Opinion ID: 209547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Equitable Relief

Text: Finally, we address Tavory's argument that the district court erred in denying him leave to amend his complaint to add a claim for federal equitable relief. We apply the law of the regional circuit in reviewing denials of leave to amend a pleading. Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys. LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 8 If, however, Tavory's co-ownership did not depend on resolving inventorship or any other issue governed exclusively by federal law, his unjust enrichment claim may not be preempted because ownership, as distinct from inventorship, is generally governed by state law. See Jim Arnold Corp. v, Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 2007-1527 15 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Here, we review the district court's denial of leave to amend a pleading for an abuse of discretion. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999). Leave to amend may properly be denied where the amendment would be futile. See Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986). The district court held that amending a complaint with a new claim that could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) would be futile. See Schmidling v. City of Chicago, 1 F.3d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 1993). We agree, and Tavory does not seriously challenge this view. Tavory argues in large part that the district court erred in denying him leave to amend by relying on the same reasoning for its dismissal of Tavory's unjust enrichment claim, which Tavory argues was also wrong. As already discussed, that decision was correct. Thus, to the extent Tavory's vague claim for federal equitable relief is just a purported federal version of his state law unjust enrichment claim, the district court correctly held it was futile to add it to the complaint. Tavory next relies on Cyanamid IV as supposedly recognizing a federal equitable relief cause of action. But nowhere in that decision do we do so; we note that the district court considered equitable claims (such as unjust enrichment), and certainly the equitable remedy of correction of inventorship was at issue, but we vacated all of the district court's patent-related decisions as based on an erroneous determination of inventorship (i.e., because it was decided under state law rather than federal law). Cyanamid IV, 196 F.3d at 1376. To the extent Tavory is arguing that his federal equitable relief claim seeks the correction of the patents to list him as a co-inventor, the 2007-1527 16 district court clearly did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to add such a duplicative claim. Lastly, Tavory relies on Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Industries, Inc., 939 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1991). There, we held that the plaintiff could not sue the infringer for damages because, during the entire period of infringement, plaintiff held equitable title but not legal title. Id. at 1579-80. Initially, the legal title holder of the patent at issue entered into an agreement to assign ownership of future inventions to the plaintiff. Id. at 1580-81. The legal owner later executed an actual assignment of ownership to the plaintiff of a patent to such an invention, but he was not assigned the right to sue for past infringement. Id. at 1576. Thus, we held that the patentee could still sue for past infringement but could only be granted equitable relief. Id. at 1579-80. This case is inapposite here. Tavory is not suing for infringement and is not seeking equitable relief for infringement. If he was adjudicated to be a co-inventor he would assume legal title retroactive to issuance because he has never assigned his ownership interests in the patents-in-suit, if any. Thus, Tavory would never have held equitable title but not legal title. And Arachnid certainly does not support a vague cause of action for unspecified federal equitable relief. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend the complaint.