Opinion ID: 3214213
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sora creates three separate offenses

Text: There is strong textual support leading to the conclusion that the Legislature created three separate offenses in MCL 28.729(1). 33 When the Legislature enacted SORA in 1994, it delineated only one offense punishable by 4 years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. 34 Had that section been left in its original form, there would have been no doubt that subsequent violations of SORA would be subject to enhancements under the HOA and, for a second-offense habitual offender, the maximum sentence would be 6 33 MCL 28.729(1) currently provides: [A]n individual required to be registered under this act who willfully violates this act is guilty of a felony punishable as follows: (a) If the individual has no prior convictions for a violation of this act, by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both. (b) If the individual has 1 prior conviction for a violation of this act, by imprisonment for not more than 7 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both. (c) If the individual has 2 or more prior convictions for violations of this act, by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both. 34 MCL 28.729(1), as enacted by 1994 PA 295, provided: An individual required to be registered under this act who willfully violates this act is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both. 11 years, 1½ times the 4-year sentence. But the Legislature amended SORA in 1999 to set forth SORA-1, SORA-2 and SORA-3. 35 Simultaneously, the Legislature amended the sentencing guidelines, MCL 777.1 et seq., to address the SORA amendments. 36 The sentencing guidelines expressly assign felonies an offense category and offense class, and MCL 777.11 to MCL 777.18 give descriptions of the offenses and identify the statutory maximum terms of imprisonment. Before the 1999 amendment of SORA that set forth SORA-1, SORA-2, and SORA-3, MCL 777.11 (as originally enacted by 1998 PA 317) identified MCL 28.729 as establishing one offense, a Class G felony, 37 punishable by up to 4 years’ imprisonment and described as “Sex offenders—failure to register[.]” In 1999 PA 90, the Legislature amended MCL 777.11 to list SORA-1, SORA-2, and SORA-3 as separate and distinct offenses. 38 While the Legislature designated the three offenses as being in the offense category of “crimes against public 35 1999 PA 85, effective September 1, 1999. 36 1999 PA 90, effective September 1, 1999. 37 All offenses to which the guidelines apply are classified in a manner that generally corresponds to the seriousness of the offense. This gradation of seriousness is indicated by the offense’s class, which is designated by the letters “M2” (second-degree murder) and “A” through “H,” in order of decreasing seriousness. For example, when scoring Prior Record Variable (PRV) 1, MCL 777.51, a “high severity felony conviction” is defined in part as a conviction for a “crime listed in class M2, A, B, C, or D”; when scoring PRV 2, MCL 777.52, a “low severity felony conviction” is defined in part as a conviction for a “crime listed in class E, F, G, or H[.]” 38 At that time, MCL 28.729 was listed in MCL 777.11. Subsequently, 2002 PA 31 added several new sections to the guidelines, and MCL 28.729 became listed in MCL 777.11b. 12 order,” 39 it did not assign the same offense class to all three. Furthermore, the Legislature gave different descriptions for all three. SORA-1, MCL 28.729(1)(a), is a Class F felony, punishable by up to 4 years’ imprisonment and described as “Failure to register as a sex offender, first offense[.]”40 SORA-2, MCL 28.729(1)(b) is a Class D felony, punishable by up to 7 years’ imprisonment and described as “Failure to register as a sex offender, second offense[.]” 41 SORA-3, MCL 28.729(1)(c) is a Class D felony, punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment and described as “Failure to register as a sex offender, third or subsequent offense[.]”42 The Legislature’s references to SORA-1, SORA-2, and SORA-3 as individual offenses, its classification of these offenses in two different offense classes, and its differing offense descriptions and penalties demonstrate that the Legislature intended these offenses to be separate and distinct felonies that elevate in severity for recidivist behavior. Having concluded that SORA does indeed create three separate offenses, we return to the provision of the HOA at issue: If the subsequent felony is punishable upon a first conviction by imprisonment for a term less than life, the court . . . may place the person on probation or sentence the person to imprisonment for a maximum term 39 MCL 777.5(d); MCL 777.11b. All offenses to which the sentencing guidelines apply belong to one of six offense categories: crimes against a person, crimes against property, crimes involving a controlled substance, crimes against public order, crimes against public trust, and crimes against public safety. MCL 777.5(a) to (f). 40 MCL 777.11b. 41 Id. 42 Id. 13 that is not more than 1-1/2 times the longest term prescribed for a first conviction of that offense or for a lesser term.[43] The words “first conviction of that offense” plainly refer to “the subsequent felony” identified in the first part of the sentence. Defendant’s subsequent felony is his conviction in June 2013 of SORA-2, which is punishable by a maximum of 7 years’ imprisonment. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by interpreting MCL 28.729(1) and MCL 769.10 as directly conflicting. Defendant was charged with and convicted of SORA-2, MCL 28.729(1)(b), and not a violation of SORA generally. We must then consider the longest term prescribed for a first conviction of SORA-2 under MCL 28.729(1)(b), which, again, is 7 years. MCL 769.10(1)(a) states that the court may sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment 1½ times the longest term prescribed for a “first conviction of that offense.” 44 The Court of Appeals, by holding that MCL 28.729(1) sets forth a single offense, erroneously read the phrase “that offense” as meaning any violation under MCL 28.729. Consequently, the Court of Appeals mistakenly concluded that the phrase “first conviction of that offense” in MCL 769.10(1)(a) referred to MCL 28.729(1)(a) (SORA-1) and, as a result, defendant’s maximum sentence as a second-offense habitual offender would be 6 years. Rather, defendant was subject to a 7-year maximum term of imprisonment, and the trial court 43 MCL 769.10(1)(a) (emphasis added). 44 Emphasis added. 14 appropriately exercised its discretion in sentencing defendant to 1½ times that statutory maximum, i.e., 10.5 years. 45 C. CASELAW SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF THE HOA TO A SORA-2 CONVICTION Michigan caselaw also supports our conclusion that a SORA-2 conviction can be enhanced under the HOA. In People v Bewersdorf, one of the defendants, Bewersdorf, pleaded guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense (OUIL-3), a felony punishable by up to 5 years’ imprisonment, and of being a second-offense habitual offender. 46 The Court of Appeals panel in 45 We do not quibble with the notion that the Legislature clearly set the maximum penalty for two convictions of violating SORA at 7 years. Implicit in defendant’s argument and the Court of Appeals’ opinion is the notion that, having set that penalty, the Legislature could not have intended to also allow a sentencing court to impose a 10.5 year maximum sentence. But as outlined in this opinion, it is clear that this is exactly what the Legiature intended. The Legislature was fully aware that sentence enhancement under the HOA is not mandatory, as vast discretion with regard to sentence enhancement is placed in the sentencing court and the prosecution. A sentencing court can exercise the option to not enhance a defendant’s sentence. See MCL 769.10(1)(a) (“[T]he court . . . . may place the person on probation or sentence the person to imprisonment for a maximum term that is not more than 1-1/2 times [the applicable term].”) (emphasis added); People v Turski, 436 Mich 878 (1990). In order to seek sentence enhancement under the HOA, the prosecuting attorney must file a written notice of intent to do so. MCL 769.13. The prosecutor thus has discretion not to seek habitual-offender sentence enhancement. It is clear that the Legislature wanted to ensure that an offender violating SORA a second time would be subject to a maximum sentence of not less than 7 years, while vesting in the sentencing court and the prosecution discretion that could result in a maximum sentence of up to 10.5 years. 46 Bewersdorf, 438 Mich at 60. At the time, OUIL-3 was prohibited by MCL 257.625(6), as amended by 1987 PA 109, and punishable under MCL 257.902 as a 5-year felony. The offense is now operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and is a 5-year felony prohibited by MCL 257.625(9)(c). 15 Bewersdorf, much like the Court of Appeals panel in this case, vacated Bewersdorf’s habitual-offender sentence enhancement, concluding that the two statutes stood in conflict and therefore the more specific sentencing scheme applicable to OUIL offenses under the Michigan Vehicle Code “prevail[ed] to the exclusion of the general habitualoffender statute.” 47 This Court reversed in part, concluding that while the HOA establishes a procedure for enhancing a sentence, it is clear that the OUIL provisions of the Michigan Vehicle Code established separate crimes. 48 We rejected the Court of Appeals’ “forced construction that placed the two statutes in conflict,” holding that the two statutes could be read to “dovetail harmoniously,” thereby concluding that Bewersdorf’s OUIL-3 conviction was subject to the habitual-offender provisions of the HOA. 49 The statutory scheme in SORA, MCL 28.729(1), is similar to that currently establishing the OWI offenses (previously known as OUIL) in the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625(9)(a) to (c). Both schemes establish three separate crimes, stating in the prefatory language that a violation will be punished as stated in the subparts and then creating a first offense, second offense, and third or subsequent offense. 47 People v Bewersdorf, 181 Mich App 430, 433; 450 NW2d 271 (1989), aff’d in part and rev’d in part 438 Mich 55 (1991). 48 Bewersdorf, 438 Mich at 68. 49 Id. at 69-70 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 Just as Bewersdorf held that “OUIL-3 is a separate crime” from other OUIL offenses, the same is true of SORA. 50 MCL 257.625(9) currently creates three separate crimes under Subdivision (a) (first offense), Subdivision (b) (second offense if committed within 7 years of a prior conviction), and Subdivision (c) (third or subsequent offense), and MCL 28.729(1) creates three separate crimes under Subdivision (a) (first offense), Subdivision (b) (second offense), and Subdivision (c) (third or subsequent offense). This is likewise true of other statutory schemes of commonly charged offenses, such as domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2) to (4). In addition, our reasoning is consistent with other Court of Appeals cases that have addressed this issue. 51 50 Id. at 68. The OUIL provisions at issue in Bewersdorf differ from the SORA provisions in that the underlying offenses in Bewersdorf were misdemeanors and SORA-1, SORA-2, and SORA-3 are all felonies. Defendant complains that his sentence is inappropriate because his SORA-1 conviction was used to support his SORA-2 conviction and as the predicate to enhance his sentence as a second-offense habitual offender. While defendant objects to this, he offers no statutory or legal analysis to support the contention that his claimed double enhancement is inappropriate. The critical point from Bewersdorf is that the OUIL provisions increased the punishment for each repeated offense, just as the SORA provisions do in the present case. In fact, defendant concedes that there is no error in enhancing a SORA-2 sentence under the habitual-offender provisions as long as the habitual-offender enhancement is based on a felony other than a SORA violation. Thus, to this extent, defendant agrees with our conclusion that MCL 28.729(1)(a) to (c) sets forth separate, elevated offenses. 51 E.g., People v Eilola, 179 Mich App 315, 325; 445 NW2d 490 (1989) (holding that the habitual-offender provisions could be used to enhance a sentence for a conviction that constituted first-degree retail fraud because of a prior conviction, MCL 750.356c(2), as added by 1988 PA 20); People v Brown, 186 Mich App 350, 357; 463 NW2d 491 (1990) (reaffirming Eiolola and extending it by holding that the sentence could be enhanced using the same conviction used to elevate the offense (answering a question left open in Eilola)); People v James, 191 Mich App 480, 481-482; 479 NW2d 16 (1991) (holding that the habitual-offender statutes and the statute imposing a mandatory minimum 5-year sentence for a second offense of criminal sexual conduct may be concurrently applied); 17 Pursuant to the statutory analysis discussed earlier in this opinion, we conclude the Legislature intended in enacting SORA-2 and SORA-3 to elevate each offense, not merely the punishment. Thus, Michigan caselaw also supports our conclusion that a trial court can sentence defendant under SORA-2 as a second-offense habitual offender using his SORA-1 conviction.