Opinion ID: 1437427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Plain Language of the Act

Text: The plain language of the Act readily resolves the central dispute on appeal; a reading of the Act does not result in ambiguity or lead to an unreasonable result. Chrysler Corp. v. Comm'r, 436 F.3d 644, 654 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that legislative intent should be divined first and foremost from the plain language of the statute, and if the text is clear, judicial inquiry is complete). To begin, it is well-established that Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 516). Accordingly, courts have long recognized that criminal prosecution is `an executive function within the exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General.' United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145 F.3d 850, 865 (7th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th Cir.1987)). Congress may delegate these prosecutorial functions to another executive agency or office, see Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 96-97, 66 S.Ct. 438, 90 L.Ed. 552 (1946), but to graft such an exception upon the criminal law ... require[s] a clear and unambiguous expression of the legislative will. United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274, 282, 32 S.Ct. 81, 56 L.Ed. 198 (1911). Turning to the pertinent provisions of the Act, we find absent from the statutory text such a clear and unambiguous expression of the legislative will. Id. The relevant provisions of the Act read as follows: The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to, this Act ... The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1). Except as provided in section 437g(a)(8) of the title, the power of the Commission to initiate civil actions under subsection (a)(6) of this section shall be the exclusive civil remedy for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(e). While both of these provisions reference the civil enforcement powers of the Commission, they are silent with respect to criminal jurisdiction. The fact that Congress chose to vest exclusive civil jurisdiction in the Commission, while including no such analogous provision regarding criminal jurisdiction, suggests that Congress did not intend to attenuate the traditional criminal enforcement powers of the Attorney General. Plaintiffs hinge their argument on sections of the Act setting forth the referral mechanism by which the FEC, upon an affirmative vote, may refer cases to the Attorney General for criminal investigation. This procedure is codified in 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(C) which states: If the Commission by an affirmative vote of 4 of its members, determines that there is probable cause to believe that a knowing and willful violation of this Act ... has occurred or is about to occur, it may refer such apparent violation to the Attorney General of the United States without regard to any limitations set forth in paragraph (4)(A). In interpreting this referral mechanism, the district court determined that nothing in the language addresses, much less restricts, the authority of the Attorney General (or a grand jury) to investigate activities that might constitute criminal violations of the Act. We agree. By its plain terms, this provision concerns only the scope of the FEC's authority. Admittedly, the FEC's decision to make such a referral imposes upon the Attorney General corollary duties of regular monthly reports to the agency until the final disposition of the matter. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(c). Nonetheless, the Act contains no explicit language suggesting that this referral process is the sole avenue through which the Attorney General may initiate criminal prosecutions. Absent a clear and unambiguous expression to situate referrals as the exclusive origin of criminal investigation by the Attorney General, this Court should not and will not read such a meaning into the statute.