Opinion ID: 1719421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the fraud counts

Text: Although a party may bring an action seeking relief from a judgment procured by fraud, A.R.Civ.P. 60(b), the plaintiff does not seek to have the divorce decree set aside or modified. Presumably, she would be unable to have the decree set aside, because she participated in the fraudulent procurement of the decree and has freely enjoyed the fruits of the divorce. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 280 Ala. 115, 190 So.2d 548 (1966). We are of the opinion that the plaintiff should not be allowed to do indirectly what she would be unable to do by directly attacking the decree. An inquiry into the damages she suffered by relying on the defendant's representations would necessarily require an inquiry into the adequacy of the award in the divorce action. Since Mrs. Hall has chosen not to attack the award in the divorce decree, she should be bound by it. Even if the situation were such that the plaintiff was not estopped from attacking the divorce decree, the facts in the record do not support her claim that she allowed herself to be divorced from the defendant without contest. The divorce decree was based on oral testimony, not on an agreement between the parties. A different situation might be presented in a case where a litigant is fraudulently induced to enter into an agreement settling a case on disadvantageous terms. The trial court's decision is hereby affirmed. AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur. EMBRY, J., not sitting.