Opinion ID: 1144723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The propriety of specific performance.

Text: Defendants' argument that specific performance is not an available remedy is based upon the fact that there were numerous stipulations which had not been reduced to writing at the time that the principal contract was signed. This created, it is said, a condition of vagueness which rendered specific performance unavailable. Therefore the narrow question is whether the equitable remedy of specific performance is limited to fact situations in which a complete agreement has been reduced to writing. Whether a contract was intended by the parties as an integrated one is, as indicated above, a matter of intention. See 3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 633 and 3 Corbin, Contracts, sec. 581. Where it is shown that a writing was not intended to be fully integrated, terms other than those set forth in the writing may be proved by parol evidence, Fleming Construction Co. v. Scott, 141 Colo. 449, 348 P.2d 701. In the case at bar, the writing furnished the basic foundation for the agreement. The most essential of the terms are set forth therein and nothing appears on its face rendering it incomplete. As to the additional matters not expressed in writing, it is noted that the plaintiffs have acceded to each of the demands of the defendants except that which would allow defendant Claude Coulter to supervise the management of the ranch as a security measure. As to this the trial court did not find that plaintiff's had made oral commitments. In these circumstances, we see no grounds justifying denial of specific performance. It was within the power of the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction to eliminate the uncertainty which arose from failure to include every detail of the transaction in the written contract. The principle is expressed in the maxim certum est quod certum reddi potest.