Opinion ID: 2282775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the defendants' questions

Text: Before this court may reach the merits of the present appeal as raised by the plaintiff's certified question of law, we must first consider the three certified questions of law raised by the defendants. These threshold questions arise from three motions to dismiss made during the proceedings below which were decided against the defendants. An affirmative answer to any of these questions would make it unnecessary for this court to reach the plaintiff's question. A The first of the defendants' questions certified by the trial judge is: In a statutory proceeding under § 9-329a of the General Statutes, must the judge issuing the order for the hearing personally conduct it? If so, does the conduct [sic] of the hearing by another judge warrant the dismissal of the proceedings? This question arises because one judge, Judge Hadden, ordered the hearing on the plaintiff's complaint under § 9-329a and another judge, Judge Norcott, conducted the hearing. The statutory language in question states that a complaint such as the plaintiff's is to be brought directly to any judge of the superior court, that [s]uch judge shall order a hearing, and that [s]uch judge shall conduct the hearing. The defendants contend that the failure to adhere to the statutory scheme requires the dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. [13] We conclude that there was compliance with the statute. The particular language of § 9-329a in question was adopted only recently, in 1978 by Public Acts 1978, No. 78-125, § 12. Prior to the 1978 amendment, the statute, then § 9-449 of the General Statutes, provided that the complaint be brought to any judge of the superior court, that such judge shall order the hearing and that [s]uch judge or, in case of his inability, a judge designated by the chief justice of the supreme court shall conduct the hearing. (Emphasis added.) Thus, prior to the 1978 amendment, the defendants' contention would have had merit. The earlier version of the statute intended that the judge who issued the order for the hearing would also conduct it, as indicated by the specified mechanism for replacing that judge. In 1978, however, the legislature amended the language in question and deleted the express replacement mechanism. Because the present statute only mentions such judge, it must be read to refer to any judge of the superior court and not to the specific judge to whom the complaint was originally brought. Furthermore, § 51-189 provides that when any application, petition or matter is presented to or pending before any judge of the Superior Court, that judge may designate any other Superior Court judge to hear the case or transfer the case to such judge. When this is done the other judge is to proceed with the same authority as though the same had originally been presented to him or had theretofore been pending before him. Therefore, as to the defendants' first certified question of law, there was no error in one judge's issuing the order for the required hearing and another judge's conducting it. B The second of the defendants' certified questions of law is: In a statutory proceeding under § 9-329a, must the alleged misconduct relied on be by an `election official.' If so, is the alleged misconduct by a person other than an `election official' within the purvue [sic] of the statute? The defendants contend that with regard to a primary election dispute § 9-329a is limited to disputes concerning the propriety of the actions of election officials and the arithmetic tabulation of the votes. Thus, according to the defendants, because the present dispute does not concern either the activity of an election official or the tabulation of the votes, the plaintiff's complaint should have been dismissed. The trial judge rejected this reasoning and held that the plaintiff's complaint was properly brought under § 9-329a. Section 9-329a provides that a candidate such as the plaintiff may bring a complaint thereunder if the candidate either is aggrieved by a ruling of an election official in connection with any primary [14] or alleges that there has been a mistake in the count of the votes cast at such primary. The plaintiff's complaint is based on the casting of twenty-six absentee ballots which, according to the plaintiff, were void because they were improperly mailed. Thus, because the plaintiff would have won the primary had these ballots not been counted, he clearly is aggrieved by the ruling of an election official, such ruling being the counting of the absentee ballots. Therefore, as to the defendants' second certified question of law, we hold that the plaintiff's complaint was properly brought under § 9-329a. C The third of the defendants' certified questions of law is: In a statutory proceeding under § 9-329a of the General Statutes, must notice of the proceeding and hearing be given to the under-ticket in a mayoral primary election as `candidates in any way directly affected by the decision upon such hearing?' If so, does the failure to serve or notice the under-ticket in the instant action warrant dismissal of the proceeding? This question arises because the primary in dispute involved not only the nomination for mayor but also nominations for seats on the board of education, the board of tax review, and the town council. Notice of the hearing conducted by the trial judge was not provided to any of the candidates for those nominations. It is the defendants' contention that the plaintiff's action must be dismissed because of this want of notice. [15] Section 9-329a provides that for any proceeding held thereunder the Superior Court judge who orders the hearing shall cause notice of not less than three days to be given to any candidate or candidates in any way directly affected by the decision upon such hearing, to such election official [from whose ruling the plaintiff claims aggrievement] and to any other person or persons, whom such judge deems proper parties thereto, of the time and place of the hearing.... (Emphasis added.) The statute does not require that all candidates in the contested primary be noticed, as it easily could have done. Notice is required to be given only to those candidates directly affected by the decision. In the present case the dispute is restricted to the validity of twenty-six specific absentee ballots. The certified results of the West Haven Democratic party primary reveal that all races in the primary, with the exception of that for the nomination for mayor, were decided by more than twenty-six votes. Because of this the trial judge found that there was no evidence that the 26 absentee ballots in question directly affected any candidate other than those party to this instant action. In view of this finding, not disputed by any of the parties, this court must conclude that there was no error in the notice given of the complaint brought pursuant to § 9-329a. Cf. Lobsenz v. Davidoff, 182 Conn. Ill, 116, 438 A.2d 21 (1980). The defendants' contention that the other candidates would be affected by a new primary is without merit because the new primary ordered by this court is to be held only between the named parties. Therefore, as to the defendants' third certified question of law, we conclude that the notice of the proceeding complied with § 9-329a.