Opinion ID: 1759736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in refusing to allow opinion testimony regarding ladnier's sexual morality.

Text: ¶ 26. At trial, Ladnier's ex-wife, Linda Jenkins, testified that she was married to Ladnier for twenty years, had been divorced from him for nine years, and that, in her opinion, he had a reputation of being truthful. The jury was excused and Ladnier proffered Jenkins's testimony as to his reputation for sexual morality and her opinion of his sexual morality. When asked her opinion about his sexual morality, she stated that in her opinion he would not harm a young person. When asked if she ever had an opportunity for anyone to say anything about his sexual morality, she replied that she had not. She then stated that she and Ladnier were chaperones for their children's high school activities and that she believed that he would never harm a young person. ¶ 27. The circuit court excluded the proffered testimony, finding that it was inadmissible character evidence, that Jenkins gave only her personal opinion as to Ladnier's sexual morality, and she offered nothing as to his general reputation for sexual morality in the community. The standard of review regarding admission [or exclusion] of evidence is abuse of discretion. Where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court `will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party.' Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 13 (Miss.2000) (citing Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 113 (Miss.1999)). ¶ 28. An accused has an absolute right to put on character evidence as to a pertinent trait. 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 56 (3d ed.1940). Indeed, M.R.E. 404 allows a criminal defendant to put on evidence of his good character. [2] Whether a proposed testimony is pertinent and therefore open to exploration via character evidence depends on the nature of the case. 3 Crim. Prac. Manual § 56:3. The nature of the trait in question determines the time period about which the witness would testify, e.g., the time of trial for veracity, the time of the alleged incident for honesty or peacefulness. Id. ¶ 29. Mrs. Jenkins's testimony regarding Ladnier's reputation for sexual morality was properly excluded because the testimony was based on incidents which had occurred approximately nine years prior to the date of the incident. As pointed out above, testimony based on facts which occurred at the time of the alleged incident would be admissible, but facts which occurred nine years prior are too remote to be relevant.