Opinion ID: 2083904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Habitual Offender

Text: Plaintiff next claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict that Straub was an habitual offender because there was no evidence to establish that Straub had been convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and, even if the evidence was sufficient to establish a conviction, there was no evidence that the conviction was for a felony. In Section V, we concluded that the evidence was sufficient to connect Straub with the conviction memorialized in Exhibit 20. We now address the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Straub's conviction was for a felony. Our review of the record reveals the following facts. Page 1 of Exhibit 20 is the document relating to the conviction. It shows that Straub was convicted in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, of carrying a concealed weapon in 1974. According to the document, Straub was to: be imprisoned and confined in the Ohio State Reformatory, Mansfield, Ohio, per R.C. 2923.01 for an indeterminate period, according to law, and that he pay the costs of the prosecution for which execution is awarded. Imposition of sentence suspended and defendant placed on probation for one year under the supervision of the Cuyahoga County Probation Department. The document is silent as to the potential penalty for conviction of this crime. On direct examination, over the objection of Straub, Sgt. Szudarek testified that in the State of Ohio this crime carries a penalty of one to three years. On cross examination, Sgt. Szudarek testified that at the time of the conviction, carrying a concealed weapon could have been treated as a misdemeanor in Ohio. He did not know whether, in this case, the charge had been treated as a misdemeanor or a felony. This is the only evidence at trial bearing upon the determination of whether the conviction was for a felony. For purposes of the Habitual Offender statute, a felony is any crime for which the sentence could be more than one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-1. The issue is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the conviction was for a felony. This Court has previously decided that parol evidence, alone, is insufficient to prove all the elements of the Habitual Offender portion of the State's case absent some showing that records are unavailable. Davis v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 167. In Morgan v. State, we stated: To countenance proof of such an important matter as a prior conviction in a criminal trial upon parol evidence alone from witnesses who have observed the judicial proceedings, resulting in it, is counter to our entire perspective on this subject. We, therefore, hold that parol evidence standing alone is insufficient evidence of the fact of prior convictions in the absence of a showing of the unavailability of the proper certified records. Here, no such records were introduced, and there was no indication that the State was unable to produce them. The additional 30-year term imposed under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 cannot stand on the evidence submitted, and defendant's conviction on that charge must be reversed. (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 1087, 1091. In this case, parol evidence was offered to prove only one element of the habitual offender charge, that is, whether the conviction memorialized in Exhibit 20 was for a felony. Without deciding whether parol evidence, alone, may ever be sufficient to prove this element, we conclude that in this case it was not. There was no showing that the police officer was qualified to offer testimony on potential sentences for particular crimes or to interpret the Ohio statutes providing for those sentences. The police officer did not have personal knowledge of the facts surrounding Straub's conviction or sentencing, and did not know whether the charge against Straub had been treated as a felony or a misdemeanor, thus calling into question whether, in fact, Straub had faced a sentence which could have been more than one year. Further, the State made no showing that documentary evidence which might have clarified this issue was unavailable and did not ask the trial court to take judicial notice of Ohio statutes. [1] In view of our ruling, then, the determination that Straub is an habitual offender must be set aside and the sentence imposed thereon vacated. Because our decision involves a reversal based upon insufficiency of the evidence, discharge of Straub on the habitual offender charge is required by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Burks v. United States (1978), 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1.