Opinion ID: 1199062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vagueness of Torture Special Circumstance

Text: (26) Citing Maynard v. Cartwright (hereafter Maynard ) (1988) 486 U.S. 356 [100 L.Ed.2d 372, 108 S.Ct. 1853], defendant asserts that the special circumstance of torture is unconstitutionally vague as applied here because it fails to provide a principled way to distinguish this case, where the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not. In Maynard, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional, on the ground of vagueness, an aggravating circumstance that allowed the imposition of the death penalty when the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The high court pointed out that because the language of the aggravating circumstance had not been construed narrowly it did not adequately inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty. (486 U.S. at pp. 363-364 [100 L.Ed.2d at pp. 381-382]; accord, Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 429, 432 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 408-409, 100 S.Ct. 1759]; People v. Superior Court ( Engert ) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 797, 806 [183 Cal. Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76]; Proffitt v. Wainwright (11th Cir.1982) 685 F.2d 1227.) The narrowing construction absent in Maynard is present here. In People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 271, this court construed the torture special circumstance as requiring proof that the defendant intended to kill and torture the victim, and inflicted extreme pain upon a living victim. Thus, unlike the vaguely worded aggravating circumstances of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel ( Maynard, supra, 486 U.S. 356), the torture special circumstance involved here has been construed narrowly by this court and its constitutionality has been upheld. ( People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 266-271; People v. Wade, supra, 44 Cal.3d 975, 993-994.)