Opinion ID: 3169091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Post-Verdict Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Text: On certiorari, Abdon reasserts his claim that the circuit court erred by denying his post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his prosecution was timely. We disagree. Post-verdict motions for judgment of acquittal are reviewed using the same standard applied by the circuit court, namely, whether, upon the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the trier of fact, the evidence is sufficient to support a prima facie case so that a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case requires substantial evidence as to every material element of the offense charged. Substantial evidence as to every material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. Under such a review, we give full play to the right of the fact finder to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact. 14 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ Timoteo, 87 Hawaiʻi at 112-13, 952 P.2d at 869-70 (quoting State v. Jhun, 83 Hawaiʻi 472, 481, 927 P.2d 1355, 1364 (1996)). Here, Abdon would prevail on the motion for judgment of acquittal if either the record lacked substantial evidence as to the elements of sexual assault in the first degree, HRS § 701-114(1)(a), or it lacked substantial evidence as to one of the following: (b) The state of mind required to establish each element of the offense; (c) Facts establishing jurisdiction; (d) Facts establishing venue; and (e) Facts establishing that the offense was committed within the time period specified in [HRS] section 701–108. HRS § 701-114(1); see also Timoteo, 87 Hawaiʻi at 113, 952 P.2d at 870. At issue here is Abdon’s claim, pursuant to HRS § 701114(1)(e), that the State failed to present evidence, and that the jury failed to specifically find, that his prosecution complied with the time limitations laid out in HRS § 701-108. As noted supra, sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony, and accordingly, at the time relevant here, the prosecution had to “be commenced within six years after” commission of the crime. HRS § 701-108(2)(b).9 Pursuant to HRS § 701-108(6)(c), however, for felony sexual and child abuse 9 HRS § 701-108(2)(b) (2014) states, as it did at the time relevant here, that “[a] prosecution for a class A felony must be commenced within six years after it is committed[.]” However, in 2014, the legislature amended HRS § 701-108(1) to provide that “[a] prosecution for . . . sexual assault in the first and second degrees . . . may be commenced at any time.” HRS § 701108(1) (2014). This amendment does not apply to the instant case. 15 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ offenses, the limitations period is tolled “during any time when the victim is alive and under eighteen years of age.” HRS § 701-108(5) (2014) provides, as it did at the time relevant here, that “[a] prosecution is commenced either when an indictment is found or a complaint filed, or when an arrest warrant or other process is issued[.]” Here, the indictment charging Abdon with sexual assault in the first degree averred that CW was less than fourteen years old at the time of the offense. The indictment further averred that CW “was born on April 26, 1988, became eighteen years of age on April 26, 2006, and is still alive” with reference to the applicable tolling statute, HRS § 701108(6)(c). At trial, CW’s testimony supporting these averments was undisputed. Specifically CW testified that she was nine years old in June 1997 when the alleged sexual assault occurred and that her date of birth was April 26, 1988. Because CW was a minor at the time of the crime, the six-year limitations period was tolled during the time CW was alive and under eighteen years old. See HRS § 701-108(6)(c). Thus, the six-year limitations period did not commence until the date of CW’s eighteenth birthday on April 26, 2006. The indictment was filed and found on April 24, 2012, two days prior to the expiration of the 16 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ statute of limitations, on April 26, 2012. Accordingly, the prosecution was timely. Abdon does not dispute the timeliness of his prosecution, but instead argues that HRS § 701-114(1)(e) required the State to present evidence to the jury of the date the prosecution commenced. Pursuant to HRS § 701-114(1)(e), the State is statutorily required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt “[f]acts establishing that the offense was committed within” the relevant time period. HRS § 701-114(1)(e). If the State fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the requirements under HRS § 701-114(1), then “the innocence of the defendant is presumed.” HRS § 701-114(2). For purposes of proving that the offense was committed within the relevant limitations period, the State had to present facts establishing the date of the offense, the CW’s date of birth or her eighteenth birthday, that she was alive on her eighteenth birthday, and the date of the commencement of the proceedings. Hawaiʻi case law has repeatedly confirmed the State’s obligation to prove timeliness and has determined that timeliness is a factual issue. See State v. Stan’s Contracting, Inc., 111 Hawaiʻi 17, 33, 137 P.3d 331, 347 (2006) (stating that the timely commencement of the prosecution “constitutes a baseline substantive component that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial”); 17 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ Iuli, 101 Hawaiʻi at 207, 65 P.3d at 154 (stating that HRS § 701– 114 “requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense, the state of mind required to establish each element of the offense, and facts establishing jurisdiction, venue, and timeliness”); State v. Correa, 5 Haw. App. 644, 650, 706 P.2d 1321, 1325 (1985) (“Evidence is merely the means of proving a fact. The trier of fact still must find the fact. Where timeliness of the prosecution and venue are issues of fact, the jury must be so instructed.”). Here, the State presented evidence of the date of the offense—June 1997—through CW’s testimony. As to the tolling period, as noted above, the State adduced substantial evidence regarding CW’s date of birth (and accordingly, her eighteenth birthday), as well as evidence that she was alive during the applicable period, the latter by virtue of her live trial testimony. However, there was no evidence presented regarding the date of the commencement of the proceedings, and thus, the record lacked substantial evidence that the prosecution was commenced within the six-year statute of limitations period. Because the circuit court ruled that the State was not required to provide evidence of the date of the indictment, the court did not address the State’s request that it take judicial notice of that fact. The State also requested on appeal that 18 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ the ICA take judicial notice of the fact that the indictment was found, and the prosecution was commenced, on April 24, 2012, two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations. The ICA affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Abdon’s motion for judgment of acquittal, finding, inter alia, that the indictment was timely because it was filed on April 24, 2012, and Abdon waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the statute of limitations. Abdon, mem. op., 2014 WL 4800994, at -6. Consequently, the ICA also did not address the State’s request to take judicial notice of the date of the indictment. Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence Rule 201 governs judicial notice of adjudicative facts; it provides that “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” “[T]he purpose of the judicial notice rule . . . is to eliminate the necessity of taking the time of the court and the jury to make formal proof of a fact which cannot be disputed.” State v. Moses, 102 Hawaiʻi 449, 454, 77 P.3d 940, 945 (2003) (quoting In re Estate of Herbert, 90 Hawaiʻi 443, 446, 979 P.2d 39, 62 (1999)). Judicial notice, 19 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ then, dispenses with the need for evidence and enables a court to declare the existence of a relevant fact so long as it is a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute. See HRE Rule 201. “The most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable facts is in noticing the content of court records.” State v. Akana, 68 Haw. 164, 165, 706 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1985). Because an indictment is a court record and thus an official document, it qualifies as a “source[] whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.” See Addison M. Bowman, Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence Manual § 201-5[4] (2014-2015 ed.). This court has noted that “taking judicial notice of the records and files of a case may or may not be proper, depending upon the type of record at issue and the purpose for which it is considered.” State v. Kotis, 91 Hawaiʻi 319, 343, 984 P.2d 78, 102 (1999). Where a trial court seeks to take judicial notice of “its own acts or of the existence of records on file in the same case,” a number of other jurisdictions have held that judicial notice under this circumstance is proper. Id. at 341, 984 P.2d at 100. And other jurisdictions have specifically taken judicial notice of the filing date of certain documents, as well as the dates when certain hearings are held in the case. See, e.g., Deicher v. City of Evansville, 545 F.3d 537, 541-42 (7th Cir. 2008) 20 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ (holding that the court properly took judicial notice of the complaint filing date, which was not admitted into evidence); State v. Blow, 602 A.2d 552, 557 (Vt. 1991) (affirming the trial court’s decision to take judicial notice of the date of the defendant’s arraignment). Under HRE Rule 201(d), a court shall take judicial notice when a party requests that the court take judicial notice of a fact and supplies the court with the necessary information. In this case, Abdon was found guilty of sexual assault in the first degree after a jury trial. He filed a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, contending that the State failed to adduce evidence and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution commenced within six years of the victim’s eighteenth birthday, as required by statute. In its opposition memorandum, the State requested that the trial court take judicial notice that the filing date of the indictment was April 24, 2012, which was within six years of the victim’s eighteenth birthday and therefore before the expiration of the statute of limitations on April 26, 2012.10 The indictment, dated April 24, 2012, was in the circuit court’s file and in the court’s immediate possession as it was attached to Abdon’s post-verdict 10 The State made this argument in the alternative. The State’s primary argument was that it did not need to adduce evidence regarding the date of the indictment, or in other words, the date the prosecution commenced. 21 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ motion and part of the court records of this case. The ready availability and accuracy of the indictment, which neither party contested, thus could not be questioned, and under these circumstances, the circuit court was mandated to take judicial notice of the date the indictment was found and filed. See HRE Rule 201(d). Because a court is required to take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information and because a court may take judicial notice “at any stage of the proceeding,” including on appeal, the ICA also should have taken judicial notice of the indictment in light of the State’s similar request to the circuit court. See HRE Rule 201(f). The indictment was in the record on appeal and was in the ICA’s immediate possession. Further, neither party disputed on appeal the validity and accuracy of the date of the indictment, and therefore the accuracy of the indictment could not be reasonably questioned. Under the circumstances of this case, the ICA erred in failing to take judicial notice of the date the indictment was found and filed. See HRE Rule 201(d), (f). In order to correct the circuit court’s and the ICA’s error, this court takes judicial notice that the date the indictment was found and filed in this case was April 24, 2012. Taking judicial notice of this fact establishes that the 22 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ prosecution was timely commenced two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations, on April 24, 2012, when the indictment was found. On this basis, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Abdon’s post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal. We additionally determine that the ICA erred in its conclusion that Abdon waived his timeliness challenge under HRS § 701-114(1)(e). See Abdon, mem. op., 2014 WL 4800994, at . Specifically, the ICA concluded that pursuant to Timoteo, Abdon waived his statute of limitations challenge to the charged offense by requesting a jury instruction on a lesser included time-barred offense, i.e., sexual assault in the third degree. Id. (citing Timoteo, 87 Hawaiʻi at 115-16, 952 P.2d at 872-73). However, Timoteo’s waiver holding does not extend to the facts of Abdon’s case, and accordingly, the ICA’s conclusion is incorrect. In Timoteo, the petitioner was charged with burglary in the first degree. 87 Hawaiʻi at 111, 952 P.2d at 868. While the parties and the court were settling jury instructions, Timoteo requested an instruction on simple trespass, a lesser included offense. Id. The court granted Timoteo’s request and the jury proceeded to find Timoteo guilty of the lesser included offense. Id. Timoteo filed a “motion to dismiss” two days 23 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ following the verdict, arguing that the court should enter a judgment of acquittal because the one-year statute of limitations on simple trespass had expired prior to the date of the indictment. Id. The prosecution argued that Timoteo waived the statute of limitations challenge by “request[ing] the jury instruction for the time-barred lesser included offense of simple trespass.” Id. The circuit court granted Timoteo’s motion, dismissing his conviction. Id. We construed Timoteo’s motion as a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal and considered the prosecution’s waiver argument. Id. In this regard, we determined that statutes of limitations for prosecutions in Hawaiʻi are waivable and agreed with the State that Timoteo waived his statute of limitations challenge under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 114, 952 P.2d at 871. Specifically, we held that by “request[ing] the jury instruction on simple trespass, [Timoteo] effectively waived the statute of limitations and agreed that the jury could convict him of simple trespass, rather than the more serious initially charged offense of burglary in the first degree, because he preferred the less serious of the two possible convictions.” Id. at 116, 952 P.2d at 873. In the instant case, the ICA determined that Abdon waived his statute of limitations defense for the lesser 24 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ included offense of sexual assault in the third degree by requesting an instruction on the lesser included offense, which “would have been time barred,” Abdon, mem. op., 2014 WL 4800994, at , as explained supra. The ICA’s conclusion in this regard is a correct reading of Timoteo. The ICA, however, went further to hold that because Abdon waived a statute of limitations defense for the third degree sexual assault charge, “it follows that Abdon similarly has waived his statute of limitations challenge as to the charged crime that was not, in fact time barred.” Id. The ICA’s conclusion does not follow from Timoteo’s holding. Indeed, the Timoteo court made no reference to the effect of its waiver holding on the charged offense. Moreover, the reasoning supporting Timoteo’s holding does not extend to cases where the statute of limitations challenge is to the charged offense. As we noted in Timoteo, by requesting an instruction on a lesser included offense, in effect, a defendant is agreeing that it is possible that he or she may be found guilty of that offense. 87 Hawaiʻi at 116, 952 P.2d at 873. Other courts have similarly explained that where a defendant seeks the benefit of being convicted of a less serious crime, he or she cannot proceed to attack a conviction for that same crime on statute of limitation grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 684 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding 25 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ that where the defendant requested the charge for the lesser included offense and “in all probability, benefited from the charge[,]” the defendant “cannot now complain of the result”); People v. Brocksmith, 604 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“If a defendant wishes to seek a lesser offense and try for the possible compromise verdict, he must be willing to accept the consequences of that decision, even if it means conviction of a crime for which the statute of limitations has expired.”), aff’d, 642 N.E.2d 1230 (1994); Weber v. State, 602 So.2d 1316, 1319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that following a guilty verdict “based on the requested [lesser included offense] instruction, defense counsel cannot be allowed to change legal positions in midstream and seek a reversal based on that error”).11 Abdon did not request to be charged with sexual assault in the first degree, the charge at issue for his statute of limitations challenge. Thus, unlike in Timoteo and the other cases mentioned above, Abdon did not seek the benefit of being convicted of a lesser crime and then take the inconsistent position—after conviction of that lesser crime—that such a conviction was invalid. We also disagree with the ICA’s conclusion that Abdon waived his statute of limitations challenge by failing to raise 11 These cases were also cited in Timoteo. 26 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ it before or at trial. Abdon, mem. op., 2014 WL 4800994, at . As noted supra, statutes of limitations for criminal prosecutions can be waived in certain situations. Specifically, we have held that a statute of limitations challenge to a lesser included offense is waived by requesting an instruction on the lesser included offense, as in Timoteo; and that the statute of limitations may be waived by pleading no contest to the charge at issue, as in Adams v. State, 103 Hawaiʻi 214, 226, 81 P.3d 394, 406 (2003). However, unlike in the instant case, both Timoteo and Adams presented situations in which the defendant acted affirmatively to imply acquiescence to being convicted of a time-barred offense. See Timoteo, 87 Hawaiʻi at 116, 952 P.2d at 873 (distinguishing State v. Black, 66 Haw. 530, 531, 668 P.2d 32, 34 (1983), in which we held that a defendant did not waive his right to proof of venue by failing to raise the issue prior to a motion for judgment of acquittal, because “unlike Timoteo, the defendant in Black did not affirmatively act in any manner indicating that he was waiving the right at issue”).12 We have not yet decided whether a statute of limitations challenge can be waived based solely on the timing of the challenge. To determine this issue, we are mindful that while 12 Timoteo also distinguished Black on the basis that proof of venue, unlike the statute of limitations, involves a constitutional right. Id. 27 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ statutes of limitations “may be invoked, and waived, as affirmative defenses, that is not the sum total of their nature or function.” Stan’s, 111 Hawaiʻi at 33, 137 P.3d at 347 (emphasis added). We emphasized in Stan’s that pursuant to “HRS § 701–114(1)(e), the timeliness of the prosecution in satisfaction of HRS § 701–108 constitutes a baseline substantive component that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial” and that “silence by the defendant on the issue of timeliness does not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving that component.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, based on our holding in Stan’s, Abdon’s statute of limitations challenge was timely, despite first raising it in a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal.13 As Abdon contends, a pretrial motion would have been premature,14 and HRPP Rule 29(c) (1977) allows for post-verdict motions for judgment of acquittal within ten days of the verdict without requiring a “similar motion . . . [to be] made prior to the submission of the case to the 13 Notably, in Timoteo, the defendant raised the statute of limitations challenge to the lesser-included offense at issue post-verdict, but the court made no mention of the timing of the challenge in determining that the claim had been waived. 87 Hawaiʻi at 113-16, 952 P.2d at 869-73. 14 The ICA concurrence determined that pursuant to HRPP Rule 12(b), Abdon waived his statute of limitations claim by failing to raise it in a pretrial motion. Abdon, mem. op., 2014 WL 4800994, at -11 (Nakamura, C.J., concurring). However, HRPP Rule 12(b), governing pretrial motions, applies to defenses and objections “which [are] capable of determination without the trial of the general issue.” Here, Abdon’s challenge was to the State’s failure to prove at trial that the prosecution was timely. Accordingly, HRPP Rule 12(b) is inapplicable. 28 ____ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ____ jury.”