Opinion ID: 749394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: does ada delmore enjoy qualified or absolute immunity

Text: 11 We begin with the well-settled principle that although § 1983 contains no immunities on its face, the Supreme Court has recognized the potentially disruptive effect of limitless civil liability, and as such, has held that certain public officials enjoy either absolute or qualified immunity from § 1983 suits. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536-37, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1095, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 988-89, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). The test for determining whether a particular public official enjoys immunity from a § 1983 suit is not a rigid one. Rather, the Court has said that whether particular actions of government officials fit within a common law tradition of absolute immunity, or only the more general standard of qualified immunity, [courts] have applied a 'functional approach,' ... which looks to 'the nature of the functions performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.'  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2613, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 545, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)). 12 This functional framework has spawned certain general principles that operate to guide courts in their determination of whether prosecutors enjoy qualified immunity or absolute immunity. Prosecutors, for example, are entitled to absolute immunity from civil damages arising out of any acts geared towards the initiation of a prosecution or in preparation for judicial proceedings. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 427, 96 S.Ct. at 993; Brooks v. George County, Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 168 & n. 17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 359, 136 L.Ed.2d 251 (1996); Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir.1991). On the other hand, prosecutors enjoy qualified immunity only if the prosecutor's administrative duties and ... investigatory functions ... do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. at 272, 113 S.Ct. at 2615; see Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492-94, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1942-44, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (qualified immunity for giving legal advice to police); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274-75, 113 S.Ct. at 2616-17 (qualified immunity for participating in investigatory functions prior to establishing probable cause or initiating suit); id. at 277-78, 113 S.Ct. at 2617-18 (qualified immunity for making out-of-court statements to the press). In general, qualified immunity  'represents the norm'  for executive officers. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 340, 106 S.Ct. at 1095 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2732, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). 13 In this case, our job is to determine whether the actions of ADA Delmore constitute preparation for judicial proceedings (which would entitle him to absolute immunity) or whether ADA Delmore was merely performing administrative duties (which would entitle him to qualified immunity). The record reveals that the only thing ADA Delmore did was file a motion that would remove the fugitive complaint against Sanchez from the docket of the county criminal court. We hold that this act was simply administrative in nature, thereby entitling ADA Delmore to qualified (and not absolute) immunity. 14