Opinion ID: 173184
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Common to Both Defendants

Text: Both Barraza-Martinez and Ramirez appeal the district court’s denial of their motions to suppress. Both argue the evidence seized pursuant to the traffic stop should have been suppressed for two reasons: (1) lack of reasonable suspicion that their truck failed to maintain its lane of travel in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522(a); and (2) because Barraza-Martinez’s consent to the search -8- of the vehicle was not voluntarily and freely given. “In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the court’s factual findings for clear error and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Worthon, 520 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2008).
Both defendants argue the truck’s relatively brief failure to maintain its lane did not create reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation under Kansas law. Before initiating a stop of a vehicle, an “officer must have an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred.” United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993). An officer’s subjective intentions play no part in this analysis. United States v. Cervine, 347 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that the troopers had other motivations for stopping [the defendant] has no bearing upon this review.”). Both Barraza-Martinez and Ramirez contend that Deputy Bentley’s initial traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. Under Kansas law, a vehicle must be driven “as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522(a). Recently, in State v. Marx, the Kansas Supreme Court interpreted § 8-1522(a)’s single-lane rule as requiring “more than an incidental and minimal lane breach.” 215 P.3d 601, 612 (Kan. 2009) (concluding no reasonable suspicion existed where the deputy observed a vehicle momentarily cross the fog line, overcorrect, and subsequently cross the -9- center line). Accordingly, Marx held that to establish reasonable suspicion, “a detaining officer must articulate something more than an observation of one instance of a momentary lane breach.” Id. Marx rejected the notion that every intrusion upon a lane’s marker lines gives rise to reasonable suspicion, but also stopped short of holding that a single swerve can never amount to reasonable suspicion. Id. Rather, the Marx court held that under the circumstances, and given the record’s complete silence as to the driving conditions and how far the vehicle crossed over marker lines, the state had failed to carry its burden of establishing the deputy had a reasonable suspicion of a violation of § 8-1522(a). Id. at 613; see also United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The use of the phrase ‘as nearly as practicable’ in [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522(a)] precludes . . . absolute standards, and requires a fact-specific inquiry to assess whether an officer has probable cause to believe a violation has occurred.”). In this case, the district court found, based on its review of the digital recording and Deputy Bentley’s testimony, that the defendants’ vehicle “strayed out of its lane multiple times over a short distance without adverse physical conditions.” Unlike Marx, the government introduced evidence of the extent of the intrusion upon the lane markers and the driving conditions. Specifically, the district court noted, “after passing the deputy’s car, defendants veered onto the shoulder of the highway 17 seconds later and again 28 seconds later.” The evidence also indicated one of the lane violations lasted approximately one-eighth -10- of a mile. As to the driving conditions, the district court noted that, though it was raining, “there was no evidence indicating that the rain caused the violation.” A review of the record reveals that these factual finding were not clearly erroneous. As a result, the traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion that defendants violated § 8-1522.
The defendants next contend Barraza-Martinez’s consent to the search of the vehicle was not voluntary and therefore invalid. Generally, “[a] traffic stop may become a consensual encounter, requiring no reasonable suspicion, if the officer returns the license and registration and asks questions without further constraining the driver by an overbearing show of authority.” United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000). If the documents have been returned, the analysis turns on whether the individual “has an objective reason to believe that he was not free to end his conversation with the law enforcement officer and proceed on his way.” United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1994). Both defendants rely heavily on Sandoval, in which the Tenth Circuit held the officer’s response of “No, wait a minute,” to the motorist’s question “That’s it?” rendered the subsequent questioning non-consensual. Id. at 542. The present case, however, is distinguishable from Sandoval on two grounds. Unlike Sandoval, Deputy Bentley indicated the original investigative detention was -11- terminated by handing Barraza-Martinez a copy of the warning citation and stating he was free to go. Barraza-Martinez then began opening the patrol car door, demonstrating he understood he was free to leave. Deputy Bentley’s subsequent question, “Hey, William, can I ask you a few more questions?” did not retract Barraza-Martinez’s freedom to leave the patrol car. Unlike the “No, wait a minute” directive at issue in Sandoval, Deputy Bentley’s question, along with his earlier statement that Barraza-Martinez was free to go, served to give a reasonable person in Barraza-Martinez’s position the choice to submit to the additional questions. Barraza-Martinez’s consent to the search of the vehicle was a product of the subsequent consensual exchange. Accordingly, the district court properly denied the defendants’ motions to suppress.