Opinion ID: 2465757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Audio Tape/Hearsay

Text: [¶ 22] As described in the statement of facts, law enforcement audio recorded the April 30, 2009, drug transaction between Ms. Smith and the confidential informant. At trial, the State moved for admission of the recording during the confidential informant's testimony. Ms. Majors objected to the recording as hearsay, and the prosecution responded: It's not hearsay, it's the actual conversation and it's the best evidence of the conversation. [¶ 23] The district court allowed the recording to be played, although it indicated that it was only allowing counsel to proceed with the identification of it. Later, the court officially admitted the recording into evidence. The recording included conversations between law enforcement and the confidential informant and a conversation between the confidential informant and Ms. Smith. The recording was very difficult to understand in places; consequently, the confidential informant was asked to explain various parts of the recording at trial. She stated that Ms. Smith gave her two bags of marijuana and she then asked about obtaining some ecstasy. We are unable to understand the recording, but the confidential informant was allowed to testify that Ms. Smith said that Lex, who she identified as Ms. Majors, had a whole bunch of ecstasy. Ms. Smith stated that she would tell Lex to bring some back with her. Defense counsel objected to the confidential informant's interpretation of Ms. Smith's statements, but the district court allowed it. [¶ 24] On appeal, Ms. Majors claims the district court erred by allowing the hearsay testimony contained in the recording to be admitted into evidence at trial. The State asserts that the evidence was properly admitted because: 1) it was not hearsay; or 2) even if it was hearsay, it was admissible under the state of mind exception to the rule. [2] The district court's decision as to the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [3] Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶ 15, 166 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 2007). A district court abuses its discretion if it could not have reasonably concluded as it did. In this context, `reasonably' means sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without being arbitrary or capricious.' Id. [¶ 25] Hearsay is not admissible except as specifically provided by court rule or statute. W.R.E. 802. W.R.E. 801 defines hearsay as: (c) Hearsay.Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The recorded statements at issue here were made outside of court and, therefore, qualify under the basic definition of hearsay. W.R.E. 801(c). [¶ 26] The State argues, however, that the statements were not hearsay because they were only elicited for the purpose of providing context to the later search and not for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Ms. Majors had a whole bunch of ecstasy and would bring the drugs back with her. In Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 28, 228 P.3d 874, 884 (Wyo.2010), we discussed statements that are admitted for a non-hearsay purpose: If the testimony was elicited in an effort to provide context for the officer's investigation, rather than for the truth of the matter asserted, it is admissible for a limited purpose. Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107, 114 (Wyo.1985). In such a situation, a limiting instruction would be appropriate if requested by the defendant. [¶ 27] The State's argument that the statements were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted is belied by the prosecutor's closing argument. After replaying the recorded statement for the jury during closing argument, the prosecutor stated: You don't have to believe [the confidential informant], but just listen to that tape and hear Ms. Smith say, We're out, we are definitely out, Lex can get some of that, Lex has a lot of that. Listen to it. You guys have to decide on that. But that's the government's case. The prosecutor continued: Did Miss Majors possess the drugs with the intent to deliver? Did Miss Majors have anything at all to do with those? First we go back to the tape, we this, and we that, Lex has a lot of that, Lex can bring those.[] . . . and [after a few days] lo and behold we come into the house and there's all the marijuana and here is all the Ecstasy, just as Mama promised. There is simply no question that the prosecution intended to use Ms. Smith's statements to prove that Ms. Majors supplied her with illegal drugs. The State clearly indicated that the recorded statement was substantive evidence of Ms. Major's possession of the controlled substances and her intent to deliver them. Thus, the statements were hearsay and were not admissible unless they fell within an exception to the hearsay rule. [¶ 28] The State argues that the statements were admissible as evidence of Ms. Smith's present state of mind under W.R.E. 803(3): The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . . . (3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health). . . . The exception is generally used when a non-party declarant's (often the victim's) state of mind is relevant. For example, in Humphrey v. State, 2008 WY 67, ¶¶ 49-50, 185 P.3d 1236, 1250 (Wyo.2008), we ruled that testimony about the victim's statement that he was angry with the defendant fell within the existing state of mind exception because the defendant's knowledge of the victim's state of mind may have affected the defendant's actions. [¶ 29] The problem with the State's argument regarding the Rule 803(3) exception in the present case is the same as the problem with its argument that the evidence was not hearsaythe record clearly shows that the prosecution was not seeking admission of the evidence simply to show the declarant's (Ms. Smith's) state of mind; the State fully intended that the evidence be viewed by the jury as substantive evidence of Ms. Majors' delivery of illegal drugs. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence was hearsay, it was not admissible because it did not fall within any recognized exception and the district court erred by admitting it. [¶ 30] However, our inquiry does not end there. Reversal is required only if the error prejudiced the defendant. See Miller v. State, 2003 WY 55, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Wyo.2003). We must determine, therefore, whether the error affected any of Ms. Majors' substantial rights or whether the error was harmless. W.R.A.P. 9.04; W.R.Cr.P. 52. The error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred. To demonstrate harmful error, [the defendant] must prove prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 21, 157 P.3d 923, 928 (Wyo.2007) (citations omitted). [¶ 31] Ms. Majors was convicted of possession of marijuana and possession of ecstasy. We cannot say that the error in admitting Ms. Smith's hearsay statements prejudiced Ms. Majors with regard to the marijuana charge because Ms. Smith's statements did not specifically relate the marijuana to Ms. Majors. Moreover, other trial evidence directly implicated Ms. Majors in the marijuana possession charge. Her fingerprint was found on the glass container containing marijuana. With that evidence in the record, we cannot say that the verdict on the marijuana charge might have been more favorable to her had the district court not erred by admitting Ms. Smith's hearsay statements. [¶ 32] The ecstasy conviction is another matter. Ms. Majors' fingerprints were not found on the bottle containing the ecstasy tablets. Besides Ms. Smith's inadmissible statements that Lex had a whole bunch of ecstasy and would bring some back with her, the only other evidence linking Ms. Majors to the ecstasy was the ecstasy pill bottle found in the bag next to her on the couch. The bag contained items connected with both Ms. Majors (the marijuana bottle) and Ms. Smith (the controlled buy funds). Other evidence admitted at trial demonstrated that illegal drugs were found throughout Ms. Smith's house. In light of the entirety of the trial evidence, we conclude there is a reasonable probability the jury may have acquitted Ms. Majors on the ecstasy possession charge had the improper evidence not been admitted. Under these circumstances, we conclude the circumstances manifest inherent unfairness and injustice. Martin, ¶ 21, 157 P.3d at 928. We, therefore, reverse her conviction for possession of the ecstasy.