Opinion ID: 2618322
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the residency requirement violate equal protection or the constitutional right to interstate travel?

Text: Appellant contends that the City of Payette residency requirement is violative of the equal protection guarantee and the right to travel, and she cites to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As to equal protection, she contends that the requirement does not have a rational relationship to any legitimate interests of the City of Payette. As to the right to travel, she contends that the requirement cannot pass muster under the strict scrutiny standard, and she cites to Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), in support of her contention that this high standard must be applied to the Payette requirement. In Shapiro, the United States Supreme Court affirmed three lower court decisions holding as unconstitutional statutes which denied welfare assistance to residents who had not resided within their jurisdiction for at least one year immediately preceding their applications for such assistance. The Court held that [s]ince the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest. Under this standard, the waiting-period requirement clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638, 89 S.Ct. at 1333. (Emphasis in original.) The emphasis we place on the phrase immediately preceding goes to the distinction between durational and continuing residency requirements. Thus, in Shapiro the Court recognized, in regard to the three statutes in question, that [t]he residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent... . Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 636, 89 S.Ct. at 1332. Additionally, in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 647, 96 S.Ct. 1154, 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 366 (1976), the United States Supreme Court recognized that it has previously differentiated between a requirement of continuing residency and a requirement of prior residency of a given duration. We have also previously recognized the distinction between durational and continuing residency requirements. Langmeyer v. State, 104 Idaho 53, 656 P.2d 114 (1982). In Langmeyer, we dealt with a durational residency requirement (five-year residency prerequisite for appointment to the Bonner County Planning and Zoning Commission), and noted that any durational residence requirement impinges to some extent on the right to travel... . Langmeyer, 104 Idaho at 56, 656 P.2d at 117 (quoting Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974)). The City of Payette residency requirement, which requires its employees to live within a certain area during their employment, is not a durational residency requirement. Thus, under the Langmeyer rationale, the strict scrutiny standard does not apply. Since the City of Payette residency requirement is a continuing residency requirement, and since neither Idaho law nor United States law applies the strict scrutiny standard to such requirements, the rationale basis standard is the proper inquiry. At trial, and on appeal, the City of Payette has asserted several bases for the residency requirement, including having its employees mix in the community and contribute to the Payette tax base. In addition, from the minutes of the Payette City Council meeting wherein the 1987 manual was adopted, it is apparent that at least some members of the council were concerned about response time. We find all of these reasons to be rational bases for the type of residency requirement before us. See Simien v. City of San Antonio, 809 F.2d 255, 257 (5th Cir.1987), wherein the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that [m]embers of the San Antonio City Council expressed at least two legitimate government purposes for the residency rule: 1) those paid with tax dollars should support the tax base; and, 2) city employees should be part of the community they serve in order to understand and identify with its problems. These purposes are sufficient to support San Antonio's residency rule. Finally, a continuing residency requirement does not impact the fundamental right to travel. In McCarthy, 424 U.S. at 646-47, 96 S.Ct. at 1155 (citations and footnote omitted), the United States Supreme Court considered whether the appellant's constitutionally recognized right to travel interstate as defined in Shapiro is impaired, and concluded that it was not, saying that [i]n this case appellant claims a constitutional right to be employed by the city of Philadelphia while he is living elsewhere. (Emphasis in original.) There is no support in our cases for such a claim. And, in Langmeyer, we stated that some `waiting period or residence requirements ... may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.' Langmeyer, 104 Idaho at 56, 656 P.2d at 117 (quoting Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 256-57, 94 S.Ct. at 1081 (1974)). (Emphasis in original.) Therefore, we hold that the rational basis standard is the proper standard to be applied to continuing residency requirements, and that the fundamental right to travel is not implicated by this type of residency requirement. We further conclude that the City of Payette's continuing residency requirement does not violate the equal protection guarantees.