Opinion ID: 887841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Evidence Seized from the Kitchen Area

Text: ¶ 35 In its reply brief on appeal, the State notes that it would have gone to trial without seeking review in this Court of the District Court's orders had the District Court not suppressed the evidence seized from the table and the bed. That said, the State then proceeds with an argument concerning the suppression of the evidence seized from the kitchen area. Thus, we will evaluate whether the District Court erred in granting Lewis's motion to suppress with respect to this evidence. ¶ 36 The State argues that McCord's subsequent seizures and photographs were permissible because, like McCord's reentry to photograph the fuses before seizing them, they were a continuation of McCord's initial, lawful entry. According to the State, McCord was at the scene for only about two and [sic] half hours, and, consequently, the State maintains that McCord's investigation lasted a reasonable period of time. Therefore, the State argues that the District Court erred when it suppressed the evidence seized by McCord from the kitchen area. ¶ 37 In response, Lewis maintains that our decision in Bassett controls in this case. Again, we stated in Bassett that there were two separate reasons for entering the house, and there thus must be two entirely separate justifications for each entry. Bassett, ¶ 41. Lewis also contends that [i]f law enforcement is not allowed on the premises, it matters not what law enforcement is investigating. Essentially, Lewis argues that McCord's third and subsequent entries were not continuations of his first, lawful entry. Therefore, according to Lewis, the District Court properly suppressed the evidence obtained by McCord from the kitchen area. ¶ 38 We observe that at the time of McCord's third entry, the fire had been suppressed and the cause and location of the fire had been determined. Thus, McCord's search of the kitchen area could only have been a search to gather evidence of criminal activity. Indeed, the purpose of McCord's third and subsequent entries into the structure was, according to his Incident Narrative, to look for further evidence. In this regard, we also note that before McCord reentered the structure for the third time, he notified Sheriff Killham that Lewis's residence was a possible crime scene. As a matter of fact, McCord testified that he collected the wine bottle [from the kitchen area] for the fingerprints on it. Therefore, unless McCord's third and subsequent warrantless entries were continuations of his earlier lawful entries, or unless exigent circumstances existed to justify these entries, the entries and corresponding searches required a warrant. See Bassett, ¶ 41. ¶ 39 With respect to continuation, we note that McCord's second entry was a continuation of his initial entry for the purpose of documenting the incriminating nature of the evidence observed in plain view on the table and the bed, seizing that evidence, and placing it in his patrol car. The same, however, cannot be said of McCord's third and subsequent entries. As McCord stated in his Incident Narrative, the purpose of his third and subsequent visits was to look for further evidencei.e., evidence of which he was not yet aware. By this point, McCord had already determined that Lewis's residence was a possible crime scene. Therefore, McCord's third entry was clearly detached from the initial exigency and warrantless entry, Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 1951, and constituted a separate entry, not a continuation of his initial and second entries. ¶ 40 A separate entry to search for and gather evidence pursuant to a criminal investigation requires a separate justification, such as a warrant, consent, or an exigency. See Bassett, ¶ 41. The State claims that an exigency existed herenamely, that fire suppression efforts were ongoing. Even if this assertion is factually accurate, however, it is entirely inapposite because McCord was not participating in efforts to suppress the fire. In point of fact, McCord noted in his Incident Narrative that while his second foray into the structure was to preserve and collect evidence that might have been damaged by efforts to suppress the fire, the purpose of his third and subsequent visits was to look for further evidence. Furthermore, we note that while a concern for the destruction of evidence is an exigent circumstance that provides an exception to the warrant requirement, McCord had already retrieved the evidence that he was concerned might be destroyed. Therefore, McCord's search of the kitchen area and his subsequent seizure of the evidence from the kitchen area were not justified by an exigent circumstance. ¶ 41 The Dissent contends that McCord's third and subsequent warrantless entries were due to an exigencynamely, to prevent further evidence from being destroyed or displaced by firefighters. This contention, however, is not supported by the record. After McCord photographed the evidence on the table and the bed during his second entry, he exited the apartment and deposited this evidence in his car. He did not then reenter the structure to prevent evidence from being destroyed or displaced. Rather, approximately seventeen minutes later, a crew from the Lewistown Rural Fire Department arrived. The fire crew entered Lewis's residence and removed some ceiling tiles in the kitchen area to ascertain whether the fire had spread into the ceiling. At some point thereafter, McCord re-entered the structureas he candidly admittedto look for further evidence. The totality of these record-based facts simply does not support the view that McCord's third and subsequent entries were designed to prevent further evidence from being destroyed or displaced by firefighters. Quite the contrary, it establishes that no such exigency existed. McCord waited well over seventeen minutes, and until after the firefighters had directed their efforts to the kitchen area, to look for evidence in that area. Moreover, as noted above, the fire had been suppressed and the cause and location of the fire had been determined by the time of McCord's third entry. Thus, McCord's search of the kitchen area was not justified by an exigency. ¶ 42 The Dissent also argues that McCord's third and subsequent entries were justified because they were all part of his brief arson investigation. As just noted, however, the cause of the firethe fuse on the tableand the location of the firebehind the wood stove and a nearby vacuum cleanerhad already been ascertained and documented. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest that by the time of his third entry, circumstances precluded McCord from applying for a search warrant, and we reject the Dissent's suggestion that warrantless entries into burned structures are per se lawful if the officer is merely trying to ascertain the cause of the fire. It is well-settled that a person retains a privacy interest in his home even when it has been damaged by fire. Bassett, ¶ 26. ¶ 43 We agree with Lewis and the District Court that McCord's searches beginning with the third entry were unlawful. We therefore affirm the District Court's suppression of evidence with respect to the matchbooks, wine bottle, and cigarette lighter seized in the kitchen area upon McCord's third and subsequent visits to the structure. ¶ 44 Before concluding, it is necessary to address the State's contention concerning abandonment. In its response to Lewis's motion to suppress, the State argued that Lewis had abandoned the property and cannot now claim that his constitutional rights were violated. However, the State does not raise this as a separate issue on appeal. The State merely addresses the issue of abandonment in one sentence, as follows: Because McCord's entry was lawful, the seizure of the items did not implicate a privacy interest. Rather, the seizure implicated only Lewis's right to dominion over personal property of negligible value (cigarettes, matchbooks, toilet paper) which the owner had ostensibly abandoned  (emphasis added). This is wholly insufficient to raise an issue on appeal. `Under Rule 23, M.R.App.P., it is not this Court's obligation to conduct legal research on appellant's behalf, to guess as to his precise position, or to develop legal analysis that may lend support to his position.' State v. St. Germain, 2007 MT 28, ¶ 41 n. 1, 336 Mont. 17, ¶ 41 n. 1, 153 P.3d 591, ¶ 41 n. 1 (quoting In re Estate of Bayers, 1999 MT 154, ¶ 19, 295 Mont. 89, ¶ 19, 983 P.2d 339, ¶ 19). Therefore, we will not address the question of abandonment.