Opinion ID: 4514238
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶20] The father contends that the court erred in finding that each child is in circumstances of jeopardy, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding and that the court “likened symptoms of parental discord 13 . . . to conditions of jeopardy.” The father contends that the allegations against him “cannot meet the threshold required of ‘serious harm or threat of serious harm’” pursuant to 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(6)(A) and 4035 (2018). [¶21] We review the court’s factual findings for clear error and will affirm its jeopardy determination “unless there is no competent record evidence that can rationally be understood to establish as more likely than not that the child was in circumstances of jeopardy to his [or her] health and welfare.” In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶ 9, 140 A.3d 1226 (quotation marks omitted); see 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2) (requiring that a determination of jeopardy be supported by a preponderance of the evidence). [¶22] “Jeopardy” is defined as “serious abuse or neglect, as evidenced by . . . [s]erious harm or threat of serious harm.” Id. § 4002(6). “Serious harm” is further defined, in part, as “[s]erious mental or emotional injury or impairment which now or in the future is likely to be evidenced by serious mental, behavioral or personality disorder, including severe anxiety, depression or withdrawal, untoward aggressive behavior, seriously delayed development or similar serious dysfunctional behavior.” 22 M.R.S. § 4002(10)(B) (2018). 14 [¶23] For a court to find jeopardy, it “need[] only . . . find, as a matter of fact, that it was more likely than not that [the child] would incur serious harm, or be subject to a threat of serious harm, if she was returned to the custody” of the parent. In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶ 11, 140 A.3d 1226. We have previously held that “the existence of the emotional harm or threat of emotional harm [is required to] be of sufficient severity that, now or in the future, it is likely to be evidenced by serious mental, behavioral or personality disorder. That disorder may manifest itself through severe anxiety, depression or withdrawal, or other dysfunctional behavior, but there must be evidence of the likelihood of the disorder or threat of that disorder.” In re Jazmine L., 2004 ME 125, ¶ 15, 861 A.2d 1277 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted); see In re Irene W., 561 A.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Me. 1989) (finding jeopardy as a result of “emotional harm” and anxiety). We have, in another context, determined that “emotional harm can create jeopardy in the same way as physical harm.” In re J.H., 2015 ME 10, ¶ 7, 108 A.3d 1271. [¶24] Here, the court did not clearly err in determining that each child currently experiences anxiety relating to visitations with the father, and that the emotional well-being of each child will likely worsen in the future absent 15 any change in the visitation schedule or the father’s conduct. Although the record gives support to the father’s contention that “parental conflict and a vast contrast in parenting styles” has contributed to the children’s anxiety, there is, nonetheless, competent evidence in the record, including testimony from the children and their social workers, demonstrating that the father’s conduct toward both children regarding the foods they eat, their appearances, and the comments made about their mothers has contributed to and increased each child’s anxiety, and that this anxiety would continue into the future. [¶25] Therefore, because there was “competent record evidence that can rationally be understood to establish as more likely than not that the [children were] in circumstances of jeopardy to [their] health and welfare,” In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶ 9, 140 A.3d 1226 (quotation marks omitted), the court did not clearly err in determining that each child is in circumstances of jeopardy. See 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2)