Opinion ID: 2816581
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The “BMF” Registration for Tires

Text: Defendants also argue that the district court erred in “excluding” the registration and PTO file for the “BMF” mark for tires.4 In particular, Defendants argue that the file history would have provided crucial rebuttal evidence as an instance where the examining attorney found Plaintiff’s mark yet subsequently allowed a registration for “BMF” so long as Defendants restricted the mark to tires. Defendants waived any claim that this evidence was wrongly excluded. “‘[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right’ leaving no correctable error in its wake.” Williams v. Port Huron Sch. Dist., 455 F. App'x 612, 623 (6th Cir. 2012) (Moore, J. dissenting) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). Waiver requires “knowledge of the right and intent to waive that right, either by action or omission.” Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Patel, 445 F.3d 899, 906 n.6 (6th Cir. 2006). Defendants were faced with a motion to exclude the “BMF” registration for tires as a sanction for discovery violations. Rather than oppose that motion on the merits, they willingly stipulated to keeping the registration out of the case in exchange for Plaintiff’s agreement not to introduce the corresponding PTO file, which contained an interim refusal based on the likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff’s mark. Defendants entered into this stipulation knowing that Plaintiff might still seek to introduce the 4 Defendants never sought to introduce the exhibit at trial, much less as rebuttal evidence after Plaintiff drew attention to the PTO’s refusal based on a likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff’s mark in the “BMF Offroad” application. It is therefore incorrect to suggest that the district court “excluded” the “BMF” file as rebuttal evidence. Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 16 file history for “BMF Offroad.” After intentionally relinquishing the right to offer the “BMF” registration for tires as evidence, Defendants cannot now claim error based on the omission of that evidence at trial. 2. Legal Opinion Testimony Defendants also seek reversal based on the testimony offered by Foltz about his understanding of the scope of Plaintiff’s trademark application and registration. Foltz testified in his direct examination regarding the scope of his BMF registration: “my understanding, when I communicated with my attorney, [was] that it covered us for automotive parts.” (R. 107 at 2249.) Defendants did not object. On cross-examination, defense counsel pressed Foltz on the scope of CFE’s application with regard to the goods claims in the following exchanges: Q. Would it surprise you to know that the classification manual states that Class 7 does not include motors or engines for land vehicles? A. Again, I can only tell you what my attorney told me. My attorney told me that we were protected against after market parts. ... Q. [T]he goods you claimed were cylinder heads, right? Forget about the class, you said cylinder heads. A. I was under the understanding when I talked to my attorney that it was aftermarket parts for the automotive industry. Q. You didn’t file for aftermarket parts. You filed for cylinder heads. Is that correct or not? A. I don’t know that that’s correct. When I talked to my attorney, he said we were covered under aftermarket parts. (R. 107 at 2281, 2291.) Defense counsel did not raise any objections to these answers during cross-examination or request the judge to instruct Foltz to omit reference to his attorney’s opinion. Defendants objected for the first time on redirect, when Plaintiff’s counsel asked Foltz, “[i]s it your understanding that whatever the internal classification of the [PTO] . . . that’s the limit of your trademark protection, you can’t go outside the box?” (Id. at 2299.) The district court allowed the question, noting that defense counsel had “roundly explored” the same issue on cross. (Id.) Foltz answered that no, that was not his understanding. Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 17 Defendants argue that Foltz’s statements reporting what he understood from his attorney were inadmissible both as hearsay and as legal opinion testimony. Responding to the hearsay challenge, Plaintiff argues that the testimony was offered only to prove Foltz’s understanding, not that his belief was legally correct. If relevant, the testimony would be admissible for this purpose. Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2009) (“A statement that is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to show its effect on the listener is not hearsay.”) We can identify no issue requiring proof of Foltz’s understanding, and Plaintiff does not offer one. Instead it appears that both attorneys were using questions about Foltz’s understanding of the scope of the trademark application and registration as a means of suggesting to the jury what protection against similar marks Plaintiff could properly claim. The statements should have been excluded as hearsay. Additionally, the statements conveyed the legal opinion of Foltz’s attorney, at least as filtered through Foltz’s understanding of the conversation. We have previously explained that “[t]he problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness' unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury. This ‘invade[s] the province of the court to determine the applicable law and to instruct the jury as to that law.’” Torres v. Cnty. of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 149 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting F.A.A. v. Landy, 705 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 1983)). Foltz’s testimony during this passage conveyed an opinion regarding the legal effects of Plaintiff’s trademark registration—a legal matter which was the responsibility of the trial court to explain to the jury. As legal opinion testimony, Foltz’s statements should not have been admitted. The error, however, was harmless. As a preliminary matter, we note that Defendants were equally implicated in the efforts to use Foltz’s testimony about his understanding of trademark law as a proxy for legal argument. Because they objected only after engaging in the same problematic pattern of questioning themselves, their substantial rights were not affected by the district court overruling their belated objection. Additionally, we are confident that Foltz’s statements about his own understanding of the scope of trademark protection sought and obtained by his company did not affect the outcome of the trial. The district court gave clear instructions on the legal issues encompassed by this testimony. The court’s charge to the jury Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 18 included a statement clarifying that the PTO’s classification system “is merely for convenience of searching; it does not limit or extend the applicant’s or registrant’s rights,” and that “[t]he classification assigned to a trademark registration has no effect on the validity or scope of protection of the registered trademark.” (R. 110-2, Jury Instructions, at PageID 2729.) As to the products covered by the registration, in response to a jury question that arose during deliberations, the district court instructed that Plaintiff’s “BMF” registration gave Plaintiff the exclusive right to use the mark with cylinder heads, and that enforcement of that right “is not limited to products listed in the registration” but also includes “products reasonably related to them.” (R. 109 at 2674.) Thus, any error was cured. And where prejudice from erroneously admitted evidence “‘is cured by instructions of the court, the motion for a new trial should be denied.’” Holmes v. City of Massillon, Ohio, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Clarksville–Montgomery Cnty. Sch. Sys. v. United States Gypsum Co., 925 F.2d 993, 1002 (6th Cir. 1991)). 3. Out-of-Court Statements of Michael Locke Next, Defendants argue that the district court improperly allowed Plaintiff’s marketing director Larry Gadette to offer hearsay testimony when he relayed his conversation with Michael Locke as evidence of customer confusion. Relatedly, Defendants assert that they should have been permitted to introduce, in rebuttal, a declaration from Locke that he had never purchased BMF wheels and that he was not confused. Defendants’ arguments regarding Locke are entirely without merit. Gadette’s testimony that Locke called to inquire about the status of his order for BMF valve covers and made reference to a corresponding set of BMF wheels was not offered for “the truth of the matter asserted,” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), but rather was “probative of the declarant’s confusion,” FunDamental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Industries Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 803(3)). The district court did not err in allowing the testimony. The “rebuttal” declaration from Locke, in contrast, was plainly proffered by Defendants to prove the truth of his assertions—that he had not purchased BMF wheels, and that he was not confused. Defendants seek to rely on the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, but that exception requires that the statement concern the declarant’s “then-existing state of mind;” it Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 19 expressly prohibits “a statement of memory . . . to prove the fact remembered.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). Locke’s declaration that he was not confused at the time of the call was a statement of memory offered for its truth. The district court correctly excluded the declaration. B. Alleged Improper Statements by Plaintiff’s Counsel Defendants also argue that a new trial is warranted because of allegedly improper comments made by Plaintiff’s counsel in closing argument. Defendants must meet a high standard to obtain a new trial on the grounds of improper statements by opposing counsel. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 761-62 (6th Cir. 2012). First, Defendants must overcome the “high level of deference that [we] afford[] to the trial court in determining whether improper comments prejudiced the jury.” Id. at 762. This deference is grounded in our recognition that “[t]he trial court is in a far better position to measure the effect of an improper question on the jury than an appellate court which reviews only the cold record.” City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 624 F.2d 749, 756 (6th Cir. 1980). We have previously instructed that “the power to set aside verdict for misconduct of counsel should be sparingly exercised on appeal.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). In considering whether allegedly improper attorney statements merit a new trial, we analyze the totality of the circumstances, “including the nature of the comments, their frequency, their possible relevancy to the real issues before the jury, the manner in which the parties and the court treated the comments, the strength of the case (e.g. whether it is a close case), and the verdict itself.” Balsley, 691 F.3d at 761 (quoting Mich. First Credit Union v. CUMIS Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 641 F.3d 240, 249 (6th Cir. 2011)). Even if the statements are improper, Defendants are not entitled to a new trial unless “there is a reasonable probability that the verdict of the jury has been influenced by such conduct.” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Owens Corning, 142 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 1998)). Our review, as in other issues in this case, is further constrained by the fact that Defendants did not object to any of the allegedly improper comments. Their failure to object “raise[s] the degree of prejudice which must be demonstrated” in order for this Court to grant the request for a new trial. Strickland, 142 F.3d at 358. We have found statements that were “egregious” or “outrageous” to have met this standard. Id. Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 20 We conclude that a new trial is not warranted. First, all but one of the challenged statements merely contrasted the PTO file for “BMF Offroad” with the application leading to the registration for “BMF Wheels,” or otherwise highlighted the examiner’s basis for finding a likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff’s mark. For example, Plaintiff pointed out to the jury that the “BMF Offroad” examiner defined the relevant category of goods as “vehicle parts,” and that the examiner concluded that “because the marks are highly similar, and the goods being provided by both parties are related, registration must be refused.” (R. 109 at 2615-16.) Plaintiff placed especially heavy emphasis on the fact that the examiner in the “BMF Offroad” file found and considered Plaintiff’s mark, unlike the examiner in the “BMF Wheels” file. (Id. at 2615, 2657.) Defendant objects that these statements “turned on its head” the presumption of validity accorded by statute to their registered trademark “BMF Wheels,” and created a “presumption of invalidity” by suggesting to the jury that the conclusion of the examiner in “BMF Offroad” should be given more credence. Def.’s First Br. at 42. That, we imagine, was precisely the point. The presumption of validity attaching to a trademark registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) may of course be rebutted. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). Evidence that the PTO, when aware of Plaintiff’s mark, identified a likelihood of confusion with a proposed mark using “BMF” on auto-parts is rebuttal evidence casting doubt on the reliability of the registration process for “BMF Wheels,” the accused mark in the case. See Mktg. Displays, 200 F.3d at 934 (“[T]here is no evidence that the PTO considered the WindMaster mark, and the PTO might have made a mistake.”). Defendants do not argue that the “BMF Offroad” file was inadmissible for this purpose, and indeed never requested a limiting instruction from the district court. These statements were not improper. It appears that Defendants’ true concern is that Plaintiff was able to make arguments about the PTO record without acknowledging the “BMF” registration Weld obtained for tires. This incomplete discussion is the natural consequence of their stipulation to the exclusion of the “BMF” registration and file; Defendants have waived any objection on these grounds. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. While their stipulation may have been unwise, they may not rely on the absence of that evidence from the record to characterize otherwise accurate statements as improper. Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 21 Defendants’ more serious contention is that Plaintiff’s counsel knowingly made a false statement in the course of the comparative discussion of the PTO files when he asserted that the examiner of the “BMF Offroad” application was the “only examiner” who saw Plaintiff’s mark: So two categories of vehicle parts, both with the exact same name in them, BMF, because Offroads is a descriptive and really that has to be disregarded, so both with BMF in them, the same three letters, for automotive or for vehicle parts, no good, says the only examiner who actually saw our mark. (R. 109 at 2657 (emphasis added).) As with all the other allegedly improper statements, Defendants did not object. On the basis of a cold record, this statement certainly is amenable to an interpretation that the PTO examining attorney who reviewed the “BMF Offroad” application was the only examining attorney ever to find Plaintiff’s mark in analyzing a trademark application from Defendants. This is clearly incorrect insofar as it goes; the examining attorney for the application that eventually became the “BMF” registration for tires also found Plaintiff’s mark—but that attorney, too, issued an initial rejection based on likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff’s mark. The falsity detected by Defendants is potentially material only because the examining the examining attorney in the “BMF” registration eventually resolved her concern and allowed the registration to proceed as to tires only. Defendants waived their right to present that outcome to the jury, and Plaintiff’s statement is in conflict with that outcome only by a chain of inferences. While Plaintiff’s counsel should have chosen his words more carefully, this misstatement is not so “outrageous” or “egregious” that Defendants are entitled to a new trial notwithstanding their failure to object. Strickland, 142 F.3d at 358. C. The Weight of the Evidence The third basis for a new trial advanced by Defendants is that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. “[G]ranting a new trial on this ground is a rare occurrence.” Innovation Ventures, 763 F.3d at 534 (quoting Armisted v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 989, 995 (6th Cir. 2012)). We will uphold the verdict reached by the jury “if it was one which the jury reasonably could have reached; we cannot set it aside simply because we think another result is more justified.” Id. We conclude that the jury reached a permissible verdict on the evidence. Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 22 The jury found that Defendants’ use of the BMF Wheels marks created a likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff’s registered and unregistered marks. The “likelihood of confusion” among consumers as to the origin of the goods provided by a defendant is a mixed question of fact and law. Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1996). We consider eight factors in determining whether a finding of likelihood of confusion is permissible. Frisch's Rest., Inc. v. Shoney's Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir. 1985). These factors include:

Id. There is no requirement that each factor be established in each case, nor do these factors imply “mathematical precision” or a particular balancing formula. Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1991). Instead, the factors are “interrelated in effect” and only a “guide to help determine whether confusion is likely.” Id. The enumeration is meant “merely [to] indicate the need for weighted evaluation of the pertinent facts in arriving at the legal conclusion of confusion.” Frisch, 759 F.2d at 1264. “The ultimate question remains whether relevant consumers are likely to believe that the products or services offered by the parties are affiliated in some way.” Homeowners Grp., 931 F.2d at 1107. The similarity of the marks “is a factor of considerable weight,” and here, it weighs very strongly in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion. Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 1997). A reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ marks were nearly identical to Plaintiff’s registered and unregistered marks. In “BMF Wheels,” the letters “BMF” provide the dominant identifier as the non-generic element of the composite. The dominant role of the letters “BMF” in Defendants’ mark plainly contributes to a likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff’s registered trademark for the letters “BMF,” without Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 23 restriction as to font, style, size, or color. See, e.g., Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding likelihood of confusion supported by the dominant role of the word “giant” in the two relevant marks, “GIANT FOOD” and “GIANT HAMBURGERS”). The striking visual similarity of Defendants’ logo to Plaintiff’s logo, of course, also supports a finding of a likelihood of confusion as to Plaintiff’s unregistered marks. Although Defendants dispute the degree of relatedness between the two companies’ products, their efforts to diminish this factor are unavailing. The products were both aftermarket vehicle parts. In fact, both companies sold in the specialty aftermarket for automotive parts— namely, in a market targeted to consumers who are not merely repairing their vehicles, but instead seeking to improve image and performance. The relatedness of the products is further illustrated by the fact that the distributors used by both companies sold cylinders heads and wheels alike. In the circumstances of this case, the nearly identical nature of the marks and the relatedness of the goods are likely sufficient to reject Defendants’ claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We would be remiss, however, if we did not point out additional evidence supporting the jury’s finding that there was a likelihood of confusion. The jury heard anecdotal evidence of actual confusion in Gadette’s testimony about the call he received from Michael Locke asking about a BMF valve cover order to go with a set of BMF wheels. Additionally, the initial perception of Weld’s colleagues and brother that Plaintiff’s company must be “ripping off” Defendants’ mark reveals the high degree of similarity these individuals found between the marks. Although Defendants emphasize the degree to which Plaintiff’s mark was in decline, the jury could have concluded that it had some strength based on the moderate distinctiveness of the design, significant previous sales numbers, and testimony about Plaintiff’s success with targeted marketing. Finally, the record contained evidence that both companies were likely to expand their product lines: Foltz reported discussions with manufacturers about producing lubricants and mufflers that would carry the “BMF” brand, and in the course of the back and forth about the PTO record, the jury heard evidence of Defendants’ proposed expansion into tires and items like suspension parts and vehicle grilles. The verdict, in short, was well supported by the evidence. A new trial is not warranted. Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 24 III. Plaintiff’s Challenge to the Narrow Scope of Injunctive Relief Plaintiff contends that the district court abused its discretion in declining to cancel Defendants’ trademark and in permitting Defendants to continue using the phrase “BMF Wheels,” subject to redesign of the logo and disclaimers of affiliation in some instances. We agree. A. Cancellation of the Trademark Registration for “BMF Wheels” Part of the equitable relief Plaintiff requested was the cancellation of Weld’s registered trademark to “BMF Wheels” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1119. That provision of the Lanham Act authorizes district courts to rule directly on the validity of a registration: In any action involving a registered mark the court may determine the right to registration, order the cancelation of registrations, in whole or in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action. § 1119. Courts have held that the permissive language of § 1119, providing that the court “may” determine the right to registration, order cancellation of registrations, and the like, endows the district court with discretionary authority. Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 541 F.3d 476, 478 (2d Cir. 2008). Therefore, “[a] district court’s determination to grant relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1119 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Patsy’s Italian Rest., Inc. v. Banas, 658 F.3d 254, 264 (2d Cir. 2011). A request for cancellation under § 1119 must be supported by a showing that (1) the party “has standing to petition for cancellation because it is likely to be damaged,” and (2) “there are valid grounds for discontinuing registration.” Coach House Rest. v. Coach & Six Rests., 934 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1991). Appellate courts have found an abuse of the discretionary authority granted by § 1119 where district courts “refus[e] to order the cancellation of registrations for claimed marks found to be incapable of serving as valid marks.” See, e.g., Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000). As the Seventh Circuit explained, because the judgment of a court “may raise doubts about the validity of a trademark registration, § 1119 arms the court with the power to update the federal trademark register to account for a mark’s actual legal status (or lack thereof) after it has been adjudicated, thereby reducing the Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 25 potential for future uncertainty over the rights in a particular mark.” Cent. Mfg., Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 2007). Where a jury’s verdict establishes that one of the party’s registered trademarks is invalid, then “cancellation is not merely appropriate, it is the best course.” Id. The district court declined to cancel Weld’s registration because it determined that “[c]onfining the defendants’ use of [their] registration to the phrase ‘BMF Wheels’ and limiting their use of that phrase adequately protects the plaintiff’s interest in its mark.” (R. 125, Opinion Regarding Injunctive Relief, PageID 2908.) This reasoning overlooks two crucial aspects of the case. First, Plaintiff’s interest in its registered mark must be understood by the scope of its registration, which encompassed the use of “BMF” without restrictions as to style. Second, the jury’s verdict necessitates a finding that Defendants’ registered trademark is invalid. The PTO may not issue registration for a trademark if the proposed mark “[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the [PTO], or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). In other words, the PTO may not issue registered marks for logos that cause confusion with a registered or unregistered trademark. See id.; Coach House Rest., 934 F.2d at 1559 (holding that a likelihood of confusion furnishes one ground for cancelling a registration). By special verdict form, the jury explicitly found that Defendants’ use of its mark “BMF Wheels” created a likelihood of confusion with “[P]laintiff’s registered BMF trademark.” (R. 100, Verdict Form, PageID 2037.) The district court supported its decision not to order cancellation with the assertion that “[t]he principal point of confusion found by the jury was the use by the defendants of their logos, which closely approximated the style, font and colors used by the plaintiff’s use of the letters ‘BMF’ in connection with its products.” (R. 125 at 2907.) This conclusion was clearly erroneous. Plaintiff’s registered “BMF” trademark provided no restriction as to size, style, font, or color, so the “principal point of confusion” found by the jury could not have been the similar style, font, and colors of the two marks. To give effect to the jury’s finding that Defendants’ marks created a likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff’s registered Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 26 trademark, we must acknowledge that this likelihood of confusion is fatal to the validity of the “BMF Wheels” registration—as the sole point of similarity between the two, and the sole potential source of confusion is the use of the three letters “BMF.” Moreover, the district court’s instructions made plain that a finding of likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff’s mark was equivalent to a finding of the invalidity of Weld’s registration: You have heard evidence that Brock Weld is the owner of a trademark registration for the mark BMF Wheels for land vehicle parts, namely wheels, registered on March 18, 2008, Registration Number 3,400,041. That registration means that the owner of the registration has the exclusive right to use the – to use the registered mark in connection – in commerce or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration unless the registration is determined to be invalid. You may find that the registration is invalid if the Plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that use of the mark is likely to cause confusion among ordinary buyers as to the source of the products. (R. 109 at 2582 (emphasis added).) Although the special verdict form did not include a special interrogatory on the validity of Weld’s registration, the jury’s finding of a likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff’s registered “BMF” trademark cannot be reconciled with the district court’s implicit finding that the Weld’s registration is nonetheless valid.5 As we have already discussed, the jury’s verdict was fully supported by the evidence. Here, as in Gracie, “[i]n light of the jury verdict, which the district court allowed to stand, the district court should have ordered cancellation” of Weld’s federal registration for “BMF Wheels.” Gracie, 217 F.3d at 1066; see also In re Lewis, 845 F.2d 624, 629 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen a party has a right to a jury trial on an issue involved in a legal claim, the judge is of course bound by the jury’s determination of that issue as it affects his disposition of an accompanying equitable claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 The district court described its ruling as “limiting” Defendants’ registration by a number of means that ultimately prove illusory. It purported to confine Defendants’ “use of [the] registration to the phrase ‘BMF Wheels’”—yet the registration was for that precise phrase. (R. 125 at 2908.) The court also prohibited Defendants from “using their registered mark in connection with the production, promotion, display or sale of any product except automotive wheels and rims.” (Id.) To find this limitation supportable, we would need to ignore the reality that Defendants’ principal use of the mark—and unquestionably the use underlying the jury’s verdict in this case—is already in connection with wheels. Although there was some evidence that the companies intended to expand their BMF product lines, that relatively minor evidence would not have supported a finding of likelihood of confusion absent a finding that the parties’ current BMF products were materially related. Finally, the district court required that use of the mark must be accompanied by a disclaimer of association with Plaintiff. The necessity of a disclaimer, however, underscores the invalidity of the mark. See 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:2 (4th ed.) (“Since the goal of the register is to make registration and use as coincidental as possible, where a court has determined that a party cannot use a mark without a prescribed disclaimer, that mark cannot be registered. Use of the mark without a disclaimer is illegal and is not a basis for registration.”) (citing Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Spring Mills, Inc., 828 F.2d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Nos. 14-1357/1608/1939 CFE Racing Products v. BMF Wheels, et al. Page 27