Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Other Purported Evidentiary Errors

Text: (38a) Defendant argues that testimony on the subject of blood-spatter by Linton von Beroldingen (1) failed to meet the Kelly/Frye test ( People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 [130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240]; Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir.1923) 293 F. 1013 [34 A.L.R. 145]), and (2) was presented by an unqualified expert. Defendant's contentions lack merit. First, with respect to the Kelly/Frye issue, this objection was not raised in the trial court and defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 688 [276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278].) Second, overlooking the procedural obstacle, the objection is without merit. [32] The testimony at issue here raises none of the concerns addressed by Kelly/Frye. The methods employed are not new to [science] or the law, and they carry no misleading aura of scientific infallibility. ( People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1157 [265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698] [psychological profile testimony], italics in the original.) In fact, the admissibility of blood-spatter or blood dynamics testimony in this state predates our Kelly decision. ( People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 750-751 [312 P.2d 665].) Moreover, neither the experiments conducted in connection with such analysis nor the principles underlying it produce an aura of scientific infallibility. Rather, it is a matter of common knowledge, readily understood by the jury, that blood will be expelled from the human body if it is hit with sufficient force and that inferences can be drawn from the manner in which the expelled blood lands upon other objects. The Kelly/Frye rule is inapplicable. [33] To the extent that defendant now renews his objection to the qualifications of Linton von Beroldingen, this objection is also without merit. (39) A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates. (Evid. Code, ง 720, subd. (a).) The trial court's determination that a witness is qualified as an expert will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. ( People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 828 [218 Cal. Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372].) (38b) No abuse of discretion is shown on this record. The witness had: (1) attended lectures and training seminars on the subject of blood dynamics in both California and Oregon; (2) read relevant literature; (3) conducted relevant experiments; [34] and (4) visited crime scenes where blood-spatter tests were conducted. ( People v. Carter, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 750; but see People v. Hogan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 851-852.) The trial court reasonably concluded that the witness was qualified to assist the jury in its inquiry. Finally, no prejudice possibly could have resulted from the blood-spatter testimony. The testimony in question was brief and not inflammatory in light of the ample evidence of the brutality of the murder.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by permitting Dr. Lee Coleman (Coleman), a psychiatrist, to testify as a rebuttal witness for the prosecution during the guilt phase of the trial. Coleman testified regarding the doubtful value of certain psychiatric testimony offered by the defense experts, especially that offered by Dr. Raffle regarding defendant's state of mind at the time of the crimes. Defendant concedes that in a recent case we rejected similar objections to such testimony by the same Coleman. ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 728-731 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729].) Defendant's attempt to factually distinguish this adverse authority is without merit. Considerations similar to those expressed in our prior opinion lead us to conclude that the admission of Coleman's testimony was neither improper nor prejudicial. ( Ibid. ) Defendant also objects to Coleman's testimony on the ground that he was not qualified to give expert testimony on the subject of the unreliability of psychiatric testimony and that this subject is not a proper subject of expert testimony. These contentions lack merit. Based upon the facts elicited in voir dire of the witness, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Coleman's opinion testimony.