Opinion ID: 2349741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Elements of Defamation

Text: A plaintiff in a defamation action carries a substantial burden. This burden is even more substantial when a plaintiff is a public official. In bringing a claim for defamation, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a defendant communicated a false and defamatory statement about him or her. Beattie v. Fleet National Bank, 746 A.2d 717, 721 (R.I.2000). In proving that a statement is defamatory, a plaintiff must show that the statement is `false and malicious, imputing conduct which injuriously affects a [person's] reputation, or which tends to degrade him [or her] in society or bring him [or her] into public hatred and contempt   .' DiBattista v. State, 808 A.2d 1081, 1088 (R.I.2002) (quoting Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 860 (R.I.1998)). Furthermore, the question of whether a particular statement or conduct alleged to be defamatory is, in fact, defamatory is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. When considering whether a statement or conduct is defamatory, the court must take into account the context of the statement in which the publication occurs and the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the community in which the publication occurred. Id. (citing Swerdlick, 721 A.2d at 859-60). This Court has recognized that there is no wholesale exemption of opinion pieces from the purview of defamation claims. Beattie, 746 A.2d at 721. However, a defamatory publication that consists of a statement in the form of opinion is actionable if and only if `it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.' Id. (quoting Healey v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 555 A.2d 321, 324 (R.I.1989)). As a result, if the non-defamatory facts underlying an expressed derogatory opinion are publicly known or disclosed, the opinion, justified or unjustified, is privileged as a matter of law. Id. (citing Hawkins v. Oden, 459 A.2d 481 (R.I.1983)). Such statements are privileged because [w]hen the facts underlying a statement of opinion are disclosed, readers will understand they are getting the author's interpretation of the facts presented; they are therefore unlikely to construe the statement as insinuating the existence of additional, undisclosed [defamatory] facts. Id. (quoting Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1439 (9th Cir.1995)). The elements of a cause of action for defamation are: (1) the utterance of a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault amounting to at least negligence; and (4) damages   . Cullen v. Auclair, 809 A.2d 1107, 1110 (R.I.2002) (per curiam) (quoting Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 790 A.2d 368, 373 n. 10 (R.I.2002)). When a plaintiff in a defamation action is a public official, and the action relates to his official conduct, he must prove that the statement was made with `actual malice'  that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). To satisfy this test, plaintiff will have to prove more than general hostility or mere ill will because actual malice is not synonymous with common-law spite or ill will. Major v. Drapeau, 507 A.2d 938, 941 (R.I.1986). A public figure defamation plaintiff meets the requisite burden of proof by demonstrating actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Cullen, 809 A.2d at 1110 (citing Lyons v. Rhode Island Public Employees Council 94, 559 A.2d 130, 134 (R.I.1989)). However, a plaintiff must first prove that there is a false statement of fact. Id. (quoting Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974)). As with a defamation claim, the question of whether a statement portrays an individual in a false light under G.L.1956 § 9-1-28.1(a)(4) is a matter of law to be determined by the court. Cullen, 809 A.2d at 1112. An allegation that an individual has been portrayed in a false light is an instance of a violation of the more general right to privacy. Section 9-1-28.1 creates the right to privacy and a cause of action for false light: Right to privacy  Action for deprivation of right.  (a) Right to privacy created. It is the policy of this state that every person in this state shall have a right to privacy which shall be defined to include any of the following rights individually:    (4) The right to be secure from publicity that reasonably places another in a false light before the public; (i) In order to recover for violation of this right, it must be established that: (A) There has been some publication of a false or fictitious fact which implies an association which does not exist; (B) The association which has been published or implied would be objectionable to the ordinary reasonable man under the circumstances[.] To prevail in an action under § 9-1-28.1(a)(4), a plaintiff must prove that [t]here has been some publication of a false or fictitious fact which implies an association which does not exist; [and][t]he association which has been published or implied would be objectionable to the ordinary reasonable [person] under the circumstances. Cullen, 809 A.2d at 1112 (quoting Swerdlick, 721 A.2d at 861). Furthermore, a false-light action is distinguishable from defamation because it requires that a plaintiff be `given unreasonable and highly objectionable publicity that attributes to him characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false, and so is placed before the public in a false position.' Id. (quoting Swerdlick, 721 A.2d at 861 and Restatement (Second) Torts, § 652E, cmt. b at 395 (1976)). Moreover, for a plaintiff properly to state a cause of action for false light, he or she must prove that there is such a major misrepresentation of his character, history, activities or beliefs that serious offense may reasonably be expected to be taken by a reasonable [person] in his [or her] position. Id. (quoting Swerdlick, 721 A.2d at 861-62 and Restatement (Second) Torts, § 652E, cmt. c at 396).