Opinion ID: 3048663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The ALJ’s reliance on the vocational expert’s

Text: testimony For the first time, we address the question whether, in light of the requirements of SSR 00-4p,6 an ALJ may rely on a 3 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 4 Flaten v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). 5 Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985). 6 Social Security Ruling 00-4p, available at 2000 WL 1898704. “[Social Security Rulings] reflect the official interpretation of the [Social Security Administration] and are entitled to ‘some deference’ as long as they are consistent with the Social Security Act and regulations.” Avenetti v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1005 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005)). 5586 MASSACHI v. ASTRUE vocational expert’s testimony regarding the requirements of a particular job without first inquiring whether the testimony conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. We hold than an ALJ may not. In so holding, we join the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.7 We also follow our own precedent. [1] SSR 00-4p unambiguously provides that “[w]hen a [vocational expert] . . . provides evidence about the requirements of a job or occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict between that [vocational expert] . . . evidence and information provided in the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles].”8 SSR 00-4p further provides that the adjudicator “will ask” the vocational expert “if the evidence he or she has provided” is consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and obtain a reasonable explanation for any apparent conflict.9 [2] Our holding in Johnson v. Shalala10 is consistent with these requirements. In Johnson, which predated SSR 00-4p, we held that “an ALJ may rely on expert testimony which contradicts the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles], but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to support the deviation.”11 The district court in Johnson was aware that the vocational expert’s testimony deviated from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, but justifiably relied on the expert’s testimony because the expert gave “persuasive testi- 7 See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2005); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2006); Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2005). 8 SSR 00-4p at  (emphasis added). The Social Security Administration has taken administrative notice of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, which is published by the Department of Labor and gives detailed physical requirements for a variety of jobs. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(d)(1); Prochaska, 454 F.3d at 735 n.1. 9 SSR 00-4p at  (emphasis added). 10 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). 11 Id. MASSACHI v. ASTRUE 5587 mony of available job categories in the local rather than the national market, and testimony matching the specific requirements of a designated occupation with the specific abilities and limitations of the claimant.”12 As a result, the vocational expert’s testimony left no “unresolved potential inconsistenc- [ies] in the evidence.”13 SSR 00-4p simply goes one step further, explicitly requiring that the ALJ determine whether the expert’s testimony deviates from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and whether there is a reasonable explanation for any deviation. [3] The procedural requirements of SSR 00-4p ensure that the record is clear as to why an ALJ relied on a vocational expert’s testimony, particularly in cases where the expert’s testimony conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In making disability determinations, the Social Security Administration relies primarily on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles for “information about the requirements of work in the national economy.”14 The Social Security Administration also uses testimony from vocational experts to obtain occupational evidence.15 Although evidence provided by a vocational expert “generally should be consistent” with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, “[n]either the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles] nor the [vocational expert] . . . evidence automatically ‘trumps’ when there is a conflict.”16 Thus, the ALJ must first determine whether a conflict exists. If it does, the ALJ must then determine whether the vocational expert’s explanation for the conflict is reasonable and whether a basis exists for relying on the expert rather than the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.17 12 Id. 13 Prochaska, 454 F.3d at 736. 14 SSR 00-4p at . 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id. SSR 00-4p gives examples of several reasonable explanations for deviating from the Dictionary. Among them are that the Dictionary does 5588 MASSACHI v. ASTRUE [4] Here, the ALJ did not ask the vocational expert whether her testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles18 and, if so, whether there was a reasonable explanation for the conflict.19 Thus, we cannot determine whether the ALJ properly relied on her testimony.20 As a result, we cannot determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-five finding that Massachi could perform other work. Accordingly, we vacate in part the district court’s summary judgment upholding the Commissioner’s decision and instruct the district court to remand this case so that the ALJ can perform the appropriate inquiries under SSR 00-4p. B. The ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding [5] Massachi also argues that the ALJ was not free on remand to change the residual functional capacity finding and that the ALJ’s new finding was error. He is incorrect. Pursuant to the district court’s order, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s original decision and specifically instructed the ALJ to reassess Massachi’s residual functional capacity. not provide information about all occupations, information about a particular job not listed in the Dictionary may be available elsewhere, and the general descriptions in the Dictionary may not apply to specific situations. Id. at -3. 18 Although the vocational expert was not providing evidence about the “requirements of a job” by saying that Massachi was qualified for certain jobs in response to the ALJ’s hypothetical question, she was indirectly providing such evidence. See SSR 00-4p at  (stating that an ALJ must inquire whether a vocational expert’s testimony regarding “the requirements of a job or occupation” conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles). 19 This procedural error could have been harmless, were there no conflict, or if the vocational expert had provided sufficient support for her conclusion so as to justify any potential conflicts, as in Johnson. Instead, we have an apparent conflict with no basis for the vocational expert’s deviation. 20 See Prochaska, 454 F.3d at 736 (holding that an ALJ’s failure to make the relevant inquiries under SSR 00-4p leaves “unresolved potential inconsistenc[ies] in the evidence”). MASSACHI v. ASTRUE 5589 Thus, on remand, the ALJ’s original finding no longer existed.21 Moreover, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s new finding that Massachi suffered from “mild to moderate” deficiencies. [6] Even if we assume that Dr. Parikh’s report did not support the ALJ’s new finding, the ALJ was free to credit Dr. Pushin’s report over Dr. Parikh’s report.22 Dr. Pushin’s report clearly indicates that deficiencies in Massachi’s concentration and overall functioning were mild. Therefore, we hold that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Massachi suffered from “mild to moderate” deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace. C. The ALJ’s Step-Three Finding For the first time on appeal, Massachi argues that the ALJ erred in step three of his disability determination by not finding that Massachi had an impairment that met or equaled the criteria of a statutorily listed impairment. We decline to consider this issue.23 At the district court level, Massachi raised only problems with the fifth step of the ALJ’s analysis, not with the third step. Further, Massachi points to no evidence in the record sufficient to prove this claim. 21 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1584 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “vacate” as “to nullify or cancel; to make void”). 22 See Key, 754 F.2d at 1549 (noting that when the evidence can support either outcome, we may not substitute our judgment for the ALJ’s). 23 See Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). Because the record does not support Massachi’s claim that the ALJ erred in step three, our failure to consider this new issue will not result in a “manifest injustice.” See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that this court will address an issue not raised by the claimant below only if the failure to do so would result in a “manifest injustice”). 5590 MASSACHI v. ASTRUE D. The ALJ’s Impartiality Massachi also contends for the first time on appeal that the ALJ was not an impartial adjudicator. He points to no evidence in the record sufficient to prove this claim, either. Accordingly, we decline to consider it.24