Opinion ID: 3053462
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Easement Claims

Text: Federal law governs a claim of easement over lands owned by the United States. See Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 353 F.2d 34, 37 n.4 (9th Cir. 1965). McFarland acknowledges that federal law governs the claimed easement in this case, but asserts that state law is “instructive” on points not addressed by federal law. However, the “instructive” value of state law is limited by federal interests. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1947). Considering the parameters articulated in Standard Oil, the strong federal interest in the management of federal land weighs against the importation of state law to resolve the present case. See Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald I) v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (D. Ariz. 1996) (noting that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) consolidated authority to grant rights-of-way over federal land by “repeal[ing] over thirty MCFARLAND v. KEMPTHORNE 14047 statutes granting rights-of-way across federal lands and vest[- ing] in the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior [the] authority to grant, issue, or renew rights of way over . . . public lands . . .”) (citation, alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
[1] The doctrine of easement by necessity applies, generally, against the United States. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D. Mont. 1980); see also United States v. Dunn, 478 F.2d 443, 444 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1973). “An easement by necessity is created when: (1) the title to two parcels of land was held by a single owner; (2) the unity of title was severed by a conveyance of one of the parcels; and (3) at the time of severance, the easement was necessary for the owner of the severed parcel to use his property.” Fitzgerald II, 460 F.3d at 1266 (citations omitted). [2] However, an easement by necessity does not exist if the claimant has another mode of access to his property. See id.; see also Mackie v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 306, 308 (D. Minn. 1961). In fact, necessity may be defeated by alternative routes or modes of access—no matter how inconvenient. See Mackie, 194 F. Supp. at 308 (finding no necessity where plaintiff could drive within one-third mile of a lake, carry his supplies to the lake, load a boat and cross the lake to his property). McFarland has year-round access to his property over Glacier Route 7. In the winter, this access is limited to nonmotorized means. We conclude that even subject to the seasonal limitations imposed by the Park Service, and in spite of the associated inconvenience, McFarland enjoys sufficient access to his property to defeat a finding of easement by necessity.
[3] McFarland contends that he is the holder of an express easement arising from the language of the Schoenberger 14048 MCFARLAND v. KEMPTHORNE Patent, which conveys the property “with the appurtenances thereof.” We rejected a similar argument in Fitzgerald II, where a property owner also claimed an express easement over federal land based on the term “appurtenances” in the land patent. 460 F.3d at 1267. “While the word ‘appurtenance’ will carry with it an existing easement, it will not create the easement.” Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348, 1355 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, unless an easement existed at the time of the grant, McFarland holds no easement. See Jenks, 129 F.3d at 1355. As discussed above, McFarland could not claim an easement at the time of the grant, and his argument is undermined by his own representation that his “predecessor’s . . . access into his property . . . was not protected by any county road easement or other guarantee of continued access.” McFarland cites Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148, 153-54 (9th Cir. 1967), and Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U.S. 304, 314 (1891), to support his claim of an express easement. Both cases are distinguishable. Hunter involved a question of what rights were appurtenant to an appropriated water right on federal land. 388 F.2d at 153-54. The court held that a grazing right was not appurtenant to the water rights because it was not necessary to the utilization of the water rights. Id. at 154. Similarly, Humphreys addressed whether an elevator was appurtenant to a railroad. 140 U.S. at 314-15. The discussion of the meaning of “appurtenant” in these cases in no way bolsters McFarland’s argument or blunts the holding of Fitzgerald II that an express easement must be expressly conveyed.
[4] McFarland contends that he is the holder of an easement implied from existing use, created at the time of the land patent under the Homestead Act by virtue of seven years of “use so long and manifest as to show that it was meant to be permanent.” McFarland attempts to bolster this argument by MCFARLAND v. KEMPTHORNE 14049 pointing to the Homestead Act’s language recognizing a right “to enter” public lands to establish a homestead. However, Fitzgerald II makes clear that this language does not create an implied easement. See 460 F.3d at 1265 (“[T]he Homestead Act did not grant settlers a vested property right of access over public lands to their homesteads, but instead merely sanctioned the longstanding customary use of public lands by a settler.”). Moreover, application of the common-law doctrine of easement implied by prior use is not appropriate in this case, where title was taken by way of a public grant. “In a public grant nothing passes by implication, and unless the grant is explicit with regard to the property conveyed, a construction will be adopted which favors the sovereign . . .” Albrecht v. United States, 831 F.2d 196, 198 (10th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Although the government has historically provided for access across federal land to reach privately owned inholdings, that access was granted in the form of a license. See Jenks, 129 F.3d at 1353-55.