Opinion ID: 2520439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board Acted Within Its Authorized Powers in Adopting the Regulation.

Text: A party challenging a regulation bears the burden of showing that adoption of the regulation is inconsistent with the adopting agency's controlling statute. [3] We presume that a regulation promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act is valid, [4] and we will uphold the regulation so long as it is consistent with and reasonably necessary to implement the statutes authorizing [its] adoption and it is reasonable and not arbitrary. [5] Because Grunert does not claim that the regulation in question in this case, 5 AAC 15.359, was not promulgated in accordance with the APA, Grunert bears the burden of showing that it is inconsistent with the Fish and Game Code or is unreasonable and arbitrary. The Board of Fisheries is governed by Article 2 of the Fish and Game Code, AS 16.05. The legislature created the board for the general purposes of the conservation and development of the fishery resources of the state. [6] In Kenai Peninsula Fisherman's Cooperative Association v. State , [7] in determining that conservation and development allowed the board to regulate utilization of resources among various user groups, we held that conservation laws such as fish and game laws should be liberally construed to achieve their intended purpose. [8] Following our decision in Kenai Peninsula, the legislature broadly granted the board the authority in AS 16.05.251 to enact regulations concerning sixteen enumerated types of issues, including, for example: establishing open and closed seasons and areas; setting quotas and bag limits; and establishing the means and methods employed in the pursuit, capture, and transport of fish. Most relevant here, the legislature in AS 16.05.251(a)(12) granted the board the power to regulate commercial, sport, guided sport, subsistence, and personal use fishing as needed for the conservation, development and utilization of fisheries. [9] Part III.C. of today's Opinion correctly rejects Grunert's argument that the co-op regulation pursues objectives not permitted by statute. In so doing, it concludes that the regulation properly concerns development and utilization of the resource. While I believe that this regulation also serves conservation objectives, [10] I otherwise agree with this portion of the Opinion. However, Part III.D. of the Opinion mistakenly accepts Grunert's argument that the regulation nonetheless exceeds the board's authority. The Opinion is based on a narrow reading of AS 16.05.251(e) (an allocation provision) and an incorrect interpretation of the statutory definition of the term fishery. Alaska Statute 16.05.251(e) provides that the board, when regulating a permitted subject, may allocate fishery resources among personal use, sport, guided sport, and commercial fisheries. Because the Opinion concludes that the entire Chignik purse seine salmon fishery  cooperative and competitive fishers included  constitutes a single fishery under the statutory definition, it strikes down the regulation, reading AS 16.05.251(e) to permit allocations between fisheries, but not within a single fishery. This conclusion is misguided for several reasons. First, the Opinion's premise  that the cooperative fishery and the competitive fishery cannot constitute separate fisheries  is clearly wrong. The Fish and Game Code, the board's controlling statute, defines a fishery as a specific administrative area in which a specific fishery resource is taken with a specific type of gear. [11] In fitting both groups into a single fishery, the majority ignores the fact  raised in the state's briefing to this court  that the board has subsequently passed a regulation permitting the cooperative fishers to use types of gear otherwise denied to competitive fishers. Thus, because the two groups have access to differing types of gear, the language easily accommodates the conclusion that these are two fisheries. Moreover, even ignoring the subsequent regulation, the differences in operation between the cooperative fishery and the competitive fishery are sufficient to qualify as different types of gear. The regulation defined cooperative fishery as a commercial purse seine salmon fishery in which, by agreement of the participants, the number of fishing vessels may be reduced with the intent of decreasing overhead expenses associated with commercial fishing and controlling the rate of harvest to achieve a higher quality product. While Grunert complains that the distinguishing trait relates only to business structure and not to tangible gear, the definition of fishery is not so restrictive. [T]ype of gear is defined broadly and includes, by way of example, such subclassifications as that between sport gear and guided sport gear. [12] Sport fisheries and guided sport fisheries use the same type of gear (hook and line) but have different economic purposes. In light of the liberal construction given to these statutes, such a difference should be sufficient to avoid striking down the regulation based on a definition. Second, even accepting the notion that the cooperative fishery and the competitive fishery constitute only one fishery, the Opinion's conclusion regarding permitted allocation is incorrect. It places too much weight on a questionable definition of the preposition among in AS 16.05.251(e). In reading among to permit allocations between the fisheries, but not within a single fishery, the Opinion conflates the terms among and between. Yet there is a distinction between these two words:  Between expresses one-to-one relations of many things, and among expresses collective and undefined relations. [13] Thus, while between would apparently preclude different allocations to members of the same fishery (i.e., within a fishery), among could possibly lead to a different result. The legislature could have used the word between in this provision, but it did not. This reading also conflicts with our case law. We have previously held that the board possesses broad allocation powers. Before there was a statutory allocation provision, we allowed the board to regulate the utilization of fishery resources by various user groups. [14] Later, we upheld a regulation allocating resources between two competing subgroups of commercial users. [15] We have also specifically rejected a lower court's interpretation of AS 16.05.251(e) that prohibited intra-group allocations (that is, between two or more commercial fisheries), stating that [t]he phrase `among personal use, sport, and commercial fishing' does not on its face indicate any intent to exclude any subsets of the phrase, such as intra-commercial allocations. [16] Moreover, we have previously held that the board may allocate resources within sub-classes of a fishery, just as the board did in the present case. In State v. Hebert, [17] we adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals [18] in upholding a board regulation that created two superexclusive herring sac roe fisheries within a single management area and provided that a person who fished one superexclusive fishery could not fish another superexclusive fishery or a nonexclusive fishery within the same season. [19] The regulation effectively discriminated between otherwise similarly situated commercial herring fishers in the same administrative area based on the size of the herring operation, with superexclusive areas favoring smaller operators. [20] One of the board's goals in passing this regulation was to alleviate local economic distress. [21] We concluded that the board acted within its authority in passing this regulation. [22] Additionally, we held it to be constitutional. [23] Hebert, consequently, stands for two propositions relevant to this case. First, the board may make resource allocations within a single fishery (same administrative area, same fishery resource, and same gear). Second, the board may make such an allocation to assist economically marginal fishers. Today's Opinion conflicts with both of these propositions. [24] Finally, allocations within a single fishery are already authorized under other provisions governing the board. As the superior court pointed out below, the board could have elected, for example, to simply impose an equal-share quota system for each seiner in Chignik, and such an allocation would have been within the board's authority. [25] It is incongruous to hold that the among language precludes allocations within a fishery, where other provisions, such as the power to set quotas, already allows it. For all of these reasons, I would hold that the board acted within its authority in adopting the regulation.