Opinion ID: 536159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Heightened Pleading Standard for Bivens Claims Alleging Unconstitutional Motive

Text: 20 In determining the validity of defendant's claim of immunity as a government official, we begin by recognizing the recasting of qualified immunity law in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Prior to Harlow, the prevailing standard contained both objective and subjective elements; thus a federal official's claim of immunity would be defeated if he knew or reasonably should have known  that his actions would violate an individual's constitutional rights, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.... Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1001, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (emphasis in original). The Harlow Court recognized that under the Strickland rule, one of the primary goals of the qualified or good faith immunity doctrine, the termination of meritless claims at the earliest possible stage of a litigation, was frustrated by the discovery required to prove the subjective element. 457 U.S. at 815-16, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-37. Therefore, the Court concluded that bare allegations of malice [would] not suffice to subject government officials to the costs of trials or burdens of broad-ranging discovery. Id. at 817-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. Instead, to overcome the qualified immunity that ordinarily attaches to government officials performing discretionary functions, a plaintiff must show that the defendant violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. The Supreme Court has subsequently described this reasonable person standard as having purged qualified immunity doctrine of its subjective components, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 517, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2810, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), and as having rejected inquiry into state of mind in favor of a wholly objective standard. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3017, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). 21 As we pointed out in Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 186-87 (D.C.Cir.1986), it is by no means clear that the Supreme Court intended this expansive language to preclude any inquiry into subjective motivation. Thus in Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425 (D.C.Cir.1987), we read Halperin as saying that the purely objective standard of inquiry was reserved for the national security context, and that otherwise 22 when the governing precedent identifies the defendant's intent (unrelated to knowledge of the law) as an essential element of plaintiff's constitutional claim, the plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to overcome an asserted immunity with an offer of proof of the defendant's alleged unconstitutional purpose. 23 Id. at 1433 (citations omitted). 24 Having determined that plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to prove such allegations of unconstitutional motive, we now turn to the wholly separate inquiry into the standard of pleading required of plaintiffs in cases involving such allegations. In Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 29-30 (D.C.Cir.1984), we first recognized the danger that plaintiffs might allege facts consistent with lawful conduct and append a claim of unconstitutional motive, thus imposing on officials the very costs and burdens of discovery and possibly trial that Harlow intended to spare them. Id. at 29. We then concluded, in dicta, that in claims of unconstitutional motive, plaintiffs must come forward with some nonconclusory allegations of evidence in order to proceed. Id. 25 In Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197 (D.C.Cir.1986), we adopted the Hobson rationale and held that damage actions against government officials are subjected to a heightened pleading standard, so that bare allegations of improper purpose, like the bare allegations of malice rejected in Harlow, do not suffice to drag officials into the mire of discovery. Id. at 200 (citations omitted). And in Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, the same case in which we recognized the need to allow offers of proof of unconstitutional motive, we nonetheless recognized that such an offer must conform to a higher standard than that generally provided for in the Federal Rules: 26 Where the defendant's subjective intent is an essential component of plaintiff's claim, once defendant has moved for pretrial judgment based on a showing of the objective reasonableness of his actions, then plaintiff, to avert dismissal short of trial, must come forward with something more than inferential or circumstantial support for his allegation of unconstitutional motive. That is, some direct evidence that the officials' actions were improperly motivated must be produced if the case is to proceed to trial. 27 812 F.2d at 1435. 28 Most recently, in Whitacre v. Davey, 890 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir.1989), we considered a Bivens claim alleging age-based discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We found that the complaint, as it alleged an unconstitutional motive, had to include nonconclusory allegations of evidence of such intent in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1171 (internal quotations omitted). If a plaintiff fails to allege direct evidence of unconstitutional intent, his claim must be dismissed immediately. Id. at 1171 n. 4. Thus, Whitacre makes clear that discovery is not to be allowed until plaintiff has alleged the existence of direct evidence of impermissible motive. 29 To summarize the applicable law: Inquiry into subjective intent unrelated to knowledge of the law is permissible where the constitutional violation turns on an unconstitutional motive. Nonetheless, under this court's heightened pleading standard, in order to obtain even limited discovery, such intent must be pleaded with specific, discernible facts or offers of proof that constitute direct as opposed to merely circumstantial evidence of the intent.