Opinion ID: 4398994
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Protected Interest

Text: Tollbrook asserts that it has a protected liberty interest “arising from its justifiable expectation that the City would comply with its own Zoning Ordinance in considering and -6- No. 18-1139, Tollbrook, LLC v. City of Troy deciding on the Lofts request.” (Appellant’s Br. at 10 (emphasis omitted).) Tollbrook contends that such a liberty interest may “arise from an ‘expectation or interest’ created by state laws or policies.” (Id. (quoting Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005)).) Section 16.03(A)(6) of the Zoning Ordinance provides: The City Council shall review the application for rezoning, the Planning Commission recommendation, and Planning Department report. The City Council, after a review of the matter, shall adopt a resolution which shall either: a. Approve the rezoning application for all or part of the property. b. Deny the rezoning application; or c. Postpone the rezoning application. Troy, Mich., Zoning Ordinance, art. 16.03(A)(6) (2011). This procedure applies to conditional rezoning requests. Id. at 16.04(C). Tollbrook asserts that the City Council failed to follow the mandates of the Troy Zoning Ordinance in denying its conditional rezoning request because the City Council never officially adopted a resolution regarding the Lofts request. Rather, the City Council merely voted down the request without adopting a resolution stating its reasons for the denial. Wilkinson v. Austin does not help Tollbrook, however. That case addressed the liberty interest of Ohio inmates in avoiding transfer to supermax prisons. 545 U.S. at 221–22. It does not support a general proposition that a constitutionally protected liberty interest arises from an expectation that municipalities will follow their own ordinances. And we have rejected arguments similar to Tollbrook’s in the past. See, e.g., EJS Props., 698 F.3d at 860 (no liberty interest in the right to corruption-free government action). Tollbrook thus fails to allege a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the City Council’s adherence to the requirement that it pass its rezoning-approval decision by resolution. Nor has Tollbrook alleged a protected property interest. Whether a person has a property interest is traditionally a question of state law. EJS Props., 698 F.3d at 855–56 (citing Logan v. -7- No. 18-1139, Tollbrook, LLC v. City of Troy Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982)). Federal constitutional law, however, “determines whether that interest rises to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. (quoting Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005)). As we explained at length in EJS Properties, a property owner may have a property interest in the existing zoning classification of his or her property or in a discretionary benefit after it has been conferred. 698 F.3d at 856 (citations omitted). Similarly, a landowner may have a property interest in a previously approved building permit where the city does not retain discretion to modify its terms. See Chandler v. Vill. of Chagrin Falls, 296 F. App’x 463, 469 (6th Cir. 2008). But “[a] party cannot possess a property interest in the receipt of a benefit when the state’s decision to award or withhold the benefit is wholly discretionary.” EJS Props., 698 F.3d at 855 (quoting Med Corp., Inc. v. City of Lima, 296 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2002)). As a result, to establish a constitutionally protected property interest in the approval of the conditional rezoning request for the Lofts project, Tollbrook must show that the City lacked the “discretion to deny [Tollbrook’s] use of the land . . . if [it] complied with certain minimum, mandatory requirements.” Id. (quoting Silver v. Franklin Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031, 1036 (6th Cir. 1992)). Tollbrook is unable to make this showing. Michigan law provides that a local government “may approve” a conditional rezoning proposal if certain conditions are met. Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3405.4 The Troy Zoning Ordinance similarly provides that a conditional rezoning “may 4 The statute provides in full: (1) An owner of land may voluntarily offer in writing, and the local unit of government may approve, certain use and development of the land as a condition to a rezoning of the land or an amendment to a zoning map. (2) In approving the conditions under subsection (1), the local unit of government may establish a time period during which the conditions apply to the land. Except for an extension under subsection (4), if the conditions are not satisfied within the time specified under this subsection, the land shall revert to its former zoning classification. -8- No. 18-1139, Tollbrook, LLC v. City of Troy only be approved upon a finding and determination” that five relevant factors are met. Troy, Mich., Zoning Ordinance, art. 16.04(C)(3). As the district court correctly noted, the legislature’s use of “may” authorizes discretionary decisionmaking by local governments. See EJS Props., 698 F.3d at 856. Further, several of the factors listed in the Zoning Ordinance require the exercise of discretion, such as whether the proposed development promotes public safety and welfare, and whether the proposed development is compatible with adjacent uses of land. Troy, Mich., Zoning Ordinance, art. 16.04. Because these considerations are inherently subjective, the Zoning Ordinance “gives the [City] broad discretion [whether] to issue a conditional zoning certificate even if the property owner can demonstrate that the use is conditionally permitted.” Silver, 966 F.2d at 1036. In other words, meeting these factors is a necessary requirement for the approval of a conditional rezoning request, but satisfying them does not obligate the City Council to approve the request. Tollbrook contends that the City Council was required to grant the conditional rezoning request because the Planning Commission unanimously voted to recommend the proposal. But the Zoning Ordinance clearly vests ultimate authority over rezoning requests in the City Council, not the Planning Commission. Section 16.03 of the Zoning Ordinance provides that the Planning Commission “shall make a recommendation to the City Council,” and that the City Council “shall review the application for rezoning, the Planning Commission recommendation, and Planning (3) The local government shall not add to or alter the conditions approved under subsection (1) during the time period specified under subsection (2) of this section. (4) The time period specified under subsection (2) may be extended upon the application of the landowner and approval of the local unit of government. (5) A local unit of government shall not require a landowner to offer conditions as a requirement for rezoning. The lack of an offer under subsection (1) shall not otherwise affect a landowner’s rights under this act, the ordinances of the local unit of government, or any other laws of this state. Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3405 (2006) (emphasis added). -9- No. 18-1139, Tollbrook, LLC v. City of Troy Department report.” Troy, Mich. Zoning Ordinance, art. 16.03(A)(4), (6). “[A]fter a review of the matter, [the City Council] shall adopt a resolution” approving, denying, or postponing the application. Id. at art. 16.03(A)(6). The ordinance makes clear that the City Council may deny the application notwithstanding a positive recommendation by the Planning Commission; the decision is wholly committed to the discretion of the City Council. Tollbrook thus has no constitutionally protected property interest in the approval of the conditional rezoning request.