Opinion ID: 1268648
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction exists because of an implied legal error.

Text: Iglesias argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen because it completely ignored the evidence he presented, as demonstrated by the lack of reasoned analysis in its decision. Recently, we held that the REAL ID Act of 2005 stripped this court of jurisdiction over discretionary reopening decisions made by the BIA. See Kucana, 533 F.3d at 538. But Kucana also reiterated that the REAL ID Act permits discretionary decisions [to] be reviewed when they entail `constitutional claims or questions of law. ...' See id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). So we can review Iglesias's petition only if he has raised an argument that the BIA committed a constitutional or legal error. Compare Huang, 534 F.3d at 623 (exercising jurisdiction, though ultimately denying relief, in cases where petitioners raised arguments that the BIA might have legally erred in denying motions to reopen), with An Na Huang v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir.2008) (declining jurisdiction over an asylum claim where a petitioner mischaracterized a factual finding as a legal error). We first note that Iglesias does not phrase his arguments in terms of constitutional claims or questions of law; instead, his brief argues only that the BIA abused its discretion. Iglesias submitted his briefs before we decided Kucana, which abrogated earlier precedent indicating that we generally had jurisdiction to review denials of motions to reopen. See Singh v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1024, 1026-27 (7th Cir.2005) (overruled in part by Kucana ). Now that Kucana is the law, the question is whether we can review Iglesias's arguments even though he labeled them under the abuse of discretion category. Kucana itself suggests the answer. It implies that even when a petitioner phrases all of his arguments in terms of abuse of discretion (which is exactly what the petitioner in Kucana did), we can review an argument that necessarily implicates a claim of legal error, such as an allegation that the BIA failed to exercise discretion at all by completely ignoring an argument. See Kucana, 533 F.3d at 538-39 (The Board must exercise discretion; only when it has done so is its decision sheltered [from our review].). So a claim labeled as challenging an abuse of discretion might also encompass a genuine claim of legal error, just as a legal or constitutional claim might disguise what is in reality just a factual allegation. See Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting petitioner's attempt to shoehorn a factual claim into the question of law category). Here, we must determine whether Iglesias's allegation that the BIA completely ignored the evidence he presented necessarily implicates a claim of constitutional or legal error. Any plausible constitutional claim would be grounded in due process. Because we have held that a petitioner has no liberty or property interest in obtaining purely discretionary relief, such as the reopening of a case, Iglesias's due process rights were not implicated here. See Hamdan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1061 (7th Cir.2005); see also Cevilla v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.2006). Nonetheless, a claim that the BIA has completely ignored the evidence put forth by a petitioner is an allegation of legal error. We assumed without deciding in Kucana that ignoring a potentially dispositive issue is an error of law that would allow review under [the REAL ID Act]. Kucana, 533 F.3d at 538; see also Kebe v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir.2007) ([A]lthough the BIA does not have to write an exegesis on every contention, it must consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted. (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have since held that a failure to exercise discretion or to consider factors acknowledged to be material to such an exercisesuch as the wholesale failure to consider evidencewould be an error of law for purposes of reviewing a motion to reopen. See Huang, 534 F.3d 618 (second quotation from Hanan v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 760, 764 (8th Cir.2008)). And we fail to see how the BIA can make a reasoned decision denying a motion to reopen if it completely ignores the evidence that a petitioner presents. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. ...). So we conclude that Iglesias's allegation that the BIA completely ignored the evidence he presented is a good faith claim of legal error that we can review. See Kucana, 533 F.3d 534 (noting that the Board has an obligation to consider every argument made to it).