Opinion ID: 267171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Confer at Reasonable Times and Intervals.

Text: 11 In this court the Board argues that the long delays between bargaining sessions and cancellation of scheduled meetings were due to the employer's dilatory tactics. The Examiner and the Board both rejected the employer's defense that delay in arranging bargaining sessions was brought about by its difficulties in retaining a bargaining representative, and further difficulties in thereafter securing his services as often as required. 12 Southland acknowledges that it was dilatory. It makes the novel contention, however, that the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement is the union's function and not the company's business. The company's brief declares: 13 'The Board appears to overlook one obvious fact in cases of this nature: The Companies involved are not in business to negotiate Union contracts as is the Union. The demands on Respondent's time to operate its business were very great. Business was down. Profits were low. It could not therefore spend full time securing the services of a labor consultant. It had to do this when time was available from the business. It would not help the employees or the Union if Respondent stopped running the business merely to negotiate, for soon there would be no jobs or dues. The Trial Examiner (supported by the Board) is punishing Respondent because its labor consultant was busy and not at home or in his office when the Union called.' 14 In short, Southland claims that its failure to obtain the services of a negotiator readily available to confer with the union at reasonable times and intervals was excusable because of its preoccupation with normal business operations. Southland would have us rule that its conduct was therefore not an unfair labor practice. 15 We cannot accept this argument. The record shows that the union's repeated attempts to bargain were thwarted by the employer. On September 25, 1962, Damon Radford, the union's business representative, sent to H. Rives King, Southland's president, a copy of a proposed contract along with a letter expressing the union's willingness to meet on short notice and to negotiate 'so that we may consummate an agreement at the earliest possible time.' After acknowledging this letter on October 2 and after further exchange of correspondence, King sent a letter to the union on October 22, stating that because the company was operating below capacity, its 'entire efforts should be devoted in attempting to alleviate our present position.' For that reason, the company said, it could not agree to meet before Monday, November 26. Radford replied that: 16 'the essence of good faith collective bargaining is promptness in meeting for negotiations. Employees represented by us will not continue to work while our certification is caused to expire by delaying tactics. Respectfully request meeting on November 5.' 17 King demurred, and the union, in the interest of 'good will and co-operation,' agreed to the November 26 date. 18 The first meeting was held on November 26. At the end of the second meeting, on December 12, Murphy asked that a date be set for another session. George Gardner, the company's attorney, indicated that because of his involvement in other matters he could not set a date at that time. 19 Thereafter, the union's attempts to arrange another meeting proved unsuccessful until after it had filed unfair labor practice charges on April 8, 1963. Six meetings were then held after the filing of unfair labor practice charges by the union, but then on July 19, 1963, the company altered its position: King, its vice president, informed Radford, the union representative, that 'a meeting with you (the union) would serve no useful purpose until the charges filed with the National Labor Relations Board have been resolved.' 20 There is thus ample support for the finding that the company failed to exercise that degree of diligence required to comply with its statutory duty to bargain in good faith. See Solo Cup Company v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 447, 448 (4th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. M. & M. Bakeries, Inc,. 271 F.2d 602, 603 (1st Cir. 1959). Furthermore, Southland's defense fails to recognize that the Act imposes an affirmative duty of good faith bargaining on both the employer, 8(a)(5), and the union, 8(b)(3). 21 There is no merit in Southland's facile assertion that the 'entire allegation of refusal to bargain stems from one simple fact: the Union did not get what it wanted from the Company.' 22