Opinion ID: 1143665
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: liability trial

Text: The Department first argues that Polk improperly challenged the propriety of the agency action in an inverse condemnation proceeding. The Department also contends that the trial court determined that the burning of Polk's trees was erroneous and not a proper exercise of the police power and, because of this determination, Polk's remedy is a tort action for negligent destruction rather than an inverse condemnation suit. The Department correctly notes that the propriety of an agency's action may not be challenged in an inverse condemnation proceeding. § 253.763(2), Fla. Stat. (1985); Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So.2d 101, 103 n. 1 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149 (1988). A review of the record, however, reveals that Polk did not challenge the validity of the Department's statutory authority. Further, Polk neither challenged the validity of the Department's rule nor alleged that the Department failed to comply with or properly implement the rule. Compare Albrecht v. State, 444 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1984) (where first action constituted a challenge to the propriety of the agency's actions). In Corneal v. State Plant Board, 95 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1957), this Court stated: In enacting regulatory measures which protect but do not destroy property, the law need not restrict itself to conditions actually harmful but may require precautions within the whole range of possible danger. But the absolute destruction of property is an extreme exercise of the police power and is justified only within the narrowest limits of actual necessity, unless the state chooses to pay compensation. (Citations omitted.) In the present case, the evidence and argument presented at the liability phase were properly related to the issue of whether the bacterial disease constituted a nuisance or presented an imminent public danger so that destruction without payment of just compensation was permissible or whether, under the circumstances, the destruction of the nursery stock was a taking of property for which full and just compensation was due. We also reject the Department's argument that the trial judge determined that the destruction in the present case was an invalid exercise of the state's police power, with the result that Polk's remedy is an action in tort rather than inverse condemnation. This Court has recognized on numerous occasions that it is a settled proposition that a regulation or statute may meet the standards necessary for exercise of the police power but still result in a taking. Mid-Florida Growers, 521 So.2d at 103; Albrecht, 444 So.2d at 12; Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374, 1381 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083, 102 S.Ct. 640, 70 L.Ed.2d 618 (1981). As noted above, the evidence and argument presented were properly limited to whether the actions of the Department constituted a taking requiring full and just compensation. The issue of the validity of the action under the police power was not raised. [2] The Department next contends that the destruction of the nursery stock was reasonable and the trial court's contrary conclusion was against the manifest weight of the evidence and must be reversed. [3] In a cross appeal, Polk argues the trial judge erred in ruling that the state was not liable for compensation for those trees located within 125 feet of the trees actually diseased. Each of the parties adduced the testimony of many witnesses regarding the necessity of destruction of the nursery stock. As we noted in Mid-Florida Growers, however, the trial judge in an inverse condemnation suit is the trier of all issues, legal and factual, except for the question of what amount constitutes just compensation. The trial court's determination of liability in an inverse condemnation suit is presumed correct and its findings will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by competent, substantial evidence. 521 So.2d at 104 (citations omitted). We conclude, based upon a review of the record, that there was substantial competent evidence presented at the liability phase to support the trial court's finding that Polk was entitled to compensation for all nursery stock destroyed except for those trees exhibiting symptoms of the bacterial disease and those located within 125 feet. [4] Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's determination of liability and reject Polk's cross appeal.