Opinion ID: 2972263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abel Santiago

Text: Abel Santiago alleges that the evidence presented by the government was insufficient to support a finding that he organized, supervised, or managed five or more people as required to convict him of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise under 21 U.S.C. §848(c). See United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1122-23 (6th Cir. 1996). It is well established that an organizer is not necessarily able to control those whom he or she organizes. Rather, an organizer can be defined as a person who puts together a number of people engaged in separate activities and arranges them in their activities in one essentially orderly operation or enterprise. -9- United States v. Patrick, 965 F.2d 1390, 1397 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Santiago concedes in his brief that among the indicia of a narcotics operation organizer are the tendency to set prices for drugs, dictate terms of payment, approve customers, store drugs at another’s property, supervise brokers or couriers, and direct persons that collect or launder proceeds. United States v. Ward, 37 F.3d 243, 247 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206, 1214 (6th Cir. 1992). A management relationship requires more than mere interaction as buyer and seller. Ward, 37 F.3d at 248. Moreover, this Court’s mandate to “review ... the sufficiency of the evidence is quite limited.” We must view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and will affirm the jury’s verdict unless no rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt,” that the defendant committed the offense charged. United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 230 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc). “[E]very reasonable inference from the evidence must be drawn in the government’s favor,” United States v. Woods, 877 F.2d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1989), citing United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988), and the Court must “refrain from independently judging the weight of the evidence.” United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468, 476 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 991 (2002). Applying these principles, it is clear that a reasonable jury could have found that Abel Santiago organized, supervised, or managed at least five people as required by the statute. Santiago concedes that he supervised the drug-selling activities of his brother Rueben, as well as those of Christian Perez and her brother Caesar. The jury also heard evidence that a number of persons dealt with Jose Salazar as Abel Santiago’s assistant1, that both Ernest and Jeannie Marshall sold drugs for Santiago in exchange 1 As the government observes, Salazar’s status was confirmed by the testimony of Manrique Reynoso, Christian Perez, Marla Taylor, and Anthony Caldwell. To find that Santiago supervised Salazar, the jury needed to believe only one of these individuals. - 10 - for cocaine for their personal use, that Abel’s cousin Hilda had asked him for directions on behalf of a man seeking to buy cocaine, and that a man named “Luis” had brought a van containing 860 pounds of marijuana to Santiago for safekeeping. The jury needed only to believe the testimony concerning two of these five individuals in order to support their finding that Abel Santiago supervised five persons. Drawing all inferences in the government’s favor, we conclude that a reasonable jury could easily have done so. Santiago seeks to analogize his case to others in which delivery men, sellers, or those merely “providing inventory” to others were held not to have acted in a supervisory capacity. Those are not the facts in this case. Here, the vast majority of the testimony depicted Abel Santiago as the lynchpin of the Harloff Farms drug operation. Abel Santiago was repeatedly depicted as the organizer and manager of cocaine and marijuana transactions, and the evidence showed at least seven individuals receiving instructions from him. Again, the panel must construe all inferences in the government’s favor, and the jury needed only to find the participation of 2 of the 5 individuals whose actions are disputed by Santiago. Santiago devotes considerable space in his brief to identifying vagueness and inconsistencies in the testimony describing “Luis.” Again, though, the jury need not have believed that “Luis” participated in the conspiracy, or even that he existed, to legitimately find Santiago guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, some members of the jury may have found “Luis” to have been a participant, while others did not. “In deciding whether a defendant had a managerial relationship with five or more persons, the jury is not required to agree unanimously on the identities of the five individuals.” United States v. Fredell, 79 Fed. Appx. 799, 805 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2003), citing United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1991). - 11 - In sum, the evidence presented at trial was far from insufficient to demonstrate that Abel Santiago supervised the requisite number of persons. Exercising the proper deference, and construing all facts and inferences in the government’s favor, we affirm his conviction.