Opinion ID: 3065917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Major Participant

Text: The Arizona Supreme Court found that Dickens was a major participant in the robbery because: The robberies were premeditated, planned, and agreed on by [Dickens] and Amaral; [Dickens] fur- nished Amaral with the weapon used in the murders or knew Amaral had the weapon with him for the robberies; [Dickens] drove Amaral to the scene, waited while Amaral committed the robberies, picked up Amaral after the crime, witnessed the destruction of evidence, and failed to report the crimes. State v. Dickens, 926 P.2d 468, 490 (Ariz. 1996) (in banc) (emphasis added). These findings rest on the role Dickens played in the plan or agreement to commit a robbery and on his role as a driver who witnessed but did not actively participate in the events leading up to the murders. This does nothing to distinguish Dickens from other getaway drivers, and 8636 DICKENS v. RYAN does not show that his participation in the events leading up to the murder of the Bernsteins was “active” and “substantial.” See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. First, the finding that the robbery was “premeditated, planned and agreed on” by Dickens and Amaral, Dickens, 926 P.2d at 490, does little to meaningfully distinguish Dickens from any other getaway driver who ordinarily plays a part in the planning of the armed robbery and then drives the car that contains the individuals who actually commit the robbery. The only getaway driver who would not play such a role would be the unwitting or coerced one, such as a driver who is hired to act as a chauffeur for the robbers or one who is blackmailed into doing so. If participating in the planning and serving the ordinary role of the member of the group who drives the car were sufficient to meet the Enmund and Tison requirements, then almost any participant in a felony would be a major participant. After all, most members of a group committing a robbery will ordinarily participate in the planning of the crime, even if they go on to perform only a minor role in the commission of the crime, such as acting as a lookout or getaway driver. Second, the Arizona Supreme Court relied on the fact that Dickens “either furnished Amaral with the weapon used in the murders or knew Amaral had the weapon with him for the robberies.” Id. at 490 (emphasis added). It so described the facts in the death eligibility section of its opinion, surely a critical section in which petitioner and the federal courts are both entitled to expect accuracy and on which both are unquestionably entitled to rely. What the Arizona Supreme Court’s statement means is that while Dickens may have furnished Amaral with a gun, what is certain is that he knew that Amaral had a gun. A getaway driver or other participant in an armed robbery (again, except for an unwitting or coerced one) knows that at least one of his accomplices is armed. Knowledge of the fact that someone is armed does not, however, make the possessor of that knowledge a major participant. DICKENS v. RYAN 8637 Moreover, possessing that knowledge is a passive rather than an active act. There is nothing inherent in knowing that an accomplice is armed that raises the level of participation to that of a major participant. This finding by the Arizona Supreme Court is essentially that Dickens was a knowing participant, but that is not the correct standard; Tison is a narrow exception that requires major participation, not mere knowledge.1 Third, the Arizona Supreme Court found that Dickens “drove Amaral to the scene, waited while Amaral committed the robberies, [and] picked up Amaral after the crime.” Id. at 490. The majority attempts to recast these findings so as to make them more inculpatory to Dickens, by describing those actions as “aiding Amaral’s escape,” “helping Amaral evade capture,” and “help[ing] Amaral flee the scene.” Maj. Op. at 8612, 8613. But these are the very functions of participating in a robbery as a getaway driver. These findings, even as recast by the majority, do nothing to distinguish Dickens’ actions from those of other getaway drivers. Enmund, who the Supreme Court found could not be sentenced to death, was 1 The majority makes inconsistent representations regarding whether Dickens furnished Amaral with a weapon. At times it states that Dickens was responsible for “arming Amaral with a handgun.” Maj. Op. at 8612, 8616. At other times, however, the majority recognizes that Dickens either provided the handgun or knew Amaral had the handgun, as was stated by the Arizona Supreme Court in the death eligibility section of its opinion. Maj. Op. at 8612, 8617. The reason for its inconsistency is apparent. The Arizona Supreme Court itself makes an inconsistent statement that led to the majority’s own inconsistencies. It is, however, the Arizona Supreme Court’s former statement, not the latter, that should control our analysis. This is, after all, a death penalty case. To base our decision (even partially) to uphold the execution of a petitioner who did not actively participate in a murder on one of two inconsistent statements by a state court, simply because that one supports the death penalty and the other does not falls far short of fulfilling our obligations to the law and the Constitution. The Arizona Supreme Court expressly did not make a finding one way or the other as to whether Dickens furnished Amaral with a weapon, and it is not for this court to do so. 8638 DICKENS v. RYAN “in the car by the side of the road at the time of the killings, waiting to help the robbers escape.” Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788 (emphasis added). Finally, the court found that Dickens “witnessed the destruction of evidence” and “failed to report the crime.” Dickens, 926 P.2d at 490. These findings are of a passive, rather than active, nature and do not establish that Dickens was a major participant in the underlying robbery. Nor do these findings do anything to distinguish Dickens from other getaway drivers, who may well help dispose of incriminating evidence and do what they can to cover up and prevent others from knowing of their own involvement in the crime.2 In sum, in finding that Dickens was a major participant, the court essentially found that he acted as the getaway driver for Amaral, and that he did nothing to stop the robbery before or after it was committed. But, the same could be said about Enmund or any other getaway driver, and the Supreme Court has clearly held that the death penalty is unconstitutional in these circumstances. Moreover, the same could be said about almost any participant in a felony-murder, major or minor. The facts simply do not support a finding that Dickens played 2 The majority again attempts to recast the findings of the Arizona Supreme Court, writing that Dickens participated in “destroying evidence” or “assisted in the destruction of evidence,” Maj. Op. at 8612, 8613, rather than merely “witnessed the destruction of evidence.” The Arizona Supreme Court never made any finding that Dickens was in any way involved in the destruction of evidence in this case. In describing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Arizona Supreme Court wrote: “Amaral removed cash, traveler’s checks, and one credit card from Bryan’s wallet, then burned the wallet and its remaining contents.” Dickens, 926 P.2d at 475 (emphasis added). This recitation of facts, notably, was “[a]ccording to Amaral’s testimony at trial,” id. at 474, so even under that version of events, it was Amaral, not Dickens, who destroyed the evidence. In any event, even if Dickens had been a participant, rather than a mere witness, in the destruction of evidence, this does nothing to distinguish him from the typical getaway driver, as explained above. DICKENS v. RYAN 8639 an active and substantial role in the robbery that resulted in the death of the Bernsteins. There is no basis for comparing Dickens, who helped plan a robbery, knew his accomplice was armed, and drove the getaway car, with the Tison brothers, the exception to the Enmund rule on which the majority seeks to rely. The Tison brothers “brought an arsenal of lethal weapons into the Arizona State Prison which [they] then handed over to two convicted murderers,” helped them escape from prison, “participated fully in the kidnaping and robbery” by flagging down the car on the road, robbing the family, driving the family into the desert, and holding them at gunpoint. Tison, 481 U.S. at 139-41, 151-52 (emphasis added). They knew that Gary Tison, their father, was “thinking about” killing the family, and “saw Greenawalt and their father brutally murder their four captives with repeated blasts from their shotguns.” Id. at 140-41 (emphasis added). The Tison brothers played an active and substantial role in the commission of the crimes (as opposed to its planning), and were therefore major participants; Dickens, whose role was limited to that of getaway driver, was not. This is a crucial and dispositive distinction. The findings by the Arizona Supreme Court in Dickens undermine the Enmund and Tison standard that only major participants in the commission of the crime may be eligible for the death penalty, and is therefore an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. The lack of any true distinguishing characteristics between Dickens and the typical getaway driver renders the analysis by the Arizona Supreme Court an unreasonable application of Enmund and Tison. The majority, no doubt recognizing that the Arizona Supreme Court findings in support of the major participant determination describe nothing more than the typical getaway driver, adds additional findings to support its conclusion that Dickens was a major participant. The majority holds that Dickens was a major participant in the robbery of the Bernsteins because, in addition to the findings by the Arizona 8640 DICKENS v. RYAN Supreme Court (sometimes as recast by the majority), he “stak[ed] out the crime scene,” “target[ed] the victims,” “watched Amaral shoot the victims,” and “continued in the criminal venture after the murders were committed.” Maj. Op. at 8612, 8613-14. Nowhere in its decision does the Arizona Supreme Court take into account these findings in its major participant determination. Even considering these additional findings, however, the majority does not get far. Three of its additional findings, that Dickens staked out the crime scene, targeted the Bernsteins, and continued in the criminal venture, do little to distinguish Dickens from other getaway drivers who may, for example, scout the neighborhood and identify the mom and pop store to be robbed. Staking out the rest stop area and targeting the Bernsteins for the robbery go only to Dickens’ role in planning the robbery, not to any active participation in its commission. And every getaway driver, in some sense, continues in the criminal venture by driving the car away from the scene of the robbery. Doing so is the essence of being a getaway driver. But Dickens did not continue in the criminal venture in the way the Tison brothers did, by continuing to aid escaped murderers and participating in a crime spree, “ending in a gun battle with the police in the final showdown.” See Tison, 481 U.S. at 151. Dickens drove the car away from the rest stop, and parted ways with Amaral two days later. In fact, Dickens refused to help Amaral use the credit card he had stolen from the Bernsteins. Despite its attempt to conjure up more support, the majority cannot distinguish Dickens from a typical getaway driver, and thus cannot establish that Dickens was a major participant in the underlying crime. The fourth finding by the majority, that Dickens “watched Amaral shoot the victims,” is not only one that the Arizona Supreme Court did not take into account in its major participation determination; it is a finding that the Arizona Supreme Court did not make at all.3 But rather than “take the facts as 3 The trial court, in its death eligibility determination, made a finding that Dickens “witnessed the shootings.” It is well established, however, DICKENS v. RYAN 8641 the Arizona Supreme Court has given them to us,” Tison, 481 U.S. at 151, the majority decides to engage in de novo factfinding, and unreasonable factfinding at that, as the finding that Dickens watched the murders is unsupported by the record. Before addressing why the finding is unreasonable, however, it is important to consider why the majority feels compelled to make this finding in the first place. Dickens correctly argues that his case is analogous to Enmund, and therefore his death sentence is unconstitutional, because he “was not present when the killing took place.” See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795. Like Enmund, he was parked in a car some distance from the scene of the murder, acting as the getaway driver. See id at 784, 788. The detectives who examined the crime scene and the surrounding area calculated that it took 2 minutes and 29 seconds to walk from where Dickens was parked to where the murders took place.4 that “[i]n conducting review of a state court decision, we look to the last reasoned state-court decision.” Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We must therefore look only to the Arizona Supreme Court decision, which did not make this finding. Further, even if we were to consider the trial court decision, the trial court did not make the broad finding the majority makes here that Dickens actually “witnessed Amaral shoot the victims,” in the sense that the majority implies. Dickens did, as explained below, witness the shootings in that he heard the gunshot and saw a muzzle flash. But he did not, and the record is clear on this, actually see Amaral shooting the Bernsteins in the head. 4 The Federal Highway Administration, which establishes the speed for stop lights at crosswalks, sets the standard crossing time at 3.5 feet per second for pedestrian crosswalks. See U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (2009), Ch. 4N, In-Roadway Lights, http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/ pdfs/2009/part4.pdf (Dec. 2009). The detectives who measured the distance in this case said they were walking “at a normal walking pace.” Assuming a walking speed above that set by the Federal Highway Administration, at 4 feet per second, the average person walks 596 feet, or 199 yards, in 2 minutes and 29 seconds. Enmund was 200 yards away from the scene of the murders, Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784, and the Supreme Court held that he was not present at the scene. Id. at 795. Neither, therefore, was Dickens. 8642 DICKENS v. RYAN The majority attempts to refute Dickens’ presence argument in two ways. First, the majority holds that “nowhere in Enmund or Tison does the Supreme Court clearly establish that ‘presence’ at a murder scene is a mandatory prerequisite for the death penalty.” Maj. Op. at 8612. To anyone who has read Enmund and Tison, however, there can be no question that the Supreme Court established that presence is a critical aspect in the analysis for death eligibility. In both Enmund and Tison, the Supreme Court stressed on several occasions that Enmund, who was found not death eligible, had not been present at the time of the killings. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795 (noting that “the defendant . . . was not present when the killing took place”); Tison, 481 U.S. at 149 (“At one pole was Enmund himself: the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state.”) (emphasis added); id. at 158 (noting that Enmund was “sitting in a car away from the actual scene of the murders”). In surveying states’ practices on imposing death sentences on those convicted of felonymurder, the Supreme Court in Enmund found that only 16 out of 739 death row inmates in the entire United States were not physically present at the scene of the crime, and only 3 of those inmates (including Enmund) were not physically present and had not “hired or solicited someone else to kill the victim or participated in a scheme designed to kill the victim.” Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795; see also Tison, 481 U.S. at 148 (“The Court [in Enmund] found . . . that only 3 of 739 death row inmates had been sentenced to death absent an intent to kill, physical presence, or direct participation in the fatal assault . . . .”) (emphasis added). In Tison, the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the importance of presence. It noted the finding in Enmund that only 3 death row inmates in the entire United States were neither present at the scene nor involved in a scheme to murder. Id. at 148. Moreover, the Supreme Court found a consensus among state courts that certain aggravated felony-murders merited the death penalty, as an exception to Enmund. Id. at DICKENS v. RYAN 8643 154-55. In describing each of those cases, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the defendants were present at the scenes of the murders, contemplated killing, or used lethal force. Id. Moreover, in distinguishing the Tison brothers from Enmund, and justifying the death penalty for the former while not for the latter, the Supreme Court stated: Far from merely sitting in a car away from the actual scene of the murders acting as the getaway driver to a robbery, each [Tison brother] was actively involved in every element of the kidnaping-robbery and was physically present during the entire sequence of criminal activity culminating in the murder of the Lyons family and the subsequent flight. Id. at 158 (emphasis added). Even if presence is not a “mandatory prerequisite” to death eligibility, Maj. Op. at 8612, it is certainly a critical aspect of the inquiry under Enmund and Tison. Second, perhaps acknowledging the weakness of its argument that presence is not a critical factor, the majority goes on to hold that “even if Tison and Enmund could be read to incorporate a mandatory ‘presence’ requirement, it seems that the Arizona Supreme Court suggested that Dickens met that requirement” because, the majority says, Dickens “watched each part of the Bernsteins’ murders as they unfolded.” Maj. Op. at 8613-14. According to the majority, “Dickens testified at trial that he. . . (1) watched Amaral leave the truck with a loaded .38-caliber handgun, knowing Amaral was going to rob the Bernsteins at gunpoint; (2) watched Amaral walk across the highway; (3) observed Amaral moving the Bernsteins around the front of their car in the path of the illuminated headlamps; and (4) saw flashes as Amaral shot the victims in the head.” Maj. Op. at 8614-15. The majority overstates the evidence in the record. Dickens testified that after Amaral left his truck, he “lost sight . . . 8644 DICKENS v. RYAN when he came up to the edge of the interstate” and then “heard one shot and one muzzle flash.” Dickens further testified that he saw a “shadow as they went in front of the lights,” like “a flicker of light.” The prosecution read into the record the following statement by Dickens: I remember seeing, I think I seen, I guess it was three, three times I seen somebody pass in front of the lights. I seen the first person, then the second person, and then a few steps behind I seen Travis walk behind or in front of the light. Moreover, Officer Johnson (the first officer on the scene) testified that it was difficult to see from where Dickens was parked across the highway to the other rest area where Amaral murdered the Bernsteins, in part because there was no lighting in either rest area. In fact, absent the car headlights, it was “pitch black.” Amaral also testified at trial that he did not see the moon on the night of the murders,5 and that there were no street lights that shone into the rest area. This evidence does not support a finding that Dickens actually “watched each part of the Bernsteins’ murders as they unfolded.” Maj. Op. at 8614. Certainly not, as the majority suggests, in the same way that the Tison brothers watched the victims in that case being murdered. Dickens saw flickers of light, shadows, heard a gunshot, and saw a muzzle flash. The Tison brothers, in contrast, were at the scene of daylight murders and “they saw Greenawalt and their father brutally murder their four captives with repeated blasts from their shotguns.” Tison, 481 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added). In any event, under no fair reading of the evidence can it be said that because Dickens could see part of the shooting of the Bernsteins he was present at the scene of the murders. To the contrary, he like Enmund was sitting in a parked car, approximately the same distance away from the scene as Enmund. 5 The sun set at 6:52 P.M. that night, and the murders occurred around 9:17 P.M. DICKENS v. RYAN 8645 The majority adds that Dickens was present at the scene of the murders because he “drove through the rest stop to pick Amaral up, and (to use his words)6 verify “everything had been taken care of” (i.e., verify the victims had been shot).” Maj. Op. at 8614. In reaching this finding, the majority goes beyond overstating the evidence; it completely misconstrues it or adds to it. No state court ever found as a fact that Dickens drove through the rest area. The “facts and procedural history” section of the Arizona Supreme Court decision put the facts in the light most favorable to the state. Dickens, 926 P.2d at 474-75. The court began that section with the statement “[a]ccording to Amaral’s testimony at trial.” Id. at 474. It did not, however, adopt some of those statements. For example, the court included “facts,” such as the use of the walkie-talkie and other parts of Amaral’s “testimony” that it deliberately did not rely on in its discussion of death eligibility under Enmund and Tison, and that the prosecution itself disavowed during the state proceedings as well as before this court. And yet, even in that “facts and procedural history” section, the Arizona Supreme Court made no mention of Dickens driving through the rest area. Rather, the court said that “[w]hile Amaral was with the Bernsteins, [Dickens] drove across the median to the westbound lanes, where he picked up Amaral.” Id. at 475 (emphasis added). Its major participant and reckless indifference discussion under Enmund and Tison also did not mention anything about Dickens driving through the rest area.7 Only one statement by the Arizona Supreme Court could possibly be interpreted as support for a finding (had one been made) that Dickens drove through the rest area, namely, that Dickens “failed to render aid even though he knew one victim 6 By “his words” the majority means what Amaral testified to at trial about a conversation that he “believe[d]” he had with Dickens. I discuss the unreasonable reliance on this testimony infra at pages 8646-47. 7 Incidentally, neither did the state trial court decision make any mention of Dickens driving through the rest stop. 8646 DICKENS v. RYAN might not be dead.” Id. at 490. If we overlook the fact that the Arizona Supreme Court did not specify any factual basis for this finding, and presume that it was making an inferential finding that Dickens drove through the rest stop and as a result of doing so knew that one victim might not be dead, then that finding clearly constitutes an unreasonable finding of fact, as it is unsupported by the evidence in the record. Amaral never stated in his testimony that he saw Dickens drive through the rest area or that Dickens did so. Amaral testified that “the only thing I can remember is he came and picked me up, I don’t know if he was leaving the interstate as far as leaving the rest stop or coming [from the interstate] into the lane going out of the rest stop.” Even after prompting as to whether he saw Dickens drive through the rest stop, Amaral said he did not remember Dickens driving through the rest stop. At trial, he further testified, “I still don’t remember him coming in as I’m going out. There was not enough time span where he left the other side to get across when I was running.” (emphasis added). Dickens, of course, also denied driving through the rest stop. The only allegation that Amaral made with respect to this point, on which the majority could conceivably be thought to rely to support its own finding, see Maj. Op. at 8620-21 n.13, was a belated half-sentence reference by Amaral to a conversation that Amaral said he had with Dickens sometime after the murders in which he “believe[d]” Dickens said that he went through the rest stop. Neither the Arizona Supreme Court nor the trial court ever mentioned that purported conversation. Neither court deemed the belated statement credible or worthy of mention. In the end, this half-sentence, the only possible “evidence” regarding Dickens driving through the rest stop, is mentioned only by the majority here but not by any state court. Moreover, that “evidence” is contrary to what Amaral himself observed, and contrary to what Amaral testified to regarding the lack of time for Dickens to drive through the rest stop before picking him up on the side of the road. Reliance on the isolated half-sentence about what Amaral DICKENS v. RYAN 8647 “believe[d]” Dickens had said to support a finding (itself nonexistent) that Dickens drove through the rest stop would in any event have been “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In short, there is no basis for any finding that Dickens drove through the rest stop and even more important no finding was made by any state court.