Opinion ID: 787930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Order Enjoining California Action

Text: 24 The district court's order enjoining the California litigation states in relevant part: 25 IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion [to enjoin certain litigation currently pending in the Northern District of California] is granted.... The Delaware action was first filed; the parties are Delaware corporations; the parties conduct business on a national basis, including in Delaware; and the prior California litigation involving some of the patents in issue was filed in 1998, resolved by settlement and was not filed against plaintiffs. 26 Order, slip op. at 1 (emphasis in original omitted). 27 Chiron argues that the district court improperly ignored the Second Standstill Agreement by enjoining the California action, and that this was an error of law that itself requires reversal of the district court's injunction. Chiron also presents several grounds upon which it alleges the district court abused its discretion. First, Chiron alleges that the district court abused its discretion in allowing LabCorp to file an anticipatory declaratory judgment action in an effort to forum shop in abuse of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Second, Chiron argues the district court should have respected an earlier ruling by the Northern District of California that the current California action was related to some prior litigation in that court. Third, Chiron contends that the district court abused its discretion by disregarding the many facts militating in favor of California as the proper forum for handling the parties' dispute, including that California has by far the greatest connection to the events in dispute. Finally, Chiron suggests that the district court erred in its conclusion that LabCorp filed first, even though LabCorp's complaint was filed four hours before Chiron's complaint, because the two actions were filed on the same day and consequently should be treated as filed simultaneously. 28 We agree with LabCorp that Chiron fails to point out a clear error of judgment, error of law, or clearly erroneous factual finding underlying the district court's decision to enjoin the California action. See Int'l Rectifier, 361 F.3d at 1359. Instead, Chiron principally argues that the district court's failure to mention the Second Standstill Agreement was an error of law meriting reversal. Although Chiron relies heavily on LabCorp's alleged breach of the parties' Second Standstill Agreement, the language barring LabCorp from filing any action until five days after the date on which this Agreement terminates is ambiguous at best. It is hard to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in not finding that agreement to be a barrier to the action. Moreover, the alleged breach of the Second Standstill Agreement is more relevant to Chiron's motion to dismiss, stay, or transfer the Delaware action than it is to LabCorp's motion to enjoin the California action. Chiron concedes that the district court should have dismissed the Delaware action if it found a breach of the Second Standstill Agreement. See Appellant's Br. at 12 (The district court should have enforced the standstill agreement by dismissing the Delaware Action....). However, Chiron did not appeal the denial of its motion to dismiss, stay, or transfer the Delaware action. Finally, the fact that the district court did not discuss the Second Standstill Agreement in its order granting the injunction does not necessarily mean it was not considered. 29 As to the remainder of Chiron's arguments — that the district court ignored, inter alia, Northern California's alleged greater connection to the disputed events and an earlier ruling by the California court that the subject of the parties' dispute is related to prior litigation in California — we find no abuse of discretion. The district court addressed these arguments when it found the parties are Delaware corporations; the parties conduct business on a national basis, including in Delaware and the prior California litigation involving some of the patents in issue was filed in 1998, resolved by settlement and was not filed against plaintiffs. Order, slip op. at 1. In none of its arguments does Chiron allege that the district court made clearly erroneous factual findings. Chiron is effectively inviting this court to review the district court's determination de novo and to substitute our judgment for that of the district court, an invitation we decline to accept. District courts are granted broad latitude in managing the cases before them. We decline to find an abuse of discretion when the district court made an informed determination as to how it would manage the litigation pending before it based on sound reasoning and identified facts. See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1357 (Fed.Cir.2001) (observing that [t]rial courts are given broad latitude in managing and scheduling cases and finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of a motion for leave to join a party). 30 After fully considering Chiron's arguments, we find no reason to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in enjoining the parallel California action.