Opinion ID: 2603565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: accuracy and scope of definitions

Text: The Department argues that the trial court did not construe executive in its usual and ordinary meaning, but rather improperly substituted Dr. Goldsmith's more limited definition as reflected in finding of fact 3. [2] Group Health argues that this finding is correct when RCW 82.04.431 is taken as a whole. In subsection (1)(b) of that statute executives are coupled with officers. This evinces the Legislature's intent to focus on those in top-level positions having the greatest managerial authority and responsibility. The trial court's adoption of Dr. Goldsmith's definition was proper. Group Health provided sufficient evidence showing that lower-level positions, whether or not executive positions, also meet the statutory requirements. [5] The trial court also properly construed like positions within the public service of the state to compare with executives in various fields of public service. The Legislature could have restricted the comparison to the medical field had the Legislature desired. The term state is not capitalized in the statutory text. When the term state is used in the Rules of Civil Procedure it is all inclusive and embraces not only the State but its political subdivisions. State v. Durham, 87 Wn.2d 206, 211, 550 P.2d 685 (1976); County of Spokane v. Gifford, 9 Wn. App. 541, 513 P.2d 301 (1973). This same construction of the term state by the trial court was appropriate here. The remaining claims were properly decided on summary judgment as neither presented material issues of fact.