Opinion ID: 2510363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: tort liability continuum

Text: ¶ 12 In Graham v. Keuchel, 1993 OK 6, 847 P.2d 342, 362, this Court explained that the common law divides actionable tortious conduct into (1) negligence, and (2) willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm. In the lower tier of tortious conduct lie three levels of negligence. Id. These are defined by statute in Oklahoma as slight negligence, ordinary negligence, and gross negligence. See Okla. Stat. tit. 25, §§ 5 & 6 (2001). In the higher tier lie two distinct levels: (1) wilful and wanton misconduct and (2) intentional misconduct. Id. at 362-363. ¶ 13 The level termed wilful and wanton misconduct, according to Professor Prosser, occupies a penumbra of what has been called `quasi intent' lying between gross negligence and intentional conduct. William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 34, at 184 (4th ed.1971). As Graham explained: [t]he intent in wilful and wanton misconduct is not an intent to cause the injury; it is an intent to do an act or the failure to do an actin reckless disregard of the consequences and under such circumstances that a reasonable man would know, or have reason to know, that such conduct would be likely to result in substantial harm to another. Graham, 847 P.2d at 362. Graham noted that [w]hile `ordinary' and `gross' negligence differ in degree, `negligence' and `willful and wanton misconduct' differ in kind. Id. Thus, comparative fault in Oklahoma remains confined to negligence and not to willful and wanton misconduct or to intentional misconduct. Id. at 363 ([W]hile ordinary negligence of the plaintiff may be used as a defense against gross negligence, it may not be considered as a defense against any form of conduct found to be willful and wanton or intentional.). ¶ 14 The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction, which was derived from the Graham decision, explains: The conduct of [Defendant] was willful and wanton if [Defendant] was either aware, or did not care, that there was a substantial and unnecessary risk that [his/her/its] conduct would cause serious injury to others. In order for the conduct to be willful and wanton, it must have been unreasonable under the circumstances, and also there must have been a high probability that the conduct would cause serious harm to another person. Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions (OUJI)(civil), No. 9.17. The instruction goes on to describe a higher level of misconduct explaining that a [Defendant]'s conduct was intentional if he/she desired to cause injury to [Plaintiff] or knew that such injury was substantially certain to result from [his/her] conduct. ¶ 15 The analysis in Graham and the definitions derived therefrom and articulated in OUJI formulate a continuum of tort liability which may be outlined as follows: I. Negligence A. Slight Negligencewant of great care and diligence. B. Ordinary Negligencewant of ordinary care and diligence. C. Gross Negligencewant of slight care and diligence. [1] II. Willful Acts Resulting in Intended or Unintended Harm A. Willful and Wanton Conduct 1. Unreasonable under the circumstances and 2. High probability of serious harm B. Intentional Conduct 1. Desire to cause injury or 2. Knowledge that such injury was substantially certain to result. This formulation of two levels of willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm is also found in specific areas of tort law. ¶ 16 The definition of intent in the area of infliction of emotional distress reflects this dichotomy. [Defendant] intentionally caused emotional distress to [Plaintiff] if [he/she/it] desired to cause such distress or knew that such distress was substantially certain to result from [his/her/its] conduct. OUJI (civil) No. 20.2. A lower standard roughly equivalent to that of willful and wanton is also defined by that instruction. [Defendant] recklessly caused emotional distress to [Plaintiff] if [he/she/it] knew there was a substantial probability that emotional distress to [Plaintiff] would result from [his/her/its] conduct, and [he/she/it] deliberately disregarded that probability. [2] Id. Similarly, the definition of intent applicable to the tort of interference with a contract states: [Defendant]'s actions were intentional if [he/she/it] either desired to interfere with [Plaintiff]'s contract with [third Party], or [he/she/it] was substantially certain that his actions would interfere with the contract. OUJI (civil) No. 24.2. ¶ 17 These statements defining intent reflect the fact that [t]he intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law will not sanction. .... Intent, however, is broader than a desire to bring about physical results. It must extend not only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are substantially certain to follow from what he does. Prosser, § 8, at 31 (footnotes omitted). These statements defining intent are mirrored in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The word `intent' is used throughout the Restatement... to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it. 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965). Comment (b) to that section further explains: All consequences which the actor desires to bring about are intended, as the word is used in this Restatement. Intent is not, however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result. Id. Thus, an actor's conduct is intentional when the actor has the desire to cause the consequences of the act or when the actor knows the consequences are substantially certain to result from the act. The question is whether some compelling policy requires that a different definition of intent be applied to the intentional tort exception to workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision.