Opinion ID: 29312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Malicious Prosecution Claim and its Prerequisites Under the Fourth Amendment

Text: 53 In Albright v. Oliver, 15 the Supreme Court held that a cause of action for malicious prosecution under the Fourteenth Amendment did not exist. However, the Court did not reach the issue of whether such a right exists under the Fourth Amendment and this circuit interpreted that void as having left undisturbed our circuit's longstanding recognition of a Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution. 16 Thus, this court has acknowledged that it has long recognized a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment `to be free from malicious prosecution.' 17 54 This court has further clarified that malicious prosecution may be a constitutional violation ... only if all of its common law elements are established. 18 Our most recent discussion of the tort of malicious prosecution held that the requirements of the state tort law and the constitutional tort are the same. In Gordy v. Burns, this court explained: 55 Unquestionably, state-law tort claims — such as the common-law tort of malicious prosecution — are not, by themselves, actionable under § 1983. Because § 1983 requires some showing that the plaintiff has been deprived of a federal right, but no constitutional provision specifically guarantees against the institution of groundless criminal prosecutions, a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is a misnomer. 56 Nevertheless, the rule in this circuit is that the elements of the state-law tort of malicious prosecution and the elements of the constitutional tort of Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution are coextensive .... the rule is rooted firmly in Fifth Circuit precedent. 19 Furthermore, the court noted that: 57 [A] plaintiff in a § 1983 malicious prosecution action need establish only the elements of common-law malicious prosecution. This circuit repeatedly has indicated — without explanation — that courts must look to the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under the law of the state where the offense was committed. 20 58 Thus, by pleading a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff pleads an actionable claim under § 1983. The reviewing court need only consider the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution as defined under the law of the relevant state to determine whether a plaintiff has established a claim of malicious prosecution. 21 Therefore, in the case at bar, Castellano was only required to satisfy the criteria for malicious prosecution under Texas law to successfully state a cause of action under § 1983 for a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Under Texas law, the elements for a cause of action for malicious prosecution are: (1) a criminal action commenced against the plaintiff; (2) the prosecution was caused by the defendants or with their aid; (3) the action terminated in plaintiff's favor; (4) the plaintiff was innocent; (5) the defendants acted without probable cause; (6) the defendants acted with malice; and (7) the criminal proceeding damaged the plaintiff. 22 59 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution existed under the Fourth Amendment. 60 B. Sufficiency of Castellano's Complaint to Assert a Cause of Action Under the Fourth Amendment 61 We now turn to defendants' allegation that Castellano did not plead a cause of action for malicious prosecution under § 1983 for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants raised the identical issue in their motion for summary judgment before the trial court — wherein the court treated it as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and determined that Castellano's complaint contained sufficient facts to support his allegation that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. We explained in Bennett v. Pippin, 62 After a trial on the merits, the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is irrelevant.... When the plaintiff has prevailed after a full trial on the merits, a district court's denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal becomes moot. The plaintiff has proved, not merely alleged, facts sufficient to support relief. 23 63 Based on the rationale in Bennett this court will not address this issue. C. Jury Instructions 64 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides, [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. 24 However, this court has never held that a party's failure to object to proposed jury instructions creates a jurisdictional bar to appellate review and has previously entertained tardy jury instruction objections under the plain error standard of review. 25 65 Furthermore, in Tompkins v. Cyr, this court cautioned that, [i]n reviewing jury instructions for plain error, we are exceedingly deferential to the trial court and reiterated the justification behind such deference: 66 Few jury charges in cases of complexity will not yield error if pored over, long after the fact in the quiet of the library — if such an enterprise is to be allowed. It is not. The reality is that most such errors will be washed away if the trial court is given a fair opportunity to consider them. In short, so long as the trial judge gives counsel a fair opportunity to object, we will listen to unobjected to rulings only in those handful of cases that can meet the exacting requirements of plain error.... These rules vindicate powerful interests in orderliness and finality. They also reflect the central role of the United States District Court. If is not a way station or entry gate. Rather, trials are the heart of the system. Trial, not appeal, is the main event. 26 67 When the party challenging the district court's instructions has not objected to them before the district court, our consideration of the issue is limited to plain error review and requires proof: (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error was plain, which means clear or obvious; (3) the plain error must affect substantial rights; and (4) not correcting the error would `seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' 27 Further, this court has noted that [a]n inadequate instruction merits reversal when `the charge as a whole leaves us with the substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations.' 28 Thus, for this court [t]o overturn a verdict for plain error in the instructions, we must find an obviously incorrect statement of law that was `probably responsible for an incorrect verdict, leading to substantial injustice.' 29 68 Because defendants did not object to the trial court's instructions pertaining to malicious prosecution before they were submitted to the jury, this court will review the instructions for plain error. 30 Clearly, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that Castellano should prevail if the jury found that defendants violated Castellano's constitutional right to due process by maliciously prosecuting him for the criminal offense of arson. Rather, the trial court should have directed the jury that Castellano should prevail only upon a showing that defendants violated Castellano's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Such an instruction would have been consistent with the court's prior order holding that Castellano could maintain his cause of action for malicious prosecution only under the Fourth or First Amendments — not the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 However, having reviewed the jury instructions as a whole, this court cannot conceive how using the words due process, rather than unreasonable seizure, would have changed the jury's verdict under the facts of this case. Thus, we conclude that the trial court's error was not responsible for an incorrect verdict, leading to substantial injustice. 31 70 The law of this circuit holds that in the event the elements of malicious prosecution are proved, a fortiori, a violation of the Fourth Amendment is also proved. In the case at bar, although the judge never mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment in its instructions, it erroneously used the words due process. However, due process was defined as the common-law elements of malicious prosecution. Thus, during its deliberations, the jury had before it the appropriate standard required to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The jury applied that standard to the overwhelming evidence and found Sanchez and Fragozo liable. It is unlikely that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had the trial court used the words unreasonable seizure rather than due process-under either wording, the jury had to find that the elements of malicious prosecution were met. 71 Further, the record clearly shows that the parties, attorneys, court, and jury were keenly aware that if Castellano proved the elements of malicious prosecution, a constitutional right had been violated. Thus, this case hinged on the jury's interpretation of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses as applied to the correct legal standard (the common-law elements of malicious prosecution). The impetus for the jury verdict was not the improper words due process, but whether the jury believed that Castellano was arrested, convicted, and sentenced as a result of Sanchez and Fragozo's conspiracy. It is evident that the jury believed that the elements of malicious prosecution were met. The facts drove this case — not the misnomer of the constitutional provision in the jury instructions. 32 72 Considering the jury instructions as a whole and applying the great deference that this court owes the trial court in reviewing jury instructions, we find that the trial court's error did not result in an incorrect verdict leading to substantial injustice. 73 D. Sufficiency of Evidence of Malicious Prosecution under the Fourth Amendment 74 On appeal, defendants contend that there was insufficient evidence to support several of the elements of malicious prosecution. 33 The only element preserved by defendants in their pre-verdict JMOL motions, however, was the lack of probable cause. This court has repeatedly explained that to assert a claim in a Rule 50(b) motion, a party must have raised the issue at the close of the evidence in a Rule 50(a) motion. 34 When a party fails to comply with the Rule 50 procedural requirements, this court employs the some evidence standard of review. 35 Therefore, we need only determine whether there was any evidence presented at trial as proof of each of the other five elements of malicious prosecution. 36 Based on our review of the record, there is at least some evidence proving each of those elements. 75 As noted above, because Sanchez preserved her challenge concerning the existence of probable cause, this court will review the record to determine whether a reasonable jury could have arrived at the same conclusion the jury rendered. 37 76 In the case at bar, the jury was presented with the following evidence: (1) testimony from Joe Hebert that the audio tape Castro received from Sanchez and Fragozo was fabricated, (2) Castellano's unwavering assertion that he was innocent, and (3) Cantu's testimony that Fragozo tried to intimidate him into altering his original story to the police in order to implicate Castellano in the arson. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Sanchez and Fragozo acted without probable cause. It would be an abuse of this court's discretion to hold otherwise. 77 E. Evidence of a Conspiracy between Sanchez and Fragozo 78 Defendants posit that there was insufficient evidence of a conspiracy to inculpate Sanchez, — who is not a § 1983 state actor. Because Sanchez properly preserved this issue in a pre-verdict JMOL, the court will review the record to consider whether a reasonable jury could have found that a conspiracy existed. 79 The elements of civil conspiracy are: (1) an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983, and (2) actions taken in concert by defendants with the specific intent to violate that right. 38 Further, for Sanchez to be liable under § 1983, there had to be proof that she conspired with Fragozo, who was acting under color of law, to violate Castellano's Fourth Amendment rights. 39 80 On this issue, the jury was presented with evidence that (1) Fragozo, as police officer, provided the tape recorder so that Sanchez could record her conversations with Castellano; (2) the tape was subsequently altered; (3) upon Fragozo's prompting, Sanchez turned the tape over to Castro; and (4) Sanchez and Fragozo attempted to get Jiminez on their side to support their story that Castellano had intentionally burned Fred's No. 7. Having concluded that Castellano's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, we similarly conclude that there was sufficient evidence before the jury for it to find that a conspiracy existed between Sanchez and Fragozo to deprive Castellano of those rights. F. Qualified Immunity 81 In his JMOL motions at the close of Castellano's case and at the close of all the evidence, Fragozo argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that, for purposes of qualified immunity, his actions were not objectively reasonable. However, Fragozo did not raise this issue in his post-verdict motion. Thus, the standard of review to be applied on appeal, whether it be plain error or abuse of discretion, is uncertain. For example in Gaia Techs., Inc. v. Recycled Prods. Corp., we explained that [w]e have never required a party to file a [post-verdict] Rule 50(b) motion in order to preserve its right to claim insufficiency of the evidence on appeal, so long as it has filed a Rule 50(a) motion at the close of all the evidence. 40 However, in Colonial Penn. Insur. v. Market Planners Insur. Agency, Inc., we held that [i]n a jury trial, of course, a party must make (and renew at the trial's conclusion) a [post-verdict] a Rule 50(a) [JMOL] motion ... in order to preserve sufficiency of the evidence for appellate review. 41 82 Having reviewed the record, however, this court is satisfied that under either standard there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Fragozo's actions were objectively unreasonable for purposes of qualified immunity. 83 If the trial court does not resolve the issue of qualified immunity before trial because facts about the official conduct are in dispute, it may be decided by the jury. 42 Thus, in determining whether an individual is entitled to qualified immunity, the jury must determine whether: (1) plaintiff alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right 43 and (2) the official's conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law existing at the time of the incident. 44 84 In the case at bar, Castellano alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution. At the time of the events at issue, the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizure was sufficiently clear so that a reasonable official would understand what he [Fragozo] was doing violate[d] that right. 45 Thus, any reasonable officer would have known that Fragozo's actions in (1) encouraging a witness to fabricate evidence and turn it over to an investigating officer and (2) intimidating another witness, for the purpose of creating probable cause to arrest an innocent individual, were unlawful. Given the above, the jury's determination that Fragozo acted unreasonably, and thereby was not entitled to qualified immunity, is supported by sufficient evidence. G. Damages 85 Having found the defendants liable, the jury awarded Castellano $3,000,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. We now turn our consideration to defendants' objections to the damage award.
86 In Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Co., 46 this court explained that in the context of a Title VII case, a plaintiff's testimony that he felt frustrated and real bad for being judged by the color of his skin and that his work environment was unbearable was insufficient to support anything more than a nominal damage award for emotional harm, absent corroborating testimony or expert medical or psychological evidence of damages caused by the alleged distress. This court has held that the testimony of a plaintiff, alone, can be sufficient to support an award of mental damages when it is particularized and extensive. 47 However, because neither defendant raised this issue in their Rule 50(a) motion, the court refused to consider the issue in the post verdict motions. 87 On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial as to Castellano's mental anguish damage award because there was insufficient evidence on which the jury could base such an award under Patterson and its progeny. 88 As alluded to above, the standard of review employed to analyze a trial court's denial of a judgment as a matter of law depends on whether the party complied with Rule 50(a). 48 When a party has properly moved for judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of the evidence, this court reviews the record to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. 49 However, when a party has not properly moved for a judgment as a matter of law, this court reviews the record only to determine whether the record contains any evidence to support the trial judge's decision. 50 89 This court has never demanded a slavish adherence to the Rule 50 procedural sequence. However, in cases in which we have strayed from its proscriptions, the divergence has been de minimus and the purposes of the rule, enabling the trial court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law and alerting the opposing party to the insufficiency of his case before being submitted to the jury, were accomplished. 51 90 The facts of this case do not warrant an exception to Rule 50. Neither the trial court nor opposing counsel had any indication that defendants intended to challenge Castellano's account of his mental anguish damages because they raised no objection during Castellano's testimony, voiced no concern as to the sufficiency of the evidence during the jury charge, and did not mention this argument at the close of the case. Thus, we will review the record to determine whether there is any evidence of mental anguish to support the jury's damage award. 91 Having reviewed the record, the court is satisfied that there is some evidence of Castellano's mental anguish damages and will not disturb the jury verdict. During the trial, the jury learned that Castellano has dealt, for fifteen years, with the stigma of being convicted of an arson he did not commit in a community where he was once a prominent citizen. Castellano explained that since his conviction, his reputation has been ruined: 52 92 People — in a situation like this, people don't forget, and they still think you're guilty, even though you're not. You can explain to them all you want that it's been expunged, I'm not guilty, it was a frame up. Tell them everything you want. But they still have it in their mind that you may be guilty. 53 93 Further, Castellano stated that he was required to resign from his civil service position after his arrest — and was not reinstated after his record was expunged. He also explained that since his conviction, he has been unable to obtain fire insurance or financing for his business. 94 Castellano also described the details of his arrest and stated after he was taken from his business, he was forced to remain in handcuffs at the police station for a little over an hour at which point he heard Castro ask another officer whether [l]os animales ya legaron (have the animals arrived). 54 He stated that by animales Castro was referring to the press and explained that he was held in a back room until the press arrived. Thereafter, Castellano was paraded slowly before the press — in handcuffs. According to Castellano, the details of his case were intermittently reported as the lead story on the front page of the newspaper for over a year. 95 Castellano's testimony was particularized, extensive, and compelling. Thus, under the plain error standard, the existence of evidence of Castellano's mental anguish constrains this court from reversing the decision of the trial court. 55 96 2. Trial Court's Decision to Allow the Jury to Compensate Castellano's Personal Damages Derivative from Damages Sustained by his Corporation 97 This court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. 56 98 Defendants first contend that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g), Castellano's request for damages to compensate his individual losses derivative from his business, including lost wages in the form of executive compensation, should have been pled with specificity as a form of special damages. 57 Further, they argue that through his complaint Castellano only requested damages to compensate the corporation for its losses stemming from its inability to franchise — not for damages Castellano allegedly suffered personally. Thus, defendants urge this court to find that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling their objections to the jury's consideration of such damages. 99 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require notice pleading 58 and defendants cite no Fifth Circuit jurisprudence to support their position that loss of earning potential must be pled with specificity. Castellano's third amended complaint prayed for damages, in part, to compensate him for any impairment to his social and mercantile standing — which arguably includes the loss of earning potential. Defendants were also aware that after his arson conviction Castellano was unable to franchise his restaurant and, under the notice pleading standard, defendants should have been aware that, as the sole owner of the restaurant, Castellano would seek any damages he suffered derivative from his business losses. Additionally, these losses were mentioned in Castellano's expert report. We find defendants' argument that they were unaware that Castellano would be seeking damages to compensate his personal loss stemming from the economic damage to his corporation to be unpersuasive. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Castellano's lost wages in the form of executive compensation. 100 3. Notice of Trevino's Testimony as to Castellano's Individual Damages 101 This court employs an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's decision on the admissibility of expert testimony. 59 102 Defendants argued at trial that they were unaware that there would be expert testimony as to Castellano's individual damages derivative from his inability to franchise his business — including lost wages in the form of executive compensation. The trial court disagreed and allowed Trevino to testify as to the damages Castellano sustained personally as a result of this malicious prosecution, such as loss of income to him as a result of being unable to franchise Fred's Fish Fry. 103 However, defendants knew that Trevino would be called as an expert witness for Castellano because he was identified as such in all pre-trial material. Further, in the report prepared before trial and served on defendants, Trevino specifically addressed the economic damages sustained by Castellano, including his lost executive compensation. Had defendants opted to depose Trevino before trial, they could have thoroughly explored the details of his report. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that, because estimates of Castellano's future compensation were included in his expert report, defendants were not unfairly surprised by Trevino's testimony as to Castellano's personal damages derivative from the failure to franchise Fred's. 4. Speculative Testimony 104 It is defendants' position that the trial court also erred in admitting Trevino's testimony as to Castellano's individual damages, including the loss of executive compensation, because it was purely speculative and premised on the assumption that Castellano's franchise would have been profitable. 105 While we have held that [d]amages will not be awarded for lost profits that are merely speculative in nature, we have tempered that rule explaining that, it is not necessary that recovery for future profits should be established by exact calculation, as it is enough to have data from which these profits may be ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty and exactness. 60 106 Having reviewed the record, this court finds that Trevino's testimony as to Castellano's individual damages was not speculative. Rather, Trevino formed and presented a competent opinion regarding Castellano's individual lost profits, after the fire, with reasonable certainty by relying on his review of objective historical data, including: (1) Fred's past economic figures and success as a restaurant before the fire, (2) the successes of other similar restaurants, and (3) other reference sources. Based on the above, this court concurs with the trial court's determination that Trevino was able to ascertain a competent opinion regarding lost profits with reasonable certainty and without speculation. 5. Punitive Damage Award 107 In reviewing an award of punitive damages, the focus of the reviewing court is to ensure that, under the circumstances of the case in question, the award is not grossly excessive or unreasonable. 61 To make that determination, the court should consider the following factors: (1) the degree of defendant's reprehensibility or culpability, (2) the ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages; 62 and (3) the possible criminal and civil sanctions for comparable misconduct. 63 108 In the case at bar, the jury found that defendants conspired to have Castellano falsely charged and convicted of arson — an insidious crime that loomed over him for years — by fabricating evidence. Such conduct is pusillanimous and unquestionably reprehensible. Further, considering the emotional and monetary harm Castellano suffered and will continue to endure through his life, the court finds that there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damage award and the harm caused by defendants' conduct. Finally, under Texas law, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence constitutes a third degree felony. 64 Therefore, the criminal and civil sanctions that could be imposed for comparable misconduct under state law are considerable and lead this court to conclude that the punitive damage award was not excessive. 109 6. Loss of Capacity for Enjoyment of Life and Global Damages Verdict Form 110 Defendants cite Dugas v. Kansas City Southern. Ry. Lines 65 for their position that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider loss of enjoyment of life as an element of Castellano's damages. In Dugas, this court held that in a case involving the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the trial court had erroneously instructed the jury as to damages because it had repeatedly stressed loss of enjoyment of life and loss of vitality as if they were separate and independent items of damages. However, in the case at bar, the trial court correctly explained that the jury was to consider loss of enjoyment of life as one of several factors in determining an appropriate compensatory damage award for Castellano. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defendants' motion for a new trial on this issue. 111 Defendants rely on this court's holding in In re Air Crash Disaster 66 for their argument that the trial court erred in submitting a global damage jury verdict form. Defendants argument is misguided and the rationale employed in In re Air Crash Disaster is distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case, we held that the use of a global rather than specific interrogatories on the issue of damages in a wrongful death action required a new trial on the element of damages comprising the general award once it was determined that the total award exceeded the maximum recovery rule. In this case, however, there is no basis for this court to remit the damage award and because the amount awarded does implicate the maximum recovery rule, the trial court's global damages interrogatory was not in error. 67 7. Attorneys Fees Under § 1983 and § 1988 112 Defendants contend that the trial court erred in awarding Castellano criminal defense attorneys' fees accrued during his criminal trial because 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) only permits the recovery of attorney fees in actions or proceedings to enforce the provisions of § 1983. 113 While this court has yet to rule upon this issue, several circuits have reasoned that a plaintiff who is successful in a malicious prosecution claim should be reimbursed for the attorney's fees expended during the original criminal proceeding. In Kerr v. City of Chicago, the court reasoned: 114 The defendants also contend that attorneys' fees expended in a criminal action are not recoverable in a civil rights action. We disagree. In Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85-86 (3d Cir.1965), the court held that federal common law controls the question of damages in civil rights actions with the purpose being to vindicate the civil rights of the individual. A plaintiff in a civil rights action should be allowed to recover the attorneys' fees in a state criminal action where the expenditure is a foreseeable result of the acts of the defendant. 68 115 Similarly, in Borunda v. Richmond, 69 the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs in a § 1983 civil rights suit, brought after they were wrongly arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment, were entitled to recover attorneys' fees incurred in their defense of state court criminal charges. The court explained: 116 Here, the attorneys' fees arose out of the necessity of defending against allegedly unwarranted criminal charges and were presented to the trier of fact as an item of damage. 117 A plaintiff who establishes liability for deprivations of constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is entitled to recover compensatory damages for all injuries suffered as a consequence of those deprivations.... The victim of the constitutional deprivation is entitled to compensation for economic harm, pain and suffering, and mental and emotional distress that results from the violations. 118 The [plaintiffs'] expenditures for legal representation during the prior criminal proceeding most assuredly constitute economic harm. The reasonable amount of these expenditures, if proved to the jury's satisfaction to be the consequence of appellants' illegal conduct, is recoverable as compensatory damages. 119 The amount of attorney's fees incurred during the criminal prosecutions was a direct and foreseeable consequence of appellants unlawful conduct. 70 120 Finally, in Greer v. Holt, the Sixth Circuit declined to award attorneys' fees incurred in an underlying prosecution where the plaintiff sued police under § 1983, but clarified that it, express[ed] no opinion as to whether the client could recover attorneys' fees as part of a damage package as, for example, in a malicious prosecution suit. 71 121 The plain language of § 1988 allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover costs expended to enforce the provisions of § 1983 72 and such a recovery is warranted in this case. Castellano was the prevailing plaintiff and successfully proved that defendants conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Furthermore, in order to satisfy the elements of malicious prosecution in his § 1983 action, Castellano had to prevail in his underlying criminal proceeding. Thus, his attorneys' fees were expended as a necessary prerequisite of his action to enforce the protections of § 1983. 122 Further, and adopting the rationale of Kerr and Borunda, Castellano's expenditure of attorneys' fees to defend himself in his criminal trial was, unquestionably, a foreseeable result of defendants' actions. Had defendants not conspired to fabricate evidence to implicate Castellano in the arson, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, he would not have been arrested and prosecuted for the crime. Thus, this court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Castellano to recover the attorneys' fees he incurred during his criminal trial. 123 8. Testimony of Castellano's Criminal Defense Attorney 124 Defendants contend that the trial court erred in allowing Castellano's criminal defense attorney to testify as to his fees from a ledger, which had not been disclosed to them, because he could not recall the specific fees charged therein. On that basis, defendants argue that the damage award should be reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages. 125 This court reviews evidentiary rulings made over a party's objections for abuse of discretion and harmless error. 73 At trial, Castellano's attorney pointed out that Castellano's claim for attorney fees expended during his criminal trial was no surprise to defendants because it was listed as an element of damages in each pre-trial order prepared for trial. It is a well-settled rule that a joint pre-trial order, signed by both parties, governs the issues and evidence presented at trial. 74 Thus, defendants were on notice that Castellano was seeking attorneys' fees from his criminal trial and the trial court did not abuse his discretion in allowing the criminal defense attorney to refresh his recollection as to the exact amount of those fees. 75 126 For all these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 127 AFFIRMED.