Opinion ID: 2217107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the defendant's exceptions.

Text: The defendant excepted to the judge's denial of his motion to strike portions of the report of the auditor. The portions objected to were the auditor's conclusions that the defendant's testatrix was negligent, although not grossly negligent. The defendant maintains that these findings were not supported by the subsidiary findings of the auditor. These findings in essence paralleled the plaintiffs' version of the events, except for the auditor's finding that the accident occurred in the emergency lane. We are satisfied that the subsidiary findings supported the conclusions of the auditor. The defendant also excepted to the admission in evidence of a pamphlet entitled Rules and Regulations for the Use of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. He argues that the provisions of G.L.c. 233, § 75, as amended through St. 1943, c. 190, § 1, [2] do not authorize its admission because the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority is not a department, commission, board or officer of the Commonwealth, but has an existence separate and apart from that of the Commonwealth. There is no question that the Authority is a creature of the Commonwealth, and indeed it has been likened to a municipal corporation for some purposes. Massachusetts Turnpike Authy. v. Commonwealth, 347 Mass. 524. We see no reason to treat the Authority, which is a public instrumentality performing an essential governmental function, supra, at 525, differently for the purposes of G.L.c. 233, § 75. There was no error. The defendant also claims error in the judge's denial of a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant on each of the counts. He contends that the evidence did not warrant a finding that the acts or omissions of the defendant's testatrix constituted gross negligence or that such acts or omissions were the legal cause of injury or damage to the plaintiffs. We do not agree. We are of opinion that there was evidence which would warrant the jury in so finding. Whether conduct amounts to gross negligence must be decided according to the peculiar features of each case. Bruno v. Donahue, 305 Mass. 30, 34. It necessarily follows that there was likewise no error in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdicts on the counts for ordinary negligence. The plaintiffs' exceptions as to counts 1 and 2 are overruled. The plaintiffs' exceptions as to counts 3 and 4 are sustained and the new trial is to be confined to counts 3 and 4. The defendant's exceptions are overruled. So ordered.