Opinion ID: 1887659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: standard of review

Text: ¶ 11. Our appellate standard for reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment is the same standard as that of the trial court under Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court employs a de novo standard of review of a lower court's grant or denial of summary judgment and examines all the evidentiary matters before itadmissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of material fact and, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Otherwise, the motion should be denied. Issues of fact sufficient to require denial of a motion for summary judgment obviously are present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says the opposite. In addition, the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists is on the moving party. That is, the non-movant should be given the benefit of the doubt. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So.2d 627, 630 (Miss.1996) ( quoting Mantachie Natural Gas Dist. v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 594 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Miss. 1992); Clark v. Moore Mem'l United Methodist Church, 538 So.2d 760, 762 (Miss.1989)). I. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RULING THAT EMPLOYMENT RECORDS MAINTAINED BY THE DEPARTMENT REFLECTING THE ACCRUED COMPENSATION TIME OF ITS EMPLOYEES ARE SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE UNDER THE MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC RECORDS ACT? II. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE DEPARTMENT COMPLIED WITH THE ASSOCIATION'S RECORDS REQUEST IN A REASONABLE MANNER WHICH SATISFIED ANY OBLIGATION IMPOSED BY THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT TO DISCLOSE THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY THE ASSOCIATION? ¶ 12. Since the Department's first two issues have overlapping analyses, the Court will consider these two assignments of error together. ¶ 13. The Department first asserts that the requested list of comp time for its public employees is exempt from disclosure under the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 25-1-100 which provides that [p]ersonnel records ... in the possession of a public body, ... shall be exempt from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983. Miss.Code Ann. § 25-1-100(1) (1999). The Department contends that any documents and/or records which reflect the accumulated comp time of the Department's employees constitute personnel records within the meaning of § 25-1-100, and such information is, therefore, exempt from the provisions of the Public Records Act. ¶ 14. It is true that there are no Mississippi cases addressing whether comp time records maintained pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter FLSA) are subject to disclosure as public records. Furthermore, there are no Mississippi cases construing the scope of the personnel records exception in the present context. Thus, the Department urges this Court to rely on a handful of Attorney General's opinions to support its position that the exemptions to disclosure somehow control over the broad, general disclosure requirements of the Act. However, this is simply not in conformity with long-established legal principles dealing with interpreting such statutory language. ¶ 15. The Act declares the public policy of the State of Mississippi to be that: ... public records shall be available for inspection by any person unless otherwise provided by this chapter; furthermore, providing access to public records is a duty of each public body and automation of public records must not erode the right of access to those records.... Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-2 (1999). ¶ 16. The Act defines public records to include: ... all books, records, papers, accounts, letters, maps, photographs, films, cards, tapes, recordings or reproductions thereof, and any other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, having been used, being in use, or prepared, possessed or retained for use in the conduct, transaction or performance of any business, transaction, work, duty or function of any public body, or required to be maintained by any public body. Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-3(b) (1999). ¶ 17. Finally, Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-5(1) specifically provides for public access to records: Except as otherwise provided by sections 25-61-9 and 25-61-11, all public records are hereby declared to be public property, and any person shall have the right to inspect, copy or mechanically reproduce or obtain a reproduction of any public record of a public body in accordance with reasonable written procedures adopted by the public body concerning cost, time, place and method of access, and public notice of the procedures shall be given by the public body, or, in the event that a public body has not adopted such written procedures, the right to inspect, copy or mechanically reproduce or obtain a reproduction of a public record of the public body shall be provided within one (1) working day after a written request for a public record is made. Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-5(1) (1999). ¶ 18. The intent of the Legislature is manifestly clear from these provisions: public records which do not fall into a carefully defined exception provided by law are entirely open to access by the general public. With regard to the creation of narrow exceptions to this broad public policy, the Legislature provided that: The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to conflict with, amend, repeal or supersede any constitutional or statutory law or decision of a court of this state or the United States which at the time of this chapter is effective or thereafter specifically declares a public record to be confidential or privileged, or provides that a public record shall be exempt from the provisions of this chapter. Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-11 (1999). ¶ 19. One specific exemption which was furnished in the Act when it was passed in 1983 is found under Miss.Code Ann. § 25-1-100 (1999), which provides that certain personnel records are exempt: (1) Personnel records and applications for employment in the possession of a public body, as defined by paragraph (a) of § 25-61-3, except those which may be released to the person who made the application or with the prior written consent of the person who made the application, shall be exempt from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983. (2) Test questions and answers in the possession of a public body, as defined by paragraph (a) of § 25-61-3, which are to be used in employment examinations, shall be exempt from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983. (3) Letters of recommendation in the possession of a public body, as defined by paragraph (a) of § 25-61-3, respecting any application for employment, shall be exempt from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983. (4) Documents relating to contract authorization under § 25-9-120 shall not be exempt from the provisions of Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983. ¶ 20. In denying the Association's public record request, the Department relied upon this statute as the reason that the comp time information, and all information with regard to a public employee's compensation, salary, leave time, etc., were exempt from the disclosure. However, it is difficult to find any support for this position when one compares the broad, general provisions of the Act with the narrow exceptions of § 25-1-100. Section 25-61-11 dictates that any exemption to the Act must be specifically enumerated; yet, § 25-1-100 does not explicitly exempt from disclosure an employee's salary or accrued comp time record. This appraisal of the Act and § 25-1-100 is supported by the general rules governing statutory construction: While there are some cases in which exceptions are liberally construed, particularly with respect to statutes subject to a strict construction, ordinarily a strict or narrow construction is applied to statutory exceptions to the operation of laws. Thus, in the resolution of ambiguities, courts favor a general provision over an exception, and one seeking to be excluded from the operation of the statute must establish that the exception embraces him. These rules are particularly applicable where the statute promotes the public welfare, or where, in general, the law itself is entitled to a liberal construction.... . . . . Statutes granting exemptions from their general operation must be strictly construed, and any doubt must be resolved against the one asserting the exemption. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 313, at 463-64 (1974) (footnotes omitted). ¶ 21. It is also important to note that this Court has held that courts have a duty to give statutes a practical application consistent with their wording, unless such application is inconsistent with the obvious intent of the legislature. Marx v. Broom, 632 So.2d 1315, 1318 (Miss.1994). Thus, if a statute is not ambiguous, the court should simply apply the statute according to its plain meaning.... City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992). The ultimate goal of the court is to discern and give effect to the legislative intent. Id. This Court has also stated that an exception must appear in the language the legislature employed. Mississippi Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Vaughn, 529 So.2d 540, 542 (Miss.1988). An exception cannot be created by construction. In State v. Heard, 246 Miss. 774, 151 So.2d 417 (1963), the Court said: An exception cannot be created by construction, when none is necessary to effectuate the legislative intention. Ordinarily, an exception must appear plainly from the express words or necessary intendment of the statute. Where no exception in positive words is made, the presumption is the legislature intended to make none. 246 Miss. at 781, 151 So.2d at 420. Accord, Roberts v. Mississippi Republican State Executive Comm., 465 So.2d 1050, 1053 (Miss.1985) (Public Records Act case). Therefore, based upon the foregoing, it is obvious to this Court that the Department's reliance upon § 25-1-100 to withhold disclosure of the requested information is improper because no such specifically worded exemption exists. ¶ 22. The Department attempts to support its first issue with opinions of the Mississippi Attorney General dealing with the Act and its exceptions. In this regard, the Department analogized its position with those situations set forth in the opinions. While acknowledging that a public employee's gross salary information is subject to disclosure, the Department cites one Attorney General opinion to support its claim that the public is not entitled to access employment records and/or documents which reflect personal employment information such as the net salary information or exemptions of a public employee. Miss. A.G. Op. # 93-0900 to J.K. Stringer, Jr. (March 23, 1994). It further contends that the public is not entitled to access the home addresses and/or telephone numbers of public employees and documents and/or records reflecting a public employee's pension and/or medical benefits. Id. (citing Miss. A.G. Op. 84-1015 to N.F. Smith (July 2, 1984) and Miss. A.G. Op. 92-0688 to Dr. Milton Walker (September 2, 1992)). The Department concluded its argument by stating that accumulated comp time is personal information which, like tax and/or benefit information, should not be unnecessarily divulged to the public without careful scrutiny. ¶ 23. However, these opinions are in fact of no support to the Department. What the Department fails to point out is that there are specific, narrowly drawn exceptions to the general provisions of the Act pertaining to the information held to be exempt by the Attorney General. For example, Miss.Code Ann. § 27-3-77 (1999), specifically provides that information in the possession of a public body concerning a person's individual tax payment or status, shall be exempt from disclosure under the Act: Records in the possession of a public body, as defined by paragraph (a) of section 25-61-3 which would disclose information about a person's individual tax payment or status, shall be exempt from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983. This statute was the basis of the Attorney General's opinion in Stringer. Turning to the Department's next analogy, Miss.Code Ann. § 25-11-119(3) (1999), sets forth that the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi (and only this agency) shall not disclose the name, address or contents of any individual member records without the prior written consent of the individual to whom the record pertains. For this reason the Attorney General held in the Walker opinion that: The 1985 amendment to the statute made it clear the 1) all books, accounts, and records would be kept in the general office of the board and were public records, except for individual member records, and 2) that the system shall not disclose the name, address or contents of any individual member records without the prior written consent of the individual to whom the record pertains. It would appear the clear intent of the above statutory changes to the Retirement Law to make the name, address and contents of member records privileged or confidential information which was not subject to the Mississippi Public Records Act. Miss. A.G. Op. 92-0688 to Milton Walker (September 2, 1992) at 2 (denying request for a printed list of the names and addresses of all retired teachers and school employees). ¶ 24. Furthermore, the Department is completely wrong concerning any alleged exemption pertaining to the disclosure of current employees' names and addresses. Miss. A.G. Op. To Singletary (June 10, 1987) at 1. ¶ 25. Indeed, in these opinions, the Attorney General made certain that the exemptions to the Act remained within the narrow parameters of the given statutory exception. For example, the Attorney General made it clear in the Walker opinion that all other records held by the Retirement System Board were public records falling under the disclosure provisions of the Act. In the other opinions cited by the Department, the Attorney General has drawn clear boundaries around the exempt material and squarely asserted that other public information for which no specific exemption exists, such as an individual public employee's name and gross salary, is subject to disclosure. This follows the general rules of statutory construction. Vaughn, 529 So.2d at 542. ¶ 26. In this regard, it is interesting to note the Department's argument with regard to the A.G. Op. # 92-0379 to Richard A. Oakes (May 20, 1992). It contends that the situation dealt with in Oakes, a request for leave time records of public school teachers, is distinguishable from its current situation because the public's right to know how many times a public employee misses work arguably outweighs that employee's privacy interests in keeping such information confidential. The Department further argues that comp time is different because it is earned, and as such depends on the personal work habits of the individual public employee. However, this argument is flawed. Both situations, leave time and comp time, deal with the work habits of an employee and are earned by the employee. The Department's argument also ignores the fact that sick leave time is also accumulated by a public employee based upon the number of days worked, just as comp time is. In fact, it was the Department which made this connection between the two types of leave time in Polles' letter denying the request of the Association: However, it is our understanding that Pursuant [sic] to Section 25-1-100 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, personnel records, including accumulated annual sick leave information as well as accumulated comp time, are exempt from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act. (emphasis added). In this letter, Polles regarded leave time and comp time in the same category of records that should be exempt. He and the Department now assert that leave information should be disclosed. Thus, it would follow that an employee's comp time is also a public record which should be disclosed. Therefore, the Department's first assignment of error is without merit. ¶ 27. The Department next asserts that, even if the accumulated comp time records are public records subject to disclosure, it complied with the Association's request in a manner which balances the interests at stake in this dispute, the public's right to access public information versus the right of the Department's employees to have personal employment information kept private. It should be noted that the Department makes this argument without citing any supporting authority that these employees have a privacy interest in this information. Although it is true that Mississippi has no case law on this issue, many other jurisdictions throughout the country have reached a completely contrary rule of law that public employees do not enjoy such a privacy right or, if they do, this right is outweighed by the public's right to know the details of their government, how it functions, and how the public's tax dollars are being spent. ¶ 28. In a case whose facts mirror those addressed in the Oakes Attorney General opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Brogan v. School Committee of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 516 N.E.2d 159 (1987), considered the question of the right of access to public school committee's employees' attendance and absentee records. The school committee provided summaries of the absentee records and the records themselves but with all employee names deleted. Following receipt of this, the plaintiffs pressed their demands for unexpurgated records, contending that such were public records subject to disclosure under the Massachusetts Public Records Law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 66 § 10 (Michie/Law Co-op.1986). The committee refused to make any further disclosures, contending that their requested records fell under the exemption for personnel and medical files or information. Brogan, 516 N.E.2d at 160. In construing the committee's argument, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed that personnel and medical files or information `are absolutely exempt from mandatory disclosure where the files or information are of a personal nature and relate to a particular individual.' Id. ( quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 446 N.E.2d 1051 (1983)). However, the Court found that the plaintiffs: ... seek information only as to the names of the school committee's employees, and the dates and generic classification, e.g., sick day, personal day, etc., of their absences. These are not `intimate details' of a `highly personal' nature, the kind of private facts that the Legislature intended to exempt from mandatory disclosure. The [plaintiffs] have not requested any information of a personal nature, such as the medical reason for a given absence or the details of family emergencies, nor does the record indicate that any of the absentee records involved such information. 516 N.E.2d at 160 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). ¶ 29. A case arising out of New York also deals specifically with the issue of the requesting parties' entitlement to accrued leave time or absentee records. In Buffalo News v. Buffalo Mun. Hous. Auth., 163 A.D.2d 830, 558 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1990), a newspaper made a request pursuant to New York's Freedom of Information Law, N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 84 et seq., for public employee payroll and disciplinary records. This request was denied by the governmental agency on the grounds that the information fell under the exemption protecting material which, if disclosed, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under the Public Officers Law, § 89(2)(b)(iv). The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, disagreed, asserting that statutory exemptions are to be narrowly interpreted and that the burden lies upon the agency to show that the requested material falls squarely within the statutory exemption. Id. at 365. The court then made the following pronouncements: First, records regarding the days worked, leave taken with or without pay, and leave accrued by employees are by their very nature relevant to the day-to-day operations of the agency. Second, respondent has failed to establish how the release of these records would result in economic or personal hardship to the subject party. The possibility that these records can be used to discover other financial information is patently insufficient.... Id. See also Capital Newspapers Div. v. Burns, 67 N.Y.2d 562, 505 N.Y.S.2d 576, 496 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1986) (stating that exemptions are to be narrowly construed to provide maximum access, and the agency seeking to prevent disclosure carries the burden of demonstrating that the requested material falls squarely within an exemption). ¶ 30. In State ex rel. Petty v. Wurst, 49 Ohio App.3d 59, 550 N.E.2d 214 (1989), a private citizen had made a request under the Ohio Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 149.43, for payroll records of county employees, including name, classification or job title, salary rate and total compensation of each and every employee paid from general funds as of those dates. Wurst, 550 N.E.2d at 215. The county provided certain information, but refused to surrender any information related to total compensation for individual employees, contending that such was exempt under Ohio law since it would constitute an invasion of the employees' privacy. An action was then brought by the private citizen for this claimed exempt information. In construing the citizen's request in the context of the Ohio Public Records Act, the Ohio Court of Appeals first declared that: public policy requires a liberal construction of the provisions defining public records and a strict construction of the exceptions. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of disclosure. Wurst at 216. (citations omitted). ¶ 31. Turning to the county's ground for objecting to the disclosure, the court defined an invasion of privacy as occurring `when disclosure would subject a person to embarrassment, harassment, physical danger, disgrace, or loss of employment or friends.' Id. ( quoting Kilroy v. National Labor Relations Bd., 633 F.Supp. 136, 143 (S.D.Ohio 1985), aff'd, 823 F.2d 553 (6th Cir.1987)). With this established, the court held that [s]uch consequences are unlikely to result, at least to any measurable extent, from the disclosure of a county employee's name, classification or job title, salary rate and gross salary and, therefore, this concern could not outweigh the public's right to know. 550 N.E.2d at 216. Noting that the information had been found to be subject to disclosure in other contexts, the court concluded that the information sought by the private citizen is a matter of public record and must be disclosed as a matter of law. Id. at 217. ¶ 32. What emerges from these cases are the following principles: (1) there is to be a liberal construction of the general disclosure provisions of a public records act, whereas a standard of strict construction is to be applied to the exceptions to disclosure; (2) any doubt concerning disclosure should be resolved in favor of disclosure; (3) compensation information on public employees, such as gross salary and accrued leave time, is subject to disclosure; and (4) such disclosure does not violate a public employee's right to privacy. These guidelines leave little doubt that the information sought by the Association is public and does not fall under any specific, narrowly construed exemption to the Act. Furthermore, this Court must keep in mind the broad public policy goals at work in this case, as set forth in the Act itself and found in the case law construing such statutes. There is no argument that accrued comp time can be paid out of the public treasury, and that this forms a part of the public employee's compensation benefits. Therefore, the chancery court did not err in finding that the Association was entitled to the information requested by it. As stated previously, the Department's first assignment of error is without merit. ¶ 33. Furthermore, based upon this persuasive authority and the plain meaning of the Act itself, there was no justification for the Department's assertion that it somehow met a balancing of interests. As such, this Court finds that the Department's second assignment of error is also without merit. ¶ 34. It is also important to note that the Association's request was narrowly drawn. It did not seek the underlying personnel records concerning the reasons that comp time was accumulated by a particular employee, nor the reasons a particular employee used or did not use his or her comp time. Rather, the Association sought only a list of the Department employees with each individual's comp time as of July 1, 1996. Thus, even assuming that some privacy interest was at stake, there was no possible intrusion into that area by the Association's request. For this reason as well, the Department's second assignment of error is without merit.