Opinion ID: 181375
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement Is Flexible.

Text: As this court has recognized, the Constitution's warrant requirement is flexible, so that different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment in light of the different purposes and practical considerations at issue. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72. Thus, when a surveillance warrant is sought for the purpose of investigating ordinary crime, the Fourth Amendment requires a showing of probable cause to believe that the target of the warrant is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense, and that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through the surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(b); see Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979). But when the government pursues a different purpose, such as obtaining security intelligence, [d]ifferent standards of probable cause reasonable to that purpose may support issuance of a warrant. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23, 92 S.Ct. 2125. The considerations that the Supreme Court identified in Keith as distinguishing domestic security surveillance from the surveillance of ordinary crime and, therefore, as supporting different warrant standards, pertain equally to foreign intelligence surveillance: The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many types of crime specified in Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime. Id. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 2125. Also noteworthy is Keith 's recognition of Congress's particular competence to weigh these considerations and to establish reasonable warrant requirements for security surveillance, as distinct from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. See id. at 322-23, 92 S.Ct. 2125. The benchmark for judicial review of the constitutionality of warrant requirements established by Congress is reasonableness: Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. Id. at 322-23, 92 S.Ct. 2125. Consistent with this pronouncement, the Court in Keith observed that Congress might well judge that the application and affidavit showing probable cause for security surveillance need not follow the exact requirements of [18 U.S.C.] § 2518 but should allege other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security cases; that the request for prior court authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a specially designated court . . .; and that the time and reporting requirements need not be so strict as those in § 2518. Id. at 323, 92 S.Ct. 2125. This discussion in Keith informed our decision in United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72-74, upholding the warrant standards established by Congress in FISA for court-ordered surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information. The PATRIOT Act did not modify the standards FISA applies to warrant applications for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence. Rather, it modified the degree to which foreign intelligence gathering must be the purpose of the surveillance. Thus, we need not here reconsider Duggan 's holding as to the reasonableness of FISA's warrant standards for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information. [24] We need consider only whether any constitutional concerns are raised by Congress's decision to allow FISA warrant standards to apply upon the executive's certification that a significant rather than a primary purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.