Opinion ID: 2959805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Local 52’s Appeals

Text: Local 52 has filed two appeals, one from the Order issuing the Consent Injunction and one from the District Court’s denial of its motion to intervene. Because of the relationship between these appeals, we discuss them together. Local 52 filed its Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene about six weeks before the District Court entered the Consent Injunction. The motion was initially calendared for argument on December 16, 2005. The Settlement Agreement was finalized on December 14, 2005. On -10- December 16, 2005, the District Court approved the consent agreement of the then-existing parties and issued the Order for the Consent Injunction, which was insignificantly amended three days later. The argument on Local 52's intervention motion was deferred for several weeks. After entry of the Consent Injunction, Local 52 filed a notice of appeal from the injunction Order. The District Court then denied the intervention motion on the ground that Local 52's notice of appeal had divested the Court of jurisdiction. Local 52 views itself as the victim of an appellate “Catch 22”: it promptly filed an appeal from the injunction Order so that, if its intervention motion was granted, it would not be considered to have appealed beyond the applicable 30day time limit, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), but its notice of appeal deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to permit intervention. Local 52 itself appears to have contributed to its own predicament. Although we make no ruling on whether any delay in submitting its motion to intervene will justify denial of that motion, it appears that a more expeditious filing of its motion might well have alerted the District Court to the need to act on that motion before approving the consent agreement. In any event, Local 52's predicament was at least in part precipitated by the action of the District Court in adjudicating the litigation-ending motion to enter the consent judgment while Local 52's motion for intervention remained pending. We conclude that this was ill advised. Although there is authority for granting a motion to intervene in the Court of Appeals, -11- see Bates v. Jones, 127 F.3d 870, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1997); Hurd v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 234 F.2d 942, 944 (7th Cir. 1956), it will normally be the better practice for a district court to rule on a pending motion to intervene before ruling on the merits of pending litigation. What we can or should do at this point to rectify the situation is not entirely clear. The District Court did not err in denying Local 52's intervention motion once the notice of appeal of the Court’s injunction Order divested the Court of jurisdiction to affect that Order. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); Roe v. Town of Highland, 909 F.2d 1097, 1100 (7th Cir. 1990); Nicol v. Gulf Fleet Supply Vessels, Inc., 743 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1983); contra Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 612 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 1979) (in banc). Therefore, on Local 52's appeal from denial of intervention, we are obliged to affirm. We do so, however, only to agree with the District Court’s jurisdictional ruling, without intimating any view as to the merits of the intervention motion. Turning next to Local 52's purported appeal from the injunction Order, we encounter the threshold obstacle that Local 52 is not a party, and normally a non-party lacks standing to appeal. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (“The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled.”). -12- Local 52 seeks to avoid this rule by contending that the Consent Injunction did not constitute a final resolution of the case. It views the injunction as an interlocutory injunction, an appeal from which does not divest the District Court of its jurisdiction over unrelated matters. See New York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1350 (2d Cir. 1989). First, Local 52 points out, the action has not yet been dismissed,2 and the Consent Injunction should therefore be treated as an interlocutory injunction. We disagree. The Consent Injunction disposed of the merits of the litigation; the remaining filing of a formal stipulation of dismissal was a ministerial act, which did not destroy the finality of the Consent Injunction. Cf. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2004). Second, Local 52 argues that the litigation remains pending because Article 2 of the Settlement Agreement contemplates the possibility of returning to court to seek modification. That argument also fails because the District Court’s authority to modify the 2 Article 10 of the Settlement Agreement reads: This Settlement Agreement constitutes a final settlement of all claims between Local 1974 and Defendant [Nastasi] arising from or relating to the Federal Action. Within ten (10) business days after execution of this Settlement Agreement or the Court’s entry of the Order, whichever is later, the Parties shall execute a stipulation of dismissal... and shall file such stipulation with the Clerk’s office of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York, dismissing the Federal Action with prejudice. -13- Consent Injunction does not deprive it of finality. Thus, Local 52's status as a non-party prevents us from adjudicating the merits of its challenge to the Consent Injunction. However, we conclude that its non-party status does not prevent us from acting to cut through this appellate Catch-22. We believe it is appropriate to remand Local 52's purported appeal from the Consent Injunction to the District Court to enable that Court, with its jurisdiction restored, to adjudicate the merits of Local 52's intervention motion. See Marino, 484 U.S. at 304 (“We think the better practice is for such a nonparty to seek intervention for purposes of appeal; denials of such motions are, of course, appealable.”); Roe, 909 F.2d at 1100 (“Although the filing of the notice [of appeal] would deprive the district court of power to act on the motion to intervene, the cause may be remanded for that purpose.”) (quotation marks omitted); 20 Moore’s Federal Practice § 303.10[1][b] at 303-19 (3d ed. 2006). If that motion is denied, Local 52 may appeal such a denial. If that motion is granted, Local 52, as a party, may then seek any relief to which it may be entitled, including a renewal of its purported appeal of the injunction Order. Since Local 52 filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the Order issuing the Consent Injunction, albeit at a time when it was not a party, its status as a party, if intervention is granted, should permit it to renew its appeal. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2) (premature notice of appeal, filed before entry of judgment, treated as filed on date of entry); see also United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 396 (1977) (noting -14- that post-judgment motion to intervene was filed within time when existing parties could have appealed). To avoid the possibility of a delay in renewing such an appeal, we add to our remand the proviso that in the event that Local 52 becomes a party, it must renew its appeal within 30 days of the date intervention is permitted or the date the District Court denies any request Local 52 might make for modification of the Consent Injunction Order, whichever is later.