Opinion ID: 171406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority of the District Court to Impose Concurrent Sentences

Text: Fay argues that the district court erred by concluding that it lacked the authority to direct that his federal sentence be served concurrently with his completed state sentence. As a general rule, this court reviews a district court's decision of whether to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir.2002). But where, as here, the district court's decision rests upon a legal conclusion, we review that ruling de novo. See United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.2004). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98, contains a series of provisions governing various aspects of sentencing. Among those provisions is 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), which provides that, if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively[.] (emphasis added). The district court in the present case concluded that the statute's use of the modifier undischarged signaled that Congress did not intend to allow a district court to direct that a new prison term run concurrently with a completed, or discharged, prison term. Fay challenges the district court's legal conclusion by relying exclusively on our opinion in Romero. In Romero, we affirmed the district court's refusal to sentence Romero to a concurrent sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release, to run concurrently with his undischarged state prison sentence, when Romero's supervised release had not yet been revoked. 511 F.3d at 1284-85. Romero's request for sentencing was premature because no decision to run the sentences concurrently [could] come before a determination of whether Mr. Romero should be sentenced for the violation of supervised release. Id. at 1284. Romero was not yet in federal custody, and parolees do not have a right to an immediate parole revocation hearing until they are actually taken into custody. Id. Fay relies on the following dictum in Romero to support his argument that the district court erred in concluding that it had no authority to effectively credit his federal sentence with time previously served on his completed state sentence: Moreover, if he is sentenced for a supervised release violation at the end of his state confinement, nothing precludes the district court from giving him credit for time served. See McDonald, 955 F.2d at 634 (we know of nothing preventing the ... authorities from retroactively granting Petitioner the right to serve the sentences concurrently if [state] law provides for this option.) Id. at 1285 (citing McDonald v. New Mexico Parole Bd., 955 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir.1991)) (alterations in original text of Romero ). To the extent that Romero can be read to suggest that federal district courts have the authority to impose a sentence to be served concurrently with a discharged state sentence, we reject that view. As the district court noted, the statutory language is clear. [I]f a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively[.] 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (emphasis added). A district court, however, does not have the authority to impose a sentence to be served concurrently with a discharged sentence. See United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir.1998) (There is no provision, either in the Act or in the Guidelines, stating that the court may order that the sentence it imposes be deemed to have been served concurrently with a prior prison term that has been fully discharged.). Fay's state sentence was discharged by the time his revocation hearing was held, thus eliminating the district court's discretion to impose a sentence concurrent to his previously completed state sentence. Finally, while Romero cites this court's opinion in McDonald as support for the general proposition that nothing precludes [a] district court from giving [a defendant] credit for time served in a fully discharged state sentence, McDonald does not support that proposition. Romero, 511 F.3d at 1285. The factual contexts of the two cases vary greatly. McDonald involved a New Mexico parolee who was convicted of a crime in Texas state court. New Mexico issued a parole violation detainer warrant against the defendant, but refused to impose a sentence until after the completion of his Texas sentence. The defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, arguing that New Mexico's refusal to complete its parole review jeopardized his ability to serve the two sentences concurrently. This court concluded that [a]t the time New Mexico executes the warrant, presumably at the completion of Petitioner's intervening Texas sentence, we know of nothing preventing the New Mexico authorities from retroactively granting Petitioner the right to serve the sentences concurrently if New Mexico law provides for this option. McDonald, 955 F.2d at 634. McDonald establishes only that if applicable state law allows concurrent sentencing, a defendant may take advantage of that law. Beyond his citation to Romero, Fay has not identified any federal statute that would provide the district court with the authority to impose a sentence that would be served concurrently with a previously discharged sentence. Fay is essentially requesting jail time credit on his federal sentence for the time he served in state custody, which would equate to a sentence of time served. The district court correctly read 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) and did not err in concluding that it lacked the authority to impose a sentence to be served concurrently with Fay's discharged state sentence. AFFIRMED.