Opinion ID: 2258987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Denial of Class Certification

Text: Before trial, the tenants sought class certification of all persons who lived in the Rittenhouse between July 31, 1988, and July 31, 1991. Upon certification, the tenants planned to assert their claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability (Count III of the complaint) on behalf of the entire class. Additionally, the tenants asked the court to certify as a subclass all tenants residing at the Rittenhouse when the Voluntary Agreement was approved in 1987. If certified, the subclass would have asserted all four of the claims set forth in the complaint. When seeking class certification, a plaintiff must meet each of the four requirements of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 23(a). [7] Moreover, since the tenants in this case sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3), they were required by that rule to demonstrate, first, that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the proposed class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and second, that a class action would be superior to other available methods for adjudication of the controversy. The party seeking certification has the burden of showing that the request for class certification complies with the requirements of the rule. Whether that burden has been met is a matter entrusted to the trial court's discretion, and its decision will not be reversed unless that discretion has been abused. Yarmolinsky v. Perpetual American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 451 A.2d 92, 94 (D.C.1982). Indeed, when the trial court conducts a thorough review of the request for class certification, as it did here, we will not reverse its decision even if we would have ruled differently. McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 239 U.S.App. D.C. 247, 251, 741 F.2d 1406, 1410 (1984). [8] The trial court agreed initially that the tenants had made a sufficient showing under Rule 23(a). Turning to the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), however, the court ruled that the issues in the case did not present questions of fact common to all members of the proposed class because applications of the law in all of the counts will turn largely on individual factual determinations concerning the individual heating and air-conditioning systems in each apartment. The court noted that questions regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the units in each apartment were likely to depend on the individual needs and desires of each tenant. For the same reasons, the court found that the tenants had failed to establish that a class action would be superior to other methods of deciding the case. [9] On appeal, the tenants have offered no argument sufficient to refute the trial court's conclusion that neither requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was met. In fact, the trial testimony of the nineteen tenant plaintiffs confirmed the court's prediction that the heating and cooling units presented problems specific to each apartment. For example, some tenants testified that the new units failed to heat or cool their apartments, or were noisy, and had no automatic temperature settings. Others testified that the installation of the units left spaces around the edges where cold air and water leaked in from the outside. Still others testified that the ventilation of the kitchens and bathrooms, promised in the Voluntary Agreement as an additional modification to the building, was inadequate or even non-existent. Given this record, and given the tenants' failure even on appeal to show that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) were met, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for class certification.