Opinion ID: 852615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Blakely Challenge to Sentencing

Text: Duncan was sentenced under the pre-2005 version of the sentencing statute. The trial court found Duncan's criminal history, the victim's young age, and the fact that Duncan was in a relationship of custodial trust with the victim to be aggravating factors. Conversely, the trial court found no mitigating circumstances. Duncan contends that her sentence was unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), because the court enhanced her sentence without the jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was under age twelve and that the relationship between Duncan and Noah was one of custodial trust. Duncan concedes the conviction for dealing under the statute as charged necessarily implied a jury finding that Noah was under the age of eighteen, but Duncan argues that this did not constitute a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Noah was under the age of twelve. Similarly, although the jury found Duncan guilty of Neglect of a Dependent, which required proof that Duncan assumed the care of a dependent under Indiana Code section 35-46-1-4, Duncan argues there was no finding that she was in a position of trust. Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind.2005), held that Blakely applied to the sentencing scheme in place at the time of Duncan's sentencing. The Court of Appeals held that Duncan had waived any Blakely claim because she did not raise a Blakely objection at her sentencing hearing. Kincaid v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind.2005), explained that [w]hile it is, of course, true that a claim is not normally available for review on appeal unless first made at trial, this Court and the Court of Appeals review many claims of sentencing error without insisting that the claim first be presented to the trial judge. We held that appellants filing a direct appeal after Smylie must raise a particular sentencing claim in his or her initial brief on direct appeal in order to receive review on the merits. Id. Duncan has met this requirement and has therefore preserved her claim. Accordingly, her Blakely claim must be addressed. Notwithstanding its finding of waiver, the Court of Appeals went on to conclude that among the aggravating circumstances considered by the trial court was Duncan's criminal history, which is explicitly excluded from the Blakely rule. Duncan, slip op. at 17. The court continued that because [Duncan's] criminal history is relevant to her crime and properly given significant weight as an aggravator, we conclude that the trial court properly calculated and imposed Duncan's sentence. Id. Although the Court of Appeals correctly noted that a single aggravating factor may support both an enhanced and consecutive sentence, this Court has held that the extent, if any, that a sentence should be enhanced turns on the weight of an individual's criminal history. Bryant v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (Ind.2006). This weight is measured by the number of prior convictions and their gravity, by their proximity or distance from the present offense, and by any similarity or dissimilarity to the present offense that might reflect on a defendant's culpability. Id. In Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 n. 4 (Ind.1999), we held that although a criminal history comprised of a prior conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated may rise to the level of a significant aggravator at a sentencing hearing for a subsequent alcohol-related offense. . . . this criminal history does not command the same significance at a sentencing hearing for murder. Duncan had been charged with, but not convicted of, class B misdemeanor public intoxication and class A criminal conversion. These two incidents are irrelevant under Blakely because only convictions are permissible as criminal history. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Duncan's criminal history included convictions for misdemeanor driving under the influence, felony disrupting public services, and class C misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Duncan was convicted of felony murder with dealing as the felony, her previous convictions of substance abuse were relevant to the instant crime. Duncan, slip op. at 13. The Court of Appeals found that because Duncan's criminal history evinces an escalation of involvement with alcohol and controlled substances that culminated in the death, by methadone poisoning, of Noah, Duncan's criminal history was properly weighed as an aggravating factor by the trial court. Id. Duncan's record may indicate an escalating involvement with some form of substance abuse. But a mitigating factor is the unusual nature of this unusual form of felony murder. There is no evidence suggesting any intent to harm Noah. We agree with the Court of Appeals that her action was irresponsible and reprehensible, but that falls far short of the conduct displayed by the vast majority of felony murders. See e.g., Mitchell v. State, 844 N.E.2d 88, 89 (Ind.2006) (three people die in armed robbery); West v. State, 755 N.E.2d 173, 177-78 (Ind.2001) (stabbing co-worker over 50 times during theft of cash register). In short, Duncan's criminal history does not justify an enhanced murder sentence. There is no dispute that Noah was two years old, and the jury undoubtedly accepted that fact. Nevertheless, it does not appear that this fact was admitted by Duncan or necessarily found by the jury. We have not addressed whether a custodian of an infant is necessarily in a position of trust. This essentially is a legal question. In view of our disposition of Duncan's sentence in part III, we leave this issue unresolved.