Opinion ID: 202748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Victor Lugo

Text: 28 As part of its case, the government sought to prove that Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán concealed material information relating to the Gutiérrez loans from the Board. Victor Lugo, the Board president, offered testimony that he was not told or was not aware of significant information. Appellants claim that Lugo's testimony showed that he had no independent recollection of the events in question, some of which occurred nearly twenty years before trial. However, appellants misconstrue Lugo's testimony about his own memory. For example, when asked whether he was informed of Modules' performance history when the Board was making decisions on the company's loans in July 1985, he stated: I don't recall that it was discussed. I believe that if it was discussed I would remember and it is not reflected in the minutes. Similarly, when asked whether the number of houses built on Modules projects was discussed when the Board was again making decisions on the loans in September 1986, he stated definitively: No ... that was not discussed. These statements show that Lugo had sufficient recall to testify from his personal knowledge about the information given to the Board. 29 Appellants also complain that the government improperly suggested the truth of hypothetical scenarios presented in certain questions to Lugo. The purpose of these questions was to probe whether the Board would have considered Gutiérrez companies' past performance in deciding to approve later loans. For example, the prosecutor asked Lugo: [I]f the Gutiérrez company, out of these 96 [housing] units only built 22, would that have been information . . . which you would have been interested in knowing for purposes of voting on the approval of this loan? The court explained at sidebar that it would only allow such hypotheticals when the government had already introduced evidence that was the basis for the hypothetical —specifically, when there is a document from the bank that clearly establishes a certain fact. It also instructed the jurors that they should not take the facts that were the basis for the hypotheticals as true: 30 Okay. The fact that the Court has authorized that question, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, does not mean . . . that the Court is concluding it is a foregoing fact that you should take those facts as true. Those facts are subject to your analysis and your credibility. 31 In other words, you have to decide in your deliberations whether or not this project called for 96 houses and you have to decide whether or not actually 22 were built or whatever number was built, that is subject to your credibility. 32 The fact that the Court is authorizing that this question be expressed in these terms does not at all mean that the Court has already determined that it is a fact at all. You have to decide. That's one of the issues that you're going to have to decide in this case. 33 The court reiterated this instruction several times. This detailed instruction was sufficient to advise the jury that it should not accept the facts set forth in the hypotheticals as true. Thus, Lugo's response to these questions did not have the effect of allowing him to testify beyond his personal knowledge to the factual correctness of the hypothetical. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing such testimony.