Opinion ID: 802933
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defenses and objections based on

Text: defects in the indictment . . . (f) Failure by a party to raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial, . . . , shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 (1991 Rev. Ed.), as excerpted in United States v. Andrello, 816 F. Supp. 806, 809 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). When the Advisory Committee adopted the current version of Rule 12(b), it specifically stated that the changes were “intended to be stylistic only,” except to “more clearly indicate that Rule 47 governs any pretrial motions filed under Rule 12, including form and content.”5 Fed. R. Crim. P. 12, Advisory Committee Notes on 2002 Amendments (adding, further, that “[n]o change in practice is intended”). [11] Having failed to raise the alleged defects in the instructions to the October 2008 Grand Jury prior to his conviction, and having shown no good cause for granting relief from Rule 12’s mandated waiver, Collins has relinquished his opportunity to raise the instructional challenges on appeal. 5 Fed. R. Crim. P. 47 contains guidelines for the form, requirements, and timing of pleading and pretrial motions submitted to the court. 7480 UNITED STATES v. COLLINS C. The Court’s Imposition of a Life Term of Supervised Release 1. Standard of Review The Court’s review of Collins’s sentence involves a twostep determination for whether the district court abused its discretion. First, we review the sentence for any significant procedural errors. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). As a matter of procedural due process, “a sentencing judge must explain a sentence suf- ficiently to communicate ‘that a reasoned decision has been made’ and ‘permit meaningful appellate review.’ ” United States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2011); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The sufficiency of a court’s explanation of its sentence is case specific. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. In the second step, we review the sentence for its substantive reasonableness, accounting for the “totality of the circumstances” presented to the district court. United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2010). This Court, tracking the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), has held that “[a] substantively reasonable sentence is one that is ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to accomplish § 3553(a)(2)’s sentencing goals.” Rudd, 662 F.3d at 1260. The length of a term of supervised release is reviewed for its reasonableness using the same, deferential, abuse-ofdiscretion standard used for challenges to any other part of the defendant’s sentence. United States v. Apodaca, 641 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-5314, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 5666 (Oct. 3, 2011). Additionally, we review the district court’s decision to impose a particular condition of a term of supervised release for an abuse of discretion. Rudd, 662 F.3d at 1259; United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008). UNITED STATES v. COLLINS 7481 2. Analysis Collins challenges the district court’s procedural and substantive reasonableness in imposing the lifetime term of supervised release with Condition 15, which prohibits him from residing within 2,000 feet of parks, schools, and other child areas, particularly in conjunction with Condition 11, which prohibits frequenting or loitering “within 100 feet of school yards, parks, public swimming pools, playgrounds, youth centers, video arcade facilities, or any other places primarily used by persons under the age of 18.” Collins also argues that Condition 15 violates his fundamental constitutional rights of travel, association, and enjoyment of property, as well as his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive punishment. a. Procedural Reasonableness of the Lifetime Term of Supervised Release When reviewing a term of supervised release for procedural error, “we consider the same factors” that pertain to reviewing terms of imprisonment. Apodaca, 641 F.3d at 1081. To be a procedurally proper sentence, the district court must do the following: (1) correctly calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range; (2) treat the Guidelines as advisory; (3) consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (4) choose a sentence that is not based on clearly erroneous facts; (5) adequately explain the sentence; and (6) not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d at 1114 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Collins’s claims of procedural error relate to the burden of proof that the district court adopted in its determination that a lifetime term of supervised release with Conditions 11 and 7482 UNITED STATES v. COLLINS 15 was appropriate in this case. The appropriate burden of proof for a court’s determination during sentencing is a question of law which we review de novo. See United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[o]rdinarily, a district court uses a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof when finding facts at sentencing”). [12] Collins claims that the district court improperly presumed the reasonableness of the Sentencing Guidelines’ recommendation of a lifetime period of supervised release, by treating the lifetime length of supervised release as the “base line” at the sentencing hearing. For Collins’s offense of possession of child pornography, the Sentencing Guidelines authorize a term of supervised release for no less than five years, and the statutory maximum of a life term is recommended. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k); USSG § 5D1.2(b). Nevertheless, it would constitute procedural error for the court to “attach[ ] a presumption of reasonableness to the Guidelines range or weight[ ] the Guidelines range more heavily than other § 3553(a) factors.” Carty, 520 F.3d at 994. [13] Despite Collins’s claims to the contrary, the court’s stated reasoning behind imposing the lifetime term as part of Collins’s sentence shows that the court duly considered whether the recommended lifetime duration of supervised release was reasonable. The court made a point to clarify that it “must make a particularized determination and must not rely on generalities” in light of “the policy of the Guidelines to impose a maximum term of supervised release.” The court then discussed the particular nature and characteristics of Collins’s offense which led it to find a lifetime term warranted, as Section 3553(a) requires. Finally, the court’s attention to the particulars of Collins’s case is reflected in its Order allowing Collins to “seek termination of supervised release” after a number of years. Id. [14] It is entirely appropriate to do as the court did here and treat the Guidelines recommendation as “the starting UNITED STATES v. COLLINS 7483 point and the initial benchmark” for arriving at its sentence, so long as the court does not simply adopt the recommendation without considering the Section 3553(a) factors. Carty, 520 F.3d at 991. As the trial judge opined, “[t]he court is mindful that the Guidelines are only a starting point in crafting a reasonable sentence.” Collins’s claim that the court inappropriately presumed the reasonableness of the Guidelines in arriving at the term of supervised release lacks evidentiary support and is unpersuasive. b. Procedural Reasonableness of the Special Conditions of Release Collins also attacks the reasonableness of the special conditions of his life term of supervised release, in particular Condition 15. Collins claims the residency restrictions of Condition 15 constitute an “extremely disproportionate effect on the sentence,” and the district court should have required the government to satisfy a heightened “clear and convincing” standard before imposing Condition 15. See, e.g., Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 660; United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). Collins also insists that the district court’s justification for imposing the onerous restrictions of Condition 15 was insufficient, and that the court misapplied prior precedent. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d),6 a district court has discre- 6 Section 3583(d) states, in pertinent part, that in addition to the mandatory conditions of release, The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent that such condition— (1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section [3553(a)] . . . and; (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section [3553(a)] . . . and; (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a); 7484 UNITED STATES v. COLLINS tion to impose special conditions of supervised release, so long as the conditions are: reasonably related to the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender; involve no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary to achieve those goals; and are consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. United States v. Riley, 576 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2009). In weighing these factors for a particular defendant, this Court has held that “the government ‘shoulders the burden of proving that a particular condition of supervised release involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to serve the goals of supervised release.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Rudd, 662 F.3d at 1260 (“The burden of establishing the necessity of any condition falls on the government.”). We reject Collins’s proposed application of the heightened “clear and convincing” burden to the government’s request for the lifetime term of release with Condition 15. The clear and convincing standard has been reserved for “exceptional” enhancements of the defendant’s offense level calculation. See United States v. Felix, 561 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). Condition 15 is a special condition of release, not an enhancement to Collins’s sentence. The clear and convincing standard, historically, has only been applied to sentencing courts’ findings in support of offense level enhancements, never for terms of supervised release. [and] any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b) [18 USCS § 3563(b)] and any other condition it considers to be appropriate. UNITED STATES v. COLLINS 7485 Although we decline to impose retroactively a heightened standard of proof on the government to support its requested conditions of release, we must still review the district court’s reasoning for each part of the sentence, including the imposed conditions of supervised release, for whether the district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. [15] It is well-established law that “it would be procedural error . . . to fail adequately to explain the sentence selected.” Rudd, 662 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Carty, 520 F.3d at 993). While “we have held that the district court ‘need not state at sentencing the reasons for imposing each condition of supervised release,” id., that is only true “if [the reasoning] is apparent from the record.” Id. (citations omitted) (concluding that “[t]he touchstone of ‘reasonableness’ is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)”). It is not clear that the district court provided adequate support for imposing the highly restrictive supervised release conditions in this case. [16] There can be no doubt that Collins’s conditions of supervised release impose significant—even extreme— restrictions on his liberty. The residency restriction effectively prevents Collins from living in any urban area.7 See Rudd, 662 F.3d at 1264 (stating that, additionally, “[s]everal courts have also found that similar residency restrictions subject defendants to a state of ‘constant eviction,’ because the prohibited locations could potentially move or open in new places”). Such a serious restriction requires sufficient explanation, par- 7 The California Coalition on Sexual Offending’s website provides maps, produced by the Senate Office of Demographics, showing the exclusion zones pertaining to Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5(b), which prohibits a registered sex offender from residing “within 2000 feet of any public or private school,” or a subset of parks “where children regularly gather.” One exclusion zone map for Central California, for example, shows that only a few isolated areas remain in the Greater Los Angeles area for defendants to live when subject to the restriction. 7486 UNITED STATES v. COLLINS ticularly where, as here, the reasonableness of the restriction is not at all clear from the record. The district court, however, justified the residency restriction here by simply stating that the California Penal Code imposes a similar restriction on all sex offenders, and without providing any specific facts about Collins’s case that warranted the restriction. While the Guidelines recommend a lifetime term of supervised release for Collins’s class of sex offenders, USSG § 5D1.2(b), the particular residency restriction in Condition 15 is not recommended, nor is it listed as one of the standard optional conditions of supervised release. See USSG § 5D1.3(e). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has recently held that, a “growing body of empirical research casts serious doubts on the assumption that persons viewing child pornography on the Internet are equally dangerous and likely to commit serious offenses involving sexual contact as are other offenders.” Apodaca, 641 F.3d at 1083. Here, rather than weighing the requisite 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors to determine the appropriateness of the residency restriction, the district court rationalized Condition 15 simply by stating that, “[t]he short answer is that as a general matter, Collins must follow the law as a condition of supervised release, and this restriction is mandated by California law.” While the court also added that Condition 15 “is a proper measure to ensure protection of the public given the nature of the crime, and the Ninth Circuit has approved even more stringent restrictions,” it did not at all explain why Collins’s crime, of possessing child pornography, warrants forcing him to live in rural areas, at least 2,000 feet from schools, parks, public swimming pools, playgrounds, youth centers, video arcade facilities, or any other places deemed by his probation officer to be “primarily used by persons under the age of 18.” Id. [17] Collins’s lifetime term with Condition 15 places his supervised release in league with the most restrictive terms, UNITED STATES v. COLLINS 7487 imposed on the most serious child molesters. Collins’s crime was an internet-only offense, and he has no prior sex crime convictions. While he admitted to having had a relationship with the 15-year-old minor, “M.A.,” which arguably may have provided some support for the restriction, the district court should have explained why the lifetime term with the severe residency restrictions “involve[d] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of supervised release.” Daniels, 541 F.3d at 924; as quoted in Rudd, 662 F.3d at 1263 (in which the Court held that, “[i]n the absence of any explanation of how the chosen distance furthers the purposes of Rudd’s supervised release, the choice of 2,000 feet appears arbitrary”). The district court, however, appears not to have considered the appropriate sentencing factors when it imposed Condition 15. By only vaguely referencing just one of the factors (protection of minors), the court’s Order “neither communicates ‘that a reasoned decision has been made,’ nor is sufficient to ‘permit meaningful appellate review.’ ” Rudd, 662 F.3d at 1263 (quoting Carty, 520 F.3d at 992). The district court’s reliance on the 2,000-foot residency restriction for all registered sex offenders under Cal. Penal Code 3003.5(b) for justifying its imposition of Condition 15, is misplaced. We agree with the district court, that, having been convicted of a sex offense punishable as an offense described in Cal. Penal Code § 290(c),8 Collins is required to register as a sex offender in California.9 Once registered as 8 Section 290.005(a) provides that any person “convicted in any other court, including any state, federal, or military court, of any offense that . . . would have been punishable as one or more of the offenses described in subdivision (c) of Section 290” shall register as a sex offender. Section 290(c) includes possession of child pornography in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 311.1 in its list of described offenses requiring sex offender registration. 9 Federal law, in turn, requires that, “[t]he court shall order, as an explicit condition of supervised release for a person required to register 7488 UNITED STATES v. COLLINS such, he will be subject to Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5(b)’s residency restriction, which is substantially similar to Condition 15’s.10 See, e.g., U.S. v. Davidson, 246 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “Section 290[ ] requires any person who has been convicted of one of a series of enumerated state law offenses, or any federal offense that would have been punishable as one of those enumerated state law offenses, to register as a sex offender for the rest of his or her life while residing in . . . or . . . while located within California”). The residency restriction imposed by the court, however, is not identical to the California Penal Code’s,11 and even if it were, the district court still has a duty to analyze the appropriateness of Condition 15 pursuant to the required federal sentencing factors, notwithstanding any related state law restrictions. See Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d at 1116 (“We assume that district judges know the law and understand their obliga- tion to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors.”) (internal quotations omitted). [18] In sum, it was procedural error for the district judge to impose a residency restriction with Condition 15’s duration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, that the person comply with the requirements of that Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583. This was ordered by Judge Selna, and Collins assented to these requirements in the proceedings below. 10 Section 3003.5(b) provides, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for any person for whom registration is required pursuant to Section 290 to reside within 2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.” Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5(b). 11 Condition 15 is significantly broader and more restrictive than Cal. Penal Code 3003.5(b). In addition to requiring Collins to reside at least 2,000 feet from parks and schools, Condition 15 adds to that list “swimming pools, playgrounds, youth centers, video arcade facilities, or any other places primarily used by persons under the age of 18,” and finally requiring that any change in residence be pre-approved by his probation officer. UNITED STATES v. COLLINS 7489 and breadth as part of Collins’s federal sentence without an analysis of the basis therefor per the federal sentencing regime. While the practical effect of removing the 2,000-foot restriction from his sentence may be minimal, the Penal Code’s restriction in Section 3003.5(b) could be amended by the state legislature to 1,000 feet or “within sight of” children, during Collins’s life. The statute could also be repealed or held unconstitutional by a state or federal court. Under his current sentence, Collins would still be bound by the 2,000foot restriction of Condition 15, regardless of what changes may be made to Section 3003.5(b). Moreover, Collins may reside in some other state where he must conform to that state’s law, and not California’s. [19] We vacate the residency restriction and remand Collins’s sentence to the district court to provide the appropriate analysis and support for its imposed terms and conditions of supervised release. c. Substantive Reasonableness of Condition 15 The next step in our review of Collins’s conditions of release would be to evaluate them for substantive reasonableness. The sentencing court “enjoys significant discretion in crafting terms of supervised release for criminal defendants, including the authority to impose restrictions that infringe on fundamental rights,” but that discretion “is not, however, boundless.” United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 557 (9th Cir. 2006). In Weber, the Court held that “conditions of supervised release are permissible only if they are reasonably related to the goal of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender.” Id. at 558. There is good reason to suspect that the imposition of the sweeping residency restriction in Condition 15 for life is substantively unreasonable for Collins’s conviction of possession of child pornography.12 Because we have concluded the dis12 In this past year’s decision, United States v. Apodaca, for example, the Court questioned the reasonableness of lifetime terms of supervised 7490 UNITED STATES v. COLLINS trict court procedurally erred by failing to provide adequate reasons for imposing Condition 15 where the reasons for such a condition were not clear form the record alone, it follows that we do not reach the question of the substantive reasonableness of Collins’s conditions of release. We remand the determination of the substantive reasonableness of Condition 15 to the district court, as part of its reconsideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for whether the residency restriction involves “a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.” Rudd, 622 F.3d at 1264 (quoting Daniels, 541 F.3d at 924).