Opinion ID: 1878612
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural History of Brown's Case

Text: On December 19, 1997, Brown filed another workers' compensation action against Courtaulds, alleging the same injuries she had alleged in the 1993 action. The 1997 workers' compensation action was assigned to Judge Joseph Johnston. Courtaulds moved for a summary judgment, contending that Brown's action was barred by the statute of limitations and by the doctrine of res judicata. Judge Johnston entered a summary judgment for Courtaulds, concluding that the dismissal of the previous action was an involuntary dismissal with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and thus constituted an adjudication on the merits, for purposes of the doctrine of res judicata. Judge Johnston also concluded that Brown's action was barred by the statute of limitations because she filed the 1997 action more than two years after the termination of her employment with Courtaulds. [2] On April 30, 1999, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the summary judgment as to Brown's claim for medical benefits, noting that there is no statute of limitations for accrued medical benefits. [3] Brown v. Courtaulds Fibers, Inc., 784 So.2d 1034 (Ala.Civ.App.1999). However, the Court of Civil Appeals held that Brown's claim for accrued medical expenses was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata and that Judge Johnston had abused his discretion in construing Judge Key's 1993 order as a dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Based on its opinion in Evans, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the summary judgment entered by the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Judge Thompson dissented in Brown, referring to his dissent in Evans.