Opinion ID: 682711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Commission's Review of MSHA Regulations.

Text: 25 In affirming the citation, the Commission noted, [our] task is not to devise the best method of monitoring injuries sustained by miners but to determine whether the Secretary's method, as implemented by the regulations, is reasonable. Energy West Mining Co., 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 592. Energy West contends that the Commission, in deferring to the Secretary, abdicated its duty under Mine Act section 113(d)(A)(2)(ii) to review cases involving a substantial question of law, policy or discretion.... 30 U.S.C. Sec. 823(d)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (emphasis added). Under this reasoning, the Commission should have visited the policy issues involved here as a matter of first impression. We disagree. 26 The Commission drew its deferential standard of review of the Secretary's interpretation from its prior decision in Consolidated Coal Co., 14 F.M.S.H.R.C. 956, 969 (1992). That case involved review of the Secretary's method for determining injury incident rates. In upholding the Secretary's interpretation there, the Commission noted, [o]ur task is not to determine the best method of calculating incident rates, but to determine whether the Secretary's interpretation of the reporting regulation is reasonable.... Id. Consequently, the Commission's review of the Secretary's interpretation, like ours, is limited to a determination of reasonableness. The Commission did not err in applying that standard. 27 We have already recognized that the Commission owes the Secretary such deference in Secretary of Labor v. Cannelton Indus., Inc., 867 F.2d 1432 (D.C.Cir.1989). There, we reversed a decision of the Commission because it failed to extend the appropriate deference to the Secretary's interpretation of her own regulations and of the Mine Act. Id. at 1439 (emphasis added). As we further stated in Cannelton Indus., in deciding issues of the interpretation of the Mine Act, [t]he question for this court and the Commission is whether the Secretary's interpretation is 'a permissible construction of the statute.'  Id. at 1435 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782) (emphasis added). 28 Petitioner argues that the Commission should not afford deference to the Secretary's interpretation because Congress has afforded the Commission itself a policymaking role under 30 U.S.C. Secs. 823(d)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) and 823(d)(2)(B). 29 The first of those two subsections merely states that the petitioner may call upon the Commission's power of discretionary review over a decision of an administrative law judge where a substantial question of law, policy or discretion is involved. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 823(d)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). 30 The second of the subsections provides that the Commission may on its own motion order a case for review where the decision may be contrary to law or Commission policy, or that a novel question of policy has been presented. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 823(d)(2)(B). Neither of these paragraphs offers a convincing argument that Congress intended to deprive the Secretary of the deference which we in Cannelton Indus. and the Commission in Consolidated Coal have previously afforded its interpretations of the Act. 31 We conclude, therefore, that the Commission's deferential approach to the Secretary's interpretation is well grounded in both administrative and circuit precedent. It affords no basis for reversal.