Opinion ID: 531907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Long Delay

Text: 7 Mulder argues that the two year delay between the time of the actual discovery of the pills and the time when they were finally tested pursuant to a legal search warrant was unreasonable and excessive. According to Mulder, the long time lapse made it impossible for the government to show that the police would have sought a warrant and discovered the evidence independently even had the prior illegal search not occurred as required by Murray, 108 S.Ct. at 2534, n. 2 and Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 n. 5, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). In other words, Mulder claims that the police officer's decision to seek a warrant for the chemical testing must have been affected by the fact that the pills had been illegally tested long before, the results were known to the officer, and the pills were in police custody for two years. If true, this would implicate the  'search first, warrant later' mentality that courts must be wary of in order to prohibit the use of confirmatory searches. See Murray, 108 S.Ct. at 2534, n. 2. 8 There is ample evidence however, that the search warrant was sought on the basis of probable cause developed independently of the first unlawful testing. Cf. United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862 (9th Cir.1987) (no independent source of probable cause). The police had lawful custody of the pills and could clearly see that the tablets were marked with the distinctive labeling of methaqualone tablets (Lemmon 714). In Mulder I we recognized that these circumstances undoubtedly provided probable cause to seek a warrant. 808 F.2d at 1349. The police officer's decision to seek a search warrant was not affected by the prior illegal search; therefore the search was legal. See Murray, 108 S.Ct. at 2534, n. 3 ([W]hat counts is whether the actual illegal search had any effect in producing the warrant, not whether some hypothetical illegal search would have aborted the warrant.). 9 Nor does the fact that there was a two-year delay require a different result. While a time delay in obtaining a warrant has been held to constitute a basis for holding the search illegal, see, e.g., United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414 (9th Cir.1988) (delay of 23 days found unconstitutional), there are two distinctions which taken together cause us to uphold the search in this case. First, in contrast to Murray, 108 S.Ct. at 2532 (where only eight hours elapsed between the first illegal search and issuance of the warrant), the government obtained Mulder's property lawfully and not as the result of an unlawful search. Moreover, Mulder never made a motion for the return of the pills or asserted any legal challenge to the government's right to retain them. 1 Second, the time lapse was the result of the judicial appeal process rather than any dilatory tactics on the part of the government. The Court stated in Murray that the government should not be placed in a worse position than it otherwise would have occupied because of the exclusionary rule. 108 S.Ct. at 2535. Obviously an appeal based on the exclusionary rule would be included in this admonishment. The government sought a warrant in a reasonable period of time after it had exhausted its appeals. Because both factors, lawful possession and legitimate delay, were present we hold that the length of time that the government maintained possession of the pills does not require us to hold the search unlawful.