Opinion ID: 1506689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Maine Human Rights Commission Proceeding

Text: [¶ 16] The remaining issue asserted on appeal is whether Commercial Union has a duty to defend the proceedings before the Maine Human Rights Commission. The trial court did not address the Academy's arguments in detail, concluding merely that because Commercial Union has no duty to defend Martin's claims in the Superior Court, it has no duty to defend the claims presented to the Maine Human Rights Commission. [¶ 17] The insurance policy provides in pertinent part: SECTION I  COVERAGES COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY . . . LIABILITY 1. Insuring Agreement. a. [Commercial Union] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury . . . to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend any suit seeking those damages. . . . . . . . SECTION V  DEFINITIONS . . . . 13. Suit means a civil proceeding in which damages because of bodily injury. . . [Or] personal injury . . . to which this insurance applies are alleged. Suit includes: a. An arbitration proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which you must submit or do submit with our consent; or b. Any other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which you submit with our consent. The Academy argues that Commercial Union's duty to defend is limited only by the definition of suit contained in the policy. The Academy argues that Commercial Union has a duty to defend because the proceeding before the Maine Human Rights Commission is a civil proceeding in which damages are alleged. The Academy further contends that the proceedings before the Commission and Martin's action in the Superior Court are so interrelated that the duty to defend arises. Commercial Union argues that its duty to defend is not limited only by the definition of suit, but also by the language limiting its duty to defend any `suit' seeking those damages. Commercial Union contends that the proceeding before the Commission is merely an investigatory proceeding rather than a civil proceeding within the policy definition of suit. Commercial Union further argues that its duty to defend applies only to a suit seeking damages for those injuries to which the insurance applies, and the proceeding before the Commission does not seek such damages. We agree. [¶ 18] First, the policy states clearly that the insurer's duty to defend is limited to suits seeking damages covered by the policy, and not any suit included within the policy definition. Proceedings before the Commission do not seek damages; instead, damages may only be sought in a subsequent enforcement action in the Superior Court. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4612(4)(A) (Supp.1996); [1] cf. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 20 (Me.1990) (no duty to defend administrative proceeding brought by the Department of Environmental Protection to compel clean-up because the agency action was not a suit seeking damages). Second, contrary to the Academy's contention, the Commission proceeding is not a necessary antecedent to Martin's action in the Superior Court. Instead, pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 4622(1), filing a complaint with the Commission is merely a prerequisite to obtaining, in a subsequent civil action, attorney fees pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 4614 and civil penal damages pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613. [¶ 19] Because we conclude Commercial Union has a duty to defend, we further conclude the trial court erred by granting a summary judgment on Count I, seeking compensatory damages for breach of contract, and Count VI, seeking punitive damages, but only to the extent that such counts pertain to Martin's underlying suit in the Superior Court. Similarly, we conclude the court erred by granting a summary judgment on Count III, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the duty to indemnify; however, we do not further address Commercial Union's duty to indemnify because it is premature at this time. [2] Because the Academy does not challenge the summary judgment as to Counts IV and V, we affirm the judgment on those counts. The entry is: Judgment on Count III vacated, and judgment on Counts I, II and VI vacated with respect to the duty to defend in the Superior Court, and affirmed with respect to the duty to defend the Maine Human Rights Commission proceeding. Remanded for (1) entry of a judgment declaring Commercial Union Insurance Company is obligated to provide a defense to Maine State Academy of Hair Design, Inc., Jeffrey Saleeby, and William Malloy in Amber Martin's underlying action in the Superior Court, and (2) further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. Judgment on Counts IV and V affirmed.