Opinion ID: 2804082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to Rhinehimer

Text: Applying the proper legal standard for protected activity under § 1514A, we conclude that the evidence submitted in this case was more than adequate to sustain the judgment that Plaintiff possessed an objectively reasonable belief that Harrigan’s conduct with regard to the contested trades constituted unsuitability fraud. Consistent with the standard of review for motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), we give Plaintiff, the nonmoving party, “the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Barnes, 401 F.3d at 736. Plaintiff knew the structure of Purcell’s long-held estate plans, and learned of trades that a reasonable investment professional (and particularly one with Plaintiff’s training and experience) would recognize as inconsistent with those plans. Indeed, as Plaintiff explained, he understood that the trades changed how the affected funds were titled and how they would be No. 13-6641 Rhinehimer v. U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc. Page 18 distributed upon Plaintiff’s death, including whether they would be exposed to probate. Plaintiff was also well aware of Purcell’s relative vulnerability as an elderly man with increasingly diminished faculties, and he was familiar with Harrigan’s incentives to place the trades and with USBII’s past efforts to encourage Purcell to invest the funds in his trust account so that the bank would earn more money. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we must also assume that Harrigan placed the contested trades after a phone call in which Plaintiff warned Harrigan of Purcell’s diminished capacity and asked Harrigan not to make any trades for Purcell. Based on the totality of these circumstances, the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that Plaintiff reasonably believed that the trades constituted unsuitability fraud. Although it is true that Plaintiff had no specific knowledge of whether Harrigan had omitted or misrepresented material information in his communications with Purcell, much less any knowledge of whether Harrigan did so intentionally or with reckless disregard, these gaps in Plaintiff’s knowledge are immaterial. Even if, in fact, everything about the trades were above board, courts universally recognize that § 1514A protects employees who reasonably but mistakenly believe that the conduct at issue constitutes a violation of relevant law. See, e.g., Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 132 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Congress chose statutory language which ensures that ‘an employee's reasonable but mistaken belief that an employer engaged in conduct that constitutes a violation of one of the six enumerated categories . . . is protected.” (citation omitted)); Van Asdale v. Int'l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009) (same); Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 2008) (same); Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2008) (same). The information that was available to Plaintiff was more than adequate to allow him reasonably to believe that the trades were the result of conduct constituting unsuitability fraud. When USBII retaliated against him for reporting that information, it therefore violated Sarbanes–Oxley’s whistleblower protections.