Opinion ID: 1405837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to limit cross-examination.

Text: (13) In a related contention, defendant urges the trial court improperly denied his motion to limit cross-examination should he decide to testify. Under the circumstances, we see no error. During presentation of defendant's penalty case, he moved for an order limiting his cross-examination. Counsel indicated that, if called, defendant would acknowledge he shot Carlos Stevenson and Robert Opel and went to the gallery intending to rob it. Though his memory of each incident was vague, he would indicate he regretted his actions very much. He would also testify that he wished to live. Counsel asked for an advance ruling that cross-examination be limited to the specifics of the incident in which [defendant] shot Mr. Stevenson and his relationship with Mr. Stevenson and the specifics of the incident during which he shot Mr. Opel, and questions perhaps as to why he wishes to live. Counsel also conceded that defendant could be impeached with prior felonies. Defendant would not testify, said counsel, unless he obtained the limiting order he sought. The prosecutor objected to an advance ruling. He declared he proposed to subject defendant to full, complete, and extensive cross-examination ... with respect to all aspects of this case and the defendant's background within the limits of the Evidence Code. In response, the trial court indicated its belief that, except for matters deemed too remote or prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352, or those already excluded for other reasons, the prosecutor was entitled to wide-ranging cross-examination. First, the court noted, defendant could be examined on all matters pertinent to his direct testimony, including his claims of remorse and vague memory. Such examination, the court suggested, might include broad inquiry into his prior criminal history and other witnesses' statements about his use of drugs near the time of the Opel and Stevenson incidents. Moreover, in the court's tentative opinion,  anything that is in the record right now as far as  either from the prosecution side of the case or from the defense side of the case, anything that the jury is going to be instructed they can consider in determining the penalty, I think the prosecutor is entitled to either have that information confirmed by Mr. Keenan while he is on the stand and say, yes, I did this, or yes, I agree with Mr. X's testimony, or to deny it and say that isn't true. (Italics added.) However, the court declined to rule in a vacuum, because I don't know what Mr. Murray [the prosecutor] wants to bring out and I don't know enough about Mr. Keenan at this time other than what I have heard to really tell you whether it would be proper cross-examination or improper cross-examination.... The court indicated it would entertain objections to specific questions if defendant decided to testify. Defendant urges the trial court erred in implying that he could be cross-examined on all record matters pertinent to penalty, whether or not they arose in his direct testimony. Thus, he contends, the court improperly denied his request to limit his cross-examination. The ruling prejudiced him, he asserts, by forcing him to avoid presenting his mitigating testimony to the jury. We need not decide whether the trial court was correct in its preliminary implication that the prosecutor could cross-examine defendant on matters beyond the scope of his direct examination. (But see Evid. Code, §§ 761, 772, subd. (d).) Though it expressed a tentative opinion, the court specifically refused to rule on matters of cross-examination before they arose. Lacking complete information, the court was well within its discretion to defer its decision. (See Keith Daniel Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 912-913.) Defendant had no inherent right to a binding advance ruling which would spare him the necessity of raising specific objections before the jury. Even had the court's remarks constituted an in limine ruling against him, they would not have been binding at trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., former § 128, subd. 8 [now § 128, subd. (a)(8)]; cf. People v. Campa (1984) 36 Cal.3d 870, 885-886 [206 Cal. Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634]; People v. Beasley (1967) 250 Cal. App.2d 71, 76-77 [58 Cal. Rptr. 485].) No error occurred.