Opinion ID: 2981834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Insufficiency

Text: In this appeal, the defendant argues: 10 The defendant was thirty-nine when the court sentenced him. 10 No. 09-6297 United States v. Ferguson • The sentencing judge did not: a) address his attorney’s arguments for a lower sentence; b) consider the § 3553(a) factors, or c) provide a reasoned basis for the sentence; • The sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court arbitrarily selected the term of 200 months without considering the § 3553(a) factors; and • His attorney’s failure to include the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity in his argument for a below-Guideline sentence constituted ineffective assistance. We conclude that the sentence in this case was procedurally unreasonable because the District Judge did not: 1) consider all of the defendant’s arguments in support of a downward variance; 2) consider all of the § 3553(a) factorsfailed to: 1) take greater cognizance of the defendant’s arguments in support of a downward variance; 2) fully consider the factors which he was required to consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and 3) adequately express his reasons, in light of those factors, for imposing a sentence of 200 months. Our review of the sentence is for procedural and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316, 322 (6th Cir. 2007). A sentence is procedurally unreasonable, inter alia, where the sentencing judge “simply selects what the judge deems an appropriate sentence without . . . consideration” of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005)). On the other hand, “sentences falling within the advisory Guidelines range,” as in this case, “may be considered presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 582 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-51 (2007)). 11 No. 09-6297 United States v. Ferguson 1. Consideration of the Defendant’s Arguments at Sentencing11 As noted, the defendant’s attorney filed a presentencing motion for a downward departure, which the court below properly treated as a request for a variance from the Guideline range.12 That motion asserted four grounds for a deviation from the enhanced Guideline range: 1. The small amount of crack which the defendant sold in 1998 (less than half a gram) and the amounts sold to the CI in this case (one gram); 2. That, despite the designation of four of his prior robbery offenses as aggravated, he had only had a gun in one of the robberies, and that had been a BB gun; 3. The defendant did not have a leadership role in the offenses of conviction; and 4. His criminal history category of VI significantly over-stated the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history. We agree with the defendant that the District Judge should have addressed all four of his asserted grounds for a departure/variance. The judge’s omissions in this regard resulted, in part, from how he framed the issue, stating at the outset, “your motion deals principally with the two predicate offenses for career offender status.” (Tr. 7/lines 8-10). Instead of then or ever reminding the judge that that was not all, the defendant’s attorney agreed with the judge’s statement. At that point, moreover, the attorney offered a weak assertion that the defendant had been unarmed during his 11 The defendant’s brief argues as its first point the failure to consider the § 3553(a) factors and state the reasons for the sentence. We first address whether the District Judge adequately considered the defense arguments for a departure/variance, then whether the Judge considered the § 3553(a) factors adequately and, finally, whether his statement of his reasons for his sentence sufficed. This is the conventional sequence, which the court followed here at sentencing. 12 To the extent that the motion asked the court to find the defendant’s criminal history category overstated, it requested a downward departure. To the extent it sought a below-Guideline sentence, it asked for a variance. 12 No. 09-6297 United States v. Ferguson month-long crime spree, though four of the convictions were for aggravated robbery. The defendant’s attorney offered no evidence in support of that assertion. Instead, he merely said that the defendant was his source for that contention. (Id. at line 25 - 10/line 14). Without mentioning the defense attorney’s remaining contentions, the Judge found that the Guideline range of 188 - 235 months was “appropriate to address all of the facts and circumstances of Mr. Ferguson’s case, as well as his history and characteristics.” (Tr. at 10/lines 21-22; 11/lines 2-4). The attorney did not remind the judge, and the judge did not comment on, the rather small overall amount of crack cocaine involved in 1998 and the sales (his and Hickerson’s) resulting in his present conviction. The Judge likewise made no mention of the defendant’s lack of a leadership role. The court did note, however, with regard to the claim that the criminal history was overstated, that the criminal history was “extensive” and occurred over a “relatively short period of time.” Thus, the court overlooked two portions of the defendant’s request for a departure/variance: the modest amount of drugs and lack (apparently undisputed) of a leadership role. This court recently summarized the duty to respond to arguments in support of a variance: Regardless of whether it may be error to grant a variance without some indication of the reasoning, discussion of all rejected requests for variances is not required. “Although Congress requires a court to give ‘the reasons’ for its sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), it does not say that courts must give the reasons for rejecting any and all arguments by the parties for alternative sentences.” . . . It suffices that “[t]he record makes clear that the sentencing judge listened to each argument,” “considered the supporting evidence,” “was fully aware of the defendant's various physical ailments[,] and imposed a sentence that takes them into account.” United States v. Lamb, 431 F. App’x 421, 426 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 13 No. 09-6297 United States v. Ferguson The defendant cites three cases in support of his claim that the sentencing judge failed to give adequate consideration to the arguments counsel made in his presentencing motion: United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2007), United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Buffington, 310 F. App’x 757 (6th Cir. 2009). The government argues that these cases are not applicable or are distinguishable. To be sure, the Judge’s explanation in Thomas13 for rejecting the defense contentions was less complete than the explanation in this case. But that those in Thomas were more opaque and abrupt does not make the judge’s response to the defendant’s contentions here sufficient. The defendant cites Richardson, a case in which the judge expansively explained his reasons for his sentence, 437 F.3d at 554, simply for the proposition that “the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it. . . .” The court in that case did so. See id. at 552-53. In Buffington, the district court carefully considered the pertinent § 3553(a) factors and commented at length on the defendant’s criminal history. 310 F. App’x at 761. But that was not enough to avoid a finding of procedural unreasonableness. This was so because, as here, “the judge never specifically addressed three of [the defendant’s] four arguments. . . .” Id. at 763. Thus, even though the court in that case considered the § 3553(a) factors, this court vacated and remanded for resentencing “[b]ecause the district court 13 “I believe that a sentence of 240 months, given the defendant's background and behavior in this particular case is a fair, adequate and reasonable sentence considering the advisory guideline range that applies, and as well considering the additional factors contained within 18 [U.S.C.] Section 3553(a).” 498 F.3d at 339. 14 No. 09-6297 United States v. Ferguson failed to provide a sufficient basis for its rejection of [the defendant’s] arguments for a lower sentence . . . .” Id. The government argues that the court’s consideration met the requisite standard: The district court stated that it had read Defendant’s motion, and it heard oral argument from both parties regarding the merits of that motion. (R. 96, Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 6-7.) During the course of defense counsel’s argument, the district court asked a number of questions. (Id. at 7-9.) And, it ultimately stated that “based upon what’s before me . . . I’m going to have to deny your motion for downward departure.” (Id. at 10.) Additionally, with respect to Defendant’s argument about the sentence received by co-defendant Hickerson, the district court explained that it considers every case individually and co-defendant Hickerson (unlike Defendant) received a downward departure due to the substantial assistance that he provided to law enforcement. (Id. at 11-12.) (Doc. 006110707161, at 19-20).14 The government recites the inarguable point that “a district court need not address in detail every argument that a defendant raises in support of a lesser sentence because district courts are afforded ‘considerable latitude in deciding which arguments to discuss and how much explanation is necessary.’” (Id. at 20) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 295 F. App’x 799, 804 (6th Cir. 2008)). The government also cites the statement in Rita, 551 U.S. at 356-57 (internal quotations omitted), that “lengthy explanation of the sentence may be particularly unnecessary where the district court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence and where a matter is conceptually simple and the record 14 Reading the defendant’s submission is not the same as “considering” it. See Thomas, 498 F.3d at 341 (where “arguments went unmentioned and unaddressed, save the general statement by the district court that it had received, read, and understood the sentencing memorandum[,] . . . we must conclude that the context and the record do not make clear the court's reasoning.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 15 No. 09-6297 United States v. Ferguson makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments.” The government fails, however, to note the Supreme Court’s caveat in Rita that where the defendant “argues for departure, . . . [and] presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence, the judge will normally go further and explain why he has rejected those arguments.” Id. at 357. That is the situation here: the defendant’s attorney presented nonfrivolous reasons for departure/variance. But the Judge failed to “go further and explain why he . . . rejected” one (that the defendant had been unarmed), glossed over another (overstated criminal history), and left two (modest drug quantity/non-leadership) of the points defense counsel asserted of four arguments. Here, as in Buffington, failure to address defense arguments for a reduced sentence (even though the District Judge in that case extensively considered the § 3553(a) factors) supports remand for resentencing. In this case, a sentence of nearly seventeen years called for some consideration of the de minimis amount of crack cocaine attributed to the defendant’s own conduct. This is especially so in light of his undisputed lesser role in the overall operation. In sum, the sentencing court’s colloquy with defense counsel did not touch on the most compelling evidence in the record favoring a downward variance. 2. Failure to Consider and Enunciate § 3553(a) Factors A foundational principle of the sentencing procedure established in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 is that the sentence is to be individualized: the judge “must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). “In making that determination,” this court stated in Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 582, “the sentencing judge is obliged to consider 16 No. 09-6297 United States v. Ferguson the unique circumstances of the defendant’s case in light of the factors set out by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” The § 3553(a) factors pertinent here are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed – (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for – (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines –