Opinion ID: 2518069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Mitigating: restitution

Text: ¶ 48 A mitigating factor is timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct. ABA STANDARDS std. 9.32(d). The Board concluded this mitigating factor carries little weight, because Preszler required his client to sign a release to get her own money back. DP at 40. Preszler, however, argues we should fully weigh this factor. ¶ 49 Restitution is in good faith if made upon the lawyer's own initiative.  ABA STANDARDS std. 9.3 cmt. at 50 (emphasis added). Lawyers who make restitution voluntarily and on their own initiative demonstrate both a recognition of their ethical violation and their responsibility to the injured client or other party. Id. std. 9.4 cmt. at 51. A reduction in the sanction also acts as an incentive to make restitution, reducing the degree of injury to the client and helping ensure that the lawyer has recognized the wrongfulness of his conduct. Id. std. 9.3 cmt. at 50. ¶ 50 In our view, consistent with the commentary to the ABA Standards, restitution is not in good faith when the lawyer's ethical misconduct was knowing and yet the lawyer pays restitution only when a client demands it. In that circumstance, the lawyer is not acting on his or her own initiative, but at the client's behest, and is acting in fear of punishment, not out of an earnest desire to remedy the damage and admit liability. A different notion of good faith would give an incentive to culpable lawyers to withhold restitution until they are caught. Rather than admitting they have done wrong and remedying the harm, they are better off risking that no one notices their misconduct. If they are caught, they would still get full mitigation credit for paying restitution. That cannot be good faith. [7] ¶ 51 We implicitly recognized this interpretation of good faith restitution in Schwimmer. In Schwimmer, attorney Alec M. Schwimmer withdrew over $2,500 of his client's money from his trust account without his client's permission. 153 Wash.2d at 759, 108 P.3d 761. Schwimmer returned the money after his client demanded reimbursement. Id. The hearing officer had found a timely good faith effort to rectify the consequences of his misconduct by reimbursing his client, id. at 756, 108 P.3d 761, but we held firmly that there were no extraordinary mitigating factors present, id. at 762, 108 P.3d 761. Schwimmer acted knowingly and intentionally, and the restitution was prompted by his client. We were clear that Schwimmer should be disbarred notwithstanding the restitution, because the repayment does not eviscerate his or her ethical violation. Id. at 761, 108 P.3d 761. ¶ 52 Restitution is timely if the lawyer pays restitution before the disciplinary proceeding begins. As the commentary to the ABA Standards concludes, lawyers who make restitution prior to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings present the best case for mitigation. ABA Standards std. 9.3 cmt. at 50. The commentary leaves open the possibility that lawyers who make restitution later in the proceedings might earn mitigation, but the commentary says those lawyers present a weaker case. Id. Indeed, we held in Trejo that George P. Trejo's waiver of fees for the harmed client was untimely, as it followed the commencement of disciplinary proceedings, and thus this mitigating factor did not apply. 163 Wash.2d at 732, 185 P.3d 1160; See also In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cramer, 168 Wash.2d 220, 239, 225 P.3d 881 (2010) (refusing to apply this mitigator because the attorney did not start paying off tax warrants until after a disciplinary hearing). We can find no Washington decision applying this mitigating factor in a case where a lawyer pays restitution after the disciplinary proceeding begins. As the ABA Standards commentary concludes, Lawyers who make restitution only after a disciplinary proceeding has been instituted against them ... cannot be regarded as acting out of a sense of responsibility for their misconduct, but, instead, as attempting to circumvent the operation of the disciplinary system. ABA Standards std. 9.4 cmt. at 51. ¶ 53 Preszler did not pay restitution on his own initiative, but only when the client demanded it, just as in Schwimmer. He wrote the check to Kinnie only after obtaining a signed agreement from the Gerrards releasing Preszler from liability for any damages arising from his misconduct. These actions do not evidence a lawyer acting out of a sense of responsibility for his misconduct. He knew what he had done was wrong, as the hearing officer found. DP at 24. Preszler emphasizes that Kinnie's new attorney, Hames, is the one who suggested that the Gerrards sign the release. Regardless of who suggested it, Preszler agreed to it, instead of declining. Because Preszler readily accepted the release, he showed that he was not yet prepared to assume responsibility for the consequences of his actions. [8] ¶ 54 Preszler later waived the release, while the decision of the first hearing officer was pending. But withdrawing the release was not Preszler's idea; it was the first hearing officer's suggestion, as Preszler acknowledged in his waiver letter to Hames. Ex. 124 (As part of the disciplinary matter, Mr. Rettig recommended that I waive the release in my favor.) The waiver letter was dated August 29, 2005-two years after Preszler's misconduct, and nearly a year after the WSBA first filed a complaint against Preszler. This waiver was too late to be considered a mitigating factor. Preszler is not entitled to mitigation for restitution because the requisite good faith and timeliness elements are absent.