Opinion ID: 2584286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel's Failure To Competently Investigate Mr. Elmore's Mental Deficiencies

Text: ¶ 96 Jon Komorowski, appointed lead counsel for the defense team, became aware through investigation that Mr. Elmore had suffered numerous head injuries, been exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam, worked with chemicals as a mechanic for most of his life, and grew up in an area with a history of crop dusting. Findings of Fact (Sept. 10, 2004) (FOF) at 17-19. Despite such knowledge, Mr. Komorowski failed to have Mr. Elmore evaluated by a neuropsychologist or neurotoxicologist until after Mr. Elmore's conviction. Counsel acknowledged, I did not consider the potential importance of further exploring Mr. Elmore's history for evidence of exposure to neurotoxins. Again, this was not a strategic decision, and instead was the product of our inexperience. Decl. of Jon C. Komorowski at 5 (reproduced in Pers. Restraint Pet. & Br. in Support, Attach. 2). Mr. Elmore now contends counsel's failure to retain mental health experts for the purpose of investigating Mr. Elmore's possible brain damage and neuropsychological deficiencies constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. I agree. ¶ 97 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, demands counsel conduct a reasonable investigation under prevailing professional norms. `In a capital case the attorney's duty to investigate all possible lines of defense is strictly observed.' Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, 1167 (10th Cir.1999) (quoting Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 777 (10th Cir.1998)). ¶ 98 Here, counsel's failure to consult mental health experts in the penalty phase (given counsel's knowledge of Mr. Elmore's history) was deficient as it fell below the objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms as part of the duty to investigate. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Court-appointed death penalty expert Dennis Balske concluded Mr. Komorowski's overall performance was objectively unreasonable and his most salient error was his failure to investigate Mr. Elmore's mental health issues. Decl. of Dennis Balske at 14 (reproduced in Pers. Restraint Pet. & Br. in Support, Attach. 1). Mr. Balske observed, Certain events in a client's past . . . are well understood to mandate further investigation, e.g., a history of trauma; head injury; neurological abnormalities; mental illness in the client and the family; and significant exposure to chemicals, including controlled substances. If the defendant has a history of brain trauma or head injury, competent counsel would retain an expert trained in neuropsychology and/or neurology, at a minimum, to do an evaluation. Similarly, a family history of seizure disorders also raises a question regarding neurological damage. Substantial exposure to toxic substances calls for an evaluation by an appropriate specialist such as a neurotoxicologist. A psychiatrist may be necessary to understand the interrelation between the medical conditions and other mental health issues, e.g., trauma, in the client's life. Id. at 12. Mr. Balske concluded that in light of Mr. Elmore's known history and the fact that Mr. Elmore himself did not understand why he had committed this crime. . . . [R]easonably competent counsel would have identified the possibility of neurological impairment and the existence of significant trauma in Mr. Elmore's life. Id. at 14-15. ¶ 99 The importance of mitigating evidence of brain damage is significant. In Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), the United States Supreme Court determined lawyers were deficient in failing to examine a court file on the defendant's prior conviction-a file which led to a range of mitigation leads that no other source had opened up. The files contained test results suggesting Rompilla suffered from schizophrenia and other disorders, and evidence that Rompilla was raised in a severely abusive household, that his parents were severe alcoholics, and that Rompilla's mother drank throughout her pregnancy with him. Postconviction mental health experts found that Rompilla suffered from organic brain damage and `extreme mental disturbance significantly impairing several of his cognitive functions.' Id. at 392, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (quoting Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 279 (3d Cir.2004) (Sloviter, J., dissenting)). ¶ 100 The Court observed, [t]he jury never heard any of this and neither did the mental health experts who examined Rompilla before trial. Id. It opined the undiscovered `mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, might well have influenced the jury's appraisal of [Rompilla's] culpability.' Id. at 393, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (alteration in original) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000))). As such, the Court concluded, the likelihood of a different result if the evidence had gone in [was] `sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' actually reached at sentencing. Id. at 393, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). ¶ 101 In Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704 (Ind.2001), the Indiana Supreme Court concluded Prowell had received ineffective assistance of counsel in his capital case. Despite counsels' suspicions that Prowell suffered from severe mental illness, counsel did not investigate such issues until two and one-half months after Prowell's guilty plea. The court stated, [w]ithout the assistance of a psychologist or psychiatrist and a mitigation investigator, Prowell's trial counsel did not have the basic information necessary to advise Prowell as to a plea of guilty but mentally ill, nor did they have the ability to argue persuasively for a plea agreement on that basis. Id. at 714. ¶ 102 Mr. Elmore's defense team consulted three mental health experts prior to the penalty phase of trial and the experts' statements highlight the significance of counsel's failure to investigate Mr. Elmore's head injuries and exposure to toxins. Dr. Ronald Kleinknecht, hired by the defense team to assist in communicating with Elmore, was not given information regarding Mr. Elmore's life long exposure to neurotoxic agents and a series of head injuries. FOF at 23. Dr. Kleinknecht indicated had he been given such information, he would have likely referred Elmore for neurotoxic testing. Majority at 341. Dr. Ronald Roesch was also hired by the defense team to assist in communications with Mr. Elmore because of Dr. Roesch's background in forensics, psychopathy, and future dangerousness. FOF at 27. Dr. Roesch was also not given information regarding Mr. Elmore's history of potential brain injury and stated had he been aware of Mr. Elmore's history, he would have recommended a neuropsychological evaluation. ¶ 103 Postconviction evaluations performed by Dr. Dale Watson, Dr. George Woods, and Dr. Raymond Singer [1] revealed evidence of Mr. Elmore's neuropsychological deficiencies and indicated he was suffering extreme emotional disturbance at the time he committed the crime, a mitigating factor under RCW 10.95.070(2). Dr. Dale Watson, a neuropsychologist, performed a neuropsychological evaluation of Mr. Elmore. FOF at 44. According to Dr. Watson, Mr. Elmore suffered from neuropsychological deficits which contributed to his lifelong pattern of impulsivity, poor judgment, and vulnerability to stress. FOF at 50. Mr. Elmore's history of violent abuse by his father, his stutter, his mother's exposure to toxins during her pregnancy, and his series of head injuries and certain illnesses were all factors significant to Dr. Watson's ultimate conclusion. In Dr. Watson's opinion, Mr. Elmore's neuropsychological deficits contributed to his crime and his behavior during, before, and after the crime was consistent with brain damage. FOF at 50. Dr. Watson believes Mr. Elmore was suffering from an extreme emotional disturbance at the time he committed the crime. Id. 51-52. ¶ 104 Dr. George Woods is a physician specializing in neuropsychiatry. In Dr. Woods' opinion, Mr. Elmore suffers brain impairment and Mr. Elmore's abusive, violent, alcoholic and chaotic family life compounded his cognitive defects, explaining his mental state at the time of the offense. FOF at 56. Dr. Woods believes Mr. Elmore's neuropsychological deficits, contributed in a direct way to an extreme emotional disturbance and inability to affectively conform his behavior. FOF at 60. Further, in Dr. Woods' opinion Mr. Elmore was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance at the time of his crime which impaired his affective ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Id. He believes Mr. Elmore's neuropsychological deficits combined with fear, anger, and frustration overwhelmed Mr. Elmore and moved him to a level of violence that he had not committed before or since. Id. at 62. ¶ 105 Dr. Raymond Singer is a neuropsychologist and neurotoxologist. In Dr. Singer's opinion Mr. Elmore suffers from functional deficits consistent with significant exposure to various neurotoxic agents over the course of a lifetime. Dr. Singer believes Mr. Elmore's neuropsychological deficits have manifested in Mr. Elmore's learning difficulties, attention span, and problems inhibiting himself in various circumstances. FOF at 70. Dr. Singer believes such deficits ultimately culminate[d] in [Mr. Elmore's] crime. Id. ¶ 106 Due to his failure to retain such expert advice, Mr. Komorowski was unable to present the above-stated mitigating evidence for purposes of plea bargaining. Further, Mr. Elmore's jury heard nothing of Mr. Elmore's brain damage or neuropsychological difficulties despite Mr. Komorowski's awareness, through the advice of a capital case consultant, that such evidence did not contradict evidence of remorse and that, to the contrary, such evidence could, in fact, enhance the evidence of remorse. FOF at 37. Dennis Balske stated, The failure to consult with experts who could accurately assess Mr. Elmore's brain dysfunction was particularly harmful in this case because without such evidence the jury was left with no explanation for the crime. . . . [T]he jury was given no insight as to why Mr. Elmore would commit this crime. Decl. of Dennis Balske at 21. In the sentencing phase of a capital case, `[what] is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 705, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (alteration in original) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), overruled in part on other grounds by Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1654, 167 L.Ed.2d 585 (2007)). The mitigating evidence counsel failed to discover and present in this case is powerful. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Due to the tremendously compelling nature of the postconviction experts' testimony regarding Mr. Elmore's brain impairment, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance had they heard such evidence. Id. at 537, 123 S.Ct. 2527. In my view Mr. Elmore was prejudiced by counsel's failure to competently investigate Mr. Elmore's mental health deficiencies.