Opinion ID: 1312717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Trial by Jury

Text: Suit was filed on November 2, 1965. Appellant's counsel appeared in the case on November 18, 1965, and an answer containing a general denial was filed on December 7, 1965. On April 19, 1966, counsel for both parties signed a Pre-Trial Order which provided for a 2 day non-jury trial set for week of September 26, 1966. The same order permitted appellant to file an amended answer and counterclaim within 20 days. On May 4, 1966, appellant filed an amended answer which again contained a general denial as well as counterclaims for wrongful attachment and negligent care of attached property. On the same date appellant filed a demand for jury trial. Trial was continued to January 9, 1967. During a hearing on January 4, 1967, appellant's request for jury trial was brought to the court's attention. After considering the request, Judge Gilbert denied it on the ground that it had not been timely filed. On the first day of trial, which was before Judge Sanders, appellant argued a Motion for Order Confirming Defendant's Right to trial by Jury which was supported by his counsel's affidavit. After argument on the motion counsel for appellee advised the court that if there was any doubt in the court's mind as to whether appellant had a right to trial by jury, that appellee would be willing to stipulate that appellant be given a jury trial. Judge Sanders denied the motion. The general thrust of appellant's argument is that he did not waive his right to a jury trial. Civil Rule 38(d) specifically provides that the failure of a party to demand a jury trial not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to an issue triable by jury, constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. [1] Since appellant failed to demand a jury trial within 10 days following the filing of his answer on December 7, 1965, trial by jury was waived. [2] Appellant argues that his counsel's signing of the pre-trial order of April 19, 1966, providing for a non-jury trial cannot legally be classified as a waiver because his counsel did not know that he was agreeing to a non-jury trial and had no authority to waive trial by jury. By signing the pre-trial order, counsel for appellant stipulated with counsel for appellee and to the court that trial was to be without jury. By its provisions, the pre-trial order made this stipulation a part of the order. The order provided that it could be modified only to prevent manifest injustice, and that such modification may be made either on the application of counsel for the parties or on motion of the court. Counsel for appellant made no specific motion to amend the pre-trial order. In Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco [3] this court upheld the binding effect of pre-trial orders. However, as appellee points out, appellant had already waived his right to a jury trial in December of 1965, by his failure to file a demand as required by Civil Rule 38(a). The effect of appellant's counsel's signing of the pre-trial order, which was also signed by the judge, was to officially establish, as a rule governing the trial of the case, that trial was to be without a jury. Appellant was bound by the act of his counsel in signing the order. Counsel's undisclosed mental state can be given no controlling effect in interpreting the effect of the pre-trial order. Counsel is presumed to have been aware of the provisions of the order. The court is of the unanimous view that appellant waived his right to trial by jury with respect to his original answer. The last of appellant's arguments on this point appears to be that his amended answer, filed May 4, 1966, contained a counterclaim which raised the new issue of wrongful attachment, which could not be considered to have been covered by the pre-trial order of April 19, 1966. On this point the court has divided opinions. It is the writer's view that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant appellant's request for trial by jury because: (1) At the same time that appellant stipulated in the pre-trial order that the trial would be without jury, he was given permission to file a counterclaim within 20 days. A counterclaim alleging wrongful attachment was filed within 20 days. It is not logical to believe that appellant did not know the basis of the counterclaim he was requesting permission to file. Since he must have known that he was going to counterclaim on the basis of wrongful attachment, and he has not at any time denied this knowledge, he should be held to the waiver of jury trial contained in the same document which granted him permission to file the counterclaim. (2) With the pre-trial order providing for trial by the court, appellant waited eight months to draw to the court's attention the fact that he had filed a request for a jury trial subsequent to issuance of the pre-trial order and did not cause to be brought on for argument his Motion for an Order Confirming Right to Trial by Jury until the morning trial by court was scheduled to commence. Justice Dimond is of the view that since appellant's amended answer contained a counterclaim which raised a new issue not raised in the original answer, that appellant had the right, despite his initial waiver of trial by jury, to demand and receive a trial by jury on the new issue raised only. [4] Justice Rabinowitz is of the view that the trial judge abused his discretion in not treating appellant's Motion for an Order Confirming Defendant's Right to Trial by Jury as a motion under Civil Rule 39(b) which permits a judge in his discretion to order a trial by jury of any issue, even though a party may have failed to make a timely or effective demand therefor. [5] Justice Rabinowitz' view is based upon the following considerations present in the case: (1) Appellant filed a written demand for a jury trial within ten days after the last pleading directed to the issue. (2) The demand for jury trial was filed some eight months prior to the time the trial actually took place. (3) Appellant's counsel's contention that his signing of the pre-trial order was inadvertent and that he did not intend to consent to a non-jury trial with respect to the counterclaims he anticipated filing. (4) The record does not show that prejudice would have resulted to appellee by the granting of a jury trial, that in fact, appellee was willing to stipulate to the granting of a jury trial. Since the concensus of the court is that appellant should have been granted a trial by jury on the new issues raised in his counterclaim the order of disposition of this appeal will so provide.