Opinion ID: 2273154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Causing M.M. to Suffer Torture, Cruel Confinement, or Cruel Punishment.

Text: We next must determine if error exists with the instruction that permitted the jury to convict Mason if it believed he intentionally abused M.M. and thereby tortured, cruelly confined, or cruelly punished M.M. We conclude the instruction was erroneous but did not constitute palpable error.
Simply put, the Commonwealth has shown us no facts that tend to prove that Mason caused M.M. to suffer cruel confinement. Indeed, the Commonwealth does not specifically cite to any conduct by Mason that even arguably could be construed as Mason's having confined M.M., cruelly or otherwise. At most, the evidence would support an inference that Mason somehow restrained M.M. by unknown means resulting in M.M.'s broken leg. But we do not believe that restraining M.M. for an unknown period, likely extremely brief in duration, by unknown means constitutes cruel confinement. In short, the Commonwealth has pointed to no evidence at all to show that M.M. was confined by Mason. The inclusion of cruel confinement language in the jury instruction was, therefore, erroneous. [23]
Although it does not really address or defend the cruel confinement aspect of the instruction, the Commonwealth does argue that there was sufficient evidence of cruel punishment. To support its argument, the Commonwealth again relies upon the bruises on M.M., which were characterized as being consistent with abuse and atypical of children of M.M.'s age. Although government is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section Seventeen of the Kentucky Constitution from imposing cruel punishment, [w]hat constitutes cruel ... punishment has not been exactly decided. [24] Instead, the prohibition on cruel punishment embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.... [25] In Kentucky, we have held that cruel punishment is that punishment which shocks the conscience and violates the principles of fundamental fairness. [26] The Court of Appeals has also cited, with approval, a dictionary definition of cruel as `disposed to inflict pain or suffering....' [27] Under those working definitions, we conclude that a juror could have reasonably inferred that Mason inflicted cruel punishment upon M.M. It is possible that the infliction of bruises consistent with abuse was sufficient to constitute cruel punishment since our precedent holds that even spanking a child may, at least in extreme situations, constitute cruel punishment under KRS 508.100. [28] Regardless of the bruises, however, we have no doubt that intentionally breaking a child's leg, at least under the facts of this case, rises to the level of cruel punishment. So construing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that M.M. subjected Mason to cruel punishment.
We, likewise, believe that there was sufficient evidence for a juror to conclude reasonably that Mason tortured M.M. We have not had many occasions to determine what conduct constitutes torture under KRS 508.100. In Stoker, we had no difficulty in determining that tying up ... children, putting tape over their mouths, and forcing them to watch pornographic movies, can reasonably and appropriately be deemed by a jury to constitute `torture, cruel confinement or cruel punishment'.... [29] Likewise, we held that hitting children with a wire coat hanger was sufficient to sustain the charges because the children testified to circumstances proving the nature of the beatings to have been cruel and indiscriminate, and far different in character from normal parental discipline. [30] As Professors Lawson and Fortune point out, however, [t]he case law is otherwise unhelpful as to the meaning of the provision.... [31] In the case at hand, M.M. did not testifyand we have been pointed to no other testimony clearly indicatingthat M.M.'s bruises were a direct result of Mason's having struck M.M. with a coat hanger or any other similar instrument. Nor is there any evidence showing that M.M. was restrained and forced to watch pornographic movies. So whether the conduct at issue constitutes torture is not readily answered by reference to our existing precedent. We, therefore, turn to the dictionary to determine what kind of behavior constitutes torture, at least for purposes of criminal abuse charges. Torture is defined as the infliction of intense pain (as from burning, crushing, wounding) to punish or coerce someone.... [32] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has opined that the primary concern of the drafters of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment was to prohibit torture and similarly barbaric types of punishment. [33] Although no one definition can cover all the possible methods of torturing someone, we agree with the Court of Appeals of Michigan's general conclusion that before a defendant may be convicted of child torture, it need only be shown that he ... inflicted extreme, intense or severe pain or injury upon the victim. [34] Thus, although the terms are generally used interchangeably, it appears that torture may require the infliction of greater pain through more barbaric methods than does cruel punishment. Although it is a difficult question, which will necessarily have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, we are unwilling to say as a matter of law under the facts of this case that abusing a child in such a manner as to cause a severe fracture in the child's leg, as well as inflicting multiple bruises and similar marks all over the child's body, is insufficient to constitute torture. Although one cannot know for sure what M.M. actually felt since he was too young to testify, we have no doubt that the diverse injuries M.M. suffered must logically have caused him to suffer extreme, intense or severe pain.... [35] We held in a somewhat similar unpublished case that evidence showing multiple bruises and abrasions all over the body of a three-year-old child was sufficient to constitute either torture or cruel punishment. [36] There was sufficient evidence, therefore, for the issue of whether Mason tortured M.M. to be submitted to a jury.