Opinion ID: 1296681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Means of Appeal or Review

Text: ¶ 40. Having determined that a juvenile may ask the juvenile court to reconsider a waiver order, but only until the filing of a criminal complaint, we are left with a second question: How may a juvenile obtain prompt review of a waiver into criminal court after the criminal court has assumed exclusive jurisdiction? ¶ 41. The parties agree that even after the criminal court has asserted exclusive jurisdiction, juveniles should have some means of raising new groundsnew factorsthat might have affected the juvenile court's waiver decision. They do not agree, however, on what options a juvenile has after criminal proceedings have commenced. [11] ¶ 42. We note initially two means of review that are not applicable after the criminal court assumes exclusive jurisdiction. First, the criminal court may not reconsider the juvenile court's decision to waive the juvenile into criminal court. As Chief Justice Dixon stated in 1868, The impropriety, I might say the utter absurdity, of applying to one court to restrain, modify or correct the orders or decrees of another court of coordinate jurisdiction, is also apparent. I think it is wholly inadmissible to do so. See H.N.T., 125 Wis. 2d at 252 (citing Platto v. Deuster, 22 Wis. 482, 484-85 (1868)). [12] ¶ 43. Second, a criminal court that has assumed jurisdiction as the result of a waiver from juvenile court may not return the juvenile to juvenile court by reverse waiver, under Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1m)(b). ¶ 44. Keeping in mind the types of review a juvenile may not seek in challenging a waiver order, we turn to what means of review a juvenile may utilize. [13] ¶ 45. First, the parties agree that a juvenile may pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.50, within 14 days of the waiver order. The juvenile may seek a stay of the juvenile court's waiver from the juvenile court to permit an interlocutory appeal before the juvenile court jurisdiction has transferred; and the juvenile may seek a stay of his or her case in criminal court to accommodate an appeal of the waiver order after the criminal court has assumed jurisdiction. Wis. Stat. § 808.07(2). [18] Nothing in the statute restricts the juvenile from filing an appeal under § 809.50 before or after the criminal court assumes jurisdiction, so long as the appeal is filed within 14 days after the issuance of the waiver order. Wis. Stat. § 809.50(1). Once the § 809.50 motion is filed, either the court of appeals or the circuit court with exclusive jurisdiction may grant a stay of proceedings pending appeal. Id. ¶ 46. Additionally, the juvenile may bring a direct appeal after conviction in criminal court. ¶ 47. The State asserts that a juvenile waived into adult court has only these two means of appealing the waiveran interlocutory appeal or a direct appeal after conviction. The State argues that reconsideration of a waiver order is unnecessary because a waiver hearing consistent with Wis. Stat. § 938.18 affords a juvenile all the fundamental fairness to which he or she is entitled, [19] and an interlocutory or a direct appeal affords sufficient appellate review. ¶ 48. Vairin acknowledges that he could have pursued an interlocutory appeal and could later file a direct appeal if he is convicted of a crime, but he asserts that neither type of appeal offers him an adequate remedy. Vairin points out that he is not claiming ineffective assistance of counsel or that the juvenile court erroneously exercised its discretion. Rather he is claiming the existence of new grounds not considered by the juvenile court. He argues that an interlocutory appeal would not accommodate such a claim. In addition, Vairin contends that a direct appeal would not be practical because it occurs only after conviction, and because a waiver order cannot be appealed after a juvenile defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea bargain. ¶ 49. We agree with Vairin that in many cases, an interlocutory appeal or a direct appeal is simply not an adequate remedy. [20] We further conclude that in some cases, particularly in small counties, the requirement that a juvenile appeal a waiver decision to the court of appeals is impractical. It is not difficult to imagine a judge in a single-judge county entering a waiver order as a juvenile court, and then, after assuming jurisdiction as a criminal court, learning of new evidence that would have changed his or her waiver decision. In such an instance, the judge might wish he or she could reconsider the waiver order, and transfer jurisdiction back to the juvenile court. Requiring an appeal to the court of appeals to afford a remedy would be absurd. Moreover, if 14 days had passed after waiver before new information came to light, the only remedy would be to wait for a direct appeal after the juvenile was convicted in criminal court. The appeal process embraced by the State would be unworkable in many cases. ¶ 50. We conclude that some meaningful remedy must be available when 14 days have passed since the waiver order, and a criminal complaint has been filed, but the juvenile wishes to raise new grounds not considered at the waiver hearing. ¶ 51. As we stated in D.H. v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 286, 292, 251 N.W.2d 196 (1977), [21] The transfer of the juvenile to the adult criminal process is a grave step, and there should be a way for the juvenile to obtain immediate review of the decision. [22] ¶ 52. We further stated in D.H. that: Review in cases where the juvenile court has waived jurisdiction must be speedy and efficient. Legislation could establish the necessary procedures but it does not. When an adequate remedy or forum does not exist to resolve disputes or provide due process, the courts, under the Wisconsin Constitution, can fashion an adequate remedy. Id. at 294 (quoting Hortonville Ed. Assn. v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 497, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975)). ¶ 53. Statutory authority already exists to transfer cases from criminal court to juvenile court, via reverse waiver. Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1m). Although the reverse waiver statute does not apply to this situation, it establishes that a reverse waiver concept is not unprecedented. Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18(7) is even more on point. Under this statute, a juvenile who has been waived to adult court after he or she absconded and failed to appear at the waiver hearing, may subsequently contest the waiver in criminal court. The juvenile may contest the waiver: by showing the court of criminal jurisdiction good cause for his or her failure to appear. If the criminal court finds good cause for the juvenile's failure to appear, it shall transfer jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48 for the purpose of holding the waiver hearing. Wis. Stat. § 938.18(7) (emphasis added). [14, 15] ¶ 54. We think that if a juvenile has compelling new grounds bearing on waiver, he or she may file a motion with the criminal court asking the court to relinquish its jurisdiction by transferring the matter to juvenile court. As grounds for the motion, the juvenile must allege a new factor that: (1) was not in existence at the time of the waiver decision or, if it was in existence, was unknowingly overlooked by all parties; [23] (2) is highly relevant to the criteria for waiver under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5); and (3) likely would have affected the juvenile court's determination that it would be contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of the public for the juvenile court to hear the case. [16-18] ¶ 55. After reviewing the motion, the criminal court may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing. If the court finds good cause, it may relinquish jurisdiction by transferring jurisdiction to the juvenile court. The juvenile may then file a motion for reconsideration of the waiver order with the juvenile court, which will have regained exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the motion. ¶ 56. The procedure we have outlined should be regarded as extraordinary. It should be strictly limited to compelling new factors. Previously considered or cumulative evidence may not form the basis of such a motion.