Opinion ID: 2351686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Provide Relevant Discovery and/or Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Text: The defendant's last issue on appeal concerns the claim that his constitutional rights were violated because the state failed to provide him with relevant discovery and/or failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. More specifically, defendant asserts that the state should have provided the shirt that the victim wore during the incident and that allegedly was ripped by defendant. Detective Perkins, a witness for the defense, testified at trial that he did not seize any shirt from the victim during his investigation of the incident, nor did he mention the victim's clothing in his report. In fact, the issue of the allegedly ripped shirt first was brought out by defense counsel during cross-examination of the victim. The state is required to produce exculpatory evidence. The duty of the state to produce evidence favorable to the accused is grounded in the guarantee of due process in a criminal trial and imposes an obligation on the prosecution to produce evidence that is `material either to guilt or punishment,' even in the absence of a request by the accused. State v. Chalk, 816 A.2d 413, 418 (R.I.2002) (quoting Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 880 (R.I.2001) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). The first factor we look at in the due-process inquiry is the reason for the nondisclosure. Id. Rhode Island applies the deliberate suppression standard to issues of this kind. Id. at 418-19. A deliberate suppression exists when the prosecution makes `a considered decision to suppress    for the purpose of obstructing' or where it fails to `disclose evidence whose high value to the defense could not have escaped    [its] attention.' Id. at 419 (quoting Cronan, 774 A.2d at 880). We conclude that in the present case Det. Perkins had no reason to seize the shirt and, therefore, the state cannot be compelled to produce it. Thus, the state did not make a deliberate or considered decision to suppress the shirt. In her statement to the police, Sarah never mentioned that her shirt had been ripped. Nor does it appear that she was asked about her clothing by the detective. Indeed, the first indication that her shirt had been ripped was during her responses to counsel's questions on cross-examination in the following exchange: Q. [Defendant's attorney] Okay. Were any of your clothes damaged in any way? A. [Sarah] No. Q. [Defendant's attorney] No rips or tears? A. [Sarah] I heard a rip in my shirt when he lifted it up. Q. [Defendant's attorney] That's your best memory is the shirt was ripped? A. [Sarah] I heard it rip. I don't know if it was actually ripped. Yes. I was wearing my Dallas Cowboy[s] shirt, and it was ripped right here. The defendant fails to articulate any reason why the police should have seized the shirt, much less why the shirt was of such a high value to defendant that it could not have escaped the state's attention. We conclude, therefore, that, as in Chalk, the nondisclosure of the alleged evidence in the present case falls into the category of absolutely unintentional [and] inadvertent. Chalk, 816 A.2d at 419 (quoting In re Ouimette, 115 R.I. 169, 179, 342 A.2d 250, 255 (1975)). In cases of inadvertent nondisclosures such as this one, we then consider the prejudicial effect of the nondisclosure. Chalk, 816 A.2d at 419 (citing State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 905 (R.I.2001)). When a nondisclosure is unintentional, [t]he burden of establishing procedural prejudice    lies with defendant. Oliveira, 774 A.2d at 905 (quoting State v. Squillante, 622 A.2d 474, 478 (R.I.1993)). [I]n order `[t]o demonstrate procedural prejudice on appeal, defendant must show that had the information been disclosed, there is a likelihood that trial counsel    could have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of one or more jurors to avoid conviction.' Id. (quoting State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180, 187 (R.I.1994)). In the present case, the defendant never made such a showing. The defendant asserts that the shirt, if it was not ripped, would have served to impeach the victim's testimony. Conversely, the defendant asserts that if the shirt had been produced in a ripped condition, this would have demonstrated that the police did not thoroughly investigate the allegations against the defendant. We do not subscribe to the defendant's reasoning. The sexual assault and its harrowing aftermath that Sarah described does not lose any of its depravity if the defendant did not, in addition, rip her shirt. The jury convicted the defendant on the basis of testimony at trial, testimony that it necessarily found credible. We do not agree that an intact shirt, showing that the defendant did not rip Sarah's clothing, would have served to create a doubt in the minds of one or more jurors that the alleged touching did not occur. Sarah's own testimony on this point was imprecise and somewhat equivocal. Moreover, we cannot assume that evidence of a ripped shirt at trial would have served any purpose other than to affirm in the jurors' minds the conviction that the defendant did, in fact, sexually molest Sarah. With respect to his second assertion, the mere fact that the police failed to seize the shirt was sufficient for the defendant to attempt to cast aspersions upon the thoroughness of the investigation. The defendant has not demonstrated to us how such an attempt would have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of one or more jurors. Rather, it is our conviction that his allegation of error in this regard lacks merit.