Opinion ID: 2520047
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Instruct on After-acquired Intent

Text: Defendant did not request a jury instruction on after-acquired intent, which would have informed the jury that if defendant first formed the intent to steal after killing or applying force against the victim, he could not be found guilty of robbery. He contends on appeal, however, that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to so instruct the jury. As we stated in Silva, an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769, citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273.) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime. We recently reaffirmed that CALJIC Nos. 9.40 and 8.21 together `adequately cover the issue of the time of the formation of the intent to steal.' ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 359, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432; People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 643, 244 Cal.Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836; Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 625-626, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) The defendant in Hughes argued, as does defendant here, that the version of CALJIC No. 8.21 given in his case was crucially different from the one this court upheld in Hayes and Hendricks. In those cases, in addition to the language quoted above, the version of CALJIC No. 8.21 read to the jury also stated that a killing was first degree murder if it occurred  as a result of the commission of ... robbery ( People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 359, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432), while in Hughes, as well as in this case, the as a result of language was not given. In Hughes, we found the omission insignificant. This was especially so because, as in this case, the Hughes jury was also given CALJIC No. 3.31, which instructed the jury that there must exist a concurrence of act or conduct and specific intent. [12] Reading CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and 9.40 together with No. 3.31, we believe that a reasonable juror would understand that defendant had to possess the specific intent to steal prior to or during his application of the force required for the commission of the offense of robbery. ( Hughes, at p. 360, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) We therefore reject defendant's claim of error. [13]