Opinion ID: 2998528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ben-Yisrayl’s Fifth Amendment Rights

Text: Ben-Yisrayl claims that the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument violated his Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled to testify. As the Supreme Court has made clear, “Where the prosecutor on his own initiative asks the jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence, . . . the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated.” United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988). In addition, indirect references to the defendant’s failure to testify are constitutionally impermissible if “the language used was manifestly intended to be or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.” United States ex rel. Burke v. Greer, 756 F.2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1968)). In addressing Ben-Yisrayl’s Fifth Amendment claim, the Indiana Supreme Court “looked to whether the prosecutor’s comments in this case could reasonably be interpreted by the jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s silence,” Ben-Yisrayl I, 690 N.E.2d at 1149. The state court found as follows: No. 03-3169 9 The jury in this case could not reasonably have interpreted the prosecutor’s comments as suggestion to infer guilt from the defendant’s silence. While the prosecutor could have been more articu- late, it is clear that he was responding to any possible implications that the defendant’s confession was less than voluntary. His “challenge” to defense counsel was made to illustrate that the only reason a defendant would confess to a crime he did not commit would be because of coercion or duress. He then pointed out that the State presented substantial evidence that the confession was not the result of coercion or duress. Consequently, he was arguing that the confession should be taken by the jury as direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The theme of the State’s argument was a challenge directed at defense counsel which pointed out the uncontradicted nature of the State’s evidence of voluntariness and invited defense counsel to ex- plain, in its closing argument, any contrary conclusions. Ben-Yisrayl I, 690 N.E.2d at 1149. We find that the Indiana Supreme Court’s determination of Ben-Yisrayl’s Fifth Amendment right is not a decision contrary to or based upon an unreasonable application of clearly-established federal law. Instead, we find that its determination that the jury in Ben-Yisrayl’s case could not have reasonably interpreted the prosecutor’s comments as a suggestion to infer guilt from the defendant’s silence an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision denying BenYisrayl’s Fifth Amendment claim was based upon its factual determination that the prosecutor’s comment, “Let the Defendant tell you” was not directed at Ben-Yisrayl individually, but, “a challenge directed at defense counsel” that, “invited defense counsel to explain, in its closing argument,” 10 No. 03-3169 why the jury should not take the confession as valid. BenYisrayl I, 690 N.E.2d at 1148 n.17. We find this determination by the Indiana Supreme Court unsupported by sufficient evidence. Just seconds before the prosecutor invited the jury to “Let the Defendant tell you,” the prosecutor told the jury that “the Defendant confessed to killing these [two] people with his shotgun.” Trial Record at 5568, quoted in Ben-Yisrayl III, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 901. Specifically, the prosecutor stated: I told you in the opening statement that the Defen- dant confessed to killing these [two] people with his shotgun. We proved that. We told you that was the cornerstone of our case and why? Because it is self evidence [sic] that no one freely and voluntarily confesses to a murder unless they’re guilty. Let the Defendant tell you why somebody would freely and voluntarily confess . . . (Id.) Over an objection from defense counsel, the prosecutor further compounded his challenge to Ben-Yisrayl by continuing to focus the jury’s attention on the defendant’s confession: I said the confessions were the cornerstone of our case because it’s self evidence [sic] that no one, anybody, nobody will ever confess to a murder freely and voluntarily unless they commit [sic] it. . . . So if you believe that there isn’t any reason for somebody to admit to murder unless they did it, you’re there. . . . What are the chances that if somebody falsely accuses me of murder that within 24 hours I’m going to falsely admit to it[?] They don’t match. I mean it just doesn’t make sense. It’s—two things don’t make sense. (Trial Record at 5570-75.) Without a doubt, the references in this argument to “the Defendant” were aimed at BenYisrayl alone and not at his counsel. Thus, it was at least reasonable for the jurors to interpret the prosecutor’s No. 03-3169 11 recommendation to “Let the Defendant tell you” as a reference to Ben-Yisrayl individually, and, therefore unreasonable for the Indiana Supreme Court to determine that no juror could have reasonably made this logical jump. In following with the legal maxim noscitur a sociis,2 that a term can be properly defined by interpreting the text surrounding that term, we find that the prosecutor’s natural progression of references including his challenge, “Let the Defendant tell you” was purposeful, directed at Ben-Yisrayl individually, and intended to guide jurors to an impermissible inference under the Fifth Amendment. The progression of the prosecutor’s words constitute clear and convincing evidence rebutting the Indiana Supreme Court’s finding that the jury in this case could not reasonably have interpreted the prosecutor’s comments as a suggestion to infer guilt from the defendant’s silence. Additional clear and convincing evidence rebutting the state court’s finding can be found by analyzing how the prosecutor used the term “Defendant” throughout its entire closing argument. The district court also reviewed how the prosecutor used the term “Defendant” throughout the closing argument and by the district court’s count, in the portion of the argument that preceded the suspect language, the prosecutor used “the Defendant” to refer to Ben-Yisrayl alone seven times3 and used the term to refer to BenYisrayl’s counsel only once.4 Our own independent review reveals an additional instance in which the prosecutor used “the Defendant” to refer to Ben-Yisrayl,5 one where the 2 “a word is known by the company it keeps.” 3 Trial Record at 5554:22, 5555:17, 5556:10, 5556:22, 5557:1, 5567:25, 5568:4. 4 T.R. at 5567:14. 5 T.R. at 5554:14. 12 No. 03-3169 prosecutor’s use of the word “Defendant” was unclear,6 and six in which the prosecutor referred to a generic or hypothetical defendant.7 In the portion of the argument that followed, “Let the Defendant tell you,” the district court located forty-nine instances in which the prosecutor used “the Defendant” to refer to Ben-Yisrayl alone,8 compared to only four instances where “the Defendant” meant Ben-Yisrayl’s counsel.9 We agree with the district court’s assessment of the record, and we have located two additional instances in which the prosecutor referred to Ben-Yisrayl individually as “the Defendant”;10 one in which the prosecutor referred to a generic or hypothetical defendant11; and one case where we find the term used ambiguously.12 By our count, then, the part of the State’s closing argument that preceded the challenged language included eight clear references to Ben-Yisrayl as “the Defendant” versus one to his counsel, and the portion after the quotation included fifty clear references to Ben-Yisrayl as “the Defendant” versus four to his counsel. As a result, in looking at 6 T.R. at 5558:22. 7 T.R. at 5559:25, 5560:1, 5567:17, 5567:20, 5567:21, 5567:23. 8 T.R. at 5570:21, 5571:8, 5571:13, 5571:16, 5571:20, 5571:22, 5572:1, 5572:11, 5573:8, 5573:12, 5573:21, 5573:21, 5573:23, 5573:24, 5574:2, 5574:5, 5574:13, 5574:23, 5574:25, 5575:1, 5575:8, 5575:21, 5576:2, 5576:2, 5576:6, 5576:8, 5576:9, 5576:13, 5576:17, 5576:22, 5578:1, 5578:3, 5578:10, 5578:14, 5579:1, 5579:2, 5579:13, 5580:1, 5581:5, 5583:4, 5583:20, 5583:22, 5585:4, 5585:18, 5585:22, 5585:23, 5586:19, 5588:3, 5589:8. 9 T.R. at 5573:13, 5580:5, 5582:2, 5588:14. 10 T.R. at 5568:17, 5587:4. 11 T.R. at 5582:9. 12 T.R. at 5573:24. No. 03-3169 13 the prosecutor’s closing argument as a whole, these overwhelming statistics constitute further evidence that, contrary to the finding of the Indiana Supreme Court, a reasonable juror could indeed interpret “Let the Defendant tell you” as a reference to Ben-Yisrayl individually, and not to his counsel. The respondent argues that such statistical evidence is immaterial because there is no predictive value in the prosecutor’s references to Ben-Yisrayl individually as it is clear from the record that the prosecutor said “the Defendant” when he meant either Ben-Yisrayl or BenYisrayl’s counsel. Respondent’s argument is unavailing as the question before us is not whether the jury could ascertain with any certainty whether the prosecutor’s use of “the Defendant” was a reference to Ben-Yisrayl’s counsel rather than to BenYisrayl individually. Instead, our inquiry is whether, based on the prosecutor’s comments as a whole, it would have been reasonable for a juror to interpret the chal- lenged prosecutor’s comments as reference to Ben-Yisrayl individually. Because the Indiana Supreme Court found that it was unreasonable for any juror to interpret the prosecutor’s comments as reference to Ben-Yisrayl individually, but expressed no comment on whether a juror could predict with any certainty the target of the prosecutor’s comments, the respondent’s argument in no way undermines the clear and convincing evidence rebutting the state court’s determination. The facts of this case, reasonably construed, indicate that the jury could have believed that the prosecutor was arguing that, because Ben-Yisrayl failed to testify as to why he would confess to a crime that he did not commit, the inference is that his confession was voluntary and true. The prosecutor’s challenge to Ben-Yisrayl to explain his confession is closely analogous to the jury instruction that the 14 No. 03-3169 Supreme Court expressly ruled unconstitutional in Griffin v. California: As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because [they are] within his knowledge, if he does not testify . . . the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are most probable. 380 U.S. 609, 610 (1965).