Opinion ID: 1207601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonableness of the Award in Light of Results Obtained

Text: A second critical component of attorney's fee calculations under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is found in the Supreme Court's analysis in Hensley. Under Hensley, the reasonableness of a fee award is determined by answering two questions: First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award? 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. In this case, while the district court properly answered no to the first question, it failed to properly analyze the award in light of the second question.
A plaintiff is not eligible to receive attorney's fees for time spent on unsuccessful claims that are unrelated to a plaintiff's successful § 1983 claim. Such unrelated claims must be treated as if they had been raised in a separate lawsuit to realize congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties. Id at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. However, in a lawsuit where the plaintiff presents different claims for relief that involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories, the district court should not attempt to divide the request for attorney's fees on a claim-by-claim basis. Id. Instead, the court must proceed to the second part of the analysis and focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Id. In this case, the district court correctly treated all of McCown's claims as related for the purpose of determining attorney's fees. Each of McCown's claims, though brought on the basis of different legal theories against different defendants, arose from a common core of facts, namely, his arrest on June 2, 2004. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it treated all the claims, successful and unsuccessful, as arising out of a common core of facts.
The City claims the amount of attorney's fees awarded to McCown was disproportionate to the amount he received on his one successful claim. Specifically, the City argued that because McCown only prevailed on one of his nine original claims, receiving a fraction of what he originally requested in his settlement demands, his attorney's fees and costs should be reduced to a similar fraction. The district court indicated that it was unsure whether the fact that eight of McCown's nine claims were dismissed at summary judgment figures into the calculation of attorney's fees. We conclude that it does. Although we can understand why our able district court colleague may have found the case law on this issue to be inscrutable, we hold that attorney's fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 must be adjusted downward where the plaintiff has obtained limited success on his pleaded claims, and the result does not confer a meaningful public benefit. [2] This conclusion follows largely from Hensley itself, where the Supreme Court noted that [a] reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole. 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933. [3] Although the Supreme Court has disavowed a test of strict proportionality, it also suggested that a comparison of damages awarded to damages sought is required. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 576, 585, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). A rule of proportionality is inappropriate, as the Court found, because it fails to recognize the nature of many, if not most, civil rights cases, in which damages may be limited by law, regardless of the importance of the civil rights at issue. Id. at 576-78, 106 S.Ct. 2686. Indeed, it was because counsel in civil rights cases might not have found it economically feasible to provide services to low-income clients without a fee-shifting provision that Congress enacted § 1988. Id. at 579, 106 S.Ct. 2686. For this reason, the district court must consider the excellence of the overall result, not merely the amount of damages won. However, the Court also clarified that, in judging the plaintiff's level of success and the reasonableness of hours spent achieving that success, a district court should give primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount sought. Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 2686 (Powell, J. concurring). Case law in this circuit provides additional guidance in how to measure a plaintiff's level of success when the plaintiff has prevailed on some, but not all his claims. For example, in McGinnis v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, this court echoed the holding in Rivera that a pro rata distribution of fees to claims makes no practical sense, but noted that [t]he district court must reduce the attorneys fee award so that it is commensurate with the extent of the plaintiff's success. 51 F.3d 805, 808, 810 (9th Cir.1994). In McGinnis, the plaintiff successfully sued his employer on the issue of disability discrimination, winning $234,000 inclusive of punitive damages, and $148,000 in attorney's fees. After a finding that punitive damages were not allowed, the plaintiff's award was reduced to $34,000, but the district court did not reduce the attorney's fees. We vacated the district court's decision on the basis that [l]awyers might reasonably spend $148,000 worth of time to win $234,000[, b]ut no reasonable person would pay lawyers $148,000 to win $34,000. Id. at 810. In McGinnis, the district court abused its discretion by expressly refusing to relate the extent of success to the amount of the fee award. Id. In this case, McCown received $20,000 in damages as part of a settlement agreement for his single remaining claim, and no other relief. The amount he received was roughly one-fourth of the damages in excess of $75,000 that he pled in his complaint, and less than one-tenth of the $251,000 he requested in settlement, which, however, included attorney's fees and costs. [4] McCown's victory clearly fell far short of his goal; therefore, it is unreasonable to grant his attorneys more than a comparable portion of the fees and costs they requested. Although the district court need not be so mechanical as to divide the amount of fees and costs requested by the number of claims, and therefore grant one-ninth of the fees and costs, the district court should take into account McCown's limited success when determining a reasonable award.
McCown argues that his attorney's fees should be granted in full because, while his monetary success was limited, he achieved an excellent result because his success conferred a benefit on the public. We disagree. We have previously noted that results may not be measured solely in terms of damages, and in determining a reasonable fee award on remand, the district court should consider not only the monetary results but also the significant nonmonetary results [the plaintiff] achieved for himself and other members of society. Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 365 (9th Cir.1996). Such a nonmonetary victory may constitute excellent results for the purpose of calculating attorney's fees. The Supreme Court has likewise indicated that when a decision has served the public interest by vindicating important constitutional rights an award of attorney's fees that is disproportionate to the actual damages may be appropriate. Rivera, 477 U.S. at 572, 106 S.Ct. 2686. However, we find this line of cases to be inopposite to McCown's situation. This particular claim was brought against two police officers, not the entire Fontana Police Department or the City of Fontana itself. Moreover, in both Morales and Rivera, the plaintiffs were members of a minority group that was subject to systematic mistreatment by members of the police force. In both cases, the plaintiffs' victories established a deterrent and resulted in a change of policy. See Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574-76, 106 S.Ct. 2686; Morales, 96 F.3d at 364-65. In contrast, McCown did not allege, and has not established, any animus within the Fontana Police Department against him or others like him, nor has his settlement resulted in any change in policy by the Fontana Police Department. McCown argues that his settlement benefits the public by providing an affirmative defense to those at risk of being sued by the individual police officers named in this suit. Such an attenuated public benefit cannot transform McCown's limited success into an excellent result.