Opinion ID: 3064694
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presumption Respecting Embezzlement of a

Text: Leased or Rented Vehicle: Whenever any person who has leased or rented a vehicle wilfully and intentionally fails to return the vehicle to its owner within five days after the lease or rental agreement has expired, that person shall be presumed to have embezzled the vehicle. Id. The Court in Neder recognized that the jury’s conviction of the defendant in Carella was not “a complete verdict because the conclusive presumption directly foreclosed independent jury consideration of whether the facts proved established certain elements of the offenses.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 12. Nevertheless, harmless error review was applicable because the guilty verdict did not vitiate the jury’s finding of grand theft. See id. [9] Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed the structural error-harmless error dichotomy in Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 129 S. Ct. 530 (2008). The Court re-emphasized the breadth of trial errors that are subject to harmless error review. See id. at 532 (describing Neder and other cases involving omitted BYRD v. LEWIS 5855 and misstated jury instructions). The Court reinforced the holding in Neder that unless all the jury’s findings are vitiated, harmless error review applies. See id. In Pulido, the Court left no doubt that its intent in Neder was to limit structural error review to those trial deficiencies that negated all the jury’s findings, rather than to a preliminary finding that merely contributed to the ultimate determination of guilt. See id. Applying these precepts to the facts of this case leads to the conclusion that the California Court of Appeal’s application of harmless error to the challenged jury instruction was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. [10] Although the scope-of-consent instruction “subjected [that] element to a lesser burden of proof,” Byrd, 2001 WL 1480516 at , the misstatement regarding that element did not “vitiate all the jury’s findings.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 11. Rather, it only prevented the jury from making a complete finding on the scope-of-consent element. The jury’s finding on the charged crime of unlawfully taking a vehicle was not vitiated. See id. We recognize that our decision in Gibson reaches a different outcome. In Gibson, we also addressed a California state court decision, which was before us on appeal of a grant of a writ of habeas corpus. As pertinent to this discussion, Gibson was convicted of forcible oral copulation and anal and genital penetration by foreign object or force or violence (collectively, sexual offenses), against the victim, his spouse. See Gibson, 387 F.3d at 817. At the state court trial, evidence of prior uncharged sexual offenses against the victim was admitted. See id.8 8 Gibson’s conviction for corporal injury to a spouse was subject to the admission of similar uncharged acts of domestic violence. 5856 BYRD v. LEWIS The jury was instructed as follows regarding the reasonable doubt burden of proof: Each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance on which the inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 821. In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to rely on the state of the evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the charge against him. No lack of testimony on defendant’s part will make up for a failure of proof by the People so as to support a finding against him on any such essential element. Id. at 821 n.7 (citation and alterations omitted). A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether [his] guilty is satisfactorily shown, [he] is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 821. The trial court in Gibson instructed the jury as follows regarding the evidence of Gibson’s prior uncharged acts: If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may, but are not required to, BYRD v. LEWIS 5857 infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit the same or similar type sexual offenses. If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did commit the crime or crimes of which he is accused. Id. at 817. The jury was further instructed that: Within the meaning of the preceding instructions, the prosecution has the burden of proving by a pre- ponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed sexual offenses and/or domestic violence other than those for which he is on trial. You must not consider this evidence for any pur- pose unless you find a preponderance of the evi- dence that a defendant committed the other sexual offenses and/or domestic violence. Id. at 818. In granting relief to Gibson, we concluded that the instructions addressing the prior uncharged acts impermissibly lowered the burden of proof “for the permissive inference” to be drawn from the uncharged acts. Id. at 822. We held that the error was structural because the instructions “permitted the jury to find Gibson guilty of the charged sexual offenses by merely a preponderance of the evidence . . .” Id. at 825 (citing Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281-82). Further, we found this to be clearly established constitutional law. See id. [11] However, Pulido instructs that “[a]n instructional error arising in the context of multiple theories of guilt” does not vitiate all the jury’s findings. Pulido, 129 S.Ct. at 532. The jury could have convicted Gibson on the theory that the infer5858 BYRD v. LEWIS ence from the prior uncharged acts warranted a finding of guilt, or it could have convicted Gibson on the theory that the direct testimony of the victim regarding the charged offenses warranted a finding of guilt, or on some combination of the two theories. The instructional error affected only the theory resting on the inference from the prior uncharged acts. Similarly, in our case, Byrd could have been convicted on the theory that he exceeded the scope of consent, or on the theory that consent was never given. The instructional error affected only the scope-of-consent theory. In such circumstances, Pulido dictates the application of harmless error review. See id. [12] Although we are reluctant to do so, we must overrule Gibson to the extent that it applies structural error review to an instructional error that affects only an element of the offense, a permissible evidentiary inference, or a potential theory of conviction, as opposed to an instructional error that affects the overarching reasonable doubt standard of proof. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 10; see also Pulido, 129 S.Ct. at 532 (citing Neder). Because Pulido “undercuts the theory or reasoning” of Gibson and the two cannot be reconciled, that portion of the holding in Gibson has been effectively overruled by the Supreme Court. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Circ. 2003) (en banc). Our concurring colleague questions the necessity of addressing our holding in Gibson. See Concurring Opinion at pp. 5864-65. The concurrence sees a principled distinction between the jury instructions at issue in Gibson and the instructions at issue here. The erroneous jury instructions in Gibson were not limited to a single element of the crimes charged. Rather, the instructions allowed the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was guilty of the entire crime charged . . . BYRD v. LEWIS 5859 Id. at p. 5864 (emphasis in the original). However, with respect, there is no rational distinction between the challenged jury instruction in this case and the challenged instruction in Gibson. In Gibson, the jury was instructed that if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, it could use that finding to support an inference that the defendant committed the crime for which he was on trial. See Gibson, 387 F.3d at 817. In this case, the jury was instructed that if it determined that the defendant clearly and substantially exceeded the scope of consent given, that fact would establish the offense of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle in violation of California Vehicle Code § 10851. See Byrd, 2001 WL 1480516, at . To say that the Gibson instruction implicates the ultimate finding of guilt and the Byrd instruction does not is analytical hairsplitting that would make our precedent difficult to apply. [13] Pulido encompassed within its holding any instructional error that falls short of “categorically ‘vitiat[ing] all the jury’s findings.’ ” 129 S.Ct. 532 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 11) (emphasis in the original). The only instructional error recognized by Pulido as vitiating all the jury’s findings is a defective overarching reasonable-doubt instruction as articulated in Sullivan. See id. The jury instruction in Gibson, which addressed a finding to support an inference of guilt, was not the equivalent of the overarching reasonable-doubt instruction referenced in Pulido, Neder, and Sullivan. In fact, an overarching reasonable-doubt instruction was given in Gibson, see 387 F.3d at 821 (reflecting the instruction setting forth the government’s burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). Neither the Gibson panel nor the parties noted any defect in that instruction. See id. By the process of elimination, if the overarching reasonable-doubt instruction in Gibson was not defective, Gibson’s holding applying structural error review to an instruction of a type other than that identified by the Supreme Court is inconsistent with governing precedent. In short, Supreme Court precedent dictates overruling that portion of Gibson, and concluding that the 5860 BYRD v. LEWIS state court’s harmless error review was not an unreasonable application of Federal law.