Opinion ID: 1861873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the lower court improperly sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.

Text: Prior to trial, the charges of kidnapping and rape were consolidated upon motion of the State and agreement of the appellant. Afterwards, the appellant waived trial by jury and requested a bench trial with the trial judge sitting as jury and judge. Appellant now contends that the trial judge lacked the authority to sentence him to life imprisonment, after sitting as a jury. Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-65 (Supp. 1988), under which the appellant was indicted, tried and convicted, provides in pertinent part: (2) Every person who shall forcibly ravish any person of the age of fourteen (14) years or upward, or who shall have been convicted of having carnal knowledge of any person above the age of fourteen (14) years without such person's consent, by administering to such person any substance or liquid which shall produce such stupor or such imbecility of mind or weakness of body as to prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its verdict so prescribes; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for any term as the court, in its discretion, may determine. We repeat again that the appellant waived trial by jury and insisted that he be tried before the judge as both the fact finder and judge on the law. The trial judge explained to appellant in great detail and length what his situation would be without a jury and that, in waiving a jury during the sentencing phase, the appellant did not prevent the State from seeking life imprisonment. Without question, the appellant understood what he was doing in waiving the jury and knew that, if found guilty by the trial judge, he could be sentenced by the trial judge to life imprisonment. Obviously, he thought his chances were better with the trial judge than with a jury on a charge of raping a Catholic nun. The contention and argument of appellant on this assigned error indicate that his actions in the lower court amounted to trifling with the court, deception and attempting to mislead the court. Appellant has no standing to seek redress from alleged error of his own creation. Sanders v. State, 219 So.2d 913, 915 (Miss. 1969); Davis v. State, 472 So.2d 428, 432 (Miss. 1985) and Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 679 (Miss. 1982). It is well settled that trial by jury in criminal cases may be waived by agreement of the prosecution except where the death penalty is involved. Robinson v. State, 345 So.2d 1044, 1045 (Miss. 1977), and Prueitt v. State, 261 So.2d 119, 121-22 (Miss. 1972); Rule 5.13 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. In § 97-3-65(2), reference to the jury is synonymous to the trier of facts. Here, the judge, at the insistence of the appellant, was the trier of facts and substituted for the jury, which ordinarily is the trier of facts in a criminal case. We are of the opinion that there is no merit to assigned Error I and it is rejected.