Opinion ID: 1974115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: some closing comment

Text: The Board's experiences in dealing with D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) pursuant to procedures mandated by In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C.1979), and the holding in In re Kerr, 424 A.2d 94 (D.C.1980), have disclosed various anomalies. Perhaps a few examples might be pertinent should the court decide in this case to revisit the procedures of Colson or the holding in Kerr. The combined effect of the permanent disbarment holding in Kerr and the related Colson procedures yield widely disparate treatment of attorneys whose misconduct is within the range of comparability. By way of example, the misconduct in In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226 (D.C.1986) ( en banc ), included intentional forgery of a client's signature, falsely impersonating the client before a notary (or alternatively, aiding and abetting a notary public to certify falsely that the signature of the client was placed on the document in the presence of the notary), and then submitting the fraudulent document to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to induce judicial action. The substance of the misconduct in the Reback was similar to, and perhaps more egregious than, the misconduct involving Respondent's alleged good Samaritan effort to assist his client in committing passport fraud. The difference between the two cases is that the attorneys in Reback escaped all possible criminal felony charges, such as charges under D.C.Code § 22-1401 (forgery), § 22-1303 (false personation before ... notaries), § 22-1308 (false certificate of acknowledgment), or § 22-2514 (misdemeanor for false statements). In contract, Respondent in this case was not so fortunate when government prosecutors decided to prosecute him for misdemeanor of aiding and abetting passport fraud. Other attorneys have escaped permanent disbarment under D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) even though, unlike the Reback attorneys, criminal charges were filed and a conviction obtained. For example, the evidence in In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1987), disclosed that the attorney had probably committed perjury in his testimony before the S.E.C. However, he entered a guilty plea to a misdemeanor offense under the securities laws, an offense which did not involve moral turpitude, and his disciplinary sanction was suspension for one year. Had the attorney in Hutchinson been convicted of perjury, there would have been a strong likelihood of a finding of moral turpitude and permanent disbarment pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-2503(a). Similarly, the case of In re Thompson, 538 A.2d 247 (D.C.1987), involved an attorney who faced a criminal charge of knowingly assisting in the presentation of false statements to the Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) in support of his client's application for status as a permanent resident alien. These charges could have provided a basis for a felony conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (fraudulent statements to U.S. agency). However, the felony charge involved in the Thompson case was ultimately dismissed for reasons not fully disclosed in the record. Once again, if the facts developed in the disciplinary proceeding had been used as a basis for a possible criminal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the sanction could have been permanent disbarment, as compared to suspension for one year as actually imposed. Other examples of similar anomalies have occurred, and are bound to occur in the future, as long as the court adheres to its holding in Kerr and the procedures of Colson for determining moral turpitude per se. Such anomalies are inconsistent with one of the most important provisions of Rule XI requiring comparable sanctions for comparable misconduct. The Board recognizes, as Judge Newman has often stressed, that the root cause of these apparent anomalies can be traced to enactment to D.C.Code § 11-2503(a). For purposes of all proceedings before this Board, including this case, the Board is bound to follow the mandates of the statute as interpreted by the court in its Colson/Kerr decisions. We have endeavored to do so in this report. These comments are submitted solely because the court announced in In re Wolff, supra, that several members of the court are prepared to reconsider interpretation of D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) in the Kerr decision, which is action that only the court, not this Board, can take. [2]