Opinion ID: 1841753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: cases tried under alabama's new death penalty statute

Text: Having reviewed the operation of Alabama's death penalty law prior to Furman, we deem it appropriate to consider the cases tried under the post-Furman law to compare the cases of defendants who received the death penalty and to attempt to ascertain whether the juries acted arbitrarily, capriciously or freakishly. [5] Pre-Furman and post-Furman statistics do not vary substantially if compared as to type of offenses, race of defendant and race of victim. Pre-Furman and post-Furman statistics do vary in one respect. There is an increase in the total number of persons sentenced to death when compared with the number of death row inmates at the time of Furman, but this increase in death sentences could very well be due to the alarming increase in crime in recent years. As Justice Powell noted in his dissenting opinion to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 414, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2816, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist: It is true that the sentencing rate might be expected to rise, rather than remain constant, when the number of violent crimes increases as it has in this country. 408 U.S. at 441, 92 S.Ct. at 2830. We have examined the operation of Alabama's Death Penalty Act conscious that many of the defendants who have been sentenced under the Act may request new trials based upon the result we reach in this case; therefore, further comment and comparison at this stage would not be appropriate. Some of the defendants, under the procedure we adopt in this opinion, may not receive the ultimate penalty. In any event, we find no indication that the Act itself has allowed racial discrimination to infect the sentences given under it. Defendants tried and convicted under the Act and sentenced to death include blacks and whites, one woman and one juvenile (who was tried as an adult). A total of 61 victims suffered death in these cases. Those victims include blacks and whites, rich and poor, young and old, male and female. The foregoing analysis is for the purpose of illustration only. Many of the death cases may have to be retried and we should not be understood here as holding that either the conviction or death penalty was appropriate in each of the cases. The correctness of the imposition of the sentence of death in any case already tried and in any case which may be tried or retried will necessarily have to be resolved in each individual case by using the guidelines set forth in this opinion. With the foregoing historical perspective, and using the taillights of the most recent decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States on this issue, we now proceed to a discussion of the specific issue presented in this case, viz.: whether this Court can, or should, sever those portions of the statute which the Supreme Court of the United States has determined to be unconstitutional. The Attorney General argues that the preclusion clause in § 13-11-2(a) (... and which offenses so charged with said aggravation shall not include any lesser offenses...) should be severed, because the only reason the legislature put the preclusion clause in this statute was the erroneous belief that the constitution required it.... The Attorney General also argues that the requirement that the jury shall fix the punishment at death which is contained in § 13-11-2(a), should be severed because [w]ithout the preclusion clause, the verdict form is unconstitutional. We agree with the Attorney General that the preclusion clause can be severed, but we cannot agree that the legislative determination to make the jury a part of the sentencing scheme can be severed. We begin our analysis of the Alabama statute in view of the mandate in this case, not with complete confidence because some of the decisions in these death penalty cases are quite confusing. We have read cases decided before Furman, and we have read very closely the post- Furman cases. We perceive that the following principles are applicable in death cases: (1) Capital punishment is not unconstitutional per se. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); it is a legislative choice, not a judicial one. [6] (2) A mandatory sentence of death upon conviction of a particular offense is generally unconstitutional. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a mandatory sentence is appropriate in certain very limited circumstances. Woodson, 428 U.S. at p. 287, n. 7, 96 S.Ct. at p. 2983, n. 7. (3) A discretionary death statute, in which the jury is given complete and unreviewable discretion, unguided by any standards as to whether the death penalty is appropriate, is unconstitutional. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); contra, McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). (4) A mandatory death penalty statute which requires a judge to give a lesser included offense instruction whether or not it was justified by the evidence is unconstitutional, when the procedure would empower the jury to exercise discretionary sentencing authority. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976), (Opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.). (5) A statute which precludes a judge from instructing a jury on lesser included offenses, even though a lesser included offense is supported by the evidence, is unconstitutional. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). (6) Where guilt is determined separately from punishment, there is little risk that the jury will use its power to decide guilt to make a de facto punishment decision. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). (7) Appellate review of death cases is required to make sure that the death penalty will not be wantonly or freakishly imposed. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). (8) There are some offenses, like rape, for which the sentence of death is disproportionate to the crime, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977). With these principles of law relative to the imposition of capital punishment clearly in mind, we how address Alabama's Death Penalty Act to determine whether it can be salvaged by severing the preclusion clause and adopting a procedure which would preserve the legislative requirement that the jury fix the punishment at death if it finds the accused guilty of a capital offense. We conclude that the Alabama Death Penalty Act can be upheld.