Opinion ID: 2058658
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identity of Claims

Text: Momentarily putting aside the inevitable inquiry into the identity of the parties in the two cases, there can be no doubt that, for our purposes, the underlying claims are identical. A claim or cause of action, for purposes of claim preclusion, comprises all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982); see Yuen, supra, 488 A.2d at 1348 ( res judicata bars further claims based on the same transaction). Further, [w]hat factual grouping constitutes a `transaction,' and what groupings constitute a `series,' are to be determined pragmatically, considering whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra, § 24(2). Put another way, the `transaction' or `occurrence' is the subject matter of a claim, rather than the legal rights arising therefrom; additions to or subtractions from the central core of fact do not change this substantial identity so as to support piecemeal appeals. Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940, 942-43 (2d Cir.1947); see also Mathews v. New York Racing Association, Inc., 193 F.Supp. 293, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Within this broad meaning, the case on appeal concerns the same claim as that adjudicated in the Maryland litigation. Even putting aside the specific legal theories upon which appellants' demands for relief are premised, which are largely the same, the underlying facts of the case comprise a single occurrence or chain of related events. The claim in Maryland, like that before us, was at least partly predicated on appellees' alleged misrepresentations regarding the purchase price of the property to be acquired by the Herring Landing partnership: in Maryland, it was asserted as one of seven issues in dispute, and here, it is asserted as the main basis of the litigation. These events were identical, and thus necessarily satisfied the Restatement criteria, that they be substantially related in time, space, origin, and motivation, constitute a convenient trial unit, and their treatment as such can be reasonably expected to conform to the parties' understanding or expectations about the nature and underlying unity of the case. Further, the fact that the scope of the Maryland litigation was broader than that of the case on appeal, encompassing alleged acts neither alleged herein nor necessary to support the instant claims, does not attenuate the substantial identity of the claims. The fact that the Maryland court decided matters beyond the scope of this litigation cannot negate the fact that it also decided on the entire claim on appeal. Nevertheless, appellants contend that the claim on appeal herein differs from that in Maryland to the extent that it alleges particular misrepresentations made to appellants in the District of Columbia, whereas the Maryland action did not allege such particular misrepresentations. The question of forum non conveniens was not in issue in the Maryland litigation, and there is nothing in our record of the Maryland action that suggests that much attention was given to the locus of the asserted misrepresentations. There is no record that the scope of the Maryland counterclaim was limited to misrepresentations made within the borders of Maryland; rather, it is apparent that the counterclaim was intended to encompass misrepresentations made to the entire partnership, including each of the limited partners. In the absence of such a record we must reject this argument. [4] In attempting to distinguish their claims in the two jurisdictions, appellants also contend that the claim on appeal asserts fraud and misrepresentation under District of Columbia law, whereas the Maryland claim asserted such violations only under Maryland law. However, this distinction alone cannot convert one claim into two. If the mere transfer of a claim based upon the same transaction from the courts of one jurisdiction to those of the next, with the attendant change in governing law, were all that were required to escape claim preclusion, then virtually all bars to relitigation in a second jurisdiction would be overcome by the very change of venue, and the purposes of claim preclusion would be defeated. We believe it is more consistent with the purposes of claim preclusion and the transaction-based or occurrence-based understanding of the term claim to treat a single transaction or related series of occurrences supporting a single alleged wrong, whether or not that wrong is recognized under local law, as one claim. As Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper have observed in their treatise: A second action may be precluded on the ground that the same claim or cause of action was advanced in the first action even though a different source of law is involved. Claim preclusion may apply to theories advanced under different statutes, under common law and statute, or under the law of different sovereigns. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: Jurisdiction, supra note 3, § 4411. [5] We are thus also constrained to reject this argument.