasons that no reports were required for indirect persuasion of employees through supervisors, and for payments to supervisors to discourage unionization. Nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act or in the holding or policy of Heckler v. Chaney, precludes review of a proper plaintiff's timely challenge of an agency's announcement of its interpretation of a statute. 40 Chaney reasoned that courts are inherently unsuited for the task of reviewing an agency's decision on where and when to pursue enforcement action. First, the Court pointed out that given an agency's inability to take enforcement action against each and every violation, the decision on where to expend its enforcement resources was inherently part of the agency's discretionary authority. Chaney, 105 S.Ct. at 1656. Second, the Court pointed out that non-enforcement decisions usually do not involve the exercise of coercive power over individuals' liberty or property rights, and thus d[o] not infringe upon areas that courts are called upon to correct. Id. (emphasis deleted). Third, the Court pointed out that when an agency decides not to act there is often no focus for judicial review. Id. Finally, the Court pointed out the similarities between an agency's decision not to take enforcement action and a prosecutor's traditionally nonreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Id. Given all of these factors, Chaney reaffirmed the  'recognized position that Sec. 701(a)(2) applies in certain circumstances where courts are unqualified to decide whether an agency has abused its discretion.'  Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 45 (D.C.Cir.1985) (quoting Cardoza v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1542, 1549 (7th Cir.1985)). 41 By contrast, when a legal challenge focuses on an announcement of a substantive statutory interpretation, courts are emphatically qualified to decide whether an agency has acted outside of the bounds of reason. 10 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782 n. 9, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction); Amalgamated Transit Union International, AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 767 F.2d 939, 944 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1985) (contrasting nonreviewable discretionary authority with reviewable agency determination of its statutory authority). Even if a statutory interpretation is announced in the course of a nonenforcement decision, that does not mean that it escapes review altogether. Cf. International Union of Bricklayers v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C.Cir.1985) (appellant could challenge underlying legal standard governing INS operations even though it could not challenge individual determinations on whether aliens should be admitted). Indeed, it seems almost ludicrous to suggest that there is no law to apply in reviewing whether an agency has reasonably interpreted a law. 42 This court's recent decision in Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683 (D.C.Cir.1985), is not to the contrary. In Schering, the court held that Chaney precluded review of an agency's agreement not to take enforcement action against a manufacturer of an animal drug. The court stressed that the agreement merely embodie[d] a legitimate exercise of enforcement discretion, at 687, and could not be characterized as a decision affecting the underlying legal or factual issues. Id. at 685. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs challenge the interpretation of the statute precisely because of the immediate and certain effect that it has on employers' and consultants' reporting duties. There are real and cognizable practical differences distinguishing an agency's announcement of how it will exercise its discretion, from an agency's announcement of what a citizen's duties are under a statute like the LMRDA that depends primarily upon self-enforcement. See infra at 247, 248-49 & n. 15. 43 Were we to accept the Department's contention, we would be handing agencies carte blanche to avoid review by announcing new interpretations of statutes only in the context of decisions not to take enforcement action. Of course, agencies have wide leeway in choosing to announce rules and interpretations in the course of adjudications. See SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 202-03, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580-81, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); infra at 248. But our approval of the authority to interpret and implement statutory authority through adjudications has always contemplated the availability of judicial review to ensure that the announced interpretations are consistent with the governing statute. Nothing in Heckler v. Chaney changed any of this.