Opinion ID: 1415387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenge with Regard to Women's Representation.

Text: Appellant's final basis for challenging the composition of the grand jury is that women are underrepresented. This contention raises a harder question because the disparity in percentages is sizeable. Although there is some disagreement as to the actual percentage of eligible women in the community, it can be roughly placed at 50 percent. There is no dispute that the percentage of women selected for the grand jury pool was 22.7 percent. This disparity between the percentages of women in the community who are eligible for duty and the percentage of women ultimately selected into the grand jury pool is sufficiently significant to satisfy the first part of the Whitus test. Now we come to the phase of this opinion which makes application of the two-tier Whitus test appear nonsensical  that is, determining whether or not an opportunity for discrimination has been shown. The state, in a good faith effort to show beyond a doubt that no discriminatory intent motivated the selection of the jury pool, has itself established the second prong of the test. The jury commissioners testified at length that they were aware of their duty to insure that the ultimate jury pool consisted of a proportional representation of all the significantly identifiable groups in the community. They testified that they worked many hours as a committee and individually to increase the number of blacks and women that would ultimately be found on the grand jury list. The record is replete with undisputed testimony of the commissioners' tireless, prolonged, conscientious and exhaustive efforts to locate as many qualified women and blacks as possible in order to increase the proportional representation of the grand jury pool. Perhaps the most convincing bit of evidence that the low number of women in the grand jury pool was not the result of discrimination is that three of the six jury commissioners were women. The evidence also shows that the women's participation in selecting jurors was not passive. Commissioner Elaine Bolton testified I am a woman; I pushed to get a lot more women on. Commissioner Reba Matthews testified that all the jury commissioners made a concerted, as well as an individual, effort to select a jury pool which would be fairly representative. While this court recognizes that mere affirmations of good faith have been held insufficient to overcome prima facie cases of discrimination ( Barrow v. State, 239 Ga. 162, supra), the testimony by the female jury commissioners can be used to show that they actively participated in the selection process. Moreover, the testimony of the jury commissioners went beyond mere statements that they did not discriminate. The testimony clearly showed the procedure employed by the commissioners to obtain an increase in the number of blacks and women in the grand jury pool. They achieved this result with regard to black representation. It would have indeed been helpful in this case if the state had offered clear evidence as to why more women were not drawn into the jury pool. However, we cannot say that this neglect results in an unconstitutionally composed grand jury. There was sufficient evidence here to authorize the trial court's denial of the defendant's challenge to the grand jury composition. We think that the evidence shows that the underrepresentation of women on the grand jury was not the result of discrimination by the jury commissioners, and therefore refuse to overturn the trial court's findings. A defendant is not constitutionally entitled to a venire or jury roll of any particular composition, but the 14th Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clause and the 6th Amendment Right to a Jury Trial do require that the state not deliberately and systematically exclude identifiable and distinct groups from their jury lists. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (95 SC 692, 42 LE2d 690) (1975). Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 429 (219 SE2d 768) (1975). 2. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance on the ground of the absence of a witness who was at the time of trial incarcerated in a Tennessee prison. Code Ann. § 81-1410 sets out the items which need to be shown by a party before a continuance will be granted because of the absence of a witness. It was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion to deny the motion for a continuance when these items were not shown. Harris v. State, 142 Ga. App. 37 (234 SE2d 798) (1977). 3. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the introduction into evidence of hair samples taken from his head. We find that there was no violation of the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination. The evidence shows that prior to the taking of the hair samples, the defendant was given the standard Miranda warnings and that although the appellant was not told that he did not have to cooperate, he brushed his hair without objection so some strands could be obtained. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (86 SC 1826, 16 LE2d 908) (1967), found no violation of the defendant's constitutional rights when he was required to submit to the taking of a blood sample. [T]he privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and. . . the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends. Id. p. 761. See also Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511 (192 SE2d 350) (1972) (where this court held that forcing a defendant to submit to a safe surgical operation to remove a bullet which might be used in evidence in his subsequent criminal trial was not violative of state or federal constitutional law). 4. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor, an investigating officer, to testify after the rule of sequestration had been invoked when the prosecutor had remained in the courtroom without court permission. The prosecutor remained at the counsel table with the district attorney throughout the course of the trial after both sides invoked the rule of sequestration. The defendant did not make objection to this fact until the district attorney called the prosecutor as a witness. Upon assertion by the district attorney that the witness' presence was needed for an orderly presentation of the case, the court allowed him to testify, but only after ruling that it would instruct the jury that violation of the rule of sequestration impairs the witness' credibility. This same situation was faced in Larkins v. State, 230 Ga. 418 (197 SE2d 367) (1973), except that in that case there were no curative instructions given by the trial court. This court in Larkins found that under such circumstances it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to allow the prosecutor-witness to testify. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the witness to testify. 5. The defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to require full compliance by the district attorney with its Brady request for production of criminal records of persons the state intended to call as a witness. When this motion was first made by the defendant, the trial court, after an in-camera inspection of the district attorney's file, ordered the state to meet with the defense and turn over the requested documents. After this meeting, the defendant's counsel stated that he was completely satisfied that the district attorney had complied with his Brady motion. Later in the trial, when the district attorney objected to the defense counsel's attempt to impeach the character of a state's witness, a prison trustee, the defendant's attorney charged the district attorney with failing to disclose the witness' criminal record. The district attorney responded that he did not have a rap sheet on this witness, that his criminal record was local and could be found by examining public records in the same courthouse and that the defendant had waived any argument along this line when he stated earlier that the state had fully complied with his Brady motion. Moreover, the defendant was allowed on cross examination to inquire into the criminal record of the witness which disclosed prior felonies and misdemeanors. As we read the record, the district attorney did not have information about this witness' background assembled for trial. Rather, he merely knew from general knowledge that the witness, a prison trustee, had a local record. We cannot read Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), as requiring the state to take the trouble to obtain a certified copy of a local record in this situation. `The test is whether the undisclosed evidence was so important that its absence prevented the accused from receiving his constitutionally-guaranteed fair trial. . .' Jackson v. Wainwright, 5 Cir., 1968, 390 F2d 288. Carter v. State, 237 Ga. 617, 619 (229 SE2d 411) (1976). An application of this test to the facts of this case shows beyond a doubt that even assuming the State did have a duty to obtain such information for the defendant, failure to do so did not prevent him from receiving a fair trial. 6. Finally, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for directed verdict on the ground that the evidence corroborating the testimony of the accomplice was insufficient to prove the identity and participation of the accused. This contention is without merit; the evidence corroborates the accomplice's testimony in almost all relevant particulars.