Opinion ID: 1168333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The New Mexico and California Cases

Text: The state relies heavily on a series of cases from New Mexico. In Wilson v. Leonard Tire Co., 90 N.M. 74, 559 P.2d 1201 (Ct.App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621 (1977), the court reversed a trial court ruling allowing the introduction of reports during the cross-examination of a testifying expert. The reports contained the opinions of non-testifying experts. The state here advances Wilson for the proposition that Rules 703 and 705 do not allow a testifying expert to base his opinions on the opinions of non-testifying experts. We do not read Wilson that broadly. Wilson focuses on the fact that the testifying expert did not rely on the other opinions. That portion of the Wilson opinion stating that Rules 703 and 705 did not authorize the admission of the non-testifying doctors' opinions refers to those the testifying expert did not rely on, not to opinions generally. See id. at 76-77, 559 P.2d at 1203-04. O'Kelley v. State, 94 N.M. 74, 607 P.2d 612 (1980), relying on the broader reading of Wilson, and without analysis, holds that a non-testifying expert's opinion was not a fact or datum within the meaning of Rule 703. The cases cited in that opinion for the proposition that a testifying expert may not base his opinion on the opinions of non-testifying experts were decided before the effective date of the modern Federal Rules of Evidence and do not reflect current law. See 94 N.M. at 76-77, 607 P.2d at 614-15. We find O'Kelley unpersuasive. Likewise, we reject Sewell v. Wilson, 101 N.M. 486, 684 P.2d 1151 (Ct.App. 1984), which relies on O'Kelley and thus Wilson. Among the cases uncovered by our own research, Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp., 191 Cal. App.3d 851, 236 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1987), propounds the rule utilized by the trial judge here. There the court held [i]t is proper to solicit the fact that another expert was consulted to show the foundation of the testifying expert's opinion, but not to reveal the content of the hearsay opinion. Id. at 859-61, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (citing People v. Piper, 103 Cal. App.3d 102, 112, 162 Cal. Rptr. 833, 839 (1980), disapproved on other grounds, People v. Hall, 28 Cal.3d 143, 156, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 851, 616 P.2d 826, 833 (1980)). Apparently, one exception to this general proscription against revealing the non-testifying expert's opinion is to admit that opinion if the testifying expert used it in his own diagnosis or treatment of a subject. Piper, 103 Cal. App.3d at 112, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 839. The object of the California rule is to prevent opening the floodgates to out-of-court opinions. Mosesian, 191 Cal. App.3d at 860-61, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 782. Mosesian does not change our position on this issue. Our rules do not follow the California model. First, we note that California has not adopted Rules 703 and 705 from the federal model. California law still limits the introduction in testimony of material forming the basis of an expert opinion to matters that are admissible. Mosesian, 191 Cal. App.3d at 861, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 783. In contrast, our expert opinion rules contemplate disclosure of hearsay to the jury. See Rule 703 (the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence); Rule 705 (The expert ... may be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross examination). Second, the requirement of reasonable reliance found in Rule 703 gives an adequate guarantee of trustworthiness to the outside opinions. This requirement renders unnecessary the stricter exception (opinions of others used by testifying expert in treatment or diagnosis may be related to the factfinder) California has to its general rule forbidding the revelation of the content of non-testifying expert's opinions. Third, the availability of appropriate limiting instructions, the conscientious application of Rule 403, a strict insistence that reliance be objectively reasonable, [8] and a steadfast refusal to allow experts to act as mere conduits for the opinions of other experts will prevent a flood of hearsay from tainting our juries. Finally, abuse may be curtailed simply by applying or enacting disclosure requirements so that the opponent may discover, interview, and, if desired, call the non-testifying expert whose opinion will be disclosed at trial. ERROR IN LIMITING CLOSING ARGUMENT From what we have already held, it follows that Garcia's concurrence was a fact or datum eligible for disclosure during cross-examination. Rule 705. [9] Rule 705 is not designed to leave out foundational information that would be helpful to the trier of fact in assessing the weight to be given an opinion. Udall, § 23, at 37 (2d ed. 1982). By asking non-leading, open-ended questions on cross-examination, the prosecutor invited repetition of the fact of Garcia's concurrence on cross-examination. The trial court did not strike the testimony. More importantly, the evidence was admissible. If anything, the trial court erred in restricting the admission of the details of Garcia's opinion. Therefore, the court erred in striking defense counsel's argument relative to Garcia's concurrence. Defense counsel may rightfully argue all evidence properly admitted, notwithstanding its admission for a limited purpose. Here Lundstrom's counsel properly could argue Garcia's concurrence so long as he was not trying to argue it as substantive evidence of insanity. See Lynn, 144 Ariz. at 568, 698 P.2d at 1287. [10] Garcia's concurrence was admissible to show a basis of Bayless's opinion and to provide the jury with a means to judge the weight and credibility of Bayless's testimony. HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS The court of appeals believed that any errors in excluding Bayless's testimony about Garcia were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Lundstrom, 157 Ariz. at 491, 759 P.2d at 637. Error is harmless or non-prejudicial [11] when it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict. State v. McVay, 127 Ariz. 450, 453, 622 P.2d 9, 12 (1981). The court of appeals rested its harmless error view on two points. First, because Garcia's concurrence was not entitled to substantive weight, the pertinence of this additional information was ... slight and, therefore, harmless. Lundstrom, 157 Ariz. at 491, 759 P.2d at 637. Second, the jury actually did hear that Garcia concurred with Bayless in his diagnosis of brief reactive psychosis. Id. The first part of the appellate court's analysis, however, ignores the jury's note to the trial judge seeking transcripts of Bayless's testimony regarding his discussions with other experts. To say the errors had, beyond a reasonable doubt, no effect on the verdict is sheer speculation on the nature of the jury's interest in this particular portion of Bayless's testimony. We also disagree with the view that the pertinence of this evidence was slight. Even though Garcia's opinion was not substantive evidence of insanity, it added to the weight and credibility of the testimony of Lundstrom's only mental health expert. Because Lundstrom's defense rested almost entirely on his expert's credibility in the face of the partially conflicting opinion of the state's expert, we cannot say the excluded evidence and prohibited argument were of slight value and the error therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 477, 720 P.2d 73, 78 (1986). It is difficult to characterize as harmless the erroneous exclusion of a basis for the ultimate opinion related by a party's only psychological expert, testifying on the only true issue in the case. Nor can we agree with the court of appeals that the error was obviated because the jury actually heard testimony that Garcia concurred with Bayless. Although the jury heard that testimony, when counsel attempted to argue the testimony, the court instructed the jury to disregard the argument. We cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no juror could have concluded that Bayless's references to Garcia were of little or no evidentiary value. DISPOSITION Because we reverse on the expert testimony and closing argument issues, we do not reach the allegation of errors in the insanity defense instructions. We vacate that portion of the court of appeals opinion concerning Bayless's testimony and closing argument. We reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial. GORDON, C.J., and CAMERON and MOELLER, JJ., concur. HOLOHAN, J., retired before the decision of this case. CORCORAN, J., did not participate in the determination of this case.