Opinion ID: 1439056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determining Disability Protection

Text: The MHRA defines disability as: [A] physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities, [9] being regarded as having such an impairment, or a record of having such an impairment, which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job, utilizing the place of public accommodation, or occupying the dwelling in question. Section 213.010(4) (emphasis added). Daugherty's discrimination claim alleges that he was terminated because the City regarded him as disabled. As a regarded as MHRA plaintiff, Daugherty must prove that the City either: (1) wrongly believed that he had an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities or (2) wrongly believed that an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limited one or more major life activities. 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(E); see also Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir.2001). Daugherty was substantially limited in performing a major life activity for purposes of the MHRA if he was unable to perform or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which he could perform a particular major life activity. Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 592 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted) (disability discrimination case brought by terminated police officer under the MHRA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)). A plaintiff's `inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.' [10] Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. section 1630.2(j)(3)(i)); Breitkreutz v. Cambrex Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir.2006). A substantial limitation on the major life activity of working means that an individual must be `significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.' Epps, 353 F.3d at 592 (quoting 29 C.F.R. section 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). The City claims that Daugherty is not disabled within the protections of the MHRA simply because he was unable to perform the particular job of police captain. However, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Daugherty, as is required by the standard of review, Daugherty's evidence shows that the City believed he was incapable of performing an entire class of jobsuniformed officer positions of any rank. As such, summary judgment is inappropriate on this issue, because the record shows genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the protections of the MHRA apply to Daugherty as a regarded as plaintiff. [11]