Opinion ID: 175982
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Class Certification Order

Text: The district court certified the state-law class under Rule 23(b)(2), and held, in the alternative, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) were also satisfied. A class need satisfy only one of the Rule 23(b) prongs. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 615 n. 38 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). Rule 23(b)(2) requires a showing that the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). Claims for monetary relief may be certified as part of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, but the rule does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 615 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note to 1966 amends.). CDN challenges the district court's decision to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2), arguing that claims for money damages predominated. We subject class certification decisions to limited review. See id. at 579 (A district court's decision regarding class certification is not only reviewed for abuse of discretion, but [is] also subject to very limited review, to be reversed only upon a strong showing that the district court's decision was a clear abuse of discretion. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In Dukes, we rejected as deficient two approaches that courts have used for determining when a class that includes claims for monetary relief can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2): the so-called Molski approach that focuses on plaintiffs' subjective intent, because it is unlikely to yield a precise answer; and the Allison incidental damages standard that permits certification of claims for monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(2) only when they are incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief, because it is unduly restrictive. See id. at 616-17 (citing Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir.2003); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415-16 (5th Cir.1998)). Although the district court did not have the benefit of our en banc decision in Dukes, it applied a certification standard at least as stringent as what Dukes requires. The district court certified the class only after concluding that the monetary relief claims do not predominate in this case but rather appear to be on equal footing with the claims for injunctive relief. Wang, 231 F.R.D. at 612. Because Dukes interpreted Rule 23(b)(2) to require only that claims for monetary relief not predominate over claims for injunctive relief, the district court did not err in applying a standard allowing Rule 23(b)(2) certification when the claims are on equal footing. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in holding that plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief did not, in fact, predominate. There were substantial claims for injunctive relief in this case. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin a longstanding set of employment policies and sought monetary relief for current and past employees allegedly injured by those policies. Because the claims for monetary and injunctive relief were closely related, the request for monetary relief neither introduce[d] new and significant legal and factual issues, nor raised particular due process or manageability concerns. See Dukes, 603 F.3d at 617, 621-22. CDN's current employees  who constitute the vast majority of the class  stood to benefit significantly from an award of injunctive relief. As the district court pointed out in its certification ruling, [d]efendant's future compliance with the law may be more valuable to the class than the present claims for back pay. Wang, 231 F.R.D. at 612. At oral argument, with the benefit of our decision in Dukes, CDN contended that the district court erred in determining the suitability of plaintiffs' claims for class treatment without inquiring into the merits of those claims. It pointed to the district court's citation to Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 n. 17 (9th Cir. 1975), for the proposition that in deciding a class certification motion, the court is bound to take the substantive allegations of the complaint as true. We agree with CDN that in Dukes we firmly rejected any suggestion that a district court, in deciding a class certification motion, may not look behind the pleadings to overlapping merits issues. See Dukes, 603 F.3d at 581. However, any reference to the incorrect Blackie standard by the district court was harmless. In determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 were met, the district court appropriately considered and relied upon the evidence submitted by the parties at the class certification stage. For example, in its discussion of Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement, during which the district court cited Blackie at the end of a  see also  string cite, the court considered several declarations in determining whether the requirement was satisfied. See Wang, 231 F.R.D. at 606-07. The district court's Rule 23(b)(2) discussion did rely primarily on the complaint to understand the nature of plaintiffs' claims. A district court need not always look beyond the complaint, however, and under the circumstances, it was appropriate for the court to focus on the complaint to determine the relationship between claims for monetary and injunctive relief. See Dukes, 603 F.3d at 594 ([The] rigorous analysis to ensure that the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been satisfied. . . will often, though not always, require looking behind the pleadings to issues overlapping with the merits of the underlying claims.). The evidence submitted by both parties at the class certification stage focused on plaintiffs' substantive allegations  the nature of the employees' work, working hours and requirements, compensation policies, the provision of meal and rest break periods, and the union campaign and NLRB proceedings. This evidence had little to do with the relationship between the claims for injunctive and monetary relief, and thus would not have been helpful to the district court's Rule 23(b)(2) analysis. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class. We therefore do not reach the parties' arguments regarding whether the alternative Rule 23(b)(3) certification was appropriate. [1]