Opinion ID: 2319967
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was a Frye Hearing Required?

Text: Here, the trial court properly admitted the expert testimony without conducting a Frye hearing. Frye only applies to a novel scientific test or a unique controversial methodology or technique. Drevenak v. Abendschein, 773 A.2d 396, 418 (D.C.2001); see Cook v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., 825 A.2d 939, 950-51 (D.C. 2003) ( Frye [] is inapplicable and there is no burden `to demonstrate ... [that the cobalt test] has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community' because testimony of two investigators highlights the fact that the MPD had used the cobalt test for many years and nothing suggested it was a novel test, or new scientific technique, or unique controversial methodology[.]) (quoting Porter, 618 A.2d at 633). Pattern matching is not new, and courts in this jurisdiction have long been admitting firearms identifications based on this method. [5] Even Leaks's motion conceded that firearm and toolmark identification evidence has generally historically been accepted in various courts across the country. Indeed, Leaks (and appellant) cited no case that had excluded such evidence. Appellant attempts to avoid this problem by asserting that, had the trial court conducted a Frye hearing, the defense could have demonstrated that the challenged method was no longer generally accepted in the scientific community. This assertion is simply not true; comparison matching remains widely accepted and appellant misplaces his reliance upon a law review article [6] to suggest that pattern matching is no longer generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Even the courts that have held pretrial hearings on the admissibility of firearms identification evidence, and considered the studies and articles cited by Jones on appeal (and Leaks below), [7] have not excluded this type of proof. Instead, the most these courts have done is to impose guidelines for the presentation of such evidence. [8] In sum, nothing presented to the trial court (or to us) suggests that the pattern matching methodology is no longer generally accepted, [9] and there was no need for Judge Dixon to expend scarce judicial resources on a Frye hearing. [10] See Jones, 548 A.2d at 40, 42 (General acceptance means just that; the answer cannot vary from case to case.... [So in evaluating general acceptance,] judicial notice of court opinions and scientific literature is appropriate and, on occasion, even necessary.).