Opinion ID: 2621451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was Asch's right to effective assistance of counsel violated as a result of counsel's failure to obtain a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript and to undertake a reasonable investigation of the case?

Text: [¶ 35] Bierman testified at the motion hearing that, after he filled in for McLeod at Asch's preliminary hearing, he probably informed her as to what had occurred at that hearing. McLeod agreed that Bierman would have told her what happened. Asch's complaint on appeal is that McLeod was ineffective in her representation of him because, having missed the preliminary hearing, she made no attempt to obtain a transcript of the proceedings, and made no determination as to whether the preliminary hearing testimony would be useful in investigating the case or for impeaching witnesses at trial. [¶ 36] The State called two witnesses at trial: the arresting officer, Swisher, and a crime laboratory expert. Clearly, the State's case was based almost entirely on Swisher's testimony. Swisher had also been the only witness at the preliminary hearing. Asch contends that McLeod should have used portions of Swisher's preliminary hearing testimony as prior inconsistent statements to impeach his trial testimony. As specific examples, Asch points out that (1) at the preliminary hearing, Swisher testified that the methamphetamine was not field tested, while at trial he testified that it was field tested; (2) at the preliminary hearing, Swisher testified that the methamphetamine was found on the passenger side of the hump between the seats, while at trial he testified that it was found tightly wedged between the two front seats; and (3) at the preliminary hearing, Swisher testified that the methamphetamine was found in an area equally accessible to the driver and the passenger, while at trial he testified that it was found in the area where he saw Asch pushing something down. [¶ 37] Asch further argues that, had McLeod obtained a transcript of the preliminary hearing, she would have been able at trial to challenge Swisher's testimony by reminding him of his statements at the preliminary hearing that (1) his observations of Asch's movements were made at night, through his own windshield, through the rear window of Sutton's car, past the rear seat and into the front seat area; (2) he really didn't have an actual view of [Asch] hiding something; and (3) the area where the methamphetamine was found between the seats was accessible to Sutton and she could have had her hands there before the traffic stop. Finally, Asch contends that, had McLeod investigated what Swisher said at the preliminary hearing, she would have discovered that Sutton's car, being front-wheel drive, did not have a hump between the front bucket seats, as Swisher testified at both the preliminary hearing and the trial. [¶ 38] McLeod never admitted that she had not reviewed the preliminary hearing testimony. The most she would say was that she did not recall having done so. She did, however, staunchly defend her decision not to use Swisher's testimony from that hearing to impeach him at trial: Q [Defense Counsel] Now, is itwhat generally do you use information from a preliminary hearing for? You, yourself, in a trial, what would you use it for? A You've got to look at each individual case; is there something specific that would help you at a preliminary hearing later on. In this kind of case, there was nothing at the preliminary hearing there was going to be specifically helpful in the trial. ... Q Now, at trial, and I have this if you would like to look at this also, Officer Swisher testified that he did not field test the drugs at the scene. You mentioned earlier that nothing in this case from the preliminary hearing seemed to be important at trial? A All right. That very statement you said there, that is not a conflicting statement enough that was worth going through the rigmarole, shall we say, of trying to bring in a preliminary tape transcript. The preliminary hearing transcript is not done by a certified court reporter. Basically inadmissible under the Supreme Court rulings right now. To bring that in, we would have to have verified the whole preliminary hearing tape before to make it accurate. What we have is a very poor record that I think is transcribed by a secretary with headphones. In this particular case, what he said at the hearing where you're going for the not field testing or not field testing at the site, they come to the same thing. The main point of this case and theory of Mr. Asch's defense was going to be that Sheryl Sutton owned the drugs, evenand the drugs were found in a common area; she owned them, she was the driver, thereby it was hers. Q Okay. Now, along those linesLet me get this straight. So you're saying you didn't feel that you wanted to put the preliminary hearing into evidence because it was poorly recorded or poorly transcribed? A No. In the theory of this case and what our defense was going to be, it was excess baggage that only ruins your credibility with the jury. Q And you said that his defense was that Sheryl Sutton owned the drugs? A Owned the drugs. Q Okay. Well, at the preliminary hearing also, Officer Swisher testified that while in his car, he didn't actually see Mr. Asch hide anything? A Correct. Q And at the trial you failed to question him about that. Now, if he said he didn't see him hide anything, is it possible somebody else maybe hid something? A That is a very elementary point and I wouldn't waste the jury's time and patience with cross-examining that point. ... Q Okay. Now, at the preliminary hearing, Officer Swisher also testified that the drugs were equally accessible to the driver? A Correct. Q And as you just said, Mr. Asch's defense was that the drugs were Sheryl Sutton's? A Correct. Q And you have the officer saying that the driver could have accessed the drugs, yet you didn't impeach him with that at trial either? A There was no point to it. It wasn't that great a point, yes. ... Q Well, did you ever investigate the car? A I'm sure I did. Q Did you become aware of what the interior of the car looked like? A I was aware of what the interior of the car was like from one of my first conversation[s] with Mr. Asch, plus I've also been going to trial, I'm sure I met with Swisher and also there was a very most key person described the car would have been Sheryl Sutton, the owner, she was taking the stand. Q And were you aware of not only the inside but the outside of the car as well from that? A I'm sure I was. Q And did you have a chance to review the preliminary hearing, besides what Mr. Bierman told you? A I don't recall. Q So you wouldn't recall if he told you what Officer Swisher said about the physical nature of the car? A No. Q So you would have no basis on which to impeach him on cross-examination if his view of the car was, in fact, inaccurate? A The way you would impeach would be to call the owner of the car who was familiar with the car to testify to the jury what the inside of the car is like. The jury would then be able to see as the officer testified wrong and the owner, who knows the car, testified that maybe he doesn't recall other things quite as well either. It's much more effective to have the actual proof there from the actual owner than to go through a litany of just going through words from a poor transcript, vague words. Q Now, but you didn't feel that had there been inaccuracies it would not be important to put the owner up there, to put the owner up there to give the description of the car and impeach Officer Swisher's recollection of the car? A Sheryl Sutton did testify. ... Q Now, it also came out in the preliminary hearing of what kind of car it was, certain aspects, so you could have impeached Officer Swisher on any inaccuracies; is that true? A I'm sure it is. Q But you chose not to? A No. Some things are much more effective, and that is not a very effective way of establishing points in trial. ... Q And now, all these other things that we previously mentioned that happened at the preliminary hearing, you didn't feel those would impeach his credibility so you chose not to cross-examine him on that, all thesethere's tangible physical inaccuracies of his A Not sufficient to make a point. Q But the fact is A Once you get into doing trial work you will realize that you ruin your trial by going after every little possible point you can. You go with the theory of the case, figure out your main point and go with it. To go after every little nitpick you can makes you look like a fool to the jury and it makes your case a lot worse. ... Q [Prosecutor] Now, the field testing. Was there actually a chemist that testified to a chemical test to the trial? A Yes. When there's not a question raised whether the drugs are drugs, then there's no point to question whether a field test was done at the scene or at the police department. Q I think you stated this in substance in your testimony, but in your experience, is it best to focus upon one clear and concrete theory rather than attacking everything that moves? A Yes. About the only way to win in a good case is to have one theory and go for it; a shotgun case, you shoot yourself in the foot. ... Q Given that was going to be the theory of the defense, did you think that bringing up minor points with Mr. Swisher would be effective? A No. I did not want to create jury sympathy for the police officer. ... Q Yes. In your opinion, do you believe that the tactical decision, even though it might not have been successful, was sound when you made it, that is, to rely on Sheryl Sutton's testimony in this particular case? A The only thing that was relevant in this case is who owned those drugs. Mr. Asch with his criminal record could not take the stand. We did discuss that in full and it was his choice not to take the stand. With his record, with all his drug felonies it would not have worked. So the only person then would have to be somebody else to say they had. We did have the law that says the driver should be presumed to be in possession of the drugs. The officer was saying it was him. The only form of testimony would have to be that somebody else owned the drugs. Q And did you feel it was a sound tactical decision to concentrate on Sheryl's testimony rather than cross-examine the officer about minor matters in doing so? A That was the only possibility. [¶ 39] As stated earlier herein, our standard for review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requires an appellant to prove both that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice to the appellant resulted. The adequacy or deficiency of counsel's performance is measured under an objective test, the question being whether counsel provided such assistance as would have been provided by a reasonably competent attorney. Becker, 2002 WY 126, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d at 98 ( quoting Reyna, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d at 1134-35). [¶ 40] We have long recognized that failure of counsel to conduct a reasonable investigation may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Epperson v. State, 637 P.2d 671, 672-73 (Wyo.1981). Our first detailed analysis of counsel's duty to investigate came in Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo.1986): The United States Supreme Court has outlined trial counsel's duty to investigate as follows: `   [S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.    The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.    [W]hat investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information.    ' (Emphasis added.) Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. The reasonableness of investigation decisions depends on other evidence as well. [I]n those cases involving claims of inadequate investigation    consideration [must be given to] the strength of the evidence known to counsel that suggested further inquiry was needed. 2 LaFave & Isr[ae]l, Crim.Proc. § 11.10(d) at 25 (1986 Pocket Part). (Emphasis in original.) We reversed Frias' second-degree murder conviction because Frias' attorney ignored considerable evidence that the victim had committed suicide and made no independent investigation into that defense. Frias, 722 P.2d at 147. [¶ 41] Since Frias, we have had numerous occasions to revisit this issue. Our developing jurisprudence has reflected our application of an objective test based on the totality of the circumstances, judged from the perspective of counsel at the time. In particular, we have distinguished between reasonable decisions made as part of trial strategy, and unreasonable decisions resulting from a failure to investigate. Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 58, 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo.2002). In that regard, an appellant cannot prove ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate a possible defense unless there are facts in the record indicating the availability of that defense. Reyna, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d at 1137. The same principle holds true where an appellant fails to identify the favorable evidence or witnesses that additional investigation would have revealed. Shipman v. State, 2001 WY 11, ¶ ¶ 10-14, 17 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo.2001); Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wyo. 2000). [¶ 42] A failure to investigate or to prepare adequately for trial does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where the failure is the appellant's fault. Mapp v. State, 953 P.2d 140, 144 (Wyo.1998) ( pro se defendant asked standby counsel to take over case three days before trial). Further, ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be premised on the failure to investigate a particular defense where that defense is presented and argued to the jury. Dean v. State, 931 P.2d 942, 946 (Wyo.1997). On the other hand, a failure to investigate that results in counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress evidence, where the motion likely would have been successful, does constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. In Interest of LDO, 858 P.2d 553, 557-59 (Wyo.1993). [¶ 43] Failure to interview an eyewitness is so egregious that it has been considered ineffective assistance of counsel without the need to show prejudice, such being presumed. King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 123 (Wyo.1991); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 343 (Wyo.1987). Strategic justification cannot be extended to the failure to investigate. King, 810 P.2d at 123. Where a proper investigation has been made, however, the decision to call or not to call a particular witness is virtually unchallengeable as a strategic choice left to counsel's discretion. Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Wyo. 1987). [¶ 44] Application of this law to the facts of this case leads us to the inescapable conclusion that McLeod's representation of Asch was deficient. There were three people who could testify as to who possessed the methamphetamine: Asch, Sutton, and Swisher. Asch was tactically unavailable because of his criminal record. Sutton was willing to, and did, testify that the methamphetamine belonged to her. The State's case depended entirely on Swisher's testimony about what he saw during the traffic stop. Consequently, cross-examination of Swisher was necessary not only to point out inconsistencies and weaknesses in his testimony, but also to bolster Sutton's testimony. Yet, McLeod made no effort to use Swisher's preliminary hearing testimony in cross-examination; in reality, she made no effort to cross-examine him at all as to what he saw. [10] No reasonable attorney would have allowed this case to go to the jury without having investigated Swisher's testimony and without having raised questions about his observations. [¶ 45] The next question is whether Asch was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. To prove prejudice, an appellant must show `a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.' Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 611-12 (Wyo.1992) ( quoting Frias, 722 P.2d at 147). We find in that regard that counsel's failure in this case is closely akin to the failure to interview an eyewitness, in which case prejudice is presumed. Asch's only hope of winning this case was to convince the jury that, given the location of the methamphetamine in an area equally accessible to Sutton, the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Asch was in possession. The only proof that Asch, rather than Sutton, possessed the methamphetamine was what Swisher claimed to have seen through the rear window of Sutton's car. McLeod's failure to investigate and test Swisher's testimony, therefore, went to the very heart of the State's case. That is a deficiency that is so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We conclude that Asch did not receive effective assistance of counsel.