Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims pertaining to 1989 competency trial

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing, over defense objections at various points in the competency trial, irrelevant discussion and evidence of the factual details of the charged offenses. (Evid. Code, § 350.) Defendant further argues that any relevancy of these details was substantially outweighed by the prejudice they caused him before the competency jury, in violation of Evidence Code section 352 and his right to due process of law under the state and federal Constitutions. Defendant complains that, during voir dire, the prosecutor asked prospective jurors, [I]f it were to come out during the testimony of the psychiatrists that because there are multiple murder charges against Jon Dunkle, some other judge and some other jury down the road  not you, nothing for you to consider . . . may have to consider the death penalty, do you have such strong feelings, one way or the other, that it would affect them in the competency trial. The prosecutor later asked similar questions of other prospective jurors. Defense counsel objected that the penalty in the criminal trial was irrelevant to and remote from the issues in the competency proceeding, and that competency jurors should not be considering the issue of possible penalties. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to inquire. There was no error. A trial court enjoys wide latitude in determining what questions may be asked on voir dire, and its exercise of discretion in this respect forms grounds for reversal only when it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 737, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302.) Contrary to defendant's assertion, the subject of penalty was relevant to the competency trial, in that the psychiatric experts' testimony touched on defendant's understanding of the potential outcome of the criminal proceedings and his possible motivation to delay them. Defendant suffered no undue prejudice by the prosecutor's mention of the potential penalty during voir dire. (See People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 925, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388 [for purposes of Evidence Code section 352, undue prejudice stems from evidence that `tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual' and that has a negligible bearing on the issues, not the prejudice `that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.'].) Defendant's due process claim lacks merit for the same reasons. Defendant further complains of the admission of references to the uncharged killing of Sean Dannehl. First, defendant notes the prosecutor, out of the presence of the jury, stated that Dr. Missett and Dr. Wilkinson had discussed the Dannehl homicide with defendant and that he intended to bring up evidence pertaining to that offense because defendant would be dealing with [it] during the penalty phase. Defense counsel objected on grounds of irrelevancy and undue prejudice. The trial court ruled inadmissible any mention of the Dannehl homicide unless it became clear that the probative value of such evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Detective Robert Bell, a homicide investigator in the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department who had worked on the Dannehl case, later testified for the prosecution without mentioning that case. Dr. Levy and Dr. Missett, in their respective testimony, referred to the existence of the Dannehl homicide, without describing any details of the offense. The determination of the extent of a defendant's ability rationally to assist counsel in presenting a penalty defense may necessitate reference to evidence of uncharged offenses likely to be presented to the penalty phase jury. (See People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 427, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 887-888, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282; People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 494-496, 174 Cal.Rptr. 684, 629 P.2d 485.) Here, Dr. Missett testified that, during the competency examination, defendant spontaneously referred to Sean Dannehl but refused to discuss the details of the offense; probing a defendant's understanding of those details, Dr. Missett noted, is relevant to the competency determination. We therefore see no error in the references to the Dannehl homicide. Defendant additionally argues the prosecutor improperly brought the facts of the Turner and Davies homicides before the jury, causing prejudice requiring reversal of the judgment. During his opening statement to the competency jury, the prosecutor summarized the evidence of those offenses; when defense counsel objected, the prosecutor explained the evidence would show that defendant remembered what he had done in the course of the killings and related it to the evaluators. As promised, the prosecutor then presented the testimony of Belmont Police Officer Joseph Farmer, who related the substance of defendant's 1986 confessions to the Davies and Turner homicides and the Murphy attempted murder. Specifically, Farmer testified defendant said that in 1984 he approached Lance Turner on a trail, stabbed him with a knife in the throat, stomach and chest, and dragged the body off the trail into the bushes; in November 1981 he invited John Davies to have some beer and listen to his car stereo, and then at Edgewood Park took a knife from his car, walked up a hillside with John, stabbed him in the back and throat, strangled him, hit him over the head with a rock, and pushed the body 100 feet off the side of the hill; and in 1982 he deliberately ran Stephen Murphy over with his car, put him into the car, drove him to another undeveloped part of Belmont and left him there. Defendant contends these facts were irrelevant to the issues involved in the competency trial, and that he never contested (as by a claim of amnesia or organic brain damage) that he remembered his actions. Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence of the homicides and attempted homicide served a legitimate purpose in the competency trial: to convey to the jurors the essence of the case against which defendant would have to defend himself, in order that they could assess his understanding of the charges and ability to assist counsel in his defense. The evidence, moreover, illuminated defendant's failure to discuss the facts of the offenses with the mental health professionals appointed or retained to evaluate him, as contrasted with his earlier, more forthcoming admissions to law enforcement officers. This, in turn, tended to support the prosecution's contention that defendant could rationally assist counsel, if he so chose. In any event, a minimum of time was spent on the facts of the homicides, and the jurors were instructed not to be biased against the defendant, or swayed by sympathy, passion, prejudice, or the possible consequences of their verdict. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting references to the facts of the Turner and Davies homicides to come before the jury, defendant was not denied due process. (Cf. People v. Turner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 427, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505.)
Defendant contends insufficient evidence supported the jury's finding of his competency, that he was in fact incompetent, and that his trial while incompetent violated state law and his federal constitutional rights of due process, to the assistance of counsel and to be present during the proceedings against him. A person cannot be tried or sentenced while mentally incompetent. (§ 1367, subd. (a).) A defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, he or she is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. ( Ibid.; see also Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824.) A defendant's trial while incompetent violates state law and federal due process guarantees. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815; People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 516-517, 58 Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942.) A defendant is presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f); People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 881-886, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282; see Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 448-451, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 [placing burden on defendant to prove incompetence does not violate due process].) On appeal, the reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the finding on competency. ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of solid value. ( Ibid. ) The jury heard this evidence during the 1989 competency proceedings: Court-appointed Psychiatrist Roland Levy, examined defendant for 45 minutes on March 21, 1989, and concluded he was incompetent. Dr. Levy reported that defendant displayed affect inappropriate to the content of his conversation and spoke of how a computer, apparently connected to the FBI, influenced him and was responsible for the killings, but wandered off that subject and began to talk about such matters as organized crime, government control and working for secret agencies. Dr. Levy suspected defendant might be experiencing auditory hallucinations and concluded he could not distinguish his delusions from reality. Defendant's delusions had a diffuse quality, while another person with better organized paranoid schizophrenia could present a delusion in such a way as to make it almost believable. Dr. Levy considered and rejected the possibility that defendant was faking mental illness, noting the only deception defendant seemed to be practicing was his overt denial that he was mentally ill. Dr. Levy diagnosed defendant as suffering from chronic schizophrenia with paranoid traits. He observed that defendant was reacting well to the antipsychotic medication Navane at a dosage that would cause a nonpsychotic person to feel slow and unable to think. On July 16, 1989, defendant met with Dr. Levy for 45 minutes; the next day, he refused to meet with him. The defense then called Psychiatrist James Missett, who had examined defendant at the prosecution's request. Dr. Missett met with defendant for 45 minutes on October 7, 1986, and five hours on October 13, 1986; on July 25, 1989, he observed defendant during a 90-minute court hearing and, on another occasion, for 90 minutes in jail. Dr. Missett diagnosed defendant as having antisocial and borderline personality disorders and sexual sadism; he ruled out a diagnosis of schizophrenia, characterizing defendant's symptoms as inconsistent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and his delusions as having a psychosis of the day quality. Dr. Missett believed defendant was malingering and had fooled other psychiatrists who had arrived at different diagnoses. He concluded defendant obtained gratification from jerking people around. The defense also called Psychiatrist George Wilkinson, whom the court had appointed to examine defendant in connection with the competency proceedings. Dr. Wilkinson examined defendant on several occasions, the first of them on May 27, 1987, when he committed involuntarily defendant, who was acutely psychotic, to Chope Hospital after an emergency referral by jail staff. His next examination of defendant, lasting more than 90 minutes, occurred on January 5, 1988, when defendant reported experiencing hallucinations. Dr. Wilkinson felt that defendant, who admitted the truth of his confessions but refused to discuss the facts of his case, was manipulating him. On January 26, 1988, Dr. Wilkinson again examined defendant, finding him competent but recommending an evaluation at Atascadero State Hospital to settle the question of whether he was malingering. (The recommended evaluation did not occur.) After defendant was again committed to Chope Hospital in May 1988, Dr. Wilkinson examined defendant and concluded that, although he had experienced psychotic episodes, he could still cooperate with counsel and was competent to stand trial. On March 1, 1989, after trial counsel reported deterioration in his relationship with defendant, Dr. Wilkinson attempted to interview defendant, who refused for delusional reasons to come out of his jail cell. Then, after a court appearance on July 7, 1989, Dr. Wilkinson saw defendant for some 45 minutes and found him to be psychotic, with disorganized thinking, loose associations, auditory hallucinations and inappropriate affect. Dr. Wilkinson's two later attempts to see defendant failed when defendant stood in his urinal and refused to come out of his cell. Dr. Wilkinson diagnosed defendant as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, although his symptoms did not fit all the criteria for that illness. He viewed defendant's manipulation of psychiatrists as a self-protective mechanism to compensate for feelings of humiliation and low self-esteem. At times, however, defendant would get his attempts to manipulate mixed up with his illness. Dr. Wilkinson noted defendant's condition had improved when he was taking Navane, consistent with someone who has had a genuine psychotic episode. Dr. Wilkinson agreed with Dr. Levy that defendant lacked the skills to fake a major mental illness completely. He disagreed with Dr. Missett that variability in reported delusions meant the patient was faking; indeed, a lack of variation in such delusions would be more consistent with total faking. Trial counsel Douglas Gray testified that defendant initially expressed hostility toward him and disclosed such delusional beliefs as that his former attorney had killed a California Highway Patrol officer and received hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes, from either organized crime or the government, to stop defendant from pleading guilty. At first defendant only wanted to plead guilty, but later he developed a working relationship with Gray. That relationship faltered as defendant's mental condition deteriorated in the fall of 1988. Defendant appeared almost emaciated and had not bathed for some time, and by January 1989 his statements were incomprehensible and disconnected and he began to refuse to see Gray. When Gray initiated competency proceedings, defendant reacted negatively, said he would not take psychotropic medication and did not want to go to Atascadero State Hospital, and declared he was not and had never been mentally ill. On the first day of competency proceedings, defendant wore his jail clothes in compliance with counsel's tactical decision. On the second day, defendant angrily said he did not want to wear jail clothes but wanted instead to wear street clothes in order to get a fair trial. Even after being removed to a holding cell, he screamed at his attorneys. Finally defendant agreed to behave in court in exchange for the attorneys' agreement to permit him to wear street clothes in court. Defendant told Gray he did not want to testify in the competency proceedings because he was embarrassed and shy about answering questions about the psychiatrists, who, he maintained, had lied. He indicated that if he could confine his testimony to the homicides there would be no problem. The attorneys would not guarantee that, so he did not testify. Attorney Thomas Nolan testified as an expert in what is needed for a client to assist rationally in a capital case. Nolan testified that if a person is uncommunicative due to mental illness, or wants to plead guilty because a computer was responsible for the crime and refuses to consider an insanity defense, or prefers communicating with the district attorney over his own counsel, or sends letters to sheriff's deputies without telling his counsel, he is not rationally assisting counsel and is preventing counsel from fulfilling his or her role. The prosecution presented the testimony of several deputy sheriffs, who described their interactions with defendant at court and in jail. On May 6, 1988, Deputy Sheriff Debra Rosengart was assigned to transport defendant to Chope Hospital. From an area where she could not be seen, Rosengart observed defendant stop talking to himself when she left his sight; when Rosengart reappeared to defendant, she saw him resume talking to himself, only to stop when she told him to do so. While transporting defendant in a van, Rosengart turned on the radio to drown out his ramblings; he stopped talking and began to sing along. While walking into the hospital, defendant was silent; after Rosengart told him to go along to his evaluation, he resumed talking to himself. Sheriff's Sergeant Robert Prevot was assigned to the jail in 1987 and 1988 and there had contact with defendant, who was generally very quiet and read and slept a lot. On February 16, 1989, Deputy Sheriff Martin Douglas transported defendant to court. Defendant was quiet until he was called into court, when he started babbling. As soon as defendant left court after his appearance, Douglas noticed he stopped babbling. Deputy Sheriff William Southward, who sometimes worked in the jail, testified he never saw unusual conduct by defendant. Once Dr. Levy came to visit defendant at his cell; when defendant asserted he did not know the doctor and Southward described him, defendant refused to meet with him. Deputy Sheriff John Quinlan testified that while he was assigned to work in the jail, he never heard defendant make unusual statements. On three to five occasions Quinlan saw defendant engage in bizarre behavior, including refusing to see family members, refusing to come out for recreation, and smearing a substance onto his cell window. Deputy Sheriff David Barrett testified he had known defendant for two years as a result of his jail assignment and had a great deal of contact with him over 8 to 12 months. Barrett and defendant conversed about bicycling, movies and television. When the conversation touched on his crimes, defendant spoke about computers. Defendant told Barrett he had smeared shampoo onto his cell window in order to scare away predatory inmates by making them think he was crazy. Joan Davies was trained to work with persons with dyslexia and spent hundreds of hours, over a four-year period, helping defendant with his reading skills before her son John disappeared. Mrs. Davies attended the trial. She testified that when the prosecutor, during his opening statement, incorrectly asserted that defendant had lived with the Davies family, defendant turned in his seat, made eye contact with Davies and her husband, and shook his head no. Sacramento County Sheriff's Department Investigator Robert Bell first made contact with defendant in 1984, during the murder investigations; after defendant's arrest, he occasionally contacted Bell. In February 1988, defendant complained to Bell that his attorneys were trying to present a sham psychiatric defense in which defendant did not want to participate. Defendant told Bell he committed the murders because he had received radar transmissions from a large antenna in Russia instructing him to kill. Bell told defendant he was disappointed because defendant had earlier confessed and now seemed to be shirking responsibility. Defendant became quiet and eventually said he wanted to talk about something else. Belmont Police Detective Joseph Farmer testified to the contents of defendant's 1986 confessions, including the details of the Davies and Turner homicides and the assault on Stephen Murphy. Defendant contends this evidence was insufficient to support the jury's competency finding. In particular, he urges that Dr. Missett's opinion  that he was competent and malingering  was contrary to facts of record and to uncontested medical and scientific facts. Here, defendant asserts, the only substantial evidence was that he was psychotic, no evidence to the contrary was presented, and no evidence showed that even if he was psychotic he nevertheless was competent to stand trial. We disagree. The opinions of the various experts stood in conflict, and in assessing their testimony the jury was entitled to consider that Dr. Missett had more than five hours of contact with defendant in 1986 against which to evaluate his behavior during the 1989 competency proceedings. The jury also heard that Dr. Wilkinson, in two 1988 reports, had found defendant competent and changed his mind after a March 1, 1989, contact that lasted only 15 minutes. Although Dr. Wilkinson saw defendant again on July 7, 1989, for 45 minutes and found him to be psychotic, he felt less than total (i.e., only 75 to 80 percent) certainty that defendant was incompetent. Dr. Levy had briefer contact with defendant than had Dr. Missett (two 45-minute evaluations), from which the jury could infer that Dr. Missett's opinion was entitled to greater weight. Although defendant argues his behavior fit the classic model of incompetency, in that  like truly psychotic people  he sometimes insisted he was not mentally ill and refused to see the psychiatrists who were in a position to assist him in avoiding his criminal trial through a finding of incompetency, the jury was entitled to consider that, during his first competency trial the year before, defendant had heard expert witnesses describe the behavior of genuinely psychotic persons and the ways malingerers go wrong in feigning mental illness. The jury, moreover, was aware that defendant had the opportunity to observe the behavior of psychotic persons while in the locked psychiatric ward at Chope Hospital, and heard Dr. Wilkinson testify that defendant was cunning and manipulative, and derived gratification from frustrating psychiatrists. Defendant cites evidence that he responded favorably to antipsychotic medications, which only a psychotic person can tolerate without becoming sleepy and clouded in thinking; on Navane, defendant related better to people, was less hostile, had less trouble controlling his impulses, and apparently experienced none of the sedation that would be expected in a nonpsychotic person taking the drug. [2] Defendant also criticizes as scientifically invalid Dr. Missett's reliance on a definition of schizophrenia as involving fixed, firm delusions (and his resulting opinion that because the reported details of defendant's delusional material varied from time to time, he must be making up the material as he went and therefore was malingering), noting that other experts acknowledged the existence of types of schizophrenia involving fluctuating or variable delusions. But whether defendant was in fact mentally ill and, if so, his precise diagnosis was not determinative of his competency. Dr. Wilkinson testified one can be both paranoid schizophrenic and competent to stand trial. The testimony of Dr. Missett and the lay witnesses describing defendant's behavior, taken together (see People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 31-32, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262), provide substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant understood the nature of the criminal proceedings and had the ability to assist his counsel in a rational manner (§ 1367, subd. (a)).
As requested by the parties, the trial court instructed the competency phase jury with CALJIC No. 4.10 as follows: In this proceeding you must decide whether the defendant is mentally competent to be tried for a criminal offense. [¶] This is not a criminal proceeding and the innocence or guilt of the defendant of the criminal charge against him is not involved nor is the question of his legal insanity at the time of the commission of the offense involved. [¶] Although on some subjects his mind may be deranged or unsound, a person charged with a criminal offense is deemed mentally competent to be tried for the crime charged against him, if: [¶] One, he is capable of understanding the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; two, he comprehends his own status and condition in reference to such proceedings; and three, he is able to assist his attorney in conducting his own defense in a rational manner. [¶] The defendant is presumed to be mentally competent. The effect of this presumption is to place upon the defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally incompetent as a result of a mental disorder. Defendant contends this instruction was flawed in several respects. The Attorney General urges that trial counsel, by joining in the prosecutor's request for the instruction, invited any error and that defendant therefore is barred from raising these contentions on appeal. On the record before us, we cannot say that trial counsel both `intentionally caused the trial court to err' and did so for `tactical reasons.' ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) Reviewing the merits of defendant's argument, we find no error. First, defendant argues the instruction improperly permitted the jury to find him competent if it believed he had a mental disorder but could be made able to assist his counsel in a rational manner if he were administered antipsychotic medications. Defendant observes that the evidence  including his own statements and the fact that, once returned to jail after each of his involuntary commitments, he stopped taking the medication he had been compelled to take while in the hospital  indicated he would not voluntarily ingest them. Such a predicate to a competency finding, he contends, would violate both the federal Constitution and state law. He argues that because it cannot be discerned from the general verdict of competency whether the jury based its finding on permissible or impermissible considerations, the judgment cannot stand. Defendant acknowledges that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court permits, under certain circumstances, the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications in order to make a criminal defendant competent to stand trial. ( Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 ( Sell ).) To be consistent with the federal Constitution's protection of a defendant's liberty interest, Sell holds such medication must be medically appropriate, substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, necessary to significantly further important governmental trial-related interests, and the trial court must so find. ( Sell, supra, 539 U.S. at pp. 180-181, 186, 123 S.Ct. 2174; Riggins v. Nevada (1992) 504 U.S. 127, 135-136, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 [the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of a fair trial and due process demand that, when a criminal defendant files a motion to terminate the administration of antipsychotic medication during trial, the state must establish the need for, and medical appropriateness of, the medication]; Washington v. Harper (1990) 494 U.S. 210, 222-227, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 [state law that provided convicted prisoners with administrative rather than judicial review of involuntary medication orders adequately protected constitutional liberty interests].) Defendant contends that, because the jury might have believed he would be competent only if medicated, because the trial court here did not make the findings required by Sell, and because the record indicates he was not voluntarily taking medication at the time of the 1989 competency trial, and indeed shows that he refused to take prescribed psychotropic medication after his release from each of his several involuntary commitments to Chope Hospital, the jury's finding of competency is invalid. As the Attorney General observes, because this case does not involve an effort to forcibly medicate defendant, the Sell findings were not required. For the same reason, the jury's finding of competency here is not invalidated by decisions such as Thor v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 725, 732, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 357, 855 P.2d 375, recognizing the right of convicted prisoners to refuse medical treatment, Keyhea v. Rushen (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 526, 530, 542, 223 Cal.Rptr. 746, recognizing the right of prisoners to refuse psychotropic medication absent a judicial finding of grave disability, and Riese v. St. Mary's Hospital & Medical Center (1987) 209 Cal.App.3d 1303, 1308, 271 Cal.Rptr. 199, recognizing the right of psychiatric patients involuntarily committed to mental health facilities under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5150 and 5250 to refuse antipsychotic medications absent a judicial determination of their incapacity to make treatment decisions. (See also In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 10, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 780, 81 P.3d 224 [in nonemergency situations, a competent mentally disordered offender cannot be forced to take antipsychotic medications absent a judicial finding of dangerousness].) The evidence tending to show that defendant was competent to stand trial was not predicated on his being administered antipsychotic medications. As noted, Dr. Missett testified defendant was malingering and not psychotic, and diagnosed defendant instead with antisocial personality disorder and sexual sadism. Jail personnel testified defendant generally behaved normally in custody, supporting an inference that he was not psychotic. Nor did the evidence tending to show that defendant was incompetent directly posit that medication was necessary to make him competent: Dr. Wilkinson merely acknowledged that defendant might regain his competency and previously had benefited from taking antipsychotic medication. Neither the prosecutor nor defendant's counsel, in their closing arguments, touched on the subject of defendant's taking medication during trial or being made competent as a result of medication. Thus, given the state of the evidence and argument, there was no foundation for a jury finding that defendant was competent based on an assumption that he would be administered antipsychotic medication, voluntarily or otherwise. The trial court therefore had no obligation to instruct the jury as defendant now argues, i.e., that to return a verdict of competency on a theory that defendant was competent only if administered antipsychotic medication, it must find either that he would voluntarily take his medications or that the Sell factors were present. For the same reason, contrary to defendant's argument the competency verdict is not inherently vague or ambiguous. Defendant next contends that the definition of competency in CALJIC No. 4.10 is inconsistent with that mandated in Dusky v. United States, supra, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, and thus fails to satisfy the requirements of due process. Specifically, he argues that a person who is able to assist an attorney in conducting his own defense in a rational manner (CALJIC No. 4.10) does not necessarily have `sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' as Dusky requires. ( Dusky v. United States, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788.) Defendant asserts that consult, properly understood, means actively to deliberate together with counsel, or in other words to think about or discuss issues and decisions carefully, concepts assertedly missing from CALJIC No. 4.10. We previously have observed that the language of section 1367, from which CALJIC No. 4.10 is drawn, does not match, word for word, that of Dusky. But as the Court of Appeal noted in James H. v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 169, 177, 143 Cal.Rptr. 398, `To anyone but a hairsplitting semanticist, the two tests are identical.' ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 816, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) Contrary to defendant's suggestion, CALJIC No. 4.10 requires more for a competency finding than evidence that a defendant is oriented to time and place, has a factual understanding of his circumstances, and recalls the events in question. Defendant's point therefore lacks merit. Defendant observes that Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. at pages 450-451, 112 S.Ct. 2572, held it consistent with due process to place the burden of proof of incompetency on the defendant, in part because defense counsel often has the best informed view concerning a defendant's inability to assist in his own defense. Defendant suggests that CALJIC No. 4.10 vitiates the predicate of Medina, and thereby rendered it unconstitutional to impose on him the burden of proof of incompetency, by failing to tell the jury, which might otherwise perceive Gray as a partisan advocate, not to discount his testimony merely because of his status as defendant's attorney, or otherwise to convey that an attorney is an officer of the court who has special obligations to the court before which he or she appears. Defendant contends the trial court exacerbated this problem by instructing the jury, using CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and 1.02, to consider possible bias and motive in determining a witness's credibility and that statements by attorneys are not evidence. If defendant believed CALJIC No. 4.10 required elaboration or clarification in this regard, however, it was incumbent on him to request it. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 122, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 669, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351; People v. Reed (1952) 38 Cal.2d 423, 430, 240 P.2d 590.) And, as discussed below (see post, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d p. 55, 116 P.3d p. 521), nothing in the instruction invited the jury to disregard Gray's testimony. The giving of the instruction did not deny defendant due process. Defendant further contends that CALJIC No. 4.10, as given in this case, was deficient because it failed to give the jury sufficient guidance regarding the various constitutional rights implicated in a criminal trial and failed to tell the jury how much and what kind of assistance a defendant must be able to provide counsel. As the Attorney General observes, however, the terms contained in CALJIC No. 4.10, including the word assist, are ones of ordinary usage. None has a technical meaning peculiar to the law on which the trial court was required to instruct absent a specific request. ( People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 861, 62 P.3d 97.) If defendant believed the instruction required clarification or elaboration, he had the burden of requesting it. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 122, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) Defendant's contention thus lacks merit.
Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 4.10, as given, was defective in that it failed to convey to the jury that a defendant must meet the criteria for competency for the duration of the capital proceedings. He argues the instruction permitted the jury to find him competent even if it believed he suffered from schizophrenia and might not have been able to maintain his competency throughout the entire trial. The asserted error was prejudicial, he maintains, because the record shows his condition waxed and waned, so that he was sometimes lucid but at other times psychotic. As the Attorney General points out, defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 4.10 and never requested a modification or clarification along these lines. The contention, therefore, is forfeited for appellate purposes. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 122, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) In any event, the point lacks merit. To demand that the jury predict the course of defendant's competency throughout a capital trial of indeterminate length would be to insist on speculation. More important, as the Attorney General reasons, section 1368 provides for the institution of additional competency proceedings should a substantial change of circumstances or the emergence of new evidence cast doubt on the earlier finding of competency. Due process requires no more.
During deliberations, the jury sent the court a note asking for a legal definition of the term rational manner, as used in CALJIC No. 4.10. Out of the jury's presence, the court discussed the request with counsel. After conducting research, the court and counsel could find neither a judicial decision defining the term nor a dictionary definition to which all parties would agree. Accordingly, the court instructed jurors to rely upon the common understanding of the meaning of the word, and reread to them the first paragraph of CALJIC No. 1.01, which directed them not to single out any particular sentence, point or instruction, but to consider the instructions as a whole. Defendant contends that by referring the jury to the common understanding of the term, the court failed in its duty to assist the jury to understand the issue before it, depriving him of a reliable competency verdict under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. The Attorney General asserts that defendant forfeited the issue for appellate purposes by approving the trial court's response, but the record reflects that his trial counsel objected to the court's proposed response and suggested a different one of his own devising, which the court declined to give. Counsel was not required to continue to argue the point in order to preserve it for appeal. On the merits, however, we see no reasonable likelihood ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1161, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384) that the trial court's response could have led the jury to misunderstand the nature of its task. That the jury expressed some uncertainty over the legal definition of the term rational manner, and the parties could not agree on a definition, does not mean that the term has a technical meaning, peculiar to the law, on which the court had an obligation to instruct the jury. (See People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 408, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279.) Thus, the trial court was not remiss in failing to instruct in the manner that defendant now argues. Our conclusion is unaffected by the circumstance that the court followed this advice with a rereading of CALJIC No. 1.01. Nothing in the instruction would have caused the jury to minimize the importance of the competency instructions.
Counsel sought to inform the jury, through the testimony of defense experts, what would happen if defendant were found incompetent to stand trial. When counsel asked Dr. Levy whether there was a way to get Mr. Dunkle competent, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection on grounds of relevancy. When counsel examined Dr. Wilkinson about his February 1988 recommendation that defendant be sent to Atascadero State Hospital for further evaluation, asking what Atascadero was, the trial court again sustained the prosecutor's objection on relevancy grounds. During the examination of Trial Counsel Douglas Gray, counsel asked what Gray had told defendant about the procedures occurring after the competency trial. When the prosecutor objected on grounds of relevancy, counsel explained that the information was relevant to defendant's motivations. The trial court permitted the testimony, instructing the jury that Gray's response was admitted only on the question of how much defendant understood of what he was told. Gray then answered: I told him if he were found incompetent in these proceedings that the criminal proceedings would remain suspended, [essentially] on hold, and he would be sent to a state hospital, most likely Atascadero State Hospital here in California where he would be treated for his mental condition. [¶] I told him that he would be required to take medication, that he would not have a choice as to whether or not to take it, and that efforts would be made to restore him to competency through treatment and medication, and that there would be further proceedings to either evaluate whether or not he had been restored to competency or to simply check and see if he had been. [¶] I told him that if he were found to be competent then we would resume the normal criminal proceedings. The court instructed jurors that the possible or potential outcome of your verdict . . . is something that is not to concern you . . . normally a jury is not told what the outcome of their verdict may be, what will happen one way or the other. Defendant now contends the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecutor's objections to the questions quoted above, and in failing to instruct on the legal consequences of a verdict of incompetency. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's evidentiary rulings. As the trial court noted, the nature and functions of Atascadero State Hospital were not in issue in this case, and permitting testimony about whether or how defendant could get competent would have invited the jury to consider matters outside its function of determining defendant's competency. We further conclude that defendant forfeited his claim of instructional error by failing to request the instruction he now contends the trial court should have given, and that, in any event, the trial court did not err in failing to give the instruction on its own motion. Defendant analogizes this case to People v. Moore (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 540, 211 Cal.Rptr. 856 ( Moore ). There, the Court of Appeal held a defendant was entitled to an instruction on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, a subject now covered in CALJIC No. 4.01. (166 Cal.App.3d. at p. 549, 211 Cal.Rptr. 856.) Acknowledging that a jury should not consider the subject of penalty or punishment in arriving at its decision on a criminal defendant's guilt or innocence, the Moore court noted that, unlike the significance of either of those verdicts, the consequence of a verdict of insanity is not commonly known to jurors. ( Id. at pp. 552-554, 211 Cal.Rptr. 856.) Without an appropriate instruction, the Moore court reasoned, the jury likely would speculate on what might happen to a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, and might wrongly assume he or she would walk free, like a defendant found not guilty for other reasons. ( Id. at p. 554, 211 Cal.Rptr. 856.) The Moore court concluded the danger of an erroneous assumption during jury deliberations overshadows any possible invitation to speculate on matters likely to be discussed anyway. ( Ibid. ) We have declined to apply Moore outside its original context ( People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 222, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222 [finding no error in the trial court's refusal of a flawed instruction, requested by the defense, regarding the consequences of a verdict of incompetency]), and do so again here. Because the outcome of any future efforts at restoring a defendant to competency is uncertain at the time when the jury must make its decision on competency, an instruction patterned after Moore and CALJIC No. 4.01 is necessarily speculative. Thus, even had defendant preserved his claim of error in failing to give such an instruction, it would fail.
Defendant contends the trial court erred prejudicially under state law and violated federal due process principles in failing to instruct the competency phase jury, on its own motion, with CALJIC No. 2.71, to view his admissions with caution. [3] Acknowledging we have held that trial courts are not required to give this instruction without a request in the penalty phase of trial ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 782-784, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297), he observes we have recently reiterated the rule requiring such an instruction, even absent a request, in the guilt phase ( People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1200-1201, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262). Defendant argues that a competency trial more resembles a guilt trial than it does a penalty trial, in that  unlike a normative sentencing decision  it results in a binary yes/no determination, in which an affirmative determination of competency is always unfavorable to a defendant. We disagree. Defendant's contrary argument is premised on the false belief a defendant in a competency proceeding has only one interest  to be found incompetent. However, unlike a criminal defendant, whose legal interest lies in being found not guilty whether he is guilty or not, the defendant in a competency proceeding has not only the right not to be tried for a criminal offense when he is incompetent; he has an equally important interest in not being sent to a mental institution with his criminal case unresolved, if he is competent. ( People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 805-806, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) Our holding in People v. Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pages 782-784, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297, recognized that a defendant's statement, admitted during a penalty trial, may be subject to varying interpretations and thus may tend either to mitigate or to aggravate; thus, we concluded, at this phase of trial an obligation to instruct, absent a request, is inappropriate. The same reasoning applies here with equal force. Because juries  and witnesses  may disagree over whether a particular communicative act or statement by a defendant reflects competency or its opposite, an instruction cautioning a jury to view a defendant's admissions, whether direct or adoptive, with caution should be given only on request. Defendant's contention, consequently, lacks merit.
The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.80 as follows: A duly qualified expert may give an opinion on questions in controversy at a trial. To assist you in deciding such questions, you may consider the opinion with the reasons given for it, if any, by the expert who gives the opinion. [¶] You may also consider the qualifications and the credibility of the expert. You are not bound to accept an expert opinion as conclusive but should give it the weight to which you find it to be entitled. (See § 1127b [requiring the trial court, when the opinion of any expert is received in evidence, to instruct in substantially the above terms, and stating no further instruction on the subject of opinion evidence need be given].) Defendant contends this instruction was deficient because it merely permitted, but did not require, the jury to consider the factual premises underlying the expert's opinion. This omission, he urges, misled the jury to believe that, to be given weight, an expert's opinion need not be founded on any reasons. Thus, defendant argues, the instruction as given caused the jury to accept uncritically Dr. Missett's opinion that defendant was malingering rather than incompetent. He observes that CALJIC No. 2.80 was revised, after his trial, to provide that the jury should consider, in addition to the witness's qualifications and believability, the facts or materials upon which each opinion is based, and the reasons for each opinion. (CALJIC No. 2.80 (6th ed.1996).) Because the asserted error affected the reliability of the jury's verdict, he contends, it denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. As the Attorney General points out, defendant requested this instruction, without requesting it be modified along the lines he now asserts was necessary. If defendant believed the instruction was incomplete, it was incumbent on him to ask the trial court to clarify or supplement it. ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1211, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) In any event, we see no reasonable likelihood the jury would have understood the instruction in the manner defendant contends. ( Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) The instruction told the jury it should consider the reasons supporting the expert's opinion; that the jury would not have understood this term to encompass the factual assumptions underlying the opinion is implausible.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in giving the jury the standard instructions that statements made by the attorneys during the trial are not evidence (CALJIC No. 1.02), that jurors must determine the facts from the evidence and no other source (CALJIC No. 1.00), and that they must not independently investigate the facts (CALJIC No. 1.03). The problem with these instructions, defendant asserts, is that they invited the jury to disregard the testimony of Douglas Gray, defendant's counsel at the guilt and penalty phases of trial, who testified in the competency phase concerning defendant's interaction with him. The Attorney General points out that defendant requested these instructions and argues he therefore invited any error. We agree: Although counsel did not expressly articulate a tactical purpose in requesting the instructions, that he did so in order to ensure the jury did not consider statements made by the prosecutor as evidence seems likely. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 49, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) We also agree with the Attorney General that defendant fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the challenged instructions. ( Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72, 112 S.Ct. 475; People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) The trial court and the parties informed the jurors, during voir dire, that they would be asked to consider the testimony of two attorney witnesses, Gray and Nolan. Neither party suggested that jurors disregard Gray's testimony because of his status as defendant's counsel in the criminal trial. Indeed, the prosecutor cited portions of Gray's testimony in his closing argument. The giving of these instructions did not constitute error.