Opinion ID: 152718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Underlying Uncharged Drug Trafficking

Text: Sanchez argues that the government should not have been permitted to introduce evidence of the underlying uncharged drug-trafficking conspiracy led by Vasquez. Evidentiary rulings are usually reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. McCulley, 178 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.1999). But because Sanchez did not object to the admission of this evidence, our review is for plain error. Accordingly, he must establish that the admission of this evidence was an error that implicated his substantial rights and `seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation' of the trial. United States v. LeShore, 543 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. James, 464 F.3d 699, 709 (7th Cir.2006)). Sanchez argues first that because the district court did not treat the underlying drugtrafficking activity as relevant conduct for purposes of calculating his sentencing-guidelines range, the drugconspiracy evidence should likewise be considered irrelevant under Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This argument makes little sense. Relevant conduct is a sentencing-guidelines concept and generally refers to conduct so intimately related to the charged conduct that the sentencing court may consider it along with the charged offense in calculating the appropriate guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1-3. This usually requires a finding that the uncharged conduct was either part of a common scheme or occurred in preparation of or during the charged crime. See id. § 1B1.3. The burden is on the government to show that the evidence adduced at trial makes it more probable than not that the charged and uncharged conduct are sufficiently related for sentencing purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 797 (7th Cir.2007). The standard of relevancy for admission of evidence at trial is, of course, much broader; it asks only whether the evidence sought to be admitted has any tendency to make a fact of consequence any more or less probable. See FED.R.EVID. 401. This standard was easily satisfied here. The evidence of the underlying drug conspiracy provided key factual background for the charged crimes and was unquestionably probative of Sanchez's motive for kidnapping. It established the rationale for Sanchez's plot by linking Vasquez to the kidnapping victims, explaining their prior agreement to transfer a Yolanda's restaurant to Vasquez as payment for a drug debt owed by the cousin of one of the victims. Without this evidence the jury would not have understood why Sanchez targeted the two. Sanchez next argues that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403, which permits the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. There was no error here. To be sure, the record reveals that a significant part of the government's case involved evidence related to the underlying uncharged drug conspiracy. But as we have explained, this evidence was critical to put Sanchez's kidnapping plot in context. Moreover, the district court took care to reduce any risk of undue prejudice. The judge repeatedly restricted the scope of the government's inquiry and issued two limiting instructions advising the jury that the evidence was relevant only as background and for the purpose of showing Sanchez's motive. And the judge reinstructed the jury on this point at the close of evidence. See United States v. Strong, 485 F.3d 985, 991 (7th Cir.2007) (assuming, absent indication to the contrary, that the jury followed the court's limiting instruction).