Opinion ID: 2812643
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Uncharged Robberies

Text: In addition to the charges for which he was later tried and convicted, defendant was initially charged with two other robberies. An amended complaint alleged a robbery of Julio Cube using a knife on January 12, 1993, and a second robbery of Cube on February 14, 1993, using a handgun. Although defendant was ultimately not tried for these robberies, evidence about them was admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) (Evidence Code section 1101(b)). The evidence was properly admitted.

At the preliminary hearing, Cube testified that on January 12 he was working at Jambi 3 Jewelry (Jambi 3) when someone robbed him at knifepoint and took a Walther PPK .380-caliber handgun. Asked who robbed him, Cube stated, ―I think it‘s that guy over there,‖ indicating defendant. He had also selected defendant at a live lineup but stated he was not completely certain because the man in the lineup wore different clothing. When questioned by the magistrate, Cube admitted that he picked defendant at the lineup because he looked like the person who had robbed him ―the second time.‖ Cube explained that he had been robbed a second time, about a month later, by the same person. He did not file a police report because nothing significant had been taken and he was afraid. The magistrate rejected the Jambi 3 robbery counts ―based on insufficient identification by Mr. Cube and his confusion and nonreporting, the fact that there 24 may have been more than one incident, and the court seemed satisfied that Mr. Cube really could not identify the defendant. [¶] He thought so at one point in time and then confused the robberies to the point where I believe he was totally confused in his testimony.‖ Notwithstanding this ruling, the prosecution filed an information that included these charges. Defendant moved to set aside the information (§ 995). As to the Jambi 3 robberies, he argued the magistrate had made a factual finding of insufficient identification that could not be second-guessed. The prosecutor disagreed with the characterization of the magistrate‘s ruling as a factual finding and countered that other evidence was sufficient to implicate defendant in the robberies. In particular, a gun stolen from Cube in the first robbery was used in several of the other robberies and ultimately found in defendant‘s possession. The motions judge agreed the presence of Cube‘s gun in defendant‘s car was ―awfully coincidental.‖ Nevertheless, she granted the section 995 motion as to the Jambi 3 robberies because she concluded the magistrate made a factual finding that defendant had not been sufficiently identified as the perpetrator. Before trial, the prosecutor indicated that she intended to call Julio Cube to testify about the Jambi 3 robberies and the stolen gun. Based on the section 995 ruling, defense counsel argued the magistrate had made a factual finding that Cube‘s identification of defendant was not believable. He moved to exclude evidence of the Jambi 3 robberies under Evidence Code section 352 because Cube‘s identification was questionable and fairness should prevent the prosecution from presenting evidence of crimes it is prohibited from charging. The court concluded the magistrate had made a legal ruling, not a factual finding, when it determined there was an insufficient identification to hold defendant to answer on the Jambi 3 counts. In any event, even if it were a factual finding that would preclude refiling of the charges, such a finding would not bar evidence offered under Evidence Code section 1101(b). The court then found the evidence 25 admissible under Evidence Code section 1101(b) to show intent or a common plan. (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380 (Ewoldt).)
Cube testified that Jambi 3 was a family business. On January 12, 1993, a man walked in, came around the counter, pushed a knife into Cube‘s stomach, and demanded money. When he ordered Cube to open the register, Cube complied, handing him the bills inside. The man then pushed Cube toward the safe and ordered him to open it. The safe contained a Walther handgun owned by Cube‘s brother. The man took the gun and placed it in his waistband. He then ordered Cube to get on the floor. When Cube heard him leave, he called 911. The store was robbed a second time on February 14, 1993. Once again, Cube was alone. He was closing the store when a Black man came to the door with some jewelry. When Cube unlocked the door, a second man pushed him back and held a gun to his neck. Cube opened the register. The second man grabbed the money and left. Cube believed the same man robbed him both times because his voice was the same. He picked defendant from a photo lineup but later said he was only 10 to 25 percent certain. He selected defendant at a live lineup but was not completely certain due to fear and the passage of time. Cube identified defendant at trial as his robber. b. Authority to Admit Evidence of Dismissed Charges Defendant‘s opening brief on appeal argued Cube‘s testimony was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101(b). In supplemental briefing, he raised additional arguments challenging the court‘s authority to admit testimony about charges dismissed in preliminary proceedings. Defendant disputes the trial judge‘s conclusion that the magistrate made a legal conclusion as to the sufficiency of evidence for the robberies rather than a factual finding that Cube could not identify defendant as the perpetrator. Absent authority, he contends the court ―violated principles of comity‖ by making an 26 evidentiary ruling inconsistent with previous rulings by other judges. Defendant also asserts that when the prosecution cannot meet the very low burden of proving a crime at the preliminary hearing, evidence of that crime should be inadmissible at trial. A magistrate‘s material factual findings are binding on the superior court considering a section 995 motion; however, the prosecution may challenge the magistrate‘s legal conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to show that the charged offense occurred. (Pizano v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 133; Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 666.) Regardless of whether the magistrate‘s findings here were factual or legal in nature, they were clearly honored. The two charges were dismissed under section 995. No prosecution ensued. Moreover, as defendant concedes, the magistrate‘s ruling had no collateral estoppel effect on the trial judge‘s evidentiary ruling. The magistrate and motions judge decided whether sufficient evidence had been presented to hold defendant for trial on the robberies. A different issue was before the trial judge: whether testimony about the robberies was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101(b). Defendant‘s complaint about inconsistency in the rulings is unavailing for similar reasons. It was not inconsistent for the trial court to reach a different conclusion in answering a different question. Moreover, to the extent defendant suggests double jeopardy principles prohibit the prosecution from relying on evidence of dismissed charges, it is important to note that defendant faced no additional jeopardy for robbing Cube. (See Serfass v. U. S. (1975) 420 U.S. 377, 391-392.) Defendant is correct that the prosecution‘s burden of proof at the preliminary hearing was lower than its burden to prove those acts at trial. At a preliminary hearing, the magistrate determines only whether probable cause exists. That is, could a reasonable person ―harbor a strong suspicion of the defendant‘s guilt‖? (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 251-252, italics added.) 27 By contrast, a jury may properly consider Evidence Code section 1101(b) evidence only if the conduct has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. (CALJIC No. 2.50.1; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 381-382.) But these different standards of proof do not mean charges dismissed by a magistrate can never be considered by a jury. The jury is a new fact finder, and its view of the evidence is not constrained by the view of a judge considering a different question. If the jury does not find that the other crimes have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it must disregard them. (Carpenter, at p. 382.) It may rely on that evidence to convict only if it concludes the other crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 831-832; CALCRIM No. 224 (Spring 2014).) Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in concluding the Jambi 3 robberies could be admissible as Evidence Code section 1101(b) evidence despite the dismissal of these charges at the preliminary hearing. c. Admissibility Under Evidence Code Section 1101(b) Defendant also contends the evidence did not satisfy Evidence Code section 1101(b). ―Character evidence, sometimes described as evidence of propensity or disposition to engage in a specific conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person‘s conduct on a specified occasion. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act may be admitted, however, not to prove a person‘s predisposition to commit such an act, but rather to prove some other material fact, such as that person‘s intent or identity. (Id., § 1101, subd. (b).) We review the trial court‘s decision whether to admit evidence, including evidence of the commission of other crimes, for abuse of discretion.‖ (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 841.) Cases sometimes describe Evidence Code section 1101(b) evidence as ―prior offenses‖ or ―prior bad acts.‖ Both shorthand formulations are imprecise. Evidence Code section 1101(b) authorizes the admission of ―a crime, civil wrong, or other act‖ to prove something other than the defendant‘s character. (Italics 28 added.) The conduct admitted under Evidence Code section 1101(b) need not have been prosecuted as a crime, nor is a conviction required. (See, e.g., People v. Garcia (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1849, disapproved on another ground in People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 991, fn. 3.) The conduct may also have occurred after the charged events, so long as the other requirements for admissibility are met. (See People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 425.) Specifically, the uncharged act must be relevant to prove a fact at issue (Evid. Code, § 210), and its admission must not be unduly prejudicial, confusing, or time consuming (Evid. Code, § 352). The relevance depends, in part, on whether the act is sufficiently similar to the current charges to support a rational inference of intent, common design, identity, or other material fact. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369.) ―The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] . . . In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant ‗ ―probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.‖ [Citations.]‘ [Citation.]‖ (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.) Greater similarity is required to prove the existence of a common design or plan. In such a case, evidence of uncharged misconduct must demonstrate ― ‗not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations.‘ [Citation.]‖ (Ibid.) To show a common design, ―evidence that the defendant has committed uncharged criminal acts that are similar to the charged offense may be relevant if these acts demonstrate circumstantially that the defendant committed the charged offense pursuant to the same design or plan he or she used in committing the uncharged acts.‖ (Id. at p. 403.) Finally, the greatest similarity is required to prove identity. When offered on this point, ―the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense must share common features that are sufficiently distinctive so as to support the inference that 29 the same person committed both acts.‖ (Ibid.) These common features need not be unique or nearly unique; ―features of substantial but lesser distinctiveness may yield a distinctive combination when considered together.‖ (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 473.) The Jambi 3 robberies were sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to show that defendant acted with both the same intent and a common plan. The store was a small retail establishment located in the same general neighborhood as the other small stores defendant and his companions robbed. The first Jambi 3 robbery occurred two days before the robbery at the Hollywood Shell station, during which defendant held a gun to cashier David Su‘s neck. The Walther handgun stolen from the Jambi 3 safe was used to commit the robberies and murders at Jack‘s Liquor and the Sun Valley Shell. It was found in the car defendant was driving when arrested. The second Jambi 3 robbery occurred three days after defendant robbed the Seven Star Motel and three days before he committed a series of four other robberies in two hours (Original Blooming Design, Rocky‘s Video, Nice Price Store, and Valley Market). Defendant argues these robberies were not distinctive. Yet, ―[u]nlike evidence of uncharged acts used to prove identity, [a common] plan need not be unusual or distinctive; it need only exist to support the inference that the defendant employed that plan in committing the charged offense.‖ (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403; see People v. Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 424.) Relying on a civil case, Hassoldt v. Patrick Media Group, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 153, defendant also contends the evidence was inadmissible to prove intent or common design because the identity of the person who committed the Jambi 3 robberies was not established. We have repeatedly rejected this argument. (People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 330-331; People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1332.) The threshold admissibility of uncharged crimes evidence does not require proof that the defendant was the perpetrator in both sets of offenses. As we explained in People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 778, ―a fact 30 finder properly may consider [section 1101(b)] evidence to prove intent, so long as (1) the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant committed both sets of crimes [citation], and further (2) . . . ‗the factual similarities . . . tend to demonstrate that in each instance the perpetrator harbored‘ the requisite intent. [Citation.] There is no requirement that it must be conceded, or a court must be able to assume, that the defendant was the perpetrator in both sets of offenses.‖ Here, the jury was able to hear and evaluate Cube‘s testimony and the accuracy of his identification of defendant. If they found that evidence lacking, they could not rely on it in determining defendant‘s guilt of the charged offenses. A second consideration is the question of undue prejudice, time consumption, or confusion. ―If evidence of prior conduct is sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to be relevant to prove the defendant‘s intent, common plan, or identity, the trial court then must consider whether the probative value of the evidence ‗is ―substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission [would] . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.‖ (Evid. Code, § 352.)‘ (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.)‖ (People v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1328.) The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the probative value of the Jambi 3 robberies was not outweighed by the substantial danger of undue prejudice. The probative value of these crimes was high because they showed defendant committed the charged crimes according to the same plan and using the same weapon. Julio Cube‘s testimony was also relevant to show how defendant obtained the handgun he used in the two charged murders. In contrast to these murders, and the other charged crimes, evidence of the Jambi 3 robberies was not particularly inflammatory. (See Ewoldt, at p. 405.) Cube‘s testimony was straightforward and occasioned no substantial consumption of time. Moreover, any juror confusion was unlikely because the court instructed that the uncharged crimes could be considered only 31 for the limited purpose of proving defendant acted with a common design or possessed the means for committing the charged crimes.11