Opinion ID: 2301631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Fair Trial Based on Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: [¶ 14] Gould argues that the prosecution's misrepresentation of evidence during the rebuttal phase of its closing argument constitutes obvious error. In particular, he objects to the prosecutor's statement, made to explain to the jury the absence of any DNA evidence, that, Unfortunately, the testimony was the bed sheet[] had been washed. Gould contends that there was no evidence in the record to support the prosecutor's assertion that DNA evidence was absent because the victim's bed sheet had been washed and that evidence in the prosecutor's possession supported the opposite conclusion. [¶ 15] The State argues that the isolated comment challenged by Gould did not misrepresent the evidence because it was supported by testimony from the victim and her mother that the victim had a habit of frequently washing her sheets, as often as every other day. The State also contends that Gould's assertion of error relies on facts outside the record that may not be considered on appeal, referring to the Maine State Police Crime Lab report, which was not admitted into evidence at trial, and to a post-trial affidavit from the lab chemist stating that neither the report nor her notes about the bed sheet indicated that she thought that the sheet had been washed or that the samples had been compromised by laundering. Assuming, however, that the prosecutor's comment constituted a misstatement, the State contends that Gould was not deprived of a fair trial by the statement. [¶ 16] Because Gould did not object to the prosecutor's statement, did not move for a mistrial, and did not seek a curative instruction, we review the prosecutor's alleged misrepresentation for obvious error. See State v. Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 15, 957 A.2d 80; M.R.Crim. P. 52(b). To meet this standard, there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 29, 28 A.3d 1147. If these elements are met, this Court will find obvious error only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. [¶ 17] We examine alleged prosecutorial misconduct by first determining whether misconduct occurred and, if it did, by then viewing the comments of the prosecutor as a whole, looking at the incidents of misconduct both in isolation and in the aggregate. State v. Clark, 2008 ME 136, ¶ 7, 954 A.2d 1066 (quotation marks omitted). [T]he central question is whether the prosecutor's comment is fairly based on the facts in evidence. State v. Roberts, 2008 ME 112, ¶ 45, 951 A.2d 803 (quotation marks omitted). However, because the alleged misconduct relates to the prosecutor's misrepresentation of facts outside the trial record, we must also look to the prosecutor's obligations as an advocate and officer of the court when evaluating the prosecutor's conduct. See M.R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.); State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103, 105 (Me.1995) (While the [Rules of Professional Conduct] apply to all attorneys, they apply with particular force to prosecutors because of their status as the community's representatives. (quotation marks omitted)). [¶ 18] Here, the comment challenged by Gould was made by the prosecutor to rebut the portion of Gould's closing argument that emphasized the absence of DNA evidence. Gould's attorney argued: Now, recall one thing that Trooper Haines said to [Gould] a number of times throughout the second part of this taped interview that you heard. He said he had DNA evidence. He told [Gould] he had DNA evidence. Where is it? There is no DNA evidence in this case, none, nothing to give you to rely upon against [Gould]. Nobody seemed to know about this. So the question is, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it happened, that any of these supposed sexual acts happened? The prosecutor's full statement in rebuttal was: You also heard [defense counsel] comment on Detective Haines' questioning and on the issue of Detective Haines telling the defendanthe told him, and you folks listened to it and you folks heard it, he said we have taken the bed sheet[]; and with the advances in DNA, we're likelythe evidence in this is going to come out. Unfortunately, the testimony was the bed sheet[] had been washed. . . . [A]nd Detective Haines got a confession. So . . . that's the state of the evidence there. [¶ 19] Gould's closing argument challenged whether the State could meet its burden of proof without having produced DNA evidence. The prosecutor's response explained why Detective Haines would have expected to eventually have DNA evidence and suggested that there was no DNA evidence because the bed sheet had been washed. It also argued that, regardless of the absence of DNA evidence, the confession was sufficient to establish Gould's guilt. Although the prosecutor's statement that the bed sheets had been washed was not based on direct evidence and appears on its face to have been contrary to the crime lab chemistry report, for the reasons we will explain, it was based on an inference that could fairly be drawn from the evidence before the jury. [¶ 20] The crime lab report, which was not admitted as an exhibit at trial but which both parties had received prior to the start of the trial, stated that the victim's bed sheet was stained and soiled and that biological evidenceincluding PSA and a presumptive positive for seminal fluidwas detected. [3] At the time the report was prepared, the crime lab lacked the capacity to test for DNA in seminal fluid and PSA samples. In addition, the lab report was silent as to whether the sheet had been washed, and the authoring chemist's post-trial affidavit did not state that the sheet had been washed or that the stained and soiled nature of the sheet necessarily signaled that it had not been washed. There was also no evidence regarding the extent to which biological material, including soil and stains, may remain on a sheet after it has been washed. [¶ 21] Thus, based on the trial evidence, which did not include the results of the crime lab report, the jury reasonably could have inferred from the victim's testimony about her every-other-day laundry habits that the sheet, which was collected two days after the last episode of abuse, had been washed on either of those two days. A prosecutor may argue for any conclusion based on facts and testimony in evidence and the reasonable inferences that [can] be drawn therefrom. State v. Ardolino, 1997 ME 141, ¶ 22, 697 A.2d 73. Nor was the prosecutor compelled to conclude from the crime lab report in his possession that the presence of soil and stains on the sheet necessarily excluded the possibility that the sheet had been washed. The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by urging the jury to draw the inference that there was no DNA on the sheet because it had been washed, and there is therefore no error requiring further analysis under the obvious error standard.