Opinion ID: 1935220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Competency Issue

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in excluding evidence that a judge of the District Court had found Martinez incompetent to stand trial and that on a subsequent occasion the Attorney General dismissed a case pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure on the ground that the Attorney General considered her incompetent to testify as a witness against her boyfriend, Edwin Otero, who had been charged with raping her shortly prior to her arrest. In support of this argument defendant asserts that the findings by the District Court and the Attorney General's department constituted judicial admissions that should have been admitted pursuant to Rules 801(d)(2)(B) and (C) and 803(8)(C) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. The record indicates, however, that the trial justice excluded this evidence not on hearsay grounds but on relevancy grounds. He stated clearly that he considered the standards for competency to stand trial and competency to testify as a witness as different and distinct from the standard of responsibility for criminal conduct. In so holding, the trial justice was clearly correct. The standard for lack of criminal responsibility has been set forth in the case of State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254, 267, 399 A.2d 469, 476 (1979), as follows: A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, his capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly be held responsible. Prior to the adoption of the foregoing formulation, this court had held under the former M'Naghten Rule that the standard for competency to stand trial is different and distinct from a test of whether an accused is criminally responsible for the commission of a crime. State v. Page, 104 R.I. 323, 336, 244 A.2d 258, 265 (1968). Our adoption of the rule of criminal responsibility enunciated in State v. Johnson, supra , does not in any way modify the distinction between these two determinations. One is incompetent to stand trial if one is unable to understand the character and consequences of the proceedings and charges with which one is faced or is unable to assist properly in his or her defense. G.L. 1956 (1990 Reenactment) § 40.1-5.3-3(a)(3); State v. Peabody, 611 A.2d 826, 830 (R.I. 1992). One is not competent to testify as a witness if one is unable (1) to observe, (2) to recollect, (3) to communicate (a capacity to understand questions and to furnish intelligent answers), and (4) to appreciate the necessity of telling the truth. See State v. Cabral, 122 R.I. 623, 629, 410 A.2d 438, 442 (1980); 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 506 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). It can readily be seen that the standards for criminal responsibility, competency to stand trial, and competency to serve as a witness are separate and distinct. The trial justice went further and observed that even if these findings had some degree of marginal relevance under Rule 401 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, he believed that introduction of such evidence would do nothing but mislead and confuse [the jury] in what is already going to be a difficult task, namely, to determine whether this defendant should or should not be acquitted under the Johnson test. Thus, the trial justice exercised his discretion under both Rule 401 and Rule 403. The standard of review for such an exercise of discretion is that the trial justice will be reversed on appeal only for abuse of that discretion. State v. Ducharme, 601 A.2d 937, 942 (R.I. 1991). Considering the different nature of these standards and the potential to mislead and confuse the jury, we conclude that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding this evidence. It should be noted that the trial justice did permit the defense to present opinion evidence from members of the staff at the IMH, who had treated and observed defendant while she was in that institution, both prior to and subsequent to the finding of incompetency to stand trial, concerning her mental state and any symptoms that they observed relating to mental illness. It should also be noted that counsel for defendant had earlier argued that he did not seek to elicit the word incompetent from any witness but only to seek the witnesses' observations relating to defendant. This type of testimony was freely admitted by the trial justice. The trial justice did not err or abuse his discretion in excluding the evidence of findings by the District Court or the Attorney General's department concerning competency to stand trial or competency to serve as a witness in support of a criminal charge.