Opinion ID: 2103439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Allegations Respecting Damages

Text: Only the first two counts of J & B's complaint seek recovery for extra costs incurred. Only those two counts are therefore affected by the argument that a claim for damages is precluded under paragraph J of the purchase order. In count I, J & B alleged that it incurred extra costs of $50,917.68 due to Iber's wrongful conduct. Specifically, J & B alleged that Iber fail[ed] to properly supervise and coordinate the construction. And, when problems related to that failure arose, Iber intentionally and contrary to [its implied] obligations of good faith and fair dealing took little or no corrective action. Under the exception to no-damage-for-delay clauses for tortious, wrongful, or willful misconduct, the allegations of count I are facially sufficient to overcome Iber's motion. We agree with the appellate court that count I should not have been dismissed but disagree that the not-within-contemplation-of-the-parties exception controls that outcome. Examination of the allegations of count II is almost as simple. In that count, J & B alternatively alleged Iber owed it the $50,917.68 as a consequence of a change in the scope of [J & B's] work. The change in scope was due to Iber's changing of the schedule for the job so that it could not be completed by July 31, 1990. J & B alleged that the contract required Iber to issue a change order to compensate J & B for additional work beyond that time, but Iber refused J & B's request to issue one. The purchase order does, in fact, provide in its typewritten provisions that Iber was obligated to advise of all changes in the scope of work in a timely manner and to work with J & B to establish a fair value for the changes involved. It further advises J & B not to perform any extra work without a written change order authorizing same. Again, under the exception to no-damage-for-delay clauses for tortious, wrongful, or willful misconduct, the allegations of count II are sufficient to overcome Iber's motion. Although bad faith or other wrongful conduct covered by the exception is not specifically alleged, it may be inferred from the allegations of Iber's conduct. Not only is it alleged that Iber intended its schedule change to preclude J & B from timely completing its performance, but Iber denied J & B the means necessary to obtain fair compensation for the attendant costs. We conclude, in the same manner as above, that the allegations are sufficient to withstand Iber's motion, although not pursuant to the exception the appellate court cited.