Opinion ID: 1804987
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: What Happened to Witt after Teague?

Text: Although under Teague state courts are free to adopt more expansive standards for retroactivity, 28 state supreme courts, as well as the District of Columbia, have adopted the Teague standard at least to cases stemming from a federal constitutional right, and the vast majority to all questions of retroactivity. [28] Only six state supreme courts have decided against adopting Teague's retroactivity standards to questions of federal constitutional law. [29] The remaining states have not reassessed their standards for retroactivity in light of Teague. Florida is one of those states that have not addressed Teague in the fourteen years since it was decided. As several district courts of appeal have noted, [30] even after Teague this Court has continued to apply the Linkletter factors. We have never consciously considered Teague, however. In fact, we have only mentioned the case once, in describing the Eleventh Circuit's denial of habeas relief to a defendant sentenced to death. See Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla.2001). [31] We should now adopt Teague in cases considering the retroactivity of decisions of the United States Supreme Court. We should not apply a different standard for determining the retroactivity of United States Supreme Court decisions than that Court itself applies. Consistency among the states  and between the state and federal courts  in applying decisions of the United States Supreme Court demands that, to the extent possible, standards for retroactivity be uniform. Otherwise, the retroactivity of a decision of the Supreme Court will depend on the jurisdiction in which the defendant was prosecuted. Although such a result is sometimes unavoidable, we should attempt as much as possible to limit such lack of uniformity. Also, even more than Linkletter, the Teague standards respect the finality of decisions, a concept we considered of utmost importance in Witt. The Court's decision to alter its retroactivity standard in Teague was based on two overriding considerations: the interests of comity and finality. 489 U.S. at 308, 109 S.Ct. 1060. Although the concept of comity is not relevant to our analysis, the concept of finality is. Regarding the importance of finality, the Court noted that [a]pplication of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect. Id. at 309, 109 S.Ct. 1060. See also Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691, 91 S.Ct. 1160 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part) (No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing that a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation....), quoted in Teague, 489 U.S. at 309, 109 S.Ct. 1060. Of course, this compelling interest in finality applies just as strongly to state court determinations of retroactivity. In fact, it is the very foundation of our analysis in Witt. As we acknowledged there, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 was originally patterned after the federal habeas corpus rule and was promulgated to provide a method of reviewing a conviction based on a major change of law, where unfairness was so fundamental in either process or substance that the doctrine of finality had to be set aside. Witt, 387 So.2d at 927. In Witt, we recognized that only a sweeping change of law ... [that] drastically alter[s] the substantive or procedural underpinnings of a final conviction and sentence, id. at 925, should be applied retroactively because applying any other standard would destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state, fiscally and intellectually, beyond any tolerable limit. Id. at 929-30. Clearly, our interests in finality and the narrow retroactive application of new legal principles coincides with the interests the Supreme Court articulated in Teague. As illustrated in section II A of this opinion, however, the Supreme Court has found that the Linkletter factors, the underpinning of our retroactivity analysis in Witt, do not well serve these interests. Therefore, I believe we should adopt the retroactivity analysis announced in Teague in determining whether we should retroactively apply new constitutional rules emanating from the United States Supreme Court. As I demonstrate below, although I believe we should adopt the Teague standard, I do not believe it ultimately matters in determining whether Ring applies retroactively. Whether we analyze the issue under Teague (as I do in part II B below) or under Witt (as I do in part II C), the result is the same: Ring does not apply retroactively.