Opinion ID: 3166758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Complaint for an Action on a Judgment

Text: [¶10] As a threshold matter, DiPietro contends that Maine does not recognize a cause of action to obtain a domestic judgment on a foreign judgment and that the trial court therefore erred by not dismissing Faith Temple’s complaint. Although DiPietro correctly asserts that there is no statute affirmatively establishing a cause of action to seek a judgment based on a foreign judgment, a review of Maine’s common law history of enforcing foreign judgments reveals that 2 In its order, the court agreed with DiPietro that compound interest on the judgment was “unauthorized.” This figure thus appears to be the $11,000 judgment plus annual simple interest for thirty years at the same rate at which Faith Temple had sought compounding interest (9.15%), with another $11,000 erroneously added to it. 3 Although the court had accepted DiPietro’s contention that simple, rather than compound, interest should be awarded, this number reflects the $11,000 judgment with compounding interest at a rate of 9.15% for thirty years. The court, however, again appears to have added an extra $11,000 to the result. 7 such a claim exists. Therefore, despite Faith Temple’s failure to articulate a legal basis for its complaint, we must reject DiPietro’s argument. [¶11] Prior to the approval of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act in 1948 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, see Unif. Enf’t of Foreign Judgments Act prefatory note (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 1964), the only method for enforcing a foreign judgment in most states was through an action on the judgment. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 100 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1971) (stating that “the method usually employed in this country for the enforcement of a foreign judgment for the payment of money is to bring a new action in the nature of debt upon the judgment in the forum State and to obtain a new judgment there”); see also Milwaukee Cty. v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1935) (recognizing federal district court jurisdiction over “suits upon a judgment . . . which were maintainable at common law upon writ of debt”). [¶12] That cause of action for “debt on a judgment” has its genesis in English common law, and was recognized in Massachusetts at the time of the founding of the United States. See Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 462, 466 (1813) (recognizing that, pursuant to statute, “actions of debt may be brought upon any judgment for debt, damages, or costs, rendered in any court of record of the United States”); Bartlet v. Knight, 1 Mass. (1 Tyng) 401, 404 (1805) (stating that 8 “[b]y the rules of common law, the judgment of a court of justice is a ground of action for the party recovering”). [¶13] When Maine acquired statehood in 1820, the Legislature codified the cause of action for debt on a judgment. See P.L. 1821, ch. 59, § 35 (“[U]pon the judgment for debt, damages or costs which has been, or which shall be rendered and recorded by a Court of record in any other of the United States, or by a Court of record of the United States and remaining in force and unsatisfied, an action of debt may be brought in any Court of record of this State . . . .”); McKim v. Odom, 12 Me. 94, 99, 103-04 (1835) (interpreting the statute to allow for an action of debt on the judgment of a court of equity in another state). In 1841, however, pursuant to the Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Revise the Public Laws of the State of Maine, the section providing for that cause of action was removed from the Maine Revised Statutes without comment. See R.S. ch. 115 (1841); R.R. 1840, Title X, ch. 115. Since that time, there has been no express statutory codification in Maine of the cause of action for a debt on a judgment. [¶14] In Edwards v. Moody, 60 Me. 255, 257-58 (1872), however, based on a review of the common law history and other statutes that referred to the cause of action, we concluded that “the right to maintain an action of debt” continued to exist “by implication,” even though the statutory provision expressly creating that claim was removed in 1841. In particular, we pointed to remaining statutory 9 provisions associated with a cause of action for debt on a judgment, such as the statute of limitations and a statute providing for interest on the judgment of a foreign court. Id. That reasoning still applies: Title 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2015) provides a six-year statute of limitation for all civil actions “except actions on a judgment or decree of any court of record of the United States, or of any state,” suggesting that there remains a common law action on a judgment. [¶15] In 1975, Maine adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, see P.L. 1975, ch. 335 (effective Oct. 1, 1975) (codified as amended at 14 M.R.S. §§ 8001-8008 (2015)), providing for the first time that a judgment creditor may file a copy of a foreign judgment with the clerk of a state court. See 14 M.R.S. § 8003. The Act further provides that once filed, the foreign judgment has the same effect and enforceability as a state court judgment. See id. The Act was designed to provide “a speedy and economical” way to enforce foreign judgments without the need to institute a separate action. See Unif. Enf’t of Foreign Judgments Act prefatory note (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 1964). [¶16] The Act also makes clear, however, that it was not intended to be the exclusive means of enforcing foreign judgments in state courts. See 14 M.R.S. § 8007. In fact, section 8007 provides that “[t]he right of a judgment creditor to bring an action to enforce his judgment instead of proceeding under this Act 10 remains unimpaired.” Id.; see also Burke v. Iowa Dist. Court, 546 N.W.2d 582, 583 (Iowa 1996) (stating that the Uniform Act “preserves the optional method of enforcing a foreign creditor’s judgment by bringing an action in the Iowa district court”); Tri-State Tank Corp. v. Higganum Heating, 699 A.2d 201, 203 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (explaining that similar language in a Connecticut statute “preserved the common-law right of a judgment creditor to bring an independent action on the judgment” (quotation marks omitted)); Alexander Constr. Co. v. Weaver, 594 P.2d 248, 250 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that the Uniform Act “is merely another method available to the judgment creditor”). Therefore, despite the legislative enactment of an expedited and more efficient procedure under the Uniform Act, the common law cause of action for debt on a judgment survives, see Edwards, 60 Me. at 257, and, absent some other bar to the claim, such as laches or a statute of limitations, Faith Temple was entitled to pursue such an action. Consequently, the court correctly denied DiPietro’s motion to dismiss Faith Temple’s complaint seeking a judgment on the Bankruptcy Court judgment.4 4 DiPietro’s brief can be read to argue that the presumption of payment after twenty years found in 14 M.R.S. § 864 (2015) completely bars Faith Temple’s complaint. We have held that section 864 “does not . . . bar” actions commenced after twenty years; rather, it merely creates a rebuttable presumption. Carter v. Carter, 611 A.2d 86, 88 n.2 (Me. 1992); see also Knight v. Macomber, 55 Me. 132, 134 (1868). Thus, it does not prevent Faith Temple from going forward with its action, although Faith Temple will have the burden of overcoming the presumption of payment before it can prevail on its claim. 11