Opinion ID: 1264567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence in Present Case

Text: In the present case, the Appellants maintain that the testimony of Joseph F. Merendino, Jr., the tournament manager, precludes summary judgment because Mr. Merendino indicated that the pipe should have and could have been found by representatives of the Appellees. [4] In this Court's review of Mr. Merendino's testimony, however, it is apparent that Mr. Merendino had no personal information regarding the knowledge possessed by any Appellee concerning the existence of the pipe on or buried in the field. When counsel for the Appellants asked Mr. Merendino whether the pipe should have been found, Mr. Merendino answered as follows: should have been found or could have been found. He immediately continued to explain, however, that I wouldn't have found it because I didn't know it was there. Mr. Merendino's deposition testimony continued: Q. Now the pipe, before the pipe was dug out of the ground, was it visible to the naked eye, to somebody out in the field, was it visible? A. I can't answer that truthful. It was visible when I walked down to first base [following the injury]. I saw they went with their hands like this and it was there. . . . . Q. But how far did Mr. Aversa have to dig to get to the top of it? A. Like I stated a minute ago, the one at first base, I could barely see the top of it. Q. Because the people there already dug it  A. Right. Now the one at second base, you had to dig down probably a good six or seven, eight inches before you could find them, and the other ones also. . . . . Q. Mr. Merendino, the pipe that Mr. Hawkins hit, it was exposed and above ground when he hit it, wasn't it? MS. SANDERS: Objection. A. It was exposed and above the ground when I went down the first baseline. Q. You agree with me that it had to be exposed and above ground when Mr. Hawkins hit it, wouldn't you? MS. SANDERS: Objection, asking for speculation. Q. You can go ahead and answer. A. I would probably have to agree with that, yes. Q. Otherwise he won't have hit it; is that right? A. That's probably a true statement. It is apparent to this Court that Mr. Merendino's testimony consists primarily of speculation regarding the degree to which the pipe might have protruded from the ground at the time Mr. Hawkin's knee encountered it. The testimony does not establish that the pipe was above ground or visible prior to the accident when representatives of the Appellees inspected and prepared the field. Nor does the testimony establish that the Appellees had any prior knowledge of the existence of the pipe or the ability to locate the pipe prior to the injury. Mr. Merendino's testimony establishes only that, in hindsight, it becomes obvious that the pipe was in existence, either completely or partially covered, at the time the competition began. To that extent, Mr. Merendino stated that it could have been located. However, that is not the issue. The issue is whether the Appellees had knowledge of the pipe or should have, through reasonable inspection, discovered the existence of the pipe. There is no evidence that any Appellee, prior to the injury, had seen the pipe or had actual or constructive knowledge of the pipe's existence. The Appellants further contend that the testimony of Steve Aversa and Ron Whiting preclude summary judgment by indicating that both men were aware that this field was also utilized by the girls' softball team and that the girls' baseline was five feet shorter than the men's baseline. This Court's review of the deposition testimony, however, reveals that Mr. Aversa, in charge of preparing the field for play, testified that he noticed no obstructions. He explained that while he was aware that a girls' softball team utilized the field and that their baselines were shorter, he had no clue how their bases were affixed to the ground and had no knowledge of anything buried in the ground in front of the bases during the tournament at issue. Similarly, Mr. Whiting, a coordinator of the Marion County Softball Association, specifically denied knowledge of the buried pipe. While he was aware that men's softball leagues use longer distances from home plate to first than do girls' high school softball teams, he was unaware that any pipe was buried along the baseline. The Appellants also assert that the deposition testimony of Charles Carpenter, a former coach of a girls' softball team, should prevent summary judgment. Mr. Carpenter had installed the pipe about five feet in front of the men's bases as part of his duties as the girls' softball team coach. Mr. Carpenter speculated that the pipe was probably exposed due to rain the night before the game or as a result of raking the field. Mr. Carpenter's testimony does not present any evidence that any Appellee had reason to know of the buried pipe on the field of play. The Appellants further maintain that the factual disagreement regarding whether the pipe was hollow or concrete filled also precludes summary judgment. Mr. Carpenter, the individual who buried the pipe, testified that it was not filled with concrete when he buried it. Yet the Appellants maintain that there was concrete in the pipe which caused the injury. As the Appellees assert, whether or not the pipe was concrete-filled is immaterial. The underlying basis for the grant of summary judgment was the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Appellees' performance of their duties in the preparation of the field. In other words, even if the pipe which injured Mr. Hawkins was not the same pipe buried by Mr. Carpenter, it does not alter the fact that there is no evidence that the Appellees knew or should have known of the existence of the buried pipe. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the United States Supreme Court explained that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original). As referenced above, a material fact is one that has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law. Jividen, 194 W.Va. at 708, 461 S.E.2d at 454, syl. pt. 5. Under the accompanying circumstances of this case, this Court does not believe that the issue of whether the pipe contained concrete has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation.