Opinion ID: 2275645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public/Private Crossing Distinction.

Text: The distinction between public and private railroad crossings is critical because the duties required of persons who operate railroad trains, when approaching and passing over public crossings, are very different from those which are required of them at private crossings. Stull's Adm'x v. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co., 172 Ky. 650, 189 S.W. 721, 723 (1916). As will be further detailed below, our well-established common law imposes a minimal duty for railroad companies at private crossings. The General Assembly, on the other hand, imposes multiple duties on railroads at public crossings. KRS 277.010, et. seq. Therefore, we must determine as a critical threshold matter, whether the BCS crossing was public or private in order to determine the extent of CSX's duty.
Although briefly detailed above, a more thorough description of the crossing is needed to properly consider whether it is public or private. In order to access the Sanitation Company, a driver must turn off of Preston Highway onto an unnamed paved road and proceed west. This paved road eventually leads to the Bullitt County Highway Garage, ending almost immediately thereafter. Bullitt County maintains the paved section of the road. Carroll Samuels, an employee of the Bullitt County Road Department testified that the county paved the road up to the garage. He stated that he considers this paved roadway a driveway to the garage. This unnamed paved road, however, does not lead directly to the Sanitation Company; rather a driver must proceed further west to another unnamed gravel road. This nameless gravel road traverses the railroad crossing, and shortly thereafter ends at the Sanitation Company. Bullitt County does not maintain this gravel road; rather, testimony in the record suggests that Kerrin Hester and Charles Burris, the landowners of the two tracts abutting the railroad right-of-way and crossing maintained the gravel road as needed. [10] Based on our common law, the determinative factor is whether the crossing is situated on a public road. In Deitz' Adm'x, we explained, [f]or a crossing to be a public one the road or street on which it is situated must be a public road or street established either in the manner prescribed by statute or by dedication, and if in the latter manner there must be an acceptance. Deitz' Adm'x v. Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co., 296 Ky. 279, 176 S.W.2d 699, 701 (1943) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the only way that a public highway may be established is in the manner provided by statute, or by its dedication to the public use and its acceptance by the proper authorities as a public highway. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Whittle's Adm'rs, 216 Ky. 314, 287 S.W. 894, 895 (1926). [11] We also noted that, although the acceptance need not be formal, some control on the part of the county authorities must be exercised. Hunt's Adm'r v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 254 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Ky.1952) (emphasis added) ( citing Whittle's Adm'rs, 287 S.W. at 895). When applying these principles to the case at bar, we conclude that the BCS crossing is private. There is no contention that the unnamed gravel road was established pursuant to statute and no evidence in the record suggesting that it is controlled by Bullitt County under any form of public dedication. Whittle's Adm'rs, 287 S.W. at 895. Moreover, the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet's listing of public roads does not list this unnamed gravel road, nor is the road included in the listed road systems of the City of Shepherdsville or Bullitt County. Appellants concede this point, stating [t]echnically, the roadway was never incorporated into the state or county road system. They do claim, however, that the road is owned by Bullitt County as evidenced by two deeds conveying the surrounding lots to Bullitt County. Without more information, however, Bullitt County's ownership of this unnamed gravel road is unclear from the deeds' cryptic language. And even if we were to assume that the deeds conveyed this nameless gravel road to Bullitt County, there is no evidence that the county ever exercised control over this road: it did not pave it, maintain it, name it, or incorporate it into its road system. [12] After examining the evidence, we conclude that Appellants failed to presen[t] at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether the road was public. Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 482. [13] Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the crossing was private as a matter of law.