Opinion ID: 2057254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Schwinn's Sales

Text: North Western's final objection to the trial proceedings pertains to Schwinn's introduction of evidence of the number of bicycles the company had sold with quick-release axles but without positive retention devices. The plaintiff was allowed, over Schwinn's objection, to present evidence of the number of accidents that had been reported to Schwinn involving the loss of front wheels on bicycles equipped with quick-release mechanisms. As stipulated by the parties, 131 such accidents were reported to Schwinn between 1968 and 1985. During its case in chief, Schwinn was permitted to introduce, over objection, an exhibit detailing in tabular form the company's annual sales of bicycles that were equipped with quick-release mechanisms but that lacked positive retention devices. The period surveyed in the table was from 1960 through 1975. Schwinn's exhibit also stated the number of complaints the company received each year regarding wheel disengagement on quick-release bicycles. The exhibit provided cumulative totals of the number of complaints received and the number of similarly equipped bicycles sold, through each year shown, and expressed the former as a percentage of the latter. According to the exhibit, in 1975 Schwinn sold 121,184 quick-release equipped bicycles and received 21 complaints of wheel separations. From 1960 through 1975, Schwinn had sold 1,198,501 such bicycles and had received 66 reports of disengaged wheels, which meant that 0.0055% of those sales had resulted in complaints of that nature. North Western argues that the evidence of Schwinn's sales was improperly admitted. We note that the plaintiff, in his separate appeal, makes the same challenge to the evidence of the bicycle manufacturer's sales. In the present case, the plaintiff introduced the evidence of prior accidents not to show notice, but rather to show that the bicycle was unreasonably dangerous. ( Ballweg v. City of Springfield (1986), 114 Ill.2d 107, 114-15; Rucker v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1979), 77 Ill.2d 434, 440-41.) Schwinn argues here that its evidence of prior sales involving quick-release-equipped bicycles lacking positive retention devices was admissible. The appellate court agreed with Schwinn, stating, It would have been totally inconsistent to permit plaintiffs to introduce evidence of similar prior accidents and then prohibit Schwinn from introducing rebuttal evidence of the number of similar bicycles sold and the absence of reported problems with the quick release mechanism. 161 Ill. App.3d at 761. Evidence of the absence of prior accidents involving the same or similar product has been admitted in strict liability actions in Illinois (see Salvi v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 896; Leischner v. Deere & Co. (1984), 127 Ill. App.3d 175, 177; Darrough v. White Motor Co. (1979), 74 Ill. App.3d 560), and we believe that Schwinn's evidence was properly admitted here. We recognize that in Salvi, Leischner, and Darrough, the evidence introduced by the defendants showed a complete absence of prior accidents. We do not believe that the distinction is significant under the circumstances here. As we have indicated, the plaintiff in the present action introduced the evidence of prior accidents to support his argument that the bicycle's design was unreasonably dangerous. That purpose, however, invited the sort of mathematical comparison that Schwinn presented to rebut the plaintiff's proof. North Western also suggests that there was an inadequate foundation for Schwinn's evidence regarding its prior sales. Parties wishing to present evidence either of prior accidents or of the absence of prior accidents must show a similarity of circumstance between the prior use and the occurrence that caused the injury complained of. ( Rucker, 77 Ill.2d at 441; Leischner, 127 Ill. App.3d at 177.) We believe that the foundational requirement was satisfied here, with respect to both Schwinn's proof of the absence of prior accidents and the plaintiff's proof of prior accidents. In each instance the evidence involved bicycles that, like Daniel's, had quick-release mechanisms but were not equipped with positive retention devices. Moreover, the accident in the present case occurred as the plaintiff was using his bicycle in a foreseeable manner, riding over a railroad crossing. It can be assumed that the bicycles involved in the parties' evidence regarding other occurrences, or the absence of other occurrences, were used in a sufficiently similar fashion. See Salvi, 140 Ill. App.3d at 905 (sufficiency of foundation for introduction of evidence that company had sold 459,000 similar air guns and had not received any prior reports of accidents); Leischner, 127 Ill. App.3d at 177 (64,000 snowmobiles).