Opinion ID: 2621417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: Respondent Richardson Construction, Inc., was a general contractor on a project for the White Pine County School District. Richardson subcontracted with Theobald to provide labor, materials, equipment, and other services for the project. The subcontract provided that [t]he Final payment of retention will be paid to Subcontractor 30 days after receipt of retention from the Owner. During construction, additional costs were allegedly incurred as a result of extras, changes, delays, failures to provide access, and changes in the scope of the project. As a result, White Pine refused to pay Richardson the final payment and retention, and Richardson refused to pay Theobald until White Pine paid Richardson. Theobald sued Richardson in April 1995 for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Richardson, however, chose to arbitrate its dispute with White Pine and moved for a stay of litigation with Theobald while it pursued the arbitration. Richardson argued that the first lawsuit was premature because it had thirty days after receiving the final payment and retention to pay Theobald, it had not received payment, and it would pay Theobald after it had received payment from White Pine. Theobald opposed the motion, arguing that the money Richardson owed under the contract was immediately due and payable. The district court denied Richardson's motion in March 1997. Nevertheless, instead of pursuing its claims, Theobald cooperated with Richardson in Richardson's arbitration with White Pine, providing documentation regarding charges owed to Theobald. Theobald then waited for the arbitration between Richardson and White Pine to be resolved so that Richardson could pay Theobald. Theobald and Richardson did not agree to extend the time for Theobald to bring the action to trial under NRCP 41(e). Richardson and White Pine settled in December 1997. In February 2002, Theobald became aware of the settlement and requested payment from Richardson, which refused to pay. In March 2003, nearly eight years after it filed its complaint, Theobald moved for summary judgment against Richardson. Richardson moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on NRCP 41(e) for failure to prosecute. As the lawsuit had not been prosecuted within NRCP 41(e)'s five-year requirement, the district court dismissed the lawsuit. The district court did not indicate whether it dismissed the lawsuit with or without prejudice. [2] Theobald did not appeal or ask for modification of that order. Instead, it filed a second complaint against Richardson in July 2003. Theobald again alleged breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Richardson moved to dismiss, arguing that Theobald was barred from further litigation because dismissal of the first lawsuit was not without prejudice and the statute of limitations had run. In response, Theobald cited Home Savings and argued that the previous district court abused its discretion when it did not dismiss the first lawsuit without prejudice because Richardson led Theobald to believe that it would be paid when Richardson was paid. Contrary to its earlier argument opposing Richardson's motion to stay the district court proceedings, Theobald also argued that Richardson's obligation to pay Theobald did not arise until White Pine paid Richardson. The district court dismissed the second complaint based on both NRCP 41(e) and the statute of limitations. Theobald appeals, arguing that, under Home Savings, a district court may consider whether the previous district court abused its discretion when it dismissed an earlier lawsuit without mentioning prejudice, and may refuse to apply the doctrine of res judicata if it determines that the earlier lawsuit should have been dismissed without prejudice.