Opinion ID: 1959985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: allocution statement

Text: Defendant objects to the trial court's failure to provide the jury with an instruction regarding his allocution statement. More specifically, defendant argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider his allocution statement insofar as it affected any of the mitigating factors. At the close of the evidence, defendant informed the court that he desired to exercise his right of allocution. The trial court first instructed the jury: Members of the jury, under our law a defendant in a case such as this is entitled to what we call a right of allocution. It is not an exercise of testifying, it is a right to speak to the jury and I had explained to Mr. DiFrisco what the limits are with respect to that and his remarks will be within those limits. It will be a brief discussion to you. Please give him your attention. You may address the jury sir. Then the defendant spoke: Thank you, your Honor. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I am deeply, deeply sorry for taking the life of Mr. Potcher. I'm equally sorry for his family as well as mine. I ask you and I plead with you to spare my life, not to give me the death penalty. Thank you. Thank you all. The State argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury that it could not consider the above allocution statement in determining the existence of any mitigating factor. In the end, the trial court elected not to refer to defendant's allocution in its charge. Defense counsel did not request an allocution instruction, nor did defense counsel object to the court's charge. Although why the trial court failed to give an instruction on the allocution statement is not entirely clear, the court appears to have been attempting to reach a compromise position. Although reasoning that the allocution statement was not testimony and, hence, not evidence to be considered as establishing a mitigating factor, the court also recognized defendant's right to present a statement in allocution. See State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 430, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S.Ct. 1146, 103 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1989). Although a defendant may not contradict other testimony or argue legal points in allocution, a defendant may make a statement in order to allow a jury to ascertain that he or she is an `individual capable of feeling and expressing remorse and of demonstrating some measure of hope for the future.' Ibid. (quoting J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional Mitigation, 15 N.M.L.Rev. 41, 41 (1985)). The right to make a statement in allocution is not constitutionally guaranteed, id. at 429, 548 A. 2d 1022, but it is a common-law right of the criminal defendant. Id. at 428, 431-32, 548 A. 2d 1022. Although no one disputes that defendant had a right to make a statement in allocution, the parties differ over whether the jury should consider such a statement in determining the existence of one or more mitigating factors. The State argues that allocution is designed not to affect mitigating evidence but to remind the jury of defendant's humanity. The State relies on the fact that the right of allocution is limited, as well as our statement in Zola, supra, that allocution reflects our common humanity, which recognizes that a defendant should not be sentenced to death by a jury `which never heard the sound of his voice.' Id. at 429-30, 548 A. 2d 1022 (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 220, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1474, 28 L.Ed. 2d 711, 733 (1971)). Defendant maintains that an allocution statement, as defined in Zola, supra, is a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury. 112 N.J. at 431, 548 A. 2d 1022 (emphasis added). Thus, according to defendant, it can be considered in the determination of mitigating factors. As we explained in Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 430-31, 548 A. 2d 1022, the purpose of allocution is two-fold. First, it reflects our commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an opportunity to ask for mercy. Second, it permits a defendant to impress a jury with his or her feelings of remorse. Because continued remorse for the victim may constitute a mitigating factor, see N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h) (stating that defendant may introduce evidence relating to character in mitigation), to afford defendants the right of allocution, the partial purpose of which is to demonstrate defendant's ability to feel remorse, and simultaneously to prohibit the jury from considering the allocution statement's impact on the mitigating factors presented would make little sense. In this case, defendant sought to prove his remorse as a specific mitigating factor; therefore, the jury may consider his allocution statement in determining whether he is, in fact, remorseful, or whether the defense has established any other mitigating factor. That understanding is implicit in our opinion in Zola, supra, and accords with other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 794 P. 2d 159, 192 (Colo. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1018, 111 S.Ct. 662, 112 L.Ed. 2d 656 (1991); Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A. 2d 1098, 111-12 (1986), vacated in part, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1987). But see State v. McNeil, 324 N.C. 33, 375 S.E. 2d 909, 912 (1989) (holding trial court did not err in refusing to submit remorse as mitigating factor where only factual support came from allocution), vacated, 494 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 1516, 108 L.Ed. 2d 756 (1990). Although we hold that a jury may consider a defendant's statement in allocution in its consideration of any mitigating factors presented, we reemphasize the cautionary words of Zola: Before a defendant speaks, he shall be instructed by the court, outside of the presence of the jury, of the limited scope of the right; that his statement is subject to the court's supervision; and that should the statement go beyond the boundaries permitted he will be subject to corrective action by the court including either comment by the court or prosecutor or in some cases possible reopening of the case for cross-examination. [112 N.J. at 432, 548 A. 2d 1022 (emphasis added).] Because a jury may consider defendant's statement in allocution insofar as it affects any mitigating factors presented, trial courts should instruct the jury accordingly. The trial court, therefore, erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider defendant's statement insofar as it related to one or more of the mitigating factors. At the time of trial, the following model instruction that had been adopted by the Committee on Capital Causes, in response to our suggestion in Zola, was in effect. If the defendant exercises his right of allocution, the judge should instruct the jury that it may consider what the defendant stated insofar as it impacts on one or more of the mitigating factors. Trial Judges Committee on Capital Causes, Judges Bench Manual for Capital Causes J(2)-40 (1993). We have been informed that this instruction has been deleted from the manual. We do not know the reasons for the deletion. However, until a new instruction is adopted by the Trial Judges Committee on Capital Causes, we think the prior instruction is an appropriate model for courts to use. Yet, we are convinced that the trial court's failure to give such an instruction, which arises as plain error, was harmless. We do not agree with defendant that the failed allocution instruction deprived him of a constitutional right to have the jury consider information that would bear on a mitigating factor. The error was not of constitutional dimension. It would be odd indeed to have a rule that recognizes that the complete deprivation of the right of allocution is not constitutional in dimension, Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 428, 431, 548 A. 2d 1022, but that nevertheless concedes that a failure to instruct a jury on how to analyze an allocution statement is. Thus, we need only be satisfied that the failed instruction was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 10-2; State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 337-38, 273 A. 2d 1 (1971). We conclude that the failed instruction was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. One of the mitigating factors that defendant submitted was that he remains remorseful about killing Edward Potcher. The failure to give the instruction did not in any way prohibit the jury from considering defendant's allocution statement as an indication of his remorse, which is the only mitigating factor it could have affected. Although the court advised the jury that the evidence it could consider in its deliberations consisted of sworn testimony and exhibits, later in the charge the trial court made clear that evidence included all material presented by both sides at this trial. The court also advised the jury that the mitigating factors listed on the verdict sheet were non-exclusive. Moreover, continued remorse for the victim was listed on the verdict sheet as a mitigating factor. Still, eleven jurors did not find that mitigating factor.