Opinion ID: 2972356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Medellin’s Appeal

Text: In his appeal, Medellin argues that he should be sentenced only for the quantity of cocaine that he personally sold to undercover agents. He initially contended that the district court failed to conduct a foreseeability analysis in determining the drug amounts for which he should be held responsible for purposes of sentencing. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), Medellin now submits that such a foreseeability analysis would have to be conducted by a jury under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. In the aftermath of United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), we agree with Medellin’s general argument that a defendant’s sentence must be based upon facts either found by a jury or to which he concedes. We, however, need not dwell long upon Medellin’s complaint in this case because our review of the record reveals that he was charged in the indictment, found guilty by the jury, and sentenced by the district court for having conspired to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Page 12 of 14 In his brief, Medellin argues that “while the conspiracy in this case might have involved five or more kilograms of cocaine, the trial evidence and the Presentence Report filed in this case only connected [him] to 429.8 grams of cocaine.” Appellant Medellin’s Br. at 13. Medellin further asserted in his brief that the sentencing guidelines required the district court to make “particularized findings” that he could foresee the other drug amounts involved in the conspiracy. Id. at 14. In a letter of July 19, 2004, Medellin supplemented his earlier argument and now contends that pursuant to Blakely the foreseeability analysis formerly conducted by the district court would now “have to have been conducted by a jury operating under a reasonable doubt standard.” We need not explore the legal underpinnings of Medellin’s argument. For even if we agree with his claim, the application of those principles to this case does not advance his cause on appeal. First, the indictment charged Medellin with having conspired to “distribute 5 kilograms or more of . . . cocaine.” J.A. at 72. Second, the district court properly instructed the jury that it was required to find that the amount of cocaine alleged in the indictment was attributable to each of the defendants, including Medellin. Specifically, the district court instructed the jury that counts five, six, and seven of the indictment were alternative counts, and “[c]ount [f]ive alleges a conspiracy involving five kilograms of cocaine.” Id. at 600. The district court also charged the jury that the government must prove that the defendants (1) knowingly and voluntarily, (2) conspired to distribute cocaine. Importantly in this appeal, the court directed that the jury “must apply this test to each of the defendants separately.” Id. at 602 (emphasis added). Lastly, the district court set the following parameters with regard to the conspiracy charges: “all members of a conspiracy are responsible for the acts committed by other members, as long as they are within the reasonable foreseeable scope of the agreement,” and “no defendant is responsible for the acts of others that go beyond the fair Page 13 of 14 scope of the agreement as he understood it.” Id. at 605. Subsequently, the jury convicted Medellin on count five of the indictment, and the district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 121 months. There is no dispute that the district court sentenced Medellin within the applicable guideline range for possession with the intent to distribute at least five kilograms, but less than 15 kilograms of cocaine. Inasmuch as the indictment charged Medellin with having conspired to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, the district court instructed the jury that he was responsible only for those acts of the conspiracy that were reasonably foreseeable to him, the jury convicted Medellin of participating in the conspiracy, and the district court sentenced him within the applicable guideline range, this court finds that Medellin’s asserted error is without merit. Finally, we note that Medellin has not argued pursuant to United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), that he is entitled to resentencing by virtue of the fact that the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory. In United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir. 2005), this court declined to consider such an argument where the defendant has failed to raise it.