Opinion ID: 1453555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Extradition Decree and Treaties on Cuevas's Sentence

Text: As a preliminary matter, the government contends that in the absence of protest from the Dominican Republic, Cuevas lacks standing to raise violation of an extradition treaty as an issue. This Court has not conclusively decided whether a defendant has standing to challenge his sentence on the ground that it violates the terms of the treaty or decree authorizing his extradition. See United States v. Banks, 464 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.2006). We need not resolve this issue here, however, because Cuevas's arguments plainly fail on the merits. See id. The rule of specialty, which is derived from principles of international comity, generally requires a country seeking extradition to adhere to any limitations placed on prosecution by the surrendering country. United States v. Baez, 349 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam). Typically, the rule of specialty is invoked to circumscribe the specific crimes for which a defendant may be tried following extradition. See United States v. Campbell, 300 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir.2002) (It is well established that, under the international principle of specialty, an extradited defendant may not be tried for a crime not enumerated in the applicable extradition treaty. (citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir.1976))). However, the rule of specialty has application in the sentencing context as well. As we held in United States v. Baez , since the cauldron of circumstances in which extradition agreements are born implicate the foreign relations of the United States, a district court, [i]n sentencing a defendant extradited to this country in accordance with a diplomatic agreement between the Executive branch and the extraditing nation, . . . delicately must balance its discretionary sentencing decision with the principles of international comity in which the rule of specialty sounds. 349 F.3d at 93. In more concrete terms, this means that a district court should temper [its] discretion in sentencing an extradited defendant with deference to the substantive assurances made by the United States to an extraditing nation.  Id. (emphasis added). The District Court did not offend against the rule of specialty here. The 1909 extradition treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic contains no limitations on sentencing. See Banks, 464 F.3d at 187, 191. Furthermore, the factual record developed on remand establishes that the United States never made any substantive assurances to the Dominican Republic that if extradited and convicted, Cuevas would not be sentenced to a term of more than 30 years' imprisonment. Cf. Baez, 349 F.3d at 92 (observing that prior to the extradition, the United States had sent a diplomatic note, assuring Colombia that should Mr. Restrepo be convicted of the offenses for which extradition has been granted, the United States executive authority, with the agreement of the attorney for the accused, will not seek a penalty of life imprisonment at the sentencing proceedings in this case); Campbell, 300 F.3d at 206 (recounting that the U.S. Department of State had provided assurances to the Costa Rican government in a diplomatic note . . . stating, inter alia, that `Campbell will not be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment greater than 50 years'). While the extradition decree indicates that officials of the Dominican Republic believed, no doubt based on the domestic law of the Dominican Republic, that [Cuevas's] sentence would be so limited, critically, nothing in the decree point[s] to any agreement or undertaking made by the United States to limit his sentence. Banks, 464 F.3d at 191-92. The Dominican Republic's unilateral belief that Cuevas would be covered by Law No. 489 is insufficient to bind the United States. See id. at 192. Cuevas does not dispute the District Court's finding that the United States provided no diplomatic assurances regarding the limitation of his sentence as part of the extradition arrangement. Cuevas contends that the United States is bound by the 30-year sentencing limitation, notwithstanding the absence of specific assurances, because in signing the U.N. Convention, the United States agreed it is the law of the Dominican Republic that controls the conditions upon which extradition is made. Cuevas rests his argument on the language of Article 6, paragraph 5 of the U.N. Convention, which provides: Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds upon which the requested party may refuse extradition. U.N. Convention, art. 6, para. 5, 28 I.L.M. at 507. In interpreting a treaty, we must begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). When Article 6 is read as a whole, it becomes clear that paragraph 5 simply means that a State may consider conditions in its domestic laws or applicable extradition treaties in deciding whether to grant a request made pursuant to the U.N. Convention, and may refuse to extradite unless the requesting State agrees to comply with those conditions. Accordingly, paragraph 6 of Article 6 states:  In considering requests received pursuant to this article, the requested State may refuse to comply with such requests where there are substantial grounds leading its judicial or other competent authorities to believe that compliance would facilitate the prosecution or punishment of any person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions, or would cause prejudice for any of those reasons to any person affected by the request. U.N. Convention, art. 6, para. 6, 28 I.L.M. at 507 (emphasis added). The onus is on the requested State to determine, prior to surrendering the individual, whether extradition is permitted under its own laws and treaty obligations. Thus, paragraph 8 provides:  Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition treaties, the requested Party may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant and are urgent, and at the request of the requesting Party, take a person whose extradition is sought and who is present in its territory into custody or take other appropriate measures to ensure his presence at extradition proceedings. Id., art. 6, para. 8, 28 I.L.M. at 507 (emphasis added). Here, the Dominican Republic did not make adherence to Law No. 489 a mandatory condition of extradition; indeed, the issue of sentencing was never discussed at any point prior to the transfer of custody. Nothing in Article 6, including paragraph 5, makes the domestic laws of the Dominican Republic binding on the United States in this situation. Cf. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1192 (2d Cir.1980) (opining that no nation may unilaterally bind another sovereign by the sheer force of its statutory enactments). Our reading finds further support in the normal practices of the United States and its extradition treaty partners, including the Dominican Republic. See Société Nationale, 482 U.S. at 534, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (stating that the practical construction adopted by the parties may also be relevant in interpreting a treaty (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the declarations from the Director of the Office of International Affairs and the Assistant Legal Advisor for the State Department establish, when a foreign nation seeks to impose a limitation on a sentence as a condition of granting the extradition of a defendant to the United States, it formally requests assurances from the United States by way of diplomatic note. The DOJ, in consultation with the State Department, determines whether the United States can and should provide the requested assurances, and relays the official position by diplomatic note. The foreign nation then considers the response of the United States in deciding whether to extradite the defendant. In this case, the Dominican Republic did not request or secure any assurances regarding the limitation of Cuevas's sentence before surrendering him to the United States. Because the United States never agreed that Cuevas's extradition would be subject to Law No. 489, the District Court was under no obligation to limit Cuevas's sentence to 30 years. We therefore affirm the District Court's conclusion that Cuevas's sentence of 390 months' imprisonment is not illegal, and that his guilty plea was not involuntary or uninformed.