Opinion ID: 157623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Cumulative Errors Adversely Affect Mr. Nichols' Right to a Fair Trial?

Text: 64 In his final claim regarding the guilt phase of his trial, Mr. Nichols argues the accumulation of all the errors committed in his case entitles him to a reversal of his conviction. Because we have noticed no errors in the proceedings, there can be no cumulative error. Cumulative error analysis applies where there are two or more actual errors; it does not apply to the cumulative effect of non-errors. Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1113 (10th Cir.1998), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 1266, 143L.Ed.2d 362 (1999). 65 VII. Did the District Court Err by Sentencing Mr. Nichols Under 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1--the Guideline for First-Degree Murder--Rather Than 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4--the Guideline for Arson and Property Damage By the Use of Explosives? 66 In his first claim relating to sentencing, Mr. Nichols contends the district court erred when it sentenced him based on 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, the guideline for first-degree murder, instead of 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4, the guideline for arson and property damage by use of explosives. The 1994 Guidelines Manual Statutory Index 3 does not specify the guideline section or sections ordinarily applicable to 18 U.S.C. § 2332a. See 1994 U.S.S.G.App. A. Thus, the district court was required to apply the most analogous offense guideline ... [or,][i]f there is not a sufficiently analogous guideline, [to sentence the defendant according to] the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1. 67 The district court stated it was inclined to apply section 2A1.1 as the most analogous guideline because the jury found that (1) the object of the conspiracy was to use a weapon of mass destruction against persons inside the Murrah building, (2) death resulted from the conspiracy, and (3) the deaths were foreseeable. The court also equated Mr. Nichols' conduct to first-degree felony murder because the deaths resulted in the course of the commission of a felony, namely, conspiring to use an explosive weapon of mass destruction. The court reasoned that while the case, of course, was not tried on felony murder theory or approach and felony murder was, of course, not submitted to the jury, the situation now is different because we're not looking at the liability; we're looking at the punishment that is appropriate. 68 To properly analyze this issue, we believe we must first review the paradigm within which the district court applied the Guidelines in this case. Section 2X5.1 requires the trial court to determine if there is a sufficiently analogous offense guideline, and, if so, to apply the guideline that is most analogous. 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1 comment (backg'd). Thus, the first step required the district court to determine whether any guideline, and there can be more than one, is sufficiently analogous to the defendant's crime of conviction. Whether there is a sufficiently analogous guideline to a particular crime is generally a task of comparing the elements of the defendant's crime of conviction to the elements of federal offenses already covered by a specific guideline. See United States v. Allard, 164 F.3d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Osborne, 164 F.3d 434, 437 (8th Cir.1999). The determination on this point is a purely legal one, and the district court need not consider the underlying factual circumstances of the defendant's case. Accordingly, we review de novo the district court's decision regarding the first step of the inquiry. See id.; United States v. Gabay, 923 F.2d 1536, 1545 (11th Cir.1991). 69 Performing that review, we believe the district court was correct when it concluded, albeit implicitly, that section 2A1.1, as a matter of law, is sufficiently analogous to Mr. Nichols' offense of conviction. Amendments to the Guidelines adopted after 1994 make clear the Sentencing Commission agrees. In Amendment 534, the Commission added 18 U.S.C. § 2332a to the Guidelines' Statutory Index. The Index now specifies, and has since November 1, 1995, that a violation of section 2332a may be handled under section 2A1.1, the first-degree murder guideline. See 1998 U.S.S.G.App. A; 1995 U.S.S.G.App. A. This clarifying amendment, which we may properly consider, see 1994 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(2); United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227, 231 n. 2 (9th Cir.1994), demonstrates the Commission's belief that section 2A1.1 is sufficiently analogous to an offense under section 2332a. Notably, the Commission has also determined that the guideline Mr. Nichols proposes as appropriate, section 2K1.4, is sufficiently analogous as well. See 1998 U.S.S.G.App. A. 70 Therefore, it was incumbent upon the district court to next determine which of these two guidelines was the most analogous. The scope of this inquiry is a matter of contention, and the parties disagree about what information a court may consider in making this determination. Citing section 1B1.2(a) of the Guidelines and case law from other circuits, Mr. Nichols argues the most analogous offense should be determined solely from the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted. 1994 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a); see also United States v. Saavedra, 148 F.3d 1311, 1316-18 (11th Cir.1998); United States v. Hornsby, 88 F.3d 336, 338-39 (5th Cir.1996); United States v. Terry, 86 F.3d 353, 357-58 (4th Cir.1996). The government, on the other hand, takes a broader position and contends the district court may look beyond the face of the indictment and properly consider the defendant's relevant conduct under section 1B1.3. See Osborne, 164 F.3d at 438; United States v. Marquardo, 149 F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir.1998); United States v. Clay, 117 F.3d 317, 319-20 (6th Cir.1997). Our circuit has not squarely addressed this issue. We have only suggested in dictum that to determine which guideline is appropriate, the district court ... should [examine] the indictment, the plea agreement, [if any,] and the facts of the case. United States v. Henning, 77 F.3d 346, 349 (10th Cir.1996). We leave resolution of the proper methodology for another day because utilizing either approach we are convinced the district court chose the appropriate guideline. 4
71 The operation of Mr. Nichols' proposed approach was demonstrated in Terry. There, the defendants were charged and convicted under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13(a), for firing a shotgun at an occupied vehicle while in a national forest. The driver of the vehicle escaped unhurt, but the vehicle sustained $2,869 in damage. No guideline expressly covered the offense of conviction so section 2X5.1 instructed the district court to apply the most analogous guideline. The district court applied the guideline for aggravated assault. See 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(a). 72 On appeal, the defendants argued the district court should have applied the guideline for property damage or destruction. See 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.3(a). The court of appeals disagreed. It began by stating that in determining which guideline is most analogous, the sentencing court must ... look to 'the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted.'  Terry, 86 F.3d at 357 (quoting 1994 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a)). The court then examined the indictment and noted it charged that the defendants did unlawfully and maliciously shoot at an occupied vehicle, putting in peril the life of the occupant therein. Id. at 358. The court concluded: 73 [W]e believe the indictment in this case describes conduct much more serious than simple property damage.... Here the indictment charges that the defendants acted with malice and that they actually imperiled the life of another person. We recognize that the conduct described in the indictment does not match the Guidelines' definition of aggravated assault perfectly, but a perfect match is not required. The defendants' argument fails because the conduct charged in the indictment is more like aggravated assault than like property damage or destruction. 74 Id.; see also Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1314 (utilizing the same approach to compare guidelines). The Terry method informs our judgment here. 75 The pertinent count of conviction in Mr. Nichols' case is Count One of the indictment. Count One charges him with conspiring to use an explosive weapon of mass destruction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a. As part of the offense conduct charged in that count, the government alleges Mr. Nichols intended with premeditation to kill the persons in the Murrah building. Paragraph two alleges [i]t was the object of the conspiracy to kill and injure innocent persons and to damage property of the United States. And paragraph thirty-eight of the same count further alleges Mr. Nichols intended the truck bomb explosion to result in death and personal injury. Given the indictment's allegations of premeditation and malice, we think it clear the conduct described in Count One is more like first-degree murder under section 2A1.1 than property damage under section 2K1.4. See United States v. Kelly, 1 F.3d 1137, 1140 n. 2 (10th Cir.1993) (describing requirements for first-degree murder). The district court did not err in selecting as it did. 76 We further hold that even if the indictment had omitted the allegations of intent to kill and premeditation, the first-degree murder guideline would remain the most analogous because the doctrine of felony murder would serve to imply the malice as a matter of law and obviate the need for premeditation. The felony-murder rule provides that an unintended death resulting from the commission or attempted commission of certain felonies is murder in the first degree. The doctrine circumvents the normal mens rea requirements of first-degree murder and requires only an intent to commit the underlying felony. See United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir.1998), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 1086, 143 L.Ed.2d 87 (1999). As we recently noted, 77 [t]here is an intended felony and an unintended homicide. The malice which plays a part in the commission of the felony is transferred by the law to the homicide. As a result of the fictional transfer, the homicide is deemed committed with malice; and a homicide with malice is, by definition, common-law murder. 78 United States v. Pearson, 159 F.3d 480, 485 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 147, at 296-97 (15th ed.1994)). The felony-murder rule also eliminates the need for a finding of premeditation. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 644, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); Nguyen, 155 F.3d at 1229; United States v. El-Zoubi, 993 F.2d 442, 449 (5th Cir.1993). 79 At present, the felony-murder rule is incorporated into 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). That statute provides in pertinent part that [e]very murder ... committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnaping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery ... is murder in the first degree. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1994). Typically, prosecutors utilize the doctrine at the guilt phase of a trial to garner a first-degree murder conviction. But use of the rule is not so strictly limited. The Sentencing Guidelines also incorporate the felony-murder rule and provide that guideline 2A1.1 also applies when death results from the commission of certain felonies. 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 n.1. Indeed, our sister circuits have made use of the felony-murder rule at sentencing even where the case was not tried on a felony murder theory. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 130-31 (2d Cir.1998); United States v. Tham, 118 F.3d 1501, 1505-11 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 672 (8th Cir.1993), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 41 F.3d 361 (8th Cir.1994). Thus, a felony murder conviction is not a procedural prerequisite to use of the doctrine at sentencing. 80 Mr. Nichols argues that his most serious offense of conviction, conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a, cannot serve as the predicate felony because that offense is not listed among the triggering felonies in 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). We disagree. 81 Initially, we note that courts are not bound by the constraints of section 1111(a) at sentencing. As the district court correctly observed, the situation now is different because we're not looking at the liability; we're looking at the punishment that is appropriate. The Sentencing Guidelines' restatement of the felony-murder rule is not as limited as the articulation of the rule in section 1111(a). The Guidelines provide that guideline 2A1.1 also applies when death results from the commission of certain felonies, 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 n.1 (emphasis added), but the Guidelines do not delineate what felonies suffice. That decision is left for judicial determination. See, e.g., Tocco, 135 F.3d at 130-31 (suggesting section 1111(a) as indicative of which felonies are included as certain felonies). 82 Recognizing that we are not bound by section 1111(a), we nevertheless think it appropriate to work within the scope of that statute. The doctrine of felony murder expresses a highly artificial concept that generally deserves no extension beyond its required application. See People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (1966), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood, 18 Cal.4th 470, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869 (1998). In keeping with our desire not to unduly expand the doctrine, we hold our decision in the context of sentencing must be made with 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) as a guide. Ultimately, our task is to determine whether Mr. Nichols' offense of conviction, as charged and described in Count One of the indictment, could serve as a predicate felony under section 1111(a). We believe it can. 83 The substantive offense of using an explosive weapon of mass destruction is functionally equivalent to the arson listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). 5 See United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 948-49 (4th Cir.1996) (reaching the same conclusion with respect to cases involving explosive devices under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)); United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 779-82 (7th Cir.1994) (same). The court in Prevatte persuasively noted that when death results, crimes involving explosive devices should be treated no differently under the felony-murder rule than those involving arson. 84 [T]o hold that a death caused by fire could be punished under the first degree murder guideline but that a death caused by a bomb was to be punished more leniently ... would attribute to Congress a result that would be anything but realistic or rational. We decline to attribute such a result to the legislative branch. 85 Id. at 782. We agree with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion and extend its reasoning to an offense involving explosives under 18 U.S.C. § 2332a. 86 The fact Mr. Nichols was convicted of conspiring to use an explosive weapon of mass destruction, and was in fact acquitted of the substantive charge, does not alter our conclusion. Section 2332a makes no distinction between a person who uses a weapon of mass destruction or conspires to use one. The statute provides in pertinent part: 87 A person who uses, or attempts or conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction ... shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 88 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (1994). Congress did not create different punishments for the conspiracy or underlying substantive offense, leading to the inference it viewed the two as equivalent in consequence and severity. This is especially so because Congress normally treats conspiracy as a crime punished by no more than five years of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). The legislature's special treatment strongly suggests we should not distinguish between using an explosive weapon of mass destruction or conspiring to do so in determining the proper punishment in this case. 89 Furthermore, the felony-murder statute does not require actual commission of the predicate offense. Rather, the statute provides that inchoate offenses, such as an attempt to commit the crime, are also sufficient. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1994). This lends further support for concluding that conspiring to use an explosive weapon of mass destruction, also a form of inchoate offense, may suffice as a predicate offense to felony murder. 90 We understand there are degrees of inchoate offenses, and conspiracy requires much less than attempt. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 6.4(c), at 530 (2d ed. 1986) ([U]nder attempt law it must be shown that the defendant has taken ... a 'substantial step' toward commission of the crime.... Conspiracy law, however, attacks inchoate crime at a far more incipient stage--the crime of conspiracy is complete at the time of the agreement....). However, given the allegations of overt acts stated in the indictment, we are persuaded Mr. Nichols' actions were more akin to attempt and should not be treated any differently at sentencing. 91 We are satisfied our interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) in the context of sentencing promotes the rationale normally associated with the felony-murder rule. Although often skeptical of the wisdom of the felony murder rule, courts and commentators generally agree that the rule was conceived to deter the commission of certain dangerous felonies. The felony-murder rule not only deters felons from killing during crime, but also deters potential felons from committing the predicate offense in the first place. Tham, 118 F.3d at 1509-10 (citations omitted). The underlying offense of which Mr. Nichols was convicted, conspiring to use an explosive weapon of mass destruction, as charged and described in Count One of the indictment, presents a great danger to the public. That Mr. Nichols was not convicted of the substantive offense does not mitigate the dangerousness of his actions. As has been stated by a respected commentator: 92 [T]he act of reaching agreement with one or more other persons on an unlawful purpose is a clear[ ] manifestation of intent.... It is less likely that the defendant will turn back, for a conspirator who has committed himself to support his associates may be less likely to violate this commitment than he would be to revise a purely private decision.... The agreement also increases the danger to society, for by a division of labor the group is more likely to be able to bring about the criminal result. This is particularly true when the objects of the conspiracy are ambitious and elaborate. 93 LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law § 6.4(c), at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961). Given the dangerousness of such an offense, we think it appropriate to attach the severe consequences of guideline 2A1.1 at sentencing. 94 Mr. Nichols refers us to United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782 (10th Cir.1990), for the proposition that the any arson language of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) is limited to the arson described in 18 U.S.C. § 81. Any extension of section 1111(a), he argues, would be over-expansive and impermissible in light of Bedonie. We have reviewed that decision and find it inapposite. 95 In Bedonie, the defendants were convicted of first-degree murder on a felony murder theory. The defendants had set fire to two police vehicles while in Indian country, killing the persons inside. The district court instructed the jury that it had to return a verdict of first-degree murder if it found the deaths resulted from the commission or attempted commission of arson. The court defined arson by reference to a Utah statute. 96 On appeal, the defendants argued the trial court erred in relying on the Utah statute because that statute could not serve as the predicate to felony murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). They contended the only proper predicate was 18 U.S.C. § 81, the federal arson statute, which by its own terms did not apply to setting fire to motor vehicles. Because section 81 was inapposite on the facts, they argued, there could be no felony murder. The government countered that the any arson language of section 1111(a) did not limit itself to the arson contemplated in section 81 and that the definitions of predicate crimes could be supplied by state statute. 97 We rejected both parties' arguments and affirmed the first-degree murder conviction. Taking the government's argument first, we held that in prosecuting a defendant for first degree murder under the 'felony-murder' provision of § 1111(a), the predicate crime shall be defined by reference to the appropriate federal statute. Id. at 789 (emphasis added). We then went further and limited the arson listed in section 1111(a) to the federal crime defined in 18 U.S.C. § 81. To hold otherwise, we stated, would permit the government to select the statute with the definition most favorable to prosecution. Id. at 788. Our decision next disposed of the defendants' argument that section 81 did not apply to motor vehicles. We held that the plain and ordinary meaning of § 81 criminalizes the burning of a motor vehicle ... [and that the] statute's terms provide[d] sufficient notice of the criminality of such conduct. Id. at 790. Because the defendants violated section 81 and death resulted from the commission of that offense, we concluded the first-degree murder conviction was proper. 98 Thus exposing the particulars of the case, it becomes evident Bedonie does not bind us here. First, the proposition upon which Mr. Nichols relies--that the any arson language of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) is limited to 18 U.S.C. § 81--is dictum. Bedonie 's resolution of the defendants' argument disposed of the case in toto. Thus, any discussion of proper predicate felonies was superfluous. Moreover, in Bedonie we were asked to decide only whether a state statute, the Utah statute, could define the predicate arson felony, and not whether federal statutes other than section 81 would suffice. Second, Bedoniedoes not purport to pertain to application of the felony-murder rule at sentencing. Therefore, Mr. Nichols' reliance on Bedonie is misplaced.
99 The relevant conduct for which Mr. Nichols must be held accountable also supports the district court's conclusion to select guideline 2A1.1 over 2K1.4. The Guidelines provide that a defendant is responsible for, among other things, all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. 1994 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Thus, in choosing the most analogous guideline, the district court must take into account all the circumstances of the case. Osborne, 164 F.3d at 438. 6 100 It is evident from the record of the sentencing hearing that the district court took into consideration all of the relevant circumstances of the case. The court noted that the jury had found that (1) the object of the conspiracy was to use a weapon of mass destruction against the Murrah building and the persons inside, (2) death resulted from the conspiracy, and (3) the deaths were a foreseeable result of Mr. Nichols' conduct. Considering the record as a whole, we think there was sufficient information from which the district court could infer that it was more likely than not Mr. Nichols harbored the malice and premeditation necessary to bring the case under section 2A1.1 of the Guidelines. 7 101 The evidence presented to the jury and relied upon by the district judge at sentencing establishes the malicious nature of Mr. Nichols' conduct. [M]alice does not require a subjective intent to kill, but may be established by evidence of conduct which is ... reckless and wanton[,] and a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care, ... that [one] is warranted in inferring that [the] defendant was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm. Sides, 944 F.2d at 1558 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir.1987). Mr. Nichols reached an agreement with Mr. McVeigh and its objective was to detonate a 3000-6000 pound truck bomb in front of the Murrah building. Both defendants intended to use the bomb as a weapon of mass destruction against not only the building but the persons inside. Furthermore, as the jury found, the deaths were a foreseeable result of Mr. Nichols' conduct. Mr. Nichols was aware of a serious risk of death attending his conduct and his callous and wanton disregard for the persons inside the Murrah building more than suffices to show malice aforethought. See United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1500 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that malice aforethought may be based on one's callous and wanton disregard for human life). 102 Furthermore, the totality of the evidence in this case preponderates towards a finding of premeditation. The requirement of premeditation under section 1111(a) involves a prior design to commit murder. We have defined it as: 103 The act of meditating in advance; deliberation upon a contemplated act; plotting or contriving; a design formed to do something before it is done. Decision or plan to commit a crime ... before committing it. A prior determination to do an act, but such determination need not exist for any particular period before it is carried into effect. 104 McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1198 (quoting United States v. Jenny, 7 F.3d 953, 957 (10th Cir.1993)). In the preceding paragraph, we described the scope and object of the criminal activity Mr. Nichols agreed to jointly undertake. The ambitious and elaborate nature of the scheme serves in itself as evidence of deliberation upon a contemplated act. As we noted in McVeigh, once there has been a finding of malice aforethought, one would have to find premeditation, simply because the method of murder employed--the bombing--could not have been implemented without an enormous amount of planning. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1198. Moreover, the temporal extent of the premeditation was confirmed by the jury. The jury found the government had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the agreement to destroy the Murrah building and the persons inside was set in motion on or about September 13, 1994, seven months before the bomb was actually detonated. Mr. Nichols' involvement in the scheme persisted through April 1995. Given the circumstances of this case, the district court was correct to conclude that Mr. Nichols' offense conduct was most analogous to first-degree murder and section 2A1.1. 105 VIII. Did the District Court Err by Failing to Make Findings Explaining Why it Chose not to Depart Downward Under 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 n.1? 106 Assuming 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 is the correct guideline, Mr. Nichols next argues that the court failed to make findings regarding the defendant's mental state in determining whether a downward departure was warranted. Section 2A1.1 n.1 states: 107 If the defendant did not cause the death intentionally or knowingly, a downward departure may be warranted. The extent of the departure should be based upon the defendant's state of mind (e.g., recklessness or negligence), the degree of risk inherent in the conduct, and the nature of the underlying offense conduct. However, the Commission does not envision that departure below that specified in § 2A1.2 (Second Degree Murder) is likely to be appropriate.... 108 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 n.1. Mr. Nichols reads this note to require a district court to make findings regarding the defendant's mental state before deciding whether to depart. The only decision to reach the same conclusion is United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 784 (7th Cir.1994). 109 We think Prevatte is wrongly decided on this point. Nothing in the guideline requires a district court to make any findings when deciding whether to depart. The section merely states that if a district court chooses to depart, the extent of that departure should be based on a number of enumerated factors. The initial determination of whether to depart at all under section 2A1.1 n.1 remains wholly discretionary, just as it is with all other decisions to depart. See United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117, 1131 (8th Cir.1998) (discussing section 2A1.1 n.1); Tocco, 135 F.3d at 131 (same). Therefore, we cannot exercise jurisdiction to review a refusal to depart under section 2A1.1 n.1 unless the district court states or believes it does not have any authority to depart. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 887 (10th Cir.1998). Here, there is no dispute the trial court was aware of its authority to depart under section 2A1.1 n.1. The court simply chose in its discretion not to do so. 110