Opinion ID: 2597721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to suppress defendant's statement

Text: Jerry contends that the district court erred in reversing itself at the second trial and allowing the admission of his unwarned statement to Detective Hopper. Our review is constricted to some degree because the transcript from the first trial is not in the record on appeal, even though the parties have cited to the record volumes as if the record contained the original trial transcript. Accordingly, we do not have the court's factual findings and legal conclusions for its original ruling suppressing the statement. The court's ruling at the second trial indicates that its sole focus at that point was determining whether the encounter was a custodial interrogation so as to require the officer to give the Miranda warnings. See State v. Morton, 286 Kan. 632, 647, 186 P.3d 785 (2008) ( Miranda warnings required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him or her `in custody'). Specifically, the district court stated: [T]he Court believes that its initial ruling in this matter at the first trial was in error and that the motion to reconsider should be granted and that the statement given by the defendant at the station will be admissible at this trial. I tend to agree with the State that we focused previously too much on whether or not Miranda was given or not and I think the Court got into a feeling that custodial interrogation was assumed then. And after reexamining the facts surrounding that interview, the Court finds that it was not a custodial interrogation.  (Emphasis added.) In his brief on appeal, Jerry makes an alternative argument that, notwithstanding the Miranda issue, his statement was not voluntary. That argument was not developed at the trial level, and the district court did not make the requisite factual findings to allow a review of that issue. Accordingly, we will confine our review to the second trial finding that Jerry was not subjected to a custodial interrogation. See State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 339, 153 P.3d 1208 (2007) (issues not raised before trial court cannot be raised on appeal). The determination of whether an interrogation is custodial involves a two-prong test. Under the first prong, the court determines the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, employing a substantial competent evidence standard. The second prong employs a de novo standard to determine whether, under the totality of those circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and disengage from the encounter. Morton, 286 Kan. at 640, 186 P.3d 785. At the second trial, the State argued that the interview was conducted under the following circumstances: Detective Hopper met Trussell at work indicating that he wanted to talk; Detective Hopper suggested that they go to a nearby substation of another law enforcement agency, so that they could have some privacy without interruption by customers; Trussell agreed to go; Trussell drove himself to the substation in a separate vehicle; Tammy rode with Trussell to the substation; the interview was conducted in the lobby of the substation; the interview took approximately 30 minutes; Trussell was never placed under arrest; Detective Hopper told Trussell he was free to leave at any time; Trussell was told that he was not required to speak to Detective Hopper; and Trussell eventually left on his own free will. In finding that the defendant was not in a custodial interrogation, the district court recited three of those facts: (1) the interview occurred in a lobby; (2) the defendant drove to the substation independently; and (3) the defendant was advised at least twice that he was free to go at any time he wanted. The parties' mistaken belief that the first trial transcript is in the appeal record hampers our analysis of the first prong, i.e., whether substantial competent evidence supports the factual findings as to the circumstances of the interview. Some of the circumstances surrounding the interview were apparently related in Detective Hopper's testimony at the first trial, but not repeated at the second trial. However, Jerry has not contested the State's recitation of those interview circumstances, has himself cited to the missing first trial transcript of the detective's testimony, and has not challenged the evidentiary support of the facts upon which the district court relied. See State v. Paul, 285 Kan. 658, 670, 175 P.3d 840 (2008) (appellant's duty to designate record on appeal). Accordingly, we will accept the State's recitation. See State v. Haney, 34 Kan.App.2d 232, 236, 116 P.3d 747, rev. denied 280 Kan. 987 (2005) (where record inadequate, appellate court presumes district court's findings are properly supported). Moving to the second prong, many of the circumstances surrounding Jerry's interview are comparable to other instances in which we have determined that the interviewee was not in custody. See, e.g., Morton, 286 Kan. at 646-47, 186 P.3d 785 (interview noncustodial where defendant voluntarily drove herself to the police station, interview did not take place in a regular interview room, she was told she was not under arrest and could refuse to answer questions, she was told she could leave at any time, and she was not physically restrained in any way); State v. Jones, 283 Kan. 186, 196-97, 200-01, 151 P.3d 22 (2007) (interview noncustodial where, although defendant was under subpoena and was arrested after the interview, he came to the interview voluntarily, officers told him he was not in custody and that the interview was voluntary, he was not restrained or threatened, and he was initially questioned as a witness); State v. Heath, 264 Kan. 557, 591, 957 P.2d 449 (1998) (interview was not custodial where defendant went to the police station voluntarily to be interviewed and waited unrestrained in waiting room prior to interview); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 32-33, 936 P.2d 1364 (1997) (defendant who voluntarily agreed to appear at a police station for questioning was not subjected to custodial interrogation, despite the fact that he was asked questions that the police knew were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatory response); State v. Loosli, 130 Idaho 398, 399-400, 941 P.2d 1299 (1997) (interrogation not custodial where the defendant agreed to come to the police station to answer questions, the officers informed the defendant he was free to leave, and the defendant was allowed to leave after the questioning). Here, although the interview occurred in a law enforcement facility, it was not the station of the interviewing detective. The detective suggested moving the interview to that site for convenience, i.e., to avoid interruption by customers at Jerry's workplace, and Jerry agreed to the move. Jerry drove himself to the location, accompanied by Tammy. The interview was conducted in the lobby of the facility, rather than an isolated interview room. Jerry was told he was free to leave whenever he wanted. Further, Jerry points out in his brief that the detective told [him] numerous times that no matter what he said he would not be arrested. The totality of the circumstances would indicate to a reasonable person that he or she was free to terminate the conversation and leave at any time. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's determination that Jerry was not in custody and the failure to give him the Miranda warnings did not mandate the suppression of his statements.