Opinion ID: 2286083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Defense Counsel's Failure To Object To Evidence Presented At Trial Concerning Thomas's Prior Convictions

Text: Thomas maintains that the trial court committed plain error by permitting the prosecutor to: 1) admit extrinsic evidence of prior convictions [] that [] he did not deny; and 2) argue in closing and rebuttal that [he] had lied. In addition, he contends that the trial court erred by permitting the government to conduct an improper cross examination of him, with regard to his prior convictions. `Under the plain error standard, the error must be (1) obvious or readily apparent, and clear under current law; and (2) so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.' Brawner, supra, 745 A.2d at 357 (quoting Coates v. United States, 705 A.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C.1998)) (other quotations and internal quotation marks omitted). This court will reverse under the plain error standard `only in exceptional circumstances where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.' Id. (quoting Peterson v. United States, 657 A.2d 756, 762 (D.C.1995)) (other quotations and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, [q]uestions assuming the existence of a factual predicate must be grounded in a good faith belief that those facts are susceptible to proof by competent evidence. Ali v. United States, 520 A.2d 306, 313 (D.C.1987) (citation omitted). Even assuming, without deciding, that the trial court committed error, Thomas has failed to show that he suffered substantial prejudice as a result of trial court error. See Bowman v. United States, 652 A.2d 64, 71-72. Furthermore, given the strength of the government's case and the weakness of the defense . . ., any possible harm . . . was `too trivial too worry about.' Washington v. United States, 760 A.2d 187, 196 (D.C.2000) (quoting Scott v. United States, 619 A.2d 917, 929 (D.C. 1993)). First, with respect to the use of extrinsic evidence regarding Thomas' prior convictions, for impeachment purposes, the prosecutor based his questions on a Pretrial Services Agency report indicating that Thomas had two prior felony carrying a dangerous weapon (CDW) convictions. Thus, the factual predicate for the prosecutor's questions was grounded in a good faith belief that ... [he could establish the prior convictions] ... by competent evidence. Ali, supra, 520 A.2d at 313. Furthermore, although the government introduced a certification of Thomas's convictions for carrying a pistol without a license (CPWL), unregistered firearm (UF), and unlawful possession of ammunition (UA) during its rebuttal, we cannot say that the trial court plainly erred in admitting the certification, given the close relationship between CDW and CPWL. See Cooke v. United States, 107 U.S.App. D.C. 223, 224-25, 275 F.2d 887, 888-89 (1960); Lucas v. United States, 256 A.2d 574, 575 (D.C.1969). Second, the jury was presented with significant damaging testimony from Thomas, himself, during trial. Thomas testified that he was a crack cocaine abuser and that he had been previously convicted of attempted possession of PCP, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and, on two occasions, possession of marijuana. Nonetheless, after hearing the government's assertions that Thomas lied during trial, the jury deadlocked on the mayhem while armed count, and convicted Thomas on the lesser included offense of ADW. Thus, even assuming, without deciding, that the government's closing and rebuttal arguments, as well as the cross-examination of Thomas, as to his prior convictions, were improper, they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there is no reasonable possibility that [they] contributed to [Thomas's] convictions. Brewer v. United States, 559 A.2d 317, 323 (D.C.1989) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). In short, we conclude that the trial court's failure to intervene, sua sponte, to correct the government's alleged errors, did not result in substantial prejudice to Thomas, requiring a reversal. See Morrison v. United States, 547 A.2d 996, 1000 (D.C.1988).