Opinion ID: 3032059
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The state law right to meal periods applies to

Text: employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. We begin with an examination of California statutes, regulations, and case law regarding meal periods in order to determine whether Ivy Hill is correct that workers covered by 6302 VALLES v. IVY HILL CORP. collective bargaining agreements are not covered by the state law right to meal periods and penalties and that their claim must therefore be based on the collective bargaining agreement. For over half a century, the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) — the state agency responsible for promulgating regulations that govern wages, hours, and working conditions in California — has guaranteed work-free meal periods to manufacturing workers in California, including those covered by collective bargaining agreements, pursuant to its authority under § 1173 of the Labor Code. See IWC Wage Order 1-2001, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8 § 11010 (2005); Cal. Mfrs. Ass’n. v. IWC, 167 Cal. Rptr. 203, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); see also IWC v. Super. Ct. of Kern County, 613 P.2d 579, 601 (Cal. 1980) (in bank). In 1999, the legislature codified the existing wage order requirements regarding meal periods when it passed the “Eight-Hour-Day Restoration and Workplace Flexibility Act of 1999.” 1999 Cal. Stat., ch. 134 (A.B. 60), §6 (codified at Cal. Lab. Code § 512).4 The Act included various other provisions, some of which, on their face, are difficult to reconcile. As Ivy Hill points out, the Act contained a provision that appeared to exempt workers covered by collective bargaining agreements who earned over a certain rate of pay from the entire chapter of the labor code. See 1999 Cal. Stat., ch. 134, §8 (codified at Cal. Lab. Code 4 (a) Section 512 of the California Labor Code reads: (a) An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total work period per day of the employee is no more than six hours, the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of both the employer and employee. . . . (b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the Industrial Welfare Commission may adopt a working condition order permitting a meal period to commence after six hours of work if the commission determines that the order is consistent with the health and welfare of the affected employees. Cal. Lab. Code § 512. VALLES v. IVY HILL CORP. 6303 § 514). However, the Act also authorized the IWC to adopt or amend existing orders relating to meal periods and made clear that the new law was not “intended to restrict the Industrial Welfare Commission in its continuing duties pursuant to Section 1173.” 1999 Cal. Stat., ch. 134, §§ 10, 11 (codified at Cal. Lab. Code §§ 516, 517). In June 2000, following public hearings, the IWC amended the wage order that had, for years, guaranteed meal breaks by adding a penalty provision. Effective October 2000, employers were required to pay employees one hour’s pay for each day on which they did not receive a meal period in accordance with the regulations. See IWC Wage Order 1-2001, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11010; see also IWC’s “Statement as to the Basis [for Wage Order 1]”, available at http:// www.dir.ca.gov/IWC/statementbasis.htm). The amended order left no doubt that it applied to workers covered by collective bargaining agreements: The order did not include any blanket exemption for workers covered by collective bargaining agreements, but rather it expressly provided for its application to such workers. Specifically, the order declared that workers covered by collective bargaining agreements could agree to a meal period that commences after six hours of work (as opposed to five hours of work for workers without collective bargaining agreements).5 Furthermore, although the 5 Part 11 of the amended Wage Order provides: (A) No employer shall employ any person for a work period of more than (5) hours without a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that when a work period of not more than six (6) hours will complete the day’s work the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and employee. In the case of employees covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement, the parties to the collective bargaining agreement may agree to a meal period that commences after no more than six (6) hours of work. ... (C) Unless the employee is relieved of all duty during a 30 min- ute meal period, the meal period shall be considered an “on 6304 VALLES v. IVY HILL CORP. amended wage order created several exemptions for particular industries and for employees who are unable to take lunch breaks due to the nature of their work, printing press employees were given no special exemption.6 [4] The California state legislature subsequently codified the amended meal period requirements and the penalties created by Wage Order 1-2001. See Act of Sept. 29, 2000 Cal. Stat., ch. 876 (A.B. 2509), § 7 (codified at Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7).7 In so doing, it made clear that the substantive providuty” meal period and counted as time worked. An “on duty” meal period shall be permitted only when the nature of the work prevents an employee from being relieved of all duty and when by written agreement between the parties an on-the-job paid meal period is agreed to. The written agreement shall state that the employee may, in writing, revoke the agreement at any time. (D) If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal period in accordance with the applicable provisions of this order, the employer shall pay the employee one (1) hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal period is not provided. IWC Wage Order 1-2001, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11010, pt. 11. The IWC also created similar penalties for the denial of rest periods. See IWC Wage Order 1-2001, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11010, pt. 12. 6 Although Ivy Hill notes that in the past, turning off the printing machines for lunch was not feasible, it concedes that printing press technology changed in the 1990s making non-working lunches possible. 7 The new provision read: (a) No employer shall require any employee to work during any meal or rest period mandated by an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission. (b) If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal period or rest period in accordance with an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7. VALLES v. IVY HILL CORP. 6305 sions mandating meal periods applied to all employers, including signatories to collective bargaining agreements, Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7, and that the statutory requirements could not “in any way be contravened or set aside by a private agreement, whether written, oral, or implied.” Cal. Lab. Code § 219. In the context of § 219 and § 226.7 of the Labor Code, as well as Wage Order 1-2001, § 514’s apparent statement that workers covered by collective bargaining agreements were not covered by the entire § 500 chapter of the Labor Code, was contradictory and confusing. [5] Recognizing the ambiguity that it had created, the legislature passed a new bill that clarified that § 514 was not intended to create a blanket collective bargaining exemption for all of chapter 500 or to take away the authority of the IWC to make wage orders applicable to all employers, including those signatory to collective bargaining agreements. Rather, the legislature declared that § 514 was intended to exempt workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement from “specified code sections relating to compensation for overtime work and authorizing the adoption of an alternative workweek schedule.” Act of Aug. 6, 2001, 2001 Cal. Stat., ch. 148 (S.B. 1208) § 1 (amending § 514). In clarifying the existing law, the legislature “confirm[ed] that IWC retains its authority to establish regulations regarding wage and hour matters for employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement.” California Bill Analysis, S.B. 1208 Assem., 6/14/2001.8 Thus, the legislature made it clear that the meal period provisions remained applicable at all times to employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. We must next consider whether the legislature’s clarification may be given effect. Under California law, as under fed- 8 See also California Bill Analysis, S.B. 1208 Sen., 6/14/2001; California Bill Analysis, S.B. 1208 Sen., 5/29/2001; California Bill Analysis, S.B. 1208 Sen., 5/21/2001; California Bill Analysis, S.B. 1208 Sen., 4/25/2001. 6306 VALLES v. IVY HILL CORP. eral law, statutes do not operate retrospectively unless the legislature plainly intended them to do so. W. Sec. Bank v. Super. Ct., 933 P.2d 507, 513 (Cal. 1997) (citing Evangelatos v. Super. Ct., 753 P.2d 585, 596-97 (Cal. 1988)). The presumption against retroactive legislation is “deeply rooted in our jurisprudence” because “individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). However, “a statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law” may be “applied to transactions predating its enactment.” W. Sec. Bank, 933 P.2d at 514; see also Vasquez v. N. County Transit Dist., 292 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (as amended). The California Supreme Court has held that the legislature’s expressed views on the prior meaning of its statute, although not binding, “are entitled to due consideration.” W. Sec. Bank, 933 P.2d at 514; see also Goldman v. Standard Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 1023, 1032-34 (9th Cir. 2003); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Lavere, 217 F.3d 684, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2000). We give particular weight to the “legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act, where the amendment was adopted soon after the controversy arose concerning the proper interpretation of the statute.” W. Sec. Bank, 933 P.2d at 514 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Huson v. County of Ventura, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). We also consider whether the legislature’s expressed views have objective support in either the language or history of the legislation, and whether they are in accordance with the practice of the affected agency. See W. Sec. Bank, 933 P.2d at 516520; City of Redlands v. Sorenson, 221 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). [6] In this case, the California legislature made clear that in its view the amendment constituted a clarification and not a substantive change. Given that just two years had elapsed between the initial enactment of § 514 and the amendment, we give considerable weight to the legislature’s interpretation. VALLES v. IVY HILL CORP. 6307 Furthermore, the legislature’s position — that the meal period provisions applied without interruption to workers covered by collective bargaining agreements — is in full accord with the longstanding regulations of the IWC, duly authorized by other provisions of the Labor Code,9 as well as with consistent and historic agency practice. See Re: Impact Of SB 1208 On Existing CBA, 2002 Cal. DLSE Lexis 37, at -2 (Cal. Dep’t Indus. Relations Dec. 9, 2002) (“IWC Order[ ] 1 . . . do[es] not provide and never [has] provided, a CBA opt-out for meal period requirements”).10 The legislature’s position is bolstered by other provisions of the Act of which the original § 514 was a part that expressly authorized the IWC to maintain the existing wage orders in effect — orders that applied to signatories to collective bargaining agreements. See Eight-Hour-Day Restoration and Workplace Flexibility Act of 1999, 1999 Cal. Stat., ch. 134 (A.B. 60), pmbl; §§ 10, 11 (codified at Cal. Lab. Code §§ 516, 517). Finally, the validity of the legislature’s declaration is further confirmed by the subsequent promulgation of Wage Order 1-2001, which expressly applied to workers covered by collective bargaining agreements, as well as by the enactment of § 226.7, which mandated meal periods and penalties that could not be negotiated away through any form of private agreement. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 219, 226.7. Accordingly, we accept the California legislature’s determination that the amendment constituted a clarification and not a retroactive change, and that the right to meal periods and penalties does apply, and has consistently applied, to workers covered by collective bargaining agreements. 9 The long-standing regulations that guaranteed meal periods were promulgated under the agency’s authority under provisions of the Labor Code outside of the 500 chapter. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1173; see also Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal. 4th 557, 561-62 (1996) (citing Cal. Lab. Code, §§ 1173, 1178.5, 1182). 10 “[W]hile not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [DLSE documents] do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 87 Cal. App. 4th 805, 815 (2001). 6308 VALLES v. IVY HILL CORP.