Opinion ID: 2308616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Warranty Claims

Text: Maryland Code (1975, 1992 Repl.Vol.) § 2-725 of the Commercial Law Article provides in pertinent part: (1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.... (2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. Decoster argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment on its warranty claims because, if allowed to complete discovery, it may have been able to allege the existence of a warranty for future performance which would extend the limitations period provided in § 2-725. Westinghouse avers that summary judgment was properly granted because mere speculation that such a warranty may exist is not enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact and prevent the entry of summary judgment. Westinghouse contends that its affidavit establishing that sale of the switch took place in 1979, unrebutted by evidence of any warranty of future performance, supports the granting of summary judgment based on limitations. Decoster asserts, however, that the affidavit was technically defective because it did not include a statement by the affiant that it was made upon his personal knowledge. Rather, in his affidavit, James McGill stated that the information was true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief .... The standard for appellate review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is whether the trial court was legally correct; a trial court decides issues of law, not fact, when granting summary judgment. Rosenberg v. Helinski, 328 Md. 664, 674, 616 A.2d 866 (1992); Heat & Power v. Air Products, 320 Md. 584, 591-92, 578 A.2d 1202 (1990). In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must show a genuine dispute as to a material fact by proffering facts which would be admissible in evidence. Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 112, 492 A.2d 608 (1985). Maryland Rule 2-501 requires that when a motion is supported by an affidavit, the opposing party, in controverting any fact, must not rest merely on allegations in the pleadings but must support the response by an affidavit or other written statement under oath. Mere speculation as to the possible existence of a factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Beatty, supra, 330 Md. at 737, 625 A.2d 1005; King, supra, 303 Md. at 112, 492 A.2d 608; Dietz v. Moore, 277 Md. 1, 4-5, 351 A.2d 428 (1976). When the moving party has carried its burden, the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), cited with approval in Beatty, supra, 330 Md. at 738, 625 A.2d 1005. In considering the summary judgment motion in this case, the trial court had before it no affidavit or other statement by Decoster to controvert the facts proffered by Westinghouse in support of its motion. Thus, if the affidavit was sufficient, we would find no error in the court's grant of the motion. Decoster argues, however, that in granting summary judgment the court denied it the opportunity of fully developing its case. It asserts that it is not unlikely that Westinghouse gave a warranty of future performance with the switch, and that if Decoster had been allowed to complete discovery, it may well have discovered that such a warranty had been extended. Decoster reminds us that in considering the motion for summary judgment, the trial court is required to resolve all inferences against the moving party, Leonhart v. Atkinson, 265 Md. 219, 220, 289 A.2d 1 (1972), and should not grant summary judgment if inquiry into facts is desirable to clarify application of law, Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Concrete Railroad Cross Ties Litigation, 776 F. Supp. 206, 218 (1991). While it is true that the court has the discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment so that a more complete factual record can be developed, it is not reversible error if the court chooses not to do so. See Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 316 Md. 418, 424, 559 A.2d 371 (1989); Metropolitan Mtg. Fd. v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 29, 415 A.2d 582 (1980). Therefore, acknowledging the fact that the court had the discretion to deny the motion and allow Decoster to further develop its case, we nevertheless conclude that the court was legally correct in granting the motion based on the facts proferred by Westinghouse and uncontroverted by Decoster. Rule 2-501(c) requires that [a]n affidavit supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment shall be made upon personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. We have long held that to be sufficient to sustain a motion for summary judgment, an affidavit must contain language that it is made on personal knowledge, Tellez v. Canton Railroad Co., 212 Md. 423, 429, 129 A.2d 809 (1957); White v. Friel, 210 Md. 274, 279-80, 123 A.2d 303 (1956); Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 58, 81 A.2d 232 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 917, 72 S.Ct. 649, 96 L.Ed. 1331 (1952), and that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein, Wyand v. Patterson Agency, Inc., 266 Md. 456, 461, 295 A.2d 773 (1972); Reeves v. Howar, 244 Md. 83, 89, 222 A.2d 697 (1966); White, supra, 210 Md. at 279-80, 123 A.2d 303. However, we have also stated that where the issue of sufficiency is not raised below we will not consider it on appeal. Wyand, supra, 266 Md. at 460-61, 295 A.2d 773; Mercier v. O'Neill Associates, Inc., 249 Md. 286, 287 n. 1, 239 A.2d 564 (1968). Because Decoster failed to raise the issue of the sufficiency of Westinghouse's affidavit below, we decline now to consider it. For this reason, therefore, and because Decoster failed to set forth facts controverting those proffered by Westinghouse, we hold that the court below did not err in granting summary judgment on the warranty claims. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR KENT COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID TWO-THIRDS BY APPELLEE AND ONE-THIRD BY APPELLANT.