Opinion ID: 1179552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Trial Court Erred Prejudicially in Denying Defendant's Change of Venue Motions

Text: As noted earlier, the trial court denied a joint pretrial motion for change of venue made by defendant and his then codefendant, his brother, Fredrick Williams. The court subsequently denied defendant's renewed motion for change of venue during jury selection. We have concluded the denial of defendant's renewed motion was prejudicially erroneous. [10] All of the critical factors, as we observed in his brother's case, strongly indicate[d] that a change of venue [was] necessary to insure that ... defendant receive a fair trial.... [T]he effect of the extensive pretrial publicity is less likely to subside in a small community such as Placer County; the crime was of a sensational nature; the offenses charged [were] grave and carr[ied] severe penalties; and defendant [was] friendless in a community in which the victim enjoyed a certain, even if limited, prominence. ( Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 595.) [11] Though the Attorney General is correct in pointing out that the publicity preceding defendant's brother's trial date was more extensive than that preceding defendant's  owing to the fact that defendant was tried first  the evidence in support of defendant's motion was in other respects more compelling. As set forth below, the penalty facing defendant was more severe (the district attorney indicated that he did not intend to seek the death penalty against defendant's brother); the pretrial publicity had identified defendant rather than his brother as the actual triggerman; and the jury voir dire in defendant's trial corroborated what could only be speculated about in his brother's case (because he had sought a writ prior to jury selection)  that the local community was too familiar with the crimes, the victim and her family, the district attorney and the prosecution witnesses, to permit the trial to proceed there.
(1) The salient principles on review of a motion for change of venue were well summarized in People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935 [171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240]: A change of venue must be granted when the defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. ( People v. Welch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 113 [104 Cal. Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225]; Frazier v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 287, 294 [95 Cal. Rptr. 798, 486 P.2d 694]; Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375, 383 [66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372].) Whether raised on petition for writ of mandate or on appeal from judgment of conviction, the reviewing court must independently examine the record and determine de novo whether a fair trial is or was obtainable. ( People v. Welch, supra ; People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 62, 68-69 [89 Cal. Rptr. 44, 473 P.2d 748]; Maine v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 382.) The factors to be considered are the nature and gravity of the offense, the nature and extent of the news coverage, the size of the community, the status of the defendant in the community, and the popularity and prominence of the victim. ( People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 818 [103 Cal. Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7, 58 A.L.R.3d 832].) ( Id. at p. 948; see also Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 937 [187 Cal. Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225]; Martinez v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 574, 577-578 [174 Cal. Rptr. 701, 629 P.2d 502].) Of course, the question presented on appeal from a judgment of conviction is necessarily different from that on a petition for writ of mandate. `A significant difference between pretrial and posttrial review is that after conviction in determining whether a defendant received a fair and impartial trial under the reasonable likelihood standard, the review is retrospective. ...' In other words, voir dire may demonstrate that pretrial publicity had no prejudicial effect, or conversely may corroborate the allegations of potential prejudice. ( People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 949, quoting People v. Martinez (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 1, 13 [174 Cal. Rptr. 701, 629 P.2d 502], original italics; People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 62, 73-74 [89 Cal. Rptr. 44, 473 P.2d 748].) (2) Put differently, because the prejudicial effect of publicity before jury selection is necessarily speculative, it is settled that `any doubt as to the necessity of removal ... should be resolved in favor of a venue change.' ( Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 588.) After trial, any presumption in favor of a venue change is unnecessary, for the matter may then be analyzed in light of the voir dire of the actual, available jury pool and the actual jury panel selected. The question then is whether, in light of the failure to change venue, it is reasonably likely that the defendant in fact received a fair trial. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 177 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) Whether raised on petition for writ of mandate or on appeal from a judgment of conviction, however, the standard of review is the same. A showing of actual prejudice shall not be required. ( Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375, 383 [66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372]; accord Martinez v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 578; Odle v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 937.) In a pretrial motion for change of venue, defendant need only demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that absent such relief a fair trial cannot be had. ( People v. Welch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 113 [104 Cal. Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225].) On appeal after judgment, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial was not had. ( People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 231 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906]; People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 948-949.) In either case, [t]he phrase `reasonable likelihood' denotes a lesser standard of proof than `more probable than not.' ( Martinez v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 578, quoting Frazier v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 287, 294 [95 Cal. Rptr. 798, 486 P.2d 694]; accord Odle v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 937.)

(3a) With the foregoing principles in mind, we have carefully examined the record to determine the potential for prejudice from pretrial publicity. Our review persuades us that all of the relevant analytical factors, viewed not only in isolation but in relation to one another, compelled a change of venue in this matter. Placer County is a relatively small county by California standards; at the time of defendant's trial, the population was approximately 117,000; Blacks numbered about 402, or approximately 0.4 percent of the total population. Yet despite its small population, Placer County is well served by the local press. As we noted in Martinez v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d 574, a capital murder case in which we also ordered a change of venue from Placer County, the circulation of the three main newspapers at that time (one year before the instant matter) covered at least half of the potential jurors in the county. ( Id. at p. 579, fn. 1; see also Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 589, fn. 3.) Indeed, as explained more fully below, the jury voir dire revealed that community awareness of this case was especially widespread. The newspaper and radio stories submitted in support of defendant and his brother's joint motion for change of venue demonstrated extensive, sometimes inflammatory pretrial publicity. More than 50 newspaper and radio reports appeared during the 9-month period between defendant's arrest and motion. Articles appeared every month during this period (with the exception of November and December of 1980). Although the coverage was most extensive during the months of June and July 1980, it remained continuous thereafter. Nearly every item contained a short description of the murder and identified defendant and his brother as suspects. Many of the reports were front-page or lead articles. [12] The nature of the newspaper reports was frequently sensational. The victim's bullet-riddled body was referred to several times; the slaying was described as execution style on at least four occasions; nearly every article reported that the victim had been raped; it was reported that authorities believed the victim had been executed so that she could not identify her assailant. Indeed, we recently contrasted the tragic if relatively unsensational killing in People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d 207, with the crimes in this very case (as described in Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d 584), which we characterized as involving sensational racial [and] sexual overtones. ( Id. at p. 232.) Later news reports also focused on preliminary hearing evidence and sheriff's statements indicating that defendant was the actual triggerman and rapist, and was therefore being held without bail, while his brother's bail was set at $50,000 and later reduced to $10,000. The local press also reported that defendant had made statements which were inadmissible due to a Miranda violation, but which nevertheless exonerated his brother. (See People v. Tidwell, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 68 [statement by the defendant's brother implicating defendant at least as damaging as report that defendant had confessed].) In short, as we said of a similar situation in Martinez, The net effect of the coverage was to suggest to the persons who were potential jurors in the trial of his case the probability that petitioner was the actual killer. ( Martinez v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 580.) The Attorney General nevertheless discounts the potential impact of the pretrial publicity on the ground that the frequency of the articles decreased after the first two weeks of defendant's arrest. The argument overlooks three facts. First, as noted earlier, the publicity did not cease but continued at a fairly steady pace until the start of trial. (See Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 589, fn. 3.) [13] Second, as discussed below, jury selection revealed that, in fact, community awareness of the crime remained quite high. (4) And third, as we have frequently observed, the passage of time does not necessarily have the same tendency to dissipate the effects of pretrial publicity in a small community that it might otherwise have in a large venue. (See, e.g., Maine v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 387 [Delays may be an efficacious antidote to publicity in medium-size and large cities, but in small communities, where a major crime becomes embedded in the public consciousness, their effectiveness is greatly diminished]; accord People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 949.) None of the foregoing, of course, is conclusive evidence that the community was aroused to an emotional fever pitch. It is not necessary, however, that defendant demonstrate overt hostility. (5) As we have explained, `When a spectacular crime has aroused community attention and a suspect has been arrested, the possibility of an unfair trial may originate in widespread publicity describing facts, statements and circumstances which tend to create a belief in his guilt.' ( Martinez v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 580, quoting Corona v. Superior Court (1972) 24 Cal. App.3d 872, 877 [101 Cal. Rptr. 411]; accord Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 590; People v. Tidwell, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 70.) Clearly this was the import of the extensive pretrial publicity in this case. (3b) The pervasiveness of the news coverage was corroborated during jury selection. Of the 116 prospective jurors questioned, 61, or approximately 52 percent, had read or heard of the case. [14] Of these, only 10 were excused for cause on the ground that they could not disregard their opinion, formed on the basis of news reports, that defendant was guilty. Eight of the twelve jurors ultimately seated had read or heard of the case. [15] It is true, of course, that exposure to pretrial publicity does not automatically indicate prejudice. (See Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 717, 722-723 [6 L.Ed.2d 751, 755-756, 81 S.Ct. 1639]; People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 950.) Indeed, the trial court in this matter was careful to inquire into each juror's prior knowledge, and most attested that they could render an impartial verdict. A juror's declaration of impartiality, however, is not conclusive. ( Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at p. 728 [6 L.Ed.2d at p. 759]; People v. Tidwell, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 73.) To be sure, perfection is not required; some knowledge of the case on the part of some jurors is often unavoidable. Here, however, a brutal murder had obviously become deeply embedded in the public consciousness (half of the jurors questioned knew something about the case). Thus, it is more than a reasonable possibility that the case could not be viewed with the requisite impartiality. ( People v. Tidwell, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 73-76; Maine v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 387.)
Clearly, the nature and extent of the pretrial publicity in this case militated in favor of a change of venue. Equally or perhaps even more compelling, however, was the relative status of the victim and the defendant in the community. As we observed in Tidwell, When the significance of associations between victims or witnesses and the jurors who actually determined defendant's fate is explored, the impossibility of an impartial adjudication of defendant's guilt and selection of penalty becomes obvious. ( People v. Tidwell, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 73.) Aside from the stark brutality of the offenses, the pretrial publicity focused heavily on the fact that the victim was a Placer County resident and the defendant was an outsider. Most articles described the victim as a young Roseville woman and defendant as a Sacramento man. There were racial overtones as well. The suspect was initially reported as a young negro male; his picture appeared in the local press. The victim was a young, White local woman. As we noted in defendant's brother's case, the social, racial and sexual overtones were precisely the kind which could most effectively prejudice defendant. ( Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 594.) Moreover, though the victim, Heather Mead, was herself not especially prominent, she came from an extended family with long and extensive ties to the community. (See Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 593 [Mead's family has prominence in the community, while the defendant is but a stranger ...].) Of the 250 potential jurors, some 35 indicated that they knew the victim, members of her family, or her boyfriends. Of these, only six were excused for cause. By contrast, not a single potential juror knew the defendant. [16] The number of potential jurors acquainted with the district attorney and one or more of the prosecution witnesses was even more striking. Some 23 indicated that they knew the district attorney and 8 others knew either the trial deputy or investigators; 14 additional jurors indicated that they knew 1 or more of the Placer County deputy sheriffs who were to testify. None indicated that they knew anyone associated with the defense. While such acquaintance with persons involved in the prosecution would not necessarily disqualify a juror, it is a factor that cannot be ignored. Thus, in addition to the one-half who were already familiar with the case, better than one-third of the jury pool knew someone directly associated with the prosecution. Only a dozen were excused for cause on this ground. Not surprisingly, defendant easily exhausted his 26 peremptory challenges. (Cf. People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 180 [defendant used only 13 of 26 peremptory challenges, suggesting that the jurors were fair, and that the defense itself so concluded.].) Of the twelve jurors ultimately seated, two-thirds had read or heard of the case. In addition, 3 of the 12 had family members who worked for Placer County law enforcement agencies. One had a brother who was a Placer County Deputy Sheriff. Another juror's father had been a constable in Roseville for over 50 years. And a third juror's husband performed medical forensic work for the county. Two of the jurors revealed that they were personally acquainted with the district attorney. One disclosed that the district attorney was a friend of ... [her] father's; she stated that she knew the district attorney well enough to speak to when ... [she] see[s] him. Another juror explained that he and the district attorney occasionally ate lunch together at a local service club. These numbers, while striking in themselves, are more significant for the intangibles they convey. As we observed in Tidwell, the fact that jurors are acquainted with trial participants infects the whole process of guilt adjudication. (3 Cal.3d at p. 74.) This is not to say, of course, that serious and even sensational crimes cannot be fairly tried in smaller communities. However, where, as here, the victim is a local woman from a prominent family, the district attorney and the prosecution witnesses are all well known, and the accused  representing the quintessential other in both a geographic and racial sense  is charged with crimes bearing both sexual and racial overtones, the risk is enormously high that the verdict may be based on a desire for revenge, or the fear of social ostracism as the cost of a mitigated verdict. In such circumstances, as we observed in Tidwell, the juror may consider himself honored and fortunate to be selected to culminate a community's anger against a stranger accused of killing [a] respected member[] of that community, [and] returning anything less than a death verdict for first degree murder might be viewed as a betrayal of both his trust as a juror and his friendship with witnesses [or the prosecution]. When a juror might reasonably fear that the cost of a mitigated verdict might be ... the alienation of an entire community, there is a danger that such fears will play a part in his deliberations. (3 Cal.3d at pp. 74-75.)
All of the factors discussed above are exacerbated by the fact that defendant was charged with an exceptionally brutal slaying, and faced the gravest of punishments. (6) It is well settled that in capital cases the factor of gravity must weigh heavily in a determination regarding the change of venue. ( Martinez v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 583; accord Odle v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 941; Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 593.) Where the jury in its discretion is responsible for determining whether a defendant lives or dies, the need for juror impartiality is obviously most acute. The United States Supreme Court has properly insisted that evidence relating to the individual character and background of a defendant must be admissible during the penalty phase, so as to maximize the jury's opportunity to see the defendant as a human being, with human frailties, and not merely as a dehumanized stranger. (See Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 304-305 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961-962, 96 S.Ct. 2978] (plur. opn. of Stewart, J.); Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28, 33-37 [90 L.Ed.2d 27, 34-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683].) (3c) In this case the risk was unacceptably high that the jury would treat defendant  a young black man, a stranger to and friendless in the community ( Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 594)  as a dehumanized stranger. We conclude that, given the size of Placer County, the nature of the crimes and the relative status of the victim and defendant in the community, the trial judge should have granted a change of venue when presented with a showing of extensive pretrial publicity, and when the jury selection process later corroborated the prospective jurors' widespread familiarity with the crime, the victim, the district attorney and the prosecution witnesses. At the very least there was a reasonable likelihood that defendant did not receive a fair and impartial trial. Hence, the judgment of conviction must be reversed.