Opinion ID: 172511
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Timeliness of Search

Text: Burgess argues the forty-four day delay in searching the computer violated the Fourth Amendment. Because this issue was not raised below, we review for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). To notice plain error under Rule 52(b), the error must: (1) be an actual error that was forfeited; (2) be plain or obvious; and (3) affect substantial rights, in other words, in most cases the error must be prejudicial, i.e., it must have affected the outcome of the trial.... Given plain error that affects substantial rights, an appellate court should exercise its discretion and notice such error where it either (a) results in the conviction of one actually innocent, or (b) seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Walser, 275 F.3d at 985. We apply the plain error rule less rigidly when reviewing a potential constitutional error. Id. Because the warrant had expired by its own terms prior to the time Agent Hughes began his forensic search of the hard drive, Burgess maintains the search was warrantless and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment does not specify that search warrants contain expiration dates. United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 955 (10th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487, 105 S.Ct. 881, 83 L.Ed.2d 890 (1985) (while police officers may not indefinitely retain possession of a vehicle and its contents before they complete a valid warrantless search, the owner of the property must prove delay in the completion of a search was unreasonable because it adversely affected a privacy or possessory interest). Specific time limits are imposed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which require that a warrant must command the officer to ... execute the warrant within a specified time no longer than 10 days. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i). The restrictions in Rule 41 not only ensure that probable cause continues to exist, but also that it is the neutral magistrate, not the executing officers, who determines whether probable cause continues to exist. United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 469 (1st Cir.2005) (quotation omitted). But violations of Rule 41 alone should not lead to exclusion unless (1) there was prejudice in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule. Sims, 428 F.3d at 955 (quotations omitted). The same analysis applies whether it is a violation of the warrant itself, or a violation of Rule 41 per se. Id. There is no evidence either of these conditions were met here. Burgess points us to United States v. Mitchell where the Eleventh Circuit held an initial seizure of a hard drive was permissible, but the detention of the hard drive for over three weeks before a warrant was sought constitute[d] a significant interference with Mitchell's possessory interest. 565 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). The court held the delay in securing a warrant was unreasonable because the government had no compelling excuse. Id. Here, the warrant to search was secured prior to the hard drives being seized [23] and there is no indication the officers were not diligent in executing the search. Probable cause to search was unaffected by the delay and the reasons to search the computer and hard drives did not dissipate during the month and a half the items sat in an evidence locker. Burgess has not identified any prejudice from the delay and the only readily apparent concern is that Burgess was temporarily denied access to his property. Moreover, any delay was due to Agent Hughes' efforts to make sure the job was done right. Our plain error analysis ends at the first step, suppression of the evidence from the computer equipment is not requiredthere was no error.