Opinion ID: 196118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claims Against the Prosecutors

Text: 18 Reid contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claims against prosecutors Wageling and McDonough. He argues that Imbler absolute immunity should not extend to claims for withholding exculpatory evidence in direct violation of trial court orders, where it is alleged that the prosecutors repeatedly misled the trial court itself throughout the criminal proceedings. Reid claims that the disclosure orders issued by the trial court displaced whatever discretion the prosecutors may have had concerning disclosure of exculpatory evidence, consequently their failure to disclose was not a prosecutorial function at all, but merely ministerial. Finally, he contends that the prosecutors repeatedly lied to the trial court about the existence of the exculpatory evidence, whereas in Imbler the prosecutor voluntarily disclosed the evidence shortly after learning of it. The district court dismissed the claims against the prosecutors as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). We review only for abuse of discretion, see Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 539 (1st Cir.1993), and find none. 7 19 First, Reid alleged no facts suggesting that the prosecutors had anything to do with the arrest. The complaint therefore failed to state an actionable false arrest claim. 8 20 Second, under Imbler it is 'now [a] well-settled rule that a prosecutor cannot be held personally liable for the knowing suppression of exculpatory information.'  Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369, 1372-73 (10th Cir.1991) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091, 112 S.Ct. 1160, 117 L.Ed.2d 408 (1992); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1446 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987). 9 See Campbell v. Maine, 787 F.2d 776, 777 (1st Cir.1986) (per curiam); Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221-22 (6th Cir.1976) (per curiam). The Imbler rule has been applied where prosecutors failed to disclose exculpatory evidence specifically requested by the defense, see Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 77, 78-80 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048, 107 S.Ct. 2177, 95 L.Ed.2d 834 (1987), and where prosecutors misled the trial court in order to conceal their failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, see Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F.Supp. 1072, 1082 (E.D.Pa.1980). 21 Thus, we think the trial court discovery orders did not displace Imbler immunity. In the first place, it is inaccurate to assert, as Reid does, that there was no prosecutorial discretion left to be exercised respecting the disclosure of this evidence. On the contrary, the disclosure orders were issued in response to motions for any 'exculpatory' evidence which could assist [Reid] in the preparation and presentation of his defense, broad language indicating a general request for Brady material. The orders accordingly left the prosecutors with something more than a ministerial function to perform. The prosecutors were required to determine what evidence in their possession was exculpatory and subject to disclosure. 10 Cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2616, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (when prosecutor evaluates evidence and interviews witnesses in preparation for trial, he functions within the scope of absolute immunity). Imbler expressly recognized that requiring prosecutors to defend--in section 1983 actions--decisions concerning the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425-26, 96 S.Ct. at 993. The view expressed in the Imbler dissent--that absolute immunity should attach only if the prosecutor has disclosed all facts which cast doubt on the State's evidence--was rejected by the Imbler Court because such a requirement would interfere with the legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 432, 96 S.Ct. at 996. Imbler thus implicitly acknowledged that prosecutors retain discretion to determine what evidence is to be disclosed under Brady and that absolute immunity attaches to their exercise of discretion. 22 The further allegation that these prosecutors repeatedly misled the trial court in order to conceal their alleged misconduct does not defeat absolute immunity. In Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489-90, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1941, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991), the Court sustained absolute prosecutorial immunity for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings (at least so long as the statements were related to the proceeding), and also for eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses. Imbler stated that it is  'better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.'  See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428, 96 S.Ct. at 994 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir.1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950)). 11 23 Nor was absolute immunity forfeited because the prosecutors continued to withhold the exculpatory evidence long after Reid's conviction. 12 Imbler specifically noted that absolute prosecutorial immunity is an essential guarantee that reviewing courts focus exclusively on the fairness of the underlying trial, not upon any collateral consequences a reversal might portend for the prosecutor. Id. at 427, 96 S.Ct. at 993; cf. Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir.1993) (The Supreme Court has created no requirement that prosecutors reveal their trial mistakes to maintain their absolute immunity....). 13 24 Reid further contends that the district court failed to address his claim against the prosecutors in their official capacities. In order to prevail on an official capacity claim, Reid would have to show that the particular governmental entity had an unconstitutional custom or policy, Monell v. New York City Dep't. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), which its representatives were executing with at least the tacit approval of governmental policymakers. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036 (customs and usages of local government may satisfy Monell requirement). Reid insists that he pleaded actionable claims against the County Prosecutor's office and the County of Hillsborough by alleging that the defendant prosecutors, themselves policymaking officials, continuously refused to produce the exculpatory evidence the court ordered disclosed. 25 We do not reach the question whether Reid alleged the requisite custom or practice under Monell, since he has not challenged the magistrate-judge's report and recommendation on this basis. See Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir.1994) (citing Park Motor Mart Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.1980) (A party may file objections within ten days or he may not, as he chooses, but he shall do so if he wishes further appellate consideration.)). Accordingly, all claims against the prosecutors were properly dismissed.