Opinion ID: 474061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: comments regarding dhs.

Text: 87 Although we have affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the promotion class, we feel that some further discussion of appellees' educational and experience requirements for jobs is needed. Nothing in the record clearly indicates that any of the job requirements or the requirement substitution procedures are being applied by DHS in an invidiously discriminatory manner. To the contrary, in some instances the requirements appear to have been interpreted in such fashion as to favor deserving minority persons. It troubles us however, that so many of the witnesses in this case were denied promotions because they could not meet the minimum educational and/or experience requirements for the new position. It further troubles us that some DHS administrative officials hold the opinion, speculative though it may be, that these requirements may tend to have a disparate impact on minorities. Still more troubling is the fact that these requirements have never been the subject of a validation study to ensure that they are legitimately related to the skills necessary to perform the relevant jobs. 88 In Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31, 91 S.Ct. at 853, the Supreme Court discussed discriminatory job criteria as follows: 89 Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification. 90 The Court went on to say that any job criteria which is proved to have a disparate impact on minorities must be shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it is used. Id. at 431, 91 S.Ct. at 853. 91 We have held that a prima facie case of disparate impact with regard to employment criteria is made by showing one or more of the following: 92 the adverse impact of the requirement on blacks as a class in the relevant geographical area; the number of blacks who are in fact disqualified by reference to the requirement; and the number of blacks who meet or are actually hired in spite of the requirement. 93 Rice v. City of St. Louis, 607 F.2d 791, 794-95 (8th Cir.1979) (footnote omitted). Appellants only proved that a handful of employees were denied promotions because they could not meet appellees' requirements, and they did not approximate a prima facie case of disparate impact under Rice. 94 Appellees, however, should take little comfort from appellants' failure. It is common knowledge that due in part to past discrimination certain minority groups have not had equal educational opportunities, and therefore almost any educational requirement for a job is likely to have some adverse impact on some members of minority groups. Many minority employees of DHS may have had little or no experience, and therefore any experience requirement for a job may tend to have adverse impact on their promotion prospects. 95 A plaintiff who had the requisite proof and sued the proper state agency 12 might well have a chance at invalidating at least some of the educational and experience requirements for state employment. Government officials of the State of Arkansas should be very concerned. They may have dodged a bullet here only to have the next one strike them between the eyes. In order to guard against such an unfortunate occurrence, we strongly suggest that the appropriate authority 13 see to it that educational and experience requirements utilized by the State are validated and updated. Such a process might well be conducted not only for the purpose of maintaining a valid and realistic relationship between the job classifications and needed skills but also with an eye toward minimizing possibility of discrimination. For now, we can only assume that what should be done will be done. 96 We also feel that a brief discussion of the alleged discriminatory work atmosphere at DHS is needed. Appellants state that they proved numerous instances of racial slurs occurring in DHS. They contend that these instances created a discriminatory work atmosphere and constituted violations of Title VII. While a few such instances were mentioned in testimony, we cannot say that there was an  'atmosphere of racial discrimination and of prejudice ... so pervasive and so long continuing ... that the employer must have become conscious of it.'  Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir.1981) (quoting district court's findings in Taylor v. Jones, 489 F.Supp. 498, 500 (E.D.Ark.1980)). Such isolated, casual ethnic slurs are unfortunate, but they cannot be attributed to the employer without further proof. We find no error in the court's treatment of this issue. 97