Opinion ID: 2193035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Prescriptive Easement After the Water District Obtained the Land

Text: [¶ 13] We next address the court's conclusion that the public could not obtain a prescriptive easement after the Water District obtained the adjacent land. The Town argues that the court erroneously expanded the nullum tempus doctrine to protect a quasi-municipal special purpose district from a public prescriptive easement. As a municipality itself, the Town argues that public policy favors its claim that the public has obtained a prescriptive easement over the land. [¶ 14] Whether the nullum tempus doctrine shields the Water District from the assertion of a prescriptive easement is a question of law. Cf. Sandmaier v. Tahoe Dev. Group, Inc., 2005 ME 126, ¶¶ 7-8, 887 A.2d 517, 518-19 (discussing the legal vitality of the nullum tempus doctrine). We review questions of law de novo. See Graves v. S.E. Downey Registered Land Surveyor, P.A., 2005 ME 116, ¶ 9, 885 A.2d 779, 781. [¶ 15] The common law rule that time does not run against the king ( nullum tempus occurit regi ) is a broad common law doctrine that arises from the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Assocs., 824 P.2d 776, 777-78 (Colo.1992). Two important common law doctrines arise from the nullum tempus doctrine: (1) the exception of the sovereign from statutes of limitations, [3] State v. Crommett, 151 Me. 188, 193, 116 A.2d 614, 616-17 (1955); Inhabitants of Topsham v. Blondell, 82 Me. 152, 154, 19 A. 93, 94 (1889); and (2) the rule that property interests may not be obtained from a governmental entity by adverse possession, Sandmaier, 2005 ME 126, ¶ 7, 887 A.2d at 518-19; see also Inhabitants of Charlotte v. Pembroke Iron Works, 82 Me. 391, 396, 19 A. 902, 904 (1890). [¶ 16] We abolished a related doctrine, the common law doctrine of governmental immunity from tort claims, in 1976. Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269, 1272-73 (Me.1976). Shortly thereafter, the Legislature enacted the Maine Tort Claims Act, 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101-8118 (2005), to provide statute-based immunity from tort claims for governmental entities subject to limited exceptions. P.L.1977, ch. 2, § 2 (effective Jan. 31, 1977); see Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 535 A.2d 421, 424 (Me.1987). With this change, the Legislature became vested with the authority of the sovereign to consent to be sued in tort. See id. [¶ 17] Notwithstanding the demise of common law governmental tort immunity, recently we reaffirmed the related, but distinct, common law rule that a party cannot assert a claim of title by adverse possession or prescriptive easement against a governmental entity. Sandmaier, 2005 ME 126, ¶¶ 7, 8, 887 A.2d at 518-19; see also Loavenbruck v. Rohrbach, 2002 ME 73, ¶ 12, 795 A.2d 90, 93 (stating that a party may not assert a claim of adverse possession against a municipality absent statutory authorization); Town of Sedgwick v. Butler, 1998 ME 280, ¶ 6, 722 A.2d 357, 358 (holding that town property cannot be adversely possessed). The assertion of a prescriptive easement against a municipality is prohibited in great part because the acts of possession that establish prescriptive easements are generally even less obvious than those that establish adverse possession and it would be difficult to monitor publicly held lands, many of which are extensive, to interrupt adverse uses. Sandmaier, 2005 ME 126, ¶ 8, 887 A.2d at 519. [¶ 18] Accordingly, we decline to alter centuries-old property law related to possession of land by the government. The Legislature has taken no action to abrogate the principle, nor is there strong public policy supporting such action, in contrast to the changes in tort immunities. As we said in Sandmaier, [u]ntil there is legislative authorization to the contrary, id. ¶ 9, 887 A.2d at 519, we will continue to apply the common law rule that a claim of adverse possession or prescriptive easement cannot be asserted against land held by the government.
[¶ 19] Apparently recognizing the solid foundation of this common law principle, the Town does not press for the abrogation of the nullum tempus doctrine broadly. [4] Rather, it urges us to narrowly hold that a prescriptive easement may be asserted against a quasi-municipal special-purpose district, as distinct from a municipality itself. The next question presented, then, is whether the Water District is a governmental entity protected from the assertion of a prescriptive easement. To determine whether the Water District is the government for these purposes, we must examine the nature of the Water District itself. The Legislature created the Portland Water District in 1907. P. & S.L.1907, ch. 433, repealed and replaced by P. & S.L.1975, ch. 84. Currently, the Water District is authorized to supply water to inhabitants of eleven cities or towns, including Standish. P. & S.L.2001, ch. 25, § 2. The Water District is authorized by Public and Special Law to supply water, manage wastewater and sewage, contract with companies that manage wastewater and sewage, erect and install structures to supply water or manage wastewater and sewage, hold and acquire property, excavate roads to perform repairs, exercise eminent domain in certain municipalities, borrow money to issue bonds and notes, grant or loan money, inspect connections to the sewer system, and adopt reasonable rules and regulations. P. & S.L.1975, ch. 84, §§ 2-6, 8-10, 16. The Water District's property is exempt from taxation. P. & S.L.1975, ch. 84, § 17. [¶ 20] Also, although not controlling in determining whether the Water District is a governmental entity, we consider the related legislative pronouncement regarding what types of entities are entitled to tort immunity. The Maine Tort Claims Act defines a political subdivision as any city, town, plantation, county, . . . quasi-municipal corporation and special purpose district, including, but not limited to, any water district, sanitary district, hospital district, school district of any type, any volunteer fire association as defined in Title 30-A, section 3151, a transit district as defined in Title 30-A, section 3501, subsection 1, a regional transportation corporation as defined in Title 30-A, section 3501, subsection 2, and any emergency medical service. 14 M.R.S. § 8102(3) (2005) (emphasis added). [5] [¶ 21] We have also considered whether statutorily created entities were governmental entities in other contexts. In construing the Freedom of Access Act, currently codified at 1 M.R.S. §§ 401-410 (2005), we have held that a hospital administrative district created by a private and special law as a body politic and corporate, P. & S.L.1999, ch. 84, § A-1, is a political subdivision for purposes of the Act. Town of Burlington v. Hosp. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 2001 ME 59, ¶¶ 3-6, 769 A.2d 857, 859-60. In reaching this conclusion, we took into account the hospital administrative district's authority to issue bonds and its ability to obtain money through taxation. Id. ¶ 5, 769 A.2d at 860. [¶ 22] We also held that a municipal housing authority was a political subdivision for purposes of a statute that preempted the regulation of firearms by political subdivisions. Doe v. Portland Hous. Auth., 656 A.2d 1200, 1202-04(Me.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 861, 116 S.Ct. 171, 133 L.Ed.2d 112 (1995). In addition, for purposes of taxation, we held that a public water district, or a municipality providing water service, is a public entity, not a private corporation, due to its public purposes, powers, and duties. Inhabitants of Boothbay v. Inhabitants of Boothbay Harbor, 148 Me. 31, 37-39, 88 A.2d 820, 823-24 (1952); City of Augusta v. Augusta Water Dist., 101 Me. 148, 63 A. 663 (1906). By contrast, we held that a building owned by a county agricultural society, a private corporation, did not provide a public use that rendered the property immune from condemnation because the use by the public was permissive, not a right. Oxford County Agric. Soc. v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 161 Me. 334, 335-37, 211 A.2d 893, 894-95 (1965). [¶ 23] Taking into account our earlier pronouncements regarding the qualities that make an entity a governmental entity or political subdivision of the State, we conclude that the Water District is a governmental entity against which a prescriptive easement may not be asserted. The State created the Water District; exempted it from taxation; and granted it the authority to exercise extensive, uniquely governmental functions, including providing water and sewage disposal, maintaining and repairing the infrastructure necessary to achieve those ends, exercising eminent domain, and adopting rules and regulations. In addition, the current legislative concept of a political subdivision, 14 M.R.S. § 8102(3), supports the notion that the Water District is a governmental entity. [6] [¶ 24] Finally, the public policy behind the rule that protects a governmental entity from the prescriptive claims of others does not apply any less forcefully because the asserted easement is a public easement. [7] Indeed, it may be more difficult to monitor the activities of the public generally than to monitor the activities of individuals or single entities. Accordingly, to vindicate the purpose of protecting government property from being ceded through inaction or oversight, see Sandmaier, 2005 ME 126, ¶ 8, 887 A.2d at 519, we hold that the assertion of a prescriptive easement is not permitted against a governmental entity. [¶ 25] Because we conclude that the Town cannot, as a matter of law, assert a public prescriptive easement against the Water District, we need not determine whether the Town has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements of a prescriptive easement. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.