Opinion ID: 450677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Double Patenting--In General

Text: 30 A double patenting rejection precludes one person from obtaining more than one valid patent for either (a) the same invention, or (b) an obvious modification of the same invention. A rejection based on double patenting of the same invention type finds its support in the language of 35 U.S.C. Sec. 101, which states that Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process ... may obtain a patent therefor.... (Emphasis added.) Thus, the term same invention, in this context means an invention drawn to identical subject matter. In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 57 C.C.P.A. 920, 164 USPQ 619 (1970). 31 On the other hand, a rejection based upon double patenting of the obviousness type ( (b), supra ) is a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the patent statute) rather than based purely on the precise terms of the statute. The purpose of this rejection is to prevent the extension of the term of a patent, even where an express statutory basis for the rejection is missing, by prohibiting the issuance of the claims in a second patent not patentably distinct from the claims of the first patent. Carman Industries Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 220 USPQ 481 (Fed.Cir.1983); and In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 57 C.C.P.A. 759, 163 USPQ 644 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1038, 90 S.Ct. 1356, 25 L.Ed.2d 649 (1970). Fundamental to this doctrine is the policy that: 32 The public should ... be able to act on the assumption that upon the expiration of the patent it will be free to use not only the invention claimed in the patent but also modifications or variants which would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, taking into account the skill of the art and prior art other than the invention claimed in the issued patent. (Emphasis in original.) 33 In re Zickendraht, 319 F.2d 225, 232, 50 C.C.P.A. 1529, 1536, 138 USPQ 23, 27 (1963) (Rich, J., concurring). Under that facet of the doctrine of double patenting, we must direct our inquiry to whether the claimed invention in the application for the second patent would have been obvious from the subject matter of the claims in the first patent, in light of the prior art. Carman Industries, 724 F.2d at 940, 220 USPQ at 487. 5 34 Appellants argue that clear lines of division among the respective groups of claims in the several applications have been maintained. They conclude that because there are no conflicting claims and the claims in these applications do not overlap, double patenting does not exist. However, appellants confuse the difference between the two types of double patenting. Overlapping and conflicting claims are considerations more significant in a Sec. 101 same invention double patenting analysis. These are not significant or controlling factors in an obviousness type double patenting analysis where a rejection may be applied to clearly distinct inventions. In re Jentoft, 392 F.2d 633, 640, 55 C.C.P.A. 1026, 1036, 157 USPQ 363, 369 (1968); see also In re Siu, 222 F.2d 267, 42 C.C.P.A. 864, 105 USPQ 428 (1955). This type of double patenting rejection has been applied where there are separate inventions, each of which is considered patentable over the prior art absent the first patent. In re Bowers, 359 F.2d 886, 53 C.C.P.A. 1590, 149 USPQ 571 (1966). Thus, appellants' argument that the claimed inventions do not overlap is irrelevant. 35 Appellants also maintain that the entire doctrine of double patenting of the obviousness type should not apply to commonly-owned applications with different inventive entities. A rejection based upon such a doctrine, appellants say, is unduly restrictive and discourages group research. Moreover, each inventor in a research department should be entitled to separate patents for his or her own independent contribution to the basic objective of the overall research project. Such a broad position has been previously rejected, and it is inconsistent with both our precedents and recent legislation. 36 Many times our predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, has treated commonly-owned applications by different inventors as though they were filed by the same inventor, and then relied upon the doctrine of double patenting of the obviousness type to deny a second patent on subject matter not patentably distinct from the claims of the first patent. See In re Newton, 414 F.2d 1400, 56 C.C.P.A. 1463, 163 USPQ 35 (1969); In re Frilette, 412 F.2d 269, 56 C.C.P.A. 1262, 162 USPQ 163 (1969); In re Rogers, 394 F.2d 566, 55 C.C.P.A. 1092, 157 USPQ 569 (1968); In re Bowers, 359 F.2d 886, 53 C.C.P.A. 1590, 149 USPQ 570 (1966); In re Borcherdt, 197 F.2d 550, 39 C.C.P.A. 1045, 94 USPQ 175 (1952); and In re Borg, 392 F.2d 642, 55 C.C.P.A. 1021, 157 USPQ 359 (1968). In fact, the appellant in In re Rogers made an argument similar to the one the present appellant makes here. In that case, Rogers asserted that the obviousness type double patenting rejection was distressing to corporate practitioners and did not take into account the considerable exchange of information between inventors. The result, as the argument goes, would be that a corporation would find itself in a box because patent protection for both inventions would not be possible. 37 As we declared in that case, appellants, and those in like situations, are not in an inescapable box. In re Rogers, supra, 394 F.2d at 571, 55 C.C.P.A. at 1099, 157 USPQ at 573. A patent may still issue if an applicant faced with such a rejection were to file a terminal disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 253, disclaiming any terminal part of the term ... of the patent, thereby guaranteeing that the second patent would expire at the same time as the first patent. It is well-established that a common assignee is entitled to proceed with a terminal disclaimer to overcome a rejection based on double patenting of the obviousness type. In re Bowers, supra, 359 F.2d 886, 53 C.C.P.A. 1590, 149 USPQ 571. Since the second patent would expire simultaneously with the first, this use of a terminal disclaimer is consistent with the policy that the public should be free to use the invention as well as any obvious modifications at the end of the patent's term. In re Robeson, 331 F.2d 610, 614, 51 C.C.P.A. 1271, 1275, 141 USPQ 485, 486 (1964). 38 Appellants respond to this suggested use of a disclaimer by citing MPEP [Manual of Patent Examining Procedure] Sec. 804.03 for the proposition that terminal disclaimers are not applicable to commonly-owned applications made by different inventive entities. The Solicitor also candidly points us to the related Commissioner's Notice on Double Patenting (834 O.G. 1615, January 9, 1967) which states in relevant portion: 39 The term 'double patenting' is properly applicable only to cases involving two or more applications and/or patents of the same inventive entity and should not be applied to situations involving commonly owned cases of different inventive entities. 40 Appellants argue, therefore, that a terminal disclaimer would be ineffective. However, this court has never approved this guideline, and such a requirement is inconsistent with many of our predecessor's decisions. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 394 F.2d at 567, n. 4, 55 C.C.P.A. at 1094, n. 4, 157 USPQ at 571 (citations omitted); and In re Frilette, 412 F.2d 269, 56 C.C.P.A. 1262, 162 USPQ 163 (1969). In fact, the examiner here invited appellants' assignee, which declined, to file a terminal disclaimer in order to overcome the rejection. We have held that the Double Patenting Notice, supra, is only a procedural memorandum which merely sets forth guidelines for the Patent and Trademark Office, and that where those guidelines are not even applied, as in the instant case, they can have no bearing on the outcome. In re Newton, 414 F.2d 1400, 56 C.C.P.A. 1463, 163 USPQ 351 (1969). 6 In short, appellants' argument in this regard is meritless. 41 As a last resort, appellants argue that under the recent legislative changes to 35 U.S.C. Sec. 103, 7 the tenuous and untenable double patenting rejection is unsupportable in light of the fierce spotlight of the now-so-clearly revealed Congressional intent. 8 To respond to this contention, we inquire whether the recent legislation changes or in any way affects the doctrine of double patenting of the obviousness type. 42 Certainly the mere words of the new statute do not compel the elimination of that type of double patenting objection. The objective of this amendment was to deal with citation of a co-worker's research development, see In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 59 C.C.P.A. 1342, 177 USPQ 178 (1973) and In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 206 USPQ 289 (CCPA 1980), not with double patenting. See 130 CONG.REC. H10925 (October 1, 1984); PATENT LAW AMENDMENTS ACT of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-622, Sec. 104, 98 Stat. 3385, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5827, 5833. Indeed, the present problem is definitively resolved by important legislative history of that legislation. Of particular interest are Congressman Kastenmaier's remarks, incorporated into the Senate Report, on the effect the legislation would have on the judicially created double patenting doctrine: 43 The Committee expects that the Patent and Trademark Office will reinstitute in appropriate circumstances the practice of rejecting claims in commonly owned applications of different inventive entities on the ground of double patenting. This will be necessary in order to prevent an organization from obtaining two or more patents with different expiration dates covering nearly identical subject matter. In accordance with established patent law doctrines, double patenting rejections can be overcome in certain circumstances by disclaiming the terminal portion of the term of the later patent, thereby eliminating the problem of extending patent life. (Emphasis added.) 44 130 CONG.REC. H10525 (daily ed. October 1, 1984); SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, PATENT LAW AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1984, S.Rep. 98-663, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5834 (section-by-section analysis of the Patent Law Amendments of 1984). Although it would seem clear from this statement that the recent amendment was not intended to affect the doctrine of double patenting, but seems rather to reaffirm its viability, appellants argue otherwise. They assert that in referring to nearly identical subject matter, Mr. Kastenmaier was coining a new term of art different from the established test utilized in the obviousness type double patenting doctrine. 45 There is no substantial support for this argument. As we have previously discussed, double patenting of the same invention type under Sec. 101 questions whether the respective claims cover identical subject matter. In referring to nearly identical subject matter, we believe Congressman Kastenmaier and the Committees were referring to subject matter which would have been obvious from the subject matter of the claims of the first patent, in accordance with the established existing doctrine of double patenting of the obviousness type. That the doctrine was left unaffected but reaffirmed is further supported by the PTO's Initial Guidelines as to Implementation of Patent Law Amendments which state: 46 (14) Double patenting rejections may now be made in applications based on commonly owned patents of different inventive entities and double patenting rejections of the obviousness type can be overcome by terminal disclaimers. 47