Opinion ID: 5128872
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevant Standard of Review

Text: Before we can reach the claim-splitting question, we must resolve a dispute about the applicable standard of review. Framing the main issue in this case as one of claim preclusion, also known as res judicata, Scholz argues that we are bound to review the district court’s motion-to-dismiss decision de novo. See Bell v. Taylor, 827 F.3d 699, 706 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We review de novo a dismissal based on res judicata.”). Instead framing the main issue as one of claim splitting or of dismissal of duplicative litigation, the United States argues we must review only for abuse of discretion. As the United States points out, No. 20-2163 15 In dealing with simultaneous actions on related theories, courts at times express principles of “claim splitting” that are similar to claim pre- clusion, but that do not require a prior judg- ment. A dismissal on this ground has been viewed as a matter of docket management, re- viewed for abuse of discretion, even in decisions that with some exaggeration describe the theory “as an aspect of res judicata.” See 18 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4406 (3d ed.); see also Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 34 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Plaintiffs generally must bring all claims arising out of a common set of facts in a single lawsuit, and federal district courts have discretion to enforce that requirement as necessary ‘to avoid duplicative litigation.’” (citation omitted)). Our Court has also recognized that a district court has “significant latitude” and “broad discretion to dismiss a complaint ‘for reasons of wise judicial administration ... whenever it is duplicative of a parallel action already pending in another federal court.’” McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 888–89 (7th Cir. 2012) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993)). We review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. See id. at 889; Serlin, 3 F.3d at 223. To determine the appropriate standard of review, we must examine whether the district court couched its decision in claim splitting or claim preclusion. The motion to dismiss filed by the government principally asserted that Scholz II “duplicates” Scholz I, and therefore “violates the rule against claim splitting.” Considering this motion, the district court 16 No. 20-2163 likewise framed the issue as whether Scholz II “should be dismissed because it violates the rule against claim splitting.” The court’s “determin[ation] that the entirety of [Scholz’s] complaint is barred by the rule against claim splitting” makes it abundantly clear, then, that the district court reached a claim-splitting, not a claim-preclusion, decision. Thus, appeal from that order calls for us to review only for an abuse of discretion. See McReynolds, 694 F.3d at 888–89; Serlin, 3 F.3d at 223. To be sure, both the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the district court’s eventual dismissal referenced claim preclusion. These references, however, were necessary because, as the district court noted, “claim splitting draws on the law of claim preclusion when determining whether the second lawsuit should be dismissed.” Indeed, the district court correctly observed that “the doctrine of claim splitting is related to, but distinct from, the doctrine of claim preclusion.” See Roumann Consulting Inc. v. Symbiont Constr., Inc., No. 18-C-1551, 2019 WL 3501527, at  (E.D. Wis. Aug. 1, 2019) (citing Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000)). Therefore, the references to and reliance on caselaw concerning claim preclusion did not transform the district court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss on claim-splitting grounds into a decision based on claim preclusion.