Opinion ID: 6221944
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officials’ Vagueness Claims

Text: The circuit court also erred in declaring section 115.646 is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 “[T]he void government speech lacks First Amendment protection. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). 5 Although they are related doctrines, vagueness under the due process clause is different than First Amendment overbreadth. While courts reviewing vagueness challenges look to the notice 5 for vagueness doctrine ensures that laws give fair and adequate notice of proscribed conduct and protects against arbitrary enforcement.” State v. Farqui, 344 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Mo. banc 2011) (quotation marks omitted). “The test in enforcing the doctrine is whether the language conveys to a person of ordinary intelligence a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” Feldhaus v. State, 311 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Mo. banc 2010). “[N]either absolute certainty nor impossible standards of specificity are required in determining whether terms are impermissibly vague.” Cocktail Fortune, Inc. v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 994 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Mo. banc 1999). First, the circuit court declared the term “ballot measure” to be vague because the circuit court believed it was unclear when a proposal becomes a “ballot measure.” Although section 115.646 does not define “ballot measure,” section 130.011(2) provides a definition of “ballot measure” that, even though not strictly applicable to chapter 115, nevertheless comports with the common understanding of the phrase and refutes that it cannot be understood by a reasonable person. See § 130.011 (defining “ballot measures” as “any proposal submitted or intended to be submitted to qualified voters for their approval or rejection”). Whether a proposal is intended to be submitted to the voters will be clear in most circumstances, especially when the process for getting it on the ballot has provided and the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, courts reviewing First Amendment overbreadth challenges focus on whether the statute “is so overbroad as to include speech that is constitutionally protected.” State v. Moore, 90 S.W.3d 64, 66 (Mo. banc 2002). As previously noted, the circuit court dismissed Plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge as moot. Even so, Plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge would be meritless because, as explained earlier, section 6 begun. But even if there are some circumstances in which the line between an idea and a proposal intended to be submitted to qualified voters is not clear, “speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before the Court will not support a facial attack on a statute when it is surely valid in the vast majority of its intended applications.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000) (quotation marks omitted). The circuit court also declared “public funds,” and whether those funds were spent “directly” by the official, to be vague. In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court raised a variety of hypothetical situations that might pose a close call under the statute. But, as previously explained, speculation about hypothetical situations is insufficient to support a facial attack when language understandable to an ordinary person, such as “public funds” and “directly,” conveys what section 115.646 prohibits in the vast majority of intended applications. The terms “public funds” and “directly” are of common understanding and provide a person of ordinary intelligence sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct. Finally, the circuit court erred in declaring the words “advocate, support, or oppose” to be unconstitutionally vague. The words “advocate, support, or oppose” also are commonly understood by a person of ordinary intelligence. Each of these terms refers to result-oriented language, rather than mere discussion of issues. 6 While there 115.646 regulates the use of public funds and does not implicate the officials’ constitutionally protected speech. 6 Plainly, section 115.646 is intended to prohibit using public funds for what the United States Supreme Court called “express advocacy” in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Supreme Court explained express advocacy consists of “express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ or ‘reject.’” Id. at 44 n.52. Given the scienter requirement in the newest version of section 115.646, it will be difficult to show intent to violate the statute absent the use of express 7 may be uncertainty in cases near the margin, complete specificity is not required. Cocktail Fortune, 994 S.W.2d at 957. 7