Opinion ID: 2974054
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ohio’s Long-Arm Statute

Text: Under Ohio’s long-arm statute, “[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s . . . [t]ransacting -4- No. 05-3876 Tharo Sys. v. cab Produkttechnik any business in this state.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382(A). The injury must also arise out of the contacts with Ohio. Brunner v. Hampson, 441 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382(C)). On the strength of the Ohio Supreme Court’s broad reading of the phrase “transacting any business,” we agree that cab transacted business in Ohio. See Ky. Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell’s Formal Wear, 559 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ohio 1990) (“‘Transact’ . . . embraces in its meaning the carrying on or prosecution of business negotiations . . . and may involve business negotiations which have been either wholly or partly brought to a conclusion.”). cab and Tharo carried on a business relationship in Ohio for over 15 years. Moreover, as the trial court concluded, because “the LOU was the basis of cab’s transactions in Ohio, and [because] Tharo’s claims are for breach of the LOU, the cause of action . . . arises from cab’s transactions in Ohio.” Accordingly, we agree that Ohio’s long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over cab.