Opinion ID: 1043279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Functional equivalent arguments

Text: Having disposed of his first two arguments, we consider the appellant's contention that a detainer is a functional equivalent of an arrest and thereby starts the thirty-day countdown. Although we have not heretofore had occasion to determine whether a federal detainer may act as the functional equivalent of a federal arrest, we have previously considered a similar question of whether the thirty-day clock begins to run while an individual remains in state custody on state charges. See 10 We further note the appellant would not be entitled to relief even if we were to adopt his proposed test. The critical question in Woolfolk was the date on which the government knew or should have known that the defendant was held solely on federal charges. 399 F.3d at 597. The Jail kept the appellant incarcerated on the State charges up through October 3, 2011, when it learned for the first time they had been dismissed. There are no allegations or evidence of collusion between the State and the government to secure a tactical advantage or to violate the appellant's rights under the Speedy Trial Act. As such, even under the appellant's proposed rule, the thirty-day clock would not have begun to count down until October 3, 2011. -19- Kelly, 661 F.3d 682. As explicated below, our reasoning in Kelly applies with equal force here and is fatal to the appellant's position. Kelly considered whether an individual's appearance under a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum constitutes an 'arrest' or 'summons' under the [Speedy Trial Act] and explicitly concluded that it did not. Id. at 687. As we explained, by issuing a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum the requesting jurisdiction seeks to have a prisoner in another jurisdiction produced to the requesting jurisdiction in order to stand trial. See id. Such a writ is neither an arrest nor a summons and differs from an arrest in that it does not involve taking an individual into custody. Id. Instead, the writ applies only to one who is already in custody. Id. Also, the fact that such a writ is directed to the individual's custodian, and not to the individual himself, further distinguishes it from an arrest or summons. Id. Furthermore, just as Congress clearly was aware of federal detainers when it drafted the Act, Congress was also well aware of ad prosequendum writs but chose not to have their issuance trigger the thirty-day clock. Id. at 688. We concluded that [w]here a state arrest takes place and the United States later files a complaint and a detainer seeking to prosecute that individual, there is no federal 'arrest' under the Act, as the individual is in custody based on state law violations. Id. at -20- 689 (citing United States v. Taylor, 814 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1987) and United States v. Copley, 774 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir. 1985)); see also Woolfolk, 399 F.3d at 595 ([T]he Government's filing of a complaint, serving of an arrest warrant and lodging of the warrant as a detainer . . . while Woolfolk was in state custody answering to state charges, did not activate the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act.). The reasoning in Kelly applies strongly here. In effectuating an arrest or serving a summons, the government takes affirmative action against an individual. A federal detainer, however, is directed to an individual's custodian and does not effect a transfer of custody. Indeed, a detainer expressly contemplates a future transfer of custody. Thus, for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, the lodging of a federal detainer is roughly equivalent to the issuance of a writ ad prosquendum. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in holding that where an individual is arrested on state charges and the government subsequently files a complaint and lodges a detainer against that individual, if the individual remains in custody based on the state charges and not in connection with the later-filed federal charges, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)'s thirty-day arrest to indictment requirement is not triggered.11 11 This is not to say that a detainer could never operate as a functional equivalent of a federal arrest. Generally speaking, an arrest may occur when law enforcement officials effect a -21- It follows here that the Speedy Trial Act's thirty-day clock began ticking when the appellant was taken into federal custody on October 3, 2011. The subsequent indictment on October 26, 2011, was issued well within thirty days. As such, there was no violation of the appellant's rights under the Speedy Trial Act, and the district court correctly denied his motion to dismiss.