Opinion ID: 2586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nexus Between Drug Offense and Killing

Text: Next, Santos argues that section 848(e)(1)(A) requires a direct and substantial nexus between the killing and the drug offense. Appellant's Br. 42. Santos does little to explain what a direct and substantial nexus means, although he suggests that the killing must be directly related ..., either proximately or temporally, to the charged drug offense, id. at 43, and that a defendant cannot be convicted if the connection is too limited and attenuated, id. at 44. These proposed standards are too vague to give courts and juries sufficiently concrete guidance. We therefore decline to adopt them. In United States v. Desinor, 525 F.3d 193 (2d Cir.2008), we concluded that section 848(e)(1)(A) does require a meaningful connection between the killing and the drug offense. See id. at 202. We explained the requirement as follows: To convict a defendant of engaging in a narcotics conspiracy resulting in murder... under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), the government need only prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one motive for the killing ... was related to the drug conspiracy. The existence of other motives does not affect the government's ability to satisfy the engaging in element, as long as there is a substantive connection between the defendant's role in the murder... and his participation in the drug conspiracy. The government has no burden to establish that a drug-related motive was the sole purpose, the primary purpose, or even that it was equally as important as any non-drug-related purpose, as long as it was one purpose. Id. (citation omitted). [5] By focusing on the defendant's motive or purpose in the killing, the Desinor standard requires a finding of fact familiar to and accessible by juries. We think the rule set forth in Desinor fully satisfies whatever nexus requirement might be implied by the language of section 848(e)(1)(A).