Opinion ID: 1817377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: juror karen steadham

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it excused juror Karen Steadham from the venire. After being asked about her ability to impose the death penalty, Steadham responded as follows: JUROR: I reallyit's not my place to tell somebody they should die. THE COURT: Well, you JUROR: I mean, you know, as far as the electric chair and other people sitting down and telling somebodyyou send them to the electric chair, theyas far as I'm concerned, the Lord did nothe don't want you to kill people and if I tell you all to go and kill him, I might as well take him outside and shoot him in the head. THE COURT: Okay. Any other questions? MR. DEES: Are you opposed to the death penalty? JUROR: I don't care if somebody else tells him to go, but myself, I'm not going to go and sit in the jury and say send him to the death sentence. MR. DEES: I see. JUROR: But also our jails are too crowded for him to sit in our jails. So, I don't know what you all are going to do with him. MR. GALANOS: Are you through, Morris? If there might be a situation where you might have to decide what to do with him, and what we're trying to find out is if you were selected as a juror in this case, if you were one of the twelve people that's going to decide this man's fate, would you automatically because of your feelings about religion and the death penalty, would you automatically vote to impose a sentence of life without parole, regardless of what the facts were and regardless of what the law may be? Life without parole or death by electrocution, because you're going to be limited to those two choices. JUROR: I guess I'll have to say yes, becauseI don't know. You all say you're not supposed to kill, but if I tell you all that, then I just might as well I'm doing the same thing. MR. GALANOS: Okay. So, I want you said your answer was yes. Does that mean yes, you would automatically vote to impose a penalty of life without parole, but not death by electrocution? JUROR: Mm-hm. MR. GALANOS: Well, thank you for your candor, because as Mr. Dees said, all we're asking folks to do is just tell us how they feel. THE COURT: Well, look, I know you feel like you're getting grilled by all these folks, but I'm going to have to ask you one more question now. Okay? JUROR: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Are you telling me that if the facts were presented to you thatand you listened to the facts and circumstances, that you would automatically go in, if you were on the jury, and vote for life in prison without parole? You would not even consider death by electrocution? MR. CARNES: I'd like to object to His Honor's question on the grounds that it's not the test under (inaudible). THE COURT: Well, that's the way I'm going to ask it. JUROR: Well, I'm not sure. Myself, I don't believe that I should go up there and tell them to kill him, but he did it to somebody else. I mean, you know, I'm not sure. MR. GALANOS: Can I ask you this, Karen, and again I'm not trying to give you a hard time, just trying to find out how you feel. If you're chosen to sit on this jury and if the facts are such that the State proves what we call aggravating circumstancesthose would be circumstances which indicate or tend to indicate that the appropriate punishment is death by electrocutionand those aggravating circumstances in your heart and in your mind outweigh what are called mitigating circumstancesthat would be evidence that Mr. Dees would put on that would indicate or tend to indicate that the appropriate punishment should be life without parole. But if the aggravating circumstances, circumstances in favor of the death outweigh mitigating circumstances, could youand then after the Judge charges you on the law of the case, could you vote to impose the penalty of death by electrocution as opposed to life without parole? JUROR: I don't know. To me, I guess (inaudible) it has to be done. MR. GALANOS: But it's not a question of what they would do, it's a question of what you would do. JUROR: That's what I said. I don't know what I would do. I hope I don't have to be in the situation, I'll tell you now. The proper test for determining whether a prospective juror may be removed for cause for her views on capital punishment is whether her views would `prevent or substantially impair' her from properly performing her duties as a juror. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S.Ct. 844, 851, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). The defendant contends that Steadham's views on capital punishment could not be determined with certainty. However, a blanket declaration of support of or opposition to the death penalty is not necessary for a trial judge to disqualify a juror. Veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made unmistakably clear; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. For reasons that will be developed more fully infra, this is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 423-26, 105 S.Ct. at 851-54. Based on Karen Steadham's responses, we find that her views on capital punishment made her unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. Therefore, the trial court was correct in excluding her from the venire.