Opinion ID: 2976114
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence found in Arizona

Text: All evidentiary rulings are subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. United 6 States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 553 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2001)). An abuse of discretion occurs when we are left with the “definite and firm conviction that the [district] court . . . committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors” or “where it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Id. (citing Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Webber argues that the jury heard evidence that quantities of marijuana, weighing equipment and packing materials were discovered in a building but not the building in which Webber was found when he was arrested by authorities. Webber asserts that this information was prejudicial and resulted in an unfair proceeding. Webber contends that the jury also heard that four firearms were found in the smaller residence that Webber visited, but that the weapons were hidden and were never handled or possessed by Webber or a co-defendant. Webber argues that the court erred by permitting the jury to hear testimony pertaining to the marijuana packing operation, the scales found at the main residence, the numerous photos of the handguns and bales of marijuana, although no fingerprints belonging to Webber were found in these locations. Webber also argues that there was no suggestion that he knew the renter or owner of the marijuana house or the activities transpiring in the main residence. Webber further argues that the trial court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction on the evidence found at the Arizona compound. Finally, Webber argues that all of these items were sent to the jury room in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 402. The government argues that a review of the evidence presented at trial revealed that the evidence was relevant and that there was a connection between the items seized at the Arizona compound and Webber. The government claims that evidence established that Webber supplied 7 marijuana to Hines and Chung and that Chung handled large amounts of marijuana proceeds for Webber; that Special Agent DeKatch observed Hines boarding the plane for Phoenix, Arizona; and that surveillance agents followed Hines to the premises where Webber was arrested. The government states that Webber was observed leaving the smaller residence. The government argues that all of this evidence established that the compound was being used for packaging and processing marijuana; that these facts and evidence were charged as overt acts in the conspiracy count of the indictment against Webber; and that possession of the marijuana, packaging material, and firearms was part of the conspiracy and thus was circumstantial evidence of actions by the co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. Relevant evidence is generally admissible while irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed, inter alia, by the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury. This court gives the district court broad discretion to determine whether or not to admit evidence based upon considerations of relevance and materiality. United States v. Walton, 909 F.2d 915, 925 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Phillips, 575 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1978). See United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 445 (6th Cir. 1984) (because the district court's determinations of relevancy depend on the exercise of considerable judgment within the context of the entire trial, appellate courts should not lightly overrule the trial court's decision). We will reverse a district court's decision to admit evidence based on considerations of relevance and materiality only if the district court abused its discretion. Walton, 909 F.2d at 925; United States v. Schrock, 855 8 F.2d 327, 333 (6th Cir. 1988). The marijuana and other contraband found in buildings where Webber was not found, and the guns found hidden in the building where Webber was found, are relevant to the charge of conspiracy. In a drug conspiracy conviction, the essential elements are: (1) an agreement to violate drug laws, (2) knowledge and intent to join in the conspiracy, and (3) participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 2001); see United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 148-49 (6th Cir. 1996). “A conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence that can be reasonably interpreted as participation in the common plan.” United States v. Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Ellzey, 874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1989)). Webber argues that he was unduly prejudiced by the admission of this evidence because he was not found in the main residence of the compound. In United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir.1991), the defendant argued that the admission of items, such as a mobile phone, beeper, answering machine, CB radio, cassette recorder, and certain books was irrelevant and prejudicial. The court reasoned that a collection of items made the charge more probable and therefore was relevant evidence. Rey, 923 F.2d at 1221. The same is true of the marijuana, packaging materials in the buildings other than where Webber was found, and the guns found in the residence where Webber was found. All of this evidence is indicative of customs and tools of the drug trade. The existence of this evidence makes the charge of conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs more probable, therefore, it is relevant. With regard to prejudice, Rey stated: “[t]he trial court has broad discretion in deciding admissibility issues under Rule 403. In order to exclude evidence under Rule 403, the evidence must be more than damaging; it must be unfairly prejudicial. Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency 9 to suggest a decision on an improper basis.” Id. at 1222 (citations omitted). The evidence in this case was certainly damaging to the defense but we do not think it was unfairly prejudicial. The marijuana and contraband recovered from buildings where Webber was not found and the guns hidden within the building where Webber was found were all within the same compound. The testimony from the agents and officers was that although there were different buildings in the property, the buildings were part of one compound. These relevant facts are facts from which the jurors could draw their own inferences. We conclude that there was no undue prejudice resulting from the admission of this evidence.