Opinion ID: 170104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Williams's Speedy Trial Act Waiver

Text: In the 109 days between February 24, 2005 and June 13, 2005, the parties filed no pretrial motions to toll the speedy trial clock. The Government argues, however, that these days were properly excluded pursuant to Mr. Williams's Speedy Trial Act Waiver and the ends-of-justice continuances granted under § 3161(h)(8)(A). Accordingly, we next consider the effect of Mr. Williams's purported waiver of his speedy trial rights. The Supreme Court recently considered the issue of waiver in the context of the Act. In Zedner, 126 S.Ct. at 1980, after being granted numerous continuances, the defendant (at the suggestion of the trial judge and through counsel) signed a blanket, prospective waiver of his rights under the Act, including his right to move to dismiss the indictment before trial based on a violation of the Act. Id. at 1981-82. After examining the text, purpose, and legislative history of the Act, the Court held that a defendant may not prospectively waive the Act's application. Id. at 1987. The Court first observed that the detailed scheme of the Act did not expressly include a provision authorizing the exclusion of days pursuant to a defendant's waiver. Id. at 1985. Second, the Court emphasized the dual purposes of the Act in protecting not only a defendant's right to a speedy trial, but also the public's interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases  an interest which would not be served if defendants may opt out of the Act entirely. Id. The Court noted that its reasoning was consistent with the legislative history of the Act. Id. at 1985-86 (Because of the Act's emphasis on that societal right, a defendant ought not be permitted to waive rights that are not his or hers alone to relinquish. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S.REP. No. 96-212, at 29 (1979))). Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the Act's provision for waivers when defendants fail to move for dismissal prior to trial, see 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), demonstrates that defendants also may prospectively waive application of the Act. Id. at 1986. Notably, it stated that [a]llowing prospective waivers would seriously undermine the Act because there are many cases  like the case at hand  in which the prosecution, the defense, and the court would all be happy to opt out of the Act, to the detriment of the public interest. Id. In contrast, reasoned the Court, The sort of retrospective waiver allowed by § 3161(a)(2) does not pose a comparable danger because the prosecution and the court cannot know until the trial actually starts or the guilty plea is actually entered whether the defendant will forgo moving to dismiss. As a consequence, the prosecution and the court retain a strong incentive to make sure that the trial begins on time. Id. Applying Zedner, we hold that Mr. Williams's avowedly free and voluntary waiver of his right to a speedy trial is invalid. Dist. Ct. Doc. 37 at 1. Consequently, the district court erred in ruling that Mr. Williams had prospectively waived his rights under the Act. [9]