Opinion ID: 1499122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proof of Bad Faith Against the Jailer

Text: In this case, the only decisions the Jailer made involving Sloas and the other state prisoners were (1) the decision to allow them to participate in the community service work program, (2) allowing Henderson, a nine year deputy, to supervise the work crew, and (3) to let them go back out in the afternoon after Billy Blackford had been brought in, having cut his leg when the saw kicked back on him. Each of these decisions was discretionary in that there was no mandate for him to decide them either way. Nor is there any evidence in the record that a kickback from a saw, such as occurred here, is anything other than a unexpected occurrence. Neither is there a showing in the record that the Jailer knew where the specific prisoners were working that day or the specific task assigned each of the prisoners. His primary decision, which was purely discretionary, was to use the work program at all. There is simply no bad faith shown by his involvement and actions, as [t]he power to exercise an honest discretion necessarily includes a power to make an honest mistake of judgment. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 510. The Court of Appeals however, implied a factual issue of bad faith in that he had not promulgated the written policy specified in KRS 441.125(2), which then provided, in part: Pursuant to a written policy adopted by the fiscal court on advice of the jailer, the jailer may permit certain prisoners to work on community service related projects. (Emphasis added). KRS 441.125(2), it is noted, required the adoption of the written policy by the fiscal court, not the jailer, as he only advised them on the policy. KRS 441.125(2) however, was enacted in 1982, ten years before state prisoners were allowed to be kept in county jails for long periods. And, when KRS 532.100 was amended in 1992 to establish the Class D Program, subsection 6 thereof specifically provided: Class D felons . . . serving their time in a local jail shall be considered state prisoners. Only in 2000 was subsection 2 amended to require the jailer to write the policy, which, of course, is now submitted to the fiscal court for its approval. This event occurred in 1998. On the other hand, KRS 532.100(4) requires an agreement between the fiscal court and the department of corrections in order for the county to house state prisoners. The record here does not disclose a written policy adopted by the fiscal court pursuant to KRS 441.125(2); nor does it disclose the agreement required between Rowan County and the Kentucky Department of Corrections for Rowan County to keep Class D state prisoners. One might assume this agreement would address what the county could or could not do with state prisoners. Nor does the record reflect the Department of Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) for state prison work programs. Either one or the other exists, or they do not. However, we note that this was an issue that was not developed in discovery. We also note that Hall testified he relied upon the Department of Corrections' policies in his administration of the work program for the Class D prisoners. [5] Thus, assuming that the agreement between the Rowan County Fiscal Court, the jail, and the Kentucky Department of Corrections do not define the scope of the use of state prisoners in their work programs and/or that the various fiscal court members and all the jailers of Rowan County have failed to adopt an appropriate written policy since 1982, the continuation of that failure by all the fiscal courts and jailers since then, including the Appellant's, offers no proof of bad faith under these circumstances. Bad faith must be directed toward a particular individual, group of individuals, or set of circumstances. Since Sloas was not a prisoner during those intervening years (1982-1997), the failure to adopt such a policy by the previous administrations could not have evidenced their bad faith towards Sloas. There must be some implication of self-interest, or a deliberate indifference, or sinister motive, rather than an honest mistake or oversight. Under these circumstances, there were none. Moreover, 501 KAR 2:060, § 1(4), dealing with procedures for the jail housing of Class D felons, provided in 1998, [i]f the custody assigned [as determined by the Department of Corrections] is minimum or community, the Class D felon may participate in programs offered outside the jail. Effective 2001, 501 KAR 10:130, § 6(1) (now 501 KAR 7:130, § 5), titled Prisoner Programs; Services, provides [s]tate inmates who have an approved custody level shall be allowed to work on community service projects outside the jail if authorized by the jailer. Moreover, the Kentucky Department of Corrections' operations manual for CD & CC Felons Housed in County Jails (Rev. March 2005), provides in part, that: Level One (1) and Level Two (2) inmates may perform community service work outside the facility under the supervision of trained work supervisors. Level A inmates may perform work outside of the facility under the direct supervision of jail security staff . . . . Jails have the discretion of choosing which inmates they work, provided that the classification of these inmates is non-discriminatory. Operations Manual for CD & CC Felons Housed in County Jails, Rev. March 2005, Work Programs at 11. Although it is unknown from the record what was in the 1998 Corrections Operations manual, the Jailer testified he followed the polices provided to him by the Department of Corrections. At the very least, the foregoing discussion indicates the questions surrounding the interpretation of KRS 441.125(2), as it may or may not apply to state prisoners under the control of the Kentucky Department of Corrections is such as to typify a legally uncertain environment in which qualified official immunity is appropriate. Peerce, 132 S.W.3d at 834. Thus, the violation may not be used to create or impute bad faith. After all, every fiscal court of Rowan county and every jailer thereof was in violation of the written policy requirement, if it applied and assuming there has been no written policy since 1982. All the while, the county Judge/executive, the magistrates, as well as the county department heads, were employing and selecting jobs at which the state prisoners would work. Given this prior and public practice, we find no basis to conclude that the Jailer would presumptively have known that he would have violated Sloas's rights by allowing him to voluntarily work on community service projects, absent the written policy, as had all his predecessors since 1982. Thus, this violation, if any, would not support an inference or finding of bad faith. Nor would his allowing the prisoners to go back to work after Billy Blackford came in for treatment demonstrate any bad faith on his part. As to insufficient training for the staff and prisoners, one must ask  insufficient for what? There is no showing in this record that Henderson was not insufficiently trained to supervise the crew. He had done it successfully for at least three years. Allegations are made he might have been talking to a neighbor during some of the time  but that is not proof of improper training or supervision. And, how do you train someone to watch out for falling trees or anticipate they might walk into such areas? This allegation simply does not support an inference of bad faith.