Opinion ID: 1537825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Social Host Liability

Text: Shea also claims that Matassa served alcoholic beverages to Healy knowing that he was under the influence of alcohol and that he would shortly thereafter drive a car. Shea contends that Matassa, a social host, had a duty to prevent Healy from driving while intoxicated and, therefore, Matassa should be liable for Healy causing Corporal Shea's death. Relying on DiOssi v. Maroney, [26] Shea argues that because this Court has never rejected a social host liability theory, recognizing social host liability on these facts would not require overturning any precedent. The central issue is whether this Court should create a common law cause of action for social host liability. Social host liability presents a mixed question of law and public policy: should a third party injured by the tortious conduct of a person who became intoxicated as the result of alcohol improperly dispensed by a social host have a cause of action against the dispenser? [27] DiOssi v. Maroney is this Court's most recent case discussing social host liability. In DiOssi, this Court held that Maroney, a social host of a private party, was liable for plaintiff DiOssi's injuries under a premises liability theory. Maroney employed DiOssi at the party to park cars, and an intoxicated driver, who was a guest at the party, struck DiOssi with his vehicle. This Court held that DiOssi was a business invitee and thus Maroney was liable for his injuries because Maroney breached his duty to make the workplace premises reasonably safe. This Court did not directly address the issue of social host liability because the focus of liability in [that] case [was] on the exposure of a business invitee to a dangerous activity which the property owner permitted to exist on his land. [28] This Court cautioned that its reversal of the lower court's decision may not be read to extend the liability of a social host for injuries to other guests which are caused by tortious conduct attributable to the social host's dispensing of alcoholic beverages. [29] Two jurisdictions, Massachusetts and North Carolina, recognize common law social host liability. [30] In McGuiggan v. New England Tel and Tel. Co., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that absent a controlling statute, the issue of social host liability is one to which the court may properly apply common law principles. [31] After further analysis, however, the court decided that particular case before them did not present a case for social host liability. [32] In Hart v. Ivey , the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted social host liability. [33] In that case, the defendants argued that there is not a common law negligence claim against a social host for serving alcoholic beverages. . . . [and] argue[d] that there are many implications from establishing such a claim. . . . [34] The North Carolina court stated that it had not created a new cause of action, but had simply applied established negligence principles. [35] In DiOssi, this Court noted that although [t]he liability of the social host has not been the subject of such purposeful statutory regulation, several other areas of the sale and use of alcohol are heavily regulated, indicating that the General Assembly's awareness of the various issues relating to alcohol, and that it has made policy choices in the areas where regulation would be most effective. [36] We observed that [m]ost courts which have faced the issue [of social host liability] have deferred to legislative process where such controversial public policy issues might be resolved through societal consensus. [37] We reaffirm that observation. The rationale for not extending liability to a social host is that one who consumes alcohol is the sole proximate cause of any injury he causes to a third person. [38] The inability of a social host to control a guest once the guest leaves the host's home can lead to significant financial burdens. [39] Furthermore, as we have consistently declined to create a common law dram shop cause of action, it would be anomalous for social hosts to have greater legal responsibility than trained, licensed and regulated bartenders. In our opinion, the creation of a cause of action against a social host raises controversial and competing public policy issues that are best addressed by the General Assembly, not this Court. Accordingly, we also affirm the Superior Court's judgment on that issue.