Opinion ID: 2602335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Parties Formed a Valid Contract When Krossa Accepted the Terms Offered by All Alaska.

Text: The superior court found that Krossa learned of All Alaskan's payment formula after about one week on the SHELIKOF, and that at that time he accepted the meaning intended by All Alaskan, thereby forming a contract. Because we give effect to the parties' reasonable expectations [23] in interpreting a contract, and because the superior court found that after the first week the parties both reasonably expected that Krossa would be paid based on All Alaskan's payment formula, we affirm the superior court's holding regarding contract formation. We have explained that although a party may avoid a contract based on mistake or misrepresentation regarding the contract's meaning, the party loses power to avoid the contract if, after he knows or has reason to know of the mistake or non-fraudulent misrepresentation... he manifests to the other party his intention to affirm it or acts with respect to anything he has received in a manner inconsistent with disaffirmance, or he does not within a reasonable time manifest to the other party his intention to avoid it. [24] Krossa does not challenge the evidentiary sufficiency of the superior court's findings that he accepted All Alaskan's terms and that his acceptance was further confirmed by his asking to return immediately for another contract that he signed in August, 1995, which included explicitly all the terms [intended by All Alaskan in the first contract]. Nor does he offer evidence that he manifested intent to avoid the contract at any point during the term of his first contract. Therefore, the trial court was correct in its conclusion that Krossa ratified the contract by his actions.
Krossa argues that even if he ratified the contract, that ratification was invalid because he acted under duress. Krossa waived this argument by not raising it below. We will not consider on appeal new arguments which (1) depend on new or controverted facts, (2) are not closely related to the appellant's arguments at trial, and (3) could not have been gleaned from the pleadings, unless the new issue raised establishes plain error. [25] Krossa's duress claim depends on factual claims regarding his financial situation and the feasibility of leaving the SHELIKOF when he learned of All Alaskan's payment terms; the superior court reached no factual findings on this issue because Krossa made no duress claim below. A duress argument could not have been gleaned from Krossa's argument below, since at the outset of this case he sought enforcement of his interpretation of the contract. In Hill v. Ames, we considered a similar waiver issue: One party brought suit to enforce an alleged oral contract, lost that claim, and on appeal argued that the lower court erred by not granting equitable quantum meruit damages. [26] We held: While there is evidence in the record which might be relevant to possible relief on theories of quantum meruit or constructive trust, appellee did not have an opportunity to put in countervailing evidence on those theories, and the court was not apprised that those questions were to be litigated. No motion for leave to amend the complaint was made in the superior court. Therefore, we will not consider these questions on appeal. [27] Following this precedent, we will not address Krossa's new claim of duress in this appeal. [28]