Opinion ID: 2971450
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Additional Testimony by Individuals

Text: Who Examined Pacoda After the Due Process Hearing The school district argues that the district court improperly admitted the testimony of Dr. Judith Kaas-Weiss and Jennie McGuire. Kaas-Weiss evaluated Pacoda in April, 2001, and testified at the district court’s evidentiary hearing in December, 2002, that, in her opinion, Pacoda is not mentally retarded.2 J.A. at 263. Her opinion contrasted with that of the school district’s experts, who evaluated Pacoda using different intelligence tests — the Wechsler and Stanford-Binet tests — and determined that Pacoda is mentally retarded.3 McGuire, a speech therapist, began providing speech therapy to Pacoda in January, 2002. In October, 2002, McGuire began training Pacoda to use a communication device that allows Pacoda to communicate her needs through a picture-based screen. J.A. at 54. She testified that Pacoda has made 2 Kaas-Weiss explained that she administered a test to Pacoda called the Comprehensive Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (CTONI). J.A. at 52-53. She explained that this test differs from the Wechsler and Stanford-Binet tests used by the school district to evaluate Pacoda because the CTONI does not require the test subject to verbalize answers or use fine motor skills. KaasWeiss thought the CTONI was more appropriate for Pacoda because “she’s incomprehensible when she speaks, so there is no way, even if she knew the answer in her head to the verbal portion of the [Wechsler] test, to respond comprehensively. And the performance part [of the Wechsler test] requires fine motor skills that she doesn’t have.” 3 Pacoda’s IQ was tested in 1995 by Josephine Cheatham, M.Ed., who administered a series of tests, including the Stanford-Binet test, and concluded that Pacoda was mentally retarded. J.A. at 51. In 1999, Dr. Warren Thompson, a psychologist for the school district, administered the Wechsler test to Pacoda. Dr. Thompson also determined that Pacoda was mentally retarded. To make this determination, Thompson administered both verbal and performance portions of the test. Although he thought that Pacoda’s speech was difficult to understand, he concluded that he could understand her well enough to score her answers. 8 considerable progress with the communication device and will be able to use it throughout her life. J.A. at 247. The school district argues that neither Kaas-Weiss’s nor McGuire’s testimony relates back to Pacoda’s 1999-2000 IEP – the only IEP, according to the school board, at issue – and is thus not properly admissible under Guest. The school district argues that the Bellamys did not raise the issue of the appropriateness of the mentally retarded designation on Pacoda’s IEP at the due process hearing; thus, according to the school district, they could not introduce evidence to contradict that designation at the hearing before the district court. The Bellamys argue, in response, that the testimony at issue, which goes directly to the question of whether, how, and what Pacoda can learn, applies directly to whether Pacoda’s 1999-2000 IEP was appropriate to her educational needs. The mere fact that Kaas-Weiss and McGuire examined Pacoda after the due process hearing occurred does not, by itself, make admission of their testimony erroneous. See Guest, 193 F.3d at 46263. The district court should not, however, “allow such evidence to change the character [of] the hearing from one of review to a trial de novo.” Cook, 915 F.2d at 234-35. The district court should “weigh heavily the important concerns of not allowing a party to undercut the statutory role of administrative expertise, the unfairness involved in one party’s reserving its best evidence for trial, the reason the witness did not testify at the administrative hearing, and the conservation of judicial resources.” Id. at 235. The focus in the instant case is on whether the district court admitted the testimony of Kaas-Weiss and McGuire for the purpose of deciding issues that were not decided by the ALJ. See, e.g., Guest, 193 9 F.3d at 463 (holding that the district court exceeds its jurisdiction when it uses additional evidence to rule on issues beyond those presented to the ALJ). Although the district court’s conclusion that “the IEPs developed for her were not properly designed to confer a meaningful educational benefit” refers to IEPs (i.e., plural IEPs), this does not lead to the conclusion that the district court improperly expanded the scope of its evidentiary hearing and review when it admitted the testimony of Kaas-Weiss and McGuire. The Bellamys were not asking the district court to evaluate Pacoda’s other IEPs, and the district court did not rule directly on the appropriateness of them. It merely relied on Kaas-Weiss’s testimony that Pacoda’s condition and cognitive abilities appeared to have been improperly diagnosed for several years to support its conclusion that her diagnosis of her disability – and, therefore, her education plan – was inappropriate for the school year 1999-2000. This is not a situation where the district court used the testimony of Kaas-Weiss and McGuire to hold that Pacoda’s other IEPs were inappropriate or ordered remedies related to those IEPs. The district court’s action echoed the trial court’s action in Guest, in which this Court stated that “[e]vidence arising from events occurring during the 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 school years was properly admitted by the district court, but only for the purpose of deciding whether the proposed IEP for the 1996-1997 school year was reasonably calculated to lead to educational benefits.” 193 F.3d at 463 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1040 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1040 (“evidence of a student’s later educational progress may only be considered in determining whether the original IEP was reasonably calculated to afford some educational benefit”). 10 Consideration of the factors recited in Cook – not allowing a party to undercut the statutory role of administrative expertise, the unfairness of allowing a party to save its best evidence for trial, the reason for the witness’s failure to testify at the due process hearing, and conservation of judicial resources – support the district court’s decision to admit the evidence. See 915 F.2d at 235. First, in this case, the testimony of the witnesses before the district court supported, rather than undercut the determination of the administrative law judge. Next, the Bellamys could not have presented the testimony of Kaas-Weiss and McGuire at the due process hearing because neither examined Pacoda until after the hearing. Their decision to procure these evaluations grew out of their belief that the 1999-2000 IEP was insufficient and failed to serve Pacoda’s needs. The additional evidence provided by Kaas-Weiss and McGuire supported the contention that they had asserted consistently. Additionally, the Bellamys were not represented by counsel at the due process hearing. Although this does not excuse their failure to present additional evidence at the due process hearing, it helps to explain their failure to have obtained this evidence earlier. Because the Bellamys had neither the opportunity nor resources to procure additional evaluations of Pacoda before the due process hearing, the district court did not abuse its discretion, in its effort fairly to adjudicate the Bellamy’s appeal, when it introduced this additional evidence.