Opinion ID: 1224040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: This case comes before this Court as an appeal from the Circuit Court of Gilmer County, which affirmed the decisions made by the West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance Board. The appeal provisions of W. Va.Code § 29-6A-7 (1998) (Repl.Vol.2004) [6] provide that an appeal may be taken to a circuit court where the final grievance decision: (1) Is contrary to law or a lawfully adopted rule or written policy of the employer; (2) Exceeds the hearing examiner's statutory authority; (3) Is the result of fraud or deceit; (4) Is clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (5) Is arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. W. Va.Code § 29-6A-7. More specifically articulated by this Court is the directive that [a] final order of the hearing examiner for the West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance Board, made pursuant to W. Va.Code, 29-6A-1, et seq. [(1988) (Repl. Vol.2004)], and based upon findings of fact, should not be reversed unless clearly wrong. Syl., Quinn v. West Virginia N. Comty. Coll., 197 W.Va. 313, 475 S.E.2d 405 (1996). Further explaining this Court's role in the review process, we have previously stated: in reviewing an ALJ's [Administrative Law Judge's] decision that was affirmed by the circuit court, this Court accords deference to the findings of fact made below. This Court reviews decisions of the circuit [court] under the same standard as that by which the circuit [court] reviews the decision of the ALJ. We must uphold any of the ALJ's factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, and we owe substantial deference to inferences drawn from these facts. . . . We review de novo the conclusions of law and application of law to the facts. Martin v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 195 W.Va. 297, 304, 465 S.E.2d 399, 406 (1995). This instruction is consistent with our observation that rulings upon questions of law are reviewed de novo Quinn, 197 W.Va. at 316, 475 S.E.2d at 408 ( citing Bolyard v. Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., 194 W.Va. 134, 136, 459 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1995) (per curiam)). Specifically, [a]lthough we accord great deference to the findings of fact of the West Virginia Educational Employees Grievance Board,[ [7] ] we review, de novo, questions of law. Syl. pt. 2, Maikotter v. University of W. Va. Bd. of Trs., 206 W.Va. 691, 527 S.E.2d 802 (1999) (footnote added). Because this Court reviews decisions of the circuit court under the same standard used by the circuit court in reviewing the decisions of an ALJ, it is clear that this Court employs a combination of deferential and plenary review. More particularly, [g]rievance rulings involve a combination of both deferential and plenary review. Since a reviewing court is obligated to give deference to factual findings rendered by an administrative law judge, a circuit court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing examiner with regard to factual determinations. Credibility determinations made by an administrative law judge are similarly entitled to deference. Plenary review is conducted as to the conclusions of law and application of law to the facts, which are reviewed de novo. Syl. pt. 1, Cahill v. Mercer County Bd. of Educ., 208 W.Va. 177, 539 S.E.2d 437 (2000). Mindful of these applicable standards, we now consider the substantive issues raised herein.