Opinion ID: 7311715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Humphrey Matter

Text: On October 19, 1982, Lloyd Humphrey retained the respondent on a contingency fee basis to handle all claims for injuries that Humphrey sustained in a fall from the roof of his brother’s house. Three days later, on October 22,1982, Humphrey sent a mailgram to respondent to “cancel” their agreement. On that same date, Humphrey sent respondent a letter confirming he would “like to cancel” their agreement for respondent to represent him. Shortly thereafter, notwithstanding Humphrey’s termination letter, respondent telephoned Humphrey several times and urged him to continue the legal action, suggesting that the insurance company would not settle if Humphrey were not represented in his claim. Respondent also forwarded several letters to various persons including doctors and a hospital in preparation of the case. By letter dated April 18, 1983, Humphrey advised respondent he did not “currently wish” to have respondent represent him, adding that should he find the insurance company totally uncooperative in settling the matter, he would then use respondent’s services. By letter dated April 29, 1983, respondent replied he had already filed the lawsuit. At the ethics proceedings, respondent produced a copy of a letter dated April 12, 1983, to the Clerk of the Superior Court in Trenton in which he filed the legal action on behalf of Humphrey. A copy of the first page of the complaint marked into evidence at the ethics proceedings reflected a filing date of April 22, 1983. When Humphrey received respondent’s letter, he telephoned respondent and told him he did not want a lawsuit filed. Respondent replied that if he attempted to withdraw the legal action at that time, Humphrey would incur expenses and would not receive anything from the insurance company. Humphrey then instructed respondent to do what he could to settle the matter immediately. On August 30, 1983, Humphrey wrote respondent, stating that his family did not agree with his approach in resolving this matter and instructed respondent “to do whatever is necessary to resolve and settle this case immediately.” This letter was followed by a mailgram dated September 1, 1983, in which Humphrey directed respondent “to settle this case within the week or drop it completely.” Respondent answered by letter dated September 8,1983. He informed Humphrey that he was awaiting a medical report before he could proceed further with the case. On October 11, 1983, respondent received the medical report in which the doctor found that Humphrey would experience some disability, including pain and a limitation of functioning. Two days later, on October 13, 1983, Humphrey sent respondent a letter, which stated in part: Effective with the date of this letter, please be advised that your services are no longer required and are terminated. Your authority is null and void. Respondent was further directed by Humphrey to transfer all his files to a Patrick Shannon, Esq., Humphrey’s new attorney. Nonetheless, on October 17, 1983, respondent accepted the insurance company’s offer of $5,000 in full settlement of the case. He immediately wrote Humphrey informing him of the settlement. In that letter he acknowledged Humphrey’s October 13, 1983, letter merely by stating that he had received it. On October 20, 1983, without waiting for further communication from his former client, respondent wrote to the insurance company, requesting a release. On October 17,1983, Patrick Shannon, Esq., Humphrey’s new attorney, wrote respondent, informing him that he had been retained by Humphrey. Four days later he wrote a similar letter to the insurance company. On October 25, 1983, before the insurance company became aware of the presence of a second counsel, it forwarded a release form and Stipulation of Dismissal to respondent. This flurry of correspondence caused confusion, and on October 28, 1983, the attorney for the insurance company wrote to Mr. Shannon: Both you and Mr. Brady have confirmed that this case is settled for $5,000. Under these circumstances, I am confused as to who is representing Mr. Humphrey, at this point. I would appreciate your advice concerning this matter. On that same day, respondent wrote to Mr. Shannon stating that he was entitled to “more than my expenses. I settled the case for $5,000.” On November 1, 1983, Humphrey wrote two letters: one to respondent, claiming dissatisfaction with the settlement and reminding respondent that his services had been terminated as of October 13, 1983, and one to the insurance company informing it that respondent had been terminated and a new attorney had been retained. Apparently as a result of communications between respondent and Humphrey’s new counsel, respondent agreed to forward a substitution of attorney, once he received a check to cover his costs and fee, a total of $2,029.44. He confirmed this agreement by letter dated November 7, 1983. When the attorney for the insurance company did not receive the completed release forms, he filed a motion to enforce the settlement, returnable on December 16, 1983. The DRB describes respondent’s conduct in pursuit of the Humphrey judgment as follows: Since respondent had planned to be in Vermont on December 16, he prepared a form of judgment which ordered that the $5,000 settlement be paid by the insurance company. Although this company insured the defendants in the civil legal action, it was not a named party in the suit. The judgment provided that a check be issued to respondent for $2,029.44 and the balance of $2,970.56 be paid to plaintiffs. Two days before the return date of the motion, respondent went to a Superior Court judge requesting that he sign the judgment. When the judge testified before the ethics committee, he said respondent had asked him to sign a consent order, which he assumed had been agreed to by all the parties involved. After the judgment was signed, respondent took a copy to the insurance company attorney who did not object to it, because it was in the agreed upon amount and the checks were in the amounts previously agreed to by Humphrey’s new attorney. Respondent did not deliver a copy to Humphrey’s attorney who only learned of it when he received a telephone call from the insurance company’s attorney. Respondent filed the judgment but did not file a warrant to satisfy the judgment after he received the money. At the ethics proceeding, respondent admitted that he acted for himself in having the judgment signed because he had an outstanding attorney’s lien. He said he was interested in being paid. However, he also maintained he was acting not only for himself but for his client. Although he was not sure whom he was representing at the time of the judgment, respondent claimed he was still attorney of record, since Humphrey’s current attorney had not filed a substitution of attorney. In the Humphrey matter, the DRB found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent persisted in his representation, although Humphrey had discharged him as his attorney. While Humphrey may have equivocated at times regarding his desire to retain respondent, it was incumbent upon respondent to determine early whether his client wished to pursue the legal matter. Instead, respondent ignored the desires of his clients and proceeded headlong in what he thought should be done. The Board agrees with the ethics committee that respondent’s conduct regarding the judgment was “outrageous.” Respondent willfully ignored or disregarded the usual motion practice of challenging a proposed court order. Respondent, without authorization of his purported client and without notice to his adversaries, went to a judge and had him sign a judgment which included an order that the insurance carrier, which was not a defendant, pay the settlement amount.