Opinion ID: 2691597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equal-Protection Considerations

Text: {¶ 38} The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “No State shall    deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause, Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, provides, “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit   .” These two equal-protection provisions are functionally equivalent and require the same analysis. Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 11; State v. Thompson, 95 Ohio St.3d 264, 2002-Ohio-2124, 767 N.E.2d 251, ¶ 11. {¶ 39} The standard of review to be applied is one of rational basis. Pursuant to this level of review, a statute that does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification does not violate equal-protection principles if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Eppley, 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401, at ¶ 15, citing Menefee v. Queen City Metro 12 January Term, 2010 (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d 181; Oliver, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009Ohio-5030, 915 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 9. {¶ 40} Ohio courts grant substantial deference to the legislature when conducting an equal-protection rational-basis review. State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 728 N.E.2d 342. Classifications will be invalidated only if they “ ‘bear no relation to the state’s goals and no ground can be conceived to justify them.’ ” State v. Peoples, 102 Ohio St.3d 460, 2004-Ohio-3923, 812 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Thompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 561, 664 N.E.2d 926. {¶ 41} Appellee asserts, and the appeals court agreed, that “[c]ommitment under R.C. 2945.39 is substantially more restrictive” than under R.C. Chapter 5122. 179 Ohio App.3d 584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 64. The court reasoned that R.C. 2945.39 applies only to persons who have been accused of committing serious violent offenses and not to persons who have been convicted of serious violent offenses or to persons who have a history of committing serious violent offenses but are not under indictment. Id. at ¶ 66. The court then held, “R.C. 2945.39 cannot reasonably effectuate the goal of providing more restrictive commitment to those who have committed dangerous crimes.” Id. In addition, the court below saw no reasonable basis for the “more onerous procedures” it perceived for terminating commitment under R.C. 2945.39 than for terminating an ordinary civil commitment under R.C. Chapter 5122. On that basis, the court found an equal-protection violation. Id. at ¶ 67. {¶ 42} Appellee’s arguments that R.C. 2945.39 violates his right to equal protection rely in large part on Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, and Baxstrom v. Herold (1966), 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620. In Jackson, the court held that the involuntary commitment of a defendant under an Indiana statute that amounted to “condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by” statutes applicable to those not charged with offenses deprived the defendant of equal protection. Id. at 729, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435. {¶ 43} In Baxstrom, the court held that the involuntary commitment under a New York statute of a mentally ill person who had completed his criminal sentence violated equal protection because the person did not receive the benefit of a judicial hearing to determine whether he was dangerous, a hearing he would have had if he had not been in prison at the time the civil commitment proceeding was instituted. Id. at 110. The court stated that there was “no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments.” Id. at 111-112. {¶ 44} The state argues that R.C. 2945.39 does not violate equalprotection rights, because its procedures are justified by the state’s interest in restraining mentally ill persons subject to hospitalization who have committed a serious crime. We agree. {¶ 45} We accept as valid the arguments presented by the state and by the amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio, that a commitment under R.C. 2945.39 and related statutes has many of the same attributes as a commitment under R.C. Chapter 5122, and that the differences between the two are not as substantial as appellee asserts. For example, R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(b) uses the term “mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order” and defines that term exactly as it is defined in R.C. 5122.01(B). See R.C. 2945.37(A)(7). Moreover, R.C. 2945.401(B) states that provisions of R.C. Chapter 5122 “regarding hospitalization or institutionalization shall apply to the extent they are not in conflict with this chapter.” {¶ 46} This court in In re Burton, 11 Ohio St.3d at 150-151, 11 OBR 465, 464 N.E.2d 530, upheld the constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 5122’s standards for involuntary commitments in the face of due-process and equal-protection 14 January Term, 2010 challenges. Certainly, to the extent that R.C. 2945.39 incorporates many of those same standards, it does not violate equal-protection principles. {¶ 47} R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)’s specific requirement that a court must make a threshold finding (by clear and convincing evidence) that the defendant committed the crimes he is charged with before ordering the defendant’s commitment is a requirement not found in R.C. Chapter 5122. But this does not create an equal-protection violation, because the standards for commitment in this regard under R.C. 2945.39 are actually stricter than those under R.C. Chapter 5122. This factor distinguishes this case from Jackson, in which an equalprotection violation was found in part because the accused person in that case was subjected to “a more lenient commitment standard” than was applicable to others. (Emphasis added.) See 406 U.S. at 730, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435. {¶ 48} The state concedes that there are some differences between the procedures by which a person is involuntarily committed through the probate court under R.C. Chapter 5122 and those procedures by which a person is involuntarily committed under R.C. 2945.39, as well as in the respective procedures once the commitment has been ordered. For example, those committed by a probate court are given earlier initial review hearings, compare R.C. 5122.15(C) and (H) with R.C. 2945.401(C); do not face the same level of scrutiny as to public-safety concerns, compare, e.g., R.C. 5122.15(C) with R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) and (D)(1); can more easily have their restrictions within the institution reduced, compare R.C. 5122.20 with R.C. 2945.401(D); and have less stringent procedures for the termination of the commitment, including possible termination of commitment by a chief medical officer pursuant to R.C. Chapter 5122 without the probate court’s approval, compare R.C. 5122.21(A) with R.C. 2945.401(I). {¶ 49} These statutory differences, however, are justified by the differing contexts of the two types of commitments. The fact that the subject of an R.C. 15 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 2945.39 commitment has been found to be a danger to others and also has been found to have committed a violent felony, such as the rape in this case, fundamentally distinguishes an R.C. 2945.39 commitment from one under R.C. Chapter 5122. It is a distinction that may permissibly be taken into account. Public-safety concerns reasonably justify assigning to the common pleas court that entered the commitment order an important role in the committed person’s possible reduction in restrictions and in the determination of whether the commitment should be terminated. Although a person committed under R.C. 2945.39 may have to wait longer to receive an initial review hearing than a person committed under R.C. Chapter 5122, see R.C. 2945.401(C), that difference is not unreasonable, because such a person has already been subjected to the extensive evaluation procedures of R.C. 2945.38. {¶ 50} Even though R.C. 2945.39 concerns only persons who are under indictment and does not include others with a history of committing serious felony offenses who are not under indictment, the General Assembly “could rationally conclude that an individual’s present involvement in the criminaljustice system indicates a greater degree of dangerousness.” 179 Ohio App.3d 584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, at ¶ 88 (Wolff, P.J., dissenting). Moreover, “because those committed under R.C. 2945.39 are particularly prone to commit serious felonies, the legislature could rationally distinguish [such persons from those] persons committed through the probate court for purpose of release procedures.    [S]ociety has a substantial interest in ensuring that those individuals who have been deemed particularly dangerous truly are no longer mentally ill persons subject to hospitalization by court order prior to their release from commitment.” Id. {¶ 51} Upon review, we hold that the procedures in R.C. 2945.39 and its related statutes that are less favorable to the person facing commitment than are the provisions governing a probate court commitment under R.C. Chapter 5122 16 January Term, 2010 are rationally related to legitimate government interests. Consequently, R.C. 2945.39 withstands equal-protection scrutiny, and appellee has not successfully borne his burden of establishing an equal-protection violation. See State v. Bretz (Dec. 30, 1999), 5th Dist. No. CA-98-001, 2000 WL 93739,  9 (holding that an involuntary commitment under R.C. 2945.39 does not violate equal-protection rights). {¶ 52} Because we hold that an involuntary commitment under R.C. 2945.39 does not violate equal protection, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed on this issue also.