Opinion ID: 1095914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Properly Plead

Text: Intracorp and Bradly argue that they were not given adequate notice that fraud by suppression would be an issue in the case, and thus, that a JNOV or new trial should have been granted. We disagree, because we find that the issue of fraud by suppression was tried by the implied consent of the parties, and that the complaint was amended to conform to the evidence. It is undisputed that Adams did not plead fraud by suppression in his complaint. However, Adams did specifically plead fraud by misrepresentation. After the close of all the evidence the following discussion occurred: MS. FERGUSON: We would move that the Plaintiff's claim for negligence be dismissed and that the Plaintiff's claim for fraud be dismissed as well, particularly, with respect to the fraud issue. .... THE COURT: Well, I don't know that you've got any evidence of misrepresentation. It seems to me the evidence is of an omission of stating something rather than a misrepresentation. It seems to me what you've shown, if anything, is that he was not advised, not that there was a misstatement. A failure to disclose is all I see. MR. ALEXANDER: Well, that's a basis for fraud, but THE COURT: Yes. It is a basis for fraud. MR. ALEXANDER: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I mean, that's fraud, but I'm just MS. FERGUSON: Your Honor, with respect to the suppression aspect of that, I think that the fraud claim has been premised on certain representations being made as to what services would be available, and those services were never rendered. .... MR. ALEXANDER: Yes, sir. They [Intracorp and Bradly] represented that they were providing, quote, professional rehabilitation services. These things right here that are stated in Defendant's Exhibit Number Thirteen [the Intracorp brochure, reprinted above] and that was basically a false representation. They represented that they were providing highly trained services to help him [Adams] return to meaningful employment, and that was a false representation because they did notthey suppressed from him knowledge that they were limited by that assignment form [the `Request for Service']. They never gave him a copy of the assignment form. THE COURT: That's what I'm saying. Here you're going intoyou are really going into suppression. MR. ALEXANDER: Yes, sir. .... MS. FERGUSON: Your Honor, may I address the suppression issue one more time? THE COURT: Yes. MS. FERGUSON: In the Plaintiff's complaint they allege that there were misrepresentations made, and in the pre-trial order they also state that there were misrepresentations made. Nowhere have they alleged that any material fact was suppressed by the Defendants, and it is upon those allegations in the complaint and the pre-trial order that we have proceeded through this trial. MR. ALEXANDER: Well, we said that they represented that they were providing rehabilitation services, including highly trained professional services, capable of evaluating all of his needs, and in doing that, what we are saying is that they suppressed from us that they were not, in fact, doing that. MS. FERGUSON: Well, Your Honor MR. ALEXANDER: We may not have used the word, suppression, but it amounts to the same thing, and of course, suppression is one of the manners by which you perpetrate fraud. It could be by an active statement or it can be by suppression. MS. FERGUSON: Your Honor, the term, though, `misrepresentation' implies that a statement was made, and under rules of pleading, if he's going to allege that they suppressed something, he must have pleaded that with much more specificity than general terms of misrepresentation, which I would contend indicates that a statement was made. THE COURT: Well, let me put it to you this way. You know, in this day and age everybody takes everybody's deposition. I don't know that there was anybody that we didn't know who was going to testify. We're just not in a notice pleading thing. Now, I understood that we had a fraud count, and I think you have correctly stated that the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant Intracorp represented to Plaintiff that the Defendants were providing rehabilitation services for Plaintiff, including highly trained professional services capable of evaluating all of the Plaintiff's needs and relating to the Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff claims that said representations were falsely made or without knowledge of the true facts, that the Plaintiff relied on said representations, and thereby, devoted time and incurred expenses in attending interview sessions of the Plaintiff. He contends that the Defendants prevented him from securing adequate and necessary rehabilitation services and prevented him from attaining positive results as soon as possible. I don't think that failure to disclose is mentioned in here, but I'm not going to dismiss the fraud count on that basis, because I think that the recurring theme that the Plaintiff has tried to establish is that he wasn't advised of that [the limited undertaking of Intracorp], and I think the Defendant was advised of that [that Plaintiff was proceeding under suppression], and I think that it's just a species of fraud. THE COURT: Well, I'll deny the motion for a directed verdict at this time, and [the case] will go to the jury on negligence and fraud and the plea of the Defendant of contributory negligence. (R. at 326-35; emphasis supplied.) Rule 15(b), Ala.R.Civ.P., states, in pertinent part: When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in the maintaining of his action or defense on the merits.... The court is to be liberal in granting permission to amend when justice so requires. Also, this Court has said that implied consent of the parties can be inferred from an opposing party's failure to object to introduction of evidence raising the disputed issue initially. Bischoff v. Thomasson, 400 So.2d 359 (Ala.1981), Hawk v. Bavarian Motor Works, 342 So.2d 355 (Ala. 1977). Additionally, implied consent may be inferred when the opposing party himself offered evidence relative to the issue. Id. at 358. Further, assuming that the opposing party did object to the evidence on a non-pleaded issue, he must also show that he would be actually prejudiced in maintaining his action or defense on the merits by the admission of the evidence. Hawk, 342 So.2d at 358. We also note that a determination as to whether [an] issue has been tried by express or implied consent under Rule 15(b) is a matter for the trial court's sound discretion, which will not be altered on appeal absent an abuse [of that discretion]. McCollum v. Reeves, 521 So.2d 13 (Ala. 1987). Furthermore, whether pleadings are deemed to be amended in order to conform to the evidence presented is also a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and a decision in that regard will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 16-17. The above quoted portion of the record convinces us that the trial court deemed Adams's complaint to be amended to conform to the evidence. We have also examined the record to find the initial introduction of evidence supporting Adams's contention of suppression, and have found no objection by the defense to this evidence. Thus, the suppression issue was tried by the implied consent of the parties, and the trial court amended the pleadings to conform to the evidence presented. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a JNOV or a new trial on this basis.