Opinion ID: 484937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the purpose of the grand jury investigation

Text: 47 It is well established that a grand jury may not conduct an investigation for the primary purpose of helping the prosecution prepare indictments for trial. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d at 1273. The prosecutor at a trial, however, may use evidence incidentally gained from a grand jury primarily investigating other crimes. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d at 1273. Many authorities have recognized the difficulties involved in enforcing this rule. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Doe 455 F.2d at 1273; 8 Moore's Federal Practice Sec. 6.04 at 6-86-87 (2d ed. 1986). 48 The difficult problems posed by the rule derive from public policies in the grand jury context which sometimes stand in tension with one another. On the one hand, grand jury proceedings are granted a presumption of regularity. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 512-13, 63 S.Ct. 1233, 1237-38, 87 L.Ed. 1546 (1943). The grand jury is, in principle, an independent body, and its proceedings may not be policed in any detail. United States v. Doe at 1274. On the other hand, the possibility of the kind of prosecutorial abuse alleged in this case stems precisely from the broad leeway granted to the grand jury. In the presumptively independent grand jury,  'the government has at its disposal the most effective discovery mechanism yet devised.'  United States v. Doe at 1275 (quoting 8 Moore's Federal Practice Sec. 16.08 at 16-100 (2d ed. 1970)). Despite these difficulties, neither we nor other courts have shirked the responsibility of deciding the merits of challenges to grand jury proceedings like the one raised here. 49 No court, to our knowledge, has established a general test to guide such inquiries. Rather, courts have looked at the circumstances of particular cases in deciding the kind of showing that they would require either from the party challenging the grand jury or from the government. This does not mean that such an inquiry is purely a matter of factual determination concerning the intent of the prosecutors conducting the grand jury investigation, and thus subject to a clearly erroneous standard on review. Although a district court's finding must, of course, be accorded considerable respect and deference, 50 [t]he question of a grand jury's dominant purpose is not the typical question of historical fact nor even the typical inquiry as to the state of mind of a witness or a party. It is the application of a legal standard designed to ensure that the grand jury, a body operating peculiarly under court supervision [cites omitted], is not misused by the prosecutor for trial preparation. 51 Simels, 767 F.2d 26, 29. 52 The kinds of showings courts have required and the remedies they have considered vary greatly. In In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701 (1st Cir.1980), cited by the district court in this case, 626 F.Supp. at 1060 n. 6, a target of a grand jury investigation claimed that the grand jury was being used to collect evidence for use at trial. We rejected the claim and refused to require any special preliminary showing by the government. In Pantojas, however, the allegation was quite unsubstantiated, particularly since the individual making the allegation had not yet even been indicted. See id. at 704. 53 On the other side of the spectrum, a Michigan district court imposed a heavy burden on the prosecution to prove that its primary purpose in a grand jury investigation was not preparation for trial. See United States v. Kovaleski, 406 F.Supp. 267 (E.D.Mich.1976). Such a showing would have had to have been something more than even a full review of the grand jury transcript. The prosecution failed to make such a showing and the court prohibited a grand jury witness from testifying at the upcoming trial. See id. at 270-71. Cf. United States v. Finazzo, 407 F.Supp. at 1132 (court ordered government to furnish detailed in camera affidavit and an offer of proof so that court could determine what grand jury transcripts it would examine). 54 The claims and remedies we considered in United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270, fall between these two extremes. In Doe, the defendant based his claim that a grand jury was gathering evidence for an upcoming trial on three circumstances: a broadly-phrased indictment in California, ... a grand jury inquiry on the home ground of the movant [and] an identity of prosecutors in the two proceedings. Id. at 1275. The government had represented to the court that the Massachusetts grand jury was investigating other than the California crimes. We declined, on the basis of this evidence, to impose any remedy which would have opened up the grand jury proceedings to the movant on such generalized suspicion. We thus refused to require an affidavit in open court or to impose judicial review of questions posed to grand jury witnesses. Rather, we granted the limited remedy of ordering the transcripts of the Massachusetts grand jury made available to the California trial court and suggested several ways in which that court could make use of those transcriptsif it saw fit. See id. at 1276. We saw this remedy as consistent with our respect for the grand jury; we were also careful to avoid any suggestion of malevolent intent on the part of the prosecution. Rather, we found that given the circumstances of the case, [t]he difficulties [the prosecutors] face[d] in not confusing their roles, with the consequent potential for distortion of the role of the grand jury, cannot be dismissed as unreal. Id. at 1275. 55 Appellant argues that a similar potential for confusion and consequent distortion of roles exists here. The government has informed us of the continuing nature of its investigations, including that of the grand jury, into the activities of certain organizations. The defendants in the 1980 Pantojas case, we were told at oral argument, involved the same individuals as in the case before us. Appellant has set forth several circumstances, including the importance of travel in the Connecticut indictment and bail hearing, to show that such overlap could possibly result in the improper mixing of the investigations. The indictment involved the transport of money and of an individual, Victor Gerena, to Mexico and Cuba. The bail hearing stressed Fernandez' international contacts; the government had a witness read a document found at Fernandez' home which contained a list of points of contact in Mexico, Panama, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua and New York. In addition, appellant has alleged the involvement of the Puerto Rico United States Attorney's office in both cases and the involvement of Roberto Moreno, prosecutor in the current grand jury investigation, in pretrial proceedings and in the securing of authorization for wiretaps for the Connecticut case. 8 We have read the sealed affidavit the government has submitted to show that it is investigating crimes other than the robbery in Connecticut. The grand jury transcripts have not been offered for our examination. 56 Appellant has not had the opportunity to contest the sealed affidavit. We do not think that any such disclosure or the holding of a minitrial on appellant's claims would be appropriate. We do note, however, that such sealed affidavits are only relied upon in certain circumstances. As the court stated in In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (2d Cir.1977), [i]n camera proceedings are extraordinary events; the presumption is against such proceedings when rights of individuals are to be adjudicated. We need not enter into a lengthy discussion of the particular need for secrecy concerning the goal of the current grand jury investigation; nor need we consider what precise weight to accord a statement of a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning the activities of a federal grand jury. We think that a decision based solely on such a statement would have certain problematic implications here. Part of the government's argument in this case focused on the independence of the grand jury from the government's general prosecutorial strategies. Yet the government asks us to rely on an FBI agent's unchallenged testimony to prove that the grand jury is acting independently of the Justice Department. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F.Supp. 958, 967 (D.Mass.1985) (sealed affidavit not relied on when it was product of investigation of I.N.S. inspector, not of grand jury). Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 722 F.2d 303, 309 (6th Cir.1983) (sealed affidavit accepted containing evidence gathered by grand jury such as testimony of other witnesses), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246, 104 S.Ct. 3524, 82 L.Ed.2d 831 (1984); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 490 (2d Cir.1982) (upheld use of in camera submission after balancing interest in grand jury secrecy against movant's claim of privilege). 57 This case presents a close question under Doe. On balance, however, we decline to impose the Doe remedy here. The district judge in this case was intimately involved with various aspects of the investigations under challenge here. We assume that his decision was based on the knowledge of the total context of this case and not merely in reliance on one ex parte affidavit. We will, therefore, defer to his judgment that appellant is not entitled to a Doe -like remedy at this stage. 58 Of course, if the Connecticut district court should at some future time wish to make its own in camera examination of the transcript of the questioning of overlapping witnesses or of the presentation of overlapping subpoena material before the Puerto Rico grand jury, we will expect the district court of Puerto Rico to order that these be made available. 59 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded. 60