Opinion ID: 2805448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence for Count One

Text: Finally, we must still address Jiménez's sufficiency argument for double jeopardy purposes. See Marshall v. Bristol Superior Court, 753 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2014) (It is black letter law that 'the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally -35- insufficient.' (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978))). According to Jiménez, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count One, the witness tampering charge, and thus his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal of Count One should have been granted. We review this allegation de novo. United States v. Pérez-Meléndez, 599 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir. 2010). In doing so, we examine the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. We do not assess the credibility of a witness, as that is a role reserved for the jury. Nor need we be convinced that the government succeeded in eliminating every possible theory consistent with the defendant's innocence. Rather, we must decide whether that evidence, including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom, would allow a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime. Id. (quoting United States v. Troy, 583 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); see also United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1173 (1st Cir. 1993). This is a formidable standard of review, so defendants challenging convictions for insufficiency of the evidence face an uphill battle on appeal. Pérez-Meléndez, 599 F.3d at 40 (quoting United States v. Lipscomb, 539 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), the government must prove beyond a reasonable -36- doubt that there was (1) a killing or attempted killing, (2) committed with a particular intent, namely an intent (a) to 'prevent' a 'communication' (b) about 'the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense' (c) to a federal 'law enforcement officer or judge.' Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045, 2049 (2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C)). Here, Jiménez concedes that the government satisfied its burden for most of these elements and only challenges the proof for the element that Sánchez was killed in order to prevent her from providing information concerning the commission or the possible commission of a Federal offense. According to Jiménez, the evidence showed that if he killed Sánchez, it was done to prevent her from communicating his whereabouts to federal officials so that he could be arrested on the outstanding Puerto Rico murder charge for which he was a fugitive. In support of this contention, Jiménez points to the investigative notes which reported that Sánchez was willing to provide [Jiménez's] location to the feds to have him arrested on an outstanding state warrant. While we agree that a jury could have come to this conclusion, we need not conclude that only a guilty verdict appropriately could be reached in order to sustain the conviction. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d at 1173 (emphasis added). To the contrary, it is enough that the finding of guilt draws its essence from a plausible reading of the record. Id.; see also Pérez-Meléndez, -37- 599 F.3d at 40 (Nor need we be convinced that the government succeeded in eliminating every possible theory consistent with the defendant's innocence. (quoting Troy, 583 F.3d at 24) (internal quotation marks omitted)). And a review of the record satisfies us that the government has met its burden. At trial, Tata testified that Sánchez was unhappy that Alexis -- her boyfriend and Jiménez's brother -- was involved in Jiménez's drug operation. As a result, she and Jiménez did not get along, and whenever she would arrive at the drug point, Jiménez would become upset and a confrontation would ensue. Tata further testified that she recorded Sánchez saying that Sánchez would turn [Jiménez] in to Justice. Given that their rocky relationship stemmed from Jiménez's drug activities and not his status as a fugitive, the jury could have plausibly inferred that Jiménez understood Sánchez to be referring to his drug trafficking activities, which is clearly a federal offense. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (criminalizing possession of controlled substances with the intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess controlled substances with the intent to distribute, respectively). The government presented additional circumstantial evidence supporting this inference. First, Aponte testified that on June 8, 2010, an FBI task force officer had asked her not to visit Sánchez because Alexis had been stopped and questioned about whether Sánchez was providing information to the government. -38- Aponte added that Sánchez later confirmed that she was cooperating with the FBI, that Jiménez owned a drug point at Falín Torrech, and that he had threatened her. Officer Irizarry similarly testified that Sánchez had provided him with information regarding Jiménez's drug operations.9 Pérez, meanwhile, testified that Sánchez had bragged that she was going to take everybody down. It is plausible to infer that both Alexis and Pérez would have reported these incidents to Jiménez, and that Jiménez would have interpreted both the questioning of Alexis and the use of everybody to refer to the drug activity to which multiple people were involved, and not to Jiménez's status as a fugitive. Taking all of this evidence together and making plausible inferences in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we believe a rational factfinder could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Jiménez intended to prevent Sánchez from providing information to federal authorities regarding Jiménez's 9 In his recitation of the facts, Jiménez suggests that the government violated both 18 U.S.C. § 3432 and Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure when it called Officer Irizarry to testify in support of this element. Jiménez provides no legal arguments or citations to support this claim, however, so it is therefore waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ([It is a] settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones. (internal citations omitted)). -39- narcotics operation -- a federal offense. Accordingly, his Rule 29 motion was properly denied.