Opinion ID: 581376
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Service upon Talluto and LaPenna.

Text: 32 As noted earlier, Southern District Civil Rule 43(a) required that the order to show cause for the contempt motion be served upon respondents-appellants personally, in the manner provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of a summons. Respondents-appellants Florence Talluto and Michael LaPenna contend that service upon them did not comply with this mandate. 33 The district court's order to show cause provided that if plaintiffs are unable to effect personal service after two attempts, they may serve respondents at their last known address by Federal Express. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 732 F.Supp. at 400. Respondents were so served. 7 The district court concluded that its order allowing such service was proper under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i), which allows service upon individuals pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is held. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 732 F.Supp. at 400-01. 34 The pertinent law is N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. 308 (McKinney 1990). The district court concluded that service was proper under paragraph 5 of section 308, which permits personal service upon a natural person in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs, if service is impracticable under paragraphs one [personal service], two ['leave and mail' service 8 ] and four ['nail and mail' service 9 ] of this section. The issue then, is whether personal, leave and mail, and nail and mail service were all impracticable. See Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 497-99, 236 N.E.2d 451, 455-56, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161, 167-68 (1968); Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB v. Mancini, 169 A.D.2d 964, 964-65, 564 N.Y.S.2d 859, 859-60 (3d Dep't 1991); Hitchcock v. Pyramid Centers of Empire State Co., 151 A.D.2d 837, 838-39, 542 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814-15 (3d Dep't 1989); Giordano v. McMurtry, 79 A.D.2d 548, 548-49, 433 N.Y.S.2d 583, 584 (1st Dep't 1980), aff'd mem., 53 N.Y.2d 962, 424 N.E.2d 555, 441 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1981). 35 LaPenna and Talluto argue that nail and mail was practicable. The district court disagreed, emphasizing that  'those who have flagrantly violated the court's orders are not disposed to make themselves readily available for personal delivery of notice that they are to be prosecuted for contempt of those orders.'  New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 732 F.Supp. at 401 (quoting Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. 24 West 132 Equities, Inc., 137 Misc.2d 459, 462, 524 N.Y.S.2d 324, 327 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1987), aff'd mem., 150 A.D.2d 181, 540 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dep't 1989), appeal dismissed, 74 N.Y.2d 841, 545 N.E.2d 872, 546 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1078, 110 S.Ct. 1130, 107 L.Ed.2d 1035 (1990)). The district court thought that Department of Housing suggested that the manner of service is sufficient if it is 'reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise respondents of the pendency of the action,'  New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 732 F.Supp. at 401 (quoting Department of Housing, 137 Misc.2d at 462, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 327), and concluded that the service here was so calculated. Id. 36 We read Department of Housing differently. The reasonably calculated formulation stated by Appellate Term was addressed to the due process standard under the United States Constitution. This is made clear by the Appellate Term's citation, immediately following the quoted passage, of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), where it is stated that: An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action.... In Department of Housing, the contemnor was served by leave and mail, see 137 Misc.2d at 461, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 326, and the court emphasized that respondent had been served in accordance with one of the methods delineated in [section 308]. Id. at 462, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 327. Accordingly, the service in Department of Housing complied with the constitutional standard and with section 308. 37 In this case, by contrast, there was concededly no compliance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of section 308, so the issue becomes the impracticability standard of paragraph 5. The district court found impracticability because plaintiffs presented evidence of the practical difficulties they would encounter in effectuating service because of respondents' demonstrated disregard for the authority of the Court. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 732 F.Supp. 401. This does not amount to a showing, however, that nail and mail service would not have been practicable. 38 As noted earlier, the district court's order to show cause allowed service by Federal Express at a respondent's last known address after two unsuccessful attempts at personal service. See id. at 400. Plaintiffs-appellees provided Federal Express with the names and last known addresses of LaPenna and Talluto. No reason appears why this information would not have sufficed for compliance with section 308(4); i.e., a mailing to the last known residence of LaPenna and Talluto, and affixation of the documents to the door of each's actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode. Id. The order to show cause did not require any showing that there was any confusion as to the residence or dwelling place of any respondent-appellant, i.e., any impracticability, before allowing a bypass of section 308(4). 39 It was claimed at oral argument that the bulky motion papers involved could not practically have been nailed to any door, but section 308 requires only that they be affix[ed], and this may be accomplished by use of a nail, tack, tape, rubber band or some other device which will ensure a genuine adherence. Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Foley, 92 A.D.2d 959, 960, 460 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664 (3d Dep't 1983). We conclude that, in the absence of any showing, or requirement of a showing, that nail and mail service was impracticable, service under section 308(5) should not have been authorized by the district court. See Dobkin, 21 N.Y.2d at 497-99, 236 N.E.2d at 455-56, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 167-68; Dime Savings Bank, 169 A.D.2d at 964-65, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 859-60; Hitchcock, 151 A.D.2d at 838-39, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 814-15; Giordano, 79 A.D.2d at 548-49, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 584. 40 When service is made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i), federal courts have no authority to stray from the requirements set by state law, here section 308, even if service in disregard of those requirements would still be constitutional. [S]ervice of process must comply not only with constitutional requirements, but also with the provisions of the state statute. FDIC v. Schaffer, 731 F.2d 1134, 1136 (4th Cir.1984). Numerous federal courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction over parties who were not served in accordance with the pertinent state statute. See, e.g., Recreational Properties, Inc. v. Southwest Mortgage Serv. Corp., 804 F.2d 311, 314-15 (5th Cir.1986); Delta S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Albano, 768 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir.1985); National Trust for Historic Preservation v. 1750 K Inv. Partnership, 100 F.R.D. 483, 485-86 (E.D.Va.1984), aff'd mem., 755 F.2d 927, 929 (4th Cir.1985); Sun Sys. Prefabricated Solar Greenhouses, Inc. v. Venuti, 596 F.Supp. 1516, 1517 (E.D.N.Y.1984). Similarly, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Talluto and LaPenna. 41