Opinion ID: 1987627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standards Governing Withdrawal of Guilty Plea

Text: Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f) (Rule 32(f)) provides a pre-sentencing sentencing and a post-sentencing standard for evaluating motions to withdraw. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice, the court after sentence, but before the judgment becomes final, may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea. Rule 32(f) (emphasis added). The more demanding standard, to correct manifest injustice, applies to motions, like the defendant's motion, which are filed after imposition of sentence. [3] This standard is based upon practical considerations important to the proper administration of justice. Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1963). Before sentencing, the inconvenience to court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared with the public interest in protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury. But if a plea of guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe. The result would be to undermine respect for the courts and fritter away the time and painstaking effort devoted to the sentencing process. Id. (footnote omitted); see also State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332, 454 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1995) (noting that finality considerations require a more demanding standard for post-sentencing withdrawal); State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 864 A.2d 400, 403 (2005) (describing manifest injustice as a discretionary determination in which finality considerations are weighed against fairness considerations). Although Rule 32(f) does not define manifest injustice, [4] courts have identified on a case-by-case basis circumstances that meet the manifest injustice standard necessary for withdrawal of a plea. [5] See Turner, 919 S.W.2d at 355; Evans, 454 S.E.2d at 473. Withdrawal to correct manifest injustice is warranted where: (1) the plea was entered through a misunderstanding as to its effect, or through fear and fraud, or where it was not made voluntarily; [6] (2) the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and this failure to disclose influenced the entry of the plea; [7] (3) the plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly entered; [8] and (4) the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel in connection with the entry of the plea. [9] Although manifest injustice may exist in the absence of a constitutional violation, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that [w]here there is a denial of due process, there is a `manifest injustice' as a matter of law. Davis, 823 S.W.2d at 220 (quoting United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 26 (3d Cir.1976)). [10] In contrast, a defendant's change of heart about pleading guilty or a defendant's dissatisfaction with the punishment ultimately imposed does not constitute manifest injustice warranting withdrawal. Turner, 919 S.W.2d at 355 (citing Capri Adult Cinema, 537 S.W.2d at 898); Ray v. State, 224 Tenn. 164, 451 S.W.2d 854, 856 (1970); Henning, 201 S.W.2d at 671.