Opinion ID: 1107717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard for Demonstrating Prejudice

Text: Taking into account both the differing standards that apply to direct appeals and postconviction proceedings and the concerns about the contemporaneous objection rule, the Fourth District held that to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland, the defendant must demonstrate that someone on the jury was actually biased against the defendant. Carratelli II, 915 So.2d at 1260 (citing Miller v. Webb, 385 F.3d 666, 674 (6th Cir.2004)). The district court relied on its prior decision in Jenkins, which held that the test for prejudice should be whether the lawyer's failure to raise a challenge resulted in a biased juror serving on the jury. Jenkins, 824 So.2d at 982 (citing Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73 (8th Cir.1995)). In Jenkins, the court recognized that [a] lawyer's competence in failing to make a cause challenge should not be reviewed in a 3.850 proceeding in the same way that a denial of a cause challenge is reviewed on direct appeal. Id. at 982. The court declined to apply the Singer standard, which applies to direct appeals. Id. As explained above, under this standard when the record supports any reasonable doubt about a juror's impartiality, the reviewing court will find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the challenge. Busby, 894 So.2d at 96. Both Jenkins and Carratelli II held that in postconviction proceedings the error must be egregious. See Jenkins, 824 So.2d at 982; Carratelli II, 915 So.2d at 1261. As the district court stated: From a practical standpoint, a jury selection error justifying postconviction relief is so fundamental and glaring that it should have alerted a trial judge to intervene, even in the absence of a proper objection, to prevent an actually biased juror from serving on the jury, thereby irrevocably tainting the trial. Where reasonable people could disagree about a juror's fitness to serve, the showing of prejudice required for postconviction relief is lacking. Carratelli II, 915 So.2d at 1261. We agree that while the Singer standard may be appropriate for direct appeals, it is not appropriate as a postconviction standard. Under Strickland, to demonstrate prejudice a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability  one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome  that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In the context of the denial of challenges for cause, such prejudice can be shown only where one who was actually biased against the defendant sat as a juror. We therefore hold that where a postconviction motion alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise or preserve a cause challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that a juror was actually biased. A juror is competent if he or she can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court. Lusk, 446 So.2d at 1041. Therefore, actual bias means bias-in-fact that would prevent service as an impartial juror. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133-34, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936) (stating, in a case involving a statute permitting government employees to serve as jurors in the District of Columbia, that the defendant in a criminal case still has the ability during voir dire to ascertain whether a prospective juror . . . has any bias in fact which would prevent his serving as an impartial juror). Under the actual bias standard, the defendant must demonstrate that the juror in question was not impartial  i.e., that the juror was biased against the defendant, and the evidence of bias must be plain on the face of the record. See Carratelli II, 915 So.2d at 1260 (citing Jenkins, 824 So.2d at 982); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038-40, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (stating that in habeas review a state court's findings are presumed correct and that although the record showing the ambiguous voir dire answers of three jurors challenged for cause arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell which of these answers was said with the greatest comprehension and certainty). We disagree with Austing's application of the Strickland prejudice standard. In Austing, the Fifth District held that failure to preserve a juror challenge that would constitute reversible error on appeal fulfills both prongs of Strickland. Such a lenient standard disregards the fundamental differences, which we have discussed, between review on appeal and the much higher standard applicable to postconviction relief. The Austing standard also eliminates the requirement for preserving error at trial. As we have explained, [t]he requirement of a contemporaneous objection is based on practical necessity and basic fairness in the operation of a judicial system. It places the trial judge on notice that error may have been committed, and provides him an opportunity to correct it at an early stage of the proceedings. Delay and an unnecessary use of the appellate process result from a failure to cure early that which must be cured eventually. Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978). Applying the Singer standard in the postconviction context would essentially eviscerate the requirement of contemporaneous objections because it would apply the same standard in the postconviction context to unpreserved claims that applies on appeal to preserved claims. A defendant asserting ineffective assistance for failing to preserve a cause challenge would have no greater burden than a defendant asserting preserved error on appeal. As the Third District stated in response to a similar claim that proof of an unpreserved reversible error was sufficient to meet Strickland: If counsel should fail, as here, to preserve for appellate review an otherwise reversible error, it would be of little moment as the conviction would still be subject to being vacated based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The preservation of error rule would have no real consequence as it would apply only when counsel failed to preserve points which would not have merited a reversal in any event. In effect, a wild card exception to the preservation of error rule would be created allowing appellate courts to pass on the merits of unpreserved, non-fundamental errors in criminal cases, and to upset criminal convictions based thereon. Anderson v. State, 467 So.2d 781, 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also Jenkins, 824 So.2d at 982 (A lawyer's competence in failing to make a cause challenge should not be reviewed in a 3.850 proceeding in the same way that a denial of a cause challenge is reviewed on direct appeal. To do so is to undermine the trial process and to nullify the reasons for requiring a timely objection in the first place.). As we have said, [t]he sole exception to the contemporaneous objection rule applies where the error is fundamental. F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226, 229 (Fla.2003). To be fundamental, the error must reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644-45 (Fla.1991) (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960)). Because, as we noted above, the failure to raise or preserve a cause challenge is not reviewable on direct appeal, it cannot constitute fundamental error per se. If an appellate court refuses to consider unpreserved error, then by definition the error could not have been fundamental. Yet, as Anderson recognized, by imposing no greater burden on postconviction than on appeal, a standard such as that articulated in Austing allows courts to review  and order new trials based on  unpreserved non-fundamental error. To make matters worse, such new trials will occur much later in the process  after the postconviction motion is filed and decided, which may happen years after the original trial. If we agreed to such a standard, it would be more efficient simply to allow appellate courts to review unpreserved error even if not fundamental. Such a rule would eliminate the contemporaneous objection requirement and permit counsel to save certain arguments for appeal. We are not willing to begin a journey down that dangerous path.