Opinion ID: 2328028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: holding the atkins petition in abeyance

Text: Attorney Nolas's presentation and characterization of appellant's serial Brady claim in both the federal court and the PCRA court, which secured delay in the proceedings in both court systems, was possible only because appellant's Atkins petition was held in abeyance. The record argument made by Attorney Nolas belowwhich was not disputed by the Commonwealth, and which apparently was accepted by the courtwas that a serial PCRA petition raising a question of death eligibility (i.e., Atkins relief) should be held in abeyance merely because the defendant was pursuing lesser, parallel federal habeas review of prior claims. This notion is mistaken. [10] Notably, counsel cited no authority when he told the PCRA court, I don't think you can rule on Atkins.  N.T., 9/25/07, at 15. That is so, because no such authority exists. It may be prudent for a PCRA court to await a pending decision from a court which binds itthe U.S. Supreme Court or this Court, when it comes to capital casesif that decision will control the issue before the PCRA court. There may be reason to await hoped-for clarifying legislation; Atkins cases were a prime example, until it became clear that the General Assembly would not act, and this Court had to step in and address the issue. But, the notion that a PCRA court should hold a serial PCRA petition in abeyance while a petitioner pursues different claims on federal habeas review, in the lower federal courts, serves only to create unwarranted delay in capital cases. There is no reason why federal habeas petitions and serial state collateral petitions cannot proceed simultaneously. Simultaneous decision-making advances the fundamental concern of finality. The PCRA does not require or authorize such delay; nor do this Court's procedural Rules. State PCRA repose, on the other hand, rewards strategic ping-ponging delay between state and federal court and consequent litigation abuse. The specific reason proffered by federal counsel to the PCRA court in this case for holding the Atkins petition confirms the point. Counsel stated: I think the reasoning before was holding in [ ] abeyance to see what the Third [C]ircuit would do because if there's no death sentence then there's no point in us doing an Atkins.  N.T., 9/25/07, at 12. Counsel is incorrect. Even assuming that the pendency of the Third Circuit cross-appeals was the reason for setting aside the Atkins petition in the first place, but see note 10, supra, the Third Circuit decision will not eliminate the need to decide the Atkins issue, since Atkins involves death eligibility. The district court granted relief on a perceived penalty phase instructional error under the Third Circuit's Mills precedent; Mills claims do not involve death eligibility. If the Mills ruling is reversed by the Third Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court, and no relief is granted on appellant's cross-appeal (which does not include an exhausted death eligibility claim), appellant's death sentence will stand. If the determination is affirmed, the Commonwealth is free to seek the death penalty in a new proceeding. Either way, it is a prospective capital case and the Atkins issue must be decided. Any relief appellant could secure in federal court still exposes him to the prospect of a capital retrial, while a meritorious Atkins claim removes the prospect of death. As this Court is reminded by capital counsel in different contexts, there are other consequences of a finding of death ineligibility, including conditions of incarceration, which specifically counsel against the deferral of legitimate death eligibility claims. There simply is no legitimate reason to defer decision of an Atkins claim, unless it lacks merit. But, even where the serial claim that would be deferred does not involve death eligibility, there is no legitimate reason to defer decisions on serial PCRA petitions merely because a federal habeas petition is pending. Acceptance of the argument federal counsel advances invites unnecessary delaysand rewards strategic abusesin capital litigation. The state courts are not obliged to accept a complicit role in federal defense counsel strategies of delay. In the case sub judice, there was reason to hold the Atkins petition when it was first filed, given the absence of legislative guidance, but that reason expired in 2005, when this Court acted and decided Miller. There also may have been a reason to hold the Atkins petition for a shorter period if the Commonwealth was deciding whether to pursue an appeal of the federal district court's conditional grant of penalty phase relief; if the Commonwealth accepted the federal decision, and pursued a new penalty phase, the Atkins issue could be litigated in the retrial setting. But, there is no reason to hold a serial PCRA petition merely because federal cross-appeals were pending on already-exhausted habeas claims. We will direct the PCRA court to address the Atkins petition immediately; and we caution PCRA courts generally that they should not place serial petitions in repose merely to allow for federal habeas litigation of prior, exhausted claims.