Opinion ID: 1091606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Respondent objected to the Commission's jurisdiction on the basis that the Commission had no authority relating to conduct which occurred prior to October 1, 1980, the date that he first became a judge. In a related argument, respondent objected at the hearing to any evidence of conduct which occurred prior to the critical date. Because the contentions are interrelated, we treat them together, although the first objection was intended to defeat the entire proceeding and the second objection was simply intended to exclude evidence. The objection to the Commission's jurisdiction was essentially an objection that the charges relating to conduct prior to October 1, 1980 did not state a cause of action for discipline of a judge. To that extent, we agree with respondent's contention that conduct of a judge prior to his assuming office generally cannot form the sole basis for disciplinary proceedings before the Commission. [3] Most of the charges in the present case, however, are alleged to have occurred while respondent was in office. Furthermore, evidence of a judge's conduct prior to his induction into office may be relevant and therefore admissible as evidence for two purposes. First, evidence of conduct prior to induction into office may be relevant and probative as to the probability that such conduct continued after the judge was inducted into office. Because judges are human beings, and because human beings generally continue habitual conduct without abrupt termination, such evidence, depending upon the degree and quality of the proof, may be relevant to the resolution of a credibility dispute when the judge testifies that the conduct halted abruptly upon his assuming office and other witnesses testify that the conduct continued after the judge assumed office. Second, evidence of conduct prior to induction into office may be relevant to the question of the extent of disciplinary sanction to be imposed. For example, one isolated occurrence of misconduct, representing the first time that such conduct had occurred, might call for a lesser sanction than a pattern of similar misconduct which occurred before and after the judge assumed office. To the extent that evidence of conduct prior to induction into office shows a pattern of misconduct, such evidence is relevant and probative on the issue of appropriate sanction. Because the suspension which we order in the present case is based on conduct which occurred after October 1, 1980, the exception to the Commission's jurisdiction is without merit.