Opinion ID: 1058506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jury instructions guilt phase

Text: The defendant claims that the trial court improperly charged the jury. Specifically, he alleges the jury instructions defining intentional and knowing conduct, direct and circumstantial evidence, and reasonable doubt were erroneous. We disagree. Under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, a defendant has a right to trial by jury. State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn.2000). A defendant also has a right to a correct and complete charge of the law, so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper instructions. Id. In evaluating claims of error in jury instructions, courts must remember that `jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of meaning.' Vann, 976 S.W.2d at 101 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-381, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990)), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071 (1999). Therefore, we review each jury charge to determine if it fairly defined the legal issues involved and did not mislead the jury. See State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 696 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 941, 118 S.Ct. 2348, 141 L.Ed.2d 718 (1998).
In instructing the jury on the elements of premeditated first degree murder, the trial court defined intentionally as, A person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is the person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.... In regard to second-degree murder, the trial court similarly defined intentionally and further instructed the jury as follows: Knowingly means that a person acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person's conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. The requirement of knowingly is also established if it is shown that the defendant acted intentionally. The defendant cites as error the trial court's instruction on intentionally for premeditated first degree premeditated murder and knowingly for second degree murder because they are result-of-conduct offenses. In support of his argument, the defendant relies upon this court's decision in State v. Page, 81 S.W.3d 781 (Tenn. Crim.App.2002), a decision filed long after the trial of this case. The defendant argues that this court's decision in Page requires reversal in the present case as the trial court committed the same error by instructing the jury in the disjunctive on the definition of intentionally and knowingly. Id. at 788.[W]e conclude the instructions constituted harmless error. See State v. Dotson, No. M2001-01970-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31370471, at , 2002 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 884, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. Oct. 21, 2002, at Nashville), perm. to app. denied (Tenn.2003).
The defendant challenges the trial court's use of the alternative pattern jury instruction on direct and circumstantial evidence. See T.P.I.CRIM. 42.03(a) (4th ed.1995). It provides in pertinent part as follows: Direct evidence is those parts of the testimony admitted in court which referred to what happened and was testified to by witnesses who saw or heard [or otherwise sensed] what happened first hand. If witnesses testified about what they themselves saw or heard [or otherwise sensed], they presented direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence is all the testimony and exhibits which give you clues about what happened in an indirect way. It consists of all the evidence which is not direct evidence.... The defendant claims the instruction erroneously implies that all evidence is direct evidence, except hearsay. Here, a commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial likely ... prevail[ed] over technical hairsplitting. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 381, 110 S.Ct. 1190. We conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors interpreted the trial court's instructions so as to prevent proper consideration of direct and circumstantial evidence.
The defendant argues that the instruction provided by the trial court erroneously defined reasonable doubt. The trial court provided the following instruction on reasonable doubt: Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a captious, possible or an imaginary doubt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. See T.P.I.CRIM. 2.03 (4th ed.1995). Our courts have upheld the constitutionality of the language contained in this reasonable doubt instruction. See, e.g., State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, app. at 521 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 953, 118 S.Ct. 376, 139 L.Ed.2d 293 (1997); Pettyjohn v. State, 885 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tenn. Crim.App.1994). Accordingly, this issue is without merit.