Opinion ID: 1094888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Jury's Role in Sentencing

Text: Taylor contends that his death sentence should be vacated because, he says, the prosecutor and the trial judge made statements to the jury that undermined the importance of its role in sentencing, in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). He argues that the prosecutor made improper statements to each group of prospective jurors during voir dire and to the jury during the penalty phase of trial. Taylor argues that the trial judge committed reversible error when, Taylor claims, he failed to instruct the jurors on the crucial importance of their role in sentencing. The State responds by arguing that Taylor's objection on this issue, which was made by motion in limine before closing arguments in the penalty phase, and which was overruled by the trial judge, did not preserve for review any error relating to comments made before that point in the trial (such as errors made during voir dire or during the opening remarks of the penalty phase) and, thus, that this Court must review Taylor's argument primarily via the plain error standard. The State further contends that the prosecutor's comments and the judge's instruction regarding the jury's role in sentencing were correct statements of Alabama law. Thus, the State argues that the statements were not error, plain or otherwise.
Taylor is correct in saying that during voir dire the prosecutor repeatedly told each panel of prospective jurors that the jury's verdict on sentencing was only a recommendation and that the ultimate decision belonged to the trial judge. Taylor did not object to any of those statements. The prosecutor also made similar statements to the jury in opening remarks at the penalty phase of the trial: [PROSECUTOR]: May it please the Court, ... ladies and gentlemen, as the judge has told you, we have now reached the second phase as is required by the capital statutes of our State law, what is known as the sentencing phase. There's going to be some evidence now presented to you for your consideration to assist you when you get ready to retire and deliberate on this matter as far as what type of recommendation that you're going to make to the judge. Again, let me, please, make sure you understand it's a recommendation. Don't want anybody getting up here giving you the idea that you're sending someone to their death, that you're killing anybody. You're not. Don't let anybody try to put a guilt trip on you or anything like that. The function of the jury in this particular phase of the trial is to listen to the evidence, go through then the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the evidence proves those to you and then provide some assistance to the judge by means of what is known as an advisory verdict. The ultimate decision that's got to be made in this case is Judge Rhea's. You're kind of sitting here as his council of advisors. By the verdict that will return at the conclusion of this phase of the trial, based on the verdict that you would bring back to him in accordance with the law and the evidence as you hear it, he will take your advice under consideration in ultimately making the decision that has to be made. So, please, don't personally feel like that you're making a decision on someone's life, that the decision is strictly yours or allow somebody to put some kind of guilt trip on you that you're doing something. You're sitting here merely as an advisor to the court. The decision is ultimately the judge's. (Emphasis added). In its opinion in this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals condemned the statement of the prosecutor that is emphasized immediately above. Taylor, 666 So.2d at 49. However, Taylor's defense counsel did not object to it. As noted previously, defense counsel filed a motion in limine just before closing arguments in the penalty phase of trial, seeking to prevent the prosecution from reminding [the jury] over and over again that their verdict is a recommendation only, because, counsel said, such comments would reduce their importance of being jurors in this phase as far as recommending a sentence. The trial judge denied the defense motion. Thereafter, in his first remarks to the jury during closing arguments, the prosecutor emphasized the importance of the jury's role in the sentencing process: [PROSECUTOR]: May it please the court, ..., ladies and gentlemen, we've come to that particular point now in the second phase of this trial, getting ready to go make a very important decision. It's an important decision that is going to affect the folks in this county. It's going to affect Mr. and Mrs. Moore's family. Going to affect the defendant's family. It's not an easy task that you're fixing to undertake. I don't envy you at all and I sure wouldn't want to swap places with any of you. Defense counsel then made his final argument to the jury regarding sentencing and concluded by saying that if it recommended that Taylor be sentenced to death, then it would also be sentencing Taylor's mother to death: [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: I submit to you that he deserves to be punished. There's no question that he does. But he deserves a life-without-parole sentence. If you kill Michael, you'll kill two people. You'll kill Michael and you'll kill his mother. I submit to you that ... you should not ... recommend the death penalty in this case. Thank you. (Emphasis added.) That comment was immediately referred to by the prosecutor in his rebuttal argument: [PROSECUTOR]: Ladies and gentlemen, you're not going to kill anybody. Nobody is asking you to do that. Nobody is walking up and saying `Here's the switch, pull it.' Nothing like that. What you're being asked to do is sit here in an advisory capacity and based on your many years of combined experience, your lives, your experience, you're asked to sit here and weigh things in the balance, the evidence as you've heard it, and to make a recommendation to Judge Rhea of what you feel like is an appropriate sentence. The judge himself is going to have to sit down and weigh this evidence just as you've already had to do in the trial, in the guilt phase, and just as you'll go back and weigh it again now. He's going to have to determine the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that he finds and he's going to have to go through the same weighing process. He's going to have to take all of that into consideration with a pre-sentence report that will be done by another agency. And with your guidance and your counsel that you're going to give him by the advisory verdict that you bringAnd it's important. It's very important, because it will give this judge some guidance and some assistance in what is appropriate for this type of offense, especially when it comes from law-abiding citizens such as you. It carries some weight and it does matter. (Emphasis added). This statement just quoted regarding the jury's role in sentencing is the only statement made by the prosecutor on that subject that followed Taylor's objection by motion in limine regarding that subject. Finally, Taylor argues that the trial judge committed reversible error in his instructions to the jury regarding its proper role in sentencing. During his instructions to the jury, the trial judge repeatedly stated that the jury would recommend the defendant's punishment and that it would recommend a sentence. Taylor's counsel did not object to these instructions.
We must determine whether the statement of the prosecutor and the trial judge indicating to the jury that it would only render an advisory verdict or a recommended sentence require Taylor's death sentence to be vacated. Taylor claims that the statements misled the jury as to the importance of its role in sentencing, in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). In Caldwell, the United States Supreme Court stated that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. 472 U.S. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2639-40. Because Taylor failed to object to the prosecutor's remarks, made during voir dire and during his opening statement at the penalty phase of trial, and to the trial judge's instructions, we review those statements under the plain error standard. Rule 39(k), Ala.R.App.P. First, we find no conflict between the prosecutor's statements and the trial judge's instructions regarding the jury's role in sentencing (as that of offering only a recommended or advisory verdict) and Alabama lawthat is the jury's role under Alabama's unique capital sentencing scheme. Under Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-46, the jury's role in sentencing in a capital case is to render an advisory verdict recommending a sentence to the trial judge. It is the trial judge who ultimately decides the capital defendant's sentence, and, [w]hile the jury's recommendation concerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the courts. § 13A-5-47 (emphasis added). Even though we find no error with regard to the prosecutor's statements regarding the jury's role in sentencing, we note that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury that statements made by the attorneys were not evidence and were not law and that those statements should be disregarded if they were not supported by the evidence or by the law as given to you by the court. We also find no error in the trial judge's instructions to the jury on its role in sentencing. It is well established that the comments of the prosecutor and the instructions of the trial court accurately informing the jury of the extent of its sentencing authority and that its sentence verdict was `advisory and a `recommendation' and that the trial court would make the final decision as to sentence does not violate Caldwell. Martin v. State, 548 So.2d 488, 494 (Ala.Crim.App.), affirmed, 548 So.2d 496 (Ala.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970, 110 S.Ct. 419, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989). See White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218 (Ala.Crim. App.1990), affirmed, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala. 1991); cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1076, 112 S.Ct. 979, 117 L.Ed.2d 142 (1992); Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d 474 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), affirmed, 577 So.2d 531 (Ala.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 886, 112 S.Ct. 242, 116 L.Ed.2d 197 (1991). In sum, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the comments of the prosecutor, or in those of the trial judge, regarding the jury's role in sentencing in a capital murder trial. Although Taylor does not argue that Alabama's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional, we note that this issue was recently addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. Alabama, ___ U.S.___, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 130 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995). In Harris, the petitioner sought a mandate from the Supreme Court stating that the United States Constitution requires Alabama trial judges to give great weight to the jury's advisory verdict. However, the Supreme Court ruled that Alabama's death penalty sentencing scheme, which does not prescribe the weight the trial judge is to give the jury's verdict, is not unconstitutional. The Court stated: The Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence. It is thus not offended when a State further requires the sentencing judge to consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper weight. ___U.S. at___, 115 S.Ct. at 1037. Finally, we must review the final comments the prosecutor made to the jury during the penalty phase of the trial, in which he told the jurors they were not going to kill anybody. Taylor claims that the prosecutor's comment misled the jurors regarding the importance of their responsibility in rendering an advisory verdict. This statement by the prosecutor was the only one to which Taylor's objection by motion in limine, made before closing arguments, would apply. We conclude, however, that the prosecutor's comment was a fair response to defense counsel's statement made immediately before, by which defense counsel argued to the jury that a recommendation of death would kill both Michael Taylor and his mother. [A] prosecutor has the right to `reply in kind' to statements made by defense counsel in the defense's closing argument. Ex parte Musgrove, 638 So.2d 1360, 1369 (Ala.1993), cert. denied, Rogers v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 136, 130 L.Ed.2d 78 (1994). The prosecutor's remark was not reversible error.