Opinion ID: 1244705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: allen -type charge to jury

Text: Although defendant did not object to the instruction at trial, he argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously gave an Allen -type instruction to the jury before it began its deliberations. Instructing the jury, the court stated: The Court instructs the Jury that although the verdict to which each Juror agrees must, of course, be each Juror[']s own conclusion, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of fellow Jurors yet, in order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result the Jurors should examine with candor the questions submitted to them, with due regard and deference to the opinions of each other. A dissenting Juror should consider whether their [sic] state of mind is a reasonable one, when it makes no impression on the minds of so many Jurors equally honest, equally intelligent, who have heard the same evidence, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, under the sanction of the same oath. You are not to give up a conscientious conclusion after you have reached such a conclusion finally, but it is your duty to confer with your fellow Jurors carefully and earnestly, and with a desire to do absolute justice both to the State and to the Defendant. An Allen charge takes its name from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). In Allen, the United States Supreme Court approved a supplemental instruction given to a jury that was having difficulty arriving at a unanimous verdict. Id. at 501, 17 S.Ct. at 157. This type of instruction has since been criticized as tending to pressure jurors into giving up their sincere convictions merely because a majority reached a different conclusion. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1022 n. 1 (Utah 1987). We acknowledge that a supplemental instruction has the potential to be coercive, depending on its content, if given to jurors who have reached an impasse. In this case, however, the charge was given prior to jury deliberations and the instruction specifically directed the jurors not to give up their own conscientious conclusions. In this context, the inherent danger of coercion resulting from the instruction is dissipated, if not lost. See State v. Wilson, 6 Kan.App.2d 302, 627 P.2d 1185, 1187, aff'd and remanded, 230 Kan. 287, 634 P.2d 1078 (1981). We reject Brown's assertion that this instruction deprive[d] the Defendant of the benefit of the convictions of each individual juror. The trial court did not err in allowing this instruction.