Opinion ID: 2968317
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim Two—Improper Discharge

Text: Francis next argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to BAH on her claim of improper discharge. Specifically, she contends that she presented evidence sufficient to create a dispute over whether BAH discharged her in violation of § 4316(c). For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the district court did not err in deciding this claim on summary judgment. Section 4316(c) temporarily changes the at-will employment status of returning veterans. For a certain period of time (dependant on the 5 Francis argues as well that BAH denied her a benefit of employment by changing her physical job location. She bases this contention on the fact that, upon her rehire, she was allegedly tied to a call center desk performing Tier I tasks instead of being allowed to move around and leave the workplace. BAH argues that Francis waived this argument by not raising it in the district court. Francis counters that at the very least, BAH and the district court could have been put on notice by her materials that she was raising the claim. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5. In any event, this claim, to the extent that it is properly before us, fails. Francis acknowledges that her job location argument is inherent in her changed responsibilities argument, i.e., that it is intertwined with the difference between Tier I (which requires the employee to remain at the call center desk) and Tier II work (which allows employees some freedom of location in performing the job). Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5. We agree with her assessment that this is no more than a restatement of the work responsibilities argument that we have previously rejected. 14 FRANCIS v. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON veteran’s length of military service), an employer cannot discharge the returning veteran except for cause. § 4316(c). In a discharge action based on conduct, the employer bears the burden of proving that it is reasonable to discharge the employee for the conduct in question, and that he or she had notice, which was express or can be fairly implied, that the conduct would constitute cause for discharge. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.248(a) (2006). Because employers have the burden of proving that the discharge was reasonable, it is difficult for employers to achieve summary judgment on claims under § 4316(c). See Alan’s of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414, 1425 (11th Cir. 1990) (As is well established, in a summary judgment proceeding the party against whom the burden of proof falls at trial faces a challenge more difficult than otherwise.). As in all summary judgments, however, the non-moving party must still provide evidence sufficient to create an issue for trial. Mere unsupported speculation is not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion if the undisputed evidence indicates that the other party should win as a matter of law. See Felty v. Graves-Humphrys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987). In this case, the evidence of Francis’ misconduct at BAH is overwhelming and largely uncontroverted. She arrived late for work and left early without permission. She missed scheduled conference calls. She acted inappropriately to customers and co-workers—engendering complaints about her behavior and professional attitude from several of the latter. She left her work station without permission. Supervisors found her to be evasive, non-responsive, and uncommunicative. Francis does submit an affidavit in the record in which she indicates that she believed that she was acting professionally and in accordance with the Core Values during her time at BAH. J.A. at 1044-45. Even viewing this affidavit in the light most favorable to Francis, however, it does not create a dispute of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. The operative legal question is not whether Francis believed that her dismissal was reasonable or that she was acting professionally. The operative question is whether, based on the undisputed evidence in the record, it was objectively reasonable for BAH to dismiss Francis. In this case, the undisputed evidence indicates an extensive pattern of unprofessional misconduct taking place over the course of years, well documented by BAH, and FRANCIS v. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON 15 reported to BAH management from a wide variety of co-workers and other sources. This pattern of misconduct provides a sufficient legal basis to justify Francis’ dismissal—despite Francis’ subjective views of her actions. See generally Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that opinions and conclusory assertions are not sufficient to survive summary judgment).6 It is also undisputed that Francis had notice that her misconduct was cause for discharge. Francis’ Notice of Probation expressly indicated that this matter is to be taken with extreme seriousness and you should understand fully that your failure to immediately address these issues would result in termination of your employment. J.A. at 429. The Notice of Probation detailed specific instances of misconduct to be corrected: failing to display a positive demeanor and respond to simple courtesies by her co-workers, failing to utilize the established process for late arrivals or absences, repeatedly refusing to do work assigned by her managers, storming out of the office after meetings, slamming down the phone on customers, and refusing to let coworkers know, as required by BAH policy, when she was going to be away from her desk. J.A. at 429-30. Finally, the Notice indicated what remedial actions Francis could take in order to avoid dismissal. This detailed statement, which Francis acknowledges receiving, constitutes notice sufficient to meet BAH’s burden under § 4316(c). In short, the evidence of record reflects a systematic history of professional misconduct and a refusal to correct that misconduct when BAH brought it to Francis’ attention. BAH, therefore, had cause to terminate Francis pursuant to § 4316(c), and we hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to BAH on this claim.