Opinion ID: 1410654
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: does the california constitution guarantee the right to gather signatures at shopping centers?

Text: No California statute prescribes that shopping center owners provide public forums. But article I, section 2 of the state Constitution reads: Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press. Though the framers could have adopted the words of the federal Bill of Rights they chose not to do so. (See Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights (1974) 26 Hastings L.J. 481.) Special protections thus accorded speech are marked in this court's opinions. Wilson v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 652, 658 [119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 532 P.2d 116], for instance, noted that [a] protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment is contained in our state constitutional guarantee of the right of free speech and press. Past decisions on speech and private property testify to the strength of liberty of speech in this state. Diamond I held that distributing leaflets and soliciting initiative signatures at a shopping center are constitutionally protected. Though the court relied partly on federal law, California precedents also were cited. (E.g., Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union (1964) 61 Cal.2d 766 [40 Cal. Rptr. 233, 394 P.2d 921]; In re Lane (1969) 71 Cal.2d 872 [79 Cal. Rptr. 729, 457 P.2d 561]; In re Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845 [64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353].) The fact that those opinions cited federal law that subsequently took a divergent course does not diminish their usefulness as precedent. ( People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 247 [145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108]; and see Cal. Const. Revision Com., Recommendations (1971) art. I, § 3, com., p. 17 [Federal ... legal precedents are subject to change and uncertain in scope].) The duty of this court is to help determine what liberty of speech means in California. Federal principles are relevant but not conclusive so long as federal rights are protected. Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d 766, held that a labor union has the right to picket a bakery located in a shopping center. The opinion noted that the basic problem is one of accommodating conflicting interests: plaintiff's assertion of its right to the exclusive use of the shopping center premises to which the public in general has been invited as against the union's right of communication of its position which, it asserts, rests upon public policy and constitutional protection. (61 Cal.2d at p. 768.) In re Lane, supra , extended the assurance of protected speech to the privately owned sidewalk of a grocery store. Certainly, this sidewalk is not private in the sense of not being open to the public. The public is openly invited to use it in gaining access to the store and in leaving the premises. Thus, in our view it is a public area in which members of the public may exercise First Amendment rights. (71 Cal.2d at p. 878.) The issue arose too in In re Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845 [64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353], where Vietnam War protesters had attempted to distribute leaflets in the Los Angeles Union Station, owned by three private companies. It housed a restaurant, snack bar, cocktail lounge, and magazine stand in addition to facilities directly related to transporting passengers. The public was free to use the whole station. Chief Justice Traynor's opinion made it clear that property owners as well as government may regulate speech as to time, place, and manner. ( Id., at pp. 852-853.) Nonetheless, a railway station is like a public street or park. ( Id., at p. 851.) Further, the test is not whether petitioners' use of the station was a railway use but whether it interfered with that use. ( Id. ) The opinion thus affirms that the public interest in peaceful speech outweighs the desire of property owners for control over their property. (See too In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 217-218 [90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992]: The shopping center may no more exclude individuals who wear long hair ... who are black, who are members of the John Birch Society, or who belong to the American Civil Liberties Union, merely because of these characteristics or associations, than may the City of San Rafael.) Diamond I, quoting Schwartz-Torrance, supra, stated: `[T]he countervailing interest which [the owner] endeavors to vindicate emanates from the exclusive possession and enjoyment of private property. Because of the public character of the shopping center, however, the impairment of [the owner's] interest must be largely theoretical. [The owner] has fully opened his property to the public....' ( Diamond I, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 662, bracketed material in original.) In his Diamond II dissent Justice Mosk described the extensive use of private shopping centers. [5] His observations on the role of the centers in our society are even more forceful now than when he wrote. The California Constitution broadly proclaims speech and petition rights. Shopping centers to which the public is invited can provide an essential and invaluable forum for exercising those rights. (1c) We therefore hold that Diamond II must be overruled. (See particularly 11 Cal.3d at p. 335, fn. 4.) A closer look at Lloyd Corp., supra, 407 U.S. 551, has revealed that it does not prevent California's providing greater protection than the First Amendment now seems to provide. We conclude that sections 2 and 3 of article I of the California Constitution protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned. By no means do we imply that those who wish to disseminate ideas have free rein. We noted above Chief Justice Traynor's endorsement of time, place, and manner rules. ( In re Hoffman, supra, 67 Cal.2d at pp. 852-853.) Further, as Justice Mosk stated in Diamond II, It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment. As a result of advertising and the lure of a congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered by the [shopping center there]. A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations (see Diamond [ I ] at p. 665) would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights. (11 Cal.3d at p. 345 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) The judgment rejecting appellants' request that Pruneyard be enjoined from denying access to circulate the petition is reversed.