Opinion ID: 4528125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Indemnification Claims

Text: so as to indemnify Georgia Power for its own negligence. ABB does not challenge these aspects of the summary judgment order, and we do not address them on appeal. 7 Case: 19-11148 Date Filed: 04/23/2020 Page: 8 of 16 Under Georgia law, 3 courts interpret contracts in three steps. First, we determine whether the contract language is unambiguous. City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc., 743 S.E.2d 381, 389 (2013). If it is, we enforce the contract according to its plain terms. Id. If the contract is ambiguous, we must apply Georgia’s rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity. Id. And if ambiguity remains after applying the rules of construction, “the issue of what the ambiguous language means and what the parties intended must be resolved by a jury.” Id. A contract is ambiguous when “the words used in the contract leave the intent of the parties in question—i.e., that intent is uncertain, unclear, or is open to various interpretations.” Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 861 F.3d 1224, 1231 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Capital Color Printing, Inc. v. Ahern, 661 S.E.2d 578, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)). Georgia courts have defined ambiguity as “duplicity, indistinctness, an uncertainty of meaning or expression used in a written instrument.” First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Ga., Inc. v. Hughes, 826 S.E.2d 71, 75– 76 (Ga. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, “no ambiguity exists where, examining the contract as a whole and affording the words used therein their plain and ordinary meaning, the contract is capable of only one reasonable 3 The parties agreed that the Contract would be governed by Georgia law. 8 Case: 19-11148 Date Filed: 04/23/2020 Page: 9 of 16 interpretation.” Grange, 861 F.3d at 1231 (quoting Capital Color Printing, 661 S.E.2d at 583). 1. The Contract Unambiguously Defines “Company” as Southern Company Services. The Contract defines “Company” in two different provisions. First, the Master Agreement’s preamble states, “This agreement is entered by Southern Company Services, Inc., . . . (acting for itself and as agent for Alabama Power Company, Georgia Power Company [], Gulf Power Company and Mississippi Power Company (Individually, ‘Affiliate’ and collectively, ‘Affiliates’) . . . ) (‘Company’) and ABB Inc., . . . (‘Contractor’).” And second, Amendment One states in its title that it is amending the Master Agreement “between Southern Company Services, Inc. (‘Company’) and ABB Inc. (‘Contractor’).” Both the preamble to the Master Agreement and the title of Amendment One thus indicate that “Company” is a defined term that refers to Southern Company Services. See HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp., 888 F.3d 334, 339 (8th Cir. 2018) (recognizing the principle that a “defined term is defined by tucking it at the end of the definition, in parentheses” (quotation marks omitted)); Bryan A. Garner, The Elements of Legal Style § 4.5, at 81 (2d ed. 2002) (describing parentheses with quotation marks inside as sufficient to signal a defined term). Meanwhile, the preamble provides that Georgia Power is an “Affiliate,” rather than the 9 Case: 19-11148 Date Filed: 04/23/2020 Page: 10 of 16 “Company.” See Olympus Ins. Co. v. AON Benfield, Inc., 711 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that a parenthetical term defines the term preceding it). ABB argues the preamble’s definition of “Company” is difficult to decipher due to its use of nested parentheticals, and that this difficulty itself raises a factual ambiguity as to whether the term “Company” includes Georgia Power. But Georgia courts have held time and again that “[a] contract is not ambiguous even though difficult to construe.” F & F Copiers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 391 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (quotation marks omitted). And while the preamble was not artfully written, the term “Company” indisputably refers to SCS and not Georgia Power. Beyond that, the title to Amendment One clears up any potential confusion by plainly associating “Company” with its directly adjacent term, “Southern Company Services, Inc.” We therefore disagree with ABB that the Master Agreement’s preamble renders “Company” ambiguous. 2. ABB Waived its Argument that the Contract’s “Broad” and “Narrow” Uses of “Company” Rendered that Term Ambiguous. ABB also argues that the term “Company” is ambiguous because the Contract sometimes uses a “broad” definition of “Company” that refers to both SCS and Affiliates such as Georgia Power, as well as a “narrow” definition that applies only to SCS. The parties disagree on whether ABB waived this argument by failing to raise it in the district court. We hold that ABB did not make this argument in the district court, and that we need not consider it on appeal. And 10 Case: 19-11148 Date Filed: 04/23/2020 Page: 11 of 16 even if we were to consider this new argument, we reject the idea that the contract employs a “broad” definition of “Company” that must refer to both SCS and Georgia Power. To start, at no point in ABB’s summary judgment briefing did it argue that the Contract was ambiguous by virtue of its varying broad and narrow usages of the term “Company.” Rather, ABB argued (1) that the Contract “specifically” defines Company as both SCS and Georgia Power; and (2) that the definition of Company includes Georgia Power because SCS entered the Contract acting as Georgia Power’s agent. And while ABB contended that any potential ambiguity would have to be resolved against Georgia Power, ABB did not specifically argue that the Contract is ambiguous, let alone that the Contract’s inconsistent deployment of “Company” is the reason for that ambiguity. See Trade Am Int’l, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 504 F. App’x 860, 861 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (refusing to consider an issue on appeal because the “specific” argument was not raised below). “As a general rule, an issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by this court.” See Blue Martini Kendall, LLC v. Miami Dade County, 816 F.3d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). However, this rule is discretionary in nature, and our Circuit has established specific exceptions for where courts may consider 11 Case: 19-11148 Date Filed: 04/23/2020 Page: 12 of 16 arguments not raised below. Id. One such exception is when the issue “involves a pure question of law, and [] refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1350 (quotation marks omitted). This court has previously held that a refusal to consider an issue would result in a miscarriage of justice where the issue involves a constitutional issue, or an “issue of general impact.” Id.; see In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a refusal to consider an issue would result in a miscarriage of justice where the issue was of “transcending public importance”). We are more willing to consider an issue not previously raised on an appeal from summary judgment. See Blue Martini, 816 F.3d at 1349. ABB’s new argument fails to satisfy any of the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal. While it is true that ABB’s new argument raises a pure question of law, our refusal to consider it is far from what we have traditionally deemed a “miscarriage of justice.” Compare Blue Martini, 816 F.3d at 1350 (holding that “application of an unconstitutional statute” would result in a miscarriage of justice), with Cita Tr. Co. AG v. Fifth Third Bank, 879 F.3d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e can discern no miscarriage of justice in enforcing the express terms of a contract . . . between two sophisticated parties.”); OMV Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. TriMont Real Estate Advisors, 484 F. App’x 299, 306 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“A 12 Case: 19-11148 Date Filed: 04/23/2020 Page: 13 of 16 litigant’s inability to inject a new ambiguity into a contract . . . will rarely be a miscarriage of justice . . . .”). And although it is true that we are more willing to consider unpreserved arguments on an appeal from summary judgment, that fact alone is not a permissible basis for exercising our discretion. See Blue Martini, 816 F.3d at 1350. We therefore hold that ABB waived its argument that Contract used the term “Company” inconsistently. Even if we were to consider ABB’s new argument, it lacks merit. ABB says that the Contract varies between using “broad” and “narrow” definitions of “Company.” The narrow definition is used when the Contract expressly differentiates between “Company” and “Affiliate,” such as when the two terms are used in the same sentence or paragraph. And the “broad” definition is used, according to ABB, when the Contract describes the terms of ABB’s products and services. Those provisions, for the most part, refer only to “Company,” rather than the “Affiliate.” For instance, the Contract says ABB will provide warranties for its services to “Company,” but does not include any similar provision for Affiliates. Similarly, the Contract says “Company” will pay for purchase orders to ABB. According to ABB, a definition of “Company” that excludes Georgia Power would render these provisions nonsensical because, for example, only SCS would receive warranties for work that ABB provides to Georgia Power. Similarly, SCS, and not 13 Case: 19-11148 Date Filed: 04/23/2020 Page: 14 of 16 Georgia Power, would have to pay for products and Services ABB provides to Georgia Power. But ABB’s argument overlooks Paragraph 1.3 of the Agreement. That provision says that any “rights, benefits, discounts, remedies and warranties accruing to Company . . . likewise accrue to the Affiliates,” and that “[e]ach Affiliate will be solely responsible for its own transactions, including payment obligations.” Paragraph 1.3 thus makes clear that any rights and warranties associated with ABB’s work extend from “Company” to “Affiliates” such as Georgia Power. A definition of “Company” that refers only to SCS would not, therefore, preclude Affiliates such as Georgia Power from receiving warranties for work provided by ABB. Similarly, because Paragraph 1.3 says Affiliates are solely responsible for their payment obligations, a definition of “Company” that is limited to SCS would not make SCS responsible for paying off Georgia Power’s purchase orders. In light of Paragraph 1.3, we reject ABB’s argument that the Contract used “Company” to refer to both SCS and its Affiliates. Because we have determined that the express language of the Contract unambiguously defines “Company” as SCS, we need not resort to Georgia’s rules of contract construction. Calhoun, GA NG, LLC v. Century Bank of Ga., 740 S.E.2d 210, 212 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (“[W]here the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to that alone to find the true intent of the parties.” 14 Case: 19-11148 Date Filed: 04/23/2020 Page: 15 of 16 (quotation marks omitted)). We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Georgia Power’s Indemnification Claims.