Opinion ID: 931073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Musser's Challenges to the Statute

Text: A litigant may bring a facial challenge to invalidate an imprecise law under two doctrines: vagueness and overbreadth. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999). Subject to a limited number of exceptions, however, a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973). Musser argues that Iowa Code § 709C.1 is invalid for being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We address each of his arguments in turn below.
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a law is unconstitutional if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); see United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32–33 (1963) (“Void for vagueness simply means that -4- criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed.”). Vagueness is generally not one of the limited exceptions mentioned above, however, see United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975), and thus for Musser to have standing to challenge the statute as vague, the statute must be unconstitutional as applied to his specific conduct at issue. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982) (A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.). For purposes of this appeal, Musser does not dispute the facts underlying his convictions—Musser admits to having unprotected sexual intercourse with four women when he knew himself to be HIV-positive and without informing the women of his condition. And for the reasons stated by the Iowa Supreme Court and reiterated by the district court, Musser had fair notice that unprotected sexual intercourse constituted intimate contact within the meaning of the statute. Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 745 (citing State v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360, 365–66 (Iowa 2001) ([A]ny reasonably intelligent person is aware it is possible to transmit HIV during sexual intercourse, especially when it is unprotected.)); see Musser, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 663 & n.8. Thus, because Musser knew his HIV status to be positive and engaged in the type of intimate contact that the statute was plainly intended to prohibit, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Accordingly, Musser is precluded from asserting a void-for-vagueness challenge to the statute based on the hypothetical situations posed in his petition and brief and noted above (e.g., accidental bleeding).
Unlike vagueness, [t]he First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to [the] normal rule regarding the standards for facial challenges. Virginia -5- v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003). [T]he overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615); see Turchick v. United States, 561 F.2d 719, 721 (8th Cir. 1977) (The aim of facial overbreadth analysis is to eliminate the deterrent or 'chilling' effect an overbroad law may have on those contemplating conduct protected by the First Amendment. (footnote omitted)). The facial overbreadth doctrine is restricted in its application, however, and is not recognized . . . outside the limited context of the First Amendment. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984) ([O]utside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad.). Here, because the certificate of appealability was granted on the issue of whether [the statute] violated the due process clause because it is vague and overbroad, and because the First Amendment is applied to the States by way of the Due Process Clause, see United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 831 (1983), a First Amendment claim is theoretically within the scope of the appealable issue. But nowhere in his appeal brief does Musser mention First Amendment or freedom of association or any terms or phrases that would indicate how his claim is properly subject to an overbreadth challenge.3 Musser argues only 3 The Iowa Supreme Court noted that the practical effect of the statute does compel some speech—forcing an individual to disclose that he or she is HIV-positive—and thus implicates the First Amendment. Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 742. Nonetheless, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that [t]he obvious purpose of th[e] statute is the protection of public health by discouraging the transmission of the AIDS virus[,] and the court could not conceive of a less restrictive way in which the state could accomplish its goal. Id. at 744–45. Musser challenged this ruling in his petition, but the district court concluded that the Iowa Supreme Court's decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Musser, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 666. There is no cognizable way to -6- that [t]he Fourteenth Amendment accords protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. For this proposition, Musser cites Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Lawrence, however, was decided on substantive due-process grounds—not the right of free association arising out of the First Amendment. See id. at 564 (We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. (emphasis added)). We agree with the district court that Musser is targeting the right of two persons to engage in private, intimate contact, and that right is more akin to rights that have been recognized under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, not the First Amendment. Musser, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 661 n.7; see Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–20 (1984) (distinguishing between the two distinct senses in which there is a constitutional right to freedom of association). Accordingly, because Musser does not raise any First Amendment concerns, he is precluded from asserting an overbreadth challenge to the statute.