Opinion ID: 1101247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in overruling the appellant's motion to suppress the statement taken by Lieutenant Sammy Pickens?

Text: ¶ 13. Porter claims that he invoked his right to counsel at a November 16, 1993, initial appearance. As a result, Porter argues that his November 18, 1993, police-initiated statement to Lieutenant Sammy Pickens, made without counsel, should have been suppressed. Porter raises this argument for the first time on appeal. However, under the plain error doctrine, and, on the record as presented on appeal, this Court must reversedespite the fact that the trial court did not have the benefit of reviewing this precise issue. ¶ 14. The record reflects that Porter gave three statements to the police. The first two statements were made November 13 and 15, 1993, and were given to the Hattiesburg police officers who retrieved Porter and Stewart from the Atlanta authorities. Porter was extremely frightened in the Fulton County Jail, and was anxious to be returned to Mississippi. In both statements, Porter admitted that he knew of Saunders' plan to have someone killed, and that he recommended Stewart for the job. However, Porter denied actually participating in the murder. ¶ 15. After being returned to Mississippi, Porter gave a third statement on November 18, 1993, to Lieutenant Sammy Pickens of the Mississippi Highway Patrol. In that statement, Porter confessed to shooting Brown. Prior to trial, Porter moved for the suppression of that confession. ¶ 16. A suppression hearing was held, and Criminal Investigator Sammy Pickens, a veteran member of the Mississippi Highway Patrol, testified that the Hattiesburg Police Department asked him to interview Porter. Stewart had already confessed. The Hattiesburg officers wanted a fresh perspective from an experienced officer, because they thought that Porter was lying. Pickens testified as to the circumstances of the November 18, 1993, interview, which resulted in Porter's confession. Pickens believed that Porter made the statement freely and voluntarily. ¶ 17. After Pickens' testimony at the pre-trial hearing, defense counsel argued that the initial appearance was inappropriately delayed until November 19, 1993, or the day after Porter's confession. The trial judge found that, given the fact that Porter had to be returned to Mississippi from Atlanta on November 15, 1993, an initial appearance on November 19, 1993, would not have been an untoward delay. ¶ 18. The November 18, 1993, confession was subsequently introduced at trial, during the testimony of Officer Pickens. Pickens' testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the statement was similar to that given during the suppression hearing. At the hearing on his motion for a new trial, Porter only contested the voluntariness of the statement given to Officer Pickens. The trial judge overruled that argument. ¶ 19. On appeal, Porter contends, for the first time, that this statement was taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. That is, Porter contends that he made his initial appearance and requested an attorney on November 16, 1993, and that an attorney was not appointed for him until December 1, 1993. Thus, Porter argues that the November 18, 1993, statement to Pickens was made after the right to counsel had attached and been asserted. ¶ 20. However, the factual assertions made before the trial judge at the suppression hearing were completely different. At that hearing, defense counsel argued that Porter's initial appearance had been postponed until after Officer Pickens was able to elicit the November 18, 1993, confession. ¶ 21. After the State filed its brief (in which it correctly argued that there was no evidence in the record, regarding the initial appearance), Porter moved the trial court to supplement the record. On April 29, 1998, the trial judge granted Porter's motion, and supplemented the record with the initial appearance form and the accompanying waiver of rights form. The documents are signed by Porter and the Justice Court Judge, and indicate that Porter made his initial appearance on November 16, 1993, and invoked his right to counsel. [1] ¶ 22. Thus, the question isgiven that Porter requested an attorney at his initial appearance on November 16, 1998 whether the November 18, 1993, statement to Officer Pickens was taken in violation of Porter's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Granted, this is not the question that was presented to the trial judge. However, this Court may notice `plain error' affecting substantial rights. Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1087 (Miss.1987). Moreover, the Court has also proclaimed, `[w]e have in death penalty cases the prerogative of relaxing our ... plain error rules when the interests of justice so require.' Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1295 (Miss.1994) (quoting Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss.1984)). ¶ 23. On the record before us, and, under the established precedent, this Court finds that the statement to Officer Pickens was taken in violation of Porter's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and should not have been admitted. Under both the United States and the Mississippi constitutions, an accused is entitled to be assisted by counsel during criminal proceedings instituted against him. These rights are identical and differ only as to the time when each attaches. The sixth amendment right to counsel attaches once the state begins criminal proceedings by any means. At a pretrial proceeding, however, the law requires presence of counsel only if the proceeding constitutes a critical stage. A critical stage arises at any confrontation in which the results might affect the course of the later trial and in which the presence of counsel might avert prejudice at trial. Under Mississippi law, the right to counsel attaches earlier than does the sixth amendment right. This right attaches once the proceedings against the defendant reach the accusatory stage. The accusatory stage is defined by Mississippi law to occur when a warrant is issued or, by binding over or recognizing the offender to compel his appearance to answer the offense, as well as by indictment or affidavit. This right to counsel attaches at the point in time when `the initial appearance under Rule 1.04 ... ought to have been held....' However, the defendant must be able to show some adverse effect or prejudice to his ability to conduct his defense before denial of this right to counsel constitutes reversible error. Ormond v. State, 599 So.2d 951, 956 (Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). ¶ 24. Thus, Porter's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the initial appearance. Moreover, Porter invoked this right when he indicated that he wanted to talk to a lawyer before or during the time [he was] questioned. [2] `Once the right to counsel has attached and been asserted, the State must of course honor it.' Crawford v. State, 716 So.2d 1028, 1038 (Miss.1998) (quoting Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 90 (Miss.1996)). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment counsel guaranteeand hence the purpose of invoking itis to protec[t] the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his expert adversary, the government, after the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified with respect to a particular alleged crime. Gouveia, 467 U.S., at 189 [104 S.Ct., at 2298].... McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. [171], 176-79, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2208-09, 115 L.Ed.2d 158, 168-69 (1991).    Once an accused has asserted the right to counsel at arraignment or a similar proceeding, the police may not initiate interrogation. If the police initiate interrogation after the right has been asserted, any waiver by the defendant for that interrogation is invalid. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1411, 89 L.Ed.2d 631, 642 (1986). [A]fter the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches and is invoked, any statements obtained from the accused during subsequent police-initiated custodial questioning regarding the charge at issue (even if the accused purports to waive his rights) are inadmissible. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. [171], 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2209, 115 L.Ed.2d 158, 169 (1991). Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 740-42 (Miss.1992). ¶ 25. The record indicates that the Hattiesburg Police Department requested that Officer Pickens interrogate Porter. Pickens complied on November 18, 1993two days after Porter invoked his right to counsel at the initial appearance. There is no evidence that Porter initiated the interrogation by Pickens. Therefore, the November 18, 1993, confession is inadmissible, and this case should be reversed and remanded. See id. ¶ 26. If Porter's November 18, 1993, confession had duplicated the statements made prior to the attachment and invocation of Porter's Sixth Amendment rights, then the admission of the later confession might have been deemed harmless. See Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 670 (Miss.1991). However, the improperly obtained confession was Porter's sole admission that he actually shot Brown. Porter's earlier statements only indicated that he knew of Saunders' plan to have someone killed, and had recommended Stewart for the job. Therefore, the admission of the improperly obtained confession was highly prejudicial to Porter. ¶ 27. In sum, although the trial judge was not asked to rule on this issue, the documents from the initial appearance indicate that Porter's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached and had been invoked prior to the November 18, 1993, interrogation by Officer Pickens. Therefore, the statement should not have been admitted. For this reason, the case is reversed and remanded. However, given the fact that this issue was first raised on appeal, the trial judge is not precluded from fully examining all facts pertaining to the initial appearance on remand.