Opinion ID: 2615564
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to object to the prosecutor's comments on and defense counsel's testimony about McNelton's in-custody status

Text: McNelton argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to prevent the prosecutor from eliciting testimony from Michael Turner, McNelton's cousin, that McNelton was in custody prior to trial. Turner testified as an alibi witness. McNelton also argues that his trial counsel were ineffective because one of them testified with respect to this issue. During cross-examination, Turner mentioned that McNelton was in custody. The prosecutor asked Turner, Did you ever talk to [Wanda McNelton] about [McNelton] being arrested for murder? Turner replied, I found out through my family that my cousin was like incarcerated. Later in cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Turner about finding out that McNelton was incarcerated. On recross-examination, the prosecutor asked Turner about visiting McNelton in 1992 in Las Vegas, You mean to tell me that [McNelton] didn't ask you to testify in this matter way back in 1992? Turner replied, No, we didn't even talk about why he was in jail. The prosecutor then asked whether Turner knew why McNelton was in jail and whether anyone told Turner not to tell the jury that he had visited McNelton in jail. Mentioning that McNelton was incarcerated and eliciting that information from Turner was improper. We have previously stated that [i]nforming the jury that a defendant is in jail raises an inference of guilt, and could have the same prejudicial effect as bringing a shackled defendant into the courtroom. Haywood v. State, 107 Nev. 285, 288, 809 P.2d 1272, 1273 (1991). In Haywood, the prosecutor referred to the fact that the defendant had been in custody between the time of his arrest and trial; the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant about jail visits he received from friends and relatives. Id. at 287, 809 P.2d at 1273. We concluded in Haywood, however, that this error was harmless because five witnesses identified the defendant and other evidence connected him to the crime. Id. at 288, 809 P.2d at 1273. Likewise, we conclude that the error in the instant case was harmless because of the substantial evidence of McNelton's guilt. Counsel therefore were not ineffective on this ground. As noted above, McNelton also argues that one of his defense counsel, Drew Christensen, made matters worse by taking the stand shortly after Turner testified. Turner had testified on direct examination that the last time he saw McNelton was at the party in 1989. On cross-examination, however, Turner said that the last time he saw McNelton was when he visited him in the Las Vegas jail in 1992 and that Christensen told him not to say anything about that visit. When Christensen testified, he denied telling Turner not to mention visiting McNelton and said that he told Turner not to mention that McNelton was in jail because he did not want the jury to know that McNelton was incarcerated. Christensen could have bolstered Turner's credibility when he explained to the jury that Turner was not trying to hide anything, but simply thought that he had been instructed not to mention the jail visit. On the other hand, Christensen could have hurt McNelton if it appeared to the jury that Christensen was just trying to vindicate himself. We do not decide whether counsel's decision to have Christensen testify was right or wrong, but conclude that the decision was a tactical one and unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances not present here. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990). Accordingly, we conclude that counsel were not ineffective on this ground.