Opinion ID: 888841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Troxel Standard

Text: ¶ 64 Maniaci further claims that the United States Supreme Court rejected a similar statutory scheme in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). In Troxel, two children were born to a couple out of wedlock. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60, 120 S.Ct. at 2057. The children's parents separated and their father lived with his parents, Jenifer and Gary Troxel (Troxels). The Troxels' son regularly brought their grandchildren to the Troxels' home for weekend visitation. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60, 120 S.Ct. at 2057. ¶ 65 Tommie Granville (Granville), the children's mother, limited the Troxels' visitation after the suicide death of the Troxel's son. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61, 120 S.Ct. at 2057. The Troxels petitioned for the right to visit their grandchildren under the Washington statute that provided any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61, 120 S.Ct. at 2057-58. The trial court determined that visitation served the children's best interests. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61, 120 S.Ct. at 2058. ¶ 66 The Washington Court of Appeals reversed. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 62, 120 S.Ct. at 2058. It viewed limits on nonparental visitation as being consistent with the constitutional restrictions on state interference with parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 62, 120 S.Ct. at 2058. The Washington Supreme Court agreed that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on the fundamental rights of parents to rear their children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63, 120 S.Ct. at 2058. ¶ 67 The Washington court found two major problems with the statute. The court noted first that the State may interfere in the right of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or potential harm to the child. The court further noted that the statute sweeps too broadly by allowing any person to petition for forced visitation at any time with the only requirement being to serve the best interest of the child. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63, 120 S.Ct. at 2058-59. The court rejected the notion that the State should be making significant custody decisions merely because it could make a `better' decision. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63, 120 S.Ct. at 2059. The court cited in this regard the fact that the trial court had given no special weight to Granville's determination of her daughters' best interests. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69, 120 S.Ct. at 2062. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63, 120 S.Ct. at 2059. ¶ 68 Maniaci argues that this Court embraced Troxel in Polasek v. Omura, 2006 MT 103, 332 Mont. 157, 136 P.3d 519, and thereby rendered unconstitutional the 1999 amendments to the nonparental statutory framework set forth in §§ 40-4-211 and 40-4-228, MCA. In Polasek, this Court determined that the Troxel plurality opinion remained consistent with our best interest of the child standard contained in § 40-9-102, MCA. Polasek, ¶ 14. Section 40-9-102, MCA, allows a grandparent reasonable rights to contact with a child. The Court reasoned that Troxel instructs, and our statute requires, a court to determine the fitness of an objecting parent whose parental rights have not been terminated before a court may grant a petition for grandparent contact. Polasek, ¶ 15; § 40-9-102(2), MCA. A presumption arises in favor of the parent's wishes if the parent is fit. Polasek, ¶ 15. ¶ 69 Maniaci seeks to have this Court extend the parental fitness condition of the grandparent contact statute to §§ 40-4-211 and 40-4-228, MCA. The extension advocated by Maniaci would ignore the different language in the grandparent contact statute and the nonparenting statutes. Section 40-4-228(5), MCA, provides that it is not necessary for the court to find a natural parent unfit before awarding a parental interest to a third party. The Supreme Court in Troxel passed on the constitutional question as to whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73, 120 S.Ct. at 2064. The Court recognized that most state adjudication in the visitation context occurs on a case-by-case basis. As a result, the Court announced that it would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73, 120 S.Ct. at 2064. ¶ 70 The Washington visitation statute at issue in Troxel allowed anyone to be awarded visitation. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61, 120 S.Ct. at 2057. Section 40-4-228(2)(b), MCA, provides that a party first must establish a child-parent relationship. Section 40-4-211(4)(b), MCA, authorizes a court to consider visitation only once the party has established a child-parent relationship. Moreover, the 1999 amendments require the court to balance the constitutionally protected rights of both the parents and children in determining the best interests of the child. Section 40-4-227, MCA. ¶ 71 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a nonparenting statute in SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815 (Minn.2007), similar to the one enacted by the Montana legislature. The Minnesota statute limited the class of people who could petition for visitation to those persons who had resided with the child for two years or more and it further narrowed the class of those who could be awarded visitation to parties who had established emotional ties creating a parent and child relationship. SooHoo, 731 N.W.2d at 820. Montana's nonparental statutes avoid constitutional infirmity under the Troxel standard through the twin thresholds of consideration of the wishes of the natural parent and the need to first establish a child-parent relationship. See also Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000). ¶ 72 Maniaci argues that courts in other jurisdictions have applied the Troxel standard in reversing decisions of trial courts in allowing visitation or custody rights to a third party. For example, in Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73 (2008), Maryland's highest appellate court rejected the common law de facto parent doctrine as a basis for awarding visitation rights to a third party. Maryland had no statute similar to Montana's nonparenting statute, however, that would provide the basis for allowing the visitation. The court cautioned that [w]hether the Maryland General Assembly chooses to enact legislation similar to the Minnesota statute at issue in SooHoo is within its prerogative. Janice M., 404 Md. at 689, 948 A.2d at 89. Montana's legislature has chosen to enact the nonparenting statutes. Maniaci has failed to carry her burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutes she challenges impermissibly infringe on her constitutional right to parent her children. In re Custody and Parenting Rights of D.S., ¶ 15. ¶ 73 Whether the court properly awarded Kulstad a parental interest. ¶ 74 The nonparental statutory framework allows a court to award a parental interest to a nonparent who establishes two threshold conditions by clear and convincing evidence. These threshold conditions are that: (a) the natural parent has engaged in conduct that is contrary to the child-parent relationship; and (b) the nonparent has established with the child a child-parent relationship as defined in 40-4-211, and it is in the best interests of the child to continue that relationship. Section 40-4-228(2)(a)(b), MCA. Maniaci contends that Kulstad failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the mandatory requirements of § 40-4-228(2)(a)-(b), MCA.