Opinion ID: 2390524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Wage Payment and Collection Claim

Text: Beichler contends that the Circuit Court committed error in dismissing the complaint upon the determination that he should have pursued and exhausted available administrative remedies prior to filing the action. Beichler seeks an exception to the well-settled principle set forth in syllabus point 1 of Daurelle v. Traders Federal Savings and Loan Association, 143 W.Va. 674, 104 S.E.2d 320 (1958): The general rule is that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute or by rules and regulations having the force and effect of law, relief must be sought from the administrative body, and such remedy must be exhausted before the courts will act. See also, syl. pt. 2, Sturm v. Board of Education of Kanawha County, 223 W.Va. 277, 672 S.E.2d 606 (2008). The West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act includes administrative remedies available to employees who wish to file a claim for unpaid wages. In W.Va.Code, 21-5-11(b) (1975), the Commissioner of the Division of Labor is authorized, among other things, to issue subpoenas and compel the attendance of witnesses in proceedings under the Act. Specifically, in McDaniel v. West Virginia Division of Labor, 214 W.Va. 719, 591 S.E.2d 277 (2003), this Court observed that the administrative proceedings in a wage payment and collection matter include an investigation, an initial meeting with the parties, a hearing before a hearing examiner and the entry of an order appealable to circuit court. Moreover, proceedings under the Act are subject to the provisions of the State Administrative Procedures Act, W.Va. Code, 29A-1-1 (1982), et seq., and the Code of State Regulations: § 42-5-1 (1990), et seq., and § 42-20-1 (1992), et seq. See, McDaniel, supra , and Isaacs v. Bonner, 225 W.Va. 460, 463 n. 1, 694 S.E.2d 302, 305 n. 1 (2010). The above remedies notwithstanding, Beichler asserts that the Wage Payment and Collection Act contemplates, rather than precludes, an initial circuit court action. Thus, Beichler suggests that, as a result of the Act's express language, an employee pursuing a claim for unpaid wages has the option of filing the claim administratively or filing an original complaint in circuit court. In so contending, Beichler relies on W.Va. Code, 21-5-12(a) (1975), of the Act which provides: Any person whose wages have not been paid in accord with this article, or the commissioner or his designated representative, upon the request of such person, may bring any legal action necessary to collect a claim under this article. With the consent of the employee, the commissioner shall have the power to settle and adjust any claim to the same extent as might the employee. (emphasis added) Beichler argues that if the West Virginia Legislature, in drafting that section, had intended that claimants be required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing an action against an employer for unpaid wages, the Legislature could have so provided. This Court finds Beichler's position in this matter persuasive. In clear and unambiguous language, W.Va.Code, 21-5-12(a) (1975), states that any person, or the Commissioner, may bring any legal action necessary to collect a claim under the Act. Thus, in Britner v. Medical Security Card, Inc., 200 W.Va. 352, 489 S.E.2d 734 (1997), this Court upheld the recovery by employees of annual raises in a wage payment action filed directly in circuit court. See also, Mullins v. Venable, 171 W.Va. 92, 297 S.E.2d 866 (1982) (also a wage payment action filed directly in circuit court, confirming the principle that a corporate officer may be held personally liable for violations of the Act and remanding the action to the circuit court for trial). Syllabus point 5 of State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959), holds: When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute. Syl. pt. 3, Skidmore v. Skidmore, 225 W.Va. 235, 691 S.E.2d 830 (2010). Supplementary to that rule is the recognition by this Court that, generally, the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar significance and meaning. Britner, 200 W.Va. at 356, 489 S.E.2d at 738; Amick v. C & T Development Co., 187 W.Va. 115, 118, 416 S.E.2d 73, 76 (1992). See also, Huffman v. Goals Coal Company, 223 W.Va. 724, 729, 679 S.E.2d 323, 328 (2009) (It is not for this Court to read into a statute that which it does not say). In Mullins, supra , this Court made clear that the Wage Payment and Collection Act is remedial legislation designed to protect working people and assist them in the collection of compensation wrongly withheld. 171 W.Va. at 94, 297 S.E.2d at 869. Syl. pt. 2, Ingram v. City of Princeton, 208 W.Va. 352, 540 S.E.2d 569 (2000). Accordingly, this Court holds that, pursuant to W.Va.Code, 21-5-12(a) (1975), a person whose wages have not been paid in accord with the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act may initiate a claim for the unpaid wages either through the administrative remedies provided under the Act or by filing a complaint for the unpaid wages directly in circuit court. Thus, until W.Va.Code, 21-5-12(a) (1975), is amended by the Legislature, the pursuit and exhaustion of administrative remedies do not constitute a condition precedent to instituting a wage payment action in circuit court. Cf., syl. pt. 1, Price v. Boone County Ambulance Authority, 175 W.Va. 676, 337 S.E.2d 913 (1985) (A plaintiff may, as an alternative to filing a complaint with the Human Rights Commission, initiate an action in circuit court to enforce rights granted by the West Virginia Human Rights Act.). B.