Opinion ID: 2615303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judgment Granting Peremptory Writ of Mandate

Text: An Alternative Writ of Mandate and Order to Show Cause having issued herein on the 14th day of October, 1959, in the above-entitled matter and the same having come regularly before me for hearing on the 22nd day of October, 1959, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock A.M. in Department No. 2 of the above-entitled court, pursuant to said Order to Show Cause, so issued in connection with said Alternative Writ of Mandate, William A. Brolin and Thomas C. Malee, Esqs., appearing as attorneys for Relators and Thomas Mahan, Esq., appearing as attorney for defendants, at which time a Motion to Quash was argued and by the Court denied, and counsel for the defendants elected to stand on said Motion, and hearing on said Order for Writ came on for hearing, no Answer by the defendants having been filed and the matter submitted upon the pleadings of the Relators, together with oral evidence taken in their behalf and exhibits introduced upon their behalf and the matter was then submitted to the Court for its decision and determination, and by the Court taken under advisement. The Court being now fully advised as to the law and the facts in the premises, finds and orders that a peremptory writ of mandate should be issued in the premises and that said Relators have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; It Is Hereby Ordered, and this Does Order, that a Peremptory Writ of Mandate in due form of law be issued requiring the defendants to rescind their orders of August 25 and September 22, A.D. 1959, with reference to the relief to be granted to those residents of those counties anticipating grants-in-aid to those individuals or families affected by the strike in the copper industry; and particularly to the families and members of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelterworkers, an unincorporated association, and said defendants are hereby Ordered to grant to said members and their families herein mentioned, the same general relief assistance accorded to applicants and recipients for general relief in the same class as the members herein mentioned and to grant them the same equal rights under said rules and regulations and general relief assistance which is compatible with standards of decency and health and in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of the State of Montana, and any member or members of said Union are not to be discriminated against solely upon the fact that they are a member of said Union and at the present time unemployed by reason of a strike by the members of their union in various cities in the State of Montana. It Is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that a Writ of Mandate be issued by the Clerk of this Court and under the seal thereof, commanding the Montana State Department of Public Welfare, Dr. M.F. Keller, M.W. Edwards, Mrs. Ray Nelson, Mrs. Dan Williams and H.A. Tibbals, as members thereof, and W.J. Fouse, as State Administrator of Public Welfare, comprising the State Board of Public Welfare of the State of Montana, to immediately rescind their previous orders, wherein the individuals and members of that class of individuals involved in this action are to receive less general relief assistance than other general relief recipients in the same class within the State of Montana and to make such arrangements and provisions therefor as required by law. It Is Further Ordered that defendants make known to this Court on the 6th day of November, 1959, how they have executed this Writ and have with them, then and there, this Writ. It Is Further Ordered and Decreed that the Relators have and recover of and from the State of Montana, their costs and disbursements necessarily incurred in this action, and It Is Further Ordered that the Relators have and recover from the State of Montana, the sum of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars, it appearing that the Relators have suffered damage in that amount to date, by reason of the necessity on their part of employing counsel to represent them herein and it appearing to the Court that the respondents appeared and made defense in this proceeding in good faith. Dated this 28th day of October, 1959. /s/ T.E. Downey, District Judge. Filed: October 29, 1959. The Appeal. On November 4, 1959, the respondents appealed to this court from the foregoing order and judgment so given, made and entered. The Evidence. Ample proof to sustain the above-quoted order and judgment was supplied by the following uncontroverted testimony given, without objection, by the relator, William Gatley, at the October 22, 1959, hearing before District Judge T.E. Downey, as shown by the record now before this court, viz.: William Gatley, one of the Relators, being first duly sworn, testified as follows, to-wit: Direct Examination by Mr. Thomas Malee: Q. State your name, please? A. William Gatley. Q. Are you the William Gatley who appears as a relator in the case before the Court? A. I am. Q. Mr. Gatley, have you needed and required relief? A. I have. Q. That was by reason of necessity? A. Yes. Q. Have you made your application for such relief? A. Yes, I have. Q. Did you receive relief? A. Yes, I received some help. Q. Will you explain to the Court the circumstances under which you received this relief? A. Well, being out of work, I applied for it in August and I received help in September. Q. In September? A. Yes. Q. Have you subsequently; and after the order that we have alleged here to be illegal, made application for relief? A. Yes. Q. Were you advised  what advice was given to you concerning your relief thereafter? A. Well, that I was to get 50 percent. Q. You were no longer entitled to the relief you had formerly gotten? A. I got 50 percent yes. Q. Had you received relief in that proportion since? A. Yes, I received it on October 5th. Q. That was on the basis of 50 percent of what others in like position would have received? A. Yes. Q. Now, Mr. Gatley, what was your business or occupation? A. Miner. Q. At the present time, are you now employed? A. No. Q. Will you state to the Court the reason for your unemployment? A. We are on strike. Q. You are on strike? A. Yes. Q. Do you belong to any organization or organizations with relation to labor? A. The International Mine, Mill and Smelterworkers and Local No. 1. Q. After you were denied relief, did you, by any means, appear before the State Welfare Board to protest their action? A. No, I protested through our joint negotiating organizations. Q. Now, Mr. Gatley, did you authorize the negotiations committee of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelterworkers to appear for you? A. Yes, I did. Q. Did you request that they do so? A. Yes, I did. Q. Were there others that did likewise? A. There's lots of them  over 1200 men in our union hall at one meeting that authorized them. Q. The authority for the committees appearance before the State Board was given personally by you and by others? A. Yes. Q. They were authorized then, to protest the ruling concerning your treatment before the board? A. Yes. Q. Do you know whether they did that? A. They appeared here  this is the first time I had been on, but they've got my authority to go ahead and appear here on the 13th, I guess, the first time. Q. Do you know whether or not the committee, in compliance with your request, did make a protest to the state board? A. I don't know if they made one separate on my case or not. Q. No, no, on conjunction with all, did they make a protest? A. Oh, they've protested all the cases. Q. In your affidavit, you have alleged that occurred on September 22nd, 1959, is that correct? A. Yes. Q. You knew they were going to make this protest? A. Yes. Q. And at your request? A. Yes. Q. And with your consent? A. Yes. Q. Since that time, your relief orders have been 50% of what they would otherwise have been? A. Yes. Q. And you have been so ordered by the Board that this would continue, is that correct? A. That was my orders. Q. That is all. Mr. Mahan: No cross-examination. Witness, William Gatley, Excused. As before noted, at the hearing of October 22, 1959, before Judge Downey, the respondents, through their counsel, Thomas H. Mahan, Esq., expressly elected to rest their case and to stand solely upon their motions to quash the alternative writ of mandate theretofore issued without pleading further or introducing any evidence whatsoever. As was said by this court in State ex rel. Du Fresne v. Leslie, 100 Mont. 449, at page 452, 50 Pac. (2d) 959, at page 961, 101 A.L.R. 1329, a mandamus proceeding: The motion to quash, being equivalent to a general demurrer, brings the controversy before us on the law. In Bailey v. Edwards, 47 Mont. 363, at pages 371, 372, 133 Pac. 1095, at page 1097, this court said: The chapter of our Code relating to mandamus has been part of our written law since the territory was organized (Bannack Statutes, p. 123, et seq.; Codified Stats. 1872, p. 206 et seq.; Rev. Stats. 1879, p. 142 et seq.; Comp. Stats. 1887, p. 206 et seq.; Code Civ. Proc. 1895, sec. 1960 et seq.); and very early in our history it was settled that mandamus is not a civil action and that the Statute of Anne is not in force with us (Chumasero v. Potts, 2 Mont. 242, 258, et seq.; Territory ex rel. Tanner v. Potts, 3 Mont. 364, 366). In Chumasero v. Potts, this court, touching the nature of mandamus said: `To call this an action or suit at law would certainly be a misnomer.    The manner in which the term civil action is used in these two sections [sections 522, 529, Civil Practice Act, 1872; Rev. Codes 1907, secs. 7218, 7225] shows conclusively that our legislative assembly did not consider that the proceedings in mandamus were a civil action.    The civil action    has reference exclusively to private    wrongs.    What is the nature of the proceeding called mandamus ? It is not applicable as a redress for mere private wrongs.    It can be resorted to only in those cases where the matter in dispute, in theory concerns the public and in which the public has an interest.    The enforcement of the writ may incidentally, and as a result, affect private rights, but this is not the prime object of the issuance of the writ.    The attempt to classify the proceedings in mandamus is always futile. It is sui generis. Undoubtedly it may be called an extraordinary legal remedy, civil in its nature.   ' But, `being a remedy to enforce public rights and not for the enforcement of private rights or the prevention or redress of private wrongs, it is not a civil action.' Again, in the recent case of State ex rel. Stuewe v. Hindson, 44 Mont. 429, 442, 120 Pac. 485, we find the following: `This proceeding is essentially ex relatione. While Stuewe is nominally the complaining party, the taxpayers of Lewis and Clark county constitute the real party in interest; and if it can be said that from the allegations contained in the affidavit and the alternative writ the taxpayers of the county are entitled to relief of any character, which can be granted in this proceeding, it is the duty of the courts to extend that relief, whether this relator individually desires it, or the Attorney General opposes it. In our determination, we are not bound by the prayer of the relator, but may search the affidavit, and order such relief as the facts stated may warrant; for the relief is granted, not to Stuewe individually, but to the public, the real party in interest.' Inferences, therefore, founded upon the Statute of Anne or upon the hypothesis that mandamus is a civil action, can have no validity to require such a construction of section 7224, Revised Codes, as respondent here seeks to evoke. In State ex rel. Grant v. Eaton, 114 Mont. 199, at pages 203, 204, 133 Pac. (2d) 588, at page 590, a mandamus proceeding, this court said: The respondents, represented by the Attorney General, have filed motions to quash upon the ground that the facts stated in the petition and the alternative writ are insufficient to constitute a cause of action or to show that relator is entitled to a writ of mandate. The facts as stated    stand uncontroverted. The controversy is thus brought to this court on the law. In State ex rel. Opheim v. State Fish and Game Commission, 133 Mont. 362, 323 Pac. (2d) 1116, 1118, a mandamus proceeding, this court said: The motion to quash here performs the function of a general demurrer and brings the controversy before the court on the law. The Question. The question presented to this court by this appeal, simply stated, is: Do the relators' applications fully supported by the testimony introduced by them state and show relators to be entitled to the writ issued and the judgment entered herein? Our answer must be and it is in the affirmative. This proceeding does not attempt to control the Welfare Department's discretion, except insofar as it asks that the department obey the clear command of the statutes. There are many factors that must be taken into consideration to determine what amount of relief assistance any applicant will receive. This proceeding does not seek to command or control the discretion of the Public Welfare Board over the usual and ordinary factors lawfully influencing the amount of assistance which an applicant may be entitled to receive. Admittedly married couples may receive more than single persons and the age of children in equal sized families may determine that one family be given more assistance than another. What this proceeding seeks is equal consideration for persons equally situated. The statutes so demand and command that the Welfare Act must be administered on an equal basis to all. This proceeding seeks enforcement of that which the statutes set out as a right of the welfare recipient. It seeks to prevent the State Welfare Board from discriminating against welfare recipients because of the source of their unemployment and cause or reasons for welfare need. Nothing in the law gives the State Welfare Board the right to discriminate against the applicants for relief upon such grounds or for such reasons. The orders of the State Welfare Board of which complaint is here made were and are discriminatory and illegal. Such rulings and orders ignored and denied to these relators the plain legal rights expressly accorded them under the provisions of the Welfare Act. It is ordered that the judgment and order given and made herein by District Judge T.E. Downey, in and for the District Court for Silver Bow County, on October 22, 1959, be and the same are hereby, affirmed in toto. BOTTOMLY, J., concur.