Opinion ID: 894680
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Test-Vial Discharge and the Domestic Sewage Exclusion

Text: Street also contends the court of appeals erred in finding as a matter of law that Street, through Corbin, arranged for the disposal of solid waste by pouring the PCE mixture produced from the titration tests down the drain. Section 361.271 imposes liability on those who are responsible for solid waste, and Street argues that it is not an arranger because the mixture Corbin disposed of does not constitute solid waste under the Act. SWDA defines solid waste in pertinent part as follows: (34) Subject to the limitations of 42 U.S.C. Section 6903(27) and 40 C.F.R. Section 261.4(a), `solid waste' means garbage, rubbish, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility, and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, municipal, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations and from community and institutional activities. The term: (A) does not include: (i) solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage ...; and .... (B) does include hazardous substances for the purposes of Sections 361.271 through 361.277, 361.280, and 361.343 through 361.345. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.003(34). The limitations of 42 U.S.C. Section 6903(27) and 40 C.F.R. Section 261.4(a), to which the definition refers, are known as the domestic sewage exclusions. Section 6903(27), the statutory domestic sewage exclusion, is a provision of RCRA which states that the term solid waste does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). Section 261.4(a), the regulatory domestic sewage exclusion, was implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to its authority under RCRA and states that the term solid waste does not include domestic sewage or [a]ny mixture of domestic sewage and other wastes that passes through a sewer system to a publicly-owned treatment works for treatment. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(1) (2004). SWDA's exclusion, cited above, is similar. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.003(34)(A)(i) (the term solid waste does not include... solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage). Street contends that these RCRA statutory and regulatory exclusions apply to the test-vial mixture Corbin poured down the sinks and commodes at Pilgrim's facilities. In response, Pilgrim argues that the definition of solid waste is more restrictive for those portions of SWDA that impose detailed permitting, record keeping, and regulatory requirements, but more expansive for SWDA's provisions that deal with remediation and cost recovery. That is why, Pilgrim claims, the solid waste definition expressly provides that the term does include hazardous substances for purposes of Sections 361.271 through 361.277, 361.280, and 361.343 through 361.345 [SWDA's remediation and cost-recovery provisions]. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.003(34)(B). Because SWDA, like CERCLA, defines a hazardous substance to include pollutants like PCE listed under 42 U.S.C. § 7412, [13] Pilgrim contends that PCE cannot be exempted from the definition of solid waste for cost-recovery purposes, notwithstanding the domestic sewage exclusion. While SWDA's definition of solid waste is not a model of clarity and Pilgrim's argument has support in subsection (B)'s language, we disagree that the federal domestic sewage exclusions have no application here. The entire SWDA definition of solid waste, including subsection (B) upon which Pilgrim relies, is expressly subject to the limitations of 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) and 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a), which contain the domestic sewage exclusions. In so holding, we recognize that these exclusions do not similarly affect the definition of hazardous substance under CERCLA. As we have said, RCRA and CERCLA are complementary, but independent, environmental statutes. CERCLA was enacted after RCRA because the need to clean up hazardous waste sites was deemed impossible within the legal remedies then provided. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir.1989) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980)). RCRA regulates the disposal of solid wastes, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27), and under RCRA, hazardous waste is a solid waste with certain properties. Id. § 6903(5). CERCLA, on the other hand, imposes liability on parties who have released hazardous substances into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). The Second Circuit has noted that Congress and the EPA have carefully distinguished between wastes, to which the Resource and Recovery Act applies, and substances, to which CERCLA applies. Murtha, 958 F.2d at 1202 (emphasis in original). Courts are in agreement that exemptions under RCRA do not extend so far as to exclude those materials from the definition of hazardous substances under CERCLA. See id. at 1203 (citing Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United States EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 927 (D.C.Cir.1985), Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 699 F.Supp. 827, 833 (D.Idaho 1987), aff'd, 882 F.2d 392 (9th Cir.1989), United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F.Supp. 1143, 1147 (D.Ariz.1984), and Transp. Leasing Co. v. California, 32 E.R.C. 1499, 1501, 1990 WL 300777 (C.D.Cal.1990)). In addition, the EPA has noted that compliance with the RCRA Subpart C regulations, which contain record-keeping, notification, and permit requirements, merely reduces the likelihood of liability arising under CERCLA. Id. at 1202 (citing EPA Directive No. 9574.00-1, Clarification of Issues Pertaining to Household Hazardous Waste Collection Programs, at 2 (Nov. 1, 1988)). Finally, the regulatory domestic sewage exclusion has limited applicability within RCRA itself. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(b)(1) (2004) (The definition of solid waste contained in this Part applies only to wastes that also are hazardous for purposes of the regulations implementing Subtitle C of RCRA.); id. § 261.1(b)(2) (This part identifies only some of the materials which are solid wastes and hazardous wastes under Sections 3007, 3013, and 7003 of RCRA.); see also Hazardous Substances: Notification of Treatment, Storage and Disposal Facilities, 46 Fed.Reg. 22,144, 22,145 (Apr. 15, 1981) (noting that the regulatory domestic sewage exclusion exempts wastes [that] might otherwise be considered hazardous wastes). Thus, CERCLA's definition of hazardous substances is not affected by either the statutory or regulatory sewage exclusion. However, we are bound by the plain language of section 361.003(34) of SWDA, in which the Legislature chose to limit the definition of solid waste by both 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) and 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a). Accordingly, if Corbin's disposal of the test-vial PCE mixture fits within RCRA's statutory or regulatory domestic sewage exclusions, we must give the exclusions effect. Street contends that the PCE mixture Corbin poured down the facilities' sinks and commodes falls under either the statutory or regulatory domestic sewage exclusion. The rationale behind both exclusions is that hazardous wastes discharged to POTWs [publicly owned treatment works] will be comprehensively regulated under the pretreatment provisions of the Clean Water Act, thus making RCRA regulation redundant. People v. Sangani, 22 Cal.App.4th 1120, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 158, 163 (Ct.App.1994). As the scope of each exclusion is not identical, we examine each in turn. The statutory exclusion, located in RCRA's definitional section, states that [t]he term `solid waste' means any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant ... but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage .... 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (emphasis added). Street contends the court of appeals erroneously relied on Comite Pro Rescate De La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority ( PRASA II ), in which Street claims the First Circuit held only that waste disposed of in a solely industrial sewer line did not fall within the statutory domestic sewage exclusion because domestic sewage was limited to sewage that comes from residences. 888 F.2d 180, 184-86 (1st Cir.1989). Street claims the court of appeals ignored PRASA II's suggestion that the outcome might be different had the industrial sewer lines at issue later connected to lines that carried domestic waste. Id. at 187-88. Street argues that Pilgrim failed to establish that the sewer lines from each plant did not connect to lines carrying wastewater from residences and therefore waived the issue. Alternatively, Street asserts that there exists at least a fact issue regarding the exclusion's application. We agree with the court of appeals that the reasoning in Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, CIV. No. S-91-760DFL/GGH, 1993 WL 217429 (E.D.Cal. Jan.21, 1993), upon which it relied, is persuasive; however, we also agree with Street that there is a fact issue in this case as to whether the exclusion applies. In Lincoln Properties, the court examined whether the exclusion precluded imposing RCRA liability for contamination under a dry-cleaning facility caused by leaking pipes. Concluding that the exclusion did not apply, the court stated,  [T]he PCE at issue  the PCE that leaked into the soil and groundwater  did not mix with the sewage from residential sources and was therefore never `solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage.' Id. at  (emphasis in original). Similarly, the contamination for which Pilgrim seeks contribution from Street is alleged to have occurred from leaks in sewage pipes on the property occupied by the dry-cleaning facilities. Thus, to the extent PCE leaked from those pipes, it never had the opportunity to mix with any potential domestic waste downstream, and the subsequent configuration of the pipes is irrelevant to our inquiry under 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). But whether the sewage pipes leaked at Pilgrim's properties was a disputed issue at trial with conflicting expert testimony. Because there is a fact issue as to whether the pipes leaked, we cannot say as a matter of law that the statutory domestic sewage exclusion did not prevent the waste Corbin disposed of from qualifying as solid waste. For the same reason, although we do not agree entirely with Street's rationale, there is a fact issue as to whether the mixture Corbin disposed of falls within the regulatory domestic sewage exclusion, which is arguably broader than the statutory exclusion. The EPA promulgated this regulation pursuant to Subtitle C of RCRA. The regulation provides: The following materials are not solid wastes for the purposes of this part: (1) (i) Domestic sewage; and (ii) Any mixture of domestic sewage and other wastes that passes through a sewer system to a publicly-owned treatment works for treatment. Domestic sewage means untreated sanitary wastes that pass through a sewer system. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(1) (2004). Street cites the EPA order adopting the rule to support its contention that the exclusion exempts material from regulation the instant it enters a sewer system that will eventually mix with domestic sewage and regardless of whether the waste leaks from the sewer line before the mixture with domestic sewage occurs. See Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed.Reg. 33084, 33097 (May 19, 1980) (stating that waste falls within the domestic sewage exemption when it first enters a sewer system that will mix it with sanitary wastes prior to storage or treatment by a POTW) (emphasis added); Comite Pro Rescate De La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 693 F.Supp. 1324, 1331 (D.Puerto Rico 1988) ( PRASA I ), vacated on other grounds, 888 F.2d 180 (1st Cir.1989). However, further review of the relevant document reveals that Street has taken this statement out of context to support its argument. In this same publication, the EPA explains the above statement: In light of the fact that the wastes will be mixed prior to treatment and that the mixture will be properly treated by the POTW, the EPA believes that the need for administrative clarity in this otherwise complicated regulatory program warrants such an approach. 45 Fed.Reg. at 33097. The EPA's rationale for its conclusion would be defeated by Street's interpretation, as such waste would fall outside the ambit of both RCRA and the Clean Water Act. See Lincoln Props., 1993 WL 217429, at  (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1317) (The Clean Water Act ... establishes pretreatment standards for discharges into a `publicly owned treatment works'; it does not apply to contaminants that are discharged into groundwater and never reach a `treatment works.'); see also PRASA II, 888 F.2d at 186 (deferring to the EPA's reading of the regulatory domestic sewage exclusion and holding that it does not apply to sanitary wastes originating at the workplace). The same reasoning renders immaterial Street's argument that a fact issue exists regarding whether the pipes at Pilgrim's facilities connected to residential lines. However, the fact issue regarding the sewage pipe leaks at Pilgrim's facilities is highly relevant and prohibits us from determining conclusively whether or not the regulatory exclusion applies. Because there is conflicting testimony that raises a fact issue as to whether the sewage pipes leaked at Pilgrim's facilities, we cannot determine as a matter of law whether the PCE mixture Corbin poured down the drains at Pilgrim's facilities qualifies as solid waste subject to SWDA regulation, and thus whether Corbin's actions constitute an arrangement for the disposal of solid waste under the Act. The court of appeals therefore erred in holding that the exclusions do not apply, as Street is entitled to have fact questions resolved in the trial court.