Opinion ID: 2070962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Juror Challenges Record Supports Rulings

Text: In Delaware, a juror in a capital case may be excused for cause when that juror's views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties, in accordance with the Superior Court's instructions and the juror's oath. DeShields v. State, Del. Supr., 534 A.2d 630, 634 (1987); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Juror bias need not be proved with unmistakable clarity. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. Potential jurors may not know what their reaction will be when faced with imposing the death sentence, may be unable to articulate their true feelings, or may want to hide their true feelings. Id. at 424-25, 105 S.Ct. at 852-53. The trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether prospective jurors should be excused for cause. DeShields v. State, 534 A.2d at 634. The role of the trial judge, who observes a juror who may be wrestling with his conscience, is paramount. The trial judge's exercise of his or her discretion will be disturbed only on a showing of abuse of discretion and actual prejudice. DeShields v. State, 534 A.2d at 634. In Manley's case, the Superior Court granted the State's motion to excuse prospective jurors George Bolduc (Bolduc) and Elwood Keplinger (Keplinger) for cause. The Superior Court determined that these two prospective jurors held views that would impair their ability to serve impartially. Prospective juror Bolduc's responses to the Superior Court's questions reflected serious reservations regarding his willingness and ability to follow the penalty phase instructions. The Superior Court's decision to excuse him for cause is supported by the record. Prospective juror Keplinger was also excused for cause. Manley did not object to Keplinger's removal. Manley is procedurally barred from asserting claim on appeal regarding Keplinger, in the absence of plain error. Supr. Ct. R. 8. The Superior Court denied defense motions to excuse prospective jurors Ellen Laucius (Laucius), William Kuck (Kuck), and Sharon Jack (Jack) for cause. Each of these three prospective jurors were subsequently the subject of a peremptory challenge by either Manley or Stevenson. [15] According to Manley, their initial answers during voir dire reflected that they would automatically impose the death penalty upon finding the defendants guilty of first degree murder. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). The record reflects that the Superior Court thoroughly questioned Laucius, Kuck and Jack about their view of the death penalty, their ability to put aside his or her opinion, to follow the court's instructions on the law, and to recommend a life sentence if the facts so dictated. See DeShields v. Snyder, D.Del., 829 F.Supp. 676, 690-91 (1993). The Superior Court's examination of Laucius covered over twenty-two pages of trial transcript. Kuck's voir dire was approximately thirteen pages in length. Jack's questioning covered ten pages. Each of the three jurors assured the Superior Court that, regardless of his or her personal view, they could follow the court's instructions and recommend a life sentence if warranted by the evidence. The predominant function of the trial judge in determining whether a juror is biased is assessing the credibility of the juror. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 429, 105 S.Ct. at 854-55. The basis for this assessment is not easily determined from the record on appeal. Id. It is for this reason that appellate tribunals accord deference to the trial court's findings. DeShields v. State, 534 A.2d at 636. The record reflects that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in excusing prospective jurors Bouldec and Keplinger for cause or in refusing to excuse prospective jurors Lucius, Kuck and Jack.