Opinion ID: 402177
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Tires, Batteries and Automotive Accessories Claims

Text: 15 In his first amended complaint, Hamro claimed that Shell conditioned the lease of the premises and the grant of the Shell trademark on the purchase of Shell tires, batteries and automotive accessories (TBA). Hamro has not raised the TBA tie-in on appeal. Hamro does claim, however, that Shell's refusal to approve the assignment of a second Shell franchise to Hamro on the ground that Hamro did not purchase sufficient TBA from Shell violates section 21140.2 1 of the California Business and Professions Code. 16 Hamro had negotiated the purchase of the equipment and goodwill of a service station operated by Carl Painter under a lease and dealer agreement with Shell. Both the lease and dealer agreement were assignable only with Shell's prior consent. Shell refused to consent to the assignment of the Painter lease and dealer agreement. Hamro alleged that Shell's consent was withheld because Hamro purchased insufficient amounts of TBA from Shell. 17 Even if we assume that Shell disapproved the assignment of a second Shell franchise to Hamro in order to coerce Hamro into purchasing larger quantities of TBA from Shell, Shell's actions as a matter of law did not violate Section 21140.2. Although the Supreme Court of California has not yet interpreted this provision, the California Court of Appeal has recognized that section 21140.2 can be the basis of an action for retaliatory eviction of a service station lessee when that eviction is motivated by the lessor-oil company's desire to punish the lessee for exercising the right to purchase tires, batteries and automotive accessories from any source. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Handley, 76 Cal.App.3d 956, 966, 143 Cal.Rptr. 321, 327-28 (1978). Nevertheless, in Witt v. Union Oil Co. of California, 99 Cal.App.3d 435, 160 Cal.Rptr. 285 (1979), the Court of Appeal held that refusal to renew a franchisee's lease in retaliation for purchases of TBA from sources other than the lessor did not constitute a retaliatory eviction and thus did not violate section 21140.2. Id. at 440, 160 Cal.Rptr. at 288. The court rested its decision on the fact that the lease had terminated automatically, and thus there was no eviction. Plaintiff had no continued expectancy in the lease that he could be deprived of by some wrongful act of Union Oil. Id. A fair reading of the case leads to the conclusion that retaliatory actions that deprive a franchisee of an opportunity that is not based on a legal expectancy do not violate section 21140.2. Hamro's existing lease and dealer agreement contained nothing to justify Hamro in believing that a second franchise would be granted to him. Therefore, Shell's refusal to approve the assignment of a second Shell franchise to Hamro did not violate section 21140.2. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Shell on the section 21140.2 claim. 18