Opinion ID: 1825816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court's order restricts Laura's right to teach her child the worship of God.

Text: The majority's refusal to consider the merits of Laura's claim is very troubling, as Laura implicates the trial court in the infringement of two closely connected, God-given and inalienable rights  the right to free exercise of religion and the right to freedom of expression in the training of one's children: [T]he trial court exceeded its authority by restricting the Mother by only permitting her to train the child in her religious views `by example.' The mother should be free to explain the teachings of her church to the child and to continue to foster her child's development as a Christian. (Petitioner's brief, pp. 38-39.) Given the exceptional importance of these rights, I believe this Court has a duty to fully consider the claims of the infringement of these rights now rather than inviting the parties to restart the potentially lengthy and costly litigation process all over again, as the majority opinion directs. Unfortunately, rather than address the vital substance of Laura's concern, the majority ignores it and instead criticizes the form in which she expressed that concern by suggesting that Laura has interpreted the trial court's order more broadly than the court intended. 929 So.2d at 457. It is true that Laura's restatement of the trial court's order could have been more precise  just as the language of the trial court's order could have been more precise  but I do not find Laura's characterization of the order to be inaccurate when considered in context. Moreover, even the most deferential reading of the trial court's order fails to address what I consider to be the most important issue in this case: whether the trial court overreached by ordering Laura to stop teaching her child the worship of God to the extent that such teaching conflicted with William's beliefs or practices. [14] III.