Opinion ID: 1112572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of R.S. 14:54.1

Text: Article I, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution states that In a criminal prosecution, an accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. If a statute is so ambiguous that it does not give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed, the due process notions embodied in § 13 are offended. Traditionally, a statute has been considered unconstitutionally vague if men of common intelligence must guess as to its meaning. State v. Prestridge, 399 So.2d 564 (La. 1981); State v. McCoy, 395 So.2d 319 (La. 1980); State v. Cannon, 383 So.2d 389 (La.1980). Thus, the task of this court is to examine the language of the statute and assess whether two reasonable, different interpretations may be derived by a reading of it. La.R.S. 14:54.1 is preceded by the title Communicating of False Information of Planned Arson. The statute itself provides: Communicating of false information of arson or attempted arson is the intentional impartation or conveyance, or causing the importation or conveyance by the use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, word of mouth or other means of communication, of any threat or false information knowing the same to be false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made, or to be made, to commit either aggravated or simple arson. The State argues that the statute is susceptible of only one interpretation; i.e., that the crime described consists of either (1) intentional threats to commit arson, or (2) intentional communication of false information of an attempt to commit arson, knowing the same to be false. Under this interpretation, the State contends that defendant was guilty of the first type of offenseintentional communication of threats to commit arson. The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, concluded that an equally reasonable interpretation could be reached. By reading the statute so that the phrase knowing the same to be false modifies both the nouns threat and false information, the Court found that the proscribed conduct arguably consisted of: (1) intentional communication of threats of arson knowing them to be false, or (2) intentional communication of false information of arson knowing the information to be false. Under this interpretation, defendant's conduct might not have been within the ambit of the statute, since his threat may not have been false; i.e., he might actually have intended to carry out his threat. We do not agree with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that R.S. 14:54.1 is susceptible of more than one interpretation. Instead, we conclude that the alternate approach suggested by the Court of Appeal is the correct one. The gravamen of the offense punishable by R.S. 14:54.1 is the communication of false information of arson. This is evident from the title of the statute as well as the first clause of the text of the statute. Further, the word threat is not set off from the term or false information knowing the same to be false by a comma; instead the phrase threat or false information knowing the same to be false reads as a continuous whole, and implies that both the threat and the false information must be known to be false. Several factors support this conclusion. The legislative history of the statute shows that R.S. 14:54.1 began in the House of Representatives as HB No. 297. This bill was originally designated as an amendment to Title 14 of the Revised Statutes ... by adding thereto a new Section to be designated as R.S. 14:54.1, relative to arson and use of explosives, to make it a crime to communicate false information relative to acts of arson to be committed. Journal of the House of Representatives, p. 94 (1970 Regular Session). The word threat was only added to the text as a floor amendment on the day of passage of the bill by the House. Journal, House of Representatives, p. 1340 (1970 Regular Session). At the time, a comma separated threat from the phrase or false information, and the bill was virtually identical to an analogous federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 837(d) [1] . This comma was deleted by Senate Amendment before ultimate passage of the bill into law. Senate Journal, p. 1075 (1970 Regular Session). The deletion of the comma thus indicates an intent that threat not be considered apart from the remainder of the clause; and that in order to be punishable under the statute, a threat must be made with the knowledge that it is false. While we recognize that this interpretation places a high burden on the State to demonstrate the falsity of a threat, that is a matter for legislative rather than judicial cognizance. [2] Having concluded that R.S. 14:54.1 is constitutional, we must now examine whether the State's evidence was legally sufficient to convict defendant of the offense. The record is devoid of any evidence which would show that defendant's statements were made knowing them to be false. For this reason, we conclude that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational finder of fact could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the offense charged; communicating a threat of arson as defined in the statute. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).