Opinion ID: 1696166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Judicial review, under Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-531 (1972), is, in most circumstances, limited to questions of law, to-wit: In any judicial proceedings under this section, the findings of the board of review as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law. Id.; See also Ray v. Bivens, 562 So.2d 119, 121 (Miss. 1990) (scope of review limited to finding of board of review); Manor v. McLeod, 511 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Miss. 1987) (same). If substantial evidence supports the Board's fact finding and the relevant law was properly applied to the facts, the appellate court must affirm. Shannon Eng'g & Constr. Inc. v. Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 549 So.2d 446, 449 (Miss. 1989). Here the relevant facts are not in dispute so the real issues are whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board's decision and whether Barnett's actions, as a matter of law, can be considered misconduct under the statute. Recently in Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Martin, 568 So.2d 725 (Miss. 1990), this Court defined misconduct under the statute as: [D]isqualification for unemployment benefits results from misconduct, which is conduct evincing such willful and wanton disregard of the employer's interest as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect from his employees. Martin, 568 So.2d at 727 (citing Wheeler v. Arriola, 408 So.2d 1381 (Miss. 1982)). Put another way, [m]isconduct imports conduct that reasonable and fair-minded external observers would consider a wanton disregard of the employer's legitimate interests. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Phillips, 562 So.2d 115, 118 (Miss. 1990). For example, Martin involved an alcoholic employee who, after receiving treatment for his alcoholism, was informed by his employer that any further absences due to his alcoholism would be considered unexcused. Martin, 568 So.2d at 726. After receiving three consecutive unexcused absences and a subsequent warning, the company terminated him. Id. This Court reinstated the MESC's decision by holding that Martin's three consecutive unexcused absences constituted misconduct within Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-513 (A)(1)(b) (1972). Id. at 727-29. See also, Ray v. Bivens, 562 So.2d 119 (Miss. 1990) (after several warnings employee discharged for sleeping on the job, this Court held that the employee's actions constituted misconduct.). While no Mississippi cases so hold, it simply goes without saying that excessive absenteeism could constitute misconduct. See e.g., Barragan v. Williams Island, 568 So.2d 106, 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Tallahassee Hous. Auth. v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 483 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). This does not mean that excessive absenteeism would qualify as misconduct in all circumstances. See e.g., McCourtney v. Imprimis Tech., Inc., 465 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (frequent absences from work not misconduct when caused by inability to obtain child care for sick infant); Gunderson v. Libbey Glass, 412 So.2d 656, 659 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (absences resulted from reasons beyond claimant's control). A claimant's failure to notify the employer of the reason for absences can constitute misconduct, if there is a policy that requires such notice. Yerger v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 73 Pa.Cmwlth.Ct. 278, 457 A.2d 1333 (1983). The main reason the Referee disqualified Barnett was because he failed to notify his employer about the absences, without sufficient excuse. Certainly that conduct, despite the unfortunate damage to his home, could constitute misconduct as that term is defined in Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-513 A(1)(b) (1972). Also, the failure to notify after being fully warned and admonished about his problem, combined with the record of excessive absenteeism, provided substantial evidence for the Board's finding that Barnett's actions amounted to misconduct under the statute. Moss testified that had he known why Barnett was not at work he would not have terminated him. The fact remains, however, that Barnett's minimal efforts to contact his employer after taking time off, judged objectively, were unreasonable under the circumstances. Nor can it be fairly said that Barnett's explanations about his absence give credence to his contention that his conduct was not willful or wanton. See, Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Phillips, 562 So.2d at 118 (objective standard); See e.g. Lamb v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n., 424 So.2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (no misconduct when employee failed to call in because he was in the middle of a move and his phone was in transfer); Campbell v. Dept. of Labor & Emp. Sec., 455 So.2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (no misconduct when employee failed to call in her absence because she was in another state attending to her daughter after a car accident and she had asked her husband to call her employer but he forgot.) Of course, if there is substantial evidence to support the Board's decision, the fact that this Court, if charged with weighing the evidence, might find otherwise is irrelevant. For the reasons stated, we affirm. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, and BANKS, JJ., concur.