Opinion ID: 4263616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: 1. M ark’s House Mark claims the trial court erred in awarding any equity in his house to Maria or, alternatively, in failing to grant him credit for its value as of the date of marriage, and in requiring him to sell the property if he does not refinance or otherwise remove Maria’s financial responsibility for the mortgage within 60 days. Mark purchased the residence located on Platte River Drive in 1990, approximately 9 years prior to the marriage. He testified he paid $58,800 for the property and took out a mortgage for the purchase in the amount of $48,000. He opined that the residence had a value of $100,000 at the time of the marriage in 1999. The district court found the entire equity in the residence to be marital property and ordered that it be divided equally between the parties. [4,5] Because he purchased the residence prior to the marriage, Mark claims that it is entirely premarital or, alternatively, that the equity he had prior to the marriage is premarital. As a 2 Bergmeier v. Bergmeier, 296 Neb. 440, 894 N.W.2d 266 (2017). 3 Id. 4 See Black v. Black, 223 Neb. 203, 388 N.W.2d 815 (1986). - 904 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports ONSTOT v. ONSTOT Cite as 298 Neb. 897 general rule, property which one party brings into the marriage is excluded from the marital estate.5 However, the burden of proof to show that property is a nonmarital asset remains with the person making the claim.6 We agree that the equity in the residence at the time of the parties’ marriage in 1999 was a nonmarital asset which, if established, should be set aside as Mark’s separate property.7 However, assuming Mark’s testimony established the value of the residence at $100,000 at the time of the marriage, he did not testify or supply any documentation as to whether the residence was either encumbered or unencumbered at that time and, if encumbered, to what extent. Because Mark has failed to establish that there was any equity in the house at the time of the parties’ marriage, he has failed to meet his burden of proving that the property is a nonmarital asset. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in including the entirety of the equity in the residence in the marital estate. Mark further assigns that the district court erred in ordering him to refinance the residence and pay off Maria within 60 days of the decree. We acknowledge that the trial court has discretion in the amount of time allowed to refinance property. But, here, Mark’s ability to refinance promptly has been impaired by his obligation to pay $700 per month in spousal support, especially as a retiree with a monthly net income of only $3,100. Therefore, we find that under these particular circumstances, the district court’s requirement that Mark refinance the mortgage within 60 days constituted an abuse of discretion. We modify the decree to extend the time period for Mark to refinance the residence and pay off Maria to 6 months from the filing of the mandate in the district court. 5 See Heald v. Heald, 259 Neb. 604, 611 N.W.2d 598 (2000). 6 Id. 7 See Harris v. Harris, 261 Neb. 75, 621 N.W.2d 491 (2001). See, also, Heald v. Heald, supra note 5. - 905 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports ONSTOT v. ONSTOT Cite as 298 Neb. 897 2. Spousal Support (a) Temporary Support [6] Mark claims the trial court erred in awarding temporary spousal support in the amount of $1,500 per month under § 42-362. However, the record on appeal does not contain any bill of exceptions in regard to the hearing for temporary ­spousal support. The transcript does contain a document entitled “Affidavit in Support of Application to Re-Set Support” that was filed with the court. We have long held that an affidavit must be offered as an exhibit and must be made part of the bill of exceptions in order to be considered on appeal.8 In Peterson v. George,9 we stated: The fact that an affidavit used as evidence in the district court was filed in the office of the clerk of the district court and made a part of the transcript is not important to a consideration and decision of an appeal in the cause to this court. If such an affidavit is not preserved in a bill of exceptions, its existence or contents cannot be known by this court. Here, we have no record that the “Affidavit in Support of Application to Re-Set Support” was received at any pretrial hearing. Whether the district court reviewed the affidavit or any evidence for purposes of Mark’s pretrial application to reset spousal support is unknown. [7,8] The party appealing has the responsibility of including within the bill of exceptions matters from the record which the party believes are material to the issues presented for review.10 A bill of exceptions is the only vehicle for bringing evidence 8 See, Altaffer v. Majestic Roofing, 263 Neb. 518, 641 N.W.2d 34 (2002); Peterson v. George, 168 Neb. 571, 96 N.W.2d 627 (1959). 9 Peterson v. George, supra note 8, 168 Neb. at 577, 96 N.W.2d at 631. 10 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1140 (Reissue 2016); State v. Dunster, 262 Neb. 329, 631 N.W.2d 879 (2001); State v. Biernacki, 237 Neb. 215, 465 N.W.2d 732 (1991); State v. Schaneman, 235 Neb. 655, 456 N.W.2d 764 (1990); State v. Isikoff, 223 Neb. 679, 392 N.W.2d 783 (1986). - 906 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports ONSTOT v. ONSTOT Cite as 298 Neb. 897 before the Nebraska Supreme Court. Evidence which is not made part of the bill of exceptions may not be considered.11 Without the benefit of a proper record, we will not consider this alleged error. (b) Continuing Support Next, Mark claims the trial court erred in awarding continuing spousal support in the amount of $700 per month until either party dies, Maria remarries or cohabits with a significant other, or she is no longer mentally ill. An appeal involving support for a mentally ill spouse under § 42-362 is reviewed de novo on the record and affirmed in the absence of an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.12 A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted for disposition.13 Mark does not contest whether Maria suffers from a mental illness. And the district court awarded spousal support pursuant to § 42-362, which in relevant part provides: When a marriage is dissolved and the evidence indicates that either spouse is mentally ill, the court may, at the time of dissolving the marriage or at any time thereafter, make such order for the support and maintenance of such mentally ill person as it may deem necessary and proper, having due regard to the property and income of the parties, and the court may require the party ordered to provide support and maintenance to file a bond or otherwise give security for such support. . . . The order for support may, if necessary, be revised from time to time on like application. 11 See, State v. Manchester, 213 Neb. 670, 331 N.W.2d 776 (1983); State v. Gingrich, 211 Neb. 786, 320 N.W.2d 445 (1982). 12 See Black v. Black, supra note 4. 13 Marshall v. Marshall, supra note 1. - 907 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports ONSTOT v. ONSTOT Cite as 298 Neb. 897 [9,10] Section 42-362 empowers the court to order the payment of such support and maintenance as it may deem necessary and proper, having due regard to the property and income of the parties, and, to that extent, parallels the alimony contemplated by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), but provides an additional specific ground to be considered—the mental illness of a spouse.14 Further, we have held that in dealing with spousal support under the provisions of § 42-362, reasonableness is the ultimate criterion to be applied in testing whether support and maintenance is to be awarded and, if so, the amount and duration thereof.15 The decree does not contain any findings as to why the district court chose to award $700 per month in spousal support, which was not an amount requested by either party. Mark’s gross retirement income was $3,602, but he testified that after taxes, he received approximately $3,100. Although Maria points out that Mark is now receiving $750 per month in rental income, Mark testified this was offset by mortgage payments and expenses for the rental property. Mark’s monthly expenses after excluding the temporary spousal support payment and mortgage payments and expenses for the rental property is approximately $2,000. In addition, Mark acknowledged his food and gas expenses were high due to his particular lifestyle. It appears the district court found Mark’s credible monthly expenses to be less than his monthly income. On the other hand, Maria had monthly income of $3,453 and monthly expenses of $3,721. Here, the court was faced with a long-term marriage, a mentally ill spouse who has no ability at present to work, and, as in Black v. Black,16 a spouse who has needs above her income which exceed the amount of support and maintenance awarded. 14 Stephens v. Stephens, 297 Neb. 188, 899 N.W.2d 582 (2017). 15 Black v. Black, supra note 4. 16 Id. - 908 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports ONSTOT v. ONSTOT Cite as 298 Neb. 897 Certainly, the $700 spousal support obligation, coupled with Mark’s other monthly expenses, may place him at or near his net income level. This is concerning and provides no flexibility for Mark, but Maria is in an even more difficult financial position. Sadly, when many couples divorce, there is not enough money to satisfy the needs of both parties. But in this instance, based upon the totality of the circumstances and evidence, we cannot find the order of spousal support was an abuse of discretion. (c) Cross-Appeal The district court initially entered a decree which awarded Maria spousal support in the amount of $700 per month commencing July 1, 2016, and continuing so long as Maria is mentally ill or until she remarries, the death of either party, or further order of the court. Following the entry of the decree, the district court partially granted Mark’s motion to alter or amend by ordering that the spousal support would further terminate upon Maria’s cohabitating with a significant other. On cross-appeal, Maria contends that it was improper to include any provision terminating spousal support if she cohabitates with another person. And, at oral argument, counsel for Maria agreed that Maria’s cohabitation with another person was not within the parties’ contemplation at the time of the entry of the decree. [11,12] Maria is correct in that we have previously held that the trial court cannot condition the termination of spousal support upon cohabitation with another person, because such matters are public policy issues for the Legislature, not the courts, to decide.17 However, cohabitation, together with a showing that such arrangement improved a former spouse’s overall financial condition, might warrant a modification of spousal support.18 Accordingly, that part of the district court’s order 17 Else v. Else, 219 Neb. 878, 367 N.W.2d 701 (1985). 18 Id. See, also, Stephens v. Stephens, supra note 14. - 909 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports ONSTOT v. ONSTOT Cite as 298 Neb. 897 adding Maria’s cohabitation with a significant other to the list of conditions terminating Mark’s spousal support obligation is hereby vacated.