Opinion ID: 1687603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: cavett's constitutional right to confront his accusers

Text: ¶ 42. The authority for this right and what it means was explained by in the dissent of Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 1087 (Miss.1997) (Sullivan, P.J., dissenting) as follows: In Crapps v. State, 221 So.2d 722, 723 (Miss.1969), this Court stated that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution established the right to confrontation. In Hubbard v. State, 437 So.2d 430, 433-34 (Miss.1983), this Court stated that the Mississippi Constitution, Article 3, Section 26, grants and guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront witnesses against him. See also Stromas v. State, 618 So.2d 116, 121 (Miss.1993). The right of confrontation extends to and includes the right to fully crossexamine the witness on every material point relating to the issue to be determined that would have a bearing on the credibility of the witness and the weight and worth of his testimony. Myers v. State, 296 So.2d 695, 700 (Miss.1974). Wilcher, 697 So.2d at 1116. This Court has further said: [I]n holding the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court said, There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal. Earl v. State, 672 So.2d 1240, 1242 (Miss. 1996) ( quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968)). ¶ 43. The pre-trial statement by co-defendant Stevens introduced at the trial had been properly redacted regarding Cavett. This Court has approved such a procedure in lieu of granting a severance of co-defendants. Walker v. State, 430 So.2d 418, 421 (Miss. 1983) (holding that the trial judge should require the state to elect between a joint trial in which the statement is excluded, a joint trial in which the statement is admitted, but the portion implicating the accused is deleted, or agree to a severance). However, the prosecution was allowed to use its closing argument to unlawfully put before the jury information that was otherwise not permitted in violation of Cavett's right to confront his accusers. The relevant part of the record which occurred during closing argument is as follows: [ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Why [Jason Brown is] not here is because he was at the Metrocenter on a Friday night, minding his own business, leaving that place when these three walked in. When they go out there and spot a car in that parking lot that did not belong to them, but it looked good enough for them that they wanted it. [CAVETT'S ATTORNEY]: Objection, Your Honor. Outside the evidence presented in Court. The COURT: Sustained. [CAVETT'S ATTORNEY]: Move for a mistrial. THE COURT: Denied. [ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: You heard the testimony and evidence. You heard the testimony from this stand where Detective Wade told you that Glynn Stevens said they went to the Metro to steal a car. [CAVETT'S ATTORNEY]: Objection, Your Honor. Outside the evidence that was presented in court. THE COURT: Let me see you at the bench a moment, please. (OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSION AT THE BENCH) THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, let me ask you to please be excused for a couple of moments while we take up a legal matter. (PROCEEDINGS OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY.) [CAVETT'S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, for the record, I would like for the Court to understand my objection is, as the Court is aware, that [the prosecutor] is getting up in front of the jury on closing and saying that Glynn Stevens said that they were going to steal a car. This was the whole point of my objection as to them being allowed to put into evidence anything that had been redacted out of the statement because I was afraid that the State was going to try to get up here at closing and say they intended to steal a car, not just Glynn Stevens. I know when the Court allowed the State to put in that evidence that the Court said that they just talk about Glynn Stevens. Now they're talking about they. This is a three-defendant trial. A severance was not allowed. I think the State knows that when they sit up there and talk about they, that they are implicating the other two defendants in an auto theft that I argued about when they were trying to get the redacted portions back in evidence. I'm making an objection and asking the Court, if the Court sustains my objection, to advise the jury to disregard the statements made by the Assistant District Attorney and to further instruct the jury that only Glynn Stevens had the intent to steal a car when he went to Metrocenter. THE COURT: Response? [ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: No response, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. I already sustained the objection. The motion to advise the jury about what it is they ought to  who they ought to attribute it to and all that stuff I think serves to call more attention to what happened than to benefit you by having me give that incautionary advice. So I'm going to decline your invitation to have the Court do that. I'm going to advise you, [Assistant District Attorney], that we've been here four days. It would be tragic for you to do something at the end of the case that compels me to have to declare a mistrial after us having been here for four days. Do you have something to add? [STRAHAN'S ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor. I want to join in the objection and Strahan moves for a mistrial. [CAVETT'S ATTORNEY]: So does Cavett, Your Honor. THE COURT: Motion for a mistrial is denied. Bring the jury back in. ¶ 44. The prosecution did through the back door what it could not do directly, namely attribute the motive of stealing a car to all three co-defendants when only Stevens, by way of his pre-trial statement to the police, stated that he had this intent. The State purposely attributed a motive to kill to Cavett which was not based on evidence introduced during the trial. Up until these statements were made, the testimony concerning Cavett was that he went to Metrocenter to buy some shoes, not to steal a car. This prosecutorial misconduct should not be overlooked by this Court, for it does violate Cavett's constitutional right to confront his accuser, co-defendant Stevens. As already stated, none of the co-defendants testified at trial. The prosecutor's comments that referred to all three co-defendant's intent to go to Metrocenter to steal a car did have a prejudicial effect on Cavett. Even if it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to overrule the motion for a mistrial, the trial judge was in error when he chose not to even admonish the jury contemporaneously that the Assistant District Attorney's improper comments should be disregarded. The conviction of Cavett should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.