Opinion ID: 2537633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in refusing Fulgham's unanimity instruction D-48.

Text: ¶ 17. This Court has ruled that `[t]he trial court enjoys considerable discretion regarding the form and substance of jury instructions.' [7] `In determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found.' [8] In order to show that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant an instruction, the defendant must show that his requested instruction was (1) a correct statement of the law, (2) not substantially covered in the jury charges as a whole, and (3) of such importance that the court's failure to instruct the jury on that issue seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present his given defense. [9] ¶ 18. Instruction D-48 reads: For you to find Kristi Fulgham guilty of capital murder, you must also agree, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Fulgham robbed Joey Fulgham of the same item. If all twelve of you do not agree on the same criminal act which supports the State's allegation of robbery, you must find Kristi Fulgham not guilty of capital murder. ¶ 19. Fulgham argues that the underlying felony of robbery is a specific-intent crime, and that the jury should have been instructed that it must agree unanimously on which item was taken. Fulgham argues that the trial court's failure to grant instruction D-48 violated her state and federal constitutional right to a unanimous verdict, because she claims the State argued that Fulgham took Joey's wallet, the CPU, and the life-insurance proceeds. ¶ 20. Fulgham also argues that the State created a situation in which certain members of the jury could have found that Fulgham had robbed Joey of his wallet while other jurors could have found that she had taken the CPU. Finally, Fulgham argues that a conviction based on the missing CPU is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as there is no evidence that the CPU was present in the house on Friday night or that it was appropriated by criminal means. ¶ 21. Contrary to her arguments, a review of the record does not show an argument by the State that Fulgham had robbed Joey of life insurance proceeds. The State argued that Fulgham had a desire for money and that the life insurance proceeds served as a motive for the murder. But the State did argue that Fulgham had robbed Joey of his wallet (and its contents) and/or the CPU. ¶ 22. To obtain a conviction for robbery, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) feloniously took (2) the personal property of another (3) in his presence or from his person and (4) against his will, (5) by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of some immediate injury to his person. [10] At issue is whether the court should have granted a specific unanimity instruction relative to element two (as embodied in D-48), because the State argued alternative theories of what personal property was taken. ¶ 23. We begin our analysis of this issue by recognizing that criminal defendants in state courts do not have a federal constitutional right to a unanimous verdict by a twelve-member jury. [11] But Article 3, Section 31 of the Mississippi Constitution [12] has been interpreted to provide criminal defendants the right to a unanimous jury verdict of twelve impartial jurors. [13] Even so, we do not believe that this right was violated under the facts of this case (as will be explained below). Furthermore, we look to the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent in interpreting our state constitution. ¶ 24. In Schad v. Arizona , [14] the defendant appealed his conviction of first-degree murder [15] where the prosecution had argued, and the trial court had instructed on, two theories of liability: premeditated murder and felony murder. [16] On appeal, the Supreme Court framed the issue as whether it was constitutionally acceptable to permit the jurors to reach one verdict based on any combination of the alternative findings. [17] In its analysis, the Court stated: We have never suggested that in returning general verdicts in such cases, the jurors should be required to agree upon a single means of commission, any more than the indictments were required to specify one alone. In these cases, as in litigation generally, different jurors may be persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the bottom line. Plainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict. [18] The Court held that premeditation and felony murder were alternative means of proving first-degree murder, and that such an option did not fall beyond the constitutional bounds of fundamental fairness and rationality. [19] ¶ 25. In Griffin v. United States , [20] the Court considered whether either its precedent or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment required that a general guilty verdict on a multiple-object conspiracy be set aside if the evidence was inadequate to support a conviction as to one of the objects. [21] The Court began its analysis with the common-law rule that a general jury verdict was valid so long as it was legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds  even though it gave no assurance that a valid ground, rather than an invalid one, was actually the basis for the jury's action. [22] The Court concluded that this rule applied to a variety of contexts including a general jury verdict under a single count charging the commission of an offense by two or more means. [23] ¶ 26. The Court did find that reversal was warranted where the jury was presented with alternative legal theories, one of which was legal error, but not where the jury was presented with alternative factual theories and one was factually inadequate. [24] The Court explained its holding with the following analysis: Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law  whether, for example, the action in question is protected by the Constitution, is time barred, or fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime. When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error. Quite the opposite is true, however, when they have been left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well equipped to analyze the evidence . . . As the Seventh Circuit put it: It is one thing to negate a verdict that, while supported by the evidence, may have been based on an erroneous view of the law; it is another to do so merely on the chance  remote, it seems to us  that the jury convicted on a ground that was not supported by adequate evidence when there existed alternative grounds for which the evidence was sufficient. [25] ¶ 27. And in Richardson v. United States, [26] the defendant appealed his conviction under a federal criminal statute that prohibited a person from engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. [27] The statute defined continuing criminal enterprise as part of a continuing series of violations. [28] On appeal, the Court examined whether a jury has to agree unanimously about which specific violations make up the `continuing series of violations.' [29] The Court held that a jury must agree unanimously about the specific violations, since the phrase series of violations constituted several elements. [30] In reaching its holding, the Court distinguished the case before it from a juror disagreement over the means: The question before us arises because a federal jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say, which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime. . . . Where, for example, an element of robbery is force or the threat of force, some jurors might conclude that the defendant used a knife to create the threat; others might conclude he used a gun. But that disagreement  a disagreement about the means  would not matter as long as all 12 jurors unanimously concluded that the Government had proved the necessary related element, namely, that the defendant had threatened force. [31] ¶ 28. Here, the jury was properly instructed that one of the elements of robbery is taking, stealing, and carrying away some personal property of another. [32] The facts necessary to prove this element can be shown by alternative fact patterns, but still lead to the conclusion that there was but one offense  that of robbery. We are satisfied that this jury was perfectly capable of sifting through the evidence presented and was able to discard any factually insufficient theories. We find that there was sufficient evidence to support the taking of the wallet and its contents. By its verdict, twelve jurors unanimously agreed that Fulgham had robbed Joey of personal property. If we were to accept Fulgham's position as embodied in instruction D-48, it could lead to an absurd result. For example, while all twelve jurors might agree that Fulgham had killed Joey and had stolen some of his personal property, acquittal would be required if six believed she had stolen his money and the other six believed she had stolen the CPU. We find this argument to be without merit.