Opinion ID: 4204188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Boyer’s Price-Anderson Claims

Text: Despite these expansive definitions, Boyer contends the District Court erred when it held that the Price-Anderson Act applied to all of her claims alleging that Ware was harmed by radiation from cesium-137 used in his lab. We disagree. The Act’s text maps neatly onto Boyer’s allegations. There is no dispute that cesium-137 is a “byproduct material,”6 and, according to Boyer, its radioactive properties 6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (defining “byproduct material”); Dumontier, 543 F.3d at 569 (applying § 2014(q) to injuries caused by cesium-137). 13 caused Ware’s “bodily injury, sickness, disease, [and ultimately] death.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). As long as we give the word “occurrence” its ordinary meaning—“something that takes place; esp. something that happens unexpectedly and without design; or the action or process of happening or taking place,” Carey v. Kerr–McGee Chem. Corp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 800, 805 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993))—the facts alleged constitute a “nuclear incident” under § 2014(q). Boyer claims UPenn bears legal liability arising from this nuclear incident, so what she alleges is “public liability” under § 2014(w). Any suit asserting public liability is a “public liability action . . . arising under section 2210” of the Price-Anderson Act. Id. § 2014(hh). Accordingly, per § 2210(n)(2) the District Court had jurisdiction over Boyer’s claims, and UPenn had the right to remove them to federal court. Boyer nonetheless raises arguments why the Act does not apply. There may exist some limiting principle that would effectively cabin the sweeping language Congress used to describe any nuclear incident subject to the Act, but none is persuasive here. As noted, the Price-Anderson Act’s history largely tracks major events in the development of the nuclear power and energy industries. Thus Boyer’s first argument is that its jurisdictional grant applies only to nuclear accidents involving nuclear power plants or weapons facilities. For support, she looks to cases, agency fact-sheets, and academic publications summarizing the Act’s applicability. E.g., In re TMI II, 940 F.2d at 855 (“[T]here can be no action for injuries caused by the release of radiation from federally licensed nuclear power plants separate and apart from the federal public liability action created by the [Price-Anderson] Act [amendments of 14 1988].”); See Acuna, 200 F.3d at 339 (“The Price Anderson Act sets up an indemnification and limitation of liability scheme for public liability arising out of the conduct of the nuclear energy and weapons industries.”); United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/fact-sheets/nuclear-insurance.pdf (December 2014) (“The Price-Anderson Act . . . cover[s] liability claims of members of the public for personal injury and property damage caused by a nuclear accident involving a commercial nuclear power plant.”); Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation?–the Sixty-Three Million Dollar Question, 13 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1989) (“The Price-Anderson Act[’s] . . . coverage for NRC licensees encompasses activities of commercial nuclear power plants, certain fuel fabrication facilities, and non-[Department of Energy] reactors used for educational and research purposes.”). Boyer contends these descriptions limit the Act’s application regardless of what is in its text. But the summaries she cites do not purport to explore its scope. They merely give the reader a rough sense of the Act’s general purpose. In re TMI II, for example, addresses “federally licensed nuclear power plants” because that’s what the case was about. 940 F.2d at 835.7 No one would take a court’s statement that 7 True, one District Court has cited the Fifth Circuit’s Acuna decision for the proposition that “the [Price-Anderson Act] only applies to the nuclear energy and weapons industries.” Samples v. Conoco, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1321 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (emphasis in original) (calling a plain text reading of the statute “Hogwash!”). But a close reading suggests Samples’ real concern was the defendants’ attempt to use the Act’s tail to wag the dog. They sought to apply the Act to the 15 “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides a cause of action to employees fired because of their race” to mean Title VII provides no cause of action to individuals suffering discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin. What is more, the Price-Anderson Act plainly applies in at least some contexts to research universities, as it has provisions that cover specifically institutions like the University of Pennsylvania. Section 2210(k) provides that “nonprofit educational institution[s]” conducting “educational activities” pursuant “to any license issued” under the federal atomic energy scheme shall be indemnified by the NRC for “public liability in excess of $250,000 arising from nuclear incidents.” 42 U.S.C. § 2210(k)(1). “[C]ontracts of indemnification [entered into by the institution and the plaintiffs’ action because uranium was listed among “the [many] hazardous substances found in the sludge ponds” at a chemical waste site. Id. at 1320 n.16. The Court evidently found this connection farfetched and gave the Price-Anderson argument short shrift. Moreover, Samples later suggests that a defendant’s possession of a license to handle nuclear materials would trigger the Act’s reach. Id. at 1321 (“The Defendants have failed to provide the Court with proof demonstrating they are a [Department of Energy] contractor or an NRC licensee. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit does not state a cause of action under the [Price-Anderson Act.]”). As we discuss below, UPenn had such a license. Thus, depending on how one reads Samples—i.e., (1) the Act applies only to the nuclear power and weapons industries or (2) the Act applies only to the holders of licenses to possess nuclear materials—even that Court could have held UPenn to be covered by the Act. 16 Commission] shall cover public liability arising out of or in connection with the licensed activity[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2210(k)(2). This section also exempts these licensed institutions from certain “financial protection” requirements under the Act. Id. It would make no sense for the Act to contain these provisions if it did not apply outside the weapons and energy industries. That is, Congress’ choice to include a provision indemnifying licensed nonprofit educational institutions from public liability suggests strongly (perhaps overwhelmingly) that the Act applies to them.8 Boyer next argues, following the reasoning of a District Court in our Circuit, that even if the Price-Anderson Act applies to a broad set of industries, it only covers defendants that have indemnity agreements with the NRC. See Gilberg v. Stepan Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 325, 339 (D.N.J. 1998), supplemented, 24 F. Supp. 2d 355 (D.N.J. 1998). 8 In the alternative, Boyer claims that, even if the PriceAnderson Act applies to university research labs, it applies only to labs that operate nuclear reactors. She cites no portion of the Act in favor of this position. The most she does is point to regulations dealing with indemnity agreements required for institutions that do use reactors. See 10 C.F.R. § 140.72. But the existence of regulations specifying requirements for institutions with reactors does not imply that those without them are somehow exempt from the Act entirely. She goes on to cite the NRC’s list of institutions with nuclear reactors in Pennsylvania and notes the University’s absence. See United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/region- state/pennsylvania.html. Its presence on the reactor list is relevant only if having a reactor is a prerequisite to the Act’s coverage, and we see no reason to hold that it is. 17 Noting § 2014(q)’s broad definition of “nuclear incident,” the Gilberg Court looked for a limit to its reach in the nearby definition of “extraordinary nuclear occurrence.” Id. (Recall that extraordinary nuclear occurrences were the only events that triggered federal jurisdiction before the 1988 PriceAnderson Act amendments.) Following a long and complicated analysis of the Act’s history and structure, Gilberg concluded that a nuclear incident may only occur (and the Act applies) when harm happens at a site covered by an indemnification agreement with the NRC. Id. The University of Pennsylvania has no such agreement, Audio Recording of Oral Argument held June 28, 2017 at 31:23 to 31:40 (http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/163801EstateofJeffreyHWarevHospitaloftheUnivesityofPennsyl vaniaetal.mp3); so, the argument goes, its negligence toward Ware did not cause a nuclear incident. We are unpersuaded that an indemnification agreement is necessary to trigger the Act’s applicability. What Gilberg misses is that “one purpose behind the 1988 amendments was to expand the scope of federal jurisdiction beyond actions arising from ‘extraordinary nuclear occurrences[.]’” Acuna, 200 F.3d at 339 (citing Kerr–McGee, 115 F.3d at 1502). Indeed, that is why the definition of “nuclear incident” is so broad. Id. Thus we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that Gilberg’s “attempts to reintroduce the limitations of ‘extraordinary nuclear occurrence’ into the 1988 amendments’ substitution of ‘nuclear incident’ rely on faulty statutory interpretation and are contrary to Congressional intent.” Id. (citing Carey, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 803–07). The remaining arguments suffer from the same flaw. Even if we were to accept the limiting principles Boyer proposes, her claims would still be governed by the Act. For this reason, we have no need to pass on whether the Act is 18 limited in the remaining ways Boyer suggests. We note only that, even so, the outcome here would be no different. Boyer argues that the Act applies only when a defendant has a license to possess nuclear materials. Indeed, § 2210(k)’s reference to “any license issued” under the federal scheme for atomic energy could be read to suggest that universities are covered by Price-Anderson only when they hold a license to use the materials involved in any nuclear incident. One District Court has held that, regardless of the type of institution in question, the Act applies exclusively to entities holding licenses. Irwin v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 3:10-CV-300, 2011 WL 976376, at  (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2011). And the unpersuasive Samples opinion mentioned above in footnote 7 gives a nod to that view as well, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (“the word occurrence as used in the definition of nuclear incident means that event at the site of the licensed activity, or activity for which the Commission has entered into a contract, which may cause damage” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original)). For this reason too, Boyer asserts, UPenn is not covered by the Act. But the University of Pennsylvania has such a license. Its license to engage in research using cesium-137 irradiators was issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Radiation Protection, which exercises delegated authority from the NRC per § 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2021. Boyer says that’s not good enough; the license must be issued by the NRC directly. Her argument, however, is hard to follow. The Price-Anderson Act is part of the Atomic Energy Act. The latter gives the NRC authority to enter into agreements with states allowing them to issue licenses in the NRC’s stead. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021. In her Reply, Boyer 19 seems to argue that, because UPenn has a state-issued license, only state nuclear regulations apply to its and its affiliates’ conduct, and thus the Price-Anderson Act does not apply to her suit. But Boyer never says why this would be true. Indeed, our sister Circuit has held that “[t]here is nothing in the definition of ‘nuclear incident’ which suggests [the Act’s application] should be contingent on whether the occurrence took place in a state which regulates its own [nuclear material] industry under NRC guidelines” or leaves that regulation to the NRC directly. Acuna, 200 F.3d at 339. We thus reject the argument that UPenn’s state-issued license is meaningfully different in this context from a license issued directly by the NRC. As a result, even if Boyer is correct that possession of a license is the lynchpin for Price-Anderson’s applicability, UPenn’s license would satisfy that requirement here.9 Next up is Boyer’s claim that the Act applies only to unintentional releases of nuclear energy. For support, she looks to one District Court that declined to apply the Act to claims of cancer patients intentionally subjected to radiation because “all of the cases applying the Price–Anderson Act have extended potential liability only to the unintended escape or release of nuclear energy.” In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 832 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (emphasis added). Boyer contends her claims similarly do not implicate an unintentional release of nuclear energy. But that’s not true. Her complaint alleges that Ware was harmed by UPenn’s neglect of its duty to protect him adequately from 9 We do not hold that possession of a license determines the Act’s applicability. Rather, we note only that, if having a license matters in this context, it makes no difference whether the license was issued by the NRC directly or by a state acting under delegated authority. 20 radiation—that is, negligence, not deliberate exposure. So even if this exception to the Act exists, it wouldn’t apply to this case. Finally, the Cincinnati Radiation Court also noted that, during the legislative process leading to the 1988 amendments, Congress considered explicitly expanding the Act’s reach to cover “persons operating nuclear pharmacies or hospital medicine department[s,]” but declined to enact the expansion. Id. at 832 n.33 (citing S. Rep. No. 100–218, at 18 (1988), reprinted as 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1476, 1493). So, Boyer argues, we should hold Congress’ failure to adopt this language implies a limit on the Act’s application to harm from radiation used for medical care. But even if we were to read so much into Congress’ inaction, it wouldn’t help Boyer. The cesium-137 irradiators that allegedly harmed Ware were not used for patient care or any medical purpose nor were they kept in a nuclear pharmacy. They were used for research only and kept in a lab. The language Congress declined to enact simply has nothing to do with the facts of this case. None of this is to say that the Act applies to all harm occurring from nuclear material in any situation whatsoever. Counsel for UPenn conceded at oral argument that any nuclear incident must, at the very least, involve “source, special nuclear, or byproduct material[.]” See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). According to counsel, that limitation would exempt harm arising from, among other things, x-rays, CAT scans, and naturally occurring uranium and radium. Audio Recording of Oral Argument held June 28, 2017 at 32:30 to 33:18 (http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/163801EstateofJeffreyHWarevHospitaloftheUnivesityofPennsyl vaniaetal.mp3). Moreover, as mentioned, we do not decide whether the possession of a license, the intent of any nuclear 21 energy release, or the medical use of nuclear material, might affect the Act’s applicability to a particular case. We note only that these implicit limitations on the Price-Anderson Act’s scope would not preclude its application here.