Opinion ID: 375743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preemption and Implied Repeal

Text: 37 We deal next with the contention that appellants' convictions should be set aside because the general mail and wire fraud statutes under which the convictions were obtained were either preempted or impliedly repealed by the enactment of the more specific antifraud provisions of the Commodities Futures Trading Act. 12 38 Appellants' argument rests primarily on the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of Section 2(a)(1) of the CFTA: 39 Provided, That the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an option, privilege, indemnity, bid, offer, put, call, advance guaranty or decline guaranty), and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market designated pursuant to section 7 of this title or any other board of trade, exchange, or market, and transactions subject to regulation by the Commission pursuant to section 23 of this title(.) 40 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1978). 41 They also point to supporting language in the Conference Report on the 1974Amendments to the CFTA. See H.Conf.Rep.No.93-1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 5843. 42 Although we agree that Congress intended the CFTC to occupy the entire field of commodities futures regulation, we see two reasons why that conclusion is of little help to appellants. 43 Assuming, arguendo, that appellants' acts violated both 7 U.S.C. § 6o and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 or 1343, 13 we find no basis for a conclusion that the former either preempted or impliedly repealed the latter. It was the fraudulent scheme furthered by use of the mails and interstate telephone calls that brought appellants within the purview of the mail and wire fraud statutes and not the sale of commodity options. While courts have held that the CFTA preempts state regulation of commodities futures, Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. Mouer, 520 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.Civ.App.1975), it has also been held that the CFTA does not preempt state general antifraud statutes. People of New York v. Monex Int'l, Ltd., 86 Misc.2d 320, 380 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1976). By the same analysis, since 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 are federal general antifraud statutes, they cannot be preempted by the CFTA. 44 Moreover, in urging a finding of implied repeal, appellants march into the teeth of a strong judicial policy disfavoring the implied repeal of statutes. See United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 198, 60 S.Ct. 182, 188, 84 L.Ed. 181 (1939). For a court to find implied repeal, there must be a positive repugnancy between the two statutes. Posados v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 504, 56 S.Ct. 349, 352, 80 L.Ed. 351 (1936); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 341, 362-63, 10 L.Ed. 987 (1842). Where two statutes cover the same subject, effect will be given to both, if possible. Posados v. United States, supra. Partial repeals will not be implied because they do not satisfy the requirement that the intent of the legislative body be clear and unequivocal. Id. It is also generally held that for a later-enacted statute to impliedly repeal an earlier one, the later statute must cover the entire field occupied by the earlier one. United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88, 20 L.Ed. 153 (1870); United States v. Montgomery, 21 F.Supp. 770, 771 (D.N.M.1938). The CFTA, which prohibits only interstate communications in commodities fraud, obviously does not cover the entire ground occupied by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, which apply to mail or interstate wire communications in furtherance of any scheme to defraud. There can be no finding of implied repeal in these circumstances. Cf. Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473, 484, 61 S.Ct. 669, 675, 85 L.Ed. 957 (1941) (the Securities Act does not operate as an implied repeal of the mail fraud statutes); Smith v. Groover, 468 F.Supp. 105 (N.D.Ill.1979) (CFTA does not impliedly repeal the federal antitrust laws); R. J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 466 F.Supp. 345 (N.D.Ill.1979) (congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC was not intended to eliminate existing private remedies). 45 Although the statutes prohibit similar conduct, they operate independently and harmoniously. The government's election to prosecute appellants under the statute which, at the time, provided the more severe penalty, 14 was an exercise of discretion that violated no rights of appellants. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979).