Opinion ID: 2294182
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Initial Disqualification In The First Trial

Text: We review the trial court's decision to disqualify Mr. Stern due to a conflict of interest raised at the first trial for an abuse of discretion. Pinkney v. United States, 851 A.2d 479, 486, 490 (D.C.2004). The trial court's determination of whether a conflict of interest exists presents a mixed question of law and fact, so we accept the trial court's factual findings unless they lack evidentiary support, and we review the legal issues de novo. Veney v. United States, 738 A.2d 1185, 1193-95 (D.C.1999). The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused in a criminal case the right to the effective assistance of counsel for his or her defense. Gibson v. United States, 632 A.2d 1155, 1158 (D.C.1993). The first essential element of effective assistance of counsel is counsel's ability and willingness to advocate fearlessly and effectively on behalf of his client. Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 135 (D.C.1985) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The erroneous deprivation of a defendant's right to retain counsel of choice is a structural error, which entitles a defendant to a reversal of his conviction without a requirement of prejudice. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145, 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). A defendant's right to counsel of choice is not absolute; it may be limited, inter alia, by the trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its calendar. Id. at 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (internal citations omitted). [T]he essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. Pinkney, supra, 851 A.2d at 486-87 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)). Moreover, the trial court has an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. Id. at 489 (quoting Wheat, supra, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692). Whenever a constitutional right to counsel exists, ... there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. Singley v. United States, 548 A.2d 780, 783 (D.C.1988) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981)). Encompassed within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is the right to representation by counsel whose loyalty is undiluted by conflicts of interest. Fitzgerald v. United States, 530 A.2d 1129, 1133 (D.C.1987) (footnote omitted). The danger of an attorney's conflict of interest is that the `attorney may forego efforts he would ordinarily undertake on behalf of one client, in order that the other client may not thereby be harmed.' Derrington v. United States, 681 A.2d 1125, 1133 (quoting Fitzgerald, supra, 530 A.2d at 1133). To protect this right to conflict-free counsel, the trial court has an affirmative `duty to inquire' into the effectiveness of counsel whenever `the possibility of conflict' becomes apparent before or during trial. Douglas, supra, 488 A.2d at 136 (quoting Wood, supra, 450 U.S. at 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097 (emphasis in original)). If such an inquiry reveals that an actual conflict of interest exists, and the defendant objects to continued representation by the conflict-burdened attorney, new counsel must be appointed. Indeed, a failure to appoint new counsel under these circumstances will lead to a reversal of any conviction obtained at trial. Douglas, supra, 488 A.2d at 136 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487-91, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)). In this case, Judge Abrecht properly recognized the competing constitutional rights at stakethe right to retain counsel of choice versus the right to conflict-free counsel. Mr. Stern himself recognized that his proposed strategy of calling his former client, Mr. Hammond, to testify that he had committed the murders with which his current client, Mr. Freeman, was charged presented a conflict of interest, for which he believed he needed to obtain a waiver. We have held that a counsel's belief about the existence of a conflict of interest and what course of action is necessary is significant. See Gibson, supra, 632 A.2d at 1158 n. 14 (stating that [i]t is significant whether counsel believed conflict of interest was so real as to oblige him to seek leave to withdraw from the case). The trial court recognized that Mr. Stern's duties to his clients were in direct conflict. In order for Mr. Stern to represent his current client, Mr. Freeman, zealously and diligently within the bounds of the law, Mr. Stern would have to elicit the most detailed and inculpatory confession on the stand from Mr. Hammond, when he was prohibited from exploiting any privileged information or any other information gained during the representation which would prove embarrassing or detrimental to Mr. Hammond or be in a position where his judgment may be affected by his duties to his current client, Mr. Freeman. See D.C. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.3 (duty of zealous and diligent representation); 1.6 (duty not to use or reveal client confidences and secrets without client's informed consent), [5] 1.7(b)(4), (c)(1) (representation prohibited where lawyer's judgment may be affected by duties to other parties without the client's informed consent). [6] While the violation of a rule of professional conduct does not necessarily prove that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated, [t]he rules do provide guidance, however, and can shed light on counsel's perceived constraints because we have recognized that an attorney's subjective belief that a conflict is present, while not conclusive, is strong evidence of an actual conflict. McCrimmon v. United States, 853 A.2d 154, 164 (D.C.2004) (citations omitted); see also id. (citing Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at 172-73, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (holding that reversal for conflict requires showing of effect on counsel's performance)). Moreover, [a]n actual conflict in successive representation may arise where the subject matter of the previous representation is substantially related to the case being tried, the attorney reveals privileged communications of the former client stemming from the previous representation, or the attorney's loyalties are otherwise divided. Pinkney, supra, 851 A.2d at 487 (quoting Veney, supra, 738 A.2d at 1193) (emphasis in original). An actual conflict of interest was present here because Mr. Stern, in representing his current client, Mr. Freeman was in a position to take advantage of his former client, Mr. Hammond's confidences and secrets. His loyalties, therefore, were divided between both Mr. Freeman and Mr. Hammond. Cf. Veney, supra, 738 A.2d at 1193-95 (citations omitted) (no indication attorney was ever in a position to use confidential information obtained from [the former client] in [the current client's] defense when the former client was not called as a witness and the attorney faced no decision over whether he could use previously acquired confidential information to cross-examine him). As Judge Abrecht noted, it would have been impossible for [Mr. Stern] to know and reveal to [Mr. Hammond] in advance all possible questions that Mr. Hammond would encounter on direct examination by him and cross-examination by the government while still zealously representing [Mr.] Freeman. By seeking to provide the best defense to Mr. Freemana sworn confession to the very crime with which he was chargedMr. Stern needed to act in the most detrimental way to his former client by eliciting the most damning confession on the stand possible. The possibility existed that Mr. Stern might improperly rely on confidences, secrets, or other information obtained in his prior representation of Mr. Hammond in a murder case. Mr. Stern also might not have objected to particular lines of inquiry by the government on cross-examination, or he might not have conducted redirect examination in order to advance Mr. Freeman's defense. Although the trial court did not elaborate in her ex parte order, it is clear from the record that the trial judge properly appreciated that the risk was too great that Mr. Stern could have favored one client over the other. Given the present charge of murder, and Mr. Stern's previous representation of Mr. Hammond in an unrelated murder case, Mr. Stern is likely familiar with Mr. Hammond's criminal history (possibility the existence of undiscovered impeachable convictions), modus operandi (possible similarities between the two murders), and personality (a factor that cannot be underestimated in formulating effective cross-examination). See Pinkney, supra, 851 A.2d at 488 ([T]he danger in not protecting the former client's confidences could be `highlighted by the nature of the questioning that can be anticipated.') (citations omitted). Although Mr. Freeman contends that this conflict was waivable by both Mr. Hammond and Mr. Freeman, the trial court was not obligated to accept that waiver because of the wide latitude accorded to trial courts in balancing the right to counsel of choice against other interests. [7] Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the trial court had an independent interest in this case of ensuring that [the trial was] conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. Id. (quoting Wheat, supra 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692). We adopt the United States Supreme Court's admonition that: [u]nfortunately for all concerned, a [trial court] must pass on the issue whether or not to allow a waiver of a conflict of interest by a criminal defendant not with the wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pretrial context when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly. The likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials.... Other [trial courts] might have reached differing or opposite conclusions with equal justification, but that does not mean that one conclusion was right and the other wrong. [Trial courts] must recognize a presumption in favor of [a defendant's] counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict [8] but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict. Wheat, supra, 486 U.S. at 162-64, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Given the facts before Judge Abrecht at the first trial, there was an actual conflict of interest that warranted the trial court's exercise of its discretion in refusing the proffered waiver and disqualifying counsel. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Mr. Stern in the first trial. [9]