Opinion ID: 1465695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: trial court's reliance on citation

Text: When reviewing the outcome of a suppression hearing regarding a warrantless search, this Court employs the standard of review enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). [A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having said this, we hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. Id. at 699, 116 S.Ct. at 1663 (cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76 (Ky.2002)). The Ornelas court recognized that police may draw inferences of illegal activity from facts that may appear innocent to a lay person and that a reviewing court should give due weight to the assessment by the trial court of the credibility of the officer and the reasonableness of the inference. Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky.2002). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge made oral findings and announced her ruling from the bench. Her findings of fact indicate that she relied upon Officer Koenig's observation of Appellee meeting with another individual in the K-mart parking lot as the determinative predictive behavior she felt necessary to support a reasonable suspicion: Well, I certainly understand Mr. Conkin why you cited that case and I think it's something that I have to take into consideration. The Florida v. J.L. [529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) ] case involved a tip that there would be a black male at a bus stop wearing a plaid shirt and that he had a gun on him. As I read the case that was basically what they were told and the officer went to the bus stop and there was a black male there with a plaid shirt on and he stopped and frisked him and indeed he did have a gun on him. This case has more detail from the beginning. First, it involves a vehicle that was carefully described as a late 70s black Ford truck, primer on the hood. There was a description of the male as a white male subject six feet tall, I think 150 to 170 pounds is what you said. I didn't get all the poundage written down, but shoulder length hair. That there would be a narcotics transaction at the Kmart parking lot at 191 Outer Loop. So this officer goes and is in the Winn Dixie parking lot and sees a vehicle matching that description and also sees him leaving the location after meeting up with another subject. So, by his own observation, he saw something that could indeed be the narcotics transaction. (Emphasis added). I think that had he driven to the parking lot and simply seen the truck, even though it's more detailed than it was in the Supreme Court case, Florida v. J.L ., I might be inclined to agree with you, Mr. Conkin, if he just saw the truck and followed the truck and stopped. But his testimony was that he observed him leaving the location after he had met up with another person and then he followed him and he stopped him and I think that that was appropriate, and then the frantic behavior was enough to certainly add to the reasonable suspicion that he had for the stop in the first instance ...    So, it's a closer call than I see sometimes, because I think somebody gives a description and you find someone at that point and place described that meets the description, I think you are most of the way there. But I think it's this added factor that's reflected in his report and it was in his testimony about meeting up with another subject there that pushes it over the line from what we had in Florida, which was just an individual at a bus stop wearing a plaid shirt. It wasn't a very detailed description and there was nothing to pair with, besides his actual presence. (Emphasis added). Here we had the presence of a truck, a person driving that truck that fit exactly and then the presence of another subject with whom the narcotics transaction could be conducted. So, accounting for all those factors and the cases that have been decided, I'm going to overrule the motion to suppress. (Emphasis added). [T]he police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity `may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause. United Stated v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). As such, [t]he issue is a preliminary question to be decided by the trial judge, KRE 104(a).... Cf. Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 82 (Ky.1998). All would agree that Officer Koenig's statement in his traffic citation that officer went to above location and subject matching description was just leaving that location after meeting up with another subject, would be sufficient predictive behavior to justify the Terry stop in this case, even under Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000); see also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the grounds that the citation was not made a part of the record  thus, concluding, there was no substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Officer Koenig observed Priddy leaving the location after meeting up with another subject.... What this argument overlooks though, is that the citation was used by the parties during the hearing, as well as, having then been reviewed by the court from its record. In this regard, KRE 104(a) provides preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.... In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence, except those with respect to privileges. See also, KRE 1101(d)(1). RCr 8.22 also provides that pretrial motions raising defenses or objections shall be determined before trial.... All other issues of fact shall be determined by the court with, or without, a jury, or on affidavits, or in such other manner as the court may direct. We can assume that the Commonwealth had a copy of the officer's citation at the suppression hearing, but it is known from the video record that the officer, counsel for the Appellee, and the court had a copy and used it. In fact, Appellee's counsel perused the citation at the hearing in an attempt to impeach Officer Koenig (per KRE 613(a)), as to the time of the arrest and the Miranda warnings. Q: Do you have a copy of your citation right handy? A: Yes I do. Q: You stated... I assume you wrote the citation, is that correct? A: That's correct. Under KRE 613(a), it is necessary to establish that the statement was written by the officer. Before other evidence can be offered of the witness having made at another time a different statement, he must be inquired of concerning it ...; and, if it be in writing, it must be shown to the witness, with opportunity to explain it. Thus, here the Appellee referenced it, confirmed its creation and authenticity, and asked questions from it for purposes of impeachment. A practitioner would expect the court, which had a copy in its record, to review the citation in conjunction with its reference and use in the proceedings, especially once it had been authenticated. Even aside from the applicability of KRE 104, this court has approved the use of interrogatory answers, not filed as exhibits, as a basis for a trial court's judgment, where the trial was by the court. See Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd. v. Bug's Imports, Inc., 453 S.W.2d 544 (Ky.1970), wherein it stated: They refer to Clay, CR 33... and Clay, CR 36.01, ..., as authority for the proposition that admissions and answers to the interrogatories must be introduced in evidence. The latter comment states only that admissions `should be' introduced in evidence, and the former comment states only that answers to interrogatories would not constitute judicial admissions unless introduced in evidence. Clearly, in the case of a jury trial, admissions and answers to interrogatories would not be evidence unless introduced as such, and normally it would seem the same should be true in case of a trial by the court without a jury. However, in the latter case the formal admission in evidence really has no significant purpose so as long as the parties know the court intends to consider the admissions or answers as evidence, and the parties are afforded the opportunity to make objections of inadmissibility. Id. at 550, (emphasis added). Similarly, although we agree it would be better procedure, we can find no rule that compels the parties, or the court, to create a record of exhibits in an RCr 8.22 hearing in front of the court. RCr 8.22 only requires a verbatim record ... of all proceedings.... See also, KRE 104(a). Which it did in this case. Moreover, the trial court twice, in its discussions and oral ruling (in open court with counsel present) referred to the facts as contained in the report and no objection to this incorporation was made at any time, such that the trial court could have clarified whether, in fact, the court was referring to the citation, or a finding from the officer's testimony that he had confirmed my information from the informant. It has long been the law of this Commonwealth that an error would not be reviewed on appeal if the trial court has not had an opportunity to rule on the objection. RCr 9.22 and KRE 103(a)(1). Commonwealth v. Petrey, 945 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky.1997). Thus, aside from the actual testimony of Officer Koenig, the court could have properly considered comments directly from the citation. This is what KRE 104(a) is about, as well as KRE 1101(d)(1) and RCr 8.22. Evidence is what a court is told, knows, sees, or perceives, formally in open court. Exhibits are what are filed in a trial, and by such, become part of the record on appeal. And where there is no objection, as here, in a video proceeding, KRE 104(a) is dispositive. This means that the judge can bring to bear on those questions evidence that might not be admissible at trial  hearsay without worry about hearsay rules, opinion without concern about opinion rules, documents without concern about the best evidence, etc. There is good reason for this approach.... Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook 4th Ed., § 6(a), p. 62 KRE 104(a) findings, however, must be supported and based upon, substantive evidence. Cf. Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 82 (Ky.1998), subject to the further caveat, that counsel are aware of what evidence the court is relying on. Cf. Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd at 550. The dissent cites many cases from Kentucky, and other jurisdictions, which say that documents not introduced into evidence, may not be considered by the court. These cases support that holding, but only at trial, and most often, in a jury setting. Several of the cases refer only to the appellate record on appeal in reference to documents absent therefrom, or added later, in briefs. These holdings do not address questions presented in a pre-trial suppression hearing under KRE 104(a).