Opinion ID: 1465188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Extreme Indifference to Human Life

Text: The key issue in the present case, as conceded by Appellant, is whether Appellant's wanton conduct manifests extreme indifference to human life. This is a question to be decided by the trier of fact. Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 922, 924 (1998). If the jury determines that, under the given circumstances, a defendant's conduct rises to the level of aggravated wantonness, then the jury could find extreme indifference to human life as required by the statute. Id. at 925. Appellant contends that his one careless act  taking control of a vehicle while intoxicated  was not manifestly extremely dangerous compared to the acts of reckless driving that would typically lead to convictions of wanton endangerment. In other words, he asserts that first-degree wanton endangerment cannot be proved solely by the fact of drunk driving, absent of evidence indicating much more dangerous physical driving. This argument must fail because: (1) by so arguing, Appellant turned a blind eye to his other dangerous driving behavior, as we will discuss shortly hereinafter; (2) this Court, in Walden [2] and Estep , [3] clearly stated that intoxication alone either sufficed to establish aggravated wantonness or it was the circumstance that raised the defendant's conduct to the level of aggravated wantonness; and (3) in ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the test is not how Appellant's behavior compares with previous defendants, but whether a jury could reasonably conclude, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, that Appellant was driving so wantonly as to manifest extreme indifference to human life. Appellant relies heavily on Matthews v. Commonwealth, Ky., 44 S.W.3d 361 (2001), arguing that, a conviction for aggravated vehicular wanton endangerment must involve behavior which is more egregious than that of Appellant, such as driving at a high-speed or on the wrong side of a road. He concludes that drunk driving alone is not sufficient to warrant a conviction of wanton endangerment. This reliance is misplaced. In Matthews, supra , the defendant was driving down the interstate at a high rate of speed on the wrong side of the road, and an accident followed. The defendant was charged with wantonly endangering the driver of a car that was located near the accident scene and was hit by the debris resulting from the accident. We reversed his conviction of wanton endangerment, reasoning that it was not supported by sufficient evidence. We could find no evidence that the driver of the car was endangered by the defendant's wanton conduct because there was no testimony to establish that the car was occupied at the time it was hit by the debris and because the individual alleged to be endangered was never connected to the car or named in any witness' testimony. Id. at 364-365. By contrast, in the case at bar, Appellant's wanton conduct endangered his 10-year-old son, who was sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle that he was driving while intoxicated. Although admittedly, Appellant was not driving at a high rate of speed on the wrong side of the road, wanton behavior manifesting extreme indifference to human life is not limited to that type of conduct. Here, Appellant was not simply driving under the influence as he tried to argue. Actually, his physical acts of driving included more than one reported lapses: it was his third time of operating a motor vehicle despite a license suspension for DUI; he was driving while intoxicated; he suddenly accelerated the vehicle at a speed noticeably higher than the normal; and he turned off the vehicle's headlights while still on the road. More importantly, he was driving, while in a drunken condition, with his minor child as a passenger. Unlike an adult who has the capability of deciding for himself whether to sit next to a drunken driver, a ten-year-old boy is powerless and has no control of himself when his drunken father wants to take him for a risky ride. We cannot expect a child at the age of ten to perceive the dangerous nature of drunk driving. Thus, the State was not relying merely on the effect of intoxication to establish the aggravated wantonness. As a matter of fact, our reading of the totality of circumstances in this particular case leads to the conclusion that Appellant was operating a vehicle in an improper manner far below the standard that a reasonable person would observe, thus manifesting extreme indifference to the grave risk of death or serious physical injury imposed on his ten-year-old son. Finally, one thing worthy of noting is that this opinion should not be read as authorization of a wanton endangerment prosecution in every DUI violation. It is true that the immediate public is placed at risk whenever an intoxicated driver enters the roadways and the crime of DUI is always to be denounced, however, the offense of DUI is separate and distinct from the offense of wanton endangerment. The sole fact of intoxication is not enough to sustain a conviction of wanton endangerment. As stated above, however, the facts in this case are so egregious as to warrant conviction of wanton endangerment.