Opinion ID: 874230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The legislative purpose for the Medical Indigency Act

Text: In addition to misapplying I.C. § 31-3510A, the majority's reading of the reimbursement provision does not comport with the declaration of the Act as a whole. The legislative intent of the Act, articulated in I.C. § 31-3501, provides that, in order to safeguard the public health, safety and welfare, and to provide suitable facilities and provisions for the care and hospitalization of indigent persons in this state, and to provide for the payment thereof, the respective counties of this state shall have the duties and powers as hereinafter provided. See Univ. of Utah Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Twin Falls Cnty., 122 Idaho 1010, 1016, 842 P.2d 689, 695 (1992). However, the legislature also provided that each person, to the maximum extent possible, is responsible for his or her own medical care. I.C. § 31-3501. This Court, in Twin Falls Cnty., held that it is not proper to make hospitals wait indefinitely for payment of just claims and that financial solvency and stability of medical facilities, achieved though prompt payment, is necessary to maintain suitable facilities. 122 Idaho at 1016, 842 P.2d at 695. Thus, the hardship of any waiting period for payment must fall on the counties, not hospitals. Id. Accordingly, in Twin Falls Cnty., this Court held that pending applications for speculative federal supplemental social security benefits were not a resource for the purpose of determining eligibility for medical indigency benefits. This Court reasoned that because the speculative social security benefits were not readily accessible, allowing them to constitute a resource would place the hardship of delayed payment on hospitals, which in turn would negatively effect the hospitals' ability to provide suitable care both to medically indigent patients and the general public. 122 Idaho at 1015, 842 P.2d at 694. It follows that allowing speculative future income to serve as a resource would result in the same hardship on hospitals seeking payment that this Court rejected in Twin Falls Cnty. The fact that the Board in this case arbitrarily found that, given the correct circumstance, Freeman would be able to pay her medical costs in no way means that such circumstantial speculation will come to fruition. Thus, the Board's finding and the majority's affirmance places the risk of non-payment directly on the hospital rather than on the county, contrary to the legislative purpose and the established precedent of this Court. Furthermore, the majority decision limits access to county funds and restricts the medically indigent from access to aid for mandatory emergency care in contravention of the Act's purpose of safeguarding the public health, safety and welfare. The medically indigent should not be restricted from access to financial benefits based on arbitrary conclusions of what constitutes a resource. Rather, when appropriate, the medically indigent should be granted benefits and the county should then use its legislatively provided authority to force reimbursement through employment. This will result in hospitals receiving prompt and just compensation while medically indigent patients are still forced to repay the maximum they are able to, by reimbursing the county for the care they received.