Opinion ID: 162871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Personal Injury Liability

Text: Part B of the Policy provided personal injury liability coverage to the Owners. Specifically, the Policy provided that it applied to “‘[p]ersonal injury’ caused by an offense arising out of [the Owners’] business, . . . but only if the offense was committed . . . during the policy period.” Policy, Section I, Coverage B, ¶ 1(b)(1), Aplt. App. at 61. The Policy then defined “personal injury” as follows: 13. ‘Personal injury’ means injury, other than ‘bodily injury’, arising out of one or more of the following offenses: .... c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor[.] Id. at Section V, ¶ 13(c), Aplt. App. at 68. -11- The parties do not dispute that the alleged “wrongful eviction” of Falley’s from the supermarket space, and/or the alleged “invasion” of Falley’s rights under its lease with the Owners, is the “offense” at issue in this case. The only dispute is whether the district court correctly determined that the offense occurred on September 13, 1996 when Falley’s signed the lease termination agreement, and thus prior to the effective date of the Policy. The Owners’ arguments under Part B of the Policy are similar to their arguments under Part A, as they argue that an “offense” under Part B “can be a continuing one and comprised of discrete acts.” Opening Br. at 42. In addition, they argue that Christie’s conveyance of the supermarket property to Albertson’s on October 31, 1996, was the “liability-triggering offense” under Part B of the Policy. Id. at 44. As with their arguments under Part A of the Policy, there is a certain logic to the Owners’ arguments under Part B. Nonetheless, we agree with the district court that the “offense” for purposes of Part B occurred on September 13, 1996, when Falley’s executed the lease termination agreement. According to Falley’s state-court petition, that is the point in time when Falley’s formally agreed to terminate all of its rights in the lease as a result of Christie’s fraudulent inducements, see Aplt. App. at 86-88, and it is undisputed that the termination of Falley’s rights was complete on that date. Thus, as found by the district court, -12- because the Policy did not provide coverage for fraud or breach of contract claims, “[a]ny event occurring after [September 13, 1996] is inconsequential to [Part B of] the policy.” Id. at 537. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that there was no potential for coverage under Part B of the Policy, and we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of Scottsdale under Part B. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court David M. Ebel