Opinion ID: 1387354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent Review of the Sentence of Death

Text: At sentencing, the trial court found two aggravating factors and concluded that the mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. On appeal, we must independently review the record to determine the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to determine whether defendant was properly sentenced to death. State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 511, 662 P.2d 1007, 1018 (1983), appeal after remand, 142 Ariz. 564, 691 P.2d 655 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059, 105 S.Ct. 1775, 84 L.Ed.2d 834 (1985). We discuss each aggravating and mitigating factor in turn and conclude that defendant's sentence of death is appropriate.

The trial court found that defendant was previously convicted of a felony in the United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person within the meaning of A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). The trial court based its finding on defendant's convictions for the attempted murder and armed robbery of Norma. Armed robbery is by its terms a felony involving the use or threat of violence on another person under the version of section 13-703(F)(2) in effect at the time of defendant's sentencing. State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 130, 871 P.2d 237, 251, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 435, 130 L.Ed.2d 347 (1994); State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 502, 707 P.2d 289, 300 (1985). Thus, defendant's armed robbery conviction supports the trial court's (F)(2) finding. Defendant's attempted murder conviction, however, falls into a different category. In order to qualify as an aggravating circumstance under section 13-703(F)(2), the statutory definition of the prior conviction, not its specific factual basis, must involve violence or the threat of violence on another person. State v. Richmond, 180 Ariz. 573, 578, 886 P.2d 1329, 1334 (1994). Under section 13-703(F)(2), violence is defined as the exertion of any physical force so as to injure or abuse. State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 51, 579 P.2d 542, 555 (1978). If a defendant may commit the crime without the use or threat of violence, the prior conviction cannot support a finding of the section 13-703(F)(2) aggravating circumstance. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. at 334, 819 P.2d at 920. Under Arizona statutes, a person commits an attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required to commit an offense, such person intentionally does or omits to do anything which is any step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in commission of an offense. A.R.S. § 13-1001 (1989). A person can, with a culpable state of mind, take an intentional step toward committing first degree murder without exerting or threatening to exert physical force on another person. Under the terms of the statute, then, the crime of attempted first degree murder does not necessarily involve the use or threat of violence on another person under section 13-703(F)(2). [1] Thus, the trial court should not have separately relied on the attempted murder conviction in making its (F)(2) finding. See Schaaf, 169 Ariz. at 333-34, 819 P.2d at 919-20 (holding that a prior conviction in Nevada for attempted murder could not support a section 13-703(F)(2) finding). Such reliance, however, is immaterial because armed robbery supports the (F)(2) factor separately. We are aware that, although the trial court found the armed robbery conviction to be a prior conviction under section 13-703(F)(2), defendant was convicted of armed robbery simultaneous to his murder conviction and committed the armed robbery after murdering Rita. These facts do not, however, invalidate the trial court's finding. Our death penalty statute is not a recidivist or enhancement statute. State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 57 n. 2, 659 P.2d 1, 16 n. 2, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 971, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983). Rather, the purpose of an aggravation/mitigation hearing is to determine the character and propensities of the defendant. State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139, 141, 602 P.2d 807, 809 (1979). That a defendant had been found guilty of other lawless acts of violence is relevant to his character, whether the acts occurred before or after the murder. Convictions entered prior to a sentencing hearing may thus be considered regardless of the order in which the underlying crimes occurred or the order in which the convictions were entered. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 57 n. 2, 659 P.2d at 16 n. 2 (citations omitted); see also State v. Steelman, 126 Ariz. 19, 25, 612 P.2d 475, 481 (holding that murders committed after the charged murder can support a section 13-703(F)(2) finding), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 287, 66 L.Ed.2d 141 (1980). Thus, the validity of the trial court's (F)(2) finding is unaffected by the fact that the convictions were simultaneous or by the fact that the armed robbery occurred after the murder. The trial court properly found the section 13-703(F)(2) aggravating factor based on defendant's conviction for armed robbery.
The trial court found that defendant committed the murder in an especially heinous or depraved manner. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) (1989). Because the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rita was conscious throughout the attack, the trial court did not find cruelty. It found heinousness and depravity based on three of the five factors set forth in State v. Gretzler : mutilation, gratuitous violence, and helplessness. See Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 51-53, 659 P.2d at 10-12 (enumerating five factors to be considered when determining whether a murder was committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner under section 13-703(F)(6)). The record supports the trial court's findings. Unquestionably, this murder involved gratuitous violence. Rita's body was broken, crushed, torn, scraped, shot, dragged, beaten, and bruised. In addition to being shot three times, Rita suffered a savage beating with a hard object, resulting in blunt force injuries covering virtually her entire upper body. Her internal injuries, consisting of pierced and torn organs, were numerous and severe. One of the gunshots completely fractured Rita's right femur, her ribs were fractured in at least thirty-one places and she suffered a broken nose, a fractured breast bone, fractured collar bones, and massive fractures of the pelvic bone. She was run over by an automobile at least twice. The number and nature of Rita's injuries belie any claim that defendant did not inflict violence in excess of that necessary to kill. See State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 178, 800 P.2d 1260, 1286 (1990) (basing gratuitous violence on large number of stab wounds and contact gunshot wound to the head), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 929, 111 S.Ct. 2044, 114 L.Ed.2d 129 (1991). Rita was also helpless during at least part of the attack. After being shot and beaten, she was unable to defend herself against defendant's further attack. When defendant dragged Rita by her feet into the road, Rita was still alive, but unable to move. She may have been unconscious. Her right leg was completely disabled as a result of the broken femur. Thus, she was totally helpless. See State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 605-06, 886 P.2d 1354, 1361-62 (1994) (finding victim helpless after the first gunshot disabled him); State v. Chaney, 141 Ariz. 295, 312-13, 686 P.2d 1265, 1282-83 (1984) (finding victim helpless after defendant's first gunshots injured the victim and trapped him in his car). Accordingly, without discussing the remaining Gretzler factors  senselessness, mutilation, and relishing of the murder  we agree with the trial court that defendant committed this murder in an especially heinous or depraved manner within the meaning of section 13-703(F)(6). (2) Mitigating Circumstances (a) No Prior Record The defendant had no criminal convictions prior to murdering Rita. This is a relevant nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144, 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 129, 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). (b) Past Good Conduct and Character The defendant displayed good character prior to murdering Rita. Until 1989, he was law abiding and had a peaceful reputation. He also once performed CPR on a neighbor who apparently was having a heart attack, and while working as a lifeguard, defendant saved two people from possible drowning. The state offered no evidence to rebut defendant's evidence of good character prior to 1989. The trial court correctly found past good conduct and character to be a relevant mitigating circumstance. See State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 161, 692 P.2d 991, 1010 (1984) (saving a life is a mitigating circumstance), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2347, 85 L.Ed.2d 864 (1985); cf. State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 524-25, 898 P.2d 454, 473-74 (1995) (rejecting good character as a mitigating factor where the state offered evidence in rebuttal).
Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court should have given mitigating weight to his alleged drug addiction. Use of drugs is a statutory mitigating circumstance only if the evidence shows that, at the time of the offense, drugs significantly impaired defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. State v. White, 168 Ariz. 500, 513, 815 P.2d 869, 882 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105, 112 S.Ct. 1199, 117 L.Ed.2d 439 (1992) (quoting State v. Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 70, 659 P.2d 22, 29, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124, 103 S.Ct. 3097, 77 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1983)). If impairment does not rise to the level of a statutory mitigating circumstance, such impairment may constitute a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance when viewed in light of a history of alcohol or drug abuse. Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 522-24, 898 P.2d at 471-73; State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 17, 870 P.2d 1097, 1113, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 330, 130 L.Ed.2d 289 (1994). Defendant has not proved that his alleged drug use was a mitigating circumstance, either statutory or nonstatutory. Michelle testified that defendant started using cocaine approximately six months before he murdered Rita and that defendant was more violent when he used cocaine. She also testified that defendant told her he was using drugs the day before the murder. However, as we have already noted, defendant denied throughout the trial and almost all the sentencing that he ever used drugs. Defendant offered no evidence showing that he was intoxicated when he murdered Rita. Defendant, thus, has not shown or even argued that he suffered any impairment when he killed Rita. Without a showing of some impairment at the time of the offense, drug use cannot be a mitigating circumstance of any kind. See Wood, 180 Ariz. at 70-71, 881 P.2d at 1175-76; White, 168 Ariz. at 513, 815 P.2d at 882; Gallegos, 178 Ariz. at 17, 870 P.2d at 1113 (addressing history of alcohol and drug abuse as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance only after finding evidence that the defendant was intoxicated on the night of the murder). We agree with the trial court, which said, [T]here was no evidence, including considering the Defendant's own testimony, to indicate that the cocaine usage by Defendant was a factor in the perpetration of the murder.
A trial judge must consider in mitigation whether the defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution. A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(2) (1989). Duress is defined as any illegal imprisonment, or legal imprisonment used for an illegal purpose, or threats of bodily or other harm, or other means amounting to or tending to coerce the will of another, and actually inducing him to do an act contrary to his free will. State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 394, 724 P.2d 1, 13 (1986) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 452 (5th ed. 1979)). To find duress under this definition, one person must coerce or induce another person to do something against his will. Id. It is undisputed that Rita went to defendant's apartment, acted belligerently, and confronted defendant with a gun. It is equally clear from the record, however, that defendant disarmed Rita shortly after she displayed the gun and that Rita thereafter presented no appreciable threat to defendant. After she was disarmed, any chance of unusual and substantial duress ended. Thus, defendant has not proven this statutory mitigating circumstance. Nor has he proved that Rita's status as the initial aggressor is a relevant mitigating factor.
Rita's sister submitted a statement to the court recommending life imprisonment because she did not want defendant's family to suffer the way her family had suffered after Rita's death. When a defendant is being sentenced for first degree murder, the sentencing court must consider any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less than death might be appropriate. State v. McCall, 139 Ariz. 147, 162, 677 P.2d 920, 935 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 2670, 81 L.Ed.2d 375 (1984). Rita's sister based her recommendation of a life sentence on her family's grief and on a concern for defendant's family. Her opinion was altogether unrelated to defendant, to his character, or to the circumstance of the offense. Thus, we do not find the sister's recommendation to be a relevant mitigating circumstance.
The record shows that defendant has a strong relationship with his family. Before his arrest, defendant was a contributing member of his household, and he maintained close ties with his parents, his brothers, and his sons. We consider this a mitigating circumstance. See Carriger, 143 Ariz. at 162, 692 P.2d at 1011. We note, however, that these relationships did not stop defendant from killing his son's mother. See id. (discounting the mitigating value of love among family because it did not deter defendant from committing crime). Moreover, Rita had once lived with defendant's parents for more than two years, and both of defendant's parents described Rita as the daughter they never had. Because defendant murdered a person who was in many ways a member of his family, we give defendant's family relationship little mitigating weight.
Age may be a mitigating circumstance. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we give defendant's age of twenty-three no weight in mitigation. When addressing the issue of young age, we look at the defendant's level of maturity, judgment, past experience, and involvement in the crime. State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 314, 896 P.2d 830, 854 (1995). Defendant was living an adult lifestyle, and there is no evidence of immaturity. Rita's murder was not impulsive. Defendant took Rita to a place different from their initial altercation, inflicted a prolonged beating, positioned her body to be run over, and then tried to conceal evidence. These actions, rather than impulsive, were quite deliberate. See State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 589, 769 P.2d 1017, 1035 (1989) (holding that carrying out a crime over a significant period of time shows relative maturity and minimizes the weight of young age as a mitigating factor), aff'd, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990).
Defendant argued to the trial court that his race (African-American) should be a mitigating factor. The trial court rejected this proposed mitigating factor, and we agree.