Opinion ID: 150891
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appearance of Partiality

Text: In support of their argument that the district court’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned, the Dier plaintiffs assert that at least one plaintiff lacked confidence in the district court’s impartiality as a result of its dual responsibilities. But because the test for impartiality is an objective one, see IQ Prods. Co., 305 F.3d at 378, an individual plaintiff’s subjective beliefs are irrelevant to the analysis. For the reasons articulated by Judge Fallon, his decision not to recuse falls well within the bounds of his discretionary authority. C. Pre-Trial Order 28 Requiring Production of a Doctor’s Report 8 Case: 09-30446 Document: 00511176837 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/16/2010 No. 09-30446 The Dier plaintiffs’ final argument is that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to issue the case-specific expert disclosure requirement in PTO 28. They contend that Merck was aware of the nature of their alleged injuries and the injuries’ purported link to Vioxx. They further assert that even if issuance of PTO 28 was generally within the district court’s discretion, in instances where state law requires no expert opinion as part of the evidence to support the claim, imposing such a requirement is an abuse of discretion and contravenes the Erie doctrine. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). 1. The Court and Merck were Already Apprised of Plaintiffs’ Injuries A district court’s adoption of a Lone Pine order and decision to dismiss a case for failing to comply with a Lone Pine order are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Acuna, 200 F.3d at 340–41. Relying on Acuna, the district court stated that “it is not too much to ask a plaintiff to provide some kind of evidence to support their claim that Vioxx caused them personal injury.” In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d at 744. In Acuna, over 1,000 plaintiffs brought personal injury claims allegedly arising from uranium mining activities. The district court issued pre-discovery Lone Pine orders that required plaintiffs to provide expert affidavits specifying the injuries suffered by each plaintiff, the substances causing the injury, the dates and circumstances of exposure to the injurious materials, and the scientific and medical bases for the expert’s opinions. Acuna, 200 F.3d at 338. The district court ultimately dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for failure to comply with the Lone Pine orders. Id. at 340. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the Lone Pine orders as imposing too high a burden at too early a stage in the litigation. Id. This court stated that “[i]n the federal courts, such orders are issued under the wide discretion afforded district judges over the management of discovery under F ED. R. C IV. P. 16.” Id. The court then held that the Lone Pine orders 9 Case: 09-30446 Document: 00511176837 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/16/2010 No. 09-30446 essentially required that information which plaintiffs should have had before filing their claims pursuant to F ED. R. C IV. P. 11(b)(3). Each plaintiff should have had at least some information regarding the nature of his injuries, the circumstances under which he could have been exposed to harmful substances, and the basis for believing that the named defendants were responsible for his injuries. Id. (citing Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999)). Thus, the Acuna court concluded that the district court did not commit an abuse of discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for failure to comply with the Lone Pine order. Id. at 341. The Dier plaintiffs contend that this case is distinguishable from Acuna because here the plaintiffs have alleged precise injuries and both the court and Merck are on notice of the nature of the injuries and the injuries’ relationship to Merck’s conduct. These grounds are insufficient, however, to warrant bypassing the clear holding in Acuna that it is within a court’s “discretion to take steps to manage the complex and potentially very burdensome discovery that the cases would require.” Id. at 340. 2. Requirement of Proof of Physical Injury for Emotional Distress Claims The Dier plaintiffs also argue that PTO 28 was improper because expert testimony is not required for claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress under New York law.4 But the Dier plaintiffs all pleaded physical injuries, and none attempted to withdraw those physical injury claims. Thus, PTO 28 would apply regardless of whether the Dier plaintiffs might have had a viable negligent infliction of emotional distress claim along with their physical injury claims.