Opinion ID: 2226871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: I.N. tags

Text: License plates Vehicle registrations Bills of sale; this and all of the above from stolen or salvaged vehicles Stereo radio and VIN Tag J6F83AA014054 from a 1976 jeep, CJ5 Custom made stereo speakers to above-listed stereo CB radio and tape deck jointly wired for use with the cigarette lighter The defendant contends the warrant was too general and, in effect, was a fishing license for his premises. He relies on Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965), which held that a warrant authorizing a search for books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments of the Communist Party in Texas was too general. Concluding [t]he indiscriminate sweep of the warrant was constitutionally intolerable, the Court in Stanford, id. at 485, 85 S.Ct. at 511, 13 L.Ed.2d at 437, emphasized that when the `things' [to be seized] are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas they contain, the particularity requirement is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude. (Emphasis added.) Thus, [t]he point is that it was not contraband [ e. g., weapons, narcotics, or `cases of whiskey'] which was ordered to be seized, but literary material. Id. at 486, 85 S.Ct. at 512, 13 L.Ed.2d at 437 (emphasis added). Thus, Stanford is to be distinguished on its facts: in that case the warrant permitted the seizure of nearly 300 books and pamphlets including some written by Karl Marx, Paul Satre, Theodore Draper, Fidel Castro, Earl Browder, Pope John XXIII, and Mr. Justice Hugo Blackas well as the defendant's private documents and papers. Id. at 479-80, 85 S.Ct. at 508-509, 13 L.Ed.2d at 434. Unlike Stanford, the search warrant under consideration here did not involve literary materials, or private documents and papers. In State v. Hamilton, 236 N.W.2d 325, 327-29 (Iowa 1976), this court considered a warrant which authorized a search for any and all controlled substances. The defendant had contended this language amounted to a general warrant; however, relying upon Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) [2] and other cases, the court held it did not. Recent federal cases have addressed the particularity requirement under analogous facts. In United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 792 (8th Cir. 1980), the court considered a warrant authorizing the seizure of certain books and records (or items of evidence) relating to the extortionate credit transaction business. The court held that the warrant was constitutionally sufficient because [t]he degree of specificity required depends on the type of goods to be seized: Where the precise identity of goods cannot be ascertained at the time the warrant is issued, naming only the general class of items will suffice because less particularity can be reasonably expected than for goods (such as those stolen) whose exact identity is already known at the time of issuance. Id. ( quoting United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1976)). Given the nature of the crime of loan-sharking, the court concluded that the warrant set reasonable parameters for the search. Id. In United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 1980), the court noted the warrant described the particular types of documents sought and specified that they must relate to the specific crimes under investigation. Thus limited, the warrant was held to be sufficiently detailed to withstand attack. In United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d at 1314, it was observed that courts have grounded their decisions in practicality and reasonableness; accordingly, they have found no impermissible vagueness in descriptions specifying merely bookmaking paraphernalia; gambling paraphernalia; run down sheets . . . and like paraphernalia, or nine guns when twenty-six were actually present to be seized. In view of the principles set forth in these cases, it appears the warrant under consideration here does not suffer from a lack of specificity. All vehicles were identified by their VIN tags; the stereo speakers were custom made; and although the license plates, registrations, titles, towing bills, receipts and bills of sale were not specifically referred to by identification number, they were limited to those from stolen or salvaged vehicles. The warrant was thus limited to a type of item to be seized and limited the scope of seizure to those items relevant to the present investigation. It did not permit the executing officers to rummage through the defendant's private belongings. The description was sufficiently definite for the executing officers to reasonably ascertain and identify. . . the things to be seized. Id. at 1313; see United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d at 746.