Opinion ID: 857090
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Investigation into Warren’s competence

Text: Warren also alleges that Wynn’s failure to investigate his mental competence amounted to unconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Warren bases this argument primarily on a pre-sentencing psychiatric evaluation that Wynn commissioned. The evaluating doctor, Dr. Robert Rawski, diagnosed Warren with “Major Depression with Psychotic Features” and “Polysubstance Dependence”; he also said that Warren was possibly “sufNo. 12-1148 13 fering from the early stages of Schizophrenia.” (R. 21-3 at 58.) Warren argues that Wynn should have requested an evaluation prior to the plea hearing for the purpose of determining whether Warren was competent to enter his plea and that Wynn’s failure to do so was uncon- stitutionally deficient. Requesting a competence evaluation and hearing, Warren contends, would have led to a “reasonable probability that . . . the court would have found that Warren was not competent to stand trial.” (Appellant’s Br. at 31.) We disagree. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Warren raised this issue in the state courts. Rather, Warren made the related, though distinct, argument that Wynn was ineffective for failing to further investigate his mental health at the time of the offense as a potential defense at trial. Normally, on habeas appeals, we do not consider claims that have not been fairly presented to state courts and would now be procedurally barred by those courts. Ward v. Jenkins, 613 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2010). That said, we also construe pro se petitions, such as Warren’s during state post-conviction review, liberally when determining whether a claim has been fairly presented. Id. at 697. Furthermore, the state does not argue default here, and, as such, has forfeited the argument. See Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 519 (7th Cir. 2004) (“failure to raise the defense [of procedural default] in a timely manner will result in a forfeiture”). Because the Wisconsin state courts have not addressed the merits of this claim, our review is de novo. Cone, 556 U.S. at 472. Again, we turn to the two-pronged Strickland test, and note that “[c]ounsel has an obligation either to investi14 No. 12-1148 gate possible defenses or make reasonable decisions that particular investigations are unnecessary.” Burt v. Uchtman, 422 F.3d 557, 566 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986)). In cases where a defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to request a competency hearing, “we have interpreted the [Strickland] prejudice inquiry as asking whether there is a reasonable probability the defendant would have been found unfit had a hearing been held.” Id. at 567. To determine whether a defendant is competent, we ask “whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Id. at 564 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).2 We find nothing in the evidence that Warren marshaled to suggest that there was reasonable probability that he would have been found unfit. Though Dr. Rawski’s report indeed diagnosed Warren with mental illnesses and prescribed medication, it did not describe him as not competent to understand the legal proceedings. Rather, Dr. Rawski described Warren as “articulate” and “goal-directed.” (R. 21-3 at 58.) Dr. Rawski also reported that Warren’s “[c]ognition was intact” 2 We note too that the constitutional standard for competence to enter a plea is the same as the standard to go to trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398-99 (1993). No. 12-1148 15 and that his “[i]ntelligence is average.” (Id.) Warren offers us no other evidence—such as affidavits from those who interacted with him or previous medical records—that would show that he was incapable of understanding the legal proceedings or assisting his lawyer at the time he made his plea. The plea colloquy evidences that Warren had rationally considered his options with his attorney, (R. 21-11), as does the transcript of the pre-plea scheduling conference, (R. 21-10). Indeed, Warren has also presented us with letters he wrote soon after his plea, in which he requested new counsel and that he be allowed to change his plea. All this evidence suggests a rather advanced understanding of the legal process and that Warren had a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings.” Burt, 422 F.3d at 564. Lacking any basis for the proposition that Warren was unfit to enter his plea, we cannot find that there was any prejudice to Warren in Wynn’s failure to request a pre-plea competency hearing. Warren offers us Burt to support his argument that Wynn was ineffective. Rather than providing support, however, Burt illuminates what we find lacking in Warren’s petition. In Burt, an Illinois statute mandated that any defendant taking psychotropic medication at the time of trial (a population that included Burt) receive a fitness hearing. Burt’s lawyers were unaware of this mandate. Id. at 567. Further, Burt’s attorneys had many first-hand experiences with their client that should have led them to question his competence, even absent Illinois’s requirement, including: they found it necessary to meet with him every day prior to court to “evaluate 16 No. 12-1148 his mental state”; they were concerned that the county jail was administering his psychotropic medications irregularly; Burt “demonstrated belligerent or explosive behavior,” both in and out of the courtroom; and his attorneys were “continually afraid that Burt would commit violent acts in court.” Id. at 568. One attorney even stated in an affidavit that he believed “Burt did not fully comprehend legal advice and that his behavior throughout the trial, particularly his decision to change his plea to guilty, was not rational.” Id. All of these facts, and several others in the same vein, led us to conclude that Burt’s attorneys were deficient for failing to request a competency hearing and “establish[ed] a reasonable probability that Burt would have been found incompetent at the time he pleaded guilty.” Id. at 569. Warren has not offered any such evidence here. Unlike Illinois, paragraph (2) of the Wisconsin statute specifically provides that “[a] defendant shall not be determined incompetent to proceed solely because medication has been or is being administered to restore or maintain competency.” Wis. Stat. § 971.13(2). And indeed the record, rather than establishing a reasonable probability that Warren would have been found incompetent, shows that Warren met the constitutional standard for competence to enter a plea. Dr. Rawski’s report described Warren’s cognition as “intact,” (R. 21-3 at 58), and Warren evinced a thorough understanding of the proceedings against him throughout. We therefore cannot find Wynn ineffective for failing to request a preplea competency hearing and cannot grant Warren’s petition on this ground. No. 12-1148 17