Opinion ID: 6984727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did UNUM violate Washington Statutes?

Text: Weyer sued UNUM under RCW 49.60.178 and 49.60.215. UNUM’s classification between types of disabilities does not violate either of these statutes. RCW 49.60.178 says that “[i]t is an unfair practice for any person ... in connection with an insurance transaction to cancel or fail or refuse to issue or renew insurance ... to any person because of ... mental ... disability.” By its terms, the statute applies only to a cancellation, a failure to issue or renew, or a refusal to issue or renew an insurance policy. Yet UNUM did none of these things. In fact, it issued Weyer a policy and paid her the full amount of benefits she was entitled to under that policy. RCW 49.60.215 is Washington’s analogue to Title III. It prohibits discrimination against mentally disabled individuals in public accommodations. 83 The Washington Supreme Court in Fell v. Spokane Transit Authority 84 stated four elements for a prima facie case under RCW 49.60.215: (1) they have a disability recognized under the statute; (2) the defendant’s business or establishment is a place of public accommodation; (3) they were discriminated against by receiving treatment that was not comparable to the level of designated services provided to individuals without disabilities by or at the place of public accommodation; and, (4) the disability was a substantial factor causing the discrimination. 85 Weyer fails to make out a pri-ma facie case under RCW 49.60.215. First, an administrator of an employer-provided disability insurance fringe benefit is not a “place of public accommodation” under RCW 49.60.215. Second, Fell explicitly requires plaintiffs to show differential treatment between disabled individuals and nondisabled individuals. Weyer alleges only that UNUM discriminated between types of disabilities. Third, UNUM did not treat Weyer any differently than anyone else. “[T]he test is comparable treatment,” 86 and UNUM treated everyone the same by offering the same policy to all individuals, whether disabled or not. “[T]he statutory mandate to provide access to places of public accommodation is not a mandate to provide services” 87 which are not otherwise available to the general public. In the absence of Washington authority to the contrary, we presume that Washington would construe its statutes consistently with seven Circuits and the Supreme Court. Because it is clear that Weyer fails to state a claim under the state statutes, we need not determine whether the state statutes would be ineffective because of ERISA preemption. 88 AFFIRMED.