Opinion ID: 1265850
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Trial Court's Error Violate the Federal Constitution?

Text: (2a) Defendants argue the trial court's error impaired their right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree. Defendants, we emphasize, do not claim error in connection with the substantive offenses with which they were charged. Rather, their claim of error relates only to the trial court's instructions on the section 12022(b) sentence enhancement allegations. State law, not the federal Constitution, is the source of defendants' right to a jury trial on the section 12022(b) allegations, and the state right, moreover, is conditional on the underlying offense being tried to a jury. (See § 969c.) [5] There simply is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact. ( McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79, 93 [91 L.Ed.2d 67, 80-81, 106 S.Ct. 2411], citing Spaziano v. Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447, 459 [82 L.Ed.2d 340, 352, 104 S.Ct. 3154].) Defendants argue the court's instructional omissions implicated their Sixth Amendment rights because section 12022(b) shares fundamental analytical and functional characteristics of a crime, although it is designated an enhancement. That an enhancement resembles a substantive offense, insofar as it imposes additional punishment based upon a factual finding that a defendant engaged in particular conduct, may be true. Such similarity, however, does not elevate to federal constitutional stature defendants' section 12022(b) jury rights. California courts have long recognized that [a]n enhancement is not a separate crime or offense.... ( People v. Waite (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 585, 593 [194 Cal. Rptr. 245], disapproved on other grounds People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 592-594 [250 Cal. Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165]; see also People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 479 [279 Cal. Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076]; In re Shull (1944) 23 Cal.2d 745, 749 [146 P.2d 417] [discussing predecessor to section 12022]; People v. Turner (1983) 145 Cal. App.3d 658, 684 [193 Cal. Rptr. 614].) As defined in the Rules of Court, an enhancement `means an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.' ( People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 207 [249 Cal. Rptr. 850, 757 P.2d 1013], quoting Cal. Rules of Court, rule 405(c), and citing Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 5, 22-24.) Enhancements typically focus on an element of the commission of the crime or the criminal history of the defendant which is not present for all such crimes and perpetrators and which justifies a higher penalty than that prescribed for the offenses themselves. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 207-208.) Section 12022(b) provides for an additional term of one year['s] imprisonment to be added to the base term of a felony conviction. That section 12022(b) includes[] element[s] in addition to those necessary to prove the underlying felony certainly does not imply it has defined a new crime. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 207 [discussing section 667.8].) Rather, section 12022(b) merely focuses on a circumstance involved in the commission of some felonies (i.e., use of a deadly or dangerous weapon) that the Legislature apparently believed justifies an additional penalty to that prescribed for the underlying felonies. Thus, as we have previously recognized in analogous circumstances, section 12022(b) articulates a penalty provision, not a substantive crime. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 207-208; see also People v. Smith (1985) 163 Cal. App.3d 908, 913 [210 Cal. Rptr. 43] [discussing section 12022, subdivision (a)]; and People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 100 [192 Cal. Rptr. 748, 665 P.2d 520] [discussing section 12022.5].) The Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination of the appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual. ( Spaziano v. Florida, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 459 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 352].) The Supreme Court, moreover, has specifically determined the Sixth Amendment does not require jury fact-finding when a statute  like section 12022(b)  makes weapon possession a sentencing factor rather than an element of a crime. ( McMillan v. Pennsylvania, supra, 477 U.S. at pp. 89-90 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 78-79].) In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, supra, 477 U.S. 79 ( McMillan ), the high court considered an aspect of the Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act of 1982, pursuant to which anyone convicted of an enumerated felony is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment, if the sentencing judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense. The act does not authorize a sentence exceeding that otherwise allowed for the underlying offense, but divests the judge of discretion to impose any sentence of less than five years. ( Id. at pp. 81-82 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 73-74]; see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9712 (1982).) The high court in McMillan held the Pennsylvania act did not deny the defendants their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. (477 U.S. at p. 93 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 80-81].) Defendants acknowledge the McMillan decision, but argue section 12022(b) is different from the Pennsylvania law upheld there in ways that should trigger Sixth Amendment jury protection. Specifically, defendants note section 12022(b) permits the imposition of punishment exceeding that provided for the underlying offense, while the Pennsylvania law provided only for imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence within a range already authorized for the underlying offense. While we discern the difference, we do not agree it should be dispositive. In McMillan, the high court acknowledged a concern that state legislatures not circumvent due process by recharacterizing elements of offenses as sentencing factors. The court considered the specter raised by petitioners of States restructuring existing crimes in order to `evade' the commands of [due process].... (477 U.S. at p. 89 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 78].) In concluding such concerns were not implicated by the Pennsylvania law, the court noted the enumerated felonies involved retain the same elements they had before the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act was passed. The Pennsylvania Legislature did not change the definition of any existing offense. ( Ibid. ) The Supreme Court concluded Pennsylvania's law simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment  the instrumentality used in committing a violent felony  and dictated the precise weight to be given that factor if the instrumentality is a firearm. Pennsylvania's decision to do so has not transformed against its will a sentencing factor into an `element' of some hypothetical `offense.' ( McMillan, supra, 477 U.S. at pp. 89-90 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 78-79].) Similarly, there is no indication our Legislature, in enacting section 12022(b), sought to circumvent due process by renaming, as a sentencing enhancement, an element of a greater offense. Section 12022(b) does not change the definition of any existing offense. [6] The Legislature's decision to impose an additional prison term for personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, a traditional sentencing factor, and to entrust the underlying factual determination to a jury (but only when the underlying offense is tried to a jury), does not transform section 12022(b) from a sentencing provision into a substantive offense. In dissent, Justice Kennard suggests the inference is strong that the Legislature must have intended enhancements to be the functional equivalent of criminal offenses. (Conc. and dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at p. 324.) Her opinion, however, cites neither statutory language nor legislative history materials supporting such an inference. Nor does it explain why, if our Legislature intended a sentence enhancement to be part of the criminal offense to which it is attached (conc. and dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post at p. 318), it did not simply say so. When the Legislature wishes to create a substantive offense having as one of its elements another substantive offense, it knows how to do so. (See, e.g., § 666 [petit theft with a prior]; § 12021 [ex-felon in possession of firearm].) (3) Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, in our statutory scheme sentence enhancements are not equivalent to, nor do they function as, substantive offenses. Most fundamentally, a sentence enhancement is not equivalent to a substantive offense, because a defendant is not at risk for punishment under an enhancement allegation until convicted of a related substantive offense. (See, e.g., section 12022(b), enhancing sentence only upon conviction....) At that time, a defendant's liberty interest has been substantially diminished by a guilty verdict. ( McMillan, supra, 477 U.S. 79, 84 [91 L.Ed.2d 67, 75].) The Legislature, moreover, has in various ways expressed its intention that enhancements not be treated as substantive offenses. [7] While in McMillan the high court made it clear that state legislatures do not have unfettered discretion to define the elements of an offense ... it has consistently rejected any bright line test.... ( Nichols v. McCormick (9th Cir.1991) 929 F.2d 507, 510.) We agree with the People that defendants mistake one factor underlying McMillan for the entire rationale. McMillan 's holding rests on several factors; that the disputed statute imposed a mandatory minimum sentence rather than increasing the maximum penalty was not the most important. (See McMillan, supra, 477 U.S. at pp. 85-90 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 75-79].) First, the high court in McMillan noted its traditional deference to state legislative judgment in defining crimes and prescribing penalties. ( McMillan, supra, 477 U.S. at pp. 85-86 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 75-76].) Second, in the challenged statute the Pennsylvania legislature was neither discarding the presumption of innocence ( id. at p. 87 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 77]) [n]or ... reliev[ing] the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt. ( Ibid. ) Third, the Pennsylvania legislature did not change the definition of any existing offense so as to circumvent due process requirements. ( Id. at p. 89 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 78].) Fourth, the disputed statute enhanced punishment based upon a factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment  the instrumentality used.... ( Ibid. ) In light of these factors, the high court declared Pennsylvania's sentencing statute was constitutional. ( Id. at p. 91 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 79-80]; see also Nichols v. McCormick, supra, 929 F.2d at p. 510.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied the McMillan factors to a state sentencing statute similar in important respects to section 12022(b). In Nichols v. McCormick, supra, 929 F.2d 507, the Ninth Circuit upheld against a due process challenge a Montana weapons enhancement statute that imposed, for weapon use during an offense, imprisonment of not less than two years or more than ten years in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of the offense. ( Nichols v. McCormick, supra, 929 F.2d at p. 508 & fn. 1 [examining Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-221 (1989)].) In considering McMillan 's impact upon the Montana statute, the Ninth Circuit noted the Montana statute, unlike that of Pennsylvania in McMillan, allows the sentencing court to impose a penalty in excess of that permitted by the underlying offense. ( Nichols v. McCormick, supra, 929 F.2d at p. 510.) The court did not find this difference dispositive, noting the additional penalty factor was, under McMillan, only one of the factors relevant to making this determination. ( Nichols v. McCormick, supra, 929 F.2d at p. 510.) The court concluded that, as Montana properly treats weapon use as a sentencing factor, it follows that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. ( Nichols v. McCormick, supra, 929 F.2d at p. 509, citing McMillan, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 93 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 80-81].) (2b) We agree with the Ninth Circuit that the import of McMillan is that a state is free to define possession of a weapon as a sentencing factor. ( Nichols v. McCormick, supra, 929 F.2d at p. 511.) Although defendants have correctly noted section 12022(b) imposes an additional term beyond that provided for the underlying offense, nothing in McMillan suggests this fact of itself entitles defendants to a jury under the Sixth Amendment. As Nichols explains, the United States Supreme Court in McMillan rejected defendants' suggestion the imposition of additional punishment automatically triggers Sixth Amendment jury protection.
(4) Defendants argue the trial court's error arbitrarily deprived them of a state-created liberty interest in the exercise of jury sentencing discretion in contravention of Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343 [65 L.Ed.2d 175, 100 S.Ct. 2227]. We disagree. In Hicks, a state law provided for discretionary jury determination of the punishment to be imposed. A state statute, however, mandated a 40-year term for habitual offenders. Finding defendant, who had been convicted of unlawfully distributing heroin, to be an habitual offender, the jury imposed the mandatory 40-year term. Thereafter, the habitual offender statute was declared unconstitutional. The appellate court nonetheless affirmed the sentence, concluding the defendant had not been prejudiced by application of the invalid statute, because the 40-year sentence was within the range of punishment for the underlying offense in any event. ( Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. at pp. 344-345 [65 L.Ed.2d at pp. 178-179].) In reversing, the high court stated [w]here ... a State has provided for the imposition of criminal punishment in the discretion of the trial jury, it is not correct to say that the defendant's interest in the exercise of that discretion is merely a matter of state procedural law. The defendant in such a case has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion [citation] and that liberty interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by the State. ( Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 346 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 180].) Because the jury had not determined the appropriate sentence (nor had the appellate court, as state law permitted, itself reconsidered its appropriateness), the Supreme Court held the defendant had been deprived of his liberty without due process. ( Id. at p. 347 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 180].) Defendants here suffered no deprivation of state-mandated jury discretion analogous to that suffered by the defendants in Hicks. Defendants were not entitled under section 12022(b) to jury sentencing discretion ; at most they were entitled to a jury finding on whether the section 12022(b) enhancement allegation was true. (See People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447-448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135] [distinguishing [w]hen the `result' under review is the product of a jury's factfinding  from [a] capital penalty jury which is charged with a responsibility different in kind, i.e., to render an individualized, normative determination about the penalty appropriate for a particular defendant].) Defendants' jury, after all, did render verdicts on each weapon-use allegation. The rationale of Hicks therefore does not apply to section 12022(b). (See also People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 411-412 [247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184] [holding Hicks rationale not applicable to a failure to instruct on the elements of a special circumstance].) The high court has made plain that Hicks does not invalidate every true finding rendered on a sentencing provision when the jury has received flawed instructions. (See Clemons v. Mississippi (1990) 494 U.S. 738 [108 L.Ed.2d 725, 110 S.Ct. 1441].) In Clemons, the court held the federal Constitution does not prevent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence imposed by a jury that is based in part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance either by reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by harmless-error review.... ( Clemons v. Mississippi, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 741 [180 L.Ed.2d at p. 733].) In so holding, the high court noted that, [c]ontrary to the situation in Hicks, the state [appellate] court in [ Clemons ] asserted its authority under Mississippi law to decide for itself whether the death sentence was to be affirmed.... ( Clemons v. Mississippi, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 747 [108 L.Ed.2d at p. 737].) We specifically pointed out [in Hicks ], however, that the [appellate court there] did not `purport to cure the deprivation by itself reconsidering the appropriateness' of the 40-year sentence, [citation] thus suggesting that appellate sentencing, if properly conducted, would not violate due process of law. ( Ibid. ) The high court's reasoning in Clemons applies to California's scheme for section 12022(b) sentence enhancements. Defendants' state statutory right to jury findings on a section 12022(b) enhancement is constitutionally qualified by the duty of California appellate courts to examine the entire cause when any misdirection of the jury is alleged and to affirm the judgment absent a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Contrary to defendants' suggestion, therefore, if we examine the record of this trial to determine whether the instructional error resulted in a miscarriage of justice, we do not engage in any impermissible attempt to substitute our determination for the jury determination a defendant may claim under section 969c. Indeed, the possibility of such a corrective appellate determination is inherent in the state statutory scheme for jury determination. When rendered, such appellate review complements, and thus affords, defendants their full jury rights and, thus, due process of law under Hicks. (Cf. Clemons v. Mississippi, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 747 [108 L.Ed.2d at p. 737] [rejecting the defendant's assertion he had an unqualified liberty interest under the Due Process Clause to have the jury assess the consequence of the invalidation of one of the aggravating circumstances].) For these reasons, defendants here cannot complain of the sort of deprivation suffered by the defendants in Hicks. Nor did the court's failure to read CALJIC No. 17.16 or an equivalent instruction render defendants' trial fundamentally unfair. Contrary to defendants' suggestion, People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d 194 does not compel a contrary result. In Hernandez, we concluded a sentencing judge may not constitutionally impose an additional three-year term under section 667.8 (kidnapping for purposes of rape) when no violation of that statute was pled or proven. (The allegation in Hernandez was mentioned for the first time in the probation report.) ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 197.) In so concluding, we stated an enhancement statute should [not] be read as a mere sentencing factor [but] rather [as] a finding which must be pled and proven before the trier of fact. ( Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 206, fn. omitted.) Our decision in Hernandez depended upon a circumstance  lack of notice  not present in this case. Because the enhancement at issue had not even been pled, we said, [i]t is possible that defendant failed to testify or otherwise put on additional evidence as to his degree of intoxication and precise mental state at the time of the crimes.... He did not know he faced ... the section 667.8 enhancement ... and from the prosecution's failure to plead section 667.8 he could reasonably assume the prosecution had chosen not to pursue it. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 209, fn. omitted.) Obviously, defendants here were not in an analogous situation; they knew from the outset they were facing section 12022(b) sentence enhancement allegations. The trial court's failure to read CALJIC No. 17.16 to the jury logically could not have diminished defendant's incentive to present evidence relating to section 12022(b), because such evidence, if presented at all, must be presented before the jury is instructed. Most importantly, any discussion in Hernandez relating to the instructional omission was dictum, as our holding depended solely upon lack of notice. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 197, 210-211.) It is true we noted no instruction had been given requiring that the jury find the crucial fact the defendant committed kidnapping with the specific intent to commit rape. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 211.) We did not, however, rely on the instructional omission in holding that, [a]s a matter of due process, the enhancement under section 667.8 could not be imposed.... (46 Cal.3d at p. 208.) We found it unnecessary to articulate a particular standard of review and engage in a harmless-error analysis when defendant's due process right to notice has been so completely violated. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 208-209.) Hernandez, therefore, is not authority for the proposition that failure to instruct the jury on the elements of a sentence enhancement violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Hernandez merely confirms that section 667.8 enhancements must be pled and proven by the prosecution. That the section 12022(b) enhancements at issue in this case were pled and proven to defendants' jury is undisputed. (5) Defendants also assert the jury instructions in this case created structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism ( Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309 [113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331, 111 S.Ct. 1246]) such as would fall within the limited category of error that is reversible per se under the federal Constitution. We disagree. The trial court's failure to read CALJIC No. 17.16 neither wholly withdrew from jury consideration substantially all of the elements of a charged substantive offense (cf. People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1315, citing Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265, 267 [105 L.Ed.2d 218, 221-223, 109 S.Ct. 2419] and Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391 [114 L.Ed.2d 432, 111 S.Ct. 1884]), [8] nor so vitiated all of the jury's findings as to effectively deny defendants a jury trial altogether. (Cf. Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. ___ [124 L.Ed.2d 182, 113 S.Ct. 2078].) Defendants were vigorously represented at trial by counsel who presented evidence and argument before a judge and jury whose impartiality is not disputed. Defendants thus received the `basic protectio[n]' to which they were entitled. ( Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, 508 U.S. at p. ___ [124 L.Ed.2d at p. 191, 113 S.Ct. at p. 2083], quoting Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 577 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470, 106 S.Ct. 3101].) The jury was charged with determining whether each defendant committed robbery and whether each used a deadly weapon. The jury was properly instructed on the elements of robbery and received some guidance (albeit incomplete) with respect to the weapon use allegation. The court's instructional error thus was not one which either aborted the basic trial process [citation] or denied it altogether [citations]. (See Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 578, fn. 6 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 470].) The jury was instructed to find the facts underlying its verdict true beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no misdescription of the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury's findings. (Cf. Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, 508 U.S. at p. ___ [124 L.Ed.2d at p. 190, 113 S.Ct. at p. 2082].) Finally, relying on Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719 [119 L.Ed.2d 492, 112 S.Ct. 2222], defendants assert federal due process requires the same standard of reversal be applied for a state violation of a state-conferred right to a jury trial as for a state violation of a federally mandated jury trial. Again, we do not agree. In Morgan v. Illinois, supra , the high court affirmed that due process requires the exclusion from state-law-mandated capital sentencing juries of jurors who would automatically vote in favor of the death penalty. (504 U.S. at pp. 729-732 [119 L.Ed.2d at pp. 503-505, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 2230-2231].) The high court based its holding on the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ( id. at p. 729 [119 L.Ed.2d at p. 503, 112 S.Ct. at p. 2229]), an incident of due process defendants have not claimed was absent from their hearing. As relevant to this case, Morgan v. Illinois stands for no more than the indisputable proposition that defendants, being statutorily entitled to a jury trial, were therefore constitutionally entitled to `a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent' jurors' (504 U.S. at p. 727 [119 L.Ed.2d at p. 501, 112 S.Ct. at p. 2228], quoting In re Oliver (1948) 333 U.S. 257 [92 L.Ed. 682, 68 S.Ct. 499]), that is, to fundamental fairness in the context of their jury trial. As previously discussed, defendants here were not denied fundamental fairness.
(6) Defendants also advance an equal protection argument, premised on the notion that [d]efendants who face a substantial loss of liberty from a jury trial on an enhancement are similarly situated to defendants who face a loss of liberty from a jury trial on an underlying offense. As a matter of federal constitutional law, defendants are simply wrong. A defendant whom the fact finder has determined committed an underlying offense has a substantially diminished liberty interest at risk in connection with any related sentencing determination. (See McMillan, supra, 477 U.S. at pp. 83-84 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 74-75.) As we have recognized, the Legislature has classified personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon during commission of a felony as a sentence enhancement, not a separate crime. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 207.) The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated states have wide discretion in defining crimes and their elements. (See, e.g., Patterson v. New York (1977) 432 U.S. 197, 201-202 [53 L.Ed.2d 281, 286-287, 97 S.Ct. 2319]; Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 636 [115 L.Ed.2d 555, 568, 111 S.Ct. 2491].) Like the high court, we reject defendants' contention that, because some elements of enhancements may be similar to elements of offenses, states are required to treat enhancement determinations exactly like determinations on substantive offenses. (7) In summary, the trial court's instructional omissions did not deny defendants any federal constitutional right. [9]