Opinion ID: 782479
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to Cremers and the Museum Security Network

Text: 56 To benefit from § 230(c) immunity, Cremers must first demonstrate that his Network website and listserv qualify as provider[s] or user[s] of an interactive computer service.  § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added). An interactive computer service is defined as any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions. § 230(f)(2). 57 The district court concluded that only services that provide access to the Internet as a whole are covered by this definition. But the definition of interactive computer service on its face covers  any  information services or other systems, as long as the service or system allows multiple users to access a computer server. Further, the statute repeatedly refers to the Internet and other interactive computer services, (emphasis added), making clear that the statutory immunity extends beyond the Internet itself. §§ 230(a)(3), (a)(4), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (f)(3). Also, the definition of interactive computer service after the broad definitional language, states that the definition  includ[es] specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet, § 230(f)(2) (emphasis added), thereby confirming that services providing access to the Internet as a whole are only a subset of the services to which the statutory immunity applies. 15 58 There is, however, no need here to decide whether a listserv or website itself fits the broad statutory definition of interactive computer service, because the language of § 230(c)(1) confers immunity not just on providers of such services, but also on users of such services. 16 § 230(c)(1). 59 There is no dispute that the Network uses interactive computer services to distribute its on-line mailing and to post the listserv on its website. Indeed, to make its website available and to mail out the listserv, the Network must access the Internet through some form of interactive computer service. Thus, both the Network website and the listserv are potentially immune under § 230. 60 Critically, however, § 230 limits immunity to information provided by another information content provider. § 230(c)(1). An information content provider is defined by the statute to mean any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service. § 230(f)(3). The reference to  another information content provider (emphasis added) distinguishes the circumstance in which the interactive computer service itself meets the definition of information content provider with respect to the information in question. The pertinent question therefore becomes whether Smith was the sole content provider of his e-mail, or whether Cremers can also be considered to have creat[ed] or develop[ed] Smith's e-mail message forwarded to the listserv. 17 61 Obviously, Cremers did not create Smith's e-mail. Smith composed the e-mail entirely on his own. Nor do Cremers's minor alterations of Smith's e-mail prior to its posting or his choice to publish the e-mail (while rejecting other e-mails for inclusion in the listserv) rise to the level of development. As we have seen, a central purpose of the Act was to protect from liability service providers and users who take some affirmative steps to edit the material posted. Also, the exclusion of publisher liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material and to edit the material published while retaining its basic form and message. 62 The development of information therefore means something more substantial than merely editing portions of an e-mail and selecting material for publication. 18 Because Cremers did no more than select and make minor alterations to Smith's e-mail, Cremers cannot be considered the content provider of Smith's e-mail for purposes of § 230. 19 63 The partial dissent does not register any disagreement with this interpretation of the definition of information content provider or with the observation that immunity for publisher[s] indicates a recognition that the immunity will extend to the selection of material supplied by others. It nonetheless simultaneously maintains that 1) a defendant who takes an active role in selecting information for publication is not immune; and 2) interactive computer service users and providers who screen the material submitted and remove offensive content are immune. See post at 1039 and n. 5. These two positions simply cannot logically coexist. 64 Such a distinction between deciding to publish only some of the material submitted and deciding not to publish some of the material submitted is not a viable one. The scope of the immunity cannot turn on whether the publisher approaches the selection process as one of inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method or degree, not substance. 65 A distinction between removing an item once it has appeared on the Internet and screening before publication cannot fly either. For one thing, there is no basis for believing that Congress intended a one-bite-at-the-apple form of immunity. Also, Congress could not have meant to favor removal of offending material over more advanced software that screens out the material before it ever appears. If anything, the goal of encouraging assistance to parents seeking to control children's access to offensive material would suggest a preference for a system in which the offensive material is not available even temporarily. The upshot is that the partial dissent's posit concerning the limitations of § 230(c) immunity simply cannot be squared with the statute's language and purposes, whatever merit it, or a variant of it, might have as a policy matter. See n. 19, supra. 66 In most cases our conclusion that Cremers cannot be considered a content provider would end matters, but this case presents one twist on the usual § 230 analysis: Smith maintains that he never imagined [his] message would be posted on an international message board or [he] never would have sent it in the first place. The question thus becomes whether Smith can be said to have provided his e-mail in the sense intended by § 230(c). If the defamatory information is not  provided by another information content provider, then § 230(c) does not confer immunity on the publisher of the information. 67 [P]rovided suggests, at least, some active role by the provider in supplying the material to a provider or user of an interactive computer service. One would not say, for example, that the author of a magazine article provided it to an interactive computer service provider or user by allowing the article to be published in hard copy off-line. Although such an article is available to anyone with access to a library or a newsstand, it is not provided for use on the Internet. 68 The result in the foregoing example should not change if the interactive computer service provider or user has a subscription to the magazine. In that instance, the material in question is provided to the provider or user of an interactive computer service, but not in its role as a provider or user of a computer service. The structure and purpose of § 230(c)(1) indicate that the immunity applies only with regard to third-party information provided for use on the Internet or another interactive computer service. As we have seen, the section is concerned with providing special immunity for individuals who would otherwise be publishers or speakers, because of Congress's concern with assuring a free market in ideas and information on the Internet. If information is provided to those individuals in a capacity unrelated to their function as a provider or user of interactive computer services, then there is no reason to protect them with the special statutory immunity. 69 So, if, for example, an individual who happens to operate a website receives a defamatory snail mail letter from an old friend, the website operator cannot be said to have been provided the information in his capacity as a website service. 20 Section 230(c)(1) supplies immunity for only individuals or entities acting as provider[s] or user[s] of an interactive computer service, and therefore does not apply when it is not provided to such persons in their roles as providers or users. 70 The situation here is somewhat more complicated than our letter example, because Smith did provide his e-mail over the Internet and transmitted it to the Network, an operator of a website that is an user of an interactive computer service. Nevertheless, Smith contends that he did not intend his e-mail to be placed on an interactive computer service for public viewing. 71 Smith's confusion, even if legitimate, does not matter, Cremers maintains, because the § 230(c)(1) immunity should be available simply because Smith was the author of the e-mail, without more. 72 We disagree. Under Cremers's broad interpretation of § 230(c), users and providers of interactive computer services could with impunity intentionally post material they knew was never meant to be put on the Internet. At the same time, the creator or developer of the information presumably could not be held liable for unforeseeable publication of his material to huge numbers of people with whom he had no intention to communicate. The result would be nearly limitless immunity for speech never meant to be broadcast over the Internet. 73 Supplying a provider or user of an interactive computer service with immunity in such circumstances is not consistent with Congress's expressly stated purposes in adopting § 230. Free speech and the development of the Internet are not promote[d] by affording immunity when providers and users of interactive computer service[s] knew or had reason to know that the information provided was not intended for publication on the Internet. Quite the contrary: Users of the Internet are likely to be discouraged from sending e-mails for fear that their e-mails may be published on the web without their permission. 74 Such a scenario is very different from the bulletin boards that Congress had in mind when passing § 230. When a user sends a message to a bulletin board, it is obvious that by doing so, he or she will be publicly posting the message. Here, by contrast, Smith claims that he had no idea that the Network even had a listserv. His expectation, he says, was that he was simply sending a private e-mail to an organization informing it of his concern about Batzel's artwork, and, he insists, he would not have sent the message had he known it would be sent on through the listserv. Absent an incentive for service providers and users to evaluate whether the content they receive is meant to be posted, speech over the Internet will be chilled rather than encouraged. Immunizing providers and users of interactive computer service[s] for publishing material when they have reason to know that the material is not intended for publication therefore contravenes the Congressional purpose of encouraging the development of the Internet. 75 Immunizing individuals and entities in such situations also interferes with Congress's objective of providing incentives for providers and users of interactive computer services to remove offensive material, especially obscene and defamatory speech. Far from encouraging such actions, immunizing a publisher or distributor for including content not intended for Internet publication increases the likelihood that obscene and defamatory material will be widely available. Not only will on-line publishers be able to distribute such material obtained from hard copy sources with impunity, but, because the content provider him or herself never intended publication, there is a greater likelihood that the distributed material will in fact be defamatory or obscene. A person is much more likely to exercise care in choosing his words when he knows that those words will be widely read. This is true not only for altruistic reasons but also because liability for defamation attaches only upon publication. In the current case, Smith claimed exactly that: He told Cremers that if he had known his e-mail would be posted, he never would have sent it. The congressional objectives in passing § 230 therefore are not furthered by providing immunity in instances where posted material was clearly not meant for publication. 76 At the same time, Congress's purpose in enacting § 230(c)(1) suggests that we must take great care in determining whether another's information was provided to a provider or user of an interactive computer service for publication. Otherwise, posting of information on the Internet and other interactive computer services would be chilled, as the service provider or user could not tell whether posting was contemplated. To preclude this possibility, the focus should be not on the information provider's intentions or knowledge when transmitting content but, instead, on the service provider's or user's reasonable perception of those intentions or knowledge. We therefore hold that a service provider or user is immune from liability under § 230(c)(1) when a third person or entity that created or developed the information in question furnished it to the provider or user under circumstances in which a reasonable person in the position of the service provider or user would conclude that the information was provided for publication on the Internet or other interactive computer service. It is not entirely clear from the record whether Smith provided the e-mail for publication on the Internet under this standard. There are facts that could have led Cremers reasonably to conclude that Smith sent him the information because he operated an Internet service. On the other hand, Smith was not a subscriber to the listserv and apparently sent the information to a different e-mail account from the one at which Cremers usually received information for publication. More development of the record may be necessary to determine whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person in Cremers' position would conclude that the information was sent for internet publication, or whether a triable issue of fact is presented on that issue. 77 We therefore vacate the district court's order denying Cremers's anti-SLAPP motion and remand to the district court for further proceedings to develop the facts under this newly announced standard and to evaluate what Cremers should have reasonably concluded at the time he received Smith's e-mail. If Cremers should have reasonably concluded, for example, that because Smith's e-mail arrived via a different e-mail address it was not provided to him for possible posting on the listserv, then Cremers cannot take advantage of the § 230(c) immunities. Under that circumstance, the posted information was not provided by another information content provider within the meaning of § 230. After making such an inquiry, the district court must then evaluate whether Batzel adequately has demonstrated a probability that she will prevail on the merits of her complaint under California's anti-SLAPP statute. 21