Opinion ID: 2286059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Anti-SLAPP Statute

Text: [¶ 19] In deciding a special motion to dismiss, the court must first determine whether the claims against the moving party are based on the moving party's exercise of the right to petition pursuant to the federal or state constitutions. [4] 14 M.R.S.A. § 556; [5] see Donovan, 740 N.E.2d at 642 (construing Massachusetts statute). Here, the Morse group seeks to enjoin Webster and Platz from appealing decisions relating to the proposed development of the Morse Brothers property. The parties do not contest that the claims are based on Webster's and Platz's exercise of their constitutional rights of petition. [¶ 20] Once the moving party has demonstrated that the statute applies, the burden shifts to the responding party to establish, through pleadings and affidavits, that the moving party's exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and that the moving party's acts caused actual injury to the responding party. 14 M.R.S.A. § 556; see Donovan, 740 N.E.2d at 642. [¶ 21] Webster and Platz contend that the Morse group failed to establish that the appeals brought by Webster and Platz were devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law.... 14 M.R.S.A. § 556. We agree. Because none of Webster and Platz's actions were devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law, we need not decide if the Morse group could sustain its burden if some but not all of Webster and Platz's actions were devoid of merit.
[¶ 22] Webster and Platz contend that because the appeals of the Auburn and Poland site plan decisions had merit, the Morse group has failed to meet its burden of proof. They contend that there was substantial opposition to the site plans, and that Morse Brothers itself admitted to noise problems at the Windham plant. They contend that they had probable cause for initiating the appeal because they reasonably believed that the permits might be held invalid. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 cmt. e (1977). Further, they contend that, because the Auburn and Poland appeals were consolidated, and they prevailed on the Auburn appeal, the Morse group has failed to establish that it prevailed on the merits of this consolidated appeal. [¶ 23] The parties do not dispute that the appeal of the Auburn decision had merit, so we need only address the Poland appeal. The consolidation of the Poland and Auburn appeals does not make the Poland appeal any more or less meritorious than it would have been if decided alone. Consolidated appeals do not restrict the court to an all or nothing review of the decisions from which the parties appeal. See, e.g., State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1368 (Me.1981) (affirming some convictions and vacating others in consolidated appeal brought by three co-defendants). [¶ 24] The Morse group submitted the affidavit of John Conway of the Poland Planning Board, who avers that Mr. Rosenblatt said that his clients intended to litigate the project to its death. Susan Oram, who represented Morse Brothers in the proceedings, avers that Webster and Platz's attorney said to her, See you next time, at the close of the hearing on the appeal, and that he stated to her with regard to another land use matter that if her other client did not meet his demands, he would `appeal and all that other good stuff just like I have been doing in the Platz case.' Even assuming that this evidence would be admissible and not excluded as hearsay, these statements are inadequate to establish that the Poland appeal was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law. 14 M.R.S.A. § 556. Moreover, others' recollections of comments made by Webster and Platz's attorney do not speak to Webster's or Platz's intentions, especially in light of Platz's affidavit stating that his intentions at all times have been to force Morse Brothers to comply with the applicable law. [¶ 25] Although the Morse group contends that the trial court was in the best position to decide the special motion because it heard all the underlying appeals, the court's legal conclusion must be supported by pleadings and evidence that demonstrate clearly that the appeal was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law.... Id.; see Jenness v. Nickerson, 637 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Me.1994) (a party seeking summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly that there is no genuine issue of fact) (quoting 2 FIELD, McKUSICK & WROTH, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE, § 56.4 at 39 (2d ed.1970)). As a matter of law, the Morse group's evidence does not meet the burden articulated in 14 M.R.S.A. § 556.
[¶ 26] Webster and Platz contend that their appeal to the BEP was successful because it resulted in the imposition of new conditions. According to them, the court's decision to deny Morse Brothers' motion to dismiss their appeal as frivolous contradicts the court's subsequent decision to deny the special motion to dismiss the present action. They contend that the court, in a footnote in its judgment, recognized that the appeal raised legitimate concerns when it stated that, because the DEP has required monitoring of the facility once it begins to operate, the applicant will proceed with the project at its peril. In addition, Webster and Platz contend that some delays related to the DEP permit came about because Morse Brothers filed its own appeal of the BEP's decision. [¶ 27] Although the court concluded in favor of Morse Brothers on the appeal, it also concluded in favor of Webster and Platz on the cross appeal. That the court reached its decision without difficulty cannot alone establish that the appeal lacked any factual or legal support. See Donovan, 740 N.E.2d at 643 (The fact that the incidents were resolved in the plaintiffs' favor ... does not mean that there was no colorable basis for [the defendants'] petitions). Moreover, the court denied Morse Brothers' motion to dismiss the BEP appeal as frivolous, and remarked on the legitimate concerns raised by the appeal. The court contradicts its earlier ruling that the appeal was not frivolous by concluding that Webster and Platz's exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law.... 14 M.R.S.A. § 556. The evidence presented is inadequate to establish that the Morse group met its burden of proof pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 556.
[¶ 28] Webster and Platz contend that, because the court dismissed their claim for lack of standing, the court never reached the merits of their appeal of the City of Auburn's decision to grant a drive entrance permit to Tim Morse. They contend that, if the court had determined that they had standing, it would have found merit in the question raised by their appeal: whether the permit required further review because the project is really a solid waste plant, not a truck terminal. Webster and Platz also contend that, because neither Morse Brothers nor MB Bagging was the applicant for the permit, neither may raise this appeal in their wrongful use of civil process complaint. [¶ 29] The tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings lies where: (1) one initiates, continues, or procures civil proceedings without probable cause, (2) with a primary purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings are based, and (3) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought. Palmer Dev. Corp. v. Gordon, 1999 ME 22, ¶ 4, 723 A.2d 881, 883 (quoting Pepperell Trust Co. v. Mountain Heir Fin. Corp., 1998 ME 46, ¶ 15, 708 A.2d 651, 656). Although we have not had the occasion to decide whether a dismissal for lack of standing constitutes a judgment in favor of the defendant, see Pepperell, ¶ 16, 708 A.2d at 656, we have held that [a] successful statute of limitations defense does not reflect on the merits of an action. Palmer, ¶ 11, 723 A.2d at 884. Other state courts have determined that a dismissal granted on procedural grounds does not constitute a judgment terminating proceedings in favor of the successful defendant. See, e.g., Rowen v. Holiday Pines Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 759 So.2d 13, 16 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.2000) (dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a favorable termination because a court must first have jurisdiction over the action that it terminates); Sierra Club Found. v. Graham, 72 Cal.App.4th 1135, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 726, 734 (1999) (a favorable termination reflect[s] on the merits of the action and the plaintiff's innocence of the misconduct alleged.... If resolution of the underlying action leaves a residue of doubt about the plaintiff's innocence or liability, it is not a favorable termination sufficient to support a cause of action for malicious prosecution). [¶ 30] The court never addressed the merits of the appeal, and could not, therefore, determine whether the exercise of the right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law.... 14 M.R.S.A. § 556. The dismissal of Webster and Platz's appeal of the decision to grant a drive entrance permit does not constitute a termination in favor of Tim Morse for which the Morse group may allege the wrongful use of civil proceedings. Even if the decision did constitute a termination in favor of Tim Morse, however, the court's seven page decision and order on the motion to dismiss establishes that there was a bona fide issue regarding whether Webster and Platz had standing to appeal the decision based on their claim that the drive would, de facto, be an impermissible accessory use like the one prohibited by the court's decision in the Auburn site plan appeal. Because the pleadings and evidence presented by the Morse group are, as a matter of law, inadequate to establish that the drive entrance appeal terminated in its favor, the same pleadings and evidence are also insufficient to meet the burden imposed by 14 M.R.S.A. § 556. [¶ 31] The court committed legal error by concluding: (1) that the Poland site plan appeal lacked factual or legal support, (2) that the BEP appeal, which the court earlier found not to be frivolous, lacked any basis in fact or law, and (3) that the Morse group met its burden in the drive entrance appeal when the allegations and evidence do not even support a prima facia case for wrongful use of civil proceedings because the Morse group failed to establish that the proceeding terminated in its favor. [¶ 32] Because we have concluded that the Morse group's complaint should be dismissed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, we need not address Webster and Platz's additional arguments that MB Bagging lacked standing to raise the three appeals to which it was not a party, that Morse Brothers lacked standing to raise Tim Morse's drive entrance appeal, and that the Morse group suffered no actual injury. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to dismiss.