Opinion ID: 1549002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Sham Exception

Text: The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to prevent vexatious lawsuits against citizens who exercise their First Amendment rights of free speech and legitimate petitioning by granting those activities conditional immunity from punitive civil claims. Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 752 (R.I.2004) (citing Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56, 61 (R.I.1996)). Rhode Island's anti-SLAPP statute derived from several United States Supreme Court cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961) ( Noerr ), and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965), and Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993). In Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129, 81 S.Ct. 523, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a railroad association's unfavorable publicity campaign against the trucking business constituted an antitrust violation. The Noerr Court held that the actions did not constitute an antitrust violation, but it also noted that [t]here may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor   . Id. at 144, 81 S.Ct. 523. Four years later, in Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670, 85 S.Ct. 1585, the Court interpreted Noerr to shield [] from [antitrust violations] a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose. In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 60, 61, 113 S.Ct. 1920, the Court established a two-part definition of actions constituting what the Noerr Court referred to as a mere sham. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, 81 S.Ct. 523. First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 60, 113 S.Ct. 1920. Second, the court must inquire whether the lawsuit is subjectively an attempt to interfere directly with an adversary's business through the use of the governmental process rather than an effort to use the outcome of the governmental process for its legitimate ends. Id. at 60-61, 113 S.Ct. 1920. If the definition's two-part definition is satisfied, the challenged conduct is deemed a sham, and is not entitled to immunity. Id. at 61, 113 S.Ct. 1920. By amending § 9-33-2 in 1995 (P.L. 1995, ch. 386, § 1), the Rhode Island General Assembly essentially adopted the two-part definition of sham participation outlined in Professional Real Estate Investors, but broadened its application to contexts beyond the field of antitrust. See Hometown Properties, Inc., 680 A.2d at 60-62. Section 9-33-2(a) provides that [t]he petition or free speech constitutes a sham only if it is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome, regardless of ultimate motive or purpose. The statute specifies that a petition or free speech constitutes a sham only if it is both objectively and subjectively baseless, as both of those terms are defined in the statute. Section 9-33-2(a)(1)(2). We will consider separately whether Pardee's appeal was objectively or subjectively baseless.