Opinion ID: 1148775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: evidence of psychiatric social worker and psychiatrist

Text: The defendant asserts that it was reversible error to allow Samuel Jackson, a qualified psychiatric social worker, to state, over objection, his opinions: (1) that the defendant would be likely to be dangerous to himself, others and the community if released, and (2) that the defendant should not be moved to a less secure ward. Furthermore, it is claimed that the court erred in allowing this witness to testify about the defendant's history of assaultive misbehavior. The challenged testimony was preceded by foundation evidence showing Mr. Jackson's training, qualifications and experience, as well as his contacts with the defendant while in charge of the defendant's hospital ward, in group therapy sessions, and otherwise. Moreover, prior to giving the challenged testimony, this witness, without objection, had stated his opinion that Mr. Giles represents an imminent escape risk and . . . possibly he could be assaultive if he did escape. There was no motion to strike that evidence. Any prejudicial effect which might have resulted from the later stated opinions to which the defendant objected would have already been done by the testimony previously stated without objection. It is asserted here that one not a psychiatrist may not give opinion testimony on the defendant's mental condition. Subject to the proper foundation, a psychiatric social worker may give opinion testimony on a defendant's mental condition. Section 16-8-109, C.R.S.1973. [10] The necessary predicate for this lay opinion evidence is a showing of adequate means to have become acquainted with the person whose mental condition is at issue. [11] In fact, trial judges have very broad discretion in determining whether or not any proffered witness is qualified to give opinion testimony. [12] Thus there was no prejudicial error. See People v. Medina, 185 Colo. 101, 521 P.2d 1257 (1974). The defendant further argues that the People's expert psychiatrist should not have been allowed to testify to the type of improvement by the defendant necessary before release would be appropriate. This is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we find no abuse of that discretion. The jury verdict was supported by competent evidence. The judgment is affirmed.