Opinion ID: 1277687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Ineffective Assistance During Opening and Closing Arguments

Text: Defendant contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the opening statement and closing arguments, as well as in his redirect examination of defendant when the latter testified at trial. We disagree. Trial counsel's brief opening statement came after an emotional opening statement by the prosecutor emphasizing the magnitude of the crimes committed, characterizing the crimes as Oakland's day of infamy occurring almost 45 years to the day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Trial counsel's opening statement emphasized putting emotion aside and deciding the case based on the evidence. It also told the jury to pay particular attention to the evidence that bears ... on mental state and mental frame of mind. Defendant contends that this opening statement was unfocused and inadequate, that it did not adequately set forth the second degree murder theory that was the primary basis of trial counsel's defense. But even assuming arguendo that counsel's performance in this regard was deficient, we cannot say that it was demonstrably detrimental to his client, and therefore cannot conclude that it constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant criticizes trial counsel's closing argument in part because he all but conceded his guilt as to the commission of the six murders. In the face of overwhelming evidence that defendant in fact committed these murders, counsel had little choice, and indeed, a contrary approach may well have been untenable. (See Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 858, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305 [concession of guilt and focusing on weak link in the prosecution's case may be a valid tactic when evidence of guilt is overwhelming].) Defendant also criticizes trial counsel for failing to adequately set forth his second degree murder defense. We disagree. Trial counsel competently argued to the jury that defendant's consumption of alcohol and drugs impaired his mental state and led to an impulsive killing that did not rise to the level of premeditation and deliberation necessary for first degree murder. He called the jury's attention to the evidence of defendant's intoxication, and to the expert testimony regarding the effects such intoxication would likely have on judgment and impulse control. Given the state of evidence in the case, such argument did not constitute deficient performance. Defendant also claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during defendant's testimony. He testified over trial counsel's protest that he needed time to talk to him to determine what questions to ask. Denied that, trial counsel asked general questions about the crime, during which defendant related his version of what had happened. On cross-examination, the incredibility of defendant's version of events and his claim of mistaken identity was brought fully to light. On redirect, trial counsel allowed defendant to testify in an open-ended fashion, asking if there was an area of testimony... about which you would like to tell. Defendant now contends that this tactic, as well as trial counsel's statements that he and defendant had not discussed defendant's testimony ahead of time, constituted ineffective assistance. We disagree. Although counsel was opposed to defendant's testifying, he cooperated as best he could, while at the same time subtly distancing himself from defendant so that he would not be tainted by defendant's own lack of credibility. Such conduct was not deficient performance.