Opinion ID: 2613356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Areas

Text: Appellants also contend the tenants lacked authority to consent to a search of the common areas of the apartment buildings because the landlords have exclusive authority over those areas. The argument is unpersuasive under both the federal and state constitutions. [4] Contrary to Appellants' assertion, landlords do not have exclusive authority over the common areas. In order to admit visitors to an apartment, the tenant must necessarily possess the authority to permit guests to pass through the common areas leading to that apartment. The tenant must therefore possess the authority to consent to the visitor's entry into the building itself. For that reason, the authority over common areas is more properly characterized as common to both tenant and landlord, rather than exclusive to the landlord alone. [5] As regards searches of common areas, under both the Fourth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 7, either of two parties who have common authority over the premises may consent to an entry or search. The United States Supreme Court has explained the meaning of common authority as follows: Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent ... rests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n. 7, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 94 S.Ct. 988 (1974). [6] In State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543-44, 688 P.2d 859 (1984), we adopted the common authority standard as the proper approach to determining questions of consent under Const. art. 1, § 7. In that case, we emphasized two points: (1) the consenting party must be able to permit the search in his or her own right, and (2) it must be reasonable to find the defendant has assumed the risk another might permit a search. [7] Both elements of the Mathe inquiry are met in this case. The tenants had authority to consent to the search of the common areas in their own right. Common authority rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. Matlock, supra at 171 n. 7. The simple fact of common tenant access to these areas supports this finding. Landlords in Washington assume the risk tenants might permit a search of common areas. Assumption of risk can be imputed to landlords by virtue of the landlord-tenant act, the legislative context within which landlords lease premises to tenants in Washington. The landlord-tenant act clearly expresses a legislative concern to assure the fitness of residential tenancies through the conduct of necessary inspections. The Legislature has found that some tenants live in residences that are substandard and dangerous to their health and safety. RCW 59.18.115(1). It has accordingly provided that under certain circumstances, where a landlord fails to fulfill the statutory obligation to keep the premises fit for habitation, the landlord shall have no power or authority to prohibit entry for the inspection. RCW 59.18.115(2)(c). Given the statutory design, and the legislative concern which underlies it, we deem that landlords operating residential apartment houses in Washington assume the risk tenants will consent to inspections of common areas. Relying on State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735, 744, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989), Appellants maintain that because they share authority over common areas, the tenants could not consent to the inspection of those areas. Leach is inapposite. That case only held the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared. Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 739 (citing Matlock, at 170). Leach does not control the outcome of this case because the landlords do not assert they were present when the tenants consented to the inspections of the common areas. Because the consent was valid in three of the four instances in which the apartments and common areas were inspected, Appellants' challenge to the legality of those inspections fails.