Opinion ID: 1432936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Driving Under the Influence [2]

Text: Probable cause to arrest Miller for reckless driving precludes a wrongful arrest claim, even if Wagester lacked probable cause for the additional charges. Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 573 (6th Cir. 2005); Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 761 (7th Cir.2006). But because probable cause is a necessary element of malicious prosecution, I address the issue here. The probable cause inquiry entails an examination of the totality of the circumstances from a law enforcement officer's perspective. United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir.1993) (en banc) (citations omitted). The determination hinges not on hindsight, but on the facts as perceived by a reasonable officer in Wagester's position when the stop and arrest occurred. Other circuits recognize that [a plaintiff's] refusal to take a breathalyzer test, coupled with the smell of alcohol from the vehicle, g[i]ve[s] [officers] probable cause to arrest. Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1260 (11th Cir.2006); see also Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1166 (10th Cir.1991). Here, Miller drove recklessly, gave varying accounts of his whereabouts, failed all but one of the field sobriety tests, [3] and refused a breathalyzer. Evaluating the facts from Wagester's perspective, but in the light most favorable to Miller, sufficient facts supported the decision to arrest. See Jolley v. Harvell, 254 Fed.Appx. 483, 488-89 (6th Cir.2007).
While the elements of a federal malicious prosecution claim remain undefined in this circuit, our cases clearly establish a plaintiff's obligation to show, at a minimum, the absence of probable cause to justify his arrest and prosecution. Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir.2006) (citations, quotation marks, and editorial marks omitted). And, here, the circumstances offered the requisite probable cause to justify Miller's arrest and prosecution.
I agree with my colleagues' conclusion that Miller failed to come forward with evidentiary support for his first two excessive force claims  unnecessary detention in freezing weather and failure to loosen handcuffs. I cannot agree, however, with the view they take on the third claim  slamming against the vehicle. Drawing all inferences in Miller's favor, Wagester spun him around, slammed him against his vehicle, and kicked his feet apart  but caused no injury. Arrests effected by law enforcement officials on a daily basis could be described that same way. Indeed, this is why the Supreme Court counsels that the right to make an arrest ... necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it and that not every push or shove ... violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Although a slam might constitute excessive force in some circumstances, it fails to rise to that level here. Miller's deposition testimony confirms this conclusion. According to Miller, as Wagester informed him that he was under arrest, the officer turned [him] around and shoved [him] against [the car]. Miller does not claim that Wagester shoved him violently, maliciously, or gratuitously. Cf. Burden v. Carroll, 108 Fed.Appx. 291, 293 (6th Cir. 2004) (officer violently shoved plaintiff into a brick wall with protrusions, causing significant injury). And when asked if Wagester's actions hurt him, Miller responded: I mean, not really. Miller's ambiguous description of the ... shov[e] ... he endured constitutes at best a scintilla of evidence, insufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that a reasonable officer would consider the force excessive. Goodrich v. Everett, 193 Fed.Appx. 551, 557 (6th Cir.2006). Because Miller fails to allege a level of force or brutality that a reasonable officer would consider excessive, id., the district court correctly granted Wagester qualified immunity.
As with Miller's federal claims, the existence of probable cause proves fatal to his state tort claims of false arrest/false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Similarly, Miller's assault and battery claim mirrors his federal excessive force claim insofar as Miller can only recover if Wagester acted unreasonably  which he did not. The district court properly resolved Miller's state law claims.
Wagester discharged his duties constitutionally and reasonably. Thus, I would affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.