Opinion ID: 3010613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: After a jury acquitted him of charges that he deliberately had set fire to his business in Philadelphia, James Gallo brought suit under 28 U.S.C. S 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), against the City of Philadelphia and the municipal and federal officials responsible for investigating his case.1 Gallo claimed that the municipal fire marshal had altered his views on the fire's cause in response to pressure from representatives of Gallo's insurance company, and that all of the officials had withheld exculpatory evidence from the United States Attorney. The district court, construing Gallo's suit as a claim of malicious prosecution, concluded that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), required Gallo to show that he had suffered a Fourth Amendment seizure. The court ruled that the pretrial restrictions imposed upon Gallo, which included posting a bond and limiting interstate travel, did not amount to a seizure. It therefore granted the City and municipal defendants' summary judgment motion and the federal officials' motion to dismiss. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Because we conclude that the intentional restrictions imposed on Gallo's liberty qualified as a seizure, we will reverse. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291; the district court had subject matter jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343(a) and 1367. _________________________________________________________________ 1. In the district court, Gallo's case involved additional defendants and claims. We, however, only need discuss the section 1983 and Bivens claims against the appellees as the other defendants and claims have been dismissed. 3