Opinion ID: 676995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Service upon the United States is Required in a Bivens Action.

Text: 17 While the government's brief on appeal does not address this issue, a memorandum of law that the government filed in support of its initial motion to dismiss in the district court cited three cases for the proposition that service upon the United States is required in a Bivens action: Light v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746 (D.C.Cir.1987); Drayton v. Veterans Administration, 654 F.Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y.1987); and Lawrence v. Acree, 79 F.R.D. 669 (D.D.C.1978). 18 Light does not address the issue that we must decide. That case decided only that service must be made upon the United States when a federal official is sued and the lawsuit could be regarded as involving such an officer's official duties--as when there is an employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant. 816 F.2d at 751 n. 14. That case does not rule that the United States must be served in a Bivens action, which by definition and established precedent is brought against defendants only in their individual capacities. 19 Similarly, Drayton involved a claim of race and sex discrimination by the Veterans Administration in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. The case was dismissed for failure to name as a defendant the head of the Veterans Administration, as required by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c). See 654 F.Supp. at 562. In addition, the court commented that if the proper party had been named, service upon the United States would have been required. See id. at 563. The case manifestly involved the requirements for service in a suit against a federal official in his official capacity. 20 Only Lawrence provides significant support for the government's position. Lawrence addressed the issue whether service upon the United States, as well as the individual defendant, was required in a suit against a federal officer in his individual capacity where the actions complained of relate to his or her duties. 79 F.R.D. at 670. The court ruled that the United States must be served when the individual defendant act[ed] under color of legal authority, id. at 671, but not when the suit is premised upon actions unrelated to [the defendant's] duties as [a] federal officer[ ]. Id. The court cited Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1, 7 n. 58 (D.C.Cir.1977), rev'd sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 100 S.Ct. 774, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980), for the proposition that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(e) (providing relaxed venue requirements for suits against any federal employee acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority) and the service provisions of Rule 4(i)(2) (service upon an officer of the United States) operate in tandem. Lawrence, 79 F.R.D. at 671. As indicated, however, Briggs was reversed by the Supreme Court after Lawrence was decided, precisely on the basis that Sec. 1391(e) is inapplicable to actions for money damages against federal officers individually. Stafford, 444 U.S. at 544, 100 S.Ct. at 784; see also Blackburn v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919, 925-26 (2d Cir.1979) (same). Thus, to the extent that Lawrence relied upon Briggs, Stafford establishes that Lawrence was wrongly decided. 21 Lawrence also noted that government attorneys will defend federal officials in lawsuits based on actions taken in their official capacity or under color of legal authority, 79 F.R.D. at 671, and concluded that the requirements of [Rule 4(i)(2) ] must be met in order to assure that notice of the lawsuit will be received by those who will defend against the claims. Id. We disagree. It is clear that the individual defendants must be served in a Bivens case in accordance with Rule 4(e). 3 See, e.g., Johnston, 875 F.2d at 1424; Lewellen, 875 F.2d at 122 n. ; Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am, Inc. v. Chasin, 845 F.2d 113, 116 (6th Cir.1988); Del Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir.1987); Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227, 240-41 (3d Cir.1980); Griffith v. Nixon, 518 F.2d 1195, 1196 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995, 96 S.Ct. 422, 46 L.Ed.2d 369 (1975); Mecartney v. Hoover, 151 F.2d 694, 694 (7th Cir.1945) (per curiam) (collecting cases). We are confident that any such defendants who are sued for actions connected with their government employment can figure out how to contact the appropriate government attorneys. We note, for example, that the DEA Agents apparently had no difficulty doing so in this case. 22 Lawrence distinguished our opinion in Griffith as holding only that service upon the United States in a Bivens case does not suffice if no service is made upon the individual defendant. See Lawrence, 79 F.R.D. at 671. That is, indeed, the narrow holding in Griffith. We also said in Griffith, however, that [t]o the extent that damages were sought against the President personally, Federal Rule 4[ (i)(2) ] is not applicable. 518 F.2d at 1196 (citing 2 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, at 1206; Green v. Laird, 357 F.Supp. 227 (N.D.Ill.1973)). In other words, the rationale of Griffith was that in a Bivens case, personal service should be made upon the individual defendant in accordance with Rule 4(e) instead of upon that individual as a government officer in accordance with Rule 4(i)(2), which incorporates by reference the requirement of service upon the United States in accordance with Rule 4(i)(1). 4 23 Applying that rationale in the context of this appeal, which squarely presents the issue whether service pursuant to Rule 4(i)(2), and thus Rule 4(i)(1), is required in a Bivens action, we hold that such service is not required, and that only personal service pursuant to Rule 4(e) or a waiver of that service pursuant to Rule 4(d), see supra note 3, must be accomplished. This determination is supported by: (1) the structure of Bivens actions as individual capacity suits to which the United States is not a party; (2) the rulings in Parsons v. Aguirre, 123 F.R.D. 293, 294-97 (N.D.Ill.1988) (questioning Lawrence ), Pavlov v. Parsons, 574 F.Supp. 393, 399 (S.D.Tex.1983), Betlyon v. Shy, 573 F.Supp. 1402, 1405-06 (D.Del.1983) (questioning Lawrence ), and United Brick & Clay Workers v. Robinson Clay Prod. Co., 64 F.Supp. 872, 874 (N.D.Ohio 1946); 5 and (3) the views of leading commentators. See 4A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1107, at 163 & n. 29 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp.1994) (If federal officers ... are parties only in their individual capacities, and plaintiff is not attacking the validity of an official order, then the usual procedures for service on individuals set out elsewhere in Rule 4 apply, and neither Rule 4[ (i)(1) ] nor Rule 4[ (i)(2) ] need be consulted.) (collecting cases); 2 James W. Moore, Jo D. Lucas, Howard P. Fink, & Charles A. Thompson, Moore's Federal Practice Sec. 4.29, at 4-240 to 4-241 (2d ed. 1994) (Rule 4[ (i)(2) ] applies only if the action is in substance one against a federal officer ... in his ... official capacity. If, on the other hand, the suit is in essence one against a federal official in his individual capacity, Rule 4[ (i)(2) ] does not govern and service should be made as in any action against an individual.). 24 Furthermore, the district court's dismissal of Armstrong's claim for failure to serve the named defendants and the United States was predicated upon Rule 4(m), which requires that an action be dismissed [i]f service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint [emphasis added] unless the party who failed to effect service can show good cause for the failure. See supra note 1. In suits against either federal officials in their official capacities or the United States pursuant to the FTCA, the United States is the real defendant and Rule 4(i)(1) and (2) applies. Accordingly, failure to serve the United States as required by Rule 4(i)(1) and (2) would warrant dismissal pursuant to 4(m) for failure to serve a defendant. Concluding that Rule 4(i)(1) and (2) governs service of process in Bivens actions, on the other hand, would lead to the anomalous result that service on the United States would be required, but the failure to serve the United States would not come within the plain language of Rule 4(m) because the United States is not a defendant in a Bivens action. 25 Because we conclude that Rule 4(i)(1) and (2) does not apply to this Bivens action against the DEA Agents in their individual capacities, Armstrong's failure to serve the United States is without consequence. We now proceed to examine whether Armstrong's failure to serve the DEA Agents warranted dismissal. 26