Opinion ID: 1429609
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Superior Court Should Have Allowed the Baumans' Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint.

Text: The Baumans' first amended complaint specifically alleges breach of contract. However, it fails to ask for relief for that claim. The Baumans now seek to amend their complaint to include a request for damages caused by the alleged breach. We have adopted a liberal policy for amending pleadings under Alaska Civil Rule 15(a). Alaska Civil Rule 15(a) states in part: A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.... Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. (Emphasis added.) Alaska Civil Rule 15(a) is identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). The federal rule has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as follows: Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires; this mandate is to be heeded. If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason  such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.  the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (citation omitted). We expressly adopted this interpretation of Rule 15. See, e.g., Siemion v. Rumfelt, 825 P.2d 896, 898 (Alaska 1992). When the superior court denied the second motion to amend in the first proceeding, it already had determined that the statute of limitations had run. [1] Given this posture of the case, it is understandable that the court would then deny the Baumans' second motion to amend their complaint. After the first appeal, however, the posture of the case had changed, as the Baumans' breach of contract claim had been revived. The reasoning supporting the court's initial denial of the motion no longer applied. The superior court's initial consideration of the Baumans' second motion to amend does not provide a basis for barring their renewed attempt to amend their complaint after remand. The Baumans did not engage in undue delay and their behavior did not stem from bad faith or dilatory motive. Their previous attempt to amend, after the superior court determined the statute of limitation had run, cannot be characterized as repeated failure to cure deficiencies. Because the Baumans' contract claim had been revived as a result of Bauman I, the second attempt to amend the complaint was no longer futile. Furthermore, the Days will not be prejudiced in their defense of the breach of contract claim that has been alleged since the beginning of this case. See Estate of Thompson v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc., 514 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Alaska 1973) (appellant should have been permitted to amend absent any showing that amendment would prejudice opposing party). In short, there are no circumstances requiring an exception to the general rule that leave to amend should be freely granted. The superior court abused its discretion when it denied the Baumans' motion to amend their complaint following remand from this court. The Baumans should have been allowed to amend their complaint in order to pursue their breach of contract claim.