Opinion ID: 795351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stigma-Plus Claims

Text: 14 Segal has conceded, as she must, that she has no property interest in her continued employment at the Department. As a probationary employee, she did not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to her position as kindergarten teacher. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Instead, Segal asserts that her liberty was deprived without due process of law. 15 We have recognized that a probationary employee can invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause where that employee has suffered a loss of reputation coupled with the deprivation of a more tangible interest, such as government employment. Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 330 (2d Cir.2004). Such an action is referred to as a stigma-plus claim; it involves an injury to one's reputation (the stigma) coupled with the deprivation of some `tangible interest' or property right (the plus), without adequate process. DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir.2003). 16 In an action based on a termination from government employment, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements in order to demonstrate a deprivation of the stigma component of a stigma-plus claim. See Patterson, 370 F.3d at 330. First, the plaintiff must ... show that the government made stigmatizing statements about [her] — statements that call into question [the] plaintiff's `good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.' Id. (quoting Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 446 (2d Cir.1980)). We have also said that statements that denigrate the employee's competence as a professional and impugn the employee's professional reputation in such a fashion as to effectively put a significant roadblock in that employee's continued ability to practice his or her profession will satisfy the stigma requirement. Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 630-31 (2d Cir.1996). 5 Second, a plaintiff must prove these stigmatizing statements were made public. Patterson, 370 F.3d at 330 (citing Abramson v. Pataki, 278 F.3d 93, 101-02 (2d Cir.2002)). Third, the plaintiff must show that the stigmatizing statements were made concurrently with, or in close temporal relationship to, the plaintiff's dismissal from government employment. Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 89 (2d Cir.2005); Patterson, 370 F.3d at 330, 335. 17 We assume, for purposes of this appeal, that Segal has brought forth evidence which demonstrates a deprivation of her liberty interest. Segal was terminated; she also presented facts in support of her claim that she was stigmatized during the course of her termination. The Matos report and Superintendent DiBartolomeo's letter all but accuse Segal of having inflicted corporal punishment upon a student under her care and supervision. Such statements would be highly stigmatizing and damaging to a school teacher. She also has presented evidence that suggests that these statements were placed in her personnel file prior to her termination, where they remain. We have previously held that the placement of statements in an employee's personnel file may satisfy the contemporaneous public disclosure elements of a stigma-plus claim. See Brandt v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 820 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir.1987). 18 Because stigma plus is a species within the phylum of procedural due process claims, however, it is not enough that the plaintiff has demonstrated the deprivation of her liberty interest; in order to bring a successful stigma-plus claim, the plaintiff also must demonstrate that her liberty was deprived without due process of law. Stated differently, the availability of adequate process defeats a stigma-plus claim. See, e.g., DiBlasio, 344 F.3d at 302 (`Stigma plus' refers to a claim brought for injury to one's reputation (the stigma) coupled with the deprivation of some `tangible interest' ... (the plus), without adequate process. (emphasis added)); see also Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1002 (2d Cir.1994) (stating that even where the plaintiff demonstrates that the government has implicated her liberty interest, she still must show that the procedural safeguards of her interest established by the state are insufficient to protect her rights). 19 Like any procedural due process claim, a stigma-plus claim enforces a limited but important right: the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted). The limited nature of this right is especially apparent where the plaintiff, like Segal, is an at-will government employee. An at-will government employee may be terminated for cause or for no cause whatsoever. Cf. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. She has no right to reinstatement. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628, 97 S.Ct. 882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (per curiam) (observing that, since the respondent, a nontenured government employee, had no Fourteenth Amendment property interest in continued employment, the adequacy or even the existence of reasons for failing to rehire him presents no federal constitutional question (footnote omitted)). [T]he hearing required where a nontenured employee has been stigmatized in the course of a decision to terminate [her] employment is solely to provide the person an opportunity to clear [her] name. Id. at 627, 97 S.Ct. 882 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Patterson, 370 F.3d at 335-36 (stating that a name-clearing hearing gives the plaintiff an opportunity to hear and answer first-hand any stigmatizing charges, clearing his name of any false statements made about him, and curing the injury to his reputation); Donato, 96 F.3d at 633 (A hearing must be held for the limited purpose of giving a discharged employee an opportunity to clear her name.). 6 Of course, this all raises the familiar question in any procedural due process case: What process is adequate? What process is due? 20 In Patterson, we strongly suggested that, in the case of an at-will government employee, a post -termination name-clearing hearing is sufficient to protect the sort of liberty interests presented in a stigma-plus claim. 370 F.3d at 335. Specifically, we stated that [t]he appropriate remedy for a stigma-plus claim premised on a plaintiff's termination from at-will government employment is a post-deprivation name-clearing hearing. Id. We also noted that [a] post-deprivation name-clearing hearing may defeat a plaintiff's stigma-plus claim, so long as the hearing is adequate for due process purposes. Id. 21 The jury in Patterson had found that, even though the plaintiff's liberty interests were implicated during the course of one of his dismissals from government employment, the defendants were not liable for any damages because they had provided the plaintiff with an adequate, post-termination hearing. Id. at 327, 334. After setting out the statements recounted above, which related to the timing of the hearing, we analyzed separately whether the procedures afforded at the hearing were adequate to meet the demands of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 336-37. We held that they were not. Id. at 337. Because the defendants had failed, as a matter of law, to provide the plaintiff with a procedurally adequate hearing at which he could clear his name, we reversed the portion of the jury's verdict that related to this claim and remanded the case for a new trial on damages. Id. 22 As we later recognized in Velez, Patterson did not actually decide whether a pre- or post-termination hearing is required in the case of an at-will employee. See Velez, 401 F.3d at 92 n. 16 (Because [the procedural inadequacies] alone sufficed to support a procedural due process violation claim, our holding did not — and could not — address the need for additional pre -removal process . . . .); Patterson, 370 F.3d at 336-37. Despite Patterson's strong suggestion that a post-deprivation hearing would not offend the Due Process Clause, it is still an undecided question in this circuit whether the availability of an adequate post-termination name-clearing hearing is sufficient to defeat an at-will employee's stigma-plus claim, or whether due process demands a pre-termination hearing. 23 We now hold that, in this case involving an at-will government employee, the availability of an adequate, reasonably prompt, post-termination name-clearing hearing is sufficient to defeat a stigma-plus claim and that the procedures available at the C-31 hearing were adequate to protect Segal's reputational and professional interests. Due process does not require a pre -termination name-clearing hearing on the facts in this case. Our decision results from applying the familiar balancing test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 320 (2d Cir.2002) (While Mathews involved social security disability benefits, we apply the Mathews balancing test in the context of government employment.); see also Patterson, 370 F.3d at 336-37 (analyzing the adequacy of the process afforded at a name-clearing hearing under the Mathews balancing test). 24 Although Mathews involved a very different interest, social security disability benefits, it presented a similar question: Whether due process required a pre-deprivation hearing. 424 U.S. at 323, 96 S.Ct. 893. In resolving that question, the Supreme Court set forth a three-part test for evaluating whether the process afforded by the government is constitutionally adequate: (1) the [nature of the] private interest that will be affected by the [governmental] action; (2) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (3) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Id. at 335. A court must balance these factors to determine what type of procedures would assure fairness in a particular case. Patterson, 370 F.3d at 336. 25 The private interests presented by Segal, an at-will employee, are her reputational interest, and how that interest can effect [her] standing in the community and [her] future job prospects. Patterson, 370 F.3d at 336. In contrast, a tenured government employee would have interests in both her reputation and her right to continued employment. Codd, 429 U.S. at 627-28, 97 S.Ct. 882. 26 The government interest at stake in a stigma-plus claim is its ability to execute and explain its personnel decisions quickly. See Baden v. Koch, 799 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir.1986) (An executive who fails to act when the facts demand action will often be taken to task by the legislature, the media and the public for the continued shortcomings of his subordinates.); see also Graham v. City of Philadelphia, 402 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir.2005) (explaining that [t]he government has a strong interest in preserving its officials' ability to make personnel decisions and communicate the reasons for those decisions to the public); Patterson, 370 F.3d at 336 (stating that government's interest is that of an executive officer to make and explain important personnel decisions). This interest is heightened in the case of an at-will employee. The government has wide latitude when it comes to retaining or dismissing such employees. See Codd, 429 U.S. at 628, 97 S.Ct. 882. Traditionally, the government has used this latitude to establish a probationary, at-will period before affording such employees the rights and privileges associated with tenured employment, including the right to a pre-termination hearing, see, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. 27 As for the third factor, we have said that [t]he risk inherent in a stigma-plus claim is the risk that the false charges against the plaintiff will go unrefuted and that [her] name will remain stigmatized. Patterson, 370 F.3d at 336. The risk will vary depending on the effectiveness of the procedures available and the promptness by which they are afforded. 28 Chancellor's Regulation C-31 sets out the procedures under which a non-tenured Department employee may be terminated. This regulation provides that the District Superintendent must notify the Department's Office of Appeals and Reviews of the need to terminate a non-tenured employee. The Office of Appeals and Reviews will then convene a Technical Assistance Conference, without the employee's participation, at which the conferees review the relevant facts provided by the Superintendent to determine whether it is advisable to fire the employee. The conferees submit their recommendation to the Chancellor. If the Chancellor accepts a recommendation to terminate the employee, he may issue a notice of discontinuance, at which point the employee is formally terminated by the Department, or he may simply indicate his intent to terminate the employee. Either way, the Chancellor must provide the employee with the specific reasons for his decision. The employee has 15 school days from the date of service in which to appeal the Chancellor's decision either terminating her employment or expressing an intent to do so. During the pendency of the review, an employee who has not been terminated is suspended without pay. Thus, the C-31 regulation provides for pre- or post-termination review, depending on whether the Chancellor determines that, in a given case, immediate dismissal is warranted. 29 The C-31 regulation provides for extensive procedures to review the Chancellor's initial decision: (1) the right to a hearing, if the employee requests one; (2) notice, at least three weeks before the hearing, of the time, date, and place of the hearing; (3) written notice of the employee's rights at the hearing; and the rights (4) to be represented by an advocate selected by the employee's union, (5) to present all relevant evidence, (6) to call witnesses on the employee's behalf, (7) to cross-examine witnesses, and (8) to make an oral presentation. The hearing must be held within one year of the employee's request for a hearing. At the hearing, the Department must present evidence to support its decision but is not obligated to call witnesses. The Chancellor is authorized to uphold his previous decision to terminate, to execute his previous intention to terminate, or to reinstate the employee. The employee is notified in writing of the Chancellor's decision. 30 In our view, the procedures available at the hearing were sufficient to safeguard Segal's reputational and professional interests. The C-31 regulation provides her with the means necessary to clear her name, including the opportunity to present evidence, call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, and make an oral presentation through union-selected counsel. Moreover, the regulation does not specifically preclude her from being represented by her own counsel. 31 Although a pre-termination hearing would provide Segal with the opportunity to refute any stigmatizing statements prior to her entry into the job market, such a hearing comes at too high a cost to the government. The government's important interests — in both explaining its employment decisions and exercising its right to terminate an at-will employee immediately — would be unduly impaired if we were to require a pre-termination hearing in such circumstances. Indeed, accepting Segal's argument would effectively mandate that the government hold a pre-termination hearing any time it provided an explanation why it decided to fire an at-will employee. If the government offered such an explanation, and that explanation implicated the employee's reputational or professional interests, as would usually be the case, the government would have to hold a pre-termination hearing or risk being haled into court, where the plaintiff need only raise the issue of falsity in order to state a claim. Brandt, 820 F.2d at 43. Such a rule would provide the government with a powerful incentive to forgo any explanation of its termination decisions, at a cost to the public as well. 32 1 Because an at-will employee lacks a property interest in continued employment, she has no right to a particular outcome following an adequate name-clearing hearing; the government is simply required to provide her with an opportunity to salvage her name. See Codd, 429 U.S. at 627-28, 97 S.Ct. 882. In our view, there is no reason to believe that this limited right — a meaningful opportunity to clear one's name — cannot be adequately vindicated at a reasonably prompt, post-termination name-clearing hearing. See id.; see also Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1112-13 & n. 25 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that the plaintiff, an at-will employee who was never afforded an opportunity to refute potentially defamatory charges during the course of her termination, was entitled to a name-clearing hearing but disavowing any suggestion that the court's holding compelled such a hearing prior to the plaintiff's termination from government employment). 7 33 Our case law does not compel a contrary result. Segal relies on both Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2005), and DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292 (2d Cir.2003), for the proposition that she is entitled to a pre-termination hearing. Although we stated that a pre-deprivation hearing was required in both of these cases, neither case involved the sort of liberty interest presented by Segal, an at-will employee. See Velez, 401 F.3d at 92; DiBlasio, 344 F.3d at 302; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 (explaining that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands (alteration and quotation marks omitted)). In Velez, we recognized that the plaintiff, a public official who could only be removed for cause, had an interest analogous to that of a property right. Velez, 401 F.3d at 85-86 (recognizing that the plaintiff, an elected member of a school board, could only be removed by the Chancellor for cause and enjoyed statutory restrictions [from] removal but holding that the plaintiff lack[ed] a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her elected office only because `public offices are mere agencies or trusts, and not property' (quoting Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577, 20 S.Ct. 890, 44 L.Ed. 1187 (1900))). Similarly, in DiBlasio, the plaintiff complained about the deprivation of a distinct interest, the summary suspension of his medical license. DiBlasio, F.3d at 294-95. Because neither case involved an at-will government employee, but instead presented interests that the government could deprive only through a showing of cause, we also had no occasion to address the government's strong interest in preserving its ability to dismiss an at-will employee without first providing a hearing. Cf. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 (stating that due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances (alteration and quotation marks omitted)). 8 34 Although Huntley v. Community School Board, 543 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.1976), involved an at-will employee, we do not read Huntley to require that such employees receive a pre-termination hearing. The plaintiff, a probationary school principal, was terminated by a vote of the school board after he was publicly charged with incompetence. Id. at 980, 982-83. The board, however, never afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to rebut the charges. Id. at 980-83, 985-86. Thus, with regard to the plaintiff's stigma-plus claims, the question before the court was whether the defendants violated the Due Process Clause by failing to provide the plaintiff with any process at all. See id. at 983 (explaining that the plaintiff was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the public reading of the charges against him nor to challenge them by calling witnesses); see also id. at 985 (stating that the plaintiff's interest in other employment opportunities was . . . impaired when the Board publicly announced its charges of incompetence without affording Huntley an opportunity to rebut them). 35 We reverse[d] the district court's rejection of Huntley's due process claim. Id. at 986. We also stated, We hold that Huntley was entitled to a fair hearing prior to the Board's public announcement of charges which might impair his chances of future employment as a school supervisor and which might damage his professional reputation. Id. Although we characterized that statement as a holding, we believe it was, in truth, dictum. Our observation in Velez, in which we recognized the limited nature of our holding in Patterson, is equally applicable to Huntley: Because the defendants failed to provide the plaintiff with any process, the timing of that process was not necessary to the decision. See Velez, 401 F.3d at 92 n. 16 (Because [the procedural inadequacies] alone sufficed to support a procedural due process violation claim, our holding [in Patterson] did not — and could not — address the need for additional pre -removal process. . . .). Moreover, even if our pronouncement were not dictum, we would be reluctant to accord authoritative weight to a decision decided so soon after Mathews that neither references nor applies the operative balancing test announced in that case. Compare Huntley, 543 F.2d at 979 (decided on May 12, 1976), with Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319, 96 S.Ct. 893 (decided on February 24, 1976). The application of the Mathews balancing test in the context of government employment is now firmly established in this circuit. See, e.g., Patterson, 370 F.3d at 336-37; Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 319-20. As a result, we do not consider ourselves bound by our statement in Huntley. 9 36 In sum, we hold that, in the context of an at-will government employee, a reasonably prompt, post-termination name-clearing hearing satisfies constitutional due process as long as the procedures afforded at such a hearing are sufficient to protect the employee's reputational and professional interests. The availability of such a hearing in this case defeats Segal's stigma-plus claims. Accordingly, there is no need to address Segal's arguments that (1) an Article 78 proceeding was somehow not available to her and (2) such a proceeding is inadequate for name-clearing purposes. 10