Opinion ID: 4522480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reimbursement of Application Fee

Text: After the district court entered summary judgment for the Government, Perrier-Bilbo filed a post-judgment motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b) and 59(e)16 in which she sought the reimbursement of the $680 application fee she paid for her second naturalization form. In the motion, Perrier-Bilbo attempts 16 Rule 52(b) provides for a motion to amend or make additional findings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b), and Rule 59(e) provides for a motion to alter or amend a judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). -43- to make out a procedural due process violation stemming from USCIS Director Haydon's conduct in response to Perrier-Bilbo's objections to the oath, and the director's handling and subsequent designation of her application as abandoned. Perrier-Bilbo argued that such a violation of basic due process required the reimbursement of the second application fee. The district court denied the motion, only noting that the Government had prevailed and Perrier-Bilbo was not entitled to reimbursement. Perrier-Bilbo's argument on appeal reiterates that Director Haydon's alleged failure to communicate with her or her attorney, along with the handling and eventual designation of her first application for naturalization as abandoned, amounts to a due process violation. We decline to consider this argument because we find it is not properly before us. Perrier-Bilbo's complaint contained a claim that a procedural due process violation had occurred, but she alleged and later argued in opposition to the Government's motion to dismiss that the violation arose from the requirement to take the oath with the words so help me God. While we acknowledge that her complaint alleged and described the facts surrounding her and her attorney's interactions with Director Haydon and the denial of the application, it was not until her post-judgment motion that she -44- connected those allegations to a purported, additional due process violation and squarely presented the argument. The purpose of Rules 52(b) and 59(e) is to allow the court to correct or amend a judgment in the event of any manifest errors of law or newly discovered evidence. See Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005); Nat'l Metal Finishing Co. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 1990). Perrier-Bilbo's motion, rather than attempting to prove a manifest error of law or present newly discovered evidence, attempts to assert -- for the first time and after summary judgment issued against her -- a procedural due process claim arising from Director Haydon's conduct. We have found that reconsideration motions are aimed at re consideration, not initial consideration, Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England-Old Colony, N.A., 897 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original) (citing White v. N.H. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982)), and thus, theories and arguments presented for the first time in those motions are not properly before the district court, see Feliciano-Hernández v. Pereira-Castillo, 663 F.3d 527, 537 (1st Cir. 2011) (The court was . . . acting within its discretion in refusing . . . to consider new arguments that [the plaintiff] could have made earlier. A motion to reconsider should not 'raise arguments which -45- could, and should, have been made before judgment issued.' (quoting ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2008))); Tell v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 145 F.3d 417, 419-20 (1st Cir. 1998)(finding that a new theory raised in a motion for reconsideration had been waived because it should have been proffered to the district court earlier); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. v. Pfizer, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Mass. 2011) (finding that a Rule 52(b) motion may not be used to assert new theories not raised at trial). We also lack the benefit of the district court's fact-finding and initial examination of this claim. See Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir. 1987). Accordingly, we conclude that Perrier-Bilbo's claim is not properly before us.17 See Iverson, 452 F.3d at 102– 03 (finding that theories not squarely and timely raised in the trial court and failure to mention or develop a legal theory in opposition to a dispositive motion defeat[s] [the] belated attempt to advance the theory on appeal); Tell, 145 F.3d at 420 n.3 (declining to consider argument that should have been presented to the district court). 17 We also note that Perrier-Bilbo's procedural due process argument on appeal as it pertains to the treatment of and communications surrounding her application is set forth in a rather conclusory manner. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). -46-