Opinion ID: 3158584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Travel Act Conspiracy Conviction

Text: Both Mazer and Aronshtein challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions for conspiring to violate the Travel Act. We begin with Mazer’s appeal. The Travel Act prohibits the use of interstate wires to distribute the proceeds of unlawful activity or to further that activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a). The unlawful activity charged here was bribery under New York law, which requires that the person receiving a bribe do so “without the consent of his employer or principal.” See N.Y. Penal Law § 180.05. Mazer contends that the testimony of Elaine Doria, OPA’s administrative director, establishes that OPA had knowledge that Mazer received “fees” from D.A. Solutions, Aronshtein’s company and the source of some of the bribe money. Even if we were to accept Mazer’s characterization of the evidence, we would have no reason to reverse his conviction. Mazer’s theory on appeal ignores the significant difference between “knowledge,” which he claims Doria had, and “consent,” which the statute requires. Accordingly, we reject Mazer’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for conspiring to violate the Travel Act. We likewise reject Aronshtein’s challenge. The object of the Travel Act conspiracy charged was the overarching scheme that involved kickbacks to Mazer and Denault paid by, among others, Aronshtein and Prime View’s principal, Victor Natanzon. Aronshtein contends that the Government failed to prove that he entered into anything more than an agreement to send money to Mazer (for, according to Aronshtein, legitimate purposes) and that the evidence failed 8 to show he was aware that Natanzon was paying kickbacks to Mazer or that Denault was receiving kickbacks. A review of the record, however, demonstrates that there was ample evidence from which the jury could infer that Aronshtein knowingly entered the larger conspiracy, and that is all that is required. See United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 16 (2d Cir. 1979) (“To be convicted as a member of a conspiracy, a defendant need not know every objective of the conspiracy, every detail of its operation or means employed to achieve the agreed-upon criminal objective, or even the identity of every co-conspirator.” (citations omitted)).