Opinion ID: 2576244
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A Genuine Question of Material Fact Exists as to Whether Schaub Attempted To Exhaust His Remedies.

Text: In its order granting summary judgment to K & L, the superior court found that Schaub had failed to exhaust his contractual and administrative remedies because Schaub could have filed a Field Grievance Report himself; he could have asked the union Shop Steward to file a Field Grievance Report on his behalf; or he could've pressed the Union to file a grievance on his behalf. Because Schaub presented genuine issues of material fact as to his ability to file a grievance on his own, we conclude that the superior court's basis for granting summary judgment was erroneous. It is well-settled law that an employee must attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by a collective bargaining agreement before obtaining judicial review. [10] However, grievance procedures mandated by a collective bargaining agreement may prove unworkable when the employer repudiates the grievance procedures or when the union wrongfully refuses to process the grievance. [11] In the latter instance, the wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee's grievance. [12] A prerequisite for this type of claim is that the union has sole power under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure, and . . . the employee-plaintiff has been prevented from exhausting his contractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to process the grievance. [13] K & L argues that Schaub could have filed his own grievance under the grievance procedures outlined in his collective bargaining agreement. [14] Schaub acknowledges that step one of the CBA grievance procedure would have allowed him to file a grievance on his own behalf, but argues that he did not have access to the appropriate form because the form was kept at the K & L offices and Schaub had already been terminated. Schaub also points out that the union had informed him that the grievance was time-barred and nobody informed him that he could file a grievance on his own. This factual question  that is, whether Schaub actually could have filed his own grievance  is sufficient to preclude summary judgment on the question of whether Schaub attempted to exhaust the grievance remedies outlined in his CBA, as required by Vaca. In addition, Schaub points to his various rejected requests that the union file a grievance as evidence that he did attempt to pursue a grievance. Drawing reasonable inferences in Schaub's favor, as required under our summary judgment standard, [15] the superior court could have concluded that Schaub pursued his grievance to the fullest extent possible. Moreover, it is not clear what Schaub could have accomplished by filing the grievance without the cooperation of his union. In an order denying Schaub's motion for reconsideration, the superior court wrote of step one: To move past the initial steps of the grievance procedure here, the grievance needed only to be filed  the result of filing would be an immediate mandatory meeting with the employee, his Union representative, and his immediate supervisor. But Schaub's collective bargaining agreement clearly requires union participation in steps two and three. Thus, even if Schaub had filed his own grievance, he could not have moved beyond step one without the assistance of his union. Schaub's situation meets the requirement in Vaca that the union has sole power under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure. [16] If the superior court finds that an employee did not exhaust contractual remedies, the next step is to determine whether the employee was prevented from doing so by the union's wrongful refusal to process the grievance. [17] In Vaca, the Supreme Court observed the contradiction inherent in allowing a union's activities to excuse an employee from exhausting contractual remedies in a suit against the employer where the employer had no control over the union's actions. But the Supreme Court concluded that if the employer has committed a wrongful discharge, an employee should not be prevented by the union's breach from pursuing any remedies. [18] In its order denying Schaub's motion for reconsideration, the superior court found that Schaub did not satisfy this court's requirements for excusal from exhaustion, concluding that Schaub's union did not act with bad faith, or in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The superior court also concluded that the union's refusal to file Schaub's grievance could not constitute excusal because Schaub could have filed the grievance on his own. As discussed above, Schaub raised a genuine factual issue as to whether he could have filed his own grievance. We now examine what constitutes breach of a union's duty of fair representation. Under the standard set forth in Vaca, [a] breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. [19] The Vaca standard presents a formidable challenge to employees, but the Supreme Court observed that the union in Vaca might well have breached its duty had it ignored [the employee's] complaint or had it processed the grievance in a perfunctory manner. [20] The standard for determining when a union's unintentional mistake amounts to unfair representation is an evolving one, [21] and most courts require more than a mere showing that a union's handling of a grievance was perfunctory. [22] In one case involving employee discharges, the Ninth Circuit observed that unions must undertake some investigation of grievances brought to their attention but that the sufficiency of the union's actions will vary with each case. [23] The Ninth Circuit Court reasoned: Although we afford unions a reasonable range of discretion in deciding how best to handle grievances, union conduct that shows an egregious disregard for the rights of union members constitutes a breach of the duty of fair representation. [24] The court also noted that the fact that employees had been discharged put an additional responsibility on the union, stating that the Union needed to exercise special care in handling petitioners' grievance because they concerned discharges, the most serious sanction an employer can impose. [25] In this case, Schaub alleges facts indicating that the union may have misinterpreted the CBA when it refused to process his grievance, resulting in Schaub missing a grievance filing deadline that he otherwise could have met. Schaub testified in a deposition that his union informed him that it could not file his grievance because more than ten days had passed since his termination. Schaub also stated in an affidavit that he never received the July 19 letter terminating his employment and explained that he first learned of his termination when he received his final paycheck in late August: I returned to Anchorage on August 23, 2000. When I got my mail I received a final paycheck from K & L. I contacted the Teamsters Union within a day or two of my arrival and requested to file a grievance. The first Business Agent I spoke to . . . told me it was too late to file a grievance since I had been fired on July 19. I told him I knew nothing about being fired on July 19, that I only learned I had been terminated when I got home and had my final paycheck in the mail, on August 23. Another Business Agent, Mr. Trosper, told me the same thing  I could not file a grievance because it was too late. Although I requested a grievance to be filed, the union refused to do so. Article 8, section 8.02 of Schaub's collective bargaining agreement allows an employee twenty work days from when the employee had, or reasonably should have had, notice of the grievance to file a grievance regarding a termination. Similarly, article 6, section 6.06 allows an employee twenty work days after a notice of termination to file a grievance. [26] When interpreting collective bargaining agreements, courts will if possible give effect to all parts of the instrument and an interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all its provisions will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of the writing useless or inexplicable. . . . [27] Applying this principle, we conclude that the reasonably should have had notice language in section 8.02 applies to section 6.06 as well. Federal case law and the collective bargaining agreement indicate that the twenty-day deadline for filing Schaub's grievance did not begin to run until Schaub received actual notice of his termination. In a case examining the timeliness of a written notice mailed by a union the day before Thanksgiving, resulting in late receipt of the notice, the Ninth Circuit observed that the general rule for written notice is that the intended recipient must receive actual notice. [28] The federal appeals court wrote: Where the giving of written notice is required by statute or contract and the manner of giving the notice is not specified, the general rule is that [there] must be personal service of the notice. However, it is sufficient to show that the party to be notified received actual written notice, the means employed being unimportant. [29] The court continued: The power of termination of a contract of employment, or of any other continuing contract can be effectively exercised only by bringing home notice to the other party, not by merely mailing it to him. [30] Schaub's collective bargaining agreement states that the employee will be asked to sign an acknowledgment of receipt of the discharge. [31] This provision indicates that actual notice of the termination was required before the twenty-day deadline for filing a grievance began to run. [32] However, we need not reach the question of whether the union's handling of Schaub's complaint was perfunctory and its refusal to file a grievance wrongful under Vaca because we conclude that Schaub's claim is time-barred.