Opinion ID: 492352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Latorre

Text: 17 Latorre complains of evidence that implicated him in three past criminal activities: involvement in the Caribbean International and Magnolia Pharmacy fires; evidence of his involvement in the theft of vans and merchandise; and evidence that he would shoot out whatever would be shot at. We find that the admission of this evidence does not constitute reversible error. 18 The evidence of Latorre's involvement in the past arsons is probative of the elements of the charge against him in this case. Latorre was indicted for conspiring with others to burn R & S and defraud its insurer. The issue at trial was not just whether Latorre committed arson. The broader issue was whether Latorre knowingly participated in a common scheme to defraud. We have often upheld the admissibility of evidence of past crimes in later trials for conspiracies to commit identical or similar crimes. 19 In such circumstances, the evidence of past similar crimes is helpful to show his mode of operation, intent, and knowing participation in the alleged conspiracy. 20 The relevance is especially strong when, as in this case, the prior crimes involved the same participants. 21 Here, the evidence of Latorre's involvement with the same people in past arson and fraud schemes is especially probative of the issue whether he was an innocent tool of others or a knowing participant in the conspiracy. 19 In contrast, the prejudicial effect of this evidence is small considering its probative value. Of course, the evidence is incriminating; but all highly probative evidence is highly prejudicial in this sense. The question is whether the defendant suffers unfair prejudice. This is not a case in which the evidence is so shocking or heinous [that it is] likely to inflame the jury. 22 Nor is the evidence so tangential to the case that the jury was certain to be confused and misdirected. Finally, the trial judge's instruction to the jury to consider the evidence only as evidence of knowledge and intent and for no other purpose, lessened the danger of unfair prejudice. 23 We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of this evidence. 20 We are less certain of the propriety of admitting evidence of Latorre's involvement in the van thefts and his role in shooting things out. Generally, it is the similarity of the past crime that makes it probative of the material issues in a later trial. 24 Here, the only similarity of these past activities with the R & S arson was the involvement of common participants. At some point, a past crime is too dissimilar to be probative of any issue except to show a bent to commit a crime. Moreover, the smaller degree of probativity is less likely to outweigh the increasing danger of unfair prejudice that results when the jury is confronted with evidence of assorted crimes in the defendant's past, crimes that bear only marginal relevance to the current charges against the defendant. 21 We need not determine whether the admission of this evidence was an abuse of the trial court's discretion because, even assuming that an error occurred, that error was harmless. The evidence against Latorre was overwhelming. The person who assisted Latorre in purchasing gasoline and starting the fire testified in detail as to the actual torching of the R & S building. Witnesses placed Latorre in meetings with the conspirators at which the plan to defraud the insurer was discussed. One witness, a former employee at R & S, testified that Latorre told her she had been fired because he and others were going to torch the business. Hospital records and witnesses' testimony clearly show that Latorre was badly burned by fire the night of the arson and that his explanation of his burns was fabricated. Another witness testified that, at the hospital, Latorre told him that he was burned while setting fire to R & S Sales. In view of this overwhelming evidence, we find that the verdict would have been the same regardless of the proffered additional evidence. 25