Opinion ID: 2322590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The hearing requirement

Text: Both Appellants contend that the Circuit Court erred in denying their C.P. § 8-301 petitions, without affording them a hearing. Appellants contend generally that the statute establishes a pleading requirement that, if met, automatically triggers a hearing, provided one was requested. The State responds that the express language of the statute allows the trial court to deny a petition for writ of actual innocence without a hearing, even if the petition has met the procedural pleading requirements, if the court finds that the petition fails to assert grounds on which relief may be granted. To determine whether C.P. § 8-301 mandates a hearing before the trial court may dismiss the petitions and, if so, under what circumstances, we turn to our rules of statutory interpretation: In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules. We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute's provisions and our analysis ends. Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute's plain language. In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments. Evans v. State, 420 Md. 391, 400, 23 A.3d 223, 228 (2011) (quoting Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 404-05, 978 A.2d 736, 747-48 (2009)). Section 8-301(e) provides: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court shall hold a hearing on a petition filed under this section if the petition satisfies the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and a hearing was requested. (2) The court may dismiss a petition without a hearing if the court finds that the petition fails to assert grounds on which relief may be granted. Section 8-301(b), in turn, provides: (b) Requirements. A petition filed under this section shall: (1) be in writing; (2) state in detail the grounds on which the petition is based; (3) describe the newly discovered evidence; (4) contain or be accompanied by a request for a hearing if a hearing is sought; and (5) distinguish the newly discovered evidence claimed in the petition from any claims made in prior petitions. The statute also defines grounds: (a) Grounds. A person charged by indictment or criminal information with a crime triable in circuit court and convicted of that crime may, at any time, file a petition for writ of actual innocence in the circuit court for the county in which the conviction was imposed if the person claims that there is newly discovered evidence that: (1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different, as that standard has been judicially determined; and (2) could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331. C.P. § 8-301(a). C.P. § 8-301(e)(2) grants the court the authority to dismiss a petition that, although compliant with the procedural requirements of subsection (b), does not assert grounds upon which relief could be granted. The language of the statute is key. It requires that a petition assert grounds for relief; it does not require the petitioner to satisfy the burden of proving those grounds in the papers submitted. Additionally, the plain language of the statute declares that a petitioner has the requisite grounds if he claims that there is newly discovered evidence that: (1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different. . .; and (2) could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331. C.P. § 8-301(a) (emphasis added). Nothing in the language of the statute requires more than that a petitioner plead those assertions before the hearing requirement is triggered. We are prohibited by our rules of construction from reading into a statute a construction not reflected by its plain language, Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003), and we will not do so here. We therefore hold that the statute establishes only a burden of pleading grounds for relief, not of proving them, and that a trial court may dismiss a petition without a hearing when one was requested, pursuant to C.P. § 8-301(e)(2), only when a petitioner fails to satisfy the pleading requirement. The pleading requirement mandates that the trial court determine whether the allegations could afford a petitioner relief, if those allegations would be proven at a hearing, assuming the facts in the light most favorable to the petitioner and accepting all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the petition. That is, when determining whether to dismiss a petition for writ of actual innocence without a hearing pursuant to C.P. § 8-301(e)(2), provided the petition comports with the procedural requirements under C.P. § 8-301(b), the trial court must consider whether the allegations, if proven, consist of newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331 and whether that evidence creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result [of the trial] may have been different. C.P. § 8-301(a). This standard does not require that a trial court take impossibilities as truths. For example, if a petition asserts, as newly discovered, evidence that was clearly known during trial, then the evidence cannot be newly discovered, and the trial court may dismiss the petition without a hearing. Similarly, if a petition asserts procedural errors committed by the trial court, that is not newly discovered evidence. If, however, the petition alleges newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331, and which creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different, then it would be error to dismiss the petition merely because the petition itself did not convince the trial court without a hearing. In Jackson we recognized the persuasive value of a hearing. 358 Md. at 625, 751 A.2d at 479-80. As we explained, [The right to a hearing] represents an assessment by us of the significance of the matter under consideration, at least to the parties, and, given that significance, of their right, if they choose to exercise it, to present directly to the court, viva voce, the reasons why they should prevail. It is a recognition that personal, vocal communication with the judge may not only itself be a more effective means of persuasion than written documents that may be read hurriedly and not fully appreciated or understood, but that a hearing offers at least a limited opportunity for dialogue, allowing for clarification, for greater precision, for addressing concerns harbored and expressed by the judge. It is a right that, ordinarily, may be waived, but when not waived, we are loathe, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, to find its denial harmless. It would often be a matter of pure speculation whether prejudice ensuedwhether, had the party been given the opportunity to make his or her pitch at a hearing, the result may have been differentand that is much more likely the case when the decision may rest upon the resolution of factual disputes or the exercise of discretion and judgment. Id., 751 A.2d at 479-80. We also recognized the necessity for courts to adhere strictly to rules mandating a hearing in particular instances. Id. at 623, 751 A.2d at 479. We noted that, [e]ven when afforded only by rule, and not as an incident of due process of law, the right to a hearing is of fundamental importance. Id. at 625, 751 A.2d at 479-80. We also have recognized the importance of holding a hearing even when one is neither mandated by statute nor by Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 929 A.2d 501 (2007), we had before us a petition filed pursuant to C.P. § 8-201 (DNA evidencePostconviction review). That statute requires the court to order DNA testing if, inter alia, a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. C.P. § 8-201(d). We reasoned that, given the purpose underlying the statute, which is to provide a means for incarcerated persons to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing, and notwithstanding that [the statute] is silent on the issue of hearings, if the court determines that there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether the evidence exists, ordinarily the court should hold a hearing. Id. at 507, 929 A.2d at 510. The same reasoning applies where C.P. § 8-301(e) mandates a hearing on a petition for actual innocence in the scenarios explained above.