Opinion ID: 782497
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Objection to Tape Recordings

Text: 111 Hamilton and Messere contend that the district court erred in admitting in evidence the tape recording made by Gabriele of the March 8 conversations inside Wharry's house, as transmitted by the informant (who was known as Supreme) and heard by Gabriele, as well as a tape recording of a conversation on April 11, 2000, between Supreme and one of Messere's informants, Seba Richards. Defendants argue that the tapes were not reliable because Supreme had supplied some of the participants in the conversations with drugs: 112 The district court should properly have excluded these tape recordings, on the grounds raised by the defense — namely that they were the product of rambling, crack-intoxicated individuals who had been intentionally placed into that state by a Government informant seeking to obtain information for use by the Government. 113 (Hamilton brief on appeal at 60; Messere brief on appeal at 55; see also id. at 53 ([T]he district court erred in admitting these tape recordings, obtained through Government agent `Supreme' giving crack cocaine to Ms. Martinez and Ms. Richards as inducements to speak.).) In support of their contention, defendants cite cases from other circuits, United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.1975); United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916, 95 S.Ct. 1577, 43 L.Ed.2d 782 (1975), which adopted a formal, seven-factor approach to the admission of audio recordings as enunciated in United States v. McKeever, 169 F.Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y.1958), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.1959), including a requirement of proof that statements elicited were made without any kind of inducement. Starks, 515 F.2d at 121 n. 11 (quoting McKeever ); McMillan, 508 F.2d at 104 (same). This Court, however, has expressly and repeatedly declined to adopt the McKeever approach, refusing to adopt[] a rigid standard for determining the admissibility of tape recordings. United States v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 532 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 491, 54 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977); see also United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 500 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137, 105 S.Ct. 2679, 86 L.Ed.2d 697 (1985). In Fuentes, we noted that the varying circumstances of particular cases in which one or another aspect of this problem may present itself militate against our adoption of inflexible criteria applicable to all cases. 563 F.2d at 532. Instead, we have adopted a general standard, namely, that the government `produce clear and convincing evidence of authenticity and accuracy' as a foundation for the admission of such recordings. Id. (quoting United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427, 440 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973, 88 S.Ct. 472, 19 L.Ed.2d 465 (1967)). We see no reason to adopt a more rigid standard in this case. A tape recording may be admitted in evidence when it has been properly authenticated by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Fed.R.Evid. 901(a); see, e.g., United States v. Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Barone, 913 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1990). Once a relevant tape recording has been sufficiently authenticated, any question as to the veracity of the recorded statements and the credibility of the speakers goes to the evidence's weight rather than to its admissibility. 114 The recordings admitted in evidence in the present case were adequately authenticated, both by Gabriele, who heard the conversations and made the recordings, and by various parties to the conversations. Hamilton and Messere do not challenge the authenticity or accuracy of the recordings; rather they challenge the veracity and reliability of the statements that were recorded. These were matters for argument to the jury; they are not grounds for reversal on appeal.