Opinion ID: 891604
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mistakes of Fact and Law and Reasonable Suspicion

Text: {21} Defendant argues that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion because Deputy Francisco made a mistake of law when he concluded that Defendant violated the traffic code. As we have already discussed, we agree with the district court that Defendant violated Section 66-7-325(A) and therefore Deputy Francisco did not make a mistake of any kind. However, in order to clarify the law regarding reasonable suspicion, we take this opportunity to discuss mistakes of law and mistakes of fact and how they interact with reasonable suspicion. {22} A mistake of law is a mistake about the legal effect of a known fact or situation, whereas a mistake of fact is a mistake about a fact that is material to a transaction; any mistake other than a mistake of law. Black's Law Dictionary 1023. Although mistakes of law and fact are more frequently encountered in the context of criminal defenses, some jurisdictions have incorporated these concepts into their rules regarding reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir.2008) ([F]ailure to understand the plain and unambiguous law . . . is not objectively reasonable. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) (Stops premised on a mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-faith mistake, are generally held to be unconstitutional.); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir.2003) (reasoning that, while an officer's mistake of fact may provide the objective grounds for reasonable suspicion, an officer's mistake of law cannot); People v. Ramirez, 140 Cal.App.4th 849, 44 Cal. Rptr.3d 813, 816 (2006) ([A] suspicion founded on a mistake of law cannot constitute the reasonable basis required for a lawful traffic stop.)
{23} Reasonable suspicion in New Mexico is analyzed with the use of an objective test. In State v. Anaya , our Court of Appeals held that conduct premised totally on a mistake of law cannot create the reasonable suspicion needed to make a traffic stop; but if the facts articulated by the officer support reasonable suspicion on another basis, the stop can be upheld. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-020, ¶ 15, 143 N.M. 431, 176 P.3d 1163. {24} The facts in Anaya are similar to the instant case. The defendant in Anaya was observed to be weaving within his lane of traffic and was later stopped by a police officer after he failed to utilize his turn signal. Id. ¶ 2. After approaching the car and observing signs of intoxication, the officer arrested the defendant for DWI. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the DWI evidence on the basis that the initial stop was invalid because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. ¶ 3. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that he did not observe any other cars in the area at the time of the stop and that he understood that the turn signal statute required the use of a turn signal in all circumstances. Id. Additionally, the officer did not testify that he was affected by the defendant's right turn. Id. The district court found that the defendant's traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and granted the motion to suppress the DWI evidence. Id. ¶ 4. {25} In affirming the district court's decision to suppress the evidence, the Anaya Court found that, although there could be cases in which the officer's vehicle could be considered affected traffic, depending on the evidence presented[,] . . . the facts as articulated by the officer do not support violation of the turn signal law. Id. ¶ 19. The Court also stated that [f]ailure to signal is not a per se traffic violation, despite [the] officer's good-faith understanding to the contrary, and also classified the officer's mistake as a mistake of law. Id. ¶ 17. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, the Court agreed with the district court's finding that the officer's vehicle was not traffic that could be affected by [the][d]efendant's failure to signal. Id. ¶ 19.
{26} The State argues that Anaya conflicts with our existing caselaw that has consistently applied an objective approach to analyzing reasonable suspicion. We disagree. {27} In its answer brief, the State asserted that [t]he Anaya Court incorrectly states that New Mexico caselaw holds that conduct premised totally on a mistake of law cannot create the reasonable suspicion needed to make a traffic stop. However, in making this assertion, the State ignored the second part of Anaya's holding: but if the facts articulated by the officer support reasonable suspicion on another basis, the stop can be upheld. Id. ¶ 15. This second part is critical because it establishes that a court's analysis has not been completed once an officer's conduct has been categorized as a mistake of lawcourts will still analyze the facts surrounding the officer's decision in order to determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion on another basis. In essence, the second part of the Anaya proposition is our objective test for reasonable suspicion. {28} Even with the mistake of law language of the first part of Anaya proposition, our objective test set forth in Brennan and Muñoz remains unaffected because it does not hinge on a court's classification of an officer's mistake as either a mistake of law or a mistake of fact. See Brennan, 1998-NMCA-176, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 389, 970 P.2d 161 ([T]he question is whether there were facts available to [the officer] that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the stop was appropriate.); Muñoz, 1998-NMCA-140, ¶ 9, 125 N.M. 765, 965 P.2d 349 (The test [for reasonable suspicion] is an objective one. The subjective belief of the officer does not in itself affect the validity of the stop; it is the evidence known to the officer that counts. . . .). In other words, it is not fatal in terms of reasonable suspicion if an officer makes a mistake of law when he conducts a traffic stop; courts will still look objectively to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the officer's decision to conduct the traffic stop in order to determine if he or she had reasonable suspicion. {29} This was the Court of Appeals' process in Anaya. It determined that the officer in that case made a mistake of law because he believed that the turn signal statute required drivers to engage their turn signal at all times, no matter if there was other traffic that may have been affected or not. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-020, ¶ 17, 143 N.M. 431, 176 P.3d 1163. However, the inquiry did not end with this determination. The Court of Appeals still had to determine, despite the officer's misunderstanding of the law, if there were other facts surrounding the officer's decision to conduct the traffic stop that could provide the objective grounds for reasonable suspicion. Id. ([T]here [were] no other facts or testimony . . . to support reasonable suspicion on other grounds.). The Court further held that [i]t cannot be objectively reasonable to stop a vehicle when there are no facts to support the inference that a law has been violated.  Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court analyzed the facts surrounding the officer's decision and did not merely conclude that there was no reasonable suspicion upon its determination that the officer had made a mistake of law.
{30} In an attempt to apply the proposition set forth in Anaya, Defendant argues that Deputy Francisco made a mistake of law when he conducted the traffic stop of Defendant based on a perceived violation of the turn signal statute and that this mistake was the sole basis for the stop. We disagree. {31} Primarily, as discussed above, we hold that Defendant violated the turn signal statute and thus, Deputy Francisco did not make a mistake either of fact or of law when he conducted the traffic stop of Defendant. Thus, the mistake of law portion of the Anaya proposition does not apply. Also, unlike the officer in Anaya, who testified that he understood Section 66-7-325 to require the use of a turn signal in all circumstances, id. ¶ 3, there is no evidence in the record before us that Deputy Francisco had any such misunderstanding of the breadth of Section 66-7-325(A). {32} Finally, even if Deputy Francisco was mistaken when he believed that Defendant had violated the turn signal statute, such a mistake would be a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law. Deputy Francisco's determinationsthat he, while driving his vehicle on the highway, was traffic, and that he may [have been] affected by Defendant's turn-concerned fact[s] that [were] material to [the] transaction. See Black's Law Dictionary 1023. Deputy Francisco made no mistake about the applicable rules of law relating to the mandatory use of turn signal. Instead, he had to determine whether certain facts the relative positions of the vehicles and their direction of travelconstituted a scenario where he may have been affected by Defendant's movement. Thus, any mistakes regarding these factual judgments would be classified as mistakes of fact and not mistakes of law.
{33} Given our interpretation of Section 66-7-325(A) and our holding that Defendant violated the statute, we now address the reasonable suspicion inquiry to the facts of this case. {34} Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that Deputy Francisco had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant. Deputy Francisco testified that as he passed through the intersection, he observed Defendant approach the same intersection perpendicularly and come to a stop. Deputy Francisco observed that Defendant did not have his turn signal engaged at that time. Deputy Francisco further testified that Defendant never, at any time, had his turn signal engaged as Deputy Francisco drove through the intersection and pulled over to the side of the road. {35} Looking at the totality of the circumstances and through an objective lens, we hold that Deputy Francisco had a particularized suspicion . . . that [Defendant] [was] breaking, or [had] broken[] the law. See Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. The specific articulable facts that Deputy Francisco observed would lead a reasonable officer to believe that Defendant had violated the turn signal statute and they created the objective basis for Deputy Francisco's reasonable suspicion. Thus, Deputy Francisco's traffic stop of Defendant was based upon reasonable suspicion.