Opinion ID: 769703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applying the Statute

Text: 82 Applying our construction of the statute to the cases at bar, we conclude that the district courts erred in a number of respects.
83 In Gilmore, the district court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, following the reasoning of the court in Thompson v. Gomez, 993 F. Supp. at 762-66. The court then quickly turned to two questions: (1) whether the 1972 Order adopting regulations for the prison libraries was issued in the absence of a finding that the relief provided therein was equivalent to the constitutional minimum under S 3626(b)(2); and (2) whether the court should now make `written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation'  under S 3626(b)(3). 84 Rather than place the burden on the state to show that the 1972 Order exceeded the constitutional minimum (recall that in fashioning that Order the court allowed the CDC to select its own means of ensuring inmates' access to the courts, see Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 112), the court inquired whether plaintiffs had shown that the 1972 Order was not terminable under S 3626(b)(2). Moreover, the court did not examine the court record and relief granted by the order to determine whether it was narrowly tailored and minimally intrusive -it simply asked whether explicit findings were made. We conclude that the court erred in its allocation of the burden of proof and its exclusive focus on express findings rather thank on whether, in fact, the remedy exceeded the constitutional minimum according to the record and the relevant caselaw. 85 The court also erred in its application of the limiting provision. The court placed the burden on plaintiffs to establish a current and ongoing violation of a Federal right rather than requiring the CDC, which had moved to terminate the decree, to prove its compliance with inmates' right of access to the courts. And although the court correctly read Casey to require evidence of actual injury, 26 the court deniedplaintiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing, thereby depriving plaintiffs of the chance to establish that the 1997 memo directing library staff to stop renewing books (or any other of the CDC's actions) would have a concrete effect on inmates' access to the courts 27 .
86 In Thompson, plaintiffs conceded that all but four remedies granted in the consent decree and subsequent proceedings were terminable under the PLRA. See Thompson, 993 F. Supp. at 755. The four remaining remedies were: (1) noise control, (2) access to legal materials, (3) the classification of prisoners, and (4) group religious services. The district court separately examined each remedy to determine whether it was either (a) supported by findings of a constitutional violation and narrowly tailored within the meaning ofS 3626(b)(2), at the time it was granted, or (b) necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation. Relying on the existing record, the district court denied plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing on present conditions at San Quentin and held that the findings were inadequate at the time each remedy was granted. 87 As in Gilmore, the district court was required to do more than merely examine the record for findings. If according to the record and relevant caselaw the prior orders granting relief were indeed narrowly drawn, extended no further than necessary, and were minimally intrusive, termination is improper under S 3626(b)(2). The court was further obliged to take evidence on the current circumstances at the prison as plaintiffs requested, at least with respect to those remedies as to which plaintiffs did not concede that defendants were in compliance. As the Second Circuit held in Benjamin, [e]vidence presented at a prior time . . . could not show a violation that is `current and ongoing.' Hence, the `record' referred to [in S 3626(b)(3) ] cannot mean the prior record but must mean a record reflecting conditions as of the time termination is sought. 172 F.3d at 166, compare Cagle v. Hutto, 177 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1999). 88 As to the noise remedy, the district court concluded: The parties seem to agree that at present plaintiffs are not suffering noise levels that constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Defendants have come into compliance with this term of the decree. Thompson, 993 F. Supp. at 757. The same can be said with respect to group religious services. The classification system, however, is different. Although the district court also indicated that plaintiffs conceded compliance with the classification system, the court focused on plaintiff's citation to the Monitor's Fourth Report. Id. at 760. The Sixth Report, however, states that there are serious problems with the classification system in the East Block. Therefore, the district court must assess the current conditions with respect to inmate classification on remand -particularly the housing of Grade A inmates with prisoners confined to administrative segregation.