Opinion ID: 1058506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prohibition from considering mitigating evidence

Text: The defendant contends the trial court unconstitutionally prevented the sentencing jury from considering relevant mitigating evidence by excluding consideration of evidence of the defendant's character and record.
The defendant complains of the following instruction regarding consideration of mitigating evidence: Any other mitigating factor which is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or defense at either the guilt or sentencing hearing; that is, you shall consider any aspect of the circumstances of the offense favorable to the defendant which is supported by the evidence. The defendant asserts that by failing to instruct the jury that it may also consider any aspect of the defendant's character or record, this instruction erroneously limited the jury to mitigating evidence related to the circumstances of the offense, and, in effect, the jury was instructed not to consider any evidence related to the defendant's character or record. The language suggested by the defendant is in the pattern jury instruction but was inadvertently omitted by the trial court. See T.P.I. CRIM. 7.04(c) (4th ed.1995); see also id. (7th ed.2002). A jury instruction on mitigating circumstances may be found prejudicially erroneous only if `it fails to fairly submit the legal issues or if it misleads the jury as to the applicable law.' State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, app. at 308 (Tenn.2002) (quoting State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 352 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 999, 118 S.Ct. 567, 139 L.Ed.2d 407 (1997)). In the instant case, we conclude that the instructions provided by the trial court when viewed in their entirety fairly submitted to the jury the legal issues. Accordingly, the omission in the trial court's instruction did not prejudice the defendant.
The defendant asserts the failure to instruct the jury that he did not have the burden of proof as to any mitigating factors was prejudicial. The jurors were instructed that the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any aggravating factor. They were further instructed there was no requirement for unanimity with respect to any particular mitigating factor. Upon reading the instructions as a whole, we fail to conclude the alleged omission misled the jury.
The defendant next objects to a portion of the state's closing argument during which the prosecutor asserted it was patently offensive to argue that the defendant's life should be spared because of his children and that such a plea was equally offensive in view of the defendant's lack of remorse. These statements were made during the state's rebuttal closing following the defendant's plea for mercy based upon his family support and potential for rehabilitation. The trial court cautioned the prosecutor after the defense objected to these statements. The trial court further instructed the jury: Ladies and Gentlemen, let me say to you that the appearance, or lack of appearance, on behalf of Mr. Robinson of any remorse is not a factor for you to consider in determining what the punishment in the case should be.... Lack of remorse is not a statutory aggravating circumstance, and it is not proper rebuttal because the defendant did not argue his remorse as a mitigating factor. However, the jury is presumed to follow the curative instruction of the trial court. State v. Butler, 880 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tenn. Crim.App.1994). Accordingly, although the prosecutor erred, such error is harmless in light of the curative instruction.
The defendant complains he was prevented from presenting evidence of his innocence at the penalty phase by virtue of an in limine order. Specifically, the defendant refers to the trial court's ruling regarding his statement given outside the presence of the jury at the beginning of the sentencing phase. During this jury-out hearing, the defendant asserted he was wrongfully convicted. He also stated he did not receive a fair trial due to the admission of improper testimony, which the jury did not disregard. He further alluded to various instances of misconduct by a particular juror and improper removal of evidence from the courtroom by the prosecutor. In response to these statements, the trial court made the following ruling: I'm not going to allow him to testify about the entire case in front of the jury, whether he, if he wants to testify he got a fair trial, or didn't get a fair trial and on all these other statements he wants to make. That may be proper, but I'm not going to allow him to get up there to attack a particular juror, so that's the basis for my decision. The defendant subsequently testified but made no reference to the alleged unfairness of his trial. The defendant has cited no authority indicating a defendant has the right to testify that he did not receive a fair trial and verbally attack jurors. Nor do we find such attacks to be proper residual doubt testimony. Residual doubt evidence generally consists of proof at the sentencing phase indicating the defendant did not commit the offense, notwithstanding the guilty verdict. State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 307 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 926, 123 S.Ct. 321, 154 L.Ed.2d 219 (2002); State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55-56 (Tenn.2001). Although the defendant had the right to proclaim his innocence, we are unable to conclude that he was prevented from doing so by virtue of the trial court's ruling.
The defendant asserts numerous errors during the penalty phase regarding closing arguments and the jury instructions which related to mitigating circumstances. We have reviewed the defendant's assertions and find the defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues.