Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Court's Evaluation of Prosecutor's Reasons

Text: (10) Finally, defendant claims the trial court failed to make a careful assessment of the prosecutor's stated reasons for challenging the Black prospective jurors and instead simply accepted the prosecutor's rationale. We disagree. (11) When ruling on a Batson/Wheeler motion, the trial court must make a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor's explanation in light of the circumstances of the case as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner in which the prosecutor has examined members of the venire and has exercised challenges for cause or peremptorily.... ( People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167-168 [197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854].) The court need not make affirmative inquiries, but must determine whether the prosecutor's reason for exercising peremptory challenges is sincere and legitimate in the sense of being nondiscriminatory. ( People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th 903, 920, 924.) (12) At the third stage of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, `the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor's demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.' ( Miller-El [ v. Cockrell ], supra, 537 U.S. at p. 339.) In assessing credibility, the court draws upon its contemporaneous observations of the voir dire. It may also rely on the court's own experiences as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and even the common practices of the advocate and the office who employs him or her. (See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.) ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th 602, 613, fn. omitted.) When reasons are given for the exercise of challenges, an advocate must `stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives.' [Citation.] The plausibility of those reasons will be reviewed, but not reweighed, in light of the entire record. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 621.) Defendant first argues the court failed to conduct a sincere and reasoned evaluation of the prosecutor's explanation that he challenged B.H. because she was a young, single mother. Not so. The court listened to the lengthy arguments offered by both parties, [13] accepted the prosecutor's explanation as to why he challenged B.H. but did not challenge A.P., who was also under the age of 30, but thereafter warned the prosecutor, I think [your] credibility is beginning to wear a little thin ... on these explanations. I'll accept this one. I still think we're not at a point where I can say it's constitutionally infirm because it was based solely on race but getting close, getting close. This warning by the court reveals, not that the court abdicated its responsibility and accepted the prosecutor's rationale, as the defense would have us conclude, but rather that the court listened to the arguments and weighed the facts known about B.H. against the prosecutor's desires to have a mature jury, and decided that, although it was a close call, the prosecutor's reasons were legitimate. Defendant next argues the court failed to conduct a sincere and reasoned evaluation of the prosecutor's explanation that he challenged A.M. because he came from a family that did not have an abiding respect for the rule of law, had considerable sympathy for Black people on trial, and was not smart enough to serve as a juror on this case. Not so. The record reveals that the court initially characterized A.M. as a pro-death-penalty juror who, at least on the surface, would be attractive to the prosecution. The prosecutor explained that he, too, found A.M. to have characteristics that were both attractive and unattractive to both parties and while he had intended to try to gain a tactical advantage over the defense by initially passing on A.M. and letting the defense use a peremptory challenge to excuse him, he made a mistake and challenged A.M. early on in the selection process. He nevertheless defended the challenge, explaining that he was ultimately moved to challenge A.M. when he reviewed his answers related to racial bias in the justice system and decided he has a racial issue that makes him a very dangerous juror for me. The court then pointed out that A.M.'s attitudes on race in the justice system were set out in writing in his answers in the questionnaire and were therefore something more than sheer speculation. We infer from this statement that the court reviewed the prosecutor's reasons and decided they were legitimate. Finally, defendant argues the court failed to make a sincere and reasoned evaluation of the prosecutor's explanation that he challenged M.M. because she had reservations about imposing the death penalty. Not so. When the prosecutor stated that M.M. has very serious reservations about imposing the death penalty on anyone, the court challenged the prosecutor's memory, stating, I didn't recall that and in my own review of her questionnaire I had her indicated as supportive of the death penalty. The prosecutor referred the court to the transcript where M.M. stated, I would just feel more comfortable if someone else did it, and where she answered, Right to his question, I understand that answer to mean you have serious reservations about your ability to impose the death penalty on anybody, even though you support it? The court acknowledged that the prosecutor may have read certain reactions on her part differently than you and I did, but stated, I don't think I have any legitimate reason to question his ... impression, despite what she said in the questionnaire, for her personally to actually do it would be difficult. I'm not in a position to counter that. I came to the same conclusion you did I think from reading the questionnaire. We infer from this record that the court listened to M.M. and read her questionnaire, formed its own opinion about her qualifications, challenged the prosecutor's interpretation of her answers in voir dire, and thereafter acknowledged that the record could support the prosecutor's position. In doing so, the court reviewed the plausibility of the prosecutor's stated reasons and decided they were legitimate. [14]