Opinion ID: 71908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of the Flawed Jury Instructions on the Count Thirteen Conviction

Text: 22 The second issue we address is whether the district court's erroneous instruction on one object of an offense in the multiple-object conspiracy of Count Thirteen warrants a reversal of the appellants' convictions on that count. 23 The district court's jury instruction regarding Count Thirteen required the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants conspired to commit one of the offenses that was an object of the alleged conspiracy. These offenses included conspiracy to launder drug proceeds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956; structuring currency transactions to avoid the filing of currency transaction reports, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324; and defrauding the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 981. The district court further instructed that the jury had to agree unanimously upon the offenses the appellants conspired to commit. Because the three offenses described in Count Thirteen are substantive offenses in their own right, the district court also separately instructed the jury on the essential elements of those offenses. The district court instructed the jury regarding the structuring currency transactions offense, 31 U.S.C. § 5324, in accordance with our holding in United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 900, 113 S.Ct. 284, 121 L.Ed.2d 210 (1992). The government concedes that this instruction was improper in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994), decided during the pendency of this case. 24 Appellants all contend that their convictions on Count Thirteen must be reversed, because the structuring currency transactions instruction was incorrect as a matter of law. 3 They assert that where one object of a multiple-object conspiracy charge has no support as a matter of law, a conviction on the multiple-object conspiracy charge cannot be sustained. The government contends that reversal is not required, as the district court's general jury instruction on the multiple-object conspiracy was correct, curing any defect in the instruction regarding one of the alleged objects of the conspiracy. 25 We agree with the appellants that reversal is appropriate based on the facts of this case. The district court gave the following general instructions regarding the multiple-object conspiracy charged in Count Thirteen: 26 [W]ith regard to the conspiracy alleged in count thirteen, the indictment charges that the defendants conspired to commit various violations of the law of the United States such as set out in Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. It is charged, in other words, that the defendants conspired to commit three separate substantive crimes or offenses. 27 In such a case it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant under consideration willfully conspired to commit all of those substantive offenses. It would be sufficient if the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant under consideration willfully conspired with someone to commit one or both [sic] offenses. 28 But in that event, in order to return a verdict of guilty, you must unanimously agree upon which of the three offenses the defendant conspired to commit. 29 The district court then gave the following specific instruction regarding structuring currency transactions in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(3): 30 I charge you that the government need not prove the defendant was aware of the illegality of money structuring in order to convict the defendant of that offense under Title 31, United States Code, Section 5324(3). 31 This specific instruction was incorrect, as the Supreme Court held in Ratzlaf that a defendant may be convicted of violating section 5324 only upon a showing that the defendant willfully violated anti-structuring laws. 510 U.S. at 136-38, 114 S.Ct. at 657. According to the Court, the government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful in order to prove a willful violation of section 5324. 510 U.S. at 137, 114 S.Ct. at 657. In other words, the Court's Ratzlaf opinion required the district court in this case to instruct the jury that the government needed to prove the defendant was aware that money structuring was illegal. 32 In our view, the district court's statement in the conspiracy instruction regarding the necessity of willful action did not cure its specific, erroneous instruction concerning the irrelevancy of proof of willfulness as to knowledge that structuring is illegal. It may be that the jury understood the conspiracy instruction to require the government to prove that the appellants willfully conspired to structure currency transactions. The jury however, may have understood the conspiracy instruction to require a showing of willfulness with respect to the money laundering or defrauding offenses, but not with regard to awareness that money structuring is illegal. Therefore, the jury may have convicted the appellants of conspiring to engage in structuring currency transactions without finding that they were aware that such structuring was illegal. As stated, such a conclusion would run afoul of Ratzlaf. 33 While it is true that the jury might have agreed unanimously to convict the appellants of conspiring to commit another offense, e.g., money laundering, that possibility alone is insufficient to justify an affirmance. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 52, 112 S.Ct. 466, 470-71, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (where one of two objects of a conspiracy charge is insufficient as a matter of law the proper rule to be applied is that which requires a verdict to be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected) (citation omitted); United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 553-54 (11th Cir.1994) (the existence of an alternative theory upon which a conviction may be based does not save a legal defect in the jury instructions); United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 589 (1st Cir.) (reversing section 371 multiple-object conspiracy conviction where court erred in instructing jury on one alleged object of conspiracy because it is impossible to tell which ground the jury based the conspiracy conviction upon), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 263, 136 L.Ed.2d 188 (1996); see also United States v. Range, 94 F.3d 614, 620 (11th Cir.1996) (A court must ... be able to determine with absolute certainty that the jury based its verdict on the ground on which it was properly instructed.) (quotations and citation omitted). 34 Accordingly, we must reverse the appellants' convictions on Count Thirteen of the indictment.CONCLUSION 35 Because the evidence was sufficient, we affirm the Highs' convictions on Count One. Because we cannot determine whether the jury convicted the appellants on a legally sufficient basis on Count Thirteen, we reverse the convictions of the appellants on that count and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 36 AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part.