Opinion ID: 1278472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inclusion of Overtime Pay in Calculation of Alimony

Text: John's second argument is that the district court's alimony award was excessive. His principal complaint is that the trial court wrongly assumed that John would continue to work significant overtime hours when, in fact, such overtime is unlikely given his age and repeated workplace injuries. Iowa Code section 598.21(3) provides: Upon every judgment of annulment, dissolution or separate maintenance, the court may grant an order requiring support payments to either party for a limited or indefinite length of time after considering all of the following: a. The length of the marriage. b. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties. c. The distribution of property made pursuant to subsection 1. d. The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the time the action is commenced. e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, responsibilities for children under either an award of custody or physical care, and the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate employment. f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of time necessary to achieve this goal. g. The tax consequences to each party. h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties concerning financial or service contributions by one party with the expectation of future reciprocation or compensation by the other party. i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement. j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an individual case. We have never decided whether overtime pay of the obligated spouse should be included in the determination of the amount of alimony. However, in In re Marriage of Brown, we held that when the overtime has been consistent, will be consistent, and is somewhat voluntary and when the overtime pay is not an anomaly or speculative, the noncustodial parent's overtime pay is properly considered in determining the amount of child support due. In re Marriage of Brown, 487 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Iowa 1992). Further, in In re Marriage of Elbert, our court of appeals held the Brown analysis was equally applicable to the calculation of spousal support. In re Marriage of Elbert, 492 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Iowa Ct.App.1992). Several other courts have held that overtime pay may be considered in setting alimony. Christopher Vaeth, Consideration of Obligated Spouse's Earnings from Overtime or Second Job Held in Addition to Regular Full-Time Employment in Alimony or Child Support Awards, 17 A.L.R.5th 143, 164-65 (1994 & Supp.2004); see, e.g., In re Marriage of Vashler, 183 Mont. 444, 600 P.2d 208, 212 (1979); Stuczynski v. Stuczynski, 238 Neb. 368, 471 N.W.2d 122, 126 (1991); In re Marriage of Crump, 138 Or.App. 362, 908 P.2d 839, 843 (1995); Hillberry v. Hillberry, 195 W.Va. 600, 466 S.E.2d 451, 456 (1995). Although John questions whether Brown's analysis should be applied to alimony awards in general, he primarily argues that his overtime should not considered in this particular case because it is speculative and uncertain. See In re Marriage of Brown, 487 N.W.2d at 333 ([I]n circumstances where overtime pay appears to be an anomaly or is uncertain or speculative, a deviation from the child support guidelines may be appropriate.) (citing In re Marriage of Close, 478 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Iowa Ct.App.1991)). As DeAnn's brief correctly notes, the only evidence John has that his continued receipt of overtime pay is uncertain or speculative is his own testimony that I don't think I can physically work that many hours any more.... I'm not sure that with the way my back feels right now, 40 hours is about all I can handle. John did not have any medical restrictions on the hours he could work, and he had continued working overtime after his back injury. The district court apparently did not find John's testimony convincing in view of the other evidence. We give weight to the district court's findings of fact, especially with regard to credibility of witnesses. Geisinger v. Geisinger, 202 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1972). While John's overtime may in fact decrease or cease in the future, the fact is that at the time of trial, he was working overtime, and he presented no evidence that he was unable to continue. Thus, the overtime pay was not uncertain or speculative, and the district court properly considered it in setting the amount of alimony. See In re Marriage of Crump, 908 P.2d at 843 (stating that overtime was properly considered even where husband had health problems and his employer was considering cutting back on the availability of overtime (citation omitted)). As the court of appeals observed, if John stops working overtime, he can apply for a modification. We also reject John's claim that he should not be required to work overtime to meet his spousal support obligation when DeAnn does not work overtime to support herself. An award for spousal support is not a quid pro quo, and the spouse seeking support does not need to work overtime before a court may consider overtime work by the other spouse in fixing the amount of the award. Spousal support is based on all the relevant factors, and there was no evidence in this case that DeAnn's earnings were not commensurate with her earning capacity.