Opinion ID: 74310
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII Preemption

Text: Although this circuit has not previously addressed Title VII’s preemptive effect in the context of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),4 this circuit has resolved 3 In his cross-appeal, Dickerson argues that the district court erred (1) in denying his motion to strike the order dismissing the individual defendants based on fraud in the inducement; (2) in denying his motion to add the State Department of Corrections and three of its employees as defendants; (3) in denying his motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct; and (4) in denying his request for a hearing under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986). After review, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the district court as to these claims without further discussion. See 11th Cir. R. 36-1. 4 Section 1985(3) provides for the recovery of damages by a party who is injured as a result of a conspiracy to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws: 8 the issue for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 148 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 1998), this Court considered a challenge to § 1983 claims arising out of the same facts as § 1981 and Title VII claims also brought by the plaintiff in that case. The defendants in Johnson argued that Title VII, with its comprehensive remedial scheme, provided the exclusive remedy for the workplace discrimination alleged by the plaintiff, a public employee. See id. at 1229. The defendants also asserted that if § 1983 could be used to sue for employment discrimination, Title VII’s procedural safeguards could be undermined. See id. at 1231. The County makes similar arguments in this case to support its position that Title VII preempts a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim for employment discrimination. The Johnson Court, however, rejected the defendants’ arguments after considering Title VII’s structure and legislative history and finding that it reflected Congress’s intent to retain § 1983 as a parallel remedy for unconstitutional If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . [and] if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 9 employment discrimination. See id. at 1229-31. The Court concluded that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims were viable because “the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for public sector employment discrimination, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983.” Id. at 1231. We find no principled basis to distinguish between § 1983 and § 1985(3) in this regard. Thus, following Johnson, we conclude that Title VII also does not preempt a constitutional cause of action under § 1985(3). The County argues that a different result is required under Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). We disagree. The issue addressed in Novotny was “whether the rights created by Title VII may be asserted within the remedial framework of § 1985(3).” Id. at 377. The Supreme Court began by noting that “Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates.” Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372. The Supreme Court proceeded to hold that § 1985(3) may not be used to enforce rights created by Title VII. Id. at 378. The Supreme Court reasoned that to hold otherwise and allow plaintiffs to use § 1985(3) to enforce rights created under Title VII would impair the effectiveness of Title VII’s comprehensive remedial scheme. Id. at 378. The Novotny Court did not address whether Title VII preempts a § 1985(3) claim based on rights created by the 10 Constitution or laws other than Title VII. In the present case, although Dickerson’s Title VII and § 1985(3) claims arise out of the same underlying facts, the rights which are the basis of the § 1985(3) claim are rights created by the Constitution, not by Title VII. Indeed, Dickerson’s § 1985(3) claim is based on the Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the laws and due process. Because this case involves the assertion of constitutional rights, the holding of Novotny simply does not apply here. Thus, consistent with our prior decision in Johnson, we hold that Dickerson’s § 1985(3) claim is not preempted by Title VII.