Opinion ID: 854070
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The class action is consonant with legislative policy

Text: Other factors point to the same result. First, the legislature has explicitly approved Trial Rule 23 and the class action device. In 1969, the General Assembly, following the recommendations of a Civil Code Study Commission created in 1967, repealed a variety of antiquated trial procedural statutes and enacted rules of civil procedure that were modeled substantially on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A virtual carbon copy of Federal Rule 23 was included. Act of March 13, 1969, ch. 191, § 1, 1969 Ind. Acts 564. These rules recognized that rules of civil procedure would ultimately be adopted by this Court. Id. § 2 at 715. ([T]he General Assembly reaffirms the power given to the Supreme Court to adopt, amend and rescind rules of Court, including these rules of Court herein adopted). Four months after the legislative rules were passed, this Court promulgated the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, including Rule 23 in its current form. The judicial rules were patterned, with some changes, on the work of the legislature and the Civil Code Study Commission. [10] The Trial Rules and their legislative counterpart went into effect on the same day (January 1, 1970). Accordingly, since their inception the Trial Rules have been the subject of both judicial and legislative blessing. For almost fifteen years, a concurrent set of the Trial Rules could be found in the Indiana Code. See, e.g., IND.CODE § 34-5-1-1 (1982). In a non-substantive change, the legislative analog was removed from the statute books in 1984. See Pub. L. No. 176-1984, § 2, 1984 Ind. Acts 1477. The following statute was adopted in its place: The general assembly adopts, and incorporates into the Indiana Code, the Indiana rules of trial procedure: (1) as enacted by the general assembly in Acts 1969, c. 191, s. 1 and amended by P.L. 319-1975, SECTION 1; and (2) as accepted by the Indiana supreme court as being in effect on December 1, 1983. IND.CODE § 34-8-2-2 (1998). This incorporate by reference provision, taken together with other statutes, evinces a plain intent to retain the 1970 legislative version of the Trial Rules to the extent not in conflict with Rules promulgated by this Court. [11] The legislative analog to Rule 23 is a nearly verbatim copy of the judicial rule; as such, Rule 23 represents both judicial and legislative policy. [12] Because Rule 23 enjoys this dual heritage, this case does not involve a clash between a procedural statute and a Rule of this Court. Rather, as other courts have concluded in construing the Trial Rules, the first level of resolution turns on whether the class action device and the Tort Claims Act may be reconciled. Elliott v. Roach, 409 N.E.2d 661, 668-69 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (noting statutory origins of Trial Rule 21(B) and describing issue as whether particular statute and the Rule could both be given effect). Under settled rules of construction, our course is clear: Where two statutes are in apparent conflict they should be construed, if it can be reasonably done, in a manner so as to bring them into harmony. Quakenbush v. Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284, 1290 (Ind.1993) (interpreting immunity provision of the Tort Claims Act) (citation omitted). For reasons already explained, permitting a tort claim notice on behalf of a class achieves this aim. The grant of partial summary judgment for the defendants must be reversed. [13]