Opinion ID: 2582024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Amendment Applies Retroactively

Text: Generally, statutes operate prospectively only. ( Myers, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 840, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40, 50 P.3d 751; see also Evangelatos v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1206-1208, 246 Cal.Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585.) [T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly.... For that reason, the `principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.' ( Landgraf, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, fns. omitted; see also Myers, supra, at pp. 840-841, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40, 50 P.3d 751.) The presumption against statutory retroactivity has consistently been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons after the fact. ( Landgraf, supra, at p. 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483.) This is not to say that a statute may never apply retroactively. [A] statute's retroactivity is, in the first instance, a policy determination for the Legislature and one to which courts defer absent `some constitutional objection' to retroactivity. ( Myers, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 841, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40, 50 P.3d 751.) But it has long been established that a statute that interferes with antecedent rights will not operate retroactively unless such retroactivity be the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the legislature. ( United States v. Heth (1806) 3 Cranch 399, 7 U.S. 399, 413, 2 L.Ed. 479; accord, Myers, supra, at p. 840, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40, 50 P.3d 751.) [A] statute may be applied retroactively only if it contains express language of retroactivity or if other sources provide a clear and unavoidable implication that the Legislature intended retroactive application. ( Myers, supra, at p. 844, 123 Cal. Rptr.2d 40, 50 P.3d 751.) We see nothing here to overcome the strong presumption against retroactivity. Plaintiff and Justice Moreno argue that the statement in section 12940, subdivision (j)(2), that the subdivision's provisions merely declared existing law, shows an intent to apply the amendment retroactively. They cite our statement that where a statute provides that it clarifies or declares existing law, `[i]t is obvious that such a provision is indicative of a legislative intent that the amendment apply to all existing causes of action from the date of its enactment. In accordance with the general rules of statutory construction, we must give effect to this intention unless there is some constitutional objection thereto.' ( Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507, quoting California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne, supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 214, 187 P.2d 702.) Neither Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th 232, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507, nor California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne, supra, 31 Cal.2d 210, 187 P.2d 702, holds that an erroneous statement that an amendment merely declares existing law is sufficient to overcome the strong presumption against retroactively applying a statute that responds to a judicial interpretation. In California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne , the amendment at issue does not appear to have been adopted in response to a judicial decision. In Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th 232, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507, the only judicial action that had interpreted the statute before the Legislature amended it was a Court of Appeal decision that never became final. After considering all of the circumstances, we specifically held that the amendment at issue did not effect any change in the law, but simply clarified and confirmed the state of the law prior to the Court of Appeal's first opinion. Because the legislative action did not change the legal effect of past actions, [the amendment] does not act retrospectively; it governs this case. ( Id. at p. 252, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507.) Here, by contrast, as we have explained, Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1132, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083, was a final and definitive judicial interpretation of the FEHA. The amendment at issue here did change the law. Moreover, the language of section 12940, subdivision (j)(2), namely, that The provisions of this subdivision are declaratory of existing law, long predates the Legislature's overruling of Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1132, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083. That language was added to the section in reference to a different, earlier, change to the statute. (Stats.1987, ch. 605, § 1, p.1945.) Any inference the Legislature intended the 2000 amendment to apply retroactively is thus far weaker than if the Legislature had asserted, in the 2000 amending act itself, that the amendment's provisions declared existing law. Plaintiff and the Court of Appeal also cite statements in the legislative history to the effect that the proposed amendment would only clarify the law's original meaning. But these references may have been intended only to demonstrate that clarification was necessary, not as positive assertions that the law always provided for coworker liability. We see no indication the Legislature even thought about giving, much less expressly intended to give, the amendment retroactive effect to the extent the amendment did change the law. Specifically, we see no clear and unavoidable intent to have the statute retroactively impose liability for actions not subject to liability when taken. Requiring clear intent assures that [the legislative body] itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits. ( Landgraf, supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 272-273, 114 S.Ct. 1483.) Retroactive application would also raise constitutional implications. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have expressed concerns that retroactively creating liability for past conduct might violate the Constitution, although it appears neither court has so held. ( Landgraf, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 281, 114 S.Ct. 1483 [Retroactive imposition of punitive damages would raise a serious constitutional question]; Myers, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 845-847, 123 Cal. Rptr.2d 40, 50 P.3d 751; but see also Landgraf, at p. 272, 114 S.Ct. 1483 [describing the constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation as now modest].) An established rule of statutory construction requires us to construe statutes to avoid `constitutional infirmit[ies].' [Citations.] That rule reinforces our construction of the [statute] as prospective only. ( Myers, supra, at pp. 846-847, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40, 50 P.3d 751.) Before we entertained that [constitutional] question, we would have to be confronted with a statute that explicitly authorized the imposition of liability for preenactment conduct. ( Landgraf, supra, at p. 281, 114 S.Ct. 1483.) The amendment here contains no such explicit authorization. For all of these reasons, we conclude that section 12940, subdivision (j)(3), does not apply retroactively to conduct predating its enactment.