Opinion ID: 885118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the unproven statements of a child informant may serve as the sole basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

Text: ¶ 19 Worrall contends that the District Court erred in holding that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant because unverified statements of an unproven informant, much less a child informant, cannot serve as the sole basis for issuance of a search warrant. He argues that allowing a search of his property based upon the uncorroborated claim of an unproven 11-year-old child, after only a fifteen-minute interview, was unreasonable. ¶ 20 In Kuneff, we observed that information provided to the police that is motivated by good citizenship is a reliable basis for determining probable cause. Kuneff, ¶ 24 (citing State v. Oleson, 1998 MT 130, ¶ 14, ___ Mont. ___, ¶ 14, 959 P.2d 503, ¶ 14, 55 St.Rep. 517, ¶ 14). Nothing in the record indicates that Erik's report should be viewed more critically than similar reports from adult citizen informants. This court has not required a greater showing of probable cause where the citizen informant happened to be under the age of eighteen. Moreover, Worrall did not challenge the competency of either Erik or Dustin at the suppression hearing. Both Erik and Dustin testified without objection as to their abilities to tell the truth and to express themselves concerning their personal observations. ¶ 21 The search warrant application related that Erik personally observed marijuana plants on Worrall's property, that he recognized the plants as marijuana, and that he knew the difference between marijuana plants and tomato plants. These assertions were sufficient to demonstrate the reasonable probability that Erik's information was reliable and not merely speculative. ¶ 22 Although Worrall complains that Erik's statements were not corroborated by law enforcement officers, this Court has made clear that corroboration is unnecessary under the circumstances of this case. [C]orroboration of an informant's information through other sources is only necessary when the information is hearsay or the informant is anonymous. State v. Adams (1997), 284 Mont. 25, 37, 943 P.2d 955, 962 (citing State v. Rinehart (1993), 262 Mont. 204, 212, 864 P.2d 1219, 1224). The informant in Adams personally observed the marijuana growing operation and he was not an anonymous informant. Consequently, we concluded that corroboration of his information was not necessary. Adams, 284 Mont. at 37, 943 P.2d at 962. Here, as in Adams, Erik was not an anonymous informant and the information he provided was based upon personal observation, not hearsay. Hence, corroboration of the information he provided to Burdick was unnecessary. ¶ 23 Accordingly, we hold that the unproven statements of a child informant may serve as the sole basis for the issuance of a search warrant.