Opinion ID: 1652295
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in its denial of the motion for j.n.o.v. or in the alternative a new trial?

Text: ¶ 21. Appellant makes the same allegations as he did in his argument concerning the peremptory instruction. Mainly, Watson contends that the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, a prima facie case of guilt as to Count I, Conspiracy to Sell Cocaine. It is the appellant's own position that the State's own witness, Franklin, testified that there was no agreement to sell cocaine. Moreover, Watson argues, [t]he jury cannot find the Defendant guilty of Count I, Conspiracy to Sell Cocaine, and not guilty as to Count II, Sale of Cocaine. ¶ 22. The complaint that the j.n.o.v. was wrongly denied is addressed under the analysis of the denial of peremptory instruction since review of denial of peremptory instruction and j.n.o.v. are essentially the same. See May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 780-81 (Miss.1984). The proof of each is that there was an agreement between Franklin and Watson, and that each was aware of the verbal agreement to sell cocaine as was illustrated by their conduct. ¶ 23. The standard of review of a post-trial motion is abuse of discretion. Flowers v. State, 601 So.2d 828, 833 (Miss. 1992) (citing Robinson v. State, 566 So.2d 1240, 1242 (Miss.1990)). As stated in Johnson v. State, 642 So.2d 924 (Miss.1994), [a] motion for new trial is discretionary with the trial judge and this Court will not order a new trial unless it is convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Johnson, 642 So.2d at 928 (citing McNeal v. State, 617 So.2d 999, 1009 (Miss. 1993); Burrell v. State, 613 So.2d 1186, 1191 (Miss.1993); Pierre v. State, 607 So. 2d 43, 54 (Miss.1992); Alexander v. State, 602 So.2d 1180, 1183 (Miss.1992); Parker v. State, 606 So.2d 1132, 1140 (Miss.1992)). ¶ 24. In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming evidence, just as when determining whether a peremptory instruction is proper, this Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the trial court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Johnson, 642 So.2d at 928 (citing Nicolaou v. State, 612 So.2d 1080, 1083 (Miss.1992); Parker, 606 So.2d at 1140; Alexander, 602 So.2d at 1184). Any factual disputes are properly resolved by the jury and do not mandate a new trial. Johnson, 642 So.2d at 928; (citing McNeal, 617 So.2d at 1009; Burrell, 613 So.2d at 1192). ¶ 25. Although the appellant argues that the jury cannot find the defendant guilty of Count I, Conspiracy to Sell Cocaine, and not guilty as to Count II, Sale of Cocaine, such an allegation lacks merit. This Court held in Davis v. State, 485 So.2d 1055, 1057-58 (Miss.1986), [c]onspiracy is a complete offense in itself, distinct from the commission of the crime contemplated by the conspiracy and does not become merged with that crime. ¶ 26. The circumstantial evidence in this case supports the verdict of guilty of conspiracy to sell cocaine. Factual disputes were properly resolved by the jury. This guilty verdict against Watson is not against the overwhelming weight of evidence, and no unconscionable injustice will result if this verdict remains undisturbed. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Watson's motion for a new trial. ¶ 27. This Court affirms the trial judge's denial of j.n.o.v. and Motion for a New Trial.