Opinion ID: 1872381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Implied-Consent Testing Unconstitutional?

Text: The more difficult question is whether proceeding with the warrantless blood testing of an unconscious suspect under the statutory implied consent provisions without probable cause and her having an opportunity to refuse violates the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures provided by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [3] Appellant argues that because she did not consent (or rather because she did not have the opportunity to refuse); there were no exigent circumstances; and no warrant was obtained, the taking of her blood violated the Constitution. [4] The United States Supreme Court has touched on this issue of implied consent in a number of cases. For example, in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), the Court held that the forced, warrantless pumping of a suspect's stomach, even after officers had seen him quickly swallow some pills, was so violent and invasive as to do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically. Id. at 172, 72 S.Ct. 205. The Court concluded that [t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience... [and] is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation. Id. Thus, the Court held that such a practice violated the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Obviously, the defendant had not been allowed to choose. Conduct like that involved here, the taking of a blood sample, while admittedly invasive, falls quite short of the veritable assault committed by the officers in Rochin . Thus, the Court in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957), held that the taking of a blood sample by a doctor from an unconscious DUI suspect was but a slight ... intrusion compared to that in Rochin and did not violate due process. Id. at 439, 77 S.Ct. 408. However, the Court declined to engage in a search-and-seizure analysis because at that time the federal exclusionary rule was not applicable to the states and the state in question, New Mexico, had not adopted the rule. Id. at 409-10. Appellant, however, has raised the Fourth Amendment specter in this case. The closest U.S. Supreme Court case to address this issue is Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). There, the defendant refused to consent to a blood test while at the hospital following a car accident. Nevertheless, a police officer had a doctor take a blood sample, which later showed the defendant had been drinking alcohol. The Court rejected claims under due process, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel. The Court also addressed a Fourth Amendment claim, the exclusionary rule having been held applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The Court framed its Fourth Amendment analysis by stating: [O]nce the privilege against self-incrimination has been found not to bar compelled intrusions into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content, the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. In other words, the questions we must decide in this case are whether the police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (emphasis added). Significantly, the Court noted that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, given that he smelled of alcohol and had bloodshot, glassy eyes. When the defendant demonstrated similar symptoms at the hospital, the officer placed him under arrest. The Court stated that this alone would not have obviated the need for a warrant, since a bodily intrusion implicates interests as precious as those related to a house, and that the determination of whether an invasive search was justified should normally be left to a neutral and detached magistrate. However, because there is a great likelihood that the defendant's body would reduce the level of alcohol in his blood as it began to process the substance, [t]he officer ... might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened `the destruction of evidence'.... Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (citation omitted). Thus, the test was justified under an exigent circumstances approach. The Court also approved the test itself as reasonable, noting that blood tests are commonplace, id. at 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, and have become routine in our everyday life, id. at 771 n. 13, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (citation and quotation marks omitted). More important to the Court's approval was the fact that the use of a blood sample to test blood alcohol concentration was a highly effective means of determining the degree to which a person is under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Finally, the Court reasoned that the specific test in that case was reasonable, having been taken by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical practices. Id. Based on these findings, the Court concluded that there was no violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. However, the Court cautioned against reading the decision as a blanket approval of bodily intrusions: It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. Id. at 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (emphasis added). In subsequent dicta, the Court has described Schmerber as clearly allow[ing] a State to force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol test. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). The Court cautioned only that due process concerns could be involved if the police initiated physical violence while administering the test, refused to respect a reasonable request to undergo a different form of testing, or responded to resistance with inappropriate force. Id. at 559 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 916. This Court has cited to Schmerber in the past as holding that blood tests in DUI cases do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Beach v. Commonwealth, 927 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Ky.1996) (The United States Supreme Court has held that a blood test does not violate the Federal Due Process Clause, the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel or the Fourth Amendment right to unlawful search and seizure.). Other times it has cited Schmerber more gingerly, noting that it is not a blanket approval of bodily invasive tests under the Fourth Amendment and that there are other requirements. Hernandez-Gonzalez, 72 S.W.3d at 915 (stating that blood test did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure, notwithstanding that the sample was taken without a warrant, where the police officer was justified in requiring the test and manner in which the test was performed was reasonable); Holbrook v. Knopf, 847 S.W.2d 52 (Ky.1992) (noting that  Schmerber was, of course, a warrantless search justified on the basis of `exigent circumstances,' which is an exception to warrant requirement). The case Appellant cites which is closest on point is Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003), in which the Georgia Supreme Court held unconstitutional an implied consent statute that allowed for testing of any person who had been involved in an accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities. The court based its decision on the fact that this allowed what amounted to a search without probable cause, since it applied any time a serious accident occurred, regardless of whether there was any evidence of DUI. Cooper , however, is readily distinguishable because the statute in question differs substantially from Kentucky's. Our implied consent statute only applies in situations where an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) or 189.520(1) has occurred, KRS 189A.103(1) (emphasis added), which is to say, when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the suspect was driving under the influence. Kentucky's statute does not include a provision like that in Georgia allowing testing for any sufficiently serious accident. Nothing in the Kentucky implied consent statute allows it to be invoked merely because a person is involved in a serious accident. In Kentucky, there must be some suspicion of driving under the influence before implied consent can be invoked. That Cooper is inapplicable is underscored by the fact that the Georgia court expressly declined to address that part of the implied consent statute that allowed testing when there was an allegation of a violation of the state's DUI statute. Id. at 607 n. 3. In fact, the court later upheld that portion of the statute, distinguishing Cooper in the process: Cooper makes it clear that [the implied consent statute] is unconstitutional to the extent that it could be interpreted to require an individual to submit to chemical testing solely because that individual was involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities. On the other hand, where an individual has been involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities and the investigating law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the individual was driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, the constitutional infirmities at play in Cooper are no longer present, and the ensuing search is both warranted and constitutional. Due to the existence of probable cause, the individual being subjected to a search is, in fact, a suspect as contemplated by the statute. Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380, 383-84 (2005). KRS 189A.103(1) requires reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of the DUI statute has occurred. To pass constitutional muster, reasonable grounds must equate at least to probable cause. The Kentucky consent statute is clearly far more similar to that part of the Georgia statute addressed in Hough than that addressed in Cooper . [5] The Georgia court's concerns about requiring probable cause could be satisfied in this case if the facts known to the officer at the time the blood test was done would support a probable cause belief that the Appellant had violated state DUI law. But in fact, at the suppression hearing, no testimony was taken. Instead, the Commonwealth summarized what occurred at the hospital in the course of responding orally to Appellant's suppression motion. The Commonwealth informed the trial court that at the hospital the officers told Helton about implied consent, and she didn't refuse, even though she did not exactly consent either. The Commonwealth also noted that she sort of passed out and closed her eyes when she was asked to give consent to a test (she was being prepared for surgery on her skull and facial fractures). The Commonwealth argued that by the plain reading of the statute, she had consented by virtue of having operated a vehicle within the Commonwealth, and that the test was done kind of on the heels of the blood test the hospital was doing anyways, and it did not involve any additional intrusion. Finally, the Commonwealth concluded its argument by saying it did not believe this was a KRS 189A.105(2)(b) situation where a warrant would be required because she did not refuse and she was not under arrest. Based on this argument by the Commonwealth, the trial court ruled that Helton had not withdrawn her consent or refused testing of her blood, and ruled as a matter of law that she had consented. The trial court did not take any proof about what the police knew at the time of the accident that gave them reasonable grounds to require such a test, and made no finding about whether there were reasonable grounds for such a blood test. Even though there is an apparent stipulation to the facts by defense counsel, who did not dispute them but only wanted to argue statutory construction, to make this a question of law, the trial court must apply all elements of the statute. Only by taking proof on all the necessary elements could the trial court establish whether the police officer had reasonable grounds to require a blood test. The trial court must know more than just that the defendant was unconscious under KRS 189A.103(2). While the minor intrusion of a blood test, at least under circumstances like these, is not unreasonable and the lack of a warrant is justified by an exigent-circumstances concern that the alcohol evidence in the blood will be destroyed in a short period of time by the human body's natural ability to metabolize alcohol, our statute (and the Constitution) require more. Specifically, the Kentucky statute requires reasonable grounds to believe that a person was driving under the influence before a blood test can be done. When reasonable grounds is read to mean probable cause, the statute satisfies Schmerber 's requirement that the intrusion[ ] ... [is] justified in the circumstances and that the police were justified in requiring [Appellant] to submit to the blood test.... 384 U.S. at 768, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The record in this case, however, simply does not reveal whether the officer had probable cause to believe that alcohol was involved in the wreck. [6] If the blood test was done merely because there were fatalities, then it runs afoul of the same concerns the Georgia Supreme Court considered in Cooper : a lack of probable cause to conduct the search. While Schmerber recognizes that such a search does not automatically violate the Fourth Amendment, given the existence of exigent circumstances, that case emphasized that the facts of the case are determinative and that those facts must be such as to justify the search. Kentucky's statute satisfies these requirements by requiring reasonable grounds, which this Court reads as requiring probable cause. When the officer does have reasonable grounds, the test may be done on a person, even if she is unconscious, without violating the Fourth Amendment. If, as in Schmerber , the state can require a conscious person, who has actually refused, to submit to the blood test due to exigent circumstances and the existence of probable cause, then it makes no difference what a person's state of consciousness is. But this step is not reached at all unless the officer had probable cause to search in the first place. Consequently, this Court's review of the blood test search in this case turns on whether the officer had probable cause to believe that Appellant had violated the DUI statutes when he requested the blood test. Unfortunately, that is not in the record, meaning that the trial court did not engage in the whole analysis necessary to decide Appellant's suppression motion.