Opinion ID: 2074738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Brady Hearing

Text: A witness to the crime, Ms. Allen, gave a statement to the police (in another case) in which she said that after the shooting she ran over to the deceased's body, took a gun from it, and fled. Subsequently, Ms. Allen told a Public Defender Service attorney that the police pressured her into giving the statement by showing her statements of other witnesses saying that she had taken the gun, which forced her to admit some involvement in the incident. Ms. Allen told the PDS attorney that the police statement was false, except for the part about her taking the gun from Bennett's body. Appellant requested that the government produce the statements of the other witnesses which the police had shown Ms. Allen. Since his defense was self-defense, such statements obviously would be Brady material. The government replied that no other statements existed. Appellant made a pretrial motion for a hearing in order that the court would be able to determine whether such statements existed. The court summarily dismissed the request, stating: If there is Brady material the Government is under an obligation to give it to you. That's it. . . . So, if it's Brady, he is giving it to you. That's it. No hearing. The principle of Brady is that government suppression of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process when that evidence is material to guilt, irrespective of good or bad faith by the government in its denial of the defendant's request. The test of materiality, in the face of appellant's claim of self-defense, is clearly met here. The government simply counters that Ms. Allen is an unreliable witness. However, the trial court had the obligation to conduct an inquiry as to the possible existence of other statements beyond the blanket denial of the prosecutor. In an analogous situation involving the Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. 3500) material, this court stated: When a defendant seeks production of a statement under the Jencks Act, the trial court has an affirmative duty to determine whether any such statement exists and to conduct such inquiry as may be necessary to resolve the issue. . . . The fact that the prosecutor does not admit the existence of a statement does not relieve the court of its duty to determine whether the statement in fact exists. . . . [ Williams v. United States, D.C. App., 355 A.2d 784, 788 (1976) (citations omitted).] We therefore remand for a hearing to determine whether exculpatory material existed and was suppressed in violation of Brady. If such material did exist, the appellant must be granted a new trial. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court for the purposes of (1) conducting a hearing concerning the existence of statements of witnesses which constitute Brady material; (2) a hearing to determine whether the government withheld information of any impeachable conviction of its witness that was not otherwise available to the defense. If neither hearing develops information which the trial court feels compels a setting aside of the verdict of guilty, then the court shall conduct the second half of the bifurcated trial to determine whether the appellant shall be adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity. So Ordered.