Opinion ID: 76559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 1991 Reversal of Eyster's and Marshall's Convictions

Text: 11 Although Lynn's appeal was dismissed, the direct appeals of codefendants Eyster and Marshall remained pending. On December 17, 1991, this Court reversed Eyster's and Marshall's convictions based on the prosecutor's improper vouching for the credibility of Sheehy, a key government witness during the trial. United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1207-08 (11th Cir.1991). This Court concluded that the prosecutor's comments implicated the government's credibility, so infecting the trial with unfairness as to rise to the level of a denial of due process. Id. at 1207. Because Lynn's § 2255 motion claims that his due process rights were violated by this same prosecutorial misconduct, we outline what happened during the 1989 trial. 12 Witness Sheehy was indicted with defendants Lynn, Eyster, and Marshall, but pled guilty shortly before trial and testified against them. Sheehy pled guilty to only Count 7 (cocaine importation on a flight in July or August 1987) and not to Count 9 (cocaine importation on a flight on September 25, 1987). During the trial, defense counsel emphasized that Sheehy was in a halfway house until July 30, 1987 and living in the Florida Keys in August 1987, and contested Sheehy's credibility by attacking his willingness to admit guilt falsely to Count 7 in order to obtain the benefits of a plea. To rehabilitate Sheehy, the prosecutor on redirect asked Sheehy questions implying that his plea to Count 7, instead of Count 9, was due to a typographical error in his plea agreement. 13 In reversing, this Court determined: (1) that Sheehy had pled to Count 7; (2) that there was no typographical error; and (3) that by suggesting to the jury that Sheehy meant to plead to Count 9 instead of Count 7, the prosecutor implicitly vouched for the witness by indicating that information not before the jury supported Sheehy's credibility. Id. 14 This Court in Eyster concluded that the prosecutor's improper vouching tainted Eyster's and Marshall's trial because the essence of their defense was attacking the credibility of certain key witnesses testifying against them pursuant to plea agreements. Id. at 1208. This Court noted that although the government produced extensive documentary and physical evidence about the drug-trafficking organization, the government's case against Eyster, and to a lesser degree Marshall, depended heavily on the credibility of witnesses who testified pursuant to plea agreements. Id. at 1200. This Court determined that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the prosecutor's improper comments, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, particularly because no physical evidence linked Eyster to the drug-trafficking organization. Id. at 1208. 15 In their direct appeals, Eyster and Marshall also sought a new trial based on prosecution witnesses' intentionally violating the witness sequestration order. 5 Specifically, witnesses Sheehy, Purvis, DeWeese, and Barclay discussed and tailored their trial testimony while incarcerated together. Id. at 1210. During the trial, defendants were able to elicit testimony from Purvis, DeWeese, and Barclay, who admitted to engaging in conversations during trial and to violating the witness sequestration order. Id. at 1210-11. Purvis even admitted to discussing testimony with DeWeese and Sheehy. Id. Defendants also filed a post-trial motion for a new trial based upon Sheehy's admission to his own counsel that there were repeated violations of the witness sequestration order and that he and others had perjured themselves regarding these violations. Id. at 1211. 16 In our Eyster decision, this Court concluded that Eyster and Marshall were not entitled to a new trial based on the witness sequestration violations. Id. Although this Court noted that the record ... reflects that both the district court and the government were lax in upholding the sequestration rule, it ultimately concluded that, given the curative aspect of the cross-examination, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants a new trial. Id. (emphasis added). In so concluding, this Court determined that [d]efense counsel fully cross-examined [witnesses] Purvis, DeWeese, Barclay and Sheehy about the nature and extent of their contacts with each other, thereby giving the jury the opportunity to evaluate their credibility. Id.