Opinion ID: 2532452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court improperly denied Banyard's proffered duress instruction.

Text: ¶ 11. On appellate review of the trial court's grant or denial of a proposed jury instruction, our primary concern is that `the jury was fairly instructed and that each party's proof-grounded theory of the case was placed before it.' [6] We ask whether the instruction at issue contained a correct statement of law and was warranted by the evidence. [7] While a party is entitled to jury instructions that present his theory of the case, this entitlement is limited; the trial court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. [8] ¶ 12. A defendant is entitled to have instructions on his theory of the case presented, even though the evidence that supports it is weak, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility. [9] If the defendant presents sufficient evidence in the record to support his theory of the case, he should then be given an instruction on his theory of the case. There needs [sic] not be even a plausible explanation. [10] A criminal defendant is entitled to have his jury instructed on all offenses of which an evidentiary basis exists in the record, even where the evidence. ... arises only in the defendant's own testimony. [11] ¶ 13. This Court has held that where a person reasonably believes that he is in danger of physical harm he may be excused for some conduct which ordinarily would be criminal. [12] We have approvingly cited the four-part test for duress set forth by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: (1) the defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that he had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in the situation; (3) that he had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; (4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal action and the avoidance of harm. [13] ¶ 14. Banyard's theory of the case is that he participated in the robbery under duress (thus lacking the necessary specific intent), and that Ballard was accidentally shot when Banyard was handing Ragsdale the gun. He claims that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support this theory. Thus, Banyard argues, the trial court erred when it refused his duress instruction, because the refusal effectively disallowed the jury from considering Banyard's theory of the case. [14] ¶ 15. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial judge's ruling that the proffered duress instruction was an incorrect statement of law because it included a manslaughter instruction. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, because Banyard had killed Ballard during the course of a robbery, he was not entitled to a manslaughter instruction. [15] ¶ 16. The Court of Appeals also held that there was no evidentiary basis to support Banyard's proffered duress instruction. Specifically, the Court of Appeals noted that Banyard had the gun in his hand throughout much of the ordeal, and that he failed to present evidence that he did not have a reasonable opportunity to avoid participating in the crime, thus negating his duress claim. [16] We address both findings.