Opinion ID: 3065183
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Breach of the Oral Referral Agreement

Text: Finally, Fitzgerald argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim for breach of the oral Referral Agreement. In the SAC, Fitzgerald alleged that he and Crockett “entered into a[n] oral contract” whereby Crockett agreed to give Fitzgerald 50% of the attorneys’ fees for referring the case. Fitzgerald argues that Crockett breached the agreement by failing to forward him his share of the fees. 14168 CROCKETT & MYERS v. NAPIER Resolution of this claim requires us to examine closely alternative theories of contractual liability. In his brief, Fitzgerald argues that the written Retainer Agreement was consistent with the oral Referral Agreement and that the parol evidence rule does not bar him from introducing the latter to explain ambiguities in the former. Although we agree with the general principle that “parol evidence is admissible in order to resolve ambiguities in a written instrument,” Lowden Inv. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Credit Co., 741 P.2d 806, 809 (Nev. 1987), we disagree with the parties’ contention that the rule is applicable here. Fitzgerald’s reference to the oral Referral Agreement in the SAC was not made to supplement or explain the written Retainer Agreement. Instead, Fitzgerald alleged that Crockett breached a separate and independent oral contract. To the extent that Fitzgerald now claims that the written contract also embodied a provision calling for the equal division of fees on account of the referral, that argument fails because he did not allege a breach of the written Retainer Agreement on those grounds in the SAC; he alleged only a breach of the oral contract. We therefore need not determine whether the written Retainer Agreement was, in fact, ambiguous. [6] To the extent that Fitzgerald alleges that Crockett breached a separate and independent oral contract, this claim must also fail because Fitzgerald has waived it. In his brief, Fitzgerald conceded that he “saw the Retainer Agreement as confirming the oral referral fee” and that “the oral referral fee agreement was embodied in the written Retainer Agreement.” See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 393 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A party . . . is bound by concessions made in its brief.”). Fitzgerald himself agrees that the oral agreement was not a separate contract. Because he now admits that there was no separate contract, this claim fails on its face.