Opinion ID: 182380
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Factual Basis for Identity Theft Conviction

Text: Oliver argues that the government did not establish that he knew that the names and social security numbers of his victims belonged to real persons. Oliver failed to object in the district court on these grounds. Therefore, this court reviews for plain error. See United States v. Castro-Trevino, 464 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir.2001) (en banc). Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must determine that the conduct admitted by the defendant is sufficient as a matter of law to constitute a violation of the statute. Marek, 238 F.3d at 314 (emphasis omitted); FED.R.CRIM.P. 11(b)(3). The defendant's admissions are compared with the elements of the offense. Marek, 238 F.3d at 314-15. [I]nferences may be `fairly drawn' from the evidence adduced after the acceptance of a guilty plea but before or at sentencing. United States v. Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d 466, 475 (5th Cir.) (citing United States v. Dyer, 136 F.3d 417, 425 n. 13 (5th Cir.1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 437, 172 L.Ed.2d 290 (2008)). As set forth above, when reviewing under a plain error standard, this court may consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error on substantial rights. Vonn, 535 U.S. at 59, 122 S.Ct. 1043. To establish aggravated identity theft, the government must prove that Oliver (1) knowingly used (2) the means of identification of another person (3) without lawful authority (4) during and in relation to a mail fraud offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A; accord United States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 404-05 (5th Cir.2009) (citing Flores-Figueroa v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 1888, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009)). While nothing in the record explicitly states that Oliver knew his victims were real persons, the evidence was sufficient for the district court to draw that inference. See Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d at 475 (citing Dyer, 136 F.3d at 425 n. 13). In the factual basis, Oliver admitted that he used without lawful authority a means of identification of another person. In addition, he admitted that he did knowingly use, without lawful authority, the means of identification of another person, that is, the name, social security account number, and date of birth of B.P. One can reasonably infer that the reference to B.P. suggests that Oliver knew that the information he used belonged to a real person bearing the initials B.P. Moreover, Agent McReynolds testified at sentencing that Henson sent Oliver text messages containing personal and identifying information of identity theft victims. Further, the cardboard box that Oliver kept at Armstrong's apartment contained identification cards and employment applications with identifying information as well as a list of names and corresponding social security numbers that Henson initially obtained while in prison. Nothing in the record suggests that any of the identities were fabricated; to the contrary, everything points to the conclusion that Oliver knew that the identities he used to effectuate the scheme belonged to actual individuals. Because it can be fairly inferred that Oliver knowingly and unlawfully possessed or used the means of identification of real persons, he fails to show that the district court plainly erred. See Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d at 475; Marek, 238 F.3d at 314-15.