Opinion ID: 2829984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Judicial Misconduct

Text: During his direct examination by the prosecutor, Tautai Seumanu proved an evasive and difficult witness. Although he previously, and tearfully, had informed police that defendant was the shooter, Tautai later pleaded guilty to the charged crimes, claimed to be the shooter himself and corroborated defendant‘s alibi defense in his testimony. When questioned on the stand, however, Tautai refused to provide any specific information about the Sons of Samoa, the street gang to which he and defendant belonged. Asked who was in the gang, he replied: ―I 5 Defendant similarly contends that reference to exhibit 46 during the prosecutor‘s penalty phase closing argument deleteriously affected the jury‘s penalty decision. We address that issue, post, in part II.B.5. 24 can‘t give no names‖ because ―they are not in the case.‖ The prosecutor then remarked: ―You are under oath to tell the truth. I know that doesn‘t mean much to you.‖ Defense counsel quickly interposed an objection to this gratuitous comment, arguing it was improperly argumentative. The trial court sustained the objection, saying: ―Ms. Backers, I know the temptation, but sustained.‖ (Italics added.) There was no further objection and the prosecutor‘s questioning of Tautai continued. Defendant now contends the trial court‘s fleeting comment (―I know the temptation‖) was judicial misconduct and demonstrated such profound and damaging judicial bias that we must reverse the judgment under both state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. For several reasons, we disagree. At the threshold, we conclude defendant‘s failure to object on this ground forfeited the claim for appeal. As a general rule, a specific and timely objection to judicial misconduct is required to preserve the claim for appellate review. (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 613, overruled on other grounds in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305.) Although defendant argues he may be excused from this general rule because an objection would have been futile, the circumstances in no way suggest an objection and request to have the jury admonished would have found an unsympathetic jurist. Were we to reach the claim despite its manifest forfeiture, we would find it meritless. A trial court should of course refrain from making comments before the jury that might suggest it has allied itself with the prosecution. (See People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 347.) For example, ―[a] trial court commits misconduct if it ‗persists in making discourteous and disparaging remarks to a defendant‘s counsel . . . and utters frequent comment from which the jury may plainly perceive that the testimony of the witnesses is not believed by the judge, and in other ways discredits the cause of the defense . . . .‘ ‖ (People v. Fudge 25 (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1107.) The trial court‘s comment defendant challenges does not contravene this rule. Not only was the comment solitary and fleeting, it was also ambiguous in that it may reasonably have been understood by the jury not as an expression of where the court‘s sympathies secretly lay, but as merely a polite reminder to the prosecutor, upon sustaining the defense objection, to maintain her composure in the face of a recalcitrant and combative witness. Finally, even if the issue were properly preserved and the remark construed as misconduct, the trial court‘s single, brief comment could not possibly have been prejudicial. ― ‗ ―[O]ur role . . . is not to determine whether the trial judge‘s conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the judge‘s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 914.) On this subject it is worth noting that the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 17.30, which instructs the jury to disregard any comment by the trial court that might suggest it disbelieved a particular witness.6 Under the circumstances, the trial court‘s single, fleeting and ambiguous interjection could not have prejudiced defendant in any way.