Opinion ID: 1280343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Arguments Against Proportionality Review

Text: This court occasionally endorses comparative proportionality analysis as if it were the ultimate fail-safe against errant death penalties and, therefore, an essential element of the state's death penalty scheme. I believe, however, that comparative proportionality review inappropriately adds an unnecessary and uncertain test to the state's sentencing procedures. Also, because the court compares death sentences in both an inconsistent and incomplete manner, comparative proportionality review lacks the capacity to eradicate the systemic arbitrariness it seemingly seeks to prevent.
While sentencing procedures in other states may give rise to a need for comparative proportionality review as an additional safeguard against arbitrary or capricious sentencing, Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45, 104 S.Ct. at 877, Arizona's capital-sentencing scheme does not. Our death statute applies only to defendants found guilty of first-degree murder as defined under state law, and permits the death penalty only when the sentencing judge, during a separate sentencing hearing, finds that at least one of the 10 statutory aggravating circumstances is present and that no mitigating circumstances warrant leniency. A.R.S. ง 13-703(A)-(C), (E)-(G); Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 54, 659 P.2d at 13 (statute prohibits a death sentence when none of the aggravating circumstances are found). Decisions by this court give substance to the operative terms of the death statute and provide sufficient sentencing guidance to presume that death sentences in Arizona meet constitutional requirements. Walton, ___ U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 3057-58. Limiting definitions placed on aggravating circumstances, for example, circumscribe the sentencer's discretion within narrow parameters to insure that the death penalty is not arbitrarily, capriciously, or freakishly imposed. See, e.g., Walton, ___ U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 3058 (definition given to the especially cruel aggravating factor gives meaningful sentencing guidance). With respect to possible mitigating circumstances, the sentencing judge must consider any aspect of defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense relevant to determining whether the death sentence should not be imposed. McCall, 160 Ariz. at 131, 770 P.2d at 1177, citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Taken together, these procedures strike the requisite balance between the need for flexibility in order to afford individualized decision-making essential in capital cases, and the need for appropriate standards to prevent the arbitrariness that accompanies unbridled discretion. State v. Mata, 125 Ariz. 233, 242, 609 P.2d 48, 57, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 338, 66 L.Ed.2d 161 (1980). Further, our review of death cases goes the second constitutional mile without the aid of comparative proportionality analysis. Although the Supreme Court does not require any specific or heightened standard of appellate review in capital cases, Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258, 96 S.Ct. at 2969, [5] we undertake an extensive, independent review of each death sentence handed down under Arizona law. As explained in State v. Watson , [a] finding merely that the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court was `factually supported' or `justified by the evidence' is not the appellate treatment that the death penalty warrants. 129 Ariz. 60, 63, 628 P.2d 943, 946 (1981). We must determine for ourselves, based upon an independent review of the entire record, whether we believe that the death penalty should be imposed. Id. This independent review includes a painstaking search of the entire record for error, an examination of the facts that establish the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and a separate determination of whether the latter circumstances outweigh the former when both are present. Richmond, 114 Ariz. at 196, 560 P.2d at 51; see, e.g., State v. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 15-16, 775 P.2d 1069, 1079-80 (1989) (death sentence reduced because mitigating evidence questioned the propriety of the penalty); State v. Prince, 160 Ariz. 268, 275-76, 772 P.2d 1121, 1128-29 (1989) (sentence reduced to life because state failed to prove an aggravating circumstance); State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz. 186, 207-08, 766 P.2d 59, 80-81 (1988) (sentence reduced to life because defendant's mental impairment was a substantial mitigating factor); Watson, 129 Ariz. at 64, 628 P.2d at 947 (death sentence set aside because mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances). To provide yet another screen in cases posing any doubt whether the death penalty should be imposed, this court has resolved such doubt in favor of a life sentence. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. at 16, 775 P.2d at 1080; State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 250, 645 P.2d 239, 241 (1982). The value of comparative proportionality review, proponents say, is that it compels the court to coordinate its actions with prior decisions in similar cases, thereby fostering uniform results. The independent review referenced above, however, already focuses the court's attention on prior, comparable cases. Section 13-703(F), for example, simply lists the 10 possible aggravating circumstances applicable to any given case. To determine the exact meaning and parameters of a particular aggravating circumstance, we must look at previous cases to see how the court interpreted ง 13-703(F) in light of similar facts. See, e.g., Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 50-53, 659 P.2d at 9-12 (court held that the statutory phrase especially heinous, cruel, or depraved has been construed in a constitutionally narrow fashion and examined its application in individual cases). The court employs the same strategy to review mitigating circumstances under ง 13-703(G). See, e.g., Rockwell, 161 Ariz. at 15, 775 P.2d at 1079 (prior cases helped determine whether a defendant's age may be a substantial and relevant mitigating factor). By verifying that certain aggravating or mitigating circumstances apply only to cases involving similar facts, our independent review performs an appropriate comparative function. Moreover, because of the wide range of mitigating evidence a defendant may proffer, see McCall, 160 Ariz. at 131, 770 P.2d at 1177, this court occasionally weighs leniency afforded other defendants as a mitigating factor. Leniency granted to an accomplice under a plea agreement, for example, does not in itself prevent the imposition of the death penalty, State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 72, 786 P.2d 395, 402 (1989) (emphasis added), but we will consider such leniency  along with other mitigating circumstances in determining whether to impose the death penalty. State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 76, 673 P.2d 1, 14 (1983) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 267, 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984). In my opinion, comparative proportionality review serves little, if any, purpose that is not already accomplished by way of Arizona's narrowly construed death statute and our independent review of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each case. A sufficiently narrow death statute alone insures that the death penalty will only be imposed for the most serious crimes [and] ... that [it] will only be imposed for the same type of offenses which occur under the same types of circumstances.  Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270, 96 S.Ct. at 2955 (emphasis added); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07, 96 S.Ct. at 2941 (jury is unable to impose a freakish death sentence if it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines). Once this court evaluates the sentencing judge's compliance with the state's death statutes and then performs a separate review to provide added protection against arbitrariness and caprice, comparative proportionality review becomes an empty ritual. See Walton, ___ U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 3058 (comparative proportionality review by the Arizona Supreme Court is not required because the death statute is construed in a manner that furnishes sufficient guidance to the sentencer); Pulley, 465 U.S. at 49, 104 S.Ct. at 878-79 (comparative proportionality review by the Texas Supreme Court is constitutionally superfluous).
The argument that a comparative proportionality review acts as a check against the random and arbitrary imposition of the death penalty also assumes, necessarily, that the comparative review mechanism itself is not freakishly applied or inherently arbitrary. Such is not the case with the proportionality reviews conducted by this court. First, the court's application of comparative proportionality analysis is by no means a model of regularity. The court frequently purports to compare a defendant's death sentence with penalties imposed for similar crimes, but its analysis is simply a cursory or rubber-stamp type of review. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259, 96 S.Ct. at 2969; see, e.g., State v. Moorman, 154 Ariz. 578, 587, 744 P.2d 679, 688 (1987) (death sentence is proportional because the facts speak for themselves here); State v. Gerlaugh, 135 Ariz. 89, 90, 659 P.2d 642, 643 (1983) (this court believed that no useful purpose would be served in comparing, discussing or citing other homicide cases); Mata, 125 Ariz. at 242, 609 P.2d at 57 (court cited no cases in ruling defendant's death sentence not excessive). In other situations the court either forgets or ignores its self-imposed proportionality review requirement. In State v. Arnett, for example, we reviewed defendant's death sentence on three separate occasions and failed each time to perform a formal proportionality review. 158 Ariz. 15, 760 P.2d 1064 (1988); 125 Ariz. 201, 608 P.2d 778 (1980); 119 Ariz. 38, 579 P.2d 542 (1978); see also State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 624 P.2d 828 (no formal proportionality review), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 364, 70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981); State v. Bishop, 127 Ariz. 531, 622 P.2d 478 (1980) (same); State v. Ceja, 115 Ariz. 413, 565 P.2d 1274 (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975, 98 S.Ct. 533, 54 L.Ed.2d 467 (1977); State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d 500 (1978). If the fair application of our state's death penalty depends in any way on inter-case sentence comparison, this court should have honored its own proportionality review requirement as a matter of practice as well as theory. Second, the scope of the court's proportionality inquiry varies from case to case. Because Richmond did not define or describe the similar cases to which a given death sentence should be compared, see 114 Ariz. at 196, 560 P.2d at 51, the court employs different standards in different cases to assess the similarity of sentences. The most common technique is to compare a death case with cases from this and other jurisdictions in which the death penalty was imposed, including cases in which the sentence was either reversed or reduced on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 179, 800 P.2d 1260, 1287 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2044, 114 L.Ed.2d 129 (1991). This court, however, frequently modifies its approach and excludes similar cases from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Comer, 165 Ariz. 413, 429-30, 799 P.2d 333, 349-50 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1404, 113 L.Ed.2d 460 (1991); State v. Wallace, 160 Ariz. 424, 428, 773 P.2d 983, 987 (1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1513, 108 L.Ed.2d 649 (1990); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 37, 734 P.2d 563, 579, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987); State v. Hensley, 142 Ariz. 598, 604, 691 P.2d 689, 695 (1984). We have yet to explain why one defendant is entitled to a more extensive comparative proportionality review than that afforded to another. By far the most serious defect in the scope of our proportionality review, however, is the court's unwillingness to include all first-degree murder cases. In State v. Ortiz, this court stated that it would consider all cases where the death penalty could be imposed so that the death penalty is not applied arbitrarily or capriciously. 131 Ariz. 195, 207, 639 P.2d 1020, 1032 (1981) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2259, 72 L.Ed.2d 863 (1982). In practice, however, we consider only those cases in which the court affirmed or vacated a death sentence on appeal. See State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, 490, 733 P.2d 1066, 1073 (true proportionality review does not require an examination of particular types of cases), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 206, 98 L.Ed.2d 157 (1987). [T]he court excludes from the pool of potentially similar cases to be considered for comparative purposes any first-degree murder case in which the defendant originally received only a life sentence. Pulaski, Capital Sentencing in Arizona: A Critical Evaluation, 1984 Ariz.St.L.J. 1, 51; see, e.g., Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 179, 800 P.2d at 1287 (citing no first-degree murder cases in which defendant initially received a life sentence); Comer, 165 Ariz. at 429-30, 799 P.2d at 349-50 (same). One observer concludes that doing so essentially skews the outcome of any proportionality review in favor of the death sentence. If the pool is made up only of cases in which the defendants' sentences are death, the death penalty under review will naturally be found comparatively proportionate. Note, Criminal Procedure: Comparative Proportionality Review of Death Sentences: Is it a Meaningful Safeguard in Oklahoma?, 38 Okla.L.Rev. 267, 278 (1985). Even in its best dress, therefore, our form of comparative proportionality review cannot possibly provide what its label suggests โ a fair proportionality assessment. Despite the many problems associated with comparative proportionality review, the majority insists on its continued use, arguing that it is better to improve the court's procedures and employ every method available to reduce our errors. That argument, however, asks this court to fix a procedure that simply cannot be fixed. No matter how skilled the court becomes at comparing similar cases, comparative proportionality review will never fulfill its intended purpose because it seeks an impossible result โ complete uniformity at the end of a process that is constitutionally required under Furman to provide an individualized assessment of each defendant. Moreover, I believe comparative proportionality review simply invites appellate error by permitting this court to modify death sentences deemed otherwise appropriate by our independent review, thereby giving birth to a new class of mercy-eligible defendants whose ranks we have no way of specifying in advance. This power to reduce to life requires comparisons with records not presently before the court and opens the door to the deliberation of inappropriate sentencing factors such as sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543, 107 S.Ct. 837, 840, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (sentencing authority should not focus on extraneous emotional factors); see also Beaty, 158 Ariz. at 247, 762 P.2d at 534 (discussing the need to reduce the human element in the imposition of the death penalty). If the sentencing judge has no right to engage in such speculation or to consider his or her own subjective belief as to the appropriateness of a penalty, we have no greater authority to do so on appeal. Narrowly tailored and individualized sentencing is the hallmark of a constitutional death penalty scheme under our present jurisprudence. By expanding the range of permissible discretion on appeal, however, we move our sentencing procedures farther away from the constitutional mark and risk the same unguided, emotional results denounced since Furman. Thus, with all due respect to the majority, comparative proportionality review does not recognize our own fallibility, but compounds it by adding a subjective variable.