Opinion ID: 767855
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel at the Culpability Phase

Text: 18 We review a district court's denial of habeas corpus relief de novo, but we review any findings of fact made by the district court for clear error. Findings of fact made by a state court are entitled to complete deference if supported by the evidence. See Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 323-24 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 935, 119 S. Ct. 348 (1998) 5 . The presumption of correctness accorded to state court findings only applies to basic, primary facts, and not to mixed questions of law and fact, and it applies to implicit findings of fact, logically deduced because of the trial court's ability to adjudge the witnesses' demeanor and credibility. Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1310 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1257 (1997)), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1132 (1998).
19 The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The well-known two part test for evaluating ineffectiveness claims was first articulated in Strickland: 20 First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 21 Id. at 687; see also, e.g., Tucker v. Prelesnik, 181 F.3d 747, 754 (6th Cir. 1999); Chandler v. Jones, 813 F.2d 773, 781 (6th Cir. 1987). 22 With regard to the performance prong of the inquiry, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Judicial scrutiny of performance is highly deferential, and [a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Therefore, this court should judge whether, in light of all the circumstances viewed at the time of counsel's conduct, counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Id. at 690. Furthermore, strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Id. at 690-91; see also Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 328 (6th Cir. 1984). Finally, when analyzing an attorney's performance, [i]t will generally be appropriate for a reviewing court to assess counsel's overall performance throughout the case in order to determine whether the 'identified acts or omissions' overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 23 As for the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the Court instructed: The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The prejudice prong focuses on the question whether counsel's deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Therefore, the prejudice inquiry must not focus solely on mere outcome determination; attention must be given to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Id. at 369. 24 Both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact entitled to de novo review. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Groseclose, 130 F.3d at 1164 (An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question of law and fact, for which both the state-court and district-court determinations are subject to de novo review by this court.). 25 2. Defense Counsel's Failure to Object to the Unconstitutional Use of Combs's Talk to My Lawyer Statement 26 Combs first claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to object both to the prosecution's use of a statement made by Combs to a police officer and to the trial court's sua sponte jury instruction concerning the purposes for which the jury could consider that statement 6 . As the Ohio Supreme Court found, after Combs had been shot Cincinnati police officer Douglas Ventre arrived on the scene and found Combs sitting on the ground and holding a shotgun. See Combs, 581 N.E.2d at 1074. Ventre then pulled the shotgun away from Combs and asked Combs what had happened, to which Combs replied the guy shot me. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). Ventre later repeated the same question as Combs was being placed into an ambulance, and Combs told [Ventre] to talk to his lawyer. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). After Officer Ventre testified about this talk to my lawyer statement, the trial court instructed: 27 Members of the jury, I am going to give you a special instruction at this time based upon the testimony that you heard the defendant Ronald Dean Combs has a constitutional right not to speak to members of law enforcement without counsel and not to speak to them. You cannot draw any inferences for or against the defendant because he may have requested an attorney or made no further statements to Officer Ventre when he was on the stretcher as Officer Ventre testified to. 28 You may consider this evidence, however, as it relates to the elements of purpose and prior calculation and design but what weight you give to this testimony depends upon your findings and the weight that you attribute to this testimony in this regard so please remember that. 29 R. at 1052-53; J.A. at 2673-74. Defense counsel did not object to this jury instruction, nor did they object to the prosecution's use of this statement at trial. In closing argument, the prosecution stated: 30 Talk to my lawyer. Talk to my lawyer. Does that sound like someone who's so intoxicated he doesn't know what is going on? Isn't that evidence that he realizes the gravity of the situation and at this time gave that particular comment or response to Officer Ventre? 31 R. at 1255; J.A. at 2761. Combs argues that the trial court's instruction permitted, and the prosecution exploited, Mr. Combs' exercise of his right to consult with counsel as substantive evidence on the ultimate culpability phase issue -- Mr. Combs' intent. Pet'r Br. at 18. 32 In order to decide whether counsel's failure to object to the use of the talk to my lawyer statement was deficient, we must first determine whether the use of this statement was constitutionally defective such that any reasonable counsel would have objected under the circumstances. Although Combs's statement referred not to silence but to his right to an attorney, the admissibility of the statement is properly analyzed as a comment on prearrest silence. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 n.13 (1986) (With respect to post-Miranda warnings'silence,' we point out that silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.). Combs's statement is best understood as communicating a desire to remain silent outside the presence of an attorney. 33 Combs grounds his argument about the admissibility of the statement in the Supreme Court's decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). In Doyle, the petitioner took the stand at his trial for selling marijuana and explained, for the first time, that he had been framed. See id. at 612-13. For impeachment purposes, the prosecutor asked the petitioner why he had not told this story immediately after his arrest. See id. at 613. The petitioner was convicted, and he appealed on the ground that cross-examination regarding his post-arrest silence was error. See id. at 615. The Supreme Court held that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 619. The theory underlying Doyle is that while Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. Id. at 618. On this reasoning, the Court concluded that it would be fundamentallyunfair first to induce a defendant to remain silent through Miranda warnings and then to penalize the defendant who relies on those warnings by allowing the defendant's silence to be used to impeach an exculpatory explanation offered at trial. See id. 34 Later cases have restricted Doyle and have reaffirmed that the fundamental unfairness identified by the Court derives from the implicit assurances of the Miranda warnings. In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), the Court held that due process is not violated by the impeachment use of prearrest, pre-Miranda warnings silence, see id. at 238-39. In Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982), the Court held that impeachment use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda warnings silence does not offend due process, see id. at 607. The Weir Court explained that Doyle was a case in which the government had actually induced silence with Miranda warnings, and it noted that any broadening of Doyle to a situation in which a defendant had not yet received Miranda warnings -- even if the defendant was in custody -- was unsupported by the reasoning of Doyle. See id. at 605-06. 35 In the instant case, Combs had not received Miranda warnings prior to his talk to my lawyer statement. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that this was of no significance based on the following reasoning: 36 [A]t the point when Combs was placed in the ambulance, we find that Combs was in custody and had a right to remain silent, consult a lawyer, and receive a Miranda warning. When he arrived at the scene, Officer Ventre personally took the shotgun from Combs; there were two women dead from shotgun blasts in the adjacent car; and Ventre had been at the scene for some ten to fifteen minutes. Ventre's questioning, without a Miranda warning, violated those rights. 37 Combs, 581 N.E.2d at 1075-76. However, even if Combs should have received Miranda warnings prior to his talk to my lawyer statement, the Doyle rationale is still inapplicable. As we have explained, the Doyle line of cases clearly rests on the theory that Miranda warnings themselves carry an implicit assurance that silence will not be penalized; actual receipt of the warnings is key. Therefore, the comment on Combs's pre-Miranda silence did not violate due process. 38 This does not, however, rule out the possibility that such comment is a violation of Combs's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 7 . In Jenkins, in addition to ruling that impeachment use of a defendant's prearrest silence is not violative of due process, the Court also held that such use does not offend the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238. The petitioner in that case took the stand at his murder trial and testified that he had killed in self-defense. See id. at 232. During cross-examination and again during closing arguments, the prosecutor, referring to the fact that the petitioner had waited two weeks to report the stabbing, attempted to impeach the petitioner's credibility by implying that he would have come forward earlier if he had truly killed in self-defense. See id. at 233-34. The Supreme Court easily disposed of the petitioner's Fifth Amendment objection to this use of his prearrest silence, relying on its 1926 decision in Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926). Raffel held that the government may impeach a defendant who takes the stand in his own defense with his prior silence without violating the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 499. The Court in Raffel relied on a waiver theory, reasoning that a defendant waives hisFifth Amendment immunity from giving testimony by offering himself as a witness. See id. at 496-97. The Raffel Court concluded by explaining: 39 The safeguards against self-incrimination are for the benefit of those who do not wish to become witnesses in their own behalf and not for those who do. There is a sound policy in requiring the accused who offers himself as a witness to do so without reservation, as does any other witness. We can discern nothing in the policy of the law against self-incrimination which would require the extension of immunity to any trial or to any tribunal other than that in which the defendant preserves it by refusing to testify. 40 Id. at 499. The Jenkins Court therefore reasoned that the rule of Raffel permits impeachment use of prearrest silence. 41 The Jenkins Court went on to explain that permitting the impeachment use of a defendant's prior silence does not unconstitutionally burden the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236-38. The Court noted that the 'threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.' Id. at 236 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973)). Relying on prior decisions, the Jenkins Court reasoned that the possibility of impeachment by prior silence does not impermissibly burden the privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 236-38. These prior decisions suggested that a defendant's real dilemma lies in determining whether to testify or not; once a defendant has voluntarily taken the stand, the rule that he must testify fully does not significantly add to this dilemma and is indeed a defendant's obligation, as the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Id. at 238 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)). The Court then explained that [i]n determining whether a constitutional right has been burdened impermissibly, it also is appropriate to consider the legitimacy of the challenged governmental practice. Id. at 238. The Court reasoned that the impeachment use of prearrest silence enhance[s] the reliability of the criminal process by giving prosecutors the chance to test a defendant's credibility by asking him to explain prior inconsistencies. Id. Once a defendant decides to testify, '[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination.' Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)) (alteration in original). 42 Jenkins did not, however, address the question at issue in this case, namely, whether the use of prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 236 n.2 (leaving this question unresolved). That use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt is significantly different than the use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility on the stand is clear. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's [refusal to testify at trial] or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. The Court reasoned that a contrary rule would allow the state to submit as substantive proof of the defendant's guilt his silence by not testifying. See id. at 613 (No formal offer of proof is made as in other situations; but the prosecutor's comment and the court's acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance.). Such proffer of the defendant's refusal to testify as evidence ofguilt would impermissibly penalize the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination and would cut[] down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. Id. at 614. 43 The circuits that have considered whether the government may comment on a defendant's prearrest silence in its case in chief are equally divided. Three circuits have held that such use violates the privilege against self-incrimination found in the Fifth Amendment, relying principally upon Griffin. See United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1987); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997 (1992); cf. United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (Whatever the future impact of Jenkins may be, we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government's direct case.; [W]e are not confident that Jenkins permits even evidence that a suspect remained silent before he was arrested or taken into custody to be used in the Government's case in chief.). In Savory, the Seventh Circuit explained that because the defendant did not take the stand and because the prosecution referred to the defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt, the case did not involve the application of Doyle but rather the application of Griffin. See Savory, 832 F.2d at 1017. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that while Griffin involved governmental use of the defendant's silence at trial, [t]he right to remain silent, unlike the right to counsel, attaches before the institution of formal adversary proceedings. Id. at 1017. The court therefore concluded that Griffin's prohibition on the use of a defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt applies equally to a defendant's silence before trial, and indeed, even before arrest. Id 8 . In Coppola, the First Circuit cited Raffel and Griffin and reasoned that the broad rule of law set forth in those cases is that where a defendant does not testify at trial it is impermissible to refer to any fifth amendment rights that defendant has exercised. Coppola, 878 F.2d at 1567. It therefore held that the prosecution's use of the defendant's prearrest silence in its case in chief violated the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 1568. The Tenth Circuit reached the same result in Burson: The general rule of law is that once a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, it is impermissible for the prosecution to refer to any Fifth Amendment rights which defendant exercised. To be sure, exceptions exist to this rule, such as the use of silence for impeachment in certain circumstances, but such exceptions have no applicability to the case before us. 952 F.2d at 1201 (citation omitted). 44 Three circuits, on the other hand, have reached the opposite conclusion. See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1998). In Rivera, the Eleventh Circuit, citing Jenkins, held that [t]he government may comment on a defendant's silence if it occurred prior to the time that he is arrested and given his Miranda warnings. Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568.Although the defendant raised only a due process challenge to the use of her prearrest silence, the Eleventh Circuit found no constitutional infirmity with the use of that silence in the government's case in chief. See id. The Fifth Circuit in Zanabria held, without citing any cases, that the Fifth Amendment did not protect the defendant's prearrest silence because the silence at issue was not induced by the government. See Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593. The court explained: The fifth amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination but does not, as Zanabria suggests, preclude the proper evidentiary use and prosecutorial comment about every communication or lack thereof by the defendant which may give rise to an incriminating inference. Id. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt does not violate the Fifth Amendment. See Oplinger, 150 F.3d at 1067. The Ninth Circuit, following the reasoning of Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Jenkins, explained that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is irrelevant to a citizen's decision to remain silent when he is under no official compulsion to speak. Id. at 1066. 45 We agree with the reasoning expressed in the opinions of the Seventh, First, and Tenth Circuits, and today we join those circuits in holding that the use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Like those circuits, we believe that application of the privilege is not limited to persons in custody or charged with a crime; it may also be asserted by a suspect who is questioned during the investigation of a crime. Coppola, 878 F.2d at 1565. The Supreme Court has given the privilege against self-incrimination a broad scope, explaining that [i]t can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ([The privilege] must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.); Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87 (To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.). In a prearrest setting as well as in a post-arrest setting, it is clear that a potential defendant's comments could provide damaging evidence that might be used in a criminal prosecution; the privilege should thus apply. 46 Furthermore, we note that even under the reasoning of Justice Stevens in his Jenkins concurrence, the Fifth Amendment would apply to Combs's situation. In Jenkins, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the Fifth Amendment was inapplicable to the petitioner's claim, but Justice Stevens objected to the majority's reliance on the waiver theory of Raffel. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Instead, Justice Stevens would have ruled that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to a precustody context: When a citizen is under no official compulsion whatever, either to speak or to remain silent, I see no reason why his voluntary decision to do one or the other should raise any issue under the Fifth Amendment. For in determining whether the privilege is applicable, the question is whether petitioner was in a position to have his testimony compelled and then asserted his privilege, not simply whether he was silent. Id. at 243-44 (footnote omitted). 47 Even assuming that the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable to precustody contexts, 9 the privilege would still be applicable to Combs, for we agree with the Ohio Supreme Court's finding that Combs was in custody at the time he made the talk to my lawyer statement. In Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994), the Supreme Court explained that [i]n determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but 'the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.' Id. at 322 (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)) (alteration in original). Moreover, in the custody determination, the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. Id. at 324 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)); see also United States v. Ozuna, 170 F.3d 654, 658 (6th Cir. 1999) (Determination of whether an individual is in custody for purposes of applying the Miranda doctrine considers 'how a reasonable man in the [individual's] position would have understood the situation.' (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442) (alteration in original)). Applying that standard to the facts of this case leads to a conclusion that Combs was in custody when Officer Ventre asked him for the second time what had happened. Although Miranda warnings are not required prior to routine questioning when officers have no details concerning what happened when they arrive on the scene, see United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991), the instant case presents a different situation. Ventre personally took the shotgun away from Combs; he testified that he pointed [his] weapon at the subject on the ground and ordered him to drop the shotgun and that he ordered him several times to drop the shotgun and [Combs] started raising the shotgun toward me. R. at 1042; J.A. at 2670 (Ventre Test.). In addition, ten or fifteen minutes passed from the time Ventre arrived on the scene until the second question. In that time, other officers had arrived and Ventre would surely have had some details about the incident. A reasonable person in Combs's situation could have believed that he was under arrest,and we therefore conclude that Combs was in custody. 48 Having decided that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to a prearrest situation, an analysis such as the one employed by the Court in Jenkins leads us to the conclusion that the use of prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt is an impermissible burden upon the exercise of that privilege. First, permitting the use of silence in the government's case in chief would substantially impair the policies behind the privilege. The Supreme Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), explained: 49 [The privilege against self-incrimination] reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to the innocent. 50 Id. at 55 (citations omitted). As the Jenkins Court recognized, when the government uses a defendant's prearrest silence for purposes of impeachment, these policies are largely not implicated; every defendant is already under some pressure to testify fully so that the jury does not draw an unfavorable inference from his silence (or partial silence), and a rule permitting a defendant to be impeached on the stand with prior silence does not add substantially to this pressure. If, on the other hand, prearrest silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt regardless of whether or not the defendant testifies at trial, then the defendant is cast into the very trilemma outlined by the Murphy Court. Because in the case of substantive use a defendant cannot avoid the introduction of his past silence by refusing to testify, the defendant is under substantial pressure to waive the privilege against self-incrimination either upon first contact with police or later at trial in order to explain the prior silence. Perhaps most importantly, use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt substantially impairs the sense of fair play underlying the privilege. Unlike in the case of impeachment use, the use of a defendant's prior silence as substantive evidence of guilt actually lessens the prosecution's burden of proving each element of the crime. 51 We also conclude that the government's use of a defendant's prearrest silence in its case in chief is not a legitimate governmental practice. Unlike the use of silence for impeachment purposes, the use of silence as substantive evidence of guilt does not enhance the reliability of the criminal process. Just as every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous, Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617, there are many reasons why a defendant may remain silent before arrest, such as a knowledge of his Miranda rights or a fear that his story may not be believed. The probative value of such silence is therefore minimal. Furthermore, the use of prearrest silence may even subvert the truthfinding process; because it pressures the defendant to explain himself or to suffer a court-sanctioned inference of guilt, the likelihood of perjury is increased. In sum, permitting the use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt would greatly undermine the policies behind the privilegeagainst self-incrimination while adding virtually nothing to the reliability of the criminal process. 52 In the instant case, Combs clearly invoked the privilege against self-incrimination by telling the officer to talk to his lawyer, thus conveying his desire to remain silent without a lawyer present. Combs never waived this privilege and did not testify at his trial. Therefore, the prosecutor's comment on Combs's prearrest silence in its case in chief and the trial court's instruction permitting the jury to use Combs's silence as substantive evidence of guilt violated Combs's Fifth Amendment rights. 53 Defense counsel's failure to object to the unconstitutional use of Combs's talk to my lawyer statement clearly fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Although the contours of the privilege against self-incrimination may sometimes be unclear, that a defendant's silence cannot be used as substantive evidence against him at trial is a fundamental aspect of the privilege. Combs's counsel should have realized that the use of Combs's prearrest silence against him was at least constitutionally suspect 10 and should have lodged an objection on that basis. Counsel's failure to have objected at any point is inexplicable, and we can perceive no possible strategic reason for such failure 11 . Not only did the failure to object ensure that the jury could use Combs's protected silence against him, but it also guaranteed that both the admission of the statement and the trial court's instruction would be analyzed on review only for plain error. Counsel's performance with respect to this issue was constitutionally deficient under the Strickland standard. 54 Even if Combs's counsel failed to realize that use of the talk to my lawyer statement as substantive evidence of guilt might be unconstitutional, counsel still should have objected to the statement on evidentiary grounds. Ohio Rule of Evidence 401 provides the definition of relevant evidence: 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Ohio R. Evid. 401. Rule 403 provides: 55 (A) Exclusion mandatory. 56 Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury. 57 (B) Exclusion discretionary. 58 Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 59 Ohio R. Evid. 403. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the comments regarding the talk to my lawyer statement were improper under these rules, stating: 60 Additionally, the talk to my lawyer evidence does not relate to or tend to prove prior calculation and design or purposefulness. Combs' comment simply meant that he was exercising his right to counsel and nothing more.Even if this remark was initially admissible, Evid.R. 401 and 403 would otherwise invite exclusion from evidence. No justification is apparent for the instruction that the evidence related to either purposefulness or prior calculation and design. Thus, we conclude the trial court erred in allowing this remark into evidence and in instructing the jury to consider the remark in relation to purposefulness and prior calculation and design. 61 Combs, 581 N.E.2d at 1076. 62 A reasonable defense attorney would have known that the admission of the talk to my lawyer statement was prejudicial to the client and would have objected on the basis of Rule 403. Such an objection would have had at least a likelihood of success, given the Ohio Supreme Court's pronouncement on this issue. A Rule 403 objection to Officer Ventre's testimony could have prevented the erroneous instruction as well as the damaging use of the statement by the prosecution. 63 3. Defense Counsel's Presentation of Dr. Fisher's Testimony 64 Combs next alleges ineffectiveness as a result of counsel's preparation of and strategy with regard to Dr. Fisher, the defense's only expert witness. Dr. Fisher testified at the culpability phase regarding Combs's drug and alcohol abuse and his intoxication on the day of the events; on cross-examination, Dr. Fisher expressed the opinion that, although intoxicated, Combs acted purposefully and intentionally. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's question, but the objection was overruled. The exchange on cross proceeded as follows: 65 Q. Dr. Fisher, you have rendered an opinion that at the time, July 15th, the defendant was under the influence, is that correct? 66 A. That's my opinion, yes. 67 Q. You are not however saying that the acts he did on that particular day were not done purposely? 68 MR. STIDHAM: Objection. 69 THE COURT: Overruled. 70 A. I certainly am not, no. 71 Q. So he may have been under the influence or your opinion based on what you were told he was under the influence but at the same time he was acting intentionally and purposely when he acted as he did on July 15th; is that correct? 72 MR. STIDHAM: Objection. 73 THE COURT: Overruled. 74 A. I certainly believe that he was, yes. 75 R. at 1183; J.A. at 2586 (Fisher Test.). 76 On redirect, defense counsel again attempted to show that intoxication has an effect on one's ability to make judgments. Defense counsel elicited Dr. Fisher's testimony that it would be my conclusion psychologically that [Combs's] judgment was impaired by what was happening to him and what he was ingesting. R. at 1187; J.A. at 2590 (Fisher Test.). On re-cross, however, Dr. Fisher gave the same testimony regarding intent: 77 Q. But, Doctor, was it so impaired that he could not -- wasn't so impaired that he could not form this intent? 78 A. That is correct, yes. 79 R. at 1188; J.A. at 2591 (Fisher Test.). The prosecutor then emphasized Dr. Fisher's testimony regarding intent three times in closing arguments 12 . Combs arguesthat counsel's failure to anticipate, suppress, prepare for, object to, or avoid repetition of this damaging testimony rendered his performance constitutionally deficient. 80 Although Combs's counsel's decision to present Dr. Fisher's testimony may be considered a strategic one, it was a decision made without undertaking a full investigation. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 ([C]counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir. 1991) ([O]ur case law rejects the notion that a'strategic' decision can be reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 952 (1992). At trial, Dr. Fisher did present several aspects of Combs's history that were psychologically relevant, such as Combs's state of despondency, his difficult past, his history of severe drug and alcohol abuse, and his stormy relationship with Peggy Schoonover. R. at 1176-78; J.A. at 2579-81 (Fisher Test.). Additionally, Fisher supported the contention that Combs was under the influence when he shot the victims. However, Stidham testified that defense counsel put Fisher on the stand in an effort to establish that Combs could not act purposely and intentionally because of his diminished capacity, and Stidham admitted that he was surprised when Fisher testified to the opposite. J.A. at 2920 (Stidham Dep.). Fisher's opinion regarding whether Combs lacked the requisite intent to commit the crimes was crucial to the defense theory; defense counsel's failure to have questioned Fisher in this regard prior to trial is inexcusable. Defense counsel should have known Fisher's opinion on this ultimate issue and should have prepared accordingly. 81 Regardless of whether Combs's counsel should have known or instead actually knew Fisher's opinion regarding Combs's intent, however, counsel's decision to put him on the stand was objectively unreasonable. In Ohio, evidence of voluntary intoxication may be considered in determining whether an act was done intentionally or with deliberation or premeditation. Ohio v. Fox, 428 N.E.2d 410, 412 (Ohio 1981). Thus, establishing that a defendant was intoxicated when he committed the crime in question is not, in and of itself, helpful; the evidence must also lead the factfinder to an inference that intoxication deprived the defendant of the ability to form intent. Indeed, Stidham testified that the defense presented Fisher in order to establish that Combs could not have been acting purposefully. Fisher's testimony directly contradicted the sole defense theory that Combs lacked the requisite intent to commit murder. Although defense counsel presented substantial testimonial evidence that Combs was in fact intoxicated at the time of the shootings, this testimony was rendered worthless when the defense's own expert testified that Combs's intoxication did not legally excuse his crime. Furthermore, not only did Fisher's testimony destroy any hope of a successful intoxication defense, but it also helped the prosecution to establish one of the elements of its case in chief. Quite simply, this testimony was completely devastating to the defense, and counsel's decision to present it was objectively unreasonable. 82 4. Defense Counsel's Overall Performance at the Culpability Phase 83 We next proceed to assess defense counsel's overall performance throughout the culpability phase of Combs's trial. We acknowledge that defense counsel presented significant evidence that Combs was intoxicated on the day of the shootings. However, the errors that we have identified are fundamental errors that were severely damaging to Combs's defense. In fact, we believe that each of the errors thatwe have identified is independently sufficient to warrant a conclusion that Combs's counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. However, these errors were compounded by other failures on the part of defense counsel. 84 For example, Combs's counsel failed to investigate and to present available physical evidence of Combs's intoxication on the day of the shootings. Combs argues that, had defense counsel investigated this matter, they would have found out from his mother that when [she] got the car back [from the police after their investigation] there were wine cooler bottles, and beer cans in the car and that [a] cooler in the back still contained two beers. J.A. at 1304 (Aff. of Geraldine Combs). At trial, Officer Zompero, who is a police criminalist, testified that he had conducted a search of Combs's car, but had not found any kind of container that would be used to hold alcohol such as a beer can, wine cooler can, or whiskey bottle. R. at 1081; J.A. at 2700 (Zompero Test.). Investigating the presence of alcohol containers in the car would have enabled defense counsel to present some corroborating physical evidence of Combs's intoxication, 13 and would also have enabled counsel to respond to Zompero's allegedly inaccurate testimony. 85 Additionally, Combs's counsel made no attempt to redact portions of a videotaped testimony that may have been prejudicial to Combs. At trial, the videotaped testimony of Tony Liming, who was then fifteen years old, was presented by the prosecution 14 . Liming was with Combs when he obtained a gun on the day of the shootings; he also testified as to Combs's use of drugs and alcohol on a regular basis and on the day in question. At one point, Stidham asked Liming what his feelings toward Combs were. Liming answered: He is, I guess I liked him, I mean I liked him. He like did stuff, stole stuff from my mom and I didn't like that. R. at 944; J.A. at 2631 (Tony Liming Test.). Combs argues that counsel should have sought to have this highly prejudicial 'other acts' evidence redacted prior to trial pursuant to Ohio Rule of Evidence 404(B), 15 and we agree. The statement is likely excludable under Rule 404(B); it does not go to any permissible purpose, and it might tend to leave the jury with an overall bad impression of Combs's character. Considering the potential prejudice from the statement, counsel clearly erred by failing to seek redaction. 86 Counsel's overall performance is particularly shocking given the fact that this case involves the death penalty. Strickland instructed that [p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) (The Defense Function), are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. ABA Standard 4-1.2(c) states that [s]ince the death penalty differs from other criminal penalties in its finality, defense counsel in a capital case should respond to thisdifference by making extraordinary efforts on behalf of the accused. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function 120 (3d ed. 1993). 5. Prejudice 87 In order to establish prejudice, Combs need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. He must instead show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt about his guilt 16 . See id. at 695. The defense theory was that Combs's intoxication rendered him unable to act with purpose or prior calculation and design, and yet defense counsel made two crucial errors that substantially undercut this theory. We conclude that each of these errors is sufficiently prejudicial to satisfy the Strickland standard. 88 Presentation of Dr. Fisher's testimony is perhaps the most devastating error. The testimony of the sole defense expert that Combs, although intoxicated, nevertheless acted with purpose and intent was obviously damaging to the defense. Furthermore, Dr. Fisher's testimony provided the State with its most powerful evidence of purpose. R. at 1226-27; J.A. at 2744-45 (State's Closing Argument at Culpability Phase) (naming Dr. Fisher's testimony first in connection with the purpose element). 17 89 Defense counsel's failure to object to the use of Combs's talk to my lawyer statement was similarly damaging. Just as Dr. Fisher's testimony partly relieved the State of its burden of proof on an element of the offense, the State strategically used Combs's protected silence as evidence that Combs was acting rationally, and thus with purpose and prior calculation, after the shootings; the trial court's instruction encouraged the jury to make that inference. 90 Of course, the State presented other evidence of Combs's purpose and prior calculation and design. As the Ohio Supreme Court pointed out: 91 Combs spent a considerable part of the afternoon of the murders searching for a shotgun. He asked two people for a shotgun, and eventually drove over eighty miles before returning to Cincinnati with a shotgun. The evidence indicates he stole the shotgun he used. After he drove back to Cincinnati, he confronted Joan and Peggy and initiated a car chase over several blocks, eventually cornering them at the Holiday Park Tower office building. He deliberately knocked out a window in their car and fired a shotgun into each woman's head at close range. Those facts alone establish both purposefulness and prior calculation and design. 92 Combs, 581 N.E.2d at 1076. 93 However, Combs offered an alternative reason for his search for a gun; rather than spending the afternoon searching for the means to commit two murders, Combs suggested that he was searching for a means to kill himself. There was evidence that Combs was contemplating suicide at the time. One witness testified that Combs sounded suicidal just days before the incident, and another witness testified that just before the shootings, Combs said that he was going to be with his father, who was dead. R. at 1192; J.A. at 2612 (Charles Hogue Test.); R. at 942 (Tony Liming Test.). Combs also argued that the car chase just prior to the shootings was not an effort to hunt the two women down, but rather an effort to talk with Peggy Schoonover afterother channels of communication had been cut off. 94 The two critical errors by defense counsel bolstered the State's case and made Combs's explanation of the events seem less likely. Without Fisher's testimony and without the use of Combs's talk to my lawyer statement, the State's evidence of purpose and prior calculation and design would have been much weaker. We therefore conclude that absent defense counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have concluded that the State did not meet its burden of proving the two contested elements, and thus that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt about Combs's guilt. 95 Federal habeas relief is available to petitioners in state confinement as a result of a proceeding that was rendered fundamentally unfair by a violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See Norris, 146 F.3d at 323 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991)). The Supreme Court has explained that [a]n ineffectiveness claim,... as our articulation of the standards that govern decision of such claims makes clear, is an attack on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is challenged. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Combs has satisfied both prongs of the Strickland test, and in so doing he has demonstrated that his counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. He is therefore entitled to a conditional grant of habeas relief. 18 96