Opinion ID: 185218
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hazard Determination

Text: 13 We review decisions of federal agencies, including the FAA, under the standards set forth by the Administrative Procedure Act. See Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1993). That Act provides that a reviewing court must set aside agency action if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). As we have often held, [t]he requirement that agency action not be arbitrary or capricious includes a requirement that the agency adequately explain its result.... Public Citizen, 988 F.2d at 197. In the hazard determination under review, the FAA has offered no such explanation. As we have stated before, we must strike down agency action if the agency failed to consider relevant factors or made a clear error of judgment. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1978). 14 The FAA made a finding that the house penetrated an imaginary surface, specifically the transitional surface. However, mere penetration, and even evidence of adverse effect alone, do not provide adequate support for a hazard determination. In dealing with obstruction standard violations, the FAA follows a handbook entitled Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters, FAA Procedures 7400.2D (1993) (Handbook), which mandates conducting aeronautical studies, in accordance with Subpart D of Part 77, of proposed structures exceeding Part 77 obstruction standards. See Br. for FAA at 4 (citing chapter 5 of Handbook). According to Subpart D of Part 77, [i]n the aeronautical studies, present and future ... aeronautical operations and procedures are reviewed and any possible changes in those operations and procedures and in the construction proposal that would eliminate or alleviate the conflicting demands are ascertained. 14 C.F.R. 77.31.Pursuant to the Handbook, objects exceeding an obstruction standard are presumed to be hazards to air navigation unless an aeronautical study determines otherwise. Id. at 7-1(b). In order to issue a hazard determination, the FAA must find by a clear showing that the penetration in question will have a substantial adverse effect on air navigation. See id. at 7-2 to 7-5, 8-2. The Handbook provides that substantial adverse effect occurs when a structure has or would have an [a]dverse effect and a significant volume of aeronautical operations would be affected. Id. at 7-4. 15 A substantial adverse effect finding requires three elements. First, the structure in question must have exceeded the relevant obstruction standards or have been found to have a physical or electromagnetic radiation effect on the operation of air navigation facilities. See id. at 7-3. Second, the structure will be considered to have an adverse effect if it would, inter alia, require a [Visual Flight Rules] operation, that is, an operation in which the pilot lands an aircraft or takes off using visual approach procedures only, to change from a regular flight course or altitude, [d]erogate airport capacity/efficiency, or [a]ffect future [Visual Flight Rules] ... operations indicated by plans on file. Id. Third, the structure must affect a significant volume of aeronautical activity; the FAA considers the type of activity involved and the frequency of occurrence. See id. at 7-5. In addition, a study must include, inter alia, an evaluation regarding marking and lighting the structure, see id. at 7-9, and every hazard finding is supposed to include a clear, but brief, statement why aviation can or cannot accommodate the proposal. Id. at 8-2. 16 Here, the FAA first sought comments from twenty-four interested parties concerning the effect the house would have on aviation. Apart from the manager of the Providence, Rhode Island Traffic Control Tower who declared, without further elaboration, that the house would result in a negative impact to air traffic operations, the responding parties either did not object to the house or failed to provide any comments pertaining to the hazardousness of the structure. 17 Based on the FAA's explanation, or lack thereof, in the issuance of this hazard determination, we conclude that the FAA acted arbitrarily by issuing a hazard determination inconsistent with established standards. Thus, we hold that the FAA exceeded the permissible bounds of agency action. 18 Nowhere in the record before us can we find a link between established hazard determination standards and the hazard determination reached by the FAA in this case. The FAA made a finding that the house penetrated an imaginary surface. However, as we previously noted, mere penetration, and even evidence of adverse effect alone, cannot support a hazard determination. See Handbook 7-3, 7-4, 8-2. According to the Handbook, the FAA is to conduct a substantial adverse effect inquiry and only upon a clear showing of substantial adverse effect issue a hazard determination. See id. at 7-1, 7-3, 7-4, 8-2(b)(3). However, here, the FAA failed both to conduct a complete inquiry and make a clear showing of substantial adverse effect. 19 More specifically, the FAA arbitrarily based its hazard finding on an unsupported pilot distraction finding instead of following the policy outlined in the controlling Handbook.We review the FAA's findings of fact merely to see whether they are 'supported by substantial evidence.'  Public Citizen, 988 F.2d at 196 (quoting 49 U.S.C. App. 1486(e) (1988)). Here, if there is substantial evidence, the FAA has not alluded to it. 20 The FAA also acted contrary to its own procedure by failing to explicitly apply the established multi-factor test which considers adverse effect and the volume of operations affected. See Handbook 7-3 to 7-5. For example, the FAA based its finding on the house's effect on VFR operations but failed to consider the relevant VFR adverse effect factors of potential changes in flight course and potential effects on future VFR operations. See id. at 7-3. In addition, the agency did not investigate the available airport traffic figures and instead based its significant volume finding on the proximity of [the] structure to the final approach course. Even assuming the FAA's reference to a traffic buffer zone in the order affirming the hazard determination has meaning as a technical and practical matter, the agency did not do its job of connecting the buffer zone concept to the substantial adverse effect inquiry. In short, the FAA did not consider relevant factors or sufficiently explain the basis of its hazard determination. 21 The FAA's post hoc rationalizations for deviating from procedure and for failing to substantiate its hazard determination cannot pass muster as a matter of law. For example, the Handbook requires that every aeronautical study include an evaluation regarding the marking and lighting of the structure in question. See id. at 7-9. However, the agency did not make any findings concerning the marking or lighting of the house. The agency cannot claim to be engaging in reasoned analysis when it cavalierly brushes off specific mandates such as a marking and lighting evaluation. Nor can it claim to be acting reasonably when it ignores, without explanation, policy provisions such as the one establishing the inclusion of a clear, but brief, statement why aviation can or cannot accommodate [a] proposal. See id. at 8-2. 22 Moreover, the agency inexplicably refused to take into consideration the trees and other structures in the vicinity also apparently intruding into the transitional surface in the surrounding terrain which might alter the geometry of its calculations. In Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979), we recognized that surrounding terrain could possibly mitigate what might otherwise have been a potential hazard to aircraft. Id. at 973.In other words, the FAA should have considered the landscape in its entirety when making its hazard determination. See id. Yet, according to the FAA, only D&F's house presents cause for concern. All in all, the FAA failed to rationally substantiate or explain its process and findings. 23 In essence, the FAA adopted an ipse dixit approach to making a hazard determination: the house creates a navigational hazard because the agency says so. Even our highly deferential standard of review requires more than the FAA offers. Thus, the FAA's abandonment of its own established procedure and its lack of reasoned analysis on the record constitute arbitrary and capricious agency action in violation of the law. Due to the shortcomings in the FAA's hazard determination, we reverse and remand D&F's case to the agency in order for it to undertake an appropriate hazard analysis.