Opinion ID: 2633581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The initiative fails to satisfy the single-subject requirement

Text: NRS 295.009(1)(a) provides that [e]ach petition for initiative or referendum must . . . [e]mbrace but one subject and matters necessarily connected therewith and pertaining thereto. Subsection 2 of the statute further defines the one subject requirement set forth in subsection (1)(a): For the purposes of paragraph (a) of subsection 1, a petition for initiative or referendum embraces but one subject and matters necessarily connected therewith and pertaining thereto, if the parts of the proposed initiative or referendum are functionally related and germane to each other in a way that provides sufficient notice of the general subject of, and of the interests likely to be affected by, the proposed initiative or referendum. NRS 295.009 plainly sets forth the standard to be applied in determining whether an initiative petition encompasses more than one subject. Specifically, each petition must embrace only one subject and matters necessarily connected with and pertaining to that subject, so that the parts of the proposed initiative ... are functionally related and germane to each other in a way that provides sufficient notice of the general subject of, and of the interests likely to be affected by, the proposed initiative or referendum. [32] Our preliminary inquiry, then, is whether the initiative's parts are functionally related and germane to each other. Here, in considering the arguments made by the proponents' counsel and examining the text of the initiative on its face, we may determine what the initiative's overall subject is. Although the proponents' attorneys have not been entirely consistent, in either their briefs or during oral argument they have essentially admitted that the initiative originated as a response to the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut , [33] which concluded that the taking of private property for private development in the context of a redevelopment scheme constituted public use. Indeed, the proponents' briefs point to the Kelo majority's statement that State[s are not precluded] from placing further restrictions on [their] exercise of the takings power [34] and indicate that the initiative, if enacted, will do just that. The proponents' attorneys also indicate that the initiative, especially section 2, is designed to prevent the taking of private property by the government through eminent domain for the purposes of transferring that property to a private party. Proponents' attorneys have also explained, however, that the initiative's provisions go further than simply addressing Kelo. At argument, counsel agreed that the initiative is  Kelo plus. In fact, counsel made it clear that, with respect to the initiative,  Kelo is the tip of the iceberg. And, in their briefs, the proponents' attorneys repeatedly state that the initiative concerns eminent domain. The initiative itself unequivocally sustains these statements, as the vast majority of its provisions address one subject  eminent domain. Indeed, the description of the initiative's effect specifically states that [t]he following constitutional provisions shall supersede all conflicting Nevada law regarding eminent domain actions. Thus, the primary subject of the initiative is unquestionably eminent domain, with its genesis the Supreme Court's Kelo decision. Because each and every provision in the initiative must be functionally related and germane to one another, it follows that, with respect to this initiative, every provision must be functionally related and germane to the subject of eminent domain. Our review of the initiative reveals, however, that, despite the proponents' contentions, not all of the initiative's provisions are functionally related and germane to the subject of eminent domain. Specifically, we conclude that section 1 and section 8 of the initiative fail to satisfy this requirement. Under section 1, [a]ll property rights are hereby declared to be fundamental constitutional rights and each and every right provided herein shall be self-executing. Although the proponents insist that this section is functionally related and germane to the subject of eminent domain because it would require the application of a strict scrutiny standard when property is taken, we disagree. [35] This section is about making all property rights fundamental rights, and thereby creating a broad new class of fundamental rights. It does not deal with the subject of eminent domain. Further, this section's inclusion in an initiative dealing with eminent domain does not provide sufficient notice of the subject addressed in section 1 or the interests likely to be affected by this section. Section 8 addresses government actions that cause substantial economic loss to property rights. Specifically, section 8 provides that government actions which result in substantial economic loss to private property shall require the payment of just compensation. This section further provides that [e]xamples of such substantial economic loss include, but are not limited to, the down zoning of private property, the elimination of any access to private property, and limiting the use of private air space. As a result, this section is extremely broad and concerns any government action that causes substantial economic loss. Although this section would, as the proponents contend, apply to many inverse condemnation cases, which this court has held to be the constitutional equivalent to eminent domain, [36] it would also apply to myriad other government actions that do not fall even within the most broad definition of eminent domain. As the opponents point out, this provision would require payment of just compensation for, among other things, public construction projects that cause a decrease in business or value while the construction work is ongoing, the creation of new public transportation routes or modification of existing routes when the change negatively impacts property values, and situations in which a zoning change request or special use permit is denied and the party requesting the change or permit would have seen a substantial increase in property value had the request been approved. [37] To the extent that section 8 would require payment of just compensation for all of the aforementioned government actions if the actions caused substantial economic loss to private property, that section far exceeds the scope of what could, even under an extremely liberal definition, be classified as eminent domain. Government actions related to construction projects, public transportation routes, and the denial of requested zoning changes or special use permits are in no way functionally related or germane to eminent domain, and this section clearly fails to provide sufficient notice of the wide array of subjects addressed in section 8 or the interests likely to be affected by it. Because of the far-reaching impact of this section on government actions completely unrelated to eminent domain, the fact that this section will also affect inverse condemnation is insufficient to render section 8 functionally related or germane to eminent domain. The proponents could easily have phrased section 8 in a way that limited its impact to eminent domain, but instead, they chose to use expansive language addressing government actions far beyond the scope of this subject. Accordingly, we conclude that although the initiative addresses a primary subject, eminent domain, it embraces more than one subject in light of sections 1 and 8. Because the initiative encompasses more than one subject, it violates NRS 295.009's single-subject requirement. We therefore must determine the appropriate remedy for this violation.