Opinion ID: 1100536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jeffrey's Life Sentence

Text: Anthony first claims that Jeffrey's life sentence is newly discovered evidence that warrants granting him a new sentencing phase. During resentencing in 1998, a jury unanimously recommended the death penalty for Anthony and Jeffrey. We later vacated Jeffrey's death sentence and reduced it to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years because he was 16 years old at the time of the crimes. See Farina v. State, 763 So.2d 302, 303 (Fla.2000) (citing Brennan v. State, 754 So.2d 1 (Fla.1999)). The circuit court construed this argument as a proportionality claim, which we rejected on direct appeal. See Farina v. State, 801 So.2d 44, 55-56 (Fla.2001). Thus, any such argument here would be procedurally barred. See Turner v. Dugger, 614 So.2d 1075, 1078 (Fla.1993) (barring claims for postconviction relief because they, or variations thereof, were raised on direct appeal). Nevertheless, Anthony insists that Jeffrey's life sentence is newly discovered evidence. To set aside a conviction based on newly discovered evidence, [f]irst ... the evidence must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by the use of diligence. Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Robinson v. State, 865 So.2d 1259, 1262 (Fla.2004) (citation omitted) (quoting Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla.1998)). The two elements of a newly discovered evidence claim apply equally to the issue of `whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.' Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 571 (Fla.2001) (quoting Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1992)). Therefore, to succeed on a claim that a death sentence must be set aside because of a codefendant's subsequent life sentence the defendant must show: 1) the life sentence could not have been known to the parties ... at the time of trial; and 2) the codefendant's life sentence would probably result in a life sentence for the defendant on retrial. Id. (quoting Groover v. State, 703 So.2d 1035, 1037 (Fla.1997)). In Scott, we held that a codefendant's subsequent life sentence constitutes newly discovered evidence which would permit collateral relief. 604 So.2d at 468-69. We further held that in a death case involving equally culpable codefendants the death sentence of one codefendant is subject to collateral review under rule 3.850 when another codefendant subsequently receives a life sentence. Id. at 469. Anthony meets the first prong of the newly discovered evidence test because we reduced Jeffrey's sentence two years after they were sentenced to death. See Farina, 763 So.2d at 303. However, Anthony fails to meet the second prong. Although Jeffrey's life sentence would normally constitute newly discovered evidence under Scott, we reduced his sentence because he was not eligible as a matter of law to receive the death penalty. See Farina, 801 So.2d at 56 (citing Brennan, 754 So.2d at 5-6). Thus, as we stated in Anthony's direct appeal, Jeffrey's life sentence is irrelevant to Anthony's proportionality review because the aggravation and mitigation in their cases are per se incomparable. Id. Jeffrey's life sentence would not probably result in a life sentence for [Anthony] on retrial. See Ventura, 794 So.2d at 571. The dissent insists that the reason for Jeffrey's reduction in sentence is irrelevant. Dissenting op. at 636. It argues that [t]here is simply no meaningful distinction between [Anthony's] claim here and the decision in Scott. Id. at 636. We disagree. The mitigating evidence that Anthony sought to introduceJeffrey's life sentencewas not relevant to Anthony's character, his background, or the circumstances of the crime. We recognize a defendant's right to present any [mitigating] circumstance to a jury or judge for consideration as a reason to spare his life. Dissenting op. at 636 (citing Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 44, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (2004)). As with all evidence, however, mitigating evidence must meet a threshold of relevance. Although the threshold is low, the evidence must tend logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value. Id. (quoting Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 44, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (2004) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004))). In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the sentencer must not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (plurality opinion). Yet we have held that Lockett requires the admission of evidence that establishes facts relevant to the defendant's character, his prior record, and the circumstances of the offense in issue. Hess v. State, 794 So.2d 1249, 1269 (Fla.2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Herring v. State, 446 So.2d 1049, 1056 (Fla. 1984)). In this case, Jeffrey's life sentence does not meet this low threshold for relevance. In Scott, this Court vacated a codefendant's death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding before a jury. 604 So.2d at 468 (citing Robinson v. State, 487 So.2d 1040 (Fla.1986)). Upon the jury's recommendation, the codefendant was resentenced to life. Id. In this case, Jeffrey, too, originally received a death sentence. Farina, 763 So.2d at 303. As the dissent notes, the jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three, and the judge found five aggravating circumstances, including HAC and CCP. Farina v. State, 680 So.2d 392, 394 (Fla.1996). The reason he did not receive the death penalty, however, had nothing to do with the circumstances of the crime or the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating factors. The basis was purely legal: we had held in Brennan, 754 So.2d at 1, that the imposition of a sentence of death on a sixteen-year-old defendant constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and Jeffrey was sixteen years old at the time of these murders. See Farina, 763 So.2d at 303 (citing Brennan, 754 So.2d at 5-6). Thus, whereas in Scott, a jury analyzed the facts and, considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, recommended a sentence of life, in this case, despite a jury recommendation of a sentence of death, and the trial court's imposition of such a sentence, this Court concluded as a matter of law that Jeffrey was ineligible for the death penalty. See id. Unlike Scott, Jeffrey's sentence reduction has no connection to the nature or circumstances of the crime or to the defendant's character or record. Under Lockett, it is irrelevant as a mitigating circumstance in Anthony's case. We have held that a defendant fails to prove that his codefendant's life sentence would probably produce an acquittal or life sentence on retrial when the codefendant was less culpable. See, e.g., Marquard v. State, 850 So.2d 417, 423-24 (Fla. 2002) (affirming the defendant's death sentence even though his codefendant received a life sentence, because the defendant was more culpable); Ventura, 794 So.2d at 571 (denying the defendant's claim because he was the triggerman in the scheme and his codefendant was not equally culpable); Groover, 703 So.2d at 1037 (affirming the denial of the defendant's newly discovered evidence claim because the defendant and codefendant were not equally culpable). In this case, although Jeffrey was the triggerman, the basis for Jeffrey's reduction in sentence hinders Anthony's ability to satisfy the second prong of the test. If Anthony were allowed to introduce Jeffrey's life sentence, the State would be entitled to rebut the relevance of that evidence by showing that the sentence was not the result of a jury recommendation or a trial court's judgment but a matter of law. The evidence is certainly not so strong that it would probably result in a life sentence for Anthony. Accordingly, we deny this claim.