Opinion ID: 656195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the erisa preemption issue

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8 After converting their case to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in December of 1988, the Schleins filed a Schedule B-4 (Property Claimed As Exempt). Property described as follows was included on the schedule: 9 Debtors claim an exemption pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 222.21(2)(a) in all monies on deposit in their respective individual retirement account, (IRA)-simplified employee pension (SEP) bank accounts established pursuant to Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code, including all monies in such accounts at First Federal Savings & Loan Association, Leesburg, Florida (IRA-SEP account with an approximate balance of $138,927.62); Barnett Bank, Leesburg, Florida (IRA-SEP account with approximate balance of $28,655.92); and Sun First National Bank of Lake County, Leesburg, Florida (IRA account with approximate balance of $2,488.86). Total Value of Pension Exemption: $170,072.40. 10 According to the bankruptcy court, the Trustee objected to the claimed exemption in the following property: 11 (i) An Individual Retirement Account/Simplified Employee Pension Account (IRA/SEP account) in First Federal Savings and Loan Association with a balance of $136,502.70. 12 (ii) An IRA/SEP account in Barnett Bank with a balance of $26,250.00. 13 (iii) A regular checking account in Barnett Bank with a balance of $54,253.55. 14 In re Schlein, 114 B.R. 780, 781 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1990). 1 15
16 After a hearing on those objections, the bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee's objections to the Schleins' claims for exemption. The Schleins were ordered to turn over the funds in their retirement accounts to the Trustee. According to the Schleins, the total amount taken by the Trustee was $175,278.83, which included the principal amount of the IRA and SEP deposits plus accrued interest. The bankruptcy court's ruling was based on the following syllogism: The Schleins' SEP/IRA account is an employee benefit plan as defined by ERISA; ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), preempts any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employment benefit plan; Florida Statute s 222.21(2)(a) directly relates to an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA; therefore, ERISA preempts Fla.Stat. § 222.21(2)(a). In re Schlein, 114 B.R. at 782-83. 17 The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Fla.Stat. § 222.21(2)(a) relates to ERISA plans, and is therefore preempted by ERISA. The court reasoned that [t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that ERISA shall preempt any state law that 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, even if the law is consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements. The court also noted that the Supreme Court has declared that this broad preemption is not restricted to state laws that affect plan terms, conditions, or administration. Finding that the existence of a pension plan is a critical factor in establishing a debtor's right to exemption under section 222.21(a), the court held that section to be preempted by ERISA. 18 The court also rejected the Schleins' argument that the saving clause contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) applies to Fla.Stat. § 222.21(2)(a). The court concluded that although debtors can opt for state exemption schemes, the Bankruptcy Code does not transform state laws into federal laws that section [1144(d) of ERISA] saves. Relying primarily on the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993), 2 the court found that because state law exemptions are not necessary to the enforcement of the Bankruptcy Code, and because the Bankruptcy Code, as a whole, can operate effectively without any state law ... section [1144(d) ] does not save section 222.21(2)(a) from preemption. 19
20 Section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), broadly preempts any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan covered by ERISA. Section 514 also provides the following saving clause: 21 Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States (except as provided in sections 1031 and 1137(b) of this title) or any rule or regulation issued under any such law. 22 Section 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d). 23 Under the Bankruptcy Code, an individual debtor is entitled to exempt certain property that has been swept into his bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). While the Bankruptcy Code provides a set of federal bankruptcy exemptions in 11 U.S.C. § 522, Bankruptcy Code § 522(b) gives states the option of opting out of the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme. In states that have opted out, the debtor may only exempt any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition.... 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A). Under the federal set of exemptions, the following may be exempted: 24 a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor, unless-- 25 (i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under such plan or contract arose; 26 (ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and 27 (iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409). 28 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). 29 Florida law provides for an opt out/opt in scheme for its debtors who file for protection under the Bankruptcy Code. First, Fla.Stat. § 222.20 establishes the general nonavailability of the federal bankruptcy exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522: 30 In accordance with the provision of s. 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. s. 522(b)), residents of this state shall not be entitled to the federal exemptions provided in s. 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. s. 522(d)). Nothing herein shall affect the exemptions given to residents of this state by the State Constitution and the Florida Statutes. 31 Fla.Stat. § 222.201 then opts the state back in as far as exemptions in Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(10) are concerned: 32 (1) Notwithstanding s. 222.20, an individual debtor under the federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 may exempt, in addition to any other exemptions allowed under state law, any property listed in subsection (d)(10) of s. 522 of that act. 33 Finally, in the section that the bankruptcy and district courts specifically held preempted by ERISA, Florida law expressly provides for exemption of pension money and retirement or profit-sharing benefits: 34 Except as provided in paragraph (b), any money or other assets payable to a participant or beneficiary from, or any interest of any participant or beneficiary in, a retirement or profit-sharing plan that is qualified under s. 401(a), s. 403(a), s. 403(b), s. 408, or s. 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, is exempt from all claims of creditors of the beneficiary or participant. 35 Fla.Stat. § 222.21(2)(a). There is no dispute in this case that the Schleins' IRA/SEP fits squarely within this exemption. The dispute is over whether this Florida law exemption is preempted by ERISA.
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37 The Supreme Court examined in detail the scope of ERISA's pre-emption provisions in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983), a case involving two New York laws relating to employee benefits plans which play a significant role in the enforcement of Title VII. 3 Id. at 101, 103 S.Ct. at 2902. In address[ing] the scope of several provisions of ERISA that speak expressly to the question of pre-emption, the Court described its inquiry as follows: The issues are whether the [state laws in question] 'relate to' employee benefit plans within the meaning of § 514(a), and, if so, whether any exception in ERISA saves them from pre-emption. Id. at 96, 103 S.Ct. at 2899. Facing as we do an analogous situation in which a state statute plays a significant role in implementing a comprehensive federal statutory scheme, namely the Bankruptcy Code, we will employ the Shaw framework of analysis. 38 The Supreme Court had no difficulty in concluding that the two New York statutes at issue in Shaw were  'relate[d] to' employee benefit plans within the meaning of § 514(a), id., and we reach the same conclusion concerning Fla.Stat. § 222.21(2)(a). As the Court explained, [a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan. Id. at 96-97, 103 S.Ct. at 2900. The Court further noted that Congress used the words 'relate to' in § 514(a) in their broad sense. Id. at 98, 103 S.Ct. at 2900. Thus, ERISA should not be read to preempt only state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans, nor should s 514(a) be interpreted to pre-empt only state laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA.... Id. The Court attempted to qualify its broad construction of relate to when it noted, in a footnote, that [s]ome state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan. Id. at 100 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. at 2901 n. 21. However, upon revisiting the question of preemption under § 514(a) in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988), the Supreme Court explained that its decisions after Shaw reaffirmed the rule that state laws which make 'reference to' ERISA plans are laws that 'relate to' those plans within the meaning of § 514(a). Id. at 829, 108 S.Ct. at 2185. 39 The statutory language of Fla.Stat. § 222.21 does not expressly mention ERISA. However, the statute does refer to retirement or profit-sharing plan[s] that [are] qualified under s. 401(a), s. 403(a), s. 403(b), s. 408, or s. 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.... In linking the protected plans to those sections of the Internal Revenue Code which designate ERISA-qualified plans, Florida has enacted a law that relate[s] to ERISA benefit plans. See Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991) (construing a virtually identical state pension plan exemption to reach the same conclusion), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993); 4 see also In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435, 1448 (5th Cir.1991) (Concluding that, when faced with an issue identical to the one before this Court, a reference in [a Texas] state law to 'stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing or similar plans' [was] ... a specific reference to ERISA benefit plans). We hold that Fla.Stat. § 222.21(2)(a) relates to ERISA benefit plans and, absent an applicable exception, is preempted by ERISA § 514(a). 40
41 Following the analytical structure laid down by the Supreme Court in Shaw, which was also followed by the Fifth Circuit in Dyke, we next consider whether any of the narrow exceptions to § 514(a) saves this Florida law from preemption. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100, 103 S.Ct. at 2902; Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1446-50. 42 To overcome the Supreme Court's conclusion that New York's Human Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law were related to employee benefit plans, the appellants in Shaw argued, as the Schleins in the present case argue, that the state law in issue was saved from preemption by the ERISA saving clause of § 514(d). That clause provides that ERISA's preemption clause shall not be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States. While this provision is to be construed as an exception to ERISA's broad preemption of state law in the area of employee benefit plans, it by no means swallows the rule: 43 ERISA's structure and legislative history, while not particularly illuminating with respect to § 514(d), caution against applying it too expansively. As we have detailed above, Congress applied the principle of pre-emption in its broadest sense to foreclose any non-Federal regulation of employee benefit plans, creating only very limited exceptions to pre-emption. ... While § 514(d) may operate to exempt provisions of state laws upon which federal laws depend for their enforcement, the combination of Congress' enactment of an all-inclusive pre-emption provision and its enumeration of narrow, specific exceptions to that provision makes us reluctant to expand § 514(d) into a more general saving clause. 44 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 104, 103 S.Ct. at 2903. 45 Nonetheless, the Court in Shaw left no doubt that § 514(d) does have some teeth. The Court began by observing that State laws obviously play a significant role in the enforcement of Title VII. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 101, 103 S.Ct. at 2902. The Court explained that the substance of this role is apparent in at least two respects. First, Title VII expressly preserves nonconflicting state laws in its § 708. Id. Second, Title VII requires recourse to available state administrative remedies. ... In its subsequent proceedings, the EEOC accords 'substantial weight' to the state administrative determination. Id. at 101-02, 103 S.Ct. at 2902. These considerations combined to support the conclusion that pre-emption of [New York's] Human Rights Law would impair Title VII to the extent that the Human Rights Law provides a means of enforcing Title VII's commands. Id. at 102, 103 S.Ct. at 2902. The Court explained this holding in some detail: 46 If ERISA were interpreted to pre-empt the Human Rights Law entirely with respect to covered benefit plans, the State no longer could prohibit the challenged employment practice and the state agency no longer would be authorized to grant relief. The EEOC thus would be unable to refer the claim to the state agency. This would frustrate the goal of encouraging joint state/federal enforcement of Title VII; an employee's only remedies for discrimination prohibited by Title VII in ERISA plans would be federal ones. Such a disruption of the enforcement scheme contemplated by Title VII would, in the words of § 514(d), 'modify' and 'impair' federal law. 47 Id. at 102, 103 S.Ct. at 2902-03. The Court added, however, that while § 514(d) saves from preemption state laws that redress discrimination that is proscribed under Title VII, the intent of Congress to provide comprehensive pre-emption of state law requires that the protections of § 514(d) not be extended to state laws that prohibit activities permitted under federal law: 48 Although Title VII does not itself prevent States from extending their nondiscrimination laws to areas not covered by Title VII, it in no way depends on such extensions for its enforcement.... Quite simply, Title VII is neutral on the subject of all employment practices it does not prohibit. We fail to see how federal law would be impaired by pre-emption of a state law prohibiting conduct that federal law permitted. 49 Id. at 103-04, 103 S.Ct. at 2903 (citation and footnote omitted). 50 Three circuits have applied the teachings of Shaw in coming to grips with the identical question before this Court: whether ERISA preempts state law pension plan exemptions relied upon by debtors in federal bankruptcy cases. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held that § 514(d) saves such state law exemptions from preemption. In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991); In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 4, 120 L.Ed.2d 933 (1992). The Ninth Circuit, over a strong dissent and in an opinion that has since been withdrawn, found that an Arizona exemption virtually identical to the Florida exemption in the present case was preempted by ERISA. Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993). 5 We conclude that the well-reasoned analyses of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, and the thoughtful dissent of the Ninth Circuit's Judge Sneed, offer the better view. 51 The Fifth Circuit perceived a direct analogy between Title VII and the Bankruptcy Code: Like Title VII, the Bankruptcy Code relies on state law to assist in the implementation and enforcement of its goals. Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1449. Primary among these goals is that a debtor comes out of bankruptcy with adequate possessions to have a 'fresh start.'  Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 6087). Because Congress invited the states to participate in determining what that fresh start would entail, ERISA preemption of every pension-related state exemption would substantially impair the ability of the Bankruptcy Code to ensure the envisioned fresh start: 52 The [Bankruptcy] Code adopts a federal exemption scheme which satisfies this goal; but recognizing that circumstances are different in the various states, the Code also permits the states to set exemption levels appropriate to the locale. [H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 6087.] See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (1988). If this Court were to interpret ERISA to preempt provisions of the state exemption schemes, the states would be unable to set enforceable exemption levels on retirement benefits. This would relegate many debtors to a federal exemption scheme which might be inappropriate to the locale. As a consequence, the enforcement scheme contemplated in the Bankruptcy Code would be modified and impaired. 53 Id. 54 In its decision in In re Vickers, the Eighth Circuit highlighted a significant flaw in the position of the proponents of ERISA preemption of state exemption schemes. The State of Missouri had chosen to opt out of the federal exemptions and had enacted Mo.Rev.Stat. § 513.430(10)(e). This exemption is virtually identical to that found in the federal exemption scheme in Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(10)(E). In re Vickers, 954 F.2d at 1429. The court was struck by the patent inconsistency presented by this situation: It would be incongruous to hold pension benefits exempted under the federal bankruptcy law, but to strike down identical provisions enacted by the state under the express authorization of the bankruptcy code. Id. 55 The Ninth Circuit also looked to the Supreme Court's Shaw decision for guidance. However, it focused on the Supreme Court's conclusion that ERISA pre-empted those portions of the New York statute which prohibited practices not unlawful under Title VII. Pitrat, 947 F.2d at 428 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 102-03, 103 S.Ct. at 2902-03). Under the Ninth Circuit's framework for analysis: 56 Careful comparison of the state law exemptions allowed by the bankruptcy code with both the state law provisions saved by Title VII and those state law provisions pre-empted by ERISA in Shaw is the first step in determining whether the bankruptcy code would be impaired if Arizona's exemption for ERISA-qualified plans were pre-empted. 57 Id. at 428-29. The court then concluded that because [t]he state law exemptions allowed by the bankruptcy code do not affirmatively aid the federal law by lessening the workload of any federal agency or court administering the federal law as did those portions of the state law saved by Title VII in Shaw ... the state law exemptions allowed by the bankruptcy code are analogous to the parts of the New York law which Shaw held ERISA pre-empted. Id. at 429. The Ninth Circuit then compared the bankruptcy code's allowance for state exemptions with Title VII's allowance for state legislation, and found that the Bankruptcy Code not only provides for state legislation, it allows for states to provide that their exemptions will be exclusively enforced. Id. But this did not lead the Ninth Circuit to the conclusion that the Bankruptcy Code would be impaired by ERISA preemption: 58 The bankruptcy code would not be impaired if there were no state law exemptions at all for it to enforce. Thus since the bankruptcy code can operate in a perfectly effective manner without any state law, it is not impaired by the failure of a particular state exemption law. 59 Id. The district court in the present case used the same reasoning to conclude that the Florida statutory exemption is preempted by ERISA. 60