Opinion ID: 803466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right Against Self-Incrimination

Text: The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. Const. amend. V. The privilege permits a person to refuse to answer questions, in formal or informal proceedings, where the answers might be used to incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984); accord United States v. Jennings, 652 F.3d 290, 303 (2d Cir. 2011). In the supervision context, we have held that a condition requiring polygraph tests for defendants convicted of sex crimes does not violate the right against self-incrimination as long as the supervisee retains the right to challenge in a court of law the use of incriminating statements as violations of his Fifth Amendment rights. See United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 278-80 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc)). As a general matter, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not self-executing. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 425; Jennings, - 12 - 652 F.3d at 303-04. Rather, the privilege must be invoked: an individual must claim the privilege to be protected by it. An individual who makes self-incriminating statements without claiming the privilege is deemed not to have been compelled but to have spoken voluntarily. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429; Jennings, 652 F.3d at 303-04. One exception exists for the so-called 'penalty' cases, where the government compels an individual to forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions 'capable of forcing . . . self-incrimination.' Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977)). Where the government compels an individual to speak by threatening him with a substantial penalty for exercising his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the privilege is selfexecuting. Id. at 434-35. In the supervision context, if a probation or parole officer tells a supervisee, explicitly or implicitly, that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of supervision, the supervisee is deemed to have been compelled - 13 - to speak and his failure to assert the privilege would be excused. Id. at 435 (describing this scenario as the classic penalty situation). The penalty exception does not apply, however, merely because the terms of probation require a probationer to appear before his probation officer and tell the truth in all matters. Id. at 433-39. Rather, a supervisee is deemed to have been compelled to speak only where he is required by the government to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent. Id. at 436. In determining whether a person's incriminating statements were compelled in such a penalty case, we examine the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1640 (2012). In Murphy, the probationer was required by his terms of probation to be truthful with his probation officer in all matters. Id. at 422. He was informed that failure to comply with his conditions of probation could result in his return to the sentencing court for a probation - 14 - revocation hearing. Id. Indeed, Murphy understood that revocation of his probation was threatened if he was untruthful with his probation officer. Id. at 434. Nonetheless, the Court held that the probationer was not compelled to incriminate himself when he admitted to his probation officer that he had committed a rape and murder. Id. at 424, 439. The Court noted that the probationer had not been told that his assertion of the privilege would result in the imposition of a penalty. Id. at 438 (emphasis added). The Court held further that even if the probationer did believe that his probation might be revoked if he claimed the privilege, that belief would not have been reasonable because the state could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. But see Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496-98 (1967) (holding that statements were compelled where defendants were expressly informed that a refusal to answer questions about possible criminal conduct would result in loss of their jobs). In other words, [s]o long as [a] - 15 - probationer has not been told that he would lose his freedom if he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, his answers to his probation officer's questions are not deemed compelled. Jennings, 652 F.3d at 304. On appeal from the district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review its conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Garcia, 339 F.3d 116, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2003).
Here, Ramos's participation in the required polygraph examination is not itself the basis for the claimed constitutional violation. Rather, the question presented is whether the incriminating statements Ramos made during the course of that examination were admissible under the Fifth Amendment. As Ramos did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when he was - 16 - interviewed for the polygraph examination on April 4, 2008,4 that question thus turns on whether his incriminatory statements were compelled as contemplated by Murphy. We conclude they were not. First, Ramos was not told that he would lose his freedom if he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. Jennings, 652 F.3d at 304 (emphasis added); see Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 ([I]f the state, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would [create] the classic penalty situation . . . .) (emphasis added)). Rather, the consent forms he signed warned him only that his failure to fully and truthfully answer all questions put to 4 Although Ramos protested on March 5, 2008, that the imposition of the two new conditions of parole violated his rights, that statement was not sufficient to invoke the privilege. Even liberally construed, in 'the entire context in which the claimant spoke,' the passing remark was too vague and too far removed in time to be considered an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights for his interview on April 4, 2008. Bradley v. Meachum, 918 F.2d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893, 902 (5th Cir. 1972)). At the very least, we cannot say that, when the evidence is taken in the light most favorable to the government, the district court clearly erred in not finding that Ramos asserted his Fifth Amendment rights by objecting on March 5, 2008. See Garcia, 339 F.3d at 118-19. - 17 - him by his parole officer could lead to the initiation of violation proceedings or the revocation of his parole.5 This was precisely the situation faced by the probationer in Murphy, who was told that his failure to be truthful in all matters could result in revocation of probation. 465 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added). Yet, the Court held that the probationer in Murphy was not compelled to speak. Id. at 436-39. Second, there is no evidence that Ramos subjectively felt compelled to answer incriminating questions during the polygraph examination or the ICE agents' later investigation. See id. at 437-38 (concluding there was no Fifth Amendment violation because, among other factors, there was no direct evidence of subjective 5 See Appellant's App. at 35 (Consent for Polygraph Examination: failure to answer questions regarding my conformance to parole . . . conditions, in the discretion of the Parole Office and Polygraph Examiner, may be deemed as a failure to participate in a meaningful way and be submitted . . . as a parole . . . violation); Appellee's App. at 137 (Notice of Polygraph Examination Requirements and Procedures: Failure to fully cooperate and participate in any aspect of the polygraph examination session, including refusal to answer questions during the examination, may be grounds for violations of my parole. (emphasis omitted)). - 18 - compulsion). During the suppression hearing, Ramos was questioned about forms he signed granting the ICE agents consent to search his home on April 4, 2008, and testified: If I did not sign those documents, there was no doubt in my mind that I would go to prison. I would be violated on parole and be sent back to prison. Ramos, however, offered no such testimony regarding his consent to the polygraph examination or to answering the ICE agents' questions. Rather, the record shows that Ramos eventually agreed to participate in the polygraph examination without expressing any reservations, and that he was capable of declining the ICE agents' requests for information as illustrated by his refusal to provide a written statement. Thus, the record does not support a finding of subjective compulsion. Third, Ramos could not have reasonably believed that his parole would be revoked for exercising his Fifth Amendment rights. As explained in the Supreme Court's decision in Murphy, the State of New York could not have constitutionally carried out a threat to revoke Ramos's parole because he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to - 19 - remain silent. See id. at 438. Indeed, the New York courts have held that the State may not punish a parolee for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege by revoking his parole. People v. Dyla, 536 N.Y.S.2d 799, 811-12 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1988) (citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 438-40). We conclude, therefore, that the circumstances of Ramos's polygraph examination on April 4, 2008, did not create a penalty situation such that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination became self-executing. The district court did not err in denying Ramos's motion to suppress his incriminating statements and the physical evidence obtained thereafter.6 6 Ramos also argues on appeal that the searches of his home and seizure of the computers on both April 4, 2008, and November 21, 2008, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. We reject the arguments. First, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Ramos voluntarily consented to the April 4, 2008, search and seizure. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 131 (2d Cir. 2006). Although Ramos testified that he felt compelled to sign the consent forms, he also stated that he was capable of refusing the ICE agents' requests for information. Further, Ramos's claim of compulsion is contradicted by the ICE agents' testimony that Ramos was cooperative during the April 4, 2008, home visit. See Ceraso v. Motiva Enters., LLC, 326 F.3d 303, 316 (2d Cir. 2003) (In reviewing findings for clear error, we are not allowed to second-guess either the trial court's credibility assessments or its choice between permissible - 20 -