Opinion ID: 1127349
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trial court's denial of appointed counsel's motion to withdraw.

Text: (10a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to permit appointed counsel to withdraw as counsel for defendant on the asserted ground the filing of the malpractice action created a conflict of interest between defendant and appointed counsel. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying the request to withdraw after determining that the assertion by defendant of frivolous claims of malpractice did not create an actual conflict between the interests of defendant and those of his appointed counsel. The procedural background pertinent to this claim is as follows. On January 25, 1985, defendant filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court the civil complaint against Newton and Windon for attorney malpractice, which had been the subject of the earlier Marsden hearing. On February 6, 1985, trial in the present case commenced with jury selection. On February 19, 1985, in an unreported ex parte conference, defense counsel informed the court they had been served with the malpractice complaint. Expressing the concern that by virtue of the filing of the complaint, defendant had waived the attorney-client privilege, counsel sought guidance from the court as to how to proceed, and offered to withdraw. The trial court responded by stating, among other things, that in the court's view the filing of the malpractice action represented another attempt by defendant to manipulate the judicial process and delay his trial. The court indicated that although the action, if not withdrawn, might warrant the removal of appointed counsel, the court would not grant a continuance of the trial date. In open court, with all counsel present, the court announced that defense counsel had informed the court that a civil action had been filed against them by defendant. Newton stated his belief that the malpractice complaint, containing the allegations that were examined at the prior Marsden hearing, created a conflict of interest and requested permission to withdraw as counsel for defendant. The trial court responded that, although the filing of the complaint technically placed the attorneys in a position adverse to that of their client, the allegations that gave rise to the alleged conflict already had been examined (at the Marsden hearing), had been determined to have no merit, and would not justify the removal of appointed counsel. The court stated that the appropriate means available to defendant to challenge that determination was appellate review of the court's ruling. The court further remarked that the record of the numerous minute orders in the proceeding led the court to believe that defendant was seeking to manipulate the system by delaying the proceedings and creating a ground for appellate reversal of any conviction subsequently rendered. Following Newton's representation that, apart from the complaint, he perceived no conflict between the interests of defendant and those of counsel, the court determined that in fact no conflict of interest existed. The court reasoned that to conclude otherwise would enable a criminal defendant to delay the prosecution indefinitely by resorting to the ploy of filing successive malpractice complaints against appointed counsel. The court indicated, however, that in the event it denied defense counsel's motion to be relieved of their appointment, the court would provide counsel an opportunity to seek writ review of its ruling before impaneling a jury. On February 25, 1985, the court denied defense counsel's motion to declare a conflict of interest and be relieved as counsel. The court stated its understanding that defense counsel would be seeking writ relief from the ruling unless defendant chose voluntarily to dismiss the complaint. Newton informed the court that he had discussed with defendant the potential adverse consequences that could arise from maintenance of the malpractice action, including waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and that defendant had agreed to dismiss the action. Newton stated that a request-for-dismissal form was in the process of being prepared for defendant's signature. On February 26, 1985, Newton informed the court that he was in receipt of a request for dismissal signed by defendant, and then inquired of defendant whether it was his desire to have the document filed with the court. Defendant responded affirmatively and, in response to the court's inquiry whether his decision to dismiss the action had been coerced, replied that it had not been. (11) Under the state and federal Constitutions, a criminal defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel, which includes the right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. ( People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1134 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].) Conflicts of interest arise in `all situations in which an attorney's loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client or a third person or by his own interests.' ( Ibid., quoting People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 835 [254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460].) (10b) Defendant's claim that his counsel were burdened by an actual conflict of interest is undermined by the circumstance that defendant voluntarily dismissed the complaint, thereby eliminating any potential conflict of interest. Moreover, the trial court properly determined, in the exercise of its discretion, that the filing of the complaint did not create any actual conflict of interest necessitating the withdrawal of appointed counsel. Although being named as a defendant in a collateral lawsuit by one's client may place an attorney in a situation in which his or her loyalties are divided ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 136-137 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781]), a criminal defendant's decision to file such an action against appointed counsel does not require disqualification unless the circumstances demonstrate an actual conflict of interest. ( Id. at p. 137.) A contrary holding would enable an indigent criminal defendant to challenge each successive appointment of counsel, delaying indefinitely the criminal prosecution. (See Smith v. Lockhart (8th Cir.1991) 923 F.2d 1314, 1321, fn. 11 [We recognize the danger of any holding implying that defendants can manufacture conflicts of interest by initiating lawsuits against their attorneys. [Citation.] A patently frivolous lawsuit brought by a defendant against his or her counsel may not, alone, constitute cause for appointment of new counsel.  (Italics added.)].) The trial court's finding that the filing of the complaint represented yet another attempt by defendant to delay his trial and otherwise interfere with the criminal prosecution against him is supported amply by the record. Counsel represented that, apart from the complaint, they discerned no conflict of interest, and the trial court previously had determined that defendant's allegations of incompetence had no merit. The circumstances apparent to the trial court fail to demonstrate any divergence of the interests of defendant from those of his attorneys, and support the trial court's determination that no actual conflict of interest existed requiring the withdrawal of counsel. Defendant contends the circumstance that his counsel affirmatively moved to withdraw distinguishes the present case from other cases where, despite the claim of conflict of interest, counsel sought to continue the representation of their client. (See, e.g., People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86.) We disagree. The record establishes that appointed counsel moved for leave to withdraw based solely upon their concern that the filing of the malpractice complaint gave rise to a conflict of interest requiring their withdrawal as a matter of law, but that, apart from the filing of the action, their interests and loyalties toward defendant were undivided. For these reasons, we conclude the trial court's denial of defense counsel's motion to withdraw did not constitute an abuse of discretion.