Opinion ID: 2098743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Adequacy of Post-Conviction Representation

Text: Finally, defendant asks us to remand this cause to allow different attorneys to replead his petition. According to defendant, the petition's shortcomings are such that it does not comply with either Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill.2d R. 651(c)), or the right to a reasonable level of assistance (see People v. Flores, 153 Ill.2d 264, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078 (1992)). Defendant notes that his attorneys filed the original petition on December 7, 1993, but asked for an extension of time to complete additional investigation and discovery. Over the next 2½ years, the circuit court allowed the attorneys several more extensions. They filed an amended petition on May 16, 1996, that raised three new claims, and attached the mitigation report of social worker Jeffrey Eno. However, the amended petition was largely the same as the original petition, and the three new claims covered barely more than two pages of the petition. Defendant argues that it is now apparent that his attorneys did nothing for 2½ years but wait for a mitigation report, and then failed to incorporate adequately that report into the claims. Defendant acknowledges that there is no sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. Defendant's right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is statutory, and that right is the right to a reasonable level of assistance. Flores, 153 Ill.2d at 276, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078. Here, defendant's attorneys clearly provided a reasonable level of assistance. They filed a lengthy post-conviction petition raising 17 new claims of deprivations of constitutional rights. The petition was supported by 47 exhibits. We do not believe that their representation was unreasonable merely because the only additional evidence they came up with in 2½ years was a mitigation report. Defendant contends that his attorneys did not meet their obligations under Rule 651(c). The State counters that Rule 651(c) applies only to defendants who file pro se petitions and does not apply when the original petition is filed by an attorney. Here, the provision of Rule 651(c) that defendant claims was not complied with was the one requiring the petitioner's claims to be shaped into appropriate legal form. The clause defendant refers to is the one requiring counsel to affirm that he has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner's contentions. 134 Ill.2d R. 651(c). As defendant did not file a pro se petition, his attorneys could not have violated that provision. Moreover, we find that petitioner's claims are in appropriate legal form. As a final matter, we note that defendant argues that counsel's deficiencies prejudiced him particularly with respect to his second, third, and fourth appellate arguments. No additional evidence or pleading would have helped defendant on these arguments. As to the second appellate argument, even if it could have been conclusively established that Douglas was the only person who told the police where the items of physical evidence could be found, the police would have inevitably spoken to Douglas and found that evidence. Regarding the third argument, that argument is irrelevant in light of our holding that any error in the admission of defendant's confession was harmless. Defendant waived the fourth argument by failing to raise it on direct appeal. We decline defendant's invitation to remand this matter for repleading of the post-conviction petition.