Opinion ID: 202865
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of the Case Against Mayor Marin

Text: The court dismissed the claims against Mayor Marin in his personal capacity, finding that, while the Mayor can in principle be held liable under a theory of failing to act or take necessary steps to remedy [her] predicament, Rodriguez-Garcia had not provided sufficient evidence to establish that the mayor was aware of her situation. Municipal officials may only be held liable under § 1983 in their personal capacity if the plaintiff can establish that her constitutional injury resulted from the direct acts or omissions of the official, or from indirect conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization. Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.2005). On either theory, the plaintiff must show that the official had actual or constructive notice of the constitutional violation. See Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir.1988) (An important factor in making the determination of liability is whether the official was put on some kind of notice of the alleged violations, for one cannot make a `deliberate' or `conscious' choice to act or not to act unless confronted with a problem that requires the taking of affirmative steps. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986))). In seeking to convince the court that the mayor knew of her employment situation, Rodriguez-Garcia relied principally on the Letters, particularly the March 27 letter from Human Resources suggesting that the mayor had referred her claim to its attention. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that it had admitted the Letters for the limited purpose of establishing that Rodriguez-Garcia did not request a transfer from Public Works and thus the Letters could not be used to establish the mayor's knowledge of her situation. With the Letters excluded, the court found that the remaining evidence was insufficient to establish that the mayor was aware of her situation and hence had any direct or indirect involvement in her transfer, lack of reinstatement, or minimal work assignments. We review the court's Rule 50(a) ruling de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rodriguez-Garcia. DiRico v. City of Quincy, 404 F.3d 464, 468 (1st Cir.2005). However, because that ruling depends upon the correctness of the court's decision to limit the admissibility of the Letters, we must first evaluate the court's evidentiary ruling, which we review for abuse of discretion. See Pelletier v. Main St. Textiles, LP, 470 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir.2006).
In their motion in limine, appellees argued that the Letters should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 408, which prohibits the use of statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim as evidence of a party's liability for . . . a claim that was disputed as to validity or amount. Fed.R.Evid. 408(a)(2), (a). At a hearing on the motion, the court initially stated: [I]t is my impression that these do not fall under Rule 408. . . . These are the sort of letters that when anything happens regarding personnel, the attorney starts to write the agency to put them on notice. The agency, the municipality in this case, will respond, `We've noted your letter. We are going to look into this.' Then . . . the attorney will say, `Oh, you have done this or you haven't done that.' Although the court seemed inclined to reject defendants' arguments that the Letters were covered by Rule 408, Rodriguez-Garcia's attorney began her arguments against the motion in limine by focusing on an exception to Rule 408 that allows evidence offered for a purpose other than showing liability. Specifically, she argued that [t]he letters [were] being introduced into evidence for the limited purpose of proving that defendants in fact knew that Ms. Rodriguez[-Garcia] did not want the transfer and that they were aware that she did not want the transfer. Despite this inauspicious beginning, Rodriguez-Garcia's attorney's arguments developed over the course of the hearing on the motion. By the end, she clearly contested the relevance of Rule 408 to the Letters. Indeed, just before the court announced that it would recess to deliberate, her attorney urged the court to examine the four Letters together: You cannot look at each letter individually. . . . You see, Mr. Cartagena directed a letter to the mayor. And the mayor, and very wisely by his counsel, is trying to take himself out of the picture saying it has nothing to do with me, I didn't exercise any action, I didn't do anything, I didn't sign the letter, I didn't send the letter. But you read [the letter from Human Resources], the first thing that it says is, `The Honorable William Miranda Marin, Mayor, has referred to us your letter dated March 8, 2000, concerning the transfer of Ms. Rodriguez.' This is evidence of liability against the mayor. (Emphasis added). Defense counsel responded: That's why [Rule] 408 does not permit the letter to come into evidence. Rodriguez-Garcia's attorney countered: This letter is not an admission. . . . It is not a compromise. Read it. Thus, by the end of the hearing, the court was on notice that Rodriguez-Garcia intended to use the Letters as proof of the mayor's liability and not merely as evidence that she did not request her transfer. Nonetheless, in a written ruling after the recess, the court [a]ssume[d] that the communications at issue [were] indeed compromise related and it admitted the Letters for the limited purpose of negating defendants' contention that plaintiff herself requested a transfer. This limitation, erroneous as a matter of law, was an abuse of discretion. See Charlesbank Equity Fund II v. Blinds To Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir.2004) (noting that legal error always constitutes abuse of discretion). The court's initial impression that these letters do not fall under Rule 408 was correct. These Letters cannot reasonably be viewed as statements made in compromise negotiations regarding [a] claim that was in dispute. Fed.R.Evid. 408(a)(2). The March 8 letter from Rodriguez-Garcia's attorney to the mayor's office served the purpose of giving the defendants notice of a claim. Indeed, appellees acknowledged that Rodriguez-Garcia's attorney had to write such a letter to comply with local pre-litigation notice requirements. The March 27 letter from Human Resources, which said that The Hon. William Miranda Marín, Mayor, has referred to us your letter dated March 8, 2000 concerning the transfer of Mrs. [Rodriguez-Garcia], simply acknowledged that notice of the claim had been received and expressed the willingness of Human Resources to grant Rodriguez-Garcia's request for reinstatement. Although Human Resources disputed a factual matter (that Rodriguez-Garcia had not requested a transfer), that disagreement did not affect their willingness to grant to her, without qualification or condition, the reinstatement that she sought. With Rodriguez-Garcia receiving in this letter exactly what she wanted, it could easily be thought there were no compromise negotiations taking place in this exchange of correspondence within the meaning of Rule 408. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 984 (10th ed.1998) (defining compromise as a settlement of differences . . . reached by mutual concessions.); see also Sandlin v. Shapiro & Fishman, 919 F.Supp. 1564, 1569 (D.Fla.1996) (finding that letters whose contents offered no concessions did not meet the definition of compromise and thus were outside the scope of the state analog to Rule 408). Relatedly, the statement at issue here (The Hon. William Miranda Marin, Mayor, has referred to us your letter dated March 8, 2000, concerning the transfer of Mrs. Rodriguez) is not the kind of statement that one would be reluctant to make to a potential adversary in an effort to reach an agreement about a dispute without the protection of Rule 408. Indeed, if a stand-alone letter of acknowledgment had been written confirming receipt and noting that the mayor's office had referred the claim to Human Resources, there is no question that the letter would have been admissible as evidence of notice to the mayor of Rodriguez-Garcia's claim. Thus, admitting this evidence complies with both the letter and spirit of Rule 408. The second letter from Rodriguez-Garcia's attorney to the mayor, dated April 10, simply reiterated the request for the transfer. When no reinstatement was forthcoming, her attorney sent a third letter dated May 31, 2000 announcing his intention to file a lawsuit. These letters too are outside the ambit of Rule 408. Therefore, Rodriguez-Garcia should have been permitted to use the Letters as evidence that the mayor personally had notice of her claims, an indispensable element of her theory of liability, rather than simply as evidence that she had not requested a transfer from Public Works.
It is a short step from the determination that the district court erred in its decision to limit the admissibility of the Letters to a determination that it erred in granting the mayor judgment as a matter of law. The district court, having excluded the Letters, determined that the remaining evidence  the March 3 complaint letter Rodriguez-Garcia sent to Human Resources [15] and the encounter between Rodriguez-Garcia and the mayor in a public square  was insufficient to establish supervisory liability. The court explained: `[i]f mere receipt of a letter or similar complaint were enough, without more, to constitute personal involvement, it would result in liability merely for being a supervisor, which is contrary to the black-letter law that [§ ] 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability.' (quoting Johnson v. Wright, 234 F.Supp.2d 352, 363 (S.D.N.Y.2002)). Given the state of the record that prompted this observation, we understand the court's reference to the mere receipt of a letter to be a reference to the March 3 letter to the acting director of Human Resources. We appreciate the reluctance to permit a jury to draw an inference about the personal involvement of the mayor on the basis of a letter sent to a department head. However, if the court had correctly admitted the Letters as evidence of the mayor's knowledge of Rodriguez-Garcia's complaint and his personal involvement in dealing with it, the court could no longer maintain that Rodriguez-Garcia was attempting to establish the mayor's liability based simply on his role as the supervisor of a department head. Instead, she would have had a basis for arguing that the mayor knew about and was directly involved in the disposition of her transfer and the failure to remedy it. Although appellees argue strenuously that there was no evidence that the mayor personally received the Letters sent to him, this is a factual question appropriate for jury determination. Moreover, because the district court erred in dismissing the case against the mayor in his personal capacity, it also improperly hindered Rodriguez-Garcia's case against the municipality. It is well established that the deliberate acts or omissions of a municipal policymaker with final authority over the subject matter in question may expose the municipality itself to liability. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-83, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (explaining that municipal liability can be found on a plaintiff's showing of a deliberate choice to follow a course of action [] made . . . by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question). We have repeatedly recognized that mayors in Puerto Rico are the government officials ultimately responsible for the employment decisions of the municipality. Rivera-Torres v. Ortiz Velez, 341 F.3d 86, 103 (1st Cir.2003); see also Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 867 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1989). If Rodriguez-Garcia could establish the mayor's liability in his personal capacity, she would have a plausible argument for municipal liability as well. Under these circumstances, the limited relevance accorded by the district court to the Letters on the basis of Rule 408 was not a harmless error.