Opinion ID: 2977012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Standby Counsel

Text: Jordan argues that the district court erred in refusing to appoint standby counsel to assist him at trial after Jordan obtained removal of his second appointed counsel, Michael Flanagan, eight days before trial. It is undisputed that Jordan knowingly and voluntarily exercised his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). After Jordan requested removal of Flanagan on November 16, 2006, the court held a hearing on November 20, 2006 and permitted Jordan to represent himself. J.A. at 104 (Status Conference Tr. at 7). After granting that request, the court informed Jordan that he could choose either to proceed to trial as scheduled eight days later without standby counsel, or alternatively accept a continuance of the trial date to allow standby counsel adequate time to become familiar with the case. Id. After explaining the options, the court asked Jordan, “Do you want to postpone the trial and have standby counsel, or do you want to have a trial next Tuesday?” Id. Jordan replied, “I would rather have the trial next Tuesday.” Id. Clearly, if Jordan had accepted the district court’s reasonable offer of a continuance, the court would have appointed standby counsel. We conclude, therefore, that Jordan voluntarily waived any right he might have had to standby counsel by refusing the district court’s offer to grant a continuance giving standby counsel adequate time to become familiar with the case.