Opinion ID: 605
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Award of Liquidated Damages

Text: Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the district court calculated a net back pay figure for each of the maids and then doubled this figure to arrive at each maid's total award. Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that [a]ny employer who violates [§§ 206 and 207] ... shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Sabhnanis argue that the § 216(b) liquidated damages provision does not apply to restitution awards under 18 U.S.C. § 1593. We disagree. Section 1593 provides that a sentencing court shall order restitution in the full amount of the victim's losses, which the statute defines to include the greater of the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim's services or labor or the value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime guarantees of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.). 18 U.S.C. § 1593(b)(3). The question here is whether § 216(b)'s provision for liquidated damages counts as part of the value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime guarantees of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. We think it does. Three points are significant about the statutory language. First, § 1593's reference to FLSA does not limit the minimum wage and overtime guarantees that determine the value of the victim's labor solely to §§ 206 and 207, the specific provisions of FLSA setting out the definitions of minimum wage and overtime and when they apply. This suggests that statutory provisions other than §§ 206 and 207 are relevant in determining what FLSA's minimum wage and overtime guarantees are. [18] Second, § 216(b)'s double damages provision is triggered automatically by a violation of §§ 206 or 207, so that an employer who violates these provisions  shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation ... and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). Third, § 216(b) is explicitly and exclusively tied to violations of the minimum wage and overtime rules in §§ 206 and 207. These points strongly suggest to us that the value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime guarantees [of FLSA], for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1593, includes the liquidated damages mandated by § 216. The Sabhnanis have one principal argument to the contrary. Section 260 of FLSA provides that when an employer shows that the conduct giving rise to a FLSA violation was undertaken in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his conduct was not unlawful, the court may, in its sound discretion lessen or dispense with the liquidated damages award. 29 U.S.C. § 260. Based on this provision, the Sabhnanis contend that a liquidated damages award is not part of the value of the victim's labor that FLSA guarantees, but is in the nature of a penalty imposed on some employers for willful non-compliance. This argument is without merit. As we have said with regard to FLSA's liquidated damages provision in the past, [l]iquidated damages are not a penalty exacted by the law, but rather compensation to the employee occasioned by the delay in receiving wages due caused by the employer's violation of the FLSA. Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir.1999); see also Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945) (noting that FLSA's liquidated damage provision is not penal in nature but constitutes compensation for the retention of a workman's pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 86 L.Ed. 1682 (1942) (same). The possibility that a judge may in narrow circumstances relieve an employer of its obligation to pay alters neither Section 216's general command that liquidated damages be paid nor our repeated recognition that these damages count as compensation. See Reich v. S. New England Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir.1997) (noting that FLSA's liquidated damages are considered compensatory rather than punitive); see also Herman, 172 F.3d at 142 (double damages [are] the norm and single damages the exception). Finally, the defendants argue, citing Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir.1988), that they are entitled to a jury trial before liquidated damages may be awarded. In Brock, this Court determined that in suits by the Secretary of Labor or an employee for back wages and liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and (c), an employer is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of the amount of back pay due pursuant to the Seventh Amendment. Brock, 840 F.2d at 1063 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 & n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978)). Suffice it to say that the issue of whether an employer has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury in a civil case in which an employee or the government is seeking back pay and liquidated damages is analytically distinct from the question whether a criminal defendant who is required by statute to pay restitution is entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment on the amount of restitution due. This court has already held that the answer to the latter question is no in the context of awards made pursuant to other restitution statutes. See United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 476 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir.2007); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118-19 (2d Cir.2006). We see no reason why these decisions should not apply here. For these reasons, the award of liquidated damages was proper. On remand, in calculating the new restitution award, the district court may award liquidated damages pursuant to FLSA § 216.