Opinion ID: 166199
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Language of the Statutes

Text: 21 Turning to the question of federal jurisdiction under the Copyright Act, we start with the language of the statute. If the statutory language is not ambiguous, and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, our inquiry ends. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). Section 411(a) is the jurisdictional linchpin to copyright infringement actions: 22 no action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute an action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the register of Copyrights. 23 (emphasis added). On its face, § 411 allows an action for infringement to be instituted only when registration has been made in accordance with the Act. Congress amended § 411 on April 27, 2005 by adding the term preregistration or before registration. 3 Congress tasked the Copyright Office with defining which class of copyrights would be eligible for preregistration. Since preregistration was not possible when this suit commenced, the new language does not control the outcome of this appeal. We discuss this amendment in more detail below. 24 The most important step necessary before instituting an infringement action is registering one's copyright. Registration is satisfied by completing the following steps: 25
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30 The plain language of the statute thus requires a series of affirmative steps by both the applicant and the Copyright Office. No language in the Act suggests that registration is accomplished by mere receipt of copyrightable material by the Copyright Office. Instead, the Register of Copyrights must affirmatively determine copyright protection is warranted, § 411, before registration occurs under the Act. 4 And only upon registration or refusal to register is a copyright holder entitled to sue for copyright infringement under § 411. 5 Until those steps are followed and registration is made, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the infringement claim. 31 Our interpretation of the Act is bolstered by other provisions pertaining to the registration process. Section 410(a), for example, provides: 32 When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that . . . the material deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter . . ., the Register shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration. 33 (emphasis added). This language requires the following affirmative acts by the Register—to examin[e], to register, and then to issue the certificate of registration. Nothing in this process suggests that the filing of an application alone would be sufficient to register the work. 34 The language of § 410(b) is similarly instructive: 35 In any case in which the Register of Copyrights determines that . . . the material deposited does not constitute copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid for any other reason, the Register shall refuse registration. . . . 36 This section is the flip side to the requirement that the material be examined before registration. Upon examination, this provision allows the Register either to register the claim or refuse registration—in any event, requiring an affirmative act by the Copyright Office disallowing registration if the Register believes the material is not an original copyrightable work under § 102. 37 Section 408 supports our view that registration is not automatic: 38 the owner of copyright . . . may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708. 39 (emphasis added). This provision, like the others, envisions substantive review of the material by the Register of Copyrights. If it were otherwise, the verb would be `shall obtain' instead of may obtain. Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F.Supp.2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y.2004). 40 A final provision of the Act underscores our view of the statutory scheme. Section 501(b), establishing remedies under the Act, states that [t]he legal or beneficial owner of . . . a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right. (emphasis added). This statutory language clearly instructs that a copyright owner can sue for infringement only after the copyright is registered, or registration is refused. 41 Taken together, these statutory provisions stand for the proposition that registration, or its refusal, requires more than the simple receipt of materials submitted by an author, and does not occur until the Register of Copyrights takes action. 42