Opinion ID: 1753250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was defendant's contributory negligence instruction proper?

Text: The following instructions were given by the court: JURY INSTRUCTION NO. P-2 The Court instructs the Jury that the driver of a vehicle waiting at an intersection, intending to turn to the left, shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection, or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. If you believe from the evidence, if any, that at the time Charles Cowie turned his vehicle into the lane occupied by Patricia C. Champagne Akin at a time the Plaintiff was so close so as to constitute an immediate hazard, then Charles Cowie was negligent. You are further instructed that if you believe such negligence, if any, proximately caused or proximately contributed to any injuries or damages sustained by Patricia C. Champagne Akin, then it shall be your sworn duty to return a verdict for Patricia C. Champagne Akin. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. P-3 The Court instructs the jury that the driver of a motor vehicle shall not turn his vehicle in the path of an oncoming vehicle unless it is safe to do so, and further, that the turn could be completed without endangering the driver of the oncoming vehicle. If you believe from the evidence that Charles Cowie turned his vehicle into the path of the vehicle driven by Patricia C. Champagne Akin at a time when it was not safe to do so, then Charles Cowie was negligent. You are further instructed that if you believe such negligence, if any, proximately caused or proximately contributed to any injuries or damages sustained by Patricia C. Champagne Akin, then it shall be your sworn duty to return a verdict for Patricia C. Champagne Akin. INSTRUCTION NO. D-7 The Court instructs the jury that if you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the Defendant, Charles Cowie, immediately before the collision in question, gave a signal of his intention to turn left across the northbound traffic of Klondyke Road and in the exercise of reasonable care, began traveling left across the northbound lane of Klondyke Road into a private parking area, when the Plaintiff, Patricia Champagne Akin, approaching from the south, was not so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, then the Defendant Cowie held the right of way over the Plaintiff Akin, and in that event, if you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff Akin negligently failed to yield the right of way to the Defendant Cowie and that such negligence, if any, was the sole proximate cause of the collision in question, it would be your sworn duty to return a verdict for the Defendant, Charles Cowie. INSTRUCTION NO. D-8 The Court instructs the jury that before you can return a verdict for the Plaintiff, she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to her injury, if any, and even then, if you further believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff was herself guilty of negligence, if any, in the operation of her vehicle which proximately contributed to any injury, the Court instructs you that you must, in this event, reduce the damages from any injury to the Plaintiff in proportion to the negligence contributed by the Plaintiff which resulted in her injury, if any. Defendant's Instruction D-8 did not define the acts which would constitute contributory negligence; however, even though failure to do so is error, it is harmless error where another instruction correctly informs the jury what facts constitute negligence. In Trainer v. Gibson, 360 So.2d 1226 at 1228 (Miss. 1978), we held: We have stated on several occasions that an instruction charging negligence or contributory negligence must define those acts which would constitute such. Jones v. Craft, 218 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1969); Rayborn v. Freeman, 209 So.2d 193 (Miss. 1968); Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So.2d 169 (1963). We have also held that even though failure to do so is error, it is harmless error where another instruction correctly informs the jury what facts constitute negligence. Gore v. Patrick, supra . Thus, if another instruction correctly defines negligence, the error would not ordinarily be reversible. Defendant's Instruction D-7 correctly informed the jury what acts of the Plaintiff could constitute negligence, and under the familiar rule that all instructions must be considered together, [1] we hold it was not reversible error to give Instruction D-8. In Jones v. Craft, 218 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1969) a contributory negligence instruction, similar to D-8, in this case was condemned. However, the court pointed out that no other instruction cured the error. In Jones, a peremptory instruction was given for the Plaintiff and the record does not contain any instruction on negligence. In Morrell Packing Co. v. Branning, 155 Miss. 376, 124 So. 356 (1929) appellant argued that an instruction was erroneous because, in the testimony offered by the respective parties, the Appellee claimed that she was not negligent at all, and the collision was caused solely by the negligence of the Appellant, Adams, while Adams claimed he was not negligent, but the collision was caused solely by the negligence of Appellee; consequently, there was no room for a finding by the jury that it was caused by the negligence of both of them. In disposing of this argument the Court held: The fact that the driver of each of the automobiles involved in the collision testified that it was caused solely by the negligence of the other does not render an instruction based on our Comparative Negligence Statute (Hemingway's Code 1927, § 516) inapplicable or erroneous. The jury was not required to accept, in its entirety, the theory of either party, and it was its duty to consider all the testimony of the witnesses in the light of the physical facts and the circumstances shown, and to determine therefrom the negligence, if any, of the respective parties. (155 Miss. at 382, 124 So. at 357) See also, Ferguson v. Denton, 239 Miss. 591, 124 So.2d 279, 280 (1960). In this case, as in Morrell Packing Co., the jury was not required to accept, in its entirety, the theory of either party, and it was its duty to consider all the testimony and to determine therefrom the negligence, if any, of the respective parties. We hold that the Instruction D-8 was not proper, but giving the instruction was harmless error because D-7 properly defined Defendant's theory of the negligence of the Plaintiff; to-wit, failure to yield the right-of-way.