Opinion ID: 2382122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Counsel's Performance Constitutionally Deficient?

Text: Perry has complained that, as a result of counsel's failure to preserve an objection to the inadmissible and prejudicial conversation with Horn, he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The standard to be applied in determining whether counsel's representation comported with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment is that enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, as more recently explicated in Lockhart v. Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180. As we recounted that standard in Wiggins v. State, 352 Md. 580, 724 A.2d 1, cert. denied, ___ U.S.___, 120 S.Ct. 90, ____ L.Ed.2d____(1999), to prove a claim of Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. To show a deficiency, the defendant must (1) demonstrate that counsel's acts or omissions, given the circumstances, `fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering prevailing professional norms,' ... and (2) overcome the presumption that the challenged conduct `be considered sound trial strategy.' Id. at 602, 724 A.2d at 12, quoting in part from Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. 256, 283, 681 A.2d 30, 43. To show that a deficiency prejudiced the defense, the defendant must establish that counsel's error was `so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.' Id. Those principles, as stated, apply as well to Article 21the Maryland analogue to the Sixth Amendment. Based on counsel's uncontroverted admission, the post-conviction court found as a fact that counsel's failure to lodge a timely objection to the wiretap evidence was not a matter of trial strategy or tactics but was instead the product of his failure to realize that Perry had a good basis for suppressionin the court's words, their ignorance of the law. Because the court went on to conclude that Perry suffered no Constitutional prejudice from that deficiency, however, it made no finding as to whether the deficiency fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering prevailing professional norms. There can be little doubt in this case that the omission to move timely to suppress the evidence, the almost certain effect of which was a waiver of any objection to the evidence, satisfied that test. Counsel correctly recognized the importance of the evidence when they first learned of it; contemporaneously with their discovery of the tape, they had all of the factual and legal information necessary to support a motion to suppress it; and they were well aware of the requirements not only of Maryland Rule 4-252, requiring that a motion to suppress be made before trial, but of the requirement that a contemporaneous objection be made at trial. As we have noted several times, there was already pending a sufficient motion to achieve that result, but it was not pursued. Not until the eleventh day of trial, after the tapes had been admitted into evidence and played in open court was an objection based on the wiretap law made. Without detracting from the general competence of the attorneys involved, it is clear that their omission to pursue a timely motion to suppress this evidence fell significantly below the objective standard of reasonableness and that the first prong of Strickland was therefore established. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, supra , U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305. The question of prejudice is not so facile. The essence of the ineffective assistance claim is that counsel's unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect. Lockhart v. Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. at 369, 113 S.Ct. at 842, 122 L.Ed.2d at 189 (quoting from Kimmelman v. Morrison, supra ). It is a high threshold, a difficult test to meet. As we pointed out in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 284, 681 A.2d at 44, citing Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 374-76, 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992), and Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-27, 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990), the petitioner must show that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, although that test should not focus solely on an outcome determination, but should consider `whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.' Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 284, 681 A.2d at 44, quoting from Lockhart v. Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. at 369, 113 S.Ct. at 842, 122 L.Ed.2d at 189. In Kimmelman v. Morrison, supra , the Court dealt with a similar situation. An important item of evidence in a rape case was a bedsheet, seized from the defendant's home without benefit of a warrant, that contained semen stains and hair samples which other evidence connected to the defendant and the victim. Counsel objected at trial to admission of the bedsheet, on Fourth Amendment grounds, but, because he had not moved to suppress the evidence before trial, as required by the New Jersey equivalent of Maryland Rule 4-252, the objection was held to have been waived. Counsel contended that he was unaware of the seizure of the bedsheet until it was offered at trial, but that unawareness, suspect in itself because of certain information forwarded to him by the prosecutor, in any event stemmed from his failure to conduct any discovery. He conducted no discovery, he said, because he believed that it was the State's obligation to supply discovery without request, a belief that the Supreme Court found wholly without foundation. Morrison's conviction was affirmed, and the case reached the Supreme Court on Federal habeas corpus. The claim was ineffective assistance of counsel based on the attorney's failure to move timely to suppress the evidence arguably seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), the Court held that, when a State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a State prisoner may not be granted Federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in violation of that Amendment was admitted at his/her trial. The issue presented in Kimmelman was whether that approach also applied to a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when the ineffective assistance stemmed from the failure to raise or preserve the Fourth Amendment claim. The principal holding of the Court was that Stone did not apply to the Sixth Amendment claim. The Fourth Amendment was not a trial right, but a general protection for all citizens against governmental intrusion; to prevail, the defendant need show only that the search or seizure in question was unlawful and that it violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. The right to counsel, on the other hand, is a fundamental right of criminal defendants, designed to assure fairness and the legitimacy of the adversary judicial process. The essence of an ineffective assistance claim, as noted, is that counsel's error upset the adversarial balance to the point that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. When the incompetence rests entirely on the failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, the defendant must prove not only that the Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious but, to establish the required prejudice under Strickland, that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence. Kimmelman, supra, U.S. at 375, 106 S.Ct. at 2583, 91 L.Ed.2d at 319. Having reached that conclusion, the Kimmelman Court then turned to the Strickland analysis. The District Court, acting before Strickland was decided, had granted relief by applying a Dorsey v. Statetype of harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and concluding that Morrison had been prejudiced. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Strickland, concluded that counsel had been grossly deficient but remanded for further consideration of the prejudice issue. The Supreme Court had no difficulty on the record before it in holding that counsel's performance was Constitutionally deficient, and it was urged to rule upon the prejudice issue as well. It declined to do so, however, and affirmed the remand, noting that no evidentiary hearing had been held on the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, that the State was entitled to an opportunity to establish that the seizure was lawful, and that, even if it was not, Morrison may be unable to show that absent the evidence concerning the bedsheet there is a reasonable probability that the trial judge would have a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Id. at 391,106 S.Ct. at 2591, 91 L.Ed.2d at 329 (Emphasis added). Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist, filed a concurring opinion in which he posed a question not raised by the parties or addressed by the Courtwhether the admission of reliable, but unlawfully seized, evidence could ever, of itself, satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Justice Powell expressed the view that the harm suffered by Morrison is not the denial of a fair and reliable adjudication of his guilt, but rather the absence of a windfall, and that [b]ecause the fundamental fairness of the trial is not affected, our reasoning in Strickland strongly suggests that such harm does not amount to prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 396, 106 S.Ct. at 2594, 91 L.Ed.2d at 333. He explained that admission of the bedsheet harmed Morrison only in the sense that it helped the factfinder make a well-informed determination of respondent's guilt or innocence, and, in his view, nothing in Strickland compelled a conclusion that such an injury establishes prejudice for purposes of the ineffective assistance claim. Powell concurred in the remand because neither the parties nor the lower courts had considered that question and because it was not encompassed in the petition for certiorari. Id. at 397, 106 S.Ct. at 2594, 91 L.Ed.2d at 334. On remand, New Jersey decided not to contest the illegality of the seizure, but asserted Justice Powell's view that the introduction of reliable evidence can never satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, even if that evidence was inadmissible because it was unlawfully obtained. The District Court expressly rejected that argument, pointing to the statement in the majority opinion that approved of habeas corpus review of an ineffective assistance claim where counsel's primary error is failure to make a timely request for the exclusion of illegally seized evidenceevidence which is `typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.' Morrison v. Kimmelman, 650 F.Supp. 801, 805 (D.N.J.1986) (quoting from Kimmelman, supra, 477 U.S. at 379, 106 S.Ct. at 2585, 91 L.Ed.2d at 322). The judge noted also that were petitioner precluded, as a legal matter, from establishing prejudice under the facts of this case, this matter would never have been remanded to this Court for further consideration. There would have been no point to it. Morrison, supra, 650 F.Supp. at 805. Addressing the prejudice issue, the court noted the importance of the bedsheet as corroborating the testimony of the victim, which was riddled with inconsistencies. Because the State essentially conceded the illegality of the seizure, the Fourth Amendment violation was established. The trial judge, it concluded, faced a close decision, and but for counsel's errors, the court found it highly probable that the evidentiary picture would have been very different. In the court's judgment, it was reasonably probable that, but for counsel's errors, the balance would have tilted in favor of Morrison's version. On that basis, which, in light of the later pronouncements in Lockhart may be an incorrect one, the court found prejudice in the particular case and granted the writ. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has embraced Justice Powell's view and held, expressly, that under Strickland no prejudice exists when evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment is erroneously admitted at trial. Holman v. Page, 95 F.3d 481, 492 (7th Cir.1996). It is inconsistent with the function of the exclusionary rule, the court held, to permit a criminal defendant on federal habeas review to claim prejudice because but for his counsel's incompetence on the suppression issue he would have gotten away with the crime. Id. at 491. That is not the kind of prejudice, it said, anticipated by Strickland. Exclusion of the evidence does not impact on the correctness of the verdict but rather enhances the truthfinding process by permitting the consideration of valuable probative evidence. Id. See also United States v. Williams, 106 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir.1997); Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Jones, 152 F.3d 680 (7th Cir.1998). To the best of our knowledge, the Seventh Circuit stands alone in that approach. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has taken an opposite approach. In Van Huynh v. King, 95 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir.1996), a State prisoner complained on Federal habeas corpus about the failure of his trial counsel to move timely to suppress evidence seized from his wallet at the time of his arrest. Counsel claimed that the decision not to file a pre-trial motion was strategic; his goal was to create an appellate issue. Accepting that argument, the District Court denied relief. The Court of Appeals disagreed with that determination and held that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and therefore deficientthat no reasonable attorney would forego the litigation of a meritorious claim in order to set up an issue for appeal or collateral review. It declined to address the prejudice question, however, without the benefit of the District Court's finding on the validity of the underlying Fourth Amendment claim. Recognizing that a good Fourth Amendment claim alone would not guarantee success on a Sixth Amendment claim, it nonetheless concluded that if the district court finds that Huynh's Fourth Amendment right was violated and as a result that, had counsel filed a motion to exclude this evidence, it likely would have been granted, then Huynh was prejudiced by his lawyer's unreasonable performance as a matter of law. Van Huynh, 95 F.3d at 1058. That determination, obviously, is a rejection of the notion that failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim can never be prejudice under Strickland. The California Supreme Court also has rejected, at least implicitly, the notion that counsel's failure to move to suppress reliable evidence can never constitute Strickland prejudice. In In re Neely, 6 Cal.4th 901, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 864 P.2d 474 (1993), the court had before it a habeas corpus petition based on the failure of trial counsel to move to suppress a tape of an incriminating conversation between the defendant and a State agent instigated by the State while the defendant was represented by counsel, and thus in violation of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). The court found both deficient performance and prejudice. As to the latter, the court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that had the tape recording been suppressed, the outcome with regard to guilt would have been more favorable to the defendant, and it therefore granted the writ. The majority opinion did not discuss Justice Powell's view but simply acted inconsistently with it. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Arabian took note of Justice Powell's view and, though sympathetic with that view, nonetheless rejected it as a statement of current law, observing that [a] holding that prejudice has not been shown for these reasons would effectively render meaningless the majority opinion in [ Kimmelman ] and would run counter to broad language found in that opinion. Id., 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 864 P.2d at 488. We cannot, of course, predict how the Supreme Court might ultimately resolve this question in the context of the Sixth Amendment, but, with all due respect to Justice Powell, the concurring Justices, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, we reject as a matter of independent Maryland law under Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights the notion that a defendant is never prejudiced under a Stricklandtype analysis when reliable, though legally inadmissible, evidence is admitted against him or her. [11] The issue in a Sixth Amendment/Article 21 context is not the scope, function, or reach of the exclusionary rule, whether judicially designed to protect a Constitutional right or created by the Legislature to protect a statutory one, but whether the defendant received the effective assistance of counsel. Nor is it a matter of an inappropriate windfall. The most fundamental underpinning of our criminal justice system, upon which most, if not all, other rights rest, is that a defendant is presumed to be innocent, and it is the obligation of the State to prove guilt, upon proper procedure and by admissible evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not a windfall when counsel succeeds in suppressing evidence that, for whatever reason, is inadmissible. That is precisely what counsel is there to doto make the State prove its case by legally admissible evidence. It is difficult for us to comprehend either a logical or a practical basis for a conclusion that the defendant is not prejudiced, as a matter of law and without regard to any other circumstance, when counsel fails in that very basic responsibility. Our focus, therefore, under the Sixth Amendment and, independently, under Article 21, must be on whether the admission of the tape recording and the voice-identification testimony relating to it so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was unfair and the verdict rendered suspect. Lockhart v. Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. at 369, 113 S.Ct. at 842, 122 L.Ed.2d at 189 (quoting from Kimmelman, supra ), whether, as noted in Oken, there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. As we have indicated several times, this evidence was extremely important. It affirmatively and persuasively established contact between Horn and Perry and, depending on how the jury interpreted the message, may have proved contact on the very morning the murders were committed. The fact that the post-conviction court did not believe that the tape captured that particular conversation is irrelevant; the prosecutor suggested that prospect to the jury and, although the conversation is certainly ambiguous, that suggestion was by no means a frivolous one. It is true, of course, that there was a great deal of other, documentary evidence from which contact could have been found, but, other than the testimony of Thomas Turner given under a grant of immunity, most of it was circumstantialcalls from pay telephones with no direct proof of who the caller was. Absent proof of contact with Horn, there was little or no evidence connecting Perry either with the murders or with any of the victims. Why would a stranger from Detroit want to break into a home in Maryland and murder its occupants, including a helpless child? To establish why, the prosecutor played the tape for the jury four times during the trial, twice during his closing argument. It is always a judgment call in determining whether a circumstance sufficed to render the verdict unreliable. In this case, we conclude, under both the Sixth Amendment and, independently, under Article 21, that it did, and, for that reason, shall reverse the judgment of the postconviction court and remand for the court to order a new trial for Perry. JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY FOR ENTRY OF ORDER IN CONFORMANCE WITH THIS OPINION; MONTGOMERY COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS. Dissenting Opinion by RODOWSKY, J., in which ROBERT L. KARWACKI (retired, specially assigned), JJ., joins in. RODOWSKY, Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dissent because, as the circuit court found at the post-conviction hearing, the interception by Horn of the telephone conversation with Perry was inadvertent and not in violation of the Maryland wiretap statute. [1] In my opinion the legal analysis is straightforward. Perry contends that the 22second tape should have been suppressed. Suppression is governed by § 10-405 which in relevant part reads: Whenever any wire ... communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of the communication ... may be received in evidence in any trial ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of [Subtitle 4]. What constitutes a violation of Subtitle 4 by way of disclosure of information contained in an intercepted wire communication is found in § 10-402(a)(2). It reads: Except as otherwise specifically provided in this subtitle it is unlawful for any person to ... (2) [w]ilfully disclose ... to any other person the contents of any wire ... communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire ... communication in violation of [Subtitle 4]. What constitutes an interception of a communication in violation of Subtitle 4 is found in immediately preceding § 10-402(a)(1) reading in relevant part: Except as otherwise specifically provided in this subtitle it is unlawful for any person to ... (1) [w]ilfully intercept ... any wire ... communication. Thus, whether the content of an intercepted communication is to be suppressed turns on (excluding exceptions) whether the interception was willful. This issue was addressed by the postconviction court. It made the specific and ultimate fact findings set forth below. The facts surrounding this case make it clear that this recording was not wilfully obtained, certainly a highly permissible inference from the facts as detailed below. The relationship between Lawrence Horn and James Perry was covered in layers of secrecy and deception. The evidence produced at the trial and the post-conviction hearing revealed the following: 1. Telephonic secrecy Lawrence Horn and James Perry established an elaborate plan to ensure that their telephone calls would not be traced. They utilized a calling card belonging to a Kamella McKinney, which was a false name assumed by Horn's cousin Marsha Webb. Perry and Horn would always use a pay phone to initiate a call to the other. They attempted pay phone to pay phone calls to one another, without success. 2. Wire transfers Over the course of the conspiracy, Lawrence Horn sent money to Perry through Western Union. In an effort to avoid any connection between him and Perry, Horn used the name of George Shaw when sending the money. George Shaw, as more fully discussed below, was a name taken from a Los Angeles Times obituary. 3. Turner utilized After the murders, when Perry and Horn realized that their telephones may be subject to police surveillance, they utilized Thomas Turner, as an intermediary, to set up a time and place when contact needed to be made. 4. Horn's Deposition Horn denied knowing James Perry during a civil deposition taken in 1994. 5. No Paper Trail During a search of Horn's residence, the police obtained thousands of pages of text that was printed from certain cassettes, disks, and the hard drive on Horn's computer. This included an address book, personal correspondence and personal notes. There was not one mention of James Perry, his phone number or his address in this information. 6. Perry's arrest When Perry was arrested he asked whether anyone else was going to be arrested or indicted that day. When told yes, and when Lawrence Horn from California was identified as the other person, Perry said he had never heard of Horn. The efforts by Lawrence Horn and James Perry to leave no trace of contact with each other were substantial. They went to extraordinary lengths to hide their relationship. To suggest that Horn would 'wilfully' record a conversation between himself and Perry defies logical explanation. The only rational explanation for the existence of the 22second tape is that the conversation was inadvertently recorded. Therefore, the Maryland Wiretap and Surveillance Act would not apply. Based on the reasons set forth above, this court finds that Exhibit 312, even if objected to in a timely fashion, would have been admissible during the trial in this case. Accordingly, the motion to suppress is denied. In this Court Perry did not contend that the finding of inadvertence was clearly erroneous and, in my opinion, the finding of inadvertence is a legitimate inference that the post-conviction court could draw from the evidence. The finding of inadvertence is not, in my view, rendered clearly erroneous, as the majority concludes, by the evidence of how Horn treated telephone conversations with people other than Perry. Indeed, the evidence of Horn's taping of calls from others suggests how it came about that Horn inadvertently intercepted a telephone call from Perry who, inferentially, was never to place a telephone call to Horn's home. This Court's principal conclusion is that the controlling provision is § 10-407(c). Section 10-407, in general, addresses the disclosure and use of the contents of intercepted communications. Subsections (a) and (b) deal with the investigatory disclosure and use of intercepted communications by any law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized [by Subtitle 4], has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire ... communication. These subsections in general authorize disclosure and use appropriate to the proper performance of official duties of the law enforcement officers involved. Subsection (c) deals with use and disclosure as testimony and in relevant part reads as follows: Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this subtitle, any information concerning a wire ... communication... intercepted in accordance with [Subtitle 4] may disclose the contents of that communication ... while giving testimony.... The majority concludes that the 22-second tape was acquired by [a] means authorized by [Subtitle 4] because it was seized under a search and seizure warrant, and I agree. I do not agree, however, that an inadvertent, and therefore non-willful interception, is suppressible under the statutory exclusionary rule of § 10-405. It is on this basis that the facts of the instant matter are distinguishable from those in Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 591 A.2d 481 (1991) where the interception was clearly willful. Nor do I agree that § 10-407(c) authorizes suppression on grounds that are broader than those specified in § 10-405, which may be invoked only when disclosure of [the intercepted] information would be in violation of [Subtitle 4]. The majority opinion departs from the rationale in Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 686 A.2d 274 (1996) ( Perry I ). On direct appeal, Perry contended that the challenged tape was inadmissible under the legislatively created exclusionary rule of § 10-405. Id. at 221, 686 A.2d at 282. To support suppression Perry relied on § 10-402(a). Id. at 224, 686 A.2d at 284. This Court concluded that the suppression issue was not before it on direct appeal, but could be raised on post conviction. Id. at 228, 686 A.2d at 285. In discussing the issues to be developed on post-conviction, this Court said that the inadequacy of the record [in Perry I includes the lack of fact-findings bearing on whether there was a violation and whether it was willful. Id. at 227, 686 A.2d at 285. This Court thereby recognized that the analysis proceeded from § 10-405 to § 10-402(a)(2) and ultimately to § 10-402(a)(1). As this Court asked the post-conviction court to do, the fact-findings have been made under the analysis in Perry I. The result is that the tape is admissible. The majority adopts an analysis different from that in Perry I. Because Perry did not consent to the interception, the majority holds that the communication was not intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this subtitle, as that quoted language is used in § 10-407(c) and that the result is exclusion. Essentially the majority creates a limbo between the heaven of interceptions authorized by or in accordance with Subtitle 4 and the hell of conduct in violation of Subtitle 4. In this limbo the majority says there dwell communications that are not intercepted in violation of Subtitle 4, because they are not willful and not subject to criminal penalty or civil liability, but are nevertheless subject to suppression because they were not intercepted in accordance with the provisions of [Subtitle 4]. In my reading of the statute, there is but one concept bearing on admissibility, and that single concept is expressed either approvingly or disapprovingly, depending on whether the intercepted communication may or may not be used as evidence. When the communication may not be used as evidence the statute speaks disapprovingly of the violation of Subtitle 4. See § 10-405. When the communication is not in violation of Subtitle 4 and may be used as evidence, the statute speaks approvingly of the intercept and use of the communication as having been acquired by means authorized by or in accordance with Subtitle 4. See § 10-407(c). Insofar as admissibility is concerned there are, in my view, only two classes of interceptions under Subtitle 4: those that are in violation and those that are not in violation. Supporting this conclusion is § 10-407(d) where the words relied upon by the majority, i.e. , in accordance with the provisions of [Subtitle 4] are used. Subsection (d) reads: An otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this subtitle, does not lose its privileged character. In subsection (d) the phrase in accordance with is used in contradistinction to the phrase, in violation of, and the combination of the two phrases clearly is intended to encompass the entire spectrum of intercepted communications. The person who enjoys the privilege does not lose it simply by virtue of an interception, of any kind, of that person's communication. The federal counterpart to § 10-407(d) is 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (No otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.). The federal act, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994) was one of the subjects of Senate Report No. 1097, 90th Cong., reprinted in, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112-309. The report explains the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4). That provision is intended to vary the existing law only to the extent it provides that an otherwise privileged communication does not lose its privileged character because it is intercepted by a stranger. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2189. The concern of § 10-407(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) is interception by a stranger, and it is immaterial whether that interception is or is not a violation. To encompass all interceptions Congress and the General Assembly used the language intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of. [I]n accordance with should be given the same meaning in § 10-407(c) as it has in the immediately following § 10-407(d). There is no limbo category. Also instructive is United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir.1990), an appeal by the Government from a suppressionorder. There, federal agents had been authorized by court order to tap the telephone of a suspected drug dealer. Someone on the dealer's premises inadvertently left the telephone in the kitchen of the dealer's residence off of the hook and not in use. Later there was a face-to face, oral conversation in the kitchen between the dealer and a co-conspirator which was carried over the open telephone and was recorded on the wiretap equipment. The District Court suppressed the conversation because there had been an oral interception, whereas the court order authorized only a wire interception. The Sixth Circuit reversed, analogizing to the plain view doctrine in search and seizure law. Id. at 1071. The court said that [w]here, as here, we have a case with a factual situation clearly not contemplated by the statute, we find it helpful on the suppression issue (as opposed to the question of whether there was a violation of the authorization order) to look to fourth amendment law. Id. at 1072. In the matter before this Court, Horn's inadvertent interception of his conversation with Perry is similar to the telephone's being left off of the hook in Baranek. Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the manner in which the government obtained the content of the conversation in Baranek, in the instant matter it is clear that the State's acquisition of the tape was lawful. Here, the combination of inadvertent interception, even though without the consent of all (or any) participants, coupled with lawful acquisition of the content by the State, should result in admissibility. Also incompatible with the majority's analysis are United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir.1987), and United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000, 97 S.Ct. 530, 50 L.Ed.2d 611 (1976). In each of these cases, a private individual who was not acting as a government agent willfully violated the federal act by intercepting oral communications. In each case, when ruling to suppress that evidence, the appellate court followed a route that took it from § 2515 (suppression) to § 2511(1) (violation) without meandering through or finding any significance in § 2517(3) (use as testimony). For these reasons I would affirm. Judge KARWACKI has authorized me to state that he joins in the views expressed herein. CATHELL, Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Because I think Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 591 A.2d 481 (1991), was incorrectly decided and should be overruled, or at least distinguished from this case, I would hold that Horn's interception of phone conversations in California did not violate Maryland's wiretap statutes and I would affirm the trial court's denial of postconviction relief. [1] I also adopt the excellent reasoning of Judge John McAuliffe's dissent in Mustafa, 323 Md. at 76-79, 591 A.2d at 486-88. I note, initially, that in the Court's statutory construction of the Maryland Wiretap Act in Mustafa, no mention was made of what I perceive to have been an important modification of the Act. In Mustafa, the Court opined: It is plain that the legislative intent in the Maryland Act was to inhibit the disclosure in Maryland courts of the content of communications not intercepted in conformity with the public policy of this State as evidenced by the provisions of its governing law. In other words, the Maryland Act precludes the admission of a communication intercepted, no matter where, under circumstances inconsistent with this State's substantive law. [Emphasis added.] Id. at 74-75, 591 A.2d at 485-86. That statement mirrored the language of the statute in 1973, but not the present language. The present language, I would respectfully suggest, requires an actual violation of the Maryland Wiretap Act. Prior to 1977, the admissibility language stated in relevant part: Only evidence obtained in conformity with the provisions of this subtitle is admissible. Md.Code (1974), § 10-406 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (emphasis added). That language was changed in 1977 to read, in relevant part: [N]o part of the contents of the communication ... may be received in evidence ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this subtitle. Md.Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), § 10-405 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (emphasis added). This change in the statute was not discussed in Mustafa. As I view the language, the earlier prohibition could be construed (although I would not do so) as an outright prohibition requiring conformance with two-party consent, or whatever the consent standard was, or would be in Maryland. The later language, as I view it, is less prohibitory. It appears to me to state that if the acquiring of the evidence actually violates Maryland law, then the evidence is inadmissible. Under the earlier version, it can reasonably be argued that conformance to certain requirements must be met before the evidence is admissible. A reasonable interpretation of the change in language is that, thereafter, in order to be inadmissible, the recording must have actually violated Maryland law. I see no other logical purpose (presuming there was a logical purpose) for the change. Considering that this legislative history, sparse as it is, was not addressed in Mustafa, I believe the Mustafa Court was incorrect in its construction of the statute in the first instance. The Supreme Court has stated that it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an `inexorable command,' and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Adhering to precedent is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right. Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision. [Citations omitted.] [Internal quotation omitted.] Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). This Court has also noted that, although important, the rule of stare decisis is not an absolute: [I]t is a well recognized and valuable doctrine that decisions, once made on a question involved in a case before a court, should not thereafter be lightly disturbed or set aside (except by a higher court). This is because it is advisable and necessary that the law should be fixed and established so far as possible, and the people guided in their personal and business dealings by established conclusions, not subject to change because some other judge or judges think differently. On the other hand, it is sometimes advisable to correct a decision or decisions wrongly made in the first instance, if it is found that the decision is clearly wrong and contrary to other established principles. Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 186 Md. 406, 417, 47 A.2d 365, 370 (1946); see also Hearst Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 269 Md. 625, 643-44, 308 A.2d 679, 689 (1973) (The doctrine of stare decisis, important as it is, is not to be construed as preventing us from changing a rule of law if we are convinced that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life. (quoting White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966))); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369, 381 (1868) (Previous decisions of this court should not be disturbed ... unless it is plainly seen that glaring injustice has been done or some egregious blunder committed.). Previous decisions governing the interpretation of statutes are generally entitled to greater deference under the doctrine of stare decisis; such decisions, however, must always yield to common sense. As the Iowa Supreme Court has noted: Generally, when a statute receives a certain judicial interpretation and is subsequently reenacted without pertinent change, such interpretation is presumed adopted or approved by the legislature. But the foregoing presumption is not conclusive. It stands only as one factor among many in determining legislative intent.... Neither does [the presumption] nor the pressures of stare decisis prevent our reconsideration, repair, correction, or abandonment of past judicial pronouncements, especially when error is manifest. Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Iowa 1978) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Parks v. City of Marshalltown, 440 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1989). The Appellate Court of Illinois has also stated: The doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring a reviewing court to blindly follow its own precedents. While considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, especially where the legislature is free to change the court's interpretation of its legislation, a reviewing court should not decline to correct a prior interpretation which it finds erroneous... and a court may depart from a prior settled rule where it becomes evident that it is prejudicial to the public interest. Mueller v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 267 Ill.App.3d 726, 732, 205 111. Dec. 304, 643 N.E.2d 255, 260-61 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Conway v. Town of Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 676, 680 A.2d 242, 254 (1996) (Our decision that we should not overrule precedent unless cogent reason and inescapable logic require it has particular force when the precedent involved concerns the interpretation or construction of a statute. There may well be precedent nevertheless that, when challenged and reexamined, mandates that '[j]udicial honesty dictates corrective action.'  (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah 1987) (As a practical matter, we can and do, on occasion, depart from a prior statutory interpretation.); Jepson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 89 Wash.2d 394, 407, 573 P.2d 10, 17 (1977) (The doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable to statutory construction when it is decided that earlier interpretations are wanting, faulty, or even wrong. (citation omitted)). The Court initially noted in Mustafa, 323 Md. at 73, 591 A.2d at 485, that [t]he exclusionary provision in § 10-405 of the Maryland [Wiretap] Act precludes the admission of evidence which was not lawfully intercepted. Our primary holding was that the Maryland [Wiretap] Act precludes the admission of a communication intercepted, no matter where, under circumstances inconsistent with this State's substantive law. Id. at 75, 591 A.2d at 486 (emphasis added). The particular section with which the Court was concerned was section 10-402 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides that any willful interception, endeavor to intercept, any willful disclosure, or endeavor to disclose or any willful use, or endeavor to use, any contents of wire, oral, or electronic communications not obtained in accordance with other provisions of the Maryland Wiretap Act, is unlawful. The Maryland statute defines violations of its requirements as felonies. See id. § 10-402(b). The exclusionary section of the Wiretap Act provides: § 10-405. Admissibility of evidence. Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of the communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this subtitle. [Emphasis added.]