Opinion ID: 2971831
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff’s Procedural Claims

Text: With respect to procedural claims, Robinson argues that the Appeals Council did not issue a remand order following the district court’s remand of January 26, 1998 and that, without such an order, a jurisdictional defect arises which renders the ALJ’s second decision a nullity. Second, Robinson contends that the ALJ violated internal procedures and Robinson’s due process rights when he obtained additional post-hearing information from Dr. Tansey and Dr. Beard without prior notice to Plaintiff. Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not complete a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”) in violation of SSA rules. The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff’s procedural claims regarding the absence of a Remand Order, the failure of the ALJ to complete a PTRF, and the ALJ’s decision to include in the record the post-hearing consultation of Dr. Beard, were not presented to the district court and have been waived for appeal purposes. These claims are based upon circumstances known to the Plaintiff during the time of the district court proceedings. Having had knowledge of the circumstances underlying these claims, Plaintiff should have presented them to the district court. Because Plaintiff did not present these issues to the district court, and because Plaintiff has not presented exceptional circumstances why we should allow such claims to be asserted for the first time here, we could find that Plaintiff has waived these issues. Taft Broad Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 243-245 (6th Cir. 1991). However, even when assessed on the merits, we find these claims without merit. Although the Appeals Council must give notice of its intended actions, Culberton v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 1994), the Commissioner’s motion to remand, the district court’s Order granting that motion, and the notice of setting of the evidentiary hearing before the 9 ALJ provided ample notice of the action the Commissioner intended to take. The Appeals Council serves as the Commissioner’s designee. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown any prejudice due to the Appeals Council’s alleged failure to provide a notice or order of remand. As to whether Plaintiff’s due process rights were violated when the ALJ twice sought post-hearing assessments in this case after the October 16, 1998 hearing, we acknowledge that due process principles do apply to Social Security proceedings. Perales v. Richardson, 402 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1971). The Commissioner has a procedural manual referred to as the “HALLEX” that sets forth safeguards and procedures for these administrative proceedings. In one decision, we have found the HALLEX to provide due process. Adams v. Massanari, 55 Fed. Appx. 279, 2003 EL 173011 at -8 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003). The HALLEX allows for post-hearing consultation proceedings referred by the ALJ, subject to the right of a party to submit interrogatories to the consultant (See Appellant’s Brief, Appendix “B” ). Robinson does not contest that he was afforded the opportunity to submit questions to Dr. Tansey, after the ALJ sent him a letter dated January 4, 1999 providing notice of the additional information he had secured from Dr. Tansey. The ALJ again sent Plaintiff’s counsel a letter on May 18, 1999, providing notice that he had secured additional information from Dr. Beard, and affording Plaintiff the opportunity to respond. On this occasion, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a supplemental deposition from Dr. King and made a request for Dr. Beard’s curriculam vitae. Thus, in line with protections afforded by due process, Robinson had notice of and an opportunity to respond to Dr. Beard’s report, as well. We do not discern any reversible error. The ALJ’s failure to complete a Psychiatric Review Technique Form can constitute reversible error, Montgomery v. Shalala, 30 F. 3d 98, 100-01 (8th Cir. 1994), but in the Sixth 10 Circuit, reversal is warranted only if the plaintiff shows “significant evidence of a possible impairment that allegedly prevented the Plaintiff from working.” Marcum v. Commissioner, SSA, 205 F.3d 1341m 2000WL92262 at  (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2000) (citations omitted). To qualify as exhibiting a severe mental impairment, Plaintiff must prove an issue or IQ of sixty to seventy, coupled with physical or other mental limitations. Daniels v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2003 WL 21774004 at , n. 1 (6th Cir. 2003). Robinson’s IQ is 80 and he does have a work history. Thus, there is no reversible error on this point.