Opinion ID: 2009627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: New York v. Belton

Text: As noted supra at 188-189, 642 A. 2d at 948-949, the Appellate Division upheld the search of the contents of Pierce's jacket pocket on the basis of the bright-line rule of New York v. Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed. 2d 768, which authorizes as an incident of the lawful arrest of a driver the contemporaneous search of the passenger compartment, including all containers, of the driver's vehicle. Approximately three-and-one-half months after the Supreme Court decided Belton this Court acknowledged that that holding appeared to be inconsistent with our decision in State v. Welsh, 84 N.J. 346, 419 A. 2d 1123 (1980), in which we reaffirmed that the proper scope of a search incident to an arrest is limited to the person of the arrestee and the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 235 n. 15, 440 A. 2d 1311 (1981) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed. 2d 685 (1969)). Because the vehicle's occupant in Welsh had been placed under custodial arrest, seated in a police car, and hence unable to reach into his own vehicle to gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence, we noted in Alston that the search in Welsh could not have been sustained as one incident to a lawful arrest under the Chimel standard. We observed, however, that the result in Welsh would not be the same were we to apply the Court's holding in Belton. Because we upheld the search in Alston on different grounds, we expressly deferred consideration of Belton 's effect on this Court's search-and-seizure jurisprudence. Ibid. A brief background perspective will explain the evolution of the Supreme Court's holding in Belton. Commencing with dictum in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 344, 58 L.Ed. 652, 655 (1914) (acknowledging right of law-enforcement officials to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime), over the course of several decades the Supreme Court successively expanded and contracted the scope of police authority to conduct warrantless searches incident to arrests. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158, 45 S.Ct. 280, 287, 69 L.Ed. 543, 553 (1925) (approving search after arrest for whatever is found upon his person or in his control); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 S.Ct. 4, 5, 70 L.Ed. 145, 148 (1925) (approving search after arrest of the person and the place where the arrest is made); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199, 48 S.Ct. 74, 77, 72 L.Ed. 231, 238 (1927) (approving, after arrest for offense occurring on premises, power to search extending to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358, 51 S.Ct. 153, 158, 75 L.Ed. 374, 383 (1931) (disapproving search of office in which defendants were arrested); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-55, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 1103, 91 L.Ed. 1399, 1408-09 (1947) (approving thorough search of four-room apartment incident to defendant's arrest therein for prior offense); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 709, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 1234, 92 L.Ed. 1663, 1671 (1948) (disapproving seizure of items in plain view after entry to make arrest because of failure to secure and use search warrants); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63-66, 70 S.Ct. 430, 434-35, 94 L.Ed. 653, 658-60 (1950) (relying on Harris, supra, overruling Trupiano, supra, and upholding as reasonable thorough search of one-room office where arrest is made). Under the Harris-Rabinowitz rule as thereafter applied, warrantless searches incident to arrests were not limited to the area into which a defendant might reach to destroy evidence or secure a weapon, but extended to the entire area in which defendant exercised a possessory interest. See Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 760, 89 S.Ct. at 2038, 23 L.Ed. 2d at 692; 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, supra, § 6.3(b) at 623-24. In 1969 the Supreme Court decided Chimel, overruling the Harris-Rabinowitz rule and restricting the constitutionally-permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest. Chimel involved the arrest at his home of a coin-shop burglary suspect by three police officers with an arrest warrant but no search warrant. Over the defendant's objections, the officers conducted a search of the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, garage, and a small workshop. The police searched dresser drawers in the master bedroom and seized various items, including coins, that the trial court admitted in evidence against defendant during the burglary trial. The search continued for almost one hour. 395 U.S. at 753-54, 89 S.Ct. at 2030, 23 L.Ed. 2d at 688. The California Supreme Court upheld the search as incidental to a valid arrest. People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421, 425, 439 P. 2d 333, 337 (1968). The Supreme Court reversed, holding the search invalid and overruling both Harris, supra, and Rabinowitz, supra : When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control  construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs  or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. The adherence to judicial processes mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less. [ Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed. 2d at 694 (footnote omitted).] In 1981 the Court applied Chimel's holding to an automobile search incident to the arrest of the occupants. Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed. 2d 768. A New York State trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding, and while examining the driver's license and registration smelled the odor of burned marijuana. The trooper also observed an envelope marked Supergold on the floor of the car and suspected that it contained marijuana. The trooper ordered the four occupants to step out of the car, and placed them under arrest for possession of marijuana. He patted down each of them, and directed them to stand in separate areas. Finding marijuana in the envelope, the trooper then searched each of the occupants and also searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. A black leather jacket on the back seat belonged to Belton. When the trooper unzipped one of the pockets, he found cocaine. Id. at 455-56, 101 S.Ct. at 2861-62, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 772. After Belton was indicted for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, he moved to suppress the cocaine. Although the lower courts upheld the validity of the search, the New York Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that [a] warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might gain access to the article. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y. 2d 447, 429 N.Y.S. 2d 574, 575, 407 N.E. 2d 420, 421 (1980). Acknowledging that both state and federal courts had experienced difficulty in determining the proper scope of a vehicular search incident to a lawful arrest, Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 459 n. 1, 101 S.Ct. at 2863 n. 1, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 774 n. 1, the Supreme Court endorsed the view that Fourth Amendment protections `can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.' Id. at 458, 101 S.Ct. at 2863, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 773 (quoting LaFave, Case-By-Case Adjudication, supra, 1974 Sup.Ct.Rev. at 142). The Court, stressing its adherence to the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case, id. at 460 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. at 2864 n. 3, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 775 n. 3, adopted the generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within `the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].' Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 775 (quoting Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed. 2d at 694). Accordingly, the Court upheld the validity of the Belton search, holding that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile [and]    may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach. [ Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 775 (footnotes omitted).] The Court defined container as any object capable of holding another object, and as including closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like. Id. at 460 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. at 2864 n. 4, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 775 n. 4. The Court's holding encompassed only the interior of an automobile's passenger compartment, not the trunk. Ibid. In applying the Belton rule, federal courts have generally sustained vehicular searches even if the arrestee has been removed from the vehicle and handcuffed. See, e.g., United States v. White, 871 F. 2d 41, 44-45 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Karlin, 852 F. 2d 968, 970-72 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021, 109 S.Ct. 1142, 103 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1989); United States v. Cotton, 751 F. 2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Collins, 668 F. 2d 819, 821 (5th Cir.1982); cf. United States v. Vasey, 834 F. 2d 782, 787 (9th Cir.1987) (holding search invalid as not contemporaneous with arrest of defendant who was handcuffed and secured in police car thirty to forty-five minutes prior to search). The Court's holding in Belton has been widely criticized. Professor LaFave, whose endorsement of bright-line rules to guide police officers in resolving Fourth Amendment issues the Belton majority quoted approvingly, id. at 458, 101 S.Ct. at 2860, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 773-74, concludes that Belton does a disservice to the development of sound Fourth Amendment doctrine. Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing Bright Lines and Good Faith, 43 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 307, 325 (1982). He observes that because the automobile search authorized by Belton is not based on probable cause, the decision creates the risk that police will make custodial arrests which they otherwise would not make as a cover for a search which the Fourth Amendment otherwise prohibits. 3 LaFave, supra, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), at 21. Other commentators have noted the inconsistency between the Belton rule and the grabbing area restriction imposed by Chimel, supra: If any bright line rule had been necessary to resolve the issue in Belton, it would have been the opposite of the rule that the Court announced.    [O]ccupants almost invariably are removed before an automobile is searched; and once they have been removed, there is no longer much chance that they can secure weapons from the automobile or destroy evidence there. [Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 V. of Pitt.L.Rev. 227, 274 (1984).] See also Jeffrey A. Carter, Fourth Amendment  Of Cars, Containers and Confusion, 72 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 1171, 1173, 1217-21 (1981) (characterizing Belton as disappointing, efficacy of its bright-line rule questionable, and its legacy confusion); Catherine Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 Va.L.Rev. 1085, 1130-31 (1982) (observing that [by] the elimination of Chimel 's case-by-case measure of grabbing areas    Belton dramatically lowered the level of Fourth Amendment protection afforded to motorists in almost every state); Yale Kamisar, The Automobile Search Cases: The Court Does Little to Clarify the Labyrinth of Judicial Uncertainty, in 3 The Supreme Court: Trends and Developments 1980-81 96 (Jesse Chaper et al. eds., 1982) (arguing that automobile exception recognized in Carroll, supra, 267 U.S. at 147, 45 S.Ct. at 283, 69 L.Ed. at 548-49, and based on probable cause constituted preferable basis for authorizing warrantless search in Belton ); John Parker, Robbins and Belton  Inconsistency and Confusion Continue to Reign Supreme in the Area of Warrantless Vehicle Searches, 19 Hous.L.Rev. 527, 552 (1982) (arguing that [r]easonableness ableness and exigency have given way to predictability in Belton ); David S. Rudstein, The Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest: An Analysis of New York v. Belton, 67 Marq.L.Rev. 205, 232, 261 (1984) (reading Belton to allow car search even if arrestee handcuffed and placed in squad car and urging reconsideration of Belton and return to rationale of Chimel, allowing search of vehicle and containers therein only if within potential control of arrestee); David M. Silk, When Bright Lines Break Down: Limiting New York v. Belton, 136 U.Pa.L.Rev. 281, 313 (1987) (hereinafter Silk) (urging that Belton be read and applied narrowly and not expanded beyond intended scope); Robert Stern, Robbins v. California and New York v. Belton : The Supreme Court Opens Car Doors to Container Searches, 31 Am.U.L.Rev. 291, 317 (1982) (describing Belton as subordinating privacy interests to bright-line rule and allowing warrantless searches of containers in automobile passenger compartments incident to arrest of driver or occupants); The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 93, 260 (1981) (noting that the Court has turned its back on the logic of its earlier decision in Chimel   , which restricted police searches incident to arrest to the arrestee's immediate area of control). Most of the state courts that have addressed the issue apply the Belton rule, see Silk, supra, 136 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 292 n. 81, although several state courts have declined to follow Belton. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982) (distinguishing Belton, but observing that we do not consider [ Belton ] to be a correct rule of police conduct under our state constitution); Commonwealth v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 448 N.E. 2d 1264, 1266-68 (1983) (excluding evidence obtained by warrantless search of truck following lawful arrest, removal, and handcuffing of driver and acknowledging validity of search under Belton but invalidating search based on Massachusetts statute limiting police authority to search incident to arrest only to evidence of crime for which arrest is effected or to seize weapons arrestee might use to resist arrest); People v. Blasich, 73 N.Y. 2d 673, 543 N.Y.S. 2d 40, 44-45, 541 N.E. 2d 40, 44-45 (1989) (upholding search but observing that New York rejects Belton bright-line rule and interprets state constitution to limit warrantless searches of automobiles incident to arrests only to area from which arrestee might actually gain possession of weapon or destructible evidence); State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W. 2d 93, 97 (N.D. 1993) (holding invalid warrantless search of jacket draped down around [passenger's] back, that passenger was kind of sitting on, following arrest of driver for driving while on suspended list, and finding Belton inapplicable to search of jacket obviously belonging to passenger not implicated in offense for which driver was arrested); State v. Brown, 63 Ohio St. 3d 349, 588 N.E. 2d 113, 114-15 (invalidating warrantless search of automobile's glove compartment following arrest of defendant for driving while intoxicated and removal into patrol car; declining to follow Belton and holding that under Ohio constitution arrest for traffic offense does not automatically authorize detailed search of arrestee's automobile), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 182, 121 L.Ed. 2d 127 (1992); State v. Kirsch, 69 Or. App. 418, 686 P. 2d 446, 448-9 (1984) (upholding reasonableness of car search incident to valid arrest; observing that Belton is not the law of Oregon and that Oregon Constitution authorizes car search incident to arrest only if necessary to protect officer or to preserve evidence, or if relevant to crime for which arrest is made and reasonable in light of facts); State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P. 2d 436, 440-41 (1986) (upholding warrantless search of unlocked glove compartment incident to arrest for theft; modifying Belton, and holding that Washington Constitution authorizes warrantless searches of automobile passenger compartment incident to valid arrest but excluding locked containers and locked glove compartment). This Court has not previously had occasion to consider and apply Belton, although we have frequently referred to the Fourth Amendment exception that it established. See, e.g., State v. Colvin, 123 N.J. 428, 435, 587 A. 2d 1278 (1991) (noting that the Belton exception for a search incident to an arrest is conceptually distinct from the exception for automobile searches. In the former, there need be no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 38, 573 A. 2d 1376 (1990) (distinguishing search during routine traffic stop from Belton search incident to lawful arrest); State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 503, 461 A. 2d 1128 (1983) (distinguishing Belton ); Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 235 n. 15, 440 A. 2d 1311) (declining to consider effect of Belton on Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. 346, 419 A. 2d 1123). In State v. Kearney, 183 N.J. Super. 13, 443 A. 2d 214 (1981), certif. denied, 89 N.J. 449, 446 A. 2d 169 (1982), the Appellate Division applied the philosophy of Belton to sustain a search of defendant's jacket inside an automobile following defendant's arrest for possession of drugs. The Appellate Division noted that Belton had defined container to include luggage, boxes, bags, clothing and the like. Id. at 20, 443 A. 2d 214. Observing that [t]he impact of Belton in this State is uncertain, the court sustained the search of defendant's jacket and acknowledged that [w]e follow Belton in this case, to the extent that its philosophy may be applicable   . Ibid. In State v. Barksdale, 224 N.J. Super. 404, 415-16, 540 A. 2d 901 (App.Div. 1988), police officers arrested the operator of a vehicle for driving while on the suspended list, handcuffed him, and placed him in the patrol car; because the car stalled, the officers ordered the occupants to push the car into a nearby parking lot. Ten or fifteen minutes after the arrest, police officers searched the passenger compartment and discovered drugs. Affirming the trial court's suppression of the evidence, the Appellate Division, based on the delay between the arrest and the search, concluded that the search was not a contemporaneous incident of that arrest within the contemplation of Belton. Id. at 415, 540 A. 2d 901. The Appellate Division also observed that the police had no reasonable belief that any occupant of the vehicle was armed and dangerous. Ibid. Noting that the driver had been handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the patrol car, the court also concluded that the search was not properly limited to the area within [the driver's] immediate control. Id. at 416, 540 A. 2d 901. No case has heretofore required us to consider the Belton holding in the context of our State Constitution because most warrantless automobile searches conducted by police officers are sustainable on other grounds. Our courts have relied primarily on the automobile exception first established in Carroll, supra, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, which holds a search warrant unnecessary when the police stop an automobile on the highway and have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 230-31, 440 A. 2d 1311; see Colvin, supra, 123 N.J. at 437, 587 A. 2d 1278; Esteves, supra, 93 N.J. at 505-07, 461 A. 2d 1128; cf. State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 9-15, 414 A. 2d 1327 (1980) (holding that police officers lacked probable cause sufficient to sustain search of automobile trunk under automobile exception). An obvious explanation for reliance by law-enforcement officials on the automobile exception is that the very same facts that constitute probable cause to arrest a vehicle's occupant often will afford police officers probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of crime or contraband. In that event, a warrantless search of the vehicle is authorized, not as a search incident to arrest, but rather as a search falling within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Blasich, supra, 543 N.Y.S. 2d at 43, 541 N.E. 2d at 43. In addition, we have applied the holding of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1201 (1983), in which the Supreme Court sustained the validity of a weapons search in the passenger compartment of an automobile when the police officers had a reasonable belief that the driver posed a threat to their safety. The Court observed that a weapons search was permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on `specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. Id. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 1220 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)). In Lund, supra, we concluded that the Michigan v. Long rule is sound and compelling precedent and should be followed to protect New Jersey's police community. 119 N.J. at 48, 573 A. 2d 1376. Hence, irrespective of the Belton rule, warrantless vehicle searches in New Jersey are sustainable either under the so-called automobile exception on the basis of probable cause, or in connection with a search for weapons based on an objectively-reasonable belief that an occupant of the vehicle is dangerous and may gain access to weapons. We must now determine whether our State Constitution will permit application of the Belton rule to sustain a warrantless vehicular search solely on the basis of an arrest for a motor-vehicle offense.