Opinion ID: 3010427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: claims for cercla contribution

Text: Unfortunately, we have no appellate jurisdiction over that portion of the district court's order rejecting the motion to dismiss Esso's claims for CERCLA contribution as a sanction under Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). Poulis sets out a six-factor balancing test to guide a court's analysis as to whether to dismiss a claim as a sanction. See id. at 868. One of those factors requires that we examine the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. (emphasis in original). However, the CERCLA claims have never been filed, though they undoubtedly will be. The district court, in an effort to stem the voluminous paper flow, has apparently asked counsel to withhold moving forward on the CERCLA claims until a more propitious point in the litigation. Therefore, under the current posture of the case we would be hard pressed to find some means to review contentions with respect to these claims. If this problem did not exist, the parties might argue that we have jurisdiction over the Poulis claim under the collateral order doctrine as set forth in Cohen.25 However, the Cohen test would allow us to exercise jurisdiction only if, inter alia, our review would not require us to examine the merits of the underlying litigation that remains to be adjudicated. To review the Poulis claim, we would need to do just that because Poulis requires us to examine the merits of the underlying CERCLA litigation. Additionally, the Cohen test does not allow our exercise of appellate jurisdiction over a non-final order if the order can be appealed effectively after final judgment. Here, there can be little dispute that the parties can appeal the Poulis claim _________________________________________________________________ 25. As we explain supra section II, part A, the district court's order is not final for appellate jurisdiction purposes. 45 after final judgment, by which time the claim will likely be better defined. We therefore have no jurisdiction over that part of the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss Esso's claim for contribution as a sanction, and will dismiss the appeals challenging that part of the order.