Opinion ID: 6109941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of the State's Appeal

Text: Pilot argues the State failed to timely appeal the circuit court's June 22 judgment of dismissal. It contends that judgment became final pursuant to Rule 81.05 when the circuit court failed to rule on the State's after-trial motion within 90 days. And because the State failed to timely appeal the June 22 judgment, the argument follows, this case is not properly before this Court. The State, however, contends the June 22 judgment never became final or appealable as the circuit court ruled on its motion on October 11, within the 90-day required period. The October 11 docket entry was labeled Order to Vacate/Set Aside. A new judgment-entered on January 24-was the operative final judgment, which the State appealed in a timely fashion. For the reasons set forth below, the case is properly before this Court.
Two procedural rules, in particular, are at the heart of the parties' arguments: Rule 75.01 and Rule 81.05. Rule 75.01 allows trial courts to retain control[ ] over judgments during the [30]-day period after entry of judgment and may, after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard and for good cause, vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its judgment within that time. Once the rule's 30-day window has expired, the judgment becomes final if neither party has filed an authorized after-trial motion. Rule 81.05(a)(1). If any after-trial motions have been filed, the second rule-Rule 81.05-governs. In the event of a proper after-trial motion, the judgment will not become final until the earlier of (A) [90] days from the date the last timely motion was filed, on which date all motions not ruled shall be deemed overruled, or (B) If all motions have been ruled, then the date of ruling of the last motion to be ruled or [30] days after entry of judgment, whichever is later. Rule 81.05(a)(2)(A)-(B). These two rules, however, do not confer identical powers to the circuit court. Under Rule 75.01, a circuit court may-for any reason supported by good cause-amend or modify its previously entered judgment, regardless of whether a party requested such modification or amendment. Rule 81.05 is more restrictive. Once the thirty day period in Rule 75.01 expires, a trial court's authority to grant relief is constrained by and limited to the grounds raised in a timely filed, authorized after-trial motion. Massman Constr. Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n , 914 S.W.2d 801 , 802-03 (Mo. banc 1996). Contrary to this Court's declaration in Massman , a number of lower court decisions have categorized the powers bestowed by Rules 75.01 and 81.05 as the same power. See, e.g., Barr v. Sanders , 206 S.W.3d 393 , 395 (Mo. App. 2006) (The trial court retains the same degree of control over the judgment during [Rule 81.05's] ninety-day period as that provided in Rule 75.01.); Puisis v. Puisis , 90 S.W.3d 169 , 172 (Mo. App. 2002) (During  the ninety-day period, the trial court has the same control over the judgment as under Rule 75.01.). This line of cases may be traced back to Steiferman v. K-Mart Corp. , 746 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. App. 1988), which states: During this 90-day period [under Rule 81.05], the court retains the same power under Rule 75.01 and may vacate, reopen, correct, amend or modify the judgment. Id. at 147 . The court of appeals in Steiferman erroneously declared this principle without the guidance of any supporting authority. The State relies on Steiferman to support its argument that the circuit court had authority to vacate its June 22 judgment because Rule 81.05 only extends the length of the court's jurisdiction. Yet it does more-Rule 81.05 also restricts the circuit court's authority to change its judgment, in any way, by limiting the court's scope to those grounds raised in a timely filed after-trial motion. Massman , 914 S.W.2d at 802-03 . To the extent Barr , Puisis , and Steiferman and their progeny imply that the powers provided by Rules 75.01 and 81.05 are the same power, these cases should not be followed. This Court's refusal to accept the State's reliance on those cases, however, is not fatal to its underlying timeliness argument. As explained below, the procedural posture of this case leads this Court to find the appeal timely.
The circuit court entered its first judgment on June 22, dismissing the State's claims with prejudice for want of standing. One month later, on July 22, the State timely filed an authorized after-trial motion in which it requested the court amend its judgment by vacating it. 3 Under Rule 81.05(a)(2)(A), the circuit court had 90 days to rule on the State's motion. Otherwise, it would be deemed overruled as a matter of law. On October 11-81 days after the State filed its motion and nine days before a ruling was due under Rule 81.05-the circuit court ruled on the State's motion. 4 The court created a docket entry labeled Order to Vacate/Set Aside. The accompanying order specifically stated, Judgment set aside. To set aside means to annul or vacate. Black's Law Dictionary 1580 (10th ed. 2014). This action was a proper exercise of the circuit court's authority under Rule 81.05 as the court granted all and only the relief requested by the State, which was essentially to vacate the judgment and allow the case to proceed, and it did so within its 90-day limitation. As such, the State's motion was sustained by the October 11 order. See Rule 81.05(a)(2); see also Massman , 914 S.W.2d at 802-03 . According to the dissent, the October 11 order did not grant the relief requested by the State but instead set[ ] a timetable for the parties to submit proposed amended judgments, with Respondent's proposal due on October 25 and the State's response due 10 days later. Op. at 34. Indeed, there was some future action to be  taken after the October 11 order, as the order indicated a revised judgment [was] due 10/25/16 and scheduled a case status review weeks after that. And as the dissent acknowledges, the parties complied with that order. Pilot filed a proposed amended judgment on October 25, and the State responded to this proposal three days later. With this continuing litigation, it is evident the parties understood the October 11 order constituted a ruling on the State's motion, as it vacated the June 22 judgment. Had the circuit court not done so, there would have been no further action for the parties or the court to take. The State's motion would have been overruled by operation of law on October 20, 90 days after the State's motion, and the June 22 judgment would have become the final judgment. To be sure, the Rule 81.05 window created by the State's motion did not expire because the October 11 order vacated the first judgment. 5 At that point, the 90-day time limit imposed by Rule 81.05 ceased to exist. There was no further action to be taken on the June 22 judgment because, after the October 11 order, the June 22 judgment did not exist. In fact, no judgment existed until the circuit court entered its second judgment in January. Contrary to Pilot's suggestion, the June 22 judgment never became final, and the circuit court never lost jurisdiction over the matter. See State v. Schierhoff , 103 Mo. 47 , 15 S.W. 151 , 152 (Mo. 1891) (A court does not lose jurisdiction of a case till final judgment be rendered.). As such, the circuit court retained jurisdiction to enter the eventual January 24 judgment. This is not to say, however, that the procedural posture of this case is without missteps. After the circuit court entered its first judgment on June 22, the State filed a motion to amend the judgment by vacating it. The circuit court timely ruled on the motion in its October 11 order, which granted the full relief requested by the State and provided the circuit court would later enter a revised judgment. When the circuit court entered the second, amended judgment of dismissal on January 24, it was 186 days after the State filed its after-trial motion. This attempted ruling was well outside the 90-day window set out in Rule 78.06. 6 Simply put, though the circuit court retained jurisdiction over the case, it was not authorized to rule on the State's after-trial motion when it entered its January 24 judgment. That judgment, therefore, is voidable: [When] the power of the court to act is subject to certain limitations, named, then the judgment of the court rendered in violation of the things stated, or contrary to the limitations named, then such order or judgment of the court is not  void for want of jurisdiction, but voidable only.... Smith v. Black , 231 Mo. 681 , 132 S.W. 1129 , 1132-33 (Mo. 1910), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Staggs , 266 Mo. 449 , 181 S.W. 116 (Mo. banc 1915). [A] judgment which is voidable is capable of confirmation or ratification, and until superseded, reversed, or vacated, it is binding and enforceable. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 24 (2018). As such, the circuit court's second judgment, though entered without authority, is nevertheless the operative final judgment unless its validity was properly challenged. Failure to challenge a court's authority to take some action waives a party's right to challenge that action. Hightower v. Myers , 304 S.W.3d 727 , 733 (Mo. banc 2010). By neglecting to challenge in the circuit court the court's authority to enter the second judgment, Pilot waived any available challenge to the judgment's validity, and the second judgment became the final judgment from which the State could appeal. 7 The State timely did so, and the case is properly before this Court.