Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the generality of the indictment

Text: 670 The majority also tries to make a point that Stirone suggested that if the indictment had been more general Stirone's conviction would not have been reversed (at ---- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., 128 of 559 F.2d). This is a good point, but it does not aid my colleagues because the indictment there was not more general and neither is this indictment. The underlying point is that the obvious intent of the grand jury prevails and the fact that the indictment might have been more general is insufficient to permit the return of a guilty verdict on evidence that might have been admissible on a more general indictment. That rule applies here with equal force. To paraphrase Stirone: 671 It follows that when only (making cash payments and offers of other benefits) is charged . . . a conviction must rest on that charge and not another, even though it be assumed that under an indictment drawn in general terms a conviction might rest upon a showing that (through misuse of the CIA the investigation was delayed). 672 361 U.S. at 218, 80 S.Ct. at 274. 673 The majority attempts to make a similar argument for excessive liberality in construing indictments out of the provision in Rule 7(c), Fed.R.Crim.P., which states that an indictment may allege that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown . . . This, however, does not eliminate the necessity for the indictment alleging sufficient facts to identify the specific offense that was committed by the accused in some unknown way, i.e., that the defendants delayed the investigation by means unknown to the Grand Jury. In any event, the means here were not unknown Count 1 specifically alleged defrauding the . . . CIA and the same allegation could easily have been included in Count 2 if the Grand Jury had intended to include it. That it did not do so indicates it did not intend to allege such offense.