Opinion ID: 780364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discretion of the District Court

Text: 35 In addition to the Fifth Amendment claim, appellant contends that the imposition of the polygraph condition constitutes an abuse of discretion because the district court failed to warn him in advance that it was considering such a condition and did not allow additional briefing on this issue at the sentencing hearing. The government, on the other hand, argues that the court imposed the polygraph condition based upon the Federal Correctional Institution's psychological evaluation (FCI's evaluation). The FCI's evaluation contained recommendations, including the following special conditions: 36 It is recommended a restrictive supervision program be implemented. Mr. Lee should be required to register as a sex offender, not be allowed contact with his victims, have no contact with persons under the age of 18, not own or operate a personal computer or other devices that allows Internet access, and should not be housed in an area where minors congregate. It is also recommended Mr. Lee not hire any minors to perform household chores or yard work, random searches of his residence be conducted for the presence of sexual risk factors, and he be administered for frequent polygraph examinations. (Appendix at B-5) (emphasis added). 37 According to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1), at sentencing, the court must afford counsel for the defendant and for the Government an opportunity to comment on the probation officer's determinations and on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence.... We addressed this Rule in United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 764 (3d Cir.2001), and held that counsel for the defendant and the government must be provided with a meaningful opportunity to address the information at issue. (emphasis in original). 38 In Nappi, the district court relied on the state presentence report (PSR), as well as the federal PSR, in sentencing the defendant. The state PSR, however, was not provided to the defense counsel prior to sentencing. As a result, we held that where the district court intends to rely on a document in addition to the federal PSR, a meaningful opportunity to comment requires the Court, in accordance with Rule 32(c)(1), to provide a copy of the document to counsel ... within a sufficient time prior to the sentencing hearing to afford them with a meaningful opportunity to comment on it at sentencing and, depending on the document, prepare a response or contest it. Id. 39 Nappi, however, is inapposite to the case at bar. Here, it appears that the district court relied upon the FCI's evaluation in sentencing the appellant. 7 Moreover, the report was made available to Lee's counsel prior to the sentencing date. In fact, after the FCI's evaluation was conducted, appellant's counsel had Lee examined by an independent psychologist, Timothy Foley, Ph.D., on September 14, 2001. It therefore appears that appellant was aware of the weight which the court would give to the FCI's evaluation, and attempted to counter it. 40 Nevertheless, Lee argues that the district court abused its discretion because (1) the probation officer failed to mention the polygraph condition in the Presentence Report, and (2) the district court refused to allow additional briefing from counsel on this issue at the sentencing hearing. We do not find that the district court's actions amount to an abuse of discretion. Even though the probation officer failed to mention the polygraph condition in the Presentence Report, appellant's counsel was provided with the FCI's evaluation — including its recommendations — prior to the sentencing date, and utilized the opportunity to provide the court with an alternate evaluation. 8 Also, even if the district court had allowed additional briefing on the issue of polygraph testing, we do not believe that it would have affected the court's decision to impose the polygraph condition. As such, the court's refusal to permit additional briefing did not prejudice Lee. Cf. Nappi, 243 F.3d at 768-72 (upholding the sentence because even though the district court violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 32, it did not affect appellant's substantial rights, so as to warrant plain error relief). 41
42 With respect to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing the polygraph condition, we have held that the sentencing court may order a condition of supervised release to the extent that it: (1) reasonably relates to the factors set forth in the statute containing the sentencing guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (2)(B)-(D); and (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the deterrence, public protection and/or correctional treatment for which it is imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) & (2); United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir.1999). In imposing conditions, the court may consider: (a) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (b) the need for the condition to deter future criminal conduct, protect the public, and provide the defendant with necessary training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (2); see also Loy, 191 F.3d at 370; United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3d Cir.2001). 43 We find that the polygraph condition is reasonably related to the protection of the public, as well as the rehabilitation of the appellant. The polygraph testing could be beneficial in enhancing the supervision and treatment of Lee. See, e.g., Wilson, 1998 WL 939987, at  (stating that polygraphs are tools to help the probation officer monitor defendant's rehabilitation and compliance with release conditions); Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir.1982) (stating that the polygraph test may act to deter the probationer from violating the terms of his probation by instilling in him a fear of detection); Ebihara, 2002 WL 432378, at  (requiring defendant to submit to polygraph examinations in order to assist in treatment, planning, and case monitoring). Moreover, the polygraph condition does not involve greater deprivation of appellant's liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes of protecting the public and rehabilitating the offender. Since appellant is already directed to report periodically to the probation officer and provide truthful answers after he is released from imprisonment, (Appendix at A-7), the additional requirement that Lee undergo polygraph testing does not place a significantly greater demand on him. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the polygraph condition.