Opinion ID: 3023355
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Verdict Sheets

Text: Turning to the question of the verdict sheet used, we note as an initial matter that special verdict sheets are generally disfavored in criminal trials. See United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 1982) (“As a general proposition, special verdicts are generally disfavored in criminal cases, but there is no per se rule against them.”); see also United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1129 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that “there is the belief that in the long run special verdicts are not favorable to defendants because by a progression of questions each of which seems to require an answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted.”). However, they may be necessary in exceptionally complex cases. See, e.g., United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 698 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Aside from these rare cases, we have held that a general unanimity instruction will suffice. United States v. Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1998) (“While it is true that in most cases a general unanimity instruction is sufficient to support a conviction . . . a specific unanimity instruction is required ‘where the complexity of the case, or other factors, creates the potential that the jury will be confused.’”).10 A district court has 9 Of course, no actual harm need result in order for a defendant to be liable. See United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 601-04 (3d Cir. 2004). 10 The Government notes that Russo challenges only the District Court’s refusal to employ special verdict sheets. We respectfully disagree, as Russo’s brief alternatees between an argument for special verdict sheets (Brief at 35) and an argument for an 9 discretion in determining whether to submit special interrogatories to the jury regarding the elements of an offense, and accordingly we will review only for an abuse thereof. See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 663 (3d Cir. 1993). At trial, the Government alleged alternative deprivations in support of Russo’s mail fraud indictment: an honest services violation (with regard to Dominick), a property violation (with regard to the Waretown property), and a money violation. Russo argues that the Government advanced one untenable legal theory (namely, the honest services violation), and that, without a special verdict sheet to confirm that Russo was not convicted on that charge, our holding in United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 2002), commands that his verdict be vacated. Having determined that the District Court’s jury charge was legally sufficient, however, we cannot say that one of the theories supporting Russo’s conviction was unconstitutional or legally untenable. See id. Moreover, the mere fact that the Government alleged alternative legal theories with regard to the mail fraud count does not necessitate the use of special verdict sheets. While Russo claims that it is unclear whether the jury unanimously convicted him of mail fraud under the honest services theory, the property theory, or the money theory, it is clear that the jury, at the very least, believed that he intentionally acted to deprive the Marshal’s Service of the use and benefit of the Waretown property, as it convicted him of unlawful conversion of the Waretown property pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 641. This provides augmented unanimity instruction. (Brief at 36.) Both concerns, however, can be addressed concurrently. 10 sufficient support for the Government’s property theory of mail fraud, making any error harmless. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993) (absent a showing that a trial court’s omission of a unanimity instruction “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” the failure to give such an order is harmless); cf. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1991) (holding that, when a defendant is convicted of a crime based on alternative theories, and the Government produces sufficient evidence to convict on one theory, a reviewing court need not consider whether the evidence is sufficient on the alternative ground). We therefore find no reversible error arising from the District Court’s decision to use a general verdict sheet or its decision to employ a general unanimity charge.