Opinion ID: 688699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Termination of the Consent Decree and All Prior Orders

Text: 79 On cross-appeal the plaintiff-prisoners argue that the district court erred: (1) in sua sponte vacating the consent decree and all other remedial orders; and (2) in sua sponte raising the inmate population caps for the jails. Specifically, the prisoners argue that the district court's actions violated the doctrine of the law of the case and the dictates of due process. 80
81 Initially, we must establish the character of the February 4, 1975 order. The County argues that the consent judgment was not really a consent decree. This contention is without merit. The Supreme Court has described a consent decree as an agreement between the parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on [its] precise terms. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3075, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, we have noted that [o]nce the district court enters the settlement as a judicial consent decree ending the lawsuit, the settlement takes on the nature of a judgment. Ho v. Martin Marietta Corp., 845 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir.1988); see also 1B James WM. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice p 0.409, at III-151 (2d ed. 1993) (The judgment is not, like the settlement agreement out of which it arose, a mere contract inter partes. The court is not properly a recorder of contracts; it is an organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions, and when it has rendered a consent judgment it has made an adjudication. (emphasis added)). 82 In the instant case, the parties intended to settle the case. The consent judgment specifically states that it was entered only when the parties being desirous of effecting a just settlement of this action, and a compromise of the claims therein ... ha[d] agreed to the terms of such a settlement. See Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Texas, No. 72-H-1094, slip op. at 1 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 1975). Thus, the entire settlement clearly was entered into with the consent of the parties, notwithstanding the fact that the court required the parties to agree to certain provisions before the court accepted the settlement. Moreover, the settlement, which was signed by the attorneys for the commissioners court, the attorney for the sheriff of Harris County, and the attorneys for the plaintiff-prisoners, was plainly labeled as CONSENT JUDGMENT. See Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, No. 72-H-1094, slip op. at 1 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 1975). 83 The nature of the February 4, 1975 order is also indicated by the court's and the parties' treatment of it. The courts and the parties (until the County's recent position) treated the February 4, 1975 consent judgment as a final judgment in which the district court retained jurisdiction to issue any and all interim orders necessary for immediate relief in this action until such time and as the terms are complied with by the Defendants Commissioners Court and the Sheriff. Id. (emphasis added); see, e.g., Alberti I, 937 F.2d at 987 ([T]he district court retained jurisdiction to issue further interim orders.); Alberti v. Heard, 600 F.Supp. 443, 446 (S.D.Tex.1984) (noting that after the consent judgment the district court retained jurisdiction); Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F.Supp. 649, 654 (S.D.Tex.1975) (On February 4, 1975, counsel signed and this Court approved, a Consent Judgment by which defendants generally agreed to bring presently existing facilities and operations into compliance with federal and state standards.). Simply, we are unconvinced that over the past two decades the parties and the courts have misapprehended the nature of the decree. 84 The fact that the Consent Judgment was a final judgment on the merits is not undermined by the court's issuance of numerous orders after February 4, 1975. These orders were not interlocutory orders, as the County asserts; rather, those orders were the very interim orders that the court described as necessary for immediate relief, and they were fully consistent with the nature of the February 4 order as a consent judgment. As the First Circuit noted, The entry of a consent decree does not 'kill' a case or terminate the district court's jurisdiction. Rather, when ... an injunction entered pursuant to a consent decree has ongoing effects, the issuing court retains authority to enforce it. In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653, 657 (1st Cir.1993); see also Ho, 845 F.2d at 548 (noting that a court has continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree); cf. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 370-79, 112 S.Ct. 748, 754-57, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (discussing the district court's orders that were issued subsequent to a consent decree). Clearly, the February 4, 1975 order was--just as it was labeled--a consent judgment.
85 Given that the February 4, 1975 order was a final judgment on the merits, we now address the propriety of the district court's sua sponte modification of the consent decree. Several circuits have recently examined whether a district court may modify a consent decree on its own initiative. See United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497 (11th Cir.1993); In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.1993). Pearson dealt, in part, with the power of a district court to sua sponte appoint a master to look at possible decree-modifying changes in the context of a consent decree governing the treatment of patients at a treatment center. The First Circuit noted that a court is intimately involved in a consent decree, stand[ing] behind the decree, ready to interpret and enforce its provisions. This ongoing supervisory responsibility carries with it a certain correlative discretion. In re Pearson, 990 F.2d at 658. This discretion, the court reasoned, is especially important when a consent decree calls for judicial supervision of a government-run facility. Id. The court also noted that, in such a case, notwithstanding the parties silence or inertia, the district court is not doomed to some Sisyphean fate, bound forever to enforce and interpret a preexisting decree without ever occasionally pausing to question whether changing circumstances have rendered the decree unnecessary, outmoded, or even harmful to the public interest. Id. Given the court's power to supervise its decrees, the First Circuit concluded that the district court acted within its discretion by sua sponte appointing a special master to ascertain the need for alteration of its ongoing activities under a consent decree. Id. at 659. 86 In City of Miami, the Eleventh Circuit adopted much of the First Circuit's analysis. In a decision regarding a consent decree in the employment discrimination context, the court noted that regardless of whether a decree is entered after litigation or by consent, a court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate, if satisfied that what it has been doing has been turned through changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong. City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1506 (quoting United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 114-15, 52 S.Ct. 460, 462-63, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932)). Then, relying extensively on Pearson, the court concluded that [w]hen the remedy prescribed in the consent decree has been accomplished[,] a district court does not have to await a party's motion to terminate a decree which requires temporary supervisory jurisdiction of an agreed upon consent decree.... The district court ... is authorized to consider sua sponte whether termination of the consent decree is appropriate. City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1506. 87 We agree with the reasoning of the First and Eleventh Circuits. There is little question that the district court has wide discretion to interpret and modify a forward-looking consent decree such as that entered in the instant case. As the Supreme Court noted,  'sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have since arisen.'  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380, 112 S.Ct. at 758 (quoting System Fed'n No. 91, Railway Employes' Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647-48, 81 S.Ct. 368, 371-72, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961)). Concomitant with that discretion is the ability for a court, regardless of the parties' silence or inertia, to modify a decree when the court sees that the factual circumstances or the law underlying that decree has changed. 88 While a court has the power to modify a consent decree, that power is not unfettered. The Supreme Court recently described the analysis for determining when a modification to a consent decree is warranted. In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), the Court noted that while a consent judgment embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature, such a judgment is still an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in and be enforceable as a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. at 757. Thus, the Court reasoned that modification of a consent decree is governed by the same standards that govern modifications of judgments as set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 14 Id. at 379-81, 112 S.Ct. at 758. 89 Additionally, the Court clarified the standard that district courts should use when considering whether a modification of a consent decree is warranted. The Court rejected the notion that only a showing of a  'grievous wrong evoked by unforeseen conditions'  mandates a change in a consent decree. Id. at 377, 112 S.Ct. at 757-58 (quoting Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S.Ct. at 464); see also City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1503-04 (noting the Supreme Court's rejection of the grievous wrong standard). The Court observed that: 90 [t]he upsurge in institutional reform litigation since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 [74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873] (1954), has made the ability of a district court to modify a decree in response to changed circumstances all the more important. Because such decrees often remain in effect for extended periods of time, the likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life of the decree is increased. 91 Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380, 112 S.Ct. at 758. The Court also noted that [t]he experience of the district and circuit courts in implementing and modifying such decrees has demonstrated that a flexible approach is often essential to achieving the goals of reform litigation. Id. Accordingly, the Court described the flexible standard to be used in determining whether an institutional reform consent decree should be modified, stating that such modification should occur when it is established that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree. Id. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 760; accord City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1503-04. Additionally, when the modification relates to the vindication of a constitutional right, the modification must be suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 760; see also id. at 383 n. 7, 393-95, 112 S.Ct. at 760 n. 7, 765. 92 In the instant case, the monitors entered proposed findings of fact on June 8, 1992, and in the September 29, 1992 final order, the district court adopted the monitors' findings of fact as findings of the court after considering the parties' objections. The monitors found that the County had complied with many of the requirements set out in the consent judgment and in other subsequent orders. The County and the State entered objections to the monitors' findings of fact, but, notably, the plaintiff-prisoners did not file objections to the monitors' findings. In the memorandum opinion accompanying its final order, the district court found that certain issues covered in the consent decree are now neither necessary nor desirable. Consequently, the court sua sponte modif[ied] the consent decree to eliminate all issues and requirements, except for those regarding staffing, classification, transportation, medical treatment, ventilation of the Franklin Jail, kitchen facilities, and provision of mattresses. 15 93 The monitors' findings of fact, which were adopted by the district court, set forth in great detail the changed circumstances of the jail surrounding almost every aspect of the 1975 consent decree and the other subsequent orders. In short, the monitors determined that the County was in compliance with almost all of the provisions of the consent decree except for those that the district court ordered the County to remedy. The district court considered the monitors' findings of fact that detailed the changed circumstances as well as the State's and the County's objections to those findings, and the court implicitly determined that the changes in the jails over the seventeen years of the court's supervision warranted modification of its orders. Moreover, the court's modifications were suitably tailored to the changed circumstances in the jails and did not violate the basic purpose of the decree--ensuring that the County's jails are maintain[ed] and operat[ed] in a manner consonant with the United State Constitution. Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Texas, No. 72-H-1094, slip op. at 1 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 1975); cf. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383-85, 112 S.Ct. at 760 (noting that in a modification, the focus should be on whether the proposed modification is tailored to resolve the problems created by the change in circumstances). Accordingly, we find no error in most of the court's modifications to the consent decree. 94 There are, however, several modifications to the consent judgment and orders which deserve special attention. First, the district court apparently vacated the requirement set out in the 1975 order that [i]nmates shall be provided with a clean change of clothing every day. Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F.Supp. 649, 677 (S.D.Tex.1975). Although the monitors did not find that the County was in compliance with this order, they did note that some of the inmates received clean clothes daily, and that all inmates received clean clothes at least three times a week. Further, the monitors commented that, in their consideration of all of the conditions of the jails (including the burgeoning population caused by the State's refusal to accept transfer-ready felons), the County's laundry practices were not unreasonable. Considering the monitors' and the district court's intimate association and knowledge of the jails' conditions, we find that the district court did not err in finding that the changed conditions of the jail warranted modification of the laundry requirement. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383-85, 112 S.Ct. at 760 (Modification of a consent decree may be warranted when changed factual circumstances make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous[,] ... or when a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen circumstances.). 95 Second and third are the portions of the December 1975 order requiring that weekenders--those inmates serving time only on the weekends--are not to stay overnight and mandating that the County serve warrants on individuals who do not appear as directed after having been released on recognizance. Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Texas, 406 F.Supp. 649, 675-76 (S.D.Tex.1975). We find that the district court did not err in its modifications of these provisions. In October of 1987, the monitors reported that the County was in substantial compliance with both of these requirements, and the monitors did not revisit these areas in its June 1992 report. The prisoner-plaintiffs half-heartedly argue that the district court erred in modifying its order, contending that if given the opportunity to investigate compliance and such confirmed their impression held at the time, plaintiffs probably would have agreed that modification or vacation would have been appropriate. Even assuming that these provisions, which were not part of the consent judgment, must meet the Rufo standards for modification, we find no error in the district court's actions. Based on its experience with the jails and the monitors' reports, the district court implicitly found that the circumstances no longer required that these portions of the order remain in effect. Notably, the plaintiff-prisoners cite no authority for the idea that they must be allowed the opportunity to determine whether circumstances have actually changed, and in fact do not truly dispute that changed circumstances warrant modification or vacation. Given the district court's power to alter its orders and consent decrees in appropriate circumstances, and the undisputed notion that the circumstances have changed, we reject the notion that the district court erred in modifying its orders regarding weekenders and service of warrants on individuals who do not appear after release on recognizance. 96 There is, however, one major modification to the consent decree for which there is insufficient evidence of changed circumstances. 16 The district court modified the constitutional capacity of three of the county jails. As we noted above, while the district court, particularly when it is so intimately involved in institutional reform litigation, may alter a consent decree upon a showing of a significant change of circumstance, before such a modification is made, there must be such a showing. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383-85, 112 S.Ct. at 760. In regard to the district court's findings that the constitutional capacity of the jails is 112.5% of design capacity, there is nothing in the monitors' report or in the record to indicate that such a modification in the cap for all of the jails is warranted by a substantial change in circumstances. For one of the facilities, the new San Jacinto jail, the monitors recommended, in findings and recommendations entered on June 2, 1992, that the cap be raised to 112.5% of design capacity. The district court reviewed the monitors' findings and recommendations and the parties' response to those findings and recommendations, and found as both a finding of fact and a conclusion of law that the constitutional capacity of the [new San Jacinto jail] was 112.5% of design capacity. 17 There are no findings by the monitors of changed circumstances in the other county facilities. On the contrary, the monitors' report is filled with references to the problems caused by overcrowding, and does not indicate that the County can constitutionally house additional prisoners. The district court is not wedded to the monitors' findings, but without something to indicate that there has been a substantial change in circumstances or in the applicable law (an indication not given in the findings of fact adopted by the court), the district court may not alter the caps. Of course, this does not mean that the district court is precluded from increasing or decreasing the population caps as circumstances warrant. Instead, we merely note that before such modification is made, the district court must find a substantial change in circumstances.