Opinion ID: 2810694
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: streinz’s access to counsel claim

Text: After his co-defendants had rested their cases, Streinz informed the court that he wanted to testify on his own behalf. That testimony was delayed, however, because on the morning that Streinz’s testimony was scheduled to begin, Government counsel informed the trial court that Streinz had just produced documents that were pertinent to his testimony and that should have been provided much earlier, during discovery. The district court convened a hearing, and Streinz testified that he had recently found the documents at home, while preparing for trial. At the Government’s request, the court ordered Streinz, his attorney, the prosecutor, and a federal agent to go to Streinz’s house to retrieve any other documents that were subject to discovery. The court recessed the proceedings, postponing Streinz’s testimony and directing him “not to communicate with anyone whatsoever with regard to the documents located at your home.” Accompanied by the prosecutor, a detective, a federal agent, and his own attorney, Streinz traveled to his home. Upon entering the house, the group went directly to an office that contained stacks of papers that Streinz had been 6 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 7 of 75 examining in preparation for trial. The situation became heated, with Streinz asserting that the officers were engaging in a more intrusive search than was appropriate for their limited mission, and with the detective, who contended that Streinz was not complying with the officer’s directives, ultimately calling for backup. To prevent matters from getting further out of hand, Streinz’s attorney quickly tried to identify any pertinent documents and brought those documents to the courtroom, where the prosecutor began reviewing them. While examining these papers, the prosecutor saw a handwritten notation indicating that the documents contained Streinz’s work product. Concerned that he might be improperly examining a defendant’s work product, the prosecutor ceased his review and asked Streinz’s attorney to keep the documents in a box in the courtroom in case an issue arose. Streinz’s attorney moved for a mistrial the next morning, arguing that his defense had been compromised by the document retrieval and review procedure. The court denied the motion and asked Streinz if he still wanted to testify. Streinz indicated that he did, although he expressed concern that his defense had been “jeopardized” by the previous day’s events. Streinz’s direct examination then began. As the trial recessed at the end of the day, the court instructed Streinz that he could not discuss his testimony with “anyone,” but that he could talk to his 7 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 8 of 75 lawyer about his “constitutional rights.” The court did not, however, explain what that phrase might mean. Prior to resuming his direct testimony the next day, Streinz sent a letter directly to the court expressing distress at his situation. As set out in that document, Streinz noted uncertainty whether it was appropriate to send the judge a letter, but, given the court’s earlier restriction on conversations with his attorney, he felt that he could not talk with the latter about his concerns without “cross[ing] a line of violating the court[’s] restrictions.” Streinz stated, among other things, that his preparation, particularly for cross-examination, had been hampered because he had been deprived of trial documents that were “seized without any advance notice,” thereby preventing him from being able to inventory or make copies of the documents. The court acknowledged Streinz’s letter and, while the other trial participants remained waiting in the courtroom, allowed Streinz, on his own and without any consultation with his attorney, to review the documents taken from his home. After he had finished reviewing the documents in the courtroom, Streinz completed his direct examination, and cross-examination began. Streinz was still on the stand being cross-examined when the trial day ended. The district court again reminded him that, although he could talk to his lawyer about “constitutional 8 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 9 of 75 rights” during the overnight recess, he could not talk to his lawyer “about the case.” Again, the court did not explain what a discussion about Streinz’s constitutional rights might entail. The next morning, Streinz sent a second letter to the court. In this letter, Streinz expressed his anxiety that, because the court would not allow him talk to his lawyer, no one was “looking out” for his “interests and due process.” He also advised the court that the time he had been given to review his documents in court on the previous day was insufficient, considering that he had been deprived of the documents for three days. In particular, he noted, the Government had referenced one of those documents in court the day before and likely would do so again, and Streinz had no access to that document to better prepare himself for crossexamination. He concluded by suggesting that errors made by the Government, his attorney, and the court were “sabotaging [his] ability to be prepared and properly defend [his] case.” The district court acknowledged Streinz’s complaint but indicated that the documents had been available to Streinz ever since his attorney, in the company of Government personnel, had retrieved them from Streinz’s home. (But as Streinz was not supposed to be talking to his attorney about the case, it is unclear how Streinz would have known that he could have requested his lawyer to hand over 9 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 10 of 75 the documents to him.) Regarding the impact of any errors on Streinz’s right to testify, the court reminded Streinz that it had previously informed him that he had a constitutional right not to testify. Then, after giving Streinz forty additional minutes to review the documents in the courtroom, cross-examination began again.
Streinz argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the trial court’s refusal to allow him to confer with counsel during the two overnight recesses while he was testifying. We agree. We review Streinz’s Sixth Amendment claim pursuant to a de novo standard. See United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (reiterating that claims of constitutional error are reviewed de novo). A trial is deemed unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). The question here is whether, by prohibiting Streinz from speaking to his attorney about his case during the three days he was on the witness stand—including the two overnight recesses—the district court deprived Streinz of assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. We conclude that the district court’s restriction did so deprive Streinz. 10 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 11 of 75 This conclusion is dictated, for the most part, by the Supreme Court’s decision in Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976). In Geders, which was also tried in the Middle District of Florida, the district court had directed defendant Geders not to talk to his attorney “about anything” 2 during a seventeen-hour overnight recess between his direct and cross-examination. Id. at 83 n.1. Geders’ attorney objected, explaining that he had a right to talk to his client about matters other than the imminent cross-examination. The district court declined counsel’s request, noting that the latter could talk to Geders, while remaining in the courtroom, about the witnesses to be called the next day, but nothing more than that. Further, the court assured counsel that he would be able to consult with Geders once the latter’s cross-examination had concluded and before redirect examination, and the court did allow that post-cross-examination consultation the next day. Id. at 82–85. In determining whether the district court’s sequestration of Geders from his own attorney during the overnight recess violated Geders’ constitutional right to counsel, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, as a general rule, valid reasons 2 In directly addressing defendant Geders at the conclusion of the colloquy on this matter, the district court stated: “[Mr. Geders] . . . I direct you not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone until you are back here tomorrow morning . . . for the purpose of being cross-examined.” Geders, 425 U.S. at 83 n.1 (emphasis added). Based on its review of the totality of the discussion and the court’s earlier statements, the Supreme Court concluded that the actual message communicated to the defendant was that he was not to talk to his attorney about anything. Id. (“The ambiguity of this colloquy appears to be resolved by the direction that petitioner ‘not talk to you (counsel) about anything.’”). 11 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 12 of 75 exist for disallowing a witness who is testifying from speaking to trial counsel at recess periods during that testimony. The main justification for this prohibition is the interest in deflecting efforts by third-parties to coach the witness before he returns to the stand the next day to face cross-examination. Id. at 87. Yet, as the Court noted, a criminal defendant is not just another witness. Although a nonparty witness will likely have little to discuss with trial counsel other than his upcoming testimony, an accused and his attorney will often have many other matters to discuss during an overnight recess. Indeed, the Court noted, “[s]uch recesses are often times of intensive work, with tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed.” Id. at 88. For example, defense counsel “may need to obtain from his client information made relevant by the day’s testimony, or he may need to pursue inquiry along lines not fully explored earlier. At the very least, the overnight recess during trial gives the defendant a chance to discuss with counsel the significance of the day’s events.” Id. Although it was sympathetic to a district court’s desire to minimize the opportunities for a witness to be coached during a long recess, the Supreme Court nonetheless determined that an accused’s right to confer with counsel trumps a court’s concerns about such consultation. Specifically, when there is a conflict between a testifying defendant’s right to consult with his attorney during “a long 12 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 13 of 75 overnight recess” and the prosecutor’s desire to eliminate the risk that defense counsel will coach his client before the latter’s cross-examination, “the conflict must, under the Sixth Amendment, be resolved in favor of the right to the assistance and guidance of counsel.” Id. at 91. Geders’ conviction was overturned because the trial court would not let him talk to his lawyer during one overnight recess. The district court here, in effect, restricted Streinz from talking to his attorney during two overnight recesses that occurred while he was testifying. 3 Thus, on its face, Geders appears to call for reversal of Streinz’s conviction. The Government, however, disagrees that Geders requires a conclusion that Streinz’s right to counsel was violated, and we now turn to those distinctions that the Government says exist between this case and Geders. First, the Government cites language, here and there, from Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989), in support of its argument that Streinz’s right to counsel was not compromised by the district court’s broad embargo on conversations between Streinz and his attorney. But it is difficult to discern how Perry bolsters the Government’s position. In Perry, the trial court had only prohibited the defendant from consulting with his attorney during a fifteen-minute recess that occurred after 3 As noted, on the first night, while Streinz was still testifying on direct, the court told him that he could not discuss his testimony with “anyone,” but that he could talk to his lawyer about his “constitutional rights.” On the second night, the district court reminded Streinz that he could not talk to his lawyer “about the case,” although he could talk to his lawyer about his “constitutional rights.” 13 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 14 of 75 the defendant’s direct testimony had concluded and before cross-examination was to begin. Id. at 280. Given the timing and short duration of the recess, the Supreme Court distinguished Geders and concluded that the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel had not been compromised by sequestration from his attorney during such a brief period of time. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that a defendant has no constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while testifying. Id. at 281. In other words, if a defendant gets in a tight spot on cross-examination, “neither he nor his lawyer has a right to have the testimony interrupted in order to give him the benefit of counsel’s advice.” Id. Were a defendant allowed to huddle with his lawyer whenever the going gets tough, the truth-seeking function of the trial would be impeded.4 And if a defendant has no right to call a time-out to talk with counsel during his testimony, he similarly has no right to take advantage of a fortuitouslytimed recess “in which there is a virtual certainty that any conversation between the witness and the lawyer would relate to the ongoing testimony.” 5 Id. at 283–84. 4 This is so not so much because of the fear of unethical coaching by counsel, but because consultation with counsel “grants the witness an opportunity to regroup and regain a poise and sense of strategy that the unaided witness would not possess. . . . [T]he discovery of truth [is less likely when] a witness [] is given time to pause and consult with his attorney.” Perry, 488 U.S. at 282. 5 It should be noted, though, that the Supreme Court made clear that it was not criticizing judges who do permit criminal defendants to consult with counsel during a short trial recess. The Court merely held that “the Federal Constitution does not compel every trial judge to allow 14 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 15 of 75 But, in terms of the right to assistance of counsel, a period of silence between a criminal defendant and his attorney during a short recess was a far different matter for the Perry court than would be a similar quarantine during an overnight recess. Reaffirming Geders, the Court noted that during an overnight recess, normal consultation between defendant and counsel would “encompass matters that go beyond the content of the defendant’s own testimony,” including the availability of other witnesses, trial tactics, or even negotiating a plea agreement. Id. at 284. And the “fact that such discussions will inevitably include some consideration of the defendant’s ongoing testimony does not compromise that basic right.” Id. In short, we read Perry as reaffirming the validity of the Geders principle. The district court’s restriction on Streinz’s ability to consult with his attorney during two overnight recesses clearly “falls on the Geders side of the line and violates the Sixth Amendment.” United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 651 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that Geders precludes “any overnight ban on communication”); see also Perry, 488 U.S. at 284 (“It is the defendant’s right to unrestricted access to his lawyer for advice on a variety of trial-related matters that is controlling in the context of a long recess.”). the defendant to consult with his lawyer while his testimony is in progress” just because a short recess has been called. Id. at 284–85. 15 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 16 of 75 In fact, this case involves the kind of communications that Geders intended to protect. The day before Streinz began his direct examination, the Government had taken documents and work product from Streinz’s house that he needed to prepare for his testimony. Thereafter, and throughout his direct and crossexamination, Streinz’s access to the documents was limited to brief, in-court review sessions. As both Streinz and his attorney interpreted the court’s instruction, Streinz could not confer with his attorney even to determine whether or how he could regain possession of the documents. Nor could he discuss with his attorney the likelihood that his defense had been compromised by the Government’s retrieval and review process, or any means to reduce that threat. See Geders, 425 U.S. at 88 (“At the very least, the overnight recess during trial gives the defendant a chance to discuss with counsel the significance of the day’s events. . . . [T]he role of counsel is important precisely because ordinarily a defendant is ill-equipped to understand and deal with the trial process without a lawyer’s guidance.”). The Government argues that the district court did not actually prevent Streinz from conferring with counsel during overnight recesses, or even during incourt recesses, because the court told Streinz several times that he could discuss with his lawyer his “constitutional rights.” We do not know what the district court 16 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 17 of 75 meant by this exemption, and it appears obvious that neither did Streinz. Clearly, Streinz was of the impression that the court had forbidden him from consulting at all with his attorney about his case, which was not an unreasonable assumption because those were the court’s exact words. Otherwise, he would not have felt compelled, during the course of his testimony, to write the court two letters revealing his concerns, and particularly his need for access to documents that the Government had taken from his home on the day his direct examination was to have begun. Indeed, Streinz told the judge, outright, that he had written the letter rather than dealing through counsel because he did not want to run afoul of the court’s order against communications between him and his attorney. As to what one could reasonably assume the district court to have meant by the phrase “constitutional rights,” when the court told Streinz not to speak to his attorney about anything except those rights, the court had previously and consistently used this term to refer to Streinz’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.6 But any discussion about Streinz’s right against self-incrimination 6 On the day that Government counsel complained that Streinz had not turned over all discovery, which was prior to Streinz’s direct examination, Streinz gave a sworn “proffer” outside of the jury’s presence as to this matter. Before that proffer, the district court inquired whether it was his intention to waive his “constitutional rights, not exercise [his] Fifth Amendment rights and to testify.” Afterward, the district court reminded Streinz that just because he had waived his constitutional rights by giving a testimonial proffer, he could rescind that waiver and “exercise his constitutional right” not to testify before the jury. Just prior to this exchange, at a sidebar conference, the court had advised defense counsel that Streinz’s constitutional rights were at stake once he took the stand. 17 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 18 of 75 would have been a very short conversation because Streinz had already begun testifying, and any right he might have earlier had not to incriminate himself had, by that time, become a moot point. And even if we assume that the district court intended to permit communication on a broader array of subjects than just Streinz’s right against selfincrimination, its instruction that Streinz should not talk to his attorney about “the case” during an overnight recess did not comply with Geders. See Perry, 488 U.S. at 284 (noting the wide variety of trial-related communications that are protected by Geders and stating that the “fact that such discussions will inevitably include some consideration of the defendant’s ongoing testimony does not compromise” a defendant’s right to assistance of counsel during an overnight recess). Finally, citing Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc), the Government makes a two-fold argument (1) that Streinz failed to preserve this issue on appeal because he did not object to the district court’s On the next day, right before Streinz took the stand to testify before the jury, the court stated: “Now, this will be the third time I believe that I have advised you of your constitutional rights. You have a Fifth Amendment constitutional right against self-incrimination . . . . Now, since the last time that I advised you of your constitutional rights have you had . . . an opportunity to counsel with your attorney with regard to whether or not you should testify?” After Streinz’s second letter, the court responded to his complaint that his ability to defend his case had been sabotaged by stating: “Sir, I told you before you had a constitutional right to testify or not to testify.” 18 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 19 of 75 restriction and (2) that there is no indication that Streinz actually wanted to talk to his attorney during the overnight recesses. In Crutchfield, the state trial court called a brief recess during defendant Crutchfield’s direct testimony and instructed defense counsel not to discuss the defendant’s testimony with him during that break. Crutchfield did not object. Id. at 1104. After conviction, and relying on Geders, Crutchfield filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that the trial court’s restriction on his communication with his attorney deprived him of the assistance of counsel. The en banc court unanimously agreed that the conviction should not be vacated, but three opinions were issued, with each opinion reflecting different reasoning in support of this outcome. A six-judge plurality of the en banc court concluded that Geders applied even to short recesses within a trial day and assumed that the trial court’s admonition to Crutchfield did unconstitutionally restrict his right to the assistance of counsel during that recess. Id. at 1104–1111. But in Geders, the defendant had objected to the proscription again consultation. Crutchfield neither objected to the court’s instruction nor did the record reflect that there was a desire to consult by either him or his counsel. Accordingly, because a defendant must show that the prohibition against consultation actually prevented 19 Case: 12-15660 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 Page: 20 of 75 him from conferring with counsel, the plurality concluded that Crutchfield had failed to show a deprivation of his right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 1109–11.