Opinion ID: 717992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: glover

Text: 15 We review the district court's denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. United States v. Riggins, 40 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.1994). The proper analysis is that used in a review of the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Shirley, 884 F.2d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir.1989). We evaluate the evidence presented against the defendant in a light most favorable to the government to determine whether  'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  Riggins, 40 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). All reasonable inferences from the facts must be drawn in favor of the government. United States v. Andrino-Carillo, 63 F.3d 922, 924 (9th Cir.1995). 16 Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may support a conviction. United States v. Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir.1995). However, mere suspicion or speculation is not sufficient. United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir.1994). The relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict. United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir.1991) (citations omitted).
17 Glover was convicted as a principal for aiding and abetting another in committing an armed robbery. A conviction of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) requires that the defendant committed an unarmed bank robbery in violation of § 2113(a) and also committed the aggravating behavior--endangering the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device--as described in § 2113(d). To be liable as a principal for helping another to commit a crime, the defendant must knowingly and intentionally help the principal in every essential element of the crime. Dinkane, 17 F.3d at 1196. The defendant must give his assistance during the commission of the crime. Id. 18 Dinkane sets out the government's burden of proof in securing a conviction of a getaway car driver for aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery: 19 The government must show that the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided the commission of the aggravating element: assaulting a person or putting a life in jeopardy before or during the commission of that aggravating element. If the aiding and abetting of the underlying offense occurs only after the aggravating use of a dangerous weapon has ended, the defendant cannot be shown to have aided and abetted an essential element of armed bank robbery and therefore cannot be convicted of the greater offense. 20 Id. at 1197 (emphasis added). 21 In Dinkane, we considered the sufficiency of the evidence supporting defendant's conviction of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery for his role as a getaway driver. We vacated the conviction, holding that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant helped in the principals' use of dangerous weapons during the robbery. We found that [t]here was no evidence that prior to the robbery [the defendant] Dinkane knew that the principals had and intended to use weapons. Id. 1 22 Relevant to our analysis in Dinkane was the fact that the jury received the following instruction, which the government later conceded was incorrect: The government is not required to show that the defendant actually knew that a dangerous weapon would be used. Id. We concluded that no properly instructed jury could have reasonably found the defendant guilty of armed bank robbery. Id. 23 On the day of the robbery, Turpitt told the police that the gun found in her house did not belong to her son. At trial, she testified for the government and stated that she later learned that her son did own that gun. The jury heard this testimony and also learned of Turpitt's initial statement to the contrary. After Turpitt testified, the prosecutor argued in summation that Turpitt lied about her son owning the BB gun. 24 On appeal, the Government urges that the jury may have believed Turpitt's trial testimony about her son's ownership of the gun. Thus, the government argues, the jury may have readily concluded that Glover took the gun from his nephew's bedroom sometime before the robbery, provided it to Pedrioli to use, and returned it to the bedroom upon Glover's return to the house after the robbery. This argument is important, because it links Glover to the gun and supports the inference that Glover must have known of the gun use before or during the robbery, as required by Dinkane. 25 Glover argues that we cannot or ought not consider Turpitt's testimony about her son's owning the gun as part of the evidence used to prove Glover's knowledge of the aggravating behavior. Glover contends that after the prosecutor discredited the Turpitt testimony during closing argument, the government may not now rely on this same testimony as a basis for sustaining the jury's verdict. Glover also asserts that this Court should in any case disregard the Turpitt testimony as inherently unbelievable. 26 We first address the issue of whether and how we should consider the Turpitt testimony and then decide whether the evidence before us supports the conviction under the Dinkane standard. 27 We reject Glover's argument that we should construe the government's disparaging of the testimony as a judicial admission. Glover improperly relies on United States v. Bentson, 947 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 958 (1992). In Bentson, this Court found that the defendant was bound on appeal by his attorney's closing statement before the district court because that statement constituted a judicial admission. We determined that the attorney conceded that the defendant did not file valid tax returns when the attorney stated that the defense did not suggest that valid returns were filed. Id. at 1356. 28 It does not appear to us that the prosecutor's interpretation of the testimony of Ms. Turpitt and argument urging the jury to adopt this interpretation constitute a judicial admission on behalf of the government. Whatever the government's version of the testimony, the jury may still have disregarded it and believed Turpitt. 29 We also reject Glover's suggestion that we should disregard the testimony because it is inherently unbelievable. Decisions finding testimony inherently unbelievable involve testimony which is physically or logically impossible. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Rascon, 8 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir.1993) (It simply defies logic to believe that a law enforcement agent can observe the extra degree of awareness the officer described here under these circumstances.); see also United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir.1992) (We must accept the evidence unless it is contrary to the laws of nature ... or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable fact finder could accept it.) (citations omitted). 30 If we construe Turpitt's trial testimony as contradicting an earlier statement, the reliability of her testimony is impacted. Nevertheless, the testimony is still far from preposterous and so should not be disregarded on the inherently unbelievable basis. 31 In any case, we find that Ms. Turpitt's testimony at trial was not really inconsistent. At the time Ms. Turpitt made her first statement denying knowledge of the gun, she may well not have known that her son owned the gun. Ms. Turpitt may have first learned that the gun did, in fact, belong to her son in later talking to him and so testified at trial. 32 We conclude that we may and will consider Turpitt's testimony in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. We also believe that the totality of the Government's evidence connected the gun to Glover and allowed the jury to conclude that he must have known about the gun's use. Two witnesses identified Glover as the driver of the getaway car from an alley near the bank. Evidence showed that the car belonged to the mother of co-defendant Pedrioli. Glover was arrested in the same car as he drove away from his sister's home. The man identified as the robber, Pedrioli, was also found in this house. Most importantly, with respect to the aiding and abetting conviction, the police found a Crossman BB pistol in the bedroom of Glover's nephew. Several witnesses identified this pistol as identical to the weapon used in the bank robbery. Glover's sister, Turpitt testified that the gun belonged to her son. In the same house, the police found almost exactly one-half of the $9870 taken in the robbery. The finding of the money at this house and especially the amount of the money are important circumstantial facts implicating Glover and also associating him with the gun. 33 Glover urges that the evidence does not exclude and even supports the conclusion that Pedrioli, rather than Glover, dropped off the gun at Glover's sister's home. 34 We acknowledge that the evidence tending to prove Glover's knowledge of the gun use does not eliminate all other alternatives. Nevertheless, the elimination of all other alternatives is not our standard for sufficiency of the evidence. See Mares, 940 F.2d at 458. The above possibilities are hypothetical exculpatory explanations which the jury is under no duty to draw from the evidence. The jury concluded that the sum of all uncertainties did not rise to the level of reasonable doubt as to their conclusion that Glover must have known about the gun. Although a different jury may have decided differently, this Court must only interfere with the jury's conclusion if no rational or reasonable jury would convict on these facts. 35 In summary, we hold that there is sufficient evidence linking Glover to the gun use in the robbery and establishing that he knew about it before the crime. 36
37 We reject Glover's assertion that there was insufficient evidence of his knowingly aiding and abetting a bank robbery as the getaway car driver. The government presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Glover knew he was helping Pedrioli rob a bank. Eyewitnesses identified Glover as the driver of the Mercedes used as the getaway car. As the robbery took place, the Mercedes was parked in an alley near the bank rather than in the bank parking lot. The police found almost half of the money taken from the bank and the weapon identified as the one used by the robber in Glover's sister's home. The man identified as the robber was also there and the Mercedes belonged to that man's mother. A reasonable jury could find this evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Glover knew he assisted a robbery. 38

39 We review the district court's denial of a motion for mistrial or a new trial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. George, 56 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir.1995).
40 To successfully move for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that it is more probable than not that the [prosecutorial] misconduct materially affected the verdict. United States v. Hinton, 31 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir.1994) (citing to United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir.1987). Reversal will only be necessary if the alleged prosecutorial misconduct actually deprived the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1539 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866, 109 S.Ct. 171, 102 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). The prosecutor's alleged misconduct must be evaluated in the context of the entire trial. Id. We find significant and may defer to the trial court's view of the prosecutor's conduct. United States v. Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir.1991) (quotation omitted). 41 We reject Glover's claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The record shows that the prosecutor did not elicit the improper testimony. With respect to the outstanding warrant for Glover's arrest, the prosecutor attempted to stop the detective from elaborating about the warrant. Moreover, Pedrioli's counsel conceded that the prosecutor's question to McNeff did not prompt the answer regarding Pedrioli's parole status.
42 Even if we find that the prosecutor did not intentionally act improperly, we must assess whether the conduct affected the outcome of the trial. The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 (1982). 43 In any case, in his prosecutorial misconduct argument, Glover implicitly argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the inadmissible evidence was not sufficiently prejudicial so as to require a mistrial or a new trial. Glover takes issue with the comment about the warrant, the Pedrioli parole testimony, and also with the adequacy of the instruction in addressing the prejudice. 44 The improper admission of evidence mandates reversal unless the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the error did not influence the verdict. United States v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir.1993). 2 45
46 In support of his argument, defendant refers to several of our cases involving the improper admission of testimony or physical evidence by the court. See, e.g., United States v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984); United States v. Lehay, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir.1959); United States v. Bradley, 5 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir.1994). 47 The above authorities are factually inapposite to the matter before us today. 3 In this case, the district court did not allow the jury to consider the improper testimony in reaching their verdict as to Glover. The court immediately struck the offending testimony about the warrant and later gave a curative instruction with respect to all of the improper evidence. 48 Even if we treat the testimony about Glover's outstanding warrant as improper admission of bad character evidence causing some prejudice to the defendant, reversal does not automatically result. We may affirm the conviction where the lower court gave an admonishment to the jury and there is strong evidence of defendant's guilt. United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761 (9th Cir.1991) (citing to United States v. Johnson, 618 F.2d 60, 62 (9th Cir.1980)). 49 We explained in Aichele,: If the case against a defendant is very strong, though not overwhelming, and the reviewing court is unconvinced that the admission of the evidence influenced the outcome of the case, the court may uphold the verdict. Id. Glover urges that in Aichele, the prejudice to the defendant was much less significant and the government's case was much stronger than in his case. In Aichele, the inadmissible testimony was about the one time defendant was in prison in 1964, about 25 years before the trial. 50 Although testimony about an outstanding warrant would be more prejudicial than the testimony in Aichele, our analysis does not stop here. We consider the prejudice in the context of the government's case. The government's case against Glover is quite powerful. The circumstantial evidence and the witness identifications of Glover as the driver constitute strong evidence tending to show that Glover was a participant in the robbery. As we discussed and concluded above, there is also sufficient evidence to conclude that Glover knew he was helping the use of a gun. Moreover, each time Speckman mentioned the warrant, he did not finish his sentence, and the testimony was not admitted into evidence. 51
52 Glover also argues that the Pedrioli parole testimony was extremely prejudicial to Glover's case. He reasons that the jury now linked Glover with an accomplice, who the jury heard was on parole for the same crime for which the jury now tried Glover. However, the evidence against Pedrioli was very strong--it included the use of his mother's car as the getaway vehicle, Pedrioli's presence at the house of the sister of the person identified as the driver of that car, and the identification of Pedrioli by four employees. The court also instructed the jury to disregard the McNeff comment. 53
54 Glover contends that the jury instruction failed to alleviate and even aggravated the prejudice caused by the evidence erroneously presented to the jury. 55 The court instructed the jury as follows, in relevant part: Ladies and gentlemen, just prior to the noon hour, you heard some testimony relating to criminal acts by the defendant and a violation of parole. You are admonished and instructed to disregard that testimony. Glover asserts that the court erroneously spoke of a violation of parole and of criminal acts, when the testimony only informed the jury about an outstanding arrest warrant and about parole. 56 Neither defendant objected to the instruction during the trial. Glover explains that any objection would have drawn more attention to the fact that there was an outstanding warrant. 57 Nonetheless, when a defendant fails to object to the instruction at trial, we review the instruction for plain error. United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 830 (9th Cir.1995). Reversal is warranted only when viewing the error in the context of the entire record, the impropriety 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, or where failing to reverse a conviction would amount to a miscarriage of justice.'  United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.1993). We have the authority, but are not required, to correct a forfeited error which is plain and affect[ing] substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993). 58 After weighing all the relevant factors and considering especially the strength of the government's case, we have a fair assurance that neither the Speckman statements about the warrant nor the McNeff comment about Pedrioli's parole influenced the jury's verdict as to Glover. We also find that the instruction did not amount to plain error which we must recognize to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 59
Defense Counsel 60 On the day of his arrest, Glover made a statement to government Agent Scott. Inadvertently, this statement was not produced to defendant until Agent Scott was on the stand. As a sanction for the untimely production, the district judge barred the government from using the statement for any purpose. 61 We review for abuse of discretion the district court's choice of remedy for violation of a discovery order. United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488, 1490 (9th Cir.1992). The trial court may exercise wide discretion in choosing a sanction for violation of Fed.R.Crim.Pro. Rule 16(a)(1)(A). United States v. Burgess, 791 F.2d 676, 681 (9th Cir.1986). In Burgess, we found that suppression of a defendant statement not produced in discovery prevented prejudice and failure to impose a more severe sanction was not an abuse of direction. Id. 62 Glover chose not to make the statement part of the record and it is not before us. Glover has not shown how the government's failure to produce this statement prejudiced the preparation or presentation of his defense. He contends that the statement is incriminating only because the jury heard that the defendant made a statement about his whereabouts without ever learning what that statement was due to a defense objection. 4 63 There is no testimony that Glover responded to Agent Scott's question in any way and certainly no testimony suggesting that he responded with some incriminating information. Defendant reaches too far when he argues that the simple knowledge on the part of the jury that the agent had a discussion with Glover concerning Glover's whereabouts is incriminating to Glover. 64 Accordingly, we find that the district court properly exercised its discretion in choosing the sanction.
65 Finally, Glover summarily contends that the prejudice from the jury learning that he made some unspecified statement about his whereabouts adds to the prejudice caused by the other errors in the case. Glover appears to argue that cumulative error occurred. 66 Even if no individual error rises to the level of reversible error, the cumulative effect of errors may be so prejudicial as to mandate reversal. Necoechea, 986 F.2d at 1282. In reviewing for cumulative error, we review all plain errors and all errors preserved for appeal. Id. We also consider whether any traces remain from an error cured by instruction. Id. 67 We have in the past declined to apply the cumulative error analysis when we found that defendant pointed to no errors in the proceedings. See United States v. Gutierrez, 995 F.2d 169, 173 (9th Cir.1993) (defendant who failed to establish single error in the admission of evidence has no basis for asserting cumulative error in receiving evidence). 68 Glover's statement was suppressed before it was used and no information about the existence of the statement or its content went to the jury. Accordingly, there was no error on that issue. Nevertheless, because traces may remain from Speckman's testimony about the warrant and McNeff's testimony about Pedrioli's parole, we will consider whether these traces amount to cumulative error. 69 The court's rulings on these evidentiary matters individually is subject to non-constitutional harmless error analysis. 5 Therefore, we affirm if we have a fair assurance that the cumulative error did not influence the verdict. United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 201 (9th Cir.1980) (using more probably than not standard to analyze for cumulative non-constitutional error). 70 The trial court admonished the jury and struck the evidence. The government presented a very strong case. We find that any lingering prejudice from the cured errors was minimal and did not affect the jury's verdict as to Glover.