Opinion ID: 891601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Grand Jury Evidence and Indictment

Text: {9} Defendant contends that the indictment issued against him was based wholly upon hearsay evidence presented by the lead detective in the case to the grand jury, and should therefore be dismissed. NMSA 1978, Section 31-6-11(A) (2003) states that [e]vidence before the grand jury upon which it may find an indictment is that which is lawful, competent and relevant and that [t]he Rules of Evidence shall not apply. {10} While Defendant's case was pending, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether hearsay evidence could provide the foundation for a lawful indictment in State v. Romero, 2006-NMCA-105, 140 N.M. 281, 142 P.3d 362. In Romero, the Court of Appeals stated that the Legislature has not authorized judicial review of the evidence presented to a grand jury except for its sufficiency and then only upon a showing of prosecutorial bad faith. Id. ¶ 5; see also § 31-6-11(A) (The sufficiency of the evidence upon which an indictment is returned shall not be subject to review absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecuting attorney assisting the grand jury.); Jones v. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 19, 145 N.M.473, 200 P.3d 523 ([A] request for post-indictment relief would necessarily challenge the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the grand jury's indictment is based. As such, the target-turned-defendant must establish bad faith on the part of the prosecutor as a prerequisite to obtaining a dismissal of the indictment.); Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 706-07, 634 P.2d 1244, 1258-59 (1981) (stating under former law that appellate courts will not review challenges to the kind and degree of evidence presented to a grand jury without an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct). {11} Like the defendant in Romero, Defendant has not argued that his indictment was the result of prosecutorial bad faith. Accordingly, we follow Romero and hold that [i]n the absence of prosecutorial bad faith, there is no clear statutory authority for judicial review ... [and] in the absence of clear statutory authority for judicial review, ... the grand jury's determination of probable cause is conclusive. Romero, 2006-NMCA-105, ¶ 8, 140 N.M. 281, 142 P.3d 362.
{12} Defendant also contends that the prosecutor did not properly instruct the grand jury on the necessary elements of first-degree kidnapping and argues that the resulting charge should be dismissed. It is undisputed that a prosecutor has a duty to advise the grand jury of the essential elements of the charges presented. See State v. Augustin M., 2003-NMCA-065, ¶ 52, 133 N.M. 636, 68 P.3d 182. At issue in this appeal is what elements are essential and must be presented to the grand jury when the State seeks an indictment for first-degree kidnapping. {13} Kidnapping is defined by NMSA 1978, Section 30-4-1(A) and (B) (2003). [1] The elements of Section 30-4-1(A) are set forth in UJI 14-403 NMRA and establish the offense of second-degree kidnapping. See UJI 14-403 committee commentary (This instruction is for the crime of second degree felony kidnapping where the victim is freed without great bodily harm having been inflicted.). In a criminal trial, if the petit jury finds a defendant guilty of kidnapping based on the elements in Subsection (A) as contained in UJI 14-403, the jurors are then directed to use a special verdict form which asks them to consider the elements contained in Subsection (B): (1) whether the Defendant voluntarily freed the victim in a safe place, and (2) whether the defendant released the victim without physical injury. See UJI 14-6018 NMRA. If the State meets its burden with regard to both Subsections (A) and (B), then the accused may be convicted of first-degree kidnapping. If the State meets its burden with regard to Subsection (A) but fails to establish the elements contained in Subsection (B), then the accused may only be convicted of second-degree kidnapping. {14} In this case, the prosecutor's instructions to the grand jury conformed with UJI 14-403 and contained the elements found in Subsection (A). However, Defendant argues that the prosecutor, in addition to presenting the essential elements of kidnapping found in UJI 14-403, was also required to present the special verdict form which contains the elements in Subsection (B) in order to indict Defendant for first-degree kidnapping. UJI 14-6018. Thus, Defendant suggests that the instructions found in the special verdict form are essential elements that must be presented to the grand jury. {15} The State raises two points in support of its position that the questions contained in the special verdict form are not essential elements of first-degree kidnapping. First, the State contends that the inquiries set forth in the special verdict form are merely mitigating, rather than essential, factors that reduce a charge of first-degree kidnapping to second-degree kidnapping. We are inclined to disagree with this assessment. {16} The elements in Subsection (A), found in UJI 14-403, if established, only support a charge of second-degree kidnapping. If the State wishes to convict an accused of first-degree kidnapping, it must also establish the elements in Subsection (B), contained in the special verdict form. It follows that a prosecutor seeking to indict an accused for first-degree kidnapping should also be required to present both the primary elements found in UJI 14-403 as well as the additional elements found in the special verdict form to the grand jury. {17} The State's second argument is that the special verdict form is used only if first-degree kidnapping is in issue and states that first-degree kidnapping is not in issue until different theories and divergent evidence is presented in an adversarial forum. See UJI 14-6018 use note; State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633. The State's position is premised on the idea that the special verdict form would ask the grand jury to make a factual determination as to the Defendant's conduct. The Court of Appeals stated in Augustin M. that such determinations are reserved for conviction or acquittal by a trial jury after argument of counsel. We do not see the desirability, much less the necessity, of requiring the grand jury to engage in the fine factual distinctions and evaluation of conduct and causation ... when it does not have the benefit of argument as to the significance of the distinctions. Augustin M., 2003-NMCA-065, ¶ 58, 133 N.M. 636, 68 P.3d 182. Therefore, the State argues that it was unnecessary to present the elements in Subsection (B) at the grand jury stage because those proceedings are not adversarial. See id. ¶ 59; see also Buzbee, 96 N.M. at 696, 634 P.2d at 1248 (stating that the grand jury does not hear both sides but only the prosecution's evidence, and does not [make] a choice between two adversaries (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {18} This assessment appears to misapprehend the State's burden with regard to kidnapping. The elements set forth in the special verdict form are not affirmative defenses that must be raised by a defendant at trial. Rather, it is the State's burden to prove the elements contained in the special verdict form in order to obtain a conviction for first-degree, rather than second-degree, kidnapping. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect the State to establish probable cause for the same elements at the grand jury stage. {19} Although we appreciate the seriousness of this issue and believe that Defendant has presented an actual controversy, we must decide this issue on another basis due to the fact that the petit jury has already rendered its verdict. As we stated in State v. Ulibarri, [t]he grand jury only makes a finding of probable cause. A defendant should not be required to face a trial in the absence of probable cause. But at a trial on the merits, the State has the obligation to prove not just probable cause but guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Like difficulties with the quality or type of evidence relied upon by the grand jury in returning an indictment, any question of probable cause is necessarily obviated by a finding of guilt. 2000-NMSC-007, ¶ 2, 128 N.M. 686, 997 P.2d 818 (citation omitted and emphasis added). Had Defendant filed a timely petition for an extraordinary writ after the district court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment, we would have had the opportunity to reach the merits of this claim. See Davis v. Traub, 90 N.M. 498, 499, 565 P.2d 1015, 1016 (1977); In re Grand Jury Sandoval County, 106 N.M. 764, 767, 750 P.2d 464, 467 (Ct.App. 1988) (where an irregularity prejudices the grand jury proceedings, as alleged here, a writ of prohibition dismissing indictment may properly issue.). However, because the petit jury was properly instructed on all of the elements of first-degree kidnapping and found Defendant guilty, then any question of probable cause is necessarily obviated by the jury's finding of guilt. Id. It is too late now to inquire into the evidence presented to the grand jury or the finding of probable cause by the grand jury.