Opinion ID: 2614597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False Friend Technique

Text: ¶24 Rettenberger's interrogation took place in yet a larger context of deception. The interrogating officers made extensive use of the so-called false friend technique, whereby they represented to Rettenberger that they were his friends and that they were acting in his best interest. See Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.2 (2d ed.1992). This technique is commonly used in police interrogations because resistence to the disclosure of information is considerably increased ... if something is not done to establish a friendly and trusting attitude on the part of the subject. Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. Pa. L.Rev. 581, 614 (1979) (quoting Robert F. Royal & Stephen R. Schutt, The Gentle Art of Interviewing and Interrogation: A Professional Manual and Guide (1976)). In this atmosphere ... the suspect is fooled into trusting that the interrogator's behavior will conform to the norms of friendship: the interrogator will loyally help the suspect out of the jam, advise the suspect to confess only if confession will be beneficial [to the suspect], and so on. Margaret L. Paris, Faults, Fallacies, and the Future of Our Criminal Justice System: Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 3 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 3, 21-22 (1995). ¶25 The State suggests that the false friend approach cannot be coercive because it does not utilize actual or threatened physical or emotional abuse such as that found in some of the earlier landmark coerced-confessions cases. However, we have never held that physical or overt emotional abuse is a pre-requisite for a finding of coercion. Evidence sufficient to support a finding that a confession is involuntary must reveal some physical or psychological force or manipulation that is designed to induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have done so. State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). ¶26 Obviously, the false friend strategy bears no resemblance to abusive coercion of the third-degree variety. This does not mean that the false friend technique cannot, in some circumstances, be coercive. Indeed, the false friend technique may be ideally suited to extract an involuntary confession from certain types of suspects who, like Rettenberger, have below-average cognitive abilities, A.D.D., and Dependent Personality Disorder, making them overly compliant, submissive, and anxious to receive reassurance and approval from other people. ¶27 The extent to which the interrogating officers were able to convince Rettenberger that they were not his adversaries but were looking out for his best interests is illustrated by a colloquy that occurred towards the end of the second day's interrogation: DETECTIVE CORBIN: I'm going to try and come up tomorrow, okay. Now, you may talk to your attorney tomorrow and he may tell you not to talk to me, but if I come and I, you know, I just  OFFICER TIMOTHY: If you're just kicking it, there's no big deal. DETECTIVE CORBIN: Yeah, okay? MR. RETTENBERGER: I'm going to go over it inside and out right when I get there. I am going to tell my attorney, It's like this. These guys have already helped me and they're trying to help me, and I know they're trying to help me, so I'm going to talk to these guys. ¶28 We do not hold that the use of the false friend technique in police interrogations is, standing alone, sufficiently coercive to produce an involuntary confession. The significance of the stratagem comes in relation to other tactics and factors. The false friend stratagem provides an environment in which other interrogation tactics may become coercive. To the extent that Rettenberger suffers from mental disabilities and deficiencies, and to the extent that he believed the officers were protecting his best interests, he was less likely to question the false claims about the evidence against him; was less likely to clearly invoke his right to counsel or to remain silent; was more likely to parrot back the details the officers suggested, whether or not they were true; was more likely to place stock in any promises or threats that the officers made, however ambiguous they might be; and was more likely to confess, whether guilty or innocent.