Opinion ID: 602202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Peral-Cota's conspiracy conviction.

Text: 27 Peral-Cota contends that his conspiracy conviction should be reversed because it is impossible to discern from the special verdict forms utilized by the jury which of the three objects within the conspiracy count formed the basis for convicting him of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371. Because the jury failed to reach a verdict on the illegal concealment of aliens count (one of the three purposes of the conspiracy count), Peral-Cota reasons that the jury may not have been unanimous. 28 His general argument contains two assignments of error. Peral-Cota maintains that the district judge's jury instructions only exacerbate[d] the potential for confusion, and that the judge used a confusing special verdict form. 29 We review the district court's formulation of jury instructions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 197, 199 (9th Cir.1992). However, [w]hether a jury instruction misstates elements of a statutory crime is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id. 30 With respect to Count One, the trial judge instructed the jury that 31 [t]he law does not require that the Government prove that the defendant conspired to accomplish each object of the conspiracy. You can return a verdict of guilty on the conspiracy count if you find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy existed to commit any of the three objects. 32 That formulation is correct, as the Supreme Court's opinion in Griffin v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 466 (1991), makes clear. The Court reaffirmed the rule set forth in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970), that  'when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, as Turner's indictment did, the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.'  Griffin, 112 S.Ct. at 473 (quoting Turner, 396 U.S. at 420). A general verdict will not be set aside because one of the possible bases of conviction was neither unconstitutional as in Stromberg[ v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) ], nor even illegal as in Yates[ v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ], but merely [because it was] unsupported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 472. Court decisions that invalidate general conspiracy verdicts for the legal deficiency of an object rather than inadequacy of proof are here, as in Griffin, irrelevant. Id. at 473 n. 2. As the government notes, concealment of an alien is a legally sufficient conspiracy object. 33 Finally, there is no requirement (constitutional or otherwise) that a conspiracy verdict be consistent with the verdict on a separate substantive count. United States v. Guzman, 849 F.2d 447, 448 (9th Cir.1988). 34 Therefore, the jury instruction regarding the multiple object conspiracy was not an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. 35 Peral-Cota also complains that the special verdict form confused the jury. This contention is meritless. The judge adequately explained the special verdict form to the jury. The form itself is relatively simple and straightforward. 36