Opinion ID: 2174046
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determining the Father

Text: We must first determine whether, under Tennessee's statutory parentage scheme, Mr. Y. or Mr. P. is the father of T.K.Y. In 1997, the formerly-separate paternity and legitimation statutes were completely overhauled. In re C.K.G., C.A.G. & C.L.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 724 (Tenn.2005). Although the statute creates a single cause of action for establishing parentage,  id. at 722 (emphasis added), its focus remains on establishing paternity. See id. at 723. The parentage statute provides: (a) A man is rebuttably presumed to be the father of a child if: (1) The man and the child's mother are married or have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce; (2) Before the child's birth, the man and the mother have attempted to marry each other in compliance with the law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared illegal, void and voidable; (3) After the child's birth, the man and the mother have married or attempted to marry each other in compliance with the law although such marriage is or could be declared illegal, void, or voidable; and: (A) The man has acknowledged his paternity of the child in a writing filed under the putative father registry established by the department of children services, pursuant to § 36-2-318; or (B) The man has consented in writing to be named the child's father on the birth certificate; or (C) The man is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or by court order; (4) While the child is under the age of majority, the man receives the child into the man's home and openly holds the child out as the man's natural child; or (5) Genetic tests have been administered as provided in § 24-7-112, an exclusion has not occurred, and the test results show a statistical probability of parentage of ninety-five percent (95%) or greater. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-304(a) (2005). As discussed by the Court of Appeals, Mr. Y. has the benefit of presumptions (1) and (4), while Mr. P. has the benefit of presumption (5). The Court of Appeals noted that the statute does not accord any greater weight to one presumption than the other, and so, declaring a tie between Mr. P. and Mr. Y. under the statute, the Court of Appeals proceeded to consider factors going to the best interests of the child to make its paternity determination. The Court of Appeals was correct that, in and of itself, section 36-2-304 does not evince a preference for one method of proving paternity over another. In our view, however, the Court of Appeals erred by reading section 36-2-304 in isolation from the entire statutory scheme governing parentage. In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, this Court may look to the language of the statute, its subject matter, the object and reach of the statute . . . and the purpose sought to be accomplished in its enactment. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 722 (citations and quotations omitted). When the parentage statutory scheme is viewed its in entirety, it becomes clear that we must not read a portion of it, i.e. section 36-2-304, as according equal weight to biological fathers and other claimants to paternity because the very point of the parentage statutes is to determine the biological father of a child. The parentage statute includes the following definitions: (1) Child born out of wedlock means a child born to parents who are not married to each other when the child was born;    (3) Father means the biological father of a child born out of wedlock;    (5) Parent means the biological mother or biological father of a child, regardless of the marital status of the mother and father; and (6) Father, mother, and parent do not include a biological parent whose parental rights have been terminated for a child whose parentage is at issue. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-302 (2005). Thus, under the definition of father in the parentage statute, whomever is the biological father of a child is the child's father. Id. § -302(3). Likewise, a parent under the parentage statute is the biological mother or biological father. Id. § -302(5). A biological parent is only denied the status of father or mother if his or her parental rights have been terminated. Id. § -302(6). Four of the five statutory presumptions are based on the traditional view that the biological mother's husband is assumed to be the biological father of her child, particularly if he takes affirmative steps to acknowledge paternity. The fifth presumption is based upon the modern-day availability and accuracy of genetic testing. It provides that if genetic tests show a statistical probability of parentage of ninety-five percent (95%) or greater, the man is rebuttably presumed to be the biological father. Id. § 36-2-304(a)(5). A man seeking to disprove paternity may still attempt to do so even if genetic testing shows a statistical probability of 95% or greater that he is the biological father. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 24-7-112(b)(2)(B) (2000). If genetic testing shows a statistical probability of 99% or greater, however, a man who contests paternity may only do so by establishing by clear and convincing evidence one or more of the following: (i) The putative father had undergone a medical sterilization procedure prior to the probable period of conception, or other medical evidence demonstrates that he was medically incapable of conceiving a child during the probable period of conception; (ii) That the putative father had no access to the child's mother during the probable period of conception; (iii) That the putative father has, or had, an identical twin who had sexual relations with the child's mother during the probable period of conception; or (iv) The putative father presents evidence in the form of an affidavit that another man has engaged in sexual relations with the mother of the child in question during the period of probable conception. In this case, the court shall order genetic testing of that other man in conformity with this section. The results of that genetic test must indicate that the other man has a statistical probability of paternity of ninety-five (95%) or greater to establish an effective defense pursuant to this subdivision. Id. -112(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iv). In this case, genetic testing showed a 99.95% statistical probability that Mr. P. was T.K.Y.'s biological father. Were Mr. P. to contest paternity, the law would prevent him from succeeding unless he could prove one of the four circumstances set forth above. Thus, the parentage statute presumes that, absent strong, specific evidence to the contrary, a man in Mr. P.'s position is the father of the child. Moreover, the parties do not contest the fact that Mr. P. is the biological father of T.K.Y. Under the parentage statutes, because Mr. P. is T.K.Y.'s biological father, he is the child's father, as defined in the parentage statute.