Opinion ID: 6109557
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to call Dr. Gelbort to testify regarding mental capacity

Text: Similarly, the motion court did not clearly err in finding defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to call Dr. Gelbort as a neurological expert to testify Mr. McFadden's mental capacity was that of someone under the age of 18. To the extent Mr. McFadden argues a mental age of less than 18 entitles him to be treated as a juvenile for sentencing purposes and precludes imposition of the death penalty even though he was 23 at the time he committed the murder, this Court already has rejected that argument in Tisius, 519 S.W.3d at 430-31 . Tisius held that even though the United States Supreme Court recognized the potential for a defendant's mental age to differ from his or her biological age, it  nonetheless, implemented a bright line rule as to the minority age for imposition of the death penalty and trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to object on grounds that Mr. Tisius' mental age prohibited imposition of the death penalty because his biological age was over 18. Id. at 431 . While it may be, at some future time, courts will prohibit imposition of the death penalty for those younger than 25 years, this is not currently the law. 8 To the extent Mr. McFadden is arguing counsel were unreasonable in deciding not to call Dr. Gelbort as a neurological expert in mitigation, his claim also fails. The record shows counsel's decision was based on their specific familiarity with Dr. Gelbort and their belief calling him would have hurt Mr. McFadden's case. In 2004, he was hired by counsel to perform a neuropsychological exam on Mr. McFadden. He concluded Mr. McFadden had a full-scale IQ in the low-average range, had impulse control problems, and had impairments in the areas of the brain that give rise to decisionmaking. But he also would not characterize Mr. McFadden as mentally disabled and believed Mr. McFadden's mental capacity did not absolve him of responsibility for the murders of Leslie and Mr. Franklin. Defense counsel nonetheless called Dr. Gelbort to testify during the first trial involving the murder of Leslie and the first trial involving the murder of Mr. Franklin, but he performed poorly on cross-examination. Counsel believed Dr. Gelbort's previous testimony was not particularly helpful because he could not definitively say Mr. McFadden's cognitive functioning had any impact on the decision to kill Leslie, the testimony had not been well-received by the jury because Dr. Gelbort had an attitude on the stand, and in both cases, the jury recommended death. Because of Dr. Gelbort's previous poor performance, defense counsel chose to try a new strategy in the retrial by calling only lay witnesses. Such strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible opinions are virtually unchallengeable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . The motion court did not clearly err in failing to find defense counsel ineffective for failing to repeat strategies that did not work at the prior trials, Baumruk, 364 S.W.3d at 536 , and instead choosing to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another. Davis, 486 S.W.3d at 912 . 9