Opinion ID: 1599022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court properly granted summary judgment on the issues of the Bank's alleged false representations and malicious and bad faith actions.

Text: Summary judgment proceedings are not a substitute for trial and the remedy is authorized only when the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are no issues of material fact. Caneva v. Miners & Merchants Bank, 335 N.W.2d 339 (S.D.1983). The moving party has the burden to clearly show that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Klatt v. Continental Ins. Co., 409 N.W.2d 366 (S.D.1987). The nonmoving party opposing a motion for summary judgment must present specific facts which demonstrate the existence of genuine, material issues for trial; mere allegations are not sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Laber v. Koch, 383 N.W.2d 490 (S.D.1986). It is the Weiszhaar's position that the Bank made false representations; acting maliciously and in bad faith violating its commitments in claiming the entire $585,000.00 (rather than $500,000.00). Additionally, the Weiszhaars assert that the Bank failed to fulfill its obligation to complete the $265,000 real estate loan which it promised to grant; also, the Bank failed to notify their corporations of the fact that the Bank was going to default on their commitment in a time sufficient to enable their corporations to secure another loan. The trial court disagreed, granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank, stating: It was stipulated and ordered by the bankruptcy court that in the event of the terms of this order [May 3, 1988] are not performed, and the bank is required to proceed to exercise available remedies in state court, the bank shall be entitled to seek the collection of the full indebtedness owed it, which is the sum of $819,387.84 as of April 26, 1988. The Bank later agreed for an extension of this matter to allow a new arrangement of payment which increased the indebtedness by $85,000.00 but eased the manner of payment for a half million dollars of debt. Later, the Bank extended by agreement, the obligations until October of 1988. The Court can find no material issue in the area of completing the agreements. In fact, it is quite clear that the debtors never met the conditions. Therefore, the Bank is entitled to go back to the original form as previously stated in Judge Hoyt's order approving stipulations. After a thorough reading of the pertinent stipulations, we are of the opinion that the Weiszhaars' argument is bottomed on a challenge to the interpretation of the stipulation they entered into. The Weiszhaars already attempted to challenge the interpretation of the July 10, 1988, stipulation in Bankruptcy Court on at least three occasions. We stated in Warren Supply v. Duerr, Pliley, Thorsheim Dev., 355 N.W.2d 838 (S.D.1984), that one who enters into a stipulation or agreement for judgment or who has taken a position in judicial proceedings may not later challenge the judgment or take a position inconsistent with his earlier position. See generally, 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel & Waiver, §§ 568-70; Gall v. South Branch Nat. Bank of S.D., 783 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.1986). To permit the Weiszhaars to now argue that the Bank's behavior in restructuring the stipulation was malicious or in bad faith, would be counter to the spirit of the stipulation proposed by the Weiszhaars themselves. Both parties believed that the July 10, 1988, renegotiated stipulation would be the answer to the Weiszhaars' inability to comply with the first stipulation. However, the Weiszhaars never met the conditions of this stipulation. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the false representations and malicious and bad faith actions.