Opinion ID: 1177186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the pending interpleader action is barred by final judgments in other civil actions arising from husband's death

Text: Wife argues that even if her acquittal on the first-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter charges does not conclusively establish her right to recover the proceeds under husband's insurance policy, the issue of whether or not she feloniously killed husband was decided in her favor in a probate proceeding on April 6, 1984. Wife contends that under the doctrine of res judicata, or alternatively under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, children and special administrator are barred from asserting in the pending interpleader action that wife is not entitled to receive the insurance proceeds. However, it does not appear from the record before us that the issue of whether or not the interpleader action is barred by the probate court's judgment  or by judgments in other civil cases arising from husband's death (including a pending wrongful death action, custody proceedings, and other probate proceedings)  has been argued before or considered by the trial court. The pre-trial hearing in the interpleader action was held on February 27, 1984, and the certified interlocutory order reviewed here by this Court was entered by the trial court on that date  more than a month prior to the probate court's final determination on April 6, 1984. Because the issue of whether the pending interpleader action is barred by judgments in other civil cases has not been raised or specifically dealt with in the trial court, and because this question was not certified to us, we need not decide this issue in this case. Gilmore v. St. Anthony Hospital, Okl., 516 P.2d 248 (1973); State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Gosselin, Okl., 493 P.2d 430 (1972); Petitioners of School Dist. No. 9 v. Jones, 193 Okl. 9, 140 P.2d 922 (1943). Instead, that issue is addressed in a companion case, In the Matter of the Estate of Tony Franklin Hampton III, Deceased, Okl., 696 P.2d 1027, an appeal which is presently pending in this Court.