Opinion ID: 2508357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The People's use of inconsistent and irreconcilable theories was prejudicial as to Sakarias

Text: The prejudice question is in these circumstances a complex one, involving two questions as to each petitioner and each culpability-increasing act inconsistently attributed to petitioners: for each petitioner we must ask, first, whether the People's attribution of the act to the petitioner is, according to all the available evidence, probably false or probably true, and, second, whether any probably false attribution of a culpability-increasing act to the petitioner could reasonably have affected the penalty verdict. As previously explained, the prosecutor's unjustified use of inconsistent and irreconcilable factual theories to convict two people of a crime only one could have committed, or to obtain harsher sentences for both on the basis of an act only one could have committed, violates due process because in those circumstances the state has necessarily convicted or sentenced a person on a false factual basis. It follows that where the probable truth of the situation can be determinedwhere we are able to say which of the prosecution theories was likely true and which falseonly the defendant prejudiced by the false attribution is entitled to relief. (See Thompson, supra, 120 F.3d at p. 1064 (conc. opn. of Tashima, J.) [To reach a conclusion of prejudice or no prejudice as to Thompson first requires a finding of which of the two inconsistent theories pursued by the prosecutor represents the true facts and which is false]; Prosecutorial Inconsistency, supra, 89 Cal. L.Rev. at p. 1478 [in assessing entitlement to relief for inconsistent prosecutorial theories, courts should ask whether the correct position on the evidence can be determined from the evidence available. If the correct position is ascertainable, the court should rule accordingly].) Only as to the defendant convicted or sentenced by use of the probably false theory can it be said the prosecution has presented a materially false picture of the defendant's culpability. We need not decide here what result obtains when the likely truth of the prosecutor's inconsistent theories cannot be determined, for the case at bench is not one of ambiguous or inconclusive evidence. [8] As the referee found, the great weight of available evidence indicates that Viivi Piirisild was dead or near death when dragged into the bedroom and thus that Waidla, rather than Sakarias, struck the antemortem, hemorrhagic hatchet-blade blow. True, some evidence blood spatters in the bedroom suggests the possibility of an antemortem blow being struck in that room. But that evidence is overwhelmed by other evidence that Viivi's hemorrhagic wounds, including the hemorrhagic chopping wound Ipsen characterized as the death blow, were inflicted during petitioners' initial attack on her in the living room, including the large pool of blood in the living room, the minimum quantity of blood on the bedroom walls and ceiling, the lack of blood on the bedroom floor, Sakarias's statement that petitioners felled Viivi in the living room before eventually dragging her into the bedroom, and the non-hemorrhagic character of the abrasion on Viivi's back. As both petitioners' statements have Waidla using the hatchet during that initial attack and Sakarias the knife, and as no evidence at all suggests the two exchanged weapons during the initial attack, the inescapable inference from all the available evidence is that Waidla inflicted the hemorrhagic chopping wound to Viivi's head. To the extent the false attribution of the antemortem hatchet-blade blow to Sakarias was potentially material to the penalty decision, it deprived Sakarias of a fair penalty trial and entitles him to relief. Sakarias and the Attorney General agree this aspect of prejudice should be tested on the reasonable likelihood standard applicable to the knowing presentation of false evidence, which is equivalent to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. (See United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342; In re Malone, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 977, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d 468; In re Jackson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 597-598, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371.) Because the prosecutor intentionally used an inconsistent and probably false theory to obtain a death sentence against Sakarias, we agree with the parties that Sakarias is entitled to relief if he can show a reasonable likelihood the prosecutor's use of the tainted factual theory affected the penalty verdict. (Accord, United States v. Kattar, supra, 840 F.2d at p. 128; Prosecutorial Inconsistency, supra, 89 Cal. L.Rev. at p. 1471.) Aside from attributing the hemorrhagic chopping wound to Sakarias, the prosecutor introduced and relied upon other significant aggravating circumstances. Sakarias undisputedly played a direct role in the brutal, unprovoked killing of Viivi Piirisild. The uncontroverted evidence showed that Sakarias stabbed Viivi four times in the chest, including two potentially fatal wounds passing through vital organs, and that he later took the hatchet, went to the bedroom, and struck her at least twice in the head with the hatchet blade. Sakarias had a loaded handgun when arrested and later was found in possession of shanks in the county jail (for use, he said, against gang members who had robbed him). He also made statements during trial indicating a lack of remorse for killing Viivi and suggesting that he and Waidla had intended to kill Avo Piirisild as well. ( Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 614-616, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152.) Other considerations, however, make it impossible for us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutorial argument that Sakarias struck all the hatchet-blade blows, including the first, antemortem one, played no role in the penalty decision. The first hatchet-blade wound was especially severe and was described in gruesome detail by the medical examiner on direct examination by the prosecutor. The path of the blade was parallel to the top of the head, straight up and down if the victim was lying on the floor. The blade entered on the upper forehead, penetrated through the scalp and the skull bone, then hit the inside of the skull. Dr. Ribe believed the blade then bounced off the bone and continued to the rear and right of the victim's head, leaving another incision. The blow's force not only penetrated the front of the skull but fractured the back as well, pushing it backward. As a result, a portion of the upper skull and scalp were partially detached from the rest of the head, forming a flap that could be easily folded back. Because of the strength of an adult human's skull, Dr. Ribe believed a tremendous amount of force, as much as an average man could exert swinging the hatchet very hard, was needed to cause this wound. In the guilt phase argument, the prosecutor discussed in detail Sakarias's attack on Viivi Piirisild with the hatchet, stating he went into the bedroom to strike a few more blows, to make sure that Viivi was dead in case the stabbing and the bludgeoning weren't enough. [¶] We know that there were three, in this series of blows, sharp hatchet wounds to the top of Viivi's head with a tremendous force .... [¶] And it was with this strength that Peter Sakarias swung this hatchet to penetrate this skull, to reach that most vital organ.... [¶] ... [¶] We know that there are in fact three hatchet wounds; the first penetrating the top of the skull, and I know it was the first because it was a hemorrhagic wound, the one in the hairline, the one that chopped the top of her head completely off with the exception of some of the scalp that kept it completely on. [¶] ... [¶] We know that this last series of chop wounds ... was consistent with the last three blows she received. In the penalty argument, the prosecutor twice again asserted that Sakarias had inflicted all the chopping wounds, swinging what I suggest were the blows that actually ended her life. Sakarias, according to Ipsen, simply ... chop[ped] the top of her head off, as the evidence indicated you did in that back room, thus finally ending her life. As to mitigation, Sakarias was young (21 years old) at the time of the offense, had no record of violence, and had suffered persecution in the Soviet Army. He was diagnosed with schizo-affective disorder, characterized by paranoia and bipolar affect; the jury was informed that he had been found incompetent to stand trial in May 1990 and spent almost a year in a state hospital. The defense also played tapes of Sakarias's mother, father, and friends, recorded in Estonia, describing his childhood and youth. ( Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 614-616, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152.) Some aspect or aspects of the case evidently gave one or more jurors considerable pause in the sentencing decision, as the penalty jury deliberated for more than 10 hours over three days and, at one point, declared itself unable to reach a unanimous verdict, before finally returning a verdict of death. In light of the prominence the prosecutor gave the antemortem chopping wound, treating it as the final, fatal wound, and the likely impact the medical examiner's description of that wound and the force necessary to inflict it would have had, that the prosecutor's attribution of that blow to Sakarias had an effect on the penalty verdict is reasonably likely. ( United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392.) Though Sakarias's undisputed conduct in stabbing Viivi Piirisild and stealing her property played, no doubt, a major role in the jury's decision, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's decision would have been the same had it not also been told that Sakarias finally ended Viivi's life by swinging a hatchet with all his strength, nearly cutting off the top of her head. The prosecutor's intentional and unjustified argument, inconsistent with the factual theory and evidence he had presented at Waidla's trial, that Sakarias struck the antemortem hatchet-blade blow was therefore prejudicial to Sakarias as to penalty. [9]