Opinion ID: 2206347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Can a court include in its sentencing of a defendant, who has been found guilty following a jury trial, a condition requiring the defendant to reimburse the county for the costs of the defendant's court-appointed counsel?

Text: Kottenbroch argues that the North Dakota recoupment statute, Section 29-07-01.1, N.D.C.C., is unconstitutionally vague and in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. We have concluded that North Dakota's recoupment statute is constitutional. Before analyzing Kottenbroch's argument, we repeat the well-recognized rules of construction summarized in State v. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d 364, 366 (N.D.1977); and State v. Hagge, 211 N.W.2d 395, 397 (N.D.1973). Acts of the legislature enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, and to rebut that presumption it must be shown that they clearly violate some provision of the Constitution. Additionally, statutes are to be construed practically, construing words in their ordinary sense and determining legislative intent from the statute as a whole. If there are two possible constructions of a statute, we must choose the one which, without doing violence to the statute, will render it valid. Id. The repayment by an indigent defendant to the State for the cost of his court-appointed attorney is provided for in Section 29-07-01.1, N.D.C.C. That section provides in relevant part: A defendant with appointed counsel shall pay to the county or state such sums as the court shall direct. The state's attorney of the county wherein the action was prosecuted shall seek recovery of any such sums any time he determines the person for whom counsel was appointed may have funds to repay the county or state within six years of the date such amount was paid on his behalf. § 29-07-01.1, N.D.C.C. In support of his arguments, Kottenbroch cites Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974); and James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600 (1972). The Supreme Court, in James, held the Kansas recoupment statute unconstitutional. That statute provided that the debt became a lien on the real estate of the defendant, and because the defendant was not accorded any of the exemptions, except the homestead exemptions, provided by the Kansas Code for other judgment debtors, the Court held that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. In Fuller, the Supreme Court upheld Oregon's recoupment statute against attacks of constitutional infirmity. The Oregon statute, however, was carefully designed to insure that only those who actually become capable of repaying the State will ever be obliged to do so. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 53, 94 S.Ct. at 2124. The Oregon statute did not deny indigent defendants the exemptions from execution afforded to other judgment debtors. In fact, a separate provision directed that [a] judgment that the defendant pay money, either as a fine or as costs and disbursements of the action, or both, shall be docketed as a judgment in a civil action and with like effect.... 417 U.S. at 47, 94 S.Ct. at 2122. The North Dakota recoupment statute, while not expressly granting indigent defendants all exemptions accorded to other judgment debtors as in Fuller, does not expressly deny any exemptions either, as in James. Without a provision expressly denying exemptions, indigent defendants in North Dakota are entitled to all exemptions from process granted to other judgment debtors. Kottenbroch's argument that North Dakota's recoupment statute is constitutionally infirm because it does not expressly permit an indigent defendant to claim exemptions allowed to other judgment debtors, therefore is without merit. The second argument made by Kottenbroch is that the statute is unconstitutional because it appears to be mandatory and not discretionary. This argument is valid when applied to a situation, such as this case, where a probationer may have his probation revoked because of his inability, though he may be willing, to pay. This infirmity is cured, however, by requiring the court to find that a probationer is capable, but unwilling, to repay the costs of his defense before permitting a revocation of his probation. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9. Legislation will be construed so that it will pass constitutional muster if possible. Tang v. Ping, 209 N.W.2d 624, 628 (N.D.1973) (Holding that males and females eighteen years of age and older will be treated uniformly in determining their residency for the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, despite statute defining minors differently for males and females.). We therefore construe Section 29-07-01.1, N.D.C.C., to impose such a restriction on revocation of probation. The third argument made by Kottenbroch is that the North Dakota recoupment statute is constitutionally infirm because it does not have the safeguards of the Oregon statute which survived constitutional challenge in Fuller. It is true that the statute in question does not provide the many safeguards found in the Oregon statute. However, our reading of Fuller and James brings us to the conclusion that a statute need not provide all the safeguards of the Oregon statute. Instead, it only needs to be fashioned so that it does not invidiously discriminate between an indigent defendant who becomes a judgment debtor by virtue of his retention of a court-appointed attorney and a non-indigent defendant or other judgment debtor. Our recoupment statute, as previously construed herein, allows an indigent defendant the same exemptions any other person is entitled to. Further, as previously indicated herein, no probation can be revoked simply because the probationer is unable to pay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. We therefore conclude that North Dakota's recoupment statute does not invidiously discriminate between an indigent defendant and a non-indigent defendant or other judgment debtor. Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9. Kottenbroch's fifth argument is that the statute is unconstitutional because it does not specify whether it applies to all indigent defendants or only those who have been convicted. This argument is the flip-side of an argument made in Fuller. In that case, the petitioner argued that Oregon's statute requiring only convicted defendants to repay the cost of their court-appointed counsel denied him equal protection of the laws by discriminating between convicted defendants and acquitted defendants or those whose convictions are reversed. The Court said: `We do not inquire whether this statute is wise or desirable.... Misguided laws may nonetheless be constitutional.' ... Our task is merely to determine whether there is `some rationality in the nature of the class singled out.' 417 U.S. at 49, 94 S.Ct. at 2122. (Citations omitted.) Our recoupment statute does not discriminate between convicted defendants and acquitted defendants, and, therefore, with no discrimination there can be no Equal Protection Clause violation. Kottenbroch next argues that requiring repayment as a condition of probation will have chilling effect on a defendant's exercise of his right to counsel. This argument is without merit. As the Court stated in Fuller : The fact that an indigent who accepts state-appointed legal representation knows that he might someday be required to repay the costs of these services in no way affects his eligibility to obtain counsel. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 53, 94 S.Ct. at 2124. As we have construed Section 29-07-01.1, N.D.C.C., to require only probationers who are able to repay the costs of their defense to pay, we conclude the statute does not chill the right to counsel. Because we have concluded that Section 29-07-01.1, N.D.C.C., is constitutionally firm, we must address Kottenbroch's final argument. He argues that because the statute does not expressly provide that repayment may be made a condition of probation, such a condition may not be imposed. He argues that the legislature intended that repayment be treated as a civil judgment. Section 12-53-13 of the North Dakota Century Code gives a sentencing judge wide discretion in imposing conditions for a deferred imposition of sentence. We believe it is wise to give the court discretion in offering a criminal defendant the opportunity to bring his future conduct into conformance with the laws society deems necessary to protect itself and to promote the general good. In State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136 (N.D.1972), we said that the trial court has a responsibility to rehabilitate a probationer, regulate a probationer's activities, and guard against continued criminal behavior. In this case, the trial court determined that repayment of a probationer's attorney's fees would be appropriate. We believe that requiring that this be done is a reasonable means of educating the probationer as to the costs involved and of impressing upon him his responsibility for them. Further, we believe it will help deter him from future criminal activity and at the same time permit him to avoid the stigma of a criminal conviction record. The condition requiring repayment may also act as an incentive to the probationer to more vigorously seek employment and thereby help him to become a more useful and productive member of society. The legislature has given the court discretion in imposing conditions of probation. Section 12.1-32-07(1), N.D.C.C., provides that the court may impose conditions of probation as the court in its discretion deems reasonably necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so. That is a very general grant of discretion. The legislature, in Section 12.1-32-07(2), N.D.C.C., provides in effect that the court may impose such conditions as it deems appropriate, and may include any one or more of the following. The statute then delineates 15 specific conditions of probation courts may impose. The language of the statute, however, is not restrictive. [4] Instead, the legislature used the permissive term may in its reference to the specified conditions of probation courts may impose. In light of legislative authorization of recoupment in Section 29-07-01.1, N.D.C.C., we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing as a condition of Kottenbroch's probation a requirement that he repay the costs of his court-appointed defense counsel. As we said in State v. Faul, 300 N.W.2d 827, 833 (N.D.1980), The court in sentencing a defendant may use any legitimate sentence and may suspend a part of the sentence upon certain conditions. Section 12-53-13, NDCC. (Emphasis added.) For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm. VANDE WALLE, PEDERSON, PAULSON and SAND, JJ., concur.