Opinion ID: 1107941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was it error for the trial court to allow identification testimony of the appellant by the state's witnesses where the identification procedures used by law enforcement were tainted?

Text: Under this first assignment of error, the appellant contends that the procedures used by the police in conducting the lineups at which he was identified by the victim were tainted, thus rendering the identification testimony improper. The robbery of Mrs. Simmons' store took place on September 24, 1986. Based on a description given the police by Mrs. Simmons, the appellant was picked up by the police at approximately 6:00 p.m. that same day. The record makes no reference whatsoever as to whether or not the appellant was ever given his Miranda rights. The next day, on September 25, at approximately 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon, the victim viewed a lineup at the Marion County jail; in this lineup was the appellant Johnny Ray Magee. The victim viewed the lineup through a glass panel in a door that was covered with a piece of paper, with a peep hole cut in the piece of paper. While at the jail, Mrs. Simmons viewed the lineup on two occasions. She was not able to positively pick the appellant out of the lineup. She did state at the time that one of the men in the lineup looked similar to one of the robbers. The victim did not identify the appellant in any way at this time. On the following day, September 26, several police officers went to the Northside Package Store where Mrs. Simmons was working, and showed her five photographs. Among these photographs was a picture of the Johnny Ray Magee. After examining the photographs, Mrs. Simmons picked out the appellant without any hesitation whatsoever. It is uncontradicted that the only person who appeared in both the lineup and the photographic display was Johnny Ray Magee. Magee contends that Mrs. Simmons' in-court identification testimony was impermissibly tainted by the lineup and the photographic display by singling him out in such a manner. It is worth noting that the main focus of the appellant's challenge to the lineups is the fact that he was the only person to appear in both the lineup and the photographs; he does not appear to challenge the actual physical composition of the lineup and/or the photographs. Before the trial began, the appellant's counsel made a motion to suppress the identification testimony of Mrs. Simmons. After hearing testimony on the motion to suppress, the trial judge overruled the appellant's motion. The court found that using the totality of the circumstances test, there was no danger of irreparable misidentification. The court further found that Mrs. Simmons had testified that she could identify the appellant as the person who robbed her on September 24, 1986, based on her independent recollection of the robbery and the person who perpetrated it without any aid from lineups, pictures, etc. This Court's scope of review for suppression hearing findings in pretrial identification cases is as follows: The combined effect of the circuit court's pretrial and trial rulings is that of a finding of fact that, under the totality of the circumstances ... in-court identification testimony had not been impermissibly tainted. We may, of course, disturb such a finding only where there is an absence of substantial credible evidence supporting it. Nicholson v. State, 523 So.2d 68, 71 (Miss. 1988) [quoting Ray v. State, 503 So.2d 222, 224 (Miss. 1986)]. Therefore, this Court must determine if, in this case, there is substantial credible evidence supporting the trial judge's findings. Nicholson, supra, at 71. The most well-known set of standards for judging the reliability of lineup identification procedures is found in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). In that case, the Supreme Court noted the necessity for determining whether under the `totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive. 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382, 34 L.Ed.2d at 411. The Court listed five factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification. They are as follows: (1) The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime. (2) The witness's degree of attention. (3) The accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal. (4) The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation. (5) The length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. See also York v. State, 413 So.2d 1372, 1383 (Miss. 1982). Turning then to the facts of this case, it is helpful and necessary to apply the Biggers analysis: (1) The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime. Mrs. Simmons testified that she had three to five minutes to view the two men who came into her store and viewed them from three to four feet in a store that was only twelve feet from wall to wall. There was no testimony about bad lighting and the men did not wear masks, so it must be assumed that Mrs. Simmons had a good opportunity to view the men in question. (2) The witness's degree of attention. When the two men walked into the store there were no other customers inside to distract Mrs. Simmons. They stopped to speak to her on their way into the store, and her attention was therefore focused on them for the rest of the time they were in the store. Mrs. Simmons was looking directly at the defendant as he came over the counter, and she testified that his face was in [her] mind all the time. She described with particularity their clothing. (3) The accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal. Immediately after the robbery, Mrs. Simmons described the man who jumped over the counter (the appellant) as being a black man approximately 5' 8 or 9, weighing about 145 to 150 pounds. In actuality, Johnny Ray Magee was 5' 11 and weighed 160 pounds. There does not appear to have been a significant difference in the description given by the victim and the actual dimensions of the appellant. (4) The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation. As noted earlier, the victim could not positively identify the appellant at the first lineup, in spite of the fact that he was standing next to the person she tentatively described as being one of the robbers. At the second photographic display she unequivocally and unhesitatingly picked the appellant out from the group of pictures. (5) The length of time between the crime and the confrontation. The first lineup took place one day after the crime took place, and the photographic display took place two days after the crime had occurred. Therefore, a very short time frame was present here. An examination of the Biggers factors leads this Court to conclude that the only troublesome area is the fourth factor, that is the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness after the confrontation. There are other jurisdictions holding that the lineup procedure used in the case before us was not unduly suggestive. In State v. Johnson, 306 So.2d 724 (La. 1975), the Court held: That it is not error to have the person identified in the photographic lineup participate also in a corporeal lineup, even though he may be the only common participant in the two procedures. Id. at 726. In State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251, 535 P.2d 881, 886-887 (1975), a similar conclusion was reached. In Bey, supra, the Court put great emphasis on the fact that the victim did not seem aware that the appellant was the only person who had appeared in both of the lineups. For a discussion of similar, although not identical situations, see U.S. v. Dobson, 512 F.2d 615 (6th Cir.1975) and U.S. v. O'Neal, 496 F.2d 368 (6th Cir.1974). In O'Neal, supra, the Court noted the following: The initial misidentification on the part of these eyewitnesses to a crime did not completely destroy the value of their testimony or render it inadmissible. The jury was fully advised of the original mistake and had it as well as the subsequent testimony identifying appellant before them to weigh. The weight to be given this evidence was for the jury to determine. Id. at 372. During the suppression hearing, Mrs. Simmons was asked point-blank by the trial judge whether she was basing her identification testimony on her memory of the events as they transpired at the time of the robbery, or whether she was using the lineup and photographic procedures in making her identification. She stated that her identification of the appellant was based on her independent recollection of the events as they transpired on September 24, 1986. Therefore, this Court concludes that there is ample credible evidence to support the trial court finding that there was no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification in that the victim has never identified someone else and then changed, nor had she positively not identified the defendant and then later through suggestive procedures come to identify the defendant. The Court finds no merit to this assignment.