Opinion ID: 2714926
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Speaking the Truth

Text: 14 State v. Lindsay (James Leroy)/State v. Holmes (Jennifer), No. 88437-4 The Court of Appeals held that telling the jury to find the truth or speak the truth is improper. That court had previously held such statements trivialized the burden of proof in Anderson: The prosecutor's repeated requests that the jury 'declare the truth,' however, were improper. A jury's job is not to 'solve' a case ... . Rather, the jury's duty is to determine whether the State has proved its allegations against a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. 153 Wn. App. at 429. There is some conflict in Division Two cases about whether an exhortation to the jury to speak the truth is improper. In Anderson, the court held that it was improper. In Curtiss, the court held that it was not. Later, in State v. Walker, Division Two implicitly rejected Curtiss on this point. 164 Wn. App. 724, 733, 265 P.3d 191 (2011) (We rely on Anderson [as opposed to Curtiss] in our determination the statements in the present case are improper conduct.). The Court of Appeals agreed that the statements in this case were misconduct under Walker. The statements in Walker are nearly identical to the statements at issue here. Walker, 164 Wn. App. at 732-33 ('The word verdict comes from a Latin word, veredictum. V eredictum means to declare the truth. And so by your verdict in this case, you folks, the 12 of you who will deliberate, will decide the truth of what happened .... '). We agree. Telling the jury that its job is to speak the truth, or some variation thereof, misstates the burden of proof and is improper. 15 State v. Lindsay (James Leroy)/State v. Holmes (Jennifer), No. 88437-4 c. Expression of Personal Opinion of Credibility/Guilt It is impermissible for a prosecutor to express a personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness or the guilt of a defendant. State v. Reed, 102 Wn.2d 140, 145, 684 P.2d 699 (1984) (citing AM. BAR Ass'N, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § DR 7-106(C)(4) (1980)). It constitutes misconduct, id., and violates the advocate-witness rule, which prohibits an attorney from appearing as both a witness and an advocate in the same litigation. Prantil, 764 F.2d at 552-53. The prosecutor told the jury in his closing that the defendant Holmes's testimony was funny and disgusting, 95 VRP at 8717, comical, id. at 8722, and the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard, id. at 8708. The Court of Appeals noted that words like ridiculous or preposterous in relation to testimony are not, alone, an improper expression of personal opinion as long as the prosecutor is arguably drawing an inference from the evidence. Anderson, 153 Wn. App. at 430. The Court of Appeals also noted, though, that the prosecutor told the jury that Holmes should not get up here and sit here and lie. 95 VRP at 8882. And the Court of Appeals was particularly disturbed by the prosecutor's reference to Holmes's theory of the case as a crock, which it held was plainly an expression of personal opinion as to credibility. Lindsay & Holmes, 171 Wn. App. at 833. 16 State v. Lindsay (James Leroy)/State v. Holmes (Jennifer), No. 88437-4 The prosecutor's crock comment was a comment on both defense counsel's closing argument and the defendant Holmes's testimony, because the two are to some degree inseparable. The prosecutor's argument that Holmes lied on the stand and the statement that Holmes's testimony was the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard are even more direct statements of the prosecutor's personal opinion as to Holmes's veracity. 95 VRP at 8722. An isolated use of the term ridiculous to describe a witness's testimony is not improper in every circumstance. But labeling testimony the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard is an obvious expression of personal opinion as to credibility. There is no other reasonable interpretation of the phrase. Given that comment, in context with the crock accusation and the sit here and lie argument, we hold that the prosecutor in this case impermissibly expressed his personal opinion about the defendant's credibility to the jury. d. Inaudible statements to jury The prosecutor during closing arguments spoke to the jury so softly that the court reporter, parties, and their attorneys could not hear him. The prosecutor's voice became inaudible three times. The first time, the record states, Do they get . . . (sotto voce.) 95 VRP at 8884 (alteration in original). After the court reporter and defendants' lawyers said they could not hear the prosecutor, the judge stated, Keep your voice up, please, so everybody can hear. Id. at 8885. The second time, the record states, I mean, the Jennifer Holmes story is arguably-- well, it's silly .. 17 State v. Lindsay (James Leroy)/State v. Holmes (Jennifer), No. 88437-4 . (sotto voce.) Id. at 8886 (alteration in original). Defense counsel complained, and the judge asked the reporter to read that back. Id. The reporter said, I did not hear it, Judge, and the judge replied, Okay. !d. Another debate between counsel ensued, and the prosecutor eventually continued his closing without a further remark from the judge. The third time, the record states, Ask yourself who wants to find the truth and ... (sotto voce.) Id. at 8888. The reporter responded, Ask yourself .. ? Id. (alteration in original). The prosecutor answered, Who wants to find the truth. Ask yourself what the truth is. Convict them. Id. No other comment was made on this third incident. During one of these incidents, the prosecutor, after being told no one could hear him, stood directly behind Holmes's counsel and shouted his next sentence very loudly, to the laughter of the jury. Finally, in a later motion for mistrial based in part on the prosecutor's whispering, the judge stated in denying the motion, I did tell [the prosecutor] to speak up and he did speak up, and I thought he repeated everything that he said in a voice that everybody could hear, and I think that's what he said on the record. 97 VRP at 8993. The Court of Appeals did not expressly label this misconduct. It held that although a prosecutor must never whisper to the jury off the record, the record in this case was sufficiently complete to permit review. Lindsay & Holmes, 171 Wn. App. at 836. 18 State v. Lindsay (James Leroy)/State v. Holmes (Jennifer), No. 88437-4 The dissent disagreed. It asserted this whispering amounted to a private communication with the jury, which is presumed prejudicial, thus shifting the burden to the State to prove the communication was harmless. Id. at 851-52 (Armstrong, J. Pro Tern., dissenting) (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 654 (1954); State v. Kell, 101 Wn. App. 619, 621, 5 P.3d 47 (2000); State v. Murphy, 44 Wn. App. 290, 296, 721 P.2d 30 (1986)). Without lmowing what the prosecutor said to the jury, the dissent argued, prejudice must be presumed and the State has not rebutted that presumption. In this case, however, the judge stated, in denying a defense motion for mistrial based on the whispering, I did tell [the prosecutor] to speak up and he did speak up, and I thought he repeated everything that he said in a voice that everybody could hear, and I think that's what he said on the record. 97 VRP at 8993. Under the circumstances, we find the prosecutor's whispering, although improper, was not presumptively prejudicial. We emphasize, however, that the prosecutor's behavior in both whispering and shouting, as revealed through transcripts and affidavits, was highly unprofessional and potentially damaging to the fairness of the proceedings.