Opinion ID: 78594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strickland Governs Claims of Ineffective Assistance

Text: In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court established the federal law governing the evaluation of all ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel, since the purpose of the right to counsel more generally is to ensure a fair trial. Blankenship, 542 F.3d at 1272 (emphasis in original) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-64). A petitioner's claim that the assistance rendered by his counsel is so defective as to require reversal of a ... death sentence has two components. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment, [a] petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064). To establish that counsel's performance was deficient, a petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176 (11th Cir.2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that [t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S.Ct. at 2535 (citation and quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice, the petitioner is required to prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. That is, a petitioner must show only a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different; he `need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.' Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1059-60 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2068). When evaluating this probability, `a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.' Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1060 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069). The petitioner bears the burden of proof on the performance prong as well as the prejudice prong of a Strickland claim, and both prongs must be proved to prevail. Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1176 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Courts must `indulge [the] strong presumption' that counsel's performance was reasonable and that counsel `made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.' Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66). When assessing Williams' claim that counsel were ineffective, it is important to keep in mind that [i]n addition to the deference to counsel's performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds another layer of deferencethis one to a [S]tate court's decisionwhen we are considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a [S]tate court's decision. Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Thus, Williams not only has to satisfy the elements of the Strickland standard, but he must also show that the State court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.  Blankenship, 542 F.3d at 1271 (emphasis in original) (quoting Rutherford, 385 F.3d at 1309). In light of these principles, we will consider each of Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel challenges. Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel argument is three-fold. He complains that counsel were ineffective because counsel: (1) presented an invalid defense under Alabama law; (2) failed to properly argue a voluntary intoxication defense to negate an intent to murder; and (3) failed to object to jury instructions. Williams therefore asserts that the State court unreasonably applied Strickland.