Opinion ID: 2622582
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Horseplay

Text: In general, if an employer condones what courts have described as horseplay among its employees, an employee who engages in it is within the scope of employment under section 3601, subdivision (a), and is thus immune from suit, unless exceptions apply. ( Oliva v. Heath (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 926, 933, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 613; but see Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 286, 294, 158 P.2d 9 [holding a nonparticipating employee's injury from a coemployee's horseplay is compensable under § 3600].) Although horseplay in the workplace is characterized by a lack of animosity, it may be committed under circumstances involving an obvious and significant risk of injury. (See, e.g., Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 26 Cal.2d 286, 158 P.2d 9 [busboys throwing hard rolls at each other and striking another employee]; Oliva v. Heath, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 933, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 [employees lowering coemployee's chair as a prank]; Hodges v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 894, 898-899, 147 Cal. Rptr. 546 [employees' friendly sparring match]; Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp.App. Bd. (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 669, 672, 55 Cal.Rptr. 810 [ranch employees chasing each other around bunkhouse].) Thus, by defining willful and unprovoked physical act of aggression in terms of an intent to injure element, the Legislature has ensured that section 3601, subdivision (a)(1)'s reach would not extend to acts traditionally viewed as horseplay that are otherwise subject to exclusive coverage under the workers' compensation system. Given the the propensities and tendencies of mankind and the ordinary habits of life, it must be admitted that wherever human beings congregate, either at work or at play, there is some frolicking and horseplay. ( Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 294, 158 P.2d 9.) We doubt the Legislature intended to permit employees to sue each other based on conduct arguably inherent in the workplace. Indeed, that result would be inconsistent with section 3601's aim to severely limit[ ] a preexisting right to freely sue a fellow employee for damages. ( Miner v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal. App.3d at p. 600, 106 Cal.Rptr. 416.) At oral argument, however, plaintiffs asserted that the horseplay doctrine is irrelevant in this case. They emphasized that jurors understand the distinction between horseplay and aggression, and that imposing an intent to injure requirement is unwarranted and unnecessary. To that end, they argued that the exception requires only a hostile intent, which they did not clearly define, to commit a physical act of aggression. We are unpersuaded. Because horseplay is characterized by a lack of animosity ( Mathews, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 726, 100 Cal.Rptr. 301, 493 P.2d 1165), jurors, in distinguishing between horseplay and aggression, must still consider the presence of any [b]itter hostility or open enmity . . . [or] active hatred. (American Heritage Diet., supra, at p. 52 [defining animosity].) Moreover, as discussed, the term aggression also suggests intentional harmful conduct. (See ante, 111 Cal. Rptr.2d p. 570, 30 P.3d p. 62.) Although plaintiffs underscore that the phrase intent to injure is not contained in the exception, they fail to discern the full import of the phrase willful and unprovoked physical act of aggression. (§ 3601, subd. (a)(1).) Finally, plaintiffs fail to show how a hostile intent to commit a physical act of aggression has any practical difference from an intent to injure in this context.