Opinion ID: 1443005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Punitive Damages; Other Defendants

Text: DeFelice's final two arguments are intertwined: he asserts that the district court should not have permitted Kunz to dismiss all of the defendants other than DeFelice on the eve of trial. Their absence at trial prejudiced him, he says, primarily because it led the jury to impose the full weight of the punitive damages on him alone. That award, he continues, even at the $90,000 level, is disproportionate to the compensatory damages. Voluntary dismissal pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) is allowed at the district court's discretion. Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Koppers, Co., 627 F.2d 54, 56 (7th Cir.1980). A district court abuses its discretion only if the defendant shows that she will suffer plain legal prejudice. We have identified four factors that throw light on whether this kind of prejudice would arise: [t]he defendant's effort and expense of preparation for trial, excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting the action, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal, and the fact that a motion for summary judgment has been filed by the defendant. Pace v. Southern Express Co., 409 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir.1969). DeFelice does not come close to showing reversible error here. The assertion that his defense was hampered by creating too many empty chairs at the defense table seems backward: far from preventing him from deflecting liability onto others, as he phrases it, it permitted him to point at those empty chairs and question how much of the harm he was responsible for. Unlike codefendants, empty chairs do not talk back. DeFelice questioned Kunz about the dismissals at trial, and so the jury was well aware that DeFelice was not the only officer involved. Finally, DeFelice did not object to the motion at the time, and so he has forfeited the point. DeFelice also argues that he was saddled with disproportionate punitive damages (initially $250,000, then after remittitur $90,000) because he ended up as the sole defendant. When no constitutional issue about the size of a punitive damages award has been raised, we review only for abuse of discretion. Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 433, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001). If, however, we must decide whether an award transgresses constitutional limits, our review is de novo. Id. at 436, 121 S.Ct. 1678. DeFelice cites constitutional decisions in his brief, including BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), and State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), but he also cites one case from this circuit where a conventional claim of excessiveness was raised, and reviewed deferentially, Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 1983). Despite Cooper's guidance, he does not distinguish between the two kinds of arguments. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008), underscores the importance of keeping these theories straight. In Exxon, the Court held that as a matter of federal common law, a punitive damages award in an admiralty case may not exceed the compensatory award (that is, a 1:1 ratio is the upper limit for this class of cases). 128 S.Ct. at 2633. The Court stressed both the particular features of maritime law, as exemplified by the oil spill caused by the Exxon Valdez, and the fact that it was acting here in the position of a common law court of last review. Id. at 2629. Kunz's case was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although this statute, like many, requires a certain amount of elaboration, we do not sit, as the Exxon Court did, as a common law court of last review. Instead, we must respect the limitations Congress built into the statute. In the context of establishing the proper limitations period for various federal actions when the statute is silent, the Supreme Court has reminded us that [i]nevitably our resolution of cases or controversies requires us to close interstices in federal law from time to time, but when it is necessary for us to borrow a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, we borrow no more than necessary. West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39, 107 S.Ct. 1538, 95 L.Ed.2d 32 (1987). Looking particularly at § 1983, the Court has also held that [t]here can be no doubt that claims brought pursuant to § 1983 sound in tort. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999); id. at 727, 119 S.Ct. 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring). There is thus good reason for us to look for guidance in the standards for excessiveness of punitive damages that courts have established in tort cases, when we evaluate this verdict. DeFelice, however, has not presented any argument for the proposition that § 1983 imposes a stricter limitation on awards of punitive damages than the Constitution would permit in a state tort case. We therefore have no reason to consider that question. Instead, as he has implicitly requested, we look only at the question whether the eventual verdict of $90,000 in punitive damages exceeds the outer limits established in the Supreme Court's constitutional cases. Our evaluation is guided by three guideposts: the reprehensibility of the action in question, the ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages, and the parallel remedies available. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Of these guideposts, [p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. Id. Evaluating reprehensibility involves inquiry into whether the injury was physical, whether it evinced a reckless disregard for the health of the target, whether the target had a financial vulnerability, and whether the injury was clearly intentional. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513. DeFelice's brief slid quickly over this factor. Kunz's injury was clearly physical, he was shackled and defenseless while he was being punched and thus vulnerable to the injury inflicted, and DeFelice's violent actions were intentional. This court takes police brutality very seriously as grounds for punitive damages. See, e.g., Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir.1996). The need to deter such behavior is plain: police brutality is a longstanding problem with which many cities are still coming to grips. The reprehensibility of DeFelice's conduct in his position of public trust justifies a substantial punitive damages award. The second guidepost we consult is the ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages awards. As Exxon reiterated, there is no simple mathematical formula that courts must follow. See 128 S.Ct. at 2626; Gore, 517 U.S. at 580-82, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Instead, the Exxon Court acknowledged that heavier punitive awards have been thought to be justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect or when the value of injury and the corresponding compensatory award are small. 128 S.Ct. at 2622. In making the latter point, the Court relied on Gore, which recognized that low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. 517 U.S. at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589. DeFelice does not offer a clear response to this point. The jury's award of $10,000 in compensatory damages against DeFelice was low for a beating of this kind, and there is some reason to think that the punitive award was disguised compensation for pain and suffering. A total of $100,000 for Kunz's injuries does not seem excessive. Moreover, even accepting the characterization of the $90,000 damages award as punitive, the ratio to compensatory damages is still in the single-digits9:1nowhere near the 500:1 ratio overturned in Gore. Particularly in light of DeFelice's poorly developed arguments on this point, we see no reversible error in the ratio between the compensatory and the punitive damages. The final guidepost involves examining the parallel remedies available to Kunz. DeFelice argues that under Illinois law a conviction for battery or aggravated battery would have resulted in fines of $2,500 or $25,000, respectively. See 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(a)(1) & (2). While this is true, he neglects to point out that an aggravated battery conviction, a felony, might also bring from two to five years of prison time. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6). In Gore the Supreme Court recognized that fines alone might not tell the whole story about proportionality when imprisonment is also on the table. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 583-84, 116 S.Ct. 1589. In this case, the possibility of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was also lingering in the background. In short, we cannot simply look in isolation at the fines authorized under the pertinent Illinois statutes. We note as well that nothing in this record suggests that DeFelice has already been punished. The City's brief says only that he is no longer a Chicago police officer, citing to a place in the record where DeFelice testifies that he is retired. The broader picture therefore shows that the punitive damages award ordered by the court is not so disproportionate that we must vacate it.