Opinion ID: 2515085
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Three-Prong Test of the Private Attorney General Doctrine to the Facts of This Case

Text: DOT and Superferry argue that none of the private attorney general doctrine prongs are satisfied in this case. Sierra Club disagrees and argues that all three prongs of the doctrine have been satisfied. We agree with Sierra Club.
DOT and Superferry argue that no public policy was vindicated by Sierra Club's litigation because the policy underlying HRS chapter 343 was never at risk. Rather, DOT and Superferry claim that the litigation was based on an erroneous determination of DOT in applying the policy of HRS chapter 343. Sierra Club disagrees and notes that this litigation is responsible for establishing the principle of procedural standing in environmental law in Hawai'i and clarifying the importance of addressing the secondary impacts of a project in the environmental review process pursuant to HRS chapter 343. We agree with Sierra Club.
As to the second prong, DOT and Superferry argue that this litigation was not necessary to enforce DOT's duties under HRS chapter 343, and the burden on Sierra Club for bringing the action was relatively minor. They argue that (1) there were three separate organizations to share the expenses of attorney's fees and costs, (2) litigation is one of the purposes of Sierra Club, and (3) Sierra Club has received fee discounts from its attorney. Sierra Club argues that it was necessary for it to bring this action to enforce DOT's duties to the public under the Hawai'i Constitution, statutes, and the public trust doctrine. We agree with Sierra Club. Unlike Waiahole II, the plaintiffs in this case were comprised of two non-profit organizations and an unincorporated association. See Waiahole II, 96 Hawai'i at 32, 25 P.3d at 807. These groups were solely responsible for challenging DOT's erroneous application of its responsibilities under HRS chapter 343. As this court stated in Sierra Club I, [s]tated simply, the record in this case shows that DOT did not consider whether its facilitation of the Hawaii Superferry Project will probably have minimal or no significant impacts, both primary and secondary, on the environment. Therefore, based on this record, we can only conclude that DOT's determination that the improvements to Kahului Harbor are exempt from the requirements of HEPA was erroneous as a matter of law. The exemption being invalid, the EA requirement of HRS ง 343-5 is applicable. Sierra Club I, 115 Hawai'i at 342, 167 P.3d at 335. In contravention of its responsibilities under the laws of this state, DOT exempted the Superferry project from the requirements of HRS chapter 343 without considering its secondary impacts on the environment. The action brought by Sierra Club clarified DOT's responsibilities under HRS chapter 343 by challenging DOT's erroneous interpretation of those duties. This case is similarly distinguishable from Maui Tomorrow, where the challenged government policy resulted from an erroneous understanding that another state agency was to perform the duty at issue. Maui Tomorrow, 110 Hawai'i at 245, 131 P.3d at 528. In Maui Tomorrow, the duty had not been abandoned, rather it had been recognized with an assumption that it would be addressed by another agency. Id. In this case, DOT simply did not recognize its duty to consider both the primary and secondary impacts of the Superferry project on the environment. DOT was not under the erroneous understanding that another agency was considering those impacts, as in Maui Tomorrow; rather, in this case DOT wholly abandoned that duty by issuing an erroneous exemption to Superferry.
DOT and Superferry argue that Sierra Club's theory of benefit is based on the Hawaii Supreme Court decision that was supplanted by Act 2. Sierra Club argues, however, that this court's opinion in Sierra Club I provided a public benefit, because it is generally applicable law that established procedural standing in environmental law and clarified the need to address secondary impacts in environmental review pursuant to HRS chapter 343 and will benefit large numbers of people over long periods of time. Sierra Club also cites to this court's opinion in Sierra Club I, 115 Hawai'i at 343, 167 P.3d at 336, which stated: `All parties involved and society as a whole' would have benefitted had the public been allowed to participate in the review process of the Superferry project, as was envisioned by the legislature when it enacted the Hawai'i Environmental Policy Act. (Emphasis removed.) We agree with Sierra Club, and further note that with our holding today that Act 2 is unconstitutional, DOT and Superferry's reliance on Act 2 is without merit. In sum, the facts of this case satisfy all three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine. Sierra Club having met the requirements for entitlement to the benefits of the private attorney general doctrine, we adopt the doctrine. Application of the private attorney general doctrine is, however, subject to the defenses which a defendant may have, so we now turn to the respective defenses asserted by Superferry and DOT to its application.