Opinion ID: 1242947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Publication of Private Facts

Text: The claim that a publication has given unwanted publicity to allegedly private aspects of a person's life is one of the more commonly litigated and well-defined areas of privacy law. In Diaz, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at page 126, 188 Cal.Rptr. 762, the appellate court accurately discerned the following elements of the public disclosure tort: (1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern. (See Forsher v. Bugliosi supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 808-809,163 Cal.Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716; GUI v. Hearst Publishing Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 224, 228-231, 253 P.2d 441; Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc. (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 733, 744-748, 20 Cal.Rptr. 405.) That formulation does not differ significantly from the Restatement's, which provides that [o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that [¶] (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and [¶] (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. (Rest.2d Torts, § 652D.) The element critical to this case is the presence or absence of legitimate public interest, i.e., news worthiness, in the facts disclosed. After reviewing the decisional law regarding news worthiness, we conclude, inter alias, that lack of news worthiness is an element of the private facts tort, making news worthiness a complete bar to common law liability. We further conclude that the analysis of news worthiness inevitably involves accommodating conflicting interests in personal privacy and in press freedom as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that in the circumstances of this case  where the facts disclosed about a private person involuntarily caught up in events of public interest bear a logical relationship to the newsworthy subject of the broadcast and are not intrusive in great disproportion to their relevance  the broadcast was of legitimate public concern, barring liability under the private facts tort. The Diaz formulation, like the Restatements, includes as a tort element that the matter published is not of legitimate public concern. Diaz thus expressly makes the lack of news worthiness part of the plaintiffs case in a private facts action. (See also Diaz, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at pp. 128-130, 188 Cal.Rptr: 762 [plaintiff bears burden of proving published matter was not newsworthy].) Our own decisions are consistent, if less explicit, on this point. (See Forsher v. Bugliosi supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 809, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716 [The defendant's First Amendment right to disseminate information to the public must be considered [i]n determining whether a cause of action [for publication of private facts] has been stated....]; Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 273, 278, 239 P.2d 630 [Public interest in the dissemination of news and information must be balanced against the privacy right in defining the boundaries of the right.].) The Diaz approach is consistent with the tort's historical development, in which defining an actionable invasion of privacy has generally been understood to require balancing privacy interests against the press's right to report, and the community's interest in receiving, news and information. (See Brandeis, supra, 4 Harv. L.Rev. at p. 214; Melvin v. Reid, supra, 112 Cal.App. at p. 290, 297 P. 91; Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp. (2d Cir.1940) 113 F.2d 806, 809; Barber v. Time, Inc. (1942) 348 Mo. 1199, 1206, 159 S.W.2d 291; Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., supra, 201 Cal.App.2d at p. 745, 20 Cal.Rptr. 405; GUI v. Curtis Publishing Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 277, 239 P.2d 630; Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 534, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34.) We therefore agree with defendants that under California common law the dissemination of truthful, newsworthy material is hot actionable as a publication of private facts. ( Kapellas v. Kofman, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 35-36, 81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912; Diaz, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 126,188 Cal.Rptr. 762; Rest.2d Torts, § 652D.) If the contents of a broadcast or publication are of legitimate public concern, the plaintiff cannot establish a necessary element of the tort action, the lack of news worthiness. To so state, however, is merely to begin the necessary legal inquiry, not to end it. It is in the determination of news worthiness  in deciding whether published or broadcast material is of legitimate public concern  that courts must struggle most directly to accommodate the conflicting interests of individual privacy and press freedom. Although we speak of the lack of news worthiness as an element of the private facts tort, news worthiness is at the same time a constitutional defense to, or privilege against, liability for publication of truthful information. ( Forsher v. Bugliosi, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 809, 163 Cal.Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716; Gilbert v. Medical Economics Company (10th Cir.1981) 665 F.2d 305, 307-308; Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's Brooks Bros. (D.C. 1985) 492 A.2d 580, 589.) Indeed, the danger of interference with constitutionally protected press freedom has been and remains an ever-present consideration for courts and commentators struggling to set the tort's parameters, and the requirements of tort law and the Constitution have generally been assumed to be congruent. (See Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. d, p. 388 [news worthiness standard developed in common law but now expresses constitutional limit as well]; Virgil v. Time, Inc. (9th Cir.1975) 527 F.2d 1122, 1128-1130 [accepting Restatement test of news worthiness as constitutional standard]; Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc. (5th Cir.1989) 870 F.2d 271, 273 [Stating of Texas law, which follows the Restatement, that [i]n the `news worthiness' line of argument... the state law and constitutional tests are the same.].) Little is to be gained, therefore, in attempting to keep rigorously separate the tort and constitutional issues as regards news worthiness, and we have not attempted to do so here. Tort inability, obviously, can extend no further than the First Amendment allows; conversely, we see no reason or authority for fashioning the news worthiness element of the private facts tort to preclude liability where the Constitution would allow it. Delineating the exact contours of the constitutional privilege of the press in publication of private facts is, however, particularly problematic, because this privilege has not received extensive attention from the United States Supreme Court. The high court has considered the issue in only one case involving the common law public disclosure tort, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 ( Cox Broadcasting), and its holding in that case was deliberately and explicitly narrow. In Cox Broadcasting, a criminal court clerk, during a recess in court proceedings relating to a rape-murder case, allowed a television reporter to see the indictment, which contained the name of the victim. The television station broadcast an account of the court proceedings, using the victim's name; the victim's father alleged the broadcast to be a tortuous publication of private facts. ( Id. at pp. 471-74, 95 S.Ct. at pp. 1034-1036.) The Georgia Supreme Court, relying on a Georgia statute prohibiting publication or broadcast of a rape victim's identity, held the broadcast of the victim's name was not privileged as newsworthy; the court viewed the statute as showing that the victim's identity was not a matter of legitimate public concern. The state court further held the statute did not itself infringe on the stations First Amendment rights. ( Id. at p. 475, 95 S.Ct. at p. 1036.) The federal high court reversed, but  recognizing the important interests on both sides of the news worthiness question  proceeded cautiously and on limited grounds. Rather than address the broader question of whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it another way, whether the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press, it is appropriate to focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy that this case presents, namely, whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records  more specifically, from judicial records which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection. We are convinced that the State may not do so. ( Cox Broadcasting, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 491, 95 S.Ct. at p. 1044.) For this holding the court relied on the responsibility of the press to report the operations of government ( id. at p. 492, 95 S.Ct. at p. 1044), including judicial proceedings regarding crimes, and the premise that [b]y placing the information in the public domain on official court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being served ( id. at p. 495, 95 S.Ct. at p. 1046). A more recent case cited by defendants, The Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989) 491 U.S. 524, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 ( Florida Star), reached a similar conclusion with regard to a Florida statute that, like the Georgia law in Cox Broadcasting, criminally punished the publication of a sexual assault victim's name. In Florida Star, however, the plaintiffs civil action was not plead as the common law tort for publication of private facts, but rather as a negligence action (with the criminal statute used as predicate for application of the negligence per se doctrine), a distinction the' high court relied upon in holding liability to be constitutionally barred. ( Id. at p. 539, 109 S.Ct, at 2612.) Here, again, the high court chose to move cautiously, relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case. ( Id. at p. 533, 109 S.Ct. at p. 2609.) The limited principle relied upon in Florida Star was that `[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.' ( Ibid. ) Like Cox Broadcasting, the Florida Star decision provides little general guidance as to what is, and is not, a matter Of public significance  what is newsworthy, in other words  or as to when, if ever, the protection of private facts against public disclosure should be considered a sufficiently important state interest to justify civil liability pursuant to the common law tort. As in Cox Broadcasting, moreover, the Florida Star newspaper had obtained the victim's name from a public records source, in this case a police report made available to the press. The high court's holding that publication was constitutionally protected again rested in large part on the fact the government had, by making the information available to the press, impliedly determined its dissemination was in the public interest, and could not then punish a newspaper for relating on the governments implied representations of the lawfulness of dissemination. ( Florida Star, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 536, 109 S.Ct. at p. 2610.) One federal court has observed that, despite the limited scope of their holdings, the implications of [ Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star ] for the branch of the right of privacy that limits the publication of private facts are profound.... The Court must believe that the First Amendment greatly circumscribes the right even of a private figure to obtain damages for the publication of newsworthy facts about him, even when they are facts of a kind that people want very much to conceal. ( Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. (7th Cir.1993) 8 F.3d 1222, 1232.) We agree the high court's decisions are instructive on the strength of First Amendment protection for truthful publication of private facts. More particularly, they establish that truthful reporting on current judicial proceedings, using material drawn from public records, is generally within the scope of constitutional protection. The decisions do not, however, enunciate a general test of news worthiness applicable to other factual circumstances or provide a broad theoretical basis for discovery of such a general constitutional standard. (See Woito & McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community Decide News worthiness? (1978) 64 Iowa L.Rev. 185,199-202.) News worthiness  constitutional or common law  is also difficult to define because it may be used as either a descriptive or a formative term. Is the term `newsworthy' a descriptive predicate, intended to refer to the fact there is widespread public interest? Or is it a value predicate, intended to indicate that the publication is a meritorious contribution and that the public's interest is praiseworthy? (Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of News worthiness (1963) 30 U. Chi. L.Rev. 722, 725.) A position at either extreme has unpalatable consequences. If news worthiness is completely descriptive  if all coverage that sells papers or boosts ratings is deemed newsworthy  it would seem to swallow the publication of private facts tort, for it would be difficult to suppose that publishers were in the habit of reporting occurrences of little interest. ( Id. at p. 734.) At the other extreme, if news worthiness is viewed as a purely formative concept, the courts could become to an unacceptable degree editors of the news and self appointed guardians of public taste. The difficulty of finding a workable standard in the middle ground between the extremes of formative and descriptive analysis, and the variety of factual circumstances in which the issue has been presented, have led to considerable variation in judicial descriptions of the news worthiness concept. As one commentator has noted, the news worthiness test bears an enormous social pressure, and it is not surprising to find that the common law is deeply confused and ambivalent about its application. (Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort (1989) 77 Cal.L.Rev. 957, 1007.) Without attempting an exhaustive survey, and with particular focus on California decisions, we review some of these attempts below. In the first California privacy case, Melvin v. Reid supra, 112 Cal.App. 285, 297 P. 91, the defendants, using the plaintiffs true maiden name, had produced and exhibited a motion picture based on events of the plaintiffs life, including her having been a prostitute many years earlier. ( Id. at pp. 286-287, 297 P. 91.) The appellate court held the use of the plaintiffs true name was unnecessary and indelicate, and a willful and wanton disregard of that charity which should actuate us in our social intercourse. ( Id. at p. 291, 297 P. 91.) In short, such use was not justified by any standard of morals or ethics known to us. ( Id. at p. 292, 297 P. 91.) This court took a similar, albeit less overtly moralistic, approach in GUI v. Curtis Publishing Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 ( Gill v. Curtis ), involving a Ladies Home Journal article entitled Love that used a photograph of the plaintiffs embracing to illustrate the wrong kind of love, founded upon 100 per cent sex attraction. ( Id. at p. 275, 239 P.2d 630.) As the Court of Appeal had done in Melvin v. Reid, supra, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, we attempted to distinguish a disclosure of private facts that was closely connected to the news worthiness of the publication from one that superfluously exposed the subject's private life to public view. Assuming the article's contents to be within the range of public interest in dissemination of news, information or education, still the public interest did not require the use of any particular person's likeness nor that of plaintiffs without their consent. ( Gill v. Curtis, supra, at p. 279, 239 P.2d 630.) Although we therefore did not need to decide on a general standard of news worthiness, we noted that [f]lactors deserving consideration may include the medium of publication, the extent of the use, the public interest served by the publication, and the seriousness of the interference with the person's privacy. ( Id. at pp. 278-279, 239 P.2d 630.) A year later, without explicitly overruling Gill v. Curtis, we reached a seemingly inconsistent conclusion in another case involving the same publication. ( Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., supra, 40 Cal.2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 ( Gill v. Hearst ).) We held no action for invasion of privacy would lie solely for publication of the photograph of the plaintiffs embracing. The photograph itself, we reasoned, enjoyed some measure of constitutional protection despite its slight or nonexistent informational value. Apparently the picture has no particular news value but is designed to serve the function of entertainment as a matter of legitimate public interest. [Citation.] However, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression apply with equal force to the publication whether it be a news report or an entertainment feature.... ( Id. at p. 229, 253 P.2d 441.) [5] The author of Gill v. Curtis dissented from this portion of Gill v. Hearst, arguing, it should be quite obvious that there is no news or educational value whatsoever in the photograph alone. It depicts two persons (plaintiffs) in an amorous pose.... While some remote news significance might be attached to persons in such a pose on the theory that the public likes and is entitled to see persons in such a pose, there is no reason why the publisher need invade the privacy of John and Jane Doe for his purpose. He can employ models for that purpose and the portion of the public interested will never know the difference but its maudlin curiosity will be appeased. ( Gill v. Hearst, supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 232, 253 P.2d 441 (cone. & dis. opn. of Carter, J.).) This court next addressed the question in Kapellas v. Kofinan, supra, 1 Cal.3d 20, 81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912 ( Kapellas), involving a newspaper editorial that allegedly violated the privacy rights of the children of a woman running for public office by revealing certain juvenile offenses and peccadillos for which the children had been arrested or detained. Drawing from academic comment and the two Gill decisions, we attempted a general analysis involving the balancing of three factors: In determining whether a particular incident is `newsworthy' and thus whether the privilege shields its truthful publication from liability, the courts consider a variety of factors, melding the social value of the facts published, the depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety. ( Kapellas, supra, at p. 36, 81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912.) Applying these factors, we articulated a general rule favoring dissemination of relevant information regarding candidates for public office, including at least some information about their families: Generally, courts will be most reluctant to impede the free flow of any truthful information that may be relevant to a candidate's qualifications for office. Although the conduct of a candidate's children in many cases may not appear particularly relevant to his qualifications for office, normally the public should be permitted to determine the importance or relevance of the reported facts for itself. If the publication does not proceed widely beyond the bounds of propriety and reason in disclosing facts about those closely related to an aspirant for public office, the compelling public interest in the unfettered dissemination of information will outweigh society's interest in preserving such individuals' rights to privacy. ( Id, at pp. 37-38, 81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912, fn. Omitted.) Following the articulated principle, we held the information disclosed, if true, was absolutely privileged. (Id. at p. 39, 81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912.) We employed the Kapellas factors in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.3d 529, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34 ( Briscoe). A magazine article on truck hijacking included a description of such a crime the plaintiff had committed 11 years earlier, using the plaintiffs true name. Conceding that reports of the facts of past crimes are newsworthy ( id. at p. 537, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34), we nonetheless concluded a jury could reasonably find the plaintiffs identity as a former hijacker to be non newsworthy. The identification of a rehabilitated person as a former criminal was, under the circumstances, of minimal social value ( id. at p. 541, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34), would tend to interfere with the state's interest in rehabilitating criminals returning them to society, and could be regarded as a serious intrusion on private matters ( id. at p. 542, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34). [6] In Briscoe, while employing Kapellas's analysis of competing interests, we also recognized the strong constitutional policy against fact dependent balancing of First Amendment rights against other interests. Because the categories with which we deal  private and public, newsworthy and non newsworthy  have no clear profile, there is a temptation to balance interests in ad hoc fashion in each case. Yet history teaches us that such a process leads too often to discounting society's stake in First Amendment nights. [Citation.] We therefore stave for as much predictability as possible within our system of case-by-case adjudication, lest we unwittingly chill First Amendment freedoms. ( Briscoe, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 542-543, fn. 18, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34.) We believed, however, danger of chilling future expression by our holding in Briscoe was slight because the facts of the case clearly negated protection, ( Ibid. ) Our holding of possible ability in that case, moreover, was expressly limited to narrow circumstances to be established at trial: that the plaintiff, having been punished for his past crime, was now a rehabilitated member of society; that identification of him as a former criminal was not only highly offensive but injurious to his efforts at leading an ordinary law-abiding life; that the publication was made with reckless disregard for its offensiveness; and that the defendant had no independent justification for printing plaintiffs identity. ( Id. at p. 543, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34.) In the most recent of this court's decisions on publication of private facts, we applied the same general analysis of news worthiness ad in Briscoe but distinguished that case on its facts. ( Forsher v. Bugliosi, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 809-813, 163 Cal.Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716 ( Forsher ).) We held the defendant's book, Helter-skelter, did not invade the plaintiff's privacy by mentioning his name in connection with the disappearance of an attorney who had represented a defendant in the highly publicized Tate-LaBianca killings. Briscoe, we observed, was an exception to the more general rule that `once a man has become a public figure, or news, he remains a matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his days.' Forsher, supra, at p. 811, 163 Cal.Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716.) Our prior decisions have not explicitly addressed the type of privacy invasion alleged in this case: the broadcast of embarrassing pictures and speech of a person who, while generally not a public figure, has become involuntarily involved in an event or activity of legitimate public concern. We nonetheless draw guidance from those decisions, that they articulate the competing interests to be balanced. First, the analysis of news worthiness does involve courts to some degree in a formative assessment of the social value of a publication. ( Kapellas, supra, 1 Cal.3d at. 36, 81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912.) All material that might attract readers or viewers is not, simply by virtue of its attractiveness, of legitimate public interest. Second, the evaluation of news worthiness depends on the degree of intrusion and the extent to which the plaintiff played an important role in public events ( ibid.), and thus on a comparison between the information revealed and the nature of the activity or event that brought the plaintiff to public attention. Some reasonable proportion is ... to be maintained between the events or activity that makes the individual a public figure and the private facts to which publicity is given. Revelations that may properly be made concerning a murderer or the President of the United States would not be privileged if they were to be made concerning one who is merely injured in an automobile accident. (Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. h, p. 391.) [7] Courts balancing these interests in cases similar to this have recognized that, when a person is involuntarily involved in a newsworthy incident, not all aspects of the person's life, and not everything the person says or does, is thereby rendered newsworthy. Most persons are connected with some activity, vocational or avocational, as to which the public can be said as a matters law to have a legitimate interest or curiosity. To hold as a matter of law that private facts as to such persons are also within the area of legitimate public interest could indirectly expose everyone's private life to public view. ( Virgil v. Time, Inc., supra, 527 F.2d at p. 1131; accord, Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., supra, 665 F.2d at p. 308 ( Gilbert). ) This principle is illustrated in the decisions holding that, while a particular event was newsworthy, identification of the plaintiff as the person involved, or use of the plaintiffs identifiable image, added nothing of significance to the story and was therefore an unnecessary invasion of privacy. (See Briscoe, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 541, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34 [identification of plaintiff as former criminal]; Gill v. Curtis, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 279, 239 P.2d 630 [use of plaintiffs' photograph to illustrate article on love]; Melvin v. Reid,, supra, 112 Cal.App. at pp. 291-292, 297 P. 91 [identification of plaintiff as former prostitute]; Barber v. Time, Inc., supra, 348 Mo. at pp. 1207-1208, 159 S.W.2d 291 [use of plaintiffs name and photograph in article about her unusual medical condition]; Vassiliades v. Garfinkel's Brooks Bros., supra, 492 A.2d at pp. 589-590 [use of plaintiffs photograph to illustrate presentations on cosmetic surgery].) For the same reason, a college student's candidacy for president of the student body did not render newsworthy a newspaper's revelation that the student was a (transsexual, where the court could find little if any connection between the information disclosed and [the student's] fitness for office. ( Diaz, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 134, 188 Cal.Rptr. 762.) Similarly, a mother's private words over the body of her slain son as it lay in a hospital room were held non newsworthy despite undisputed legitimate public interest in the subjects of gang violence and murder. ( Green v. Chicago Tribune Co. (1996) 286 Ill.App.3d 1, 221 Ill.Dec. 342, 675 N.E.2d 249, 255-256.) Consistent with the above, courts have generally protected the privacy of otherwise private individual involved in events of public interest by requiring that a logical nexus exist between the complaining individual and the matter of legitimate public interest. ( Campbell v. Seabury Press (5th Cir. 1980) 614 F.2d 395, 397.) The contents of the publication or broadcast are protected only if they have some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest. ( Gilbert, supra, 665 F.2d at p. 308.) Thus, recent decisions have generally tested news worthiness with regard to such individuals by assessing the logical relationship or nexus, or the lack thereof, between the events or activities that brought the person into the public eye and the particular facts disclosed. These decisions have used a number of similar or equivalent phrases to describe the necessary relationship. (See Cinel v. Connick (5th Cir. 15 F.3d 1338,1346 [substantially relation Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., supra, 870 F.2d at p. 274 [5th Cir.: logical nexus]; Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d at p. 397 [5th Cir.: logical nexus]; Gilbert, supra, 665 F.2d at p. 308 Cir.: substantial relevance]; Lee v. Calhoun (10th Cir.1991) 948 F.2d 1162, 1165-1166 [following Gilbert ]; Haynes v. Alfred A. Knob, Inc., supra, 8 F.3d at p. 1233 [facts germane to story]; Vassiliades v. Garfinkel's Brooks Bros., supra, 492 A.2d at p. 590 [logical nexus].) This approach accords our own prior decisions, in that it balances the public's right to know against the plaintiffs privacy interest by drawing a protective line at the point the material revealed ceases to have any substantial connection to the subject matter of the newsworthy report, (Cf. Kapellas, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 37, 81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912 [in context of political candidacy, truthful information is generally protected if it may be relevant to qualifications for office].) This approach also echoes the Restatement commentators' widely quoted and cited view that legitimate interest does not include a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake .... (Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. h, p. 391, italics added; see, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1984) 154 Cal. App.3d 1040, 1048-1049, 201 Cal.Rptr. 665; Virgil v. Time, Inc., supra, 527 F.2d at p. 1129; Gilbert, supra, 665 F.2d at pp. 307-308; see also Haynes v. Alfred A Knob, Inc., supra, 8 F.3d at p. 1232 [private not newsworthy when the community has no interest in them beyond the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy that surrounds a stranger].) An analysis measuring news-worthiness of facts about an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an event of public interest by their relevance to a newsworthy subject matter incorporates con supra, deference to reporters and editors, avoiding the likelihood of unconstitutional in[10th interference with the freedom of the press to report truthfully on matters of legitimate public interest. [8] In general, it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular story is best covered. The constitutional privilege to publish truthful material ceases to operate only when an editor abuses his broad discretion to publish matters that are of legitimate public interest. ( Gilbert, supra, 665 F.2d at p. 308.) By confining our interference to extreme cases, the courts avoid] unduly limiting ... the exercise of effective editorial judgment. ( Virgil v. Time, Inc., supra, 527 F.2d at p. 1129.) Nor is news worthiness governed by the tastes or limited interests of an individual judge or juror; a publication is newsworthy if some reasonable members of the community could entertain a legitimate interest in it. Our analysis thus does not purport to distinguish among the various gitimate purposes that may be served by truthful publications and broadcasts. As we said in Gill v. Hearst, supra, 40 Cal.2d at page 229, 253 P.2d 441, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression apply with equal force to the publication whether it be a news report or an entertainment feature.... Thus, news worthiness is not limited to news in the narrow sense of reports current events. It extends also to the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published. (Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. j, p. 393; accord, Gilbert, supra, 665 F.2d at p. 308; Virgil v. Time, Inc., supra, 527 F.2d at p. 1129; see also Carlisle v. Faucet Publications, Inc., supra, 201 Cal.App.2d at p. 746, 20 Cal.Rptr. 405 [matters of legitimate public interest include, for example, the reproduction of past events, travelogues and biographies]; Vassiliades v. Garfinkel's Brooks Bros., supra, 492 A.2d at p. 589 [includes `information concerning interesting phases of human activity].) Finally, an analysis focusing on relevance allows courts and juries to decide most cases involving persons involuntarily involved in events of public interest without balanc[ing] interests in ad hoc fashion in each case ( Briscoe, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 542, fn. 18, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34). The articulation of standards that do not require ad hoc resolution of the competing interest in each ... case ( Gertz v. Welch (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 343, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d 789) is favored in areas affecting First Amendment rights, because the relative predictability of results reached under such standards minimizes the inadvertent chilling of protected speech, and because standards that can be applied objectively provide a stronger shield against the unconstitutional punishment of unpopular speech. ( Ibid.; Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy ' (1968) 56 Call rev. 935, 938-945 (hereafter Nimmer); see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) ___ U.S. ___, ___, ___ ___, 117; S.Ct. 2329, 2341, 2344-2345, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 [internet speech prohibitions employing undefined term indecent and appealing to community standards of what is patently offensive are, absent further narrowing of prohibitions, unconstitutionally vague and uncertain].) On the other hand, no mode of analyzing news worthiness can be applied mechanically or without consideration of its proper boundaries. To observe that the news worthiness of private facts about a person involuntarily thrust into the public eye depends, in the ordinary case, on the existence of a logical nexus between the newsworthy event or activity and the facts revealed is not to deny that the balance of free press and privacy interests may require a different conclusion when the intrusiveness of the revelation is greatly disproportionate to its relevance. Intensely personal or intimate revelations might not, in a given case, be considered newsworthy, especially where they bear only slight relevance to a topic of legitimate public concern. (See Kapellas, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 37-38, 81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912 [Public interest in free flow of information will outweigh interest in individual privacy [i]f the publication does not proceed widely beyond the bounds of propriety and reason in disclosing facts about those closely related to an aspirant for public office....]; Haynes v. Alfred A. Knob, Inc., supra, 8 F.3d at pp. 1234-1235 [although personal facts revealed in book at issue were newsworthy because germane to the book's subject matter, that protection may not extend to publication of intimate physical details the publicizing of which would be not merely embarrassing and painful but deeply shocking to the average person].) [9] A few words are in order at this point regarding the right of privacy secured by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal, citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pages 37-38, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633 ( Hill), equated the judicial balancing undertaken in delineation of the common law right of privacy to the balancing of interests this court has prescribed for evaluating claims raised under our state's constitutional right of privacy. Defendants attack the Court of Appeal's adoption of Hill 's balancing test in the common law tort context, arguing that under the federal Constitution news worthiness is a complete bar to liability, rather than merely an interest to be balanced against private or state-protected interests. We agree with defendants that the publication of truthful, lawfully obtained material of legitimate public concern is constitutionally privileged and does not create liability under the private facts tort. As discussed above, however, a certain amount of interest balancing does occur in deciding whether material is of legitimate public concern, or in formulating rules for that decision. To that extent, the Court of Appeal's analogy to Hill was not in error. In Hill, we held, inter alias, that article I, section 1 of the California Constitution protects Californians against invasions of privacy by non governmental as well as governmental parties. ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 15-20, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.) Decisions concerning the tort actions for invasion of privacy have, in addition, sometimes linked the plaintiffs' protected interest to that constitutional provision. (See, e.g., Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1490-1491, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 [intrusion plaintiffs interest protected by constitutional privacy provision]; Melvin v. Reid, supra, 112 Cal.App. at p. 291, 297 P. 91 [in private facts case predating addition of privacy to article I, section 1, plaintiff deemed protected by that section's guarantee of right to pursue and obtain happiness].) The Hill court itself sought to draw upon the one hundred years of legal experience surrounding the term `privacy' in formulating the correct analysis of claims brought under the state Constitution. ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 27, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.) Thus, these two sources of protection for privacy  the common law and the state Constitution  are not unrelated. Nothing in Hill or our more recent constitutional privacy cases ( American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 210, 940 P.2d 797; Loder v. City of Glendale (1997) 14 Cal.4th 846, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 927 P.2d 1200), however, suggests that the conceptual framework developed for resolving privacy claims under the California Constitution was intended to supplant the common law tort analysis or Preclude its independent development. Nor did we have occasion in those cases to address the analytical means by which a state-created privacy right, whether of constitutional or common law origin, may be accommodated to conflicting and superior demands of federal constitutional interests, as for example those protected by the First Amendment. Turning now to the case at bar, we consider whether the possibly private facts complained of here  broadly speaking, Ruth's appearance and words during the rescue and evacuation  were of legitimate public interest. If so, summary judgment was properly entered. [B]ecause unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights, speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable. [Citation.] Therefore, summary judgment is a favored remedy [in such cases].... ( Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 672, 685,150 Cal.Rptr. 258, 586 P.2d 572; see also Haynes v. Alfred A. Knob Inc., supra, 8 F.3d at p. 1234 [Affirming summary judgment for defendants in private facts case: To any suggestion that the outer bounds of ability should be left to a jury to decide we reply that in cases involving the rights protected by the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment the courts insist on judicial control of the jury.].) Nonetheless, the basic question raised on a defense motion for summary judgment, and on review of such judgment, is the same in a privacy action against media defendants as in other cases: does the motion record demonstrate the existence of tribal issues of fact, or was the defense entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, subd. (c); Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1046, 201 Cal.Rptr. 665.) We agree at the outset with defendants that the subject matter of the broadcast as a whole was of legitimate public concern. Automobile accidents are by their nature of interest to that great portion of the public that travels frequently by automobile. The rescue and medical treatment of accident victims is also of legitimate concern to much of the public, involving as it does a critical service that any member of the public may someday need. The story of Ruth's difficult extrication from the crushed car, the medical attention given her at the scene, and her evacuation by helicopter was of particular interest because it highlighted some of the challenges facing emergency workers dealing with serious accidents. The more difficult question is whether Ruth's appearance and words as she was extricated from the overturned car, placed in the helicopter and transported to the hospital were of legitimate public concern. Pursuant to the analysis outlined earlier, we conclude the disputed material was newsworthy as a matter of law. One of the dramatic and interesting aspects of the story as a whole is its focus on flight nurse Carnahan, who appears to be in charge of communications with other emergency workers, the hospital base and Ruth, and who leads the medical assistance to Ruth at the scene. Her work is portrayed as demanding and important and as involving a measure of personal risk (e.g., in crawling under the car to aid Ruth despite warnings that gasoline may be dripping from the car). [10] The broadcast segment makes apparent that this type of emergency care requires not only medical knowledge, concentration and courage, but an ability to talk and listen to severely traumatized patients. One of the challenges Carnahan faces in assisting Ruth is the confusion, pain and fear that Ruth understandably feels in the aftermath of the accident. For that reason the broadcast video depicting Ruth's injured physical state (which was not luridly shown) and audio showing her disorientation and despair were substantially relevant to the segment's newsworthy subject matter. Plaintiffs argue that showing Ruth's intimate private, medical facts and her suffering was not necessary to enable the public to understand the significance of the accident or the rescue as a public event. The standard, however, is not necessity. That the broadcast could have been edited to exclude some of Ruth's words and images and still excite a minimum degree of viewer interest is not deteriorative. Nor is the possibility that the members of this or another court, or a jury, might find a differently edited broadcast more to their taste or even more interesting. The courts do not, and constitutionally could not, sit as superior editors of the press. ( Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., supra, 870 F.2d at p. 275 [Exuberant judicial blue-penciling after-the-fact would blunt the quills of even the most honorable journalists.]; Gilbert, supra, 665 F.2d at p. 308 [Liability for disclosure of private facts is limited to the extreme case, thereby providing the breathing space needed by the press to properly exercise effective editorial judgment.].) The challenged material was thus substantially relevant to the newsworthy subject matter of the broadcast and did not constitute a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake. (Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. h, p. 391, italics added.) Nor can we say the broadcast material was so lurid and sensational in emotional tone, or so intensely personal in content, as to make its intrusiveness disproportionate to its relevance. Under these circumstances, the material was, as a matter of law, of legitimate public concern. Summary judgment was therefore properly entered against Ruth on her cause of action for publication of private facts. [11] As to Wayne, he is glimpsed only fleetingly in the broadcast video and is never heard. The broadcast includes no images or information regarding him that could be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Summary judgment was therefore also proper on Wayne's cause of action for publication of private facts. One might argue that, while the contents of the broadcast were of legitimate interest in that they reflected on the nature and quality of emergency rescue services, the images and sounds that potentially allowed identification of Ruth as the accident victim were irrelevant and of no legitimate public interest in a broadcast that aired some months after the accident and had little or no value as hot news. (See Briscoe, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 537, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34 [while reports of the facts of long past crimes are newsworthy, identification of the actor in such crimes usually serves little independent public purpose].) We do not take that view. It is difficult to see how the subject broadcast could have been edited to avoid completely any possible identification without severely undercutting its legitimate descriptive and narrative impact. As broadcast, the segment included neither Ruth's full name nor direct display of her face. She was nonetheless arguably identifiable by her first name (used in recorded dialogue), her voice, her general appearance and the recounted circumstances of the accident (which, as noted, had previously been published, with Ruth's full name and city of residence, in a newspaper). [12] In a video documentary of this type, however, the use of that degree of truthful detail would seem not only relevant, but essential to the narrative.