Opinion ID: 867919
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: in furtherance of a compelling governmental

Text: INTEREST The Defendants argue that Florida’s policy of not providing kosher meals furthers two compelling governmental interests: safety and cost management. While safety and cost can be compelling governmental interests, the Defendants 11 Case: 12-11735 Date Filed: 05/14/2013 Page: 12 of 16 have not carried their burden to show that Florida’s policy in fact furthered these two interests. First, the evidence submitted by the Defendants on summary judgment in support of its position is insubstantial. While we are mindful of our obligation to give “‘due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators,’” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2123 (2005) (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 10 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900, 1911), “‘policies grounded on mere speculation, exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to meet the act’s requirements,’” Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 509 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 10, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900) (discussing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, predecessor to RLUIPA). The cost estimates in the Fuhrman Affidavit were based on assumptions that were unsupported by the record. For example, Ms. Fuhrman assumed that providing kosher meals to as many as 6,283 inmates would not at all reduce the amount of non-kosher food that would have to be purchased. Also, Ms. Fuhrman assumed that every Muslim inmate would request a kosher meal in spite of the fact that Florida removed pork products from its prison meal plans in order to accommodate Muslims. Many of the security concerns in the Upchurch Affidavit are also speculative. For example, Mr. Upchurch testified that providing kosher meals may “lead to retaliation against the 12 Case: 12-11735 Date Filed: 05/14/2013 Page: 13 of 16 kosher inmates” if other inmates believed that the higher cost of providing a kosher diet impacted the quality of the food they received. Second, as Mr. Rich noted in his pro se motion filed in opposition to summary judgment, the copy of Florida’s Food Services Standards for prisons raises more questions which the Defendants left unanswered. For example, how is Florida able to administer a therapeutic diet program without the same inmate morale and administrative cost problems they suggest would plague a kosher meal program? Cf. Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 204 (4th Cir. 2012) (determining that the affidavits relied on by prison officials to show that there was a compelling security interest were weak because they “fail[ed] to explain how the prison is able to deal with the beards of medically exempt inmates but could not similarly accommodate religious exemptions”); Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta, Ga., 654 F.3d 1231, 1246 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the city’s compelling interest argument in the context of a RLUIPA land-use claim because the “proffered interests . . . [were] not pursued against analogous nonreligious conduct” (quotation marks omitted)). Third, Mr. Rich’s pro se motion filed in opposition to summary judgment raises other genuine questions of material fact about whether cost control and security are furthered by denying kosher meals to inmates. For example, the Aleph Institute letter said that the kosher meal pilot program at the South Florida 13 Case: 12-11735 Date Filed: 05/14/2013 Page: 14 of 16 Reception Center has not caused any security problems and has not prompted overwhelming interest from inmates. This raises more questions of fact about whether providing kosher meals would actually cause the security and cost concerns the Defendants alleged. We also observe that the Study Group on Religious Dietary Accommodation’s Report on the JDAP, and other agency reports referred to by Mr. Rich on appeal, support the determination that the Defendants have not met their burden on summary judgment. See Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 997, 1000 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Absent some reason for mistrust, courts have not hesitated to take judicial notice of agency records and reports.”).7