Opinion ID: 700696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Law Claims and the Utah Worker's Compensation Statute

Text: 47 The district court concluded, as a matter of law, that Doi's state law claims for (1) failure adequately to train, supervise, or control and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 35-1-60, and dismissed these claims. Utah law bars all claims (other than claims under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act) by employees for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, except those based on certain intentional torts. Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1975) (providing for exception to general exclusivity); see also Lantz v. National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937, 938-40 (Utah App.1989) (defining excepted intentional conduct as actual deliberate intent to injure). 48 Doi attempts to avoid this bar by stating both claims in terms of intentional acts by US West. Appellant's App. at 16 (Doi entitled to damages as a result of US West's willful, malicious or intentional conduct in failing adequately to train, supervise or control Coleman); 18 (US West's own conduct in failing to deal properly with Coleman despite what it knew about his acts of sexual harassment was atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community and so extreme as to be beyond all bounds of decency). Doi has neither alleged nor provided evidence that US West deliberately intended harm or injury to Doi. 49 The Utah Court of Appeals has clearly stated that the scope of the exception to workers' compensation exclusivity is limited to claims that allege a defendant's deliberate intent to bring about injury. Lantz, 775 P.2d at 940, n. 5. Intentional actions, coupled with knowledge that the injurious result was substantially certain to occur, are not sufficient to avoid the bar. Id. at 939-40. Doi argues that this is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's decisions on this issue, and that such an application would violate Doi's state constitutional rights by depriving her of any remedy under either the workers' compensation statute or tort law. Appellant's Reply Br. at 20-21. We disagree on both counts. 50 In Bryan, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the exception for certain intentional torts without defining intentional as clearly as the court of appeals does in Lantz. However, nothing in Bryan conflicts with the decision in Lantz. In fact, the language in Bryan and its application support the decision reached in Lantz. Bryan, in first addressing whether a claim against a co-worker was barred, describes the exception based on an intentional act, but then goes on to justify the exception based on seek[ing] redress from the one intending harm, deterring intentional injury, and serv[ing] no social purpose to allow an employee to intentionally injure another employee. 533 P.2d at 894. The court then went on to apply the exception to Bryan's claim against his employer, stating that he had alleged injurious intentional misconduct which had been going on for some time and was known to his employer. Id. However, the court reasoned, there was no showing that the employer intended the injury or that the injurious act was directed or intended by the employer. Id. at 894-95. Bryan may not bar Doi's claims as clearly as Lantz does. However, Lantz expressly bars Doi's claims because they lack any allegation of US West's intent to injure Doi, and Lantz is a consistent and logical extension of Bryan. 5 51 Doi has not alleged that US West intended that Doi be harmed by its conduct, nor is there any indication that she could do so. Therefore, based on the holding in Lantz, we affirm the decision of the district court that Doi's state common law tort claims are barred by the exclusivity provision of the state workers' compensation statute. 6