Opinion ID: 1749674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the trial court err in refusing appellant's instruction D-25?

Text: Instruction D-25 provided: The Plaintiff may invoke the medical privilege and prevent any physician who has treated him from testifying or prevent the introduction into evidence of records of said treatment. When the Plaintiff claims this medical privilege, the Defendant cannot compel a treating physician to testify or introduce into evidence records of that treatment. The Plaintiff has invoked the medical privilege in this case and prevented the testimony of Dr. Charles Allen and Dr. J.S. Weatherall and also the Plaintiff has prevented the introduction into evidence of records of the Plaintiff's medical records regarding medical treatment which the Plaintiff Henry Thomas Welzbacher, may have received on December 23, 1978. As the Plaintiff has so used the medical privilege, you as jurors are warranted in inferring that the testimony of Dr. Allen and Dr. Weatherall and the medical records regarding such treatment would have been unfavorable to the Plaintiff should the doctors had (sic) been permitted to testify or the records introduced into evidence. An objection to the instruction was interposed and sustained on the grounds that the instruction was a misstatement of the law and that the December 23, 1978, records were not admitted into evidence. In Killings v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 187 Miss. 265, 192 So. 577 (1940), this Court first upheld the granting of the following instruction: In that state of case the court, at the instance of appellee, instructed the jury that under the law it could not introduce as a witness any doctor to testify to anything learned by him of the plaintiff's physical condition while the relation of physician and patient existed between him and plaintiff, and further instructed the jury that the fact that appellant failed to introduce as a witness one of his physicians, Dr. Waldrup, would justify the jury in inferring that his testimony would have been unfavorable to the appellant... . (187 Miss. at 271, 192 So. at 578). However, the instruction in the present case goes farther than what was contemplated in the Killings decision. In McCay v. Jones, 354 So.2d 1095 (Miss. 1978), this Court stated: In our case the defendant obtained an instruction that plaintiff had the right to claim as privileged the communication between her and the two physicians sought to be called as witnesses, but when she claimed the privilege, the jury could infer that, if the physicians were permitted to testify, their testimony would have been adverse to the interest of the plaintiff. This instruction was first authorized by our decision in Killings v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 187 Miss. 265, 192 So. 577 (1940). We hold that it was error to sustain the motion in limine because the privileged communication statute between physicians and patients does not make a physician incompetent as a witness for all purposes, but only prevents the physician from testifying as to any privileged communication. There are competent questions, which may be asked of an attending physician, which fall outside the prohibition of the statute. When the court denied defendants the right to subpoena and introduce otherwise competent witnesses, this extended the privileged communication statute more than the legislature intended. (354 So.2d at 1100) See also Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Smith, 210 Miss. 768, 50 So.2d 898, 899 (1951). The instruction in the present case incorrectly informed the jury that appellant could not compel appellee's physician to testify. Neither Dr. Charles Allen or Dr. J.S. Weatherall actually treated Welzbacher because he left the hospital before they had the opportunity. Furthermore, neither was called as a witness. It appears as though the appellant wanted to elicit testimony concerning appellee's state of intoxication on December 23, 1978. Although no testimony concerning privileged communication could have been elicited, the physician was not an incompetent witness for all purposes. In fact, appellant could have used the physician to impeach appellee's testimony that he was not admitted to the hospital on December 23, 1978. The instruction was properly refused as a misstatement of the law.