Opinion ID: 903090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: redd is entitled to one-third of the

Text: ATTORNEY FEES AWARD BASED ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT ¶16 Hill argues that the Agreement is ambiguous because it does not directly address the allocation of attorney fees and that the ambiguity should be strictly construed against Redd, who drafted the Agreement. Redd counters that the Agreement is plain on its face and that the intent of the parties should be determined from the language of the Agreement. We agree with Redd. ¶17 We begin our analysis with an examination of “the language of [the Agreement] to determine meaning and intent.” Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, ¶ 10, 225 P.3d 185. “Where the language is unambiguous, the parties’ intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the [Agreement] may be interpreted as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If, however, the Agreement is ambiguous, we turn to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 25, 190 P.3d 1269. Because the Agreement involves a disputed fee, any ambiguity is “resolved against the 4 Cite as: 2013 UT 35 Opinion of the Court attorney and the construction adopted which is favorable to the client.” Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶18 Ambiguity exists if a contractual term or provision “is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.” WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ¶ 20, 54 P.3d 1139 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass’n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) (stating that an ambiguous interpretation must be “reasonably supported by the language of the contract”). ¶19 The Agreement states that “[Redd] is entitled to ONE THIRD (33 1/3%) of all monies paid to or in [Hill’s] behalf for what ever [sic] cause related to this cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) It is uncontested that Redd was retained to represent Hill in the underlying case. It is also uncontested that the district court awarded attorney fees as a result of that representation. Thus, it cannot be contested that the attorney fees award was “paid to or in [Hill’s] behalf” with respect to the “cause of action” referred to in the Agreement. ¶20 Though the Agreement does not specifically address the allocation of general damages, punitive damages, or attorney fees, the language of the contested provision embraces all such recoveries. The Agreement states that Redd receive one-third of “all monies” paid to Hill “related to” Ms. Hill’s “cause of action.” Webster’s Dictionary defines “all” as “the whole extent or quantity of,” “the entire number of,” “every one of,” and “any.” WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 36 (2007). The district court’s award of attorney fees falls within the definition of “all monies,” inasmuch as it was undoubtedly part of the “extent or quantity of” the money awarded to Hill based on Redd’s representation of Hill in the underlying case. And the attorney fees award was “one of” the components of “all monies” paid to Hill as a result of that lawsuit. Because the language of the Agreement embraces the court’s award of attorney fees, Redd is entitled to one-third of that award.