Opinion ID: 779119
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of Contract Due to Agway's Hiring of Goodman

Text: 36 Only paragraph 5 of the Terms restrains Agway's ability to hire an ADR employee. Thus, unless ADR can show that the Terms constituted part of its agreement with Agway, ADR cannot show that Agway's employment of Goodman caused a breach. ADR posits two theories of how the Terms constitute part of the agreement. The first is that the Proposal and Terms formed the initial agreement on or around February or March 1998. Under this theory, the subsequent signed documents — the Confidentiality Agreement and the Supply Agreement — are signed amendments to the contract under paragraph 1(d) of the Terms. Alternatively, ADR argues that the Supply Agreement is ambiguous and can only be understood by reference to the Proposal and Terms. 37 ADR's claim must fail, whether we begin with ADR's theory that the Proposal and Terms were amended by the Supply Agreement, or begin with ADR's theory that the Supply Agreement is ambiguous and clarified by the Proposal and Terms. Under Michigan's parol evidence rule, prior agreements or negotiations cannot contradict the terms of a document intended to be the final and complete expression of the parties' agreement. Am. Anodco, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 743 F.2d 417, 422 (6th Cir.1984); see Archambo v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 466 Mich. 402, 646 N.W.2d 170, 176-77 (2002) (a subsequent contract abrogates the terms of a prior contract when evidence demonstrates such an intent). We look to objective evidence, such as expressed words and visible acts, to determine the intent of the parties. See Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 444 Mich. 107, 507 N.W.2d 591, 598 (1993). 38 A written integration clause is conclusive evidence that the parties intended the document to be the final and complete expression of their agreement. See Archambo, 646 N.W.2d at 177 n. 16; UAW-GM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 228 Mich.App. 486, 579 N.W.2d 411, 418 (1998); see also Cook v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 210 F.3d 653, 656 (6th Cir.2000) (applying Michigan law to a franchise agreement). It is also conclusive evidence that the parties intended to supersede any prior contract on the same subject matter. See Archambo, 646 N.W.2d at 177 n. 16. The only exception to this rule is in cases of fraud ... or where an agreement is obviously incomplete `on its face' and, therefore, parol evidence is necessary for the `filling of gaps.' UAW-GM, 579 N.W.2d at 418 (citation omitted); see also Archambo, 646 N.W.2d at 177 n. 15. 39 ADR does not allege fraud. Therefore, it may only admit the Proposal and Terms if the Supply Agreement is incomplete on its face. UAW-GM, 579 N.W.2d at 418. An agreement is incomplete on its face where it fails to specify obvious elements of the deal struck. Id. at 420 n. 12. However, we may not read ambiguity into a contract where none exists. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mich. v. Nikkel, 460 Mich. 558, 596 N.W.2d 915, 920 (1999). Furthermore, the Michigan Court of Appeals has counseled that we should construe the incompleteness exception narrowly, as [a] broad interpretation of this exception would largely vitiate the purpose of [an integration] clause. UAW-GM, 579 N.W.2d at 420 n. 12. 40 ADR has produced no objective evidence that the Supply Agreement is incomplete on its face or omits obvious elements of the deal struck. The Supply Agreement plainly contains essential terms of a consulting contract including provisions for confidentiality, limitations on liability, fee structure, and termination. ADR's only credible argument for facial incompleteness is the use of the term proposal in paragraph one of the Supply Agreement. We find, however, that the statement that ADR has produced a proposal detailing the scope, objectives and deliverables from the project does not specifically reference the Proposal, as ADR claims. Instead, we conclude that the language refers to the Supply Agreement itself. If the parties had intended to specifically reference the Proposal, they could have used the same explicit language with which they incorporated the Confidentiality Agreement. The fact that they knew how to use such clear language of incorporation, but chose not to use it, is highly probative — and in this case dispositive — evidence that the parties did not intend to incorporate the Proposal. See Zurich Ins. v. CCR & Co., 226 Mich.App. 599, 576 N.W.2d 392, 397 (1997) (a defendant could not introduce parol evidence to clarify an alleged ambiguity where the terminology (and the necessity for its use, if agreed) was known and available to the scriveners but was not utilized for the purpose advocated by defendant). 2 ADR has failed to produce sufficient evidence to suggest that the Supply Agreement was intended to be anything other than the final and complete agreement between the parties. 41