Opinion ID: 2518071
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adequacy of Service

Text: ¶ 16 In addition to requiring that an appeal be taken within 30 days, RCW 41.12.090 also requires serving the commission... a written notice of appeal. Beyond this, the statute is silent as to the required means of service. The Commission's rules supplement the statute, providing that [p]apers required to be filed with the Commission shall be deemed filed upon actual receipt of the papers by the Commission staff at the Commission office. CP at 59 (MCSR 18.15(d)). The office address for the Commission is 501 Evergreen Point Road, Medina, Washington 98039, which is the address of the Medina City Hall. CP at 57 (MCSR 2.13). The City argues that Skinner never served the Commission and, therefore, that the superior court lacked jurisdiction. Because we find that Skinner substantially complied with service requirements, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals. ¶ 17 As a starting point, Skinner did not strictly comply with service requirements. To do so, Commission staff would have had to actually receive service at the Medina City Hall within the 30 days. Skinner has failed to identify any evidence in the record that this occurred. Skinner argues that the Medina city clerk should be treated as part of the Commission staff. We reject this argument. It is true that the Commission's rules provide that [t]he City Manager of the City of Medina, or his/her designee, shall be the Secretary and Chief Examiner of the Commission. CP at 58 (MCSR 3.01). However, at the time Skinner served the city clerk, the city manager had appointed a designee to serve as secretary and chief examiner and, therefore, the city manager was not a part of the Commission. Thus, even if Skinner is correct that the service on the city clerk is service on the city manager, that would not amount to service on the Commission in the present case. ¶ 18 Nonetheless, substantial compliance with service requirements is generally sufficient to invoke a superior court's appellate jurisdiction. See Black v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 131 Wash.2d 547, 552-53, 933 P.2d 1025 (1997); In re Saltis, 94 Wash.2d 889, 896, 621 P.2d 716 (1980). The City's citation to Skagit Surveyors & Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wash.2d 542, 958 P.2d 962 (1998), to argue for a contrary result is misplaced. Skagit Surveyors relied on this court's previous decision in Union Bay Preservation Coalition v. Cosmos Development & Administration Corp., 127 Wash.2d 614, 902 P.2d 1247 (1995), to hold that substantial compliance, as it relates to service of attorneys instead of the parties directly, is insufficient to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter 34.05 RCW. Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash.2d at 555-56, 958 P.2d 962. The analysis in Union Bay focused on the legislature's deletion, as opposed to mere omission, of approval for service on a party's attorney of record. [2] Union Bay, 127 Wash.2d at 618-19, 902 P.2d 1247. It was only in light of this fact that the court declined to apply the doctrine of substantial compliance. Id. at 620, 902 P.2d 1247. Indeed, in Union Bay, the court stated that its conclusion had no bearing on other statutes and other requirements of service. Id. Thus, Union Bay and Skagit Surveyors do not preclude application of the doctrine of substantial compliance in the present case. ¶ 19 In determining whether a party has substantially complied with service requirements, the relevant inquiry is whether the party to be served has received actual notice of appeal or the notice was served in a manner reasonably calculated to give notice to the opposing party. Black, 131 Wash.2d at 553, 933 P.2d 1025 (citing Saltis, 94 Wash.2d at 896, 621 P.2d 716). Here, we know that the Commission received actual notice of the appeal from the fact that it filed a notice of appearance six days after Skinner's attorney served the city clerk, but we do not know whether that actual notice was received within 30 days of the issuance of the order. The question squarely presented, then, is whether Skinner's service of the notice of appeal was reasonably calculated to give notice to the Commission. ¶ 20 In an effort to serve the Commission, Skinner's attorney traveled to the address designated as the Commission's office address. This address was the Medina City Hall. Despite this being the office address of the Commission, the Commission maintained no physical office space within the city hall, nor did its members or secretary and chief examiner keep regular office hours there. Finding no Commission staff present, Skinner's attorney left three copies of the notice of appeal with the city clerk; this number of copies corresponded to the number of named defendantsthe City of Medina, the Medina Police Department, and the Civil Service Commission of the City of Medina. The name of each party appeared on the front of each notice. Moreover, we find it significant that Medina is a relatively small city, with an estimated population of 2,974 people around the time the events took place here. In these circumstances, where the Commission's office address (at which a notice of appeal must be served) contains no office or Commission staff and the municipality is relatively small, we hold that Skinner's service on the city clerk, located at that address, was reasonably calculated to give notice to the Commission. ¶ 21 The Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Hall. In Hall, notice of appeal was given to the secretary of the chairperson of the school board instead of the chairperson of the school board, as required by the statute. 66 Wash.App. at 312, 831 P.2d 1128. Relying on the fact that the chairperson of the school board only works part-time, is not paid, and is not present every day at the school board office, the Court of Appeals concluded that the service substantially complied with the statute. Id. at 312-14, 831 P.2d 1128. Analogously, the Commission members here held similarly unpaid part-time positions. The Hall rationale supports our decision. ¶ 22 Finally, Nitardy v. Snohomish County, 105 Wash.2d 133, 712 P.2d 296 (1986), does not undermine our holding. In Nitardy, the statute required service on the county auditor but the plaintiff instead served the secretary to the county executive. Id. at 133-34, 712 P.2d 296. The court in Nitardy held that this service was insufficient. Id. Critically absent from Nitardy, but present in Hall and this case, is any indication that the person to be served was absent. Moreover, the present rules here do not just require service on the Commission, but service on the Commission  at the Commission office.  CP at 59 (emphasis added) (MCSR 18.15(d)). The absence of Commission staff from the Commission office certainly factors into the reasonableness of alternative manners of service. This issue was not before the court in Nitardy. ¶ 23 Also important to our decision that Skinner substantially complied with service requirements is the fact that there was no prejudice here. The Commission filed a notice of appearance in the superior court six days after Skinner served the Medina city clerk and the Commission joined the City's motion to dismiss on November 15, 2006. The City does not and cannot argue that the Commission was prejudiced by Skinner's manner of service. ¶ 24 Because Skinner substantially complied with service requirements, the superior court did not lack appellate jurisdiction based on improper service.