Opinion ID: 572652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ERISA Preemption: The Doctrine As Applied.

Text: 25 Based on the policy considerations described above, the Funds have a plausible argument that the mechanics' lien law here at issue should not succumb to section 514(a). After all, the Massachusetts statute grants employee benefit plans access not only to a further mechanism by which they can collect outstanding debts, but also to a new (and perhaps deeper) pocket from which monies owed may be repaid. Improving a fund's collection prospects seems, at first blush, fully consonant with Congress' purpose of safeguarding participants' rights and expectations. Furthermore, the lien law advantages employee benefit plans without increasing the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal Government--a factor which could work to the detriment of plan beneficiaries. Ingersoll-Rand, 111 S.Ct. at 484. And, it is hard to see how use of Mass.Gen.L. ch. 254 might interfere with establishing a uniform body of benefit law, id., to any greater degree than would use of a state garnishment statute (as permitted in Mackey ). In this sense, then, allowing trustees of covered plans to utilize the lien law at their own volition would simply add an arrow to an already well-stocked quiver. Coming at the same point from another direction, if the trustees of an ERISA-regulated plan choose to impose and enforce a lien, it is fair to presume that, as fiduciaries, they will use the proceeds to the betterment of plan beneficiaries. So viewed, the lien law is a help, not a hindrance, to ERISA-regulated plans. 26 But, benefit is not the relevant test. Notwithstanding the synchronicity between the policy considerations that undergird ERISA and the Funds' attempted utilization of the Massachusetts mechanics' lien law, fidelity to precedent compels a conclusion that any such use of the lien law is preempted. We explain briefly. 27 The Court has been especially skeptical of state laws which, like the Massachusetts lien law, specifically refer to ERISA plans and grant them special treatment. See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829, 108 S.Ct. at 2185 (stating that the Court has virtually taken it for granted that state laws which are specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans are pre-empted under § 514(a)) (quotation marks omitted). The vice in such laws is not palliated by a state legislature's good intentions or by a comfortable fit between a state statute and ERISA's overall aims. To the exact contrary, the Court has made it pellucidly clear that section 514(a) was intended to displace all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2389, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985); accord Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830, 108 S.Ct. at 2185. Hence, any state law which singles out ERISA plans, by express reference, for special treatment is pre-empted. Id. at 838 n. 12, 108 S.Ct. at 2189 n. 12 (emphasis in original). This means, in short, that state laws which expressly relate to employee benefit plans are necessarily grist for the preemption mill. 28 To be sure, footnote 12 in Mackey is dictum--but it is considered dictum. We are, therefore, both unable to ignore it and unwilling to do so. We agree with Professor Wright that, in evaluating dicta, [m]uch depends on the character of the dictum. Mere obiter may be entitled to little weight, while a carefully considered statement ..., though technically dictum, must carry great weight, and may even ... be regarded as conclusive. Charles A. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 58, at 374 (4th ed. 1983). And here, the earmarks of careful consideration are readily apparent. In our judgment, it would be blinking reality to pass off Mackey 's footnote 12 as a chance statement. Justice White's emphasizing of the word any  by placing it in italics eliminates even the remote possibility that footnote 12 was casually constructed. 29 This conclusion draws the grease from the goose. We think that federal appellate courts are bound by the Supreme Court's considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court's outright holdings, particularly when, as here, a dictum is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement. Cf., e.g., Faucher v. Federal Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir.) (court of appeals cannot assume the Supreme Court proclaims the law lightly when it authors considered dictum), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 79, 116 L.Ed.2d 52 (1991). If lower courts felt free to limit Supreme Court opinions precisely to the facts of each case, then our system of jurisprudence would be in shambles, with litigants, lawyers, and legislatures left to grope aimlessly for some semblance of reliable guidance. Nor are we alone in voicing our healthy regard for dictum that appears to have been carefully considered. See, e.g., Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 115, 120 n. 8 (7th Cir.1989) (court of appeals should respect considered Supreme Court dicta); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir.1983) (court of appeals not at liberty to disregard ... guidelines established by Supreme Court, albeit through dicta), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1036, 104 S.Ct. 1309, 79 L.Ed.2d 707 (1984); United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir.1975) (considered dictum must be given considerable weight and can not be ignored in the resolution of [a] close question). 30 If we are to turn corners squarely, the rest follows inexorably. In respect to the scope of ERISA preemption, we have no real option except to conclude that the High Court meant exactly what it wrote in footnote 12 of Mackey. Therefore, we are constrained to treat the statement as authoritative and to obey its command. 31 Given this preface, there can be no question about the closing chapter. The statute at issue expressly singles out ERISA plans for special treatment. The second paragraph of Mass.Gen.L. ch. 254, § 1 provides, inter alia, that the mechanics' lien law shall inure to the advantage of the trustee or trustees of any fund or funds, established pursuant to section 302 of the Taft Hartley Law (29 USC 186), providing coverage or benefits to [an employee]. Similarly, the law provides for the filing of certain lien-related notices by the trustee or trustees of a fund or funds, described in section one, providing coverage or benefits to any person performing labor. Id. § 4. Under ERISA's staple definitions, the term employee benefit plan (or simply plan) includes employee welfare benefit plan[s]. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). A plan fits within this integument if it is established, inter alia, for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries ... any benefit described in [29 U.S.C. § 186(c) ]. Id. § 1002(1)(B). Thus, any plan that grants benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 186, which is another way of describing any plan that grants benefits under section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act, is by definition an ERISA plan. 2 Put bluntly, by singling out section 302 plans for special treatment, the Massachusetts mechanics' lien law, in the same stroke, singles out ERISA plans for special treatment. It is, therefore, preempted as it applies to ERISA-regulated plans. 32 In light of this analysis, we find it unsurprising that, in analogous cases, several of our sister circuits have ruled in favor of preemption. The Fifth Circuit, in a strikingly similar case involving Louisiana's mechanics' lien statute, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 9:4801-9:4823 (West 1983), held that ERISA preempted the law's operation. See Iron Workers Mid-South Pension Fund v. Terotechnology Corp., 891 F.2d 548, 556 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3272, 111 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990). The Third Circuit found preemption in a case involving Pennsylvania's wage payment and collection law, Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 43, §§ 260.1-260.12 (Supp.1985). See McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 105-08 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 971, 107 S.Ct. 473, 93 L.Ed.2d 417 (1986). The Ninth Circuit recently decided that a California lien law which advantaged trusts established to receive employer's contributions on account of fringe benefits supplemental to a wage agreement, Cal.Civ.Code § 3111 (West 1974), was preempted by ERISA. See Sturgis v. Herman Miller, Inc., 943 F.2d 1127, 1129-30 (9th Cir.1991). The court remarked that, while the California law did not expressly refer to ERISA plans, it need not do so where the statute obviously singles out ERISA plans. Id. at 1130. Since the state law accorded ERISA plans a unique procedural benefit by conferring upon them special mechanic lien rights to collect delinquent contributions, it was preempted. Id. Given the difference in language between the Massachusetts and California statutes--a difference which tilts toward preemption, not away from it--the same result must obtain here. 3 33 We need not paint the lily. State statutes which expressly grant preferential benefits to ERISA plans cannot withstand the preemptive force of ERISA § 514(a). Inasmuch as Mass.Gen.L. ch. 254 is such a statute, the Funds' use of the lien created thereby is preempted. 34