Opinion ID: 2765521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: H., 2000 MT 64, 299 Mont. 62, 997 P.2d 776.

Text: ¶26 The Guidelines provide a non-exhaustive list of criteria that may be considered in good cause determinations. Under section (b) of the Guidelines, good cause to deny transfer may exist under any of the following circumstances: (i) The proceeding was at an advanced stage when the petition to transfer was received and the petitioner did not file the petition promptly after receiving notice of the hearing. (ii) The Indian child is over twelve years of age and objects to the transfer. (iii) The evidence necessary to decide the case could not be adequately presented in the tribal court without undue hardship to the parties or the witnesses. (iv) The parents of a child over five years of age are not available and the child has little or no contact with the child’s tribe or members of the child’s tribe. 44 Fed. Reg. 67591. The Guidelines also provide that “[s]ocio-economic conditions and the perceived adequacy of tribal or Bureau of Indian Affairs social services or judicial systems may not be considered in a determination that good cause exists.” 44 Fed. Reg. 67591. C. The District Court’s Denial of Transfer of Jurisdiction ¶27 Birth Mother, Biological Father, and the Tribe advance several arguments challenging the District Court’s determination that good cause existed to deny transfer to 13 Tribal Court. First, they argue the court erred by concluding that the proceeding was in an advanced stage when the Tribe filed the motion for transfer, thereby making the motion untimely. This argument is in reference to subsection b(i) of the Guidelines, which provides that “[g]ood cause not to transfer the proceeding may exist” if the “proceeding was at an advanced stage when the petition to transfer was received and the petitioner did not file the petition promptly after receiving notice of the hearing.” 44 Fed. Reg. 67591. This timeliness criterion is “designed to encourage the prompt exercise of the right to petition for transfer in order to avoid unnecessary delays.” 44 Fed. Reg. 67591. ¶28 The District Court was careful to acknowledge that nothing in the actual text of ICWA explicitly requires a tribe’s transfer motion to be timely, but the Tribe makes a valid point with which we concur: the proceeding had not advanced to a stage that rendered the Tribe’s motion, filed about 30 days after the petition for termination, untimely as a matter of law. ICWA does not set concrete timeliness for either tribal intervention or transfer requests. However, ICWA’s purposes include sensitivity to delays in requesting transfers to tribal court. The commentary to the Guidelines explains: While the Act permits intervention at any point in the proceeding, it does not explicitly authorize transfer requests at any time. Late interventions do not have nearly the disruptive effect on the proceeding that last minute transfers do. . . . Although the Act does not explicitly require transfer petitions to be timely, it does authorize the court to refuse to transfer a case for good cause. When a party who could have petitioned earlier waits until the case is almost complete to ask that it be transferred to another court and retried, good cause exists to deny the request. 14 44 Fed. Reg. 67590.7,8 We thus consider the circumstances here, including the delay and the potential harm to the child that could occur by granting a transfer at the time the request was made. ¶29 The Tribe received notice of S.B.C.’s placement in foster care and intervened in January 2012. At the time of the Tribe’s intervention, the problems identified with the biological parents’ ability to care for S.B.C. were readily apparent: Birth Mother had forfeited the care of S.B.C., been arrested for her fourth DUI, and had failed in attempts to reunite with S.B.C.; similarly, Biological Father had denied paternity, refused to voluntarily undergo paternity tests, and exhibited no interest in caring for S.B.C.—leading ultimately to the development of a concurrent plan for adoption of S.B.C. later that year. Given the emergent care situation, and the lack of a tribal option, Child Services located an ICWA-qualified foster home and conferred with the Tribe’s representative about this placement, which Vaile approved. S.B.C. went there in October 2011 and progressed well in the care of Foster Mother. The Tribe was 7 The comment’s reference to avoiding having a case “retried” is a further demonstration that the Tribe’s motion was not untimely as a matter of law. The termination matter here had not yet been “tried.” 8 We acknowledge a split in authority regarding the propriety of considering the time the child spent in foster care in determining whether the proceeding is at an advanced stage. Compare In re A.B., 2003 ND 98, ¶ 18, 663 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 2003) (“advance stage” determination must separately consider termination proceeding) with People ex rel. T.E.R., 2013 COA 73, ¶ 14, 305 P.3d 414, 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013) (“advanced stage” based on considering the time child spent in foster care placement). However, we need not resolve this issue here, as the parties do not argue the point, but rather focus on whether the District Court’s good cause determination was supported by sufficient evidence and based on improper considerations. See City of Billings v. Peterson, 2004 MT 232, ¶ 45, 322 Mont. 444, 97 P.3d 532 (“It is not this Court’s obligation to develop parties’ arguments for them.”). 15 continually advised and approved of the situation. The Tribe filed a transfer motion in April 2013, 18 months after S.B.C.’s foster care placement, and 15 months after the Tribe intervened. The record does not demonstrate any reason that would have prohibited the Tribe from requesting transfer earlier. Although Fisher’s testimony, that things “fell apart,” infers that tribal disorganization played a role, those problems, if any, should not accrue against S.B.C. and the permanency he achieved in the meantime. The evidence supports the District Court’s conclusion that both the legal proceeding and S.B.C.’s progress in his placement had significantly advanced by the time the Tribe filed its motion to transfer. ¶30 The Tribe next argues the District Court improperly found clear and convincing evidence the best interests of the child would be injured by a transfer to Tribal Court. The commentary to the Guidelines states that the motion for transfer should be prompt and avoid delay because “[l]ong periods of uncertainty concerning the future are generally regarded as harmful to the well-being of children. For that reason, it is especially important to avoid unnecessary delays in child custody proceedings.” 44 Fed. Reg. 67591-67592. This Court has likewise stated that “custody of children should be quickly fixed” and “subject[ing] a child to protracted custodial litigation” is harmful to a child’s best interests. In re Matter of D.A., 2003 MT 109, ¶ 16, 315 Mont. 340, 68 P.3d 735 (citations omitted). ¶31 The District Court found from testimony that separation from his current placement would be very traumatic for S.B.C. The court found Foster Mother is the only 16 parent he has ever known and that removal would create a substantial risk of harm to him, and be a detriment to his physical and psychological well-being. It found that Foster Mother fully appreciates the laudable goals of ICWA, understands and is capable of helping S.B.C. learn his own heritage, culture and customs, and is willing to travel with him to participate in important tribal activities and rituals unique to his Blackfeet Tribe. The District Court did not err by finding there was clear and convincing evidence that subjecting S.B.C. to another court system and beginning the proceeding anew in Tribal Court would injure S.B.C.’s best interests. ¶32 Lastly, the Tribe argues the District Court improperly considered the socio-economic conditions of the Tribal Court. Subsection (c) of the Guidelines prohibit the consideration of the “[s]ocio-economic conditions and the perceived adequacy” of the tribal court system in making a determination of good cause. 44 Fed. Reg. 67591. In an attempt to demonstrate that the court based its decision on the inadequacy of the Tribal Court system, the Tribe draws our attention to a number of assertions the District Court made in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The District Court remarked throughout its findings of fact and conclusions of law that the Tribe “chose to sit on its hands and delay seeking jurisdiction over [S.B.C.] for tribal financial reasons.” Further, the court insinuated that the Tribe believes its children are sacred “only when it is in its best financial interests to do so.” ¶33 We agree that the District Court made comments that were both unnecessary and inappropriate. While the court’s financial comments validly reflected the testimony of 17 Fisher to the extent she testified that the availability of funding necessarily factors into the Tribe’s custody decisions, there was no reason to question the Tribe’s motives with regard to the sacredness with which it views S.B.C. or other Blackfeet children, or that it “exercise[s] its sovereign rights as a Nation . . . only when it is in its best financial interests to do so.” Despite the inappropriateness of some of the court’s statements, none were directed at the efficacy of the Blackfeet Tribal Court system itself. We conclude that the statements are not a basis for reversal. We affirm the District Court’s denial of the motion for transfer. ¶34 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by terminating Biological Father’s parental rights? ¶35 Biological Father argues the District Court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights. Biological Father asserts that there was no “testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that continued custody” of S.B.C. would result in serious damage to the child as is required by ICWA. The State, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 255, 186 L. Ed. 2d 729 (2013), argues that no qualified expert testimony was required because Biological Father did not ever have custody of S.B.C., as the District Court held. ¶36 Section 1912(f) of ICWA addresses the requisite expert testimony necessary to involuntarily terminate parental rights with respect to Indian children. Specifically, § 1912(f) provides that “no termination of parental rights may be ordered . . . in the absence of . . . testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical 18 damage to the child.” (Emphasis added.) In Baby Girl, the Supreme Court held that “§ 1912(f) does not apply in cases where the Indian parent never had custody of the Indian child.” Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2560, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 740 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court reasoned the phrase “continued custody” as referenced in § 1912(f) necessarily implies a prior term of “custody that a parent has” or “had at some point in the past” that could be continued. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2560, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 739. See also In re J.S., 2014 MT 79, ¶ 31, 374 Mont. 329, 321 P.3d 103. ¶37 The record supports the District Court’s determination that Biological Father never had custody of S.B.C. Biological Father was given opportunities to exercise custodial rights regarding S.B.C., but he steadfastly was unwilling or unable to do so. Biological Father initially denied paternity and failed to appear for paternity tests. Even after paternity was established by court order, Biological Father did not attempt to be a placement option for S.B.C., did not object to S.B.C.’s placement elsewhere, and in nine months following the establishment of paternity, did not visit S.B.C. While he did have minimal visits with S.B.C., Biological Father testified he “never had [S.B.C.] in [his] care.” Given this record, there was never any “custody” by Biological Father that could be continued within the meaning of § 1912(f). Therefore, § 1912(f) is inapplicable and the District Court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Biological Father’s parental rights. ¶38 3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by terminating Birth Mother’s parental rights? 19 ¶39 Birth Mother argues the District Court abused its discretion by terminating her parental rights. Birth Mother offers that there is insufficient evidence to support the District Court’s finding that she failed to complete her treatment plan. Pursuant to § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, a court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the child is an adjudicated youth in need of care and both of the following exist: (1) “an appropriate treatment plan that has been approved by the court has not been complied with by the parents or has not been successful,” and (2) “the conduct or condition of the parents rendering them unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.” ¶40 It is undisputed S.B.C. was adjudicated a youth in need of care, and that he had been in foster care for 30 consecutive months. Pursuant to § 41-3-604(1), MCA, “[i]f a child has been in foster care under the physical custody of the state for 15 months of the most recent 22 months, the best interests of the child must be presumed to be served by termination of parental rights.” ¶41 The treatment plan ordered by the District Court required Birth Mother to address her alcohol addiction issues and lack of parenting skills. The treatment plan listed specific tasks which included, among other things, that Birth Mother achieve a sober living environment, whether on her own or in a facility like the Carole Graham Home; inform her social worker of her plans for aftercare and obtain her social worker’s approval for them; and successfully complete her aftercare. ¶42 The record supports the District Court’s determination that Birth Mother failed to comply with her treatment plan. Birth Mother did enroll in the Carole Graham Home, 20 but she was asked to leave because of rules violations. Birth Mother’s social worker testified at the termination hearing that Birth Mother still has “an alcohol problem,” “warrants are out for her arrest for absconding from probation,” and she “failed to last in a structured environment for two weeks.” The record indicates Birth Mother was not present at the termination hearing of her parental rights and her whereabouts were unknown. The District Court found that her condition rendered her unfit, unable or unwilling to provide adequate parental care for S.B.C., which condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and that continued custody of S.B.C. by Birth Mother would be harmful to him. Birth Mother’s social worker further testified that Birth Mother’s parental rights should be terminated “due to two failed reunifications” with S.B.C. and because she is “not invested in developing that relationship with [her] son, and following a treatment plan, successfully.” ¶43 There is sufficient evidence to conclude that Birth Mother had not complied with her treatment plan, and it was not successful. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Birth Mother’s parental rights. ¶44 Affirmed. /S/ JIM RICE We concur: /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ LAURIE McKINNON 21