Opinion ID: 47779
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Cash Evidence and Brady Violation

Text: We also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence testimony concerning the $ 22,000 in cash found in his truck. The record supports a finding that its introduction was not overly prejudicial or cumulative, and therefore not in violation of FED. R. EVID. 403 and 404. Indeed, the presence of large sums of money is often considered relevant as an indication of guilt in drug possession cases. See United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1998) (listing types of behavior that this court has previously recognized as circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge, including “possession of large amounts of cash”). In addition, Harrison fails to state a Brady violation claim as to the introduction of evidence allegedly withheld from the defense without a prior opportunity for review by the defense. The evidence at issue, the actual manifest of Harrison’s cargo on the day of the arrest, was introduced at trial over defense counsel’s objections and its existence was known to the defense ever since not later than April 2005. See United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 386 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Brady rights are not denied where the information was fully available to the defendant factual scenarios whereby coercion or involuntariness was found or not found); United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir. 1978) (listing cases where the court found that the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession provided ample support for a trial court’s ruling of voluntariness). 8 and his reason for not obtaining and presenting such information was his lack of reasonable diligence.”). Also, there is no sufficient indication that, even had the manifest been withheld by the prosecution, it was exculpatory or impeaching. See United States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 477 (5th Cir. 2004) (listing elements of a Brady claim). C. Denial of Motion for Continuance of Sentencing Hearing In October 2005 the day before the sentencing hearing was scheduled (as per the district court’s July 18, 2005 order) to commence, Harrison moved for a continuance of the hearing in order to obtain a psychiatric examination, based on information his counsel apparently received from Harrison's brother and sister just after the second trial, about three months earlier. Harrison claims the district court’s denial of his motion denied him the right to argue for a downward departure based on his psychological issues, including ADHD, using the sentencingdetermination factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Harrison argues he should be given the opportunity to present evidence as to his psychological condition in order to argue that a reasonable sentence would be lesser than that imposed. He contends that a new sentencing hearing should be held since the district court did not have the opportunity to properly consider that argument because it denied him the opportunity to obtain additional evidence to support it. 9 A district court’s denial of a motion to continue a sentencing hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138, 144 (5th Cir. 1999). In order for there to be an abuse of discretion, the denial must be arbitrary or unreasonable. United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). Movant must show that the denial of the continuance resulted in prejudice that is “specific and compelling” or “serious.” Barnett, 197 F.3d at 144. Also, since Harrison did not raise his additional objection below that denial of the continuance was error under United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), because he should have been able to examine this potential sentencing issue, review of that issue is for plain error. To establish plain error, there must be clear or obvious error that affected Harrison’s substantial rights. To determine whether the plain error affected Harrison’s substantial rights, Harrison must demonstrate a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004). The district court’s denial of Harrison’s motion for continuance at the beginning of the sentencing hearing in order for him to obtain a psychiatric examination was not an abuse of discretion. Harrison has failed to show that the denial was arbitrary or unreasonable and that the denial of the continuance resulted in prejudice that is “specific and compelling” or 10 “serious.” Barnett, 197 F.3d at 144; United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). As the district court expressly noted in denying the continuance motion, it had observed Harrison closely through two trials and a suppression hearing, heard him testify (and questioned him at the suppression hearing) and “never at any time have I gotten any indication that there are any issues about his mental competency.” No question of Harrison’s competency was ever raised in either of the two trials or in any pretrial hearing. And, finally, he is not unconditionally due a continuance for which he moved at so late a date without any reasonable explanation for the last minute nature of the motion. Harrison also fails to establish plain error as to his Booker claim because the PSR contained information on his personal history, including information as to his mental and emotional health; as stated above, the judge had ample opportunity to observe him through trial; and his only argument that the denial undermined confidence in the proceedings’ outcome is that he theoretically may have been able to make another argument for the court to consider in its discretion in determining his sentence. D. Sentence Reduction for Minor Participant Finally, we review for clear error the district court’s factual finding that the defendant is not a minor participant in 11 a crime for purposes of reviewing the denial of Harrison’s motion for a downward departure based on U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, which allows for a two-level reduction if a defendant is a “minor participant” in the offense for which he is being sentenced. United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 2001). The determination of “minor participation” status is a “sophisticated factual determination” to be made by the sentencing judge. Id. at 597-98. Harrison indicates that he should have received the minor role reduction because (1) other courts have found the adjustment to be permissible when only one participant is charged in an indictment, as is his case, though others were involved and (2) his role was limited to transporting the marihuana. Harrison also points out that his compensation of $60,000 was minimal compared to the value of the illegal cargo he was transporting, which was worth $1.7 million in Chicago and Richmond, Illinois. Harrison fails to establish clear error under this court’s precedent. See United States v. Pafahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1485 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a “‘mule’ or transporter of drugs may not be entitled to minor or minimal status”). U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 indicates that it may be permissible to consider a mere drug transporter a minor participant but it is by no means an automatic or mandatory determination. Indeed, Harrison’s role was essential for the drugs to get to Illinois from El Paso. See United States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1989). 12 Harrison was not attributed for sentencing purposes with any amount of marihuana in excess of what he was knowingly transporting on this occasion.