Opinion ID: 2819351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Colonial’s Appeal

Text: After the trial, Colonial filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, contending, among other things, (1) that it had no legal duty to keep the parking garage safe and (2) that plaintiffs failed to establish the proper standard of care. We review de novo whether the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, Townsend v. Donaldson, 933 A.2d 282, 297 (D.C. 2007), and will reverse the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law if “‘no reasonable person, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, could reach a verdict in favor of that party,’” Presley v. Commercial Moving & Rigging, Inc., 25 A.3d 873, 897 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Lyons v. Barrazotto, 667 A.2d 314, 320 (D.C. 1995)). 12 Plaintiffs request a retrial of the amount of V.I.’s damages, contending that the trial court unfairly limited their time to present evidence relevant to her emotional distress. We cannot, however, discern whether the trial court abused its discretion in setting time limits for trial because plaintiffs do not explain why such limits were unreasonable. See Pietrangelo, 68 A.3d at 717 (trial court has broad discretion in managing trials). 28
Colonial first contends that it had no legal duty to plaintiffs regarding the safety of the parking garage. The company, citing Presley, argues that in situations where a plaintiff is suing for negligence arising from the defendant’s undertaking of a service to a third party, the defendant’s liability is limited by the scope of the service he or she undertook. See Presley, 25 A.3d at 889. That argument does not help Colonial because the facts of this case show that it did not merely undertake a limited set of duties with respect to the parking garage. Its contract with CNMC requires Colonial to “operate the [p]arking [g]arage”; “[r]ecruit, engage, hire, supervise and discharge all employees and persons needed in order to operate said [p]arking [g]arage”; “[d]irect courteously, and efficiently, all traffic into and out of the [p]arking [g]arage”; and take all “actions and steps as may be necessary to manage, service and operate the [p]arking [g]arage properly and efficiently.” The contract also obligated Colonial to patrol the garage and provide general maintenance, including “general cleaning of the parking garage,” “treatment of oil 29 spills,” “sweeping and . . . emptying of all trash containers,” and “mechanical sweeping of all parking levels.” Testimony at trial established that Colonial employees were supposed to fulfill those obligations by patrolling the garage three times a day. They were trained to look for certain hazardous conditions on a checklist that they filled out while patrolling the garage. The checklist included inspecting different “surfaces” in the garage for damage; checking for leaks in the pipes, ceilings, or walls; and making sure drain covers were properly in place. In contrast, the agreement obligated CNMC to maintain “major structural items” in the parking garage, defined as “the air handling systems, the maintenance of green space, sewer systems, sump pumps, traps and drains, HVAC systems, plumbing, all concrete surfaces and other major structural elements . . . , sprinkler and fire systems and electrical and lighting fixtures . . . .” Even then, evidence at trial showed that CNMC relied on Colonial to report structural problems for repair. To carry out its duties, Colonial hired and contracted with workers to direct the flow of traffic coming into and out of the garage. Those workers were assigned their duties by Colonial employees. The company printed tickets for customers when they entered the garage and collected parking fees from them when they left. 30 Though Colonial was hired by CNMC to manage the parking garage, it was clearly in control of those “business premises.” Colonial’s contract with CNMC (and the related evidence at trial describing the way Colonial and CNMC carried out their respective duties and responsibilities) shows that Colonial had primary control over the parking garage. Courts in this jurisdiction have long recognized that businesses in control of parking areas have a possessory interest in the premises that gives rise to a duty of reasonable care to those who are present. See, e.g., Becker v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 133 U.S. App. D.C. 213, 216-17, 409 F.2d 1130, 1133-34 (1969) (“A parking lot operator, like other possessors of business premises, though not an insurer of the safety of his customers, does owe them a duty of reasonable care.” (internal footnotes omitted)); Daisey v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 118 U.S. App. D.C. 31, 3234, 331 F.2d 777, 778-80 (1963) (pedestrian could bring claim for negligence against parking lot operator when she tripped over a chain that was “part of a parking area under defendants’ control”). Plaintiffs were in the parking garage for business purposes. Colonial therefore owed them a duty of care as a possessor of the premises. 31
Colonial also contends that its motion for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted because plaintiffs provided no expert testimony on the standard of care. We review that ruling for abuse of discretion. District of Columbia v. Tulin, 994 A.2d 788, 795 (D.C. 2010). “Where negligent conduct is alleged in a context which is within the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience, the plaintiff is not required to adduce expert testimony either to establish the applicable standard of care or to prove that the defendant failed to adhere to it.” Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195, 200 (D.C. 1991). “Expert testimony is required, however, where the subject presented is ‘so distinctly related to some science, profession or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layperson.’” Id. (quoting Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 1988)). Under the circumstances of this case, it was not beyond the ken of the average layperson to determine whether Colonial deviated from the standard of care. According to testimony at trial, Colonial had notice of the open vent because a contract employee reported the problem to a Colonial employee who dismissed the contractor’s concerns. It does not take special knowledge to know that a large, uncovered vent in the wall of a parking garage could be a hazard, or that taking 32 reasonable steps, such as posting a warning or replacing the vent cover, could ameliorate the danger. Indeed, one of CNMC’s witnesses testified that even if she did not know where the uncovered vent led, she would still consider it a type of safety hazard that was a “[v]ery serious immediate threat.” The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining that expert testimony was not required to establish Colonial’s deviation from the standard of care in this case.