Opinion ID: 1844540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Formal Validity of the Execution of the Will

Text: The proponents advanced two arguments before the Court of Civil Appeals in support of the proponents' claim that the trial court erred in denying the proponents' motion for JML on the issue of the formal validity of the execution of the will. The first argument was that the will was self-proved pursuant to § 43-8-132, Ala. Code 1975, even though the official seal of the officer authorized to administer oaths was not affixed as required by this statute. The Court of Civil Appeals agreed that the seal was unnecessary and that the will was self-proved. We must reject these holdings, because the statute means what it says. Judge Murdock, in his special writing in this case below, correctly explains the indispensable nature of the seal, Morrow, 873 So.2d at 1137 (Murdock, J., concurring in the result), and we adopt Judge Murdock's analysis. The proponents' second argument is that they introduced uncontradicted evidence that the will was actually executed as required by § 43-8-131, Ala.Code 1975that is, that the will was signed by the testator before two witnesses, who also signed. We agree. Judge Murdock's special writing correctly analyzes this issue too. Morrow, 873 So.2d at 1138 (Murdock, J., concurring in the result). The contestants did not preserve any challenge to the legal sufficiency of the proponents' prima facie proof of the formalities of the execution of the will, and no evidence in the record rebuts the proponents' prima facie proof. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the proponents' motion for JML on this issue and in submitting this issue to the jury. The jury returned a general verdict, which reads: We, the Jury, find the issues in favor of the Contestants, Annie Jean Helms, Mary Jon Brown, Sharon Wallace, Susan Mitch[u]m. and Robert Grimes and that the purported will offered in evidence is not the valid last will and testament of Bernice H. Grimes, deceased. The text of this verdict against the proponents of the will does not exclude the possibility that the jury based the verdict on a finding that Bernice did not sign the will or that she did not sign it before two witnesses who also signed, as required by § 43-8-131. Such a finding would be contrary to the proponents' uncontroverted prima facie proof. Thus, the error of the trial court in denying JML in favor of the proponents on this issue requires reversal. See Aspinwall v. Gowens, 405 So.2d 134 (Ala.1981). The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is correct to this extent, although for a wrong reason.