Opinion ID: 1363123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the trial court err in allowing the prosecuting attorney to question the appellant about past misconduct unrelated in time to the crime for which he was charged ?

Text: Because the case must be retried and Issue No. 2 will probably arise again, we will discuss the problem and its implications in the hope that future error may be avoided. As we have said, defendant's motion in limine asked that the court prevent the State's inquiry concerning the character of the defendant, except and unless the defendant were to first place his character in evidence. The request was grounded in the directives of Rule 404(a)(1), W.R.E. (See, fn. 3, supra), and the motion was overruled. The following cross-examination appears: Q. Had you ever had any fights or troubles out there before? MR. HEALY: Objection, your Honor, irrelevant. THE COURT: Overruled. Q. (By Mr. Wolfe) Had you ever had any fights or trouble out there before? A. A scuffle once in awhile. Q. What do you mean, a scuffle once in awhile? A. Arguments, nothing more than that. Q. Well, had you been involved in arguments, had you ever been involved in a fist fight out there before? A. Not inside the bar. Q. Had you been involved in fist fights outside the bar? A. Not to a continuing extent. I was hit one time, but never anything after that. Q. So the only time you were ever involved in any fights or altercations was just one time outside the bar that you were hit? A. Yes, sir. Q. You weren't involved in any other fights? A. Maybe an argument once in awhile. That's normal out there. Q. Well, many people go through life without too many arguments, but apparently it's normal for you to get into arguments, is it, when you go to the Torchlight? MR. HEALY: Objection, your Honor, that statement is argumentative. THE COURT: Sustained. This testimony was admitted by the court because the defense counsel had cross-examined the complaining witness by attacking his credibility through inquiry about his past criminal record. The court reasoned that if the credibility of the complaining witness could be tested in this manner, then it was also permissible for the State to impeach the defendant's credibility with character-trait evidence. The court was wrong about this. In resume, Rule 404(a), W.R.E., provides that evidence of a person's character or trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on the occasion in question. If, however, the accused first introduces evidence of character or trait, then the prosecution may introduce similar evidence in rebuttal. Rule 404(a)(1), W.R.E. Rule 404(b), W.R.E., provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character in order to show that a person acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may, in proper circumstances, be admissible for the purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or conduct. While admitting that evidence of the accused's prior unrelated misconduct is inadmissible for purposes of proving his guilt [6] , the appellee argues in its brief that this rule is applicable since Kwallek's main defense was that he was not the aggressor and that it was Weedman who precipitated the fight, and, thereby, the defendant has placed his own credibility in issue. It is also urged that the questioned testimony goes to impeach Kwallek and is admissible to show a course of conduct consisting of a propensity for public fighting. As authority, the State relies on State v. Lindsay, 77 Wyo. 410, 317 P.2d 506, wherein we said: ... As is indicated by defense counsel, the general rule is that evidence of accused having committed another crime independent of and unconnected with the one on trial is inadmissible. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 682. But evidence is not to be excluded because it shows or tends to show the commission of other offenses where it tends to prove facts material in the trial for homicide or where it tends to show a plan, scheme, system, or course of conduct. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 688, and § 691 at 1140 ff. This exception to the general rule as it relates to forgery is recognized by Judge Blume in State v. Grider, 74 Wyo. 88, 284 P.2d 400, 406, 288 P.2d 766. One of the better known cases which presents the philosophy of the law on this point is People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 62 L.R.A. 193. The theft of the automobile by the defendant and Phillips tended to show a course of conduct on the part of the defendant which we think was relevant to the crime with which he was charged and was, therefore, admissible. 317 P.2d at 510. Lindsay is inapplicable for the position urged by the State here. The evidence held to be admissible in Lindsay showed that the prior crime (the stealing of a vehicle) was directly connected with the homicide with which the defendant was charged. The theft and the homicide were all part and parcel of the same transaction. Or, as Wigmore says, the theft was an inseparable part of the whole deed, [7] In the case with which we are here concerned, there is no showing that the defendant's alleged prior misconduct or propensity for trouble-making has any connection whatsoever with the aggravated assault and battery with which he was charged in this case. It is also true that the evidence was not offered or admitted for purposes of showing a plan, scheme, system or course of conduct. The effect of admitting this evidence for the purpose offered (attacking credibility) or any purpose conceived of by Lindsay, supra, would be to invite the very dangers that we have warned about in Dorador v. State, Wyo., 520 P.2d 230 (1974), Gabrielson v. State, Wyo., 510 P.2d 534 (1973), Rosencrance v. State, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952 (1925), and Newell v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 8 (1976)  namely, it requires the defendant to meet and explain other acts than those with which he is charged. Furthermore, the admission of this testimony has a tendency to lead the jury to believe that it is permissible to convict for conduct other than that with which the defendant is charged. [8] It is conceded that where the defendant first introduces evidence of his character, the prosecution may then explore the matters raised by the accused, both on cross-examination of the accused's witnesses to test their views and basis for their testimony, and on rebuttal. [9] In this case, the question is  did the accused open up the issue of his character by introducing evidence to the effect that he had acted in self-defense? The State argues this point without citing any authority whatever. In addition, we can find none and, therefore, must assume that authority does not exist for this proposition, or, if there is authority, it is not supportive of the point urged by the State. Peterson v. First National Bank of Lander, Wyo., 579 P.2d 1038 (1978). Evidence of other offenses may be received for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility under authorities cited by the State. [10] In addition, evidence of the bad character of the accused may be admissible when the accused first gives evidence of his good character  Rule 404(a)(1), W.R.E.  or under circumstances set forth in Rule 404(b), W.R.E. We are cited to no authority which holds that, for the defendant to testify about the facts of the incident, this, in and of itself, is sufficient to warrant inquiry into all of the defendant's past deeds or misdeeds on the ground that his self-defense testimony opened up the character issue. In sum, we conclude that the defendant's character-trait evidence could not have been admitted for the purpose relied upon by the court, which was that the defendant's character was subject to inquiry by reason of the fact that the defendant inquired into the character of the complaining witness. We know of no authority which upholds such a rule, and the State cites none. Furthermore, it would have been improper to admit such evidence upon cross-examination to test credibility where the only opening was the defendant's self-defense testimony. The Lindsay, supra, rule is unavailable because the evidence of character does not tend to prove facts material to the crime charged, nor does it tend to reveal a plan, scheme, system or course of conduct resulting in the commission of the act in question. It is not for us to explore all the possibilities for the introduction of character evidence under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. We have undertaken here to point up the fallacy of the ruling of the trial court on the question and to dispose of the character-trait theories of the State, as they appear in its brief. For us to go further would be to render an advisory opinion, which this court should not do. Defense issues numbered 3 and 4, supra, need not be addressed in light of our disposal of this appeal. Reversed and remanded for new trial.