Opinion ID: 793234
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the district court's order clearly erroneous?

Text: 30 An order is clearly erroneous for purposes of a mandamus petition if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Wash. Pub. Utils. Group v. U.S. Dist. Court, 843 F.2d 319, 325 (9th Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1305-07 (9th Cir.1982). Rule 15, which governs the taking of depositions in criminal cases, provides in pertinent part that [a] party may move that a prospective witness be deposed in order to preserve testimony for trial, and that [t]he court may grant the motion because of exceptional circumstances and in the interests of justice. Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(a)(1). Unlike in civil cases, however, Rule 15 depositions are not allowed merely for discovery purposes. United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir.1978). 31 We have previously clarified that Rule 15 contemplates a party taking the deposition of only his own witness, and only if the witness may be unable to attend trial. Id. at 934; United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986). Here, the district court's order violates the well-established principles governing Rule 15 depositions because the prospective deponents are adverse witnesses; they are available to testify at trial; and the defendants seek discovery, not preservation of testimony. Although the district court's order acknowledges that Rule 15 does not permit depositions for discovery purposes, the court inexplicably proceeded to authorize pre-trial depositions for that very purpose. 32 The only justification that can be gleaned from the discovery order is that [t]he witnesses would be less inconvenienced if allowed to state [their] opinions orally as opposed to being required to write them out, and that it would be more efficient to extract the details of any expert opinion[,] or lack thereof, before trial. The district court also justified its order as ensuring fairness and efficiency of the trial process. While the district court's belief that it would be more convenient and efficient to allow pretrial depositions may be well-founded, Rule 15 makes no exception for convenience and efficiency. See Rich, 580 F.2d at 933-34; Cutler, 806 F.2d at 935-36. 4 Moreover, the district court cites no case law to support its interpretation of Rule 15, and ignores the extensive body of law that directly contradicts its reasoning. Accordingly, the district court's order was clearly erroneous. 33 4. Is the error an oft-repeated error, or does it manifest a persistent disregard of the federal rules? 34 Because the district court's discovery order is a clear violation of the well-established legal principles underlying Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is likely not an oft-repeated error. Moreover, the government has not argued or presented any evidence to the contrary. Therefore, this factor weighs against the government's petition. 35 5. Does the district court's order raise a new and important problem, or an issue of first impression? 36 The district court reasoned that its order was necessary to ensure the fairness and efficiency of the trial process, and to establish pretrial procedures for effectively controlling the dissemination of the trade secrets before they are presented in the context of a public jury trial. However, no circuit has recognized any such exception to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the district court's order raises the new and important question of whether the EEA empowers a district court to order depositions for discovery purposes under Rule 15's exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice provision in order to ensure fairness and efficiency and effectively control[ ] the dissemination of important trade secrets. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting the government's petition. 37 In sum, four of the five Bauman factors weigh in favor of granting the government's petition.