Opinion ID: 171322
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entitlement to Hearing

Text: Having assumed Boyle was diligent in developing the factual basis for his claim of ineffective assistance in state court, we next consider whether Boyle is entitled to relief on that claim in federal court. Boyle is entitled to an evidentiary hearing so long as his factual allegations, if true, would entitle [him] to federal habeas relief. Schriro, 127 S.Ct. at 1940; Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1287. Consistent with this standard, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if the claim can be resolved on the record. Anderson v. Att'y Gen. of Kan., 425 F.3d 853, 859 (10th Cir.2005); see also Schriro, 127 S.Ct. at 1940 ([I]f the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.). Kansas asks us to review Boyle's entitlement to relief under the deferential standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Although its decisional language is unclear, the Kansas Court of Appeals seems to have rejected Boyle's ineffectiveness claim on procedural, rather than substantive, grounds. The court held, Boyle raises several issues in his 60-1507 motion that could have been raised on direct appeal. . . . All of the issues he attempts to raise have been or could have been dealt with on his direct appeal. Boyle v. State, No. 86,730, 2002 WL 31274355 (Kan.Ct. App. Oct.4, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished). [3] Whether or not we think the court's decision involves the full-blown invocation of a procedural bar, it does not constitute an adjudication on the merits under our case law. See generally Harris v. Poppell, 411 F.3d 1189, 1195-96 (10th Cir.2005) (citing cases). See also Wilson, 536 F.3d 1064, 1082 (When a state court has not examined [petitioner's] non-record evidence, it has reached no conclusion `on the merits.'); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 946-47 (5th Cir.2001) (An adjudication on the merits occurs when the state court resolves the case on substantive grounds, rather than procedural grounds. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Boyle's claim was not adjudicated on the merits in state court, § 2254(d)'s deferential standards of review do not apply to our merits determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (setting forth a deferential standard of review for any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings). Without an adjudication on the merits, there is no state court decision to which we could defer. See Barkell, 468 F.3d at 697-98. Therefore, Boyle does not have to prove the state court's adjudication of his claim was in some way unreasonable, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2), but rather that he is entitled to relief under our independent review of his ineffectiveness claim, Barkell, 468 F.3d at 698. [4] Under the now familiar two-part standard for judging ineffective assistance, Boyle is entitled to relief if he can show by a preponderance of the evidence the following: (1) trial counsel was deficient, i.e., counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the deficiency prejudiced his defense, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord Sperry v. McKune, 445 F.3d 1268, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 2006); Anderson, 425 F.3d at 859. There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of professional assistance[;] the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)). [A] particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Of particular note here is that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not designed to allow defendants to relitigate trial errors that should have been raised on direct appeal. State habeas petitioners, in particular, are not allowed to bring their state trial court errors into federal court under the guise of catch-all ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We cannot allow this practice for the simple reason that our task on habeas is limited to upholding federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. (emphasis added)). Applying this standard here, we conclude that even if the facts Boyle alleges were true, he has not met the second prong of Strickland's ineffectiveness test: He has failed to show that even if counsel were deficient in the ways he alleges, such deficiency would have prejudiced his defense. There is simply no reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 915 (10th Cir.1999) (concluding, after examining the totality of the evidence, there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict).