Opinion ID: 1447881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Prior-rape Evidence

Text: The parties stipulated that in July 1972 defendant had pleaded guilty to violations of section 261, subdivision (a)(2) (rape by force) and section 245 (assault with a deadly weapon or assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury) against Antoinette R., and that the victim was unavailable to testify at trial. As mentioned earlier, the victim's mother, Marilyn G., testified regarding her daughter's physical appearance before and after the rape. At trial, she identified a photograph of her daughter taken five to seven days after she had undergone reconstructive facial surgery as a result of injuries sustained in the course of the rape. This photograph was admitted into evidence over defendant's objection. (24) Defendant contends the trial court's admission of the photograph was in error, because the photograph was not relevant and was, in any event, more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. Generally, photographs that show the manner in which a victim was wounded are relevant to the determination of malice, aggravation and penalty. ( People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 247 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669]; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 914 [8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712].) Here, the photograph was relevant to the prosecution's penalty phase case under factor (b) of section 190.3, as it tended to show criminal activity by the defendant that involved the use of force or violence. The evidence was particularly relevant to show the extreme violence defendant used on the 14-year-old rape victim. ( People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 568 [250 Cal. Rptr. 530, 758 P.2d 1060].) The trial court properly determined that the fact that the photograph was taken following the victim's reconstructive surgery went to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the photographic evidence. Moreover, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling that the photograph was not substantially more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. The photograph, which we have examined, is not unduly gruesome. ( People v. Milner, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 247; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 666 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].) Although it is true that the photograph itself could not reveal to what extent the victim's facial swelling and discoloration directly resulted from defendant's attack and not from the victim's later surgery necessitated by the attack, defendant's counsel was free to cross-examine the victim's mother on this point, and counsel did suggest to the jury that it should take this uncertainty into consideration. In any event, the victim's mother testified that, after the attack but apparently before the victim's surgery, the victim's mouth and cheekbones were severely swollen, and her right eye was swollen shut. This testimony enabled the jury to evaluate to what extent the photograph in question reflected the trauma of the assault rather than the effects of the surgery. Defendant had originally been charged with a violation of the 1970 version of section 264 (rape with commission of great bodily injury) for his attack on Antoinette R., but this charge was dismissed as part of a plea bargain. Defendant contends that exhibit 31 and all of the testimony given by Marilyn G., the mother of rape victim Antoinette R., were inadmissible because use of the facts underlying the dismissed charge was a breach of the plea bargain and a violation of double jeopardy principles. We have repeatedly rejected virtually identical double jeopardy claims (see, e.g., People v. McDowell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 568; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 756, fn. 17 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]), and we decline to revisit this issue. We have also rejected the argument that the use at a penalty phase of facts underlying a charge dismissed as part of a plea bargain is precluded by the plea bargain agreement ( People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 728-729 [274 Cal. Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215]; see People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 257 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643]), and defendant offers no compelling reason to reconsider the question. Defendant additionally argues that this court's holding in People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 754, that the use of facts underlying a prior conviction as aggravating evidence at a capital case penalty trial is permissible conflicts with People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355 [243 Cal. Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150], in which this court held that the facts underlying a prior conviction could not be relitigated in the context of enhancements under section 667. We have previously rejected a similar contention ( People v. McDowell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 568; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1242-1243 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1]), and decline to reconsider the issue. [8]