Opinion ID: 695501
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Evidence of the Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Cocaine

Text: 18 Rodriguez argues that aside from the testimony of Elizabeth Santos, the government's case against him was based on guilt by association. Rodriguez claims that because of his familial ties to other members of the conspiracy, he was convicted without sufficient evidence linking him to the narcotics distribution ring. The government contends that the evidence linking Rodriguez to the drug distribution ring was overwhelming. After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the prosecution presented the jury with more than sufficient evidence to support Rodriguez's conviction for his role in the Rodriguez-Corral drug alliance. 19 The Seventh Circuit defines a conspiracy as  'a combination or confederation of two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, a criminal act.'  United States v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 669, 684 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 344, 130 L.Ed.2d 300 (1994) (quoting United States v. Gutierrez, 978 F.2d 1463, 1469 (7th Cir.1992)). To prove a conspiracy, the government must establish that  ' there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act, that the defendant was a party to the agreement, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the agreement by one of the co-conspirators.'  United States v. Navarez, 954 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Muehlbauer, 892 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir.1990)) and quoted in United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 1472, 1478 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1614, 123 L.Ed.2d 174 (1993). 20 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence connecting him to a conspiracy on appeal, substantial evidence should be the test rather than slight evidence or slight connection. Johnson, 26 F.3d at 684 (quoting Olson, 978 F.2d at 1479). Direct evidence of the conspiratorial agreement need not be shown, an agreement can be inferred from the circumstances. United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1284 (7th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). Due to the covert nature of a conspiracy, direct evidence is rare and 21 not only is the use of circumstantial evidence permissible, but circumstantial evidence may be the sole support for a conviction.... Circumstantial evidence is not less probative than direct evidence and, in some cases is even more reliable.... The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). 23 In order to convict for conspiring to distribute drugs, there must be facts in evidence in addition to a sale for resale from which proof of a conspiracy to distribute can be inferred. United States v. Baker, 1 F.3d 596, 597 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 412, 126 L.Ed.2d 359 (1993). In determining whether a defendant was a party to the conspiracy at issue, this court has considered the existence of mutual dependence or mutual support among the defendant and members of the conspiracy as evidence suggesting that the defendant did, in fact, join the conspiracy. United States v. Testa, 33 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th Cir.1991)). 24 The evidence of Rodriguez's willing and active participation in the conspiracy begins with Elizabeth Santos, who testified that she witnessed Rodriguez deliver a brown bag containing five ounces of cocaine to Maria Cabello at the video store and leave the store without receiving payment. An individual's participation in drug deals which involve credit transactions such as fronting is strong evidence of membership in a conspiracy. Baker, 1 F.3d at 597. If Rodriguez were not an integral member of the conspiracy, it is inconceivable that he would have entrusted Maria with the cocaine without receiving immediate payment. 10 Rodriguez's fronting of drugs to Maria was significant evidence of his direct participation in the drug conspiracy. 25 Santos also testified about the drug ring's operations based on the one-hundred trips she made to the video store with Ramiro to pick up drugs. She explained that a different member of the conspiracy would act as the holder of each shipment of cocaine, and divide and distribute it to other members of the group. She also described the numerous transactions she witnessed at the video store, where, on each occasion, Maria would front drugs to Ramiro, who would pay Maria later after selling the drugs. Based on the testimony of Elizabeth Santos regarding Rodriguez's role in the drug transaction at the video store and the drug distribution operation as a whole, a rational jury could certainly infer that Rodriguez did not simply deliver drugs to Maria on that single day, but rather that he was an integral part of the larger conspiracy to distribute cocaine. See United States v. Hill, 40 F.3d 164, 166-67 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1385, 131 L.Ed.2d 238, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 2195 (1995) (quoting United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337, 360 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1052, 111 S.Ct. 766, 112 L.Ed.2d 786 (1991)) ([w]hen the trier of fact is a jury, we must 'defer to reasonable inferences drawn by the jury and the weight it gave to the evidence' ). Santos's testimony clearly illustrated the mutual dependence or support among the various members of the alliance. See Testa, 33 F.3d at 750. 26 Rodriguez contends that Santos's testimony was inherently incredible because her view of the transaction at the video store was obscured, and her observations were, therefore, suspect. However, as a Court of Appeals, [w]e will not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Kellum, 42 F.3d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir.1994).  '[T]he credibility of witnesses is peculiarly within the province of the jury and our review of credibility is prohibited absent extraordinary circumstances.'  United States v. Rose, 12 F.3d 1414, 1421 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818, 106 S.Ct. 63, 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985)). It's rather obvious that had the jury not found Santos's testimony to be credible and a reliable witness, they would not have found the defendant guilty. The jury would not have returned a guilty verdict had the jurors found Santos to be an unreliable witness. Rodriguez has not brought to our attention any extraordinary circumstances to justify second-guessing the jury's credibility determinations; accordingly, we refuse to overturn his conviction on this basis. 27 The record contains substantial evidence, aside from Santos's testimony, reflecting Rodriguez's involvement with other members of the conspiracy. Rodriguez attempted to conceal his participation in two separate residential real estate purchases--funded with drug sale proceeds--by placing the titles of the two homes in the names of other members of the conspiracy. In the first of these transactions, Rodriguez and his half brother Gilberto purchased a home on Towle Avenue with two cashier's checks totalling $13,000, but placed the title in the name of Rodriguez's cousin, Victor Arredondo, who never lived in the house and eventually asked that his name be removed from the title. In the second of these transactions, Rodriguez and Luis Corral co-signed the purchase agreement for a house on Pulaski. Rodriguez gave the realtor a $1,000 cash payment of earnest money for this property. The serial numbers on the sixteen bills that made up the earnest money deposit matched the serial numbers on the bills a DEA informant had used earlier that day to purchase drugs from Luis Corral. 11 At the defendant's request, his wife's name was substituted for Corral's on the purchase agreement for the house on Pulaski. Although Rodriguez and his wife actually owned the home, Gilberto and Maria lived there. These two home purchases were further evidence of the mutual dependence or mutual support among the conspirators, including Rodriguez. See Testa, 33 F.3d at 750 (mutual dependence among conspiracy members may support a finding that a particular defendant joined the conspiracy). 28 Other evidence, including physical evidence discovered during the searches conducted at the houses owned by various members of the conspiracy, linked Rodriguez to the alliance. During the search of Rodriguez's house on Pulaski, the DEA discovered cocaine, $7,200 in currency, and a photograph of Gilberto, Luis Corral, the defendant and his wife. During the subsequent search of Rodriguez's residence on 156th Street, the DEA found a DEA notification of seizure form sent to Gilberto pertaining to $7,200 seized from the earlier search of Gilberto's residence on Pulaski, as well as the defendant's briefcase, which contained the search warrant for the house on Sheffield, photographs of that house, and a receipt for property seized during the search of that house. 29 This evidence combined with all the facts and circumstances, when considered as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, leads us to a single conclusion: a rational jury could readily have found that Rodriguez was not only associated with the other conspirators, but actively participated in the cocaine distribution ring. Because the record is replete with concrete examples of the defendant's efforts as an active participant in the drug sales operation as well as in conjunction with others to further the conspiracy's objectives, we uphold his conviction for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine.