Opinion ID: 1779062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Agostini v. Felton

Text: ś 38. We have carefully reviewed Agostini (the primary authority for the Missouri court's holding in Gibson ), and we find reliance on that case puzzling. It involved nothing remotely connected to questions of hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy, as is implied in the Missouri decision. Instead, it addressed the constitutionality of the City of New York Board of Education sending public school teachers into parochial schools to assist disadvantaged children. In overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985), the Agostini Court held such assistance did not violate the Establishment Clause. ś 39. Rather than supporting the Missouri court's Gibson decision, Agostini appears (if anything) to cast doubt on its logic. For instance, on the page from the Agostini decision cited by the Missouri court (see quote from Gibson, supra), the United States Supreme Court made no mention of hiring, ordaining or retaining clergy, but rather stated: Not all entanglements, of course, have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction between church and state is inevitable, see 403 U.S., at 614, 91 S.Ct., at 2112, and we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two. Entanglement must be excessive before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S., at 615-617, 108 S.Ct., at 2577-2579 (no excessive entanglement where government reviews the adolescent counseling program set up by the religious institutions that are grantees, reviews the materials used by such grantees, and monitors the program by periodic visits); Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 764-765, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 2353-2354, 49 L.Ed.2d 179 (1976) (no excessive entanglement where State conducts annual audits to ensure that categorical state grants to religious colleges are not used to teach religion).    [W]e have not found excessive entanglement in cases in which States imposed far more onerous burdens on religious institutions than the monitoring system at issue here. See Bowen, supra, at 615-617, 108 S.Ct., at 2577-2579. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233-24, 117 S.Ct. 1997. ś 40. The Diocese cites Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F.Supp.2d 328 (S.D.N.Y.2003), aff'd, 385 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.2004), and other federal district court and state court cases, for the proposition that the Establishment Clause prevents our courts from exercising jurisdiction over the Morrisons' claims. See e.g., Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F.Supp.2d 1246 (D.Colo.1998), aff'd mem. 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir.1999); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997) Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo.1997); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis.2d 674, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis.2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995). ś 41. We agree with the Diocese that the decisions of many courts would support dismissal of the Morrisons' complaint on jurisdictional grounds. For instance, in Ehrens, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York examined a cause of action for wrongful hiring and retention where the pastor of a Lutheran church was accused of sexually abusing a child. Addressing the jurisdictional issue, the court stated: Plaintiff's legal theory is that Defendants employed or supervised or retained Chapman as a Pastor in a position of trust with the knowledge that he had a history of sexually assaulting minors. Plaintiff alleges that in 1977, while serving as Pastor in New York, Chapman was forced to leave that post because of inappropriate behavior towards female members including minors. Reverend Ronald Fink was the President of the Atlantic District in 1977 and is claimed to have had personal knowledge concerning that misconduct. In August 1980, in connection with Chapman's transfer to the New England District, Rev. Fink failed to inform the New England District of Chapman's prior misconduct, and Defendants allowed him to remain rostered, knowing that during his ministry in the New England District, Chapman would have unsupervised access to children, including Plaintiff. This failure is alleged to be the cause of Plaintiff's injuries which are the subject of the suit. 269 F.Supp.2d at 331-32. The Ehrens court continued: Defendants point out, and this Court agrees that the Court is prevented by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution from determining, after the fact, that the ecclesiastical authorities of the Lutheran Church negligently supervised or retained a clergyman, as Plaintiff contends. It is constitutionally dubious for a court or jury to set a standard of reasonable care for religious bodies which maintain rosters of clergy eligibility for employment by congregations. New York courts have ruled that any attempt to define the duty of care owed by a member of the clergy to a parishioner fosters excessive entanglement with religion. Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 271 A.D.2d 494, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (2d Dep't 2000). The same is true with regard to the duty of care in determining the continued eligibility of a priest to serve as a Pastor. As this Court has previously held in Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) in which Plaintiff's claims against the Church Defendants were dismissed as a matter of law: Any inquiry into the policies and practices of the Church Defendants in hiring or supervising their clergy raises the same kind of First Amendment problems of entanglement . . . . which might involve the Court in making sensitive judgments about the propriety of the Church Defendants' supervision in light of their religious beliefs. Insofar as concerns retention or supervision, the pastor of a Presbyterian Church is not analogous to a common law employee. He may not demit his charge nor be removed by the session, without the consent of the presbytery, functioning essentially as an ecclesiastical court. The traditional denominations each have their own intricate principles of governance, as to which the state has no rights of visitation. Church governance is founded in scripture, modified by reformers over almost two millenia [sic]. 269 F.Supp.2d at 332. ś 42. We do not find the issue to be as difficult as did the Ehrens court. We agree with and support the proposition that the First Amendment deprives our civil courts of jurisdiction over claims which would require excessive entanglement of our courts in employment decisions of the Catholic Church. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2135. However, we find the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test has been unnecessarily expanded and extended by the minority of courts granting First Amendment protection to religious organizations from claims such as those before us today. A case providing an excellent discussion of excessive entanglement by the government in a religious organization's hiring and retention decisions, is Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004).