Opinion ID: 1694843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether drake was denied his right to a speedy trial.

Text: ¶ 19. Drake contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss this case for speedy-trial and 270-day-rule violations. Drake was arrested on February 13, 1999, and indicted on March 23, 1999. His attorney signed a waiver of arraignment and entered a not-guilty plea on behalf of his client on April 6, 1999. The trial began approximately 328 days later on February 28, 2000. ¶ 20. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (2000) states as follows: Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned. ¶ 21. An order of continuance was entered in this case on September 14, 1999, setting trial for February 28, 2000. The order was entered upon the motion of the parties for a continuance and was agreed to and signed by both Susan Brewer, Assistant District Attorney, and Jack Jones, III, Drake's attorney. ¶ 22. Trial began approximately 167 days after the order of continuance was entered. Deducting 167 days from 328 days results in 161 days. Thus, after deduction of the time which lapsed due to the agreed continuance, Drake was tried well within the 270-day time frame. See Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 953-55 (Miss. 1997). We find no merit to this assignment of error.