Opinion ID: 1872503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: hearsay and opinion bolstering

Text: Harris's testimony of the conversation between McDavid and the confidential informant, and between McDavid and herself in transacting the sale of cocaine was not hearsay. Her testimony of this discussion was relating, first-hand, relevant acts in the criminal offense. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Payden, 622 F. Supp. 915 (D.C.N.Y. 1985); Graves v. State, 492 So.2d 562 (Miss. 1986); West v. State, 485 So.2d 681 (Miss. 1985). For the same reason, Carter's and Clowers's testimony of what they heard over the short wave radio was not hearsay. They, too, were giving a first-hand account of what was said by the parties involved in the sale of the cocaine. This conversation was an ingredient of the crime. The circuit judge should be cautious and wary before admitting testimony such as Carter's and Clowers's, however, and only after laying the proper predicate. It is not competent testimony until the officer who saw and heard the defendant talking (in this case Harris) first testifies what was said. Then, the officers away from the scene may be permitted to relate the conversation they heard via radio between the seller and the law enforcement purchaser on the scene as corroboration of the purchaser's testimony of what was said. And, such testimony should be restricted to what words they heard, not a characterization of what the conversation was about. Before such officers should be permitted to express an opinion that the seller's voice was that of the defendant, an even more stringent predicate must be laid, especially when, as here, no tape recording was made of the sale transaction. All the officers heard was a short wave radio transmission of the transaction. The jury was not afforded an opportunity to hear the transmission, and short wave radio transmissions normally leave much to be desired. Also, there is too much temptation on the part of the law enforcement officer to give the State and not the defendant the benefit of the doubt. And such an opinion, even when permitted, is at best tenuous. Carter and Clowers testified they had heard the voices of Harris and the confidential informant frequently, and no doubt had heard it in person as well as over the radio receiver. No particular problem is encountered in their identification of these two voices over the radio as those of Harris and the informant. They had never heard or met McDavid prior to that night's sale, however. Before admitting such opinion testimony, the State should first have been required to offer testimony by these officers as to when, where, and under what circumstances they later heard the voice of McDavid. If such subsequent conversation was of such nature as to form a basis for the opinion, it is permissible to permit it. Sparks v. State, 412 So.2d 754, 757 (Miss. 1982). In this case no such predicate was laid. Both officers saw and heard McDavid when Gladney briefly questioned him at the scene, but neither Carter nor Clowers offered the time, place or circumstances under which they heard McDavid's voice subsequent to the transaction, and upon which to base a valid opinion that the voice on the radio was his. It was error to permit Carter to characterize what the conversation between Harris and the seller was about; instead it should have been restricted to what was said, to the best of his recollection. It was error for the court first to permit Carter to testify he had heard McDavid and Harris have a conversation when no adequate predicate had been laid. The prosecutor's question And did you hear them discussing money? was objectionable for two reasons: It was blatantly leading and also it characterized what was said instead of simply relating what was said. The circuit judge should have required sufficient testimony from Carter and Clowers to determine they had a basis for expressing the opinion that the seller's voice was that of McDavid before permitting them to give such opinion. In this case, neither Carter nor Clowers had met McDavid before that night. It was error under the facts of this case for the court to admit any opinion testimony as to the stranger's voice on the radio being that of McDavid. The opinion was specially damaging because the only other identification of McDavid as the seller of the cocaine was Harris, who had not viewed him under the best of conditions, herself. There is no merit to McDavid's contention that permitting Carter's and Clowers's testimony about what they heard on the radio was erroneous bolstering of the testimony of Harris. Such evidence, if otherwise admissible, would not be inadmissible simply because it corroborated her testimony. Henry v. State, 209 So.2d 614, 617 (Miss. 1968).