Opinion ID: 474563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Dual Capacity Doctrine Under Pennsylvania Law

Text: 8 In Tatrai, supra, a hospital employee became ill while on the job and went to the hospital emergency room to seek medical attention. The foot stand of the X-ray table on which she was perched in the emergency room was loose, and she fell. When Ms. Tatrai sued the hospital, it pleaded the comp-bar defense. The opinion of the court, written by Justice Nix, held for plaintiff on the ground that, because her injury was not suffered in the course of employment, she was not eligible for workmen's compensation, hence the comp-bar did not apply. However, none of the other justices on the court joined Justice Nix's opinion. Rather, Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion, joined by three justices, 5 that supported plaintiff on a somewhat different basis. Justice Roberts essentially invoked the dual capacity doctrine: 9 In holding itself out to the public as a provider of medical services, appellee hospital owed a duty to all its patients. There is no basis for distinguishing appellant, a paying customer, from any other member of the public injured during the course of treatment. 10 Id., 497 Pa. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166 (Roberts, J., concurring). Under this theory, plaintiff's eligibility for workmen's compensation was simply irrelevant. Id., 497 Pa. at 257, 439 A.2d at 1168. She was suing not as an employee injured by her employer, but as a member of the public. 11 Because Justice Roberts' opinion was a concurrence (albeit joined by a majority of the court), and Justice Nix's opinion for the court decided the case on a different basis, there is uncertainty as to whether the dual capacity doctrine is good law in Pennsylvania. After Tatrai, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court faced a case involving the doctrine, but provided no answer. See Budzichowski v. Bell Telephone Co., 503 Pa. 160, 469 A.2d 111 (1983) (court assumed arguendo that the doctrine is good law in the course of finding that, on the facts of the case, it did not apply in any event). 12 The lower Pennsylvania courts have not provided definitive guidance either. In Kosowan v. MDC Industries, Inc., 319 Pa.Super. 91, 465 A.2d 1069 (1983), the Superior Court stated that Tatrai did not adopt generally the doctrine of dual capacity. Id. at 1072. However, it reached that conclusion by analyzing Justice Nix's lone opinion while simply ignoring the concurring opinion that had the support of four justices. Another superior court decision, Silvestri v. Strescon Industries, Inc., 312 Pa.Super. 82, 458 A.2d 246 (1983), noting the concurrence in Tatrai, concluded that the dual capacity doctrine is the law of Pennsylvania. 13 Our task, of course, is to predict what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would do. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir.1982). Even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cannot be said to have adopted the dual capacity doctrine in Tatrai, it surely gave us grounds for predicting that it will do so--four out of seven justices explicitly endorsed the doctrine, and none opposed it. Under the circumstances, we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, if called upon to decide the status of the dual capacity doctrine, would find the doctrine viable. 14