Opinion ID: 2087736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: PUC Jurisdiction

Text: In its report and order, the PUC determined that its jurisdiction was conferred by § 39-1-30 and by Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104 (RI. 1992). The PUC found that the Providence ordinance and regulations would affect the operations of the petitioning utilities and, on that basis, concluded that the commission had jurisdiction. Section 39-1-30 is not, however, the only statute that must be considered. When this Court construes a statute, our purpose is to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent and to attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes. Dias v. Cinquegrana, 727 A.2d 198, 199-200 (R.I.1999) (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I.1987)). Although the existence of multiple statutory provisions in pari materia complicates our task, our goal remains that of construing the laws such that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general objective scope. In re Doe, 717 A.2d 1129, 1132 (R.I.1998) (quoting Blanchette v. Stone, 591 A.2d 785, 786 (R.I.1991)); see also Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp., Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire, 637 A.2d 1047, 1051 (R.I.1994) (when two apparently inconsistent provisions are contained in a statute, every effort should be made to construe and apply the provisions as consistent). In this case, there are several statutory provisions that must be considered with § 39-1-30 in determining the Legislature's intent regarding the PUC's role in regulating street excavations and reconstructions. We begin with the observation that, at least as early as 1822, towns had both the authority and responsibility to maintain roadways. The Legislature's unambiguous statement in An act for the Mending of Highways and Bridges declared that: [A]ll highways, townways, causeways and bridges, lying and being within the bounds of any town, shall be kept in repair and amended from time to time, so that the same may be safe and convenient for travellers with their horses, teams, carts and carriages, at all seasons of the year, at the proper charge and expense of such town, under the care and direction of the surveyor or surveyors of the highways. P.L. 1822, § 1, p. 290 (currently codified as G.L. 1956 § 24-5-1). The statute has remained unchanged in all material aspects, save for the substitution, by 1896, of the town council of the town for the surveyors, who had been appointed by the town councils. P.L. 1844, An Act for the Mending of Highways and Bridges, § 1; General Statutes of R.I. 1872, ch. 60, § 1; Public Statutes of R.I. 1882, ch. 65, § 1; G.L. 1896, ch. 72, § 1. This legislative enactment not only obliges cities and towns to maintain municipal roadways, but it also gives municipalities the authority to regulate the manner in which those roadways are maintained. One hundred and seventy years later, the legislature mandated that any person, firm, or corporation including utilities and contractors who alter a roadway that is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall restore that portion of the roadway which was altered to the same or better condition that existed prior to alteration. Section 24-5-1.1. (Emphasis added.) This provision places a direct obligation on utilities to repair and restore street excavations. Because § 24-5-1.1 provides no standards for that repair or restoration, it is clear that the Legislature intended that the obligatory restoration by private excavators be regulated under the care and direction of the town council through ordinances and rules that municipalities were authorized to promulgate by § 24-5-1. In addition to the duty of municipalities to maintain roadways, by 1844 a concomitant liability was imposed on cities and towns for any damages resulting from improper maintenance of municipal roadways. [4] P.L. 1844, An Act for the Mending of Highways and Bridges, § 13. This provision has also remained virtually unchanged to the present day. Section 24-5-13; G.L. 1956 § 45-15-8. Consequently, if a utility or other private excavator fails to properly restore a roadway, and a driver or pedestrian suffers subsequent damage, the municipality may be held statutorily liable for damages. See Seamons v. Fitts, 20 R.I. 443, 444-45. 40 A. 3, 3-4 (1898) (holding that a town was liable for negligent road reconstruction by a private water company). In our opinion, the Legislature would not have imposed this liability on municipalities if it had not intended that communities be given sufficient authority to regulate the manner in which streets are repaired and reconstructed and thereby take steps to prevent and reduce injuries for which cities and towns could be held liable. Section 39-1-30 confers upon the PUC the power to review ordinances or regulations promulgated by any town or city affecting the mode or manner of operation or the placing or maintenance of the plant and equipment of any company under the supervision of the commission. A facial examination of this statute clearly grants jurisdiction to the PUC to review the ordinance in question, inasmuch as the ordinance does affect the placing and maintenance of equipment of utility companies and the ability of the utilities to connect their services by lines, pipes, wires, or other implements to buildings occupied by utility customers. This grant of jurisdiction to review, however, does not authorize or empower the PUC to nullify or substantially modify a municipal ordinance that regulates the maintenance and repair of city streets and highways unless such ordinance or regulation is unduly burdensome and adversely affects the ability of the utility company to service its customers. In short, the jurisdiction to review does not confer untrammeled power upon the PUC to nullify or modify a city or town ordinance relating to the municipality's streets and highways without careful factfinding that balances the need of the municipality to control the maintenance of its highways with the need of the utility company to provide service to its customers. This Court, in interpreting the statute that imposes upon municipalities the authority and obligation to maintain highways and bridges within its boundaries in harmony with the statute that accords to the PUC the right to review municipal ordinances that affect public utilities, is constrained to recognize the delicate balance which results from conflicting legitimate interests. The PUC must by its faultfinding also recognize these conflicting interests and seek to harmonize the need of the municipality to maintain its highways with the need of the utility companies to provide services. The obligation of a municipality to maintain and regulate its highways is of equal concern with that of the public utility to provide service to customers. These dual obligations must coexist and be accorded as effective a balance as is practicable in a given set of circumstances. Consequently, the jurisdiction to review does not permit the PUC arbitrarily to discount the compelling interest of the municipality in favor of the utility company. The PUC must accord due deference to the authority of the municipality to regulate the maintenance of its highways when it evaluates the effect of an ordinance upon a public utility. In order to nullify an ordinance, the PUC must find facts that are competent to establish that the ordinance is unduly and unnecessarily burdensome in its impact upon the business and services of the utility companies. A mere incidental burden whether financial or otherwise is not enough to support the nullification of an ordinance. The burden must have a substantial adverse impact upon the business of the utility in order for the PUC to exercise its power to overrule or modify substantially the considered judgment of the legislative authority of the municipality. We review any findings of the PUC `to ascertain if the evidence upon which the commission based its findings reasonably supports the results.' Newport Electric Corp., 650 A.2d at 491. The PUC cited as precedent for this case our holding in Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104 (R.I.1992). The facts in O'Neil, however, are clearly distinguishable from those of the case at bar. In O'Neil, East Greenwich had enacted an ordinance that prohibited for three years the construction of high voltage electric transmission lines greater than sixty kilowatts. Id. at 106. The PUC has been granted `exclusive power and authority to supervise, regulate, and make orders governing the conduct' id. at 110, of utility companies by § 39-1-1, and thus the town clearly invaded a field that the state has intentionally occupied. O'Neil, 617 A.2d at 110. In our view, a municipality's regulating the excavation and refilling of roadways  for which activity towns have long been held responsible and liable in the event of damages  does not clearly invade a field that the state has intentionally occupied, to the exclusion of cities and towns. Finally, one respondent acknowledged at oral argument that the PUC does not have special authority to regulate roadways, and another agreed that the state has not completely preempted the field of roadway excavation, additionally distinguishing this case from O'Neil.