Opinion ID: 59484
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of error.(a) Standard of review

Text: When a prosecutor's improper remarks are claimed by a defendant to have prejudiced his right to a fair trial, we have used a few different articulations of our appellate role in reviewing the error. Regardless of the precise language, the goal is to determine if there is a meaningful risk that the verdict was improperly affected by those remarks. At times, we have distinguished review of prosecutorial misconduct under our broad supervisory power over the trials conducted in federal district courts, from our more circumscribed review authority over petitions for post-conviction relief, which is limited to due process violations. E.g., Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1460 (5th Cir.1992). This distinction explains somebut not allof the different standards of inquiry stated in opinions. When prosecutor misconduct is reviewed on direct appeal from a criminal trial, one of the earliest statements of the present test for reversal is this: As the Supreme Court observed nearly a half century ago, the prosecutor may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). To determine whether the prosecutor violated this rule, the reviewing court must weigh the degree to which the alleged improper argument may have affected the substantial rights of the defendants. United States v. Rhoden, 453 F.2d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 1972). Pertinent factors include: (1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the statements, (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instructions, and (3) the strength of the evidence of defendant's guilt. Id. United States v. McPhee, 731 F.2d 1150, 1152 (5th Cir.1984). A more recent statement of the three factors appears in United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276, 290-91 (5th Cir.2001). It is the standard we apply to this appeal. We do not view the prosecutor's remarks in isolation but consider the effect of those remarks in the context of the entire trial. Id. Underlying our considerations is that a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone. Andrews, 22 F.3d at 1341. The government initially argues that defense counsel's objection was insufficient to preserve the error for this Court's review. Mendoza's counsel stated simply that the prosecutor was testifying. The trial court was thereby presented with a valid objection that the prosecutor was bringing before the jurors a matter that had not been introduced as evidence, which no juror may have observed, and which reflected the prosecutor's opinion derived either from his observations or simply his desire to persuade. We conclude that the objection to the prosecutor's remarks was sufficient to preserve the error for review. Though the error was preserved, Mendoza still bears the substantial burden of establishing that the error warrants reversal of his conviction. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d at 290. The determinative question is whether the prosecutor's remarks cast serious doubt on the correctness of the jury's verdict. Id. (quoting United States v. Iredia, 866 F.2d 114, 117 (5th Cir.1989)). The dissent characterizes the error as one violating a due process right to have jurors base their verdict solely on the evidence introduced at trial. The dissent would treat the prosecutor's remarks as a violation of the due process protections of the Fifth Amendment, akin to a remark regarding the defendant's post-arrest silence or request for counsel. E.g., United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d 465, 472-73 (5th Cir.1999). When analyzing whether constitutional error requires reversal, we ask whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [3] The dissent's view that a due process violation occurred arises from language in Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978). In Taylor, the Supreme Court considered whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a presumption of innocence instruction if requested by the accused. 436 U.S. at 479, 98 S.Ct. 1930. In the course of its analysis, the Court remarked that one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial. Id. at 485, 98 S.Ct. 1930 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)). The cited precedent held that an accused cannot be compelled to stand trial in prison clothing. Williams, 425 U.S. at 503-06, 96 S.Ct. 1691. These precedents were concerned that even when law enforcement officers and the prosecution found sufficient justifications for arrest and a trial for the charged offenses, the presumption of innocence was the necessary starting position for jurors. See Taylor, 436 U.S. at 484-85, 98 S.Ct. 1930; Williams, 425 U.S. at 504, 96 S.Ct. 1691. Governmental views about guilt are reflected in arrest, indictment, and even in a person's being issued prisoner clothing. It is the trial court's function to ensure that jurors do not use those events and symbols as evidence. Taylor and Williams do not transform any reference to matters not in evidence into a Fifth Amendment violation. Consistently, this Court has reviewed a prosecutor's reference to facts not in the record under the non-constitutional error standard that we apply today. E.g., United States v. Davis, 792 F.2d 1299, 1306-08 (5th Cir.1986). We find no precedent in which the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard was applied to this kind of closing argument error. This is not a case in which the [Government] has denied a defendant the benefit of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, such as the right to counsel, or in which the prosecutor's remarks so prejudiced a specific right, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, as to amount to a denial of that right. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) (citation omitted). One point at which caselaw concerning constitutional error intersects with the caselaw about review of improper closing arguments is when the prosecutor's remarks have so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Id. at 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868. Under the Donnelly test of pervading unfairness, an improper comment may become constitutional error, but it is only the exceptional case in which that will occur.