Opinion ID: 2576303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Recognition of Common Law De Facto Parentage

Text: ¶ 31 Persuasive Authority for De facto Parents: In recent years, numerous other jurisdictions have faced issues similar to those presented here, often in the face of a statutory scheme which failed to contemplate the scenario presented. As this remains a case of first impression in this state, a review of decisions of other jurisdictions is instructive. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Pierce County, 148 Wash.2d 760, 770, 64 P.3d 618 (2003). ¶ 32 In 1995, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was presented with a situation factually analogous to the one presented here. See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 193 Wis.2d at 659-63, 533 N.W.2d 419. In that case, two women shared a close, committed relationship for more than ten years and jointly decided to raise a child. Id. at 659-60, 533 N.W.2d 419. One partner was artificially inseminated with sperm from an anonymous donor, became pregnant, and in December 1988 a child was born. Id. at 660, 533 N.W.2d 419. The women gave the child names honoring the families of both partners, held themselves out to the public as a family unit, and actively coparented the child until their relationship ended in 1993. Id. at 660-61, 533 N.W.2d 419. Three months after the parties separated, the biological mother terminated her former partner's relationship with the child and filed a restraining order seeking to prohibit all contact. Id. at 661, 533 N.W.2d 419. In response, the biological mother's former partner filed a petition for visitation and custody. Id. ¶ 33 The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that under the Wisconsin statutory scheme, the biological mother's former female partner lacked standing to petition for custody or visitation. Id. at 657-58, 533 N.W.2d 419. The relevant custody statute, Wisconsin Statute § 767.24 (1991-1992), provided that a nonparent may petition for custody only if a parent is `unfit or unable to care for the child' or other compelling reasons exist. H.S.H.-K., 193 Wis.2d at 664, 533 N.W.2d 419 (quoting In re Interest of Z.J.H., 162 Wis.2d 1002, 1009, 471 N.W.2d 202 (1991)). The former partner was unable to meet this standard and thus lacked standing. Id. at 665-66, 533 N.W.2d 419. In addition, the court rejected the former partner's statutory visitation claim because the court determined that the legislature enacted the ch. 767 visitation statute with the dissolution of marriage in mind. Id. at 667, 533 N.W.2d 419. Because the parties' dispute did not arise in the context of dissolution of a marriage, a legal impossibility because of their lesbian relationship, statutory visitation was unavailable. ¶ 34 In spite of this determination, the court held that the legislature had not intended to preempt the equitable power of the court in domestic matters so as to preclude a remedy outside of the statutory scheme. Id. It then examined the history of that state's visitation law and the relevant legislative enactments to discern whether the statutory scheme was intended as the exclusive means of obtaining visitation rights and concluded that [i]t is reasonable to infer that the legislature did not intend the visitation statutes to bar the courts from exercising their equitable power to order visitation in circumstances not included within the statutes but in conformity with the policy directions set forth in the statutes. Id. at 682-83, 693, 533 N.W.2d 419. The court thus concluded that courts have equitable power to hear a visitation petition if it finds that the nonparent has a parent-like relationship with the child and that a significant triggering event justifies state intervention. Id. at 694, 533 N.W.2d 419 (requiring, as a threshold matter, that the legal parent substantially interfere with the petitioner's parent-like relationship and then setting forth the four-part test adopted by our Court of Appeals below). ¶ 35 Again, with facts substantially identical to those present here, in 1999, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized the viability of the common law de facto parent doctrine. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 828-30, 711 N.E.2d 886, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed.2d 386 (1999). There, the former partner of the biological mother sought temporary visitation with the child she had parented from birth until the child was over three years old. Id. at 825-26, 711 N.E.2d 886. The court held that the equity jurisdiction of the probate and family court governed resolution of the issue in spite of a lack of statutory authority. Id. at 827, 711 N.E.2d 886. It then concluded that the the best interests of the child require . . . the child's de facto parent[] be allowed . . . visitation with the child. Id. at 832, 711 N.E.2d 886. The court found significant the fact that the former lesbian partner was intimately involved in the decision to bring the child into the world. Id. at 830, 711 N.E.2d 886. Additionally, E.N.O. noted that, contrary to cases where a third party nonparent seeks rights vis-à-vis a child, or even where a putative father seeks paternity rights, here the family unit deserving protection was the family unit consisting of the biological mother, the lesbian partner, and the child, id. at 833, 711 N.E.2d 886, and [t]he child's interest in maintaining his filial ties with the plaintiff counters the [biological mother's] custodial interest. Id. The fact that [t]he only family the child has ever known, id. (emphasis added), could be described as a nontraditional family unit, did not make its disruption any less significant to the child. As such, E.N.O. 's holding principally rested on its conclusion that recognition of de facto parents is in accord with notions of the modern family, id. at 829, 711 N.E.2d 886, and it is the actual family unit that should ultimately be afforded respect and protected from unreasonable disruption. ¶ 36 Numerous other jurisdictions have recognized common law rights on behalf of de facto parents. See, e.g., C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, 845 A.2d 1146, 1151-52 (recognizing de facto parents and placing them in parity with statutory parents); In re Bonfield, 97 Ohio St.3d 387, 393-94, 2002-Ohio-6660, 780 N.E.2d 241 (finding that because state statute specifically defined `parent,' court found it inappropriate to . . . broaden the narrow class of persons to include biological mother's same-sex partner and thus partner was not entitled to the benefit of statutes that are clearly inapplicable to such a familial arrangement, but concluding courts do have jurisdiction to consider petition for shared custody as not preempted by statute); T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 234, 786 A.2d 913 (2001) (concluding lesbian partner assumed a parental status and discharged parental duties with the consent of [the biological mother] and thus has standing as person in loco parentis to bring action for partial custody and visitation); V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 227-28, 748 A.2d 539 (holding de facto parent stands in parity with the legal parent but legal parent's status is a significant weight in the best interests balance and with [v]isitation . . . the presumptive rule), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926, 121 S.Ct. 302, 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 975-76 (R.I.2000) (finding no infer[ence] [of] legislative intent to preclude standing to a de facto parent concludes that a person who has no biological connection to a child but who has served as a psychological or de facto parent to that child may . . . establish his or her entitlement to parental rights vis-à-vis the child); see also In re Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 131-33 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (holding common law permits recognition of former same-sex partner of biological mother as legal coparent of child conceived by artificial insemination during relationship); In re Interest of E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 558-61 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (finding a compelling state interest in preventing harm to child satisfies strict scrutiny analysis and affirming recognition of psychological parent doctrine in context of former same-sex partner's petition for equal parenting time), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2551, 162 L.Ed.2d 287 and Clark v. McLeod, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1371, 161 L.Ed.2d 102 (2005); A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 584-85, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct.App.) (recognizing same-sex dual parent relationship and reversing trial court's ruling that coparenting agreement unenforceable), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 449, 827 P.2d 837 (1992). [23] These cases provide a well reasoned and just template for the recognition of de facto parent status in Washington. [24] ¶ 37 Conclusion: Our state's current statutory scheme reflects the unsurprising fact that statutes often fail to contemplate all potential scenarios which may arise in the ever changing and evolving notion of familial relations. Yet, simply because a statute fails to speak to a specific situation should not, and does not in our common law system, operate to preclude the availability of potential redress. This is especially true when the rights and interests of those least able to speak for themselves are concerned. We cannot read the legislature's pronouncements on this subject to preclude any potential redress to Carvin or L.B. In fact, to do so would be antagonistic to the clear legislative intent that permeates this field of law  to effectuate the best interests of the child in the face of differing notions of family and to provide certain and needed economical and psychological support and nurturing to the children of our state. While the legislature may eventually choose to enact differing standards than those recognized here today, and to do so would be within its province, until that time, it is the duty of this court to endeavor to administer justice according to the promptings of reason and common sense. Bernot, 81 Wash. at 544, 143 P. 104. ¶ 38 Reason and common sense support recognizing the existence of de facto parents and according them the rights and responsibilities which attach to parents in this state. We adapt our common law today to fill the interstices that our current legislative enactment fails to cover in a manner consistent with our laws and stated legislative policy. As Justice O'Connor noted, [t]he demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family, Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (plurality opinion). ¶ 39 Recognition of a de facto parent is supported primarily by our legislature's pronouncements on the subject, our courts historic common law role with respect to visitation, child custody, and support obligations, and is further buttressed by the prior Court of Appeals cases of In re Marriage of Allen and In re Custody of Stell and the persuasive reasoning of out-of-state cases. As such, the common law grants Carvin standing to prove she is a de facto parent and if so determined, to petition for the corresponding rights and obligations of parenthood. ¶ 40 To establish standing as a de facto parent we adopt the following criteria, delineated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and set forth in the Court of Appeals opinion below: (1) the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship, (2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household, (3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation, and (4) the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature. See In re Parentage of L.B., 121 Wash.App. at 487, 89 P.3d 271. In addition, recognition of a de facto parent is limited to those adults who have fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child's life. C.E.W., 845 A.2d at 1152. ¶ 41 We thus hold that henceforth in Washington, a de facto parent stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent, whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise. [25] Cf. C.E.W., 845 A.2d at 1151-52. As such, recognition of a person as a child's de facto parent necessarily authorizes [a] court to consider an award of parental rights and responsibilities ... based on its determination of the best interest of the child. Id. at 1152; see RCW 26.09.002. [26] A de facto parent is not entitled to any parental privileges, as a matter of right, but only as is determined to be in the best interests of the child at the center of any such dispute. D