Opinion ID: 223685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress Statements and Evidence

Text: Knope argues that the district court erred in admitting (1) post-arrest statements he made to the detectives and (2) computer equipment seized from his residence. A magistrate judge heard Knope's motion and issued a report and recommendation that the motion be denied, which the district court adopted in a separate written opinion. Because the district court adopted the report and recommendation, we review the magistrate judge's factual findings for clear error and her legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Hendrix, 509 F.3d 362, 373 (7th Cir.2007). We give deference to the credibility determinations of the court that had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Id.
The evidence presented at the suppression hearing showed that Knope began to talk immediately after the officers approached him in the Walgreens parking lot. He stated, I'm so stupid. Curiosity killed the cat. Knope was then arrested and placed in the back seat of the unmarked police car. [3] DuCharme sat in the front seat, which was not separated from the back seat by a cage. Knope continued to talk to DuCharme while she set up the recording equipment for their interview. Knope stated he was upset and angry with himself, and DuCharme initially told him, All right. I can't talk to you about it until after my partner gets here. Knope responded, I know, I know, I'm just I'm ready to cry seriously. I can't believe I even did it. I just ... and there's no way. I'm going to get charged with it and that's all there is to it.... I can't believe I did this. I can't. DuCharme explained that she and McQuown worked for the Milwaukee Police Department and that they appreciated Knope's cooperation with the arrest. Knope continued, When you know you're stupid, you know you're stupid ... you screwed up. You should just realize you did something you should have slapped yourself in the head for. Somebody else shouldn't have to. After McQuown joined her in the front seat of the car, DuCharme told Knope that he had been arrested for using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime. She said that she would need to obtain preliminary information and then asked Knope to state his first and last name, age, date of birth, address, and phone number. Knope stated that he was 31 years old and that he lived at 109 Randolph in Burlington, Wisconsin. He also expressed concern about being detained at the police station and repeatedly asked whether there was any way to make the case go away. After DuCharme obtained Knope's information, she notified him of his Miranda rights. The interview continued after Knope stated that he was willing to answer questions. Knope argues that the statements he made while he was seated in the back of the unmarked police car were admitted in error because they were the result of a custodial interrogation. Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the test for whether Knope was subject to interrogation is whether a reasonable objective observer would have believed that the ... question[] claimed by [the defendant] to have been unlawful interrogation [was] in fact `reasonably likely to elicit' an incriminating response. United States v. Abdulla, 294 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996, 1002 (7th Cir.1997)). Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The focus of Knope's objection is the admission of biographical information that was later used to execute a search of his residence. Knope argues that the question Where do you live? was a form of interrogation because his answer provided the likely location of the computer that he had used for the online chats. [R]outine booking questions asked before Miranda warnings are given are not usually grounds for suppression of a defendant's statements revealing his identity and residence. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (questions reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns do not constitute interrogation under Miranda); United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 385 (7th Cir.1989). Although a suspect's home is a likely place for this type of illicit activity, DuCharme did not then know the location of the computer Knope used. (It could have been at work or anywhere a laptop could be linked to the Internet.) There is no evidence that DuCharme was seeking an admission when she asked where he lived. Knope cites no precedent where revealing one's place of residence during booking, thereby identifying a place to search, was found sufficient to invoke Miranda. Although we do not foreclose the possibility of such a case, this is not it.
Knope argues that computer equipment seized from his residence should be suppressed because it was the fruit of an illegal search. During his interview with Detectives DuCharme and McQuown, Knope stated that there was a strap-on dildo in his car, that he had viewed and downloaded child pornography on his home computer, and that he had used his home computer to chat online with Maria. DuCharme eventually asked Knope for permission to go to his house and search his computer. Knope said that he wanted to be present for the search because there was stuff on his external hard drive that he didn't have a chance to go through yet. DuCharme told Knope, That's the problem ... you can't be [there]. Knope continued, [T]here is probably stuff on it.... And it's in a separate folder ... that needs to be deleted.... [B]ut all I'm saying is I just ... I want to make this go away the best I can. DuCharme responded, Listen.... It's already there so whether you give me permission I can go other ways and try to do it. I'm asking for your permission. Knope stated, What's done is done, and asked when his computers would be returned to him. DuCharme explained that they would not be returned if they contained contraband and continued to question Knope about the items he downloaded from the Internet. As she spoke to Knope, DuCharme filled out the top of a Milwaukee Police Department consent to search form. The form stated that Knope gave consent for the search of [his] premises and all property found therein and located at 105 Randolph as well as his car, personal computers, data storage devices, and cell phone. DuCharme read the form aloud to Knope, who confirmed that he understood what the consent entailed. DuCharme then handed the form to Knope to complete, instructing him to check off the boxes if you agree ... and then sign your name on the bottom. She also asked Knope additional questions about the items that might be found in his car. During this exchange, Knope asked, When we get down there [to the police station], [i]s it possible to have a lawyer there? DuCharme told him, Sure.... You have a right to a lawyer, whatever you want. Knope responded that he did not want to worm [his] way out of anything that's done and that he knew that their conversation was recorded. DuCharme told Knope the date, which he wrote on the form, and then said, Okay, Randy, just so you know where I'm at now, because you're asking for a lawyer at this point, I can't ask you any more questions. You can go ahead and you can talk to me but you've limited what I can do.... DuCharme testified that she decided to stop asking Knope questions to be on the safe side, even though she was not sure whether he was asking for a lawyer at that time or stating that he wanted a lawyer to be present when he arrived at the police station. She could not recall whether Knope had already signed the consent form when he invoked his right to an attorney. After the interview, DuCharme and McQuown traveled to Burlington to conduct the search. They stopped at the Burlington Police Department on the way because they wanted uniformed officers to be present when they arrived at Knope's residence. There they confirmed that Knope lived at 109 Randolph Street. As they arrived, DuCharme realized that she had written 105 Randolph on the top of Knope's consent form. After reviewing her notes, DuCharme concluded that 109 Randolph was correct, as it was what she had initially written down when she asked Knope for his address. The detectives proceeded to 109 Randolph Street, where they met Knope's girlfriend and her mother, both of whom lived with Knope. The detectives explained that Knope had been arrested for a computer-related crime and that he had consented to a search of his area of the residence. The mother then showed the detectives where Knope's belongings were located. The detectives recovered a DVD with child pornography images, Knope's laptop computer, and an external hard drive. Before the DVD and laptop were searched, DuCharme obtained a search warrant to examine the items that had been seized. Knope first argues that he was coerced into signing the consent form when DuCharme told him whether you give me permission [to search the residence] I can go other ways and try to do it. The court looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether Knope's consent was voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The factors we consider include Knope's age, education, and intelligence, the length of his detention prior to consent, whether the police repeatedly asked for consent, whether physical coercion was used, and whether he was in custody. United States v. Strache, 202 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir. 2000). An empty threat to obtain a search warrant may render consent involuntary, but if the expressed intention to obtain a warrant is genuine ... and not merely a pretext to induce submission, it does not vitiate consent. United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir.1992); see also United States v. Hicks, 539 F.3d 566, 572 (7th Cir.2008). Here, Knope had admitted that he viewed and downloaded child pornography on his home computer and that he had been using that computer when he engaged in online chats with Maria. Therefore, DuCharme would have had a legitimate belief that she could obtain a warrant to search Knope's residence. Moreover, the record shows that DuCharme explained Knope's rights to him in a non-threatening manner and that he readily consented to the search of his residence. The district court did not err in concluding that Knope's consent was voluntary. Knope also asserts that his consent was invalid because he signed the consent form after he invoked his right to counsel. He cites Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), where the Supreme Court held that police cannot continue an interrogation after the accused invokes his right to counsel. Knope's argument is foreclosed, however, by this court's holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 335 (7th Cir.1994). Indeed, we rejected nearly identical arguments in Shlater and LaGrone. Knope's consent was not invalid on these grounds. Finally, Knope argues that the consent form was not valid because it contained the wrong address. There is no question that Knope consented to the search of his residence, that he told DuCharme that his address was 109 Randolph Street, or that the Burlington Police Department confirmed that Knope lived at that address. DuCharme's transcription error does not invalidate Knope's voluntary consent. [4] For these reasons, the district court correctly denied Knope's motion to suppress.