Opinion ID: 2099700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Barnes's Commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator

Text: Barnes disputes that he suffers from a mental abnormality as defined under the statute because his mental diagnosis is limited to antisocial personality disorder. He asserts this diagnosis is not correlated with sex-offending and that forty to sixty percent of the prison population has this diagnosis. See Paul Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 34 Soc. Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology 231, 234 (1999) (recognizing that forty to sixty percent of the male prison population is diagnosable with antisocial personality disorder). He further contends, a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder does not imply anything about a person's ability to control their behavior and does not indicate whether the person is more or less likely to commit a sex offense. Therefore, he concludes that a civil commitment based solely on this diagnosis violates due process. We consider this argument in the context of the statutory elements of a mental abnormality.
There was expert testimony presented at trial that Barnes suffers from antisocial personality disorder. This testimony also revealed that such a disorder does not necessarily relate to sexual offending. However, the experts disagreed about the effect of the disorder, including the effect of the disorder on a person's emotional or volitional capacity. Dr. Roberts testified that antisocial personality disorder is a condition that is either congenital, acquired, or both. He further testified it affects Barnes's emotional and volitional capacity. Dr. Maskel, on the other hand, testified that antisocial personality disorder does not affect emotional or volitional capacity. We first reject the notion that antisocial personality disorder cannot serve as the basis for civil commitment under chapter 229A. Our review of section 229A.2(11) reveals that the types of conditions that can serve to establish a mental abnormality are not limited to certain recognized diagnoses. Furthermore, due process does not require such limitation. What is important is that the statute requires the condition to be congenital or acquired and to affect the emotional or volitional capacity of the person subject to commitment. Significantly, the statute does not require that the condition affect the emotional or volitional capacity of every person who is afflicted with the disorder or condition; the requirement is that it has that effect on the particular individual subject to commitment. This limitation satisfies due process and requires the State to present evidence to support it. The opinions expressed by Dr. Roberts, the State's expert, supported a finding that Barnes had a condition affecting [his] emotional or volitional capacity. Although the evidence was conflicting, we frequently defer to the district court's judgment in such cases because it was in a better position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Iowa 2000). Additionally, Barnes testified that he did not set out to commit rape in one of the rape incidents in 1985. Instead, Barnes testified the rape was just a spur of the moment thing. He also testified to the effect that at the time, he felt the victims wanted to engage in sexual intercourse with him because they had been nice and smiled at him. He indicated he felt forced to rape them because they did not voluntarily engage in sexual intercourse with him or attempt to run from him. Thus, the first component of the definition of mental abnormality was satisfied, and we turn to the second component.
Barnes claims there is an insufficient nexus between antisocial personality disorder and predisposition to sexually offend. He argues that an antisocial personality disorder ultimately cannot serve to establish a mental abnormality under the statute because the DSM-IV definition of the disorder does not include a predisposition to commit sex offenses. [1] Thus, because he has not been diagnosed with a paraphlia, such as pedophilia [2] or exhibitionism, [3] or any other recognized condition that is in general directly related to sexual offending, Barnes claims he cannot be adjudicated a sexually violent predator under the statute. It is in this context that Barnes asserts that commitment under chapter 229A violates due process. Consistent with the first component of mental abnormality, we observe the statute does not require a sexually violent predator to have a condition that causes people in general to sexually offend. Rather, it requires an individualized inquiry: whether the mental abnormality makes the particular individual likely to commit sexually violent offenses. See Iowa Code § 229A.2(5) (requiring a condition that predispos[es] that person to commit sexually violent offenses to a degree which would constitute a menace to the health and safety of others); id. § 229A.2(11) (requiring the offender to suffer[ ] from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility) (emphasis added); cf. In re Commitment of Adams, 223 Wis.2d 60, 588 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Ct.App.1998) (stating that the Wisconsin civil commitment statute focuses on the person who is the subject of the petition and on the specific link between that person's mental disorder and the effect of that mental disorder on that person; holding that a person who has the mental disorder of `antisocial personality disorder,' uncoupled with any other mental disorder, may be found to be a `sexually violent person'). We think this individualized inquiry comports with the requirements of due process because it ultimately serves to limit civil commitment to dangerous sexual offenders. At the same time, it protects those persons inflicted with antisocial personality disorder who are not predisposed to commit sexual offenses from commitment. Thus, we conclude due process does not require the person subject to commitment to have an underlying condition or diagnosis that causes people in general to commit sexually violent offenses. Due process is satisfied as long as the condition or disorder predisposes the particular person, under his or her particular circumstances, to commit sexually violent offenses. The evidence in this case shows how the particularized inquiry satisfies due process. The opinion expressed by Dr. Roberts that Barnes's antisocial personality disorder predisposed him to commit sexual offenses included other evidence such as his psychopathy checklist score, sexually violent history, and treatment history.