Opinion ID: 345511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Congress on Broadway

Text: 74 It might be argued that the recent adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence casts new light on the proper role of Broadway in this circuit. Rule 404(b) provides merely that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for specified purposes such as proof of intent. See note 4, supra. The Federal Rule thus addresses only the question of the permissible purposes for admitting such evidence. 75 Cataloguing those exceptions has always been only the first and easiest question in considering the admissibility of other crimes evidence. The statute thus merely summarizes prior caselaw regarding the permissible uses for such evidence. It leaves untouched the second and more problematic task of refining criteria, such as the requisite degree of similarity of the prior and charged offenses and the degree of proof required of those ostensibly similar elements, designed to ensure that extrinsic conduct evidence is of probative value for the enumerated purposes in particular cases. The latter project is one for which there is no authoritative source other than the prior common law. It is a task in which this court has been painstakingly involved for almost ten years. Broadway and San Martin are the products of that common law evolution. The fruits of this court's careful labors are not lightly to be discarded by implication. 76 Nevertheless, it might be argued that the legislative history of Rule 404(b) suggests Congress generally favors the admissibility of evidence of other wrongs or acts offered for permissible purposes. To begin with, the House Committee on the Judiciary amended the second sentence of 404(b), which in the version approved by the Supreme Court had begun with the words, This subdivision does not exclude the evidence when offered . . . . The amended version of this sentence, which begins with the words It may, however, be admissible, was substituted to place greater emphasis on admissibility. See H.Rep.No.93-650, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, pp. 7075, 7081. 77 At best, this portion of the legislative history represents merely the expression of a relative, not an absolute preference. Congress thought the Court's version of 404(b) unsatisfactory insofar as it contained a negative implication that even highly probative other crimes evidence adduced for a permissible purpose might be excluded. At worst, such unelaborated sentiment, completely divorced from the question how intelligently to gauge the probative value of other crimes evidence adduced for a particular purpose, is scarcely a basis for implying the dismemberment of a body of law reflecting this tribunal's deliberations over the subtle and perplexing question at hand. 78 The remarks of the Senate Committee are no more disabling to the law of this circuit. Concerned that the use of the word may in Rule 404(b) in the final version might give the trial judge warrant to exclude evidence on an unprincipled basis, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported: 79 Although your committee sees no necessity in amending the rule itself, it anticipated that the use of the discretionary word may with respect to the admissibility of evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts is not intended to confer any arbitrary discretion on the trial judge. Rather, it is anticipated that with respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the trial judge may exclude it only on the basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i. e., prejudice, confusion or waste of time. 80 S.Rep.No.93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, pp. 7051, 7071. 81 This portion of the legislative history, like the House Committee Report, gives no indication that it is addressed to the viability of judicially developed requirements for the admission of other crimes evidence. It is, rather, addressed solely to the scope of the trial judge's discretion. The statement merely expresses an understandable concern that trial judges not construe the phrase may . . . be admissible in 404(b) as impliedly according them unlimited freedom to exclude other crimes evidence adduced for one of the permissible purposes. Although trial judges will continue to have discretion to exclude such other crimes evidence, the decision to do so must be founded on an articulable reason it cannot be arbitrary. Furthermore, the articulated reason must correspond to one of the considerations enumerated in Rule 403. 21 Since those considerations include such open-ended concepts as prejudice and confusion, there remains in the trial judge broad discretion to exclude other crimes evidence. The function of Broadway and San Martin is, as we shall see, merely further to confine and guide that discretion. 82 A third aspect of the legislative history of Rule 404(b) is the pertinent Advisory Committee Note. The Committee declares first that the rule does not require that (other crimes evidence offered for a permissible purpose) be excluded. This statement of Rule 404(b) avers only that there is no per se rule against the admission of other crimes evidence. 22 The Committee goes on to observe that, with respect to excluding other crimes evidence offered for a permissible purpose, 83 (t)he determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other facts appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403. 84 The Advisory Note, like the Senate Committee Report, brings the considerations set forth in Rule 403 to bear on the decision to exclude other crimes evidence. But nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress or the Advisory Committee intended also to import the standard for weighing those considerations set forth in Rule 403 i. e., that probativeness must be substantially outweighed by prejudice or confusion. Indeed, had it been Congress's intention to rely solely on Rule 403, the Senate Committee Report presumably would have said that the trial might exclude other crimes evidence only on the basis of Rule 403 rather than on the basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i. e., prejudice, confusion or waste of time. 85 Even if Congress did intend to say that the trial judge may exclude other crimes evidence only on the basis of Rule 403 itself, however, Broadway would still control this case. To say that other crimes evidence may be excluded only if prejudice substantially outweighs probative value simply does not effect such a radical shift in the law as would sweep before it Broadway and San Martin and render the law of this circuit an anachronism. 86 To begin with, the term substantially outweighs is susceptible of such variable and subjective application that it is hard to see how it would alter a doctrine such as the Broadway rule that leaves unarticulated the precise balance of probative value and prejudice. More fundamentally, the animus behind the Broadway rule cannot be other than to prevent the admission of other crimes evidence that exerts a prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value. As we have interpreted and applied Broadway, then, that case is entirely consistent with both Rule 404(b) and the legislative purpose the rule was meant to serve. 87 There is ample authority for the proposition that our pre-Rules cases in general and Broadway and San Martin in particular guide our application of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In United States v. Brown, supra, 548 F.2d at 1206-07, 1206 n.24, we turned to Broadway for such guidance in applying Rule 404(b). 23 Similarly, in United States v. Bloom, supra, 538 F.2d at 709, we applied Broadway's requirement that the similar physical elements of the prior offense be proved by plain, clear, and convincing evidence, though we ultimately sustained the admission of the evidence in that case. Most important, we correctly observed in Bloom that Rule 404(b) coincides with and is further clarified by our prior Fifth Circuit decisions, notably San Martin and Broadway. United States v. Bloom, supra, 538 F.2d at 708. We shall turn next to investigate the precise manner in which Broadway clarifies Rule 404(b). 88 Rule 404(b) represents an omnibus provision in the sense that it applies to different kinds of prior act evidence and different permissible uses of that evidence. Applying Rule 403 to Rule 404(b) demands drawing certain distinctions among uses and kinds of Rule 404(b) evidence. Determining the meaning of Rule 403 terms such as unfair prejudice in the context of other crimes evidence adduced to prove a defendant's mental state or identity calls for precisely the kind of inquiry envisaged by Broadway and San Martin. Far from eventuating in the sort of arbitrary discretion feared by the Senate Committee, application of these precedents establishes a structured and principled means of determining the admissibility of other crimes evidence. Broadway and San Martin merely unpack the concepts of prejudice and probative value in an other crimes context, thereby generating several levels of inquiry.
89 Determining whether the prior offense is sufficiently similar to generate a valid inference of intent to commit the charged offense is a matter of assessing its probative value. Rule 404(b) does not address the question of similarity at all. Indeed, it does not even use the term. The reason is simply that 404(b) describes some permissible uses of other crimes evidence for which similarity is required (e. g., intent) and some for which the similarity of the prior act is irrelevant (e. g., motive). 90 Consequently the requirement of similarity and criteria for determining the requisite degree of similarity must be imported into the terms of 404(b) and 403 in the context of other crimes evidence adduced for purposes to which similarity is germane. It would be possible to leave the trial judge without guidelines in this respect that is, without establishing criteria in virtue of which a prior and charged offense are to be adjudged similar. That, however, would not solve the problem of arbitrary discretion and would inevitably lead to different results in like cases. On the other hand, we might establish beforehand the requisite criteria for determining similarity, thereby confining the trial judge's discretion within broad limits and placing both the government and criminal defendants on notice regarding the kinds of other crimes showings likely to be sufficient. That is precisely what Broadway and San Martin purport to do. 91 We are unwilling to read a Congressional committee's concern regarding arbitrary discretion as a compelling reason to scrap established criteria for determining similarity, and hence probative value, in favor of the trial judge's unguided calculation in which similarity will presumably play a less exclusionary, but correspondingly more unpredictable role. 92 Under any reasonable standard, moreover, the government failed to demonstrate the requisite degree of similarity between prior and charged offense in the case at bar if it failed to show that the credit cards were stolen.
93 The probative force of the other crimes evidence in this case rests on the notion that Beechum possessed stolen credit cards. The government, failed to prove convincingly that the cards were stolen. Rule 404(b) by its express terms does not suggest the standard of proof required of other crimes evidence. One reason for this is that the rule covers the spectrum from evidence of prior convictions to evidence of prior acts that are not themselves unlawful; moreover, it covers a broad range of permissible uses for such evidence. Not surprisingly, therefore, the rule leaves open the requisite degree of certainty. 94 Our pre-Rules cases, notably Broadway and Simmons, help fill this gap. At least where the prior act is introduced as a prior criminal offense to prove the defendant's mental state, Broadway and its progeny supply the plain, clear and convincing standard. The trial court is enabled by this standard to assess whether the elements of the prior offense required to establish its similarity to the charged offense have been sufficiently proved, and hence whether the prior offense has significant probative value. When the evidence fails to satisfy the clear and convincing standard, the reliability of the already subtle inference from past act to present intent is damaged beyond repair. Given the doubtful probative value of the evidence, coupled with the prejudicial impact necessarily attendant to evidence of prior crimes even incompletely proved crimes Broadway properly excludes such evidence.
95 Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Broadway were no longer a per se rule, we would reach the same result. That is, assuming that the only ground for excluding other crimes evidence was the Rule 403 balancing test, under the circumstances of this case the trial judge should not have admitted evidence of Beechum's possession of the two credit cards. A case by case determination of probative value versus potential prejudice would call for consideration of the same factors that undergird the Broadway test, though we should no longer automatically exclude evidence of other crimes when the requisite similarity to the charged crime was not convincingly demonstrated. Rather, we should weigh the prejudicial impact of the particular extrinsic offense against the probative value of the evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances. 96 Under such a test it might be argued that although the prosecution did not convincingly demonstrate that the credit cards were stolen, there was nonetheless some evidence from which the jury might conclude that Beechum possessed stolen credit cards. Hence, it might be said, the other crimes evidence had some probative value that was not outweighed by possible prejudicial effect since the danger of unfair prejudice from a case of possessing stolen property is not as great as that occasioned by evidence of more violent crimes, such as murder or rape. 97 Although the danger of prejudice is admittedly less when the prior offense is not one calculated to excite the outrage of the jury, the prejudicial effect of other crimes is not limited to their emotional impact on the jury. The message not only of Broadway but of the great weight of the case law is that evidence of other crimes is inherently prejudicial. See, e. g., United States v. Myers, supra, 550 F.2d at 1044. Even when the prior offense is not a violent crime, three elements of prejudice remain. 98 First, the jury may punish the defendant for the prior rather than the charged offense. Second, the jury may infer from the defendant's assumed guilt of the prior offense that he committed the charged offense. Third, the jury may infer that two incomplete or unproved offenses somehow cumulate to justify some punishment. This, of course, is the danger of bootstrapping, whereby a prosecutor uses an incomplete prior offense and an incomplete charged offense to reinforce each other, each providing the basis of an inference that completes the other. 99 A necessary counterweight to these dangers is the requirement that the physical elements of the prior offense be convincingly proved. But assuming Broadway is no longer a per se rule, in some cases the need for other crimes evidence may be so great, and the failure to satisfy those requirements so inconsequential, that the trial court may, in its discretion, admit the evidence. This is not such a case. 100 In the case at bar the prosecution's failure to show that the credit cards were stolen went to the heart of the ostensible similarity between the prior and charged offenses. The prosecution could so easily have obtained evidence that the addressees had not received the cards, or perhaps that Beechum had used the cards in an unauthorized manner, that its failure to come forward with such proof is entirely unexcused. Certainly any sensible system of balancing prejudice against probative value would take into account the difficulty of buttressing proof of the similar elements of the prior offense. Probative value is hence reduced when the foundation for other crimes evidence is lacking an easily verifiable fact that might resolve substantial doubt whether a similar offense in fact took place. 101 Moreover, the need for admitting the cards into evidence, was not so pressing that we must overlook the deficiencies of the government's foundation. There was other convincing evidence from which Beechum's unlawful intent could have been inferred. Beechum's story that he intended to turn in the silver dollar to his supervisor was contradicted by two witnesses. 102 Supervisor Cox testified that he had seen Beechum and Beechum had seen him between 3:30 and 4:00 that afternoon, that indeed Beechum had been close enough to touch him, but that Beechum had mentioned nothing about a silver dollar. The postal inspector testified that he arrested Beechum at the end of the work day, while the appellant was standing outside his car in the parking lot with the engine running. The implication was clear that Beechum was preparing to leave, not trying to find his supervisor. 103 Given the strength of available evidence from which the jury could have inferred intent, the deficiencies of the prosecution's proof of the extrinsic offenses, and the ease with which the information lacking could have been supplied it was error to admit evidence of the extrinsic offenses.