Opinion ID: 1571490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Charged Offenses

Text: Lynch contends that his trial counsel did not properly research and inform him of the elements of, and defenses to, armed burglary, kidnapping, and first-degree murder and that, but for these errors, he would not have pled guilty. We disagree and, instead, find that trial counsel properly advised Lynch. Based on the nature of the crimes Lynch committed, and the fact that he confessed on at least three occasions, trial counsel believed that this was purely a sentencing case. Therefore, lead trial counsel, James E. Figgatt, in conjunction with co-counsel, Timothy Caudill, made a strategic decision to recommend that Lynch plead guilty and concentrate on mitigating his culpability for these offenses during the ensuing penalty phase. Counsel were particularly concerned with exposing Lynch to a jury because this case involved a thoroughly planned double murder of a mother and her thirteen-year-old minor daughter (although the murder of the daughter was an unintended, felony murder). During the postconviction hearing, Mr. Figgatt testified that he reviewed the indictment for defects and that he discussed possible defenses with Lynch before he pled guilty. Second-chair trial counsel, Mr. Caudill, did not believe that the facts of this case reasonably supported any theoretical defenses because Lynch had confessed to his actions during (1) a thirty- to forty-minute recorded conversation with a 911 dispatcher, (2) a discussion with a police negotiator, and (3) a videotaped confession (although Lynch characterized the murders as accidental). In Caudill's mind, the facts of this case were wholly inconsistent with accidental discharge, Lynch's actions supported a kidnapping charge, and the testimony of a neighborwho lived directly across the hall from the victimswas extremely damaging to any burglary defense. As we stated on direct appeal, the neighbor testified that she looked out of the peephole in her door after hearing the initial shots and saw Lynch dragging Morgan by the hands into Morgan's apartment. She further testified that Lynch knocked on the door to Morgan's apartment and said, Hurry up, open the door, your mom is hurt.  The neighbor testified that Morgan was screaming and was bloody from her waist down. Morgan's neighbor further testified that the door was opened, then after entering with Morgan, Lynch closed the door and approximately five minutes later she heard the sound of three more gunshots. Lynch, 841 So.2d at 367 (emphasis supplied). Lynch hinges this guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim on his reading of the factual proffer Mr. Figgatt presented to the trial court during Lynch's plea colloquy. In relevant part, Mr. Figgatt stated that Lynch went to [Roseanna Morgan's] new home..., he approached her daughter [Leah Caday] who was coming home from school, he gained entry voluntarily into the home at that point in time [(i.e., his initial entry) ]. Subsequently removed from a bag that he had, one of two or three firearms. And at that point in time the kidnapping ensues, as well as what we contend or what the State contends and we admit was, in essence, a burglary, because whatever consent he had to be there was gone. Subsequently, Ms. Morgan, ... arrived at her apartment, her home. She was met at the door, ... she had a heated discussion with [Lynch], and refused to come into the apartment with him there.... [Ms. Morgan] was shot on her front stoop or porch area in front of the apartment, and then pulled inside.... [Lynch] shot [Morgan] with more than one of the guns that he brought. ... Ms. Caday either went to her mother or attempted to leave and got in the way of the shooting and she was shot one time and she died.... While [Lynch] was there he called the Sanford Police Department or 911 and got the Sanford Police Department dispatcher, who remained on the line with him from thirty-five to forty-five minutes. There is no issue of fact. (Emphasis supplied.) Based on his reading of the proffer, Lynch contends that counsel and the trial court failed to comply with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(a), which states that [b]efore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the trial judge shall determine that the plea is voluntarily entered and that a factual basis for the plea exists. Counsel for the prosecution and the defense shall assist the trial judge in this function. (Emphasis supplied.) Lynch asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because the factual proffer did not legally support his convictions for first-degree murder, armed burglary, or kidnapping, and that this deficient performance constitutes fundamental error.
We find no deficiency with regard to the factual proffer as it addresses Lynch's two first-degree murder convictions. The proffer, upon which the trial court relied in accepting Lynch's plea, provided sufficient factual support for each first-degree murder conviction. Cf. Williams v. State, 316 So.2d 267, 271-73 (Fla.1975); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.172(a). According to the proffer, Lynch arrived at the victims' apartment, held the daughter-victim (Leah Caday) hostage, and then subsequently shot and killed both victims after the mother-victim (Roseanna Morgan) arrived at the apartment. There was no deficiency. Lynch's killing of Morgan was an intentional, premeditated first-degree murder, and his killing of Caday was both first-degree felony murder and first-degree murder under the doctrine of transferred intent. See § 782.04(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (1999) (premeditated murder); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2 (defining premeditation and transferred intent); § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (felony murder committed while engaged in the murder or attempted murder of another); Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 951 (Fla.2007) (Premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as `the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.' (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993))), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2056, 170 L.Ed.2d 799 (2008); Lee v. State, 141 So.2d 257, 259 (Fla.1962) (explaining our adherence to the doctrine of transferred intent). However, even if we were to conclude that counsel performed deficiently with regard to the proffer, Lynch cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this deficiency because both he and counsel were well aware that the State possessed the necessary evidence to prove his commission of these murders. The State submitted a competing written factual proffer, which was more explicit in describing the offenses Lynch committed on March 5, 1999. Trial counsel offered their factual proffer in the hope of softening some or all of the facts for purposes of the penalty phase. As Mr. Figgatt recognized during the postconviction hearing, this was a sentencing case, this always was a sentencing case. When Mr. Lynch finished his thirty to forty-five minute conversation with the [911] dispatcher and the acts that were done were done, this was a sentencing case.... This was not a trial in the sense of guilt or innocence. (Emphasis supplied.) The evidence and testimony presented during the penalty phase more than adequately support the two first-degree murder convictions. Lynch thoroughly planned and executed the murder portion of his murder-suicide plot (i.e., the murder of Roseanna Morgan). As we determined on direct appeal: (1) Lynch drafted a murder-suicide letter in which he disclosed his plan to kill Roseanna Morgan and then commit suicide; (2) Lynch packed a bag with three loaded firearms and brought them with him to the victims' apartment; (3) Lynch concealed his vehicle to prevent the victims from seeing it; (4) Lynch held Leah Caday hostage for thirty to forty minutes while he waited for her mother; (5) Lynch shot Morgan five times (four times with the Glock G30 and once with another weapon); and (6) Lynch shot Caday while in the process of murdering Morgan. Lynch, 841 So.2d at 366-79. Additionally, the facts established during the penalty phase clearly demonstrated that Lynch had not only exhibited a premeditated intent to murder Morgan, but had also exhibited the heightened premeditation necessary to support the CCP statutory aggravator as we held on direct appeal. See id. at 373. The facts also support Lynch's conviction for the first-degree murder of Caday. The sentencing court found that Lynch did not intend to kill Caday; however, the court also recognized that intent is not an issue where one kills another in the course of committing an enumerated felony. See § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(e)-(f), (o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (to kill another while engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, e. Burglary, f. Kidnapping, o. Murder of another human being, is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 (emphasis supplied)). Thus, the unintentional killing of Caday during the intentional, premeditated killing of Morgan renders the killing of Caday a murder in the first degree and a capital felony. Lynch's armed-burglary and kidnapping felonies also render the killing of Caday first-degree felony murder. Furthermore, the doctrine of transferred intent converts the unintentional killing of Caday into a first-degree capital murder. This Court held in Lee v. State that one who kills a person through mistaken identity or accident, with a premeditated design to kill another is guilty of murder in the first degree. ... The law transfers the felonious intent in such a case to the actual object of his assault, and the homicide so committed is murder in the first degree. 141 So.2d at 259 (emphasis supplied). The indictment alleges that Lynch possessed a premeditated design to murder both Morgan and Caday. [7] The sentencing court found that Lynch only possessed an intent to murder Morgan. Competent, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Lynch did not intend to kill Caday. These facts are not defenses to first-degree murder because the felony-murder rule and the doctrine of transferred intent apply under these circumstances. In sum, the factual proffer was adequate to support each first-degree murder conviction. Further, even assuming that counsel were deficient in this regard (which they were not), the facts of this case reveal that any hypothetical prejudice Lynch may have suffered from his counsel's off-the-cuff factual proffer was de minimis and would not have altered his decision to plead guilty. Counsel and Lynch were well aware of the wealth of evidence supporting the allegations that Lynch committed two first-degree murders on March 5, 1999. Moreover, the trial court was exceptionally thorough in its colloquy with Lynch before it allowed him to enter his guilty pleas, and trial counsel only submitted Lynch's competing factual proffer to soften the facts for purposes of the penalty phase. Lynch has thus not satisfied his burden under Grosvenor, 874 So.2d at 1179-80.
Lynch next contends that our decisions in Delgado v. State, 776 So.2d 233 (Fla.2000), and State v. Ruiz, 863 So.2d 1205 (Fla.2003), compel the conclusion that he did not commit a burglary on March 5, 1999, and that he would not have pled guilty had counsel informed him of this case law. He premises this contention on the following portion of his guilt-phase factual proffer: [H]e gained entry voluntarily into the home at that point in time [ (i.e., his initial entry) ]. Subsequently removed from a bag that he had, one of two or three firearms. And at that point in time the kidnapping ensues, as well as what we contend or what the State contends and we admit was, in essence, a burglary, because whatever consent he had to be there was gone. (Emphasis supplied.) The 1999 version of section 810.02, Florida Statutes, which applies to Lynch's armed burglary, states: Burglary means entering or remaining in a dwelling ... with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain. (Emphasis supplied.) In Delgado, we held that the rule of lenity (codified in section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes) required that the remaining in element of burglary be limited to situations where the defendant surreptitiously remains after having received consent to enter; otherwise, the State could charge that a burglary had occurred in any situation in which an individual entered a dwelling with consent and later committed an offense therein. In Ruiz, we stated: [T]he essence of Delgado is that evidence of a crime committed inside the dwelling, structure, or conveyance of another cannot, in and of itself, establish the crime of burglary. Stated differently, the State cannot use the criminal act to prove both intent and revocation of the consent to enter. 863 So.2d at 1211 (quoting Delgado, 776 So.2d at 238). Delgado applies to burglaries committed before February 1, 2000, which had not been finally adjudicated at the time this Court issued its opinion in that case (i.e., August 24, 2000). See Ruiz, 863 So.2d at 1212. Lynch committed this armed burglary on March, 5, 1999, and his direct appeal was not finalized until January 9, 2003. See Lynch, 841 So.2d at 362. [8] Consequently, Delgado applies to Lynch's armed-burglary offense. Lynch is correct that during his guilt-phase proceeding trial counsel misapprehended the then-existing nature of burglary. The facts counsel proffered during the plea colloquy would not support a burglary conviction under Delgado because counsel stated Lynch entered the victims' apartment with the consent of Leah Caday. The State could not have used the kidnapping of Caday and the murders of Caday and Morgan to prove the burglary elements of (1) lack of consent or revocation of consent and (2) intent to commit an offense within the dwelling. See Ruiz, 863 So.2d at 1211. However, any deficiency in this regard did not prejudice Lynch because trial counsel and Lynch were well aware that he exited the apartment and thereafter sought a non-consensual reentry after having wounded Morgan with three shots from the Glock G30. Lynch knocked on the door to Morgan's apartment and said [to Caday], `Hurry up, open the door, your mom is hurt.'  Lynch, 841 So.2d at 371 (emphasis supplied). Consent to enter induced through fraud or deceit is illusory as a matter of law, and we conclude that the same rationale applies to consent induced through coercion or implied threat of force. Cf., e.g., Andrews v. State, 973 So.2d 1280, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that consent obtained through fraud or deceit (i.e., false pretense) is a legal nullity). Lynch compelled a minor to open the door of her apartment by shooting her mother and then using her mother's injuries to gain access to the dwelling with the intent to commit an offense therein (i.e., the murder of Roseanna Morgan). This is not a consensual entry. Lynch and his trial counsel knew that the State possessed facts sufficient to establish burglary. Therefore, the facts of this case reveal that any prejudice Lynch alleges that he may have suffered from his counsel's off-the-cuff factual proffer would not have altered his decision to plead guilty to the offense of armed burglary.
In the final portion of this guiltphase ineffectiveness subclaim, Lynch contends that the factual proffer is legally insufficient to support a kidnapping conviction under our decisions in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983), and Berry v. State, 668 So.2d 967 (Fla.1996). Lynch cannot demonstrate prejudice and, for this reason, we need not address whether the performance of counsel was deficient. See Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986) (A court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied.). In Faison, we recognized that the plain text of section 787.01, Florida Statutes, could lead to potentially absurd results. To limit the scope of this statute, and to prevent any crime that involves some level of confinement or detention from also constituting a kidnapping, we adopted the three-part test articulated by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976): [I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; (b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and (c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. Faison, 426 So.2d at 965 (quoting Buggs, 547 P.2d at 731) (emphasis supplied). We also explained that we had previously adopted the view that subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 did not apply to unlawful confinements or movements that were merely incidental to other felonies, but [had] recognized an exception in the case of hostages.  426 So.2d at 966 (emphasis supplied) (explaining the holding of Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031, 1036-37 (Fla.1982)). In Berry, we reaffirmed our adherence to the Faison/Buggs test and stated that the inquiry into whether a kidnapping has occurred does not end with an examination of the statute. ... [T]here can be no kidnapping where the only confinement involved is the sort that, though not necessary to the underlying felony, is likely to naturally accompany it. Berry 668 So.2d at 969 (emphasis supplied). Here, Lynch maintains that his confinement of Caday was wholly incidental to the murders of Caday and Morgan. This assertion is inconsistent with the facts of this case. Lynch approached Caday and lured her into her apartment by stating that he wished to speak with her mother. Once inside, Lynch withdrew a number of firearms from his bag, and he has subsequently admitted that (1) Caday was aware of the firearms, (2) he technically held Caday hostage, (3) she was terrified, and (4) she only complied with his demands based on fear. Under the three-part Faison test and the hostage exception from Mobley, Lynch committed a kidnapping on March 5, 1999. First, his movement of Caday was not inconsequential. He wanted access to Caday's apartment to kill her mother, Roseanna Morgan, and he lured Caday there by stating that he wanted to speak to Morgan. Second, Lynch's kidnapping and confinement of Caday was not inherent in his intentional murder of Morgan and his erstwhile unintentional killing of Caday. Lynch could have killed Morgan without ever holding Caday hostage, as evidenced by his frequent trips to Morgan's place of business prior to the events of March 5, 1999, and Lynch did not intend to kill Caday. Third and finally, Lynch's kidnapping of Caday made his murder of Morgan substantially easier ... [and] substantially lessen[ed] the risk of detection, because Caday otherwise could have warned her mother or notified neighbors and law enforcement that an armed man was stationed in her apartment waiting for her mother to return home. Faison, 426 So.2d at 965; Berry, 668 So.2d at 969. Trial counsel and Lynch were well aware that the facts of this case supported a kidnapping charge and conviction. Therefore, any prejudice Lynch allegedly suffered from his counsel's factual proffer was de minimis and would not have altered his decision to plead guilty to the offense of kidnapping. Trial counsel's verbal factual proffer in response to the State's written proffer was not deficient with regard to the first-degree murder charges. With regard to the remaining charges, the proffer did not materially prejudice Lynch because counsel and Lynch knew that the facts of this case clearly supported convictions for both offenses. Furthermore, as stated above, the trial court was exceptionally thorough in its colloquy with Lynch, and trial counsel only submitted a competing factual proffer to soften the facts for purposes of the penalty phase. Consequently, we deny relief with regard to this guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim.