Opinion ID: 2216235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutionality of the Statutes

Text: [10-12] Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 762, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992). Every presumption must be indulged to sustain the constitutionality of a statute, and if doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Zintek v. Perchik, 163 Wis. 2d 439, 478, 471 N.W.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute, bears the burden to establish unconstitutionality. Id. at 478-79. Petitioners raise two constitutional objections to secs. 800.09 and 800.095, Stats. They contend that: (1) ch. 800 suspensions constitute an unlawful exercise of police power and, therefore, violate due process; and (2) ch. 800 suspensions are excessive fines in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, sec. 6 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The test to determine whether secs. 800.09 and 800.095, Stats., constitute an unlawful use of police power and violate due process, is whether these statutes are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 130, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989). Driver license suspensions imposed under ch. 800 are a form of coercive action designed to compel the contemnor to take affirmative and corrective action to remain in compliance with an existing court order. This particular grant of authority was first extended to municipal courts by 1987 Wis. Act 389. Under prior law, the only sanction available for nonpayment of a fine, was to order the individual to jail. The legislative purpose in amending the law, as stated in the Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis attached to the bill, was to add new procedures and options if a defendant fails to pay a judgment. [13] We conclude that the purpose of providing municipal courts with additional procedures and options, and particularly the option of suspending a driver's license, is rationally related to (1) the legitimate interest the state has in securing compliance with orders issued by its courts; and (2) the grant of authority is a valid exercise of the state's power to regulate for the health, welfare and safety of its citizens. [14] Further, ch. 800 suspensions ensure procedural due process because the sanction is not imposed unless all of the following occur: (1) the defendant is notified that failure to pay the fine within 60 days after payment is ordered may result in suspension; (2) the suspension is rescinded and the operating privilege reinstated once the fine is paid; (3) the suspension will not be enforced against any individual who is able to demonstrate an inability, for good cause or indigence, to pay the fine; and (4) the suspension is limited in duration not to exceed 5 years. Section 800.09(1)(c), Stats. [15] Petitioners also argue that the practice of suspending drivers' licenses for failure to pay a fine violates the excessive fines clause of the state and federal constitutions. The gist of this argument is that a 5 year license suspension is unduly harsh when compared to the maximum penalties for persons convicted, as they were, of Class B misdemeanors. The maximum penalties petitioners refer to are a $1,000 fine or 90 days confinement or both. Petitioners fail to explain, why a suspension that will be rescinded upon payment of an outstanding fine is excessive when compared with a larger fine or with a loss of liberty for 3 months, or both. Petitioners also attempt to demonstrate the lack of proportionality by pointing out that the other offenses for which five year suspensions are authorized are homicide and hit and run. We think this argument misses the point. Unlike ch. 800 suspensions, which are purgeable, and therefore remain in effect only until such time as the fine is paid, suspensions under sec. 343.31(3)(c), (d)4 and (j) are not purgeable; once imposed, they last for the full 5 years. The distinguishing feature of ch. 800 suspensions is that it is only enforced for the full term if the individual who is subject to the fine continues to refuse to pay the amount due. Accordingly, we find no merit to petitioners' argument that ch. 800 suspensions are excessive. [16] For the reasons set forth above, we hold that, pursuant to the specifically applicable statutes, secs. 800.09 and 800.095, Stats., municipal courts have the statutory authority to suspend drivers' licenses for failure to pay non-traffic related fines imposed for municipal ordinance violations. Further, we hold that this grant of authority is constitutional. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.