Opinion ID: 2994844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jemison’s Plea Agreement and Sentencing

Text: In Jemison’s negotiated plea agreement, the government agreed not to pursue the two-level enhancement set forth in the United States Sentencing Guideline 3B1.1/3 and in return Jemison consented to waive her right to appeal either her conviction or sentence. The appellate waiver clause stated: Defendant understands that by pleading guilty she is waiving all the rights set forth in the prior paragraph. Defendant’s attorney has explained those rights to her and the consequences of waiving all appellate issues that might have been available if she had exercised her right to trial. The defendant is also aware that Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 affords defendant a right to appeal the sentence imposed. Acknowledging all of this, the defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal any sentence within the maximum provided in the statute of conviction (or manner in which that sentence was determined) on the grounds set forth in section 3742 or on any other ground whatsoever, in exchange for the concessions made by the United States in this Plea Agreement. The defendant also waives her right to challenge her sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255. On December 22, 1998, Jemison and her attorney, Mark Danielson, signed the agreement which averred that they had read the entire plea document, including the appellate waiver provision. Jemison subsequently entered a plea of guilty to Count One of the information (conspiracy to make a false statement in an application for the purchase of a firearm from a federally licenced firearms dealer) and the other three counts charged were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. The court, after interrogating her as to the voluntariness of her plea and knowledge of the plea agreement, accepted her plea, ordered a pre-sentence report, and continued her sentencing hearing to March 31, 1998. At Jemison’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel moved for a continuance and informed the court he had been advised by his client at the start of the hearing that, for reasons not set forth in the record, she was attempting to hire new counsel. In support thereof, Jemison went on and asserted that she had already hired new counsel. The court, after questioning her, found Jemison’s claim of newly retained counsel to be implausible given the fact that no other attorney had either filed a written notice of substitution of counsel nor was a substitute attorney present in court for the scheduled sentencing hearing. The trial judge denied her motion for a continuance and proceeded with the hearing and sentenced her to 16 months’ imprisonment./4 Carrying out the terms of the plea agreement, the prosecution did not request (and the court did not apply) enhancements to Jemison’s sentence. Jemison appeals her conviction and sentence, apparently/5 arguing that her counsel was somehow ineffective in: (1) failing to file pre- trial motions attacking unspecified violations of her Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, and (2) failing to file a motion requesting the he be allowed to withdraw prior to her sentencing hearing based upon a break-down in communications between counsel and Jemison.