Opinion ID: 2389275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Grand Jury's Indictment

Text: Sheppard argues the state grand jury did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the counts of obtaining property under false pretenses and conspiracy, and therefore his convictions should be vacated. We disagree. Sheppard cloaks his argument as subject matter jurisdiction, but he is actually challenging the sufficiency of the indictment when he argues the state grand jury did not have jurisdiction over the counts of obtaining property under false pretenses and conspiracy. He contends section 14-7-1630 of the South Carolina Code does not specifically include these charges, and that these charges are not related to the securities violations that are expressly included in the grand jury's jurisdiction. For this reason, he argues, he could not have been properly charged with these crimes, and the circuit court consequently lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict him. Certainly, issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 100, 610 S.E.2d 494, 498 (2005). In Gentry, this Court clarified that a court's subject matter jurisdiction is that court's power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Id. Further, the sufficiency of an indictment is a question separate from and does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 101, 610 S.E.2d at 499. Thus, this Court held that if an indictment is challenged as insufficient or defective, that challenge must be raised before the jury is sworn. Id. Here, there is no question that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over the crimes charged. See S.C. Const. art. V, § 11 (The Circuit Court shall be a general trial court with original jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases. . . .) Despite Sheppard's phrasing and denial, he is challenging the sufficiency of the indictment when he claims the state grand jury could not consider the counts of obtaining property under false pretenses and conspiracy. As explained in Gentry, any challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment must be made before the jury is sworn. Id. at 101, 610 S.E.2d at 499. While Sheppard did timely file a motion to quash the indictment, he only challenged eight of the eleven counts, conceding the counts upon which he was ultimately convicted were within the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the state grand jury. Therefore, Sheppard mischaracterizes his argument as one of subject matter jurisdiction. Further, because he failed to timely challenge these counts in the indictment and instead went to trial on the charges, he cannot now, having lost at trial, come back to challenge the sufficiency of the indictment. See Gentry, 363 S.C. at 102, 610 S.E.2d at 499-500 ( quoting State v. Faile, 43 S.C. 52, 59-60, 20 S.E. 798, 801 (1895)). Further, we disagree with the substance of Sheppard's argument that the statute granting the state grand jury authority over securities violations does not encompass the crimes of obtaining property by false pretenses and conspiracy. While the statute establishing the jurisdiction of the state grand jury plainly evidences the General Assembly's intent to limit said jurisdiction, we do not believe it intended to hinder the grand jury's ability to investigate and indict for crimes committed in the course of conduct of an enumerated crime. See S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1630 (Supp.2009). Subsection 7 of the statute grants jurisdiction to the state grand jury over a crime involving a violation of Chapter 1, Title 35 of the Uniform Securities Act, or a crime related to securities fraud or a violation of the securities laws. Id. § 14-7-1630(7). We find the language or a crime related to is broad enough to encompass those crimes committed in the same course of conduct as an enumerated crime. Thus, the state grand jury has jurisdiction over the charges of obtaining property by false pretenses and conspiracy, even though those specific crimes may not be enumerated elsewhere in section 14-7-1630, because they were committed in the same course of conduct as the securities violations.