Opinion ID: 2101921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History of Cases Interpreting Section 3(7) of the Indiana Tort Claims Act

Text: Governmental immunity in Indiana is regulated by the Tort Claims Act, Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-16.5-1 through § 34-4-16.5-22 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992). Governmental entities and their employees are subject to liability for torts committed by them, unless the activity giving rise to the tort falls within one of the exceptions enumerated in the Act. Peavler v. Monroe County Bd. of Comm'rs. (1988), Ind., 528 N.E.2d 40, 42. Section 3(7), pursuant to which Lackey seeks immunity, provides: A governmental entity or employee acting within the scope of his employment is not liable if a loss results from: .... (7) the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and regulations) unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment. Ind. Code § 34-4-16.5-3(7). The first case decided by this Court interpreting the extent of the law enforcement immunity in Section 3(7) was Seymour Nat'l. Bank v. State (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1223, modified on reh'g, 428 N.E.2d 203. In Seymour, this Court held that all acts of enforcement save false arrest and imprisonment now render the State immune, 422 N.E.2d at 1226, and concluded that the State was immune from liability for the negligence of a state trooper during a high speed chase of a criminal suspect. In so holding, the 3-2 majority rejected the opinion of the two dissenting members (DeBruler and Hunter, JJ.), 422 N.E.2d at 1226-29, and the unanimous opinion of the First District Court of Appeals, (1979), 179 Ind. App. 295, 384 N.E.2d 1177, 1183-84, that the legislature had not intended to grant immunity for the breach of a private duty owed by governmental entities or employees to individual citizens. Ten years later, we re-examined Section 3(7) to determine its applicability to cases involving jail detainees. Tittle v. Mahan (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 796. Although we rejected the notion that immunity attaches to all law enforcement activities, in our effort to give due weight to stare decisis, we reaffirmed the holding in Seymour as applied to its facts. Accordingly, in Tittle, we stated that the immunity provided by Section 3(7) was limited to activities attendant to effecting the arrest of those who may have broken the law. 582 N.E.2d at 801. As another way of stating the same concept, we said in a companion case that immunity was limited to actual attempts to effect an arrest of one who may have broken the law. City of Wakarusa v. Holdeman (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 802, 803. We rejected the notion that the law enforcement immunity of Section 3(7) was co-extensive with the statutory obligations placed on law enforcement officials. City of Valparaiso v. Edgecomb (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 96, 97. Thus, we held that law enforcement officers are not immune for treatment of pre-trial detainees, Tittle, 582 N.E.2d at 801; when searching for possible license plate violations, Wakarusa, 582 N.E.2d at 804; or when leading a funeral procession, Edgecomb, 587 N.E.2d at 97. This case and the other cases we decide today, Fries v. Fincher (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1294, and Belding v. Town of New Whiteland (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1291, require us to focus more precisely on the parameters of enforcement of a law as it relates to arrest activities. The necessity to address once again the meaning of this phrase fulfills Justice Hunter's prediction in his dissent to Seymour, that the interpretation of the ambiguous term enforcement of a law will open a Pandora's box of unsettling questions which will revolve around dubious distinctions between the `administration' and `enforcement' of laws. 422 N.E.2d at 1229. So, too, the statements in Tittle accomplish little more than requiring courts and litigants across this State to guess at our intended meaning of actual attempt to effect an arrest, [2] and cause us to conclude that our reluctance to overrule a prior decision of this Court has produced an unworkable rule of law. [3] Moreover, further reflection upon the parameters of the common law governmental immunity doctrine existing at the time the Tort Claims Act was passed, the language of Section 3(7) itself, and correct application of the rules of statutory construction, convince us that the statements in Tittle do not comport with any sound legal principle other than stare decisis. Therefore, we begin anew our analysis of Section 3(7).