Opinion ID: 23596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable notwithstanding that such denial was premised upon the existence of “[m]aterial issues of fact”. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S.Ct. 834, 842 (1996); Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1998). On such an interlocutory appeal, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s finding that particular factual issues are “genuine,” that is that the summary judgment evidence would support a particular finding of fact. Behrens, 116 S.Ct. at 842; Johnson v. Jones, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2159 (1995); Colston, 146 F.3d at 284. However, this Court does have jurisdiction to review the magistrate’s determination that certain facts (or factual disputes) are “material” to the issue of qualified immunity. White v. Balderama, 153 F.3d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 1998); Colston, 146 F.3d at 284-85. The scope of clearly established law and the objective reasonableness of those acts of the defendant that the district court found the plaintiff could prove at trial are legal issues we review de novo. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. at 2156, 59; Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1999); Balderama, 153 F.3d at 242; Colston, 146 F.3d at 285 n.2.7 7 See also, e.g., Hare v. City of Corinth, Ms., 135 F.3d 320 at 328 (5th Cir. 1998) (Hare III) (“objective reasonableness is a question of law for the court”); Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]o the extent that the relevant discrete, historic facts are undisputed . . . the question of the objective reasonableness of the 10 Ideally, the district court’s order denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity explains what facts the plaintiff may be able to prove at trial, i.e. what particular facts the court assumed in denying summary judgment urged on the basis of qualified immunity. This facilitates appellate review by allowing this Court to focus on the aforementioned purely legal issues. When, as is true to some extent here, the court below fails to do this and, instead, denies the motion simply because “fact issues” remain, this Court has two choices. We can either scour the record and determine what facts the plaintiff may be able to prove at trial and proceed to resolve the legal issues, or remand so that the trial court can clarify the order. Behrens, 116 S.Ct, at 842; Johnson, 115 S.Ct. at 2159; Glenn v. City of Tyler, 2001 WL 102270,  (5th Cir. February 22, 2001); Wagner v. Bay City, Texas, 227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2000); Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000); Balderama, 153 F.3d at 242; Colston, 146 F.3d at 285-86 & nn. 2-3. We do not believe remand is necessary here. II. Standard for Entitlement to Qualified Immunity The doctrine of qualified immunity serves to shield a government official from civil liability for damages based upon the performance of discretionary functions if the official’s acts were defendant’s conduct–i.e., whether at the time and under the circumstances all reasonable officials would have realized the particular challenged conduct violated the constitutional provision sued on–is . . . a question of law”). 11 objectively reasonable in light of then clearly established law. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). As we said in Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1997): “Where, as here, a section 1983 defendant pleads qualified immunity and shows he is a governmental official whose position involves the exercise of discretion, the plaintiff then has the burden ‘to rebut this defense by establishing that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.’ Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992). We do ‘not require that an official demonstrate that he did not violate clearly established federal rights; our precedent places that burden upon plaintiffs.’ Id.” The first step in the qualified immunity analysis is to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established federal constitutional (or federal statutory) right. Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998) (Hare III); Pierce, 117 F.3d at 872. If the plaintiff does so, the Court must then assess whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. Hare III, 135 F.3d at 326; Pierce, 117 F.3d at 872. Unlike the first step, the step two inquiry applies the law that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. To ensure that qualified immunity serves its intended purpose, it is of paramount import, during step two, to define “clearly established law” at the proper level of generality. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987); Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1998); 12 Pierce, 117 F.3d at 872. “Clearly established” means that the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. The defendant’s acts are held to be objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in the defendant’s circumstances would have then known that the defendant’s conduct violated the United States Constitution or the federal statute as alleged by the plaintiff. Id. at 3040; Malley v. Briggs, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986); Pierce, 117 F.3d at 871. The “defendant’s circumstances” includes facts know to the defendant. However, because qualified immunity turns only upon the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s acts, a particular defendant’s subjective state of mind has no bearing on whether that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3040; Pierce, 117 F.3d at 871 n.5. An official is eligible for qualified immunity even if the official violated another’s constitutional rights. Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000); Pierce, 117 F.3d at 872. III. Constitutional Right to Reasonable Medical Care Plaintiffs correctly observe that pretrial detainees have a constitutional right, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to have their serious medical needs met 13 with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Hare II); Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1426 (11th Cir. 1997); Colle v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1993); Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979). Lancaster, Colle and Fielder establish that delirium tremens is a serious medical need. In Fielder, a request by the prisoner’s mother to the jailer that he receive medical attention for delirium tremens was followed by a request from the prisoner himself. Fielder 590 F.2d at 108. These requests were ignored, the jailers stating that they thought the prisoner was “faking.” Id. This evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff. Id. Colle reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint and held that the plaintiff properly alleged a constitutional violation by asserting that the sheriff: 1) staffed the jail with persons who did not have the authority to transfer a detainee to the hospital; and 2) had a policy of failing to monitor the serious health needs of detainees. Colle, 981 F.2d at 245. The sheriff’s jailers failed to call for medical assistance as the condition of an inmate they knew to be suffering from delirium tremens worsened. Id. at 240. Lancaster reversed the district court’s grant of summary 14 judgment based on defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity and held that either a “total failure” to provide or an exacerbating delay in providing life saving medical treatment to a detainee suffering from DTs was a violation of constitutional rights. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1425-28. The court cited Fielder for the proposition that DTs was recognized as a serious medical need. Id. at 1426. Lancaster established that ignoring the dangers of alcohol withdrawal and waiting for a “manifest emergency” before summoning medical help constituted deliberate indifference.8 The facts in Lancaster were particularly egregious because the detainee’s wife and father had informed a jailer and the sheriff that the detainee was a chronic alcoholic, would suffer DTs, and would need immediate help if he had a seizure. Plaintiffs rely most heavily upon Weaver v. Tipton County, Tennessee, 41 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). In Weaver, a prisoner who had a history of seizures and alcohol withdrawal appeared to have a seizure and was told he was going to be taken to the hospital. The prisoner stated that he was fine and that a trip to the hospital was unnecessary. The next day a psychologist told the jailer the prisoner needed to be taken to the emergency room. 8 Id. The Lancaster court appears to have melded or confused deliberate indifference (the standard for § 1983 liability) with objective reasonableness (the standard for entitlement to qualified immunity). In this circuit, the concepts, though related, are distinct. Hare III, 135 F.3d at 327-38. Nevertheless, we believe Lancaster supports the proposition that delaying medical treatment for a detainee suffering from DTs until a crisis occurs is objectively unreasonable. 15 The prisoner was never taken to the emergency room and was never again offered a trip to the hospital. He died six days after entering the jail, four days after initially refusing a trip to the hospital. The jailers moved for summary judgment solely on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion because it concluded that, in the Sixth Circuit, when a plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s needs, the defense of qualified immunity is precluded. Id. at 785. The district court noted its disagreement with the Sixth Circuit’s construction of Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994), in this respect, and likewise indicated its agreement with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Hare III, which held that the defense of qualified immunity is not precluded by a deliberate indifference claim. Weaver, 41 F.Supp.2d at 785 n.5. Plaintiffs’ reliance upon Weaver is misplaced. Weaver, in obedience to its understanding of Sixth Circuit law, merely concluded that an allegation of deliberate indifference precluded the defense of qualified immunity without reference to whether the conduct of the defendant was objectively reasonable, contrary to the law of this circuit. Moreover, Weaver is not only a decision of a district court outside of this circuit, and not a decision of this Court, but it was handed down almost eighteen months after Thompson died, and cannot be considered part of any body of law that was then clearly established. 16