Opinion ID: 766078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search and Seizure Analysis

Text: 14 Kyllo's essential claim is that a warrant was constitutionally necessary before the government could employ the thermal imaging device. The Fourth Amendment's restrictions on governmental searches and seizures are triggered when the government invades an individual's privacy. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984). The individual need not show actual intrusion or invasion into a protected space, as the Fourth Amendment protects people -- and not simply `areas' -- against unreasonable searches and seizures. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). We follow a two-part test to determine whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated by a claimed governmental intrusion into an individual's privacy. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., Concurring); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (adopting Katz reasoning). We evaluate whether the individual has made a showing of an actual subjective expectation of privacy and then ask whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as objectively reasonable. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., Concurring); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 15 In conducting this evaluation of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been infringed upon by government action, we consider the facts of the case at hand. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 n.5 (1986); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) ([W]e have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.). 16 No one disputes that a warrant was not obtained before the Agema 210 was used to scan the thermal emissions from Kyllo's house. In its inquiry into the technological capacities of the Agema 210, the district court found that it was a non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house. The court also found that the device cannot and did not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure and that it recorded only the heat being emitted from the home. Based upon a review of the record, we cannot conclude that these findings were in clear error. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699. 17 Kyllo argues in opposition that the thermal scan intruded into activities within his home, in which he had an expectation of privacy, rather than measuring waste heat emitted from his home. We disagree with Kyllo, and follow our sister circuits in holding that the use of thermal imaging technology in this case did not constitute a search under contemporary Fourth Amendment standards. See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994). 7 Whatever the Star Wars capabilities this technology may possess in the abstract, the thermal imaging device employed here intruded into nothing.
18 We reject Kyllo's argument that what occurred late that January night was government intrusion into activities in his home, in which he expected privacy, rather than a measurement of heat emissions radiating from his home. While Elliott inferred, correctly as it turned out, from the unusually high levels of thermal emissions being radiated from the roof and wall that a marijuana grow was within Kyllo's home, the Agema 210 did not literally or figuratively penetrate the walls of the Kyllo residence to expose this activity. 19 While Kyllo's decision to move his marijuana-growing operation indoors may well show he had some subjective expectation of privacy in the operation, he took no affirmative action to conceal the waste heat emissions created by the heat lamps needed for a successful indoor grow. The Agema 210 scan simply indicated that seemingly anomalous waste heat was radiating from the outside surface of the home, much like a trained police dog would be used to indicate that an object was emitting the odor of illicit drugs. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (holding canine sniffs are not searches). Kyllo made no attempt to conceal these emissions, demonstrating a lack of concern with the heat emitted and a lack of a subjective privacy expectation in the heat. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328-29; Myers, 46 F.3d at 669-70; United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (11th Cir. 1994). But see Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854-55 (finding subjective expectation of privacy although determining it was unreasonable). We conclude, like the district court, that the Agema 210's scan measured waste heat emissions that Kyllo had made no attempt to conceal, rather than peering into Kyllo's home, and that Kyllo has demonstrated no subjective expectation of privacy in these emissions from his home.
20 Even if Kyllo could demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emissions from his residence, he has not established that this privacy expectation would be accepted by society as objectively reasonable.  [T]he correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83. 21 While a heightened privacy expectation in the home has been recognized for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, see Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237 n.4, activities within a residence are not protected from outside, non-intrusive,government observation, simply because they are within the home or its curtilage. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (plurality opinion); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. The use of technology to enhance government surveillance does not necessarily turn permissible non-intrusive observation into impermissible search. See id.; Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238-39. Much like the Fifth Circuit, we believe that, in evaluating whether technology has been used to aid in permissible observation or to perform an impermissible warrantless search, the crucial inquiry, as in any search and seizure analysis, is whether the technology reveals `intimate details.'  Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855 (quoting Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238). 22 The thermal emission scan performed on Kyllo's residence, and the other houses in the triplex, while giving information unavailable to the naked eye, did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life. The scan merely indicated amorphous hot spots on the roof and exterior wall and not the detailed images of private activity that Kyllo suggests the technology could expose. Such information is neither sensitive nor personal, nor does it reveal the specific activities within the... home. Ford, 34 F.3d at 997; see also Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059. Like the Court in Dow Chemical, we reject Kyllo's attempt to rely on extravagant generalizations about the potential invasions of privacy that this sort of advanced technology may someday present. See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239. 23 Considering the facts of this case, and the district court's findings on the technology used, we cannot conclude that this surveillance was so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. Id. While this technology may, in other circumstances, be or become advanced to the point that its use will step over the edge from permissible non-intrusive observation into impermissible warrantless search, we find no violation of the Fourth Amendment on these facts. See id. at 239 and n.5; Myers, 46 F.3d at 670 n.1.