Opinion ID: 2009468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Guilt Phase Remarks by Prosecution

Text: During the State's rebuttal in the guilt phase of Ferguson's trial, the prosecutor made the following remarks to the jury: [Defense counsel] makes a point that the State has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Ladies and gentlemen, it's not something that we have great difficulty with, philosophically or intellectually. The Judge is going to define the terms very specifically for you, but remember this. We, the State, ha[ve] been proving defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for 200 years [emphasis added]. Ferguson's defense counsel immediately objected. The prosecutor promptly qualified his remarks by stating: Not all defendants, certainly. I'm sorry. After hearing defense counsel's grounds for objection, the Superior Court judge instructed the jury as follows: Obviously, the issue before the jury in this case is the guilt or innocence of this defendant, and the burden is on the State to establish that in this case beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense counsel sought no additional curative instruction from the trial judge at that time. Two days after the jury rendered its verdicts in the guilt phase of Ferguson's trial, his defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis of the prosecutor's aforementioned remarks during rebuttal. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 26.3. The Superior Court judge denied the motion. The trial judge's denial was based upon the ground that the defense objection had been sustained and the jury had been given a curative instruction. In this appeal, Ferguson contends that the Superior Court judge erred by failing to specifically instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remark. Compare Diaz v. State, Del.Supr., 508 A.2d 861, 866-67 (1986); Boatson v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 738, 743 (1983). Ferguson argues that the trial judge's instruction was inadequate to cure the potential prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's reference to the State's ability to establish the guilt of other defendants beyond a reasonable doubt. The applicable standard of appellate review regarding the Superior Court's denial of Ferguson's motion for a mistrial is abuse of discretion. Hope v. State, Del.Supr., 570 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1990) (citing Thompson v. State, Del.Supr., 399 A.2d 194, 199 (1979)). This Court traditionally applies a three-part analysis to determine the prejudice flowing from improper prosecutorial argument. Hughes v. State, Del.Supr., 437 A.2d 559 (1981). The three determinative factors in that analysis are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the [alleged] error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. Id. at 571 (quoting Dyson v. United States, D.C.App., 418 A.2d 127, 132 (1980)). We have reviewed Ferguson's allegation of error in accordance with those three factors. The State's burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is always a central issue in a criminal proceeding. However, the State's case against Ferguson was not close. The evidence at trial, including Ferguson's tape recorded statement, established that Ferguson was the person who shot and killed Hodges. The State's forensic evidence demonstrated that Hodges was shot by a gun which was pressed against his body and fired at point blank range. That apparently objective evidence contradicted the events related by Ferguson in his statement to the police. The State's evidence also indicated that the murder was committed in furtherance of a plan by Hyland and Ferguson to rob Hodges. The record does not reflect an abuse of discretion by the Superior Court in denying Ferguson's motion for a mistrial. Hope v. State, 570 A.2d at 1189. The record reflects that although the prosecutor's broad remark concerning the State's historical ability to consistently sustain its burden of proof was admittedly improper, it did not prejudice Ferguson's substantial rights in the guilt phase of his trial. Pennell v. State, Del. Supr., 602 A.2d 48, 51 (1991). Under the circumstances, the Superior Court's prompt curative instruction correcting the remark by the prosecutor, in conjunction with the prosecutor's own immediate self-correction, was adequate to cure any potential prejudice to Ferguson which might have been created by the comment. [5] See Kornbluth v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 556, 560 (1990).