Opinion ID: 8414555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Schaffer’s Challenge to the District Court’s Denial of his Motion to Suppress

Text: In an appeal of an order denying a motion to suppress, we review a district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 21 We will not overrule the credibility findings of a district court unless they are clearly erroneous. 22
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, the prosecution is prohibited from using at trial a defendant’s statements made during a “custodial interrogation” unless “it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 23 There is no dispute that Agent Mancene did not advise Schaf-fer of his Miranda rights until after Schaf-fer had made his incriminating statements. Accordingly, the only relevant issue on appeal is whether Schaffer was in “custody” for purposes of Miranda when he spoke with law enforcement agents. As we have had occasion to observe, “ i[c]ustody’ for Miranda purposes is not coterminous with ... the colloquial understanding of custody.” 24 Instead, an individual is in “custody” only if two conditions are met: (1) “a reasonable person would have thought he was [not] free to leave the police encounter at issue” and (2) “a reasonable- person would have understood his freedom of action to have been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” 25 While the first condition — a seizure — is necessary for concluding that a suspect was in custody, “not every seizure constitutes custody for purposes of Mir anda..” 26 Thus, the “ultimate inquiry” is whether a reasonable person would have understood the law enforcement agents’ restraint on his freedom to equal “the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 27 To determine whether a suspect’s freedom of movement was “curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest,” courts are required to conduct an objective examination of “all the surrounding circumstances.” 28 Because our case law requires an objective inquiry, “[a]n individual’s subjective belief about his or her status generally does not bear on the custody analysis.” 29 Rather, a court should consider a variety of factors including: (1) the interrogation’s duration; (2) its location (e.g., at the suspect’s home, in public, in a police station, or at the border); (3) whether the suspect volunteered for the interview; (4) whether the officers used restraints; (5) whether weapons were present and especially whether they were drawn; and (6) whether officers told the suspect he was free to leave or under suspicion. 30 Ultimately, if a court determines that it was reasonable for the individual being interrogated to conclude that his detention was “not likely to be temporary and brief’ and to feel that he was “completely at the mercy of [the] police,” then the individual was in “custody” and Miranda’s protections apply. 31
Schaffer argues that the District Court erred by denying his motion to suppress because he was in “custody” during his interview with Agents Maneene and Buckley. Specifically, Schaffer contends that his interview was “custodial” because Agent Maneene twice denied his request to leave the office. The District Court examined all of the surrounding circumstances, including the denial of Schaffer’s two requests to leave, and concluded that a reasonable person in Schaffer’s position would not have considered himself subject to arrest-like constraints and, thus, Schaffer was not in “custody.” 32 We agree. Under the circumstances presented here, a reasonable person would not believe that his freedom of movement was “curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” 33 The fact that law enforcement agents denied Schaffer’s requests to leave his office would not cause a reasonable person to think otherwise, because a reasonable person would have viewed the agents’ limited restriction on his freedom of movement as necessary to protect the integrity of the ongoing search. As an initial matter, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on Schaffer’s motion to suppress, at which it found the testimony of Agent Maneene to be credible, “particularly in light of the fact that it [was] controverted only by Schaffer’s own self-serving declaration.” 34 On appeal, Schaffer does not contest the District Court’s credibility finding or its resulting factual findings. Accordingly, we adopt the findings of the District Court and review only its legal conclusion that Schaffer was not in “custody.” In holding that Schaffer was not in “custody,” the District Court considered the following facts: (1) Schaffer was not handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained during his interview; (2) at no point did any of the agents have their weapons drawn; (3) the agents interviewed Schaffer in the familiar surroundings of his office and permitted him to drink coffee and smoke cigarettes; (4) the agents informed Schaffer that he was not under arrest; (5) Schaffer voluntarily agreed to speak with the agents; (6) the interview lasted only about an hour; and, (7) there was no evidence that Schaffer asked for an attorney or that the agents denied a request for an attorney. 35 The District Court concluded that each of those facts cut against holding that Schaffer was in custody. 36 It also considered the fact that Agent Maneene denied Schaffer’s two requests to leave, understanding that fact to suggest that Schaffer’s freedom of movement was indeed curtailed, but it declined to treat that fact as decisive because it reflected only a limited restriction on Schaffer’s freedom of movement. 37 Because “not every seizure constitutes custody for purposes of Miranda,” 38 a custodial interrogation will be found only where a reasonable person would have understood the restraint on his freedom of movement to be “of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 39 Where there is evidence that an individual’s freedom to move was limited, courts should consider whether “the relevant- environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” 40 Based on the uncontested factual findings of the District Court, it is clear that Schaffer’s interview did not constitute a coercive environment tantamount to a formal arrest. 41 The fact that there were nine agents in the office during the interview and that Agent Mancene denied Schaffer the ability to leave the interview while the search of his office continued do not compel a different conclusion. First, as we have explained before, “the number of officers is typically not dispositive” of custody. 42 Moreover, while there were nine agents inside Schaf-fer’s office during the search, only Agents Mancene and Buckley conducted the interview, which took place in a separate part of the office away from the other seven agents. A reasonable person would not have felt “completely at the mercy of [the] police” 43 simply because he knew seven other agents were searching his office. Second, a reasonable person in Schaf-fer’s position would not have concluded that being prohibited from leaving his office during an ongoing search was equivalent to a formal arrest. Instead, he would have considered the restriction on his freedom of movement to be a “sensible precaution” designed to protect the integrity of an ongoing search. 44 Agent Mancene testified that he instructed Schaffer that leaving the office would present a “security issue” because the “agents had set up ... the boxes [of evidence] and the chains of custody, and they were all over the floor by the threshold of the doorway .... ” 45 Considering the other conditions present during Schaffer’s interview, no reasonable person in his position would have interpreted Agent Mancene’s explanation as pretextual. Rather, his explanation that the exit was blocked by agents collecting and cataloguing evidence reasonably suggests that Schaffer’s detention would be “temporary and brief.” 46 A reasonable person in Schaffer’s position would have assumed that law enforcement would permit him to leave the office once they had completed their search. The reasonableness of Agent Mancene’s precautionary denial is underscored by the triviality of Schaffer’s request to leave. Schaffer asked #to leave the office because he wanted to collect money from an acquaintance. A reasonable person would not have expected law enforcement to permit him to leave the site of an ongoing search for such an inconsequential purpose. In contrast, if Schaffer had requested permission to depart the interview because he needed to address some timely emergency, and if law enforcement agents had denied such a request, it might be reasonable for Schaffer to have felt more “completely at the mercy of [the] police.” 47 No such exigency, however, was mentioned here. Consequently, while Agent Mancene did curtail Schaffer’s freedom of action, his denial of Schaffer’s request to leave was not, on the facts presented, indicative of an arrest-like restraint. 48 In sum, a reasonable person in Schaf-fer’s position would not have concluded that “his freedom of action [was] curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” 49 Schaffer, therefore, was not in “custody” and law enforcement were not required to deliver a Miranda warning before questioning him. The District Court properly denied his motion to suppress. II. Schaffer’s Challenge to the District Court’s Admission at Trial of Four Videos Showing Prior Sexual Assaults a. Standard of Review We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of-a statute. 50 And, “mindful of [a district court’s] superior position to assess relevancy and to weigh the probative value of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice,” we review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for “abuse of discretion.” 51 b. Federal Rule of Evidence 413 Does Not Violate the Due Process Clause Schaffer asserts that the District Court’s admission of portions of four videos showing his prior sexual assaults under Rule 413 violated the right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. He argues that the “common-law tradition” 52 of prohibiting prosecutors from using evidence of prior bad acts to establish a probability of guilt is so fundamental in our criminal justice system that the admission of propensity evidence 53 pursuant to Rule 413 “violates fundamental conceptions of justice.” 54 While we recognize that Rule 413 represents an exception to the general “ban against propensity evidence,” 55 we agree with every other court of appeals that has addressed this issue and hold that, in light of the safeguards provided by Rule 403, Rule 413 on its face does not violate the Due Process Clause. 56 Rule 413 provides that “[i]n a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault.” Unlike Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which allows prior bad act evidence to be used for purposes other than to show a defendant’s propensity to commit a particular crime, Rule 413 permits the jury to consider the evidence “on any matter to which it is relevant.” In other words, a prosecutor may use evidence of prior sexual assaults precisely to show that a defendant has a pattern or propensity for committing sexual assault. 57 In passing Rule 413, Congress considered “Knowledge that the defendant has committed rapes on other occasions [to be] critical in assessing the relative plausibility of [sexual assault] claims and accurately deciding cases that would otherwise become unresolvable swearing matches.” 58 For Schaffer to succeed on his claim that Rule 413 offends the Due Process Clause, he must show that its presumption favoring the admission of propensity evidence in sexual assault cases “violates those fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political, institutions.” 59 The necessary predicate to such a showing, of course, would be a determination that prohibiting the use of propensity evidence in prosecutions for sexual assault is a “fundamental conception[ ] of justice.” To ascertain whether that is indeed the case, we must examine “historical practice.” 60 In conducting that inquiry, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[j]udges are not free, in defining ‘due process,’ to impose on law enforcement officials our ‘personal and private notions’ of fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function.’ ” 61 To that end, the Supreme Court has “defined the category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly” and instructed that “[b]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.” 62 Schaffer argues that the historical practice of courts in this country is to prohibit the use of propensity evidence in criminal prosecutions. As a general matter, Schaf-fer is correct. 63 Not only is a general prohibition on propensity evidence embodied in Rule 404(b), 64 but the Supreme Court has repeatedly extolled, though often in dicta, the virtues of the “common-law tradition” of “disallow[ing] resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s' evil character to establish a probability of guilt.” 65 However, as other courts of appeals have explained, the evidence regarding the historical practice of allowing (or disallowing) propensity evidence in prosecutions for sex crimes is mixed. 66 For example, many jurisdictions presently have evidentiary rules analogous to both Rule 413 and its companion rule addressing child molestation, Federal Rule of Evidence 414, 67 and have had rules permitting the use of various kinds of propensity evidence in prosecutions for sex crimes for the past century and a half. 68 Short of citing three recent cases in the highest courts of Washington, 69 Iowa, 70 and Missouri, 71 all of which invalidated, for one reason or another, state laws parallel to Rule 413, Schaffer fails to present evidence compelling a different historical analysis. Because Schaffer bears the burden of establishing 72 that the prohibition of propensity evidence in sexual-offense cases is a “fundamental conception ] of justice,” 73 the lack of conclusive historical evidence is a sufficient ground on which to reject his due process claim. Nevertheless, because the admission of propensity evidence raises the specter of unfairness, we do not rely solely on the lack of any established historical practice of prohibiting the admission of propensity evidence in sexual-assault cases to deny Schaffer’s constitutional challenge. Instead, we independently conclude that Rule 413 does not threaten a defendant’s right to due process. Justice Robert H. Jackson, writing for the Court in Michelson v. United States, described the justification for the general policy of excluding propensity evidence as follows: The state may not show defendant’s pri- or trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice. 74 We share Justice Jackson’s concern that propensity evidence may cause “undue prejudice” to a defendant and, as a result, threaten his right to a fair trial. However, we conclude, like the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits before us, that the protections provided in Rule 403, which we now explicitly hold apply to evidence being offered pursuant to Rule 413, effectively mitigate the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the admission of propensity evidence in sexual-assault cases. 75 Because Rule 403 requires a district court to determine whether the probative value of any evidence “is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice,” 76 the practical effect of Rule 413 is to create a presumption that evidence of prior sexual assaults is relevant and probative in a prosecution for sexual assault. 77 It does not require or guarantee the admission of all propensity evidence in every sexual-assault case. Where in a particular instance the admission of evidence of prior sexual assaults would create “undue prejudice” and threaten due process, district courts can and should, by operation of Rule 403, exclude that evidence and ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Schaffer’s primary argument on appeal is his contention that Rule 413’s fundamental assumption “that past sex offenses are valid proof of future ones” is not supported by empirical evidence. 78 To bolster his claim, Schaffer describes the serious opposition to Rule 413 at the time Congress enacted it 79 as well as the continued opposition to the Rule since its passage. 80 However, our conclusion that Rule 413 does not on its face violate the Due Process Clause does not turn on our assessment (much less our endorsement) of the Rule’s underlying rationale. 81 As the Supreme Court has observed in another context, “[t]he criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the public good.” 82 The wisdom of an evidentiary rule permitting the use of propensity evidence in prosecutions for sexual assault is not “the concern of the courts.” 83 Rather, our concern is only whether Rule 413 violates fundamental principles of due process. We conclude that it does not. Deliberating the merits and demerits of Rule 413 is a matter for Congress alone. c. The District Court Did Not Err by Permitting the Government to Introduce the Four Videos at Trial Schaffer also argues that, even if Rule 413 is constitutional, the District Court erred in admitting at trial excerpts from four videos showing him sexually assaulting two other minor girls. 84 He contends that the probative value of the videos was minimal and that the videos created unfair prejudice. The District Court reviewed the videos in camera and concluded that they were highly relevant to the charges against Schaffer and that the resulting prejudice was not unfair. We agree. The video evidence was certainly prejudicial, but that prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence given the severity of the crimes charged, the similarity between Schaffer’s acts in the videos and the acts alleged in the indictment, and the fact that Schaffer argued at trial that the government failed to prove his intent to engage Sierra in illegal sex. In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the District Court erred in admitting the video evidence. Rule 403 requires a district court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice.” However, the fact that evidence “may be highly prejudicial” does not necessarily mean that it is “unfairly prejudicial.” 85 The distinction between “highly prejudicial” evidence and “unfairly prejudicial” evidence “will often be difficult to determine.” 86 For that reason, “we accord great deference to the district court’s assessment of the relevancy and unfair prejudice of proffered evidence, mindful that it sees the witnesses, the parties, the jurors, and the attorneys, and is thus in a superior position to evaluate the likely impact of the evidence.” 87 The government introduced at trial approximately fifteen minutes’ worth of video evidence showing Schaffer committing sexual assaults on two other minor girls. The video clips showed two girls between the ages of eight and thirteen years old trying on swimsuits for Schaffer and having their bodies fondled by him. Two of the videos also showed one of the girls performing sexual acts on Schaffer. The District Court concluded that these video clips were “highly relevant to the charges against Schaffer.” 88 Specifically, the District Court reasoned that: Schaffer’s prior acts demonstrating his sexual interest in minor females are extremely relevant to the question of his intent here. This is particularly so because of the similarities between the conduct shown on the videos and Schaf-fer’s alleged conduct with [Sierra]. The videos show a pattern of Schaffer’s enticing girls into situations in which they are alone with him and making them try on swimsuits before forcing them to engage in sexual conduct. This pattern is highly probative of the question of his intent here. 89 On appeal, Schaffer argues that the probative value of the videos was negligible because: (1) the significant age difference between the girls in the videos and Sierra undermines the idea that Schaffer has a predilection for girls of a certain age, ,(2) the existence of a video showing Sierra trying on swimsuits already puts his practice of having girls try on swimsuits beyond dispute, and (3) the videos were not necessary to corroborate Sierra’s testimony because Schaffer did not put forth a credibility or consent defense. We agree with the District Court that the videos were highly probative of Schaf-fer’s guilt. To prove that Schaffer committed the crimes charged in the indictment, the government had to establish that Schaffer intended to engage in sexual acts with Sierra at the time he asked her to travel to New Jersey. The video evidence challenged here tended to demonstrate Schaffer’s sexual intent at the time he contacted Sierra because it reveals a pattern of illegal conduct that involved having minor girls visit him alone and try on swimsuits as a precursor to sexual assault. While it is true that Schaffer did not put forth a consent defense and did not challenge the credibility of Sierra’s testimony, his defense at trial was predicated on questioning the government’s ability to establish his intent to entice Sierra into unlawful sexual acts. Contrary to Schaffer’s arguments on appeal, the fact that the girls in the videos were slightly younger than Sierra does not undercut the probative value of the evidence regarding Schaffer’s guilt in this case. Not only does Section 2422(b) criminalize enticing all individuals under the age of 18, drawing no distinction between nine-, thirteen-, or fifteen-year-old victims, 90 but evidence that Schaffer had a sexual interest in nine- and thirteen-year-old girls makes it more likely, not less, that he would have a sexual interest in the fifteen-year-old victim. Furthermore, the existence of video evidence showing Sierra trying on swimsuits enhances, rather than diminishes, the probative value of the four challenged videos because it demonstrates a clear pattern of sexual behavior. The District Court also concluded that the probative value of the videos was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. It considered the age difference between Sierra and the two girls in the videos and found that a viewer could not readily discern that there were any significant differences in age. 91 It concluded also that the conduct in the videos was no more inflammatory than the conduct alleged in the indictment, namely noncon-sensual sexual acts with a fifteen-year-old girl. 92 And, it determined that the government limited the potential for unfair prejudice by showing the jury only short portions of the videos. 93 Schaffer, of course, disagrees. He argues that the prejudicial effect of the evidence was unfair because: (1) the videos showing his sexual assaults on young children were too inflammatory, (2) the videos were graphic and there was no video of his alleged sexual assault on Sierra, and (3) the District Court instructed the jury that they could consider the videos for any purpose. We find no error in the District Court’s conclusion that the videos did not cause unfair prejudice. First, the conduct portrayed in the videos was not more inflammatory than the conduct for which Schaf-fer was being tried. Rather, all of the sexual conduct was essentially identical. The fact that the girls in the video were slightly younger than Sierra does not make his assaults on them more inflammatory because there were no observable differences in age. Second, any prejudice produced by the graphic nature of the videos was minimized by the government limiting the total runtime of the videos to only fifteen minutes. And third, the District Court’s evidentiary instruction was legally correct: Rule 413 explicitly permits a jury to consider evidence of prior sexual assaults for “any matter to which it is relevant.” In fact, the District Court’s cautionary instructions to the jury, which it gave both at the time the government introduced the videos and immediately prior to the commencement of deliberations, further reduced the risk of unfair prejudice. 94 It informed the jurors, among other ‘things, that Schaffer was not being charged for the conduct presented in the videos and that “evidence of another offense on its own is not sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in the indictment in this case.” 95 In enacting Rule 413, Congress intended to create a presumption that evidence of prior sexual assaults, such as the video evidence at issue here, is relevant and probative in prosecutions for sexual assault. 96 As we have held, that presumption does not violate the Due Process Clause in a particular case so long as a district court weighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative value. Here, the District Court considered the four videos consistent with the dictates of Rule 413 and, after conducting a Rule 403 analysis, found the videos to be relevant and highly probative of Schaffer’s intent and not unfairly prejudicial. After careful review of the record and bearing in mind the “great deference” accorded to district courts in resolving evidentiary questions, 97 we conclude that the District Court did not exceed its discretion in admitting the four videos at trial.