Opinion ID: 2366053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Bias, Harassment and Fabrication Issue

Text: We turn first to Butler's contention concerning the trial court's alleged reversible error in ruling that cross-examination of the arresting officers on bias `opened the door' to evidence of appellant's prior arrests by the same officers. According to Butler, this ruling severely prejudiced his defense. He points out that a witness' bias is relevant to witness credibility, and asserts that prejudice to his case stemmed from the trial court's ruling that he could not discuss his role as a defense witness in a case in which Officers Spalding and Baker were government witnesses, and in which the defendant was acquitted, because the trial court ruled that the police officers in response could tell about their prior arrests of Butler. The introduction of prior arrest testimony would have been akin to prior bad acts introduced to show propensity to commit the crime charged, Butler argues. He further asserts that the government could have rebutted his bias evidence without reference to his prior arrests. According to Butler, this approach would have been consistent with the doctrine of evidentiary parity discussed in Johns v. United States, 434 A.2d 463 (D.C.1981). In Butler's view, the offer of a limiting instruction could not overcome the prejudice of the officers' testimony about their arrests of Butler, and the disposition of cases in which he was charged with criminal acts. In the end, says Butler, the government was able to exploit the absence of a bias, harassment and fabrication defense by commenting in its closing argument on the absence of any evidence showing the officers had any reason to get Mr. Butler or to fabricate the charges against him. In response, the government first maintains that under Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), Butler did not preserve this issue for appellate review. Because of our conclusion on this issue, we do not reach the merits of Butler's argument regarding the contemplated bias, harassment and impeachment defense. In Luce, the Supreme Court held that to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify. 469 U.S. at 43, 105 S.Ct. at 464. [6] The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee had ruled that use of the prior conviction to impeach was consistent with Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, [7] but that the nature and scope of petitioner's trial testimony could affect the court's specific evidentiary rulings. 469 U.S. at 40, 105 S.Ct. at 462. The Supreme Court questioned an appellate court's ability to rule on subtle evidentiary questions outside a factual context. Id. at 41, 105 S.Ct. at 463. Furthermore, the court said, [b]ecause an accused's decision whether to testify `seldom turns on the resolution of one factor,' (citations omitted), a reviewing court cannot assume that the adverse ruling motivated a defendant's decision not to testify. Id. at 42, 105 S.Ct. at 463. With regard to the issue of harmless error, the Luce court pointed out that [w]ere in limine rulings under Rule 609(a) reviewable on appeal, almost any error would result in the windfall of automatic reversal; the appellate court would not logically term `harmless' an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying. Id. at 42, 105 S.Ct. at 463. In their concurring opinion in Luce, Justices Brennan and Marshall stressed the need for an appellate court to know the specific factual context of a trial as it has unfolded in order to conduct a careful weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect of the challenged testimony. [8] Butler argues that Luce is inapplicable because the disputed issue [in Butler's case] was fully litigated pretrial and covers thirty-eight pages of the transcripts. Moreover, argues Butler, the trial court's in limine ruling was final. While the Luce issue has been raised in prior cases, generally we have either not reached it, or not embraced or adopted its holding. See Marshall v. United States, 623 A.2d 551, 556 (D.C.1992) ( Luce issue not reached because the ruling allowing the question to be put to the character witness was proper); Allen v. United States, 622 A.2d 1103, 1104 (D.C.1993) ( Luce issue not reached because the record [failed] to support appellant's argument that the added factor of likely impeachment with a rape . . . conviction materially influenced his decision not to testify); Askew v. United States, 540 A.2d 760, 761 n. 1 (D.C.1988) (because of the disposition of appellant's arguments, we need decide neither the question whether to adopt the principle of Luce, nor the question whether, if we adopt it, to apply Luce prospectively from the date it was decided or prospectively from the date of the adopting opinion); Devore v. United States, 530 A.2d 1173, 1174 n. 3 (D.C.1987) (case could be [decided] on the merits without reference to Luce ); and Ross v. United States, 520 A.2d 1064, 1065 n. 2 (D.C.1987) (appellant was tried before Luce and in Langley v. United States, 515 A.2d 729, 733 (D.C.1986) this court decided not to apply Luce retroactively). Luce involved a defendant who did not testify after an in limine ruling that the government could impeach him with a prior conviction. In contrast, Butler decided not to rely on or testify regarding a bias, harassment and fabrication defense after a preliminary in limine ruling that the government could impeach him by focusing on the reasons, times and dates of Butler's prior arrests, convictions and acquittals. Nonetheless, the principles enunciated in Luce are applicable to the specific record before us. Our review of the record on appeal reveals that the trial judge signaled throughout his pretrial discussion with the prosecution and defense counsel that he had not come to a final conclusion concerning his ruling. He used words such as preliminarily, or I am inclined or we're all sort of thinking these things through or we can address that tomorrow. Even when he uttered the words, in my mind right now the only open point, the trial court went on to say that two issues had not been resolved: the final resolution of [whether to allow testimony concerning] the adjudication in the juvenile and the acquittal in the adult case. . . . I'm leaning to allowing them to come in. But I'll hear from the parties tomorrow on that point. Luce's concern about an appellate court's ability to rule on subtle evidentiary questions outside a factual context, 469 U.S. at 41, 105 S.Ct. at 463, is directly applicable here. Final trial court rulings on key issues of admissibility were not made. Moreover, the defense never proceeded on the bias, harassment and fabrication theory. Hence, there was no occasion for Butler to testify as to the alleged bias and harassment of Officers Spalding and Baker, nor any reason for Butler to cross-examine the officers regarding their supposed anger and retaliatory mentality flowing from Butler's testimony as a defense witness in a case in which the two officers testified as government witnesses, and in which the defendant was acquitted. Nor was there any occasion for the government to redirect questions to the officers concerning their prior arrests of Butler and the disposition of those cases. Significantly, we do not know whether the trial court would have permitted evidence as to Butler's juvenile adjudication or his acquittal as an adult. Had the trial judge permitted only testimony regarding contacts with Butler that did not result in arrests, the case would be in a different posture before us. Simply put, we have no factual or record context to resolve Butler's contention on appeal. As the Court said in Luce, it would be a matter of conjecture whether the [trial court] would have allowed the [g]overnment to attack [appellant's] credibility at trial by means of the prior conviction. We cannot assume that any adverse [in limine] ruling motivated [Butler's] decision not to ... [rely on a bias, harassment and fabrication theory]. Id. at 42, 105 S.Ct. at 463. More than one defense theory was available, and Butler had to weigh the risks and advantages of each theory. In addition, as the court asserted in Luce, if discretionary in limine rulings are reviewable on appeal, almost any error would result in the windfall of automatic reversal; the appellate court could not logically term `harmless' an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying, or as in this case, from testifying about the bias, harassment and fabrication of key government witnesses. Without Butler's testimony, as opposed to a proffer which provided only a skeletal outline of Butler's proposed testimony on the bias, harassment and fabrication theory, we cannot determine the impact any erroneous impeachment may have had in light of the record as a whole, and, if we require the defendant to testify and to make his or her record, it will also tend to discourage making [in limine] motions solely to `plant' reversible error in the event of conviction. Id. Accordingly, we hold that where (1) there is an in limine ruling that does not represent the trial court's complete and final decision regarding the use of prior arrests to impeach a defendant who contemplates relying on a bias, harassment and fabrication theory; (2) the defendant does not testify regarding his or her skeletal outline of that proffered but later abandoned defense theory; and (3) the trial court cannot reasonably rule on the in limine motion on the basis of the proffered testimony, the principles enunciated in Luce are applicable. Based on the record in this case, Butler may not challenge the trial court's discretionary in limine ruling because it did not constitute a final ruling on the impeachment issue; because Butler provided no testimony to the trial court regarding his bias, harassment and fabrication theory; and because, based on Butler's general proffer of his testimony, the trial court could not reasonably provide a ruling on the in limine request. Therefore, Butler did not preserve the impeachment issue for appellate review, and there is no record on which this court could reach a decision without conjecture.