Opinion ID: 1822508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Erred in Submitting the Issue of Punitive Damages to the Jury.

Text: ¶ 54. In an overreaching effort to protect tortfeasors from punitive damages, the Legislature passed Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-1-65, bifurcating trials when punitive damages are sought. In pertinent part, the statute reads: (c) If, but only if, an award of compensatory damages has been made against a party, the court shall promptly commence an evidentiary hearing to determine whether punitive damages may be considered by the same trier of fact. (d) The court shall determine whether the issue of punitive damages may be submitted to the trier of fact; and, if so, the trier of fact shall determine whether to award punitive damages and in what amount. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (Supp.2007). ¶ 55. This Court has further interpreted the statute in Bradfield v. Schwartz , stating: If the jury awards compensatory damages, then an evidentiary hearing is conducted in the presence of the jury. At the close of this second phase of the trial, via an appropriate motion for a directed verdict, the judge, as gatekeeper, then ultimately decides whether the issue of punitive damages should be submitted to the trier-of-fact (jury). If the judge, from the record, should determine, as a matter of law, that the jury should not be allowed to consider the issue of punitive damages, a directed verdict shall be entered in favor of the defendant on the issue of punitive damages, and the case will end. If, on the other hand, the judge should allow the issue of punitive damages to be considered by the jury, then the jury, upon being properly instructed by the judge on the punitive damages issue, may decide to award punitive damages, and if so, in what amount, or the jury may decide not to award punitive damages. Bradfield v. Schwartz, 936 So.2d 931, 939 (Miss.2006) (emphasis added). ¶ 56. Prior to Bradfield, the initial determination by the trial court regarding punitive damages would have been made immediately following the verdict on compensatory damages. Bradfield, 936 So.2d at 940. The trial court's decision of whether to allow the jury to consider the issue of punitive damages would be reviewed by the appellate court under an abuse of discretion standard. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Salvation Army, 835 So.2d 76, 81 (Miss.2003) (citing Hurst v. Southwest Miss. Legal Servs. Corp., 708 So.2d 1347, 1351 (Miss. 1998)). However, this Court in Bradfield said that when the jury returned a verdict which resulted in a compensatory damages award, a punitive damages phase of trial should have automatically proceeded. Bradfield, 936 So.2d at 940. In accordance with the process outlined by this Court in Bradfield, it appears that the trial court correctly submitted the issue to the jury for consideration. Id. ¶ 57. After automatically proceeding to the punitive damages phase of the trial, the trial judge may determine as matter of law whether the issue of punitive damages should be submitted to the jury. Pursuant to Bradfield, the trial court's decision is reviewed under the standard for a directed verdict, as further discussed herein. Bradfield, 936 So.2d at 939. This Court reviews whether a directed verdict should have been granted de novo. Windmon v. Marshall, 926 So.2d 867, 872 (Miss.2006). All evidence is considered `in the light most favorable to the non-movant, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence.' Forbes v. GMC, 935 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss.2006). Furthermore, [a] trial court should submit an issue to the jury only if the evidence creates a question of fact concerning which reasonable jurors could disagree. Vines v. Windham, 606 So.2d 128, 131 (Miss.1992). Hence, Bradfield takes us from the abuse of discretion standard of review to the totally different de novo review of a decision regarding a directed verdict. That change is undeniably substantive, and the Bradfield majority cavalierly declares that in order to follow the procedure set out in the statute, this substantive change must occur. ¶ 58. Mandatory bifurcation is an unwise and inefficient use of judicial resources and of jurors' time. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633, 659 (Ct.App.1992) (holding that mandatory bifurcation would result in the same witness having to repeat their testimony, . . . this duplication would burden both witnesses and jurors as well as waste judicial resources). [9] Moreover, the Legislature's enactment of the bifurcation statute is evidence of the Legislature's lack of faith and confidence in the ability of jurors to properly resolve disputes. That lack of confidence is unfounded. Despite the lack of empirical evidence of jurors' inability to resolve multiple issues, in Bradfield this Court justified that lack of confidence by stating: . . . [T]he detailed procedure which is outlined . . . [in the bifurcation statute] must be meticulously followed because without an evidentiary buffer at trial, juries will ultimately confuse the basic issue of fault or liability and compensatory damages with the contingent issue of wanton and reckless conduct which may or may not ultimately justify an award of punitive damages. Bradfield, 936 So.2d at 938 (emphasis added). Again, there is simply no empirical evidence to support such a finding. Weimer v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 2007 WL 1959103 (N.D.Iowa 2007) (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 326, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (To say that the jury might have been confused amounts to nothing more than an unfounded speculation that the jurors disregarded clear instruction of the court in arriving at their verdict)); see also, Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting Devices Defeat the Jury's Role, 26 U. Tol. L.Rev. 505, 537 (1995) (arguing that mistrust of juries rests upon generalization and exaggeration, and that empirical evidence provides a solid basis for trusting the objectivity and rationality of juries). [10] It is as a result of the bifurcation statute that Mississippi state courts are required to try certain cases in two phases, notwithstanding that practically all of the evidence necessary to phase two will have been presented in phase one. This Court compounds the inefficiency by requiring that jurors listen to testimony and evidence before a determination as to whether or not the jurors will ever decide the issue relevant to the testimony. This process is akin to granting a motion for summary judgment after the trial. ¶ 59. Although the punitive damages statute requiring bifurcation is unnecessary and this Court's rationale in Bradfield is impractical, I find that the trial court in the instant case meticulously followed the Bradfield process. After the jury returned a verdict awarding compensatory damages, the evidentiary hearing was promptly commenced. Only two witnesses were called. That makes perfect sense inasmuch as the evidence regarding Prudential's conduct was necessarily presented during the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' cases in-chief. Both the judge and the jury had already heard that testimony prior to the verdict on compensatory damages. Hence, it is much more logical that the judge would decide at that juncture whether or not the jury would be allowed to consider awarding punitive damages. ¶ 60. However, this Court has said when the jury awards compensatory damages, the trial court should automatically proceed . . . to the punitive damages phase of the trial. Bradfield, 936 So.2d at 939. At which time, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. This Court has indicated that the evidentiary hearing involves more than just a judicial evaluation of previously heard testimony. See Bradfield, 936 So.2d at 939 (holding that an evidentiary hearing would allow both the judge and the jury to evaluate the conduct of Schwartz & Associates in light of the standards of ethics and professionalism that control a firm, and the lawyers within the firm, in the practice of law in this State) (citations omitted). Consequently, the trial court was compelled to proceed with the punitive damage phase upon the return of a verdict for the Plaintiffs awarding compensatory damages. ¶ 61. The automatic evidentiary hearing requirement set forth by this Court is infeasible and is likely to result in a grossly inefficient use of judicial resources in those instances where punitive damages are not warranted. If a judge is to serve as a gatekeeper, it is illogical to allow a jury to hear all the evidence and testimony on the issue of punitive damages prior to the judge's determination of whether the jury should consider the issue. The process outlined by this Court in Bradfield takes away the judge's discretion to make a preliminary determination that, as a matter of law, punitive damages should not be considered by the jury. Once that discretion is taken away, any prudent judge should be reluctant to deny the jury an opportunity to make a finding regarding a matter about which they have already heard all of the relevant testimony and evidence. That is why the directed verdict is so rarely granted and is disfavored by courts. Dangler v. Doherty, 777 F.Supp. 1175, 1178 (1991) (stating directed verdicts are disfavored); see also Robinson v. Gailno, 275 Conn. 290, 297, 880 A.2d 127 (Conn.2005); In re Oakley Custom Homes, 168 B.R. 232, 238 (Bankr.D.Colo.1994). The Bradfield process was followed in the instant case and the result was a jury award of punitive damages. ¶ 62. Explicitly, I do not find nor do I imply that the bifurcation statute is unconstitutional. I simply point out that by determining that the judge should review the issue of punitive damages and decide whether or not to grant a directed verdict, the standard of review on appeal has been changed from an abuse of discretion standard to a standard of whether or not reasonable jurors could disagree. Those are two totally different standards, and it is impossible to reconcile those two standards in appellate review of the singular issue of punitive damages. Moreover, to indicate that the statute compels such a result is to acknowledge that a procedural requirement compels a substantive change. Hence, this Court's interpretation of the statute in Bradfield is infeasible, illogical, and impractical. ¶ 63. In the instant case, upon application of the standard set out in Bradfield, I would affirm the trial court's decision to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Moreover, in light of the fact that the net worth of Defendant Prudential exceeded seven billion dollars, the award of thirty-five million dollars in punitive damages was not excessive. In fact, Prudential's net worth was $7,469,076,983. The thirty-five million dollar award in punitive damages was approximately .5% less than 1% of Prudential's net-worth. This calculation does not include Defendant Pruco's net worth which was $514,870,597. ¶ 64. In sum, substantial evidence exists to support the establishment of all the requisites for formation of an insurance contract  offer, acceptance, and consideration. Moreover, the issue of punitive damages was properly submitted to and decided by the jury. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court's judgment granting compensatory damages in the amount of $1,400,000; punitive damages in the amount of $35,000,000; and attorney fees and costs in the amount $501,638,02. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. DIAZ, P.J., JOINS THIS OPINION.