Opinion ID: 2976073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim requires the claimant to establish two components: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance,” id., as measured by “prevailing professional norms,” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted). As the Court made clear in Strickland, and has reiterated many times since, those “prevailing professional norms” are the norms in place at the time counsel renders the nowchallenged assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's 3 perspective at the time.”); see also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381 (“In judging the defense's investigation, as in applying Strickland generally, hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to counsel's perspective at the time investigative decisions are made.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (“[W]e must conduct an objective review of [counsel’s] performance, measured for reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, which includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel's perspective at the time.” (quotation marks and internal citations omitted)). At its core, the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis is based on “an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. When evaluating counsel’s performance, we indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and effective. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186 (1986). To establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Newman must identify Porter’s acts or omissions that he alleges were not the result of “reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Newman specifically argues that Porter’s failure to pursue an agreement permitting him to plead guilty to second-degree murder rendered her assistance constitutionally ineffective. It is clear from the record that Porter neither approached Beadle regarding such a plea agreement nor discussed with Newman the possibility of pursuing such an agreement. Therefore, we must determine whether Porter’s failure to pursue such a plea amounts to ineffective assistance, keeping in mind the strong presumption that Porter rendered “adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. Adequate representation by a criminal defense attorney entails exploring possible plea negotiations and deals. Newman v. United States, No. 96-6326, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20565 at  (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 1998) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978)). Here, Porter 4 did explore plea negotiations that were consistent with Newman’s claim that he accidentally shot Bell, but Beadle rebuffed her, stating that a plea to manslaughter was “totally unacceptable.” That rejection led Porter to believe, erroneously, that Beadle had foreclosed the idea of any plea agreement in the case, and that pursuing further plea negotiations would be futile. This incorrect belief, however, did not render her assistance ineffective. To fairly assess Porter’s representation we must “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. It is undisputed that Beadle made no offer to Porter of a plea agreement of any kind, and while he may have been open to a plea to second-degree murder, Porter certainly did not know that at the time. Importantly, such a plea would have been wholly inconsistent with Newman’s contention that he accidentally shot Bell. Newman admits that the evidence against him in this case was “very strong.” Furthermore, Beadle testified that had Porter offered a plea deal that included a corresponding sentence of at least 30 years in prison for Newman, he would have referred it to his supervisor. Beadle did not testify that he even had the authority to accept such an offer. Porter’s bargaining position on behalf of Newman was markedly weak. We will not hold that an attorney rendered constitutionally deficient assistance because she did not seek a plea agreement that she reasonably believed the prosecutor would reject, and that could not be reconciled with her client’s version of the facts of the offense. Accordingly, we hold that Porter’s representation was not constitutionally ineffective.