Opinion ID: 2001496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tribal-State Compacts

Text: Plaintiffs assert that although the Constitution allows for certain types of regulated gaming, it still completely prohibits commercial gaming. However, IGRA does not allow the state to consider the purpose behind the gaming. The language of the statute is clear that class III gaming will be permitted when located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity (25 USC § 2710 [d] [1] [B] [emphasis added]). This language is intentionally broad and includes the limited gaming permitted by the New York State Constitution under the supervision and authority of the New York State Racing and Wagering Board ( see General Municipal Law art 9-A; 9 NYCRR 5600.1 et seq. ). Through IGRA, Congress has preempted the states in this area. Since New York allows some forms of class III gamingfor charitable purposessuch gaming may lawfully be conducted on Indian lands provided it is authorized by a tribal ordinance and is carried out pursuant to a tribal-state compact ( see 25 USC § 2710 [d] [1]). We likewise reject the argument that IGRA specifically provides that state laws prohibiting gambling will apply on Indian lands. Plaintiffs argue that 18 USC § 1166 allows for the constitutional ban on commercial gambling in article I, § 9 to be applied to Indian lands. That section states that all State laws pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State (18 USC § 1166 [a]). However, the statute further provides that class III gaming conducted pursuant to an approved tribal-state compact will not be considered gambling for purposes of that section ( see 18 USC § 1166 [c] [2]). Thus, the state constitutional prohibition against commercial gambling does not apply to Indian lands that are in compliance with IGRA and governed by a valid tribal-state compact. Plaintiffs state that IGRA does not require states to enter into a tribal-state compact with Indian tribes, arguing that, as a matter of state sovereignty, [t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program ( New York v United States, 505 US 144, 188 [1992]). However, it may be to the state's benefit to do so. Through IGRA the states are granted a certain degree of authority over class III gaming that they otherwise would not have due to the sovereignty of Indian nations ( see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v Florida, 517 US 44, 58 [1996]; US Const, art I, § 8 [3]). Thus, through the compacting process, IGRA confers a benefit on the state by allowing it to negotiate and to have some input into how class III gaming will be conducted. However, this authority is limited in that if the state either does not negotiate with a tribe or does not do so in good faith, the tribe may bring suit in Federal District Court ( see 25 USC § 2710 [d] [7] [B]). [5] If the court determines the state has not negotiated in good faith, the court will order the parties to conclude such a compact within a 60-day period (25 USC § 2710 [d] [7] [B] [iii]). If an agreement is not reached within that time, the court will appoint a mediator, who shall select from the two proposed compacts [from the tribe and the state] the one which best comports with the terms of this Act and any other applicable Federal law and with the findings and order of the court (25 USC § 2710 [d] [7] [B] [iv]). If the state timely agrees, that compact will become the tribal-state compact ( see 25 USC § 2710 [d] [7] [B] [vi]). If the state does not agree (or invokes sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution), the Secretary of the Interior and the tribe will decide upon procedures for conducting class III gaming ( see 25 USC § 2710 [d] [7] [B] [vii]). Thus, if class III gaming is permitted in the state for any purpose, including a strictly charitable purpose, it will be permitted on Indian land with or without the state's involvement. Given the consequence, obviously state involvement and regulation is to be favored. In the alternative, plaintiffs argue that even if IGRA requires that class III gaming be permitted on Indian lands, the same result is not required on land that is not Indian land. This argument is directed to the portion of part B that authorizes the Governor to enter into tribal-state compacts allowing up to three casinos in Sullivan and Ulster counties ( see L 2001, ch 383, part B, § 2, codified at Executive Law § 12 [b]). With a few exceptions, gaming is generally prohibited on lands acquired by the Secretary of the Interior after the enactment of IGRA and held in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe (25 USC § 2719 [a]). Gaming, however, will be permitted when the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary's determination (25 USC § 2719 [b] [1] [A]). Here, plaintiffs urge that both the constitutional provision and New York's public policy against commercial gambling prevent the Governor from agreeing that there would not be a detrimental effect on the communities at issue if casinos were located in those areas. The constitutional provision is relevant to the determination under 25 USC § 2710 (d) (1) (B) only whether class III gaming is permitted for any purpose and thus whether gaming should be allowed on Indian lands. Section 2719 (b) (1) (A) does not call for the Governor to make a determination as to the legality of gaming. Rather, the determination whether gaming would be detrimental to the surrounding community entails an analysis of the potential negative consequences presented by the presence of the casinos, such as social or economic consequences. The Constitution plainly does not prevent the Governor from determining that there would be no detrimental effect on a particular community. [6] Plaintiffs' last argument pertaining to part B is that it was an improper delegation of legislative authority for the Legislature to authorize the Governor to execute tribal-state compacts in Sullivan and Ulster counties ( see L 2001, ch 383, part B, § 2, codified at Executive Law § 12 [b]). In Saratoga, we determined that the Governor did not have the authority to unilaterally. . . negotiate and execute tribal gaming compacts under IGRA (100 NY2d at 824). The Court observed that the issues that would be covered by a tribal-state compact involved policy decisions that were within the province of the Legislature ( see Saratoga, 100 NY2d at 823). Here, the Legislature authorized the Governor to execute the tribal-state compacts and specified that such agreements would be deemed ratified by the legislature upon the governor's certification that the compacts contained certain provisions (L 2001, ch 383, part B, § 2, codified at Executive Law § 12 [b]). For example, the Legislature required that the compacts contain assurances that the tribe would provide access to labor unions, an adequate civil recovery system and sufficient liability insurance ( see L 2001, ch 383, part B, § 2, codified at Executive Law § 12 [b]). The Legislature has thus made the necessary policy determinations as to what the tribal-state compacts must contain and has authorized the Governor to implement those policy determinations by executing the compacts to their specifications. This is a permissible delegation of authority. That the legislation does not specify the names of the tribes or where the casinos will be located does not change this determination ( see Bourquin v Cuomo, 85 NY2d 781, 785 [1995] [there need not be a specific and detailed legislative expression authorizing a particular executive act as long as `the basic policy decisions underlying the regulations have been made and articulated by the Legislature' (citation omitted)]).