Opinion ID: 2824637
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The RLUIPA Standard

Text: Congress enacted the RLUIPA as a response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause typically does not shield religiously motivated conduct from the burdens of generally applicable laws. 494 U.S. at 878-79. Congress responded three years later by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). In an effort to restore the level of protection that religious observances enjoyed before Smith, the RFRA commanded that “government”—including state and local governments—“shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless such a burden met a “compelling governmental interest” and “least restrictive means” test. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. In Flores, the 5 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 14 Case: 12-11926 Date Filed: 08/05/2015 Page: 15 of 27 Supreme Court declared the RFRA’s application to the States unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. 521 U.S. at 532-36. Mindful of the adage “where there’s a will, there’s a way,” Congress responded to Flores with the RLUIPA, predicating its enactment not only on its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, but also on its Spending and Commerce powers. Less sweeping than the RFRA, the RLUIPA targets only two areas: land-use regulation and institutions that receive federal funds. Borrowing the RFRA standard almost entirely, with respect to its protection of institutionalized persons, the RLUIPA commands that: No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person— (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The Act broadly defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Under the RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove that the challenged law, regulation, or practice substantially burdens his exercise of religion. Once a plaintiff has made this prima facie 15 Case: 12-11926 Date Filed: 08/05/2015 Page: 16 of 27 showing, the defendant bears the burden to prove that the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Id. § 2000cc-2(b); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011). Although the RLUIPA protects, to a substantial degree, the religious observances of institutionalized persons, it does not give courts carte blanche to second guess the reasoned judgments of prison officials. Indeed, while Congress enacted the RLUIPA to address the many “frivolous or arbitrary” barriers impeding institutionalized persons’ religious exercise, it nevertheless anticipated that courts entertaining RLUIPA challenges “would accord ‘due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators.’” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716-17 (2005) (quoting 146 Cong. Rec. 16698, 16699 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy on the RLUIPA)). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[w]e do not read RLUIPA to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety,” and “an accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other significant interests.” Id. at 722. The Court further instructed: We have no cause to believe that RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way, with particular sensitivity to security concerns. While the Act adopts a “compelling governmental interest” standard, context matters in the application of that standard. Lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions. They 16 Case: 12-11926 Date Filed: 08/05/2015 Page: 17 of 27 anticipated that courts would apply the Act’s standard with due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources. Id. at 722-23 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This deference is not, however, unlimited, and “policies grounded on mere speculation, exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to meet the act’s requirements.” Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 533 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).