Opinion ID: 1391736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Admissibility of Witnesses' Former Testimony

Text: (26a) Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of two witnesses (Larry Rushing and Debria Lewis) who were unavailable at trial. According to defendant, the prosecutor failed to exercise reasonable diligence in procuring the trial attendance of these witnesses. Under California law, prior testimony may be introduced if, among other things, the declarant is unavailable as a witness. (Evid. Code, § 1291.) Unavailability may be established by showing that the declarant is Absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his attendance by the court's process. ( Id., § 240, subd. (a)(5).) It has been stated that the requirement of due diligence is a stringent one for the prosecution. It is not sufficient that reasonable diligence has been exercised in an effort to procure a defendant's [ sic, witness'] attendance `by the court's process.' A criminal defendant's witness-confrontation right is deemed to require that the prosecution make the additional showing of a good faith effort and reasonable diligence to procure the witness' voluntary attendance. ( People v. Salas (1976) 58 Cal. App.3d 460, 469-470 [129 Cal. Rptr. 871], italics in original; see People v. Johnson (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 749, 755 [114 Cal. Rptr. 545].) In a recent review of the issue ( People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 235 [137 Cal. Rptr. 171, 561 P.2d 261]), for example, we observed that a prosecutor's sole effort to procure the attendance of a witness was to request issuance of a bench warrant and, at some undisclosed time, to ask the absent witness' mother where he might be located. (19 Cal.3d at p. 236.) No attempt was made in Enriquez to serve the warrant or to locate the witness based on information available to the prosecutor. We concluded that the record disclosed only casual indifference, not diligence, in attempting to serve the warrant on [witness] Prieto. ( Id., at pp. 236-237.) In the present case, in contrast, there is ample evidence in the record supporting the trial court's finding of the prosecution's due diligence. The police officers and their investigators actively sought these two witnesses by interviewing friends and relatives, checking with jails, hospitals and probation officers, and leaving appropriate messages. The trial court heard extensive testimony on the issue and expressly found that given the lifestyle of these witnesses (Rushing was characterized as a fugitive from justice, Lewis was assertedly a prostitute), and the evident difficulties incurred in trying to find them, the prosecutor exercised due diligence under the circumstances. (27) As we recently noted in Enriquez, due diligence is a factual question to be determined by the trial court according to the circumstances in each case; under familiar rules the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion appears. (19 Cal.3d at p. 235; see also People v. Williams (1973) 9 Cal.3d 24, 35 [106 Cal. Rptr. 622, 506 P.2d 998].) No such abuse appears herein. (26b) Moreover, even were we to hold that the prosecutor failed to exercise due diligence, any error in admitting the former testimony of witnesses Rushing and Lewis would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]; In re Montgomery (1970) 2 Cal.3d 863, 868 [87 Cal. Rptr. 695, 471 P.2d 15]), because neither witness provided significant, noncumulative testimony. Rushing testified merely that defendant had admitted hitting an elderly lady during the course of a burglary; Lewis was one of several witnesses (Gaines, Hall, Mikles, McFarland) in whom defendant confided regarding his role in the murders. Indeed, as we have noted, defendant's own tape-recorded statement firmly established his complicity in these crimes.