Opinion ID: 2449956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the prosecutor make improper comments during closing argument?

Text: Hall contends that in closing argument the prosecutor misstated Pahmahmie's testimony regarding the statement Hall made as he waited in the vehicle immediately before the shooting. During the State's case-in-chief, Pahmahmie was asked if she recalled Hall saying something outside the vehicle. When she responded negatively, the prosecutor presented her with her statement to police, which was admitted into evidence without objection as State's Exhibit 97. In that statement, Pahmahmie indicated that just before Hall got out of the car, he said, I don't know, but I'm ready to do something. After Pahmahmie was directed to read the relevant portion of her statement, she indicated her recollection had been refreshed and testified as follows: A. Before he got out he said he was ready to go. Q. Okay. That's before he got out of the car? A. Uh-huh. Q. Okay. And he said what? I apologize. A. That he was ready to go do something. He was ready. Q. Ready to go and do something? A. Not ready to go and dohe just said he was ready to go. Q. Okay. Was hecould you easily understand what he was saying? A. I mean, yeah, he said it just quietly but, yeah. Q. Okay. A. I just took it as he was, you know, ready to go like I was ready to go. Q. You were ready to go too, right? A. Yeah. In his initial closing argument, the prosecutor twice referred to Pahmahmie's testimony regarding Hall's statement: What do you have from the individuals in the car? They've never talked to Mr. Scroggin, they've never talked to Mr. Blake. But what do they tell you? They tell you the individual that they identified as Mr. Hall got out of that vehicle, that Ms. Leona, who was closest to where he got out, said he said something to the effect, I've got to go do something. He deliberately got out of the car, said what he said. He then took several steps, stood by a wall looking at the car, takes a moment. He's thinking about what he's going to do next. He pulls a hood up, turns and walks down the hallway.... .... Now, the question then becomes premeditation. You heard the instruction. It means to have thought the matter over beforehand. Well, let's look when that happened.... [Premeditation] simply requires him to form the thought prior to committing the act. Well, he deliberating [ sic ] gets out of the vehicle, he tells the individuals I've got to do something. He takes several steps. During that time period to the wall, he certainly could have turned around and got right back in the vehicle. He gets to the wall, and what does he do? He pulls up a hood. (Emphasis added.) On appeal, Hall contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when he twice told the jury that Hall said I've got to go do something. Hall contends there was no such testimony at trial and therefore the prosecutor was improperly stating facts not in evidence. Hall reasons that this misstatement was significant because the key issue at trial was premeditation, and the statement, I've got to go do something, indicated Hall intended to commit an act, i.e., he premeditated the killing, while the statement, I'm ready to go, merely indicated Hall was fidgety and tired of waiting in the car. This court has repeatedly held that in closing argument, a prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence but may not comment upon facts outside the evidence. See State v. Murray, 285 Kan. 503, 512, 174 P.3d 407 (2008). A prosecutor `is given wide latitude in language and in manner [of] presentation of closing argument as long as the argument is consistent with the evidence. [Citation omitted.]' State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 947, 190 P.3d 937 (2008) (quoting State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 114, 21 P.3d 516, cert. denied 534 U.S. 1047, 122 S.Ct. 630, 151 L.Ed.2d 550 [2001]). Further, when a prosecutor argues facts not in evidence, the first prong of the prosecutorial misconduct test is met, and we must consider whether the misstatement of fact constitutes plain error. State v. Ly, 277 Kan. 386, Syl. ¶ 4, 85 P.3d 1200, cert. denied 541 U.S. 1090, 124 S.Ct. 2822, 159 L.Ed.2d 254 (2004). We do not agree with Hall's characterization of the prosecutor's summary of Pahmahmie's testimony as being outside the evidence. Contrary to Hall's suggestion, Pahmahmie did testify that Hall said he was ready to go do something. And significantly, although neither party mentions it, this testimony came after Pahmahmie's recollection was refreshed with her statement to police in which she claimed that before getting out of the vehicle, Hall said, `I don't know but I'm ready to do something.' Pahmahmie's statement to police was admitted into evidence and available to the jury, and it was consistent with her testimony given immediately after seeing her prior statement at trial. And while Pahmahmie did attempt to correct her statement to police and the statement she had just made at trial by saying that Hall said only that he was ready to go, that clarification does not change the fact that Pahmahmie's statement to police and her statement at trial were both in evidence and thus supported the prosecutor's comments in closing argument. We find no misconduct with respect to this issue.
Pointing to the following excerpts from the prosecutor's closing arguments, Hall argues the prosecutor committed further misconduct by twice misstating the law regarding the element of premeditation: Premeditation, don't get confused about time either. As the instruction tells you, there's no element of time necessary. It can be seconds, minutes, days. There's no requirement of a period of time. .... ... It isn't aboutit isn't a matter of fact of how many things we've given you. It's the quantityit's the quality of what we've given you. It's the quality of what the witnesses told you about what occurred before he pulled the trigger the first time.  You can even form premeditation after the pull of the first trigger, because remember, he pulls four times. He says there's no evidence of the fact that the two on the bottom occurred before. Well, nobody made that statement. But what you did hear is that he fired and kept moving forward. (Emphasis added.) A defendant is denied a fair trial when a prosecutor misstates the law and the facts are such that the jury could have been confused or misled by the statement. State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan. 392, 404, 133 P.3d 14 (2006) (citing State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 619, 44 P.3d 466 [2002]). Hall argues that with the italicized comments above, the prosecutor effectively advised the jury that premeditation can occur instantaneouslya premise repeatedly disapproved by this court. See, e.g., State v. Cosby, 285 Kan. 230, 248, 169 P.3d 1128 (2007) (We have consistently found reversible misconduct when a prosecutor states or implies that premeditation can be instantaneous.); State v. Morton, 277 Kan. 575, 585, 86 P.3d 535 (2004) ( Morton I ) (reversible error for prosecutor to imply premeditation can be instantaneous); State v. Pabst, 273 Kan. 658, 662, 44 P.3d 1230, cert. denied 537 U.S. 959, 123 S.Ct. 384, 154 L.Ed.2d 311 (2002) ( Pabst II ) (A discussion of PIK Crim.3d 56.04[b] in closing argument should avoid any temptation to use a synonym to convey the suggestion of `an instant' without using the actual phrase.). We have described premeditation as a `state of mind' that relates to a person's reasons and motives for acting as he or she did. State v. Doyle, 272 Kan. 1157, 1162, 38 P.3d 650 (2002) (quoting State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 [1999]). PIK Crim.3d 56.04(b) defines premeditation as to have thought the matter over beforehand, in other words, to have formed the design or intent to kill before the act. Although there is no specific time period required for premeditation, the concept of premeditation requires more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life. Hall contends that by advising the jury that premeditation could be formed in seconds, minutes, days, the prosecutor implied that premeditation could be formed instantaneously. We disagree. In fact, the prosecutor specifically preceded his reference to seconds, minutes, days with the statement that there's no element of time necessary. This language is consistent with PIK Crim.3d 56.04, the pattern instruction given to the jury in this case, which provides that there is no specific time period required for premeditation. Thus, we conclude this particular statement did not misstate the law. We are more concerned, however, with the prosecutor's statement that Hall could have form[ed] premeditation after the pull of the first trigger, because remember, he pulls four times. Hall argues this was an improper statement of the law and mischaracterized the evidence in this case because there was no evidence that after pulling the trigger the first time, Hall had an opportunity to have thought the matter over beforehand or formed the intent to kill before the act. Relying on State v. Saleem, 267 Kan. 100, 977 P.2d 921 (1999), the State contends the prosecutor did not misstate the law because it was theoretically possible for Hall to have instantaneously shot the victim on the first shot, but have fired the other shots with the plan to kill the victim. The State concludes simply that [s]tating that this was theoretically possible was not a misstatement of the law. In Saleem, this court rejected the defendant's claim that the evidence of premeditation was insufficient to support his first-degree murder conviction where the defendant instigated an altercation with the victim, fell to the ground, and then had sufficient time to consider his actions as he arose from the ground and drew his weapon and fired not one but four shots. 267 Kan. at 106, 977 P.2d 921. Saleem is distinguishable for two key reasons. First, the issue before the court in that case was whether the evidence was sufficient to support the element of premeditationnot whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the facts or evidence regarding premeditation, the question we currently face. Further, Saleem does not stand for the proposition that when shots are fired in rapid succession, a defendant may form the requisite premeditation after the first shot and sometime between the next three shots, as the prosecutor suggested here. Rather, the court in Saleem clearly conditioned its finding on the specific circumstances before it i.e., the defendant initiated an altercation and then fell down and got up before firing four successive shots. 267 Kan. at 106, 977 P.2d 921. Here, on the other hand, there was no evidence of any interaction or altercation between Hall and the victim before the shooting. Rather, the evidence showed that the four shots that felled the victim were fired in rapid succession. The victim's fiancé, Michael Scroggin, who was seated next to the victim, testified: Q: What happened next? A: As people come walking through the corridor, and then they walk out in the parking lot and go to their houses or whatever they're doing, we kind of noticed, and then we go back, like I say, to the conversation. I noticed a man come through the opening of the corridor, and he had on a hooded sweatshirt. And for a split second, I thought it was kind of weird because it was really nice that day, but I didn't think nothing about it. I turned back around and went right back to the conversation. Q: What happened next? A: The next thing I know, Pamela had been shot in the back. As quick as I realized that, that person was already gone, and then she folded up over into my lap. I actually didn't even realize she was shot until after she folded up in my lap, then I could see the little round blood splotches in her back. Similarly, Kenneth Blake, who sat directly across from the victim at the time of the shooting, testified, He [Hall] kept on coming up, and came right up to the back of Pam and Mike, and reached in this area of his person, and pulled out a gun, and shot Pam four times in the back. The evidence showed that the shooter fired four shots in rapid succession, immediately killing McMaster. Therefore, when the prosecutor told the jury that Hall could have premeditated the murder after the pull of the first trigger, he essentially suggested that premeditation could have been formed instantaneouslya premise repeatedly disapproved by this court. As such, we conclude that the prosecutor misstated the law with respect to the facts of this case. We will leave for another day the State's assertion that it may be theoretically possible under the law to instantaneously and without premeditation fire an initial shot at a victim, but to then premeditate before firing additional shots. We are not faced with that question here, and the evidence in this case does not support the State's theoretical argument.
Next, Hall claims the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing arguments by inappropriately injecting his personal belief as to Hall's guilt with the following statement:  Like I told you in Voir Dire, that I would present all the evidence necessary to convict the defendant of first-degree murder. And I believe the evidence states for that fact that I've done that. But what I told you I would not be able to do is present you with why. The witnesses who saw it couldn't tell you why. (Emphasis added.) A lawyer is prohibited from stating a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused. Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct 3.4(e) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 552); State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 506, 996 P.2d 321 (2000) ( Pabst I ). The point of not allowing a prosecutor to comment on the credibility of a witness is that expressions of personal opinion by the prosecutor are a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony, not commentary on the evidence of the case. 268 Kan. at 510, 996 P.2d 321. Hall argues the prosecutor's comments here equate with the improper injection of personal beliefs found objectionable in Pabst I. We disagree. While we recognized in Pabst I that a prosecutor may not express his or her personal belief regarding the defendant's guilt, the prosecutor here did not do so. Instead, he reminded the jury that he had told them in voir dire that he would present the necessary evidence to convict the defendant, and he further informed them that he believed he had done his job. Accordingly, we do not find this statement to be improper.
Pointing to the following statement in the prosecutor's closing arguments, Hall claims the prosecutor inflamed the passions of the jury by suggesting that the jury had a responsibility to find Hall guilty of first-degree premeditated murder: Ladies and gentlemen, the blood on that sidewalk that was spilled that day is long since gone. The memories of that day though of the witnesses that you heard from are not. Thank goodness they were here to tell you what happened. And now it's your responsibility to go back, view that evidence, not forget what happened, but expose what happened, and tell this man exactly what he's guilty of: First-degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a firearm. Thank you. (Emphasis added.) Prosecutors are not allowed to make statements that inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury or distract the jury from its duty to make decisions based on the evidence and the controlling law. State v. Baker, 281 Kan. 997, 1016, 135 P.3d 1098 (2006); see Tosh, 278 Kan. at 90, 98, 91 P.3d 1204; Henry, 273 Kan. at 641, 44 P.3d 466. We have held that a prosecutor must guard against appeals to jurors' sympathies or prejudices. Cravatt, 267 Kan. at 333, 979 P.2d 679. More specifically, we have found a prosecutor's comments to be improper when the prosecutor asked the jury to send a message to the community or a message that promotes a fear in the neighborhood. See Cravatt, 267 Kan. at 333-34, 979 P.2d 679. But see State v. Nguyen, 285 Kan. 418, 425, 172 P.3d 1165 (2007) (finding it permissible for prosecutor to ask for justice generally, as opposed to asking for justice for the victim). In arguing the prosecutor's comment here was improper, Hall relies on State v. Ruff, 252 Kan. 625, 636, 847 P.2d 1258 (1993), where this court found the prosecutor's closing statement erroneously informed the jurors that they had a duty to send a message to the community. In Ruff, the prosecutor drew a strong objection from defense counsel when he commented to the jury, `[D]o not allow this conduct to be tolerated in our county.' 252 Kan. at 631, 847 P.2d 1258. In response, the trial court directed the prosecutor to `wind it up,' and the prosecutor then again asked the jury to `[s]end that message' by returning a guilty verdict. 252 Kan. at 631, 847 P.2d 1258. Noting that the district court approved the prosecutor's remark after defense counsel's objection, this court held in Ruff that the misconduct could have prejudiced the jurors and hindered them from considering only the evidence presented, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair trial. 252 Kan. at 636, 847 P.2d 1258. The prosecutor's statement at issue in this case is distinguishable from the comment at issue in Ruff. Here, the prosecutor did not ask the jury to send a message; rather, he reminded the jurors of their responsibility to review the evidence and asked them to return a guilty verdict based on that evidence. While the prosecutor did suggest to the jury that it expose what happened, we do not find this statement comparable to the send a message language utilized in Ruff.