Opinion ID: 2088237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Personal Immunity for Discretionary Functions

Text: The defendants contend that in responding to Harrison's request for an evaluation of True, Ladner was performing a discretionary function or duty within the meaning of 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C) (1980) and therefore is personally immune from suit. Because we hold that Ladner was not performing a function or duty within the meaning of the statute, we do not reach the question whether discretion was involved. The Maine Tort Claims Act, 14 M.R. S.A. §§ 8101-8118 (1980 & Supp.1985-1986), provides for a general immunity of all governmental entities [2] from suit. § 8103(1). This immunity explicitly includes: The performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion be abused and whether or not the statute, charter, ordinance, order, resolution, regulation or resolve under which the discretionary function or duty is performed is valid or invalid. § 8103(2)(C) (emphasis added). Section 8111 provides a corresponding personal immunity for employees of governmental entities in specified instances including: The performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused; and whether or not the statute, charter, ordinance, order, resolution, regulation or resolve under which the discretionary function or duty is performed is valid. § 8111(1)(C) (emphasis added). The necessary implication of these companion sections is that an employee of a governmental entity enjoys a personal immunity from civil liability for his performance of, or failure to perform, a discretionary function or duty only when a statute, charter, ordinance, order, resolution, regulation or resolve authorizes the performance of the discretionary function or duty and when the defendant has acted, or has failed to act, pursuant to that authorization. Cf. MacKerron v. Madura, 445 A.2d 680, 682 (Me.1982) (improper to dismiss complaint when it is not discernible whether the actions alleged were functions or duties of [the employee] and if they were, whether they were discretionary). This conclusion is reinforced by an examination of the language of sections 8103(2)(A) and 8111(1)(A). These sections provide immunity for governmental entities and employees of such entities, respectively, for undertaking or failing to undertake any legislative or quasi-legislative act. §§ 8103(2)(A), 8111(1)(A). The two sections characterize a legislative or quasi-legislative act as including, but not limited to, the adoption or failure to adopt any statute, charter, ordinance, order, regulation, resolution or resolve. Id. Thus the legislative immunity provisions characterize a legislative or quasi-legislative act in terminology identical to that of the discretionary function immunity provisions. We conclude therefore that the authority for the performance of a discretionary function or duty must arise from the legislative or quasi-legislative enactments listed in the discretionary function immunity provisions. In the instant case the defendants point to statutory provisions delineating the recruiting and supervisory duties of the school superintendent. The superintendent shall nominate all teachers subject to regulations governing salaries and qualifications made by the school board. 20-A M.R.S.A. § 13201 (Supp.1985-1986). When the school board approves the nominations, the superintendent may employ teachers so nominated and approved. Id. The superintendent has the duty to direct and supervise the work of teachers within the school system. 20-A M.R.S.A. § 1055(10) (1983). Here there is no basis to find that Ladner was acting pursuant to these statutory duties. When Ladner made the statements in question, True was not teaching under the supervision of Ladner, nor was Ladner engaged in determining whether to nominate True for a position within School Union 30. On the contrary, Ladner's statements concerned a person who had not been employed within School Union 30 for two years and who was seeking employment elsewhere. The defendants have not pointed to, nor has our research disclosed, any other enactments that might authorize the function or duty of Ladner to respond to a prospective employer's request for an evaluation of an applicant for a teaching position. We hold therefore that in responding to Harrison's request for an evaluation, Ladner was not engaged in a function or duty within the meaning of 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C). [3]