Opinion ID: 2803111
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sandra Flores-Rivera's Arguments

Text: Sandra first argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court committed error under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) by admitting testimony about prior bad acts. We begin by describing the complained-of evidence. Near the beginning of Xiomara's direct examination, the prosecutor asked her several questions aimed at lessening the blow of the defendants' anticipated impeachment attempts. For example, the prosecutor elicited Xiomara's admission that she cut off her electronic bracelet while on bail, used drugs while on bail, lied to her parole officer, and fought another prisoner while incarcerated. During this line of questions, the prosecutor asked Xiomara if she had ever been involved in an incident regarding a knife. Xiomara proceeded to explain that she was placed in the hole for seventeen days because prison officials discovered a homemade knife in a co-defendant's cell. The following day, the prosecutor returned to this subject, and Xiomara clarified that it was Lauren Ortiz-Flores, Sandra's niece, in whose cell the knife -36- was found. Sandra was not mentioned in connection to this story at all. On cross-examination, Sandra's trial counsel elicited testimony that during the investigation about the homemade knife, prison officials found a sewing needle in Xiomara's cell. Prisoners were not allowed to have sewing needles, so this was another instance of Xiomara breaking prison rules. The second piece of evidence is a story told by Andy during his testimony. Andy testified that Sandra and her sister Diana (also a co-defendant) got into a domestic dispute about a purported love affair between Sandra's daughter and Diana's husband. Andy, Omar, Zavala-Martí and three other members of the conspiracy traveled to Victor Berríos after hearing that Sandra and Diana had shot guns at each other as part of the dispute. ZavalaMartí warned Sandra and Diana that gunfire compromised the drug point because it would make the drug point hot and attract cops. He also threatened Sandra that if he had to go back because of this sort of issue, . . . he was going to deal with her. Sandra concedes that she did not lodge a contemporaneous objection to the testimony about the homemade knife, the domestic dispute, or the shooting itself at trial. We therefore review her claims for plain error, which means that we will only deem the testimony's admission to justify reversal if it seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of -37- judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 128 (1st Cir. 2009) (reviewing defendant's forfeited 404(b) argument for plain error). Rule 404(b) provides that [e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). The Rule expressly provides that evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).16 Andy's account of the domestic dispute between Sandra and Diana exemplifies the type of prior bad act evidence that may be admitted for a purpose other than to show propensity. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (Permitted Uses). The story illustrated how 16 Subparagraph (b)(2) of Rule 404 provides: On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must: (A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial[.] See also United States v. Tuesta-Toro, 29 F.3d 771, 774—75 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing the specificity with which such a request must be made, and holding that a general request for exculpatory information was insufficient). Sandra argues that the prosecutor improperly failed to provide notice of the evidence, but she also admits that she did not request such notice. We therefore reject any implied argument that the prosecutor's failure to provide proper notice constituted reversible error. -38- high-ranking co-conspirators reprimanded lower-ranking members and ensured the drug-selling operation's continued success. Thus, while the domestic dispute itself was not relevant to Sandra's guilt, the incident in its entirety was probative in showing Sandra's participation in the conspiracy. See United States v. Currier, 821 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1987) ([E]vidence of prior or contemporaneous uncharged conduct may be admissible to complete the story of a crime by proving the immediate context of events near in time and place.); United States v. Watson, 695 F.3d 159, 165 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that the full weight of [the narrative] would be lost on the jury absent the introduction of some limited factual foundation); United States v. Guerrero, 169 F.3d 933, 944 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that Rule 404(b) permits admission of evidence that explains the relationship between the parties). With respect to the homemade knife incident, the story had no direct connection to Sandra in the first place. Any inference that the jury may have made due to the familial relationship between Lauren and Sandra was too tenuous to attribute the bad act to Sandra in these circumstances, especially under plain error review. We therefore need not decide whether the purpose of softening the blow of cross-examination would have been a proper non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(b). Either way, it was at worst harmless. -39- Having rejected Sandra's evidentiary arguments, we proceed to her sentencing challenges.
The district court sentenced Sandra to twenty years' imprisonment with respect to count one, which represented the mandatory minimum term of incarceration for that count due to the drug quantities found by the jury, the proximity of the offense to a public housing project, and Sandra's prior felony drug offense convictions. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), 846, 851, and 860. She was sentenced to 188 months for each of the four remaining counts, to run concurrently with count one and each other. Sandra challenges what amounts to a twenty-year sentence on two bases, both of which butt up against a stone wall of controlling precedent. She also fails to direct us to any indication in the record that she preserved her claims. We therefore review her two sentencing arguments on plain error review. See United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2010). Sandra first makes a broad attack on the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences. This Court has already determined that it is beyond cavil that Congress has the power to set statutory minimum and maximum sentences to which courts must adhere. United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 561 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. -40- 453, 467 (1991)). No subsequent case has called that conclusion into question. Sandra's constitutional challenge to mandatory minimum sentences therefore fails to raise error, much less plain error. Sandra's second sentencing challenge is based on a conflict she perceives between mandatory minimum sentences and the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that sentences be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth therein, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and other enumerated sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). She argues that sometimes the mandatory minimum is greater than necessary to comply with those purposes.17 Thus, she says, we must rely on the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in her favor, and (we assume) remand to the district court for a different sentence. We need look no farther than the text of section 3553 itself to conclude that no such conflict exists. Sections 3553(e) and (f) describe the limited situations in which a sentencing judge has the authority to impose a sentence below a statutorily mandated minimum. A court may impose a lower sentence, for instance, when the government makes a motion to reduce the sentence due to the defendant's substantial assistance with an investigation or 17 Sandra fails to explain why her own sentence ought to be characterized as such. -41- prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). There would have been no need for Congress to include these carve-outs had it not assumed that statutory mandatory minimums were generally applicable. Cf. United States v. Jimenez, 507 F.3d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that the rule of lenity only applies if there is a grievous ambiguity in the statute (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finding no ambiguity, reliance upon the rule of lenity is unnecessary, and we find no plain error in the district court's decision to subject Sandra to the statute's mandatory minimum sentence.