Opinion ID: 787920
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Immunity for Parole Officers

Text: 25 Christian and Rodriguez contend that under Anderson and Sellars all parole officials are entitled to absolute immunity for actions that relate to the decision to grant, deny or revoke parole. See id. at 909 (extending absolute immunity to actions directly related to the decision to revoke parole). We conclude that the scope of absolute immunity for parole officers is not as extensive. 26 First, Anderson itself does not support such a broad proposition. It limited immunity to acts  directly related to the decision to revoke parole. Id. at 909 (emphasis added). Moreover, it noted that parole officers are not entitled to absolute immunity for conduct arising from their duty to supervise parolees, id. at 909-10, conduct that could include actions that would fall within the reach of Christian and Rodriguez's suggested test. Thus, on its face, Anderson limited immunity more than Christian and Rodriguez suggest. 27 Second, subsequent to Anderson, [i]n Antoine, the Supreme Court worked a sea change in the way in which we are to examine absolute quasi-judicial immunity for nonjudicial officers. Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir.2002). The relevant test now is whether the official is performing a duty functionally comparable to one for which officials were rendered immune at common law. Miller, 335 F.3d at 897. Indeed, to the extent Anderson applied a relates to test, as opposed to a functional test, Antoine overruled it. Under Antoine, [t]he relation of the action to a judicial proceeding ... is no longer a relevant standard. Id. As we have described above, Antoine adopted a functional approach, under which we must determine not whether an action relates to the decision to grant, deny, or revoke parole, as Christian and Rodriguez suggest, but whether an action is taken by an official performing a duty functionally comparable to one for which officials were rendered immune at common law. Id. 4 28 Antoine thus forecloses Christian and Rodriguez's contention that Anderson stands for the broad proposition that quasi-judicial acts include all acts by any parole official that relate to the parole authority's decision to grant, deny or revoke parole. As we explained in Anderson , parole officers are not entitled to absolute immunity for conduct taken outside an official's adjudicatory role[,] or arising from their duty to supervise parolees. Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909-10. Nevertheless, Anderson generally applied a functional test, and the case still dictates that an official who adjudicates parole decisions is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for those decisions, and actions integral to those decisions.