Opinion ID: 3199516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable Cause Issues

Text: Mr. Villanueva next claims that the warrant was not supported by probable cause because it raised only a mere suspicion of his involvement in a drug conspiracy, there was no showing of a nexus between the items sought and the residence searched, and the information relied on for the warrant was stale. -17- A judge’s probable cause determination is generally afforded great deference. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). But this deference presupposes that “the magistrate judge’s ‘neutral and detached function’ has been properly fulfilled.” United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 240). Because we have not decided whether the issuing judge here was neutral and detached, we turn directly to a consideration of the officers’ good faith reliance on the warrant. Leon explained that an officer cannot be said to manifest objective good faith if he relies “on a warrant based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975)). “When an officer searches pursuant to a warrant, Leon generally requires we presume the officer acted in good-faith reliance upon the warrant.” Campbell, 603 F.3d at 1225. The officer’s “reliance is only ‘entirely unreasonable’ when the affidavit is ‘devoid of factual support.’” Id. at 1230 (quoting United States v. Henderson, 595 F.3d 1198, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2010)). Mr. Villanueva argues that this is the case here. “An affidavit is not devoid of factual support if it establishe[s] a minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity and the place to be searched.” Id. at 1231 (quotation marks omitted). An affidavit meets this “minimal nexus” requirement when it “‘describes circumstances which would warrant a person of -18- reasonable caution’ in the belief that the ‘articles sought’ are in a particular place.” Biglow, 562 F.3d at 1279 (quoting United States v. $149,442.43 in U.S. Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 874 (10th Cir. 1992)). Our decision in Roach, 582 F.3d at 1202-03, is particularly instructive. There, we held the affidavit failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause to believe the defendant resided at the location to be searched. Nevertheless, we applied the Leon good faith rule to uphold the search because the affidavit set forth enough language indicating the officers used at least one investigative technique to “provide a ‘minimal nexus’ connecting Roach to the address.” Id. at 1204. We held it was not “entirely unreasonable, therefore, for officers executing the warrant to rely on the magistrates authorization of it” since it was “not a ‘bare bones’ affidavit of the sort disapproved in Leon.” Id. Contrary to Mr. Villaneuva’s contention, the affidavit here is “not so facially deficient or so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the officer’s reliance on the warrant in conducting the search was objectively unreasonable.” United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1207 (10th Cir. 1998). The affidavit set forth wiretap communications demonstrating Mr. Villanueva’s involvement in ongoing distribution of narcotics and his use of others to carry out his orders. The affidavit linked his utilization of the family residence using ping data from Mr. Villanueva’s and other co-conspirators’ phones, which placed them at the residence while discussing criminal activity. During surveillance, officers -19- observed vehicles connected to Mr. Villanueva’s family and girlfriend at the residence. These facts provided a minimal nexus connecting Mr. Villanueva to the residence and to possible contraband to be found there. Although the affidavit here sought to search a residence that was suspected of being used by Mr. Villanueva for drug distribution but not owned by him, Agent Thompson relied on information connecting Mr. Villanueva, his coconspirators, his wife, and his girlfriend to the house, which was owned by Mr. Villaneuva’s stepfather. “It is undisputed that ‘a law enforcement agent’s opinion, based upon his professional expertise, that evidence of illegal activity will be found in the place to be searched, is entitled to consideration in our determination of whether probable cause existed at the time a warrant issued.’” United States v. Harrison, 566 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004)). Agent Thompson presented numerous facts and his own opinion, based on his extensive training, which more than met the “minimal nexus” requirement. Campbell, 603 F.3d at 1231. Mr. Villanueva also argues that the information used to support the issuance of the search warrant was stale because the search and arrest warrant affidavits used events from October 2012 to tie drug activity to the Lawton residence, but the house was not searched until January 2013. “[P]robable cause to search cannot be based on stale information that no longer suggests that the -20- items sought will be found in the place to be searched.” Roach, 582 F.3d at 1201 (alteration in original) (quoting Mathis, 357 F.3d at 1206-07). As we recognized in Mathis, however, “whether information is too stale to establish probable cause depends on the nature of the criminal activity, the length of the activity, and the nature of the property to be seized.” 357 F.3d at 1207 (quoting United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458, 1460 (10th Cir. 1990)). We noted that Mathis’ continuous and ongoing drug activity undermined the claim of staleness. As in Campbell, “[w]e need not decide whether the affidavit’s information on [Mr. Villanueva] was so stale as to not support probable cause because we conclude the affidavit provided sufficiently recent information to support the executing officers’ reliance on the magistrate’s authorization.” 603 F.3d at 1233. The most recent information tying the Lawton residence and Mr. Villanueva to drug activity preceded the search by only three months. In Mathis, 357 F.3d at 1203, 1206, we held two-month-old information was not stale, and in United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 1997), we held that five-month-old information was not stale. Both of these cases involved illegal drug distribution, as here. It was reasonable for the officers in this case to rely on the magistrate’s authorization when similar gaps of time have been upheld by our court in the past. In sum, we hold that the affidavit provided sufficient indicia of probable cause to justify the executing officers’ good faith reliance upon the magistrate's issuance of the search warrant. -21-