Opinion ID: 1865512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Verdict as to Informed Consent.

Text: We first consider plaintiff's claim that the jury's finding in favor of defendants Van Bramer and Oei on the issue of informed consent is so contrary to the great weight of the evidence that he is entitled to a new trial on that issue. He asserts, correctly we believe, that on the present record no reason existed to withhold from him for therapeutic reasons any information material to his decision concerning the course of medical treatment to be pursued. Accordingly, he was entitled to disclosure of all relevant information relating to the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success of the contemplated therapy and its alternatives, and the risk of unfortunate consequences associated with such treatment. See Cowman v. Hornaday, 329 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Iowa 1983). It appears without dispute that the defendant Van Bramer, in counseling the plaintiff with respect to whether surgery or drug therapy should be employed, discussed the risks of surgery with some particularity but only generally described the anticipated process with regard to drug therapy. Van Bramer left the task of informing plaintiff about the specifics of the proposed drug therapy to defendant Oei, who had undertaken the determination of the antibiotic drug components for the rectal wash solution. There is a factual dispute in the testimony between plaintiff and defendant Oei concerning whether the latter advised plaintiff concerning the potential for hearing loss. Dr. Oei testified that he advised plaintiff concerning risk of hearing loss associated with these drugs. Plaintiff disputes that this occurred. The trial court submitted the issue of informed consent to the jury. A special interrogatory was answered rejecting plaintiff's claim. In arguing this issue on appeal, plaintiff asserts: As mentioned ..., a factual dispute exists in this case over whether the plaintiff was warned at all. The jury decided this issue for the defendant, and accordingly plaintiff concedes ... that Dr. Oei did indeed discuss the possibility of hearing loss with the plaintiff. [N]o one told the plaintiff about the risk of hearing loss before June 18. [U]nder Cowman, the plaintiff received the necessary warning too late. June 18, to which plaintiff refers, was when he had a discussion with Dr. Oei prior to the first application of the rectal flush solution. The crux of plaintiff's argument is that he was entitled to the warning of potential adverse consequences from the drug therapy at the time he was consulting with defendant Van Bramer on whether to elect a surgical solution to his problem. We do not believe that, in determining the informed consent issue, it is realistic to compartmentalize the decisions in the manner proposed by plaintiff. The jury could have found that defendant Van Bramer informed plaintiff to the best of his ability concerning the advantages and disadvantages of surgery as contrasted with drug therapy and left to Oei the burden of filling in the details concerning risks involved in specific drug therapy. Indeed, this division of responsibility was perhaps unavoidable in view of the fact that Oei was in charge of the selection of the drugs to be utilized. Viewed in this light, we believe the issue of informed consent was primarily a factual dispute, and the jury's resolution of that issue is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for new trial on the informed consent issue. See Northrup v. Miles Homes, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 850, 861 (Iowa 1973); Lantz v. Cook, 256 Iowa 409, 412, 127 N.W.2d 675, 677 (1964).