Opinion ID: 1187842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Scene of the Accident or its Aftermath

Text: Many of the courts that permit an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress limit it by the manner in which plaintiff perceived the harm to his loved one. The New Mexico Supreme Court requires that the plaintiff's shock result from a direct emotional impact    caused by the contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident by means other than contemporaneous sensory perception, or by learning of the accident after its occurrence. Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822, 825-826 (1983). Massachusetts has a somewhat broader rule allowing recovery when the plaintiff either witnesses the accident or soon comes on the scene while the [victim] is still there. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (1978). We think the Massachusetts rule is most consistent with the limitation's rationale, and it is hereby adopted. The essence of the tort is the shock caused by the perception of an especially horrendous event. Yandrich v. Radic, 495 Pa. 243, 433 A.2d 459, 461 (1981). It is more than the shock one suffers when he learns of the death or injury of a child, sibling or parent over the phone, from a witness, or at the hospital. It is more than bad news. The kind of shock the tort requires is the result of the immediate aftermath of an accident. It may be the crushed body, the bleeding, the cries of pain, and, in some cases, the dying words which are really a continuation of the event. The immediate aftermath may be more shocking than the actual impact. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiff can recover if he observed the infliction of serious bodily harm or death, or if he observed the serious bodily harm or death shortly after its occurrence but without material change in the condition and location of the victim. Comment, Dillon Revisited, 43 Ohio State L.Rev. 931, 948 (1982).