Opinion ID: 2812090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Williamson Test

Text: The Hawaiʻi Constitution requires, as a fundamental protection of an individual in a criminal case, trial by an impartial jury. State v. Pokini, 55 Haw. 640, 641, 526 P.2d 94, 99 (1974). The defendant bears the initial burden of making a 14 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER prima facie showing of a deprivation that “could substantially prejudice [his or her] right to a fair trial” by an impartial jury. 10 State v. Williamson, 72 Haw. 97, 102, 807 P.2d 593, 596 (1991) (emphasis added); see also Furutani, 76 Hawaiʻi at 181, 873 P.2d at 60. Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a deprivation, “a rebuttable presumption of prejudice is raised.” Williamson, 72 Haw. at 102, 807 P.2d at 596. Therefore, the analysis in Williamson initially focuses on the general nature of the outside influence and whether it “could” substantially prejudice a defendant; if the court so finds, then a rebuttable presumption of prejudice is raised that triggers the court’s obligation to investigate the totality of the circumstances. Id. The circuit court and the ICA applied an incomplete formulation of the Williamson test in examining the juror misconduct in this case. Instead of applying the Williamson analysis--which requires that the trial court first determine whether the misconduct “could substantially prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial”--the circuit court and the 10 That prima facie case includes a presentation by the defendant of “some specific, substantial evidence” showing the occurrence of the outside influence that may have possibly biased the juror. State v. Yamada, 108 Hawaiʻi 474, 479, 122 P.3d 254, 259 (2005); State v. Pauline, 100 Hawaiʻi 356, 381, 60 P.3d 306, 331 (2002); Furutani, 76 Hawaiʻi at 181, 873 P.2d at 60. 15 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ICA considered whether Chin presented evidence demonstrating that she was substantially prejudiced. 11 Under the circuit court and the ICA’s interpretation, the first step considers whether the alleged misconduct substantially prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial. In this formulation, the focus of the defendant’s initial burden is to demonstrate that the specific misconduct rises to the level of being substantially prejudicial in order to trigger the court’s duty to investigate. This interpretation is inconsistent with Williamson. The origin of the test used by the circuit court and the ICA is the following passage from Keliiholokai: “the initial step for the trial court to take . . . is to determine whether the nature of the [outside influence] rises to the level of being substantially prejudicial.” Keliiholokai, 58 Haw. at 359, 569 P.2d at 895. When viewed in isolation, this passage does not reflect the actual holding of the Keliiholokai decision or the law as pronounced in our subsequent cases. In Keliiholokai, the issue was whether the jury had been improperly influenced by a newspaper article. Id. at 361, 11 The circuit court stated, “Because [Chin] has failed to meet her burden of presenting sufficient evidence of a deprivation that rises to the level of being ‘substantially prejudicial[,]’ the [ ] motion for new trial is denied.” Similarly, the ICA indicated that the trial court would be bound to investigate the circumstances of the misconduct only if the trial court “determined that the alleged deprivation was substantially prejudicial.” 16 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 569 P.2d at 893. This court explained that the first consideration was whether the contents of the article were of a nature that could be substantially prejudicial. Thus, the initial step for the trial court to take, once a claim of prejudicial news accounts is made, is to determine whether the nature of the news accounts rises to the level of being substantially prejudicial. Id. at 359, 569 P.2d at 894-95 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 1976)). Thus, in the context of the question of whether a jury received improper information through a news article, the initial evaluation is to examine the “nature” of the improper influence or alleged misconduct. The Keliiholokai court ruled that the news account disclosed the defendant’s prior convictions. Id. at 360, 569 P.2d at 895. As the defendant in Keliiholokai had not testified in his own behalf and there was “no indication of any relevant and proper purpose for which evidence of [his] prior convictions would have been admissible at trial,” the convictions should not have been before the jury. Id. [W]e hold that the nature of the article containing appellant’s prior convictions was substantially prejudicial and rose to “that degree of prejudice” which “triggered the court’s responsibility to investigate further by specifically questioning the jury.” All of the factors present in the instant case should have prompted the trial court to conduct “an immediate voir dire inquiry to determine if the jurors had read the offensive articles and, if they had, whether they could nonetheless render a fair and true verdict.” This, the trial court failed to do. Accordingly, we conclude that appellant was denied a fair trial. 17 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Id. at 360, 569 P.2d at 896 (emphases added) (citations omitted) (quoting Jones, 542 F.2d at 194, and United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061, 1063 (7th Cir. 1972)) (alteration omitted). The Keliiholokai court first examined the general “nature” of the outside influence, and having determined that it had the potential to substantially prejudice him, applied a presumption of prejudice in favor of the defendant. Id. Accordingly, although the nature of the news article was “substantially prejudicial,” the court in Keliiholokai did not require the defendant to show that he had been prejudiced. Indeed, it was unknown if any of the jurors had read the article. Id. at 361, 569 P.2d at 893. The error by the trial court was in failing to recognize that the article was of a nature that, if read by a juror, could be substantially prejudicial to the defendant, and therefore the trial court was required to investigate whether any of the jurors had been exposed to the contents of the article. Subsequently, this court’s decision in Williamson considered whether a defendant was prejudiced by a dictionary discovered in the jury room following deliberations. Williamson, 72 Haw. at 98, 807 P.2d at 594. Similar to Keliiholokai, the Williamson decision first considered whether the influence was of a nature that could substantially prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id. at 102-04, 807 P.2d 18 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER at 596. The court observed, “During the course of a trial, a juror’s obtaining of extraneous definitions or statements of law differing from that intended by the court is misconduct which may result in prejudice to the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” Id. at 102-03, 807 at 596 (emphasis added). Also parallel to Keliiholokai, once the nature of the misconduct was determined to have the potential to substantially prejudice the defendant, this court charged the trial court with a duty to adequately investigate the misconduct. “[B]y not inquiring into the identity of the juror who brought the dictionary and obtaining a personal explanation from him or her as to its use, the trial court did not have before it the totality of circumstances surrounding the misconduct to decide whether it was harmless.” Id. at 104, 807 P.2d at 597. Williamson and Keliiholokai require the same procedure of the trial court when an improper influence is raised: (1) an initial determination that the outside influence is of a nature that could substantially prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial and, once that general nature has been established, (2) an investigation of the totality of the circumstances. The Williamson and Keliiholokai formulations are equivalent because both refer to “the nature” of the outside influence, indicating that the initial test looks at the general type of improper conduct alleged. Thus, Keliiholokai instructs a trial court to 19 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER examine whether the nature of the outside influence “rises to the level of being substantially prejudicial,” Id. at 359, 569 P.2d at 895, and Williamson recognizes that this directive requires that the trial court determine whether “such influence is of a nature which could substantially prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” 72 Haw. at 102, 807 P.2d at 596. Since Williamson, this court has most frequently cited the Keliiholokai and Williamson formulations together. For example, State v. Bailey, 126 Hawaiʻi 383, 271 P.3d 1142 (2012), recently cited the following passage from Furutani: [W]hen a defendant in a criminal case claims a deprivation of the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, the initial step for the trial court to take is to determine whether the nature of the alleged deprivation rises to the level of being substantially prejudicial. If it does not rise to such a level, the trial court is under no duty to interrogate the jury. And whether it does rise to the level of substantial prejudice is ordinarily a question committed to the trial court’s discretion. Where the trial court does determine that such alleged deprivation is of a nature which could substantially prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice is raised. The trial judge is then duty bound to further investigate the totality of circumstances surrounding the alleged deprivation to determine its impact on jury impartiality. The standard to be applied in overcoming such a presumption is that the alleged deprivation must be proved harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of a deprivation that could substantially prejudice his or her right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. But once a rebuttable presumption of prejudice is raised, the burden of proving harmlessness falls squarely on the prosecution. 20 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Bailey, 126 Hawaiʻi at 399-400, 271 P.3d at 1158-59 (emphases added) (quoting Furutani, 76 Hawaiʻi at 180–81, 873 P.2d at 59– 60). Similar passages setting forth both formulations were stated in State v. Keohokapu, 127 Hawaiʻi 91, 102, 276 P.3d 660, 671 (2012), Yamada, 108 Hawaiʻi at 478-79, 122 P.3d at 258-59, and State v. Samonte, 83 Hawaiʻi 507, 523-24, 928 P.2d 1, 17-18 (1996). 12 Thus, the decisions of this court have most frequently cited the Keliiholokai and Williamson formulations together as a single test that first examines whether the general nature of the misconduct could substantially prejudice the right to a fair trial. This test does not require a defendant to prove substantial prejudice before a court has a duty to investigate the circumstances. For instance, in Bailey, the issue presented was whether a juror’s statements to the other members of the jury concerning the defendant’s prior convictions warranted a new 12 When only the Keliiholokai formulation has been cited, this court determined that the nature of the misconduct was of a type that could not substantially prejudice a defendant. See State v. Gabalis, 83 Hawaiʻi 40, 4546, 924 P.2d 534, 540-41(1996) (citing only the Keliiholokai formulation and affirming denial of new trial based on a general rule that “information regarding the reputation of an establishment or a community location is, in and of itself, insufficiently prejudicial to warrant the grant of a new trial”); see also State v. Kim, 103 Hawaiʻi 285, 291, 81 P.3d 1200, 1206-07 (2003) (citing only the Keliiholokai formulation and affirming trial court’s denial on motion for new trial because allegedly improper juror comments did “not constitute information from outside sources, and, thus, were not improper”); Pauline, 100 Hawaiʻi at 381-82, 60 P.3d at 331-32 (citing only the Keliiholokai formulation and affirming trial court’s denial of motion for new trial based on paucity of evidence demonstrating that the alleged misconduct occurred). 21 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER trial. Bailey, 126 Hawaiʻi at 385, 271 P.3d at 1144. This court cited both the Keliiholokai and Williamson formulations and concluded that the defendant “met his burden of ‘making a prima facie showing of a deprivation that could substantially prejudice his or her right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.’” Id. at 399-400, 271 P.3d at 1158-59 (emphasis added) (quoting Furutani, 76 Hawaiʻi at 180–81, 873 P.2d at 59–60). We concluded in Bailey that the trial court’s “decision to investigate the impact of [the juror’s] statements on juror impartiality was proper.” 13 Id. at 400, 271 P.3d at 1159. Thus, Bailey applied the test, as stated in Williamson, that the court first examines the general nature of the misconduct, and if such misconduct is generally of a nature that could substantially prejudice a defendant, the trial court is required to investigate the totality of the circumstances surrounding the outside influence. Consequently, the circuit court should not have denied Chin’s motion for new trial on the basis that she failed to present sufficient evidence of a deprivation that rose to the level of being substantially prejudicial. The ICA similarly erred when it indicated that the trial court would be bound to 13 Following a review of the trial court’s investigation, this court reversed the trial court’s denial of a new trial because the juror’s statements were “insurmountably prejudicial” and thus were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Bailey, 126 Hawaiʻi at 403, 271 P.3d at 1162 22 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER investigate the circumstances of the misconduct only if the trial court “determined that the alleged deprivation was substantially prejudicial.” 14