Opinion ID: 779913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Court's Discretion to Allow Withdrawal of Pleas

Text: 17 Pursuant to the currently applicable Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(e), 5 a district court may permit withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing if there are valid grounds for withdrawal and if granting the motion would be fair and just, giving due regard to any prejudice the government might suffer as a result. United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1529 (2d Cir.1997). While this standard implies that motions to withdraw prior to sentence should be liberally granted, a defendant who seeks to withdraw his plea bears the burden of satisfying the trial judge that there are valid grounds for withdrawal. United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir.1992) (quotation marks and citations omitted). A district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Maher, 108 F.3d at 1529. A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on a mistaken application of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir.2001). 18 In denying Defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea, the district court erred in its analysis of whether a fair and just reason to allow the withdrawal existed. At the outset, the court correctly noted that the factors to be considered include 1) the amount of time between the plea and the motion to withdraw, 2) whether the defendant is now asserting her legal innocence, and 3) the prejudice, if any, to the government. The court concluded that there was, in fact, no delay in filing the motion, and no evidence that the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal. In evaluating Defendant's claim of innocence, however, the district court felt constrained to assume that the videotape of communications between Defendant and the undercover agent 6 could make out the elements of the crime for the government, and that that government is likely to call the INS agents as witnesses, further solidifying their case against Defendant. 178 F.Supp.2d at 175. In explaining these assumptions, the court asserted three times, without citation, that it was required to draw all inferences in favor of the government. Id. at 172, 175. 19 In this assertion, the district court appears to have been relying on United States v. Maher. Maher, however, involved circumstances vastly different from those presented here. In Maher, the defendants, after two weeks of trial at which the government had presented evidence... through the testimony of 25 of its 26 scheduled witnesses, entered an agreement with prosecutors to change their plea to guilty. Maher, 108 F.3d at 1519. At their plea allocution, the defendants made several very specific admissions which contradicted the assertions they subsequently made in their motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. Id. at 1530. In considering that motion, the court noted that 20 [t]he self-inculpatory statements he made under oath at his plea allocution carry a strong presumption of verity, and the court, in reviewing the belated claims of innocence, must draw all permissible inferences in favor of the government and against the defendant, especially when, as here, the defendant has gone to trial, heard most of the government's evidence, and then pleaded guilty, describing his wrongdoing and acknowledging that he could not effectively defend against that evidence. 21 The defendants here have not met their burden, for the district court was, in all the circumstances, entitled to reject the newly advanced innocent explanation for their behavior and to credit instead the evidence that had been presented at trial and in the defendants' own earlier descriptions of their conduct. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). 22 The instant case is readily distinguishable. First, at the plea allocution, Defendant made no specific admissions beyond her statement yes, that's what happened, — a statement which was itself somewhat questionable given her hesitation and difficulty with English. Second and more important, the district court here did not, as the Maher trial court had done, simply consider and credit the evidence that the prosecutor had actually presented. Rather, the trial court in this case made broad assumptions about the evidence the prosecutors might present and the possible strength of that evidence. 23 For example, the court said that the government is likely to call the INS agents as witnesses, thus solidifying their case against Defendant. 178 F.Supp.2d at 175. But since the INS agents had neither provided affidavits, nor been cross-examined by the defense or questioned by the court, there was no reasonable basis from which to infer that the agents' testimony would strengthen, rather than weaken, the government's case. 7 Certainly Maher does not cover such a situation and is more appropriately viewed as concerned only with specific statements made at the plea allocution and evidence presented to the court. It is with respect to those statements and evidence that Maher requires that inferences be drawn in the government's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Yarmoluk, 993 F.Supp. 206, 209 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1998), aff'd 172 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that [s]elf-serving speculations, hearsay, and other inadmissible evidence in the [defendants'] affidavits must be disregarded. In addition, the affidavits should be construed, if anything, favorably to the Government (citing Maher )). 24 Because the district court erred in believing that it was obligated to make inferences crediting whatever evidence it thought the government might present at a subsequent trial, the court misunderstood the broad discretion afforded it by Rule 32(e). At a minimum, then, the court's order denying Defendant's motion to withdraw should be vacated and remanded to that court. As explained below, however, additional facts in the record allow us to go further and determine that the motion to withdraw should have been granted.