Opinion ID: 2328573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Against Hartz

Text: The case against Hartz went to trial. Monaco testified that on April 18, 1996, he was employed by the Newark Board of Education at 2 Cedar Street in Newark, New Jersey, and that 18-Wheeled delivery trucks, which used the area's loading docks to deliver various types of material, frequently traversed the street. He stated that on that same date, he exited the building around noontime to get some fresh air, noting that it was extremely windy. He left the building through two sets of doorsthe first led to a small foyer and the second, outside. As he went through the first set of doors, Monaco saw two friends, Lou Maccarone and Jude Luongo. He held the second door open for Frager Berry, who was leaving the building behind him. Monaco testified that the next thing he remembered was seeing a flash or a blur as he was knocked back. He was hit by a parking sign and its attached pole, which struck him on the right side of the head, causing him to fall and hit his head on the exit doors. Monaco testified that the parking sign was located approximately eight feet from the front entrance of the building before becoming airborne. Jude Luongo, an employee of the Newark Board of Education, testified that five to ten minutes before the accident occurred, he was standing next to the sign smoking a cigarette and talking with Maccarone. Luongo witnessed Monaco and others exit the building just as a gust of wind blew through the area, he saw the sign pole dislodge from its cement foundation, become airborne, and strike Monaco, knocking him unconscious as a result of the blow. Luongo recalled that he had seen cars and trucks hit the sign three or four times in the three years before the plaintiffs were injured and that for a couple of months prior to the accident, the sign was crooked and that it was fixed on a couple of occasions only to become crooked again. Notably, Luongo testified that he observed that the sidewalk directly beneath the sign was cracked prior to the accident. Berry also testified at trial, stating that he went to 2 Cedar Street several times a week prior to the accident to make deliveries or to pick up materials. Berry said that approximately one to two months before the incident, he noticed that both the sign and its pole would squeak and move when the wind blew, but that he had not observed the sign on the day of the accident. Moss gave expert testimony on behalf of plaintiffs that tracked his report. He stated that the sign and its pole had been bent by impact; that there was damage to the base of the sign where it was embedded in the concrete; and that the pole was bent, causing looseness between it and the concrete. Moss asserted that the sign's loosened connection at its base, coupled with the windy conditions of the area that day, caused the sign to dislodge from its concrete foundation, become airborne, and strike plaintiffs as they exited the building. He concluded that both the City and Hartz were responsible for the sidewalk and the sign, and that even a minimally competent inspection would have revealed the defect that led to the plaintiffs' injuries. [2] Portions of the deposition of Philip LaPlaca, Hartz's property manager at 2 Cedar Street, were read into the record at trial. LaPlaca acknowledged that Hartz installed the sidewalk and was responsible for its maintenance. He stated that he inspected the area surrounding 2 Cedar Street two or three times a week, including sidewalks and signs in front of 2 Cedar Street extending all the way down the block of Cedar Street. However, he denied inspecting the sign that is at issue in this case. At the close of plaintiffs' case, Hartz moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b), arguing that it had a duty only with regard to the sidewalk, but no duty with regard to a sign that was owned, maintained, installed, and repaired by the City. Hartz further asserted that, if the trial court found that it did have a duty, it did not have notice that the sign was defective. In response to Hartz's contention that it had no duty to inspect or maintain the sign, plaintiffs argued that, as a commercial landowner, Hartz owed traditional duties of inspection and warning to its invitees and that, in any event, it voluntarily assumed that duty through LaPlaca. The trial court granted Hartz's motion for directed verdict, concluding that: The real question is whether Hartz Mountain, as the landowner, has any legal duty with respect to a traffic sign which, in this case, the City of Newark installed on the sidewalk of its premises and which the city essentially has whatever obligation there is to maintain. I find nothing in any of the deposition transcript read of Mr. LaPlaca of Hartz Mountain that Hartz actually assumed the inspection responsibilities which, I think, very clearly rested with the City of Newark with respect to the sign in question, and there's nothing to indicate that the City of Newark in any way delegated its inspection responseand maintenance responsibilities to Hartz Mountain. This Court knows of no case in New Jersey which imposes upon a landowner any duty with respect to inspecting or notifying somebody else about any problems with a structure which that landowner does not own or maintain. Certainly such aa sign such as this is not something within the landowner's control. Monaco appealed from the grant of the City's motion for summary judgment and from the grant of Hartz's motion for a directed verdict. Hartz did not challenge the denial of its motion for summary judgment. [3] The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's grant of a directed verdict in favor of Hartz. In doing so, it ruled that Hartz had no legal duty with respect to a traffic sign owned and installed by the municipality. However, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City based on what it viewed as a genuine issue of material fact regarding constructive notice, outlining facts from which such notice could be inferred. The court stated: In this case, the City did not have actual notice, but there was in our view a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it had constructive notice. The pertinent circumstances from which an inference of constructive notice could reasonably arise include evidence that concrete around the base of the sign's support post was cracked, that the signpost had been bent over in the past by trucks or other vehicles, and that bending of the post had been noticeable. It appears undisputed that the damage to the base of the post had existed for more than a month. We conclude, then, that whether the City had constructive notice pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b) is a question for the trier of fact in all the circumstances here presented and that the granting of summary judgment was error under the standards affirmed in Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of. Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A. 2d 146 (1995). Monaco petitioned for certification from the affirmance of the grant of directed verdict in favor of Hartz. The City filed a cross-petition challenging the reversal of the trial court's grant of a directed verdict in its favor. We granted both petitions. 175 N.J. 433, 815 A. 2d 479 (2003).