Opinion ID: 1725936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was testimony improperly admitted relating to defendant's prior assaults on his wife?

Text: One of defendant's pretrial motions was a motion in limine. It was directed against potential testimony from thirteen prosecution witnesses regarding defendant's prior assaults on Carole, her fear of defendant, and the general state of their relationship before and after marriage. Defendant sought to prohibit disclosure of questionable evidence until the Court during trial in the jury's absence has been presented an offer and objection. Defendant asserted the described evidence is too remote in time to be material for any issue in this case, is an attempt to prove the current charge by proof of prior criminal acts and is an attempt to establish past conduct and character on the part of the defendant. State resisted. Trial court sustained the motion as it related to four witnesses who would have testified to events prior to the February 29, 1976, marriage of defendant and Carole. The motion was overruled as to nine witnesses. Six of these persons testified. From this evidence the jury could have found the following facts. One year before Carole's death defendant struck her real hard in the back of the head and    two or three times in the face, chipping a tooth and causing a swollen lip. The assault occurred because Carole refused to have sexual intercourse with defendant. In August, 1977, only ten days before Colleen was born, defendant hit and beat Carole on her face and torso, causing bruises and swelling. Clothed only in bikini panties, Carole ran from her mobile home and sought refuge with neighbors. Earlier in the day defendant had become angry when he learned he would not be permitted in the delivery room. In December, 1976, Carole again fled her mobile home after defendant struck her several times in the face during an argument. The jury could have found that during these incidents Carole feared for her life and the child's safety, believed defendant wanted to hurt her and Colleen, and believed defendant became very violent when angry. This evidence was introduced with but two objections, both made when the first witness began to testify about the prior assaults. These objections merely referred to the motion in limine and mentioned only the first witness. Trial court overruled the general objection and reserved rulings on specific matters that relate to specific objections. While much of the above testimony was hearsay, the motion in limine did not raise that ground. Defendant made a hearsay objection only when officer Gary McCormack was relating circumstances surrounding the first assault. This witness testified he and a fellow officer had responded promptly to a call at the O'Connell mobile home. When they arrived Carole was sobbing, her eyes were red, her cheeks were wet, and the left upper portion of her lip was swollen. A tooth had been chipped and she had some particles of tooth in a little handkerchief or kleenex held in her hand. Over the hearsay objection officer McCormack was permitted to testify Carole said that her husband had hit her real hard in the back of the head and that he had struck her two or three times in the face and that he knew quite a bit about karate. After the officers had been at the mobile home about ten minutes her sobbing and intense crying had quieted down quite a bit. They then took her to the police department where her injuries were photographed and her statement was taken. She then expressed fear of her husband and said, [H]er husband had come home and wanted to have sexual intercourse, and she refused him, and he got mad. On appeal defendant contends admission of this prior assault evidence over objections made in his limine motion was error. He also asserts trial court erroneously admitted the above-quoted portions of McCormack's testimony because they constituted hearsay. We turn first to the motion in limine. A close study of our decisions discloses our rulings on the preservation issue ordinarily are not controlled by the title of the motion or its prayer. See, e. g., State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 761, 765-66 (Iowa 1978); State v. Miller, 229 N.W.2d 762, 767-68 (Iowa 1975). What is critical is what the ruling by trial court does or purports to do. A ruling only granting or denying protection from prejudicial references to challenged evidence cannot preserve the inadmissibility issue for appellate review. But if the ruling reaches the ultimate issue and declares the evidence admissible or inadmissible, it is ordinarily a final ruling and need not be questioned again during trial. Id. Here defendant's motion was titled and clearly intended to be treated only as a motion in limine. However, trial court directed the filing of briefs and held a hearing on the record. The anticipated evidence was adequately described, the law was discussed, and trial court ruled on admissibility of each witness' testimony. Under these circumstances it was unnecessary to raise again during trial the objections set out in the motion. Because the error, if any, was preserved we must address the merits of defendant's limine objection. He essentially contends trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior criminal acts. As a general rule, evidence of other criminal acts committed by an accused is inadmissible. See State v. Johnson, 224 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Iowa 1974): We also recognized exceptions permitting evidence of reasonably similar other crimes when it tends to prove (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or system of criminal activity embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related that proof of one tends to prove the other, or (5) identity of the [perpetrator]   . In this trial the crucial factual issue was the identity of the person who strangled Carole. Defendant's prior assaults on her are relevant. They also tend to prove intent. Nor was the evidence so unduly prejudicial that trial court abused its discretion in admitting this relevant evidence. The evidence of quarreling, defendant's hostility, and Carole's fears was also relevant. To prove murder the State had to prove malice aforethought. Because this element constitutes a state of mind, a prosecutor in a murder case may show prior relations between the accused and the alleged victim, as bearing on accused's quo animo. State v. Kellogg, 263 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Iowa 1978); State v. Peterson, 219 N.W.2d 665, 672 (Iowa 1974). Turning to the second prong of the claimed error, we find the statements made by Carole to officer McCormack could be admitted under the res gestae (excited utterance) exception. See State v. Haines, 259 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Iowa 1977), and citations. The time lapse prior to the second quoted statement was not so great, under a rational view of the evidence, to warrant a holding that trial court abused its discretion in admitting it. See State v. Stafford, 237 Iowa 780, 787, 23 N.W.2d 832, 836 (1946) (required spontaneity held to have prevailed fourteen hours after the event).