Opinion ID: 2623326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges for cause against prospective jurors

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court violated his rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by excusing three prospective jurors for cause on the prosecutor's challenges. Under both the federal and state Constitutions, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be impartial. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 666-667, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752; see also Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492.) A prospective juror whose views about capital punishment, either for or against, would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror' is not impartial and therefore may be challenged for cause. ( People v. Williams, supra, at p. 667, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) We will uphold a trial court's ruling on a for-cause challenge by either party if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 727, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485; see also People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.)
At the outset of voir dire, Prospective Juror Harold G. said he had no personal convictions that would cause him to automatically decide which penalty to impose and he could follow the trial court's instructions and reach an appropriate verdict. During the prosecution's examination, however, Harold G. confirmed he had answered yes to a questionnaire item asking, Do you believe there is any reason why you might have any difficulty in objectively and impartially serving as a juror in this case? The prosecutor then asked him if he would still answer no to the question posed to him on the questionnaire as to whether he could set aside his personal feelings about the death penalty law and follow the law as explained by the court. He replied that his answer would still be no. Although he made contradictory statements about his ability to set aside his own personal views and follow the law, Harold G. ended his examination with the declaration that he could not set aside his personal views. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing Harold G. for cause. The record does not support defendant's complaint that the trial court failed to ask enough questions during voir dire to determine whether the challenge for cause was proper.
When Prospective Juror Robert T. stated during voir dire he was not completely sold on that death penalty, the trial court admonished him that his personal views were not to be taken into consideration and that he must follow the court's instructions. Robert T. responded that he could set aside his personal feelings and apply the law as the court explained it. But when the prosecutor asked him whether, in light of his convictions about the death penalty, he would be capable of deciding for himself to vote for the death penalty if that was what the evidence showed and the law indicated, Robert T. replied, I'm not positive I could, you know. And when the prosecutor asked, Wouldn't it be fair to say you just can't conceive of a situation where you'd vote for the death penalty?, he responded, I really don't think so. Given these responses to the prosecutor's questions, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excused Robert T. for cause. Defendant argues that Robert T.'s response of I really don't think so meant he found the prosecutor's assessment of his inability to apply the death penalty in any setting to be inaccurate. This interpretation is untenable in light of Robert T.'s other comments. Equally unpersuasive is defendant's contention that the trial court improperly relied on answers to the unsworn questionnaire to excuse Harold G. and Robert T. As the record shows, these prospective jurors took the required oath before being orally examined, and they confirmed their questionnaire responses during that oral examination.
On voir dire, Prospective Juror Leonard B. said he might have difficulty if he was asked to decide the penalty and such a decision would weigh on his conscience. He also said he had been opposed to the death penalty for a number of years. On further questioning by the prosecutor, Leonard B. said: I can conceive of situations, maybe where I had a personal emotional involvement, where I would go along with it. But, in general, it would be very disturbing to me to feel for the rest of my days that I voted in favor of the death penalty. He reiterated the point later when he stated, It's conceivable to me that I would vote in favor of the death penalty but I doubt it very much. He ended by declaring, I'm a flexible person but not that flexible, I think. After considering defense counsel's argument pointing out that the juror had stated there were circumstances under which he could vote for the death penalty, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's challenge for cause. The ruling was not an abuse of discretion. A prospective juror may not be excused for cause simply because of a strong opposition to capital punishment if the juror can nevertheless follow the trial court's instructions and fairly consider imposing the death penalty in a specific case. ( Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 44-45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581; see also Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, 105 S.Ct. 844; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 963, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214 [prospective juror who expresses opposition to death penalty not properly excused for cause if juror reveals ability to consider imposing death penalty as a reasonable possibility].) Here, however, Leonard B. did not merely acknowledge his opposition to the death penalty, he said he doubted very much he would vote for the death penalty, and he thought he was not flexible enough to do so against his personally held views. These comments amply support the trial court's conclusion that Leonard B.'s death penalty views would substantially impair his ability to follow the court's instructions and the law.