Opinion ID: 2273939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: prohibition on sale of alcohol

Text: The ordinance also contains a provision prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages by any adult entertainment establishment and prohibiting an adult entertainment establishment from applying for a license to sell alcoholic beverages. Appellants argue that the ban on selling alcohol is unconstitutional as a violation of § 61 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution, and is preempted by state legislation. The Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution, which repealed prohibition, gives the states power to regulate the sale of alcohol within their borders. § 61 of the Kentucky Constitution provides for local governments to hold elections to determine if alcohol shall be sold and the sale thereof regulated within its borders. Appellants maintain that Metro's prohibition on selling alcohol violates both constitutional provisions because it was enacted without voter approval and because the state has not otherwise delegated to the local government the authority to impose alcohol prohibitions. As for the Twenty-first Amendment claim, the United States Supreme Court could not have been more clear in City of Newport, Ky. v. Iacobucci, when it recognized the state's broad power to regulate alcohol, and that the state could delegate this power as they see fit. 479 U.S. 92, 95-96, 107 S.Ct. 383, 93 L.Ed.2d 334 (1986). The appellee argued, as Appellants do in the present case, that, because the Kentucky Constitution allows for local elections on the issue of whether alcohol could be sold within the locale's borders, the Twenty-first Amendment is violated when a local government seeks to prohibit or regulate alcohol without such an election. Without reaching the state law question of the propriety of the delegation of authority from the state to the City of Newport, the Supreme Court adjudged that New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 101 S.Ct. 2599, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981) (holding that state could prohibit topless dancing in bars), was controlling and thus concluded that the local government's ordinance banning nude dancing in bars that sold liquor did not violate the Twenty-first Amendment. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. at 94-96, 107 S.Ct. 383. In Bellanca, the Court stated: This Court has long recognized that a State has absolute power under the Twenty-first Amendment to prohibit totally the sale of liquor within its boundaries. It is equally well established that a State has broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the times, places, and circumstances under which liquor may be sold. 452 U.S. at 715, 101 S.Ct. 2599 (citations omitted). Hence, the question of the alleged violation of the Twenty-first Amendment has been put to rest. We now turn to the claims regarding § 61 of the Kentucky Constitution and preemption. Pursuant to § 61, the Legislature has set up means and methods of holding a local option election. KRS 242.020 et seq. KRS 241.030 and 241.060 established the Alcohol Beverage Control Board to promulgate reasonable administrative regulations governing the sale and distribution of alcohol in the state. Under its police powers [regarding the regulation of the sale of alcohol] the Legislature may provide for supplementation of measures purely local, and grant to a local subdivision such rights as it may deem best as ways and means of exercising local police power. Fuson v. Howard, 305 Ky. 843, 205 S.W.2d 1018, 1020 (1947). Pursuant to this delegation of its police power, KRS 241.220 provides for the appointment of an urban-county administrator whose functions are set out in KRS 241.250 as follows: The functions of each urban-county administrator shall be the same with respect to urban-county licenses and regulations as the functions of the [Alcohol Beverage Control] board with respect to state licenses and regulations, except that no regulation adopted by an urban-county administrator may be less stringent than the statutes relating to alcoholic beverage control or than the regulations of the board. In City of Louisville v. Michael A. Woods, Inc., the city of Louisville enacted an ordinance forbidding nude or nearly nude activities on premises licensed by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. 883 S.W.2d 881 (Ky.App.1993). The opponents of the ordinance argued that the ordinance was in conflict with the statutory scheme regarding the regulation of the sale of alcohol and thus usurped the state's power to so regulate the sale of alcohol. Id. at 884. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and upheld the ordinance, reasoning: The statutes concerning alcoholic beverages seem to not only give cities the opportunity to regulate conduct in such establishments, but require that standards be maintained. The ABC Board has acknowledged that different cities will have different standards, and the Board's regulations were to present at least some minimum standards. We find no prohibition against a city invoking stricter standards of conduct in places serving alcoholic beverages. Id. at 883. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Bellanca, [c]ommon sense indicates that any form of nudity coupled with alcohol in a public place begets undesirable behavior. 452 U.S. at 718, 101 S.Ct. 2599. And in Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, in rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a ban on the sale of alcohol in an adult-oriented business, the court recognized that [p]rohibiting alcohol on the premises of adult entertainment establishments will unquestionably reduce the enhanced secondary effects resulting from the explosive combination of alcohol consumption and nude or semi-nude dancing. 316 F.3d 702, 727-28 (7th Cir.2003). In the instant case, the ban on the sale of alcohol in adult entertainment establishments was not more lenient than any of the statutes regulating alcohol. See KRS Ch. 241-244. Thus we hold that Metro's ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcohol in adult entertainment businesses was a proper exercise of its police power to regulate the sale of alcohol, as well as the conduct in adult entertainment businesses. As to the argument that the alcohol provision was preempted by state legislation, we would note that a preemption argument was also made in Restaurant Ventures, regarding the restriction on the hours of operation. 60 S.W.3d at 580-81. In rejecting the assertion that the ordinance was preempted by KRS 244.295 (setting the hours of operation for alcoholic beverage licensees), this Court adjudged that [t]he regulation of operating hours of adult entertainment establishments is a valid exercise of the government's power to regulate those establishments. The ordinance regulates the operating hours not because they sell alcoholic beverages, but because of the sexually-oriented nature of the entertainment provided. Id. at 581. In sum, we find there was no preemption by state legislation or violation of § 61 of the Kentucky Constitution and uphold the ban on the sale of alcohol in the ordinance.