Opinion ID: 2087265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Stacking of Coverage Afforded Under the Personal Vehicle Policy With Coverage Afforded Under the Business Auto Policy

Text: Whether stacking was proper as between the different policies here turns on the operation of an other insurance provision found in the general policy conditions of the personal vehicle policy. The provision reads: If this policy and any other vehicle insurance policy issued to you by this Company apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of our liability under all the policies will not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy. As we have indicated, stacking was permitted here based on the determination that the meaning of the provision was ambiguous given the facts presented. First, it was noted that the antistacking provision was found only in the personal vehicle policy. Moreover, only that policy had been issued to Ruth Bruder. Her name did not appear on the declarations page of the business auto policy. Because Ruth had not been issued the business auto policy, the condition precluding stacking could not be satisfied. Presumably, a similar analysis was applied as for Halie. We disagree that the provision is ambiguous. It makes no difference that the antistacking provision appears only in the personal vehicle policy. The provision neither contemplates nor requires consideration of a reciprocal provision in any other policy. The question of whether coverage afforded under the personal vehicle policy may be aggregated with that afforded under any other Country Mutual policy can be determined from the provision standing alone. As we explain below, the provision's operation depends on nothing but a careful examination of the language in which it is written, as aided by the definitions provided for that purpose. Generally, the provision precludes the stacking of coverage of the personal vehicle policy with any number of other Country Mutual vehicle policies when each policy affords coverage and each is issued to the person seeking to aggregate the coverages. The question is not whether coverage exists under the policies involved. The issue of whether the coverages can be stacked arises only because that fact is a given. Specifically, operation of the provision to preclude stacking turns upon the condition represented by the phrase issued to you. Whether that condition is satisfied as for each of the policies, in turn, hinges on the meaning of the term you as that term is defined in the personal vehicle policy. As is relevant here, you is so defined to mean the person named on the declarations page of this policy and that person's spouse. Importantly, the meaning of the term youthe term used to represent the insured seeking to aggregate coverageis not confined to that person to whom the personal vehicle or any other Country Mutual policy actually was issued. Its meaning includes the spouse of that person. Further, the term you is defined with reference to the phrase the declarations page of this policy, meaning the declarations page of the personal vehicle policy. Thus, the names of the persons appearing on the declarations page of the personal vehicle policy control the determination of whether the condition issued to you is satisfied as for any other insurance policy as well. In this case, any other insurance policy means the business auto policy issued to John Bruder. Insertion of the policy's definition for the term you generates two possibilities for determining to whom the business auto policy was issued relevant under the facts here: (1) the business auto policy was issued to a person named on the declarations page of the personal vehicle policy; or (2) the business auto policy was issued to the spouse of a person named on the declarations page of the personal vehicle policy. Either possibility satisfies the condition in determining to whom the business auto policy was issued for purposes of operation of the antistacking provision. Based on the definition of the term you that must be applied, there is no difficulty in determining whether it can be said that the personal vehicle and business auto policies were issued to either or both Ruth and Halie Bruder. Again, we point out that that question is distinct from whether Ruth and Halie could be said to be persons insured under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policies as each defined such persons. There is no dispute as to that fact. Both were. There is no question that the personal vehicle policy was issued to Ruth. She was named on the declarations page of that policy. In fact, it can also be said that the policy was issued to Ruth because she is the spouse of John Bruder, who is also there named. For that same reasonbecause she is married to John Bruderit can be said that the business auto policy was issued to Ruth even though she was not named on the declarations page of that policy. John Bruder's name appears on the declarations page of the personal vehicle policy and he is a person to whom the business auto policy was issued. Because Ruth is the spouse of John Bruder, to whom the business auto policy was issued, the policy was issued to Ruth within the contemplation of the antistacking provision. Because both policies can be said to have been issued to Ruth, the condition of the antistacking provision is satisfied. Aggregation of coverage as between the two policies is not available to Ruth. We therefore reverse the appellate court's decision to permit stacking in that respect as for Ruth. Neither policy, however, can be said to have been issued to Halie Bruder. She is not named on the declarations page of either policy, and she is no one's spouse. Because the condition of the antistacking provision cannot be satisfied as for Halie, the provision cannot be enforced to bar the stacking of coverage for her as between the two policies. (See Goss v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1986), 147 Ill.App.3d 866, 101 Ill.Dec. 238, 498 N.E.2d 562 (holding that, where policies were separately issued to a husband and wife for different vehicles, the wife was not the named insured under the other insurance provision of the husband's policy so as to preclude stacking of coverage afforded to the wife under his policy with coverage afforded by the wife's own policy).) We therefore affirm the appellate court's determination to the extent that Halie is entitled to aggregate coverage as between the two policies.