Opinion ID: 2325365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Harodite's Motion for Stay and the Requests for Determination of Applicable Law

Text: On May 6, 2009, the same day as the just-described hearing, Harodite filed a motion in the Superior Court for a stay pending a ruling on the petition for writ of certiorari that it intended to file with this Court. On May 8, 2009, defendant Warren Electric objected to Harodite's motion for a stay. On May 15, 2009, it supported that objection with a memorandum of law which (1) set forth its grounds for objecting to a stay and (2) contained a Request for Determination of Applicable Law Pursuant to R.I.Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 44.1. [17] With respect to the latter issue, Warren Electric argued that Massachusetts bears the most significant relationship to the event and the parties; and it contended that, for that reason, the court should apply a Massachusetts statute of limitations. Harodite filed its own memorandum of law on May 15, 2009, urging the court to grant its motion for a stay. It also argued that Rhode Island law should be determinative with respect to the statute of limitations issueeither as the result of conducting an interest-weighing analysis or because most jurisdictions treat statutes of limitations as `procedural' law and apply their own statutes to all common law claims in their courts   . In the alternative, Harodite argued that, even if the court were to find that Massachusetts law should apply, the Rhode Island statute of limitations would in the end be applicable as a result of the doctrine of renvoi. [18] On July 9, 2009, a hearing was held in the Superior Court. The hearing justice first addressed the choice of law issue that is, whether a Rhode Island or a Massachusetts statute of limitations should apply. [19] She noted at the outset that Rhode Island has adopted an interest-weighing test to determine which law to apply   ; she added that, in light of that principle, the court must determine which state bears the most significant relationship to the event and [to] the parties. 1. The Tort Factors As she began her choice of law analysis, the hearing justice set forth in the following language the four factors that a court considers in conducting a choice of law analysis in an action sounding in tort: (1) The place where the injury occurred, (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,    (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of corporation and place of business of the parties, and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. 2. The Policy Considerations The hearing justice then listed certain additional considerations that must be weighed in determining which law applies: (1) predictability of result; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and (5) application of the better rule of law. [20] 3. The Application of the Tort Factors The hearing justice then proceeded to apply the above-listed tort factors to the instant case. It was her estimation that those factors seemed fairly evenly balanced. As for the first tort factor, she noted that it was undisputed that the property damage occurred in Massachusetts. With respect to the second tort factor (concerning which the parties were not in agreement), she ruled that the conduct causing the injury occurred in Rhode Islandin view of the fact that defendant Warren Electric designed and assembled the pre-heater and affixed warnings with respect to it in Rhode Island. In addressing the third tort factor, the hearing justice noted the respective domicile of the parties: plaintiff Harodite is a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in that Commonwealth, while defendant Warren Electric is a Rhode Island corporation with its principal place of business in this state. Significantly, with respect to the fourth tort factor ( viz., where the relationship between the parties is centered), the hearing justice found that the relationship between the parties is more centered in Rhode Island. She explicated her findings with respect to this fourth tort factor as follows: The Plaintiff turned to Rhode Island to obtain the product. The product was shipped from Rhode Island[,] and payment for it was sent to Rhode Island. In concluding her analysis of the four tort factors, the hearing justice determined that [e]ver so slightly,    the tort factors weigh[ed] in favor of applying Rhode Island law, including the statute of limitations. 4. The Application of the Policy Considerations The hearing justice then turned to the five additional policy considerations that she had outlined at the beginning of her choice of law analysis. With respect to the first policy consideration ([the] predictability of result), the hearing justice observed that it should not be a surprise to a Rhode Island domiciled corporation that it may be sued in a Rhode Island court, under Rhode Island law, for a product manufactured in Rhode Island. On that basis, she stated that it should be predictable to such a corporation that a Rhode Island statute of limitations would apply. The hearing justice then looked to the second policy consideration (the maintenance of interstate order), and she determined that that factor was without great significance in the present case. It was the hearing justice's view that the law and policy concerns of Massachusetts would not be offended by the application of a Rhode Island statute of limitations with respect to a Rhode Island corporation; she added that applying the Rhode Island statute would actually create a broader protection for the Massachusetts citizen by extending the time for filing claims against such a corporation. As for the third policy consideration (simplification of the judicial task), the hearing justice indicated that the application of the statute of limitations of either jurisdiction could simplify the judicial taskdepending upon how narrowly or broadly the factor was applied. It was her view that application of the Massachusetts statute of limitations could simplify the judicial task because it would require plaintiff either to go to trial on its original theory or dismiss its complaint. According to the hearing justice, applying a Massachusetts statute of limitations would salvage the [c]ourt's time spent on Plaintiff's gasket theory and limit the [c]ourt's future tasks relative to this case. The hearing justice further stated, however, that it would also be no great challenge for this [c]ourt to apply Rhode Island's own statute of limitations and [the] Rule 15 discovery/relation-back test as well as its own governing law on products liability. With respect to the fourth policy consideration (advancement of the forum's governmental interests), the hearing justice noted that neither party had set forth any particular governmental interests that would be advanced by the application of the law of either jurisdiction. She nonetheless observed that it would seem quite obvious    that Massachusetts would not have a strong governmental interest in precluding one of its citizens from redressing tortious conduct that caused property damage within the [Commonwealth's] borders. She also remarked that Massachusetts would not have a governmental interest in protecting Rhode Island citizens from lawsuits. On the other hand, in considering Rhode Island's governmental interests, she determined that Rhode Island would have a strong governmental interest in applying its own statute of limitations to actions commenced in a Rhode Island forum when one of the parties is domiciled in this state. Finally, the hearing justice addressed the fifth policy consideration (the better rule of law). She determined that the better rule of law was that of Rhode Island. While she noted that a ten-year statute of limitations may not be as efficient in the court system, it was nonetheless her view that a longer limitations period affords more protection for those who suffer property damage resulting from defective products. The hearing justice also commented that Rhode Island's different limitations periods for personal injury cases as contrasted with property damage cases suggested that the Rhode Island law was the product of more thoughtful deliberation and was the better rule. She explained the latter point as follows: Rhode Island's allowance of a ten-year period where the harm done is limited to property damage shows greater thought in protecting both plaintiffs and defendants. Personal injury claims [ought] to have a shorter tolling period for obvious reasons. The better rule is to extend the limitations period for property damage cases, cases that don't suffer the same vagaries of proof as bodily injury cases.