Opinion ID: 4537255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Restitution and JVTA Special Assessment

Text: Aside from the substantive reasonableness of his prison sentence, Goodin also challenges parts of the financial component of his sentence. Specifically, Goodin says that the district court incorrectly calculated the amounts of each victim’s loss attributable to him for restitution, and that his dire financial straits should have precluded the $5,000 special assessment under the JVTA. He -8- No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin also says that court-ordered restitution is unconstitutional when a judge and not a jury determines the amount of the victim’s loss. Because Goodin did not raise these objections in the district court, his claims are reviewed for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993). This review applies to cases where the defendant does not object to the amount of restitution or to the imposition of a JVTA special assessment, and even applies to claimed constitutional errors at sentencing where the defendant fails to object. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 797 F. App’x 964, 965 (6th Cir. 2020) (applying plain-error review to JVTA indigency challenge); United States v. Kent, 765 F. App’x 126 (6th Cir. 2019) (same); United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 656 (6th Cir. 2014) (alleged constitutional error); United States v. Yancy, 725 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 2013) (same); United States v. Reaume, 338 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 2003) (challenge to restitution order); United States v. Schulte, 264 F.3d 656, 660 (6th Cir. 2001) (same). Before this Court can reverse for plain error, we must find that (1) the trial court erred, (2) the error was plainly obvious or clear, (3) it affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) allowing the error to stand would undermine “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386 (quoting United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)). Under the second of these prongs, for an error to be plain, it must be “clear under current law.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. “A lack of binding case law that answers the question presented will also preclude our finding of plain error.” United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2015). Applying this forgiving standard of review, each of Goodin’s claims fails: Goodin cannot show that either the restitution amount or the JVTA assessment was plainly erroneous, and his -9- No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin constitutional challenge is foreclosed by binding circuit precedent. Accordingly, we affirm the financial component of Goodin’s sentence as well.
Goodin’s first challenge concerns the amount of restitution ordered by the district court. According to Goodin, the district court plainly erred because it never explained the basis for its restitution award, and instead relied solely on the PSR’s recommendations and the victims’ submissions to the court. Specifically, Goodin points to Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014), which addressed the amount of restitution owed by each defendant who possessed images of a child pornography victim. Paroline held that courts cannot order each defendant who possessed a victim’s images to pay the entire amount of her losses, since that approach “would amount to holding each possessor of her images liable for the conduct of thousands of other independently acting possessors and distributors,” an outcome that is “so severe it might raise questions under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 455–56. Instead, the amount of restitution must account for “the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses.” Id. at 458. The Paroline Court outlined several “rough guideposts” that courts could consider when making this assessment in possession cases, including an estimate of the number of other offenders and the quantity of images possessed by the defendant. Id. at 458– 60. According to Goodin, because the PSR and the attached submissions by the victims failed to include this information, the district court plainly erred when it adopted the recommended amounts of restitution. Normally, when a defendant challenges the amount of restitution ordered by the district court, the court of appeals will review that order for an abuse of discretion. E.g., United States v. Dunigan, 163 F.3d 979, 981 (6th Cir. 1999). But since Goodin did not object to the restitution - 10 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin order in the district court, we will only review the order for plain error. E.g., Reaume, 338 F.3d at 585; Schulte, 264 F.3d at 660. This standard of review dictates the outcome of Goodin’s appeal. While the PSR did not walk through the Paroline factors and did not specifically calculate the number of other perpetrators or the quantity of each victim’s images possessed by Goodin, the amount of restitution requested for each victim was a small fraction of the total losses claimed in their submissions. Goodin did not object to these amounts, suggesting that he agreed the estimates were appropriate reflections of his “relative role.” Paroline, 572 U.S. at 458. While this might be a different case had the district court completely disregarded the core holding of Paroline, say, by ordering restitution equal to the entire amount of all the victims’ claimed losses, our precedents show that no further fact-finding was required when the requested amount appears facially reasonable and the defendant failed to object. For example, in United States v. Sexton, 894 F.3d 787, 799–801 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 415 (2018), the defendant in a fraud case challenged the loss amounts recommended in the PSR and adopted by the district court. Specifically, with respect to legal fees claimed by one of the victims, the record did not contain enough information to assess whether the fees were incurred due to the victim’s participation in the government’s investigation, which is required for restitution under the applicable statute. Id. at 800–01 (citing Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684, 1688, 1690 (2018)). But Sexton never objected. And while “a district court is required to make adequate factual findings in calculating the loss amount when there is a ‘disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter,’” this requirement does not apply to undisputed portions of the PSR. Id. at 801 (quoting United States v. McGlown, 380 F. App’x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2010)). Thus, “because Sexton did not dispute the restitution amount, the district court was not required to - 11 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin make more specific factual findings,” and so Sexton’s challenge could not succeed on plain-error review. Id.; see also United States v. Leal, 933 F.3d 426, 432–33 (5th Cir.) (upholding a restitution order on plain-error review in part because, even though the victims failed to submit evidence as to several Paroline factors, the award was a small percentage of the victim’s total losses), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 628 (2019). Similarly, in United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946, 951–52 (6th Cir. 1998), this Court rejected a plain-error challenge where the defendant was provided with the PSR’s recommended amounts of restitution in advance of sentencing, even where those amounts conflicted with his earlier plea agreement. The Koeberlein court upheld the award under plain-error review because, where the “defendant was provided in advance of sentencing with a recommended restitution order” and nevertheless failed to object, the district court’s imposition of the recommended amount of restitution did not undermine “the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceeding.” Id. at 952. This reasoning applies with equal force here. Goodin’s reliance on United States v. Mobasseri, 764 F. App’x 549 (6th Cir. 2019), to avoid this conclusion is misplaced. In Mobasseri, the defendant did object to the amount of restitution, arguing that the victims had not established his relative role in causing their losses (as required by Paroline). Id. at 549–50. The district court acknowledged this objection, but never explained its reasons for rejecting it and for ordering restitution at the amounts listed in the PSR. Id. On appeal, then, Mobasseri argued that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for ordering restitution, which this Court found was plain error. Id. at 550. But since Goodin said he had no objection to the PSR’s findings, which included the restitution amounts, Mobasseri does not suggest plain error in this case. - 12 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin The other case upon which Goodin relies, United States v. Jones, 747 F. App’x 348 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1591 (2019), was not a plain-error case. Unlike Goodin, Jones objected to the government’s restitution proposal, but the district court ruled against him without explanation. Id. at 359–61. As explained above, the requirement for fact-finding by the district court is greatly diminished when a defendant does not contest a recommendation in the PSR, and given the amount of restitution and the facts that were available in the record, Goodin has failed to meet his heavy burden in showing plain error on appeal.
Goodin also challenges the constitutionality of court-ordered restitution, arguing that because the judge alone determines the amount of the victim’s loss, the federal restitution regime violates his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. But this Court has repeatedly rejected this argument. E.g., United States v. Sawyer, 825 F.3d 287, 297 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Churn, 800 F.3d 768, 780–83 (6th Cir. 2015). Goodin admits this fact and says that he only raises this argument to preserve it for review by the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, at the panel stage of this case, we must reject Goodin’s constitutional challenge to the district court’s restitution order. See Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985) (“A panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.”).
Finally, Goodin says that the district court plainly erred in ordering him to pay the $5,000 special assessment pursuant to the JVTA. Under the JVTA, the district court cannot order the otherwise mandatory special assessment if the defendant is indigent. 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a); United - 13 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin States v. Shepherd, 922 F.3d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 2019). On appeal, Goodin says that he was clearly indigent because he was over $25,000 in debt at the time of his conviction, will owe over $150,000 in restitution, and has a limited future earning potential. Normally, when assessing indigency for purposes of the JVTA, this Court will review the factual question of whether a defendant is indigent for clear error, but will assess the legal definition of indigency de novo. Shepherd, 922 F.3d at 757. But because Goodin failed to object in the district court, we only review his claim for plain error. E.g., Wheeler, 797 F. App’x at 965; Kent, 765 F. App’x at 126. In this circuit, district courts determine indigency under the JVTA by assessing both a defendant’s current and future ability to pay the assessment. Shepherd, 922 F.3d at 759. This future ability includes both potential in-prison and post-release earnings. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 889 (6th Cir. 2019). The defendant carries the burden of proving indigency. Id. at 889–90. Because Goodin has almost no cash and approximately $25,000 in debt, even before the $150,000-plus restitution order discussed above, it seems clear that Goodin lacks any current ability to pay the assessment. That said, prior to his arrest, Goodin held several jobs ranging from a minimum-wage job as a driver for a car dealership to various better-paying mechanical jobs. Goodin will be in his fifties when released from prison, and the JVTA gives defendants twenty years after release from prison to satisfy the debt before it is dissolved. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3014(g), 3613(b). Goodin argues that even with his work experience, his personal circumstances and the duration of his sentence mean it is unlikely that he will ever be able to pay the assessment. Specifically, Goodin notes that he lacks a high-school diploma or GED, that he is unlikely to land - 14 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin even a low-paying prison job, and that his sex-crimes conviction will severely hamper his ability to find employment after he is released. None of these arguments demonstrate plain error. Shepherd—a case that was not limited to plain-error review—found that the defendant was not indigent despite his significant other financial obligations, limited education, and correspondingly low potential for earnings after release. 922 F.3d at 759–60. And while Shepherd will be released from prison at a younger age than Goodin, id., this difference alone cannot support a finding that the district court plainly erred in its application of Shepherd. Though Goodin will be in his fifties when released from prison, he has not shown that he will be unable to pay the assessment using post-incarceration earnings, never mind whether the district court plainly erred in finding otherwise. Wandahsega also stands in the way of Goodin’s claim. Like Goodin, the defendant there faced significant debt and nonexistent assets, and even worse than Goodin, had never held a job earning more than $10 per hour. 924 F.3d at 889. Furthermore, Wandahsega was older than Goodin and faced a similar prison term, meaning he will be in his sixties when released. See id. at 878. But on plain error review, the Court held that Wandahsega’s prison and post-release earnings could support a future ability to pay. Id. at 889; see also id. (“Even if Wandahsega should be classified as impoverished now, and even if he earns only a minimum hourly wage when released from prison, he has not demonstrated that he will be unable to pay the assessment in increments over a twenty-year period.”). In an attempt to distinguish Wandahsega, Goodin focuses on Wandahsega’s belief that “he will obtain employment with [the] Hannahville Indian Community upon his release.” Id. Goodin says this “special attribute”—namely that Wandahsega “was a Native American living on the Hannahville Reservation in Michigan”—gave him a unique chance at post-release employment. - 15 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin (Reply Br. at 4–5.) But Shepherd rejected the argument that a sex-crimes conviction alone will forestall the chance of post-release employment, and that case involved no “special attribute” that could uniquely have landed the defendant a job. 922 F.3d at 759–60. Even without Shepherd, Goodin cannot thread the needle of plain-error review by distinguishing away parts of the very same cases he relies on; an on-point case is necessary (though not always sufficient) to show that the district court plainly erred. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d at 794. Finally, while Goodin argues that the district court erred by not expressly finding on the record that his future earnings could cover the assessment, this argument is directly at odds with Shepherd, which noted that the JVTA does not require “an explicit finding of [the defendant’s] non-indigency.” 922 F.3d at 760; see also id. (“[D]istrict courts ‘retain considerable latitude in deciding which arguments to discuss and how much explanation is necessary.’” (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 295 F. App’x 799, 804 (6th Cir. 2008))). And Shepherd was not a plain-error case; as discussed above, where a defendant fails to object, the district court’s obligation to place its reasoning on the record is substantially reduced. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) (requiring courts to rule on an issue at sentencing so long as the matter could affect the sentence and is “controverted” by the parties); United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 760–61 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that fact-finding on the record is not required when the defendant failed to object and “did not expressly call [the issue] to the court’s attention during the sentencing hearing”); see also Wandahsega, 924 F.3d at 888 (“[D]etailed findings are not necessary where it can be inferred that the district court considered the defendant’s ability to pay and other factors required by law.” (quoting United States v. Powell, 423 F. App’x 602, 610–11 (6th Cir. 2011))).3 3 In a post-argument letter, Goodin says that this Court’s recent decision in United States v. Fowler, 956 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2020), requires a finding of plain error where the district court imposes the JVTA assessment “without hearing argument, considering evidence or saying - 16 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin In sum, Goodin faced the burden of proving indigency and failed to object or make any showing on this point before the district court. On appeal, his arguments suggesting that it may be difficult for him to pay in the future cannot demonstrate plain error, especially given this Court’s previous cases to the contrary.