Opinion ID: 836195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: harmonization with the wdca

Text: I seek an interpretation of  315(1) that is in accord with the principles underlying the WDCA as a whole. The act is remedial in nature. [77] Thus, where ambiguity exists and judicial construction of the act is necessary, we construe the act's terms liberally to grant rather than deny benefits to injured workers. [78] This canon of statutory construction is deeply embedded in both American and Michigan jurisprudence. [79] The WCAC has explicitly recognized the importance of holding employers and their insurance carriers responsible for a proration of attorney fees pursuant to  315(1). In Harvlie v. Jack Post Corp., the WCAC stated, the purpose of [the] attorney fee provisions ... is not merely to assure that a claimant's attorney is paid, but also to deter employers from breaching their statutory duty to provide medical treatment to injured workers .... [80] I find this reasoning persuasive and applicable to this case. If employers and their insurance carriers are not held accountable for a prorated share of attorney fees, they will have an incentive to deny medical benefits. [81] They will be tempted to deny an injured employee's request for coverage in the hope that, in subsequent litigation, they will not be found liable. And even if they were found liable, they would be responsible only for actual medical expenses but not for attorney fees, despite their wrongful denial of valid claims. Likewise, if injured workers were forced to pay a prorated portion of their own attorney fees, their ultimate recovery could be reduced below their actual costs of securing medical treatment. Such a result would violate the remedial goal of the WDCA.