Opinion ID: 2519623
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Hearing Officer Applied the Correct Standard of Proof.

Text: West argues that decisions under the animal control ordinance of the Municipality of Anchorage should utilize the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof instead of the preponderance of the evidence test that the hearing officer used in this case. West asserts that beyond a reasonable doubt is the proper standard because of the remedial or criminal nature of the actions under the animal control ordinance, and the remedial penalties that resulted from the level three classification. [10] In so doing he mistakenly conflates the meaning of remedial and criminal ordinances. West cites State v. Von Thiele, [11] a Washington case which determined that where a statute is remedial rather than criminal in nature, the state's burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. In that case, Von Thiele was charged with illegal hunting and was forced to pay restitution. [12] West misreads the court's discussion on this matter as distinguishing criminal or remedial statutes on the one hand and civil on the other. In fact, the court was distinguishing between criminal and remedial statutes, holding that the remedial nature of the restitution requirement in question made it civil in nature: [T]he plain and unambiguous language of [the restitution provision] unequivocally demonstrates a legislative intent to provide a civil penalty system in the form of restitution for the redress of wildlife values lost because of illegal hunting. Accordingly, [the restitution provision] is inherently remedial, rather than criminal, in nature. [13] Thus, Von Thiele actually counters West's point and undermines his theory that the existence of penalties renders the animal control ordinance criminal in nature. Furthermore, as the municipality notes in its brief, Alaska case law similarly distinguishes between sanctions that are remedial and criminal in nature. In Johansen v. State [14] we distinguished between the procedural safeguards afforded defendants in civil contempt and criminal contempt proceedings, holding that civil contempt needed to be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. [15] No Alaska case law supports West's position that the classification hearing was criminal in nature, or that it should result in a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. West cites Sinclair v. Okata, [16] where the federal district court characterized an Anchorage ordinance on animal control as unequivocally aimed at preventing attacks and bites by dogs. [17] However, Sinclair said nothing about the statute's criminal nature or the burden of proof required for proving an injury in an administrative hearing. Indeed, the dog owner in Sinclair was held negligent per se for injuries caused by his dog when it was not under voice control. [18] Finally, the context of the ordinances confirms that the animal control regulations are not criminal in nature. The entire structure for providing an animal control hearing on an animal classification in AMC 17.05.100 utilizes the administrative adjudication procedures of AMC 03.60. The civil nature of the ordinance is further clarified by the fact that the former provision on crimes and penalties in AMC 17.40 now is contained in the criminal provisions of the AMC, [19] separating it from the rest of animal control regulations. The criminal provision of the animal behavior regulation provides that an owner is subject to criminal penalty if she or he violates with criminal negligence the requirements of the animal classification pertaining to animals classified at level three or higher. [20] Thus, while Gummie's initial classification is an administrative matter conducted under standard administrative procedures, any alleged criminal violation of the terms of the classification by West would result in a separate trial in which West would be afforded full criminal defendant protections. Because the hearing classifying Gummie was not a criminal proceeding but instead an administrative one, the hearing officer properly used the preponderance of the evidence standard.