Opinion ID: 844231
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Insight Factor

Text: (12) We turn now to broader concerns about the use of an inmate's degree of insight into his or her criminal behavior as a factor in parole suitability determinations. The majority below noted that before we decided Lawrence and Shaputis I, most parole denials by the Board and the Governor were based on the gravity of the commitment offense. (See Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) After Lawrence, which held that the circumstances of the offense justify a denial of parole only if they support the ultimate conclusion that the inmate continues to pose an unreasonable risk to public safety ( id. at p. 1221), and Shaputis I, which held that petitioner's failure to gain insight into his antisocial behavior was a factor supporting denial of parole ( Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1260), a great many parole denials have focused on the inmate's lack of insight. Other Courts of Appeal have noted this development. (See, e.g., In re Rodriguez (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 85, 97 [122 Cal.Rptr.3d 691]; In re Gomez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1308 [118 Cal.Rptr.3d 900]; In re Powell (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1539 [116 Cal.Rptr.3d 432].) (13) Here, the Court of Appeal majority commented that the increased reliance on lack of insight as a factor is likely attributable to the belief of parole authorities that it is more likely than any other factor to induce the courts to affirm the denial of parole. That assertion is inappropriate. While it is not unusual for courts to struggle[] to strike an appropriate balance between deference to the Board and the Governor and meaningful review of parole decisions ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1206), speculation regarding ulterior motives on the part of the parole authorities has no proper place in a judicial opinion. Moreover, it is not unusual for administrative determinations to follow the standards set out in controlling judicial opinions. The Lawrence and Shaputis I decisions reoriented the focus of parole suitability review, making it clear that the inmate's current dangerousness is the crucial determination. We discouraged narrow reliance on the circumstances of the commitment offense, untethered to considerations of the inmate's present risk to public safety, including the inmate's current state of mind. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1219-1221; Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1259-1260.) In the wake of those opinions, it is not surprising that the parole authorities have given greater attention to the inmate's degree of insight. It is the job of a reviewing court to proceed case by case, examining each record and applying the deferential some evidence standard to the parole determination before it. Of course judges are not blind to recurring features of the cases that come before them. They may properly be skeptical of stated reasons that appear to be unsupported by the record. Yet considerations of judicial restraint and comity between the executive and judicial branches counsel against including mere suspicions in the court's opinion. (But see Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 684 [ admissible evidence that a parole decision was made in accordance with a blanket policy may properly be considered in determining whether due process was satisfied].) The majority below also reasoned that lack of insight is not among the factors in the regulations governing unsuitability for parole, that it is a more subjective consideration than the regulatory factors, and that a statement that an inmate `lacks insight' appears to be stating a conclusion drawn from other evidence rather than being evidence itself. These observations are off the mark. Consideration of an inmate's degree of insight is well within the scope of the parole regulations. The regulations do not use the term insight, but they direct the Board to consider the inmate's past and present attitude toward the crime (Regs., § 2402, subd. (b)) and the presence of remorse, expressly including indications that the inmate understands the nature and magnitude of the offense (Regs., § 2402, subd. (d)(3)). These factors fit comfortably within the descriptive category of insight. (14) In Lawrence, we observed that changes in a prisoner's maturity, understanding, and mental state are highly probative . . . of current dangerousness. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1220.) In Shaputis I, we held that this petitioner's failure to gain insight or understanding into either his violent conduct or his commission of the commitment offense supported a denial of parole. ( Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1260.) (15) Thus, we have expressly recognized that the presence or absence of insight is a significant factor in determining whether there is a rational nexus between the inmate's dangerous past behavior and the threat the inmate currently poses to public safety. ( Lawrence, at p. 1227; see also Shaputis I, at p. 1261, fn. 20.) (16) We note that the regulatory suitability and unsuitability factors are not intended to function as comprehensive objective standards. The regulations state that the factors are set forth as general guidelines; the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment of the panel. (Regs., § 2402, subds. (c) & (d).) The parole authority is required to consider [a]ll relevant, reliable information that bears on the prisoner's suitability for release. (Regs., § 2402, subd. (b).) Accordingly, the inmate's insight into not just the commitment offense, but also his or her other antisocial behavior, is a proper consideration. (17) As for the Court of Appeal majority's comments that insight is a particularly subjective factor, amounting to a conclusion drawn from other evidence, we note that a finding on insight is no more subjective or conclusory than a finding on the inmate's past and present mental state. (Regs., § 2402, subd. (b).) Furthermore, it has long been recognized that a parole suitability decision is an attempt to predict by subjective analysis whether the inmate will be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts. ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 655; see In re Sturm, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 266.) Past criminal conduct and current attitudes toward that conduct may both be significant predictors of an inmate's future behavior should parole be granted. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1213; Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1259-1260.) (18) It bears emphasis that while subjective analysis is an inherent aspect of the parole suitability determination, it plays a proper role only in the parole authority's determination. ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 655.) The courts' function is one of objective review, limited to ensuring that the Board's or Governor's analysis of the public safety risk entailed in a grant of parole is based on a modicum of evidence, not mere guesswork. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1213.) It is the parole authority's duty to conduct an individualized inquiry into the inmate's suitability for parole. [12] ( Lawrence, at p. 1219.) The courts consider only whether some evidence supports the ultimate conclusion that the inmate poses an unreasonable risk to public safety if released. ( Id. at p. 1221.) The majority below correctly observed that lack of insight, like any other parole unsuitability factor, supports a denial of parole only if it is rationally indicative of the inmate's current dangerousness. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1210.) However, it is noteworthy that lack of insight pertains to the inmate's current state of mind, unlike the circumstances of the commitment offense, the factor primarily at issue in Lawrence. (See Lawrence, at p. 1191.) Thus, insight bears more immediately on the ultimate question of the present risk to public safety posed by the inmate's release. Moreover, insight, unlike the circumstances of the offense, may change over time. (See Lawrence, at pp. 1218-1220.) Therefore, the most recent evidence of the inmate's degree of insight will usually bear most closely on the parole determination, although as discussed in part II.A., ante, this is not necessarily so. This case is an example of the Board's proper reliance on older evidence in the record, and of the disadvantages that may follow from an inmate's decision not to testify at a parole hearing or otherwise cooperate in the development of current information regarding his or her mental state. Petitioner, in his brief before this court, goes a good deal further than the majority opinion below, and contends that lack of insight plays no proper role in determining suitability for parole. Citing a number of reports in psychological, psychiatric, and criminological journals, he claims that experts disagree on the meaning of a subject's insight, that judgments of insight reached without empirically validated measures have no value in predicting recidivism, and that major studies have found no relationship between insight into past behavior and future violence. Thus, petitioner asserts that lack of insight can never be deemed some evidence that an inmate poses an unreasonable risk to public safety. These arguments fail. (19) In the first place, it is not a judicial function to weigh conflicting views in the social or psychological sciences for the purpose of developing rules binding on the executive branch. Petitioner's arguments on the efficacy of insight as a predictor of future violence would be more appropriately presented to the Legislature, or to the Board in its rulemaking capacity. (See Pen. Code, §§ 3041, subd. (a), 3052.) As discussed above, the current parole regulations firmly support consideration of an inmate's insight into his or her criminal behavior as a relevant factor. These considerations aside, it is difficult to imagine that the Board and the Governor should be required to ignore the inmate's understanding of the crime and the reasons it occurred, or the inmate's insight into other aspects of his or her personal history relating to future criminality. Rational people, in considering the likely behavior of others, or their own future choices, naturally consider past similar circumstances and the reasons for actions taken in those circumstances. Petitioner's argument that the inmate's insight should play no role in parole suitability determinations flies in the face of reason.