Opinion ID: 1401457
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Composition of the Prospective Venire Panel.

Text: Appellant's final challenge to the denial of his RCr 8.10 motion is that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent because his attorney told him in a letter that he would be tried by an all white, female jury, and that such a jury would inevitably convict him. Faced with such an alternative, Appellant argues, he was forced to enter the guilty plea. The letter was never included in the record. However, in support of his motion, Appellant produced the letter in court and read from it. Thereafter, his attorney stated the following: Counsel: And at great peril, I do tell clients, . . . I try a lot of cases and it has been my experience based on . . . the demographics of the racial population of this jurisdiction, pretty much is similar with the veniremen we receive. I did tell my client he would be . . . fortunate to get six to eight people of color and the balance being Caucasian, out of forty-two. . . . It has also been my experience that the vast majority of my cases with black defendants have been with an all white jury. I have had occasions when one or two or three blacks [are on the panel] .... But many times blacks are stricken, even after Batson challenges, and I told my client he would be tried by a predominantly white jury. Judge: Would be predominantly . . . . Counsel: Which is true. Well, it's my experience. May not always be true. . . . I projected that white female jurors will be uncomfortable talking about rape and anal intercourse. I don't know that men will be more than women, but my sense was that women would be. And those are the remarks I made, and if they are false or misleading, I take full responsibility for it. Though discrimination in jury selection on the basis of race is prohibited by the equal protection clause, a defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1717, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). As such, statements by a defense attorney, based on his own prior experience, that a criminal defendant faces the prospect of being tried by a jury devoid of members of that defendant's race are not misleading or inaccurate. Reasonable forecasts by defense counsel regarding a defendant's fate or likelihood of success at trial do not render a plea involuntary simply because the prediction is unwelcome or undesirable. See, e.g., United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir.2002) ([A] defense lawyer's stern warnings about the client's chances of success at trial ... do[es] not compromise voluntariness.); Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099, 1101-02 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding plea voluntary where attorney warned client that he would be lucky to get ninety-nine years if he went to trial and threatened to withdraw if defendant did not plead guilty). Concern over the prospect of being tried by a jury with a racial composition permitted by the Constitution cannot render a subsequent guilty plea constitutionally invalid for want of voluntariness. After finding that Appellant's plea was voluntary (which is reviewed for clear error), a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ky.2002); Elkins v. Commonwealth, 154 S.W.3d 298, 300 (Ky.App.2004). For the reasons set forth above, the denial of Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles, Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999), thus no abuse of discretion occurred. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence imposed by the Jefferson Circuit Court pursuant to Appellant's guilty plea is AFFIRMED. All concur.