Opinion ID: 21517
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Relationship Between the EEOC and the TCHR

Text: 10 The TCHRA establishes a comprehensive administrative review system to carry out the policies embodied in Title VII, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. 1991); see also Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.001(1)-(3) (West 1996). One of the primary goals of the statute is to coordinate state law with federal law in the area of employment discrimination. See Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.001(1)-(2). This dual state-federal system has resulted in similar, though not always identical, procedures for combating employment discrimination, and overlapping, though not always interchangeable, spheres of authority. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and 29 U.S.C. § 633(b), if a state has its own anti-discrimination laws and corresponding agency (as Texas does), the EEOC must defer its processing of a discrimination complaint until the state has had at least sixty days to investigate and attempt to resolve the complaint. See Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 485. Accordingly, the TCHRA created the TCHR as a deferral agency so that claims of employment (and now disability) discrimination could be addressed at the state level first. See id. 11 In both the federal and Texas state systems, a complainant must file a complaint with the appropriate agency before filing suit. See id. at 487. The complainant must do so within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.002(a). In 1989, the TCHR and the EEOC entered a Worksharing Agreement, to be amended annually, which was intended to minimize unnecessary duplication of effort and make the operations of the two agencies more efficient. See Griffin, 26 F.3d at 612. 2 In the 1998 Worksharing Agreement, the EEOC and the [TCHR] each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges, including those that are not jurisdictional with the agency that initially receives the charges. 3 1998 Worksharing Agreement § II(A). In a case like this one, when a complainant files her initial charge with the EEOC, her charge willalso be considered filed with the TCHR. See Griffin, 26 F.3d at 612-13; Price v. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. Co., 934 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ). 4 12 In the case of a complainant pursuing state claims under the TCHRA, if the TCHR dismisses the complaint or has not resolved it within 180 days, it must notify the complainant in writing. See Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.208. A complainant who receives notice of dismissal may request a written notice of her right to file a civil action. See id. § 21.252. Once the complainant receives notice of her right to file a civil action, she must do so within sixty days. See id. § 21.254. The complainant does not have to wait for this letter before filing suit, however. See id. § 21.252(d) (Failure to issue the notice of the complainant's right to file a civil action does not affect the complainant's right under this subchapter to bring a civil action against the respondent.); see also Eckerdt v. Frostex Foods, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ). Whether she receives a letter or not, the complainant must institute her state suit within two years of filing the administrative complaint. See id. § 21.256. 13 The federal system is similar, but not identical. As noted above, a complainant alleging violations of federal law must file the complaint within 180 days of the conduct at issue. The EEOC will launch its own investigation, and if it decides to dismiss the complaint, it will notify the complainant of this dismissal and her right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 5 As the district court noted, the principal differences between the two systems are that in the federal system mailing the right to sue letter is mandatory and that receipt of the right to sue letter is generally necessary before filing federal suit. See id.; see also Carter v. South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 841 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that the right to sue letter is usually a condition precedent, though not a jurisdictional prerequisite, to bringing a federal employment discrimination cause of action). Most relevant to our inquiry, the federal complainant must file suit within ninety days of receipt of the right to sue letter, as opposed to sixty days under the TCHRA. 14 In the present case, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Eureka because it concluded that Vielma's claims under the TCHRA were time-barred. Specifically, the district court found that she had not complied with section 21.254, which provides that [w]ithin 60 days after the date a notice of the right to file a civil action is received, the complainant may bring a civil action against the respondent. The district court found that in light of the Worksharing Agreement and two unpublished opinions from the Northern District of Texas, the reference to a notice in section 21.254 encompassed not only the notice of a right to file a civil action specified in section 21.252, but also a right to sue letter issued by the EEOC. On appeal, Vielma contends that section 21.254 refers only to a right to file a civil action letter from the TCHR; under her interpretation, she would not be time-barred because she filed her state suit before receiving her TCHR letter. Eureka, naturally enough, agrees with the district court's more expansive interpretation. 15 The EEOC acted as the TCHR's agent at least for the purpose of receivingand processing Vielma's original complaint. The relevant inquiry, then, is defining the scope of the EEOC's agency for the TCHR in this context, that is, whether in addition to receiving and processing complaints for the TCHR, the EEOC can also notify a complainant of her right to file a civil action under state law by issuing her a federal right to sue letter. We conclude that it cannot. 16 At the outset, we note that while the coordinated efforts of the EEEOC and state agencies are complicated and sometimes overlapping, the Supreme Court has observed that the limitations periods for federal and state anti-discrimination claims are independent. See E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 108 S.Ct. 1666, 1675-76 (1988) (concluding that in light of Title VII's broad remedial purpose, untimely filing under state law did not preclude application of extended federal filing period for certain categories of cases); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2073 (1979) (finding that complainant's failure to file age discrimination claim within a state limitations period did not automatically render his federal claim untimely). In Commercial Office Products, the Court found that state time limits for filing discrimination claims do not determine the applicable federal time limit. Id. at 1675. It also noted that in the absence of any express reference to timeliness under state law, the federal statutes should not import[] such a hurdle into a remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the process. Id. at 1675-76 (citing Oscar Mayer, 99 S.Ct. at 2073-74); see also Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding procedural requirement that untimely state filing and forwarding of complaint to EEOC time-bars federal claim to be entirely at odds with the purpose of the worksharing agreement and with Title VII). These policy observations are equally applicable to the TCHRA: importing extra procedural hurdles from the federal system into the TCHRA would contravene the purpose of the statute and the Worksharing Agreement. The agreements are in place to benefit not only the agencies but also the complainants, who do not have to file their complaints twice. In light of these considerations, and in the absence of any clear statutory command to the contrary, we cannot agree with the district court that an EEOC right to sue letter is interchangeable with a TCHR right to file a civil action letter and thus capable of triggering the TCHRA's sixty-day filing period.