Opinion ID: 2534942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absolute Legislative Immunity

Text: According to the members, [p]ublic officers, in both their official capacity and individual capacity, are entitled to absolute legislative immunity in conjunction with the actions of enacting local legislation. Petition, at 11 (emphasis added). Moreover, they say, legislative immunity not only bars actions seeking damages but also bars actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980). Petition, at 13. Although these general statements of law are essentially correct, they miss the point of this dispute. The question considered by the United States Supreme Court in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980), was whether the Supreme Court of Virginia (Virginia Court) and its chief justice [were] [absolutely] immune from suit in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the Virginia Court's disciplinary rules governing the conduct of attorneys .... 446 U.S. at 721, 100 S.Ct. 1967. In particular, the suit sought to permanently enjoin the enforcement and operation of DR 2-102(A)(6) of the Virginia Bar Code, which Code had been promulgated by the Virginia Supreme Court. 446 U.S. at 726, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (emphasis added). Although the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the Virginia Supreme Court and its chief justice would, for the issuance of, or failure to amend, the challenged rules, enjoy the same type of absolute, legislative immunity generally afforded state legislators, 446 U.S. at 734, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (emphasis added), it noted that they were properly held liable in their enforcement capacities, and thus were proper defendants in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. 446 U.S. at 736, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (emphasis added). This was so, because the suit sought to enjoin the enforcement, not the promulgation, of DR 2-102(A)(6); because the Virginia Supreme Court and its chief justice exercised inherent and statutory enforcement powers; and because  enforcement officers and agencies  are amenable to suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. 446 U.S. at 736, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (emphasis added). In Ex parte Simpson, supra , we recently explained: `[Legislative] immunity applies only to actions that are inherently legislative (policy- making ) as opposed to administrative (policy- applying ). Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir.1993). Thus, applications [emphasis in original] of general city policy to a specific party, even if undertaken by city officials who would be immune from suit for the creation [emphasis in original] of that policy, are not protected by legislative immunity.... `....'  Grider v. City of Auburn, 628 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1336 (M.D.Ala.2009) (emphasis added except where otherwise indicated). `Acts of zoning enforcement rather than rulemaking are not legislative.' Crymes v. DeKalb County, 923 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (11th Cir.1991)(emphasis added)(county commissioners who voted to deny a permit for the development of a landfill were not entitled to legislative immunity, because denial of the permit was the `application of policy to a specific party'); see also Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989) (`when municipal officials do more than adopt prospective, legislative-type rules and take the next step into the area of enforcement,' they cannot claim legislative immunity). 36 So.3d at 30. The complaints in the Montgomery action out of which this petition arises merely seek to enjoin the  enforcement of the Amendment and ... any and all further acts of the [members] ... to deny [the ASEA and PEBCO] ... the exercise of [their] legal, contractual, and property rights, and business relationship with Nationwide. (Emphasis added.) See also respondents' brief, at 10 (ASEA and PEBCO therefore seek an injunction prohibiting the Amendment's enforcement). Section 36-26-6(b), Ala.Code 1975, which sets forth the powers and duties of the Board, authorizes the Board: (3) To make investigations, either on petition of a citizen, taxpayer or interested party, or of its own motion, concerning the enforcement and effect of this article and to require observance of its provision in the rules and regulations made pursuant thereto; (4) To conduct hearings and to render decisions, as provided in Section 36-26-27, [Ala.Code 1975,] on charges preferred against persons in the classified service; ... (6) To consider and act on such matters as may be referred to the board by the director. (Emphasis added.) Indeed, there is no dispute regarding the enforcement authority of the Board. According to the ASEA and PEBCO, the Board has canceled the business relationship involving Nationwide, the ASEA, and PEBCO and similarly threatens to deny ASEA the benefit and exercise of its legal, contractual and property rights and business relationships related to the 457 Plan. Respondents' brief, at 6. Elsewhere, they contend that the Board purports to fundamentally change and, indeed, prohibit ASEA's involvement with the 457 Plan, contrary to § 36-26-14. Respondents' brief, at 9. Thus, the issue here is notas the members attempt to present it [4] whether the Board in its purported legislative capacity could amend the 457 Plan without fear of legal reprisal but, instead, whether the members are immune in their enforcement capacities. Because the members' challenged acts involve only enforcement of the amendment, it is unnecessary to affirmatively decide whether they had absolute legislative immunity to enact the amendment in the first place. Moreover, although the members rely on Supreme Court of Virginia, they do so only for the proposition that legislative immunity bars actions for injunctive relief. They ignore that portion of the opinion holding that  enforcement officers and agencies  are amenable to suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. 446 U.S. at 736, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (emphasis added). In fact, the members' arguments entirely ignore the consequences of their enforcement actions on their immunity arguments. Consequently, they have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating a clear, legal right to relief on this ground.