Opinion ID: 2800624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Translation Commentary.

Text: We start with the defendant's claim that the prosecutor strayed into forbidden terrain by commenting on the court interpreter's translation of certain testimony. Under the Jones Act, 48 U.S.C. § 864, judicial proceedings in the District of Puerto Rico must be conducted in English. When a witness testifies in Spanish (as frequently happens), it is the interpreter's translation of that testimony that constitutes the evidence of record. See United States v. Morales-Madera, 352 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003). During direct examination, the prosecutor asked González to describe what transpired after the police arrived at El Trapiche. As her account proceeded, the following exchange occurred: [GONZÁLEZ:] After the strobe lights went on, I noticed the gentleman that was sitting by the bar who then takes a look to his right side, which then would have been the right side. [PROSECUTOR:] Excuse me. The translation. Basically she said he looks to the right where we would be. There was no objection, and direct examination continued. The defendant now calumnizes the prosecutor for unilaterally supplying his own translation. This attack is not without a patina of plausibility: the prosecutor's spontaneous correction of the interpreter may well have constituted error. See -5- United States v. Powell, 771 F.2d 1173, 1175 (8th Cir. 1985) (deeming similar correction improper). If the prosecutor thought that the interpreter had made a mistake, a simple follow-up question was all that was needed to set the record straight. Even assuming that there was an error, however, that error was not so prejudicial as to warrant relief. To prevail under plain error review, the defendant would have to demonstrate that the alleged error likely swayed the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Landry, 631 F.3d 597, 606 (1st Cir. 2011). The defendant cannot make such a showing. The government introduced ample evidence concerning where the defendant was seated in relation to the officers. And shortly after the disputed exchange, González testified without objection that the defendant looked to the right and saw the strobe lights. Given this unchallenged testimony, the prosecutor's editorialization could not conceivably have influenced the verdict. If more were needed — and we doubt that it is — the district court carefully instructed the jury, both near the beginning and near the end of the trial, that statements and objections of counsel are not evidence. Such an instruction can, in appropriate circumstances, allay the potential prejudice that may result from overzealous advocacy. See, e.g., United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1999). In this instance, the court's -6- meticulous instructions were sufficient to palliate any prejudice that might otherwise have flowed from the errant correction. In much the same vein, the defendant takes issue with an objection that the prosecutor made during cross-examination of Serrano. We set the stage: [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Agent Serrano, I believe you testified here this afternoon that what you recall seeing [the defendant] do at the bar was slide this object, this fanny pack, across the bar. In the initial report that you prepared back at the time you investigated the case, you actually wrote that he threw the fanny pack over the bar; correct? [SERRANO:] No. He extended his hand, and he threw — he dropped the fanny pack behind the bar. . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Do you recall telling Agent Torres that while you were there at the location, you noticed a male subject sitting in a bar with a black fanny pack and that you observed that subject later identified as [the defendant] throw the fanny pack to the other side of the bar? Do you recall telling Agent Torres that specific statement? [SERRANO:] I told him that he threw the fanny pack inside the bar with his right hand. [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] So you agree that . . . you told him that the person you saw threw the fanny pack? [PROSECUTOR:] Your Honor, we have an objection here. This is sort of like a translation. In Spanish tiro could be -7- translated dropping in English versus throwing, and in Spanish, tiro could be throwing and dropping. I think here we only have a translation thing basically saying that he tiro, he dropped it, or that he threw it which is what brother counsel wants to make an impeachment. [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Well, Your Honor, we disagree because I think that the witnesses have testified in Spanish, and they did not use the word tiro. They used the word slipped or dropped. [PROSECUTOR:] I'm sorry. He just testified, and he used the word tiro. [COURT:] Did he testify whether the fanny pack was tiro or dropped? He did? [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] That's all I have, Your Honor. Thank you. The defendant concedes that, as a general matter, a prosecutor is allowed to object to the court interpreter's translation and/or defense counsel's attempts at impeachment. He nonetheless asserts that the objection should have been made at sidebar. His rationale is that the prosecutor relied on evidence outside the record (presumably, his understanding of Spanish) to bolster Serrano's credibility and, thus, unfairly interfered with defense counsel's attempt to impeach Serrano. This claim of error arguably fails to satisfy any aspect of the plain error test. We need not run the gamut. For present purposes, it suffices to say that while the prosecutor's objection might more appropriately have been made at sidebar, see United -8- States v. Diaz-Castro, 752 F.3d 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2014), the defendant has identified no case holding that an otherwise appropriate objection to impeachment based on a translation issue must invariably be made in that manner. Whether and when objections should be made at sidebar rather than in open court are matters that, within broad limits, lie peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court. Cf. United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1018 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing district court's broad discretion to control trial proceedings). There was no obvious abuse of that broad discretion here — and errors that are not obvious cannot be plain. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). To cinch matters, the defendant has not shown that the prosecutor's statement had any effect on the outcome of the trial. The prosecutor merely pointed out that there were two ways to translate the word tiro. In and of itself, that was not prejudicial.1 At any rate, the prosecutor's remark was made in the context of a clearly identified objection. Because the court explicitly instructed the jury that objections of counsel were not to be considered as evidence, we can safely presume that the jury 1 The defendant's suggestion that the prosecutor's comment somehow violated the Jones Act, 48 U.S.C. § 864, is untenable. So long as the proceedings are conducted in English (as they were here), an occasional reference to a foreign-language word or phrase by a lawyer or a witness does not offend the Jones Act. -9- did not factor the remark into its decision. See United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 39 (1st Cir. 2007) (Jurors are normally presumed to follow the trial court's instructions.). The defendant has offered no reason to question the force of that presumption here.