Opinion ID: 1671209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dependent Adult Abuse by Sexual Exploitation.

Text: Iowa Code section 235B.2(5)( a )(3) prohibits sexual exploitation of a dependent adult. It defines sexual exploitation, in relevant part, as any consensual or nonconsensual sexual conduct with a dependent adult for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of the caretaker or dependent adult, which includes but is not limited to kissing; touching of the clothed or unclothed inner thigh, breast, groin, buttock, anus, pubes, or genitals;.... Iowa Code § 235B.2(5)( a )(3). Importantly, sexual exploitation requires a caretaker to engage in sexual conduct, either consensual or nonconsensual, with a dependent adult for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of the caretaker or the dependent adult. The conduct specifically includes touching certain areas of the body, including the inner thigh and groin. While Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of all elements of sexual exploitation, she primarily seizes on the consensual or nonconsensual sexual conduct component of the definition of sexual exploitation. She asserts that sexual conduct between two persons is consensual only when both persons consent, but is nonconsensual when just one person does not consent. Thus, she argues nonconsensual sexual conduct must be interpreted under the statute to constitute sexual exploitation only when the dependent adult does not consent and not when the caretaker is the nonconsensual person. In other words, Smith claims the statutory definition of sexual exploitation cannot be interpreted to include a caretaker who is the victim of a sexual assault by a dependent adult. Relying on that interpretation, Smith argues the evidence does not support a finding that she consented to the touching by E.M., and there was no evidence she engaged in sexual conduct by affirmatively touching E.M. We are bound by the findings of an administrative agency if supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Grant v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 722 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 2006). Evidence is substantial when a neutral, detached, and reasonable person would find it sufficient to establish the fact at issue. Iowa Code § 17A.19 (10)( f ). The central finding of dependent adult abuse in this case is that Smith allowed E.M. to place his hand on her inner thigh. The facts that support this finding date back to the days preceding the March 20 incident when Smith reported to her supervisor that E.M. had been touching her in inappropriate ways. Yet, despite a warning by her supervisor to stay away from E.M., Smith visited him in the privacy of his room on March 20. During this visit, she positioned herself in a chair in a way that enabled E.M. to touch her inner thigh from his wheelchair. A sexually suggestive comment exchanged between Smith and E.M. was overheard at the time. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Smith willingly engaged in consensual sexual conduct with E.M. for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of either of them. In particular, it is not important that the evidence might also support a finding that Smith did not consent to the touching by E.M. The evidence must only support the finding made. See Grant, 722 N.W.2d at 173. While Smith testified otherwise, a reasonable fact finder could have concluded that she consented to the touching by E.M. and removed his hand from her inner thigh and voiced opposition to the presence of his hand on her body only when the conduct was detected by others. Consequently, it is unnecessary to further consider Smith's claim that sexual exploitation under the statute does not include sexual conduct with a nonconsensual caretaker. Additionally, there is nothing in the statute that requires a caretaker to affirmatively touch a dependent adult in a sexual manner to commit sexual exploitation. The statutory definition of sexual exploitation hinges on sexual conduct, and there is no language in the statute that confines the phrase to require the caretaker to affirmatively touch the dependent adult in a sexual manner. Instead, sexual conduct has a much broader meaning under the statute and requires the actions of the caretaker to be examined in light of all of the circumstances to determine if the conduct at issue was sexual and done for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of the caretaker or the dependent adult. In this case, Smith affirmatively permitted a wheelchair-bound dependent adult to touch an area of her body in a sexual manner by sitting in a chair in such a way that allowed the touching to take place. These facts amount to sexual conduct without the need to further show touching by the caretaker.