Opinion ID: 6219164
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The first Breit prong

Text: {26} Under this prong, we are required to determine if the judge’s conduct was “so unfairly prejudicial to [Defendant] that it [could not] be cured by means short of a mistrial or a motion for a new trial.” Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 32. {27} In its analysis, the Court of Appeals focused on the tone and demeanor of the judge before the jury to conclude that the judge’s conduct was not improper. Hildreth, 2019-NMCA-047, ¶ 20. The Court of Appeals “listened to the entire audio recording of the trial,” focusing on the “judge’s tone of voice” which “sounded” appropriate and proper. Id. The Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he judge did not raise his voice, . . . kept his commentary on Seeger’s actions to a minimum in front of the jury[, and] . . . repeatedly gave Seeger the opportunity to change course and actively participate in the trial proceedings.” Id. The Court of Appeals determined that because the judge did not sound dismissive or biased, the judge’s conduct was not improper. Id. This is where the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis. 11 {28} While the tone and content of remarks may be considered when determining whether an official’s conduct was improper, see Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶¶ 41-44, these considerations are not dispositive. Rather, we must “carefully examine the [official’s] conduct in light of the totality of the circumstances of the trial,” id. ¶ 40, and assess “the effect” the official’s conduct had on the defendant. State v. McClaugherty, 2008-NMSC-044, ¶ 26, 144 N.M. 483, 188 P.3d 1234. {29} Looking to the totality of the circumstances of the trial, we repeat that this was a battle between Seeger and the judge over whether a continuance was warranted or trial should proceed as scheduled. The denial of Seeger’s repeated requests for a continuance resulted in repeated motions for a mistrial. These procedural maneuvers between Seeger and the judge deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, prompting us to consider the circumstances under which the denial of a continuance is an abuse of discretion because it causes undue prejudice to a defendant. {30} In State v. Salazar, we concluded that “our case law requires the trial court to consider the Torres factors initially in evaluating a motion for a continuance.” State v. Salazar, 2007-NMSC-004, ¶ 27, 141 N.M. 148, 152 P.3d 135 (citing State v. Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, 127 N.M. 20, 976 P.2d 20). As reiterated by the Salazar Court, the Torres factors include: the length of the requested delay, the likelihood that a delay would accomplish the movant’s objectives, the existence of previous 12 continuances in the same matter, the degree of inconvenience to the parties and to the court, legitimacy in motives in requesting the continuance, fault of the movant in causing a need for delay, and the prejudice to the movant in denying that motion. Salazar, 2007-NMSC-004, ¶ 14 (citing Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 10). “In addition to meeting the Torres factors, [the d]efendant must show that the denial of the continuance prejudiced him.” Salazar, 2007-NMSC-004, ¶ 16. {31} In Salazar, we noted the prejudice to the defendant by the late discovery of a videotape and the effect it had on defense counsel’s cross-examination of a witness. Id. ¶¶ 7, 23. We determined “that the trial court abused its discretion in denying [the d]efendant’s motion” for a continuance because “[t]here had been no previous continuances, . . . the State did not oppose [the] continuance,” and “[the d]efendant was not at fault for causing the delay.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 21. We concluded by stating that “if the motion for a continuance depends on a claim that, absent a continuance, the defendant will have been or will be denied effective assistance of counsel, Brazeal offers guidance on how that claim should be analyzed,” but “that standard should play a subsequent, even subsidiary role to the Torres factors and analysis.” Id. ¶¶ 2728 (citing State v. Brazeal, 1990-NMCA-010, ¶ 15, 109 N.M. 752, 790 P.2d 1033). {32} In Brazeal, our Court of Appeals set forth a two-prong analysis to determine whether the denial of the continuance amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. 1990-NMCA-010, ¶ 15. The first consideration is whether “a per se violation of [the] defendant’s constitutional rights” has occurred—“in other words, whether we can 13 presume . . . that [the] defendant suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel because of the denial of a continuance.” Id. The second consideration is the defendant’s specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The circumstances in which prejudice to the defendant can be presumed include: “(1) denial of counsel altogether; (2) defense counsel’s failure ‘to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing’; and (3) when the accused is ‘denied the right of effective cross-examination.’” State v. Grogan, 2007-NMSC039, ¶ 12, 142 N.M. 107, 163 P.3d 494 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)). {33} With this background in mind, we begin with the judge’s denial of Seeger’s first motion for a continuance. Although there had been no previous continuances, we cannot say that the judge’s conduct was improper in denying this motion. To be sure, the State provided late discovery of the CD, but in looking to the Torres factors, as mandated by Salazar, the degree of inconvenience to the parties, legitimacy of motives, and prejudice to Defendant were unknown at this time. Salazar, 2007NMSC-004, ¶¶ 27-28. Seeger’s comment that he would “not participate” at trial does not change this determination. The judge could not know whether Seeger would remain true to his word, as evinced by the judge’s response, “[i]f that is true, then [Defendant] would have . . . excellent grounds for appeal.” (Emphasis added.) {34} At the motion hearing the morning of the trial, Seeger argued for sanctions because of the late discovery. Again, he argued that the CD might contain prior 14 statements of a witness and that he had not had an opportunity to review it for exculpatory material. Apparently acting on the State’s assurance that the CD was “nothing that the State would have presented today,” the judge denied the motion for sanctions. Again, there was no abuse of discretion and the trial commenced. {35} At trial, the judge watched as Seeger refused to participate in voir dire, juror challenges, opening statement, and witness examination. After the jury was sworn and Seeger made his first motion for mistrial, the judge asked Seeger to confirm “that [Seeger was] not going to defend this man,” to which Seeger replied, “[c]orrect.” The trial continued and the State called two of its three witnesses. Seeger did not cross-examine either witness. {36} By this time Seeger’s voluntary posture of determined inaction precluded any “meaningful adversarial testing” and denied Defendant “the right of effective crossexamination.” Grogan, 2007-NMSC-039, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “Seeger’s conduct rose to the level of a constructive denial of counsel sufficient to create a presumption of prejudice.” Hildreth, 2019-NMCA047, ¶ 14. By now, it was clear that Defendant was being denied his right to effective assistance of counsel, but that is not the question before us. The question is whether the judge’s conduct was “so prejudicial as to cause a mistrial or new trial.” Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 33. {37} After lunch, Seeger renewed the motions for mistrial or continuance. At this moment in the trial, the judge’s conduct became “so unfairly prejudicial to 15 [Defendant] that it [could not] be cured by means short of a mistrial or a motion for a new trial.” Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 32. This time, Seeger told the judge what was on the CD: statements from Defendant and the State’s two witnesses who testified that morning. At this time, the judge knew that there was no meaningful adversarial testing of the State’s case, that Defendant was denied his right to effective cross-examination, that the State misled the court by declaring that it would not use the CD but then calling two witnesses whose prior statements were on the CD, and that Seeger had no role in the State’s failure to provide the CD less than a week prior to trial. The judge’s denial of a continuance under these circumstances was unfairly prejudicial to Defendant. {38} These facts are similar to those in Salazar—there had been no previous continuances, the defense was not at fault for causing the delay, and the late discovery provided by the State prejudiced defense counsel’s cross-examination of witnesses—but here we also have a headstrong attorney refusing to participate in a criminal trial. Salazar, 2007-NMSC-004, ¶¶ 7, 21-23. Yet, despite the Torres factors weighing in favor of granting a continuance and allowing Defendant to develop a defense, the judge—equally obstinate—remained resolute in maintaining the trial docket. It was at this point in the trial that the judge had an affirmative obligation to do something: grant a continuance, declare a mistrial, or impose sanctions. However, the judge failed to undertake any measures to protect the constitutional rights of Defendant and the integrity of the court. See Grogan, 2007-NMSC-039, ¶ 10 (“[I]n 16 cases of obvious ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial judge has the duty to maintain the integrity of the court, and thus inquire into the representation.”); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (“The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court.”). {39} Returning to Breit, the judge’s decision to allow the trial to proceed in light of the facts before him was conduct so unfairly prejudicial to Defendant that it could not be cured short of a mistrial or new trial. We conclude that the first prong of the Breit analysis is satisfied. {40} Before turning to the second Breit prong, we take this opportunity to note that our determination that the judge’s conduct was improper and unfairly prejudicial to Defendant should in no way be construed as a validation of Seeger’s actions. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (“[A] counsel’s function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case.”), superseded on other grounds by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; see also Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245, 1250-52 (6th Cir. 1984) (concluding that defense counsel’s decision to “abandon all attempts to defend his client at trial” was a “bizarre and irresponsible stratagem” that amounted to constitutional error). “[A]ttorneys in New Mexico are not empowered with decisional autonomy regarding when trials commence and when they do not 17 commence. District courts are.” Hildreth, 2019-NMCA-047, ¶ 16. Seeger had an obligation to preserve the record with a focus on the specific facts in support of a continuance and to demonstrate how the denial of the continuance was prejudicial to Defendant, while not abdicating his role as Defendant’s attorney. See Salazar, 2007-NMSC-004, ¶¶ 15-16 (factors to be considered when “evaluating a trial court decision granting or denying a motion for continuance”). {41} That said, we echo the guidance offered to our district courts by the Court of Appeals as to how to respond when an attorney is threatening to withdraw from participation in a criminal trial. “[T]he district court can order new counsel to represent the defendant,” it can “impose a sanction on the culpable attorney while at the same time granting a continuance,” or, should “the attorney still refuse[] to participate in the face of a clear order to do so, the court can invoke its contempt powers against the obstructionist attorney.” Hildreth, 2019-NMCA-047, ¶ 16. Additionally, the court could “question the defendant to determine whether he [or she] understands the implications and consequences of the attorney’s proposed tactic and agrees to waive his [or her] right to effective assistance of counsel at trial.” Martin, 744 F.2d at 1251-52; see State v. Chapman, 1986-NMSC-037, ¶ 10, 104 N.M. 324, 721 P.2d 392 (“[T]he trial court must determine if a defendant is making a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel and fully understands the dangers of self-representation.”). 18