Opinion ID: 2777568
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unduly Prejudicial

Text: It has already been explained why the evidence of Richardson’s conviction was not probative of his intent to possess and distribute in this case, the only basis for which it was 3 As previously discussed, there is an intra-circuit split on whether this element is reviewed for an abuse of discretion or de novo. However, because “[t]he abuse-of-discretion standard includes review to determine that the decision was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions,” little turns on whether we label review of this aspect of the district court’s Rule 404(b) decision abuse of discretion or de novo. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). Here, the district court had no indication that Richardson’s 1998 conviction was in any way related to his present crime. Thus, under either standard of review, the court reached an erroneous legal conclusion. 10 No. 13-2287 offered. However, even assuming that the conviction was probative on the issue of intent, it was only minimally so. Similar to the defendant in Bell, Richardson’s distribution of drugs thirteen years prior to the instant offense “does not necessarily imply that he was intending to possess and distribute drugs on this occasion.” 516 F.3d at 445. Because no facts relating to the 1998 conviction were offered into evidence to show what the conviction and the present crime shared in common other than their elements of proof, the record of conviction would only be probative if the jury were permitted to reason that because Richardson intended to commit the offense before, he intended to do it again. See id.; see also United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the bare fact that the defendant was convicted for distributing drugs in 2000 could only be evidence that he intended to distribute drugs in 2008 under a propensity theory). This is precisely the type of propensity inference upon which the government implicitly relied and Rule 404(b) forbids. The district court was aware that the probative value and unfair prejudice inquiry requires consideration of whether the jury would be able “to impartially place evidence in context” and consider it only for a legitimate purpose. [R. 55, Tr. Jury Trial III, PGID 609.] However, the court concluded that Richardson’s convictions did not require consideration of this “balancing.” [Id.] Instead, it briefly considered whether the conviction would “inflame or upset” the jury and concluded it would not. [Id.] Because the district court conducted the incorrect prejudice inquiry, it abused its discretion. See Jones, 617 F.3d at 850.