Opinion ID: 771926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allegations of Racism

Text: 38 All four appellants contend that their convictions must be reversed because their trial was tainted by juror Sean O'Reilly's racial bias, which appellants characterize as an extraneous influence not subject to Rule 606(b)'s prohibitions against juror testimony. In the alternative, appellants argue that even if Rule 606(b) bars the introduction of juror testimony regarding O'Reilly's racist statements in support of their claim that their right to an impartial jury was violated, that testimony may be considered as evidence that O'Reilly lied materially during voir dire, also compelling the grant of a new trial. Appellants emphasize that O'Reilly's alleged racism would have had a powerful impact in this trial, where three of the four appellants are African-American males and the prosecution's principal witness was a young white woman who had a sexual relationship with one of the African American defendants. 39 The district court summarily rejected the appellants' claim that their trial was tainted by racial bias, holding that testimony regarding O'Reilly's pre-verdict remarks  was foreclosed by Rule 606(b). The court did, however, consider the second question -whether O'Reilly's claimed statements demonstrated that he had failed to answer truthfully questions posed to him during voir dire. Without making any findings concerning the actual content of O'Reilly's statements -about which there was conflicting testimony and considerable dispute -the court ruled that it did not find that jurorO'Reilly failed to answer honestly. 40 Courts and commentators have struggled with the apparent conflict between protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial, free of racial bias, and protecting the secrecy and sanctity of jury deliberations. See generally Developments in the Law -Race and the Criminal Process: VII. Racist Juror Misconduct During Deliberations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1595 (1988); Victor Gold, Juror Competency to Testify that a Verdict was the Product of Racial Bias, 9 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 125 (1993). Although the broad language of Rule 606(b) could plausibly be read to exclude all juror testimony regarding racial bias during deliberations -at least to the extent that such testimony might reveal the influence of racial bias on a juror's verdict -courts faced with the difficult issue of whether to consider evidence that a criminal defendant was prejudiced by racial bias in the jury room have hesitated to apply the rule dogmatically. Wright v. United States, 559 F.Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 41 Appellants maintain that racial bias should be viewed as extraneous prejudicial information or as an outside influence that is expressly excluded from Rule 606(b)'s bar. 12 Even without characterizing racial bias as extraneous, a powerful case can be made that Rule 606(b) is wholly inapplicable to racial bias because, as the Supreme Court has explained, [a] juror may testify concerning any mental bias in matters unrelated to the specific issues that the juror was called upon to decide . . . . Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 121 n.5 (1983) (per curiam) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)) (emphasis added). Racial prejudice is plainly a mental bias that is unrelated to any specific issue that a juror in a criminal case may legitimately be called upon to determine. 13 It would seem, therefore, to be consistent with the text of the rule, as well as with the broad goal of eliminating racial prejudice from the judicial system, to hold that evidence of racial bias is generally not subject to Rule 606(b)'s prohibitions against juror testimony. 42 Some courts have suggested that Rule 606(b) should generally apply to racist statements made by jurors during deliberations, unless the resulting prohibition would deprive defendants of their right to a fair trial. 14 The Seventh Circuit expressed that view as follows: 43 The rule of juror incompetency cannot be applied in such an unfair manner as to deny due process. Thus, further review may be necessary in the occasional case in order to discover the extremely rare abuse that could exist even after the court has applied the rule and determined the evidence incompetent. In short, although our scope of review is narrow at this stage, we must consider whether prejudice pervaded the jury room, whether there is a substantial probability that the alleged racial slur made a difference in the outcome of the trial. 15 44 Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987). Or, as another court explained, if a criminal defendant could show that the jury was racially prejudiced, such evidence could not be ignored without trampling the sixth amendment's guarantee to a fair trial and an impartial jury.  Wright, 559 F.Supp. at 1151. In order to apply Rule 606(b) in this limited manner, a court would first have to receive the juror testimony in question, and then determine whether the testimony established that prejudice pervaded the jury room or that the jury was racially prejudiced. In our circuit, however, it would not be necessary to demonstrate that prejudice pervaded the jury room in order to establish a constitutional violation; we have made clear that the Sixth Amendment is violated by the bias or prejudice of even a single juror. Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). One racist juror would be enough. 45 In this case, there would be even stronger reason to conclude that Rule 606(b) should not bar juror testimony regarding O'Reilly's alleged racist statements, because the statements in question were made before deliberations began and outside the jury room. Rule 606(b)'s primary purpose -the insulation of jurors' private deliberations from postverdict scrutiny -would not be implicated by permitting juror testimony about what O'Reilly allegedly said while car pooling with other jurors. 46 While we find persuasive those cases that have exempted evidence of racial prejudice from Rule 606(b)'s juror incompetency doctrine, we need not decide today whether or to what extent the rule prohibits juror testimony concerning racist statements made during deliberations or, as in this case, outside of deliberations but during the course of the trial. Where, as here, a juror has been asked direct questions about racial bias during voir dire, and has sworn that racial bias would play no part in his deliberations, evidence of that juror's alleged racial bias is indisputably admissible for the purpose of determining whether the juror's responses were truthful. Hard v. Burlington Northern R.R. , 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir. 1987) (Statements which tend to show deceit during voir dire are not barred by [Rule 606(b)].). If appellants can show that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause, then they are entitled to a new trial. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). 47 The appellants contend that juror O'Reilly's racist statements establish conclusively that he answered questions untruthfully in his voir dire questionnaire. On that questionnaire, O'Reilly submitted that his overall view of interracial dating was neutral, that he had never had a bad experience with a person of a different race, and that race would not influence his decision as a juror in any way. The district court rejected appellants' claim, finding that the record did not establish that O'Reilly had answered any questions untruthfully. 48 The government does not dispute that a juror who answered in the affirmative questions about whether race would influence his decision would be subject to a challenge for cause. Instead, the government argues that appellants' claim is based on an unsupportable inference that anyone who uses the word nigger must hold racial bias against all African-Americans, and that the district court was not obligated to draw that inference. 49 We have considerable difficulty accepting the government's assumption that, at this time in our history, people who use the word nigger are not racially biased. In the present case, however, it is necessary to determine precisely what O'Reilly did or did not say before evaluating the truthfulness of his voir dire responses. The district court erred by rejecting appellants' claim without making any findings concerning whether O'Reilly actually made a racist statement and, if so, its specific content. Because there is considerable dispute as to the facts, we are unable to review the district court's conclusion in the absence of a specific finding as to which, if any, of the various accounts is correct. For example, in Malachowski's first account, he maintained that O'Reilly had declared, All the niggers should hang. Later, when Malachowski was pleading guilty to charges related to his role in the bribery scheme, he recanted his initial report and insisted that O'Reilly had simply used the word nigger,  but not in relation to the defendants in this case. Quihuis's version of events was different; it tended, however, to support Malachowski's original statement. Quihuis reported to the FBI that O'Reilly had stated, The niggers are guilty,  or simply Niggers are guilty. Finally, O'Reilly himself denied having made any racist statements at all, although we note that O'Reilly's own denials may be entitled to less weight than the accounts of other witnesses. Because the bias of a juror willrarely be admitted by the juror himself, partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it, it necessarily must be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 558 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 50 From the district court's order, it is not possible to determine whether the court concluded that O'Reilly had not made any racist statements, or whether it believed that while he did make such statements, that fact was not sufficient to establish that he answered untruthfully during voir dire. Resolution of the disputed question as to what O'Reilly did or did not say may well be determinative of whether his responses to the questionnaire were truthful. We therefore remand to the district court with instructions that the court enter detailed findings and make a specific determination regarding O'Reilly's alleged statements and racial bias.