Opinion ID: 1113765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: RCW 10.94.020(10)(b) reads:

Text: Are you [the jury] convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability that the defendant would commit additional criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society? Defendants claim the question is so vague and the issue it presents so imponderable that it fails to provide a rational and fairly limited basis for the decision whether or not to impose the death penalty. We disagree and, contrary to the position of defendants, find that this question has been considered and answered by the United States Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas, supra . [12, 13] In Jurek, the Supreme Court reviewed a provision of the Texas death penalty statute which is identical to the question in RCW 10.94.020(10)(b). In discussing this provision of the Texas statute, the court, in an opinion signed by three Justices said: Focusing on the second statutory question that Texas requires a jury to answer in considering whether to impose a death sentence, the petitioner argues that it is impossible to predict future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless. It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. The fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be made. Indeed, prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge's prediction of the defendant's future conduct. And any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose. For those sentenced to prison, these same predictions must be made by parole authorities. The task that a Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory question in issue is thus basically no different from the task performed countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal justice. What is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine. Texas law clearly assures that all such evidence will be adduced. (Footnotes omitted.) Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76, 49 L.Ed.2d 929, 96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976). Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment. Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, concurred. The question before us was specifically reviewed by the concurring opinion of Justice White. Discussing the issue of vagueness, the concurrence stated: Petitioner claims that the additional questions upon which the death sentence depends are so vague that in essence the jury possesses standardless sentencing power; but I agree with JUSTICES STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS that the issues posed in the sentencing proceeding have a commonsense core of meaning and that criminal juries should be capable of understanding them. Jurek, at 278-79. In essence, the Supreme Court upheld the Texas language on predicting future events because (1) prediction of future behavior has a common core of meaning juries can understand and (2) prediction of future behavior depends on the jury having sufficient information and under the Texas statute the jury would have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine. Jurek, at 276. The Washington statute is clearly sufficient to meet this standard. RCW 10.94.020(7), (8), (10)(a), (b); RCW 9A.32.045(2). Certainly the rationale and results of Jurek can be argued. See, e.g., Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1 (1976). We believe, however, that the constitutional validity of the Texas statute which is identical to RCW 10.94.020(10)(b) has been considered by a majority of the Supreme Court and its constitutionality upheld. This same issue has come before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Collins v. State, 548 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959, 51 L.Ed.2d 811, 97 S.Ct. 1611 (1977). In Collins, the Texas court held the words a probability in the context of the statute are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Defendants next urge that the due process clause of the Washington Constitution, article 1, section 3, No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, may set a higher standard than the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and should control. We have long held that federal cases construing the various due process clauses of the federal constitution should be given great weight but that they are not necessarily controlling in our construction of Const. art. 1, ง 3. Young v. Konz, 91 Wn.2d 532, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979); Herr v. Schwager, 145 Wash. 101, 258 P. 1039 (1927). We believe, however, that the prediction of future dangerousness while admittedly difficult is neither so vague nor imponderable as to be unconstitutional. Although the case concerned an attack on the commitment law for criminal insanity and the predictive language was a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts rather than a probability certain criminal acts would be committed, we believe the analysis and holding by the court in Alter v. Morris, 85 Wn.2d 414, 536 P.2d 630 (1975), overruled on other grounds, In re Harris, 94 Wn.2d 430, 436, 617 P.2d 739 (1980), is applicable here. While, as we observed in Alter at page 420, the social and scientific determinants of dangerousness, especially future dangerousness, are far from perfect, nonetheless we found the standard not to be unconstitutional: [T]he State's interest in the safety of its citizens is strong enough to allow the legislature some leeway in formulating what are essentially predictive standards. The theory of mental commitment underlying both statutes is twofold: preventive detention, and treatment. Neither statute authorizes commitment and detention on the sole ground of a person's need for treatment; protection of citizens is the primary justification for the deprivation of an individual's liberty under these statutes. Protection by prevention requires prediction; under our statutes, prediction is based in part on the fact of prior dangerous acts proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Full due process safeguards surround that proof. The fact that the prediction cannot be foolproof does not discredit the attempt. At this point in the development of our knowledge about human behavior, the dangerousness standard is not an unreasonable one. Alter v. Morris, supra at 420-21. We hold RCW 10.94.020(10)(b) meets the standards of both the federal and the state constitutions.