Opinion ID: 2625903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury instruction on state of mind

Text: Iuli also contends that, because the court's instructions listing two material elements of robbery in the second degree was improper, and because the trial court instructed the jury on the requisite state of mind with respect to three elements instead of two, the jury instruction on the state of mind became meaningless in the context of the court's description of the elements. The trial court did not instruct the jury as to the specific language of HRS § 702-204, which states in relevant part that a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, with respect to each element of the offense. However, the trial court instructed the jury on the requisite state of mind as follows: A person acts intentionally with respect to his conduct when it is his conscious object to engage in such conduct. A person acts intentionally with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious object to cause such a result. The state of mind with which a person commits an act such as intentionally may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Here, although the trial court presented the elements of robbery in the second degree as two material elements, but instructed the jury on the requisite state of mind with respect to three elements, the instructions taken as a whole was nevertheless understandable and did not render the state of mind instructions prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. Kinnane, 79 Hawai`i at 49, 897 P.2d at 976.