Opinion ID: 153024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision

Text: There can be no question that Garland's petition satisfies the first Reyes-Requena factor, i.e. that his claim is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision. The Government argues that Santos should not apply retroactively because the Supreme Court did not make its holding retroactive. Government Br. 15 (emphasis in original). However, as Garland argues, our case law establishes that new decisions interpreting federal statutes that substantively define criminal offenses automatically apply retroactively and Santos is an exemplar of such a decision. See United States v. McPhail, 112 F.3d 197, 199 (5th Cir.1997). In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a petitioner could collaterally attack his conviction based on a decision issued after [the petitioner's] conviction was affirmed if that decision established that the conviction and punishment are for an act that the law does not make criminal. 417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974). This court has interpreted Davis to hold that substantive, non-constitutional decision[s] concerning the reach of a federal statute . . . do[] not implicate the retroactivity analysis set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), [6] [and instead] appl[y] retroactively to cases on collateral review. United States v. McPhail, 112 F.3d at 199 (citing Davis, 417 U.S. at 341-47, 94 S.Ct. 2298; United States v. McKie, 73 F.3d 1149, 1153 (D.C.Cir.1996); United States v. Dashney, 52 F.3d 298, 299 (10th Cir.1995)). McPhail further explained that a decision is substantive, non-constitutional[,] . . . concerning the reach of a federal statute, if it articulates the substantive elements that the government must prove to convict a person charged under the statute. Id. By so doing, that decision explains what conduct is, and has always been, criminalized by the statute and thus it applies retroactively to cases on collateral review without triggering the Teague analysis. Id. Accordingly, the McPhail panel concluded that a petitioner could collaterally attack his conviction for using a firearm in furtherance of his crime based on Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 147-51, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), which was handed down subsequent to his conviction becoming final, and which established that the Government must present evidence sufficient to show active employment of the firearm in order to sustain such a conviction. McPhail, 112 F.3d at 199. In light of McPhail, Santos is a prime example of a Supreme Court decision retroactively applicable to cases pending on collateral review. Santos examines the meaning of the word proceeds in the money-laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956. It determines that, in certain circumstances, proceeds cannot be understood as gross receipts, but rather must be defined as profits. See Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2034 n. 7 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, for money laundering falling within the case's holding, Santos fill[s] gaps in [the] statute by defin[ing][a] potentially ambiguous statutory term[]. Id. at 2031. Just as in McPhail, Santos construed the reach of a federal statute more narrowly than its broadest possible meaning, thus requiring the Government to prove additional facts in order to convict Garland of money laundering. Accordingly, Santos applies retroactively. It is not barred from having retroactive effect upon cases on collateral review under the Teague analysis because it is a substantive, non-constitutional decision concerning the reach of a federal statute.