Opinion ID: 186281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Company's Leaflet

Text: 16 The company's central claim is that the union's certification was invalid because the Board abused its discretion in setting aside the first election. Indeed, the company does not dispute the outcome of the second election, which the union won. Therefore, unless the company prevails in its assertion that the Board improperly set aside the results of the first election, the Board's certification of the union was valid and the company's refusal to bargain with the union violates sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (1). See Gannett Rochester Newspapers v. NLRB, 988 F.2d 198, 203 (D.C.Cir.1993); C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 881-82 (D.C.Cir.1988). 17 Our review of Board decisions is deferential, and we have specifically held that judicial review of a Board decision for a rerun of an election is extremely limited. Timsco Inc. v. NLRB, 819 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C.Cir.1987) (citation omitted). The legal principles governing the sort of conduct here alleged are clear and well-settled: the Board will sustain an objection to a party's statements or conduct during an election when the challenged actions had a reasonable tendency to interfere with employee free choice. See NLRB v. Superior Coatings, Inc., 839 F.2d 1178, 1180 (6th Cir.1988). Further, the Board reasonably finds that employee free choice has been compromised when the election is tainted by conduct or statements that tended to interfere substantially with the ability of the employees to make a free and rational choice in the election. General Dynamics Corp., 250 NLRB 719, 719 (1980) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). See also Macmillan Pub'g. Co., 194 F.3d at 168. 18 In sum, the issue before the Board was whether an employer's threats or statements had a reasonable tendency to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act. S.W. Reg'l. Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 1027, 1031 (D.C.Cir.1970). 19 In our prior review of this case, we found that the Regional Director, whose decision the Board refused to review, did not engage in the required reasoned decisionmaking. We specifically addressed the Regional Director's conclusion that the flyer violated the principle that an employer should act as if a union were not in the picture. Macmillan Pub'g. Co. v. NLRB, 194 F.3d at 168. However, as we held, [t]here is no such principle governing employer communications during election campaigns, and we doubt that there could be in light of the First Amendment. Id. Because of this defect, we found that the Board's decision reflected a classic case of lack of reasoned decisionmaking. Id. (The rationale was the antithesis of reasoned decisionmaking, and as such was arbitrary and capricious.) ( citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)). We hold that this defect has now been cured. 20 The Board correctly found that the company's leaflet, circulated several days before the election, threatened to withhold a promised wage increase if the union won the election, and set aside the results of the first election. The Board then certified the union as the bargaining representative of the unit employees based on the employees' vote in favor of union representation in the second election. If the Board's decision as to the first election was correct, the second follows without challenge. It was correct. 21 The settled law is clear: to state that a previously announced wage increase will probably be lost if a union wins constitutes employer coercion. See Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 324 NLRB 72, 111 (1997), enforced in relevant part, 148 F.3d 1166, 1175 (D.C.Cir.1998). Here, just days after the company announced a ten-percent wage-increase, and just days before the election, the company distributed a campaign flyer that threatened that the increase, amounting to $2,522.00 next year, was WHAT ... YOU HAVE TO LOSE if the Union wins the election. As the Board emphasized, the flyer explicitly states that the promised wage increase will be put in jeopardy if the employees choose the Union. We agree with the Board that this constitutes classic coercive conduct. See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 315 NLRB 882, 892-93 (1994), enforced in relevant part, 96 F.3d 1439 (4th Cir.1996). And petitioner's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. 22 The flyer states that [w]ithout a Union, [the Company] will be free to proceed ahead with the announced wage increases for the [upcoming] move, but [w]ith a union, since all wages and benefits would be subject to negotiation, no one can predict what the final wage package will be. WHY TAKE THE RISK? We agree with the Board's conclusion that the language leaves the clear impression that if the employees choose the union, `what they may ultimately receive depends upon what the union can induce the employer to restore.' As the Board indicated, this is coercive conduct because it sends the clear message that, in the absence of the Union, the Company is willing to grant the raise, but if the Union wins the election, the Company will pay only what the Union can force it to pay. See NLRB v. Saunders Leasing System, Inc., 497 F.2d 453, 457 (8th Cir.1974) (Express threats to bargain from scratch and withdraw benefits during negotiations can carry in themselves their own seeds of coercive threats.); NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 435 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (4th Cir.1970). 23 A promised raise must be awarded even if a union wins an election. See Advo System Inc., 297 NLRB 926, 940 (1990); Arrow Elastic Corp., 230 NLRB 110, 113, enforced, 573 F.2d 702 (1st Cir.1978). Although the union here could legally bargain away the raise, as the Board emphasized, that is not what the leaflet says. We agree with the Board's conclusion that [t]he message of the leaflet is that the Union would have to bargain to get the employees the raise, and this is simply not true. 24 Because we agree with the Board that the company's distribution of the leaflet was objectionable conduct independently sufficient to set aside the election, we do not need to reach the additional allegations of objectionable conduct by the company.