Opinion ID: 2010756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The felony murder statute.

Text: Comer was charged with murder in the first degree pursuant to Delaware's felony murder statute, 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(2), which provides that a person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: While engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit any felony, the person recklessly causes the death of another person. [7] The General Assembly amended Section 636(a)(2) effective May 19, 2004, four months before the homicide in this case. Pre-amendment, the statute imposed first degree murder liability when, [i]n the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony or immediate flight therefrom, the person recklessly causes the death of another person.... [8] The Synopsis to the bill amending the statute indicates that the legislature intended to be more consistent with the majority approach, noting that removing the phrase in the course of and in furtherance of made Section 636(a)(2) utilize language similar to that used in the felony murder statutes in thirty-eight other states. [9] The question thus before us, is whether this amendment supersedes the agency theory of felony murder previously settled by Delaware caselaw. We hold it does not.
Title 11, sections 635(2) and 636(a)(2) of the Delaware Code codify the common law felony murder rule. [10] Nearly thirty years ago, in Weick v. State, [11] we recognized that [t]he purpose of the [common law] rule was to clothe the actions of the accused and his co-felons, if any, with an implied-in-law malice, thus enabling the courts to find the felon guilty of common-law murder when a killing was committed by one of the felons in the perpetration of the felony. We noted, however, that the common law rule originated at a time when all felonies were punishable by death and [w]ith the general trend toward mitigation in the severity of punishment for many felonies, and with the addition of many statutory felonies of a character less dangerous than was typical of most common law felonies, the irrationality and unfairness of an unlimited felony-murder rule become increasingly apparent. [12] Therefore, limits were placed on the scope of the rule. [13] One such limitation, which we recognized in Jenkins v. State [14] and reaffirmed in Weick, was the requirement of a causal connection between the felony and the murder. [15] As we noted in Weick, another limitation adopted by some courts at that time was the requirement that the killing be performed by the felon, his accomplices, or one associated with the felon in his unlawful enterprise. [16] We further noted that [t]he parameters of this rule [were] probably best defined in Commonwealth v. Redline, [17] in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: In adjudging a felony-murder, it is to be remembered at all times that the thing which is imputed to a felon for a killing incidental to his felony is malice and not the act of killing. The mere coincidence of homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony murder doctrine. It is necessary ... to show that the conduct causing death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the felony. Death must be a consequence of the felony ... and not merely coincidence. Finding that this limitation represented the majority rule, [18] we explained that it clearly applies in Delaware, because the felony murder statute in force at that time required that the homicide be committed in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony. If the killing was not committed by the defendant or one acting in concert with him, then logically, the killing could hardly be considered to be `in furtherance' of the commission or attempted commission of a felony. [19] Applying this rule in Weick, we found that the felony murder statute could not apply when the victim of the felony killed one of the defendants' accomplices. [20] In dicta, we also noted that the rule precluded felony murder liability for the killing of a co-felon by the victim or a police officer, or the accidental killing of an innocent bystander by the victim or a police officer.... [21] Although not denominated as such in that case, this limitation is the agency theory of felony murder. [22] We examined the felony murder statute more recently in Williams v. State. [23] In that case, we explained that Weick imposed two separate limitations on felony murder: (1) that there be a causal connection between the felony and the murder; and (2) that the felon, or his accomplices, if any, perform the actual killing. [24] But, we noted that in an intervening decision, Chao v. State, [25] we had held that for felony murder liability to attach, a killing need only accompany the commission of an underlying felony. Thus, if the `in furtherance' language has any limiting effect, it is solely to require that the killing be done by the felon, him or herself. After analyzing Section 636(2), we concluded, in Williams, that the in furtherance of language not only requires that the murder occur during the course of the felony, but also that the murder occur to facilitate commission of the felony. [26] Thus, in Williams, we overruled Chao, but retained the agency theory of felony murder we adopted in Weick, namely, that the felony murder language requires not only that the defendant, or his accomplices, if any, commit the killing but also that the murder helps to move the felony forward. [27]
Eighteen months after Williams was decided, the General Assembly amended Sections 635(2) and 636(a)(2), removing the phrase in the course of and in furtherance of. [28] In the Synopsis, the legislature cited our Williams decision with disapproval, stating that this Court's interpretation of Section 636(a)(2), as requiring evidence that a killing was intended to help the [underlying] felony progress, is inconsistent with the common law rule, and with the definition of felony murder in almost every other state, which does not require evidence of specific intent in a felony murder prosecution. [29] The Synopsis went on to explain that the new statutory language, while engaged in felonious conduct meant only that the killing must be directly associated with the predicate felony as one continuous occurrence; rather than requiring that the killing affirmatively help facilitate the predicate felony. [30] Thus, the Synopsis indicates that the amendment was targeting this Court's expanded reading of the felony murder statute in Williams, which required that the killing facilitate the predicate felony. Although our adoption of the agency theory in Weick was indeed predicated on the now-excised in furtherance of language in the pre-amendment statute, the Synopsis demonstrates that the General Assembly did not address either of Weick's dual limitations of causation and agency. The language of the current statute supports both the causation and agency limitations. The current statute reads [w]hile engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit any felony, the person recklessly causes the death of another person.  [31] This language plainly encompasses the requirement that the person (or an accomplice [32] ) engaged in the felony cause the death of another. It does not preclude the application of the agency theory of felony murder. The Synopsis demonstrates that the General Assembly passed the amendment in order to be consistent with the felony murder rule of a majority of states. Although many states in the first half of the twentieth century adopted the rule that any death occurring during the commission of, or escape from, the felony constituted felony murder, the trend thereafter has been decidedly in favor of the agency theory. [33] Thus, of the jurisdictions that have considered the question, the vast majority maintain that the felony murder rule cannot be used to impose murder liability on a defendant when the lethal act is committed by a person other than the felon or his accomplices. [34] A minority of jurisdictions have adopted the so-called proximate cause theory of felony murder urged by the State. Under that theory, a defendant is liable for any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activitynotwithstanding the fact that the killing was by one resisting the crime. [35] The Synopsis does not refer to the minority rule. The Synopsis to the 2004 amendment indicates that the amendment was intended only to target the Williams requirement that the murder occur to facilitate commission of the felony. [36] Significantly, the Synopsis also states that other aspects of the present judicial interpretation of Delaware's felony murder rule would remain unaffected by this Act. [37] Although the agency theory is not explicitly identified as one of the retained present judicial interpretations, the General Assembly's clearly expressed intent to follow the majority rule of felony murder demonstrates to us that it did not intend to supersede the agency theory with the rule adopted only by a minority of States. Finally, nothing in the Synopsis shows that the General Assembly considered the merits of the agency theory or the proximate cause theory. The concepts are not even mentioned in the Synopsis. Justifications do exist for continuing the agency theory. Those justifications would be subject to consideration by the General Assembly if a proposal to repeal the agency theory had been clearly presented to it. For example, the historical justification for the felony murder rule has been to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit.  [38] If felons are criminally liable for murder (and a mandatory life sentence) for any death occurring during the commission of, or escape from, the felony, felons become strictly liable for killings by others not engaged in the felony. [39] This gives felons ... little incentive to refrain from using a gun against an armed victim or a pursuing police officer, since they will be held liable for any deaths that ensue regardless of whether the felons fire any shots themselves. [40] By limiting liability [for felony murder] to the acts of defendants and their accomplices, the agency theory limits liability to the consequences of acts that are at least putatively within the defendant's control. [41] As a result, unlike the proximate cause theory, the agency theory gives felons incentives to refrain from using a deadly weapon. Although the General Assembly certainly may reject the agency theory if it chooses to do so, we do not discern any legislative intent to supersede the agency theory of felony murder by the 2004 amendment.