Opinion ID: 2590108
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective Juror H.

Text: Defendant contends the trial court improperly excused Prospective Juror H. for cause. Defendant maintains that the record shows H. was prepared to follow the law and the trial court's instructions, and that the trial court's findings to the contrary are not supported by substantial evidence. In assessing defendant's claim, we set forth in full the relevant portion of the voir dire examination of this potential juror: The court: `Mr. [H.], ... [a]re you of any position right now where you would automatically vote life without possibility of parole and no matter what evidence showed?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `No.' The court: `Or would you vote death automatically no matter what the evidence showed?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `No.' The court: `Would you characterize yourself as a person who would listen to the evidence and make a decision thereafter?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Yes.' The court: `Would you be reluctant at all to get to the guilt [ sic; read penalty] phase by either finding a defendant not guilty of first degree murder or finding the special circumstances not true so as to avoid having to face the issue of the death penalty?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `No.' The court: `Would you decide the case based upon the evidence without fear of having to reach the next stages in deciding this case?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `No.' The court: `[I] think I phrased the question badly. [I refer to juror written questionnaire] number 46. It says, If a defendant is convicted of first degree murder and the special circumstances [are found] to be true, the law provides that the only possible verdicts are death or life without possibility of parole. Overall, which do you think [is] worse for a defendant? [¶] You have indicated life without possibility of parole. And under explanation of your answer, you said[,] Perhaps the special circumstances are due to past psychological experiences and I would consider prison. [¶] Assuming there were past psychological experiences, bad childhood or abuse or something else, I don't know whether any of that is going to come out, but assuming that thing occurred, would you be automatically in favor of life without possibility of parole as opposed to the death penalty because of those factors?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Well, whatever the law states.' The court: `The law is not going to help you a whole lot in weighing the evidence and deciding the penalty. That is, the law is going to give you the two options. And the law is going to tell you that you must consider all the evidence that's in. And then you must look at the aggravating and mitigating factors.' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Un-huh.' The court: `And you can only impose death if the aggravating factors are so substantial in comparison to the mitigating factors that death is warranted. [¶] Now that's pretty much it. You are going to have to decide for yourself what those factors are and decide wh[ich] penalty is appropriate. So we are not going to tell you how to weigh the psychological factors. We are just not going to. You are going to have to weigh it yourself in your decisions with the other jurors. You feel comfortable doing that?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Yes.' The court: `Do you think that if there were past psychological factors that they would weigh heavily enough that you probably wouldn't impose the death penalty? [¶] [Long period of silence.] Is your answer you just don't know or what?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Yes, I think they might.' The court: `You think they might auger toward life without possibility of parole?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Yes.' The court: `Are you absolutely committed to that position?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Yes.' The court: `Are you saying that if there were psychological factors, without naming what they might be, you would automatically vote for life without possibility of parole?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Without naming them, I don't think so.' The court: `All right. [¶] I am not trying to force anybody into an answer, believe me. I just want to know how you think. As I have told you earlier, if you are irrevocably committed to life without possibility of parole, you can't sit [on the jury in this case]. If the opposite is true, you can't sit. There are a number of reasons for that. I am just trying to find out whether you are going to be in a position to be able to choose or that you feel so strongly about something that you are really not going to consider anything else. That's the intent of my question. That's for all of you, too. [¶] Any questions, [Ms.] Gray?' [Defense counsel] Ms. Gray: `Yes. [¶] Good morning, Mr. [H.]. [¶] On [juror written questionnaire] number 46, and I know his honor has already asked you about this, but you had basically said that you felt that life without possibility of parole is worse than death. [¶] Do you understand now that after hearing his honor's question's that it might not necessarily be so[?] In other words, when you hear bad things about say, a person accused of a crime, those are aggravating factors. And when you hear good things, those are the mitigating factors. And it's only when the aggravating factors, those are the bad things, so substantially outweigh those mitigating factors, that you give death. If it doesn't so substantially, you give life. [¶] So do you see that death is like the worst of the worst?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Yeah.' Ms. Gray: `When you look at it, in terms of whether or not the aggravating factors or bad things about the person accused of a crime[, that] is what you look at it to determine life or death?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Yeah.' Ms. Gray: All right. And do you also not understand, and I guess all of you understand that you are going to be given certain things that you can consider in determining or making that choice as to whether to give life or death?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Yeah.' Ms. Gray: `And one of those things that you can consider is maybe a psychological background. Would you consider that?' Prospective Juror [H.]: `Yeah.' Ms. Gray: `What about whether or not a person has or does not have any prior felony convictions? Would you consider that?' The court: `The court's objection is sustained. He doesn't know what to consider at this point, counsel. I have told him to consider all the evidence. If you ask him whether he should consider prior felony convictions, how does he know whether he can or cannot consider that?' Ms. Gray: `I would preface that question, if the law states that you can.' The court: `No. Court's objection is sustained.' Ms. Gray: `I have nothing further.' The court: `[Ms.] Frohreich.' [Prosecutor] Ms. Frohreich: No questions. Thank you, Mr. [H.].' [¶] ... [¶] [The following colloquy was conducted outside the presence of the prospective jurors.] The court: `First challenge for cause, who wants to go first?' Ms. Frohreich: `I will go first. [¶] Mr. [H.]. Psychiatric problems that I feel makes him, subject to a motion for cause. He admitted to the court that he felt that there were psychological factors in the background that would [lead him to] feel life without possibility of parole was the appropriate sentence. And he indicated when you pressed him, your honor, that he still felt that way, even though you gave him opportunities to back away from that position. [¶] My impression of the record is that he did not back away from that position, and he would not want to impose death if there were ' The court: `I remember what he said.' Ms. Gray: `The circumstances in all of his answers, though, he consistently said that he would consider the factors in all of the evidence as instructed. And he kept emphasizing whatever the law says and whatever I am told. I don't know the law. [¶] And I think once he gets the instructions, he would be able to follow [the law] because he kept emphasizing he would.' The court: `Okay.... [¶] ... [¶] [Discussion involving another prospective juror.] Mr. [H.][,] I will excuse for cause. I think that his answers were such that I think he would, given background conditions, vote [for life in prison without possibility of parole]. I think he's although less articulate [than a different prospective juror], in the same sort of a ballpark. So Mr. [H.] is out....' As noted earlier, the applicable law is clear: a prospective juror properly may be excluded for cause based upon his or her views concerning the death penalty only if the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, 105 S.Ct. 844; Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581; see also People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 719-720, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 443, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 456, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) We conclude that the record in this case does not support excusal for cause under the governing standard. The People initially contend that the trial court's excusal of Prospective Juror H. is supported by the jury questionnaire completed by H. prior to the oral voir dire examination and, in particular, by H.'s response to one question set forth in the questionnaire (question No. 46), in which H. expressed the view that imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole represents a worse punishment than death. As defendant notes, the jury questionnaire completed by Prospective Juror H. was lost after the trial and is not a part of the record on appeal, and thus we cannot review the particular questionnaire answer to which the trial court referred in the context of H.'s questionnaire responses as a whole, in order to determine whether other responses may shed additional light on the meaning or significance of the particular response to which the trial court referred. In any event, however, it is evident from the transcript of the voir dire quoted above that after the trial court explained to H. that California law considers death the more serious punishment and that the death penalty can be imposed under California law only if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, H. did not provide any indication that his views regarding the death penalty would prevent or significantly impair him from following the controlling California law. Instead the prospective juror stated that he would do whatever the law states. The record further indicates that this answer to the questionnaire  that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was considered to be a worse punishment for a defendant than death  was not an uncommon response from the jury venire as a whole, and, indeed, from a substantial number of jurors who actually sat on the case. In view of H.'s clarification of his views during voir dire, we conclude that his earlier juror questionnaire response, given without the benefit of the trial court's explanation of the governing legal principles, does not provide an adequate basis to support H.'s excusal for cause. Further, we conclude that H.'s responses to the questions posed by the court and counsel on voir dire do not support a determination that his views regarding the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror so as to justify his excusal for cause under the governing precedent of United States Supreme Court decisions. (See Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) Despite the trial court's imprecise questioning, H. made it quite clear that he would not vote automatically  in other words, no matter what the evidence showed  either for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or for death, and also that he would not be reluctant to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder or to find the special circumstances true so as to avoid having to face the issue of the death penalty. When the court asked whether H. would vote automatically in favor of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if there was evidence that the defendant had past psychological experiences, bad childhood or abuse, H. responded, Well, whatever the law states. When the court then explained that the law provides you can only impose death if the aggravating factors are so substantial in comparison to the mitigating factors that death is warranted, but that [y]ou are going to have to decide for yourself what those factors are and decide [which] penalty is appropriate and asked whether H. felt comfortable doing that, H. responded that he did. When the court further asked whether if there were past psychological factors ... they would weigh heavily enough that you probably wouldn't impose the death penalty, defendant, after a pause, stated I think they might, but when the court followed up by asking, Are you saying that if there were psychological factors, without naming what they might be, you would automatically vote for life without possibility of parole? H. responded, Without naming them, I don't think so. Nothing in the foregoing responses supported a finding that H.'s views were such that they would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror. The circumstance that the existence of psychological factors might influence H.'s determination whether or not the death penalty would be appropriate in a particular case certainly does not suggest that H. would not properly be exercising the role that California law assigns to jurors in a death penalty case. (See People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 163, fn. 13, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960, overruled on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673 [recognizing that a challenge for cause will not lie in such circumstances].) In granting the prosecution's motion to excuse Prospective Juror H. for cause, the trial court stated: I think [H.'s] answers were such that I think he would, given background conditions, vote [for life in prison without possibility of parole]. I think he's although less articulate [than another prospective juror], in the same ballpark. So Mr. [H.] is out.... The trial court's statement does not reveal what the court meant by background conditions, but in any event the court did not explain what there was in H.'s responses that indicated that he would not be willing or able to follow the law in determining whether life in prison without the possibility of parole, or death, was the appropriate punishment in light of all the evidence presented. If the trial court remained uncertain as to whether H.'s views concerning the death penalty would impair his ability to follow the law or to otherwise perform his duties as a juror, the court was free, of course, to follow up with additional questions. The prosecutor similarly could have pursued the matter with further questions. Based upon the responses of Prospective Juror H. set forth in the record, however, we conclude that there is not substantial evidence to support a determination that H. harbored views that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties so as to support his excusal for cause. Accordingly, under the applicable standard established by the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the trial court's excusal of Prospective Juror H. for cause was error. Furthermore, the governing high court decisions also establish that although such an error does not require reversal of the judgment of guilt or the special circumstance findings, the error does compel the automatic reversal of defendant's death sentence, and in that respect the error is not subject to a harmless-error rule, regardless whether the prosecutor may have had remaining peremptory challenges and could have excused Prospective Juror H. (See Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. 648, 666-668, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (opn. of the court); id. at pp. 669-672, 107 S.Ct. 2045 (conc. opn. by Powell, J.); Davis v. Georgia, supra, 429 U.S. 122, 123, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 339; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 962, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) Accordingly, we are compelled by these decisions of the high court to reverse the judgment in the case before us insofar as it relates to the penalty imposed. Although such precedent clearly requires that we set aside the penalty, we note our dismay regarding the adequacy of the trial court's efforts to fulfill its responsibilities in selecting a jury in this case. Unlike other duties imposed by law upon a trial court that may call for the rendition of quick and difficult decisions under unexpected circumstances in the midst of trial, the conduct of voir dire in a death penalty case is an activity that is particularly susceptible to careful planning and successful completion. In California, numerous resources exist that assist trial courts in conducting voir dire in death penalty trials, and in preventing the type of readily avoidable error that was committed in this case. [9] In view of the extremely serious consequence  an automatic reversal of any ensuing death penalty judgment  that results from a trial court's error in improperly excluding a prospective juror for cause during the death-qualification stage of jury selection, we expect a trial court to make a special effort to be apprised of and to follow the well-established principles and protocols pertaining to the death-qualification of a capital jury. As the present case demonstrates, an inadequate or incomplete examination of potential jurors can have disastrous consequences as to the validity of a judgment. The error that occurred in this case  introducing a fatal flaw that tainted the outcome of the penalty phase even before the jury was sworn  underscores the need for trial courts to proceed with special care and clarity in conducting voir dire in death penalty trials. The circumstance that the error in this case was committed by a trial judge with substantial experience in criminal law renders the voir dire examination at issue all the more inexplicable and disappointing. The colloquy set forth above shows that, in response to a series of awkward questions posited by the trial court, Prospective Juror H. indicated he was prepared to follow the law and had no predisposition one way or the other as to imposition of the death penalty. Prospective Juror H. generally was clear in his declarations that he would attempt to fulfill his responsibilities as a juror in accordance with the court's instructions and his oath. To the extent H.'s responses were less than definitive, such vagueness reasonably must be viewed as a product of the trial court's own unclear inquiries. [10] Nor do we believe that additional follow-up questions or observations by the court would have been unduly burdensome: in a capital case that required more than three weeks, the trial court's expenditure of another minute or two in making thoughtful inquiries, followed by a somewhat more thorough explanation of its reasons for excusing or not excusing Prospective Juror H., would have made the difference between rendering a supportable ruling and a reversible one. But given the absence of substantial support in the record for the trial court's ruling, it cannot stand. Although we accord appropriate deference to determinations made by a trial court in the course of jury selection, the trial court in the present case has provided us with virtually nothing of substance to which we might properly defer. [11] In view of the per se standard of reversal set forth in the United States Supreme Court decisions cited above, the validity of the penalty judgment ultimately rendered against defendant was doomed even before the jury was empaneled. The penalty phase of the trial thus was rendered a complete waste; for naught went the parties' preparation and presentation of their respective penalty phase cases, the court's use of its own resources, and the jurors' performance of their civic duty in deciding the punishment to be imposed. When a trial court commits such readily avoidable error under the circumstances before us, the public perception of justice suffers and the public fisc is squandered. Now, several years after the original trial commenced, the prosecution and the defense will be asked to prepare and present their respective cases, not only strictly concerning the appropriate penalty but also largely concerning the facts underlying the determination as to guilt in order to sufficiently inform the new jury, thereby consuming scant governmental resources and causing witnesses to relive the details of this horrible crime. That such inefficiencies and renewed anguish were so readily avoidable, and yet were set in motion here by an experienced jurist, thereby compelling this court to reverse a penalty phase judgment in a case so exceptionally aggravated, underscores the need for our trial courts to redouble their efforts to proceed with great care, clarity, and patience in the examination of potential jurors, especially in capital cases.