Opinion ID: 2021311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutional Rights to Compulsory Process and Effective Assistance of Counsel

Text: ś 60 Schaefer also raises challenges under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. First, he argues that the rights to compulsory process found in both of these constitutional provisions include the right to access and copy police investigation reports and nonprivileged materials prior to a preliminary hearing. Second, he argues that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied without his attorney having access to these materials before the preliminary examination. ś 61 We address these challenges in turn and conclude that Schaefer has no state or federal constitutional right to obtain and copy police investigation reports and nonprivileged materials by subpoena prior to his preliminary hearing.
ś 62 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the accused in a criminal proceeding shall have the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. [13] U.S. const. amend. VI. Similarly, the Wisconsin Constitution provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf[.] Wis. Const. art. 1, § 7. Although this court has the prerogative to afford greater protection to a criminal defendant under a provision of the Wisconsin Constitution than is mandated by an equivalent provision in the United States Constitution, State v. Doe, 78 Wis.2d 161, 171, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977), the court tends to interpret and apply equivalent provisions in the same manner. See State v. Agnello, 226 Wis.2d 164, 180-81, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999) (stating that [w]here . . . the language of the provision in the state constitution is `virtually identical' to that of the federal provision or where no difference in intent is discernible, Wisconsin courts have normally construed the state constitution consistent with the United States Supreme Court's construction of the federal constitution). ś 63 In Washington v. Texas (1967), the Supreme Court explained that the right to compulsory process is plainly the right to present a defense[.] Washington, 388 U.S. at 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920. The Court reviewed a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge to two Texas statutes that prohibited persons charged or convicted as co-participants in the same crime from testifying for one another, even though there was no bar to their testifying for the state. Id. at 16-17, 87 S.Ct. 1920. The Court held that this statutory scheme violated the defendant's right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses at trial: The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. Id. at 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920 (emphasis added). Thus, compulsory process for securing favorable witnesses is so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 17-18, 87 S.Ct. 1920. The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). ś 64 Twenty years after Washington, the Court noted that it has had little occasion to discuss the contours of the Compulsory Process Clause. [14] Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 55, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). In Ritchie, the Court reviewed Sixth Amendment claims of a criminal defendant convicted of various sexual offenses against his daughter. Id. at 39, 107 S.Ct. 989. The defendant, Ritchie, sought pretrial discovery â via subpoena â of ostensibly confidential records from Children and Youth Services (CYS), a Pennsylvania protective agency. Id. at 43, 107 S.Ct. 989. Ritchie claimed he was entitled to review CYS's file to discover information that might be useful in contradicting testimony favorable to the state. Id. at 53, 107 S.Ct. 989. Because it noted that defense counsel was able to cross-examine all trial witnesses fully, the Court determined that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 54, 107 S.Ct. 989. ś 65 The Court then turned to the compulsory process claim. The Court acknowledged that Sixth Amendment applicability to discovery disputes was unsettled; hence, it utilized a due process analysis. Id. at 56, 107 S.Ct. 989. The Court said it had articulated some of the specific rights secured by the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.  Id. (emphasis added). ś 66 The Court was reluctant to establish an unconditional discovery right under the Sixth Amendment. Thus, it analyzed the case on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds. The Court concluded that the Compulsory Process Clause provides no greater protections in this area than those afforded by due process. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56, 107 S.Ct. 989. Stated another way, unless due process requires defense access to specific evidence, the Compulsory Process Clause cannot provide substitute authority for such access. ś 67 These comments by the Court point the compass of the Compulsory Process Clause toward a defendant's right to the compelled production of evidence in anticipation of trial, not in anticipation of a preliminary examination. Professor LaFave has observed that [t]he Compulsory Process Clause naturally suggests some constitutional entitlement to trial evidence.  5 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.3(a), at 469 (2d ed. 1999) (emphasis added). ś 68 Thus, our holding in Lynch, founded upon due process, applies here and circumscribes a criminal defendant's compulsory process right to access the state's files prior to his preliminary examination. ś 69 In Lynch, we held that, under the Due Process Clause, a criminal defendant has no right to inspect the state's files for the existence of exculpatory evidence prior to a preliminary examination. Lynch, 82 Wis.2d at 465-68, 262 N.W.2d 773. The constitutional right to such exculpatory material is in the right to a fair trial guaranteed by [due process]. Id. at 465, 262 N.W.2d 773 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). We concluded: Inspection of the state's files by the defense at this early stage, where there has been no showing of particularized need for inspection, can serve only as an opportunity for generalized, unrestricted discovery, rather than as a device for the constitutionally mandated disclosure of specific exculpatory material. Such discovery will impede the orderly processes of discovery prescribed by statute, see: secs. 971.23 to 971.25, Stats., and will circumvent the legislative determinations reflected in those statutes; will unjustifiably delay the administration of justice; and will needlessly complicate the relatively informal procedures applicable at this early stage of a prosecution. This harm is inherent in the order of the county court. Lynch, 82 Wis.2d at 466, 262 N.W.2d 773 (footnote omitted). ś 70 We conclude that Lynch controls the compulsory process challenge in the instant case. There is no compulsory process right to subpoena police investigation reports and nonprivileged materials before the preliminary examination. ś 71 Schaefer asserts that if Lynch applies, he has demonstrated a particularized need for access to police records because of a sixteen year delay in charging and its consequent effect on memory. We are not persuaded. An extended period of time between commission of the alleged offense and the filing of a criminal complaint may provide justification for subpoena access to police investigatory records under extraordinary circumstances. See Lynch, 82 Wis.2d at 466, 262 N.W.2d 773. However, in Schaefer's case, the criminal complaint is sufficiently detailed to allow him to identify the complainant [15] and the alleged circumstances of the charges and to prepare to rebut the plausibility of the complainant's accusations and probable cause. The lengthy span of time since the alleged offenses will not incapacitate this defendant from preparing for the preliminary examination, and it does not justify the unbridled access to police investigatory materials that the defendant seeks. ś 72 We note that this court has also addressed compulsory process in the context of a circuit court's subpoena ordering two newspaper reporters to appear at a pretrial hearing regarding the identities of their sources for several stories they wrote about a murder. State ex rel. Green Bay Newspaper Co. v. Cir. Ct., Branch 1, Brown County, 113 Wis.2d 411, 415-16, 335 N.W.2d 367 (1983). We concluded that the circuit court erred when it ordered in camera disclosure of the reporters' sources and held the reporters in contempt for refusing to disclose this information. Id. at 429, 335 N.W.2d 367. ś 73 Weighing the defendant's right to compulsory process for witnesses in his favor against the journalist's qualified nondisclosure privilege, we recognized that a criminal defendant does not have an unqualified right to subpoena witnesses. Id. at 420, 335 N.W.2d 367. We observed that [f]or the constitutional right to compulsory process to be invoked, a defendant must, if the subpoena is challenged, show there is a reasonable probability that the subpoenaed witnesses' testimony will be competent, relevant, material and favorable to his defense. Id. at 420-21, 335 N.W.2d 367. [16] ś 74 We went on to analyze the efficacy of the circuit court's order requiring in camera disclosure of reporter sources, concluding that the facts of the case did not suggest a need for such disclosure. We outlined a procedure for the circuit court to evaluate compulsory process rights implicated by desired evidence based upon whether the evidence is necessary to the defense. Id. at 423, 335 N.W.2d 367. Information is necessary to the defense if it tends to support the theory of defense which the defendant intends to assert at trial.  Id. (emphasis added). ś 75 The Green Bay Newspaper case evaluated compulsory process rights in terms of their relationship to trial evidence. Inasmuch as a criminal defendant does not have an unqualified right to require the appearance of any and all persons as witnesses for a trial, and a defendant's right to compulsory process at trial must satisfy certain standards, see id. at 420-21, 335 N.W.2d 367, we conclude a fortiori that the compulsory process rights of a criminal defendant at a preliminary stage of the criminal proceedings also must be subject to reasonable restrictions. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413, (1998) (A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions.). We have previously observed that even though a defendant's right to present certain evidence is constitutionally protected, that right may have to `bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.' State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis.2d 633, 653, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990) (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038). In our view, there is a legitimate interest in preserving the statutory scheme that prescribes pretrial discovery limitations under Wis. Stat. §§ 971.31(5)(b) and 971.23. Therefore, we decline to expand a criminal defendant's compulsory process rights to encompass a right to subpoena police reports and other non-privileged investigatory materials for examination and copying in anticipation of a preliminary hearing. ś 76 Schaefer suggests that we adopt a procedure in which Wisconsin circuit courts would review subpoena duces tecum materials prior to the preliminary examination to resolve disputes regarding privilege, relevance, and materiality. He notes that Illinois has adopted such a procedure, see People ex rel. Fisher v. Carey, 77 Ill.2d 259, 32 Ill.Dec. 904, 396 N.E.2d 17 (1979), and he urges Wisconsin to follow suit. ś 77 We respectfully decline this invitation. In Carey, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that: Subpoenaed material should be sent directly to the court because the subpoena is a judicial process or court writ, whereas discovery is the parties' procedure, a distinguishable concept under our rules. . . . The court then determines the relevance and materiality of the materials, and whether they are privileged, as well as whether the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive. The State's attorney, of course, must be fully aware of the records sought from the investigative agency by the subpoena in order for him to object. Carey, 32 Ill.Dec. 904, 396 N.E.2d at 19-20 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). [17] ś 78 The underlined language implies that the Illinois court established a proceeding â before the preliminary hearing â to hear objections and settle evidentiary disputes, even though Illinois rules at the time precluded the use of a subpoena to circumvent formal discovery (which was not scheduled to go into effect until following indictment or information.). Id. at 19; see 58 Ill.2d Rule 411, 65 Ill.2d Rule 412(g). The Carey court appears to have concluded that its ruling was constitutionally required. ś 79 The Illinois Supreme Court's analysis is clearly supportive of Schaefer's position. On the other hand, the Illinois Supreme Court's analysis does not square with subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, most notably Ritchie. The analysis also conflicts with our decision in Lynch. The Illinois court's heavy reliance on United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.Va.1807), is intriguing, but that decision has no precedential value for us because it is not a decision by the United States Supreme Court, and it predated modern discovery rules. ś 80 In United States v. Nixon , one of only a handful of Supreme Court cases to discuss and apply Burr, the Court commented that the subpoena duces tecum was not intended to provide a means of discovery for criminal cases[.] United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). The Court construed the federal subpoena duces tecum provision, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 17(c), as requiring, among other things, that the application [be] made in good faith and [] not intended as a general `fishing expedition.' Id. at 699, 94 S.Ct. 3090. ś 81 As an additional matter of public policy, Schaefer notes that at least one county in Wisconsin, Washington County, conducts a pretrial status hearing where discovery material is customarily exchanged prior to the preliminary examination. We acknowledge the benefits that such an open file policy may produce in terms of an increased number of defense waivers of the preliminary examination as well as eventual guilty pleas. [18] As one commentator has observed, however, [t]hough some prosecutors maintain an `open file' policy, granting defenders access to the prosecution's case files, this is purely a policy choice on the prosecutor's part, not a legal right of defendants. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 Mich. L.Rev. 1729, 1738 (1993). No existing state statute or compulsory process provision of either the United States Constitution or the Wisconsin Constitution commands the state to divulge the entirety of police investigatory files to an accused before an information has been filed against him. ś 82 Accordingly, we hold that Schaefer has no right to subpoena police reports and other non-privileged investigatory materials prior to his preliminary hearing under either the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
ś 83 Finally, Schaefer contends that he is entitled to subpoena police reports and other investigatory materials to safeguard his right to effective assistance of counsel, which also is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [19] ś 84 A defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of prosecution. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). In State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis.2d 234, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995), we adopted the view of the Supreme Court that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage in the criminal process. Wolverton, 193 Wis.2d at 252, 533 N.W.2d 167 (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970)). Consequently, every defendant charged with a felony in Wisconsin is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing. Wolverton, 193 Wis.2d at 253, 533 N.W.2d 167. We also observed, however, that [a]lthough the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing is constitutionally guaranteed, the right to a preliminary hearing is purely statutory. Id. at 253 n. 11, 533 N.W.2d 167 (citing State v. Moats, 156 Wis.2d 74, 83, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990)). This factor influences our analysis. ś 85 In considering Schaefer's right to effective assistance of counsel at a preliminary examination, we must keep in mind the narrow purpose of the hearing. [T]he limited scope of the preliminary hearing compresses the contours of the sixth amendment. Wiseman, et al., 9 Wisconsin Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 8.12 (1996). In particular, the defendant's right to present evidence and cross-examine the state's witnesses is severely limited by the summary nature of the preliminary hearing. Id. ś 86 Schaefer's argument is somewhat unusual because he poses a prospective challenge to effective assistance of counsel. Schaefer argues that his defense counsel cannot be effective at a future preliminary examination without access to police reports and other similar materials, not that his counsel was ineffective in the past for lack of access to such evidence. To address Schaefer's position on the merits would require this court to hypothesize, in the abstract, what actions by defense counsel are necessary to preserve a criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel at a preliminary examination. To adopt Schaefer's position would require us to create a per se rule that defense counsel is ineffective when counsel fails to subpoena police reports and other similar materials prior to a preliminary examination. ś 87 This court operates under the principles adopted by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the defendant must demonstrate that: (1) defense counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced the defense so seriously as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. ś 88 The primary consideration on the first prong is whether a reasonable basis existed for the lawyer's conduct. State v. Rock, 92 Wis.2d 554, 560, 285 N.W.2d 739 (1979). On the second prong, counsel will not be deemed ineffective unless the defendant is prejudiced by the lawyer's action or failure to act. State v. Felton, 110 Wis.2d 485, 503, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983). Since Schaefer's Sixth Amendment challenge is prospective, he must demonstrate that he would be prejudiced per se by defense counsel's inability to subpoena police reports prior to the preliminary hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (noting that prejudice is presumed where there is no likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance under a particular set of facts). ś 89 Schaefer cites State v. Harper, 57 Wis.2d 543, 557, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973), in which we said that effective counsel must be equal to that which the ordinarily prudent lawyer, skilled and versed in criminal law, would give to clients who had privately retained his services. In so holding, we expressly approved of the 1971 American Bar Association Project on Standards For Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to The Prosecution Function and The Defense Function, as a means of evaluating counsel's performance. See Harper, 57 Wis.2d at 557 n. 8, 205 N.W.2d 1. Schaefer places emphasis on ABA Standard 4.1: 4.1 Duty to investigate. It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty. Harper, 57 Wis.2d at 553 n. 3, 205 N.W.2d 1 (emphasis added). He argues that the Standard's use of the word prompt, coupled with our comment that [t]he lawyer who is ignorant of the facts of the case incapacitates himself to serve his client effectively, id. at 553, 205 N.W.2d 1, should persuade us to hold that police records must be provided to defense counsel before the preliminary examination to preserve the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. ś 90 We cannot adopt Schaefer's argument. Harper can be distinguished by the fact the case concerned defense counsel's performance at trial, not his investigatory acumen prior to the preliminary examination. Id. at 551, 205 N.W.2d 1. ABA Standard 4.1, although calling for defense counsel to explore all avenues and include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities, does not compel us to conclude that Schaefer's attorney would be ineffective if he failed to procure police investigative materials (including police reports) prior to Schaefer's preliminary examination. ś 91 An attorney's performance at the preliminary examination does not define the level of performance expected of defense counsel at later stages of the proceeding. A preliminary hearing is not a full evidentiary trial and [] the purpose of a preliminary examination is only to determine whether further criminal proceedings are justified. State v. Akins, 198 Wis.2d 495, 512, 544 N.W.2d 392 (1996) (citing Taylor v. State, 55 Wis.2d 168, 172-73, 197 N.W.2d 805 (1972)). Given the limited scope and purpose of the preliminary examination, a defendant's counsel may waive the hearing entirely, or deliberately decline to ask certain questions that would be relevant. We cannot say that Schaefer's counsel would be hand-cuffed and rendered ineffective by failing to procure police reports prior to Schaefer's preliminary examination. ś 92 Defense counsel is not barred from conducting significant investigation into the case before the preliminary examination to rebut the plausibility of a witness's story and probable cause. This investigation would likely be based on the details in the complaint and information supplied by the defendant. In this case, nothing prevents counsel from identifying and seeking to interview the complainant's classmates and teammates, as well as Schaefer's co-workers and family. We note that the failure of classmates to corroborate the complainant's claim of sexual assaults would not undermine the plausibility of her story at the preliminary examination. Witness statements that do corroborate the complainant's claims are likely to be disclosed to the defendant before trial. ś 93 Schaefer cannot reasonably argue that information contained in March 2006 police reports would offer indispensable information about the complainant's story that is not stated or implied in the May 2006 criminal complaint. The principal benefits to be gained from review of the police investigation file would be to determine the names of additional persons whom the police interviewed and whether the police had uncovered corroborating evidence. We cannot say that Schaefer's defense counsel will be ineffective at the preliminary examination without this information. ś 94 Therefore, we hold that Schaefer has no Sixth Amendment right, based on effective assistance of counsel, to subpoena police reports and other non-privileged materials prior to his preliminary examination.