Opinion ID: 2135474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Absence of probable cause.

Text: One of the elements of malicious prosecution which a plaintiff has the burden of proving is the absence of probable cause for the underlying criminal proceeding. We have defined probable cause in this context as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing that the accused is guilty. Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484, 471 A.2d 297, 301-02 (1984) (citations omitted). Miessner argues that because he was acquitted of the charges of embezzlement and larceny, probable cause was lacking. Acquittal of the accused at trial, however, is no evidence that probable cause was lacking, since acquittal amounts only to a decision that guilt has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 119, at 880. See also Palmer Ford, 471 A.2d at 307 (stating that acquittal after trial is not in and of itself evidence of a lack of probable cause). Defendants counter that probable cause was determined on at least two occasions. Initially, when the magistrate determined after a preliminary hearing that probable cause existed to support the allegations of the complaint and bound Miessner over for trial and, secondly, when Miessner moved for a directed verdict of dismissal and his motion was denied. There is good agreement that certain rulings unfavorable to the accused in the criminal case furnish evidence or presumptions that the prosecutor had probable cause. The magistrate's commitment and the grand jury's indictment constitute at least some evidence of probable cause. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 119, at 881. It appears that Miessner failed to show the absence of probable cause. He alleges, however, in his complaint, affidavit, and answers to Defendants' interrogatories, that Defendants fabricated false evidence and gave false and malicious testimony at the preliminary hearing and court trial. According to Miessner's Affidavit In Opposition to Motion For Summary Judgment: In the course of the prosecution and trial [for embezzlement and larceny], Defendants fabricated false evidence as shown by Exhibit 9, which is a summary of Leanne Weideman's calculations from State's Exhibit DD. Defendants further gave false and malicious testimony in the preliminary hearing and trial of my case as shown by my Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories dated June 8, 1992, which are attached hereto as Exhibit 10 which detail the false and malicious statements made by Defendants Rudge and Weideman during the preliminary hearing and trial in Circuit Court before the Honorable Merton B. Tice, Jr. As previously noted, while the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and reasonable doubts must be resolved against the moving party, the non-moving party must present specific facts showing that a genuine, material issue for trial exists. Lamp, 496 N.W.2d at 583; Hughes-Johnson Co. v. Dakota Midland Hosp., 86 S.D. 361, 364, 195 N.W.2d 519, 520-21 (1972). Allegations which do not set forth specific facts will not prevent the issuance of a summary judgment. (Citations omitted.) The rationale for the rule was explored in Hughes-Johnson Co. v. Dakota Midland Hospital, 86 S.D. 361, 364, 195 N.W.2d 519, 520 (1972): The function of Rule 56 is to provide a procedural device for promptly disposing of actions in which there are no genuine issues of material facts. To attain this end, the rule permits a party to pierce the allegations of fact in the pleadings and to obtain relief by summary judgment where facts set forth in detail in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file show that there are no general issues of material fact to be tried. ... To allow formal denials and conclusory pleadings to raise genuine issues against uncontradicted facts would nullify the utility of the rule. Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gridley, 362 N.W.2d 100, 102-03 (S.D.1985). See also SDCL 15-6-56(e). [3] Miessner failed to set forth specific facts but rather provided mere allegations that Defendants fabricated false evidence and gave false and malicious testimony. Therefore, he has failed to show the absence of probable cause for the charges of embezzlement and larceny and summary judgment was proper.