Opinion ID: 885360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Failure to offer mitigating evidence to the sentencing court.

Text: ś 120 Dawson argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because they failed to offer crucial mitigating evidence to the sentencing court. ś 121 First, Dawson asserts that his counsel failed to offer Amy's statement to the police regarding the man she saw in the parking lot. Dawson contends that his counsel should have offered Amy's statements because it would have bolstered the defense theory that Dawson acted under the duress or coercion of another. ś 122 As previously discussed, Amy's statement to the police was vague. Further, defense counsel had no information that the man in the parking lot was connected in any way with this incident. Additionally, prior to the sentencing hearing, Dawson's counsel specifically asked Dawson to provide them with information regarding the involvement of others and Dawson replied that he had nothing to tell them. Moreover, apparently, neither the jury, nor the sentencing court accepted the defense theory that Dawson was acting under the control of another. Therefore, Dawson has not shown that the failure to offer this evidence prejudiced him. ś 123 Second, Dawson contends that his counsel failed to present evidence regarding Dawson's use of drugs at the time of the incident. Dawson asserts that evidence of his drug use was already before the court and thus a decision by his counsel not to discuss the issue at sentencing could not reasonably have been based on a wish to keep information away from the judge. ś 124 In response, the State agrees that evidence of Dawson's drug use was before the court and asserts that the sentencing judge did consider the evidence of Dawson's drug use as a possible mitigator, but ultimately determined that it was not. The State points to the sentencing court's finding in which Judge Barz stated: The defendant reported to the pre-sentence investigator that at the time of the current offenses he used crystal methamphetamine. He couldn't remember the exact amount, but that it was more than just a little bit, but not an abnormal amount. There is absolutely no evidence showing that the Defendant's mental capacity was impaired. (Emphasis added.) ś 125 At the evidentiary hearing to consider Dawson's petition for postconviction relief, Allen Beck testified to his reasoning for not arguing drug use as a mitigating factor: Q. Did you consider calling Dr. Watkins as a witness at the mitigation hearing? A. Yes. Q. And did you make a decision not to do that? A. I did. Q. And what was your reason for that decision? A. To put it simply, in looking at any judge, and I think particularly Judge Barz, Your Honor, to say that I engaged in this conduct because I took drugs is not a matter in mitigation. It's a matter in aggravation. It's that these deaths occurred because I was high on drugs seems to me and under the facts in this case to be highly inflammatory and prejudicial. Beck felt that, based on the facts in this case, including a record replete with actions by Dawson which evidenced that his mental capacity was not impaired at the time of the incident, to argue outright that Dawson engaged in this conduct because he used drugs was inflammatory and would not benefit Dawson. Beck's decision was a reasonable defense strategy under the circumstances. ś 126 Therefore, we conclude that Dawson's counsel's decision not to present or argue evidence of Dawson's drug use as a mitigating factor did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. ś 127 Finally, Dawson asserts that his counsel failed to present evidence of Dawson's good conduct in jail while awaiting trial. Dawson contends that his counsel failed to recognize this as a mitigating factor and that this evidence would have contradicted the sentencing court's conclusion that Dawson posed a risk to society and could not be rehabilitated. ś 128 In response, the State asserts that evidence of Dawson's good behavior in jail was presented at the guilt phase and, therefore, considered at the sentencing phase. The State also points out the following testimony of Denise Hust, a correctional officer in the Yellowstone County Detention Facility, elicited at trial by Dawson's counsel on cross-examination: Q. [By Gary Wilcox] Now, you have had an opportunity to observe him quite a bit in the months that he was in the jail; is that right? A. Yes. Q. It is safe to testify that he has been, in the words in your statement, a model prisoner; is that right? A. Yes. Q. You have had no problems with as far as violent outbursts; is that correct? A. No. Q. And he has not gotten into any violent disputes with any other individuals in the jail facility; is that correct? A. Correct. .... Q. And he is one of the better behaved prisoners that you have up there; is that also not correct? A. That is correct. ś 129 Section 46-18-302, MCA (1985), provides that in the sentencing hearing in a case where the death penalty may be imposed, [e]vidence admitted at the trial relating to such aggravating or mitigating circumstances shall be considered without reintroducing it at the sentencing proceeding. ś 130 Accordingly, we conclude that Dawson's argument that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because they failed to present evidence of his good behavior in jail, is without merit.