Opinion ID: 65945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ware’s Indictment Was Sufficient.

Text: Ware raises for the first time on appeal two challenges to the sufficiency of her indictment. First, Ware argues that her indictment failed to allege that she acted with specific intent to commit the five tax crimes. Second, Ware argues that the government should have alleged that the Revenue Service had assessed the taxes that she owed, given her notice, and demanded payment. Ware’s two arguments about the sufficiency of her indictment fail. When the adequacy of an indictment is challenged for the first time on appeal, this Court “‘must find the indictment sufficient unless it is so defective that it does not, by any reasonable construction, charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted.’” United States v. Adams, 83 F.3d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir. 1996) 8 (quoting United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 734–35 (11th Cir. 1991)). The indictments sufficiently notified Ware of the mens rea component of her tax crimes because the term “willfully,” used in the tax laws, means a “‘voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.’” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201, 111 S. Ct. 604, 610 (1991). An assessment and notice of a tax deficiency are not elements of tax evasion and the government was not required to allege them in Ware’s indictment. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201. The indictments sufficiently alleged Ware’s tax crimes. “[F]or an indictment to be valid, it must ‘contain the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprise the defendant of what [she] must be prepared to meet.’” Bobo, 334 F.3d at 1083 (quoting Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 1047 (1962)). Counts 1 and 2 alleged the elements of tax evasion and Counts 3 through 5 alleged the elements of failing to file a tax return. B. We Lack Jurisdiction to Consider Ware’s Argument About Waiver of Counsel. Ware argues that she did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to trial counsel, but this argument fails. Ware waived this argument because she failed to object to the order of the magistrate judge that granted Ware’s request to represent herself. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(a). We lack jurisdiction to review that order. United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). 9 C. Sufficient Evidence Supports Ware’s Convictions. Ware presents two arguments for the first time on appeal that the government presented insufficient evidence to support her convictions. First, Ware argues that the government was required to prove that the Revenue Service made an assessment, showed that a deficiency existed, and gave her notice and demanded payment. Second, Ware argues that the government failed to prove the element of willfulness because it did not establish that Ware was aware that a statute or regulation imposed a duty to file a return. Ware’s arguments fail. The district court did not err by failing to grant sua sponte a judgment of acquittal. When a defendant fails to move for a judgment of acquittal, we will affirm her conviction “unless there is a manifest miscarriage of justice — if the evidence ‘on a key element of the offense is so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.’” United States v. Bischel, 156 F.3d 1148, 1150 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Williams, 144 F.3d 1397, 1402 (11th Cir. 1998)). The government proved that Ware knew and intentionally avoided her tax obligations. After Ware paid income taxes in 1998 and 1999, Ware intentionally evaded the payment of taxes by providing her employer with fraudulent tax forms; instructing him to stop withholding taxes; depositing her earnings in nominee bank 10 accounts; conducting surreptitious cash transactions; and failing to file tax returns or pay taxes. Ware received notice from the Revenue Service that she had failed to pay sufficient taxes in 2000 and 2001 and did not file returns in 2002, 2003, and 2004. Ware ignored these obligations despite rulings of a federal court and the Revenue Service that she was subject to and accountable for the taxes. The government was not required to prove that the Revenue Service had assessed the tax owing or demanded payment because the tax code does not require those acts to precede the filing of a tax return or payment of income taxes. See 26 U.S.C. § 6151(a). Special Agent Cortier’s testimony established that Ware owed an additional $126,664.07 for federal income taxes in 2000 and $33,482.70 for taxes in 2001, and Ware’s testimony denying guilt, which the jury discredited, under our precedents, established her guilt. United States v. Williams, 398 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2004). Because the government proved that Ware was aware of her duty to file income tax returns and treat her wages as income, it was not required to prove Ware’s knowledge that a specific statute or regulation imposed those duties. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202, 111 S. Ct. at 610 (“[I]f the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge component of the willfulness requirement.”). 11 D. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err in its Jury Instructions. Ware raises on appeal two new challenges to the jury instructions. First, Ware argues that the court erroneously combined the affirmative act and willfulness components of section 7201. Second, Ware argues that the jury instruction about willfulness did not convey that Ware’s tax offenses were specific intent crimes and did not specify the provisions that required her to file tax returns and pay taxes. These arguments fail. The district court did not plainly err in its jury instructions. The court correctly followed our pattern jury instructions, which “clearly state the elements of proof required for conviction under [section 7201]” and section 7203. United States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840, 852 (11th Cir. 2007). The instructions accurately conveyed the law regarding tax evasion and willfulness. See 11th Cir. Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 93.1, 94; Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202, 111 S. Ct. at 610. E. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err At Sentencing. Ware presents two challenges to her sentence. First, Ware argues that the district court violated her rights under the Sixth Amendment when it calculated her sentence based on facts not alleged in the indictment or proved to the jury regarding the amount of tax loss to the government. Second, Ware argues that the district court should not have ordered restitution because the Revenue Service is 12 not a “victim.” These arguments fail. The district court did not plainly err by calculating Ware’s offense level based on the taxes Ware failed to pay in years 2000 through 2004. See U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(G). The amounts of the unpaid taxes were listed in the presentence investigation report. Because Ware did not object to them, these facts were admitted as true, and the district court could rely on them as supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Sheldon, 400 F.3d 1325, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court viewed the guidelines as advisory and could use the findings to calculate Ware’s sentence. See Dean, 487 F.3d at 854. Ware is barred from challenging the amount of restitution. Ware paid the Revenue Service the full amount of restitution before sentencing. Any error is invited. Love, 449 F.3d at 1157.