Opinion ID: 405150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Factors Guiding the Exercise of Discretion

Text: 19 As the Supreme Court emphasized in Gibbs, even if the District Court had the power to determine the pendent claim, That power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. Gibbs articulates the basic principles underlying the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction-principles which require the District Court to weigh and balance several factors. The justification of pendent jurisdiction, the Court wrote, 20 lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to them   . Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.    Id. 6 21 In dictum in the Gibbs opinion the Court seemed to establish a firm rule for exercise of the District Court's discretion: (I)f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well. Id. Frequently this outcome will be consistent with the general principles cited above. If the federal claims have been resolved at an early stage in the litigation, leaving state claims to the state courts will not necessarily require a wasteful duplication of effort, and a state court will provide a more accurate, authoritative determination of the applicable law. See Wham-O-Mfg. Co. v. Paradise Manufacturing Co., 327 F.2d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 1964) (cited in Gibbs ); Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 Colum.L.Rev. 1018, 1025-1026, 1044 (1962) (also cited in Gibbs ). 7 22 Nevertheless, as a number of federal courts have recognized, ironclad adherence to the Gibbs dictum would occasionally disserve the basic policies of pendent jurisdiction. If extensive pretrial proceedings have already occurred before dismissal of the federal claims, considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness may support retention of pendent jurisdiction by the federal court rather than dismissal of state claims, which would require the parties to bring a new civil action in state court. Relying on the Supreme Court's emphasis on judicial economy and convenience in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970), a post-Gibbs case involving a pendent federal statutory claim, 8 a number of Court of Appeals decisions have upheld the exercise of pendent jurisdiction by District Courts after dismissal of federal claims. 9 The Supreme Court has not directly modified the Gibbs dictum, but it has not rejected the more flexible approach taken by the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006, 98 S.Ct. 1876, 56 L.Ed.2d 388 (1978); State of Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 1327, 51 L.Ed.2d 593 (1977); see 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3567 at 451-453 (1975). 10 23