Opinion ID: 3014071
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the base offense level of 8. Neither party

Text: addressed whether Lennon’s 1988 Lennon first contends that the Pennsylvania controlled substance version of the Guidelines in force on the conviction would have qualified as an date of her 1994 re-entry—the 1993 aggravated felony under subsection Guidelines—should have been used to 1101(a)(43)(B) as “illicit trafficking in a calculate her sentence. Those guidelines controlled substance,” making the 1993 would have been more favorable to her G u i d e l i n e s’ a g g r a v a te d f e l o ny because, she argues, she would have enhancement nonetheless applicable to faced—before a reduction for acceptance her. Because it does not change our of responsibility—a total offense level of analysis, we assume that her 1988 8, rather than the level 24 the District Pennsylvania controlled substance Court calculated under the November conviction would not have qualified as an “aggravated felony” within the meaning of the 1993 Guidelines. 5 ambiguously worded to charge both the we need to discuss at some length. “re-entry” prong and the “found in” prong In DiSantillo, the defendant had of Section 1326.6 She invokes the “rule of been arrested and deported in 1962. Id. at lenity,” see United States v. Lainer, 520 130. He re-entered the United States in U.S. 259, 266 (1997), and argues that the 1970, under his own name and on an crime with which she is charged should be immigrant visa issued by the American deemed to be illegal re-entry in 1994 Consul General in Italy. But because of because the 1993 Guidelines are more his earlier deportation, that visa was lenient than the 2001 Guidelines under improper and DiSantillo’s re-entry was in which she was sentenced. violation of Section 1326. Id. This is not a reasonable application DiSantillo was not interviewed by of the rule of lenity. Notwithstanding the INS agents until 1976 and not reference to Lennon’s “re-entry,” the indicted—under Section 1326's “found in” indictment clearly charges her under the prong—until 1979. Id. He argued that the “found in” prong of Section 1326. See five-year statute of limitations for his United States v. Whittaker, 999 F.2d 38, “found in” violation began to run on his 40-41 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that re-entry into the United States and expired alien’s crime occurred for sentencing in 1975. Id. at 132. The Government purposes on alien’s “found” date even argued that DiSantillo’s offense was a though the indictment charged all three continuing one, “effectively tolling the prongs of Section 1326). statute of limitations for as long as the Next, though somewhat obliquely, alien remain[ed] illegally in the country.” Lennon argues that even if her violation Id. at 132. was being “found in” the United States We looked to the plain language of illegally, that offense occurred as a matter Section 1326 and held that the statute of of law at the time she illegally crossed into limitations for a “found in” violation the United States in 1994 through a begins on the date the alien comes to the recognized port of entry. This argument is attention of immigration authorities. Id. at on somewhat stronger footing, flowing from this Court’s decision in United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d at 134-36,7 which the statute of limitations has run on her “found in” violation. See DiSantillo, 615 6 Lennon does not assert, however, F.2d at 134-36. But Lennon that the ambiguity in the indictment unquestionably waived any argument she renders it duplicitous. may have had based on the statute of limitations by failing to raise that defense 7 We note that Lennon’s argument before the District Court. Accordingly, could be construed as a means of we voice no opinion with respect to that contending, by way of the back door, that defense. 6 135. Central to our holding was the fact with “knowledge” of an alien’s presence that DiSantillo had passed through a in the United States—does not extend to a recognized port of entry pursuant to an case such as this, where Lennon otherwise valid American-issued visa affirmatively concealed her identity. To under his own name. That being so, his hold otherwise would actually favor the re-entry was not surreptitious, and illegal entrants who affirmatively conceal immigration authorities had sufficient their identities over those who honestly notice of that re-entry to start the running use their own names.8 of the five-year statute of limitations for his “found in” offense. We contrasted, in a dictum, DiSantillo’s case with the 8 The Government urges that the example of an alien who enters the United crime of being “found in” the United States surreptitiously. Id. at 134-36. States is a continuing offense, just in the Under those circumstances, we reasoned, same way that a conspiracy is. See, e.g., Congress did not intend the statute of United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 129 limitations for “found in” violations to n.6 (3d Cir. 2002). The argument has begin running against the Government on force; the passage of time does not give the date of the alien’s illegal re-entry into rise to a de facto amnesty that legalizes an the United States. Rather, as in the case of unlawful alien’s presence. But the DiSantillo’s non-surreptitious re-entry, the question of whether “found in” violations statute of limitations only begins to run are continuing crimes was addressed, to a once the Government is on notice of the limited extent, in our holding in alien’s illegal presence in the United DiSantillo. 615 F.2d at 134-36. In the States. context of that case, we held that the In short, DiSantillo held that illegal “found in” prong did not codify a re-entry begins, for statute of limitations continuing crime. Id. Since that time, purposes, when the alien presents himself numerous other courts have taken non-surreptitiously (i.e., using his own positions that are, to varying degrees, to name) at an open point of entry even the contrary. See United States v. Ruizthough immigration personnel failed to Gea, 340 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. react. That makes some sense because the 2003); United States v. Mendez-Cruz, 329 Government has sufficient notice of the F.3d 885, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United alien’s presence in the United States to States v. Lopez-Flores, 275 F.3d 661, 663 bear the burden of the running of the (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mendezstatute of limitations against it. Id. Here, Casillas, 272 F.3d 1199, 1203-05 (9th Cir. however, Lennon admits that she used an 2001); United States v. Ruelas-Arreguin, alias when she crossed into the United 219 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000); States. The logic of DiSantillo—that United States v. Reyes-Nava, 169 F.3d immigration authorities should be imputed 278, 279-80 (5th Cir. 1999)); United States v. Diaz-Diaz, 135 F.3d 572, 575 7 This reading of DiSantillo is any error by the District Court in this consistent with the decisions of other respect was harmless.9 Lennon concedes courts, holding that the offense of being that, excluding her pre-1991 crimes, her “found in” the United States illegally is criminal history score was a Level IV. “committed” when the alien comes to the The District Court here ultimately affirmative attention of INS officials. See sentenced her based on a criminal history United States v. Rodriguez, 26 F.3d 4, 8 of Level IV, arriving at the same (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Gonzales, sentencing range as would have resulted 988 F.2d 16, 18 (5th Cir. 1993); had the District Court excluded Lennon’s Whittaker, 999 F.2d at 40-42. Indeed, in pre-1991 crimes.10 Thus, any error by the Whittaker, the Second Circuit interpreted Section 1326 as we do here: Where an 9 alien unlawfully enters with a fictitious The Government argues that there name, even through a recognized port of is no error because Lennon’s offense was entry, he is “found in” the United States a continuing one, lasting from 1994 when actually discovered. Whittaker, 999 through 2001. This is arguably F.2d at 42. Accordingly, Lennon’s Section inconsistent with DiSantillo, but we need 1326 violation was “committed” when she not reach the question. was apprehended by INS officials in 2001. 10 At oral argument, Lennon’s Finally, Lennon observes that a counsel suggested that the District Court’s logical implication of a finding that her use of the older crimes might be error even crime was “committed” in 2001 is that her though the District Court applied the pre-1991 crimes should not have been lower criminal history level. Lennon’s used as sentencing factors, since they counsel speculated that the District Court “occurred” for sentencing purposes before might have been inclined to reduce the the Guidelines’ ten year look-back period criminal history category irrespective of as measured from her “found” date. But whether that history reflected her pre-1991 crimes. All things being equal, the argument runs, if the District Court had (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. not included her pre-1991 crimes but still Castrillon-Gonzales, 77 F.3d 403, 406 found her criminal history to be (11th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. overstated, her sentencing range—and Almendarez, 1 Fed. Appx. 234, (4th Cir. presumably her sentence—would have 2001) (unpublished per curiam). But see been that much lower. Apart from being United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d pure speculation, Lennon’s counsel’s 277, 280-82 (2d Cir. 1995). Perhaps this argument was not advanced in her briefs. should cause a re-examination of our For the same reason that we will not holding in DiSantillo. But we need not consider an argument minted at the reply confront the continued viability of brief stage, we will not consider an DiSantillo in this case. argument made by counsel for the first 8 District Court in initially considering Aggravated felonies that Lennon’s pre-1991 crimes for criminal trigger the adjustment from history purposes was harmless. See subsection (b)(1)(A) vary United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, widely. If subsection 208 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that a (b)(1)(A) applies, and (A) sentencing error need not be remanded if the defendant has “the record shows that the sentence was previously been convicted unaffected by the error.”); United States v. of only one felony offense; Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 229 (3d Cir. 1999). (B) such offense was not a crime of violence or