Opinion ID: 1196062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The broad contours of Article III standing are well known. We must first decide whether a plaintiff has suffered sufficient injury to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997); Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.2004). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the three elements of Article III standing: (1) he or she has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Statutory standing is the second part of the inquiry. Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1175. If a plaintiff has shown sufficient injury to satisfy Article III, but has not been granted statutory standing, the suit must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because the plaintiff cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 975 n. 7 (9th Cir.2008) (citing Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1175).
In the first claim for relief, Salmon Spawning alleged that the 1999 BiOp authorizing the United States' entry into the Treaty was arbitrary and capricious in violation of § 5 of the APA, and also a violation of ESA §§ 7 and 9. Specifically, the groups claimed that the BiOp improperly compared only the Treaty's effect on harvest rates to harvest rates in the absence of the Treaty, instead of aggregating the effects of take under the Treaty, other harvest impacts, and non-harvest impacts; failed to evaluate the effects of take under the Treaty on the recovery and survival of listed salmon; evaluated only a fraction of the Puget Sound chinook populations; did not develop or apply a biologically based target exploitation rate in its jeopardy evaluation of Upper Willamette chinook; studied harvest impacts on the strongest components of the Lower Columbia chinook population, but not the weaker ones; and failed to analyze or propose reasonable and prudent measures or alternatives that would force the fisheries to target more selectively hatchery-origin salmon. [2] In short, the conservationists challenge the biological foundation for the Treaty. To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of the Article III inquiry, a plaintiff asserting a procedural injury must show that the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Public Citizen v. Dep't of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1015 (9th Cir.2003), rev'd on other grounds, 541 U.S. 752, 124 S.Ct. 2204, 159 L.Ed.2d 60 (2004) (quoting Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir.2001))). The conservation groups alleged in their complaint that they have various scientific, educational, aesthetic, recreational, spiritual, conservation, economic, and business interests in the salmon. The § 7 consultation procedures in questionfor example, the requirements that the BiOp evaluate both the recovery and survival of listed species, and that RPA or reasonable and prudent measures are proposedprotect these concrete interests. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (defining, for purposes of ESA § 7(a)(2), to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (requiring the proposal of RPA if jeopardy is found). These procedures are designed to advance the ESA's overall goal of species preservation, and thus the groups' specific goals as to salmon preservation, by ensuring agency compliance with the ESA's substantive provisions. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 176, 117 S.Ct. 1154. A showing of procedural injury lessens a plaintiff's burden on the last two prongs of the Article III standing inquiry, causation and redressibility. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (stating that the person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressibility and immediacy.). Plaintiffs alleging procedural injury must show only that they have a procedural right that, if exercised, could protect their concrete interests. Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir.2005) (emphasis in original), overruled on other grounds by Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007). It is at this step of the standing analysis that the conservation groups stumble. The BiOp considered two proposed agency actions, only one of which is at issue in this appeal: the formal commitment of the U.S. to implement its fishery obligations consistent with, and for the duration of, the new PST agreement essentially a final U.S. approval of the agreement. [3] The BiOp recognized that, once the United States entered into the Treaty, fishing levels in Canada will be set by the provisions of the agreement for its duration, and cannot be re-visited except as may otherwise be agreed by both countries.  (emphasis added). The relationship between the BiOp and the Treaty sets up a dichotomy of interests that sinks the effort to establish Article III standing for the first two claims; if the groups were successful in establishing that NMFS failed to comply with the procedural requirements of ESA § 7 in deciding whether the United States' entrance into the Treaty would jeopardize listed species, the procedurally flawed consultation and defective BiOp could theoretically be set aside. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. But, a court could not set aside the next, and more significant, link in the chainthe United States' entrance into the Treaty. While the United States and Canada can decide to withdraw from the Treaty, that is a decision committed to the Executive Branch, and we may not order the State Department to withdraw from it. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 652-53 (9th Cir.1993) (deciding not to enforce a statute that required the Executive Branch to negotiate with foreign nations, as that branch alone has the exclusive power to conduct foreign relations). So, while the groups correctly allege that they have a right to a procedurally sound consultation, they cannot demonstrate that that right, if exercised, could protect their concrete interests. Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 957. Plaintiffs alleging procedural injury can often establish redressibility with little difficulty, because they need to show only that the relief requestedthat the agency follow the correct proceduresmay influence the agency's ultimate decision of whether to take or refrain from taking a certain action. See, e.g., Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 779 (9th Cir.2006). This is not a high bar to meet. But, the redressibility requirement is not toothless in procedural injury cases. Here, if a court were to give the groups the remedy that they seekthat NMFS and the State Department follow the proper procedures during a new § 7 consultation processthe ultimate agency decision of whether to enter into the Treaty with Canada, made nine years ago, could never be influenced. In effect, if we rule against the groups' claim of procedural injury, they will continue to suffer injury; and, if we rule in their favor, they will still suffer injury because we cannot undo the Treaty. Cf. id. That the BiOp authorized the United States to enter into a Treaty with a foreign sovereign foreclose[s] our ability to provide effective relief. Id. Perhaps recognizing their redressibility quandary, the conservation groups assert that the BiOp authorized agency actions broader than the State Department's entrance into the Treaty. [4] But, this semantic attempt to turn the BiOp into a freestanding basis for relief fails. The agency action that the BiOp authorized was the United States' entrance into the Treaty. And, although we can set aside the BiOp, we cannot remedy the harm asserted. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the first claim for lack of standing.
In its second claim for relief, Salmon Spawning asserted that the agencies' and officials' continued participation in the implementation of the Treaty jeopardized listed salmon in violation of ESA § 7(a)(2), and that such participation was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Section 7(a)(2) confers upon agencies that are considering discretionary actions an affirmative do-no-harm obligation when their actions could cause harm to an endangered species. Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 965. This duty is separate from an agency's responsibility to comply with the procedures required by § 7. See id. at 957 (noting that a plaintiff may allege both procedural and substantive violations of the ESA). In other words, even if an action agency has satisfied the ESA's consultation requirements, a court may conclude that the agency has not complied with its substantive duty to avoid jeopardy. Id. So, in contrast to its first claim, which focused on alleged procedural flaws that occurred during the pre-Treaty consultation process, Salmon Spawning's second claim challenges the agencies' decision to continue allowing excessive Canadian harvesting now that the United States is a party to the Treaty. Even assuming that Salmon Spawning meets the injury-in-fact requirementby asserting that its scientific, educational, aesthetic, recreational, economic, and business interests in the listed species will continue to be harmed by the failure to correct overharvesting by the Canadiansa more difficult question is whether the groups have established causation and redressibility with respect to this claim. To show causation, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained ofthe injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the complaint, Salmon Spawning alleged that the groups' injury is caused by the United States' continued implementation of the Treaty, without exercising the authority to withdraw from the Treaty or requesting additional conservation measures to benefit listed salmon. On these allegations alone, the district court properly concluded that causation was lacking. The excessive harvesting permitted under the Treaty is not fairly traceable to the United States' failure to withdraw from the Treaty. If the United States withdrew, the harvesting of listed species would arguably increase, because the Treaty set abundance-based limits on the Canadians' take. The over-harvesting is also not fairly traceable to the agencies' failure to ask the Canadians to take additional conservation measures. Although the Canadians, if asked, might agree to require a reduction in their fisheries' take, they could also refuse to accommodate the United States' request. If we consider only these grounds as the bases for establishing causation, the causal connection put forward by the conservation groups relies on an attenuated chain of conjecture insufficient to support standing. See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1152 (9th Cir.2000). But, on appeal, the groups have focused on a different ground to illustrate their injury: the ability of the federal agencies to limit the take of United States fisheries. [5] They argue that because the agencies can limit the take of United States fisheries and thus offset the effects of Canadian harvesting, the failure to take such action while permitting Canadian overharvesting under the Treaty violates the ESA. Though we are dubious about this proposition for purposes of causation and we are not inclined to read the complaint so broadly as to encompass an entirely new theory of causation, even if we were to credit this argument, redressibility poses an upstream battle. Salmon Spawning argues that a court order declaring that the agencies and officials violated the ESA and APA would require the defendants to exercise their authority to reduce the take of United States fisheries. We are not persuaded. According to Salmon Spawning, if we declared that the agencies violated their ESA obligation to avoid jeopardy, that would leave it up to Defendants to determine whether ... negotiations with Canadaor changes in U.S. fisheriesare needed to meet their obligations under the ESA. This argument highlights the key difference between asserting substantive and procedural violations of the ESA: a plaintiff alleging procedural violations of the ESA must show only that the procedural right could protect their interest, whereas a plaintiff alleging a substantive violation must demonstrate that its injury would likely be redressed by a favorable court decision. For much the same reason as the first claim fails, this claim hinges on agency action vis-a-vis the Treaty. The court cannot order renegotiation of the Treaty, and discretionary efforts by the agencies are too uncertain to establish redressibility. That a favorable judicial decision would leave matters to the discretion of the State Department and NMFS makes equally likely the possibility that the agencies would decide to take no agency action with respect to Canada's fisheries  so as not to be constricted by § 7's no jeopardy requirementas the possibility that they would renegotiate a Treaty that would more aggressively limit the Canadians' take. Because Salmon Spawning has failed to show redressibility, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the second claim for relief.
Salmon Spawning also alleged that the State Department and NMFS were obligated by ESA § 7 and its implementing regulations to reinitiate consultation on the 1999 BiOp. Consultation under § 7 must be reinitiated where (a) discretionary federal involvement or control has been retained or authorized; and (b) the amount or extent of taking specified is exceeded, new information reveals effects that may affect listed species or critical habitat in a manner not considered, the action is subsequently modified so as to cause an effect to the listed species or critical habitat not previously considered, or a new species is listed or critical habitat designated. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. The duty to reinitiate consultation lies with both the action agency and the consulting agency. See id. According to Salmon Spawning, since the BiOp was issued in 1999, new criteria developed by NMFS show that the Canadian harvest is taking more Puget Sound chinook than the BiOp anticipated; new data shows the amount and extent of the Canadian harvest of ESA-listed salmon; NMFS has changed the definition of salmon evolutionary significant units since 1999, such that almost three quarters of the salmon caught in some Canadian fisheries are ESA-listed; and it is now possible to differentiate between hatchery-origin salmon and listed salmon. These claims alleged sufficient injury to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III. With respect to injury in fact, Salmon Spawning claims that the State Department and NMFS violated the procedural requirements of § 7 by failing to reinitiate consultation in light of new information. The requirement that consultation be reinitiated protects a concrete threatened interest that is the basis of Salmon Spawning's standing, the avoidance of harm to listed species. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 969-70. Because Salmon Spawning has properly alleged procedural injury, as noted earlier, causation and redressibility are relaxed. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130. That it is uncertain whether reinitiation will ultimately benefit the groups (for example, by resulting in a jeopardy determination) does not undermine their standing. Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 682. The asserted injury is not too tenuously connected to the agencies' failure to reinitiate consultation. And a court order requiring the agencies to reinitiate consultation would remedy the harm asserted. Unlike the other claims, this claim is a forwardlooking allegation whose remedy rests in the hands of federal officials and does not hinge on upsetting the Treaty. Salmon Spawning also meets the requirements for statutory standing under the ESA and the APA. The ESA's citizen-suit provision authorizes the groups to bring suit against the State Department, as the action agency, for failure to comply with its ESA obligations. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A). As for standing under the APA, the failure to reinitiate § 7 consultation is a final agency action subject to judicial review. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir.2001). The conservation groups' interests in the protection of listed salmon are within the zone of interests to be protected by the ESA regulation requiring reinitiation. See id. Finally, Salmon Spawning has established associational standing. Public Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1019. Each of the conservation groups' members has standing to sue individually; the interests the groups seek to protect are germane to their purposes as conservation organizations; and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of the individual members in the lawsuit. Id. Therefore, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Salmon Spawning's third claim for lack of standing and remand for further proceedings. [6] The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We remand to the district court to determine whether attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, should be granted. Each party shall pay its own costs on appeal. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.