Opinion ID: 1773224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: apportionment of fault to louisville water company

Text: Owens Corning asserts that, based on the evidence, the jury's apportionment of ten (10%) per cent of the fault for Parrish's damages to LWC was proper pursuant to the Comparative Fault Statute. Parrish responds that, since LWC never became a party to Parrish's lawsuit, the trial court improperly allowed the jury to apportion fault to LWC. We disagree with Parrish's position. Kentucky's Comparative Fault Statute expressly provides for apportionment against a person settling with a claimant: (4) A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable, shall discharge that person from all liability for contribution, but it shall not be considered to discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons shall be reduced by the amount of the released persons' equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of this section. [35] KRS 411.182 does not require as a prerequisite for apportionment that the settling person be joined as a party to the action. In fact, it implies that the settling person will not be named a party to the action. [36] Parrish relies primarily on Dix & Associates Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key [37] as support for his argument against apportionment as to his nonparty employer. Parrish directs this Court to the following language of the opinion: In Kentucky, when an injured employee proceeds for workers' compensation against his employer and separately, in a tort action, against a negligent third party, if the employer is made a third-party defendant in the tort action, the jury should be instructed to determine the total damage sustained by the employee and to apportion liability between the employer and the third party according to the respective fault of each. When a claim by an injured employee against a negligent third party in which the employer has been designated a third-party defendant is settled without trial and apportionment of liability, either the injured employee or the employer shall be entitled to litigate the issue of apportionment of liability in order to ascertain the extent of the employer's right to recoup compensation payments. [38] We first note that the first paragraph of Parrish's quotation is incomplete and that Parrish does not indicate that he omitted any language. We believe the full context of the quotation is necessary to comprehend Dix & Associates and the language emphasized by Parrish. The complete first paragraph of the portion quoted by Parrish reads as follows: In Kentucky, when an injured employee proceeds for workers' compensation against his employer and separately, in a tort action, against a negligent third party, if the employer is made a third-party defendant in the tort action, the jury should be instructed to determine the total damage sustained by the employee and to apportion liability between the employer and the third party according to the respective fault of each. The judgment against the negligent third party should be for only that percentage of the total damage which has been apportioned to him, and he will not have any claim for contribution against the employer. The employer shall then be entitled to recoup from the proceeds of the worker's settlement or judgment a percentage of the amount paid or payable as compensation benefits equal to the percentage of fault apportioned to the negligent third party. [39] In Dix & Associates , therefore, the employer was a partya third-party defendantwho sought, by virtue of its counter-claim, to recoup from the proceeds of the worker's settlement or judgment a percentage of the amount paid or payable as compensation benefits. Here, LWC, Parrish's employer, is not a party and, accordingly, recoupment of benefits paid by LWC was never a possibility in this action. Accordingly, the language quoted from Dix & Associates is not determinative of the issue now before the Court. In fact, we believe Dix & Associates supports Owens Corning's position. In Dix & Associates , we quoted with approval the holding in Floyd v. Carlisle Const. Co., Inc . [40] that apportionment to a settling nonparty was proper, A tortfeasor who is not actually a defendant is construed to be one for purposes of apportionment if he has settled the claim against him.... [41] We then held that Dix & Associates, the plaintiff's employer, by providing workers compensation coverage, occupied the same position as a settling tortfeasor: In this case, what otherwise would have been tort liability of Dix & Associates to the injured worker has been extinguished by reason of the workers compensation coverage. As a practical matter, workers compensation coverage constitutes a settlement between the employee and the employer whereby the employee settles his tort claim for the amount he will receive as compensation. For all practical purposes, in this case. Dix & Associates occupies the position of a tort-feasor which has settled the tort claim against it. [42] Thus, if supported by the evidence, proper instructions may allow the jury to apportion fault against a settling nonparty, [43] and a settlement, between an employer and employee, of a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act constitutes a settlement under KRS 411.182(4). We therefore hold that the trial court appropriately submitted a comparative fault instruction as to LWC. For the reasons outlined above, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgments of the Jefferson Circuit Court. COOPER, GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and KELLER, JJ., concur. LAMBERT, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in which STUMBO and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join.