Opinion ID: 3033866
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-Wildfire Documents

Text: After the 24 Command Fire, both the FWS and DOE con- ducted internal investigations and issued detailed reports4 to “evaluate the actions taken to manage the wildfire, present findings, and offer constructive recommendations,” as well as to “provid[e] information for use in improving DOE response to fire incidents across the agency’s national complex.” The reports contain disclaimers regarding their use.5 They were obviously prepared for remedial purposes. But they do make some conclusions that Plaintiffs point to as some indication of negligence and responsibility. The FWS Report made a general finding that “[t]here were not adequate agreements or operating plans in place to enhance safe, effective, and efficient fire protection.” It found: Agreements were unclear or were inadequate. Local fire districts appear to believe that [FWS] philosophy and policy restrict the use of certain tactics and that Federal wildland fire suppression activities would cease at the Federal land boundary. Both of these perceptions were unfounded based on review of 4 An “FWS Interagency Fire Team Report of September 2000” and a “DOE Type B Accident Investigation Report of October 2000.” 5 The DOE Report states: The discussion of fact, as determined by the [Accident Investigation] Board, and the views expressed in the report do not assume and are not intended to establish the existence of any duty at law on the part of the U.S. Government, its employees or agents, contractors, their employees or agents, or subcontractors at any tier, or any other party. This report neither determines nor implies liability. AUTERY v. UNITED STATES 13015 existing policy, current agreements, and actions taken during the incident. The FWS report thus could be alluding to the reasons for the lack of maintenance of SR-24 firebreaks (i.e., HFD leaving matters to the State after 1995 as a result of the creation of “fugitive dust”). The DOE Report was more specific. It indicates, among other things, that the Board found that the lack of maintenance of defensible firebreaks along state highways allowed the fire to spread quickly onto the ALE Reserve. The Board found that RL [Richland DOE office], ORP [DOE Office of River Protection], and the contractors need to engage and coordinate with local clean air authorities, state regulators, the DOE-HQ Office of Environmental Health (EH), and the WSDOT [State Department of Transportation] to evaluate the most effective means of establishing defensible space along state right-of-way shoulders between State Routes 24 and 240 and the DOE fenceline. It made the following analysis regarding fire barriers: While [a precut fire break between SR 24 and the DOE fenceline] was last time in place in 1995, it was not maintained along the entire lengths of SR 24, and vegetation reseeded enough to yield readily available fuel. . . . Maintenance of this barrier may have prevented the fire that started on the highway from igniting the natural vegetation on the ALE Reserve.6 6 HFD Fire Chief Good disagreed with the conclusion, indicating that it was speculation. He testified in his deposition that “there’s no way to tell whether that fire would have been stopped by that firebreak being maintained or not being maintained. . . . I’ve seen fire jump the [Columbia] River, I’ve seen fire jump the Yakima River, I’ve seen fire jump four-lane highways.” His observations may well be sound, but this litigation never reached a stage to decide issues regarding causation. 13016 AUTERY v. UNITED STATES Plaintiffs point to these reports as indicating that the DOE or FWS (or both) was negligent in failing to maintain firebreaks around SR-24. As a further indication of DOE control or responsibility for firebreak maintenance around SR-24, Plaintiffs also point to an easement granted shortly after the 24 Command Fire (in November of 2000) by DOE to Touch America for fiber optic cables. That easement requires Touch America to conduct certain “fire stabilization measures:” [Touch America] agrees to complete the following fire stabilization measures along State Highway 24 . . . 1) smooth soil surface where disturbed by the installation of fiber optic conduit bundle, 2) mow vegetation on both sides of State Highway 24 from fence to shoulder of road, 3) apply a one time application of herbicides on both sides of State Highway 24 from fence to shoulder of road. . . . The type of herbicides and method of application will be determined by DOE. [Touch America] agrees to contact the DOE to coordinate installation of the fiber optic conduit bundle and fire stabilization measures. According to Don Good, the HFD was not involved in negotiating any aspect of that easement. Finally, as another alleged indicator of DOE control of the firebreaks near SR-24, Plaintiffs point to a post-wildfire internal DOE memorandum discussing fire recovery actions and plans. The memorandum discusses firebreaks along SR-240 and SR-24, indicating that “[t]he firebreaks [on SR-240] have been neglected since 1995 contributing (in the opinion of some investigators) to the most recent fire spread.” It goes on to indicate an “immediate plan” of herbicide applications. As for SR-24, the memorandum states “the 32 miles of SR 24 represents a bigger problem at this time. Mostly unburned, but also neglected, it accommodates a heavy fuel load in both our AUTERY v. UNITED STATES 13017 [DOE] view and in the view of [FWS].” The DOE memorandum recommends: 1. . . . that the Firebreaks be maintained annually and in the future budgeted properly by the Landlord organization. . . . As long as the U.S. DOE has responsibility for SR 240 and SR 24, this will amount to about $400,000 to $500,000 per year. . . . 2. The US DOE needs to seriously consider divest- ing itself of SR 240 and SR 24 while still ensuring that the Firebreaks are properly maintained[.] Plaintiffs essentially contend that the memorandum indicates that DOE (not the HFD as indicated in the relevant contracts) still had substantial responsibility for SR-24 firebreak maintenance, and that such maintenance was not solely contractor responsibility.