Opinion ID: 1165637
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: As to Proceedings Relative to Second Judgment

Text: Psychiatric Report of Theo K. Miller, M.D., and Walter Rapaport, M.D., dated September 6, 1962: The Honorable Wakefield Taylor, Judge Superior Court Contra Costa County Martinez, California Dear Judge Taylor: Pursuant to your order the undersigned Theo K. Miller, M.D., Superintendent and Medical Director of the Napa State Hospital, and Walter Rapaport, M.D., Superintendent and Medical Director of the Agnews State Hospital, examined the above-named Ronald Kaye Henderson to determine his mental condition with special reference to his plea of Not Guilty and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity to a charge of violation of Penal Code, Sec. 187. Be it remembered that both examiners had seen Mr. Henderson and examined him on several occasions in October 1961. In addition, one of us, Dr. Rapaport, examined Mr. Henderson on December 24, 1961. Reports of these examinations were submitted to The Honorable Martin E. Rothenberg on the date of October 30, 1961 and the report of Dr. Rapaport under date of December 27, 1961.... [Defendant] went to Vacaville on January 23, 1962 and in April was transferred to San Quentin Prison. He states that he was not placed on a psychiatric ward as [ sic ] San Quentin. The defendant states that he went to Court prior to going to Vacaville and he states that Judge Donovan was the judge. At this time he states that he never knew the charges that he was facing. When asked about his statement at earlier examinations wherein he told the examiners what the charges were, the defendant replied, `If you know anything you can bring it up in court.' He states that when he went into Judge Donovan's court last year he had decided to fire his attorneys because he did not feel that they were giving him a good defense. He states that on January 24, the day after arriving in Vacaville, he put in a Notice of Appeal and a lawyer was appointed to represent him and the appeal was completed on the grounds that the court had accepted a plea of Guilty at a time when the defendant had no lawyer. He states that the matter of firing his lawyers and entering a plea of Guilty was his own idea and no one else had advised him. [Italics added.] He states the lawyer who wrote the appeal was Robert Brilliant but that now he has another lawyer who was appointed by the court in Martinez. He states that his case is set for September 18 and that his plea is Not Guilty and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. He gives the victim's name as Joyce Marie Lovett, whom he had met about a year and a half before the incident. He states that he is now in jail for killing someone but goes on to say that he didn't kill anybody, that he wouldn't even kill a fly. Asked whether he had beaten women in the past, he states, `That is in the past. I am talking about the present. There is no actual proof of anything.' The defendant states that he will answer any questions except those about the actual homicide. Asked if this means that he could answer if he wanted to or that he doesn't know the answers, the defendant replies that the examiners can form their own conclusion, and repeats that he will not answer question[s] or give any information about the homicide. He quotes the Penal Code and says, `You can't walk into court and plead guilty unless evidence is introduced to prove a crime was committed, and there was no such evidence introduced in my case. I entered a plea of guilty to get a new trial. I looked at books in the jail here and took a chance that the judge would refuse to accept my plea of guilty and appoint another attorney. ' (Italics added.) Proceeding with his scheme to procure a new trial it appears (from the official record of the proceedings in this action in the District Court of Appeal leading to the reversal of the first judgment, and in more detail than is related by the majority in respect thereto) that defendant under date of July 11, 1962, procured a stipulation as follows: IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties to the above-entitled action, through their respective counsel, that the judgment of conviction entered against the appellant on Jan. 22, 1962, by the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of Contra Costa, may be reversed by this Court and the matter remanded for retrial. The basis for this stipulation is that the appellant was erroneously allowed to enter a plea of guilty, while unrepresented by counsel, to a felony for which the maximum punishment was death. Dated: July 11, 1962 STANLEY MOSK, Attorney General of the State of California JOHN S. McINERNY Deputy Attorney General John S. McInerny Attorneys for Respondent Robert M. Brilliant ROBERT M. BRILLIANT Attorney for Petitioner Ronald Kaye Henderson RONALD KAYE HENDERSON Petitioner The stipulation was then followed up by letters dated July 17, 1962, from defendant's then attorney, Robert M. Brilliant, and one dated July 18, 1962, from the Attorney General which read respectively as follows: Consistent with our telephone conversation of even date herewith with John S. McInerny, deputy attorney general, and the Clerk in the above-entitled Court, hereiwith [ sic ] is my stipulation, to wit: That the remittitur issue forthwith. Pursuant to the stipulation presently on file with the Court and relating to the reversal of this case, the People of the State of California hereby consent that the remittitur in this case may issue immediately by this Court upon the Court's entering the judgment of reversal With such stipulations before it the District Court of Appeal on July 19, 1962, entered its order: Pursuant to a stipulation of the appellant and counsel for the respective parties, the judgment of conviction entered against the appellant on January 22, 1962, by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Contra Costa is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. It is ordered that the remittitur issue forthwith. Reading of the record at the second trial reveals that the evidence then taken was far more extensive and conclusive than that received at the first trial. The evidence now before us is overwhelming not only that defendant perpetrated the atrocities and killed his victim but also that he did so intentionally, designedly, intelligently, because he enjoyed doing it, and because he had learned from having failed to kill at least one woman (whom he had tortured to some extent as he tortured his victim here) that despite her promises not to tell on him if he would let her live, she did eventually tell. Indeed, it develops she could not well have concealed what he had done because of the condition in which he left her. More particularly as to the case at bench the evidence establishes that defendant weighed something over 200 pounds; his victim weighed 100 pounds. The cruelties he perpetrated on her before strangling her are too revolting to unnecessarily detail, but some quotations from the transcript must be incorporated. Indicative of the crafty legal acumen of this defendant is the fact that he testified that the atrocious mutilations of the deceased occurred after he had killed her by strangulation. Thus he would avoid a finding of murder in the first degree, which is required by statute (Pen. Code, § 189) where the proof shows that the killing was perpetrated by means of ... torture. Likewise this man said he could not recall when or how he received the long scratches on his face (and did not explain his black eye) although the evidence was unequivocal that he was cold sober shortly after receiving them and at the time he was arranging to get his car in order to dispose of the victim's body. He could not remember things that were difficult to explain in any such way as would absolve him from guilt but he testified that before killing his victim he did not hit or cut her or do any other violence to her body. He conveniently passed out or went to sleep and he woke or came out only after the violent acts had been committed. This man by his trick on the trial court  perhaps on the Attorney General  has secured one new trial and seems about to cheat justice again. He Got a lot of pain and it made him black out like, and when he came to, he had a can opener in his hand and ... he looked at her and he realized he strangled her and cut her up from the bottom part with the can opener to the belly button.... He said that he went into the bathroom and strangled her and then he.... He just cut her up.... That he woke up and he found the can opener in his hand. Is it not significant to even a reviewing court that he reiterates that he strangled her first and only then cut her up? Manifestly this testimony was significant to the jury and the trial judge. The record at the second trial reveals evidence pertinent to both guilt and penalty which was not produced at the first trial. It was not received at the first trial because defendant at that trial avoided it by pleading guilty. One new witness at the second trial had been picked up by defendant at the same bar at which about one month later he picked up the victim in the case at bench. The witness related defendant's following her from the bar, offering to give her a ride home, her acceptance, her developing apprehension and attempt to leave the car, his beating her, wounding her in the head, and forcing her to disrobe and engage in unnatural acts. Then He got some kind of thing ... and put it up in me ... he rammed it up in me in my privates ... and he also had his finger up my rectum.... Each of these things, it appears he also did to the victim he killed in the case at bench. The transcript proceeds ... he grabbed me by the hair ... and beat my head down against the seat and said ... `I think I'll kill you now because, after all I did to you and after what you did to me,' he said, `I still didn't come'.... He says `I'm going to bite you up all over your body and I'm going to cut you wide open because I always wanted to see what a woman looked like inside,' I said, `Please don't.... Don't kill me ...' He said, `It wouldn't do you any good if you get killed.' I said, `You'll die too,' and he said `I don't care, when I go into these moods, what happens to me.'... He ... bit me on my right leg and my privates and my right side and bit me up on my breasts and my arms. (Five color photographs graphically corroborating the witness's testimony were received in evidence.) Relevant indeed to the case at bench the witness continued: I said, `Just let me get out of this car. I don't care, any way, without any clothes, anything, just let me go. I won't turn you in or anything.... And he says, `No, I'm afraid to let you. I'm afraid you'll tell on me like the rest of the girls I have done.' However, although he kept her pants, bra, slip, purse, and a little jacket that went with the dress she had on, he did let her go. She ran to a house and started ringing the doorbell, was admitted, the police were called and she went to the San Jose County Hospital. About two weeks later she received a telephone call from defendant, and he said, Oh, yes. You turned me in, didn't you? Now I'm going to get you. I'll get you one way or the other. I'm going to kill you. She reported that call to the police. That incident meant to defendant that he would not be so indulgent as to let his next victim live to tell her story. This record shows he kept that resolution. After studying the record it is impossible for me to conclude that the defendant has been denied any element of a fair trial or due process, or that there has been a miscarriage of justice by the conviction and sentence of the appellant. In particular, although many instructions were necessarily given to the jury to cover the multiple aspects of the case, the charge (taken as a whole of course) is commendably comprehensive and free from error. The learned trial judge was especially careful in defining the degrees of murder and the necessity for proof of specific intent, reached by deliberation and premeditation, as a basis for first degree murder. Among other elements the judge emphasized that To constitute this kind and degree of homicide the killing must be accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent to take life. The intent to kill must be the result of deliberation and must have been formed upon a pre-existing reflection and not under a heat of passion or other condition such as precludes the idea of deliberation.... To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such choice, and, having in mind the consequences, decide to and commit the unlawful act causing death. I would affirm the judgment.