Opinion ID: 3159549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Correcting Illegal Sentences

Text: In Tennessee, a trial court‘s judgment becomes final thirty days after entry, unless a specified post-trial motion is filed, in which case the judgment becomes final upon ―entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion or petition.‖ Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c); State v. Green, 106 S.W.3d 646, 648-49 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Peele, 58 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996). The general rule is that a trial court has no power to alter a final judgment. Green, 106 S.W.3d at 648–49; Peele, 58 S.W.3d at 704; Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837 (citing State v. Moore, 814 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). In 1978, this Court recognized an exception to this general rule and held that ―a trial judge may correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely erroneous, sentence at any time, even if it has become final.‖ State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). Nevertheless, when we announced this exception in Burkhart, we did not simultaneously establish a procedure for requesting correction of an allegedly illegal sentence. Moreover, the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective in 1979, only one year after Burkhart, also failed to specify any procedure for making such requests. Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Tenn. 2011). In the absence of any explicit procedure, defendants challenging illegal sentences used the procedural mechanism that the defendant in Burkhart had used—a motion to the sentencing court requesting correction of an illegal sentence. See Moody v. State, 160 S.W.3d 512, 515 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Cox v. State, 53 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)). One disadvantage of this procedure, however, was that the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which also became effective in 1979,10 did not authorize an appeal as of right from a trial court‘s decision on a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516. Thus, like the defendant in Burkhart, parties relied upon the discretionary common law writ of certiorari to seek appellate review of trial court orders denying motions to correct illegal sentences. Id. at 515. In 2005, this Court confronted the question of the proper procedural vehicle for raising and appealing challenges to illegal sentences. After the trial court dismissed Mr. Moody‘s motion to correct his illegal sentence, he sought to appeal by filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Criminal Appeals, but the intermediate appellate court 10 Tenn. R. App. P. 49 (stating that the rules ―shall take effect on July 1, 1979‖). -6- declined to issue the discretionary writ. Id. at 514. This Court granted review and began its analysis by reaffirming the rule announced in Burkhart—that an allegedly illegal sentence may be challenged at any time, even after it is final. Id. at 516. The Moody Court rejected the Burkhart procedure, however, and clarified that ―the proper procedure for challenging an illegal sentence at the trial level is through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the grant or denial of which can then be appealed under the Rules of Appellate Procedure.‖ Id. By adopting habeas corpus as the mechanism for challenging illegal sentences, the Moody Court implicitly limited the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims to unexpired illegal sentences. Although habeas corpus is guaranteed by article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution, the procedure for seeking habeas corpus relief is regulated by statute and has been for nearly one hundred and fifty years. May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Code of Tennessee §§ 3720 to 3765 (Return J. Meigs & William F. Cooper eds., E.G. Easterman & Co. 1858); Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007)). One of these statutes provides that habeas corpus relief is available only to persons who are ―imprisoned or restrained of liberty.‖ Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101(a) (2012). Only one year before Moody, this Court had, in two separate decisions, interpreted this statute to mean that habeas corpus relief may not be granted after expiration of a sentence. See Benson v. State, 153 S.W.3d 27, 32 (Tenn. 2004); Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 24 (Tenn. 2004). The petitioner in Hickman had been convicted in 1986 of possession of marijuana and had received a ten-day suspended sentence. 153 S.W.3d at 18-19. Almost sixteen years later, long after his sentence had expired, he sought habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed his habeas corpus petition. Id. The Hickman Court affirmed, and in so doing, emphasized that, although no statute of limitations applies to habeas corpus petitions, meaning that such petitions may be filed at any time, habeas corpus relief is available only to petitioners who are ―‗imprisoned or restrained of liberty.‘‖ Id. at 22 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101(a)). The Court acknowledged that ―restrained of liberty‖ had been interpreted to include limitations upon freedom of action short of imprisonment, including such restraints as conditions of parole or probation, or an order requiring a person to remain in one city. Id. Nevertheless, the Hickman Court held that [A] person is not ―restrained of liberty‖ for purposes of the habeas corpus statute unless the challenged judgment itself imposes a restraint upon the petitioner‘s freedom of action or movement. Use of the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction long after the sentence on the original conviction has expired. -7- Id. at 23. Use of Mr. Hickman‘s 1986 conviction to enhance the sentence he received on a subsequent conviction, the Court explained, was ―merely a collateral consequence‖ of his conviction and not a sufficient restraint of liberty to entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Id. at 24. In Benson, the Court again affirmed the lower courts‘ denial of habeas corpus relief, explaining that ―[t]he sentences complained of were served and expired before the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition to challenge them‖ and, therefore, he was not ―‗imprisoned or restrained of liberty‘ by any of the challenged convictions.‖ 153 S.W.3d at 32 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101(a) (2000)). Two years later, the Court applied the holdings of Hickman and Benson to an illegal sentence claim. See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 257-58 (Tenn. 2007). In Summers, the State argued that any illegality in the petitioner‘s sentence was moot because the petitioner was not ―‗imprisoned or restrained of liberty.‘‖ Id. at 257 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101 (2000)). The Summers Court acknowledged that the State‘s argument would be correct ―if all of the sentences imposed for the challenged convictions were served and expired before Summers filed his habeas corpus petition.‖ Id. (citing Benson, 153 S.W. 3d at 32). The Court pointed out, however, that Mr. Summers‘ forty-year sentence had not been served and had not expired; therefore, the Summers Court ―decline[d] to view any illegality in the escape sentence as moot.‖ Id. at 258. Three years after Summers, this Court described and defined the types of sentences that are ―illegal‖ for purposes of obtaining habeas corpus relief. We enumerated the following four non-exclusive categories of illegal sentences: (1) a sentence imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme; (2) a sentence designating a [release eligibility date] where a [release eligibility date] is specifically prohibited by statute; (3) a sentence ordered to be served concurrently where statutorily required to be served consecutively; and (4) a sentence not authorized for the offense by any statute[.] Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted). The following year, we returned to the topic of illegal sentences and provided a more comprehensive analysis of sentencing errors and a more general definition of illegal sentences. Cantrell, 346 S.W.3d at 448-55. We recognized that errors in sentencing are inevitable, but ―[t]he avenue of relief and remedy‖ is determined by the type of error that ―infects‖ the sentence. Id. at 448-49. We explained that sentencing errors fall into three general categories—clerical errors, appealable errors, and fatal errors. Id. at 449-52. Only fatal errors render sentences illegal. Id. at 452. Clerical errors ―arise simply from a clerical mistake in filling out the uniform judgment document‖ and may be corrected at any time under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Id. at 449. Appealable errors include -8- ―those errors for which the Sentencing Act specifically provides a right of direct appeal.‖ Id. Included in this category is any claim that is ―akin to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction[,]‖ such as a claim that the record does not support the trial court‘s factual findings regarding sentencing. Id. at 451. Claims of appealable error generally involve attacks on the correctness of the methodology the trial court used to impose sentence. Id. at 450-51; see also State v. Deal, No. E2013-02623-CCA-R3CD, 2014 WL 2802910 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2014). The final category—fatal errors—include only errors that are ―so profound as to render the sentence illegal and void.‖ Cantrell, 346 S.W.3d at 452. We defined an illegal sentence as ―one which is ‗in direct contravention of the express provisions of [an applicable statute], and consequently [is] a nullity.‘‖ Id. (quoting Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d at 873). We included within this definition sentences which are ―not authorized under the applicable statutory scheme.‖ Id. (citing Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 759); see also id. at 454 (describing illegal sentences as ―those that are simply unavailable under the Sentencing Act‖). It is important to note, however, that even after this Court had identified habeas corpus as the procedure for defendants to use when challenging illegal sentences and had defined illegal sentences, the State still had no mechanism for seeking to correct illegal sentences. See id. at 457; see also Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d at 873 (recognizing that the Tennessee Department of Correction ―may not alter the judgment of a court, even if that judgment is illegal‖). Although Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure (―Rule 36‖) provides a method for correcting clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or the record, it does not provide the State with a mechanism for correcting illegal sentences. See Wilkerson v. Carlton, No. E2007-02453-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 4949227, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2008) (quoting State v. Thomas, No. 03C019504-CR-00109, 1995 WL 676396, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 1995)) (cited with approval in Cantrell, 346 S.W.3d at 449; see also Lee v. State, No. W2013-01088-CCAR3-CO, 2014 WL 902450, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2014)).