Opinion ID: 4535792
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequacy of the District Court’s Explanation

Text: Mr. Brown advances several challenges to the adequacy of the district court’s analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and its explanation of the sentence imposed. With respect to the § 3553(a) factors, Mr. Brown contends the district 1 Mr. Brown’s unpreserved challenges fail under either standard of review. Resolving these challenges on the first prong of plain error, we conclude the district court did not commit any error. Because the district court did not err, it also did not abuse its discretion. 5 court’s analysis failed to explain how the 720-month sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary. He specifically claims the district court “provided a philosophical discussion . . . on the rule of law and society, rehabilitation, and deterrence,” but failed to analyze how the 720-month sentence promotes respect for the law, affords adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, or furthers Mr. Brown’s rehabilitation. Aplt. Br. at 13–14. With respect to the district court’s explanation of the sentence, Mr. Brown argues the court erred by failing to specifically address factors that may have counseled in favor of leniency. According to Mr. Brown, these factors include his own background as a victim of child sexual abuse; his potential to return to society after corrective treatment; his cooperation with law enforcement; and the comparison of his sentence with the sentences of his co-defendants. “[A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). But “a specific discussion of Section 3553(a) factors is not required for sentences falling within the ranges suggested by the Guidelines.” United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007). Moreover, we do “not demand that the district court recite any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider.” United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1115–16 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). But we will not “presume the district court weighed a party’s arguments in light of the § 3553(a) factors where the record provides no indication that it did so and 6 no clear explanation of the sentence imposed.” Id. at 1116. “After settling on the appropriate sentence, [the district court] must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. A sentencing judge should articulate “enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has . . . a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Here, the sentencing court met this standard. The district court noted that it had reviewed the sentencing memorandum submitted by Mr. Brown’s counsel, and it gave both parties an opportunity to present argument at the sentencing hearing before imposing a within-Guidelines sentence. The district court explained the Guidelines calculations and specifically indicated it was imposing a sentence in light of the § 3553(a) factors: “The sentence as pointed out here today is one that seeks to be sufficient, but not greater than necessary considering Title 18 United States Code Section 3553(a).” ROA, Vol. III at 74–75. Although the district court was not required to specifically discuss each § 3553(a) factor, Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1202, its explanation at sentencing touched on several factors. Contrary to Mr. Brown’s contention that the district court failed to consider “mitigating personal factors,” the district court acknowledged that Mr. Brown was a victim of sexual abuse as a child. And the court noted that Mr. Brown began sexually abusing others as a teenager. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (requiring the district court to consider a defendant’s “history and characteristics”). The district court then addressed the need for the sentence “to promote respect for the law,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), and it opined 7 that “[w]hen a predator is allowed to continue to function[,] of course, that is antithetical to the law and a rule of law.” ROA, Vol. III at 75. The district court went on to discuss the severity of the conduct of conviction, which involved Mr. Brown sexually abusing and exploiting his two-year-old son. See § 3553(a)(1) (requiring the district court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense”). The district court next remarked on the need for general deterrence and deterrence specific to Mr. Brown. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (requiring the district court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence”). And while the district court specifically considered the availability of correctional treatment, it expressed concerns regarding Mr. Brown’s potential to reoffend: There are some programs within the prison system. As pointed out and suggested by [the United States], these offenses tend to repeat. There is a rate of recidivism. It is reflected in the history of this defendant. I am not optimistic that all of this will turn around. I wish that it would.[2] ROA, Vol. III at 77; see also id. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (requiring the district court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”); id. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (requiring the district court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”). Ultimately, the district court concluded that a “very, very 2 These comments belie Mr. Brown’s contention that the district court failed to consider Mr. Brown’s potential to return to society with corrective treatment. The district court did consider the availability of treatment programs in prison, but it concluded that Mr. Brown’s prior conduct suggested he was likely to reoffend, even with such treatment. 8 harsh sentence” was appropriate based on both the offense conduct and Mr. Brown’s background because “there will be and is a risk that now and in the future should [Mr. Brown] not be confined, [he] would be a potential risk to others.” ROA, Vol. III at 77–78. Contrary to Mr. Brown’s contentions, the district court’s analysis of these factors adequately explains why it imposed a 720-month sentence and why that sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of § 3553(a)(2). Mr. Brown’s contentions, that the district court erred by failing to consider several items that may have counseled in favor of leniency, are also meritless. As discussed, the district court did consider mitigating facts from Mr. Brown’s background and his potential to return to society with corrective treatment. See supra note 2. And the district court did not err by failing to expressly address Mr. Brown’s cooperation with law enforcement or the sentences of his co-defendants because Mr. Brown did not make those arguments until appeal to this court. 3 Even if these arguments had been preserved, however, the district court is not required to explain why it disagrees with a defendant’s arguments for leniency. See United States v. 3 The district court was not required under the § 3553(a) factors to specifically consider Mr. Brown’s cooperation with law enforcement or the sentences of his co-defendants. Section 3553(a)(6) requires the district court to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Mr. Brown’s co-defendants received lower sentences than Mr. Brown, but there is no indication in the record that any of them had similar records and was found guilty of similar conduct--that is, two counts of production of child pornography. See ROA, Vol. II at 23–24 (noting one co-defendant pleaded guilty to attempted online enticement of a minor); ROA, Vol. II at 52 n.4 (noting another co-defendant pleaded guilty to aid and abet production of child pornography). 9 Jarrillo-Luna, 478 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Lopez-Macias, 661 F.3d 485 (10th Cir. 2011). Rather, the district court must simply demonstrate that it has considered the party’s arguments, Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. The district court did so here by noting it had reviewed Mr. Brown’s sentencing memorandum and by entertaining argument from his counsel at sentencing. The rejection of those arguments does not equate to the court’s failure to consider them. In sum, the district court adequately explained its imposition of a 720-month, within-Guidelines sentence and sufficiently considered the leniency arguments Mr. Brown brought to its attention.