Opinion ID: 854116
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jackson's Identification of Montgomery as his Assailant

Text: The trial court permitted both Officer Elam and Stephens to testify that Jackson had identified Montgomery as the person who shot him. Jackson's identification is clearly hearsay, as it is an out of court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter assertedthat Montgomery shot Jackson. The State asserts that it was nevertheless admissible under three hearsay exceptions: (1) excited utterance, Evid.R. 803(2), (2) present sense impression, Evid.R. 803(1), and (3) statement under belief of impending death, Evid.R. 804(b)(2). An excited utterance is defined as follows: A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Evid.R. 803(2). In a case involving a shooting victim's identification of his assailant, this Court has explained: For a hearsay statement to be admitted as an excited utterance, three elements must be shown: 1) a startling event occurs; 2) a statement is made by a declarant while under the stress of excitement caused by the event; and 3) the statement relates to the event. Application of these criteria is not mechanical. Rather, under Rule 803(2), like its predecessor common-law doctrine, the heart of the inquiry is whether the statement is inherently reliable because the declarant was incapable of thoughtful reflection.... .... A declaration does not lack spontaneity simply because it was an answer to a question. Whether given in response to a question or not, the statement must be unrehearsed and made while still under the stress of excitement from the startling event.... ... [T]he time between the startling event and the hearsay statement is one factor to be considered in determining admissibility as an excited utterance. While a declaration is generally less likely to be admitted if it is made long after the startling event, the amount of time that has passed is not dispositive.... Again, the central issue is whether the declarant was still under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event when the statement was made.... ... Being shot is a traumatic event, both physically and psychologically. Its startling effect, depending on the severity of the injury, can continue for hours or longer.... .... ... We have addressed in several decisions whether a shooting victim's identification of the assailant was properly admitted as an excited utterance under common law. In nearly every instance, we held the statement to be admissible.... [However], trial courts should not abdicate rational analysis in cases where a shooting victim has fingered a possible perpetrator. Fairness to the defendant requires an assessment of whether the declarant's statement was the product of reflective thought. Yamobi v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1344, 1346-47 (Ind.1996) (citations omitted). In this case, Officer Elam and Stephens arrived within minutes after Jackson had been shot four times. Jackson was lying face down on the sidewalk and bleeding. While Jackson did not answer the officer's first two inquiries as to the identity of his assailant, Jackson's expressed concern was to reach the safety of his home. After Jackson collapsed while attempting to get up, he answered the officer's third inquiry without hesitation. The officer did not suggest who the assailant might be, and although there were other people in the vicinity, there is no evidence that anyone else suggested that Jackson identify Montgomery in the short time it took for Officer Elam to arrive at the scene. We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence under the excited utterance exception the testimony of Officer Elam and of Stephens that Jackson had identified Montgomery as his assailant. Because the identification was properly admitted on this basis, we need not consider whether any other hearsay exception would also apply.