Opinion ID: 807765
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Predeprivation Process

Text: Under the Massachusetts licensing scheme, before a license may be revoked, the licensing authority must determine that there was an occurrence of any event that would have disqualified the holder from being issued such license or from having such license renewed, or that it appears that the holder is no longer a suitable person to possess such license. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. -46- 140, § 131(f). The statute provides that [a]ny revocation or suspension of a license shall be in writing and shall state the reasons therefor. Id. It is undisputed that this requirement was complied with here. We reject Hightower's claim that due process required that a hearing take place before her license could be revoked. The predeprivation process provided here was constitutionally adequate, when considered in conjunction with the available postdeprivation process. The Supreme Court has recognized, on many occasions, that where a State must act quickly, or where it would be impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997). We have explained that [t]he variety of . . . circumstances within which the exception [to the general requirement of predeprivation process] has been recognized demonstrates that the exception is a flexible one. San Gerónimo Caribe Project, Inc. v. Acevedo-Vilá, No. 09-2566, 2012 WL 3002559, at  (1st Cir. July 24, 2012) (to be published in F.3d) (en banc) (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting Elena v. Municipality of San Juan, 677 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that [p]rotection of the health and safety of the public is a paramount governmental interest which justifies summary administrative action. Indeed, -47- deprivation of property to protect the public health and safety is '[one] of the oldest examples' of permissible summary action. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 300 (1981) (second alteration in original) (quoting Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950)); see also San Gerónimo, 2012 WL 3002559, at . The Court has traditionally accorded the states great leeway in adopting summary procedures to protect public health and safety. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (upholding statutory scheme providing for summary suspension of a driver's license if a driver suspected of being intoxicated refuses to take a breathalyzer test). In such circumstances, full predeprivation process is not required so long as prompt postdeprivation review is available for correction of administrative error.22 Id. at 13. The revocation of a firearms license, particularly a license to carry a concealed, large capacity weapon, without a predeprivation hearing is justified by concerns as to public health and safety.23 See Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (Connecticut clearly has a strong and compelling interest in 22 We note that the federal Administrative Procedure Act provides for notice and an opportunity to demonstrate compliance with licensing requirements before revocation . . . of a license, [e]xcept in cases of willfulness or those in which public health, interest, or safety requires otherwise. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c). 23 Between January 1, 2005, and March 1, 2011, there were 1,876 shootings in the City of Boston, 301 of which were fatal. -48- ensuring that firearm permits are not issued to those 'lacking the essential character or temperament necessary to be entrusted with a weapon.' (quoting Dwyer v. Farrell, 475 A.2d 257, 260 (Conn. 1984))); Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that predeprivation process was not required to suspend gun dealer's license where there were security lapses at the gun store, given the interest in public safety); Hain v. DeLeo, No. 1:08-CV-2136, 2010 WL 4514315, at  (M.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2010) (rejecting the claim that revocation of a firearms license requires a predeprivation hearing, in part because the state interest in protecting the public safety through the enforcement of licensure requirements is compelling. . . . [A predeprivation hearing] would significantly burden the state interest in quickly removing licenses from individuals who prove to be dangerous after their license has been issued); Thomson v. Bd. of Firearms Permit Exam'rs, No. NNH950369628, 1996 WL 24701, at  (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1996) (holding that no predeprivation hearing need be held to revoke a pistol permit, in part because, given the nature of weapons and their potential for inflicting harm or causing death, recognition of a right to continue to carry a weapon between the time that evidence of unsuitability arises and completion of notice and a hearing would impose a great risk to the public whose interests the government must protect); Rabbitt v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489, 491, 493 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that, while the -49- Connecticut constitution provides a right to bear arms which must be protected by procedural due process, predeprivation process for revoking a pistol permit is not required, in part because [t]he summary nature of a pistol permit revocation is vital to protect the public safety. A permittee who is, in fact, unfit to carry a pistol could conceivably do a great deal of harm if given advance notice that his permit might be revoked; it could even result in the loss of human life. The risk is too great.). To the extent that Hightower separately argues that she was entitled to a hearing before surrendering her firearm itself, the argument fails because Hightower could have retained her firearm had she appealed the revocation of her license. The revocation statute provides that [u]pon revocation or suspension, the licensing authority shall take possession of such license and the person whose license is so revoked or suspended shall take all actions required under the provisions of section 129D. No appeal or post-judgment motion shall operate to stay such revocation or suspension. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(f). The license revocation letter Hightower received stated that Hightower shall, in accordance with M.G.L. c. 140, § 129D, without delay, deliver or surrender to the licensing authority where you reside your licenses to carry, and all firearms. Section 129D, in turn, provides that [u]pon revocation . . . of any firearms license if [a] firearms identification card is not then in force . . . the person whose -50- application was so revoked . . . shall without delay deliver or surrender, to the licensing authority where he resides, all firearms . . . which he then possesses unless an appeal is pending. Id. § 129D (emphasis added). The Supreme Judicial Court has noted that under § 129D, the obligation to turn over the firearms is suspended during the pendency of such an appeal. Pasqualone v. Gately, 662 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Mass. 1996).24