Opinion ID: 1777815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: felony prosecutions are barred by double jeopardy

Text: Appellant contends that his pleas of guilt and resulting sentences entered in municipal court to the misdemeanor charges of driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, and driving without a license bar the subsequent prosecution in circuit court for the felony charges of fleeing, first-degree assault, and first-degree battery. Appellant argues that under the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), reckless driving contains the same elements as do aggravated assault and first-degree battery. Likewise, he claims that failure to yield encompasses the same elements as fleeing. The State intimates that we need not conduct a Blockburger analysis because of the jurisdictional exception to the double jeopardy bar. The jurisdictional exception was stated in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 449, 32 S.Ct. 250, 251, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), as follows: [T]he justice of the peace, although possessed of jurisdiction to try the accused for assault and battery, was without jurisdiction to try him for homicide; and, of course, the jeopardy incident to the trial before the justice did not extend to an offense beyond his jurisdiction. All that could be claimed for that jeopardy was that it protected the accused from being again prosecuted for the assault and battery, and therefore required that the latter be not treated as included, as a lesser offense, in the charge of homicide.... It follows that the plea of former jeopardy disclosed no obstacle to the prosecution for homicide. In support of its claim that the jurisdictional exception applies to eliminate any bar by Appellant's former jeopardy plea, the State cites Ark.Code Ann. § 5-1-113(1)(A) (Repl.1993), which states that a former prosecution is an affirmative defense to a subsequent prosecution for a different offense when the former prosecution results in a conviction and the subsequent prosecution is for any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted in the first prosecution. The State maintains that Appellant could not have been convicted of the felonies in municipal court because municipal courts lack jurisdiction of felonies; and therefore, the felony prosecutions in circuit court were not barred by the municipal court convictions. Because Appellant was charged in both municipal court and circuit court and pleaded guilty and was sentenced concerning the municipal-court charges, we agree that the facts of this case appear within the jurisdictional exception to the bar of double jeopardy. However, the jurisdictional exception does not apply when lesser-included offenses are involved. Diaz, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500. Therefore, we must conduct a Blockburger analysis to determine if these offenses are the same or included offenses such that they are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clauses. The Blockburger test is as follows: [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342, 31 S.Ct. 421, 422, 55 L.Ed. 489, and authorities cited. In that case this court quoted from and adopted the language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433: A single act may be an offense against two statutes, and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. Following are the elements of the crimes at issue here as provided in the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated (Repl.1993, Repl. 1994, and Supp.1995): XX-XX-XXX. Reckless driving. (a) Any person who drives any vehicle in such a manner as to indicate a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. (b)(1)(A) If physical injury to a person results, every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished upon a first conviction by imprisonment for a period of not less than thirty (30) days nor more than ninety (90) days or by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both such fine and imprisonment. 5-13-201. Battery in the first degree. (a) A person commits battery in the first degree if: (1) With the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person, he causes serious physical injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon; or (2) With the purpose of seriously and permanently disfiguring another person or of destroying, amputating, or permanently disabling a member or organ of his body, he causes such an injury to any person; or (3) He causes serious physical injury to another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.] 5-13-204. Aggravated assault. (a) A person commits aggravated assault if, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he purposely engages in conduct that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person. XX-XX-XXX. Operation of vehicles and streetcars on approach of authorized emergency vehicles. (a) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle, when the driver is giving audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or bell, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to the right-hand edge or curb of the highway clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police officer. 5-54-125. Fleeing. (a) If a person knows that his immediate arrest or detention is being attempted by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, it is the lawful duty of such person to refrain from fleeing, either on foot or by means of any vehicle or conveyance. (b) Fleeing is a separate offense and shall not be considered a lesser included offense or component offense with relation to other offenses which may occur simultaneously with the fleeing. The offense of reckless driving requires proof of the actual driving of a vehicle; the offenses of assault and battery do not. The offense of first-degree battery requires proof of actual physical injury to another person; the offense of reckless driving does not. The offense of aggravated assault [1] requires proof of creating danger of serious physical injury to another; the offense of reckless driving does not. Reckless driving requires proof of elements that first-degree battery and aggravated assault do not, and first-degree battery and aggravated assault require proof of elements that reckless driving does not. Therefore, we conclude that first-degree battery and aggravated assault are not lesser-included offenses of reckless driving and that they are not considered the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. The fleeing statute specifically provides that it is a separate offense and is not to be considered a component offense with other offenses occurring simultaneously. Section 5-54-125(b). The United States Supreme Court has stated that legislatures are free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments, but that courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). That Court has further stated that, Because the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the legislature, ..., the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are `multiple' is essentially one of legislative intent[.] Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2541, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984). Given the clear legislative intent expressed in section 5-54-125(b) that fleeing is to be considered a separate offense, we have no doubt in concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar Appellant's trial or punishment therefor. Therefore, we conclude that under the Blockburger rule and the Double Jeopardy Clauses the felony prosecutions and punishments for first-degree battery, aggravated and first-degree assault, and fleeing were not barred. In summary, we conclude that, with respect to all felonies, Appellant's jeopardy plea had no merit and that, consequently, Appellant cannot demonstrate any prejudice from having endured the trial in circuit court. Thus, although the trial court erred in proceeding with Appellant's trial without allowing for an interlocutory appeal, reversal is not required because Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial was for a jeopardy-barred offense. See Morris, 475 U.S. 237, 106 S.Ct. 1032. Finally, we note the State's argument that we should overrule Craig v. State, 314 Ark. 585, 863 S.W.2d 825 (1993). This argument is without merit because it overlooks the fact that Craig involved a subsequent conviction for a lesser-included offense and multiple punishment was therefore barred on that basis. Craig is not, as the State fears, precedent for defendants to intentionally plead guilty in municipal court with the purpose of creating a double jeopardy bar to a subsequent felony prosecution.