Opinion ID: 151897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Class-Action Tolling

Text: In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the Supreme Court held that the commencement of a class action will in some cases suspend[ ] the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action. 414 U.S. 538, 554, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974). In this case we consider whether the time limit for filing an administrative claim should be tolled under American Pipe when filing that claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to participation in the class action. A party generally must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144-45, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992); see also Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938). That rule applies to class actions, in which courts typically require exhaustion by at least one member of the class. Phillips v. Klassen, 502 F.2d 362, 369 (D.C.Cir.1974); see, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n. 8, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). Where exhaustion is a jurisdictional requirement, however, every class member must exhaust its administrative remedies. Blackmon-Malloy v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 575 F.3d 699, 704-05 (D.C.Cir.2009); see, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). Menominee contends that the pendency of the Cherokee class action brought by other Indian tribes against the IHS tolled the limitations period in § 605(a) for all putative class members, including Menominee, under American Pipe. At the same time, Menominee acknowledges that it did not submit its claims to the contracting officer until after class certification was denied, and it concedes that the submission of such a claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review. Appellant's Br. at 42 n. 17. [3] It follows that Menominee should have been excluded from the Cherokee class, had one been certified, because the tribe had not satisfied the jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. In arguing otherwise, the tribe relies on cases permitting class-action tolling of the administrative filing deadlines in Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). See Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1392-93 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc); Griffin v. Singletary, 17 F.3d 356, 359-61 (11th Cir.1994); Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 148-49 (6th Cir.1988). Those cases are inapposite, however, because neither Title VII nor the ADEA incorporates a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 395 n. 11, 397, 102 S.Ct. 1127. Also unhelpful is Menominee's citation to McDonald v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 834 F.2d 1085 (1st Cir. 1987), in which all unnamed class members had already satisfied the non-waivable jurisdictional requirement of having presented `a claim for benefits ... to the Secretary,' id. at 1092 n. 4 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). Accord Arctic Slope, 583 F.3d at 794 & n. 1. Menominee further argues that even if the Cherokee court could not have exercised jurisdiction over its claims, class-action tolling of the period for filing an administrative claim is nevertheless required. In keeping with this court's functional reading of American Pipe,  McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 562 F.2d 1269, 1274 (D.C.Cir.1977), we consider whether tolling under these circumstances would serve the purposes underlying the class-action tolling doctrine. We hold that the limitations period for submitting an administrative claim is not tolled under American Pipe for asserted class members who, because of their failure to satisfy a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement, are ineligible to participate in the class action at the time class certification is denied. American Pipe addressed what effect, if any, the timely filing of a complaint on behalf of an asserted class should have on the statute of limitations governing the claims of absent class membersa problem that arises from the delay between the commencement of the action and the district court's determination whether to certify the action as a class action and how to define the class and the class claims. FED.R.CIV.P. 23(c)(1)(B). If the statute of limitations on the claims of putative class members continued to run in the meantime, the unnamed plaintiffs would face a choice: act to preserve their rights (by moving to intervene or join or by initiating a separate action) or run the risk of forfeiting their rights if class certification is denied after their claims have grown stale. The American Pipe Court held that, where a class is certified, the commencement of the action by the named plaintiff satisfies the statute of limitations as to all those who might subsequently participate in the suit. 414 U.S. at 551, 94 S.Ct. 756. If certification is denied, then the limitations period is suspended between the filing of the class complaint and the denial of class status. Id. at 554, 94 S.Ct. 756. The tolling rule of American Pipe permits members of the asserted class to safely await the certification decision before filing a motion to intervene in the action brought by the named plaintiff, id., or a separate lawsuit, Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). A contrary rule would defeat Rule 23's objectives of efficiency and economy of litigation by forcing putative class members to file protective motions to intervene in the pending action or run the risk of their claims growing stale. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553, 94 S.Ct. 756. [R]equiring successful anticipation of the determination of the validity of the class would breed needless duplication of motions, the Court explained, because that determination in some cases turns on such subtle factors as experience with prior similar litigation or the current status of a court's docket. Id. at 553-54, 94 S.Ct. 756. The need for class-action tolling thus rests on the uncertainty of putative class members regarding whether the court will certify a class that will protect their interests. If putative class members knew in advance that a class would not be certified or that they would be excluded from the class action, there would be no need for tolling. We agree with the Federal Circuit that the American Pipe doctrine does not require courts to toll the time putative class members have to satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review when the failure to do so precludes them from obtaining relief via the class action. See Arctic Slope, 583 F.3d at 797. Until they satisfy the jurisdictional preconditions to class membership, putative class members have no reason to anticipate whether or not class certification will be granted and face none of the uncertainty class-action tolling is meant to ameliorate. Regardless of whether certification is granted, every contractor must submit its claim to the contracting officer. Only once a contractor's claim is denied by the contracting officer does the contractor have a choice between participating in the class or proceeding individuallythe choice with which the class-action tolling doctrine is concerned. Because Menominee could not have participated in the Cherokee class action without first presenting a claim to the contracting officer, the purposes of Rule 23 would not be advanced by tolling the limitations period in § 605(a). Where the rationale for a rule stops, so ordinarily does the rule. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir.2009) (Boudin, J.). Menominee contends that extending class-action tolling to the time limitation in § 605(a) would advance the goal of efficiency and economy of litigation described by the Court in American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553, 94 S.Ct. 756. Unless tolling applies, Menominee asserts, contractors will be forced to file claims with the contracting officer merely to preserve their rights to participate in [a] proposed class [action]. Appellant's Br. at 17. Yes and no. It is true that contractors must file administrative claims in order to participate in a class action brought under the CDA. But every asserted class member must submit a claim to the contracting officer because of the general rule that one cannot obtain relief as a member of a class action without first satisfying the jurisdictional prerequisites to judicial review, not because class-action tolling is inapplicable to § 605(a). Menominee also suggests that, under our rule, contractors that submit claims to the contracting officer must then file individual actions or motions to intervene within twelve months of the contracting officer's decision. This argument fails, too. The tribe would be correct if the time limit for seeking judicial review in § 609 were not subject to tolling under American Pipe, but nothing in our decision precludes application of class-action tolling to that deadline. Menominee further argues that the district court in Cherokee conclusively decided the parameters of the putative class[,]... that the Tribe was a member of that class, and that the issue cannot be relitigated. Reply Br. at 4-5 & n. 1. That argument has no merit. The Cherokee court denied class certification and therefore never defined a class. See FED. R.CIV.P. 23(c)(1)(B). Finally, Menominee contends that class-action tolling should apply here because the tribe's failure to present a timely claim resulted from its reliance upon the Cherokee class action and arguments the government allegedly made in the course of that litigation. See Appellant's Br. at 17; Reply Br. at 6. But Menominee's purported reliance on the pendency of the class action is not germane to the availability of class-action tolling, which benefits even those asserted class members who were unaware of the proceedings brought in their interest or who demonstrably did not rely on the institution of those proceedings. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 552, 94 S.Ct. 756. The various defenses raised by the government in the Cherokee litigation similarly have no bearing on the availability of class-action tolling. In sum, Menominee advocates extending the benefit of tolling to all members of the class described by the named plaintiff, including those jurisdictionally barred from participation due to their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Such a rule would serve only one function: Permitting plaintiffs who could not have participated in the class to initiate actions against the government after their claims have grown stale. Adopting the rule Menominee advances would not further the objectives of Rule 23 but rather invit[e] abuse of the class device by encouraging lawyers to frame their pleadings ... [to] save members of the purported class who have slept on their rights. Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 354, 103 S.Ct. 2392 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 561, 94 S.Ct. 756 (Blackmun, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We join the Federal Circuit in holding that class-action tolling is not available under these circumstances.