Opinion ID: 2747138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of prospective jurors

Text: During jury selection, the trial court granted the prosecution’s for-cause challenge to prospective jurors Howe, Gonzalez, and Brown. The trial court also dismissed sua sponte prospective juror Thurston. In her fourth assignment of error, defendant argues that, in excusing those jurors for cause, the trial court violated her right to an impartial jury. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee the right to an impartial jury during criminal proceedings. To protect that right, the trial court may excuse a prospective juror for actual bias. See ORCP 57 D(1)(g); ORS 136.210(1) (making ORCP 57 D(1)(g) applicable to criminal trials). In assessing whether a prospective juror should be excused for actual bias, the question is whether the juror’s “ ‘ideas or opinions would impair substantially his or her performance of the duties of a juror to decide the case fairly and impartially on the evidence presented in court.’ ” State v. Fanus, 336 Or 63, 83, 79 P3d 847 (2003), cert den, 541 US 1075 (2004) (quoting State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 74, 969 P2d 1013 (1998), cert den, 528 US 1135 (2000)); see also ORCP 57 D(1)(g); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 US 412, 424, Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 463 105 S Ct 844, 83 L Ed 2d 841 (1985) (stating essentially the same standard). The trial court must look to “the totality of the potential juror’s voir dire testimony to discern whether it suggests the probability of bias.” State v. Lotches, 331 Or 455, 474, 17 P3d 1045 (2000), cert den, 534 US 833 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have explained, “it is not enough that a prospective juror believes that he can be fair and impartial. The trial court    must find from all the facts that the juror will be impartial and fair and not be consciously or unconsciously biased.” Montez, 309 Or at 575. A prospective juror’s “approval of or opposition to the death penalty alone is not determinative of whether the juror may serve as a juror or must be excused.” Montez, 309 Or at 575; State v. Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 536, 789 P2d 1326 (1990) (same); Witt, 469 US at 424 (stating similar rule). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Adams v. Texas, 448 US 38, 50, 100 S Ct 2521, 65 L Ed 2d 581 (1980), “to exclude all jurors who would be in the slightest way affected by the prospect of the death penalty or by their views about such a penalty would be to deprive the defendant of the impartial jury to which he or she is entitled under the law.” However, a juror may be excused if the juror indicates that he or she cannot put aside personal views and decide the case impartially and in accordance with the law. In Nefstad, this court affirmed the excusal of a prospective juror who expressed opposition for the death penalty when the juror indicated that he could not vote for the penalty. 309 Or at 536-38. We review the trial court’s decisions excusing jurors for abuse of discretion. Montez, 309 Or at 575; see also Lotches, 331 Or at 473-74 (actual bias is a factual question to be determined by trial court). “Because the trial court has the advantage of observing a challenged prospective juror’s demeanor, apparent intelligence, and candor,” we accord great deference to the trial court’s judgment as to the prospective juror’s qualifications. State v. Compton, 333 Or 274, 285, 39 P3d 833, cert den, 537 US 841 (2002); Montez, 309 Or at 575. “We give greatest deference to the trial court when a juror’s answers are contradictory or unclear.” Compton, 333 Or at 286; see also Nefstad, 309 Or at 537-38; Witt, 469 US at 429 (noting that the “predominant function” of trial judge in 464 State v. McAnulty determining juror bias “involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily discerned from an appellate record”). We now review each excusal.
After defendant questioned and passed prospective juror Howe, the prosecutor asked: “Q.    Do you think you could decide whether or not this living, breathing human being deserves to die for the crime she committed? “A. Probably, yeah. “Q. And I ask you that because I notice there was a lot of ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t understand,’ you know, responses to some of these questions [in the juror questionnaire]— “A. Yeah. “Q. —and so I—we need to take some time to figure out what is it you’re thinking about when you say you don’t understand. What comes to mind? You haven’t really elaborated on any of that with regard to the death penalty. “A. There w[ere] a few questions on there that I didn’t really understand— “Q. Yeah. “     “Q. Ms. Howe, I’m looking at page 7 [of the juror questionnaire]. I’ll give you a chance to get there. And I’m looking at (d) there. It’s basically asking you about, you know, religious, moral or just even philosophical, you know, really, objections to the death penalty. And you said there you didn’t understand. Do you understand the question or— “A. Um, yeah, the question. “     “Q. All right. And so that’s sort of what the question’s getting at there. You know, if you have beliefs maybe religious or otherwise that would actually, you know, prohibit you from making this kind of decision? “A. Yeah. “Q. Can you expand on that? Do you have any such beliefs? Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 465 “A. I’m not sure. I don’t think so. “Q. And what would happen if you ended up sitting on the jury is you’d be posed, essentially, with four questions; and three of those would be highly factually driven, and the fourth is a discretionary one, and it would be: ‘Do you think the defendant should receive the death penalty?’ And again, I want to—would you be able to personally make that decision? “A. Yeah. “Q. Why? What would you be looking for? What kind of evidence? “A. I’m not sure. I mean, it would have to be pretty good evidence to decide that. I don’t know. I mean— “Q. That’s what I’m getting at. Do you know you could do this or are you still unsure? “A. I’m still pretty unsure. “Q. And it’s okay. You’re in a tough spot and there’s no right or wrong answer. This is just the time that we would need to find that out now rather than later— “A. Yeah. “Q. —if you could do that. And so, again, you know, if charged with the responsibility of deciding, are you just unsure if you’d be able to consider death penalty for this defendant? “A. Yeah, I’m pretty unsure.” The prosecutor then asked that Howe be removed for cause. On defense counsel’s attempt to rehabilitate Howe, the following exchange occurred: “Q. It’s a tough position. I hope we’re not picking on you at all. I appreciate your being honest about it. But you did say in the questionnaire that you do—you do believe in the death penalty? “A. Yeah. “Q. Is that correct? “A. Yeah. “Q. And it’s one of the three [possible sentences] you would consider? 466 State v. McAnulty “A. Yeah. “Q. But it wouldn’t be easy to make that vote? “A. Yeah. “Q. But could you make that vote if the facts came in— “A. Yeah. “Q. —and the instructions came in and you decided in your mind and conscious [sic] that that’s the decision that has to be made? “A. Yeah. “Q. But you also would consider the other two [sen- tencing options] and might impose any of the three [sentencing options], correct? “A. Yeah.” Defense counsel then objected to the excusal of juror Howe. The trial court granted the state’s motion and excused Howe. Defendant argues that Howe’s statements generally demonstrated a willingness to consider the evidence notwithstanding her hesitancy about questions relating to the death penalty. We agree that neither Howe’s indication that it would be difficult to vote to put a person to death or her statement that, to garner her vote, the evidence would have to be “pretty good,” constituted sufficient reason to exclude her for actual bias. The decision that Howe and other jurors were asked to make was indeed difficult, and the jury is required to base its sentencing decision on the evidence presented. The fact that Howe stated, at the outset of the case, that to support a sentence of death, evidence would have to be “pretty good” was not an indication that Howe would not be able to make her sentencing decision fairly and impartially. That does not mean, however, that the trial court erred in excluding Howe. The state challenged Howe for “cause,” and a trial court permissibly may grant such a motion for reasons other than actual bias. See ORCP 57 D(1)(a), (b) (challenges for cause); ORS 136.210(1) (applying ORCP 57 D(1)(a) and (b) to criminal cases). Howe expressed confusion and a lack of comprehension with respect to a Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 467 number of questions appearing on the juror questionnaire and in response to questions directed to her during voir dire. In addition, Howe said that she was unsure whether she could make the sentencing decision that she would be required to make. The trial court could have understood Howe’s response as an indication that she did not have the ability to make any sentencing decision, rather than as an indication that she was biased in favor or against any particular sentencing decision. We have carefully reviewed the voir dire of all of the jurors in this case and are satisfied that the trial court correctly considered whether the jurors exhibited actual bias that would impair their ability to make the sentencing decision fairly and impartially. The record demonstrates that a number of jurors stated that the sentencing decision would be difficult or that the evidence indicating that death should be imposed would have to be persuasive, but who, nevertheless, remained on the jury panel after challenges for cause were taken. In fact, in one instance, a juror stated, in response to questions by the prosecutor, that it would be “hard to imagine anything heinous enough that you would have to vote for the death penalty. It’s hard.” Nevertheless, the court denied the state’s challenge for cause. That juror was different from Howe, however, in that she exhibited a strong ability to understand the complex issues presented and to follow the court’s instructions. We conclude that the trial court was in a position to assess Howe’s demeanor and qualifications and did not abuse its discretion in excluding her for cause other than actual bias.
During defense questioning, prospective juror Gonzalez agreed that the death penalty may be proper in some cases, but stated that she would want to know “the why’s and why not’s.” After the defense passed Gonzalez, the prosecutor asked her the following: “Q. Ms. Gonzalez, I notice in a lot of your answers, you make reference to counseling, you know, getting help for people. What does that mean to you when you think about a death penalty case? What are you thinking? 468 State v. McAnulty “A. Well, there’s a reason why it happened, and sometimes by going to counseling or seeing somebody to talk about why, there’s a reason behind that. And something could have happened in their past or in their situation. And so—and only that person that they talk with is going to know that. “Q. Hypothetically speaking, let’s say you do get that sort of information, why are you looking for that sort of information? Does that somehow reduce culpability in your mind? “A. Maybe. Maybe to justify it, maybe, in my mind. “Q. And conversely, what if you never hear why the defendant killed her daughter? You learn about what happened, but you’re never really satisfied about why or maybe the psychological or— “A. I don’t know. I would probably ask myself ques- tions, I guess. “Q. Would that impair your ability to decide whether her crime deserved the death penalty? “A. I’m not sure. “Q. If that itch was never scratched, you know, could you bear the responsibility of deciding whether the crime itself deserved— “A. Probably not. “Q. And so then you wouldn’t, of course, be able to consider the death penalty. “A. Correct.” The prosecutor moved that Gonzalez be removed for cause. Defense counsel then attempted to rehabilitate Gonzalez. On defense questioning, Gonzalez agreed that she was not categorically against the death penalty and would keep “an open mind.” Defense counsel then informed the court that the defense opposed the excusal of Gonzalez. The court provided a brief explanation of the death penalty sentencing process, after which the prosecutor resumed with the following questioning: “Q. And with regard to that, as the Court’s told you, you are not—you know, it’s not required that you hear why. Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 469 You may never hear why and it’s not one of the [four questions required to impose the death penalty]. And I’ll just restate my question. Then knowing that you’d have a possibility of, you know, [imposing a sentence of] life without parole after 30 years, would there be any circumstance under which you would consider whether the death penalty is appropriate? “A. I can’t—I don’t know. “Q. You had answered no before, and was there some- thing that changed? “A. (No response.) “Q. There’s no right or wrong answer. “A. I really can’t—I don’t know. I can’t say. I’m sorry. I don’t know the answer to that question. “Q. Okay.” The court then asked a question: “COURT: And it’s difficult. I mean I can’t imagine in any other place or any other moment in somebody’s life is there a discussion that takes place like this. We’re asking something very serious. One way to put it, thinking about this now, do you either favor or rule out any of the three [sentencing] options? “A. I don’t favor them and I don’t rule them out.” The prosecutor renewed the challenge, arguing that “the answer ‘I don’t know’ still doesn’t quite get us to what the juror would be required to do if she were to sit on the jury.” The trial court then excused Gonzalez for cause. Defendant asserts that Gonzalez’s statement that she would keep an open mind and consider all three sentencing possibilities demonstrated her qualifications, and that her difficulty with imposing the death penalty if the question “why the defendant killed her daughter” was not answered was merely Gonzalez’s acknowledgement of the gravity of the death penalty decision. That is one way of looking at the voir dire. However, our review of the transcript indicates that the trial court took great pains to outline for Gonzalez the four questions that the jurors would be required to answer and, immediately after having heard 470 State v. McAnulty that explanation, Gonzalez answered the question, “would there be any circumstances under which you would consider whether the death penalty is appropriate?” by saying “I can’t—I don’t know.” The trial court may well have concluded that Gonzalez was unable to make the weighty decision that would be required in a death penalty case and not that she was actually biased against or in favor of defendant or the state. Defendant alternatively suggests that the prosecutor’s question asking whether Gonzalez would need to know “why” defendant killed her daughter was improper for two reasons. First, defendant contends that the prosecutor’s question essentially asked Gonzalez to comment in advance how she would react to certain evidence. Defendant equates the “why” question here to the “improper” question posed in Montez where the prosecutor asked whether specific pieces of evidence—e.g., the victim being “hog-tied,” “sexually abused,” “strangled,” and “burned”—would make the prospective juror “angry.” 309 Or at 592. Second, defendant argues that the “why” question impermissibly asked Gonzalez to positively state whether she would vote for the death penalty. Defendant submits that the United States Supreme Court rejected that type of questioning in Adams, which held it improper to exclude jurors who “were unable positively to state whether or not their deliberations would in any way be affected” by the possibility of the death penalty. 448 US at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). The state responds that the prosecutor permissi- bly asked the “why” question because it tended to expose the risk that Gonzalez would not follow the court’s instructions if defendant’s motives were not explained at trial. In the state’s view, the “why” question at issue here is different from positing specific evidence and asking a juror to prejudge the case, which this court found improper in Montez. We do not think that the prosecutor’s question about a potential lack of evidence regarding defendant’s motive is improper. Unlike Montez, the question did not “ask[ ] the juror to comment in advance on how [she] would react to specific evidence.” Montez, 309 Or at 584. Rather, it generally referred to the potential lack of evidence relating to Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 471 defendant’s motive. The question was also unlike that posed in Adams because it did not tend to suggest that the possibility of the death penalty itself would affect Gonzalez’s deliberations. We therefore conclude that the trial court’s decision to excuse Gonzalez fell within the proper exercise of its discretion. Montez, 309 Or at 574-75.
After defendant questioned and passed prospective juror Brown, the prosecutor asked: “Q. Mr. Brown, before anybody here at counsel table had a chance to talk to you, it looks [from your questionnaire] like you actually strongly disagree with the death penalty. Even if the facts and laws justify it, you disagree. Before any lawyers talked to you. “A. I may disagree, but like I stated in my questionnaire, I believe in the rule of law. If I felt that strongly about it I would protest against it until the law changed. I really haven’t done that. So I do feel that there are extenuating circumstances which would call for the death penalty and be justified. “Q. You mentioned it. It must be the only course of action remaining. And of course that’s not the case. There are three [sentencing] options. “A. Yes. “     “Q. —would you look for the other options. “A. Well, I think that what I feel as a person in society is one of the things I’ve used to measure the decision. The next step is what happens after the court is done. What happens to the defendant? What happens to how she integrates into society and how she should live in society? What her intentions are that she has to society and those that would be affected. I think that the knowledge just isn’t in here. This is a continuing— “Q. Understood. “     “Q. There are two other [sentencing] options, though. “A. Yes. 472 State v. McAnulty “Q. Based on what you’re telling me it doesn’t look like to me as though you’d ever consider the death penalty, because you wouldn’t have to. “A. That is true. But this is an issue I would have to consider. But if the other 11 jurors are strongly in favor of [the death penalty], I would have to take a moment to understand why is it I might be coming from a different perspective. And then I would do my job to either understand what they’re saying and why they feel that way or to give it some more thought. But with that said, I have not heard the specifics of the case. And when I say it must be the only option and it must be the only option that is efficient. The only option that is expedient. “     “Q. What if one of the questions is    should the defendant receive the death penalty, not the cause-andeffect analysis, or what if you’re not given any of that information. You just have to decide based on what she did, whether she should die. Could you do it? “A. I certainly could. But I’m not going to give you a statement right now. “Q. It’s something that is certainly important for all of us up here to know before you be chosen as a juror whether or not you would be able to make that decision. “A. Yes. I understand. Like I said, if a person presents a clear and present threat to society, there’s no way that she could be rehabilitated, there’s—it’s so grievous a crime that no one—she can’t be suffered to live, I would say yes. “Q. Can you think of such a crime? “A. If I were to say I would never choose the death penalty as an option, I would have stated that. I’m leaving the chance open for that to be a possibility. I’m leaving the chance open for that decision to be made. But it is true that I’m strongly slanted against the death penalty for the reasons I have stated. “Q. Do you think the State would have a fairly uphill battle to overcome your personal bias? “A. I think that’s fair to say.” At that point, the court explained that neither cost nor efficiency were “a legal basis” for deciding whether to Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 473 impose the death penalty. The prosecution resumed with the following questions: “Q. With regard to that fourth question, whether or not the defendant should receive the death penalty, given the other options, would there ever be a reason you would decide the death penalty? “A. I can’t state for sure in this case to answer the specifics, but again, if the crime was so grievous that there was no—it seemed like the only solution was the death penalty, I can see that situation occurring. I’m not going to wallow in some type of fantasy to try and describe how that might occur. Again, I’m not so closed to the death penalty that I would say it’s not an option. “Q. And your strong bias, do you feel that that would at least impair—would that be a better word—your ability? Would that be more fair to say? “A. I would say that just as much as you are fighting— if that’s what I’m hearing, that you are fighting for the death penalty, then I would say just as much that I am fighting to have justice served that would probably not include the death penalty.” The prosecutor then moved to excuse Brown for cause. The defense attempted to rehabilitate Brown: “Q. And we’ve been back and forth and I don’t want to pick on you any longer, but can you sit on the jury, take an oath, and consider all three as possible sentences after you’ve heard the evidence, of course? “A. Well, I think what seems to be—there is no legal guidance on what the penalty should be. And I think a person must have some sort of framework with which to decide what is appropriate. And what I’m being clear to you is that my framework put the death penalty below the time in prison, or the other two [possible sentences], basically. That’s all I’m saying. “Q. But that doesn’t eliminate it from your considered decision? “A. Not at all. “Q. All right.” The trial court ultimately excused Brown for cause. 474 State v. McAnulty Defendant argues that Brown expressed an abil- ity and a willingness to follow the court’s instructions and consider all potential sentences, notwithstanding his disapproval of the death penalty. Defendant contends that Brown’s statements reflect the gravity with which jurors properly should treat such a decision. However, just before Brown was examined, the court had granted, over the state’s objection, defendant’s motion to exclude a juror who had said that she was “for [the] child” and that defendant would have a huge uphill battle getting her to impose a penalty other than death. After the court’s ruling, the state asked to speak with the court. The state pointed out its understanding that, “even if a juror is leaning toward one result or another, that doesn’t necessarily disqualify them,” as long as the juror agrees that the juror will consider all the options, and that that standard “cuts both ways.” The court responded by explaining why its practice was to retain some but not all jurors who agree that they will consider all of the sentencing options. The court said that, when jurors come into the evidentiary process with an expressed position on one option or another, the court was inclined to accept that as “a very accurate and sincere statement of how they look at the case,” and that, although there could be “wrestling” to get jurors to commit to being fair and impartial, “moving them semantically” did not necessarily give the court an accurate view of the jurors’ beliefs. The court stated, to be blunt, “the idea that somebody who expresses an opinion one way or the other can sort of be talked back to the middle I don’t find it particularly helpful unless it is clear to me that their first statement of how they feel or their initial statements or their explanation somehow did not correctly reflect how they feel” about imposing the death penalty. That is the case with Brown. He stated on the juror questionnaire that he filled out before coming to court that he “strongly disagreed” with the death penalty. Although on questioning Brown stated that he would consider sentencing defendant to death, he also said that he would “fight” to “have justice served that would probably not include the death penalty.” The trial court did not err in deciding that Brown’s opinions would substantially impair his ability to decide the case fairly and impartially. The trial court treated Brown’s Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 475 statements that he would consider imposing the death penalty in the same way it had treated the statements of the prior juror who stated that she would consider imposing a sentence other than death—that is, as statements that did not accurately reflect Brown’s true feelings. In the circumstance in which a juror expresses such a strong opinion for or against the death penalty as did Brown, the trial court acts within its discretion in declining to credit the juror’s commitment to impartiality.
During defense questioning, defense counsel asked prospective juror Thurston about comments that he made in his juror questionnaire. The following exchange occurred: “Q. I’m going to—you know, you did this questionnaire for us and we thank you for it. “A. Un-huh. “Q. It gives us a lot of things to talk about. But I’m going to jump through [to] the portion about the death penalty because you made some fairly strong comments there. “A. Yes. “Q. [Defendant] is on trial for her life— “A. I understand. “Q. —and she is entitled to have objective, fair jurors, as the State is— “A. Un-huh. “Q. —and they’re going to have to go in the jury room now that she’s pled guilty and not decide she’s guilty or not, just decide if she’s going to live or not. “A. Exactly. “Q. Can you go to that jury room and keep an open mind on those three possible [sentencing] verdicts, the life with a chance of parole after 30 [years], life with no chance of ever being paroled, or the death penalty? “A. No, I cannot. “Q. And I think I read a little bit, but can you tell me how you feel? 476 State v. McAnulty “A. Well, it goes beyond religion and spiritual things. Ever since I can remember, um, I hate to add fuel to the flames, but I grew up in Oakland, California, and unfortunately, some aspects of what you hear are true. Not to the degree that you hear—things are blown way out of proportion but, of course, I’ve had friends that died. I’ve lived in a neighborhood where you hear gunshots at night. Even at the youngest point, there was something inside me that said I do what I can for my country, but I can’t be a soldier because there’s something in me that cannot take a life.    I would lose a part of myself. And if any way, shape, or form possible that I would not have to do that, I would not. I have a hard time—I do understand the concept. I do understand the whole capital punishment situation. However, people who are on trial for murders have their reasons for murdering and as a general rule, no matter what the reasoning, the State or the federal government always says, ‘You cannot do this. You are not allowed to do this.’ But then again, we have our reasons and we say it’s okay to do it when it comes to capital punishment. That, to me, just doesn’t make sense.” As defense counsel began asking another question, the trial court interrupted, stating, “I think Mr. Thurston has articulated how he feels about these issues, and I’m not sure how much more inquiry is going to be of value in this process.” The court then excused Thurston sua sponte. Defendant did not object or request to ask any additional questions of Thurston. Although Thurston expressed a strong view against imposing the death penalty, defendant contends that the trial court erred in cutting off defense counsel’s inquiry and sua sponte excusing him. Defendant cites Morgan v. Illinois, 504 US 719, 736-39, 112 S Ct 2222, 119 L Ed 2d 492 (1992), in support of her position that she was entitled to rehabilitate Thurston. However, Morgan is inapposite. In Morgan, the trial court conducted voir dire and denied the defendant’s specific request to ask prospective jurors about their ability to give fair consideration to mitigation evidence. Here, defendant did not object or specifically request to ask additional questions. Defendant does not explain how the trial court’s decision to cut off defense counsel’s inquiry of Thurston prejudiced her when she did not object or request to ask further Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 477 questions of him. Further, nothing in the record suggests that defendant could have rehabilitated Thurston. To the contrary, Thurston stated that his inability to impose the death penalty “goes beyond religion and spiritual things” to his personal experience of having friends that died when he was young. He stated that, “[e]ven at the youngest point, there was something inside me that said I do what I can for my country, but I can’t be a soldier because there’s something in me that cannot take a life.    I would lose a part of myself. And if any way, shape, or form possible that I would not have to do that, I would not.” On this record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in excusing Thurston sua sponte when defendant did not object to the excusal or request to ask further questions. See also Nefstad, 309 Or at 536-38 (excusal affirmed when juror stated that he could not vote for the death penalty).