Opinion ID: 2514752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Legal Action

Text: [¶32] Finally, Coonts makes two general arguments regarding the underlying action. First, she moved to dismiss the case as to Mary's Bake Shoppe at the beginning of the action. Coonts points out that Mary's Bake Shoppe is merely a trade name under which she conducted business. As such, Coonts claims Mary's Bake Shoppe is not a proper party to this action. Coonts is partially correct. Mary's Bake Shoppe is not a corporation or other official legal entity with the capacity to be sued. Under these specific facts, however, the name fairly identifies Mary Coonts and as such, there is no absolute prohibition against its use to identify her as a defendant. See generally 67A CJS Parties, § 170 (2002); Brand v. Southern Empl. Serv., 545 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. App. 2001). In essence, Mary's Bake Shoppe is the alter ego of Coonts. As such it is redundant to sue both Coonts individually and Mary's Bake Shoppe. For the sake of simplicity, the action should have been dismissed as to Mary's Bake Shoppe. The judgment, however, is unaffected. There is one judgment, and it is against Coonts, however referred to. [¶33] Her second objection is that the City did not plead a recognized cause of action for the recovery of money. The first count of the City's complaint was for the recovery of money paid for the demolition and clean-up pursuant to the terms of the IPMC. Coonts argues the IPMC does not create a cause of action. Her argument centers on the language of the IPMC that states: legal counsel of the jurisdiction shall institute appropriate action against the owner of the premises where the unsafe structure is or was located for recovery of such costs. IPMC 109.5. Coonts argues an appropriate action means a recognized action in tort, contract or equity. We disagree. The IPMC created the debt. It also created the authority to recover the debt. The cause of action was properly identified as arising under the IPMC.