Opinion ID: 2994360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ill March 5, 1997). To summarize, in 1987 Ron

Text: Harper, Kevin Perkins, William Elliot, and Robert McCoy (the Class) filed a class action against the City of Chicago Heights (the City), alleging that the at-large election method used to elect representatives to the City Council diluted the voting strength of African-Americans in violation of Section 2. In 1988, the Class filed an almost identical suit against the Chicago Heights Park District (the Park District) aimed at changing the at-large election method used to select the Park District Board. (Although the Chicago Heights Election Commission and the Clerk of Cook County were also named as nominal defendants, these cases have been defended by the City and the Park District.) The district court ultimately consolidated the claims and certified the Class. The Class wanted the court to order the replacement of the at-large voting systems with single-member districts and to award it attorneys’ fees and costs. In February 1989, all parties moved for summary judgment. District Judge Nordberg denied the defendants’ motion and granted in part and denied in part the Class’s motion. He held that the Class had proven the three Gingles factors, see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), that are threshold requirements to a Section 2 vote dilution claim./2 See Harper, 824 F. Supp. at 792-93. However, he concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained with regard to the second step to proving a vote dilution claim, the so- called Senate Report Factors, see S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 28-29 (1982)./3 The cases were then reassigned to District Judge Will for trial. Judge Will conducted pretrial mediation, and a consent decree resulted. The decree abandoned the at-large election method and created a new system of government for both the City and the Park District. The new plan called for six single- member districts for the election of six City Council members and six park board commissioners, with a mayor and a park board president elected at large. Three of the districts would be majority white, two would be majority African- American, and one would have a majority population of African-American and Hispanic residents of voting age. The consent decree plan was based on the strong mayor form of government authorized by the Illinois Municipal Code, and it replaced a commission form of government. (The Code allows Illinois cities to select among several acceptable forms of government. The aldermanic form is the basic form, see 65 ILCS 5/3.1, but cities may expand upon the aldermanic form by adopting the commission, see 65 ILCS 5/4 et seq., managerial, see 65 ILCS 5/5 et seq., or strong mayor, see 65 ILCS 5/6 et seq., forms. Cities may normally adopt, alter, or repeal a form of government only through a referendum. Ill. Const. art. VII, sec. 6(f).) In a development that would later prove problematic, the consent decree plan departed from the statutory strong mayor form in several respects. First, instead of five wards with two aldermen each, the decree called for six wards with one alderman each. Moreover, the mayor was authorized to appoint a city clerk and treasurer (persons usually elected at large), as well as administrative assistants and a budget and finance director (positions usually reserved for cities larger than Chicago Heights). The consent decree plan also modified the statutorily defined form of government for Illinois Park Districts. See 70 ILCS 1205/1-1 et seq. Rather than five commissioners elected at large, the decree called for six commissioners, one to be elected from each ward. Judge Will approved the consent decree over the objections of Kevin Perkins and Robert McCoy (the Individual Plaintiffs), who had by this time split from their fellow class representatives. Perkins and McCoy thus appealed from the order entering the consent decree (with Harper, Elliott, the City, the Park District, and certain nominal defendants listed as appellees). See Perkins, 47 F.3d 212. This court found merit in their challenge and held that the district court should not have approved a consent decree that overrides state law without making properly supported findings that such a remedy is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law. Id. at 216 (emphasis removed). Absent a finding of a violation of federal law, a municipality may modify a statutorily prescribed form of government only through a referendum. We vacated the entire decree and remanded for further proceedings. By the time the decision in Perkins was handed down (February 7, 1995), the City’s 1995 general election was approaching. Judge Will ordered that the election should take place as scheduled, but in recognition of this court’s concerns, he also directed that the consent decree should be submitted for voter approval through a referendum. At the same time, he noted that the Park District had passed a resolution adopting the new form of governance specified in the decree and thus that no further action was necessary legally to establish the new Park District structure. On November 7, 1995, Chicago Heights held a referendum and the voters approved the new form of city government--which was modeled on and identical to the form adopted in the earlier consent decree. Judge Will passed away shortly thereafter, and these cases, still on remand to the district court, were reassigned