Opinion ID: 2978524
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Crucial for a Fair and Just Resolution

Text: Even if the States were not “required” parties under Rule 19(a), dismissal of this lawsuit without reaching the merits would still be proper. A court can dismiss a case for a myriad of prudential reasons, including the absence of a party who is crucial to a fair and just resolution of the dispute but who would not fit squarely within Rule 19’s framework. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967) (“And courts may even refuse declaratory relief for the nonjoinder of interested parties who are not, technically speaking, indispensible.”); Emery v. Adams, 179 F.2d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 1950) (“Even if [the corporation] were not an indispensible party, the court could proceed, in any event against Adams, individually, in its discretion, Rule 19, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., and it was no abuse of judicial discretion to decline to do so.”). The States’ interests in the subject of this lawsuit, as well as the equitable factors weighing in favor of dismissal under Rule 19(b) set forth above, likewise weigh in favor of dismissal under general prudential principles. Furthermore, while parents are not required parties under Rule 19(a), it must be acknowledged that they have little voice in the current lawsuit even though they have arguably the second most important interest in the outcome, next to their children’s own interest. While parents are consulted when a school district develops a local plan, 20 U.S.C. § 6312(d)(1), the scope of that plan is narrower than a State’s own plan. Were the States involved, the broader interests embodied in the statewide plans would be represented. Id. § 6311(a)(1). It is also undisputed that, whatever the merits of the parties’ respective arguments, the Act is a lengthy, intricate statutory scheme. It is much more likely that the court would arrive at the correct resolution were Plaintiffs to pursue a claim involving a proposed amendment to a plan that could be considered first at the administrative level where state and federal education officials could bring their professional expertise to bear. Alternatively, faced with a broad claim aimed directly at the meaning and operation of the Act, it can hardly be doubted that the court’s decision would be aided by input from the States. No. 05-2708 School District of the City of Pontiac, et al. v. Secretary Page 86 of the United States Dep’t of Educ. Apart from these concerns, the involvement of the school districts from Vermont and Texas poses its own unique justiciability concerns. The State of Connecticut has brought a similar case against the Secretary raising, inter alia, the same two legal claims at issue in the present case: (a) the unfunded mandate provision prohibits school districts and States from spending nonfederal funds on activities required under the Act but not fully paid for by the federal government; and (b) the unfunded mandate provision violates the Spending Clause. Connecticut I, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 480, 491. The case is now on appeal before the Second Circuit. Connecticut v. Duncan, No. 08-2437 (2d Cir.). Assume for a moment that the Second Circuit were to find in favor of the Secretary on the merits, but this court were to find in favor of Plaintiffs. As noted above, Plaintiffs have requested declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the States and school districts. Yet, the State of Vermont is within the geographic jurisdiction of the Second Circuit. Although not a party to the Connecticut v. Spellings lawsuit, a decision by the Second Circuit in favor of the Secretary would surely reverberate throughout that circuit and embolden the Secretary to continue applying his interpretation of the unfunded-mandate provision to the other States within that circuit. Thus, the State of Vermont could be faced with deciding how to reconcile contrary decisions from two federal circuits, one (the Sixth Circuit) in which a political subdivision of the State is a party to the lawsuit and the other (the Second Circuit) in which the State is geographically encompassed. Again, though, it is possible that any relief in the present lawsuit could be strictly limited to Plaintiff school districts—i.e., they could be granted greater discretion in how they spend federal funds under the Act without also affording similar relief to the three States or any other school district within those States. Doing so would, at least at first blush, appear to avoid thrusting the State of Vermont into an intercircuit conflict. Yet, now consider the position in which the State of Vermont would find itself. Several of its school districts could unilaterally decide to forgo the programs and requirements set forth in the applicable plans and the Act, yet the remaining school districts that are nonparties to this lawsuit as well as the State of Vermont itself would be required to No. 05-2708 School District of the City of Pontiac, et al. v. Secretary Page 87 of the United States Dep’t of Educ. comply with the mandates of the Act, as interpreted by the Secretary. And, under this scenario, the Secretary’s interpretation would have the backing of the Second Circuit. Were this lawsuit to go forward and were Plaintiff school districts to be awarded relief, the State of Vermont’s education system would, in effect, be balkanized by conflicting circuit decisions. Moreover, even without a similar lawsuit winding through the Fifth Circuit, the State of Texas would be in the same situation as the State of Vermont because the State of Texas is currently subject to the Secretary’s interpretation of the Act. By granting relief to the Vermont and Texas school districts, the court would be requiring that those States treat some of its political subdivisions in one manner, while at the same time they would be required by the Secretary to treat other parallel subdivisions in a diametrically different manner. This balkanization of the States’ educational systems undermines the dignity interest of the sovereign States. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (The States “are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”). Moreover, this balkanization could have serious repercussions on the delivery of education services in the affected districts. Under Plaintiffs’ view of the Act, Congress relieved them from complying with the Act’s requirements whenever the cost of compliance exceeds federal appropriations. However, States and school districts ultimately control the costs of compliance, not the federal government. Thus, a Plaintiff school district itself would determine whether, in its opinion, a particular program was being sufficiently funded by the federal government. The district could then decide to spend its funds on something else because, in the district’s judgment, the federal government has not fully funded that program. The parents of economically disadvantaged students, of course, have the least opportunity to choose another school for their children, a school that would fulfill the requirements of the Act. Given that the Act’s programs and requirements are specifically intended to help the nation’s most disadvantaged students, those left-behind students are precisely the ones to whom the Act attempts to bring long-neglected relief but who would be hurt most by that district’s No. 05-2708 School District of the City of Pontiac, et al. v. Secretary Page 88 of the United States Dep’t of Educ. decision. Permitting school districts to pick-and-choose which programs they will comply with and which they will not would, as the NAACP predicted in this case, “sound the death knell for NCLB.” Amicus Br. at 17.