Opinion ID: 799956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Agent Carpio's Lay Witness Testimony

Text: During trial, the government introduced evidence linking Valdivia to one of the two phone numbers found in Giovani Castro's possession at the time of his arrest, which referenced only the name Jos. That evidence included, inter alia, testimony from the issuing phone company's custodian of records, who explained that while the account's subscriber was an inconsequential third party, its registered user name was in fact Jos Valdivia. In an effort to undermine this link to his client, defense counsel subsequently cross-examined Special Agent Carpio concerning the fact that a second phone number, found in the possession of another of De Sousa's couriers, was ascribable to a Jos with a different surnameone José Camilo. On redirect examination, the prosecutor and Carpio engaged in the following colloquy over the objection of defense counsel: Prosecutor: According to your experience as a narcotics investigator, how ... does a telephone number registered in the name of a person compare with the practice of money traffickers of putting their telephone numbers in the names of third parties? S.A. Carpio: Based on my training and experience, whenever traffickers utilize cell phones, they try to disguise names by placing it into somebody else's name, or there are phone companies that allow you to give names without any proper identification. Therefore, masking the real user of the telephone. Valdivia now challenges the admission of this testimony on two grounds: (1) that the district court erred in permitting Carpio to cross the line from fact witness to expert witness without the appropriate qualification and prior notice, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(G), 26(a)(2); and (2) that even if Carpio's statements were properly characterized and admitted as expert testimony, they constituted unwarranted and unreasonable use of [such] testimony about matters within the ordinary comprehension of jurors. We review the admission of lay opinion and expert testimony for manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 83 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Montas, 41 F.3d 775, 783 (1st Cir.1994). The admissibility of lay opinion testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which provides: If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of [opinions or inferences] is limited to [those which are] (a) rationally based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Fed.R.Evid. 701 (emphasis added). Valdivia claims primarily that, as scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, Carpio's testimony contravenes prong (c) of Rule 701. That prong, appended to the rule by amendment in 2000, was intended to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing. Fed.R.Evid. 701, Advisory Committee's note to the 2000 amendments. While such sentiment is expedient in the abstract, the line between expert testimony under Rule 702 and lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 is, in practice, not [an] easy [one] to draw. United States v. Colón Osorio, 360 F.3d 48, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Hilario-Hilario, 529 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir.2008) (There is no bright-line rule to separate lay opinion from expert witness testimony.). Indeed, as we have previously noted, the same witnessfor example, a law enforcement officermay be qualified to `provide both lay and expert testimony in a single case.' United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 701, Advisory Committee's note). The statements proffered by Special Agent Carpio, however, do not straddle that hazy line, but rather fall comfortably within the boundaries of permissible lay opinion testimony. It required no scientific or technical expertise within the scope of Rule 702 for Carpio to conclude, based on his experience in prior drug investigations, that traffickers often list unrelated third parties as their telephones' subscribers, and that, in this case, the phone account at issue was organized under a similar scheme. Such testimony was a product of Carpio's requisite personal knowledge, see Fed.R.Evid. 602, and also met the requirements of Rule 701, because it was derived from particularized knowledge that [Carpio had obtained] by virtue of his ... position as a drug enforcement agent tasked with investigating the De Sousa narcotics ring, Fed.R.Evid. 701, Advisory Committee's note. The district court therefore properly exercised its considerable discretion in admitting Carpio's testimony pursuant to Rule 701. See United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 24 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that an officer's testimony that, based on his experience, certain post it notes were likely drug orders and the number 4 likely referred to a quantity of the drug found by law enforcement did not cross the line to become expert testimony); Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d at 29 (finding that an officer's testimony that heroin seized at drug points was typically packed in aluminum decks and that the heroin seized in the case was packaged in such decks was Rule 701 testimony). That Carpio's testimony was of the lay opinion variety necessarily precludes Valdivia's second argument, that the use of an expert was improper. Because the argument also fails on the merits, however, we will address it briefly. We have held, as Valdivia notes, that where expert testimony on a subject is well within the bounds of a jury's ordinary experience, the risk of unfair prejudice outweighing probative value is not improbable. See Montas, 41 F.3d at 781-84. In essence, the appearance of an expert's imprimatur upon the government's theory might unduly influence the jury's assessment of the inference being urged. Id. at 783-84. We are not faced with such a scenario here. For one thing, the challenged testimony was elicited by the government in direct response to defense counsel's line of questioning. The appellant, under the circumstances presented, cannot earnestly question the government's attempt to re-forge inferential links that he himself sought to sever. More importantly, the testimony was not so obviously within the jury's bounds of knowledge as to negate all probative value. The average juror may not be aware that some phone companies permit account subscriptions without the presentation of identification, nor might some jurors know that such a scheme is a common tactic for drug traffickers to conceal their identities. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.