Opinion ID: 1928340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the guilt phase of trial

Text: The state's case centers upon the testimony of J.D. Reddix, hereinafter J.D., who testified that on the morning of December 2, 1974, his brother Willie Reddix, hereinafter Willie, and Larry Jones persuaded him to drive them to downtown Biloxi. J.D. testified that at the time he had no knowledge of any criminal design of the others. After stopping for gas, J.D. proceeded with Willie and Larry Jones, hereinafter Jones, to downtown Biloxi where he parked his gray Cadillac in the parking lot of a shoe store. J.D. testified Willie and Jones then left walking in the general direction of Weinburger's store while he remained in the car. J.D. recalled that Jones at the time was wearing a pair of combat boots. Orvel McGee was in the same downtown area on December 2, 1974. After identifying a photograph of J.D.'s car, he testified that at about 11:15 a.m. he saw one man park the car and two others get out of it and walk in the direction of Weinburger's store. McGee observed that one of the persons leaving the car wore combat boots. Shortly thereafter, he saw them return and noted the person wearing combat boots was carrying a footlocker. He could not identify Jones as one of the two men he saw leave and later return to the car. Shortly before noon on December 2, 1974, Ray Real, a store manager, observed a man carrying a footlocker away from Weinburger's store. At about this time Preston Sullivan testified he entered the store and found Arthur Weinburger, proprietor, lying in an office doorway amid a pool of blood. A surgeon gave evidence that Weinburger died later in the day as the result of blows to his head. J.D. stated that Jones was carrying a footlocker when he returned to the car. A state witness, Lula Mae Bell, aunt of J.D. and Willie, at first testified she could not remember having seen her nephews or Jones in downtown Biloxi on the day of the homicide. However, on direct examination the following day she recanted, admitting that she had lied earlier in her testimony, and explained by stating her life had been threatened in the interest of Jones. She then testified that she did see Willie and Jones leave J.D.'s car and walk toward Weinburger's store on the day of the homicide and that Jones was wearing combat boots. Annie Lee Reddix, mother of Willie and J.D., testified that on December 2, 1974, J.D., Willie and Jones left her house in J.D.'s car. When they returned, Jones stored the footlocker which he had in her house, changed the combat boots he was wearing to tennis shoes, and later departed, leaving the boots. On December 3, 1974, pursuant to warrant, detectives searched the house of Annie Lee Reddix. They discovered a footlocker and a pair of combat boots. The footlocker was identified as the one taken from Weinburger's store, and the boots were found to be stained with human blood of an undeterminable type. Lerline Blancq, manager of Weinburger's store, testified that approximately $600 had been taken in the robbery and positively identified the merchandise found in the footlocker as belonging to Weinburger's store. By his first, second, and sixth assignments of error, Jones raises the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict. He argues that only two witnesses, Lula Mae Bell, an admitted perjurer, and J.D. Reddix, an admitted accomplice, linked him to the crime. We conclude the state presented circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the jury verdict of guilty. Under our authorities Lula Mae Bell's and J.D. Reddix's testimony is competent. Lula Mae Bell was presumptively innocent of perjury when she testified and was therefore a competent witness. Isonhood v. State, 274 So.2d 685, 690 (Miss. 1973). As for J.D. Reddix, his status as an accomplice affected the weight, not the competency of his testimony. Thomas v. State, 340 So.2d 1 (Miss. 1976); Black v. State, 336 So.2d 1302 (Miss. 1976); Fleming v. State, 319 So.2d 223 (Miss. 1975). The jury had before it exhaustive attempts by the defense to impeach these witnesses and by the state to rehabilitate them. The trial court, in our opinion, properly left to the jury the weight and worth to be accorded their testimony. From the entirety of the record and particularly in view of the corroborating circumstances evidenced by disinterested witnesses, we think that reasonable minds could have found it to have been beyond reasonable doubt that Jones participated in the robbery resulting in Weinburger's death. As a confessed accessory after the fact to the murder with which Jones was charged, J.D. was an accomplice. Dedeaux v. State, 125 Miss. 326, 87 So. 664 (1921). Therefore, his testimony must be considered with caution. Feranda v. State, 267 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1972). However, it is also established that an accused may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Rich v. State, 322 So.2d 468 (Miss. 1975); Moore v. State, 291 So.2d 187 (Miss. 1974); Young v. State, 212 Miss. 460, 54 So.2d 671 (1951). Moreover, J.D.'s testimony appears consistent with the corroborating testimony to which other witnesses testified. State witnesses Orvel McGee, Ray Real, Preston Sullivan, Lerline Blancq, and others, together established that at about midday on the day of the homicide, two empty-handed black men, one wearing combat boots, went in the direction of Weinburger's store from J.D.'s parked automobile. Orvel McGee recalled seeing a man wearing combat boots return with a footlocker to the car a few minutes after he left it. Later a footlocker was carried by Jones into Annie Lee Reddix's house, where it was subsequently discovered and identified as stolen from Weinburger's store, and bloodstained boots were also found. In sum, the record contains more than slight corroborative evidence which we held sufficient to sustain the conviction on an accomplice's testimony in Lifer v. State, 189 Miss. 754, 199 So. 107 (1940), and cases cited therein. On cross-examination of J.D., an inconsistency was established between his current testimony concerning the color of the pants worn by Jones on the day of the homicide and his testimony on the same matter given at a previous hearing. J.D. acknowledged the inconsistency, but offered no explanation. An additional inconsistency was brought out on cross-examination. J.D. had apparently told the Biloxi police that one Royce was with them on the day of the homicide, but the evidence was inconclusive as to whether Royce or Roy, [1] as he was later referred to, accompanied the participants in the crime to the downtown area. We do not think the cross-examination concerning the color of the pants worn by Larry Jones and the company of Roy destroyed J.D.'s testimony as a matter of law. The jury has the duty to determine the impeachment value of inconsistencies or contradictions as well as testimonial defects of perception, memory and sincerity. The entire sequence of examination suggests that while Roy may have been with them sometime on December 2, 1974, he did not accompany the criminal participants to downtown Biloxi. Under the circumstances, we think leaving the question of credibility to the jury was proper and that appellant's conviction cannot be said to be contrary to the weight of the evidence. See Kinney v. State, 336 So.2d 493 (Miss. 1976); Black v. State, 336 So.2d 1302 (Miss. 1976); Fleming v. State, 319 So.2d 223 (Miss. 1975); Null v. State, 311 So.2d 654 (Miss. 1975). Appellant next contends, The record does not expressly show that this appellant was actively engaged in an assault on the victim in the course of the robbery set out by all the evidence in the record. We agree the record does not conclusively establish which of the two co-felons, Willie Reddix or Larry Jones, the appellant, actually wielded the blows causing Weinburger's death. However, doubt concerning the precise role of the appellant in the homicide does not upset the jury's verdict. The indictment alleges that Larry Jones, together with his co-indictees Willie Reddix and J.D. Reddix, participated in an armed robbery which resulted in the death of Arthur Weinburger, a human being. The statutory subsection proscribing appellant's conduct, Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(2)(e) (1972), appears in the indictment. It designates as capital murder a killing done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of ... robbery... . This language renders the factual question of which of two co-felons acted as the efficient cause of the death unnecessary to the verdict in the guilt-determining phase. It is enough that the evidence shows the willing participation of the accused in a robbery in furtherance of which a death resulted. See Price v. State, 362 So.2d 204 (Miss. 1978); McNeer v. State, 228 Miss. 308, 87 So.2d 568 (1956); Carrol v. State, 183 Miss. 1, 183 So. 703 (1938); Woodward v. State, 166 Miss. 596, 143 So. 859 (1932); Fisher v. State, 150 Miss. 206, 116 So. 746 (1928); cf. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-3 (1972). As we have said, the evidence sufficiently demonstrates such a willing participation by the appellant. He does not challenge the indictment, nor suggest the legislature lacks the power to expose him to guilt of capital murder in the absence of proof that he had a specific intention to kill. We conclude that the verdict in the guilt-determining phase is within the law and the weight of the evidence. Appellant next contends the cumulative effect of trial errors consisting of unduly constrained voir dire examination, unduly restricted defense argument and improper prosecutorial remarks requires reversal. The trial court has broad discretion in passing upon the extent and propriety of questions addressed to prospective jurors. Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1972). Although broad, the discretion is not unlimited, and an abuse will be found on appeal where clear prejudice to the accused results from undue constraint on the defense or undue lack of constraint on the prosecution. See, e.g., McCaskill v. State, 227 So.2d 847 (Miss. 1969); Leverett v. State, 112 Miss. 394, 73 So. 273 (1916). Appellant complains that the trial court did not permit him to inquire of the prospective jurors whether they would be happy to be tried by persons in their frame of mind. Yet our review reveals the trial court, for whatever reason, did permit this questioning. Further, appellant suggests he was not permitted to ask the prospective jurors whether they would follow the law. Again, the record does not support the suggestion, and we must conclude neither contention has merit. Appellant next argues that undue restraint was imposed upon defense counsel when he attempted to ask the prospective jurors whether they would consider the indictment as anything but a mere piece of paper in considering their verdict. At this point the court advised defense counsel that he would instruct on this point and the record reveals that he did so at the appropriate time. A review of the objections which were sustained to defense counsel's closing summation in the guilt-determining phase reveals no error, in our opinion. The court properly sustained an objection to defense counsel's attempt to place the individual jurors in the non-neutral position of the accused. See Danner v. Mid-State Paving Co., 252 Miss. 776, 173 So.2d 608 (1965). The state also objected to defense counsel's statement, [b]ear with me also because the state is going to try to confuse me as much as they can... . The court sustained the objection to this argument and we think properly so. Later in defense counsel's argument, the court sustained an objection raised when counsel suggested to the jury that one of the state's witnesses had been granted immunity from perjury. Again, the trial court's ruling appears to have been correct, because there is no suggestion in the record that there had been a grant of immunity. One well established constraint upon the permissible perimeters of closing argument is that counsel must limit his remarks to the evidence presented. See Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342 (Miss. 1977); Nelms and Blum v. Fink, 159 Miss. 372, 131 So. 817 (1930). Appellant next contends that the cumulative effect of objectionable statements made by the state vitiated his trial with prejudicial error. Appellant's complaint concerns testimony and statements which touched upon the unpleasant details of Weinburger's death. Again, reviewing the record, we find the trial court sustained defense counsel's objections to any detail relating to the physical aspects of the death when questioning exceeded that necessary to establish the fact and cause of death. For example, the trial court refused to admit pictures of the deceased during the guilt phase and instructed the jury to disregard the state's dim suggestions that the killing was particularly atrocious. Appellant also complains that the jury learned of Willie Reddix's conviction in a separate trial. It is true that we have held admission of evidence of this nature to be inimical to a fair trial. Ivy v. State, 301 So.2d 292 (Miss. 1974); McCray v. State, 293 So.2d 807 (Miss. 1974); Buckley v. State, 223 So.2d 524 (Miss. 1969); State v. Thornhill, 251 Miss. 718, 171 So.2d 308 (1965). However, we find that defense counsel underscored Willie Reddix's conviction and attempted to use that fact to appellant's advantage, as can be seen from the following colloquy between defense counsel and state witness Annie Lee Reddix: Q. You do have a real good motive in shifting the blame in this case from your son J.D. to Larry Jones haven't you?       A. I don't know the reason you are talking about. Q. Well, J.D. is your son, isn't he? A. Yes, he's my son. Q. J.D. was charged with capital murder, wasn't he? A. All three of them was charged with capital murder. Q. That's right, and Willie's been convicted hasn't he? A. Yes. Q. And sent to the gas chamber. A. Yes. Also, defense counsel while cross-examining J.D. Reddix, elicited the following testimony: Q. Were you or were you not a codefendant in this case in the beginning? A. Would you  what  Q.  Weren't you charged and indicted for the crime of capital murder? A. Yes, I was. We think an appellant cannot assail as prejudical his own trial tactics, because it would foster a propensity in litigants to create error to enhance the possibility of reversal and repeated trials. This he is not permitted to do. Simpson v. State, 366 So.2d 1085 (Miss. 1979). Appellant then argues his motion for a mistrial was improperly denied, because irreparable prejudice resulted from the following: BY MR. NECAISE: And then finding this Defendant along with the co-defendant, Willie Reddix, in Jackson County four days later and this Defendant doing  BY MR. MORRIS:  objection, Your Honor. There is no evidence whatsoever before this Court that this Defendant was found with Willie Reddix. BY THE COURT: Objection sustained. The court's ruling sufficed to repair any prejudice which might otherwise have resulted. It negated, we think, any suggestion of guilt by association. In conclusion, we are of the opinion that when considered either alone or in combination, appellant's third, fourth, and twelfth assignments of error do not merit reversal of the verdict rendered in the guilt-determining phase. By his seventh assignment of error, Jones contends the court erred in refusing Instructions D-4, D-5, D-8, D-9, D-10, D-12, D-16, D-17, D-18 and D-19. We have studiously reviewed these instructions and are of the opinion they are in all essential respects cumulative with others which were granted. The trial court is not required to grant several instructions on the same question in a different verbiage. McMillan v. State, 198 Miss. 179, 21 So.2d 586 (1945). When we consider all of the instructions together, we conclude the jury was properly instructed upon the law of the case. Instruction D-17 concerns the weight to be accorded the testimony of an accomplice. While it would not be improper to grant an instruction of this nature, Dedeaux v. State, 125 Miss. 326, 87 So. 664 (1921), the decision to grant or refuse it rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ragan v. State, 318 So.2d 879 (Miss. 1975); Wellborn v. State, 140 Miss. 640, 105 So. 769 (1925). Moreover, the instruction refers to the unsupported testimony of an alleged codefendant. This suggests the testimony of the accomplice was unsupported by other evidence when in fact it was corroborated. We therefore think refusal of Instruction D-17 does not constitute reversible error. Our review of the record reveals no prejudicial error. We therefore affirm the verdict of guilty. AFFIRMED.