Opinion ID: 1431348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: lack of sufficient description in complaint.

Text: Rule 71.1(c)(2), W.R.C.P., provides in part:    The complaint shall contain a short and plain statement of the authority for the taking, the use for which the property is to be taken, a description of the property sufficient for its identification, the interests to be acquired, and as to each separate piece of property, a designation of the defendants who have been joined as owners thereof of some interest therein, together with their residences, if known, and whether the plaintiff demands immediate possession or desires to continue in possession.    (Emphasis supplied.) In its complaint, appellant recites the ownership by appellees Grieves of the SW 1/4, Sec. 17; S 1/2, Sec. 18; NE 1/4, Sec. 19; and NW 1/4, Sec. 20, T. 42 N., R. 64 W., 6th P.M. and S 1/2, Sec. 13 and N 1/2, Sec. 24, T. 42 N., R. 65 W., 6th P.M.; and by appellees Graham and Neal and Hazel Reisland of SE 1/4, Sec. 14; NE 1/4 NE 1/4, Sec. 23, and NW 1/4 NW 1/4, Sec. 24, T. 42 N., R. 65 W., 6th P.M., all in Weston County. It then alleges: 6  There are roads located on the property described in paragraphs four and five which are used by oil producers and connect with Weston County Road No. 5. These roads cross, touch or are in very close proximity to the leases and property described in paragraph two of this complaint. It is not possible to provide a description of the roads because of their winding character. Plaintiff will introduce exhibits to demonstrate the locations. The complaint contains no further or other description of the property to be taken. The last sentence in paragraph 6 of the complaint, supra, is a direct rejection of the requirement of Rule 71.1(c)(2) that a description of the property be set forth in the complaint. It would possibly be sufficient to attach a map-to-scale as an exhibit to the complaint, but to make the condemnees speculate as to whether the taking would be 100 square feet or 25,000,000 square feet until confronted with the specifics at the hearing is not sufficient. The purpose of the requirement is two fold. One, it allows preparation for a consideration by the court and by the condemnees of the issues of proper purpose, subjectivity of property, quantum and necessity for the appropriation; and second, it provides the condemnees with an opportunity to assess the damages to be occasioned by the taking so that an intelligent decision can be made concerning the necessity of filing an answer and so that potential witnesses can be obtained to assess the damages occasioned by the taking. County of Orange v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 71 Misc.2d 691, 337 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1971); Monongahela Power Co. v. Shackelford, 137 W. Va. 441, 73 S.E.2d 809 (1952); 27 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain, § 396; 6A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 27.23 (1976). Unless the exact property to be taken and its location is known to such witnesses, they cannot begin their appraisal. Many times the condemnee settles out of court before the hearing when he receives the results of the appraisals made by his witnesses. In this instance, the map introduced at the hearing, on its face, seems to indicate the existence of access without condemnation to all of appellant's leases except the one in the SW 1/4 SE 1/4, Sec. 13, T. 42 N., R. 65 W., 6th P.M. It would seem, therefore, that access to this one area is the only access necessary to be obtained by condemnation, and it could be obtained by condemnation of the Grieves' property without that of the other appellees, or vice versa. If the map had been made an exhibit to the complaint, appellees could have prepared their evidence relative to the necessity of the taking along those lines. Without this information, they could not do so. [4]    Indeed, there is nothing more obviously essential to a petitioner's case than a sufficient description of that which it proposes to acquire. It cannot put on the defendant the burden of determining what or how much it requires to accomplish its purpose.    27 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain, § 396, p. 274 (1966). The contention that the description in the complaint was as specific as possible because permission to enter for making of surveys, etc. was denied to appellant by appellees is not well founded or plausible inasmuch as a simple application to the court for an order granting authority to enter for such purposes undoubtedly would have resulted in such an order. [5] The citations contained in the majority opinion, upon which it relies to conclude the adequacy of the description in this matter, actually contradict such conclusion. The references to 12 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 3044, p. 101 (1973), and 7 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 71A.40[4], p. 359 (1979), are to restatements therein of the language of the rule itself, i.e., a description of the property sufficient for its identification is required in the complaint. Wright & Miller, supra, makes reference to Official Form 29 as illustrative of a complaint form in a condemnation action. That form provides in part: 5. The property so to be taken is (here set forth a description of the property sufficient for its identification) or (described in Exhibit A hereto attached and made a part hereof). 12 Wright & Miller, supra, Appendix A, p. 331. As previously indicated, the description in the complaint does not meet this criteria and is not sufficient for    identification of the property. The quotation in the majority opinion from 6A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 27.23, pp. 27-37 to 27-39 (1976) is again a contradiction of the determination made by the majority of the court in this respect. Language in it, such as the following, reflects the complete inadequacy of the description in the complaint: `   The description in the complaint should be such that no difficulty will arise in framing the judgment by reference to such description without repeating it.' (An obvious impossibility in this case.) `   On the theory that the proceedings operate as a deed to transfer title, some authorities hold that the land should be described with as much certainty as would be necessary in a conveyance. Others hold sufficient a description from which a surveyor or someone familiar with the locality might locate the tract.   ' (The description in the complaint is insufficient under either theory.) `Although it has been said that the description must be definite enough so that the land can be ascertained without extrinsic evidence, it will usually be considered sufficient, although some investigation outside the description itself is necessary. Thus, if the allegations in the complaint together with a map make an intelligible description, it is sufficient. The map need not be physically attached, for it may be included by reference to a recorded map open to the defendant's inspection. But whether the map or plan is physically attached to the petition or not, the description must incorporate it by reference or the court will not take notice of it.   ' (Emphasis supplied.) (The outside investigation must have a specific starting place, which is completely lacking in the complaint.) The examples given in the quoted material from Nichols of sufficient general allegations; of designation by square number if all property within the square is included; metes and bounds with definite and certain termini; use of word about as non-impairment of certainty of description  none of these approach the generality of the description used in this complaint. Additionally, it is said at § 26.112, pp. 26-48.1  26-56 of 6 Nichols on Eminent Domain, that: The petition must contain an accurate description of the land sought to be taken, so that the extent of the claim will appear on the record. In the absence of an opportunity to amend the petition, failure in this respect will invalidate the proceeding. This description should be as accurate as is required in the case of a deed of land. At any rate it must be such that a surveyor could locate the parcel described without the aid of extrinsic evidence.    (Emphasis supplied.) and at § 26.1123, p. 26-65: Inasmuch as a petition containing the allegations required by law is the foundation upon which rests the jurisdiction of the court to entertain condemnation proceedings, insufficiency in the description of the land renders the entire proceeding void.    (Emphasis supplied.) Of course, an amended complaint can be used to cure a description defect, Rule 71.1(f), W.R.C.P., but the requirement of an adequate description in the complaint is a common-sense requirement and should be recognized as essential. The requirement for such is so basic to a condemnation proceeding as to be jurisdictional. It is a jurisdictional requirement that the land sought to be taken be described in the petition with such accuracy, and certainty as will enable it to be identified.    29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 269, p. 1105 (1965).    Failure in this respect is a violation of substantive due process and will vitiate the proceedings. [Citations.] Housing Authority v. Atlantic City Exposition, Inc., 62 N.J. 322, 301 A.2d 441, 444 (1973). See United States v. 5.324 Acres of Land, D.C.S.D.Cal., 79 F. Supp. 748 (1948); 6 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 26.1123, p. 26-65. And see quotations from 6 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra. Historically, an adequate description in the complaint has been required. [6] The complaint does not contain the required description. But then appellant's own words in the complaint recognize a disregard for the specific requirement of Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P. Appellant there said it is not possible to provide a description. It was possible. Other condemnors provide adequate descriptions under far more difficult conditions.