Opinion ID: 2645949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Parole Eligibility Restriction Factors

Text: Alaska Statute 12.55.115 does not itself set out any factors sentencing courts should evaluate when they consider imposing parole eligibility restrictions beyond the statutory minimum. Although we never have addressed the issue and it therefore comes to us as a matter of first impression, the court of appeals repeatedly has held that sentencing courts can restrict discretionary parole only when the statutory default term of parole eligibility “would be insufficient to protect the public and [e]nsure the defendant’s reformation.” 31 The State argues that limiting consideration only to these 31 See, e.g., Lawrence v. State, 764 P.2d 318, 321 (Alaska App. 1988) (quoting Spencer v. State, 642 P.2d 1371, 1377 (Alaska App. 1982)); see also Bates v. State, 258 P.3d 851, 866 (Alaska App. 2011); Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166, 1173 (Alaska App. 2008); Cheely v. State, 861 P.2d 1168, 1181 (Alaska App. 1993); Stern v. State, 827 P.2d 442, 450 (Alaska App. 1992). Cf. Bloomstrand v. State, 656 P.2d 584, 591 (Alaska App. 1982) (stating that amount of time reasonably required for rehabilitation is “among the various factors” sentencing courts can consider to restrict discretionary parole eligibility) (emphasis added). -10- 6856 two criteria is inconsistent with article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution, AS 12.55.005, and AS 12.55.115. Korkow responds that because parole eligibility restrictions are forward-looking and involve different considerations than sentencing, sentencing courts should focus only on protection of the public and rehabilitation. We agree with the State. The Alaska Constitution states that “[c]riminal administration shall be based upon the following: the need for protecting the public, community condemnation of the offender, the rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the offender, and the principle of reformation.”32 Alaska Statute 12.55.005, the declaration of purpose for Alaska’s sentencing and probation laws, incorporates the constitutional criteria by requiring consideration of a set of related factors when imposing a sentence.33 As a matter of statutory interpretation, AS 12.55.005’s list of factors governs the sentencing court’s authority under AS 12.55.115 to restrict discretionary parole “as part of a sentence of imprisonment.” The statutory language is clear and uncontradicted by any legislative history — a sentencing court must consider all the enumerated criteria in AS 12.55.005 when restricting discretionary parole as a part of a sentence, not just public protection and the defendant’s reformation. We recognize that not all of the AS 12.55.005 factors necessarily will be relevant in every parole eligibility determination, and that the most relevant factors often will be public safety and potential for rehabilitation. And we emphasize that a sentencing court may err by ignoring relevant factors or improperly weighing relevant factors when imposing a parole eligibility restriction beyond the statutory minimum. A 32 Alaska Const. art. I, § 12. 33 As noted earlier, these are “the Chaney factors.” See supra note 12 and related text. -11- 6856 sentencing court must consider all of the statutory factors, determine which are relevant to the case, and support its overall sentence — including parole eligibility restrictions — with expressly articulated reasons backed by substantial evidence.34