Opinion ID: 2680038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Denial of America’s Second Motion to Amend

Text: [¶6] We initially examine whether America should have been allowed to amend his complaint for a second time following the dismissal of the smoking-ban counts in his first amended complaint. We do so because one of the grounds the court cited for dismissing those claims was that America failed to assert a cognizable individual injury, and in his proffered second amended complaint America named new plaintiffs and alleged more specific injuries that the court recognized might survive a motion to dismiss. [¶7] We review the denial of a motion to amend the pleadings for an abuse of discretion, examining the record before the trial court at the time the motion was filed. Efstathiou v. Aspinquid, Inc., 2008 ME 145, ¶ 21, 956 A.2d 110. After a responsive pleading is served, a party may amend a pleading “only by leave of court,” although “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” M.R. Civ. P. 15(a). To prevail on appeal, America “must demonstrate (1) that the court clearly and manifestly abused its discretion and (2) that the amendment [was] necessary to prevent injustice.” Efstathiou, 2008 ME 145, ¶ 21, 956 A.2d 110 (quotation marks omitted). [¶8] Given the state of the record at the time the court denied America leave to amend, we find no manifest abuse of discretion. The dismissal order concerning 6 the first amended complaint, entered a month before America moved to amend for a second time, left intact most of the counts related to an allegedly improper Board election, meaning that those counts remained scheduled for trial.3 The court noted that the complaint had been amended and litigated through a motion to dismiss once already, and concluded that “it is time for the election-related claims that remain in this case to move forward.” [¶9] The court further noted that many of the new allegations of harm in the proffered second amended complaint sounded in nuisance, and observed that its single nuisance count might be insufficient because it alleged nuisance resulting from failure to enforce the smoking ban, rather than harm caused by actual exposure to smoke. Taking all of the circumstances together, the court determined that “any nuisance claims . . . must be filed separately.” That result does not rise to the level of a clear, manifest abuse of discretion, nor does it create an injustice because America’s potential nuisance claim is not foreclosed in a future action. See Efstathiou, 2008 ME 145, ¶ 21, 956 A.2d 110.