Opinion ID: 2314474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 1B Proof of theft by deception to support conviction of theft by unauthorized taking

Text: The indictment, in each count, charges Warren Brasslett with the crime of theft in that he did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of [name of owner], to wit, personal property of a value [value stated] with intent to deprive said [owner] thereof. This charge literally describes the commission of theft under section 353 of 17-A M.R.S.A., entitled: Theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. [1] In his motion for acquittal, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove the specific charge alleged in the indictment, asserting that the State's proof was to the effect that the defendant had obtained control of these wood splitters with the express authority of the owners thereof and had the right under the contract to exercise control over them for twenty-four hours. The defendant suggests that his exercise of control over these wood splitters did not become unauthorized within the meaning of section 353 until he disposed of them in Winterport, a town in Waldo County outside the jurisdiction of a Penobscot County Grand Jury. We do not agree. It is true that the State's proof of the theft was to the effect that the defendant obtained and exercised control over these wood splitters as a result of the deception which he and his co-conspirators had perpetrated in Brewer, a city within the territorial jurisdiction of the Penobscot County Grand Jury. True also is the fact that our criminal code specifically makes it a crime to commit theft by deception. [2] But, we stated in State v. Rand, Me., 430 A.2d 808, 815 (1981), that the Maine Criminal Code, as provided in 17-A M.R. S.A. § 351, by consolidating the several different manners of committing the common law crime of larceny into a single crime of theft, merely effected a procedural mechanism to avoid insubstantial variances and prevent the possibility of a miscarriage of justice by virtue of a variance in that respect between the charge and the proof. Section 351 of 17-A M.R.S.A., indeed, provides that [a]n accusation of theft may be proved by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft under this chapter, notwithstanding the specification of a different manner in the information or indictment. Thus, a specific allegation of theft by unauthorized taking pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353, as in the instant case, will support evidentiary proof of theft in any other manner described by the several separate provisions of the Code relating to the crime of theft. State v. Rand, supra, at 815. We did add the comment in Rand, however, that the consolidation was not intended to bring about a conceptual change of substance in criminology; in other words, common law concepts of criminal conduct would persist. Section 351 so confirms by providing that [c]onduct denominated theft in this chapter constitutes a single crime embracing the separate crimes such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailee, embezzlement, false pretenses, extortion, blackmail, shoplifting and receiving stolen property. The consolidation seeks to play down the historical distinctions at common law between the various types of offenses involving the misappropriation of property. The major objective in this area has been to define the crime broadly enough to include all vaguely separated theft offenses, so that evidence of appropriation by any of the forbidden methods will support the charge. See State v. Saylor, 228 Kan. 498, 618 P.2d 1166, 1170 (1980); People v. Muskgrave, 60 Ill.App.3d 742, 18 Ill.Dec. 306, 377 N.E.2d 595, 597 (1978); Ballou, Property Offenses, 28 Me.L.Rev. 13, at 19 (1976); LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 91 at 677-78 (1972). The comprehensive consolidation permitted by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 351 gives recognition to the principle that it is not necessary in criminal pleading to make averments in indictments or complaints to the degree they become a recital of the evidence in proof of the charge. See State v. Charette, 159 Me. 124, 127, 188 A.2d 898, 900 (1963); State v. Papalos, 150 Me. 46, 57, 103 A.2d 511, 516 (1954). Furthermore, section 353, in defining exercises unauthorized control under that particular section, expressly extended its meaning to include conduct heretofore defined or known as common law larceny by `trespassory taking,' etc. Larceny by trespassory taking at common law includes larceny by deception, trick or fraud. In State v. Humphrey, 32 Vt. 569, at 571-72 (1860), the Court stated: Where the consent of the owner to the taking has been obtained by fraud and deception by inducing him to believe that the taker wishes to obtain the property for an honest and temporary purpose, when in fact the design is to wholly deprive him of it, and where no consent would have been given if the real purpose had been disclosed, this is not regarded as any assent by the owner, and the taking for the purpose and design of the taker is against the will of the owner. A consent thus obtained is wholly nugatory, and the taking may be regarded as tortious, and the taker a trespasser, both civilly and criminally. The Vermont court went on to note that actual disposition or sale of the property was unnecessary in order to complete the crime so long as the taker kept the property for his own use. Id. at 574. Thus, under common law concepts, a trespassory taking took place even though the initial possession of the alleged stolen property was obtained through the actual consent of the owner, if that consent was secured through deception, trick or fraudulent purpose. The common law viewed the deceptor, trickster or defrauder as a trespasser from the beginning, commonly stated a trespasser ab initio. The Humphrey court considered the doctrine as prevailing universally in England and in the several states, and so imbedded in the criminal jurisprudence of the times as to be laid down as the rule in every elementary book on criminal law. The Maine court in 1868 did voice this universal common law theory that in contemplation of law, when property is obtained with a fraudulent purpose, the taker is a wrongdoer from the beginning, his wrongful act is continuous and, when to that act the taker subsequently adds the felonious intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently and to convert it to his own use without the consent of the owner, the crime of larceny is complete. In such case it is not necessary that the felonious intent should exist at the time of the original taking to constitute larceny, the wrongful taking being all the while continuous. State v. Coombs, 55 Me. 477, 481 (1868). This doctrine has been reaffirmed in State v. Boisvert, Me., 236 A.2d 419 (1967); State v. McKeough, Me., 300 A.2d 755, 757, n. 4 (1973); State v. Dematteo, Me., 308 A.2d 579, 580 (1973). See also State v. Gordon, Me., 321 A.2d 352, 357-58 (1974). We conclude that the Maine Criminal Code, in its structural arrangement of separate sections defining the crime of theft by the various and diversified manners in which the crime can be committed, did not purport to displace the common law concept of trespassory taking. To the contrary, it expressly adopted the same by its reference inclusion incorporated in section 353 and, thus, by so doing, must be viewed as importing into the structural scheme of treatment respecting the crime of theft some overlap of the several sections. We do note that the Code does not address the concept of exclusivity of the several definitional provisions and also notice that violation of either section 353 or 354 subjects one to the same punishment. The evidence in the instant case would have supported a conviction for theft by deception, since the defendant obtained the wood splitters by deceitful means in creating in the owners a false impression that the promise to return them as agreed would be fulfilled while at the time he did not intend to perform; but, because the acquisition of another's property by deceitful means is unlawful, it also constitutes an unlawful taking, and, thus, no fatal variance exists between a charge of theft by unlawful taking and proof of the charge by evidence of taking through deceitful means with the concomitant intention of depriving the owner of his property. See Change v. State, 156 Ga.App. 316, 274 S.E.2d 711 (1980).