Opinion ID: 2177021
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Access to Teacher Evaluations and Student Grade Transcripts.

Text: On the crucial issue of gaining access to evaluations and transcripts, the superintendent took the position that Iowa Code section 68A.7 prohibited him from producing them. [1] This was the rationale adopted by district court, which further applied the public interestprivate interest balancing test referred to in City of Dubuque v. Telegraph Herald, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Iowa 1980). We believe the rationale advanced by the superintendent and adopted by the court proceeded from the wrong premise, and thus invoked an inapplicable rule of law. This is not a proceeding in which the teacher asserts, as a member of the general public, an Iowa Code chapter 68A right of access to public records. An assertion of that right may meet resistance based on a section 68A.7 exception. This is a situation in which a teacher with his own employment at risk has asserted his statutory right to have the board issue a subpoena for ... the production of such ... papers as ... the teacher may designate. The right is invoked in a section 279.16 private hearing where [t]he record ... findings of fact and exceptions shall be exempt from the provisions of chapter 68A. Iowa Code § 279.16 (1983). In Iowa Civil Rights Commission v. City of Des Moines, 313 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1981), the city challenged the authority of the commission to subpoena personnel and medical records of city employees. The city contended the records at issue were confidential under chapter 68A. We there wrote: We do not believe the legislature intended section 68A.7 to be applicable to administrative subpoenas.... The exemptions are ... applicable only within the framework of every citizen's general right to examine public records under chapter 68A. In this case the Commission did not seek inspection as a citizen under chapter 68A; it sought inspection pursuant to its investigative powers granted by chapter 601A and the subpoena power granted to administrative agencies by section 17A.13(1). Id. at 495 (emphasis in original). We followed this analysis in Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d 510, 511 (Iowa), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 3540, 77 L.Ed.2d 1390 (1983), and noted it approvingly in Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Iowa 1983). Federal courts have applied the same rationale when the custodian of public records has sought to invoke similar exceptions in the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1979); Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339, 342-43 (D.C.Cir.1977). The public interestprivate interest balancing test referred to in Telegraph Herald, 297 N.W.2d at 527, is not invoked in factual circumstances like those before us, but is applied in FOIA and Iowa Code chapter 68A cases where the access right is claimed under the provisions of the act. In Telegraph Herald the newspaper posited its right to secure the information on chapter 68A. We thus applied the balancing equation to determine whether the subsection 68A.7(11) exception (for personal information in confidential personnel records) applied to the specific information requested. We hold trial court resorted to an inapplicable rule of law in applying section 68A.7 exceptions to the teacher's right to subpoena the controverted papers, and in applying the balancing equation to quash the subpoena. We further hold that the teacher is entitled to the evaluations and transcripts described in the subpoena. This does not mean, however, that the court upon remand is without power to protect teachers and students from unnecessary injury or damage. In Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 313 N.W.2d at 496, we recognized trial court's authority under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 123 to issue a protective order to shelter certain rights of the persons whose medical records were sought. In the case before us, trial court's in camera inspection of the subpoenaed papers, on proper motion, may result in the exclusion of material that is not only embarrassing but irrelevant to the issues before the board. We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the superintendent in this appeal, even though they are not discussed in this opinion, and find them without merit. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings before the district court in conformance with this opinion. Costs are taxed one-half to the appellee superintendent and one-half to the appellant teacher. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTION.