Opinion ID: 2359652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Omissions from Jury Instructions

Text: On this appeal, the defendant assigns as error, despite no objection at the time, the presiding justice's failure to define the terms use of a dangerous weapon, an essential element of the crime of criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon, and bodily injury, an essential element of the crime of simple assault. No party shall assign as error any omission from jury instructions unless he objects before the jury retires. M.R.Crim.P. 30(b). An exception to the general rule is M.R. Crim.P. 52(b), which permits the Law Court to notice obvious errors affecting substantial rights even though no objection was made at trial. In review, the Law Court will not scrutinize instructions for isolated short-comings, instead we consider the effect of all the instructions in context, particularly in an obvious error situation. State v. Daley, 440 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Me.1982). The presiding justice's failure to define the phrase use of a dangerous weapon prejudicially affects substantial rights of the defendant. Use of a dangerous weapon means: the use of a firearm or other weapon, device, instrument or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which, in the manner it is used or threatened to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 2(9)(A) (1983). Serious bodily injury referred to in the definition of use of a dangerous weapon, and undefined by the presiding justice's instructions, means: a bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or loss or substantial impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or extended convalescence necessary for recovery of physical health. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 2(23) (1983). Although the jury had the opportunity to view the butcher knife and hear testimony about its use, the jury could not determine by means of common sense the meaning of the phrases use of a dangerous weapon and serious bodily injury, indeed the jury may never have heard the phrase serious bodily injury during the trial. In fact, the presiding justice instructed the jury that on neither charge were they to be concerned with the quantum of bodily injury. The jury may have incorrectly thought that by merely holding a knife in his hand the defendant used a dangerous weapon when the definition requires a use or threatened use which is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. Because we vacate the defendant's conviction of criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon, we do not reach the issue whether the Superior Court's failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of simple criminal threatening was reversible error. Unlike the failure to define use of a dangerous weapon and serious bodily injury, the failure to define bodily injury, as used in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207(1) simple assault, did not prejudicially affect substantial rights of the defendant. Neither 17-A M.R.S.A. § 2(5) (1983) defining bodily injury, nor § 207(1) itself, requires any particular level or quantum of pain, illness, or impairment. If anything, the common sense understanding of the phrase bodily injury is more restrictive than its statutory meaning.