Opinion ID: 6342797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The WVSFMO’s Immunity

Text: First, the WVSFMO argues that if Mr. Ayersman is immune, the WVSFMO must also be immune under a theory of vicarious liability. Since Mr. Ayersman’s immunity is yet to be resolved, this argument is premature. Second, the WVSFMO argues that even if Mr. Ayersman is not immune, his conduct falls outside the scope of his employment and therefore the WVSFMO cannot be held to account for it. Several of the Wratchfords’ claims against Mr. Ayersman could be construed as alleging conduct that is not in the ordinary course of his job duties, including the allegations surrounding Mr. Ayersman’s conduct during the polygraph examination and interview, and the allegation that he falsely indicated that Ms. Wratchford admitted to a prior arson attempt. If these allegations are found to be true, a jury may conclude that this conduct was outside the scope of Mr. Ayersman’s employment, negating WVSFMO’s vicarious liability. 24 To this point, we have plainly held that [i]f the plaintiff identifies a clearly established right or law which has been violated by the acts or omissions of the State, its agencies, officials, or employees, or can otherwise identify fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive acts committed by such official or employee, the court must determine whether such acts or omissions were within the scope of the public official or employee’s duties, authority, and/or employment. To the extent that such official or employee is determined to have been acting outside of the scope of his duties, authority, and/or employment, the State and/or its agencies are immune from vicarious liability, but the public employee or official is not entitled to immunity in accordance with State v. Chase Securities, Inc., 188 W.Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992) and its progeny. If the public official or employee was acting within the scope of his duties, authority, and/or employment, the State and/or its agencies may be held liable for such acts or omissions under the doctrine of respondeat superior along with the public official or employee. A.B., 234 W. Va. at 497, 766 S.E.2d at 756, syl. pt. 12. We further recognized in A.B. that “whether an agent is ‘acting within the scope of his employment and about his employer’s business [. . .] is generally a question of fact for the jury and a jury determination on that point will not be set aside unless clearly wrong.” Id. at 509, 766 S.E.2d at 768 (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Griffith v. George Transfer and Rigging, Inc., 157 W. Va. 316, 201 S.E.2d 281 (1973)) (emphasis in original). We elaborated upon this by stating that “[o]rdinarily, the determination whether an employee has acted within the scope of employment presents a question of fact; it becomes a question of law, however, when ‘the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible.’ In some cases, the relationship between an employee’s work and wrongful conduct is so attenuated that a jury could not reasonably conclude that the act was within the scope of employment.” 25 Id. (quoting Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991)). In the case at bar there are many disputed facts regarding Mr. Ayersman’s conduct. A jury must determine whether Mr. Ayersman was acting within the scope of his employment. Until that determination is made, the WVSFMO’s entitlement to qualified immunity cannot be resolved. Finally, the WVSFMO contends that the circuit court erred in finding that it was not entitled to qualified immunity on the Wratchfords’ claim that the WVSFMO negligently trained and supervised Mr. Ayersman. This Court has recognized that “broad categories of training, supervision, and employee retention . . . easily fall within the category of ‘discretionary’ governmental functions.” Id. at 514, 766 S.E.2d at 773. As such, we once again apply the standard that a government entity engaged in performing discretionary functions is entitled to immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates “that such acts or omissions are in violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws . . . or are otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive[.]” Id. at 497, 766 S.E.2d at 756, syl. pt. 11. In this regard, the Wratchfords contend that Mr. Ayersman’s WVSFMO supervisors assisted in orchestrating this faulty investigation by: (1) assigning him to the investigation despite knowing of his potential conflict of interest; (2) condoning, accepting, or covering up his alleged failure to adhere to WVSFMO policies and the law; (3) providing allegedly false information to the Ethics Commission to protect Mr. Ayersman; and (4) 26 directing Mr. Ayersman to file allegedly unfounded criminal charges against Ms. Wratchford. Assuming a jury determined Mr. Ayersman’s conduct below was fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive, it is not unreasonable that the same jury may find that the WVSFMO acted in a manner which would strip it of qualified immunity for its discretionary supervision of Mr. Ayersman. As stated above, the resolution of this question lies with a jury, as it is contingent upon the resolution of numerous disputed facts. Based on the foregoing, each of the WVSFMO’s arguments fails at this time because — as with Mr. Ayersman — there are multiple factual issues that must be resolved before an immunity determination can be made. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment on these points.