Opinion ID: 1529516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Olney Pond Matter

Text: DiPrete contends that the trial justice and the commission erred by (1) misapplying § 36-14-5, subsections (a), (d), and (g); and § 36-14-7(a) and § 36-14-6, and (2) imposing fines that were excessive and not supported by the evidence. DiPrete also avers that the trial justice and the commission made several other errors violating the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; however, we need not evaluate those contentions as our analysis under DiPrete's first argument will be dispositive of the Olney Pond matter. We have outlined § 36-14-5(a) and (d), § 36-14-7(a), and § 36-14-6 in our analysis under the bridge matter and need not repeat those texts. Section 36-14-5(g) prohibits a public official or a related party from solicit[ing] or accept[ing] any gift, loan, [or] political contribution    based on any understanding that the    official action    would be influenced thereby. Our analysis begins with the query concerning whether DiPrete took any official action that caused Tutela to be selected for the Olney Pond project. There is adequate evidence supporting the commission's finding of fact that DiPrete designated and selected Tutela. Lippitt testified that he had general conversations with DiPrete and that it was his understanding that DiPrete wanted to make the final selection from the short lists. DiPrete testified that it was his usual practice to indicate his input or my say or recommendation on the short lists. DiPrete testified that Tutela was his personal recommendation for the [Olney Pond project]. He stated that he made his recommendation pursuant to his usual practice involving the short lists. It is DiPrete's position that his role was limited to a recommendation to an expression of opinion to the director of administration who was free to accept or reject it. We believe, as did the trial justice, that this argument is one of semantics and not of substance. Sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the premise that it was DiPrete's action, whether by recommending or by selecting, that caused Tutela to be chosen for the Olney Pond project. In this instance DiPrete failed to avoid official action over a matter that could have represented a potential conflict. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 504 A.2d at 461. Parenthetically we note that by his actions DiPrete violated his own executive order that delegated the authority to select the firm to the director of administration. We do not render any opinion on the ethical consequences of that behavior, but we question whether that action contributed to any appearance of impropriety that may have existed. DiPrete contends that he did not violate §§ 36-14-5(a) or 36-14-7(a) because Tutela was not a business associate and because he took no official action that secured monetary gain for Tutela because Tutela never actually received the project. The statute does not specifically require that a person or entity actually receive the monetary gain or loss. The trial justice noted that this precludes an official from embarking upon an avenue of potential financial gain. DiPrete also ignores the fact that § 36-14-7(a) includes obtaining a financial benefit for oneself as constituting a substantial conflict. The trial justice held that DiPrete was acutely aware that Tutela was a significant contributor to his gubernatorial campaigns. These contributions directly benefited [DiPrete] in the form of providing valuable and essential monies for [DiPrete's] campaigns. The trial justice affirmed the commission's finding that by selecting Tutela, DiPrete had reason to believe or to expect that his official action could lead to direct monetary gain in the form of campaign contributions. Section 36-14-7(a) defines a substantial conflict as one in which the public figure has reason to believe or expect that he or [a related party]    will derive a direct monetary gain [or loss]    by reason of his official activity. (Emphasis added.) We believe the record is devoid of any competent, reliable evidence that DiPrete ever received or had an expectation of receiving any financial remuneration specifically for selecting Tutela for the Olney Pond project. Although we are mindful that the subject of political-campaign contributions places us in a realm that may implicate First Amendment guarantees, we are also aware of the danger in defining a person's reason to believe or a person's expectations differently simply because they are involved in a political climate. We are not adhering to the former proposition but are simply reviewing whether the facts of record are adequate to find a sufficient belief or expectation of monetary gain. Tutela had performed work for the city of Cranston while DiPrete was mayor. Between 1984 and August 1988 Tutela contributed some $20,500 to DiPrete's campaigns for Governor. Tutela testified that he had bid on and received state projects between 1985 and 1987, specifically recalling two such projects. Tutela testified that he stopped contributing to DiPrete's campaign after an article in the Providence Journal linked his political contributions with deferential treatment from the Governor. Tutela believed that his contributions were unfairly harming DiPrete's reputation and his own and therefore decided to prevent any possibility of further harm. Tutela averred that he did bid on and receive state projects after his contributions ceased. A general expectation of receiving political contributions will not fulfill the reason to believe or expect requirement of § 36-14-7(a). More than a blind expectation of monetary gain must be demonstrated. `No politician who knows the identity and business interests of his campaign contributors is ever completely devoid of knowledge as to the inspiration behind the donation. There must be more specific knowledge of a definite official act for which the contributor intends to compensate before an official's action crosses the line    .' United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir.1976). As the trial justice noted, illegal political schemes will rarely be memorialized in formal agreements, but the lack of a smoking gun will not be fatal. We believe that there must be some evidence to suggest that some form of a quid pro quo existed between the contributor and the official regarding the inspiration behind the donation. A tacit understanding between DiPrete and Tutela would have been sufficient. We find no such understanding or agreement in any evidence of record. We note that a tacit understanding need not be shown by direct evidence only but can be proven by sufficient circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Vap, 852 F.2d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir.1988). It appears that the Legislature intended to prohibit conflicts of interest in which political favoritism is clear and unambiguous and situations in which the appearance of impropriety exists even though clear and direct evidence of political favoritism is absent. This court has stated that the appearance of impropriety alone [may be] `simply too slender a reed on which to rest a [decision].' In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 667 (R.I. 1993) (quoting Olivier v. Town of Cumberland, 540 A.2d 23, 27 (R.I. 1988)). The line is a fine one between an altogether `voluntary' payment and the conferring of a benefit on someone who holds a particular public office in    expectation of [a] benefit. United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 783 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829, 103 S.Ct. 66, 74 L.Ed.2d 67 (1982). The evidence of record does not support the proposition that anything more than a blind expectation of monetary gain may or may not have existed. A review of Tutela's campaign-contribution history does not lend credence to the proposition that the contributions represented evidence of any understanding, tacit or otherwise, between DiPrete and Tutela. We believe that the commission and the trial justice erred by adducing that an agreement did exist between DiPrete and Tutela for some form of political favoritism. The record is deficient of reliable, probative evidence to support the proposition that DiPrete had a reasonable belief in or expectation of monetary gain as a result of his selection of Tutela. Consequently, since the record is deficient in establishing sufficient evidence to show that an adequate quid pro quo existed, the trial justice erred in upholding the commission's finding that DiPrete had violated §§ 36-14-5(a) and 36-14-7(a). Additionally, since there was insufficient evidence to show that any understanding or agreement existed, neither can there be a violation of § 36-14-5, subsection (d) or (g). Finally, because there was an insufficient nexus between the possible expectation of monetary gain and the contribution, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that a violation of § 36-14-6 had likewise occurred. DiPrete also contends that the commission members ceased to function as impartial triers of fact. Upon our examination of the transcript we do not believe that the behavior of the commission members rose to a level that jeopardized DiPrete's due-process rights. However, we wish to respond to this argument. We note that the resolution of investigating, inquisitorial, and adjudicative roles in a single administrative body has been a subject of comment by parties to administrative law proceedings. See, e.g., La Petite Auberge, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 284 (R.I. 1980). A hearing officer must be impartial and must not attempt to establish proof to support the position of any party to the controversy. Davis v. Wood, 427 A.2d 332, 337 (R.I. 1981). However, the officer is allowed to interrupt witnesses to clarify the testimony. Id. In reviewing the transcripts, we note that there were many circumstances in which commission members were properly asking questions to clarify responses from witnesses. However, we did note several instances in which commission members made gratuitous comments. These comments, although not jeopardizing the integrity of the proceedings, were superfluous and tasteless. We deem our statement of this response necessary and constructive because the present environment portends a higher frequency of ethics hearings. Commission members should be aware of their important responsibilities as well as their limitations. See generally chapter 35 of title 42 and chapter 14 of title 36. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the petition for certiorari with regard to the Jamestown Bridge matter is denied; the writ heretofore issued is quashed. The petition for certiorari with regard to the Olney Pond matter is granted, and the judgment appealed from is quashed. The papers in this case are remanded to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon. FAY, C.J., did not participate.