Opinion ID: 1611371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: the improper argument

Text: In the district attorney's rebuttal closing argument during the sentencing phase, he stated, You know, as bad as I hate to say it, what about prisoner's rights? What about those people in Parchman who are in there for drugs? Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial and for an instruction to the jury to disregard the remark. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard but overruled the motion for a mistrial. Woodward's reliance on Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.1983), is misplaced because Hance has been largely overruled. Davis v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir.1987); Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1398-99 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 3325, 92 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986). In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the future dangerousness of a defendant is a proper consideration in imposing death. See Tucker, 762 F.2d at 1507; Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F.2d 672, 679 (11th Cir.1985). In the above quoted excerpt, the prosecutor dramatically illustrated this future dangerousness. In Brooks, the prosecutor brought this very matter home to the jury by asking, Who's daughter will be killed next? We found such an argument to be constitutional, concluding that: A legitimate future dangerousness argument is not rendered improper merely because the prosecutor refers to possible victims. Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1412. The argument made in this case is no more emotion laden than the imagery created by the prosecutor in Brooks. Davis, 829 F.2d at 1528-29. Included in the prosecutor's argument in Brooks was the suggestion that the defendant may kill a guard or fellow prisoner. 762 F.2d at 1411 & n. 46. See also, Evans v. Thigpen, 809 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir.1987). The prosecutor's arguments were directly relevant to the consideration of whether Brooks would remain a threat to society. 762 F.2d at 1411. On the same day Brooks was decided, the eleventh circuit also specifically held in another case that an argument about the safety of prisoners and guards if the defendant were to receive a life sentence was an appropriate means of pointing out the possibility of the defendant's future dangerousness and did not call for a speculative inquiry into prison conditions. Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1480, 1486 (11th Cir.1985), vacated, 474 U.S. 1001, 106 S.Ct. 517, 88 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985), on remand, 802 F.2d 1293 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911, 107 S.Ct. 1359, 94 L.Ed.2d 529 (1987). In light of these recent decisions, we conclude that this final portion of the assignment is without merit. We further conclude that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors do not merit reversal of either guilt or sentence phase of this case.