Opinion ID: 375509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Claims for Damages under the Fourteenth Amendment

Text: 13 Mark-Garner brought several of its claims directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. These claims alleging abridgements of due process and equal protection are premised on the assumption that there exists an implied cause of action for damages under the Fourteenth Amendment that is wholly independent of statutory authorization. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether such a cause of action exists. 15 It has held, however, that there is an implied cause of action for damages under the Fourth 16 and Fifth 17 Amendments. We have declared that such an action exists for suits brought under the First Amendment, 18 but have reserved the question whether such a cause of action exists under the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 Other courts of appeals have held explicitly that there is an implied cause of action for damages under a number of constitutional provisions. 20 14 There is no occasion to decide, in the present case, whether the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes a direct cause of action for damages, 21 however, because Mark-Garner has alleged causes of action under § 1983 that are premised on its constitutional claims. Indeed, § 1983 was designed to afford plaintiffs a cause of action for constitutional violations on the part of local governmental bodies and other state officials. 22 15 In Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3122, 57 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1978), two black citizens brought suit against the City of Pittsburgh as well as two of its police officers, alleging that the officers abused them on account of their race. The plaintiffs sought damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 and under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the claims against the city on the basis of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), in which the Supreme Court had held that municipalities were immune from suit under § 1983. 23 We affirmed the dismissal of the claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment and §§ 1983 and 1985, but reversed the dismissal of the claim based on § 1981. In view of our holding in this case that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action against the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, we concluded, a fourteenth amendment remedy should not be implied. . . . If plaintiffs prove the racially motivated deprivations of their rights which they allege, section 1981 will afford them the redress in federal court which they seek. Bivens teaches that the existence of an effective and substantial federal statutory remedy for the plaintiffs obviates the need to imply a constitutional remedy on (their) behalf. 24 16 The principle enunciated in Mahone applies to the present action. Section 1983 affords Mark-Garner remedies at law or equity against the named defendants for any constitutional violations that can be established. 25 It is now settled that cities and other municipal bodies, such as the Bensalem Zoning Hearing Board, are persons within the meaning of § 1983. 26 Therefore, it would be a redundant and wasteful use of judicial resources to permit the adjudication of both direct constitutional and § 1983 claims where the latter wholly subsume the former. 27