Opinion ID: 2638197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Development of Quick-take Procedure

Text: As adopted in 1879, the California Constitution provided only that [p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made.... (Cal. Const, art. I, former § 14, repealed Nov. 5,1974.) No constitutional provision allowed prejudgment possession. Instead, it was statutorily provided under former section 1254 that a condemned could take possession of the land as the condemnation proceeding was pending if it deposited probable compensation into court. Under the statute, the defendant was allowed to apply to the court for the money, but the condemner could take possession even without the court approving the payment. ( Steinhart v. Superior Court (1902) 137 Cal. 575, 576, 577, 70 P. 629 (Steinhart) .) Steinhart considered the constitutionality of this early possession provision. As the Constitution at the time required that just compensation must have first [been] made, the court held that a preliminary possession cannot be authorized until the damage ... has been judicially determined and the amount has been paid or tendered to the owner. ( Steinhart, supra, 137 Cal. at p. 578, 70 P. 629.) As the owner could not immediately withdraw the funds, nor had the amount of compensation yet been decided by a jury, the deposit statute was declared unconstitutional. (Id. at pp. 578-579, 70 P. 629.) In response to the Steinhart decision, California voters; amended the Constitution to authorize certain public agencies to take immediate possession of the condemned property without first making payment to the owner. (See Taking Possession and Passage of Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings (Oct.1960) 3 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1961) p. B-10 (Commission Report).) Owners had no right to withdraw the money, [4] and were left to vacate the property, locate new property to replace that taken and move to the new location at a time when there [was] little or no money available from the condemnation. (Id. at p. B-7.) In 1956, the California Law Revision Commission (Commission) was authorized to study whether condemnation law should be revised to better safeguard private property rights. (Commission Report, supra, at p. B-l.) Its findings were incorporated into Proposition 7, which was passed by the voters in 1974. ( Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 522-523, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 489.) Proposition 7 repealed and replaced the former just compensation clause in article I, section 14 of the California Constitution with the current clause in article I, section 19. The Commission concurrently recommended revision of a number of statutory measures relating to eminent domain and the right to immediate possession. (Commission Report, supra, at pp. B-12 to 25.) The Legislature enacted many of these recommendations into law. (See People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Southern California Edison (2000) 22 Cal.4th 791, 799-800, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 996 P.2d 711; Miro v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 87, 99-100, 84 Cal. Rptr. 874.) The Commission concluded that a constitutional amendment was necessary, as the policy underlying the Steinhart decision and the original provisions of the 1879 Constitution is sound and the contrary policy of the present provisions of the Constitution [under article I, former section 14] is undesirable. (Commission Report, supra, at p. B-10.) Under former article I, section 14, an owner had no assurance he or she would actually receive compensation at the time the property taking occurred. A person's property should not be taken from him unless he has the right to be paid concurrently for the property, for it is at the time of the taking that he must meet the expenses of locating and purchasing property to replace that taken and of moving to the new location. (Commission Report, supra, at p. B-10.) The Commission recommended that the condemnee be allowed to withdraw the entire deposit when the condemner takes actual possession of the property. (Id. at p. B-7.) The Commission reasoned that immediate possession proceedings were more beneficial to both condemners and owners than straight condemnations. The public interest would be promoted by shortening the delay between the beginning of the condemnation proceeding and the actual taking of possession. While the need for public improvements of all kinds has become increasingly clear, the construction of these improvements has often been delayed for excessive periods of time, largely because of the inability of the condemnor to expedite the taking of possession. (Commission Report, supra, at p. B-29.) These delays resulted in an increase in the cost of the development, which in turn led to increased taxes. (Ibid.) Because bond issues finance many developments, the inability to take immediate possession may cause inability to meet the bonding requirements and, consequently, may not only retard but completely prevent the construction of the improvement. (Ibid., fn. omitted.) The Commission also observed that, Upon commencement of condemnation proceedings, a landowner is deprived of many of the valuable incidents of ownership. He can no longer place improvements upon the property for which he may be compensated. He is practically precluded from selling or renting the property for few persons want to purchase a law suit. (Commission Report, supra, at p. B-12.) In ordinary condemnation proceedings, the owner received no compensation until the end of litigation. (Ibid.) The Commission proposed that in quick-take or immediate possession proceedings, the owner should have the right to withdraw compensation when the condemner actually takes possession of the property, and therefore have the money available immediately to use when planning for the future. [5] (Id. at p. B-12.) The Commission suggested few alterations to the waiver provision when it proposed the aforementioned constitutional and statutory changes, recommending only that former section 1254.7 be amended and renumbered as (former) section 1243.7, and that the waiver of claims and defenses in subdivision (g) be retained. [6] (Commission Report, supra, at pp. B-15 to B-16.) The Legislature followed this recommendation and retained the waiver provision when it enacted section 1243.7. (Stats. 1961, ch. 1613, § 4, pp. 3444, 3446.) The Commission later discussed the proper date of valuation. Before 1974, the rule had been to value the property as of the date the summons was issued. (Recommendation: Eminent Domain Law (Oct 1974) 12 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1974) pp. 1605, 1645-1646 (1974 Commission Report).) The Commission again noted the condemning agency's need for certainty: In acquiring property for public use, it is frequently essential that there be a definite future date as of which all property needed for the public improvement will be available. An undue delay in acquiring even one essential parcel can prevent construction of a vitally needed public improvement and can complicate financial and contractual arrangements for the entire project.... In general, the need of the condemnor is not for haste but for certainty in the date of acquisition. The variable conditions of court calendars and the unpredictable period required for the trial of the issue of compensation preclude any certainty in the date of acquisition if that date is determined solely by entry of judgment in the proceeding. (Id. at p. 1658.) The Commission considered the oft-made proposal that the date of valuation should be the date trial commences in all cases. (1974 Commission Report, supra, at p. 1645.) It would seem more appropriate to ascertain the level of the general market and the value of the particular property in that market at the time the exchange of the property for `just compensation' actually takes place. Also, in a rapidly rising market, property values may have increased so much that the property owner cannot purchase equivalent property when he eventually receives the award.... Nonetheless, the existing California rules appear to have worked equitably in most cases. The alternative rule might provide an undesirable incentive to condemnees to delay the proceedings to obtain the latest possible date of valuation. And, as a matter of convenience, there is merit in fixing the date of valuation as of a date certain, rather than by reference to the uncertain date that the trial may begin. (Id. at pp. 1645-1646, fn. omitted.) The Commission recommended retention of the existing rule. In addition to providing a needed incentive to condemnors to deposit approximate compensation, the rule would accord with the view that the property should be valued as of the time payment is made.... A date of valuation thus established should not be subject to change by any subsequent development in the proceeding. (Id. at p. 1646.) Procedural safeguards under current eminent domain laws ensure the deposit closely approximates the amount that a jury would actually award, and the owner is guaranteed a jury trial on the award amount if requested. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19.) The owner's constitutional right to receive just compensation for the property `cannot be made to depend upon state statutory provisions.' ( Gilmore, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 797, 214 Cal.Rptr. 904, 700 P.2d 794, citing Seaboard, supra, 261 U.S. at p. 306, 43 S.Ct. 354; see also Kirby Forest Industries Inc. v. United States (1984) 467 U.S. 1, 17, 104 S.Ct. 2187, 81 L.Ed.2d 1 (Kirby ).) The Legislature does have the power to place additional restrictions on the exercise of eminent domain. Saratoga Fire Protection Dist. v. Hackett (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 895, 905-906, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 (Saratoga ); see also Kelo v. City of New London (2005) 545 U.S. 469, 489, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 [`Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch'].) The Legislature has incorporated a number of these restrictions into its statutory scheme. (See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (1982) 32 Cal.3d 60, pp. 64-65, 69, 183 Cal.Rptr. 673, 646 P.2d 835.) But state and federal statutory provisions have been invalidated when necessary to ensure just compensation to the owner. (See, e.g., Kirby, supra, 467 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2187, 81 L.Ed.2d 1; Gilmore, supra, 38 Cal.3d 790, 214 Cal.Rptr. 904, 700 P.2d 794; Saratoga, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 905-906,118 Cal.Rptr.2d 696.) The statutory procedural safeguards in place today include a property appraisal requirement. (§ 1255.010) A recent statute requires the condemner to offer to pay the reasonable costs (up to $5,000) of an independent appraisal that the property owner orders at the time the condemner offers to take the property. (§ 1263.025, subd. (a).) Once the deposit is made, the owner may petition the court to determine or redetermine whether it equals the probable compensation that will be awarded. (§ 1255.030, subd. (a).) If the deposit does not meet the amount of probable compensation and is not increased within the time allowed, the deposit is void and will not be used to determine the date of valuation. (§ 1263.110, subd. (b).)