Opinion ID: 351847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Standard Applied: Afanador

Text: 9 As we have stated, despite the fact that the informant's tip related solely to illegal activity by Vidal-Garcia, 5 the customs authorities in Miami ordered strip searches of all six Aerocondor crew members. Nothing was found on four; however, a quantity of cocaine was discovered under the girdle of appellant Afanador. We conclude that the reasonable suspicion standard was not satisfied as to Afanador and that her motion to suppress should have been granted. 10 The government advances two theories to justify the strip search of appellant Afanador. First, the government maintains that Afanador matched the smuggling profile discussed by this court in United States v. Forbicetta, 484 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993, 94 S.Ct. 2404, 40 L.Ed.2d 772 (1974). The elements of that profile are set forth in a passage from that opinion which we reproduce in the margin. 6 The record in our case discloses that Afanador arrived in Miami after working Aerocondor flight 204 as a stewardess. She was attired in the customary Aerocondor stewardess' uniform, described by the government witness as a white blouse with bright orange-like leisure suit type of top, topcoat, whatever, and a skirt. The top was further described as a blazer-type, loose-fitting jacket. There is no suggestion in the record that Afanador's mode of dress played any part whatsoever in the decision to subject her, or any of her fellow crew-members, to a strip search. In view of these facts, 7 we simply cannot take seriously the suggestion that these searches can be justified to any degree by application of the Forbicetta smuggling profile. Even if Afanador's conformity with such a profile were established, we would be governed by our statement in Himmelwright, supra, 551 F.2d at 995, that a generalized suspicion of criminal activity such as that which is fostered, for example, when one closely resembles a 'smuggling profile' will not normally in itself permit a reasonable conclusion that a strip search should occur. The fruitless search of Afanador's luggage and the failure to elicit suspicious information on questioning would, in these circumstances, preclude this justification for a strip search. 11 The government's second argument, stripped to its essentials, is that the reasonable suspicion established as to Vidal-Garcia somehow carries over to Afanador and other members of the Aerocondor crew. The government's brief is admirably forthright in its explanation of the factual basis for this search: 12 the customs inspectors were instructed by their superiors to search the entire crew, because they had a tip that one crew member was a body carrier. (A c) ustoms inspector . . . testified that it is routine practice on the part of the inspectors to conduct a secondary body search (strip search) of the entire crew if there is suspicion as to one and that to her knowledge the inspectors never single out a specific crew member. 13 Lest there be any doubt, we state here that reasonable suspicion must be specifically directed to the person to be searched. While in narrowly limited circumstances the degree of suspicion as to an already suspicious individual may be somewhat enhanced by virtue of suspicious activity by a closely linked traveling companion at the border, United States v. Wilson,488 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989, 94 S.Ct. 2397, 40 L.Ed.2d 767 (1974), 8 the fourth amendment does not permit any automatic or casual transference of suspicion. Though a Siamese symbiosis need not be demonstrated, more than physical companionship and/or a working relationship is required. Here there was no independent basis for suspicion of appellant Afanador. She was not the subject of a tip; nothing contained in her luggage gave rise to suspicion; there is no indication that her demeanor was in the least suspicious. There was no attempt to elicit information from Afanador, or from other members of the crew, by questioning. Rather, in accord with routine practice, all six members of the crew were subjected to degrading strip searches. We do not view members of an airline crew as a suspicious gang, and reject the casual transference of suspicion among a group of persons traveling together as a means of justifying such searches. Only where reasonable suspicion is specifically directed to the individual to be searched, as was the case with appellant Vidal-Garcia, may an intrusive search be conducted. 14 While we are cognizant of the serious problems of controlling drug traffic at Miami International Airport, we are not prepared to create there a special enclave exempt from the operation of the United States Constitution. The balance we have sought to strike in border search cases between the level of official intrusion into individual privacy and the public interest to be served by such intrusions, Himmelwright, supra, 551 F.2d at 994, a balance which permits searches and seizures to be based upon less than probable cause, fully reflects (t)he national interests in self-protection and protection of tariff revenue, United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 715 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092, 97 S.Ct. 1104, 51 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), present at the national border. In a civilized society, one's anatomy is draped with constitutional protections. The fourth amendment does not permit us to give border agents a freer hand or a more probing eye. 15 AFFIRMED as to appellant Vidal-Garcia. 16 REVERSED as to appellant Afanador.