Opinion ID: 4198316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The TCPA

Text: With an understanding of the scope of the exclusionary clause, we turn next to the TCPA. Federal argues a TCPA claim is inherently an invasion of privacy claim. The district court agreed, concluding that the protection of privacy interests was “the conceptual wellspring of the TCPA’s protections.” 2015 WL 2088865, at . The Lakers assert in response that invasion of privacy is just one of the harms which the TCPA sought to protect the public against. Thus, we must determine whether the purpose of the TCPA was to prevent invasions of privacy, or, in addition, some other harm. In making this determination we start, as we must, with the text of the statute.2 McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 2 We know of no canon of construction that instructs us first to determine if the statutory elements of a cause of action are ambiguous. Rather, we approach statutory construction as a “holistic endeavor,” considering the whole text of a statute, including any portion expressing the statute’s purpose. See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). L.A. LAKERS V. FEDERAL INS. CO. 11 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014); see also Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text.”). Our inquiry will “end[] there as well if the text [of the statute] is unambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). “The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to ‘presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). If “the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms.” Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534 (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)). We must also “assum[e] that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used” by the legislature. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962). Like plain meaning, “[t]he ‘plain purpose’ of legislation . . . is determined in the first instance with reference to the plain language of the statute itself.” Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 (1986) (citing Richards, 369 U.S. at 9); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012) (“[T]he purpose [of a statute] must be derived from the text, not from extrinsic sources such as legislative history or an assumption about the legal drafter’s desires.”). In debating and considering a statute, Congress often gives numerous reasons why the statute would be advantageous. But not all of these stated objectives potentially served by the statute constitute the statute’s “purpose.” To find a statute’s purpose we must look to see if Congress has clearly stated it in the text of the statute itself. Thus, the language of the 12 L.A. LAKERS V. FEDERAL INS. CO. statute is “the best guide to the purposes of a statute,” because “statutes are records of legislative compromise.” Am. Ass’n of Retired Pers. v. EEOC, 823 F.2d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Bd. of Governors, 474 U.S. at 374). The TCPA makes it unlawful for a person, to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service . . . or any service for which the called party is charged for the call . . . . 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). In addition, one of the individuals to the call (either the caller or the recipient) must be “within the United States.” Id. § 227(b)(1). Unlike some statutes, the TCPA does not dedicate a section of its text to describing its purpose. However, that does not mean the TCPA does not state its purpose. In fact, Congress explicitly stated the purpose of the TCPA in two sections: § 227(b)(2)(B) and § 227(b)(2)(C). Subsection 227(b)(2) requires the Federal Communications Commission to “prescribe regulations to implement th[e] subsection” of the TCPA that outlines the “[r]estrictions on use of automated telephone equipment.” In addition, § 227(b)(2)(B) provides that the Federal Communications Commission, may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of paragraph (1)(B) of this L.A. LAKERS V. FEDERAL INS. CO. 13 subsection, subject to such conditions as the Commission may prescribe– ... (ii) such classes or categories of calls made for commercial purposes as the Commission determines– (I) will not adversely affect the privacy rights that this section is intended to protect; and (II) do no include the transmission of any unsolicited advertisement. (emphasis added). Further, § 227(b)(2)(C) provides that, “[i]n implementing the requirements of this subsection, the Commission–” may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of paragraph (1)(A)(iii) of this subsection calls to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party, subject to such conditions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary in the interest of the privacy rights this section is intended to protect. (emphasis added). Thus, the TCPA twice explicitly states that it is intended to protect privacy rights. Equally as significant, the TCPA contains no other statement regarding its intended purpose. Thus, we must presume from this 14 L.A. LAKERS V. FEDERAL INS. CO. unequivocal statement, and the lack of any other statements expressing an alternative intent, that the purpose of the TCPA is to protect privacy rights and privacy rights alone.3 See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius). We have before outlined the three elements of a TCPA claim: “(1) the defendant called a cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without the recipient’s prior express consent.” Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012). Absent from this list is proof that the call invaded the recipient’s privacy. This omission is no mistake. As demonstrated by the explicitly stated purpose of the TCPA, Congress concluded that the calls it prohibited in passing the TCPA were an implicit invasion of privacy. In practice, there may be other interests that the TCPA protects. But these alternative interests do not transform Congress’s express intent to craft the TCPA to serve privacy interests. Accordingly, in pleading the elements of a TCPA claim, a plaintiff pleads an invasion of privacy claim.4 3 We have previously cited legislative history when considering the purpose of the TCPA. See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009). In Satterfield we also determined that the purpose of the TCPA was to protect privacy interests. Id. However, while this purpose is clear from the statute, some history was required in that case to assist us in determining the ambiguous question of whether “call,” a term not defined in the TCPA, included text messages. Id. at 953–54. Thus, the issues in Satterfield are distinguishable from the question we face now. 4 One issue raised at oral argument was whether a holding that a TCPA claim is inherently an invasion of privacy claim would prevent corporations, which do not have the same privacy interests as individuals L.A. LAKERS V. FEDERAL INS. CO. 15 Moreover, once a TCPA plaintiff has established these three elements, and has thus proven an invasion of privacy, the plaintiff may obtain either actual or statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Such damages are available only because the plaintiff has suffered a cognizable, personal injury.5 As the district court explained, the “fact that [a plaintiff] seeks only economic damages does not strip [TCPA claims] of their privacy-based character.” 2015 WL 2088865, at . Instead, “[t]he economic injury stems from” and is a result of a defendant’s invasion of a plaintiff’s privacy. Id. The availability of statutory damages only eases the burden on plaintiffs of establishing the actual value of the harm they in many states, from obtaining relief under the TCPA. The parties did not brief this issue, so we do not address it. However, if we were to address this issue, it would not affect our decision here. Although the statute clearly indicates that Congress intended the TCPA to protect privacy interests, the statute does not clearly indicate that the TCPA was intended to protect corporations, and we have yet to answer that question. The statute’s provision of a private right of action supplies the closest indication of an answer. The statute provides that “[a] person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State . . . an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A). The statute does not define “entity.” But the statute does indicate that the states are to determine which “entities” can bring TCPA claims. Thus, the states determine whether a corporation can seek or obtain relief under the TCPA. 5 Citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the dissent asserts that the three statutory elements, which do not recite a harm, alone demonstrate a legally cognizable injury. Not only is Emanuel’s standing to sue not before us, but “[i]t is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997). 16 L.A. LAKERS V. FEDERAL INS. CO. suffered when a defendant invaded their privacy. Of course, if the invasion of privacy resulted in a loss greater than the fixed statutory award, actual damages are available.