Opinion ID: 6335450
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Host Alleges Harm Only to Itself

Text: Refusing to agree to a contract also cannot state a plausible Section 1 injury because it is now “axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’” Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). Even if that axiom comes from the courts, not Congress, it is still a binding limitation on our review. The District Court recognized, “[d]espite references of potential harm to others, . . . Host seeks remedy for its injury alone, and that injury is its exclusion from PHL.” (App. at 9.) But, once again, pleading an antitrust injury requires a plaintiff to “prove that [the] challenged conduct affected the prices, quantity or quality of goods or services, not just [its] own welfare.” Mathews, 87 F.3d at 641 (quotations omitted); see also Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing W. Penn, 627 F.3d at 100).8 Host 8 Host’s speculations do not alter that conclusion. The Complaint references, anecdotally, that a pouring rights agreement “at one airport, . . . resulted in the exclusion of three of four premium brands of bottled water.” (App. at 21). And “[i]n another market study, 17% of respondents indicated it is essential that the water they purchase be natural spring water.” (App. at 22.) Taking both in the light most favorable to Host, we can infer: 1) that a market study was conducted at some airport, somewhere, sometime; and 2) in a separate study, around 1.7 of every ten consumers—perhaps at airports, 12 “estimates [under the PRA] . . . costs at its existing units would increase by over 30%,” noting, for example, “the price increase for regular non-premium water is more than 40% for a smaller serving size.” (App. at 21.) But that is harm only to Host’s “own welfare,” which is not our focus. Mathews, 87 F.3d at 641. Host fails to plead facts tending to show that consumer prices would increase under the PRA because it does not follow that Host’s costs must be passed on to consumers. The PRA might just as easily secure lower or discounted beverage prices for smaller subtenants who could not access volume discounts and decrease prices for consumers. See Eisai, 821 F.3d at 403 (“[E]xclusive dealing arrangements . . . can also offer consumers various economic benefits, such as assuring them the availability of supply and price stability.”); Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 76 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is widely recognized that in many circumstances [exclusive dealing arrangements] may be highly efficient—to assure supply, price stability, outlets, investment, best efforts or the like—and pose no competitive threat at all.”) (quoting E. Food Servs., 357 F.3d at 8)). And what is more, Host is not even required to purchase non-alcoholic beverages under the PRA. Host also contends that “MarketPlace and [PHL] have attempted to cause and have in fact caused . . . competitive harm . . . potentially to other lessors/sublessors at PHL, as well as to competing beverage suppliers shut out of the market under pouring rights and consumers of beverages and other products at PHL.” (App. at 28 (emphasis added).) But Host’s perhaps not— really liked spring water. We cannot infer that the quality of non-alcoholic beverages at PHL under the PRA would not be comparable. Or much else for that matter. 13 Complaint lacks any facts alleging harm to other PHL tenants and potential harms do not suffice. To recover treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, “a plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent,” not potential injury. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 558 (1981) (emphasis added). And most importantly, competing beverage suppliers were not “shut out” of the market unilaterally; they participated in a competitive bidding process that PepsiCo simply won.9 Sailing a straight course through the murky waters of antitrust injury challenges courts to avoid the siren songs of illusory harm. That is why the doctrine “requires every plaintiff to show that its loss comes from acts that reduce output or raise prices to consumers” in the relevant market. Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases). Host does not and, for that reason, cannot state a claim for relief. 9 It is telling that the same competitive bidding process that resulted in the PRA also awarded Host the two retail concession spaces, (App. at 24–25) a process Host agrees was competitive. (Opening Br. at 15.) Understandably, as “[i]t is well established that competition among businesses to serve as an exclusive supplier should actually be encouraged.” Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 83; see also Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., 354 F.3d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2004) (competition to be an exclusive supplier “is a vital form of rivalry, and often the most powerful one, which the antitrust laws encourage rather than suppress.”). 14