Opinion ID: 805881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Testimony of Nicholas Bobo

Text: Chapman argues that Bobo’s testimony identifying the voice on recordings of Jimenez’s calls as Chapman’s voice was inadmissible and violated Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(5). Chapman also argues that the admission of Bobo’s testimony violated his due process rights because cross-examination of Bobo was limited. “We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, subject to harmless-error analysis.” United States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 318 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]o be reversible error, the admission of the evidence in question must have substantially prejudiced the defendant’s rights.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). At trial, a voice may be identified by an opinion “based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect it with the alleged speaker.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(5). Chapman argues that Bobo’s minimal contacts were insufficient to provide reliable familiarity with Chapman’s voice. Bobo testified that he had spoken with Chapman 47 times over a ten-month period both in person and over the phone. Some of those conversations were as short as five seconds while others were much longer. Bobo’s conversations with Chapman over the ten-month period allowed him to connect Chapman’s voice with Chapman. “Rule 901(b)(5) merely requires that the witness have some familiarity with the voice which he identifies.” United States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903, 915 (5th Cir. 1979). Bobo’s testimony was therefore permissible under Rule 901(b)(5). See United States v. Norman, 415 F.3d 466, 472-73 (5th Cir. 2005). 15 Case: 10-50982 Document: 00511942948 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/02/2012 No. 10-50982 Chapman next argues that Bobo’s identification was not objective because Bobo had knowledge that Chapman was being investigated. At trial, Bobo testified that he had been told that the “cassettes were being sent to [him] in regards to an investigation” of Chapman. Bobo’s prior knowledge of the investigation goes to the weight and credibility of his testimony, not the admissibility of his testimony. Once a basis for the identification has been shown, “the jury determines the weight to accord the identification testimony.” Cuesta, 597 F.2d at 915; see also United States v. Lampton, 158 F.3d 251, 259 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Bobo’s testimony identifying Chapman’s voice on the recordings. Finally, Chapman argues that his due process rights were violated because cross-examination of Bobo was limited. Chapman’s cross-examination was only limited by his own motion in limine requesting that the parties not mention any term of supervised release, probation or supervision.2 Cross-examination was limited in that Chapman could not elicit testimony from Bobo regarding Bobo’s position as Chapman’s former supervised-release officer. A district court has “wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on crossexamination subject to the Sixth Amendment requirement that sufficient crossexamination be permitted to expose to the jurors facts from which they can draw inferences relating to the reliability of witnesses.” United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1998). A district court abuses its discretion if “the limitation was clearly prejudicial, meaning that the defendant demonstrates that a reasonable jury might have had a significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility if the defense counsel had been allowed to pursue the 2 Because any limitation on cross-examination was not error, we do not address what the effect might be of Chapman’s being the party who filed the motion that caused the limitation. 16 Case: 10-50982 Document: 00511942948 Page: 17 Date Filed: 08/02/2012 No. 10-50982 questioning.” United States v. McCullough, 631 F.3d 783, 791 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). On cross-examination, Chapman was permitted to elicit information from Bobo that would allow jurors to draw inferences relating to his reliability. Chapman was able to question Bobo about the length of their relationship, about racial tension between them, and whether Bobo had been contacted by the NAACP. Chapman also elicited information that he and Bobo were not friends and that Bobo had knowledge of an investigation into Chapman prior to listening to the tapes. Chapman was only limited in that he could not ask Bobo about the specific nature of their professional relationship. Chapman has not shown that a reasonable juror might have a significantly different impression of Bobo’s credibility if Chapman had been able to ask about Bobo’s position as his former supervised-release officer.