Opinion ID: 2630130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: W.R.Cr.P. 41(e)

Text: [¶ 15] Mr. DeLoge initiated this case with a motion under W.R.Cr.P. 41(e) for return of his property. The district court denied his motion and granted the State's motion to close the case, ruling that it did not have authority under Rule 41(e) to order Mississippi authorities to return Mr. DeLoge's property. The denial of a motion for return of property under Rule 41(e) is usually reviewed for abuse of discretion, DeLoge III, ¶ 22, 156 P.3d at 1011. However, because the district court concluded it did not have the legal authority, i.e., jurisdiction, to order Mississippi officials to return Mr. DeLoge's property, our standard of review on this issue is de novo. See, William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, ¶ 9, 206 P.3d 722, 726 (Wyo.2009); Coleman v. State, 2005 WY 69, ¶ 11, 115 P.3d 411, 413-14 (Wyo. 2005). [¶ 16] Arguing that the district court's denial of his motion for return of property was erroneous, Mr. DeLoge cites to cases regarding a court's authority over property, res, seized as evidence in a criminal case which do not discuss Rule 41 or comparable rules. For example, Mr. DeLoge directs us to United States v. $79,123.49 in United States Cash and Currency, 830 F.2d 94 (7th Cir.1987). In that case, Wisconsin law enforcement seized the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction and initiated a forfeiture action. Subsequently, federal authorities filed for forfeiture of the same funds and took possession of the funds pursuant to a federal warrant. In resolving whether the state or federal authorities had authority over the funds, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, ruled the court which first assumed jurisdiction over the property could exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. Id. at 96. Although interesting, the decision in that case did not address Rule 41 and, consequently, is inapposite. [¶ 17] Because Rule 41(e) is similar to F.R.Cr.P. 41(g), [2] we look to federal precedent to guide our analysis as to whether the district court had authority to order property located in Mississippi returned to Mr. DeLoge. Bromley v. State, 2009 WY 133, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 110, 115 (Wyo.2009). As a general rule, a court does not have jurisdiction to grant a Rule 41 motion for return of the property when the evidence establishes that the governmental defendant no longer has possession of the property. Clymore v. United States, 415 F.3d 1113, 1120 (10th Cir.2005). See also, Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir.2003). [¶ 18] A Seventh Circuit case, Stevens v. United States, 530 F.3d 502 (7th Cir.2008), applies the general rule to facts remarkably similar to the case at bar. In the course of investigating an armed robbery, law enforcement searched Mr. Stevens' residence and seized many items. He was convicted of federal drug and firearms offenses. After the appellate court affirmed his conviction, he filed a motion demanding return of the seized property. Id. at 503. The district court denied Mr. Stevens' motion based upon the government's representation that it no longer possessed any of the seized items. The government did not, however, support its explanation of the status of the property with any evidence. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that Rule 41 permits recovery only of property in possession of the federal government; therefore, if the government no longer possessed the property at issue, no relief was available. However, like in the case at bar, the court remanded for an evidentiary hearing. It stated that the determination of whether the government possessed the property was a question of fact and actual evidence, rather than the government's unsupported argument, was needed to determine the factual question. Id. at 503-04. See also, United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374 (3rd Cir. 1999) and Rufu v. United States, 20 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir.1994) (ruling district court must hold evidentiary hearing to determine whether government retained possession of property). [¶ 19] On remand, the district court again denied Mr. Stevens' motion for return of property on the basis that the evidence established the government no longer possessed the property. Stevens, 530 F.3d at 504. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, stating: On remand from Stevens II, the district court concluded, based on the Government's undisputed evidence, that the Government no longer possessed Mr. Stevens' property. Because the district court found that the Government was not in possession of any of Mr. Stevens' property, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Stevens' Rule 41(g) motion. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the district court. Id. at 506. See also, United States v. Copeman, 458 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that Rule 41(g) generally did not give a federal court authority to order return of the defendant's property when it was in possession of state authorities). [¶ 20] Although the analysis is somewhat different, the Vermont Supreme Court reached a result consistent with Stevens in State v. Wetherbee, 177 Vt. 274, 866 A.2d 527 (2004). Vermont's Rule 41(e) varies some from the Wyoming rule but it provides a similar procedure for a defendant to request return of property seized by law enforcement. Id. at 530. Responding to the defendant's argument that the court had power over property that the state had transferred to the federal government, the Vermont Supreme Court stated that a motion for the return of property pursuant to Rule 41(e) is essentially a replevin action that lies exclusively against the State ... [and][i]t is well settled that a party demanding possession cannot maintain a replevin action against a defendant who, at the time the action is instituted, is not in possession of or cannot exercise control over the property sought. Id. at 534 (citations omitted). Describing the procedure as a race to the res, the court ruled that the court's jurisdiction under Rule 41 is limited to property in possession of the state. Thus, [a] person seeking return of property under the rule must file a motion before the State transfers possession to the federal government. Once the transfer takes place, the race is lost. The person seeking return of property must then do so in the federal forum because the res is no longer in the possession of a party before the court and consequently is not present in the jurisdiction. Id. at 535. [¶ 21] Applying the rationale from Stevens and Wetherbee to the circumstances presented here, we conclude that the district court properly denied Mr. DeLoge's motion. The undisputed evidence established that Mr. DeLoge filed his motion for return of property after the State had already transferred his property to another sovereign, the State of Mississippi, and the property was still in possession of Mississippi authorities. The district court did not, therefore, have jurisdiction under Rule 41(e) to order that it be returned to him. [¶ 22] After the district court ruled that it did not have authority to grant Mr. DeLoge's motion for return of his property, Mr. DeLoge asked for compensation for his loss. There is a split among federal courts with regard to whether Rule 41 gives the court authority to grant monetary damages for the government's loss or destruction of a defendant's property. In Clymore, 415 F.3d at 1120, the Tenth Circuit reviewed case law from across the country and concluded: We agree with the majority of the circuits and conclude sovereign immunity bars monetary relief in a Rule 41(e) proceeding when the government no longer possesses the property. Neither Mora [v. United States, 955 F.2d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 1992)] nor [ United States v.] Martinson [809 F.2d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir.1987)] addressed sovereign immunity. Rather, their holdings rested in large part on equitable considerations. However, fairness or policy reasons cannot by themselves waive sovereign immunity. United States v. $30,006.25 in U.S. Currency, 236 F.3d 610, 614 (10th Cir.2000) (holding sovereign immunity prohibited an award of prejudgment interest to the claimant upon the return of his property). Based on the above, to the extent the government is no longer in possession of the property and Clymore seeks monetary relief, sovereign immunity bars his claim. See also, Okoro, 324 F.3d at 491. [¶ 23] As the Tenth Circuit stated, there are cases allowing monetary damages under F.R.Cr.P. 41, however, they do not discuss the impact of sovereign immunity and our review reveals another distinction. In many of those cases, law enforcement destroyed the property after the defendant had filed his motion for return of his property. For example, in United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir.1987), Mr. Martinson's antique rifles were seized after he was improperly jailed on an invalid warrant. He filed a motion for return of his property pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 41(e). [3] After his motion was filed, the government destroyed the guns. The government argued that Mr. Martinson's motion was moot because it no longer had possession of the guns. Id. at 1366-68. [¶ 24] The Ninth Circuit ruled that the motion was not moot and the court had equitable power to award damages to compensate the defendant for his lost property. The opinion stated: If we were to allow the government to moot a motion for return of property by giving the property away or destroying it, we would be encouraging ... unilateral nonjudicial conduct. Id. at 1368. Thus, it was clear that the court condemned the government's attempt to undermine the court's authority to order return of the property when it destroyed it after the defendant had already filed his Rule 41 motion. See also, Soviero v. United States, 967 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.1992) (motion for return of property under F.R.Cr.P. 41(e) not rendered moot by government's destruction of property after it had been ordered to show cause why property should not be returned). Under such circumstances, the award of damages could be considered as a sanction for the government's intentional disregard of the court's authority to order the property be returned to a claimant/defendant. [¶ 25] The undisputed facts in the case at bar show that, in 2000, Mr. DeLoge's property was transferred from the Cheyenne Police Department to an FBI agent who then transferred it to Mississippi authorities. Mr. DeLoge filed his Rule 41(e) motion for return of property in 2003. Pursuant to the district court's order in 2007, the State contacted Mississippi authorities to request an itemized list of all property in their possession. The Mississippi authorities did not cooperate, and the State filed its motion to close the case. There is no indication in the facts that the State acted to dispose of Mr. DeLoge's property after he filed his motion for return of property. Therefore, the equitable considerations raised in some of the federal cases do not apply. [¶ 26] Moreover, we agree with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Clymore and conclude that the concept of sovereign immunity applies to Mr. DeLoge's request for an award of damages. Although Mr. DeLoge argues that the State of Wyoming may have waived immunity under these circumstances, there is no indication that he has filed a governmental claim pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101 through 121 (LexisNexis 2009), as required in order to recover damages from the state coffers. We see no basis in Rule 41(e) or the Governmental Claims Act for the mandatory claims procedure to be ignored. Thus, the district court correctly denied Mr. DeLoge's request for damages because his claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.