Opinion ID: 853646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Partiality of the Trial Judge

Text: Marcum first argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial because of the partiality of the trial judge. The right to a fair trial before an impartial judge is an essential element of due process. See Abernathy v. State, 524 N.E.2d 12, 13 (Ind. 1988). As this Court observed in Kennedy v. State, 258 Ind. 211, 226, 280 N.E.2d 611, 620-21 (1972): A jury of laymen will often have an awesome respect for the institution of the American trial judge. This can lead them to accord great and perhaps decisive significance to the judge's every word and intimation. It is therefore essential that the judge refrain from any actions indicating any position other than strict impartiality. A trial court is given latitude to manage the courtroom and maintain order and decorum. See Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 256 (Ind.1997). Even where the trial court's remarks display a degree of impatience, if in the context of a particular trial they do not impart an appearance of partiality, they may be permissible to promote an orderly progression of events at trial. Id. (quoting Rowe v. State, 539 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ind.1989)). However, reversal is required if the defendant shows that the trial judge's actions and demeanor crossed the barrier of impartiality and prejudiced his or her case. Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 256. Marcum points to several instances of alleged partiality by the trial court. First, Marcum cites the following exchange in the course of defense counsel's questioning of the defense's medical expert: Q. I am not asking if the person died as a result of this accident, did a person die in this accident? A. The autopsy would indicate that. You don't normally do autopsies on people who are alive. Q. Okay. [PROSECUTOR:] Judge again this is an inappropriate way to frame that question. There is no evidence that anybody died in an accident. There is no evidence in this trial, there is no evidence that has been admitted in this trial. He has asked this doctor for a professional conclusion, whether somebody died in an accident. That is assuming facts not in evidence. JUDGE: And he is right Mr. Oliver. If that is the end result that is okay but your question presumes that the deceased died as a result of the accident. So far the evidence has been that he died as a result of a homicide. Marcum moved for a mistrial based on the trial court's comment. The trial court overruled the motion, observing that defense counsel's question presume[d] the ultimate fact and so far the evidence has not been that.... If you will just ask the question a different way it is okay sir. Marcum contends that the trial court improperly commented on a fact in controversy, i.e., whether Skinner died as a result of the automobile accident or from a homicide. This was occasioned by defense counsel's phrasing of a question that assumed the defense's conclusion as to the manner of death. The trial court correctly observed that the evidence to that point did not support that assumption. [1] This comment did not necessitate a mistrial and was invited by defense counsel. Marcum next points to a comment made by the trial court during his questioning of Fosnot. Defense counsel (Mr. Oliver) asked if Mr. Cummings, the prosecutor, had charge[d] [Fosnot] any bond money, and the trial court interposed the following comment: Excuse me Mr. Oliver. I am pretty sure the Judge does that, not Mr. Cummings.... In this Court the Judge sets the bond sir. This comment presents no basis for reversal. [2] Marcum also argues that the trial court made an improper comment after the jury returned its signed verdict forms in open court. The trial court realized that the verdict form signed by the foreman for auto theft as charged in count six did not include the word guilty. The not guilty form for that count was not signed by the foreperson of the jury. The trial court then stated: I know the intent was he is guilty but it doesn't say guilty. Members of the Jury I have discovered a mistake and it is not your mistake it is ours. The verdict form for Count VI does not contain the word guilty. It simply says, We, the jury, find the defendant, Chad Marcum, Count VI, Auto Theft. It is my view that you intend to find him guilty because you did not sign the form of verdict that says not guilty. If you will retire to the jury room, if it is your intention to find him guilty, please add the word guilty at the top, and then I will receive your verdict for Count VI. Defense counsel did not object to this comment or procedure, and the jury retained the option of writing not guilty on the form, if that was its intention. However, the foreperson wrote the word guilty on the form before returning it in open court. Under these circumstances this comment presents no basis for finding a lack of impartiality on the part of the trial court. Finally, Marcum points to an instance in which he made a continuing objection to testimony he believed to be hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection, observing, And it very well may be Mr. Oliver, but I am going to allow it. The State had asserted that the testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Marcum makes no argument in this appeal that the trial court's ruling on this issue was erroneous. Therefore, there is no basis for finding a lack of impartiality on the part of the judge for making what appears to be a proper ruling on an evidentiary issue. In sum, Marcum has failed to demonstrate that the comments cited above demonstrate partiality of the trial judge or that they prejudiced his case. See Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 256.