Opinion ID: 164078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Substance Of The Qualified Immunity Instruction

Text: 30 Reviewing the jury instruction under a plain error standard, we affirm the substance of the qualified immunity instruction. Ms. Maestas did not object to the qualified immunity jury instruction at trial. We review a jury instruction ... for plain error when no objection was made [at trial]. United States v. Fabiano, 169 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir.1999). Under that standard, we will affirm unless the instructions were `patently, plainly erroneous and prejudicial.' Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 1237, 1245 (10th Cir.2000). We do not review any particular instruction in isolation; rather, we must view the [jury] instructions in their entirety.... Coleman v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir.1997). 31 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Court held that the qualified immunity analysis does not consider subjective good faith. Id. (The subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.). Looking to Harlow, Ms. Maestas contends that the following instruction constitutes plain error because it injects a subjective element into the qualified immunity analysis: 32 In order for [Mr. Lujan] to prevail on his defense of qualified immunity, he bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he act[ed] at all times in good faith in carrying out discretionary duties, reasonably believing that he was not violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 33 We disagree with Ms. Maestas's conclusion. Even assuming that the acted at all times in good faith language adds a subjective component, inclusion of this language did not prejudice Ms. Maestas. See Greene, 210 F.3d at 1245 (holding that on plain error review, appellant must establish that instruction prejudiced her). The disputed instruction is conjunctive (i.e., to find for Mr. Lujan, the jury must find that (1) Mr. Lujan act[ed] at all times in good faith, and (2) that he reasonably believ[ed] that he was not violating plaintiff's constitutional rights). Thus, even if the district court injected a subjective component, it retained the reasonably believed part of the analysis. 34 The Court in Harlow struck the subjective component of the qualified immunity analysis because it placed too harsh of a burden on government officials. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816, 102 S.Ct. 2727. The Court reasoned that the subjective component often required resolution by a jury of qualified immunity issues and placed special costs on officials performing discretionary functions. Id. In an effort to encourage courts to resolve qualified immunity questions on summary judgment, the Court removed the subjective-goodfaith factor to aid government officials such as Mr. Lujan. Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.). Pursuant to Harlow, then, if anyone was prejudiced by the inclusion of a subjective component in the qualified immunity analysis it is Mr. Lujan, not Ms. Maestas. 35 Ms. Maestas further contends that including the phrase reasonably believed in the instruction is simply not enough to undo the damage done by instructing the jury to look at Mr. Lujan's state of mind. First, as noted above, if the disputed instruction damaged anyone, pursuant to Harlow, it would be Mr. Lujan — not Ms. Maestas. Thus, Ms. Maestas's remedial approach to this instruction is flawed from its inception. 36 Second, the district court's reasonably believed language sufficiently apprised the jury of the objective component of qualified immunity analysis to withstand plain error review because it is neither patently nor plainly erroneous. For example, in Dixon v. Wallowa County, 336 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the following instruction pursuant to the harmless error rule, a more vigorous standard of review than plain error: 37 The district court instructed the jury that to be entitled to qualified immunity on [plaintiff's] Fourth Amendment claim, the officers must establish ... that they held a reasonable belief that the search warrant was still valid on June 8, 1998, and there were exigent circumstances giving rise to a concern that additional evidence might still remain in the house and was likely to disappear or be destroyed before police could search the house again.... Id. (emphasis added). 38 Given the similarity of the Dixon instruction to the instruction challenged here and Ms. Maestas's failure to cite a case where a similarly worded instruction constituted plain error, we reject Ms. Maestas's argument on this score. 39 In sum, the disputed instruction was only prejudicial, if at all, to Mr. Lujan. Moreover, the reasonably believed language, while not ideal, adequately conveys, under plain error review, the objectively reasonable component of the qualified immunity defense as it is not patently nor plainly erroneous.