Opinion ID: 1818171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Guilt Phase Prosecutorial Argument

Text: Salazar argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on improper prosecutorial comments during guilt phase final arguments. We disagree and affirm the trial court's ruling. During the guilt phase final arguments, the prosecutor attempted to explain that the State made a deal with Hatcher because it was concerned that there would be another attempt on Ronze Cummings' life if Salazar was not convicted. Specifically, the prosecutor said: You may or may not like the deal, you may or may not like the concept that the State would give the shooter in this case some consideration, give him his life; not give him his freedom, give him his life. Nobody is happy about having to make any accommodation. But this is the real world, and if Hatcher is not available to the state as a witness, the person who did this act, who directed this act, who had it done and who not only took the life of one person, tried to take the life of another person, and for all practical purposes has taken the life of Hatcher by putting him in a position where he's committed an offense that will put him in prison, I'm sure, for the rest of his life, would walk. He could have walked out of here. So we made this case a little bit better by bringing the other person who made a statement real early saying that Neil was the one directing everything. We also did something else by doing that. We've had in this case a man come from Miami with another man, broke into a house, killed one person, certainly left there thinking they had killed two people, people they knew, people they had been friendly with, he (indicating) had been friendly with, and we have at the outset Ronze Cummings who has survived and who is alive today, six years later, and would the State in this circumstance have a reasonable concern that there could be another attempt on Ronze's life, attempt to finish him At that point, the defense objected and a sidebar discussion was held. At sidebar, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the State's comments referred to facts not in evidence and appealed to the sympathy of the jury. The trial judge sustained the defense's objection but denied the motion for mistrial. Then, defense counsel requested a curative instruction. The trial judge denied the request on the basis that ... it would just highlight [the erroneous comment] that much more. Defense counsel agreed, indicating that he only requested the curative instruction because he believed it was necessary to preserve the issue for appeal. When final arguments resumed, the State closed the issue by asking the jury to focus on the reasonableness of Hatcher's testimony and whether it was consistent with other evidence in the case. We have repeatedly held that this Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. See England v. State, 940 So.2d 389, 402 (Fla.2006) (A trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.); Perez v. State, 919 So.2d 347, 363 (Fla.2005) ([A] trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. (quoting Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537, 546 (Fla. 1999))); Floyd v. State, 913 So.2d 564, 576 (Fla.2005); Ricks v. Loyola, 822 So.2d 502, 506 (Fla.2002) (holding that trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on motions for new trial and motions for mistrial); Ford v. State, 802 So.2d 1121, 1129 (Fla.2001) (A trial court's ruling on a motion for a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the court and will be sustained on review absent an abuse of discretion.); Snipes v. State, 733 So.2d 1000, 1005 (Fla.1999) (A decision on a motion for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial judge and such a motion should be granted only in the case of absolute necessity.); Power v. State, 605 So.2d 856, 861 (Fla.1992) (Ruling on a motion for a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court.). A motion for mistrial should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. Cole v. State, 701 So.2d 845, 853 (Fla.1997). Stated differently, [a] motion for a mistrial should only be granted when an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial. England, 940 So.2d at 401-02; see Hamilton v. State, 703 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1997) (A mistrial is appropriate only where the error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.). Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's ruling will be upheld unless the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.... [D]iscretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court. Trease v. State, 768 So.2d 1050, 1053 n. 2 (Fla.2000) (second alteration in original) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla.1990)). Thus, [i]n order for the prosecutor's comments to merit a new trial, the comments must either deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial, materially contribute to the conviction, be so harmful or fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or be so inflammatory that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict than that it would have otherwise. Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377, 383 (Fla.1994). We conclude that while the prosecutor's comments were improper, they were not so prejudicial as to deny Salazar a fair trial. The defense objection interrupted the prosecutor in mid-sentence before the argument was developed, and the trial court sustained the objection at sidebar. Following the sidebar conference, the prosecutor abandoned the argument. Given these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Salazar's motion for mistrial. Cf. Merck v. State, 664 So.2d 939, 941 (Fla.1995) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial based upon an isolated reference to the first trial of the case). The comments were not likely to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors such that their verdict and sentencing recommendation reflect an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law. Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla.1985); see Kearse v. State, 770 So.2d 1119, 1130 (Fla.2000). Moreover, as to not giving the curative instruction, the trial court had the discretion not to give a curative instruction if it believed that doing so would draw further attention to the improper comment. See Israel v. State, 837 So.2d 381, 389 (Fla. 2002) (holding that the trial court, which refused to admonish the jury so that no further attention would be drawn to the error, was well within its discretion to determine that the statement did not prevent Israel from receiving a fair trial).