Opinion ID: 1604614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: A & B and Allemang argue that Henry's motion lacked any factual support for his contentions regarding the $300,000 offer, and, therefore, that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it granted Henry's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. [7] In part, A & B and Allemang note that Henry's attorneys have not provided any affidavits to support their contention that the offer was not made, likely because they cannot affirmatively state the $300,000 offer of judgment was not made; they simply do not remember one way or another. Not remembering if an offer was made is entirely different than knowing that an offer was not made. By contrast, A & B and Allemang note that their attorney does recall such conversations and has evidentiary support for his position that the offer was indeed made, including affidavits, billing records and email correspondence between the parties' attorneys. [Henry] has made no effort to repudiate this evidentiary support. Before discussing A & B and Allemang's argument, we first note that where there are disputed issues of fact to be resolved and the trial court has received ore tenus evidence, the ore tenus rule is applicable to our review of a ruling on a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See Shipe v. Shipe, 477 So.2d 430, 432 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985). In the present case, however, the material facts, as hereinafter discussed, were not in dispute, and the trial court did not receive ore tenus evidence. Thus, the trial court's order setting aside the consent judgment is subject to de novo review. Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So.2d 1365, 1373 (Ala.1994) ([B]ecause the underlying facts are not disputed and this appeal focuses on the application of the law to those facts, there can be no presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court's ruling, and this Court must review that application of the law de novo. ). The materials before us do not reflect that Henry made any evidentiary submission in support of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion; they reflect only that his attorneys stated to the trial court that they have no recollection of whether Legion's offer to settle for $300,000 was ever communicated to them. A & B and Allemang, by contrast, submitted two affidavits from Oncale and written materials in support of their argument that Oncale discussed the $300,000 settlement with Henry's attorneys before the consent judgment was entered. In one affidavit, Oncale stated, in part, that he remembered vividly having a telephone conference with [Henry's attorneys] attempting to explain the fact that Legion was willing to make the $300,000 settlement offer, but could not pay any money. [One of Henry's attorneys] responded by stating, `Why should I take a $300,000 judgment when I already have a $750,000 judgment?' I responded by saying `Legion is certain that you will never be able to collect more than the $300,000.' [Henry's attorney] responded by stating `my research shows that I can collect the $300,000 judgment against the Guarantee Association and still collect underinsured motorist benefits.' Within days of this discussion I was in fact contacted by State Farm inquiring about the judgment, settlement discussions and the demand made for payment by [Henry]. [8] Henry offered no testimony or other evidence to contradict Oncale's assertion that this telephone conversation occurred. Oncale also asserted that the materials submitted with his affidavits, including, in part, the e-mail correspondence between him and Gustafson, his billing records, and his December 12, 2002, letter to Gustafson, supported his recollection that the $300,000 offer was communicated to Henry's attorneys. Oncale stated further that his billing records reflected that he had a meeting with Henry's attorneys on December 3, 2002, to discuss the settlement. It is true that the October 2006 order by the trial court states that Oncale informed the court that he had no recollection of such a meeting. It is also true that the materials before us do not include correspondence from Oncale to [ Henry's attorneys ] that would confirm that a meeting occurred. (Emphasis added.) Even if Oncale had no recollection as to the occurrence of a meeting, his billing records and the December 12, 2002, letter to Gustafson constitute affirmative evidence that a meeting did occur. There is no suggestion that any of the materials A & B and Allemang submitted in opposition to Henry's motion were falsified or inaccurate. Aside from the issue whether a face-to-face meeting occurred, however, there is nothing in the materials before us to support the conclusion that Oncale did not properly remember that he had communicated the $300,000 offer to Henry's attorneys. The materials before us contain undisputed evidence that Oncale did communicate the $300,000 offer to Henry's attorneys. Again, according to the October 2006 order, Henry's attorneys only stated that they have no recollection of whether Legion's offer to settle for $300,000 was ever communicated to them  this is not a denial that Oncale communicated the offer to them or evidence indicating that Oncale failed to communicate the offer to them. In fact, Henry states in his appellate brief that his attorneys have no recollection of this offer ever being conveyed to them, but the evidence produced by petitioners certainly suggests that the offer was made at some time before the consent decree was entered as a final judgment. After learning of the presence of the $300,000.00 offer and not recalling the fact that the offer had ever been brought to their attention, counsel for [Henry] filed a Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from Judgment, arguing that equity demanded that the consent decree be set aside so that the parties could start fresh. (Henry's brief pp. 6-7.) Henry's appellate brief further states: [I]n light of defendants' evidentiary showing, [Henry] concede[s] that it is more likely than not that [his attorneys] did have knowledge of the offer before the consent decree was entered. (Henry's brief p. 13 at n.9.) Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Henry failed to meet his burden of proving extraordinary circumstances and/or extreme hardship or injustice sufficient to entitle him to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Ex parte Baker, 459 So.2d at 876. All Henry proved, if anything, was that his attorneys could not recall whether they received notice of the $300,000 settlement offer. Absent evidence that would support a finding that Henry did not receive the offer, he could not prove that he would be entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) (assuming, without deciding, that such relief would be proper if the $300,000 offer was not communicated to Henry's attorneys). See note 7, supra. Finally, Henry argues in his appellate brief that, even if the $300,000 offer was communicated to his attorneys, he should still be entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) because the parties were in a difficult situation concerning settlement in light of the rehabilitation proceedings regarding Legion. In other words, Henry argues that he should be allowed to set aside the $750,000 settlement offer he accepted because of the difficult financial circumstance confronting the parties in 2002 and because he has been unable to enforce that settlement so as to obtain the monetary result he desired (apparently being under the impression that LIGA will then make some more definite and acceptable settlement offer). It is well settled, however, that `Rule 60(b)(6) [cannot] be used for the purpose of relieving a party from the free, calculated, and deliberate choices he has made.' See Ex parte Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 So.2d 279, 285 (Ala.1998) (quoting Chambers County Comm'rs v. Walker, 459 So.2d 861, 866 (Ala.1984), quoting in turn 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2864, at 214-15 (1973)). [9]