Opinion ID: 495206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: discussion of plaintiffs' claims

Text: 64 We turn first to the claims asserted by both plaintiffs against Chief Herring, and by Stevens against Officer Harasek. Plaintiffs fail to present even the barest factual support for their claims of constitutional violations by either Herring or Harasek, and we therefore order the district court to dismiss these claims. Stevens' common law tort claim against Harasek, while cognizable on its face under District of Columbia law, cannot survive Harasek's responding motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity.
65 Martin and Stevens asserted essentially identical claims against Chief Herring: 66 On information and belief, persons other than Plaintiff have been arrested by and assaulted by U.S. Park Police officers, when they had violated no law and are afterward charged with the offense of Disorderly Conduct and Disobeying the Order of a Police officer. Most, if not all, of these charges are dismissed before being brought to trial.... 67 On information and belief, ... Defendants have either affirmatively permitted this practice of arrest of persons without probable cause or have failed to establish systems and procedures adequate to provide reasonable assurances that persons are not improperly arrested and assaulted.... 42 68 Chief Herring moved for immediate judgment dismissing these claims in both actions; he asserted that plaintiffs had not set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial 43 regarding the existence of the alleged unconstitutional arrest policy. The district court denied Herring's motions without prejudice. The court acknowledged that plaintiffs' allegations are unsupported and conclusory, 44 but found Herring's summary judgment motions premature: Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 when faced with a motion for summary judgment a party is entitled to discovery sufficient to enable him to oppose the motion. 45 Plaintiffs, the district court ruled, had not had an opportunity to pursue sufficient discovery, and Herring's motions were therefore denied. 69 Application of pre-trial procedural rules to actions for damages against public officers is a perplexing, still developing area of the law. We set forth below our understanding of the current state of the governing precedent, and we explain why we hold that immediate judgment must be entered in Chief Herring's favor. 70 Herring's appeal presents two discrete questions. First, did the evidence indicate a genuine issue, within the meaning of Rule 56, as to Herring's responsibility for, or participation in, the alleged practice of arrest of persons without probable cause? This question is readily resolved, for we find no factual support for plaintiffs' claims that a pattern of arrests without cause pervades U.S. Park Police practices. Each plaintiff points to a single instance--his or her own arrest--as illustrative of the alleged unlawful pattern; beyond these personal encounters, plaintiffs tender only the conclusory allegations to which the district court referred. 46 71 Our opinion in Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C.Cir.1986), highlights the deficiencies in plaintiffs' presentations. In Carter, plaintiffs alleged a similar policy or established custom of deliberate indifference to police misconduct, id. at 122, on the part of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department and the Chief of Police. We upheld the entry of directed verdicts in both defendants' favor; 47 while plaintiffs came forward with evidence of assorted actual instances of misconduct, 48 id. at 124, their catalog of disquieting events [was] not sufficient to demonstrate a pervasive pattern of police officer indulgence in the use of excessive force, persisting in the District because of the MPD's tacit approval. Id. at 123. The incidents cited by the Carter plaintiffs were scattered, id., and did not support an inference that the instances would not [have] occur[red] but for municipal tolerance of the practice in question. Id. at 124. 72 As the basis for inferring a general practice in their cases, Martin and Stevens urge instances of alleged police misconduct not merely scattered but wholly isolated. One instance, however egregious, does not a pattern or practice make. As the Supreme Court has recently observed, a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to establish that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial--an apt description of Martin and Stevens here--cannot withstand an opponent's motion for summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 73 We thus can answer the first question (did the evidence cited by plaintiffs indicate a genuine issue) by straightforward application of familiar principles governing resolution of motions under FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); we need take no special cognizance of the defendant's immunity claims in reaching our conclusion. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 188-89 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Harlow's reformulation of the qualified immunity defense did not ... alter the burden that rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure places on the movant to demonstrate, as a condition of summary judgment, that the objective inquiry raises 'no genuine issue as to any material fact....' ); 49 see also Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 489 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.) (the rules governing summary judgment in cases involving officials claiming a qualified immunity do not differ from those applicable in other contexts), vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C.Cir.1983). 74 This brings us to the second question Herring's appeal raises: did the district court err in deferring final disposition of Herring's motions in order to give plaintiffs an opportunity to uncover, through discovery, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial? See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). We hold, in light of the special nature of the immunity defense, that dispositive rulings on Herring's motions should not have been deferred. 75 While [a] plaintiff's hope that further evidence may develop prior to trial is an 'insufficient basis upon which to justify the denial of [defendant's summary judgment] motion,'  Martin, 812 F.2d at 1430 (emphasis added), quoting Contemporary Missions, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir.1981), a district judge may defer a final ruling on that motion, pending further discovery, where the nonmovant avers that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(f). Indeed, a reasonable opportunity to complete discovery before grappling with a summary judgment motion is the norm. See Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2554-55 (any potential problem with ... premature [summary judgment] motions can be adequately dealt with under Rule 56(f), which allows [deferral of] a summary judgment motion ... if the nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to make full discovery); see also Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787-88 (D.C.Cir.1971) (Rule 56[ (f) ] clearly contemplates that the parties shall have opportunity for deposition in order to establish the existence of a material issue); Sames v. Cable, 732 F.2d 49, 51-52 (3d Cir.1984) (reversing district court's entry of summary judgment for defendants where pertinent discovery requests were outstanding). See generally 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Sec. 2741 at 541-48 (2d ed. 1983) (One of the most common reasons offered under Rule 56(f) for being unable to present specific facts in opposition to a summary judgment motion is insufficient time or opportunity to engage in discovery.). 76 Where public official defendants invoking an immunity from suit are involved, however, a case is no longer ordinary in this regard, for [d]iscovery is itself one of the burdens from which defendants are sheltered by the immunity doctrine. Martin, 812 F.2d at 1430; see also Anderson, --- U.S. at ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3042 n. 6 (One of the purposes of the Harlow qualified immunity standard is to protect public officials from the 'broad-ranging discovery' that can be 'peculiarly disruptive of effective government'.), quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817, 102 S.Ct. at 2737-38; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1986) (the essence of official immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to ... stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation ) (emphasis added); Smith, 807 F.2d at 200-201 (Harlow directed against the primary evil of  'broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons' ), quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-17, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-37. 77 Two lines of authority are thus opposed, one tending towards deferral of a ruling on Herring's summary judgment motions, the other towards immediate final disposition. Our precedent attempts to reconcile this conflict by applying the above-mentioned heightened pleading standard, see supra p. 253, to damage actions against government officials, requiring plaintiffs normally to come forward with nonconclusory allegations of evidence [if they are] to proceed to discovery on the claim. Hobson, 737 F.2d at 29. This standard would not serve its intended function--protecting public officials from becoming unduly enmesh[ed] in protracted discovery, Hobson, 737 F.2d at 30--unless it were read to restrict the otherwise applicable authority of a trial judge to permit discovery to proceed so that plaintiffs can uncover facts essential to justify [their] opposition to a motion for summary judgment. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(f). 78 The heightened pleading standard will thus operate, in practice, much like Rule 9(b)'s requirement that the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated [in the complaint] with particularity. FED.R.CIV.P. 9(b) (emphasis added). Because conclusory allegations of unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct will not withstand a public official's dispositive pre-trial motion, and because plaintiffs cannot expect the court's assistance in obtaining the necessary factual support, plaintiffs bringing suit against public officials generally must put forward, in their complaints or other supporting materials, greater factual specificity and particularity than is usually required. 79 We emphasize that this heightened standard restricts, but does not eliminate, the trial court's Rule 56(f) discretion. See Martin, 812 F.2d at 1436-38 (a blanket restriction on all discovery prior to the resolution of the qualified immunity issue could in some circumstances unfairly penalize plaintiffs seeking  'crucial facts ... in the control of the opposing party' ), quoting Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1278 (D.C.Cir.1981). Difficult cases will no doubt arise calling for fine judgments as to the sufficiency of a plaintiff's showing. Martin and Stevens, however, do not tender such a case. We have no warrant to subject Park Police officials to a fishing expedition in government waters, Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 807 F.2d 204, 208 (D.C.Cir.1986), on the basis of wholly unsubstantiated charges. The broadsides against Herring levelled by Martin and Stevens fail to make out a prima facie case that Herring affirmatively permitted repeated illegal activity on the part of his subordinates; indeed, the allegations do not support even the most tenuous of inferences that such activity routinely took place. Accordingly, we remand this portion of the proceedings with instructions that judgment be entered in Herring's favor on all claims against him.
80 Stevens brought two claims against Officer Harasek, one for conspir[ing] to violate her constitutional rights [in violation of] 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985, 50 the other for negligently breach[ing] [his] affirmative duty to intervene and prevent Defendant Stover from unlawfully arresting and assaulting Plaintiff. 51 In support of her constitutional claim, Stevens alleged that Harasek made untrue statements [s]imilar 52 to those made by Officer McKinstry--i.e., that Stevens was honking her horn while in traffic and that she drove away from [McKinstry] when he attempted to obtain her license and registration 53 --statements subsequently used in an effort to obtain an indictment against Plaintiff. 54 As to her common law claim, Stevens asserted that Harasek [stood] there with his hands in his pocket while she was being forcibly and brutally handcuffed and pressed against the rear of her vehicle[.] 55 81
82 As the district court observed, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985, Stevens must allege: 83 (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, ... and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in her person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. 84 Hobson, 737 F.2d at 14; see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-103 (1971). The statute does not apply to all conspiratorial tortious interferences with the rights of others, but only those motivated by some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Hobson, 737 F.2d at 14. 85 The district court denied Harasek's motion for dismissal of this claim, or in the alternative for summary judgment, with this observation: 86 To make out her prima facie case plaintiff relies on Metropolitan Police Department documents showing that defendants Stover and Harasek conferred before officer McKinistry testified before the grand jury. The requisite discriminatory animus is found in the reference to the plaintiff by one officer as a black bitch. This is adequate to survive a motion to dismiss. 56 87 We disagree. [U]nsupported factual allegations which fail to specify in detail the factual basis necessary to enable [defendants] to intelligently prepare their defense, will not suffice to sustain a claim of governmental conspiracy to deprive [plaintiff] of [her] constitutional rights. Hobson, 737 F.2d at 30, quoting Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.1977); see also id. at 30 n. 87 (citing cases requiring particularity in pleading civil rights complaints). Here again, measuring Stevens' claim against the indicated heightened pleading standard must result in its dismissal. The record shows only that Harasek conferred with Officer Stover prior to Officer McKinstry's grand jury testimony, and that Harasek's allegedly false statements helped to secure Stevens' indictment. Even accepting these two factual allegations as true, the inference Stevens is apparently asking us to draw--that the three officers agreed to testify falsely and thereby obtain Stevens' indictment--is a most tenuous one, hardly an adequate foundation on which to base a complaint of this kind. 57 88
89 Stevens next maintains that Harasek's failure to intervene on her behalf while Officer Stover was assaulting her constitutes an actionable breach of Harasek's duty to protect her from harm. This claim is met, first, by Harasek's assertion that he owed Stevens no such duty and that, as a result, no cognizable negligence claim has been stated. 58 90 As far as we can determine, this precise question--whether a law enforcement officer is answerable in damages for standing by and failing to protect a member of the public from an assault allegedly perpetrated by a fellow officer--has never been squarely addressed by the District of Columbia courts. We are satisfied, nonetheless, that Stevens' complaint, at the threshold, stated a cognizable claim under principles reflected in case law governing negligence actions against law enforcement officers in the District of Columbia. 91 In two recent cases, the D.C. Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, has considered a question bearing upon the one presented here: in what circumstances is a police officers' general duty to protect the public from harm a sufficient base on which to premise liability for a failure to protect an individual from harm caused by a third party? Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C.1983) (en banc); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C.1981) (en banc). As these cases make clear, only where the police and the individual are in a special relationship different from that existing between police and citizens generally, Warren, 444 A.2d at 5, can a sufficiently particularized duty to protect arise rendering the officer potentially liable for a failure to act. See also Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1312-15. 59 Absent any such special relationship, the officer's duty is a public duty, for neglect of which the officer is answerable to the public and punishable by indictment only. Id. at 1311, quoting South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 403, 15 L.Ed. 433 (1856). 92 In determining whether the necessary special relationship exists in a given situation, the District of Columbia courts look to see whether the police have beg[un] to act in behalf of a particular citizen in such a way as to raise significantly the quotient of risk over and above the risks assumed by every other member of the community. Id. at 1312. Requiring some affirmative undertaking to protect a particular individual, id. at 1314, before a specific duty to the plaintiff will be recognized avoids conflict with the primary policy supporting the no-duty rule: the practical realization that individuals, juries and courts are ill-equipped to judge 'considered legislative-executive decision[s]' as to how particular community resources should be or should have been allocated to protect individual members of the public. Id. at 1311, quoting Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 579, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860 (1968). Once the police have exercised [their] discretion and chosen to act, imposing a duty to proceed with reasonable care to protect people whom they have particularly placed in peril  does not interpose the judgment of a jury for the discretion of the police. Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1313 (emphasis added). 93 We think Officer Stover's affirmative undertakings--forcibly removing Stevens from her car, handcuffing her and placing her in police custody--sufficient to establish a special relationship between Stevens and the police. Once Stevens was denied, by Stover's actions, the most basic means of self-protection, the quotient of risk to which she was exposed rose significantly; the officers thus incurred an obligation to take reasonable steps to insure that the physical harm to which Stevens was vulnerable did not materialize. 94 We express no opinion as to the extent of that obligation or the steps a reasonable officer in Harasek's position must take in order to satisfy it. We hold only that Stevens' allegations set forth a cognizable negligence claim which, if proved, and not met by a dispositive defense, could subject Harasek to liability. 95 This does not end our inquiry, however, for Harasek has asserted that, even assuming the threshold validity of Stevens' negligence claim, her entire case against him must be dismissed on the basis of an immunity from suit. Under the qualified immunity standard we have declared applicable to this claim, see supra pp. 251-254, we find Harasek's showing of the objective reasonableness of his actions sufficient to warrant entry of judgment in his favor. 96 Harasek's action, in failing to intervene on Stevens' behalf, must be placed in the context of the transpiring events and the information Harasek possessed. According to Stevens' own account, shortly after Officer Stover approached her vehicle, Stover began hysterically screaming to [Officer] Harasek[:] 'She's got a gun'. 60 At this stage of the encounter, again according to Stevens, while Stover was forcibly and brutally handcuff[ing] and press[ing] [Stevens] against the rear of her vehicle, Harasek [stood] there with his hands in his pockets. 61 97 Shortly thereafter, once more in Stevens' words, she was drag[ged] to [Stover's] unmarked police cruiser ... some 500 feet [away from Stevens'] car. 62 Once she was inside the cruiser, Stover allegedly intensified his attack on her. 63 Stevens does not claim that Harasek was involved in, or could even see, the alleged attack inside the cruiser. 64 According to Harasek's uncontradicted account, 65 after Stover took Stevens to the cruiser, Harasek radioed a request for assistance on his portable radio; he then went back and retrieved [Stevens'] pocketbook[,] which was lying in the street. 66 Harasek recalls looking through the pocketbook for the weapon to which Stover had referred, and finding nothing but Stevens' police ID badge and other non-incriminating material. 67 98 Given these facts, we are satisfied that the alleged unlawfulness of Harasek's failure to intervene on Stevens' behalf would not have been apparent, Anderson, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3039, to a reasonable officer in Harasek's shoes. Harasek had a fully rational basis for anticipating that Stevens had a gun, possibly on her person, at the time Stover pulled her from her vehicle. Stover's attempts to subdue and handcuff Stevens could therefore have been viewed by Harasek as justified by the threat he could reasonably have thought she posed to the officers' safety. When Stover began his allegedly brutal and unprovoked attack on a handcuffed and defenseless suspect, he and Stevens were inside a police cruiser some 500 feet away from Harasek. We find no basis for inferring, even assuming the truth of Stevens' allegations, that Harasek could have seen that attack clearly enough to render his failure to come to Stevens' aid unreasonable. Our view on this matter is reinforced by the apparent failure of Stevens' passengers--who surely must have been at least as concerned with Stevens' treatment inside the cruiser as was Harasek--to see the alleged beating. 68 99 For these reasons, we hold that Harasek is immune from suit on Stevens' negligence charge, and we direct the district court to dismiss that last remaining claim against him. 100
101 As recounted above, see supra p. 244, Martin alleged that Officer Malhoyt violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure, Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty or property with [out] due process of law, [and] Sixth Amendment right to be advised of charges brought against him. 69 Malhoyt countered that none of [Martin's] allegations rise[s] to the level of a constitutional tort, 70 i.e., that no constitutional rights, let alone clearly established constitutional rights, were violated by Malhoyt's alleged conduct. Except as to Martin's claim of a fourth amendment violation, we agree with Malhoyt's contention.
102 Martin asserts that approximately four hours passed between the time of his arrest and his being informed of the charges against him (disorderly conduct and disobeying the order of a police officer). 71 This, we hold, does not amount to a violation of the sixth amendment right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. 72 Whatever temporal limitations may be read by implication into that clause, 73 we cannot rank a four-hour delay between arrest and notice of the charges as more than a de minimis abridgment of Martin's right to be advised as to every element in respect to which it is necessary for him to prepare a defense. United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 850 (D.C.Cir.1954) (en banc).
103
104 Martin's claim under this heading rests upon his allegation that Malhoyt used unreasonable force to effect Martin's arrest. In appraising this claim under the fourth rather than the fifth amendment, 74 we are guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Garner clarifies that fourth amendment protection from unreasonable ... seizures 75 extends not only to an officer's decision to make a particular arrest (the decision must be supported by probable cause); the protection extends as well to how the arrest is carried out. While Garner specifically addresses the use of deadly force, the language and logic of the opinion indicate that all police use of force in effecting arrests must meet an objective standard of reasonableness. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-9, 105 S.Ct. at 1699-1700. 105 Garner's reasonableness formulation is the one typically used in court review of fourth amendment seizures: reasonableness is to be determined by balancing the infringement of the individual's interest caused by the police action against the governmental interest served by that action. See id. at 8, 105 S.Ct. at 1699, quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). This balancing test is both objective and fact-sensitive; it looks to the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the challenged conduct, and it accords a measure of respect to the officer's judgment about the quantum of force called for in a quickly developing situation. 76 106 According to Martin, the most severe infringement by Malhoyt upon Martin's interest in freedom from arrest in an excessive manner was Malhoyt's brutally grabb[ing] [Martin] about [the] waist, ... thr[owing] [him] back into [his] driver seat ... [and] slamm[ing] [the] door on one of [Martin's] legs. 77 Martin further alleged that Malhoyt later grabbed [Martin's] arms[,] pulled them behind [Martin's] back[,] and immediately placed [Martin] in handcuffs while pushing [him] up against [the] limousine, 78 Malhoyt, as Martin recounts, then forced Martin to sit in a painful position in Malhoyt's police car, which aggravated Martin's previous shoulder injury. 107 Malhoyt, while disputing the particulars of Martin's account, asserted by way of justification that he wanted Martin in the car for [Martin's] safety, the public's safety, and [Malhoyt's] own safety. By opening his door into traffic Mr. Martin caused a traffic hazard which was a danger to himself and the oncoming traffic.... Finally, in the event that [Martin] present[ed] any danger to [Malhoyt], [Martin would be] more easily controlled inside his car. 79 Martin does not dispute the reasonableness of such concerns, if in fact Malhoyt had and acted upon them, at the time and place of the incident. According to Martin's own story, moreover, Martin knew that Malhoyt was waiting to see whether one of Martin's passengers really was having difficulty walking; yet Martin began to move the limousine before his passengers had returned to the vehicle. This action by Martin could well have given Malhoyt cause to doubt Martin's good faith, which in turn would have increased concern on Malhoyt's part for the safety of oncoming traffic, Martin, and himself. In addition, Martin's movement of his car would have supplied support for any fear of Malhoyt's that Martin might flee. 108 Tested by the standard confirmed in Garner, we are unable to characterize the manner in which Malhoyt arrested Martin as objectively unreasonable in light of the rapidly unfolding sequence of events. Slamming the car door on Martin's leg causes us to pause, for that action appears malicious. But under Garner's objective test, maliciousness is irrelevant. We must focus on whether Malhoyt's total conduct, objectively appraised, added up to a reasonable mode of arrest. We conclude that it did. Even the door slamming, given the apparent need for instant action, does not appear to be an extraordinary response. In sum, viewing the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that Malhoyt used unreasonable force in taking immediate steps first to confine Martin to his vehicle, then to effect his arrest. 109
110 In addition to objecting to the manner in which he was arrested, Martin asserts that his fourth amendment rights were violated because there was no probable cause to arrest and detain him for disorderly conduct and disobeying a police officer's orders. It is well settled that an arrest without probable cause violates the fourth amendment. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct. 854, 861, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Under Martin's version of the facts, probable cause to arrest was indisputably absent. Martin asserted that [a]fter Malhoyt threw me into my car and obtained my permit and registration, he returned to his police car without saying anything to me. 80 When Martin got out of [his] car ... and went behind [it] to open the door for his passengers, Malhoyt, in Martin's words, suddenly got out of his police car and while appearing to be extremely angry and upset, and without saying one word to me  handcuffed Martin and put him in the police car. 81 111 Since Martin claims that Malhoyt said nothing at all to him at the relevant time, let alone something that could be construed as an order, under the facts as we must take them at this stage of the case, there was no probable cause for an arrest for disobeying a police officer's order. As to the charge of disorderly conduct, the only elements of the offense possibly relevant here are: (1) Act[ing] in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to others; ... [or] (4) interfer[ing] with any person in any place by jostling against such person or unnecessarily crowding him with the intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby. D.C.CODE ANN. Sec. 22-1121 (1), (4) (1981); see Gueory v. District of Columbia, 408 A.2d 967 (D.C.1979). Martin relates that he did nothing but get out of his car and stand behind it. True, as we observed above, Malhoyt might have had cause to be wary of Martin, but Martin was doing nothing to annoy or interfere with anyone at the time of his arrest. We think it plain that, accepting Martin's version of the disputed events as true, Martin's arrest was without probable cause and therefore violated the fourth amendment. 112 We turn, then, to Malhoyt's plea of qualified immunity from suit. The district court reasoned that because the relevant law--probable cause is required to arrest--was clearly established, Malhoyt cannot surmount the Harlow threshold; 82 observing that the conflicting versions of the events presented a genuine issue as to the existence of probable cause, the district court refused to enter summary judgment for Malhoyt on his qualified immunity plea. 83 113 We agree with the district court's conclusion but not its reasoning. That probable cause may have been absent when viewing the arrest ex post does not in and of itself establish that the officer acted in an objectively unreasonable manner ex ante. The relevant inquiry, as the Supreme Court recently made clear, is whether in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness of Martin's arrest was apparent. Anderson, --- U.S. at ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; see also id. (indicating as the pivotal issue the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed Martin's arrest to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the information [Malhoyt] possessed). 114 Resolution of Malhoyt's motion thus turns not on whether probable cause to arrest Martin in fact existed, but on whether Malhoyt has established as a matter of law that a reasonable officer in Malhoyt's shoes would have believed it to have existed. We are confident, again assuming the truth of Martin's version of the disputed events, that no reasonable officer could have believed that an individual who merely gets out of his car has committed either of the offenses with which Martin was charged, even assuming that Malhoyt reasonably believed that Martin was attempting to evade a citation for a parking violation. Without resolving the factual dispute as to what actually transpired between Martin and Malhoyt, we cannot say that Malhoyt has established the requisite objective reasonableness of his actions. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Malhoyt's motion for summary judgment as that motion relates to the fourth amendment, lack of probable cause claim. 115
116 Our disposition of the claims remaining against Officers Malhoyt and Stover 85 requires no extended analysis. Martin and Stevens have set forth detailed accounts of their encounters with these officers which, if believed, establish the tortious character of the officers' actions. In their versions, plaintiffs acted in a manner that no reasonable officer could have believed violated District of Columbia law; and they offered no resistance to the officers' commands that could justify the stern measures taken against them. As we have several times emphasized in this opinion, plaintiffs' descriptions of the episodes in suit are directly contradicted by the officers' statements, and the officers' liability will ultimately turn on which of the accounts the factfinder believes. A reviewing court's role is not to resolve these factual disputes; merely verifying their existence is sufficient, at this stage of the proceedings, for us to uphold the district court's denial of the officers' motions to dismiss these claims.