Opinion ID: 2715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BIA's Test In Matter of Acosta

Text: 16 In 1985, the BIA undertook to clarify the meaning of the phrase particular social group in the seminal decision of Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232-34 (BIA 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). In Matter of Acosta, the BIA explained that a particular social group is one unified by some characteristic that is either (1) beyond the power of an individual to change or (2) so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. The BIA explained that [t]he shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land ownership. Id. 17 Recently, in In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006), the BIA reaffirmed the Acosta test and provided further clarification regarding its proper application. See id. at 955-61. It observed that Acosta does not require a voluntary associational relationship among group members nor does it require an element of cohesiveness or homogeneity among group members. Id. at 956-57. However, a group's visibility—meaning the extent to which members of society perceive those with the relevant characteristic as members of a social group—is a factor in determining whether it constitutes a particular social group under the INA. Id. at 957, 959-60. 18 With regard to groups united by some shared past experience, In re C-A- reiterated that shared past experiences do constitute an immutable characteristic because a past experience cannot be undone. See id. at 958; see also Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (BIA 1988) (stating that an applicant's status as a former member of the national police was in fact an immutable characteristic that could serve as the basis of a particular social group). Yet, not all applicants who can point to membership in some group united by a shared past experience will qualify for asylum. Rather, an asylum applicant's status as a member of a particular social group—and not some other factor—must be the central reason why that individual is targeted for persecution. Thus, the BIA indicated that an individual who is targeted due to her status as a former police officer may be eligible for asylum as a member of the particular social group of former police officers. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 958-59; see also Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 662. But, a former police officer singled out for reprisal because of her role in disrupting particular criminal activity would likely not be eligible for asylum. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959. In the second scenario, the persecution the applicant fears is not a result simply of her status as a former police officer, but rather is a result occasioned by other factors more specific to the particular applicant. 19 In sum, the BIA has adopted a broad definition of particular social group, one that encompasses groups united by a shared past experience. Nonetheless, in determining whether an applicant ultimately qualifies for asylum, courts must examine closely whether the persecution the applicant fears derives primarily from his or her status as a member of that particular social group or whether it derives primarily from some other factor.