Opinion ID: 201506
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Protected speech determination

Text: 17 To prevail on a § 1983 claim based on a violation of his First Amendment rights, a public employee like Baron must show that (1) his expression involved matters of public concern; (2) his interest in commenting upon those matters outweighed the [government employer's] interests in the efficient performance of its public services; and (3) his protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the ... adverse employment actions. Lewis v. City of Boston, 321 F.3d 207, 218 (1st Cir.2003). This appeal focuses on the first prong, the threshold question of whether Baron was speaking not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). In answering this question of law, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to consider the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Id. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684. 18 Not every First Amendment inquiry requires a full Connick inquiry into form and context, however. There are some situations where public interest will be apparent from the content of speech alone: 19 Where a public employee speaks out on a topic which is clearly a legitimate matter of inherent concern to the electorate, the court may eschew further inquiry into the employee's motives as revealed by the form and context of the expression. On the other hand, public-employee speech on a topic which would not necessarily qualify, on the basis of its content alone, as a matter of inherent public concern (e.g., internal working conditions, affecting only the speaker and co-workers), may require a more complete Connick analysis into the form and context of the public-employee expression, as revealed by the whole record, with a view to whether the community has in fact manifested a legitimate concern in the internal workings of the particular agency or department of government, and if so, whether the form of the employee's expression suggests a subjective intent to contribute to any such public discourse. 20 O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 913-14 (1st Cir.1993) (internal citations omitted). 21 The district court determined at summary judgment that the internal workings of the Sheriff's Department were a matter of inherent public concern, and thus found that Baron's speech was protected without engaging in an extended analysis of its form and context. 11 The Department takes issue with this conclusion, arguing that the content of Baron's expression was not a matter of inherent public concern because it dealt exclusively with internal working conditions at the House of Correction. We disagree. 22 It is true that some speech about internal working conditions would not be of inherent public interest. For example, in Connick, the Court considered whether a questionnaire circulated by an Assistant District Attorney to her colleagues was protected speech under the First Amendment. Most of the questionnaire dealt with office transfer policy, employee morale, and the performance of certain supervisors. The Court concluded that questions related to discipline and morale were not protected speech: 23 [W]e do not believe these questions are of public import in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected official.... Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, would convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo. 24 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Based on that holding, we noted in O'Connor that speech about internal working conditions may not qualify as a matter of inherent public concern on the basis of its content alone, and instead may require a more complete Connick analysis. 994 F.2d at 914. 25 As the district court recognized, however, Connick does not entirely foreclose the possibility that under some circumstances, speech regarding internal working conditions may be of inherent public interest. Indeed, the Supreme Court identified one item on the Connick questionnaire as falling into this category: a question asking whether Assistant District Attorneys ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates. 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Noting that there is a demonstrated interest in this country that government service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service, the Court found that the political pressure question involved a matter of interest to the community upon which it is essential that public employees be able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal. Id. 26 The district court concluded that this line of reasoning applied equally to Baron's repeated reports of harassment in retaliation for violating the code of silence: 27 It is apparent that the issue of whether a corrections officer is willing to walk the blue line to report wrongdoing within the prison walls is a matter of great interest to the community, and the courts. This problem is analogous to the situation in which a public employee feels pressured to work in a political campaign, which the Supreme Court discussed in Connick. It is essential that corrections officers be able to speak out freely about misconduct without the pressure of a code of silence and fear of extreme retaliatory harassment sufficient to force resignation. 28 The court also emphasized that [t]he community has in fact manifested a legitimate concern in the internal workings of the Sheriff's Department. As evidence of that concern, the court cited a series of 2001 Boston Globe newspaper articles chronicling abuse and mismanagement at the House of Correction, and the Stern Report, commissioned by Governor Jane Swift in 2001 in response to mounting allegations of mismanagement of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, which recommended a number of sweeping changes to the Department, including an aggressive attack on the code of silence. 12 29 The Department now argues that the district court should not have considered these sources because they reflect public interest several years after the speech at issue here. While it is true that this specific evidence of public interest post-dates Baron's speech, there is nothing to suggest that the public would not have been similarly interested in internal Department conditions in 1997 and 1998 when Baron repeatedly complained about retaliatory harassment without a meaningful response from his superiors. Given that the court's protected speech determination rested on a finding of inherent public interest, the small time discrepancy that the Department points to is unimportant. If there was an inherent public interest in internal Department conditions in 2001, there is no reason to doubt that the same interest was present in 1997. 30 Retaliation against officers who breach a code of silence among their colleagues at a county House of Correction implicates the public interest in a way that morale among Assistant District Attorneys does not. Unlike the speaker in Connick, Baron was reporting actual wrongdoing on the part of public employees. Cf. 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (employee did not seek to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing). The wrongdoing Baron complained of, including officers' violations of prison policy, retaliation for breaching the code of silence, and prison officials' failure to investigate or put a stop to that retaliation, affected not only Baron and his co-workers, but also the prison inmates who were under the Department's control. Accordingly, Baron's speech involved a legitimate matter of inherent concern to the electorate, O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 913-14, and the district court properly eschew[ed] further inquiry into the employee's motives. Id. The Department's additional arguments regarding the form and context of Baron's speech are thus inapposite.