Opinion ID: 2398903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motions to Disqualify the Prosecuting Attorney

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing a defense motion to disqualify the prosecuting attorney and by failing to rule on the defendant's renewed motion to disqualify the prosecuting attorney. In Syllabus Point 2 of Walker v. West Virginia Ethics Commission, 201 W.Va. 108, 492 S.E.2d 167 (1997), we held that: [i]n reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court, we apply a two-prong deferential standard of review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review. The record reflects that the defendant initially moved to disqualify the prosecuting attorney because the defendant wanted the prosecutor to testify that Mr. Smith was a dangerous person and that a videotape in the possession of [the prosecutor] would be part of that evidence and there may be issues with regard to the authenticity or chain of custody of such tape. On February 12, 2008, a hearing on the motion was held by the trial court. At the hearing the prosecuting attorney informed the trial court that he did not have possession of the video referenced by the defendant and that he was never a part of the chain of custody of that video. The trial court denied the motion to disqualify the prosecuting attorney, finding that the video had been maintained by law enforcement officials. The trial court also found that the video in question had been made by the defendant and, as such, ruled that the defendant can use the tape in any manner which he sees fit. At some point thereafter, the defendant fired his trial counsel and obtained new counsel. On August 7, 2008, the defendant renewed his motion to disqualify the prosecuting attorney. The second motion to disqualify the prosecutor was premised on the defendant's intent to call the prosecutor as a fact witness. The substance of the prosecutor's expected testimony was that the defendant had spoken with the prosecutor on at least three occasions prior to the incident with Mr. Smith. In these discussions, one of which was an in-person meeting where the defendant brought legal counsel with him, the defendant relayed the difficulty [he] was having with [Mr. Smith] and sought the prosecutor's assistance and advice as to how to deal with the situation. The defendant proffered that the prosecutor would testify as to the defendant's unsuccessful efforts to get the prosecuting attorney to file charges against Mr. Smith or obtain a peace bond against Mr. Smith. Simultaneous with filing the renewed motion to disqualify the prosecuting attorney, the defendant filed an amended witness list naming the prosecuting attorney as a fact witness for the defense. The defendant also obtained and served on the prosecuting attorney a witness subpoena. After being served with the subpoena, the prosecutor moved to have it quashed, arguing that the issue had already been decided by the trial court. The record does not reflect that the trial court ruled on the renewed motion to disqualify the prosecuting attorney; however, the record also shows that the defendant took no further action to prosecute the motion after it was filed. [4] Reviewing the record, we do not find that the trial court's failure to address the renewed motion to disqualify the prosecuting attorney constitutes reversible error. The defendant did not object or bring to the trial court's attention that the renewed motion to disqualify remained a pending motion, even though the record reflects that the trial court, prior to commencement of the trial, asked defendant's counsel if the defense was ready to proceed, to which defendant's counsel responded Yes, your Honor. Our review of the record fails to find that the defendant, at any point during the trial, raised the issue of the outstanding motion with the trial court which would have provided the trial court the opportunity to address that issue. Moreover, while the defendant had identified the prosecuting attorney as a witness and even served a witness subpoena on him, the defendant did not call the prosecutor to the stand which would have forced the trial court to address the issue. Had the issue been properly raised, the defendant would not have been entitled to disqualify the prosecuting attorney under our standard for disqualifying opposing counsel when opposing counsel may be called as a witness. In Syllabus Point 3 of Smithson v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 186 W.Va. 195, 411 S.E.2d 850 (1991), we held that: When an attorney is sought to be disqualified from representing his client because an opposing party desires to call the attorney as a witness, the motion for disqualification should not be granted unless the following factors can be met: First, it must be shown that the attorney will give evidence material to the determination of the issues being litigated; second, the evidence cannot be obtained elsewhere; and, third, the testimony is prejudicial or may be potentially prejudicial to the testifying attorney's client. The defendant ostensibly wanted the prosecutor to testify that the defendant met with the prosecutor prior to the defendant's attack on the victim regarding complaints he had about Mr. Smith, and also to testify that the defendant had sought to have criminal charges prosecuted against Mr. Smith for a battery. The defendant was not entitled to disqualify the prosecuting attorney because the substance of the prosecutor's proposed testimony was obtained from other witnesses at trial and, therefore, the defendant failed to meet the second prong of our standard in Smithson. One of the witnesses providing the substance of the prosecutor's proposed testimony was attorney Berkeley Simmons. Attorney Simmons testified that he had been retained by the defendant, prior to the defendant's attack on Mr. Smith, for the purpose of helping the defendant address the problems he was having with Mr. Smith. As part of his assistance to the defendant, Attorney Simmons testified that he personally contacted the prosecuting attorney in June 2007 and arranged a meeting between the defendant and the prosecutor. At that meeting, Attorney Simmons recalled that the defendant complained to the prosecuting attorney that Mr. Smith had, on a repeated basis, harassed him, intimidated him and his family including acts of [vandalism] and other misconduct. When asked of the outcome of the meeting, Attorney Simmons testified that he did not know that anything was resolved, but that he did recall that the prosecutor had discussed the possibility of a mutual peace bond. In addition to Attorney Simmons, the defendant called David Richards, who was the Chief of Police for the Pennsboro Police Department in Ritchie County. Chief Richards testified that he had filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Smith for battery because Mr. Smith was alleged to have pushed [the defendant] in the back. A video of that incidentDefendant's Exhibit 2, which is also the same video that formed the basis for the defense's first motion to disqualifywas introduced by the defense and admitted into evidence without objection. Chief Richards testified that the battery complaint was later dismissed on motion of the prosecuting attorney because the state cannot prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt. The motion to dismiss, as well as the criminal complaint against Tom Smith, were admitted into evidence. It is clear from our review of the record that there was no basis to disqualify the prosecuting attorney. The substance of the prosecutor's testimony was obtained from other witnesses. Therefore, the defendant's motion failed to meet the standard set forth in Smithson for disqualifying a party opponent's legal counsel.