Opinion ID: 180654
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Grand Jury's Relation to the U.S. Attorney

Text: Caruto's final objection arises out of another instruction that she claims limited the grand jury's constitutionally guaranteed independence. In the course of explaining the very concept of grand jury independence, the court told jurors: It is extremely important for you to realize that under our Constitution, the grand jury is an independent arm of the United States Attorney. It's not part of the U.S. Attorney's Office nor an agent of the federal law enforcement agency. Caruto argues that calling the grand jury an independent arm of the United States Attorney unconstitutionally associated it with the prosecution. Context reveals that the phrase Caruto singles out was simply an inadvertent misstatement, which the court immediately corrected. The very next sentence told jurors that they were not part of the U.S. Attorney's Office. The court eliminated any confusion that might have arisen with an unequivocal clarification that told grand jurors to always bear in mind that ultimately you have to depend on your own independent judgment. Never become an arm of the United States Attorney's Office. It is fine for you to form relationship[s] with the prosecutors that you'll see on a regular basis. But keep in mind that you must be independent of them. You don't defer to them in exercising your judgment as a grand jury. You rather exercise that judgment independently. The government lawyers are prosecutors, and you are not. You are independent judges of the facts. If the facts suggest to you that you should not indict, then you should not do so, even in the face of opposition or statements by the U.S. Attorney. It is up to you, ultimately, to make that decision. Far from limiting the grand jury's independence, the entirety of the court's instruction emphatically underscored the grand jury's independent role. It did not violate the Fifth Amendment.
In addition to her main arguments about the constitutionality of the grand jury's instructions, Caruto included two paragraphs in her motion to dismiss the indictment seeking disclosure of the grand jury voir dire transcripts and an instructional video that the grand jury watched before it was charged. Concluding that the disclosure of voir dire would invade the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings and that Caruto had not made [a] sufficient showing [of] the need for disclosure, the district court denied the request. Caruto challenges that decision. We review the decision not to release grand jury transcripts for abuse of discretion. United States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir.1991); see also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 223, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979) ([A] court called upon to determine whether grand jury transcripts should be released necessarily is infused with substantial discretion.). Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. 1667. In her two-paragraph argument in support of her request before the district court, Caruto made none of these three required showings, nor does she make them in her briefs on appeal. The district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in denying Caruto's request. AFFIRMED.