Opinion ID: 1864160
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Effect of the Post-election Filing

Text: It is undisputed that Krages did not comply with § 17-22A-8(a), which provides in part: The treasurer of each principal campaign committee or other political committee shall file with the Secretary of State or judge of probate, as designated in Section 17-22A-9, reports of contributions and expenditures... between five and 10 days before a run-off election. (Emphasis added.) In other words, it is undisputed that Krages filed the contributions and expenditures report (the report) required under this provision on September 18, 1996, the day after the runoff election. Krages contends, however, that, because he ultimately filed the reportalbeit, on the day after the electionhe did not fail to file any statement or report required by the FCPA, within the meaning of § 17-22A-21. Specifically, he argues, § 17-22A-21 does not state that a certificate of election shall not be issued to a candidate who has failed to file a report `within (5) days of the election' but, he says, The statute simply states that no certificate shall be issued to any person elected who shall fail to file the required report. Petitioner's Reply Brief, at 9 (emphasis added). In other words, he contends, § 17-22A-21 does not specify when the ... reports must be filed; it merely requires that [they] be filed prior to issuance of a certificate of election. Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, he reasons, any defect in filing was cured and the certificate was due to be issued to him (once he filed the required report). Id. (emphasis added). This case thus requires us, once again, to address the consequences of noncompliance with the reporting requirements of the FCPA. These consequences were most recently discussed in Davis v. Reynolds, 592 So.2d 546 (Ala.1991). In that case, this Court discussed the consequences of filing a statement designating [a candidate's] principal campaign committee after the period specified by § 17-22A-4, but before the day of the election. 592 So.2d at 547. In doing so, we commented on the primary laudable purpose of the FCPA, id. at 555, which, we stated, was to inform the voting public of the source of a candidate's financial support and, thereby, to aid the voting public in choosing its [government] officials. 592 So.2d at 556. We reasoned, however, that this purpose could be accomplished only as long as candidates comply with the requirements of the FCPA to disclose campaign contributions and expenditures prior to elections. Id. at 555 (emphasis added). Thus, we reasoned, a winning candidate who waits until after the election to disclose the required information, forfeit[s] the election. Id. [4] As Davis explained, the disclosure obligations are so fundamental to the purposes and objectives of the FCPA that a disclosure offered to the voting public only after the election constitutes an incurable default. This is so, of course, because a post-election disclosure simply cannot provide the benefits the legislature sought to bestow upon the voting public by passage of the FCPA. To be sure, in Davis we overruled Megginson v. Turner, 565 So.2d 247 (Ala.1990), which had construed the FCPA to require a forfeiture for any defect in the reporting requirements, even one that was ultimately filed well before the election. Davis, 592 So.2d at 556; Id. at 558 n. 8 (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, Krages's interpretation of § 17-22A-21, namely, that a candidate may cure a defect in his or her compliance with the reporting requirements by filing at any time before the certificate is issued even after the election would render the FCPA illusory. We hold, therefore, that Krages, who waited until after the election to file the reports required by § 17-22A-8, fail[ed] to file within the meaning of § 17-22A-21, and, consequently, may not be certified the winner of the mayoral election.