Opinion ID: 2341803
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The performance of David's attorney before and during trial

Text: David first argues that his attorney underperformed at trial, detailing a variety of alleged failings. David argues that his attorney did not meet with him enough before trial and that their first in-person meeting was focused on whether David would relinquish his parental rights. At the hearing on David's Civil Rule 60(b)(6) motion, it was explained that this choice was strategic because with relinquishment David would retain some visitation rights while with termination he would have none. The attorney explained that he had spoken with David numerous times by phone and had even tried to contact David while David was a fugitive. The attorney explained that he was available to speak with David whenever David wished to call and would have met in person had David wanted that. David also argues that his trial attorney should have performed a dry run of David's testimony. Although there was testimony at the Rule 60(b) hearing that rehearsal of the client's testimony is standard, the State maintains that David had a full opportunity to present whatever testimony he felt should have been presented at the termination trial. David also argues that his attorney was overly passive during trial, declining to ask questions of some witnesses or asking inconsequential questions. The State counters that trial counsel's decisions were strategic, explaining that it is not sound strategy to cross-examine a witness whose answers may not be beneficial to your client. Although David's expert witness testified that she had never participated in a termination trial with so few questions, the State responds that David has not established any prejudice and simply summarizes who testified at the termination trial and whether [his attorney] cross-examined that person. David also challenges the adequacy of his attorney's closing argument. The attorney's closing argument was short, stating in its entirety: I have just a few brief comments. We believe that [David], if given the opportunity, would be a suitable parent for his child. And he's been struggling, rightly, with his addictions and he'd usually dohe often does fairly well, and we think with more effort, that he could be a suitable parent. David's expert testified that the brevity of this closing argument was shocking. But the State's closing argument was not long either, addressing only the required elements and findings needed to support termination of parental rights under AS 47.10.011(1), (2), and (10). The first prong of the Risher test calls for evaluating the standard of the attorney's performance at the termination trial. It asks whether the attorney's performance was at a level that no reasonably competent attorney would provide. [67] We have reviewed the question whether counsel's performance fell below minimally acceptable standards in several previous decisions. [68] V.F. v. State is the only case we have decided that bears any factual resemblance to this one. In that case, V.F. made three arguments to support her claim that her attorney did not provide effective assistance. [69] First, she argued that she misunderstood the attorney's role and did not realize until shortly before the hearing that he represented her. [70] But we found that she was informed of the appointment. [71] Second, V.F. argued that her attorney failed to argue that the proceeding should have been governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act. [72] We concluded that this would not have contributed to the outcome of the hearing as the proceedings did substantially comply with ICWA. [73] Third, V.F. argued that her attorney failed to call her boyfriend as a witness, who arguably could have established that V.F. could provide a good, stable environment for her children. [74] We concluded that the failure to subpoena this witness was a strategic decision that did not fall outside of the range of reasonable actions which might have been taken by an attorney. [75] In this case, trial counsel demonstrated a willingness to work with David and respond to his concerns. He offered strategic reasons for his trial decisions, and David did not prove otherwise. Although the superior court found that counsel's performance was substandard insofar as he did not conduct a run-through of David's testimony prior to his taking the stand, it is unclear that this mistake fell outside of the range of reasonable actions which might have been taken by an attorney skilled in the ... law. [76] Perhaps more importantly, David did not show how an improved or more aggressive performance would have made a difference in the outcome of his case. At the conclusion of closing arguments, the superior court noted: This is in my view not a close case. Nonetheless, David argues that his trial counsel could have raised the issue that David [ ] had an adequate plan in place for Hannah's care during his incarceration. But incarceration was only one of the three grounds on which the superior court found Hannah to be a child in need of aid. And David did not dispute the factual bases for the superior court's rulings on the other two grounds: abandonment based on his nine-month flight from the authorities and substance abuse based on his methamphetamine and marijuana use. In In re M.B., the Vermont Supreme Court declined to find ineffective assistance in a termination case because the parent fail[ed] to specify what additional, relevant evidence would have been provided had counsel been more effective. [77] Similarly, David does not specify how he thinks the trial would have been different if his counsel had taken a different approach. As such, he has not met the prejudice prong of the Risher test. [78]