Opinion ID: 1414388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: conspiracy to intentionally interfere with contractual relations

Text: On appeal, Sutherland contends that Gross, the Copelands, Gray and Western conspired to interfere with Sutherland's installment contract with Brown. He argues that we should set aside the district court's finding to the contrary as clearly erroneous. We disagree. An actionable conspiracy consists of a combination of two or more persons who, by some concerted action, intend to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another, and damage results from the act or acts. Collins v. Union Fed. Savings & Loan, 99 Nev. 284, 303, 662 P.2d 610, 622 (1983). To establish intentional interference with contractual relations, the plaintiff must show: (1) a valid and existing contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the contractual relationship; (4) actual disruption of the contract; and (5) resulting damage. Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care Ent., 177 Cal. App.3d 1120, 225 Cal. Rptr. 120, 124 (1986). Sutherland asserts that when Brown acquired the Apartments, Brown intended to pay Sutherland $600,000 in accordance with his contractual obligations. But, after the December 13, 1985 meeting, Brown no longer intended to pay that $600,000 since he assigned his rights and obligations under the contract to Western. Additionally, Sutherland argues that Western had no intention to pay any portion of the $600,000 due him. Thus, Sutherland contends that the effect of respondents' conspiracy, with Western acquiring the property, and Brown, the Copelands and Gray agreeing not to interfere with Gross' quiet title action, was to eliminate Sutherland's interest in the Apartments. In its findings of fact, the district court noted that the Apartments' rental records during the ten month period in which Sutherland owned the property disclosed that the business operated at a loss. Moreover, the records showed that Sutherland made a substantial infusion of capital into the property during this time. Notwithstanding the Apartments' financial condition, the subcontract of sale between Sutherland and Brown required Brown to pay $600,000 to Sutherland in addition to assuming the obligations to Las Vegas 70 and the Copelands. Consequently, the trial court found that this subcontract incorporates values that are non-existent and obligations that were never intended to be honored or paid. Therefore, the court concluded that Sutherland's only rights were those he received from the Copelands by way of this contract. The district court observed that Sutherland's rights in the Apartments did not change with the December 13 meeting. Both before and after the meeting, Sutherland's only remedy in case of default was to take possession of the property and to look to the property for any and all liability. Consequently, Sutherland failed to show that he suffered any actual harm as required in order to prove a conspiracy to intentionally interfere with contractual relations. Findings of fact are reversible only if clearly erroneous. NRCP 52(a). As well, substantial evidence to support the district court's determinations, and thus, the constraints of the appellate process preclude us from disturbing the court's conclusion that respondents did not conspire to intentionally interfere with contractual relations. Leavitt v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 103 Nev. 81, 89, 734 P.2d 1221, 1226 (1987).