Opinion ID: 1205096
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutor's Testimony and Asserted Vouching

Text: (12a) Defendant contends that several remarks by the prosecutor during his guilt phase closing argument amounted to unsworn testimony or had the effect of vouching for prosecution witnesses, and so constituted misconduct. (See People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 212 [152 Cal. Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396]; People v. Perez (1962) 58 Cal.2d 229, 245-246 [23 Cal. Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617, 3 A.L.R.3d 946].) He has waived each claim of misconduct by failing to object and request an admonition to the jury. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1235 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) His failure to object is not excused: in each instance any harm could have been cured by prompt admonition. Moreover, as will appear, even if defendant had preserved his claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we would find no reversible error. (13) Defendant first argues that the prosecutor argued improperly regarding the change in Angela's testimony about the perpetrator's earring. Angela initially stated that she noticed a shiny stud in the second gunman's right ear. (Defendant's left ear, not his right, is pierced.) In a conversation with Detective Shipp and the prosecutor shortly before the preliminary hearing, however, Angela determined the stud was, in fact, in the perpetrator's left ear. Both Angela and Detective Shipp testified regarding that conversation. In essence, Detective Shipp testified that Angela reached toward her own right ear, but then paused and spontaneously pointed at the prosecutor's left ear. Shipp testified that he told her she was pointing to her right ear, and that Angela agreed, and indicated the stud was in defendant's left ear. Shipp testified that neither he nor the prosecutor suggested to Angela which ear was the correct one. On cross-examination, Detective Shipp acknowledged that the conversation had not been tape-recorded. Referring to the change in her testimony regarding the gunman's earring, Angela testified she did it all on [her] own. Based on this testimony, the prosecutor argued, [A]ll I could do is submit to you that no suggestion was made in any way to Angela as to which hole or which pierced ear the defendant, Mr. Johnson, had. Defense counsel, in turn, stated in closing argument that [t]his movement of the earring really upsets me. People can be wrong, sure, but the earring never gets moved until two days before preliminary hearing, the 16th of December in an unrecorded conversation between the district attorney and Detective Shipp after Willie Johnson has been arrested for murder and after he has had his left ear photographed. In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued, The second time that same question [the location of the earring], it was not a leading question, it was not a suggestive question, ladies and gentlemen, I more than anybody else wish there was a tape of that interview, because I submit to you if you heard a tape of that, if you heard the spontaneity following the pregnant pause, if you will, and that ear, and Detective Shipp saying that's your right, the clear reliability and spontaneity of that pointing would be manifest. But, we don't have that taped. All I can do is submit it on the testimony of Angela Womble and Detective Shipp that that is in fact what happened. The prosecutor also told the jury that [A]ll I could do is submit to you that no suggestion was made in any way to Angela as to which hole or which pierced ear the defendant ... had. Defendant contends that the prosecutor injected into closing argument his own unsworn testimony regarding the conversation among himself, Angela, and Detective Shipp. Although defendant's contention is not without some force, we conclude the prosecutor's line of argument was sufficiently supported by the testimony of Angela Womble and Detective Shipp to avoid characterization as misconduct. The prosecutor's use of the term spontaneity echoed Detective Shipp's testimony as well as Angela's testimony that she did it all on [her] own. The prosecutor was entitled to express his personal wish that the conversation had been recorded, since defense counsel had implicitly accused the prosecutor of suggesting that Angela change her description of the second gunman; the jury would have appreciated the context of the remark. (See United States v. Young (1985) 470 U.S. 1, 17-18 [84 L.Ed.2d 1, 14, 1055 S.Ct. 1038].) Even if we could agree with defendant that the remarks strayed beyond the evidence, we would find them harmless. The jury had the oportunity to hear Detective Shipp and Angela Womble testify to the circumstances of the interview, and thus could judge their credibility independently of the prosecutor's argument. Defendant also contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by calling Angela Womble's identification of defendant as reliable an identification as may be found in a courtroom. We disagree; the statement cannot reasonably be interpreted as vouching, but would have been understood as an invitation to draw the desired inference. (14) Defendant further argues that the prosecutor gave unsworn testimony in suggesting to the jury a way to interpret Angela's reference to the second gunman as tall: that defendant, although only five feet, nine and three-quarters inches in height, was tall compared with Willie Womble. Unfortunately for the prosecutor, no witness had testified to Willie Womble's height. To overcome the difficulty, the prosecutor argued the jury could calculate, from the dimensions of the room and the distance of the body from the east wall, that Willie Womble was five feet three inches tall. [10] Defendant complains that the method by which the prosecutor derived Willie Womble's height was fallacious, and that in effect the prosecutor simply urged the jury to take his word for it that she was five feet three inches tall. We find no misconduct. The prosecutor avoided the error of stating that the pathologist would have testified that Willie Womble was indeed five feet three inches (see People v. Johnson (1981) 121 Cal. App.3d 94, 102 [175 Cal. Rptr. 8]); instead, he conceded he had not asked the proper questions and made a rather strained argument from other evidence that the jury should so find. If the prosecutor's reasoning was faulty, the jury was free to reject it. (15) Defendant next contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by referring to autopsy photographs not in evidence and by specifically noting with respect to one item, [Y]ou're not going to see a picture of it. No misconduct appears. The pathologist described Willie Womble's injuries as depicted in eight autopsy photographs. The trial court later ruled it would admit three of the photographs in evidence and exclude the remaining five. It would have been apparent to the jury, on retiring to deliberate, that the number of exhibits before them did not correspond to the number of photographs about which the pathologist had testified. We are unpersuaded the prosecutor's remark could have led the jury to speculate what else might be shown in the photographs not admitted. (16) Finally, defendant urges the prosecutor used his closing argument to testify to the reasons why criminalist Fukayama undertook a reexamination of the shotgun shells taken from the Womble residence. Defense counsel, in argument, suggested that reexamination was done to fit a case around Willie. In rebuttal, the prosecutor described the initial tests performed by Fukayama and certain omissions from his analysis, stating, The point is not what Mr. Fukayama's conclusions were, that wasn't the problem. The problem was with his method. It was unprofessional. The prosecutor elaborated: The problem was the incomplete examination and for that reason, and only that reason, that evidence went back to Mr. Fukayama in January after the preliminary hearing. I can only submit that to you but I submit to you that is in fact the case. Defendant contends that because there was no testimony either specifically labelling Fukayama's analysis unprofessional or directly stating that the reason for the reexamination was the incompleteness of the initial examination, the quoted argument constituted misconduct. We believe the prosecutor's comments that Fukayama's method was unprofessional and incomplete were fair inferences from the evidence, inasmuch as Fukayama described the deficiencies in his initial analysis and admitted his initial conclusion was wrong. However, the prosecutor went beyond the evidence when he argued that the only reason Fukayama reexamined the evidence was the incompleteness of the initial analysis. Fukayama did not so testify, and the prosecutor, as the person in charge of the proceedings against defendant, was in the best position to know why Fukayama was asked to reexamine the evidence. In effect, the prosecutor submitted the point on his own representation. We see no possibility that defendant was prejudiced, however, in light of the admitted deficiencies in Fukayama's initial analysis and his testimony that the prosecutor did not apply any undue influence or pressure on him. None of the claimed instances of misconduct, therefore, rendered defendant's trial unfair or unreliable. Because we find no prejudice, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must likewise fail. ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) [11]