Opinion ID: 2525492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sme's implied warranty claim against tvsa

Text: ¶ 23 SME's second claim for relief, in addition to asserting a claim for breach of express warranty, also asserts a claim for breach of implied warranty against TVSA. Like its express warranty claim, SME alleges that TVSA impliedly warranted that the plans and specifications provided under its contract with the County were correct, accurate, properly coordinated, in conformance with all applicable codes, regulations and laws and suitable for their intended use. Moreover, SME further alleged that TVSA impliedly warranted that it would not unreasonably hinder, delay, obstruct or interfere with the performance of the work . . . on the Project. The trial court dismissed SME's implied warranty claim, holding that architects cannot be liable under a theory of implied warranty as a matter of law. ¶ 24 As a matter of history, warranties developed in the context of the commercial sale of goods. [7] Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983) (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-312 to -318 (1981); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal.2d 573, 12 Cal.Rptr. 257, 360 P.2d 897, 902 (1961); Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal.2d 481, 275 P.2d 15, 19 (1954)); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-312 to -318 (1997). The contract at issue here, as SME acknowledges, does not involve the sale of goods, and SME does not rely on the implied warranties set out in the Uniform Commercial Code. Rather, SME urges us to extend our law of implied warranty and hold that an architect or design professional impliedly warrants a perfect plan or satisfactory result. ¶ 25 Despite SME's argument, a solid majority of jurisdictions have refused to hold that architects and design professionals impliedly warrant perfect plans or satisfactory results, but rather, limit the liability of architects to those situations in which the professional is negligent in the provision of his or her services. Indeed, the rule was stated as early as 1896 by the Supreme Court of Maine: The responsibility resting on an architect is essentially the same as that which rests upon the lawyer to his client, or upon the physician to his patient. . . . The undertaking of an architect implies that he possesses skill and ability, including taste, sufficient to enable him to perform the required services at least ordinarily and reasonably well; and that he will exercise and apply, in the given case, his skill and ability, his judgment and taste, reasonably and without neglect. But the undertaking does not imply or warrant a satisfactory result. . . . There is no implied promise that miscalculations may not occur. Coombs v. Beede, 89 Me. 187, 36 A. 104, 104-05 (1896) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Gravely v. Providence Partnership, 549 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir.1977); R.J. Longo Constr. Co. Inc. v. Transit America, Inc. 921 F.Supp. 1295, 1310 (D.N.J.1996) (and cases cited therein); Johnson-Voiland-Archuleta, Inc. v. Roark Assocs., 40 Colo.App. 269, 572 P.2d 1220, 1221 (1977); Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. Britt Assocs., Inc., 168 So.2d 333, 335 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1964), cert. denied, 173 So.2d 146 (Fla.1965); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514, 525 (Mass.1982); Borman's, Inc. v. Lake State Dev. Co., 60 Mich.App. 175, 230 N.W.2d 363, 368 (1975); City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn.1978); Queensbury Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Jim Walter Corp., 91 Misc.2d 804, 398 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1977); State ex rel. Risk Mgmt. Div. v. Gathman-Matotan Architects & Planners, Inc., 98 N.M. 790, 653 P.2d 166, 170 (N.M.Ct.App.), cert. quashed, 99 N.M. 47, 653 P.2d 878 (1982); Ryan v. Morgan Spear Assocs., Inc., 546 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tex.Civ.App.1977); Kemper Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel & Kimball Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 843 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Wyo. 1992). ¶ 26 The majority rule articulated in Coombs was restated by this court in Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Associates, 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d 610 (1970). Nauman, as SME correctly notes, involved a negligence claim against an architect, not an implied warranty claim. However, in adjudicating the negligence claim, this court stated: [T]he responsibility of an architect does not differ from that of a lawyer or physician. When he possesses the requisite skill and knowledge, and in the exercise thereof has used his best judgment, he has done all the law requires. The architect is not a warrantor of his plans and specifications.  24 Utah 2d at 179, 467 P.2d at 615 (emphasis added) (quoting Bayne v. Everham, 197 Mich. 181, 163 N.W. 1002, 1008 (Mich.1917)). ¶ 27 Sound policy concerns support the validity of the majority view articulated by this court in Nauman. As the Minnesota Supreme Court aptly stated in City of Mounds View: Architects, doctors, engineers, attorneys, and others deal in somewhat inexact sciences and are continually called upon to exercise their skilled judgment in order to anticipate and provide for random factors which are incapable of precise measurement. The indeterminate nature of these factors makes it impossible for professional service people to gauge them with complete accuracy in every instance. . . . Because of the inescapable possibility of error which inheres in these services, the law has traditionally required, not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that skill and judgment which can be reasonably expected from similarly situated professionals. 263 N.W.2d at 424. ¶ 28 Therefore, consistent with Nauman, we hold that architects and design professionals do not impliedly warrant or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfactory result. Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that SME's implied warranty claim against TVSA is barred to the extent it argues that TVSA impliedly warranted or guaranteed that the plans and specifications it provided under the County-TVSA contract were free from defects or inaccuracies. ¶ 29 However, although architects do not impliedly warrant or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfactory result, many courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that when architects or design professionals bind themselves by contract to do a work or to perform a service, they agree by implication to use reasonable care and skill in doing it. See, e.g., Klein, 437 N.E.2d at 526 (holding that architects provide an implied warranty that they [will] exercise the standard of care required of their profession); City of Mounds View, 263 N.W.2d at 424 `One who undertakes to render professional services is under a duty to the person for whom the service is to be performed to exercise such care, skill, and diligence as men in that profession ordinarily exercise under like circumstances.' (quoting City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 302 Minn. 249, 225 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1974)); Gathman-Matotan, 653 P.2d at 169 (The professional is usually employed to exercise the customary or reasonable skills of his profession for a particular job. He `warrants' his work only to the extent that he will use the skill customarily demanded of his profession.). Moreover, these courts have held that breach of the implied warranty or duty to use reasonable or customary care in the provision of professional services gives rise to an action under contract for negligent services. See Klein, 437 N.E.2d at 526; Gathman-Matotan, 653 P.2d at 170. We find the reasoning of the above courts to be persuasive, and adopt it here. ¶ 30 Therefore, although the trial court correctly held that SME's implied warranty claim is barred to the extent it argues that TVSA impliedly warranted or guaranteed a perfect plan or satisfactory result, the trial court erred in failing to allow the claim to proceed to the extent it argues that TVSA breached an implied promise or duty to use reasonable and customary care in performing professional services under the County-TVSA contract. However, the implied duty to use reasonable and customary care in the provision of professional services arising from contract is owed only to the person or entity for whom the professional services are to be rendered  in this case the County. See City of Mounds View, 263 N.W.2d at 424; Adobe Masters, Inc. v. Downey, 118 N.M. 547, 883 P.2d 133, 134 (1994). Therefore, SME may proceed with its implied warranty claim only if, on remand, the trial court determines that the County's assignment of its claims to Hughes-Hunt, and Hughes-Hunt's subsequent assignment of such interests to SME, is valid. Moreover, because SME's implied warranty claim is an assigned claim, SME may not recover the damages it suffered as a result of TVSA's alleged breach of the implied warranty to use reasonable and customary care in the performance of contractual duties under the County-TVSA contract. Rather, SME's recovery, if any, is limited to those damages the County suffered as a result of TVSA's alleged breach of the implied warranty to exercise reasonable and customary care. See 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignments § 144 (1999) (stating that an assignee can acquire no right superior to those held by the assignor, and simply stands in the shoes of the assignor).