Opinion ID: 1910213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Pretrial Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: Spino Bros. first argues on appeal that the hearing justice erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. According to Spino Bros., the indemnity agreement between it and DePasquale Bldg. was void pursuant to § 6-34-1. DePasquale Bldg., however, argues that, although one specific provision of the indemnity agreement may be prohibited by law, the remainder is valid. On appeal, this Court reviews summary judgment motions de novo, applying the same standards as the hearing justice. Ritter v. Mantissa Investment Corp., 864 A.2d 601, 604 (R.I.2005). Summary judgment must be denied if there are any genuine issues of material fact or if the moving party cannot prevail as a matter of law. Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Indeed, only if the case is legally dead on arrival should the court take the drastic step of    granting summary judgment. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 756 A.2d 179, 185 (R.I.2000). [5] Furthermore, this Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo and affords clear and unambiguous language its plain and ordinary meaning. Park v. Rizzo Ford, Inc., 893 A.2d 216, 221 (R.I.2006). Section 6-34-1(a) provides, in relevant part: A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in, or in connection with or collateral to, a contract    purporting to indemnify the promisee, the promisee's independent contractors, agents, employees, or indemnitees against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property proximately caused by or resulting from the negligence of the promisee, the promisee's independent contractors, agents, employees, or indemnitees, is against public policy and is void   . Spino Bros. urges this Court to invalidate its indemnity agreement with DePasquale Bldg. in its entirety pursuant to this statute because it requires Spino Bros. to indemnify DePasquale Bldg. for DePasquale Bldg.'s own negligence. We are unconvinced. The plain language of § 6-34-1 invalidates the problematic promise itself, not the agreement in its entirety. Indeed, in Cosentino v. A.F. Lusi Construction Co., 485 A.2d 105 (R.I.1984), this Court explained: The clear and direct mandate of § 6-34-1 bars the enforcement of that portion of the indemnification clause that attempts to indemnify [the contractor] for any negligence on its part. However, there is nothing in § 6-34-1 that bars [the contractor] from attempting to secure indemnification from [the subcontractor] for claims resulting from negligence on the part of [the subcontractor]. Id. at 107. In this case, the parties even contemplated such a scenario. The contract itself provides that the invalidity of any provision of this agreement shall not affect the balance of the agreement which shall continue to be enforceable. As we noted in Cosentino, absent a public policy violation, we perceive no reason why the expressed intent of the parties in a contract    should not be effectuated. Id. Accordingly, the hearing justice did not err in invalidating only that provision of the contract between Spino Bros. and DePasquale Bldg. that violated public policy.