Opinion ID: 2812091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preemption under the First Richardson Prong

Text: Second, the Plaintiffs argue “there still may be no preemption of the County Ordinance by State general laws,” pointing to the first prong of the Richardson test, which states that a “municipal ordinance may be preempted” if it covers the same subject matter embraced within a comprehensive state statutory scheme disclosing an express or implied intent to be exclusive and uniform throughout the state, or if the ordinance conflicts with state law. Richardson, 76 Hawaii at 62, 868 P.2d at 1209 (emphasis added). The Plaintiffs “disagree that the Penal Code of the State of Hawaiʻi is comprehensive, even if uniformly applied throughout the state.” They contend, “Nothing 16  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  was expressly mentioned in the statutes as to the Hawaiʻi Penal Code’s exclusivity.” (Emphasis in original). We read this argument as challenging the ICA’s conclusion that the LLEP “covers . . . the same subject matter that the legislature intended to govern under HRS Chapter 329 provisions for the regulation of controlled substances.” 132 Hawaii at 516, 323 P.3d at 160. The ICA did not need to address Richardson’s first prong because it had already correctly determined that the ordinance was preempted under the second prong. Furthermore, the ICA’s articulation of Richardson’s first prong was incomplete because the ICA did not analyze whether HRS Chapter 329 is a “comprehensive statutory scheme disclosing an express or implied intent to be exclusive and uniform throughout the state. . . .” Id. We note that the ICA incorrectly views the Richardson preemption test as a single test it calls the “‘comprehensive statutory-scheme’ test.” Ruggles, 132 Hawaii at 514, 323 P.3d at 158. In actuality, as noted, it is a two-prong test. With respect to the first prong, we need not address whether the LLEP ordinance is field-preempted by state law. We note that several other jurisdictions have passed LLEP 17  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  ordinances4, but there are no published opinions addressing the issue. We also need not address, in general, whether a municipal drug ordinance is field-preempted by the state Uniform Controlled Substances Act. We note that such a holding is rare across the nation. Of the forty-eight5 states that have adopted some form of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, only one has held that its state controlled substances act “occupies the field of penalizing crimes involving controlled substances, thus impliedly preempting” a municipal ordinance, which, in that case, provided for the forfeiture of vehicles used to acquire or attempt to acquire controlled substances. O’Connell v. City of Stockton, 162 P.3d 583, 589, 590 (Cal. 2007). In so holding, the Supreme Court of California examined, in “tedious” detail, the “comprehensive nature of [its state controlled substances act] in defining drug crimes and specifying penalties (including forfeiture). . . .” 162 P.3d at 588, 589. The O’Connell Court considered the California Uniform Controlled Substances Act “so thorough and detailed as to manifest the Legislature’s intent to 4 According to the Marijuana Policy Project, the following cities and counties passed LLEP ordinances: Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; Oakland, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, San Francisco, Santa Monica, and West Hollywood, California; Eureka Springs, Arkansas; Missoula County, Montana; Denver, Colorado; Fayetteville, Arkansas; Hailey, Idaho, and Kalamazoo and Ypsilanti, Michigan. Marijuana Policy Project, Lowest Law Enforcement Priority Jurisdictions, available at http://www.mpp.org/reports/lowest-lawenforcement.html (last visited May 22, 2015). 5 See 9 West’s Hawaii Revised Statutes Annotated, 2013 Pocket Part 269-270 (2013). 18  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  preclude local regulation.” 162 P.3d at 589. There is no similar analysis into the comprehensive nature of HRS Chapter 329 in the ICA’s opinion. Compare O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 588-89, with Ruggles, 132 Hawaii at 515-16, 323 P.3d at 159-60. The ICA did not need to reach the field preemption issue, however, as the Richardson test is stated in the disjunctive, and the ICA had already correctly held that the LLEP conflicted with, and was therefore preempted by, HRS Chapter 329 and HRS §§ 712-1247(1)(e), -1248(1)(c), and -1249(1). Therefore, we overrule the ICA’s opinion only to the extent it erroneously included within its conflict analysis an incomplete articulation of Richardson’s field-preemption prong. As it is unnecessary to address the issue, we make no determination as to whether Chapter 329 field-preempts the LLEP under the first Richardson prong.