Opinion ID: 1712255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: James Becnel

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause of prospective juror James Becnel. According to defendant, during defense counsel's questioning of this prospective juror, Becnel demonstrated a reluctance to hold the State to its burden of proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring his exclusion pursuant to LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 797(4). (The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court.) Specifically, defendant complains of the following exchange: MR. ARMOND: Okay. But if you went back in the back to deliberate and you're back there and you're saying, yeah, you know, they put on some evidence, it looks like he probably did it, but there is something out there, there is something missing, something doesn't sound right, how would you deal with it? . . . . MR. BECNEL: It would bother me, really. I'd have to ask more questions of you, notes or whatever we can take whatever, go through everything again to be sure. MR. ARMOND: Well you're not really allowed to take notes. MR. BECNEL: Got to ask questions. MR. ARMOND: But if the state puts on the case, he probably did it. I'm pretty sure he did it, but there's something missing. I can't put my finger on it. What do you think? MR. BECNEL: I can't answer that. MR. ARMOND: You can't answer that? MR. BECNEL: I probably would vote guilty. At the close of the panel, defense counsel challenged Becnel for cause on the ground that [h]e said when we were voir diring [sic] about guilt or innocence and reasonable doubt that if he thought that the guy probably did it and even if he had a doubt, he would probably vote guilty anyway. The trial court disputed defense counsel's interpretation of Becnel's responses, explaining: I heard him and I don't think he indicated that. The court denied the challenge for cause. Reading the record of the voir dire examination of this potential juror as a whole, it is clear that the trial court was correct in its assessment of Becnel's ability to hold the State to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Becnel's voir dire responses, considered as a whole, and not in a piecemeal fashion, reveal a potential juror who would work to deliberate further when he was not quite sure of his verdict, and seek to resolve any unresolved doubts by the means available to him. Moreover, a juror who probably would not listen to a nagging doubt for which he could not assign a rational reason based on the evidence (or lack thereof) presented at trial is not a juror who cannot hold the State to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on his responses as a whole, Becnel was clearly competent to apply the trial court's instruction at the close of the case that the State does not have to prove guilt beyond all possible doubt. Reasonable doubt is based on reason and common sense and is present when after you have carefully considered all the evidence, you cannot say that you are firmly convinced of the truth of the charge. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the challenge for cause of Becnel. Accordingly, defendant's assignments of error Numbers 18 and 19 lack merit.