Opinion ID: 2598598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Imposition of Multiple and Consecutive Life Sentences

Text: [¶ 54] Mr. Urbigkit claims the habitual criminal statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 2001), provides for punishment by imprisonment for life, not life for each conviction. On this basis, he asserts the trial court exceeded its statutory authority when it imposed multiple sentences of life in prison. [¶ 55] When a criminal sentence is within the parameters set by the legislature, it will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Dodge v. State, 951 P.2d 383, 385 (Wyo.1997). Section 6-10-201 (emphasis added) provides: (a) A person is [a] habitual criminal if: (i) He is convicted of a violent felony; and (ii) He has been convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous charges separately brought and tried which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or elsewhere. (b) [A] habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment for: (i) Not less than ten (10) years nor more than fifty (50) years, if he has two (2) previous convictions; (ii) Life, if he has three (3) or more previous convictions. In Lacey v. State, 803 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Wyo.1990) (citation omitted), we said: The purpose of the habitual criminal statute is to provide additional punishment for people who have not been deterred by previous penalties. That purpose applies regardless of whether the habitual criminal commits more than one felony during a single occurrence or more than one felony in separate occurrences. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced two sentences for two convictions arising out of a single occurrence. For the same reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced each sentence for each conviction of a violent felony arising out of the February 7, 2001, occurrence. [¶ 56] Mr. Urbigkit also contends the trial court violated his right to be free from double jeopardy when it used prior convictions in 1983, 1987, and 1997 to enhance each of his aggravated assault convictions. In Kearns v. State, 2002 WY 97, ¶ 24, 48 P.3d 1090, ¶ 24 (Wyo.2002), we said: The intent behind Wyoming's habitual criminal statute is to provide enhanced punishment to an individual who has engaged in a pattern of violent criminal conduct. For that reason, the fact that some prior crimes have already been used to enhance a sentence does not preclude the use of the same crimes to enhance a later sentence.... `... A habitual criminal statute does not punish a defendant for his previous offenses but for his persistence in crime, and it has been said that to be a habitual criminal involves a status rather than the commission of a separate offense.' Evans [ v. State ], 655 P.2d [1214,] 1220-21 [(Wyo.1982)] (quoting 39 Am.Jur.2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders, § 2, pp. 308-310 (1968)). Thus, the use of Mr. Urbigkit's prior convictions to enhance his aggravated assault convictions did not violate his right against double jeopardy.