Opinion ID: 2035801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Plaintiffs' Other Arguments

Text: Plaintiffs make three other arguments, all of which may be disposed of summarily. First, they argue that the original tax ordinance passed by the Authority violated article VII, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution. This is because, according to plaintiffs, the Authority had not yet been granted the authority to pass the tax. However, the Authority passed an identical ordinance in July, in anticipation of such an attack. Plaintiffs concede that this second act was not ultra vires; consequently, a ruling on the propriety of the first ordinance could not grant plaintiffs any form of relief. We therefore need not resolve that issue. Plaintiffs also argue that the Act violates article IV, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution, which prohibits local legislation. This is because the General Assembly added the power to quick take property within a defined area (the site) to the Authority's general eminent domain power. Plaintiffs and defendant disagree whether this is impermissible special legislation. However, we need not decide this issue because, as plaintiffs admit, none of them owns property within the site. Consequently, they do not have standing to raise the issue. Finally, plaintiffs argue that the Act violates article VIII, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution, which provides that [p]ublic funds, property or credit shall be used only for public purposes. Plaintiffs do not argue that the Expansion Project is not a public purpose. Rather, they argue that, if they can show that the other Expansion Fund taxes are likely to be enough to pay the debt service on the bonds, then a court should strike down the tax on the ground that it constitutes excessive taxation. To support this argument, plaintiffs cite a number of cases involving taxing bodies that had accumulated a surplus of money and were attempting to collect even more taxes. ( Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Miller (1969), 42 Ill.2d 542, 248 N.E.2d 89; People ex rel. Kramer v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. (1956), 8 Ill.2d 382, 134 N.E.2d 335; People ex rel. Bergan v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1945), 390 Ill. 30, 60 N.E.2d 228; People ex rel. Ross v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co. (1942), 381 Ill. 58, 44 N.E.2d 566.) These cases are inapplicable here because we are faced not with a surplus, but rather a prediction of a surplus. We reaffirm the principle that these cases expound, namely that it is unconstitutional to impose unnecessary taxes. However, we decline to expand the rule to allow discovery anytime a plaintiff surmises that a tax may cause coffers to overflow in the future.