Opinion ID: 42668
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invalid under Chevron Step Two

Text: 34 The Third Circuit also invalidated 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) but did so under Chevron step two. Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 120 (3d Cir.2005). The Third Circuit disagreed with the First Circuit's conclusion that Lopez did not govern the Chevron step one result. Id. at 116. The Zheng court, applying Lopez, stated that [t]he fact that Congress declared some categories of aliens ineligible for adjustment by statute does not in itself conclusively prove that the Attorney General cannot declare other categories ineligible by regulation. Id. 35 Moving to the second step of Chevron, the Zheng court noted that if the regulation was to survive, it would have to be both `reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design' and `based on a permissible construction of the statute.' Id. (quoting NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257, 115 S.Ct. 810, 130 L.Ed.2d 740 (1995), and Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778). Looking to the operation of the INA as a whole the Zheng court determined that virtually all parolees will be in removal proceedings. Id. at 117. In addition to considering Succar, the Zheng court found that the statutory structure was such that parolees will, by default, be in removal proceedings. Id. Based on this understanding of the INA's operation, the Third Circuit determined that Congress intended that the mere fact of removal proceedings would not render an alien ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. Id. at 118. 36 According to the Zheng court, 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) rendered most aliens paroled into the United States ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. Id. Although the Government contended that some aliens in removal proceedings might be eligible to adjust status, the Third Circuit deemed the exception too narrow to capture congressional intent that parolees be able to apply for status adjustment. Id. at 119. Ultimately, the Zheng court stated that [f]or all practical purposes,.. . 8 C.F.R. § [245.1(c)(8)] renders paroled aliens ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. Id. Based on its practical understanding of the statute's function and the effect of the regulation, the Zheng court concluded that [t]he conflict between regulation and statute is clear and unmistakable. Id. As such, the regulation, which, according to the Third Circuit, essentially reverses the eligibility structure set out by Congress, was held invalid under Chevron step two. Id. at 120. 37 Recently, the Eleventh Circuit, in Scheerer v. U.S. Attorney General, 445 F.3d 1311, ___, Nos. 04-16231 & 05-11303, 2006 WL 947680, at  (11th Cir. Apr.13, 2006), followed the Zheng court's reasoning and held 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) invalid. The Eleventh Circuit adhered to Lopez and held that the Attorney General may exercise his discretion by rulemaking in lieu of adjudication. Scheerer, ___ F.3d at ___, 2006 WL 947680, at . The Scheerer court, like Succar, Bona, and Zheng, based its conclusion on an understanding that [t]he vast majority of aliens paroled into the United States will ... be in removal proceedings by virtue of the statutory scheme. Id. at ___, 2006 WL 947680, at .