Opinion ID: 166399
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Comments on the Appropriate Sentence

Text: 131 Mr. Thornburg contends that the sentencing stage of his trial was fundamentally unfair because in his sentencing-stage closing the prosecutor (1) injected his personal opinion on the appropriate sentence and (2) misled the jury about sentencing alternatives. The prosecutor said: 132 And you must give independent consideration to each and every one of the murder convictions because every one of those individuals in there was a separate life, and that is they never deserved to die in the manner in which they died. 133 And we can't change that. But I can and you can give them at least individual consideration with the understanding that the man who murdered them, the man who led, the man who created this and the man who was out seeking for revenge that night, that he receive the punishment that is just under the statutes, under the law and most important in this case, as we discussed at the very beginning. 134 . . . 135 And we told you what the law is. That's merely the charges we file against somebody. But that's not easy. There's nothing easy about it. You know, we all try to be moral people, we think about trying to do good for our community, our society. 136 When we file a piece of paper, we're asking you to sentence this person to death. We're asking you to return a verdict allowing the State to execute Mr. Thornburg. So basically we're asking you the State for the authority to do that. There's nothing easy about that. We're talking about life and death. Nothing easy at all. 137 . . . 138 Justice, folks, cries for the death penalty in this case like no other case. Justice cries for the death penalty. There is no other reasonable verdict, nothing. Nothing can come close. 139 Talk about the sword of mercy. It's above Judge Winchester. The sword there. You live by the sword, you die by the sword, folks. We're asking you to return a verdict now of guilty which you already have. The maximum punishment is on everything. 140 If you really don't want Mr. Thornburg back on your streets ever again, then the only proper punishment is death. We're asking you to sentence Mr. Thornburg to that. It should not be a difficult decision. I know it is. We're talking about killing somebody. You're authorizing the State to kill somebody. But there is no other just verdict. This is justice. 141 Tr. IV at 195-96, 201-02, 205-06. Mr. Thornburg contends that these comments imposed the prosecutor's personal views upon the jury. It is improper for a prosecutor to inject his personal opinion on the propriety of the death sentence. It is also impermissible for a prosecutor to suggest that he or some other authority, not the jury, [is] the final or true arbiter of . . . punishment. Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1343 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). As stated in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), [T]he uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role. But a prosecutor is entitled to argue that under the facts and law, capital punishment is appropriate. See United States v. Ainesworth, 716 F.2d 769, 771 (10th Cir.1983) (distinguishing improper argument that prosecutor believes accused is guilty of crime or stating facts not in evidence from proper commentary that on the basis of the evidence in the case, it is his belief that the defendant is guilty). Here, the prosecutor did not suggest the existence of facts not in evidence, nor did he suggest that anyone other than the jury was responsible for fixing the appropriate sentence. On the other hand, his comments on the appropriateness of the death penalty could be taken as his personal view. We will assume that the comments crossed the line. 142 More troubling is the prosecutor's comment that did cross the line. In the last quoted paragraph he said, If you really don't want Mr. Thornburg back on your streets ever again, then the only proper punishment is death. Tr. IV at 205. This statement could mislead the jury about possible punishment alternatives, suggesting that he could be released from jail at some point if not sentenced to death. The State may not create a false dilemma by advancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future dangerousness while, at the same time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant never will be released if given a sentence other than death. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (jury should have been instructed on possibility of life without parole); see also Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (requiring Simmons instruction when prosecution presented evidence showing defendant's probability of future dangerousness). 143 Nevertheless, the trial judge remedied this error when he instructed the jury: Even if you find that the aggravating circumstance outweigh(s) the mitigating circumstance, you may impose a sentence of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for life without parole. Instr. 12 St. Ct. Rec. Vol. 3 at 504. Thus, the jury knew that it could keep Mr. Thornburg off the streets without imposing the death penalty. See Kelly, 534 U.S. at 257 n. 8, 122 S.Ct. 726 (jury instruction on parole ineligibility could cure problem raised by prosecutor's argument). 144