Opinion ID: 308173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: personal attack doctrine

Text: The law in this area is well settled. Whenever there is an attack made on a person or group in the context of a controversial issue of public importance the individual attacked has a right to respond. The right is extended on the basis of two separate lines of authority-the holdings in Red Lion and Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., and on the basis of the Commission's regulations. 142 These obligations differ from the general fairness requirement that issues be presented, and presented with coverage of competing views, in that the broadcaster does not have the option of presenting the attacked party's side himself or choosing a third party to represent that side. But insofar as there is an obligation of the broadcaster to see that both sides are presented, and insofar as that is an affirmative obligation, the personal attack doctrine and regulations do not differ from the preceding fairness doctrine. The simple fact that the attacked men or unendorsed candidates may respond themselves or through agents is not a critical distinction, and indeed, it is not unreasonable for the FCC to conclude that the objective of adequate presentation of all sides may best be served by allowing those most closely affected to make the response, rather than leaving the response in the hands of the station which has attacked their candidacies, endorsed their opponents, or carried a personal attack upon them. 143 The Supreme Court laid to rest any existing challenges as to the Commission's authority in enacting regulations under the personal attack doctrine in Red Lion. 144 Congress has given a mandate to the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires to enact such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions . . . as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter . . . . 145 The demands of public interest are prime considerations for the Commission in granting licenses, 146 renewing licenses, 147 and modifying them. 148 Additionally, station operation must be carried out in the public interest. 149 This mandate to the FCC to assure that broadcasters operate in the public interest is a broad one, a power not niggardly but expansive, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943), whose validity we have long upheld. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138, 60 S.Ct. 437, 84 L.Ed. 656 (1940); FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90, 73 S.Ct. 998, 97 L.Ed. 1470 (1953); FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285, 53 S.Ct. 627, 77 L.Ed. 1166 (1933). It is broad enough to encompass these regulations. 150 As the Supreme Court has held specifically that the personal attack regulations . . . are [not] beyond the scope of the congressionally conferred power to assure that stations are operated by those whose possession of a license serves 'the public interest,' 151 this leaves us only to examine the adequacy of the Commission's holding in the instant case. 152 The facts in this case indicate, as the Commission found, that the licensee demonstrated complete disregard for the rules in this area. There are instances on the record where the licensee totally failed to give any notification to persons attacked, 153 in other cases there were failures to send tapes, transcripts, or summaries. 154 The Commission found, adopting the Examiner's decision, that [m]anagement did very little to comply with the mandate of the rules in supplying tapes or summaries. Usually the individual was obliged to request a tape and, even then, he had difficulty. 155 This is a demonstration of Brandywine's degree of compliance in regard to personal attacks. We have reviewed the alleged attacks in this case and find many instances of attacks upon honesty, character, integrity and other personal qualities of given persons or groups in the course of discussion of controversial issues of public importance. Yet we find that the licensee did not send tapes, that it did not send transcripts, that it did not send summaries. Is this the responsible behavior of an earnest licensee? As was the case with regard to the fairness doctrine, Brandywine was informed of its responsibilities in personal attack situations by the Commission at the time of approving the initial transfer. Brandywine represented to the Commission that they understood and would abide by the responsibilities placed on them. As the Commission stated: The unavoidable conclusion is that Brandywine simply ignored its plain duty to the public. . . . We note here again that these violations, although they would warrant the same conclusion in any event, are particularly reprehensible in light of the fact that the licensee had been cautioned at the outset concerning its duties in this area. 156 Brandywine has attempted to pass its obligations in this area to those who purchase time from the licensee. The law is clear in this regard. The obligation rests squarely on the shoulders of the licensee. The fact that the licensee decided to act in avoidance of this obligation by seeking to delegate a non-delegable duty is another indicia of Brandywine's failings under the law. We fully understand Brandywine's two pronged defense in this area. Firstly, Brandywine claims it is incapable of screening tapes prior to broadcast because of the small size of its staff. We note that small staffs in no way exculpate licensees from their affirmative duties. Brandywine would be incapable of operating without an engineer; similarly, a person suitable to protect the rights of the listening public is a necessity for a licensee. This is part of the expense of operating a radio station. Any economic argument to the contrary loses sight of the purposes of Commission regulation. Brandywine's second assertion is even less valid. John Norris testified that the station did not have anyone listen to program tapes prior to broadcast as this act would constitute censorship. 157 This argument offends the sensibilities of the court for various reasons. This is prima facie evidence that despite the numerous and lengthy assertions of the licensee to the Commission, Brandywine never intended to comply with the personal attack rules. Any representation to the contrary on the part of the licensees can only be said to constitute a gratuitous design intended to lull the Commission into a feeling of security. Brandywine has dealt with the Commission in a setting which not only lacked good faith but was also meant to defraud the Commission with regard to the licensee's actual intentions in this area. Brandywine was aware of the personal attack rules, it acknowledged responsibility under them and then chose to disregard them under a guise claiming that the rules constitued licensee censorship. Such maneuvering has proven to be not so wise gamesmanship on the part of licensee. Brandywine's abuses in this area are so blatant as to be sufficient to shock the conscience of the court. The Commission had every justification for its findings in regard to the personal attack rules.