Opinion ID: 3035963
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Event-based exemptions

Text: [13] Likewise, the permit exemption for temporary signs in residential zones is not content based. Indeed, the provision creating this exemption explicitly demands content neutrality. See LOC § 47.08.300(B)(1) (“In any residential zone temporary signage shall be allowed for each and every lot. This signage shall not be restricted by content, but is usually and signs shall comply with all provisions and regulations of this chapter; However [sic], no fee, permit or application is required.”). Furthermore, the exemption here for public signs is more narrowly drawn because the Code exempts only those signs “erected and maintained by a public agency within the right-of-way of a street or alley.” LOC § 47.03.015. G.K. LTD. TRAVEL v. CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO 1119 customarily used to advertise real estate sales, political or ideological positions, garage sales, home construction or remodeling, etc.”) (emphasis added). Section 47.08.300(B) imposes only temporal and size restrictions on temporary signs. For example, homeowners may erect a temporary sign concerning any topic whatsoever on their property without a permit so long as that sign goes up not more than 90 days prior to an election, stays up not more than five days following the election and is no larger than six square feet. See LOC § 47.08.300(B)(1)(a). Likewise, a homeowner may put up “[o]ne temporary sign not exceeding six square feet provided the sign is removed within fifteen days from the sale, lease or rental of the property or within seven days of completion of any construction or remodeling.” LOC § 47.08.300(B)(1)(b). Such exemptions indicate the City’s recognition that during certain times, more speech is demanded by the citizenry because of the event (e.g., a real estate transaction or election) but the City does not limit the substance of this speech in any way. The exemption for temporary signs does not manifest the City’s desire to prefer certain types of speech or regulate signage by its content. Therefore, this exemption, too, is content neutral. Neither the speaker- nor event-based exemptions implicate Foti insofar as neither requires law enforcement officers to “read a sign’s message to determine if the sign is exempted from the ordinance.” Foti, 146 F.3d at 636. In the speaker category, officers decide whether an exemption applies by identifying the entity speaking through the sign without regard for the actual substance of the message. In the case of eventbased exemptions to the permitting process, the officer must determine only whether a specific triggering event has occurred and if the temporary sign has been erected within the specified time frame. Plainly, the City anticipates that signs will relate to the triggering event, but the ordinance, by its own terms, does not mandate the temporary sign comply with content restrictions. Although it may seem “bizarre” to plaintiffs to read the ordinance as allowing temporary signs, 1120 G.K. LTD. TRAVEL v. CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO regardless of content, during certain events, this is precisely what the ordinance says and it reveals the extent the City is willing to go to avoid content-based restrictions on expression. See G.K. Ltd. Travel I, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6984 at .