Opinion ID: 839193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: information of a personal nature

Text: I did not join the majority opinion in Bradley. Instead, I joined Justice Boyle's partial dissent. Justice Boyle took issue with the majority's constricted interpretation of the phrase of a personal nature, [9] preferring the definitions arrived at in Kestenbaum v. Michigan State Univ . [10] and Swickard v. Wayne Co. Medical Examiner. [11] In Kestenbaum, Justice Ryan concluded that information is of a personal nature if it is `personal,' intimate, or embarrassing. [12] Swickard defined the phrase of a personal nature as `[o]f or pertaining to a particular person; private; one's own. . . . Concerning a particular individual and his intimate affairs, interests, or activities; intimate. . . . ' [13] Although the majority does not explicitly recognize it, its interpretation of the phrase of a personal nature is consistent with the definitions arrived at in Kestenbaum and Swickard. In fact, the majority's interpretation represents a synthesizing of the two. When one combines the definitions in Kestenbaum and Swickard, information is of a personal nature if it reveals private, intimate, or embarrassing information about a particular person. The majority holds that intimate, embarrassing, private, or confidential information is `of a personal nature.' [14] The majority's interpretation of the privacy exemption is consistent with my position in Bradley, and I agree with it. [15] But Bradley, being precedent of this Court, should be followed unless weighty reasons exist for abandoning it. As the United States Supreme Court recently recognized, considerations [of stare decisis] impose a considerable burden upon those who would seek a different interpretation that would necessarily unsettle . . . Court precedents. [16] I am confident that substantial reasons exist for expanding Bradley's interpretation of the privacy exemption. Bradley was decided 10 years ago. Since that time, society has come to recognize that identity fraud poses a major problem. [17] Because of it, individuals are encouraged not to make public their personal information for fear it be used to victimize them. [18] And individuals have taken notice of this trend and are now more vigilant in protecting their personal information. [19] Accordingly, it appears that, since Bradley was decided, increasing incidents of identity fraud have caused a change in behavior. When the facts underlying a court decision drastically change and render the decision outdated, a reexamination of the decision is required. [20] The changes that have occurred since Bradley was decided illustrate that individuals have an interest in preventing the disclosure of more than intimate or embarrassing information. They reasonably wish to prevent the disclosure of other information they keep private. These changes in fact make it appropriate for us to overrule Bradley to the extent it holds that private information is not of a personal nature. As a consequence, I concur with the majority's decision to expand Bradley's interpretation of the privacy exemption. But I part company from the majority in its application of the new interpretation.