Opinion ID: 1228534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Other possible grounds for new trial.

Text: Defendants contend that even if it was not proper for the trial court to order a new trial based upon its holding that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, there are four additional bases upon which a new trial could have been granted and which this court may consider by reason of ORS 19.130(2). [3] First, defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying defendants' motion for a new trial. In support of that contention defendants say that the verdict assessed damages in an amount entirely unrelated to the pleadings, indicating substantial confusion on the part of the jury and compromise on the issues of negligence and damages. It appears from the record, however, that Dr. Todd testified, at one point, that he would have sold his shares for $35,000. The amount awarded by the jury, the sum of $23,005.65, was the exact amount by which the price paid by plaintiffs (the sum of $58,005.65) exceeded the amount which Dr. Todd said that he would sell his shares for. Although it may be speculative to say that this was the basis upon which the jury arrived at its verdict, we cannot say, to the contrary, that the jury acted improperly in its award of damages in that amount, much less that such an award is an indication of confusion and compromise on the issues of negligence and damages. Next, defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to strike the first count of plaintiffs' complaint. In support of that contention defendants say that the evidence is clear that Dr. Daskalos fully understood and knowingly agreed to both the formula being utilized and the amount derived therefrom and that the [trial] court properly found that Plaintiff's negligence was greater than that of Defendant Kell, with the result that [d]efendant was substantially prejudiced by the submission of Count I to the jury. For the reasons previously stated, however, sufficient evidence was offered by plaintiffs to support a finding by the jury that Dr. Daskalos did not so fully understand and agree and that plaintiffs were not guilty of contributory negligence. It follows that it was not error to submit Count I to the jury. Defendants next contend that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the limited probative value of answers to hypothetical question. In support of that contention defendants say that answers to hypothetical questions by plaintiffs' expert witness substantially misrepresented to the jury the standard of care applicable to Defendant attorney under the circumstances of this case and that, as a result, the trial court erred in failing to give Uniform Jury Instruction No. 2.08, for which defendants say that they took proper exception. [4] It appears from the record, however, that defendants had not previously requested that the court give that instruction and that its only exception to the instruction given by the court was that I did not detect any instruction on the hypothetical question. Under these circumstances, the failure to give the instruction now urged by defendants was not a proper ground for the granting of a new trial. Finally, defendants contend that the trial court erred in failing to limit plaintiff's recovery on Count III to the amount supported by the evidence. In support of that contention defendants say that the prayer of plaintiffs' complaint under Count III was for the sum of $11,272.50, but that the testimony of the accountant offered by plaintiffs under that count supported a figure of $9,937 and that no evidence was presented to support a finding for any larger amount, but that the jury was nevertheless instructed that under Count III it could return a verdict of $11,272.50. It may be that the jury, in returning a general verdict in favor of plaintiffs in the sum of $23,005.65, based such a verdict entirely upon Count I (in which plaintiffs' prayer was for $43,979.47). We have said, however, that to speculate concerning the mental processes of juries is forbidden to the courts. See DeMaris v. Whittier, 280 Or. 25, 31, 569 P.2d 605, 608 (1977). The extent of any possible prejudice suffered by defendants as the result of such an error, however, was limited to the difference between the amount prayed for in Count III (the sum of $11,272.50) and the amount supported by plaintiffs' proof (the sum of $9,937), i.e., the sum of $1,335.50. Accordingly, we hold that the judgment in this case be reduced from $23,005.65 to $21,670.15 unless plaintiffs prefer a new trial. We do not believe, however, that any good purpose would be served by remanding this case for a new trial under these circumstances, unless demanded by plaintiffs. For all of these reasons, this case is reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in reduced amount or new trial.