Opinion ID: 889885
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burch

Text: ¶ 49 In Burch, we considered whether the district court had authority to impose conditions on Burch's parole. Burch argued that sentencing judges are not generally authorized to impose parole conditions in the absence of express statutory authority. Burch, ¶ 16. The State, however, argued that conditions on parole are lawful because parole is statutorily defined as the release to the community of a prisoner . . . prior to the expiration of the prisoner's term. Section 46-23-1001(3), MCA. In other words, the State reasoned that because the term of parole is within the sentence originally imposed by the sentencing judge, the judge has the authority to impose parole conditions on a defendant who the judge has sentenced. The State cited § 46-18-202(1), MCA, as the statutory basis for the judge to impose such conditions. Burch, ¶¶ 17-18. ¶ 50 We rejected this reasoning. We began with the well-established rule that district courts do not have the power to impose a sentence unless authorized by a specific grant of statutory authority. Burch, ¶ 23. We then analyzed the language of § 46-18-202(1), MCA, and observed that this provision gives sentencing judges the statutory authority to impose the restrictions and conditions listed in subsections (1)(a) through (f) of the statute, `on the sentence provided for in XX-XX-XXX. . . .' In other words, the sentencing authority of sentencing judges is constrained and defined by § 46-18-201, MCA. Burch, ¶ 24 (ellipsis in original, emphasis added, citation omitted). We therefore turned to the language of § 46-18-201, MCA. We observed that this provision lists the types of sentence that may be imposed and gives sentencing judges authority to defer imposition of sentence, to suspend execution of sentence, to impose reasonable restrictions or conditions on the period of deferment or suspension, to impose restitution, and to suspend driving privileges. But we further observed that not a single subsection of this statute authorizes a sentencing judge to impose conditions on parole. Burch, ¶ 25. ¶ 51 We accordingly rejected the State's theory that § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, provides a general authority to impose parole conditions. We held that sentencing judges have only the power to impose those parole conditions which are specifically and explicitly authorized by statute. Sentencing judges do not have a residual or inherent authority under Title 46, Chapter 18, Part 2, to generally impose parole conditions. Burch, ¶ 36. Thus, because there was no specific grant of authority for any (except one) of the parole conditions at issue, we held that those conditions could not be imposed on Burch's parole by the district court. Burch, ¶¶ 30-31, 36. We acknowledged this rule and reaffirmed it in State v. Heafner, 2010 MT 87, ¶¶ 5-6, 356 Mont. 128, 231 P.3d 1087. We stated: It is clear that except as to those specific conditions authorized by statute, the District Court did not have the power to impose conditions upon a future parole that might be granted to Heafner. Heafner, ¶ 6 (emphasis added). ¶ 52 Under Burch, then, judges lack authority to impose conditions to be met during parole, and the question here is whether judges have authority to impose conditions to be met before parole will be allowed. There is no language in § 46-18-201 or § 46-18-202(1), MCA, supporting such a distinction between conditions to be met during parole and conditions to be met before parole may be granted. The fact is that neither one of these statutes specifically and explicitly authorizes a judge to impose conditions on parolewhether the conditions are to be met before parole or during parole. [3] ¶ 53 Again, § 46-18-202(1), MCA, cannot provide any greater sentencing authority than is provided for in § 46-18-201, MCA. Burch, ¶ 26. Turning to § 46-18-201, MCA, there is authority for the sentencing judge to impose a term of incarceration, to defer imposition of sentence, to suspend execution of sentence, to impose reasonable restrictions or conditions on the period of deferment or suspension, to impose restitution, and to suspend driving privileges. But there is no authority anywhere in the statute for the judge to grant parole, to restrict parole, or to place conditions on parole or parole eligibility. As a matter of fact, § 46-18-201, MCA, says nothing whatsoever about paroleas we already determined in Burch, ¶¶ 25-26. ¶ 54 While parole may be within (or a part of) a term of incarceration because it occurs prior to the expiration of the prisoner's term (as the State argued in Burch ), this fact did not persuade us in Burch that the judge has authority to place conditions on the parole. Equally so, the fact that parole may be within (or a part of) a term of incarceration does not mean that the judge has authority to place conditions on the prisoner's eligibility for that parole. Sentencing authority must be specifically and explicitly granted; it may not be inferred. Sections 46-18-201 and -202(1), MCA, do not contain a specific and explicit grant of authority to sentencing judges to impose conditions on parole eligibility.