Opinion ID: 2011173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The quality of the interaction between the child and others.

Text: Section 16-2353(b)(3) requires the judge to consider the quality of the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent, siblings, relative and/or caretakers, including the foster parent. It is undisputed that M.D., Jr.'s relationship with his foster mother, and apparently with other members of her household, has been altogether favorable. Dr. Galler described L.L.'s interaction with M.D., Jr. as very warm. The judge found that M.D., Jr. has also bonded well with his father, but not with his mother. [23] Given the father's sparse visitation record and his mercurial history, however, we do not believe that the record contains any reliable basis for believing that favorable interaction could continue on a long-term basis. Both Dr. Moldauer and Dr. Galler testified that the father lacked the patience and stability required to interact successfully with a 3-year-old boy. [24] Dr. Moldauer, as we have observed, discerned no realistic possibility that this problem could be resolved in the next decade or so. At oral argument before this court, the father's counsel stated that, according to the expert testimony, the average age for men to recover from an antisocial personality disorder is 46. The father is about 33. When he is 46, M.D., Jr. will be 17. [25]
The trial judge concluded that M.D., Sr. was entitled to a parental preference because he was a fit parent who had grasped his opportunity interest. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). M.D., Jr. and L.L. challenge this finding, both as to the father's fitness and as to the sufficiency of his exercise of his parental rights, [26] and contend that, contrary to the judge's ruling, they proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father's parental rights and adoption by L.L. were both in M.D., Jr.'s best interest. Given the judge's evidentiary findings and the uncontradicted expert testimony, her ultimate finding that M.D., Sr. is a fit parent for M.D., Jr., or that he is likely to become fit in the near future, would be difficult to sustain even under the deferential clearly erroneous standard. A convicted child molester with a criminal background, homicidal ideation, and a record of threatening conduct is not fit in the ordinary everyday sense of that word. But even if we assume, solely for the sake of argument, that M.D., Sr. has not been shown to be unfit, we conclude as a matter of law that the judge's evidentiary findings cannot be reconciled with her implicit conclusion that eventual reunification with the father would be in M.D., Jr.'s best interest. Unfortunately, in our society, conduct vis-a-vis children which in the past might have been viewed as unspeakable has almost become commonplace and unremarkable. As a result of his mother's ingestion of crack cocaine during her pregnancy, M.D., Jr. was brought into this world with that addictive substance already in his system. Predictably, he cried and cried. As if parental transmission of a potential cocaine dependency to a helpless newborn child were not enough, M.D., Sr. acknowledged in open court that he committed a sexual offense against a seven-year-old girl, one who was his own stepdaughter. This is not all. The parents are married to one another, and may contemplate that their son would live with both of them. [27] He would thus be placed at the tender mercy of a father who, according to the testimony of court-appointed experts, suffers from a severe personality disorder which has led him to threaten people, attempt suicide, commit numerous criminal acts, and blame virtually everyone except himself for his troubles. M.D., Jr. would potentially find himself in the care of a mother who has been indifferent to him, who has prostituted herself (presumably for dope), and who has for some time lived the lifestyle of a cocaine addict. [28] Nothing in life is certain. It is conceivable, of course, that the experts were wrong, that the trial judge was right, and that notwithstanding the father's indecent liberties conviction, criminal background, and past emotional disturbance, he no longer represents a significant danger to his son's emotional and physical well-being. On this remarkable record, however, it is far more probable that the experts were right, that the past will repeat itself, and that the father's antisocial personality disorder will come to the fore under the pressures of looking after a four-year-old boy (and, possibly, a cocaine-addicted wife). The question is therefore whether the law permits a court to take the kind of risk with M.D., Jr.'s future that reunification with his father would present. We hold that the court's first duty is to protect M.D., Jr. from any unwarranted danger of harm. As we recently noted in a similar (but less extreme) factual context, the court, acting as parens patriae in L.W.'s behalf, would surely be loath to take the kind of risk with this child's future which the biological father is asking us to take. L.W., supra, 613 A.2d at 354-55. Courts will not gamble with a child's future. In re Interest of P.M.C., 231 Neb. 701, 437 N.W.2d 786, 792 (1989). On this record, the return of M.D., Jr. to his father would, at the very least, serious[ly] threat[en] ... the future welfare of the child. Fritts v. Krugh, 354 Mich. 97, 92 N.W.2d 604, 614 (1958); see also In re Sprite, 155 Mich.App. 531, 400 N.W.2d 320, 323 (1986). Indeed, the possibility that the father would change his past conduct is entirely speculative, especially in light of the testimony of Dr. Moldauer. [29] Where, as here, the child has been successfully integrated into a stable home from which he would now have to be removed if the father were awarded custody, the risk inherent in such an outcome is unacceptable as a matter of law.
Our conclusion that early reunification would constitute an unwarranted gamble with M.D., Jr.'s future is not, in and of itself, dispositive of this appeal. Indeed, the question of the child's custody is not technically before us, for the neglect proceedings relating to M.D., Jr. are before a different judge who, according to the trial judge in this case, may hold a view of the situation different from her own. Although here, as in L.W., supra, the only conceivable basis for denying the petition by [L.L.] would be to enable [the] biological father to assume custody, 613 A.2d at 355 n. 10, and although the father's counsel indicated at argument that he will promptly seek the return of his son if the trial court's decision is affirmed, immediate reunification and termination of parental rights are not the only available alternatives. A third option would be to affirm the denial of the petitions, in the expectation that the trial court would seek to bring about more effective action by the social service agencies, and then to wait and see, in the hope that, contrary to the expert testimony, reunification with the father will become feasible some time in the future. Termination of parental rights is a drastic remedy, which should be ordered only upon a showing of clear necessity. See, e.g., In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, 1241, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880, 99 S.Ct. 216, 58 L.Ed.2d 192 (1978); see also In re Adoption of Carlos, 413 Mass. 339, 596 N.E.2d 1383, 1389 (1992) (characterizing termination as an extreme step). Courts are properly expected to exercise restraint before ordering such relief. William L., supra, 383 A.2d at 1240-41. We are therefore obliged to consider whether the trial judge's denial of the petitions was an appropriate exercise of that restraint and therefore within her discretion, notwithstanding our disagreement with some of her legal analysis. We are mindful, in that regard, of the fact that M.D., Jr. presently has a father with whom, according to the trial judge, he has bonded. Adoption of M.D., Jr. by L.L. would deprive the father of any legally protected interest in the boy's future upbringing, and M.D., Jr. would no longer have a legally recognized father. The trial judge's refusal to dissolve permanently the existing legal relationship between father and son is not to be lightly overridden. Nevertheless, we cannot sustain the wait and see option. Legislatures and courts alike have recognized that, in the words of one commentary, no child can grow emotionally while in limbo. He cannot invest except in a minimal way ... if tomorrow the relationship may be severed. M. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STANFORD L.REV. 985, 995 (1975) (quoting BRYCE & EHLERT, 144 Foster Children, 50 CHILD WELFARE 499, 503 (1971)). In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized that protracted stays in [foster] care ... may deprive [neglected] children of positive, nurturing family relationships and have deleterious effects on their development into responsible, productive citizens. Id. at 835-36 n. 37, 97 S.Ct. at 2105 n. 37 (quoting legislative finding). Legislation on the federal and local levels has been enacted to counteract the dangers inherent in the consignment of neglected children for an indefinite period to temporary expedients such as foster care. The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1986 (AACWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 670, et seq., requires affected jurisdictions to facilitate permanent placement for children as a condition to receiving federal funding for their foster care and adoption assistance programs. [T]he central purpose of the legislation is to remove children from long term foster care, either by uniting them with their parents or by placing them with adoptive parents or in some other permanent arrangement. Ashley K., supra note 19, 156 Ill.Dec. at 938, 571 N.E.2d at 918. Foster care, with few exceptions, should be a temporary placement. Id. (quoting Senator Cranston's remarks in introducing the bill, 125 Cong.Rec. S22684 (Aug. 3, 1979)); see also In re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 642 A.2d 201, 204 (1994). [30] The District of Columbia receives federal financial assistance pursuant to the AACWA, see LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 962-64 (D.D.C.1991), aff'd sub nom. La-Shawn A. v. Kelly, 301 U.S.App.D.C. 49, 990 F.2d 1319 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 691, 126 L.Ed.2d 659 (1994), and is obliged to comply with its mandates. The District has also enacted legislation requiring prompt planning for the permanent placement of a child who has not been reunited with his or her family within a reasonable time. See D.C.Code §§ 6-2123(b)(2); 16-2360(b); LaShawn A., supra, 762 F.Supp. at 964; see also In re A.W., 569 A.2d 168, 172-73 (D.C.1990) (discussing legislative history of TPR statute). [31] Almost everyone agrees that a child should not be suspended permanently in foster care ... if any other solution is possible. 3 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, § 29.10, at 77 (2d ed. 1994). If a child is adoptable, then adoption is the statutorily preferred plan, for the goal of permanency planning is to end the uncertainty of foster care and allow the dependent child to form a long-lasting emotional attachment to a permanent caretaker. In re Brian R., 2 Cal. App.4th 904, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 768, 778 (6th Dist. 1991) (citations omitted). A child cannot, and should not, be left suspended in foster care, nor be made to await uncertain parental maturity. In re Interest of J.W., 224 Neb. 897, 402 N.W.2d 671, 676 (1987); see also P.M.C., supra, 437 N.W.2d at 792. In the present case, according to the expert testimony, the improvement of the father's condition to the point where he could safely look after M.D., Jr., is not only uncertain but, for the foreseeable future, extremely improbable. Although we sincerely hope that [the father] one day finds mental and emotional stability, we cannot leave [M.D., Jr.] in legal limbo waiting for an event that likely will never happen. In re Adoption No. 10941, supra, 642 A.2d at 211. The recent decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Adoption No. 10941 is instructive. There, the maternal grandparents of Ivan M., who was born in June, 1990, and who had lived with them since birth, filed a petition to adopt him. The Department of Social Services filed a companion petition to terminate Ivan's mother's parental rights. [32] The mother, who was mentally retarded and schizophrenic, opposed the petition and sought to obtain custody of Ivan. The trial judge found that it was in Ivan M's interest to remain in the custody of his grandparents, but held that his continued placement with them did not require termination of the mother's parental rights. He reasoned that the [c]hild is presently in a stable environment with his grandparents, and this environment provides him with the security and sense of belonging to a family that is the goal of adoption. In re Adoption No. 10941, supra, 642 A.2d at 211 (quoting the trial court's order). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that [o]nly termination of parental rights and a subsequent permanent placement, such as the adoption sought by the grandparents here, can provide Ivan with the permanency he needs and the Legislature has mandated. Id. at 212. The court explained that it was necessary to approve the grandparents' petition to adopt because, so long as Ivan has not been adopted, he remains within the foster care system, and thereby subject to administrative review every six months. He also remains under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, subject to periodic judicial review. This constant administrative and judicial supervision is disruptive to the lives of Ivan and his grandparents, and is the very type of uncertainty the child welfare statutes were designed to avoid. Also, as Ivan's natural guardian, [the mother] has the right to visitation and the right to make educational and medical decisions on his behalf. [Statutory citation omitted.] More importantly, while the grandparents have expressed their unequivocal desire to adopt Ivan, if they are not his legal parents, they can later decide, for whatever reason, that they are no longer in a position to care for Ivan. If this were to occur, the grandparents would simply inform the juvenile court that retains jurisdiction over Ivan that they can no longer care for him and the court would have no alternative but to place him back in the foster care system. This possible foster care drift is exactly what Congress and our General Assembly desire to avoid. Id. at 212. These considerations apply with at least equal force to M.D., Jr.'s situation. [33] See also In re Adoption of Gwendolyn, 29 Mass.App. 130, 558 N.E.2d 10, 14 (1990). If the decision in this case were to wait and see, then for how long should the trial court do so? M.D., Jr. has already lived with the foster mother for three years. May permanency for M.D., Jr. be deferred for two more years? Five years? Even ten more, according to Dr. Moldauer, would not be enough to make a placement with the father feasible. We conclude, as a matter of law, that on these facts, the wait and see alternative cannot be reconciled with M.D., Jr.'s best interests or with the authorities which we have cited. [34]
Where a judge, in exercising her discretion, has in our view misapprehended applicable legal principles, we often remand the case for reconsideration under the correct standards. See, e.g., Murphy v. McCloud, supra, 650 A.2d at 220. In the present case, in light of the clear weight of the evidence and the danger to the child, however, we are of the opinion that such a remand would serve no useful purpose. We recognize that appellants had the burden to prove their case by clear and convincing evidence. An appellate court will rarely hold as a matter of law, notwithstanding the contrary view of the trial judge, that a party's proof satisfied such an exacting standard. In the vast majority of cases, that determination must be made by the trier of fact. We conclude, however, that this is one of the rare cases in which such an appellate ruling is appropriate. Indeed, the law requires us so to hold in the interest of M.D., Jr. [35] Like all mortals, M.D., Sr. has both strengths and weaknesses. One may well regard as admirable his fight to keep his son, which he has waged, in the trial judge's words, against the odds. Moreover, termination of parental rights, as we have noted, is an extreme remedy. Nevertheless, the best interests of this child cannot be disregarded in order to reward the father for his efforts or to encourage others to exercise their parental responsibilities. M.D., Jr. is the subject of this litigation. What is best for him trumps all other considerations.