Opinion ID: 613588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Who Bore the Burden of Making A Clearer Record?

Text: The district court held that Downs's Sixth Amendment claim was unreviewable because of the insufficiency of the record. The district court squarely placed the burden of making a record on Downs, as it held that petitioner [bore] the responsibility for generating a record that makes meaningful post-conviction review feasible. Downs v. Lape, No. 08 Civ. 92(RJD), 2009 WL 3698134, at  (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2009). The majority acquiesces in this conclusion. It notes that [t]he record pertaining to the state trial judge's request that [the brother] leave the courtroom is, to say the least, poorly developed. Maj. Op. at 104. It observes that defense counsel failed specifically to ask that the judge give reasons for the exclusion or to solicit comment from the judge or the prosecutor, neither of whom interrupted or responded to counsel's statement. Maj. Op. at 100. The majority seems to agree with the district court that it was up to Downs and his counsel to create a record that was free from all ambiguity, and that Downs must now bear the consequences of the lack of a pristine record. In my view, if there is any doubtand I believe there is very littleany ambiguity should be resolved in favor of Downs. First, as a general matter, § 295 of the New York Judiciary Law requires complete stenographic notes of each ruling or decision of the presiding judge. N.Y. Jud. Law § 295 (McKinney 2005) (emphasis added). [4] See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 6-1.7 (3d ed.2000) (The trial judge has a duty to see that the reporter makes a true, complete, and accurate record of all proceedings.). The trial court's ruling excluding Nathaniel from the trial should have been transcribed. While a defendant must show that he has been prejudiced by the absence of a stenographic record to obtain reversal of a conviction, see People v. Harrison, 85 N.Y.2d at 796, 628 N.Y.S.2d 939, 652 N.E.2d 638, [5] Downs surely would be prejudiced if he is deemed to have forfeited his right to post-conviction review because of the absence of a more complete record. Second, in the Sixth Amendment context in particular, the trial court itself has an obligation to make a proper record. In Waller v. Georgia , the Supreme Court held that a trial court may not close a court proceeding unless it concludes, based on specific findings, that closure is justified by an overriding interest, the closure is no broader than necessary, and reasonable alternatives to closure have been considered. 467 U.S. 39, 45, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) (internal citations omitted). A trial may not be closed unless the trial court makes findings specific enough to permit a reviewing court to determine whether the closure order was properly entered. Id. at 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210. Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals has held that, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, a trial court's reasons for excluding a defendant's family members from the courtroom must be `demonstrated and documented.' Nieves, 90 N.Y.2d at 429-30, 660 N.Y.S.2d 858, 683 N.E.2d 764 (quoting People v. Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d 54, 57, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042 (1991)). So too, in Martinez, the First Department noted that the record was silent as to any factual findings or overriding interest to justify the closure, and determined that the burden was on the trial court to create a record when such an important right was being foreclosed. 172 A.D.2d at 429-30, 568 N.Y.S.2d 940. Here, although the record is sparse, what exists makes clear that the exclusion order rested upon the trial court's policy of not permitting members of the public under 16 or 17 years of age to attend trial. Defense counsel's statement that Nathaniel would not have been an obstruction to the proceedings and the observation in his affidavit to the Appellate Division that the court ordered Nathaniel out of the courtroom solely because of his age, J.A. 63, make clear that the court's policy was a blanket one and that Nathaniel was not given individual consideration. Moreover, the available record shows that the trial court ordered Nathaniel excluded on its own initiative; the prosecution had not requested that Nathaniel be removed. Downs's counsel challenged the exclusion order by making his statement for the record. Yet, the trial court remained silentit did not correct anything that counsel said, nor did it make the individualized findings required by Waller . Likewise, the prosecution did nothing, when it should have reminded the trial court of its duty to make findings sufficient to justify exclusion of Nathaniel. In these circumstances, it was the trial court's burden to make findings sufficient to justify its self-initiated closure of the courtroom to Nathaniel. [6] Yet, it made no findings at all. As the district court noted below, [t]his record ... would almost automatically fail Waller, for no overriding interest has been identified, the court's consideration of alternatives is not evident on the record, and of course there are no findings. Downs, 2009 WL 3698134, at  (emphasis added). In light of all the circumstances, to the extent there is any ambiguity in the record, that ambiguity should not operate to deprive Downs of his right to habeas review.