Opinion ID: 2548719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying trustmark's and mbhs' motions for summary judgment.

Text: ¶ 15. These statements are the only evidence supporting Meador's fraudulent-concealment claim and should be excluded based on hearsay. Without these statements, Meador has no valid claims against Trustmark or MBHS. [3] Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in its denial of summary judgment in favor of Trustmark and MBHS. ¶ 16. Meador's claims arise from the same series of promissory notes he executed with Trustmark in the late 1990s. Therefore, all of Meador's claims are time-barred by the one-year and three-year statute of limitations of Mississippi Code Sections 15-1-35 and 15-1-49(1). [4] Miss. Code Ann. §§ 15-1-35 and 15-1-49(1) (Rev.2003). In his complaint, filed in August of 2004, Meador listed intentional infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action. In accordance with Mississippi Code Section 15-1-35, the statute of limitations for an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim is one year after the cause of action accrued. Jones v. Fluor Daniel Servs. Corp., 32 So.3d 417, 423 (Miss.2010). Meador's claim accrued in 1999 at the latest. Meador also listed contract-related claims in his 2004 complaint. These also accrued in 1999 at the latest. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(1), [i]n a contractual claim, a cause of action accrues on the date of actual injury, the date the facts occurred which enable the Plaintiffs to bring a cause of action. CitiFinancial Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Washington, 967 So.2d 16, 19 (Miss. 2007) (citations omitted). Trustmark and MBHS both used these statutes of limitations as a defense in their motions for summary judgment. We agree that the statute of limitations bars all claims listed in Meador's complaint. ¶ 17. In his attempt to toll the statute of limitations, Meador claims that Trustmark and MBHS fraudulently concealed the causes of action listed in his complaint. Section 15-1-67 of the Mississippi Code provides that: If a person liable to any personal action shall fraudulently conceal the cause of action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the cause of action shall be deemed to have first accrued at, and not before, the time at which such fraud shall be, or with reasonable diligence might have been, first known or discovered. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-67 (Rev.2003). When a plaintiff uses fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations, he must prove the necessary elements of fraudulent concealment in order to defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment. Sanderson Farms Inc. v. Ballard, 917 So.2d 783, 790 (Miss.2005). [5] To establish a claim of fraudulent concealment, there must be shown some act or conduct of an affirmative nature designed to prevent and which does prevent discovery of the claim. Reich, 526 So.2d at 552 (citations omitted). The party is required to show that (1) some affirmative act of conduct was done and prevented discovery of the claim; and (2) due diligence was performed on its part to discover the claim. Sanderson Farms Inc., 917 So.2d at 790. This Court has also has held that fraudulent concealment must be pled with specificity and particularity under [Miss. R. Civ. P.] 9(b). State Indus., Inc. v. Hodges, 919 So.2d 943, 946 (Miss.2006). Meador did not satisfy either requirement, nor did he plead any claim with particularity. Therefore, this Court reverses the trial court's ruling, thereby granting Trustmark's and MBHS' motions for summary judgment.
¶ 18. Meador has not presented any evidence that Trustmark or MBHS performed any act to prevent discovery of his alleged claims. Meador states that he did not have and had no means to obtain relevant information regarding his fraudulent-concealment claim. However, he cannot satisfy the affirmative act requirement with mere allegations that the other party had complete control of the information. See Sanderson Farms Inc., 917 So.2d at 790. The party opposing the motion must be diligent and may not rest upon allegations or denials in the pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 920 So.2d 427, 432 (Miss.2006) (citations omitted). ¶ 19. With regard to Meador's claims against Trustmark, Trustmark argues that the claims not involving conspiracy are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. [6] In his opposition to summary judgment, Meador offered no evidence to show how Trustmark or MBHS fraudulently concealed these claims. The only evidence he provided was his own affidavit, which consisted of hearsay and speculation. Therefore, Meador did not meet the first requirement for fraudulent concealment.
¶ 20. Meador did not present any evidence at the summary judgment hearing to show he exercised due-diligence in discovering the present claims. He merely stated he was unable to discover any information about the alleged claims. He did not show any conduct that would be considered an exercise of due diligence. This Court has held that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the due diligence requirement if he had information regarding the claim and failed to take action before the statute of limitations expired. Andrus v. Ellis, 887 So.2d 175, 181 (Miss.2004). In February 1999, Meador's attorney stated that he had significant evidence that other parties, including Trustmark Bank, have colluded with MBMC in seeking to destroy Dr. Meador and take his business from him. Meador had notice of an alleged conspiracy between Trustmark and MBHS in 1999. However, Meador waited five years to bring an action against both Trustmark and MBHS. Meador's lack of due diligence bars any claim based on fraudulent concealment.