Opinion ID: 585672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Speedy Trial Act Argument

Text: 9 Mungia contends that because 32 days elapsed between his October 14 arrest and his November 15 indictment, the indictment violated the Speedy Trial Act and therefore should have been dismissed by the district court. 1 The proper interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act raises a question of law subject to de novo review. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). 10 Section 3161(b) of the Speedy Trial Act provides: 11 Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges. 12 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). Section 3162(a)(1) specifies the appropriate sanction for violations of section 3161(b). It provides: 13 If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an offense, no indictment or information is filed within the time limit required by section 3161(b) ... such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. 14 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). 15 In denying Mungia's motion to dismiss, the trial court held that dismissal of an indictment is required under section 3162(a)(1) only where a defendant has not been indicted within 30 days of the filing of a federal complaint. The district judge noted initially that the sanction Congress created for violation of the thirty-day limit for indictment was made applicable expressly to 'the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed.'  The judge acknowledged both that the plain language of section 3161(b) requires that a defendant be indicted within 30 days of arrest and that Mungia's certificate of arrest expressly stated that the date of arrest for Speedy Trial Act purposes was October 14. Observing that the section 3162(a)(1) applied only to those individuals against whom a complaint has been filed, however, the district court held that the dismissal sanction was inapplicable to Mungia because he was indicted within the thirty days from the date on which charges were filed. 16 The district court apparently perceived an inconsistency between section 3161(b), which refers to a defendant's arrest, and section 3162(a)(1), which refers to dismissal of the complaint. The statutory language and case law make clear that a federal arrest, rather than the subsequent filing of a complaint, is the triggering event for purposes of the 30-day speedy trial period under both section 3161(b) and section 3162(a)(1). Section 3161(b) explicitly states that the 30-day period is measured from the date of arrest, and section 3162(a)(1) incorporates this period by reference. See United States v. Antonio, 705 F.2d 1483, 1485 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that section 3162(a)(1) applies if the indictment has not been returned within 30 days of the arrest); see also id. at 1484 (noting that section 3161(b) directs indictments be returned within 30 days after a defendant has been arrested and that section 3162(a)(1) provides a specific sanction where the government fails to obtain an indictment within that time). 17 One exception to this general rule has been recognized. In United States v. Candelaria, 704 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.1983), we read sections 3161(b) and 3162(a)(1) together to mean that the 30-day time limit does not apply in the case of a defendant who is arrested but released without charge or other restraint. See id. at 1131; see also Antonio, 705 F.2d at 1485 n. 1 (construing Candelaria ). In recognizing this exception to the 30-day rule, the court in Candelaria interpreted section 3161(b) to apply only to persons who are arrested and subsequently charged or otherwise restrained. See Candelaria, 704 F.2d at 1131 & n. 2. In so doing, the court declined to presume that Congress intended there to be a gap between the section 3161(b) right and the section 3162(a)(1) remedy. See id. 18 Under the law of this circuit, when an individual is arrested and subsequently charged or held in custody, the Speedy Trial Act's 30-day clock begins to run from the date of the individual's arrest. As the government points out, however, the arrest must be a federal arrest for the 30-day speedy trial clock to be activated. See United States v. Adams, 694 F.2d 200, 202 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983). A defendant's arrest by state officers, though pursuant to a joint federal-state investigation, does not trigger the 30-day clock. Id.; accord United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 915 (9th Cir.1983). 19 Mungia's October 14 arrest was not a triggering event for Speedy Trial Act purposes because the arrest was made by Salem police. No federal arrest took place until Mungia was transferred to federal custody on October 16. Mungia's November 15 indictment therefore did not violate the Act. See United States v. Redmond, 803 F.2d 438, 440 n. 7 (9th Cir.1986) (noting that [c]ourts have found that a person is not arrested for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act until he is taken into custody after a federal arrest for the purpose of responding to a federal charge), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032 (1987).