Opinion ID: 196165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gaining Perspective.

Text: 15 Further facts are needed to place appellant's extradition-related claims into a workable perspective. On November 18, 1991, a federal grand jury returned the indictment that inaugurated this prosecution. Count 1 charged appellant, his wife, and eleven associates with RICO conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d) (1988). A RICO conspiracy, of course, requires the government to prove, inter alia, an illicit agreement to conduct a pattern of racketeering activity. See United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 503 (1st Cir.1990); see also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c) (1988). Proof of a pattern demands that the prosecution show at least two acts of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5) (1988). These acts, which must themselves comprise violations of specified criminal statutes, see id. Sec. 1961(1)(B), are commonly referred to as predicates or predicate acts. See, e.g., Ruiz, 905 F.2d at 503. 16 In the instant indictment, the alleged racketeering activity comprised, among other specified predicate acts, incidents of money laundering, see 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1956, 1957, CTR violations, see 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5324(a)(1)-(3), and using travel and facilities in interstate commerce to promote these money laundering ventures, see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952(a)(3). The grand jury also averred that the RICO conspiracy had been accomplished by means that included failing to file the necessary CTRs for cash transactions over $10,000. Counts 2-53 of the indictment charged appellant and others with failing to file CTRs in specific instances, see 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5324(a)(1); counts 54-68 charged appellant with illegally structuring monetary transactions in order to avoid the CTR reporting requirements, see id. Sec. 5324(a)(3); counts 69-129 charged appellant and his wife with the use of property derived from unlawful activities while engaging in monetary transactions affecting interstate commerce, see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956; counts 130-142 charged appellant and his wife with money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(a)(2); and counts 143-150 charged appellant and others with Travel Act violations under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952(a)(3). The indictment also contained forfeiture allegations under the applicable RICO and money laundering statutes. See 18 U.S.C. Secs. 982, 1963. 17 Six days after the grand jury returned the indictment, Swiss authorities arrested the Saccoccias in Geneva. They contested extradition on counts 1 through 68, and counts 143 through 150. On June 11, 1992, the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) granted extradition on all charges except those contained in counts 2 through 68. The SFT reasoned that these 67 counts constituted nonextraditable offenses because Swiss law did not prohibit the underlying conduct. The SFT's discussion did not specifically mention the forfeiture allegations. 18 The Swiss surrendered appellant to the United States. He was transported to Rhode Island and arraigned on July 15. One week later, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment. 5 On July 30, the Justice Department, in the person of Michael O'Hare, wrote to Tania Cavassini, a Swiss official, enclosing a copy of the superseding indictment and inquiring whether it required a waiver of the rule of specialty. 19 On December 1, 1992, apparently in response to an inquiry from Cavassini, O'Hare transmitted a written assurance that, although the court papers still formally listed appellant as a defendant in respect to the CTR counts (for which extradition had been denied), the prosecution did not intend to press those counts. O'Hare explained that the prosecutor would offer no evidence of appellant's guilt on those charges, with the result that American law [will require] the judge to direct the jury to find the defendant not guilty. The following day, Cavassini advised that, under a final decision dated November 20, 1992, the SFT had granted extradition of [appellant] for the facts enclosed in the Count Nr. 1 of the Superseding Indictment. Cavassini also indicated that appellant's local counsel in Geneva agreed with the SFT's decision and had scotched any possibility of a further appeal. 20 On February 2, 1993, before the start of the trial with which we are concerned, the government moved to dismiss those counts of the superseding indictment (counts 2-37) that charged appellant with CTR offenses. The district court complied. The matter resurfaced in a slightly different shape ten days later when appellant's Swiss lawyer, Paul Gully-Hart, wrote to Cavassini expressing concern that appellant's impending prosecution on charges in which CTR violations were embedded as predicates for other offenses would insult the rule of specialty. On March 2, Gully-Hart wrote again, this time enclosing a copy of the prosecution's opening statement to the petit jury. Cavassini forwarded both of these letters to O'Hare. On March 8, Cavassini spoke with O'Hare and voiced her concern that appellant might be convicted under count 1 solely on the basis of CTR offenses. 21 The next day, Assistant United States Attorney James Leavey, a member of the prosecution team, advised Judge Torres that he had spoken with O'Hare. Without conceding the legal validity of Gully-Hart's point, Leavey asked the court to instruct the jury that CTR violations could not serve as predicates for purposes of either the RICO or Travel Act counts. When the court acquiesced, the government submitted a redacted indictment that deleted all references to CTR offenses from the RICO and Travel Act counts. Appellant nonetheless moved for a mistrial, invoking the rules of dual criminality and specialty. 22 The district court denied the motion, explaining that it had agreed to the government's proposal purely as an accommodation. In the judge's view, the precautions were not legally required because the SFT had been pellucid in authorizing prosecution on the RICO count even though the claimed CTR violations were prominently displayed therein as potential predicates. The judge noted, moreover, that evidence of appellant's CTR violations was in all events admissible in connection with the substantive money laundering counts (as to which extradition had been approved). Appellant resurrected the issue in his motion for a new trial following the adverse jury verdict. The court stood firm. 23