Opinion ID: 1785706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Anderson's assertion of his right

Text: Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of an accused. Kelley v. State, 568 So.2d 405, 410 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). On the other hand, an accused's delay [in filing a motion for a speedy trial] reduces the significance of the appellant's assertion. Archer v. State, 643 So.2d 597, 599 (Ala.Crim. App.1991). In the present case, Anderson first requested a final disposition of untried indictments, information or complaints in Alabama on December 13, 2005, a year and 10 months after he was indicted. Then, on March 28, 2006, he asked that his trial date be continued. Shortly thereafter, on June 29, 2006, Anderson moved to dismiss the case specifically for failure to provide a Speedy Trial. [2] Thus, Anderson waited nearly two years after his indictment to request a final disposition; he subsequently secured a further delay; and he then specifically asserted that the trial court had failed to provide him a speedy trial. Anderson's delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial and his own effort to delay the trial weighs against his claim. Archer v. State, 643 So.2d at 599 ([T]he appellant did not file his motion for speedy trial until . . . over a year from the date of indictment. The fact that the appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial sooner `tends to suggest that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only minimal prejudice prior to that date.' (quoting Lewis v. State, 469 So.2d 1291, 1294 (Ala.Crim.App.1984))).