Opinion ID: 1280418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Demurrer to cross action

Text: The defendant Brown filed a cross action for damages against the defendant Satcher Motor Company based upon Satcher's alleged fraud and deceit in selling Brown the automobile represented to be new and upon which there were no liens when, in fact, the automobile was a used one upon which plaintiff held a mortgage. Satcher demurred to the cross action upon the ground that it attempted to set up against it a cause of action which did not arise from the same transaction set forth in the complaint. The lower court overruled the demurrer holding that the facts alleged in the cross action arose from the same transaction which formed the basis of plaintiff's cause of action. While the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not specifically provide for the filing of cross actions between co-defendants, proceedings brought under the Act are governed by the applicable established rules of pleading. 22 Am. Jur., Declaratory Judgments, Section 87. Under our practice, such cross actions may be filed where the cause of action stated therein arises from, or is germane to, the transaction set forth in plaintiff's complaint. A cross action may not introduce new matters which are outside the original controversy. Brown v. Quinn , 220 S.C. 426, 68 S.E. (2d) 326. The cross action in this case is in no way germane to the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint and a decision of the issues raised by it is not necessary to a complete determination of the action of plaintiff for declaratory relief. The controversy which formed the basis of plaintiff's cause of action related solely to the priority of the liens held by the parties over the automobile, whereas the cross action seeks damages against a codefendant based upon alleged fraud and deceit practiced in the subsequent sale of the vehicle. The determination of the right of the defendant Brown to recover damages arising from fraud in the sale of the automobile to him is totally disconnected from the issues relating to plaintiff's right to declaratory relief based upon the priority of its mortgage over the vehicle. The cross action was not properly pleadable in this action for declaratory judgment and the demurrer interposed thereto by the defendant Satcher Motor Company should have been sustained. The judgment of the lower court is accordingly affirmed in part and reversed in part in accordance with the foregoing views. MOSS, C.J., BUSSEY and BRAILSFORD, JJ., and LIONEL K. LEGGE, Acting Associate Justice, concur.