Opinion ID: 1415021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the jury was properly instructed and whether the special verdict form was appropriate.

Text: Several issues raised by Island Holidays on appeal remain to be decided in this case: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Island Holidays' motion for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in giving jury instructions numbers 17 and 18; [9] (3) whether the trial court erred in denying Island Holidays' oral motion for remittitur and motion for a new trial. We find appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict and the alleged prejudicial impact of the jury instructions difficult because of certain ambiguities in Fitzgerald's pleading and the confusing manner in which the trial court conducted this case. Fitzgerald's pleading is ambiguous for two reasons. First, it fails to clearly set forth whether Fitzgerald's claim seeks recovery for breach of the written lease or breach of the alleged oral lease or both. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of counterclaim, Fitzgerald asserts that a promise by Amfac (Island Holidays) to execute a new lease with Fitzgerald and that in reliance thereon, Fitzgerald removed the contents of his shop out of the hotel lobby to permit renovations. [10] These paragraphs indicate that an oral agreement to execute a new written lease is at issue. Paragraph 5 alleges that Amfac knew of the existence of a lease by and between Fitz and Amfac's predecessors ... which [was] in effect till December of 1974. This paragraph puts the written lease of 1964 at issue. [11] Paragraph 6 alleges many acts of Amfac which interfered with the conduct of Fitzgerald's retail business contrary to the existing lease. Paragraph 7 alleges that Amfac's conduct was insidious, invidious, discriminating and covertly committed to force Fitz out of the hotel. Paragraph 8 asserts that Amfac's conduct carelessly and negligently disregarded the existing lease. Fitzgerald's second cause of action reiterates and incorporates paragraphs 1-9 and states again that Amfac breached their existing lease. The third cause of action also reiterates and incorporates paragraphs 1-9. It is unclear whether the term existing lease in paragraphs 6 through 8 refers to the new lease in paragraph 3 or the written lease in paragraph 5, or both. [12] Read as a whole, the pleadings appear to refer to a breach of an alleged oral agreement to execute a new written lease, but subsequent events at trial put this interpretation in doubt. No attempt was made by Fitzgerald to amend his pleadings, nor did the court or Island Holidays formally request any amendments or supplements to the pleadings. The pleading also fails to specify what covenant or which terms of either lease were breached. If, as paragraph 8 seems to imply, [13] Fitzgerald is claiming a breach of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, we are unable to determine from the evidence adduced at trial whether some or all of Island Holidays' conduct as stated in paragraphs 3 and 6 breached the covenant as to the alleged oral contract to lease, or the written lease. The evidence at trial does not clarify the terms of the new lease, nor does Fitzgerald show how the conduct of Island Holidays resulted in a breach of the terms of the written lease. Neither party at trial requested jury instructions addressing the issue of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. Rule 8(e)(1), H.R.C.P., requires that [e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.  (Emphasis added.) Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 47, 451 P.2d 814, 818 (1969); Silver v. Queen's Hospital, 53 F.R.D. 223 (D.C. 1971); Goshen Veneer Co. v. G. & A. Aircraft, 3 F.R.D. 344 (D.C. 1944). However, it is also well established that, generally, pleadings must be construed liberally and not technically. Rule 8(f), H.R.C.P. [14] ; Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-422, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959); Johnson v. Reagan, 524 F.2d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir.1975); Trixler Brokerage Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 505 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir.1974). In the instant case, no matter how liberally we attempt to construe the pleadings, especially of Fitzgerald's, our net conclusion is, still, confusion and uncertainty as to what controversy Fitzgerald attempts to plead. Fitzgerald's pleading, therefore, fails to concentrate the controversy adequately to permit the appellate court to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. A second source of confusion in this appeal stems from the trial court's ruling on the summary possession issue. Since Fitzgerald defended against Island Holidays' complaint for summary possession on the basis of an existing valid oral lease as well as on the equitable defense of estoppel, we can only conclude by the court's granting of the summary judgment order that the court found insufficient evidence to support both defenses. A case is ripe for summary adjudication in accordance with applicable principles of law when there is no triable issue of fact as to any of the affirmative defenses or they are all legally insufficient. If there is a triable issue of fact as to any one or more legally sufficient affirmative defenses, the plaintiff would not be entitled to summary judgment. 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[4]. If this is so, the court should not have submitted the issue of the existence of a valid and binding oral contract to lease to the jury. If the court meant to conduct the trial on the basis of a breach of the written lease alone, then questions 3, 4, and 5 of the court's special verdict form were inappropriate. If the court meant to conduct the trial on a claim that a valid and binding oral contract to lease had been entered into, then the summary judgment order was improvidently granted and questions 1 and 2 of the special verdict to the jury were inappropriate. [15] We can only conclude from the submission of all 5 questions to the jury that the court intended to conduct the trial on the issues of breach of the written lease and a possible breach of an alleged oral contract to lease. At trial on May 27, 1975, before the jury, the trial judge made the following statement: Now as far as the subject matter of the trial goes, I'm not going to go into it excepting very briefly. Very briefly Mr. Fitzgerald claims to have had a lease on a portion of what is sometimes called the Kaanapali Beach Hotel to conduct a business, a camera shop business. And this lease was entered into back in 1964. That was about almost 11 years ago, 10 and a half years ago. Now that original lease apparently was a five year lease. There was a clause saying that under certain conditions they could have a renewal. And then the  It has already been decided that as far as the lease itself goes, as of the first of January of this year there is no question but that a lease has ended. So we are not going to be involved with any matters after January 1st of 1974-'75 I should say. (Emphasis added.) It is very unclear what the judge meant by the last statement. [16] Appellate review of the prejudicial impact of jury instructions numbers 17 and 18 is difficult because it is not clear from the jury verdict whether or not the jury found sufficient evidence of willful and wanton conduct by Island Holidays justifying an award of punitive damages. Our review of the record reveals no evidence of conduct by Island Holidays amounting to wanton or reckless breach of contract as that found in Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Haw. 18, 501 P.2d 368 (1972). Since erroneous jury instructions are presumptively harmful unless it affirmatively appears from the whole record that it was not prejudicial, City and County of Honolulu v. Bennett, 57 Haw. 195, 206, 552 P.2d 1380, 1388 (1976), we are persuaded to reverse the judgment on the issue of damages for retrial. We, therefore, decline in the resolution of the remaining issues. However, upon remand for new trial, we suggest to the trial court that it advise the parties herein to seek proper amendments of the pleadings. Our review of the record indicates that the conduct of the trial did not prejudice the jury finding on Island Holidays' claim for back rent. On remand, Island Holidays is precluded from raising this issue. Judgment for summary possession and judgment for damages reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.