Opinion ID: 1831975
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inconsistent Verdicts Issue

Text: We next consider whether the trial court erred in denying Barnes's motion for new trial on the ground that the jury verdicts were inconsistent. We conclude that the trial court did err, because we conclude that the verdicts are inconsistent. In Smith v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 171 So.2d 96 (1965), this Court considered whether the same jury could find the defendant not negligent in one case but negligent in another case where the evidence was the same. In Smith, Theresa Smith sued Arnett Richardson, alleging negligence and willful and wanton conduct. Theresa was a minor and she sued through her father as next friend. Her father, Coy Smith, sued Richardson also, alleging negligence. The two cases were consolidated for trial. The jury returned a verdict for Richardson in Theresa's case, and a $5,165 verdict for Coy Smith in his case. The trial court denied both parties' motions for new trial. The parties alleged that the jury verdicts were inconsistent because the verdicts were based on the same evidence, both cases involved the same defendant, and the same jury rendered the verdicts. In reversing the trial court's denial of the motions for new trial, this Court stated: The verdicts, clearly inconsistent, having been rendered at the same time by the same jury, on identical facts, renders speculative what the jury intended by its verdicts. Patently, the verdicts indicate confusion on the part of the jury. Coy Smith's claim for damages was dependent upon negligence on the part of Richardson toward Theresa, as was of course Theresa's claim for damages. The jury by their verdict in Theresa's case negatived any negligent conduct by Richardson toward her, yet at the same time and on the same facts found that Richardson was negligent toward Theresa in Mr. Smith's case. While the two judgments now on review were based on separate complaints filed by separate parties, and were rendered on separate verdicts, yet in truth and in fact the separate cases were joined for trial, and the verdicts rendered on the identical facts. This fact cannot be disregarded on review. ... Id. at 391-92, 171 So.2d at 97 (citations omitted). Also, in Lewis v. Moss, supra , this Court addressed the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in Harden v. Alabama Great Southern R.R., 45 Ala.App. 301, 229 So.2d 803 (1969), [3] and stated: It is the second (emphasized) portion of this quoted language with which we disagree. The analogy of a single jury's verdicts in consolidated primary and derivative actions with separate verdicts by two different juries is fallacious reasoning. This overlooks `opposite results' which are permissible in the case of two juries viewing the same transaction and `inconsistent verdicts' which are impermissible in the case of a single jury trying two claims in a consolidated action.  Res judicata is operatively precluded in the case of separate trials by lack of identity of parties. That two juries viewing the same transaction can come to opposite conclusions has long been recognized in Alabama. More appropriate is the analogy of inconsistent verdicts against two separate defendants in respondeat superior cases. If the proof shows that the principal could have acted only through the named employee defendant, a verdict against the principal only is inconsistent and will be set aside. On the other hand, if the proof shows the employer acted through another agent or employee, such a verdict is not erroneous as being inconsistent.  In either case, whether the issue is one of damages or one of liability, proof of the legally essential elements is the touchstone in determining the permissible limits of inconsistency of jury verdicts. Simply stated, whether in separate or consolidated trials, the jury verdict or verdicts, when tested by the proof, will be set aside if found to be legally irreconcilable. 347 So.2d at 94 (emphasis supplied). See also Lindsay v. Hackney, 283 Ala. 372, 217 So.2d 238 (1968). In the present case, the jury returned a verdict for Barnes on his personal injury claim but returned a verdict for Oswalt on the wrongful death claim. The jury reached its decision based upon the same alleged negligent act of driving on the wrong side of the road. In essence, the jury found the defendant negligent on the personal injury claim, but not negligent on the wrongful death claim, even though both claims arose from the same circumstances. We recognize that damages under personal injury actions and wrongful death actions differ. In personal injury actions damages are compensatory in nature, while damages in wrongful death actions are punitive in nature. Although the jury has discretion in awarding punitive damages, an award of punitive damages cannot stand where the jury has mistaken the rules of law in awarding such damages. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Birmingham Oxygen Serv., Inc., 290 Ala. 149, 274 So.2d 615 (1973); Hardin v. Sellers, 270 Ala. 156, 117 So.2d 383 (1960); Shirley v. Shirley, 261 Ala. 100, 73 So.2d 77 (1954); Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Harrell, 43 Ala.App. 258, 188 So.2d 555 (1965), cert. denied, 279 Ala. 685, 188 So.2d 558 (1966). See also C. Gamble, Alabama Law of Damages § 37.10 (1988); L. Jeffries, Wrongful Death Actions: The Law in Alabama § 13-7 (1979 and 1989 Supp.). In this case it appears that the jury misconceived the issues presented to it. As this Court stated in Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. Posey, 333 So.2d 815, 817 (Ala.1976): When two actions are tried together, and inconsistent verdicts are rendered, sound practice requires that both verdicts be set aside without attempt by analysis of the evidence to determine which result the jury intended. This rule of law is based upon the principle that, where verdicts are inconsistent on their face the jury has misconceived the issues presented, or was prompted by bias. The verdicts in the present case are not consistent, nor are they reconcilable under these facts. Consequently, the trial court erred in not granting Barnes's motion for new trial, and we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ADAMS, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur. HOUSTON, J., concurs in the result.