Opinion ID: 2354677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Valid Business Expectancy

Text: Sprint argues that Stehno had no valid business expectancy in his continued employment on the Sprint project through Amdocs. The valid business expectancy requirement involves more than a mere subjective expectancyit must be a reasonable expectancy of continued employment. See Bell v. May Dep't Stores Co., 6 S.W.3d 871, 877 (Mo. banc 1999). The plaintiff must have more than a mere hope of continued employment. See Misischia v. St. John's Mercy Med. Ctr., 30 S.W.3d 848, 863 (Mo.App.2000). Stehno was a temporary contractor. While he may have had a subjective hope to have long-term employment on the Sprint project, both Amdocs and Sprint retained the right to end Stehno's assignment without even consulting him. Amdocs' agreement with Modis stated that Amdocs could terminate a service order for any reason with seven days' written notice. The contract further stated that Amdocs could request that a contractor be removed immediately if it was dissatisfied with the contractor. Similarly, Sprint's agreement with Amdocs provided that Sprint retained the right at any time to reasonably require removal of a Subcontractor and/or any of a Subcontractor's personnel ... [with] reasonable prior notice to Amdocs, specifying the reasons for such removal, with an opportunity to cure (except in cases of gross negligence or intentional misconduct) within such notice period. A business expectancy that is contrary to the terms of a contract on which the expectancy depends is unreasonable. [2] See Rhodes Eng'g Co. v. Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 1, 128 S.W.3d 550 (Mo.App. 2004); Hartbarger v. Burdeau Real Estate Co., 741 S.W.2d 309 (Mo.App.1987). Stehno argues that although he was a temporary contractor, subject to removal at any time by either Sprint or Amdocs under their respective contracts, that is not dispositive. He is correct that his business expectancy need not be based on an existing contract. Eib v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 633 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Mo.App.1982). A probable future business relationship that gives rise to a reasonable expectancy of financial benefit is enough. Id. at 435-36. As such, Stehno argues his employment at-will status does not preclude a valid business expectancy. His argument does have some support in a case from the court of appeals. See, e.g., Hensen v. Truman Med. Ctr., 62 S.W.3d 549, 553 (Mo.App.2001). Stehno asserts that the facts of this case are analogous to those in Hensen . Hensen worked directly for a company called REN. Id. at 551. He, like Stehno, was assigned to work for another employer Truman Medical Centerthat formerly employed him directly. Id. Because of some alleged misconduct during his assignment, Truman refused to allow Hensen to return to work there under any condition. Id. at 551-52. Hensen sued Truman for tortious interference with his business expectancy, and the court of appeals held that he made a submissible case. Id. at 554. Specifically, the court stated that although Truman enjoyed much latitude in terminating him when he was a Truman employee, [w]hen Hansen assumed employment with RENalbeit [as] an at-will employee for RENTruman became obligated not to interfere unjustifiably with any of Hensen's business expectancies in his new employment relation with REN. Id. Although it is facially similar, Hensen differs from the present case in two notable aspects. First, Hensen was not a temporary contractor, but was assigned to work at Truman indefinitely in a specific assignment. [3] Id. at 551. Second, Hensen involved an employer that retained the right to transfer its employees to a different employment assignment. It does not, however, address the situation where the alleged interferer retains a contractual right to remove the employee at any time as in this case. Because of the temporary nature of Stehno's assignment and the contractual provisions allowing either Sprint or Amdocs to remove him from the project, the present case is clearly distinguishable from Hensen . Lastly, Richertthe Sprint manager whose department was to provide DBAs for the billing system projectrejected an offer to have Stehno return to work for her less than one week before he began working on the project through Amdocs. It is specious that Stehno believed he had any chance of long-term employment on the project. Clearly any expectation Stehno had of continued employment on the Sprint project was not a valid, reasonable business expectation. [4]