Opinion ID: 3028437
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did a state actor exercise his or her authority?

Text: We have never squarely considered the meaning of the term “authority” within the context of the state-created danger doctrine. Nevertheless, Dr. Kim urges us to give definition to this section of the fourth Bright element in an effort to bar Ye’s gross negligence, at a minimum, and gross recklessness, at a maximum. Though there are certainly pressures and time constraints in a public clinic, we cannot say that they are equal, or indeed close, to EMTs responding to an emergency call for a seizure victim. Therefore, recklessness or gross negligence is the mens rea necessary to satisfy the “shocks the conscious” element in the case before us. However, we need not decide that issue, as Dr. Kim conceded that Ye had adduced sufficient evidence, much of it unrebutted, that Dr. Kim’s conduct constituted recklessness. 12 claim. Dr. Kim argues that dicta from this Court’s decision in Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir. 1995), dictates that a plaintiff can make out a state-created danger claim only where a state actor has exercised power that is uniquely within the province of the state. The Mark Court observed that “[t]he cases where the state-created danger theory was applied were based on discrete, grossly reckless acts committed by the state or state actors using their peculiar positions as state actors.” Id. (emphasis added). However, this language was mere dicta and was applied to a volunteer firefighter who had committed arson, thus acting well outside the scope of his authority. Nevertheless, Dr. Kim argues that because the power he exercised, the ability to give medical advice or to serve as a doctor, was not unique to state actors, this component of the state-created danger claim cannot be satisfied. This Court has never imposed such a requirement on state-created danger claims. Although we cited Mark extensively in Bright for its discussion of the fourth element of a state-created danger claim, we made no reference to a requirement that the affirmative action be one that is solely within the province of the state. See Bright, 443 F.3d at 282-84. This Court’s decision in Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2004), counsels even more strongly against imposing such a requirement. In Rivas, emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”) were summoned to assist a man apparently experiencing an epileptic seizure. Id. at 185. The EMTs 13 summoned police to the scene, indicated that Rivas had attacked them, but did not inform them that they believed him to be epileptic. Id. They also did not communicate their knowledge that placing Rivas in restraints could be fatal. Id. at 186. Rivas died of asphyxiation. Id. at 187-88. His representatives brought a § 1983 action under the state-created danger theory of liability. Id. at 189. The Rivas Court dealt with the fourth element of a state created danger claim in a single paragraph, focusing entirely on whether a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the EMTs had increased Rivas’s exposure to harm. Id. at 197. Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain how Ye’s theory of the “authority” requirement comports with our decision in Rivas. 365 F.3d 186-89. The coercive and custodial functions at issue in most state-created danger cases are powers only the state may legitimately exercise. However, the EMTs’ critical affirmative act was to call the police–an action that any private citizen can legitimately take. Dr. Kim’s attempts to distinguish Rivas by arguing that emergency medical care is uniquely within the province of the state. However, much of the country’s emergency medical services are now provided by private companies.3 Even if we were to conclude that emergency 3 American Medical Response is the country’s largest private provider of emergency medical services and has a near monopoly in many suburban areas. See www.amr.net (“AMR is locally operated in 36 states and the District of Columbia. More than 18,000 AMR paramedics, EMTs and other professionals, with a fleet of 4,400 vehicles, transport nearly 14 medical care were traditionally the province of the state, that argument would apply with equal force to medical care for the indigent. However, there is no indication in our jurisprudence or in its Supreme Court antecedents that there exists an independent requirement that the “authority” exercised must be peculiarly within the province of the state. The “authority” language is simply a reflection of the “state actor” requirement for all § 1983 claims.