Opinion ID: 1776784
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: PART I: Compensatory Damages

Text: ¶ 11. This Court has not addressed this issue in any previous cases. Gamble argues that when parties are involved in mediation, the opposing party has a duty to act in good faith in seeking and participating in mediation. The opposing party, according to Gamble, must not use mediation as a tactic to delay trial or to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the opposition. ¶ 12. The elements of fraud are: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the speakers intent that the representation be acted upon by the hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on the representation's truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; and, (9) the hearer's consequent and proximate damages. Allen v. Mac Tools, Inc., 671 So.2d 636, 642 (Miss.1996). Gamble argues that Dollar General's concealment of relevant insurance coverage rises to the level of misrepresentation and concealment that would entitle Gamble to a cause of action based on fraud. Gamble alleges that the misrepresentation by Dollar General has caused detriment to Gamble in the form of four hours of wasted time, the loss of an opportunity for a successful mediation, additional stress and an unfair opportunity for Dollar General to measure the strengths and weaknesses of Gamble's case at mediation. Gamble also argues that because Dollar General did not file a response to her amended complaint, by rule, Gamble's amended allegation should have been recognized as admitted. ¶ 13. On the other hand, Dollar General argues that under M.R.C.P. 12(b), Dollar General had the option of either filing an answer to the amended claims or filing a motion to dismiss. Dollar General argues that Gamble's cause of action lacks any reasonable basis in law and is entirely without merit. Dollar General filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Gamble for filing a frivolous cause of action. M.R.C.P. 11. The circuit court denied Dollar General's motion for sanctions. Dollar General instead asks that this Court sanction Gamble for her conduct and for raising a frivolous appeal. ¶ 14. This Court affirms the dismissal of Gamble's claim for fraud. Other than her reference to the general law on fraud, Gamble has presented no meaningful arguments and no legal support for a civil claim with regard to misrepresentations in discovery. The proper course of action for Gamble would have been to seek recourse under the discovery rules themselves. Recourse for violations of discovery rules is set forth in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. See M.R.C.P. 37.
¶ 15. A trial court should only grant a motion for a new trial if it believes the jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence or is contrary to the law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. McGory, 697 So.2d 1171, 1174 (Miss.1997). This Court will not overturn a denial of a motion for new trial unless the trial judge abused his discretion. Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083, 1089 (Miss.1998).
¶ 16. Dollar General presented a motion in limine requesting that the trial court not allow Gamble to testify that she experienced insomnia as a result of Dollar General and Thornton's conduct. The trial court denied the motion finding that expert testimony was not required to prove that the victim of an intentional tort suffered mental anguish because the trier of fact has some expertise with regard to mental anguish. ¶ 17. Dollar General argues that Gamble's testimony that the incident has caused her loss of sleep was not admissible because Gamble was treated for insomnia sometime in 1997, prior to the incident at issue. Also, Dollar General asserts that insomnia is a medical condition which requires proof by expert testimony. Dollar General believes that Gamble's testimony that she was emotionally upset or experienced a loss of sleep is insufficient to support an award of compensatory damages, and that expert testimony is required to establish a causal connection between the insomnia and the incident in question. Also, Dollar General claims that Gamble's emotional distress was only momentary. ¶ 18. Where there is resulting physical harm or mental assault, requiring treatment by the medical profession, a legal cause of action can exist. Summers ex rel. Dawson v. St. Andrew's Episcopal Sch., Inc., 759 So.2d 1203, 1211-12 (Miss. 2000) (citing Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So.2d 898, 902 (Miss.1981)). Mental anguish is a nebulous concept ... and requires substantial proof for recovery. Morrison v. Means, 680 So.2d 803, 805 (Miss.1996). ¶ 19. Where there is no physical injury, recovery for mental anguish can be appropriate under certain circumstances when the defendant's conduct evokes outrage or revulsion. Summers, 759 So.2d at 1211. Furthermore, expert testimony showing actual harm or proof of physical or mental injury is not always required. Where there are claims involving only sleeplessness, mental anguish, and humiliation, compensatory damages can be awarded based on the nature of the incident from which the damages flow. Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 10-11 (Miss. 2000). In cases in which there is evidence of willful, wanton, malicious, outrageous or intentional wrongs, and where mental or emotional stress is a foreseeable result of the conduct of the defendant, a court can assess damages for mental and emotional distress. Adams v. U.S. Homecrafters, Inc. 744 So.2d 736, 743 (Miss.1999) (a claim of mental anguish based on simple negligence did not require evidence of physical manifestation). See also American Bankers' Ins. Co. v. Wells, 819 So.2d 1196, 1208-09 (Miss.2001); Mississippi Valley Gas Co. v. Estate of Walker, 725 So.2d 139, 148 (Miss.1998); Means, 680 So.2d at 806; Devers, 405 So.2d at 902; Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 149, 150 So.2d 154, 158 (1963). If there is outrageous conduct, no injury is required for the recovery of infliction of emotional distress or mental anguish. Means, 680 So.2d at 806 (citing Leaf River Prods. Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So.2d 648, 659 (Miss.1995)). The plaintiff does not have to present further proof of injury. The nature of the act itself, rather than the seriousness of the consequences, can justify an award for compensatory damages. Devers, 405 So.2d at 902. ¶ 20. In the instant case, the jury was instructed on whether the defendants' conduct rose to the level of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress, not just ordinary negligence. The question to ask is whether the facts justify more than nominal damages. Whitten, 799 So.2d at 10. The issue boils down to a credibility issue for the jury with regard to the offensive, outrageous, injurious or malicious nature of Thornton's conduct when she assaulted Gamble and caused her mental distress. ¶ 21. This Court distinguished the facts in Whitten from other cases involving claims of mental anguish and infliction of emotional distress because in Whitten the conduct amounted to more than a mere `discomfort.' Id. In Whitten, the plaintiffs were confronted by an armed man who fired several shots, pointed his weapon at the men, handcuffed one of the plaintiffs, and pulled one plaintiff's cap down over his eyes. Id. at 6-7. In Harbin, an example of a case in which the facts only amounted to mere annoyance or discomfort, the Court of Appeals found that a high school student who sued a photographer for alleged invasion of privacy, for use of a photograph without permission, did not suffer harm which would be compensable. Harbin v. Jennings, 734 So.2d 269, 273 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). In Means, this Court determined that failed expectations and mutual misunderstandings could not give rise to an award for damages for emotional distress. Means, 680 So.2d at 804. ¶ 22. In Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, 1 So.2d 510 (1941) the appellants were the operators of about forty eight retail stores. The appellee purchased an article of underwear, paid for it, and departed the store. Id. The manager of the store witnessed the purchase but became suspicious that the appellee had taken away two garments but had only paid for one garment. Id. The manager left the store and followed the appellee a block away from the store. Id. at 511. The manager called to the appellee, while in the presence of others, and stated that he needed to investigate whether she had taken two garments instead of one. Id. The manager forcibly seized the package and examined it, only to discover that he had made a mistake. Id. This Court found that an assault had been committed and that the award of damages was not excessive. Id. This Court stated that our courts should not tolerate such conduct. Id. In the instant case, although there was no testimony that anyone witnessed the incident, based on the record, the conduct of Dollar General's employee appears to be just as offensive, if not more offensive than the employee's conduct in Morgan. ¶ 23. The facts in the instant case are more akin to the facts in Whitten and Morgan. The conduct in the present case was confrontational, physical, demeaning, and embarrassing enough such that compensatory damages were appropriately considered by the jury. This Court can not say that the trial judge erred in allowing the issue of compensatory damages to go to a jury. ¶ 24. Dollar General argues that the facts of this case and the momentary touching of Gamble could not result in the type of emotional distress that justifies an award for more than nominal damages. Dollar General believes that Gamble could only have been momentarily upset over the incident. This Court has held that a plaintiff who asserts a claim for mental anguish, whether as a result of negligence or an intentional tort must prove that the emotional distress was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct. Morgan v. Greenwaldt, 786 So.2d 1037, 1044 (Miss.2001). Under the facts of this case, a reasonable jury could find that Dollar General's conduct toward Gamble could result in the type of emotional distress described by Gamble. ¶ 25. Dollar General also claims that it suffered prejudice due to the trial court's failure to strike testimony that indicated Gamble's headaches were cause by the incident. Gamble testified that she suffered headaches for a period of time after the accident, beginning in November of 1999, and that her doctors told her the headaches were probably stress related. She also testified that she has had headache problems recently. However, Gamble did not testify that her headaches were caused by the incident. She testified that she has been under stress because of the incident with Dollar General, but she confirmed that no doctor has stated that the headaches might be caused by the incident. This Court finds that Gamble did not testify to any stress related injury that had to be confirmed by an expert. Furthermore, a layperson could determine whether the conduct of Dollar General was outrageous enough to cause stress and insomnia. ¶ 26. Dollar General also adds that Gamble's encounter with Thornton and the touching that occurred was not traumatic enough to support a claim of mental anguish. Based on a review of the record, there was sufficient evidence offered at trial to present a jury question as to whether the conduct by Thornton supported Gamble's claim that she suffered mental anguish. This issue is without merit.
¶ 27. Dollar General asserts that because Gamble continued shopping, went to work, and never sought medical treatment, that she could not have met her burden for proving intentional infliction of emotional distress. Gamble testified that she was too upset to stay at work and went home early that day. Dollar General asserts that Gamble must present substantial proof to prevail on a claim of intentional emotional distress. Means, 680 So.2d at 805. The facts in the instant case are sufficiently outrageous to present a jury issue as to whether Gamble suffered intentional infliction of emotional distress. Based on a review of the record, there was substantial evidence presented for Gamble to prevail on her claims. This issue is without merit.
¶ 28. Instruction 14A states as follows: If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the actions and/or omissions of Sheri Thornton or any other employee of the Defendant corporation were performed either intentionally in an effort to cause Heather Gamble to sustain and experience mental and emotional distress and anguish or that said actions and/or omissions on the part of the Defendants were performed negligently which resulted in mental and emotional distress and anguish being suffered by Heather Gamble, which distress and anguish were reasonably foreseeable results of Defendant's Conduct, then your verdict shall be for the Plaintiff as to said claim. However, if you find that the Plaintiff has failed to prove these elements by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict shall be for the Defendants as to said count. Dollar General states that this instruction is a misstatement of the law and that it improperly fails to distinguish between the standards for proving the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Dollar General offers no legal support for its determination that Instruction 14A was improper. This Court finds that Jury Instruction 14A sufficiently instructs the jury as to the elements for proving each claim. This issue lacks merit.
¶ 29. Dollar General argues that the jury should not have been allowed to hear Gamble's claim of negligent training. Dollar General had a written shoplifting policy that stated that no employee should leave a store to go after a suspected shoplifter and no employee should ever touch a shoplifter. Dollar General argues that this policy was provided to Thornton and that she read and understood the policy. Gamble asserted at trial that merely providing the policy to Thornton, without actually providing any training, was sufficient evidence to establish a claim of negligent training. ¶ 30. Dollar General asserts that Mississippi law requires the plaintiff to call an expert witness on retail store shoplifting procedures in order to establish that Dollar General's training was inadequate and negligent. Dollar General cites M.R.E. 703 and Langston v. Kidder, 670 So.2d 1, 3 (Miss.1995). However, neither of these authorities establishes a rule that Gamble must produce expert witnesses to establish that Thornton did not receive training or that the lack of training was negligence. ¶ 31. Gamble has simply misstated her issue with regard to her claim for negligent training. Instead of claiming that Dollar General's training was inadequate or negligent, Gamble's claim is better understood as an allegation that Dollar General provided no training. Stated as an issue of no training, the jury could infer Dollar General's negligence without the need of expert testimony on proper or adequate training. The jury could properly find that Dollar General was negligent in failing to provide training to Thornton. ¶ 32. There was also testimony that Thornton, a regional manager, was required to go to other stores to train employees in dealing with shoplifting. However, other than receiving a booklet, there was no evidence that showed that Thornton had received any training. Based on Dollar General's failure to show any training provided to Thornton, other than handing her a manual, it was proper to allow the jury to consider the issue of negligence for Dollar General's failure to train its employee. This issues is without merit.
¶ 33. Dollar General asserts that there was no evidence to warrant a jury instruction on assault. Dollar General's brief does not contain any meaningful arguments in support of this issue. Dollar General simply states that it does not believe the facts give rise to a claim for assault. The trial court stated that there was no question that there was an issue of assault in this case. Thornton's act of following Gamble and impermissibly yanking Gamble's underwear, to see if they were shoplifted, were sufficient facts to warrant a jury's consideration as to the tort of assault. Therefore, this issue is without merit. ¶ 34. Dollar General also asserts that evidence regarding the wrongful detention issue and defamation issue were improperly presented to the jury. Dollar General does not make reference to any testimony that would support these assertions. Instructions as to these issues were not given to the jury, and based on a review of the record, no statements made to the jury would have led them to base their decision on the issues of wrongful detention and defamation.