Opinion ID: 487837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the denial of the motion for severance

Text: 19 The trial of Cepeda, LaChance, and Bowles began with three others joined as defendants, William Jeske, James Harnage, and Albert Fortna. A mistrial was declared as to Fortna one week into the trial because a cancer detected in his lawyer's arm prevented his continued participation in the case. Jeske was subsequently severed before any evidence incriminating him was adduced. The trial continued to conclusion with the four remaining defendants. All three appellants argue that the district court erred in denying their motions for severance. Each sought severance on diverse grounds including a spillover effect of testimony relating to Fortna's activities, comments by counsel on the testimony of co-defendants, comments made by Bowles in his pro se closing argument, and the court's instructions bearing upon all of these alleged errors.
20 Persons charged together should be tried together. United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir.1986). However, Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may in its discretion order a severance of defendants to avoid prejudice resulting from the joinder. See United States v. Taylor, 792 F.2d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir.1986). A defendant must demonstrate specific and compelling prejudice to justify reversal of a denial of severance. United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 883 (11th Cir.1985). The standard for determining compelling prejudice is whether the jury could compare and estimate the independent evidence against each defendant on each count and thereupon reach individual verdicts. United States v. Pirolli, 742 F.2d 1382, 1386 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, 1014 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1017 (5th Cir.1981). 21 In addition, cautionary instructions limit the effect of evidence which might otherwise be prejudicial. Meester, 762 F.2d at 884. Where there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the jury did not have the capacity to follow these instructions and make the required judgments as to guilt on each count and each defendant, there is no basis for severance. United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir.1985), Meester, 762 F.2d at 884. 22 When the record is considered in light of these principals, we find no error in the district court's denial of severance. 23
24 LaChance did not testify at the trial. He argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial as to him on grounds that counsel for Cepeda, who did testify, commented upon his right to remain silent during the closing argument. Counsel for Cepeda told the jury that you had better be clean up there when you take the stand because if you're not, Mr. Kennedy (the prosecutor) will have her in his hand. Transcript at 1658. No objection was made when the comment occurred. LaChance moved for a mistrial only after the closing charge had been given by the court and contended that the remark by counsel for Cepeda constituted a side slap at those who have not taken the stand and an impermissible reference to his client's failure to testify. Transcript at 1695. No other relief was thereafter requested. 25 In United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 553 (5th Cir.1979), the court distinguished between an adverse reference to an accused's silence by counsel for a testifying co-defendant, which is improper, and a favorable observation by that lawyer on the willingness of his own client to testify, which, we hold, is permissible. The court found no error where counsel made no reference to the silence of other defendants but merely observed that [his own client] had told his story under oath, subject to cross-examination and before the scrutiny of the jury. Compare DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.1962), in which a co-defendant's attorney's direct comment on the failure of another accused to testify constituted reversible error. 26 We see no significant difference between the remarks in Diecidue and those of Cepeda's lawyer, and we hold that the comment was not error. See also United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1362 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Washington, 550 F.2d 320, 328 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Hodges, 502 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.1974). 27 We note further that the court in its final instructions instructed the jury that the government bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It also admonished the jury that if a defendant elects not to testify, you should not consider this in any way during your deliberations. This language afforded LaChance the protection to which he was entitled.
28 LaChance and Cepeda argue that the district court erred in not granting a mistrial as to them on grounds that Bowles, in his pro se closing argument, improperly vouched for the credibility of a government witness, argued facts not in evidence, and made inflammatory comments. 29 The district court's diligent instruction of the jury throughout Bowles' pro se summation abrogated any prejudice which may have affected the co-defendants' verdicts. The court informed the jury that it had granted Bowles' request to present his own closing argument. Transcript at 1542-1543. The court emphasized that Bowles had been cautioned not to use the opportunity to testify on his own behalf, 4 and underscored this point by instructing them that the final arguments do not constitute evidence. Transcript at 1544. At each juncture at which Bowles made an improper comment, the court interrupted him to give the jury the appropriate cautionary instruction. 5 The court's persistence, and the lack of any basis upon which to conclude that the jury could not comprehend the court's instructions, precludes a finding of compelling prejudice warranting reversal of the district court's denial of severances for LaChance and Cepeda. 30
31 LaChance further argues that the court's reference to Bowles' failure to testify in an instruction given to the jury during his closing argument impermissibly commented upon LaChance's right not to testify. However, it is clear that this admonition referred to Bowles alone. 32 Following two comments made by Bowles, 6 the court addressed the jury as follows: 33 I have told Mr. Bowles earlier--and this is a difficult situation. This is not usual, ladies and gentlemen, and now I'll tell you that he had an opportunity to testify under oath where he could have been cross-examined by the prosecution. He chose not to do that, and therefore, anything he says is not evidence in the case. It's not sworn testimony. 34 Transcript at 1593. 35 This comment merely placed Bowles' argument in perspective by noting that its substance was not to be taken as evidence. It did not comment upon Bowles' right to remain silent or, by implication, LaChance's right to do so. Cf. Diecidue, 603 F.2d at 553. 36
37 Bowles argues that his case should have been severed upon severance of that of Fortna, so that the prejudice resulting from his being tried jointly with Harnage would have been avoided. Bowles' argument rests on the premise that evidence adduced at the joint trial that related only to counts against Harnage reduced his chances of acquittal and thereby prejudiced his case. 7 38 Bowles must demonstrate he suffered compelling prejudice as a result of the joint trial. See Priolli, 742 at 1386; Garrett, 727 F.2d at 1014; and Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1017. Specifically, he must show compelling prejudice caused by the alleged evidentiary spillover, which effectively precluded the jury's ability to make the necessary individualized determination. Johnson, 713 F.2d at 640. Bowles cannot point to anything in the record indicating that the jury was confused about the evidence against him, or that the jury decided to hold him responsible for offenses committed by co-defendants. Nor can we find a basis in the record to conclude that the jury was unable to, or failed to, comply with the court's unequivocal instructions during and at the close of trial, that the jury was to consider each defendant and each count separately.