Opinion ID: 1768154
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of the confession at trial.

Text: The Nelson Circuit Court admitted Michael's confession at trial under Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), because the confession did not explicitly refer to P.J. by name. The confession was admitted without a limiting admonition by the trial court (none was requested). On appeal, P.J. argues that Michael's confession was inadmissible because it was not sufficiently redacted and, alternatively, that the trial judge should have admonished the jury sua sponte as to its limited use. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), held that the admission of a non-testifying defendant's confession that expressly implicated his codefendant violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 137, 88 S.Ct. at 1628. In that situation, the codefendant has no opportunity to directly question his hearsay accuser. Bruton overruled Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278 (1957), which had allowed the introduction of a non-testifying defendant's inculpatory confession in a joint trial provided that a limiting instruction was given to the jury to consider the confession as evidence only against the confessor. In Richardson v. Marsh, supra , the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause is satisfied if the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence. Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 1709. In reaching this conclusion, the Court in Richardson distinguished Bruton : In Bruton , the codefendant's confession expressly implicat[ed] the defendant as his accomplice. Thus, at the time that confession was introduced there was not the slightest doubt that it would prove powerfully incriminating. By contrast, in this case the confession was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial .... Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1707 (citations omitted). Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998), addressed the extent and sufficiency of the redaction required by Richardson . In Gray , the non-testifying defendant's confession had been redacted by replacing any reference to the codefendant's name with a blank space or the word deleted. Id. at 188, 118 S.Ct. at 1153. The Supreme Court concluded that, unlike in Richardson , the confession at issue referred directly to the `existence' of the nonconfessing defendant. Id. at 192, 118 S.Ct. at 1155. The Court held that a confession which substitute[s] blanks and the word `delete' for the [defendant's] proper name, falls within the class of statements to which Bruton `s protections apply. Id. at 197, 118 S.Ct. at 1157. Likewise, the admission of Michael's confession violated P. J.'s Sixth Amendment rights as interpreted in Bruton and Gray . In relevant part, Michael stated in his confession: Q. And who did you go to Randall Jackson's house with? A. I can't tell you that.       Q. Who taped up Randall? A. The other party.... Q.... You and another party, that you're not naming[,] went into the house? A. Uh-huh. Q. Okay, who ... did all the injuries to Randall? A. The other party. I made sure he's all right. I didn't touch him.       Q.... And when you ... took the gun to the saw mill, you were by yourself? A. Naw. Somebody was with me. Q. Was it this other unnamed party? A. Yeah. It was. Q. Okay, so this person was with you at the hospital? A. Yeah.       Q. When you went [into Randall's house] this other party was with you .... How come you didn't get involved in none of that hitting on Randall? A. `Cause I'm not like that. I didn't go there to hurt nobody.       Q. [How did Randall] get wax on him? A. I guess the other party dumped it on him. Q. What, candle wax? A. Yeah.       Q. So who took the one gun. Did you take it? A. The other party did.       Q. Okay, ... did you hide the gun? A. Nope. Q. Then who hid it. A. The other party. Q. And you don't [want to] say who this other party is? A. No sir. While the confession did not directly implicate P.J. by name, it was facially inculpatory as to the unnamed other party. As in Gray, supra , the jury needed only to make a slight, intuitive leap to infer that P. J., the confessor's codefendant, was the other party identified in the confession as the primary perpetrator of these crimes. As explained in Gray, supra : The inferences at issue here involve statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial. Moreover, the redacted confession with the blank prominent on its face ...  facially incriminates the codefendant. Id. at 196, 118 S.Ct. at 1157 (emphasis in original). A Bruton violation can be subject to harmless error analysis. Gill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 7 S.W.3d 365, 368 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830, 121 S.Ct. 83, 148 L.Ed.2d 45 (2000). However, before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Upon review of the record before us, we conclude that the error in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Other than Michael's confession, the only evidence linking P.J. to the crime was Randall Jackson's in-court identification and P. J.'s fingerprints found on the Cadillac and other stolen items. The reliability of identification testimony has long been questioned by various litigants, courts and commentators. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) ([t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification). While sufficient to avoid a directed verdict of acquittal, we do not believe the victim's identification of P.J. as one of his attackers or the evidence linking P.J. to the spoils of the robbery were so overwhelming that the admission of [Michael's] statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Gill, supra, at 368. Michael's confession, which pointed the finger at the other party as the primary perpetrator, was clearly the most damning evidence against P.J. We therefore reverse P. J.'s case for a new trial, at which Michael's confession will be excluded from evidence unless Michael testifies and his testimony is inconsistent with his confession ( e.g., he testifies that he acted alone), KRE 801A(a)(1), or is consistent with his confession and is offered to rebut a claim of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, KRE 801A(a)(2). We disagree with P. J.'s contention that the trial court had a duty to, sua sponte, give a limiting admonition to the jury with respect to its use of Michael's confession. KRE 105(a) provides: When evidence which is admissible as to one (1) party or for one (1) purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and admonish the jury accordingly. In the absence of such a request, the admission of the evidence by the trial judge without limitation shall not be a ground for complaint on appeal, except under the palpable error rule. (Emphasis added.) Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 105 is identical to the first sentence of the Kentucky Rule except that it uses the term instruct instead of admonish. The Federal Rule does not contain the appellate review limitation in the second sentence of KRE 105, but has been uniformly so interpreted by the federal courts. E.g., United States v. Vitale, 596 F.2d 688, 689 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135, 1140 (10th Cir.1978). The upon request qualification of the rule is but a codification of the principle that [t]he admission of mixed admissibility evidence without an accompanying admonition cannot be questioned on appeal by a party who failed to request an admonition at trial. R. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 1.05, at 17 (3d ed. Michie 1993) (citing 1 Wigmore, Evidence 697 (Tiller's rev. 1983) ([T]he opponent of the evidence must ask for that instruction. Otherwise, he may be supposed to have waived it as unnecessary for his protection.)). Kentucky has long adhered to this view, e.g., Hall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 228, 229 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 526 (1996); Raeber v. Commonwealth, Ky., 558 S.W.2d 609, 610 (1977); Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 242 S.W.2d 984, 987 (1951); as have the federal courts, both before and after adoption of the Federal Rules. United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (D.C.Cir.1995), vacated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1164, 116 S.Ct. 1562, 134 L.Ed.2d 662 (1996); United States v. Brawner, 32 F.3d 602, 606 (D.C.Cir.1994); United States v. Regner, 677 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 911, 103 S.Ct. 220, 74 L.Ed.2d 175 (1982); United States v. Conley, 523 F.2d 650, 654 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920, 96 S.Ct. 1125, 47 L.Ed.2d 327 (1976); Stevens v. United States, 256 F.2d 619, 624 (9th Cir.1958). One federal court has noted that [t]here are occasions when, for tactical reasons, defense counsel may wish to forego such a limiting instruction because it might focus the jury's attention on the damaging evidence. United States v. Rhodes, supra, at 1453. To the same effect is Hall v. Commonwealth, supra , regarding the need to request a limiting instruction with respect to the admission of evidence of a defendant's prior felony conviction. As a matter of trial strategy, it may be decided that the admonition would only serve to emphasize the conviction.... If, on the other hand, a limiting admonition is desired, it need only be requested. Id. at 229. In both Bruton and Richardson v. Marsh , the limiting instruction was, in fact, given; so the issue of whether the right to a limiting instruction can be waived was not addressed. Bruton held that the limiting instruction, standing alone, was insufficient to protect a defendant's right of confrontation against an incriminating out-of-court confession by a non-testifying codefendant. Richardson held that the Confrontation Clause is satisfied if the limiting instruction is accompanied by the redaction of the codefendant's confession to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence. 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 1709. Richardson did not say that the redaction of the confession, standing alone, would be insufficient if the defendant had waived his right to the limiting instruction by failing to request it. Presumably, a confession properly redacted per Richardson and Gray v. Maryland, supra , would not incriminate the codefendant at all. In view of this fact and the upon request qualification in both FRE 105 and KRE 105(a), we decline to construe Richardson that narrowly. Upon retrial, the trial court is directed to give the limiting admonition upon request.