Opinion ID: 4191525
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Miranda Challenge

Text: The Constitution’s Fifth Amendment provides that an individual may not be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. We have explained that: To the ends of protecting that right, Miranda requires law-enforcement officers to give warnings, including the right to remain silent, before interrogating individuals whom the officers have placed “in custody.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). In drawing the line between a non-custodial encounter between a citizen and the police (where Miranda does not apply) and a custodial encounter (where it does), courts consider “all of the circumstances” surrounding the encounter, with “the ultimate inquiry” turning on whether “a formal arrest” occurred or whether there was a “restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To answer this question, courts focus on the “objective circumstances of the interrogation,” id. at 323, to determine “how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action,” id. at 325 (internal quotation marks omitted). Several factors guide the inquiry: the location of the interview; the length and manner of questioning; whether the individual possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during the interview; and whether the individual was told she need not answer the questions. See United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2003). 9 No. 16-2063 United States v. Panak, 552 F.3d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2009). Additionally, the Supreme Court has held “that an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981).
Defendant argues that the district court should have suppressed the statements he made during his March 31, 2015 interview because the police continued questioning him after he invoked his right to counsel. The district court denied the motion to suppress because it found that Defendant was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes, and that even if he was, he did not unambiguously ask for an attorney to be present. We need not reach the question of whether Defendant was “in custody,” because we hold that the police did not violate Defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights under the facts presented here. The uncontested facts found by the district court show that after Agent Johnson and Detective Sperrel initiated the interview and introduced themselves, Defendant unequivocally invoked his right to counsel by saying: “I need an attorney present.” However, immediately after this invocation, Defendant went on to express concern as to why he was being questioned by the FBI. At that point, Agent Johnson and Detective Sperrel (appropriately) explained that they could not interrogate Defendant because he had asked for an attorney, but offered to explain why they had come to talk with him. Defendant responded by repeatedly asking why the officers had come to interview him. The officers then presented Defendant with an advice of rights form, read the form out loud, and told Defendant that they could only continue discussing the case if Defendant signed it. Defendant told the officers that he understood his rights, and signed the form. The officers then reiterated that Defendant could stop the interview at any time by requesting to speak with an attorney. 10 No. 16-2063 Under these facts, it is clear that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily re-initiated his interview with Agent Johnson and Detective Sperrel after the officers ceased questioning following Defendant’s request for counsel. Accordingly, under settled legal principles, the police did not violate Defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by continuing to question him. See, e.g., Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85; Henness v. Bagley, 644 F.3d 308, 320 (6th Cir. 2011) (“An Edwards reinitiation occurs when, without influence by the authorities, the suspect shows a willingness and a desire to talk about his case.”); Davie v. Mitchell, 547 F.3d 297, 305 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Whaley, 13 F.3d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1994) (same). We therefore affirm the denial of Defendant’s second motion to suppress.