Opinion ID: 2273030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Claims on Behalf of Estate

Text: For his first point on cross-appeal, Deichman asserts error in the circuit court's September 28, 2005 order dismissing his claims brought as administrator of his mother's estate, for failure to obtain ancillary letters of administration and to comply with the mandatory bond requirement. Deichman maintains that there was no need for him to institute an ancillary administration, as he did not seek to administer or distribute any portion of his mother's estate in Arkansas. He also avers that the bond requirement did not apply to him. Alternatively, Deichman argues that he was authorized to institute suit on behalf of the estate under Illinois law and under his mother's will, which appointed him executor. Although Travis Lumber's motion leading to this order was styled as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the circuit court considered matters outside the pleadings in ruling on it. When matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded by the circuit court, a motion to dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Ruth R. Remmel Revocable Trust v. Regions Fin. Corp., 369 Ark. 392, 402, 255 S.W.3d 453, 461 (2007). Ordinarily, upon reviewing a court's decision on a summary-judgment motion, we would examine the record to determine if genuine issues of material fact exist. Id. However, in a case such as this one, which does not involve the question of whether factual issues exist but rather the application of legal rules, we simply determine whether the appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Deichman first takes issue with the circuit court's finding that his failure to file for ancillary administration rendered his original and amended complaints absolute nullities. An ancillary administration is a separate but related proceeding to the administration of the decedent's estate in the jurisdiction where the decedent died. Craig v. Carrigo, 340 Ark. 624, 633, 12 S.W.3d 229, 235 (2000). The primary administration of the decedent's estate in the instant case is presumably occurring in Illinois. An ancillary proceeding in Arkansas would serve to collect assets and pay debts of the decedent in this locality. Id. Ancillary administration of an estate in Arkansas is governed by Arkansas Code Annotated sections 28-42-101 through XX-XX-XXX (Repl.2004). Id. Deichman, however, argues that he was not required to comply with the statutes governing ancillary administration because he filed suit on behalf of his mother's estate pursuant to the survival statute, which allows an executor or administrator to maintain an action following the death of the injured party in the same manner and with like effect in all respects as actions founded on contracts. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-62-101(a)(1) (Repl.2005). We agree that Deichman was not required to comply with the statutes governing ancillary administration, as he did not seek to institute an ancillary administration in this state. However, both parties seem to be in agreement on the issue of the applicability of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-61-110, which provides as follows, in its entirety: Administrators, executors, and guardians appointed in any of the states, territories, or districts of the United States, under the laws thereof, may sue in any of the courts of this state, in their representative capacity, to the same and like effect as if the administrators, executors, and guardians had been qualified under the laws of this state. However, the administrators, executors, or guardians shall be required, before they shall institute a suit or proceeding, to execute the same bond as is required of other nonresidents by the laws of this state. Id. § 16-61-110 (Repl.2005). Pursuant to this statute, Deichman, as a foreign administrator, was required to institute suit as if he had been qualified to do so under Arkansas law. As such, he was subject to the requirements for domiciliary personal representatives, found in Arkansas Code Annotated sections 28-48-101 through XX-XX-XXX (Repl.2004 & Supp.2007). While letters of administration are no longer necessary to empower the person appointed to act for the estate, an administrator is empowered to act for the estate by an order of appointment. Ark. Code Ann. § 28-48-102(d) (Supp.2007). This court has interpreted section 28-48-102(d) to mean that letters of administration are unnecessary so long as there is an order appointing the administrator. Steward v. Statler, 371 Ark. 351, 356, 266 S.W.3d 710, 714 (2007). It is undisputed that, at the time of the filing of the original complaint, Deichman had not been appointed administrator of his mother's estate in any state. Thus, he did not have standing to sue, and the complaint was a nullity. See Hubbard v. Nat'l Healthcare of Pocahontas, Inc., 371 Ark. 444, 267 S.W.3d 573 (2007). Because the original complaint was a nullity, the amended complaint could not relate back to it under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court of Craighead County, 348 Ark. 197, 73 S.W.3d 584 (2002). Moreover, the amended complaint could not stand on its own; because the last possible cause of action of the estate would have occurred before December 17, 1997, the January 25, 2001 amended complaint was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-56-105(4) & (6) (Repl. 2005) (three-year statute of limitations for trespass and conversion); Ark.Code Ann. § 16-56-108 (Repl.2005) (two-year statute of limitations under penal statutes where penalty or part thereof goes to person suing); Kutait v. O'Roark, 305 Ark. 538, 542, 809 S.W.2d 371, 373-74 (1991) (holding that two-year statute of limitations under section 16-56-108 applies to claims brought pursuant to section 18-60-102). Even if Deichman's amended complaint on behalf of the estate had not been time-barred, it, along with the original complaint, was a nullity for another reason. Deichman contends that the bond requirement of Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-42-103 does not apply to him because he is not seeking an ancillary administration. As we have stated, we agree that Deichman's claims on behalf of his mother's estate were not subject to the code provisions governing ancillary administration. Section 16-61-110, however, requires foreign administrators to execute the same bond as is required of other nonresidents by the laws of this state before instituting suit in Arkansas. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-110. The bond requirement for domiciliary personal representatives is set forth in section 28-48-201 (Repl.2004), and, pursuant to section 28-48-101(b)(6)(A) (Repl.2004), applies to nonresidents who have appointed an agent to accept service of process. The failure to give bond results in the revocation of letters of administration already issued and the appointment of another person as personal representative. Id. § 28-48-202 (Repl.2004). From our review of the record, it appears undisputed that Deichman did not give bond prior to the filing of either the original or the amended complaint. Therefore, we hold that Deichman lacked standing to sue and that both complaints were nullities. Finally, we reject Deichman's alternative contention that he was nonetheless authorized to file suit under either Illinois law or his mother's will, by which he had been appointed executor. According to Deichman, Illinois law permits a person named as executor in a will to take action in order to preserve the estate. A later entry of orders of administration will relate back to the date of the decedent's death and verify the executor's prior actions. See 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/6-14; 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-4; Phelps v. Elgin Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 37 Ill.App.2d 46, 184 N.E.2d 799 (1962); Faubel v. Mich. Blvd. Bldg. Co., 278 Ill.App. 159 (1934). The problem with this argument is that Deichman offers no authority for the proposition that Illinois law controls this case. This court has recognized that standing is a procedural issue. Meeks v. State, 341 Ark. 620, 622, 19 S.W.3d 25, 26 (2000). As such, it is governed by the law of the forum. Middleton v. Lockhart, 355 Ark. 434, 438, 139 S.W.3d 500, 502-03 (2003). Accordingly, the issue of whether Deichman had standing to sue on behalf of his mother's estate is governed by Arkansas law. Moreover, under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-61-110 and the provisions of the Arkansas Probate Code governing domiciliary personal representatives, executors are subject to the same appointment and bond requirements as administrators. Therefore, the fact that Deichman was named executor in his mother's will does not exempt him from the statutory requirements outlined herein. For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of Deichman's claims brought as administrator of his mother's estate.