Opinion ID: 895396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Fees

Text: The trial court awarded Garcia $28,260.00. Ford challenges the amount for three related reasons. First, some of the activities on the invoice were admittedly performed by persons other than Garcia and the court order appointed only Garcia as ad litem. Second, there is no evidence of how much time was spent performing each invoiced task, so there is no evidence of either how much time is compensable for individual tasks or how much total time is compensable. Third, even if there had been evidence to show which of the invoiced activities Garcia individually performed and how long they took, compensation cannot be awarded for many of those tasks because they were not necessary given the purpose of his appointment.
The amount a guardian ad litem is awarded as compensation is within the trial court's discretion and an award will not be set aside except for abuse of that discretion. See Land Rover U.K., 210 S.W.3d at 607. A trial court abuses its discretion by ruling (1) arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles; or (2) without supporting evidence. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1998).
When construing rules of procedure, we apply the same rules of construction that govern the interpretation of statutes. In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex.2007). We first look to the plain language of the rule and construe it according to its plain or literal meaning. See, e.g., In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.2009). In doing so we keep in mind that the rules of civil procedure are given a liberal construction so as to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive law. TEX.R. CIV. P. 1. When a guardian ad litem is appointed under circumstances covered by Rule 173, as opposed to other rules or statutes, [4] the guardian has a limited role in the litigation and may be compensated only for limited types of activities. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 173.4(b), (c), (d); Vandewater, 907 S.W.2d at 493 n. 2. Garcia's role falls under Rule 173.4(c) which provides: (c) When Settlement Proposed. When an offer has been made to settle the claim of a party represented by a next friend or guardian, a guardian ad litem has the limited duty to determine and advise the court whether the settlement is in the party's best interest. TEX.R. CIV. P. 173.4(c). The rule contemplates appointment of a guardian ad litem when a party's next friend or guardian appears to have an interest adverse to the party because of the division of settlement proceeds. TEX.R. CIV. P. 173 cmt. 3. The comments to Rule 173 elaborate on the guardian's role and compensation under those circumstances: [T]he responsibility of the guardian ad litem as prescribed by the rule is very limited, and no reason exists for the guardian ad litem to participate in the conduct of the litigation in any other way or to review the discovery or the litigation file except to the limited extent that it may bear on the division of settlement proceeds. A guardian ad litem may, of course, choose to review the file or attend proceedings when it is unnecessary, but the guardian ad litem may not be compensated for unnecessary expenses or services. Id. (citation omitted). Not all Rule 173 guardians ad litem seek compensation, but for those who do, Rule 173.6 prescribes how compensation is to be determined: 173.6. Compensation (a) Amount. If a guardian ad litem requests compensation, he or she may be reimbursed for reasonable and necessary expenses incurred and may be paid a reasonable hourly fee for necessary services performed. (b) Procedure. At the conclusion of the appointment, a guardian ad litem may file an application for compensation. The application must be verified and must detail the basis for the compensation requested. Unless all parties agree to the application, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the total amount of fees and expenses that are reasonable and necessary. In making this determination, the court must not consider compensation as a percentage of any judgment or settlement. (c) Taxation as Costs. The court may tax a guardian ad litem's compensation as costs of court. TEX.R. CIV. P. 173.6(a)-(c). We stated in Land Rover U.K. that [a] reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours spent performing necessary services within the guardian ad litem's role yields a reasonable fee. 210 S.W.3d at 608. While necessary services within the proper, limited scope of the Rule 173 guardian ad litem's role are compensable, including those legal services necessarily performed by a lawyer appointed as guardian ad litem, compensation cannot be awarded for legal or other services outside that role, even if they are performed. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 173.4 (defining the role of a guardian ad litem); Land Rover U.K., 210 S.W.3d at 607 (If a guardian ad litem performs work beyond the scope of this role, such work is non-compensable.). Ordinarily only the person appointed as guardian ad litem should be compensated for services under Rule 173. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 173.6 & 173 cmt. 7; Gamez, 151 S.W.3d at 588. However, Rule 173.6 does not preclude awarding compensation for persons other than the person designated in the trial court's order as guardian ad litem if the evidence shows particular, unusual circumstances making services of other persons necessary for the ad litem's duties to be fulfilled. Such circumstances might exist, for example, if paralegals or other staff under the supervision of the appointed guardian ad litem could perform tasks necessary for the ad litem to properly fulfill his or her appointed role, but at a lesser hourly rate than the ad litem, or an unexpected emergency requires the guardian ad litem to miss a mandatory hearing and an associated attorney familiar with the matter appears instead. [5] See, e.g., TEX.R. CIV. P. 173.4(d)(2). But if a guardian ad litem such as Garcia seeks compensation for activities of persons not authorized in advance by the trial court to act on behalf of the incapacitated person, he or she should identify the persons with particularity and prove the particular, unusual circumstances making the services of the persons necessary for the ad litem's duties to be fulfilled, the specific services they performed, when the services were performed, the amount of time spent performing the services, the necessity of the services in light of the ad litem's appointment, and a reasonable hourly rate for each person. See Jocson v. Crabb, 133 S.W.3d 268, 270 (Tex.2004) (per curiam) (recognizing that parties would be wise to seek direction from the trial court if they disagree about an ad litem's role, but also recognizing that it could be expensive and disruptive if they had to pursue every disagreement to a hearing). Once that is done the trial court will have evidence on which to determine whether to award compensation for the activities of those persons, and if so, how much.
Garcia's invoice and testimony are not legally sufficient evidence to support the amount of compensation he was awarded. First, Garcia was the only person the trial court's order designated to act as Gonzalez's guardian ad litem. His appointment was for a particular, narrow role: protecting Gonzalez's interest in dividing the settlement. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 173.4(c). As a guardian ad litem under Rule 173, he was to exercise his independent judgment about the division. That warranted his personal attention to the matter, and ordinarily it would have required only his personal involvement. Garcia does not claim there is evidence of particular, unusual circumstances showing services of other persons were necessary for his ad litem duties to be fulfilled. Even if he did, there is no evidence of who the persons were that performed services, what services they performed, why it was necessary for them to perform the services for Garcia's limited role to be fulfilled, the necessity of the services, the time it took to perform the services, and the reasonable hourly rate for each person. Garcia admittedly did not perform all of the tasks listed on his invoice, so even if all the tasks were compensable under Rule 173 and the time for each task was proved, matters we address below, there is no evidence to support the amount of compensation awarded to Garcia for having done them. Thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the amount he was awarded. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding it, and the court of appeals erred by affirming the award. See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21. Second, the invoice did not set out the amount of time each task took. Nor did Garcia supply the necessary evidence: Q. Now, in this [invoice], you don't have any actual times or dates, do you? A. No, I don't. Q. Okay. So, it's really impossible for somebody to decipher what days you supposedly did this and how long this took, correct, because there's no information relating to those entries, right? A. As to what you're making reference to, there's not. . . . . Q. Yeah, if I went through each one of these activities as we sit here today, could you put in the time that you have expended on these activities? A. I don't have that information with me. Perhaps it could be reconstructed. I will tell you that on any action or matter or document that I review, I do charge a minimum of a quarter hour on anything that you may see listed here. . . . . Q. Did you keep time? Drove to Rio Grande City, whatever, met with her, 1.5 hours, two hours, anything like that? A. I don't have anything like that with me. I can go back and check. The only evidence of the time spent is Garcia's testimony that he invoiced a minimum of a quarter-hour for each activity, but manifestly, more than a quarter-hour was spent performing some of the activities such as traveling to where the Gonzalezes lived and conferring with them. Although there is evidence that Garcia necessarily spent time in performing his duties as ad litem, the evidence is such that the total number of hours he spent in the representation cannot be calculated on the record before us. Under Rule 173 compensation is to be based on the hours necessarily spent on the representation multiplied by a reasonable hourly fee. TEX.R. CIV. P. 173.6(a) (If a guardian ad litem requests compensation, he or she may be ... paid a reasonable hourly fee for necessary services performed.); Land Rover U.K., 210 S.W.3d at 608. The evidence is legally insufficient to support the fees awarded, and the trial court abused its discretion by awarding them. See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21. The court of appeals calculated a number of hours for the tasks listed on the invoice by dividing the total amount requested ($28,260.00) by the invoiced hourly rate of $300.00. It held that [w]hen the total number of hours billed is mathematically determinable in this way, direct evidence of total hours is not required and the trial court could simply assess whether that number of hours was reasonable to complete the tasks performed. 363 S.W.3d at 623. We disagree. Such a calculation does not comport with the requirements of Rule 173. See Land Rover U.K., 210 S.W.3d at 607-08. The court of appeals erred by affirming the compensation award. Third, many of the tasks shown on the invoice were not compensable under Rule 173 because they were not necessary to fulfill the limited role to which Garcia was appointed. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 173.4 (defining the role of a guardian ad litem); Land Rover U.K., 210 S.W.3d at 607 (If a guardian ad litem performs work beyond the scope of this role, such work is non-compensable.). Only those tasks directly and materially bearing on the conflict of interest between Ramona and Gonzalez regarding division of the settlement were necessary. Some of the non-compensable tasks demonstrated by this record were Receiv[ing] and Review[ing] (1) multiple motions to transfer venue, responses to those, orders setting hearings on the motions and correspondence relating to the motions and responses; (2) superseded petitions; (3) sundry discovery requests and responses; (4) a motion relating to admission of an attorney to practice pro hac vice; (5) correspondence about postponed hearings; (6) pleadings relating to already-settled claims; (7) notices of settlement of minor plaintiffs' claims; and (8) copies of citations issued for defendants. Garcia testified, in part, that the activities he performed were for the purpose of becoming familiar with the lawsuit, representing Gonzalez's interests, and advising the court. But tasks such as those enumerated above were not necessary to fulfilling the limited role for which he was appointed. The trial court did not conform to guiding rules and principles when it awarded compensation for non-necessary activities, thus it abused its discretion. See, e.g., TEX.R. CIV. P. 173 & cmts. 3-4, 7; Land Rover U.K., 210 S.W.3d at 607-08. The court of appeals erred by holding otherwise.