Opinion ID: 509516
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Presumed Prejudice Standard

Text: 28 Prejudice is presumed when the record demonstrates that the community where the trial was held was saturated with prejudical and inflammatory media publicity about the crime. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-27, 83 S.Ct. at 1419; Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798-99, 95 S.Ct. at 2035; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352-55, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1516-18, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). Under such circumstances, it is not necessary to demonstrate actual bias. Estes, 381 U.S. at 542-43, 85 S.Ct. at 1632-33; Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1986, 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981) (quoting United States v. Capo, 595 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied sub nom. Lukefahr v. United States, 444 U.S. 1012, 100 S.Ct. 660, 62 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980)). The presumed prejudice principle is rarely applicable, Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 554, 96 S.Ct. at 2800, and is reserved for an extreme situation. Mayola, 623 F.2d at 997. 29 In Rideau, the Supreme Court found the facts concerning the media publicity to be sufficiently extreme to invoke the presumed prejudice rule. Rideau confessed to robbing a bank in Calcasieu Parish, kidnapping three of the bank's employees, and killing one of them. 373 U.S. at 723-24, 83 S.Ct. at 1418. This confession was videotaped and subsequently broadcast three times by a local television station. Id. at 724, 83 S.Ct. at 1418. At the time, Calcasieu Parish had a population of 150,000. Id. At trial, the court denied defendant's motion for a change of venue. Id. The Supreme Court held that the denial of the motion to change venue violated the due process clause. Id. at 726, 83 S.Ct. at 1419. The Court noted that three jurors who decided the case had seen the televised confession. Id. at 725, 83 S.Ct. at 1418. The Court concluded without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire examination of the members of the jury that due process required a trial before a community of persons who had not seen the televised confession. Id. at 727, 83 S.Ct. at 1419-20. The Court reasoned that the televised confession was Rideau's trial, and [a]ny subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality. Id. at 726, 83 S.Ct. at 1419 (emphasis in original). 30 We have independently reviewed the 136 exhibits introduced at the state court hearing on the motion for a change of venue. These exhibits apparently include every media reference to the Harris matter from July 5, 1978, the date of the homicides, until November 30, 1978, the commencement of jury selection. The exhibits reveal that from July 5, 1978 to July 21, 1978, media interest in this case was at its zenith. We conclude that the record of publicity in the months preceding, and at the time of, the ... trial does not reveal the 'barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial' amounting to a 'huge ... wave of public passion'  to warrant a presumption that the jurors selected for the trial of this matter were prejudiced. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1032-33, 104 S.Ct. at 2889 (citations omitted). 31 The vast majority of the media accounts are largely factual in nature. Compare Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802, 95 S.Ct. at 2037 (pretrial publicity not prejudicial because the news articles concerning the defendant were ... largely factual in nature) with Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 338-49, 86 S.Ct. at 1509 (prejudicial media reports were not factual in nature). It is quite true that some of the media reports refer to Harris' prior criminal record, and the alleged confession of each brother. These accounts, however, were published within the two weeks immediately following the homicides. The number of news reports regarding the Harris case had dissipated considerably by the time of jury selection four months later. 32 Harris also claims the record of publicity in this case demonstrates repeated acts by state and federal prosecutors releasing inflammatory statements, each publicly vying to outinsure [sic] the other that their jurisdiction would best guarantee appellant's permanent isolation from society. Harris argues that the release of publicity by law enforcement demonstrates the atmosphere surrounding the trial was so inflammatory as to undermine his right to a fair trial. The record does not support this contention. 33 Former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird, in her dissent in People v. Harris, described the public disagreement that occurred between the offices of the United States Attorney and the county district attorney as follows: 34 About this time, the publicity surrounding this case in San Diego County developed a new aspect, as the two major prosecutorial officers in the county became engaged in a sharp public dispute over which office would get first crack at prosecuting appellant. The local United States Attorney's office was responsible for the prosecution of the bank robbery offense, and the county district attorney for the homicides. Each office issued statements indicating what sentence appellant would likely obtain if convicted in its respective court. The United States Attorney claimed that the federal charges were an insurance policy against appellant's early release by the parole board. After the district attorney's office responded that it was seeking the death penalty--a punishment not available in the federal courts for bank robbery--the United States Attorney held a televised news conference at which he expressed the opinion that the California death penalty law was unconstitutional. 35 The district attorney's office took the public position that if the federal charges were tried first, the state might lose the opportunity to try appellant and obtain a death sentence. The district attorney attempted to delay appellant's arraignment in federal court, and members of the office accused the United States Attorney of political grandstanding. 36 The United States Attorney responded that it was the county prosecutors who were grandstanding. 37 When the federal authorities obtained a trial date of October 3, the Tribune noted this tightens the race between the two jurisdictions as to which will be the first to try the case. An assistant district attorney described the competition between his office and the federal prosecutors as an awkward situation. On August 7, the district attorney was able to have the state trial set on a date earlier than October 3, and the press reported that the district attorney had moved ahead in his efforts to beat federal authorities to the punch in prosecuting the Harris brothers. 38 Attorneys in the district attorney's office privately told the press that the motivation of the United States Attorney was politics. They claimed he is politically ambitious and ... he knows the case will receive a lot of publicity.... The United States Attorney responded that he was merely seeking maximum protection of the community. Members of the district attorney's office were said to scoff at this justification. 39 On August 10, the Union published a lengthy article on the jurisdictional dispute, reporting that a senior federal parole officer disputed the United States Attorney's computation of appellant's federal sentence. This official, who calculated a prison term far under the term mentioned by the United States Attorney, cannot understand why [the United States Attorney] is insisting on prosecuting the two brothers from Visalia. County prosecutors were again said to claim that federal involvement was for the sake of publicity. An assistant legal counsel for the C.R.B. computed for the Union that the least appellant would serve in state prison would be a term of years well beyond the term calculated by the federal parole officer. 40 These events were duly reported by the Union, the Times, the Evening Tribune, and by the local television stations over a two and one-half week period from July 20th through August 10th, and beyond. 41 28 Cal.3d at 969-71, 623 P.2d at 259-60, 171 Cal.Rptr. at 698-99. 42 These facts do not reveal a general atmosphere in the community or courtroom [which] is sufficiently inflammatory to deny Harris a fair trial by impartial jurors. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802, 95 S.Ct. at 2037. The dispute between the two prosecutorial branches focused on the merits of each criminal system in the context of this particular case; the publicized dispute did not involve a prejudgment by either office as to the guilt of Harris which existed in Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.1968), relied upon by Harris. Similarly, the disagreement was relatively short-lived, only spanning a brief two and one-half week period in the early part of the four-month period between the homicides and the voir dire of the jury. Under the totality of circumstances, Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799, 95 S.Ct. at 2036, Patton, 467 U.S. at 1031, 104 S.Ct. at 2889, the public dispute between the federal and local prosecution does not warrant a finding of community prejudice sufficiently inflammatory to deny Harris a fair trial.