Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitation on defense theories

Text: Defendant did not testify, nor did he present any witnesses at the guilt phase of the trial. Rather, the defense pursued the following three theories to raise doubt about whether he had committed the murder of Marsh: (1) that there were multiple perpetrators involved in the robbery, or third-party guilt; (2) that defendant did not commit the crime but only found the wallet after the murder; and (3) that the murder resulted from a robbery gone bad. In cross-examining members of the police force who had investigated the Marsh murder, defendant attempted to elicit testimony supporting the theory that multiple perpetrators may have been involved in the robbery of the Exxon station. The trial court twice refused to allow certain questions of police witnesses, and defendant complains that those restrictions deprived him of his right to confront witnesses and present a defense. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c limits death-penalty eligibility to those defendants convicted of murder committed by their own conduct. [A] capital-murder defendant may focus his or her efforts in the guilt phase on raising a reasonable doubt about issues that trigger the penalty phase, rather than vigorously contesting guilt or innocence on the murder charge. State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 517, 651 A. 2d 19 (1994). Patrolman Thomas Maple was called by the State to testify about the police investigation of the murder scene. During direct examination, the officer described the police arrival at the scene, the appearance of the gas station, and the victim's appearance. Maple further testified that there was no evidence of a struggle. During his testimony, Maple relied upon his partner's report of the crime scene to refresh his recollection. During cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to ask the following question: Patrolman Maple, was there anything in your investigation on May 5th, 1992 between 6:15 in the morning and 9:00 in the morning which would eliminate the possibility of multiple actors involved with this particular robbery/homicide? The trial court sustained an objection, finding that the question was outside the scope of direct examination. The trial court added: [t]o the extent that you want to cover areas not covered by his direct examination, I do believe he is listed on the defense witness list.... You want the officer to be available for recall on defense case, you certainly may do that, but this line of questioning must stop. Defendant chose not to call Maple and address these questions. Cross-examination is generally limited to the scope of direct examination, N.J.R.E. 611(b). At trial, defense counsel argued that the question was within the scope of direct examination because the report written by Maple's partner that Maple used to refresh his recollection, discussed suspect[s], raising the implication of multiple perpetrators. The trial court correctly rejected that attempt, because that reference to a single line in a report that was not admitted into evidence did not constitute part of the direct examination. Defendant now contends that, because Maple discussed the crime scene, it was legitimate to question him about whether the crime scene revealed any evidence about multiple perpetrators. That contention would bring the question into the scope of direct examination if trial counsel had raised it with the trial court. However, any error was harmless because the trial court clearly informed defendant that he could recall Maple and raise those questions. R. 2:10-2. Thus, defendant's right to present a defense was not compromised at all. The State also presented Sergeant Joseph Mosner. Mosner described the layout of the gasoline station and the office, including the locations where blood and bullets were found. Defense counsel then cross-examined Mosner about the details of his description of the layout, and elicited from the officer the fact that the police had found several fingerprints in the office (none matched the defendant). Then, suddenly, defense counsel asked: Sometime later you were asked to check or investigate the brother of Donald Loftin, Ronald Loftin? The trial court refused to allow the question under the third-party guilt doctrine. The third-party guilt doctrine is implicated when a defendant seek[s] to prove that another agency produced the death with which he is charged. State v. Sturdivant, 31 N.J. 165, 179, 155 A. 2d 771 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 956, 80 S.Ct. 873, 4 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1960). Because of the ease in which unsupported claims may infect the process, we have held that third-party guilt evidence is admissible only when the proof offered has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State's case. Ibid. In State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 300, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988) ( Koedatich I ), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L.Ed. 2d 803 (1989), we reaffirmed the Sturdivant standard and noted that the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of third-party guilt is a particularly fact-sensitive one. However, courts have recognized that evidence that tends to create reasonable doubt that someone else, generically, rather than defendant, committed the offense, is admissible. State v. Jorgensen, 241 N.J. Super. 345, 351, 575 A. 2d 31 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 386, 585 A. 2d 389 (1990). Thus, in Koedatich I, the defendant sought to introduce testimony that a small sports car was in the vicinity of the murder, while the defendant drove a large car; the defendant further sought to introduce evidence that an identified third-party owned such a sports car. We refused to allow testimony about the specific third-party since no evidence linked that person to the crime; however, we did allow evidence about the sports car since it tended to create reasonable doubt about whether someone other than the defendant committed the crime. Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 306, 548 A. 2d 939. Defendant does not argue, nor did he argue at trial, that he has any evidence linking his brother to the crime. Thus, the trial court correctly applied Koedatich I and Sturdivant in refusing to allow any questions about Ronald Loftin. As in Koedatich I, defendant was free to introduce evidence tending to prove that a generic someone else did the crime, but he could not identify any specific individual without more notice. The trial court's ruling was therefore correct.
Prior to closing statements, the trial court granted a motion in limine precluding the defense from making certain arguments during summation. Defendant contends that those limitations deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L.Ed. 2d 636, 645 (1986) (citations omitted). During the trial, the State focused on defendant's statement to the Sears employees that he (as Gary Marsh) worked at Exxon. Because none of Marsh's personal belongings identified him as an Exxon employee, the State asked the jury to conclude that defendant could have known that Mr. Marsh worked at Exxon only if defendant had been at the Exxon station during the robbery/homicide. Defense counsel sought to argue in summation that defendant need not have been at the Exxon station, but could have simply found Mr. Marsh's wallet and read about the homicide in one of the Trenton newspapers that reported the homicide and provided details. Indeed, Thomas Citron, one of the State's witnesses, had first contacted the police after seeing an article about the homicide in the newspaper. The trial court refused to allow defense counsel to assert that defendant read about the crime in the newspaper because there was no evidence presented at trial to allow this inference. However, the court did permit the defense to argue that the information in the newspaper was available for people to read. I want it to be clear, you're not going to tell the jury that Mr. Loftin could have read the article. You're not going to say those words. You can certainly say to the jury that Mr. Citron read the article.... Certainly one could infer or conclude a lot of people could have read the article. During summation, defense counsel argued that the information supplied by defendant to Sears was the same information that Mr. Citron was equipped with ... that he had read in the newspapers about the incident. The scope of defendant's summation argument must not exceed the four corners of the evidence. State v. Reynolds, 41 N.J. 163, 176, 195 A. 2d 449, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000, 84 S.Ct. 1930, 12 L.Ed. 2d 1050 (1964) (citation omitted). The four corners include the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. State v. Hill, 47 N.J. 490, 499, 221 A. 2d 725 (1966). We agree with the trial court that defendant's claim here was not based on any evidence introduced at trial. Defendant did not establish that he ever read the newspaper, or that he even saw it, especially since he did not live in Trenton but in Bristol, Pennsylvania. Defendant need not have taken the stand and waived his right to remain silent in order to have established a factual basis for this argument; he could have had his wife or mother testify on the availability of Trenton newspapers. Because no such evidence was offered, the trial court properly excluded that argument. Moreover, even if the argument should have been allowed, its exclusion was harmless error. The defense was adequately able to suggest to the jury that defendant could have acquired the information from the newspaper. Moreover, the evidence was overwhelming that defendant was at the Exxon station and committed the murder, and no rational jury would have concluded that defendant was not at the scene but merely read about the crime in the paper. Defense counsel also sought to argue in summation that the homicide may not have been intentional but rather an accident, the result of a robbery gone bad. The trial court restricted that argument in several ways. First, defendant sought to argue that because Mr. Marsh was a nail biter and nail biters are nervous people, he might have acted in a nervous manner which could explain the unintended discharge of the weapon which went off. We readily agree with the trial court that such an argument had no basis in the evidence. Second, defendant sought to argue in summation that the homicide was the result of an accidental discharge of the gun. The State objected, clarifying that it did not object to the defense arguing that the evidence cannot tell us whether this is an intentional murder versus an accident or a fight or a robbery that just went awry, but it did object to defense counsel asserting an evidentiary basis for a conclusion that was unsupported by the evidence. As defendant virtually conceded at the in limine hearing, the scenarios he wished to proffer were not based on facts in evidence but the lack of facts. The trial court agreed with the State, asserting that there was no fact or inference to support a robbery gone bad theory. We agree. Defendant was permitted to argue, and did in fact argue, that there was no evidence conclusively proving that this was not an accidental death. For example, defense counsel pointed to the medical examiner's inability, based on the autopsy itself, to rule out accidental death. However, because no evidence that actually supported the defense theory was developed on the record, the trial court correctly precluded defendant from arguing that a factual basis existed to affirmatively support the conclusion that the death was accidental. There was no evidence of a struggle and no evidence that the gun discharged accidentally. Indeed, the State presented testimony that the gun could fire only if the safety was removed and ten pounds of pressure was applied to the trigger. Thus, even if defendant were able to argue a robbery gone bad theory, the sheer weight of the facts would have led the jury to disregard it. Because there was no evidence to support a robbery gone bad theory, the trial court correctly limited the defense argument on that theory.