Opinion ID: 2506395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver Election Language Requirements

Text: The plaintiffs first assert that the local school district waiver elections do not constitute the required advance voter approval because they provided no notice to voters that a yes vote could impact their property taxes. They insist that because the waiver elections did not specifically reference the property tax revenue limit, that limit was not waived. As noted, 174 of the 178 school districts in Colorado held successful, broadly worded waiver elections. The ballot measures at issue in these elections referred to collecting and expending all revenues or full revenues from whatever source, notwithstanding the limitations of article X, section 20. The scope of these waivers was unlimited as to the source of the revenue. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and found that the language of subsections (7)(c) and (d) established that changes in revenue and changes in property tax revenue must be treated differently. The court then held that the waiver elections at issue only met the requirements for revenue in general, and not property tax revenue. In essence, the court read into subsection (7)(c) specific voter approval language requirements for removing the property tax revenue limitation, and found that the local school district waiver elections did not meet those requirements. In reaching this conclusion, the court incorrectly interpreted the constitution and failed to give full force and effect to the waiver elections. Subsection (7)(c) simply states that the property tax revenue limit can only be adjusted by revenue changes approved by the voters without specifying any particulars about what kind of voter approval in advance is required. Applying the constitutional language by its clear terms, we determine that there are no specific voter approval language requirements in subsection (7). The only specific ballot language requirements of article X, section 20 are contained in subsection (3), [16] which is not at issue in this case. The inclusion of such specific ballot language elsewhere, however, points to the fact that the drafters could have included specific ballot language in this type of situation if they had chosen to do so. In the absence of any such language requirement, a district has the discretion to fashion an appropriate ballot question. With this understanding, we find our precedent established in Havens applicable. In Havens, we held that subsection (7)(d) mandates one of two outcomes when one of the limits established in sub-subsections (a) through (c) is exceeded. 924 P.2d at 523-24. Either the excess revenues are to be refunded or they may be retained and expended if the voters so approve. Id. Havens concerned a revenue waiver election held by Archuleta County containing language very similar to the waiver elections at issue in this case. We held that such wording in a revenue limit waiver clearly provides that the County may retain and expend the excess revenues it collects. Id. at 522. We did not require specific ballot language. In the case now before us, we again find that a broadly worded, voter-approved waiver of revenue limits, authorizing school districts to collect and retain all revenues notwithstanding the limitations of article X, section 20, does just that, with no restrictions or language requirements. In each of the 174 districts, voters waived all revenue limitations imposed by article X, section 20, and we will respect the General Assembly's interpretation that these elections provided the authority to implement SB 07-199 in the absence of clear provisions to the contrary. Id. The plaintiffs assert that our precedent established in Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 215 (Colo.1994), and Bolt v. Arapahoe County School District No. 6, 898 P.2d 525 (Colo.1995), requires that any voter approval in advance must involve approval of the specific tax policy change that is causing the net tax revenue gain. This is a misinterpretation of those holdings. Bickel and Bolt both dealt with mill levy increases, not the removal of a revenue limit, which is at issue here. In Bolt, we stated that article X, section 20, subsection (4) only requires voter approval for those taxes which are either new or represent increases from the previous year. Bolt, 898 P.2d at 534. In this case, there is neither a new tax nor a tax rate increase at issue, but the removal of a revenue limit. Moreover, we held in Bickel that even in the context of the specific ballot language requirements of subsection (3)requirements that are not at issue in this casea substantial compliance standard should be used to review claims brought to enforce article X, section 20's election provisions. Bickel, 885 P.2d at 227. As relevant here, those cases merely establish that a substantial compliance standard applies to article X, section 20 voting requirements. Because there are no specific language requirements for this type of waiver election, the individual school district waiver elections that reference all or full revenues substantially comply with the general requirements of subsection (7). In examining the plain language, we do not `read a statute to create an exception that the plain language does not suggest, warrant, or mandate.' Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs, 129 P.3d 988, 993 (Colo.2006) (quoting Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 35 (Colo.2000)). Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to prove that the waiver elections at issue violated a constitutional provision.