Opinion ID: 1934979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: March 12, 2002, Settlement Conference

Text: Analysis of Monsanto's allegations is fact-intensive. Monsanto argues that Judge Laird demonstrated bias by threatening to jail Monsanto executives for contempt for their alleged failure to negotiate in good faith at the March 12, 2002, settlement conference, and that Judge Laird demonstrated bias by threatening to compel Monsanto executives to give testimony at the settlement conference. The plaintiffs argue that Monsanto is wrong on the facts and the law. Monsanto argues that Judge Laird demonstrated his bias during the discussions about what was to happen at the March 12 settlement conference. In its petition, Monsanto quotes a dialogue between Judge Laird and one of its attorneys that took place before the March 12 settlement conference in which the attorney stated to the court that Monsanto did not want the corporate officers who were coming to the settlement conference to be compelled to testify: The Court: They are here for a settlement conference. But there may be facts of which they can testify to in this case too. Mr. White: That is why I'm asking. I wouldn't think a settlement conference would be something where somebody would testify. But you might just ask them questions, is what you're saying? The Court: Yeah. But then they also may be pertinent witnesses for the injunctive relief in this case. So they may be here for dual purposes. Mr. White: Welland that'swe're are not calling themWe have other people who know a lot more about this, like Mr. Branchfield, and we are getting them here for purposes of the settlement, not to be witnesses. The Court: But they are alsoMr. Branchfield doesn't know what the chief financial officer of these corporations knows as to the financial conditions of these corporations. And that may be pertinent evidence, necessary evidence on the injunctive phase of this case. Mr. White: Here is my concern. I'm just sort of laying it out there because I'm troubled about it. As I said, I worked hard on bringing people down here for the purposes of settlement. And then I don't want them to get down here and find out that they are here for settlement, and not only that, they are going to have to testify. I wouldI think it is appropriate to keep them separate and apart. And let's get through this. And then if Your Honor thinks somewhere later you might need testimony from somebody, then we will revisit it at that time. Is that okay? The Court: That's fine. I was going to keep it separate. The settlement conference will be separate from any testimony in this case. Mr. White: And again, I didn't want a situation where we might conclude the settlement conference and you say I now want to put somebody on the stand to testify. Because they are comingYour Honor has the inherent power under Rule 16 [Ala. R. Civ. P.] to bring someone down here for a settlement conference. And that is why they are coming. The Court: And I think I have the inherent power under the rules of evidence to call witnesses. Mr. White: I really wish we wouldn't do that, Judge. That is going to put me in a difficult situation. Because, I mean, they are coming down here for the purposes of settlement. And I would really ask, you know, so we could keep it on that basis, and that is what your order was. The Court: As long as they are coming here to negotiate in good faith a settlement in this case, I don't have a problem keeping this strictly to settlement. And I don't want anybody to leave the settlement conference until this case is settled. The settlement conference could take several days. And I won't call any witnesses. I won't call them as a witness. They may be informed that they will have to come back as witnesses. (Petition at 12-14, quoting transcript at 5897; emphasis in petition.) Monsanto also quotes Judge Laird as saying later in the same dialogue: I want to do it in my courtroom in Anniston with my bailiff there in case I find somebody is not negotiating in good faith, they will be close to my jail instead of the Jefferson County jail. [14] (Petition at 15, quoting transcript at 5898.) Monsanto argues that the quoted passages indicate that Judge Laird contemplated contempt sanctions at least a week before the settlement conference even though, it argues, Judge Laird lacked any justification to threaten contempt sanctions before the settlement conference actually took place. Monsanto argues that Judge Laird continued to demonstrate bias by his conduct at the settlement conference. [15] Monsanto argues that Judge Laird's actions in connection with the settlement conference lacked any basis in law or fact, and that Judge Laird's actions were an improper attempt to coerce a settlement. Monsanto cites Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir.1985), as persuasive authority for the proposition that Rule 16, Ala. R. Civ. P., does not sanction efforts by trial judges to effect settlements through coercion. [16] Monsanto argues that Judge Laird's conduct after he adjourned the settlement conference on March 12, 2002, also demonstrates his bias against Monsanto. At 12:40 p.m. on March 12, after adjourning the conference, Judge Laird called John Hunter, the chairman and chief executive officer of Solutia, to the witness stand. Monsanto argues, without directly quoting any supporting examples from the transcript, that Judge Laird asked inappropriate questions of Hunter and that the act of making Hunter testify in and of itself constitutes evidence of bias on Judge Laird's part. Monsanto argues that Judge Laird further demonstrated bias at the conference when he stated to Monsanto's lawyers, I don't want [a settlement offer] to go through you because I'm not confident and I'm not sure you're communicating everything you should to your client. (Petition at 21, quoting transcript at 6649.) Monsanto asserts that Judge Laird further demonstrated bias when he later stated: It's obvious to this Court thatI mean, this Court has heard testimony since the second week of January, and it's obvious to this Court that the same attitude that Solutia or Monsanto exhibited years ago still exists today, and that is a lack of concern for the environment, a lack of concern for their neighbors and the plaintiffs in this case, and it's obvious to this Court that it is simply the Defendant's strategy and plan to keep from facing the music in this case as long as they possibly can and stretch it out as long as they possibly can. (Petition at 21, quoting transcript at 6629.) Monsanto also argues that the remarks Judge Laird made while adjourning the settlement conference demonstrate bias [17] and that Judge Laird's remarks later that evening directed to one of Monsanto's attorneys demonstrate bias. [18] Without citation to authority, Monsanto concludes that [t]he court's actions at the March 12 settlement conference and immediately thereafter exceeded all bounds of authority and evidence the existence of bias and lack of impartiality sufficient to require recusal. (Petition at 26.) The plaintiffs argue that Monsanto is wrong on the facts and the law. The facts before this Court indicate that Judge Laird sanctioned no one for contempt and forced no one to settle. When Monsanto indicated that it was unwilling to settle the action, Judge Laird adjourned the settlement conference. Judge Laird never agreed before the settlement conference not to call any executives as witnesses; instead, Judge Laird agreed only that he would not call executives as witness [a]s long as they are coming here to negotiate in good faith .... Although Monsanto argues that Rule 16, Ala. R. Civ. P., does not permit Judge Laird to coerce a settlement and that Judge Laird's threats to hold Monsanto executives in contempt constitute coercion, the scope of Judge Laird's Rule 16 authority is not at issue in a motion to recuse based on the judge's alleged bias. `[R]ulings on issues of law or attitudes concerning legal issues' do not establish bias or prejudice requiring recusal unless those rulings or attitudes are the product of bias and prejudice of an extra-judicial source. In re Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350, 357 (Ala.1984). If Judge Laird's threats to sanction Monsanto for contempt exceeded his authority under Rule 16, Ala. R. Civ. P., [19] Monsanto's remedy would lie in an appeal of Judge Laird's ruling, not in an action seeking his recusal. The remarks Judge Laird directed at Monsanto's attorneys do not indicate that Judge Laird should recuse himself for bias because Judge Laird's remarks apparently are based on what he learned during the course of the trial. An appearance of partiality cannot necessarily be presumed to follow from a stormy relationship with the attorneys for a party. Barnett v. City of Chicago, 952 F.Supp. 1265, 1269 (N.D.Ill.1997). Judge Laird suggested in his remarks that his judgments were formed by what he had seen during the course of the litigation. [20] The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed sometimes ... necessary to completion of the judge's task. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550-51, 114 S.Ct. 1147. We hold that Judge Laird's conduct and remarks in conjunction with the March 12 settlement conference do not constitute grounds for his recusal.