Opinion ID: 2450547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Does K.S.A. 3-307e grant the County the authority to approve or disapprove a rezoning request?

Text: First, the City and the landowners suggest that the word approval in K.S.A. 3-307e means that the County has no discretion and must accept any reasonable rezoning decision made by the City. Countering this argument, the County contends it is authorized to conduct a review of the rezoning application and make an independent determination, exercise its full discretion, and approve or disapprove the proposed rezoning. In support of the County's argument, it cites State, ex rel., v. Brooks, 160 Kan. 526, 163 P.2d 414 (1945), an original action in mandamus in which the plaintiffs asked this court to order the state superintendent of public instruction to consent to the annexation of certain territory to a rural high school district. The statute in effect at that time provided for the annexation of new territory to a rural high school district if petitions were signed by a majority of the electors of the proposed territory and the annexation had the approval of the rural high school board and the consent of the county superintendent of public instruction. The petition requirement was satisfied and the board approved the annexation, but the county superintendent did not consent. The plaintiffs appealed to the state superintendent, who also refused to consent to the annexation. In considering whether a mandamus order was an appropriate remedy, the Brooks court discussed the meaning of the terms consent and approval and concluded that both terms grant discretion to accept or reject the annexation. It is pretty hard to see, stated the Brooks court, why the lawmakers provided that the county superintendent had to consent if his action was purely ministerial. Such a construction renders the use of the word `consent' meaningless. Brooks, 160 Kan. at 530, 163 P.2d 414. The Brooks court further explained that [i]f after the board approved or refused its approval the rest of the steps were ministerial there would not be any reason at all for providing for an appeal. (Emphasis added.) Brooks, 160 Kan. at 530, 163 P.2d 414; see also McCarten v. Sanderson et al., 111 Mont. 407, 109 P.2d 1108 (1941) (approval implies such concepts as knowledge and the exercise of discretion after knowledge and the exercise of judgment); Melton v. Cherokee Oil & Gas Co., 67 Okla. 247, 253, 170 P. 691 (1918) (on rehearing), cert. denied 247 U.S. 507, 38 S.Ct. 427, 62 L.Ed. 1241 (1918) (`The very act of approval imports the act of passing judgment, the use of discretion, and the determination as a deduction therefrom unless limited by the context of the statute.'). The County argues that the Brooks court's conclusion also applies to K.S.A. 3-307e: The requirement of County approval of any City rezoning within 1 mile of the Airport would be meaningless if it were purely ministerial. Consequently, the County argues the County Commissioners had the discretion to refuse to approve the proposed rezoning just as the school board in Brooks had the discretion to disapprove the proposed annexation and the superintendent had the discretion to refuse consent. We agree and conclude that the interpretation in Brooks and similar cases is consistent with the common understanding of the must have the approval phrase used in K.S.A. 3-307e. In common usage, if one must have approval as a condition precedent, one knows that disapproval is possible. Certainly, as the Oklahoma court indicated in Melton, 67 Okla. 247, 170 P. 691, a legislature can limit this discretion. For example, there are Kansas statutes in which the legislature has defined alternatives to approval, including at least one, K.S.A. 12-756, which can be found in zoning statutes. In K.S.A. 12-756, the legislature requires a planning commission to submit proposed zoning regulations to its city or county governing body and that body may (1) [a]pprove such recommendations by the adoption of the same by ordinance in a city or resolution in a county; (2) override the planning commission's recommendations by a 2/3 majority vote of the membership of the governing body; or (3) may return the same to the planning commission for further consideration. K.S.A. 3-307e, however, does not include or incorporate any such limitations on the type of action that can be taken. Further, the requirement in K.S.A. 3-307e that any changes in existing city zoning must have the approval of the board of county commissioners is similar to language used in several Kansas statutes that are commonly understood to grant a zoning authority the discretion to approve or disapprove a zoning proposal. E.g., K.S.A. 12-749 (political subdivision may approve recommendation to amend subdivision regulations); K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 12-752 (procedures for approval of platting and replatting); K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 12-757(d) (procedures for amending zoning regulation; using term approval); K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 19-2960 (procedures relating to protest of rezoning; using phrase approve or disapprove). The word approval in K.S.A. 3-307e is used in the same sense and indicates the County serves in the same approval role as other zoning authorities, i.e., the County also has the right to disapprove a proposal. Finally and importantly, K.S.A. 3-307e is not worded as a review provision. Not only does the statute use the term approval rather than review or a similar term, it does not provide any criteria for a review. Rather, under the statute, the County exercises its full discretion to approve or disapprove the rezoning application.