Opinion ID: 1302292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: cross-examination of william henderson

Text: The judge noted that orders in limine had been entered, but the Court had reserved ruling upon the question of whether or not the defense could cross-examine Mr. Henderson regarding any arrangements he had made with the State related to charges arising against him from the murder of Gerald Mayfield. The State agreed to charge Henderson with aggravated battery and conspiracy to commit aggravated battery in the Mayfield case. In exchange for his testimony in that case, Henderson would receive probation. The appropriate standard of review is not one of constitutional error, but whether the trial judge abused her discretion in ruling that Lyons could not cross-examine Henderson regarding the specifics of the Mayfield case. In State v. Mims, 264 Kan. 506, 956 P.2d 1337 (1998), the court stated that [a]dmission of evidence falls within the trial court's discretion, which is abused only when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would adopt the trial court's view. 264 Kan. at 510 (citing State v. Haddock, 257 Kan. 964, 978, 897 P.2d 152 (1995). Defense counsel made an offer of proof regarding his questioning of Henderson and stated that his inquiry would be: And you're also continuing to aid the State, and you're aiding the State in the matter of the Mayfield homicide, and you were testifying in that case, also, ... and you're going to get a deal based on your testimony? The State's objection to allowing the defense to so question Henderson was that although a logical connection existed because Henderson was involved in both homicide cases, the Mayfield homicide occurred after the Dexter homicide. Therefore, the State could not have offered Henderson anything in Lyons' case that related to Mayfield, because Mayfield had not happened when the State made arrangements for Henderson's testimony in Lyons' murder trial. The judge stated that Henderson's agreement to continue aiding the State could affect his bias. The judge thus ruled that Henderson's involvement in the Mayfield homicide was something the defendant should be allowed to explore to a limited degree. The problem that I have with the offer of proof you have made is that it flies into 60-455 as to Gerald Mayfield of other bad acts. The judge concluded: I am willing to allow a question which says, `And have you had consideration in other matters from the State,' but not get into the specifics that it was another homicide, or the specifics of that case. On direct examination, the prosecution questioned Henderson about what he was receiving in exchange for his testimony against Lyons. Henderson testified that the State had agreed not to charge him for hiding the guns and had recalled a warrant for his arrest due to a juvenile probation violation. The State also asked Henderson whether he was involved with another case for which he was receiving consideration from the State, and Henderson responded affirmatively. The following dialogue took place between Henderson and the prosecutor during direct examination: Q. (by Mr. Rues) William, this other case, it's a homicide case, right? A. (by Henderson) Right. Q. You didn't commit the homicide? A. Nope. Q. You're giving testimony of what you saw, correct? A. Correct. Q. All right. You're charged with other charges in the homicide? A. Correct. Q. Aggravated Battery, Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Battery? A. Correct. Henderson also answered affirmatively to the following question: Is it your understanding that this testimony you're giving in this other case, not in this one today, but this other case, it happened after you gave an interview in this case with the police and also the preliminary hearing transcript, correct? Lyons vigorously crossexamined Henderson regarding his statements to the police, his testimony during the preliminary hearing, and his motivation for testifying against Lyons. Lyons exposed that Henderson had failed to mention anything about his involvement with hiding the guns and wiping them down for fingerprints prior to his cross-examination during the preliminary hearing. In conclusion, Lyons was not denied his right of effective cross-examination because the court disallowed him from delving into the specifics of the Mayfield homicide, which could have presented evidentiary (double jeopardy) problems for that case. Thus, the trial court's action in limiting cross-examination to avoid jeopardizing another case was not an abuse of discretion. See State v. Davidson, 264 Kan. 44, 56, 954 P.2d 702 (1998). The defense asserts that the denial of effective cross-examination has been held to amount to a constitutional error of such magnitude that Lyons is not required to show prejudice for reversal. Under the facts of this case, the limitation imposed on Lyons' cross-examination of Henderson does not rise to the level to amount to constitutional error. In conclusion, Lyons' rights to cross-examination and to present a defense were not impaired by the trial court's ruling that Lyons avoid the specifics of Henderson's involvement and cooperation in the Mayfield homicide during Henderson's cross-examination. Lyons was provided ample opportunity to question Henderson and to expose his bias and motivation. The jury heard Henderson's testimony, observed his demeanor, and evaluated his credibility. The jury may have found that Henderson's testimony was a complete fabrication. Nevertheless, the jury was presented with evidence from many other sources upon which it could have found Lyons guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not the function of this court to delve into the jury room deliberations. Issues of credibility are within the province of the jury. On appellate review, the credibility of witnesses will not be passed upon, conflicting evidence will not be weighed, and all questions of credibility are to be resolved in favor of the State. State v. Clemons, 261 Kan. 66, Syl. ¶ 4, 929 P.2d 749 (1996). Affirmed.