Opinion ID: 2072259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Death Penalty Hearing Arguments

Text: Defendant claims that the prosecutor repeatedly made improper arguments and misstated the law during defendant's sentencing hearing. Defendant asserts, therefore, that this cause should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Defendant first notes several instances where the prosecutor allegedly misstated the law. During the mitigation phase of sentencing, the prosecutor stated that the fact that the defendant has no prior convictions is not mitigating because of the nature and the severity of the crime. Defense counsel's objection to this comment was sustained. The prosecutor then stated that the defendant's work history, his education background, belief in God, helping others in doing good deeds are not mitigating. The trial court again sustained defense counsel's objection, and instructed the jury that those factors are mitigating under the law. In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the closing arguments of both the State and the defendant must be examined in their entirety and the complained-of comments must be placed in their proper context. ( People v. Cisewski (1987), 118 Ill.2d 163, 175-76, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970.) Just prior to stating that the various acts of defendant were not mitigating, the prosecutor stated that the mitigating factors presented by the defense were not sufficiently mitigating to preclude imposition of the death penalty. Additionally, after the trial judge stated that defendant's evidence was mitigating under the law, the prosecutor responded to the jury, I say to you that it is not mitigation sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. The context in which the prosecutor's comments were made shows that by not mitigating, the prosecutor meant not sufficiently mitigating under the circumstances of this case. The comments by the judge and the prosecutor would have made this distinction evident to the jury. Defendant also claims that the prosecutor's statement during rebuttal that if [defendant's] good outweighs the bad that you know about, then you should let him go, was a misstatement of the law. Defense counsel's objection to this statement was overruled. Defendant claims that the good does not have to outweigh the bad, but that the good need only be sufficient to militate against the imposition of death. We agree. We do not, however, believe that this misstatement warrants remanding this cause for a new sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the jury was correctly instructed as to the applicable law. The instructions explained that defendant could be sentenced to death only if the jury could unanimously find that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. We do not believe that, given the instruction provided to the jury prior to its deliberation, the isolated comment by the prosecutor prejudiced defendant. Accordingly, the misstatement of law by the prosecutor was harmless error. Defendant next asserts that the prosecutor improperly implied that defendant would commit violent acts in the future if not put to death. During his final argument, the prosecutor stated that it would be unfair for me to predict that he will set fire to a mattress and kill seven inmates as it would be for them to say he won't. We can't predict the future, so don't you try. [C]ommenting that the defendant may kill while in prison may cause the jury to focus `upon a speculative possibility that may or may not occur,' and that is immaterial to the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. ( People v. Hooper (1989), 133 Ill.2d 469, 500, 142 Ill.Dec. 93, 552 N.E.2d 684, quoting People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill.2d 502, 515, 64 Ill.Dec. 531, 440 N.E.2d 83.) Comments which are invited by opposing counsel, however, are generally appropriate. ( United States v. Young (1985), 470 U.S. 1, 12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1044-45, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11; People v. Howard (1991), 147 Ill.2d 103, 167 Ill.Dec. 914, 588 N.E.2d 1044.) In the present case, the prosecutor's comment was in direct response to an argument made by defense counsel in his closing argument. Defense counsel claimed that defendant's outbreak of violence was an isolated instance brought on by a special set of circumstances which would not occur again. In response to this argument, the prosecutor stated that neither he nor defense counsel should engage in such speculation. We believe that the prosecutor's response was invited by the argument of defense counsel, and therefore, defendant cannot claim that the response was error. Defendant next claims that the State's closing argument served to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility regarding its role in the imposition of the death penalty. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated to the jury that [y]ou must follow the law. And in so doing you are not killing anyone. This comment was in response to defense counsel's plea during his opening statement that the jury not return a verdict which would kill the defendant. Defense counsel was objecting to the label put on a sentence of death. The jury would not be killing defendant in the same manner that defendant killed the victims of the fire; instead, the prosecutor was urging the jury to follow the law. While following the law might ultimately result in defendant's death, labeling the jury's action as killing was inappropriate. Because defense counsel invited the prosecutor's response, that response was not error. Defendant also claims that the State misstated the evidence by arguing that defendant had a relative who would look out for defendant in prison. The prosecutor stated that [defendant] has help. You heard he has relatives over in Division 6 those people are going to look out for him. One of defendant's mitigation witness, Jack Smith, Jr., was defendant's cousin and a correctional officer at the Cook County jail where defendant was held prior to trial. Defendant claims that he would not stay in Cook County jail if sentenced to life imprisonment, and there was no evidence that Smith would look out for him. As we stated earlier, comments of the prosecutor made during closing arguments must be examined in context. ( Cisewski, 118 Ill.2d at 175-76, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970.) The comment regarding defendant's relative was made during the prosecutor's response to defendant's assertion that he had been well-behaved while in jail awaiting trial. The prosecutor stated that defendant's good behavior meant little because defendant knew such behavior would eventually be used as mitigating evidence in a death penalty hearing. The prosecutor then made the statement at issue. The statement referring to defendant's relative was an explanation of defendant's good behavior in prison prior to trial, it was not an attempt to convey the idea that, if sentenced to life imprisonment, defendant would be accorded special treatment. Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor's characterization of defendant as a little weasel was error. Defense counsel's objection to this statement was sustained. Defendant claims that the prejudice he suffered as a result of this statement could not be cured by an objection, and cites People v. Garreau (1963), 27 Ill.2d 388, 189 N.E.2d 287, in support of his contention. In Garreau, [t]he prosecutor referred to the defendant as a pervert, a weasel and a moron; told the jury that the defendant, who raped his mother's friend, would rape a dog and would rape each and every member of the jury   . ( Garreau, 27 Ill.2d at 391, 189 N.E.2d 287.) We believe Garreau is distinguishable from the present case. Here, the prosecutor was discussing defendant's alleged rock throwing incident with Patricia Phiefer. The prosecutor stated that instead of waiting to speak with Phiefer after he had thrown a rock through her window, the little weasel ran away. While this type of name calling is inappropriate, we believe that any prejudice to defendant was cured when the trial court sustained defendant's objection. People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill.2d 78, 100, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743.