Opinion ID: 1106252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: what to do to get out of the penitentiary

Text: Insofar as criminal cases are concerned, the legitimate authority of any court of this State ends when there has been no appeal from the trial court conviction, or when this Court finally affirms a judgment of conviction on appeal. Once a criminal accused has been convicted in a court of law and all appeals exhausted, all court jurisdiction of the case terminates. Only the Governor has the authority under the Constitution to grant reprieves or pardons. Miss. Const. Art. 5, § 124. Whittington v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 73 So.2d 137 (1954). The only possible way in which this Court can have any lawful authority, after a criminal prosecution has been finally concluded, to again  and collaterally  examine the validity of a criminal conviction, is by some special statute authorizing us to do so. Smith v. State, 155 So.2d 494 (Miss. 1963); 1952 Miss. Laws Ch. 250; Miss. Code Ann. § 1992.5 (1942); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-35-145 (1972), repealed by 1984 Miss. Laws Ch. 378, eff. from and after April 17, 1984; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-1, et seq., (Supp. 1990); Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act. In the absence of Legislative enactment giving this Court authority to collaterally review a terminated criminal case, we have none. Yet, as above noted, in McClendon and McCarty the membership of this Court intrepidly held that it is this Court, and this Court only, which determines the laws whereby a convict in the state penitentiary stays or gets out. The ground rules the Legislature sets for determining whether or not a convicted felon is entitled to relief are of no validity unless this Court allows or accepts them. This Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-1, et seq., covers twelve pages in the Code Supplement. According to this Court, they are no more than trash paper in the absence of our approval. [1] It is perfectly plain to me that the legislature has the absolute power and authority to pass statutes dealing with criminal practice and procedure, and need not look to this Court for permission to pass any such statute. Furthermore, so long as any statute they pass meets constitutional muster insofar as protecting the rights of the accused, it is none of this Court's business, except to enforce the statute. It is a blatant usurpation to even intimate that we have some kind of supervisory power over the Legislature in matters as these, or that any such law they pass cannot be enforced without this Court allowing or accepting it. I have had my say about this Court usurping power it does not have in Hall and its progeny. Hawkins, P.J., dissenting from adoption of Evidentiary Rules, 575 So.2d LXXXIX (Miss. 1991); In Interest of C.B., 574 So.2d 1369, 1375 (Miss. 1990) (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting); Lambert v. State, 574 So.2d 573, 579 (Miss. 1990) (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting); Leatherwood v. State, 548 So.2d 389, 406 (Miss. 1989) (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting); Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d 1366, 1374 (Miss. 1989) (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting). I do not care to repeat any of it now. What I would suggest as fairly respectable criticism has already been directed at Hall. In the absence of the repeal of section 90(s) of the Mississippi Constitution, the court cannot constitutionally justify its assumption of exclusive rule-making authority. Comment, The Limits of the Mississippi Supreme Court's Rule-Making Authority, 60 Miss.L.J. 359, 385 (1990). The lesson of today's majority and McClendon, McCarty and Blanks is that this Court has no intention to retreat from its position in Hall, but indeed to broaden it. [2] DAN M. LEE, P.J., joins this opinion.