Opinion ID: 1277454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Salazar's Wrongful Detention Claim

Text: ¶ 25 The issue dispositive of City's immunity defenses interposed against the claim of wrongful detention is whether the terms of 51 O.S.1991 § 155(6) [45] operate to shield a municipality from tort liability for negligence arising from the exercise of police or law enforcement protection services. We hold that because City stood vis-a-vis Salazar not as protector, but qua law enforcer, its actions are not within the § 155(6) immunity.
¶ 26 The common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity was abrogated by Vanderpool v. State. [46] Later, the legislature enacted a form of sovereign immunity into the body of statutory law. [47] Governmental immunity of the state and its political subdivisions is waived only to the extent and in the manner provided in the Act. [48] Subject only to the Act's specific limitations and exceptions, the GTCA extends governmental accountability to all torts for which a private person or entity would be liable. [49] The legislature kept in force certain forms of immunity from liability by providing in § 155 [50] thirty carefully circumscribed exemptions. Section 155(6) of the GTCA affords immunity to a governmental subdivision for claims that result from the failure to provide, or the method of providing, police, law enforcement or fire protection.  [51] Protection serves as the key word for the textual analysis of the critical sentence quoted here from subsection 6. The exemption in that subsection is invocable when the tort arises while a municipality is rendering services that fall into some category of police protection, law enforcement protection or fire protection. In short, a governmental subdivision is not liable for deficiency of protective services extended by its police, law enforcement or fire fighting components. [52]
¶ 27 Statutory immunity for providing protective services (police or fire) is not co-extensive with a blanket immunity from common-law negligence for carrying out law enforcement duties. [53] The GTCA's purview of immunity does not encompass the latter category. A scenario in which a law enforcement function is negligently carried out  as in actions incident to arrest or imprisonment  must be distinguished from negligently providing protective service. The former activity is unshielded by the § 155(6) immunity.
¶ 28 Oklahoma City is liable for police conduct that exceeds the limits of law-authorized action. [54] In Schmidt v. Grady County, Oklahoma [55] a woman who had been taken into custody by a deputy sheriff who undertook to protect her from harm was injured when she either jumped or fell from a vehicle. The court held that when she sustained the harm the deputy was providing [to the plaintiff] police protection. Schmidt deals not with an arrestee but with a person in need of protection from harming herself or others. It does not involve negligence in driving but failure to put a passenger under some type of restraint. Rather than carrying out a law enforcement function, the officer in Schmidt was protecting a woman from the consequences of her disturbed mental state. ¶ 29 Schmidt relies on the teachings of Shockey v. City of Oklahoma City. [56] The fire fighters in Shockey were unable to secure water for a burning house because of a faulty fire hydrant. The plaintiffs, whose home and furnishings were destroyed by fire, sued the city for negligently failing to maintain a fire hydrant or to warn them of its malfunction. The court explained that a municipality's immunity from tort liability applies while it is engaged in fire protection and prevention.  [57] The court noted that fire hydrants were installed for the purpose of fire protection. ¶ 30 Recent jurisprudence, Prichard v. City of Oklahoma City , [58] holds that the Schmidt teachings do not give the City blanket immunity from negligence when it is carrying out law enforcement activities. A police officer in Prichard arrested the plaintiff and transported him to an emergency room for treatment of injuries that occurred before he was taken into custody. The plaintiff was diagnosed to have a broken jaw and referred to another hospital for immediate medical attention. The officer transported him to the city jail where he remained for three days without any other treatment for injury. The plaintiff sued the city, alleging that its officer was negligent for failing to provide him with medical care. Unlike the plaintiff in Schmidt, Prichard was neither taken into custody for his own protection, nor was he harmed in police custody. Instead, he was injured before being taken into police custody, which injuries were evident to the officer. The actions of the police officer were deemed unrelated to the method of providing police protection to the public. [59] ¶ 31 In Medina v. State [60] Ramirez, the decedent, was confined with one Grant in a cell at a correctional facility. The prison physician prescribed Enkaide for Grant's congenital heart condition, to be taken every six hours. Once each week the prison pharmacy furnished Grant a supply of twenty-eight Enkaide tablets. The prison pharmacy dispensed all prescription medication in the same manner at weekly pill lines. A one-week supply of Enkaide, twenty-eight pills, is a potentially lethal quantity of that medication. Ramirez died from ingesting a lethal dose of the medicine, either accidentally or by design. This court determined that (1) the dispensing of medicine to an inmate in a state penal institution by a state employee is a function performed in the operation of an institution and hence exempt from tort liability, and (2) the state is not required to waive its sovereign immunity and provide an inmate with a GTCA remedy for the ordinary negligence of officers or employees at a penal institution. In Redding v. State [61] a prison inmate was seriously injured when he was struck in the head by a softball during a prison softball game. This court held the state immune from tort liability under the GTCA. The court looked to Medina as determinative of liability.
¶ 32 Neither the arresting nor the detaining officer was in this case affording protection to Salazar. Rather, City employees in charge were acting in the exercise of law enforcement duties. In short, City rendered general law enforcement services in the context of which Salazar was not a protected subject, but instead an arrested and detained person. He did not sue for City's failure to protect him from himself or from others nor did he press a claim for inadequacy of City's protection against fire. We hence conclude and hold that City is not shielded by the § 155(6) immunity from tort liability for the alleged negligence in Salazar's wrongful detention.