Opinion ID: 2619533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court erroneously excused two veniremen for cause.

Text: The trial court excused for cause three prospective jurors because of their opposition to the death penalty. [2] One of these stated unequivocally that he would automatically vote against the death penalty no matter what the evidence produced at the trial might reveal. The remaining two, however, were stricken from the jury in violation of the mandate of Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770]. [1] The first juror excused for cause was Mrs. Ruth McClarin. When she indicated that she disapproved of the law permitting the death penalty, the trial court asked if she could nonetheless follow the law. (See Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 514-515, fn. 7 [20 L.Ed 776, 780-781, 88 S.Ct. 1770].) Mrs. McClarin responded ambiguously, I would have a difficult time doing that. I am not sure whether I could in all cases. When asked whether her feelings would prevent her from choosing the death penalty, she stated, I am afraid they would. The response was unclear, since the juror's conjectures as to her possible future views and the juror's actual reaction on presentation of the facts might not have coincided. (Compare People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 199 [74 Cal. Rptr. 262, 449 P.2d 198]; see People v. Osuna (1969) 70 Cal.2d 759, 769 [76 Cal. Rptr. 462, 452 P.2d 678].) Later Mrs. McClarin volunteered, I really feel that I object so strongly that I couldn't consider the death penalty. (Compare Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784, 88 S.Ct. 1770].) Mrs. McClarin, in qualifying her statement by the phrase I feel suggested that she might not be certain of her precise position. (Compare People v. Risenhoover (1968) 70 Cal.2d 39, 55 [73 Cal. Rptr. 533, 447 P.2d 925]; People v. Osuna, supra, 70 Cal.2d 759, 769.) This uncertainty crystallized in her answer to the last question put to the prospective juror by the court. THE COURT: Mrs. McClarin, would it be fair to say that under no circumstance would you impose the death penalty in any kind of a situation that could be brought before you? A. Not being able to think of enough cases, I can't say for sure, but I certainly can't think of any myself right now in which I could possibly impose a death penalty. (Italics added.) As we said in People v. Osuna, supra, 70 Cal.2d 759, 769: It is impossible to determine from this exchange whether the prospective juror believed ... that her opposition to the death penalty would prevent her from voting for that penalty without regard to the evidence. Accordingly, she did not make `unmistakably clear' ... that she would automatically vote against the death penalty.... [2] The other juror erroneously excused for cause was Mrs. Betty Krokoski. The full text of the voir dire is set out in the margin. [3] Mrs. Krokoski indicated that she would try to follow the law. (Compare Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 514-515, fn. 7 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 780-781, 88 S.Ct. 1770].) When asked if she could impose the death penalty, Mrs. Krokoski twice indicated that she could do so if the evidence supporting the death penalty were very great. She explicitly admitted on at least four occasions that she was not sure or did not know whether she would automatically vote against the death penalty. Her statements of opposition to the death penalty were hedged by phrases such as I think, I feel, I believe, and I am afraid. (See People v. Durham, supra, 70 Cal.2d 171, 199; People v. Risenhoover, supra, 70 Cal.2d 39, 55; People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 772 [73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106].) Unlike the jurors excused in People v. Beivelman (1968) 70 Cal.2d 60, 78-79, footnote 4 [73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 447 P.2d 913], who were able to predict how they would vote in any case whatever, Mrs. Krokoski declined to predict what she might do in a situation other than those she hypothesized to herself during the voir dire. As of the moment she does not believe or think she would bring in a death penalty but she does not know, and will not state, that she would never bring in a death verdict. It would take an awful lot to; the evidence would have to be very, very heavy. This clearly left open the possibility that in some case Mrs. Krokoski might impose the death penalty. The equivocal statements of Mrs. Krokoski represent the kind of ambiguity that occurred in People v. Risenhoover, supra, 70 Cal.2d 39; there we stated the venireman's conscientious opinion may have precluded her from concurring in such a verdict in the majority of cases but not have precluded her from concurring in such a verdict in all cases or in this case irrespective of the evidence that might be introduced at the trial. The court did not allow her to complete her answers, and her partial answers do not make it `unmistakably clear' that she `would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial....' ( Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra [1968] 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 22 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785].) (70 Cal.2d at p. 56.) Having firmly declined to give the sort of unambiguous yes or no answer required by Witherspoon ( People v. Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d 765, 772), Mrs. Krokoski was improperly excused.