Opinion ID: 2543712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The magistrate judge's characterizations, valuations, and divisions of the remaining items of property were supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Text: William argues that the community property presumption only placed upon him a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion. He argues that the testimony and documents admitted into evidence met this burden of production. Therefore, William argues that there was not substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's findings that the following were community property: proceeds from the William Reed Trust, proceeds from the sale of a ranch owned by LC Livestock, Inc., the marital residence, the Skyline Apartments owned during marriage, the Erb & Reed Partnership, real property at 1620 West Broadway, Texaco stock, and a host of personal items purchased from the estate of William's grandmother. A party wishing to overcome the community presumption and show that assets acquired during marriage are separate property must prove with `reasonable certainty and particularity' that the property is, in fact, separate. Barton, 132 Idaho at 396, 973 P.2d at 748. [T]he party asserting that the property is separate, bears the burden of proving to a reasonable certainty that the property is separate. Worzala v. Worzala, 128 Idaho 408, 412, 913 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1996). [The] presumption can be rebutted, but the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts that the property is separate. Stanger v. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725, 727, 571 P.2d 1126, 1128 (1977). William carried more than a burden to merely produce some scintilla of evidence, rather he carried, the burden of persuasion to rebut the community presumption remained on him throughout the trial. William did not produce any admissible documentation to demonstrate the separate property nature of these items of property, or to trace contributions to the community back to separate property sources. The magistrate judge was simply presented with the conflicting witness testimony, to be weighed in light of the community presumption. William cites Wood v. Hoglund for the rule that [a] trier of fact may not arbitrarily disregard credible and unimpeached testimony of a witness. 131 Idaho 700, 703, 963 P.2d 383, 386 (1998). William argues that, under this rule, the magistrate judge was required to accept his allegedly uncontradicted testimony regarding these items of property. However, the record contains contradictory testimony by Katherine regarding some of the property at issue. Additionally, the prior testimony given by William and Wallace provided substantial evidence from which the magistrate judge could conclude that their sincerity and memories were less than perfect. Consequently, it cannot be said that the magistrate judge's decision to give little or no weight to the testimony of William and Wallace was arbitrary. The magistrate judge's findings, that William did not overcome the community property presumption as to the contested items of property, were based on substantial and competent evidence. William also contests the magistrate judge's valuation of American Carriage, Inc. and American Marine, Inc., two businesses owned by the couple during marriage. William's expert testified that the companies were so interrelated that they should be valued together. He testified that the proper valuation of American Carriage should include a liability represented by the negative worth of American Marine, for property and debt allocation purposes. Katherine's expert testified that the companies were still independent entities, that they could be valued separately, and that American Marine could be liquidated separately. The magistrate judge apparently gave more evidentiary weight to the testimony of Katherine's expert than that of William's expert, because he found that the businesses could be valued separately and that American Marine could be liquidated. The magistrate judge's findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. B. The Magistrate Judge's Award Of Separate Maintenance Was Supported By Substantial And Competent Evidence. William argues that in awarding maintenance to Katherine, the magistrate judge abused his discretion under I.C. § 32-705, which provides for awards of spousal maintenance. However, the heart of William's challenge to the award is not an argument that there should have been no maintenance award at all; rather, he disagrees with the magistrate judge's factual findings underlying the amount and duration of the award. Specifically, he argues that the magistrate judge erred in his findings regarding William's income and Katherine's needs and that the he ordered the parties to maintain an artificially high standard of living that will require consumption of assets. Although the parties argue about whether the judge abused his discretion, and while some Idaho cases have discussed the abuse of discretion standard in relation to awards of spousal maintenance, this Court, in the case of Mulch v. Mulch, clarified that the substantial and competent evidence standard should be applied to the factual determinations underlying the award, duration, and amount of spousal maintenance. 125 Idaho 93, 98, 867 P.2d 967, 972 (1994). In the course of determining the proper amount of maintenance, the magistrate judge considered evidence regarding the income paid to William from the parties' businesses, the value of the fringe benefits William receives from those businesses, and the amount by which loans and money from alleged inheritances and gifts affected his income. The judge also spent considerable time determining Katherine's ability to provide for herself, given her lack of formal education and limited work experience. The magistrate judge's findings as to William's income, Katherine's needs, and the amount and duration of maintenance to be awarded are supported by substantial and competent evidence.