Opinion ID: 600290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the State Transfer Inalienable Public Trust Land?

Text: 14 The State transferred title by the issuance of various patents to Lafourche Realty's ancestors-in-title from 1861 to 1901. The State next contends that it could not have legally divested itself of the disputed property, because the property was inalienable public trust land--either tidelands or navigable water bottoms--during the years of the putative transfers of title. The district court resolved this issue by finding that none of the Lafourche Realty property contained navigable waters or was subject to tidal ebb and flow from the Gulf of Mexico from 1812 through 1902--after the last alienation by the State. The district court concluded that the State did not run afoul of any restriction on alienation of public things.
15 As with the findings regarding the year 1812, the State challenges the district court's finding that the property contained no tide lands or waters that were navigable or subject to the ebb and flow of the tide until 1902. The trial court found, 16 At no time between 1812 and 1902 was any of the Lafourche Realty Property navigable in fact, capable of sustaining maritime or waterborne commerce, [or] more than at most two or three feet in water depth (and then only in isolated spots), or subject to salt or brackish water intrusion through tidal ebb and flow from the Gulf of Mexico. No evidence was presented of any sustained human habitation or activity including hunting, trapping, or fishing on the property during this period. While small portions of the property, namely, Bays Rambo and Jaque, may have been indirectly and slightly subject to fresh-water tidal influences (as opposed to the direct, open coastal ebb and flow of tides) as early as 1901, none was in 1812. Although the entire area was subject to annual water overflow in and after 1812, this overflow was of fresh water from the Mississippi River; the actual waters of the Gulf did not, and still do not, spread over any of the Lafourche Realty Property. Further, this overflow would distribute in an even sheet fashion, and was not channeled along the relict channels that once connected to Bayou Lafourche. 17 ... Lac de l'Isle did not exist before ... 1915.... [A]round 1901 ... Bayou Rambo was no more than a trickling stream; in 1812, Bay Rambo did not cover any of the Lafourche Realty Property.... [I]n 1812, [Bay Jaque] was at most two feet deep at its deepest point. Similarly, Palmetto Bayou and Redfish Bayou ... likely did not exist in 1812.... The relict channels in which Bayou Ferblanc [ ], Bayou Cochon [ ], and Mink Bayou are now located did not contain navigable--if indeed they contained any--water flow as late as 1901. 18 9 R. 2342-43. Again the State simply argues that its evidence was persuasive and attempts to discredit Lafourche Realty's evidence. The trial court heard the evidence, made credibility determinations, and found that none of the land was subject to coastal tidal influence or under navigable waters until after 1901. We will not second-guess the trial court's view of the evidence. The findings of non-navigability and lack of coastal tide waters through 1902 are supported by substantial evidence, including Dr. Gagliano's analysis of the paleogeography of the area. 19
20 We need not reach the State's argument that navigability of certain waterways at the time of the transfers to private owners rendered the water bottoms inalienable. As noted above, the court found that the property contained no navigable waters until 1902, after the property was alienated to private ownership. 21 We turn next to the State's argument that the land and waters influenced by the tides were inalienable. 22
23 The State also complains that the district court erred in distinguishing between indirect fresh-water tidal influences and direct coastal ebb and flow from the gulf. The State argues that land overflowed in either manner is inalienable public trust land. 24 Phillips Petroleum teaches that Louisiana law governs the alienability of tidelands.  '[T]here is no universal ... law upon the subject; but ... each State has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders according to its own view of justice and policy.'  Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 483, 108 S.Ct. at 799 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26, 14 S.Ct. 548, 557, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894)). Thus, Louisiana may transfer ownership of tidelands to private parties if permitted by state law. 25 Louisiana has retained some of the tidelands it acquired in public trust as public property. The Civil Code declares that [p]ublic things are owned by the State or its political subdivisions and are subject to public use. La.Civ.Code Ann. arts. 450 and 452 (West 1980). The State owns [p]ublic things ... such as running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore. Id. art. 450. Seashore is defined as the space of land over which the waters of the sea spread in the highest tide during the winter season. Id. art. 451. Thus, tidelands comprising the seashore or sea bottoms are still owned by the State. 26 Tidelands which Louisiana acquired through the equal footing doctrine that are not seashore or sea bottoms, however, may be privately owned. Inland non-navigable water bodies and swamp land subject to indirect tidal overflow, but not direct coastal ebb and flow, may be privately owned under Louisiana law. 5 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly distinguished direct coastal ebb and flow from indirect freshwater tidal influence. The question narrows to whether any of the subject land is properly characterized as the seashore or any of the water as the sea. 27 The district court found that the entire area comprising the Lafourche Realty property was subject to annual fresh water overflow from the Mississippi River. The court correctly ruled that this characteristic does not render the land inalienable seashore under Louisiana law. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has held, 28 The fact that [land] is subject to tidal overflow does not characterize the land as 'seashore,' under the provisions of the Code.... It has never heretofore been supposed that the definition [of seashore] was intended to include ... any and all land that is subject to tidal overflow, however remote from the 'seashore,' as it is generally understood. The waters of the Gulf of Mexico ... do not 'spread' upon it, during the ordinary high tides, or in the highwater seasons.... These expressions in the Code 'the sea and its shores,' and 'seashore,' have reference to the gulf coast, and to the lakes, bays and sounds along the coast. 29 Buras v. Salinovich, 154 La. 495, 97 So. 748, 750 (1923). That tides may cause other water bodies to rise and spread over the area is insufficient to characterize the land as seashore. See id.; see also State v. Scott, 185 So.2d 877 (La.Ct.App.) (marshland subject to overflow is not seashore), writ denied, 249 La. 485, 187 So.2d 450 (1966). 30 The court found that Bays Rambo and Jaque may have been subject to fresh-water tidal influences as early as 1901, but not direct coastal ebb and flow. Such fresh-water tidal influence, without ebb and flow from the gulf, is not enough to identify the bays as the sea or arms of the sea. Discussing whether the bottom of an inland water body was an arm of the sea and its banks were seashore, the Louisiana Supreme Court analyzed the matter as follows: 31 Bayou Cook appears to form a connecting link between Bay Bastian, an arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and Bay Adam ... situated a mile or more from Bay Bastian, in the interior and in close proximity to the Mississippi river, a few miles above the point of its confluence with the gulf.... 32 ... The proof does not show clearly the extent to which the ebb and flow of the tides of the gulf affect those lands on the shores of Bayou Cook.... Evidently the salt water found in Bayou Cook does not result from the overflow occasioned by the high tides flooding its banks; it enters Bay Bastian, in the first instance, and thence passes into Bayou Cook. The salt water thus supplied, combined with the accumulation of fresh water derived from the Mississippi river, floods the banks of Bayou Cook and passes into the adjacent marsh, to be returned again to the gulf, when the tide is low. 33 Morgan v. Negodich, 3 So. 636, 639 (La.1887). The court concluded that Bayou Cook was not an arm of the sea and its banks formed no part of the seashore, because the the waters of the sea (gulf) did not spread over its banks. Id. at 639. Hence, inland waters, such as Bays Jaque and Rambo are not arms of the sea even if their banks were subject to fresh water tidal overflow. See also Buras, 97 So. at 750 (holding that the sea means water bodies along the gulf coast). 34 Upon finding that none of the Lafourche Realty property constituted the bottoms of natural navigable water bodies ... [or] the seashore, the district court concluded that the State did not run afoul of any restriction on alienation of public things. This conclusion was correct. At the time of the issuance of patents, the property consisted of only inland non-navigable water bodies and swamp land subject to overflow--neither of which is inalienable public property under the Code.