Opinion ID: 3003133
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Official Capacity Claims: Sovereign Immunity

Text: Under Section 1983, RLUIPA, and IRFRA Defendant argues that Nelson’s claim for damages against him in his official capacity are barred under Section 1983 (a point conceded by Nelson), RLUIPA and IRFRA. In its summary judgment order, the district court held 30 No. 08-2044 that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims for damages against Miller in his official capacity under RLUIPA but held that IRFRA allows damages against the State. Plaintiff argues that he should be able to obtain official capacity damages against Nelson under both RLUIPA and IRFRA.
For purposes of sovereign immunity, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is . . . no different than a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). A suit against a state may be brought in federal court only when (1) a state official is sued for prospective equitable relief under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); (2) Congress abrogates the State’s immunity pursuant to its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; or (3) the State consents and waives its immunity. See, e.g., Gary A v. New Trier High School, 796 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1986). The first two avenues are inapplicable here, because Ex parte Young does not apply to claims for damages, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-03 (1984), and because Congress enacted RLUIPA under its Article I powers, not the Fourteenth Amendment, see Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001); Cherry v. Univ. of Wis. Sys. Bd. of Regents, 265 F.3d 541, 554 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Congress cannot override the States’ immunity using an Article I power . . . .”). However, Plaintiff claims that the third avenue applies because the State has waived its immunity and consented to suit. No. 08-2044 31 Section 3 of RLUIPA states that no government may impose a substantial burden on prisoners’ religious exercise “in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1), or in a way that affects interstate commerce, id. § 2000cc-1(b)(2). Regarding remedies, the statute provides that prisoners “may assert a violation of [RLUIPA] . . . and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” Id. § 2000cc-2(a) (emphasis added). The question here is whether the term “appropriate relief” is sufficiently specific to waive a state’s sovereign immunity to a suit for damages. In analyzing whether a sovereign has waived its immunity, we strictly construe the scope of any alleged waiver in favor of the sovereign. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). We may “not enlarge the waiver beyond what the language [of the statute] requires.” Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Consent to suit cannot be implied, see id., and ambiguities are construed in favor of immunity, see United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992). There is a division of authority regarding whether states have waived their sovereign immunity to a suit for damages under RLUIPA. In Benning v. Georgia, the Eleventh Circuit held that RLUIPA’s reference to “appropriate relief” was specific enough to constitute a waiver. 391 F.3d 1299, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2004). Benning held that RLUIPA’s reference to “appropriate relief against government” “unambiguously required states to waive their sovereign immunity from suits filed by prisoners” under 32 No. 08-2044 the statute. Id. at 1305. A few years later, in Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007), the Eleventh Circuit retreated a bit from Benning’s analysis, this time reasoning that because Congress had not clearly stated what remedies were included in “appropriate relief,” the court should presume that such relief included money damages. Id. at 1270-71. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have taken a contrary view. In Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 130-33 (4th Cir. 2006), the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the phrase “appropriate relief” is subject to multiple interpretations, and while it was willing to infer that states understood this phrase to include injunctive relief, the phrase fell short of “the unequivocal textual expression necessary to waive State immunity from suits for damages.” Id. at 132. The court noted that the statute makes no reference to monetary relief or sovereign immunity, and that if Congress had wished to obtain a waiver for damages from states as a consequence of accepting funds, it easily could have expressed that intention. Id. (citing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (2000)). By using the “open-ended” term “appropriate relief,” RLUIPA “foreclose[d] any argument that the statute waive[d] immunity for monetary relief.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Webman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s identical “appropriate relief” provision insufficient to waive federal sovereign immunity for damages suits). In Sossamon v. The Lone Star State of Texas, the Fifth Circuit likewise found sovereign immunity to bar a suit against state officials in No. 08-2044 33 their official capacities under RLUIPA. 560 F.3d at 331. The court noted that the ordinary rule when interpreting a statute—that a court presumes a statute affords all ordinary remedies not expressly disclaimed—does not apply when inquiring whether a state waived its immunity. Id. Rather, damages must be “expressly provided” in the statute in order for a court to find that a state has waived immunity to such suits. Id.; see also Scott v. Beard, 252 Fed. Appx. 491, 492-93 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding without discussion that the Eleventh Amendment barred official capacity damages under RLUIPA). We find the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ analysis convincing. The term “appropriate relief” is open to several interpretations and does not provide the “unequivocal textual expression” necessary to effect a sovereign’s waiver to suits for damages. Nelson tries to distinguish Madison by noting that it relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane, which dealt with federal, not state, immunity from suit. But plaintiff does not explain why this distinction matters to the underlying analysis. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that “[i]n considering whether the Eleventh Amendment applies . . . cases involving the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government . . . provide guidance.” California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 506 (1998). Because a statutory reference to “appropriate relief” does not provide the “unequivocal textual expression” necessary to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity to suits for damages, we affirm the district court’s judgment that Miller is shielded from a monetary judgment in his official capacity under RLUIPA. 34 No. 08-2044
Miller concedes that IRFRA allows for monetary damages against him in his official capacity, but contends that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction over such a suit because the Illinois Court of Claims possesses exclusive jurisdiction of all claims against the state itself that are founded on state law. The district court did not address this argument at length, finding only that “IRFRA leaves open the possibility of monetary damages.” Our case law acknowledges that the Illinois Court of Claims “possesses exclusive jurisdiction of all claims against the state itself.” Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 505 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing 705 ILCS 505/8). We have also recognized that Illinois courts treat suits against a public employee in his official capacity as suits against the state. Id. (Suits against employees in their personal capacity, by contrast, are not considered suits against the state. Id.) Thus, it appears that the Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over the suit against Miller for damages in his official capacity. Plaintiff’s only response to this conclusion is his argument that the Court of Claims cannot provide the “judicial relief”contemplated by IRFRA 9 because it is not part of 9 IRFRA states the following with regard to judicial remedies under the statute: Judicial relief. If a person’s exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of this Act, that person may assert (continued...) No. 08-2044 35 the Illinois judiciary but rather is an agency created by the legislature. To support his argument, Nelson quotes the Illinois Court of Claims Act, which states that “any person who files a claim in the court shall, before seeking final determination of his or her claim exhaust all other remedies and sources of recovery whether administrative or judicial; . . .” 705 ILCS 505/25. Plaintiff claims that this portion of the Act distinguishes the Court of Claims from the “judiciary” because it requires a claimant to exhaust all “judicial” remedies before filing in the Court of Claims. But this argument is a non-starter: requiring exhaustion of other judicial remedies does not mean Court of Claims proceedings are “non-judicial” any more than requiring exhaustion of other administrative remedies means that such proceedings are “non-administrative.” Because it appears that the Court of Claims possesses exclusive jurisdiction over a suit against Miller in his official capacity, and because Nelson has offered no compelling counter-arguments, we remand this portion of Nelson’s suit to the district court for dismissal. 9 (...continued) that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and may obtain appropriate relief against a government. 775 ILCS 35/20. 36 No. 08-2044