Opinion ID: 2273400
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Deficient Representation Caused Prejudice

Text: To establish prejudice under the second prong of Strickland, a defendant must show that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different. [36] A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [37] It is [therefore] not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. [38] Rather, [t]he prejudice prong of the Strickland standard requires `attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.' [39] In its Rule 61 decision, the Superior Court did not decide whether the performance of Smith's attorneys was deficient. Instead, the Superior Court only addressed the second prong of Strickland, and concluded that Smith was not prejudiced by the failure of his trial attorneys to request a specific jury instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony. [40] The Superior Court noted that Smith's jury was given the pattern instruction on the credibility of witnesses in general and, therefore, concluded that Smith was not prejudiced by any failure to give a separate instruction as to the credibility of accomplice testimony: [the] instruction given adequately guided the jury as trier of fact and determiner of credibility. The instruction correctly stated the law and enabled the jury to perform its duty. [Smith] did not suffer any prejudice. This claim fails. The Superior Court's conclusion that Smith was not prejudiced by any failure to give a specific instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. [41] The State points out that in addressing Smith's Confrontation Clause claim on Smith's direct appeal, this Court stated: We are satisfied that the jury was exposed to facts sufficient for it to draw inferences about DeShields'[] reliability and credibility and that defense counsel had an adequate record from which to argue why the witness might have been biased. Thus, the jury had in its possession sufficient information to evaluate DeShields'[] biases and motivations. [42] Although Smith's attorney had an adequate record to make arguments about DeShields' credibility, those jury arguments were not an acceptable substitute for a specific instruction on the law from the trial judge regarding accomplice credibility. In considering the arguments of counsel, Smith's jury was instructed on their limited purpose: An attorney may argue in closing that a witness lied while testifying. Ladies and gentlemen, the role of an attorney is to zealously and effectively advance the claims of the party he or she represents within the bounds of the law. Further, what an attorney states in his or her opening or closing arguments is not evidence. Evidence consists of testimony from witnesses testifying from the witness stand and exhibits introduced through their testimony. It is this evidence only which you may consider in reaching your verdicts. Similarly, while the Smith jury may have had sufficient information to evaluate DeShields' testimony, it was not instructed by the trial judge, as a matter of law, on how to use that information in assessing DeShields' credibility as an accomplice. Four decades ago in Bland, this Court recognized that convictions that rest primarily on accomplice testimony are sufficiently problematical to merit a special jury instruction concerning the credibility of accomplice testimony, separate and apart from the general credibility of other nonaccomplice witnesses. [43] Although in decisions after Bland [44] this Court has allowed trial judges considerable latitude in formulating the language of an accomplice testimony instruction, we have not overruled Bland or held that a specific instruction is not required. In other words, even though we held that a Bland accomplice liability instruction need not be given verbatim, it does not follow that a general credibility instruction will cure a failure to give a specific instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony. In Bland, the sine qua non of our holding involved two primary principles: first, the credibility of accomplice testimony merits the jury's special consideration, separate and apart from its credibility assessment of other witnesses; and, second, although Delaware law does not require the testimony of an accomplice to be corroborated, the absence of corroboration also merits special consideration by the jury. [45] In Bland, when reviewing a conviction based solely on the conflicting and uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, this Court declined to overturn the O'Neal v. State [46] rule that corroboration is not an absolute necessity, noting that it was deeply embedded in the law of our State. [47] We recognized, nevertheless, that because of the inherent weakness in accomplice testimony, Delaware courts have always cautioned juries that, although they have the power to convict solely upon such testimony if firmly convinced of its truth, great care should be exercised in doing so. [48] Accordingly, the instruction that we approved in Bland stated: Without such corroboration, you should not find the defendants guilty unless, after careful examination of the alleged accomplices' testimony, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it is true and that you may safely rely upon it. Of course, if you are so satisfied, you would be justified in relying upon it, despite the lack of corroboration, and in finding the defendants guilty. [49] In Bordley, this Court approved the use of the pattern jury instruction because it was faithful to the two primary principles articulated in Bland. First, it singled out the credibility of the accomplice for special consideration by the jury, visá-vis the credibility of witnesses who were not accomplices. Second, in evaluating the credibility of accomplice testimony, the pattern instruction directed the jury to consider whether or not the testimony is corroborated by any other evidence in the case. Accordingly, although in Bordley we held that the pattern jury instruction on accomplice credibility was a correct statement of the law, we now hold that the best practice is to give the Bland instruction on accomplice liability rather than the pattern jury instruction given in Bordley. In Smith's case, we ratify and reaffirm our holding in Bland. In particular, we determine that a general credibility instruction is not an acceptable substitute for a specific accomplice credibility instruction. [50] Therefore, the general credibility instruction given to Smith's jury was an inadequate guide to how the jury should properly conduct its deliberations in reviewing the credibility of uncorroborated testimony from an accomplicehere, DeShields. In this case, the Superior Court did not give a special instruction on accomplice credibility because Smith's attorneys did not ask it to. As a result, the Smith jury was never advised, in accordance with Bland, that: accomplice credibility should be given special consideration and that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice should be subjected to enhanced scrutiny. Both points could have been communicated in a Bland type of instruction to the jury on accomplice credibility without disclosing the outcome of DeShields' case. [51] It is undisputed that Smith did not kill Coverdale. The State stipulated that DeShields fired the gun that killed Coverdale. The theory of the State's case was that Smith was liable, as an accomplice to DeShields, for all of the criminal acts committed by DeShields, including the murder of Coverdale. Smith's jury was instructed to decide whether the death of Coverdale was within the foreseeable range of consequences following from the commission of Robbery in the First Degree. [52] Whether Smith and DeShields were accomplices rested entirely on whether the jury believed Smith or DeShields, in particular, about the original purpose of their encounter with Coverdale. Smith testified that there was never any plan for a robbery or a murder. [53] DeShields testified that he and Smith agreed in advance to rob Coverdale at gun point. DeShields' testimony was uncorroborated. When a defendant is tied to a crime through the testimony of an accomplice-witness, specific accomplice credibility instructions are required. [54] However, trial counsel's failure to request such an instruction will not always be prejudicial per se. The prejudicial effect depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The absence of a Bland instruction in Smith's case establishes prejudice under the second prong of a Strickland analysis. The record reflects this error casts doubt on the reliability of Smith's convictions. Accordingly, we hold that, under Strickland, Smith has established that he was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.