Opinion ID: 6982600
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The BIA’s Decision and Our Holdings

Text: The BIA dismissed Guinac’s appeal from the IJ’s order after conducting a de novo review of the record and issuing a decision on the merits; accordingly, our review is limited to that decision. See Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir.1996). We will reverse the BIA’s determination that Guinac is not eligible for asylum or entitled to withholding of deportation only if, on the basis of the evidence in the record, a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). In denying Guinac’s application, the Board first stated that mandatory military service without more, even if against one’s will, is not a ground for asylum. The BIA then held that the type of racially-motivated treatment Guinac testified to constituted discrimination rather than persecution, adding only that “there is no support for the contention that [he was] persecuted.” Finally, the BIA stated that because Gui-nac did not show that his desertion constituted a demonstration of political opinion and that he would face torture or execution for his desertion, the requisite nexus between the suffering Guinac might face in the future and a statutorily protected ground did not exist. Guinac does not assert that conscription alone suffices for a grant of asylum; accordingly, we do not consider the first ground relied on by the BIA for its decision. Further, we do not consider whether the BIA erred in finding that Guinac’s fear of persecution on account of political opinion was not well-founded. Instead, we hold that the evidence compels the eonclusion that Guinac has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race. It is undisputed that Guinac satisfied the subjective requirement of a well-founded fear; the IJ found his testimony that he feared persecution on account of race should he return to Guatemala to be credible. See Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir.1998) (“Singh III ”). The critical issue we discuss, therefore, is whether Guinac established “past persecution” and thereby met the objective requirement. 6 With respect to the question whether Guinac suffered past persecution on account of his race, the evidence in the record compels a contrary conclusion to that reached by the BIA. From the time he was conscripted into the Guatemalan military, petitioner Guinac witnessed and was the object of repeated beatings and severe verbal harassment by his Hispanic superiors. He was explicitly targeted for this oppression because he was an Indian, as his superiors made clear by combining the beatings with verbal insults referring to his indigenous status, e.g., “Indian pig.” Guinac testified that while he was not alone in receiving these beatings, only he and the five other indigenous soldiers were subjected to such treatment. When Gui-nac vehemently complained to his superior officer regarding the race-based beatings, he was told that it was not his place to object and was warned against deserting. Guinac finally deserted, because he could not stand the beatings any longer. Shortly thereafter, Guinac fled Guatemala because of fear of summary execution based on his having deserted the military. The BIA expressed sympathy for Gui-nac and stated that it does not condone the actions of the Guatemalan military, but found him ineligible for asylum because it interpreted the treatment he endured as “discrimination,” not “persecution.” The BIA’s determination that Guinac’s suffering did not rise to the level of persecution appears to be based on two reasons: first, that the harm Guinac suffered was of insufficient severity to constitute persecution, and second, that he had not submitted sufficient documentary evidence supporting his claim of racially-motivated persecution. Both of the BIA’s reasons for holding that Guinac did not show that he was a victim of persecution are contrary to law.