Opinion ID: 351700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Title VII Recovery Period

Text: 115 On its finding that in particular respects NWA had violated Title VII, the District Court awarded affected employees backpay 280 to remedy the pay discrimination wrought thereby, 281 but limited the recovery period to two years from the date on which charges were filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 282 The court explained: 116 The Court has discretion to award back-pay to July 2, 1965, 283 but has chosen to limit that award herein. The 1972 amendment to Title VII 284 . . . limiting backpay liability to not more than two years prior to filing of charges with the (Commission) 285 is not applicable to this case. Nevertheless, it does indicate that Congress felt some limitation is appropriate to avoid windfall damage awards and to avoid harsh, and sometimes unbearable, economic burdens upon employers. The amendment also indicates that two years is an appropriate and reasonable period for measuring the adequacy of the remedy for the plaintiff. In light of these considerations, the court has, in the exercise of its discretion, limited the recovery period. 286 117 Both sides claim error. Two issues must therefore be joined: what statute of limitations applies to pre-1972 Title VII cases, and whether within that limitation the trial judge had discretion further to restrict an award of backpay. 118 Preliminarily, we note that the District Court was correct in holding that the 1972 amendment inaugurating the two-year limitation on backpay liability does not apply to this case. In the amending legislation, Congress made significant changes in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's procedures and expressly provided that the amendments made by this Act to the enforcement provision of Title VII upon which the District Court's judgment rested shall be applicable with respect to charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act and all charges filed thereafter. 287 The irresistible inference from this language is that the amendments were not to extend to litigation which on their effective date had proceeded beyond the Commission stage. Here, on that date, the charges by Title VII claimants were no longer before the Commission, and the case was well underway in the courts, 288 and thus was not affected by the new two-year provision. 289 119 Even so, both sides have argued from the 1972 amendments in favor of their respective positions on the proper limitation period for pre-1972 cases. 290 Quite apart from the canon that the meaning of legislation cannot be altered by remarks subsequent to its passage, 291 we must construe Title VII on the assumption that Congress did not intend in 1964 to limit liability by later amendment. Thus the employee-parties' contention that backpay may be awarded back to the effective date of the Act 292 seems superficially plausible now that the amendments have limited liability measured in that manner to seven years. 293 Absent the amendments, however, such a novel interpretation would have subjected NWA to a potentially unlimited backpay liability. This is not to suggest that Congress considered and put aside such a construction; rather, the fact that such matters would require thought leads us ultimately to reject it. 294 120 Seen in this light, the problem at this point is simply that of fashioning a federal common law period of limitations. 295 Most often this is effected by adopting the period prescribed by the most analogous state statute. 296 Because of its convenience, and of the notice it presumably affords prospective litigants, 297 adoption of the state limitation period is proscribed only when it would create important conflicts with the federal policy underlying the cause of action, 298 or when it would amount to discriminatory restriction of a federal right of action. 299 Neither of those conditions exists here. While adoption of relatively short 300 state periods will prevent the fullest possible realization of the compensatory aims of Title VII, such is the inevitable result of any time bar to recovery. Neither the Supreme Court 301 nor this circuit 302 has regarded actions based on civil rights statutes as of such a special nature that recourse to state limitation periods is impermissible, and indeed, as the Supreme Court noted recently, 303 such a result may be required by federal statute. 304 Nothing about Title VII serves to distinguish it from those statutes; indeed, other circuits have invoked state rules to govern Title VII litigation. 305 On remand, the District Court must determine the local statute of limitations most appropriate to this case, 306 and its provisions will serve as the outermost limit on awards of Title VII backpay. 121 The question, then, is whether the trial judge has discretion to shorten, within the statutory limits, the recovery period and, if so, whether it was properly exercised in this case. Unquestionably, the judge has discretion as to whether to award backpay, but that discretion is limited to exercises faithful to the goals of Title VII. Recently in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 307 the Supreme Court, called upon to clarify this discretionary power, noted that the District Court's decision must therefore be measured against the purposes which inform Title VII. 308 After observing that Congress patterned the backpay provision after a comparable provision in the National Labor Relations Act, and that Congress presumably was aware that backpay thereunder had been administratively awarded as a matter of course, 309 the Court held that backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination. 310 The presumption in favor of backpay is thus clear, and any denial must be well supported. 311 122 While no court seems to have explicitly addressed the question whether there is power to limit as well as deny backpay, we believe the power exists. Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion in Albemarle, assumed its existence; while expressing doubt that prejudice from a delayed request for backpay could be proved, he observed that even if it were shown that an earlier backpay claim would have inspired an exercise (of) unusual zeal in litigating the case, that would justify only a reduction in the award of backpay to reflect the earlier date at which the court would have awarded it. 312 Such power would also appear to be inherent in the broad latitude given district courts in fashioning relief. 313 As Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurring opinion in Albemarle, 123 (i)f the award of backpay is indeed governed by equitable considerations, and not simply a thinly disguised form of damages, factors such as (reasonableness of delay and prejudice resulting), which may argue in favor of or against the equities of either plaintiff or defendants, must be open for consideration by the District Court. . . . 314 124 (T)he backpay remedy provided by Title VII is modeled on the remedial provisions of the NLRA. This Court spoke to the breadth of the latter provision in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271 (1941), when it said: (W)e must avoid the rigidities of an either-or rule. The remedy of backpay, it must be remembered, is entrusted to the Board's discretion; it is not mechanistically compelled by the Act. And in applying its authority over backpay orders, the Board has not used stereotyped formulas but has availed itself of the freedom given it by Congress under the Act to obtain just results in diverse, complicated situations. 315 125 Nevertheless, the power to limit backpay is subject to restraints. As a partial denial of backpay, authority to limit must be as narrowly constrained as authority to totally deny; its exercise, therefore, must be supported by reasons faithful to the dual purpose attributed to the backpay remedy by the Albemarle Court. Firstly, a reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award 'provide(s) the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history.'  316 Secondly, backpay make(s) persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination. 317 126 By these standards, we deem the reasons given by the District Court inadequate. The fact that Congress decided to limit the recovery period for future backpay actions is not a sound basis for limiting the period in this action, for Congress deliberately chose not to apply the limitation to cases already in the courts. 318 Moreover, this generalized reason does not reflect consideration of the particular circumstances of the case. And while the court's second statement that the two-year period appropriately measures the backpay recovery here may indicate a focus on the equities of this case, it is not sufficiently detailed to permit competent review. 319 We are mindful of Albemarle's admonition that 127 the courts of appeals must maintain a consistent and principled application of the backpay provision, consonant with the twin statutory objectives, while at the same time recognizing that the trial court will often have the keener appreciation of those facts and circumstances peculiar to particular cases. 320 128 Accordingly, we remand to allow the District Court to reconsider, in light of Albemarle and this opinion, the need to limit the backpay remedy here. 321 D. The Title VII Class 129 NWA next contends that the District Court erred in granting relief pursuant to Title VII in the form of backpay to stewardesses whose employment with the company terminated more than ninety days prior to the first filing by an employee of an unlawful-employment-practice charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The relevant provision of Title VII 322 specifies, as a precondition to a later action in court, that (a) charge . . . shall be filed (with the Commission) within ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 323 It now appears settled that not all members of an employee class need file charges with the Commission in order to share in a recovery of backpay; 324 the purposes of the filing requirement to give notice to the charged party and enable the Commission to conciliate are adequately served by a timely filing by any member of the class. 325 130 That filing, it seems clear, however, cannot revive claims which are no longer viable at the time of the filing. 326 Any other result would produce an anomaly. Time-barred members could not press their claims individually either before the Commission or judicial tribunals; and surely the employer's liability to them cannot be made to depend upon whether they come into court in a different character. True it is that class actions are liberally permitted in the federal courts, 327 but that procedural device cannot be used to expand substantive rights. 328 Not surprisingly, then, courts which have considered the question directly have uniformly held that only those employees who could have filed charges with the Commission individually when the class filing was made are properly members of the litigating class. 329 131 It is contended, however, in support of the District Court's inclusion of the disputed class members within its Title VII award, that the Title VII violations complained of were of a continuing nature and thus that all past and present stewardesses could have made timely filings with the Commission when the filing for the class occurred. The District Court concluded that each of the violations was indeed continuing and that none was barred by the ninety-day provision. 330 We agree that where, as here, discrimination is not limited to isolated incidents but pervades a series or pattern of events which continue to within ninety days of the filing of the charge with the Commission, the filing is timely as to all similarly situated employees regardless of when the first discriminatory incident occurred. 331 132 NWA does not dispute that the violations here are of a continuing kind. But NWA does contend that the discrimination could not be deemed continuing as to those who left the company's employ more than ninety days prior to the class filing with the Commission. We are in agreement with NWA on that score. A severing of the employment relationship ordinarily terminates a discrimination against the severed employee, and activates the time period for filing charges with the Commission concerning any violation which occurred at separation or which may have been continuing up to the date thereof. 332 To hold otherwise would effectively read the timely-filing requirement out of the statute. 333 133 It is said, however, that NWA is estopped from asserting that employees terminated more than ninety days before the class filing should be excluded from the class recovery because the company was not timely in raising the issue and its untimeliness has prejudiced some individuals within the class. During the course of the proceeding, the District Court ordered class notices to be mailed to all stewardesses who were then or who had been employed by NWA at any time since the effective date of Title VII. 334 The notices informed these employees that they could file consents with the clerk of the court, in which case they would become members of the classes for Equal Pay Act and Title VII relief. 335 The notices also advised that in the event that no consent was filed, the recipient would be entitled to share in any money award which the court grants under the Civil Rights Act. 336 The employees alleged to have been prejudiced by NWA's omission to raise the issue, at the time the class was certified and the notices were mailed, are those who, if they had filed consents with the court, could have recovered under the Equal Pay Act but who did not so file. 337 Had these employees been informed that they could not recover under Title VII and that therefore their failure to file consents would preclude them from any recovery whatever, so the argument runs, they might have filed consents in order to obtain at least partial recovery of backpay pursuant to the Equal Pay Act. 134 If compliance with the ninety-day charge-filing requirement is jurisdictional, there can be no estoppel. Parties cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction by their conduct or confer it on the court by consent, 338 and the absence of such jurisdiction can be raised at any time. 339 On the other hand, if timely filing with the Commission is not a jurisdictional step but is to be analogized to a statute of limitations, then an estoppel might possibly arise. 340 135 The courts have not been uniform in their concept of the ninety-day period. Although the Supreme Court and this court like most others have referred to the timely-filing requirement as a jurisdictional prerequisite, 341 neither has ever had occasion to focus on the question whether courts are precluded from invoking traditional equitable doctrines to modify the requirement. When the issue has been considered, most courts have concluded that equitable principles can be used to extend the time period in deserving cases. 342 Thus several circuits have held that since private settlement of claims is a major goal of Title VII and the pursuit of contractual grievance procedures furthers that goal, the time provision is tolled while an employee pursues his contractual grievance remedies. 343 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has stated that the time limitation must sometimes be modified to further the broad remedial purposes of Title VII. It held that the ninety-day period did not start until the facts supporting the charge of discrimination would or should have been known to an employee with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff. 344 136 We need not indicate a view on specific equitable modifications which the courts have seen fit to make. But we are in accord with the principle that the time provisions of Title VII are subject to equitable modification. Nothing in the legislative history compels us to treat those provisions as jurisdictional; on the contrary, the legislative history, although very limited on the time provisions, suggests that Congress intended them to operate similarly to statutes of limitations. 345 Therefore, to modify these time provisions to serve the dictates of sound equitable considerations would not seem to be inconsistent with congressional intent. 137 Equally importantly, where congressional purpose is unclear, courts have traditionally resolved ambiguities in remedial statutes in favor of those whom the legislation was designed to protect. 346 As the Supreme Court has declared, procedural technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process. 347 Indeed, only recently, in Coles v. Penny, 348 we ourselves observed that provisions in Title VII requires an interpretation animated by the broad humanitarian and remedial purposes underlying the federal proscription of employment discrimination. 349 While we declined in Coles to determine whether Title VII's time provisions are jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional, we cited with approval cases which have permitted equitable modifications of those provisions. 350 We hold that Title VII's ninety-day provision for the filing of charges with the Commission is not a jurisdictional absolute. 351 138 We now return to the question whether NWA is estopped from raising the defense of untimeliness of the filing of charges in this case. NWA conceded in the District Court that through inadvertence it had omitted to defensively plead the ninety-day provision as a statute of limitations. 352 Even now, NWA does not claim that it posed any objection on account of that provision prior to trial. 353 By the time NWA raised the issue of untimeliness, notice had already gone out to class members informing them that they need not do anything to join in any recovery which the court might order under Title VII. It is evident that some members may have been lulled into inaction on their Equal Pay Act rights in the understanding that they would share in any Title VII recovery. It would be inconsistent with the board remedial purposes of Title VII to foreclose them from recovery thereunder. We conclude, then, that while the District Court on remand must exclude from the Title VII recovery those employees whose connection with NWA was dissolved more than ninety days before the class filing with the Commission, the court must retain in the class for the Title VII recovery those employees who would have brought themselves within the Equal Pay Act class by filing consents. E. Longevity 139 The last remedy-issue raised by NWA is that the District Court erred in equating longevity with seniority for pay purposes. The court's judgment provides for (a) salaries, as prescribed in the purser pay-scale, for all female cabin attendants, (t)he longevity of each . . . for purposes of applying the purser pay scale (to) be her system seniority, 354 and (b) backpay for both the Equal Pay Act and the Title VII plaintiffs, calculated at the difference between the Equal Pay Act and the Title VII plaintiffs, calculated at the difference between the salary actually paid to her . . . and the salary . . . which would have been paid to her had she been compensated as a purser with longevity for pay purposes equal to her system seniority. 355 NWA insists that longevity and seniority are computed differently longevity as representing the days of actual service and seniority as merely reflecting the hiring date and that longevity rather than seniority fixes the appropriate step on the salary schedule. NWA's contention is not disputed. It is argued, however, that NWA should have raised the point before the judgment was entered, and not by a post-judgment motion, and that there is no evidence in the record to either support or refute NWA's position. But we must remand this case anyway, and we discern no reason why the District Court should not then afford NWA an opportunity to prove its point. Since no one was prejudiced by NWA's somewhat delayed objection, reconsideration of the matter would better serve the ends of justice. And since a quick look at the collective bargaining agreement should answer the question, no additional delay should be entailed. The remedial order in this case is to make employees whole, but not more than whole.