Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of court-ordered immunity for Maurice Solvang

Text: Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion (made during trial) seeking immunity for Maurice Solvang, thereby violating defendant's federal and state constitutional rights to a fair trial.
As noted above, on December 5, 1989  a day before the preliminary hearing began  the prosecutor and Inspector Sjostrand interviewed Donna Guthrie at her home and, finding Maurice Solvang there, briefly interviewed him at that time as well. Later that day, Solvang agreed to accompany the prosecutor and Sjostrand to the Richmond Office of the District Attorney, where Solvang submitted to a tape-recorded interview for approximately 90 minutes. In that interview, which was transcribed and made available to defendant (and was subsequently referred to and extensively quoted in defendant's midtrial motion seeking immunity for Solvang), Solvang described his contacts with defendant in the days prior to and after the killings. We set out below a summary of that interview. At numerous times during the interview, Solvang recounted that, prior to the killings, defendant told him he hated his mother and his stepfather for sending him to prison and that, in retribution, he planned to kill them. Solvang stated that on June 30, 1989  three days before the killings  Solvang advised defendant concerning how one would go about committing such homicides, including the killer's need to make sure that he was not seen by any witness, the need to dispose of any evidence, and the procedures necessary to create a gas leak in order to burn the home of his intended victims. In the course of this recitation, Solvang volunteered that in making such recommendations to defendant he was neither encouraging nor dissuading defendant, because he (Solvang) was an impartial party who reasoned, if you're going to be stupid and do it, do it the smart way. He also asserted, however, that he did not believe that defendant actually would commit the planned crimes. Solvang proceeded to explain that defendant told him how defendant obtained the gun used in the killings; that at Solvang's own recommendation, the two of them test-fired the gun; and that on July 2  two days before the crimes  Solvang went with defendant to purchase a box of bullets. Solvang related that on July 5  the day after the killings  he and Donna Guthrie spent approximately four hours with defendant in a park, at which time defendant spoke to Solvang about the homicides and told him how he had killed each of the victims. Solvang stated he was uncertain as to of the number of bullets defendant said had been fired. Solvang recounted that defendant reported strangling the family dog with a vacuum hose because it would not stop barking after the gunfire ended, and that defendant had described looking out the front door and being noticed by Terry Guillory. Solvang, revealing his and defendant's ingestion of drugs and alcohol for three days prior to the killings, described defendant's demeanor on July 5 as alternating between euphoria (at having killed Ardell) and depression (at the prospect of having no place to live), but showing no remorse. Solvang twice emphasized that while he and Donna Guthrie sat with defendant in the park, listening to him recount the crimes, he feared that defendant, who still was armed, also might kill him and Donna. Solvang speculated that defendant was in a cloud of ecstasy at the time he committed the crimes and did not know right from wrong. Solvang related that he advised defendant to shed the clothing he had worn during the killings and drove with defendant and Donna to a store where defendant purchased new clothing. Solvang explained that while they were waiting for defendant to try on the new clothing, Donna told him (Solvang) that on July 3, defendant had telephoned her numerous times from the Pillow home, last calling at about 11:30 p.m. and pleading, `If you don't come pick me up you'll read about it in the newspapers. I hope you feel great `cause this is all your fault, it's your trip.' Solvang conceded having helped defendant discard his shoes and the gun, both of which, he claimed, defendant threw into a deep reservoir in his presence. Solvang also admitted speaking with defendant by telephone numerous times in the months after defendant's arrest, and related that defendant had made me several offers for Terry Guillory's life. Solvang explained that, in this regard, he had accepted from defendant a $1,000 retainer that was delivered to him in a cigarette box at a Foster Freeze in El Sobrante. Solvang stated that although defendant did not specifically ask that Guillory be killed, it was clear to Solvang that defendant wanted Guillory's termination, which Solvang assumed meant that Guillory was to be killed. Solvang, however, asserted that he never intended to kill Guillory, but instead viewed the retainer as free money, which he used to purchase gifts and food for Donna Guthrie (who, by this time, was Solvang's girlfriend  and who, further complicating matters, also had a long-standing relationship with Terry Guillory). During the interview, Solvang expressed concern that he might be prosecuted for his involvement in the events he was relating. Inspector Sjostrand replied that if Solvang in fact had destroyed evidence or assisted defendant after the killings, that's something you're going to have to address. Finally, Solvang acknowledged having suffered three prison terms for numerous crimes, including smuggling narcotics, shooting a dog, and (in his words) robberies, robberies, robberies, robberies. Evidence adduced at the hearing on defendant's motion for court-ordered immunity for Solvang revealed the following. Approximately one month prior to the December 5, 1989, interview described above (on November 4, 1989), Solvang had been charged with a misdemeanor, brandishing a firearm. On December 7, 1989, a police officer reviewing the original November report obtained Solvang's criminal records and on that basis modified the charges to include the additional felony charge of felon in possession of a firearm. There is no indication that the modification was made at the behest of the District Attorney's office. A subsequent police report entry in February 1990 indicated that the police would take this case to D.A. review. Still later, a police report entry stated: This case has been reviewed by the D.A. and a felony complaint issued. Solvang had been subpoenaed by the prosecution to testify at defendant's preliminary hearing, which commenced on December 6, 1989. But thereafter Solvang was provided appointed counsel who advised him concerning his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Solvang was not subsequently called to testify at the preliminary hearing, apparently because he had demanded transactional immunity, which, the prosecutor later explained at a February 1990 hearing, he was not prepared to offer. Counsel for defendant learned of Solvang's December 5, 1989, interview shortly after noon on December 6. Soon thereafter, Craig Rock, the defense investigator, attempted at various times to interview Solvang. Ultimately Solvang agreed to an interview with Rock on July 26, 1990. At that interview, Solvang first stated that he knew he had AIDS. Solvang also stated he had been subpoenaed by the prosecution to testify at defendant's trial and would do so if he received user immunity from the D.A. Solvang further asserted he would state that his previous statement to the D.A. regarding [defendant's] involvement in the killings was a lie and that defendant was an innocent witness to a robbery and the killings. Rock testified: When I asked him how he knew this, was he present at the killings, he said `possibly.' I then asked him if he did the shootings to which he again said `possibly.' I asked him if he knew about a bracelet that was left at the crime scene. He asked me if I meant the one belonging to Donna. He then said we should check for her fingerprints on the wine bottle and on a pair of sunglasses. [¶] [Solvang] said that he and Donna had gone their separate ways and that in the past he had had a sexual relationship with Donna but not while [defendant] was going out with her. Later, Solvang agreed to another interview with Rock, held on September 12, 1990. While Rock was driving Solvang to the office of defendant's counsel for that interview, and as they neared that office, Solvang noticed the prosecution investigator, Sjostrand, traveling in the opposite direction, and shared that observation with Rock. At the September 12 interview with Rock and defense counsel, counsel began by telling Solvang he wanted to know what really happened on the night of the killings. Solvang responded he would demand immunity in order to testify at defendant's trial. Solvang asserted that the prosecution had told him that somebody else must be involved [in the killings] because these victims didn't wait in line to be shot and that if Solvang helped the prosecution, Donna would not be prosecuted, nor would he unless he did the actual killings. Solvang asked defense counsel whether the public defender's office would represent him (Solvang) if the weight of the evidence shifted to him, and counsel responded that in that circumstance a conflict would be declared and Solvang would receive another court-appointed attorney. Solvang asked why should a person be punished for something he didn't do?, adding I don't want to see [defendant] get what they, the D.A. wanted him to get. Solvang then mused: If me and two friends go to a house and I see valuable items and things get out of hand you got to terminate certain people. People with you have to decide whether they're going to be a witness against the person. Later, Rock testified, Solvang mentioned that he `never saw this lady [Gloria Pillow] until....' Rock explained that Solvang did not finish the sentence. Rock further stated Solvang told him that after the killings, Donna was going around telling people that [Solvang] was the one who did the killings. Solvang also said that he saw Terry Guillory with a $1,000 check, apparently from a newspaper's witness reward program, provided for having turned in defendant, and that Guillory had purchased drugs from Donna with that money. Solvang further stated that he also had given Donna the $800 he had received from the cigarette package delivered by defendant's friend Jackie. Solvang explained that Donna has a way of wrapping men around her finger. Finally, Solvang asserted that at one point Guillory demanded that Donna share the $800 with Guillory, and that Inspector Sjostrand happened to have arrived while Guillory was making this demand. After the September 12 interview, Rock served Solvang with a subpoena to testify for the defense at defendant's trial. Immediately after Solvang's September 12 interview, when Rock returned Solvang to his home, Donna  who at that time resided at the same location  angrily confronted Solvang, claiming Solvang was out to get her. Donna then telephoned the police to report a charge of disturbing the peace, a violation of Penal Code section 415. The San Pablo police responded. Upon interviewing Solvang, the investigating officer discovered that Solvang had two outstanding warrants. Based upon those warrants, Solvang was transported to the San Pablo Police Department, booked, and then transported to the Contra Costa County Jail. Investigator Rock testified that, within two weeks of March 1991 (just prior to the beginning of jury selection in defendant's trial) he was led to believe by the prosecution that it planned to call Solvang as a witness at defendant's trial and that the prosecution had secured a removal order for the transportation of Solvang from the prison where he was then confined. But, Rock testified, when he checked he found that the prosecution in fact had not sought a removal order. Accordingly, defense counsel was required to seek such an order for Solvang's removal. Rock also testified that during defendant's trial  on March 27, 1991, the day before the immunity motion at issue was filed and heard  Rock spoke to Solvang, who advised him that he (Solvang) would exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege to decline to testify at defendant's trial. Rock did not ask Solvang why he would elect to exercise that privilege, and Solvang did not indicate why he had made that decision. The parties stipulated that if called to the stand at defendant's trial, Solvang would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and would refuse to testify absent a grant of immunity from the District Attorney.
On March 28, 1991, during the presentation of the defense case at trial, defendant requested that the trial court grant immunity to Solvang. Citing People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 974, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608 ( Hunter ), In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 29, 241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374 ( Martin ), and Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3d Cir.1980) 615 F.2d 964, 972 ( Smith ), defendant asserted in his motion that the court should grant Solvang immunity in order to redress the prosecution's asserted interference with defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence in his defense and to ensure defendant's right to a fair trial. The trial court, in denying the motion, observed that many courts  including this court (see Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 973, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608)  have recognized that the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive, that is, to the prosecution (see § 1324), and have questioned whether a trial court possesses inherent authority to grant such immunity. Indeed, addressing this question in People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373, our court characterized as doubtful the proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity. ( Id., at p. 460, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; see also, e.g., Carter v. United States (D.C.1996) 684 A.2d 331, 338-339 [citing and agreeing with the overwhelming number of courts ... that have rejected the concept of judicially imposed immunity, and noting that `there is considerable force to the Government's apprehension that defense witness immunity could create opportunities for undermining the administration of justice by inviting cooperative perjury among law violators'].) Nevertheless, in Lucas as in Hunter and other cases ( In re Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 572, 610, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072 ( Williams ); People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 619, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635 ( Cudjo )), we proceeded to assume that such inherent judicial authority exists and to address whether the defendant met the stringent requirements described in Hunter and Smith under which such relief conceivably might be warranted. The trial court in the present case undertook this same approach in considering (and ultimately denying) defendant's motion for court-ordered immunity. Following that same approach here, we conclude that assuming the trial court possessed authority to order transactional or use immunity for Solvang, the court did not err in failing to do so on the facts of this case. We acknowledged in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608, that it was possible to hypothesize cases in which a judicially conferred use immunity might possibly be necessary to vindicate a criminal defendant's rights to compulsory process and a fair trial. ( Id., at p. 974, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608.) We reviewed the one case which has clearly recognized such authority  Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964  and highlighted two `clearly limited' circumstances (both articulated in Smith ) in which judicially conferred use immunity might be constitutionally necessary. ( Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 974, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608.) The first of the two tests outlined in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608, would recognize the authority of a trial court to confer immunity upon a witness when each of the following three elements is met: (1) the proffered testimony [is] clearly exculpatory; [ (2) ] the testimony [is] essential; and [ (3) ] there [is] no strong governmental interest[ ] which countervail[s] against a grant of immunity. ( Id. at p. 974, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608, citing Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964, 972.) [23] The trial court declined to make an express finding on the first element of this test, but, the People assert, necessarily made implied negative findings on either the second or third element (or both) of this test. Upon review, we conclude that defendant has failed to carry his burden of establishing the third element of this first test outlined in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608. (See Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th 572, 603, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072 [defendant has burden of establishing alleged interference with his right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses].) The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion suggested that Solvang had given directly contradictory statements to the police and to the defense investigator regarding the events of the crime. His statements to the defense suggested that Solvang himself may have been the killer  and if that were true, there certainly would have been a strong governmental interest in not granting Solvang immunity (either transactional or use) from prosecution. Moreover, even under the version of the facts related in Solvang's statement to the police, Solvang himself may have been guilty as an aider and abettor of the homicides, in that he admitted that, prior to the killings, he had given advice to defendant that would facilitate the commission of the murders. Under these circumstances, the prosecution reasonably would have been skeptical concerning which (if either) of Solvang's versions of the events was true. Contrary to defendant's assertions, even a grant of use immunity would have substantially burdened the People. Had such immunity been conferred, at any later prosecution of Solvang in connection with the homicides at issue in this case the district attorney would have been forced to prove that the evidence offered was not obtained or derived from Solvang's immunized testimony at defendant's trial. (See People v. Cooke (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1370, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 506.) Moreover, conferral of such immunity would have facilitated perjury by Solvang, who had shown himself to be of questionable veracity ( id., at p. 1371, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 506), and at the same time it would have substantially limited the prosecution's ability to conduct a full and free-ranging cross-examination of Solvang at defendant's trial (so as to narrow the scope of testimony that Solvang later might claim had tainted any subsequent prosecution). Based upon these considerations, and given Solvang's apparent complicity and culpability, the prosecution clearly had a strong governmental countervailing interest in not granting him either use or transactional immunity. The second of the two tests referred to in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608, as authorizing a trial court to grant immunity to a defense witness, would recognize such authority when the prosecutor intentionally refused to grant immunity to a key defense witness for the purpose of suppressing essential, noncumulative exculpatory evidence, thereby distorting the judicial factfinding process. ( Id., at p. 975, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608; see Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964, 969 [inquiring whether prosecution acted with the deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process]; see also United States v. Westerdahl (9th Cir.1991) 945 F.2d 1083, 1086-1087 ( Westerdahl ) [defense-requested immunity should be granted when the defense witness would provide relevant testimony and the prosecution intentionally has distorted the factfinding process, which may be shown when the government relies heavily upon the immunized testimony of a government witness while denying immunity to a defense witness whose testimony would directly contradict that of the government witness].) The trial court implicitly found that this test was not met here. There is no doubt that Solvang's testimony would have been relevant. But defendant has not met his burden of establishing that the prosecution's treatment of Solvang constituted an intentional distortion of the factfinding process with reference to (i) the upgrading, at the recommendation of the Richmond police, of Solvang's November 4, 1989, misdemeanor firearm charge to a felony charge; (ii) the arrest, by the San Pablo police, of Solvang on outstanding warrants shortly after his September 12, 1990, interview with the defense team; and (iii) the prosecution's refusal to grant immunity to Solvang, while granting limited immunity to other witnesses. Contrary to defendant's speculation that the prosecution orchestrated the upgrading of the November 4, 1989, firearms charge against Solvang two days after obtaining a detailed statement from Solvang largely incriminating defendant, there is no evidence that the prosecution prompted the Richmond police to reevaluate and upgrade the November 4, 1989 misdemeanor firearms charge. The record reveals instead that a Richmond detective sergeant, while reviewing reports that had been submitted to him ... recognized the name of Maurice Solvang as a person who may have been a convicted felon and ... did some checking to determine that in fact ... Solvang was a convicted felon and ... on that basis he modified the charges ... to reflect ... the additional charge of felon in possession of a firearm. Also, contrary to defendant's speculation that the prosecution arranged to have Solvang arrested in retaliation for his September 12, 1990, interview with the defense team, the evidence presented at the hearing on the immunity motion neither established nor reasonably implied any such connection, and suggested instead that Solvang's arrest immediately following his September 12 interview was the direct result of Donna Guthrie's disturbing the peace complaint, the investigation of which, by the San Pablo police, disclosed the existence of two warrants for Solvang's arrest. Finally, contrary to defendant's speculation that the prosecution sought to pressure and punish Solvang after learning of his September 12, 1990, interview with the defense by refusing to grant him immunity while granting immunity to other witnesses, the record shows that beginning at the December 6, 1989, preliminary hearing, the prosecution consistently had declined to grant Solvang immunity. Although the prosecution granted very limited use immunity to witnesses Coghlan and Guillory, the People did not rely heavily upon immunized testimony (cf. Westerdahl, supra, 945 F.2d 1083, 1087) in proving their case. We find no support for the hypothesis that the prosecution changed its position concerning the propriety of immunity for Solvang in response to his September 12, 1990, interview with the defense team. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has failed to satisfy the second test referred to in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 975, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608, which potentially authorizes a trial court to grant immunity to a defense witness when the prosecution has acted with the deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process. (See Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964, 969; Westerdahl, supra, 945 F.2d 1083, 1086-1087.) Defendant also asserts a general claim of interference with his right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. (See Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1, 29-32, 241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374; Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th 572, 603-609, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072.) To demonstrate such a violation, defendant is required to establish, among other things, (i) prosecutorial misconduct  that is, activity that was wholly unnecessary to the proper performance of [the prosecution's] duties and was of such a character as `to transform [a defense witness] from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify,' and (ii) interference with the fact finding process  that is, a causal link between the misconduct and [the defendant's] inability to present witnesses on his own behalf. ( Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 31, 241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374; Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 603, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072.) In this regard, the trial court stated: I'm not persuaded that there has been anything that the District Attorney or the police agencies have done which constitutes misconduct; that is to say, a governmental interference with the defendant's [Sixth] Amendment right to produce witnesses. [¶] This is not a situation where Solvang was some kind of a willing defense witness who was transformed into one who has refused to testify. It's not a situation where a witness has been arrested outside of the courtroom in the presence of other witnesses. There simply has been no showing that prosecution intimidation was a substantial cause of Solvang's present refusal [to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds]. The trial court then speculated that perhaps Solvang presently was refusing to testify because he himself was fearful of retaliation by defendant. [24] The court concluded that, in any event, there's been no connection between what may have been revealed to [the defense team] on July 26, 1990, and September 12th, 1990, no showing that [the] prosecution was aware of any of that, that might somehow provide the basis for an inference that Solvang's arrest was an effort to threaten or intimidate him. We find the trial court's conclusions adequately supported by the record. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for court-ordered immunity.