Opinion ID: 781366
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disciplinary suspension: the alleged bomb threat

Text: 32 The district court also granted summary judgment to the District on Raad's claim that, due to her alleged bomb threat, she was discriminatorily subjected to a disciplinary suspension in her eligibility to be hired either as a substitute or as a full-time teacher. The district court inappropriately concluded, again weighing the evidence, that defendant's personnel legitimately believed that plaintiff had threatened to blow up the building. 33 In applying the McDonnell Douglas test to the facts of this claim, Raad may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was adequately performing her job (prior to the alleged bomb threat), and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action or was treated differently from others who were similarly situated. See 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; see also Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII ... claims on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994). The plaintiff need only offer evidence which gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 34 Raad made out a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the District's reaction to the alleged bomb threat. She showed that: (1) she is a member of a protected group, (2) she was performing her job adequately before the alleged bomb threat, and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action when the District issued its disciplinary suspension. Therefore, the burden of production shifted to the District to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1126. 35 The District asserts that it disciplined Raad because she made a bomb threat, and claims that it would have sanctioned similarly any other employee who made such a threat. Raad maintains that she did not make a bomb threat, but that fact is irrelevant at the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, which focuses on the employer. To satisfy its burden, the District need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Here, the District presented sufficient evidence of a bomb threat to shift the burden back to Raad to show that the District's proffered reason is pretextual. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1126. 36 Raad may prove pretext either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. As discussed above, Raad presented evidence tending to show that the District's bomb-threat explanation is unworthy of credence. She offered proof that she did not threaten to blow up the building but, instead, stated only that she was very angry and did not want to blow up. Further, Raad presented evidence that the staff members may have misunderstood what she said because of their preconceptions regarding her religion and national origin. 37 Although the District presented evidence in support of its claim that Raad did, in fact, make a bomb threat, Raad presented evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that she made no bomb threat at all and that the District's contrary interpretation of the event was influenced by stereotypes about her religion or nationality. Thus, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the District's stated reason for disciplining Raad was pretextual, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment.