Opinion ID: 1250996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The May 23, 1994 Order

Text: Appellant also contends that the family court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration of the sanction order. Motions for rehearing or reconsideration under Hawai`i Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rules 59(a) and (b) involve the exercise of wide discretion, which will not be reversed on appeal absent abuse thereof. Lusch v. Foster, 3 Haw.App. 175, 184, 646 P.2d 969, 975 (1982); see also Kaneohe Bay Cruises, Inc. v. Hirata, 75 Haw. 250, 251, 861 P.2d 1, 3 (1993) (motion for reconsideration reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard). The circuit court abuses its discretion when it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. Kaneohe Bay Cruises, 75 Haw. at 251, 861 P.2d at 3. To the extent that appellant's arguments are intelligible, he asserts that the family court abused its discretion by ruling that the sanction order was enforceable, thereby effectively denying his August 26, 1993 motion for reconsideration. His arguments are without merit. Appellant contends first that only the judge who issued the original order could hear the motion for reconsideration. Again, however, he fails to cite the court to any rule or other authority that would preclude a different judge from hearing the motion. For example, appellant could have cited Wong v. City & County of Honolulu, 66 Haw. 389, 396, 665 P.2d 157, 162 (1983), for the proposition that, [u]nless cogent reasons support the second court's action, any modification of a prior ruling of another court of equal and concurrent jurisdiction will be deemed an abuse of discretion. (Emphasis in original and citations omitted.). Whether the judge who issued the original order is the only one who can hear a motion for reconsideration thereof is of no consequence here because it was not, strictly speaking, appellant's motion that was the subject of the May 23 hearing. Technically, the hearing was to consider appellee's February 7, 1994 motion to show cause why appellant's motion for reconsideration should not be heard or dismissed. [5] Appellant next contends that he did not have notice of the May 23 hearing. The transcript of the hearing discloses that appellee's counsel informed the court that [the hearing] [o]n May 9th at 1:30 was continued and  to last week. And then Mr.  at 1:30 p.m. and then Mr. Oki could not make the hearing last week `cause he was ill. So, he asked me to continue it to this Monday which I did. . . . . I also prepared a letter  I sent him a copy of the order for last week and I also was gonna fax him a written confirmation today this morning but his fax machine wouldn't come on but in any event I did leave a message on his machine. Elsewhere in the record, appellant's counsel acknowledges that he knew there was a hearing involving this case on the afternoon of May 23, 1994. In an affidavit, he avowed that: Before leaving court late that morning [on May 23, 1994], after 11:00 a.m., I checked with the bailiff there as to whether there were any hearing[s] scheduled for that afternoon for the Bettencourt case and was informed that there were reflection [sic] of such on the list that she reviewed at her station, adding that I ought to obtain said hearing date from opposing counsel. (Emphasis added.) This court is not in a position to resolve conflicting factual assertions. The family court was informed by appellee's counsel, an officer of the court, that Oki had been notified of the rescheduled hearing. It was not an abuse of discretion, therefore, to find appellant in default and uphold the earlier order imposing sanctions. If Oki believes that misrepresentations were made to the court, he can file a complaint with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel regarding opposing counsel's actions in this case. In doing so, however, we believe Oki should be called upon to explain why, after requesting that the hearing be rescheduled, he failed to follow up and make inquiries of opposing counsel or court personnel regarding the new hearing date, especially after being informed by the court bailiff that the Bettencourt case appeared to be scheduled for hearing that afternoon. Oki's duty to his client, at the very least, required him to make reasonable follow up inquiries, and his attempt to shift this responsibility to opposing counsel is not well taken.