Opinion ID: 772539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: De Minimis Exemptions Under Clean Air Act

Text: 12 The first question is whether, under the Clean Air Act, EPA has the power to exempt de minimis sources of pollution from controls. 13 The Act requires that a plan to reduce air pollution in a moderate nonattainment area (such as the plan required in this case) must include either reasonably available control measures (RACM) to bring the PM-10 pollution levels within national standards by a specified deadline, or a demonstration that attainment by such date is impracticable. 42 U.S.C. S 7513a(a)(1)(B)-(C). The Act makes no explicit provision for a de minimis exception. 14 EPA issued a General Preamble for the Implementation of Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 in April 1992. The Preamble, in describing how a moderate area planshould identify RACM for PM-10 pollution, states: 15 If it can be shown that one or more measures are unreasonable because emissions from the sources affected are insignificant (i.e., de minimis), those measures may be excluded from further consider ation as they would not represent RACM for that area. 16 57 Fed. Reg. at 13,498, 13,540. An accompanying footnote explains: 17 Where the sources affected by a particular measure contribute only negligibly to ambient concentrations that exceed the NAAQS, EPA's policy is that it would be unreasonable and therefore would not con stitute RACM to require controls on the source. In this regard, it is worth noting that the inherent authority of administrative agencies to exempt de minimis situations has been recognized in contexts such as this where an agency is invoking a de minimis exemption as a tool to be used in imple menting the legislative design. 18 Id. at 13,541 (quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). Although the Preamble assumes that de minimis levels of PM-10 can be exempted from controls in moderate nonattainment areas, it does not establish thresholds for de minimis sources. 19 In Alabama Power, the District of Columbia Circuit held that EPA could exempt de minimis sources of air pollution from the requirements of the Clean Air Act: 20 Categorical exemptions may . . . be permissible as an exercise of agency power, inherent in most statutory schemes, to overlook circumstances that in context may fairly be considered de minimis. It is common place, of course, that the law does not concern itself with trifling matters, and this principle has often found application in the administrative context. Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to mandate pointless expenditures of effort. . . . The ability . . . to exempt de minimis situ ations from a statutory command is not an ability to depart from the statute, but rather a tool to be used in implementing the legislative design. 21 636 F.2d at 360 (emphasis added); see Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 663-64(1980) (under Occupational Health and Safety Act, de minimis exemption appropriate when administrative record reveals only scant or minimal risk of material health impairment) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing Alabama Power). 22 This court has not explicitly held that the Clean Air Act is subject to de minimis exemptions. We have, however, implicitly approved EPA's power to make appropriate de minimis exemptions to the Act. In Western States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 283-85 (9th Cir. 1996), we analyzed Clean Air Act regulations which explicitly allow state programs to exclude insignificant activities and emissions from permit applications, and reversed an EPA decision disapproving a state permit program which exempted such insignificant activities. 23 Courts have refused to allow de minimis exemptions where the statutory language does not allow it. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 1993) (because Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 draws no distinctions based on quantity, even party contributing minimal amount of hazardous substance is liable); Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rigid language of Color Additive Amendment does not allow application of de minimis exemption). There is no explicit provision in the Clean Air Act prohibiting the exemption from controls for de minimis sources of PM-10 pollution. Nor is the statutory language uncompromisingly rigid. The Act provides that a plan must include reasonably available control measures to bring an area within national standards unless attainment is impracticable. Those terms allow for the exercise of agency judgment. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1996 (per curiam) (de minimis exemption cannot stand if it is contrary to express terms in statute, but unless Congress has been extraordinarily rigid in drafting the statute, de minimis exemption is allowed for regulation yielding trivial gain). We conclude that EPA, in discharging its duty to enforce the Act, is permitted under Chevron to exempt de minimis sources of PM-10 from pollution controls.