Opinion ID: 564393
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause

Text: 7 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The Supreme Court has held that this right to compulsory process includes [t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, [and] is in plain terms the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). According to the Court, [t]his right is a fundamental element of due process of law. Id. 8 The defendant's right to offer the testimony of witnesses is not unbounded, however. In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's exclusion of a witness as a sanction for defense counsel's deliberately failing to identify the witness prior to trial, as required by local discovery rules. The Court rested its decision on the determination that the compulsory process clause did not absolutely bar the preclusion of the testimony. In the Court's words: 9 The principle that undergirds the defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence is also the source of essential limitations on the right. The adversary process could not function effectively without adherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the opponent's case. The trial process would be a shambles if either party had an absolute right to control the time and content of his witnesses' testimony.... The State's interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal trial is sufficient to justify the imposition and enforcement of firm, though not always inflexible, rules relating to the identification and presentation of evidence. 10 Id. at 410-11, 108 S.Ct. at 653. While recognizing that less drastic remedies than exclusion were available as sanctions, the Court held that if the explanation for a party's failure to comply with a discovery rule reveals that the omission was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage, it would be entirely consistent with the purposes of the Compulsory Process Clause simply to exclude the witness' testimony. Id. at 415, 108 S.Ct. at 655. 11
12 Peters argues that Taylor is inapplicable to the case at bar because his counsel committed no willful violation of any discovery rule. The government concedes that it never sought an order for an exchange of witness lists prior to trial, nor was there any agreement between counsel regarding the exchange of such lists. Instead, it contends that defense counsel violated both Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b), and its local counterpart, Hawaii Local Rule 345-1(b), by his failure to disclose the conclusions Dr. Allen had reached. Defendant disputes this contention: he argues that because Dr. Allen made no written findings of his review of the photographs or the medical records and because his review of Clyne's photographs and medical records did not constitute a physical examination, neither rule is applicable in this case. 13 This circuit has not previously considered whether either Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 or Hawaii Local Rule 345-1(b) require disclosure of an expert's opinion that has not been recorded in any manner. On consideration, however, we believe that the plain language of both rules precludes their application in such circumstances. 14 The federal and local rules are fairly similar in wording. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part: 15 [T]he defendant ... shall permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical and mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, ... within the possession or control of the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports relate to that witness' testimony. Hawaii Local Rule 345-1(b) provides: 16 The defendant shall (1) inform the government if any of the following exists, and (2) shall permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph the following: 17 . . . . . 18 2. Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial.... 19 While the language results or reports which appears in both rules arguably could apply to an expert's opinion that has not been recorded in some tangible medium, other language in both rules clearly demonstrates that the rules refer only to information recorded in some tangible form. Specifically, both rules are phrased in terms of inspecting and copying or photographing material covered by the rule; such language clearly cannot pertain to oral information. The fact that items listed in other sections of Rule 16(b) and Local Rule 345-1(b), for which the rules require inspection and copying or photographing, are all indisputably information contained in some tangible form confirms this impression. 1 See United States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir.1985) ([T]he language of Rule 16(a)(1)(D) suggests that it refers only to written reports.); United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 659 (11th Cir.1983) ([A]ppellants complain of the conduct of the government in calling an expert to testify without prior notification.... In criminal cases, the government must supply, upon the defendant's request, the results or reports of physical or mental examinations. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(D). However, no such reports were made in this case.). 20 The government argues that even if we find that Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b) does not require disclosure of the expert's opinion, we should still find that Local Rule 345-1(b) requires such disclosure. The government bases this argument on the local rule's use of the word inform, which is not present in the federal rule, in addition to the inspect and copy or photograph language. The inclusion of the term inform, the government contends, demonstrates that the rule is intended to include discovery of a broader category of information than tangible information which can be inspected and copied or photographed. 21 The structure of Local Rule 345-1(b) belies the government's contention, however. That rule states that [t]he defendant shall ... inform the government if any of the following exists, and ... permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph the following (emphasis added). By using the conjunction and, the language indicates that everything of which the government should be informed is capable of inspection and copying, or photographing, and is therefore a physical item. 22 Even if the expert witness' findings had been recorded in some manner, we do not believe that disclosure would be required pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 18 or Local Rule 345-1(b). While the government contends that the expert's review of the photographs constitutes a physical examination within the meaning of the rules, we believe that the plain meaning of the term physical examination requires more than the mere inspection of photographs. To reach any other conclusion, as defendant notes, would impose notice requirements for all witnesses who merely view photographs prior to their court testimony. We do not read the rules so broadly. 23
24 The government argues that even if defendant's attorney did not commit a clear-cut violation of any discovery rule, the district court properly excluded the witness because defense counsel deliberately failed to divulge the existence of the expert witness in order to secure the defendant an unfair advantage at trial. Specifically, the government asserts that, after agreeing to time restrictions imposed due to the district court's schedule, defense counsel deliberately withheld the fact of the existence of the expert until the eleventh hour in order to impede the government's ability to find an appropriate rebuttal witness within the time period set for trial. The Supreme Court has emphasized that [f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408, 108 S.Ct. at 652. For this reason, the Court has upheld the drastic remedy of excluding a witness only in cases involving willful and blatant discovery violations. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 416, 108 S.Ct. at 656. Here, no willful and blatant discovery violations occurred. Accordingly, application of the exclusionary sanction is impermissible. See United States v. Schwartz, 857 F.2d 655, 658-59 (9th Cir.1988) (In the absence of a specific constitutional, statutory or other violation warranting the imposition of the exclusionary sanction, and subject also to the rules regulating admissibility, the government is entitled to offer its best evidence to the court and the jury.); cf. Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir.1988) (exclusion of witness appropriate where violation was lurid and unequivocal, and its genesis was inexcusably deliberate).