Opinion ID: 1184860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Introduction of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure

Text: Defendant urges that the court erred in permitting the introduction into evidence of his boots, which had been obtained from the search of his automobile. He claims that the search cannot rest either upon the theory that probable cause supported his arrest and that the search was incident to it, or upon the subsequent issuance of a search warrant. We point out that even if such an argument may now properly be addressed to us, the arrest quite clearly rested upon probable cause. [2] If defendant had failed to adduce substantially different evidence on the issue at the new trial, we could dispose of the search and seizure issue without considering its merits by relying upon People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 151 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381]. In Terry we held that in such circumstances a prior appellate ruling that a search was lawful constituted the law of the case. On appeal of defendant's first penalty judgment we held the evidence presently questioned was legally obtained. ( People v. Hillery (1965) 62 Cal.2d 692, 710 [44 Cal. Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382].) At the second penalty trial, however, defendant's counsel developed a more extensive record on the actual knowledge of the officer ordering defendant's arrest; defendant still fails to sustain the contention. [3] To constitute probable cause for arrest, a state of facts must be known to the officer that would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or to entertain a strong suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty. ( People v. Stewart (1965) 62 Cal.2d 571, 577-578 [43 Cal. Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97]; People v. Fischer (1957) 49 Cal.2d 442, 446 [317 P.2d 967]; see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) pp. 102-104; Fricke, Cal. Criminal Procedure (6th ed. 1962) pp. 19-20.) [4] Although the facts must incline the mind to believe, they may leave room for doubt. ( People v. Ingle (1960) 53 Cal.2d 407, 413 [2 Cal. Rptr. 14, 348 P.2d 577].) Probable cause depends upon the measurement of probabilities ( Draper v. United States (1959) 358 U.S. 307, 313 [3 L.Ed.2d 327, 79 S.Ct. 329]), based upon the unique facts of each particular case ( Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 479 [9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407]). As we shall explain, the factual basis found to support probable cause in two recent exemplar cases, People v. Hall (1964) 62 Cal.2d 104 [41 Cal. Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700], and People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716 [44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665], illustrates the sufficiency of the showing of probable cause here. In Hall the arresting officer learned that the name called out by the victim in addressing her assailant was the same first name as that of defendant, that defendant knew the victim, that he appeared to be the only person with that first name known to the victim, and that he had a criminal record including assault with a deadly weapon. In Schader the arresting officer had been advised that the robber-murderers were travelling in an easterly direction in a late-model red Cadillac. Shortly thereafter, he saw such a car proceeding in the specified direction; moreover, the officer testified that he believed the youthful appearance and informal dress of the driver of the car presented a suspicious circumstance. (62 Cal.2d 716, at p. 722.) [5] The showing of the probability of the identity of defendant here as the perpetrator of the crime was far greater than in Hall or Schader; hence the arrest was based upon probable cause. Chief Deputy Thomas knew that at the time of the killing a car similar to defendant's uniquely painted black and turquoise 1952 Plymouth had been seen in Tome Lane, two-tenths of a mile from the scene of the crime. Officer Thomas had also seen the bootprints and tire prints in Tome Lane; he compared them visually with boots seen in, and the treads of the tires of, defendant's car, which he knew was parked in front of defendant's hotel and registered to defendant. He saw the condition of the victim's body; he knew that defendant had a prior record of conviction for forcible rape. He also knew of the victim's occasional employment as a babysitter at the farm where defendant worked. The probability of the independent concurrence of these factors in the absence of the guilt of defendant was slim enough to render suspicion of defendant reasonable and probable. Since the arrest was proper, the evidence seized incident to it could properly be admitted at trial.