Opinion ID: 831187
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the superiority of the legislature to make policy decisions

Text: This Court has recognized that the Legislature is the superior institution for creating the public policy of this state: As a general rule, making social policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts. See In re Kurzyniec Estate, 207 Mich.App. 531, 543, 526 N.W.2d 191 (1994). This is especially true when the determination or resolution requires placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another: `The responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as oursof identifying priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between competing alternativesis the Legislature's, not the judiciary's.' O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 524, 542, 273 N.W.2d 829 (1979). [40] The superiority of the Legislature to address matters of public policy is positively correlated with the complexity of the government's role in our society. During the nineteenth century, courts exercising their authority to alter the common law did so within the context of a simpler, agrarian economy. The legislatures of that era exercised a more limited regulatory role. In contrast, today's modern legislatures exercise robust regulation of all facets of our modern, internationalized economy and the rights and responsibilities of citizens. The need for a judiciary responsive to perceived public policy needs of the state has been correspondingly reduced by the development of the Legislature as a full-time institution and its pervasive statutory regulation of our increasingly complex society. This case illustrates why this Court should frequently defer policy-based changes in the common law to the Legislature. When formulating public policy for this state, the Legislature possesses superior tools and means for gathering facts, data, and opinion and assessing the will of the public. [41] The Legislature can hold hearings, gather the opinions of experts, procure studies, and generally provide a forum for all societal factions to present their competing views on a particular question of public policy. The judiciary, by contrast, is designed to accomplish the discrete task of resolving disputes, typically between two parties, each in pursuit of the party's own narrow interests. We are `limited to one set of facts in each lawsuit, which is shaped and limited by arguments from opposing counsel who seek to advance purely private interests.' [42] We do not generally consider the views of nonparties on questions of policy, [43] and we are limited to the record developed by the parties. The reality of our judicial institutional limitations is a significant liability in regard to our ability to make informed decisions when we are asked to create public policy by changing the common law. This case demonstrates these institutional limitations. Defendant openly concedes that the principal impetus for seeking enforcement of parental preinjury waivers is the protection that waivers afford its business in the face of the increasingly litigious nature of society. But for the perceived increased likelihood of a lawsuit and accompanying litigation costs, businesses such as defendant would not need parental preinjury waivers. [44] Accordingly, in seeking to have its waiver enforced, defendant requires a modification of the common law rule and thus necessarily (but only impliedly) asserts that the societal benefits of enforcing the waiversaving defendant litigation costsoutweigh the societal costs of abrogating the common law. Defendant, however, has not provided this Court with anything beyond mere conjecture that this is true. [45] This is a purely policy-driven matter with numerous costs, benefits, and trade-offsnone of which defendant has bothered to raise, much less explicate. Certainly, enforcing the common law would protect minors' contractual and property rights and presumably encourage greater care in preventing negligent injuries to children. These are, without question, admirable societal goals with significant societal benefits that have a long provenance in this state's jurisprudence. Changing the common law would arguably save litigation costs for businesses offering recreational activities for children and concomitantly promote the availability of a wide range of activities for children. These too are admirable societal goals. [46] Of concern, however, are the potential hidden costs that might occur if the common law were changed. For example, if parental preinjury waivers were to be enforced, there would be a possibility that business owners will have diminished incentives to maintain their property appropriately, resulting in an increased number of injuries to children. Moreover, the enforcement of preinjury waivers might result in an increased burden on taxpayers for children whose parents waived their children's right to pursue a tort remedy but cannot afford their necessary medical care. [47] These are but two illustrations of possible unintended consequences that a change in the common law here might occasion. Undoubtedly, there are many others. How are we as jurists to determine whether enforcing or changing the common law rule will result in a net benefit to society? Here we would only be able to make an uneducated guess without even a substantial analysis from the party that requires (but has not asked for) changes in the common law. [48] When engaging in such rank guesswork, the weight of common law authority that has existed for more than a century must be preferred. In accord with Hippocrates' admonition, maintaining the status quo has the significant benefit of doing no greater harm. As stated previously, the Legislature is not similarly constrained to make policy on the basis of blind speculation. Thus, if changing the common law to permit a parent to bind his child to a preinjury waiver is deemed to result in a net societal benefit, the Legislature can determine that fact with reasonable assurance before subjecting the public to such a change. Illustratively, defendant's proffered rationale for a revision of what a majority of justices have concluded is the existing rule is the argument that a parent is presumed to act in his child's best interests and has a fundamental right ... to make decisions pertaining to the care, custody, and control of [that] minor child[ ]. [49] That rationale, however, is not discretely limited to preinjury waivers. Under defendant's proffered analysis, a parent would be able to bind the child in any contract, no matter how detrimental to the child. Thus, defendant's rationale would arguably completely abrogate the common law prohibition of guardians contractually binding their minor wards. As explained, the common law rules regarding minors and limitations on those who would contract on their behalf exist solely for the protection of the minors. [50] As unfortunate as it may be, a parent does not always act in his child's best interests. For example, in Wood v. Truax, [51] the defendant's guardian entered into a mortgage and bond when the defendant was a minor. After the mortgage went into foreclosure, the plaintiff procured a decree for the deficiency against the defendant. However, Wood applied the common law rules to invalidate a judgment against the defendant because the mortgage was entered into when she was a minor and she had done nothing to affirm the contract after reaching adulthood. [52] Similarly, in Tuer v. Niedoliwka, [53] the mother agreed on her infant child's behalf to release the father from all child support obligations in return for $2,000. However, the Court held that a child's right to support from a putative father cannot be contracted away by its mother, and that any release or compromise executed by the mother is invalid to the extent that it purports to affect the rights of the child. [54] Thus, as noted in our caselaw, there have been instances in which a parent did not act in his child's best interests, and it is certainly not unimaginable that such agreements could recur and be enforced in the absence of the common law rule that serves to protect the minor child. As occurred in oral argument on this case, those favoring the modification of the common law rule might reflexively respond to the fact that parents do not always act in the best interests of their children by adding a qualifier to the modification of the common law rule: a parental waiver is binding on the child only if the waiver is in the child's best interests. However, this effort to avoid eviscerating the protection of children now recognized in the common law rule would undoubtedly create as many problems as it would resolve. Certainly, such an approach would create ancillary litigation over whether the parental waiver was in the child's best interests. While society might generally benefit from allowance of parental waivers for minor children, it could reasonably be asked: Is any preinjury waiver that is later asserted against a particular minor ever in the best interests of the injured child? The existing common law is well established, clear, and easy to apply and consistently protects children; it must be preferred over a chaotic, ad hoc alternative.