Opinion ID: 2084660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Manufacturer Defendants

Text: The heart of the Court of Special Appeals' opinion, expressed as multiple holdings, see id. at 534, 538, 545, 547, 552, 933 A.2d at 546, 549, 553, 554, 557, is that the facts determinative of whether the negligent acts of the manufacturer defendants... are substantial factors in causing the deaths and injuries and, hence, that such injuries and deaths were foreseeable are susceptible of more than one inference. Id. at 552, 933 A.2d at 557. The court found that [t]hese facts are not so close to the polar extreme that the issue of causation is rendered a matter of law. Id. On this basis, with examples cited to support its reasoning, [10] the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court's grant of the manufacturer defendants' motion to dismiss, making clear that the court was not addressing a resolution of the merits of the issue, but rather ruling that the issue was more appropriately decided on a motion for summary judgment or after trial. Id. at 551, 933 A.2d at 557. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court in dismissing Counts III and IV of the Complaint alleging that the manufacturer defendants were strictly liable for design defects in the smoke detector. After reviewing the essential elements of a claim sounding in strict liability, as delineated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, [11] the court noted that the only issue is whether the circuit court could properly determine from the allegations in the complaint that any causation attributable to the manufacturer defendants... was superseded by the negligence of others. Id. at 578, 933 A.2d at 573. The intermediate appellate court stated that an intermediary's negligent failure to prevent harm will be a superseding cause when it is `so extraordinary as to not have been reasonably foreseeable.' Id. at 580-81, 933 A.2d at 574 (citation omitted). Moreover, the crucial inquiry in determining the effect that a factor has, in causing harm, standing alone, when there are multiple causes, is determined, not only by the nature of the particular factor, but also by whether the aggregate of the causes produce an unforeseeable result. Id. at 582, 933 A.2d at 575. The Court of Special Appeals held that such a determination could not be made until the facts [are] ... gleaned from all relevant and material information. Id. at 582, 933 A.2d at 575. Finally, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court granting the motion to dismiss the manufacturer defendants as to Counts V and VI in the Complaint alleging breach of express and implied warranties. The Court of Special Appeals reiterated that the motion must be evaluated based on the pleadings alone. When matters outside of the pleadings are presented, the motion should be treated as one for summary judgment and `all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent.' Id. at 583, 933 A.2d at 576. The Court of Special Appeals noted as follows: Had the court elected to consider the User's Manual, it may well have been persuaded that there was no breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because the instructions contained in the User's Manual ... accurately described precisely how the product would perform.... As to the more general implied warranty of merchantability, based on industry standards, a superseding cause analysis would likewise be appropriate, but only upon facts susceptible of but one inference. Id. at 586-87, 933 A.2d at 577-78. With respect to the breach of an express warranty claim, the Court of Special Appeals first noted the difference between a court's treatment of express and implied warranties: What differentiates a promise implied by law [ i.e., an implied warranty,]... and an express warranty is that the `standard of performance is set by the defendants' promises, rather than imposed by law.' Id. at 587, 933 A.2d at 578. Thus, an express warranty [as well as an implied warranty], in essence, sounds in contract and, accordingly, is viewed from the perspective of the individual bargain. Id. at 588, 933 A.2d at 578. The Court of Special held that the Circuit Court could not have analyzed the breach of express warranty claim properly without examining the documents, including the smoke detector's User's Manual as well as marketing, advertisements, and sales literature, alleged to extend such warranties. Id. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court's grant of the manufacturer defendants' motion to dismiss on Counts V and VI alleging breach of express and implied warranties.