Opinion ID: 1363671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ambiguity of his household.

Text: Wainscott contends that the term while residents of his household in the policy is ambiguous, in that it could have at least two meanings: the one urged by State Farm, which would require that the insured be a resident of the household; and an alternative meaning proffered by Wainscott, under which his household could mean a house and appurtenances thereto owned by a person in which his family resides where that person furnishes the necessary support for the family. Under the latter interpretation, his household does not suggest co-residency, but rather ownership [10] of the premises and support of those residing there. Certainly the word his can encompass purely possessory rights ( e.g., his land denotes ownership) as well as membership ( e.g., his team would denote membership on the team). His household occupies a hazy area which could denote either concept. State Farm presents several points which it claims narrow this meaning. First, the case law has not distinguished his household from same household, which Wainscott concedes would connote residency. [11] It is true that courts have not distinguished the two terms, and have cited cases using one term to assist in the interpretation of insurance policies containing the other. However, accepting this argument would hold Wainscott to too high a burden. Wainscott does not dispute the proposition that the two terms can be interchangeable; he argues only that the phrase his household is capable of at least two meanings, one of which could be interchangeable with same household as the insured, and the other of which denotes ownership or possessory rights. Thus, Wainscott's position is not inconsistent with the case law, as no case brought to our attention has held that his household must have exactly the same meaning as same household. State Farm next argues, correctly, that the term must be interpreted in conjunction with the other terms and definitions contained in the policy. It points to two definitions contained in the policy to support its position, that of resident and that of relative. The definition of resident is: Resident or Reside  when used with reference to the named insured's household, means bodily presence in such household and intention to continue to dwell therein. This definition sheds no light on the problem. The term such household clearly refers back to named insured's household, which presents the same problem as his household; it could denote either possessory rights and support of, or residence in, the household. [12] The definition of relative is more problematic: Relative  means a relative of the named insured or of his spouse, who is a resident of the same household, provided neither such relative nor his spouse owns a private passenger automobile. [emphasis in original] State Farm argues that for Deborah Wainscott to be a relative under this definition, she had to have been a resident of the same household as Robert Wainscott. It claims that since Wainscott concedes that same household would clearly imply coresidence, his argument in support of the ownership and support interpretation breaks down. However, we find the policy's definition of relative ambiguous for we cannot tell from the text whether it is the relative or the spouse who is required to be a resident of the same household, and this makes a dispositive difference here. If the relative is required to be a resident of the same household, then State Farm is correct. If, however, the spouse is required to be a resident of the same household, then a different construction follows. In the latter case, the term relative would include any relative of the named insured, and, as long as the insured and his spouse are residents of the same household, any relative of the spouse. This might seem to extend the coverage of the policy too broadly, but for the additional residency requirement imposed in the definition of insured  i.e., that this group of relatives are only insured while they are residents of his household. Since spouse is a closer antecedent than relative; since the latter interpretation better explains the otherwise duplicative presence of a residency requirement in the two definitions ( i.e., that of relative and that of insured); and since ambiguities, such as the one found here, are to be resolved in favor of the insured, we must adopt the latter interpretation. Given that interpretation, the definition of relative avails State Farm nothing. Deborah clearly was a relative of the named insured, Robert Wainscott; and since this special residency requirement may only affect relatives of the spouse ( i.e., if the spouse is not a resident of the same household, then the spouse's relatives are not included in this definition), Deborah was within this definition of relative and the question again comes back to whether Deborah was in the insured's ( i.e., Wainscott's) household. Here again, we find ourselves unable to adopt Wainscott's position completely. We do not think that coverage should be found in every case involving a house and appurtenances thereto owned by a person in which his family resides where that person furnishes the necessary support for the family. For example, in Schehen v. NorthWest Insurance Co., 258 Or. 559, 484 P.2d 836 (1971), this definition was met, but the court denied coverage. There, the insured originally resided with his wife, adult daughter and two grandchildren in a duplex he owned in Eugene. In 1964, he and his wife moved to Klamath Falls, where they bought a house, but the daughter remained in the duplex in Eugene with her two children. The insured continued to provide the financial support for his daughter, maintained contacts in Eugene (he belonged to clubs in Eugene, continued to receive mail there, etc.), and in fact moved back there in 1968. The question in that case was whether the daughter had been a resident of the insured's household at the time of an accident in 1967. The court rejected the argument that the daughter was in the insured's household, in spite of the fact that the insured owned the premises in Eugene and provided the support for his daughter there. This holding was, we think, correct, in light of the facts of that case: the daughter was a full-grown woman with children of her own, and the father and daughter lived in different cities for a period of about four years. The Oregon court was of the view that the claim of a common household would stretch credulity. Id. 484 P.2d at 838. On the other hand, we think that ownership of the premises and support can be relevant considerations. In Butler v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 356 So.2d 1129, 1132 (La. App.), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 641 (La. 1978), the court found a household relationship between the insured and his daughter despite the fact that the insured and his wife were divorced and custody of the daughter had been granted to the wife. This ruling was based partially on findings that: [The insured] exercised such dominion and control over the property to justify a finding that it continued to be his legal residence even though he spent most nights in a rented room at another address. He was the owner of the property, filed a homestead exemption from taxes on it, provided all upkeep and maintenance. [13] Id. Thus, we conclude that the superior court's grant of summary judgment to State Farm on this ground was erroneous, as the term his household is sufficiently ambiguous to encompass the situation presented here, should the factual issues, once resolved, place this case closer to Butler than to Schehen. However, the superior court's denial of summary judgment to Wainscott cannot be reversed on this ground for we do not think that ownership of the premises and support of the family, alone, require a finding that 6410 Ridgeview Circle was Wainscott's household. Since resolution of this particular question involves findings of fact which are contested by the parties, summary judgment for either is inappropriate. However, despite the fact that a remand would be necessary to resolve the first two issues discussed here, we conclude that Wainscott's third argument entitles him to summary judgment.