Opinion ID: 746516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bowen's tort and constitutional claims

Text: 11 Both the United States and the State of Alaska (on behalf of itself and the individual state defendants) contend that the Feres doctrine bars Bowen's tort and constitutional claims against the military and its members. We agree. 12 In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that members of the armed services could not sue the Government for injuries that arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. This bar has been interpreted broadly. [P]ractically any suit that 'implicates the military judgments and decisions' ... runs the risk of colliding with Feres. Persons v. United States, 925 F.2d 292, 295 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691, 107 S.Ct. 2063, 2069, 95 L.Ed.2d 648 (1987)). The Supreme Court has held that Feres applies not only to tort actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., but to Bivens actions as well. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) (enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 680-81, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 3062, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) (Chappell approach applies to all activities performed incident to service and not merely to activities performed within the officer/subordinate relationship). 2 Furthermore, Feres bars intentional tort claims as well as simple negligence claims. See Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir.1983). Finally, Feres is not limited to suits against the United States. We have extended Feres to suits between individual members of the military, recognizing an 'intramilitary immunity' from suits based on injuries sustained incident to service. Lutz v. Secretary of the Air Force, 944 F.2d 1477, 1480-81 (9th Cir.1991). In sum, the Feres doctrine is applicable whenever a legal action 'would require a civilian court to examine decisions regarding management, discipline, supervision, and control of members of the armed forces of the United States.'  Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 710 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting McGowan v. Scoggins, 890 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir.1989)). 3 13 Bowen attempts to escape the reach of Feres by arguing that the doctrine applies only to the federal military structure. First, Bowen claims that his status as a state, rather than federal, military employee exempts his claim from the Feres bar. We previously have rejected this argument. It is beyond question that the Feres doctrine generally applies to claims brought by National Guard members. Stauber v. Cline, 837 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir.1988); see also Jackson, 110 F.3d at 1487 (Members of the National Guard and the Reserves are service members under Feres.); cf. Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 588 (1st Cir.1993) (It is axiomatic that the National Guard is military in character.). The fact that Bowen was not on active duty with the United States Air Force Reserve 4 does not alter this conclusion, see, e.g., Quintana v. United States, 997 F.2d 711, 712 (10th Cir.1993) (active duty status is not necessary for the Feres 'incident to service' test to apply); Velez v. United States ex rel. Dept. of Army, 891 F.Supp. 61, 63 (D.Puerto Rico 1995) (The distinction between an 'active' and 'inactive' National Guard serviceman relative to the Feres doctrine is irrelevant.), particularly where, as here, the service member is on full-time duty as a member of the federally authorized AGR. We follow Stauber and conclude that Bowen's status as a member of the National Guard triggers application of Feres, despite the fact that he was serving as a member of the Alaska Air National Guard under the direct authority of state officers. 14 While Bowen's first argument against the application of the Feres doctrine focuses upon his own status as a state employee, his second argument against Feres focuses upon the status of the defendants. Bowen urges us not to bar his claims against the state officers because, he argues, the Feres doctrine cannot be applied to the states, i.e., it is applicable only to those actions where federal military personnel are somehow implicated in the alleged unlawful conduct. Thus, Bowen distinguishes Stauber by noting that the parties in that case were under the direct command of a uniformed, full-time U.S. Army lieutenant colonel. See Stauber, 837 F.2d at 397. 15 In United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court noted that it had 16 never suggested that the military status of the alleged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the [Feres ] doctrine. Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant under Feres. Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members against the Government based upon service-related injuries. 17 481 U.S. 681, 686-88, 107 S.Ct. 2063, 2066-67, 95 L.Ed.2d 648 (1987). 18 Courts have not interpreted this language to mean that the service person's suit must be against the federal government or federal officers. The overwhelming weight of authority indicates that state National Guard officers are protected from suit by fellow Guardsmen by the Feres doctrine. Stauber, for example, applied Feres to a Guardsman's claims against individual members of the Alaska National Guard, the Alaska Adjutant General, the Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs, and the State of Alaska itself. See also Uhl v. Swanstrom, 79 F.3d 751 (8th Cir.1996) (applying Feres bar to suit by National Guardsman against his commanding state officer, the Adjutant General of the Iowa Air National Guard, and the Iowa Air National Guard); Lovell v. Heng, 890 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.1989) (National Guardsman's § 1983 action against state National Guard officers barred under Feres ); Townsend v. Seurer, 791 F.Supp. 227, 229 (D.Minn.1992) ([R]egardless of whether the suit is brought against the state National Guard and individual Guard personnel or against the United States and individual Guard personnel, the Feres doctrine will bar the action.). Indeed, we indicated in Stauber that the Feres doctrine has far more to do with the proper relation between the courts, Congress and the military than it has to do with individual defendants.... It is a judicial doctrine leaving matters incident to service to the military, in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary. Stauber, 837 F.2d at 399. 19 These cases implicitly recognize that the military apparatus of the United States cannot be divided into strictly state and federal components. We endorse these holdings: Feres applies to the state National Guards and their members due to the integral role they play as part of the nation's defense force and the substantial degree to which the state National Guards are financed, regulated, and controlled by the federal government even when not called into active federal service. Consequently, under Stauber and the clear weight of authority in other circuits, Bowen's constitutional claims and claims sounding in tort are subject to the Feres doctrine. 20 Under Feres, judicial review of those claims is barred if the harms about which Bowen complains arose out of or in the course of activity incident to service. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. We have no trouble concluding that the personnel decisions contested by Bowen in fact were made incident to service. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 3043, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985) (noting that decision to discharge a serviceman is an essentially professional one and that respondent's attempt to hale Army officials into court to account for their supervision and discipline of [a serviceman] must fail); see also Lutz, 944 F.2d at 1485 (The Supreme Court made plain in Stanley that in deciding whether Feres applies, courts should answer the broader question of whether 'the injury arises out of activity incident to service' ... rather than considering any actual impact on military discipline.). Accordingly, Bowen's tort and constitutional claims contesting those personnel decisions are barred.