Opinion ID: 2388653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Status of the Agency as a Religious Corporation

Text: The Agency first must establish its status as a religious corporation to be entitled to the section 5.06(1) exemption. Because of the similarity between section 5.06(1) and the federal exemption to Title VII, [6] federal case law provides guidance in construing the meaning of the term religious corporation. [7] Most federal courts use a balancing test to determine whether an entity is a religious corporation. [E]ach case must turn on its own facts. All significant religious and secular characteristics must be weighed to determine whether the corporation's purpose and character are primarily religious. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir.1988), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1077, 109 S.Ct. 1527, 103 L.Ed.2d 832 (1989) (emphasis added); see also EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 780 F.Supp. 1317, 1324 (D.Haw.1991) (the court is required to use a balancing test to determine whether [the entity] is exempt). In making this determination, courts should give deference to the religious aspects of the organization. The United States Supreme Court clearly articulated the policy behind this deference in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987), where the Court upheld the firing of two non-Mormon employees from a gym that was open to the public but owned by the Church of Latter Day Saints. The Court noted that the exemption to Title VII has the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. Id. at 339, 107 S.Ct. at 2870. Furthermore, the statute effectuates a more complete separation of the two [church and state] and avoids... intrusive inquiry into religious belief. Id. The Court also determined that an inquiry into the religious nature of an organization should be avoided because it is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. Id. at 336, 107 S.Ct. at 2868. The legislative history of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act also evidences an intent to give due deference to the religious aspects of an organization. See House Study Group Daily Floor Report, Tex.H.B. 14, 68th Leg., 1st C.S. (June 25, 1983) (The bill would not apply to religious employment....); Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221k § 1.02(1) (Vernon Supp.1992-93) (purpose of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act is to provide for execution of the policies embodied in Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964). Balancing all significant religious and secular characteristics of the Agency, and giving due deference to the religious aspects of the organization, the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that the Agency is a religious corporation. In making this determination the court of appeals examined eight relevant factors that have been identified by various federal courts. The underlying inquiry is a balancing test, which examines whether the primary purpose and character of the entity are religious while maintaining the proper deference for the religious aspects of the entity. The eight factors distilled by the court of appeals from several federal decisions are helpful in making this determination, but they are not necessarily dispositive or exclusive. Thus, an entity need not meet all these factors to be considered a religious corporation; instead, the entity must, on the balance, have a primary purpose and character that is religious. The eight factors are as follows: 1) whether the entity operates for profit or as a nonprofit organization, Townley, 859 F.2d at 619; 2) whether an administrative agency has determined the entity's status, Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F.Supp. 974, 978 (D.Mass.1983); 3) whether the entity's articles of incorporation or other pertinent documents state a religious purpose, Townley, 859 F.2d at 619; Feldstein, 555 F.Supp. at 977; 4) whether the entity represents itself to the church, the public, and the government as a secular or sectarian body, Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home, 547 F.Supp. 286, 289-290 (E.D.Va.1982), affd, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.1983); 5) whether the church is intimately involved in the management, day-to-day operations, and the financial affairs of the entity, Feldstein, 555 F.Supp. at 977; 6) whether the church supports or is affiliated with the entity, Townley, 859 F.2d at 619; Feldstein, 555 F.Supp. at 977; 7) whether the entity adheres to or deviates from an original religious purpose, Fike, 547 F.Supp. at 290; and 8) whether the entity conducts religious activities, services, or instruction, Fike, 547 F.Supp. at 289-90. I will briefly discuss each of these factors in turn as they relate to the lower courts' conclusion that the Agency is a religious corporation.