Opinion ID: 832933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The class certification criteria in MCR 3.501(A)(1)

Text: Second, I disagree that [i]t appears that the circuit court made an independent determination that the plaintiff at least alleged a sufficient factual and legal basis to support each of the prerequisites provided in MCR 3.501(A)(1), as required by Henry, 484 Mich, at 505, 772 N.W.2d 301. To the contrary, the court's written reasoning is sparseparticularly with regard to the criteria in MCR 3.501(A)(1)(c)-(e). It supplied no oral reasoning; although the written opinion (incorrectly) states that the court ha[d] heard oral argument, no hearing was ever held. Indeed, defendant raised the lack of hearing as a ground for reconsideration. [1] With regard to element (c) of MCR 3.501(A)(1) (typicality), the circuit court reasoned: [A]lthough there are factual differences between Plaintiffs claims and those of the putative class, her claims arise out of the same course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class members, i.e., Severstal's alleged discharge of fallout and dust. Furthermore, Plaintiffs claims and the claims of the putative class members are based on the same legal theories, nuisance and negligence. Accordingly, the Court finds that the requirement of typicality has been met. This analysis is scarcely distinguishable from the typicality analysis we rejected in Henry, supra at 506 n. 40, 772 N.W.2d 301, stating: For MCR 3.501(A)(1)(c), the typicality prerequisite, the trial court's analysis consisted of a restatement of the standard; a statement that plaintiffs contend that their claims arise from the same course of conduct and that they share common legal and remedial theories; and a quote from a federal district court case stating that the typicality requirement may be satisfied if there is a nexus between the class representatives' claims [and] defenses and the common questions of fact or law which unite the class. It is unclear from the trial court's analysis whether it independently determined that the plaintiffs alleged basic questions of law and fact sufficient to support their allegation that their legal remedial theories were typical of those of the class. Similarly, for element (d) (adequacy of representation), the circuit court stated in full: MCR 3.501(A)(1)(d) focuses on whether the class representatives can fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class as a whole. In the present case, for the reasons stated in Plaintiffs brief, the court believes that Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the class. The Henry opinion renders this inadequate. Henry rejected the trial court's similar analysis of element (d), stating: In the circuit court's analysis of MCR 3.501(A)(1)(d), the adequacy of representation prerequisite, it stated that [t]he representative parties will fairly and adequately assert arid protect the interest of the class. It supported this conclusion by reasoning that no proof has been submitted to this Court that would indicate that the Plaintiffs herein, the representative parties, would not fairly and adequately assert and protect the interest of the class. In other words, the circuit court did not perform an analysis that sufficiently shows that it independently determined that the plaintiffs would adequately represent the class and also potentially shifted the burden to defendant to show that plaintiffs would not adequately represent the class. [ Henry, supra at 506 n. 40, 772 N.W.2d 301.] I also question the discussion of element (e) (superiority), in which the court opines: For the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs brief, this Court is of the opinion that in this case, a class action is superior to other available means of adjudication. Although the Court is well aware that mini-trials will be necessary with respect to issues of proximate causation and damages, and that such mini-trials may also involve the allocation of fault, the determination of common issues of liability via class action treatment is more efficient th[a]n joining hundreds, if not thousands, of individual plaintiffs. As with elements (c) and (d), and particularly because the court relies primarily on plaintiffs brief, the court did not independently determine under element (e) that a class action is superior to other available means of adjudication, and it potentially shifted the burden to defendant to disprove this element.