Opinion ID: 1670153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy to Commit First-Degree Premeditated Murder

Text: In order to convict Clark of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, the State was required to prove, among other things, that Clark was part of a conspiracy. Under our law, [w]hoever conspires with another to commit a crime and in furtherance of the conspiracy one or more of the parties does some overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy is guilty of conspiracy. Minn.Stat. § 609.175, subd. 2 (2006). To establish a conspiracy, the State must provide evidence that objectively indicates an agreement between the defendant and another to commit the crime. Hatfield, 639 N.W.2d at 376. Generally, when there is evidence of a common plan, concerted conduct, or prior involvement with the alleged co-conspirator, it is reasonable to infer that there was an agreement. Id. at 377. The State's theory of the case at trial was that on the night that Officer Sackett was shot, Reed, along with Clark, followed through with Reed's previously stated desire to kill a police officer. According to the State, Reed, carrying a bolt-action rifle, walked with Clark from Day's apartment to Clark's house, where they stored the rifle. Reed then picked up Trimble and drove her to make the false emergency phone call. Then Reed, along with Trimble, drove to Clark's house to retrieve the rifle, at which point either Reed or Clark or both left Clark's house and carried out the shooting of Officer Sackett. The shooter then returned to Clark's house after which Reed drove Trimble home. According to the State, the evidence supporting Clark's conspiracy conviction includes evidence: [6] (1) that Clark was present at group meetings at which Reed advocated killing a police officer; (2) of Clark's apparent agreement with Reed's statements about killing a police officer, self-defense, and black power; (3) that Clark made statements about black power and self-defense; (4) that Clark had a close relationship with Reed; and (5) that Clark was seen shortly before the shooting walking with Reed, who was carrying a rifle, in the direction of Clark's house and the location of the shooting. The State also argues that evidence of Clark and Reed's involvement in the shooting of a police officer during the Nebraska bank robbery supports the element of intent. Finally, the State argues that the conspiracy conviction is supported by the evidence of the false emergency call summoning police to 867 Hague Avenue two days before the shooting of Officer Sackett at 859 Hague. All of the evidence that the State contends supports Clark's guilt is circumstantial. The question that must be answered is whether this circumstantial evidence when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict points unerringly to Clark's guilt. I conclude that it does not. First, the evidence of Clark's presence at United Black Front meetings, his agreement with Reed's statements about killing a police officer, statements of his own about black power and self-defense, and Clark's close relationship with Reed, standing alone, does nothing more than suggest that Clark is guilty because of his association with Reed. Without more, this evidence is insufficient because mere association with an individual engaged in an illegal enterprise does not make a person a conspirator. United States v. Moss, 591 F.2d 428, 435 (8th Cir.1979). Moreover, this evidence does not point unerringly to Clark's guilt or exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than that of guilt. The strongest evidence against Clark is Harper's testimony that he saw Clark, along with a rifle-carrying Reed, leave Day's apartment walking in the direction of Clark's house and the location of the shooting. The State argues that the inference to be drawn from this evidence is that Reed and Clark were on their way to carry out the shooting. The State further argues that this evidence supports not only an agreement to shoot a police officer, but also action by the two men in furtherance of that agreement, which goes beyond mere association. However, based on other evidence in the record indicating that Reed and Clark had been seen together on a number of occasions with a rifle in their possession without anyone being shot, it is equally possible to infer that Clark did not know of Reed's plan to shoot a police officer that evening. This inference leads to a rational hypothesis other than guilt. Absent a showing that Clark had knowledge of Reed's plan, an agreement to be part of the plan cannot be inferred. Without other evidence that Clark knew of Reed's plan, the fact that Clark was seen in Reed's company shortly before the shooting becomes mere presence. See Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d at 682. That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, while there is evidence of Clark being in Reed's company approximately 15 to 30 minutes before Officer Sackett was shot, it is undisputed that Clark and Reed separated after Harper saw them leaving Day's apartment together and there is no available evidence placing Clark and Reed together again that night. Nor is there evidence placing Clark at or near the scene of the shooting at the time of or after the shooting. Indeed, while Reed, Day, Harper, and Garrett were seen immediately after the shooting near the scene, there is no evidence in the record that Clark was seen after Officer Sackett was shot, either with Reed or near the crime scene. Therefore, it cannot be said that the fact that Reed and Clark were seen together with a rifle the night Officer Sackett was shot leads unerringly to the conclusion that an agreement to conspire existed between Reed and Clark. The State also suggests that Clark's guilt can be inferred from the proximity of Clark's house to 859 Hague, the location where Officer Sackett was shot, and 867 Hague, the location identified to which the police responded as a result of the unfounded call two days before the shooting of Officer Sackett. Other than establishing that Clark lived in close proximity to those locations, the location of Clark's house, without more, sheds no light on Clark's involvement, if any, in Officer Sackett's shooting. Like mere presence, mere proximity to the crime scene is insufficient to support the inference that Clark conspired with Reed and/or others to carry out the shooting. Finally, the State asserts that Reed's and Clark's convictions for the Nebraska bank robbery, which occurred five months after Officer Sackett's shooting and during which an off-duty police officer was shot, evidence Clark's intentional involvement in Officer Sackett's shooting. I will assume for purposes of argument that evidence of the bank robbery was properly admitted as Spreigl evidence. At trial, the State argued that the evidence that Clark and Reed were convicted of shooting with intent to kill, wound, or maim during the bank robbery was necessary to prove Clark was more than merely present at his house with Reed the night of the shooting. The State also argued that the bank robbery evidence was necessary to rebut suggestions that the State's witnesses lied at trial. The State's theory was that Reed and Trimble did not accidentally go from the phone booth to Clark's house the night Officer Sackett was shot and that Clark was not accidentally waiting outside his house when Reed and Trimble arrived. Given that Trimble's uncorroborated accomplice testimony putting Reed and Clark together at Clark's house near the time of the shooting is, as a matter of law, unavailable to support the conviction, the State's assertion that Clark was intentionally present at his house the night of the shooting is not supported by the record. To the extent that part of the State's argument was or is that Reed's and Clark's intent to engage in a conspiracy to shoot Officer Sackett can be inferred from the intentional shooting of the police officer during the bank robbery, that argument fails. The fact that Reed and Clark, during a bank robbery, shot a security guard who happened to be an off-duty police officer after the guard attempted to thwart the robbery does not shed light on any agreement that Clark and Reed may have had five months earlier to shoot Officer Sackett for the purpose of obtaining permission to start a local Black Panther chapter. I therefore conclude that Clark's involvement in the bank robbery does not either by itself or in combination with the other evidence provide sufficient evidentiary support for Clark's conspiracy conviction.