Opinion ID: 1927470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: suppression of informants' testimony

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by not suppressing the inculpatory statements related by appellant to Tucker and Murphy, two inmates incarcerated with appellant, on the grounds that the statements were obtained in violation of appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Appellant asserts that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because Tucker and Murphy were acting as agents of the police when they questioned appellant about the murder without appellant's legal counsel being present. Our standard or review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Commonwealth v. Cortez, 507 Pa. 529, 532, 491 A.2d 111, 112 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950, 106 S.Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.2d 297 (1985). When reviewing rulings of a suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. Cortez, 507 Pa. at 532, 491 A.2d at 112. Information secured by an informant acting as an agent of the government must be suppressed where the informant acts under instructions as an informant for the government, where he presents himself as no more than a fellow inmate rather than a governmental agent, and where the suspect is in custody and under indictment at the time of the questioning by the informant because such questioning outside the presence of the accused's counsel violates the accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Commonwealth v. Berkheimer, 501 Pa. 85, 88, 460 A.2d 233, 234 (1983). In order to prove such a violation, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and the informant took some action, beyond mere listening, which was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2629-30, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986). Moreover, the defendant must show that the informant was acting as an agent of the government. Individual acts do not become imbued with the character of governmental action merely because they are later relied upon and used by the government in furtherance of governmental objectives. Commonwealth v. Corley, 507 Pa. 540, 547, 491 A.2d 829, 832 (1985). Here, the trial court found that the police some time before May 4, 1990 interviewed the inmates in appellant's cell block regarding any information they may have overheard from defendant. On May 4, 1990, inmate Murphy, not acting under any agreement with the police, initiated his first contact with Montgomery County detectives. On May 5, 1990, appellant himself approached inmate Tucker to ask Tucker about aiding appellant in his murder defense since Tucker was previously a private investigator with contacts outside of prison. Tucker had a discussion with appellant in which appellant made incriminating statements about the murder. Tucker obtained this information by asking appellant questions. Murphy, who was in the cell next to appellant, never asked appellant any questions and only testified at appellant's trial about the conversation he overheard between appellant and Tucker. The trial court found that neither Tucker nor Murphy were promised anything by the Montgomery County detectives for their cooperation. The trial court also found that neither Tucker nor Murphy were given any information by the police concerning the murder which would have enhanced their ability to solicit information from appellant and that neither man was instructed by the Montgomery County detectives to seek information from appellant. Moreover, the trial court found that neither informant was intentionally placed in a cell near appellant in order to aid in the investigation. Based on these findings by the trial court, which are supported by the record, we conclude that the trial court correctly held that the testimony of the two informants should not be suppressed because neither was acting as an agent of the government. Rather, the record demonstrates that the two informants acted on their own initiative without the benefit of any promise or reward by the Commonwealth. Thus, appellant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated and the testimony of the two informants was properly admitted at trial. See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 364 Pa.Super. 54, 527 A.2d 148 (1987), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 611, 557 A.2d 343 (1989) (not violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights where incriminating statements made to prison inmate who was acting on his own initiative and without promise of benefit from Commonwealth and who had been placed in adjoining cell by happenstance and not design). Accordingly, this claim must fail.