Opinion ID: 2637598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Each Victim of a Robbery Forms the Basis of a Separate Charge of Robbery

Text: The defendant argues that he committed only one aggravated robbery during the first incident because there was only one violent taking of property from a common owner. Therefore, his conviction of two counts of aggravated robbery is multiplicitous. In contrast, the prosecution argues that there were two robbery victims because the robber put both in fear of death or bodily injury and both possessed control over the property. Therefore, the defendant was properly convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery. As background to our discussion, we explain the interplay between our robbery and aggravated robbery statutes. The elements of the crime of robbery are (1) that the defendant (2) in the State of Colorado (3) knowingly (4) took anything of value (5) from the person or presence of [another victim] (6) by the use of force, threats, or intimidation. CJI Criminal § 15:01 (1983). Aggravated robbery includes all of the elements of the crime of robbery, but also requires additional elements such as the use of a deadly weapon or putting the person robbed, or any other person, in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury. Id. at 15:06. Thus, one who commits an aggravated robbery has also committed the lesser included offense of robbery. See People v. Futamata, 140 Colo. 233, 241, 343 P.2d 1058, 1062 (1959) (If the greater of two offenses includes all the legal and factual elements of the lesser, the greater includes the lesser.). In light of the related nature of the two offenses, we focus our analysis of whether two robberies can arise out of a single taking of property primarily on the offense of robbery. However, this analysis will in turn apply to aggravated robbery, for which the defendant was convicted, for two reasons. First, aggravated robbery differs from simple robbery in the degree of force and violence directed at a victim. Thus, if we determine that robbery is a crime intended primarily to protect people and charges for robbery are based upon the number of victims, this conclusion will be equally applicable to the potentially more violent crime of aggravated robbery. Second, because the commission of aggravated robbery includes the lesser crime of robbery, it would be contradictory to apply our conclusion with respect to robbery inconsistently with the greater crime of aggravated robbery. Similar to the court of appeals' analysis, we consider both the robbery and aggravated robbery statutes together. See Borghesi, 40 P.3d at 21. Pursuant to part of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the United States and Colorado Constitutions, a person may not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V; Colo. Const. art. II, § 18. In this case the defendant invokes the protection afforded by multiplicity, which occurs when the same offense is charged in multiple counts and results in multiple punishments. See, e.g., United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1505 (10th Cir.1992). We must determine, therefore, whether the defendant's threatening the two clerks, who were counting their employer's money at the single cash register, constitutes the same offense or multiple offenses under our aggravated robbery statute. Because the legislature establishes and defines offenses and determines [w]hether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct `offenses,' we turn to an examination of our robbery and aggravated robbery statutes. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978). [5] In considering our robbery statutes, two possible constructions exist. If we construe the statutes as designed primarily to protect property interests, then only one robbery occurred because there was only one taking of property. In effect, such a construction means that the defendant robbed the store, not the clerks. If, on the other hand, we construe the statutes as designed primarily to protect persons, then there were two robberies because there were two victims during the first incident. That is, the defendant robbed the clerks, not the store.
To determine whether our robbery statutes protect persons or property we review how our statutes define a victim. Each robbery statute uses related but differing terms to describe the victim, and ultimately, we conclude that a plain language analysis does not resolve our competing interpretations. The robbery statute provides that A person who knowingly takes anything of value from the person or presence of another by the use of force, threats, or intimidation commits robbery. § 18-4-301, 6 C.R.S. (2002). The aggravated robbery statute provides that a person is guilty of aggravated robbery if during the act of robbery he knowingly wounds or strikes the person robbed or any other person. . . [or] knowingly puts the person robbed or any other person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury. . . . § 18-4-302(1)(b). The phrase person or presence of another in the robbery statute refers to the victim of a robbery in the singular, which suggests that the legislature may have intended that a robber commits a separate offense for each person against whom she applies force and intimidation. [6] In contrast, the victim of an aggravated robbery is defined as the person or any other person. Whether this phrase refers to a single victim or a group of victims appears unclear. One possible readingthat any other person means a group of peoplesuggests that only one conviction based upon an incident involving multiple victims may have been contemplated. On the other hand, another possible reading of any other person refers to the victim in the singular, which suggests that similar to the offense of robbery, multiple victims give rise to multiple offenses. Because aggravated robbery is a heightened form of the lesser included offense of robbery, and because the robbery and aggravated robbery statutes address this issue inconsistently, we conclude that the plain language of our robbery statutes does not provide guidance on whether aggravated robbery is a crime against the person or a crime against property. Hence, we shift our inquiry to legislative history of our robbery statutes.
In 1971, the legislature revised and reenacted the Criminal Code, but the robbery statutes remained essentially the same. [7] Because both the old and the revised robbery statutes track the basic elements of common law robbery, and there is no indication that the legislature has departed from the usual and customary meaning of any of the common law terms, we seek guidance from the common law. See People v. Jenkins, 198 Colo. 347, 350, 599 P.2d 912, 913 (1979). At common law, robbery was (1) the taking, with the intent to steal (2) the personal property of another (3) from his person or in his presence (4) against his will, by violence or intimidation. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1899); 1 Roland Burrows, Odgers on the Common Law of England, part IV, ch. V.,(3d Ed.1927). The crime of robbery, which was created before the crime of larceny, developed out of a concern for crimes of violence. [8] Although originally confined to cases of actual violence to the person, robbery eventually extended not only to cases where property has been taken or delivered under a threat of bodily violence. . . but also where the fear has resulted from apprehension of violence to the habitation and property. . . . 2 Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 8.11, n. 1 (citing Commissioners on Criminal Law Fourth Report lxvii (1839)). As the crime of robbery expanded, so did the criminal law, by means of the ancient quasi-criminal writ of trespass, to cover all taking of another's property from his possession without his consent, even though no force was used. This misconduct was punished as larceny. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code art. 223, Comment 2(a) (1980). Larceny at common law was the willful and wrongful taking possession of and carrying away of another's property without consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of all benefits of ownership. 1 Burrows, Odgers on the Common Law, at 338. Common law robbery, however, is easily distinguishable from the property crime of larceny in two ways. First, there can be no robbery without violence, and there can be no larceny with it. It is the violence that makes the former an offense of greater atrocity than the latter. 135 A.S.R. 474, 476 (1909). Second, unlike larceny, which required the intent to permanently deprive an owner of property, robbery had no such requirement, and the time of possession could be exceedingly short. As one commentator explained, [I]n an old case a thief snatched a lady's earring out of her ear with such violence that he tore her ear; he was immediately arrested and searched, but no earring was found in his possession. When the lady reached her home, she found it in her back hair. This was held to amount to robbery, because the thief had had possession of the earring, although only for a moment. 1 Burrows, Odgers on the Common Law, at 390 (citing Rex v. Farrell, 1 Leach 322 (1787)). [9] Modern commentaries on common law robbery also emphasize the assaultive element over the larcenous element of the crime. Robbery may be considered a greater crime than the sum of the two lesser crimes of larceny and assault. . . The modern trend is to consider robbery as an offense against the person rather than against property. . . . 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, at n. 3-4 (citing Mitchell v. State, 281 Ark. 112, 661 S.W.2d 390, 391 (1983)). Similarly, another commentator states that the common law came to regard robbery `amongst the most heinous felonies.' It was deemed to be a more serious offense than larceny because of the added element of personal violence or intimidation. Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 344 (3d Ed.1982). Although robbery violates both the interests of personal safety and security as well as the interest in protecting property, as a matter of abstract classification, it probably should be grouped with offenses against the person rather than with offenses against property. . . . Id. at 350. [10] Just as the common law of robbery emphasizes the violence associated with the taking, so do our cases construing robbery statutes. [11] We have stated that the gravamen of the offense of robbery is the violent nature of the taking. People v. Marquez 692 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Colo.1984), rejected on other grounds by James v. People, 727 P.2d 850, 855 n. 4 (1986); Rowan v. People, 93 Colo. 473, 475, 26 P.2d 1066, 1067 (1933) (the gravamen of the offense, as well as the conception of the lawmaking body, rested in the manner of the taking.); Jenkins, 198 Colo. at 350, 599 P.2d at 913 (force or fear is the main element of the offense of robbery); People v. Thomas, 181 Colo. 317, 320, 509 P.2d 592, 594 (1973) (As we have held in the past, `force or fear is the main element of the offense [of robbery].'); Sterling v. People, 151 Colo. 127, 130, 376 P.2d 676, 678 (1962) (The gravamen of [robbery] is the `manner of the taking.'). [12] Not only have we emphasized the violent nature of the taking, but we have also deemphasized the larcenous component of robbery. For example, penalties do not vary based upon the value of the property taken. See, e.g. Maes v. People, 178 Colo. 46, 48, 494 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1972). Proof of ownership of the property taken is immaterial so long as the victim had sufficient control over it at the time of the taking. See, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 244 (Colo.1983); Hampton v. People, 146 Colo. 570, 574, 362 P.2d 864, 867 (1961). Thus, our case precedent reflects the common law emphasis on the assaultive nature of the crime, and indicates that our robbery statutes are primarily intended to protect persons and not property.
The court of appeals based its holding in significant part on the concern that if a defendant is convicted and sentenced on multiple counts of aggravated robbery based upon the number of victims in control of the property, disproportionate sentencing may occur. Borghesi, 40 P.3d at 21. Pursuant to section 18-1.3-406(1)(a), a court must sentence a defendant to consecutive sentences if he is convicted of two or more separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident. While this concern for possible disproportionate sentencing is understandable, we reason that it is misplaced in this context. Considerations of disproportionate sentencing are legally irrelevant to a double jeopardy multiplicity analysis. Once it has been determined that a defendant can be punished for his wrongful conduct, the manner in which his conduct is divided into separate units for purposes of calculating his total sentence is of no constitutional significance except for deciding whether the total sentence is excessive.... Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup.Ct. Rev. 81, 114. [13] The constitutional determination of whether a sentence is excessive arises not under the Double Jeopardy Clause, but instead, under the Eighth Amendment, which the defendant did not and does not raise in this case. Under the Eighth Amendment, no sentence is per se constitutional. Although courts afford a great deal of deference to legislative determinations regarding sentencing, a defendant is still entitled to an abbreviated proportionality review upon request for each separate sentence imposed under the crime of violence statute. Close v. People, 48 P.3d 528, 540 (Colo.2002); see also § 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I). If an abbreviated proportionality review gives rise to an inference of gross disproportionality, a defendant is then entitled to an extended proportionality review. Close, 48 P.3d at 541, see also People v. Deroulet, 48 P.3d 520, 527 (Colo.2002). Additionally, statutory provisions exist to provide courts with sufficient discretion to mitigate disproportionate sentences when appropriate. Pursuant to section 18-1.3-406(1)(a), courts have the discretion to modify sentences for violent crimes in unusual and extenuating circumstances. See also Borghesi, 40 P.3d at 25 (Nieto, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although convicted defendants must still serve modified sentences consecutively, courts may modify sentences below the statutory range, even to include probationary sentences, if the defendant is eligible. [14] Id., People v. Byrum, 784 P.2d 817, 818 (Colo.App.1989) (holding that evidence of defendant's mental problems, lack of prior convictions, regular medical treatment, and model prison behavior warranted a downward modification of a mandatory sentence). The defendant argues that the statutory designation of robbery as an offense against property as opposed to an offense against the person indicates the legislature's intent to treat our robbery statutes primarily as protective of property. [15] We are not persuaded. Such designations are generally left to the revisor of statutes, who possesses no authority to make substantive statutory changes. Hence, we may draw no implications or presumptions of legislative intent. Even if we assume arguendo that this designation reflects the will of the General Assembly, we deem it of limited value because the statutes incorporate both larcenous and assaultive elements. On balance, we reason that the legislative designation of the crime of robbery as an offense against property is less persuasive than the common law principles of robbery upon which our statute is based and our own precedent, both of which emphasize the assault element and deemphasize the theft element. Other jurisdictions support our rationale that the violent nature of the taking merits the treatment of robbery as an offense against the person, even though the crimes are classified under the code heading of offenses against property. [16] Hence, we conclude that Colorado's robbery statutes are intended primarily to protect persons, not property. Charging, convicting, and sentencing a robber on multiple counts of robbery based upon the number of persons in control of the property taken does not offend multiplicity principles because each person who is subject to force and intimidation constitutes a victim of a separate offense under our robbery statutes. We hold, therefore, that a robber may be convicted of more than one count of robbery for a single taking of property from more than one person. [17]
We begin our application of the principles discussed by initially considering the requirement of robbery that property must be taken from the victim's person or presence of another. Our case law construes the term presence of another to mean that the property taken must be within the victim's reach, inspection or observation so that the victim would be able to retain control over the property but for the force or threat of force directed by the perpetrator against the victim. See Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d at 244. Thus, our holding that the state may charge a defendant with more than one robbery for a single taking from more than one victim is limited by the presence of another requirement. Not every person present during a robbery will necessarily give rise to an additional charge. Despite this limitation, the court of appeals' hypothetical of one defendant who robs fifteen clerks appears superficially accurate. An armed robber might be convicted of fifteen counts and sentenced to fifteen consecutive sentences for fifteen crimes. Such a lengthy sentence appears consistent with the purpose expressed by our robbery statutes, but it would occur only when each of the fifteen employees possessed control over the employer's property at the time of the taking, and each of the fifteen were subject to the robber's force or intimidation, and each of the fifteen were put in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury. While possible, this fact situation appears to us to be not very probable. In this case both clerks, who were counting the money in the cash register, had sufficient control over the store's property when the defendant brandished a hatchet and demanded money from the register. The defendant directed threats to both employees when he sought and obtained control over the store's money. While it was the second clerk who handed over the money, the property was taken from the presence of the first clerk, who would have been able to retain control over it but for the threats by the defendant to the second clerk. Because the common property taken from the second clerk was also taken from the presence of anotherthe first clerkthe robber's acts constitute different offenses as to each victim under our aggravated robbery statute. Hence, the judgments of conviction for both clerks are not multiplicitous because the defendant is being punished for two separate offenses, or the robbery of each clerk, and not for the same offense. Accordingly, the trial court's imposition of separate sentences for the first robbery was proper, and we overturn the court of appeals' reversal of the defendant's conviction for one count of aggravated robbery.