Opinion ID: 688572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jury instruction on plasencia-garcia's failure to testify

Text: 82 Plasencia-Garcia did not testify. He requested the following instruction: 83 The law permits an accused in a criminal case to choose to testify or proceed through his attorney. No inference of any kind may be drawn from the defendant's choice not to testify. As previously stated, the burden is entirely on the prosecution to present evidence to rebut the presumption of innocence. 84 (Plasencia-Garcia ER at 64.) The trial court did not give that instruction, but it did instruct the jury that [a] defendant is presumed to be innocent and does not have to testify or present any evidence to prove innocence. (Id. at 44) (emphasis added). 85 Although Plasencia-Garcia submitted an alternative instruction in this case, he did not object to the instruction as given. Accordingly, we review this instruction for plain error. See United States v. Kessi, 868 F.2d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 1989) (offering an alternative instruction is not enough to preserve a claim under Fed. R. Crim. P. 30). 86 In Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), the Supreme Court held that, when requested by defense, a trial court must instruct the jury that they may not consider the defendant's failure to testify during their deliberations and may draw no inference from that election. The Court ruled that failure to so instruct constitutes a Fifth Amendment violation, and that a trial court's general instruction on presumption of innocence is insufficient in this context. Id. at 304. Courts have subsequently referred to this as the no inference instruction. 87 Although the Court in Carter ruled that a general instruction on the presumption of innocence was not sufficient to protect the defendant's Fifth Amendment right, Carter did not address whether an instruction would be adequate if it contained the language in this case. Here, the instruction contained additional language from the instruction in Carter: the instruction here told the jury the defendant does not have to testify. 88 In United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1981), the trial court instructed the jurors while impanelling them that you do not have to take the witness stand and testify against yourself. 648 F.2d at 631 n.16. The defendant in Patterson had requested that the court give an explicit no inference instruction at the close of trial, but the court refused to do so. 648 F.2d at 630 n.12. Although we stated in Patterson that the defendant's proposed instruction was preferable, we did not decide whether, if the court's impanelling instruction had been given at the close of trial, it would have been adequate under Carter. 12 See 648 F.2d at 631 n.16 (We need not consider ... whether the language used would require reversal had it been used at the appropriate time.). 89 The instruction in the present case did more than the instruction in Carter v. Kentucky. It informed the jury that the defendant was not obligated to testify. While we recognize that the instruction did not contain the specific words no inference, we also note that Plasencia-Garcia did not object to the instruction as given. The trial court did not plainly err in giving this instruction to the jury. J. SENTENCING AS A MINOR PARTICIPANT 90 Oliveras-Perez and Wynn argue that they were minor participants under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.2, and that the court should have reduced each of their offense levels by two points as a result. 91 Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines reads: Sec. 3B1.2. Mitigating Role 92 Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows: 93 (a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. 94 (b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. 95 In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.2. Application Note 3 to this provision explains that [f]or purposes of Sec. 3B1.2(b), a minor participant means any participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.2, cmt. n.3. 96 We review the trial court's determination that a defendant is not a minor participant for clear error. United States v. Peters, 962 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1992). 1. Oliveras-Perez 97 Oliveras-Perez argues that he was nothing more than a courier in this drug network, and thus he should have received the minor participant adjustment. 98 There was much evidence on the record from which the court could conclude that Oliveras-Perez was not a minor participant. Evidence of large-scale drug dealing, including a hydraulic press, was seized from his house. Oliveras-Perez was arrested with 30 grams of methamphetamine on his person, just after he acted as a lookout during a drug buy where Cisneros-Silva sold $1,000 of methamphetamine. In addition, informants Daly and Colburg testified that Oliveras-Perez and Cisneros-Silva sold them each a half-gram of methamphetamine every other day for three months. 99 Oliveras-Perez is clearly more culpable than the defendants in the cases he cites in support of his argument. See United States v. Madera-Gallegos, 945 F.2d 264, 269 (9th Cir. 1991) (wife and partner of heroin dealer was a minor, but not minimal, participant where she retrieved a drug sample, and gave it to her husband, who gave it to the undercover agent); United States v. Christman, 894 F.2d 339, 341 (defendant who negotiated the amount and price for a drug transaction but did not profit from it was a minor, but not minimal, participant). 100 The district court's findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. The court did not clearly err in determining that Oliveras-Perez was not a minor participant. 2. Wynn 101 Wynn argues that because he did not join the conspiracy until December 1992 and did not sell the drugs, the court should have sentenced him as a minor participant. 102 The evidence at trial showed that Wynn joined the conspiracy as a cutter. Wynn had special expertise in enhancing poor-quality methamphetamine by a process known as soft rocking. (Red br. at 17-18, paragraphs 46-49.) Witness Ernest Polsfuss also testified that Wynn sold some of the cocaine that Polsfuss received from Plasencia-Garcia. (Red br. at 17, p 45.) Further, police seized several thousand dollars worth of methamphetamine from a motel room occupied by Wynn and his girlfriend. (Red br. at 10, p 21.) 103 This evidence supports the district court's finding that Wynn was more than a minor participant in the conspiracy. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not clearly err when it refused to make the minor participant adjustment to Wynn's offense level. K. ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY 104 Wynn argues that the district court erred when it failed to decrease his offense level by two levels based on acceptance of responsibility, under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1(a). Wynn makes a constitutional argument here, contending that the acceptance of responsibility provision unfairly penalizes him for asserting his right to a trial. 13 In United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1990), we rejected that argument, and held instead that the purpose of that provision is not to punish defendants for exercising their rights, but instead its purpose is to encourage defendants to accept responsibility for their actions at early stages of prosecution. See also United States v. Davis, 960 F.2d 820, 828-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 210 (1992). We therefore reject Wynn's argument, as we have ruled squarely against this argument in Gonzalez. L. DRUG QUANTITY CALCULATIONS 105 Oliveras-Perez and Wynn contend that the trial court miscalculated the drug quantities attributable to them in fixing their sentences. The government argues in response that the trial court took an extremely conservative approach in establishing the drug quantities attributable to the defendants. (Red br. at 51.) 106 The district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Though we review the court's application of the Guidelines de novo, due deference is given to the sentencing court's application of the Guidelines to the facts. United States v. Motz, 936 F.2d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 1991). 1. Oliveras-Perez 107 Oliveras-Perez asserts that he should not be held responsible for the drugs seized from Sanchez-Cervantes's barn, and that he should instead only be held responsible for the drugs seized during the controlled buy where he and Cisneros-Silva were arrested. Under U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2), a defendant involved in joint criminal activity is accountable for conduct of others that was both in furtherance of the joint criminal activity, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. 108 Oliveras-Perez argues that although trial testimony supports a finding that he was Sanchez-Cervantes's underling, there is insufficient evidence to prove that Oliveras-Perez knew where his boss hid his large drug stash. Therefore, argues Oliveras-Perez, the drugs seized from Sanchez-Cervantes's hiding place were not foreseeably connected to him and should not have been counted in calculating his offense level. 109 There was significant evidence beyond the controlled buy, however, that linked Oliveras-Perez to Sanchez-Cervantes' drug business. Kathy Daly testified that Oliveras-Perez moved in with her and Sanchez-Cervantes in 1990 and sold cocaine for them. (Govt br. at 10, p 25.) Daly also testified that in 1992, she regularly bought drugs from Sanchez-Cervantes's runner, Oliveras-Perez. (Id. at 12, p 30.) Further, the drug press seized from Oliveras-Perez's house conformed to the pressed kilogram block of cocaine found in the barn. 110 The evidence presented in this case clearly supports the trial court's finding that Oliveras-Perez was responsible under U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3 for the drugs seized from Sanchez-Cervantes's barn. The court did not err in calculating the drug amount attributable to Oliveras-Perez. 2. Wynn 111 Wynn claims that the district court erred in counting drugs seized from his motel room on February 2, 1993. The amount of methamphetamine seized was 229.76 grams. (Wynn PSR Attachment #1, at 1.) Wynn also contends that it was error for the court to count the drugs found on his person when he was arrested on March 23, 1993, because the indictment charged the conspiracy as ending on March 5, 1993. The amount seized at his arrest was 2.04 grams. 112 The court did not err in counting the methamphetamine seized from Wynn's hotel room during the time of the conspiracy in calculating Wynn's sentence. The circumstances surrounding Wynn's possession of this methamphetamine clearly supported a finding that it was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan under U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2). 113 As to the drugs seized from Wynn when he was arrested, we need not review this contention. Assuming arguendo that the court erred in counting these drugs, their omission from Wynn's sentence calculation would not change his offense level. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(c)(8) (Level 28 of the Drug Quantity Table) (Nov. 1988 ed.). M. UPWARD DEPARTURE 114 The trial court granted the government's request for an upward departure of four levels on Wynn's sentence based on the serious injuries sustained by the driver of a vehicle Wynn struck while transporting drugs in his van. 14 115 In granting this departure, the court relied on U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.2, which allows the court to make an upward departure if significant physical injury resulted from the defendant's conduct. That provision states further: 116 When the victim suffers a major, permanent disability and when such injury was intentionally inflicted, a substantial departure may be warranted. If the injury is less serious or if the defendant ... did not knowingly create the risk of harm, a less substantial departure would be indicated. 117 U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.2. 118 We review de novo whether the aggravating circumstance identified by the sentencing court as a basis for the departure is a valid legal reason to depart. The court's factual determination that the aggravating circumstance existed is reviewed for clear error. We must also determine the reasonableness of the departure. United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746-747 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 119 Section 5K2.2 clearly allows for upward departures based on serious injury which occurs as a result of the offense. Wynn does not contest that the injuries sustained in the collision were serious, but he argues that the accident involved here was not connected with the conspiracy. 120 The court found that Wynn was transporting drugs purchased as part of the conspiracy when he hit the other vehicle. Testimony at trial established the following. 121 Wynn and Polsfuss received three-quarters of a pound of methamphetamine from Plasencia-Garcia (via Castillo-Arvizu) just before Christmas 1992. Wynn's accident occurred on Christmas Eve 1992. Wynn told Polsfuss that he had lost the drugs that they had obtained in an accident. Another witness testified that Wynn admitted dumping the drugs in the water at the accident scene. Police discovered a small bag of methamphetamine at the accident scene. All of this occurred during the time of the conspiracy, which the indictment alleged to end on March 5, 1993. 122 The court's factual finding that this accident occurred as part of the conspiracy was not clear error, and the extent of the departure (60 months) was reasonable. 123 N. DRUG DEALING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A SCHOOL 124 Under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.2, the trial court added one point to Oliveras-Perez's offense level because his possession conviction took place within 1000 feet of a public school. Oliveras-Perez, citing no authority, argues that this enhancement should not be applied to him because the offense occurred on December 30, when school was not in session. 125 We agree with the government that the Guidelines have already taken this argument into consideration. Subpart (a)(1) of section 2D1.2 requires a two point enhancement when the drug dealing activity directly involv[es] a protected location. Here, the court instead applied subpart (b)(2), which prescribes a one point enhancement for an offense near a protected location. Subpart (b)(2) is identical to subpart (a)(2), except it does not contain the language about direct involvement. We find no error in the court's application of this provision.