Opinion ID: 2627837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-Judgment Interest and Cost Adjustments.

Text: Reust's final point on appeal is that post-judgment interest should be set at the rate of interest that was in effect at the time of the first judgment, 4.25%, rather than the rate on judgments when the judgment after remand was issued, 9.25%. This argument is based on Appellant Rule 509, which provides: If a judgment for money in a civil case is affirmed, interest at the rate prescribed by law shall be payable from the effective date of the judgment of the trial court. If in a civil case a judgment is modified or reversed with directions that a judgment for money be issued by the trial court, interest on the new judgment at the rate prescribed by law shall be payable from the effective date of the prior judgment which was modified or reversed. Reust's point is well taken and the State concedes it. The State also suggests that in light of our decision in State v. Carpenter, [18] a pro rata share of Reust's costs, in addition to attorney's fees, should have been deducted from the State's share of punitive damages. We agree. As we held in Carpenter, [i]n order to ensure that the state is not unjustly enriched at the expense of litigants, we read AS 09.60.080 to require a pro rata deduction of costs from the state's share of the punitive damages award. [19] For the above reasons, we conclude that this case should be remanded to the superior court with instructions to modify the judgment by changing the post-judgment rate of interest on the judgment to 4.25% and by deducting Reust's pro rata share of costs attributable to the State's portion of the award. Except for these changes, the judgment should be affirmed. AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED for modification.