Opinion ID: 2381990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inflammatory Photos

Text: Harris further asserts that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence State's Exhibits 4 and 5, consisting of two color photographs of the victim taken shortly after he had been shot. Harris objected to admission of the photographs at the sentencing because ... [they were] in color, ... inflammatory, [and] outrageous on their face. He claimed that they could do much better with black and white. In the words of Detective Ostendorp, the photographer, State's Exhibit 4 [s]how[ed] the victim lying on his back with his head facing ... the entrance of the store ... [, amongst] broken pieces of glass ... [and] blood. State's Exhibit 5 according to Ostendorp depicted the victim with blood about ... [his] face ... [,] torso and right hand ... [,] lying between the shelves which contained two shotguns and the cabinet which contained the handguns. In Mills v. State, supra, 310 Md. at 43, 527 A.2d at 7, we said that the admissibility of photographs turns upon a balancing of their probative value against their potential for prejudice, and that the application of this test is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 463, 509 A.2d 1179, 1197, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 598, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986); Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 729-730, 506 A.2d 580, 602 (1986); Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 502-504, 495 A.2d 1, 9 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 868, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986). Under this standard [a] court's determination in this area will not be disturbed unless plainly arbitrary. Mills, 310 Md. at 43-44, 527 A.2d at 8 (quoting Johnson v. State, supra, 303 Md. at 502, 495 A.2d at 8). In Mills, the defendant was charged with murdering his cell mate by stabbing him six times in the chest and thirty-nine times in the back. 310 Md. at 39, 527 A.2d at 5. At the guilt phase of the trial the judge admitted, over Mills's objection, a color photograph show[ing] the back of the victim with blood draining from stabbings scattered from the shoulders to the waist level. Id. at 41, 527 A.2d at 7. We concluded that the photo was [un]likely to so distort the jury's deliberations that its admission was `plainly arbitrary.' Id. at 44, 527 A.2d at 8. As a basis for our conclusion, we noted that the defense had not offered a stipulation that the victim had been stabbed six times in the chest and thirty-nine times in the back; those were facts the State was entitled to prove. And following examination of the photograph, we did not find it to be particularly gory or gruesome. Id. at 44-45, 527 A.2d at 8. In short we concluded that the photo's probative value on the issues of premeditation and provocation were not sufficiently outweighed by its potential for prejudice. In Mills the photos were presented at the guilt phase of trial; here they were introduced at the sentencing phase. The standard for admissibility  probative value versus prejudicial effect  remains the same, but the weighing must be done with recognition that the sentencing phase implicates issues and concerns that are different from those which predominate at the trial on the merits. In Booth, supra, 482 U.S. at ___-___, 107 S.Ct. at 2532-2536, 96 L.Ed.2d at 448-452, the Supreme Court addressed some of the concerns which are present during sentencing. The Court noted that the jury's task at a capital sentencing is to focus on the defendant as a `uniquely individual human bein[g].' 482 U.S. at ___, 107 S.Ct. at 2533, 96 L.Ed.2d at 449 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. at 304, 96 S.Ct. at 2990, 49 L.Ed.2d at 961). As we have already observed, the Court found that victim impact statements presenting the victim's family members' opinions and characterizations of the crimes injected an impermissible arbitrary component into the sentencing proceeding. In this regard Justice Powell explained that the formal presentation of this information by the State can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. As we have noted, any decision to impose the death sentence must be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion. .... The admission of these emotionally-charged opinions as to what conclusions the jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with the reasoned decision making we require in capital cases. 482 U.S. at ___, 107 S.Ct. at 2536, 96 L.Ed.2d at 452 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 402 (1977) (plurality opinion of Stevens, Stewart and Powell, JJ.)) [emphasis supplied]. Photographs of a murder victim, similarly, involve the potential for inflaming the sentencing jury and divert[ing] it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. Booth, 482 U.S. at ___, 107 S.Ct. at 2536, 96 L.Ed.2d at 452. Therefore, the presiding judge at a capital sentencing proceeding must exercise his discretion with great caution when ruling on the admissibility of photographic evidence of the murder victim. We do not know whether the State will reoffer the photographs at Harris's resentencing, nor can we foresee the circumstances under which they may be offered. When the sentencing jury is not the jury that heard the guilt stage of the proceedings, the evidence that is admissible at sentencing may differ from that which would be proper if a single jury heard both proceedings. See Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 427 A.2d 991 (1981). We can do no more at this point than direct the judge's attention to the principles we have discussed and charge him to exercise his discretion in light of them and of the circumstances before him.