Opinion ID: 1154934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the true life sentence

Text: Having addressed the issues raised by defendant's petition for review, we turn to the issue raised by the state's petition. The state contends that the Court of Appeals erred in remanding this case for resentencing on the ground that the sentence imposed on defendant, life in prison without possibility of parole, violated constitutional guarantees against ex post facto laws. Ex post facto laws are the subject of Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and Article I, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States. [11] As has been our practice, we construe these particular state and federal provisions without distinguishing them. See State v. Gallant, 307 Or. 152, 764 P.2d 920 (1988) (applying joint analysis). The prohibition against ex post facto laws applies to substantive changes in criminal law and sentencing that are applied retroactively. This court's summary of the prohibition was stated in State v. Gallant, supra, 307 Or. at 155, 764 P.2d 920; Generally speaking, ex post facto laws punish acts that were legal at the time they occurred, [increase] the punishment for [criminal] acts, or deprive the defendant of a defense for those acts. In a recent opinion applying the federal Ex Post Facto Clause, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that the term  ex post facto law is a term of art, the established meaning of which predates the framing of the Constitution of the United States. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2718, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). The Court explained the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause as follows: `It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.' Id. at 42, 110 S.Ct. at 2719 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). In summary, the Court stated, [l]egislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts. Id. 497 U.S. at 42, 110 S.Ct. at 2719. The sentence imposed on defendant in this case was established by an amendment to ORS 163.150. That amendment was enacted in 1989, that is, after defendant committed the crime, but before his trial. Or.Laws 1989, ch. 720, § 2. There is no question that the amended law was applied retroactively to defendant. The sole question before us is whether the amendment increased the punishment for aggravated murder. The Court of Appeals concluded that it did. State v. Wille, supra, 115 Or.App. at 59, 839 P.2d 712. As noted above, punishment is increased, and a law is an ex post facto violation, if the law makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission. Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U.S. at 42, 110 S.Ct. at 2719. The crux of our analysis of whether the punishment became more burdensome in this case lies in comparing the sentencing structure for aggravated murder in effect when defendant's crime was committed with the structure in effect when he was sentenced. In February 1989, when defendant killed the victim, there were two sentencing options for those convicted of aggravated murder. A jury could make findings requiring a defendant to be sentenced to death; if it did not, the trial judge was required to impose a sentence of life imprisonment, statutorily defined as imprisonment for a minimum of 30 years. [12] The 1989 legislature enacted a third sentencing option, that of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. [13] For purposes of this opinion, we refer to the original life imprisonment sentence as ordinary life and the new sentence as true life. Under the 1989 amendment, true life is the presumptive sentence when a jury does not return findings supporting the death penalty; since the amendment, ordinary life may be imposed only when 10 members of the jury agree that there are sufficient mitigating circumstances. ORS 163.150(2)(a). [14] In summary, at the time of defendant's crime, a jury that had convicted a defendant of aggravated murder was to answer three statutory questions regarding the applicability of the death penalty. If the jury unanimously answered all the questions affirmatively, the trial court was required to sentence the defendant to death. Except for the addition of a fourth question, that much of the sentencing procedure remains essentially unaltered. [15] If the jury did not agree on the death penalty, the trial court was required to impose a sentence of ordinary life. Since the 1989 amendment, however, when a jury does not agree affirmatively and unanimously on the death penalty questions, the presumptive sentence that the trial court must impose is true life unless 10 or more members of the jury further agree that the presumptive sentence should be reduced to ordinary life. Had the 1989 legislature merely substituted the definition of life imprisonment, changing it from ordinary life to true life, the increase in punishment would be obvious. However, because ordinary life still is a valid sentence for aggravated murder, the state argues that the legislature intended the true life sentence to be only an intermediate sentencing option. The state argues that, indeed, the legislature intended to decrease punishment for most defendants convicted of aggravated murder by giving juries a sentencing option that is more burdensome than ordinary life but not so burdensome as death. The state's argument is not well taken. At the time of defendant's crime, the presumptive sentence for aggravated murder where a sentence of death was not imposed was ordinary life. The presumptive sentence in such a case at the time of defendant's trial was true life. True life clearly is a more burdensome punishment than ordinary life. The fact that a jury, by a vote of 10, affirmatively could have found mitigating circumstances sufficient to warrant reducing the true life sentence to ordinary life does not alter the calculation. The new sentence structure increased the presumptive punishment for a crime. Retroactive imposition of that punishment violated Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and Article I, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, in part on different grounds. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed as to defendant's conviction for aggravated murder. The sentence for aggravated murder is vacated, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for resentencing to life imprisonment rather than life imprisonment without possibility of parole.