Opinion ID: 62990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Valle's Arguments

Text: In addition to his attempts to suggest that Myers has been called into doubt by Sun-Diamond, Valle claims that (1) there were no criminal charges against Gutierrez and that he never intended to remove the nonexistent charges, and (2) Valle had no ability to remove criminal charges because the El Paso Processing Center handled only administrative aspects of the aliens' detention there. Valle's first argument is the same playacting claim from Myers, and we conclude that the Second Circuit's decision rejecting the playacting defense to § 201(b)(2) is persuasive. Therefore, we hold that an official may be convicted under § 201(b)(2), if he has corruptly entered into a quid pro quo, knowing that the purpose behind the payment that he has received, or agreed to receive, is to induce or influence him in an official act, even if he has no intention of actually fulfilling his end of the bargain. However, Valle attempts to distinguish his case from Myers by suggesting that he had no ability to remove criminal charges from any detainee's alien registration files, whereas the defendant in Myers was capable of committing the official acts that he promised. There is no need to consider this argument. Our review of the trial record shows that Valle was capable of violating his duty in the manner that he promised. The violation of Valle's official duty charged in the indictment was the removal of criminal charges from the official United States Department of Homeland Security records (alien registration file). Valle was an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent assigned as a classification officer with a collateral duty to gather intelligence. He had access to detainees' alien registration files, as well as their detention files, and the authority to gather information on criminal violations, as well as newly discovered criminal charges. From these facts, a rational jury could have inferred that Valle was capable of removing criminal charges from an alien registration file, whether those were past criminal history or pending charges. Therefore, we affirm Valle's conviction for bribery.
We review a district court's instructions to a jury for abuse of discretion. United States v. Clayton, 506 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir.2007). A district court has broad discretion in framing the instructions to the jury and this Court will not reverse unless the instructions taken as a whole do not correctly reflect the issues and law. United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 676 (5th Cir.1995). Valle claims that the district court's supplemental instruction in response to the jury's note, asking to see the alleged promissory note shown to Gutierrez during cross-examination, implied that Valle had an obligation to offer the note into evidence. He relies on our decision in United States v. Meadows, 598 F.2d 984, 990 (5th Cir.1979), to argue that the judge was obligated to remind the jury of the burden and quantum of proof and presumption of innocence.... In Meadows, this court stated: It is well-established that in giving additional instructions to a jury; particularly in response to inquiries from the jury, a court must be especially careful not to give an unbalanced charge. Id. In United States v. Colatriano, 624 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir.1980), however, this court explained that Meadows does not support the contention that convictions must be automatically reversed when a trial court fails to recharge the jury. Rather, the trial court's actions must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances, considering the complete instructions given to the jury. Id. The district court here initially gave thorough, balanced instructions regarding the presumption of innocence and the government's burden of proof to the jury, both orally and in writing. In response to the jury's note, the court's response, particularly the second sentence to which Valle objected, was a direct answer to the jury's request that incorrectly referred to the alleged promissory note as evidence. In light of the balanced initial instructions to the jury and the brevity, neutrality, and accuracy of the supplemental instruction, the district court's decision not to remind the jury of the burden and quantum of proof and presumption of innocence did not result in a prejudicial unbalanced charge, nor did it shift the burden of proof to Valle. See id. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion as to the supplemental jury instruction.