Opinion ID: 50249
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The MSA is Governed by Maritime Law

Text: Maxum’s final argument is that Louisiana law should apply to strike down the MSA’s indemnity clause. However, if the MSA is a maritime contract governed by maritime law, as Axxis argues, Louisiana law is inapplicable and the parties agree that the indemnity provision is enforceable. See Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 500 (5th Cir. 2002). There is no bright-line rule used to determine whether a contract is maritime in nature. Id. at 500 (describing it as “a perplexing affair”); Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 1986). Determining whether the MSA is a maritime contract governed by maritime law depends partly on “its historical treatment in the jurisprudence,” and partly on a six-pronged “factspecific inquiry.” Demette, 280 F.3d at 500 (discussing Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1990)). It is uncontested that the FREEDOM is an inland drilling barge, and personnel contracts for such barges are historically treated as 9 maritime contracts. Demette, 280 F.3d at 500–01. As for the fact-specific inquiry, we need not consider each of the six prongs listed in Demette individually.2 Axxis points out that the undisputed evidence shows that all six of these factors militate in favor of finding that this was a maritime contract and Maxum never makes any allegation disputing that. Maxum only makes a conclusory statement that there are insufficient facts to find that maritime law applies. But Maxum cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by claiming “some metaphysical doubt” as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). Axxis’s argument is strengthened by the MSA’s choice-of-law provision stating that general maritime law is applicable. 2 The six prongs are as follows: 1. What does the specific work order in effect at the time of the injury provide? 2. What work did the crew assigned under the work order actually do? 3. Was the crew assigned to do work aboard a vessel in navigable waters? 4. To what extent did the work being done relate to the mission of the vessel? 5. What was the principal work of the injured worker? 6. What work was the injured worker actually doing at the time of injury? 10 The district court properly found that the MSA is governed by maritime law and Maxum has failed to point to any concrete factual dispute that could alter that finding. Under maritime law, it is undisputed that the indemnity provision at issue is valid, so we affirm the district court’s judgment.