Opinion ID: 754305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel

Text: 12 The government contends that Martinez waived his right to conflict-free counsel. Martinez argues that he did not effectively waive Roark's conflict. In the alternative, he maintains that, even if he did make such a waiver, the district court had a duty to disregard the waiver to protect his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.
13 A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a conflict-free attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir.1995). Trial courts may allow an attorney to proceed despite a conflict if the defendant makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1994). Whether a defendant has made a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883-84, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). In making such a determination, the court must indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights. United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1498 (9th Cir.1987) (citation omitted). 14 In Garcia v. Bunnell, the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal defendant waived his attorney's conflict where the record showed 15 a defendant who was well aware of his interests, his right to an unbiased counsel, his right to seek outside legal advice, and his right to discuss with the court any dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel.... [A]fter the court explicitly discussed with him the possible conflict, [he] was articulate and forthright in declaring his desire to proceed with [his attorney]. 16 Garcia, 33 F.3d at 1197. Here, the district court informed Martinez that he was entitled to a conflict-free attorney, that he could receive outside legal advice about waiving the conflict, and that he could ask questions. Martinez stated that he wished to retain Roark despite the conflict. It appears that Martinez understood the court and was not coerced. We find that Martinez's waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel was valid and that it applied to all conflicts foreseeable at the time of the hearing, including the possibility that Martinez could be called to testify against Cervantes. A properly advised criminal defendant is not free to intelligently and knowingly make or approve of a tactical choice and then later abandon it when it seems convenient. Martinez waived Roark's conflict. 17
18 Martinez argues that the district court had a duty to disregard his waiver. It is true that, having previously represented Cervantes with regard to the same matter, Roark should not have represented Martinez. However, we do not find that the district court was obligated to override Martinez's waiver. 19 In Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant's presumptive right to his counsel of choice may be overcome by the district court's independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. Id. at 160, 108 S.Ct. at 1698. The Court noted that the decision to override a criminal defendant's waiver of a conflict must be left primarily to the informed judgment of the trial court. Id. at 164, 108 S.Ct. at 1700. 20 In the instant case, instead of contesting the district court's discretion to ignore a waiver, Martinez claims that the district court abused its discretion by not ignoring his waiver. Although we have not yet specified when a district court must override a defendant's waiver, the Second Circuit has held that an actual conflict that is so egregious that no rational defendant would knowingly and voluntarily desire the attorney's representation cannot be waived. United States v. Lussier, 71 F.3d 456, 461 (2d Cir.1995). The relevant question in this case is whether Roark's conflict was so severe as to be non-waivable. Martinez argues that, once he was called to testify against Cervantes, Roark could not give him any advice at all, which should have compelled the court to ignore his waiver. We disagree. 21 A defendant who claims a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel for the first time on appeal must demonstrate that an actual conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance. United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). The defendant is not required to show prejudice. See Mett, 65 F.3d at 1534. Here, Martinez has not shown that Roark's conflict affected his representation at all, adversely or otherwise. From the time of the conflict hearing to the time that Martinez gave false testimony against Cervantes, the district court apparently did not discern any adverse effect on Roark's representation due to his conflict of interest. Furthermore, we see no such effect in hindsight. 22 By contrast, in Wheat, the court ignored the defendant's waiver because of a serious danger that his Sixth Amendment rights would be violated. Here, Martinez has not shown that Roark's conflict had any impact on his representation at all, much less that it threatened to violate his Sixth Amendment rights. Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to override Martinez's waiver.