Opinion ID: 494609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the pendent state wrongful discharge claim

Text: 28 In addition to a front pay award, the jury awarded $5,000 to each plaintiff for pain and suffering and $1,840 to Blum for medical expenses. We have held that such damages are not recoverable under the ADEA. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022, 98 S.Ct. 749, 54 L.Ed.2d 770 (1978). The issue of pain and suffering, however, was also submitted to the jury in connection with plaintiffs' pendent state law claim for wrongful discharge. 29 The New Jersey Supreme Court has not addressed the question whether a tort cause of action exists for age discrimination in employment. In the absence of an authoritative pronouncement from the state's highest court, the task of a federal tribunal is to predict how that court would rule. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1167 (3d Cir.1981). The district court predicted that the New Jersey courts would allow a cause of action for wrongful discharge based on age discrimination. This prediction is a determination of law and is reviewable by us under the plenary review standard. Compagnie Des Bauxites v. Ins. Co. of North America, 724 F.2d 369, 371-72 (3d Cir.1983). We will do so by examining the policies underlying New Jersey's wrongful discharge doctrine and its application in other cases. 30 In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980), the New Jersey Supreme Court carved out a public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. The court held that an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d 505. The pronouncement was made in the context of an alleged retaliatory firing. The court limited its apparently broad holding by stating that unless an employee at will identifies a specific expression of public policy [that he was discharged for refusing to violate], he may be discharged with or without cause. Id. 31 In Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981), the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed a civil cause of action for wrongful discharge based on a retaliatory firing after the plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim. A New Jersey statute declared such firings illegal and provided both penal sanctions and administrative relief. Id. at 670, 428 A.2d 1317 (citing N.J.S.A. 34:15-39.1 and 39.2). The court reasoned that these statutory remedies did not preempt but rather would be complemented by a civil right of redress. Id. at 671, 428 A.2d 1317. 32 The case at bar is not one of retaliatory discharge. Although discharging an employee based on age discrimination would violate the clear mandate of public policy as announced by New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq. (NJLAD), no New Jersey court has specifically held that a wrongful discharge tort claim can be maintained in such a case. Moreover, plaintiffs here, unlike those in Pierce and Lally, have avenues for relief under comprehensive and parallel state and federal statutes. Under the NJLAD plaintiffs have the option of seeking administrative relief through the Division of Civil Rights or of filing suit in the New Jersey Superior Court. NJSA 10:5-13; Christian Bros. Institute of New Jersey v. Northern New Jersey Interscholastic League, 86 N.J. 409, 432 A.2d 26 (1981). Damages for pain and suffering, unavailable under the ADEA, have been awarded under NJLAD. Andersen v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 89 N.J. 483, 446 A.2d 486 (1982). 33 Given the comprehensive remedies available under the state and federal statutes, we find it unlikely that New Jersey would expand its wrongful discharge doctrine, which is a narrow exception to the employment at will rule, to include an action for age discrimination. In Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir.1977), we expressed doubt that the mere passage of a state age discrimination statute created a separate common law claim where none had existed before and where that void had been filled by that very legislation. See also Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir.1982) (refusing to predict that Pennsylvania would create common law cause of action for discriminatory discharge where state statutory remedies were available). 34 In view of these authorities, and of the absence of a clear declaration from the New Jersey legislature or judiciary, we decline to open the federal forum to this cause of action. We therefore will set aside the jury's award of $5,000 to each plaintiff for pain and suffering and $1,840 in medical bills to Blum.