Opinion ID: 1441425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Beyond the ken.

Text: Nixon next contends that the admission of Dr. Dutton's expert testimony was reversible error because battered woman syndrome is not beyond the ken of the average layperson. Nixon made essentially the same claim in the trial court, and the issue has been preserved for appeal. During the course of the trial, the defense repeatedly attempted to persuade the jury that Ms. Boyd's testimony was not credible. Nixon's counsel argued that for a long period, Ms. Boyd did not report, and even denied, the alleged abuse, and that her allegations were therefore belied by her own conduct. In his opening statement, Nixon's attorney told the jurors that there would be no medical records ... no pictures... no police reports of my client beating up Miss Boyd. Counsel asked the jurors to ponder why. During his cross-examination of the complainant, Nixon's attorney focused on her failure to report or disclose the abuse. Subsequently, in closing argument, counsel suggested that the failure of Ms. Boyd (or her family) to report the alleged battering to the police doesn't make sense. Actions sometimes speak louder than words, and a lay juror might well wonder whether Ms. Boyd's actions (and inaction) at the time of the alleged abuse were consistent with the narrative which she provided in the courtroom long after the events occurred. Dr. Dutton's testimony was designed to apprise the jurors of certain repeated patterns of behavior on the part of many battered women. With that information, the jurors were in a better position to determine whether these patterns of behavior might explain any perceived discrepancy between Ms. Boyd's words and her deeds. This court and other courts have held that testimony of the type provided by Dr. Dutton may assist the jury in understanding the evidence and is beyond the ken of the average lay juror within the meaning of Dyas. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas I, supra, 407 A.2d at 635 ([t]he substantive element of the Dyas ... test  `beyond the ken of the average layman'  is accordingly met here); Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 913, 112 S.Ct. 312, 116 L.Ed.2d 255 (1991); Grecinger, supra, 569 N.W.2d at 193-94; Christel, supra, 537 N.W.2d at 203-04; Borrelli, supra, 629 A.2d at 1112; Ciskie, supra, 751 P.2d at 1166, 1170-74. In Borrelli, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the testimony of the prosecution's expert on battered woman syndrome was beyond the knowledge and experience of the average juror. 629 A.2d at 1112 (citation omitted). The court relied on empirical research indicating that potential jurors may hold beliefs and attitudes about abused women at variance with the views of experts who have studied or had experience with abused women. In particular, males are likely to be skeptical about the fear the woman feels in an abusive relationship and about her inability to leave a setting in which abuse is threatened. Id. (quoting N. Vidmar & R. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52 Law & Contemp.Probs. 133, 154 (1989)). In Ciskie the defendant challenged the complainant's claims of abuse, arguing that she failed to seek medical attention, call the police, or leave the defendant, and that her behavior cast doubt upon her allegations. The Supreme Court of Washington sustained the trial judge's admission of testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome, reasoning that [n]either logic nor law requires us to deny victims an opportunity to explain to a jury, through a qualified expert, the reasons for conduct which would otherwise be beyond the average juror's understanding. 751 P.2d at 1166. Accord, Commonwealth v. Goetzendanner, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 637, 679 N.E.2d 240, 244 (1997) ([t]estimony concerning BWS could assist jurors in overcoming the common myth or stereotype that the victims of assaultive partners or spouses would naturally choose to end the relationship) (citations omitted). It is true, as Nixon contends, that a great deal of information about battered women is reported by the media and has found its way into the public domain. In that respect, however, this case is not unlike Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26 (D.C.1989). In Irick, the trial judge had admitted, over objection, testimony regarding the association between drugs and firearms. On appeal, the defendant contended that the evidence was not beyond the ken of the average juror and should therefore have been excluded. This court disagreed: Although the average reader of the daily press might well surmise, to quote Detective [Johnny St. Valentine] Brown, [22] that when you relate to drugs and guns it's like a marriage, it was surely reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that an expert's explication of the background of this melancholy proposition would be helpful to the jury. Id. at 31. In this case, too, the judge could reasonably conclude, without abusing his discretion, that Dr. Dutton's testimony was beyond the ken of a lay trier of fact and would be helpful to the jurors in their consideration of the evidence.