Opinion ID: 1043362
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compensation Provision

Text: The Compensation Provision of the Texas Election Code, § 13.008(a), creates offenses if a person: (1) compensates another person based on the number of voter registrations that the other person successfully facilitates; (2) presents another person with a quota of voter registrations to facilitate as a condition of payment or employment; (3) engages in another practice that causes another person’s compensation from or employment status with the person to be dependent on the number of voter registrations that the other person facilitates; or (4) accepts compensation for an activity described by Subdivision (1), (2) or (3). Recognizing that these provisions are potentially overbroad, Steen interprets subdivisions (2) and (3) of the Compensation Provision to ban (1) paying canvassers on a per-application basis and (2) conditioning payment or employment solely on the submission of a fixed number of applications.8 More precisely, according to Steen, subdivision (a)(2) applies only when a quota is “present[ed]” to a canvasser, while subdivision (a)(3) applies to any different 8 That subdivisions (1) and (4) are constitutional devices to prevent fraudulent registrations is not disputed. 23 Case: 12-40914 Document: 00512395979 Page: 24 Date Filed: 10/03/2013 No. 12-40914 (“another”) situation when employment is conditioned solely on a quota that has not been presented to the canvasser. Federal courts are required to accept a narrowing construction of a state law in order to preserve its constitutionality. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2502 (1988) (construing a town ordinance “more narrowly” in part because “[t]his narrow reading is supported by representations of counsel for the town at oral argument”); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143, 96 S. Ct. 2857, 2864 (1976) (noting the importance of the interpretation given by the officials charged with enforcing the statute); see also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2980 (1990) (“[W]here fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court refused to accept the narrowing construction, reasoning that it is plainly contradictory to the statutory language. Thus, the court held, if Steen’s construction is accepted, subdivision (a)(3) either superfluously overlaps subdivision (a)(2), or on its own, subdivision (a)(3) prevents the employer from making traditional performance-based decisions about the canvassers’ effectiveness. We disagree with these conclusions. With respect to the district court’s opinion that Steen’s construction would render subsection (a)(3) of the provision “superfluous,” subsection (a)(2) applies when someone “presents another person with a quota of voter registrations to facilitate as a condition of payment or employment.” Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 13.008(a)(2) (emphasis added). Subsection (a)(3) applies when that fixed quota is used as the sole basis for determining compensation or employment, regardless whether it has been “presented” to the canvasser. Id. § 13.008(a)(3). 24 Case: 12-40914 Document: 00512395979 Page: 25 Date Filed: 10/03/2013 No. 12-40914 As such, Steen’s interpretation leaves the more comprehensive language of (a)(3) with plenty of work to do. Because the subsection readily lends itself to this interpretation, the district court incorrectly disregarded it. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397, 108 S. Ct. 636, 646 (1988) (maintaining that statues “readily susceptible” to a narrowing construction will survive a First Amendment challenge). The district court’s alternative interpretation is that (a)(3) overbroadly bans performance-based work reviews. Appellees contended that their employment decisions are chilled (and thus the quantum of their speech burdened) because in managing canvassers’ work, they must inescapably tie decisions for superior or subpar performance to the canvassers’ productivity in terms of voter registrations facilitated. The district court’s interpretation is plausible, but it is impermissible pursuant to the standards of deference we have earlier cited. First, the district court failed to assess whether “a substantial number” of the applications of (a)(2) and (a)(3) are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the provision’s “plainly legitimate sweep.” This inquiry is required in a facial challenge on First Amendment grounds under Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587. The existence of a wide swath of constitutional applications of the provision would suffice to prevent a facial remedy. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 331, 130 S. Ct. 876, 893 (distinguishing facial and as-applied challenges by “the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court”); see also 25 Case: 12-40914 Document: 00512395979 Page: 26 Date Filed: 10/03/2013 No. 12-40914 United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 477-78, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 130 (1995) (contrasting “a facial challenge” with “a narrower remedy”).9 Second, the narrowing interpretation is not contradictory to the statute, and the court was thus required to accept it for present purposes. Subdivision (a)(2) is premised on “presenting” a quota to the employee, a formulation that implies direct contact in advance to warn the person of a “quid pro quota.” Subdivision (a)(3), making employment decisions “in another practice” “dependent” on the employee’s number of voter registrations reasonably lends itself to decisions that are “solely dependent” on that number. Employers are familiar, through Title VII discrimination law, with the difference between “sole” motive and “mixed motive” decision making. Appellees cannot feign their inability to justify reasonable employment decisions on factors other than or in addition to the number of registrations a canvasser produces. Moreover, as a criminal statute susceptible to more than one interpretation, this provision’s enforcement would have to be construed with lenity. See Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 13.008(b). The rule of lenity reinforces the state’s proffered narrowing interpretation. Finally, Texas’s strong severability statute, which preserves statutes even if in some “applications” they are unconstitutional, clearly applies to the hypothetical situations Appellees invoked. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.032(c). Severability is a state law issue that binds federal courts. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139, 116 S. Ct. 2068, 2069 (1996). 9 Steen’s reply brief crystallizes its narrowing interpretation: “Section 13.008 allows employers to fire cavassers for shirking and instruct them to increase their productivity. It prohibits only employment decisions made solely on the basis of the number of applications facilitated. Employers may consider the number of applications facilitated as part of a contextualized evaluation of a canvasser’s performance.” 26 Case: 12-40914 Document: 00512395979 Page: 27 Date Filed: 10/03/2013 No. 12-40914 As we must accept the state’s narrowing construction of the Compensation Provision, we turn to the merits. Because the provision applies to all persons–not just VDRs–and covers any activity that facilitates voter registration, it encompasses activities that involve expression, including voter drives where canvassers seek to persuade eligible voters to register. Further, we assume, without deciding, that prohibiting quota-based pay is a “lesser burden,” not subject to strict scrutiny. Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir. 2006) (assessing ban on tying compensation to number of signatures obtained for a petition as a lesser burden); Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 617–18 (declining to apply strict scrutiny to statute banning payment per petition signature procured); see also Person v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 467 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that statute prohibiting payment of electoral petition signature gatherers on a per-signature basis does not, by itself, violate the First Amendment). Appellees have not made a strong showing that their facial challenge will prevail because the Compensation Provision can apply constitutionally to proscribe quotas or compensation incentives that reward canvassers solely for turning in a very high number of applications, which all parties agree can encourage fraud. Texas has a strong legitimate interest in preventing fraud. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 204–05, 119 S. Ct. at 648. The Compensation Provision was enacted in part to rectify deficiencies in the previous law that created incentives, such as paying canvassers for each application, that resulted in voter registration scandals. See Follow the Money, supra; Tex. Elec. Comm. Rep. on H.B. 239, 82d Leg. (2011) (“In many of the scandals, the convicted individuals specifically cited the compensation or 27 Case: 12-40914 Document: 00512395979 Page: 28 Date Filed: 10/03/2013 No. 12-40914 performance quotas as the incentive to fraudulently complete voter registration forms.”). Nevertheless, the district court faulted the Compensation Provision for being stricter than laws in other states, particularly since there is no indication that Texas is more susceptible to voter registration fraud. Andrade I, 888 F.Supp.2d at 852. This criticism is unwarranted; neither the uniqueness of an election law nor the state-wide prevalence of the type of fraud a law seeks to prevent has any bearing on its constitutionality. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195, 128 S. Ct. at 1619 (upholding Indiana’s unique voter-ID law as a legitimate means to combat election fraud, despite no evidence of impersonation fraud in Indiana). In addition, the district court’s and Appellees’ analogies to Meyer, supra, and Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 518 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2008), are inapposite. Unlike the laws struck down in those cases, the Compensation Provision does not completely ban third-party organizations from compensating canvassers or only permit them to pay hourly wages. To deter fraud, (a)(3) merely prevents organizations from making compensation and employment decisions solely based on a fixed number of applications.10 We conclude that the Compensation Provision, as narrowly construed, does not violate the First Amendment. It is unnecessary to address Steen’s abstention argument. Accordingly, Appellees have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of this claim. 10 To the extent Appellees attempted to present an as-applied challenge to this provision, we agree with and adopt the analysis of the motions panel majority that rejected their contention. See Andrade II, 488 F. App’x at 901. 28 Case: 12-40914 Document: 00512395979 Page: 29 Date Filed: 10/03/2013 No. 12-40914