Opinion ID: 1059180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: material proceedings and facts

Text: The appellee, Richard M. Robertson (Robertson), owns approximately 2.78 acres of real estate located on the west side of the Dulles Airport Access Road (DAAR) and south of Idylwood Road in Fairfax County. The property is zoned to the R-3 District, permitting the development of three residential dwelling units per acre. Although the property's lengthy southeastern boundary abuts the DAAR, it is shielded from that roadway by an eight-foot, wooden acoustical fence. Because of the property's configuration, virtually all the parcel lies within 200 feet of the DAAR. Thus, a 200-foot setback restriction set forth in Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance (Zoning Ordinance) § 2-414(1)(A) is applicable and affects the development of Robertson's property. The provisions of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(1)(A) require a minimum distance of 200 feet between all residential buildings and right(s)-of-way of interstate highways and the Dulles Airport Access Road. Pursuant to subsection (3) of that ordinance, [d]eviations from the setback requirement may be permitted with Board of Supervisors' approval of appropriate proffered conditions, if it finds that such deviations will further the intent of the Ordinance, adopted comprehensive plan and other adopted policies. However, the setback requirement shall not apply in those instances where a lot has been recorded prior to the effective date of this Ordinance where the enforcement of this regulation would negate the use of the lot in accordance with the provisions of the zoning district in which located. Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4). Since Robertson's property satisfied the conditions in subsection (4), the parties stipulated that he could develop one single-family dwelling on the property. Robertson, however, wanted to build four single-family dwelling units on his property. Thus, in accordance with the provisions of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(3), Robertson filed a proffered condition amendment application seeking a deviation from the 200-foot setback requirement. The proffers submitted with Robertson's application included, among other things, the use of certain materials and building techniques that would reduce the interior noise level in the four dwellings that he proposed to construct on the subject property. After several hearings before the Fairfax County Planning Commission (the Commission), the Commission denied Robertson's application. [1] One of the commissioners voiced concerns about noise levels in the yards of the homes that would be constructed if the deviation was approved and about traffic data showing an increasing number of vehicles using the DAAR each day. The commissioner also stated that Robertson's right to build one home on the property was a reasonable use of his property and that granting his requested deviation would not enhance the ordinance at issue or the Comprehensive Plan for Fairfax County, Virginia (Comprehensive Plan). The Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County (the Board) subsequently heard Robertson's application and also denied it, adopting the comments at the Commission's hearing. Robertson then filed a second amended bill of complaint against the Board and Fairfax County (collectively, the defendants), seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. In that pleading, Robertson acknowledged that, because most of his property lies within 200 feet of the DAAR, the terms of Zoning Ordinance §§ 2-414(1)(A) and -414(4) limit the development of the property to one dwelling unit. Among other things, Robertson alleged that the Board's denial of his application was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and bore no substantial relation to public health, safety, and welfare. The circuit court sustained a plea in bar and demurrer filed by the defendants in response to the second amended bill of complaint. After that ruling, the only claims remaining in the case were that the action of the Board in denying [Robertson's] application was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and an abuse of discretion; and/or failed to advance a legitimate public purpose and bore no relationship to the public health, safety and welfare; and/or failed to have a rational nexus to any legitimate state interest or public purpose. After hearing evidence relevant to those claims, the circuit court issued an interim letter opinion. The court ruled, sua sponte, that the provisions of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4) do not apply to the subject property and that Robertson, therefore, cannot develop even one dwelling on his property due to the 200-foot setback requirement unless the Board approves a deviation from that requirement. The court believed that the express terms of subsection (4) limit its application to a lot. That term is defined as a parcel of land that is designated at the time of application for a special permit, a special exception, a Building Permit, or Residential/Non-Residential Use Permit, as a tract all of which is to be used, developed or built upon as a unit under single ownership. Zoning Ordinance § 20-300. The court reasoned that, since Robertson's property was not the subject of an application for one of the permits listed in that definition, it was not a lot as that term is defined in Zoning Ordinance § 20-300 and therefore did not come within the purview of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4). [2] After the circuit court made that ruling, the defendants asked the court to reconsider. In support of their motion, the defendants presented testimony from Jane W. Gwinn (Gwinn), Zoning Administrator for Fairfax County, about her interpretation of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4). Gwinn testified that she had consistently construed the provisions of that subsection to mean that, if a lot was recorded prior to August 14, 1978, the effective date of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414, and if application of the 200-foot setback requirement would negate all use of the lot, the lot was grandfathered and the landowner could construct one dwelling on the lot without complying with the 200-foot setback requirement. Since Robertson's property satisfied those conditions, Gwinn indicated that Robertson would have a right to a building permit allowing construction of one single-family dwelling. Gwinn noted, however, that, when a landowner, such as Robertson, wishes to further subdivide a lot, the additional lots would not be recorded prior to the effective date of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414 and the setback requirement would, therefore, be applicable. In that situation, the landowner would need to obtain the Board's approval of a proffered condition amendment and deviation under subsection (3) or apply to the board of zoning appeals for a variance. Gwinn also explained how she applied the definition of the term lot in the context of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4). She testified that, when determining the applicability of subsection (4) to a particular parcel of real estate, the determination is made on the basis that the landowner will be applying for a building permit. In Gwinn's view, that approach brings the parcel within the meaning of the term lot. After hearing this testimony, the circuit court denied the defendants' motion to reconsider. The court's decision on this particular issue led it to evaluate the propriety of the Board's denial of Robertson's application from the perspective that the provisions of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(1)(A) prevented any development of the subject property and that Robertson sought a deviation that would allow him to build four single-family residences on the property. That level of development would result in a density lower than what would have been permissible under the R-3 zoning classification absent the 200-foot setback requirement. The circuit court subsequently issued a letter opinion, in which it initially reiterated its prior ruling regarding the applicability of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4). [3] The court then held that Robertson had met his twin burden of proving his proffered use of the property was reasonable and the Board's rejection of his application was unreasonable. Next, the court considered whether the defendants had produced evidence to establish that the Board's rejection of Robertson's application was fairly debatable. The court concluded that the defendants had failed to do so. In the court's view, the defendants had not provided probative evidence demonstrating that DAAR noise levels at the [p]roperty [were] presently problematic, or that noise levels will be problematic in the future. Thus, the court held that the Board's denial of Robertson's application was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. In a final decree incorporating its letter opinion, the circuit court remanded Robertson's application to the Board for further action consistent with the court's letter opinion. The defendants appeal from that judgment.