Opinion ID: 407751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Restrictions Imposed on FOIA-Exempt Information

Text: 18 Although government employees do not shed their first amendment rights on assuming public responsibilities, the scope of their right to speak freely is narrower than that of private citizens. As the Court has often repeated: 19 The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern, and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 20 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Accord Mount Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2889, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1974). This balance will differ according to the type of speech, 31 the nature of the agency, 32 and the context in which the speech is uttered. 33 In this case, the context of the speech is of utmost importance. Since the Lauer memorandum works to restrict communications between government employees and their attorneys, it implicates the fundamental right of those employees to meaningful access to the courts. Absent grounds to believe that discussions in this limited context would significantly impair any governmental interest, we conclude that the Lauer memorandum provisions, as applied to FOIA-exempt information violate appellants' first amendment rights. We emphasize, however, that this conclusion pertains only to the communications made to the employees' attorneys and not to any subsequent use made of those communications. Were the employees to reveal the FOIA-exempt information to others, or to authorize their attorney to do so, the balance between the government's interests and the employees' might well shift. 34
21 Appellants' interest in speaking freely with their attorneys is interwoven with their right to effective assistance of counsel. Meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right of citizenship in this country. Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 1979). Indeed, all other legal rights would be illusory without it. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973). Thus, while private parties must ordinarily pay their own legal fees, 35 they have an undeniable right to retain counsel to ascertain their legal rights. See Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1117-19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). 22 Restrictions on speech between attorneys and their clients directly undermine the ability of attorneys to offer sound legal advice. As the common law has long recognized, the right to confer with counsel would be hollow if those consulting counsel could not speak freely about their legal problems. 36 Through the attorney-client privilege, the common law encourage(s) full and frank discussions between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote(s) broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends on the lawyer being fully informed by the client. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). Limitations on the attorney-client privilege have therefore been drawn narrowly, to remove the privilege only where the privileged relationship is abused. 37 Absent such abuse, or a waiver of the privilege, 38 our legal system jealously protects the confidential status of attorneyclient communications. Although an adversary may ordinarily inquire as to what the client knows, he  'cannot (compel him) to answer the question What did you say or write to your attorney?.'  Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 396, 101 S.Ct. at 686 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 205 F.Supp. 830, 831 (E.D.Pa.1962)). 23 In this case, the government suggests that appellants have no legitimate interest in discussing government information with counsel. It argues that appellants, like other litigants, may request government information through standard FOIA and discovery procedures. Any claim of right to discuss such matters with counsel prior to formal receipt of the information, it suggests, is merely a plea for special treatment. 39 24 The government's argument ignores appellants' legitimate interest in an early assessment of their legal rights. The first step in the resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through the facts with an eye to the legally relevant. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 390-91, 101 S.Ct. at 683. Maintaining the confidentiality of attorney-client communications facilitates this process by encouraging the client to supply his attorney with relevant information. Id. If the client were to act at his peril, 40 in pre-screening information that may be exempt from FOIA, however, these initial consultations could be seriously hampered. Because of the complexity of the law concerning FOIA exemptions, the client might unduly restrict his discussion of non-exempt information. 41 25 Thus, we conclude that appellants' speech interests are not only legitimate but, because they implicate appellants' fundamental right of access to the courts, are deserving of rigorous protection. Following the approach of Pickering and its progeny, we must now examine the government's interest in restricting appellants' speech in order to determine whether the Lauer memorandum passes constitutional muster. 26
27 Although the Freedom of Information Act is a disclosure statute rather than a withholding statute, see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979), it recognizes specific public and private interests in limiting disclosure. 42 A decision whether to release FOIA-exempt material, therefore, requires a considered balancing of the public's interest in disclosure of particular material and the interests in nondisclosure acknowledged by the statutory exemptions. Regulations governing the processing of FOIA requests serve to assure that such an accommodation of competing interests will occur prior to the release of government information. 43 We do not doubt that, in general, these regulations serve substantial governmental interests. As one commentator has explained: 28 (L)egitimate government functions ... can be seriously harmed if confidential information is disseminated. For example, disclosure of investigative files might forewarn a violator and allow him to escape arrest or indictment. Similarly, publication of certain economic information, such as a Securities and Exchange Commission decision to suspend trading in a certain corporation's stock, might provide some parties with an unfair advantage if released early. Revelation of the proceeding of legitimately confidential government hearings or meetings might disrupt decisionmaking, since officials might then be afraid to air their true views. Finally, dissemination of defense secrets might cause loss of lives or endanger security. 29 Comment, First Amendment Standards for Subsequent Punishment of Dissemination of Confidential Information, 68 Cal.L.Rev. 83, 87 (1980). The strength of the government's interest, however, varies according to the nature of the information and the likelihood of public dissemination. Thus, the government's interest in nondisclosure is generally greater when a specific statute prohibits dissemination of information. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b (Privacy Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (Trade Secrets Act). And the interest is perhaps greatest when government information concerns national secrets. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3, 100 S.Ct. 763, 765 n.3, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980) (The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service. (Emphasis added.)). In contrast, there is a lesser government interest in preventing dissemination of much of the information covered by exemption two-information relating solely to internal personnel rules and practices. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). Although exemption two is in part designed to screen out illegitimate public inquiries into the functioning of an agency, see Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1065 (D.C.Cir.1981) (en banc) (exemption two covers all internal personnel matters that are not  'the subject of legitimate public interest' ) (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1142 (D.C.Cir.1975)), it also serves to relieve the agency from the administrative burden of processing FOIA requests when internal matters are not likely to be the subject of public interest. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d at 1150 (Leventhal, J., concurring). To the extent that matters are exempted from disclosure under exemption two on grounds of administrative burden, the exemption certainly does not represent a government interest in preventing employees from openly discussing such government information. 30 Thus, even with regard to public dissemination of FOIA-exempt information, the government does not always have an interest in preventing ad hoc disclosures of government information. We therefore question whether an across-the-board limitation on public discussion of FOIA-exempt matters would be valid. This case, however, concerns a far more limited type of disclosure-the discussion of information within the attorney-client context. Here, the government may protect its interest in prohibiting public disbursal of any sensitive information without intruding on the employee's substantial interest in freely discussing his legal rights with his attorney. Because the attorney is bound to maintain the confidence of his client, see Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101, matters disclosed in confidential discussions between the attorney and his client would only become public if the client authorized the attorney to make such a disclosure or the attorney breached his ethical obligations. Arguably, the government could protect its interest in preventing public disclosure of government information by requiring the employee not to authorize any subsequent disclosure of sensitive government information by his attorney. 44 But a broad restriction, undermining the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship and chilling discussions with counsel in order to protect the government's unclear interest in monitoring all discussions of FOIA-exempt information cuts too deeply into the employee's first amendment rights. Especially in the absence of any specific allegation that appellants or their attorneys are likely to disseminate government information publicly, we conclude that appellants may not be required to disclose all of their discussions touching on FOIA-exempt information.