Opinion ID: 1897681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court err in denying spepa's motions for attorney's fees?

Text: Read filed a motion requesting that she be allowed to inspect the transformer which SPEPA had removed from the utility pole near her home. SPEPA responded, stating that the transformer had been lost by the company that repaired transformers for SPEPA. In its response SPEPA also objected to the request, claiming that the period for discovery [had] expired. The trial court then ordered SPEPA to produce the transformer and allow Read to inspect it. SPEPA, asserting that the transformer could not be found, did not produce it. Read then filed a motion for sanctions, seeking an order conclusively adjudicating that the transformer was defective. The trial court denied the motion. SPEPA submitted to the trial court motions for 1) expenses and attorney's fees incurred in defending against the motion for sanctions, and 2) expenses and attorney's fees incurred in preparing for and obtaining the attendance of expert witnesses for the original trial date, which was continued at Read's request after the testimony of Read's expert was excluded because Read had not provided his name to SPEPA during discovery. In regard to the request for attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defending against the motion for sanctions, we are of the opinion that Read acted reasonably in seeking sanctions. The sanction which Read sought is provided for in Miss.R.Civ. P. 37(b)(2): Sanctions by Court in Which Action Is Pending. If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rules 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify in behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under subsection (a) of this rule, the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: (A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order. The thrust of SPEPA's argument is that because its failure to comply with discovery was due to inability rather than willful refusal, sanctions were inappropriate. Therefore, SPEPA claims, Read abused the discovery process by seeking sanctions which she knew would not be granted. In so arguing, SPEPA misconstrues our discovery rules. In Kilpatrick v. Mississippi Baptist Medical, 461 So.2d 765, 768 (Miss. 1984) (cited in White v. White, 509 So.2d 205 (Miss. 1987), we held that [i]f the failure to comply is because of inability to comply, rather than because of willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of the party, the action may not be dismissed, nor a default judgment given, and less severe sanctions are the most that can be invoked. Although failure to comply because of inability does not warrant the most severe sanctions, lesser sanctions may well be appropriate. Therefore, a motion for sanctions against a party unable to comply is not per se an abuse of discovery. In the case at bar, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award expenses and attorney's fees to SPEPA for defending against the motion for sanctions. Finally, SPEPA claims the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award SPEPA attorney's fees and expenses, including expenses for expert witnesses, incurred by SPEPA when the trial was continued on Read's motion. Read requested the continuance after the trial court excluded the testimony of her expert, a ruling necessitated by Read's failure to disclose the expert's identity during discovery. We agree with SPEPA that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award SPEPA reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in preparing for and attending trial on the date originally set. Because Read withheld the name of her expert witness, the circuit court excluded that witness's testimony. Faced with this appropriate sanction, Read requested a continuance, thus seeking to mitigate the impact of a ruling which she necessitated by her discovery violation. SPEPA was prepared to go to trial on the date originally scheduled, as were its experts. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have awarded SPEPA reasonable expenses and attorney's fees. Although the trial court may not require a monetary payment as a condition for a continuance, Owens v. Whitwell, 481 So.2d 1071 (Miss. 1986), the trial court may impose upon any party or counsel such sanctions as may be just, including the payment of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees, if any party or counsel... abuses the discovery process in seeking, making or resisting discovery, Miss.R.Civ.P. 37(e). In this case the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award SPEPA reasonable expenses and attorney's fees. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for the trial court to reinstate the jury verdict and enter judgment for Read in the amount of the verdict, less 1) the settlement from the manufacturer, and 2) a reasonable amount of expenses and attorney's fees resulting from the continuance, the amount to be determined by the trial court. REVERSED ON DIRECT APPEAL; REVERSED ON CROSS-APPEAL AND REMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. ROBERTSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.