Opinion ID: 1030914
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shared Parental Intent

Text: The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Mozes v. Mozes has served as a guide for federal courts in determining parental intentions in Hague Convention cases. See Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at 622; Gitter, 396 F.3d at 131-32; Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255; Whiting, 391 F.3d at 548-49; Silverman, 338 F.3d at 899. In Mozes, the Ninth Circuit recognized that [d]ifficulty arises, of course, when the persons entitled to fix the child's residence no longer agree on where it has been fixeda situation that, for obvious reasons, is likely to arise in cases under the Convention. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076. The Mozes court divided these cases into three broad factual categories. In the first category are cases where the court finds that the family as a unit has manifested a settled purpose to change habitual residence, despite the fact that one parent may have had qualms about the move. Id. In the second category are those cases where the child's initial translocation from an established habitual residence was clearly intended to be of a specific, delimited period. Id. at 1077. In these cases, courts have generally refused to find that the changed intentions of one parent led to an alteration in the child's habitual residence. Id. The third category of cases is comprised of [i]n between cases where the petitioning parent had earlier consented to let the child stay abroad for some period of ambiguous duration. Id. at 1076-77. Following Mozes, another category of cases developed. In this category are those cases where courts have refused to find a change in habitual residence because one parent intended to move to the new country of residence on a trial or conditional basis. See Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at 625-26; Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1254; Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135; McKenzie v. McKenzie, 168 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (E.D.N.Y.2001). In cases where there is a dispute regarding a child's habitual residence, the representations of the parties cannot be accepted at face value, and courts must determine [habitual residence] from all available evidence. Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135 (considering the subjective intentions of parents to determine whether the parents shared an intent to adopt a new country of residence for their children); Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 (same). Federal courts have considered the following factors as evidence of parental intent: parental employment in the new country of residence; [8] the purchase of a home in the new country and the sale of a home in the former country; [9] marital stability; [10] the retention of close ties to the former country; [11] the storage and shipment of family possessions; [12] the citizenship status of the parents and children; [13] and the stability of the home environment in the new country of residence. [14] In the case at bar, Andrew argues that Kristina's conduct before the move to Australia indicates that she intended that the move would be indefinite. Specifically, Andrew points to the following conduct: Kristina's sale of her cherished personal items; her failure to tell her family and friends that her move to Australia was conditional; her statement to family and friends on the day before she departed that [t]his is our last night in the U.S.; and her completion of permanent residency applications for herself and Gabi. We find that the district court properly considered this conduct and correctly determined that much of this evidence is equivocal as these actions would be appropriate even if Kristina and the Children were planning on living in Australia temporarily, as per the Custody Order, or on a trial basis. J.A. 363. Andrew also places great emphasis on the letters that Gabi received from teachers and friends with statements wishing her good luck on her new life in Australia, and saying goodbye, good luck, and I will miss you. The district court also considered this evidence in its analysis and properly concluded that the weight that Andrew places on these letters is undermined by the fact that Kristina sought permission from Gabi's school to allow her to miss the first portion of the spring semester and return to school in March. Moreover, the district court appropriately determined that the following facts support the conclusion that Kristina intended that the move to Australia would be conditional: Kristina left many possessions behind in North Carolina; Kristina reserved round trip tickets for herself and the children; Kristina and the children traveled with Australian tourist visas that limited their stay in Australia to three months; and Kristina maintained her local financial accounts, North Carolina Medicare insurance, and the lease and insurance on her vehicle. Moreover, the record supports the district court's determination that Kristina never intended to abandon the United States as the quadruplet's residence after the family arrived in Australia. This determination is supported by the fact that Kristina sought to return to the United States just five weeks after she arrived in Australia. Although Kristina did fill out permanent Australian residency applications for herself and Gabi, the district court determined to be plausible her testimony that she only did so because Andrew took a number of measures to prevent her from leaving Australia. Moreover, in light of the district court's determination that Kristina's testimony was credible and Andrew's testimony was not credible, we cannot conclude that the district court was clearly erroneous in its conclusion that there was no shared parental intent to abandon the United States as the quadruplets' habitual residence. Accordingly, the district court's finding that there was no shared parental intent to abandon the United States as the quadruplets' habitual residence is not clearly erroneous.