Opinion ID: 3044975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Forcible Assault Instruction

Text: Appellant next takes issue with the District Court’s decision not to include a definition of forcible assault in the jury charge. Because Appellant did not object to the instruction before the jury retired to deliberate, we review the District Court’s jury charge for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d); see also United States v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033, 1048 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that failure to make a specific objection to a jury instruction before the jury retires subjects the appellant’s argument to plain error review). Under plain error review, reversal will be granted “only in exceptional cases where the error is so fundamental as to result in the miscarriage of justice.” Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1294 (internal quotation marks omitted). Failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of the offense charged does not constitute reversible error if the failure to instruct is harmless. United States v. Gomez, 580 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2009). “The failure to instruct a jury on an essential element of an offense is harmless when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). instruction. DE 60:242. He cannot now claim he was denied an instruction that he expressly refused. 14 Case: 12-13809 Date Filed: 01/16/2014 Page: 15 of 25 Here, Appellant contends that the District Court’s decision not to include the definition of forcible assault found in the Eleventh Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instructions constitutes reversible error. Consistent with the Pattern Instructions, we have concluded that forcible assault includes any willful threat or attempt to inflict bodily injury upon the person of another when coupled with an apparent present ability to do so. Fallen, 256 F.3d at 1087; see supra note 3. This is not, of course, the only species of forcible assault. E.g., Martinez, 486 F.3d at 1246 (holding an assault with physical contact constitutes forcible assault). The Pattern Instructions act only as a guide for judges when fashioning a jury charge. They do not constitute precedent and “cannot foreclose the construction of the necessary elements of a crime as stated in the statute.” Ettinger, 344 F.3d at 1158. Given the facts of this case, providing the definition of forcible assault in the Pattern Instruction was not required. The pattern definition for forcible assault almost entirely concerns attempts or threats. Because this case did not involve attempts or threats, it would not be of much use to a jury. Indeed, its inclusion may have likely bred confusion. The intent requirement was the only language in the pattern definition pertinent to this case—language that was included as an additional element in the jury charge. See supra note 6; United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1395 (11th Cir. 1984) (“A district judge is vested with broad discretion in formulating his charge to the jury so long as it accurately 15 Case: 12-13809 Date Filed: 01/16/2014 Page: 16 of 25 reflects the law and the facts.”). Because this case did not involve threats or attempts, but did involve an intentional act and bodily injury, as the jury was so instructed, the District Court’s decision not to include the Pattern Instructions’ definition of forcible assault was not plain error. Silverman, 745 F.2d. at 1395-96 (“The charge must define the offense charged and its elements to enable the jury to apply the law of the case to the facts.”). The instructions in the jury charge, “taken together, accurately express[ed] the law applicable to the case without confusing or prejudicing the jury . . . .” United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996). 10