Opinion ID: 672074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the briefcase tape

Text: 20 Within the major issue of this case, the defendant raises several sub-issues. First, he argues that the district court should have suppressed the tape obtained as a result of a surveillance device placed in Spurrier's briefcase, because the government failed to comply with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a). The defendant next argues that the court should have suppressed the briefcase tape because it was inaudible. Finally, in a somewhat related vein, the defendant argues that the district court erred by providing the jury a transcript of the tape without deleting many inaudible or undecipherable portions therein. 21 Under Title III of the Omnibus Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510, electronic surveillance may only be conducted pursuant to court order and in a manner consistent with the requirements of Title III. See United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 110 S.Ct. 1845, 109 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990). When the government conducts electronic surveillance, such as the briefcase recording in this case, Sec. 2518(8)(a) requires that the contents of any ... communication intercepted by any means authorized by [Title III] shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a). Furthermore, these types of recordings shall be done in such a way as will protect the recording from doctoring or alterations. Id. Finally, in order to ensure the integrity of the recording, Sec. 2518(8)(a) also requires that immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extension thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such surveillance order and sealed under his direction. Id. Failure immediately to seal a recording pursuant to Sec. 2518(8)(a) can result in the exclusion of the evidence. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. at 260, 110 S.Ct. at 1848; 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a) (stating a compliance with sealing requirements or a satisfactory explanation for noncompliance shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any reported communication or evidence derived therefrom). 22 In an order dated January 7, 1992, the district court authorized electronic surveillance, which resulted in the briefcase tape. The district court's interception order provided that it would expire on the earliest of three dates: (1) the last date on which the government intercepted conversations with the briefcase recording device; (2) fifteen days measured from the first interception; or (3) twenty-five days from entry of the order. The order also stated that interception of oral communications must terminate upon the attainment of the authorized objectives, not to exceed fifteen days measured from the day on which the investigative law enforcement officers first began to conduct an interception of this order, or ten days after the order was entered, whichever was the earlier time. 23 The only communications intercepted by the briefcase recorder occurred on January 7, 1992. The defendant argues that the authorization accordingly expired on that same date. The defendant also argues that the government failed to have the briefcase tape judicially sealed until January 23, 1992, sixteen days after the only interception, and hence sixteen days after the expiration of the authorization. Thus he maintains that, as a result, the briefcase tape was not sealed immediately upon the expiration of the order, as required under the Act. 24 The government argues that if the period specified in the order expired on January 22, 1992, the tape was immediately sealed on January 23, 1992. If, however, we determine that the period of the order expired on January 7, 1992, the government concedes that the tape may not have been timely sealed under the Act. The government, nevertheless, argues that prejudicial error did not occur, in any event. 25 The government urges adoption of a rule that surveillance tapes need not be sealed until the authorization order expires--that is, the last day before an extension of the order would be required for further surveillance. The district court apparently held that because the interception order expired on January 22, 1992, fifteen days after the United States first began intercepting communications, the government timely sealed the January 7 tape on January 23, 1992. 26 We find no authority on this precise issue in this court. We must first determine whether the immediate sealing requirement under the Act and under these circumstances required the government to seal the tape on January 7, 1992, or immediately after the interception. 27 The government contends that it was not required to seal the tape recording until the fifteen day period in the interception authorization order had expired, despite the fact that the United States did not intercept other conversations during the ensuing fifteen day period. It urges this court to adopt a rule that surveillance tapes need not be sealed until the authorization order expires, that is, the last day before an extension of the order would be required for further surveillance. The district court was persuaded to hold that the sealing January 23, 1992, was timely. 28 The defendant unsuccessfully argued that since the last actual interception occurred January 7, the sealing of the tape on January 23 did not meet the statutory mandate. The defendant cites United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 110 S.Ct. 1845, 109 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990), in his brief in support of his argument for suppression of the tape based on untimely sealing. Ojeda Rios held that the sealing of the tape was to be done immediately as specified by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518, because it limits the Government's opportunity to alter the recordings. Id. at 263, 110 S.Ct. at 1849. If not done immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order [of interception], the Court stated that the reason for delay or excuse ... advanced by the Government [must be] ... objectively reasonable. Id. at 266, 110 S.Ct. at 1851. (Or that its interpretation of the time of expiration, even if incorrect, was objectively reasonable at the time.) Requiring a correct interpretation  was too strict a standard. Id. at 267, 110 S.Ct. at 1851 (emphasis added). 29 The concurrence of Justices O'Connor and Blackmun indicated further that a 'satisfactory explanation' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a) cannot merely be a reasonable excuse for the delay; it also must reflect the actual reason for the delay ... based on findings made and evidence presented in the district court. There is no reflection in the record as to the basis for the delay in causing the briefcase tape to be sealed except the United States Attorney's belief that our 15-day clock start[ed] running either on the day we started recepting [sic] or 10 days after the order was signed ... the Judge's order says it doesn't expire for 15 days, and on Day 16, we sealed the tapes with Judge Bertelsman. J/A 60. The judge's ruling was: I think that the tapes were properly sealed without any recitation of authority or further specifications. In its written order, the district court concluded that [b]oth the admission of tape recordings at trial and a determination of the accuracy of a transcript are within the discretion of this court. United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir.1983). 5 30 In accordance with Ojeda Rios, then, we must determine whether the January 7 tape was turned over immediately within the meaning of the statute, and, if not, whether the delay was unreasonable, and whether the explanation of the prosecution for the delay was objectively reasonable. 31 Upon remand of the delay in sealing issue in Ojeda Rios to the Second Circuit, that court in United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 948-53 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211, 111 S.Ct. 2811, 115 L.Ed.2d 984 and cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1233, 111 S.Ct. 2858, 115 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1991), found that the government's explanations for the 15- to 19-day intervals were satisfactory [and] did not warrant suppression of the tapes. Id. at 952, 953. The reasons given by the government for these delays were based on misunderstandings, but they were held to be genuine and  'satisfactory' within the meaning of Title III. Id. at 951. The erroneous misunderstanding about the legal requirements were somewhat similar in Maldonado-Rivera to those of the prosecutor in the instant case. The supervising attorney believed he did not have to seek a judicial sealing of the tapes until 'there was a meaningful hiatus in the investigation as a whole,' i.e. until not only the original order but also all extensions of that order. Id. at 950. Even a mistaken view of the law might still be satisfactory or reasonable in accordance with Maldonado-Rivera. Id. at 951. Even a longer delay, again based upon a legal misunderstanding of the sealing requirements that sealing was to occur immediately upon conclusion of the investigation, may be sufficient to withstand a suppression motion if the mistake or misunderstanding were reasonable or justified after a careful analysis of the explanation given, according to United States v. Vastola, 989 F.2d 1318, 1326-27 (3d Cir.1993). 6 32 Another circuit court, following the rationale of Ojeda Rios recently analyzed reasons given by the government for a delay of 14 days in sealing and set out a number of factors to consider before finally finding that the district court's denial of the motion to suppress the surveillance tapes was not in error. See United States v. Pedroni, 958 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir.1992). See also United States v. Suarez, 906 F.2d 977, 982 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1070, 111 S.Ct. 790, 112 L.Ed.2d 852 (1991) stating: 33 But the government also must demonstrate good cause for the failure. United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. at 264, 110 S.Ct. at 1850. Among the factors relevant in determining whether the government has presented a satisfactory explanation for its failure to seal are the length of any delay before sealing, the care taken in handling the recordings, prejudice to the defendants, any tactical advantage accruing to the government, and whether deliberate or gross dereliction of duty or honest mistake caused the failure to file. See United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d at 868-69 [(1st Cir. 1987)]; United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d [1307] at 1314-16 [(4th Cir.1979)]; see also United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. at 266, 110 S.Ct. at 1851 (government's objectively reasonable misapprehension of statute's requirements is satisfactory explanation for delay in sealing.) 34 The case discussed hereinabove points out the importance of particular findings and conclusions regarding the circumstances of, and the reasons given for, delay for any period beyond the immediate requirement of sealing under the Wiretap or Omnibus Crime Control Acts. The district court in this case made no such analysis and did not set out clearly its reasons for finding that the sealing in the instant case was timely or objectively reasonable within the meaning of the law. We are troubled, moreover, by the lack of clarity, the gaps, and problems inherent in the tape itself, as well as the purported transcript thereof. Under all these circumstances, we would find it very helpful for appellate review purposes for the district court to set out specifically the reasons for finding that the sealing was timely and its version of the particular authentic, accurate and trustworthy portions of the tape that deal with the vital meeting between Spurrier and the defendant on January 7, 1992. 35 Of course, even if the tape itself or the transcripts were legally inadequate or deficient for any reason, it may be that the district court could find that there was sufficient and adequate other corroborative evidence that might support the verdict rendered. All of these considerations need be reviewed and taken into account by the district court in setting out, upon remand, its findings and conclusions on the difficult issues concerning the tape in question. 36 Accordingly, we REMAND, for the reasons stated, the issues related to the briefcase tape of January 7, 1992, for further consideration, findings and conclusions by the district court.