Opinion ID: 3010428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Well-Founded Fear of Persecution and the

Text: Clear Probability of Persecution Standards Chang must demonstrate that his fear of persecution is well-founded in order to qualify for a discretionary grant of asylum under section 208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980. He must also show that he faces a clear probability of harm to qualify for mandatory withholding of deportation under Section 243(h) of the Act. We will reverse on these two questions only if a reasonable fact-finder would be forced to conclude that Chang has shown the requisite fear of persecution. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. at 481. Under the clear probability of persecution standard of§ 243(h), the Attorney General must withhold deportation if Chang demonstrates that upon return to China his life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of the statutory factors. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1237. To meet this standard, Chang must show with objective evidence that it is more likely than not he will face persecution if he is deported to China. INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987). The test under § 208(a) is less exacting; Chang need only show that he has a subjective fear of persecution that is supported by objective evidence that persecution is a reasonable possibility. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430, 440; Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987) (holding that an applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution). This lesser standard does not require a showing that persecution is more likely than not. Fear can be well-founded even when there is a less than 50% chance of the occurrence taking place. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431. If Chang meets this standard, the Attorney General may, but is not required to, grant asylum. 19 In evaluating the likelihood that Chang faces persecution upon return to China, we begin with a consideration of the possible punishment that Chang faces under China's laws. China's treatment of those who violate the security laws is relevant both as to how likely it is that Chang will be punished and as to whether or not such punishment would constitute persecution. Only if that punishment is severe enough to constitute extreme conduct, can it constitute persecution. See Fatin v. INS 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (reasoning that the term persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional). Althoughgenerally harsh conditions shared by many other persons do not constitute persecution, id. (quoting In Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)), the term does include threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240. To prove his claim, Chang must therefore show either that he has a well founded fear or that there is a clear probability that he will suffer not just harm, but harm that qualifies as persecution under this standard. According to Chang's testimony at the hearing before the Immigration Judge and in his application for asylum, upon return to China, Chang would be arrested, detained in a block house, imprisoned, and lose his job. The INS introduced into evidence a United States Department of State Report on country conditions in China, which notes that Article 176 of the Criminal Code provides a prison sentence of up to one year for violating China's exit laws. Most economic immigrants, according to the Report, are not imprisoned upon return to China, although some repeat offenders have received one year administrative sentences of imprisonment in labor camps. Chang submitted a report, authored by Ross Munro of the Foreign Policy Institute, which found that because of Chang's access to privileged information, his high status in the Chinese government, and the position with which the Chinese government entrusted him, Chang would face a longer sentence. The Department of State Report concluded that political dissidents in general do not fare well in China; the Report relates that in 1994 there continued to be widespread and 20 well-documented human rights abuses in China, in violation of internationally accepted norms, stemming both from the authorities' intolerance of dissent and the inadequacy of legal safeguards for freedom of speech, association and religion. Such abuses include arbitrary and lengthy incommunicado detention, torture and mistreatment of prisoners. AR 0199. The BIA did not discuss the likelihood that Chang would face persecution on return to China, and it is difficult to determine exactly what the immigration judge concluded on this subject. The immigration judge stated in his oral opinion that as indicated, in country conditions [sic] the government of China does not persecute its members simply for returning after they have been in another country illegally. Leaving aside the problem that Chang has done more than remain in this country illegally, the as indicated does not refer to any previous discussion or statement by the judge concerning the country conditions of China. The judge stated in the previous paragraph that he was not convinced that Chang would, in fact, be punished as that term is defined under the Act as a means of persecution for any political opinion. This appears to go to the motives of China in exacting punishment, not to whether it enforces its security laws, and nowhere does the judge state a basis for reaching any conclusion about the country conditions of China.9 Indeed, at the outset of the opinion the judge stated that neither the State Department report nor the report of Ross Munro provided much weight to its decision. As discussed, Chang testified that both he and his fellow delegates faced potential imprisonment and economic repercussions for violations of the security laws, a claim that the BIA repeated without comment. The IJ made no finding that this testimony lacked credibility. See Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832, 837 (3d Cir. 1984) (remanding in part because IJ and BIA must articulate reasons for discrediting _________________________________________________________________ 9. The opinion appears to confuse three distinct issues: whether Chang's fear of persecution is well-founded, whether what he fears is severe enough to constitute persecution, and whether the punishment that he fears would be imposed for one of the statutorily prohibited grounds. 21 evidence before them); Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 341 (9th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that although the IJ is in the best position to make credibility determinations, the IJ must offer a specific reason for disbelieving the applicant's testimony or the court should accept the testimony as true); see also, Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 451 (7th Cir. 1995) (vacating BIA order that did not address[ ] in a rational manner the questions that the aliens tendered for consideration). Further, the State Department Report, introduced by the INA, supports this claim. Chinese law provides that violations of exit laws alone can result in a year of punishment, and those who express political opposition to the Chinese government may face imprisonment and torture. It is uncontroverted that Chang violated the security laws in several ways, and as the IJ acknowledged, Chang's actions could be believed or perceived by many as being motivated by political opposition to the Chinese. Under these circumstances, punishment of up to one year of imprisonment under Article 176, and perhaps significantly more, are sufficiently severe to constitute persecution under this Circuit's standard in Fatin. See Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 431 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that three years in prison for leaving Cuba qualifies as persecution); Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. at 875 (holding a year long sentence enough to constitute persecution for leaving Hungary). We simply cannot credit the IJ's unexplained conclusion about China's country conditions. And even if it is true that China does not generally punish those who simply violate its exit laws, that conclusion has little to do with this case, where the violation of the security laws was far more extensive and fraught with political implications. We now turn to a related inquiry -- the likelihood that Chang will experience this persecution if he is returned to China. In addition to the information about China's laws in general, the evidence in this case is that 1) Chang violated China's Security Law by remaining in the United States and by failing to report others to the Chinese government; 2) one other member of the delegation also failed to return to China; 3) China is aware that Chang remained in this 22 country beyond the time that he was permitted to do so and may be aware that he seeks asylum; 4) Chang held a high-level position in the Chinese government and was privy to confidential state technical information; 5) China has treated his defection as foreign affairs incident and posted his photograph at the local security office; 6) the FBI told Chang that he was in danger; 7) Chang's wife was forced to retire early and his son is not allowed to attend the university. The IJ noted that the information about the incident being treated as a foreign affairs incident was provided by Chang's sister, but that she did not submit a letter, although she probably could have done so. We defer to this conclusion that the evidence from the sister lacked credibility, and we do not consider it further. The IJ also noted that Chang gave no confidential information to the FBI and that it is not clear that the Chinese government is aware that Chang sought political asylum in this country or met with the FBI. It would be virtually impossible for Chang to demonstrate what the Chinese government does or does not know about his conversations with the FBI or about his application for asylum. It is beyond dispute, however, when a high-ranking state employee entrusted with supervising an entire technical delegation suddenly and inexplicably fails to return to China, leaving his important positions with the Chinese government and his entire family behind, that the Chinese government may suspect that the he applied for asylum in this country. Even assuming, however, that China does not know or believe that Chang applied for asylum, Chang has demonstrated disloyalty to the Chinese through his unauthorized stay in this country such that, given his position with government and his responsibilities in supervising the delegation, it is more likely than not that he faces persecution upon return. In reaching this conclusion, we are particularly mindful of the responsibilities with which Chang was entrusted by China and of the unusual role of FBI in this case. Chang did not initiate contact with the FBI. The uncontroverted evidence shows that the FBI told Chang that he was in danger. Certainly this constitutes strong objective evidence that Chang was, in fact, in danger. The FBI agent 23 went so far as to escort Chang to the meeting with the immigration officer. And although we do not know what the Chinese government knows of Chang's meetings with the FBI, we agree with Chang that, regardless of whether he gave information to the FBI, the Chinese government is more likely than not to believe that he did. Of course, the Chinese government may not know anything of his meeting with the FBI. This possibility is one factor in the calculus, but we cannot disregard the possibility that China does know of the FBI meeting.