Opinion ID: 1709662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the solid waste law

Text: ถ 17. We now turn to the first issue presented on appeal: whether the discovery rule should apply to the State's environmental enforcement action under the Solid Waste Law, so as to render it timely under Wis. Stat. ง 893.87 (1995-96). Upon review of the application of appropriate law in granting a motion for summary judgment, we exercise a de novo standard of review. Thus, we analyze and apply the law without deference to the circuit court's conclusion of law. See Le Fevre v. Schrieber, 167 Wis. 2d 733, 736, 482 N.W.2d 904 (1992). ถ 18. The discovery rule was first adopted by this court in Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983). In that case, the plaintiff (Hansen) had a Dalkon Shield intrauterine device inserted into her uterus by medical personnel. See id. at 552. Approximately four years later, she began to experience various health problems, which eventually prompted her doctor to remove the device. See id. at 552-53. Although the Dalkon Shield was removed, the plaintiff did not escape unharmed: she contracted pelvic inflammatory disease, which left her fallopian tubes blocked and rendered her sterile. See id. at 553. ถ 19. The applicable statute of limitations in Hansen's subsequent personal injury action stated that actions to recover damages for injuries to the person must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. See id. at 554. If Hansen's personal injury cause of action had accrued at the time of the negligent actโthe insertion of the Dalkon Shieldโher claim against A.H. Robins would have been barred. Instead, recognizing the injustice of commencing the statute of limitations before a claimant is aware of his or her right of action, and that using the date of injury as the benchmark for accrual of claims can yield extremely harsh results, id. at 556, we adopted the discovery rule for Hansen's action and others like it. See id. at 560-61. ถ 20. In adopting the discovery rule, we stated: In the interest of justice and fundamental fairness, we adopt the discovery rule for all tort actions other than those already governed by a legislatively created discovery rule. Such tort claims shall accrue on the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should be discovered, whichever occurs first. All cases holding that tort claims accrue at the time of the negligent act or injury are hereby overruled. Id. at 560. Because Hansen could not have discovered her injury any earlier, or could not be expected to personally diagnose her condition, we held that her personal injury claim accrued in 1978, upon discovery of her medical condition. See id. at 561. Thus, her cause of action was timely filed. ถ 21. The State seeks to have this same rule applied to the present cause of action: an environmental enforcement claim for violations of the Solid Waste Law which occurred in 1970, but which were not discovered until 1992. According to the State, this court has continued, without legislative direction, to expand the discovery rule since our decision in Hansen, and has indicated its intention to make the discovery rule applicable to other types of cases. To support this proposition, the State cites several cases, including Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997), Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989), Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co., 144 Wis. 2d 352, 424 N.W.2d 191 (1988), and Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986). We disagree with the State's argument and use of authority. ถ 22. This court has recently declined to extend the discovery rule to causes of action not sounding in tort. See CLL Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 604, 617, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993) (holding that causes of action sounding in contract accrue at the time the contract is breached, regardless of whether the injured party knew or should have known that the breach occurred). [14] Moreover, although several of the cases cited by the State arguably represent some expansion of the discovery rule, they are all cases in which the plaintiffs cause of action sounded in tort. Stated more precisely, these cases all involved claims for personal injury. See Claypool, 209 Wis. 2d at 287-88 (barring claim for medical malpractice); Spitler, 148 Wis. 2d at 631-32 (permitting intentional tort claim arising from assault and battery); Kohnke, 144 Wis. 2d at 355 (permitting claim for medical malpractice); Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 423-24 (permitting claim for personal injury resulting from defective furnace). ถ 23. In none of these cases did we indicate our intention to expand the discovery rule to situations arising outside of the tort context. The State brings our attention to a paragraph in Kohnke which states: The plain language of the Hansen case did not limit its discovery rule to certain types of cases, such as medical malpractice or products liability, but was applicable to any case not `already governed by a legislatively created discovery rule.' Kohnke, 144 Wis. 2d at 361 (quoting Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 560). The State misinterprets this statement. ถ 24. Nothing in that paragraph purports to apply the discovery rule to situations arising outside the tort context. This is made evident by the fact that Kohnke involved a personal injury tort claim for damages sustained during the plaintiff, Kohnke's, childhood surgery. See Kohnke, 144 Wis. 2d at 356. The statement cited by the State simply reflects our conclusion that the discovery rule should apply to Kohnke's actionโa claim controlled not by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, but by a personal injury statute of limitations in effect when Kohnke suffered his injury and which did not contain its own rule of discovery. Kohnke, 144 Wis. 2d at 359-61. ถ 25. Nevertheless, the State attempts to analogize the social purposes underlying environmental enforcement actions to those generally served by tort law. According to the State, environmental enforcement actions are strikingly similar to tort claims because the actions shift the losses, in the form of injunctions to remediate the environment or forfeitures, to the party at fault for damaging the environment. Placing this cost with the law-violating partyโthe one most able to prevent the injuryโserves to deter other would-be violators from handling or disposing of their hazardous wastes in an unsafe manner. Finally, just as in tort law, losses are distributed widely since industry considers the cost of compliance as part of the cost of doing business in Wisconsin. [15] ถ 26. We are not persuaded by the State's analogy. Nor are we persuaded that the State's request in this case comports with our traditional understanding of the discovery rule. We now proceed to expound upon these important distinctions, and to explain our decision to defer to the legislature for adopting the discovery rule in environmental enforcement actions brought pursuant to the Solid Waste Law.