Opinion ID: 3035638
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: washington’s jurisdiction statute

Text: [2] Washington courts apply the service of process statute, rather than the long-arm statute, to determine whether general jurisdiction applies. Rev. Code Wash. § 4.28.080(10). The statute confers general jurisdiction over a corporation that is “doing business” in the state. Crose v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 558 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Wash. 1977). A company is doing business in Washington when it participates continuously and substantially in the state’s markets. Id. at 766. The Washington Supreme Court has no rigid or formulaic test for determining when a company is “doing business” in Washington, and instead conducts a fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis. Id. at 767.2 In Crose and more recent cases, Washington courts have set guideposts to aid our inquiry. Crose involved a products liability lawsuit filed by a Washington resident against Volkswagen, a German corporation, arising from an injury in California. Volkswagen did not sell its products directly to Washington consumers, but only to an Oregon distributor. Despite this attenuated relationship, the Washington Supreme Court held that there was general jurisdiction under 4.28.080(10) because Volkswagen generated substantial revenue from a “well-organized, fully-integrated worldwide chain of distribution.” Id. More recent cases have relied on other factors in finding 2 In broad terms, the Crose analysis looks to five factors, including: (1) the interest of the state in providing a forum for its residents, (2) the ease with which the plaintiff could access another jurisdiction, (3) the amount, kind, and continuity of activities by the defendant in the state, (4) the significance of the economic benefits flowing from the defendant’s in-state activities, and (5) the foreseeability of injury resulting from the use of the defendant’s products. Crose, 558 P.2d at 768; see also Hartley v. American Contract Bridge League, 812 P.2d at 109, 112-13 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). Washington courts regularly consider only the third factor in determining whether to exercise general jurisdiction. Id. at 113. TUAZON v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO 223 substantial and continuous contacts. In Hartley v. American Contract Bridge League, 812 P.2d 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), the defendant’s contacts were deemed continuous and substantial where it sold and transported goods to support bridge tournaments it organized in Washington and collected fees and dues from Washington residents. Id. at 112. The defendant’s contacts also met the standard in Hein v. Taco Bell, 803 P.2d 329 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); the defendant had been registered to do business in Washington for more than twenty years, owned a chain of restaurants, and depended on local markets and government infrastructure to support its business. Id. at 330-31. [3] In contrast, where in-state activity is singular, passive, or collateral to a business’s principal efforts, Washington courts have refused jurisdiction. For example, one court held that a company’s limited efforts to solicit visits to Opryland (Tennessee), commission payments to Washington-based travel brokers, and occasional broadcasts of music were not “continuous and substantial” contacts sufficient to subject the defendant to general jurisdiction in Washington. Banton v. Opryland U.S.A., Inc., 767 P.2d 584, 588-89 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 783 P.2d 78, 82 (Wash. 1989). In Osborne v. Spokane, the court found that deriving revenue from sales in Washington that accounted for less than 1% of the company’s regional revenue was insufficient to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over a Canadian insurance brokerage firm because that revenue was not accompanied by indicia of other systematic and continuous contacts. 738 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 786 P.2d 265, 267 (Wash. 1990). [4] Close cases exist, but this is not one of them. Taken together, Reynolds’ activities are very close to those of the defendants in Hartley and Hein. Unlike the defendants in Banton and Osborne, Reynolds does not attract customers or generate revenue on the basis of limited or passive contacts. 224 TUAZON v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO As in Hartley and Hein, Reynolds does business in Washington with a long-established presence that generates substantial revenue and reaches many in-state consumers. [5] We are not convinced by Reynolds’ argument that its contacts in Washington were “continuous” but not “substantial.” Reynolds has been licensed to do business in Washington for decades, maintains an office and a staff of permanent employees, advertises in purely local media, targets Washington consumers, and derives $145-240 million in annual revenues from sales in Washington. In short, we hold that Reynolds’ activities in Washington constitute “doing business” within the meaning of the Washington service of process statute.