Opinion ID: 1058888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Selection of Venire

Text: The relevant statutory provisions governing the selection of the jury venire or a special jury venire are established in Tennessee Code Annotation section 22-2-302 and related sections. As relevant to this case, the provisions require the board of jury commissioners to select qualified persons from each district in the county and in proportion to the population of such districts, as near as may be, to serve as jurors in the circuit and criminal courts of such county.... Tenn.Code Ann. § 22-2-302(a)(1) (1994). Although minor or inadvertent deviations from the statutory jury selection provisions may not warrant a reversal of a conviction, we have emphasized that the courts will not sanction flagrant and unnecessary deviations. State v. Bondurant, 4 S.W.3d 662, 670 (Tenn.1999); see also State v. Lynn, 924 S.W.2d 892, 898 (Tenn.1996) (holding that the selection of a special venire was an improper and unnecessary deviation from the statutory procedures). The record reflects that Sue Zwingle, the Criminal and Circuit Court Clerk for Dickson County, testified that the venire was randomly selected by a computer from a list of every licensed driver over eighteen years of age in Dickson County. Although she did not determine the population spread among the districts in Dickson County, Zwingle testified that the method of selecting the venire was in accordance with her training, experience, and discussions with judges. Davidson introduced no further evidence. The trial court denied relief after finding that Davidson had introduced no evidence to establish the number of persons selected from each district and no evidence to establish that the number of persons selected from each district was disproportionate in any way. The issue apparently was not addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. [7] We conclude that the record supports the trial court's determination that Davidson failed to establish the number of persons selected from each district and that he failed to show that the selection in any district was disproportionate. Moreover, Davidson has not demonstrated any grounds for concluding that the selection procedures were a flagrant and unnecessary deviation from the statute. See Bondurant, 4 S.W.3d at 670. In sum, Davidson has failed to establish grounds for relief. [8]