Opinion ID: 1684899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Summary Denial of Several Claims

Text: Overton contends that the trial court improperly picked and chose the issues upon which to grant an evidentiary hearing by summarily denying several claims. As a general rule, when this Court reviews the summary denial of a claim raised in a rule 3.851 motion, this Court accepts the movant's factual allegations as true, and we will affirm the ruling only if the filings show that the movant has failed to state a facially sufficient claim or that there is no issue of material fact to be determined. Booker v. State, 969 So.2d 186, 195 (Fla. 2007). Overton's evidentiary hearing claim that postconviction counsel was denied access to public records from various agencies is without merit. This claim was exhaustively argued in the trial court on January 14, 2003, and no further evidentiary hearing before the same trial court was necessary. Thus, there was no issue of material fact to be determined. Generally, an abuse of discretion standard is applied to review a court's denial of a public records request. See Hill v. State, 921 So.2d 579, 584 (Fla.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1219, 126 S.Ct. 1441, 164 L.Ed.2d 141 (2006). Additionally, [d]iscretion is abused only when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Parker v. State, 904 So.2d 370, 379 (Fla.2005) (quoting State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003)). In denying the request here, the trial court specifically found that the requests were not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and were overly broad and unduly burdensome. The record fully supports the trial court's finding with regard to the denial of these overly broad requests. It was reasonable to limit discovery of public records to those pertaining to the investigation of the MacIvor murders, rather than any investigation in which Overton had ever been involved, so such was certainly not an abuse of discretion. See Moore v. State, 820 So.2d 199, 204 (Fla. 2002) (recognizing that a trial court has the discretion to deny public records requests that are overly broad, of questionable relevance, and unlikely to lead to discoverable evidence); Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 253 (Fla.2001) (explaining that the production of public records for capital postconviction proceedings is not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records unrelated to a colorable claim for postconviction relief (quoting Sims v. State, 753 So.2d 66, 70 (Fla. 2000))). In a similar manner, the summary denial of other ineffective assistance claims in Claim II was correct. The allegations of counsels failure to utilize experts in crime scene investigation is refuted by the fact that extensive testimony on crime scene investigation matters did occur. During trial, Dr. Wright testified that it was possible that the murders were committed elsewhere and there could have been more than one perpetrator. Thus, the claim was legally insufficient on its face. Allegations directed to counsel's failure to utilize an expert for additional testing of Nonoxynol [20] were also properly denied because the trial court was correct in concluding that the claim was procedurally barred because it already had been decided. On direct appeal, this Court held that the trial court did not err by failing to appoint an additional defense expert to rebut the State's theory of Nonoxynol in the bedding. See Overton, 801 So.2d at 896-97. This Court reasoned that there was no need for an additional expert and there was also no prejudice. See id. at 897. Overton cannot relitigate this same issue disguised as ineffective assistance of counsel. See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So.2d 1009, 1023 (Fla.1999) ([A]llegations of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be used to circumvent the rule that postconviction proceedings cannot serve as a second appeal. (citing Medina v. State, 573 So.2d 293, 295 (Fla.1990))). Thus, this claim was legally insufficient on its face. Allegations of counsel's failure to properly prepare for trial, which allegedly produced inadequate cross-examination of both Detective Petrick with regard to partial palm prints on the metal pipe and Dr. Nelms on alternative theories of the crime, are also baseless and summary denial was proper. First, Overton's counsel did properly challenge Petrick's statement that he did not know if the partial palm prints were compared to Overton by eliciting direct evidence from other witnesses that a comparison did occur and there was no match. Detective Daniels testified that the partial palm prints did not match with those of Overton. Second, Overton's counsel did properly address the testimony of Dr. Nelms by presenting Dr. Wright as a defense expert. Wright expressed the opinion that it was possible that the murders occurred elsewhere and that there was more than one perpetrator. Thus, these claims were legally insufficient on their face. Contrary to Overton's arguments, an evidentiary hearing was in fact granted on the allegations in paragraph 34 of the petition directed to counsels failure to promptly investigate work alibi witnesses. In addition to the court's order reflecting that an evidentiary hearing was granted, there were numerous witnesses presented during the evidentiary hearing who were extensively questioned on the issue of a possible work alibi defense and whether Overton's counsel pursued the theory. The challenge to counsel's failure to present evidence of harassment of Overton by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office [21] was also properly summarily denied. The trial court was correct in concluding that pursuit of the theory would have opened the door to the fact that Overton was a suspect in many unsolved crimes, which Overton's counsel attempted to avoid as evidenced by the motion in limine they filed. The claim was facially invalid. Similarly, other paragraphs which assert that counsel improperly failed to impeach Detective Visco with Overton's statements from the Rachelle Surrett homicide investigation were also properly summarily denied because this would have opened the door to the fact that Overton was a suspect in the unsolved crime involving Surrett. Denial of Claim III, which alleged that the State committed a Brady violation by not providing notes from police profiler brainstorming sessions and documentation of the sloppy collection techniques of Dr. Pope in other cases, was also correct. As discussed above, Overton's claim that the State did not provide notes from brainstorming sessions is insufficiently pled because it is based on pure speculation. See Gore, 846 So.2d at 466-67. Additionally, as discussed above, Overton's claim that the State should have provided documentation of Dr. Pope's sloppy collection techniques clearly could not meet the prejudice requirement under Brady. Thus, these two issues were legally insufficient on their face. Claim VII, which alleged that Overton's counsel was ineffective for the failure to object to the jury instruction on the testimony of expert witnesses, was correctly denied as facially invalid. During the Huff hearing, Overton's counsel stipulated that this particular jury instruction was the standard expert jury instruction and that this legal issue could be determined without an evidentiary hearing. Failure to object to a standard jury instruction is not ineffective assistance here. See Elledge v. State, 911 So.2d 57, 77 (Fla. 2005); Thompson v. State, 759 So.2d 650, 665 (Fla.2000) (holding that it was not deficient for counsel to fail to object to a standard instruction that had not been invalidated by this Court). Claim VIII, directed to a lack of effective assistance due to a rule of professional conduct that prevents the interviewing of jurors, has no merit and was facially invalid. During the Huff hearing, Overton's counsel stipulated that this was the particular rule in place and that this was a purely legal issue. The claim is procedurally barred because it could have been asserted on direct appeal and is now being couched in terms of ineffective assistance. See Arbelaez v. State, 775 So.2d 909, 920 (Fla.2000) (holding that the claim of not being able to interview jurors was procedurally barred because the claim should and could have been raised on direct appeal). Moreover, this Court has previously determined that this type of claim is without merit. See id. (holding that the claim of not being able to interview jurors is without merit when the goal is to be able to conduct fishing expedition interviews with jurors after they return a guilty verdict). Claim IX, which alleged ineffectiveness during voir dire, was insufficiently pled to the trial court. Overton advanced only conclusory arguments that because the jury was not sequestered and his motion to change venue was denied, counsel must have been ineffective during voir dire. See Bryant v. State, 901 So.2d 810, 821-22 (Fla.2005) (holding that a 3.851 claim of ineffective assistance was legally insufficient where the motion did not allege the specific facts to which the witness would testify and how the lack of testimony prejudiced the case). Claim X, asserting cumulative error, was properly denied. As we have explained, all of Overton's claims of error have been rejected which renders this cumulative error claim moot. See Marshall v. State, 854 So.2d 1235, 1252 (Fla.2003) (holding that the claim of cumulative error was rendered moot because all claims were rejected but one, for which an evidentiary hearing would occur on remand). Claim XI, directed to a lack of effective assistance due to a failure to object to the introduction of time-barred offenses (the burglary charge), and Claim XII, which claimed that Overton's death sentences were unconstitutional under Ring, were both properly denied without an evidentiary hearing. Overton's postconviction counsel conceded that these were purely legal issues that did not require an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, as previously developed, no prejudice resulted from the introduction of the burglary charge, which the trial court correctly recognized in denying the evidentiary hearing. Additionally, the claim that Overton's death sentences violated Ring was clearly without merit because this Court has previously held that Ring cannot receive retroactive application. See Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 412 (Fla.2005) (holding that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida postconviction proceedings to cases that were final on direct review at the time of the Ring decision). Thus, these claims were legally insufficient on their face. Relief cannot be granted on Claim XIII. This claim concerning a Richardson hearing has been insufficiently presented in Overton's brief to this Court because it is merely listed with no corresponding argument. See Darling v. State, 966 So.2d 366, 382 (Fla.2007) ([T]his claim is denied as insufficiently pled because Darling alleges no additional facts or circumstances revealed by these additional materials that would require leave to amend the 3.851 motion.).