Opinion ID: 2089358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The claim of the children pursuant to the common law

Text: There is no basis in the common law for the intervention of minor children as parties in the divorce action of their parents with an attorney of their choice. Although at common law minor children have a right to sue and be sued, children do not possess the requisite legal capacity to participate in litigation in their own names. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 215 (1978). This incapacity is premised on age, inexperience, and immaturity. Id. See also, 1 Kramer, Legal `Rights of Children, § 11.02 (1994). Due to their incapacity, children must bring or defend a legal proceeding through an adult representative, such as a next friend [2] or a guardian ad litem. [3] 43 C.J.S. Infants § 215. Similarly, intervention of minor children in an action may only be commenced by a guardian ad litem or a next friend. A person acting as either a next friend or a guardian ad litem is only a nominal party to the litigation; the child is the real party in interest. 6A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1570 (2d ed.1990) (discussing F.R.C.P. 17(a)). The next friend or guardian ad litem brings the minor child's claim or interest to the attention of a court. The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure reflect this common law tradition. M.R.Civ.P. 17(b) provides in relevant part: (b) Guardians and Other Representatives. Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.... Pursuant to Rule 17(b), a minor child may only sue if the child has a representative, next friend, or guardian ad litem. The court is empowered to appoint such a representative for a child whenever protection of the child's interests demands it. There is one exception to this rule in M.R.Civ.P. 80(e), that allows minor children who are themselves married and parties to a divorce to proceed in their own capacity, without the need for a next friend or guardian ad litem. M.R.Civ.P. 80(e). [4] With respect to the children of these divorcing parties, however, the second sentence of Rule 80(e) reverts to the common law approach, and allows a court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of those children. Read together, Rule 17(b) and Rule 80(e) confirm that Maine subscribes to the common law view of the legal capacity of children. Except for the unique situation presented by a divorce that involves minor children as parties, minor children may not under Maine law sue or be sued unless they are represented by a guardian or next friend. The same rule applies when children seek, as they do here, to become parties to an action by intervention. There is another obstacle to the claim of the Miller children that they have a right to intervene as parties in this divorce action with an attorney of their choice. Pursuant to Maine law, children have no authority to appoint an attorney. 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 17.5 at 356 (1970) (citing Bernard v. Merrill, 91 Me. 358, 361, 40 A. 136 (1898)). We stated the rule emphatically in the Bernard case: Even should the infant employ counsel, who procures the suit dismissed, the entry would be void, because the infant could not appear by attorney as the employment would be null. Bernard v. Merrill, 91 Me. at 361, 40 A. 136. [5] We see no reason to depart from this rule, which reflects the same concerns that account for the legal incapacity of children to sue or be suedtheir age, inexperience and immaturity. Although the law imposes procedural limitations on children, it does so to protect their interests. In the realm of divorce and other family litigation, this protective purpose finds expression in the best interest standard. In Maine, as in the multitude of other states which have adopted the best interest standard, courts faced with the task of rearranging parental rights and responsibilities must strive for an outcome that will maximize the best interest of children. See 19 M.R.S.A. § 752 (Supp.1995). This standard protects children who lack the ability because of youth, inexperience, and immaturity to protect themselves. The protective purpose of this standard is also important in analyzing the constitutional claim of the Miller children.