Opinion ID: 682433
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Petros' Claims

Text: 30 Peter Petros, individually, raises three challenges to his conviction, two of which concern the district court's denial of his motion under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4241(a) for a mental competency hearing; the last concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to prove Petros' participatory link to the RICO conspiracy.
31 First, Petros asserts the district court erred in denying his pre-trial motion for a psychiatric examination. That motion was made on March 20, 1991, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4241(a), which provides that [a]t any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the defendant, the defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4241(a). This is essentially a two-phase process, requiring the court to grant the motion for a hearing before it is obligated to actually hold the competency hearing. Shortly after Petros' motion, the district court held a hearing to inquire if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense exists. Id. Following the hearing, the court issued a written entry denying Petros' motion for a formal competency hearing, finding no reasonable cause to believe he was incompetent. Petros argues that decision was erroneous because the court failed to sufficiently consider his evidence of a history of mental incompetency. 32 Section 4241(a) prescribes the procedural formula to be used by a district court to decide if a defendant deserves a hearing to determine if he is competent to stand trial, the mental competency of a criminal defendant being a fundamental predicate to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 921, 924 (7th Cir.1991). The starting point in all this is the notion that a criminal defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial and bears the burden of proving otherwise. Chichakly v. United States, 926 F.2d 624, 633 (7th Cir.1991). Though the decision not to order a Sec. 4241(a) hearing is an exercise of the district court's discretion, reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion, United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 782 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 241, 126 L.Ed.2d 195 (1993), the failure to grant such a hearing in the face of sufficient evidence to establish reasonable cause to believe that a defendant is mentally incompetent is a violation of due process in and of itself, United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 905, 111 S.Ct. 272, 112 L.Ed.2d 227 (1990). The district court's factual findings regarding competency are disturbed only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Bennett, 908 F.2d 189, 195 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991, 111 S.Ct. 534, 112 L.Ed.2d 544 (1990). The exact quantum of evidence necessary to establish reasonable cause is difficult to describe with any certitude, though the reasonableness aspect of the inquiry clearly places the focus on the facts viewed objectively (what a reasonable person would think of the facts) rather than analyzing the subjective propriety of the district court's decision. Collins, 949 F.2d at 924; Chichakly, 926 F.2d at 633. 33 The sole evidence offered by Petros to sustain his claim of incompetency was his own testimony, in both the form of an affidavit and responses to the court's questioning during the hearing on the Sec. 4241(a) motion, and averments of his attorney in response to the court's questioning. While this evidence did indeed indicate a history of mental difficulties, including Petros' discharge from the military for mental illness in 1952, a period of institutionalization in 1975, and determinations by the Social Security Administration that he was disabled due to mental illness in both 1978 and again as recently as 1990, the district court properly focused its inquiry to Petros' mental state at the time of the hearing, yet still considered the evidentiary import of his history of mental illness. Garrett, 903 F.2d at 1117 ([P]rior psychiatric commitments are not necessarily dispositive of whether 'the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent....' ). Upon questioning by the court, Petros' counsel acknowledged his belief that Petros understood the nature of the criminal charges against him and that Petros had been helpful and more cooperative than the average criminal defendant in assisting in preparation for trial. 6 An averment such as this by a supposedly incompetent defendant's attorney at most wholly negates the requisite finding under Sec. 4241(a) that the defendant be unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense, id., and at least casts grave doubt on the defendant's incompetency. Who but the defendant's attorney knows best if the accused is able to assist in his own defense? 34 Perhaps unsatisfied with the statements of Petros' attorney and the affidavit offered by Petros, the district court decided to question Petros (after securing his attorney's permission) at the hearing. Under oath, Petros admitted he understood the nature of the charges and proceedings pending against him yet baldly and self-servingly asserted he did not know the difference between right and wrong. 7 This latter revelation is, however, quite irrelevant to the inquiry mandated by Sec. 4241(a), which focuses on whether the defendant is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4241(a). Even adding Petros' testimony to the hesitance expressed by his attorney regarding whether Petros truly understood the proceedings, it was not an abuse of the district court's discretion to conclude reasonable cause to question Petros' competency did not exist. Cumulatively, the evidence, including the testimony and statements offered by Petros and his attorney, as well as the observations made by the district court of Petros' demeanor when testifying, supports the court's decision that no reasonable cause existed to believe Petros did not understand the charges against him or was unable to assist in his defense.
35 The reason he lost his request for a hearing under Sec. 4241(a), argues Petros, is the incompetency of his attorney. Based on that belief, Petros asserts (for the first time on appeal) that his trial counsel so incompetently handled the Sec. 4241(a) motion as to deny him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because the district court has the opportunity to observe an attorney's conduct and serves as the best forum in which to develop a factual record relevant to an ineffective assistance claim, these claims are ordinarily best brought first in the district court, either as a motion for a new trial or in a collateral proceeding following conviction. United States v. Levine, 5 F.3d 1100, 1108 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Mojica, 984 F.2d 1426, 1452 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Castaneda v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2433, 124 L.Ed.2d 653 (1993). If a sufficient evidentiary record of the perceived incompetent conduct already exists, and the defendant is willing to rest his claim on that record rather than take the opportunity to present evidence to the trial court, the court of appeals need not defer to the lower court and refuse to entertain the ineffective assistance claim because the appellate court then stands in as good a position as the trial court to resolve the issue. See Mojica, 984 F.2d at 1452; United States v. Asubonteng, 895 F.2d 424, 428 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Rivers v. United States, 494 U.S. 1089, 110 S.Ct. 1830, 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990). So while it may seem the defendant confronts the dilemma of either raising the ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, and thereby relying solely on the trial record, or bringing the claim in the trial court with the concomitant possibly beneficial ability to present additional evidence supporting the ineffectiveness of the trial counsel, United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 417-18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. McDonnell v. United States, 500 U.S. 927, 111 S.Ct. 2040, 114 L.Ed.2d 125 (1991), many of this court's decisions have refused to even review, let alone reject, a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if first raised on direct appeal and the court of appeals perceives the trial record as being inadequate to decide the issue. E.g., United States v. Marshall, 985 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Mojica, 984 F.2d at 1452; United States v. D'Iguillont, 979 F.2d 612, 614-15 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1873, 123 L.Ed.2d 492 (1993). This is so despite the defendant's presumably voluntary decision to immediately charge forward with the claim on direct appeal. Given that Petros bears the burden of proving his trial counsel was ineffective, the absence of an adequate record from which to gauge the competence of the attorney could simply result in a denial of the argument for failure of the Defendant to carry his burden of proof. This, however, is not the procedure in this circuit and rightly ought not be--courts need not resolve every issue before them if either the timing or materials presented may result in an improvident decision. In this vein, Petros' ineffective assistance claim simply cannot be decided on the record as it currently stands. To eventually succeed on this argument, Petros must demonstrate both that his trial counsel's performance was seriously deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense and ultimately deprived him of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To satisfy the deficiency prong, Petros notes his attorney's failure to present witnesses, records or other evidence of Petros' past mental history and institutionalization at the Sec. 4241 hearing as proof of Petros' present diminished mental capacity to stand trial. Because the affidavit and testimony of Petros' counsel offered during the hearing in the district court clearly shows the attorney was aware of Petros' psychological past, but did not present evidence of this past, this case is slightly different than Balfour v. Haws, 892 F.2d 556 (7th Cir.1989) or United States v. Hubbard, 929 F.2d 307 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 206, 116 L.Ed.2d 165 (1991), cases in which a defense attorney wholly failed to pursue evident clues of possible defenses or mental defect. Instead the inquiry is whether the conduct of Petros' attorney was objectively reasonable, knowing what he knew about Petros' past, in deciding not to present additional evidence of Petros' mental health history. United States v. Booker, 981 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir.1992) ([T]he defendant must prove that his counsel's performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness.); United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 851 (7th Cir.1991) (same). But we only know what the attorney did not do (i.e. present that evidence), not why he did not do so--and the why is more important than the what in this circumstance. See United States v. Johnson-Wilder, 29 F.3d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir.1994) (choosing to raise ineffective assistance initially on appeal is nearly always the wrong one for an appellant because typically the trial record will be silent about the reasons for actions taken by trial counsel.); Mojica, 984 F.2d at 1452 (Because [defendant's] allegations, which primarily concern litigation strategy, depend upon evidence outside the record, we decline to rule on this issue.); D'Iguillont, 979 F.2d at 614-15 (refusing to resolve ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal when issue turned on reason for attorney's conduct and no evidence on that point existed in the record). 36 Even if we were to agree that Petros' attorney should have presented additional evidence (which we do not at this point), no one really knows what this evidence would have shown or proved. Petros merely asserts, in a conclusory fashion, that the evidence would have provided grounds for the district court to find reasonable cause to believe he was indeed incompetent to stand trial. Something more, in the form of a detailed explanation of the contents and value of the additional evidence, must be offered before a court can conclude the attorney's failure to offer the evidence was ineffective assistance. United States v. Hubbard, 929 F.2d 307, 310-11 (7th Cir.1991) (noting [t]he mere assertion of unspecified evidence obviously proves nothing.); United States v. Gramley, 915 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir.1990) (stating [T]his court has made clear that a petitioner alleging that counsel's ineffectiveness was centered on a supposed failure to investigate has the burden of providing ... 'a comprehensive showing as to what the investigation would have produced.' ). Perhaps the attorney made a tactical decision to forego presentation of the extra evidence; or maybe it simply involved too much effort--effort he did not want to expend to track down all the records, psychiatrists and medical experts. Because trial counsel's tactical decisions received great deference in assessing ineffective assistance claims, United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 760-61 (7th Cir.1993), which of these possibilities, if any, are true is critical to resolving the issue, yet are unknown absent some factual development in the trial court on this point. Thus, we decline to review this claim on the record before us on direct appeal. This declination does not preclude Petros from seeking collateral relief, but he should note that a more complete record will be necessary to examine this issue.
37 Lastly, Petros challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish his participatory link to the overall RICO conspiracy for which the Defendants were convicted under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d). Sufficiency of the evidence arguments are, to say the least, difficult to mount with any success. So long as the evidence offered at trial, viewed in a light most favorable to the Government, was sufficient to allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction is upheld. United States v. Santos, 20 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir.1994). To prove that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy, the Government must demonstrate a participatory link between the conspiracy and the defendant. United States v. Campbell, 985 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir.1993). Proof of the participatory link requires substantial evidence that the defendant both knew of the conspiracy and that he intended to join and associate himself with the conspiracy's criminal design and purpose. Id. at 344-45; United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1229 (7th Cir.1990). This requires proof the defendant did more than merely know the conspiracy existed, approved of the conspiracy, associated himself with the conspiracy or was present during some conspiratorial activities. Durrive, 902 F.2d at 1225. Keeping all this in mind, it becomes quite clear that ample evidence was presented to support Petros' RICO conspiracy conviction. Petros not only collected some $2500 a month from one poker machine vender (Reginald Kinkade) during 1984 to 1986, but attempted to collect street tax from other video machine vendors as well as operators of other gambling games. More importantly, at trial Kinkade testified that Petros identified himself as being affiliated with the Chicago Mob, an association Kinkade confirmed when Frank Zizzo, the local syndicate boss and a central figure in the conspiracy, identified Petros as his man. Petros also spoke with Kinkade about having the old man (Zizzo's nickname) approve the amount of Kinkade's payments. A surreptitiously taped conversation between Petros and another operator of video poker games, Tim Janowsky, contained many references by Petros to his boss, the old man. Evidence also indicated Petros, in 1986, informed Kinkade that Zizzo had died and that Snooky (Morgano) was now in charge of collections. Beyond the testimony of victims of the extortion, other members of the conspiracy confirmed Petros' participation. Leone, for example, testified that he met Petros through Morgano, and that Petros was, at the time of their introduction, collecting street tax for Zizzo. From this evidence of distinct relationships between Petros and other known members of the conspiracy, it was clearly possible for the trier of fact to conclude Petros not only knew of the conspiracy, but joined, associated, and participated in the conspiracy's goals and operations. Given that, the evidence is sufficient to establish Petros' participatory link to the conspiracy and thus enough to validate his conviction. 38