Opinion ID: 777353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 37 UAL first maintains that the district court should have refused to enforce the EEOC's subpoena because the agency lacks jurisdiction to investigate the underlying charge. UAL primarily argues that the charge should be construed as a charge of citizenship discrimination, as opposed to national origin discrimination. Because citizenship discrimination is not prohibited by Title VII, UAL continues, the EEOC is not authorized to investigate the claim. As a corollary, UAL contends that the actions identified in Ms. Droge's charge are sanctioned by international treaty. Consequently, the treaty operates to deprive the EEOC of investigative authority concerning these actions. 38 With respect to its first argument, UAL focuses on the language used by the EEOC in its subpoena which speaks in terms of citizenship as opposed to country of origin. See R.9, Ex.1 ¶¶ 1, 5, 7 & 8-10 (1. Identify each and every benefit received by employees of United Airlines who are French citizens ....) (emphasis added). UAL also points to the EEOC's determination letter — declining to revoke the administrative subpoena — which refers to Ms. Droge's national origin as United States. R.9, Ex.3 at 2. 39 We begin our analysis with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a), which provides the statutory authority for EEOC investigations. The section provides: 40 In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under section 2000e-5 of this title, the Commission or its designated representative shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to the charge under investigation. 41 Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has explained that the authority of the EEOC to investigate is grounded in the charge of discrimination: 42 [T]he EEOC's investigative authority is tied to charges filed with the Commission; unlike other federal agencies that possess plenary authority to demand to see records relevant to matters within their jurisdiction, the EEOC is entitled to access only to evidence relevant to the charge under investigation. 43 EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 64, 104 S.Ct. 1621, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a); footnotes omitted). Consequently, the Court has concluded, a valid charge of discrimination is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial enforcement of a subpoena issued by the EEOC. Id. at 65, 104 S.Ct. 1621. Whether a specific charge is valid 2 is determined from the face of the charge, not from extrinsic evidence. See EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d 1055, 1065 (6th Cir.1982). 44 Turning to the charge at issue, we do not believe that the charge fails to allege an injury that, on its face, is covered by Title VII. It states: 45 I. I am employed by Respondent in Paris, France. Respondent does not pay into the French Social Security system for me and other Americans employed or domiciled in France. As a result, Americans are not compensated for absences from work due to illness or temporary disability whereas French employees are. 46 II. I believe that I and other Americans have been discriminated against because of our national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, in that Respondent does not contribute to the French Social [security system], but is permitted to do so under French law, for Americans employed or domiciled in France. 47 R.9, Tab 9, Ex.B. The charge, therefore, identifies the allegedly discriminatory act and alleges a basis for the discrimination — national origin — that is covered by Title VII. 3 48 UAL does not point to any infirmities in the charge. Instead, it relies solely on language chosen by the EEOC in its subpoena and determination letter. Although the EEOC's use of the terms citizen and United States may suggest that the EEOC's attention is focused upon citizenship as opposed to national origin, and, as a result, may strengthen UAL's argument that the EEOC's inquiries are not directed at investigating the underlying charge of national origin discrimination, this language does not affect the validity of the underlying charge or the EEOC's authority to investigate it. 4 49 UAL argues alternatively that the treaty operates to divest the EEOC of authority to investigate Ms. Droge's charge. Specifically, UAL points to this court's decisions in Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir.1991), and Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Industries Co., 126 F.3d 926 (7th Cir.1997), for the proposition that the treaty deprives the EEOC of jurisdiction in this matter. We believe UAL reads these cases too broadly. Neither of these cases addresses the authority of the EEOC to investigate a charge of discrimination. The claims at issue in Fortino and Weeks already had proceeded through the EEOC, and were before this court on an appeal from a judge and jury verdict and on an appeal from summary judgment, respectively. In both cases, we determined that the exercise of treaty rights — in those cases the right of a foreign sovereign to employ their own citizens — may not be made the basis for inferring a violation of Title VII. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393; Weeks, 126 F.3d at 935 (quoting same). Consequently, we dismissed the national origin claim in Fortino and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in Weeks. 50 However, the EEOC's authority to investigate is not negated simply because the party under investigation may have a valid defense to a later suit. EEOC v. Tempel Steel Co., 814 F.2d 482, 486 (7th Cir.1989). Even if an employer offers a valid defense in response to the charge, or presents facts that undermine the EEOC's jurisdiction, the EEOC does not have to take an employer at its word, but may investigate the underlying charge to determine the validity of the defenses raised. See Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 233 F.3d 981, 986 (7th Cir.2000) (An agency may investigate to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a party as long as the party's conduct superficially appears to bring it within the jurisdiction of the agency....); EEOC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 711 F.2d 780, 787 (7th Cir.1983) (We note initially that the mere assertion by an employer that his employment practices are lawful does not deprive the EEOC of jurisdiction. No action would ever be brought against an employer if the jurisdiction of the EEOC depended upon the assertions of employers as to whether their own employment practices were lawful.). Consequently, even when an employer asserts that its actions are protected or excused by international treaty, there is a legitimate role for the EEOC.