Opinion ID: 156860
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 97-1076--Claims against CSU

Text: 21 The CSU Defendants conceded that Drake has established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII: he is a member of a protected group; he applied and was qualified for the CSUPD job; he was rejected; and a non-minority applicant filled the position. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). As a result, the burden shifted to the CSU Defendants to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. See id. The CSU Defendants met this burden by producing the August 17 memorandum listing Hopkins' reasons for refusing to hire Drake, reasons that taken as true permit the conclusion that CSU had a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. 22 Consequently, the presumption of discrimination disappeared and the burden shifted back to Drake to present sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could find that CSU's proffered legitimate reasons for refusing to hire Drake were merely pretexts. See id. at 804; Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir.1995). At summary judgment, Drake could have met this burden either by presenting direct evidence of discrimination or by presenting circumstantial evidence showing that CSU's proffered reasons for refusing to hire Drake are unworthy of belief. See Randle, 69 F.3d at 451-53. The district court found that Drake failed to meet this burden. 23 Drake presented no direct evidence of discrimination. Instead, he argues that a statement in the August 17 memorandum by Hopkins that Drake indicated a high sensitivity to his race constituted sufficient circumstantial evidence of discrimination. While Hopkins mentioned the word race, Hopkins did not argue the Drake should be denied employment because of his race. Rather, Hopkins expressed concern over Drake's sensitivity to his race, a sensitivity that Hopkins feared would result in inappropriate action by Drake as a campus police officer in response to situations involving students of different races. Hopkins could not be sure that Drake would exercise appropriate professional judgment in such cases, especially given the Glendale incident, Drake's unrealistic understanding of the role of a campus police officer, and his poor interviewing demeanor. While inartfully worded, such a concern does not amount to discrimination on the basis of race. 24 Drake needed to present some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, suggesting discriminatory intent or casting doubt on the legitimacy of CSU's proffered explanations. This Drake failed to do. For example, although Drake presented evidence that CSUPD's hiring practices were sloppy and inconsistent, such evidence does not sufficiently rebut as pretextual the legitimate reasons proffered by CSU.
25 The same burden-shifting approach set forth above in the discrimination context applies to retaliation claims. See Purrington v. University of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025, 1033-34 (10th Cir.1993). Even assuming that Drake established a prima facie case of retaliation, 5 CSU met its burden by producing Hopkins' August 17 memorandum articulating legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment decision. Thus, Drake bears the burden of showing that CSU had a retaliatory motive in not offering him the job. See id. 26 Drake points to one part of Hopkins' memorandum in support of his retaliation claim, where Hopkins wrote: 27 It was stated in one interview by Mr. Drake that he would tolerate prejudice while in uniform because he was being paid to take it, but he would take civil action regarding prejudice out of uniform. I cannot be sure what he would consider on or off duty prejudice, although neither is appropriate and should not occur! He has the right to pursue civil remedies where he feels he was treated illegally; however, I would think it would be irresponsible for me to hire someone who has the propensity to be frequently embroiled in civil actions and the controversy stimulated by those actions. 28 Drake contends that Hopkins' concerns about Drake's propensity to be frequently embroiled in civil actions is sufficient evidence of retaliation to withstand summary judgment. However, Drake does not provide any evidence to show that this comment refers to the past Title VII suits Drake filed against various employers. In fact, Hopkins made that statement while noting that Drake would take civil action regarding prejudice out of uniform. Placed in context, the statement does not refer to past Title VII suits. Rather, Hopkins expressed concern over Drake's intention to file civil suits in the future against other private entities and the impact such litigation would have on the operations of the CSUPD and on Drake's ability to perform the job. 6 Hopkins did not criticize but rather affirmed Drake's right to take advantage of Title VII protections. Thus, Hopkins' statements do not constitute sufficient evidence of retaliatory motive. 7