Opinion ID: 2520047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lingering Doubt and Exclusion of Evidence of Third Party Culpability

Text: Defendant contends the trial court's exclusion at the guilt phase of third party culpability evidence relating to Liberato Gutierrez prejudicially affected the penalty verdict depriving him of his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and nonarbitrary penalty determination. As with defendant's guilt phase argument, we reject this claim because defendant did not rely on a theory of third party culpability in his offer of proof. Defense counsel was very clear that it was not his intention to point [ ] the finger at Liberato Gutierrez. (See ante, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 302-304, 82 P.3d at pp. 322-324.) Even so, as defendant concedes, the trial court instructed the jury on lingering doubt. [27] Defendant's assertion that the lingering doubt instruction was ineffective is undermined by Detective Guenther's testimony and defense counsel's argument, which alerted the jury to the possibility that other individuals were in the vicinity before, during, or after the murder and robbery. Defense counsel, for example, argued to the jury during his guilt phase closing argument that other individuals could have killed or robbed the victim, arguing at one point: In the back alley ... are other people that are found, that are detained, that are talked to. Guenther knows they're back there. He talked to them. [¶] Were those people's shoes gathered up? Were those people's shoes taken? Were those people's shoes analyzed? Were those people's shoes looked at for blood? Defendant's reliance on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 is misplaced. Lockett struck down Ohio's death sentence statute because it prevented the sentencer from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation.  ( Id. at p. 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, italics added.) Defendant here, however, did not seek to introduce third party culpability evidence at the penalty phase as mitigating evidence. (See e.g., People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 967, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574, abrogated on another ground in People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 999 P.2d 666 [finding that since defendant did not seek to introduce lingering doubt at the second penalty phase trial he could not complain of any state law violation].) [28]