Opinion ID: 691962
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pretext for Retaliatory Discharge

Text: 31 Since General Physics articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for LaFond's discharge, LaFond's burden at trial under McDonnell Douglas would be to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason articulated was a pretext for retaliatory discharge. See, e.g., Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38. Pretext may be demonstrated either by the presentation of additional evidence showing that 'the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence,' or by reliance on the evidence comprising the prima facie case, without more.... Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1226. Thus, unless the employer has come forward with evidence of a dispositive non-retaliatory reason as to which there is no genuine issue and which no rational trier of fact could reject, the conflict between the plaintiff's evidence establishing a prima facie case and the employer's evidence of a [non-retaliatory] reason reflects a question of fact to be resolved by the factfinder after trial. Cronin, 46 F.3d at 203. 32 The district court found that the evidence did not support LaFond's argument that General Physics' stated reason for his discharge was a pretext concealing a retaliatory motive. The court noted that it was [v]ery likely, [LaFond's] threat to disclose his information to valued clients, without more, would have prompted the same reaction by [General Physics], both in conducting an investigation and in terminating [LaFond]. LaFond, No. 2:92CV571, slip op. at 15. It also noted that LaFond's addition of public bodies to the list of those he would inform, while triggering the Act's protection, in all likelihood did nothing to alter Thames' response to the threat that was ultimately made by [LaFond]. Id. The court credited testimony by Thames in which he stated that he would have conducted the same investigation upon being made aware of the allegations even if LaFond had not threatened to take the complaint to the government. The court concluded that LaFond provided no evidence supporting the conclusion that the true reason for his termination was his act of mailing his letter to public bodies. Rather[,] the evidence support[ed] the conclusion that had [LaFond] not taken that one step the remaining facts would be unchanged. Id. 33 As stated earlier, the role of the trial court at the summary judgment stage is limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224; Donahue, 834 F.2d at 58. In determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223; Donahue, 834 F.2d at 57. Herein, the district court resolved disputed issues of fact and drew inferences in favor of the movant, rather than limiting its analysis to determining whether there were any genuine issues of material fact to be tried. 34 It is undisputed on the present record that LaFond personally believed his charges against Urso to be true. Although General Physics' investigation resulted in what it perceived as no direct evidence in support of LaFond's claims, General Physics' own witnesses have stated their belief that LaFond personally believed the charges. Indeed, the record supports, at least inferentially, that some of the allegations actually may have been true, at least to some degree. With regard to the claim involving the security violation, Galloway, Chown and Stone indicated that they had recollections regarding a secret document and a fax relating to it, albeit there was some question as to whether Urso was the person involved. Edmond indicated that LaFond had related to her his allegations regarding Urso's sneaking into people's desks, for whatever materiality that may have regarding that claim. Thames even admitted that he found kernels of truth woven throughout LaFond's claims. Furthermore, General Physics initiated the investigation upon an assumption that copies of the letter had already been mailed. Thus, any continuing fear of threat of extortion was no longer present. 35 If all permissible inferences are drawn in favor of LaFond, a rational jury could conclude, based on these facts, that LaFond actually suspected that there had been violations of federal law; that General Physics conducted its investigation in anticipation that a government inquiry would result based upon LaFond's report of his claims; and that General Physics discharged LaFond because he reported the violations to public bodies, not because he mailed an extortionate letter containing unsubstantiated claims. It may be that after a trial, a jury will find that General Physics did not discharge LaFond in retaliation for his reporting of the suspected violations to the NUSC and CDOL. The question of which inference to draw, however, is a matter exclusively within the province of the jury. Ramseur, 865 F.2d at 467. 36 We conclude that LaFond presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether General Physics' stated reason for discharging him was a pretext concealing a retaliatory motive. Accordingly, we hold that summary judgment in favor of General Physics was improper.