Opinion ID: 525194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonable Fee Requirement

Text: 55 Having found that Donovan satisfied the but for requirement, the court must now determine what portion of the requested fees were reasonably incurred and thus qualify for reimbursement. In determining whether fees are reasonable, courts ordinarily focus on two questions: (1) whether the attorneys charged a reasonable hourly rate and (2) whether the time attorneys logged on the case was reasonable--i.e., did the attorneys waste or otherwise unnecessarily spend time on the matter. We conclude that Donovan's attorneys charged a reasonable hourly rate, 15 but, however, billed for time which was either not reasonably necessary or sufficiently documented. 16 56 Donovan's request for reimbursement was accompanied by affidavits of his attorneys supporting his request for compensation. Donovan was represented by William O. Bittman of Pierson, Ball & Dowd (Pierson, Ball) of Washington, D.C., and Paul J. Curran of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler (Kaye, Scholer) of New York City. The fee application states that Donovan has paid $112,281.56 in fees and expenses: Attorneys' fees and expenses of $79,228.90 on account of the work of Pierson, Ball, and $33,052.66 in fees and expenses on account of the work of Kaye, Scholer. The Supplemental Submission included affidavits from his two lead counsel, Bittman and Curran, and from highly qualified counsel of the New York and Washington Bars, Robert B. Fiske, Jr. and Daniel A. Rezneck. This court was also provided with exhibits and further information documenting the services rendered by the two law firms, Pierson, Ball and Kaye, Scholer. Principally, the firms submitted their time sheets which contained an itemized bill and brief description of services rendered. 57 The statute authorizing reimbursement of attorneys' fees leaves the determination of the amount of reimbursement to the discretion and judgment of this court, i.e., the division of the court may ... award reimbursement for those reasonable attorneys' fees... Sec. 593(f)(1) (emphasis added). 58 The Conference Committee Report of November 20, 1987, to accompany H.R. 2939, Rep. No. 452, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1987), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1987, pp. 2150, 2197, of the House of Representatives states: 59 [T]he hourly rate is left to the judgment of the special court using the standard of reasonableness. In determining the proper rate, the special court should consider the prevailing community standards and any helpful case law. The conferees encouraged the special court to obtain the Justice Department's opinion on the reasonableness of the hourly rate being claimed by counsel in a particular case. 60 Also in determining the amount of the underlying fees to be awarded, the special court should pay particular attention to the reasonableness of the underlying items. Reimbursable attorneys' fees are for reasonable legal expenses arising from the independent counsel process. Attention should also be paid to the number of hours claimed for performing particular services, again to ensure the reasonableness of the underlying item. 61 We interpret the term reimbursement to mean actual fees incurred by the subject and the term incurred to mean actual fees which the subject paid or for which he is liable. Our interpretation of the reasonableness limitation will in turn be influenced by the existing law on determination of a reasonable attorneys' fee: 62 There are over 100 separate statutes providing for the award of attorney's fees; and although these provisions cover a wide variety of contexts and causes of action, the benchmark for the awards under nearly all these statutes is that the attorney's fee must be reasonable. 63 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council For Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3096, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). See also Kreimes v. Department of Treasury, 764 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.1985) (Standards set out in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), are applicable generally to attorneys' fee cases.). This court, using the standard of reasonableness to be applied to every feature of the amount requested, will ordinarily award an amount which will be equal to the lodestar 17 figure in such litigation. 64 In Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984), the Court, citing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 and Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), concluded that 'product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate' normally provides a 'reasonable' attorney's fee within the meaning of the statute [Sec. 1988]. Blum, 465 U.S. at 897, 104 S.Ct. at 1548 (quoting Hensley at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1939). Additionally, the Court stated that Hensley recognized that an upward adjustment to the normal award may be justified in an exceptional case. Id. However, the Blum Court noted that [t]he burden of proving that [an upward] adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee is on the fee applicant. Blum, 465 U.S. at 898, 104 S.Ct. at 1548. 65 The Blum formulation has been summarized by this court as a three part analysis: (1) determination of the number of hours reasonably expended in litigation; (2) determination of a reasonable hourly rate or 'lodestar'; and (3) the use of multipliers as merited. Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C.Cir.1988) (en banc )--hereafter SOCM. See also, Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564-65, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3097-98, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). In the instant case, Raymond Donovan has not requested an upward adjustment of the lodestar amount. Moreover, the court will not make any downward adjustment of its calculation of the lodestar--i.e., the deductions the court will make from Donovan's fee request are made in determining the reasonable hours expended. Thus, the court need not address the issue of whether any adjustments are merited. 66 The body of law developed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 and other similar federal attorneys' fee statutes will prove useful to attorneys in preparing applications for fees. The attorneys' fees provision of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, has been interpreted to include reasonable expenses usually billed to the client in addition to the hourly rate. See Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 559 (10th Cir.1983). In this Act the term expenses is used in the legislative history interchangeably with the term attorneys' fees. The obvious intent of the Act is to reimburse public officials for expenses incurred in the scrutiny of their affairs when the investigation exceeded that to which a private citizen would be subjected. 67 Under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, 18 attorneys' fees are based on a market rate analysis and we are applying an actual but reasonable rate analysis to the determination of reimbursable costs. The statute and legislative history establish that 'reasonable fees' under Sec. 1988 are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the revelant community. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. at 1547; 19 see also Bebchick v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Com'n, 805 F.2d 396, 402 (D.C.Cir.1986); Jordan v. Multinomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1987). 68 Under the market rate analysis only those expenses actually billed to normal clients are includable in an attorneys' fee award. See Ramos v. Lamm, supra. The decisions cited above, however, are not controlling precedents for this court's application of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act. This court will not impose a requirement that the subject has paid the attorneys' fee in question before reimbursement can be sought. It will only require that the subject be legally liable for fees incurred by representation during the investigation. In this case no question is raised as to compliance with the latter standard since the fees have been paid on the basis billed. 69 The foregoing analysis also applies to the rates charged for services of paralegals and law clerks. 20 The use of paralegals and law clerks has become an accepted practice among law firms. Often the work done by them was formerly done by junior associates at much higher rates. The use of paralegals and law clerks results in lower fees to the client and thus should result in a lower request for reimbursement. 70
71 Donovan's attorneys here have requested their usual hourly rates for their services. See Bittman affidavit at 5; Curran affidavit at 6. Supporting affidavits attached to the Supplemental Application by independent and well qualified counsel assert that these rates are within the range of rates usually charged by attorneys in the Washington, D.C. and New York City areas. We therefore find the hourly rates charged by Pierson, Ball and Kaye, Scholer to be reasonable. The firms' rates range, for Pierson, Ball from $250.00 per hour (Bittman in Washington, D.C.) to $65.00 per hour and, for Kaye, Scholer from $350.00 per hour (Curran in New York City) to $60.00 per hour. These fees--while very high, especially for the lead counsel--were the attorneys' usual hourly rates and all rates billed conformed with the fees charges by attorneys of comparable qualifications in their respective communities. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. at 1547. 21 72
73 The court's determination of the reasonableness of the hours billed will consist of a two-step analysis. First, we shall examine the fee application in light of the Act which requires the court to determine whether the fees charged were incurred during the independent counsel investigation and were reasonably related to a defense to such investigation. Second, we shall examine the fee request in light of general case law on what constitutes hours reasonably incurred. 74 At the outset, the court will deduct from Donovan's fee request hours which were not contemplated by Sec. 593(f) as fees incurred during the Independent Counsel's investigation. That is, hours which both firms billed for activities which were unnecessary to the substantive defense of Raymond Donovan against the charges the Independent Counsel was investigating. Because these services were not rendered for activities reasonably related to Donovan's defense, they cannot be subject to reimbursement under Sec. 593(f). 75 In reviewing the time sheets for such charges, we have not approved attorneys' fees paid to Pierson, Ball for the following items: (1) Raymond Donovan's letter to the Independent Counsel explaining his refusal to submit to a formal interview. This letter was transmitted to the Independent Counsel after Donovan's attorneys had communicated his refusal to testify 22 and therefore was unnecessary to the defense of Donovan. Letter at 1. The letter acknowledges that its motivation was personal and not legal. Id. The charges concerning the Donovan letter total $1,020.50. (2) Pierson, Ball's time sheets also denote charges ($1,873.50) for hours expended in responding to press inquiries and drafting press releases. Media related activity has no bearing on the operation of an independent counsel's investigation and thus is not reasonably related to a defense to such investigation. This holding is in accord with our previous Order In re Edwin Meese III, Division No. 84-1 (June 7, 1985). In Meese, this court excluded fee requests for media related activity due to the nonreimbursability of time spent dealing with the media in the course of represent[ation] ... Id. (3) Pierson, Ball's billings ($963.00) for services rendered described as conflict of interest research are also not reimbursable. There has been no indication as to how conflict of interest research is relevant to this matter. 76 We had some misgiving about the expenditures, $3,650, with respect to the [r]esponse to the Report of [the] Independent Counsel. Such expenditures, strictly speaking, were not incurred during [the] investigation as required by Sec. 593(f), the Independent Counsel's investigation terminates with his filing of a Final Report. We, however, find such expenses to be reimbursable since the Act provides that subjects of investigations may file comments and factual information [for inclusion in] ... an appendix to such final report. Sec. 594(h). 77 In determining the amount to be deducted from Kaye, Scholer's fees, the court has, as with Pierson, Ball, subtracted for (1) services rendered in connection with the drafting of press releases and other media related activity--($728)--and (2) for services rendered in regard to Donovan's letter to Independent Counsel Silverman explaining his refusal to testify--($290.50). 78 Turning to issues which generally affect attorneys' fee requests, this court will require that fee applications include contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of the work with supporting documents, if any. See National Association of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1982); ([C]asual after-the-fact estimates of time expended on a case are insufficient to support an award of attorneys' fees. Attorneys who anticipate making a fee application must maintain contemporaneous, complete and standardized time records which accurately reflect the work done by each attorney.); see also Grendel's Den Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir.1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir.1983); Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Supply Co., 540 F.2d 102, 109 (3d Cir.1976) (en banc ). 79 This requirement is particularly apt when the fee requirements will be satisfied from the United States Treasury. We must strictly construe a waiver of sovereign immunity. See, United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 851, 106 S.Ct. 2224, 2234, 90 L.Ed.2d 841 (1986) ([A] waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be lightly implied ...) (citations omitted); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 2701, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981) ([T]his Court has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be used must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.) (citations omitted); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18, 100 S.Ct. 352, 356-57, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) ([W]e should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver [of sovereign immunity] beyond that which Congress intended.); In re Jordan, 745 F.2d 1574, 1576 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.). 80 Additionally, where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the ... court may reduce the award accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). See also Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988); United Slate Tile & Composition v. G & M Roofing, 732 F.2d 495, 502 n. 2 (6th Cir.1984) (Supporting documentation must be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended ...). 81 We have examined all the documentation provided by Donovan's attorneys and find that a number of billing entries are not sufficiently documented. On several occasions the description of services rendered is confined to legal issues, conference re all aspects or call re status. Such description fails to provide the court with any basis to determine with a high degree of certainty that the hours billed were reasonable. The vague description does not allow the court to evaluate whether the time billed was spent on issues that have been found not within the contemplation of Sec. 593(f) and this compels the court to exclude such hours. 82 Examples of such disallowed time include: July 27, 1987, August 11, 1987, August 28, 1987, October 16, 1987, October 19, 1987 and October 20, 1987. Additionally, vague descriptions force the court to partially disallow some other time claimed. Examples of partially disallowed times include: August 12, 1987, (1 hour), August 19, 1987 (1 hour), September 3, 1987 (1 hour), September 14, 1987 (1 hour) and September 23, 1987 (1.2 hours). The partially disallowed time involves billing entries for a large block of time and the description contained some references to specific work and a general reference. We credit the specific reference; we cannot credit the general reference. 83 In addition to the above deductions for vagueness, we are also compelled to deduct from the fees claimed by both firms charges incurred when attorneys held conferences and teleconferences with persons referenced as Geiser and Wells. The application fails to document who these individuals are or the nature of their relationship to the investigation; consequently, we cannot evaluate whether such fees were reasonably incurred. 23 84 Additionally, we note the Supreme Court's admonition in Hensley that [t]he district court should also exclude from the initial fee application hours that were not 'reasonably expended.' Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 [Citing S.Rep. No. 94-1011 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 5908--The Senate Report on the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Award Act of 1976, supra.]. Because [c]ases may be overstaffed, the Hensley Court directed courts to scrutinize fee requests for excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours which firms would have excluded from bills to their own clients. Id. This Circuit has stated: Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (1980) (en banc ) (emphasis in original). Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit observed: [g]eneralized statements that time spent was reasonable ... of course are not entitled to much weight. Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, supra, at 1301 (citing, Hensley, 461 U.S. at 439 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. at 1942 n. 15). 85 The case of Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C.Cir.1984) (partially overruled on other grounds ), 24 provides an example of a court excluding redundant fee requests. In Laffey, Mary Pat Laffey, et al., and counsel, the Washington, D.C. law firm of Bredhoff & Kaiser, brought a successful Title VII action against Northwest. Following the trial on the merits, the district court ordered counsel to negotiate on the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded to the plaintiff. Bredhoff & Kaiser hired the Washington, D.C. law firm of Arnold & Porter to represent them in the negotiations. The negotiations failed and the parties submitted widely divergent calculations of fees. One source of disagreement between the parties was the hiring of Arnold & Porter. Northwest asserted such hiring caused unnecessary duplication of work by Bredhoff & Kaiser and Arnold & Porter. The Laffey district court judge excluded hours that he believed were duplicative stating: 86 The Court declines to pass judgment on the propriety of Bredhoff & Kaiser's decision to retain separate fee counsel; it leaves to counsel the professional judgment as to how its fee application is most effectively prepared. Counsel is not free, however, to exercise its judgment in a fashion that unnecessarily inflates the losing party's fee liability, e.g. by injecting an additional layer of attorneys into the case. 87 Laffey, 572 F.Supp. 354, 369 (D.D.C.1983). 88 The district court excluded 125 hours out of 245 hours of inter-firm meetings concerning the fee application. This ruling was affirmed by this Circuit. Laffey, 746 F.2d at 29-30. Thus, Laffey outlines a situation where a court should exclude fee requests because of overstaffing on a case. See also Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir.1988) (Redundant hours generally occur where more than one attorney represents a client.); Singer v. Shannon & Luchs Co., 779 F.2d 69, 70-71 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Absent some explanation, a fee attributable to expenses incurred by several attorneys in attendance at hearings at which only a single attorney's presence arguably was necessary would appear to be excessive.); Grendel's Den v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 953 (1st Cir.1984) (We see no justification for the presence of two top echelon attorneys at each proceeding.); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 623 F.Supp. 21, 24 (D.C.Ariz.1985) (reversed on other grounds, 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.1985) (If more than one attorney is involved, the trial judge in determining the amount of attorneys' fees must consider the possibility of duplication of effort.) (citations omitted). 89 In addition to the above mentioned deductions, we have also excluded the fees charged by Kaye, Scholer between July 28, 1987 and October 22, 1988. This period represents the legal fees billed by Kaye, Scholer in responding to the Independent Counsel's subpoenas and conducting the substantive defense to the allegation that Donovan committed perjury. The services provided by Kaye, Scholer duplicate the services provided by Pierson, Ball. During this period, both firms engaged in extensive research and legal analysis of perjury law. The supporting affidavit states: [t]he key issue involved was whether or not Mr. Donovan had committed perjury ... The time sheets of both firms are replete with references to work done researching legal issues, perjury issues and materiality (an element of the perjury offense). This research was duplicative. 90 Additionally, the court will deduct one-third ( 1/3) of Pierson, Ball's billings for services rendered between July 27, 1987 and October 22, 1987 that were incurred when Pierson, Ball attorneys held conferences with attorneys from Kaye, Scholer. We view this time as also being duplicative in light of the numerous intra-firm conferences at Pierson, Ball. 25 91 Similarly, we have excluded the work done by Pierson, Ball in advising Donovan on whether to waive the statute of limitations on the perjury charge. Donovan incurred these fees in March of 1987. The Independent Counsel sought the waiver to prevent him from being forced to actively investigate the Columbian Allegation while the Bronx County trial was still pending. Kaye, Scholer also billed for this time and we find that one firm was fully capable of competently advising Donovan on the statute of limitations matter. Thus these services were also duplicative. 92 While a subject of an independent counsel investigation has every right to retain as many attorneys as he chooses, we consider, for the purpose of determining the proper award of reasonable attorneys' fees, the retention of two very competent attorneys with their accompanying staffs at major law firms excessive and therefore an unreasonable expenditure. The court cannot see any reason why one firm could not have handled the entire case. We recognize that both legal counsel successfully defended Donovan in the Bronx County criminal prosecution; this fact alone, however, does not render the hiring of both firms reasonable.