Opinion ID: 2210065
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dearden v. DetroitLegislative Intent

Text: We agree with the parties and the Court of Appeals that the present dispute is governed by this Court's decision in Dearden v. Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 264, 269 N.W.2d 139 (1978), in which we held that the legislative intent, where it can be discerned, is the test for determining whether a governmental unit is immune from the provisions of local zoning ordinances. In Dearden, the Michigan Department of Corrections leased a multiresidential structure from the archdiocese of Detroit with the intent to convert it into a rehabilitation center. However, the Detroit Board of Zoning Appeals denied the archdiocese's request for a variance and permission to change the use of the property. The archdiocese brought suit, seeking to set aside the board's decision. The Department of Corrections intervened. The circuit court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the board's decision denying the requested variance. Id. at 260-261, 269 N.W.2d 139. This Court disagreed and held that the Department of Corrections was immune from local zoning ordinances when establishing state penal institutions. Id. at 267, 269 N.W.2d 139. The Court found in the statute establishing the authority of the Department of Corrections, M.C.L. § 791.201 et seq. MSA 28.2271 et seq., a clear expression of the Legislature's intent to vest the department with complete jurisdiction over the state's penal institutions.... Id. at 265, 269 N.W.2d 139. Conversely, the Court found nothing in the language of the zoning enabling act, M.C.L. § 125.581 et seq. ; MSA 5.2931 et seq., to suggest a legislative intent to subject the department's exclusive jurisdiction over the state's penal institutions, and its duty to coordinate and adjust those institutions as an integral part of a unified, general correctional system, to the many and varied municipal zoning ordinances throughout the state. [ Id. at 266-267, 269 N.W.2d 139.] The Court concluded that Detroit's zoning ordinance was void to the extent that it attempts to prohibit the use of the subject property as a rehabilitation center. Id. at 267, 269 N.W.2d 139. [3]