Opinion ID: 2600346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion when Sentencing the Defendant?

Text: We review the length of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard, State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002), and when doing so we consider the defendant's entire sentence, State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007). [1] We presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999). That is because whether or not a defendant serves longer than the fixed portion of the sentence is a matter left to the sole discretion of the parole board, and [c]ourts cannot intrude on this discretion when fashioning a sentence nor when reviewing a sentence, State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). When conducting our review, we independently review the record on appeal, having due regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest, State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002). We review the record for the information that was known to the sentencing court at the time the sentence was imposed. A sentence is reasonable if at the time of imposition it appears necessary to achieve `the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to the given case.' State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 836, 11 P.3d 27, 32 (2000) (quoting from State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App. 1982)). To show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002). The district court sentenced Oliver to five years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with one year fixed and four years indeterminate. Oliver challenges the indeterminate portion of his sentence. He asserts that this Court should find that the four year indeterminate sentence imposed by the district court is excessive in light of mitigating circumstances present in his case. Under our standard of review, we assume that Oliver will be paroled after serving one year of incarceration. Once he is paroled, the commission for pardons and parole will specify in writing the conditions of his parole. I.C. § 20-228; IDAPA 50.01.01.250. Oliver apparently contends that it is unreasonable for him to be on parole supervision for four years after he is released from incarceration. In support of his argument that the indeterminate portion of his sentence is unreasonable, Oliver states: that at the time of sentencing he was fifty-eight years old; that when he was younger he had been drafted into the Army, served two years, and was honorably discharged; that he suffers from several physical impairments and mental illness; that this is his first felony; that his only other criminal convictions are two offenses of driving while under the influence in 2000; that he has a serious alcohol problem; and that he has been in treatment for alcoholism and is eligible for further treatment at the Veteran's Administration. These factors do not indicate any abuse of discretion by the district court. In fact, they show the proper exercise of discretion. Oliver admittedly has a serious alcohol problem. He was first arrested for driving while under the influence on November 18, 2000. A breath test showed an alcohol concentration of .21/.20. His second arrest occurred on November 24, 2000, when the pickup he was driving slammed into a vehicle stopped at a traffic light. According to the medical personnel, Oliver was very intoxicated, but he refused to submit to a blood alcohol test. On June 20, 2001, he pled guilty to both charges and was sentenced. He did not stop consuming alcohol. His medical records from the Veterans Administration show that on July 12, 2004, Pt states he `went on a bender' yesterday. Was drinking wine primarily, took his `heart meds: captopril and metoprolol, double dose the night before' because he knew he would be drinking. The records show he was hospitalized for alcohol detoxification and a possible heart attack. The heart attack was ruled out, but he was treated for alcohol withdrawal. The record shows that Oliver is an alcoholic. This is his third conviction for driving while under the influence. Four months after he was arrested and charged in this case, he went on a bender and was hospitalized for alcohol detoxification. A four-year period of parole supervision after Oliver's release from incarceration is clearly reasonable not only for the protection of the public, but for his own protection. We affirm the district court's sentence.