Opinion ID: 626855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of Unilateral Contract2

Text: In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they and Levy entered into a 2 The parties agree that Geogia substantive law governs this case. 4 unilateral contract, the Service Charge/Tipping Policy, and that Levy breached this contract by retaining the service charge. The district court found that the Policy, to the extent it constituted an agreement, was between Levy and its patrons only. We agree. The plaintiffs have not, and cannot, provide any factual allegations to support their assertion that the Policy, which was between Levy and its patrons, somehow became a contract between themselves and Levy. The Policy’s plain language shows that it was directed towards Levy’s patrons alone. See Casper v. Harrison Hatchery, Inc., 321 S.E.2d 785, 786 (Ga. 1984) (“The first requirement of the law relative to contracts is that there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, and mutuality . . . .”); Myers v. Texaco Refining & Mktg., Inc., 422 S.E.2d 216, 219 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (“Georgia law does not permit us to ignore plain language in a contract . . . .”). The plaintiffs have no legal support for their proposition that their awareness of an agreement to which they are not parties allows recovery on any breach of that agreement. And the cases the plaintiffs cite in support of their argument all concern employees’ awareness of an employer-employee contract or policy. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the breach-of-unilateral-contract claim. B. Breach of Contract as a Third-Party Beneficiary 5 The plaintiffs’ third-party beneficiary contract claim also fails. The mere fact that a third party would benefit from performance of an agreement is insufficient to permit that party to enforce the agreement. Haldi v. Piedmont Nephrology Assocs., 641 S.E.2d 298, 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). A third party only has standing to maintain a breach-of-contract action if it “clearly appear[s] from the contract that it was intended for [the third party’s] benefit.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Policy here, even assuming it is enforceable between Levy and its patrons, does not evidence Levy’s and the patrons’ intent to benefit the plaintiffs. Instead, the Policy’s stated intent is to benefit patrons. The Policy permits Levy to “attract a high quality employee,” which is “critical to making [the patrons’] experience memorable.” The plaintiffs’ focus on the Policy’s statement that the service charge “is shared in the form of higher wages for all Suite employees” is unavailing: the express purpose of higher wages is ultimately to benefit patrons, not employees. Thus, the plaintiffs lack standing as third-party beneficiaries. Because the plaintiffs lack standing, the district court properly dismissed the claim and denied the plaintiffs’ subsequent motion for reconsideration. And the district court properly denied the plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend their breach-of-contract claim because an amended complaint could not change the 6 Policy’s clear intent to benefit patrons. C. Unjust Enrichment/Quantum Meruit The plaintiffs’ alternative argument that Levy was unjustly enriched also fails as a matter of law. Recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiffs performed valuable services for Levy; (2) Levy either requested or knowingly accepted the services; (3) Levy’s receipt of the services without compensating the plaintiffs would be unjust; and (4) the plaintiffs expected compensation at the time they rendered the services. Artac Corp. v. Austin Kelley Adver., Inc., 399 S.E.2d 529, 533-34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). The plaintiffs’ allegation that Levy’s retention of the service charge is unjust—a legal conclusion, rather than an allegation of fact—is insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (emphasizing that a complaint that provides only “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” is insufficient as a matter of law (internal quotation marks omitted). And the plaintiffs failed to set forth any facts showing that they were not justly compensated by the wages Levy supplied. See id. (requiring a plaintiff to plead facts that state a plausible claim for relief). D. Conversion 7 Because the plaintiffs have failed, for the reasons above, to allege sufficient facts to show they have a right to the service charge, they cannot state a claim for conversion. See City of College Park v. Sheraton Savannah Corp., 509 S.E.2d 371, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“In an action for conversion, proof of title to the property in the plaintiff, right of possession in the plaintiff, possession in the defendant, demand for possession, refusal to surrender, and value of the property, make a prima facie case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).