Opinion ID: 1290268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Modification of Sentences. Generally, when an offense is committed prior to a statutory change, the amendment or new statute is not applicable to the defendant.... A change which imposes a more burdensome punishment than existed at the time a crime was committed runs afoul of ex post facto principles. State v. Martin, 246 Neb. 896, 900, 524 N.W.2d 58, 60 (1994). According to the amended information, the crimes took place in May 1993. Section 83-1,105 was repealed by 1993 Neb.Laws, L.B. 529, § 2, which became effective on September 9, 1993. See Neb. Const. art. III, § 27. We have held: While procedural statutes do apply to pending litigation, it is a general proposition of law that they have no retroactive effect upon any steps that may have been taken in an action before such statutes were effective. All things performed and completed under the old law must stand. State v. Russell, 194 Neb. 64, 73, 230 N.W.2d 196, 203 (1975). The removal of the minimum limit on indeterminate sentences affected Groff's sentences. When examining changes in statutory criminal sentencing procedures, the enactment, amendment, or repeal of a statute shall be treated as a substantive change in the law if the statute allows for a more burdensome potential punishment of the defendant than that allowed under the superseded or repealed statute. Prior to the repeal of § 83-1,105, judicial discretion regarding the minimum sentence that could be imposed for indeterminate sentences was limited by law. Section 83-1,105 provided that the minimum sentence could not exceed one-third of the maximum sentence. Statutes covering substantive matters in effect at the time of the transaction govern, not later enacted statutes. Schall v. Anderson's Implement, 240 Neb. 658, 484 N.W.2d 86 (1992). Thus, at the time that Groff committed the crimes, the minimum sentence imposed by the district court could not be more than one-third of the maximum term provided by law. In State v. Randolph, 186 Neb. 297, 301-02, 183 N.W.2d 225, 228 (1971), we held: [W]here a criminal statute is amended by mitigating the punishment, after the commission of a prohibited act but before final judgment, the punishment is that provided by the amendatory act unless the Legislature has specifically provided otherwise. Here, the repeal of § 83-1,105 does not mitigate the punishment, but has the opposite effect. Therefore, the repeal of the statute does not apply to crimes committed prior to the repeal. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the minimum sentences imposed exceeded the maximum allowed minimum penalty and correctly ordered that the sentences imposed by the district court be modified accordingly. Credit for Time Served. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court stated: I'm to give you credit for time served. However, the court's notes, the original commitment order, and the revised commitment order all fail to calculate the amount of credit Groff is to be given for time served. We note plain error in the failure of the district court to calculate the amount of credit to be given for time served. See State v. Clausen, 247 Neb. 309, 527 N.W.2d 609 (1995). Where the imposed sentence of imprisonment is the statutory maximum for the offense, the sentencing court must give the defendant credit for jail time. State v. Heckman, 239 Neb. 25, 473 N.W.2d 416 (1991). A judge in sentencing is required to separately determine, state, and grant the amount of credit on the defendant's sentence to which the defendant is entitled under § 83-1,106(1). State v. Esquivel, 244 Neb. 308, 505 N.W.2d 736 (1993). The record here does not indicate that the district court ever determined the amount of credit for time served to which Groff is entitled, and the Court of Appeals failed to order that the district court do so.