Opinion ID: 2187643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial Court's Failure to Make A Ruling On the Voluntariness of Defendant's Statements

Text: Following the colloquy between the trial court and counsel regarding defense counsel's failure to make a pretrial motion to suppress, the in-camera hearing proceeded with the State's examination of Russell regarding the circumstances under which he and the prosecutors had interrogated defendant in Spokane. Russell testified, and his testimony is borne out by the transcript of the interrogation, that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights, that defendant replied that he understood those rights, and that in response to Russell's question whether he wished to waive those rights and talk to Russell and the prosecutors, defendant replied, Sure. I mean, I've always been fair with you before haven't I? Defense counsel then cross-examined Russell with respect to the giving of the Miranda warnings. Following an off-the-record discussion, defense counsel continued as follows: Q. (By Mr. Rensch) Dwane, my client just told me that every time he has ever talked to you guys he always had his lawyer with him, Randy Connelly, and he tells me that you knew he had a lawyer in this proceeding. Is that true? A. Yes. Q. And how many times did you talk to Randy Connelly and Don Wiegers before you went out to Washington? A. Together? Q. Yeah. A. Once. Q. Once? Now, you had been advised that Randy was his lawyer however, we're not going to quarrel about that. You knew that, didn't you? A. Yes. Q. Roger Tellinghuisen knew that Don Wiegers was represented by Randy Connelly, didn't he? A. Yes. Russell also acknowledged that attorney Connelly had been contacted about and was aware of the polygraph examination that had earlier been administered to defendant. On redirect examination, Russell testified as follows: Well, I talked to him [defendant], as far as my records show, four times. On 8/2 of `82 we was in Randy Connelly's office where I talked to everyone. And then on 12/22 of `82 I stopped into Mr. Wiegers' store and talked to him briefly. And I had talked to Randy Connelly beforehand and asked him if it's all right if I go down and visit, and he said yes. During recross-examination Russell testified: [By Mr. Rensch] Q. So each time during this period of time before you talked to Mr. Wiegers you got Randy Connelly's permission, is that it? A. Except for the last time in Spokane I didn't talk to Mr. Connelly, no. Defense counsel then renewed his motion to suppress the tape recording, expanding the motion to include the objection that the interrogation in Spokane had been conducted by the State with full knowledge that defendant was being represented by attorney Connelly. The trial court denied the motion and admitted the tape recording up to the point where defendant said, I think, I'd like to have Randy Connelly around here before I continue. (We note that the written transcript of the recording goes on for some eight or nine more pages following this request for Connelly's assistance.) South Dakota Constitution Article VI, § 9 states in part: No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself.... The State argues that defendant waived his right against self-incrimination and that therefore his Spokane statements were voluntary within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). We do not agree. In State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 1984), we held that the State had failed to meet its heavy burden of showing a waiver of the right against self-incrimination where the record was clear that a police officer and an assistant attorney general had interviewed the defendant in an Oregon jail knowing that the defendant was represented by a South Dakota attorney and being aware that there was a prior agreement that the defendant would not speak unless his South Dakota attorney was present. We are satisfied that the record in the case before us manifests with equal clarity the fact that the agents of the State knew that defendant was represented by an attorney with respect to the charges against him and that the attorney had either been present during all prior interrogations or had given permission for interrogation to take place in his absence. We conclude that to permit the State to introduce the recording of the Spokane interrogation would make a mockery of the right against self-incrimination guaranteed by South Dakota Constitution Article VI, § 9. By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that defendant initiated the Spokane interrogation. Cf. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). [3] We also conclude that the Spokane interrogation violated defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed him by South Dakota Constitution Article VI, § 7, quoted in full above. Defendant had been indicted on January 28, 1983. He was being represented by counsel with respect to the matter that led to the indictment. That being the case, the post-indictment conduct of the State's agents in interrogating defendant in the absence of and without notice to his counsel constituted a violation of the principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). In reaching our conclusion regarding the violation of defendant's rights under §§ 7 and 9 of Article VI of the South Dakota Constitution, we point out, as noted in Justice Henderson's special concurrence in State v. Holland, supra, 346 N.W.2d at 309, that the South Dakota Code of Professional Responsibility forbids unconsented communication between a lawyer and a represented party. Canon 7, Disciplinary Rule 7-104, provides in part: (A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: (1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.... SDCL 16-18 (Appx.). The protection afforded a criminal defendant by Article VI, §§ 7 and 9, must be held to be at least co-extensive with that provided by the Code of Professional Responsibility to a party in a civil action. We offer no opinion whether the Spokane interrogation violated defendant's rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We hold only that defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed to him by South Dakota Constitution Article VI, §§ 7 and 9, were transgressed by the State. Accordingly, the trial court should not have admitted the tape recording. There remains the question whether the trial court's failure to suppress the tape recording requires a reversal of the convictions. We conclude that it does not. The statements made by defendant in Spokane were not in the nature of a confession. At most, they constituted only an admission by defendant that he had been approached by Iwan. The relevant portions of the transcript are as follows: Russell: Well Don, let me finish okay. Awright, now I understand you know, this here is kind of a deal among friends. It got started off with Melvin Brown using Keith Iwan. Keith Iwan is a friend of his. Your [sic] a friend of Keith Iwan's and so he comes to you. It's kind an abusing of friendships here wouldn't you say so? Defendant: (no verbal response) Russell: Uh? Can you tell me a little bit about how Keith talked you into this? Defendant: I'll tell you it wasn't Keith who talked me into it. Russell: Who talked you into it? Defendant: Is [sic] was that truck guy and he didn't talk me into it, he talked to Tim Holmes. He didn't talk to me you know. .... Defendant: I never gotten [sic] the money. Defendant: There's still something that I can't figure out about it. There's alot of it I can't figure out. Russell: How did Keith approach you on this? Do you remember? Defendant: I can't remember how they did this? He wasn't the only one of them. Russell: Well, for right now let's just say that Keith approached ya okay. He was the first time. Defendant: I don't know if it was he the first time or the second time. I don't know which one it was. But there wasn't no (inaudible). Defendant: I can't remember. Russell: Well, Don you had to pass out the information. You had to give it to Holmes. The telephone number, you had to pass on to Whitesell what the name was. Defendant: I'll tell you one thing, I wasn't, I wasn't (inaudible). .... As can be readily seen, defendant's answers were far less incriminatory than was his testimony before the jury regarding his involvement with Iwan, Holmes, Whitesell, and the unnamed, unknown truck driver. True, the interrogation included Tellinghuisen's summary of the State's evidence against defendant and Tellinghuisen's opinion that defendant was a screwed pooch, but defendant did not acknowledge the truth of Tellinghuisen's statements. Accordingly, when considered in the light of the totality of the evidence, defendant's tape recorded statements were so innocuous that we conclude that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty even if the recording had not been admitted into evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972); State v. Bittner, 359 N.W.2d 121 (S.D.1984); High Elk v. State, 344 N.W.2d 497 (S.D.1984); State v. Waller, 338 N.W.2d 288 (S.D.1983).