Opinion ID: 2326578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellants' Arguments Regarding the Fairness of the Proceedings.

Text: We note that, given the adversarial aspect of these proceedings, the circumstances of this case seemingly placed the Ds at a disadvantage. A.S. had already been living with C.M. for several months at the time of the Ds' petitionas is likely true in many similar cases involving children in the foster systemwhich gave C.M. ample time to bond with the child. Appellants argue that they were prejudiced by the relatively short amount of time the Ds were allowed to spend with A.S. in order to explore whether the child would also bond with them. They contend that this unfairness violates the presumption that the trial court must afford the mother's choice of caregiver. In the interest of fairness, it may be advisable for the trial court to allow each side in a contested adoption, such as this one, due opportunity to establish an adequate basis for its petition. Notwithstanding, in reviewing appellants' claim of prejudice, we cannot `lose sight of the principle that governs in this contextthe best interest of the child.' R.E.S., supra, 19 A.3d at 794 (citation omitted); see In re C.A.B., 4 A.3d 890, 899 (D.C.2010) ([I]t is the child's best interest, not the fundamental right to parent, that is paramount in adoption cases.); In re M.L.P., 936 A.2d 316, 321 (D.C.2007) (Even where we are asked to evaluate whether a parent's rights were violated, in matters affecting the future of a minor child, the best interest of the child is the decisive consideration.); L.L., supra, 653 A.2d at 882 (quotations omitted) ([T]he overriding consideration is the best interest of the child, which may compel the [trial court to] terminate parental rights regardless of the defaults of public agencies in seeking reunification of the family.); In re A.B.E., 564 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C.1989) (The legal touchstone in any proceeding to terminate parental rights is the best interest of the child, and that interest is controlling.). While we cannot charge the blood relatives with c[oming] too late with a willing adoptive placement for A.S. as we have done in other cases, see An.C., supra, 722 A.2d at 41, [10] we cannot count the alleged inefficiencies of the agency in their favor, either. Where an adoption is demonstrably in the child's interest, the child cannot be punished for the alleged wrongs of the bureaucracy. L.L., supra, 653 A.2d at 882. Thus, the interests of natural and potential adoptive parents must give way before the child's best interests. In re A.B.E., supra, 564 A.2d at 755. It could not be helped that by the time the Ds began exploring the possibility of adopting A.S., regardless of any blame to be placed on the agency or the blood relatives themselves, the bonding between A.S. and C.M. was already a fact of life. In re R.E.S., supra, 19 A.3d at 791 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, faced with the very real question of the current placement of A.S., the trial judge did not err in considering the facts as they were, not as they may have been were the circumstances more favorable to the Ds. [11] And, as we discussed, those facts established a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that placement with the Ds would be clearly contrary to the best interests of the child.