Opinion ID: 2005604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: violent offender statute.

Text: As amended by the 1998 General Assembly, 1998 Ky. Acts, ch. 606, § 77, KRS 439.3401 provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) As used in this section, violent offender means any person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of a capital offense, Class A felony, or Class B felony involving the death of the victim.... (2) A violent offender who has been convicted of ... a Class A felony and receives a life sentence ... shall not be released on ... parole until he has served at least twenty (20) years in the penitentiary. Violent offenders may have a greater minimum parole eligibility date than other offenders who receive longer sentences, including a sentence of life imprisonment. (3) A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital offense or Class A felony with a sentence of a term of years or Class B felony who is a violent offender shall not be released on parole until he has served at least eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed. Appellant pled guilty to murder without a plea agreement and waived jury sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel advised the trial judge that, pursuant to KRS 439.3401(2) and (3), Appellant would have an earlier parole eligibility date if he were sentenced to life than if he were sentenced to a term of years in excess of 24.5 years, and, if the judge intended to impose a sentence in excess of 24.5 years, Appellant would request imposition of a life sentence. The trial judge sentenced Appellant to forty years in prison. Pursuant to the KRS 439.3401(3), as written, Appellant would not be eligible for parole until after serving thirty-four years of his sentencefourteen years longer than a violent offender serving a life sentence and nine years longer than a capital offender serving a term of life without benefit of probation or parole for twenty-five years. KRS 532.030(1). Prior to 1998, KRS 439.3401 contained essentially the same provisions with respect to parole eligibility for violent offenders as it does now, except that subsection (2) required service of a minimum of twelve years of a life sentence before being eligible for parole and subsection (3) required service of at least fifty percent (50%) of a term of years before being eligible for parole. Thus, under the pre-1998 version of the statute, a violent offender sentenced to a term of years of more than twenty-four years had a later parole eligibility date than a violent offender serving a life sentence. Except for extending the minimum parole eligibility dates, the only relevant change made by the 1998 amendment was the addition of the last sentence in KRS 439.3401(2): Violent offenders may have a greater minimum parole eligibility date than other offenders who receive longer sentences, including a sentence of life imprisonment. We are not writing on a clean slate. In Huff v. Commonwealth, Ky., 763 S.W.2d 106 (1988), the very same constitutional issues were raised with respect to the pre-1998 version of the statute as are raised here. Noting that the classification of offenses and the length of punishment are prerogatives of the legislature, citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) and Rudolph v. Corrections Cabinet, Ky., 710 S.W.2d 235, 236 (1986), Huff held that the statute was not unconstitutional as written. We do not find the minimum imposed by the legislature to be arbitrary or capricious in any way. It is the uncertainty of life itself, not a declaration of a minimum eligibility, which creates a possible disparity. For example, a life sentence imposed on a 60-year-old defendant is not the same as a life sentence imposed upon a 20-year-old defendant. 763 S.W.2d at 108. (We might add that a forty-year sentence imposed on a sixty-year-old defendant is not the same as a forty year sentence imposed upon a twenty-year-old defendant.) We have subsequently reiterated in Land v. Commonwealth, Ky., 986 S.W.2d 440 (1999), that there is no constitutional right to parole, but rather parole is a matter of legislative grace or executive clemency. Id. at 442. The issue was raised again in Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 844 S.W.2d 391 (1992). Sanders finessed the constitutional issues decided by Huff, supra , and found a legislative intent in KRS 439.3401(3) that a violent offender sentenced to a term of years would be eligible for parole after serving either fifty percent (50%) of the sentence imposed, or twelve years, whichever was less. Id. at 394. Of course, that is not what the statute plainly and unambiguously stated, Mullins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 210, 212 (1997); and the Commonwealth points out that we have subsequently held that, when engaged in statutory construction, a court must refer to the words used in enacting the statute rather than surmising what may have been intended but was not expressed. Commonwealth v. Allen, Ky., 980 S.W.2d 278, 280 (1998); see also Commonwealth v. Frodge, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 864, 866 (1998). Nevertheless, the 1998 amendment of KRS 439.3401(3) changed only the length of the period of parole disability from fifty percent (50%) to eighty-five percent (85%) of the imposed sentence. The amendment did not address the interpretation of the statute set forth in Sanders . It is a generally recognized rule of statutory construction that when a statute has been construed by a court of last resort and the statute is substantially reenacted, the Legislature may be regarded as adopting such construction. Commonwealth v. Trousdale, 297 Ky. 724, 181 S.W.2d 254, 256 (1944). Further, the failure of the legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a statute [is] extremely persuasive evidence of the true legislative intent. There is a strong implication that the legislature agrees with a prior court interpretation when it does not amend the statute interpreted. Rye v. Weasel, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (1996). The Commonwealth argues that a contrary legislative intent was expressed by the added language in the amendment of KRS 439.3401(2): Violent offenders may have a greater minimum parole eligibility date than other offenders who receive longer sentences, including a sentence of life imprisonment. (Emphasis added.) We disagree. The reference to other offenders obviously refers to offenders other than violent offenders. Parole eligibility guidelines for other offenders are generally established by the parole board, KRS 439.340(3), and nonviolent offenders obviously have earlier parole eligibility dates. 501 KAR 1:030 § 3. Furthermore, KRS 439.3401(2) pertains only to life sentences. Under current parole board guidelines, a nonviolent first offender serving a life sentence is eligible for parole after serving eight years. 501 KAR 1:030 § 3(a). Regardless, KRS 439.3401(3), which pertains to sentences to a term of years and which was the provision interpreted in Sanders, supra , was not amended to add new language similar to that added to KRS 439.3401(2). Nor do we perceive any legislative intent in the 1998 amendments of KRS 532.060(2)(a) and KRS 532.110(1)(c) to affect the Sanders interpretation of KRS 439.3401(3). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the Fayette Circuit Court are affirmed and the interpretation of KRS 439.3401(3) set forth in Sanders v. Commonwealth, supra , is reaffirmed. LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. KELLER, J., concurs by separate opinion, with STUMBO, J., joining that concurring opinion.