Opinion ID: 1039978
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion To Reconsider COA Request

Text: Having found no ground to grant federal habeas relief from either the guilt phase or second penalty phase, we turn to the alleged errors in Howell’s trial on mental retardation. Because the district court denied a COA, we cannot review Howell’s claims on their merits unless we first grant Howell a COA. We have already denied his request for a COA, but he timely moved for our reconsideration. He asked us to grant COA on four issues: (1) the applicable burden of proof in Atkins proceedings; (2) prosecutorial misconduct at jury selection; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) insufficient evidence to support the jury’s mental retardation finding. We grant a COA only if an applicant makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). An applicant must show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” United States v. Taylor, 454 F.3d 1075, 1078 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Howell’s claims already have been adjudicated on the merits in state court, so he can obtain federal habeas relief only if he can overcome AEDPA deference -45- —i.e., only if he can establish that the state court’s decision was either (1) contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law,” or (2) was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, the decision whether to grant Howell’s COA request rests on whether “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong” in light of the deference owed to the OCCA’s adjudication of Howell’s claims. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003); see also id. at 336 (“We look to the District Court’s application of AEDPA to petitioner’s constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable amongst jurists of reason.”). Based on these principles, we find no persuasive reason to reconsider our previous decision denying COA.
Howell first claims the Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), require the prosecution to bear the burden of proving Howell is not mentally retarded. After analyzing both Supreme Court cases, the OCCA disagreed and denied this claim. The district court concluded the OCCA’s interpretation and application of Apprendi and Ring were reasonable and therefore entitled to AEDPA deference. Consequently, the district court denied this ground for relief. -46- The district court’s decision is not debatable—Howell cannot overcome AEDPA deference. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. In Ring, the Supreme Court extended Apprendi to capital defendants, thereby requiring prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt statutory aggravating circumstances to impose the death penalty. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 589. Neither holding applies directly to the circumstances of our case, so under AEDPA deference, the OCCA’s decision cannot be challenged. Nevertheless, Howell argues this question “remains open and debatable,” and therefore a proper ground for a COA. Aplt. COA Br. at 33. But the problem for Howell is that this question’s lack of firm resolution precludes any relief, given that the OCCA has already taken a reasonable position. The OCCA’s determination here is not contrary to a Supreme Court holding, so none could debate the district court’s decision that AEDPA deference precludes relief. Moreover, we have already held that Oklahoma law on this burden-of-proof question was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See Ochoa v. Workman, 669 F.3d 1130, 1133 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012). And other courts agree. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 311–12 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting that Apprendi and Ring require placing the burden on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is not mentally retarded); State v. Were, 890 -47- N.E.2d 263, 478–79 (Ohio 2008) (same, and listing other state courts of accord, including those of Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania); supra Part II.F. (listing still other state courts holding the same, including those of Louisiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia); see also Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 381–82 (Ky. 2005) (“Every state statute providing a mental retardation exemption from the death penalty places the burden on the defendant to prove that he is mentally retarded, as has every court that has addressed the issue, usually in the context of holding that the absence of mental retardation is not an element of the offense.” (footnotes omitted)). Accordingly, we deny Howell’s request for a COA on this issue. 11
Howell claims the prosecution used two peremptory challenges on the basis of race, thereby violating the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Reviewing for plain error (since Howell did not raise a 11 Howell also argues that “[b]ecause a finding of retardation precludes the death sentence, the absence of retardation is a necessary finding for imposition of death within the meaning of Ring.” Aplt. COA Br. at 34. But that logic does not mandate placing the burden of proof on the prosecution. Just because finding a defendant incompetent to stand trial precludes sentencing him to death does not mean the prosecution must prove a defendant’s competence. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449–51 (1992). It is the same with mental retardation. Until the Supreme Court holds otherwise, no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s decision to deny relief. -48- Batson objection at trial), the OCCA found no merit to this claim, concluding Howell failed to show that the prosecutor lacked a race-neutral explanation for the two strikes in question. Thus, Howell would have to overcome AEDPA deference if granted a COA. The district court also rejected this claim, but for a different reason. According to the district court, Howell failed to make a prima facie case that the two jurors were removed due to their race. It explained, “the race of these jurors is not borne out by the record.” Howell v. Workman, No. CIV-07-1008-D, 2011 WL 5143069, at  (W.D. Okla. Oct. 28, 2011). For that reason, the district court concluded Howell failed to meet his burden under step one of Batson, and it dismissed the claim accordingly. Batson provides a three-step process for a trial court to use in adjudicating a claim that a peremptory challenge was based on race: First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476–77 (2008) (alterations incorporated) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). -49- The district court’s decision to reject this claim is not “debatable or wrong.” As the district court explained, nowhere in the record is there any reference to a juror’s race. Howell does not point to one, and we cannot find one. Nor has Howell attempted to supplement the record with an affidavit from any juror or other person present at trial to establish a juror’s race. And in the alternative, the record amply supports the State’s contention that the prosecutor had race-neutral reasons for excusing the jurors—namely, their experiences with mentally disabled people in their personal lives. The district court also denied Howell’s motion for an evidentiary hearing as untimely, and that decision also is not open to debate. After granting several extensions, the court gave Howell until April 7, 2008, to file an additional motion. But Howell did not submit his motion for an evidentiary hearing until July 2009—fifteen months after the deadline. And Howell offered no reason for the untimeliness of his motion. No reasonable jurist could debate whether this issue should have been resolved differently. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (“Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further. In such a circumstance, no appeal would be warranted.”). -50- Accordingly, we deny Howell’s request for a COA on this ground. 12
Howell raised three claims of ineffective assistance at his Atkins trial: (1) trial counsel’s failure to object to the alleged Batson violations, (2) his failure to exclude the state mental health expert’s testimony, and (3) his failure to present an additional witness to show that Howell was in special education classes as a youth. The OCCA denied all three IAC claims, so Howell would have to overcome AEDPA deference if we granted a COA. And under AEDPA deference, the OCCA violated no clearly established federal law in denying relief for Howell’s IAC claims because Howell is unable to show prejudice from any of these alleged mistakes. Accordingly, no reasonable jurist could disagree with the district court’s decision to deny relief for these claims as well. We turn first to defense counsel’s failure to object to the alleged Batson violations. Because Howell has not shown any Batson violations, he cannot show counsel erred in failing to object. Thus, he is not entitled to habeas relief. 12 We agree with Howell that the OCCA misstated clearly established law when it said Howell bore the burden of showing the prosecution lacked a raceneutral explanation for the strikes. As Howell correctly notes, the prosecution bears that burden. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477. But we do not get to the prosecution’s burden of providing a race-neutral explanation—step two of a Batson claim—unless Howell first gets us past step one. See, e.g., id. at 477–78. And as the district court concluded, Howell has not made the requisite prima facie case. No reasonable jurist could debate that conclusion. -51- The other two IAC claims merit additional discussion. Howell argues that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge or exclude Dr. Hutson (the State mental health expert)’s conclusions. And he claims his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to present at trial the testimony of a former high school teacher who says she taught Howell and his brother in a special education class in high school. The OCCA rejected Howell’s first claim for lack of prejudice because “[b]oth experts used their professional knowledge and experience to ‘estimate’ what they believed [Howell’s] true IQ to be,” and “both experts used a wide array of information, well beyond raw IQ scores, to arrive at their respective conclusions about [Howell’s] mental abilities.” Howell IV, No. PCD-2006-712, slip op. at 9, 11. More, both experts were exposed to vigorous and effective examination regarding their testimony, further mitigating any potential prejudice. Given AEDPA deference to the OCCA—not to mention the plethora of evidence supporting the OCCA’s and jury’s conclusions—the district court’s decision to deny relief for this IAC claim is not open to debate. The OCCA rejected Howell’s other IAC claim because, even if the high school teacher had testified at Howell’s Oklahoma trial, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Howell failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he manifested mental retardation before the age of eighteen. In light of AEDPA deference, the district court denied relief. -52- No reasonable jurist could debate this decision, either. Howell’s brother testified at the Atkins trial, and he said—as the teacher also would have said—that Howell was in special education classes in high school. But the school records belied that claim: Howell’s brother and sister were both listed in special education, while Howell was not. Having one more voice (the teacher’s) saying that Howell was in fact in a special education class could have helped Howell’s case, but it is not enough to show prejudice given the deference owed to the OCCA’s decision to deny relief. Besides, IQ tests administered to Howell when he was younger showed an IQ closer to 80, not one below 70. In sum, the district court’s decision is not open to debate. Accordingly, we deny Howell’s request for a COA on his IAC claims.
Howell also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at the Atkins trial. He faces an uphill battle to show the district court’s assessment of this issue was “debatable or wrong.” As the district court correctly noted, “[r]eview of this claim requires layers of deference.” Howell v. Workman, 2011 WL 5143069, at . First, AEDPA deference applies to the OCCA’s review—and rejection—of this claim. Thus, the OCCA’s factual determinations are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Second, a jury concluded Howell was not mentally retarded, and our review of jury verdicts is “‘sharply limited.’” Boltz v. Mullin, 415 F.3d 1215, 1232 (10th -53- Cir. 2005). We cannot overturn a jury verdict “as long as it is within the bounds of reason.” Id. Given these layers of deference, Howell would have to present a very convincing case that he is, in fact, mentally retarded—i.e., that the OCCA’s and Oklahoma jury’s decisions to the contrary were unreasonable—in order to show that the district court’s assessment of this claim was “debatable or wrong.” Howell falls far short of meeting that standard. First, he argues that Atkins requires a level of scientific certainty that the Oklahoma trial court fell below. But as the district court correctly noted, under Atkins, the states have “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction [against executing the mentally retarded].” 536 U.S. at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Atkins Court did not mandate any particular methodologies for determining mental retardation, instead leaving that question to the states. The district court’s rejection of this argument is not open to reasonable debate. Second, Howell argues that the OCCA’s decision to affirm the jury’s verdict was an unreasonable determination of the facts and thus should be overturned on federal habeas. But the district court disagreed, finding that, contrary to Howell’s claims, “the evidence presented was not conclusive but disputed.” Howell v. Workman, 2011 WL 5143069, at . And under AEDPA deference and the deference owed to jury verdicts, no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s conclusion. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). -54- Accordingly, we deny Howell’s request for a COA on this ground.
For his last ground, Howell incorporates by reference briefing and arguments for “all remaining issues not already briefed in this application, including Claims 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 18, and 19.” Aplt. COA Br. at 34. But “incorporation by reference is not permitted in appellate materials in this circuit.” Young v. Addison, 490 F. App’x 960, 964 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing 10th Cir. R. 28.4). “Thus we should not consider arguments [Howell] made in state and district court that he attempts to incorporate into his appellate brief.” Id.; see also Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 624 (10th Cir. 1998) (“arguments not set forth fully in the opening brief are waived”); cf. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (“The appellant’s brief must contain . . . the argument, which must contain: appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them . . . .”). Accordingly, these arguments will not be addressed, and we deny Howell’s request for a COA on these claims.