Opinion ID: 2533844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Mississippi Code Section 47-5-193 is unconstitutionally vague.

Text: ¶ 7. Fulgham argues that the version of Mississippi Code Section 47-5-193 in force at the time of her guilty plea was facially vague, that is, the vagueness was apparent from the words of the statute. [7] She points to the fact that the statute has been twice amended to include the terms cell phone and charger. [8] Fulgham asserts that the statute is vague for failing to define the phrase unauthorized electronic device. Last, Fulgham argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise her or the court of the statute's alleged vagueness. The State also contends that the statute is not facially vague, and alternatively, that it is not unconstitutional as applied to Fulgham. [9] ¶ 8. As previously noted, an unconstitutionally vague statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. [10] Because there is a strong presumption that a legislative enactment is valid, the party challenging a statute's constitutionality must prove his or her case beyond a reasonable doubt. [11] All doubts are resolved in favor of the validity of the statute. [12] The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [13] The Court has ruled that [t]he test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. [14] ¶ 9. As previously noted, Fulgham asserts the statute is facially vague, while the State argues that we should analyze whether the statute is constitutional as applied to Fulgham's conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence has been rather obscure as to when courts should engage in an as-applied analysis versus a facial analysis when reviewing a statute for vagueness. [15] Furthermore, this Court has used each analysis in separate cases without instruction as to application. [16] So, we set forth some notable decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court on this issue and are guided by the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of it. We often defer to the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of federal law but are not bound by it. [17] ¶ 10. In U.S. v. National Dairy Products, the parties challenged a criminal statute on its face for vagueness, while the Government argued the statute was constitutional as applied to the alleged conduct. [18] The Court found that a statute must not be examined in the abstract but rather in light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged. [19] The Court noted that it conducts a facial analysis of an allegedly vague statute in cases arising under the First Amendment because such vagueness may in itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct. [20] ¶ 11. In Village of Hoffman Estates, the Court set forth a test governing a facial challenge to an allegedly vague statute. [21] The Court ruled that the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications and that [a] court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. [22] However, the Court noted that the most important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. [23] If it does, then a more stringent vagueness test should apply. [24] ¶ 12. In Kolender v. Lawson , the Court used a more stringent vagueness test to strike down an antiloitering statute as being subject to arbitrary enforcement. [25] In that case, the Court found that a facial analysis was appropriate, because the statute potentially suppressed First Amendment liberties and implicated the constitutional right of freedom of movement. [26] And in City of Chicago v. Morales , the Court again used a facial analysis and struck down an antiloitering ordinance as vague, reasoning that: (1) the statute contained no mens rea element, (2) the statute infringed on a constitutionally protected right, and (3) vagueness permeated the text of the law. [27] ¶ 13. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the Supreme Court's precedent to require the following steps in a vagueness challenge: 1. The court must consider whether the statute affects a constitutional right. [28] 2. If the statute implicates no constitutionally protected right, the court should consider whether the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its applications, applying the statute to the complainant's conduct before considering any hypothetical scenarios. [29] In applying the statute to the facts at hand, the court must consider whether the complainant had notice of what conduct is prohibited and whether law enforcement had definite standards to avoid arbitrary enforcement. [30] `The same facets of a statute usually raise concerns of both fair notice and adequate enforcement standards. Hence the analysis of these two concerns tends to overlap.' [31] ¶ 14. We agree with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the vagueness doctrine and apply it to this case. At the time of Fulgham's offense, Mississippi Code Section 47-5-193 provided that: It is unlawful for any officer or employee of the department, or any county sheriff's department, of any private correctional facility in this state in which offenders are confined or for any other person to furnish, attempt to furnish, or assist in furnishing to any offender confined in this state any weapon, deadly weapon, unauthorized electronic device or contraband item. It is unlawful for any person to take, attempt to take, or assist in taking any weapon, unauthorized electronic device or contraband item on property belonging to the department which is occupied or used by offenders, except as authorized by law. [32] We note that the statute in effect in 2004 contained no definition for unauthorized electronic device. ¶ 15. First, we must determine whether the statute affects a constitutionally protected right. Fulgham does not argue that the statute affects any constitutional right, and we find that it does not. Therefore, we apply the statute to Fulgham's conduct to determine whether she had notice of what conduct was prohibited and whether law enforcement had definite standards to avoid arbitrary enforcement. [33] This inquiry involves a factual determination for the trial court, which did not hold a hearing on Fulgham's petition for post-conviction relief. And the plea dialogue in this case provides no more information than what is contained in the bare-bones indictment. The record before us is silent as to what was or was not authorized and what, if any, notice was given to Fulgham. Therefore, we remand for an evidentiary hearing for the court to determine (1) whether Fulgham had notice that a cell phone and charger constituted an electronic device, and if so, (2) whether she had notice that they were unauthorized, [34] and (3) whether law enforcement had definite standards to avoid arbitrary enforcement. These questions simply cannot be answered based on the sparse record before us.