Opinion ID: 4522726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Brady / Giglio Challenge

Text: Siri-Reynoso’s last challenge does not fare any better. Siri-Reynoso argues that the Government’s inadvertent failure to produce a letter from Miguel Carela (“Carela”), a cooperating witness and a member of the Trinitarios, to a prosecutor unassociated with the instant case violated Siri-Reynoso’s due process rights under Brady and Giglio. Siri-Reynoso contends that, as a result of the violation of the Government’s obligation to disclose exculpatory material and impeaching evidence, he is entitled to a new trial. To establish a claim based on a violation of these constitutional obligations, “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (citation omitted). “Under Brady and Giglio, the government’s failure to disclose favorable information will result in an order of retrial if the undisclosed information is ‘material,’ within the exacting standard of materiality established by the governing case law.” United States v. Spinelli, 551 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2008). “[S]uch undisclosed information is deemed material so as to justify a retrial only ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34 (1995)). In reviewing Siri-Reynoso’s challenge, we conduct “an independent examination of the record to determine whether Brady has been violated in a nondisclosure claim” and “of a district 5 court’s determination of materiality, which is a mixed question of fact and law.” United States v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 320 (2d Cir. 1997). On review, we conclude that Siri-Reynoso is not entitled to a new trial in the circumstances presented here. With the agreement of Siri-Reynoso’s counsel at trial, the District Court substantially mitigated the risk of any ensuing prejudice by authorizing Carela’s letter, whose primary value consisted of impeaching Carela’s credibility, to be introduced into the record. The District Court also permitted defense counsel to give an additional summation. As a result, the jury had an opportunity to examine the evidence with the benefit of defense counsel’s summation. Relatedly, Carela’s credibility had little, if anything, to do with the jury’s verdict on the first four counts of the indictment, the only counts on which Siri-Reynoso was convicted. In fact, the jury acquitted Siri-Reynoso of the charge in Count Six (i.e., using, carrying, and possessing a firearm, which was discharged, in connection with an attempted murder in aid of racketeering), which was the primary focus of Carela’s testimony. Nor does Siri-Reynoso reasonably assert that this is a situation where the pertinent material, Carela’s letter, “could have led to specific exculpatory information only if the defense undertook further investigation.” Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 2001). If anything, Carela’s letter allowed Siri-Reynoso to bolster his efforts in impeaching the credibility of Carela to the point of successfully obtaining an acquittal on Count Six. In sum, there was “no [reasonable] probability that the government’s late disclosure of the evidence resulted in a different outcome in [Siri-Reynoso’s] case.” United States v. Rittweger, 524 F.3d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[U]ndisclosed impeachment evidence is not material in the Brady sense when, although ‘possibly useful to the defense,’ it is ‘not likely to have changed the verdict.’” (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154)). Accordingly, Siri-Reynoso is not entitled to a new trial and his challenge thus fails.