Opinion ID: 758566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individualized Suspicion

Text: 5 School officials do not need to establish probable cause to justify the search of a student; instead, such a search is permissible if it is both 'justified at its inception' and 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'  Bridgman v. New Trier High Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42, 105 S.Ct. 733). On appeal, Willis challenges only the district court's conclusion that the Corporation's search would have been justified at its inception. To satisfy this requirement, a student's conduct must  'create[ ] a reasonable suspicion that a particular regulation or law has been violated, with the search serving to produce evidence of the violation.'  Id. (quoting Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir.1993)). We review a finding of reasonable suspicion de novo, giving due weight to the inferences the district court drew from the facts. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 6 At the outset, our inquiry into whether the Corporation had a reasonable suspicion of drug use seems a bit of a paradox. The deposition testimony of Philip Nikirk, Dean of Students at Anderson High School, reveals that the Corporation required Willis to submit to a urine screen solely because he had been in a fight, which triggered suspension and a mandatory drug test: 7 Q. Now, did you observe [Willis] after the fight that gave rise to the initial suspension? 8 A. The teacher brought both of the students down to my office, yes. 9 Q. Did you observe anything that would make you think he was impaired or under the influence of drugs or alcohol? 10 A. I had nothing at that time that would give me reasonable suspicion, no. 11 Q. So the basis for the testing was the fact that a decision was made to suspend him because of the offense of fighting; is that correct? 12 A. That's correct. 13 R. 24. Given this testimony, the Corporation's assertion that Willis' actions established reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol use, Appellee's Br. at 18, is problematic. The Corporation argues that, in light of the data establishing a causal nexus between illegal substances and violent behavior, the fight itself was enough to create reasonable suspicion that Willis was using an illegal substance. We can construe this argument in two ways. From one perspective, the Corporation seems to be contending that fighting alone gives rise to a conclusive presumption of reasonable suspicion and that the Corporation's rule incorporates this presumption. This, however, would belie the very notion of individualized suspicion, which is almost by definition determined on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Bridgman, supra; Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir.1993). Alternatively, the Corporation may be arguing that its Dean of Students was simply wrong--that in this particular case Willis' conduct created a reasonable suspicion of drug use. Of course, when a school official concludes that a student's conduct creates individualized suspicion of drug or alcohol use, our usual inquiry is whether that conclusion is a reasonable one. See Bridgman, 128 F.3d at 1149. But if the Corporation is arguing that its Dean of Students was incorrect, we would have to turn our traditional inquiry on its head and ask whether it was unreasonable for Dean Nikirk to conclude that Willis' actions did not create individualized suspicion of drug or alcohol use. 14 In light of these analytical difficulties, perhaps our discussion of the Corporation's alleged reasonable suspicion could end here. But because the Corporation argues the issue at length, we review its data to show why the causal nexus between fighting and illegal substance use is not strong enough to support a conclusive presumption of reasonable suspicion. Or, stated a bit differently, we review the Corporation's data to illustrate why it was reasonable for Dean Nikirk to conclude that Willis' actions did not create reasonable suspicion. 15 The Corporation's data has two core components: the results of drug tests administered at the Corporation's two high schools, and various literature demonstrating a causal nexus between drug and alcohol abuse and disciplinary problems in schools. Appellee's Br. at 2. With respect to the results of the Corporation's tests, during the first semester the policy was in effect, 40% of all students at Highland High School who were suspended for fighting tested positive. At Anderson High School--where Willis was a freshman--18% of all students suspended for fighting tested positive. The record does not contain information about Highland High School freshmen who were suspended for fighting, but 6% of all Highland freshmen who were screened under the policy tested positive. At Anderson High School, 27% of all freshmen tested positive, but none of the freshmen who were suspended for fighting tested positive. 16 The professional literature documents a relationship between fighting and the use of unlawful substances. It states, for example, that students who use illegal substances are more than twice as likely to get into physical fights, and that 50% of users admitted initiating violence. Aggressive and Violent Students, R. 13. In explaining how to recognize drug and alcohol abuse, the literature instructs parents and teachers to look for children who are defying rules and regulations and exhibiting abusive behavior. Adolescent Substance Abuse: Etiology, Treatment, and Prevention, R. 13 at 17-18. It is notable, however, that one of the texts on which the Corporation relies also lists 31 other indications of substance use--including sleeping more than usual and playing parents against each other. Id. The text also states that a list of the possible signs of substance abuse could be endless, and cautions that many of the indicators are to some extent normal in many adolescents at certain times. Id. at 18. For this reason, the literature explains, [c]hanges from the norm, several behaviors going on at once, and frequency of occurrence are most revealing. Id. at 17-18. 17 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, articulating a precise definition of reasonable suspicion is impossible. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695, 116 S.Ct. 1657. But the Court has made clear that reasonable suspicion is a commonsense, nontechnical conception[ ] that deal[s] with 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'  Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). With this definition in mind, we think a prudent person would reasonably conclude that while the Corporation's own statistics suggest some relationship between the use of illegal substances and fighting, the relationship is by no means conclusive. Indeed, it varies dramatically depending on how one analyzes the testing results--by school, grade or whatever. (And, even more fundamentally, since it is unknown what percentage of the Corporation's general student population uses drugs or alcohol, it is also unknown whether--at the Corporation's two high schools--students who fight are more likely than their peers to use illegal substances.) Moreover, while the professional literature reports that fighting is an indication of substance abuse, it also describes fighting as normal for adolescents and advises that a clustering of disruptive behaviors is most indicative of unlawful substance use. As far as we know, of course, Willis was involved in only a single fight. The same can probably be said about some of the other students who have been suspended for fighting. We therefore cannot find that the Corporation's data is strong enough to conclusively establish reasonable suspicion of substance abuse when a student is suspended for fighting, or that it was unreasonable for Dean Nikirk to conclude that Willis' conduct did not give rise to individualized suspicion. 2 Cf. Bridgman, 128 F.3d at 1147, 1149 (illustrating that student was searched because he exhibited multiple signs of drug use); Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1323 (As the facts of this case stand, however, Spencer and Frye relied on a number of relatively recent incidents reported by various teachers and aides as well as their personal observations, the cumulative effect of which is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that Cornfield was crotching drugs.) (emphasis added).