Opinion ID: 172774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of the Due Process Claim

Text: To support his due process claim, Robinson relies primarily on the standards set forth in Ritchie. In that case, a state trial court refused a defendant's request to order a child services agency to disclose privileged records pertaining to the victim of sexual abuse. The state law privilege applicable to the records was qualified, and a court of competent jurisdiction could order disclosure. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 44, 107 S.Ct. 989 (internal quotation marks omitted). Employing a due process analysis, the Supreme Court held that the state court should have conducted an in camera review of the records, and should have released material evidence to defense counsel. Id. at 58, 107 S.Ct. 989. But the Court also held that the defendant had no due process right to personally examine the records, noting that [a]lthough the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant ... this Court has never held... that a defendant alone may make the determination as to the materiality of [exculpatory evidence]. Id. at 59, 107 S.Ct. 989 (citations omitted). [1] Here, in light of Ritchie, the district court did not commit plain error when it denied Robinson access to the CI's psychiatric records. Under plain-error review, an error is `plain' if it is `obvious or clear, i.e., if it is contrary to well-settled law.' United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1274 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir.2003)). Any error by the district court in this case was not contrary to well-settled law. It is important to recognize that the bulk of the CI's medical records  i.e., the portions containing the CI's statements to his psychiatrists and their statements regarding his treatment  were potentially subject to federal privilege. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) ([W]e hold that confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure....). In this circuit, the privilege has few exceptions, and none were plainly applicable to the facts of this case. See United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir.1998) (applying the Jaffee rule in a criminal case, and creating a narrow exception to the rule where disclosure [is] the only means of averting [imminent] harm); cf. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir.2003) (refusing to recognize a dangerous-patient exception to the Jaffee rule). Indeed, we have noted that the federal psychotherapist privilege is not rooted in any constitutional right of privacy but in a public good which overrides the quest for relevant evidence; the privilege is not subject to a balancing component. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1358 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given these circumstances, the district court exercised caution and judgment despite the thorny legal issues that emerged on the eve of trial. And even though Robinson failed to properly raise his Ritchie claim, the court carefully followed the procedure approved in Ritchie by conducting an in camera review of the CI's psychiatric records, informing the parties of the CI's psychiatric diagnosis, hearing arguments from the parties (on several occasions), and determining that the records should remain confidential. See United States v. Haworth, 168 F.R.D. 660 (D.N.M. 1996) (conducting an analysis under Ritchie and determining that a witness's privileged psychotherapist records should not be disclosed to defendants). Moreover, the court's decision comports with the Ritchie materiality requirement. Under Ritchie, only material evidence  i.e., that which probably would have changed the outcome of ... trial  need be disclosed to the defense. 480 U.S. at 58, 107 S.Ct. 989. After reviewing the records in camera, interviewing a doctor from Osawatomie State hospital, and hearing arguments from the parties, the district court determined the CI's psychiatric records contained only irrelevant, prejudicial, or otherwise inadmissible evidence. As explained below in the context of my Confrontation Clause harmlessness analysis, the district court's ruling was sound; disclosure of the records would have had little effect on the outcome of Robinson's trial. In short, the district court's refusal to permit Robinson to inspect the CI's psychiatric records was not plain error and cannot be the basis for reversal.