Opinion ID: 845820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Third-party Standing

Text: In count I of their amended petition, petitioners challenge appellants' policy endorsement as violating the rights of appellants' insureds. Thus, count I of the petition concerns third-party standing  whether petitioners may litigate to vindicate the rights of others. The general rule is that a litigant cannot vindicate the rights of a third party. [27] The rule disfavoring jus tertii  litigating the rights of a third party  assumes that the party with the right has the appropriate incentive to challenge (or not challenge) governmental action and to do so with the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation. [28] Furthermore, this rule reflects a healthy concern that if the claim is brought by a third party, the courts might be `called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.' [29] As is often the case with general rules, there are recognized exceptions. While third-party standing is generally disfavored, federal jurisprudence has permitted, under certain limited circumstances, a litigant to assert the rights of another. In addition to requiring that the litigant establish standing, [30] the litigant must also make two additional showings. First, the litigant must have a sufficiently close relation to the third party. [31] Second, there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests. [32] Michigan's third-party standing jurisprudence is considerably less developed. In Mary v. Lewis , [33] a garnishee defendant challenged the constitutionality of a codefendant's prejudgment garnishment. This Court discussed and denied third-party standing to the defendant after discussing factors from a United States Supreme Court dissenting opinion: [34] As a general rule, one party may not raise the denial of another person's constitutional rights. . . . Defendant quotes portions of Justice Brennan's dissent in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974), where two exceptions to this general rule are discussed: first, those situations where there is evidence that the direct consequence of the denial of the constitutional rights of the other would impose substantial economic injury upon the party asserting the right; second, those instances where the litigant's interest and the other's interest intertwine and the latter's rights may not be effectively vindicated in any other manner because they are capable of evading constitutional review. In this case the bank does not show how it qualifies under either of these exceptions . . . . We therefore conclude that the bank has no standing to interpose the due process rights of the principal defendant regarding the prejudgment garnishment. [399 Mich. at 416, 249 N.W.2d 102.] Thus, the Mary Court would permit jus tertii where a litigant could establish an economic injury, show that the interests between the litigant and the party possessing the right intertwine, and show that the third party's rights are capable of evading constitutional review. In our judgment, the test utilized by the Mary Court is analytically deficient. Requiring that a litigant establish an injury, economic or otherwise, is merely a component of our traditional standing doctrine. [35] Moreover, that the litigant and the third party have intertwining interests does not lead to the inference that the party establishing jus tertii will be an ardent proponent of the rights of the third party. The third factor is the most curious, for whether a claim is capable of evading review is a consideration that is recognized as relevant to mootness, not standing. [36] Accordingly, we adopt the traditional federal test for third-party standing as articulated in Tesmer. A party seeking to litigate the claims of another must, as an initial matter, establish standing under the test established in Lee, supra . [37] Second, the party must have a close relationship with the party possessing the right in order to establish third-party standing. Last, the litigant must establish that there is a hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests. As applied to the facts of this case, petitioners cannot meet the requirements of third-party standing and cannot litigate the rights of appellants' insureds. Assuming arguendo that petitioners could satisfy the Lee elements, [38] and assuming without deciding that petitioners share a sufficiently close relationship with appellants' insureds, [39] there is absolutely no evidence that any obstacle or hindrance prevents appellants' insureds from protecting their own interests through litigation. Therefore, we hold that petitioners do not have standing to assert that the rights of appellants' insureds were violated by appellants' managed care endorsement.