Opinion ID: 605573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: clark meunier

Text: 6 In their plea agreement, the Government and Clark Meunier calculated what they felt should be the applicable sentence according to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The two parties concluded that pursuant to the Guidelines, Meunier had a Criminal History Category of I and an Offense Level of 34. Applying this information to the Guideline's Sentencing Table, the parties foresaw Meunier receiving a sentence between 151 and 188 months. 7 Meunier and the Government agreed, though, that the Government would make a motion requesting a lesser sentence pursuant to section 5K1.1. This section permits a judge to depart from the Guidelines when the Government files a motion stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Taking advantage of this clause, the agreement stipulated that in return for Meunier's substantial assistance the Government would recommend a term of imprisonment ... of 105 months. 8 A sentence of 105 months represents approximately a thirty percent decrease from the 151 months minimum sentence Meunier would receive without the Government's motion. 9 Meunier and the Government recognized in the plea agreement that their calculations regarding the appropriate sentence were preliminary in nature and subject to revision by the Court in light of investigation by the United States Probation Officer and the Court's determination of the facts and the applicable law. The parties agreed also that the validity of the plea agreement was not contingent upon the probation officer's or the Court's concurrence with the above calculations. 10 This language proved prescient, for after hearing new information from the probation officer the district court did indeed revise the sentencing calculations. In the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, the probation officer stated that Meunier's Offense Level should be increased an additional two levels. The officer felt this was justified pursuant to Guidelines section 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for a two-level enhancement if the defendant possesses a dangerous weapon during the commission of his crime. 11 At Meunier's sentencing hearing on March 5, 1992, an Internal Revenue Service Special Agent testified that Meunier kept almost two-dozen rifles and automatic weapons at his Illinois marijuana farm and was always armed while cultivating his crops. Judge Conlon accordingly found that the two-level firearms enhancement applied and upped Meunier's total Offense Level from the plea agreement's 34 to a total of 36. As the Offense Level increases so too does the applicable term of imprisonment. Due to the two-level enhancement Meunier found himself looking at a sentence of somewhere between 188 and 235 months. 12 The judge then asked the Government for its sentencing position and the Government stated that pursuant to the plea agreement it would recommend a 30 percent departure. This was not the first time the Government used the 30 percent terminology, rather than speaking of 105 months as the plea agreement specified. In the Government's Motion for Downward Departure for Substantial Assistance, filed on February 14, 1992, the Government also requested the Court to grant Mr. Meunier a 30% downward departure in this case because of his substantial assistance. 13 Neither Meunier nor his counsel objected to the Government's 30 percent departure recommendations made at the sentencing hearing or in the motion for downward departure. While Meunier's counsel did use the 105 months language, Meunier himself spoke of the plea agreement as reducing his sentence by a certain percentage. Speaking to Judge Conlon, Meunier argued that he deserved a further 20 percent departure from the Guidelines and said his information was worth 50 percent. 14 Judge Conlon rejected any departure from the Guidelines. While she recognized that Meunier provided information to the Government, the judge felt the seriousness of Meunier's crimes offset any departure: I'm looking at the ongoing nature of this conspiracy over a substantial period of time that grossed a million dollars at least, involved a lot of profit, involved sophisticated money laundering, and it's hard to ... imagine how many lives were affected by your activities in the drug world. The judge therefore rejected the Government's recommendation of a departure from the Guidelines and stayed within the applicable range. She did note Meunier's cooperation, however, and therefore sentenced Meunier to the minimum 188 months incarceration. 15 Before our court, Meunier asserts he is entitled to a new sentencing before a different judge. The crucial flaw in his current sentence, as Meunier sees it, is that the Government breached the plea agreement by recommending to Judge Conlon that Meunier's sentence be reduced by thirty percent rather than being reduced to 105 months. 16 Admittedly, saying thirty percent rather than 105 months would not make a bit of difference had Judge Conlon not enhanced Meunier's Offense Level by two levels due to his possession of weapons during his crimes. As we noted earlier, 105 months is a thirty percent decrease from the 151 months minimum sentence the Government and Meunier foresaw him receiving. When Meunier's sentence was upped to a minimum of 188 months, though, the terms 30 percent and 105 months were no longer interchangeable. A thirty percent reduction from 188 months is only 132 months, a far cry from 105 months. 17 Despite the difference between 30 percent and 105 months we shall not order a new sentencing for Meunier. In the recent case of United States v. D'Iguillont, 979 F.2d 612 (7th Cir.1992), we stated that breach of a plea agreement cannot be raised for the first time on direct appeal. Id. at 614. Where a defendant fails to object to the breach at sentencing, he or she generally waives the issue. Id.; United States v. Pryor, 957 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Youmans, 926 F.2d 747, 749 (8th Cir.1991) (per curiam); United States v. Flores-Payon, 942 F.2d 556, 558-60 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Jones, 933 F.2d 1541, 1547 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Argentine, 814 F.2d 783, 790-91 (1st Cir.1987). 18 One exception to waiver, as stated in D'Iguillont, is plain error. 979 F.2d at 614; see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) (court may independently note plain errors). We have defined plain error as being an error that is palpably wrong and likely to cause the outcome of the trial to be mistaken. United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 363 (7th Cir.1986). A reversal on the basis of plain error is justifiable only when the reviewing court is convinced that it is necessary in order to avert an actual miscarriage of justice. United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 792, 83 L.Ed.2d 785 (1985); accord United States v. White, 903 F.2d 457, 466-67 (7th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (plain error exception to contemporaneous objection rule is to be used solely where miscarriage of justice would otherwise result); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 & n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592 & n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (plain errors are those which are particularly egregious). In the context of a plea agreement, to establish plain error a defendant must show that but for the breach of the plea agreement his sentence would have been different. D'Iguillont, 979 F.2d at 613. 19 Even assuming the Government breached the plea agreement, Meunier cannot show plain error. Judge Conlon, after all, rejected the Government's recommendation that Meunier's sentence be reduced thirty percent. There is no reason to believe the judge would be more receptive to reducing Meunier's sentence by more than forty percent, i.e. from 188 to 105 months. We therefore hold that Meunier has waived his right to challenge the alleged breach of the plea agreement and we affirm Meunier's sentence.