Opinion ID: 2805598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, the Cains argue that the trial court erred in giving Instruction 10. They also take issue with the trial court’s decision to exclude the results of the PBT and the evidence of Lee’s post-accident DUI and expulsion from the VASAP program.
The Cains argue that the trial court erred in giving Instruction 10. According to the Cains, the instruction does not properly state the law, improperly incorporates the appellate standard of review, and is prejudicial. We agree. When we review the content of jury instructions, our “‘sole responsibility . . . is to see that the law has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises.’” Molina v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 666, 671, 636 S.E.2d 470, 473 (2006) (quoting Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 503, 290 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1982)). Whether the content of the instruction is an accurate statement of the relevant legal principles is a question of law that, like all questions of law, we review de novo. Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc., 272 Va. 37, 41, 630 S.E.2d 301, 303 (2006). Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127, 131, 670 S.E.2d 720, 722 (2009). Under Code § 8.01-44.5, when a defendant unreasonably refuses to submit to a breath test, the finder of fact may award 5 punitive damages if the evidence demonstrates: (1) the defendant was intoxicated at the time of accident; (2) the defendant knew or should have known “his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired;” and (3) “the defendant’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff or death of the plaintiff’s decedent.” It is undisputed that all of these elements were met in the present case. Instruction 10, however, further requires the Cains prove that Lee’s conduct was “egregious,” an additional element not included in the statute. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to give Instruction 10. Furthermore, this case provides yet another illustration of the error addressed in our repeated admonishment about “the danger of the indiscriminate use of language from appellate opinions in a jury instruction.” Blondel v. Hays, 241 Va. 467, 474, 403 S.E.2d 340, 344 (1991) (collecting cases). We have long recognized that the language used in our opinions may include “argumentative language” about legal matters that is inappropriate for consideration by the jury. Abernathy v. Emporia Manufacturing Co., 122 Va. 406, 413, 95 S.E. 418, 420 (1918). Here, Instruction 10 was taken directly from our holding in Xspedius Mgmt. Co. of Va., L.L.C. v. Stephan, 269 Va. 421, 425, 611 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2005), and clearly includes an example of “argumentative language” in the form of this Court’s commentary about the favorability of punitive damages. Such 6 language does not assist the jury in any way; it does not explain the law applicable to the case or aid the jury in arriving at the proper verdict. Rather, given that Code § 8.0144.5 expressly allows for punitive damages upon the showing specified by the General Assembly, referring to them as “generally not favored” serves only to confuse or mislead the jury. Additionally, it is worth noting that the punitive damages discussed in Xspedius Mgmt. Co. were common law punitive damages; the punitive damages at issue in the present case are statutory punitive damages. Unlike common law punitive damages, statutory punitive damages have been explicitly approved by the General Assembly. As such, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that such punitive damages are “generally not favored.” Indeed, logic would dictate otherwise. Finding that the trial court erred in giving Instruction 10, we must next determine whether that error was harmless. The mere fact that the jury awarded punitive damages is not, in the present case, sufficient evidence that the error was harmless. “If an issue is erroneously submitted to a jury, we presume that the jury decided the case upon that issue.” Clohessy v. Weiler, 250 Va. 249, 254, 462 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1995). Here, Instruction 10 included unnecessary commentary on the propriety of punitive damages and improperly required the jury to consider an element 7 or legal standard that the Cains were not required to prove. It is not illogical that a jury would decrease the amount of punitive damages because the trial court stated that such damages were “generally not favored.” Similarly, it is likely that the jury factored the egregiousness of Lee’s conduct into its determination of punitive damages. As we cannot definitively state whether Instruction 10 had an effect on the jury’s award, we cannot say that the error was harmless. Accordingly, we will reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings. However, we recognize that the issue of post-accident conduct raised by the Cains will likely arise again upon remand.  Therefore, we will address that issue here. See Harman v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 288 Va. 84, 95-96, 758 S.E.2d 515, 522 (2014) (considering evidentiary issues that would probably arise on remand where the judgment was reversed on other grounds).
The Cains argue that the trial court erred in refusing to allow them to present evidence of Lee’s subsequent DUI