Opinion ID: 158744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Pattern and Practice Suit

Text: 107 The United States brought a pattern and practice action alleging Denver ha[s] pursued and continue[s] to pursue policies and practices that discriminate in employment on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA. The district court bifurcated the action into a liability phase to determine whether Denver's policy comported with the ADA, and a remedial phase to determine whether there were any qualified individuals with disabilities who merited relief. About a month before trial, the district court granted summary judgment on the question of liability in favor of the United States. The court held Denver's policy forbidding reassignment of disabled police officers to Career Service positions violated the ADA, and that Denver failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that accommodating such individuals would cause it an undue hardship. United States v. City & County of Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (D. Colo. 1996). The court later certified this summary judgment order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1292(b). 108 Denver raises several issues in this interlocutory appeal. First, it argues that the United States has not properly brought an ADA pattern and practice suit because it followed the framework of International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), a systemic disparate treatment Title VII case, and not the test set forth in White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995), an ADA case. Denver also asserts that the Teamsters framework is inapposite because Denver applies its policy neutrally, that reassignment is never a required reasonable accommodation, 21 and that requiring reassignment here would constitute an undue hardship. Finally, Denver requests that we address the necessary elements of the remedial phase. 109 Title I of the ADA adopts the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. 12117(a). Section 707 of Title VII states 110 [w]henever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any . . . [protected] rights . . . and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the [protected] rights . . ., the Attorney General may bring a civil action. 111 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(a). The United States brought this pattern and practice action pursuant to this subsection, as it is authorized to do under Title I. 112 In Teamsters, the Supreme Court addressed, inter alia, the proper structure for a pattern and practice case brought by the government. See 431 U.S. at 357-62. The defendant there argued that in order to maintain a pattern and practice action, the United States should have to prove each element of the McDonnell Douglas test, which sets forth the burden for an individual prima facie case under Title VII. See id. at 357. The Court rejected this contention. It ruled that in a pattern or practice action the Government's 113 initial burden is to demonstrate that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer or group of employers. . . . At the initial, liability stage of a pattern-or-practice suit the Government is not required to offer evidence that each person for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer's discriminatory policy. Its burden is to establish a prima facie case that such a policy existed. 114 Id. at 360; see also Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 449 n.1. (In a true 'pattern and practice' suit, the government is not required to show individual discrimination with respect to each person for whom it seeks relief when establishing its prima facie case.). However, when the Government also seeks individual relief for the victims of the unlawful practice, the district court must usually conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the trial to determine the scope of individual relief. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361. 115 Just as McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), sets forth the elements of a prima facie case for an individual seeking relief under Title VII, White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, sets forth the elements of a prima facie case for an individual seeking relief under the ADA in this circuit, id. at 360-61. And, just as the Court recognized that the specifics of the McDonnell Douglas framework are inapplicable in certain factual situations, including when the government has brought a broad-based pattern and practice action, see Teamsters at 358-60, it is clear that White does not articulate the elements of a prima facie case when the government seek[s] to protect the public's interest through a pattern and practice action, Coe, 646 F.2d at 449 n.1. Teamsters sets forth a logical and efficient framework for allocating burdens of proof in pattern and practice employment discrimination suits, and we approve of the district court's use of that framework in this case. See United States v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp.1092, 1096 (E.D. La. 1994). 116 Denver also argues that the United States cannot maintain a pattern and practice action because Denver applies its policy to all Classified and Career Service employees and there is no disparity in treatment. We have rejected that argument in part III A.2. supra. The district court correctly found that Denver's undisputed policy constituted unlawful discrimination, Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360. With respect to Denver's undue hardship defense, we agree with the district court that, even viewing the evidence presented on summary judgment in the light most favorable to Denver, no reasonable trier of fact could find reassignment constituted an undue hardship as a general matter. 117 Finally, we decline to address the elements the United States must prove during the remedial phase of the pattern and practice suit as that issue is beyond the scope of this interlocutory appeal. Cf. United Transp. Union Local 1745 v. City of Albuquerque, 178 F.3d 1109, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 1999); Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 17 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1994). IV 118 We AFFIRM the jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs. We also AFFIRM the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for class certification and its grant of summary judgment in favor of Denver on plaintiffs' equal protection claims. We REVERSE and REMAND plaintiffs' front pay award to the district court for further consideration in light of this opinion. We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States on the liability phase of its pattern and practice suit.