Opinion ID: 2804713
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adoptive Admission Instruction

Text: Defendant contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury on adoptive admissions because the jailhouse letter to which the instruction pertained was improperly admitted and also because, as a cautionary instruction for his benefit, it should not have been given over his objection. He asserts the instruction ―focused the jury‘s attention on . . . the prosecution‘s highly improper yet highly influential letter from the informant.‖ Over defendant‘s objection, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.71.5 as follows: ―If you should find from the evidence that there was an occasion when the defendant[:] one, under conditions which reasonably afforded him an opportunity to reply; two, failed to make a denial in the face of an accusation, expressly directed to him or in his presence, charging him with the crime for which such defendant now is on trial or tending to connect him with its commission; and three, that he heard the accusation and understood its nature, then the circumstance of his silence and conduct on that occasion may be considered against him as indicating an admission that the accusation thus made was true. [¶] Evidence of an accusatory statement is not received for the purpose of proving its truth, but only as it supplies meaning to the silence and conduct of the accused in the face of it. Unless you find that the defendant‘s silence and conduct at the time indicated an admission that the accusatory statement was true, you must entirely disregard the statement.‖ Inasmuch as we have concluded the admission of the letter was proper, we necessarily reject defendant‘s claim, premised on the asserted inadmissibility of the letter, that it was error to give the instruction. Defendant‘s remaining 29 argument—that a trial court cannot give CALJIC No. 2.71.5 should a defendant object to it—misreads People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, on which he relies. In Carter, we rejected defendant‘s argument that trial courts have a sua sponte duty to give CALJIC No. 2.71.5 and held ―a trial court must give CALJIC No. 2.71.5 only when the defendant requests it.‖ (Carter, at p. 1198, italics added.) Carter did not say that the trial court cannot give the instruction if the court determines it is warranted. To the contrary, we specifically observed: ―Trial courts may certainly [give CALJIC No. 2.71.5] if they think it best to do so. But, . . . courts are required to so instruct only at a defendant‘s request.‖ (Ibid.) Accordingly, a trial court may give the instruction, whether or not defendant requests it, if it believes the instruction will be helpful to the jury. (See People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1268 [noting that this instruction and the instruction on admissions are ―intended to help the jury . . . determine‖ whether such admissions were made].) Moreover, as we held in People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1021, the court may do so even over a defendant‘s objection. Given the letter was admitted into evidence and the jury would have to consider it, the trial court properly determined the instruction would guide the jury in assessing its evidentiary value, if any. Had the court not given the instruction, the jury might well have been left at sea regarding the relevance and significance of the letter. By implication, the trial court rejected defendant‘s argument that the instruction would be more prejudicial to him than beneficial to the jury. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in giving the instruction. 30 2. Penalty Phase Claims A. Permitting a Fourth Penalty Trial Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when, pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (b), the trial court granted the prosecution‘s motion for a fourth penalty trial. We see no abuse of discretion. Section 190.4, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part: ―If the trier of fact [at the penalty trial] is a jury and has been unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall dismiss the jury and shall order a new jury impaneled to try the issue as to what the penalty shall be. If such new jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court in its discretion shall either order a new jury or impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole.‖ Preliminarily, we note that, although there were four penalty trials in this case, only two of them were either required by or granted as a matter of discretion under the provisions of section 190.4, subdivision (b). Defendant‘s first penalty phase jury deadlocked, dividing 11 to one in favor of a death verdict. Under the statute, the prosecution was entitled to a second penalty phase trial as a matter of right. (Ibid. [providing that, if first penalty phase jury is unable to reach a verdict, the court ―shall order a new jury impaneled to try the issue as to what the penalty shall be‖].) Consequently, a mistrial was declared and a second penalty phase jury impanelled. The second penalty phase jury did not result in a hung jury. Rather, it returned a death verdict, but that verdict was reversed by the trial court and a new trial granted based on defendant‘s allegation of juror misconduct. The third penalty phase jury, required after the new trial motion was granted, deadlocked, also dividing 11 to one in favor of a death verdict. The prosecution moved for a fourth penalty trial. Although it was the fourth penalty trial sought, for purposes of section 190.4, subdivision (b), it would 31 have been only the second retrial of the penalty phase.10 Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that a fourth penalty trial was unprecedented; life in prison without parole was sufficient punishment for defendant; the prosecution‘s case was not ―going to get any better‖ if a new penalty trial were granted, while the defense case would improve; and the court should consider the testimony of defendant‘s relatives at the prior penalty trial, which defense counsel characterized as a plea to ―End this. Let us go on with our lives.‖ The prosecutor responded that the nature of defendant‘s crimes justified the death penalty and a new penalty trial. He also pointed out that, of the 36 jurors who had sat in the three penalty trials, 34 had voted for death. In ruling on the motion, the trial court acknowledged that section 190.4, subdivision (b) called upon it to exercise its discretion. The court stated it was guided by the concept of whether a new trial would be ―in furtherance of justice,‖ which required it to balance ―the constitutional rights of the defendant with the interests of society as a whole as represented by the People. It also necessitates an examination of the nature of the offense, a weighing of the evidence, consideration of the possible harassment and burdens imposed upon the defendant, and the likelihood that additional evidence will be presented at trial.‖ The court rejected economic considerations as a factor in deciding whether to grant a new penalty trial because ―[i]t is the decision of the District Attorney to allocate public resources,‖ and if either side requested a trial by jury, ―it is the constitutional duty of the court to provide a proper forum.‖ The court found that consideration of the number of jurors that had voted for the death penalty—34 out 10 Thus, we do not reach, and express no opinion regarding, whether a fourth penalty trial could be granted under the statute where the three earlier trials had resulted in deadlocked juries. 32 of 36—was proper. The court observed that the only significant evidence in mitigation was that defendant had no prior criminal record. Regarding the circumstances of the crime, the court ―determine[d] that there is substantial evidence on which a jury could base a verdict of death.‖ The court acknowledged neither side had represented it would present new or additional evidence in a new penalty trial. It found defendant would not be prejudiced by a new penalty trial because ―[h]e is not going anywhere. He will either receive the death penalty or be in prison for the rest of his life.‖ On balance, the court concluded ―legally there is no justification to deny the People‘s request to retry the penalty phase of the case,‖ but cautioned, ―[i]n the words of Mick Jagger, ‗This could be the last time.‘ ‖ Under the standard applicable to the court‘s ruling on the motion under section 190.4, subdivision (b), ― ‗a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.‘ ‖ (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 430.) Here, the trial court‘s decision was neither irrational nor arbitrary. The court carefully laid out the factors that guided its exercise of discretion, considered each one and determined, on balance, a retrial was warranted. The factors it considered were both weighty and relevant to the exercise of its discretion: whether, for example, evidence of the circumstances of the crime supported imposition of the death penalty, the numerical breakdown of jurors voting for and against the death penalty, the absence of defense evidence of more than a single factor in mitigation, and the absence of prejudice to defendant. In short, the trial court found a jury would be warranted in returning a death verdict for this horrendous crime as to which defendant offered little in the way of mitigation and as to which the overwhelming number of prior jurors had voted for death. We find no abuse of discretion in the court‘s ruling. 33 On appeal, defendant contends the trial court gave undue weight to the numerical breakdown of jurors voting for the death penalty. This is not accurate. As our recitation of the trial court‘s ruling shows, this was simply one of several factors the court considered, and one to which it did not assign dispositive or even particular weight. More broadly, defendant asserts the trial court failed to give sufficient weight to his constitutional right ―to be free from undue harassment resulting from repeated or vexatious litigation.‖ Defendant did not expressly make this argument to the trial court. Ordinarily it would be forfeited, except that the court specifically stated it had considered harassment of defendant as part of its balancing of interests. We presume that in finding no prejudice to defendant in granting the request for a fourth penalty trial, the trial court impliedly found it would not constitute harassment. Defendant‘s argument to the contrary is without merit. Defendant seeks to import into section 190.4‘s abuse of discretion standard limitations from section 1387. ―Section 1387 . . . establishes that two dismissals pursuant to section 1385, 859b, 861, 871 or 995, bar retrial on felony charges except in limited circumstances.‖ (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 270 [noting the statute is sometimes denominated the ― ‗two-dismissal rule‘ ‖].) Under that statute, retrial is permitted when, for example, ―substantial new evidence has been discovered by the prosecution which would not have been known through the exercise of due diligence at, or prior to, the time of termination of the action.‖ (§ 1387, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant argues the ―failure to offer new evidence is particularly important in the weighing process,‖ as if to suggest the absence of new evidence by the prosecution should have precluded a fourth penalty trial. We reject defendant‘s attempt to limit the trial court‘s discretion under section 190.4 with standards imposed in an entirely different statute. In the circumstances here, neither a charge nor a special circumstance finding had been 34 or would have been dismissed. Moreover, section 1387 was first enacted in 1872 while section 190.4 was first enacted in 1978. Certainly, had the Legislature wished to import standards from the former statute into the latter it could have done so, but it did not. As the trial court noted, defendant was not going anywhere, unlike a noncapital defendant who might well regain his or her liberty under the dismissal provisions of section 1387. We fail to see, and defendant fails to persuasively explain, in what manner a penalty phase retrial in the circumstances of this case constituted harassment. We affirm the trial court‘s ruling. B. Limitations on Testimony by Defendant’s Family Regarding Penalty Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excluded testimony from his relatives that his family did not wish to have the death penalty imposed upon him.11 He asserts the evidence was admissible under section 190.3 because it related to his character. (§ 190.3 [at penalty phase evidence may be presented by either side ―relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence including, but not limited to‖ evidence of ―the defendant‘s character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition‖].) Additionally, he argues the evidence should have been admitted as ―execution impact evidence‖ admissible to counter the prosecution‘s victim impact evidence. Regarding defendant‘s second argument, we have consistently held that the ―impact of a defendant‘s execution on his or her family may not be considered by the jury in mitigation.‖ (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 601, and cases cited there.) In Bennett, we also rejected any construction of section 190.3 that 11 The testimony was excluded before his second penalty trial. When the issue arose again before his fourth penalty trial, the trial court adopted the prior ruling. 35 would permit admission of such execution impact testimony, an argument defendant revives. (Bennett, at p. 602.) He fails to persuade us to reconsider our conclusions. Regarding defendant‘s argument that the evidence related to his character, we have held ―evidence that a family member or friend wants the defendant to live is admissible to the extent it relates to the defendant‘s character, but not if it merely relates to the impact of the execution on the witness.‖ (People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 367.) Thus, in Smith we concluded the trial court erred when it excluded testimony by the defendant‘s tutor that death was not appropriate because, in her assessment, the defendant was essentially a child and the execution of children was inappropriate. We explained: ―Because Foster had . . . a significant relationship [with defendant], and her opinion was based on a feature of defendant‘s character that she had personally observed (his emotional and social immaturity), we conclude that her opinion was relevant and admissible.‖ (Ibid.) Unlike Smith, defendant fails to explain to what aspect of his character testimony by family members regarding the death penalty would have applied. Trial counsel merely argued that the fact members of defendant‘s family, who were also members of the victims‘ family, were willing to testify why they did not want defendant executed ―speaks volumes about who the defendant is,‖ and was ―reflective of the kind of person they saw [him] as.‖ Nevertheless, even assuming the trial court erred in excluding the testimony, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 368 [applying the federal harmless error test, pursuant to Chapman v. California, supra, 368 U.S. 18, to the erroneous exclusion of testimony that the defendant should not receive the death penalty].) Both defendant‘s aunt and cousin testified they, and the rest of his family, wanted to maintain a relationship with him in the future. Obviously, a prerequisite to such a 36 continuing relationship would be that defendant remain alive. As one of defendant‘s attorneys observed about the scope of the trial court‘s ruling regarding permissible testimony by family members, ―anybody with a relatively low I.Q. would be able to figure out from the testimony that the ultimate conclusion is that they don‘t want him to be executed.‖ Accordingly, any error in excluding additional testimony was not prejudicial. C. CALJIC No. 8.88 Defendant launches familiar challenges to CALJIC No. 8.88, which addresses the jury‘s function in weighing the circumstances in mitigation and aggravation and in deciding the appropriate penalty. As we have consistently held with respect to these claims, the instruction is not impermissibly broad, vague or misleading, and does not fail to properly advise the jury how to determine when death is the appropriate penalty. (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1111; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 816–817.)