Opinion ID: 1219182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: hearing panel findings and recommendation

Text: The three-member hearing panel unanimously recommended that applicant's application for admission be denied. After reciting the relevant evidence in the record, the hearing panel's opinion states in part: The issue before this hearing panel    is not so much what applicant has done, but whether he presently possesses the necessary good moral character for admission to the Bar. While the issue before the hearing panel involves applicant's present moral character, it is his current explanation of past conduct that was of most concern to the hearing panel. Specifically, the hearing panel is not convinced of applicant's candor in explaining his past conduct. After a careful review of all the evidence presented, the hearing panel concludes that applicant has not shown himself to be a candid and credible person and, therefore, has not established by clear and convincing evidence that he now has the good moral character required to practice law. The hearing panel's conclusion is based primarily on applicant's present statements about his past acts. In re Fine, 303 Or 314, 330, [736 P.2d 183] (1987). The hearing panel concluded: The hearing panel concludes that applicant has not been fully candid and truthful in his testimony and that he therefore does not possess the good moral character to be a member of the bar. Applicant's testimony before the hearing panel, and his prior testimony before the Board, were under oath. There may be no requirement more central to the idea of good moral character, as it applies to those who would practice law in this state, than truthful testimony under oath. Applicant had the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence his good moral character. The hearing panel concludes that applicant has failed to meet the burden, and therefore recommends that his re-application for admission be denied. As to applicant's 1986 California suspension, the hearing panel found: Applicant was suspended from the practice of law in California in 1986 for the neglect of client matters and unprofessional conduct. Applicant has consistently attributed this neglect and unprofessional conduct to the emotional problems he suffered as a result of his wife's death in September, 1982. In his application, he states that he was suspended from the practice of law and placed on probation for a year `for failure to complete representation on several civil matters following his wife's death.' One of these civil matters involved clients named Sielinski. At applicant's first hearing before the Board, he was asked if his negligence in regards to the Sielinski case occurred in 1981. He answered no. Applicant also testified that none of the problems or failures to cooperate or return phone calls to the Sielinskis occurred before his wife's death. He testified that the Sielinski case was being handled up to the time of his wife's death and, as far as he knew, there was no failure to communicate with the Sielinskis prior to that. At the hearing before this hearing panel, applicant testified that up until his wife's death he believed he was taking care of business. He testified that the Sielinski matter would not have come to the attention of the California State Bar absent his wife's death. Thus, applicant maintains that his negligence and unprofessional conduct in regards to the Sielinski case occurred after his wife's death in September, 1982. Applicant's testimony is not consistent with the facts. The California State Bar alleged that after May 22, 1981, applicant failed to return numerous telephone calls to the Sielinskis, and on or about March 7, 1982 and August 18, 1982, the Sielinskis wrote applicant requesting information concerning their case and applicant failed to respond. In connection with a settlement of the California State Bar's complaint, applicant signed a stipulation as to facts and discipline which, in part, concerned the Sielinski case. Applicant's stipulation recited that the Sielinskis hired applicant on April 13, 1981, in connection with damages they incurred on February 28, 1980. The stipulation provided that during 1981 applicant took minimal substantive action on behalf of the Sielinskis, and that he failed to file a complaint before the relevant statute of limitations expired. According to applicant, the statute of limitations for this claim was two years and, therefore, would have expired by February 28, 1982. The stipulation further provided that after April 13, 1981 applicant failed to respond to the Sielinskis' telephone calls and correspondence requesting information on their case. Applicant stipulated in a judicial proceeding involving his own misconduct that his acts of neglect and professional misconduct involving the Sielinski case occurred prior to his wife's death in September, 1982. In fact, his negligence in not filing suit for the Sielinskis occurred not later than the end of February, 1982. Applicant's Stipulation of Facts before the California State Bar, and other evidence, is directly contrary to his testimony before the Board and this hearing panel that none of his neglect and professional misconduct in the Sielinski case occurred before his wife's death, but was caused by his wife's death. The hearing panel finds that applicant is being untruthful in attempting to attribute his neglect and professional misconduct to the tragedy of his wife's death. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) As to applicant's 1986 probation revocation, the hearing panel found: In July, 1986, applicant's probation arising out of his conviction for manufacture of a controlled substance was revoked because he threatened another man with violence and was in possession of firearms. While working for Legal Services, Inc. in the spring of 1986, during the community service portion of his sentence, applicant became involved in a dispute with a man who he claimed failed to pay the balance of a debt for the purchase of a travel trailer. During this dispute, applicant threatened the man's life by telling the man's brother, `If Frank didn't get a hold of me by midnight, or in six hours, he was going to be dead man.' In addition to this threat, applicant posted placards in public places calling the man a `thief' and a `punk' and stating `You can run, but you can't hide.' This activity culminated in an altercation in a parking lot between applicant and the man he had threatened. Believing this conduct was a violation of applicant's probation, his probation officer, Pat Mimnaugh, went to applicant's home in June, 1986. Besides verifying that applicant had threatened the debtor's life, the probation officer searched applicant's home and discovered that applicant still possessed firearms. Specifically, applicant had eleven firearms, including two loaded pistols. One of these pistols was under the bed of applicant and his female companion. Applicant testified in the first hearing before the Board that the guns were loaded because his female companion felt unsafe. At the first hearing before the Board, applicant testified that he knew it was against the law for a convicted felon to own a firearm, but he asserted that his probation conditions did not prohibit gun ownership: `It was not a condition of any probation. I was told that.' In contrast, Mr. Mimnaugh testified at the first hearing that one of the specific conditions to applicant's probation prohibited the use or possession of a firearm. Mr. Mimnaugh testified that he read the conditions of probation to applicant and that applicant signed the probation conditions. This discrepancy between applicant's testimony and Mr. Mimnaugh's testimony was detailed in the Board's first opinion, a copy of which was sent to applicant. Notwithstanding that the Board's first opinion specifically detailed the conflict between applicant's testimony and his probation officer's testimony, at applicant's second hearing before the Board he testified that although he did not doubt that a prohibition against the use or possession of firearms was a standard condition of the probation department, he also testified that a prohibition against the use or possession of firearms was not a term of his probation. Applicant's testimony that a prohibition against his use or possession of firearms was not a term of his probation is, at best, misleading. Even if applicant forgot that a firearms prohibition was a condition of his probation (unlikely for an experienced criminal lawyer), he was clearly reminded of this at the first hearing before the Board when Mr. Mimnaugh testified. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) As to applicant's marijuana production, the hearing panel found: In August, 1985, when law enforcement officers raided applicant's property they found 143 marijuana plants ranging in size from tiny seedlings to tall plants. Applicant has consistently testified before the Board that this marijuana was grown for personal consumption. Applicant testified he grew this marijuana to smoke it and so he would not have to go to California to buy it. He described this marijuana cultivation as a `stupidgardening activity' in which he became emotionally involved. The issue presented by applicant's testimony that he grew the marijuana as a gardening activity solely for personal consumption is whether this testimony is fully candid and truthful. This hearing panel concludes that it is not for two primary reasons. First, applicant's own testimony is self-contradictory. Second, the quantity of the marijuana grown was in commercial quantities and is not consistent with personal consumption. (Emphasis added.) The hearing panel explained why it had concluded that applicant's testimony about his marijuana crop was not candid and truthful: (a) Contradictory Statement and Testimony A presentence investigation was done in connection with applicant's conviction for manufacture of a controlled substance. Applicant told the presentence investigator that he briefly considered selling the marijuana but he did not think that he would have followed through. At both the first and second hearings before the Board, applicant testified that he did consider selling marijuana, although he said that he never took any overt steps to sell it. At the third hearing before this panel, applicant testified that it was not his intention to sell marijuana, although he considered it, but he took no steps to contact anyone to sell it. The hearing panel finds it noteworthy that the first time that the Board asked applicant about his purpose in growing marijuana he testified that he did so `to be able to smoke it,' and maintained that it was only for his personal use. When asked further about the quantity of marijuana, applicant testified that it was fun gardening the marijuana. It was later, when applicant was pressed as to his intentions, that he said that he considered selling the marijuana: `Yes, I certainly considered it. All I can tell you is I took no steps to move it along toward fruition. I, you know, made no plans or contacts with anyone to sell it to. I considered it.' The hearing panel finds this testimony troubling because it is contradictory. Applicant has clearly attempted to convince the Board that he was growing marijuana solely for personal consumption. Yet when pressed, applicant conceded that he considered selling the marijuana. If applicant had an intent to grow marijuana solely for his personal consumption, then he would not have considered selling it. On the other hand, if applicant grew marijuana while he considered selling it, then he had an intent both to consume it and, possibly, to sell it if his cultivation efforts succeeded. The contradiction, therefore, is in applicant's testimony as to his intentions. (b) The Quantity of the Marijuana If applicant had grown one or a few marijuana plants, the apparent conflict in his testimony as to whether he grew it solely for personal consumption or also considered selling it would not be as troubling to the hearing panel. But this hearing panel finds applicant's testimony very troubling when it is considered in light of the quantity of marijuana he was growing. Applicant was growing 143 marijuana plants. At the second hearing, applicant testified that he and his wife consumed about a half to one ounce a week of marijuana. He also testified that he thought that the marijuana he was growing would produce about five to ten pounds and maybe more. If applicant and his wife consumed two ounces of marijuana a week, and if the marijuana he was growing did produce ten pounds, or 160 ounces, the marijuana applicant was growing would have produced an 80-week supply. Applicant admitted that 143 marijuana plants would produce far in excess of anybody's ability for personal use. Applicant also conceded that 143 marijuana plants raised to maturity would create a great deal of marijuana, and that one would assume that this quantity of successfully raised marijuana plants would cause a person to deal with kilograms or bales as opposed to ounces. According to Mr. Mimnaugh, 143 plants of various size is a very significant amount of marijuana and would be more than ten or twenty would use in a year. At the hearing before this hearing panel, applicant dismissed as farcical the affidavits of federal officers that said that 143 marijuana plants grown to full fruition could have a crop value of a million and one half dollars. This estimated value may be greatly exaggerated. But the point remains that 143 marijuana plants could produce a crop with a significant illegal commercial value. Not only was applicant growing 143 marijuana plants, he intended to grow more. Applicant's arrest information report states that along the railing of applicant's patio were starter pots and a tray of water that contained marijuana seeds covered with cloth waiting to sprout. When applicant was asked why he had more seeds under water that he was trying to bring to start, he responded that he became involved emotionally and psychologically in the process of growing the marijuana and he did not think that the existing plants were likely to survive. If applicant was only raising marijuana for personal consumption, he would not care if a few, or many, of his 143 plants died, nor would he back up his 143 growing plants with more seeds. The evidence strongly indicates applicant was involved in farming commercial quantities of marijuana. And if applicant intended to produce marijuana in commercial quantities, he must have had an intent as to how he would dispose of commercial quantities of the marijuana. The Board's first opinion recommending against applicant's admission stated: `Some (but not all) members of the Board's majority found from [applicant's] testimony that he was cultivating substantial quantities of marijuana solely for his own consumption to be incredible.' The Board's second opinion which recommended applicant's admission stated: `As in the prior Opinion and Recommendation of this Board, some members of the board continue to question the credibility of [applicant's] explanation that the cultivation of substantial quantities of marijuana were solely for his own use and that he was an unpredictably successful gardener. However, the mere suspicion of a lack of candor will not support the denial of admission. In re Tobiga, 310 Or 46[, 791 P.2d 830] (1990).' This hearing panel concludes that the evidence supports far more than a mere suspicion of a lack of candor on applicant's behalf. To the contrary, this hearing panel concludes that applicant's testimony, in light of its contradictory nature and in light of the quantity of marijuana being grown, is evasive, self-serving and lacks complete candor and credibility. Applicant was a mature, intelligent adult when he was growing marijuana. He was also an experienced criminal defense lawyer. The hearing panel does not believe applicant's testimony that he was growing commercial quantities of marijuana for fun and so he and his wife could smoke an ounce or two per week. The hearing panel finds that applicant was growing commercial quantities of marijuana for a commercial purpose, and that applicant's testimony to the contrary is not truthful (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) The hearing panel unanimously concluded that applicant had not been candid and truthful in his testimony and therefore he did not possess the good moral character to be a member of the bar and recommended that applicant not be admitted to practice in Oregon.