Opinion ID: 798357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bishop's Confrontation with Bock Was Protected and the Company's Post-discharge Justifications for His Termination Are Unavailing

Text: The Board found that the Company violated section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by suspending ... Hunter Bishop and later discharging him. Id. at 1. The Board therefore ordered the Company to offer to reinstate Bishop, to compensate him for lost earnings, and to remove any references to the suspension or termination from his file. See id. at 3-4. It is well settled that an employer violates the NLRA by taking an adverse employment action in order to discourage union activity. Ark Las Vegas Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 104 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer, by discrimination in regard to... tenure of employment ... to ... discourage membership in any labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Section 7 guarantees employees the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of... mutual aid or protection. Id. § 157. That right, in turn, is protected by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer `to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [S]ection 7.' Citizens Inv. Servs. Corp., 430 F.3d at 1197 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Courts are to construe section 7 broadly when considering whether activities qualify as protected. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563-70, 98 S.Ct. 2505, 57 L.Ed.2d 428 (1978). The Board found that the Company illegally suspended and discharged Bishop for engaging in protected concerted activities. The Company initially based its suspension and discharge of Bishop on his confrontation with Bock on October 18, 2005. See Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63, at 9. Bishop initiated that confrontation, because he reasonably believed that Bock was about to conduct an investigatory, disciplinary interview with Nako, without allowing her to bring a witness, see id. at 20-21, in violation of her rights under the NLRA, see Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260-64, 95 S.Ct. 959. Furthermore, Nako had signaled to Bishop that she wanted him present during that meeting. See Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63, at 20. The Board thus concluded that Bishop was acting in his capacity as shop steward when he attempted to intervene on Nako's behalf and that, consequently, his conduct was protected. That determination is eminently reasonable and, therefore, it is entitled to our deference. The Company avers that Bishop was not engaged in protected activity when he confronted Bock. The Company argues that Nako may have assented to Bishop's presence, but she did not request it. See id. at 7, 8, 20. The Company points to Board decisions holding that, to be entitled to a union witness in a meeting, an employee must initiate the request for representation. See Appalachian Power Co., 253 NLRB 931, 933-34 (1980), enforced 660 F.2d 488 (4th Cir.1981) (unpublished). The Company additionally argues that Bishop confronted Bock based on his subjective belief that Nako was about to be disciplined. Under Weingarten, an employee is entitled to a witness only if she or he reasonably believes that the investigation will result in discipline. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257 & n. 5, 95 S.Ct. 959. The Company thus contends that Bishop's subjective views could not have satisfied Weingarten 's objective test. The entire premise of the Company's argument is flawed. The argument rests on the unstated and erroneous assumption that the question of whether Bishop was engaged in protected activity is coterminous with the question of whether Nako actually had the right to bring a witness to her meeting with Bock. These two questions are analytically distinct. See Briar Crest Nursing Home, 333 NLRB 935, 947-48 (2001) (finding that an employee engaged in protected concerted activity by accompanying a colleague to a post-strike disciplinary meeting, without expressly finding that the colleague was entitled to have a witness at that meeting). Bishop was engaged in protected activity when he confronted Bock, because he was acting on his reasonable belief that the Company was about to impermissibly discipline a bargaining unit employee. Cf. Hi-Tech Cable Corp., 309 N.L.R.B. 3, 12 (1992) (finding that an employee was engaged in protected activity when he ... honestly and reasonably protested that [a] work assignment contravened an agreement reached in the preliminary stages of grievance resolution (emphasis added)), enforced 25 F.3d 1044 (5th Cir.1994) (unpublished). It does not matter whether Bishop was correct in what he reasonably assumed. See Crown Zellerbach Corp., 284 NLRB 111, 112 (1987) (finding that an employee was engaged in protected concerted activity when he filed [a] grievance... even though as a temporary employee he probably was ineligible to file a grievance). The point here is that when Bishop made repeated demands to represent Nako, he was merely acting as a union steward and a forceful advocate for Nako. Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63, at 9. This was protected activity. The Company next argues that even if Bishop was involved in protected activity when he intervened on Nako's behalf, he forfeited the Act's protections by confronting Bock in an opprobrious manner. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 837, 104 S.Ct. 1505, 79 L.Ed.2d 839 (1984) (An employee may engage in concerted activity in such an abusive manner that he loses the protection of § 7. (citations omitted)); Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.3d 22, 26-29 (D.C.Cir.2011) (discussing when conduct that is otherwise protected falls outside of the Act's protections, because it is opprobrious). We disagree. Whether an employee has crossed that line depends on several factors: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee's outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer's unfair labor practice. Atl. Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814, 816 (1979). The Board followed this framework and found that Bishop's conduct was [not] so egregious as to be considered indefensible. Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63, at 21. This finding is supported by substantial evidence, and the Company's claims to the contrary, see Pet'r's Br. at 34-37, are largely based on statements by discredited witnesses, see Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63, at 9; see also id. at 1 n. 2. The Company also argues that, in finding Bishop's dismissal to be an unfair labor practice, the Board ignored the fact that Bishop was a recidivist offender with a long disciplinary history. This is a specious argument. As the Company knew, Bishop was engaged in union activity on October 18 when he attempted to assist Nako, by asking Bock if he intended to discipline her during a meeting. Substantial evidence in the record confirms that Nako had indicated that she wanted Bishop to accompany her to the meeting. As a union steward, Bishop was fulfilling his union duties toward Nako in seeking to be present during what turned out to be a Weingarten investigative meeting. Id. at 20. The Board found that Bishop's conduct was protected and not opprobrious. The Company disciplined Bishop precisely because he was engaged in protected activity, not because of his alleged past bad behavior. We find no error in the Board's reasoning. The Company next offers two arguments to challenge the Board's decision ordering reinstatement and backpay for Bishop. First, the Company seeks to avoid these remedies by pointing to its postdischarge discovery of predischarge misconduct that it claims would have justified Bishop's termination. Under Board precedent, if an employer establishes that an employee engaged in misconduct for which the employer would have discharged any employee, reinstatement is not ordered and backpay is terminated on the date that the employer first acquired knowledge of the misconduct. Berkshire Farm Ctr., 333 NLRB 367, 367 (2001) (citations omitted). Here, the Company claims that several months after Bishop was fired, Bock discovered that Bishop had failed to satisfy the Company's productivity standard for reporters. See Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63, at 10. The NLRB found that the Company's `discovery' of Bishop's low productivity after his termination is a belatedly discovered pretext for Bishop's discharge. Id. at 21. This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. The Company closely monitored Bishop's story count from May 2002 to May 2004, resulting in warnings and a suspension. Id. Based on Bishop's disciplinary history, the NLRB reasonably rejected as implausible the Company's assertions that it was not monitoring Bishop from May 6, 2004, to October 27, 2005 and that it had no idea of Bishop's productivity during that window. Id. We owe substantial deference to the NLRB's factual inference that, given the circumstances, the Company must have been aware of Bishop's productivity throughout 2004 and 2005. Yet, the Company did not act to discipline Bishop for this alleged low productivity until many months after he had been fired. The Board reasonably concluded that the Company's productivity justification for firing Bishop was pretextual and unavailing. See Citizens Inv. Servs. Corp., 430 F.3d at 1202 (rejecting an employer's proffered affirmative defenses for a disciplinary decision, in part, because there was substantial evidence that they were pretextual). Second, the Company claims that Bishop engaged in postdischarge disloyal conduct that precludes reinstatement and limits his right to backpay. The Company relies heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW ( Jefferson Standard ), 346 U.S. 464, 74 S.Ct. 172, 98 L.Ed. 195 (1953), in which the Court enforced an NLRB decision denying reinstatement to several discharged technicians, see id. at 465, 74 S.Ct. 172. As the Court explained, the technicians in question were discharged solely because, at a critical time in the initiation of the company's television service, they sponsored or distributed 5,000 handbills making a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the quality of the company's product and its business policies, in a manner reasonably calculated to harm the company's reputation and reduce its income. Id. at 471, 74 S.Ct. 172. The Court went on to hold that [t]here is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer. Id. at 472, 74 S.Ct. 172. The Company argues that it had cause to fire Bishop, because his postdischarge conduct was blatantly disloyal to the Company. In support of this claim, the Company points out that Bishop stated at a public event that the Company suffered from organizational and management problems, see Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63, at 9, and that he made other disparaging statements about the Company on his blog, see id. at 9-10. The ALJ found that, even under Jefferson Standard, an employee is entitled to reinstatement and backpay if his or her statements are not maliciously false, i.e., statements made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. Id. at 22 (citing TNT Logistics N. Am., Inc., 347 NLRB 568, 569 (2006)). According to the judge, Bishop's statements were not maliciously false. See id. The Board offered a different rationale to support the judgment that Bishop had not forfeited his reinstatement and backpay. The NLRB held that Jefferson Standard is inapposite. See id. at 2-3. The Board noted that the technicians in Jefferson Standard verbally attacked the television company while they were current employees of that company. See 346 U.S. at 466-68, 74 S.Ct. 172. Bishop, in contrast, verbally attacked the Company after he was unlawfully discharged. See Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63, at 9-10. The Board held that in the latter set of circumstances i.e., where an employer seeks to avoid its obligations based on an employee's postdischarge misconductthe employer has the burden of proving misconduct so flagrant as to render the employee unfit for further service, or a threat to efficiency in the plant. Id. at 2 (quoting O'Daniel Oldsmobile, Inc., 179 NLRB at 405). The Board also overruled the limited number of prior cases in which it had applied principles drawn from Jefferson Standard in evaluating whether postdischarge conduct disqualified unlawfully discharged employees from reinstatement and cut off their right to backpay. Id. (citations omitted). Before this court, the Company objects to the Board's analysis on two levels. First, the Company argues that the Board committed a legal error by adopting O'Daniel Oldsmobile as the governing standard when an employer challenges its remedial obligations based on an employee's postdischarge misconduct. See Pet'r's Br. at 65-69. In effect, the Company argues that the Board impermissibly moved the goalpost by jettisoning Jefferson Standard and resuscitating O'Daniel Oldsmobile. Second, the Company argues that, as a factual matter, the Board misapplied O'Daniel Oldsmobile. See Pet'r's Reply Br. at 19-20. The Company claims that even under O'Daniel Oldsmobile, Bishop is not entitled to reinstatement or backpay. We lack jurisdiction to consider both arguments, however, because the Company never raised them before the Board. Section 10(e) of the NLRA states that [n]o objection that has not been urged before the Board ... shall be considered by an appellate court absent extraordinary circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). And pursuant to section 10(e), a party's failure to present a question to the Boardincluding by failing to file a motion for reconsideration under the Board's regulations, see 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(d)(1) (2011)prevents consideration of the question by the courts. Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 666, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 L.Ed.2d 398 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Spectrum HealthKent Cmty. Campus v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 341, 348 (D.C.Cir.2011). The only argument that the Company advanced before the NLRB regarding Bishop's disloyalty is that Bishop does not qualify for reinstatement or full backpay under Jefferson Standard. That is the only argument that the Company preserved for appeal, and it does not encompass the Company's present objections to the Board's adoption or application of O'Daniel Oldsmobile. The Company points to no extraordinary circumstances justifying its failure to raise and preserve the O'Daniel Oldsmobile arguments. To the contrary, the Company's arguments before this courtthat the NLRB committed a legal error in changing the governing standard and committed a factual error in applying that new standardare precisely the types of claims that the Company was obligated to bring to the Board's attention by filing a motion for reconsideration. Such a motion would have given the Board notice of [the Company's] objection[s] and an opportunity to fix its supposed mistake[s]. W & M Props. of Conn., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1341, 1345 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citations omitted). In the absence of such motion, we are constrained to find that the Company waived these arguments.