Opinion ID: 2077226
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Collateral Estoppel as to Peter Wiers

Text: [¶ 18] Although Wiers was not a party to the divorce or the subsequent Rule 60(b) proceeding, he asserts that the collateral estoppel component of the res judicata doctrine bars Donald's action against him. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of factual issues already decided if the identical issue was determined by a prior final judgment, and the party estopped had a fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue in a prior proceeding. Portland Co., 2009 ME 98, ¶ 22, 979 A.2d at 1287 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 19] A party to a current proceeding may assert collateral estoppel defensively to bar the opposing party from relitigating factual issues resolved against it in a prior proceeding and which were decided by a prior final judgment, even though the party asserting collateral estoppel was not a party to the prior proceeding. See Brewer v. Hagemann, 2001 ME 27, ¶ 8, 771 A.2d 1030, 1033 (holding that the defendant, though not a party to the prior litigation, could assert collateral estoppel defensively to preclude the plaintiff from relitigating factual issues that the plaintiff had previously litigated and lost); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 768 (Me. 1979). A party may be collaterally estopped from relitigating a factual issue even if the two proceedings offer substantially different remedies or the second proceeding is based on a different claim than the first. Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie, 2003 ME 121, ¶ 22, 834 A.2d 131, 139; Button v. Peoples Heritage Sav. Bank, 666 A.2d 120, 122 (Me.1995). [¶ 20] As discussed in the case history above, Donald had notice and a fair opportunity to address Wiers's paternity in or concurrently with the Rule 60(b) proceeding. He could have sought to join Wiers as a necessary party at the time he sought Rule 60(b) relief pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 20, or he could have initiated a separate paternity action against Wiers and moved to consolidate the two proceedings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 42. [5] [¶ 21] A father who seeks Rule 60(b) relief from an original parentage determination made in a divorce judgment cannot split his claim of non-paternity by having the question decided first in the Rule 60(b) proceeding, and if unsuccessful, instituting a subsequent, independent paternity action. [6] Having been on notice that he may not be the father of the child from the time of the marriage forward and having had the opportunity to challenge the paternity determination made in the divorce judgment in the course of the Rule 60(b) proceeding, Donald is collaterally estopped from joining Wiers in this new action to relitigate the already determined parentage issue. [¶ 22] In Stitham, 2001 ME 52, ¶¶ 6-12, 768 A.2d at 600-02, Department of Human Services v. Richardson, 621 A.2d 855, 856-58 (Me.1993), and Atkinson v. Hall, 556 A.2d 651 n. 1 (Me.1989), we addressed circumstances in which a paternity determination made in a judgment that has become final may be reopened for certain purposes, particularly when requested by third parties. None of those circumstances are present here, and our statements in those opinions are not implicated by today's opinion. The entry is: Judgments affirmed. No costs to any party.