Opinion ID: 1748481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: law i. did the lower court err in denying the motion for a citation of contempt based on equitable estoppel and unclean hands?

Text: Anna contends that the lower court erred in finding that she was equitably estoppel for two reasons: (1) estoppel was not pled specifically as an affirmative defense and, (2) the elements of estoppel were not shown by John. In Sumrall v. Doggett, 511 So.2d 908, 910 (Miss. 1987), the Court held that estoppel was an affirmative defense which must be pled by the party asserting it and cited Miss.R.Civ.Proc. 8(c), which states In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... estoppel ... and other affirmative defenses. The case at bar went to trial on the motion setting up estoppel and we do not hold that John's failure to plead the defense bars it. The following argument by John's counsel, without question, should have placed Anna on notice that the question of estoppel was being injected into the hearing: the inference to be drawn from all of this is that she wasn't thinking about telling Colonel Brennan until she had to because I'm sure she felt like she was fixing to lose twelve hundred and something dollars a month and why not go on and ride it out and stonewall it as long as you can and collect it and get it in the bank and then have the question raised. The essential elements of equitable estoppel are: Conduct and acts, language or silence, amounting to a representation or concealment of material facts, with knowledge or imputed knowledge of such facts, with the intent that the representation or silence, or concealment be relied upon, with the other party's ignorance of the true facts, and reliance to his damage upon the representation or silence. Chapman v. Chapman, 473 So.2d 467, 470 (Miss. 1985) (quoting Crow v. Fotiades, 224 Miss. 422, 80 So.2d 478, 486 (1955)). We are of the opinion that the lower court easily could have found that Anna did not notify John about receiving the gifts as directed by the earlier decree, thereby concealing the gifts from his knowledge; that he could have found her intent was to prevent John from filing a modification petition based on the changed circumstances as contemplated in the decree; and that the lower court could have found that John did not know of the gifts despite his admissions that he knew Anna was living well.
Anna contends that the lower court was in error when it held that the unclean hands doctrine precluded a finding for Anna on the contempt issue. The Chancellor's order confirms that the denial of relief to Anna was based, primarily, on the maxim of equity that [h]e who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thigpen v. Kennedy, 238 So.2d 744, 746 (Miss. 1970). O'Neill v. O'Neill, 551 So.2d 228, 233 (Miss. 1989) holds that [t]he meaning of this maxim is to declare that `no person as a complaining party can have the aid of a court of equity when his conduct with respect to the transaction in question has been characterized by wilful inequity... .' (quoting V.A. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice, § 42 (2d ed. 1950). In Thigpen, supra, the Court approved the following description of the maxim in the words of Pomeroy: [W]henever a party, who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy. Vol. 1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., Section 397, page 738. Thigpen v. Kennedy, 238 So.2d 744, 746 (Miss. 1970) (quoting from Patterson v. Koernor, 220 Miss. 590, 594, 595, 71 So.2d 464, 466 (1954)). The maxim should be applied by the court sua sponte where it is shown to be applicable. Pearson v. Pearson, 458 So.2d 711, 713 (Miss. 1984); Cole v. Hood, 371 So.2d 861, 864 (Miss. 1979); Thigpen, supra, 238 So.2d at 746-747 (citing Griffith, § 42). The lower court found that Anna did not notify John of the gifts she had received from family members until May 29, 1990, after she received the letter from John's attorney. The record indicates that the lower court was compelled to make this finding from Anna's own testimony. We are of the opinion that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion and was not manifestly wrong in applying the maxim of unclean hands to Anna's claim for contempt against John because of his failure to perform the terms of the decree. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed on direct appeal.