Opinion ID: 2498467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The appellant was irreparably and unfairly prejudiced when character evidence of an aggravated assault, other wrongs, acts, or other unrelated crimes were referenced by the prosecution in the presence of the jury.

Text: ¶ 33. Neal argues that evidence of the robbery should not have been admitted, because the robbery and the burglary did not constitute a single transaction or occurrence or a closely related series of transactions or occurrences. Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235, 1246 (Miss.1994). In fact, the trial court's pretrial ruling reveals that it agreed with this portion of Neal's argument, and the State did not mention or reference the robbery in its case-in-chief. ¶ 34. It was only after Neal testified (contrary to the advice of his trial counsel) that the issue of the robbery came up. Neal testified that he was being interrogated for a robbery and other burglaries in an attempt to buttress why he admitted guilt for the burglary for which he was being tried. Neal testified that: (1) the officers had offered him a deal, (2) he had been questioned about a robbery and other burglaries, and (3) he had entered Peterson's home with the intent to assault him. The trial court properly allowed cross-examination regarding Neal's claims. The trial court then also allowed the State to rebut Neal's claim, not because it was part of single transaction, but because Neal had opened the door by his testimony, in which he asserted a different motive for the burglary and claimed the police offered him a deal. Additionally, the trial court allowed the rebuttal to permit the State to tell a complete story so that the jury could understand what's going on. See Davis, 660 So.2d at 1252. ¶ 35. This Court has stated that: even if evidence is otherwise inadmissible, one party can open the door to its admission. Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131, 133 (Miss.1988). We have previously said that [i]f a defendant opens the door to [the] line of testimony, ordinarily he may not complain about the prosecutor's decision to accept the benevolent invitation to cross the threshold. Payton v. State, 897 So.2d 921, 945 (Miss. 2003) (quoting Randall v. State, 806 So.2d 185, 198 (Miss.2001)) (citation omitted). See also Pruitt v. State, 807 So.2d 1236, 1241 (Miss.2002). ¶ 36. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Neal had been questioned about the robbery.