Opinion ID: 299553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: validity of juvenile court waiver

Text: 18 A. We begin by considering, and rejecting, the contention that appellant was a sick juvenile and therefore could not be waived to the District Court. 19 In our 1968 decision on remand in Kent v. United States, supra, the Juvenile Court had waived jurisdiction over Kent knowing that he needed mental treatment, and was civilly committable, on the ground that his potential danger to himself and others made the District Court a more appropriate forum for ordering treatment. This court held that the Juvenile Court Act forbids waiver of a seriously ill juvenile. The court stated (130 U.S.App.D.C. at 347, 401 F.2d at 412): 20 [I]t is clear that society can be protected without departing from civilized standards for the prompt and adequate care of disturbed children. The juvenile court can institute civil commitment proceedings against the youngster. If commitment ensues, he will be confined and treated until he is no longer dangerous due to mental illness. If not, the juvenile court will be free to follow its usual procedures. 21 Since waiver was not necessary for the protection of society and not conducive to Kent's rehabilitation, its exercise in this case violated the social welfare philosophy of the Juvenile Court Act. Of course, this philosophy does not forbid all waivers. We only decide here that it does forbid waiver of a seriously ill juvenile. 22 In Kent there was a premise of civil commitment guaranteeing public safety during the period of treatment. Although there were contrary indications to some extent from two psychologists, we cannot say that the Juvenile Court erred in concluding that appellant was not subject to civil commitment. 2 23 B. Appellant challenges the validity of his waiver on the ground that the Juvenile Court did not fully explore the possibilities for his rehabilitation as required by statute and by decisions of this court and the Supreme Court. The provisions of the Juvenile Court Act governing waiver provide that jurisdiction may be waived only after full investigation. 3 Section 16-2316(1) of the D.C.Code in turn provides that the waiver statute shall be liberally construed so that    each child coming under the court's jurisdiction    shall receive such care and guidance    as will serve his welfare and the best interests of the District. 24 The full investigation required prior to waiver cannot be mere ritual. 4 The statutory mandate anticipates a thorough exploration of the possible dispositions, short of waiver, by which the welfare of the juvenile and the interests of the District may be secured. 5 As this court stated in Haziel v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 298, 302, 404 F.2d 1275, 1279 (1968), 25 Both counsel and the court have a vital role to play in this exploration. The child's advocate should search for a plan, or perhaps a range of plans, which may persuade the court that the welfare of the child and the safety of the community can be served without waiver. And the court itself cannot remain inert. It also has a duty to utilize its facilities, personnel, and expertise for a proper determination of the waiver issue. [Citation omitted] 26 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court held in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), the decision to waive jurisdiction must be accompanied by a statement of the reasons or considerations therefor. The Court did not read the statute as requiring that this statement must be formal or that it should necessarily include conventional findings of fact. But the statement should be sufficient to demontrate that the statutory requirement of `full investigation' has been met; and that the question has received the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review. Id. at 561, 86 S.Ct. at 1057. 27 With due regard for the presumption in favor of treating juvenile defendants in a juvenile setting, and the grave consequences that may follow from waiver to the District Court, we nevertheless conclude that the Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion in determining, after exhaustive inquiry, that appellant's rehabilitation within the presently available juvenile facilities is unlikely. 6 28 The Juvenile Court held extensive hearings on appellant's prospects for rehabilitation, as well as the facilities available to carry out a meaningful program. While appellant's chances for rehabilitation were viewed favorably by Dr. Bukatman and Mr. Bethia of the Neighborhood Delinquent Youth Program, Mr. Bennett, the Intake Officer, who once had the same view as these two witnesses, testified that appellant's escape from the receiving home rendered him an unlikely candidate for successful treatment. Notwithstanding the testimony of Miss Knowles regarding the new Laurel youth facility, the court acted within its permissible discretion when it concluded, following personal visits by the judge, that the Laurel facility lacked the programs necessary for appellant's rehabilitation and in addition could not guarantee security of confinement. 29 The court was also entitled to consider, as it did, that appellant had reached the age of 18 at the time of his waiver hearing, and would be subject to juvenile jurisdiction for less than three years. 11 D.C.Code § 1551. The court could reasonably conclude, on the basis of testimony and appellant's past record, that even assuming a juvenile like appellant could be rehabilitated if provided with rehabilitation programs over a longer period of time, the short span available to the Juvenile Court as to this appellant would be insufficient to ensure success in any rehabilitative endeavor. The court's statement of November 12, 1968, without disturbing the July 30 waiver order, concluded that appellant, if guilty, would best be dealt with by a wider range of powers, longer term possibilities, and greater choice of facilities that are available to the United States District Court and the Attorney General. (Tr. 325.) We see no abuse of discretion in the Juvenile Court's conclusion, following its effort to explore the possibilities for treating appellant in a juvenile setting, that no meaningful results could be accomplished with the limited facilities available to it, and in the limited time frame of the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction. 7