Opinion ID: 1795931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: GM's Motion for a New Trial

Text: GM argues that the trial court erred in denying its challenges for cause of certain prospective jurors. This Court reviews a claim that the trial court erred in denying a challenge for cause to see if in denying the challenge the trial court exceeded its discretion. Hutchins v. DCH Reg'l Med. Ctr., 770 So.2d 49, 53 (Ala. 2000). The trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to sustain challenges for cause, and the trial court's decision will not be interfered with unless clearly erroneous. Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So.2d 1249, 1255-56 (Ala.1986). Having dealt with the only issue that would have been dispositive of all other issues and having found no error as to that issue, we turn to GM's lead argument in its brief and at oral argument. GM argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in denying five of its challenges for cause. Section 12-16-150(11), Ala.Code 1975, provides that a prospective juror in a civil case related by consanguinity within the ninth degree or by affinity within the fifth degree ... to any attorney in the case to be tried is subject to challenge for cause. [20] GM argues that it was prejudiced as a matter of law because it was forced to use some of its peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who were related to lawyers in the case to be tried, and that the jury, as finally constituted, included members who had been clients of one of the law firms representing Jernigan or who had been injured in automobile accidents or who had relatives who had been so injured. Furthermore, GM says, it was forced to allow one of Myron Penn's relatives to serve as an alternate juror and, although she did not deliberate, she was present for several days with those jurors who did deliberate. Jernigan argues that Myron Penn was not an attorney in the case to be tried because he was of counsel to the Jinks law firm rather than a full-time attorney in the firm, he maintained no office with the firm, he had no financial interest in the firm or in the case, and he did not participate in the trial. He was merely in the courtroom, Jernigan says, when jury selection took place. We reject that argument for two reasons. First, it is clear from the record that Myron Penn's name appeared on the letterhead of the Jinks firm, although he was listed of counsel. Moreover, questioning from GM's counsel elicited responses from the veniremembers that were consistent with their understanding that Myron Penn had an ongoing relationship with that firm. GM's counsel asked the veniremembers whether they understood that Myron Penn is of counsel to the Jinks, Daniel & Crow firm and that he works for their firm, to which he received affirmative responses. GM's counsel also asked, without objection: Based on your relationship with Myron, thethe individuals who answered that question about being related, do you think you can be a fair and impartial juror in this case, knowing that he is a part of the firm that is helping represent Mr. Jernigan? You can? He then asked Willie Ann Penn, Irene Penn, Juanita Penn, and Clarence Penn, individually, whether his or her being related to Myron Penn would affect his or her judgment in the case, and each responded that it would not. Jernigan's counsel did nothing to correct the veniremembers' perception that Myron Penn was an attorney with the Jinks law firm. Second, this Court has already construed § 12-16-150(11) to reach relatives of members of a law firm who are not present in the courtroom while the jury is being selected. In Williams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 286 Ala. 703, 246 So.2d 431 (1971), the Court stated the facts and the issue to be addressed as follows: The grounds of the original motion for new trial which the plaintiff insists here were well taken and required the rendition by the trial court of a judgment granting the plaintiff a new trial aver, in effect, that one of the jurors who served on the case failed to disclose upon voir dire examination by the trial court that he was related by blood or marriage within the prohibited degree as prescribed by the law of this state to a member of a legal firm which represented the defendants, which relationship was unknown to the plaintiff or to his attorneys, and thereby plaintiff was deprived of his right to advisedly strike said juror whose service on the trial jury was to the prejudice and injury of the plaintiff. In qualifying the jury, the trial court advised the prospective jurors that the defendants were represented by two law firms. The court identified them by firm names and identified the member or members of those firms who were present in court at the time the jury was being qualified. The court then propounded the following question: `Are any of you kin by blood or marriage to any of the gentlemen to either one of those law firms?' It is conceded that none of the prospective jurors responded to that question. It is further conceded that one of them, to whom we will sometimes hereinafter refer as the subject juror, was the first cousin of the wife of a member of one of the law firms which represented the defendants, at the time of their marriage in 1948. That member of the firm was not in court at the time.  286 Ala. at 705, 246 So.2d at 432 (emphasis added). The Court held that [t]he subject juror was related by affinity within the fifth degree according to the rules of the civil law to a member of one of the law firms which represented the defendants and that the subject juror could have been successfully challenged for cause in a case in which the wife's husband or his firm appeared as counsel. 286 Ala. at 706, 246 So.2d at 432 (emphasis added). Myron Penn was an attorney in the case to be tried within the meaning of § 12-16-150(11), as construed in Dan River Mills. GM was entitled to have its challenges for cause as to Penn's relatives granted. We note that the trial court based its denial of the challenges for cause made pursuant to § 12-16-150(11) on an interpretation of the statute provided by Jernigan's counselthat the statute applied to persons within a certain degree of kinship to parties in the case, but not to relatives of the lawyers in the case. Because the statute clearly applies to veniremembers who are related to attorneys, the trial court's denial of GM's five challenges for cause based upon § 12-16-150(11) was erroneous. We must now determine whether the denial of those five challenges for cause deprived GM of a substantial right. See Southern Ry. v. Milan, 240 Ala. 333, 199 So. 711 (1940). At least since 1965, this Court has held that the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause was reversible error. The Court initially did so in the aftermath of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), overruled, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), dealing with challenges to jurors in a capital-murder case. However, long before Swain, this Court had treated the denial of a challenge for cause as harmless error where a peremptory challenge was thereafter used to remove the prospective juror from the venire and an impartial jury was seated. See Turner v. State, 160 Ala. 55, 49 So. 304 (1909). The United States Supreme Court retreated from Swain in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), and United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000), applying a harmless-error rule comparable to that employed by our Court in Turner v. State . We followed suit in two cases dealing with the trial court's erroneous granting of a challenge for cause. See Dailey v. State, 828 So.2d 340 (Ala.2001), and Evans v. State, 794 So.2d 411 (Ala.2000). In Bethea v. Springhill Memorial Hospital, 833 So.2d 1 (Ala. 2002), we overturned several post- Swain cases and applied the harmless-error rule to the trial court's erroneous denial of a challenge for cause. There is an important distinction between the present case and the Court's pre- Swain cases embracing harmless error and its post- Ross and Martinez-Salazar return to the harmless-error rule. In each instance in which we have applied the harmless-error rule, we have been presented with only one erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause. Here we have five. In an interesting footnote in Martinez-Salazar, the United States Supreme Court stated: Relying on language in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), as did the Court of Appeals in the decision below, Martinez-Salazar urges the Court to adopt a remedy of automatic reversal whenever a defendant's right to a certain number of peremptory challenges is substantially impaired. Brief for Respondent 29 (a `denial or impairment of the right [to exercise peremptory challenges] is reversible error without a showing of prejudice') (quoting Swain, 380 U.S., at 219, 85 S.Ct. 824). Because we find no impairment, we do not decide in this case what the appropriate remedy for a substantial impairment would be.  528 U.S. at 317 n. 4, 120 S.Ct. 774 (emphasis added). [21] Because Ross, Martinez-Salazar, Bethea, and Turner all involved only one juror, those cases can be distinguished. GM was forced to use 5 of its 19 peremptory challenges, over 25%, to eliminate potential jurors who should have been struck by the trial court pursuant to GM's challenges for cause. The jury that was seated consisted of jurors who had been clients of one of the law firms representing Jernigan, who knew Jernigan and/or his witnesses, and who had either been injured themselves in automobile accidents or who had relatives who had been injured, two of whom had filed lawsuits as a result. Presumably, such jurors would have been struck by GM through the exercise of its peremptory challenges had the full arsenal of such challenges been available against jurors who remained after correct rulings on the challenges for cause. [22] The fact that GM left one of Myron Penn's relatives on the jury, albeit as an alternate, demonstrates that it could not exercise enough peremptory challenges to remove all of the veniremembers it had challenged for cause. Based upon the unique facts and circumstances here presented, the trial court, by denying five of GM's challenges for cause that should have been granted, substantially impaired GM's right to the use of its peremptory challenges in selecting a jury. In this case, unlike Bethea, the jurors who ultimately were selected fell in the category of jurors who would likely have been the subject of peremptory challenges had such challenges been available. Therefore, we conclude that the multiple errors on the part of the trial court in improperly denying GM's challenges for cause were not harmless, whether or not it could have been shown that the jury ultimately seated was unbiased and impartial. The trial court erred in denying GM's challenges for cause as to the five veniremembers related to attorneys in this case. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying GM's motion for a new trial, and we reverse that portion of the postjudgment order. Because we hold that GM is entitled to a new trial, we pretermit consideration of other issues raised by GM.