Opinion ID: 1183983
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Appeal of City and Mongan

Text: Defendants concede, for purposes of this appeal, that Mongan defamed plaintiff. They assert, however, that Mongan possessed either an absolute or qualified privilege (see Civ. Code, § 47, subds. 1, 3), or alternatively that both Mongan and City are immune from liability under the circumstances of this case (see Gov. Code, §§ 815.2, subd. (b), 820.2). We first dispose of a preliminary issue, namely, the liability, if any, of City for the acts of Mongan, its employee. (1) a.) Respondeat superior. As a general proposition it may be said that, if an employee or agent while acting in the scope of his authority and in furtherance of the employer's business defames another, his employer or principal may be held liable therefor. ( Correia v. Santos (1961) 191 Cal. App.2d 844, 855 [13 Cal. Rptr. 132].) This is so even though the agent may have exceeded his express authority ( Draper v. Hellman Com. T. & S. Bank (1928) 203 Cal. 26, 38-39 [263 P. 240]), and it is true regardless of the agent's motive ( Rosenberg v. J.C. Penney Co. (1939) 30 Cal. App.2d 609, 623 [86 P.2d 696]). It has been said that the rule is supported by The great weight of authority. (See Annot. 150 A.L.R. 1338, 1344.) The foregoing well-rooted principle is unaffected by the fact that the employment is public. Considerations bearing on the ambit and nature of that public employment were well expressed in Neal v. Gatlin (1973) 35 Cal. App.3d 871, 875 [111 Cal. Rptr. 117], ... a public employee is acting in the course and scope of the employment `when he is engaged in work he was employed to perform or when the act is an incident to his duty and was performed for the benefit of his employer and not to serve his own purposes or conveniences.' [Citations.] The phrase `scope of employment' has been equated with the express or implied power of the public employee to act in a particular instance, and in evaluating his conduct to determine whether it is within the ambit of his authority we are to look not to the nature of the act itself, but to the purpose or result intended. [Citations, fn. omitted.] If the object or end to be accomplished is within the employee's express or implied authority his act is deemed to be within the scope of his employment irrespective of its wrongful nature. (See also Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443 [54 Cal. Rptr. 805].) (2) The record before us supports the jury's implied finding that Mongan was acting within the scope of his authority when he defamed the plaintiff. Mongan held the office of Clerk of the City and County of San Francisco and, as such, had at least implied authority to issue statements to the press and to submit to interviews regarding the operation of the clerk's office, including explanations as to why impounded funds were released without prior court order. The subject of the press interview involved public and official business. Any statements made by Mongan concerning transactions of the clerk's office, while conceivably exculpating Mongan personally to a degree, would also serve the further purpose of informing the press and the public as to whether the clerk's office was performing its public duties in a rational and orderly fashion. While City insists that the sole purpose of the statement in question was for the personal advantage and gain of Mongan, we cannot presume as a matter of law that the statements were of no conceivable benefit to the City, or that their object was solely to save Mongan from personal embarrassment. The jury reasonably could have concluded that responses to press inquiry constituted, as to time, place, and circumstance, responses of a public official regarding his administration of a public office and thus was within the scope of his public employment. An important public purpose is served both by the press inquiry and by the official's response. We conclude, accordingly, that the statement was made within the ambit of Mongan's public employment, and that his principal, City, is liable therefor in the absence of other defenses. (3) b.) Absolute privilege. Mongan and City both contend that Mongan's statements were protected by an absolute statutory privilege conferred on all publications made [i]n the proper discharge of an official duty. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. 1.) Plaintiff, however, correctly observes that the courts of this state have thus far extended the protections of this statute only to high-ranking state and federal officials, such as the President of the United States, the governor of any state or territory, cabinet officers of the United States and the corresponding officers of any state or territory. (See Saroyan v. Burkett (1962) 57 Cal.2d 706, 710 [21 Cal. Rptr. 557, 371 P.2d 293]; Frisk v. Merrihew (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 319, 323 [116 Cal. Rptr. 781]; White v. State of California (1971) 17 Cal. App.3d 621, 627-628 [95 Cal. Rptr. 175]; see also Rest., Torts, § 591; Rest.2d Torts (Tent. Draft No. 20), § 591, com. (c); Prosser, The Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 114, pp. 782-784; 1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956) § 5.23, pp. 429-430; but see Barr v. Matteo (1959) 360 U.S. 564, 572-576 [3 L.Ed.2d 1434, 1441-1444, 79 S.Ct. 1335] [absolute privilege for all federal executive officers].) It has been noted by recognized authorities that the purpose of the so-called absolute official duty privilege is to insure efficiency in government by encouraging policy-making officials to exercise their best judgment in the performance of their duties free from fear of general tort liability. (Harper & James, supra, at p. 429.) As we discuss below in greater detail we have concluded that defendant Mongan was not exercising policy-making functions when he defamed plaintiff, and thus he is not protected by the absolute privilege contained in Civil Code section 47, subdivision 1. c.) Conditional or qualified privilege. Defendants next assert that they are entitled to the protection of that privilege, if not absolute at least conditional or qualified, which is contained in subdivision 3 of section 47 of the Civil Code. This statute immunizes communications made ... without malice, to a person interested therein, [by one] ... (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information. (Italics added.) By definition, this conditional privilege is defeated by a showing of malice. Section 48a, subdivision 4(d), of the Civil Code defines actual malice as that state of mind arising from hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff; provided, however, that such a state of mind occasioned by a good faith belief on the part of the defendant in the truth of the libelous publication or broadcast at the time it is published or broadcast shall not constitute actual malice. A California appellate court has recently held that The malice necessary to defeat a qualified privilege is `actual malice' which is established by a showing that the publication was motivated by hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff or by a showing that the defendant lacked reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights (citations). ( Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 926, 936 [119 Cal. Rptr. 82], italics in original; see also White v. State of California, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d 621, 628-629.) Defendants have not asserted the existence of any First Amendment issues which might have invoked a different standard for proving malice. (See Roemer, supra, at pp. 931-936.) (4) The record contains substantial evidence to support a finding either that Mongan bore plaintiff ill will, or that Mongan lacked a good faith belief in the truth of his statements. The jury could have found that Mongan blamed plaintiff for the loss of the deposited funds, and that Mongan wished to transfer the blame to plaintiff by characterizing plaintiff's efforts as a con job, thereby exculpating himself in the eyes of the press and general public. Although the evidence was also susceptible of other inferences, we conclude that there was substantial evidence of malice. (See, e.g., Cunningham v. Simpson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 301, 308 [81 Cal. Rptr. 855, 461 P.2d 39], illustrating the type of evidence sufficient to establish malice.) d.) Statutory immunity. Defendants Mongan and City next assert that Mongan's activities constituted discretionary acts for which immunity is granted under Government Code section 820.2. If Mongan is immune from liability to plaintiff under this section, it necessarily follows that City would likewise be immune. (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (b).) Section 820.2 provides: Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused. Several Court of Appeal cases have held, in varying factual contexts, that public employees who, while acting within the scope of their employment, defame third persons are engaged in discretionary activity thereby invoking immunity under section 820.2. (See Miller v. Hoagland (1966) 247 Cal. App.2d 57, 62 [55 Cal. Rptr. 311]; Burgdorf v. Funder, supra, 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449; Glickman v. Glasner (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 120, 125-126 [40 Cal. Rptr. 719].) In Miller and Burgdorf, for example, a city attorney and a tax officer, respectively, wrote allegedly libelous letters in the course of discharging their official functions. The courts in those cases held that section 820.2 immunity was available since these officers were exercising their discretion in the matters at issue. Defendants urge that Mongan was likewise engaged in discretionary activity when he discussed the plaintiff's matter with the press. The foregoing cases, however, preceded our decision in Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782 [73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352]. The broad rule of discretionary immunity suggested by the courts in such cases as Miller and Burgdorf must be reexamined in the light of the principles therein enunciated by us. (5) In Johnson, we construed section 820.2 as conferring immunity with respect to basic policy decisions, or activity which may be characterized as the planning rather than the operational level of decision making. (69 Cal.2d at pp. 793-794; see Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 693 [94 Cal. Rptr. 421, 484 P.2d 93]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 489-491 [105 Cal. Rptr. 374, 503 P.2d 1382] [dis. opn. by Tobriner, J.].) We pointed out in Johnson that Immunity for `discretionary' activities serves no purpose except to assure that courts refuse to pass judgment of policy decisions in the province of coordinate branches of government. Accordingly, to be entitled to immunity the state must make a showing that such a policy decision, consciously balancing risks and advantages, took place. The fact that an employee normally engages in `discretionary activity' is irrelevant if, in a given case, the employee did not render a considered decision. [Citations] (69 Cal.2d at pp. 794-795, fn. 8.) A leading commentator in the field, has interpreted Johnson as rejecting a mere semantic inquiry into the literal meaning of the word discretionary in section 820.2, and impliedly disapproving two of the libel cases relied upon by defendants herein, Burgdorf v. Funder, supra, 246 Cal. App.2d 443, and Glickman v. Glasner, supra, 230 Cal. App.2d 120. (Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability (Cont.Ed.Bar Supp. 1969) § 5.51 at pp. 12-13.) Was defendant Mongan's telephonic interview with the press a type of discretionary act contemplated by section 820.2? We conclude that it was not. Although defendants' contention is arguable that Mongan may have had discretion to discuss the Sanborn matter with the press, we cannot conclude that the decision to do so was in the nature of a basic policy decision made at the planning stage of City's operations. A governmental officer's discussions with the public or press regarding the functioning of his office would seem, instead, to fall within the category of those routine, ministerial duties incident to the normal operations of that office. Moreover, Mongan testified at trial that Mr. Cooper, the county controller, had advised Mongan to discuss the Sanborn affair with the press. If, for purposes of argument, the decision to permit a press interview was a basic policy decision under Johnson, the jury reasonably could have found that such a decision was made by Cooper, not Mongan, and accordingly the decision having been made by another, Mongan's subsequent defamatory statements were not protected by the discretionary act immunity of section 820.2. We conclude that the judgment against defendants City and Mongan should be affirmed.