Opinion ID: 3186961
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppressed

Text: Sauter argues that the plea agreement supplement was not suppressed because its existence was disclosed to Dvorin’s counsel by a reference to it in Derrington’s plea agreement, which was disclosed to Dvorin. Sauter contends that this should have prompted Dvorin’s counsel to request the plea agreement supplement from the prosecution. Dvorin counters that the supplement was suppressed because, although the plea agreement referenced the supplement, the supplement itself was sealed, and thus could not be discovered by Dvorin’s counsel through due diligence. To constitute suppressed evidence under Brady, the evidence must not have been discoverable through the defendant’s due diligence. Brown, 650 F.3d at 588. “[E]vidence is not suppressed if the defendant knows or should know of the essential facts that would enable him to take advantage of it.” Id. (quoting United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 575 (5th Cir. 2009)). The Brady analysis regarding suppression focuses on the fact that the government need not “furnish a defendant with exculpatory evidence that is fully available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2002). Sauter does not, nor can she, contend that the plea agreement supplement was fully available to Dvorin’s counsel through the exercise of due diligence. The plea agreement supplement was sealed and in the control and possession of the government. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Sauter suppressed the plea agreement supplement. 14 Case: 15-10142 Document: 00513429336 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/18/2016 No. 15-10142 Cons. w/ No. 15-10183