Opinion ID: 1961581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Employers' liability to employee of employee or contractor permitted to enter upon premises.

Text: An employer who permits the entry upon premises occupied by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an employe or contractor, for the performance upon such premises of a part of the employer's regular business entrusted to such employe or contractor, shall be liable to such laborer or assistant in the same manner and to the same extent as to his own employe. 1915, June 2, P.L. 736, art. II, § 203; 1937, June 4, P.L. 1552, § 1; 1939, June 21, P.L. 520, § 1. Were this wording our only guide, we would have to say that under the clear meaning of the terms, the present facts would fit the statutory criteria. Appellant permitted appellee, who was hired by the Trucking Co.-contractor which did its hauling, to enter premises occupied by it and under its control. Testimony established that the driver controlled the vehicle entirely, but was subject to direction from appellant's employees while on that property. Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, we also find that the work done on appellant's grounds by appellee was clearly part of its regular business. Section 22, containing the definition of employe, also has wording that opposes regular course of business with casual in character in describing the employment itself; in pertinent part, that section provides as follows: § 22. Employe defined The term employe, as used in this act is declared to be synonymous with servant, and includes  All natural persons who perform services for another for a valuable consideration, exclusive of persons whose employment is casual in character and not in the regular course of the business of the employer, . . . (Emphasis supplied). Common sense asserts that the services of the Trucking Co. employes, running to nearly two thousand hours a month on appellant's property, were far from casual and were indeed vitally necessary to the smooth functioning of that company. The court in Dews v. Shmukler, 199 Pa.Super. 417, 185 A.2d 607 (1962) distinguished these terms as follows: Employment is not casual even if only for single or special jobs, if it is not of emergency or incidental nature but represents a planned project, and tenure of service necessary to complete it and for which employment is to continue is of fairly long duration. Appellee was employed for valuable consideration as part of a well-planned long term enterprise essential to appellant's business. We must, therefore, disagree with the analysis of the court below which excluded the appellant from the status of statutory employer on the grounds that the services for which it hired appellee were not part of its regular business. Under the wording of § 52, without more, plaintiff would appear to be an employe of defendant. However, both case law and later statutory definition prevent that result. In 1972 the Act was amended to include the definition of contractor in Section 25, as set forth infra. § 25. Contractor defined. The term contractor as used in article two, section two hundred and three, [1] and article three, section three hundred and two (b), [2] shall not include a contractor engaged in an independent business, other than that of supplying laborers or assistants, in which he serves persons other than the employer in whose service the injury occurs, but shall include a sub-contractor to whom a principal contractor has sublet any part of the work which such principal contractor has undertaken. (Emphasis supplied). This wording excludes from consideration any contractor engaged in an independent business . . . in which he serves persons other than the employer in whose service the injury occurs. The Trucking Co. serves companies other than appellant, which places it in the independent business category and takes it out of the definition of contractor in § 52. The term contractor does, however, by definition at § 25, include contractors in the business of supplying laborers or assistants. Even assuming that a teamster whose services are rented out on an hourly basis falls into the category of laborer or assistant  a matter which we need not decide  plaintiff here was supplied in conjunction with the equipment he drove. Under Pennsylvania law, this is a significant distinction, see discussion infra. Additionally, contractor at § 25 also includes a subcontractor to whom a principal contractor has sublet some portion of the work the principal contractor has undertaken. Appellant is not a principal contractor, but an owner of the property. Our courts have held that this distinction is significant; an independent contractor's employe is not ordinarily considered to become an employe of the owner of the property for Compensation Act purposes. Brooks v. Buckley & Banks, 291 Pa. 1, 139 A. 379 (1927); Freeny v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 180 Pa.Super. 434, 118 A.2d 275 (1955). Therefore, under the instant facts, we find that contrary to appellant's argument, appellant, under the relevant statutory language of the Workmen Compensation Act, is not the employer of the appellee. To recapitulate in brief, he remains the employe of the Trucking Co. for the following reasons: (1) the Trucking Co. supplies a number of customers besides appellant; (2) it is also in the business of leasing equipment and operators in a single package; (3) it leased the equipment and services of its operator directly to the appellant itself, the property owner, and not to a principal contractor subleasing a part of the work to be done on an owner's property.