Opinion ID: 324656
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Redistricting

Text: 35 Districting, the drawing of geographical boundaries for attendance purposes, does not apply to the high schools in Boston. As we have indicated, their student bodies were determined by feeder patterns. Alterations of feeder patterns accomplished the same goals as redistricting or the changing of attendance zones of existing schools. We treat here only actual changes in geographical attendance zones and necessarily confine ourselves to the effect on lower schools. 36 As indicated above, we now enter an area where decisions were mostly not to do something. There are, even here, some affirmative actions either pro-segregation or in perpetuation of segregation. For example there were districting changes affecting certain fifth and sixth grade classes that were 'tracks' to the three examination schools. White students ultimately comprised more than 80 percent of these classes. 379 F.Supp. at 433 n. 16. And redistricting was undertaken where greater integration would not come about, thereby perpetuating existing disparties. In 1959 the boundary lines of the districts for Cleveland and Campbell junior highs were altered for administrative reasons; between 1963--1964 and 1969--1970 Roosevelt junior high in Roxbury and Edison junior high in Brighton were redistricted to house an overflow of students from English high; and in 1969--1970 the Boardman district was changed to accommodate the fourth grade at overcrowded Kennedy. 379 F.Supp. at 437--438. Generally, however, the court was concerned about the focused, knowledgeable resistance to otherwise feasible proposals and opportunities for redistricting. 37 The district court examined the existing districts in Dorchester for intermediate schools, which are irregularly drawn and do not, in general, coincide with geographical boundaries. As they existed, they maximized racial isolation in the schools while slight changes could have been made which would have been more convenient for students and would also have forwarded integration. 379 F.Supp. at 435. Similarly, elementary schools in the area including that immediately south of South Boston, through Roxbury and into Dorchester, have black districts cut away from predominantly white areas, by an essentially north-south dividing line. The predominantly white schools are located some distance to the east of the dividing line, indicating that the line could, as far as convenience to students is concerned, be readily moved to aid integration. Furthermore, there were several multi-school elementary districts which are segregated according to race within the district with rare exceptions. On no occasion have the city defendants redistricted to eliminate racial imbalance. 379 F.Supp. at 438. 17 38 The city's intransigence becomes all too clear when we review the proposals made to it. The Kiernan Report, filed in April, 1965, proposed specific solutions. It was ignored. After the first racial imbalance census taken pursuant to the Racial Imbalance Act, the state Board notified the Committee that it was under a legal duty to remedy imbalance. The first plan submitted suggested no redistricting and was rejected on that basis. Because of the Committee's failure to comply with state law, state funds were held in escrow during the years from 1966 to 1971--a withholding which must have substantially affected the school system's ability to meet the educational needs of those years. 39 The Committee was not left to its own devices. The state Board asked the Joint Center for Urban Studies at Harvard and MIT to submit proposals. Eight alternative redistricting proposals for elementary schools and three for intermediate schools were provided, all being geared to minimize transfers of white students, to avoid long walks for young children, and to avoid the irregular shaping of districts. Safety was a foremost consideration. Kindergarten children were not affected and only junior high students would have had to be bused under the proposals. Various excuses were given for the dogged refusal to adopt the plans. At one meeting of the Committee in 1966, 379 F.Supp. at 439, the chairman continually urged a good faith effort in order to obtain the release of funds, an effort which he felt would have to include redistricting. To launch such an effort, he moved 'that the superintendent be directed to review the Joint Center package and 'extract from it those recommendations which you can live with and which are workable and will have the effect of' minimizing racial imbalance.' This limited, preliminary suggestion was rejected. The Committee proposed instead plans which would permit city blacks to be bused under Metco to suburban schools in exchange for white students from those schools. The plan was rejected by the state Board, submitted again and rejected again. The funds were still withheld. This process continued as the number of racially imbalanced schools increased steadily from 40 in 1966 to 62 in 1969. 40 The climax was, in the view of the district court, the Committee's reaction to the Board's rejection of its fourth stage plan in 1971. The Committee countered the rejection by proposals to create an advisory committee to review all district lines, to request technical advice from the Board, and to participate in a committee to oversee development of a 'Comprehensive Plan' to eliminate racial imbalance. The Committee, so found the court, appointed strong opponents of balance to the advisory committee, refused access to critical data by the Board, and never appointed members to the committee of oversight. In the district court's words, it 'sabotaged' the entire effort. It is beyond dispute that the defendants took every opportunity to maintain segregation where it existed and to foster segregation where it did not. To use the Supreme Court's language, 'the 'neighborhood school' concept has not been maintained free of manipulation', Keyes, supra, 413 U.S. at 212, 93 S.Ct. at 2699, 37 L.Ed.2d 548. 41 We have addressed the facts found and the district court's inferences drawn as to segregative purpose, and have found no error. Moreover, even if the individual instances were not by themselves capable of supporting a finding of discriminatory intent--and we think those addressed were sufficient--they clearly create a definite pattern of intentional segregatory motives and practices. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 474 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, 93 S.Ct. 3066, 37 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1973); Davis v. School District of Pontiac, 443 F.2d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 1971). '(T)he courts are not precluded from drawing the normal inference of intent from consciously consummated acts.' 474 F.2d at 85. Here that intent was consistent with the expressed motivation. It takes very little alteration of the words of the Supreme Court in describing in Denver school board's actions, found impermissible, to describe accurately the Boston practices: 42 'First, it is obvious that a practice of concentrating Negroes in certain schools by structuring attendance zones or designating 'feeder' schools on the basis of race has the reciprocal effect of keeping other nearby schools predominantly white. Similarly, the practice of building . . . school(s) . . . in a certain location 'with conscious knowledge that (they) would be . . . segregated . . .' . . . has a substantial reciprocal effect on the racial composition of other nearby schools. So also, the use of mobile classrooms, the drafting of student transfer policies . . . on racially identifiable bases, have the clear effect of earmarking schools according to their racial composition . . ..' Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201--202, 93 S.Ct. at 2694. 43 The district court's findings as to school assignment, building policy, the use of mobile classrooms, and districting and redistricting are thoroughly supported. These findings in turn amply support the findings of segregative intent. 44