Opinion ID: 797525
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Public's Common Law Right To Access Judicial Documents

Text: 53 We have previously noted that, [i]t is well-settled that there exists, in both criminal and civil cases, a common law public right of access to judicial proceedings and records. Goldstein v. Forbes (In re Cendant Corp.), 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir.2001); see also United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir.1981) ([T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.). 19 We review decisions relating to the common law right of access generally for abuse of discretion, though our review of the legal principles applied is plenary. See In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 913 F.2d 89, 92 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir.1986). 54 The public's common law right to access judicial records is not absolute. Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678. Instead, when the right exists, there is a strong presumption that the public may view the records. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir.1986). When parties assert that the need for confidentiality outweighs this strong presumption, we trust trial courts to fairly balance the interests at stake. Here, the government concedes that if a common law right exists, it has failed to justify precluding the court from disclosing the information. Resp. & Reply Br. at 27. Accordingly, the only question before us is whether the public has a common law right to the Orsini records. 55 In general, the common law right attaches to any document that is considered a judicial record, which depends on whether [the] document has been filed with the court, or otherwise somehow incorporated or integrated into a district court's adjudicatory proceedings. Goldstein, 260 F.3d at 192; see also United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir.1984) (The common law right of access is not limited to evidence, but rather encompasses all judicial records and documents. It includes transcripts, evidence, pleadings, and other materials submitted by litigants . . . .) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 56 The government argues, however, that the Orsini records are discovery materials that cannot be subject to the common law right of access. The government notes that discovery traditionally has been conducted by the parties in private and has not been publically available. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984) ([R]estraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir.1985) (holding that the common law right of access . . . extend[s] to bills of particulars because we think them more properly regarded as supplements to the indictment than as the equivalent of civil discovery); United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir.1986) (Discovery, whether civil or criminal, is essentially a private process because the litigants and the courts assume that the sole purpose of discovery is to assist trial preparation.). 57 When discovery materials are filed with the trial court, the private nature of discovery comes into conflict with the public's right to access judicial records. We considered such a situation in Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157 (3d Cir.1993), where a party had attached discovery materials to a motion filed with the court. After discussing the benefits and disadvantages of extending the common law right to such materials, we concluded that there is a presumptive [common law] right to public access to all material filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions, whether these motions are case dispositive or not, but no such right as to discovery motions and their supporting documents. Id. at 165. In other words, documents filed with the court are generally subject to the common law right of access, unless attached to a discovery motion. 58 The government argues that the Orsini records fall within the exception we established in Leucadia because they were filed with a motion for in camera review. According to the government, Brady materials constitute discovery and the motion for in camera review is therefore a discovery motion. The government notes that we have previously referred to materials that must be disclosed as part of the government's constitutional obligations as discovery materials. United States v. Bocra, 623 F.2d 281, 285 (3d Cir.1980); see also In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 913 F.2d at 91 (describing material that was possibly subject to discovery by the defendants under Brady ). And the government is correct that Brady materials are like discovery in that information is shared in preparation for trial through a process that is generally private and does not involve the court. 59 At the same time, obligations under Brady are governed not by rules of procedure but by the Constitution. See United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577, 579 (3d Cir.1977) (The rule of Brady v. Maryland is founded on the constitutional requirement of a fair trial, binding on both state and federal courts. It is not a rule of discovery.). In addition, Brady materials, unlike civil discovery, are turned over by the government to the defense during its prosecution of alleged criminals on behalf of the public. Although we are guided by our reasoning in Leucadia, we believe that the unique nature of Brady materials prevents us from seamlessly applying the discovery-nondiscovery dichotomy that Leucadia established in the civil context. 60 The government has argued that we would cripple the in camera process for potential Brady materials if we hold that the common law right of access attaches to the Orsini records. We acknowledge that the implications of extending the common law right to documents submitted for in camera review are unclear, and this alone should counsel restraint. Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 165. Nevertheless, we believe that under the particular circumstances of this case, the public does have a common law right to access the Orsini records. 61 First, the Orsini documents were filed with the motion for in camera review which clearly establishes them as judicial records. Goldstein, 260 F.3d at 192. Second, the District Court evaluated the potential relevance of the Orsini records and determined that they must be disclosed to the defense as possible impeachment evidence. Public access to judicial determinations provid[es] the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, and promotes the public perception of fairness. Criden, 675 F.2d at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678 ([T]he bright light cast upon the judicial process by public observation diminishes possibilities for injustice, incompetence, perjury, and fraud.); Hotel Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 344 (The court's . . . action on a motion [is a] matter[] which the public has a right to know about and evaluate.). 62 Third, the process by which the government investigates and prosecutes its citizens is an important matter of public concern. See Criden, 675 F.2d at 557 (noting that the public has a vital interest in evaluating the public officials who work in the criminal justice system). This distinguishes Brady materials from traditional civil discovery between private parties. Fourth, there can be little question that the particular documents at issue here are of significant interest to the public. The records concern the conduct of an FBI official who played a prominent role in a highly publicized investigation of a well-known defendant accused of abusing his public office. While the probative value of the documents is open to debate, they are of at least some relevance to Wecht's repeated assertions that Agent Orsini lacks veracity and that his affidavits in support of the search warrants were infected with his deliberate and reckless falsehoods. App. 67. 63 Finally, we believe the records were relevant to Wecht's suppression motion. There is little doubt that Wecht would have cited the Orsini records in his papers had he possessed them at the time he filed his suppression motion. 20 Indeed, the suppression motion discussed Orsini's alleged lack of veracity and previous involve[ment] in improprieties. App. 68. Further, we take McDevitt at his word that he wanted to use the records to impeach Orsini at the suppression hearing, but that he believed the District Court had prohibited him from doing so. 21 In fact, the government was surprised that defense counsel did not cross-examine Orsini with the records, Tr. 114, and it concedes that the documents would be publicly available had they been attached to the suppression motion or used at a public hearing. We think it likely that the District Court would have permitted Wecht to use the records, but even a ruling prohibiting their use would have constituted yet another important judicial decision that the public would have had an interest in evaluating. For these reasons, we conclude that the public has a common law right to access the Orsini records. 64 The government has suggested that allowing public access to Brady documents filed with the trial court for in camera review might result in less production of such material by the government going forward. Because we trust that the government will continue to fulfill its constitutional obligations diligently and with an abundance of caution, we find little merit to this argument. In addition, our decision today is based on the particular facts of this case. We certainly do not suggest that the common law right attaches when district courts determine that the government need not disclose materials. As one of our sister courts of appeals has noted, [g]ranting the public access to . . . undiscoverable documents would furnish it with materials that do not bear on the merits of the trial to which the public has a right of access and would, in effect, give the defendant the discovery to which the court has ruled he is not entitled. United States v. Wolfson, 55 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1995). 65