Opinion ID: 2068093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: kinsey's counterclaim

Text: Kinsey also asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing his counterclaim against Continental. Kinsey alleged in the counterclaim that Continental did not represent him fairly or in good faith in defending the action brought by Bjorgen. Kinsey asserted that Continental did not properly conduct discovery, did not negotiate in good faith to settle with Bjorgen, and did not otherwise represent him in good faith. Continental asserts that Kinsey's failure to file a timely appeal from the final judgment in this case precludes consideration of this issue on appeal. In April 1992, Continental moved for summary judgment in its favor and dismissal of Kinsey's counterclaim. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Continental's motion. A final judgment was entered on July 17, 1992, and notice of entry of final judgment was served on all parties on July 22, 1992. In a document entitled Kinsey's Motion For Reconsideration, dated July 15, 1992, and filed on August 3, 1992, Kinsey requested the court to reconsider its order granting summary judgment to Continental and dismissing Kinsey's counterclaim. The trial court treated the motion as a request for relief from the judgment on grounds of newly discovered evidence, under Rule 60(b)(ii), N.D.R.Civ.P. By order, dated July 31, 1992, the court denied Kinsey's motion for reconsideration. On September 29, 1992, Kinsey filed his notice of appeal from the final judgment of July 17, 1992, and from orders of the court dated December 17, 1991, July 1, 1992, and July 31, 1992. Continental asserts that this notice of appeal was untimely. Under Rule 4, N.D.R.App.P., a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days from the date of the service of notice of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 4, N.D.R.App. P., is not tolled by the filing of a Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., motion, but it is tolled by the filing of a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59, N.D.R.Civ.P. Under the corresponding federal rule, a motion characterized as a motion for reconsideration is deemed to be a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment, for purposes of tolling the time period for filing a notice of appeal. Tylo Sauna, S.A. v. Amerec Corp., 826 F.2d 7 (Fed.Cir.1987); Emory v. Secretary of Navy, 819 F.2d 291 (D.C.Cir.1987); Rados v. Celotex Corp., 809 F.2d 170 (2d Cir.1986); Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345 (3d Cir.1986). Following these federal authorities, we are persuaded that Kinsey's motion should be treated as a Rule 59, N.D.R.Civ.P., motion, for purposes of tolling the time period for filing the notice of appeal. We conclude, therefore, that Kinsey filed a timely notice of appeal and that the issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing Kinsey's counterclaim is properly before this court. The primary ground for the trial court's dismissal of Kinsey's counterclaim was the court's conclusion that Kinsey's insurance policy with Continental did not provide coverage for Bjorgen's judgment against Kinsey. We have construed the policy to provide coverage for the punitive damages portion of Bjorgen's judgment, and, therefore, it is necessary for the trial court to reconsider the merits of Kinsey's counterclaim. Because the issues discussed in this opinion are dispositive of the appeal, other issues raised by the parties need not be addressed. Karst v. Vickers, 444 N.W.2d 698 (N.D.1989). We reverse the decision of the trial court, and we remand for reconsideration of the issues raised by Kinsey's counterclaim and for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SANDSTROM, Acting C.J., MESCHKE, J., and RALPH J. ERICKSTAD, Surrogate Judge, concur. RALPH J. ERICKSTAD, Surrogate Judge, sitting in place of VANDE WALLE, C.J., disqualified.