Opinion ID: 3060770
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fraud in the Inducement to Sign the MSA

Text: White Construction argues Martin Marietta fraudulently induced it to enter into the MSA. White Construction contends Martin Marietta falsely promised that: (1) the MSA would terminate upon the conclusion of the criminal proceedings; and (2) Martin Marietta would honor the terms of the Letter of Intent (LOI) and purchase its remaining assets for $15.5 million. White Construction asserts when Martin Marietta made these statements, Martin Marietta knew its promises were false because it had no intention of purchasing its assets at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.2 Therefore, White Construction asserts there remains a 2 In White Construction’s third amended complaint, it also argues Martin Marietta falsely stated it would properly manage the Clifton, O’Neal, and Cabbage Grove quarries. Further, White Construction argues it reasonably relied on Martin Marietta’s false statements to its detriment because it lost the lease of the O’Neal and Clifton quarries due to Martin Marietta’s failure to renew the leases. This argument was not briefed on appeal and is, therefore, deemed abandoned. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). 3 genuine issue of material fact as to whether it justifiably relied upon Martin Marietta’s false statements when it executed the MSA with Martin Marietta Florida.3 This argument has no merit. To recover on a claim for fraud in the inducement, a plaintiff must allege “(a) the representor made a misrepresentation of a material fact; (b) the representor knew or should have known of the falsity of the statement; (c) the representor intended that the representation would induce another to rely and act on it; and (d) the plaintiff suffered injury in justifiable reliance on the representation.” Joseph v. Liberty Nat’l Bank, 873 So. 2d 384, 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (alteration omitted). As a general rule in Florida, fraud in the inducement “cannot be predicated upon a mere promise not performed.” Alexander/Davis Props., Inc. v. Graham, 397 So. 2d 699, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Moreover, “a fraud claim 3 White Construction argues Martin Marietta was not a party to the MSA. White Construction never meaningfully distinguished between Martin Marietta and Martin Marietta Florida in their third amended complaint or in their response to Martin Marietta’s summary judgment motion. However, White Construction attempted to raise this argument late in the summary judgment process. White Construction filed a Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Supplement Their Response to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment seeking permission to supplement their response to Martin Marietta’s motion for summary judgment to include the argument Martin Marietta was not a party to the MSA. The district court denied the motion, concluding as stated in an earlier order that “further briefing will not aid this Court in addressing the pending Motion for Summary Judgment.” White Construction does not appeal the district court’s denial of their Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Supplement Their Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. As White Construction does not appeal the denial of that motion, they have abandoned any argument the district court abused its discretion in denying that motion. See Tanner Adver. Grp., LLC v. Fayette County, Ga., 451 F.3d 777, 785-86 (11th Cir. 2006). 4 cannot be premised on a promise to do something in the future except where the promise is made without any intention of performing or made with the positive intention not to perform.” Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1316 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). White Construction has not established a viable claim for fraud in the inducement. First, we reject White Construction’s argument that Martin Marietta made a misrepresentation of material fact. At most, White Construction alleges Martin Marietta made a mere promise not performed, which cannot form the predicate for actionable fraud. Second, White Construction has not proffered any evidence to show that at the time the MSA was executed, Martin Marietta knew these alleged statements were false. Moreover, according to the terms of the MSA, Martin Marietta included an option to purchase White Construction’s assets. This language expressly reserves Martin Marietta’s right to purchase White Construction’s assets at its discretion. Due to the express reservation of discretionary purchase power, White Construction has not shown Martin Marietta intended for White Construction to rely and act on the alleged false promise. Furthermore, White Construction was not only aware of the option to purchase, but unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate to have the clause removed. Despite its efforts, White Construction eventually agreed to the option to purchase clause 5 while aware the terms of the MSA directly contradicted the alleged oral promises. Thus, we are unable to conclude White Construction justifiably relied on any alleged promise that Martin Marietta would purchase its assets for $15.5 million once the criminal proceedings settled. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying White Construction’s claim of fraud in the inducement to sign the MSA.