Opinion ID: 657197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Awdish's Last Telephone Communication with Harris

Text: 28 Finally, Harris contends that Awdish's last phone call to him, which took place after the arrest of Kilbourn and Morgan, violated Harris' Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the conversation occurred after the conspiracy had ended and law enforcement personnel had moved from the investigatory stage to the accusatory stage. Thus, defendant urges that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the conversation. Harris failed to raise this issue at the trial level. As a general rule, we will not consider issues not presented to and considered by the district court. United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 415 (6th Cir.1991). We retain discretion to consider issues not previously raised to avoid a plain miscarriage of justice, but only to the extent the issue is presented with sufficient clarity and completeness. Id. This issue is rife with factual disputes, and we therefore will not consider the merits of defendant's claim. 29 According to defendant, the phone call from Awdish at approximately 4:47 p.m. on March 26 was placed after criminal charges were filed against Harris and after an arrest warrant was issued against him. It is not clear that Harris' reconstruction of the sequence of events is accurate. Indeed, the government argues that the complaint was filed and the warrant issued after Awdish placed his phone call to Harris. According to the government, the complaint against Harris was not filed until 11:19 a.m. the next day, clearly after Awdish placed his call to Harris. This fact is very important, for Harris' position is that adversary judicial proceedings had begun prior to his phone conversation with Awdish and therefore any statements he made without the presence or waiver of counsel should not have been admitted at trial. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (once adversary proceedings have begun, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated when the State knowingly exploits the opportunity to record statements of the accused made in the absence of counsel). We do not understand Harris to argue that he has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel even if he had spoken with Awdish prior to the filing of a complaint. Moreover, applicable law belies such an argument, for the government is certainly able to elicit statements 2 from individuals prior to the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (Sixth Amendment prohibition on the use of incriminating statements deliberately elicited from the accused without the presence or waiver of counsel extends only to the use of such statements in the prosecution of charges for which the accused's right to counsel already had attached). We decline to address the merits of Harris' argument, because the factual predicate for his contention was not sufficiently developed in the district court.