Opinion ID: 1309215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: contentions affecting penalty phase

Text: (21a) Defendant contends that five prospective jurors were improperly excluded by reason of their adverse views regarding the death penalty. According to defendant, these prospective jurors failed to make it unmistakably clear that they would automatically vote against the death penalty without regard to the evidence produced at trial. (See Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 522-523, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785]; Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, 10-11.) The review standard cited by defendant has been substantially modified by the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844], a modification recently adopted by our court in People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250]. (22) Witt adopted a new review standard, namely, whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. In addition to dispensing with Witherspoon's reference to automatic decisionmaking, this new standard likewise does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. (469 U.S. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852].) Because we believed that Witt's review standard and underlying rationale made good sense, and because California courts have generally followed the teachings of the high court in determining when a prospective juror properly may be excused for cause because of his views regarding capital punishment, we adopted the Witt standard in Ghent. (21b) As will appear, however, even under the stricter Witherspoon test, none of the prospective jurors was improperly excused for cause in the present case. Our review of the record discloses that although several such jurors made somewhat equivocal responses to the Witherspoon inquiry, each of them at one point confirmed that he or she could not vote for death under any circumstances. For example, in the present case prospective juror Risher at one point stated that she could see herself voting for the death penalty, but she later explained that given the alternative of life imprisonment without parole, she would never vote for death. Prospective juror Lopez first replied that he didn't know whether he could vote for death, but subsequently explained that he could not do so under any circumstances. Similar responses were elicited from prospective jurors Herce, Williams and Johnson. All these prospective jurors were properly excused for cause. Defendant additionally argues that each of the foregoing challenges for cause were improper because the trial court failed to inform the prospective jurors of their duty to subordinate their personal views regarding the death penalty and to obey the laws of this state. We rejected that argument in People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pages 768-769.
Defendant contends that three items of evidence were erroneously admitted at the penalty phase. We find no prejudicial error. 1. The pornographic magazine. (23) After defendant presented numerous witnesses attesting to his character and background, the prosecutor (1) introduced, on rebuttal, evidence that defendant read pornographic magazines, and (2) offered into evidence over defendant's objection a magazine found in his bedroom. The magazine, Sweet Virgins, featured apparently young girls in pornographic poses. The trial court admitted the magazine. Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in doing so. (See Evid. Code, § 352.) Under the 1977 death penalty law applicable to this case, evidence of defendant's character was admissible even if it did not relate to any specific mitigating or aggravating factor. ( People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 773; see People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 791 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113] [rebuttal evidence]; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772, 775-776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) Here, the prosecutor offered the magazine in an attempt to rebut or balance the image of defendant presented by defense witnesses of a studious, artistic intellectual. In our view, trial courts should exercise great caution before admitting evidence of a defendant's private reading material, especially where the relevance of such material to the issues in the case is slight. Nonetheless, as we stated recently, The scope of admissible evidence as to the defendant's character and background must ... be very broad in capital cases, in light of the nature of the jury's penalty decision. ( People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 68 [201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433].) We conclude that no abuse of discretion is shown here. 2. The autopsy protocol. (24) The People also admitted over objection an autopsy report which, in dry, technical jargon, described victim Salazar's various wounds and injuries, and the surgical procedures performed before and after her death. The trial court previously had excluded the protocol from the guilt phase as largely irrelevant, but the court admitted it at the penalty phase as relevant to the manner in which defendant killed his victim. We have held that similar penalty phase evidence is admissible in the court's discretion for the purpose of showing the degree of violence involved, because such evidence bears on the aggravation of the crime and the penalty issue. ( People v. Fields, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 372-373 [gruesome photo of victim].) No abuse of discretion appears here. 3. The victim's photograph. As previously discussed, the court admitted a large portrait photograph of victim Salazar at the guilt phase. According to defendant, the prosecutor continued to refer to and use the photograph during the penalty phase arguments, in an attempt to gain sympathy for the victim and her family. (25a) We have held that some appeals to sympathy are proper at the penalty phase where the jury must weigh the sympathetic elements of defendant's background against those that may offend the conscience, so long as no wholly irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric is employed. ( People v. Haskett (1981) 30 Cal.3d 841, 863 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776]; see People v. Fields, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 362, fn. 14.) (26) (See fn. 5.), (25b) Although trial courts should discourage use of the victim's photograph solely to invoke a sympathetic reaction at the penalty phase, any error here was clearly harmless and could not have affected the verdict. [5] We observe that the prosecutor, during her penalty phase arguments, referred to the impact of Tina's death upon her parents, a subject arguably inappropriate under the recent decision in Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. ___ [96 L.Ed.2d 440, 107 S.Ct. 2529], barring testimony or statements from a victim's family regarding the impact upon them arising from the victim's death. Thus, the prosecutor stated Who else is the victim in this case? The parent of that child. I would suspect that not one of you on this jury has not at one time or another had the occasion to find some small child ... to be missing. [¶] Think a minute when you don't find the child.... Think that the next time you see that child she's in the hospital and she doesn't talk to you and she never talks to you again. [¶] Perhaps the ultimate horror in this crime, the comparison ... between the way defendant in this case treated these children, did not care about them, was concerned for himself, his safety, unconcerned about them, about Tina, about Michelle.... [¶] It's that that makes this crime the most horrible of all horrible crimes. The brutal, unconsidering, vicious act of the defendant. Compared with the love that the family has for these  these little girls. Unlike Booth, where the jury was given lengthy, detailed statements from family members regarding the actual impact of the victim's death upon their lives, here the prosecutor's remarks were confined to matters already obvious to any juror. Accordingly, the Booth decision is patently distinguishable. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 113.) Moreover, these remarks did not focus on the effect on the family but instead simply distinguished defendant's treatment of his victims from the treatment they received from their loving families. Accordingly, assuming Booth would apply to prosecutorial argument of this kind, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
As previously indicated, the prosecutor at the penalty phase was permitted, over objection, to present evidence that defendant had committed a forcible kidnapping of a young girl in Albany and had been convicted of that offense. (27) Because the crime occurred three months after the Salazar murder, defendant now contends that the evidence of the Albany kidnapping was inadmissible because it did not involve a prior offense. The point lacks merit. Under the 1977 death penalty law applicable here, the People were permitted to present evidence as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including ... the presence or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence.... (Former § 190.3, italics added.) The same section provided that, in deciding penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account (b) The presence or absence of [forceful or violent] criminal activity by the defendant ... Neither of these provisions was limited to prior criminal activity. The section also contained, however, two further references to the subject. One unnumbered paragraph of former section 190.3 excluded evidence of other criminal activity which did not involve force or violence, while another paragraph excluded evidence of  prior criminal activity (italics added) for an offense of which defendant was acquitted. Neither of these latter two paragraphs is applicable here, and we find no legislative intent to limit the penalty phase evidence to forceful or violent criminal activity which preceded the charged offense. In light of the penalty jury's role, it would be anomalous to exclude from its consideration highly relevant evidence regarding the defendant's violent character and background. (See People v. Bentley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 458, 460 [24 Cal. Rptr. 685, 374 P.2d 645] [subsequent crime admissible at penalty phase].) People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201-204 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480], supports our conclusion. There, we construed the language of the 1978 death penalty law, permitting consideration of the defendant's violent or nonviolent  prior felony convictions (italics added) as limited to nonviolent convictions entered before the charged offense was committed. Significantly, we observed that as to violent crimes, Subdivision (b) [of § 190.3] allows in all evidence of violent criminality to show defendant's propensity for violence. (P. 202, italics in original.) We so stated despite the fact that other language in section 190.3 provided (in language identical to the 1977 law discussed above) that no evidence of prior criminal activity shall be admitted for an offense of which defendant was acquitted. Balderas thereby implicitly rejected the present argument that one isolated inclusion of the word prior in section 190.3 disclosed an intent generally to limit the admission of evidence of defendant's violent criminal activity. Nor can we think of any sound policy reason for limiting the penalty phase evidence in the manner suggested by defendant. Similarly, we see no abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting the People to explore the details of the Albany kidnapping, rather than restricting them to proof of the bare fact of that offense. Defendant now suggests that the trial court should have merely admitted proof of the prior conviction, without the sordid details, but former section 190.3 contained no such restriction on proof of forcible or violent criminal activity. We conclude that the circumstances surrounding defendant's subsequent offense were properly admitted. (See People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301]; People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 68; People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 773.)
Defendant next complains of various asserted misconduct by the prosecutor during the course of her jury arguments at the penalty phase. As will appear, no prejudicial misconduct occurred. (28) First, defendant points to repeated statements by the prosecutor that defendant's crime was the worst possible or the most incredibly horrible crime one might commit. Defendant acknowledges that the prosecutor is entitled to comment on the gravity of the offense in penalty arguments (see People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 863-864), but he contends that in the present case the prosecutor went further and implied a benchmark for comparison that was not in evidence, supposedly based on her experience as a prosecutor. (See People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 212-213 [152 Cal. Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396].) We disagree. The prosecutor's hyperbole suggesting that defendant's crime was the worst possible crime one might commit did not purport to be based on any secret information known only to the prosecutor. Moreover, under the circumstances of the present case, the prosecutor's remark constituted a reasonably fair comment on the evidence. We also note that defendant failed to object to the comment or seek an appropriate admonition. (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) Next, defendant points to a reference by the prosecutor suggesting that defendant may have shared the same genocidal theories as Adolph Hitler. Thus, the prosecutor stated: Nothing unusual about this [selective breeding] theory. A lot of people have had it. Hitler, good old Hitler. Hitler wrote poetry. You know, wrote a couple of other things too, and he had some real interesting theories on selective  selection and genetics breeding. The record indicates that the foregoing remarks were made in response to defense evidence indicating that defendant was a serious student and poet, and referred to extensive prosecution evidence revealing that defendant had expressed strong views on genetic engineering (selectively breeding for intelligence), including the necessity of kill[ing] off the people to begin a new race. Thus, the prosecutor's remarks were not entirely inappropriate or unlinked to the evidence, unlike the cases cited by defendant. (See United States v. Hawkins (1973) 156 App.D.C. 259 [480 F.2d 1151, 1154] [references to Napoleon, Hitler, Sirhan and others]; People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 396-397 [326 P.2d 457] [comparison to Caryl Chessman improper but harmless error].) We think a case closer on point is People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 762-763 [114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267], where a prosecutor's comparison of the defendant to the Marquis de Sade was upheld on the basis, in part, that the prosecutor's remark was not inappropriate in view of the evidence in the case, and that the prosecutor certainly had a right to point out to the jury that modest behavior ... in the courtroom, is not inconsistent with depraved conduct under other circumstances, and his recourse to history and literature to make this point was not improper under the circumstances. (29) In a supplemental brief, defendant complains of the prosecutor's inquiries, on cross-examination of defendant's character witnesses (family members), as to whether or not defendant expressed any remorse for his crime. (The questions were answered with the uniform response that defendant had neither admitted the offense nor discussed it with these witnesses.) According to defendant, this questioning was improper because it focused upon his failure to confess and, accordingly, violated his privilege against self-incrimination. (See Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454 [68 L.Ed.2d 359, 101 S.Ct. 1866]; Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 [49 L.Ed.2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240] [questioning regarding defendant's post-arrest silence]; People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1168-1169 [80 Cal. Rptr. 920, 459 P.2d 248].) Although prosecutorial comment or questioning regarding a defendant's silence may be improper in some instances, here the prosecutor's very limited inquiries regarding defendant's expressions of remorse to his relatives were met with unhelpful, negative responses, so any error was clearly harmless. The prosecutor made no effort to draw adverse inferences from defendant's mere silence. Moreover, as to remorse, we have held that, under a prior death penalty law, the presence or absence of remorse is a factor relevant to the jury's penalty decision. ( People v. Coleman, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1168.) In addition, we recently observed that The concept of remorse for past offenses as a mitigating factor sometimes warranting less severe punishment or condemnation is universal. ( People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 771.) As in Ghent, the prosecutor's questioning herein was relevant in demonstrating the absence of that particular mitigating factor. (Both Ghent and the present case were tried under the 1977 death penalty law. In light of possible differences in admissibility standards between the 1977 and 1978 laws [see People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776], we express no opinion regarding the propriety of such comments under the 1978 death penalty law.) (30) Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when, during arguments regarding the appropriate penalty, she observed that Laws can change, people can escape and the crime is too awful.... [T]he risk is too great and the crime is too awful. No parent should ever, ever have to find their daughter like that. According to defendant, the prosecutor's reference to changing laws and risks amounted to comment upon the possibility that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole might be commuted by the Governor. (See People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 155-158 [180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908] [instructing regarding commutation power unconstitutional under state Constitution].) Ramos and its rationale would indeed preclude either court or counsel from advising the jury regarding the Governor's commutation power, and the prosecutor should have avoided any argument which might have diverted the jury's attention to the question whether defendant might some day be paroled. But the prosecutor's statement in the present case was too indefinite and imprecise to have prejudiced defendant. Rather than comment upon the possibility of parole or commutation, the prosecutor merely noted the possibility of an unspecified change in laws, or an escape from prison. Although these matters likewise were extraneous to the penalty determination (see Ramos at pp. 157-159), they were also matters of common knowledge appreciated by every juror who must choose between a death sentence and a sentence of life without parole. The prosecutor's argument herein was far less objectionable than the example cited in Ramos of a prosecutor speculating that some future Governor might accept bribes for commuting prison sentences. ( Id., at p. 157, fn. 11; see also People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 287-288 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 769-770.) We conclude that no prejudicial misconduct occurred here.
The penalty jury was instructed, in the words of former section 190.3, subdivision (j), that in determining penalty the jury should consider, take into account and be guided by various facts and circumstances, including Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. (31a) Defendant contends that this instruction was inadequate without additional clarifying instructions (proposed by him, but rejected by the court) which explain the broad scope of the jury's sentencing discretion, including the propriety of considering such mitigating or sympathy factors as the defendant's character and background. [6] As we held in People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, footnote 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], the unadorned language quoted above is potentially confusing because it might be understood by the jury to preclude consideration of a defendant's general character and background evidence. (32) Moreover, in People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 777, we observed that, by reason of a recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court, we must review the record in each case to determine whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, and read in conjunction with the prosecutor's arguments, adequately informed the jury of its responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the case. (See California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 546 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 943, 107 S.Ct. 837] (conc. opn. by O'Connor, J.), 561 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 952] (dis. opn. by Brennan, J.), 563 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 953] (dis. opn. by Blackmun, J.)) (31b) We have undertaken such a review, and we conclude that there exists no legitimate basis (see opn. of O'Connor, J., id., at p. 546 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 943]) for believing that the jury was misled regarding its sentencing responsibilities. In the present case, in addition to giving the catchall instruction of subdivision (j), the court preceded its penalty phase instructions by telling the jury that In determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of the case. (Italics added.) Thus, the jury probably realized that it could consider the extensive testimony regarding defendant's character and background, including testimony from his father, mother, brother, several friends, former classmates, coworkers, and a psychiatrist. Indeed, both defense counsel and the prosecutor devoted substantial portions of their closing arguments to reviewing and weighing the various character and background evidence that had been admitted at the penalty phase. Thus, the prosecutor, after reviewing the aggravating circumstances for the jury, then stated that The next question you have to address is the question of mitigation. Is there any way from what you heard or any other factors you can draw upon, is there any possible way that you can explain, excuse, understand in any form, the defendant and his behavior .... (Italics added.) The prosecutor reviewed defendant's background and character evidence, concluding that it tells us very little, if anything.... Thereafter, defense counsel attempted to rebut the prosecutor's arguments by reviewing the evidence purportedly showing defendant's good side. [7] In light of the respective jury arguments, it is inconceivable that the jury failed to understand that it was permitted to consider this evidence in deciding the appropriate penalty.
(33) Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing a proposed instruction which would have precluded the jury from considering as an aggravating factor any evidence not included in the statutory list of such factors read to the jury. As we pointed out in People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pages 772-776, while the 1978 death penalty law requires the jury's penalty determination to be based on a weighing of the specific statutory factors, the 1977 law (under which defendant herein was tried) appears to permit consideration of a broader range of evidence, including aggravating evidence of the defendant's character and mental condition even if it did not relate to any specific aggravating or mitigating factor. [Citation.] ( Id., at p. 772; see People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 773.) Thus, defendant's proposed instruction was inappropriate under the 1977 death penalty law. Moreover, the failure to instruct regarding consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors clearly would be harmless unless defendant could point to some evidence which was admitted bearing on such factors. Defendant cites the pornographic magazine and the prosecutor's reference to defendant's selective breeding theories, but as we have previously discussed, such evidence was properly admitted in rebuttal as relevant to the penalty issue.
(34a) Defendant asserts that the trial court inadequately responded to various inquiries from the jury during its deliberations. We find no error was committed. The jury inquired whether there [is] any way our verdict could be changed if we gave life imprisonment without possibility of parole  our concern is that [defendant] would be paroled in later years. The jury also asked how many persons sentenced to life without parole subsequently have been paroled. Finally, the jury inquired, Does the death penalty automatically go to appeal? In response to all these inquiries, the trial court, with the concurrence of both counsel, responded that You must not speculate or consider matters not presented by way of legal evidence. Rather, you must follow the law as the court gave it to you and make the decisions following that law in accordance with the facts as you determine them to be from the evidence. [¶] Your responsibility is to reach a verdict to the best of your own ability following that procedure. You must do that without speculation concerning questions or matters outside of that which has been presented to you here in court as law or evidence. We think the trial court's noncommittal response was sufficient, requiring the jury to follow the court's instructions and weigh the evidence without speculating on extraneous matters. In People v. Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at page 159, footnote 12, we considered a similar question arising in the context of the 1978 death penalty law, stating that when the jury itself raises the commutation issue during deliberations, the matter obviously cannot be avoided and is probably best handled by a short statement indicating that the Governor's commutation power applies to both sentences [life without parole and death] but emphasizing that it would be a violation of the juror's duty to consider the possibility of such commutation in determining the appropriate sentence. (Cf. People v. Morse [1964] 60 Cal.2d 631, 648 [36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810].) In the present case, of course, the trial court did not have the benefit of Ramos 's admonition, but nonetheless sufficiently anticipated our concern that the jury be admonished not to speculate regarding the possibility of commutation. We see no likelihood of prejudice from the fact that the trial court failed to give the further explanation that the Governor's commutation power would apply to both a life without parole sentence and a death sentence. Similarly, we find the trial court's reply an adequate response to the jury's inquiry regarding automatic appeals. (35) As a general rule, the jury should not be advised regarding the availability of an appeal in death cases, because such information may dilute the jury's sense of responsibility in fixing the penalty. (See People v. Morse, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 649-651; People v. Linden (1959) 52 Cal.2d 1, 27 [338 P.2d 397].) (34b) Yet it would be inaccurate and misleading to advise the jury, upon inquiry, that a death judgment was final and unreviewable. The trial court's response, quoted above, was a satisfactory way of redirecting the jury's attention to its proper sentencing responsibilities without misinforming them regarding the availability of an appeal.
(36) Defendant contends that he was improperly excluded from proceedings convened to reread certain psychiatric testimony at the jury's request. Defense counsel purported to waive defendant's presence, but defendant now challenges the effectiveness of the waiver. As we previously observed in discussing a similar guilt phase contention, defendant is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him, and the burden is on defendant to demonstrate that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a fair and impartial trial. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 309-310.) The rereading of testimony ordinarily would not be an event which bears a substantial relation to the defendant's opportunity to defend, and nothing in the present record indicates that defendant's personal presence would have assisted the defense in any way. Defendant's suggestion that the jury might have been favorably influenced by defendant's reactions to the reread testimony (which involved psychiatric testimony regarding his mental state) is entirely speculative and fails to carry his burden of establishing prejudice. Defendant relies on Bustamante v. Eyeman (9th Cir.1972) 456 F.2d 269, but that case is not controlling. There, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for further proceedings to determine whether a criminal defendant was prejudiced by being excluded from the rereading of the court's instructions to the jury. The remand was deemed necessary because the appellate record was entirely silent as to what transpired during the rereading of the instructions  no transcript of the proceedings was provided. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that nothing further occurred during the session other than replaying the judge's tape-recorded instructions. Accordingly, both the district court and court of appeals ultimately concluded that any error in excluding defendant was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Bustamante v. Cardwell (9th Cir.1974) 497 F.2d 556, 557-558.) In the present case, the record merely shows that various portions of testimony were reread to the jury, and defendant does not contend that any other exchanges between the judge and jury, or counsel and jury, took place. Accordingly, like the federal courts in Bustamante, we conclude that any error in excluding defendant from the proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See also People v. Conrad (1973) 31 Cal. App.3d 308, 323-324 [107 Cal. Rptr. 421] [neither defendant nor his counsel was present at rereading of district attorney's opening argument]; People v. Morales (1943) 60 Cal. App.2d 196, 200-201 [140 P.2d 461] [defendant absent from rereading of jury instructions].)