Opinion ID: 194530
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D).

Text: When a defendant alleges that a PSI Report contains an identified inaccuracy, the district court must either make a finding concerning the allegation or make a determination that no finding is necessary because the matter will not be taken into account at sentencing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D). The court must also append a written record of any such findings or determinations to the PSI Report. Id. This protocol serves the dual purpose of protecting the defendant's due process rights and supplying a clear record for future proceedings (say, appellate review or consideration for parole). See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 897 F.2d 596, 599 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Bruckman, 874 F.2d 57, 63-64 (1st Cir. 1989). Accordingly, we have insisted on strict compliance with the rule. See United States v. Hanono-Surujun, 914 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). That we are firm in requiring compliance with Rule 32(c)(3)(D) does not mean, however, that we habitually ignore the 16 realities of particular situations or divorce our consideration from the circumstances of actual cases. The opposite is true. See, e.g., United States v. Santana-Camacho, 931 F.2d 966, 969-70 (1st Cir. 1991); Levy, 897 F.2d at 598-99; Bruckman, 874 F.2d at 64-66; United States v. Serino, 835 F.2d 924, 932 (1st Cir. 1987). Thus, the record in a given case may show that the court has ma[d]e 'implicit' findings on disputed factual questions by accepting the government's recommendations at the sentencing hearing. United States v. Wells Metal Finishing, Inc., 922 F.2d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1991). The circumstances here are analogous to those that confronted the Wells court. The judge presented both the prosecutor and defense counsel with an opportunity to voice their concerns anent the contents of the PSI Report. He heard arguments from both sides about disputed matters. After argument, the judge accepted the government's sentencing recommendations and then indicated in writing, as part of the judgment, that he had adopt[ed] the factual findings . . . in the presentence report. We think that this writing is tantamount to the slightly more elaborate notation made by the judge in Wells, 922 F.2d at 58, and that the purposes of Rule 32 were equally served. The only logically inferable conclusion is that the court rejected each and all of appellant's fact-based challenges to the PSI Report. See id.; see also United States v. Cruz, F.2d , (1st Cir. 1992) [No. 91-1047, slip op. at 17 12-15]; Gerante, 891 F.2d at 367; Bruckman, 874 F.2d at 64. In short, the district court made adequately particularized findings, and created a minimally sufficient written memorialization of those findings, when it expressly adopted the facts as limned in the PSI Report, thereby necessarily finding against appellant on all disputed matters of fact. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D) was not violated.