Opinion ID: 777310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Delay Between Seizure and Institution of the Forfeiture Proceedings

Text: 63 Finally, the claimant argues that the approximately fifteen months which elapsed between the seizure of the money orders at LaGuardia and the government's institution of judicial forfeiture proceedings constitutes an unreasonable delay that bars the forfeiture of the defendant funds. The government responded that this issue was forfeited by the claimant's failure sufficiently to press the claim before the district court, and there is some merit in the government's contention. While it is true that the claimant noted in its answer to the forfeiture complaint an affirmative defense of unreasonable delay, and noted the claimed unreasonable delay to the district court at the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, we find no point in the record where the claimant specifically requested dismissal of the action on that ground, as is normally required to preserve an issue for review. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 46. Claimant's reference to the issue at the probable cause determination was an odd and confusing choice. As we understand his argument, the unreasonableness of the delay did not render the government without probable cause for institution of the forfeiture proceedings, but rather barred forfeiture altogether, even in the face of an unrebutted showing of probable cause. A motion to dismiss would have been far clearer. Nonetheless, we believe the claimant sufficiently apprised the district court (and the government) of its objection so that the better course on appeal is to review the issue on its merits rather than considering it forfeited. 64 Claimant argues that the delay between seizure and filing of the forfeiture complaint violated the then-existent statutory requirement that, where warrantless seizures of property have occurred, forfeiture proceedings be instituted promptly. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1994) (amended 2000). 19 Failure to comply with these requirements, asserts the claimant, bars forfeiture of the property altogether. 65 To begin with, § 881(b) required that, where property had been seized without a warrant on the ground that the Attorney General has probable cause to believe the property is subject to civil forfeiture, as was the case here, proceedings under subsection (d) of this section shall be instituted promptly. § 881(b). Subsection (d), however, refers not solely to the institution of judicial forfeiture proceedings, but instead to, inter alia, [t]he provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws, i.e., the provisions of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1621. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d). As noted above, these provisions allow, in certain instances (including, as here, seizure of monetary instruments), for administrative forfeiture proceedings to be commenced by publication and notice to interested parties, to be followed by judicial proceedings only upon the filing of a proper claim (and posting of a bond). Thus, as far as § 881(b)'s requirement of prompt institution of proceedings under § 881(d) is concerned, the plain language of the statute would seem to indicate that the act constituting institution of proceedings would be the institution of administrative forfeiture proceedings (in those instances where administrative forfeiture was permissible). The DEA sent notice to the claimant, thereby instituting administrative forfeiture proceedings, on July 11, 1994, a little over one month after the seizure. Obviously, there can be no question as to the promptness of this action. 66 Even if the promptness requirement were taken to apply to the institution of judicial proceedings, the claimant points us to no authority for the proposition that the proper remedy for a violation of this requirement is the immunization from forfeiture of property to which the government would otherwise be entitled. Indeed, in our opinion such a remedy is foreclosed by the reasoning of United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993), in which the Supreme Court held that, where Congress had included various promptness requirements in the statutory forfeiture provisions of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604 but included no statutory penalty for failure to meet those requirements, the Court would not impose its own sanction of dismissal. Id. at 64-65, 114 S.Ct. 492; see also id. at 63, 114 S.Ct. 492 ([I]f a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.). Congress having specified no sanction for the failure to file promptly as (then) required by 21 U.S.C. § 881(b), we decline the invitation to do so ourselves. 20 Regardless, therefore, of whether the delay in instituting proceedings violated any statutory promptness requirements (and we do not mean to imply that it did), claimant has not demonstrated that immunization of the property would be a proper remedy.