Opinion ID: 4535605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties

Text: Finally, McLellan asserts that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment demand that courts have the authority to order the -56- government to exercise its MLAT powers to request evidence from foreign countries. He therefore argues that the district court erred by declining to compel the government to pursue the evidence and testimony he sought through the MLAT process when its letters rogatory proved ineffectual. Because the district court does not possess the power to order the government to lodge requests under MLATs, we disagree and find no reversible error.8 We review the district court's determination that it lacked the power to order the government to make an MLAT request de novo because it turn[s] on an interpretation of law. Obiora, 910 F.3d at 560. The district court determined that it lacked the authority to compel the government to exercise its rights under any of the relevant MLATs on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a private person. First, to support its ruling, it quoted our decision in United States v. McIntyre (In re Price), 685 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hereinafter Price I) for the proposition that treaties do not generally 8 Alternatively, McLellan argues that the district court erred in not excluding the government's evidence obtained from foreign clients. As his claim is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Obiora, 910 F.3d 555, 560 (1st Cir. 2018), and the evidence the government sought to introduce was probative and equally available to McLellan, we see no grounds to find that the district court abused its discretion in not excluding this evidence. See United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ([A] defendant's inability to subpoena foreign witnesses is not a bar to criminal prosecution.). -57- create rights that are privately enforceable in the federal courts. Second, it referenced United States v. Rosen, 240 F.R.D. 204, 214-15 (E.D. Va. 2007), which not[ed] that no court has held that a defendant's compulsory process rights are violated when the executive branch declines to exercise a treaty power to compel testimony of a non-American in another country. McLellan challenges both rationales. Our opinion in Price I is the lodestar for the MLAT origin story and the appropriate law to apply when private individuals seek MLAT relief. As the district court noted, treaties do not generally create rights that are privately enforceable in the federal courts. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc).9 The U.S.-U.K. MLAT is no exception because it expressly disclaims the existence of any private rights. Price I, 685 F.3d at 13. Article 1, paragraph 3 of the U.S.-U.K. MLAT provides the textual hook for this conclusion. Id. at 12-13. It states, in full: This treaty is intended solely for mutual legal assistance between the Parties. The provisions of this Treaty shall not give rise to a right on 9 This comports with the background presumption that [i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefitting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 907 cmt. a, at 395 (1986)). -58- the part of any private person to obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request. U.S.-U.K. MLAT, art. 1, ¶ 3. In relevant part, the U.S.-Ireland MLAT is a carbon copy. See U.S.-Ireland MLAT, art. 1, ¶ 4. However, we recognize that McLellan seeks relief under the Constitution and only indirectly invokes the MLATs. By asking the district court for an order to compel the government to exercise its treaty powers to request potentially favorable evidence to his case from foreign countries, McLellan seeks to protect his due process rights rather than to vindicate a private treaty right.10 It is well-settled law that no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion)). As the Ninth Circuit has noted, those restraints certainly include the separation of powers and the guarantee of due process. In re Premises Located at 840 140th Ave. NE, Bellevue, Wash., 634 F.3d 557, 571-72 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 n.9 (2003) (holding that treaties are 10 Along those lines, McLellan contends that even if the MLATs preclude private rights of action, they do not preclude the ability of courts to order the government to seek evidence in the interests of ensuring defendants a fair trial. By his reading, the language of the MLATs is broad enough to encompass requests made by the government on behalf of criminal defendants. -59- [s]ubject . . . to the Constitution's guarantees of individual rights)). McLellan submits that because MLATs create an evidence-gathering imbalance in criminal cases where the charges include conduct occurring abroad, the related guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment empower the courts to safeguard these rights to restore the evidentiary balance, notwithstanding the absence of private rights of action in the MLATs. As McLellan notes, we have held that district courts possess the authority to quash a subpoena issued by the government pursuant to a U.S.-U.K. MLAT request. United States v. Trs. of Bos. Coll. (In re Price), 718 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2013) (hereinafter Price II). Our reasoning was based on the observation that [n]othing in the text of the U.S.-U.K. MLAT, or its legislative history . . . lead[s] us to conclude that the courts of the United States have been divested of an inherent judicial role that is basic to our function as judges. Id.11 Relying on Price II, McLellan contends that if separation of powers 11 Additionally, he cites to the Ninth Circuit case quoted in Price II rejecting the government's assertion of sole discretion in MLAT affairs because it suggests that by ratifying an MLAT, the legislative branch could compel the judicial branch to reach a particular result . . . in particular cases, notwithstanding any concerns, such as violations of individual rights, that a federal court may have. In re 840 140th Ave. NE, 634 F.3d at 572. -60- justifies a trial court's retention of power to quash MLAT subpoenas issued by the U.S. government that potentially infringe on First Amendment protections, then it must also dictate that courts have the power to ensure the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial by ordering the government to exercise its undoubted right to obtain the evidence. For the following reasons, we disagree. First, our line of cases involving MLAT subpoenas is readily distinguishable from the predicament that McLellan faces. In Price I and Price II, the Executive Branch exercised its diplomatic discretion to comply with the United Kingdom's MLAT request for information related to an ongoing investigation into a casualty from the conflict in Northern Ireland. See Price II, 718 F.3d at 16-17. Accordingly, the U.S. government issued two subpoenas through an appointed commissioner, see 18 U.S.C. § 3512, to compel Boston College (BC) to produce interviews from formerly active participants in the conflict that were compiled by one of BC's research projects. Price II, 718 F.3d at 16. The central holding of Price II was that the district court had abused its discretion by compelling BC to produce interviews that exceeded the scope of the original subpoena, thus implicating First Amendment concerns. Id. at 17. In Price I, we determined that the treaties precluded private rights of action, and we therefore denied foreign citizens' motions to intervene in BC's motion to -61- quash. 685 F.3d at 3, 13. Additionally, we held that § 701(a)(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) barred jurisdiction over the prospective plaintiff's APA claim because the U.S.-U.K. MLAT by its express language precludes judicial review. Id. at 13. These cases constitute the inverse of McLellan's situation. Since the U.S. government has not exercised its discretion to pursue evidence through the relevant MLATs, McLellan effectively urges the Court to find that the MLATs have expanded the role of the judiciary to include the ability to compel the government to seek the type of evidence he requests. Separation of powers surely cannot be stretched so far in this direction as to provide an avenue for a district court to compel a co-equal branch to take certain action on behalf of a private individual without textual or statutory direction.12 Quite the opposite of Price II, here, it would offend separation of powers principles to permit the Judiciary to impair the Executive in the performance 12 This is consistent with the view taken by the Department of Justice at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: While a U.S. court would be able to ask the prosecution to make a request under the treaty (i.e., to adopt a request as its own), the court would lack the power or authority to compel the Government to make a request for the benefit of the defense over the objection of the prosecution. Consular Conventions, Extradition Treaties, and Treaties Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLATs): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong. 40 (1992) (statement of Robert Mueller III, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., Dep't of Justice). -62- of its constitutional duties. Price II, 718 F.3d at 22 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701 (1997)). The Constitution may protect individuals in the United States from subpoenas to comply with foreign MLAT requests, but it generally does not vest criminal defendants with the power to compel the government to lodge diplomatic requests on their behalf. See United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 917 (9th Cir. 2013) ([T]he district court had no authority to order the Executive Branch to invoke the treaty process to obtain evidence abroad for a private citizen.).13 A contrary finding could potentially open U.S. foreign affairs to the far-flung theories of criminal defendants and risk delay of 13 Despite our search, we could find no decision contrary to this proposition. United States v. Schneider, No. 17-935, 2019 WL 4242637, at  (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2019) (rejecting the defendant's argument that the government's use of an MLAT with Russia deprived him of his rights to a fair trial, due process and compulsory process); Escalante v. Lizarraga, No. ED CV 17-850-R (SHK), 2018 WL 2938520, at -9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2018) ([A] criminal defendant has no rights under the [MLAT between the U.S. and Mexico] to obtain evidence.); United States v. León, No. 09 CR 383-16, 2018 WL 1832878, at  (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2018) ([T]his Court has 'no authority to order the Executive Branch to invoke the treaty process to obtain evidence abroad for a private citizen.' (quoting Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d at 911-917)); United States v. Márquez, No. 10CR3044 WQH, 2012 WL 349580, at  (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2012) ([T]he Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process . . . does not require an order compelling the Government to use the MLAT to obtain evidence on behalf of the Defendant.); United States v. Jefferson, 594 F. Supp. 2d 655, 674-75 (E.D. Va. 2009) (It is . . . 'quite clear that the right to compulsory process extends only to forms of process a court can issue of its own power, not to forms of process that require the cooperation of the Executive Branch or foreign courts.' (quoting Rosen, 240 F.R.D. at 214)). -63- trial as other countries respond to those requests. Id. (noting distinctions between immunity context and international treaties).14 Second, despite McLellan's protestations, our holding in United States v. Theresius Filippi, 918 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1990), does not dictate otherwise. The Sixth Amendment encompasses a criminal defendant's right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. U.S. Const. amend. VI. This includes [t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary. United States v. Acevedo-Hernández, 898 F.3d 150, 169 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967)). This right, however, is not absolute. See United States v. Resurrección, 978 F.2d 759, 762 (1st Cir. 1992) (The Constitution does not automatically entitle a criminal defendant to unobtainable testimony.). There can be no violation of the defense's right to present evidence . . . unless some contested act or omission (1) can be attributed to the sovereign and (2) causes the loss or erosion of testimony which is both (3) material to the 14 This is certainly not a case where there was a stacked deck against McLellan. See Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d at 916. McLellan concedes that he was able to receive some measure of documents from the relevant clients. This is, therefore, not a case where the government possesses evidence, or has easy access to evidence, that a criminal defendant lacks. Instead, both sides faced obstacles in obtaining evidence from abroad. See id. -64- case and (4) favorable to the accused. United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1303 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Theresius Filippi, 918 F.2d at 247. Theresius Filippi featured a criminal defendant facing drug trafficking charges who was unable to secure the presence of a key corroborating witness located in Ecuador due to government inaction. 918 F.2d at 245-46. Since the district court judge determined that the witness was material and that his testimony would have been favorable to the defense, our analysis concerned the attributability and causation prongs of the Hoffman test. Id. at 247. We recognized that the right of compulsory process does not ordinarily extend beyond the boundaries of the United States. Id. However, we determined that the government's subpoena power abroad was not at issue because the witness was willing -- and indeed intended -- to testify at trial but for his inability to overcome the immigration hurdles blocking his entry into the United States. Id. In our view, the onus was therefore on the government merely to make it possible for the witness to attend trial by requesting a Special Interest Parole from the [Immigration and Naturalization Service]. Id. Although we ultimately affirmed the conviction because the defendant waived his compulsory process rights by proceed[ing] at trial without his witness, id. at 246, we also found that the U.S. Attorney's deliberate omission to act, where action was required directly -65- caused the defense to lose its only material witness, which rose to the level of impermissible interference with his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 247. McLellan's case is readily distinguishable on the causation and favorability prongs of the Hoffman test. First, McLellan has not established that the U.S. government actually or proximately caused the absence of the evidence he seeks. The omission in this case is the government's discretionary decision not to initiate MLAT requests for evidence on McLellan's behalf when the letters rogatory failed to achieve the desired result. However, while the government may request evidence through the MLAT process, it cannot guarantee compliance. See United States v. Mejía, 448 F.3d 436, 444 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Having the authority 'to seek' tapes or transcripts through a treaty is not the same thing as having 'the power to secure' them.); United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1317 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) ([C]ompliance with an MLAT request is not mandatory with respect to records held by governmental agencies.). The Judicial Authority of Ireland's reply to the district court's letters rogatory statement that it understands the U.S.-Ireland MLAT to be the appropriate avenue for requesting evidence refers to a protocol, but it does not promise results. McLellan's claim also stumbles on the favorability element. Although the district court acknowledged that the -66- evidence McLellan sought was material to his case (specifically to the materiality component of securities fraud), McLellan failed to provide a plausible showing that the evidence would be favorable to his defense. See Hoffman, 832 F.2d at 1303 (There must be a plausible showing that the testimony was both material and favorable to the defense.). McLellan sought information from Ireland-based Eircom and NTMA pertaining to (1) internal communications related to the firms understanding of the offer from State Street, (2) communications regarding the fees, (3) competing bids, and (4) communications related to overcharges. While McLellan argues strenuously that the evidence was necessary to cross-examine witnesses on the securities fraud counts, he presented no plausible basis for the district court to determine that the evidence in the possession of those firms contained information that could have led to an acquittal, and he concedes that he does not know the contents of the documents that he seeks. See id.15 His arguments only demonstrate that the evidence was 15 In an analogous case, the Supreme Court held that the government was not required to halt a deportation of a potentially material and possibly favorable witness, where the criminal defendant made no showing that the testimony the witness would have given would have been favorable. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 870-71 (1982). While the Court recognized that it would be difficult for an accused defendant to determine if testimony from the witness would be material and favorable at trial, and relaxing the requirements might be justified in those instances, it determined that such difficulty does not afford[] the basis for wholly dispensing with such a showing. Id. at 870. -67- material, but he has not demonstrated that the evidence would have been favorable. A showing of materiality, alone, is insufficient to show favorability. Id.; see also United States v. Combs, 555 F.3d 60, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting criminal defendant's claim that it [was] impossible to know how [the witness] might have testified absent [the government's] conduct as insufficient to establish favorability). We conclude, therefore, that the district court does not have the authority to compel the government to issue MLAT requests. Nor is the onus on the government in this case to make it possible for the defendant to obtain, via an MLAT request, evidence that he cannot establish is favorable to his case. Theresius Filippi, 918 F.2d at 247. Thus, we find no reversible error. However, we believe it important to note that we do not disagree that the text of the MLATs at issue do not explicitly preclude the government from using its discretion to lodge requests on behalf of criminal defendants. Prosecutors have a duty to act in accordance with the obligations imposed on [them] as . . . agent[s] of justice, id. at 246, and where practicable, deploying the government's MLAT capabilities in such a manner would be a just way of fulfilling those obligations.16 However, where, 16 In the rare event that a court does make a request for information under an MLAT, the Department of Justice takes the position that [a] decision would be made on a case-by-case basis, and even if the prosecutor is not persuaded that evidence abroad -68- as here, a criminal defendant makes no plausible showing that the government could have secured evidence that is both material and favorable to his defense, we have little difficulty concluding that the prosecutors did not violate this duty.