Opinion ID: 2745141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Search of Moore’s Residence

Text: On appeal, Moore argues that the search of his residence was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Randolph because, although his fiancée consented to the search, he was present at the residence and did not consent. “The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained.” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106. In Georgia v. Randolph, the Supreme Court created a narrow exception to this rule and held that “a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as 8 UNITED STATES V. MOORE to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.” Id. at 122–23; accord Fernandez v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1129 (2014) (“In Georgia v. Randolph, we recognized a narrow exception to this rule, holding that the consent of one occupant is insufficient when another occupant is present and objects to the search.” (citation omitted)). Like the district court, we conclude that the search of Moore’s residence was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The search did not violate Randolph because Moore never expressly refused consent to the search. Randolph requires that the co-occupant both be physically present and expressly refuse consent. See 547 U.S. at 120 (“We therefore hold that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.” (emphasis added)); id. at 122–23 (“This case invites a straightforward application of the rule that a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.” (emphasis added)). No such express refusal occurred here. The relevant conduct by Moore on that day is as follows: he did not respond to the police officers’ “knock and talk” at 2:00 p.m.; he did not answer Jones’ phone calls; and he did not open the door for Jones when she, accompanied by police officers, knocked on the door at approximately 8:45 p.m. Moore never expressly refused to consent to the search and simply acquiesced in letting his fiancée deal with the police. The facts at best show that Moore implicitly refused to allow the police to search the residence. However, Randolph requires an express, not implicit, refusal. See 547 U.S. at UNITED STATES V. MOORE 9 120, 122–23. Moreover, the Supreme Court has subsequently emphasized that Randolph represents a “narrow exception” to the rule that “police officers may search jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants consents.” Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1129 (footnote omitted); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121 (“we are drawing a fine line”). Therefore, we decline to extend the Supreme Court’s holding in Randolph to include implicit refusals in addition to express refusals. Further, Moore’s reliance on United States v. Williams, 521 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 2008), is unpersuasive. In Williams, the defendant, after speaking to the police officers, slammed the door shut on the officers and put the dead-bolt on. Id. at 905. The Eighth Circuit found that this action was sufficient to invalidate a co-occupant’s consent to search the premises. See id. at 907. Unlike in Williams, here, Moore never met the police officers at the door, nor did he engage in any affirmative conduct to physically prevent the police officers from coming inside the house. Moore simply remained in the house while Jones worked with the police officers to gain entry to the house. Acquiescence in a co-occupant’s consent and police officers’ subsequent actions is insufficient to satisfy the narrow exception set forth in Randolph. Relying on Randolph, Moore also argues that commonly held understandings regarding a fellow occupant’s right to invite third parties to enter a shared residence do not extend to the use of a battering ram. We disagree. There is nothing in Randolph that prevents police officers from using a battering ram to gain access to a residence when the cooccupant is locked out and expressly consents to the use of such methods. 10 UNITED STATES V. MOORE The search of Moore’s residence was lawful and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the district court correctly denied Moore’s motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.