Opinion ID: 586641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Burglary Conviction

Text: 5 The court properly admonished Johnson before accepting his burglary plea. It explained the charge to him and discussed the rights he was waiving. This dialogue was acceptable despite Johnson's young age and limited experience with the criminal justice system.
6 Seventeen-year old Johnson pleaded guilty to burglary in 1979. At the beginning of his plea hearing, the judge asked Johnson and a co-defendant if they had an attorney. When both responded no, the judge passed the case and appointed a public defender to represent them. 7 After a short recess, Johnson's attorney told the court that his clients wished to plead guilty. Before accepting the plea, the court (1) defined burglary, (2) discussed the minimum and maximum prison term under the statute, as well as the term agreed to in the plea bargain, (3) informed the defendants that they waived their rights to a jury trial, to plead not guilty, and to hear and question the witnesses in [the] case, (4) asked whether they freely plead guilty, and (5) listened to the prosecutor's summary of the evidence.
8 Johnson first attacks the judge's failure to read his plea bargain into evidence. Johnson correctly asserts that this failure violates Rule 402 of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules, but he never explains why it renders the plea unintelligent or involuntary. Without such an explanation, his claim must fail. This court's function is to locate constitutional errors, not to interpret and apply state law, Stewart v. Peters, 958 F.2d 1379 (7th Cir.1992) (Rule 402 does not establish constitutional requirements). 9 Johnson also argues that his attorney's incompetence, along with the judge's limited questioning, make his conviction unintelligent. See Brady, 397 U.S. 742 (a finding of unconstitutionality must be based on the totality of the circumstances). We may disregard Johnson's claims of attorney incompetence because Johnson has not provided sufficient evidence. Johnson never obtained evidence from witnesses such as his co-defendant or attorney. He only presents his own affidavit. In similar situations, we have held a defendant's self-serving affidavit insufficient to establish unconstitutionality. Gallman, 907 F.2d at 644. 10 Johnson also alleges that the court's admonitions were insufficient given his age and inexperience. Johnson admits that the judge informed him of his rights (1) to a jury trial, (2) to plead not guilty, and (3) to question witnesses. Although these are the exact warnings required by Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243; Johnson claims they were too cursory. See also United States v. Henry, 713 F.Supp. 1182 (N.D.Ill.1989), aff'd, 933 F.2d 553 (7th Cir.1991) (the right to plead not guilty is the functional equivalent of Boykin 's right against self-incrimination). He argues that the judge should have assured his understanding of crucial words, such as jury trial. 11 Johnson, however, provides no authority for his position. He cites only United States v. Burnom, 1991 WL 152902 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 10,995 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 1, 1991), a memorandum decision from the Northern District of Illinois. Burnom shares many facts with Johnson's case, including short, undetailed questions by the judge and one-word answers by the defendant. Id. at  9- 10. Johnson dwells on these similarities, without elaborating on a crucial distinction. Id. at  9. In Burnam, unlike Johnson's case, the judge misstated the defendant's rights. Id. Instead of discussing the right to confront witnesses, the judge discussed the right to be confronted by witnesses; The right against self-incrimination became the right of self-incrimination. Id. These were, in the court's opinion, important distinctions. Id. 12 Johnson has not cited a case where warnings fully complying with Boykin were insufficient because of the age and experience of a defendant. Our research has shown that, absent extreme circumstances, a simple recitation of the Boykin rights is effective. See, e.g., United States v. Frye, 738 F.2d 196, 201 (7th Cir.1984) (exceptional circumstances exist where there is an apparent conflict of interest between the defendant and her attorney). We, therefore, affirm the district court's decision to consider the 1979 conviction at sentencing.