Opinion ID: 1471392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the period from december 31, 1990 to march 25, 1991

Text: On December 31, 1990, Circuit Judge Francis T. Donovan recused from the case and requested the Arkansas Judicial Department to appoint a new trial judge. This was necessary because Judge Donovan was leaving office and the other two judges in Faulkner County with criminal jurisdiction, the Honorable David Reynolds and the Honorable Watson Villines, would be disqualified from the case. Judge Reynolds had acted as deputy prosecuting attorney during Clements' first trial and Judge Villines was defense counsel in Clements' first trial. On March 25, 1991, the Honorable Floyd Lofton was assigned to hear the case. This period is excludable under Ark.R.Crim.P. 28.3(h) as a period of delay for good cause. The state could have done nothing further to expedite the trial during the time that Judge Donovan recused and Judge Lofton was appointed. This delay was necessary and reasonable under the circumstances. Appellant erroneously relies upon Art. 7, sections 21 and 22 of the Arkansas Constitution and Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 1 published in In Re: Changes to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Abolishment of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and Chancery Courts, and Publication of Administrative Orders, 294 Ark. 664, 742 S.W.2d 551 (1987) to argue that a special election to elect a judge should have been held. These provisions only apply when the circuit court judge's office is vacant at the commencement of the term of court or if the judge fails to attend or is disqualified. No special election was required in this case. The correct procedure of waiting until the Arkansas Judicial Department appointed Judge Lofton was followed. Therefore, this period is excludable.