Opinion ID: 2166967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A Summary Judgment Motion

Text: Is Inappropriate in a Recovery Proceeding The State maintains that because section 3.01 of the Act refers to the provision of the Civil Practice Law, the summary judgment provision of that section automatically applies to proceedings under the Act. There is no dispute that the proceedings under the Act are civil in nature. The plain language of the statute makes this fact apparent. Nonetheless, this court has long recognized that the application of the Act may result in deprivation of liberty. As such, we have consistently held that a person proceeding under the Act must be accorded the essential protections available to a defendant in a criminal trial, including the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial. Olmstead, 32 Ill.2d at 312, 205 N.E.2d 625; Capoldi, 37 Ill.2d at 18, 225 N.E.2d 634. In that respect the Act can be characterized as a hybrid; although civil in nature, it still confers certain rights of a criminal defendant to a person proceeded against under the Act. The extension of these rights to a person filing an application for recovery under section 9 of the Act guides our decision in this case. If the recovery hearing scheme created by the appellate court, which places the burden of proof on the defendant, was approved, a defendant would gain nothing in terms of an opportunity to regain his freedom. Because, according to Illinois law, the trial court is not required to provide an independent psychiatrist to the defendant under the Act, the defendant would have nothing but his own application to present to the trier of fact. People v. McVeay, 302 Ill.App.3d 960, 964, 235 Ill. Dec. 984, 706 N.E.2d 539 (1999). The necessarily limited allegations made in the defendant's application alone would almost always be insufficient to sustain the burden placed on him to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he has recovered. Theoretically, a defendant could, on his own or with the help of privately retained expert witnesses, make a sufficient allegation in his petition to meet the present burden. However, a review of nearly half a century of case law interpreting the Act has failed to reveal such a hypothetical case. To require the defendant to prove that he has recovered and to rebut the statutorily required socio-psychiatric report effectively reduces the defendant's right to a jury trial to an exercise in futility. See People v. Coan, 316 Ill. App.3d 14, 16-17, 249 Ill.Dec. 530, 736 N.E.2d 724 (2000) (McLaren, J., specially concurring). A defendant's right to assistance of counsel and the right to demand a jury trial, that we have previously held is available to him under section 5 of the Act, would be, in almost all cases, rendered of no value. 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 1998); Shiro, 52 Ill.2d at 282, 287 N.E.2d 708. In Shiro, we held that if a person who is committed as a sexually dangerous person files an application for release, the court is required to determine whether he should be released and must grant the defendant's request for a jury trial. Shiro, 52 Ill.2d at 282, 287 N.E.2d 708, citing Capoldi, 37 Ill.2d at 18, 225 N.E.2d 634. However, if the defendant during a recovery proceeding were placed in the situation where he had to proceed with the evidence, he would never be able to sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. It is unlikely that such a defendant would ever survive a motion for a directed verdict at the close of his evidence. Essentially, section 5 of the Act would be rendered completely ineffectual in the recovery proceedings. The eradication of the protections provided by section 5 of the Act was the appellate court's concern in this case on direct appeal. 312 Ill.App.3d 860, 245 Ill. Dec. 343, 728 N.E.2d 74. As the appellate court accurately noted, granting a summary judgment motion would allow the State to circumvent the defendant's right to a jury trial in violation of section 5 of the Act. 312 Ill.App.3d at 863, 245 Ill. Dec. 343, 728 N.E.2d 74. That was precisely the outcome when the trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment in this case. Defendant was stripped of his right to demand a jury trial, the right to be represented by counsel, and the right to test the State's evidence against him. The requirements of due process, under both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions, required that the drastic impairment of the liberty and reputation of an individual which results from civil commitment under the Act be justified. Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d at 321, 342 N.E.2d 28. Allowing a system to exist which would make section 5 essentially inoperable during recovery proceedings would deny the defendant of any viable method of regaining his freedom and would violate his due process rights. As our court stated in Olmstead, a defendant's route to freedom should not find a road block in the fact that the indigent defendant is inarticulate in the forms of law or that he does not have the affidavits of psychiatric specialists to support his application. Olmstead, 32 Ill.2d at 314, 205 N.E.2d 625. The minimum pleading requirement for a defendant filing an application for recovery under the Act is that he must set forth facts and circumstances showing that he has recovered. Olmstead, 32 Ill.2d at 314, 205 N.E.2d 625. Under the principles set forth in Olmstead, and its progeny, defendant's application in this case fulfilled the minimum pleading requirement. Those facts and circumstances did not need to be accompanied by additional psychiatric reports or documents. Therefore, on its face, the application for recovery was sufficient and required the court to set the matter for a hearing and to impanel a jury. Defendant's only avenue to freedom, a hearing pursuant to an application for recovery where the State must sustain the burden of proof against defendant, would be thwarted through a motion for summary judgment. Applying the principles of a purely civil remedy would force defendant to show that a material fact exists. As we have previously noted, defendant is not entitled to appointment of an independent expert. Therefore, the only expert opinion that would be considered at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment is that contained in the Department's sociopsychiatric report. Thus, the defendant would be placed in a position where the true decision would not be made by an impartial fact finder but by the expert testimony of the government psychiatrist or reliance on the Department's expert's report. The defendant would have nothing to present to the trier of fact, as he is indigent and without any means to procure evidence necessary to overcome the presumption against him. As a consequence, the State would never have to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to show that the defendant had not recovered and that he should remain confined in the Department of Corrections. The scheme envisioned by our appellate court would deprive defendant of having a jury of 12 impartial citizens test the credibility of the witnesses and determine the defendant's future. A defendant would only find success in a situation where the State's experts agreed that the accused has recovered from the condition that first led to his commitment. This outcome, however, is highly improbable. Stripping the defendant of the protections of section 5 under the Act would render an absurd result. In essence, a defendant's avenue to liberty, paved with precious rights to counsel and trial by jury, under the current structure created by various panels of the appellate court, would be equipped with a dead end. To avoid such a contrary result, we conclude that a motion for summary judgment is an inappropriate civil remedy that has no place in applications for recovery filed under the Act. We realize that the Act imposes a significant burden on this State's limited judicial resources. The Act is silent and contains no limitation on the number of applications showing recovery that a sexually dangerous person may file. In addition, it also fails to specify the length of time allowed between applications, unlike its similar sister statute. [4] Although we recognize the impact of the Act on the State's resources, this is a legislative matter that we must leave for the General Assembly to address.