Opinion ID: 668596
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ineffectiveness of Post-Conviction Counsel

Text: 40 In Coleman v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held that because there was no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of council in such proceedings. 501 U.S. 722, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2566, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Accordingly, ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot be imputed to the state and cannot constitute the cause and prejudice necessary to excuse a procedural default. Id. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2566-67. 41 Nave argues that Coleman should not apply in a situation where, as is the case here, the state post-conviction proceeding represented the first opportunity to raise his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. He correctly points out that Coleman specifically declined to address such a situation. However, in light of Coleman, this court has held that even if the state post-conviction proceeding represents the first opportunity to raise a claim, counsel's failure to do so may not excuse the procedural default. Nolan v. Armontrout, 973 F.2d 615, 617 (8th Cir.1992) (citing cases). Accordingly, assuming Nave's post-conviction counsel was ineffective in a constitutional sense, his deficiency cannot serve as cause and prejudice sufficient to lift the procedural bar. 42