Opinion ID: 1560116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Which party bears the burden of proof.

Text: ¶ 50. The parties agree that the subject policy provides all-risk coverage as to Coverage ADwelling and Coverage BOther Structures. The purpose of an `All-Risk' policy is to insure losses when the cause of the loss is unknown or the specific risk was not explicitly contemplated by either party. Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 7 Couch on Insurance § 101:7 (3d ed.2007). Under such coverage, the insured has the initial burden to prove that the loss occurred. Id. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the insurer, as [i]n an all-risk ... policy where an exclusion is specifically pleaded as an affirmative defense the burden of proving such affirmative defense is upon the insurer.... Lunday v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 276 So.2d 696, 698 (Miss.1973). See also Morrison Grain Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 424, 430 (5th Cir.1980) ([i]t would seem to be inconsistent with the broad protective purposes of `all risks' insurance to impose on the insured ... the burden of proving the precise cause of the loss or damage.). USAA offers that: as to the all risk dwelling and other structures coverage, once the Corbans demonstrate a direct, physical loss to their property, USAA bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any part of the damage it excluded from coverage was caused or contributed to by storm surge flooding. USAA further acknowledged that it does not contest the existence of such direct, physical loss under Coverage ADwelling and Coverage BOther Structures. Finally, with respect to indeterminable loss under the all-risk coverage of Coverage ADwelling and Coverage B Other Structures, USAA also concedes coverage. ¶ 51. This Court finds that with respect to the all-risk coverage of Coverage ADwelling and Coverage BOther Structures, the Corbans are required to prove a direct, physical loss to property described. Thereafter, USAA assumes the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the causes of the losses are excluded by the policy, in this case, [flood] damage. USAA is obliged to indemnify the Corbans for all losses under Coverage ADwelling and Coverage BOther Structures which USAA cannot establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have been caused or concurrently contributed to by [flood] damage. Contributed to comes into play only when [flood] damage is a cause or event contributing concurrently to the loss. Pursuant to the policy language, only if proof of a concurrent cause is presented to a jury for consideration would the jury receive an instruction including the policy phrase contributing concurrently. Likewise, striking the proper balance, under Coverage CPersonal Property, discussed in ¶¶ 52-53 infra, the plaintiff must prove that the loss was caused by a peril insured against, not caused or contributed to. Upon proper instruction, these determinations are for a jury. See Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So.2d 217, 224 (Miss.1972). ¶ 52. The parties likewise agree that the subject policy separately provides named perils coverage as to Coverage CPersonal Property. Under named perils coverage, the burden of proof rests with the insured to prove that the damages sustained were covered by the peril insured against.... Lunday, 276 So.2d at 699. See also Appleman on Insurance at § 192.09 (under named peril coverage, the insured has the burden of proving that any losses were caused by a peril covered by the policyindemnity is not available unless the loss falls under one of the specifically enumerated coverages.); Russ & Segalla, 7 Couch on Insurance at § 101:7 (`[n]amed perils' ... policies provide coverage only for the specific risks enumerated in the policy and excludes all other risks.). ¶ 53. We find that with respect to the named perils coverage of Coverage CPersonal Property, the Corbans are required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the direct physical loss to the property described in Coverage C was caused by wind. This is likewise a question of fact for the jury. See Grace, 257 So.2d at 224.