Opinion ID: 2451115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Granting a Writ to Compel the Attorney General to File an Appeal Against His Judgment Vastly Expands Mandamus

Text: ¶ 34 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and we have placed strict limits on the circumstances under which we will issue the writ to public officers. SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 168 Wash.2d 593, 598-99, 229 P.3d 774 (2010); Walker v. Munro, 124 Wash.2d 402, 407, 879 P.2d 920 (1994) (noting that mandamus is an extraordinary writ). Mandamus is available only to compel a state officer to undertake a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty. SEIU Healthcare, 168 Wash.2d at 599, 229 P.3d 774. A duty is nondiscretionary or ministerial when `the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Clark v. City of Seattle, 137 Wash. 455, 461, 242 P. 966 (1926)). Thus, while a duty may be mandatory, it is not subject to mandamus unless the duty is also nondiscretionary or ministerialthat is, there is a complete absence of discretion in the officer's performance of the duty. Id. ; Brown v. Owen, 165 Wash.2d 706, 725, 206 P.3d 310 (2009) (Where we find a mandatory duty, we must further determine whether that duty is ministerial or discretionary in nature.). ¶ 35 The majority sidesteps the strict limits that have made mandamus an extraordinary remedy by construing the attorney general's authority to direct litigation as entirely nondiscretionary. The majority says that our cases recognizing the attorney general's discretion are distinguishable because they did not involve the situation here where a state officer, rather than a third party, seeks to command action by the attorney general. But in none of the cases the majority attempts to distinguish did the court conclude the duty was discretionary because the request to act came from a third party. Rather, we have always found the duty discretionary for the simple reason that discretion inheres in the role of attorney general as the state official charged with directing litigation. See Pratt, 68 Wash. at 158, 122 P. 987; Young Ams. for Freedom, 91 Wash.2d at 210, 588 P.2d 195; Blue Sky Advocates, 107 Wash.2d at 118-19, 727 P.2d 644. While the majority's distinction may matter to the issue of standing, once standing is established, the duty to be exercised is either discretionary or it is not. The majority fails to explain how the identity of the party seeking the writ has any bearing on whether the duty to direct litigation in the best interest of the public is nondiscretionary in nature. ¶ 36 If we compel the attorney general to file an appeal on the grounds that it is a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty, there is no limiting principle that would allow us to avoid mandamus where state officers disagree on other steps in litigation. What if the attorney general wants to settle a lawsuit and the commissioner does not? What if the commissioner insists on pursuing a claim that the attorney general believes is unwarranted? In denying the request for mandamus in Pratt, we recognized this very problem: [T]o compel [the attorney general], against his will and contrary to his judgment, to merely commence an action would be an idle thing in the absence of power to compel him to prosecute it to final determination; and such power is not contended for by appellant. And, indeed, there could be no practicable exercise of such power. The court granting the writ of mandate could not follow the [attorney general] through the case, and see to it that he filed proper pleadings, offered sufficient evidence, made necessary objections to evidence offered by [opposing counsel], used proper arguments and authorities in discussing questions raised before the court or jury, and conducted the trial [and appeal] with reasonable care and diligence. 68 Wash. at 159, 122 P. 987 (quoting Boyne v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265, 267, 34 P. 707 (1893)). ¶ 37 The majority asserts that the commissioner is satisfied by the writ here and will rely on the attorney general thereafter to meet his ethical obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Majority at 1102. But this again wrongly assumes that the attorney general serves in a capacity that is typical of any attorney-client relationship. Majority at 1102. The Rules themselves clarify that the attorney general, by virtue of his unique constitutional and statutory role, is anything but a typical private attorney. The majority sees no risk of persistent writ requests every time the attorney general exercises discretion because it obviates that discretion. Under the majority's analysis, the attorney general's role is reduced to asking how high when the state officer he represents says jump. ¶ 38 Simply stated, once we start down this path, we trivialize the writ of mandamus and vastly expand our role in resolving disagreements between independently elected officers in another branch of government. I believe this sets up an ill-advised test of the limits of our authority. It is not only unwise, but potentially destructive to the very system of checks and balances the framers of our constitution created. [1]