Opinion ID: 1118222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Use of Allocution Testimony

Text: After conviction in the first trial, at Harvey's sentencing for the kidnapping and sexual assault, Harvey made an allocution statement to the court. At his subsequent trial on the conspiracy charges, the State read portions of his allocution statement into evidence as follows: MR. FLYNN: Ready, your Honor? MR. KINNAIRD: At this time, your Honor, I would like for Mr. Harvey to make a statement that he would like to make [to the Court]. DETECTIVE MAXWELL: MR. HARVEY: I meant this woman no harm. In fact, I even stopped her from being harmed at the end. I tried resisting long before she was even abducted. Everett was just insistent from two blocks past her to two blocks to her, telling me to grab her. Grab her. And I was saying, `No. I don't want this.' And even when I pulled up beside her and I rolled down my window, she walked by. I just asked her if she wanted a ride because it was cold. She never looked at me. She never answered. She just kept her head down, her hands in her coat pocket and she walked by. And I turned to Everett and I said, `See, she doesn't even want a ride.' And he says, `No. All you got to do is grab her.' He throws it into reverse and backs up past the woman, slapping me, `Just grab her. Just grab her.' THE COURT: You read that incorrectly Officer. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. `Just grab her. Grab her.' And that's when I finally broke down on it there. I got out and stepped out in front of her. She walked up to me, lifted her head, looked at me and I said, `Hey, look. Just get in and we'll give you a ride home.' And she turned and walked around me. And that's when I heard Everett say, `Grab her, chicken-shit.' And that was the final straw of the dare. I turned and grabbed her by the coat, the shoulder, pulled her off her feet toward the pickup. Picked her up and put her in the vehicle. She was laying between the seats with her hands up like this. She was saying, `Don't hurt me.' I said, `No one is going to hurt you.' She relaxed.    I grabbed her legs by the boots, and I said, `Don't worry. No one is going to hurt you.' And then Everett Phillips  I don't know where we were going. He pulls into this trailer park and starts hollering, `I want some. I want some.' I says, `No, Everett. Let's take the woman home.' And he goes, `Well, the bitch can suck it.' And I grabbed his arm then and I said, `No, Everett. We're taking her home. Let's go.' And that is when I saw a cop car go by through the window. And I said, `Now there is a cop. Let's just take her home.' And when we stopped, the cops, I didn't even know it was cops. I could see lights in the mirror. Everett got out and went back to them. He was gone for, anyway, two minutes and there was no struggle in the back. There was no one hollering, screaming. I just looked in the mirror. And then as I'm looking in the mirror back a couple minutes or so, this woman [the victim], she got between the seats and started headed for the driver's door. And I just stepped out of the truck. And the police officer told me to stop and put my hands on the camper. That's just what I done until after the fight with David Swazo. They cuffed us and took us to jail. But, at the time of all of this, there was a real  there was a big factor, too of very drunk. MR. FLYNN: Thank you, Officer, that finishes the reading. Harvey claims that the use of his allocution statements violated his right not to incriminate himself under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution. The origin of a defendant's right to allocution  to address the court before having sentence pronounced  lies in English common law. Under early English criminal practice, an accused was not allowed counsel nor was he a competent witness for himself. Allocution provided a convicted defendant the only opportunity to speak for himself, and its omission would generally have required reversal. Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Question to Defendant as to Whether He Has Anything to Say Why Sentence Should Not Be Pronounced Against Him, 96 A.L.R.2d 1292, 1295 (1964). In the early days of Wyoming jurisprudence, this court did not consider it reversible error if the trial court failed to properly allow the defendant to allocute. Kinsler v. Territory of Wyoming, 1 Wyo. 112 (1873) (Convicted murderer resentenced using procedures in accordance with statutory sentencing provisions). The omission of the court to address the defendant did not require a new trial, but it did require setting aside the judgment in order to allow compliance with the requirement. Keffer v. State, 12 Wyo. 49, 73 P. 556, 560 (1903). Under current practice of criminal procedure, a defendant's right to address the court at his sentencing is embodied in W.R.Cr.P. 33, which states in part: (a) Sentence. (1) Imposition of Sentence.  Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay. Pending sentence the court may commit defendant, continue or alter the bail. Before imposing sentence the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak and shall address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of the punishment. W.R.Cr.P. 33(a)(1). We have recognized the right to allocution as constitutionally protected. Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo. 1987). Harvey argues that use at a subsequent trial of his allocution statement impermissibly compromises his right of allocution, his right against self-incrimination, and right to due process. He relies upon Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), to advance this contention. In Simmons, one of the petitioners sought to have evidence suppressed due to an illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In order to have standing to contest the admission of the evidence, the petitioner had to claim ownership of the evidence. 390 U.S. at 389, 88 S.Ct. at 974. The statements of ownership were subsequently used to incriminate him at trial. Thus, the Court noted that allowing use in trial of the petitioner's claim of ownership at a suppression hearing would require the petitioner to choose between the exercise of two constitutional rights. The Court reversed the petitioner's conviction because it found intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. 390 U.S. at 394, 88 S.Ct. at 976. However, exercising a right to allocution does not require surrendering one right to preserve another. The convicted party only needs to decide whether the right to remain silent will be asserted or waived. The right of allocution is similar to the right to testify in one's own behalf. The United States Supreme Court recognizes the right to testify in one's own behalf as a constitutional right embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution right to call witnesses in one's own behalf and the Fourteenth Amendment Right of due process. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-52, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708-09, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). These rights apply as well to actions in state courts. 483 U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 2708. We recognize this right in our own constitution, Art. 1, § 10, Wyo. Const., and we recognize that an accused can waive the right, take the stand, and testify as a witness in his own behalf. Only incriminating statements obtained by a genuine compulsion of testimony spark concerns about violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186-87, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977); Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 315, 32 S.Ct. 281, 284, 56 L.Ed. 448 (1912). Testimony given voluntarily may be used against a defendant without violating his rights. 431 U.S. at 186-87, 97 S.Ct. at 1818. A defendant's choice to exercise his right to allocution is entirely voluntary; he can speak to the court, but he is not required to do so. We do not prescribe limits on what the defendant can or cannot say during allocution. A defendant's statements may be admissible against him in further proceedings, provided they are voluntary. However, if the trial court were to require a defendant to confess to criminal activities in his allocution in return for a more lenient sentence, those statements would amount to genuine compulsion of testimony in violation of the right against self-incrimination. Washington, 431 U.S. at 187, 97 S.Ct. at 1818; United States v. Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 302, 312 (5th Cir.1974). We examine the transcript at Harvey's sentencing to determine if his statement was the result of compulsion. Before Harvey spoke to the court, the following took place: COURT: Court is in session; you may be seated. These are proceedings in Criminal Docket No. 86-11, the State of Wyoming versus Jetty Lee Harvey. Will Mr. Harvey and his counsel please stand at the lectern. Let the record show the presence of Mr. Harvey with his attorney Mr. Virgil Kinnaird. Mr. Harvey, earlier you were arraigned and tried and convicted of the crime of Kidnapping and First Degree Sexual Assault. And you've requested a pre-sentence investigation, which has been and I've read it. Are you under the influence of alcohol or drugs or have any mental defect which could affect your ability to understand these proceedings? MR. HARVEY: No, sir. COURT: Do you or your attorney have anything to say in your behalf or wish to present information in mitigation of punishment or know of any reason why I shouldn't sentence you now? MR. KINNAIRD: Yes, Your Honor. We'd like to present some evidence on his behalf. We do not have any reason why sentence should not be imposed at this time. COURT: All right. Who do you want to have speak? MR. KINNAIRD: Well, Mr. Harvey himself would like to make a statement to the Court and then after Mr. Harvey has completed his statement, I have a young lady by the name of Miss Cory Wagonsen (Phonetic spelling) from Sheridan, Wyoming, actually from Big Horn, Wyoming, Sheridan County, who would like to make a statement to the Court. And I have a letter from an individual familiar with Mr. Harvey, and I brought the letter down pursuant to your earlier indications that you would accept a letter on his behalf that I would read into the record, sir. COURT: All right. Will the young lady stand. MR. KINNAIRD: This is Cory Wagonsen, Your Honor. COURT: All right. Raise your right hand, both of you. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? MS. WAGONSEN: I do. MR. HARVEY: I do. COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Kinnaird. MR. KINNAIRD: At this time, Your Honor, I'd like for Mr. Harvey to make a statement that he would like to make to the Court. Harvey then made his allocution statement. Following receipt of other evidence, the court addressed Harvey as follows: COURT: I have considered the possibility of probation and I've listened to Mr. Kinnaird, but feel as in the case of Mr. Phillips that the prior record, the nature of the crime, and other factors compel me to believe that probation is not warranted and should be denied. The court proceeded to pronounce sentence. There was nothing stated by the court that would even suggest that allocution was required, and there was no evidence nor inference that Harvey was forced to relate the details of the abduction and assault at his sentencing. Harvey made these statements voluntarily. This issue comes to us as one of first impression. We have considered whether Harvey's statements might be analogous and subject to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), because they were obtained in a case later dismissed for a speedy trial violation. 774 P.2d at 98. Had the trial court granted Harvey's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, no occasion would have existed for Harvey to allocute. But the same may be said for any defendant who waives his right to remain silent, testifies, and the case is later reversed on appeal. In Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2010, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968), defendant testified to refute a statement previously made. The conviction was reversed on appeal. The defendant's testimony was received in a subsequent trial which resulted in conviction. On appeal, the Court held the testimony inadmissible because it was necessary to refute a prior statement and, therefore, fruit of the poisonous tree. Harvey's allocution in this case was not prompted by a desire to refute a prior statement, suppress illegally obtained evidence, or anything of a similar nature. Harrison is of no help. Simply stated, he waived his right to remain silent and made a voluntary statement which is admissible, the same as if he had testified at trial for the sole purpose of giving testimony favorable to himself. Affirmed. URBIGKIT, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which URBIGKIT, C.J., joined.