Opinion ID: 2820105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Performance Review

Text: Allen’s 2008 performance review period began in October 2007 and ended September 30, 2008. Hill rated Allen on four “performance goals.” Of those four goals, Allen received the highest rating (Achieved Excellence) on two of them, but only the next-highest rating (Exceeded Expectations) on another, and the third-from-highest rating (Achieved Expectations) on a fourth. Her overall rating— combining scores on her achievement of those four goals with scores on seven “core competencies”—was at the Achieved Expectations level. Allen challenges two of her performance goal ratings, which affected her overall rating, and Hill’s failure to provide Allen a mid-year performance review as unlawful retaliation.
deserved a rating of Achieved Excellence rather than Exceeded Expectations on Performance Goal 2, regarding her performance in preparing ICE for a 2009 audit. 2008 Perf. Rev., J.A. 183, at 3-5. The Department gave two reasons for the rating. First, Hill wrote in Allen’s performance review that Allen failed to communicate adequately with “subject matter experts” over her changes to documentation relating to budget and payroll systems. Id. at 14-15. The “subject matter experts” at issue were at ICE’s finance center in Burlington, Vermont, where invoices are paid and payments to ICE are processed. See Allen Decl., J.A. 559 ¶¶ 3-4. According to Hill, the finance center complained that Allen made changes to drafts of documents without consulting them or explaining 12 the changes, resulting in confusion at the finance center as to how to respond. Hill Decl., J.A. 478 ¶ 17. Allen has not disputed that the finance center complained. Instead, she argues that the complaint was not her fault, because, she says, Hill never notified her of the requirement that she collaborate with the finance center. But Performance Goal 2 of Allen’s performance plan—which Hill developed with Allen’s detailed input and review—required Allen to collaborate with the ICE “Program Offices” to ensure a successful audit. 2008 Perf. Rev. at 3-4. Allen asserts Hill’s definitions were ambiguous and made it unclear what her responsibilities were in dealing with the Burlington Finance Center, but Hill avers that ICE finance centers were routinely referred to as both “Program Offices” (components within ICE) and “subject matter experts” (entities whose staff were most knowledgeable about the processes Allen was evaluating), and thus were clearly entities included in Allen’s Performance Goal. Hill Decl. ¶ 9. Allen provides no further response to Hill’s assertions that Allen knew or should have known that the Burlington Finance Center was among the entities with which she was expected to communicate. Allen also argues that it would have been inappropriate to communicate at that time with the Burlington Finance Center about the 2009 audit because that center was the subject of the audit Allen was managing, and “[a]s a general matter, an auditee does not have input into the auditor’s evaluation of their work.” Allen Decl. ¶ 4. But Allen identifies no evidence showing that she was auditing the Burlington Finance Center, and the Department’s evidence refutes that contention. See Supp. Hill Decl., J.A. 563 ¶ 4 (“While our office did audit-related work, the ultimate audit was performed by KPMG.”). Even if Allen were correct that it would have been inappropriate for her to collaborate with the finance center, there is no evidence that she brought any such 13 concern to Hill’s attention. And even if Allen had established that her Performance Goal did not encompass collaborating with the finance center, she has failed to identify a material issue of fact in dispute because she points to nothing that suggests that Hill’s putative error on that score was either dishonest or unreasonable. Allen’s effort to dispute the scope of her duties as a basis for the challenged performance rating thus raises no inference of retaliatory motive. To the contrary, after having maintained throughout this litigation that she was not aware that collaboration was required, and that any collaboration with the finance center would have been inappropriate, Allen asserts in her reply brief that she did in fact collaborate with the finance center. Allen Reply Br. 13. Hill provided a second, independent justification for the Performance Goal 2 rating: delays in the administration of an internal financial control test called the “Test of Operating Effectiveness.” Hill wrote in Allen’s performance review that Allen failed adequately to oversee and coordinate with PricewaterhouseCoopers, an ICE contractor working on the test. 2008 Perf. Rev. at 15. Hill “believed that if [the project] had been managed effectively, it could have been completed in the original deadline[].” Hill Decl. ¶ 18. Allen claims the delays were actually due to “a significant expansion of the scope of the project midway through”—an expansion Allen says she recommended against. Allen Decl. ¶ 5. She produced no evidence, however, that Hill lacked grounds for expanding the project, let alone that Allen predicted and timely advised steps to avoid the delays she concedes befell the project. Hence, she has failed to identify any material factual dispute about the validity of Hill’s criticism. Allen also claims that Hill excluded her from meetings with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and that those exclusions 14 contributed to any “lack of oversight and coordination” of that contractor’s work. The meetings from which Allen claims she was excluded occurred after the 2008 review period closed, however, and are therefore irrelevant to her challenge to the performance ratings. Allen’s suggestion that she did, in fact, fail adequately to coordinate with the contractors, but that it was Hill’s fault she did so, undermines her argument that no lack of coordination occurred and that the delays were due to the expanded scope of the project. In sum, Allen has not identified record evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that Hill’s rating of Allen on Performance Goal 2 was done in retaliation for Allen’s prior protected conduct. 2. Performance Goal 3. Hill asserted that Allen’s rating of Achieved Expectations on Performance Goal 3, rather than the Achieved Excellence rating Allen believed she deserved, was similarly based on her evaluation of Allen’s oversight of ICE finance centers during a project that required the collection of documents from those centers for testing; delays in document collection resulted in delays in the overall project. See 2008 Perf. Rev. at 5, 15; Hill Decl. ¶ 4. Allen does not dispute that the project delays were caused by a failure to get the documents from the finance center in a timely manner. Indeed, Allen initially blamed the delays on Hill, who Allen says made the “high risk decision” of assigning the testing work to the finance centers rather than to the two employees at the Office of Assurance and Compliance whom Allen directly oversaw. J.A. 510. Later, Allen blamed her subordinate, Melissa Crane, for the same delays, on the ground that Crane “was assigned as the project leader.” J.A. 518. Allen avers that she did not intervene earlier because Crane never informed her of any problems. But the record shows that Allen was aware at least two months in advance that her office was having difficulty 15 getting the documents. See J.A. 511, 516. Allen made little progress to remedy the situation in those intervening months. Hill claims she personally had to “intervene in the situation and direct the efforts to locate the missing documentation to resolve the situation.” Hill Decl. ¶ 21. Despite that “crisis,” Hill gave Allen the Achieved Expectations rating and not a lower mark because, once arrangements were made to adjust the deadline, Allen was able to meet it. Id. Even if Allen were right that the delays were really caused by Hill’s “high risk decision” or Crane’s failure to inform Allen of the problems sooner, as a manager, Hill reasonably expected Allen to diagnose, communicate over, and forestall problems; record evidence raises no inference that Hill’s judgments that Allen had failed adequately to do so were unreasonable or dishonest. Allen also claims a jury could infer retaliation based on the fact that Hill approved the highest level rating for Crane, meaning that Crane received a higher rating than Allen for their work on the same project. Hill thought it was reasonable to rate Allen’s subordinate more highly than Allen herself because it was Allen, not her subordinate, who had managerial responsibility. Allen II, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 51; see also Hill Decl. ¶ 22 (justifying rating on grounds that Allen “needed to take ownership, and not seek to deflect responsibility to those that she supervised”). Although Allen disagrees with the rating difference on its merits, she identifies no reason to question the genuineness of Hill’s stated justification for the differential ratings. 3. Mid-Year Review. Allen also argues that Hill deviated from established Department of Homeland Security personnel procedure by failing to give Allen a mid-year performance review in the 2008 fiscal year, casting doubt on the authenticity of the reasons given for her performance 16 ratings. The record demonstrates that, under ordinary circumstances, supervisors were expected to give mid-year reviews. Keenan Dep., J.A. 311, at 37. Allen’s evidence also shows that mid-year reviews were called for “halfway through the rating period,” id., but that Allen’s performance plan was not finalized until May 2008, almost eight months into the performance period, Pl. St. Mat. Facts, J.A. 544 ¶ 8; Hill Decl. ¶ 11. Allen did not introduce evidence demonstrating that, under those circumstances, Department policy called for a mid-year review, and the Department has consistently maintained otherwise. Consequently, she has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact concerning her claim that Hill deviated from established procedures.