Opinion ID: 1704585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: owen's refusal to proceed

Text: As noted above, on November 5, 1997, the trial court in the Worden case granted an evidentiary hearing on five claims involving ineffectiveness and conflict issues. The evidentiary hearing was held on December 8, 1997. Before the hearing commenced, Carey Haughwout, Owen's counsel in the upcoming Slattery retrial, [6] informed the court that Owen had invoked the attorney-client privilege in the Slattery case. Haughwout then sought to stay the Worden postconviction proceeding until the Slattery retrial was completed or in the alternative to prohibit disclosure of confidential information concerning the Slattery case. Haughwout was concerned that information disclosed during the hearing would be used against Owen in the upcoming Slattery retrial. The court agreed to bar disclosure of privileged information. At the hearing, Owen called Barry Krischer as his first witness. Krischer testified on direct examination that he had served as Owen's counsel during the original Slattery trial. He stated that his sole responsibility vis-a-vis Owen was to represent him in the Slattery case, that he played no role in the Worden case. In fact, Krischer testified that he told Owen at the time of trial that he did not want to hear anything about the Worden murder. Krischer noted, however, that he and Salnick did litigate the motion to suppress Owen's omnibus confession, portions of which were later introduced into evidence at both trials. When Krischer declined to answer any questions concerning this motion to suppress, collateral counsel terminated her direct examination of the witness. After the assistant attorney general finished cross-examining Krischer, collateral counsel declined to proceed any further with the evidentiary hearing, stating that to do so would violate the attorney-client privilege in the Slattery case. Owen claims that the court erred in subsequently denying his rule 3.850 motion. We disagree. A court's ruling on a matter related to the course and conduct of a proceeding is generally within the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion. [7] The attorney-client privilege is a basic, long-standing prerogative that promotes a client's right to effective legal representation: Various reasons have historically been cited for the existence of the attorney-client privilege. The modern view is that the privilege promotes the administration of justice by encouraging clients to lay the facts fully before their counsel. By encouraging full disclosure, a client is able to receive fully informed legal advice without the fear that his statements may later be used against him. Brookings v. State, 495 So.2d 135, 139 (Fla.1986) (citation omitted). The privilege has been codified by the legislature: A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and prevent any other person from disclosing, the contents of confidential communications when such other person learned of the communications because they were made in the rendition of legal services to the client. § 90.502(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Although the privilege is statutorily based, it also possesses a constitutional dimension. [8] This Court has held that when a defendant pursues an ineffectiveness claim against trial counsel, the defendant waives the attorney-client privilege as to that claim: Thus, we hold that a lawyer who represents a client in any criminal proceeding may reveal communications between him and his client when accused of wrongful conduct by his client concerning his representation where such revelation is necessary to establish whether his conduct was wrongful as accused. This is so whether the lawyer is retained by the defendant or appointed by the State to represent him and includes lawyers serving as public defenders and their assistants. Reed v. State, 640 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Wilson v. Wainwright, 248 So.2d 249, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)). [9] In the present proceeding, by filing ineffectiveness and conflict of interest claims against trial counsel in the Worden case, Owen waived the attorney-client privilege in that case. Although he subsequently invoked the privilege in the Slattery case, he still was obligated to proceed in good faith in the present case to the extent that the privilege permitted. He did not do so. In fact, at the hearing below, he made no effort to introduce substantive evidence concerning the Worden trial. Instead, he called as his only witness Barry Krischer, i.e., his former trial counsel in the Slattery case. Krischer knew virtually nothing about the Worden trial and his testimony was guaranteed to implicate the privilege, which expressly applied only to the Slattery case. Further, although the court below agreed to bar disclosure of privileged information, Owen made no effort to proffer any substantive evidence that would have been excluded by the privilege. In short, Owen made no showing of prejudice. We find no abuse of discretion in the manner in which the court conducted the hearing.