Opinion ID: 166731
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusing sua sponte to order a continuance.

Text: Cleaver never requested that the district court continue the trial so that he could have more time to review these recordings. Rather, Cleaver sought only to have the district court exclude these witnesses’s testimony. Cleaver now argues that the district court should have sua sponte granted him a continuance. Ordinarily we would review the district court’s decision not to grant a continuance for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d 7 647, 663 (10th Cir. 2005). But because Cleaver never requested a continuance, 8 we review the district court’s failure to order one sua sponte only for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see also United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kizzee, 150 F.3d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 1998). “Under that test, before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (quotations, alterations omitted). “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotations, alterations omitted). Here, there was no plain error. Cleaver does not dispute that he had the transcripts of these recordings from which to prepare for trial for eighteen months. And he knew two months before his trial that the Government intended to call these witnesses to testify against him. Further, Cleaver had the actual recordings a week prior to trial. Finally, the Government sought to play only one 8 At the time that the district court severed Cleaver’s trial from that of Thomas Dowell, the court postponed Cleaver’s trial for two months. Cleaver’s argument on appeal, however, is that the trial court should have sua sponte granted him another delay in light of his July 21, 2003, motion to strike these three witnesses. 8 recorded conversation between Cleaver and Marshall for the jury, but was unable to do so because of technical difficulties. And even if we could say there had been plain error, which we cannot, any such error did not affect Cleaver’s substantial rights. Cleaver was able to cross-examine these witnesses at trial. He does not assert now how he might have better cross-examined them or what he could have done differently at trial if he had had the actual recordings for a longer period of time before trial. Cleaver, therefore, has failed to meet his burden of establishing that the district court’s failure to continue his trial sua sponte amounted to plain error that affected his substantial rights. Cf. United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 904 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in denying continuance where defendant was unable to show he had been prejudiced by that denial).