Opinion ID: 852529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Weighing of Aggravators and Mitigators

Text: A sentence of life without parole is subject to the same statutory standards and requirements as the death penalty. Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ind. 2006); Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 936 (Ind.1998). Under the death penalty statute, following the entry of judgment on a plea of guilty, the trial court proceeds to the sentencing phase of trial. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(d). Before death or life imprisonment can be imposed, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance listed in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(16) of the statute. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(a); see also Brown v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1121, 1127 (Ind.2003). In making its sentencing determination, the trial court must find not only that the State has proven the existence of an alleged aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt, I.C. § 35-50-2-9( l )(1), but also that any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. I.C. § 35-50-2-9( l )(2). [4] Krempetz contends the trial court erred when it determined that the statutory aggravating circumstances supporting his sentence of life without parole outweighed his proffered mitigating circumstances. He also complains that the trial court did not properly weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances when it imposed enhanced sentences for conspiracy to commit murder and criminal confinement. This latter claim is not available for review. We recently observed that as a result of the 2005 amendments to Indiana's criminal sentencing statutes, the trial court no longer has any obligation to `weigh' aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind.2007). Consequently, we concluded, a trial court can not now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to `properly weigh' such factors. Id. This proposition however is applicable only to the general sentencing statute which provides in part that a trial court may impose any sentence that is . . . authorized by statute; and . . . permissible under the Constitution of the State of Indiana . . . regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(d). Therefore, as to Krempetz's contentions concerning his non-capital convictions, his argument must fail. A much different rule applies under Indiana's capital sentencing scheme. The requirement for sentencing findings is more stringent in cases under our capital statute than in non-capital cases. Leone v. State, 797 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ind.2003). When imposing a sentence of life without parole, the trial court's sentencing statement: (i) must identify each mitigating and aggravating circumstance found, (ii) must include the specific facts and reasons which lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance, (iii) must articulate that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determination of the sentence, and (iv) must set forth the trial court's personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and this crime. Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1122-23 (Ind.2004). Where, as here, the penalty phase of trial is conducted before the court, without the intervention of a jury, before the trial court may impose a death sentence or a sentence of life without parole, it must find that the State has proven the existence of an alleged aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt and must find that any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. I.C. § 35-50-2-9( l )(2). Thus the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances remains a part of the trial court's obligation under our capital sentencing statutes. We give great deference to a court's determination of the proper weight to assign to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Losch, 834 N.E.2d at 1014. And we will set aside the court's weighing only upon the showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. The trial court in this case found the existence of several mitigating factors but assigned them minimal weight and determined they did not outweigh the two statutory aggravators. As the trial court explained, This Court places weight of the full, complete and highest level on the brutal, purposeful, preplanned, premeditated, senseless, unprovoked, and persistent means of murder by the intentional killing of Barbara Jo Keim. App. at 116. The trial court acknowledged that Krempetz has no juvenile adjudications and prior to this case no adult criminal convictions. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(1) (listing as a mitigating factor [t]he defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conduct). The court also acknowledged that the lack of adult criminal convictions alone would be a substantial mitigator. App. at 101; see also Loveless v. State, 642 N.E.2d 974, 976 (Ind.1994) (noting defendant's age of sixteen and lack of delinquent adjudications or criminal history deserve substantial mitigating weight). This mitigator was discounted, however, because of Krempetz's admitted drug use on numerous occasions, which the trial court believed evidenced contempt for the laws of this state. App. at 101. Additionally, the trial court discounted this mitigator because Krempetz committed other crimes after he murdered Keim, including using Keim's debit card and returning to Keim's apartment to take her jewelry and motor vehicle. Id. at 102. The trial court explained, The fact that numerous crimes were committed by this Defendant's own admission (although these crimes were not reduced to convictions) certainly detracts from the mitigating nature of his actual criminal history. Id. This was the trial judge's call and we find no error. See Losch, 834 N.E.2d at 1014-15 (affirming life without parole sentence where trial court gave only minimal weight to defendant's lack of adult criminal convictions based on his continuous use of marijuana since age 13 and the fact that he stole money from his family indicated his contempt for the laws of the state and lessened the weight of his lack of an adult criminal record as a mitigating fact). The trial court also found that Krempetz suffered from an impaired mental condition. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(2), (c)(6) (listing as mitigating factors [t]he defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the murder was committed and [t]he defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of intoxication). Several factors bore on the trial court reaching this conclusion, including testimony from Dr. Paul Yoder, a clinical psychologist, who diagnosed Krempetz with Bipolar I disorder, mixed, severe with psychotic features . . . Cannabis Dependence . . . Polysubstance Dependence . . . Schizoaffective Disorder . . . Posttraumatic Stress Disorder . . . [and] antisocial traits. App. at 105. Dr. Yoder also testified that Krempetz suffered from mood swings related to mania . . . neurologic difficulty . . . psychotic features . . . possible ADHD . . . [and] possible hallucinations (after he was arrested). Id. After either a finding of mental illness or a plea of guilty but mentally ill, the trial court must consider several factors in determining what, if any, mitigating weight to give to any evidence of a defendant's mental illness. Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ind.2002). The factors include: (1) the extent of the defendant's inability to control his or her behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of the crime. Id. (citing Archer v. State, 689 N.E.2d 678, 685 (Ind.1997)). In this case the trial court determined that the impaired mental condition mitigator should be given minimal weight for several reasons, including: (1) there was no credible testimony that clearly linked the mitigator to the commission of the murder; (2) Krempetz's mental state at the time of the crime could not be determined; (3) there was no evidence that Krempetz is of inferior intellect; (4) Krempetz was able to function on a daily basis unhampered by debilitating mental conditions; (5) Krempetz accepted full and complete responsibility for his commission of the offense of murder entering a plea of guilty (he did not enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill or not guilty by reason of insanity); (6) Krempetz self medicated with marijuana and other illegal drugs and thus any mental condition could have been self induced; (7) his statement in allocution showed that before, during, and after the murder Krempetz was in control of his thought process and oriented as to time and place indicating that he was in control of his faculties; and (8) Dr. Yoder testified that Krempetz was manipulative, glorified his problems, and was deceptive during testing. Again, we find no error with the trial court's determination. Krempetz also advanced several other factors in mitigation. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(8) (listing as a mitigating factor [a]ny other circumstances appropriate for consideration). They included: (1) Krempetz was eighteen years of age when the crime was committed; (2) he was sexually abused as a child; (3) he was exposed to domestic violence; (4) he was exposed to drugs and alcohol as a way of life; (5) facilitation by Hannah Stone who provided a reason to commit the crime; and (6) facilitation by Aaron McDonald who provided the handgun. The trial court agreed that these factors were mitigating, but assigned them minimal weight for a number of reasons, including: (1) Krempetz is over eighteen years of age at the time of sentencing and is considered an adult under Indiana law; (2) Krempetz does not rely on his sexual victimization as a child or observations of domestic violence as an excuse; rather he claims to have done this act to please his girlfriend Hannah Stone; (3) by Krempetz's own admission there was no nexus between drug/alcohol use and the murder of Keim; and (4) the alleged facilitation by Stone and McDonald did not mitigate Krempetz's action in shooting the victim. Krempetz was in a position to stop the plan from being completed, and he chose not to do so. The trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as the defendant does. Gross v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Ind.2002). In this case the trial court's sentencing statement presents a detailed appraisal of the mitigating factors that Krempetz advanced for consideration. The trial court balanced the mitigators against the charged aggravators  intentional killing while committing or attempting to commit robbery and murder while lying in wait  and concluded that each of the charged aggravators outweighed the mitigators. The trial court acted well within its discretion. We find no abuse.