Opinion ID: 2460785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: state-of-the art instruction.

Text: KRS 411.310(2) provides as follows: In any product liability action, it shall be presumed, until rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary, that the product was not defective if the design, methods of manufacture, and testing conformed to the generally recognized and prevailing standards or the state of the art in existence at the time the design was prepared, and the product was manufactured. OCF contends that once evidence was introduced that its product conformed to the state of the art existing at the time it was designed and manufactured, this statute entitled it to a jury instruction on that issue. The trial judge did not instruct the jury on this alleged defense. Golightly responds that under Kentucky law, the only effect of a presumption is to require the person against whom the presumption operates to present evidence in rebuttal, whereupon the presumption disappears. KRE 301; R. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 10.05 III (3rd ed. Michie 1993). He cites Sexton by and through Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820, 112 S.Ct. 79, 116 L.Ed.2d 52 (1991), a diversity action interpreting Kentucky law, which held that the only effect of KRS 411.310(2) is to entitle the manufacturer to a directed verdict if the plaintiff fails to present evidence in rebuttal of the presumption. OCF notes that in Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 789, 792, n. 1 (1985), we referred to the defenses expressed in KRS 411.310 and that Justice Palmore suggests that the statute is superfluous if it only reiterates the traditional plaintiff's burden of producing evidence to establish his claim, citing 2 Palmore, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Civil) § 49.01 (Comment), pp. 385-86 (4th ed. Anderson 1989). OCF's characterization of Justice Palmore's Comment is dubious at best; but we do note that unlike other statutes creating presumptions, KRS 411.130(2) requires rebuttal not simply by evidence, but by a preponderance of the evidence, which at least suggests a shifting of the burden of proof and the creation of a jury issue. [3] Nevertheless, this issue must await resolution in another case; for here, it was not preserved for appellate review. As noted supra in Part I of this opinion, Golightly sued twenty different defendants in this case, all of whom except OCF either settled or were dismissed prior to trial. In addition, numerous other plaintiffs filed separate civil actions against the same defendants also claiming asbestos-related injuries. The trial judge entered a standing order with respect to all pending asbestos-related litigation which created a Master File as a repository for orders and documents common to all of those civil actions. Paragraph 8 of the standing order provided as follows: Within 60 days of the entry of this order, all parties shall file master jury instructions in the Master File. In subsequently filed cases, those parties who have not previously filed jury instructions in the Master File shall do so within 60 days prior to trial. Nothing in this provision shall be deemed to waive the right of any party to amend or file additional jury instructions in any case. In response to this order, many of the defendants filed sets of tendered jury instructions in the Master File. Four defendants, A.W. Chesterton Co., Allied-Signal Corp., John Crane, Inc., and U.S. Mineral Products Co., included in their tendered instructions an instruction purporting to embody a state-of-the art defense. OCF tendered no instructions, but filed a document in the Master File containing the following two sentences: Comes the defendant, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, and pursuant to the Court's Standing Order regarding asbestos personal injury litigation, and hereby expressly adopts the Master Jury Instructions filed on behalf of all other defendants in these cases. Defendant Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, pursuant to the terms of the Standing Order, reserves the right to amend or supplement jury instructions in this matter. OCF never amended or supplemented this document and the record does not reflect that it ever tendered any specific instructions of its own. Nor does the record contain an objection by OCF to the instructions ultimately given to the jury. It contends that its adoption of all of the instructions tendered by all of the other defendants was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CR 51(3): No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he has fairly and adequately presented his position by an offered instruction or by motion, or unless he makes objection before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the ground or grounds of his objection. (Emphasis added.) Filing a document stating that a party adopts all of the instructions tendered by all of the other parties does not satisfy the requirement of CR 51(3), which requires that the desired instruction be offered. That is especially true in a case like this with multiple defendants, some of whom tendered instructions and some of whom did not, and all of whom except OCF were no longer parties when the case went to trial. The trial judge would have needed extra-sensory perception to discern which instruction among literally sheaves of instructions tendered by now absent defendants was the one desired, but not specifically requested, by OCF in this case. If a party seeks to preserve error under CR 51(3) by tendered instruction instead of specific objection, that party must actually tender the desired instruction or specifically call the trial judge's attention to its existence at some point before the jury is instructed. Accordingly, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court and the decision of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. All concur.