Opinion ID: 2994264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Strike the Certification of Gregory

Text: Stahl Brooklyn Bagel finally contends that the district court erred by striking the certification of Gregory Stahl, the former president of Brooklyn Bagel and a signatory to the Contract. Brooklyn Bagel initially asserts that its breach of contract claim can be established without any consideration of Stahl’s certification. According to Brooklyn Bagel, Stahl’s certification merely offers additional extrinsic evidence that the parties intended to enter into a requirements contract. While consideration of this evidence is unnecessary in light of the unambiguous Contract, we nonetheless review the district court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Stahl’s certification purports to express his own recollection before and at the time of the execution of the Contract. The district court excluded Stahl’s certification because the certification was not based on his personal knowledge and did not establish his competency to testify to the matters contained in the certification. The district court based its ruling on Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Under Rule 56(e), an affidavit shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. An examination of the record indicates that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Stahl’s certification. As the district court observed, Stahl gave deposition testimony that he was really on the sidelines of [contract negotiations] and was being updated as th[e] [contract negotiations] went along. Brooklyn Bagel further admits that Stahl was not involved in the day-to-day contractual negotiations. (Appellant’s Br. at 35.) Stahl, however, specifically testifies in the certification about the understanding the parties had in executing the Contract. Given his conflicting deposition testimony, Stahl’s understanding of the Contract, which he did not form independent of others, is of no evidentiary value. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that Stahl lacked personal knowledge about the information contained in the certification. The district court was also correct in its observation that Stahl’s certification presented many self-serving, conclusory allegations, which were based on his private expectations of the Contract. Stahl’s private expectations are of no consequence, particularly since he offered no factual basis to demonstrate Earthgrains’ awareness of his expectation or understanding. See Sethness-Greenleaf, Inc. v. Green River Corp., 65 F.3d 64, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1995). The district court’s grant of Earthgrains’ motion to strike Stahl’s certification did not constitute an abuse of discretion.