Opinion ID: 1441368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The district court had jurisdiction over the interpleader action.

Text: Stringer first argues that, because he never filed a claim against either Bannon or Summers in Idaho, there was no cause of action in Idaho to which St. Alphonsus' lien could attach. I.C. § 45-701 states that entities operating hospitals in Idaho shall be entitled to a lien for the reasonable charges for hospital care, treatment and maintenance of an injured person upon any and all causes of action, suits, claims, counterclaims, or demands accruing to the person to whom such care, treatment or maintenance is furnished. (emphasis added). St. Alphonsus' right to a lien under I.C. § 45-701 is determined by what, if any, causes of action accrued to Stringer, not when, if ever, Stringer files a claim. Furthermore, I.C. § 45-704, clearly states that St. Alphonsus may enforce its lien by an action against the person, firm or corporation liable for such damages. Thus, St. Alphonsus' right to assert a lien on Stringer's causes of action against Bannon or Summers under I.C. § 45-701, or its right to enforce that lien under I.C. § 45-704, is not contingent on Stringer doing anything.
Stringer next argues that, because he did not assert a claim in Idaho to the insurance proceeds for an accident which occurred in Oregon, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the interpled funds. However, an action to foreclose a lien is an in rem action, for which jurisdiction is determined by the situs of the property against which foreclosure is sought. The propertythe $25,000 that Farmers acknowledged it was liable to pay on account of the cause of action which had accrued to Stringer against its insuredwas deposited with the court in Idaho. Thus, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the interpled funds.
Finally, Stringer's argument that St. Alphonsus could not proceed on its lien foreclosure claim without him because he was a necessary and indispensable party is likewise unavailing. Stringer consented to the court's in personam jurisdiction over him in the interpleader action, which action afforded him the opportunity to protect any interest he chose to assert in the interpled funds. The fact that he chose not to assert a personal interest in the fund, but instead limited his appearance in the interpleader action to a challenge of St. Alphonsus' right to the money, is of no consequence.