Opinion ID: 214654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Damages for Conscious Pain and Suffering

Text: AmeriCor challenges the $300,000 damages award for conscious pain and suffering, arguing (1) that there was no evidence to support submission to the jury of a claim for conscious pain and suffering and (2) that the award was excessive. Both challenges are unavailing. In order to be “entitled to an instruction on a claim,” a party need only show “that there is some evidence supporting the theory behind the instruction so that a question of fact may be presented to the jury.” Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs made such a showing here. The record contains evidence from which a jury could have inferred that Sinkov experienced conscious pain and suffering, and plaintiffs were therefore entitled to an instruction on this claim. That evidence includes the New York State Commission of Correction’s final report on Sinkov’s death, which was received in evidence at trial without objection from AmeriCor. The report noted that a guard “found inmate Sinkov hanging from the cell bars by his sweatshirt. Sinkov had tied the shirt at the top of the front cell bars and sat down. He was 10 found facing the back of the cell with one foot on the floor and one foot on the bunk.” The jury also heard testimony that, when Sinkov was cut down from the bars, he hit his head on the edge of a table, and that a nurse administered CPR on him for ten to fifteen minutes before he was pronounced dead. The jury was entitled to rely on common sense and common experience to conclude that an amateur, improvised hanging is likely to produce a painful death by asphyxiation, and reasonably could have concluded that Sinkov struggled and suffered in the period between when he placed his homemade noose around his neck and when he lost consciousness. Even assuming arguendo that other evidence in the record might have suggested that Sinkov did not experience conscious pain and suffering, “it would be an undue invasion of the jury’s historic function for [us] to weigh the conflicting evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses and arrive at a conclusion opposite from the one reached by the jury.” Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1946). AmeriCor also argues that the $300,000 damages award for Sinkov’s conscious pain and suffering was excessive. We will set aside a jury’s award as excessive only if it “is so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice,” O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1988), quoting Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1978). “That we personally would have awarded a lesser sum or, if we had been the trial judge, have set the verdict aside, is insufficient.” Batchkowsky v. Penn Central Co., 525 F.2d 1121, 1124 (2d Cir. 1975). To set aside the award, we must conclude that the trial judge abused his or her discretion in permitting the verdict to stand. Id. In determining whether a compensatory award is so large as to shock the judicial 11 conscience, we look to other awards in similar cases. See Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990); Attridge v. Cencorp Div. of Dover Techs. Int’l, Inc., 836 F.2d 113, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1987). However, “our task is not to balance the number of high and low awards and reject the verdict in the instant case if the number of lower awards is greater. Rather, we inquire whether the . . . verdict is within reasonable range.” Ismail, 899 F.2d at at 187. “This inherently imprecise calculation depends on careful analysis of the facts in each case.” Attridge, 836 F.2d at 117. Here, based on the facts of the present case and on a review of pain and suffering awards in other cases, we are satisfied that the jury’s $300,000 award for Sinkov’s conscious pain and suffering was not excessive. See Gonzalez v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 555 N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (1st Dep’t 1990) (“Asphyxiation by gagging, whether it occurred within minutes or within an hour of the initial assault, is a particularly slow and terrifying way to die and, under the circumstances, we do not find the [$350,000] award for conscious pain and suffering . . . to be excessive.”); Rodd v. Luxfer USA Ltd., 709 N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (2d Dep’t 2000) ($300,000 award for pain and suffering where decedent “suffered severe and massive injuries” from any exploding oxygen tank, but the “period of consciousness was limited in duration”); Filipinas v. Action Auto Leasing, 851 N.Y.S.2d 550, 550 (1st Dep’t 2008) ($750,000 award where decedent was struck in the head by a van’s side mirror, and sustained serious head injuries, but “was heavily medicated and/or sedated” within an hour of the accident). The district court was within its discretion in denying AmeriCor’s motion for a new trial on the basis of excessiveness. 12