Opinion ID: 1702542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: law i. whether the trial court erred in allowing dr. timothy sisemore, a clinical psychologist, to testify concerning w.v.'s out-of-court statements?

Text: W.V. attended eight counseling sessions with Dr. Timothy Sisemore, a clinical psychologist. The purpose of these meetings was to enable Dr. Sisemore to form an opinion concerning whether W.V. had encountered sexual abuse and to provide treatment for the emotional trauma arising from the alleged abuse. Testifying for the prosecution, Sisemore discussed his meetings with W.V. and the conclusions he drew therefrom. Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent Sisemore from revealing what W.V. had told him concerning the details of her alleged encounters with Baine. The trial court overruled the motion, holding that such declarations, although hearsay, would be admissible under MRE Rule 803(4). At the time of the trial below, Rule 803(4) read as follows: Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Baine argues that since psychologists do not engage in medical diagnosis or treatment, Rule 803(4) is inapplicable to statements W.V. made to Dr. Sisemore. When the trial court considered Baine's motion in limine, we had not yet addressed the question of whether the Rule 803(4) exception to the hearsay rule extended to statements made to psychologists. A few months later, the Court tip-toed around the subject in Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338 (Miss. 1989). In holding that the hearsay testimony of two social workers did not fit within any of the Rule 803 exceptions, the Court noted in passing that the hearsay statements were not made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Hall, 539 So.2d at 1342. While not explicitly stating that Rule 803(4) did not apply to statements concerning mental as opposed to physical health, the Court observed in a footnote that Rule 803(4) statements may be made either to a physician or to diagnostic medical personnel. Hall, 539 So.2d at 1342 n. 7. In Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d 1366 (Miss. 1989), a decision handed down three weeks after Hall, the Court again alluded to but did not decide the issue. Although the Mitchell case apparently did not involve the testimony of a mental health professional, the Court stated in dicta that many courts, State and Federal, with evidence rules similar to ours admit statements by child sexual abuse victims to physicians and psychologists while being examined, diagnosed, and treated following an incident of sexual abuse under exceptions analogous to MRE 803(4). Mitchell, 539 So.2d at 1368 (emphasis added). The clear implication is that the Mississippi rule is subject to a construction similar to that imposed in other jurisdictions. The issue was clouded somewhat, however, by Leatherwood v. State, 548 So.2d 389 (Miss. 1989) wherein the Court held that statements made by a child rape victim to a social worker employed by a mental health center were not covered by the Rule 803(4) exception. Id. at 398. The Court noted that the social worker was not a physician nor may the services she rendered be stretched into the world of the medical. Id. A 1991 amendment to MRE Rule 803(4) settled the matter once and for all. The Rule now reads as follows: Statement for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, regardless of to whom the statements are made, or when the statements are made, if the court, in its discretion affirmatively finds that the proffered statements were made under circumstances substantially indicating their trustworthiness. For purposes of this rule, the term medical refers to emotional and mental health as well as physical health. (emphasis indicates language added pursuant to 1991 amendment). According to the comment to Rule 803(4), [t]he amendment ... is a recognization that medical diagnosis and treatment may encompass mental and emotional conditions as well as physical conditions. Clearly, statements which are reasonably pertinent to psychological diagnosis or treatment are covered by the rule as it presently reads. The court below, of course, had the benefit of neither the 1991 amendment to Rule 803(4) nor the 1989 cases cited above. But as this Court hinted in Mitchell, even the original language of Rule 803(4) is sufficient to support the judge's ruling. It is settled in the federal courts that the medical diagnosis and treatment language in FRE Rule 803(4) includes matters psychological even though the federal rule, like the pre-1991 Mississippi version, does not expressly define medical in terms of emotional and mental health. See, e.g., United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1472 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172, 177 (8th Cir.1989); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 949 n. 17 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. LeChoco, 542 F.2d 84, 89 n. 6 (D.C. Cir.1976); see also Annotation, Admissibility of Statements Made for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment As Hearsay Exception Under Rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 55 A.L.R.Fed. 689, 699 (1981). Moreover, most states having hearsay exceptions equivalent to the federal Rule 803(4) also include within the rule's coverage statements made to psychologists. See, e.g., Dolny v. State, No. C5-91-23, 1991 WL 109230 (Minn. Ct. App. June 25, 1991) (WESTLAW, MN-CS file) (unpublished opinion); Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990); Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 565 A.2d 1015, 1022-23 (1989); Macias v. State, 776 S.W.2d 255, 258-59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Wall, No. 13531 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1988), 1988 WL 110852 (WESTLAW, OH-CS file) (unpublished opinion); State v. Bullock, 320 N.C. 780, 360 S.E.2d 689 (1987); State v. Nelson, 138 Wis.2d 418, 406 N.W.2d 385, 391 (1987); State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801 (1987); In re Welfare of R.T., 364 N.W.2d 884, 886-87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). But see State v. Barone, No. 01-C-019008CR00196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 1991), 1991 WL 194148 (WESTLAW, TN-CS file) (unpublished opinion); State v. Gokey, 154 Vt. 129, 574 A.2d 766 (1990). We do not classify a psychologist as a medical doctor. Nevertheless, in light of the prevailing authority, the trial court was probably justified in admitting Dr. Sizemore's testimony under the old 803(4) exception. Even if the trial court erred, however, the error would clearly be harmless. Were we to grant Baine a new trial, the second trial would be governed by the revised 803(4) exception which expressly permits testimony of the kind Baine contests here. Baine attacks the hearsay testimony of Dr. Sisemore on several other grounds, none of which have merit. First Baine argues that since the victim herself testified, Dr. Sisemore's testimony concerning what the victim told him constituted evidence of prior consistent statements. According to Clanton v. State, 539 So.2d 1024, 1028 (Miss. 1989), prior consistent hearsay statements cannot be used to bolster the testimony of a witness. Clanton is good law, but it does not apply here for two reasons. First, Dr. Sisemore's testimony falls within the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception  an exception to which the availability of the declarant is immaterial. See Rule 803 (statements covered by rule are not excluded even though the declarant is available as a witness). Secondly and more importantly, Dr. Sisemore's testimony was not offered to bolster the victim's testimony. Rather, Dr. Sisemore related what W.V. had told him in order to establish a basis for his opinion that she had suffered sexual abuse. Baine also asserted at the voir dire of Dr. Sisemore that W.V.'s out-of-court statements were not credible since she made them subsequent to a group therapy session. Baine insisted that W.V.'s story might have been colored by the statements of other sexually abused children. The trial judge ruled that credibility was a question for the jury. In this he was entirely correct. Fisher v. City of Eupora, 587 So.2d 878, 889 (Miss. 1991); Sudduth v. State, 562 So.2d 67, 70 (Miss. 1990); Byrd v. State, 522 So.2d 756, 760 (Miss. 1988); Ashford v. State, 583 So.2d 1279, 1282 (Miss. 1991) (McRae, J., dissenting). Under the revised Rule 803(4), Mississippi trial courts may engage in a discretionary determination of the whether the proffered statements were made under circumstances substantially indicating their trustworthiness. See Rule 803(2) (West 1991). The official comment relating to the amended rule observes that the rule, by requiring the judge to find trustworthiness, gives the trial judge greater discretion than the original rule. The trial court below was not afforded such discretion, and thus rightly referred all questions of credibility to the jury. It is noteworthy that since Baine was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine both W.V. and Dr. Sisemore, the questions Baine raises concerning the credibility of the declarant do not impinge upon his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. See Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 132-34 (Miss. 1991); Harrison v. State, 534 So.2d 175, 182 (Miss. 1988); Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 488 (Miss. 1988); Stoop v. State, 531 So.2d 1215, 1221 (Miss. 1988).