Opinion ID: 610140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Amount of loss attributable to Boyd.

Text: 15 The district court's determination of the total amount of loss attributable to Boyd for purposes of sentencing is a question of the proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts. We review the district court's findings of fact only for clear error, United States v. Brown, 944 F.2d 1377, 1379 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Haddon, 927 F.2d 942, 952 (7th Cir.1991), and give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); see United States v. Herrera, 878 F.2d 997, 999-1000 (7th Cir.1989). The meaning of guideline terms such as loss is a question of law that receives plenary review. See United States v. Strozier, 981 F.2d 281, 283 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Mount, 966 F.2d 262, 265 (7th Cir.1992). The parties agree that the district court's determination of the amount of loss attributable to Boyd should be upheld if not clearly erroneous. (Appellant's Br. at ix; Appellee's Br. at 9). 16 Because Boyd was convicted of taking part with other persons in a scheme to defraud the Credit Union, the Sentencing Guidelines require that her applicable guideline range be determined not only on the basis of her own acts, but also on the basis of all reasonably foreseeable acts ... of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The evidence submitted at trial established that all the participants in the scheme contemplated that Isermann would obtain and then cash unfunded money orders, and that Booker cashed an unfunded money order at Boyd's request. Boyd's claim that she was unaware of the activities of other participants in the fraud is foreclosed both by the jury's verdict and by the district court's amply supported findings of fact at sentencing. 17 Boyd also argues that in order for her to be held responsible for the dollar amounts of the money orders cashed by others in the scheme, both the total number of money orders cashed and their dollar amounts should have been reasonably foreseeable by Boyd. The Guidelines hold co-defendants responsible for the acts of other participants in furtherance of an agreed-upon scheme on the basis of the foreseeability of those acts. 4 In United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1590 (1992), where the amount of drugs attributable to each participant in a drug conspiracy for purposes of sentencing was in dispute, we held that the most relevant factor in determining the reasonable foreseeability of conduct engaged in by co-conspirators ... is the scope of the defendant's agreement with the other conspirators. 945 F.2d at 1392. Given the nature of the initial agreement between Boyd, Isermann and Stanley, the district court determined that the money orders cashed by Isermann were within the contemplated scope of the scheme to defraud the Credit Union, so that the total amount of loss brought about by Isermann's acts must also be attributed to Boyd. (Sentencing Tr. at 8-9). 18 Although Boyd was directly involved in negotiating only five fraudulent money orders, totalling approximately $2,300, 5 Boyd has presented no convincing argument that the other seven money orders negotiated by Isermann, totalling approximately $6,577, were beyond the scope of the initial agreement between Boyd, Isermann and Stanley. Neither the total number nor the face amount of the money orders cashed by Isermann differs so greatly from those cashed by Boyd as to cast doubt on the district court's conclusion that they were reasonably foreseeable by Boyd and are fairly attributable to her. 6 Moreover, the fact that Isermann cashed two of the money orders at locations other than the Credit Union does not differ so greatly from the agreed-upon scheme as to take those money orders outside the scope of the jointly undertaken activity. Isermann could just as easily have cashed the two money orders at the Credit Union and then bought stereo equipment with the proceeds. Boyd's case might have been more convincing if Isermann had obtained money orders from some other financial institution, or from someone other than Stanley at the Credit Union, or if the amounts he obtained through the scheme had been much greater than those obtained by Boyd. Under the facts presented, the district court's view of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. See Herrera, 878 F.2d at 1000 (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). 19