Opinion ID: 3181052
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The head of each agency referred to in section

Text: 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5 [including the FBI] shall prescribe procedures for ensuring that the rights under this chapter apply to the employees of such agency. 32 PARKINSON v. DOJ (b) In prescribing procedures under subsection (a), the head of an agency referred to in that subsec- tion shall ensure, to the maximum extent practi- cable, that the procedures of the agency for reemploying persons who serve in the uniformed services provide for the reemployment of such persons in the agency in a manner similar to the manner of reemployment described in section 4313. Section 4315 goes on to wholly exclude the FBI’s determination of reemployability under that section from judicial review as follows: (c) (1) The procedures prescribed under subsection (a) shall designate an official at the agency who shall determine whether or not the reemployment of a person referred to in subsection (b) by the agency is impossible or unreasonable. (2) Upon making a determination that the reemployment by the agency of a person referred to in subsection (b) is impossible or unreasonable, the official referred to in paragraph (1) shall notify the person and the Director of the Office of Per- sonnel Management of such determination. (3) A determination pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to judicial review. (emphasis added). Unlike 5 U.S.C. § 2303(a), which sets forth a procedure for the internal resolution of whistleblower rights, 38 U.S.C. § 4315 explicitly indicates that the substantive determination of reemployability “shall not be subject to judicial review.” Although such a prohibition applies by its terms only for “a determination pursuant to this subsection,” i.e., pursuant to internal agency procedures, the Congressional intent to insulate the substantive determination from judicial review would be frustrated by allowance of judicial review under 5 PARKINSON v. DOJ 33 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2). Cf. Dew v. United States, 192 F.3d 366, 371–72 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)) (“‘Whether and to what extent a particular statute [provides or] precludes judicial review is determined not only from its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.’”). We note also that unlike the whistleblower act, which protects both veteran and non-veteran employees, USERRA by its terms applies only to veterans. See 38 U.S.C. § 4303 (defining “service in the uniformed services”) and 38 U.S.C. §§ 4311–4312 (prohibiting certain acts against those who “serve in the uniformed services”). As such, it makes little sense to allow Parkinson—by virtue of his having served in the military service—access to judicial review over an affirmative defense grounded in a USERRA violation, when claims by others who have served are explicitly insulated from judicial review. Congress’s coupling of a specific procedure for enforcing USERRA reemployment violations at the FBI and similar agencies, coupled with an affirmative prohibition on judicial review of the substantive determination made thereby, leads us to conclude that Congress intended to exclude the substantive determination from judicial review of any kind, including when presented in the context of an affirmative defense under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2). E. Remand In light of our disposition reversing the lack of candor determination, lifting the Board’s prohibition of Parkinson’s whistleblower retaliation defense, and sustaining the obstruction charge and the Board’s prohibition of Parkinson’s USERRA defense, we vacate the Board’s affirmance of Parkinson’s removal and remand. On remand, the only matters remaining for consideration are 34 PARKINSON v. DOJ the obstruction charge, Parkinson’s whistleblowerreprisal defense thereto and the appropriate penalty, if any, after such consideration. We note that the penalty determination section of the FBI’s dismissal letter relating to the obstruction charge states: The investigation also established you violat- ed FBI Offense Code 2.11 (OPR Matter – Obstruc- tion). The standard penalty for this offense is a ten-day suspension. Mitigating factors warrant a three- to seven-day suspension. Aggravating factors warrant a fifteen-day suspension to dismis- sal. Your misconduct was repeated. You not only had Person # 1 [Rodda, it seems] sign a document, prepared by you, setting out the facts concerning a check for $1,215.67 written directly to you, but also contacted SA # 2, after the OIG investigation had begun, and questioned her regarding her rec- ollection of witnessing the paying of a laborer in cash, prior to her interview. Based on the circum- stances of this case, I would normally impose a 30- day suspension for your 2.11 offense, aggravated due to the multiple occurrences of attempting to influence witness statements. However, since I am dismissing you for your 4.5, 5.22, and 2.6 of- fenses, I am not imposing a separate sanction for your 2.11 offense. J.A. 114–15. We note also the AJ’s observation at J.A. 16 that “[t]his was not an especially egregious case of obstruction. The agency did not prove that the written statement [Parkinson] drafted for the landlord was incorrect or that he asked the landlord to lie about any- thing. Tr. 105, 116. The agency’s proposal suggested that this was the least serious of the charges, and that on its PARKINSON v. DOJ 35 own it would have merited only a suspension rather than removal.” From the foregoing, it should be appreciated by the Board on remand that the penalty of removal, which was predicated on the now overturned lack of candor charge, cannot be sustained. Moreover, this court and the Board have made clear that, when “the Board sustains fewer than all of the agency’s charges,” the Board must defer to the agency’s clear statement in “its final decision . . . that it desires a lesser penalty [than the maximum reasonable penalty] be imposed on fewer charges.” J.A. 49 (Board decision in this case) (citing Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, the maximum penalty that can be sustained by the Board for the sole charge remaining in this case is a suspension of up to 30 days. Whether and to what extent the FBI, in the Board proceedings, has established more than the single instance of obstruction noted in the AJ’s opinion at J.A. 14– 16 and the Board’s opinion at J.A. 38–40, or any other basis to warrant greater than a 10-day suspension for the obstruction charge is a question to be determined by the Board on remand.