Opinion ID: 778370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: evidentiary value of registration

Text: 10 The relationship between trademark protection and functionality is well established: The physical details and design of a product may be protected under the trademark laws only if they are nonfunctional.... Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 515 (9th Cir.1989). The Lanham Act codifies this common law requirement by prohibiting registration of a mark for a product configuration that is functional. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (no protection for a mark which comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional). Consistent with this threshold registration requirement, Congress has allowed defendants in an infringement action to raise an affirmative defense of invalidity based on a mark's functionality. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8). This defense, however, is not raised on a clean slate. Rather, it provides the challenger of a mark the opportunity to rebut prima facie evidence of the mark's validity. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (registration ... shall not preclude another person from proving any legal or equitable defense ... set forth in subsection (b)). Section 1115(a), entitled Evidentiary value, provides that [a]ny registration... shall be admissible in evidence and shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and ... of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark.... (Emphasis added). 11 As prima facie evidence of validity, the registration certificate is simply evidence that in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (6th ed.1990) (emphasis added). 12 The cases often refer interchangeably to prima facie evidence of validity and presumption of validity. See e.g., America Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir.2001); Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir.1986). We note that from an evidentiary viewpoint, establishment of a prima facie case is often seen as creating a presumption. For example, in the Title VII context, [e]stablishment of a prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 301.29[1][a] (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed.1997). Thus, while we prefer to use the statutory language because it more precisely conveys the evidentiary nature of the registration, we acknowledge the interchangeability of the terms in practice. 13 In trademark terms, the registration is not absolute but is subject to rebuttal. In essence, the registration discharges the plaintiff's original common law burden of proving validity in an infringement action. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir.1981); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (in absence of registered mark, plaintiff has burden of proving non-functionality). 14 Terminology with respect to the invalidity defense based on functionality is likewise not wholly consistent. The cases variously refer to the defendant as having the burden of proof or having assumed a shifting burden of production. This mixing and matching of terms has engendered some confusion in the analysis. For example, in Vuitton we held that the registration... shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff, who would have to establish his right to exclusive use in a common law infringement action, to the defendant, who must introduce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of plaintiff's right to such protected use. Id. at 775. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit concluded that [t]he presumption really serves only to shift the burden of production to the defendant. Liquid Controls, 802 F.2d at 938. 15 Although the description of the burden shifting is different in these two cases, the result is the same. Overall, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion in a trademark infringement action, namely proof of infringement. A necessary concomitant to proving infringement is, of course, having a valid trademark; there can be no infringement of an invalid mark. See Yarmuth-Dion, Inc. v. D'ion Furs, Inc., 835 F.2d 990, 992 (2nd Cir.1987) (characterizing the plaintiff's burden in an infringement action as a two-step test); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:14 (4th ed.2002). 16 Validity, then, is a threshold issue. On this point, the plaintiff in an infringement action with a registered mark is given the prima facie or presumptive advantage on the issue of validity, thus shifting the burden of production to the defendant to prove otherwise — in our case, to provide evidence of functionality. Or, to put it as we did in Vuitton, the defendant then bears the burden with respect to invalidity. Once the presumption of validity is overcome, however, the mark's registration is merely evidence of registration, nothing more. This approach can be characterized as rebutting the prima facie case or piercing the presumption. 17 Of course, at the summary judgment stage, all inferences from the facts must be drawn most favorably to the nonmoving party. Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 776. We also recognize that functionality is generally viewed as an intensely factual issue. Id. at 775. Nonetheless, assuming the defendant can demonstrate through law, undisputed facts, or a combination thereof that the mark is invalid, the evidentiary bubble bursts and the plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment. In the face of sufficient and undisputed facts demonstrating functionality, as in our case, the registration loses its evidentiary significance. 18 Under Tie Tech's theory, on the other hand, a defendant in a trademark infringement action could never prevail at the summary judgment stage on an invalidity defense because the registration itself would always raise a material issue of fact. This approach not only inflates the evidentiary value of a trademark registration, but ignores situations where functionality can be determined as a matter of law based on undisputed facts. 19 In support of its position, Tie Tech points to America Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, (4th Cir.2001), where the Fourth Circuit discussed the evidentiary value of the registration: 20 Although evidence rebutting the presumption may neutralize the presumption itself — i.e., that the burden of proof on the fact giving rise to the presumption has been met without rebutting evidence — it does not eliminate from the case the evidence itself that gave rise to the presumption. Thus, through the certificate of registration, the Commissioner introduces his opinion that the application of the registrant was sufficient to demonstrate a valid mark. 21 Id. at 818 (internal citations omitted). Although the court did not elaborate on its reasoning, the key to its decision appears to be the conclusion that a mark's registration should be treated as something of an expert's affidavit on its validity. 3 22 Despite this interpretation of the certificate's evidentiary value, the America Online court further determined that summary judgment was inappropriate because the record contained other material evidence regarding the mark's validity beyond the certificate of registration. Id. Thus, the factual scenario in America Online is similar to that of Vuitton where we concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate when the plaintiff presented evidence beyond the registration that if accepted by the trier of fact, would defeat the claim that the Vuitton design is functional. 644 F.2d at 776. Nothing was remarkable about either case — disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. 23 Because there were genuine issues of material fact raised by the trademark holder's other evidence, we cannot speculate as to the reach of the Fourth Circuit's analysis. But we need not reconcile the approach in America Online and our own because Tie Tech's case presents a decidedly different evidentiary landscape. 24 What Tie Tech fails to recognize is that we need not weigh any evidence, make any credibility determinations, or otherwise engage in duties appropriate for a fact finder where, as is the case here, there are no disputed material facts. Rather, upon a motion for summary judgment, it is for the court in the first instance to resolve issues of materiality independent of and separate from the question of the incorporation of the evidentiary standard. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 25 As the discussion below illuminates, Kinedyne has not only presented evidence of functionality sufficient to overcome the evidence of prima facie validity, but Tie Tech has also failed to raise a material issue of fact. By relying primarily on the same evidence offered by Kinedyne or on evidence that Kinedyne does not dispute, Tie Tech demonstrates that at least in this case, the issue is ultimately one of law, and thus properly disposed of at the summary judgment stage. See id. (Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.). We turn now to the legal analysis of the functionality defense.