Opinion ID: 4507859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: proximate cause in medical malpractice cases

Text: ¶9 A claim for medical malpractice requires a plaintiff to prove four elements: “(1) the standard of care by which the [medical professional’s] conduct is to be measured, (2) breach of that standard by the [medical professional], (3) injury that was proximately caused by the [medical professional]’s negligence, and (4) damages.” Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ¶ 96, 82 P.3d 1076 (citation omitted). At issue here is the third element of medical malpractice—whether G.R.’s injury was proximately caused by the defendants’ negligence. ¶10 The proximate-cause element requires the plaintiff to show that the alleged breach, “in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produce[d] the injury” and that without the alleged breach “the result would not have occurred.” Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted). The plaintiff can meet this burden by providing “evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation.” Id. But the jury cannot be left to “speculate and guess on too many elements in the chain of causation.” Jackson v. Colston, 209 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1949). somewhat skeptical that a minor does not have a separate interest in medical expenses that have not yet been paid for. To be sure, parents alone have a claim against a tortfeasor for past medical expenses they have paid for. See Ostertag v. La Mont, 339 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Utah 1959) (holding that a minor did not have a claim for medical expenses paid for by his father). But that does not automatically mean that minors do not have a distinct claim for unpaid premajority medical expenses. 4 Cite as: 2020 UT 6 Opinion of the Court ¶11 To ensure that the jury is not left to speculate, plaintiffs may not provide just any evidence of proximate cause: They must generally “produce expert testimony that the medical professional’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff injury.” Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 102 (emphasis added); see also Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9, ¶ 7, 179 P.3d 754. 4 The expert-testimony requirement exists because “most medical malpractice cases depend upon knowledge of the scientific effect of medicine.” Bowman, 2008 UT 9, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). And so “the standard of care and the causal link between the negligence and the injury are usually not within the common knowledge of the lay juror.” Id. Expert testimony thus “ensure[s] that factfinders have adequate knowledge upon which to base their decisions.” Id.