Opinion ID: 2777571
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michigan Whistleblower’s Protection Act

Text: Wallace also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the County and the individual defendants on his claim under the Michigan Whistleblower’s Protection Act (WPA), Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 15.361–15.369. To establish a prima facie case under the WPA, Wallace must (1) show that he engaged in activity protected by the WPA, i.e., he reported or was about to report an actual or suspected violation of a law, regulation, or rule, and (2) connect his discharge—the only adverse action at issue in this case—to that protected activity. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.362; West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 665 N.W.2d 468, 471–72 (Mich. 2003). The district court found that Wallace could not link his discharge to any protected activity, because the “evidence conclusively shows that the discharge decision was made by a non-defendant, Schenk, with little or no involvement of defendants and that his reasons for doing so had nothing to do with plaintiff objecting to being required to perform political work.” (R. 166, Op.& Order at 13.) The court held that the conversation between Schenk and Ingram or Downey in early 2011 was too remote from Wallace’s discharge to permit an inference of causation. Wallace argues that the district court erred because: (1) a jury could reasonably infer that Ficano, Fakhouri, and Ingram influenced Schenk’s decision from their presence at the meeting to discuss candidates for termination, (2) he can prove causation under a cat’s-paw theory because Schenk relied on information provided by Downey and Ingram, who “wanted adverse action taken against Wallace because of his reporting of the improper political activity that he was being forced to participate in,” and (3) a jury could reasonably infer from Schenk’s inability to recall details about his conversation with Downey and Ingram that Schenk knew that Wallace - 12 - Case No. 13-2704 Wallace v. Wayne County, et al. complained about both nonprofit projects and overtly political assignments. None of these arguments has merit. Wallace’s first argument—that Schenk did not act alone—mirrors his argument in support of his First Amendment claim. We reject it for the same reason we found his earlier argument wanting: lack of evidence that Ficano, Fakhouri, or Ingram declined to persuade Schenk to remove Wallace from the list because he complained about politically-charged assignments. Further, Wallace puts forward no evidence that Ficano or Fakhouri even knew that he complained about illegal activity. His second argument—that Downey and Ingram sought to discipline him for refusing to work on overtly political projects, and that Schenk included him on the list, at least in part, because Downey or Ingram reported that he refused to complete work assignments—fares no better. Again, Wallace forfeited reliance on a cat’s-paw theory by failing to argue it at summary judgment. See Scottsdale, 513 F.3d at 553. Finally, no jury could reasonably infer that Schenk knew Wallace reported feeling pressured to complete overtly political assignments for Ficano’s campaigns during County time. Wallace suggests that Schenk’s testimony about his conversation with Downey or Ingram in early 2011 is “brimming with inconsistencies,” and that a jury could reasonably reject Schenk’s account of the conversation entirely, concluding instead that Downey or Ingram told Schenk everything Wallace ever complained about. Not so. The purported inconsistencies—which boil down to Schenk’s ability to recall the substance but not specific details of the conversation—do not undermine his credibility and so did not require the court to reject his account when considering the motion for summary judgment. Cf. Dawson v. Dorman, 528 F. App’x 450, 452 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[S]ummary judgment is not appropriate where the opposing party offers - 13 - Case No. 13-2704 Wallace v. Wayne County, et al. specific facts that call into question the credibility of the movant’s witnesses.” (quoting TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004))). Ultimately, the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Wallace, shows that Downey or Ingram told Schenk in early 2011 that Wallace objected to creating advertisements that explicitly supported local nonprofit organizations while implicitly supporting Ficano’s political career, Schenk asked Director of Human Resources Tim Taylor to investigate, Taylor reported back that the issue had been resolved, and Schenk selected Wallace and eleven other employees for discharge in January 2012. No jury could reasonably infer from such evidence that Wallace’s concerns about politically tinged nonprofit work motivated Schenk to include him on his list of candidates for discharge some ten months later. See West, 665 N.W.2d at 472 (“To prevail [on his WPA claim], plaintiff had to show that his employer took adverse employment action because of plaintiff’s protected activity, but plaintiff has merely shown that his employer disciplined him after the protected activity occurred.”).