Opinion ID: 518486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of Moot Motions on Speedy Trial Act Calculations

Text: 22 On December 5 the district court ruled that all pending motions were rendered moot on October 22 when the third indictment was filed. 9 As a result, appellants argue that the entire time during which the motions were pending is nonexcludable. Essentially, they submit that the district court's December 5 ruling should be given a nunc pro tunc effect, thereby mooting the motions as of the date they were filed and rendering them irrelevant to any Speedy Trial Act calculations. Appellants cite no authority for their proposition equating mootness with nonexistence, and conceptually, there is no reason to give retroactive effect to the ruling. 23 Furthermore, appellants' argument is belied by the record. The court ultimately ruled on the very motions appellants contend never existed. 10 Additionally, on December 18, the court purportedly reinstated various pretrial motions. Thus, the record supports the conclusion that at most, the motions were merely rendered inactive on October 22. Therefore, the time prior to and including this date was properly excluded under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)(1)(F).