Opinion ID: 787590
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Basis for Spending Cap Limits

Text: 142 If the District Court finds, however, that mandatory spending limits were the only type of regulation that could sufficiently advance Vermont's time-protection and anti-corruption interests, then the court must also inquire into the basis for the particular amount of the spending limits chosen. There was evidence presented at trial that Act 64's spending limits were intended to map onto existing spending levels from past campaigns. In defendants' proposed findings of fact after trial, defendants indicated that the legislature considered factors such as population, historical information on past spending levels and campaigns, Vermont's previous voluntary spending limits, and the testimony of numerous witnesses concerning the appropriate level for the limits, with the legislature balancing different viewpoints as is necessary with most pieces of legislation. This is consistent with the District Court's findings that the average spending on past races was consistently under the limits imposed by Act 64. 118 F.Supp.2d at 471-472. See also Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1769 (2001) (suggesting that median spending levels of candidates in recent races could be an appropriate basis for spending limits). 143 Nonetheless, the specific basis for the final limits is not entirely clear from the existing record. Defendants noted that for the Governor's race, the Senate bill would have set a $250,000 limit, while the House bill originally set a $400,000 limit. In the final bill as adopted, the limit was set at $300,000. Similarly, the limits for one-seat Senate races varied in the various committee bills, either $4,000, $5,000 or $6,000, with an additional $2-3,000 for each additional seat in the district. The final limits were those that emerged out of the Senate Finance Committee (the lowest in any of the committee bills)—$4,000 plus an additional $2,500 for each additional seat. Such decisions, of course, could be the product of typical legislative compromise— a process into which we will not intrude. However, plaintiffs also presented evidence that the ultimate decision as to the amount of certain statewide spending limits was motivated by a desire to preserve the public fisc, because of Act 64's public financing option for gubernatorial and Lieutenant Governor candidates. 22 Particularly in the context of expenditure limits, these choices demand greater scrutiny. 144 Thus, in undertaking its least restrictive means analysis on remand, the District Court should make additional findings on the impact of the legislative choices as to the appropriate spending limits on candidates' and voters' First Amendment rights. Even if Act 64's spending limits are sufficiently high to permit effective advocacy as defined in Shrink, as the District Court found and as we have affirmed, the precise level of the limits chosen can have a significant impact on how restrictive the provision is on First Amendment rights. Of course, a $2 million limit for State Senate races is quite unlikely to restrict First Amendment rights, but equally unlikely to impact the arms race mentality and thereby advance the interests asserted. Moreover, there will always be distinctions in degree that could be seen as less restrictive —$305,000 is less restrictive than $300,000; $310,000 less restrictive than $305,000, etc. And such an inquiry has no logical endpoint. 145 However, the specific choices made by the Vermont legislature among the different spending limits contained in various bills may be differences in kind with respect to the impact on the First Amendment rights of candidates and voters. Inquiries into the First Amendment impact of challenged regulations have been undertaken in analogous contexts by other courts, see, e.g., National Black Police Ass'n v. D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics, 924 F.Supp. 270, 277 (D.D.C.1996) (considering a variety of factors in assessing whether the reduction in campaign funds was so substantial that it affected the candidates' ability to reach voters), vacated as moot sub nom. National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C.Cir.1997), and, although necessarily speculative here, should be undertaken on remand. If the choice of the lower spending limit—for example, $4,000 for a Senate race as opposed to $6,000—is significantly more restrictive, while no more effective in advancing the interest asserted, then the lower spending limit is not consistent with the First Amendment. Assessing the legislative alternatives, then, requires evaluating both (1) the extent to which the higher spending limit is less restrictive of the First Amendment rights of candidates and voters 23 ; and (2) the extent to which the higher spending limit would be as effective in advancing the anti-corruption and time-protection interests. The answers to these questions will determine whether the spending limits chosen not only allow for effective campaigns but also are the least restrictive alternative, and therefore narrowly tailored.