Opinion ID: 42099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wise’s Ex Post Facto/Due Process Challenge

Text: On appeal, Wise argues that she has a due process right to prevent the retroactive application of Booker’s remedial holding because her offense and plea were entered before Booker, and an advisory application of the guidelines undoes the benefit of her plea and works to her disadvantage. Wise further argues that ex post facto concerns are raised because the retroactive application of a judicially rewritten sentencing statute is the equivalent of retroactively applying penal legislation. Finally, she argues that the guidelines should be applied, consistent with Blakely,1 in a binding fashion because she relied upon Blakely when determining her statutory maximum sentence and deciding to enter a plea. Her 1 Wise appears to argue that, under Blakely, any extra-verdict enhancements are in violation of her Sixth Amendment rights. Nothing in Blakely, however, applies to the federal Sentencing Guidelines. It was Booker that extended a principle from Blakely to the Sentencing Guidelines. Her cites to Blakely in this regard are, therefore, in error. 7 position is essentially that, after Booker: (1) all of the sentencing enhancements made by the judge violated her Sixth Amendment right to a jury; and (2) the guideline range, as calculated after the enhancements are removed, should be binding and mandatory on the sentencing judge, not advisory as it is post-Booker. We review questions of constitutional law de novo. United States v. Brown, 364 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004). In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964), the Supreme Court held that judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, violated the Due Process Clause because it was unforeseeable and like an ex post facto law. The Supreme Court later clarified Bouie, holding that, while the Ex Post Facto Clause2 does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch, the Due Process Clause encompasses the ex post facto principle of fair warning. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 462 (2001). Accordingly, as we have held, Wise’s argument on appeal is not an ex post facto issue, but rather, an issue of whether Wise had fair warning. See United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) petition for cert. filed, Duncan v. U.S., — S.Ct. — , 2005 WL 2493971 (U.S. Oct 11, 2005). In Duncan, the defendant argued that, if Booker’s remedial holding, rendering the guidelines advisory, were applied retroactively, his maximum sentence would be increased 2 The Ex Post Facto Clause provides that: “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” U.S. Const. Art I Sec. 9. 8 beyond that authorized by the jury’s verdict. Id. We rejected that argument, noting that (1) the U.S. Code informed the defendant, at the time when he committed his offenses, that he faced a maximum of life, and (2) the guidelines at the time further gave notice that a judge would engage in fact-finding to determine his sentence. Id. Ultimately, we held that the defendant’s due process rights to fair warning were met because, at the time of the defendant’s criminal conduct, the state of the law was that the U.S. Code set the maximum sentence, even though the guidelines were mandatory. Id. at 1308. Recently the Ninth Circuit, relying in part on Duncan, persuasively rejected a nearly identical argument to the one that Wise makes here for three reasons: (1) it was in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s instruction that both Booker opinions be applied retroactively to cases on direct review; (2) Ninth Circuit precedent held that Bouie did not apply to retroactive sentencing enhancements; and (3) the defendant was on notice that his sentence could be based on judicial determinations and set within the applicable statutory maximum. United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2005). Wise attempts to distinguish her situation from the one in Duncan by arguing that, in Duncan, the defendant had been convicted and sentenced long before the Supreme Court decided Blakely and, therefore, he could not have had 9 any reliance on its holding, like Wise did. Furthermore, she argues that, unlike the defendant in Duncan, she preserved her due process challenge at sentencing. Wise’s distinctions are unavailing, and, like the defendants in Duncan and Dupas, her due process right to fair warning was not violated. Here, Wise’s sentence, based on the enhancements that were then binding on the judge, was 24 months’ imprisonment. Losing the extra-verdict enhancements, but making the base offense level binding on the judge, Wise argues that her guidelines’ range would be 12-18 months’ imprisonment. However, like in Duncan and Dupas, Wise was on notice of her statutory maximum sentence and that her ultimate sentence would be based on judicial determinations and set within that statutory maximum. Wise’s conviction under § 1344, provided a statutory maximum of 30 years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344. According to the indictment, all of Wise’s offense conduct took place prior to Blakely, and, as we noted in Duncan, prior to Blakely “every federal court of appeals had held that Apprendi [ v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2002)], did not apply to guideline calculations made within the statutory maximum.” See Duncan, 400 F.3d at 1308 (quotation and citations omitted). Thus, the law at the time of Wise’s offense conduct was that the U.S. Code was the source for determining a maximum statutory sentence. Id. Accordingly, like with the defendant in Duncan, we conclude that Wise had 10 sufficient warning to satisfy the due process concerns articulated in Rogers v. Tennessee.” Id.