Opinion ID: 1038522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of Plea Stipulation

Text: The determination regarding whether a statement was made in the course of plea negotiations is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo. United States v. Young, 223 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2000). A determination as to whether a waiver of rights is valid is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id. at 909. Whether the district court erred in admitting the plea stipulation of facts at trial is a layered inquiry. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) states, [t]he admissibility or inadmissibility of a plea, a plea discussion, and any related statement is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 410. Rule 410 provides that the following -3- are inadmissible: a guilty plea that was later withdrawn, and a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority that did not result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea. Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(1), (a)(4). There is no dispute by the parties that the factual stipulation contained in the plea agreement offered at trial was made during the course of plea discussions. To allow into evidence this plea stipulation in the face of its general inadmissibility, then, the district court had to find that Washburn waived his rights under Rule 410. It is a determination regarding such waiver that drives our analysis on appeal. The Supreme Court has recognized that the protections offered by Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) are presumptively waivable. Young, 223 F.3d at 909. [A]bsent some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995). Washburn claims the prosecution never advised him that the government would attempt to use the stipulation of facts at trial if he failed to enter or withdraw his plea. Additionally, he posits that this court must determine that even if it existed, the waiver language was hidden in the small print thus rendering it impossible for Washburn to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. He claims the plea memorandum contained no clear warning, and contained conflicting statements and vague references. At bottom, though, Washburn's claims that he involuntarily and unknowingly waived his rights under Rule 410 are unpersuasive on appeal. The plea agreement initialed and signed by Washburn contained language regarding Washburn's waiver of rights. Language relied upon by the district court includes the following: -4- Paragraph 1: Defendant will plead guilty to Counts 13 and 46 of the [indictment.] Paragraph 8: By initialing each of the following paragraphs, defendant stipulates to the following facts. Defendant agrees these facts are true and may be used to establish a factual basis for defendant's guilty plea and sentence. Defendant has been advised by defendant's attorney of defendant's rights under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) and Federal Rule of Evidence 410. Defendant waives these rights and agrees this stipulation may be used against defendant at any time in any proceeding should defendant violate or refuse to follow through on this plea agreement, regardless of whether the plea agreement has been accepted by the Court. Defendant agrees that the stipulation below is a summary of the facts against defendant and does not constitute all of the facts the government would be able to prove at trial and may be able to prove to the Court in accordance with this agreement. Paragraph 30: If defendant violates any term or condition of this plea agreement, in any respect, the entire agreement will be deemed to have been breached and may be rendered null and void by the United States. Defendant understands, however, the government may elect to proceed with the guilty plea and sentencing. These decisions shall be in the sole discretion of the United States. If defendant does breach this agreement, defendant faces the following consequences: (1) all testimony and other information defendant has provided at any time (including any stipulations in this agreement) to attorneys, employees, or law enforcement officers of the government, to the Court, or to the federal grand jury may and will be used against defendant in any prosecution or proceeding; (2) the United States will be entitled to reinstate previously dismissed charges and/or pursue additional charges against defendant and to use any information obtained directly or indirectly from defendant in those additional prosecutions; and (3) the United States will be released from any obligations, agreements, or restrictions imposed upon it under this plea agreement. (boldface in original; italicization added). -5- Washburn violated paragraph 1 of the agreement, which stated that Washburn would plead guilty to two counts, and he otherwise refused to follow through with the plea agreement in violation of paragraph 8. Accordingly, the stipulation of facts contained in the plea agreement was fair game for use at trial per the agreement. In opposition to this conclusion, Washburn places great emphasis on the fact that the agreement was never approved and accepted by the court, and questions whether this plea agreement was binding the moment he added his initials and signature. However, Washburn offers no applicable legal precedent directly supporting the validity of his defensive assertions. He states more than once that no plea was ever entered by [him]. However, this is not the crucial issue. The court's discussion in Young belies the importance of Washburn's argument that no plea was ever entered by [him], or that this plea language is too ambiguous. The plea agreement was binding at the time Washburn added his initials and signature. United States v. Miller, 295 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2002) ('A plea agreement is contractual in nature and generally governed by ordinary contract principles.' (quoting United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996)). As to whether Washburn waived his Rule 410 rights knowingly and voluntarily, '[w]e look to the circumstances surrounding the signing and entry of the plea agreement to determine whether the defendant willfully agreed to its terms.' Young, 223 F.3d at 909 (quoting United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 1998)). In Young, the defendant entered into a plea agreement and provided a signed affidavit along with it, in part, so that he would be allowed to remain free on bond pending the plea and sentencing hearing. Id. at 907. The day before the change of plea hearing, arrest warrants were issued for Young and his co-defendants for absconding from pretrial supervision. Id. The government sought to introduce the affidavit signed by Young in its case against him, which the district court denied. Id. at 908. This court determined that the affidavits utilized by the government were made in the course of plea negotiations and were thus subject to the edicts of Rule 410 and Rule 11(e)(6). Id. The substantive issue on appeal in Young, as here, was -6- whether Young knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under the plea-statement rule–whether the signed plea agreement could be used against him at trial. Id. at 909. Relying upon similarly worded plea agreement language as that contained in Washburn's plea, this court held that Young's waiver of his plea-statement rights was knowing and voluntary, as there was no evidence that Young entered into the agreement involuntarily or unknowingly. Id. at 911. Like Young, there is no evidence in the record that Washburn entered into this agreement involuntarily or unknowingly. Washburn does not dispute that he signed the plea agreement. He does not contend that he was coerced to enter into the plea or that it was the product of duress. Washburn argues instead that the judge was required to conduct an inquiry into the voluntariness of Washburn's waiver prior to allowing the factual stipulation into evidence. While the court could have conducted such an inquiry, it was not required to do so on these facts. Indeed, Washburn's arguments to the district court in resistance to the government's motion regarding the admissibility of the factual stipulation in the plea did not mention, or challenge, Washburn's waiver at all. He never questioned the voluntary and knowing nature of this waiver before the district court.4 Regardless, notwithstanding the fact that Washburn failed to raise the issue, a dialogue between the district court and the defendant regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea agreement that usually occurs at a change of plea hearing is not a prerequisite for a valid waiver of a particular right. Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 871. The language of the plea agreement constitutes a valid waiver of Washburn's plea-statement rights, as it clearly states that Washburn understood the provisions therein, among which was the acknowledgment that a consequence of failing to follow through with the plea could be that this stipulation may be used against defendant at 4 In fact, at trial, Washburn painstakenly made clear that just so the record is clear, defendant has never maintained the statement, the factual stipulation, was not entered knowing [sic] and voluntary. Trial Tr. vol. III, 411. -7- any time in any proceeding. [I]mplicit in advice regarding the consequences of foregoing a right is the knowledge that a right exists. Young, 223 F.3d at 911. We do not believe that the failure to include a rote recitation of the rules in the plea agreement constitutes an 'affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily.' Id. (quoting Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210). Despite Washburn's arguments to the contrary, the government said what it meant in the plea itself and nothing further was required. When Washburn initialed the paragraphs of the factual stipulation contained in the plea memorandum and signed the document, he was aware of the benefits he was securing, the rights he was foregoing, and the consequences of breaching the agreement. Id. Washburn does not highlight any evidence, persuasive or otherwise, that he entered into the agreement involuntarily or unknowingly. We conclude that Washburn's plea-statement waiver was knowing and voluntary and thus the district court did not err in allowing the government to successfully offer the plea agreement factual stipulation as evidence against Washburn.
Washburn alternatively argues that even if this court finds that he made a knowing waiver of his Rule 410 rights, the factual stipulation should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as unduly prejudicial. Rule 403 provides: The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. The district court admitted the evidence, ruling that Washburn failed to demonstrate that evidence of the stipulations as to the two counts would cause the jury -8- to find Washburn's guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged. The court further held that Washburn failed to demonstrate that the probative value of the plea agreement factual stipulation was substantially outweighed by the danger that the government would present needlessly cumulative evidence. In fact, ruled the district court, admission of the stipulations had the opposite effect of streamlining the government's presentation of evidence. On appeal Washburn falls well short of the threshold required for us to reverse the district court's evidentiary ruling. Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC, No. 12-2170, 2013 WL 3868144, at  (8th Cir. July 29, 2013) (Our review of the district court's evidentiary rulings is highly deferential, 'particularly . . . with respect to [Federal Rule of Evidence] 403' because the district court is better positioned than we are to weigh the probative value of a piece of evidence, in context, against its prejudicial effect. (quoting Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) (alterations in original)). Washburn argues that the stipulation was admitted without limitation and laments that the court never gave a limiting instruction. However, Washburn fails to articulate how, in fact, the stipulation was unfairly prejudicial and, possibly more critically, never requested any limiting instruction whatsoever, nor objected to the proposed instructions as relevant to this claim. This claim is thus forfeited, as Washburn makes no showing of plain error. United States v. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 2013) ([W]hen a defendant does not object to a jury instruction before the jury retires to deliberate, the defendant may later attack that instruction only for plain error.). Indeed, the jury acquitted Washburn of two counts despite Washburn's stipulations admitting facts relevant to the charges. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's admission of the factual stipulation under Rule 403. -9-