Opinion ID: 2689731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: W. Sweeney, Wright and Evans, JJ., concur.

Text: Moyer, C.J., concurs separately. Douglas, Resnick and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. John R. Evans, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for Resnick, J. FOOTNOTES: 1. In his application for clemency, Saram Bellinger stated that he was convicted of aggravated robbery with firearm specifications and was sentenced to an indefinite term of five to twenty-five years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with three years’ actual incarceration. Both former Governor Celeste and Governor George V. Voinovich commuted that sentence to time served. Bellinger withdrew his appeal. According to his application for clemency, Freddie Moore was convicted of operating a gambling house and received a suspended sentence. Former Governor Celeste granted Moore a full and unconditional pardon on January 11, 1991, after which Governor Voinovich pardoned him on August 24, 1992. The court of appeals noted that his appeal had been rendered moot by the pardon from Governor Voinovich. 2. Reginald Wilkinson was substituted as a party to this action pursuant to Civ.R. 25(D)(1) when he replaced George W. Wilson as the Director of Rehabilitation and Correction effective March 25, 1991. Jill Goldhart was substituted as a party for John W. Shoemaker when she became Acting Chief of the APA. 3. Even though courts may not review the substantive decision of the Governor on whether to exercise clemency in a particular case, courts may consider whether constitutionally authorized limitations on the clemency power have been respected. For example, if a Governor attempted to grant a pardon before the recipient had been convicted, the purported grant would be outside the scope of the clemency power conferred by Section 11, Article III and constitutionally invalid from the outset. Similarly, a purported pardon is not really a pardon at all if constitutionally authorized procedural limitations on the pardoning power are ignored. Knapp held that a pardon, once granted and delivered, is irrevocable. Id., 39 Ohio St. 377, syllabus. However, Knapp did not consider the issue of constitutional limitations on the Governor’s power. An attempted pardon which is granted without adherence to constitutionally authorized requirements is invalid, and is not immune to challenge. 4. Interpreting the “subject to” clause as authorizing the General Assembly to set up a regulatory scheme which includes prerequisites to the exercise of the Governor’s pardoning power is consistent with our earlier analysis where we found that the clemency power is subject to whatever limits are set forth in Section 11, Article III. In the case of the “subject to” clause, the limit takes the form of an authorization to the General Assembly to issue regulations that will themselves limit the Governor’s pardoning power. 5. Though the validity of a reprieve is not at issue in this case, we believe that any interpretation of the “subject to” clause is necessarily incomplete without considering each of the three types of executive clemency. In terms of reprieves, we believe that they are fundamentally different from pardons. A reprieve is temporary; execution of a sentence is delayed when the Governor grants a reprieve. A reprieve is not permanent in the way that a pardon is. Reprieves, by their very nature, often require prompt, totally unfettered action by the Governor. Consequently, we find that reprieves are not governed by the “subject to” clause and, consistent with our analysis below, the General Assembly may not regulate the application process for reprieves. Moyer, C.J., concurring separately. I concur in the judgment and opinion of the majority that apply Section 11, Article III, Ohio Constitution and R.C. Chapter 2967 as clearly intended by the drafters of the Ohio Constitution and by the General Assembly. I write separately to discuss an aspect of the majority decision that demonstrates one of the very difficult responsibilities of being a judge. The majority’s careful and restrained interpretation produces the only conclusion that is faithful to the words of the Constitution and to R.C. Chapter 2967. We are not required or even requested to review the wisdom or the judgment of the acts of Governor Celeste when he pardoned and commuted the sentences of the defendants two business days before he left office. If that were the issue, my vote would be to invalidate all of the Governor’s actions. That, however, is not the issue we are required to decide. Nor is there any dispute that even if the Governor were required by the Constitution and the statutes to receive a report from the Ohio Adult Parole Authority before granting a pardon or commutation, he could disregard the recommendation contained in the report and grant the pardon or commutation. Indeed, the manner in which Governor Celeste granted the commutations and pardon in the cases before us suggests that even if he had followed the statutory procedure, it is unlikely he would have followed a recommendation of the Adult Parole Authority that any of the defendants not be granted a commutation or pardon. It appears that that is precisely the reason the dissent advocates an amendment to the Constitution that would limit the power of the Governor to grant pardons, commutations and reprieves beyond the limitations in Section 11, Article III. As Chief Justice Marshall observed, “[c]ourts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.” Osborn v. Bank of United States (1824), 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed. 204, 234. The majority opinion reflects the fundamental role of judicial responsibility and restraint. Every judge faithful to the judicial oath of office must be able to separate the law from his or her personal views when deciding cases. That fundamental aspect of judging is a unique challenge to judicial decision- making. In separating personal opinion from the constitutional issues before us, I am reminded of the observation that “[i]f the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned.” Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell (1934), 290 U.S. 398, 483, 54 S.Ct. 231, 256, 78 L.Ed. 413, 452 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). There is no comfort in applying the plain language of the Ohio Constitution to the facts in the case before us. The conduct of the death-penalty defendants that produced their convictions and death sentences is the lowest form of human behavior. If the death penalty is appropriate for anyone, it is appropriate for them. However, that personal belief has no relevance to the legal issues before us and must be separated from the judicial decision we are required to render. The words of the Constitution can be given their plain meaning only as applied by the majority decision. To analyze away the words of the Constitution is to engage in an act of corroborating one’s own belief that the Governor’s actions were unwise. The distribution of power among the three branches of government rests on a delicate balance. It is a fundamental element of American government. S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 28 OBR 250, 503 N.E.2d 136. We are urged by the successor in the office of governor to exercise our constitutional power to invalidate the commutations and a pardon of his predecessor in office. Restraint should characterize the exercise of judicial power in such a case. If we abandon the words of the Constitution as adopted by the citizens of Ohio in 1851, we invade both the authority of the executive branch and the will of the people. For the foregoing reasons, I concur, albeit regretfully, in