Opinion ID: 4076467
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deceptive Access

Text: Requests The second way that TLI gained access to Avaya’s PBX systems was to cajole Avaya Business Partners into submitting deceptive requests for login access. As Scott Graham characterized it, TLI would “work[] with several Business Partners” to have them “submit[] a DADMIN form at the customer’s request” – but, unbeknownst to Avaya, TLI would be the ultimate user. (J.A. 2293.) Graham acknowledged that, if Avaya had known that TLI was behind the request, it would not have enabled the DADMINs because Avaya was “doing everything [it] could to put [TLI] out of the maintenance business.” (J.A. 2338.) Therefore, as Graham put it, the submissions “did not identify [TLI] on there” and “did not have [TLI’s] name on there to identify to Avaya that [the customer] was also a customer of [TLI’s].” (J.A. 2338.) In response to an interrogatory, TLI identified seven Business Partners who cooperated in the scheme to send access requests “that resulted in the activation of DADMIN logins” that were used by TLI. (J.A. 3041.)