Opinion ID: 613164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MHRA Retaliation

Text: Under the MHRA, employers may not retaliate against employees for reporting sexual harassment. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.15. [3] In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the MHRA, [4] an employee must show that (1) she engaged in protected conduct, (2) she suffered a materially adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the materially adverse employment action and the protected conduct. Fercello, 612 F.3d at 1077-78. The County moved for summary judgment in part [5] based on Quinn's failure to establish an issue of fact on whether she suffered a materially adverse employment action. An employee suffers a materially adverse employment action in the context of a MHRA retaliation claim when the employer engages in conduct that would dissuade a reasonable employee from making a discrimination claim. Devin v. Schwan's Home Serv., Inc., 491 F.3d 778, 787-89 (8th Cir.2007), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43, 1058 (8th Cir.2011) (en banc). The materially adverse employment action element may be met by an employer's single act that produces a material employment disadvantage, such as termination, a cut in pay or benefits, or a change that undermines an employee's future career prospects. Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir.1999). The element may also be met by the cumulative effect of an employer's alleged retaliatory conduct, if the acts, considered in the aggregate, would dissuade a reasonable employee from reporting discrimination. Fercello, 612 F.3d at 1083-84; Devin, 491 F.3d at 787-88. Similarly, the materially adverse employment action element may be met by a series of acts by the employer that, considered collectively, amount to constructive discharge. See Helton v. Southland Racing Corp., 600 F.3d 954, 961 (8th Cir.2010). After carefully reviewing Quinn's response to the County's motion for summary judgment, we conclude that Quinn did not adequately explain to the district court why the disputed facts she listed were material to her theory that the County's actions, either individually or in the aggregate, would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from reporting sexual harassment. A party cannot defeat a summary judgment motion by asserting the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties; the party must assert that there is a  genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). In order to show that disputed facts are material, the party opposing summary judgment must cite to the relevant substantive law in identifying facts that might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party must then categorize the factual disputes in relation to the legal elements of her claim. Id.; Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2006). In order to survive the County's motion for summary judgment, Quinn needed to explain the legal significance of her factual allegations beyond mere conclusory statements importing the appropriate terms of art. Doe ex rel Thomas v. Tsai, 648 F.3d 584, 588 (8th Cir.2011); Holland v. Sam's Club, 487 F.3d 641, 644 n. 5 (8th Cir.2007). Quinn failed to provide meaningful legal analysis explaining how, under the applicable law, the disputed facts might prove Quinn's MHRA reprisal claim at trial. Rodgers, 435 F.3d at 908. Specifically, Quinn did not argue that the County's actions, either individually or in the aggregate, would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from reporting sexual harassment. See Devin, 491 F.3d at 787-88 (providing reasonable employee standard). Instead, Quinn's responsive motion merely recounted her factual allegations and declared them reprisal. See Rodgers, 435 F.3d at 908 (conclusory statements insufficient to establish material question of fact). The only non-conclusory explanation we glean from Quinn's motion as to why the County's acts, either individually or in the aggregate, would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from reporting sexual harassment is the assertion that Quinn felt harassed. But the standard is objective  whether the employer's actions would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from reporting illegal conduct. Quinn's subjective views are legally inconsequential. Fercello, 612 F.3d at 1081. Quinn simply did not frame her argument before the district court using the appropriate, objective standard. [6] Quinn also alleged that the County's actions amounted to constructive discharge in attempting to establish a materially adverse action. See Helton, 600 F.3d at 961. In support of her constructive discharge theory, Quinn cited applicable law and employed meaningful analysis. To prove constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show (1) a reasonable person in [her] situation would find the working conditions intolerable, and (2) the employer intended to force [her] to quit. Fercello, 612 F.3d at 1083 (quoting Carpenter v. Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 616 (8th Cir.2007)). A plaintiff may satisfy the intent requirement through evidence that her resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer's actions. Id. Quinn argued that a reasonable juror could conclude from the disputed facts she listed that her working conditions were intolerable and that the County intended to force her to quit. Although Quinn used the appropriate legal standard to attempt to establish a material question of fact, no reasonable juror could conclude from the record facts that the County intended to force Quinn to quit or that her resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the County's actions. To the contrary, the County attempted to accommodate Quinn's illness by adjusting her work schedule and allowing her to take time off to recover. See Fercello, 612 F.3d at 1083 (granting time off and accommodation of work schedule show intent to maintain employment relationship); Devin, 491 F.3d at 790 (offering to discuss plaintiff's options in order to retain plaintiff as employee undercuts constructive discharge claim). In addition, after Quinn took full-time leave, the County consistently encouraged Quinn to return to work. For example, in a letter from the County to Quinn, the County wrote, While we want you to return to work healthy, we do want you to return to work. You have been a valued employee of St. Louis County and we have critical public information work which needs to be done. We will continue to work with you to find a schedule that would accommodate your needs and also fulfill the County's requirements for your job performance. App'x at 96. Similarly, in an email from Mitchell to Quinn, he wrote, I must reiterate that the clear desire of St. Louis County is to have you back at your job performing the service that you were originally hired for. Id. at 101. The record indicates that the County intended to maintain an employment relationship with Quinn, and no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the County intended to force Quinn to quit. See Anda v. Wickes Furniture Co., 517 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that plaintiff failed to generate issue of fact on employer's intent to force resignation when employer expresses desire for plaintiff to return to work). Accordingly, Quinn's constructive discharge theory fails as a matter of law. Finally, we reject Quinn's perfunctory invitation to reverse because the district court ignored facts and inappropriately resolved issues of fact. Quinn's brief lists various facts that the district court allegedly ignored, asserts that the district court resolved certain issues of fact in the County's favor, and concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists. But Quinn neither explains why the facts to which she refers are material, Tsai, 648 F.3d 584, 588, nor categorizes the factual disputes in relation to the legal elements of her claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Because Quinn failed to generate an issue of fact as to whether she suffered a materially adverse employment action, summary judgment was appropriate as to Quinn's MHRA retaliation claim.