Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Denial of Automatic Application for Modification of the Judgment

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his automatic application for modification of the judgment because it (1) speculated he had planned the crime, and (2) refused to consider sympathetic factors in mitigation. He has forfeited the first issue because he failed to make a contemporaneous objection on this ground at trial. The contemporaneous objection rule applied at defendant's modification hearing, held on November 22, 1993. ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1220, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969 [the rule requiring an objection applies to cases in which the modification hearing was held after this court's decision in People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1013, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984, became final].) Defendant contends that an objection would have been futile because he had argued in his new trial motion, heard immediately before the modification hearing, that there was no evidence he had planned Powell's murder. We disagree because defendant did not clearly argue absence of planning even in the new trial motion. Moreover, denial of a new trial motion does not mean this objection at the modification hearing would have been futile. We do, however, believe that defendant's argument the modification hearing regarding use of sympathetic factors was sufficient to preserve that claim. The entire contention lacks merit. In ruling on an automatic application for modification of the verdict under section 190.4, subdivision (e), the trial judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances ... and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The trial court's ruling must be based only on the evidence presented at trial. ( People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 648, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152.) [T]he trial judge's function is not to make an independent and de novo penalty determination, but rather to independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then to determine whether, in the judge's independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury verdict. [Citations.] ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1045, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) The trial judge must provide a ruling `adequate to assure thoughtful and effective appellate review.' ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 191, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) On appeal, we subject a ruling on a verdict-modification application to independent review. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 689, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) Of course, when we conduct such scrutiny, we simply review the trial court's determination after independently considering the record; we do not make a de novo determination of penalty. ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 704, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.)
Defendant first contends the trial court improperly speculated that he planned Powell's murder. His contention is without merit. The trial court's remark (As to the crime for which defendant was convicted, it is clear from the evidence that it was a planned offense, not spur-of-the-moment) reflects a reasonable interpretation of the evidence presented to the jury. Even though the court expressed uncertainty whether the evidence showed the murder was premeditated, evidence that defendant planned his attack on Powell was compelling. Defendant remained at the jobsite until after all of the other construction workers had left for the day. When one of Powell's neighbors walked by in the afternoon, he asked her if she had come from Powell's house, assuring himself that Powell would be alone in the house.
At the modification hearing, counsel summarized the testimony of the penalty phase witnesses who testified to defendant's good deeds in Guatemala and urged the trial court to strike the death penalty based on this evidence alone. He also argued that defendant was a good member of his community when he was not intoxicated. The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances substantially outweighed the mitigating circumstances and rejected the automatic application for a reduction in sentence from death to life without the possibility of parole. Defendant contends that in deciding his verdict-modification application the trial court erred because it refused to consider sympathetic factors in mitigation. He specifically complains the court ignored the sympathetic value of the evidence of his good deeds and community involvement described above. Defendant cites as error the following statements by the trial court: So the logic of the setup of the statutory scheme plus the decisions of the Supreme Court lead me to the inescapable conclusion that a trial court does not assess whether [the death penalty] was appropriate, that considerations of mercy and sympathy come into play in only two areas when a death penalty is involved. [¶] They are factors appropriate for the jury to consider, . . . and number two, of course, historically they continued to employ factors considered by the governor when it comes to his commutation powers. But they are not within the purview of the trial judge. As defendant correctly argues, we have recognized that sympathetic factors are integral to both the jury's penalty determination and the trial court's ruling on a motion for modification of the verdict. (See People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 84, 246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1 [the court's comments reflected its understanding that it could properly consider sympathy in making its decision]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 971-972, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395 [the jury, and the judge in deciding whether to modify a verdict of death, must be permitted to consider any evidence that is relevant and potentially mitigating, including evidence that may reflect remorse, or otherwise arouse sympathy in either jury or judge].) But [s]ympathy is not itself a mitigating `factor' or `circumstance,' but an emotion. ( People v. Lanphear (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 166, 203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081.) The trial court is not required to find that evidence offered in mitigation does in fact mitigate. ( People v. Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1222, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.) Here, the record indicates the trial court painstakingly considered all of the evidence offered in aggravation and mitigation. It identified the evidence of defendant's good deeds in Guatemala, his intoxication on the day of the murder, and his lack of felony convictions as circumstances in mitigation it considered. The court specifically commented on the sympathetic value of the good deeds offered by defendant, although it found many of these deeds were not what it called altruistic in nature. The court then independently weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and found, as stated above, the evidence of the aggravating circumstances substantially outweighed that of the mitigating circumstances. The court concluded the findings of the jury were appropriate based on the evidence presented. No more is required of the trial court. ( People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1045, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) The trial court made the remarks about sympathy and mercy in the course of commenting that, after assessing whether the evidence of the aggravating circumstances outweighs that of the mitigating circumstances, a trial court does not itself, independently and de novo, determine that the death penalty is appropriate in a particular case. (See § 190.4, subd. (e); People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 245, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) Instead, as the trial court stated, its function in ruling on the verdict-modification application is to independently reweigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence and determine whether the evidence supports the jury's verdict. Its remarks concerning the mitigating evidence defendant offered reveal that it considered all such evidence although finding it worthy of little weight. The court's reference to mercy and sympathy not being within the purview of the trial judge are most reasonably understood as its declining to step outside the trial judge's proper role of independently reweighing evidence to substitute its own view of the appropriate penalty. It correctly stated that sympathetic factors may be considered by the jury in determining whether the death penalty is warranted (§ 190.3) and by the Governor in deciding whether to commute a sentence (Cal. Const., art. V, § 8).