Opinion ID: 2567514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court of Appeal's Rationale for Recusal: Obstruction

Text: We begin with the unexceptionable proposition that the good faith assertion of legal argument, without more, does not establish a conflict. Zealous advocacy in pursuit of convictions forms an essential part of the prosecutor's proper duties and does not show the prosecutor's participation was improper. ( People v. Vasquez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 47, 65, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 372, 137 P.3d 199.) `In an adversary system, [prosecutors] are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the law.' ( Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. (1980) 446 U.S. 238, 248 [100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182].) So long as their zeal remains within legal limits ... the lawful execution of their duty does not establish as a matter of law that they have surrendered their independence and impartiality. ( Hambarian v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 843, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 725, 44 P.3d 102.) The same is true of the occurrence of discovery disputes, which alone do not suggest a conflict. ( Vasquez, at p. 65, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 372, 137 P.3d 199.) Implicit in the Court of Appeal's decision is the conclusion that the prosecution stepped beyond permissible zealous advocacy by acting in bad faith to obstruct discovery and impair defense preparation. Humberto S. echoes this position. Although the persistent, bad faith use of litigation tactics lawful in and of themselves might in some circumstances evidence an underlying conflict that renders a fair trial unlikely and warrants recusal, that is not this case. The trial court made no finding of bad faith, nor did it rest its recusal order on any such basis. [5] To the contrary, it viewed the prosecution's objections as motivated by a desire to see the law followed, not a desire to obstruct discovery. As the record is susceptible of this conclusion, neither the Court of Appeal nor we may substitute our own assessment of the prosecutors' good or bad faith in seeking to prevent disclosure of Samantha's medical and psychotherapy records. [6] The good faith assertion of nonfrivolous arguments is not a basis for recusal. Accordingly, we reject the Court of Appeal's conclusion that although the prosecution acted permissibly by initially challenging disclosure, it stepped over the line by persisting after Samantha's fatherHumberto S.'s brotherconsented to disclosure in open court. The Court of Appeal chastised the prosecution for creating delay, but less than a week passed between Samantha's father's testimony and the trial court's order directing that the records be disclosed. To the extent the Court of Appeal's conclusion rested on the additional month of delay that resulted from the prosecution's declining to acquiesce in the trial court's ruling and instead seeking appellate review, we reject that basis as well. As defendants may not be punished for resort to the appellate process ( North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 723-725, 89 S.Ct. 2072; In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 873-876, 215 Cal.Rptr. 267, 700 P.2d 1269), so prosecutors need not fear that the good faith availment of writ review will lead to their recusal.