Opinion ID: 4569201
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable Cause for the Arrest Warrant

Text: This case’s second question concerns the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause: Was the warrant for Baker’s arrest supported by “probable cause” and, if not, should we suppress the evidence recovered during that arrest as “fruit of the poisonous tree”? See Graves v. Mahoning County, 821 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2016). While the affidavit supporting the warrant likely should have included more detail, it is not so recklessly inadequate as to trigger the “exclusionary rule.” No. 19-5636 United States v. Baker Page 10 1 This case implicates both the standard for probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant and the remedy that applies when a court concludes (after the fact) that a warrant fell short. Standard. “Probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (citation omitted). “It ‘requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.’” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983)). Whether a set of facts meets this standard turns on a practical assessment commonly made by “reasonable and prudent” people, not a technical assessment reserved for “legal technicians.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231). Beyond explaining that this standard requires more than a bare-bones conclusion that a crime has occurred, see Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 564–65, the Court has refused to offer clear rules separating the hazy “border between suspicion and probable cause,” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949); see Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. It has instead said that “the probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371. The probable-cause standard applies differently in different contexts. This case involves probable cause for an arrest, not a search. While the same “prudent person standard” governs both contexts, the arrest and search inquiries “focus” on “different” things. Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1996). The test for an arrest asks whether there is “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt” specific to the suspect. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (citation omitted). This test is less “complex” than the one for a search. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.1(b), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2019). The search inquiry requires courts to ask whether a “nexus” exists between a crime and the place to be searched and whether information in an affidavit is sufficiently timely to think that the sought-after evidence still remains at the identified location. See id. §§ 3.1(b), 3.7(a)–(d); e.g., United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hython, 443 F.3d 480, 485–87 (6th Cir. 2006). So the “existence of probable cause to arrest will not necessarily No. 19-5636 United States v. Baker Page 11 establish probable cause to search.” United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). This case also involves a judge’s independent decision that probable cause exists for a warrant, not an officer’s on-the-spot decision that probable cause exists for an arrest. “[C]ourts more often will deem seizures reasonable when they’re associated with a warrant.” Graves, 821 F.3d at 777. We review an officer’s probable-cause conclusion de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). But “[a] magistrate’s ‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.’” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (citation omitted). This distinction flows from the Supreme Court’s “preference” for “warrants” and requires courts to give judges the benefit of the doubt in “doubtful or marginal cases.” Id. at 237 n.10 (citation omitted). Remedy. The Fourth Amendment “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands.” Evans, 514 U.S. at 10. But the Supreme Court has adopted an “exclusionary rule” that bars the government from using evidence in a criminal trial when police uncover it unconstitutionally. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011). The Court once indiscriminately applied this rule to all Fourth Amendment violations. See Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568–69. More recently, it has called the rule “a ‘judicially created remedy’ of [the] Court’s own making.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (citation omitted). The Court has thus felt free to adjust the rule’s scope in common-law fashion. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 140– 44. To decide whether the rule applies, the Court asks if its “deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061 (citation omitted). As a benefit, the rule “deter[s] future Fourth Amendment violations.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 236–37. As a cost, the rule often means “letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free—something that ‘offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.’” Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (citation omitted). Balancing these interests, the Court has held that the exclusionary rule should apply only to police misconduct and only if that misconduct is “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Id. at 144. This test is met if an officer violates “Fourth Amendment rights No. 19-5636 United States v. Baker Page 12 deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 240. It is not met if the violation arises from “‘[i]solated,’ ‘nonrecurring’ police negligence[.]” Id. at 239 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 137). This common-law balancing has led the Court to reject the exclusionary rule when officers illegally uncover evidence pursuant to a search warrant that lacks probable cause, so long as the officers’ reliance on that warrant was “objectively reasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Suppression is not worth its substantial costs in this scenario, the Court explained, because any error in deciding whether probable cause exists for the search warrant belongs primarily to the magistrate issuing the warrant, not the officer seeking it. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 239. And the “officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. Yet Leon identified “four circumstances in which an officer’s reliance would not be objectively reasonable.” United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2017). As relevant here, the exclusionary rule applies even under Leon if the affidavit that officers use to obtain the warrant is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” 468 U.S. at 923 (citation omitted). Given that police misconduct must qualify as “purposeful or flagrant” to justify suppression, Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063, this exception applies only if the affidavit can be described as “bare bones,” White, 874 F.3d at 496. The classic bare-bones affidavit asserts only an officer’s conclusion that probable cause exists “without any statement of adequate supporting facts.” Id. at 498 (quoting Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933)). For search warrants, we have found this test met when the affidavit lacked any allegation tying illegal activity to the place to be searched, Brown, 828 F.3d at 385–86; United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 526–27 (6th Cir. 2006), or when it contained no basis to believe that contraband would still remain there, see Hython, 443 F.3d at 485–87. An affidavit seeking a search warrant is not bare bones, by contrast, if it contains “some modicum of evidence, however slight,” “between the criminal activity at issue and the place to be searched[.]” White, 874 F.3d at 497 (citation omitted); Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 596. No. 19-5636 United States v. Baker Page 13 These criteria and cases concern search warrants. As far as we are aware, the Supreme Court has not technically extended Leon’s framework for warrants lacking probable cause to the arrest-warrant context. Cf. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.6 (1986). The Court has, however, used similar logic in related situations. It has held that the exclusionary rule should not apply when “an officer reasonably believes there is an outstanding arrest warrant, but that belief turns out to be wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping error by” a police or judicial employee. Herring, 555 U.S. at 137; Evans, 514 U.S. at 15–16. Many other courts also have held that Leon’s “exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable to arrest warrants in much the same way it applies to search warrants.” LaFave, supra, § 5.1(h) (citing, among others, United States v. Teitloff, 55 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gobey, 12 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1985)); cf. United States v. Newsome, 504 F. App’x 463, 464–65 (6th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court’s current approach to the exclusionary rule all but compels this result. See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 136–39. Under the Court’s balancing of costs and benefits, Leon’s framework should apply to arrest warrants in a manner accounting for the “different” factors that are relevant to those types of warrants. See Greene, 80 F.3d at 1106. 2 Under these standards, we opt not to decide whether the state judge properly found probable cause for the warrant to arrest Baker. See White, 874 F.3d at 495–96. This case instead falls within Leon’s heartland. The affidavit seeking the warrant was not so recklessly bare bones as to trigger the exclusionary rule and its “substantial social costs.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (citation omitted). The warrant charged Baker with receiving stolen property. Officer Alan King, the affiant and a police officer from the nearby Providence Police Department, stated that on April 19, 2015, a “Nextbook tablet” and other items were stolen from a home in Providence. King attested that the tablet “turned up pawned” at River City Pawn in Madisonville and was recovered from that location. King also said: “An interview with the subject who pawned the tablet revealed that the tablet was purchased in Madisonville, KY from a Tyslen Baker.” Based on these facts, a state judge found probable cause to believe that Baker violated Kentucky Revised Statutes No. 19-5636 United States v. Baker Page 14 § 514.110. It provides: “A person is guilty of receiving stolen property when he receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or having reason to believe that it has been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner.” Id. § 514.110(1). Whether or not this affidavit established probable cause, it included “some modicum of evidence,” even if only “slight,” connecting “the criminal activity at issue” to the person to be seized. White, 874 F.3d at 497 (citation omitted). By noting that Baker had sold the Nextbook to the subject who pawned it, the affidavit averred facts suggesting that Baker “dispose[d] of [the] movable property of another[.]” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 514.110(1). And while the affidavit did not offer more details about whether Baker knew or should have known that the tablet was stolen, see id., an officer would not have been reckless in believing that Baker’s possession created an inference of this knowledge that was sufficient for probable cause. Indeed, “[f]or centuries courts have instructed juries that an inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of stolen goods.” Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973). “If a jury can permissibly find guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt” based on one’s possession of stolen goods, an officer would not act recklessly in believing that Baker’s possession of the tablet created a substantial chance he knew (or should have known) it was stolen. Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland, 439 F. App’x 433, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2011); see Young v. Owens, 577 F. App’x 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2014); Bender’s Inc. v. Walker, 1 F. App’x 317, 325 (6th Cir. 2001). True, the jury instruction discussed by the Supreme Court in Barnes (like the common law) allowed juries to find the required knowledge “from unexplained possession of recently stolen” goods. 412 U.S. at 838 (emphasis added). And some 21 months passed between when the tablet was reported stolen and when King sought a warrant for Baker’s arrest. But probable cause “does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction” beyond a reasonable doubt. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972); see Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 256 (6th Cir. 2003). Our cases thus have found possession sufficient to justify a finding of probable cause without separately discussing any temporal-proximity element. See Young, 577 F. App’x at 415; No. 19-5636 United States v. Baker Page 15 Rodriguez, 439 F. App’x at 452–53. In other contexts, courts have also indicated that “[w]hile intent is an element of the crime which must be proved at trial, it is not necessary in order to establish probable cause to arrest.” United States v. Everett, 719 F.2d 1119, 1120 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); United States v. Abney, 1994 WL 620799, at  (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1994) (per curiam). Here, moreover, we need not even hold (one way or the other) that the allegations of Baker’s possession sufficed to establish probable cause that he committed the crime. We need only hold that those allegations sufficed to avoid the bare-bones label that triggers the exclusionary rule. See White, 874 F.3d at 497. Also true, Officer King did not himself see Baker possess the stolen Nextbook recovered from the pawn shop. Rather, he relied on the hearsay statement from the unnamed “subject” who bought the tablet from Baker. Having interviewed the subject, King clearly could have—and likely should have—included more details about this subject’s reliability based on what had been said to him. That conclusion, however, does not change the fact that the affidavit contained a “modicum of evidence” connecting Baker to a crime. Id. (citation omitted). An officer would not have acted recklessly—as opposed to, at most, negligently—in agreeing with the state judge that the information from this subject sufficed. Cf. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]nformants’ tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons,” ranging from the professional “informant” to the “honest citizen.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232–34. On one end of this witness spectrum, we have held that “a known informant’s statement can support probable cause even though the affidavit fails to provide any additional basis for the known informant’s credibility and the informant has never provided information to the police in the past.” United States v. Kinison, 710 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Miller, 314 F.3d 265, 270 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 976 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States v. Pelham, 801 F.2d 875, 878 (6th Cir. 1986). We have likewise often required little in the way of corroboration for statements from “eyewitnesses” to a crime. See Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Newsome, 504 F. App’x at 464–65; Harness, 453 F.3d at 754–55; Thacker, 328 F.3d at 257. On the other end, we have required significantly more corroboration for “[t]ips from anonymous persons.” United States v. Howard, No. 19-5636 United States v. Baker Page 16 632 F. App’x 795, 799 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. May, 399 F.3d 817, 825 (6th Cir. 2005). Perhaps the biggest takeaway from our caselaw is its confirmation of what the Supreme Court said long ago: Given the inquiry’s fact-dependent nature, “one determination will seldom be a useful ‘precedent’ for another.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 n.11. An officer could reasonably (or at least not recklessly) conclude that the witness in this case fell on the side of the spectrum requiring little in the way of corroboration. The subject was not an “anonymous” informant—the category of witnesses that generally requires the most corroboration. See May, 399 F.3d at 825. Rather, King dealt with a known (albeit unnamed) individual. Id. And the corroborating factors for this subject cut both ways. Having possessed the stolen laptop, the subject had an obvious motive to shift blame. Yet Officer King’s affidavit did make clear that the police had physical evidence (the recovered tablet) corroborating the subject’s story. And we have recognized that the statements of a person “whose identity was known to the police and who would be subject to prosecution for making a false report” are “entitled to far greater weight than those of an anonymous source.” Id. at 824–25; see Miller, 314 F.3d at 270. These factors sufficed to avoid any recklessness finding in this case. That leaves Baker with one remaining argument. He suggests that receiving stolen property is a misdemeanor if the property’s value falls below $500, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 514.110(3), that Kentucky has a one-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors, id. § 500.050(2), and that the statute of limitations likely had run when the warrant issued in January 2017 given that the theft occurred in April 2015. But Baker cites no caselaw suggesting that police officers (who are not lawyers) behave recklessly if they do not independently calculate the statute of limitations before seeking or executing an arrest warrant. Unsurprisingly, the existing caselaw cuts against him. The Third Circuit rejected this type of argument in a § 1983 suit against an officer who sought an arrest warrant because the argument “would place far more responsibility on police officers than is required by their calling.” Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2007). And the Eleventh Circuit rejected this type of argument in another § 1983 suit against an officer who effected the arrest because “police officers have no responsibility to determine the viability of a statute of limitations defense when executing a valid arrest warrant.” Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1206–08 (11th Cir. 1995). Whether right or wrong, these cases show No. 19-5636 United States v. Baker Page 17 that the officers in this case would not have acted recklessly (so as to trigger the exclusionary rule under Leon) even if they had failed to consider whether the statute of limitations had run. We affirm. No. 19-5636 United States v. Baker Page 18 _________________ DISSENT _________________