Opinion ID: 1516216
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Comments to Examining Witnesses

Text: Appellant next claims that the prosecutor unacceptably bolstered the testimony of Commonwealth witness Ms. Beverly, the sole testifying eyewitness to the crime, as well as portraying her as a victim of the shooting that killed William Lloyd. Specifically, appellant objects to the prosecutor's statement during the cross-examination of Commonwealth witness Monique Wylie: [10] DEFENSE COUNSEL: Tell the members of the jury why you went to see Raymon [sic] Burton? MS. WYLIE: To buy narcotics from him. DEFENSE COUNSEL: To buy narcotics from him. And how often did you buy narcotics? THE COURT: What's the relevancy of that question? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, the District Attorney is going to call Mr. Burton as a witness, and when he calls Mr. Burton as a witness and I have an opportunity to cross examine you will certainly see the relevancy. PROSECUTOR: I don't care if the guy [Ramon Burton] does narcotics. Everybody in the case did with the exception of the eyewitnesses. N.T. 7/10/1995 at 29-30. The Commonwealth argues that the prosecutor's comment was based on the established evidence in the case and that appellant freely admitted that he was a drug dealer when he testified in his own defense. Appellant makes a leap in logic in characterizing the statement above as bolstering of Ms. Beverly's testimony. First, the prosecutor's statement was made in response to a discussion initiated by the trial court because defense counsel's line of questioning seemed irrelevant. Second, Ms. Beverly had yet to testify and, when she did, she admitted on cross-examination to having been addicted to narcotics in the past. Id. at 154-56. Ms. Beverly's admission effectively eviscerated any supposed validation of her testimony by the prosecutor and, as a result, could not have prejudiced appellant by rendering the jury incapable of reaching a fair verdict. In any event, counsel cannot be faulted for failing to forward this strained interpretation. Appellant also accuses the prosecutor of painting Ms. Beverly as a victim of the shooting that killed William Lloyd. The Commonwealth does not respond to this specific sub-claim. During cross-examination by defense counsel, Ms. Beverly stated that bullets don't have no name on it so I stayed down there until after I heard the gun fire. N.T. 7/10/1995 at 175. The trial court then commented, [t]hat's what I would be concerned about, and the prosecutor responded, I'm concerned about those too. Id. Although appellant frames this exchange as objectionable vouching for Ms. Beverly's testimony by the trial court and prosecutor, the irrelevant comment by the prosecutor does not legitimize a portion of Ms. Beverly's testimony or even comment on testimony directly relevant to appellant's guilt. The prosecutor's comment, albeit unnecessary, merely verbalized humanity's universal fear of gunfire. As such, trial counsel was not obliged to object. Appellant next complains that the prosecutor sought to ingratiate himself at Appellant's expense, Appellant's Brief at 24, by stating: [s]ir, you are [sic] man with an IQ of 120 to 130, which is higher than mine. N.T. 7/11/1995 at 151. The Commonwealth questions how such a statement would help the prosecution, as appellant does not explain why the prosecutor would seek to fawn in front of the jury by saying he was less intelligent than appellant, and argues that the prosecutor merely wished to demonstrate the implausibility of appellant's story. Commonwealth's Brief at 29-30. Appellant, yet again, omits the trial context from his brief, as this allegedly unfitting statement was followed by the prosecutor asking with respect to appellant's testimony: If a man is chasing you with a gun a block and a half from your house, and you run in your house and you hear a series of gunshots and your first reaction is that it's just a random firing and not coming from the corner. Your first immediate reaction is not that it is coming from the corner, but it's random? N.T. 7/11/1995 at 151. This question was an appropriate follow-up to appellant's earlier testimony on direct examination that his IQ was in the range of 125 or 130, id. at 116, and his recollection of hearing random gunshots on the night of the murder, but which he testified he did not attribute to being chased by an armed man a short time prior to the shooting. Id. at 150. In the context of appellant's implausible account and self-proclaimed intelligence, the prosecutor's statement was nothing more than oratorical flair aimed at persuading the jury not to credit appellant's version of events. Counsel was not obliged to object to the prosecutor's statement. Since each of these claims have no validity, appellant's overarching layered ineffectiveness claims, which are reliant on the independent merit of the claims of prosecutor impropriety, also fail. McGill, 832 A.2d at 1023.