Opinion ID: 787945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sampson's Mandatory Minimum Sentence

Text: 44 Sampson argues that the district court improperly enhanced his mandatory minimum sentence on count three based on previous New York State felony drug convictions that were replaced by a youthful offender finding. CPL § 720.20(3); see id. § 720.20 (establishing the procedures for a youthful offender determination); id. § 720.35 (prescribing the consequences, under state law, of a youthful offender adjudication); see also United States v. Cuello, 357 F.3d 162, 165-67 (2d Cir.2004) (analyzing New York's youthful offender regime); United States v. Matthews, 205 F.3d 544, 546-48 (2d Cir.2000) (same). We review this determination de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Berg, 250 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir.2001). 45 The question is whether a prior conviction of a felony drug offense qualifies as final under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), notwithstanding that it was replaced by a youthful offender finding. CPL § 720.20(3). A felony drug offense is an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances. 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). [A] prior conviction is final for purposes of recidivist sentencing when all avenues of direct appellate review have been exhausted. United States v. Lovell, 16 F.3d 494, 497 (2d Cir.1994) (emphasis added). 46 Under the state procedure, Sampson was convicted of felony drug offenses, but (based on a finding by the sentencing court) his convictions were deemed vacated and replaced by a youthful offender finding, CPL § 720.20(3). To say that the convictions were deemed vacated is to say that they were not vacated in fact, id., but rather the [y]outhful offender finding was substituted for the conviction[s], id. § 720.10(4). In doing so, New York law indulged Sampson by an adjudication of leniency. See People v. Dunbar, 71 A.D.2d 805, 806, 419 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357-58 (N.Y.App.Div.1979) (The grant of youthful offender (Y.O.) treatment is a matter of privilege, not of right.). But see CPL § 720.20(1)(b) (noting limited circumstances — not present in this case — in which a youthful offender finding is mandatory). 47 Even where a defendant is adjudicated a youthful offender, post-judgment motions and appeals are permissible wherever [the relevant] provisions can reasonably be so applied. CPL § 720.30; see, e.g., People v. Nudelman, 70 A.D.2d 13, 16, 419 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (N.Y.App.Div.1979) (It is well settled that a trial court's exercise of discretion in affording youthful offender treatment is reviewable on appeal.); see also CPL §§ 440.10-.60 (post-judgment motions), 450.10-.90 (appeals). The record in this case does not indicate whether Sampson elected to appeal his youthful offender finding or the corresponding sentence; but it is clear enough that Sampson no longer has any avenue for directly appealing the prior felony convictions upon which the youthful offender finding and the prison sentence were based. 48 In sum, as a result of the criminal conduct underlying Sampson's youthful offender adjudication, he was [i] tried and convicted [ii] in an adult court [iii] of adult drug offense[s] ... [iv] punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, 21 U.S.C. § 802(44); [v] he served his sentence in an adult institution; and [vi] no avenue for direct appeal exists. Accordingly, the district court properly determined that Sampson's New York youthful offender adjudication qualifies as a prior final conviction under Section 841(b)(1). 8 49 Reaching the same conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a youthful offender statute is meant to provide a second chance, not a `technical legal advantage if, not having learned a lesson, [individuals] continue their criminal conduct.' United States v. Acosta, 287 F.3d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir.2002). As the Acosta court observed, the purpose of section 841(b)(1)(B), `to punish and deter recidivism,' would be frustrated if recidivist offenders were excused from enhanced sentencing merely because their prior offenses are not deemed `convictions' under state law. Id. (citation omitted). 50 True, New York courts do not use youthful offender adjudications as predicates for enhanced sentencing.... Matthews, 205 F.3d at 548 (internal citation omitted). But this does not restrict federal courts from taking them into account when imposing sentences under the Guidelines where ... youthful offender adjudications are permitted to be used in various other ways both inside and outside the State of New York, id., including at sentencing, id. at 548 n. 4. The language and design of [the New York] statute, as well as its purpose, compel [the] conclusion that an adjudication under the New York youthful offender statute does not result in an `expunged' conviction for purposes of the Guidelines. Id. at 546. The New York statute does not require actions that would effectively eliminate all vestiges of the adjudication and instead requires that records concerning the adjudication ... are retained and, in certain circumstances, used for subsequent purposes. Id. at 547. 51 Our holding is consistent with how we previously have construed the relevant New York law in cases involving the calculation of criminal history and offense level under the Guidelines. See Cuello, 357 F.3d at 165-69; United States v. Reinoso, 350 F.3d 51, 54-56 (2d Cir.2003); United States v. Driskell, 277 F.3d 150, 152-58 (2d Cir.2002); Matthews, 205 F.3d at 546-49. 52 We therefore affirm the district court's ruling that Sampson is subject to a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence.