Opinion ID: 1924861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: excluding evidence of threats

Text: Stanley Pratt, the father of the child victim, never testified. During his cross-examination of Stewart Pratt, defense counsel never asked Stewart if he was afraid of his father, never asked him about any conversation he had had with Phyllis Bounds, never asked him about any threats he had ever heard his father make. During his examination of Phyllis, a defense witness, defense counsel sought to bring out a conversation between Phyllis and Stewart after Stanley had got out of prison. Q. Did he come  over at John's Car Care, did you have a conversation with [Stewart]? A. I did. Q. And what was the extent of that conversation? BY HON. TRACY KLEIN (for the State): Objection. BY THE COURT: With who now, with [Stewart]? A. With [Stewart] the day the charges was [sic] filed. BY THE COURT: If it was with [Stewart], I will sustain. Q. I'll ask this, did [Stewart] say anything about what his father wanted him to do? A. Yes, he said he wanted  BY HON. TRACY KLEIN: Objection, hearsay. BY THE COURT: I sustain as to hearsay. You are still talking about what [Stewart] told you, is that right? A. [Stewart], yes sir. Q. I'll ask you whether or not [Stewart] was afraid of his father? A. He told me he was. BY HON. TRACY KLEIN: Objection as to hearsay. BY HON. KARL KEPPER (for defendant): She can testify whether or not he told her he was afraid of him or not. BY THE COURT: Well, she could have answered the question without it being hearsay. But I am going to sustain. Q. Now what did he say? BY HON. TRACY KLEIN: Objection, call for a hearsay answer. BY HON. KARL KEPPER: All right. BY THE COURT: Sustained. Whigham complains of the circuit judge's excluding the testimony of Phyllis as to what Stewart, her nephew, had told her. Yet when Stewart was on the witness stand as a State witness, defense counsel never laid any kind of predicate for such hearsay testimony to be admitted. Counsel never asked Stewart if he had made any statements to Phyllis or anybody else contrary to his testimony, never asked him if his father, Stanley, had told him what, if anything, to say in court, had threatened him, or if he, Stewart, had made pretrial statements out of court to this effect. No error was committed in sustaining the State's objection to these questions to Phyllis. Rule 613(b) M.R.E. provides: (b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party opponent. Prior to the adoption of the M.R.E. January 1, 1986, the courts of this State followed The Queen's Case, 2 Br. & B. 284, 129 Eng.Rep. 976 (1820), in our requirement of the detailed foundation which had to be laid before evidence of contrary out-of-court statements could be admitted. The witness had to be asked whether or not on a specific date, at a specific place and in the presence of specific persons he made a particular statement. Harrison v. State, 534 So.2d 175, 179 (Miss. 1988); Hubbard v. State, 437 So.2d 430, 434 (Miss. 1983); Carlisle v. State, 348 So.2d 765, 766 (Miss. 1977). As the comment to Rule 613(b) states, the foundation requirement of our pre-rules decisions was preserved, but with some modifications. There is no requirement that the witness's attention be directed to a particular time or sequence. U.S. v. Nelson, 574 F.2d 277 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 956, 99 S.Ct. 355, 58 L.Ed.2d 347 (1978); U.S. v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (Fla.Ct.App. 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 1007, 98 S.Ct. 1877, 56 L.Ed.2d 388 (1978). [2] As Harrison makes clear, however, before impeachment testimony will be permitted some foundation must be laid. In that case the State sought to impeach a witness, Ray Patty, as to prior statements he had made to Coleman, a police officer: ... M.R.E. 613(b) was complied with in that the witness Ray Patty was given an opportunity to explain or deny his statements, and Patty was available for interrogation by opposing counsel. Officer Coleman was likewise available by counsel for the defendant. Harrison, 534 So.2d at 179. If counsel for a party desires to impeach the testimony of a witness with some pretrial, out-of-court statement that is inconsistent with his trial testimony, it is only fair that the witness, while he is on the stand, be asked about it, and be given an opportunity to explain or deny it. Nor does this create any difficulty to counsel. It is manifestly unfair, after the witness has been excused, to attempt to offer a pretrial inconsistent statement of the witness into evidence, and no trial court should be faulted for excluding such hearsay testimony in the absence of laying any foundation. In this case counsel surely knew prior to trial about the statements Stewart allegedly made to Phyllis. Yet he did not ask Stewart a single question about any of them. There may be instances in which a pretrial inconsistent statement of a witness will not be known until after the witness has left the stand. In such an instance a trial judge in the interest of justice may permit the introduction of such statement, but only after making sure that the witness is available for recall and is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement. Even here, however, it would be better procedure to permit the witness to be recalled for further examination and asked about the statement, and given an opportunity to explain or deny it, rather than introducing the statement and then recalling the witness. We make these extended observations about the rather plain provisions of Rule 613(b) because of our recent decision, Marcum v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 587 So.2d 223 (Miss. 1991), in which we held it was reversible error for a circuit court to exclude a pretrial inconsistent statement of a witness for which no foundation had been laid while the witness was on the stand. We adhere to our holding in Marcum that there may be instances, as above noted, in which a trial court in the interest of justice has the discretion of admitting a pretrial inconsistent statement of a witness into evidence for which no predicate was laid of the witness, but only after the court has seen to it that the witness is available for recall and is given an opportunity to deny. Marcum, however, is overruled insofar as it is contrary to our holding today. Because no foundation was laid for the introduction of any pretrial statements of Stewart, the court made no error in excluding any testimony of Phyllis Bounds as to any such statement. There is an additional reason why the circuit judge did not err in excluding questions to Phyllis about pretrial statements of Stewart: There was no profert made by counsel as to what Phyllis would testify, if permitted to do so. Rule 103(a)(2) M.R.E.; Tigner v. State, 478 So.2d 293 (Miss. 1985); Hammond v. Grissom, 470 So.2d 1049 (Miss. 1985).