Opinion ID: 3151870
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Impaired Driving

Text: Finally, Petitioner asserts the trial judge erred in charging the jury section 56-5-2930,18 the criminal statute involving the charge of driving under the influence (DUI), but refusing to charge section 56-5-2950(b)(1)19 to show that Colvin was presumptively not impaired by alcohol as her blood alcohol content was .018%. Additionally, Petitioner claims the prejudice from the refusal to 'always train time at a railroad crossing' and that one approaching must make use of his senses, to the best of his ability under the circumstances, to ascertain the presence or approach of a train and do so in time and place, so far as is reasonably within his control, to be effective[.]); Breeden v. Rockingham R.R. Co., 193 S.C. 220, 224, 8 S.E.2d 366, 368 (1940) (It is the duty of a traveler, upon the approach to a railroad crossing of which he is aware, to use due care to observe the approach of trains at said crossing for, as stated in Robison v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 179 S.C. 493, [501], 184 S.E. 96, 100 [1936], 'it is always train time at a railroad crossing.' ). 18 S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2930 (2006) (outlining offense of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or a combination of both). We note that this statute has since been amended. Therefore, we cite to the version of the statute in effect at the time of the accident. 19 Id. § 56-5-2950(b)(1) (providing that in a criminal prosecution for violation of section 56-5-2930 an alcohol concentration of .05 or less is conclusively presumed that the person was not under the influence of alcohol). We note that section 56-5- 2950(b)(1) is now codified as section 56-5-2950(G)(1). S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5- 2950(G) (Supp. 2014). charge section 56-5-2950(b)(1) was exacerbated by the judge's decision to charge section 15-78-60(20),20 which led the jury to infer that SCDOT could not be liable for its omissions because of criminal activities committed by Colvin. Like the dissent in the Court of Appeals' opinion, we are most troubled by this issue. Given the evidence, it was necessary to provide the jury with some type of instruction regarding impaired driving as the emergency responder testified the accident scene smelled of alcohol, Colvin admitted that she consumed alcohol and took prescription medication the morning of the accident, and Colvin's blood test after the accident revealed the presence of opiates. However, because Petitioner presented evidence that Colvin's blood alcohol content was .018%, we find Petitioner was entitled to have the jury instructed on the statutory presumption provided in section 56-5-2950(b)(1). In the absence of this instruction, it is arguable the jury found Colvin was impaired while driving and that this criminal act negated any negligence on the part of CSX and SCDOT. Accordingly, we find Petitioner was prejudiced by the judge's refusal to charge his proposed instruction.