Opinion ID: 2690309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Effect of a Pardon

Text: {¶ 20} The term “pardon” is not defined or further explained in the Constitution. Sterling v. Drake, 29 Ohio St. 457, 460 (1876). We have stated that “[a] full and absolute pardon releases the offender from the entire punishment prescribed for his offense, and from all the disabilities consequent on his conviction.” State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629, 650, 4 N.E. 81 (1885). Similarly, the General Assembly defines “pardon” as “the remission of penalty by the governor in accordance with the power vested in the governor by the constitution.” R.C. 2967.01(B). R.C. 2967.04(B) further provides that “[a]n unconditional pardon relieves the person to whom it is granted of all disabilities arising out of the conviction or convictions from which it is granted.” {¶ 21} Boykin argues that because a pardon relieves the recipient of all disabilities arising out of the conviction, a judicial expungement is necessary to remove the “disability” that results from having a criminal record. The failure to seal the criminal record, according to Boykin, encroaches on the governor’s constitutional authority to issue a pardon and undermines the pardon’s impact. She contends that having a criminal record imposes real and lasting negative consequences such as difficulty in finding employment, in obtaining housing, and in establishing eligibility for public benefits. Boykin also argues that because our case law holds that an absolute pardon reaches both punishment and the 8 January Term, 2013 underlying conviction, court sealing of the pertinent criminal record must accompany the pardon.
{¶ 22} We first address Boykin’s contention that a pardon covers both the conviction and the sentence of the pardoned offense and that it therefore should automatically entitle her to have her records sealed. In support of this argument, Boykin quotes the following passage from Knapp, 39 Ohio St. at 381: “[A] pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender.” Ex parte Garland, [71 U.S.] 333, 380 [4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866)].    It is, in effect, a reversal of the judgment, a verdict of acquittal, and a judgment of discharge thereon, to this extent, that there is a complete estoppel of record against further punishment pursuant to such conviction. {¶ 23} Context, however, reveals that this language is simply dicta. In Knapp, the issue before us was whether the petitioner was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Knapp had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The governor granted Knapp a full pardon, and Knapp was released from prison. Shortly thereafter, the governor declared that the pardon had been obtained by fraud and ordered the warden to rearrest Knapp. After his reincarceration, Knapp sought a writ of habeas corpus. The warden argued that Knapp’s detention was proper because the pardon was void due to fraud and because the governor had revoked the pardon. Id. at 377-379. We disagreed and held that a full, unconditional pardon is irrevocable. Id. at syllabus. We also were unwilling to sanction a principle that would authorize this court or any other court to impeach a pardon in a collateral proceeding on the ground of fraud. Id. at 391. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 24} Boykin contends that this court in State ex rel. Gordon v. Zangerle, 136 Ohio St. 371, 376, 26 N.E.2d 190 (1940), “reaffirmed” Knapp and other precedents by stating that a pardon “purges away all guilt and leaves the recipient from a legal standpoint, in the same condition as if the crime had never been committed.” She also relies on State v. Morris, 55 Ohio St.2d 101, 378 N.E.2d 708 (1978), which included similar remarks. Again, we find that the statements regarding the effect of a pardon in these cases are dicta. In Zangerle, the issue was whether the system of probation in Cuyahoga County was constitutional. Id. at 374. In Morris, we answered whether the General Assembly had the authority to enact legislation permitting a trial court to consider abrogating a previous conviction or reducing a previously imposed sentence for prisoners whose original offense of conviction was eliminated by newly enacted statutes or whose punishment would have been less harsh under newly enacted statutes. Id. at 104. As in Knapp, the scope of a pardon was not in any way at issue in either case. {¶ 25} Moreover, the language in the federal case that Knapp relied upon, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 380, 18 L.Ed. 366, which engendered Knapp’s dicta regarding the effect of a pardon, has itself been dismissed as dictum by numerous courts. E.g., In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 17 (D.C.App.1997) (noting that by the time the opinion in Garland reached the issue of the pardon, “the case had already been decided” on other grounds); United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 958 (3d Cir.1990) (stating that the language in Garland is clearly dictum and that “a pardon does not vitiate guilt”). See also Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 128 (7th Cir.1975), fn. 2 (declaring that a pardon does not “restore the offender to a state of innocence in the eye of the law as was suggested” in Garland). {¶ 26} The United States Supreme Court has also considerably narrowed Garland’s statement regarding the effect of a pardon. See Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 151 U.S. 1, 19, 14 S.Ct. 240, 38 L.Ed. 55 (1894) (although an executive pardon relieves the wrongdoer from public 10 January Term, 2013 punishment, it does not relieve the wrongdoer from civil liability); Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94, 35 S.Ct. 267, 59 L.Ed. 476 (1915) (a pardon “carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it”); Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 59, 34 S.Ct. 576, 58 L.Ed. 843 (1914) (in sentencing a defendant as a habitual offender, a court may consider “past offenses committed by the accused as a circumstance of aggravation, even although for such past offenses there had been a pardon granted”); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (“the granting of a pardon is in no sense an overturning of a judgment of conviction by some other tribunal; it is ‘[a]n executive action that mitigates or sets aside punishment for a crime.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1113 (6th Ed.1990)” [emphasis added in Nixon]). {¶ 27} Thus, although a pardon grants the recipient relief from any ongoing punishment for the offense and prevents any future legal disability based on that offense, it does not erase the past conduct. In other words, what’s done is done.
{¶ 28} Even if we were to consider, arguendo, that a pardon nullifies the recipient’s guilt, nothing in our case law indicates that sealing is required when a conviction is pardoned. As we stated in Pepper Pike, “even individuals who have never been convicted are not entitled to expungement of their arrest records as a matter of course.” 66 Ohio St.2d at 376-377, 421 N.E.2d 1303. {¶ 29} We have long recognized that effects from past conduct can continue to linger despite a pardon. For instance, the underlying conduct of a pardoned offense may still be relevant for employment considerations. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 116-117, 5 N.E. 228 (1886). This court in that case upheld the governor’s decision to remove three police commissioners for hiring a large number of people who were viewed as unfit to act as police officers, including several who had been convicted of offenses that 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO should have disqualified them from serving on the police force. Id. The commissioners attempted to defend their actions by arguing that two of the officers had received presidential pardons for their criminal offenses and should be treated as if they had never been charged with an offense. Id. at 102-103. We disagreed, stating: Whatever the theory of the law may be as to the effect of a pardon, it can not work such moral changes as to warrant the assertion that a pardoned convict is just as reliable as one who has constantly maintained the character of a good citizen. It is a perversion of language to give to the views expressed by Judge Okey in Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377, such a construction. He never meant any thing of the kind. Id. at 117. {¶ 30} Furthermore, this court denied an attorney’s motion for the termination of his indefinite license suspension in Ohio based on the pardon of his underlying felony conviction. In re Bustamante, 100 Ohio St.3d 39, 2003-Ohio4828, 796 N.E.2d 494. We held that the attorney was required to show full compliance with all conditions for reinstatement under Gov.Bar R. V(10) despite the pardon. Id. at ¶ 7. {¶ 31} The United States Supreme Court has also indicated that the effect of a pardon can be limited: “A pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from the consequences of his offence, so far as such release is practicable and within control of the pardoning power, or of officers under its direction.    It does not make amends for the past.” (Emphasis added.) Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153, 24 L.Ed. 442 (1877). Although the governor may have the power to issue a pardon, an entitlement to the sealing of court 12 January Term, 2013 records is not an automatic result of that pardon, because the maintenance of judicial records is not within the governor’s control. As one federal court has expressed regarding the United States Constitution: Whatever be the effect of a Presidential pardon in other respects,    the notion that the President has the ability, through the pardon power vested under Article II, § 2, to tamper with judicial records is a concept jurisprudentially difficult to swallow. The idea flies in the face of the separation of powers doctrine. We need only to note that Article III, § 1 states: “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” It is beyond cavil that the maintenance of court records is an inherent aspect of judicial power. Noonan, 906 F.2d at 956. {¶ 32} The Ohio Constitution also militates against Boykin’s argument that a pardon automatically entitles the recipient to have the record of the pardoned conviction sealed. Article III, Section 11 provides: The governor shall communicate to the General Assembly, at every regular session, each case of reprieve, commutation, or pardon granted, stating the name and crime of the convict, the sentence, its date, and the date of the commutation, pardon, or reprieve, with the governor’s reasons therefor. In other words, the Constitution contemplates that a record of the conviction and the pardon will be maintained. The governor must report the name of the 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO offender, the offense, the sentence, and the reasons for the pardon to the General Assembly. {¶ 33} Nor has the General Assembly provided that the recipient of a pardon is automatically entitled to have the record of the pardoned conviction sealed. Neither R.C. 2953.32 nor R.C. 2953.52 includes a pardon under the factors to consider in sealing a criminal record. On the other hand, R.C. 2967.06 indicates that the warrant of pardon becomes part of the criminal record. It states: Warrants of pardon and commutation shall be issued in triplicate, one to be given to the convict, one to be filed with the clerk of the court of common pleas in whose office the sentence is recorded, and one to be filed with the head of the institution in which the convict was confined, in case he was confined. All warrants of pardon, whether conditional or otherwise, shall be recorded by said clerk and the officer of the institution with whom such warrants and copies are filed, in a book provided for that purpose, which record shall include the indorsements on such warrants. A copy of such a warrant with all indorsements, certified by said clerk under seal, shall be received in evidence as proof of the facts set forth in such copy with indorsements. {¶ 34} The General Assembly has provided that a pardon does not automatically release a pardoned felon from paying the costs of the conviction. R.C. 2961.01(A)(2); see also R.C. 2961.02(C). Read together, R.C. 2961.01(A) and (B) support a determination that a pardon does not automatically remove a person’s incompetency to circulate or serve as a witness for certain electionrelated documents and petitions. Nor does a pardon automatically remove the recipient’s disability with respect to firearms. R.C. 2923.14(B)(1). 14 January Term, 2013 {¶ 35} For all the foregoing reasons, we disagree with the First District’s statement that “ ‘[a] pardon without expungement is not a pardon.’ ” Cope, 111 Ohio App.3d at 312, 676 N.E.2d 141, quoting Commonwealth v. C.S., 517 Pa. 89, 93, 534 A.2d 1053 (1987). Although the sealing of a criminal record may complement a pardon, it is not an automatic right that flows from a pardon. Accordingly, we answer the certified-conflict question in the negative.