Opinion ID: 1678594
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Heading: Interrogation after a Request to Remain Silent

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his statement on the ground that the officers had not respected his exercise of his right to remain silent under Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. He argues further that the statement was taken in violation of the Supreme Court's holding in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), because the officers failed to scrupulously honor his request to remain silent and not make a statement. We disagree. In reviewing a trial judge's ruling on a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, and we reverse only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Tabor v. State, 333 Ark. 429, 971 S.W.2d 227 (1998). The credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing about the circumstances surrounding the appellant's in-custody confession is for the trial judge to determine, and we defer to the superior position of the trial judge in matters of credibility. Id. Conflicts in the testimony are for the trial judge to resolve, and the judge is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, especially that of the accused since he or she is the person most interested in the outcome of the proceedings. Id. So long as there is no evidence of coercion, a statement made voluntarily may be admissible against an accused even though he once previously refused to make a statement. Harvey v. State, 292 Ark. 267, 729 S.W.2d 406 (1987). In Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, the Supreme Court held that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his `right to cut off questioning' was `scrupulously honored.' (Footnote omitted.) The Court explained: A reasonable and faithful interpretation of the Miranda opinion must rest on the intention of the Court in that case to adopt fully effective means ... to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored.... 384 U.S., at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The critical safeguard identified in the passage at issue is a person's right to cut off questioning. Id., at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Through the exercise of his option to terminate questioning he can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. The requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person's exercise of that option counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. Id. at 103-104, 96 S.Ct. 321. Under Mosley, there are three factors for determining whether the police scrupulously honored the defendant's right of silence: (1) whether the police immediately ceased the interrogation upon defendant's request; (2) whether they resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and provided a fresh set of Miranda warnings; and (3) whether they restricted the later interrogation to a crime that had not been the subject of the first interrogation. Hatley v. Lockhart, 990 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir.1993). The leading Arkansas case on this issue is Hatley v. State, 289 Ark. 130, 709 S.W.2d 812 (1986). There, the defendant, sixteen-year-old Benny Hatley, was arrested for the capital murder of two police officers. The arresting officer advised Hatley of his rights, but Hatley declined to make a statement. Hatley was then immediately taken to a cell. Two hours later, Hatley was brought out of his cell for trace-metal tests. Another officer approached Hatley and said: I'm Bill Gage with the State Police. Benny, you're in a lot of trouble. You want to tell me about it? Hatley replied, Yes sir, I'll talk to you. Officer Gage then advised Hatley of his individual Miranda rights, after which Hatley confessed to killing the two officers. Before discussing the merits of the appeal, this court pointed out that the Court rejected a literal reading of Miranda that would require a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances. Id. at 133, 709 S.W.2d at 814 (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102, 96 S.Ct. 321). Additionally, this court concluded that the Court's emphasis on interrogation about a different crime was misplaced, and that the important consideration is the strict adherence to its dictates of scrupulously honoring the defendant's right to remain silent. Id. at 135, 709 S.W.2d at 815. This court held: To scrupulously honor the defendant's right to cut off questioning means simply that once the defendant has invoked his right to remain silent, his will to exercise that right will remain undisturbed; there must be no attempt to undermine his will and he must be secure in the knowledge he is under no compulsion to respond to any questions. Such a determination will, of course, depend on the facts in each case relative to the conduct of the police and of the defendant. Id. Based upon the facts of that case, this court concluded that Hatley's rights had not been violated: There is nothing to suggest there were efforts to wear down his resistance or to prevail on him to change his mind. When Hatley was brought to the station there was not even an attempt to question him after the Miranda warnings were given, and Gage's comment to him two hours later in the radio room was the first and only time Hatley was asked whether he had anything to say regarding the charges. Having been fully informed that he had a right to remain silent, Hatley readily responded that he did wish to talk and the single fact that he had volunteered the earlier comment when the Miranda warnings were given cannot and should not void a statement clearly shown to have been made willingly. We note, too, that Hatley's detention prior to Gage's question was about two hours, of sufficient length to produce more than a momentary lull before being approached again, thus avoiding the effects of repeated questioning. See Anderson [ v. Smith ], [751 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.1984)], and Mosley, [423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313]. Yet the interval was not so long as to produce an inference that his cooperation was the result of lengthy incommunicado detention. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.1976). Nor do we think Gage's comment objectionable. It was direct and reasonable stating only the obvious, but lacking the quality of coercion and threat found in [ United States v. ] Olof, [527 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1975)]. Id. at 135-36, 709 S.W.2d at 815-16 (emphasis added). Based upon the particular facts of this case, we conclude that there was no violation of Appellant's rights under Miranda . After Appellant initially requested to remain silent, the police officers immediately ceased interrogation and no further inquiry was made by them. Approximately one hour passed before Appellant was approached by different officers wishing to inquire of Appellant about a separate crime. These officers provided a fresh set of Miranda warnings. Appellant signed the rights form, agreeing to waive his right to remain silent. When they asked Appellant if he wanted to answer some questions, Appellant replied by asking them what they wanted to know. Appellant was then allowed to hand-pick the officer he wished to speak with, one that he already knew would not be mean. The fact that during their inquiry the subject of this crime arose is unimportant, as this court previously determined in Hatley, 289 Ark. 130, 709 S.W.2d 812, that the Supreme Court's emphasis upon interrogation of a different crime was misplaced. Other than Appellant's own self-serving statements, which conflicted with his statements given on tape, there was no uncontroverted evidence that Appellant had been coerced or promised anything by the officers, or that there was any attempt to undermine his will after he had initially chosen to remain silent. Moreover, it is of no consequence to Appellant that some of the officers' testimony conflicted on the issue of whether any attempts had been made to contact his mother. As stated previously, the trial judge determines the credibility of the witnesses and is thus free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of any witness. We thus conclude that there was no violation of Appellant's constitutional rights because the police officers scrupulously honored his initial request to remain silent.