Opinion ID: 837290
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court Clearly Erred

Text: The trial court excused the failures of notice and communication by noting respondent's failure to contact the DHS or the court after his initial call to Patterson on March 23, 2006, or after he attended the June 8, 2006, hearing. The court refused to credit respondent's testimony that, when he did not hear from the court or the DHS after March 23, he assumed that A. had been returned to Kops; rather, the court assum[ed] he was under the impression that [A. was] still in foster care. The court also did not credit respondent's claim that he declined to seek visits with A. because he feared bouncing in and out of A.'s life. Rather, the court concluded that respondent simply wished to avoid liability for child support payments. We conclude that the trial court clearly erred by ruling that respondent was sufficiently responsible for his own lack of participation to excuse the state's failures to inform him of the ongoing proceedings. First, although respondent was generally aware of A.'s initial placement in foster care and Kops's admission of neglect, his stated assumption that A. had been or would be returned to Kops was reasonableand, indeed, was correctuntil he was successfully notified in January 2007 of the termination proceedings; until that time, the express goal of the proceedings was reunification with Kops. Second, although the court correctly concluded that respondent never formally paid child support, he was also never ordered to pay child support. Significantly, the state was obligated to pursue support from him without regard to whether he visited A. [51] Therefore, he could not avoid his support obligation by simply deciding to forgo visitation. Similarly, no evidence was presented to contradict his claim that he provided Kops with items such as diapers when she asked for them. Rather, the record confirms respondent's alleged reason for refusing to give Kops money, which was that she had an ongoing history of drug and alcohol abuse. We acknowledge that, under the clear error standard, regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. MCR 2.613(C). [52] But under these circumstances, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Miller, 433 Mich. at 337, 445 N.W.2d 161 (quotation marks omitted). The court's finding that respondent continued to avoid contact with his child merely to avoid paying child support was based on respondent's admission that, at some time in the past, Kops had insisted that she control his visitation schedule with A. and that, if he did not comply, she would pursue support. Thus, there is some evidence in the record to support the court's finding. But this isolated statement is a thin reed on which to base the overarching conclusion that respondent chose not to visit A. while in foster care merely to avoid paying support. As noted, respondent could, and should, have been ordered to pay support at any time during A.'s stay in foster care; he could not have avoided support by choosing not to visit her. Moreover, his willingness to care for A. if Kops were out of the picture is evident from his requests of the DHS and the court to place A. with him. Significantly, respondent's willful absence from A.'s life and failure to voluntarily offer monetary supporteven while A. was in foster care and even if to avoid Kopsis not automatic grounds for termination. Rather, his lack of contact and support is evidence of neglect. As A.'s natural and legal parent, although this neglect suggests that respondent was not a model parent[], Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, he is still entitled to notice and meaningful participation in a process affecting his parental rights. Accordingly, it is crucial that, although respondent had actual notice of A.'s removal after the fact and received notice of one dispositional proceeding, respondent received no notice of the ongoing proceedings, the services and evaluations available from the DHS, or the fact that his parental rights could be at stake in a neglect case against Kops. In other words, although he had actual notice of A.'s removal and the allegations against Kops, by no means did he receive actual notice of the full nature and import of the proceedings with regard to his own rights. Subsequent notice of the termination petition and the appointment of counsel are insufficient to afford due process when respondent's rights were terminated in part because he had not participated in the earlier proceedings and when the trial court refused to adjourn in order for respondent to meaningfully participate in services and be evaluated as an appropriate caregiver for A. The state cannot fail to make reasonable attempts to provide adequate notice of earlier proceedings and their consequences and then terminate a parent's rights on the basis of circumstances that could have been significantly affected by those proceedings. Further, it is for this reason that the trial court erred when it excused the court's failures of notice on the basis of respondent's lack of contact with the court and the DHS. Even if respondent willfully failed to follow up with the DHS or the court in the neglect proceeding against Kops, he did not effectively forfeit his constitutional parental rights at a later termination proceeding against him by doing so. As explained earlier, his failure to seek visits with A. or to voluntarily provide monetary support during the proceedings was certainly additional evidence of his own neglect of his daughter. But a showing of neglect, alone, merely triggers a parent's right to participate in services. It does not automatically justify termination. As expressed in MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), when a parent fails to provide proper care or custody for the child, termination is not appropriate unless there is [also] no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age. Because respondent was neither informed about nor properly offered the evaluation and services available to aid the court in making the latter determination, his rights could not be terminated merely because of his failure to provide care and custody.