Opinion ID: 2561872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Ceded Lands in General

Text: With regard to ceded lands in general, the trial court concluded that: Case law has held that sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for injunctive relief to prohibit state officials from acting in an illegal manner. [ (Citing in a footnote to Pele Defense Fund, supra . )] The State of Hawai`i has not consented, however, to be sued in a lawsuit contesting the validity of its title to the ceded lands. It is the law in this jurisdiction that a proceeding against property in which the State of Hawaii has an interest is a suit against the State and cannot be maintained without the consent of the State, so that the State and its interest in land are immune from suit. [ (Citing in a footnote to A.C. Chock, Ltd. v. Kaneshiro, 51 Haw. 87, 88, 451 P.2d 809, 811 (1969). ] If it is made to appear at any stage of the case that the State claims title, the court's jurisdiction over the merits of such claim thereby is ousted under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. [ (Citing in a footnote to Marks v. Ah Nee, 48 Haw. 92, 94, 395 P.2d 620, 622 (1964).) ] A claim for injunctive and declaratory relief would have the effect of depriving the State of control over public lands under [HRS] chapters 171 and 201E is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action, and is barred by sovereign immunity. [ (Citing in a footnote to Idaho v. Couer [Coeur] d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 [117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438] (1997).) ] Looking beyond the pleadings to examine the effect of the suit and its impact on these special sovereignty interests [of the State], sovereign immunity bars [p]laintiffs' claims to the extent they seek relief based on an allege [sic] cloud on the State's title to ceded lands. Where the requested injunctive relief would bar the State's principal officers from exercising their governmental powers and authority over the disputed lands and waters, and would diminish, even extinguish, the State's control over a vast reach of land and waters long deemed by the State to be an integral part of its territory, sovereign immunity applies. [ (Citing in a footnote to Caner [Coeur] d'Alene)] (Internal footnotes omitted.) The plaintiffs take issue with the trial court's reliance on Coeur d'Alene. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenge the trial court's determination that their claims with regard to the sale of ceded lands in general were the functional equivalent of a quiet title action [20] and, therefore, barred by sovereign immunity inasmuch as `[i]t is the law in this jurisdiction that a proceeding against property in which the State of Hawai`i has an interest in is a suit against the State and cannot be maintained without the consent of the State[.]' On appeal, the OHA plaintiffs contend that they are not seeking ownership of property from this court, but  only an order prohibiting the transfer of [c]eded [l]ands pending the resolution of [n]ative Hawaiian claims. (Emphasis in original.) As such, the OHA plaintiffs argue that the trial court's reliance on Coeur d'Alene, discussed infra, was error. The OHA plaintiffs submit that the trial court should have, instead, been guided by Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir.1997), aff'd, 526 U.S. 172, 119 S.Ct. 1187, 143 L.Ed.2d 270 (1999), discussed infra. The individual plaintiffs similarly maintain that they do not seek an ownership determination or even a declaration that they are entitled to the beneficial use and/or occupancy of the ceded lands. The defendants, however, contend that the trial court correctly relied on Coeur d'Alene because, as in this case, the requested injunctive relief would bar the State's principal officers from exercising their governmental powers and authority over the disputed lands and waters,' and `would diminish, even extinguish the State's control over a vast reach of lands . . . long deemed by the State to be an integral part of its territory.' (Citing Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 282, 117 S.Ct. 2028). In Coeur d'Alene, the sole issue before the Court was whether the federally recognized Coeur d'Alene Tribe's (the Tribe) suit against the State of Idaho, seeking the beneficial interest, subject to the trusteeship of the United States, in the beds and banks of all navigable watercourses and waters (the `submerged lands') within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation, was barred by sovereign, immunity. 521 U.S. at 264-65, 117 S.Ct. 2028. The Tribe styled its suit as a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging an ongoing violation of its property rights in contravention of federal law and [seeking] prospective injunctive relief. Id. at 266, 281, 117 S.Ct. 2028. The Court recognized that [a]n allegation of an ongoing violation of federal' law where the requested relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young [exception].)[ [21] ] However, this case is unusual in that the Tribe's suit is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action which implicates special sovereignty interests. Id. at 281, 117 S.Ct. 2028. The Court, in its principal decision, determined that the Tribe's suit was the functional equivalent of a quiet title action in that substantially all benefits of ownership and control [in the submerged lands] would shift from [Idaho] to the Tribe. Id. at 282, 117 S.Ct. 2028. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the submerged lands have historically been considered `sovereign lands[,' and] State ownership of them has been considered an essential attribute of sovereignty. Id. at 283, 117 S.Ct. 2028 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court concluded: It is apparent, then, that[,] if the Tribe were to prevail, Idaho's sovereign interest in its lands and waters would be affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury. Under these particular and special circumstances, we find the Young exception inapplicable. The dignity and status of its statehood allow Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon responding to these claims in its own courts, which are open to hear and determine the case. Id. at 287-88, 117 S.Ct. 2028.