Opinion ID: 2537905
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence of Intent to Kill Montoya

Text: Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence he intended to kill Montoya, requiring reversal of his attempted murder conviction. Not so. (6) When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidenceโthat is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid valueโfrom which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 323, 190 P.3d 664].) We determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) In so doing, a reviewing court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68].) This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved. ( People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].) [I]t is well settled that intent to kill or express malice, the mental state required to convict a defendant of attempted murder, may ... be inferred from the defendant's acts and the circumstances of the crime. ( People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741 [37 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 124 P.3d 730].) (7) Here, defendant repeatedly attempted to stab Montoya, an unarmed and trapped victim, and succeeded in stabbing him in the arm and leg. This evidence alone is substantial evidence of defendant's intent to kill. ( People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 124] [intent to kill demonstrated in part by evidence of unprovoked attack that rendered unarmed victim prone and defenseless as the defendant repeatedly stabbed him].) In addition, defendant then fatally stabbed Moncada and Navarro, who were members of Montoya's group, inflicting wounds that were, respectively, approximately four and five inches deep and that penetrated their hearts. (See People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 561 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931] [defendant could have had no other intent than to kill when he plunged the knife deeply into a vital area of the body of an apparently unsuspecting and defenseless victim]; see also People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1253 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015] [similarities between murders support the inference that defendant went to the victim's home armed with a knife and with the intent to kill].) The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder for these deaths based on a theory of premeditation, and reasonably could have inferred defendant had the same intent to kill when, immediately prior to the murders, he attacked Montoya in the same manner. [7] Defendant asserts that the evidence of intent to kill is not substantial because the injury to Montoya was not serious. Of course, the degree of the resulting injury is not dispositive of defendant's intent. Indeed, a defendant may properly be convicted of attempted murder when no injury results. (See People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 135-136 [92 Cal.Rptr.3d 362, 205 P.3d 272].) The jury reasonably could infer that Montoya avoided further injury solely because he assumed a position from which he could kick at defendant and thus protect his vital organs from immediate injury. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1552 [that the defendant missed the victim's heart and lungs was fortuitous rather than indicative of the absence of an intent to kill]; People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629] [that the victim may have escaped death due to poor marksmanship does not vitiate intent to kill].) Defendant also contends there was a reasonable alternative explanation other than the intent to kill, because he may have merely wanted to prevent Moreno from driving away with Quintana, or perhaps simply was following through with Montoya's acceptance of a challenge to engage him in a fight. It is not clear how these motivations would be inconsistent with an intent to kill. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 162 [if jury found defendant's use of a lethal weapon with lethal force was purposeful, an intent to kill could be inferred, even if the act was done without advance consideration and only to eliminate a momentary obstacle or annoyance].) Even assuming they are inconsistent with such intent, if the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 143 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988].)