Opinion ID: 1593630
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Standards

Text: The Missouri General Assembly has identified sexually violent predators as a very real threat to the safety of the people of Missouri. As a result, if a previously convicted sexually violent offender is found to have a mental abnormality making him dangerous at the time of scheduled release, sections 632.480 et. seq. establish the process pursuant to which he or she may be civilly committed. [7] Section 632.480 defines mental abnormality and sexually violent predator as follows: Mental abnormality, a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others[.] . . . Sexually violent predator, any person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. [8] Sec. 632.480(2), 632.480(5). Pursuant to its police power, a state may enact SVP statutes providing for the involuntary civil commitment of dangerous persons provided the commitment takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). The Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975), held that a finding of mental illness alone will not justify locking up a person against his will for an indefinite period of time. Id. at 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486. Rather, due process requires that a person be both mentally ill and dangerous in order to be civilly committed; the absence of either characteristic renders involuntary civil confinement unconstitutional. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77, 112 S.Ct. 1780. See also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The individual must not only be dangerous at the time of, but also during, commitment, for if his involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after a basis no longer existed. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486. Moreover, due process requires that the mental abnormality and dangerousness be inextricably intertwined, such that involuntary civil confinement [is limited] to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The result being, as found in Thomas, that to pass constitutional muster the statute must require a finding of future dangerousness and then link that finding to the existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that causes the individual serious difficulty controlling his behavior. See Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 791-92; see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072; Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867.