Opinion ID: 158518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I was working eight to five, probably helping a son.

Text: . . . . Q. What was you wife doing during that period of time A. Most of the time she was she stayed home and typed up documents, papers, in from of the computer all of the time Q. All of the time? A. A big share of the day, yes. Q. Well, did you see the kinds of documents that she was typing? A. I might have saw the papers. Q. Did you A. I didn't read them, no. I'm not saying that there were stacks, but there were documents or papers that she was always working on. Q. And what were those papers in connection with? Why was she doing all of this typing? A. To get the rest of the checks ready to go. . . . . Q. Was she typing documents in connection with the common law court? A. Correct. It was a lot of it was involved with the common law court. 7 As Hanzlicek correctly recognizes in his brief, the deliberate ignorance instruction given in this case, properly stated the law and avoided the problems identified by this court in earlier opinions that is, the instruction does not imply that negligence or mistake is enough to support a conviction and does not shift the burden to the defendant to prove his innocence. See United States v. Sasser, 974 F.2d 1544, 1552 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Barbee, 968 F.2d 1026, 1033-34 (10th Cir. 1992). The instruction given here provided as follows: The government may prove that a defendant acted knowingly by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant deliberately closed his or her eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him or her. No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by deliberately ignoring what is obvious. A finding beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the defendant to avoid knowledge or enlightenment would permit the jury to infer knowledge. Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a particular fact may be inferred from a deliberate or intentional ignorance or deliberate or intentional blindness to the existence of that fact. It is, of course, entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliberate ignorance or deliberate closing of the eyes and the inferences to be drawn from any such evidence. You may not infer that a defendant had knowledge, however, from proof of a mistake, negligence, carelessness, or a belief in an inaccurate proposition. 8 Cf. United States v. Kelley, 929 F.2d 582, 585 (10th Cir. 1991) (allowing, but not requiring, evidence of actual pecuniary loss). 9 The effectiveness of the scheme would tend to show that the falsely made obligation imitated or resembled a genuine obligation of the United States. This is how the government characterized the $1.8 million loss evidence at trial, while, at the same time, reminding the jury that it was not required to prove any loss at all. Nevertheless, as set out below, this court rejects the contention that the government must prove that an actual government obligation was replicated to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 472. See infra Section III. E. 39