Opinion ID: 6319314
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Objectively Reasonable” Analysis

Text: Lennen next argues that the district court erred by relying on (1) the aforementioned findings regarding the Officers’ conduct and (2) “the subjective thoughts, feeling, and beliefs” of the Officers in its determination that the Officers’ actions, under the totality of the circumstances, were “objectively reasonable” and therefore constitutionally permissible. To assess whether force, particularly deadly force, was used in violation of the Fourth Amendment, this court employs two complementary frameworks: Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, and Estate of Larsen, 511 F.3d at 1260. Estate of Larsen provides additional guidance as to the second Graham factor, which is “undoubtedly the most important and fact intensive factor.” Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197, 1216 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, in claiming that the Officers’ actions were not objectively reasonable, Lennen rehashes many of the same arguments discussed in the previous section that are contradicted by the record and the Dashcam Video. For instance, Lennen asserts that the Officers issued only two warnings to Oneyear to “drop the sword,” but the Dashcam Video audio captures the Officers issuing a total of four commands. Dashcam Video, at 2:22–2:28 (“Drop the sword!”; “Drop the sword now, sir!”; “Now!”; and “Drop it!”). Lennen also asserts that Oneyear “was just walking down the street when confronted by the officers and it wasn’t until the officers deliberately stood in and blocked his path that he was coming toward them,” but the Dashcam Video shows that Oneyear was not 19 Appellate Case: 21-8040 Document: 010110651621 Date Filed: 03/02/2022 Page: 20 blocked in and instead rapidly advanced toward Officer Schlager. Compare Aplt. Br. at 23–24, with Dashcam Video, at 2:22–2:30. Applying the Graham and Estate of Larsen factors to the circumstances Oneyear presented, we conclude that the Officers’ conduct was objectively reasonable. Considering the first Graham factor (“the severity of the crime at issue”), Oneyear had previously swung a crowbar at a car driving in the street, which prompted a 911 call. Minutes later, still armed, Oneyear assaulted a clerk at the Loaf ‘N Jug. When Officer Schlager encountered Oneyear on 15th Street, Oneyear rapidly advanced toward him while still armed with a sword. The two reported armed and violent crimes, Oneyear’s posture, his bearing, his single response to Officer Schlager, and the speed of his approach toward Officer Schlager leads to this factor weighing heavily in the Officers’ favor. Considering the second Graham factor (“whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others”), in conjunction with the Estate of Larsen factors, the record shows that (1) the Officers ordered Oneyear four times to drop his sword or stop, and Oneyear never complied; (2) while Oneyear did not raise his sword as if to strike in a downward manner, Oneyear’s continued aggressive advance toward Officer Schlager and his disregard of the Officers’ commands further demonstrated his hostile intent, and the Officers believed he was holding the weapon in such a way that he was ready to use it; (3) when the Officers shot Oneyear, Oneyear was approximately a car length away from Officer Schlager and was within a stride or two of being able to strike Officer Schlager with his sword; and (4) the tone of Oneyear’s verbal statement to 20 Appellate Case: 21-8040 Document: 010110651621 Date Filed: 03/02/2022 Page: 21 Officer Schlager was obstinate, and his manifest actions, demeanor, and body language demonstrated an intent to aggressively and quickly close in on Officer Schlager while refusing to drop his sword. This factor also weighs in the Officers’ favor. Considering the third Graham factor (“whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”), the Officers were not attempting to arrest Oneyear but were trying to conduct an investigatory detention regarding a reported aggravated assault with a weapon. Oneyear fit the description of the suspect, was seen carrying the sword once the Officers arrived on scene, refused commands to stop and drop the sword, and approached the Officers in a manner indicative of a hostile intent. Taken together, the Officers had probable cause to believe that Oneyear posed a threat of serious harm to either the Officers or others. The Graham and Estate of Larsen factors therefore weigh in favor of Officers Schlager and Meyers. But both Lennen and the concurrence assert that even when an officer uses deadly force in response to a clear threat of such force being employed against him, the Graham inquiry does not end there. Aplt. Br. at 21–22; Concurrence, at 3–7. Relying on the danger creation theory rooted in Sevier and reiterated in Allen, the concurrence contends that we should take the additional step of inquiring “whether the officer[’s] own reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such 21 Appellate Case: 21-8040 Document: 010110651621 Date Filed: 03/02/2022 Page: 22 force.”5 Concurrence, at 6–7 (citing Sevier and Allen) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The concurrence reasons that if Officer Schlager knew Oneyear “pos[ed] no imminent threat of harm to the public” yet “confronted Mr. Oneyear head on” without maintaining a safe time, distance, and/or cover, “the foreseeable consequence of his approach should have been obvious: if the suspect did not immediately stop as directed, then Officer Schlager would have to shoot him.” Id. at 3–4. This reliance on Sevier and Allen is misguided. The Supreme Court recently ruled per curiam that the legal principle outlined in Sevier—that an officer’s deliberate and reckless pre-seizure conduct can render a later use of force excessive—was “merely noted in dicta” and “[t]o state the obvious, a decision where the court did not even have jurisdiction cannot clearly establish substantive constitutional law.” City of Tahlequah, Oklahoma v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam). The Supreme Court further implied that any reliance on Allen to determine whether an officer’s conduct “was reckless or that [his] ultimate use of force was unlawful” required factual symmetry. Id. at 12. In Allen, the officers responded to a potential suicide call by sprinting toward a parked car, screaming at the suspect, and attempting to physically wrest a gun from his 5 In support, the concurrence cites a line of cases that rely on Sevier and Allen: Estate of Taylor v. Salt Lake City, 16 F.4th 744, 762 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Sevier, Allen, and Bond v. City of Tahlequah, 981 F.3d 808, 820 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, judgment rev’d, 142 S. Ct. 9 (2021)); Estate of Valverde ex rel. Padilla v. Dodge, 967 F.3d 1049, 1067 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Sevier and Allen but noting that “it is unclear from recent Supreme Court authority where the Court stands on the matter”); and Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1217 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing Sevier and engaging in a factual comparison with Allen to determine if it provided clearly established guidance to an objective officer in a factually similar situation). 22 Appellate Case: 21-8040 Document: 010110651621 Date Filed: 03/02/2022 Page: 23 hands. 119 F.3d, at 841. Here, in contrast, Officer Schlager responded to a call about an armed suspect who had assaulted a store clerk by attempting to engage Oneyear in conversation, retreating once Oneyear rapidly and aggressively advanced toward him while armed, and discharging his weapon only after he issued multiple warnings for Oneyear to drop his sword. Even if we assume that such a legal principle exists, there is no factual symmetry between Allen and the present case, which the concurrence acknowledges. See Concurrence, at 7–8. Finally, Lennen also claims that the district court improperly considered the “subjective thoughts, feelings, and beliefs” of the Officers as part of the “objectively reasonable” analysis. Aplt. Br. at 28–29. Lennen’s only evidence in support of this argument is that the district court used the following language in its opinion: the “[o]fficers reported/suspected (thought, assumed),” “reported/believed,” and “started to say.” Id. at 29. This argument is unpersuasive, as such references went to nothing more than background for what the Officers knew and did not apply to the district court’s “objectively reasonable” analysis. We conclude that the Graham and Estate of Larsen factors weigh in favor of the Officers, and therefore in light of the totality of the circumstances, their conduct was objectively reasonable. As such, Oneyear’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Without a constitutional violation, Lennen fails to meet the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, and we need not address the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis regarding clearly established law or Lennen’s claim that the City is liable for its 23 Appellate Case: 21-8040 Document: 010110651621 Date Filed: 03/02/2022 Page: 24 failure to properly train its officers.6 Because the Officers did not use excessive force and therefore did not violate Oneyear’s constitutional rights, Lennen’s § 1983 claims of excessive force and failure-to-train fail, and the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Officers Schlager and Meyers and the City.