Opinion ID: 1199062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence Relating to Sandra B.

Text: The defense offered to introduce evidence that Sandra B. had used drugs and abused her children before the beatings that resulted in James's death. After the prosecution stated that if such evidence was admitted the prosecution would also introduce evidence of similar acts by defendant, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion in limine to exclude the evidence because Sandra's abuse of the children has been conceded and testified to and is not in issue, because introduction of the evidence would require evidence of defendant's prior abuse to be introduced so that the complete story would be before the jury, and because evidence that Sandra or defendant did certain things in the past did not establish that Sandra or defendant did these things in the present. Thus, the court ruled that evidence of Sandra's drug use and child abuse at times unrelated to the date of James's death was improper character evidence (Evid. Code, § 1101), and was irrelevant, cumulative, and would unduly consume time ( id., § 352). (10) Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the prosecution's motion in limine. He asserts that the court's ruling violated his rights to compulsory process, confrontation, and due process under both the United States and California Constitutions. (U.S. Const., Amends. VI, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) He also argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because the prosecution exploited the excluded evidence by comparing defendant's culpability to Sandra B.'s culpability while preventing the jury from learning of evidence damaging to Sandra. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. A trial court may exclude evidence under Evidence Code section 352 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that admission will unduly consume time, create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Cumulative evidence may be excluded on this basis. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 525 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251].) The court's exercise of discretion will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse. ( Id. at p. 526.) Here, the discussion of the evidence was limited to general references to Sandra B.'s prior abuse of the children, and was in a context in which it was clear that its admission would result in the admission of similar prior acts of defendant by the prosecution. In this situation, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the admission of the evidence would require an undue consumption of time or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence would be cumulative. The evidence before the jury disclosed that Sandra B. too had abused the children. For instance, four-year-old Wendy testified that defendant did most of the whipping the night James died; the jury heard the tape-recorded police interview of defendant in which defendant accused Sandra B. of administering beatings; a police officer testified that, in an incident that occurred two years before the murder in this case, defendant claimed that Sandra had abused the children; and there was testimony by Dr. Rath, a clinical psychologist, that he formed the initial impression, based on his review of the reports and records before talking to defendant, that a good deal of physical abuse of the children had taken place probably by both parties with an unknown extent by one party or the other. Because the trial court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352, we need not address the question whether the court improperly excluded character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101. Also without merit is defendant's argument that the excluded evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense. Application of the ordinary rules of evidence, as the trial court did here, does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant's right to present a defense. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 [226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99].)
Defendant subpoenaed Sandra B. to testify at the guilt phase of his trial. Like defendant, Sandra was charged with the murder of James. At a court hearing outside the jury's presence (see Evid. Code, § 402) the defense questioned Sandra, who refused to respond, asserting her privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution. Sandra informed the court that, on the advice of counsel, she would invoke the privilege in response to any question asked by defendant. The trial court denied defendant's request to compel Sandra B. to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury. (11) Defendant contends that the court's ruling violated his constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense. He argues that Sandra's interests could not have been infringed by telling the jury of Sandra's invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights. He is wrong. Evidence Code section 913, subdivision (a) prohibits the trial court and counsel from commenting on a witness's assertion of a privilege. It further provides that the trier of fact may not draw any inference [from the assertion of a privilege] as to the credibility of the witness or as to any matter at issue in the proceeding. And Evidence Code section 913, subdivision (b) requires the court, at the request of an adversely affected party, to instruct the jury that it may not draw any inferences from the exercise of a privilege as to the credibility of a witness or as to any matter at issue in the proceeding. The statutory prohibition applies to witnesses as well as parties litigant. Defendant's request that the trial court compel Sandra B. to invoke the privilege in the presence of the jury was in direct violation of Evidence Code section 913. The court's refusal to do so was therefore proper. Defendant argues that Evidence Code section 913 infringes upon his constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense. Defendant's argument is based on his assumption that Sandra B.'s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination would allow the jury to draw the inference that it was Sandra, not defendant, who had killed James. But, as explained below, it would have been improper for the jury to draw such an inference. A person may invoke the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination for a reason other than guilt. The privilege may be asserted, for example, simply to insure that the prosecution against a person charged with a crime is not helped by that person's own statements. Thus, inferring guilt from the mere exercise of the privilege would be improper and is at best based on speculation, not evidence. (See e.g., People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 [280 Cal. Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197]; People v. Johnson (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 749, 760 [114 Cal. Rptr. 545], quoting Bowles v. United States (D.C. Cir.1970) 439 F.2d 536, 541-542 [142 App.D.C. 26]; see Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B West's Ann. Evid. Code (1966 ed.) § 913, p. 496 [Deering's Ann. Evid. Code (1986 ed.) § 913, p. 80].) To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, we have in the past recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness's invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury's presence. ( People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 441, fn. 6 [247 Cal. Rptr. 121, 754 P.2d 168, 76 A.L.R.4th 785].) This was done here. A defendant's rights to due process and to present a defense do not include a right to present to the jury a speculative, factually unfounded inference. (See People v. Frierson, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 743.) If the trial court in this case had permitted defendant to compel Sandra B. to assert the privilege in front of the jury, it would have been required, on request, to instruct the jury not to draw the very inference defendant sought to present to the jury. (Evid. Code, § 913, subd. (b).) Defendant's reliance on United States v. Robinson (1988) 485 U.S. 25 [99 L.Ed.2d 23, 108 S.Ct. 864] is misplaced. There, the high court held that it was permissible for the prosecutor to respond to the defendant's assertion that the government had not allowed him to give his version of events, by pointing out that the defendant had the opportunity to testify and did not do so. ( Id. at pp. 26, 34.) Here, it was defendant, not the prosecutor, who attempted to comment on a witness's assertion of a constitutional right, by seeking to have the jury draw an inference of guilt from Sandra B.'s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. [7] We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing defendant's request to compel Sandra B. to invoke before the jury her privilege against self-incrimination.
During the prosecution's case-in-chief, the trial court allowed the defense to call Sandra B. as a witness out of order. After Sandra's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination outside the jury's presence, the defense requested that the court permit the jury to see Sandra. The prosecution objected on the ground of lack of relevancy. The defense countered that it was relevant to the issue of whether in their relationship defendant or Sandra was the dominant personality and thus in control of any particular incidents. The trial court denied defendant's request without prejudice to it being renewed during the defense case upon a showing of justification. Defendant did not renew the request. (12) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in provisionally denying defendant's request that the jury view Sandra B. (See People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1239.) The request was made during the prosecution's case-in-chief and before the defense introduced expert testimony that Sandra rather than defendant was the dominant personality in their relationship. The trial court expressly denied the request without prejudice to its being later renewed, thus allowing the defense to again raise the issue at a later time. Even if it were erroneous, the trial court's ruling did not prejudice defendant. The relative physical strength of defendant and Sandra B. was not a critical issue. At the time of his death, James was 45 inches tall and weighed 45 pounds. There is no question that either defendant or Sandra possessed physical strength sufficient to have killed the child. To the extent a jury view of Sandra was relevant at all, it related to defendant's assertion that Sandra was the dominant personality in their relationship. No evidence was presented at trial that the relative physical size or strength of persons is determinative of control. In addition, in the opinion of Dr. Craig Rath, a clinical licensed psychologist called as a witness by the defendant, Sandra rather than defendant was the dominant personality in the relationship. Under these circumstances, the probative value of having Sandra appear before the jury was minimal.