Opinion ID: 2330562
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: By statutory definition, Sprung's conduct comprised one violation of K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A).

Text: Under the second Schoonover component, we must determine whether, by statutory definition, Sprung's conduct constitutes one offense or two. See 281 Kan. at 497, 133 P.3d 48. Because Sprung's convictions are based on multiple violations of the same statute, the unit-of-prosecution test applies. See 281 Kan. at 497, 133 P.3d 48. This test requires that we interpret the statutory definition of the crime to determine the allowable unit of prosecution intended by the legislature. 281 Kan. at 497, 133 P.3d 48. Only one conviction can result from each allowable unit of prosecution. 281 Kan. at 497-98, 133 P.3d 48. In Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 472, 133 P.3d 48, we pointed out that the determination of the appropriate unit of prosecution is not necessarily dependent upon whether there is a single physical action or a single victim. Instead, the key is the scope of the course of conduct proscribed by the statute. The statute at issue here, K.S.A. 21-3504(a), prohibits: (3) engaging in any of the following acts with a child who is under 14 years of age: (A) Any lewd fondling or touching of the person of either the child or the offender, done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the offender, or both; or (B) soliciting the child to engage in any lewd fondling or touching of the person of another with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the child, the offender or another. In rejecting Sprung's multiplicity argument, the Court of Appeals reasoned that K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A) proscribes lewd acts with respect to the child or the offender, therefore either conduct constitutes a unit of prosecution. Sprung, 2009 WL 1591397, at . The panel further noted that the jury instructions and the verdict form clearly distinguished the units of prosecution for the jury by specifying that Count II related to Sprung's act of touching K.M. and Count III related to Sprung's act of submitting to K.M.'s touching of Sprung's penis. 2009 WL 1591397, at . The panel's reasoning mirrored that of another panel in State v. Cramer, No. 96,166, 2008 WL 4416022, at  (Kan. App.2008) (unpublished opinion) (noting that several of the incidents underlying the charges for aggravated indecent liberties involved multiple touchings, but concluding that the language of K.S.A. 21-3504[a][3][A] clearly states that either touching the child or the offender is enough to constitute an offense. The unit of prosecution, thus, is one such touching of either party.). In arguing the panel's rationale is faulty, Sprung points out that the legislature in K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3) chose to prohibit engaging in any of the following acts. The statute then sets out two separate subsections in which those acts are defined. The first subsection, which is at issue here, defines the criminal act as [ a ] ny lewd fondling or touching of the person of either the child or the offender. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A). The second subsection makes the criminal act the soliciting of the child to fondle or touch another person. K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(B). That subsection is not at issue here. Sprung argues that if the legislature intended for each separate instance of touching or fondling to constitute a violation of K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3), it could have defined aggravated indecent liberties with a child as any act of lewd fondling or touching. Instead, the legislature chose to define the criminal act as  any lewd fondling or touching, suggesting that any number of touchings or fondlings could constitute only one violation of K.S.A. 21-3504. The State maintains that K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3) provides different ways in which the crime can occur and maintains that Sprung committed two distinctive acts against K.M. which may be prosecuted in different counts. The State also notes that the jury instructions listed very different and distinctive elements. But in considering the unit of prosecution test, the key is the nature of the conduct proscribed, not the number of acts or the number of victims. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 472, 133 P.3d 48. As Sprung persuasively argues, the nature of the conduct proscribed by K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3) is engaging in any of the following acts. Subsection (A) then defines one of those acts as [a]ny lewd fondling or touching of the person of either the child or the offender, done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the offender, or both. K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A). We are persuaded by Sprung's argument that K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A) creates only a single unit of prosecution. Had the legislature intended to create one unit of prosecution when the offender touches the child and a separate unit of prosecution when the child touches the offender, the legislature could have separated subsection (A) into two subsections, i.e., one subsection proscribing any lewd fondling or touching of a child by the offender and one subsection proscribing any lewd fondling or touching of the offender by the child. Instead, the legislature defined aggravated indecent liberties as engaging in any of the following acts, and then provided only two defining subsections, (A) and (B). See Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 472, 133 P.3d 48; see also State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 246-47, 200 P.3d 22 (2009) (finding that had legislature intended to make possession of each substance listed in K.S.A. 65-7006[a] a separate offense, legislature could have explicitly stated as much in the statute). Further, like the statute at issue in Thompson, K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A) possesses a unifying intentto arouse or to satisfy the sexual desireswith the object of that intent being the child, the offender, or both. See 287 Kan. at 248-52, 200 P.3d 22 (discussing the unitary intent to manufacture methamphetamine specified in K.S.A. 65-7006[a]). The legislature's inclusion of a unitary intent in subsection (A) lends additional support to our conclusion that the legislature intended to create a single unit of prosecution for that subsection. Moreover, even if we were to find the legislature's intent to be unclear as to the unit of prosecution defined by K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), the rule of lenity would mandate that we construe the statute in favor of the defendant. Under that rule, statutory silence and ambiguity regarding the unit of prosecution is construed in favor of the defendant. See Thompson, 287 Kan. at 248-49, 200 P.3d 22. Here, the jury convicted Sprung of the unitary conduct of Sprung's lewd fondling or touching of K.M. and K.M.'s fondling or touching of Sprung. Further, the plain language of the applicable subsection of the charging statute for both counts, K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), creates a single unit of prosecution. We conclude Sprung's convictions for aggravated indecent liberties with a child are multiplicitous, and we reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling finding otherwise. Accordingly, we affirm one of those convictions, reverse the second conviction, and vacate the sentence for the second conviction.