Opinion ID: 855053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rahman’s Pro Se Appeal

Text: Rahman, in his pro se brief, raises eight additional issues for review. Rahman argues that Congress has not authorized cumulative punishment for violating federal health care statutes; all 6 four counts of the indictment are multiplicitous and violate the Fifth Amendment; he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial; the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case because the defrauded Medicaid program was not a federal health care program; the district court was biased; the jury instructions were erroneous; the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to convict on counts 2 and 4 of the indictment; and the district court abused its discretion in imposing certain sentencing enhancements. We review de novo a preserved claim that the charges were multiplicitous. United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 204 (2d Cir. 2008). Multiplicity is found where an indictment “charges in separate counts two or more crimes, when in law and fact, only one crime has been committed,” United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2002) (overruled on other grounds). We consider “whether each [count] requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The charges of conviction are not multiplicitous and do not result in a violation of the Constitution’s double jeopardy clause. The counts charged in the indictment—health care fraud, access device fraud, and obtaining controlled substances by fraud—each required proof of at least one fact that the others did not. 18 U.S.C. § 1347; 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5); 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3). Nor does the charge of aggravated identity theft violate the double jeopardy clause because cumulative punishment is authorized for that crime. See 18 U.S. § 1028A(a)(1) and (c); see also Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 648 (2009). Rahman has not identified a Speedy Trial Act violation. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s determination that the ends of justice warrant the exclusion of time in 7 the calculation of mandated time frames. United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1197–98 (2d Cir. 1989). Each instance that the district court excluded time, the exclusion was either consented to or within the court’s discretion upon a finding that the ends of justice were served by taking such action. That determination is entrusted to the court, not the parties, Parisi v. United States, 529 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2008), and we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding time, notwithstanding Rahman’s objection, to allow for production and discovery, to resolve the matter of Rahman’s competency, and to enable new defense counsel to prepare pre-trial motions. Rahman also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence produced at trial to demonstrate his guilt on the charges of health care fraud and access device fraud. Upon our independent review of the trial record, we conclude that there was ample evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict on each count. See United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2007). We have considered Rahman’s remaining claims regarding his arrest, the district court’s jurisdiction and alleged bias, and his challenges to the sentence imposed, and we determine that each is without merit. For the reasons stated above and in the accompanying per curiam opinion, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 8