Opinion ID: 2633006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: We, the jury, find the Defendant, MARVIN RICHARDSON, GUILTY of:

Text: [ ] Murder in the First-degree [ ] Murder in the Second-degree   [ ] Manslaughter [ ] Criminally Negligent Homicide Foreperson The Foreperson should sign only one of the above (I or II). If the verdict is NOT GUILTY, then I above should be signed. If the verdict is GUILTY, then II above should be signed. If you find the Defendant guilty of the crime charged or one of the lesser included offenses the foreman must complete this GUILTY verdict by placing, in ink, an X in the appropriate square. ONLY ONE SQUARE may be filled in, with the remainder to remain unmarked. Thus, while the form permitted the jury to find Richardson not guilty on first-degree murder and the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder, manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide as a collective matter, there was no place on the form for the jury to return a not-guilty verdict on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide as an individual matter. The only individual consideration appeared in the guilty portion of the form, which allowed the jury to find Richardson guilty of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide. Nothing in the record indicates that Richardson objected to structuring the first-degree murder verdict form in this way. The jury began deliberations on Tuesday, March 6, 2007. On Friday, March 9th, the jury sent the trial court a note asking, How long do we continue to deliberate without coming to a consensus? At what point do we become a hung jury? The court answered, You should continue to deliberate so long as progress is being made toward a unanimous verdict. Richardson objected to this answer, arguing that the jury should be told it is not a hung jury if the jurors have reached unanimity on any count. The court overruled the objection, stating, I've not interpreted the question to mean that [the jury has] reached unanimity of anything. . . . It's simply an inquiry from the jury about what's next and how long should we try. Later the same day, the jury asked for and received permission to go home for the weekend. The trial court denied Richardson's request for the court to inquire, under People v. Lewis, 676 P.2d 682 (Colo.1984), whether the jury was making any progress toward a unanimous verdict, and if not, whether the jury was divided over Richardson's guilt or innocence as to one of the charges, or whether the division only concerned Richardson's degree of guilt. The court based its decision on its conclusion that [t]he jury has not expressed any indication that they are a hung jury. Deliberations resumed the following Monday, March 12th, and the jury sent a note asking, If we have reached consensus regarding a particular charge but have some people who think the defendant is guilty of a higher charge have we reached unanimity regarding the lesser charge according to the law? Richardson requested that the trial court provide the following instruction: You should return a guilty verdict on any lesser included offense, only if all jurors unanimously agree on the defendant's guilt as to the lesser included offense and no juror remains convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the facts and law that the defendant is guilty of a greater offense submitted for the jury's consideration. The People, however, objected to this instruction on the ground that it was barred by section 18-1-408(8), C.R.S. (2007), [1] because it instructed the jury to convict on a lesser-included offense. The trial court agreed with the People, stating: The Court believes that 18-1-408(8) is mandatory in its language and that it prevents the Court from instructing the jury further regarding reaching a consensus on the guilt of the defendant on a lesser charge so long as there is a remaining juror who believes the defendant is guilty of a greater offense and that if the prosecution wishes to prevent any other inquiry of the jury as to lesser included offense, that that statute entitles them to do that. Instead of giving the jury Richardson's proposed instruction, the court provided the following answer to the jury's question: If any juror remains convinced by the facts and law that the defendant is guilty of a greater offense, then the jury has not reached unanimity. You should continue to deliberate if there is a likelihood of progress toward a unanimous verdict on any charge. The jury subsequently sent a note announcing that they had reached a unanimous decision on one charge, but that they had stopped making progress toward a unanimous decision on the other two charges. At this point, Richardson requested that the trial court instruct the jury to return a verdict on any greater-included or lesser-included offense as to which they had reached unanimity. The court declined this request and accepted three verdict forms from the jury. The form for vehicular homicide (DUI) was signed and found Richardson not guilty. However, the forms for first-degree murder and vehicular homicide (reckless) were unsigned and unmarked. Richardson requested the trial court to poll the jury as to their unanimity on the charge of first-degree murder and the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, but the court refused. The court acknowledged that the jury had returned a verdict solely on the charge of vehicular manslaughter (DUI) and asked each juror, Is this your verdict? Each juror replied yes, and the court dismissed the jury. The court then denied Richardson's second request to poll the jury. The court also discussed the need to set a date for retrial, and eventually scheduled a hearing to conduct further proceedings and set the retrial date. Although it did not expressly declare a mistrial at that time, the court's order dated March 14, 2007, stated that the jury had failed to reach a verdict as to Counts One and Three and that [t]he Court declared a mistrial and will proceed to set the case for retrial within 90 days of [March 12, 2007]. Richardson subsequently hired investigators to interview the jurors. The investigators obtained affidavits from all twelve jurors stating that the jury had unanimously agreed that Richardson was not guilty of first- or second-degree murder. Based on the affidavits, Richardson moved to dismiss these charges on double jeopardy grounds. The People stipulated to the affidavits for purposes of the motion only, but argued that CRE 606(b) [2] prohibited the court from considering them. The trial court agreed and denied Richardson's motion. We issued a rule to show cause.