Opinion ID: 170093
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Search of Vehicle and Spare Tire

Text: Lyons argues the warrantless search of his vehicle, including its spare tire, violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court determined (1) the search of the back of Lyons' vehicle, including the visual examination of the spare tire, was justified by Lyons' unequivocal consent to Ranieri's request to look in the back, (2) even if the scope of Lyons' consent did not extend to the visual examination of the spare tire, this examination did not require consent because it was not a search under the Fourth Amendment, and (3) Ranieri's lowering of the spare tire and cutting it open was justified by probable cause. a) Consent to Search Lyons claims his consent to search was not voluntary and even if it was, the search exceeded the scope of his consent.
In the district court, Lyons argued he never gave Ranieri permission to look in the back of his vehicle. He takes a different approach on appeal, claiming his permission to look in the back of the vehicle was not freely and voluntarily given. He asserts he felt extreme pressure to consent because of the presence of two police officers and his reluctance to provide consent is evidenced by the fact Ranieri had to repeatedly (actually, twice) ask for his permission to look in the back of the vehicle. [8] Normally, we do not review issues raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Abdenbi, 361 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir.2004). However, this rule is not jurisdictional and it is within our discretion to address an issue not raised in the district court. United States v. Jarvis, 499 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir.2007). We generally only exercise this in the most unusual circumstances. Our discretion allows us to determine an issue raised for the first time on appeal if it is a pure matter of law and its proper resolution is certain. Id. at 1202. While the determination of whether Ranieri's consent to look in the back was voluntary is a question of fact, United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir.2001), the issue has been fully briefed by the parties and the record is sufficiently developed. In particular, the videotape of the stop shows the conditions under which Lyons consented. Its proper resolution is certain. Consequently, we exercise our discretion to address the issue. [W]arrantless searches violate the Fourth Amendment unless they fall within a specific exception to the warrant requirement. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d at 1162. Consent is one such exception and therefore, a vehicle may be searched if a person in control of the vehicle has given his voluntary consent to the search. Id. Whether voluntary consent was given is a question of fact determined by the totality of the circumstances. Id. The government bears the burden of showing the consent was voluntary. Id. To meet its burden, the government (1) must proffer clear and positive testimony that consent was unequivocal and specific and freely given and (2) prove that this consent was given without implied or express duress or coercion. Id. (quotations omitted). The videotape of the incident shows that Ranieri asked Lyons twice for permission to look in the back. See supra at 1231-32. Lyons' response to the first request is inaudible but it appears Lyons did not directly respond to the request because whatever he said led Ranieri to ask him about the overdue rental agreement. In any event, it is clear Lyons did not say no. However, when Ranieri asked him the second time, Lyons unequivocally responded `go ahead' and unlocked the back door. ( Id.; R. Vol. 3 at 71.) Nothing in the exchange suggests Lyons' grant of permission was involuntary. Indeed, the videotape shows Ranieri's manner and tone of voice when seeking permission to search was pleasant, not intimidating. See Concepcion- Ledesma, 447 F.3d at 1314-15 (stating an officer's pleasant manner and tone of voice are factors demonstrating voluntariness of consent). The fact Trooper Dean was also present does not affect our conclusion. While the threatening presence of multiple officers is a factor in determining whether an individual's consent is voluntary, id. at 1314, it is but one factor and there is no evidence Dean's presence was coercive or threatening. In fact, when Lyons gave Ranieri permission to search, Dean was standing on the other side of the vehicle.
Lyons argues that even assuming his consent was voluntary, the search exceeded the scope of his consent. Specifically, he asserts that when he gave Ranieri permission to look in the back of his vehicle, he had a right to believe Ranieri was only going to look in the back of the vehicle, not under it, and certainly not remove the tire and cut it open. The scope of the consent determines the scope of the search. United States v. Osage, 235 F.3d 518, 520 (10th Cir.2000). In determining the scope of a defendant's consent, [the question is] what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the defendant and police officer. United States v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999). A court determines from the totality of the circumstances whether a search remains within the boundaries of the consent, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. West, 219 F.3d at 1177. Generally, where a suspect does not limit the scope of a search, and does not object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a more limited consent, an officer is justified in searching the entire vehicle. Id. (quotations omitted). Once Lyons consented to Ranieri look[ing] in the back, Ranieri went to the back of the vehicle and began searching for the tools to lower the spare tire. He did not find the tools, but found four cans of Fix-A-Flat Tire. He then performed an echo test on the spare tire with a stethoscope. After performing the echo test, he looked under the rear bench seat where he found the tools to lower the spare tire. We agree with the district court that Lyons' consent to Ranieri's request to look in the back allowed Ranieri to search the back of the vehicle and Lyons does not contend otherwise. Although the district court did not specifically address the issue, we conclude Lyons' consent also permitted Ranieri to look under the rear bench seat after performing the echo test on the tire. This conclusion is bolstered by Lyons' failure to object to Ranieri searching under the rear bench seat or otherwise attempting to limit the scope of his consent (and he had plenty of opportunity to do so while Ranieri was looking in the back of the vehicle and performing the echo test). We also agree with the district court that it is unnecessary to decide whether Lyons' consent to look in the back allowed Ranieri to visually examine the spare tire underneath the vehicle because such conduct does not constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 754 (10th Cir.1993) (because the undercarriage of a vehicle is part of its exterior and not afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy, an officer's brief visual examination of it is not a search under the Fourth Amendment). However, the court's conclusion was limited to visual inspection of the tire and Ranieri did more than simply visually examine the spare tire; he also performed an echo test, which required him to hit the tire while listening to it with a stethoscope. Nevertheless, we conclude this conduct was also within the scope of Lyons' consent. [9] A reasonable person may have understood that Lyons consent to look in the back extended to Ranieri hitting the tire and listening to the resulting sound. [10] Regardless, Lyons did not object to an echo test or make any attempt to limit the scope of his consent at that time. His current objection is late blooming and convenient. His consent to look in the back rendered the entire rear portion of Lyons' vehicle, including the rear part of its undercarriage and the spare tire attached thereto, fair game for all that might be revealed to the senses. It may have extended further. Lyons also claims his consent did not give Ranieri permission to remove the spare tire and cut it open. Because we agree with the district court that Ranieri's removal of the spare tire and cutting it open were supported by probable cause, infra § b), we need not address Lyons' argument that his consent did not extend to these actions. United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1261 (10th Cir.2006) (stating consent to search vehicle unnecessary where probable cause exists). b) Probable Cause to Search Another exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is the automobile exception. United States v. Sparks, 291 F.3d 683, 690 (10th Cir.2002). Under this exception, an officer who has probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road may search it without obtaining a warrant. Id. (quotations omitted). If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). An officer has probable cause to search a vehicle if under the totality of the circumstances there is a fair probability that the car contains contraband or evidence. United States v. Jurado-Vallejo, 380 F.3d 1235, 1238 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations and emphasis omitted). In determining whether probable cause exists, an officer may draw inferences based on his own experience. Id. (quotations omitted). The district court determined that Ranieri had probable cause to lower the spare tire on Lyons' vehicle and cut it open once he observed the cans of Fix-A-Flat Tire and confirmed his suspicions that the spare tire contained contraband by performing the echo test. We agree. The spare tire on Lyons' vehicle was hanging lower than normal. While the rim of the spare tire was salty and dirty, the tire was clean. The spare tire also contained fingerprints and tool marks where the rim and tire meet. These facts suggested the tire had been placed on the rim, and, based on the difference in weather conditions between the day of the stop and the previous one, that the tire had been placed on the rim that day. The spare tire was a different brand and larger than the other four tires on the vehicle. The results of the echo test performed on the spare tire were consistent with the presence of contraband hidden therein. There were four cans of Fix-A-Flat Tire in the vehicle, which was unusual considering the vehicle was a rental. The presence of the Fix-A-Flat Tire in the vehicle also led Ranieri to the reasonable inference that Lyons was concerned about getting a flat tire because the spare tire was inoperable. When Ranieri lowered the spare tire, the vehicle rose up and when Ranieri pulled the tire from under the vehicle, it was extraordinarily heavy. These factors, as well as Ranieri's experience with drugs being transported in spare tires, demonstrate there was a fair probability that the spare tire contained contraband.