Opinion ID: 2314669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appeal of Defendants Place

Text: The basis of a right-of-way, claimed by the owners of the north camp, over the Zivic and Woodbury property, was stated in their notice of cross-appeal to be the following: In 1937, defendant Thomas Place constructed a road [east branch] starting at a town road and traversing lands now belonging to Plaintiff Zivic and defendants Woodbury to serve the south camp of Thomas Place and land beyond belonging to his aunt, Alice Place. The road was a convenient access to a camp beyond the Alice Place land [north camp] and Dr. Mahlon Mason [then owner of that camp] asked Thomas Place if he would mind if the Mason family used the road. Thomas Place granted permission. He had no authority to grant permission to cross the land of Zivic and Woodburys. Although Dr. Mason knew he was crossing land of other owners, he asked none of them for permission nor was such permission granted. For more than 20 years, the Mason family made continuous and uninterrupted use of the road. Present and predecessor owners of the Zivic and Woodbury lands knew of the use but did nothing. The master properly found that Thomas B. Place had not himself acquired an easement to use the new road and its east branch to reach the north camp because he had not used them to reach the north camp for the required twenty years of adverse use. If Thomas B. Place had a prescriptive right to use the portion of the new road on the Zivic and Woodbury land for access to the north camp, it would have to be based upon Dr. Mason's use from 1948 to 1970 for ingress and egress to and from the north camp which he owned. [4] The master properly held that to establish an easement by prescription a use must be of an adverse character. Since Dr. Mason based his use upon a permission given by Thomas B. Place, although not effective as to the actual landowners, it nevertheless disclosed a permissive attitude as to Mason's use of the ways. Consequently, the master found that neither Thomas B. Place, nor the appellants, the present owners of north camp, had a right-of-way for ingress to and egress from the north camp lot over the new road and its east branch because the use by the predecessor in title, Dr. Mason, did not establish an easement by prescription over said road to reach the north camp lot. The appellants rely on the testimony of Dr. Mason reported by the master that he and his friends and relatives used the new road and the east branch continuously from 1948 to 1970 for ingress and egress to and from the north camp. Mason testified that he knew that the new road crossed Woodbury land but never asked them for permission to use the road. Harry G. Woodbury, owner of the land in question from 1953 to 1979, confirmed the testimony of Dr. Mason as to the use of the road and further testified that he was aware of such use, never did anything about it, and, in fact, was glad to see the improvement of the road made by the Places. The appellants agree that the master properly ruled that the permission given to Dr. Mason by Thomas B. Place was ineffective to bind the Woodburys, who were the owners of the land. However, they maintain that the master erred in ruling that the use of the ways made by Dr. Mason could not be regarded as adverse to the true owners. [5-8] In Hewes v. Bruno, 121 N.H. at 34, 424 A.2d at 1145, we held that: It is unnecessary to inquire into the motives of a possessor. The acts of his entry onto and possession of the land should, regardless of the basis of the occupancy, alert the true owner of his cause of action. Furthermore, this court held in Ellison v. Fellows, 121 N.H. at 981, 437 A.2d at 280, that an adverse use does not require overt antagonism between the user and the property owner. As mentioned above, we stated in Ellison that the requirement of adverse use necessitates trespassory use. Id., 437 A.2d at 280. As an element of all adverse use, trespassory use consists of a wrong which the fee holder can prevent or for which he can obtain damages by means of legal action. United States v. Certain Land in City of Portsmouth, 247 F. Supp. at 934; see C.J.S. Easements § 14, at 654. Because the Woodburys were aware of Dr. Mason's wrongful use of their land (which then included the Zivic lot) and never did anything about it, Dr. Mason's use was a trespassory use with respect to the property now owned by Zivic and the Woodburys. The use was therefore adverse and resulted in a right-of-way in Dr. Mason and his successors, the present owners, the defendants Place. We set aside the decree that the present owners of the north camp be restrained from using the `new road' for access to the north camp. We hold that the present owners of the north camp have an easement by prescription for travel from the Poor Farm Road over the new road and its east branch to and from the north camp over lands of Zivic and Woodbury. [9] We realize that the master and the superior court did not have the benefit of some opinions now relied on, when their rulings were made. However, in defining what the law is, these later court opinions and decisions were saying what the law always was, and, consequently, their principles may apply to this case, which was on appeal and still pending. Cf. Hampton Nat'l Bank v. Desjardins, 114 N.H. 68, 73, 314 A.2d 654, 657-58 (1974). Appeals sustained.