Opinion ID: 750084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Davidson's Continued Presence and Search of the House

Text: 36 Tierney also claims that Davidson's continued presence in the house and his search of the children's bedroom violated the Fourth Amendment. The Officers argue that Davidson's search was justified and reasonable, because (inter alia ) once Davidson discovered Tierney and confirmed that there had been a domestic dispute, it was imperative that he find the other participant in the disturbance to ensure that Tierney and the children were no longer in danger and that the emergency had passed. 37 [A] warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413 (internal quotation marks omitted). As one commentator has noted: 38 As to what may be done by the police or other public authorities once they are inside the premises, this must be assessed upon a case-by-case basis, taking into account the type of emergency which appeared to be present.... The officer's post-entry conduct must be carefully limited to achieving the objective which justified the entry--the officer may do no more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance and to provide that assistance. 39 3 LaFave, supra, § 6.6(a), at 400-01. For example, in United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir.1964), the invasion of a bathroom in the course of a warrantless search triggered by screams coming from the apartment was justified when the officers were unable to ascertain the reason for the screams solely from their survey of the living room. Id.; cf. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1099-1100, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990) (The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.). 40 Here, domestic violence training warned Davidson about the inherent sensitivity and volatility of this situation. He entered the house for the purpose of ensuring that none of the occupants was in need of medical aid or protection. Tierney's response did not allay his well-founded concern that she or the children were in danger; her face was red, and she appeared shaken. Further cause for Davidson's concern was Tierney's false denial that any altercation had taken place. Tierney's deposition reflects that she first told Davidson that there was no problem or dispute; she then changed her story and stated that the identity of the other person involved in the dispute was none of [Davidson's] business and that the person had left. It was perfectly reasonable for Davidson to conclude that there had been a serious domestic dispute, that the other participant in the dispute was still on the premises and waiting in another room for the police to leave, and that Tierney and the children were intimidated and in danger. Nor was Davidson required to rule out the contingency that the other participant was pointing a gun at Tierney from another location or that Tierney was the aggressor and that she had hidden her victim in another room. The logical means to defuse the situation was to find the other person and ensure that he or she presented or was in no further danger. Maybe some reasonable officers would have disregarded these dangers; fortunately, other reasonable officers show more initiative. 41 Tierney argues, frivolously, that Davidson was required to believe her statements that no dispute had occurred and leave the house. Tierney's denials contradicted the independent reports of a dispute; and her statements to Davidson were self-contradictory, so that it was clear she was lying. See United States v. Bartelho, 71 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir.1995) ([T]he police were not required to take [the victim's] statements at face value, given her demeanor, their training regarding domestic violence, and [the neighbor's] report.); Magnuson, 813 F.Supp. at 1324 ([E]xigent circumstances do not end merely because the victim indicates that she is no longer in danger. That is a determination for the officer to make independently in light of the totality of the circumstances.). Nor did the absence of blood, overturned furniture or other signs of tumult render Davidson's belief that danger existed unreasonable. Davidson was not required to withdraw and go about other business, or stand watch outside the premises listening for the sounds of splintering furniture. 42 Indeed, it may have been a dereliction of duty for Davidson to have left the premises without ensuring that any danger had passed. See Barone, 330 F.2d at 545. And Davidson could not tell that the danger had passed unless he found the other participant in the dispute. See State v. Raines, 55 Wash.App. 459, 778 P.2d 538, 542-43 (1989) ([T]he fact that the occupants appeared to be unharmed when the officers entered did not guarantee that the disturbance had cooled to the point where their continued safety was assured. Until they had an opportunity to observe [the boyfriend] and talk to him, they had no knowledge of his condition and state of mind.). Vermont State Police policy requires that officers responding to a domestic dispute ensure that the scene is no longer violent[,] assess the need for medical attention, and interview all parties separately.It was objectively reasonable for Davidson to believe that a limited search of the premises to locate the other person involved in the dispute was necessary to ensure the safety of the people on the premises (including Tierney's two young children), and therefore lawful under the circumstances. Accordingly, Davidson is immune from suit for his continued presence in, and search of, the premises. 43