Opinion ID: 72947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the scope of the preliminary injunction

Text: Palm Beach argues that several provisions of the preliminary injunction are so vague as to violate Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65(d)). As we have previously held, a court must craft its orders so that those who seek to obey may know precisely what the court intends to forbid. See Hughey v. JMS Dev., 78 F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir.1996). Thus, Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [e]very order granting an injunction ... shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in reasonable detail ... the act or acts sought to be restrained.... Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). Under this rule, an ordinary person reading the court's order 6 should be able to ascertain from the document itself exactly what conduct is proscribed. Hughey, 78 F.3d at 1531 (quoting 11A Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2955 at 308-09 (1995)).4 Applying Rule 65(d), we believe that two significant portions of the injunction do not give Palm Beach sufficient notice as to what actions the district court means to prohibit. First, the injunction prohibits contacting and/or soliciting donations from any donor whose name is contained on Plaintiff's lists. R2-49-2. Although at first glance this directive from the district court may seem simple enough, Palm Beach has no way to determine whether a given member of the public might happen to appear on a Red Cross list not in Palm Beach's possession. As the district court itself acknowledged during its preliminary injunction hearing: Well, almost everybody that has ever donated before as a Red Cross donor, therein lies one of the problems. The American Red Cross has been in existence for 50-odd years according to the testimony, or maybe longer, so it is very difficult, I presume, to go out and compete in the recruiting of donors without touching upon someone in this five percent of the donating population that is or has been at some point in time a Red Cross donor. I mean, if the two entities are going to compete at all, if they are entitled to compete, it is obvious they are going to be competing for each others' donors. R6-88. Since an ordinary person in Palm Beach's position could not ascertain which members of the public might be off-limits for its recruitment efforts, this provision contravenes Rule 65(d).5 4 Rule 65(d) not only serves the interest of fairness but also helps to ensure informed and intelligent appellate review. See Hughey, 78 F.3d at 1531. 5 We are also concerned that this portion of the injunction, along with the section banning Palm Beach from in any way adversely affecting Plaintiff's reputation or goodwill, R2-46-2, may constitute an impermissible prior restraint on Palm Beach's legitimate competitive speech. See In re Nat'l Serv. Corp., 742 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that injunction prohibiting advertising of company's bankruptcy was unconstitutional prior restraint). Because we conclude that the injunction is improper under Rule 65(d), however, we do not reach this constitutional issue. 7 Second, the injunction bars Palm Beach from possessing, copying, or making unauthorized use of Plaintiff's lists or any other documents that contain trade secrets that are the proprietary property of Plaintiff. R2-46-2 (emphasis added). As Red Cross argues, a nonspecific injunction may sometimes be justified when the information needed to make the order specific in form is known only to the party to be enjoined. Wright, § 2955 at 323. In this case, though, Red Cross has not suggested even a genre of trade secret beyond its donor lists that Palm Beach might misappropriate, nor has Red Cross explained why only Palm Beach should be thought to have knowledge of those Red Cross trade secrets that the injunction might protect. Indeed, the lack of any apparent factual basis for this open-ended portion of the injunction has left Palm Beach understandably uncertain as to what the district court means to prohibit. While we would not expect an injunction in a case such as the one at bar to describe with particularity each of the documents that Palm Beach might misappropriate, we do think that the district court's injunction should put Palm Beach on notice as to the types of information, other than lists, to which it applies. See E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1969); Hughey, 78 F.3d at 1531. The district court may not simply order Palm Beach to obey the law. See Hughey, 78 F.3d at 1531. Finally, we note that, assuming Red Cross's lists are protectable trade secrets, the district court could readily have drafted a more narrow injunction. Such an injunction would presumably have prohibited Palm Beach from (1) possessing, using, or copying Red Cross's lists or any other specific types of valuable confidential documents identified by the district court, (2) using false designations or descriptions to mislead individuals or businesses into believing that Palm Beach is 8 affiliated with Red Cross,6 and (3) disposing of or destroying material evidence. Such an injunction would have given Palm Beach much fairer notice of what the district court intended to prohibit, without compromising whatever legitimate need Red Cross may have for protection of its trade secrets. In sum, the district court has crafted an injunction that leaves Palm Beach without reasonable notice of what the court means to prohibit. Regardless of whatever assurances Red Cross may have given the district court or Palm Beach regarding its intended manner of enforcing the injunction, Palm Beach should not have to risk citation for contempt in order to determine the true scope of activity barred by the district court's order. See Hughey, 78 F.3d at 1531. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary injunction is impermissibly vague under Rule 65(d), and we vacate the district court's order.