Opinion ID: 2257779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Own-Conduct Instruction

Text: Defendant also challenges the adequacy of the own-conduct instruction. He argues that the instruction permitted the jury to decide that defendant by his own conduct had killed Eck, even if the jury could not agree that defendant had delivered one of the fatal stab wounds. According to defendant, the instruction precluded the jury from reaching a non-unanimous own-conduct determination, which would have resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier rather than death. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(1). Defendant also argues that the court erred in failing to inform the jury that, if defendant was not found guilty of death-eligible murder, he would be subject to the severe penalty of life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier. As a result of this Court's opinion last term in State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 700 A. 2d 306 (1997), the trial court was not required to inform the jury that, absent a death-eligible conviction, defendant would be subject to a term of life imprisonment with a 30-year parole disqualifier. Id. at 377-78, 700 A. 2d 306. Defendant's case, moreover, was tried before our decision in Cooper. Consequently, the trial court was not obligated to follow Cooper's prospective direction that in the future courts should inform the guilt-phase jury of the severe prison sentence[] to which the defendant would be subject if found guilty of non-capital murder. Id. at 378-79, 700 A. 2d 306. Nor did the court err by failing to require the jury to find, as a prerequisite to the own-conduct determination, that defendant had inflicted one of the fatal blows. See State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 97, 549 A. 2d 792 (1988) (overruled on other grounds by constitutional amendment). The court's instruction on the own-conduct determination stated in part: In this case, the phrase by his own conduct means either that, one, Robert Morton struck the knife blow which killed Mr. Eck, or two, that Robert Morton, along with Alonzo Bryant, inflicted stab wounds upon Michael Eck, and that when he did so it was Robert Morton's purpose that Michael Eck should die from the wounds, or he was aware that it was practically certain that Michael Eck would die from the knife wounds. Under this instruction, the jury, without deciding that defendant had struck the fatal blow, could find that he had killed by his own conduct if it decided that both defendant and Bryant inflicted knife wounds on Eck. As we stated in Gerald, supra : [T]he focus on the actions of the defendant, as required by the own conduct language, does not necessitate a specific finding that the defendant's actions standing alone caused the victim's death. The relevant inquiry is whether or not the defendant actively and directly participated in the homicidal act, i.e., in the infliction of the injuries from which the victim died. The critical elements are that defendant in fact acted, and the immediacy of his conduct to the victim's demise. [113 N.J. at 97, 549 A. 2d 792.] In determining whether defendant acted by his own conduct, the issue is not whether he or Bryant struck the fatal blows, but whether he participated directly and immediately in the killing. State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 561, 577 A. 2d 419 (1990). Here, the victim was stabbed twenty-four times. Three of the wounds alone would have proven fatal. In finding that defendant committed the murder by his own conduct, the jury determined that defendant participated in the attack that caused Eck's death. Such a finding is legally sufficient to support an own-conduct determination. See Chew, supra, 150 N.J. at 74, 695 A. 2d 1301 (noting own-conduct determination involves a judgment as to whether defendant's participation in the homicidal act was qualitatively sufficient to make the defendant death eligible). Defendant further argues that the charge was too vague in defining the requirement that the jury be unanimous in deciding whether he had killed by his own conduct. In a capital trial, the court must inform the jury of its option to render a non-unanimous verdict on the own-conduct determination. State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 514, 651 A. 2d 19 (1994), disapproved of on other grounds by Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. 326, 700 A. 2d 306. If the jury had reached such a verdict, defendant could not have been sentenced to death. Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 514, 651 A. 2d 19; see also State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 350, 680 A. 2d 677 (1996) (A jury's inability to decide [own-conduct] unanimously is a de facto decision that the defendant is not death-eligible.). When discussing the unanimity requirements of the own-conduct determination, the trial court gave the following instruction: Generally, we ask a Jury only if a Defendant has been found guilty of a crime. We do not inquire if the Jury sees a Defendant whom they convict as a principal or an accomplice or a co-conspirator. The practice is different when, as here, one of the charges is potentially punishable by death. If the jury convicts Mr. Morton or convicts any defendant of a murder in such a case, I must then ask if the Jury unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt finds two things: one, that the defendant committed a purposeful or knowing murder; and two, that the defendant committed the fatal act by his own conduct. .... It is permissible for a jury to find a person guilty of a crime if some jurors see the person as the principal and others see him as an accomplice or a co-conspirator. What is essential is that each Juror be satisfied in his or her own mind that all the elements necessary to establish guilt under the theory upon which the Juror convicts has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A conviction of murder under these circumstances is perfectly proper. Under our law, a person is only capital eligible if the Jury finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt both that the Defendant committed a knowing and purposeful murder, and that the Defendant committed the murder by his own conduct. In that discussion, the court properly instructed the jury that, unlike other crimes, to convict defendant of capital murder, the jury must unanimously determine that defendant had committed purposeful and knowing murder by his own conduct. See Chew, supra, 150 N.J. at 73, 695 A. 2d 1301 ([O]nly a jury verdict that finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the murder by his or her own conduct triggers the penalty phase.). The court also correctly noted that a conviction of murder was perfectly proper even if the jurors disagreed on whether defendant acted as a principal, accomplice, or co-conspirator. Ibid. (A jury need not unanimously agree on the theory of liability as principal or accomplice in order to convict of murder.); State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 300-01, 550 A. 2d 117 (1988) (Failure to satisfy the own conduct requirement does not render a murder conviction invalid). That instruction provided the jury with the opportunity to convict defendant of murder, albeit non-capital murder, if it could not reach a unanimous decision that defendant had killed by his own conduct. The court then repeated the instruction that, to find defendant guilty of capital murder, the jury must unanimously determine defendant committed a knowing and purposeful murder by his own conduct. Initially, in explaining to the jury that defendant could be found guilty of murder, despite a non-unanimous own-conduct determination, the court did not specifically inform the jury that such a determination would result in a non-capital sentence. Defendant suggests this omission might have led the jury to convict him of capital murder despite a non-unanimous own-conduct determination in which some jurors believed defendant acted only as an accomplice or co-conspirator. Defendant's argument, however, ignores the explicit instruction that to convict defendant of capital murder, the jury must unanimously find that he had killed by his own conduct. In addition, the court, at the prosecutor's request, provided the following supplemental instruction: A person can only be found guilty of capital murder if they're a principal, if they commit the murder by their own conduct. But all the other charges a person can be held liable as a principal, accessory, or co-conspirator. The verdict sheet clarified any potential vagueness in the charge. It stated in relevant part: 3. IF YOU HAVE BOTH FOUND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF MURDER AND CHECKED 2A [purposeful-or-knowing murder] ABOVE, THEN CHECK 3A, OR 3B, BELOW: A. Robert W. Morton committed the murder by his own conduct, i.e., Robert W. Morton, either alone or along with Alonzo Bryant, participated in stabbing Michael Eck, with the purpose to kill him or with the knowledge that the stabbing was practically certain to kill him.... . ./____/ B. Unable to Agree Unanimously on 3A, i.e., unable to agree unanimously that Robert W. Morton, either alone or along with Alonzo Bryant participated in stabbing Michael Eck with the purpose to kill him or with the knowledge that the stabbing was practically certain to kill him..... ./____/ These options unequivocally conveyed to the jury the requirement that it must be unanimous in finding that defendant had killed by his own conduct. By checking 3A, the jury so found. In sum, the court cured any ambiguity in the initial charge through its subsequent instruction and the verdict sheet. See Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 45-46, 716 A. 2d 395 (holding that the verdict sheet may clarify ambiguities in the jury charge); McDougald, supra, 120 N.J. at 561-62, 577 A. 2d 419 (noting, in upholding adequacy of the charge, the verdict sheet's correct delineation of the jury's own-conduct determination options); cf. State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 487, 662 A. 2d 308 (1995) (noting, in finding that the charge constituted reversible error, the fact that the verdict sheet mirrored the erroneous charge).