Opinion ID: 808270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Railroad Right-of-Way

Text: The trust argues that the 1908 right-of-way granted to the railroad (pursuant to the 1875 Act) is like an ordinary easement that has been extinguished. It reasons as follows. The 1976 patent issued to the trust’s predecessors-in-interest did not reserve to the United States any interest in this easement; it merely provided that the property was subject to the easement for railroad purposes. 1 1 The pertinent portions provide: EXCEPTING AND RESERVING TO THE UNITED STATES from the land granted a right-of-way thereon for ditches or canals constructed by the authority of the United States; and RESERVING TO the United States, and its assigns, a right-of-way for the existing Platte Access Road No. 512 over and across Tract No. 37 . . . containing 3.30 acres, more or less; and RESERVING TO the United States, and its assigns, a right-of-way for the existing Dry Park Road No. 517, over and across Tract 37 . . . containing 0.71 acres, more or less. Provided, that if for a period of five years, the United States, or its assigns, shall cease to use the above roads, or any segment thereof, for the purposes reserved, or if at any time the Regional Forester determines that the roads, or any segment thereof, is no longer needed for the purposes reserved, the easement traversed thereby shall terminate. In the event of such nonuse or such determination by the Regional Forester, the Regional Forester shall furnish to the patentees or, their heirs or assigns, a statement in recordable form evidencing termination. -3- Thus, when the railroad administratively abandoned the easement (by notifying the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) on January 15, 2004 that it would exercise its authority to abandon the line), the easement was extinguished and the trust’s property was disencumbered. Because the United States lacked any ownership interest (as of October 4, 1988) in the right-of-way, it could not claim through 16 U.S.C. § 1248(c) which generally provides that the United States retains rights in abandoned or forfeited railroad grants. Nor could the United States claim through 43 U.S.C. § 912, which generally provided that the interest in the right-of-way went to the adjacent landowner given abandonment decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction or an Act of Congress. The trust argues that the district court should have quieted title in it, not the United States. Much of the trust’s argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent which we are bound to follow. See United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 709 n.2, 710 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990). In Marshall v. Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co., 31 F.3d 1028, 1030–32 (10th Cir. 1994), we held that § 912 applies to grants under the 1875 Act. Relying upon Idaho v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 617 F. Supp. 207 (D. Idaho 1985), we concluded that the United States retained an implied SUBJECT TO those rights for railroad purposes as have been granted to the Laramie Hahn’s Peak & Pacific Railway Company, its successors or assigns by permit Cheyenne 04128 under the Act of March 3, 1875, 43 U.S.C. 934–939. Aplt. App. 92–93. -4- reversionary interest. Marshall, 31 F.3d at 1032. We subsequently applied § 912 on the issue of whether a railroad had abandoned its right-of-way such that adjacent landowners would take in Phillips Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 97 F.3d 1375 (10th Cir. 1996). And we have recognized that § 912 was modified by 16 U.S.C. § 1248(c) to provide that, as of October 4, 1988, interests in abandoned railroad rights-of-way generally revert to the United States rather than adjacent landowners. See Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Corp., 440 F.3d 1227, 1236 n.9 (10th Cir. 2006); Phillips, 97 F.3d at 1376 n.4. We are unpersuaded by the remainder of the trust’s other arguments and efforts to distinguish and limit the obvious contrary precedent. Though we recognize that the Seventh Circuit, the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims have concluded that the United States did not retain any reversionary interest in these railroad rights-ofway, we are bound by our precedent. See Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Tr. v. Bayfield County, 649 F.3d 799, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2011); Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Beres v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 403, 427–28 (2005). But see Darwin P. Roberts, The Legal History of Federally Granted Railroad Rights-of-Way and the Myth of Congress’s “1871 Shift”, 82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 85, 150–64 (2011) (criticizing this interpretation). Thus, the district court correctly held that the interest in the abandoned railroad right-ofway belongs to the United States.