Opinion ID: 2582487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Trial Court's Failure to Exclude Jurors 9, 29, 100, and 120 for Cause

Text: ¶ 31 Yates claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motions to excuse jurors 9, 29, 100, and 120 for cause. Because Yates exercised a peremptory challenge following the denial of each motion, none of the four prospective jurors was seated on his panel. Moreover, at the close of voir dire, Yates retained three unused peremptory challenges. CP at 3746. On these facts, Yates cannot establish a Sixth Amendment violation. In United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000), the Supreme Court held that, where a defendant exercises a peremptory challenge after the court denies a defense motion to excuse the juror for cause, any potential violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is cured. Id. at 316-17, 120 S.Ct. 774; see State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471, 518, 14 P.3d 713 (2000) (holding that, because Roberts has not demonstrated that jurors who should have been removed for cause actually sat on the panel, his rights were not violated); State v. Fire, 145 Wash.2d 152, 165, 34 P.3d 1218 (2001) (holding that, even where defendant who has used peremptory challenge after denial of motion to exclude juror for cause ultimately exhausts peremptory challenges, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice if convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat). Thus, even if Yates could establish that the trial court erroneously denied his motions to excuse these four jurors for cause, he would be unable to establish a constitutional violation. c. Trial Court's Ruling on Proposed Voir Dire Regarding Religious Affiliations ¶ 32 The scope of voir dire is within the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Robinson, 75 Wash.2d 230, 231, 450 P.2d 180 (1969). The trial court's ruling regarding the scope of voir dire may not be disturbed on appeal [a]bsent an abuse of discretion and a showing that the accused's rights have been substantially prejudiced thereby. State v. Frederiksen, 40 Wash. App. 749, 752-53, 700 P.2d 369 (1985) (citing United States v. Robinson, 154 U.S.App. D.C. 265, 475 F.2d 376, 380 (1973)). Ordinarily, an individual's religious affiliations and beliefs are not proper subjects of inquiry during voir dire. See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Minn.1993); see also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (providing, in part, that no person shall . . . be incompetent as a witness or juror, in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion). Such questions may be proper, however, if the case involves religious issues or if the information is a necessary predicate for a voir dire challenge. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 772. The trial court in the present case reasonably permitted the written jurors' questionnaire to explore whether a juror's religious views would compromise his or her ability to apply impartially the law regarding the death penalty. [11] ¶ 33 Yates claims that the trial court erred when it refused to include the following proposed questions in the jurors' written questionnaire: 1. What is your religious affiliation, if any? 2. What is the fundamental teaching of your religion? 3. What influence has religion had in your life? 4. Describe your religious beliefs or philosophy. CP at 2827. Expressing reservations about the first question, the trial court rejected it, subject to getting some additional information from [the defense] or the State on whether that direct question can be asked; the court apparently received no supplemental information. 23 VRP at 1200 (emphasis added). Regarding the three additional questions, the trial court invited counsel to expand questions 102 and 103, which inquired into the effect of the jurors' religious beliefs on their ability to impose the death penalty. See supra note 10. However, here again, nothing in the record suggests that the defense sought any modification of the two questions. 23 VRP at 1190-91, 1200-01. Additionally, the trial court expressly stated that counsel could appropriate[ly] . . . ask follow-up questions of any jurors who responded affirmatively to the question, Do you have any religious or philosophical views which may cause you to feel uncomfortable sitting as a juror in a criminal case? 32 VRP at 1791; CP at 3281 (emphasis added). The record shows that the attorneys were permitted to follow up on questionnaire responses regarding the effect of a juror's religious beliefs on his or her ability to impose the death penalty. See, e.g., 35 VRP at 2403-04, 2408-15; 36 VRP at 2507. In some instances, defense counsel asked jurors directly about their notions of mercy. See, e.g., 33 VRP at 1971; 39 VRP at 2965, 3001; 40 VRP at 3244. ¶ 34 Because the trial court gave Yates ample latitude to explore the prospective jurors' religious beliefs as they related to the death penalty, Yates cannot show that the trial court's tentative rejection of his proposed question on religious affiliation substantially prejudiced his rights to a fair jury. Frederiksen, 40 Wash.App. at 753, 700 P.2d 369. In light of the foregoing facts, we conclude that the trial court's ruling regarding Yates's proposed voir dire questions was not an abuse of discretion. ¶ 35 3. Jury Instruction on Common Scheme or Plan.  Yates argues that the trial court substantially lowered the State's burden of proof by improperly defining, in jury instruction 20, the aggravating circumstance of RCW 10.95.020(10), commission of the murders as part of a common scheme or plan. [12] Appellate courts review de novo any claimed errors in jury instructions. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 605, 940 P.2d 546. ¶ 36 Because the phrase common scheme or plan consists of commonly understood words, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury regarding the definition of the phrase. Id. at 611-12, 940 P.2d 546. In this case, however, the trial court, after considering proposed instructions from the defense and the State, provided the following instruction on the definition of common scheme or plan: A common scheme or plan means there is a connection between the crimes in that one crime is done in preparation for the other. A common scheme or plan also occurs when a person devises an overarching criminal plan and uses it to perpetrate separate but very similar crimes. CP at 4106, Jury Instruction 20. The court's instruction and the State's proposed instruction [13] relied on the two alternative definitions of common scheme or plan that this court embraced in State v. Lough, 125 Wash.2d 847, 889 P.2d 487 (1995), for purposes of defining common scheme or plan under ER 404(b): There are two different situations wherein the plan exception to the general ban on prior bad acts evidence may arise. One is where several crimes constitute constituent parts of a plan in which each crime is but a piece of the larger plan. . . . A simple example would be a prior theft to acquire a tool or weapon to perpetrate a subsequently executed crime. The other situation arises when an individual devises a plan and uses it repeatedly to perpetrate separate but very similar crimes. Id. at 854-55, 889 P.2d 487 (emphasis added). Rejecting the notion that the prior act had to be causally connected to (and done in preparation for) the charged act, the Lough court concluded that under ER 404(b) the State, in order to prove the charged crimes of indecent liberties and attempted rape, was entitled to present evidence that the defendant had previously drugged and raped four other women in much the same manner. Id. at 855-61, 889 P.2d 487. ¶ 37 In the present case, Yates argues that the trial court erred when it defined common scheme or plan in RCW 10.95.020(10) by relying on the Lough court's definition of the phrase for purposes of ER 404(b). Yates's argument is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, Yates ignores this court's earlier reliance on Lough in State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d 628, 904 P.2d 245 (1995). In Pirtle, the court turned to the traditional understanding of common scheme or plan within the rules of evidence and specifically stated that [t]his understanding . . . sheds light on the nature of the connection needed between the murders for purposes of RCW 10.95.020(10). Id. at 662, 904 P.2d 245. The Pirtle court quoted only the first of the two Lough alternatives because Pirtle's murders were committed as `constituent parts of a plan in which each crime is but a piece of the larger plan.' Id. (quoting Lough, 125 Wash.2d at 855, 889 P.2d 487). The Pirtle court found ample evidence that the murder of the second Burger King employee was connected to Pirtle's larger criminal purpose of robbing the Burger King and killing the first victim. Id. at 663, 904 P.2d 245. While the facts in Pirtle were applicable only to the first of the Lough court's alternative definitions of common scheme or plan, the Pirtle court nonetheless broadly declared the Lough court's ER 404(b) definition a source of enlightenment for interpreting the same phrase in RCW 10.95.020(10). ¶ 38 Additionally, the second of the Lough court's alternative definitions of common scheme or plan comports with legislative intent. Were this court to adopt Yates's narrow notion of the common scheme or plan aggravator, the court would necessarily be holding that the legislature did not intend to enact an aggravating circumstance applicable to serial killers who use the same plan or formula over an extended period of time to kill multiple victims. Br. of Resp't at 103; see id. at 104 (describing legislative history). [14] We reject such a notion. ¶ 39 Thus, we hold that in jury instruction 20 the trial court properly defined common scheme or plan. ¶ 40 4. Sufficiency of Evidence Regarding Aggravating Circumstances. Yates concedes that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he murdered Mercer and Ellis with premeditated intent. [15] As defense counsel told the jury in his opening statement, Mr. Yates has waited patiently for almost two years for me to say to you that he killed Melinda Mercer and Connie LaFontaine Ellis. He did. We are in trial because the State, through the Pierce County prosecutor, has decided that these are not premeditated murders as Mr. Yates has pled guilty to in Spokane, but premeditated murder with aggravating circumstances. 50 VRP at 4366. ¶ 41 However, Yates argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the three alleged aggravating circumstances  that is, that he committed the murders as part of a common scheme or plan, in furtherance of . . . [r]obbery, and to conceal the commission of a crime. RCW 10.95.020(10), (11)(a), (9). In challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the presence of the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Varga, 151 Wash.2d 179, 201, 86 P.3d 139 (2004); Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 607, 940 P.2d 546. Circumstantial and direct evidence are deemed equally reliable. Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 201, 86 P.3d 139.