Opinion ID: 1720542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: I have carefully read and considered Justice Cook's special concurring opinion, in which he states that the interpretation of Ala.Code 1975, § 17-15-6, by the Eleventh Circuit, an interpretation with which I agree, flies in the face of well-established rules of statutory construction and the long-settled case law of this state. I must respectfully disagree with that assessment of the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation, because I find rather recent authority of this Court that I believe supports the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation. The latest expression of the law of this State on the jurisdiction of a circuit judge to interfere with an election and any subsequent contest of an election was stated in the so-called Baxley-Graddick primary election contest for Governor of Alabama in 1986, when Circuit Judge Jack Carl, at the request of Charles Graddick and others, issued an injunction against the State Democratic Executive Committee, enjoining it from entertaining a contest of the Democratic primary run-off for Governor of Alabama in 1986. In the Baxley-Graddick contest in 1986, the opposing parties essentially did what the opposing parties did in this case. One candidate, Charles Graddick, sought a State court injunction to enjoin with the tribunal that was entertaining a contest of the election from further proceedings; the other candidate, William Baxley, and parties on his behalf, filed a contest, as allowed by State law. Others who supported Baxley went into a federal court, alleging primarily violations of the Voter Rights Act, [2] just as Larry Roe and others have done in this case. The Baxley-Graddick contest involved a Democratic primary election, where the party executive committee was the tribunal, under provisions of State law, vested with the power to declare the ultimate winner of the run-off election. [3] In that run-off primary election, Charles Graddick had received the most votes, but William Baxley and two electors filed contests. As authorized by State statutes, the chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee appointed a subcommittee to hear and determine the contest. Graddick filed a motion with the committee to dismiss the contest, and later filed, before Judge Jack Carl, a petition for a temporary restraining order, writ of prohibition, and other extraordinary and equitable relief, to halt the election contest proceedings and all discovery by Baxley. Judge Carl, as Judge Eugene Reese of the Montgomery Circuit Court did in the subject case on petition of the so-called Davis class, granted Graddick his requested relief. Baxley appealed to this Court, asking that this Court vacate Judge Carl's order. [4] This Court did. Ex parte Baxley, 496 So.2d 688 (Ala.1986). What did this Court, in that case, say about the jurisdiction of a circuit court, in view of the plain language of Ala.Code 1975, § 17-15-6? It said exactly what the Eleventh Circuit said in this case, and what I said in my original dissent on the jurisdictional question, that the trial court [in enjoining the contest was] without authority and in express violation of statutory and case law. Code 1975, § 17-15-6; State v. Albritton, 251 Ala. 422, 37 So.2d 640 (1948); Ex parte State ex rel. Tucker, 236 Ala. 284, 181 So. 761 (1938). Ex parte Baxley, 496 So.2d 688, 691 (Ala.1986). (Emphasis added.) This Court vacated the injunction issued by Judge Carl and allowed the State Democratic Executive Committee to conduct the contest, which declared Baxley the winner of the run-off election. Joining in the opinion in Ex parte Baxley were Jones, Almon, Shores, Adams and Steagall, JJ.; Torbert, C.J., concurred specially with an opinion, in which Houston, J., concurred; Maddox, J., concurred specially; Beatty, J., did not sit. The four Justices who concurred in the opinion in this case state that [h]ad the Republican Party appealed from the order of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County issued in November, 1994, the entire controversy involving the November general election would have been resolved long ago, and that [t]he people of Alabama would have known the outcome of the election, and the losing candidates, had they chosen to do so, could have contested the elections in the state legislature. This statement by the four Justices suggests that they would have affirmed the judgment of Judge Reese and not followed the law set out in Ex parte Baxley i.e., would not have held that Judge Reese, like Judge Carl, was  without authority and in express violation of statutory and case law. Code 1975, § 17-15-6 ... (Emphasis added.) Based on the foregoing, and as I stated in my original dissent, to which Justice Cook's special concurrence is primarily addressed, I agree completely with the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of Ala.Code 1975, § 17-15-6, [5] and I would apply the provisions of that law to Judge Reese with the same force that I voted to apply it against Judge Carl. [6] The provisions of Ala.Code 1975, § 17-15-6, creating a jurisdictional bar, are clear. Furthermore, the Legislature of Alabama, in Ala.Code 1975, §§ 17-15-50 through 17-15-63, has specially and specifically enumerated and set down by statute that [t]he two houses of the legislature, in joint convention assembled, and presided over by the speaker of the house of representatives, shall constitute the tribunal for the trial of all contests for the office of ... justices of the supreme court.... In view of the fact that the Legislature, by statute, has specially and specifically enumerated how contests of the election of chief justice and treasurer are to be tried, just as the Legislature provided for the tribunal to hear primary election contests in Ex parte Baxley, why does Judge Reese have jurisdiction when Judge Carl so clearly did not? The law has not changed; a circuit court, under the facts of this case, has no more jurisdiction than Judge Jack Carl had in Ex parte Baxley, to enjoin the determination of the winner of the November 8, 1994, election. If after the votes are certified, the losing candidate feels that there are grounds for a contest of those results because illegal votes were cast, that party can file a contest with the two houses of the Legislature, which the Legislature has specially and specifically enumerated as the tribunal to try the contests of races involving justices of the Supreme Court, and the state treasurer. Consequently, the law, as interpreted and expressed in Ex parte Baxley, specifically says that the Circuit Court of Montgomery County was devoid of any jurisdiction, just as the Eleventh Circuit recognized, and as I state in my original dissent. Justice Cook cites three Alabama cases that he believes are clear authority for the legal position he takes, and I will discuss those briefly: Ex parte Pollard, 251 Ala. 309, 37 So.2d 178 (1948) (contest of Democratic nomination for county board of revenue); Hudmon v. Slaughter, 70 Ala. 546 (1881) (office of alderman for the City of Opelika); and Sears v. Carson, 551 So.2d 1054 (Ala. 1989) (involved an election for the office of Franklin, Alabama, town council). I think that each of those cases is clearly distinguishable. None of those cases involved a factual setting where a circuit court, before election results were certified, issued an injunction and directed the certifying official to certify certain votes as legal votes. On the other hand, each of those cases involved an election contest, not a pre-certification contest. Each of those cases involved a factual setting where the tribunal conducting the contest had determined a winner and the official having the responsibility of certifying the tribunal's determination of the winner refused to certify the candidate who had been declared by the tribunal deciding the contest to be the winner. Here, the facts are far different. Here, the circuit court interrupted the process before the results of the election were certified, and before any contest was filed in the Legislature. In Ex parte Baxley, the actions were filed after the results of the election were certified, not before, but the facts are similar to this case in that one candidate was trying to prevent the tribunal established by the Legislature from hearing the contest. In Ex parte Baxley, this Court, with eight members agreeing, said that Judge Carl was  without authority and in express violation of statutory and case law. Code 1975, § 17-15-6; State v. Albritton, 251 Ala. 422, 37 So.2d 640 (1948); Ex parte State ex rel. Tucker, 236 Ala. 284, 181 So. 761 (1938). (Emphasis added). 496 So.2d at 691. That case answers the jurisdictional argument.