Opinion ID: 296594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: allegations concerning admissibility of the confession

Text: 19 The Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Hunter, supra, 456 S.W.2d at 316, stated the law of the State of Missouri concerning the admissibility of confessions in that state as follows: 20 [C]onfessions induced by the influence of hope of leniency, State v. Ball, Mo.Sup., 262 S.W. 1043, hope of clemency, State v. Hart, 292 Mo. 74, 237 S.W. 473, or hope of mitigation of punishment for the crime charged, or of `worldly advantage,' State v. Williamson, 339 Mo. 1038, 99 S.W.2d 76, are not voluntary and are not admissible in evidence. 21 In so stating the law, the Missouri Supreme Court did not cite State v. White, 316 Mo. 576, 292 S.W. 411 (1927), a case which presents a fact situation very similar to that of this case. White, while in jail and charged with murder in the first degree, confessed after the prosecuting attorney had promised him he would recommend minimum punishment and had told him that a co-defendant had confessed. The Court stated: 22 By all the authorities that confession was not voluntary. The defendant was in jail at the time, and his interview was with the prosecuting attorney and the sheriff — persons in authority — and the law presumes that a confession thus induced is involuntary. 23 State v. White, supra, 316 Mo. at 580, 292 S.W. at 412. The distinguishing factor between the White case and that of Hunter is that the alleged promise was made directly, rather than indirectly, by the prosecuting attorney and was made after the murder charge had been filed. However, this is a distinction without a substantial difference inasmuch as the alleged promise was made by a person in authority. In Hunter's case, Sgt. Shirley was such a person in authority. 24 This Court, however, must apply the federal standard in cases such as this. As stated in Cummings v. United States, 398 F.2d 377, 381-382 (8th Cir. 1968): 25 The standard to be applied by this Court in determining whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary `is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). `Under this test, the constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of    officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether the confession was free and voluntary: that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.' Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). 26 See also Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 347, 83 S.Ct. 448, 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963). In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), the Supreme Court noted: 27  Bram dealt with a confession given by a defendant in custody, alone and unrepresented by counsel. In such circumstances, even a mild promise of leniency was deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not because the promise was an illegal act as such, but because defendants at such times are too sensitive to inducement and the possible impact on them too great to ignore and too difficult to assess. 28 Since Hunter has stated in his petition for habeas corpus that his confession was procured by false promises of a reduced charge for his cooperation at a time when he was in jail and unrepresented by counsel, we conclude that his petition did make allegations which would, if proven to be correct, properly be the basis for the relief requested. Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 91 S.Ct. 485, 27 L.Ed.2d 524 (1971).