Opinion ID: 1123041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court's evidentiary ruling

Text: The ICA held that, pursuant HRE Rule 803(b)(8)(C), Officer Cravalho's testimony regarding Michael's statements in the HPD-252 forms was presumptively admissible as evidence. We disagree. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Hawaii, by statute, by these rules, or by other rules adopted by the supreme court. HRE Rule 402 (1993). However, [h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Hawaii supreme court, or by statute. HRE Rule 802 (1993). Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. HRE Rule 801(3) (1993). An exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of public records and documents: Rule 803 Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: .... (b) Other exceptions. .... (8) Public records and reports. ... (C) in civil proceedings and against the government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. .... HRE Rule 803(b)(8)(C) (1993) (emphasis added). Despite this exception to the hearsay rule, the trial court did not permit Officer Cravalho to testify during cross-examination about Michael's statements in the HPD-252 forms, and it is this evidentiary decision that we review. [D]ifferent standards of review must be applied to trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence, depending on the requirements of the particular rule of evidence at issue. When application of a particular evidentiary rule can yield only one correct result, the proper standard for appellate review is the right/wrong standard. However, the traditional abuse of discretion standard should be applied in the case of those rules of evidence that require a judgment call on the part of the trial court. Kealoha v. County of Hawai`i, 74 Haw. 308, 319-20, 844 P.2d 670, 676 (1993), reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 847 P.2d 263 (1993). The trial court did not have to make a judgment call when it determined that Officer Cravalho's testimony about Michael's statements in the HPD-252 forms was inadmissible hearsay that failed to qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule under HRS § 803(b)(8)(C). [4] Therefore, we review the trial court's ruling with respect to hearsay and HRE Rule 803(b)(8)(C) according to the right/wrong standard. Since Rule 803(b)(8)(C), HRE, is identical to Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we [may] refer to federal case law for assistance in construing our Rule. Touche Ross Ltd. v. Filipek, 7 Haw.App. 473, 485-86, 778 P.2d 721, 729 (1989). Accordingly, we may also refer to case authority from another jurisdiction whose public records hearsay exception is identical to FRE Rule 803(8)(C). For example, the public records hearsay exception under the North Dakota Rules of Evidence (NDRE) Rule 803(8)(iii), is a verbatim adoption of Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence[.] Victory Park Apartments, Inc. v. Axelson, 367 N.W.2d 155, 161 (N.D.1985). In a civil proceeding [5] in North Dakota, in which a landlord sued a tenant for the damage that a fire had caused in her apartment, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a trial court had erred by allowing a police officer to testify about statements made by the tenant's boyfriend, Melvin Thompson, that the police officer had recorded in his police report on the morning after the fire. Id. at 162. The Axelson court initially determined that the police report itself was not admissible as evidence under the public records hearsay exception, because, rather than containing the factual findings of the police officer, as the police record hearsay exception requires, the police report merely contained Melvin Thompson's out-of-court statements from his interrogation with the police officer: The report in this case ... contains no ... findings or conclusions of the investigating officer; it is a summary of Melvin Thompson's interrogation. [The police officer] did not record any findings or conclusions drawn from his investigation or interrogation of Thompson. Even under the liberal interpretation of factual findings embodied in [other case authority], the report in this case simply does not fall within the Rule 803(8)(iii) [public records hearsay exception]. We conclude that the police report was not admissible under Rule 803(8)(iii). Id. (citation omitted). In addition to holding that the trial court had erred by admitting the police report into evidence, the Axelson court went on to address whether the trial court had also erred by admitting into evidence the testimony of the investigating police officer regarding Thompson's statements included in the police report[.] Id. Without a detailed analysis, the Axelson court quickly concluded that [t]he hearsay character of this testimony [wa]s obvious. Id. Therefore, [i]t was error to permit [the investigating officer] to testify regarding the statements made by Thompson. Id. Similarly, in a product liability lawsuit involving a particular medical device, a federal district court concluded that a witness's testimony did not satisfy the public records hearsay exception under FRE Rule 803(8)(C) because the witness's testimony consisted of what the witness and his staff had learned about the regulation of medical devices through, among other things, a review of F[ood and Drug Administration (FDA)] documents. Chadwell v. Optical Radiation Corp., 902 F.Supp. 830, 833 (S.D.Ind.1995). In response to the plaintiff's assertion that the witness's testimony about the FDA documents fell within the hearsay exception for public records and reports under FRE Rule 803(8), the Chadwell court explained that the plaintiff's assertion overlook[ed] that the evidence before the Court [wa]s not a public report, but testimony about such a report. Id. at 834 (emphasis added). Under such circumstances, [t]here may be several layers of hearsay involved. Id. Likewise in the instant case, Jhun's assertion, that Officer Cravalho's cross-examination testimony about Michael's statements in the HPD-252 forms was admissible under HRE Rule 803(b)(8)(C), overlooks that the proffered evidence before the trial court was not Officer Cravalho's factual findings, conclusions or opinions in the HPD-252 forms, but rather, the proffered evidence was Officer Cravalho's testimony about Michael's statements in the HPD-252 forms. With respect to the common law public records exception to the hearsay rule, Professor Wigmore states that the public records exception applies only to written statements: The statement must be in writing; this is not doubted. The policy of this limitation is unquestionable; for a written statement offers incomparable advantages with respect to accuracy of use and permanency of service; and since official records are commonly preserved after the death or retirement of the officer, there is commonly no practical need ... of accepting oral statements. 5 J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, § 1633(5), at 623 (1974) (footnotes omitted). Notwithstanding Professor Wigmore's requirement that public records must be in writing, we acknowledge that, today, public offices or agencies have utilized modern technology to store informational records in, not just written form, but, many different forms of documents. See, e.g., HRS § 92F-3 (1993) (`Government record' means information maintained by an agency in written, auditory, visual, electronic, or other physical form.). However, following the gist of Professor Wigmore's statement, we interpret the phrase record, report, statement, or data compilation of a public office or agency as not applying to the oral testimony of an employee of the public office or agency about such public informational documents. Instead, this phrase applies to a formal informational document that a public office or agency maintains in a written, auditory, visual, electronic or other physical document form. We agree with the Chadwell court that, when a party attempts to introduce a witness's testimony about a public informational document into evidence instead of the public informational document itself, there may be several layers of hearsay involved. Chadwell, 902 F.Supp. at 834. Jhun wanted to expose the trial court to the statements that Michael had made to Officer Cravalho, because Michael's statements might have tended to support Jhun's assertion that Cornelius was attacking Ronald in such a way as to put Ronald's life in danger, which, in turn, might have given Jhun justification for stabbing Cornelius under HRS § 703-305(1) (1993). However, Michael's statements to Officer Cravalho were hearsay, because they were out-of-court statements that Jhun offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Jhun was justified in stabbing Cornelius. Furthermore, Officer Cravalho had transcribed Michael's statements into the HPD-252 forms, which constituted hearsay. Finally, rather than offering the HPD-252 forms into evidence, Jhun attempted in court to elicit Officer Cravalho's testimony about Michael's statements in the HPD-252 forms, which, under these circumstances, was an attempt to elicit hearsay. Without a hearsay exception for each of these three levels of hearsay, Officer Cravalho's testimony was inadmissible. Indeed, even if Jhun had attempted to introduce the HPD-252 forms into evidence, rather than Officer Cravalho's testimony, Michael's statements within the HPD-252 forms would not be admissible pursuant to HRE Rule 803(b)(8)(C). Although the United States Supreme Court has held that FRE Rule 803(8)(C) allows for admission of public records and reports containing opinions and conclusions, Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169-70, 109 S.Ct. 439, 449-50, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988), the requirement that reports contain factual findings bars the admission of statements not based on factual investigation. Id. at 169, 109 S.Ct. at 449-50. Thus, cases from several jurisdictions indicate that when a police report simply records a witness's statement, absent a hearsay exception for the witness's statement, the police report cannot be admitted into evidence under an evidentiary rule similar to HRE Rule 803(b)(8)(C). [6] Although conclusions and opinions may also be contained in the document to be admissible under Rule 803(8)(C)'s exception to the hearsay rule, a report must first be a set of factual findings. The factual findings in a report qualifying for a Rule 803(8)(C) exception to the hearsay rule must, however, be based upon the knowledge or observations of the preparer of the report. As stated in the Advisory committee Notes to Rule 803, in a hearsay situation, the declarant is, of course, a witness and neither this rule nor Rule 804 dispenses with the requirement of firsthand knowledge. It may appear from his statement or be inferable from circumstances. Additionally, the comments note that police reports have generally been excluded except to the extent to which they incorporate firsthand observations of the officer. Miller v. Field, 35 F.3d 1088, 1091 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations, quotation marks, brackets and emphasis omitted). In Miller, a prison inmate brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against his camp supervisor and correctional officials, alleging that his camp supervisor and correctional officials were deliberately indifferent in failing to prevent inmates from sexually assaulting him, despite the fact that he had earlier apprised the supervisor and correctional officials that inmates had been threatening to assault him. However, upon the request of the defendants, the trial court admitted three Michigan State Police investigative reports into evidence that contained statements from the victim, the alleged assailants, various witnesses, and the local prosecutor, some of which tended to show that the victim's allegations about the assault might not be true. Vacating and remanding for a new trial, the Miller court held that, while the portions of the police investigative reports containing firsthand knowledge, observations, and fact finding were admissible under FRE Rule 803(8)(C), the portions of the police investigative reports containing third persons' statements were not admissible: [T]he statements of the victim, the alleged assailants, and various witnesses, as well as any statements by the prosecutor regarding reasons for not pursuing criminal charges against certain individuals, contained hearsay information, not facts observed by the preparer of the police report.... .... While a court may presume that a preparer of a report, under a duty to relate information, will perform the task required and formulate justified conclusions and reasonable opinions based on evidence actually observed by the preparer, no such presumption arises when the preparer relies on potentially untrustworthy hearsay evidence from another individual under no duty to provide unbiased information. The bulk of the Michigan State Police reports introduced as evidence at trial contains neither factual findings made by the report[s'] preparers nor conclusions and opinions based upon such factual findings. Instead, the reports are largely a recitation of statements of other individuals that fall under no other exception to the hearsay rule. Because those statements of the victim, the alleged assailants, other witnesses, and the local prosecutor are, therefore, hearsay within hearsay, that evidence should not have been placed before the jury in this case. Miller, 35 F.3d at 1091-92 (emphases omitted). Similarly in the instant case, the HPD-252 forms did not contain factual findings that Officer Cravalho based on his own investigation. Officer Cravalho did not record any of his own independent conclusions or opinions about his interview with Michael. Rather, the HPD-252 forms merely contained out-of-court statements that Michael had made to Officer Cravalho approximately one hour and forty-five minutes after the events that had culminated in Jhun's arrest. As a result, the HPD-252 forms lacked the typical characteristics of factual findings. Like the police reports at issue in Miller, the HPD-252 forms were merely a recitation of a thirdparty's out-of-court statements that fell under no other exception to the hearsay rule, and thus, the HPD-252 forms were not admissible under HRE Rule 803(b)(8)(C). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that Officer Cravalho's cross-examination testimony about Michael's statements in the HPD-252 forms was inadmissible hearsay.