Opinion ID: 4528672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wallace’s Challenges to His Conviction

Text: A. Sufficiency of the Government’s Evidence as to Wallace’s Foreknowledge Finally, we consider two challenges Wallace mounts as to his conviction. As an initial matter, Wallace argues his conviction must be overturned because the Government presented insufficient evidence of his foreknowledge that a codefendant would be armed. To prove aiding and abetting under § 924(c), the Government must show “that the defendant actively participated in the underlying . . . violent crime with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s commission.” Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 67 (2014) (emphasis added). Rosemond emphasized that the defendant’s advance knowledge must come at a point at which “the accomplice can do something with it—most notably, opt to walk away.” Id. at 78. By “deciding . . . to go ahead with his role in the venture[,] that shows his intent to aid an armed offense.” Id. 19 18 And although Benson argues that the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, this right “is not absolute: criminal defendants do not have a right to present evidence that the district court, in its discretion, deems irrelevant or immaterial.” United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2003). For the reasons discussed, it is evident that the court deemed Benson’s defense based on the dismissed charges irrelevant. 19 The district court also properly offered a Rosemond instruction, telling the jury it must find “the defendant must have actively participated in the crime of violence with advance knowledge that another participant would use or carry a firearm during and in relation to, or possess a firearm in furtherance of the crime of violence.” J.A. 993. 29 Wallace’s conviction must be upheld if there is substantial evidence to support it. Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating the evidence, this Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor” and “assum[ing] the jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in favor of the [G]overnment.” Id. Insufficient evidence may be found “only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011). Here, the evidence of such advance knowledge need not be direct. Other circuits have concluded that where there is evidence that a defendant extensively participated in the planning of a robbery of the type that would generally necessitate the use of firearms, such evidence is sufficient to fulfill this requirement. For example, in United States v. Akiti, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding that the defendant had advance knowledge that his co-conspirator in the armed robbery of a credit union would carry a gun despite a lack of direct evidence. 701 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2012). The government had presented evidence that the defendant “played a major role in planning the robbery”; that he “was very familiar” with the credit union that was robbed; that the plan involved robbery during business hours when multiple employees were present (thereby necessitating a firearm); and that the defendant was with his armed co-conspirator in his own apartment “immediately before the robbery.” Id. at 887. Based on all of this, the Eighth Circuit agreed that “a reasonable jury could have concluded [the defendant] knew [the co-conspirator] 30 would be armed during the robbery.” Id.; see also Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 77 (citing Akiti approvingly). Similarly, in United States v. Jordan, the Fifth Circuit observed that although evidence of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery was circumstantial, the defendant had been observed “communicating with various co-defendants” on the morning of the robbery; “moving between the robbery vehicles”; was on a conference call with the codefendants before and “throughout the commission of the robbery”; and was arrested in a vehicle following another co-conspirator after the robbery (with multiple weapons recovered from co-conspirators’ vehicles). 945 F.3d 245, 259–61 (5th Cir. 2019). Based on this, the Fifth Circuit determined that a reasonable jury “could conclude that [the defendant] was aware that his co-defendants would be carrying weapons in the commission of the robbery[.]” Id. at 261; see also United States v. Henry, 722 F. App’x 496, 499–500 (6th Cir. 2018) (same); United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 237 (1st Cir. 1995) (same). The same analysis applies here. As Wallace correctly observes, there is no direct evidence that he had advance knowledge that a codefendant would carry a gun into the robbery. Nonetheless, in light of this Court’s deferential review of the jury’s findings, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have concluded that this element of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt because the Government presented substantial evidence that Wallace organized his codefendants to execute an armed robbery. Specifically, Wallace was the only defendant who knew and communicated with all three of the other defendants before and after the murder (and the only link between the victim in Virginia and Benson and Kindell in Boston). Wallace communicated with Kindell 31 immediately before Kindell and Benson travelled from Boston to Williamsburg. On the morning of the murder, Wallace called Brown, who possessed one of the guns used in the murder and owned the truck Wallace admitted “he and others . . . took to . . . [t]he homicide.” J.A. 622. Further, according to Wallace’s cell phone records and his own admissions, Wallace then went to Joseph’s home, where Joseph’s car was visibly present, at precisely the time Joseph’s phone stopped making outgoing transmissions. Finally, after the murder, Wallace repeatedly called the other Defendants and traveled with Kindell and Benson to the Greyhound bus station for their accelerated departure. From this evidence of Wallace’s relationships and extensive communications with the other codefendants—especially directly before and after the murder—the jury could have reasonably inferred that Wallace was the chief organizer of an armed robbery. As in Akiti, the evidence supported a reasonable jury’s conclusion that Wallace was intimately involved with planning and executing the robbery, travelled with his armed codefendants to the robbery, and saw a car in Joseph’s driveway (leading to the inference that a firearm would be necessary to proceed). See 701 F.3d at 887. In turn, that jury could have concluded that Wallace knew his codefendants would be armed. Thus, to the extent the evidence presented conflicting inferences, 20 the jury was entitled to resolve them in favor 20 In arguing there was insufficient evidence of his advance knowledge, Wallace relies on his statements to law enforcement that he stayed in the vehicle and that his codefendants shot at him. However, given the evidence of his continued contact with the other Defendants after the robbery, the jury was entitled to conclude these statements were a false attempt at exculpation. 32 of the prosecution. Moye, 454 F.3d at 394 (observing that “where the evidence supports differing reasonable interpretations, the jury will decide which interpretation to accept”). Finally, as Rosemond itself observed, a defendant’s continued participation “after a gun was displayed or used by a confederate” permits the jury to “infer from his failure to object or withdraw” that he had the requisite foreknowledge. 572 U.S. at 78 n.9; see also United States v. Manso-Cepeda, 810 F.3d 846, 850 (1st Cir. 2016) (observing that the jury could have inferred from the defendant’s failure to withdraw after becoming aware of the gun that he had advance knowledge of the gun); United States v. Newman, 755 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing that the defendant’s continued cooperation with a coconspirator after he had learned the co-conspirator was using a shotgun led to the conclusion that the defendant had advance knowledge of firearm possession). Wallace’s post-crime communication with and transportation of the other codefendants arguably meets that standard. In sum, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found sufficient evidence to support Wallace’s advance knowledge. B. Constitutionality of Wallace’s Conviction Finally, Wallace argues his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and (j) should be reversed and the superseding indictment dismissed in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). There, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the definition of “crime of violence” found at § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. Wallace submits that because he was convicted under a subsection of § 924(c), he was convicted under a constitutionally infirm statute. 33 Wallace’s challenge is without merit. Here, the predicate offense for the § 924(c) “crime of violence” was Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). In United States v. Mathis, this Court concluded that Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence under the force clause at § 924(c)(3)(A), not the residual clause at § 924(c)(3)(B). 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019). Therefore, any determination by Davis regarding the residual clause has no bearing on whether Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a valid crime of violence for the purposes of a § 924(c)(1) conviction.