Opinion ID: 772959
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Trial and Sentencing Errors

Text: 56 Allen asserts that the district court committed numerous errors during the trial, each of which allegedly warrants this court granting him a new trial or a new sentencing. We address each of his contentions in order, and as explained below, conclude that none of the asserted district court errors entitle Allen to a new trial or a new sentencing. 57
58 Allen asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying Allen's motion for a continuance of the trial after Allen's mitigation expert quit ten days prior to trial with little of his work done. The facts are as follows. The government filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty on August 8, 1997. Defense counsel hired a mitigation expert in early September. On October 15, Allen's case was set for trial on February 9, 1998. On January 12, 1998, the original mitigation expert informed defense counsel that he could not fulfill his obligations. Defense counsel hired a new mitigation expert on January 15 who started working on Allen's mitigation defense on January 16. Allen filed his motion for continuance on January 29, requesting that the trial be delayed for 120 days in order to prepare adequately the mitigation evidence for use during sentencing. The district court denied the motion for a continuance on the grounds that substantial work had been completed on Allen's mitigation defense and that sufficient time remained to finish preparations. Jury selection began on February 9, trial commenced on February 17, the sentencing began on March 2, and Allen presented his mitigation evidence from March 3 to March 6. 59 We review rulings on requests for continuances under the following standard: 60 District courts are afforded broad discretion when ruling on requests for continuances. Continuances generally are not favored and should be granted only when the party requesting one has shown a compelling reason. We will reverse a district court's decision to deny a motion for continuance only if the court abused its discretion and the moving party was prejudiced by the denial. 61 United States v. Cotroneo, 89 F.3d 510, 514 (8th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. Denied, 519 U.S. 1018 (1996). Abuse of discretion is determined by looking at the particular circumstances of the case. United States v. Ware, 890 F.2d 1008, 1010 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)). Our review of the circumstances of this case convinces us that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Allen's request for a continuance. 62 The replacement mitigation expert had worked on Allen's case for two weeks prior to the continuance request, and at the time the motion for the continuance was filed he had over four weeks left to prepare Allen's sentencing defense. In addition, the defense never renewed its motion for a continuance at the start of the penalty phase. Thus, the evidence supports the district court's finding that the defense had sufficient time to prepare an adequate mitigation defense. 63 Furthermore, the defendant has failed to show any specific prejudice resulting from the denial of his request for a continuance. Allen's mitigation evidence consisted of three days of testimony, totaling over nine hundred pages of transcript, and involved thirty-six witnesses testifying on Allen's behalf in support of four statutory mitigating factors and twenty-two non-statutory mitigating factors. Allen does not point to any specific mitigation evidence that he was deprived of presenting to the jury due to the district court's denial of his request for a continuance. See Walls v. Bowersox, 151 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071 (1999). In fact, on the basis of the evidence presented, the jurors were able to identify three additional mitigating factors which they considered during deliberations. 64 Allen argues general prejudice on the basis that there was not overwhelming evidence in support of the jury's decision to sentence Allen to death on Count II, given the jury's decision not to impose a sentence of death on Count I. We disagree. There was overwhelming evidence that Allen was responsible for firing all or at least most of the shots that killed the security guard, which is more than enough to support the jury's finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors thus warranting a sentence of death. We therefore need not address the question of whether Allen had a compelling reason for requesting a continuance of the trial (no explanation was ever given for the delay in discovering the nonperformance of the original mitigation expert), because we find neither an abuse of discretion by the district court nor any prejudice as a result. 65
66 Allen argues, based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that his due process rights to a fair trial were violated by the government's failure to disclose that two government eyewitnesses--Betty Thompson and William Green--would testify at trial inconsistently with previous statements attributed to them as contained in FBI reports, and that the district court therefore abused its discretion in denying Allen's motion for a mistrial or to strike some of the witnesses' testimony. We will affirm a district court's decision denying a request for a mistrial unless we find an abuse of discretion resulting in clear prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Rhodenizer, 106 F.3d 222, 225 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). See United States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Ryan, 153 F.3d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 1998)(applying the same standard to denial of motion for new trial based on Brady violation allegations), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999). In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that the government suppressed exculpatory evidence material either to guilt or punishment. See Ryan, 153 F.3d at 711. 67 Evidence is material under Brady if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. However, materiality is not established through the mere possibility that the suppressed evidence might have influenced the jury. 68 Id. at 712 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 69 We agree with the district court that there has been no Brady violation. First, the witnesses' expected trial testimony was not Brady evidence because the witnesses testified at trial and the defense was provided with the necessary impeachment evidence (in this case the FBI reports). See United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1368 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that Brady is not violated by a delay in disclosing evidence so long as the evidence is disclosed during trial). Second, Allen has not shown that the change in testimony satisfies the element of materiality. The statements of witnesses Thompson and Green were inconsistent only as to the issue of whether the driver or the passenger was carrying the bag of money as the two defendants reentered the van after the robbery. Whether Holder or Allen carried the bag, however, has almost no probative value as to whether Allen was guilty of the charged offenses, and has only some probative value as to who actually shot Heflin, which was relevant to the jury's sentencing decision. Moreover, the other evidence convincingly showed that Allen actually did most of the shooting. In short, our confidence in the jury's verdict as a result of any delayed disclosure of the negligibly exculpatory information is not at all undermined, because earlier disclosure of the information would have had no effect on the outcome of the jury's verdict. 70 Nor do we find any clear prejudice. The prosecutor expressly stated during opening argument that witness Green was going to testify that the driver was carrying the bag, which was contrary to Green's statement to the FBI. (See Trial Tr., Vol. VI at 52 (A few moments later [Mr. Green] saw two men run to the van, the driver carrying a bag, both men carrying what looked to him to be long-barreled weapons.).) Given that there is little doubt that Holder was the driver of the van, the prosecutor's remarks during his opening statement alerted defense counsel to the inconsistency between witness Green's prior statements and his expected trial testimony. Moreover, defense counsel had the necessary impeachment material--the FBI reports--and we agree with the district court that defense counsel did a very effective job of using the inconsistencies to impeach the credibility and accuracy of Green's trial testimony. (See Trial Tr., Vol. VIII at 198.) Thus, not only did defense counsel have notice of the inconsistency between Green's statements to the FBI and his testimony at trial, but counsel also had and effectively used the FBI report during cross-examination to impeach Green's testimony. Finally, defense counsel never asked for a continuance to deal with Green's allegedly surprising and prejudicial change in testimony, and never even raised an objection at the time Thompson's change in testimony was discovered. Based on these circumstances, we do not find any clear prejudice to Allen. We therefore reject Allen's contention that the district court abused its discretion in denying Allen's request for a mistrial because there was no Brady violation by the government and there was no clear prejudice to Allen. 71
72 Allen asserts that the district court erred in ordering him to undergo a psychiatric examination by a government-selected psychiatrist without a full protective order and in allowing a prosecutor to violate the terms of the court's partial protective order. We find no constitutional error and therefore reject both claims. 73 There is no doubt that a district court has the authority to order a defendant who states that he will use evidence from his own psychiatric examination in the penalty phase of a trial to undergo a psychiatric examination by a government-selected psychiatrist before the start of the penalty phase. See United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 338-40 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a district court possesses the inherent power to order a psychiatric examination based on 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), which requires that the government be given a fair opportunity to rebut any of defendant's mitigating evidence, and Fed.R.Crim.P. 12, which allows a court-ordered psychiatric examination during similar circumstances in the guilt phase of trials), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829 (1999). See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 466 n.10, 472 (1981) (leaving open the possibility, without deciding it, that a defendant can be precluded from using psychiatric evidence during the penalty phase if he does not also consent to a prosecution-selected psychiatrist). The government must be able to put on a fair rebuttal to a defendant's mitigation evidence during sentencing. Here, the district court allowed one assistant prosecutor to begin evaluating the results of the government's psychiatric examination prior to the sentencing phase under an order to not divulge any of the results to the rest of the prosecution team until after the completion of the guilt phase. 11 This partial protective order is legally and constitutionally sufficient because, as explained by the Fifth Circuit, a defendant is adequately protected under the Constitution from impermissible early introduction of the fruits of a government psychiatric examination under a scheme wherein the defendant has the burden of producing some evidence of taint, and the government has the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the evidence is not tainted. United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 399 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183(1969)), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Martinez-Salizar, 528 U.S. 304, 317 (2000). Additional prophylactic safeguards beyond this evidentiary framework, such as the sealing of exam results until after the completion of the guilt phase, as the court did in United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 748, 761 (E.D. Va. 1997), may avoid later litigation but are not constitutionally required. See Hall, 152 F.3d at 399. We therefore decline to adopt any such rigid prophylactic rule in the name of the Constitution and leave the matter to the discretion of district courts, subject only to our review for abuse of discretion, which we do not find present in this case. 74 As for Allen's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, after a careful review of the record we find neither a breach of the district court's protective order nor any prejudice to Allen during the guilt phase had the prosecutor's comments been a breach. The government requested that the entire prosecution team be allowed to review the results of the court-ordered psychiatrist's interview with Allen before the end of the trial so that they could begin researching possible defenses Allen might raise. The Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) designated to receive the results of the court-ordered psychiatrist's interview with Allen made the following statement in open court, without the jury present, in response to Allen's assertion that the results should continue to be excluded from the entire prosecution team because they might be used against him during the guilt phase of the trial: 75 There really isn't anything in any of these reports that would prejudice the defendant if the prosecution team was made aware of them prior to the beginning of the penalty phase. In fact, Mr. Allen does not seem to discuss the offense or wasn't even asked about the offense with either one of the physicians that were chosen by the defense and there was no discussion of it with the court-appointed psychiatrist beyond Mr. Allen's maintaining that he wasn't there, so there isn't anything in these reports that could be exploited in the guilt phase of any type that I can see. 76 (Trial Tr., Vol. X at 2-3.) 77 Allen argues that the AUSA's disclosure, in the presence of other members of the prosecution team, of Allen's statement to the government psychiatrist that Allen was not present at the armed bank robbery is a violation of the court's protective order and a structural defect in the trial. We disagree. While the defense did express the view that the Chinese wall had been breached, it did not raise a formal objection at the time the comment was made, and the district court's failure to take any action sua sponte in response to the comment or to the allegation that its order had been violated, makes clear that it did not consider it to be a violation of the order. We see no violation either because the defendant had denied being present at the armed robbery as early as July 25, 1997, in his Notice of Intent to Rely Upon Defense of Alibis, so the prosecution team was already on notice from Allen himself that Allen might argue an I wasn't there defense. Thus, the AUSA's disclosure had little, if any, impact on the prosecution's presentation of evidence, and for that reason, even if the AUSA's disclosure was a technical violation of the court's protective order, Allen was certainly not prejudiced by the disclosure. 78 We also reject Allen's assertion that the disclosure effectively precluded or chilled him from exercising his right to testify at trial because he was afraid that all of the examination results had been disclosed to the entire prosecution team. The defendant could have taken the stand and still have protected his Fifth Amendment rights by alleging specific violations of the court's protective order if the government appeared to be improperly using information from the psychiatric examination. The decision was made to forego this protection, and on appeal Allen points to no specific improper uses of the results or contents of the psychiatric examination during the guilt phase of the trial. We therefore hold that the AUSA's disclosure does not, as Allen argues, rise to the level of a structural error (which he argues requires no showing of prejudice), nor do we find any abuse of discretion by the district court or prejudice to Allen with respect to the court-ordered psychiatric examination and partial protective order. 79
80 Allen argues that government prosecutors made improper and prejudicial statements during the penalty phase which rendered the jury's sentencing decision fundamentally unfair. Specifically, Allen points to three allegedly improper statements: (1) a direct reference to Allen as a murderous dog during closing arguments; (2) a statement saying don't let him down there dribbling basketballs on Richard Heflin's grave during closing arguments; and (3) a question to one of Allen's witnesses about whether the blue color of his clothing signified his association with any gang. Allen argues that, given the fact that he is an African-American, each of these statements was designed to appeal to racial fears and prejudices of jury members in order to secure a death sentence, and that it did have this improper effect. Our standard of review is as follows: 81 We afford the district court broad discretion in controlling closing arguments, overturning the lower court only when it clearly abuses its discretion. We examine prosecutorial remarks to determine, first, whether the remarks were in fact improper, and if so, whether, in the context of the entire trial, the remarks prejudicially affected [the defendant's] substantial rights, so as to deprive [him] of a fair trial. 82 United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) ([I]t is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 83 We first address whether the prosecutor's statements were in fact improper. Given the context surrounding the statements, we are convinced that neither the basketball comment nor the gang reference was improper. The basketball reference was made after several of Allen's own mitigation witnesses, such as his middle school basketball coach and relatives, testified that Allen enjoyed playing basketball, and therefore later reference to it by the prosecution was not improper. (See, e.g., Trial Tr., Vol. XV at 130, 167.) The gang affiliation question came up during cross-examination of one of Allen's witnesses in the context of determining, as alleged in one of the mitigating factors, whether Allen was a follower. The prosecutor's questions were directed at discovering whether either Allen or the witness or both were ever involved in gang activity, and we find nothing wrong with the questions because they were relevant to and in response to the mitigating factors presented by Allen, which indicated he grew up surrounded by gang factions. Furthermore, in the circumstances of this case, we find that the prosecutor's statements--both the basketball comment and the gang affiliation questions--were not intended nor did they have the effect of appealing to racial fears or to any prejudices of the jurors. 84 The characterization of Allen as a murderous dog presents a closer question. The comment was made in response to one of Allen's proposed non-statutory mitigating factors, which portrayed Allen as a likeable, gentle, lighthearted person who was not considered aggressive or violent. 12 (Allen's App. at 405.) During closing argument, moreover, Allen's counsel made the assertion that the prosecution [c]ouldn't find a single person to say [Allen] was violent. (Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 77.) In rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor responded as follows: 85 How about the mitigator that you're going to see on that verdict form that this defendant is a gentle, lighthearted, likable person? He's considered those things, okay? That's important. It says he's considered kind, gentle, and lighthearted. He's not considered violent or aggressive. Richard Heflin didn't think this guy with the mask, armed for war, armed to kill, was kind, lighthearted, or gentle. He thought he was a murderous dog coming in there to kill people for money. That's what Richard Heflin thought. And remember when you are back there deliberating, the last thing Richard Heflin ever saw was these two come in and start blazing at him, blow him down - and the terrible irony is he survived Vietnam, survived Vietnam, managed to live through having to fight people with guns just like that, and he's killed at High Point in St. Louis City on St. Patrick's day, that is a terrible irony. 86 (Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 105-06.) Although we find no improper appeal to racial fears or prejudice in the above statement, we do find that the reference to Allen as being a murderous dog is inappropriate and improper. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 179-80 (finding it improper to characterize the defendant as an animal). 87 We will not, however, reverse a sentence on the basis of improper prosecutorial statements unless those statements are prejudicial enough to deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights to a fair penalty phase hearing. At the outset, we reject Allen's contention that in a capital case there is greater protection under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause 13 for a fair penalty phase hearing than there is for a fair trial. In determining whether Allen has received a fair penalty phase hearing, we therefore adopt the same standard set out by the Supreme Court and this court in determining whether a defendant has received a fair trial under the Constitution despite improper prosecutorial comments during trial. See, e.g., Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (holding that [t]he relevant question is whether the prosecutor's comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process); Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1502 (outlining a three-factor test to help determine, in the context of the trial as a whole, whether a defendant has been deprived of a fair trial, including the cumulative effect of any misconduct, the strength of the properly admitted evidence of guilt, and any remedial actions taken by the trial court). 88 Although we find that the prosecutor's reference to Allen as a murderous dog was improper, we have little difficulty in deciding that in this case Allen was not deprived of his constitutional right to a fair sentencing. First, the comment was made only once and did not manipulate or misstate the evidence. See Mack v. Caspari, 92 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding despite numerous references to the defendant as a killer that the entire trial was not so fundamentally unfair as to amount to a deprivation of due process, in part because the prosecutor's statements did not manipulate or misstate the evidence), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1109 (1997). Although it is possible that one isolated comment can result in the denial of a defendant's due process right to a fair trial or sentencing, the lack of any cumulative effect of more than one improper comment is certainly a strong indication that the sentencing was not fundamentally unfair. Second, the evidence is essentially overwhelming that Allen fired the shots from the Chinese SKS that killed Richard Heflin, which helps explain why the jury imposed a death sentence for the firearm conviction and a life sentence for Allen's armed robbery conviction (the evidence shows that Holder was primarily responsible for initiating and planning the armed robbery). Thus, if the prosecutor's improper statement was as emotionally prejudicial as Allen claims, we think it likely that the jury would have returned a sentence of death on both counts, so the fact that the jury returned a sentence of life in prison for the armed robbery conviction is strong evidence that its decisions were not based on passion. Third, the trial court was not called upon to take any curative actions because the defendant never objected to the remark, and the experienced trial judge did not intervene sua sponte, a decision we do not find to be error of any kind. The court did instruct the jury to make its decision based only on the evidence and that statements by the lawyers were not evidence. This is sufficient in the absence of an objection. Id. at 643-44. 89 We also reject Allen's argument that the murderous dog reference, in combination with telling the story through the eyes of the victim, makes the statement unduly prejudicial. No undue prejudice arises from reminding the jury to consider the murder victim's perspective where the defendant has asserted a gentle spirit and accused the government of being unable to produce any witness to testify that the defendant was violent. For these reasons, we conclude that Allen's penalty phase was not unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor's murderous dog reference, and therefore he was not denied his due process right to a fair sentencing. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 180-81 (finding during habeas review of a death penalty conviction that the defendant was not deprived of his right to a fair trial despite the prosecutor's references to the defendant as an animal that shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him); Kellogg v. Skon, 176 F.3d 447, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding in criminal sexual abuse case that defendant did not receive a fundamentally unfair trial even though the prosecutor referred to him as a monster, sexual deviant, and liar); Pollard v. Delo, 28 F.3d 887, 890 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that repeated references to the defendant as a predator were not so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial). 90
91 Allen argues that the district court erred in overruling his motion to limit the quantity of victim impact evidence introduced by the government during the sentencing phase, and that this decision ultimately led to a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights because the government was allowed to present too much victim impact evidence. We normally review evidentiary decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Martin, 180 F.3d 965, 966 (8th Cir. 1999). In this case, however, Allen failed to raise an objection to any of the victim impact testimony. Although Allen filed a motion to limit the government's evidence before any of it was introduced, in denying the motion the district court made it quite clear that it would be necessary to raise objections later in order to preserve the issue for appeal. The district court stated the following: 92 The parties will note that motions in limine are advisory only, that is orders in limine are advisory only. The parties will be required to make appropriate objections or offers of proof at the proper time during the trial to protect their respective positions.... The Court will consider victim impact [testimony] as it is presented. I have no way of knowing at this time precisely what it will be. Parties understand the statutory scheme which provides for the impact testimony and also the body of concept of cases dealing on that subject and neither -- and the government should not go beyond the bounds of either the statute or the case law. 93 (Trial Tr., Vol. XIV at 34-36.) 94 Due to Allen's failure to raise any objections during the sentencing phase to the victim impact testimony, we review Allen's claim for plain error. Thus, Allen 95 must therefore show that the error was plain, meaning clear or obvious; and [that] the error affected [his] substantial rights, which requires a showing that the error was prejudicial and affected the trial's outcome. Even clear errors will only matter if a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result that might seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. 96 United States v. Tulk, 171 F.3d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-35 (1993)) (alterations in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 97 First, it is clear from both the FDPA and Supreme Court precedent that the government is allowed to present and a jury is allowed to consider victim impact evidence in reaching its sentencing decision in a capital case. The FDPA provides for the submission of aggravating factors that may concern the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's family, and may include oral testimony, a victim impact statement identifying the victim and the loss suffered by the victim and the victim's family, and any other relevant information. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(2). Likewise, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Eighth Amendment permits capital sentencing juries to consider evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the victim's family in deciding whether an eligible defendant should receive a death sentence. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 395 (1999) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830-31 (explaining that the Eighth Amendment does not bar a jury from considering the full extent of the harm caused by the crime, including its impact on the victim's family and community or from seeing a quick glimpse of the life petitioner chose to extinguish to remind the jury that the person whose life was taken was a unique human being, and further explaining that a defendant may still seek relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [i]f, in a particular case, a witness' testimony or a prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair)(internal quotations and citations omitted)(O'Connor, J., concurring). 98 Second, there is little, if any, danger of undue prejudice due to victim impact evidence under the FDPA if a jury, as in this case, fails to even find the existence of the victim-impact aggravating factor. (See Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 123, 132.) This is because the FDPA prohibits a jury from considering, in the final weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any aggravating factor which the jury did not find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d), (e). The instructions to the jury were clear on this point, and unless a jury disregards its instructions, which we do not and cannot presume, there can be no prejudice. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325 n.9 (1985)([a]bsent [] extraordinary situations, however, we adhere to the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow instructions); United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1144 (8th Cir. 1996). 99 Third, although the jury did not find the existence of the victim-impact aggravating factor, which is strong evidence of and in most cases will be sufficient to make a ruling of no undue prejudice, we will nevertheless consider the possibility that the evidence may have been so prejudicial as to violate the Due Process Clause. Our review of the record, however, convinces us that no such violation occurred. The government's evidence of victim impact consisted of testimony from eleven witnesses, including Richard Heflin's mother, one sister, one brother, two bank co-workers, one former co-worker, his former wife (and mother of his three sons), each of his three sons, and his widow (who had married Heflin approximately seven months prior to his death). The testimony from these witnesses lasted less than a day and took up only eighty-eight pages of transcript. In comparison, the entire penalty phase transcript takes up over seventeen hundred pages, and the testimony from Allen's penalty phase witnesses took up over nine hundred pages. Furthermore, Allen could have objected to any specific testimony that he thought was unduly prejudicial, and he could have raised an objection if he believed the amount of testimony had become unduly prejudicial. For tactical reasons, such objections could have been lodged at a side bar conference outside of the jury's hearing. No objections were raised, however, and on appeal Allen makes no allegations that any specific testimony was unduly prejudicial. Our own review of the record convinces us that neither the amount nor the scope and nature of the victim-impact testimony was unduly prejudicial. 100 For all of the above stated reasons, we find that the district court did not commit any error, much less plain error, in its decision to deny Allen's motion in limine at the outset of the sentencing hearing and later to permit all of the government's victim impact evidence to come into the record without objection. 101
102 Allen argues that the district court erred in failing to submit to the jury his tendered mercy instruction which would have informed the jury that they never are required to impose a sentence of death. When reviewing a challenge to the jury instructions, we recognize that the district court has wide discretion in formulating the instructions and [we] will affirm if the entire charge to the jury, when read as a whole, fairly and adequately contains the law applicable to the case. United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1057 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Casas, 999 F.2d 1225, 1230 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1078 (1994)). 103 Our review of the instructions given to the jury convinces us that the district court committed no error in fairly and adequately presenting the applicable law. The relevant portions of the district court's instructions to the jury were as follows: 104 Again, whether or not the circumstances in this case justify a sentence of death is a decision that the law leaves entirely to you.... If you unanimously conclude that the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death... you shall record your determination that death is justified in Section 6A of the special verdict form for each count of the indictment. 105 (Instr. No. 8, Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 37-38.) The district court also instructed the jury that, [a]t the end of your deliberations, if you determine that Billie Jerome Allen should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without possibility of release, the Court is required to impose that sentence. (Instr. No. 9, id. at 39.) 106 We think these instructions accurately explain the jury's role in sentencing under the FDPA, which reads as follows: 107 [T]he defendant... shall be sentenced to death if, after consideration of the factors set forth in section 3592 [delineating possible aggravating and mitigating circumstances] in the course of a hearing held pursuant to section 3593, it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death is justified.... 108 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (emphasis added). In § 3593, entitled Special hearing to determine whether a sentence of death is justified, the FDPA states the following: 109 [T]he jury... shall consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death.... Based upon this consideration, the jury by unanimous vote... shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other lesser sentence. 110 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (emphasis added). Based upon the plain language of the statute, once a jury makes a final, unanimous determination that a sentence of death is justified, then the FDPA requires its imposition. See 18 U.S.C. § 3594 (requiring that once a recommendation of death or life imprisonment is made, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly). 111 Allen argues that the language in § 3593(e) requires a jury to make two decisions--first, whether a sentence of death is justified and second, whether a sentence of death should actually be imposed. Although § 3593(e) could lend itself to this interpretation when read in isolation, we reject this interpretation as inconsistent with the Act as a whole. 14 See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 900 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that we apply common sense meaning to the text of statutes and interpret provisions in a manner logically consistent with the Act as a whole). Allen's two-decision interpretation of § 3593(e) would allow the jurors to disregard a unanimous determination that a sentence of death is justified. We conclude that such an interpretation contradicts the language of § 3591(a)(2), stating that a defendant shall be sentenced to death if the fact finder determines that a sentence of death is justified after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. To consistently harmonize the two sections, we must read § 3593(e) as specifying the jury's options within this framework. We already know from § 3591(a)(2) that a unanimous finding that death is justified requires a recommendation of a death sentence. The jury's remaining options, then (life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other lesser sentence), are only valid options for the jury to recommend if the balancing process favors the mitigating factors and does not justify a sentence of death. 112 Thus, we read the requirement in § 3593(e) that the jury recommend by unanimous vote the sentence to be imposed to be a procedural mechanism to record the jury's findings, first on the question of whether a death sentence is justified, and if not, then on whether the sentence should be life in prison or some other sentence imposed by the court. We do not read § 3593(e) as requiring from the jury a second, substantive determination regarding a sentence of death once it decides that a sentence of death is indeed justified. 113 In another context, the Controlled Substances Act, Congress clearly has provided that the jury regardless of its findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, is never required to impose a death sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (requiring the jury to be instructed in this manner). This language would explicitly allow the jury to make the second, substantive determination that Allen seeks. No similar language exists in the FDPA, however, and we are not permitted to legislate this language into the Act ourselves, particularly in light of the contrary language explained above which already exists in the FDPA. 114 Under the FDPA, the jury exercises complete discretion in its determination of whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. The jury was informed that whether or not the circumstances justify a sentence of death was a decision left entirely to them. Mercy is not precluded from entering into the balance of whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The FDPA merely precludes the jurors from arbitrarily disregarding its unanimous determination that a sentence of death is justified. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1993) (explaining that 'it would be very difficult to reconcile a rule allowing the fate of a defendant to turn on the vagaries of particular jurors' emotional sensitivities with our longstanding recognition that, above all, capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and non-arbitrary') (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990)); Saffle, 494 U.S. at 493 (stating that the government must not cut off full and fair consideration of mitigating evidence; but it need not grant the jury the choice to make the sentencing decision according to its own whims or caprice). Congress is free to pass a statute which confines arguments of mercy to the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances and in its final determination of whether the aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors. We also note that Allen was not prohibited from urging the jury to be merciful in its deliberations and in its consideration of asserted mitigating factors. The district court stated as follows: 115 There will be no ruling by the Court that mercy is a factor that cannot be considered. Certainly jury nullification cannot be argued nor any argument permitted beyond a statutory scheme. So there's no doubt about it, the defense will not be precluded from arguing that the jury may be merciful in its deliberations. 116 (Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 22-23.) For these reasons, we conclude that the instructions given in this case adequately state the law and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Allen's proposed mercy instruction. 117 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1), we have addressed all of the substantive and procedural issues raised by Billie Jerome Allen's appeal from the sentence of death. We have also considered whether his sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and conclude that it was not so imposed. We further have carefully considered whether the evidence supports the jury's special findings of the existence of the aggravating factors, both statutory and non-statutory, which the jury found to exist, and we conclude that the evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury's special findings.