Opinion ID: 389247
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Contractual Relationship Between Lorton and the Federal Bureau of Prisons

Text: 33 In Logue, a contract defined the division of responsibility between the state and federal jailers. By contrast, no contract between Lorton or the Department and the Bureau or other federal agency acting on behalf of the Attorney General exists regarding the care of federal prisoners housed at Lorton. The appellant argues that this difference forecloses a holding that Lorton, like the Nueces County jail, is an independent contractor with the United States for the purposes of the FTCA. We find this argument meritless because the statutory and regulatory restraints on federal control over Lorton are the functional equivalent of the contract in Logue. The statutory authority for sending prisoners to state or local-run and District-run institutions is identical; 36 financial arrangements for the care of the United States Code offenders housed there are similar; 37 and federal requirements as to the care and treatment of federal prisoners at Lorton are, if anything, less intrusive. 38 34 Lorton houses three classes of prisoners: those sentenced by the District of Columbia courts for District of Columbia Code offenses, a group with which we are not concerned here; those sentenced by the United States District Court for District of Columbia Code offenses, such as Cannon; 39 and those sentenced by the United States District Court for general federal crimes. Although 24 D.C.Code § 425 commit(s) ... to the custody of the Attorney General all three types of prisoners, and additionally gives him the power to transfer these prisoners to other available, suitable, and appropriate institutions, the federal government differentiates between the latter two groups of prisoners for fiscal purposes. Lorton receives a per diem allowance, based upon an allocation of the facility's actual operating costs, 40 for each federal prisoner charged or convicted of a general federal offense that it houses. No difference appears to exist between this arrangement and those the Bureau makes for the care of federal prisoners in state-run institutions. The District is financially responsible for the upkeep of all District of Columbia Code offenders, including Cannon; a statute assesses the District in a similar fashion for costs incurred by the federal government in housing District of Columbia Code offenders in federal penal institutions. 41 35 The same regulations govern the commitment of federal prisoners to Lorton as to contract facilities. The applicable regulations require the Bureau to provide suitable quarters for, and safekeeping, care and subsistence of, as well as protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States. (Emphasis supplied.) 42 The Bureau conducts periodic examinations of state and local facilities to ensure that they meet the Bureau's standards for suitability, although neither their regulations, contracts, nor internal policies provide for Bureau monitoring of the day-to-day programs and activities of these non-federal facilities. 43 The Bureau, on the other hand, does not conduct any inspections of Lorton, on the basis of its belief that even this minimal intrusion would interfere with the power of supervision delegated by statute to the Mayor of the District of Columbia. 44 Thus, the Bureau of Prisons' and the Attorney General's control of Cannon's jailers is even more attenuated than that found insufficient to establish federal liability under the FTCA by the Court in Logue. 36 That this division of responsibility is established by statute rather than contract is irrelevant, insofar as liability under the FTCA is concerned. It effectively ensures that Lorton is no more under the day-to-day control of the federal government than are contracting state and local facilities. 45 37