Opinion ID: 417730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: problems with comparative fault/comparative causation

Text: 52 Camden argues strenuously that anything other than a pro tanto credit would result in overcompensation for Dobson and would be unfair. Ignoring for the moment the added complexity of joint and separate torts in this case, we are unpersuaded that this claimed overcompensation introduces a problem in our comparative fault/comparative causation scheme. We will address this point, first, under a fairness theory and, second, under a deterrence theory. 53 1. Overcompensation and Fairness.--Camden's overcompensation argument sounds most strongly in chords of fairness. Camden argues that it simply is not fair that Dobson receive a double recovery. Even under a fairness rationale, however, we see nothing wrong with a proportional credit for settlement. 54 First, in invoking compensation Camden neglects to consider carefully the fairness rationale underlying it. The fairness of a tortfeasor paying an injured party rests not solely on the fact that the injured party deserves compensation, but also on the fact that the tortfeasor deserves to pay. 5 If another tortfeasor has already compensated the plaintiff that payment obviates one reason for transferring money between the parties, the injured party receiving money, but the fairness involved in the tortfeasor paying still remains. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: 55 If there is enrichment, it is not at the defendant's expense. Defendant does not seek to make [the settling defendant] whole but rather to profit from the injustice that [the settling defendant] supposedly experienced. If the voluntary agreement between plaintiff and [the settling defendant] were thought so to offend public policy as to require redress, the remedy would run to [the settling defendant] rather than to a stranger to the bargain. 56 Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 129 (1965). Alternately stated, 57 The one-compensation rule, grounded in unjust enrichment, is not to be applied in such a way as to generate unjust enrichment to the only litigating defendant.... It would be unjust enrichment ... to give the only defendant who was eventually found liable ... a full pro tanto credit for the full amount paid by the others. 58 Rose v. Associated Anesthesiologists, 501 F.2d 806, 809 (D.C.Cir.1974). 59 A second fairness argument suggesting that overcompensation does not make a proportional credit unfair flows from the fact that comparative fault actually separates a joint tort into independent multiple torts. There is no reason that a settlement with one tortfeasor should affect the judgment against another tortfeasor. If, in fact, the settlement was more generous to the plaintiff than a trial with that joint tortfeasor would have been, all that indicates is that the plaintiff got a good deal. 6 There certainly is no reason why a nonsettling tortfeasor should claim the benefit of the plaintiff's bargain with the settling tortfeasors. Fairness demands that the benefits of the bargain remain where the bargaining parties place them, and that nonsettling tortfeasors pay damages in proportion to their fault. See Larson, A Problem in Contribution: The Tortfeasor with an Individual Defense Against the Injured Party, 1940 Wis.L.Rev. 467, 486-81; California Comment, supra, 65 Calif.L.Rev. at 1278-79. 60 2. Overcompensation and Deterrence.--The argument against overcompensation is even weaker under a deterrence theory. Deterrence is not at all concerned with compensating the injured party. Deterrence, rather, is concerned with making the tortfeasors pay. The fact that the money goes to the plaintiff is not really relevant. 7 [F]rom the deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant to whom damages are paid, so long as someone redressed the violation. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2028, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In order for deterrence to function properly, each tortfeasor must pay for the proportional share of damage caused. Whether this payment results in over, under, or exact compensation is beside the point. 61 Another way of understanding this is to realize that deterrence is concerned with establishing a rule to shape future conduct. A potential tortfeasor's actions will probably not be shaped by considerations of whether the injured party will be compensated nearly as much as they will be shaped by considerations of whether the tortfeasor will have to pay. Accordingly, the issue of whether another joint tortfeasor has settled with the plaintiff just is not relevant at all to the deterrence rationale for requiring each nonsettling tortfeasor to pay a proportional share of damages. 8
62 Finally we must deal with two procedural problems presented on the facts of this case. First, the settlement in this case was for multiple torts, not all of which were joint. Denny's was sued for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to violate Dobson's federal rights. The only joint aspect of these allegations was the conspiracy claim, and we have no clear way of allocating the settlement among the joint and separate claims. Second, we do not have any jury findings as to comparative fault/comparative causation. 63 These problems are linked in one regard. With a jury finding on comparative fault we would not need to concern ourselves with identifying which part of the settlement was for which claim. We would merely assign to Camden his share of the damages and be done with it. Again, under a system of comparative fault/comparative negligence the existence of a settlement is irrelevant to the liability of a nonsettling tortfeasor. 64 That principle is of little comfort to us now because we have no jury finding on comparative fault. Our question at this point is how to handle this procedural default. In future cases we would have no problem in holding that the party desiring a reduction in judgment on account of a settlement has the burden of proving its entitlement to that reduction by showing another party shares responsibility for the injuries and submitting jury issues on relative fault/causation. In this case, however, we are reluctant to charge a party with the consequences of default of a procedure that did not even exist prior to this appeal. Accordingly, we must remand for a determination of relative liability.