Opinion ID: 2813315
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mix Met His Initial Evidentiary Burden

Text: Mix met his initial evidentiary burden of showing that prejudice was likely, both as to the information overheard by Juror 1 and as to the information that she relayed to the rest of the jury.
The government argues that the information overheard by Juror 1 was innocuous. It argues that the only plausible effect of the overheard information was that Juror 1 would feel better about convicting Mix, a relatively low-level BP employee, given that potentially higher-level BP employees were also being prosecuted. Because Mix had no right to jury nullification, this information was not prejudicial. But we agree with Mix that the overheard information lent credence to the government’s theory of the case, which was that Mix deleted the texts to hide the fact that he knew that he was misrepresenting the flow rate. Mix, in contrast, argued that he thoughtlessly deleted the texts. Knowing that other individuals were being prosecuted could bolster the government’s theory in at least two ways. First, Mix’s scheme to cover up his texts would only work if his supervisor, Sprague, had also deleted the text messages. Thus, if Sprague was also being prosecuted for the same misconduct, that would tend to bolster the government’s theory that Mix deleted the texts as part of a scheme rather than by mistake. Indeed, the district court specifically prohibited the government from presenting evidence that Sprague also deleted the texts, finding that the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Nonetheless, the jury could have inferred that Sprague deleted the texts based on the fact that the government stated that it recovered some but not all of the deleted texts from Sprague’s phone. The overheard information would tend to buttress the implication that Sprague had also deleted the texts as part of a scheme with Mix. 7 Case: 14-30837 Document: 00513099242 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/30/2015 No. 14-30837 Second, Mix would have had a stronger motive to delete the text messages if he had acted unlawfully in misrepresenting the flow rate calculation. The jurors knew that other people had also allegedly misrepresented the calculation. Evidence that others were being prosecuted for this misrepresentation would increase Mix’s motive to cover up his own misrepresentation. The government argues that Juror 1 could not have reasonably inferred that the other prosecuted BP employees were Sprague or others involved in misrepresenting the estimated flow rate. But that was the obvious inference, given that Juror 1 overheard the information in the courthouse elevator during Mix’s trial, which was a trial that centered around allegedly false flow rate calculations and deleted text messages. The government also argues that evidence about Mix’s motive is irrelevant because it was not an element of the crime. But, while the government did not have to prove why Mix wanted to subvert the grand jury, it had to prove that he deleted the text messages with the intent of subverting future grand jury proceedings. The government attempted to prove this intent partly by showing that Mix had a motive to subvert the grand jury proceedings. Finally, independent of the government’s theory of the case, the fact that Mix was part of BP, an organization that perpetrated allegedly criminal acts, could lead the jury to find him guilty by association. Of course, such a finding would be improper, but the jury instructions did not dwell on this point. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the overheard information was likely prejudicial. The information that Juror 1 received was just the kind of information that could affect a juror, particularly given the government’s theory of the case. 8 Case: 14-30837 Document: 00513099242 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/30/2015 No. 14-30837
The government argues that the information that Juror 1 relayed to the rest of the jury was not extrinsic. The government asks us to imagine a scenario where a juror pretends that she overheard information that gave her comfort in voting guilty, but, in fact, she has not overheard any information. The government argues that this situation would simply involve the juror’s strategy to persuade other jurors and therefore would be an intrinsic rather than extrinsic injection of information into the deliberation room. We reject this argument. A juror’s reference to non-record evidence that directly pertains to the particular case being considered is by definition an injection of extrinsic information, even if it is fabricated. The government also argues that the intrusion on the rest of the jury was de minimis, given that Juror 1 did not actually reveal the extrinsic information. But, given the nature of the communication (the foreperson vouching for Mix’s guilt based on unrevealed extrinsic evidence), the district court did not abuse its discretion by holding that prejudice was likely. Moreover, objective evidence indicated that the jury was indeed affected by Juror 1’s statement. The statement was made by the foreperson during a deadlock, and, within two hours, the jury returned a guilty verdict. 3 This evidence further supports a holding that prejudice was likely. The district 3 The government disputes that Juror 1 made her statement after the district court gave the modified Allen charge. But the district court found that the jury convicted Mix two hours after Juror 1 made her extrinsic statement, which means that it found that the statement was made after it issued the Allen charge. Further, one of the jurors testified that Juror 1 told the jury about the extrinsic information either at the end of the day that they received the Allen charge or on the morning after that. Three other jurors also testified that they believed that she made the statement after they had notified the district court of the deadlock. So the district court was justified in inferring that Juror 1 made her statement after or shortly before the Allen charge, meaning that the jurors resolved their deadlock and came to their decision within two hours of hearing her statement. 9 Case: 14-30837 Document: 00513099242 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/30/2015 No. 14-30837 court therefore did not abuse its discretion in holding that the presumption of prejudice was triggered.