Opinion ID: 1534917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Product-Liability Claims.

Text: The appellants next argue that the trial court erred in declining to find that the hospitals could be strictly liable as suppliers of the Orthoblock. The premise of their argument is that our Product Liability Act and our Strict Liability Act expose a larger class of defendants to liability than does Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Before addressing this issue, we deal with a mootness issue raised by the hospitals.
Both hospitals contend that any viable strict liability claims against them are moot due to the appellants' settlement with Calcitek. In support of this argument they primarily rely on Sochanski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 F.2d 45 (3d Cir.1982). In Sochanski the court drew a distinction between primary and secondary liability in product-liability claims. The appellant there executed a release in favor of the manufacturer of a defective tire, the party primarily liable. However, the seller had only acted as a conduit between the manufacturer and the purchaser, and was thus only secondarily liable. Consequently, [the seller's] liability for any misfeasance on [the manufacturer's] part is discharged by the release in favor of [the manufacturer]. Id. The hospitals also highlight the indemnification provision of the Product Liability Act, which gives the supplier of a defective product a claim for indemnification against the product's manufacturer. See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-116-107 (1987). We decline to hold that the appellants' product-liability claims against the hospitals are moot in these cases. The orders of dismissal with Calcitek in these records show only that the matter has been compromised and settled, the above-styled cause against Defendant Calcitek, Inc. is hereby dismissed with prejudice. However, we do not have the benefit of any release between the appellants and Calcitek, and we would be left to speculate as to the terms of that release, as well as the potential viability of cross-claims between the parties.
While we do not hold that the appellants' product-liability claims against the hospitals are moot, we nonetheless affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the hospitals. In doing so, we do not decide whether a hospital, under these facts, may be strictly liable as a supplier. To the extent that these appellants have viable product-liability claims against the hospitals, they are all barred by the applicable limitations period found in the Medical Malpractice Act. The Product Liability Act establishes a three-year statute of limitations, All product liability actions shall be commenced within three (3) years after the date on which the death, injury, or damage complained of occurs. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-116-103. A product liability action includes all actions brought for or on account of personal injury, death, or property damage caused by, or resulting from, the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, testing, service, warning, instruction, marketing, packaging, or labeling, of any product[.] Ark.Code Ann. § 16-116-102(5). By contrast, the Medical Malpractice Act's limitations period provides in part that all actions for medical injury shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues. An Action for medical injury means any action against a medical care provider, whether based in tort, contract, or otherwise, to recover damages on account of medical injury. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-114-201(1). Furthermore, medical injury means any adverse consequences arising out of or sustained in the course of the professional services being rendered by a medical care provider, whether resulting from negligence, error, or omission in the performance of such services; or from rendition of such services without informed consent or in breach of warranty or in violation of contract; or from failure to diagnose; or from premature abandonment of a patient or of a course of treatment; or from failure to properly maintain equipment or appliances necessary to the rendition of such services; or otherwise arising out of or sustained in the course of such services. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-114-201(3). In exploring the plain language of both Acts, there is obviously a potential conflict lurking with regard to the limitations period for an action otherwise falling within the scope of the Product Liability Act, yet involving an allegedly defective product that is supplied by a medical-care provider in the course of rendering professional services. This is due to the Medical Malpractice Act's broadly inclusive language used in defining an action for medical injury, which includes any action against a medical care provider to recover damages on account of medical injury whether based in tort, contract, or otherwise[.] See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-114-201(1). The definition of medical injury is similarly inclusive, encompassing adverse consequences arising out of the rendition of professional services whether in breach of warranty... or otherwise arising out of or sustained in the course of such services. See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-114-201(3). In the present cases, where the appellants attempt to hold the hospitals liable for adverse consequences arising from an allegedly defective product supplied in the course of rendering a surgical procedure, the appellants' alleged injuries fall within the definition of medical injury, and the appellants' cause of action based on strict or product liability is an action for medical injury as that term is used in the Medical Malpractice Act. Cf. Burris v. Hospital Corp. of America, 773 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989) (product-liability action against hospital governed by statute of limitations for medical malpractice action when such action included an action for death resulting from malpractice by a health care provider ... whether based upon tort or contract law.Any ground which a plaintiff might state for recovery of civil damages must fall into one of the categories, contract or tort.). Thus, the conflict between the two statutes of limitations is readily apparent in these cases. This is not the first time that this court has been confronted with conflicting statutes of limitations in interpreting the Medical Malpractice Act. In Hertlein v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 323 Ark. 283, 914 S.W.2d 303 (1996), this court held that the Medical Malpractice Act's two-year limitations period governed a wrongful-death action, despite the longer limitations period generally applicable to wrongful-death actions. Compare with McQuay v. Guntharp, 331 Ark. 466, 963 S.W.2d 583 (1998) (declining to reach merits of whether Medical Malpractice Act's two-year limitations period applied to outrage claim against a physicianappellant failed to obtain a ruling on this issue at the trial court level). The rationale behind the Hertlein decision was the general repealer clause contained in the Medical Malpractice Act, Act 709 of 1979. We noted that the Act expressly applies to all causes of action for medical injury accruing after April 2, 1979, and, as to such causes of action, shall supersede any inconsistent provision of law.  Hertlein, supra (quoting Ark.Code Ann. § 16-114-202 (1987) (emphasis in original). Here, the statute of limitations found in the Medical Malpractice Act conflicts with that found in the Product Liability Act, and for that matter, the same limitations period applicable to claims brought pursuant to the Strict Liability Act. See Harris v. Standardized San. Sys., 658 F.Supp. 438 (W.D.Ark. 1987) (acknowledging that Strict Liability Act omits specific limitations period but applied three-year period found in Product Liability Act), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 64 (8th Cir.1988). In resolving the conflict, we hold that the two-year limitations period found in the Medical Malpractice Act supersedes that found in the Product Liability Act. We are not unmindful of the fact that the Product Liability Act, Act 511 of 1979, and the Medical Malpractice Act, Act 709 of 1979, were enacted in the same legislative session, and that such an implied repealer is not favored. See generally 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.17 (5th ed.1993); see also Matthews v. Travelers Indemnity Ins. Co., 245 Ark. 247, 432 S.W.2d 485 (1968) (policy is to use longer limitations period where the issue is doubtful). However, the Medical Malpractice Act, as the latter enactment within the session, may be seen as the prevailing expression of legislative intent. See Williams v. State, 215 Ark. 757, 223 S.W.2d 190 (1949) (As between two acts, it has been held that one passed later and going into effect earlier will prevail over one passed earlier and going into effect later.); but see Citizens to Establish a Reform Party v. Priest, 325 Ark. 257, 926 S.W.2d 432 (1996) (Where Acts passed at the same session contain conflicting clauses, the whole record of legislation will be examined to ascertain the Legislative intent, and such intent, if ascertained, will be given effect, regardless of priority of enactment.); Horn v. White, 225 Ark. 540, 284 S.W.2d 122 (1955) (declining to mechanically apply last passed rule). For these reasons, and in light of the all inclusive language used by the General Assembly in defining an action for medical injury to encompass those actions whether based in tort, contract, or otherwise, we conclude that the Medical Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitations governs the appellants' product-liability claims brought against the hospitals. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the appellee hospitals on the appellants' product-liability claims. In so holding, we are also cognizant of Spickes v. Medtronic, 275 Ark. 421, 631 S.W.2d 5 (1982), where this court applied the Product Liability Act's three-year statute of limitations in the context of a product-liability claim brought against the manufacturer of a pacemaker as well as the hospital through which the device was sold[.] Id. However, Spickes presented no issue as to whether the Medical Malpractice Act's two-year statute would otherwise govern. Therefore, Spickes is not dispositive here.