Opinion ID: 1905130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Maintaining a Vehicle

Text: The offense of Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping a Controlled Substance is defined by title 16, section 4755(a)(5) of the Delaware Criminal Code, which provides in pertinent part: It is unlawful for any person ... [k]nowingly to keep or maintain any ... vehicle... which is resorted to by persons using controlled substances ... for the purpose of using [controlled] substances or which is used for keeping or delivering them.... [3] At Brown's trial, the State's evidence showed that a police officer and two probation officers stopped a vehicle with a headlight out. The officers questioned and removed the driver and the front-seat passenger from the vehicle. The officers also questioned Brown, who was a passenger in the back-seat, and removed him from the vehicle. They searched all three individuals. In Brown's jacket pocket, the arresting officer found a plastic bag containing twenty-two smaller bags of marijuana. The driver possessed $1,017 in cash. The officers did not find any drugs or drug paraphernalia in the vehicle. In this appeal, Brown argues that the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the offense of Maintaining a Vehicle because there was insufficient evidence to prove all of the elements of that offense. Brown argued to the trial court that a conviction for Maintaining a Vehicle requires more proof than evidence that a passenger in a vehicle possessed drugs while in the vehicle. Otherwise, Brown argued, any person who possessed a controlled substance while in a vehicle would be guilty of Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping a Controlled Substance. In Priest v. State , this Court reversed a conviction for Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping a Controlled Substance, due to insufficient evidence for that offense. [4] The record in Priest reflected that the driver of the vehicle and the front-seat passenger, not Priest, had agreed to use the driver's vehicle to drive to a location where they could buy drugs. [5] Priest, also a passenger, was sitting in the back seat. [6] The driver of the vehicle testified that, as the arresting officer approached the vehicle, Priest appeared to be hiding something in the back seat. [7] The officer searched the car and recovered crack cocaine and a scale in the front seat area and glove box. [8] He also located a loaded firearm hidden in the back seat cushion. [9] In Priest, we held that something more than presence in a vehicle that contains controlled substances or knowledge that controlled substances are in the vehicle is required to prove that a defendant maintained a vehicle to keep controlled substances. [10] Accordingly, our holding in Priest requires the State to prove some affirmative activity ... to utilize the vehicle to facilitate the possession, delivery, or use of the controlled substance. [11] Priest's conviction for Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping a Controlled Substance was reversed on appeal because the State did not offer evidence of some affirmative activity by the defendant to utilize the vehicle to facilitate the possession ... or use of controlled substances. [12] In this case, the Superior Court ruled that Priest was distinguishable because there was no evidence that Priest, a passenger in the back seat, was aware that drugs were in that vehicle, while in this case, Brown possessed the drugs himself while he was in the vehicle. Brown argues that the Superior Court erred, however, because it focused only on one element, that Brown was responsible for possessing or using a controlled substance, but not on the separate, additional element that Brown maintained or kept the vehicle in order to facilitate the possession or use of the controlled substance. We agree. In Priest, this Court recognized that the critical benchmark for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in a Maintaining a Vehicle prosecution has been the degree of the defendant's control or use of the vehicle in connection with the possession of drugs. [13] In Priest, this Court held that in order to sustain a finding of guilt on a Maintaining a Vehicle charge, the State must offer evidence of some affirmative activity by the defendant to utilize the vehicle to facilitate the possession, delivery, or use of controlled substances. [14] The statutory element that a defendant keep or maintain a vehicle requires more than merely proving that a defendant possessed or used a controlled substance while in a vehicle. If, in order to establish the offense of Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping a Controlled Substance, the State need only show that Brown possessed a controlled substance while in a vehicle, the necessary statutory element that Brown also keep or maintain the vehicle itself is eliminated. If it is only necessary to prove that a passenger in a vehicle possessed or used a controlled substance in the vehicle in order to prove the offense of maintaining or keeping the vehicle for that purpose, then the element and language of the offense that the defendant keep or maintain the vehicle, and not just the controlled substance, would be statutory surplusage. This Court reiterated in Priest that section 4755(a)(5) requires only that the State prove a single instance of possession or use of a controlled substance in connection with a vehicle. [15] This Court noted that most, if not all, other jurisdictions that adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act reject the `single occurrence' approach that Delaware endorses. [16] By single occurrence, however, this Court did not mean that the State simply must prove that the defendant possessed drugs while in a vehicle. [17] The defendant must exercise some control over the vehicle in order to keep or maintain the vehicle. [18] In Priest, this Court further explained that whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping a Controlled Substance turns on the degree of the defendant's control or use of the vehicle in connection with the possession of drugs. [19] Priest's mere presence in the vehicle while another occupant possessed drugs and attempted to facilitate a drug transaction d[id] not establish that Priest knowingly kept or maintained a vehicle `used for keeping or delivering' controlled substances. [20] Therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support Priest's conviction for Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping a Controlled Substance. [21] In this case, the record reflects there was no evidence of affirmative activity by Brown to utilize the vehicle to facilitate the possession or use of the controlled substance as our holding in Priest requires. The only evidence was that Brown was a passenger in a vehicle and that he possessed marijuana. There was no evidence that he was acting in concert with the driver to facilitate a drug transaction. The driver of the vehicle was not charged with any drug-related offenses. In addition, the State presented no evidence that Brown exercised any control over the operation of the vehicle or directed its travel. Thus, while there was sufficient evidence of one element of the offense, i.e., that Brown possessed marijuana in a vehicle, there was no evidence of the separate element that he kept or maintained the vehicle itself. There was no evidence at trial that Brown exercised any control over the operation or direction of the motor vehicle, only that he was a passenger. In the absence of any evidence that Brown engaged in some affirmative activity to use the vehicle to facilitate his possession of a controlled substance, there was insufficient evidence that he maintained a vehicle for keeping a controlled substance. Therefore, we hold that the Superior Court erred, as a matter of law, in denying Brown's motion for a judgment of acquittal on that charge. [22]