Opinion ID: 794576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DeGarmo's Competency Examination

Text: 5 DeGarmo primarily argues that the days of pretrial delay attributable to a competency examination ordered by the magistrate judge should not be excluded from DeGarmo's STA calculation. DeGarmo contends that, although such delay is normally excludable from an STA calculation, the delay in this case should not be excluded because the magistrate judge improperly relied upon defense counsel's inadequate representations concerning DeGarmo's competency and the magistrate judge therefore lacked reasonable cause to order the competency examination. DeGarmo reasons that, because the statute authorizing the district court to order a competency examination, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), only allows the court to order the examination for reasonable cause, the alleged lack of reasonable cause makes all of the delay attributable to his competency examination non-excludable for purposes of his STA calculation. 6 In the alternative, DeGarmo argues that, even if some of the days attributable to his competency examination can properly be excluded, the excluded period cannot exceed 30 days. DeGarmo reasons that, because the statute governing the procedure for conducting psychological examinations, 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b), provides that, absent good cause, an examination should be completed within 30 days, the excludable delay attributable to DeGarmo's competency examination cannot exceed 30 days. Accordingly, DeGarmo concludes, because his competency examination took 56 days to complete, 26 of those days must be included in his STA calculation. 7 Contrary to DeGarmo's arguments, the STA does not adopt either the reasonable cause standard set forth in § 4241(a) or the 30-day time limit set forth in § 4247(b). The STA instead provides that STA calculations must exclude  [a]ny period of delay . . . resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), (h)(1)(A) (emphases added). 8 We have previously refused to read the word reasonable into the STA where Congress declined to include it. Thus, in United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1276-77 (8th Cir.1990), we declined to limit the excluded time attributable to an interlocutory appeal to only a reasonable period. In Long, we relied upon the Supreme Court's rejection of a similar argument in Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). Refusing to read the word reasonable into § 3161(h)(1)(F) of the STA, the Court in Henderson reasoned that Congress clearly knew how to limit an exclusion to a reasonable period, but chose not to do so in § 3161(h)(1)(F). Id. Based upon our reasoning in Long and the Supreme Court's reasoning in Henderson, as well as the plain language of the STA, we refuse to borrow a reasonable cause standard or a time limit from another statute and to read them into the STA. We further note that several other circuits have similarly concluded that importing into the STA the 30-day time limit from § 4247(b) would be improper. 2 Accordingly, we hold that the delay attributable to DeGarmo's competency examination was properly excluded from his STA calculation. 9