Opinion ID: 1439705
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mixed-Motive Theory of Discrimination

Text: A Title VII plaintiff may state a claim for discrimination under either the pretext theory set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or the mixed-motive theory set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), under which a plaintiff may show that an employment decision was made based on both legitimate and illegitimate reasons. Following some division among the circuits as to application of Price Waterhouse, Congress enacted two new statutory provisions geared toward setting the applicable standard in a mixed-motive case. The first provision stated: Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The second provision gave the employer a limited affirmative defense to `demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.' Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)) (alterations omitted). If proven, this defense limits the plaintiff's relief to injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and costs. Id. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 2148. Although the courts were divided about whether a discrimination claim brought under a mixed-motive theory had to be proven with direct evidence, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in Desert Palace by holding that a plaintiff does not need to present direct evidence of discrimination to proceed on a mixed-motive theory of discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 2148. The Court reiterated the general principle that Title VII has made it an `unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual ..., because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. at 92-93, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). In sum, [i]n order to obtain an instruction under § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that `race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.' Id. at 101, 123 S.Ct. 2148.