Opinion ID: 1983429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Direct Examination of the State's Witnesses

Text: In his post-verdict motion for a new trial, Dube argued for the first time that the District Attorney's conduct of the direct examination of the State's witnesses was improper and prejudicial. [3] As we said in State v. Greene, 512 A.2d 330, 334 (Me. 1986): At no time did the defendant move for a mistrial or otherwise protest that the [District Attorney's] remarks denied him a fair trial. By such inaction the defendant has failed to preserve the claimed errors since he must be taken to have acquiesced in the measures adopted by the trial justice. Accordingly, we review under the obvious error standard. Matters reviewed only for obvious error will not be accorded a more detailed review merely because they were ultimately presented to the trial court in a motion for a new trial. 1 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 33.4 at 33-11 (1985). The alleged improprieties constitute a basis for vacating the judgment only if they caused that high degree of prejudice defined by the True standard of obvious error we have previously discussed. State v. True, 438 A.2d at 468-69. See State v. Hebert, 480 A.2d 742, 750 (Me.1984) (manifest injustice). On applying that standard to the alleged improprieties in handling the State's direct case, we cannot find any obvious error. Dube contends that the District Attorney's use of leading questions in his examination of the prosecutrix deprived him of a fair trial. However, defense counsel had requested that during that examination the questions be phrased so that the answers [will] be given without a long narrative. Even if we disregard the fact that many of the leading questions constituted invited error, we cannot conclude that those leading questions deprived defendant of a fair trial; there is no suggestion that the content of the prosecutrix's testimony would have been any different had the questions been nonleading. On appeal Dube also contends that on several occasions the District Attorney phrased his questions in a way that was inflammatory and highly prejudicial. Dube claims the District Attorney inflamed the jury by referring to the prosecutrix as a rape victim. The District Attorney's use of that shorthand was harmless error. The jury was aware from the indictment that the prosecutrix had accused Dube of rape. Furthermore, the State's attorney used the terms rape and rape victim only in questioning two police officers who testified that they had acted on the night in question in a manner that indicated they had concluded the prosecutrix had been raped. Even if an improper comment is made by a [lawyer for the State], reversal of the judgment of conviction, however, is warranted only upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the defendant. State v. Bernier, 486 A.2d 147, 149 (Me.1985). Contrary to defendant's appellate contentions, the District Attorney's question of the prosecutrix whether the Lord answered her prayers to be freed was a permissible reference to her prior testimony about her state of mind (namely, that she had fallen back on prayer for deliverance), which was relevant to the compulsion element of rape and gross sexual misconduct. See State v. Graves, 224 A.2d at 60-61. Dube also now claims the District Attorney inflamed the jury by asking the arresting officer whether Dube was that nicely dressed that night. That question was promptly withdrawn before it was answered. In any event, its apparent sarcasm, though unbecoming, could have had little consequence in the trial. Dube fails to convince us that the obviousness of the error [in those allegedly inflammatorily framed questions] and the seriousness of the injustice done to the defendant thereby are so great that the Law Court cannot in good conscience let the conviction stand. State v. True, 438 A.2d at 469. Dube contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by the District Attorney's personal involvement in the presentation of evidence. During the State's direct examination of Dr. John Britton, the prosecutrix's examining physician, the doctor at the District Attorney's request gripped the attorney's neck with that degree of force the doctor estimated would be required to cause bruises such as those displayed by the prosecutrix at the hospital emergency room. As Dr. Britton did so, the District Attorney commented on his feelings and noted that the doctor had produced no red marks. We cannot conclude that that attorney's conduct deprived Dube of a fair trial. Although such personal involvement in giving testimony was improper, the District Attorney's theatrics brought out nothing more than what Dube admitted in his own testimony; namely, that he had grabbed her real hard, and that [a]s far as leaving bruises on her neck, I probably did. Dube's motion for new trial required the presiding justice to assess the consequences of the District Attorney's alleged misconduct. The justice's presence throughout the trial afforded him a unique and advantageous perspective in evaluating any prejudicial effect of that conduct upon defendant. Accordingly, we must allow the presiding justice broad discretion in determining whether to grant the new trial. Isaacson v. Husson College, 332 A.2d 757, 764 (Me.1975). His determination that Dube was not deprived of a fair trial by the alleged misconduct of the State's attorney fell within the allowable scope of his discretion.