Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prospective Juror D.A.

Text: Prospective Juror D.A. strongly supported the death penalty. In her questionnaire she gave conflicting responses, both that she would consider evidence in mitigation and aggravation before imposing the death penalty and that she thought the death penalty should be imposed on every defendant who intentionally kills the victim. She could not conceive of any case in which the defendant was eligible for the death penalty but in which she would be willing to return a verdict of life without the possibility of parole. During voir dire, she offered different answers, stating not only that she believed the death penalty should not be imposed on every defendant who intentionally killed the victim, but also that I just feel like when people take another person's life, they should recognize at that time that they are doing this and that they should be willing to give up theirs, too. She did not think her views on the death penalty were so strong that she would be unable to listen to and evaluate additional evidence beyond those associated with the crime itself, and she could realistically conceive of voting for a sentence other than death once she knew more about the facts and circumstances of the case. Defendant challenged Prospective Juror D.A. for cause, arguing her view that if you take a life, you should be willing to give up yours indicated she would invariably vote for death for an intentional killing. The court disagreed, reasoning that in making that statement D.A. apparently meant that, to her, `you, the offender, should be willing to give yours up,' [means] realize at least that  you run that risk. That may be the result. I don't think that necessarily translates into always without exception the death penalty. Because it finds support in the record, we are bound by the trial court's assessment of D.A.'s true state of mind when she made this statement. ( People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 339.) We therefore defer to the court's conclusion that D.A.'s views on the death penalty did not impair her ability to be a fair and impartial juror. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1007.)