Opinion ID: 1301652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is LaBudde Protected by Either Immunity or Privilege?

Text: ¶ 59 Finally, LaBudde raises the defenses of qualified immunity and good faith advice. He argues that an attorney is not liable to third parties for acts committed on behalf of his client in the exercise of his professional responsibilities as an attorney. He cites Yorgan v. Durkin for the proposition that [t]he well established rule of law in Wisconsin is that absent fraud or certain public policy considerations, an attorney is not liable to third parties for acts committed in the exercise of his duties as an attorney. 2006 WI 60, ¶ 27, 290 Wis.2d 671, 715 N.W.2d 160. ¶ 60 We agree that in most cases, an attorney is immune from liability to third parties based on the attorney's failure to perform a duty owed to a client. However, failure to perform an obligation to a client is entirely distinct from conduct that assists the client committing an unlawful act to the detriment of a third party. ¶ 61 In Yorgan v. Durkin , we refused to hold an attorney personally liable for the fees his client owed to a chiropractor. The client had directed Attorney Durkin to pay the chiropractor's fees out of the proceeds she received from a personal injury lawsuit, but Durkin failed to follow his client's instructions. The chiropractor brought suit against Durkin, alleging that Durkin was liable to third party creditors for failing to properly settle his client's obligations. Id., ¶ 23. We concluded that the public policy factors implicated by the nature of the situation at hand did not weigh in favor of imposing liability to third party creditors. Id., ¶¶ 29, 35. ¶ 62 The public policy implicated by the nature of this case weighs differently. Under these facts, the public policy balance favors liability. Unlike in Yorgan v. Durkin , the theory of liability advanced by the Tensfeldt children is not vicarious. It is not based on LaBudde's failure to fulfill a professional obligation to Robert to the detriment of the Tensfeldt children. Indeed, the parties agree that Robert asked LaBudde to draft the will in violation of the court judgment, and LaBudde was not negligent in performing this service. In contrast to Yorgan v. Durkin , the basis for liability here is that LaBudde knowingly assisted the commission of the unlawful act. [25] ¶ 63 A thorough discussion of an attorney's liability to third parties is found in Strid v. Converse, 111 Wis.2d 418, 331 N.W.2d 350 (1983). In that case, we stated that immunity is not available when the attorney engages in fraudulent or unlawful acts: [An attorney] is duty bound ... to exercise good faith. He must not be guilty of any fraudulent acts, and he must be free from any unlawful conspiracy with either his client, the judge, or any other person, which might have a tendency to either frustrate the administration of justice or to obtain for his client something to which he is not justly and fairly entitled. Id. at 429, 331 N.W.2d 350 (quoting Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis. 277, 206 N.W. 181 (1925)). Further, the court concluded: [T]he immunity of an attorney who is acting in a professional capacity is qualified rather than absolute. The immunity from liability to third parties extends to an attorney who pursues in good faith his or her client's interest on a matter fairly debatable in the law. However, the immunity does not apply when the attorney acts in a malicious, fraudulent or tortious manner which frustrates the administration of justice or to obtain something for the client to which the client is not justly entitled. Id. at 429-30, 331 N.W.2d 350. ¶ 64 Here, LaBudde drafted documents that obtained for Robert something he was not legally entitled toan estate plan that violated a court judgment requiring Robert to leave two-thirds of his net estate to his children outright. Under these circumstances, LaBudde is not entitled to qualified immunity. ¶ 65 LaBudde cites several cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that an attorney is entitled to qualified immunity for aiding his client in committing an unlawful act. After reading these cases carefully, we determine that they do not support this proposition. [26] None of these cases involves the client's commission of an unlawful act. Instead, they involve the client's breach of a contract or fiduciary duty. We reject LaBudde's assertion that cases involving fiduciary duty are analogous to this case, which involves a client's court-imposed obligations. ¶ 66 LaBudde also argues that he is entitled to the good faith advice privilege. This privilege is based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772 (1979), which this court has neither adopted nor rejected as applied to attorneys. Notably, this section of the Restatement focuses on advice leading to a breach of contract: One who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract or not to enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly with the other's contractual relation, by giving the third person (a) truthful information, or (b) honest advice within the scope of a request for the advice. Id. We acknowledge that in some circumstances, an attorney may in good faith advise a client to breach a contract. That is not the situation before us today. ¶ 67 The action here is not for breach of contract. Rather, it is an action in tort for assisting a client to unlawfully violate a court judgment. Further, LaBudde did not merely give advice. He drafted an estate plan that violated the judgment. We conclude that, under these facts, LaBudde is not entitled to this privilege. ¶ 68 In sum, we determine that the circuit court properly concluded that LaBudde is liable as a matter of law for aiding and abetting his client's unlawful act. The divorce judgment was enforceable at the time it was entered and at the time Robert asked LaBudde to draft an estate plan that violated the judgment. Under these facts, LaBudde is not entitled to either qualified immunity or the good faith advice privilege.