Opinion ID: 152984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prohibition from wearing of colors, insignia, or obtaining tattoos or burn marks (including branding and scars) relative to [criminal street] gangs

Text: The condition of supervised release that prohibits Green from the wearing of colors, insignia, or obtaining tattoos or burn marks (including branding and scars) relative to [criminal street] gangs, on the other hand, is not statutorily defined and does not provide Green with sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct. The range of possible gang colors is vast and indeterminate. For example, the L.A. Police Department's explanation of gang colors and clothing includes white T-shirts, blue or black or a combination of the two, red, green, black, brown and purple. Los Angeles Police Department, How Are Gangs Identified, http://www.lapdonline.org/get_informed (last visited May 14, 2010). Eliminating such a broad swath of clothing colors would make his daily choice of dress fraught with potential illegality. People of ordinary intelligence would be unable to confidently comply with this condition. Although we find that the condition against wearing gang related clothing is impermissibly vague, we do not mean to suggest that all broad prohibitions are unconstitutional. We uphold broad conditions of supervised release so long as they are sufficiently clear to provide the defendant with notice of what conduct is prohibited. See MacMillen, 544 F.3d at 74 (upholding condition of supervised release prohibiting defendant from being on [sic] any areas or locations where children are likely to congregate[,] such as schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds, theme parks, arcades, recreational facilities, and recreation parks) (internal notations in original); Johnson, 446 F.3d at 280 (upholding condition prohibiting defendant from being in any area in which persons under the age of 18 are likely to congregate, such as school grounds, child care centers, or playgrounds). The condition of supervised release at issue here contains no limiting list of the colors or insignia that are typically associated with any particular gangs to guide Green in his clothing choices, and is, therefore, much more vague than the prohibited conditions in MacMillen and Johnson. This condition is therefore unconstitutionally vague.
Green also argues that we should vacate the street gang condition because it was not reasonably related to his criminal history or prior acts. Although the district court is endowed with broad discretion to tailor conditions of supervised release to the goals and purposes of sentencing, this discretion is constrained by congressionally imposed limits. United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Chaklader, 232 F.3d 343, 348 (2d Cir.2000)). To fall within the discretion of the district court, a condition of supervised release need only be reasonably related to sentencing factors. United States v. Gill, 523 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Dupes, 513 F.3d at 344). Because we have already vacated the condition, we need not reach this issue.
Finally, we are troubled by the fact that additional terms were imposed after the oral hearing. Even though we vacate the additional condition on due process grounds, we emphasize that Green should have been present for the imposition of new sentencing terms. United States v. Jacques, 321 F.3d 255, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. A-Abras Inc., 185 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir.1999); Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a)(3).