Opinion ID: 3002225
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequate Remedies at Law

Text: As we noted in Bloedorn, “[s]ection 10(j) relief is an extraordinary remedy . . . reserved for ‘those situations in which the effective enforcement of the NLRA is threatened by the delays inherent in the NLRB dispute resolution process.’ ” 276 F.3d at 297 (quoting Szabo v. PIE Nationwide, Inc., 878 F.2d 207, 209 (7th Cir. 1989)). We first consider whether the district court clearly erred when it determined that the rights of the employees under the NLRA would suffer irreparable harm from the passage of time between the filing of charges and the resolution of the complaint by the NLRB. Id.; see also Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Only if [the employees] will suffer irreparable harm in the interim—that is, harm that cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the final judgment after trial—can [they] get a preliminary injunction.”). The process of NLRB resolution has long been recognized as extraordinarily slow—indeed, the purpose of section 10(j) was to prevent employers from taking advantage of this significant passage of time in their efforts to quash 16 No. 07-3925 union support in the interim. See NLRB v. PIE Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1990); Szabo, 878 F.2d at 20910; Kinney, 881 F.2d at 493-94. The longer that an employer is able to chill union participation or avoid bargaining with a union, the less likely it is that the union will be able to organize and to represent employees effectively once the NLRB issues its final order. See Bloedorn, 276 F.3d at 299; see also Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1573; Schaub v. W. Mich. Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 250 F.3d 962, 971 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting the significant effects of chill on the ability of a union to organize). This risk is particularly true in cases involving fledgling unions, where the passage of time is especially critical. See Arlook v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 367, 373 (11th Cir. 1992). Here, the district court, noting the precipitous decline in Union participation, credited the testimony of many Spurlino employees who stated that they were hesitant to attend Union meetings because they feared discrimination. If Spurlino is allowed to proceed in its quest to defeat the Union before it becomes established, the court found, then merely requiring the company to pay its employees damages after the fact will not remedy the adverse impact to the Union and the employees in the interim period. Spurlino contends that immediate injunctive relief is unnecessary in this case. In support, it notes that the Regional Director filed a motion to postpone for a few weeks the district court’s hearing on the preliminary injunction, which, in Spurlino’s view, shows that the need for injunctive relief is not urgent. See Schaub v. Detroit No. 07-3925 17 Newspaper Agency, 154 F.3d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Director’s 18-month delay in filing a petition for injunction showed that interim relief was unnecessary); but see Gottfried v. Frankel, 818 F.2d 485, 495 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that delay is a factor that may be considered, but it is not particularly probative; the question is whether interim relief is necessary to restore the parties to the status quo). Spurlino also contends that evidence in the record shows that the Union is not in precipitous decline, and it suggests that any reduction in attendance at Union meetings is because the meetings are held on Friday evenings, a popular time for other activities. Spurlino’s arguments, however, show only that there may be an alternative view of the evidence presented to the district court; they do not establish that the district court’s view of the evidence was clearly erroneous. After a review of the record, we must conclude that the district court did not clearly err when it found that an award of damages in future years would be an inade- quate remedy in this case.