Opinion ID: 2381990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Miscellaneous Guidance for the Trial Court

Text: The matters we now discuss need not be decided, since we vacate Harris's sentence. Nevertheless, because they may arise again, we consider them in order to provide guidance for the trial court.
In the proceedings below, the following dialogue occurred: THE COURT: Mr. Harris, would you please stand. THE COURT: Do you wish this proceeding to be conducted by a judge sitting alone or by a jury? THE DEFENDANT: By a jury. Harris asserts that this litany was grossly insufficient [under Art. 27, § 413(b)(3)] ... because he was never informed that a court sentencing could be advantageous because only one mind, and not 12, need be convinced that mitigating factors are not outweighed by aggravating circumstances. Brief at 45. In short, Harris argues that his election of a jury sentencing (or conversely waiver of the right to a court sentencing) was not made knowingly and voluntarily. Harris's assertion of ignorance is without basis, and for that reason, we need not and do not address his argument that he could not proceed to jury sentencing absent a full explanation of the difference between court and jury sentencing. In Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 455 A.2d 979 (1983) ( Harris I ), Harris argued that his waiver of the right to jury sentencing was not knowing and voluntary because the trial judge gave him the mistaken impression that in order to obtain a life sentence, he needed to convince 12 jurors that the death sentence was inappropriate. We agreed and vacated the sentence. 295 Md. at 338-340 & n. 1, 455 A.2d at 984 & n. 1. In so doing we carefully explained jury sentencing procedures and, by clear implication, court sentencing procedures. Id. In view of this, Harris cannot be heard to claim ignorance, especially since before the sentencing hearing in the case before us, he actually participated in a court sentencing, as well as a jury sentencing. Moreover, the very point that Harris now asserts  that a court sentencing could be more advantageous because he would have to convince only a single mind that mitigating factors are not outweighed by aggravating factors  is incorrect. As we said in Harris I, a single juror hold-out would result in a life sentence. Id. at 339, 455 A.2d at 984. See also Mills, 310 Md. at 54-55, 527 A.2d at 13. Whether the sentencing is by court or jury, only a single mind need be convinced that a life sentence is appropriate in order to achieve that outcome.
Harris further asserts that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence State's Exhibits 4 and 5, consisting of two color photographs of the victim taken shortly after he had been shot. Harris objected to admission of the photographs at the sentencing because ... [they were] in color, ... inflammatory, [and] outrageous on their face. He claimed that they could do much better with black and white. In the words of Detective Ostendorp, the photographer, State's Exhibit 4 [s]how[ed] the victim lying on his back with his head facing ... the entrance of the store ... [, amongst] broken pieces of glass ... [and] blood. State's Exhibit 5 according to Ostendorp depicted the victim with blood about ... [his] face ... [,] torso and right hand ... [,] lying between the shelves which contained two shotguns and the cabinet which contained the handguns. In Mills v. State, supra, 310 Md. at 43, 527 A.2d at 7, we said that the admissibility of photographs turns upon a balancing of their probative value against their potential for prejudice, and that the application of this test is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 463, 509 A.2d 1179, 1197, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 598, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986); Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 729-730, 506 A.2d 580, 602 (1986); Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 502-504, 495 A.2d 1, 9 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 868, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986). Under this standard [a] court's determination in this area will not be disturbed unless plainly arbitrary. Mills, 310 Md. at 43-44, 527 A.2d at 8 (quoting Johnson v. State, supra, 303 Md. at 502, 495 A.2d at 8). In Mills, the defendant was charged with murdering his cell mate by stabbing him six times in the chest and thirty-nine times in the back. 310 Md. at 39, 527 A.2d at 5. At the guilt phase of the trial the judge admitted, over Mills's objection, a color photograph show[ing] the back of the victim with blood draining from stabbings scattered from the shoulders to the waist level. Id. at 41, 527 A.2d at 7. We concluded that the photo was [un]likely to so distort the jury's deliberations that its admission was `plainly arbitrary.' Id. at 44, 527 A.2d at 8. As a basis for our conclusion, we noted that the defense had not offered a stipulation that the victim had been stabbed six times in the chest and thirty-nine times in the back; those were facts the State was entitled to prove. And following examination of the photograph, we did not find it to be particularly gory or gruesome. Id. at 44-45, 527 A.2d at 8. In short we concluded that the photo's probative value on the issues of premeditation and provocation were not sufficiently outweighed by its potential for prejudice. In Mills the photos were presented at the guilt phase of trial; here they were introduced at the sentencing phase. The standard for admissibility  probative value versus prejudicial effect  remains the same, but the weighing must be done with recognition that the sentencing phase implicates issues and concerns that are different from those which predominate at the trial on the merits. In Booth, supra, 482 U.S. at ___-___, 107 S.Ct. at 2532-2536, 96 L.Ed.2d at 448-452, the Supreme Court addressed some of the concerns which are present during sentencing. The Court noted that the jury's task at a capital sentencing is to focus on the defendant as a `uniquely individual human bein[g].' 482 U.S. at ___, 107 S.Ct. at 2533, 96 L.Ed.2d at 449 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. at 304, 96 S.Ct. at 2990, 49 L.Ed.2d at 961). As we have already observed, the Court found that victim impact statements presenting the victim's family members' opinions and characterizations of the crimes injected an impermissible arbitrary component into the sentencing proceeding. In this regard Justice Powell explained that the formal presentation of this information by the State can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. As we have noted, any decision to impose the death sentence must be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion. .... The admission of these emotionally-charged opinions as to what conclusions the jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with the reasoned decision making we require in capital cases. 482 U.S. at ___, 107 S.Ct. at 2536, 96 L.Ed.2d at 452 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 402 (1977) (plurality opinion of Stevens, Stewart and Powell, JJ.)) [emphasis supplied]. Photographs of a murder victim, similarly, involve the potential for inflaming the sentencing jury and divert[ing] it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. Booth, 482 U.S. at ___, 107 S.Ct. at 2536, 96 L.Ed.2d at 452. Therefore, the presiding judge at a capital sentencing proceeding must exercise his discretion with great caution when ruling on the admissibility of photographic evidence of the murder victim. We do not know whether the State will reoffer the photographs at Harris's resentencing, nor can we foresee the circumstances under which they may be offered. When the sentencing jury is not the jury that heard the guilt stage of the proceedings, the evidence that is admissible at sentencing may differ from that which would be proper if a single jury heard both proceedings. See Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 427 A.2d 991 (1981). We can do no more at this point than direct the judge's attention to the principles we have discussed and charge him to exercise his discretion in light of them and of the circumstances before him.
At the sentencing hearing the State offered evidence showing that while Harris was incarcerated for the instant offenses, he attempted to escape from the Maryland Penitentiary. The prosecutor asserted that this evidence would tend to refute the mitigating factor contained in Md. Code (1982 Repl. Vol., 1987 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 413(g)(7) (It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society). Despite Harris's objection and his announced intention not to rely upon the § 413(g)(7) mitigating factor, the trial judge admitted the evidence. Harris concedes that the State may introduce evidence rebutting a mitigating factor before the defense raises the issue, but argues the State may not do so when the defense announces in advance [as did Harris] that it will not generate the issue. Brief at 31. White v. State, 300 Md. 719, 481 A.2d 201 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 1779, 84 L.Ed.2d 837 (1985), was a case in which we held the State may properly introduce evidence of a capital defendant's future dangerousness whether or not the defendant has first introduced evidence on or argued the issue. 300 Md. at 740, 481 A.2d at 211. In White, we noted that the mitigating circumstance of future dangerousness, along with all other mitigating circumstances, is in issue at the inception of the proceeding since the jury is bound to consider all statutorily prescribed [mitigating] factors. Johnson v. State, supra, 303 Md. at 530, 495 A.2d at 23 (discussing White v. State, 300 Md. at 740, 481 A.2d at 211). Also see Md. Code (1982 Repl. Vol., 1987 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 413(g) (requiring the jury to consider whether any mitigating factors exist). Moreover, as we said in White, [t]o say that the ... mitigating circumstance is not an issue ... unless the convicted capital murderer invokes it would lead to the absurd consequence that, absent affirmative evidence or argument from the defendant, the court could instruct a sentencing jury that it could not find this mitigating factor to apply. White, 300 Md. at 740, 481 A.2d at 211. Since the jury must consider all mitigating factors set forth in § 413(g) whether or not raised by the defense, the State is not precluded from introducing evidence to refute any one of them. The lower court did not err in overruling Harris's objection and in admitting evidence of his attempted escape.
After Harris's guilty plea in Harris I, Judge DeWaters imposed the death sentence for Hviding's murder. As to related offenses to which Harris had also pled guilty, he imposed a concurrent 20 year sentence for the armed robbery of Hviding (subject to a merger proviso); a 15 year sentence, consecutive to the foregoing, for the armed robbery of George Lindley that had occurred during the same episode; and a five year sentence, consecutive to all the above, for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Thus, at the conclusion of his first sentencing proceeding, Harris had been sentenced to death plus 20 years. Harris I, 295 Md. at 331, 455 A.2d at 980. Although Harris's death sentence was set aside, the other sentences remained. At the sentencing proceeding now before us, the State proposed to offer into evidence the presentence report, as authorized by Md.Code (1982 Repl. Vol., 1987 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 413(c)(iv). But the State planned to edit the report by eliminating from it the sentences imposed for the related offenses. Over Harris's objection, the court admitted the report subject to the redaction proposed by the State. Harris now claims, among other things, that evidence of the sentences should have been permitted because it had a bearing on a statutory mitigating factor  the likelihood (or unlikelihood) that he would engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Art. 27, § 413(g)(7). He posits that the consecutive sentences might convince the jury that eventual release on parole would be far in the future; thus, a life sentence might be deemed appropriate punishment when coupled with the consecutive sentences. The State responds that the possibility of parole is simply irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision. The State's argument is correct. In Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 197, 453 A.2d 1218, 1233 (1983), involving a capital sentencing proceeding, we held improper a reference to the possibility of parole because, as Judge Couch explained for the Court we believe this type of argument is likely to allow the jury to disregard its duty to determine aggravating and mitigating factors, and to then balance one against the other as required by ... Art. 27, § 413, before imposing the death penalty. Any consideration of the possibility of parole as such simply is irrelevant and obviously prejudicial; we cannot condone such argument. Shortly thereafter we applied the ban against reference to the possibility of parole to defense efforts to use that information at capital sentencing. Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 529-530, 499 A.2d 1261, 1283-1284 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986). There Judge Eldridge, citing Poole (among other authorities), expressly rejected the argument that the possibility of parole is relevant to the § 413(g)(7) future dangerousness mitigating factor. For the Court he wrote: In this connection, it should be pointed out that one might be likely to engage in criminal activity constituting a threat to those around him whether he is confined in a penal institution or is on parole. 304 Md. at 530, 499 A.2d at 1283 [footnote omitted]. We have on numerous occasions reaffirmed the rule. See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 151-153, 507 A.2d 1072, 1087-1089, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 292, 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). And see Booth v. State, supra, 306 Md. at 216-219, 507 A.2d at 1120-1122 (testimony of defense witness as to parole eligibility should have been excluded had proper objection been made). [9] But to concede the validity of the State's argument does not dispose of the issue. The robberies of which Harris was convicted were statutory aggravating factors. Art. 27, § 413(d)(10). A sentencer might consider as a mitigating factor (when weighing the possibility of a death sentence) the fact that Harris had been appropriately sentenced for those crimes. Moreover, a sentencing jury, aware of Harris's convictions for armed robbery and use of a handgun, but not being informed of any sentences for them, might conclude that Harris had not been sentenced. The juror might further conclude that the jury sentence was intended to apply to all the crimes committed by Harris during the Hviding episode. Such a conclusion might induce a harsher sentence, whereas awareness of existence and extent of the prior sentences could have a mitigating effect. A jury in a capital case does not engage in a mechanical tabulation of aggravating factors against mitigating factors. Jones v. State, 310 Md. 569, 601, 530 A.2d 743, 758-759 (1987). The Maryland capital punishment statute does not require the death sentence if the jury believes death to be inappropriate.... Mills v. State, supra, 310 Md. at 50, 527 A.2d at 11. If the sentencing authority perceives anything relating to the defendant or the crime which causes it to believe that death may not be appropriate, it may treat such factor as a mitigating circumstance and decide that it outweighs the aggravating circumstances. Foster v. State, supra, 304 Md. at 475, 499 A.2d at 1254. We hold that the sentences imposed on Harris for robbery and handgun use during the Hviding incident could have helped the jurors, or some of them, to decide not to impose the death penalty. In this sense, these sentences were evidence of mitigating circumstances. They should not have been redacted from the presentence report. [10]
Harris cites three reasons why the jury instructions were erroneous. First, he argues that the sentencing court did not instruct the jury pursuant to Mills and, therefore, the death penalty statute was applied in an unconstitutionally mandatory manner. Second, he claims that it denigrated his right of allocution. And finally, he asserts that the sentencing court misinstructed on his burden of proof. Whether Harris's first contention is correct is immaterial; we agree with Harris on the second claim of error; he is wrong as to the third. [11]
Since we vacate Harris's sentence, it is not necessary for us to consider the validity of the instructions of which he now complains. At the new sentencing proceeding, if a jury is used, new instructions will be required. These must, of course, comply with the principles Judge Eldridge explained for the Court in Mills v. State, supra . What Mills contemplates is that: (1) each individual juror must weigh the aggravating factors and any mitigating factors that he or she finds persuasive, even if those mitigating factors do not command unanimous agreement, Mills, 310 Md. at 54-56, 527 A.2d at 13-14; (2) a mitigating factor upon which the jury is divided should not be answered no in the Findings and Sentencing Determination form, id. at 58, 527 A.2d at 15; and (3) `[i]f the sentencing authority perceives anything relating to the defendant or the crime which causes it to believe that death may not be appropriate, it may treat such factor as a mitigating circumstance and decide that it outweighs the aggravating circumstances.' Id. at 51, 527 A.2d at 11-12 (quoting Foster, 304 Md. at 475, 499 A.2d at 1254). To put the last proposition slightly differently, the judge should explain to the jury that a § 413(g)(8) mitigating factor is `anything relating to the defendant or to the crime which causes it [or any of its individual members] to believe that death may not be appropriate.' Mills, 310 Md. at 51, 527 A.2d at 11 (quoting Foster, 304 Md. at 475, 499 A.2d at 1254). At resentencing, instructions should be given that are fully consistent with Mills, Foster, and Scott v. State, 310 Md. at 281-291, 529 A.2d at 342-346. [13]
The lower court instructed the jury as follows concerning Harris's right of allocution: A Defendant has a common law right of allocution, i.e., to address the sentencing body in mitigation of punishment, however, his statement in allocution is not evidence or testimony. During allocution the Defendant is not under oath, and thus not subject to the penalties of perjury and to cross-examination. Any statement Jackie Harris makes to you should not be regarded as evidence but rather as his statement in mitigation of punishment. Harris argues that the trial judge through this instruction denigrated his right of allocution. We agree. In Booth v. State, 306 Md. at 199, 507 A.2d at 1112, we held that it was permissible for the prosecutor, in argument, to contrast unsworn allocution with the elevated level of evidence which is sworn testimony subject to cross-examination. We also said that [b]ecause the content of a convicted defendant's allocution may be considered by the jury or court in mitigation, the State, as a matter of nonconstitutional Maryland law, may comment on that allocution and urge its rejection by arguments which may include attacking the defendant's credibility by explicit reference to the lack of an oath and to the lack of testing by cross-examination. Id. The instruction now before us referred to those matters, but it in effect told the jury that it should disregard any facts stated during allocution, because those facts were not evidence or testimony. This is so because the sentencing jury was previously instructed that it was to decide the case only on ... evidence. Booth makes it plain that the credibility of what is said at allocution may be questioned, but Booth makes it equally plain that statements made at allocution may not be disregarded merely because they are not under oath. Because the instruction told the jurors they should not heed the latter precept, it was improper.
Closing arguments were made following testimony by the last defense witness and Harris's allocution. The State presented argument first and the defense followed. After the defense concluded its argument, the court, over Harris's objection, permitted the State to present rebuttal argument. Harris contends that since he bore the burden of proof as to a critical issue, i.e., the presence of mitigating factors, he should have been given the last word at closing argument. In support of his position, Harris points out that there was only one aggravating circumstance: the fact that the murder took place during the commission of a felony. Harris argues that since he conceded this point, the critical determination at sentencing involved the existence of mitigating factors, as to which he bore the burden of proof. Therefore, he contends, since a failure on his part to sustain the burden of proof meant mandatory imposition of the death penalty, he bore the ultimate burden of proof and should have been allowed to close argument. We disagree. The general rule in Maryland is that the party holding the affirmative of the issue ... has the right to begin and reply, both in the introduction of evidence and in the argument to the jury. Kenly v. Washington County R.R. Co., 129 Md. 1, 6, 98 A. 232, 234 (1916). In more contemporary terms we might say that one factor bearing on which side should have the advantage of opening and closing argument is which party has the burden of persuasion. 5 L. McLain, Maryland Practice: Maryland Evidence, § 300.2 (1987) (hereinafter McLain). The burden of persuasion refers to the standard of proof by which a party must satisfy the fact-finder in order to win a verdict.... McLain, supra, § 300.1 at 132. The burden of persuasion is one of three elements which together make up the burden of proof. The other two are the burden of pleading (the allocation between parties as to who must plead what in order to (1) avoid an adverse judgment on the pleadings and (2) make an issue a proper subject of proof at trial) and the burden of production (the allocation between parties as to who must come forward with evidence in order to avoid an adverse judgment at the close of the evidence). Id. Cf. Commodities Reserve Corp. v. Belt's Wharf, 310 Md. 365, 368 n. 2, 529 A.2d 822, 823 n. 2 (1987). Putting aside the burden of pleading, which is not at issue here, it is clear that in a criminal case the prosecution ordinarily bears the burden of persuasion and the burden of production and thus usually has the right to the first and last word in the trial. McLain, § 300.2 at 139. This is also true at a capital sentencing proceeding. The imposition of a death sentence involves a three-step process. First, the sentencing authority must find that at least one aggravating circumstance has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As to aggravating circumstances the State bears the risk of both nonproduction and nonpersuasion. See § 413(f) and Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 730, 415 A.2d 830, 848 (1980). The second step requires the sentencing authority to consider whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, a mitigating circumstance exists. Id. See also § 413(g) and Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 361, 473 A.2d 903, 918, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900, 105 S.Ct. 276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984). Finally, the prosecution is assigned the burden of persuading the jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See § 413(h) and Tichnell, 287 Md. at 730, 415 A.2d at 848-849. It is true that in Stebbing we said that the defendant has the burden of proving ... the existence of a mitigating circumstance. 299 Md. at 361, 473 A.2d at 918. But what we meant by this was that the State is not required to prove the non-existence of mitigating circumstances. Tichnell, 287 Md. at 730, 415 A.2d at 848. Harris is incorrect in insisting that he had, in the traditional sense, the burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances. Although he had the risk of nonproduction and of nonpersuasion, a court could not have directed the jury to find against him on this issue, even if he produced no specific evidence at all, and even if he failed to argue it. [R]egardless of what evidence a defendant himself may or may not produce, or regardless of any mitigation argument he may or may not advance, if the jury perceives from the case a fact or circumstance concerning the crime or the defendant, which the jury deems to be mitigating, it may treat it as such. As to mitigation, it is only the risk of nonproduction or nonpersuasion which the defendant bears. Foster v. State, 304 Md. at 474, 499 A.2d at 1254. The short of it is that at a capital sentencing proceeding the State has the ultimate burden of persuading the jury to impose a death sentence. See McLain, § 300.6 (Of course the prosecution will bear the burden of persuasion of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Thus, under the normal Maryland rule, the State was entitled to open and close. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HARFORD COUNTY IMPOSING A DEATH SENTENCE VACATED. CASED REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW SENTENCING PROCEEDING IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY BALTIMORE COUNTY. [14] Concurring opinion by COLE, J. Concurring opinion by McAULIFFE, J., in which BLACKWELL, J., joins in Part I only. COLE, Judge, concurring. I concur in the judgment vacating the death penalty. However, I do not agree with the majority's reasoning in Part IV D of the opinion. The majority holds that the new sentencer should be able to consider Harris's robbery and related sentences as mitigating factors when weighing the possibility of a death sentence. I disagree. It is impossible to divine the judge's rationale for imposing the specific sentences and the new sentencer should not be influenced as to the appropriateness of the death penalty based upon the disposition the judge made in the other related crimes. I believe the new sentencing jury should be in substantially the same situation as the old sentencing jury. Stated another way, the evidence produced before the new sentencer should be evidence that would have been admissible in the first sentencing proceeding or evidence of misconduct (otherwise admissible) that occurred subsequent to the former proceeding. As I see it, the sentences for the related crimes for which the defendant is on trial are irrelevant to the death sentence procedure as having no additional bearing on the facts of the crime or the defendant's character, prior record, or redemptive qualities. The jury already knows of the conduct leading to his convictions and the introduction of these sentences can only confuse and distract the jury. In Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 495 A.2d 1 (1985), this Court recognized the United States Supreme Court's teachings that a proper death penalty statute confines and directs the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular crime and to `the characteristics of the person who committed the crime.' 303 Md. at 527, 495 A.2d at 21, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111, 102 S.Ct. 869, 875, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 9 (1982). Instead of confining the jury's attention to the circumstances of the crime and the defendant's characteristics, allowing evidence of Harris's robbery and related sentences improperly focuses the jury's attention upon how the trial judge thought the defendant should be punished. In sum, to allow the sentencing jury to draw any inference from the robbery and related sentences is to approve an entirely unpredictable and conjectural process, which is the antithesis of the well-reasoned decision-making process required of a death penalty proceeding. In a death sentencing procedure the defendant should be protected against his own frustration. Therefore, to ensure fairness, the defendant should not be allowed to introduce this disconcerting evidence into the jury's deliberative process. McAULIFFE, Judge, concurring in part and concurring in judgment. BLACKWELL, Judge, joins in Part I only. I concur in the result, but write separately to express my disagreement with part IV-D (Exclusion of Sentences for Related Offenses) and with the dictum relating to a defendant's burden of proof which appears in part IV-F (Order of Argument).