Opinion ID: 2559630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sounds of Silence

Text: The Supreme Court, this Court, and commentators warn at length about the dangers of introducing at trial the fact that a defendant in a criminal case decided not to speak to law enforcement personnel, especially where that refusal occurred following arrest and after the defendant is advised of his or her Miranda rights. In United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), the Supreme Court noted generally that, [i]n most circumstances[,] silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force and more specifically regarding post-arrest, post- Miranda silence: [T]he situation of an arrestee is very different, for he is under no duty to speak and ... has ordinarily been advised by government authorities only moments earlier that he has a right to remain silent, and that anything he does say can and will be used against him in court. At the time of arrest and during custodial interrogation, innocent and guilty alikeperhaps particularly the innocentmay find the situation so intimidating that they may choose to stand mute. A variety of reasons may influence that decision. In these often emotional and confusing circumstances, a suspect may not have heard or fully understood the question, or may have felt there was no need to reply. He may have maintained silence out of fear or unwillingness to incriminate another. Or the arrestee may simply react with silence in response to the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere surrounding his detention. Hale, 422 U.S. at 176-77, 95 S.Ct. at 2136-37, 45 L.Ed.2d at 104 (internal citation omitted); see Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. at 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d at 97 (Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested.). In addition to explaining why post-arrest, post- Miranda silence has scant probative value, the Supreme Court went on to discuss the significant potential for prejudice inherent in admitting evidence relating to a defendant's silence: The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more weight to the defendant's previous silence than is warranted. And permitting the defendant to explain the reasons for his silence is unlikely to overcome the strong negative inference that the jury is likely to draw from the fact that the defendant remained silent at the time of his arrest. Hale, 422 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 2138, 45 L.Ed.2d at 107. In Maryland, we have said that, [i]n general, silence is evidence of dubious value that it is usually inadmissible under Maryland Rule 5-402 [relevance] or 5-403 [prejudice]. Kosh v. State, 382 Md. 218, 227, 854 A.2d 1259, 1265 (2004). On the issue of probity of post-arrest, post- Miranda silence, in Grier, 351 Md. at 254-55, 718 A.2d at 218, we stated that: [A] defendant's failure to come forward does not constitute an admission, and lacks probative value. Citizens ordinarily have no legal obligation to come forward to the police. Failure to come forward to the police may result from numerous factors, including a belief that one has committed no crime, general suspicion of the police, or fear of retaliation. Such silence is simply not probative as substantive evidence of guilt. (Citations omitted.); see Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 594, 762 A.2d 125, 133 (2000) (When viewed in the context of the petitioner[']s right to remain silent, the admission of the petitioner's silence as evidence of his consciousness of guilt ... has an element of unfairness, and is not very probative of that fact.). Regarding the potential for prejudice inherent in admitting evidence of post-arrest, post- Miranda silence, we explained: The prejudice to a defendant resulting from reference to his silence is often substantial. As the Fifth Circuit observed, we would be naive if we failed to recognize that most laymen view an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege as a badge of guilt. Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir.1968). Silence at the time of arrest has a significant potential for unfair prejudice. Grier, 351 Md. at 263, 718 A.2d at 222 (some citations and quotation marks omitted).