Opinion ID: 2370675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Joint & Several Liability

Text: Goudreault argues that Dr. Kleeman should have been jointly and severally liable. Under the rule of joint and several liability, a defendant who is only partly responsible for a plaintiff's injuries may be held responsible for the entire amount of recoverable damages. DeBenedetto, 153 N.H. at 798, 903 A.2d 969. This allows a plaintiff to sue any one of several tortfeasors and collect the full amount of recoverable damages. Id. As a result, numerous jurisdictions[, including New Hampshire,] have enacted legislation seeking to ameliorate the `inequities' suffered by low fault, `deep pocket' defendants.... Id. at 799, 903 A.2d 969. Under New Hampshire's statutory scheme, liability is joint and several for each party fifty percent at fault or greater. See RSA 507:7-e, I(b) (1997). However, where any party shall be less than 50 percent at fault, then that party's liability shall be several and not joint and he shall be liable only for the damages attributable to him. Id. Notwithstanding RSA 507:7-e, I(b), RSA 507:7-e, I(c), restores joint liability by providing, in pertinent part: [I]n all cases where parties are found to have knowingly pursued or taken active part in a common plan or design resulting in the harm, [the court shall] grant judgment against all such parties on the basis of the rules of joint and several liability. RSA 507:7-e, I(c) (1997). Goudreault asserts that Dr. Kleeman should be jointly liable regardless of his percentage of fault because he t[ook] active part in a common plan or design, id., with the other doctors operating upon him where each w[as] responsible for [his] treatment and care[,] ... stood side by side during surgery and assisted one another[,] ... wrote notes and observations in the same chart[,] ... and individually profited [from] the services rendered. We disagree. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. We are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. We first examine the language of the statute, and, where possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. When a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond it for further indication of legislative intent, and we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. If a statute is ambiguous, however, we consider legislative history to aid our analysis. Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature's intent in enacting them, and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Cloutier v. City of Berlin, 154 N.H. 13, 17, 907 A.2d 955 (2006) (citations omitted). We begin our analysis by considering RSA 507:7-e, I(c), in context. RSA chapter 507 is a broad framework governing comparative fault and apportionment of tort liability. See Nilsson, 150 N.H. at 395, 839 A.2d 25. The New Hampshire legislature first enacted a comparative negligence statute in 1969, motivated by a deep conviction that the contributory negligence rule was so basically unfair and illogical that it should have no further place in the State's law. DeBenedetto, 153 N.H. at 808, 903 A.2d 969 (quotation and brackets omitted). However, the statute abolished not only contributory negligence, but joint and several liability as well. Id. In 1986, the legislature separated the concepts of apportionment and contributory negligence, enact[ing] section 7-d to address contributory negligence and section 7-e to address apportionment. Nilsson, 150 N.H. at 397, 839 A.2d 25. As enacted in 1986, section 7-e provided for apportionment of damages in all actions, not only those involving contributorily negligent plaintiffs. Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). [T]he legislature [thereby] established a system for contribution among tortfeasors and reinstituted joint and several liability, DeBenedetto, 153 N.H. at 808, 903 A.2d 969, for `each party liable,' Id. at 798, 903 A.2d 969 (quoting Laws 1986, 227:2). In 1989, the legislature amended section 7-e, I(b) to protect minimally liable defendants. Nilsson, 150 N.H. at 399, 839 A.2d 25 (quotation omitted). [R]ecognizing that manufacturers, professionals and public agencies become targets for damage recoveries because of their potential money resources rather than their fault, [it] sought to amend RSA 507:7-e to treat fairly those entities which may be unfairly treated under the rule of joint and several liability. DeBenedetto, 153 N.H. at 799, 903 A.2d 969 (quotations and ellipsis omitted). [It] rejected [a] pure several liability approach and instead passed a compromise measure adopting several liability only for those parties less than 50 percent at fault. Id. (quotation omitted). The resulting legislation made New Hampshire a hybrid jurisdiction employing both several and joint liability. Id. [T]he comprehensive scheme of RSA chapter 507 reflects the legislature's careful balance of the rights of defendants and plaintiffs ... [, and i]t is not our place to upset this balance. Nilsson, 150 N.H. at 400, 839 A.2d 25. The plain language of RSA 507:7-e, I(c) imposes joint liability where a tortfeasor (1) knowingly (2) pursued or took active part in (3) a common plan or design (4) resulting in harm. See RSA 507:7-e, I(c). The present dispute centers upon what the legislature meant by a common plan or design. Id. Goudreault argues that its plain meaning is concerted action, taken by each with knowledge of the others' participation without proof of civil conspiracy or specific intent. He argues it is enough that the doctors t[ook] a conscious part in a common plan which results in harm. On the other hand, Dr. Kleeman argues that Goudreault's construction would have the absurd result of subjecting every doctor involved in a patient's care to joint and several liability for the full extent of the patient's[] damages. He maintains that RSA 507:7-e, I(c) creates a narrow exception to several liability, preserving the common law rule of joint and several liability when there is concerted wrongful activity such as ... civil conspiracy or when a defendant intentionally aids and abets another's tortious conduct. We note that of the several ways one may be subject to joint and several tort liability, RSA 507:7-e, I(c), most closely resembles the common law imposition of joint and several liability for concerted activity. See 2 J.D. Lee & B.A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law Liability & Litigation § 19:4, at 19-7 to -8 (2d ed.2002); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15 (2000). Recognizing this, both parties attempt to define what constitutes concerted activity; specifically, whether it contemplates collaboration to achieve a tortious result, or, conversely, if the pursuit of a desirable result gone awry due to negligence is sufficient. Goudreault correctly points out that the legislature did not include words such as common plan or design to commit a tortious act. However, neither did it require a common plan or design to achieve any other variety of result. The better reading of the statute, considering its object and purpose, takes account of the fact that, to be subject to RSA 507:7-e, I(c), the conduct must be undertaken knowingly. Under the Criminal Code, [a] person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance ... when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist. RSA 626:2, II(b) (2007) (emphases added). In other words, a defendant acts knowingly when he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause a prohibited result. State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 394, 398, 808 A.2d 55 (2002) (quotation omitted). We believe the legislature required the mental state of knowingly as a limited exception restoring common law joint liability for [a]ll those who, in pursuit of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt the wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit. W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 46, at 323 (5th ed.1984) (footnotes omitted). In this way, the requirements of RSA 507:7-e, I(c), resemble the concerted activity of civil conspiracy. See Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 47, 534 A.2d 706 (1987) (outlining elements of civil conspiracy). It is ... essential that each ... defendant ... be proceeding tortiously, which is to say with the intent requisite to committing a tort, or with negligence. Keeton, supra at 324. However, [e]xpress agreement is not necessary, and all that is required is that there be a tacit understanding, as where two automobile drivers suddenly and without consultation decide to race their cars on the public highway. Id. at 323 (footnotes omitted). Our construction is guided by the legislative policy behind RSA chapter 507. We have previously observed that RSA 507:7-e, I(c) imposes joint liability only as an exception to RSA 507:7-e, I(b). Rodgers v. Colby's Ol' Place, 148 N.H. 41, 44, 802 A.2d 1159 (2002). Goudreault's expansive exception would contravene the legislature's objective of shielding minimally liable tortfeasors from undue civil liability. Dr. Kleeman correctly points out that [d]octors, lawyers, dentists, and architects rarely practice their trades in isolation and that Goudreault's construction would swallow the rule of several liability. Finally, we note that our construction accords with the decisions of other states. See, e.g., GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 117 Nev. 265, 21 P.3d 11, 15 (2001); Schneider v. Schaaf, 603 N.W.2d 869, 876 (N.D.1999); Kottler v. State, 136 Wash.2d 437, 963 P.2d 834, 841 (1998).