Opinion ID: 167108
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of Mr. Wittig's Wealth and Executive Employment Agreement

Text: 87 Mr. Wittig challenges the district court's admission of exhibits 31 and 52, arguing that they were unduly prejudicial and that, as a result, he is entitled to a new trial. We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1067 (10th Cir.2003). 88 Under that standard, a trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. McEwen v. City of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539, 1553-54 (10th Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our deference to the trial court is based upon its first-hand ability to view the witnesses and evidence and assess credibility and probative value. Id. at 1554. An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical, or results in a manifestly unreasonable judgment. Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504-05 (10th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even [i]f we find error in the admission of evidence, we will set aside a jury verdict only if the error prejudicially affects a substantial right of a party. Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 776 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 89 The first document to which Mr. Wittig objects, exhibit 31, is an employment agreement between Western Resources and Mr. Wittig, dated September 19, 2000. At trial, the government contended that this agreement demonstrated that Mr. Wittig would greatly benefit from the creation of a new utility company and that, because Mr. Wittig was seeking funding from Mr. Weidner's bank, the agreement supplied a motive for Mr. Wittig's allowing his line of credit to be used to provide the $1.5 million loan to Mr. Weidner. 90 The second document at issue, exhibit 51, is an overview of the benefits that would flow to executives in the new utility company. The government contended at trial that the document indicated that Mr. Wittig would receive between $37 million and $64 million. Again, the government asserted that the opportunity available to Mr. Wittig to receive these substantial sums explained why Mr. Wittig declined to invest in the Arizona real estate project himself and opted instead to curry favor with Mr. Weidner, whose bank would be able to finance the creation of the lucrative new utility company. 91 Mr. Wittig contends that both documents were irrelevant and prejudicial. According to Mr. Wittig, the government trumpeted these documents in an attempt to prejudice the jury with arguments about a potential multimillion dollar payout scenario, bonuses, stock options, and split-dollar life insurance, as well as the value of the Wittigs' extensively renovated home in Topeka and a New York apartment they maintained. Wittig's Br. at 30. 92 Mr. Wittig further contends that the government failed to establish that he needed Mr. Weidner's assistance in obtaining financing for the new utility company. He points to evidence that the new utility company had great profit potential for the bank and that, as a result, Mr. Wittig did not need Mr. Weidner's help in obtaining the financing. Moreover, he notes, any decision with respect to the financing at issue would have been referred to a committee because Mr. Weidner lacked the authority to personally approve it. Finally, Mr. Wittig observes that the proposed transaction creating the new utility never came to fruition. 93 To a degree, Mr. Wittig's points are well-taken. The government's quid pro quo theory involved a substantial amount of speculation and in fact was unnecessary to prove the counts against Mr. Wittig, which involved the loan to Mr. Weidner, not the creation of the new utility. Cf. Shively, 715 F.2d at 266 (noting, in a prosecution for conspiracy to misapply bank funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 656, and 1014, that the motivation of a customer in loaning money to a bank official was irrelevant—whether he did so out of pure friendship, or, as is more likely, to ingratiate himself with the officer of a bank with which he did business). Moreover, even without the evidence of the potential benefits from the new utility company, the government introduced evidence that Mr. Wittig was benefitting from the loan to Mr. Weidner: Mr. Weidner was paying Mr. Wittig a higher interest rate than Mr. Wittig was paying the bank. 94 Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. The evidence of the lucrative benefits from the new utility company was of some relevance: it did indicate that Mr. Wittig had an interest in cultivating a good relationship with Mr. Weidner. The evidence invoked by Mr. Wittig does not foreclose the government's allegation that Mr. Wittig sought to cultivate Mr. Weidner's good will and that one way of obtaining that good will was to loan Mr. Weidner the $1.5 million. Moreover, Mr. Wittig has not established the necessary prejudice to warrant reversal of his conviction. See Coletti, 165 F.3d at 776 (noting [i]f [this court] find[s] error in the admission of evidence, [it] will set aside a jury verdict only if the error prejudicially affects a substantial right of a party (internal quotation marks omitted)). 95