Opinion ID: 1744485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: attention

Text: DISP If Folley should be able to bail out on the DWI charge  let him go thru bail process. However! When that is finished he is to be notified at that point he is being arrested for 1st degree sexual misconduct and is to be immediately re-booked on those charges and held.  Per 256. Per WSM Do not notify of charges, until bail is supplied. Notify 256 at decent time, if it happens. Defendant did not make bail. He was acquitted of the aggravated DWI charge. Before he could obtain freedom pursuant to the acquittal, he was formally charged with the sex crimes. When the defendant discovered the above note, he sought jail credit for the time he spent in jail awaiting trial on the aggravated DWI charge. Defendant argues that he would have been entitled to the credit if the prosecutor had formally charged him with the sex crime when he was arrested for aggravated DWI or if the prosecutor had placed a formal hold on him. He argued that it is unfair to allow the prosecutor to deprive him of the credit by placing a secret hold on him and then not filing formal charges until 2 months later when he was acquitted of the aggravated DWI charge. In the last several years, we have issued a number of decisions in different contexts clarifying when a defendant is entitled to jail credit. We need not discuss those cases in detail here. It is sufficient to say that a number of basic principles are reflected in those decisions, including that, in a case dealing with jail credit against concurrent Guidelines sentences where the State of Minnesota is a party to both charges, the trial court should ensure that the withholding of jail credit does not result in a de facto departure with respect to consecutive service. State v. Dulski, 363 N.W.2d 307 (Minn.1985). We have also held that a defendant who cannot post bail because of indigency should serve the same time that a person in identical circumstances who is able to post bail would serve, State v. Hott, 426 N.W.2d 423 (Minn.1988), and that the total amount of time a defendant is incarcerated should not turn on irrelevant concerns such as whether the defendant pleads guilty or insists on his right to trial. State v. Arden, 424 N.W.2d 293 (Minn.1988); Dulski, 363 N.W.2d 307. Additionally, the total amount of time a defendant is incarcerated should not turn on matters that are subject to manipulation by the prosecutor. Arden, 424 N.W.2d 293; Dulski, 363 N.W.2d 307. We, of course, do not know  nor do we imply  that the prosecutor was motivated by a desire to get around the credit cases. However, if credit is not allowed in this case, the effect will be the same as if the prosecutor acted in a deliberate attempt to manipulate unfairly the charging process to defendant's disadvantage. Further, the fact that defendant was indigent and, therefore, unable to post bail on the aggravated DWI charge is a factor affecting our decision. There may be certain inequities in the award of jail credit that we cannot correct. This is one case in which the inequity can be corrected. We believe that defendant should be given credit not from January 13, 1988, when he was arrested and formally charged with the sex crimes, but from November 4, 1987, when he was arrested for the aggravated DWI charge. Any uncertainty as to when the state's investigation of the sex crimes was completed and when the decision to charge petitioner was actually made must be resolved against the prosecutor since it was he who gave the secret instructions to the jailers and requested the placing of a secret hold on defendant. Since there is some indication in the record that the sex investigation was, in fact, completed by the time defendant was arrested for the aggravated DWI charge and that he was told a day or two later that he would be charged with the sex crimes, we conclude that using the November 4 date is appropriate. In summary, while we agree with the court of appeals that the evidence of defendant's guilt was sufficient to sustain the convictions, one of the convictions must be vacated by the trial court pursuant to section 609.04 and defendant must be given jail credit from November 4, 1987, when he was arrested for the aggravated DWI charge. Affirmed in part; remanded to trial court for further proceedings. KELLEY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.