Opinion ID: 852053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sheila Perdue

Text: The State also challenges the trial court's determination that the FSSA violated Sheila Perdue's rights under the ADA and the RA. In seeking summary judgment, Perdue challenged the FSSA's administrative policy decision not to assign specific case-workers to applicants to help them navigate the application and recertification processes. Perdue alleges that this policy disproportionately impacts disabled individuals and constitutes a failure to accommodate her disability in violation of Title II of the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165) and Section 794 of the RA. The State contends, however, that Perdue has failed to designate sufficient evidence to support summary judgment. Specifically, the State makes three arguments: (1) Perdue failed to provide evidence establishing that she is deaf or that her disability was known to the agency; (2) Perdue failed to designate evidence establishing that but for her disability, she would have received the benefit being sought; and (3) Perdue did not designate any evidence that established that the [FSSA] intentionally discriminated against Perdue, or refused to provide a reasonable modification to Perdue, or that the rule in question had a disproportionate impact on Perdue as a disabled person. Appellees' Cross-Appeal Br. at 36, 38 (emphasis omitted). We agree with Perdue that the FSSA was required to reasonably accommodate her disability under the ADA and RA. Perdue alleges the following facts in her verified complaint, which she designated as evidence in her summary judgment motion: Perdue had been receiving Food Stamp and Medicaid for the Disabled benefits for three or four years. In December 2007, the FSSA notified her that she must be recertified for these programs in order to continue receiving benefits. As part of the recertification process, she was required to participate in a telephonic interview. Perdue timely appeared for the interview. Because she was having difficulty hearing the interviewer over the telephone, she asked the interviewer if she could schedule an in-person interview. The interviewer told her that she could not. Perdue then gathered her paperwork and traveled to a nearby FSSA Help Center where she requested assistance completing her recertification forms. None was provided. Perdue then completed the forms herself to the best of her ability and submitted them. The State has offered no competing facts. Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled by public services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165. Section 12132 of the ADA mandates that no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. Id. § 12132. ADA regulations require a public entity to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). Such modifications are required unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity. Id. Similarly, Section 794 of the RA provides: No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . . 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The RA's accompanying regulations also mandate that a covered entity shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the [covered entity] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program. 28 C.F.R. § 41.53. As outlined in the preceding paragraph, to sustain a claim under either the ADA or the RA, Perdue must demonstrate that (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability (2) who was excluded from or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of, or otherwise subjected to discrimination (3) by a public entity (4) by reason of her disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). [26] The State does not dispute, nor could it, that the FSSA is a public entity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A), (B) (A public entity is any State or local government or any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or local government.). Nor does the State dispute that Perdue was denied Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits by the FSSA. Instead, the State challenges Perdue's status as a qualified individual with a disability and that Perdue was excluded by reason of her disability. As an initial matter, based on the facts presented, there is no issue of material fact that would support the State's argument that Perdue was denied benefits by reason of her disability. While there doesn't appear to be any evidence of intentional discrimination, the FSSA clearly did not provide any accommodations to Perdue to assist her in applying for benefits, and this failure to accommodate disproportionately impacted this plaintiff as a disabled person. The fact that she was unable to participate in the telephone interview alone places a heavier burden on the disabled. Perdue has designated sufficient evidence to support a finding that she is disabled. The ADA defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities and includes hearing among major life activities. Id. § 12102(1)(A), (2)(A). In her deposition, Perdue stated that she has seventy percent nerve damage in both of her ears for which she regularly wears hearing aids. She stated that she does not hear well over the telephone and cannot hear people talking at all without her hearing aids. Based on this evidence, there is no issue of material fact that Perdue is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Lastly, there is no issue of material fact as to whether Perdue is a qualified individual with a disability. Under the ADA, a qualified individual with a disability is an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity. Id. § 12131(2). This determination is inextricably linked with the determination of whether the denial, exclusion, or discrimination was by reason of such disability. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 n. 19, 105 S.Ct. 712, 719 n. 19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661, 671 n. 19 (1985) (discussing the identical requirements of the RA: However, the question of who is `otherwise qualified' and what actions constitute `discrimination' under the section would seem to be two sides of a single coin; the ultimate question is the extent to which a [public entity] is required to make reasonable modifications in its programs for the needs of the handicapped.). Both the ADA and the RA seek to assure evenhanded treatment and the opportunity for handicapped individuals to participate in and benefit from [covered] programs. Id. at 304, 105 S.Ct. at 721, 83 L.Ed.2d at 674. Accordingly, a public entity is not required to make `fundamental' or `substantial' modifications to accommodate the handicapped, [but] it may be required to make `reasonable' ones, which includes providing otherwise qualified disabled individuals with meaningful access to its benefits. Id. at 300, 105 S.Ct. at 720, 83 L.Ed.2d at 671. The parties disagree about the precise benefit for which Perdue must be otherwise qualified. On the one hand, a plaintiff must show that, `but for' [her] disability, [she] would have received the ultimate benefit being sought in order to maintain a claim under the ADA or RA. Wis. Comm. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 755 (7th Cir.2006). Thus, the State contends, Perdue must demonstrate her eligibility to receive the Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits for which she was applying at the time of the alleged violation. On the other hand, Perdue argues that any entitlement to benefits she might have is meaningless unless she is able to meaningfully participate in the application process. As such, Perdue contends that she must only demonstrate her eligibility to apply for Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits to satisfy the otherwise qualified requirement. We are persuaded that Perdue is correct and do not believe that the accommodation requirements of the ADA and RA were intended to operate so rigidly as the State would have us conclude. In Choate, the Supreme Court admonishes us that we should not define the benefitfor which a disabled individual must show they are otherwise qualifiedin a manner that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled. . . . 469 U.S. at 301, 105 S.Ct. at 720, 83 L.Ed.2d at 672. Were we to define the benefit so narrowly as to encompass only the individual's actual entitlement to Food Stamp or Medicaid benefits, the FSSA would only be required to reasonably accommodate disabled applicants who could demonstrate that they are eligible for benefits before applying for benefits. But this would be placing the cart before the horse. The entire purpose of the application process is to determine the applicant's eligibility. If disabled applicants first had to demonstrate their eligibility for the program before the agency was required to accommodate them, they would be right back in the same situation that gave rise to this case in the first place. The agency would have to establish a process for verifying disabled applicants' eligibility before the agency would be required to provide reasonable accommodations to assist disabled applicants with the application process. In effect, the agency would have to establish an eligibility process for disabled individuals to receive accommodations for the eligibility process. This would be absurd and cannot have been the result intended by Congress. Perdue's claim is premised wholly on the notion that she needs assistance with the application process on account of her disabilities. If she is unable to meet the requirements of the application process without accommodations, she would not be more able to demonstrate to the FSSA that she is entitled to reasonable accommodations because she is otherwise eligible for Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits. Because the FSSA does not know before an applicant's eligibility is determined whether a disabled individual is legally entitled to benefits, it must reasonably accommodate all disabled individuals during the application process so as not to inadvertently burden qualified disabled applicants. Perdue has designated sufficient facts to support a finding that she was denied meaningful access to the FSSA's programs because anyone is eligible to apply for Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits. Having concluded that the FSSA violated Perdue's rights under the ADA and RA, the trial court ordered the FSSA to provide her with a caseworker or case management services. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment, Appellants' App'x at 38. The trial court's order was premised on the Second Circuit's conclusion in Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg , that the case management system utilized by New York City in that case represented a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 36 (citing 331 F.3d 261, 280 (2d Cir.2003)). Henrietta D., however, does not stand for the proposition that a case management system is the only reasonable accommodation sufficient to accommodate disabled applicants for social services. It stands only for the proposition that such a system is a sufficient reasonable accommodation. 331 F.3d at 280. The ADA and RA only require that the FSSA provide meaningful access to the disabled unless such reasonable accommodation . . . would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program. See id., 331 F.3d at 281-82 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.53). Thus, the FSSA is not required to adopt any specific form of accommodation such as a caseworker or case management services. Rather, the FSSA is only required to make reasonable accommodations sufficient to accommodate the disabled.