Opinion ID: 788103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ESA Fee Shifting

Text: 14 The Endangered Species Act states that any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf ... against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary with the Secretary. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(C). The Final Rule was enacted pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). The Act further provides that [t]he court, in issuing any final order in any suit brought pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.  16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (emphasis added). 15 Defendants argue that the district court erred as a matter of law when it awarded fees pursuant to the ESA. They contend that Plaintiffs' suit was cognizable only under the APA because they assert that Defendants' duty is discretionary. However, Plaintiffs' claims under the ESA fall squarely within § 1540(g)(4). The Supreme Court has held in an analogous case that: 16 [T]he terms of § 1533(b)(2) are plainly those of obligation rather than discretion: The secretary shall designate critical habitat, and make revisions thereto, . . . on the basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular areas as critical habitat. (Emphasis added.) It is true that this is followed by the statement that, except where extinction of the species is at issue, [t]he Secretary may exclude any area as part of the critical habitat. Ibid. (emphasis added). However, the fact that the Secretary's ultimate decision is reviewable only for abuse of discretion does not alter the categorical requirement that, in arriving at his decision, he tak[e] into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, and use the best scientific data available. Ibid. It is rudimentary administrative law that discretion as to the substance of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to ignore the required procedures of decisionmaking. 17 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 172, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). In this case, as in Bennett v. Spear, Defendants had the categorical requirement to take into consideration the economic impact or any other relevant impact in the designation of critical habitat. The Final Rule having been enacted pursuant to section 1533(b)(2), the suit was properly brought under, and governed by, the relevant fee shifting provision of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4). 18 The issue in the case brought by Plaintiffs was whether Defendants had fulfilled that required duty when they applied the so-called incremental effects analysis to determine the economic impact of designating critical habitats. The incremental effects analysis is premised on the idea that listing the species will have certain economic impacts that are not to be considered in evaluating the economic impact from the designation of the critical habitats. Under this analysis, if the designation of critical habitat results in no additional economic impact, and the Secretary ignores the economic impact attributable to the listing of the endangered species, the Secretary may determine that the designation actually results in no economic impact at all. Plaintiffs contended that this approach contravenes the requirements of § 1533(b)(2) because under it the Secretary does not perform a proper economic impact analysis of the effects of designating a critical habitat. 19 Clearly, Plaintiffs' action was brought under the ESA. More importantly, the action was brought to enforce the ESA. Plaintiffs contend that the action they brought was a catalyst in bringing about Defendants' changed interpretation of section 1533(b)(2) and the remand of the designations, and that attorneys' fees are therefore available under the ESA's fee-shifting provision. 20