Opinion ID: 664049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Supposed Inconsistency

Text: 26 Before reaching the argument relied on by the government, we note our view that the verdicts were not inconsistent. Although the district court assumed that a shared intent to defraud was required, a view perhaps occasioned by the government's merging of Secs. 331 and 333 in the indictment (e.g., p 13, alleging conspir[acy] ... to violate ... Sections 331(b) and 333(a)(2) (adulterating and misbranding prescription drugs with intent to defraud and mislead)), that assumption seems contrary both to the design of the food and drug laws and to basic conspiracy law. 27 Section 331, entitled Prohibited acts, provides in pertinent part as follows: 28 The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited: 29 .... 30 (b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic in interstate commerce. 31 (c) The receipt in interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded, and the delivery or proffered delivery thereof for pay or otherwise. 32 .... 33 (i)(1) Forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely representing, or without proper authority using any mark, stamp, tag, label, or other identification device authorized or required by [certain] regulations.... 34 .... 35 (k) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and results in such article being adulterated or misbranded. 36 21 U.S.C. Sec. 331(b), (c), (i), and (k). These provisions defining the prohibited conduct do not include an intent requirement. The intent-to-defraud ingredient is found instead in Sec. 333, which prescribes the penalties for a violation of Sec. 331. Section 333 provides felony-level penalties for one who has violated Sec. 331 with intent to defraud or mislead, but provides only misdemeanor-level penalties for one who, assuming he had not previously been convicted of such conduct, has adulterated without that intent: 37 (1) Any person who violates a provision of section 331 of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both. 38 (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), if any person commits such a violation after a conviction of him under this section has become final, or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, such person shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than $10,000, or both. 39 21 U.S.C. Secs. 333(a)(1) and (2). 40 This separation of the fraudulent-intent requirement from the provisions that define the substantive offenses reflects Congress's attempt to keep impure and adulterated food and drugs out of the channels of commerce by having Sec. 331 dispense[ ] with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct--awareness of some wrongdoing. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280, 64 S.Ct. 134, 136, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943). Thus, a defendant is made criminally liable for violating Sec. 331 without regard to his mental state or criminal history. Congress simply enhanced the penalties for the aggravating circumstances reflected by a defendant's fraudulent intent or his Sec. 331 recidivism. The Supreme Court observed a half-century ago that 41 [t]he Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was an exertion by Congress of its power to keep impure and adulterated food and drugs out of the channels of commerce. By the Act of 1938, Congress extended the range of its control over illicit and noxious articles and stiffened the penalties for disobedience. The purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of the legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of government and not merely as a collection of English words. 42 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280, 64 S.Ct. at 136. If the defendants plainly agreed to violate Sec. 331, and one of them did so with intent to defraud, we conclude that to allow the latter to escape the more severe penalty Congress saw fit to attach to that intent, merely because his codefendants lacked a similar intent, would show little regard for the legislative goal of impeding the flow of adulterated drugs. 43 The district court's imposition of the condition that, for any coconspirator to incur the more severe penalty, at least two of the persons who conspired to adulterate drugs must also have shared an intent to defraud or mislead is also contrary to basic conspiracy law. It is well established that two or more defendants may be guilty of participating in a single conspiracy where they agreed on the essential nature of the plan, even though their goals may not have been congruent. See, e.g., United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1191-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933, 110 S.Ct. 324, 107 L.Ed.2d 314 (1989); United States v. Heinemann, 801 F.2d 86, 92 & n. 1 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094, 107 S.Ct. 1308, 94 L.Ed.2d 163 (1987); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 63 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 133, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983); United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 473 (2d Cir.1980). In United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., for example, a food company official was found guilty of conspiring with suppliers to ship adulterated foods in interstate commerce with intent to defraud, notwithstanding evidence that the suppliers' goal was simply to sell adulterated precursor concentrate to the food company, regardless of whether or not the foods ultimately prepared and shipped were adulterated. 44 We see no reason why this principle should not be applied here, especially since Sec. 331 prohibits adulteration regardless of any intent to defraud, thereby authorizing two or more defendants to be convicted of conspiring to violate Sec. 331 regardless of whether any of them had intent to defraud. If, in addition to proving that two or more persons conspired to violate Sec. 331, the government proves that any defendant who so conspired also had the intent to defraud or mislead, that defendant should be subject to the more severe penalty provided by Sec. 333(a)(2). 45