Opinion ID: 20178
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: gratification.

Text: Dickinson claims insufficient evidence to support his aggravated kidnapping Arnold, 548 So. 2d at 924. convictions. “In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the Citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. evidence in the light most favorable to the 347 (1964), Dickinson argues that the Arnold verdict and uphold the verdict if, but only if, a holding cannot be applied to his 1977 rational juror could have found each element conviction. In Bouie, the Court held that an of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” unforeseeable state-court construction of a United States v. Brown, 186 F.3d 661, 664 criminal statute cannot be applied (5th Cir. 1999); see also Foy v. Donnelly, 959 retroactively. See id. Dickinson’s claim is F.2d 1307, 1313 (5th Cir. 1992). We apply without merit, because the Arnold court this standard with explicit reference to the specifically addressed the precedent and substantive elements of the criminal offense as opined that defined by state law, and give great weight to the state court’s determination that the [a] review of the history of the statute evidence is sufficient. See Foy, 959 F.2d at and our jurisprudence reveals that [the 1314. requirement Dickinson advocates] has never been part of the law of aggravated In State v. Arnold, 548 So. 2d 920, 923 kidnapping. Rather, all the law has (La. 1989), the court identified the elements of required is evidence of defendant’s aggravated kidnapping as follows: (1) the intent to extort something of value by forcible seizing, and (2) the carrying of any playing upon the victim’s hope of person from one place to another, (3) with the release. intent to force the victim to give up anything of value, (4) in order to secure the release of Arnold, 548 So. 2d at 923.10 that person. Dickinson argues that there was no evidence of the fourth element; in other The evidence is sufficient to support words, he contends there was no evidence that Dickinson’s conviction. He abducted both he intended to condition the victims’ release victims at knifepoint, forced them into a car, on their submitting to sexual intercourse. As and drove them to an apartment where they we will explain, Arnold makes plain that the were raped by him and his cohort. Both evidence is sufficient to prove all four elements victims gave substantial test imony of the offense: corroborating their claims. The opinion in Arnold, 548 So. 2d at 921, 924, makes plain [T]he relevant factor in applying the that when a victim is forcibly abducted at fourth element of aggravated kidnapping knifepoint, driven to a remote location, and is not whether the kidnapper explicitly forced to have sexual intercourse, the communicated to the victim that requirements of aggravated kidnapping are performance of sexual acts would result established. in his or her release, but whether the kidnapper intended to extort sexual AFFIRMED. gratification from the victim by playing upon the victim’s hope for release. This intent is manifested not merely by the kidnapper’s words or actions, but by analyzing whether a reasonable person 10 In fact, even the dissent in Arnold specifically in the victim’s place, given the totality of cites the case sub judice as one in which sufficient the circumstances, would believe that he evidence to satisfy all elements of the offense did or she would not be safely released exist. See Arnold, 548 So. 2d at 929 n.5 unless he or she complied with the (Calogero, J., dissenting in part) (discussing State kidnapper’s demands for sexual v. Dickinson, 370 So. 2d 557 (La. 1979)). 7