Opinion ID: 1059619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Evidence of Third Party Guilt

Text: Johnson argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to present testimony that would have proved that Leroy Quick, III, was the person who raped and murdered Hope Hall. Johnson proffered the testimony of Natalie Williams, Hall's co-worker, who would have testified that Hall received flowers from Quick shortly before she was murdered, and that Hall told Williams that Hall did not want to have anything to do with Quick because he was crazy. Johnson also proffered the testimony of three women who worked in the rental office of Hall's apartment complex who would have testified that within 30 days before the murder, Hall expressed concern and apprehension about a person she used to date. [5] One of these rental office workers, Dolores Reid, also would have testified that about one month before the murder, she saw Leroy Quick grab Hall in an attempt to get her to go from one room to another. We find no merit in Johnson's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit this evidence. Proffered evidence that merely suggests a third party may have committed the crime charged is inadmissible; only when the proffered evidence tends clearly to point to some other person as the guilty party will such proof be admitted. Soering v. Deeds, 255 Va. 457, 464, 499 S.E.2d 514, 518 (1998). We have stated that a large discretion must and should remain vested in the trial court as to the admission of this class of testimony. Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 766, 99 S.E. 562, 565 (1919); see also Oliva v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 523, 527, 452 S.E.2d 877, 880 (1995); Weller v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 886, 890, 434 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1993). In Karnes, we reversed a defendant's conviction because the trial court refused to admit evidence of death threats that a third party had made to the victim shortly before she was murdered. 125 Va. at 766-67, 99 S.E. at 565. In Oliva, the Court of Appeals reversed a defendant's conviction because the trial court excluded testimony from a witness who had observed someone other than the defendant, but who resembled him, running from the scene of the crime. 19 Va.App. at 528-29, 452 S.E.2d at 881. In contrast to the evidence at issue in Karnes and Oliva, the proffered testimony at issue here bore no direct relation to the crimes charged. Instead, the proffered testimony tended to prove only that Hall had a poor relationship with Quick, and such evidence would have invited the jury to speculate that these difficulties caused Quick to rape and murder Hall. Moreover, Hamilton testified that she had eliminated Quick as a possible source of the DNA found on the crime scene evidence. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence.