Opinion ID: 2106213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Evidence To Support D.I.L.H.R. Finding.

Text: The company challenges D.I.L.H.R.'s factual findings. Claims under sec. 66.191, Stats., are properly reviewable under ch. 227, the administrative procedure statute. Sperbeck v. I.L.H.R. Dept., 46 Wis.2d 282, 290, 174 N.W.2d 546 (1970); Reinke v. Personnel Board, 53 Wis. 2d 123, 136, 191 N.W.2d 833 (1971). Under sec. 227.20 (6), Stats. 1975, an agency finding of fact will not be overturned unless the agency's finding . . . is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. This standard does not allow a reviewing court to weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses. Moreover, an agency determination reviewable under ch. 227 will not be overturned because it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Voight v. Washington Island Ferry Line, 79 Wis.2d 333, 342, 255 N.W.2d 545 (1977), citing Gateway City Transfer Co. v. Public Service Comm., 253 Wis. 397, 405, 34 N.W.2d 238 (1948). Before deciding whether the D.I.L.H.R. finding is supported by substantial evidence, it must first be determined what finding the company attacks and what D.I.L.H.R. actually found. The company states that, There is absolutely no evidence indicating the employment aggravated a pre-existing disease so as to cause death on October 22, 1973. The company also claims that there . . . is absolutely no evidence showing . . . that . . . the aggravation resulted in his [deceased's] death on April 22, 1973. The pertinent portion of the D.I.L.H.R. findings are as follows: . . . that the deceased's work for the respondent as a fire fighter and as a captain in respondent's fire department was sufficiently arduous and stressful enough to aggravate and accelerate beyond normal progress the arteriosclerotic heart disease from which the deceased suffered and which resulted in his death on October 22, 1973; that the deceased sustained an injury caused by an occupational disease arising out of employment by the respondent; that such injury, by aggravation and acceleration of the preexisting condition, caused the death of the deceased; . . . (Emphasis added.) The underlined portion, although somewhat confusing, might be interpreted to mean that the occupational aggravation of the heart condition caused death. But, the portion immediately before that clearly states that death resulted from arteriosclerotic heart disease and that the deceased's employment was an aggravating and accelerating factor. This latter finding is the only one that is necessary to support D.I.L.H.R.'s award in this case. If the work activity precipitates, aggravates and accelerates beyond normal progression, a progressively deteriorating or degenerative condition, it is an accident causing injury or disease and the employee should recover even if there is no definite `breakage.' Shawley v. Industrial Comm., supra; Currie, 37 Wis. Bar Bulletin F. Lewellyn v. I.L.H.R. Dept., 38 Wis.2d 43, 59, 155 N.W.2d 678 (1968). [2] The necessary D.I.L.H.R. finding in this case is that death was caused by heart disease and that the deceased's employment aggravated that disease. This finding is supported by the presumption of sec. 891.45, Stats., and by substantial evidence in the record. Sec. 891.45, Stats. 1975 [3] provides that, 891.45. Presumption of employment connected disease. In any proceeding involving the application by a municipal fire fighter or his or her beneficiary for disability or death benefits under s. 66.191 or any pension or retirement system applicable to fire fighters, where at the time of death or filing of application for disability benefits the deceased or disabled fire fighter had served a total of 5 years as a fire fighter and a qualifying medical examination given prior to the time of his or her joining the department showed no evidence of heart or respiratory impairment or disease, and where the disability or death is found to be caused by heart or respiratory impairment or disease, such finding shall be presumptive evidence that such impairment or disease was caused by such employment. The presumption of sec. 891.45, Stats., was interpreted in Sperbeck v. I.L.H.R. Dept., supra . We are of the opinion that there are two types of rebuttable presumptions. One type is invoked by the law for reasons of public policy without regard to whether the presumption thus invoked is likely to bear any reasonable relationship to the actual fact presumed. A typical example of this type is the presumption that a deceased person exercised due care for his own safety. Such a presumption disappears from the case as soon as any evidence is introduced which tends to establish negligence on the part of the deceased. Callahan v. Van Galder (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 654, 657, 89 N.W. (2d) 210 (1958); McCarty v. Weber (1953), 265 Wis. 70, 73, 60 N.W. (2d) 716. The other type of presumption is one in which the facts upon which it is based reasonably give rise to an inference of the ultimate conclusion embodied in the presumption. The presumption of undue influence, with which we are here concerned, is of this latter category. For reasons of policy the law has seen fit to clothe such an inference with the authority of a presumption in order to determine the result when no evidence to the contrary is introduced. However, there is no perceivable reason grounded on policy or logic why the inference should not continue after some evidence has come into the case which tends to rebut the presumption. Basing a finding of fact on an inference is nothing more than grounding such a finding on circumstantial evidence. Cf. Ryan v. Zweek-Wollenberg Co. (1954), 266 Wis. 630, 647, 64 N.W. (2d) 226. Professor McCormick recognizes the two classes of presumptions heretofore discussed. McCormick, Evidence (hornbook series), p. 639, sec. 308. Furthermore, in speaking of a presumption grounded upon a reasonable inference, he states that `. . . the inference remains though the presumption has disappeared.' Id., at page 650, sec. 311, Schlichting v. Schlichting (1961), 15 Wis.2d 147, 156, 157, 112 N.W.2d 149. Sperbeck at 46 Wis.2d 287. In Sperbeck this court concluded that the presumption of sec. 891.45, Stats., was a presumption based on probability that may remain as an inference even though there has been some evidence tending to rebut it. In Sperbeck there was testimony rebutting the statutory presumption. On cross-examination Dr. Belknap testified in substance as follows: There is considerable literature on the relationship of emotional stress to heart disease and there are great differences of opinion on this. Physicians agree that arteriosclerotic heart disease is a naturally progressive, degenerative disease but there is a wide difference of opinion as to cause. I know of no studies showing the effect of environment on the heart or arteriosclerotic disease, and the consensus of opinion is that environmental factors do not play a significant part. There are no studies excluding environment as a factor, however. Physicians speculate on a great many factors which might have effect on arteriosclerosis, but, I believe, that I can say beyond all reasonable doubt that the deceased's occupation had no effect on his arteriosclerotic heart disease. This is in the face of material, the majority of which excludes environment as a causative factor. Sperbeck at 46 Wis.2d 288, 289. This court determined that the above evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption. Evidence which only attacks the rationale of the statute, without exposing the cause of death of a particular claimant, does nothing more than question the wisdom of the legislature. As the trial court stated, `If the Legislature has acted unwisely upon the basis of the insufficient information, the remedy is to go back to the Legislature.' Sperbeck at 46 Wis.2d 289. In this case the deceased had severe coronary arteriosclerosis prior to October, 1973. Dr. Norbert Enzer, the company's expert, agreed with Dr. Stanley Irving, who performed the autopsy, that the cause of death was coronary thrombosis and arteriosclerotic heart disease. The exact etiology of arteriosclerosesais is unknown. Dr. Enzer testified that the deceased had advanced arteriosclerosis at death, but that in his opinion that condition was not caused, nor aggravated, nor accelerated by the deceased's job. In support of his opinion, Dr. Enzer noted the lack of any statistical evidence linking occupation and arteriosclerosis. On cross-examination Dr. Enzer stated that there were various causes of arteriosclerosis. He also conceded that some medical doctors believed that there was a relationship between arteriosclerosis and fire fighting, but that he did not agree with that opinion. However, while Dr. Enzer did not believe it probable that the deceased's heart condition was affected by his work, he could not rule it out as a possible cause. Dr. Max Lavine, the deceased's personal physician testified that the deceased suffered from high blood pressure which was aggravated by his work and that high blood pressure pre-disposed a person toward coronary artery disease. Dr. Lavine twice testified that the deceased's work aggravated and accelerated his previously existing heart condition. The experts in this case agreed that death was caused by arteriosclerosis and coronary thrombosis. Dr. Lavine's testimony was further substantial evidence supporting D.I.L.H.R.'s findings that death was caused by arteriosclerosis aggravated and accelerated by the deceased's fire fighting duties. [1] Moreover, Dr. Enzer's testimony did not overcome the presumption of sec. 891.45, Stats., that a fireman's heart disease is caused by his employment. [4] Dr. Enzer disputed that fire fighting caused heart disease, but this was . . . evidence which attacks the rationale of the statute, without exposing the cause of death of a particular claimant [and] does nothing more than question the wisdom of the legislature. Sperbeck at 46 Wis.2d 289. [5]