Opinion ID: 6320572
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did service of the guardianship applications

Text: on James comply with Estates Code Section 1051.051? Having concluded that Section 1051.051 governs who must serve a citation and application for guardianship, we turn to whether service of each of the two applications for guardianship in this case—one served in New York, one in Texas—satisfied its requirements. Focusing on Section 1051.103(a), the court of appeals concluded that a private process server was an “other officer” authorized to serve an application for guardianship because a 1994 Bexar County probate court administrative order permitted licensed private process servers to serve process in the probate courts. 604 S.W.3d at 457. The court also relied on Rule of Civil Procedure 103, the general rule governing service of process, which authorizes service by “any person authorized by law or by written order of the court.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 103. But neither an order from the Bexar County probate courts nor a rule of procedure can trump a statute governing service of process in guardianship proceedings. See Johnstone v. State, 22 S.W.3d 408, 409 (Tex. 2000) (absent certain 20 circumstances not present here, “when a rule of procedure conflicts with a statute, the statute prevails”). The Estates Code establishes a detailed framework controlling service in these proceedings, and Section 1051.051 specifies who is authorized to serve when personal service is required. These statutory requirements cannot be overridden by a conflicting court order or by a rule of procedure of general application.
guardianship Mauricette filed her application for appointment as James’s temporary guardian in Bexar County in October 2014, shortly after Juliette took James to New York. James was personally served with this application and citation in New York by Sara Clark, a private process server. Juliette contends that Estates Code Section 1051.103(a) required service by a “sheriff or other officer” and contends that Clark was neither. But, as discussed above, Section 1051.103(a) does not prescribe who may effect service. Section 1051.051 does. Because James was absent from Texas, Section 1051.051(b)(2) authorizes personal service by “a disinterested person competent to make an oath that the citation . . . was served.” TEX. EST. CODE § 1051.051(b)(2). We thus reject Juliette’s argument that service of the temporaryguardianship application on James was defective because he was not served by a sheriff, constable, or other elected official. Juliette also argues that service of the application for temporary guardianship did not comply with Section 1051.051(b)(2) because the Affidavit of Service failed to establish that Clark was “disinterested.” A “disinterested” person is one who is “[f]ree from bias, prejudice, or partiality” and lacks “a pecuniary interest in the matter at hand.” 21 Disinterested, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). In her Affidavit of Service, Clark states only that she is “not a party to this action.” This statement alone does not establish that Clark was “disinterested.” See Indus. Models, Inc. v. SNF, Inc., No. 02-13-00281-CV, 2014 WL 3696104, at  (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 24, 2014, no pet.) (concluding that an affidavit stating that the person serving citation was “not a party” is insufficient to establish that person was “disinterested”); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 103 (prohibiting service by someone who is either “a party to” a suit or “interested in the outcome” of a suit). Accordingly, we conclude the record does not establish that James was served by a disinterested person, as required by Section 1051.051(b)(2).6
guardianship Mauricette filed her application for appointment as James’s permanent guardian in December 2014, by which time James had returned to Texas. James was personally served by a private process server at the assisted-living facility in San Antonio, and, because he was served in Texas, Section 1051.051(b)(1) applies. Under that provision, personal service must be by “sheriff or constable”—a private process 6Juliette also asserts that the Affidavit of Service failed to comply with Section 1051.151, which requires the return of a person serving citation to be “endorsed on or attached to the citation.” TEX. EST. CODE § 1051.151(1). For the reasons we discuss below, this additional alleged technical defect in the method of service does not affect our ultimate disposition. Therefore, we assume without deciding that the Affidavit of Service was not endorsed on or attached to the citation, as required by Section 1051.151(1). 22 server is insufficient.7 Service of this application thus failed to satisfy Section 1051.051(b)(1)’s technical requirements. 2. Did the technical defects in service deprive the probate court of personal jurisdiction over James or void its orders? Juliette conceded during oral argument that her complaints about service concern personal jurisdiction, not subject-matter jurisdiction. As we explain above, the probate court acquired subjectmatter jurisdiction over this guardianship proceeding when Mauricette filed her initial application. See TEX. EST. CODE § 1022.002(d). And Juliette does not contend the probate court lacked personal jurisdiction over her—her complaint is that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over James. Nevertheless, Juliette asks us to hold that technical defects in personal service on the now-deceased James voided all orders in the guardianship proceeding and deprived the probate court of jurisdiction to enter any orders, including the order transferring her wrongful-death suit to the probate court. We disagree because James never complained about these defects at a time at which they could have been corrected. 7 By the time James was served with the permanent-guardianship application, his court-appointed attorney ad litem had entered an appearance and filed an answer on James’s behalf. Because James had an attorney of record, Section 1051.051(a) authorized service on James through that attorney by any method specified by Section 1051.055. TEX. EST. CODE § 1051.051(a). Although the record shows that a copy of the application for permanent guardianship was served on James’s attorney ad litem, the record does not reflect whether this attorney was also served with citation, as the statute requires. See id. § 1051.103(a) (requiring James to be personally served with “citation to appear and answer an application for guardianship”). And Mauricette does not argue that service was proper through James’s attorney ad litem. Therefore, we assume that James was never properly served through his attorney under Section 1051.051(a). 23 He instead entered a general appearance in the guardianship proceeding through his attorney ad litem and thereby consented to the personal jurisdiction of the probate court. Unlike with subject-matter jurisdiction, parties can consent to the court’s personal jurisdiction over them. In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d at 532. One common way to consent to a court’s jurisdiction is by entering a general appearance in the proceeding. A party may enter an appearance in person or by attorney. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120. Such an appearance “shall have the same force and effect as if the citation had been duly issued and served as provided by law.” Id. Thus, a party’s appearance in a lawsuit cures any defect in the method of serving that party. Baker v. Monsanto Co., 111 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex. 2003). The mere presence of a party or that party’s attorney in court does not constitute an appearance. See Seals v. Upper Trinity Reg’l Water Dist., 145 S.W.3d 291, 297 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. dism’d by agr.) (“[A] party who is a silent figurehead in the courtroom, observing the proceedings without participating, has not [made a general appearance].”). Instead, a party enters a general appearance when it (1) invokes the judgment of the court on any question other than the court’s jurisdiction, (2) recognizes by its acts that an action is properly pending, or (3) seeks affirmative action from the court. Exito Elecs. Co. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. 2004). Our courts routinely hold that a court-appointed attorney who files an answer or seeks affirmative 24 action from the court invokes the court’s jurisdiction and thus enters a general appearance on behalf of the client.8 Here, the probate court appointed an attorney ad litem to represent James’s interests in the guardianship proceeding. See TEX. EST. CODE § 1054.001 (requiring court to appoint an attorney ad litem for the proposed ward in a proceeding for the appointment of a 8 See In re M.D.M., 579 S.W.3d 744, 760–61 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (attorney ad litem’s participation in final parentaltermination hearing on behalf of the father through questioning of witnesses and argument constituted a general appearance by the father that waived complaints regarding service); Roberts v. Fargason, No. 13-17-00395-CV, 2019 WL 1716803, at  (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 18, 2019, no pet.) (defendant made a general appearance and waived alleged defects in service when attorney ad litem appointed to represent him while in military service filed an answer on his behalf); In re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d 60, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (father in parental-termination case made a general appearance and waived any complaints about service because appointed attorney ad litem filed an answer on father’s behalf); In re D.M.B., 467 S.W.3d 100, 103–04 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied) (attorney ad litem’s objections to evidence and objection to entry of a temporary restraining order on behalf of the father in a parental-termination hearing constituted a general appearance by the father that waived his service complaints); In re P.Y.M., No. 04-13-00024-CV, 2013 WL 4009748, at  (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 7, 2013, pet. denied) (father in parental-termination case made a general appearance and waived any complaints about service when attorney ad litem questioned a witness and presented argument on behalf of the father at the termination hearing); Gamez v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-09-00190-CV, 2009 WL 4456150, at  (Tex. App.— Austin Dec. 1, 2009, no pet.) (attorney ad litem’s answer and attendance at hearings and trial on behalf of mother in parental-termination case was a general appearance that waived complaints about service); Phillips v. Dall. Cnty. Child Protective Servs. Unit, 197 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (filing of an answer on mother’s behalf by attorney ad litem in parental-termination case was a general appearance that waived any complaints about defects in service); In re $475,001.16, 96 S.W.3d 625, 628–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (party entered a general appearance in forfeiture proceeding and waived challenges to defects in service because court-appointed attorney ad litem filed an answer on his behalf). 25 guardian); see also id. § 1002.002 (defining “attorney ad litem” as an attorney appointed by the court “to represent and advocate on behalf of a proposed ward . . . in a guardianship proceeding”). James’s appointed attorney filed an answer on James’s behalf. In advance of the hearing on Mauricette’s application for a temporary guardianship, he filed a request that James not be required to appear at the hearing. At the hearing on the temporary guardianship, the attorney ad litem represented to the court that he had spoken with James, and he conveyed James’s views regarding the guardianship to the court. He also appeared at the permanent-guardianship hearing and approved with his signature the 2015 order appointing Mauricette as James’s permanent guardian. An attorney ad litem is required by statute to review the application and relevant supporting materials; to interview the proposed ward before the appointment hearing; and to discuss with the ward, to the extent possible, the details of the case, the ward’s legal options, and the ward’s opinions regarding the necessity and scope of a guardianship. Id. § 1054.004. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this attorney’s representation of James was deficient in any way. And at no time during the guardianship proceeding did James’s attorney ad litem (or anyone else) assert any complaints about the manner in which James was served. We conclude that James made a general appearance in the guardianship proceeding through the affirmative actions of his attorney ad litem. Accordingly, he consented to the probate court’s personal 26 jurisdiction over him, waiving any technical defects regarding service. See Baker, 111 S.W.3d at 161.9 Amicus TCPJ correctly notes that the Estates Code provides that an attorney ad litem “may not waive personal service of citation.” TEX. EST. CODE § 1051.055(e). But no one claims that occurred here—indeed, it is undisputed that James was personally served with both applications for guardianship. While Section 1051.055(e) prohibits waiving service altogether, we do not read it to prohibit a general appearance and waiver of technical service defects when the proposed 9 Contrary to our dissenting colleagues’ characterization, we do not suggest that technical defects in service “don’t matter” and are “perfectly fine.” Post at ___ (Devine, J., dissenting). And we emphatically do not suggest that courts are “free to ignore statutory requirements.” Id. at __. Indeed, if anyone had alerted the probate court to a defect in service in a timely manner, the probate court could have and no doubt would have remedied the defect so as to satisfy the statute’s requirements in every detail. But, alas, ours is an imperfect world—one in which no one brought the defect to the probate court’s attention in time for it to be cured. The real question is thus not whether courts should ignore statutory requirements—obviously they should not and do not— but, rather, whether the statutory text expresses the Legislature’s intent that anything short of strict compliance requires that the entire guardianship be voided when the attorney ad litem entered a general appearance for the ward, affirmatively invoked the probate court’s jurisdiction, and ably represented the ward. The text of the Estates Code reveals no such intent, and the dissent’s professed desire to read such a requirement into the statute is undermined by the Legislature’s decision to allow service on a ward to be accomplished by serving his attorney of record. See TEX. EST. CODE §§ 1051.051(a), 1051.055(c) (providing that service on a ward’s attorney may be delivered by a variety of persons, including another party, the attorney of record for another party, a sheriff or constable, or another person competent to testify). Because the Estates Code contemplates that personal jurisdiction attaches in a variety of ways that do not involve physical service on the ward by anyone, we cannot, in the absence of text signaling such an intent, conclude that the Legislature intended to attach jurisdictional significance to whether “the right person” serves a ward. 27 ward has been served and has opted through his attorney to submit to the court’s jurisdiction. See Ex parte Rodriguez, 466 S.W.3d 846, 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (concluding that Family Code statute prohibiting juvenile from waiving “service of [the] summons” does not prohibit the waiver of defects in the manner of service). This reading coheres with our rules, which distinguish between a defendant’s appearance (which has “the same force and effect as if the citation had been duly issued and served as provided by law,” TEX. R. CIV. P. 120) and a waiver of service. Rule 124 provides that a judgment cannot be rendered unless a defendant is served, or upon “acceptance or waiver of process, or upon an appearance by the defendant.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 124. In short, although James’s appearance in the proceeding through his attorney ad litem waived any complaints about the method of personal service, it was not a waiver of personal service of citation on James. Juliette urges us to adopt a rule requiring strict compliance with the statutory requirements for service of a guardianship application, similar to the rule we apply when reviewing a default judgment. See WWLC Inv., L.P. v. Miraki, 624 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2021) (“For well over a century, this court has required that strict compliance with the rules for service of citation affirmatively appear on the record in order for a default judgment to withstand direct attack.” (quoting Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994))). But even in the context of default judgments (which this case is not), that rule does not apply in every case. In PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2012), we held that strict compliance with service requirements is 28 not required when a defendant seeks to void a default judgment through a collateral attack. In that case, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with all the requirements for service rendered the judgment void and, therefore, the default judgment could be set aside by a collateral attack. We disagreed, and we held that, because the defendant failed to establish either an absence of service or defects in service that deprived the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to appear and answer the lawsuit, the judgment was not void. Id. at 275. Our holding in PNS Stores was designed to strike “a reasonable balance between the need for finality of judgments and the requirement that the power underlying judicial authority must be based on a litigant’s fair opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 274 (footnote omitted). Our decision here strikes the same balance. Even though the guardianship proceeding remained pending, the probate court’s order appointing Mauricette as James’s permanent guardian is “final” and is treated as such for purposes of appeal. See In re Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Tex. 2021) (“[A]n order [in a guardianship proceeding] disposing of all issues and all parties ‘in the phase of the proceeding for which it was brought’ is final and appealable even when the proceeding remains pending as to other issues.” (quoting Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995))). Because James was personally served, and because Juliette does not allege any defects in service that rise to the level of a due process violation, none of the orders in the guardianship proceeding are void. 29 The cases cited to us in which courts have held a guardianship order void are consistent with our holding here because they involve situations where the proposed ward was never personally served. See Gauci v. Gauci, 471 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (concluding that a guardianship order was void because the proposed ward was not personally served with citation and therefore the probate court lacked personal jurisdiction over the ward); In re Martinez, No. 04-07-00558-CV, 2008 WL 227987, at  (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 30, 2008, orig. proceeding) (holding that orders issued in guardianship proceeding were void because the proposed ward was never served with citation); In re Guardianship of B.A.G., 794 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1990, no writ) (holding that all of the trial court’s actions regarding a guardianship were void because the proposed ward was never personally served). Juliette relies on dicta in several court of appeals opinions to support her contention that a probate court acquires jurisdiction of a guardianship proceeding only following “proper service” on the ward. See In re Guardianship of Phillips, No. 01-14-01004-CV, 2016 WL 3391249, at  (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 16, 2016, no pet.) (“Service of citation on a proposed ward is jurisdictional and a court order appointing a guardian without proper service on the ward is void.”); In re Guardianship of V.A., 390 S.W.3d 414, 421 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (“We do not dispute the contention that a probate court lacks jurisdiction over a guardianship proceeding where the proposed ward has not been properly served.”); Whatley v. Walker, 302 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) 30 (“Failure to serve the proposed ward with citation is jurisdictional, and a court’s subsequent order appointing a guardian without proper service on the ward is void.”); In re Guardianship of Erickson, 208 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (“[O]nly through compliance with Section 633 of the Texas Probate Code [the precursor to Estates Code Section 1051.103] is the trial court’s jurisdiction invoked.”). But none of these cases involved a challenge to the method by which the proposed ward was served. In Phillips, V.A., and Whatley, the primary complaint was that the applicant failed to comply with a requirement to provide notice to certain third parties, including the ward’s relatives. See Phillips, 2016 WL 3391249, at –5; V.A., 390 S.W.3d at 418–19; Whatley, 302 S.W.3d at 322. None of the courts in those cases voided any orders for lack of jurisdiction, nor did they conclude that a defect in service deprived the probate court of jurisdiction.10