Opinion ID: 2510351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Easement In The Southeastern Corner Of Parcel B

Text: Although the district court confirmed the Appellants' easement rights across Government Lot 2, the court held that the easement ends at the western boundary of Government Lot 2 and does not pass into Parcel B. Because Government Lot 2 only abuts the Appellants' Parcel A property at a corner, they do not share a border. Or, to put it another way, they share a border but that border is infinitely small. As a result, the district court's ruling that the Appellants' easement does not continue into the Akers' land in Parcel B results in an easement that crosses much of the Akers' property but stops just short of providing the Appellants with access to the county road. When discussing the access road and the Appellants' easement, it is important to distinguish between the two. When the district court determined the Appellants' easement ended at the western boundary of Government Lot 2, it was articulating a conclusion of law regarding the easement, not a finding of fact regarding the location of the access road itself. With respect to the actual access road, the district court found that it does pass through Parcel B. [1] In finding of fact number 26, the district court found that by 1966 the access road left the western boundary of Government 2, entered Parcel B, and then turned south into Parcel A. The court also found the access road in Parcel B has since been expanded twice, first by the Peplinskis well after 1980, and more recently by the Mortensens. The Appellants contend their easement rights follow the access road through the southeast corner of Parcel B to their property, and they present three different theories in support of this contention: (1) express easement, (2) implied easement from prior use, and (3) easement by prescription. We will consider each of them.
An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement, or with notice, actual or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement, takes the land subject to the easement. Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944). An express easement may be by way of reservation or by exception. 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 60.03(a)(2)(i) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). An express easement by reservation reserves to the grantor some new right in the property being conveyed; an express easement by exception operates by withholding title to a portion of the conveyed property. Id. The deed from the Millsaps to the Bakers, the Akers' predecessors in interest, contains an unambiguous express easement by reservation, reserving an easement across the southern portion of Government Lot 2. The deed conveying the property to the Akers states that they took subject to easements of record and also specifically referenced the Millsaps-to-Baker deed. However, as the district court noted, by itself the express easement by reservation across the southern portion Government Lot 2 takes the easement no further west than the western boundary of Government Lot 2. The Appellants next direct our attention to language in the Akers' deed stating that they took their property subject not only to easements of record, but also those in view. Because the access road across the Akers' property, including that property in Parcel B, was in view to the Akers at the time of purchase, the Appellants contend the Akers took subject to an express easement by exception. However, the deed language the Appellants point out to us is not evidence of a grantor's intent to reserve or except an easement. Instead, the language in the Akers' deed discussing easements in view was an attempt to create an exception to the grantor's warranties of title and quiet enjoyment and thereby limit the grantor's potential liability. As a result, we must look instead to the other theories raised by the Appellants to determine if they possess an easement connecting their property with Government Lot 2.
The Appellants argue they hold an easement over the whole of the access road by an implied easement from prior use. A party seeking to establish an implied easement from prior use must demonstrate three essential elements: (1) unity of title or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. In the present case, it is undisputed that all the property in question was once in the common ownership of the Millsaps, establishing the necessary unity of title or ownership. It was separated in 1966, with the Millsaps retaining ownership over the dominant estate. That established the needed subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate. As a result, the first element has been met. Regarding the second element, apparent continuous use, the district court wrote in its conclusions of law that there was no evidence of such use, then that there was little testimony regarding the use of the access road. However, testimony on the Millsaps' farming use of the access road at the time of separation was provided by longtime neighbor and witness for the Akers, William Reynolds as well as William A. Millsap, a witness for the Appellants and the son of W.L. and Patricia Millsaps, the common grantors. [2] This farming use was consistent with the nature of the property at the time. The testimony of the Millsaps' use of the road at the time of severance was uncontradicted and was even accepted by the district court in its findings of fact when the court stated in finding number 19 that in 1966 [t]he easement was used primarily for cultivating in May-June and haying in July-August, and in finding number 20 that the access road was used by the Millsaps about six times a year.... The district court's own findings of fact show the easement was in regular use by the Millsaps, the original grantors, at the time of severance of the dominant and servient estates. In its decision issued on reconsideration, the district court applied different reasoning, ruling that the appellants failed to show apparent continuous use of the access road because they had not proven that in 1948 the access road crossed into Parcel B. However, the time that is legally relevant to the question of apparent continuous use is the time the dominant and servient estates were severed. Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. In this case, that was in 1966, not 1948. [3] Although the district court made no findings as to the location of the access road in 1948, it found that by 1966 the access road passed through Parcel B and was in regular use by the common grantors, the Millsaps. As a result, the district court's conclusion that there was no apparent continuous use by the common grantors at the time of severance is incompatible with its findings of fact and is therefore reversed. The third element requires the party claiming an implied easement from prior use to show the easement to be reasonably necessary for the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. With respect to an implied easement from prior use, under Idaho law reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for an easement implied by necessity. Davis, 133 Idaho at 643, 991 P.2d at 368. When determining whether such reasonable necessity existed, a court does not look to the present moment, but instead determines whether reasonable necessity existed at the time the dominant and servient estates were severed. Id. at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. Once an implied easement by prior use is found to have existed at the time of severance, it is not later extinguished if the easement is no longer reasonably necessary. Id. at 643, 991 P.2d at 368. [A]n implied easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore passes with all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient estates. Id. In the instant case, the district court reasoned that because Vernon Mortensen testified that he recently had a back way to access his parcel A property through other property he had purchased (but since sold), the Appellants' use of the access road across the Akers' property was not reasonably necessary. The district court's finding of fact that a back way recently existed does not support its conclusion of law. The legally relevant time period for the creation of an easement implied from prior use is the time of the severance of the dominant and servient estates. Id. at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. In this case, the relevant time period would therefore be 1966, not the present day. Because the district court made no findings of fact useful to the resolution of whether in 1966 use of the access road through Parcel B was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate, we remand the question to the district court for additional fact finding. Because the first two elements of an easement implied from prior use have been satisfied, if such reasonable necessity is found an easement appurtenant to the dominant estate will be determined to have been established at the time of severance.
In addition to the preceding theories, the Appellants also argue they are entitled to an easement along the whole of the access road by prescription. A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory period. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973. The statutory period in question is five years. I.C. § 5-203; Weaver, 134 Idaho at 698, 8 P.3d at 1241. A claimant may rely on his own use, or he may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite five continuous years of adverse use. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. Wood, 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at 386; Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The nature of the use is adverse if it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; the focus is on the nature of their use. Id. at 231-32, 76 P.3d at 975-76. In the present case, the Appellants established the necessary use of the access road from the time of the separation of the servient and dominant estates in 1966, at least until the Peplinskis' sale of Parcel A to the Mortensens in 1994. The district court nonetheless ruled on two grounds that no prescriptive easement arose. The first of these grounds was that, until recently, the Akers had given permission for the use of the access road, and this permission defeated the formation of any prescriptive easement. The difficulty with that reasoning is that the Akers did not purchase the property across which the access road passes until 1980. Consequently, they were not in a position to grant or deny permission to use the access road before that time. The Appellants contend that an easement by prescription arose during the time from 1966 to 1980, regardless of events after the Akers took possession of their property. If such an easement arose in favor of the dominant estate, it ran with the land that is now held by the Appellants. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. Once a prescriptive easement has been established, discussion of permissive use afterwards is unnecessary. Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 637, 570 P.2d 870, 874 (1977). The district court, unfortunately, did not determine whether the use of the access road by the Peplinskis, the Appellants' predecessors in interest, was adverse or only with the permission of the Akers' predecessors in interest, the Wilhelms and Turks, the Wigens, and the Bakers. The second reason given by the district court was that until the Appellants' recent actions giving rise to the present suit, there were no problems between the Akers and Appellants, Dennis Akers and Floyd Peplinskis were friends, and therefore even if no permission was articulated by Akers neither the Peplinskis' nor the Appellants' use of the access road was adverse. The district court's reasoning, however, is incorrect. Because the Appellants have already presented proof of open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the claimed easement for the prescriptive period, they are entitled to a presumption of adverse use. Wood, 131 Idaho at 702-03, 963 P.2d at 385-86. It is the Akers' burden, as the owners of the servient tenement, to overcome that presumption. Id. at 703, 963 P.2d at 386. Moreover, mere inaction and passive acquiescence is not a sufficient basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was with the permission of the owner of the servient tenement. West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973). The Akers' passive acquiescence cannot establish that the Appellants' or the Peplinskis' use was permissive, because such acquiescence is equally consistent with recognition of the users' claim of right. As a result, the second ground given by the district court also does not support its conclusion that no prescriptive easement was ever formed. Because the district court did not consider whether an easement by prescription across the Akers property arose during the period from 1966 to 1980, that question is to be resolved by the district court on remand.