Opinion ID: 7097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: debra rico

Text: 58 Debra assigns only one point of error on appeal; namely, that her Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel was violated as a result of an alleged conflict of interest of her trial counsel, Ralph Martinez. Under the Sixth Amendment, where there exists a constitutional right to counsel, there exists a correlative right to representation that is free from any conflict of interest. 42 As with many other rights, though, the right to a conflict-free counsel is not absolute. It can be waived if (1) the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, 43 and (2) the conflict is not so severe as to undermine the integrity of the judicial system. 44 We consider first whether there was an actual conflict of interest; if so, whether Debra did in fact freely and validly waive her right to a representation by a conflict-free attorney; and if that too is so, whether the conflict is nevertheless so severe as to be unwaivable as a matter of law.
59 Joint representation does not necessarily create a conflict of interest. 45 To establish a [S]ixth [A]mendment violation, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must show that an actual conflict of interest affected [her] attorney's performance. 46 Debra claims for the first time on appeal that an actual conflict existed in this case because--by representing both her and her husband--Attorney Martinez could not advance for her the defenses of duress or battered spouse without jeopardizing his defense of her husband, Manuel, in both the instant case and in another prosecution then pending in state court, in which Manuel was charged with sexually abusing Debra's daughter (his step-daughter). 60 An actual conflict exists if 'counsel's introduction of probative evidence or plausible arguments that would significantly benefit one defendant would damage the defense of another defendant whom the same counsel is representing.'  47 Debra's claim of actual conflict rests solely on her assertion that she might have been exonerated if she had had conflict-free counsel who could have advanced the defenses of duress or battered spouse on her behalf. Obviously, that assertion amounts to little more than rank speculation, for the record reflects only that her daughters, but not she, were possibly victims of abuse by Manuel. The record does contain some evidence suggesting that Manuel may have mistreated Debra's daughters, but the only indications that Debra herself might also have been a victim are statements by her daughters--which Debra emphatically refuted. Even if Debra had been abused by Manuel, the record makes clear that she remained steadfastly unwilling to assert that claim: She has consistently defended Manuel against allegations that he abused her children and has flatly denied that he ever harmed her. 61 Our decision in United States v. Lyons, 48 governs Debra's Sixth Amendment argument. In that case, one attorney represented both husband and wife at trial. On appeal, the wife argued, as Debra does here, that the joint representation violated, inter alia, her constitutional right to a conflict-free counsel. She urged that she might have exonerated herself by claiming that she was the innocent dupe of [her husband]. 49 We noted in Lyons that the record was devoid of evidence of such circumstances and that the wife's allegation amounts to little more than speculation ... [and] does not constituted the actual conflict of interest required ... to obtain relief. 50 Similarly, the instant record is devoid of evidence that Debra was abused by Manuel. Her argument that she might have been exonerated on either defense--duress or battered spouse--is pure conjecture, akin to the speculative argument proffered by Mrs. Lyons, which we held insufficient to constitute the type of actual conflict that merits relief. 51
62 But even if we assume arguendo that Martinez' joint representation of Debra and Manuel did create an actual conflict of interest, the record establishes that Debra validly waived her right to a conflict-free counsel. At Debra's initial appearance, the magistrate judge repeatedly advised her of her constitutional right to separate counsel and warned her of the potential pitfalls of continuing with joint representation. Her counsel, Martinez, had just alerted the court that he intended to represent both spouses and advised the court that we may want to do a Garcia waiver or a conflict of interest waiver. The magistrate judge agreed and then cautioned Debra, in accordance with Garcia, regarding the possible hazards of joint representation: 63 [Y]ou [Debra] have the right to a lawyer who is loyal only to you, and there may be some potential conflict between a defense that is in your husband's best interest and a defense that is in your best interest. And this often happens between co-defendants, that evidence that would tend to exculpate one of them tends to incriminate the other. 64 You need to be aware of the possible conflict of interest by being represented by the same lawyer as your husband, and if you do decide to go forward with this attorney representing both you and your husband, then at least, I would say--well, you'll have to sign the waiver form before the detention hearing.... [Y]ou'll have a chance to read over the forms, discuss them with your attorney, and then, ... we'll have a formal waiver signature at our next hearing.... 65 That hearing substantially complied with the mandates of United States v. Garcia 52 and Rule 44(c) 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 54 66 Again, at Debra's next judicial proceeding, her arraignment and detention hearing, the court reminded her of the conflict issue. This time the court obtained from her a signed document, entitled Joint Representation By Counsel--Waiver of Conflict of Interest, in which she expressly and in writing waived her right to a conflict-free counsel. 67 After receiving all of those admonitions, both orally and in writing, Debra chose to waive her right. We are satisfied too that she did so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily when ultimately she signed the waiver document. In that instrument, she expressly acknowledged that, inter alia, she had been advised of her right to effective representation, understood the details and potential perils of her attorney's possible conflict of interest, had discussed the matter with her attorney and understood that she could discuss it with outside counsel, and that she knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to conflict-free effective assistance of counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment. 68 In the face of all that, Debra now complains unabashedly that the court committed reversible error because it failed to engage her in a colloquy adequate to satisfy Garcia, wherein we recommended that the court should ... endeavor to have each defendant personally articulate in detail his intent to forego [the] significant constitutional protection of a conflict-free counsel. 55 Although in that case we did recommend that trial courts elicit such an exchange, the touchstone of a valid waiver is, as it always has been, that it be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and in clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous language. 56 Debra's waiver well satisfies all requirements notwithstanding the absence of such a colloquy. 69 But our determination that Debra validly waived her right to conflict-free counsel does not end our inquiry. For [i]f the conflict is so severe as to render a trial inherently unfair, then the integrity of the judicial system has been undermined, and the accused has been deprived of [her] right to effective assistance of counsel. 57 We determine whether the integrity of the judicial system has been undermined by reference to the current national standards of legal ethics, 58 although such standards are not controlling. 59 70 The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that an attorney may not represent a client whose interests are adverse to those of another client ... unless the attorney reasonably believes that the new client's representation will not be affected, and the client consents after having the conflict explained to [her]. 60 Debra was fully apprised of the dangers inherent in the joint representation; she consented to the representation after the conflict was explained to her by both the court and her counsel; and Martinez expressed his reasonable belief that his dual representation would not affect his ability to represent Debra's interests. As neither the defense of duress nor the defense of battered spouse was raised at trial--and, based on the record, it is far from certain whether facts exist that would even plausibly support the raising of either defense--we cannot say that Martinez was unreasonable in believing that his dual representation would not affect his ability to represent Debra. And, as the Supreme Court has noted, the  ' attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial. '  61 71 Current professional standards do not require a defense counsel to assert every potential defense, regardless how farfetched or implausible. To the contrary, attorneys are routinely cautioned against advancing frivolous positions. 62 And frequently even the most astute advocates elect to forego plausible arguments for tactical reasons or at the client's request. The record before us indicates that there are precious few facts on which a defense counsel could credibly construct an argument that Debra became involved in this multi-kilogram narcotics operation and continued her involvement for a protracted period because she was under duress or was a battered spouse, especially considering that Debra herself was apparently adamant in her refusal to allow either defense to be raised. As such, we cannot say either that the joint representation in this case created an actual conflict or that, if it did, the conflict was sufficient to impugn the judicial system or render Debra's trial inherently unfair, thereby making her right to conflict-free counsel unwaivable. To the contrary, it was waivable; she did waive it; and she did so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. III