Opinion ID: 1933405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Springfield Petition

Text: Petitioners from Springfield challenge various aspects of Act 116 and Act 147. They argue that (1) the House plan violates the equal protection clause because it has an overall deviation greater than 10%, and the State has failed to show that the deviation was the necessary result of the implementation of legitimate state policies; (2) their initial district violates constitutional and statutory criteria because it crosses a county line and lacks contiguity, compactness, and common interests; (3) the subdivided districts created by the Legislature resulted from political gerrymandering rather than the application of the relevant constitutional and statutory criteria; (4) the incumbency criterion for subdividing multimember districts violates the Vermont Constitution; (5) Act 116 violates equal protection by giving each town board of civil authority, regardless of population, an equal vote in subdividing multimember districts; and (6) the Legislature violated statutory procedure when it subdivided their initial district. We reject each of these arguments, and dismiss the petition. Petitioners first argue that the State failed to adequately justify the House plan's overall deviation of 17.6%. We agree with the State that petitioners have waived their right to raise this issue at this juncture because it was not raised in their petition or at the hearing before the master. See In re Mullestein, 148 Vt. 170, 175, 531 A.2d 890, 893 (1987) (absent extraordinary circumstances, constitutional issues not raised before trial court are waived on appeal). Petitioners contend that the issue was adequately raised by a request for relief in their petitionDeclare Act 116 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitutionand by unspecified evidence presented at the master's hearing. [12] But the prayer for relief was one of fifteen various requests for relief in a thirty-page petition that never specifically challenged the overall deviation of the House plan. Further, a challenge based on the plan's overall deviation was not specifically addressed at the master's hearing. It is not enough that there was evidence before the master that could have supported this claim. The point is that the State was not given adequate notice of the claim. Further, the fact that this Court has original jurisdiction is not significant. The purpose of the master is to take testimony and make findings for this Court. See 17 V.S.A. § 1909(d). Because the State was not on notice that petitioners were challenging the overall deviation of the plan, it had no opportunity to create a record before the master that included justification for the deviation. Next, petitioners argue that inclusion of Springfield in a district with three Windham County towns violated constitutional and statutory criteria requiring the Legislature to create compact and contiguous districts that, if possible, maintain county lines and common interests. We reject this argument on procedural grounds. First, petitioners are challenging the initial Windsor-Windham 1 district, which no longer exists as a representative district. See id. § 1903(b) (stating standards for the creation of representative and senatorial districts). We are aware that the town boards of civil authority are directed to consider the § 1903 standards when recommending proposals of initial districts to the Legislative Apportionment Board, see id. § 1905, but the fact of the matter is that the initial Windsor-Windham 1 district has been subdivided and does not exist as a representative district. Therefore, petitioners cannot complain that it is not compact or that towns within it have no common interests. Second, even if we accepted petitioners' argument as a challenge to the subdivided Windsor-Windham 1 district, we agree with the State that petitioners have no standing to raise this issue because they do not reside in the challenged district. Petitioners correctly point out that many of their arguments entail a broader challenge, foreclosing dismissal of their petition on grounds of standing. But that is not the case with this argument. Petitioners all reside in the Windsor 6 district, yet they argue that Windsor-Windham 1 is invalid because it crosses county lines, is not compact or contiguous, and is not composed of towns with common interests. We address their broader political gerrymandering claims below, but we do not accept this narrow challenge to a district in which none of the petitioners reside. Finally, even if we considered petitioners' challenge of Windsor-Windham 1 on the nonnumerical criteria, we would reject it because petitioners have failed to meet their burden of showing that the Legislature had no rational or legitimate basis for creating the district. Petitioners' principal argument is that the nonnumerical constitutional and statutory criteria would be better met by placing Springfield with other towns. The question is not whether there is a better alternative plan, however, but whether the Legislature's plan violates the legal standards. We find no such violation. The boot-shaped district clearly does not violate principles of compactness and contiguity. See, e.g., Schrage v. State Board of Elections, 58 Ill.Dec. at 454-55, 430 N.E.2d at 486-87 (citing cases involving noncompact districts and describing one challenged district as tortured and extremely elongated); In re Legislative Districting, 475 A.2d at 443-44 (describing odd-shaped districts that might pose compactness problem, and noting that presentation of alternative only begs the question of whether a district meets constitutional or statutory requirements). Although the master found that the town of Springfield was not contiguous with the towns of Windham and Grafton, he did not find that the district lacked contiguity. On the contrary, he found that all four towns in the district shared at least one common border. Further, petitioners presented virtually no evidence to show a lack of common interests among the towns in Windsor-Windham 1. Indeed, the master found that there is a network of state highways connecting the towns. The only evidence presented by petitioners showing that Windsor-Windham 1 does not meet a nonnumerical criterion is that the district breaches a county line. That alone, however, does not prove that there was no rational or legitimate basis for creation of the district. See In re Senate Bills 177 & 83, 132 Vt. at 289, 318 A.2d at 162 (crossing county lines does not disqualify plan, given difficulties of reaching an acceptable result statewide); In re Reapportionment Plan for Pennsylvania General Assembly, 442 A.2d at 668 (crossing county lines is unavoidable). Petitioners also argue that the subdivision of Windsor 6 violated the requirement that the Legislature seek to adhere to boundaries of existing political subdivisions because the district line within Springfield splits too many streets, relies too much on boundaries of census blocks, and, at times, ignores all natural boundaries. Petitioners, however, have failed to indicate which political subdivisions were ignored, or to refute adequately the State's contention that the line was drawn to separate Springfield's most urban areas from neighborhoods that would have more in common with the relatively rural town of Rockingham. We cannot conclude that there was no rational and legitimate basis for the internal line drawn within Springfield. Petitioners' next contention is that the subdivision of Windsor-Windham 1 amounted to political gerrymandering in favor of the Democratic Party, in violation of the compactness and contiguity requirements of Chapter II, § 13 and Chapter I, Article 7, the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. They rely chiefly on hearsay testimony to the effect that the Speaker of the House indicated that he wanted internal lines drawn in Springfield to protect certain Democratic incumbents. According to petitioners, this goal was accomplished by forming districts that would pit a Republican incumbent against two unbeatable Democratic incumbents rather than against a more vulnerable Democratic incumbent. This argument is without merit. Political considerations are an inevitable component of redistricting and are not per se improper. In re Reapportionment of Colorado General Assembly, 828 P.2d at 199; see Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129, 106 S.Ct. at 2809 (As long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 753, 93 S.Ct. at 2331 (districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences); see also In re 1991 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 609 A.2d at 142 (no individual has a right to run for a particular office, nor do citizens have a right to vote for a specific individual). In challenging the formation of a district, the fundamental question is whether constitutional or statutory criteria have been violated, not whether the legislators intended to obtain some political advantage. See Republican Party of Virginia v. Wilder, 774 F.Supp. 400, 404 (W.D.Va. 1991) (even if petitioners showed that district boundaries were drawn solely for partisan ends, they must prove an actual discriminatory effect) (emphasis in original). Because we have found that neither of the challenged districts violates constitutional or statutory criteria, we need not consider the motives of the legislators. In re 1991 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 609 A.2d at 147 (because redistricting plan does not violate state constitution on its face, court need not resolve whether members of the commission can be compelled to disclose underlying motives); see People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill.2d 270, 167 Ill.Dec. 903, 908, 588 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (1992) (A map that is politically unacceptable to one political party is not, for that reason, legally unacceptable.) (emphasis in original). If we were to accept gerrymandering claims based solely on a showing of an intent to favor a political party, we would commit the responsibility for redistricting to the courts rather than to the Legislature. Next, petitioners challenge two of the procedures added by Act 116 for subdividing multimember districts. First, petitioners argue that Act 116 violates Chapter II, § 13 and Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution by requiring boards of civil authority to consider incumbencies when creating subdivision proposals for multimember districts. See 17 V.S.A. §§ 1906b(c)(4) and 1906c(c)(4). The thrust of petitioners' argument is that protecting incumbents is just another form of political gerrymandering, which the criteria of Chapter II, § 13 are meant to prevent. We disagree that consideration of incumbents in any manner constitutes a per se violation of the Vermont Constitution. As long as constitutional and statutory criteria regarding redistricting are adhered to, including those criteria contained in Chapter II, § 13, creating districts to avoid contests between incumbents is a legitimate consideration that may justify minor deviations from equal representation. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 2663, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983); see In re Legislative Districting of General Assembly, 193 N.W.2d at 790 (minimizing contests between incumbents is not impermissible consideration unless it results in districts lacking population equality or compactness). The record indicates that the incumbency criterion was narrowly interpreted to mean avoiding alternatives that create contests between incumbents, [13] which is the limited construction we give it. As noted above, there is no showing that consideration of this criterion created a district that violated any constitutional or statutory criteria. Regarding the Common Benefits Clause, [14] petitioners have not indicated what part of, or how, the community has been disadvantaged. Cf. In re One Church Street, 152 Vt. 260, 264, 565 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1989) (construing State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 141 Vt. 261, 448 A.2d 791 (1982)) (supporters of Sunday closing law could not claim that large businesses compelled to close on Sundays were included in the general class of beneficiaries, or that the detriment they incurred was only incidental). Petitioners complain that the incumbency criterion is a form of gerrymandering, yet, under the narrow construction we have given it, it can reduce the potential for gerrymandering by making it more difficult to pit a targeted incumbent against another incumbent who is more likely to prevail. See State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 141 Vt. at 269, 448 A.2d at 795 (preferential legislation must further a goal independent of the preference awarded). Although two incumbents had to be pitted against one another in this case, we believe that in cases where it is possible to avoid this result, the criterion will prevent gerrymandering. We conclude that the purpose of the criterion is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. See Town of Sandgate v. Colehamer, 156 Vt. 77, 88, 589 A.2d 1205, 1211 (1990) (test of constitutionality is whether law's purpose is reasonably related to promoting valid state interest). The second provision of Act 116 to which petitioners object concerns the procedure by which town boards of civil authority share responsibility for preparing a proposal for subdivision of multimember districts. After enactment of a final plan for initial districts, boards of towns within multimember districts are directed to meet and prepare a proposal for division of the district. 17 V.S.A. §§ 1906b(b) and 1906c(b). Each town, regardless of population, has one vote on accepting or rejecting any proposal, and any town may veto a proposal that draws internal lines within that town. Id. §§ 1906b(b) and 1906c(b). If a majority of the towns agree on a proposal, and it is consistent with the statutory standards, the Legislature must accept it. Id. §§ 1906b(f) and 1906c(f). On the other hand, if the boards are unable to obtain a majority vote on a proposed subdivision, the Legislature must subdivide the district. Id. §§ 1906b(e) and 1906c(e). Petitioners contend that giving each town one vote, regardless of population, offends the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree. Petitioners rely heavily on two cases, which stand for the proposition that under certain circumstances the makeup of local governing boards is subject to the one-person, one-vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). See New York City Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989); Kelleher v. Southeastern Regional Vocational Technical High School District, 806 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.1986). Petitioners correctly point out that equal representation applies to local governing bodies in situations where the members of the local body are elected officials, and the body exercises a wide range of local governmental functions. Regarding the second criterion, the Court in Board of Estimate listed a litany of significant functions common to municipal governments that are performed by New York's Board of Estimateincluding calculating tax rates, zoning, managing city property, fixing salaries of city employees, granting city contracts, and sharing responsibility for formulation of the city budgetand concluded that these `powers are general enough and have sufficient impact throughout the district' to require that elections to the body comply with equal protection strictures. 489 U.S. at 696, 109 S.Ct. at 1439 (quoting Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 54, 90 S.Ct. 791, 794, 25 L.Ed.2d 45 (1970)); see Kelleher, 806 F.2d at 10-11 & n. 7 (court lists wide range of powers given to regional school district committee that brings the committee within the one-person, one-vote principle). According to petitioners, the second criterion is satisfied here because the boards of civil authority of each town perform many functions common to municipal governments. Petitioners miss the point, however. They are challenging the voting procedure of a superboard created by combining the boards of each town in a multimember district, not of an individual town board. This superboard does not perform a wide range of local governmental functions. Rather, the Legislature has delegated an aspect of redistricting, a legislative function, to this superboard, perhaps in deference to Vermont's unique history as a state formed by an association of preexisting independent towns. Thus, rather than performing a wide range of functions common to local government, the superboard performs an extremely narrow role within a legislative function. There is no equal protection violation. Assuming the constitutionality of § 1906c, petitioners argue that the Legislature violated that section by adopting its own subdivision of Windsor-Windham 1 despite the fact that a majority of the district's boards of civil authority agreed upon their own subdivision. We cannot agree that this fact alone is sufficient to establish a violation of § 1906c. On or before April 1 of an election year, a majority of a district's boards of civil authority must present a proposal for subdividing the district. 17 V.S.A. § 1906c(e). On March 30, 1992, Springfield's proposal for subdividing Windsor-Windham 1 was transmitted to the clerk of the House. The proposal required subdivision lines within both Springfield and Rockingham, but no internal lines were drawn through Rockingham. The House Government Appropriations Committee held a public hearing on April 2, 1992, in which it learned or was aware that Springfield, Grafton, and Windham supported the Springfield plan, but Rockingham objected to being subdivided. The Legislature was entitled to subdivide Windsor-Windham 1 because the Springfield plan required that Rockingham be divided, and Rockingham had a right to veto a plan that drew internal lines within its boundaries. Id. § 1906c(b). We also reject petitioners' argument that the Legislature's subdivision favored only Democrats. Because of the decline in the population of the area, any subdivision plan would have had to pit the Republican incumbent against Democratic incumbents. We are not concerned with speculation as to which incumbent had the best chance to prevail over which incumbent in the other party. In this situation, one of the political parties had to be in a presumably favored position. We find no violation of any statutory or constitutional criteria.