Opinion ID: 589967
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trademark Infringement: The PM Designator

Text: 19 To facilitate our analysis, we will deal first with the cross-appeal. Bristol appeals from the district court's refusal to grant preliminary injunctive relief preventing McNeil from using the term PM appended to its Tylenol trade name to designate its combination analgesic/sleep aid. Under the terms of the preliminary injunction, McNeil remains free to market Tylenol PM in a trade dress that does not resemble the Excedrin PM trade dress. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge that the term PM as used by Bristol did not warrant protection under section 43(a). 20 In making the preliminary inquiry into whether a particular mark is eligible for protection under section 43(a), we have established several categories into which we classify various marks. Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.1976). Suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful marks, because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product, are deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection. Two Pesos, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2757. Generic marks are never entitled to protection, while a descriptive mark is eligible for protection if it 'has become distinctive of the [producer's] goods in commerce.' This acquired distinctiveness is generally called 'secondary meaning.'  Id. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2757 (citations omitted). 21 Although we have not expressly articulated the standard of review appropriately applied to a district court's classification of a mark, other courts of appeals have found that classification to be a factual question, review of which is limited to whether the district court was clearly erroneous in its determination. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, 930 F.2d 277, 292 n. 18 (3d Cir.) (The characterization of a mark is a factual issue.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 373, 116 L.Ed.2d 324 (1991); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, 873 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir.1989) ([T]he district court's classification of a term on the trademark spectrum is a factual determination subject to the 'clearly erroneous' standard of review.); Wiley v. American Greetings Corp., 762 F.2d 139, 141 (1st Cir.1985) (Whether a design is 'inherently distinctive,' i.e., whether it is arbitrary or merely descriptive, is ordinarily a question of fact.) (citation omitted); Anheuser-Busch v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1984) ([T]he categorization of a term for which trademark protection is claimed is considered to be a factual issue and thus is to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).) (citations omitted); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 n. 12 (5th Cir.1980) (Any given term's correct categorization is a factual issue.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); cf. In re Northland Aluminum Products, 777 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed.Cir.1985) (Whether a term is a common descriptive name is a question of fact in context of trademark registration.) (citation omitted). We agree with these courts that the initial classification of a mark to determine its eligibility for protection is a question of fact left to the determination of the district court. We will substitute our own judgment on the matter for that of the district court only if the district court's determination is clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). 22 The district court classified the PM mark as descriptive. Bristol argues that the mark is suggestive. Neither party claims that the mark is generic, arbitrary or fanciful. The question in this case, therefore, is whether PM, when affixed to an analgesic trade name, is descriptive or suggestive of the product, a combination analgesic/sleep aid. 23 A descriptive mark is one that  'forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.'  Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11 (citation omitted). [A] term can be descriptive in two ways. It can literally describe the product, or it can describe the purpose or utility of the product. 20th Century Wear v. Sanmark-Stardust, 747 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 1755, 84 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). A term is suggestive  'if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.'  Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11 (citation omitted). 24 Although the line between descriptive and suggestive may be difficult to discern, see id. at 10-11, the consequence of the classification is important. A descriptive term is subject to protection under section 43(a) only if the proponent of protection demonstrates that, in addition to the ordinary common meaning of the word or words, the term has acquired a secondary meaning in its particular market--that the consuming public primarily associates the term with a particular source. See Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, 830 F.2d 1217, 1221 (2d Cir.1987); Thompson Medical, 753 F.2d at 212-13. The public presumably will not be confused by a descriptive term, but if the proponent of protection can show that the descriptive term is primarily associated with a single producer, a sufficient question is raised to justify further inquiry into the likelihood of confusion. In contrast, if its mark is suggestive a plaintiff need not prove such secondary meaning in order to qualify for trademark protection. Id. at 213. 25 In this case, the PM acts as a modifier to the analgesic brand name. Both Tylenol and Excedrin are well known brand names for analgesics; the PM modifies each to show that they are a particular type of analgesic. PM, usually abbreviated p.m. or P.M. (for post meridiem), is a common term that refers to the period of time between noon and midnight. It is often associated with the time when most people go to sleep. 26 As used here, PM does not literally describe the presence of a sleep aid in the product. The PM refers to the purpose or utility of the product--it is an analgesic that should be used at night. The issue, therefore, is whether the connection between PM and a nighttime sleep aid is direct enough that the term may be categorized as descriptive or whether the connection is more indirect, requiring categorization as suggestive. 27 Bristol argues that PM is suggestive because a consumer must engage in a multi-step analysis before coming to the conclusion that it denotes the presence of a sleep aid in the analgesic. Bristol asserts that the consumer first must eliminate possible alternate meanings for PM--e.g., Pre-Menstrual or Pain Medication--before arriving at Post Meridiem. Next, Bristol argues, the consumer must make a leap from all the post meridiem hours to those at night, and a further intellectual leap from nighttime to sleeping. 28 The magistrate judge found that several other over-the-counter products are designated as nighttime products by the use of some close variant of PM. The magistrate judge held in that context that [t]he direct connotation of 'PM' is nighttime. There is no 'multi-stage reasoning process' that a consumer must indulge in to associate the term 'PM' with a nighttime product.We cannot say that the district court's adoption of this finding was clearly erroneous. The focus in categorizing a mark is on how the words are used in context rather than their meaning in the abstract. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 12. One of the leading commentators has offered the following example to demonstrate the context-dependent nature of the classification: [T]he word 'apple' would be arbitrary when used on personal computers, suggestive when used in 'Apple-A-Day' on vitamin tablets, descriptive when used in 'Tomapple' for combination tomato-apple juice and generic when used on apples. 1 J.T. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:22, at 498-99 (2d ed. 1984). There was sufficient evidence before the magistrate judge to support the finding that several nighttime products were sold using some variant of PM. Given that context, the conclusion that PM describes rather than suggests a nighttime product was not clearly erroneous. Once the consumer arrives at an awareness that the product is useful at nighttime, the purpose or utility of the product has been conveyed, even though the consumer is not aware of why the product is useful at night. See Thompson Medical, 753 F.2d at 216 & n. 15 (Sportscreme descriptive of cream useful in sports even though inadequately descriptive as to significance of product). Therefore, the consumer need not conclude that the analgesic contains a sleep aid. 29 Given the deferential standard of review, and the fact that this matter is before us at the preliminary injunction stage, we will not disturb the district court's finding that PM is descriptive. 30 Because PM is a descriptive term it is not entitled to trademark protection unless Bristol demonstrates secondary meaning. The district court found that Bristol had not established that the PM designator had acquired secondary meaning. We agree with the district court. 31 To establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself. Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 851 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2187 n. 11, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) (citation omitted). Secondary meaning is an essentially factual determination, proof of which  'entails vigorous evidentiary requirements.'  Thompson Medical, 753 F.2d at 217 (citation omitted); see Coach Leatherware v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 169 (2d Cir.1991). We will reverse the district court's determination that a term has not acquired secondary meaning only if that determination is clearly erroneous. See Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins., 923 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 65, 116 L.Ed.2d 40 (1991); 815 Tonawanda Street Corp. v. Fay's Drug Co., 842 F.2d 643, 647 (2d Cir.1988). 32 Among the factors that we have found relevant to this inquiry in the past are advertising expenditures, consumer studies, sales success, unsolicited media coverage, attempts to plagiarize and length and exclusivity of use. Thompson Medical, 753 F.2d at 217. There are undoubtedly other types of evidence that would also be relevant to a claim of secondary meaning. The fundamental question, however, is whether  'the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer.'  Centaur Communications, 830 F.2d at 1221 (citations omitted). 33 The existence of secondary meaning is a question of fact with the burden of proof on the party claiming exclusive rights in the designation. PaperCutter, Inc. v. Fay's Drug Co., 900 F.2d 558, 564 (2d Cir.1990) (citation omitted). The district court found that Bristol had not presented sufficient evidence that consumers recognized the source of Excedrin PM by the PM designator and that there was no evidence that Bristol had ever marketed the product as PM. 34 Bristol suggests two grounds in support of its contention that the district court's finding that the PM mark had not acquired secondary meaning was clearly erroneous. First, Bristol argues that McNeil's intentional copying of its mark is indicative of secondary meaning. Although imitative intent can help support a finding of secondary meaning, see Centaur Communications, 830 F.2d at 1224, it does not necessarily mandate one, see American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir.1979) ([N]o single factor is determinative.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 1601, 63 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980). Therefore, we believe that, even assuming McNeil's imitative intent, the district court was not bound to find that the PM designator had acquired secondary meaning. 35 Second, Bristol argues that the fact that each Excedrin PM tablet is imprinted with PM shows that the consuming public must associate PM with Bristol. However, [a]lthough the mark owner strives to create a secondary meaning for its product, it is the consuming public which, in effect, determines whether that effort has succeeded. Centaur Communications, 830 F.2d at 1221 (citations omitted). The mere fact that Bristol places the name PM on its tablets does not persuade us that the consuming public associates that term with Bristol. Moreover, on the larger caplet version of the product, Bristol placed the entire Excedrin PM mark. 36 The district court was not clearly erroneous in classifying PM as a descriptive term in these circumstances. Because PM had not become primarily associated with a single producer in these circumstances, PM as used by Bristol is not by itself subject to protection under the Lanham Act. The district court therefore properly declined to enjoin McNeil from using the PM designator in connection with its combination analgesic/sleep aid.