Opinion ID: 2747913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence and the Post-

Text: Verdict Motion for Judgment of Acquittal22 Franz’s final set of arguments focus on the District Court’s denial of his post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 22 “We review de novo an appeal of a district court’s ruling on a ‘Rule 29 motion [for judgment of acquittal] and independently appl[y] the same standard as the District Court.’” United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 343 (3d Cir. 2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006)). “‘A Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal obliges a district court to review the record in the light more favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available evidence.’” Id. (quoting Bobb, 471 F.3d at 494). “Furthermore, ‘we review the evidence as a whole, not in isolation … .’” United States v. CaraballoRodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010)) (discussing the standard for reviewing a post-verdict grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal). Thus, “‘[t]he question is whether all the pieces of evidence against the defendant, taken together, make a strong enough case to let a jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 432 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977)). “The evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cooper, 567 F.2d at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted). 37 Procedure. He contends that the government failed to establish three elements regarding the receipt charge: a jurisdictional nexus, mens rea, and the sexually explicit nature of the digital image.
Section 2252 of the criminal code prohibits the knowing receipt of child pornography that has been transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).23 Transportation in interstate or foreign 23 Section 2252(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
… “(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, … if – (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; … 38 commerce – an essential element of the offense – provides the “jurisdictional nexus” that allows Congress to criminalize the conduct. United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2006). Downloading images from the internet satisfies that element. Id. at 246 (“[T]he government is not required to prove that the child pornography images crossed state lines before being downloaded and received by the defendant, but rather only must prove that the images were downloaded from the Internet, which is properly regulated by Congress as a channel and instrumentality of interstate commerce … .”). Franz argues that judgment of acquittal should have been granted because the government presented no evidence that the 202.jpg image was downloaded from the internet. He argues that the image instead “could have come from any external source (thumb drive, [compact disc], or other external media).” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 47.) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational juror could certainly conclude that the government had proven the jurisdictional element beyond a reasonable doubt. Price, the government’s computer forensics expert, testified that someone using Franz’s computer viewed the image on a website and that, on June 9, 2008, someone viewed the image in a folder called “Downloads,” located on his hard drive. Price further testified that, on December 24, 2008, the image was stored to shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a). 39 a folder named “Internet Downloads 14” on Franz’s external hard drive. Although not direct proof of the actual download itself, Price’s testimony presents circumstantial evidence sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that the image was in fact downloaded from the internet. See CaraballoRodriguez, 726 F.3d at 425 (“Circumstantial inferences drawn from the evidence must bear a ‘logical or convincing connection to established fact.’” (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 291 (3d Cir. 2004))); cf. United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 67-69 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding sufficient evidence of knowing receipt existed despite the lack of any direct, forensic evidence that images had been downloaded on the defendant’s computer or that defendant had ever visited child pornography websites). And if that evidence were not enough, the government presented testimony from an investigator establishing that the image in question was a photograph taken in Connecticut. If we accept Franz’s alternative theory as true – that the image was placed on the external hard drive from a thumb drive or compact disc and never downloaded from the internet – the image would still have had to get to Pennsylvania from Connecticut. A rational juror thus could have inferred that Franz received a “visual depiction … that ha[d] been mailed, or ha[d] been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or which contain[ed] materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). Either way, the District Court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on the jurisdictional element of the receipt charge. 40
Franz also challenges the element of knowing receipt. In United States v. Miller, we identified a number of factors relevant to the inquiry of whether receipt of child pornography was accomplished knowingly:
defendant’s computer; (2) the number of images of child pornography that were found … ; (3) whether the content of the images was evident from their file names … [;] (4) defendant’s knowledge of and ability to access the storage area for the images … [; and (5)] the number of occasions that the images were copied [or downloaded]. 527 F.3d at 67, 69 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Applying those factors, Franz argues that the evidence was not sufficient to allow a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that his receipt of the 202.jpg image was “knowing.”24 We disagree. 24 Franz also argues that the government was required to prove the specific date on which he received the image. We reject that argument. He relies on an unpublished district court case that states, without citation to authority, that when receipt of child pornography is alleged, “the government [is] obliged to prove that the material traveled in interstate commerce, and also the date of receipt.” United States v. MacEwan, No. CRIM.A.04-262, 2004 WL 3019316, at  n.1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006). Proof of the specific date of receipt 41 Two images were found on Franz’s computer. The number is admittedly small, and he may not have known the content of the images from file names alone. But Price testified that someone viewed the 202.jpg image on the internet and again in Franz’s download folder and then saved it to his external hard drive. That chain of events strongly suggests that whoever received the image did so knowingly. Cf. United States v. Brown, 862 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that evidence of ordering child pornography is circumstantial evidence of knowing receipt of child pornography). Price further testified that Franz’s computer had one user-created profile, that Franz lived alone, and that the image was viewed on the computer when the user was logged in as Franz. Finally, Price testified that the folder “Internet Downloads 14” – which was stored on the root drive of the external hard drive and would have been visible to would doubtless strengthen the overall evidentiary picture for purposes of establishing the defendant’s mens rea. But when Congress has not identified time as an essential element of an offense, “proof of the acts charged on any date within the statute of limitations and before the return date of the indictment is sufficient to support a conviction.” United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 745 (3d Cir. 1974) (addressing variances between indictment and proof). Furthermore, “[b]y the use of the qualifying phrase ‘on or about’, the grand jury indicates its unwillingness to pinpoint the date of the offense charged.” Id. Here, the indictment charged Franz with knowing receipt “[o]n or about June 9, 2008.” (App. at 44.) Price testified that someone using Franz’s computer viewed the image on a website, and then on June 9, 2008, someone viewed the same image on Franz’s computer in a folder titled “Downloads.” That is enough. 42 anyone who used that device – was not created or named by default; rather, someone created and named the file folder. Thus, three of the five Miller factors (the first, fourth, and fifth) point to Franz knowingly receiving the image in question. Because a rational juror could conclude, based on that evidence, that Franz knowingly received the image, his Rule 29 challenge fails. Viewing the evidence as a whole, a rational jury could – and did – conclude that Franz knowingly received the image at issue.
Finally, Franz challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that the 202.jpg image was child pornography. That picture is of a nine- to eleven-year-old girl, fully nude, sitting on a bed, with her legs spread and her genitals exposed. The minor’s head, arms, and legs are cropped from the picture. To be guilty of knowing receipt of child pornography, the visual depiction must be “of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A), (B). The statute defines “sexually explicit conduct” as including “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.” Id. § 2256(2)(A)(v). In determining whether a visual depiction involves “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area,” we have adopted what have come to be called the Dost factors: “1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child’s genitalia or pubic area; 2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place 43 or pose generally associated with sexual activity; 3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; 5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; 6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.” United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987) and aff’d, 813 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1987)). The sixth factor is not “a separate substantive inquiry about the photographs.” Id. at 125. Rather, it is simply “useful as another way of inquiring into whether any of the other five Dost factors are met.” Id. Furthermore, “the Dost factors are not dispositive and serve only as a guide.” United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 746 n.10 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The analysis is qualitative and no single factor is dispositive.”). “In addition to the considerations detailed in Dost, we are guided by Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines ‘lascivious exhibition’ as a depiction which displays or brings forth to view in order to attract notice to the genitals and pubic area of children, in order to excite lustfulness or sexual s[t]imulation in the viewer.” Larkin, 629 F.3d at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We may also consider any other relevant factors given the particularities of the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 44 According to Franz, “the setting of the visual depiction is not alone sexually suggestive, although the background is in a bed room” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 54); the minor is not inappropriately attired considering the age of the child; the nature of the pose cannot be determined from the image because the child’s head, arms, and legs are cropped from the picture; “absent any expression, look, or even gesture the depiction can suggest nothing at all,” let alone sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 15); and the picture is not intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. His arguments are wholly unpersuasive. This is no mere baby-in-the-bathtub picture. Common sense and consideration of the Dost factors are enough to lead to the conclusion that the picture shows a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. First, the focal point of the image is the child’s genitals. Second, the image depicts a child in a bedroom, sitting on a bed, thus placing the image in a sexually suggestive setting. Villard, 885 F.2d at 124 (identifying a bed or mattress as a place commonly associated with sexual activity, though that alone is not enough to establish lasciviousness). Third, the child’s legs are spread and her genitals exposed, thus depicting a pose often associated with sexual activity. See Knox, 32 F.3d at 747 (concluding that pictures exhibited sexually explicit conduct when, among other things, the minors “were shown specifically spreading or extending their legs to make their genital and pubic region entirely visible to the viewer”). Fourth, although it is true the child is not wearing any sexually suggestive clothing, that is because she is wearing 45 nothing at all.25 Fifth, sitting on a bed nude with legs spread can be understood as suggesting a willingness to engage in sexual activity. Cf. United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that a girl’s posture did not demonstrate a willingness to engage in sexual activity because, among other facts, “her legs are not widespread”). Sixth, all of the facts addressed above suggest that the image was intended to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.26 25 Franz argues that the image is protected speech – rather than child pornography – because it is a “‘depiction[] of nudity, without more.’” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 16 (alteration in original) (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990)); see also Appellant’s Opening Br. at 54.) As our discussion of the Dost factors indicates, the image is not simply a “depiction[] of nudity, without more.” Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112. 26 Franz claims that the depiction in this case is similar to the one at issue in United States v. Amirault, in which the First Circuit concluded that a photograph was not sexually explicit because, even though it depicted a minor’s genitals, “there is no zooming in on the genitals and the focus is not on the genital area.” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 54.) Franz’s attempt to align his case with Amirault is unavailing. Amirault addressed whether “a photograph of a young naked female, probably a teenager, standing or kneeling in a hole on a beach” depicted “sexually explicit conduct.” 173 F.3d at 30. Applying the Dost factors, the First Circuit concluded that the photograph did not depict sexually explicit conduct. Id. at 33. The court thrice noted the fact that the girl’s legs were not widespread – as it discussed the focus of the photograph, the girl’s pose, and whether the girl’s expression or posture demonstrated a willingness to engage in sexual 46 The nature of the 202.jpg image is certainly such that a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the image depicted “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area,” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v), and thus satisfied the requirement that the image depict “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” id. § 2252(a)(2)(A), (B).