Opinion ID: 418131
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instructions and Special Verdict

Text: 95 Cauble challenges the judge's charge to the jury and the adequacy of the special verdict form the jury completed in ordering the forfeiture. He claims that the instructions failed to inform the jury of its role in determining the scope of the defendant's interest in the enterprise, in effect directing a verdict on the extent of the forfeiture. 96 The judge explained the forfeiture allegation in the indictment to the jury, stated that the government sought to forfeit only Cauble's one-third interest in Cauble Enterprises, and re-summarized the allegations of all three RICO counts. He then read the forfeiture provision, Sec. 1963(a), to the jury and added: [I]f you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of any of the offenses charged in Counts 1, 2 or 3 of the Indictment, it will be your duty to determine whether the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Rex C. Cauble's interest in Cauble Enterprises is subject to forfeiture to the United States. The judge also gave the jury the special forfeiture verdict. 97 97 Before considering Cauble's claims of error, we pause to explain briefly how some of the complaints he raises can be avoided in future RICO trials. The substantive jury charge in these trials is ordinarily extremely long 98 and requires the jurors to pay close attention to a number of definitions and elements. Therefore, it is not surprising that the instructions on forfeiture, which ordinarily come at the end of the substantive charge, are often brief--perhaps excessively so. 98 To ease the jurors' task in determining guilt or innocence, the forfeiture issue should be withheld from them until after they have returned a general verdict. At that time the trial judge can instruct the jurors fully about forfeiture and submit the special verdict to them. Such a bifurcated trial--using, of course, only one jury--is not only convenient for the judge and fairer to the defendant. It also prevents the potential penalty of forfeiture from influencing the jurors' deliberations about guilt or innocence. 99 That practice was not followed here, but Cauble made no objection to the judge's method, instructions, or special verdict form. We, therefore, review only for plain error. 100 Cauble argues that the instructions failed to inform the jury that only interests acquired or maintained in violation of Sec. 1962 or affording a source of influence over the enterprise are subject to forfeiture. He claims that the instructions and verdict form made it appear that a RICO conviction carried a penalty of automatic forfeiture of his entire interest in Cauble Enterprises. This claim is belied, however, by the fact that the judge read Sec. 1963(a) to the jury and, therefore, used the precise words Cauble emphasizes in defining the interest subject to forfeiture. Furthermore, the special verdict specifically asked the jury whether Cauble's interest in Cauble Enterprises afforded him a source of influence over the enterprise. Although the judge might have expanded the entire forfeiture charge and emphasized this point in his instructions, the charge he gave, read together with the special verdict form, accurately presented the relevant legal issue to the jury. 101 Cauble next argues that the jury was not informed that it had to find a nexus between the racketeering activity and the property claimed. We agree that proper jury instructions should include language that suggests that a jury may find an interest or contractual right forfeitable if there is evidence linking the defendant's conduct to the property interest and the government has proved such a nexus beyond a reasonable doubt. 99 Nevertheless, the omission of this charge did not amount to plain error. The substantive RICO instructions required the government to prove that Cauble conducted the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Therefore, the jury had already found beyond a reasonable doubt a link between Cauble's conduct, the enterprise, and the racketeering activity. 102 Furthermore, the second question in the special verdict form required the jury again to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cauble conducted the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. The jury answered the question affirmatively and, therefore, found the nexus required. The omission of the nexus instruction from the forfeiture charge was not plain error. 103 Cauble next claims that the charge made it impossible for the jurors to render anything but a blanket verdict of forfeiture because they were not furnished a list of Cauble Enterprises' assets so that they might forfeit only those that were the basis for Cauble's control and were not asked to determine what manner of forfeiture would deprive him of his influence over the enterprise. 100 Cauble emphasizes the minor role of some of Cauble Enterprises' assets and the absence of evidence that some assets were involved at all. This argument, however, is based on an incorrect view of the operation of RICO's forfeiture provisions. 104 The RICO forfeiture is in personam: a punishment imposed on a guilty defendant. It deprives that defendant of all of the assets that allow him to maintain an interest in a RICO enterprise, regardless whether those assets are themselves tainted by use in connection with the racketeering activity. Thus, in United States v. Hess, 691 F.2d 188, 190-91 (4th Cir.1982), the court held that the jury may not find that less than the full amount of the defendant's interest in an enterprise is subject to forfeiture because Sec. 1963 is mandatory. The court concluded that the only issues for the jury are whether the defendant violated RICO and what interest the defendant held in the enterprise. 101 105 In United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 758 (1980), the jury was required to specify which corporations were part of the enterprise and the percentage of [the defendant's] interest in each. The indictment in that case, however, charged an enterprise-in-fact composed of a number of corporations. Therefore, it was necessary for the jury to decide which corporations were, in fact, part of the enterprise. 102 106 In this case, however, the enterprise charged was a single pre-existing legal entity. Once Cauble was convicted his interest in that entity was subject to forfeiture in accordance with Sec. 1963(a). The jury was not required to select only certain of that entity's assets for forfeiture, just as the jury in Huber was not required to determine which assets or divisions of the several corporations were subject to forfeiture. 103