Opinion ID: 4453865
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ACCA Requirements and Standard of Review

Text: We review de novo whether a defendant’s “prior conviction constitutes a crime of violence.” United States v. Ash, 917 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. filed, No. 189639 (June 12, 2019). The ACCA sets a minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment for anyone who violates § 922(g)(1) and “has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines a violent felony as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” or is otherwise a crime listed in the statute. Id. at § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Because robbery is not listed in the enumerated offenses clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), we look to whether the Oklahoma robbery statute at the time of the conviction fit the requirements of the “elements” clause, § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony, we deploy a categorical approach and consider the elements of the crime, not the facts of the case. United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1438 (2018). We consider the “minimum culpable conduct”—here, the minimum degree of force—required for a conviction under the state law. Id. at 1264. If the floor of 3 culpability for a given felony is lower than the floor set by the ACCA, then that felony is not a predicate violent felony. In the time since Godlock filed this appeal, the Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the elements clause encompasses robbery offenses that require the criminal to overcome the victim’s resistance.” Ash, 917 F.3d at 1239 (citing Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 549). We have now applied Stokeling in several cases that illustrate its scope. For example, we have held that a Missouri conviction for second-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence pursuant to Stokeling because Missouri law requires overcoming at least some resistance by the victim. Id. at 1242–43. By contrast, we decided that robbery in Kansas did not constitute a crime of violence for ACCA purposes because it “can be accomplished with minimal force that falls short” of the sort of violence required by Stokeling. United States v. Bong, 913 F.3d 1252, 1264 (10th Cir. 2019). In Kansas, a person could commit robbery “without any application of force directly to the victim, and also, importantly, without any resistance by or injury to the victim.” Id. These cases help clarify the line we have drawn “between robbery that can be accomplished by the mere snatching of property and robbery that requires overcoming even slight victim resistance.” Ash, 917 F.3d at 1242. Any robbery statute that can be violated “by the mere snatching of property” cannot satisfy the Stokeling force requirement. This is the line drawn at common law between robbery and larceny, and the Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between the two common law offenses. The 4 additional force required to convict a person of robbery instead of larceny is “sufficient to justify an enhanced sentence under the . . . elements clause.” Stokeling, 139 S.Ct. at 551.