Opinion ID: 1027257
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Accept

Text: Worden's argument on appeal as to the accept prong of his § 2002(2) claim is that SunTrust admitted that it received information regarding the polygraph results. He makes no other argument that SunTrust accepted the polygraph results other than the mere receipt of the results from either law enforcement or himself. Worden does not challenge the district court's finding that SunTrust's receipt of the polygraph results from law enforcement was passive and that SunTrust did not request [Worden's] polygraph results from law enforcement. Similarly, Worden does not challenge the district court's finding, at least as to the second polygraph examination, that Worden unilaterally forced knowledge of the polygraph results upon SunTrust. With this background in mind, and recognizing neither the EPPA nor its promulgated regulations define the term accept for § 2002(2) purposes, we review the district court's judgment in that regard. The district court determined that under the facts of this case, SunTrust's mere receipt of the polygraph results was not acceptance for purposes of a § 2002(2) claim. SunTrust's receipt came either because law enforcement voluntarily announced the results in the presence of SunTrust employees (both examinations) or Worden told SunTrust the results (the second examination). As the district court discussed, this conduct does not constitute acceptance of the results. The word accept, in both legal and non-legal contexts, necessarily connoted the ability to decline and requires some action by the person or entity accepting. Black's Law Dictionary defines accept as: To receive with approval or satisfaction; to receive with intent to retain ... Means something more than to receive, meaning to adopt, to agree to carry out provisions, to keep and retain. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 12 (5th ed.1979) (emphasis added). Worden, slip op. at 16. Worden contended mere receipt of the polygraph results, without more and regardless of the circumstances, constitutes accept[ance] for purposes of establishing liability under § 2002(2). In support of this contention, he cited 29 C.F.R. § 801.4(c), a Department of Labor regulation implementing the EPPA, which provides: The receipt by an employer of information from a polygraph test administered by police authorities pursuant to an investigation is prohibited by § 2002(2). The district court disagreed with this argument and rejected the validity of the regulation. This Court declines to follow [§ 801.4(c)] that provides an employer's mere receipt of the results of a polygraph examination from law enforcement is a violation of the EPPA. Such a regulation goes beyond the authority granted to the DOL by Congress to issue rules and regulations.... In essence, such a provision operates to make an employer strictly liable for receiving such information from law enforcement. Such an interpretation is beyond the scope of the authority granted by Congress and is irreconcilable with the express terms of the EPPA. Clearly, the actual language of the EPPA requires more than the employer's passive receipt of polygraph information from law enforcement.... In this case, the statute expressly uses the word accept, which has a plain meaning beyond mere receipt. Moreover, the words of the statute surrounding accept, namely use, refer to, and inquire, all connote active participation by an employer. Receipt connotes no such active participation, a point made dramatically clear by the circumstances of this case where SunTrust did not request [Worden's] polygraph results from law enforcement, yet would be liable under the DOL's expansive interpretation of the EPPA. When viewed in context of the express language of the statute itself, it is clear that the regulation goes beyond congressional intent. Therefore, [the regulation] goes beyond the scope of authority granted by Congress and will not be followed by the [c]ourt. Worden, slip op. at 16-17, 18-19. We agree with the district court's analysis. 29 C.F.R. § 801.4(c) is an interpretive and not a legislative regulation because it merely explains how a provision operates. See Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc., 370 F.3d 446, 452 (4th Cir.2004). As the district court correctly noted, this means § 801.4(c) can only be upheld if [it] implement[s] the congressional mandate in a reasonable manner. [ Walton, 370 F.3d at 452 (citing Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir.1999))]. In making such a determination, the Court must assess whether the regulation `represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute ... [and] should not [be] disturb[ed] ... unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.' Chevron[, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 6 L.Ed.2d 908 (1961)).] Worden, slip op. at 17. In the absence of a definition from Congress in a statute, or a clear congressional intent to the contrary, see Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993), we accord words in a statute their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207, 117 S.Ct. 660, 136 L.Ed.2d 644 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis states that a word is known by the company it keeps. See S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378, 126 S.Ct. 1843, 164 L.Ed.2d 625 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). [9] As the district court correctly concluded, accept as defined means something more than to receive. [10] Furthermore, the inclusion of accept in the same statutory phrase as use, refer to, and inquire concerning the results reflects a statutory intent that accept be read in context as carrying similar meaning. Those terms all involve an action by the employer greater than passive receipt. Thus, both its dictionary definition and its context with the adjoining statutory terms under noscitur a sociis establish that accept means something other than mere unsolicited receipt for § 2002(2) purposes. As the regulation adopts a mere receipt rule, it is contrary to this plain statutory meaning, and it cannot, as a matter of law, implement[ ] the congressional mandate in a reasonable manner. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in ruling 29 C.F.R. § 801.4(c) invalid. Because the mere receipt of unsolicited polygraph results does not constitute accept[ance] under § 2002(2), Worden's § 2002(2) claim cannot succeed under the facts of this case. We thus conclude SunTrust did not accept the polygraph results within the intendment of § 2002(2) and therefore the district court did not err in awarding summary judgment to SunTrust as to the accept prong of the § 2002(2) claim. Accordingly, we affirm the award of summary judgment as to that part of the § 2002(2) claim.