Opinion ID: 1771774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 34

Heading: In-Chambers Agreement

Text: ś 68. Puckett argues that the trial court should have granted a mistrial when the prosecution asked a witness questions exceeding that which was previously agreed to in chambers. David Griffis was the victim's husband and was also the defendant's former employer. However, Griffis fired the defendant from his employment upon learning that a married female resident of the Canebrake community reported that one of his employees had scared her by following her while she was walking in the neighborhood. The woman provided Griffis with a description of the individual and later positively identified him. The State elicited testimony from Griffis limited to confirmation that the defendant was fired from his employment prior to his wife's murder. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked the following questions concerning the termination. MR. ADELMAN: Q. When you terminated Matt, you told him that he was terminated. Was there any type of hostile reaction or anything like that? A. No. Q. Did you in fact offer to recommend him for other employment? A. No, I didn't. Q. You just told him he was terminated and that appeared to be the end of the matter? A. I told him why he was terminated. Q. As you indicated, there was no hostile reaction or anything like that? A. No. (emphasis added). Following this dialog, the prosecution requested an in-chambers Rule 403 hearing regarding the admissibility of prior acts of the defendant under Rule 404(b). The prosecution argued that since defense counsel solicited information concerning the defendant's demeanor upon being told that he was terminated and the witness' response indicating that the defendant was given the reason why he was terminated, they should be allowed to cross-examine Griffis as to the reason for termination on a limited basis. Following a lengthy hearing and a proffer regarding the testimony, the trial judge ruled that Griffis would be allowed to testify concerning the following facts: (1) that a complaint was made by a married lady resident that the defendant scared her by walking with her, (2) that Griffis investigated the incident, (3) that the defendant denied the incident, and (4) that Griffis fired Puckett after identifying him as the individual complained about. The trial court then instructed the prosecution that they could not go into any hearsay concerning the matter. In the presence of the jury, the prosecution asked the following questions: MR HELFRICH: Q. So you fired Matt? A. Yes. Q. Why did you fire Matt? A. Because of a complaint from a lady, a lady resident. Q. What was the complaint about? A. That he was following her on the walking track and scared her and made her uneasy. Q. How did you determine that it was Matt? A. I got the lady in my truck and I drove her by the area they were working at, and she identified him. Q. Did you confront Matt? A. Yes. Q. What did he say? A. He said that he never left the work area. He denied it. Q. So he lied? ADELMAN: Object. THE COURT: Sustained. ADELMAN: He is going outside and I will ask for a mistrial based on that question. ś 69. At this point, a conference was held outside the jury's presence. Defense counsel argued that the question exceeded the scope of their in-chambers agreement and that it was a prejudicial and inflammatory question. The prosecution argued that even if it was error, it was harmless error and it was not prejudicial since the testimony was already before the jury that the lady said he did it and the defendant said he did not. Consequently, the jury could have made the natural inference that in Griffis' opinion, Puckett had lied by the mere fact that Griffis did in fact terminate Puckett. Additionally, the jury could have also made an inference that Puckett lied regarding the incident based on their own beliefs concerning the credibility of the witnesses. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion for mistrial but gave the jury a precautionary instruction to totally disregard any inferences whatsoever concerning whether the defendant lied. All jurors agreed that they would follow the court's instructions. ś 70. In alleging prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to warrant a new trial, Puckett relies on Smith v. State, 457 So.2d 327 (Miss.1984) and Hughes v. State, 470 So.2d 1046 (Miss.1985). The State contends that Smith is distinguishable from the case at bar because Smith involved numerous instances of improper and prejudicial conduct. During the cross-examination in Smith, the prosecution insinuated criminal conduct which could not be proven, attempted to impeach a witness about a prior inconsistent statement when he knew the witness omitted the information in compliance with a court order, asked the witness about details of a crime for which she was under indictment, and repeatedly asked the witnesses in rebuttal whether they were being provided with a rent-free apartment even after defense counsel's objections regarding this subject were sustained. Id. at 334-35. The Court held that the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial in view of the numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 336 (emphasis added). This Court agrees with the State's position and find that the case at bar is not controlled by this Court's Smith decision. ś 71. Puckett further maintains that this Court did not hesitate to reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct in Hughes, which involves prosecutorial misconduct strikingly similar to the second instance of prosecutorial misconduct in this case. However, a review of the Hughes decision reveals that it too is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Hughes, this Court stated, The dispositive assignment of error arises out of the State's subtle but effective effort to try Hughes for offenses other than the charge in the indictment, the sale of more than one ounce of marijuana on June 10, 1981. Specifically, the State put before the jury (a) the fact that after the date in question Hughes stated to Agent Washington that he had some homegrown marijuana, and (b) that Hughes was living with a woman without the benefit of marriage.     When proof of a wholly unrelated drug offense plus proof that Hughes was having an illicit relationship with a woman without benefit of marriage were place before the jury, the chance that Hughes would be found guilty by reason of factors extraneous to the charge in the indictment was substantially increased in a legally impermissible way. Hughes, 470 So.2d at 1047. ś 72. Even if we were to assume that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in this case when the prosecution asked Griffis his opinion as to whether or not Puckett had lied about the Canebrake incident, this instance comes nowhere near the seriousness of the conduct in the cases Puckett relies upon. In making his ruling, the trial judge in the case at bar, stated THE COURT: I did not want any hearsay before this jury. And some of the things that were contained in chambers did involve hearsay, and I did instruct the witness not to go into that. Helfrich did not attempt to elicit that. I think the only problem is with the final question because everything that Helfrich asked pretty much tracked that which was gone over in chambers. I think the only place where he may have veered a little bit off dead center was when he asked the question about whether or not the Defendant lied. (emphasis added). By his comments, it is obvious that the trial judge did not believe the prosecution engaged in flagrant and intentional disregard of his prior ruling or of the prior in-chambers agreement. As previously mentioned, even if the question could be considered error, it was harmless error and not prejudicial since the testimony was already before the jury that the lady said he did it and the defendant said he did not. From this information, the jury could have made the natural inference that in Griffis' opinion, the defendant had lied by the mere fact that Griffis did in fact terminate Puckett. Additionally, the jury could have also made an inference that Puckett lied regarding the incident based on their own beliefs concerning the credibility of the witnesses. The jurors were told to disregard the comment, and they agreed that they would follow the court's instructions. It is presumed that jurors follow the instructions of the court. To presume otherwise would be to render the jury system inoperable. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 853 (Miss.1994) ( quoting Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1142 (Miss.1985)). ś 73. Therefore, this Court finds that any error by the prosecutor's was harmless under the facts of this case. The question did not cause such prejudice as to warrant a new trial, and any possible error was cured by the trial court's admonishment to the jury to disregard the prosecutor's question. Accordingly, the trial court's decision is affirmed.