Opinion ID: 4154590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Gilmartin argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite criminal intent for his convictions.1 ʺIt is well‐established that a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a heavy burden.ʺ United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 264 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When considering a sufficiency challenge, ʺwe view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences in the governmentʹs favor and deferring to the juryʹs assessments of the witnessesʹ credibility.ʺ Id. A jury verdict must stand as long as ʺany rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 1 For Counts Two, Three, and Four, tax evasion, failure to file a tax return, and failure to pay taxes, the government was required to prove willfulness. See United States v. Josephberg, 562 F.3d 478, 488 (2d Cir. 2009) (tax evasion); United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906, 919 (7th Cir. 2011) (failure to file); United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 239‐40 (3d Cir. 1992) (failure to pay). For Count One, IRS obstruction, the government had to show that Gilmartin acted ʺcorruptly,ʺ or with ʺthe intent to secure an unlawful advantage or benefitʺ for himself or another. United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 218 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83, 121 (2d Cir. 2015)). For Count Five, mail fraud, the government had to prove Gilmartinʹs specific intent to defraud the United States of federal taxes. See United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83, 121 (2d Cir. 2015). 4 crime beyond a reasonable doubt.ʺ Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In the tax fraud context, willfulness is established when the government shows (1) ʺthe law imposed a duty on the defendantʺ; (2) ʺthe defendant knew of [that] dutyʺ; and (3) ʺ[the defendant] voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.ʺ United States v. Klausner, 80 F.3d 55, 62‐63 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991)). Willfulness may be established by circumstantial evidence. Id. at 62‐ 63. We have previously determined that certain facts can support an inference that a defendant willfully violated his duty to obey tax laws, including the defendantʹs prior taxpaying record, United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 1998); educational background, United States v. MacKenzie, 777 F.2d 811, 818 (2d Cir. 1985); and knowledge of previous court rulings against the defendant or others who relied on the defendantʹs theory of tax law, United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Ebner, 782 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1986) (defendantsʹ continued claim of tax‐exempt status after court issued judgment against them ʺwas strong proof to rebut [the] contention that they did not knowingly do anything illegalʺ). The government presented compelling evidence to establish Gilmartinʹs intent to violate the Tax Code, secure an unlawful advantage for himself, and deprive the IRS of taxes owed. The record is replete with evidence of Gilmartinʹs advanced education level, history of filing valid tax returns, and knowledge of case law that rejected his theory of tax liability. In particular, Gilmartin refused to file returns after a 5 New York State appellate court rejected his arguments and dismissed his appeal, which belies the contention that he did not knowingly violate the law. Ebner, 782 F.2d at 1126. Thus, the government provided sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that Gilmartin acted with the requisite intent. Finally, Gilmartin may not rely on his purportedly good‐faith belief that he was not required to pay taxes, as such a defense ʺencompasses misunderstanding of the law, not disagreement with the law.ʺ Schiff, 801 F.2d at 112. Claims regarding the constitutionality of the Tax Code that ʺdo not arise from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of the [code]ʺ are wholly different, do not negate willfulness, and do not provide a defense to criminal prosecution. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205‐06.