Opinion ID: 787920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Christian and Rodriguez's Functions Here

Text: 29 Applying the functional analysis articulated in Antoine and Miller, we conclude that Christian and Rodriguez are not entitled to absolute immunity for their conduct while: (1) investigating parole violations, (2) ordering the issuance of a parole hold and orchestrating Swift's arrest, and (3) recommending the initiation of parole revocation proceedings.
30 Under California's system of parole, a parole agent acts as a law enforcement official when investigating parole violations and executing parole holds. As CDC parole agents, Christian and Rodriguez were peace officers under California law. Cal.Penal Code. § 830.5. Both the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have observed that as peace officers, parole officers perform a law enforcement function. People v. Willis, 28 Cal.4th 22, 40, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 105, 118, 46 P.3d 898, 909 (2002) (quoting Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 443-44, 102 S.Ct. 735, 70 L.Ed.2d 677 (1982)). Thus, parole officers act like police officers when they seek to uncover evidence of illegal activity. Scott, 524 U.S. at 369, 118 S.Ct. 2014; see Willis, 28 Cal.4th at 41, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d at 119, 46 P.3d at 910 (explaining that when CDC parole officers investigate crimes they act like police officers (quoting Scott, 524 U.S. at 369, 118 S.Ct. 2014)). 31 We have held that prosecutors are not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when performing investigatory or administrative functions, or [when] essentially functioning as a police officer or detective. Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028. Given that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity when performing investigatory or law enforcement functions, we hold that parole officers cannot be entitled to absolute immunity when performing the same functions. Therefore, since Christian and Rodriguez were performing a law enforcement function while investigating Swift's alleged parole violations, they are not entitled to absolute immunity for this conduct.
32 In California, the issuance of a parole hold is an act by the parole agent that takes place independently of the parole decisional authority. In re Law, 10 Cal.3d 21, 23 n. 2, 109 Cal.Rptr. 573, 575 n. 2, 513 P.2d 621, 623 n. 2 (1973). The ability to issue a parole hold gives the parole officer the power ... to have the parolee restrained merely by exercising his authority to take the parolee into custody and book him into a local jail. Id. When issuing a parole hold, or authorizing an arrest, a parole agent functions as a police officer. See Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8. Therefore, when Christian and Rodriguez ordered the issuance of a parole hold and arrest independently from the BPT's decision making authority, they performed a law enforcement function and are not entitled to absolute immunity for this conduct. 33
34 An agency official, like a prosecutor, may have broad discretion in deciding whether a proceeding should be brought and what sanctions should be sought[,] and should be able to claim absolute immunity with respect to such acts. Butz, 438 U.S. at 515, 98 S.Ct. 2894. 35 In Miller, we explained that a social worker's decision to institute proceedings to make a child a ward of the state is functionally similar to the prosecutorial institution of a criminal proceeding and is likely entitled to absolute immunity. Miller, 335 F.3d at 898. By contrast, in Scotto, the Second Circuit reasoned that when a parole officer recommends that a senior official initiate parole revocation proceedings, the recommendation is not comparable to initiating a prosecution and is more analogous to a police officer applying for an arrest warrant. Scotto, 143 F.3d at 112-13. The recommending officer is thus only entitled to qualified immunity, while the senior official who makes the discretionary decision to issue the warrant is the one who initiates the revocation prosecution and is absolutely immune. Id. at 113. 5 36 The issue in Scotto turned on an analysis of New York's regulations regarding the Division of Parole. Under the New York regulations, if a parole officer believes that a parolee ... has violated a condition of his parole, `such parole officer shall report such fact to a member of the board or a designated officer.' Id. at 112 (quoting N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 8004.2(a)) (emphasis in original). Once the board receives the report, [t]he member or designated officer may issue a warrant.... N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 8004.2(b) (emphasis added). Thus, while the regulations direct the parole officer to report what he believes to be a violation of a condition of parole, they give the board discretion as to issuing a warrant. The board, therefore, not the officer, plays a quasi-judicial role. 37 The California Code of Regulations establishes an analogous relationship between CDC parole agents and the BPT. The P & CSD shall report to the board any parolee who is reasonably believed to have committed certain enumerated violations. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2616(a) (emphasis added). Once the report is forwarded to the BPT, [t]he board is authorized to revoke parole in any case where the parolee has violated parole. Id. at § 2615 (emphasis added). Like parole officers under the New York regulations, parole officers under the California regulations must report parole violations, while the BPT is given the discretion to initiate the revocation proceedings. 6 See id. (Parole violations ... must be reported to the board.). 38 Swift alleges that Christian and Rodriguez request[ed] an order for a revocation hearing based upon falsified and suppressed evidence. Construing this allegation in the light most favorable to Swift, as we must, this statement parallels the regulations and suggests that Christian and Rodriguez performed a non-discretionary function, while another official made the discretionary prosecutorial decision to issue the order for a revocation hearing. We conclude that, like the parole officer in Scotto, Christian and Rodriguez's actions requesting that the BPT initiate revocation proceedings, were more akin to a police officer seeking an arrest warrant, than to a prosecutor exercising quasi-judicial discretion to initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, Christian and Rodriguez are not entitled to absolute immunity for recommending that the BPT initiate revocation proceedings. 7