Opinion ID: 2974870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rebuttal Comments

Text: Edwards claims his trial was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct from a comment by the No. 05-2634 United States v. Edwards government during its closing argument. These excerpts illustrate the context for this challenge. Edwards’s counsel made the following statement during his closing argument: You know, when you see that supposedly you’re saying that Mr. Edwards had the gun and later you find out you put in your report Mr. Moore had the gun, why don’t you fingerprint the gun? Why don’t you send it out for fingerprints? Incontrovertible proof, fingerprints. No two people have the same fingerprints. Fingerprint the firearm. Mr. Edwards’ fingerprints on the firearm? Mr. Moore’s fingerprints on the firearm? During its closing argument, the government responded to this assertion as follows: Defendant mentions these fingerprints, why don’t we have fingerprints? Well, the evidence had been touched by so many people, who were we going to get fingerprints back from? We couldn’t get fingerprints, and besides that, the officers saw the Defendant with this firearm. You have direct testimony. Someone sees something. You see me standing here right now; it’s unrefuted. You see this pen in my hand right now; it’s unrefuted. Do you need a fingerprint for this pen to know that I’m touching this pen right now? I don’t think so. Because Edwards did not object at trial, we review his prosecutorial misconduct claim for plain error using a two-step analysis. United States v. Jackson, ___ F.3d ___, No. 05-6014, 2007 WL 77964, at  (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2007). We first determine whether the prosecutor’s comments were improper. Id. If the comments were improper, we consider the following four factors in determining if the comments were flagrant: “whether the conduct or remarks tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice the accused; whether they were isolated or extensive; whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and the strength of the evidence against the -2- No. 05-2634 United States v. Edwards accused.” Id. (quoting United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1039 (6th Cir. 1996)).
In determining the impropriety of the prosecutor’s comment, we “view the conduct at issue within the context of the trial as a whole.” United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 543 (6th Cir. 2004). “It is also appropriate to consider whether, and to what extent, a prosecutor’s improper argument is invited by defense counsel’s statements.” United States v. Jacobs, 244 F.3d 503, 508 (6th Cir. 2001). Edwards characterizes the prosecutor’s comments as improperly discussing additional evidence not introduced at trial. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935). He contends that the government never introduced evidence that other people touched the firearm, as the prosecutor seems to imply; moreover, Edwards construes the statement “[w]e couldn’t get fingerprints” as an implicit admission that the government conducted a fingerprint test. This overstates the inferences which can be drawn from the prosecutor’s comment. Although the comment does imply that a number of people touched the gun, the inference that the government actually conducted a test that contained too many fingerprints to be useful is fairly attenuated. Nevertheless, to the extent the prosecutor’s comment introduced additional evidence about fingerprints on the weapon, they were arguably improper.
Edwards cannot establish reversible error, however, because the prosecutor’s brief comment -3- No. 05-2634 United States v. Edwards cannot plausibly constitute flagrant prosecutorial misconduct under the relevant four-factor test. See Collins, 78 F.3d at 1039. First, the advantage the government could have gained by misrepresenting that it performed an inconclusive test is minimal, if not illusory. Edwards claims that this remark “bolstered” what he contends was an error-prone and incomplete police investigation and that it “implied all possible steps were taken to develop the evidence, when, in fact, they had not been.” Evidence elicited by the prosecutor during the trial belies this argument, as the government freely admitted it did not test the weapon for fingerprints.1 Viewing the statement in context, it is difficult to see how the remarks tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the accused. United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 2005). Examining the second factor, the comment was isolated and limited to one sentence in the government’s summation. Id. Third, nothing about the remark suggests a deliberate attempt to mislead the jury; rather, the context of the statement suggests the prosecutor was searching for an additional response to Edwards’s fingerprints argument beyond her already well-grounded assertion that eyewitness testimony suffices to prove the crime charged. Id. The government’s brief denies any deliberateness, characterizing the statement as “nothing more than [an] overzealous, emotional response[] to strained exculpatory arguments advanced by the defense,” United States v. Smith, 561 F.2d 8, 13 (6th Cir. 1977), and the context of the statement supports this characterization. And finally, the strength of the evidence against Edwards minimizes any harm the statement could cause. Barnett, 398 F.3d at 522. Although Edwards emphasizes a 1 This information was conveyed as a question directed to an investigating officer: “Officer Hull, if you see a person in possession of a firearm, is it necessary that you submit it for fingerprints?” The officer responded, “No ma’am.” -4- No. 05-2634 United States v. Edwards mistake the police made in one section of their report,2 the government produced eyewitness testimony from three police officers who witnessed Edwards possess and fire the gun. We hold the prosecutor’s arguably improper comment was not flagrant, and thus the district court did not plainly err.