Opinion ID: 2050773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absence at the Termination Hearing

Text: In her appeal, respondent contended that the Family Court justice erred in continuing the termination proceedings in her absence and that he should have made  some inquiry into her whereabouts and the reason for her absence. The respondent argued that she had a right to participate fully in a hearing on the allegations of the [involuntary termination of parental rights] petition, pursuant to Rule 18(c)(5) of the Family Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings, and she asked that the termination decree be vacated and the case be remanded for a trial with her participation. Because we agree with respondent on this issue, we do not address the merits of this case and consequently do not review the findings of fact made by the Family Court justice. In consideration of their fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their child, In re Antonio G., 657 A.2d 1052, 1057 (R.I.1995) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982)), parents are entitled to procedural due process before the termination of their parental rights. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54, 102 S.Ct. at 1395, 71 L.Ed.2d at 606. Because the right of confrontation is not absolute, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1320, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 258 (1968), and is limited to criminal proceedings, Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 n.4, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2804 n.4, 125 L.Ed.2d 488, 496 n. 4 (1993), respondent had no absolute right to be physically present at the termination hearing. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25-28, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158-59, 68 L.Ed.2d 640, 648-49 (1981) (termination of parental rights is a civil and not a criminal proceeding). Although the termination of parental rights is a civil, not a criminal proceeding, id., the termination of parental rights is a significant event in which a parent's due process rights reasonably should be protected. Here, pursuant to Rule 18(c)(4), respondent initially was represented by the Public Defender's office, the services of which she terminated. She then was referred to Rhode Island Legal Services. The respondent again dismissed legal counsel provided to her and entered her appearance pro se on September 10, 1998, indicating that she would represent herself in the termination proceedings. We have held that there is no mandate to appoint substitute counsel, once a respondent has discharged appointed counsel, In re Bryce T., 764 A.2d 718, 721 (R.I.2001) (per curiam). However, we also suggested that trial judges should direct that an appointed, dismissed attorney serve as stand-by counsel in the event the unrepresented party is unable to proceed pro se or requires assistance during trial. Id. at 722. Furthermore, in a case in which a respondent asks to attend a termination hearing personally but is prevented from doing so, the Family Court justice should ascertain whether  in light of due process considerations  alternative means of participation in the proceedings can be afforded to a respondent. In re Brandon A., 769 A.2d 586, 591 (R.I.2001) (holding that an out-of-state incarcerated parent should be given an opportunity for reasonable participation in a hearing on the termination of his parental rights). Although it was unclear in this case why respondent did not appear at the termination hearing, it was known to the Family Court justice and to all parties at the hearing that respondent had a long history of mental illness and substance abuse that frequently resulted in hospitalizations. Moreover, respondent recently had informed her social services caseworker that she intended to discontinue her court-ordered medication after expiration of the order without which her mental state was known to deteriorate. Given those circumstances, it could not be assumed that respondent's absence from the hearing was entirely voluntary. We have held that a parent was adequately represented by her guardian ad litem although the parent's attorney was permitted to withdraw when [d]uring the course of the hearing the guardian ad litem was present, examined witnesses and took other steps to represent his absent ward. In re John P., 458 A.2d 1085, 1085 (R.I.1983) (per curiam). Unlike John P., respondent's guardian ad litem in the instant case remained entirely passive, and she indicated that it was her understanding that her responsibilities as guardian did not include her acting as respondent's legal representative. In cases such as this, wherein the pro se parent failed to appear, no attorney represented the parent, and the guardian ad litem did nothing to protect the absent parent's rights, a Family Court justice must make findings on the reasons why the respondent in a termination of parental rights hearing was absent. We previously have stated that it is the obligation of a justice of the Family Court, or of any court, to see that truth is as fully ascertained as circumstances permit. In re John P., 458 A.2d at 1086. At a minimum, a Family Court justice should inquire about the status or position of the parent and the reason for his or her absence to ascertain whether the non-appearance was voluntary or non-voluntary. Therefore, we remand this case to the Family Court for a hearing in which the respondent has the opportunity to present testimony in evidence. Moreover, a reasonable effort should be made to allow the witnesses in the April 9, 1999 hearing to be cross-examined by the respondent. It lies within the sound discretion of the Family Court justice to determine whether additional testimony should be taken at that time or whether the original transcript may be relied upon.