Opinion ID: 2507697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Stand Your Ground Law

Text: In conjunction with his duty to retreat challenges, Dickey argues the Court of Appeals erred in finding the trial judge properly refused to retroactively apply the Stand Your Ground law to this case. Although Dickey refers to the Act as the Stand Your Ground law, it is identified in the South Carolina Code as the Protection of Persons and Property Act. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-11-410 (Supp.2010). This Act states, It is the intent of the General Assembly to codify the common law Castle Doctrine which recognizes that a person's home is his castle and to extend the doctrine to include an occupied vehicle and the person's place of business. Id. § 16-11-420(A). The Act became effective on June 9, 2006, and contained a Savings Clause, which provides in pertinent part: The repeal or amendment by this act of any law, whether temporary or permanent or civil or criminal, does not affect pending actions, rights, duties, or liabilities founded thereon, or alter, discharge, release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under the repealed or amended law, unless the repealed or amended provision shall so expressly provide. Act No. 379, 2006 S.C. Acts 2909. Because this Act was promulgated prior to Dickey's September 2006 trial, defense counsel moved for the trial judge to dismiss Dickey's case based on the immunity from criminal prosecution created by the Act. The trial judge denied the motion, finding the Act did not apply as Dickey's case had been pending since April 2004 and, thus, was precluded from the Act's application. The Court of Appeals held the trial judge properly refused to apply the Act retroactively. In so ruling, the court found the Act creates substantive rights for citizens and, therefore, the Act would only operate retroactively if there was a clear indication from the Legislature that this was intended. Dickey, 380 S.C. at 404-05, 669 S.E.2d at 928. Referencing the Act's savings clause, the court concluded that the Legislature clearly manifested its intent that the Act be applied prospectively. Id. at 405, 669 S.E.2d at 928. Accordingly, the court held the Act should not have been applied to Dickey's case as the criminal prosecution was pending before the effective date of the Act. Id. I find the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial judge's decision to preclude the application of the Act as the Legislature's intent is clear and unambiguous that the Act is to be applied prospectively. See State v. Varner, 310 S.C. 264, 266, 423 S.E.2d 133, 134 (1992) (recognizing that prospective application is presumed absent a specific provision or clear legislative intent to the contrary). In any event, the evidence presented clearly showed that Dickey was not in his home, business, or vehicle at the time of the shooting.