Opinion ID: 931960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Guilty Plea in the Forged Passport Scheme

Text: Tien next argues that his plea in the forged passport case was insufficient because (1) the district court erred by “incorporating” Tien’s answers from his plea to the bribery charges into the record of his plea to the passport scheme charges, and (2) that the District Court failed to establish that the plea was knowing and voluntary, omitting the requirements of Rule 11(b)(1) and (2), and “focus[ing only] on 12 those events that are relevant to this charge.” (A-333.) The Government did not address this issue in its brief. Unlike the first plea, the district court in this plea failed to ask any questions about the medicine Tien was taking. This is especially glaring because the district court learned at a plea just sixteen months earlier that Tien was on myriad medications. As discussed above, when a court learns that a defendant is on medications, it must determine on the record that they are not interfering with the defendant’s understanding of the plea. The district court failed to (1) ascertain whether Tien was still taking the medications he reported taking sixteen months earlier, (2) ask about the effects of Tien’s medications, and (3) conduct an inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind. As a result, Tien did not have the opportunity to express confusion or demonstrate an inability to render a knowing and voluntary plea. Additionally, Rule 11(b)(1) is not satisfied by reference to an earlier plea. Even if the first plea were adequate, it is not always the situation that a knowing and voluntary plea in one case necessarily means the second plea will occur under the same circumstances. Here, the district court improperly conflated the proceedings, assuming the defendant was taking the same medications at the time of the next plea, and that he 13 remembered the proceedings from the plea that happened sixteen months earlier. In vacating Tien’s plea in the forgery case, this Court holds that the district court committed plain error. First, as the Rossillo court has made clear, failure to inquire into the effects of medications on a defendant’s state of mind is a substantial defect calling into question the validity of the plea, see Rossillo, 853 F.2d at 1066. Second, we conclude that there is a reasonable probability that Tien would not have entered the plea if Tien’s medications and comprehension had been properly examined. Indeed, had Tien provided answers similar to those he provided in the first plea, such as that he understood only about fifty percent of what was happening, the district court should have rejected the plea. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Tien had already filed a motion to withdraw his prior plea. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s error affected Tien’s substantial rights. Finally, we find that the fact that the District Court stated that it believed the Appellant understood what was happening because it observed Tien is insufficient. The Supreme Court and this Court have both held that a plea will not be considered voluntary when a district court “resorts to 14 ‘assumptions’ not based upon recorded responses to his inquiries.” McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 467; see also Rossillo, 853 F.2d at 1065 (Rule 11 violated where district judge “assumed” defendant’s medication did not interfere with defendant’s ability to comprehend proceedings). In finding plain error, we note that this Circuit has “adopted a standard of strict adherence to Rule 11,” United States v. Lora, 895 F.2d 878, 880 (2d Cir. 1990), and “therefore . . . ‘we examine critically even slight procedural deficiencies to ensure that the defendant’s guilty plea was a voluntary and intelligent choice, and that none of the defendant’s substantial rights ha[s] been compromised.’” United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1520 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Parkins, 25 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1994)).