Opinion ID: 1226553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Instruct Jury on Malice

Text: The defendant argues next that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to include the element of malice in its instruction on the murder charge. [26] We have held that [t]he trial court must instruct the jury on all essential elements of the offenses charged, and the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the essential elements deprives the accused of his fundamental right to a fair trial, and constitutes reversible error. Syllabus, State v. Miller, 184 W.Va. 367, 400 S.E.2d 611 (1990). In Syllabus Point 4 of Guthrie, supra, we stated: A trial court's instructions to the jury must be a correct statement of the law and supported by the evidence. Jury instructions are reviewed by determining whether the charge, reviewed as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so they understood the issues involved and were not mislead by the law. A jury instruction cannot be dissected on appeal; instead, the entire instruction is looked at when determining its accuracy. A trial court, therefore, has broad discretion in formulating its charge to the jury, so long as the charge accurately reflects the law. Deference is given to a trial court's discretion concerning the specific wording of the instruction, and the precise extent and character of any specific instruction will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. The problem presented by the defendant's argument is that she failed to object to the instruction given by the trial court on the elements required to be proven. The general rule is that a party may not assign as error the giving of an instruction unless he objects, stating distinctly the matters to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Gangwer, 169 W.Va. 177, 286 S.E.2d 389 (1982). See State v. Milam, 159 W.Va. 691, 702, 226 S.E.2d 433, 441 (1976) ([W]e will not consider an objection to instructions in the first instance before this Court). Moreover, the pertinent language in Rule 30 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the refusal to give an instruction or the giving of any portion of the charge unless that party objects thereto before the arguments to the jury are begun[.] See State v. Schofield, 175 W.Va. 99, 331 S.E.2d 829 (1985). This Court is not only concerned with defense counsel's failure to object to the instruction given on the elements of the murder charge; our review of the jury instruction hearing shows that the State and defense counsel specifically discussed with the trial court the type of language to be given on the elements of the murder by poison offense. At no time did defense counsel indicate that it had an objection to the charge as it was intended to be given. The defendant asks that this Court invoke the plain error doctrine to review this assignment of error. [27] We held in Syllabus Point 7 of State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995) that [t]o trigger application of the `plain error' doctrine, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. For the following reasons, we find no error in the trial court's jury instructions. As noted above, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder under W.Va.Code § 61-2-1. In Syllabus Point 5 of State v. Sims, 162 W.Va. 212, 248 S.E.2d 834 (1978), this Court explained: W.Va.Code, 61-2-1, was not designed primarily to define the substantive elements of the particular types of first degree murder, but rather was enacted to categorize the common law crimes of murder for the purpose of setting degrees of punishment. We further explained: Our statute enumerates three broad categories of homicide constituting first degree murder: (1) murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving; (2) by any wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (3) in the commission of, or attempt to commit, [ inter alia ], [28] arson, [sexual assault], robbery or burglary. Sims, 162 W.Va. at 221, 248 S.E.2d at 840 (footnote added). Under W.Va.Code § 61-2-1, every homicide is prima facie murder in the second degree, and in order to elevate the offense to murder in the first degree, the burden is cast upon the [State] to bring it, by proof, either within the specific class of cases, such as killing by poison ... enumerated in the statute, ... within the general class of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing[,] or within the felony murder rule. State v. Abbott, 8 W.Va. 741, 771 (1875). Prior to examining the category of first degree murder under which the defendant was convicted, we deem it useful first to briefly review the remaining portions of the statute. According to the statute, murder by any willful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of the first degree. Our cases have held that to sustain a conviction for this category of first degree murder it is essential that the State produce[] evidence that the homicide was a result of malice ... and was deliberate and premeditated[.] Syl. Pt. 3, in part, State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982). See also, Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Jenkins, 191 W.Va. 87, 443 S.E.2d 244 (1994). We observed in State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 673-74, 461 S.E.2d 163, 179-180, that the elements that separate first degree murder and second degree murder are deliberation and premeditation in addition to the formation of the specific intent to kill. See Miller, 197 W.Va. at 600, 476 S.E.2d at 547 (It is `deliberation' that separates first degree murder from second degree murder); Hatfield, 169 W.Va. at 198, 286 S.E.2d at 407 ([T]he specific intent to kill for first degree murder is related to and is a necessary constituent of the elements of premeditation and deliberation). In Syllabus Point 6 of Guthrie, in part, we indicated that [i]n criminal cases where the State seeks a conviction of first degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation, a trial court should instruct the jury that murder in the first degree consists of an intentional, deliberate, and premeditated killing which means that the killing is done after a period of time for prior consideration. W.Va.Code § 61-2-1 also includes the codification of the common law felony murder rule. Felony murder does not require proof of the elements of malice, premeditation or specific intent to kill. It is deemed sufficient if the homicide occurs during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, one of the enumerated felonies. State v. Sims, 162 W.Va. at 223, 248 S.E.2d at 841 (citations omitted). This Court has explained that the felony murder rule requires the State to prove ... that defendant committed or attempted to commit the named felony and that he committed murder incidental thereto. Syllabus Point 3, in part, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W.Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977). This Court has had few occasions to consider the category of first degree murder under which the defendant was convicted. According to the statute, [m]urder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving ... is murder of the first degree. In the ancient case of State v. Abbott, 8 W.Va. 741 (1875), this Court considered the elements of first degree murder by lying in wait. The Court concluded in Abbott that the term murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving does not require a showing of premeditation or a specific intent to kill. Rather, to elevate a murder by one of the four enumerated acts to first degree murder, the State must prove only malice plus one of the four acts. If it be proved that the killing was of such a character that, under ordinary circumstances, it would have been murder at common law, and the fact of lying in wait exist, that fact will make it a case of murder in the first degree.... Where a lying in wait is established, all proof as to `intention' or `wilfulness' is irrelevant[.] Abbott, 8 W.Va. at 770-771 (citation omitted). See also, State v. Sims, supra . In reliance on Abbott, this Court later held in a case also involving lying in wait: In order to sustain a conviction for first degree murder by lying in wait pursuant to W.Va.Code, 61-2-1 [1987], the prosecution must prove that the accused was waiting and watching with concealment or secrecy for the purpose of or with the intent to kill or inflict bodily harm upon a person. Syllabus Point 2, in part, State v. Harper, 179 W.Va. 24, 365 S.E.2d 69 (1987). See also, Syllabus Point 1, State v. Walker, 181 W.Va. 162, 381 S.E.2d 277 (1989) (per curiam). It is obvious, therefore, that in order to elevate a murder by one of the four enumerated acts in W.Va.Code § 61-2-1 to first degree murder, it is not necessary to prove specific intent to kill, deliberation and premeditation. The State must prove, rather, that the accused committed one of the four enumerated acts, and that he or she did so with malice. Regarding the meaning of the term malice, in State v. Douglass, 28 W.Va. 297, 299 (1886), this Court opined: [T]he source of which said malice is not only confined to a particular ill will to the deceased, but is intended to denote ... an action flowing from a wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done malo animo, where the fact has been attended with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indications of a heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief. In State v. Starkey, 161 W.Va. 517, 524, 244 S.E.2d 219, 223 (1978), overruled on other grounds, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995), we stated that [t]he term malice has been frequently used, but not extensively defined, by this Court[,] and concluded that malice is essentially a form of criminal intent[.] Id., 161 W.Va. at 523, 244 S.E.2d at 223. For example, in regard to first degree murder, the term `malice' is often used as a substitute for `specific intent to kill' or an `intentional killing.' State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. at 198, 286 S.E.2d at 407 (citation omitted). In order to determine whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on malice or criminal intent, we first must decide what form of criminal intent is required as an element of murder by poison. Concerning the specific crime of murder by poison at issue in the instant case, this Court has not previously spoken. As noted above, the plain language of the statute indicates that in order to elevate murder by poison to first degree murder, there must be both a murder, the unlawful killing of another with malice aforethought, and the act of the administration of poison. In other words, if the State proves that the killing was such that it would have been murder at common law, and the murder was accomplished by the administration of poison, W.Va.Code § 61-2-1 elevates the common law murder to murder in the first degree. Under the common law, [t]he homicide must first amount to murder, either because the defendant had an intent to kill or do serious bodily injury, or because his conduct evinced a depraved heart, or because the death by poison resulted from the defendant's commission or attempted commission of a felony. Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Handbook On Criminal Law § 73, p. 567 (1972) (footnote omitted). Concerning the act of administering poison, [i]t is not necessarily murder by poison to kill another person with poison, as where one administered poison innocently and for a lawful purpose and yet produces a death. Id. (footnote omitted). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the malice required to constitute murder by poison includes an intent to kill, intent to do serious bodily harm or conduct which evinces a depraved heart. [29] Further, we conclude that the administration of poison must be done intentionally, willfully and unlawfully. Accordingly, we hold that specific intent to kill, premeditation and deliberation are not elements of the crime of first degree murder perpetrated by means of poison pursuant to W.Va.Code § 61-2-1 (1991). Rather, in order to sustain a conviction for first degree murder by poison pursuant to W.Va. Code § 61-2-1, the State must prove that the accused committed the act of administration of poison unlawfully, willfully and intentionally for the purpose of or with the intent to kill or do serious bodily injury, or that the accused's conduct evinced a depraved heart. We now apply this rule to the facts before us. The trial court instructed the jury, in part, as follows: The Court instructs the jury that according to West Virginia law, murder of the first degree is committed when one person kills another person by unlawfully, willfully, and intentionally administering poison to that person.