Opinion ID: 2110897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the Defendant, as the Owner and Lessor of the Premises, Owe a Duty of Care to the Plaintiff?

Text: A. General principles. The elements of a negligence claim include the existence of a duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others, a failure to conform to that standard, proximate cause, and damages. Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Iowa 1995); see also W. Page Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts § 30, at 164 (5th ed.1984). Courts look to legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions, and general legal principles as a source for the existence of a duty. See Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Iowa 1990). Our court has often relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts when determining whether a given defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff and the scope of that duty. Shaw v. Soo Line R.R., 463 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Iowa 1990). Ultimately, though, the existence of a duty is a policy decision, based on the relevant circumstances, that the law should protect a particular person from a particular type of harm. See Larsen v. United Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 300 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Iowa 1981). B. Duty of an Owner/Lessor of Land. It is well established under Iowa law that a possessor of land owes a duty of care to entrants upon the land, including business invitees. [2] The general rule is as follows: The possessor of land is under a duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for business invitees. This duty requires the possessor to use reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of the premises. The duty also requires the possessor to make the area reasonably safe or to give warning of the actual condition and risk involved. Konicek v. Loomis Bros., Inc., 457 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Iowa 1990) (citations omitted). The Restatement (Second) of Torts and our cases define a possessor of land as (a) a person who is in occupation of the land with the intent to control it or (b) a person who has been in occupation of the land with intent to control it, if no other person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control it, or (c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no other person is in possession under clauses (a) and (b). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328E, at 170 (1965) (emphasis added); accord Hoffnagle, 522 N.W.2d at 813; Downs v. A & H Constr. Ltd., 481 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Iowa 1992). As this definition implies, possessor status, and the corresponding duty of due care, turns not on ownership, but on occupation and control of the land. See Hoffnagle, 522 N.W.2d at 813. This conclusion is reflected in the principles of law applicable to an owner who has leased his land to another: In [the] case [of an absentee owner of rental property], the mere fact of ownership is not sufficient to impose liability for premises defect. While ownership includes the right of possession and control, possessory rights may be `loaned' to another, thereby conferring the duty to make the premises safe while simultaneously absolving oneself of responsibility. Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 1988) (quoting Merritt v. Nickelson, 407 Mich. 544, 287 N.W.2d 178, 181 (1980)). Similarly, the Restatement states the following rule with respect to the liability of a lessor: subject to certain exceptions, a lessor of land is not liable to his lessee or to others on the land for physical harm caused by any dangerous condition, whether natural or artificial, which existed when the lessee took possession. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 356, at 240; accord 62 Am.Jur.2d Premises Liability § 13, at 361 (1990) (In the case of injuries to third parties occasioned by the condition or the use of leased premises, it is the general rule that, prima facie, the breach of duty and therefore the liability, is that of the tenant or lessee and not that of the landlord or lessor.). The comment to Restatement section 356 amplifies this rule: [I]t is the general rule that the lessor is not liable to the lessee, or to others on the land, for injuries occurring after the lessee has taken possession, even though such injuries result from a dangerous condition existing at the time of the transfer. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 356 cmt. a, at 240 (emphasis added); accord Wright v. Peterson, 259 Iowa 1239, 1244, 146 N.W.2d 617, 620 (1966). [3] Based on these authorities, it is clear that McCormick's ownership of the grain bin is not sufficient, standing alone, to place a duty on McCormick to business invitees such as Van Essen. Nor does the fact that the allegedly dangerous condition existed when McCormick leased the bin support the imposition of a duty. Therefore, we must find an applicable exception to the general principles discussed above in order to sustain the Van Essens' claim against McCormick. C. Retained control. The Van Essens argue that McCormick exercised a degree of control over the premises that warrants its continued responsibility for dangerous conditions on the land. They are on solid ground in arguing that retained control is an exception to the rule of nonliability of an owner/lessor. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 360, at 250; Stupka v. Scheidel, 244 Iowa 442, 447, 56 N.W.2d 874, 877 (1953) (holding that rule of nonliability of landlord does not apply where the owner retains control, or the owner and tenant have joint control, over the premises or the part thereof where the injury occurs). The crucial question is whether the Van Essens have shown that McCormick retained control of the bin. See Hoffnagle, 522 N.W.2d at 814 (holding that question of retained control is part of duty issue and is therefore necessarily and properly determined as a matter of law by the court). The Van Essens rely on three facts, in addition to McCormick's ownership of the bin, to prove control: (1) McCormick had a contractual obligation to insure the bin; (2) McCormick agreed in the lease to pay one-half of the cost of repairs; and (3) rent due McCormick was based on an equal share of the proceeds generated by the Coop's storage of grain in the bin. There are other facts, however, that more directly reflect McCormick's actual control of the bin. The lease agreement specifically stated that the Coop had inspected the bin and was leasing it without requiring McCormick to perform any repairs. In addition, all repairs and maintenance to the bin were initiated and directed by the Coop. It is also undisputed in the record that McCormick had no control over the day-to-day operation of the grain bin. We think the district court correctly concluded that the undisputed facts showed McCormick did not retain significant control over the bin. Its participation in the profits generated by the bin and in the expense of repairs and maintenance is not sufficient to establish that it had the requisite degree of control so as to justify the imposition of a duty to keep the premises safe for business invitees. See Willis v. Snyder, 190 Iowa 248, 250, 180 N.W. 290, 291 (1920) (refusing to hold landlord liable where there was no express agreement to repair and the tenant had full control over the premises). [4] This conclusion is in accord with established public policy. This policy was explained in our Stalter case, in which we discussed [t]he rationale underlying the general rule that one who has transferred ownership and control is no longer held liable. Stalter by Stalter v. Iowa Resources, Inc., 468 N.W.2d 796, 798 (Iowa 1991). [5] In that case we stated that the rationale underlying the rule is that the former owner [or lessor] no longer has control and thus may not enter the property to cure any deficiency, and, he/she cannot control the entry of persons onto the property to provide safeguards for them. Id. We again endorse this rationale and, having found no exception to the general rule applicable, hold that the district court did not err in ruling that McCormick owed no duty to Van Essen. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted to McCormick. See Hoffnagle, 522 N.W.2d at 810 (affirming summary judgment for defendant lessor because lessor did not retain sufficient control ... so as to give rise to a duty); cf. Downs, 481 N.W.2d at 524 (holding as a matter of law that defendant owner owed no duty of care because it had surrendered control to a general contractor without retaining enough control to qualify as a possessor of land). AFFIRMED.