Opinion ID: 438801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Allegation of Class-wide Overcompensation

Text: 137 In calculating the backpay pool the District Court used the race coefficient of the first of plaintiffs' two salary regressions as the measure of average discrimination per agent. The first regression measured discrimination against all black agents, including those hired before 1972. This study may therefore have reflected the continuing effects of some discrimination occurring prior to 1972. See Parts I-B-1, II-B-1-b supra. Since the actionable period in this case commenced on July 15, 1972, use of the first regression might, according to DEA's argument, amount to compensation for some nonactionable discrimination. 37 7] Though the remedial order specifically states that backpay begins to accrue only as of July 15, 1972, see Remedial Order at 3, JA 121, DEA argues that a portion of the disparities between black and white agents as of that time (and thereafter) was caused by discrimination before 1972, and that DEA is therefore not liable for that portion. 138 The District Court found in the Liability Determination that while pre-1972 discrimination may have affected the statistics   , post 1972 discrimination largely contributed to those statistics. Findings p 7i, 508 F.Supp. at 697. The court also noted in the Remedial Order that plaintiffs' regressions provide an accurate measure of the extent to which blacks at DEA were paid less than comparably qualified whites [and]    provide an appropriate basis for classwide relief. Mem.Op. at 3, JA 116 (citation omitted). We are reluctant to disturb the trial court's finding on this factual issue. See McKenzie v. Sawyer, supra, 684 F.2d at 75. Nonetheless on the record as it now stands, we cannot affirm the District Court's decision to use the first regression as a basis for calculating the backpay pool. 139 Although the court properly found that the plaintiffs' evidence sufficed to support an inference of actionable discrimination, see Part II-B-1-b supra, the court's reliance on the first regression to determine backpay is problematic. The court never found that all of that regression's race coefficient reflected actionable post-1972 discrimination. 38 To do so the court would have had to find either that all discrimination reflected in the salary disparities occurred after 1972 or that the small portion of continuing effects of pre-1972 discrimination reflected in the disparities was the result of a continuing violation. See id. The court made neither finding, and having found in the Liability Determination that pre-1972 discrimination had been neither admitted nor proven, 508 F.Supp. at 696, the court cannot plausibly rely on a continuing violation theory in the Remedial Order as grounds for using the first salary regression as a benchmark for the backpay pool. 140 It may be that plaintiffs' first regression does reflect only post-1972 discrimination. DEA's complete failure to present evidence showing pre-1972 discrimination in the regression certainly supports this view. It may also be that the portion of the disparity that reflects continuing effects of pre-1972 discrimination might be actionable on a continuing violation theory. Or it may be that the small amount of continuing effects cannot plausibly be factored out of the study; if so, and if no more precise methods of ascertaining the amount of actionable discrimination are reasonably available to the court, the court would be faced with using either a mildly overcompensatory formula based on the first regression or a significantly undercompensatory formula based on the second regression. Use of the first regression under these circumstances might be permissible. 141 We cannot, however, resolve these matters on the present appeal. As the Supreme Court stressed in Lehman v. Trout, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 1404, this court must scrupulously respect the factfinding prerogative of the District Court. In this case the District Court has not yet determined whether the first regression reflects only post-1972 discrimination, whether a continuing violation occurred that might permit compensation for whatever continuing effects the regression reflects, or whether the small portion of nonactionable continuing effects that might be reflected in the regression cannot be factored out. On remand, if the District Court is unable to find that any of these three factual circumstances exists, the court must devise a new backpay formula.