Opinion ID: 6112076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hobbs Act Robbery Conviction

Text: Chisholm first argues that there is no “factual basis” to support his guilty plea for Hobbs Act robbery, as required under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Chisholm did not raise this argument before the district court. “We review violations of Rule 11 for plain error if the defendant did not object before the district court.” United States v. Lalonde, 509 F.3d 750, 759 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2005)).2 Rule 11(b)(3) provides that, “[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” “The purpose of this rule is ‘to protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.’” Lalonde, 1 Chisholm did not appeal this conviction. 2 To the extent that Chisholm frames this issue as a constitutional challenge, the standard of review is still plain error. See United States v. Bacon, 884 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d 577, 591 (6th Cir. 2008)). -4- No. 21-3271, United States v. Chisholm 509 F.3d at 762 (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969)). Chisholm argues that there is no factual basis for his plea because a “single, run-of-the-mill robbery of a retail store” cannot meet the “affects commerce” element under the Hobbs Act. (Def. Br. at 10.) As Chisholm himself admits, our precedents foreclose this argument. The Hobbs Act provides that: Whoever in any way or degree . . . affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The Act broadly defines “commerce” to include interstate commerce “and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.” Id. § 1951(b)(3). Thus, to determine the scope of the “affects commerce” element, we look to cases that define Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. Taylor v. United States, 579 U.S. 301, 306 (2016). As relevant to the Hobbs Act, Congress can regulate activities that “substantially affect interstate commerce in the aggregate, even if their individual impact on interstate commerce is minimal.” Id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)). When the defendant robs a business, then “the government must prove only that a robbery has a de minimis effect on interstate commerce in order to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act.” United States v. Baylor, 517 F.3d 899, 901 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1999)). Chisholm starts by urging us to abandon the de minimis test because it allegedly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause cases. Chisholm points to United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), as proof that the de minimis test is no longer good law. But we have repeatedly upheld the de minimis standard even in the wake of Morrison and Lopez. Baylor, 517 F.3d at 902. Therefore, the district court should have -5- No. 21-3271, United States v. Chisholm accepted Chisholm’s guilty plea if the facts showed that robbing the AT&T store had a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. Chisholm next suggests that robbing a single retail store does not met even the de minimis test. According to Chisholm, “[t]here needs to be something more than the stolen goods being shipped to the retail store from another state.” (Def. Br. at 22.) But we have held just the opposite. Robbing a business that buys or sells goods across state lines satisfies the Hobbs Act’s “affects commerce” requirement. See United States v. Sanders, No. 20-3963, 2021 WL 4787226, at  (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021). As explained in Sanders: A few examples show the minimal connection that suffices in this business context. The robbery of a Chattanooga bar satisfied this commerce element because the bar bought alcohol from a Georgia distributor and served Atlanta customers. United States v. Davis, 473 F.3d 680, 683–84 (6th Cir. 2007) . . . . Likewise, the robbery of a Little Caesars in Cleveland sufficed because the store purchased its flour from Minnesota, its pizza sauce from California, and its cheese from Wisconsin. See United States v. Baylor, 517 F.3d 899, 903 (6th Cir. 2008) . . . . Similarly, the robbery of a Family Dollar Store’s cash register satisfied the commerce element because this Memphis store sold goods originating from outside Tennessee. United States v. Frazier, 414 F. App’x 782, 782–83 (6th Cir. 2011). Id. at .3 Chisholm does not dispute that he stole iPhones from an AT&T store. Nor does he dispute that those phones were manufactured outside of Ohio and later moved in interstate commerce. 3 To the extent that Chisholm also argues that the Hobbs Act is void for vagueness, this argument lacks merit. As this passage from Sanders shows, this Court has defined the contours of the “affects commerce” element in the Hobbs Act with sufficient clarity to put ordinary people on notice of what it covers and to prevent arbitrary enforcement. See United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 380 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999)), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1182 (2005); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997) (stating that the touchstone of notice is whether the statute itself or as interpreted by courts makes clear that the defendant’s conduct was prohibited). Other circuits confronting this question have found that the “affects commerce” element is not unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cordero, 166 F.3d 334, 1998 WL 852013, at  (4th Cir. 1998) (table). Especially on plain error review, we do not disagree. -6- No. 21-3271, United States v. Chisholm Rather, Chisholm points out that police recovered twenty-four of the twenty-five phones. He believes that stealing one phone valued at $1000 has no economic impact because the cell phone market is a “several billion dollar a year industry.” (Def. Br. at 19.) This argument is factually and legally flawed. Factually, Chisholm walked away from the store with twenty-five phones, amounting to $25,000 of merchandise. Still, his point remains that even $25,000 is a drop in the bucket when it comes to the cell phone market. However, relatively insignificant amounts can meet the “affects commerce” requirement because, in the aggregate, robbing businesses has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Baylor, 517 F.3d at 901. Indeed, we have affirmed convictions under the Hobbs Act when the defendants stole far smaller amounts. See Sanders, 2021 WL 4787226, at  4 ($128 from a small loan servicing office); Frazier, 414 F. App’x at 783 ($300 from a hotel). Therefore, the district court did not plainly err in finding that there was a sufficient factual basis to support Chisholm’s guilty plea for Hobbs Act robbery.