Opinion ID: 1952246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Francis As Plaintiff

Text: We also agree with the trial court that Francis lacked statutory authority, or any other basis for standing, to file a suit to dislodge the CAB order. As Francis herself has noted, a noncorporate department within a municipal corporation is not sui juris. See Braxton, 396 A.2d at 216. Not long ago we intimated in Nickles v. District of Columbia, 628 A.2d 113, 114 (D.C.1993)  and hereby confirm  that DPW is not sui juris. Francis, therefore, cannot sue on DPW's behalf unless DPW itself has statutory authority to sue. [9]
Francis begins, properly, with the Procurement Practices Act, D.C.Code §§ 1-1181.1 to -1192.6. She points specifically to § 1-1189.5(b), which provides in part: If the Director [of the Department of Administrative Services (DAS)] determines that an appeal should be taken, the Director, with the prior approval of the Corporation Counsel, may appeal the Board's decision to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.... This language would appear to reserve to DAS the exclusive right to seek judicial review of CAB decisions. Francis maintains, however, that our decision in Jones & Artis eliminated this exclusive arrangement by assigning appeals of bid protests to the Superior Court. Francis specifically argues, initially, that someone must have the right to appeal a bid protest to the Superior Court on behalf of the District; failure to permit that would contravene the pre- Jones & Artis meaning of § 1-1189.5(b) and give contractors an unfair advantage over the District. Cf. United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426, 430-32, 69 S.Ct. 1410, 1413-14, 93 L.Ed. 1451 (1949) (holding that United States as shipper does not have fewer rights than private commercial shipper and can seek judicial review of I.C.C. decision). [10] Francis then makes her fundamental point: while DAS may have the sole authority to appeal a CAB decision to the Court of Appeals, [t]he Procurement Act is silent about who can bring an action in the Superior Court. Because of this legislative silence, Francis finds it logical to look at the actual interests involved and concludes that she is the real party in interest entitled to bring such an action. While we agree that the District has authority to appeal a CAB bid protest decision, we see no reason to believe that the Procurement Practices Act leaves room for anyone other than DAS to do so. In the first place, because DPW is not sui juris, Francis cannot bring this suit on behalf of DPW without legislative authorization found somewhere. To hold, as Francis apparently would have us, that any governmental entity with an interest can file suit on behalf of the District, unless the Council has positively forbidden it to do so, would violate the fundamental requirements of standing to sue. More specifically, even if Francis, as DPW Director or contracting officer  embodying the District's interests  can be shown, by virtue of the CAB's decision in favor of RSI, to have suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147, 1160 (D.C.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), and can be said to fall within the zone of interests protected by the Procurement Practices Act, see GIA, 633 A.2d at 17  propositions that are dubious at best  she still cannot claim standing to sue if there is a clear legislative intent to withhold judicial review by placing that right in another. See id. (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)). Furthermore, our decision in Jones & Artis dealt strictly with choice of forum. Nothing in that opinion, and certainly nothing in the statute itself, suggests that the Council intended to give a District representative other than DAS the authority to file a bid protest if the specified forum turned out to be inappropriate. Even if DPW were sui juris, therefore, we would reject Francis's argument that, failing applicability of § 1-1189.5 pursuant to its exact terms (authorizing DAS to appeal the CAB's decision directly to this court), there is implied statutory room for another governmental department to seek judicial review of CAB orders in another, correct forum. The legislative history of the Procurement Practices Act makes clear, if its plain statutory words do not, that the Council granted DAS the exclusive right to file bid protests on behalf of the District, whatever the forum. This conclusion is best confirmed by examining Francis's alternative argument that, if she lacks standing to bring this case simply as a real party in interest, she is clothed with the statutory authority of the Mayor that trumps any exclusive right to sue that the Procurement Practices Act may confer on DAS. We turn to that contention.
At oral argument Francis presented for the first time a new idea. Noting that the statute says the DAS Director may appeal with the prior approval of the Corporation Counsel, Francis contended that the authority to sue rests, fundamentally, with the Mayor as Chief Executive of the District and operates through the Corporation Counsel as the District's chief law officer. According to Francis, it follows that, in permitting her to bring this suit as the contracting officer, the Mayor and the Corporation Counsel have properly delegated to Francis the authority to act as their agent to do so. We cannot agree; we conclude that the Procurement Practices Act supersedes any authority the Mayor otherwise might have to appeal a CAB bid protest decision. Under the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Home Rule Act), all executive power of the District is vested in the Mayor. See D.C.Code § 1-242; Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 441 A.2d 871, 878 (D.C. 1980) (hereinafter CCRC I ). The Corporation Counsel serves as the chief law officer and thus [has] charge and conduct of all law business of the said District, and all suits instituted by and against the government thereof. D.C.Code § 1-361; see Reorg.Ord. No. 50, Part II(A) and (D), June 26, 1953, as amended; In re T.L.J., 413 A.2d 154, 157 (D.C.1980). If these provisions stood alone, we might well agree with Francis's argument. We must ask, however, whether the Council's passage of the Procurement Practices Act limited the Mayor's and Corporation Counsel's power to seek judicial review of CAB decisions against the District. We have said before that, just as the executive power is vested in the Mayor, the legislative power of the District (where not reserved to Congress) is vested in the Council. See D.C.Code § 1-227; Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 441 A.2d 889, 902-04 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (hereinafter CCRC II ). The Council accordingly may enact legislation that restricts the actions of the Mayor. See CCRC II, 441 A.2d at 910. As elaborated below, we conclude that the Council deliberately chose to limit the Mayor's and the Corporation Counsel's authority in the procurement area and, thereby, conferred on DAS the exclusive authority to seek judicial review of CAB decisions against the District. As a general rule, we look first to the plain language of a statute to determine its meaning. See James Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 567 A.2d 43, 45 (D.C.1989). Here, the plain meaning of the statute clearly cuts against Francis's position. Section 1-1189.5(b) provides: the Director [of DAS], with the prior approval of the Corporation Counsel, ... may appeal the Board's decision.... This language makes clear that, while the Corporation Counsel has a role to play, that officer may not unilaterally bring an appeal. Furthermore, an examination of the act's legislative history confirms that DAS  and no other executive authority  is the agency the Council has authorized to initiate an appeal, whether to this court or to the Superior Court. From the beginning, the Council desired a centralized process to eliminate the inefficiencies and waste caused by the decentralized, competing, and inconsistent procurement procedures then in place. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, REPORT ON BILL 5-335, DISTRICT PROCUREMENT ACT OF 1984 1-2 (1984) (hereinafter 1984 COMMITTEE REPORT); COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, REPORT ON BILL 6-191, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PROCUREMENT PRACTICES ACT OF 1985, AMENDMENT IN NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE 1-2 (1985) (hereinafter 1985 COMMITTEE REPORT). [11] The legislative history also shows much discussion and negotiation regarding the respective roles of the Mayor and of DAS in the procurement process, including the authority to seek judicial review of CAB decisions. The initial version of the Procurement Act, Bill 5-335, introduced on December 1, 1983, sharply curtailed the role of the Mayor in procurement. See District of Columbia Procurement Practices Act of 1983, D.C. 5-335 (1983). It centralized all procurement power in the Director of the Department of General Services (later DAS) and in a proposed Chief Procurement Officer. See id. §§ 2-101, -102. Only the Chief Procurement Officer, with the assistance of Corporation Counsel, could appeal a CAB decision on behalf of the District. See id. § 10-304(b). The Council referred the bill to the Committee on Government Operations. 1984 COMMITTEE REPORT at 1. Comments by the Mayor and the Corporation Counsel's office caused the Committee on Government Operations to rethink this position. See id. at 3-4. The Committee introduced a new version of Bill 5-335 that recognized the Mayor as the overall authority for procurement, with the power to delegate authority to DAS. Id. at 2. Under the new version, only the Mayor with the prior approval of Corporation Counsel could seek judicial review of a CAB decision. Id. at 11; Committee Print of Bill 5-335 § 905(b). This new version, however, failed to win the Council's approval. The Council continued the matter until the next session, when Councilmember Spaulding reintroduced the proposed legislation as Bill 6-191. See 1985 COMMITTEE REPORT at 1. The new  and final  version of the Procurement Practices Act struck a balance between the power of the Mayor and the authority of DAS in procurement. Bill 6-191 recognizes the Mayor as being the Chief Executive but mandates the delegation of procurement authority to the [DAS]. Id. at 2. The bill gave the Mayor the important policymaking function of creating regulations but centralized operational decisions in DAS. See id. The Committee stressed that [o]ne of the major concerns addressed by this legislation is the separation of the policymaking and operational functions relating to procurement. Id. This, the Committee believed, would both elevate the entire procurement process in the eyes of the general public and ensure the professional integrity of those involved in the process by creating additional checks and balances. Id. In delineating who would exercise what authority, the Committee stated: The Mayor would determine matters of procurement policy and issue rules and regulations.... DAS would be responsible for carrying out all aspects of the purchase and delivery ... as well as determin[ing] that all purchases are made consistent with existing laws and regulations. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). The Committee further noted that DAS would settle disputes arising from the performance of contracts, id. at 4, and that the bill [p]rovides for the Director to seek judicial review of a decision of the Board, id. at 11. Seen in this context, § 1-1189.5(b) cannot mean, as Francis would have it, that the Mayor and the Corporation Counsel have overall authority to decide whether the District may appeal a CAB decision. Instead, statutory limitation of such appeal authority to DAS appears to be consistent with the Council's desire to create a system of checks and balances in the procurement process between the broad policy-making role of the Mayor and the operational role of DAS. The fact that the Council mistakenly authorized DAS to seek review of bid protests directly in this court, see Jones & Artis, does not detract from the clear indication that the Council desired DAS to initiate all such applications for review. The unavailability of this court as the initial appellate forum for one kind of review does not in any way suggest that some executive authority other than DAS is empowered to appeal a bid protest simply because the Council failed to realize a particular forum was unavailable to DAS. Accordingly, because only DAS has statutory authority to initiate appellate review of CAB procurement decisions on behalf of the District government, the Mayor  even with concurrence of the Corporation Counsel  cannot appoint Francis as agent to bring this action.
By the same logic, we reject the argument that Francis had authority to bring this suit in her capacity as contracting officer. The legislative history demonstrates the Council's clear desire to avoid any such possibility in favor of centralizing control in the Director of DAS. Indeed, Francis's statutory argument based on her status as contracting officer is even weaker than her contention based on her status as DPW Director or as agent of the Mayor, since D.C.Code § 1-1181.5(b)(2) expressly subjects contracting officers to the authority and review of the DAS Director. Not long ago, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the very kind of argument Francis makes here. In Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs, Department of Labor v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 115 S.Ct. 1278, 131 L.Ed.2d 160 (1995), the Director of the Office of Worker's Compensation Programs for the United States Department of Labor sought judicial review of a decision of the Benefits Review Board in a case decided under the Longshore & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1994). The Supreme Court did not permit the review; the Court held that it would be contrary both to established case law and to public policy to recognize that an agency's policy interest could give rise to standing in the absence of a specific statutory grant of authority. See Newport News, 514 U.S. at 132-134, 115 S.Ct. at 1286-87. To acknowledge the general adequacy of such an interest would put the federal courts into the regular business of deciding intrabranch and intraagency policy disputes  a role that would be most inappropriate. .... ... Every statute proposes, not only to achieve certain ends, but also to achieve them by particular means  and there is often a considerable legislative battle over what those means ought to be. The withholding of agency authority is as significant as the granting of it, and we have no right to play favorites between the two. Id. at 129-130, 136, 115 S.Ct. at 1284-85, 1288. We agree. It is clear to us, from the language of the Procurement Practices Act and its legislative history, that the Council meant to withhold the power to seek judicial review of CAB decisions from everyone but DAS.
Francis cites two provisions in the Solid Waste Management and Multi-Material Recycling Act, D.C. Law 7-226 (1989), codified at D.C.Code §§ 6-3401 to -3423 (1995 Repl.) (hereinafter Recycling Act). Under § 12 of the Recycling Act, D.C.Code § 6-3411(a), [t]he Director of the Department of Public Works shall enter into contracts or agreements to market recyclable materials. The same act also gives the Mayor authority to enter into contracts to establish the multi-material buy-back center mandated by § 6-3410. See id. §§ 6-3410(a), -3411(a). The Mayor delegated his authority regarding establishment of the buy-back facility to the Director of DPW. Mayor's Order 89-160, 36 D.C.Reg. 5690 (1989). Francis therefore argues that the contracting power in these sections provides her with authority to seek judicial review of CAB decisions relating to these contracts. Again, we reject Francis's statutory interpretation. She has cited no statutory language or legislative history that would indicate any desire by the Council to modify the system established by the Procurement Practices Act. To accept Francis's argument, we would have to conclude that whenever a statute bearing on procurement does not specify that the Procurement Practices Act in all respects applies, various involved District officials may litigate as they wish. Such a ruling would defeat the intended legislative purpose of a universal procurement system. Nor can the Mayor's delegation of authority over the buy-back facility clothe Francis with power to initiate this litigation. The Mayor cannot delegate power the Mayor does not have. Since nothing in the buy-back facility authorization indicates that the Mayor could circumvent the Procurement Practices Act, Francis cannot claim that the Mayor's delegation gives her the power to do so herself.