Opinion ID: 6108256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the bza's decision to deny the variance was supported by competent and substantial evidence

Text: Section 89.090.1(3), RSMo 2008, provides boards of adjustment shall have the power to grant variances when: there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in the way of carrying out the strict letter of such ordinance, to vary or modify the application of any of the regulations or provisions of such ordinance relating to the construction or alteration of buildings or structures or the use of land so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety and welfare secured and substantial justice done.... Id. In applying section 89.090, this Court has held the general rule is that the authority to grant a variance should be exercised sparingly and only under exceptional circumstances. Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 413 . It is generally held that [the existence of a practical difficulty or] unnecessary hardship is the principal basis on which a variance is granted. Id. at 416 (citations and quotations omitted). A use variance permits a use which the ordinance prohibits. Id. at 413 . Although prior Missouri cases had recognized nonuse variances, Matthew was the first case to recognize a use variance in Missouri. Matthew determined Missouri would follow the New York approach and require an applicant to prove unnecessary hardship to obtain a use variance. Id. at 415 . In the absence of prior guidance in Missouri cases as to what criteria to apply when deciding whether to approve a use variance, Matthew looked to outside authority, stating an applicant must show: (1) relief is necessary because of the unique character of the property rather than for personal considerations; and (2) applying the strict letter of the ordinance would result in unnecessary hardship; and the (3) imposition of such a hardship is not necessary for the preservation of the plan; and (4) granting the  variance will result in substantial justice to all. Id. at 415-16 , citing, A. Rathkopf, 3 The Law of Zoning and Planning § 38 (1979); N. Williams, 5 American Planning Law § 129.05 (1985). In addition, Matthew cited approvingly to three criteria utilized in New York law in determining whether the second factor, unnecessary hardship, exists: (1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood which may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and (3) that the use to be authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character of the locality. 707 S.W.2d at 416-17 , quoting, Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71 , 24 N.E.2d 851 , 853 (N.Y. 1939). Here, the Church's use of its property as a church is a permitted use, and what it seeks is a variance to permit deviations from restrictions which relate to a permitted use. Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 413 . The Church, therefore, seeks a nonuse variance rather than a use variance. Matthew recognized that nonuse variances may be granted if practical difficulties are shown and that, under section 89.090, the practical difficulties standard is a  slightly less rigorous version of the unnecessary hardship standard. Id. at 416 . Unfortunately, neither Matthew nor other variance cases from this Court set out specific criteria for determining when practical difficulties have been shown. As this Court noted in Rosedale-Skinker, this lack of a specific definition stems in part from the fact that determining what constitutes a practical difficulty is inherently fact-specific and so committed to the discretion of the zoning authority: There is no all-inclusive definition of what constitutes a sufficient showing of practical difficulty and undue hardship to warrant granting a variance; whether such difficulties o[r] hardships exist is a question of fact as to which the Board of Adjustment is accorded a discretion to be exercised within the guidelines of the zoning legislation. Rosedale-Skinker, 425 S.W.2d at 933 . Nonetheless, Rosedale-Skinker identified certain guiding principles that apply when determining whether practical difficulties have been shown. First, the power to grant variances must be exercised sparingly and in keeping with the general purpose of the zoning plan and the public welfare. Id. at 936 ; see also § 89.090 (that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed). Second, as noted earlier, The scope of judicial review ... is limited to a determination of whether the ruling is authorized by law and is supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record. Id., citing, Mo. Const. art. 5, § 22 (1945). The courts may not substitute their discretion for that of the board. State ex rel. Nigro v. Kansas City, 325 Mo. 95 , 27 S.W.2d 1030 , 1033 (Mo. banc 1930) ; Brown v. Beuc, 384 S.W.2d 845 , 850 (Mo. App. 1964). Third, in the absence of specific additional local zoning requirements, section 89.890 does not require a showing that the need for a nonuse variance is due to topographical limitations or the condition of the land itself, as some prior cases erroneously had stated. Rosedale-Skinker, 425 S.W.2d at 932-33 . Rather, The topography or physical characteristics of the land itself giving rise to difficulties and undue hardships is one, but not the sole,  ground upon which variances in the application of zoning regulations may be granted. Id. at 933-34 . 6 But to ensure it is practical difficulties with the zoning that cause the need for a variance, later nonuse cases have followed Matthew 's requirement for use variances that the applicant show relief is necessary because of the unique character of the property rather than for personal considerations. Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 415 ; see, e.g., Behrens v. Ebenrech, 784 S.W.2d 827 , 829 (Mo. App. 1990) (Further, the practical difficulty relied on as a ground for a variance must be 'unusual or peculiar to the property involved and must be different from that suffered throughout the zone or neighborhood.' ); accord, Ogawa v. City of Des Peres, 745 S.W.2d 238 , 242-43 (Mo. App. 1987). Slate v. Boone County Board of Adjustment, 810 S.W.2d 361 , 364 (Mo. App. 1991), gave further guidance as to what is meant by practical difficulties. Noting Matthew explicitly followed the New York model of variance analysis for use variances, Slate adopted the rule followed in New York that a non-use variance applicant must show that as a practical matter the property cannot be used for a permitted use without coming into conflict with certain of the ordinance's restrictions. Id. at 364 (emphasis omitted). As the court of appeals subsequently clarified in Highlands Homes, 306 S.W.3d at 566 , this standard does not mean the applicant must show it cannot make any permitted use of the property absent a variance. The latter is the standard for unnecessary hardship, not for practical difficulties. Matthew , 707 S.W.2d at 417 . Rather, it means the applicant seeks to use the property for a specific permitted use but cannot do so without conflicting with the zoning requirement as to which the applicant seeks a variance. 7 See Highlands Homes, 306 S.W.3d at 566 . Slate also looked to New York cases for five additional principles that New York applies in considering applications for nonuse variances: (1) how substantial the variation is in relation to the requirement, (2) the effect, if the variance is allowed, of the increased population density thus produced on available governmental facilities (fire, water, garbage and the like), (3) whether a substantial change will be produced in the character of the neighborhood or a substantial detriment to adjoining properties created, (4) whether the difficulty can be obviated by some  method, feasible for the applicant to pursue, other than a variance, and (5) whether in view of the manner in which the difficulty arose and considering all of the above factors the interests of justice will be served by allowing the variance. 810 S.W.2d at 364 , quoting, Wachsberger, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 624. While this Court has not had occasion to further address relevant criteria to be evaluated in nonuse variance cases, a myriad court of appeals decisions have followed Slate in considering these criteria. 8 A few cases have shortened the list by eliminating the second criteria, as it is fact-specific to applications affecting zoning density. See, e.g., Highlands Homes, 306 S.W.3d at 566 ; Branum, 85 S.W.3d at 41 . This Court agrees consideration of these four or five criteria can be helpful in understanding the requirements of section 89.090 for granting a variance, although they are not themselves elements, but rather guidelines, a zoning board should consider in determining whether practical difficulties have been shown. As this Court held in Rosedale-Skinker, ultimately the question of whether practical difficulties have been shown is a question of fact as to which the Board of Adjustment is accorded a discretion to be exercised within the guidelines of the zoning legislation. 425 S.W.2d at 933 . Finally, as this Court noted in Matthew, local ordinances, such as Kansas City's zoning code, may further define the power of the Board of Adjustment to grant a variance, but they may not conflict with the statutory criteria and how courts have interpreted those criteria. 707 S.W.2d at 415 . As relevant here, section 88-565-06 of Kansas City's zoning code further defines the authority of the BZA to grant a variance, and its requirements have not been shown to be inconsistent with section 89.090. The zoning code authorizes the BZA to grant a variance if there is substantial evidence in the record that: (1) a strict application of one or more standards or requirements of this zoning and development code would result in unnecessary hardships or practical difficulties for the subject property, (2) those practical difficulties are not generally applicable to other property in the same zoning district, (3) the variance is generally consistent with all relevant purposes and intents of the zoning code, and (4) the variance will result in substantial justice being done. KANSAS CITY , MO. , ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88-565-06 (2011). Here, the parties do not claim applying the local ordinance changes the analysis as to whether a nonuse variance should be granted. Rather, the focus is on whether the variance requested from the specific signage requirements of the zoning code would meet the various criteria recognized in the cases, and it is to that issue this Court turns.
The Church seeks a nonuse variance for its monument sign. The Church says it is entitled to the variance under section 89.090 because it has shown it faces practical difficulties in using the property as a church absent a variance allowing it to have a digital monument sign, and the variance can be granted consistent with  the spirit of the ordinance and in accordance with public safety and welfare and substantial justice. See § 89.090.1(3). At the BZA hearing, the Church identified three facts it believes constituted practical difficulties to its operation of the church without a digital sign. It also argued these same facts met the other criteria discussed above by showing relief is necessary because of the unique character of the property rather than for personal considerations and that justice would be served by granting the variance without substantial deviation from the general zoning plan or a detriment to surrounding properties, citing the criteria set out in Slate, Highlands Homes, and similar cases discussed above. More specifically, first, the Church argued the lack of a digital sign impairs the church's ability to meaningfully convey its non-commercial religious messages because the Church's aging membership found it extremely difficult to go outside and manually change the lettering on the old non-digital sign, especially in inclement weather. The Church argued the new digital display also was more useful because it allows the Church to post an increased volume of messages by simply changing the message from inside. Second, the Church argued the cup letters on the non-digital display were small and difficult for passing motorists to see, and the larger digital letters allow it to more clearly convey its messages and so helps recruit new church members. The Church relatedly suggested the very fact the Church is located on a public street with large traffic flow meant its membership uniquely would benefit from having a digital sign more than most churches, while it agreed a church in a more secluded area would not need a digital sign. Third, the Church argued it showed economic hardship and unique factual circumstances in that the monument sign had existed since 1956, and the Church spent more than $11,000 on the digital display because it knew another church in a different city had no issues upgrading its sign to include a digital display. While the offered reasons explain why the Church finds a digital display preferable and more convenient, they do not show practical difficulty in carrying out the Church's use of the property as a church. 9 Going outside in inclement weather may be inconvenient, but [l]egislation granting relief by way of variance to zoning codes is not intended to relieve mere inconvenience. Volkman v. City of Kirkwood, 624 S.W.2d 58 , 61 (Mo. App. 1981) . Moreover, the inconvenience does not arise from the bar on monument signs having digital components or from any unique aspect of the property or its use as a church; it is a personal difficulty related to the particular demographics of the current Church members. It can be cured without practical difficulty by having a younger member of the church change the lettering or by hiring someone to change the lettering. A variance is not needed to address this problem. See Cousin's Advert., Inc., 78 S.W.3d at 784 (finding a variance inappropriate when a proposed sign could be erected in compliance with the [ordinance]  by [simply] locating it in front of the existing building on the ... property). For these reasons, the Church has failed to show as a practical matter the property cannot be used for a [specific] permitted use without coming into conflict with certain of the ordinance's restrictions. Slate, 810 S.W.2d at 364 (emphasis omitted). Neither do the problems the Church identified show relief is necessary because of the unique character of the property rather than for personal considerations. Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 415-16 . Similarly, while the ability to exhibit larger bright electronic lettering and to change messages more often and more quickly might improve the Church's ability to convey messages to passing motorists and help with church membership drives, the test for a variance is not whether the variance would be beneficial or allow the Church to expand but whether the Church experiences practical difficulties in operating without the variance. The Church admits that if it were located on a smaller street it would not need the variance to operate as a church. It says it needs the variance only because of its location on a busy thoroughfare. While that location might give the Church a unique opportunity to benefit from the addition of a more visible sign, this does not mean the absence of the digital sign will cause it practical difficulty in operating as a church. See Rauls, 170 S.W.3d at 52 (a board is not bound to grant a variance which it believes would benefit [Applicant] financially but would also lead to the detriment of the surrounding existing communities). The Church has existed as a church at this same location sign since 1853 without a sign with digital lettering and has failed to show it cannot continue to do so absent this new, potentially useful modern-day tool. Finally, while the Church's reliance on the situation of another church in a different city may explain why it spent the $11,000 bequest on the digital upgrade without requesting a variance, these circumstances cannot be said to be unusual or peculiar to the property involved. Neither can the fact that this money would effectively be wasted if a variance is not granted, itself, justify the variance. However understandable, this failure and the resulting cost are the epitome of a problem that is personal in nature rather than resulting from the unique nature of the property involved. 10 The unfortunate waste of resources was caused by the Church's expenditure without checking on the zoning requirements, not due to the requirements themselves. The fact it would be costly to remove the digital sign and reinstall a manual one does not show as a  practical matter the property cannot be used for a permitted use without coming into conflict with certain of the ordinance's restrictions. Slate, 810 S.W.2d at 364 . The Church has not met its burden of establishing the existence of a practical difficulty absent the grant of a variance for its digital sign.