Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Asserted error in allowing defendant to waive counsel during nine months of pretrial proceedings

Text: Defendant asserts that Judges Arnason and Sepulveda erred by granting his request for self-representation in May and September of 1990, because he was incompetent to waive his right to counsel. Accordingly, defendant urges, he was denied his right to counsel during the pretrial period from May 1990 to February 1991. Indeed, defendant further suggests that the record shows there was, during this time, substantial evidence of his mental incompetence to stand trial or waive counsel, and that Judges Arnason and Sepulveda erred under section 1367 in failing, on their own motion, to order and conduct a competency hearing pursuant to section 1368. As the United States Supreme Court clarified in Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 ( Godinez ), in order to represent oneself at trial, (1) a defendant must be competent to waive his or her right to counsel ( id., at p. 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680)  a determination that must be made, the court held, under the same test that applies to competence to stand trial, that is, the defendant must have a `sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and ... `a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him' ( id., at p. 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680); and (2) the waiver of counsel must be knowing and voluntary  that is, the defendant must actually ... understand the significance and consequences of the decision, and the decision must be uncoerced ( id., at p. 401, 113 S.Ct. 2680, fn. 12; see generally People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 732, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1363-1364, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) [33] We turn first to the lengthy examination conducted at the May 1990 hearing by Judge Arnason. During that hearing defendant was advised of his right to counsel and was told that if he represented himself he would have no right to an attorney who would work for him or be under his control, and that his access to a law library would be less than that available to an attorney appointed to represent him. Defendant was advised that he would be expected to know and follow applicable evidentiary and legal rules and to behave in court as would an attorney. He was told that the prosecutor would be an experienced professional, that self-representation is almost always unwise, and that by representing himself he might do more harm than good to his defense. Defendant replied that he understood, but still wished to represent himself. He explained that he had received a high school G.E.D., had an underwater diving certification, was 12 units short of an A.A. degree, had read a thousand books (including the Evidence Code and much of the Penal Code), had [g]reat comprehension, and understood trials and the legal system. Finally, defendant stated that he understood the consequences  including being subject to the death penalty  should he be convicted. Defendant was informed, and acknowledged, that by representing himself he would be giving up one of the most common bas[e]s for appeal, namely asserted ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Invoking his experience as a certified diver, defendant asserted that he could handle the pressure of a trial. Judge Arnason concluded: Well, [defendant] impresses me as being an individual who is certainly competent to make this decision under the Faretta doctrine [ ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, [422 U.S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562])]. He obviously has some background in dealing with situations where pressure could be applied.... [¶] Being a licensed deep sea diver is not the easiest thing in the world to acquire.... And your education is sufficient for me to find that you are able to understand the English language, to read, understand the documents fully. [¶] And I'm satisfied that this defendant therefore is entitled to from this time forward ... be his own lawyer. Defendant asserts that because, at the time he brought his motion before Judge Arnason, he had been accused of threatening potentially adverse witnesses and of arranging for a payment of $1,000 to keep Terry Guillory from testifying, Judge Arnason was required to find him incompetent to stand trial and hence incompetent to waive counsel. We disagree. The circumstance that defendant was accused of such misconduct did not provide a basis for questioning his competence either to stand trial or waive counsel, and defendant provides no authority to support his assertion. [34] We turn next to the follow-up inquiry conducted at the September 1990 hearing by Judge Sepulveda  to whom, at that time, defendant's case had been assigned for trial. Judge Sepulveda explained that from her reading of the transcript of the prior hearing, it appeared that defendant was legally entitled to represent himself. Judge Sepulveda asked defendant whether he was experiencing any problems, and whether he wanted to continue to represent himself. Defendant (who by that time had filed motions for pretrial discovery, change of venue, dismissal, and expanded telephone use, as well as a motion to declare the use of cyanide gas as a means of execution to be illegal) responded that he was having difficulty obtaining compliance with discovery requests and that his assigned investigator was overburdened with other cases. Defendant also mentioned that he had been authorized to incur $5,000 in expenses for a venue study to support his change of venue motion, and that he had been told that expenses for that study would amount to $10,000  but he added that he might submit the venue motion without the supporting documentation, because I don't feel the venue study is going to tell me anything different than you all know, to be honest. On the whole, defendant asserted, he remained comfortable with the prospect of self-representation. Judge Sepulveda then discussed with defendant various scheduling matters, such as when defendant planned to file future motions, and whether he could meet the then-target date for trial in November 1990. The court again admonished defendant that by representing himself, he would forgo his ability to assert, on appeal, ineffective assistance of trial counsel as a basis for relief, and that it would be difficult for defendant to prepare his own case from the jail, especially if he continued to have disciplinary problems in custody. In this regard, the court stated that it had become aware that defendant had been accused of stabbing a fellow inmate in the neck with a pencil. Finally, Judge Sepulveda reiterated that James's role as advisory counsel would be a limited one. The court stated: He can advise you. He can help you write your motions. He can talk to you. He'll be sitting there next to you if you want to have him there during the trial, during motions, but ... he would not be questioning the witnesses, asking questions of potential jurors, arguing the motions. In other words, he won't be speaking for you. Now as I say, he may convince me otherwise or you may convince me otherwise. If you even want him to do something like that later on, but the reason for telling you that is as it might impact on your decision to stay in a pro per status. I don't want you to have a frame of mind where you think that you and Mr. James are co-counsel, and that you're going to be trying this case together. I just want you to understand that, okay? (Italics added.) Defendant responded that he understood and still wished to represent himself, with James as advisory counsel. Defendant asserts that despite this record, because Judge Sepulveda (i) knew he had stabbed a jail inmate with a pencil, and (ii) had been told by defendant that he might submit his venue motion without a supporting study, and because (iii) Maurice Solvang had asserted, in his unsworn December 5, 1989, interview, that defendant had acted strangely shortly before and after the killings, Judge Sepulveda should have harbored doubt concerning defendant's competence to stand trial and hence to waive his right to counsel. We disagree. The stabbing incident surely suggested defendant's potential for violence (as of course did the charged killings themselves), but violent tendencies do not by themselves suggest incompetence to stand trial or waive counsel. The stabbing certainly did not suggest any absence of `sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' or `a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' ( Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680.) Nor did defendant's stated plan (which he eventually undertook) to submit his venue motion without supporting documentation establish or suggest incompetence to stand trial or waive counsel. Defendant submitted numerous other motions, some successful, and ably argued them. That he submitted his venue motion without a supporting study may suggest, as defendant implied at the September 1990 hearing before Judge Sepulveda, that he did not believe the study was crucial to, or would add much to, the motion  but the circumstance that defendant held that view would not suggest incompetence to stand trial or waive counsel. Moreover, the unsworn December 5, 1989, statement by Maurice Solvang, which defendant asserts should have alerted the court that defendant was incompetent to stand trial or waive counsel, was not before either Judge Arnason or Judge Sepulveda  and, indeed, was not introduced until after the trial had commenced. Accordingly, there is no reason for the information contained in the transcript of that interview to have informed the understanding of either Judge Arnason or Judge Sepulveda concerning defendant's competence to stand trial or waive counsel. Moreover, the assertedly relevant contents of the interview concerned defendant's demeanor on July 5, 1989  which was 10 months before the May 1990 hearing, and 14 months before the September 1990 hearing at which defendant asserts the court should have declared a doubt concerning his then-present ability to stand trial or waive counsel; hence this interview was of questionable relevance to defendant's then-present ability to stand trial or waive counsel. Finally, the description of defendant's mental condition set forth in the interview  disclosing Solvang's impression that defendant was jumpy after having taken drugs and appeared a few days before the killings like a volcano that was building to the point of exploding, and that defendant was very irritated, agitated, scary, and distraught after the killings on July 5, 1989  does not suggest incompetence to stand trial or waive counsel many months later. Thus, even if knowledge of the contents of Solvang's December 5, 1989, statement properly could be attributed to Judge Arnason or to Judge Sepulveda, these judges would not have had any substantial reason to doubt defendant's ability to stand trial or waive counsel. We conclude that the record supports the conclusion of Judges Arnason and Sepulveda that defendant was competent to waive his right to counsel, and that his waiver was knowing and voluntary. Defendant's responses demonstrated, with regard to the question of competence to waive counsel, that he had `sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and ... `a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' ( Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680.) Defendant responded in an appropriate manner to questions posed to him, fully demonstrating his awareness of the circumstances he faced and the proceedings against him. He explained that he had consulted with his counsel, James, concerning his decision, and wished James  whom he considered a very good attorney  to remain available to him as advisory counsel. The record also clearly supports the determination that defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent, in the sense he understood the significance and consequences of his decision, and that his decision was uncoerced. It follows that neither judge erred in accepting defendant's waiver of counsel.