Opinion ID: 602165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Charging Paper

Text: 24 A § 924(e) enhancement is also appropriate if the conviction was based on a guilty plea to charges that contain all the elements of generic burglary. United States v. O'Neal, 937 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir.1991) (interpreting Taylor's categorical approach). 25 In the present case, the 1986 Burglary II Indictment stated that McCorvey unlawfully and knowingly enter[ed] and remain[ed] in a building located at 619 Southeast 122nd, with the intent to commit the crime of theft therein. In its Judgment Order, the state court ordered McCorvey to pay restitution to an individual whose address was also 619 Southeast 122nd. 26 The indictment shows that McCorvey entered a habitation that, at the very least, has been adapted for accommodation of persons (as substantiated by the fact that the victim could be reached by mail at that address). Therefore, the indictment contains all the elements of generic burglary. See generally Sweeten, 933 F.2d at 771 (a vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons falls within the generic definition). 27 The district court did not err in finding the 1986 Burglary II conviction a valid predicate act for purposes of § 924(e). 2. THE TWO 1988 BURGLARY I CONVICTIONS 28 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), predicate criminal convictions must be committed on occasions different from one another. In Antonie, this court explained that § 924(e)  'was intended to reach multiple criminal episodes that were distinct in time, not multiple felony convictions arising out of a single criminal episode.'  953 F.2d at 498 (quoting United States v. Petty, 828 F.2d 2, 3 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1057 (1988) (holding only one offense exists where defendant simultaneously robbed six restaurant customers)). The Antonie court found that two robberies perpetrated the same night, forty minutes apart, were two distinct predicate offenses under § 924(e) because they occurred in a different city, at a different time, were perpetrated against different victims, and were not a part of the same crime spree. Id. at 499. 29 The present case is analogous: the two 1988 burglaries occurred in different places, at different times (two weeks apart), were perpetrated against different people, and were not part of the same crime spree. See also United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir.1987) (burglaries that occurred on the same night but at different locations are separate convictions), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988). We therefore conclude that McCorvey's two 1988 burglaries were separate offenses for purposes of § 924(e). 30 McCorvey states that his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection was violated because of the incongruity between U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), which require[s] a sentencing judge to examine the circumstances of the conviction in computing the defendant's criminal history, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which simply look[s] at the mere number of prior convictions when determining whether a person qualifies as a career offender. 31 McCorvey's argument is meritless. The Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state, not federal statutes. U.S. Const. amend. XIV (No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis added)). McCorvey's argument also lacks merit even under the Fifth Amendment, which protects against discriminatory federal statutes. See Martin v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 582, 584 (9th Cir.1992). McCorvey is not a member of a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring heightened scrutiny and, therefore, the challenged classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Id. Consideration of the number of a defendant's prior convictions is rationally related to Congress' intent to deter recidivism and protect the public from recidivist criminals.