Opinion ID: 884037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is Mandamus an appropriate remedy?

Text: The issuance or denial or a writ of mandate calls for a conclusion of law which we review to determine if it is correct. Franchi v. County of Jefferson (1995), 274 Mont. 272, 275, 908 P.2d 210, 212; Becky v. Butte-Silver Bow Sch. Dist. 1 (1995), 274 Mont. 131, 135, 906 P.2d 193, 195. Pursuant to § 27-26-102, MCA, a two-part standard applies to the issuance of a writ of mandate. Franchi, 908 P.2d at 212; State ex rel. Chisholm v. District Court (1986), 224 Mont. 441, 443, 731 P.2d 324, 325. First, the writ is available when the party requesting it is entitled to the performance of a clear legal duty by the party against whom the writ is sought. Becky, 906 P.2d at 195. Second, if there is a clear legal duty, the district court must grant the writ if there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Franchi, 908 P.2d at 212; State ex rel. Cobbs v. Montana Dep't of Social and Rehabilitative Servs. (Mont.1995), 906 P.2d 204, 206, 52 St.Rep. 1166, 1167; § 27-26-102(2), MCA. In Chisholm, we clarified the inquiry: A negative answer to the first question bars the issuance of the writ, and, irrespective of the answer to that question, an affirmative answer to the second, divests the court of authority to issue it. Chisholm, 731 P.2d at 325. Regarding the first standard for mandamus, does the Commissioner have a clear legal duty to initiate rulemaking, the Commissioner contends that it is within his discretion to determine what rules are necessary as that term is used in § 5-7-111, MCA. We do not interpret the Commissioner's discretion that broadly. The as necessary language of § 5-7-111, MCA, does not give the Commissioner discretion to ignore the initial mandate that he shall adopt rules. He cannot choose to take no action without first holding a hearing to determine whether rules are necessary. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers (3d Cir.1975), 520 F.2d 11, the Third Circuit Court addressed a similar issue. The State of Pennsylvania, on behalf of its citizens, sued the flood insurers and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development for mandamus and injunctive relief for their failure to publicize the availability of flood insurance prior to the floods in question. As in the case sub judice, the district court dismissed the complaint and the plaintiff appealed. The federal law required that: The Secretary shall from time to time take such action as may be necessary in order to make information and data available to the public and to any state or local agency or official, with regard to (1) the flood insurance program, its coverage and objectives.... Commonwealth, 520 F.2d at 26 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4020). This statute, like the Montana statute presently at issue, contains the mandatory shall followed by the as necessary language. In interpreting the federal law, the Third Circuit held: These paragraphs [42 U.S.C. § 4020], when read together, set forth a sufficient allegation which, if proved, warrants mandamus relief.... Although § 4020 does contain language of discretion normally not subject to review under a petition for mandamus, the discretion authorized pertains only to the time and manner of acting. Specifically, the provision mandates that the Secretary shall ... take such action as may be necessary .... Commonwealth, 520 F.2d at 26 (emphasis added, citation omitted). As to the significance of the phrase as may be necessary, the court stated: The inclusion of the phrase as may be necessary does not permit disobedience to the initial directive, implicit in the statutory framework, requiring the Secretary to first consider whether or not action should be taken. Commonwealth, 520 F.2d at 26 (citations omitted). In holding that mandamus was appropriate, the Third Circuit concluded that, although the Secretary had the final decision as to whether action was required, he could not make that decision without first weighing the considerations. It is sufficient if the Secretary, having considered whether action should be taken, then determines that no action is necessary. But the Secretary cannot avoid taking the first step of evaluating the necessity of disseminating information. It is that step to which the Commonwealth has, in part, addressed its complaint. It is only at a hearing that the facts bearing upon this allegation may be developed. Accordingly, mandamus may issue to require the exercise of permissible discretion, ... although the manner in which the discretionary act is to be performed is not to be directed by the Court. Commonwealth, 520 F.2d at 26-27 (citation omitted). We adopt a similar analysis in the context of the Lobbying Act. Although § 5-7-111, MCA, requires the Commissioner to adopt rules as necessary, that discretionary phrase does not permit the Commissioner to circumvent the initial directive that he shall adopt rules. The Commissioner has the ultimate discretion to determine what, if any, rules are necessary. He cannot, however, in the face of a petition alleging the necessity for rules, deny the petition without first conducting a hearing as to the question of necessity, this is his clear legal duty. Assuming the truth of the allegations in Common Cause's complaint, it has established that the Commissioner has a clear legal duty to engage in rulemaking. The question then becomes, does Common Cause have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law? Chisholm, 731 P.2d at 325. A review of MAPA reveals that there is no provision for appeal from, or judicial review of, the Commissioner's decision to not initiate rulemaking under § 5-7-111, MCA. Thus Common Cause has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Common Cause's complaint sets forth sufficient allegations which, if proven, warrant mandamus relief. See Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile, Etc. v. Brown (10th Cir.1981), 656 F.2d 564, 568, (citing Commonwealth, 520 F.2d at 26-27). We hold that mandamus can lie to compel the Commissioner to conduct rulemaking procedures before he makes his decision as to whether new or additional rules are necessary. The District Court erred in dismissing Common Cause's complaint, thus, we reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. NELSON, HUNT and TRIEWEILER, JJ., concur.