Opinion ID: 801836
Heading Depth: 7
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discretion to Revoke and Modify Permit

Text: While we are satisfied that the power to grant permits is sufficiently constrained, we conclude that the discretion DLNR has reserved to revoke a permit, and add to its terms and conditions, is not. Paragraph 18 of the Terms and Conditions provides, “The right-of-entry permit is revocable and terminable at anytime for any reason in the sole and absolute discretion of the Chairperson [of the Board of DLNR].” Further, Paragraph 21 grants DLNR “the right to impose additional[ ] terms and conditions as it deems necessary or appropriate while the right-of-entry is in force.” For purposes of our analysis in this section, we assume that the state’s unencumbered beaches are nonpublic forums. In a nonpublic forum, restrictions on access must be “(1) reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and (2) viewpoint neutral.” Ctr for Bio-ethical Reform, Inc., 455 F.3d at 920 (quoting Brown, 321 F.3d at 1222). [23] The Supreme Court has not expressly held that the viewpoint neutrality requirement includes the prohibition on a licensing authority’s unbridled discretion, but at least two other circuits have expressly so held. See Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Schs., 457 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[V]iewpoint neutrality requires not just that a government refrain from explicit viewpoint discrimination, but also that it provide adequate safeguards to protect against the improper exclusion of viewpoints.”); Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 307 F.3d 566, 579 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e conclude that the prohibition against unbridled discretion is a component of the viewpoint-neutrality requirement.”). We agree with those circuits. KAAHUMANU v. STATE OF HAWAII 6335 The Supreme Court has shaped the unbridled discretion doctrine with the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination in mind. In City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. 750, the Court sustained a facial challenge to a city ordinance conferring unbridled discretion on the mayor to deny an application for the placement of a news rack. Id. at 769-70. In so doing, it tied the prohibition on unbridled discretion to the constitutional requirement of viewpoint neutrality. The Court wrote, [A] law or policy permitting communication in a certain manner for some but not for others raises the specter of . . . viewpoint censorship. This danger is at its zenith when the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the unbridled dis- cretion of a government official. As demonstrated above, we have often and uniformly held that such statutes or policies impose censorship on the public or the press, and hence are unconstitutional, because without standards governing the exercise of discretion, a government official may decide who may speak and who may not based upon the . . . view- point of the speaker. Id. at 763-64; see also Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130 (condemning unbridled discretion in licensing authority as having “the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323 (premising unbridled discretion doctrine on risk that “licensing official . . . will favor or disfavor speech based on its content”). Twelve years later, in Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000), the Court implied that the unbridled discretion doctrine is necessary to protect against viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 235. In Southworth, it examined a university rule regulating the funding or defunding of a student organization by majority vote of the student body. Id. It wrote, “It is unclear to us what protec6336 KAAHUMANU v. STATE OF HAWAII tion, if any, there is for viewpoint neutrality in this part of the process. To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality it would undermine the constitutional protection the program requires. The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same respect as are majority views.” Id. at 235. The decision-maker there was a majority of the student body in a public university, but the Court’s concern for a lack of standards applies no less to a public official with unlimited discretion in administering a permitting scheme. On remand, the Seventh Circuit expressly held that the viewpoint neutrality requirement includes the prohibition on unbridled discretion. See Southworth, 307 F.3d at 579. In these cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that conferring an unbridled discretion on a licensing official creates the danger of self-censorship, as well as a danger of government censorship. A citizen may hesitate to express, or refrain from expressing, his or her viewpoint for fear of adverse government action such as the denial of a permit. See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759 (describing “self-censorship by speakers in order to avoid being denied a license to speak” as risk of unbridled discretion). A standardless discretion also makes it difficult to detect, and protect the public from, unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by the licensing official. See id. at 759 (explaining difficulty of “effectively detecting, reviewing, and correcting” censorship “without standards by which to measure the licensor’s action”); see also Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323 (describing risk that “[a licensing official] will favor or disfavor speech based on its content,” posed by vesting a public official or body with unbridled discretion). [24] “[A] time, place, and manner regulation [must] contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial review.” Id. at 323. Adequate guiding standards are not provided here, given that DLNR may revoke a permit “at anytime.” “for any reason,” KAAHUMANU v. STATE OF HAWAII 6337 and “in the sole and absolute discretion of the Chairperson.” Further, DLNR may add terms and conditions to a permit “as it deems necessary or appropriate.” In some contexts, the phrase “necessary and appropriate” may sufficiently constrain the authority of a permitting official. But here, when read in pari materia with the Chairperson’s discretionary power to revoke a permit, there are insufficient limitations on the official’s authority. See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130 (“[A permit requirement] may not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official.”); see also World Wide Rush, LLC v. City of L.A., 606 F.3d 676, 687 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that “a law cannot condition the free exercise of First Amendment rights on the unbridled discretion of government officials”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Desert Outdoor Adver. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1996)). [25] There is nothing in the record to indicate that either the Chairperson or the DLNR has ever used Paragraphs 18 and 21 to “favor some speakers and suppress others.” Barter Fair, 372 F.3d at 1138. To the contrary, the record indicates that permits for commercial weddings have been issued as a matter of course, and that the discretionary power reserved in Paragraphs 18 and 21 has never been exercised. However, because the potential for the exercise of such power exists, we hold that this discretionary power is inconsistent with the First Amendment.