Opinion ID: 1699909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the test for determining when the violation of a penal statute gives rise to a civil cause of action.

Text: Section 50 of the Liquor Control Act provides criminal penalties for violations of the provisions of its act. MCL 436.50; MSA 18.1021. Section 26c of the act is a penal statute providing punishment for violations of its mandates. Compare Longstreth v Gensel, 423 Mich 675, 692; 377 NW2d 804 (1985), holding that § 33 of the act prohibiting the furnishing of alcoholic liquors to minors is a penal statute. Where a penal statute is silent concerning whether a violation of its provisions should give rise to a civil remedy, courts will infer a civil remedy for the violation to further the ultimate policy for the protection of individuals which they find underlying the statute, and which they believe the legislature must have had in mind. Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 36, p 222. The civil remedy may be afforded through an existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action. [5] If there is no common-law tort sufficiently analogous to fit the situation, a new tort may be created for the purpose. 4 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 874A, comment f, p 304. In the interest of public policy, this Court has created a new cause of action to redress the violation of a penal statute and, pursuant to the following test, incorporated the statute as the specific standard of care: The court may adopt as the standard conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results. [ Longstreth, supra, pp 692-693, quoting Restatement Torts, 2d, § 286, p 25. See also Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 137-138, ns 21, 22; 243 NW2d 270 (1976); Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 36, pp 229-230; 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence, §§ 257-258, pp 641-643; SJI2d 12.01.] Where the court concludes that the statutory purpose was not to protect the person allegedly injured, or even if it was, that the harm suffered was not what the Legislature intended the statute to remedy, Zeni, supra, the court may conclude that the statute is not applicable to the facts of the case before it. [6] Thus, our determination should not only be consistent with legislative intent, but should further the purpose of the legislative enactment. Involved in the case at bar is a comprehensive legislative scheme creating new and particular remedies against persons not liable at the common law and vesting exclusive control of the licensing, taxation, sale, or distribution of alcoholic liquors in the state for the benefit of the public. While it is part of the court's historic common-law function to develop the law, a degree of caution must be exercised in fashioning civil remedies where a balance struck by a comprehensive regulatory scheme could be undermined. [7]