Opinion ID: 45530
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: IIRIRA and Fleuti

Text: 8 Before IIRIRA's passage, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) defined entry as: 9 [A]ny coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary. 10 Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 452, 83 S.Ct. 1804. The Fleuti doctrine refers to the Supreme Court's determination that a resident alien did not effect an entry returning from `an innocent, casual, and brief excursion' outside the United States; instead such an alien effects an entry only if he intended to depart in a manner `meaningfully interruptive' of the alien's permanent residence. Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS, 78 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir.1996) (quoting Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462, 83 S.Ct. 1804). Petitioner argues this doctrine continues to apply, and that she cannot be considered to be entering the United States because she did not intend to meaningfully [interrupt] her residence. 11 Despite the innocent and brief nature of her trip to Mexico, 2 Petitioner can be considered an arriving alien. IIRIRA superseded the Fleuti doctrine and its intent test when the act replaced the above-quoted provision with the current § 1101(a)(13)(C). 3 The plain language of the statute does not allow for the exception found by the Court in Fleuti. 4 See Betancourt-Parga v. Ashcroft, 126 Fed.Appx. 165 (5th Cir.2005)(per curiam) ( Fleuti . . . has been superceded by the enactment of certain [IIRIRA] provisions in cases involving suspension of deportation). Our conclusion regarding IIRIRA's effect on the Fleuti doctrine is consistent with those of our sister circuits. See, e.g., Tapia v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir.2003) (The Fleuti doctrine . . . has been superseded by the IIRIRA); Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 394 (3rd Cir.2003) (Congress has also set forth six scenarios under which a returning lawful permanent resident may not retain that status. In those scenarios, where Congress has deemed Fleuti doctrine irrelevant, § 301(a)(13) cannot be read to permit an inquiry into the alien's intent.); see also Rivera-Jimenez v. INS, 214 F.3d 1213, 1218 n. 6 (10th Cir.2000) (noting absence of brief, casual, and innocent and did not meaningfully interrupt the continuous physical presence provision for calculating residence period in IIRIRA). 12 Even if the effect of IIRIRA on the Fleuti doctrine were not so plain, the deference we accord the BIA regarding its construction of immigration law yields the same result. In In re Collado, the BIA concluded that the Fleuti doctrine did not survive IIRIRA's passage. 21 I. & N. Dec. 1061, 1064-66 & n. 3, 1998 WL 95929 (BIA 1998). 5 Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., we subject the BIA's construction of the law it administers to a deferential review. Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 442 (5th Cir.2005)(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). This review involves a two-step inquiry. First, we ask whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If Congress' intent is clear, the agency and the courts are bound to give effect to it. Id. at 443 (quoting Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1005 (5th Cir.1999)). If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, we ask the second question, whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. As discussed above, we find the statute's language to be clear. Even were it not, Petitioner's observation-that the placement of the word unless allows for the logical possibility of an LPR who has committed one of the listed offenses not being deemed to seek admission-does not render the BIA's reading of the statute impermissible. The statute's command that an LPR shall not be regarded as seeking admission unless she has committed a crime of moral turpitude certainly permits the determination of an LPR who has committed such a crime as seeking admission. Even if we agreed with Petitioner's reading, to hold otherwise would be to simply impose [this court's] own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Id. at 443. Chevron commands we not go so far.