Opinion ID: 656840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Government's Alleged Use of False Testimony

Text: 42 Fischl contends that the government's case against him consisted, in every material respect, of false testimony that the government knew was false. Absent such allegedly false testimony, Fischl claims, no rational trier of fact would have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). Furthermore, the fact that many of the alleged falsehoods could have been discovered by trial counsel before the jury retired to deliberate, 2 in Fischl's view, adds to his claim that counsel was ineffective and that such ineffectiveness prejudiced his case. Fischl thus contends that both prongs of the two-pronged Strickland test are implicated and satisfied by the failure of trial counsel to expose[ ] the Government's case as the tissue of lies that it is, Fischl's Br. at 25. 43 The district court quoted United States v. Shaid, 916 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir.1990), holding that any purported error not of [constitutional or jurisdictional] magnitude may only be considered under a section 2255 motion if it could not have been raised on direct appeal and, if condoned, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice. J.A. at 225. The court held that Fischl had not raised his insufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments on direct appeal, and has not shown cause why he did not, thus obviating the need to address the merits of Fischl's contentions on this score. The court also considered the evidentiary arguments to be unrelated to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 44 Fischl responds to these arguments along many lines. Concerning the district court's dismissal of his evidentiary claims on procedural grounds, he argues that the procedural cause and prejudice rule invoked by the district court does not apply to constitutional claims, and knowing use of false testimony implicates constitutional due process. Second, he contends that the alleged falsity of much of the testimony could not have been known prior to the direct appeal to this court because it was revealed during the retrial of co-defendant Kerkman which occurred after this court's opinion in Fischl I. 45 We have held that for a defendant to successfully assert that the conviction was obtained with the use of testimony that the prosecution knew was false, the moving party must show that the statements were material, that they were actually false, and that the prosecution knew they were false. United States v. Hawkins, 969 F.2d 169, 175 (6th Cir.1992). Fischl cannot meet this burden. To avoid the procedural bar otherwise in effect due to his failure to raise this issue on direct appeal, Fischl relies heavily on the fact that some of the alleged material falsehoods could not have been known until after his direct appeal because the contradictions became apparent at the retrial of Kerkman. If it is true, however, that Fischl could not have realized the alleged falsity of the statements given at his own trial because of the inconsistencies revealed at Kerkman's trial, it is not clear why the government would have known of the inconsistencies earlier. The third prong of the Hawkins test is not met. Alternatively, if Fischl were aware of the use of false testimony at the time of trial or on appeal, the claim is not cognizable in this Sec. 2255 action. As the Seventh Circuit stated in Anderson v. United States, 403 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir.1968) (emphasis added): 46 The knowing use by the Government of perjured testimony in order to obtain a conviction would, if proved, be grounds under section 2255 for vacation of a conviction under circumstances such as exist here where the petitioners assert that they were unaware of the alleged perjury both at the time of the trial and the appeals. 47 See also Theodorou v. United States, 887 F.2d 1336, 1339 (7th Cir.1989) (We have made it clear ... that a district court cannot reach the merits of an appealable issue in a section 2255 proceeding unless that issue has been raised in a procedurally appropriate manner.... As we have reiterated, a petition under section 2255 'will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.' ... These cases have clearly confirmed our position ... that a failure to raise constitutional challenges to a conviction on direct appeal bars a petitioner from raising the same issue in a section 2255 proceeding--absent a showing of good cause for and prejudice from the failure to appeal.) (emphasis added); see also Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir.1990) (In a section 2255 federal habeas motion, a movant may not raise claims that were not presented on direct appeal unless he can show cause excusing his failure to raise the issues previously and actual prejudice resulting from the errors.). Fischl has not demonstrated sufficient good cause.