Opinion ID: 1912613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: jury was properly instructed

Text: Mats assigns that the district court improperly instructed the jury in two respects. First, he argues the court should have required jurors to reach a unanimous decision on the State's alternative theories of exceptional depravity. Second, he contends that the wording of one of the alter native theories was unconstitutionally vague. We reject both arguments. (a) Use of the Term Apparently Relished Did Not Render Aggravator Instruction Unconstitutionally Vague Mata contends that the district court erred in instructing the jury that the State can satisfy the exceptional depravity aggravator in § 29-2523(1)(d) by proving that the defendant apparently relished the murder. (Emphasis supplied.) He argues that the use of the term apparently relished rendered the instruction unconstitutionally vague. He contends it is not clear whether the term refers to the juror's perception or the defendant's mental state. Mata cites no authority for this argument. Whether jury instructions given by a trial court are correct is a question of law. [68] In death penalty cases, the key inquiry in examining eligibility and selection factors is whether they are neutral and principled. [69] In determining whether an aggravating circumstance, is unconstitutionally vague, the court should consider whether it creates an unacceptable risk of randomness, the, mark of [an] arbitrary and capricious sentencing process. [70] An aggravating factor must be sufficiently narrow so that it does not apply to everyone convicted of first degree murder. [71] But [b]ecause the proper degree of definition' of eligibility and selection factors often `is not susceptible of mathematical precision,' [a] vagueness review is quite deferential. [72] [A] factor is not unconstitutional if it has some `common-sense core of meaning' that a juror can understand. [73] Jury instruction No. 2, in relevant part, provided: The State of Nebraska has alleged the following aggravating circumstance existed at the time the defendant committed the crime of first degree murder: That the murder manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence The aggravating circumstance is presumed not to exist. That means you may not return a verdict that it does exist unless you unanimously decide the state has proved its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. .... The essential elements necessary to prove the alleged aggravating circumstance of exceptional depravity are either that: 1. the defendant apparently relished the murder; or 2. the defendant inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim; or 3. the defendant needlessly mutilated the victim. These three alternative theories come directly from this court's five-factor test for applying the exceptional depravity aggravator, [74] As noted, the Eighth Circuit has held these five factors are constitutional. [75] In addition, we have previously concluded that the phrase apparent effort to conceal in aggravator (1)(b) of the earlier version of § 29-2523 referred to the fact finder's perspective of the defendant's conduct. Before 1998, aggravator (1)(b) provided: The murder was committed in an apparent effort to conceal the commission of a crime ... In State v. Reeves, [76] we agreed with the federal district court that `apparent' means `readily perceptible' and further agreed that aggravator (1)(b) cannot be applied in speculative situations or where a strained construction is necessary to fulfill it. After the Legislature removed apparent from aggravator (1)(b) in 1998, the defendant in State v. Lotter [77] argued that the change had narrowed this aggravator's application, which necessitated resentencing. Thus, we considered the effect that change had on what the sentencing panel must conclude to find the existence of this aggravator. [78] We first considered the meaning of the phrase apparent effort before the amendment. We noted that readily perceptible means easily capable of being noticed. We stated that before the amendment, apparent effort meant that for the sentencing panel to conclude that [the defendant] murdered ... in an `apparent effort to conceal the commission of a crime,' it must have been obvious to the panel that that was [the defendant's] purpose. [79] We concluded that apparent had no substantive meaning and was an obtuse way of stating that the aggravator must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the challenge in Lotter was different, we concluded that apparent clearly refers to the fact finder's perception. By analogy, we conclude that a juror. would have clearly understood that the term apparently relished in our five-factor test under § 29-2523(1)(d) referred to his or her own perception of Mata's conduct. The instruction was therefore not unconstitutionally vague.