Opinion ID: 1933441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: My Daughter's Children

Text: The trial court's holding that the Zimmerman children are not included in my daughter's children and that Lee Wiltsie is included is based on its analysis of relevant Alabama cases, from which it drew the following conclusion: . . . [T]he criterion to be satisfied in determining whether or not an adopted child should take under a class gift to `my children' is: (1) That the child must have been in contemplation by the testator at the time his will was executed; (2) That the testator knew of or was otherwise aware of the adoption of the child or that the child was in being; and (3) That the testator treated or otherwise regarded the child as a member of his family and to all human appearance recognized the child as an object of his solicitude and bounty. . . . The Zimmerman children and those aligned with their interests, as appellants with respect to this aspect of the trial court's judgment, contend basically that Alabama case law concerning adopted children should be modified so that adopted children are treated exactly as natural children, unless a contrary intent clearly appears. The modification urged by the appellants was effected, after this case was orally argued and submitted, in McCaleb v. Brown, 344 So.2d 485 (Ala.1977), in which this Court held that an adopted child is presumptively within the designation of the adopter's descendants unless the context or circumstances clearly establish a contrary intention. Since the term descendants includes children, we can see no reason for following a different rule with respect to the term children. There being no indication of contrary intention on the part of the testators, we hold that the phrase my daughter's children in both wills includes adopted children. The most cogent argument for reaching a different result is that the testators may have relied on our previous case law that the term children does not include adopted children. See Whitfield v. Matthews, 334 So.2d 876, 878 (Ala.1976). This argument is vitiated in this case because there is testimony to the effect that the testators intended that the phrase my daughter's children include adopted children. When the wills were executed, one of the testators' daughter's children was, in fact, adopted. The wills spoke of Harriet's children in terms of him or her, but Harriet's adopted child was her only female child then existing. Furthermore, Mr. Sadler testified that the Testator indicated to him that he intended for the adopted child Lee to be included in the class my daughter's children. Since the testators obviously intended for one adopted child to be included in the class, they saw no need to mention specifically that the term my daughter's children was meant to include adopted children. Even under our previous case law, Lee would probably have been included in the class my daughter's children without a specific mention in the will. But, surely any scrivener who had those previous cases in mind would not have left the inclusion of an adopted child to an event as unpredictable as a court's interpretation of the testator's intent. Apparently, the testators were not relying on our previous holdings that children does not include adopted children, but were using the term as it is commonly used to include all children, whether natural or adopted. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's holding that the class my daughter's children does not include Bonnie Gale Zimmerman and Miles Raymond Zimmerman, Jr.