Opinion ID: 552803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: use of evidence related to dismissed count 3

Text: 52 Defendant's third allegation of error relates to the jury's use of evidence relevant to a dismissed count. At the close of the government's case, the district judge dismissed Count 3 of the indictment. The judge found that, while the indictment stated that the acts charged in Count 3 took place in October, 1984, the proof adduced at trial concerned acts occurring six months later, in March 1985. According to the district court, this amounted to an impermissible variance. 7 53 At the close of the presentation of evidence, defense counsel requested that the trial judge instruct the jury that it could not consider evidence relating to the third count in its consideration of the conspiracy count or the other substantive counts. The judge denied the motion, allowing the jury to consider any evidence that would be within the time framework of the dates alleged in the conspiracy count only as it relates to the conspiracy. Transcript at 1191-92. 54 After the jury began deliberations, it sought further instruction from the trial judge on the question of whether it could consider witness testimony relating to Count 3 to help us decide other facts in Charge Four. Transcript at 1372. After soliciting the views of counsel, the judge repeated a portion of his prior jury instructions, reminding the jury that: 55 Each count of the indictment charged the defendant with having committed a separate offense. You must give separate consideration both to each count and to each defendant. You must consider each count and the evidence relating to it separate and apart from every other count. You should return a separate verdict as to each defendant and to each count. Your verdict of guilty or not guilty of an offense charged in one count should not control your decision as to that defendant under any other count. 56 Following this reiteration, the trial judge told the jury that probably the short and most simple answer to your question is no. He went on to add, however, that: 57 evidence that was adduced during the trial that would have been relevant to Count Three can be used by you with respect that determinations that you have to make on the overall conspiracy charge. Furthermore, there's a doctrine they call collateral estoppel in the law, and there is some--a Rule 404(b) that leads me to add that depending on what the issue is that caused you to ask the question, evidence from Count Three that was dismissed could be used if it was of value to you in determining questions of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 58 Transcript at 1387-89 (emphasis supplied). Defendants objected to this instruction. 59 On appeal, defendants argue that the instruction was defective for three reasons: it erroneously allowed the jury to consider Count 3 evidence in evaluating the evidence relating to Count 4 and the remaining substantive counts, it encouraged the jury to consider Count 3 evidence as it related to the conspiracy count, and it unnecessarily confused the jury. The prosecution responds that the nature of conspiracies is that they are ongoing and continuous and that courts routinely allow uncharged evidence to be used to substantiate a conspiracy count. As to the jury's use of Count 3 evidence as it relates to the other substantive counts, the prosecution contends that the district court correctly decided whether to admit the Count 3 evidence by applying the standard used for the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts set out in Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). 60 As counsel for one of the defendants noted in discussing the proposed instruction with the judge, the set of facts presented is rather unusual. 8 Transcript at 1374. We share defendants' concern that counts of an indictment dismissed at the close of the prosecution's case could be resuscitated by an open invitation to the jury to consider evidence pertinent to the dismissed count in resolving other counts. We are also concerned that the somewhat atypical procedural developments in this case led to the admission of bad acts testimony absent a detailed assessment of the evidence presented in support of [the dismissed count] under the standards articulated in United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 779 (7th Cir.1984). Government Brief at 37. 61 Nonetheless, on the facts of this case we decide that the district court's instruction to the jury was proper. The instruction given the jury here raises two distinct issues, first, the use of the Count 3 evidence in support of the conspiracy charged in Count 1, and second, the use of the Count 3 evidence in support of the other substantive counts, particularly Count 4. The first question is the easier of the two; as we have observed, [e]vidence of overt acts which occurred after a conspiracy was formed and which were related to the object of the conspiracy is admissible regardless of whether the overt acts are charged in the indictment. United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1300 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 934, 97 S.Ct. 1558, 51 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977); see also United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1239 (7th Cir.1981); United States v. Greichunos, 572 F.Supp. 220, 224 (N.D.Ill.1983). Had the government chosen before trial not to charge Count 3 at all but simply to elicit testimony concerning an uncharged drug transaction that supported its conspiracy allegations, Harris and the cases following it would support an affirmance. These cases put defendants here on notice that the Count 3 evidence could be used by the jury in deciding whether to convict on the conspiracy count even after that count had been dismissed. 62 The specific question posed by the jury, however, related to the second of our two inquiries, the use of the Count 3 testimony to decide the question of defendants' guilt or innocence on the remaining substantive counts. Three factors convince us that the jury instruction permitting the use of the Count 3 testimony was not error. First, we note that the challenged instruction was immediately preceded by a repetition of the trial judge's prior instruction that the jury must separately consider each count and the evidence relating to that count. Thus, the jury was reminded not to aggregate all the evidence in the case and instead to conduct individualized determinations with respect to each defendant and each count. The fact that the jury acquitted Juan Carlos Colin on Counts 4 and 6, Alejandro Rodriguez on Count 4, and Fernando Rodriguez on Count 6 suggests that they heeded this instruction. 63 Second, the trial judge limited the jury's use of the Count 3 evidence to the categories enumerated in Rule 404(b). 9 While a specific instruction to the jury that they should not consider the Count 3 testimony as probative of a propensity to commit crime would have been preferable, the jury's use of the evidence was cabined by the trial judge's enumeration of the Rule 404(b) categories. 64 The third and final factor persuading us that the instruction to the jury that it could consider the evidence related to Count 3 in its consideration of the other substantive counts is that the Count 3 evidence satisfies the four-part standard for the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence set out by this Circuit in United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 779 (7th Cir.1984); see also United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.1990). Under the Shackleford test, 65 admission of evidence of prior or subsequent acts will be approved if (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue ... (3) the evidence is clear and convincing, 10 and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 66 Shackleford, 738 F.2d at 776, 779. 67 Applying these factors here, the testimony elicited in support of Count 3 suggested the use of a common plan, one of the Rule 404(b) categories the jury was instructed by the trial judge that the evidence could be used for. There is no requirement that acts used to show the existence of a common scheme or plan be identical, just that the charged and uncharged prior events have sufficient points in common. United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir.1989); cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3221, 110 L.Ed.2d 668 (1990); see also United States v. Nolan, 910 F.2d 1553, 1561 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 621 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Radseck, 718 F.2d 233, 236 (7th Cir.1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1029, 104 S.Ct. 1291, 79 L.Ed.2d 693 (1984). 68 That standard was met here. While the facts alleged in Count 2, the initial transaction engaged in by the conspiracy, are somewhat unique, the facts supporting Counts 3, 4, and 5 share important features. In each of these counts Valdemar Colin brought marijuana from Mexico and transferred it to one of a small group of associates at a motel in the lower Midwest. One of three associates drove the marijuana to the Milwaukee area, and stored at one of two sites. On the associate's trip north he was escorted by another conspirator. Counts 3 through 6 occurred over a period of 22 months, but counts 3, 4, and 5 took place over approximately three months, March through June 1985. We think this pattern shows sufficient similarity to satisfy the standard of Rule 404(b). 69 The similarities between Counts 3 and 4, the focus of the jury's question to the trial judge, are even more striking. The facts underlying the two counts take place weeks apart. In both cases the marijuana transfer was effectuated by Valdemar's handing over the keys to a U-Haul truck to Arturo Garay. In Count 3, Garay drove the truck himself, escorted by Fernando Rodriguez. In Count 4, Elizondo drove the truck, with Arturo Garay and Fernando Rodriguez providing the escorts. In both counts, the marijuana's first stop in the Milwaukee area was Tom Koss's garage. 70 The evidence here also satisfies the Huddleston standard of proof. The person who brought together Valdemar Colin and the other participants in the marijuana shipment involved in Count 3 was Arturo Garay, who testified at trial as to his meeting with Valdemar. His testimony concerning the unloading of the marijuana in Milwaukee was supported by testimony concerning the same events provided by Tom Koss, in whose garage the marijuana was stored. Both witnesses were cross-examined by defense counsel. This evidence is sufficient for a jury reasonably to conclude that the acts alleged in Count 3 occurred and that Valdemar Colin and Fernando Rodriguez committed those acts. 71 Turning to the last Shackleford factor, the evidence pertaining to Count 3 was clearly no more or less prejudicial than evidence pertaining to any of the substantive counts that remained in the case. There is no suggestion that the Count 3 evidence was presented in a sensational manner: the government, thinking during its case in chief that the Count would go to the jury, presented it in the same manner as the other substantive counts. 72