Opinion ID: 1894988
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Occupants

Text: The parties in this case debate the meaning Summers gives to occupants of the place to be searched. Summers used the term occupants interchangeably with residents, without defining either term. The briefs submitted to this Court note a split of authority in other jurisdictions as to whether occupants applies to persons visiting the searched premises when the police execute a search warrant. A review of the relevant case law reveals three different approaches. First, some jurisdictions categorically limit Summers to actual residents of the place to be searched. See United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576, 1579 (D.C.Cir.1993) ([U]nlike Summers, Reid was not a resident of the apartment which was to be searched under the warrant, and the trial did not disclose that he had any proprietary or residential interest in the suspected premises.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1132, 114 S.Ct. 1105, 127 L.Ed.2d 417 (1994); State v. Carrasco, 147 Ariz. 558, 561, 711 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Ariz.Ct. App.1985) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning that police could facilitate the search by using a detained suspect to open locked doors and containers logically does not apply to visitors); State v. Williams, 665 So.2d 112, 115 (La.Ct.App.1995) (affirming a motion to suppress because the defendant was not a resident of the house to be searched, nor was she even a known suspect.); People v. Burbank, 137 Mich.App. 266, 269, 358 N.W.2d 348, 349 (1984) (per curiam) (distinguishing Summers because the defendant did not live in the house that the police were searching.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190, 105 S.Ct. 962, 83 L.Ed.2d 967 (1985); Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) ([W]e do not agree that Summers can be extended to a non-occupant....). Language in Summers appears to support this interpretation. For example, the Supreme Court, justifying the probable cause exception, said: A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there. The detention of one of the residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself. Indeed, we may safely assume that most citizens ... would elect to remain in order to observe the search of their possessions. ... Moreover, because the detention in this case was in [Summers]'s own residence, it could add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the search.... Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-02, 101 S.Ct. at 2593-94, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). In its holding, the Supreme Court stated that it is constitutionally reasonable to require [a] citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home. Id. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2595, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (emphasis added). Quoting part of this language, Professor Wayne LaFave argues that the word `occupants' is not to be loosely construed as covering anyone present, but instead is to be interpreted literally. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.9(e), at 650 (3d ed.1996) (footnote omitted). A second group of jurisdictions also recognize that a visitor generally may not be detained under Summers; however, these jurisdictions allow a detention if the police can point to reasonably articulable facts that associate the visitor with the residence or the criminal activity being investigated in the search warrant. To ascertain whether such an association exists, these cases recognize that police must make a minimal intrusion to ascertain the visitor's identity. See Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir.1995) (Although Summers itself only pertains to a resident of the house under warrant, it follows that the police may stop people coming to or going from the house if police need to ascertain whether they live there.); United States v. McEaddy, 780 F.Supp. 464, 471 (E.D.Mich.1991) (holding that `occupant' refers to any individual on the premises who, from the perspective of the executing officers at the scene, might reasonably have some relationship to the subject premises.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014, 114 S.Ct. 608, 126 L.Ed.2d 573 (1993); People v. Glaser, 11 Cal.4th 354, 365, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729, 734 (1995) (holding that the detention of the defendant, who drove up to his own house prior to search, was justified by the need to determine what connection defendant, who appeared to be more than a stranger or casual visitor, had to the premises, and by the related need to ensure officer safety and security at the site.); Claffey v. State, 209 Ga.App. 455, 456, 433 S.E.2d 441, 442 (upholding the detention of a motorist and passengers for the purpose of ascertaining whether they lived in the premises being searched), aff'd, 211 Ga.App. 375, 439 S.E.2d 106 (1993); State v. Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 92, 888 P.2d 971, 974 (N.M.Ct.App.1994) (holding that the police cannot detain a non-resident unless they have a reasonable basis to believe that the non-resident has some type of connection to the premises or to criminal activity.); State v. Schultz, 23 Ohio App.3d 130, 133, 491 N.E.2d 735, 739 (1985) (extending the definition of occupants to persons with a reasonable connection to the property); State v. Curtis, 964 S.W.2d 604, 612-14 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997) (noting that police may detain but not search a transient visitor when reasonable suspicion exists that he or she might be connected to the illegal activity conducted in the residence); State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 295, 654 P.2d 96, 103 (1982) (en banc) (requiring, to detain a visitor, facts additional to the visitor's mere presence at the scene that associate him or her with the illegal activities to be investigated); cf. 2 LAFAVEE, § 4.9(e), at 651 (The police still must make the judgment as to who is an occupant rather than a visitor, and surely they are entitled to act upon appearances without regard to what the true facts ultimately turn out to be.). Finally, some jurisdictions broadly define occupants to include those visiting the residence to be searched. Most of these cases, however, review the detention of the visitor under the balancing of interests conducted in Summers by comparing the nature of the police intrusion with any valid law enforcement interests in the detention. See Fountain, 2 F.3d at 663 (explaining that the detention of a nonresident is reasonable if the detention satisfies the factors described in Summers); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1239 (7th Cir.) (At the very least, Summers ' analysisbalancing the nature of the intrusion against the governmental interests justifying itapplies to the detention of visitors), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1030, 110 S.Ct. 3286, 111 L.Ed.2d 795 (1990); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1983) (The Court clearly framed Summers in terms of `occupants', not owners; however, detention of the defendant, a visitor, was not justified by any of the law enforcement interests described in Summers); State v. Phipps, 528 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995) (holding that Summers applies to nonresident visitors); cf. United States v. Vaughan, 718 F.2d 332, 335 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that police could detain but not search a passenger in a car for safety reasons while the other occupants were searched legally).