Opinion ID: 1742459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Overlapping

Text: Nooner raises the spectre of unconstitutional overlapping between our capital murder statute and first degree murder statute in that the two statutes blur and proscribe the same conduct. According to his theory, the statutes do not give proper notice of the criminal offenses and are void for vagueness. This court has discounted this argument on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Greene v. State, 317 Ark. 350, 878 S.W.2d 384 (1994); Sanders v. State, 317 Ark. 328, 878 S.W.2d 391 (1994); Buchanan v. State, 315 Ark. 227, 866 S.W.2d 395 (1993); Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 831 S.W.2d 104 (1992); Van Pelt v. State, 306 Ark. 624, 816 S.W.2d 607 (1991); Smith v. State, 306 Ark. 483, 815 S.W.2d 922 (1991). Nooner also contends that aggravated robbery is not enumerated as a predicate felony for capital murder in the governing statute, only robbery is. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101 (Repl.1993). We adopt again the reasoning in McClendon v. State, 295 Ark. 303, 306, 748 S.W.2d 641, 642-643 (1988): In support of this the appellant asserts that the underlying felony, aggravated robbery, is not one of the seven felonies that can support a charge of capital felony murder. This argument has been raised before. In Simpson v. State, 274 Ark. 188, 623 S.W.2d 200 (1981), we held the General Assembly could not conceivably have intended that robbery, which may involve no force, would support a charge of capital murder, while aggravated robbery, an inherently dangerous crime, would not. Aggravated robbery is still robbery. Though § 5-10-101(a)(1) has been amended since the McClendon case, the quoted rationale continues to be convincing. The circuit court correctly denied this motion.