Opinion ID: 758855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the requirements for next friend standing.

Text: 28 Under Article III, a federal court cannot consider the merits of a legal claim unless the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court establishes the requisite standing to sue. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). A litigant demonstrates standing by showing that she has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action and is redressable by a favorable judicial decision. Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, ----, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1017, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). 29 The Supreme Court recognized in Whitmore that a habeas petitioner may demonstrate standing as a next friend. 495 U.S. at 163, 110 S.Ct. 1717. A next friend does not herself become a party to the habeas petition, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest. Id. The Court set out at least two firmly rooted prerequisites to 'next friend' standing: 30 First, a next friend must provide an adequate explanation--such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability--why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action. Second, the next friend must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate and it has been further suggested that a next friend must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest. The burden is on the next friend clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court. 31 Id. at 163-64, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (citations omitted). 32 Thus, in order to meet the first prong of next friend standing, Vargas must show that Sagastegui is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental capacity. Id. at 165, 110 S.Ct. 1717. The Supreme Court stated the test for determining whether a habeas petitioner is competent to waive his right to federal review of his conviction in Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966): 33 whether he has [the] capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity ... 34 In Whitmore, the Court concluded that Whitmore, the putative next friend, lacked standing because he failed to present meaningful evidence that the real party in interest was incompetent. 495 U.S. at 165-66, 110 S.Ct. 1717. 35 In Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990), the Court granted a motion to vacate a stay because this court was without jurisdiction to entertain a next friend petition. The Court first observed that the state courts had found that Baal, the real party in interest, was competent and that the district court had properly denied the petitioners' motion for an evidentiary hearing because they had not presented  'meaningful evidence' of incompetency. 495 U.S. at 736, 110 S.Ct. 2223 (citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 166, 110 S.Ct. 1717). The Court then held: 36 As there was no evidentiary basis for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the stay granted by the court did not reflect the presence of substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted. ... [F]ederal courts are authorized by the federal habeas statutes to interfere with the course of state proceedings only in specified circumstances. Before granting a stay, therefore, federal courts must make certain that an adequate basis exists for the exercise of federal power. In this case, that basis was plainly lacking. 37 Id. at 737, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (emphasis added). 38 In Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021 (1993), this court denied a stay of execution sought by a mother claiming next friend standing. We determined that because Ms. Brewer had not presented the  'meaningful evidence' necessary to support [her] claim of standing, she was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her son's competence. Brewer, 989 F.2d at 1025-1026 (citing Baal, 495 U.S. at 736, 110 S.Ct. 2223). For the same reason, i.e. the absence of meaningful evidence that [the condemned prisoner] was suffering from a mental disease, disorder or defect that substantially affected his capacity to make an intelligent decision, we also dismissed her appeal for lack of standing. Id. at 1026 (citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 166, 110 S.Ct. 1717). 39 C. THE QUANTUM OF PROOF OF INCOMPETENCE REQUIRED FOR A NEXT FRIEND TO REQUEST A STAY. 40 The State urges us to dismiss Vargas's motion for lack of jurisdiction because she has not clearly established that Sagastegui is incompetent. Vargas, on the other hand, contends that because the district court issued a certificate of probable cause based on a substantial showing as to jurisdiction, we must grant an automatic stay pending resolution of her petition on the merits. Neither party correctly states the standard we must apply in determining whether we have jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution to a next friend. 41 We conclude that our jurisdiction must be based on essentially the same quantum of evidence whether measured by the Barefoot standard for grant of a stay, by the Whitmore standard for next party standing, or by the juxtaposition of the two standards. If Vargas has produced meaningful new 3 evidence that Sagastegui is not competent, she has established her standing to request a stay. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164-166, 110 S.Ct. 1717; Baal, 495 U.S. at 736-737, 110 S.Ct. 2223. The same quantum of evidence constitutes a substantial showing ... [that] demonstrates the [issue of jurisdiction is] debatable among jurists of reason, Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 3383, and raises a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider ... the notation of probable jurisdiction, id. at 895, 103 S.Ct. 3383. 42 No authority requires that this court determine on the merits that Sagastegui is not competent before we can grant a stay of execution in order to allow the state to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if he is competent. If this were true, there would be no difference between Vargas's ultimate burden of clearly establishing that Sagastegui is incompetent and the requirement that she produce meaningful evidence that he is incompetent to establish her standing to obtain a stay of execution pending a hearing to determine that issue. 43 The quantum of evidence supporting Vargas's standing and, therefore, jurisdiction of this court to exercise federal authority is logically connected to the degree of authority we are asked to exercise. Here, we are not reviewing a habeas petition. We are merely resolving whether or not we have jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution until an evidentiary hearing can be held as to Sagastegui's competence. For this limited purpose, we conclude Vargas has standing. 44