Opinion ID: 1335858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: directed verdict: commission of the crime

Text: Brisbon asserts the court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict where the State failed to present any substantial evidence that Brisbon murdered Victim. We disagree. In determining whether to send the case to the jury on circumstantial evidence, the judge is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight; and although he should not refuse to grant the motion where the evidence merely raises a suspicion that the accused is guilty, it is his duty to submit the case to the jury if there be any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 275, 379 S.E.2d 888, 889 ( quoting State v. Littlejohn, 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924 (1955)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895, 110 S.Ct. 246, 107 L.Ed.2d 196 (1989). The following are the major pieces of evidence presented by the State linking Brisbon to the murder of Victim: a. he and Victim had been dating for a number of years; b. it was his practice to pick up Victim on Fridays, and she would return home on Sundays; c. he picked her up on Friday, June 12, 1992, after which she was not seen; d. at Brisbon's workplace, a sofa was found on which were blood stains indicating a blood type consistent with only nine percent of the North American black population (Victim had this type of blood.); e. blood was on an axe found at Brisbon's workplace (The blood, which was found on the axe head and handle, again matched Victim's blood type.); f. Brisbon's bloody palm print was on the handle of the same axe. From the above evidence, Brisbon's guilt may be fairly and logically deduced; the evidence went beyond merely raising a suspicion of the accused's guilt. See id.