Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mischaracterization of Evidence

Text: Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly characterized the sequence of Powell's murder and argued without evidence that Powell was psychologically vulnerable, that defendant breached her trust, and that defendant lurked in the darkness waiting for her. He first challenges the prosecutor's presentation of his theory on the sequence of events leading up to Powell's murder. (See ante, 40 Cal. Rptr.3d at pp. 190-191, 129 P.3d at pp. 382-383.) The trial court overruled defendant's objection that the prosecutor misstated the coroner's testimony. On appeal, defendant's contends there was no evidence to support this theory. A prosecutor may properly discuss the circumstances of defendant's crime when arguing in favor of the death penalty. ( People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 519, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182.) A prosecutor also may express an opinion on the state of the evidence and relate the People's theory of the case in a comprehensible, story-like manner. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 975-976, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Here, the coroner testified that Powell suffered poke wounds, stabbing to the back and neck, and defensive wounds on her arms and hands. Several of these wounds could have been fatal. During his argument, the prosecutor informed the jury that the inferences he drew from the evidence reflected his theory and not necessarily what actually happened. He explained that there was no direct evidence of what transpired at the time defendant murdered Powell, and thus, the jury would have to rely on the circumstantial evidence to determine what Powell experienced. Further, after presenting his sequence of events, the prosecutor told the jury, [E]ven if we don't have the exact sequence correct of everything that happened, you know that everything that I just said happened. The prosecutor properly based his theory on the evidence admitted at trial or reasonable inferences drawn from it. Therefore, we conclude the prosecutor's argument was not improper. Defendant further contends the evidence does not support the prosecutor's argument that Powell was psychologically vulnerable and that defendant breached her trust and lurked in the dark, waiting to kill her. During argument, the prosecutor portrayed Powell as psychologically vulnerable and someone who clung to a childlike belief that all people are good at heart. He stated that anyone who met her would have been aware of her vulnerability. The prosecutor then questioned whether defendant gave Powell either some indication that although he seemed outwardly quiet and harmless, he was a monster inside or a warning such as, Kathy, you can't trust me, I know I might seem quiet and harmless, but watch out because there's a monster inside. Continuing, the prosecutor described Powell as someone who would never have been able to look into defendant's cold, cold eyes and see the emptiness behind them. He suggested that Powell was too decent to ... protect herself and that defendant saw this weakness in her and perceived her as a convenient target. The prosecutor further accused defendant of abus[ing] the trust that Kathy Powell placed in him and lurking in the darkness of Powell's home, waiting for her. The trial court overruled defendant's objections that there was no evidence to support this line of argument and that Powell's vulnerability and defendant's breach of her trust were not aggravating factors under section 190.3. It ruled the argument was properly based on evidence of the circumstances of Powell's murder. We agree that the prosecutor's argument was properly based on the evidence or reasonable inferences drawn from it. A prosecutor may identify those traits of the victim that made the victim vulnerable to crime when such characteristics are relevant to the charged crimes, and has no duty `to shield the jury from all favorable inferences about the victim's life or to describe relevant events in artificially drab or clinical terms.' ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 975, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Further, the trial court instructed the jury that it was to determine what the facts are from the evidence received during the entire trial. (Former CALJIC No. 8.84.1.) Whether to draw the same inferences as those urged by the prosecutor regarding the circumstances of Powell's murder was, thus, a question for the jury to decide. There was no misconduct.