Opinion ID: 3149588
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Although this court generally reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, when the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are also at issue, we review those rulings for abuse of discretion. See Tex. A&M Research Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 401 (5th Cir. 2003); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[A]n appeal of a summary judgment presenting evidentiary issues raises two levels of inquiry. At the first level, we review the trial court's evidentiary rulings, which define the summary judgment record, and we give these rulings their due deference. At the second level, with the record defined, we review the trial court's summary judgment 3 Case: 15-40710 Document: 00513246690 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/26/2015 No. 15-40710 decision de novo”), abrogated on other grounds by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Further, when a party fails to file a written objection to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation of a magistrate judge, this court reviews the district court’s adoption of any finding, conclusion, or recommendation for plain error. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds. A reversal under plain error review occurs only when, inter alia, this court finds “an error that is clear and obvious.” Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute on other grounds. b. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) and the Espinoza Affidavit Because the College did not disclose Dr. Espinoza as a witness, Keller argues that the Espinoza affidavit should not be included in the summary judgment record under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) (“Rule 37”). Pursuant to Rule 37, the district court determined that Dr. Espinoza’s affidavit could be admitted into evidence if the failure to disclose her identity was found to be harmless. The district court correctly found that “any prejudice to Plaintiff caused by Defendant’s failure to disclose Espinoza as a witness c[ould] be cured by deposing Espinoza” and allowed both parties to take her deposition and supplement the summary judgment record. See Tex. A&M, 338 F.3d at 402 (citation omitted). Keller urges this court to enforce Rule 37 as written, but Rule 37 explicitly states that “[i]f a party fails to provide information or [the] identity of a witness as required . . . the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 4 Case: 15-40710 Document: 00513246690 Page: 5 Date Filed: 10/26/2015 No. 15-40710 c. Hearsay and the Espinoza Affidavit Keller next argues that the district court erred in overruling his evidentiary objection to the Espinoza affidavit because it is not based on personal knowledge and is “riddled with inadmissible hearsay.” 2 The district court found Keller’s argument regarding hearsay unpersuasive and noted that Dr. Espinoza’s affidavit is not evidence of the truth of the allegations against Keller, but is evidence of Dr. Espinoza’s state of mind when she made a good faith reliance on a subordinate’s allegations regarding Keller’s work performance. When “an employer discharges an employee based on the complaint of another employee, the issue is not the truth or falsity of the allegation, but ‘whether the employer reasonably believed the employee’s allegation and acted on it in good faith.’” Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also Nobles v. Cardno, Inc., 549 F. App'x 265, 268 (5th Cir. 2013) (relying on Jackson and holding that when complaints from other employees are offered to show the reasons for an employment action, the allegations are not hearsay). Accordingly, because Dr. Espinoza’s state of mind is the relevant factor, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Espinoza’s affidavit into the summary judgment record. 2 Keller also objects on appeal to the magistrate’s finding that Dr. Espinoza had personal knowledge regarding the interview process for selecting Keller’s replacement after his termination. We review for plain error because Keller failed to object below. Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1428-29. We have held that personal knowledge can stem from the affiant’s “sphere of responsibility” as a corporate employee. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Budden, 420 F.3d 521, 530 (5th Cir. 2005). Assessing only for plain error, because Dr. Espinoza was found to have the requisite knowledge based on her position as the president of the College, we do not disturb the magistrate’s finding. 5 Case: 15-40710 Document: 00513246690 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/26/2015 No. 15-40710 d. Summary Judgment Documents Lastly, Keller objects on appeal to the inclusion of all documents attached to the College’s motion for summary judgment, except for his own deposition testimony, because the documents are not authenticated “by a proper business record affidavit.” The magistrate found that all of the exhibits were properly authenticated either by Dr. Espinoza in her affidavit or by Keller in his deposition. 3 Because Keller failed to object to the magistrate’s authentication finding, this court’s review is limited to plain error. Douglass, 79 F.3d at 128-29 (5th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Evidence 901 provides for methods of authentication. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) (listing multiple methods of authentication); see also In re McLain, 516 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that “Rule 901 does not limit the type of evidence allowed to authenticate a document. . . . [but] merely requires some evidence which is sufficient to support a finding that the evidence in question is what its proponent claims it to be”) (citation omitted)). Rule 901 does not preclude authentication by affidavit or deposition. See Rust v. Bank of Am., N.A., 573 F. App’x 343, 345 (5th Cir. 2014) (allowing a document to be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(1) by an affiant with knowledge swearing the document to be true and correct); Fed. R. Evid. 901(b). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err by considering all documents submitted by the College in relation to its motion for summary judgment. 3 Dr. Espinoza testified in her affidavit that exhibits B-1, B-2, and B-3 were true and correct copies of documents maintained by the College. Exhibits A-1 through A-10 were discussed and authenticated by Keller during his deposition. 6 Case: 15-40710 Document: 00513246690 Page: 7 Date Filed: 10/26/2015 No. 15-40710