Opinion ID: 2671326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Encourages or Induces

Text: Thum first argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he encouraged or induced Varguez-Rodriguez to reside in the United States, in violation 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). His argument focuses chiefly on the statutory text. Under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), it is a federal crime to “encourage[] or induce[] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.” As we have previously explained, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 codifies “several discrete immigration offenses, including: (1) bringing an alien to the United States; (2) transporting or moving an illegal alien within the United States; (3) harboring or concealing an illegal alien within the United States; and (4) encouraging or inducing an illegal alien to enter [or reside in] the United States.” United States UNITED STATES V. THUM 7 v. Lopez, 484 F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Thum argues that the evidence here—i.e., that he escorted an illegal alien from a restaurant to a van, knowing that the alien would be transported to Northern California—shows, at most, that he aided in the attempted transportation of the alien, which would be covered under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii).2 Thum asserts, however, that there is no evidence suggesting that he did anything to encourage or induce the alien to reside in this country. And he maintains that encouraging or inducing an illegal alien to reside in the United States must mean something other than aiding in the transportation of an illegal alien within this country. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see King, 608 F.3d at 1129, Thum’s argument is persuasive. In Lopez, we explained that each of the immigration offenses codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1324 is “discrete,” and that Congress intended each to “cover different groups of wrongdoers.” Lopez, 484 F.3d at 1190, 1197. As such, we rejected an interpretation of the statute that would elide the distinction between bringing an illegal alien into the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), and transporting an illegal alien within the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). Lopez, 484 F.3d at 1197. Similarly here, under the government’s and the district court’s interpretation of the statute, a defendant who transported an illegal alien within the 2 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) criminalizes “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, transport[ing], or mov[ing] or attempt[ing] to transport or move such alien within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law.” Thum does not concede that the evidence was sufficient to show that he committed any crime. 8 UNITED STATES V. THUM United States would also have encouraged that alien to reside in the United States. This reading of the statute is foreclosed by Lopez, as it would render the statutory ban on transporting illegal aliens within the United States a mere subset of the prohibition on encouraging such aliens to reside in this country. The government counters that its broad reading of “encourages or induces” to “reside” is compelled by the plain language of the statute, and that Thum encouraged VarguezRodriguez to remain in this country by assisting in his attempt to travel north. This argument is unpersuasive. At the outset, we agree with the government, and the Seventh Circuit, that “to encourage” means “to inspire with courage, spirit, or hope . . . to spur on . . . to give help or patronage to.” United States v. He, 245 F.3d 954, 960 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 381 (10th ed. 1996)). Indeed, we have previously equated “encouraged” with “helped.” United States v. Yoshida, 303 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002). But the government’s argument that Thum encouraged Varguez-Rodriguez to reside in the United States merely by escorting him to a van that Thum knew was traveling north clashes with the statutory text. It is axiomatic that “a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also United States v. Lin, 738 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting an interpretation of one statutory provision that “would leave no work to be done by” another). And here, reading “encourages” under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as broadly as the government seeks “would leave no work to be UNITED STATES V. THUM 9 done by” the separate ban on transporting an illegal alien within the United States under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). Lin, 738 F.3d at 1084. We therefore reject the government’s reading of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).3 Our decision in Yoshida, on which the government relies, does not compel a contrary conclusion. In that case, the defendant escorted three aliens onto an airplane and accompanied them from Japan to the United States. Yoshida, 303 F.3d at 1148. We affirmed the defendant’s conviction for both encouraging or inducing the aliens to enter the United States, under§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), and bringing those aliens to the United States, under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at 1149. The government correctly observes that, under Yoshida, the same criminal conduct may violate more than one provision of § 1324 at the same time. Accordingly, if Thum had both assisted in the transportation of an illegal alien within the United States and taken steps to encourage that alien to reside here, Yoshida would permit the revocation of his supervised release under both the “encourages or induces” and the 3 The government argues that Lopez should not apply here because “an encouraging offense and a transportation offense both carry the same maximum penalties and no mandatory minimum penalty,” and therefore “[n]othing would be gained” by interpreting § 1324 “to eliminate any potential overlap between the two offenses.” But, regardless of such practical concerns, we must construe § 1324 in a manner that gives independent effect to each of its provisions. Corley, 556 U.S. at 314. Further, before a district court may revoke a probationer’s supervised release, due process requires that the probationer “receive notice of the specific statute he is charged with violating.” United States v. Havier, 155 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the government proceeded against Thum under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), and not under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). The mere fact that the two distinct crimes may carry the same maximum punishment does not excuse the government’s failure to charge Thum under the proper statutory provision. 10 UNITED STATES V. THUM “transports within” provisions of § 1324. But, as discussed above, Thum took no steps to encourage an illegal alien to reside in this country, and nothing in Yoshida supports the proposition that the “encourages or induces” provision is violated whenever a defendant engages in conduct that may violate the “transports within” provision. Yoshida is therefore inapposite. Rather, as Thum argues, the out-of-circuit decisions in United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133, 135–37 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), provide more useful guidance here. In Ndiaye, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a defendant who enabled an illegal alien to work in the United States without fear of detection by supplying the alien with a Social Security number to which he was not entitled was properly convicted of encouraging the alien to reside here. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d at 1298. Similarly, in Oloyede, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the defendant encouraged illegal aliens to reside in the United States by providing them with false documents for citizenship applications. Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 137. As these cases demonstrate, a defendant “encourages” an illegal alien to “reside” in the United States when the defendant takes some action “to convince the illegal alien to . . . stay in this country,” id., or to facilitate the alien’s ability to live in this country indefinitely, see Ndiaye, 434 F.3d at 1298. In this case, by contrast, the government proffered no evidence showing that Thum did anything to persuade, or even assist, an illegal alien to reside here. Rather, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government merely shows that Thum attempted to help an illegal alien travel within the United States. As discussed UNITED STATES V. THUM 11 above, if merely facilitating the transportation of an illegal alien within this country sufficed to show “encouragement,” then the separate statutory prohibition on “transportation” would be superfluous. As such, the evidence was insufficient to support the district court’s conclusion that Thum violated his supervised release by encouraging an illegal alien to reside in the Untied States.