Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of First Degree Murder

Text: Defendant contends his murder conviction must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to prove malice or deliberation and premeditation. He argues the evidence was insufficient because the prosecution provided no response to the testimony of the defense experts that, due to the effect on his brain of PCP use, defendant lacked the capacity to form these mental states. He contends that the testimony of the prosecution expert Dr. Coleman that the requisite mental state could be inferred from defendant's acts was insufficient to rebut the testimony of the defense experts. In resolving such a claim, a reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560; see also People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Contrary to defendant's contention, the jury was not required to accept the testimony of the defense experts. The value of an expert's opinion depends upon the quality of the material on which the opinion is based and the reasoning used to arrive at the conclusion. ( Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 31-32, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) The jury could have found the defense experts' reasoning to be flawed, or could have found an insufficient basis for concluding that defendant was under the influence of PCP at the time of the crimes. The jury also could have concluded that the defense experts' opinions regarding defendant's state of mind were inconsistent with the circumstances of the offense as described in defendant's admissionswhich indicated that defendant planned and carried out a plot to kidnap the victim, transport him to a remote location, and kill him to prevent him from testifyingand with his conduct in fleeing the state after the crime. Those circumstances are certainly sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that defendant was capable of forming, and did form, the intent to kill and that the murder was deliberate and premeditated.