Opinion ID: 1058718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutional and Privacy Claims

Text: Although we have determined that the tapes are public records in the control of the Supreme Court Clerk, we will briefly address Cawood's constitutional and privacy interest claims. Cawood first claims that he is entitled to permanent possession of the tapes because he has a privacy interest in the tapes created by the wiretapping and surveillance statutes. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-601 to -604 (1997 & Supp. 2002), 40-6-301 to -311 (2003). However, this claim is without merit because any limitations imposed on the use of intercepted communications do not apply to evidence admitted at trial and which ultimately becomes part of the appellate record. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-6-306, -307 (2003). Second, Cawood asserts that because the tapes depict him engaged in sexual conduct in a private place and were recorded by a state agent without his permission, leaving those tapes in the possession of the Clerk would violate his fundamental right to privacy, especially because his convictions were vacated. For support, he cites to the test used in J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1088-91 (6th Cir.1981), to determine when state-authorized or mandated public disclosure of private information triggers constitutional protection: (1) whether a fundamental right is at issue, and if so, (2) whether the government's interest in the disclosure of the information outweighs the individual's privacy interest. See Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 684-87 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying the test in DeSanti to the government's release of sensitive details of a rape). The State responds that neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has recognized that an individual's informational right to privacy supersedes the State's right to maintain information on matters of public interest. See generally Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 96 S.Ct. 1155 (1976). We agree with the State. While we acknowledge that the notion of individual liberty is . . . deeply embedded in the Tennessee Constitution and that there is a right of individual privacy guaranteed under and protected by the liberty clauses of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights, Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tenn.1999) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 599, 600 (Tenn.1992)), the legislature has recognized through the Public Records Act that the State has a compelling need to maintain public records, including those relating to criminal prosecutions and appeals. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 10-7-503 (Supp.2003); see also Griffin, 821 S.W.2d at 923-24. Furthermore, this Court has held that the confidentiality of records is a statutory matter that is best left to the legislature. See Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d at 926. The Public Records Act reflects the legislature's effort to create legislation that advances the best interests of the public. Cf. id. at 925 (finding that the legislation allowing the disclosure of sealed adoption records to adopted persons over age twenty-one does not impair plaintiffs' constitutional rights to privacy and reflects the legislature's view that disclosure of records is in the best interest of the public). The trend is towards a policy of openness with respect to state records, and this trend is reflected in the legislative directive to provide the fullest possible public access to public records. Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(d) (1999). Were we to grant Cawood's motion, the public would no longer have the fullest possible access to the records. Previously, this Court declined an invitation to create a public policy exception [11] to the Public Records Act, declaring that [i]t is the prerogative of the legislature to declare the policy of the State touching the general welfare. And where the legislature speaks upon a particular subject, its utterance is the public policy. . . upon that subject. Tennessean, 979 S.W.2d at 301; see also Memphis Publ'g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W.2d at 685-86 (stating that the legislature's mandate is clear that it alone has the power to make public policy exceptions to section 10-7-503, and any exception must be supported by specific authority). Therefore, this Court declines to make a public policy exception for the records at issue in this case because it is within the prerogative of the legislature to do so.