Opinion ID: 2600470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retention of Counsel

Text: Citing the decisions in Wheat v. United States (1988) 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 and People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 275 Cal.Rptr. 191, 800 P.2d 547, defendant argues that the trial court violated its positive, sua sponte duty under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution to ensure that appellant would be represented by qualified, effective counsel by granting defendant's request for substitution of counsel. We disagree. As noted above, defendant was arrested on August 31, 1985. On September 3, 1985, a felony complaint was filed against defendant and the public defender was appointed as counsel. Defendant appeared in court represented by the public defender on September 9, 17, and 27, 1985. On October 9, 1985, Municipal Court Judge Elva Soper removed the public defender as counsel subject to defendant providing a written agreement retaining attorney Joseph Gallegos. On October 22, 1985, Judge Soper noted that defendant had failed to provide a written agreement retaining attorney Gallegos. Defendant indicated he no longer intended to retain Gallegos and instead asked to retain attorneys Arturo Hernandez and Daniel Hernandez (who are unrelated). The court stated that it had conducted an extensive examination of the attorneys which the defendant desires to have substituted in as the retained counsel. Noting that defendant had the right to retain counsel of his choice, the court stated that it is important the defendant be fully informed regarding his choice of counsel at this point rather than to have serious questions arise later which could result in even greater delay. This court cannot guarantee that such result will not happen anyway; it can only attempt to safeguard against it. The court stated that it had informed Mr. Ramirez that neither Daniel Hernandez nor Arturo Hernandez have the legal experience which would qualify them to be appointed by this court to represent him in this case, nor do either attorney meet the qualifications set forth by the Los Angeles County Bar for the indigent criminal defense appointment panel. The court was interrupted by an objection from Arturo Hernandez, stating that he and Daniel Hernandez were not seeking appointment by the court but had been retained by defendant's family and terming the court's remarks out of order. The court continued, stating: Court is aware of that. Under the bar plan, an attorney would have to be a member of the California bar for a minimum of ten years, be an attorney of record in at least fifty trials, forty of which must have been submitted to a jury for decision, and thirty of the fifty must have been felonies. The attorneys must have been attorneys of record in at least three cases where the initial charge was a violation for Penal Code section 187 and at least one of those cases must have been submitted to a jury for decision. Both attorneys fall short of these qualifications. In addition, it has been brought before the court's attention that both Arturo Hernandez and Daniel Hernandez have been held in contempt by the courts in Santa Clara County on at least two occasions; that on a third occasion a contempt citation was not sustained against Daniel Hernandez . Daniel Hernandez interrupted the court to object on the ground that this material had been discussed during an in camera hearing, noting that he and Arturo Hernandez had been assured that any information given to the court would be kept closed. The court continued, stating: They are a matter of public record, sir.... And that there is presently pending in that court another contempt hearing for Daniel Hernandez' failure to appear at a preliminary hearing where the defendant is charged with a violation of section 187 of the Penal Code. [¶] . . . [¶] It also has been brought to the court's attention that there is presently pending in Superior Court of Santa Clara County a hearing set for November 12 in the case of People versus Pinon where the district attorney's office has asked the court for  has asked for monetary sanctions against Mr. Daniel Hernandez for his failure to appear at the hearing in the Pinon case. In view of the above facts, the court is ordering that both attorneys make full disclosure to Mr. Ramirez of any facts which might bear on their ability to effectively represent him in this case.... After this disclosure, if there are any made, the court will, if Mr. Ramirez desires, offer him independent assistance to check any information disclosed to him. This court fully recognizes that the defendant has the right to retained counsel of his choice at all stages of the proceedings against him. However, it is also the view of the court that the defendant should be fully informed regarding his choice of counsel, so that he may make his decision knowingly and intelligently. It is a decision which must be made by the defendant.... In addition, the court has requested that the agreement retaining Mr. Arturo Hernandez and Mr. Daniel Hernandez be reduced to writing and that Mr. Ramirez be given the opportunity to discuss that contract with an independent attorney appointed by this court. [¶] ... [¶] For these reasons, the court is going to take the matter of the substitution of attorneys under submission until October 24, 1985, to allow the defendant to investigate the attorneys he now wishes to hire, if he so desires, and for him to have the contractual agreement looked at by an independent attorney. For that purpose the court has appointed attorney Victor E. Chavez of Los Angeles County. On October 24, 1985, the prosecutor, defendant, Gallegos, Arturo Hernandez, and Daniel Hernandez appeared in camera before the municipal court. Arturo Hernandez represented that defendant had entered into a written contract retaining him and Daniel Hernandez as his attorneys. The court had the following exchange with defendant: The Court: Since you are bilingual, I want to inquire: the contract was written in English? The Defendant: Yes. And I did read it. The Court: Did you read the entire contract? The Defendant: Entirety. The Court: Did you have any questions regarding any of the conditions in that contract? The Defendant: No questions. The Court: Did you understand each item in that contract? The Defendant: Completely. The Court: You are aware that the court did provide an independent attorney for you to discuss any questions you might have with him? The Defendant: Yes. He was provided and he did visit me yesterday, but I refused to see him. The court further questioned defendant regarding the possibility of a conflict between him and his counsel, and defendant stated he understood but felt there would be no conflict. Defendant declined the court's offer to permit defendant to speak to an independent attorney. The court invited defendant to request to speak to an independent attorney if at any time in the future you change your mind. The in camera hearing concluded and, in open court, defendant acknowledged that he wished to substitute Arturo Hernandez and Daniel Hernandez as his counsel. The court relieved Gallegos as counsel and permitted the substitution. More than three years later, on March 6, 1989, during the presentation of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the trial court appointed Attorney Roy Clark as an additional cocounsel for defendant. As noted above, defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting his request for substitution of counsel, but the cases he cites do not support his assertion that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to ensure that he would be represented by qualified, effective counsel. To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has just reiterated that an element of a defendant's right to counsel is the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him. [Citations.] ( United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 2557, ___ L.Ed.2d ___.) A criminal defendant has a qualified right to retain counsel of his choice, and the trial court can deny a defendant's timely request to substitute counsel only if it `will result in significant prejudice to the defendant.' ( People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 587, 186 Cal.Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145.) The right to effective assistance of counsel [citations] encompasses the right to retain counsel of one's choice. [Citation.] Though entitlement to representation by a particular attorney is not absolute [citation], `the state should keep to a necessary minimum its interference with the individual's desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using any legitimate means within his resources  and ... that desire can constitutionally be forced to yield only when it will result in significant prejudice to the defendant himself or in a disruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case' [citation]. ( Id. at pp. 586-587, 186 Cal.Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145.) We observed in Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 615, 180 Cal.Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248: [C]hosen representation is the preferred representation. Defendant's confidence in his lawyer is vital to his defense. His right to decide for himself who best can conduct the case must be respected wherever feasible. (Fn.omitted.) In Wheat v. United States, supra, 486 U.S. 153, 157, 108 S.Ct. 1692, the trial court denied the defendant's request to substitute counsel because it found that the proposed attorney had an `irreconcilable conflict of interest' that the defendant was not permitted to waive. The high court ruled that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's request to substitute counsel, stating, where a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver, and insist that defendants be separately represented. ( Id. at p. 162, 108 S.Ct. 1692.) The defendant in People v. Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d 975, 275 Cal.Rptr. 191, 800 P.2d 547, retained private counsel, but his first trial ended in a mistrial and he became indigent prior to the retrial. He moved to discharge his attorney and obtain appointed counsel. The trial court denied his request to discharge counsel on the grounds that the defendant had not shown that his attorneys were incompetent. This court reversed the ensuing judgment of conviction, holding that the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to demonstrate that his attorneys were incompetent before allowing him to discharge them. [4] ( Ortiz, at p. 987, 275 Cal.Rptr. 191, 800 P.2d 547.) We described the right of a criminal defendant to counsel and to present a defense as among the most sacred and sensitive of our constitutional rights and cautioned that the state should keep to a `necessary minimum its interference with the individual's desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best.' ( Id. at p. 982, 275 Cal.Rptr. 191, 800 P.2d 547.) We recognized in Ortiz the value we place on allowing defendants to defend themselves as they deem best, absent prejudice to themselves or unreasonable delay in the processes of justice and the importance of the right to counsel of choice and the sensitive nature of the relationship between a criminal defendant and his lawyer. ( Id. at p. 987, 275 Cal.Rptr. 191, 800 P.2d 547.) Moreover, a trial court must exercise caution when denying a defendant's request to substitute counsel, because [r]eversal is automatic . . . when a defendant has been deprived of his right to defend with counsel of his choice. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 988, 275 Cal.Rptr. 191, 800 P.2d 547.) The right to counsel of choice is one of the constitutional rights most basic to a fair trial. Accordingly, it is clear that a criminal defendant need not demonstrate prejudice resulting from a violation of that right in order to have his conviction reversed. ( Ibid. ) Defendant cites no case, and we are aware of none, in which a conviction was reversed because the court granted the defendant's request to substitute counsel. A defendant whose request to substitute counsel is granted cannot complain on appeal that the trial court should have denied that request. The defendant's only contention on appeal in such circumstances can be that he or she was denied effective assistance of counsel. (See Wheat v. United States, supra, 486 U.S. 153, 161, 108 S.Ct. 1692 [If a district court agrees to the multiple representation, and the advocacy of counsel is thereafter impaired as a result, the defendant may well claim that he did not receive effective assistance].) Defendant expressly does not claim on appeal that counsel were ineffective, noting that [a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will be separately presented in a related petition for writ of habeas corpus. Curiously, defendant cites our decision in Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, 106 Cal.Rptr. 631, 506 P.2d 1007 for the proposition that the trial court has a duty to ensure that any counsel appointed to represent the accused is competent and qualified to conduct the defense (italics added), adding: That is precisely the obligation involved in the present case which the trial court failed to meet. But Daniel Hernandez and Arturo Hernandez were not appointed by the court, they were retained by defendant. Our decision in Drumgo, accordingly, has no application here. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court in the present case did not find that Daniel Hernandez and Arturo Hernandez were unqualified to be retained as counsel by defendant. The court simply made certain that defendant was fully informed regarding his choice of counsel ( ante, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 695, 139 P.3d at p. 79) by observing that the Hernandez attorneys did not meet the standards required of attorneys appointed by the court to represent capital defendants, noting that both attorneys had been held in contempt on at least two occasions, requiring both attorneys to disclose to defendant any facts which might bear on their ability to effectively represent him in this case, and offering defendant the assistance of independent counsel to check any information disclosed to him. ( Ante, at p. 696, 139 P.3d at p. 80.) The trial court correctly recognized that the defendant has the right to retained counsel of his choice. ( Ante, at p. 696, 139 P.3d at p. 80.) The Sixth Amendment commands . . . that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best. ( United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. 2557.) The trial court did not err in granting defendant's request to substitute counsel.