Opinion ID: 2111871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Custodian

Text: Because Appellant was neither the parent or the guardian [14] of the victim in this case, our focus is on whether he qualified as either a custodian or a person in a position of trust with regard to Marissa G. A custodian is statutorily defined as a person over the age of fourteen years who has or shares actual physical possession or care and custody of a child on a full-time or temporary basis, regardless of whether such person has been granted custody of the child by any contract, agreement or legal proceeding. Custodian shall also include, but not be limited to, the spouse of a parent, guardian or custodian, or a person cohabiting with a parent, guardian or custodian in the relationship of husband and wife, where such spouse or other person shares actual physical possession or care and custody of a child with the parent, guardian or custodian. W.Va.Code § 61-8D-1(4) (2005). Because Mrs. Longerbeam was never alleged to have actual physical possession or care and custody of Marissa G., Appellant does not automatically come under the definition of custodian as her spouse. Id. Given that the second sentence of the definition is clearly inapplicable, we proceed to determine whether Appellant qualified as a custodian by examining whether he had actual physical possession or care and custody of Marissa G. on a full-time or temporary basis. Id. The record of this case makes clear that Appellant did not have actual physical possession of Marissa G. on a full-time or temporary basis. Consequently, to come within the statutory definition of custodian, the State was required to prove that Appellant had care and custody of the victim on a full-time or temporary basis. W.Va.Code § 61-8D-1(4). Because the State sought only to show that the Appellant was the custodian of Marissa G. on limited occasions, we look to see whether he fulfilled the role of custodian on a part time basis. The State argued that the Longerbeams voluntarily became the custodians of ... Marissa and her sisters when they arrived at the house to respond to the children's request for help with the escaped hamster. Upon entry into the residence, the State posits that Appellant and his wife became responsible for the care and custody of all three girls. As evidence of this assumed duty, the State cites to the fact that the Longerbeams entered the house without knocking and then Mrs. Longerbeam acted in a custodial fashion by telling Marissa G. and Taylor G. to come downstairs. The State contends that Appellant assumed a custodial role with regard to the victim based on the fact that he was the only adult in the room with her at the time of the alleged incident. In response to these arguments, Appellant points out that Kacy was the person charged by her mother with the responsibility of caring for her two younger sisters, Marissa G. and Taylor G., while their mother was working. The fact that Appellant and his wife came onto the premises upon the invitation of Taylor G. to help locate the hamster did not, according to Appellant, cloak them with any custody-based responsibility towards the three children inside that house. To support his contention that Kacy's status as the child's caregiver was not negated by the presence of her aunt and uncle, Appellant observes that not only did Kacy order the Longerbeams to leave the property upon learning of the alleged abuse, but, as the record indicates, they immediately complied with her request. The State seeks to sidestep Kacy's position as the intended babysitter or custodian [15] of her sisters by suggesting that it is possible for an individual to voluntarily become the custodian of the child even when other legal custodians are present. As support for this contention, the State relies upon our determination in State v. Collins, 221 W.Va. 229, 654 S.E.2d 115 (2007), that an adult who took a minor child four-wheeling with the permission of the child's mother was a custodian of that child for purposes of West Virginia Code § 61-8D-5(a). The State suggests that under Collins it is clear that the presence of one legal custodian does not negate another person from also being recognized as a custodian of a minor. In making this argument, the State completely overlooks several factual distinctions between Collins and this case. In Collins, the individual determined to qualify as a custodian physically removed the victim, with her mother's implicit permission, from her residence and took her to another location to commit the acts of alleged abuse. See 221 W.Va. at 234, 654 S.E.2d at 120. On those particular facts, this Court found that the perpetrator of the alleged abuse was a voluntary, temporary custodian. There is nothing even remotely analogous in this case to Collins as Appellant did not physically remove Marissa G. from her home with the permission of either her mother or her custodian at the timeher sister, Kacy. The record disproves the State's contention that Appellant and his wife became the custodians of their three nieces upon walking into the victim's household. When asked whether she was going to her sister's house to watch the kids, Mrs. Longerbeam was firm in responding, No, just going into [sic] catch the hamster. And when she was questioned about whether she would watch the younger two nieces, Taylor G. and Marissa G., when Kacy was present, Mrs. Longerbeam stated: No, Kacy watched them. As a follow-up to this inquiry, Appellant's counsel inquired: So if Kacy was present she would be the person in charge? In response, Mrs. Longerbeam testified without hesitation [y]es. Seeking to dispel the position of responsibility that Kacy occupied with regard to her two younger sisters, the State framed the following argument to the jury in closing: I am going to ask you who is in charge when there is an adult and a 12-year-old in the room? The adult. Who is in charge when a 16-year-old is asleep in a bedroom, a 16-year-old who is asleep? Is it the aunt and uncle who are awake in the house? You know the answer[;] it is the adult who is there who is in charge. In fact, [Mrs.] Cindy Longerbeam testified today that she was in charge when the kids were there. Then when Mr. Wrye [Appellant's counsel] asked a few more questions, well, Marissa would ask Kacy. But ask yourselves was the 16-year-old sister in charge or was the adult aunt and adult uncle who are there in charge? I think you know the answer [is] it is clearly the adult. While the State sought to emphasize the fact that Kacy was sleeping during the alleged touching incident, Kacy testified that if they [Marissa G. and Taylor G.] needed something they came to me and they knew to stay in the house and not to go anywhere and if they needed something [to] come get me. The fact that Appellant and his wife were older than Kacy did not vitiate her mother's charge of being the caregiver of her sisters. Similarly, the fact of Kacy being asleep did not in itself abrogate her responsibilities. While it certainly is not ideal for a caregiver to be asleep, the testimony offered by Kacy made clear that her sisters knew the rule of staying in the house and that they were to wake her if they needed something. [16] Contrary to the picture the State sought to paint for the jury, Kacy remained in charge of her sisters despite the presence of Appellant and his wife. This was demonstrated by the fact that upon learning what had just happened to Marissa G., Kacy immediately confronted her aunt after discovering that her uncle was no longer in the household and demanded that they both leave the premises. The fact that Mrs. Longerbeam complied with Kacy's directive further proves that Kacy was the person in charge of her two younger sisters. Not only did Kacy take control of the situation upon discovering the alleged abuse but she continued to act in a clear-thinking, adult fashion by promptly contacting the police to report the alleged sexual assault. When the facts of this case are applied to the applicable portion of the statutory definition of custodian that requires care and custody on at least a part-time basis, we simply cannot conclude that Appellant was a custodian of Marissa G. at the time of the alleged assault in question. The record makes clear that she was not under his care and custody at the time of the incident for which Appellant was convicted. [17] Accordingly, Appellant was not a custodian of Marissa G. within the meaning of West Virginia Code 61-8D-5(a) at the time of the alleged incident of sexual assault.