Opinion ID: 622564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ketterer's Claim of a Hostile Work Environment

Text: As we previously discussed, a hostile work environment claim requires (1) membership in a protected group; (2) harassment (3) based on a factor rendered impermissible by Title VII; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment yet failed to address it promptly. Ramsey, 286 F.3d at 268. Ketterer, who is Caucasian, argues that he is a member of a protected class due to his association with African-Americans and Hispanics. He claims harassment based upon that association was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to affect his employment. The district court found that Ketterer did not establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment because he failed to claim an association with a protected group sufficient to bring him under the coverage of Title VII's substantive anti-discrimination provision. Specifically, Ketterer alleges that he was discriminated against because of a general `association with minorities.' He neither describes the extent of his association nor identifies the minorities with which he associates. Additionally, the district court found Ketterer had not alleged harassment based on his race that was sufficiently pervasive to affect his employment. There is substantial evidence in the record that in this workplace, many workers treated other workers profanely, cruelly, and with hostility. To survive the employer's motion for summary judgment, though, Ketterer also needed to point to specific facts in the record to demonstrate that the company knew or should have known that Ketterer was harassed because of a reason that could be remedied under Title VII, namely, his association with minorities. Jones, 82 F.3d at 1338. There is evidence that Ketterer was harassed, at least in part, for reasons unrelated to his association with his minorities. He had disagreements with union officials about a work slow-down and may have antagonized certain coworkers. Yellow Transportation's acquiescence does not violate Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). Ketterer describes an incident in which a supervisor explained, using a racial slur, that he liked NASCAR because African-Americans do not. Ketterer, who described the statement as an off-the-wall comment, does not explain how the statement harassed him. There are also allegations concerning the conduct of his coworkers. The allegations are not accompanied by any facts to show that the company knew of the comments. Far from presenting evidence that the company knew or should have known of the harassment, he specifically denied that he told management. Ketterer's deposition contained an exchange about various incidents. Q. Now, and you never complained to Yellow either about the firecracker incident and the racial slur used then or the other incident during which you were called a racial slur. You never complained to Yellow, correct? A. No. And it doesn't do any good because the incidents I complained about, Tammy Hardge turned them all around. [Hardge was a Human Relations employee.] Now, what would have happened is they would have said, Ohthere would have been more of them than me. And they said, Oh, your only friend is Abe Trevino. And thenso that's it. A. Just like you've been saying. Q. You never complained to Yellow about either of these incidents, correct? A. To the best of my recollection, no. Q. Okay. Are there any other employees who you believe harassed you because youbecause of your association with minorities or because you filed this lawsuit? A. Frank Haskle. Q. Haskle? A. Yes. Frank Haskle. Q. And when did Frank Haskle harass you? A. Oh, on and off the last four years. Q. And what did he do to harass you? A. He called me a nigger lover, too. Q. And when did he do that? A. Oh, because my association with the black people. He's ahe's a menhe's a midnight hostler and associated with the black people. He called me a nigger lover. It was about, oh, gee, maybe last year, yes. Q. And yet you never complained to anyone at Yellow about that, did you? A. No. Q. Told your lawyer, but didn't tell Yellow. Is that fair? A. I told my lawyer about it, yes; and we have that in the complaint, yes. We have not quoted all of Ketterer's complaints, but he never asserts he complained to management. As part of the quoted testimony reveals, he alleged that at some previous time he had complained and the human relations representative was nonresponsive. An employee's decision to refrain from informing the employer about the harassment will be excused once it becomes objectively obvious that the employer has no real intention of stopping the harassment, as such reporting is wasted motion. Woods v. Delta Beverage Grp., Inc., 274 F.3d 295, 300-01 (5th Cir.2001). The plaintiffs collectively assert that any complaint would have been futile because everyone knew about the harassment but no one did anything to stop it. To support this assertion, the plaintiffs direct us to evidence about the prevalence of graffiti concerning minorities. Yet Ketterer must present evidence that complaints about his harassment would have been futile. See id. at 301. He has not. The evidence shows that Yellow Transportation conducted investigations in the past when Ketterer reported harassment and his one reference to Hardge's having turned them all around gives the court nothing on which to make an objective finding of futility. For its part, Yellow Transportation asserts that it was never informed of the harassment. We agree there is no evidence that it was aware of any of the incidents on which Ketterer sues. Despite any lack of actual knowledge, an employer may have constructive knowledge when the harassment is pervasive. Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 930 (5th Cir.1999). A holding that an employer had constructive knowledge will be less likely if it had in place a procedure by which employees could report instances of harassment. Id. Ketterer acknowledges that Yellow Transportation provided him with an employee manual which explained the procedures an employee should follow when harassed. Ketterer admits that he did not follow these procedures. Ketterer argues that he was frequently called by a profane scatological word by other coworkers, including over the company radio. There is evidence that management listened to the radio. While it may be that Yellow Transportation at least should have been aware that Ketterer was being insulted frequently, he fails to identify evidence to support that management would have known that these insults were based on his association with minorities. Rather, Ketterer admits that coworkers of all races refer to him by that name. The record contains an explanation as to how Ketterer earned that name, and there is no Title VII component to the story. There are no identified facts that could lead to the conclusion that one of the most pervasive aspects of the harassmentthe nicknamewas in response to his association with minorities. This fact distinguishes this case from another in which the court has allowed a suit to proceed. See Waltman, 875 F.2d at 478. There, we reversed a district court's decision to grant summary judgment to the employer because the employee alleged that there was sexual graffiti directed at her in numerous locations. Id. Ketterer has not explained how frequent use of this nickname notified management, as the sexual graffiti did in Waltman, that he was being harassed for a reason prohibited by Title VII. Another coworker alleges that he saw graffiti in one location which used a racial slur in relation to Ketterer. There is no evidence that similar graffiti was at multiple locations. One item of graffiti is not sufficient when the other circumstances are taken into consideration. The record fully supports that the Yellow Transportation facility was not a pleasant place to work. As the facts show, the reasons for the hostility were complicated and ever-changing. Much of the harassment stemmed from conduct not prohibited by Title VII. In these circumstances, insufficient facts have been identified to show that Yellow Transportation should have known Ketterer was harassed because of his association with minorities. The district court did not err by granting Yellow Transportation's motion for summary judgment.