Opinion ID: 718690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reliance on an Authorized Copy

Text: 29 Section 406(a) states in relevant part that: 30 [W]here the person named in the copyright notice on copies ... publicly distributed by authority of the copyright owner is not the owner of the copyright, ... any person who innocently begins an undertaking that infringes the copyright has a complete defense to any action for such infringement if such person proves that he or she was misled by the notice and began the undertaking in good faith under a purported transfer or license from the person named therein.... 31 17 U.S.C. § 406(a). Bagdadi contends that the innocent infringer defense would not apply to Nazar because the copy on which Nazar relied, which came from Linguex, was not an authorized copy. Bagdadi reasons that he transferred to Linguex only the right to use the video in its classrooms, not to further sell the video to Nazar. As a result of Nazar's reliance on the erroneous copyright in an un authorized copy of English I, Bagdadi asserts that the § 406(a) defense does not apply. 32 This argument misses the mark. 4 Bagdadi's interpretation would require that in order for the § 406(a) defense to apply, the purported transfer or license from the person named in the copyright (Linguex) to the person claiming innocent infringement (Nazar) would have to be authorized by the true copyright owner (Bagdadi). Such a rule would inappropriately shift the focus of the requirement of owner authorization from the initial public distribution, where it belongs, and render irrelevant the innocence of anyone relying in good faith on a misleading notice. 33 It is Bagdadi's authorization of the initial public distribution to Linguex that is the authorization required to constitute a copy publicly distributed by authority of the copyright owner. A subsequent distribution to another party, such as that found in this case, is precisely the type of situation for which the innocent infringer defense was created. Thus, Bagdadi's reading of section 406(a) fails because it is inconsistent with the statute's plain language and irreconcilable with its manifest purpose. 34