Opinion ID: 2631865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Opinion & Credibility Testimony

Text: [¶ 20] In Ogden's next point of error, he asserts that the prosecutor elicited improper opinion testimony from the young skateboarders that Ogden intentionally drove toward the victim and would have injured him had the victim not jumped onto the car. Ogden also complains that the detective improperly vouched for the boys' credibility. The plain error standard of review set out in our discussion of the first issue applies here as well given that the defense did not object to any of the challenged testimony. [¶ 21] This court has consistently held that it is the jury's function to resolve the factual issues, determine the credibility of the witnesses, and decide the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant. Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Wyo.1999). This is because jurors are deemed to be experts in determining the credibility of the witnesses. Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo.1989). Two rules flow from the Wyoming cases that have addressed th[ese] issue[s]. First, the prosecution may not elicit opinion testimony from a witness, lay or expert, concerning the guilt of the accused. Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo. 1990); Stephens [v. State ], 774 P.2d [60,] 66 [(Wyo.1989)]. Second, the prosecution may not elicit an expert witness' opinion with regard to another witness' credibility. Stephens, 774 P.2d at 68. These rules ensure that it is the jury which resolves the factual issues, judges the credibility of the witnesses, and ultimately determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 596 (Wyo. 1992), denial of habeas corpus aff'd, 37 F.3d 1510 (10th Cir.1994). Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1998). Our review of our case law on this issue, however, has reminded us that we must carefully analyze the testimony to determine whether a given comment by one witness actually vouched for another witness' credibility or commented on the defendant's guilt. Huff, 992 P.2d at 1079; see Gayler, 957 P.2d at 860 and Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1182 (Wyo.1998) (for cases where this court did carefully analyze the challenged testimony). [¶ 22] The challenged exchanges between the prosecutor and the young witnesses are clearly set out in the record. Ogden first complains about the boys' testimony that it appeared to them that Ogden had intentionally tried to hit the victim with his car: Witness # 1 Q. Okay. When the man went down the sidewalkor the car went down the sidewalkdid it appear to be an accident that it was going down there? A. No. Q. Did it appear to be intentional and directed towards the person that was walking? A. Yeah. Witness # 2 Q. Okay. When you were watching the car almost hit the man that was walking, did it appear to you that it was an accident when they were going down the sidewalk? A. No. Q. Did it appear that they were intentionally accelerating towards that man? A. Yeah, it did. Witness # 3 Q. Okay. Did it appear to you, when you were watching this, that that car went intentionally towards [the victim]? A. Yeah, it did. Q. Did it seem like it was an accident? A. No. Witness # 4 Q. And I have asked these questions a lot, so bear with me if I repeat myself. When the car was going down the sidewalk, was it driven directly towards the man that was on the sidewalk? A. Yes, it was. Q. Did it look like it was an accident? A. No. Ogden also challenges the testimony about whether the witnesses believed that he was attempting to injure the victim: Witness # 1 Q.... [W]hat do you think would have happened if [the victim] hadn't jumped up when he did? A. It probably would have hit him in the legs and like made him fall on to the hood. Witness # 2 Q. What did you think would have happened if that man walking hadn't jumped before that car hit him? A. They probably would have hit him. Q. They would have hit him. Thank you. [¶ 23] Testimony that is otherwise admissible will not be excluded unless it constitutes an actual conclusion about the guilt or innocence of the accused party. Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 616 (Wyo.1993). An interpretation of the evidence by a witness, even though that interpretation may be important in establishing an element of the crime and thus leading to the inference of guilt, is not in the same category as an actual conclusional statement on the guilt or innocence of the accused party. 846 P.2d at 616. [¶ 24] Ogden premises his challenge to the boys' testimony on this court's decision in Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1344 (Wyo.1992), where we held that a law enforcement officer's testimony that I listened to her story and made a determination that she had been raped constituted reversible error as an improper conclusion of law and thereby improper opinion on Whiteplume's guilt. [¶ 25] We conclude that the boys' statements do not rise to the same level of impropriety that our Whiteplume opinion guards against. In Whiteplume, the officer's statement informed the jury specifically that he thought the victim was credible and the defendant was guilty of raping her. 841 P.2d at 1340. To further exacerbate the officer's statements was the fact that they came from an officer of the law who is presumed to know the elements of the various criminal laws and whether a particular activity qualifies as a violation of one or more of those laws. [¶ 26] Additionally, as the State points out, the testimony at issue is supported by Wyoming Rules of Evidence 602 and 701, which in essence provide that so long as sufficient evidence exists to show that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter, a nonexpert witness may testify in the form of opinions or inferences that are rationally based on the perceptions of the witness and are helpful to the fact finder. W.R.E. 602, 701. Moreover, W.R.E. 704 provides that [t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. [¶ 27] The young witnesses all had personal knowledge about the incident, and they testified regarding their perceptions of what occurred. Their testimony was rationally based on their observations of the incident, helpful to the jury, and did not amount to conclusory statements about Ogden's guilt. A clear and unequivocal rule of law was therefore not violated. [¶ 28] Ogden also complains that the State improperly elicited the detective's opinion that the teenagers were credible and reliable. Specifically, Ogden challenges the detective's statement that all the boys had very good detail. It was obvious to me they were focused on the event. He is also troubled about the following exchange: Q. And was [the victim], I guess, as coherent and detailed as the boys were? A. Yes, he was. Q. And did you find his statement also to be consistent with the boys' statements? A. Yes, I did. Q. Was there anything that led you to believe that [the victim] had told the boys what to say? A. No. He further complains that the following testimony suggested that the detective believed the boys and that Ogden was, indeed, guilty: Q.... [Y]ou had said that when you were first interviewing Mr. Ogden, in your mind he wasn't free to leave? A. That's correct. Q. After you interviewed Mr. Ogden, and you reviewed the statements of the witnesses that you interviewed and the statements of the witnesses the other officer interviewed, did your mind change? A. No. [¶ 29] Ogden contends that this testimony did not allow the jury to reach its own conclusion on whether or not the statements were consistent or reliable and that these errors were made more prejudicial because they were emphasized in the State's closing argument. After analyzing the detective's testimony, we conclude that he at no time stated that he believed the young witnesses were credible. He merely testified that the versions of what happened were consistent with one another and that he relied upon the statements in determining that sufficient probable cause existed to arrest Ogden. [¶ 30] The fact that in its closing argument the State commented on the fact that the detective relied on the witnesses' statements in making his decision to arrest Ogden did not cause unfair prejudice to Ogden. Counsel are given wide latitude in making their closing argument, and we examine closing arguments in their entirety, refusing to consider individual sentences out of context. Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 771 (Wyo.1995). The State's comments were simply comments on the evidence. Furthermore, the jury instructions would have remedied any misunderstandings, if any existed, by informing the jury that the criminal charge is only a formal charge and is not to be considered any evidence of guilt on the part of the defendant. [¶ 31] We have discerned no violations of any clear and unequivocal rules of law and, accordingly, conclude that none of Ogden's challenges amount to plain error. Finding no plain error, we affirm. [¶ 32] Affirmed.