Opinion ID: 2625050
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stare decisis precludes reconsideration of policy issues decided in Guin v. Ha.

Text: In Guin v. Ha , we stated that public policy could potentially require holding an insurer liable for prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limit. [31] However, we concluded that the policy arguments advanced by the parties in that case favored both sides equally, and therefore did not justify overriding the contract. [32] In Guin, we considered three policy arguments in favor of holding insurers liable for prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limit. First, the plaintiff argued that economic fairness required insurer liability for prejudgment interest because insured defendants would otherwise have to pay for interest actually retained by their insurers. [33] We found that such a concern was not sufficient grounds for restructuring the contractual relationship between insured and insurer. [34] Second, we rejected the argument that insurers should bear the burden of prejudgment claims as an incentive to early settlement. [35] We expressed concern about burdening the insurer with a risk it had not contractually assumed. [36] Finally, we rejected the argument that insureds were at the mercy of the dilatory or uncooperative insurance company. [37] Insureds have a cause of action for bad faith against insurers if the insurers do not accept reasonable settlement offers in a prompt fashion. [38] We held in State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass'n that the judicial doctrine of stare decisis accords the prior holdings of the highest courts of this State precedential value while still permitting the reconsideration of legal issues when conditions warrant. [39] Farquhar has not advanced compelling arguments to show that conditions warrant departure from Guin 's rule. Nor has he raised policy considerations not already considered in Guin. Although he argues that new issues arise in this case because it concerns auto insurance, rather than the medical malpractice insurance at issue in Guin, this difference cannot be the basis for a principled policy distinction. And Farquhar's argument that public policy has been violated because he was insufficiently compensated for his injuries does not pertain to insurer liability for interest. Moreover, the legislature has already determined the appropriate level for minimum coverage. [40] We decline to reverse our holding in Guin. We note that Guin 's conclusion is consistent with holdings in a number of other jurisdictions, [41] and forms the basis of long-settled expectations of insurers in Alaska.