Opinion ID: 629120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Jury Instructions Were Proper

Text: 57 In reviewing a jury charge, [f]irst, we must focus on the specific language challenged, to determine whether it passes muster.... Next, we must 'review the instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law.'  United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1555 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541, 107 S.Ct. 837, 839, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987)); see also United States v. Mollica, 849 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir.1988). 58 Coyne first challenges the jury charge on the bribery and extortion counts. The district court instructed the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of Albany County. Coyne argues that the use of the phrase at least in part in the jury charge for Counts I-III, V and VII was error. However, in United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 683 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904, 111 S.Ct. 1102, 113 L.Ed.2d 213 (1991), we noted that there could be dual purposes for payments, stating that a valid purpose that partially motivates a transaction does not insulate participants in an unlawful transaction from criminal liability. The charge was entirely appropriate in light of Coyne's argument that he was motivated by friendship. 59 Appellant next argues that the district court gave an improper charge for Count III (Hobbs Act) based upon Evans, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1889. Evans offers two slightly different statements of what satisfies the quid pro quo requirement derived from the statute's under color of official right language. See id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1889 & n. 20. The Court stated in Evans: 60 We reject petitioner's criticism of the instruction, and conclude that it satisfies the quid pro quo requirement of McCormick ..., because the offense is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense.... We hold today that the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts. 61 Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1889. Based on Evans, the district judge gave, in pertinent part, the following charge: 62 In other words, you may only find the defendant guilty of this crime if you find that he obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts rather than being given voluntarily or unrelated to the defendant's office. The defendant need not have affirmatively induced the payment by his actions, but he must know the payment is offered in exchange for a specific requested exercise of his official power in order to violate the statute. 63 During deliberations, the jury sent out a note inquiring whether a specific requested exercise of official power [was] required to violate this statute. Counsel for Coyne then argued that a specific request was required and that the court should so instruct the jury. After a discussion, the court simply instructed the jury to reread the instructions. 64 The instruction was not error. Unlike the instructions in Garcia, it set out the quid pro quo requirement and tracked the Supreme Court's statement in Evans. Moreover, we have held since Evans that the government does not have to prove an explicit promise to perform a particular act made at the time of payment. See Garcia, 992 F.2d at 419. Rather, it is sufficient if the public official understands that he or she is expected as a result of the payment to exercise particular kinds of influence--i.e., on behalf of the payor--as specific opportunities arise. 65 Finally, it was well within the district court's discretion to decline to charge the jury that it was legal to backdate the promissory notes. Indeed, although the jury subsequently acquitted Coyne on the tax charges and found the evidence that the $30,000 was a gift to be insufficient, it was hardly clear at the time of trial that the backdating was not chargeable at least as an obstruction of justice. See United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1223 (2d Cir.1983) (backdated loan agreements are evidence of conspiracy to obstruct justice), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S.Ct. 2344, 80 L.Ed.2d 818 (1984). We thus see neither error nor prejudice.