Opinion ID: 1694753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of First Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: The Trust argues on appeal that the trial court erred in entertaining the summary-judgment motion because it did not contain a narrative summary of undisputed material facts, as required by Rule 56(c)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., and because the defendants' November 16 submission in support of the motion was untimely. We have already stated that the November 16 submission was untimely and was therefore due to be disregarded by the trial court; however, nothing in the record shows that the trial court considered it. Concerning the requirement that a summary-judgment motion contain a narrative summary of undisputed material facts, Rule 56(c)(1) states: (1) Form of Motion and Statement in Opposition Thereto. The motion shall be supported by a narrative summary of what the movant contends to be the undisputed material facts; that narrative summary may be set forth in the motion or may be attached as an exhibit. The narrative summary shall be supported by specific references to pleadings, portions of discovery materials, or affidavits and may include citations to legal authority. Any supporting documents that are not on file shall be attached as exhibits. If the opposing party contends that material facts are in dispute, that party shall file and serve a statement in opposition supported in the same manner as is provided herein for a summary of undisputed material facts. In its response to the motion, the Trust took the position that, because the summary-judgment motion did not contain a formally identified narrative summary, it was due to be denied. In its brief to this Court, the Trust argues that the trial court should have treated the motion exclusively as one for a dismissal, and refrain[ed] from considering the Defendants' Motion in the Alternative, until [the Trust] had been given an opportunity to develop and present its own evidence in opposition. The Trust asserts that it argued to the trial judge at the November 20 hearing that because the defendants'submission in support was untimely the Trust intended to address its arguments only to the motion to dismiss, requesting that before the court converted the motion to dismiss into one for a summary judgment, the Trust be given an opportunity to submit evidentiary materials in opposition. The Trust complains that it was never informed that the trial court was going to treat the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and that it was therefore deprived of any opportunity to respond to the defendants' evidentiary material before the trial court entered the partial summary judgment on November 28, 2001. As support for those assertions, the Trust cites only its Motion to Reconsider Partial Grant of Summary Judgment filed January 29, 2002, and its April 2, 2002, reply to the defendants' response to its motion to reconsider. The motion to reconsider was not heard by the trial judge who entered the partial summary judgment, the Trust having successfully sought the recusal of the initial trial judge. The trial judge hearing the motion to reconsider, therefore, could not take judicial notice of anything supposedly stated at the hearing on the summary-judgment motion. At any rate, the Trust simply argued in its motion to reconsider that because the defendants' untimely submission in support of the summary-judgment motion contained the first expressly identified statement of undisputed facts, the defendants' statement of fact was not timely tendered and should not have been considered by the Court, and that had the submission been timely the Trust would have filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit in response, averring to the need for further discovery in order to oppose the `facts' proffered by the defendants. In its April 2, 2002, reply, the Trust expanded this argument as follows: The defendants also make the false and misleading assertion that their motion for summary judgment was fully argued before the [the initial trial judge]. In fact, what was argued before [initial trial judge] was the defendants' motion to dismiss. The [Trust] informed the Court at the November 28, 2001 hearing that in light of the fact that the defendants' supporting materials had not been timely filed as required by Alabama law, the [Trust] intended to argue the Motion as a motion to dismiss. The [Trust] specifically requested that before the Court convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment that the [Trust] be informed of the Court's intention and that the [Trust] be given a reasonable opportunity to submit evidentiary materials in opposition. The Court, however, never informed the [Trust] that it was treating the Motion as one for summary judgment, and did not give the [Trust] any opportunity to respond to the defendants' untimely-filed evidentiary material prior to entering its Order. As a consequence, the [Trust] has not been heard in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the impression created by the defendants that the [initial trial judge] heard `extended arguments' on the same is incorrect. Even if these assertions were sufficient, in the abstract, to establish error on the part of the initial trial judge, we could not base a reversal on them because they are unsupported by the record. That is not to impugn in any way the integrity or credibility of counsel for the Trust; it is simply to acknowledge a restriction of appellate review  an appellate court is limited to the facts as established by the record. Cooper v. Adams, 295 Ala. 58, 61, 322 So.2d 706, 708 (1975). The proper method on appeal for submitting a record of unreported matters occurring at a hearing is stated in Rule 10(d), Ala. R.App. P. As noted from the excerpt quoted above from the Trust's reply to the defendants' response to its motion to reconsider, the Trust and the defendants disputed before the second trial judge what had actually been argued before the initial trial judge. In their response to the Trust's motion to reconsider, the defendants asserted that [t]his matter was fully briefed and argued before [the initial trial judge], and that the Trust had no valid argument that [i]t was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to present material in opposition to summary judgment and [was] not given adequate notice of the defendants' argument in support of summary judgment. Finally, even if we accept at face value the Trust's after the fact description in its reply of what transpired at the November 20 hearing, at most it appears that the Trust requested that before the trial court converted the motion to dismiss into one for a summary judgment, the Trust be given notice so that it could submit evidentiary materials in opposition. The Trust did not, and does not, assert that the trial judge agreed to that request. Further, there was actually no conversion of a motion here because a duly identified motion for a summary judgment was pending at the hearing. The fact that the Trust unilaterally took the position at the hearing that the summary-judgment motion would have to be ignored because it lacked a formally specified narrative summary of undisputed material facts would not bind the trial judge. We turn then to the question whether the motion for a summary judgment, considered completely apart from the subsequently filed and untimely submission in support of the motion, was deficient with regard to the requirement that a summary-judgment motion contain a narrative statement of undisputed material facts. The Trust cites Northwest Florida Truss, Inc. v. Baldwin County Commission, 782 So.2d 274 (Ala.2000), along with Tucker v. Morgan, 833 So.2d 68 (Ala.Civ.App.2002); Moore v. ClaimSouth, Inc., 628 So.2d 500 (Ala.1993); Thompson v. Rehabworks of Florida, Inc., 727 So.2d 807 (Ala.Civ.App.1997); and Hale v. Union Foundry Co., 673 So.2d 762 (Ala.Civ.App.1995), in support of its contention that granting a motion for a summary judgment that does not contain a formally designated narrative statement of undisputed material facts is reversible error. In Northwest Florida Truss, the summary-judgment motion simply stated in a conclusory fashion that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, `based upon the previous filings and briefings made in connection with,' 782 So.2d at 276, an earlier motion for a summary judgment filed by an entirely different party. This Court noted that a party moving for a summary judgment always bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it argues demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 782 So.2d at 276. The Court concluded that Rule 56(c) does not allow a party to file a simplistic motion devoid of a narrative summary and specific references to those portions of the record demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. 782 So.2d at 277. Likewise, in Moore, supra, we condemned a summary-judgment motion that did not contain anything close to a narrative summary of what [the movant] contended to be the undisputed material facts; rather, the motion simply stated that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the pleadings and depositions, but made no specific reference to any of those documents. 628 So.2d at 501. The cases from the Court of Civil Appeals cited by the Trust involved similarly seriously deficient motions for a summary judgment. This Court held in International Fidelity Insurance Co. v. Gilliam, 659 So.2d 24 (Ala.1995), however, that a converted motion for a summary judgment that did not contain a separately identified narrative summary of undisputed material facts was nonetheless procedurally sufficient under the provision of Rule 56(c)(1) that allowed the narrative summary to be attached as an exhibit. The Court held that [t]he motion included exhibits sufficient to meet the narrative summary requirement of Rule 56. 659 So.2d at 27. See also Cashion v. Torbert, 881 So.2d 408 (Ala.2003). The first summary-judgment motion filed by the defendants sufficiently complied with Rule 56(c)(1) so that the trial judge did not err in considering it on the merits. It set forth in clear narrative form the relevant material facts it deemed to be undisputed, attaching as exhibits the supporting documents that are not on file, as allowed by Rule 56(c)(1). It included citations to legal authority in the form of citations to the provisions of the Alabama Code (and one decision of this Court) establishing statutes of limitation for claims of breach of contract, fraudulent suppression, accounting, and unjust enrichment. It clearly stated that, because the attachments established that coal-mining operations had ceased on the premises by the end of 1989, the Trust's claims relating to nonpayment of royalties were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. That was the sole basis for the partial summary judgment entered by the trial judge on November 28, 2001, in which he found that [t]here is no disputed material fact that no mining operations have taken place on plaintiffs' property since 1989 and concluded that because [t]he causes of action pled in the complaint are all based on the mining operations which ceased in 1989, the applicable statutes of limitation bar recovery or relief under any cause of action except the fraudulent suppression claim.