Opinion ID: 895408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Compensation for Wrongfully Imprisoned Persons in Texas

Text: Wrongfully imprisoned persons have not always been entitled to compensation from the state. In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d at 585. In 1955, the people adopted a constitutional amendment granting the Legislature power to grant aid and compensation to persons who have served prison sentences for offenses of which they were not guilty, under such regulations and limitations that the Legislature may deem expedient. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 51-c. Ten years later, the Legislature enacted the first wrongful-imprisonment compensation statute. Act of May 28, 1965, 59th Leg., R. S., ch. 507, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1022, 1022-1024. A person was entitled to compensation if he is not guilty of the crime for which he was sentenced. Id. at 1022. Almost thirty years later, the Supreme Court decided Herrera v. Collins and Schlup v. Delo . 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993); 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). Following the Supreme Court's lead, in 1996 the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized in Texas that the incarceration of an innocent person is as much a violation of the Due Process Clause as is the execution of such a person. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 205. The applicant presented the Court of Criminal Appeals with a Herrera -type claim, and the Court turned to Schlup for guidance and modified the standard to be applied in Herrera -type claims. Id. at 208-09; Franklin, 72 S.W.3d at 677. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief based on the Herrera -type claim at issue, and confirmed that claims of actual innocence include both Herrera -type claims and Schlup -type claims. Id. at 675 (citing Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 208). The Legislature amended the TCA following the Supreme Court's decisions in Herrera and Schlup and after the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized both types of habeas actual innocence claims. In 2001, the Legislature changed the language of the Act to compensate a person who has been granted relief on the basis of actual innocence of the crime for which the person was committed. Act of May 18, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1488, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 5280, 5280-5284. No longer did the legislation require not guilty, but instead adopted the term actual innocence, used in Herrera, Schlup, and Elizondo. The TCA does not define the term actual innocence. Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex.2008); TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.011(b). The Comptroller also admits that the Legislature intended the technical meaning of the term actual innocence when it changed the TCA in 2001. Actual innocence is a legal term of art, which has acquired a technical meaning in the habeas corpus context. [4] We presume the Legislature is aware of relevant case law when it enacts or modifies statutes. A statute is presumed to have been enacted by the legislature with complete knowledge of the existing law and with reference to it. Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.1990) (citation omitted). Language in a statute is presumed to have been selected and used with care, and every word or phrase in a statute is presumed to have been intentionally used with a meaning and a purpose. State v. K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d 16, 21 (Tex.2010) (citations omitted). The term actual innocence has a particular meaning within habeas corpus jurisprudence, in that it is a particular type of claim that may be raised in a collateral attack on a conviction. Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 390; see also Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 545 (We have stated that `any person who has once been finally convicted in a fair trial should not be permitted to wage, and we do not permit him to wage, a collateral attack on that conviction without making an exceedingly persuasive case that he is actually innocent.') (citing Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 205). The Legislature is presumed to have known about both types of actual innocence claims in habeas corpus jurisprudence when it modified the Act to change not guilty to actual innocence, since, before the 2001 Amendment, the Supreme Court had decided both Herrera (1993) and Schlup (1995) and the Court of Criminal Appeals had recognized both types of habeas claims in Texas. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 390, 113 S.Ct. 853; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 298, 115 S.Ct. 851; Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 202. Even more to the point, we need not presume legislative awareness of the changing habeas jurisprudence because in 1999 the Legislature amended the subsequent application provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure to accommodate Schlup -type claims. Act of May 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 803, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3431, 3431-3436. The Legislature responded to Schlup by updating Articles 11.07 and 11.071 of the Habeas Corpus Reform Act to provide exceptions allowing review of subsequent habeas writs if the legal basis for the writ had not existed in federal or state appellate courts previously. [5] TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 4(a); TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(2); Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 733 (Tex. Crim.App.2008) (citing Ex parte Brooks, 219 S.W.3d at 399). The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that [b]ecause Article 11.071 Section 5(a)(2) was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Schlup, we conclude that the standards set forth for evaluating a gateway-actual-innocence claim announced by the Supreme Court should guide our consideration of such claims under Section 5(a)(2). Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 733. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the Legislature amended the Code of Criminal Procedure in recognition of and to provide for consideration of Schlup -type habeas claims. Because the Legislature changed the statutory term not guilty to actual innocence following federal and state jurisprudence, from both the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and adopted writ provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure in response to Schlup, we conclude the Legislature intended the legal term of art, actual innocence, to include both Herrera and Schlup claims in the TCA.