Opinion ID: 1587058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Effect of Denial of Requested Instruction on Jury's Pardon Power

Text: In reaching the above conclusion, we have considered and rejected the Fifth District's determination that the verdict form in this case denied Iseley an opportunity for a jury pardon. The Fifth District's conclusion rests on its determination that aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault with a firearm. Specifically, the Fifth District relied on dicta in Fernandez v. State, 570 So.2d 1008, 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), stating that [t]he jury instructions and the verdict form logically treated aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as the next lesser-included offense of aggravated assault with a firearm. Iseley, 865 So.2d at 581. We disagree. In Fernandez, the issue was whether an instruction on discharge of a firearm in public should have been given as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault with a firearm. The Second District held that the instruction was necessary to allow the jury to exercise its pardon power because the instruction on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense did not provide such an opportunity: Under the evidence in this case, the jury could only conclude that the deadly weapon was a firearm. No reasonable jury could have found that the defendant used a weapon other than a firearm. Thus, the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm did not give the jury an honest option to pardon the defendant. 570 So.2d at 1011. Thus, Fernandez supports the view that where the only deadly weapon involved in the offense is a firearm, a choice between finding that the crime was committed with a firearm and finding that it was committed with a deadly weapon is really no choice at all. In this case, the jury was instructed on assault, the next immediate lesser included offense to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. This lesser included offense subtracted the element of the deadly weapon or firearm. Thus, the jury was not deprived of an opportunity to use its inherent pardon power. See State v. Abreau, 363 So.2d 1063, 1064 (Fla.1978) (stating that the jury has an opportunity to exercise its inherent pardon power if it is instructed on the next immediate lesser included offense).