Opinion ID: 162057
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Separation Between the Government and a Potential Relator

Text: 24 We first observe that the concept of a qui tam action assumes a distinction between the government and the individual qui tam plaintiff. When the FCA permits a private suit, the person filing it brings the action for the person and for the United States Government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). The term qui tam derives from the Latin phrase, qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter. Black's Law Dictionary 1262 (7th ed.1999). This distinction between relator and government is not present, however, when a federal employee obtains information about fraud in the pursuit of his or her particular duties as a government employee. In effect, that person obtains the information as the government. At least with respect to an ongoing government investigation, a federal employee who is involved in the investigation pursuant to employment duties is the government. Therefore, we hold that such an employee cannot file an action under section 3730(b) for the person and for the United States Government. 7 25 Holmes is such an employee in this case. Holmes first encountered the CIG employees in her capacity as postmaster at the post office in Poncha Springs, Colorado. To determine whether CIG was entitled to the bulk rate it sought, she consulted with the postmaster at Howard, where CIG was supposedly receiving that rate. Though the Howard postmaster confirmed that CIG got the bulk rate, Holmes ultimately denied CIG that rate, based on her determination that the mailing did not meet weight requirements. It is undisputed that, at all times during this progression of events, Holmes acted in her capacity as postmaster. 26 Several years later, Holmes went to the Howard post office to provide training to the acting postmaster. It is undisputed that Holmes undertook this task within the scope of her employment as a postmaster. Holmes states in her affidavit that she provided this training with the approval of her manager, and her complaint states that she was assigned temporarily to the Howard post office. She makes no claim that the training itself was outside the scope of her employment. The affidavit of Marsha Boyle, a labor relations specialist who serves as a representative and advisor to the U.S. Postal Service, states that, under Postal Service regulations, postmasters may be designated and certified as postmaster trainers. 27 Holmes states in her affidavit that, during lunch with the acting postmaster when she was in Howard to provide training, she asked about CIG's bulk rate and learned that it was getting the rate she had denied it two years earlier. She and the acting postmaster discussed the matter and together examined CIG's latest mailing statement. Holmes claims that she had no other business than curiosity to inquire about the rates CIG was getting at the Howard post office, and that she had no authority over the Howard office and had not been assigned to check into bulk mailings. Even if she had no specific duty to inquire ask about CIG's rates, however, she made the inquiry and obtained the relevant information in her capacity as postmaster. 28 Moreover, Holmes had a duty as a postmaster to report information about this type of fraud. Regulation 224.3 in the Postal Service's Administrative Support Manual requires a postmaster to report by memorandum [f]ailure to pay postage, violation of franking privilege, misuse of penalty mail, depositing of advertising material in mailboxes without payment of postage, and similar schemes to evade payment of postage.  (Emphasis added). Holmes does not dispute that this regulation applies to her. Nothing in the regulation limits its scope, and Holmes has provided no evidence to suggest that its scope is limited to fraud conducted or discovered at her home post office. 8 In fact, she concedes its applicability when she states in her brief that she could have met her job description responsibility to report suspected fraud by simply sending a memorandum to the Postal Inspection Service. 29 Holmes argues that she did more than what was required of her. We are not persuaded. According to her affidavit, Holmes first reported the fraud to her superior after her trip to Howard in August 1997, rather than immediately submitting a written memorandum to her local postal inspector in charge, as the postal regulations require. In December 1997, she had not yet heard anything about an investigation by the postal inspectors. She therefore sent a letter to the Inspector General's office. In early March 1998, the Inspector General's office notified Holmes by letter that it had reviewed the information and referred [her] concerns to the appropriate Office of Inspector General Director for action deemed warranted. Holmes had little confidence that anything would be done, and she therefore told a postal systems coordinator about the fraud allegations. Soon after, however, an agent from the Inspector General's office contacted Holmes about its investigation. This course of events, as described by Holmes, demonstrates that, while she certainly reported the information, she did not follow the procedure outlined in the postal regulations. Moreover, it is undisputed that, when it became aware of the fraud allegations, the Postal Inspection Service investigated them. Thus, we cannot find that Holmes's actions so exceeded her duties as to entitle her to pursue a qui tam action. 30 Inasmuch as Holmes's duties as a federal employee are an important element in our analysis, our reasoning bears some similarity to the First Circuit's reasoning in United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir.1990). We emphasize, however, that our approach differs significantly from the First Circuit's. The LeBlanc court held that a government employee who has a duty, as a condition of his employment, to uncover fraud does not qualify as a qui tam relator, because this duty prevents him from qualifying as an original source. Id. at 20. In contrast, we find it unnecessary to reach the original source question where there has been no public disclosure. 9 Instead, our analysis revolves around the meaning of Congress's statement that [a] person may bring a civil action ... for the person and for the United States Government, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), an issue that logically precedes the public disclosure and original source inquiries. A federal employee who is not precluded for the reasons we outline in this opinion would still be subject to the public disclosure bar, and if public disclosure had occurred, there would be no jurisdiction unless the employee could qualify as an original source. 31