Opinion ID: 4346623
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Private Citizen Speaking on a Public Concern

Text: “In order for a government employee’s speech to warrant First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court’s Connick and Pickering decisions have long imposed the threshold requirements that the employee (1) must have spoken ‘as a citizen,’ and (2) must have ‘address[ed] matters of public concern.’” Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2007). “The Supreme Court clarified the first of these requirements in Garcetti, [547 U.S. at 421], by holding that ‘when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.’” Weisbarth, 499 F.3d at 542 (emphasis in Weisbarth). In Garcetti, the respondent Ceballos was employed as a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office. 547 U.S. at 413. Ceballos was contacted by a defense attorney on a pending criminal case, who told Ceballos there were inaccuracies in an affidavit used to obtain a critical search warrant. Id. Ceballos conducted an investigation, visiting the location No. 18-1660 Appendix to Haddad v. Gregg, et al. Page 11 described and speaking with the warrant affiant. Id. at 414. Based on his investigation, Ceballos believed the search warrant contained serious misrepresentations, and he conveyed his findings to his supervisors, following up with a disposition memorandum that recommended dismissal of the case. Id. at 414, 420; see also Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2015). A joint meeting was scheduled to discuss the affidavit with the sheriff’s department, in which one lieutenant sharply criticized Ceballos for his handling of the case. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414. Cebellos’ supervisor decided to proceed with the prosecution, and Ceballos was called by the defense to testify at a hearing in the trial court. Id. at 414-15. The trial court rejected the challenge to the warrant. Id. at 415. Ceballos claimed that in the aftermath of these events, he was subjected to a series of retaliatory employment actions, including reassignment from his calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion. Id. “Ceballos initiated an employment grievance, but the grievance was denied based on a finding that he had not suffered any retaliation.” Id. Unsatisfied, Ceballos sued in federal court alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim. Id. The Garcetti Court rejected Ceballos’ First Amendment claim, holding that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. The Court found that the fact that Ceballos expressed his views inside his office, rather than publicly, or that the memo concerned the subject matter of Ceballos’ employment was not dispositive. Id. at 421-22. The controlling factor was that Ceballos’ expressions were made pursuant to his official duties as a calendar deputy. Id. at 421. The Court contrasted the expressions made by the speaker in Pickering, No. 18-1660 Appendix to Haddad v. Gregg, et al. Page 12 a teacher whose letter to the newspaper had no official significance and bore similarities to letters submitted by numerous citizens every day. Id. at 422. However, the Court noted that because it was undisputed that Ceballos wrote the memo pursuant to his employment duties, the Court had no occasion for articulating a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious debate. Id. at 424. Defendants argue that based on Garcetti and the relevant case law, Plaintiff cannot show he was speaking as a private citizen. His speech to, and association with, individuals outside of DIFS dealt specifically with how DIFS would regulate insurance companies doing business in Michigan (ECF No. 39 at PageID.218). These issues are squarely within the official job functions assigned to Plaintiff (id.). Thus, Plaintiff cannot sustain his First Amendment retaliation claim even if he was speaking on a matter of public concern (id. at PageID.218-219). “Determining whether an employee speaks as a private citizen or as a public employee can be challenging.” Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464 (citing Boulton, 795 F.3d 533). “‘The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.’” Id. at 463 (quoting Lane v. Franks, U.S. ____ 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014) (emphasis omitted)). Although the Supreme Court has not identified any detailed analysis to decide this question, “the ‘proper inquiry is a practical one.’” Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424). Further, the public employee exception to First Amendment protection “‘must be read narrowly as speech that an employee made in furtherance of the ordinary responsibilities of his employment.’” Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464 (quoting Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534). The Sixth Circuit has utilized several non-exhaustive factors to assess an employee’s statement, including the speech’s impetus; its setting; its audience; No. 18-1660 Appendix to Haddad v. Gregg, et al. Page 13 and its general subject matter—“who, where, what, when, why, and how” considerations. Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464 (citing Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 2012)). This case presents a particularly fine line in deciding whether Plaintiff’s speech and conduct emanated from his ordinary responsibilities. While the parties each attempt to align this case with decisions in other cases, the Court finds none of the parties’ cited cases directly on point. Defendants rely on Omokehinde v. Detroit Board of Education, 563 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Mich. 2008), as “highly instructive” (ECF No. 39 at PageID.216). The plaintiff was a former school district employee who helped monitor the school district’s expenditure and disbursement of certain federal funds. Omokehinde, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 720. After informing her supervisor that she believed the school district was using federal funds for improper purposes, and receiving no response, the plaintiff expressed her concerns in an anonymous letter to a reporter for the Detroit Free Press, which published an exposé on misconduct in the school district. Id. at 721. The plaintiff was discharged a short time later and brought suit claiming she was discharged for speaking out as a private citizen. The court disagreed, holding that the plaintiff’s anonymous letter to the paper was not protected speech: Plaintiff’s complaints to her supervisor about questionable Title I expenditures flowed directly from her duties and responsibilities as an employee of the Defendant School District. When her protests through the chain of command proved unavailing, she repeated precisely the same complaints to an outside audience. This Court fails to see how the broader dissemination of precisely the same speech alters the fundamental nature of the underlying communication, such that what was once a part of the employee’s official duties becomes the speech of a private citizen. Id. at 728. Defendants similarly cite Meggison v. Charlevoix County, No. 1:07-CV-577, 2009 WL 5411896 at ,  (Dec. 23, 2008) (unpublished), in which the court determined that the statements No. 18-1660 Appendix to Haddad v. Gregg, et al. Page 14 of a jail administrator addressing jail air quality concerns did not qualify as private citizen speech under Garcetti. Like the plaintiff in Omokehinde, the plaintiff took internal complaints to a public audience, speaking at a county board of commissioners meeting and meeting with a reporter. Id. at . The court observed that the entire subject matter of the plaintiff’s speech owed its existence to her professional responsibilities and role as Jail Administrator. Id. at -6. The plaintiff’s decision to disseminate her employment grievances to a wider audience did not cloak those grievances with First Amendment protection. Id. at . The court noted that the plaintiff was not “an average citizen who happens to be a public employee.” Id. Instead, her extensive knowledge of the air quality issue about which she spoke was a direct result of her job. Id. Defendants argue that Omokehinde and Meggison are consistent with Sixth Circuit case law. For example, in Weisbarth, the Sixth Circuit held that statements made by a park ranger to a consultant hired by her employer were not protected by the First Amendment. 499 F.3d 538. The plaintiff in Housey v. Macomb County, 534 F. App’x 316, 322 (6th Cir. 2013), made a similar argument—that he was speaking as a private citizen when he reported the misconduct of a probate judge “over whom he had no authority vis-à-vis his job duties” to the State Court Administrative Office and the Judicial Tenure Commission, because his “purely administrative” job duties did not include such reporting. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, holding that his reports arose from his duty to oversee the efficient administration of the Macomb County Probate Court as the Court Register, and were not the type of activity engaged in by private citizens. Id. at 323. His reports and communications owed their existence to his responsibilities as a probate court register. Id. That is, the plaintiff’s speech “had a measure of ‘official significance’” because of his duty to ensure the court was functioning properly. Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422). No. 18-1660 Appendix to Haddad v. Gregg, et al. Page 15 Defendants argue that, as was true in Meggison, Plaintiff was not “an average citizen who happens to be a public employee” (ECF No. 39 at PageID.218). In other words, he was not the typical private citizen speaking to individuals about the regulation of the insurance industry. To the contrary, he had extensive knowledge of the issues on which he spoke—knowledge based on his employment and unique knowledge gleaned from his position as a DIFS Examiner. Thus, Plaintiff’s speech was not private citizen speech and is not entitled to constitutional protection. Plaintiff cites cases to the contrary. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). In Rankin, a clerical employee in a county constable’s office was fired after making a statement to another employee, apparently her boyfriend, which expressed an opinion about policies of the President’s administration (see ECF No. 42 at PageID.434). The Rankin Court held that such a political statement addressed a matter of public concern and was subject to First Amendment protection. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387-88. It also applied the Pickering balancing test and held that the State’s interest in maintaining a peaceful and cohesive workplace did not outweigh the employee’s right to express political opinions while at work. Plaintiff asserts that, similarly, the right to free association applies to State employees while at work, Monks v. Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 1991). See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 389-92. Plaintiff argues that he had a right to express opinions at work and to associate with persons and organizations outside of DIFS, and these rights survive Defendants’ challenge under the Pickering balancing test (ECF No. 42 at PageID.435). Plaintiff further argues that Garcetti does not mandate a different result simply because Plaintiff’s activities were taken in the course and scope of his employment with DIFS (id.). The Garcetti Court noted that the fact that the plaintiff expressed his views inside his office rather than publicly was not dispositive. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420. Moreover, the Garcetti Court cited No. 18-1660 Appendix to Haddad v. Gregg, et al. Page 16 Rankin with approval; thus, the holding in Garcetti cedes to Rankin’s protection of a public employee’s right to express political opinion while at work (ECF No. 42 at PageID.435). Finally, Plaintiff notes that although Defendants attempt to align this case with those in which the speech or association was viewed as a “continuation” of work duties, Defendant Boven’s comment that Plaintiff was “going to take an issue beyond what he’s authorized to do” casts doubt on the theory that Plaintiff’s activities were entirely within the scope of his State employment (ECF No. 42 at PageID.435). Plaintiff asserts that his speech at issue all “centered around” his expression of his opinion that the IFE was “unlawful” and “deceptive” (id. at PageID.435-436). And Boven’s stated concerns “boil down to animus toward[] him for expressing opinions with which she, and the powers-that-be at DIFS, did not agree” (id. at PageID.436). The parties each advance arguments grounded in proper First Amendment analysis. However, having considered the underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis and more recent binding Sixth Circuit precedent, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff’s conduct falls outside the realm of recognized “private citizen” speech and activity ordinarily afforded First Amendment protection. First, as Defendants point out, Rankin, on which Plaintiff largely relies, can be distinguished. There, the expression involved a data-entry employee in a county constable’s office, who was fired for remarking in a private conversation with a co-worker, after hearing of an attempt on the President’s life, “if they go for him again, I hope they get him.” Rankin, 483 U.S. at 381. The statement was made in the context of discussing the policies of the President’s administration, with her boyfriend/coworker, and right after a news bulletin of an attempt on the President’s life, “a matter of heightened public attention.” Id. at 381, 386. The Court thus found the statement plainly dealt with a public concern. Id. at 386. No. 18-1660 Appendix to Haddad v. Gregg, et al. Page 17 Rankin did not expressly address the “private citizen” aspect of protected First Amendment speech and does not further Plaintiff’s case. Here, Plaintiff was addressing the very regulatory issues he was tasked with dealing with daily in his employment as an Examiner for DIFS. Plaintiff acknowledges that his “central function” at DIFS was to perform Market Conduct Exams to look at the practices and procedures of an insurance company to see whether it is engaging in potentially unfair business practices in dealing with consumers (ECF No. 42 at PageID.421). In the course of that job task in the Progressive MCE, Plaintiff discovered the IFE and “took umbrage” to the exclusion “[b]ecause I would not want to see any poor parent get denied BI benefits to their child because they think they might – she might have driven into a tree on purpose. I would not want to see that happen to anybody” (ECF No. 42 at PageID.422-423, citing Ex. 13, Haddad Dep. at 127:17-21). Plaintiff then began his extensive investigation, which ultimately resulted in his termination. Plaintiff states that he first followed protocol, asking the Office of General Counsel and several other DIFS staffers to provide him with a no-fault expert. When he was told that no no-fault experts were available, he pursued his investigation outside DIFS channels, eventually consulting with the Sinas Dramis law firm and attending their “People’s Law School” (ECF No. 42 at PageID.423). He discussed the IFE with attorney Steve Sinas, who expressed his opinion that IFEs were “really unfair” (id. at PageID.424). Viewed from a practical standpoint, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s activities were in furtherance of the ordinary responsibilities of his employment. Here, Plaintiff used his investigation, and presumed validation that IFEs were deceptive and contrary to Michigan law, to press this point in the examination process of Progressive, which willingly agreed to make more No. 18-1660 Appendix to Haddad v. Gregg, et al. Page 18 prominent disclosures of the provision, and its potential ill effects, to its insureds. Thus, Plaintiff’s conduct was directly in the course of the performance of his job, and not as a private citizen. The Court’s conclusion does not ignore that Plaintiff’s mission may have been motivated by his perceived public interest purpose. But however laudable, Plaintiff’s quest to have the IFE prohibited as deceptive and unfair to insurance consumers was taken in his role as a Market Conduct Examiner, subject to the controls of DIFS as his employer. See Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 465 (noting, but rejecting, the plaintiff’s argument that his complaints about a superior’s questionable conduct with respect to the city’s wastewater treatment “were borne of out of his civic and ‘moral responsibility,’ not his job functions”). As the Court initially explained in Garcetti: “‘Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.’” Boulton, 795 F.3d at 532-33 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22). In this Court’s view, Plaintiff’s speech and activity in mustering the collective will of his coworkers and DIFS to prohibit the IFE falls outside protected First Amendment activity, given Plaintiff’s job responsibilities and the nature of DIFS’ role as a public agency. But even if portions or aspects of Plaintiff’s conduct were so considered, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim otherwise fails.