Opinion ID: 1679096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: unauthorized use of an indeterminate sentence

Text: Section 28-304(2) defines murder in the second degree as a Class IB felony. The penalty authorized by § 28-105 is a maximum of life imprisonment and a minimum of 10 years' imprisonment. On December 20, 1993, the district court sentenced Martin to an indeterminate term of not less than 40 years nor more than life in prison. This court previously held that an indeterminate sentence could not be imposed on one convicted of second degree murder. See, State v. Ward, 226 Neb. 809, 415 N.W.2d 151 (1987); State v. Moss, 219 Neb. 327, 363 N.W.2d 367 (1985); State v. Laravie, 192 Neb. 625, 223 N.W.2d 435 (1974). However, in 1993, the Legislature enacted § 29-2204, which, effective September 9, 1993, specifically altered the rule against indeterminate sentencing for Class IB felonies. Here, Martin entered a plea of no contest on October 27, 1993, to a crime that was committed on October 31, 1990. Apparently, the district court sentenced Martin pursuant to the newly effective indeterminate sentencing statute, § 29-2204. Section 29-2204 (Supp.1993) was not in effect on the date of the crime. Generally, when an offense is committed prior to a statutory change, the amendment or new statute is not applicable to the defendant. Berry v. Wolff, 193 Neb. 717, 228 N.W.2d 885 (1975). A change which imposes a more burdensome punishment than existed at the time a crime was committed runs afoul of ex post facto principles. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). This indeterminate sentence is more burdensome. But more to the point, it simply was not authorized by statute. An indeterminate sentence imposed for a crime, where not authorized by statute, is erroneous but not void. State v. Rouse, 206 Neb. 371, 381, 293 N.W.2d 83, 89 (1980). It is plain from the record before us that the district court lacked the authority to impose an indeterminate sentence on Martin.