Opinion ID: 2148885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wellman's Restoration

Text: Murphy himself acknowledged to the trial court in his motion for leave to appeal that the court restored Wellman and discharged Murphy. He also admitted that, as a result, he had no standing to act on behalf of the estate in any respect including appeal of the June 3, 1991, final judgment order. However, the trial court granted Murphy leave to appeal on behalf of the estate. The appellate court held that Murphy had standing to appeal, reasoning: We first find that the Public Guardian had standing to appeal the denial of his petition to sever the joint tenancies. The Public Guardian had an interest in seeking that relief because the Public Guardian had been appointed plenary guardian of Wellman and because he believed that his ward was incapable of handling his own affairs. The discharge of the Public Guardian did not deprive the Public Guardian of the ability to appeal an adverse ruling. This reasoning was erroneous. Murphy correctly acknowledged that Wellman's restoration deprived him of standing to appeal. The Probate Act of 1975 does not provide for the automatic termination of a guardianship for a disabled ward as in the case of a guardianship for a minor ward who reaches the age of majority (see 755 ILCS 5/11-14.1 (West 1992)). Rather, the Act requires the trial court to hold a hearing on the petition of the ward, someone on the ward's behalf, or on the court's own motion, to revoke or modify the guardianship. 755 ILCS 5/11a-20, 11a-21 (West 1992). At the close of the hearing, the court may: (1) dismiss the petition; (2) terminate the adjudication of disability; (3) revoke the letters of guardianship of the estate or person, or both; (4) modify the duties of the guardian; and (5) make any other order which the court deems appropriate and in the interests of the ward. 755 ILCS 5/11a-21(c) (West 1992). In Hoff v. Meirink, 12 Ill.2d 108, 111, 145 N.E.2d 58 (1957), this court stated: While it is clear that a restoration to competency does not ipso facto terminate the office of the conservator, it by no means follows that the probate court can continue to exercise its supervisory power over the property of the ward after the ward has been restored to competency and until the conservator's office terminates. Indeed, serious constitutional questions would be presented by a statute that provided for the exercise of supervisory power after the ward's disability had been removed. We find no such provision in the Probate Act. The appellate court has correctly read Hoff as authority for the general proposition that a restored ward becomes reinvested with the rights he lost when adjudicated an incompetent. In re Estate of Hayden, 105 Ill. App.3d 60, 65, 60 Ill.Dec. 923, 433 N.E.2d 1161 (1982). Upon the restoration of a mentally disabled ward, the ward has the right to be put in possession of his or her property, and to ask the court to order the guardian to deliver to the ward all of the ward's money and property that the guardian has, or the money and property to which the ward is entitled. In re Estate of Berger, 166 Ill. App.3d 1045, 1055, 117 Ill.Dec. 339, 520 N.E.2d 690 (1987). Following the restoration of a ward, the now-competent former ward is capable of representing, and has the right to represent, his or her own interests. Thus, the guardian no longer has standing to represent in court the interests of the former ward. Hayden, 105 Ill.App.3d at 63-66, 60 Ill.Dec. 923, 433 N.E.2d 1161. Further, we agree with long-established authority that upon a ward's restoration, the guardian lacks standing to appeal therefrom. In re Guardianship of Love, 19 Ohio St.2d 111, 249 N.E.2d 794 (1969) (and cases cited therein); see, contra, Cobb v. South Carolina National Bank, 210 S.C. 533, 43 S.E.2d 465 (1947). Courts reason that the guardian lacks a legally sufficient interest in the ward's restoration to allow the guardian to contest it on appeal. The guardian `is simply a trustee and can have no interest in this regard adverse to the recovery of sanity by the ward.' Love, 19 Ohio St.2d at 114-15, 249 N.E.2d at 796, quoting Ensign v. Faxon, 224 Mass. 145, 150, 112 N.E. 948, 950 (1916). This reasoning is quite settled in Illinois. The appointment of a guardian creates the relation of trustee and beneficiary between the guardian and the ward. The estate becomes a trust fund for the ward's support. Lewis v. Hill, 387 Ill. 542, 545, 56 N.E.2d 619 (1944). The guardian only acts as the hand of the court and is at all times subject to the court's direction in the manner in which the guardian provides for the care and support of the disabled person. In re Estate of Nelson, 250 Ill.App.3d 282, 287, 190 Ill.Dec. 212, 621 N.E.2d 81 (1993). Also, guardianship proceedings are not, strictly speaking, adversarial. The trial court protects the disabled person as its ward, vigilantly guarding the ward's property and viewing the ward as a favored person in the eyes of the law. The court functions in a central role, which permits it to oversee and control all aspects of the management and protection of the disabled person's estate. The court controls the ward's person and estate, and directs the guardian's care, management, and investment of the estate. Berger, 166 Ill.App.3d at 1055, 117 Ill.Dec. 339, 520 N.E.2d 690. The sole issue facing the trial court in a restoration proceeding is the mental condition and the best interests of the ward. See Love, 19 Ohio St.2d at 114, 249 N.E.2d at 795. Thus, based on the foregoing principles, and contrary to the appellate court's reasoning, the trial court's restoration of Wellman cannot be considered to be such an adverse ruling to Murphy as to allow him to appeal therefrom. We note that Murphy characterizes the final judgment order as only partially restoring Wellman. Thus, according to Murphy, his relationship to Wellman should not have ended, providing him with standing to appeal. Murphy points to the final judgment order, in which the trial court found that John F. Wellman [was] a partially disabled person who lacks some but not all of the capacity as specified in [755 ILCS 5/11a-3 (West 1992)] and, therefore, is entitled to the appointment of a limited guardian of the person and estate. The court also found that Wellman lacked the capacity to perform the tasks necessary for the routine care and safety of his person or for the tasks incidental to the paying of bills, writing checks, making purchases and managing his estate at that level of performance. However, the trial court terminated the adjudication of mental disability. In addition to the above-quoted finding, the court also found that: the extent of Wellman's confusion or dementia varied due to his anemia and blood transfusions, and that drug therapy had helped with those conditions; Wellman had the mental ability to communicate with his physician, to understand his mental and physical conditions, and to make responsible decisions concerning his health care; and that Wellman had the mental ability to make and communicate responsible decisions concerning the control, investment, and management of his financial affairs and the disposition of his estate. The trial court also found that Wellman understood the nature and consequences of placing his accounts in joint tenancy with Young, had the requisite mental capacity to enter into the transactions, and was capable of controlling or revoking the agency relationship with Young. These findings show that the trial court found Wellman to be a partially disabled person, but not yet in need of a guardian over his estate. With help from others, i.e., Young, his agent, Wellman was able to direct and manage his affairs and estate. See In re Estate of Galvin, 112 Ill.App.3d 677, 681, 68 Ill.Dec. 370, 445 N.E.2d 1223 (1983), quoting In re Estate of Mackey, 85 Ill.App.3d 235, 238, 40 Ill.Dec. 525, 406 N.E.2d 226 (1980). Of course, the question of Wellman's mental disability was a uniquely factual question for the trial court, whose findings will not be disturbed on review unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Galvin, 112 Ill.App.3d at 681-82, 68 Ill.Dec. 370, 445 N.E.2d 1223. When the trial court restored Wellman on June 3, 1991, the reason for the State's interference with his affairs ceased. See In re Estate of Hire, 309 Ill.App. 566, 568, 33 N.E.2d 652 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 379 Ill. 201, 40 N.E.2d 63 (1942). The only function for Murphy to perform was to account for Wellman's estate and deliver it to Wellman. The existence or absence of Wellman's next of kin neither diminished nor enlarged Murphy's role as guardian. On July 3, 1991, a few days after Murphy filed his notice of appeal, he filed his account of Wellman's estate. The trial court approved the account, formally discharged Murphy as plenary guardian of Wellman's person and estate, and closed the estate. Contrary to the trial court's grant of leave to appeal, Murphy could not appeal on behalf of the estate. After July 3, 1991, Murphy's relationship to Wellman's money and property ceased to exist. In terms of our definition of standing, after Wellman was restored and Murphy was discharged, Murphy could no longer claim an injury in fact to a legally recognized interest. See Burgeson, 125 Ill.2d at 487, 126 Ill.Dec. 954, 532 N.E.2d 825.