Opinion ID: 1690969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Disputed George Tract

Text: In 1951, S. D. Hunter purchased the George tract from Walter George et al. The acts of sale conveyed That portion of the Northwest Quarter (NW ¼) lying South and West of the traverse line of Soda Lake [less 11 acres] and The Southwest Quarter [less 50 acres], all in Township 19 North, Range 15 West, comprising 223 acres. This was the George tract proper, to which the Georges held apparent record title. The conveyance of this George-tract property (unlike the conveyance of the Disputed George Tract within the same deed, see below) was made with full guarantee of title, and with complete transfer and subrogation of all rights and actions of warranty against all former proprietors of the property herein conveyed, together with all rights of prescription, whether acquisitive or liberative, to which the said vendors may be entitled. The vendors further reserved one-half of the mineral rights to this property. After conveying the George tract proper with express and full warranty title, and reserving one-half of the mineral interests as to it (only), the deed continued (conveying the Disputed George Tract without warranty): Vendors further declare that they do by these presents GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL, CONVEY AND DELIVER, without any warranty of title whatsoever, unto the said Vendee, the following described property located in Caddo Parish, Louisiana: That portion of the Northwest Quarter (NW¼) of Section 24, Township 19 North, Range 15 West lying generally North of the traverse line of Soda Lake. The Disputed George Tract was on the bayou (northerly) side of the traverse line of Soda Lake. Governmental plats and all transactions pertinent noted this line as marking the southerly limits of the levee district overflow lands conveyed to it by the State. The Disputed George Tract was immediately adjacent to (northerly of) the other land in the Northwest Quarter of Section 24 to which the Georges held record title. However, as the court of appeal noted, the evidence reflects insignificant, if any, prior possession of this levee district land by the Georges or their predecessors in title. Ten Years' Acquisitive Prescription The sole arguable ground for the Hunter defendants' claim to title of the Disputed George Tract is based upon S. D. Hunter's possession of the tract for ten years after his alleged good faith acquisition by this 1951 sale. He who acquires an immovable in good faith and by just title prescribes for it in ten years.   . La.C.C. Art. 3478. La.C.C. Art. 3479 provides that, to acquire ownership by this prescription, four conditions must concur: 1. Good faith on the part of the possessor. 2. A title which shall be legal, and sufficient to transfer the property. 3. Possession during the time required by law, which possession must be accompanied by the incidents hereafter required. 4. And finally an object which may be acquired by prescription. The plaintiff levee district concedes that a non-warranty sale may be a just title for purposes of acquisition of ownership by this prescription. Nevertheless, it contests the good faith of the purchaser, who in a single conveyance acquired certain lands with express warranty, but the disputed land (to which his vendors had no title and little, if any, possession) expressly without warranty, considering also that the deed reserved the vendor's mineral interest only to the warranted title and not to the disputed strip. A possessor in good faith is one who has just reason to believe himself the master of the thing which he possesses, although he may not be in fact . . . La.C.C. Art. 3451. Bad faith possession is possession as owner, but with the possessor having knowledge that he had no title or that his title is defective. La.C.C. Art. 3452. Good faith is always presumed in matters of prescription; and he who alleges bad faith in the possessor, must prove it, La.C.C. Art. 3481. Excellent analyses of the jurisprudence on the issue, with comprehensive citation and summary, are set forth in Johnson, Good Faith as a Condition of Ten Year Acquisitive Prescription, 34 Tul.L.Rev. 671 (1960) and in the Comment, The Ten-Year Acquisitive Prescription of Immovables, 36 La.L.Rev. 1000, 1001-05, 1011 (1976). In describing the nature of good and bad faith, (then Professor) Johnson states, 34 Tul.L.Rev. 673-75 (footnote citations included in brackets where appropriate): Unlike moral good faith or moral bad faith, which is solely subjective, legal good faith or legal bad faith is both subjective and objective. Concisely stated, good faith or bad faith is a state of mind indicated by acts and circumstances. In other words, the good faith or bad faith of a particular purchaser must be determined by the particular facts of each case. [See Land Development Co. v. Schulz, 169 La. 1, 124 So. 125 (1929); Hall & Turner v. Mooring, 27 La.Ann. 596 (1875); Franz v. Mohr, 4 So.2d 584 (La.App.1941).] There is no rule of law that categorizes the acts and circumstances that will be considered in good faith as opposed to those acts and circumstances that will be considered in bad faith: the purchaser must acquire the property from one whom he has `just reason to believe' to be the owner;    Having `just reason to believe' is the same thing as having an `honest belief' that the seller is the owner of the property which he is selling. `Just reason to believe' means that the purchaser has reasonable grounds to believe that the seller is the owner of the property which is being transferred although there is a defect in the title. That is to say, if his grounds of belief are such that a man of ordinary business experience would say that the seller is the owner of the property, the purchaser is then in good faith. [See Harrill v. Pitts, 194 La. 123, 193 So. 562 (1940); Smith v. King, 192 La. 346, 188 So. 25 (1939); Nethery v. Louisiana Cent. Lumber Co., supra [175 La. 753, 144 So. 486 (1932)]; Land Development Co. v. Schulz, 169 La. 1, 124 So. 125 (1929); Scott v. Dickson, 148 La. 967, 88 So. 235 (1921); Delouche v. Rosenthal, 143 La. 581, 78 So. 970 (1918);   ] On the other hand, if the purchaser has reason to doubt the validity of the title being acquired from the seller, he is in bad faith. To explain, the purchaser is in bad faith if he acquires the property when he knows that the seller does not own the property, or when the facts and circumstances are such that a man of ordinary business experience would say that the seller is not the owner of the property. . . . Bel v. Manuel, 234 La. 135, 99 So.2d 58 (1958); Wise v. Watkins, 222 La. 493, 62 So.2d 653 (1952); Juneau v. Laborde, 219 La. 921, 54 So.2d 325 (1951); Louisiana Truck & Orange Land Co. v. Page, 199 La. 1, 5 So.2d 365 (1941); Fradella v. Pumilia, 177 La. 47, 147 So. 496 (1933); Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nowlin, 164 La. 1044, 115 So. 140 (1927); Industrial Lumber Co. v. Earque [Fraque], 162 La. 793, 111 So. 166 (1926); Victoria Lumber Co. v. Dawson, 159 La. 848, 106 So. 327 (1925); Scaife v. Jones, 156 La. 5, 99 So. 890 (1924); Liles v. Pitts, 145 La. 650, 82 So. 735 (1919);   .] Effect of a Partial Non-Warranty Deed on the Purchaser's Good Faith Our early jurisprudence held that a non-warranty sale of the vendor's right, title and interest in his property disclosed a defect in the title, thus putting the purchaser in bad faith (as well as defeating the just title requirement). E. g., Reeves v. Towles, 10 La. 276 (1836); Eastman v. Beiller, 3 Rob. 220 (La.1842). See Comment, The Legal Effect of Quitclaim Deeds in Louisiana, 23 Tul.L.Rev. 533, 537-40 (1949). The present jurisprudence, however, is that a quitclaim or non-warranty deed by itself is insufficient to place the purchaser on inquiry and make him a bad faith purchaser. Smith v. Southern Kraft Corporation, 202 La. 1019, 13 So.2d 335 (1943); Dupuy v. Joly, 197 La. 19, 200 So. 806 (1941); Perkins v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 171 La. 913, 132 So. 499 (1930); Perkins v. Wisner, 171 La. 898, 132 So. 493 (1929); Land Development Co. v. Schulz, 169 La. 1, 124 So. 125 (1929); Read v. Hewitt, 120 La. 288, 45 So. 143 (1907). In Schulz, cited above, we stated, 124 So. 128: A stipulation in an act of sale that the seller does not warrant the title might be regarded as an indication that the seller lacked faith in his title, but it is not an indication that the buyer lacked faith in his title. This last statement, however, is incomplete. If, aside from its non-warranty nature, the deed discloses a basis for doubting the vendor's ownership of the property conveyed, then the purchaser is not in good faith: Doubt as to ownership, or the right to alienate, is inconsistent with good faith, because doubt is the mean between good and bad faith. Good faith demands a firm and positive belief. Knight v. Berwick Lumber Co., 130 La. 233, 241, 57 So. 900, 903 (1912). The acquirer's good faith must be absolute. If he had the slightest doubt concerning his author's ownership, he must be deemed to be in bad faith. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise, Vol. 1, No. 2667, p. 581 (LSLI translation, 1959). See also Aubry & Rau, Property, Section 218, pp. 363-65 (2 Civil Law Translations, LSLI, 1966). Thus, where a deed itself indicates that a seller may not own the entirety of the property conveyed, the buyer is not presumed (see La.C.C. art. 3481) to be a purchaser in good faith. Bel v. Manuel, 234 La. 135, 99 So.2d 58 (1958). If the deed gives the purchaser notice of any fact which should put a reasonably prudent person on guard, it then devolves upon him to pursue every lead and ferret out all the facts to the end that he may not purchase until he has complete information before him. Boyet v. Ferryman, 240 La. 339, 352, 123 So.2d 79, 83 (1960). When other factors tend to show that the purchaser had knowledge of defects in the title, a quitclaim or non-warranty deed may, of course, be an indication of the purchaser's bad faith at the time of acquisition. Board of Com'rs of Pt. of N. Orl. v. Delacroix Corp., 274 So.2d 745 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973); Board of Com'rs, Lafourche Basin Levee Dist. v. Elmer, 268 So.2d 274 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972). In the present George deed, the sellers expressly warranted title to property south and west of the traverse line, but in the same deed conveyed land north of the traverse line (the Disputed George Tract) expressly without any warranty of title whatsoever. In our view, this circumstance alone should have been sufficient, under the jurisprudence cited, to raise doubt in the purchaser's mind as to the vendor's title to the non-warranted title, so as to defeat his good faith at the time of its acquisition. Board of Com'rs of Pt. of N. Orl. v. Delacroix Corp., 274 So.2d 745 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973). (A contrary view was reached in Nugent v. Urania Lbr. Co., 16 La.App. 73, 133 So. 420 (2d Cir. 1931); but it is disapproved, since Delacroix represents the better view and is more consistent with the decisions of this court above cited.) See also: Board of Com'rs for Lafourche Basin Levee District v. Elmer, 268 So.2d 274 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972), certiorari denied, 263 La. 613, 268 So.2d 675 (1972) (   not final.) (Noted, 34 La.L.Rev. 276 (1973)), 318 So.2d 914 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975) (on remand for evidentiary purpose), certiorari denied 323 So.2d 131 (La.1975) (on merits). We therefore find that Hunter was not a good faith purchaser of the Disputed George Tract at the time of his acquisition of it in 1951. The possession under the deed by him and his successors (1951-64) was not sufficient to afford prescriptive title by thirty years' possession without good faith. La.C.C. art. 3499. (As earlier noted, the evidence does not suggest that his predecessors in title had possessed it at all, with the possible exception of an incident in 1942.) Accordingly, since the Hunters did not acquire title to the Disputed George Tract by prescription, we hold that the plaintiff levee district is entitled to be recognized as owner of it, in accordance with its title.