Opinion ID: 3055224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We review a district court’s order granting a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 363 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th 5 Case: 12-16193 Date Filed: 06/07/2013 Page: 6 of 8 Cir. 2004). We begin (and end) our analysis by discussing whether Stovall’s ECOA claims are barred by res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata “will bar a subsequent action if: (1) the prior decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the parties were identical in both suits; and (4) the prior and present cause of actions are the same.” Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Secretary argues that because the D.C. district court addressed the claims that Stovall brings in this lawsuit, res judicata applies and blocks the re-litigation of those claims here. We agree. As the district court below noted, the D.C. district court had jurisdiction over Stovall’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because the claims were asserted under the ECOA and the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also addressed Stovall’s 1994 and 1995 claims on the merits: Mr. Stovall’s ECOA claims are based mainly upon events that occurred between 1999 and 2001 and are not eligible. Those claims that are arguably eligible—stemming from events that occurred between 1993 and 1996—were resolved when he signed the Resolution Agreement in 1998 and he is foreclosed from initiating a new lawsuit now. As discussed above, the district court dismissed Stovall’s 1994 and 1995 claims as time-barred, and, in the alternative because of the Resolution Agreement. Both of these grounds qualify as “on the merits.” See Mathis v. Laird, 457 F.2d 926, 927 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (“A ruling based on 6 Case: 12-16193 Date Filed: 06/07/2013 Page: 7 of 8 the statute of limitations is a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes. (italics in original)). 3 Stovall does not challenge whether the D.C. district court addressed his ECOA claims on the merits, but instead challenges that court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the pre-Resolution Agreement claims. Stovall cites our decision in Friedman, where we held that a plaintiff “whose claims against the United States are essentially contractual” must abide by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), and file those claims in excess of $10,000 in the Court of Claims. 391 F.3d at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted). This argument is without merit for several reasons. First, Friedman stands for the proposition that contractual claims against the United States in excess of $10,000 must be filed in the Court of Claims, see id.; it hardly suggests that the Court of Claims is the exclusive court of jurisdiction for ECOA actions. And in fact, the D.C. district court abided by the Tucker Act and Friedman when it transferred Stovall’s contractual claims to the Court of Claims. The claims resolved on the merits by the D.C. district court—the 3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. 7 Case: 12-16193 Date Filed: 06/07/2013 Page: 8 of 8 same claims that are now before us—were not breach of contract claims, but instead ECOA claims. Because Stovall’s ECOA claims are barred by res judicata, we need not address the district court’s other reasons for dismissing his complaint. AFFIRMED. 8