Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Richard Avila

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the testimony of codefendant Richard Avila required corroboration under section 1111 [40] and should be viewed with caution, and further erred in forbidding counsel to refer to Richard as an accomplice during argument. He claims these errors violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to due process, and to present a defense, as protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and to a reliable judgment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. During a conference on jury instructions, defendant questioned whether, by virtue of Richard's status as a codefendant, his testimony could be considered independent evidence to corroborate other accomplices' testimony. He argued the court should instruct the jury to determine whether Richard was an accomplice, and the court agreed. When defendant requested that Richard's name be inserted into the instruction on whether a witness is an accomplice (CALJIC No. 3.19), Richard objected. The prosecutor suggested a separate instruction be formulated so as not to confuse the jury about the burden of proof necessary to find Richard guilty. Defendant agreed, and the court asked him to draft the instruction. [41] Richard objected, arguing that a cautionary instruction telling the jury to view his testimony with distrust would be highly prejudicial to him. The trial court wondered whether, if an accomplice instruction identifying a testifying codefendant were not given, the other two codefendants (defendant and Spradlin) nevertheless would get the benefit of a general accomplice instruction that precluded the prosecution from obtaining a conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of a testifying codefendant. The prosecutor responded that Richard's testimony should be viewed like that of any other witness as against himself, but by the rules of accomplice testimony as against his codefendants. After further discussion, the court concluded that the law precluded an accomplice instruction in this case, and that Richard's credibility should be judged by the same standards as that of any other witness. Shortly before the start of closing arguments, the trial court instructed all counsel to refrain from referring to Richard Avila as an accomplice, but permitted counsel to refer to Richard's involvement in the crimes based on the evidence. It concluded: So I'm instructing all counsel not to refer to Richard Avila as an accomplice and not to make any argument which infers or argues that his testimony because he is an accomplice must be corroborated under the law, because I have ruled that it does not have to be corroborated. We have discussed in several cases the issue of how the jury should be instructed to view the testimony of an accomplice who is also one of multiple defendants in a single criminal trial. In People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908, where a confessing codefendant was an accomplice as a matter of law, we held the trial court did not err in leaving to the jury the determination of his role as an accomplice, thus avoiding imputations of guilt of the other two codefendants which might have flowed from the court's direction that the confessing codefendant was an accomplice as a matter of law. ( Id. at p. 556, 58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908.) In People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 85 Cal.Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961 ( Terry ), overruled on another point in People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 381-382, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708, we held that, generally, instructions on accomplice testimony must be given on the court's own motion only when the accomplice witness is called by the prosecution or when a defendant, in testifying, implicates his codefendant while confessing his own guilt. But where a defendant testifies in his own behalf and denies guilt while incriminating a codefendant, it is at most for the discretion of the trial judge whether to give accomplice testimony instructions on his own motion. ( Terry, at p. 399, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961.) After the trial in this case, we decided Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th 155, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365. There, we held the trial court did not err in giving accomplice instructions, where two codefendants each testified in his or her own behalf, denied guilt, and incriminated the other to some extent. We explained that the testimony of an accomplice who testifies against a defendant deserves close scrutiny because he has the motive, opportunity, and means to attempt to help himself at the other's expense, and that this rationale remains true when the accomplice who testifies against a defendant is himself a defendant. ( Id. at p. 218, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) Similarly, in People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130 ( Box ), we held the trial court should have instructed the jury that codefendant Flores's testimony should be viewed with care and caution to the extent it tended to incriminate the defendant. Just as in the case of an accomplice who testifies for the prosecution, Flores's testimony in his own defense was subject to the taint of an improper motive  promoting his own interest by inculpating the defendant. Accordingly, we held there was no persuasive reason not to require an instruction that an accomplice's testimony should be viewed with care and caution when requested by a defendant in a case where the codefendant testified. ( Id. at p. 1209, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) Thus, decisional law existing at the time of trial recognized it was within the trial court's discretion not to give accomplice instructions with respect to Richard's testimony. But Alvarez and Box make clear that a trial court should instruct the jury that, to the extent a codefendant's testimony tends to incriminate a defendant, it should be viewed with care and caution and is subject to the corroboration requirement. We need not decide, however, whether the court erred because any error in this regard was nonprejudicial. A trial court's failure to instruct on accomplice liability under section 1111 is harmless if there is sufficient corroborating evidence in the record. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 370, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, the prosecution must present independent evidence, that is, evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the crime charged without aid or assistance from the accomplice's testimony. ( People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 769, 103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129.) Corroborating evidence is sufficient if it tends to implicate the defendant and thus relates to some act or fact that is an element of the crime. ( Ibid.; accord, People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 370, 110 Cal. Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) `[T]he corroborative evidence may be slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone.' [Citation.] ( People v. Perry, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 769, 103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129.) Here, Richard Avila's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence. When defendant was interviewed after his arrest, he initially denied being at a party, denied knowing anyone living on North Hayes, denied knowing Medina or Jeffrey Spradlin, and claimed he had not seen his cousin, Richard Avila, in years. Defendant's initial attempt to conceal from the police his involvement in the activities culminating in the murders implied consciousness of guilt constituting corroborating evidence. (See People v. Perry, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 772, 103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129 [attempts of an accused to conceal his identity or his whereabouts may warrant an inference of consciousness of guilt and may corroborate an accomplice's testimony]; see also, e.g., People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 773, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419 [evidence of flight supports an inference of consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission which may properly be considered as corroborative of an accomplice's testimony].) Defendant eventually admitted he brought Medina and Sanchez to the party. He also admitted that he might have been inside the car in which the victims were taken to their deaths and that his saliva might be found on Sanchez. Michael Ramirez also implied that defendant was present during the discussion of what was to be done with Medina and Sanchez shortly before they were taken away from the property. [42] (See, e.g. People v. Hathcock (1973) 8 Cal.3d 599, 618, 105 Cal.Rptr. 540, 504 P.2d 476 [corroborating evidence included testimony that defendant was in the presence of the two victims shortly before their deaths].) In sum, the evidence adduced at trial sufficiently corroborated Richard's testimony. Even if there were insufficient corroboration, reversal would not be required unless it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached. [Citation.] The purpose of an instruction pursuant to section 1111 is to compel the jury to view accomplice testimony with distrust and suspicion. [Citation.] ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 101, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) Here, the jury had before it ample information suggesting that Richard's testimony might not have been trustworthy. The jury knew that Richard was on trial and thus had every motive to deny his own participation in the murder and implicate a codefendant. Indeed, the gist of Richard's testimony  that he did not furnish any of the weapons present on the North Hayes property and had little or no control over the activities occurring there  was inconsistent with evidence that the purpose of the gathering that night was to assist him, at his request, in protecting the property from a drive-by shooting. Indeed, by all accounts, the victims eventually were taken away from the property at Richard's insistence. Moreover, defendant attacked Richard's credibility at length during closing argument. Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the jury been instructed on accomplice liability as to Richard Avila, or had argument referring to him as an accomplice not been limited. For the same reasons, any error was also harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.