Opinion ID: 3173497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Akzo’s Appeal

Text: We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment under the law of the regional circuit, here, the Third Circuit. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Applying the law of the Third Circuit, we review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). Summary judgment is proper when, drawing all justifiable inferences in the non-movant’s favor, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Evaluation of summary judgment of noninfringement is a two-part inquiry: construing the claims and comparing the properly construed claims to the accused product. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We review de novo the ultimate interpretation of a claim term and the evidence intrinsic to the patent. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). When a district court makes factual findings about extrinsic evidence, we review those subsidiary factual findings for clear error. Id. at 835, 841. Infringement, whether literal or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact. Absolute Software, Inc. AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 7 v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1129–30 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As such, it is amenable to summary judgment when no reasonable factfinder could find that the accused product contains every claim limitation or its equivalent. PC Connector Sols., LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29, 39 n.8 (1997).
On appeal, Akzo first faults the district court for narrowly construing “pressurized collection vessel” to require accumulation. Akzo argues that the term should instead assume its ordinary meaning of “gather or receive.” Akzo contends that such a construction is supported by both the claim language and specification, neither of which requires the dispersion to be held for a period of time. According to Akzo, the court’s construction imports further, unspecified process limitations on how long the dispersion must be in the vessel and the manner by which the dispersion exits the vessel, among others. See Appellant’s Br. 34. Dow responds that “collection,” in context, necessarily requires accumulation, as the district court held. Dow relies primarily on Examples 2 and 3 in the specification, which state: “from which the dispersion, once cooled to below 100° C., could be periodically removed.” Appellee’s Br. 28 (quoting ’956 patent col. 6 ll. 40–44, col. 7 ll. 1–4). According to Dow, “‘once cooled’ implies . . . that the material is sitting there and ‘periodically removed’ requires not immediately removed; it is removed after a period of time. Both of those assume that accumulation has occurred.” Oral Argument 14:30–14:42. Moreover, Dow contends, construing the term to broadly mean “gather or receive” renders the limitation superfluous because, under a “gather or receive” construction, any pressurized vessel is a “pressurized collection vessel.” 8 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY We agree with Dow and affirm the district court’s construction of “pressurized collection vessel” as “tubing, piping, or other container where a desired material accumulates, which is maintained above atmospheric pressure.” Our claim construction analysis begins with the language of the claim itself, as it would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Id. at 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). Indeed, we have said that the specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). As an initial matter, we agree with the district court that adopting Akzo’s proffered construction of “gather or receive” would “obviate[] the import of the word ‘collection.’” Decision at 7. There is no dispute that the “pressurized collection vessel” receives the dispersion; that function is clearly contemplated by the surrounding claim language. ’956 patent col. 7 ll. 19–21 (“[T]he aqueous dispersion enters the outlet and pressurized collection vessel at a pressure above atmospheric.”). But allowing “collection” to mean “receive” would render “collection” entirely superfluous and allow any pressurized vessel to constitute a “pressurized collection vessel”; such a result is disfavored. Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”); Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]nterpretations that render some portion of the claim language superfluous are disfavored.”). The district AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 9 court’s construction of “accumulation,” on the other hand, gives the term “collection” proper meaning in context. Moreover, the remainder of the specification supports the court’s construction. In addition to the limitation itself, “collection” and/or “collected” is used twice in the specification, in Examples 2 and 3. ’956 patent col. 6 l. 40, col. 7 l. 1. In those examples, the dispersion is collected, allowed to cool, and then “periodically removed.” Id. col. 6 l. 43, col. 7 l. 4. Those examples clearly contemplate a buildup or accumulation of dispersion in the collection vessel before the eventual “periodic removal.” Thus, as the court noted, to give meaning to “collection” consistent with the specification, “material must be permitted to accumulate within the vessel, rather than all of the material flowing through the vessel at a constant rate.” Decision at 7; cf. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1018–19 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (construing “wounds” as “skin wounds” because “[a]ll of the examples described in the specification involve skin wounds,” and construing otherwise “would thus expand the scope of the claims far beyond anything described in the specification”).
Akzo next argues that it has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to literal infringement under the court’s construction of “pressurized collection vessel.” 2 According to Akzo, it proved “substantial facts to rebut Dow’s claims regarding the function of its control valve,” and provided “unrebutted evidence to support a finding that dispersion ‘accumulates’ in Dow’s heat exchange equipment,” includ- 2 Because we affirm the district court’s construction of “pressurized collection vessel,” we need not address Akzo’s arguments regarding infringement under Akzo’s proffered construction. 10 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY ing inspections of Dow’s BLUEWAVE™ process and the expert declaration of Dr. Eldridge M. Mount III. Appellant’s Br. 46, 48 (referencing J.A. 1098 ¶ 46). Dow responds that Akzo did not provide sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find accumulation. Moreover, Dow contends, the declaration Akzo relies on fails to create a genuine issue of material fact because it is ambiguous at best about whether dispersion “accumulates” in the heat exchangers. We agree with Dow and the district court that Akzo failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to literal infringement, and thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment of no literal infringement. All of the claims contain the “pressurized collection vessel” limitation and are thus subject to the same analysis and conclusion. Literal infringement exists when every limitation recited in the claim is found in the accused device. Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 532 (Fed. Cir. 1996). On appeal from a grant of summary judgment of no literal infringement, we determine, after resolving all inferences in favor of the patentee, whether the district court correctly concluded that no reasonable jury could find infringement. Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 709 F.3d 1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2013). As the movant, Dow had “the initial responsibility of identifying the legal basis of its motion, and of pointing to those portions of the record that it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Novartis Corp. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 271 F.3d 1043, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Dow satisfied this burden by identifying that its accused process lacks a “pressurized collection vessel,” as construed, and by pointing to record evidence suggesting that, in its process, “the material continuously passed through the heat exchangers.” J.A. 914 (“Dow’s dispersion is only collected at the very end of the Dow process in AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 11 a large open-to-the-atmosphere plastic crate or an even larger, open-to-the-atmosphere storage tank, neither of which is pressurized.”). Accordingly, “the burden shift[ed] to [Akzo] to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Novartis, 271 F.3d at 1046. The court correctly determined that Akzo failed to meet that burden. For its part, Akzo had to present evidence that the dispersion accumulates in Dow’s downstream heat exchangers and pipes. Akzo primarily relied on the declaration of its expert, Dr. Mount, which stated that the piping “represents a defined volume of space in which the dispersion collects and is resident for a period of time such that a backpressure is created” on the extruder. J.A. 1098 ¶ 46. According to Akzo, that “unrebutted” statement established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dow’s pipes and heat exchangers “accumulate” dispersion, as required by the claims. We disagree. Dr. Mount’s statement is ambiguous at best as to whether accumulation occurs in Dow’s accused process. It does not recite “accumulation,” nor does it expressly refute Dow’s contention that dispersion flows continuously throughout its process and does not accumulate. Akzo instead relies heavily on Dr. Mount’s language, “resident for a period of time.” Such reliance is misplaced, however, for such a phrase does not invoke the “accumulation” envisioned by the claims, and certainly, as Dow notes, “liquid passing through pipes is always ‘resident for a period of time.’” Appellee’s Br. 47. Ultimately, the passage states that “dispersion collects,” yet it fails to identify which construction of “collection” it relies on. Such evidence did not establish a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, Akzo failed to provide sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the dispersion in Dow’s process accumulates within a “pressurized 12 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY collection vessel.” The district court’s grant of summary judgment of no literal infringement of all the claims was therefore correct. C. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents Akzo lastly contends that the district court committed legal error by applying the concept of vitiation and impermissibly creating “a ‘binary choice’ in which an element is either present or ‘not present.’” Appellant’s Br. 52 (quoting Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Under a correct application of the doctrine of equivalents, Akzo argues, it raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dow’s equipment performed the same function in substantially the same way to reach the same result. Dow responds that the district court engaged in the proper “function-way-result” inquiry and simply concluded that Akzo failed to meet its burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact. We agree with Dow and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment of no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Although infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact, summary judgment is proper “[w]here the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could determine two elements to be equivalent.” Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. A patentee must establish “equivalency on a limitation-bylimitation basis” by “particularized testimony and linking argument” as to the insubstantiality of the differences between the claimed invention and the accused device or process. Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The functionway-result test “often suffice[s] to show the substantiality of the differences.” Id. “[A]ll claim limitations are not entitled to an equal scope of equivalents.” Moore USA, Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1106 (Fed. AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 13 Cir. 2000). Ultimately, “many limitations warrant little, if any, range of equivalents.” Id. Akzo hones in on and challenges the district court’s use of “vitiate” in its equivalents analysis. We find this challenge unpersuasive. As the Supreme Court has stated, “if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a particular claim element, partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the court . . . .” Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. The dictionary defines the term “vitiate” as “to make ineffective.” See MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vitiate (last visited Dec. 15. 2015). Under the doctrine of equivalents, an infringement theory thus fails if it renders a claim limitation inconsequential or ineffective. And as we have explained, “saying that a claim element would be vitiated is akin to saying that there is no equivalent to the claim element in the accused device based on the well- established ‘function-way-result’ or ‘insubstantial differences’ tests.” Brilliant Instruments, Inc. v. GuideTech, LLC, 707 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added); cf. Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The determination of equivalence depends not on labels like ‘vitiation’ or ‘antithesis’ but on the proper assessment of the language of the claimed limitation and the substantiality of whatever relevant differences may exist in the accused structure.”). With these principles in mind, we conclude that Akzo failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dow’s process operates in substantially the same way. In fact, the opposite is true. The claimed process operates by using a pressurized collection vessel wherein dispersion accumulates to maintain backpressure in the extruder. To state it differently, it is the accumulation of dispersion in the collection vessel that generates the backpressure. Dow’s accused process, on the other hand, “uses a valve” and does not allow for accumulation in the 14 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY downstream pipes. Decision at 17. Thus, in order to survive summary judgment, Akzo had to show that a valve and a series of pipes and heat exchangers, wherein the dispersion flows continuously, generate backpressure in the extruder in substantially the same way to increase the boiling point of the carrier fluid. It did not do so. Akzo introduced Dr. Mount’s declaration as support. In the last paragraph of a fifty-one paragraph declaration, Dr. Mount states: Dow’s and Michelman’s piping and heat exchang- ers perform the same function (maintain the pres- sure) and achieve the same result (maintaining sufficient pressure to prevent boiling of the aqueous medium) in substantially the same way (by collecting the dispersed material in a contained volume) as the vessel used by the inventors in Ex- amples 2 and 3 of the patent. J.A. 1100–01. Dr. Mount’s discussion of the doctrine of equivalents is broad and scant. Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Broad conclusory statements offered by Telemac’s expert are not evidence and are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.”). Nevertheless, what truly undermines Akzo’s reliance on the above-quoted statement is the statement’s failure to articulate how Dow’s accused process operates in substantially the same way. Dr. Mount states that Dow’s process operates “in substantially the same way (by collecting the disperse material in a contained volume),” yet he fails to articulate which construction of “collecting” he invokes, much less articulate how the differences between the two processes are insubstantial. Such ambiguity and generality cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, Akzo failed to provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Dow’s valve, pipes, and heat exchangers operate in substantially the AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 15 same way as the claimed “pressurized collection vessel” to generate backpressure in the extruder. The court’s grant of summary judgment was therefore correct. 3