Opinion ID: 2621239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Third prong of Tinch

Text: The dissent does not address whether the probative value of the motive evidence substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect of its admission. I attribute this to the fact that my dissenting colleagues oppose retroactive application of Braunstein in this case. If this is so, it would appear that they wish to apply McMichael and Findley to affirm the judgment below. Because I believe that we must now apply Braunstein to this controversy, and because I believe application of the third prong of Tinch requires reversal, I will address this issue immediately below. [13] As summarized by Justice Rose, the trial judge found that the claims of A.B. were not cross-admissible in the trial of the A.R. accusations because the claims of A.B. were not proved or established by clear and convincing evidence under Tinch. Notwithstanding my view that A.R.'s claims were relevant as evidence of motive and intent in the A.B. trial, I conclude that admission of the evidence of Richmond's misconduct with child victim A.R. in the much weaker case involving the claims of A.B. was an abuse of discretion under the majority's repudiation of McMichael and Findley in Braunstein. Clearly, the probative value of A.R.'s allegations bolstered the much weaker A.B. case, that the trial court felt could not pass muster under an even lesser burden of proof than would be required to convict Richmond at trial. Thus, the prejudicial effect of the A.R. evidence substantially outweighed its probative value.