Opinion ID: 1195797
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Allegation of an improper characterization of the reasonable-doubt standard

Text: In a final specific attack on his conviction, Henry argues that the prosecutor used a flagrantly improper emotional characterization of the reasonable-doubt standard in his rebuttal to Henry's closing argument. The prosecutor described the standard by saying that you don't have a reasonable doubt if proof is so convincing that you would not hesitate to act and rely on it in the most important matters in your own lives. He then proceeded to give an example for the jury: Suppose you had your son or daughter come to you ... just out of college and... they've got a great job opportunity... out in California, and they're going to go work for a man named Roderick Henry. And they are going to go work for Roderick Henry in the music business.... What do you think, ladies and gentleman? You have heard evidence from people who have criminal records. Do you know enough when your son and daughter comes to you and say great, I'm going to work for Roderick Henry, what do you tell them? Do you tell him or her, great, sounds great to me, good luck. If it was the most important decision in your life, what decision would you ask your son or daughter to make based on the evidence you heard from that witness stand? You know what your decision would be. You know your decision would be that you know enough about Roderick Henry based on the [evidence], you know, in the most important decisions in your life, you would say he is a drug dealer, don't work for him. Henry argues that the prosecutor's example improperly suggested to the jurors that the evidence against Henry should be considered as though it involved a matter regarding the potential safety of their children. As such, he contends that the argument is a thinly veiled form of the improper community protection argument found to be reversible error in United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1153 (6th Cir.1991) (A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to protect community values ... or deter future lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence. (quoting United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C.Cir.1984))). But the suggestion that jurors consider what advice they would give a child who was considering a job with Henry differs from the send a message and community protection arguments that have been condemned by the courts. The prosecutor's statements in the present case did not shift the focus away from Henry's culpability or suggest that punishing Henry would send other drug dealers in the community a message. A more accurate characterization of the problem here is that the example used was an improper effort on the part of the prosecutor to reduce the government's burden of proof. By suggesting to the jurors that the decision of whether to convict Henry was equivalent to the decision of whether to recommend that their child take a job with Henry, the prosecutor inverted the burden of proof. In other words, the prosecutor's statement encouraged the jury to evaluate how sure they were that Henry was not a drug dealer, as opposed to how sure they were that he was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. No caring parent would recommend that their child take a job with anyone whom they remotely feared might be a drug dealer. The prosecutor's example therefore suggested that the jury should convict Henry unless they were so convinced that he was not a drug dealer that they would recommend that their child enter his employ. Such a characterization of the reasonable-doubt standard was error. We must accordingly decide whether the statement was flagrant enough to warrant reversal. To start with, the improper example could easily have misled the jury regarding the reasonable-doubt standard in a way prejudicial to Henry. The argument was also deliberately made, even if the prosecutor did not intend to invert the burden of proof by telling the story. On the other hand, the improper example was isolated and presumably given to counter defense counsel's own examples of major decisions that jurors would not make unless based on facts they believed beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidence against Henry were less strong than it was in this case, a serious question would be presented as to whether the argument rose to the level of reversible prosecutorial misconduct. The record before us, however, demonstrates that the evidence establishing Henry's guilt was quite substantial. The government presented seven fact witnesses with personal knowledge of the conspiracy, law enforcement agents who worked on the case testified, and tapes of incriminating phone calls between Henry and a coconspirator were played. Moreover, the district court properly described the reasonable-doubt standard at length in the jury instructions, making clear that the presumption of innocence stayed with Henry unless and until the government presents evidence here in court that overcomes the presumption and convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty. In addition, the court noted that the defendant has no obligation to present any evidence at all or to prove to you in any way that he is innocent, and that the government must prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also instructed the jury that they could rely only on the evidence and testimony of witnesses and not upon the statements or arguments of the lawyers. In sum, the level of proof against Henry, the proper jury instructions, and the lack of any contemporaneous objection by defense counsel militate against a finding of reversible prosecutorial misconduct. Plain-error review is the applicable standard, and under that standard we conclude that the erroneous argument did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial. See United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir.2006); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).