Opinion ID: 2338285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Tortious Interference with Employment Rights

Text: The trial court also granted summary judgment on Futrell's claim that Kravetz and CUMIS conspired to interfere with her employment relationship with DOLFCU by scheming to have her bond coverage terminated. The trial court concluded that even in the event that appellant had established an implied contract of employment, she provided no evidence that either Kravetz or CUMIS intentionally interfered with her purported contract with the credit union. Establishing a prima facie case of intentional interference with contractual relations requires that Futrell show (1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional procurement of a breach of the contract; and (4) damages resulting from the breach. Paul, supra, 754 A.2d at 308-09; Nickens v. Labor Agency of Metro. Washington, 600 A.2d 813, 819 (D.C.1991); Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, 565 A.2d 285, 289 (D.C.1989). If a prima facie case is established, DOLFCU then has the burden to show that ... [its] conduct was legally justified or privileged. See Sorrells, supra, 565 A.2d at 289-90. [13] Given our conclusion that no employment contract-express or implied-existed between Futrell and DOLFCU, she cannot establish a prima facie case of intentional interference with contractual relations and, thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on this issue as a matter of law.