Opinion ID: 41659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against the Board

Text: Worthington first argues that the magistrate judge erred in granting judgment in favor of the Board on her Fourteenth Amendment Claim, brought pursuant to § 1983. Specifically, Worthington argues that J.W. was assaulted as a result of the Board’s policy of having only one adult, the bus driver, supervise 3 The magistrate judge denied judgment as a matter of law at that time on certain claims against one defendant, but then granted judgment of a matter of law in favor of that remaining defendant at the close of the defense case. 6 ITPC students on the bus, notwithstanding that the students needed constant adult supervision. Municipal entities, such as the Board, cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior. Sauls v. Pierce County Sch. Dist., 399 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, to impose liability on a municipal government under § 1983, “the plaintiff must identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ causing the deprivation of federal rights.” Id. (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court has explained, Locating a “policy” ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a “custom” that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law. Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997) (internal citations omitted). Further, “it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality.” Id. at 404, 117 S. Ct. at 1388. Instead, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the municipality’s “deliberate conduct” was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. Id. “That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link 7 between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Id. As this Court has previously explained, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with “‘deliberate indifference’ to its known or obvious consequences.” Davis v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1367, 1375-76 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). We note at the outset that the Board could be liable only if it owed some duty to protect J.W. from third-party assaults. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 568-69 (11th Cir. 1997). “[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1989). Rather, “[t]he Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimum levels of safety and security,” and only “in certain limited circumstances [does] the Constitution impose[] upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular individuals.” Id. at 195, 198, 109 S. Ct. at 1003, 1004. Those circumstances exist where the State acts to restrain an individual’s personal liberty and ability to self-protect, such as where the individual is incarcerated or institutionalized. Id. at 198-200, 109 S. Ct. at 1004-05. 8 This Court has previously explained that public schools generally do not have the requisite level of control over children to give rise to a constitutional duty to protect them from third-party actors. See Wyke, 129 F.3d at 569; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995) (“[W]e do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect . . . .’”) (citations omitted). “By mandating school attendance, the state simply does not restrict a student’s liberty in the same sense that it does when it incarcerates prisoners or when it commits mental patients involuntarily.” Wyke, 129 F.3d at 569. Nevertheless, Worthington argues that J.W. was in a “special relationship” to the State because he was forced to attend a special school for children with learning disabilities and behavioral problems, forced to ride the bus, and suffered from known mental, emotional, and behavioral disabilities making him dependent on the Board for safety. We do not believe that these factors created a special relationship or a duty on the part of the Board to protect J.W. from third parties.4 4 On this issue, Worthington relies primarily on Teague v. Tex. City Indep. Sch. Dist., 348 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Tex. 2004), in which the district court denied a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim relating to an incident in which a student with Down’s Syndrome allegedly was sexually assaulted by another student in the school restroom. However, the district court in Teague subsequently vacated its prior order in part and granted the school board’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that no special relationship existed between the school board and the special education student to create a duty on the part of the board to protect the student from the alleged incident. Teague v. Tex. City Indep. Sch. Dist., 386 F.Supp. 2d 893, 896 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 9 Thus, even if the Board acted with deliberate indifference, there was no constitutional violation. Even assuming the Board was obligated to protect J.W., the magistrate judge nevertheless properly determined that the Board was not deliberately indifferent to J.W.’s constitutional rights. Worthington alleges that the Board had a policy of transporting troubled ITPC students with no supervision other than the bus driver. She asserts that the Board’s policy was to place aides, in addition to the bus driver, on buses only when students with physical disabilities were on board. Thus, ITPC students such as J.W. and J.M. were under the sole supervision of the bus driver. Worthington argues that the ITPC students exhibited emotional and behavioral problems, and specifically that J.M.’s individualized education plan (“IEP”) noted that he was sneaky, aggressive, made inappropriate comments to female students, and needed to be supervised at all times. As a result, Worthington argues that by transporting the ITPC students on the bus with only the supervision of the bus driver, whose main focus was on driving rather than supervising the conduct of the students, the Board placed ITPC students such as J.W. in a vulnerable position and failed to protect them from foreseeable harm inflicted by other students. She argues that the Board was aware of the need for a second adult to supervise the troubled ITPC students, as evidenced by the ITPC policy that each classroom must 10 have an aide as well as a teacher present at all times to monitor the students during class when the teacher is working with an individual student or when the teacher must leave the room.5 Worthington’s argument is not persuasive. First, despite Worthington’s contentions, the evidence at trial was that the determination of whether to place an aide on the bus was made not by the Board, but by the IEP committee; that an aide could have been placed on the bus if any of the students’ IEPs so recommended; and that an aide could be requested in any student’s IEP, not just a physically disabled student’s IEP. In addition, there was no evidence to establish a custom of failing to provide aides when recommended by IEPs. There was no aide on board J.W.’s bus because none of the students’ IEPs so recommended, not because a Board policy precluded the supervision of an aide. In any event, even if the Board did have a policy of transporting ITPC students under the sole supervision of the bus driver, Worthington has failed to show that such a policy was a “moving force” behind the alleged assault. The alleged assault was committed by another student on the bus, and not an actor of the school district. There is no evidence that J.W. sought the help of the bus driver or otherwise did anything to get the attention of the bus driver. Further, while the 5 It is worth noting that this policy was an ITPC policy and not a Board policy. 11 Board perhaps could have implemented policies that might have protected J.W. from the assault, such as placing additional supervisors on the bus, the alleged assault certainly was not a “known or obvious consequence” of the failure to take such action. See Davis, 233 F.3d at 1375-76. While J.M. was known to exhibit certain behavioral problems, Worthington points to no evidence that J.M. had previously committed a sexual assault or was a known threat to do so. Nor is ITPC’s policy of placing an aide in each classroom relevant to this case. Although it may be ideal to place a second adult in the classroom to facilitate the learning process, that policy in no way suggests that students would be in grave danger if supervised by only one adult on the bus to and from school. Worthington also argues that the Board failed to require bus drivers such as Henry Blake to be trained about the proper care for special education students. This argument also is unavailing. First, the evidence at trial indicated that bus drivers did receive training on dealing with special education students. In any event, Worthington has failed to show a causal connection between any failure to train bus drivers and the alleged assault. The alleged assault (if it occurred) is unfortunate, and Worthington’s outrage at her son’s abuse is certainly justified. However, when the alleged abuse occurred, her son was under the supervision of the bus driver. While that 12 supervision allegedly ultimately failed to prevent the harm, neither the fallibility of the supervisor nor the failure to provide a second supervisor amounts to deliberate indifference. As this Court has previously explained, “a school board is not deliberately indifferent simply because the measures it takes are ultimately ineffective . . . .” Sauls, 399 F.3d at 1285 (citing Davis, 233 F.3d at 1375) (other citation omitted). Thus, the magistrate judge properly determined that no Board policy was the moving force behind the alleged assault.