Opinion ID: 3022437
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for Joinder

Text: On March 14, 2005, Miller filed what he termed a motion for joinder, requesting permission of the Court to add four additional state troopers as defendants. In the brief filed in support of his motion, Miller indicated that the names of these four state troopers were disclosed to him in a recent response to a discovery request. Presumably, he is referring to Hassinger’s March 7, 2005 discovery response indicating that “the troopers involved in the entry and search of premises included Kenneth Hassinger, Todd Rudy, James Borza, T.E. Pinkerton, and John Brumbagh.” As noted by defendant, while the motion was captioned under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it was more properly analyzed under Rule 15, which governs the amendment of pleadings. Relying on Rule 15(c), the District Court denied the motion in its June 13, 2005 order based on Miller’s inability to “meet the necessary requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3) to permit an amendment.” We review the District Court’s decision denying Miller’s motion to amend his complaint for abuse of discretion. Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). Rule 15(c) governs the relation back of a complaint adding new parties. In pertinent part, it provides: (c) Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . 13 (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or (3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party. This Court carefully examined the requirements of Rule 15(c) in Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 266 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2001), and Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2003). As we have explained, the rule requires that three conditions be met in order for an amended complaint seeking to substitute newly named defendants to relate back to the original complaint for statute of limitations purposes. Singletary, 266 F.3d at 194. These conditions are: (1) that the claim against the newly named defendants arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original complaint, (2) that within the 120-day period for service of the summons and complaint, the newly named party have received notice of the institution of the action such that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (3) that within that same time period of time, the newly named party must have known, or should have known, that “but for a mistake,” he or she would have been named as a defendant in the first place. See id. We have further held that the notice required by Rule 15(c) can be actual or 14 constructive. Where a plaintiff chooses to rely on constructive notice to satisfy the requirements of Rule 15(c)(3), he or she can demonstrate such notice either through the shared attorney method or the identity of interest method. See id. at 196-200; Garvin, 354 F.3d at 223-227. The shared attorney method requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that there was “some communication or relationship” between the attorney for the named defendants and the parties sought to be added as defendants prior to the expiration of the 120-day period for service of the summons and complaint. See id. at 196-97; Garvin, 354 F.3d at 225. The identity of interest method requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the filing of the lawsuit permit the inference the notice was actually received by the parties sought to be added as defendants during the relevant time period.4 See id. at 197-200; Garvin, 354 F.3d at 227. Based on the record presently before us, it does not appear that Appellant had a sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue of notice. We therefore conclude that it was an abuse of discretion 4 While we held in Singletary and Garvin that “a non-management employee . . . does not share a sufficient nexus of interests with his or her employer so that notice given to the employer can be imputed to the employee for Rule 15(c)(3) purposes,” the inquiry in those cases differed from the inquiry in the instant case. In Singletary and Garvin, the question was whether non-management employees could be imputed to have received notice from their employers, which had been named as defendants (in Singletary, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, and in Garvin, the City of Philadelphia). In the instant case, the inquiry is whether the circumstances permit the inference that the troopers received notice of the pendency of the lawsuit from Trooper Hassinger, a Unit Supervisor for Troop H Tactical Narcotic Team. The relationship between Hassinger and the troopers sought to be added is not clear at the present time, and thus we cannot say, based on the record before us, whether such an inference would be reasonable. We trust that, on remand, the District Court will thoroughly explore these and other relevant issues. 15 to deny the motion and, accordingly, will vacate the District Court’s order denying Miller’s motion to amend the complaint.5 Based on the foregoing, the District Court’s order granting summary judgment will be affirmed with respect to the Fourth Amendment search claim but otherwise vacated. The District Court’s orders striking Appellant’s motion to compel and motion to amend his complaint will be vacated. Appellee’s motion to strike Appellant’s informal brief is denied.6 5 We think it relevant to note here that, in contrast to the appellant in Garvin, who delayed in filing her lawsuit, in seeking discovery regarding the proper defendants, and in attempting to amend her complaint, Appellant has acted as diligently as could be expected under the circumstances. Appellant filed his original complaint only five months after the incident in questions occurred, well within the statute of limitations. As already discussed, on December 17, 2004, Miller filed a motion to compel discovery from Hassinger. Notably, this motion was filed within the 120-day period for service of the summons and complaint, and had it been promptly acted upon, might have allowed Appellant sufficient time to provide the newly-discovered state troopers with notice of his intent to name them as defendants in this action. In addition, in his opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Appellant notified the Court of his problems in obtaining discovery from defendant on this subject, explaining: “Defendant Hassinger and his attorney have withheld requested discovery information in regard to paperwork held by the defendant that would name the participants of the illegal search.” 6 On October 7, 2005, Miller filed an informal brief with this Court which purported to be signed by an “authorized Representative on behalf of Rodney Miller, © Ens legis.” Appellee moved to strike Appellant’s brief for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(d), arguing that it was unclear whether Appellant continued to be a proper litigant before this Court. Miller filed a response indicating that the signature on his informal brief was in fact his. In light of the foregoing, the motion to strike is denied. 16