Opinion ID: 1059424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: secondary effects

Text: As described above, the R.A.V. analysis begins with categories of speech that may be subject to regulation and holds that such regulation may not selectively discriminate on the basis of content. However, the Court in R.A.V. recognized that some selective regulation of constitutionally protected speech may be permissible if it is based upon the secondary effects of speech rather than its content. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). In Renton, the ordinance under review proscribed the location of an adult motion picture theater within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, singleor multiplefamily dwelling, church, park, or school. Because the ordinance did not ban adult theaters entirely, the Court held that the ordinance is properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation. Id. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925. The analysis used by the Court focused upon whether the regulation was directed at the content of the protected speech or at a legitimate area of government concern. Determining that the dominant motive of the ordinance was to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally `protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,' the Court upheld the ordinance. Id. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 925. The Court held that the regulation in Renton was aimed not at the content of the films shown at `adult motion picture theatres,' but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community. Id. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 925. By contrast, the legislative history of the Virginia cross burning statute, the meaning afforded the expressive conduct, and the provision of prima facia evidence of intent to intimidate from the mere act of burning a cross, make it abundantly clear that Code § 18.2-423 is aimed at regulating content, not secondary effects.