Opinion ID: 1763209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claims Alleged in the Complaint

Text: Before responding to the question dealing with when the statutory limitations period begins to run, we must first assess the viability of causes of action alleged in the complaint sounding in tort and in breach of warranty.
With respect to tort claims, the complaint alleges negligence, wantonness, and claims under the AEMLD. In a secondary question, the Eleventh Circuit asks us to validate its assumption that the AEMLD subsumes preexisting remedies at common law. We noted in Keck v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 830 So.2d 1 (Ala. 2002), that the AEMLD, announced in Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128 (Ala.1976), is a judicially created accommodation of Alabama law to the doctrine of strict liability for damage or injuries caused by allegedly defective products. 830 So.2d at 5. We cannot deduce from this Court's announcement of the AEMLD in Casrell that the common law was thereby abrogated by negative inference. As we said in Keck, Judicial decision-making should not be seen as the opportunity to legislate and, to the extent Casrell stands as an example of judicial legislation, it is time for this Court to defer to the Legislature for further expansion of the sweep of its holding. 830 So.2d at 8. Spain's negligence and wantonness claims are, at this stage of the proceedings, viable alternatives to his AEMLD claim.
Spain abandoned his express-warranty claims during oral argument at the Eleventh Circuit. As to the implied-warranty claim, the Eleventh Circuit stated: Unless the Alabama Supreme Court tells us differently, we are convinced that the complaint does not state a claim for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Spain, 230 F.3d at 1310-11. In light of Shell v. Union Oil Co., 489 So.2d 569 (Ala.1986), and Yarbrough v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 So.2d 478 (Ala.1993), in which this Court declined to permit claims arising out of the use of allegedly unreasonably dangerous products to be redressed under the Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC), instead remitting the parties to remedies under the AEMLD, we cannot so limit the scope of the remedy for breach of an implied warranty. In Shell v. Union Oil Co ., Shell alleged breach of warranty of merchantability because a naphtha product, purchased by his employer and then provided to him, contained benzene, a cancer-causing agent. He alleged that the benzene was not `fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.' 489 So.2d at 571 (quoting § 7-2-314(2)(c), Ala.Code 1975). He further alleged that, because benzene was a cancer-causing substance, benzene was unreasonably dangerous and was not merchantable. The defendants, the suppliers of the naphtha product, moved for a summary judgment. The evidence showed that the naphtha product was purchased by [Shell's employer] on a bid basis, in compliance with its specifications, which limited the amount of benzene any shipment could contain. Shell, 489 So.2d at 570. Upon delivery [of the naphtha product, the employer] tested a random sampling of the shipments to assure that they conformed to its specifications. Id. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, Shell raised three issues: (1) Was there a duty owed, i.e., was there an implied promise? (2) If so, was that duty breached, i.e., was the promise unperformed? and (3) Did that duty extend to [Shell], i.e., was the obligation of performance intended for Shell's protection ...? 489 So.2d at 570. Shell argued that the defendants had breached the implied warranty of merchantability because the [naphtha product] supplied by Defendants caused cancer, it could not be `fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used'; that is, because this is a cancer-causing substance, it is unreasonably dangerous, and, therefore, cannot be merchantable. 489 So.2d at 571. As to that argument, this Court stated: Such an argument ignores the clear distinction between causes of action arising under tort law and those under the U.C.C. as adopted in Alabama. A Texas court recognized that distinction in Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.Civ.App.1977): `[U.C.C.] law, whose statutory language makes no reference to tort law in connection with products liability, concerns itself with the quality of the product by establishing standards of merchantability for a particular purpose... [while the tort law] concerns itself with safety standards by imposing strict liability upon one who sells an unreasonably dangerous product which causes physical harm. The considerations supporting either of the principles are not affected by the considerations underlying the other, and the standards of quality of a product, with the attendant risk of the bargain, are entirely distinct from its standards of safety, with a possible unreasonable risk of harm. It follows that a violation of the standards of safety which results in physical harm to the unreasonably dangerous product itself subjects the seller to the tort rule of strict liability.' 553 S.W.2d at 940. See, generally, Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128 (Ala.1976); and Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134 (Ala.1976). Whether this product was unreasonably dangerous, therefore, is not a question properly addressed in an action brought under the provisions of the U.C.C. That question could properly be raised in an action brought under Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (A.E.M.L.D.), but not in this U.C.C. action for breach of warranty. To cover the initial bare bones question (Was there a duty owed?) with flesh, we should reask the question: Did the sale of the subject product give rise to an implied warranty of merchantability in the sense that these two manufacturers promised the employee that he would not be injured by his use of or contact with their product? The answer must be made in the context of § 7-2-314: `[Whether this product was] fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.' In this instance, the productmade to [the employer's] specificationsperformed the job it was intended to do; and the manufacturers' warnings and precautions, accompanying the products, were in keeping with their knowledge of its inherent dangers. Thus, any duty arising under this section of the Code was not breached. Indeed, more precisely, these undisputed facts do not give rise to a warranty of merchantability, as contended by Shell. The implied warranty mandated by this section of the U.C.C. is one of commercial fitness and suitability, and a private right of action is afforded only where the user or consumer is injured by the breach of that warranty. That is to say, the U.C.C. does not impose upon the seller the broader obligation to warrant against health hazards inherent in the use of the product when the warranty of commercial fitness has been complied with. Those injured by the use of or contact with such a product, under these circumstances, must find their remedy outside the warranty remedies afforded by the U.C.C. For an excellent discussion of this subject, see J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-7, pp. 350-353 (2d ed.1980). Shell, 489 So.2d at 571-72 (emphasis in final paragraph original; other emphasis added). Thus, Shell turns on the fact that the naphtha product was fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. 489 So.2d at 571. Shell does not stand for the proposition that a product unfit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used cannot be unmerchantable. In Yarbrough v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, the Yarbroughs had purchased a kerosene heater from Sears. A decal on the heater warned against using gasoline in the kerosene heater. The manufacturer included instructions and warnings with the heater, including several warnings against using gasoline in the kerosene heater. About one year after purchasing the heater, Mr. Yarbrough purchased fuel from a gasoline-type fuel pump labeled `kerosene' and filled the heater with the fuel. 628 So.2d at 480. Some time after the Yarbroughs lit the heater, which was in the kitchen, they heard a `poof' noise from the kitchen. Id. The heater had caught fire. The fire destroyed the Yarbroughs' home and their personal belongings. The experts for the plaintiffs and for the defendants agreed that the fire resulted from using gasoline rather than kerosene as the fuel in the kerosene heater. The Yarbroughs sued Sears and the manufacturer of the kerosene heater, alleging a violation of the AEMLD and breach of implied and express warranties. This Court summarized the Yarbroughs' claim as being to the effect that the defendants breached the implied warranty of merchantability because the kerosene heater was unreasonably dangerous and therefore could not be merchantable. Yarbrough, 628 So.2d at 483. The defendants moved for a summary judgment. The Yarbroughs did not present any evidence indicating that the heater was [un]fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. Shell, 489 So.2d at 571. In fact, the Yarbroughs' own expert admitted that the destruction of the Yarbroughs' house and personal belongings was the result of using gasoline, as opposed to kerosene, in the kerosene heater. Yarbrough, 628 So.2d at 480. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Yarbroughs appealed. On the issue of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, this Court held: `Such an argument ignores the clear distinction between causes of action arising under tort law and those arising under the U.C.C. as adopted in Alabama.' Shell v. Union Oil Co., 489 So.2d 569, 571 (Ala.1986). Whether the kerosene heater was unreasonably dangerous is not a question properly addressed in a claim alleging breach of warranty under the U.C.C., but it could be, and was, properly raised in a claim under the AEMLD. Yarbrough, 628 So.2d at 483. In each case alleging a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the determination whether there was a breach requires a fact-intensive analysis. In paragraph 21 of his complaint, Spain alleged that the cigarettes designed, manufactured, and sold by the manufacturers were not fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used. Thus, he alleged a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Because this case is before the Eleventh Circuit on a motion to dismiss, the record before us does not contain any evidence indicating that the cigarettes smoked by Carolyn were fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used. Therefore, this case is factually distinguishable from Shell and Yarbrough. Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So.2d 1065 (Ala.1993), was decided seven days after the decision in Yarbrough was released. In Allen, Beverly Allen bought two bags of celery hearts from a Delchamps grocery store, which had inspected sample bags of celery at its warehouse for freshness and quality. After Allen washed and ate a piece of raw celery, she had an anaphylactic-shock reaction. Three days later, her husband took the two bags of celery to a laboratory for testing. The laboratory found that the unopened bag of celery contained 1.2 parts per million of sodium bisulfite and that the opened bag contained.5 parts per million of sodium bisulfite. One of Allen's treating doctors determined that Allen, an asthmatic, was sensitive to metabisulfites. There was evidence presented that 1.2 percent of the world population are asthmatics, that approximately 8 percent of asthmatics are sensitive to sulfites, and that approximately .096 percent of the world population are asthmatics who are sensitive to sulfites. Allen, 624 So.2d at 1066. The Allens sued Delchamps, alleging negligence, wantonness, violations of the AEMLD, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under § 7-2-314, Ala.Code 1975. Delchamps moved for a summary judgment on all claims. The trial court granted the motion and certified the summary judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. 624 So.2d at 1067. The Allens appealed. We held, in pertinent part: In regard to their AEMLD claim, the plaintiffs must prove that Mrs. Allen `suffered injury or damages to [herself] or [her] property by one who sold a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer.' Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134, 141 (Ala.1976). Similarly, the plaintiffs' implied warranty of merchantability claim requires that the plaintiffs show that the goods were unmerchantable or unfit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used. Ala.Code 1975, § 7-2-314. These two standards `go hand-in-hand,' at least as applied to food products, `for it is apparent that a food product is defective or unreasonably dangerous if it is unmerchantable or unfit for human consumption.' Cain v. Sheraton Perimeter Park S. Hotel, 592 So.2d 218, 220 (Ala.1991) ( quoting Ex parte Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc., 431 So.2d 975, 977 (Ala.1983)). Allen, 624 So.2d at 1068 (emphasis added). This Court held that [w]hether sulfite preservatives on fresh produce are within the reasonable expectations of a consumer is a question for a jury. Id. In Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d 903 (Ala.1999), the plaintiff Aaron Tucker bought a new Chevrolet Camaro automobile from the dealer. Shortly after he bought the automobile, it began stalling while Tucker was driving. He testified by deposition that it stalled about three times per week. Tucker returned the automobile to the dealer several times, but the stalling problem persisted. Thereafter, while Tucker was driving the automobile, the automobile stalled, and Tucker lost the power steering and the power brakes. The automobile left the roadway and collided with a utility pole. Tucker was injured. The automobile was repaired, but the stalling problem continued. On another occasion, about one year later, the automobile stalled and would not restart. Because it was the Fourth of July weekend, Tucker could not have the automobile towed until the next day. Tucker left the automobile by the side of the road overnight, and it was vandalized. The dealer refused to repair the automobile. Tucker sued, alleging breach of express warranties and breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The defendants, the automobile manufacturer and the automobile dealer, moved for a summary judgment. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Tucker appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the summary judgment on the breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose. We granted Tucker's petition for a writ of certiorari. On the breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, this Court held: As the Court of Civil Appeals held, `[t]o establish his claim of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, Tucker must `prove the existence of the implied warranty, a breach of that warranty, and damages proximately resulting from that breach.'' [ Tucker v. General Motors Corp., ] 769 So.2d [895,] 901 [ (Ala.Civ.App.1998) ] (quoting Barrington Corp. v. Patrick Lumber Co., 447 So.2d 785, 787 (Ala.Civ.App.1984), quoting, in turn, Storey v. Day Heating and Air Conditioning Co., 56 Ala.App. 81, 83, 319 So.2d 279, 280 (1975)). Because this case is before this Court on appeal from a summary judgment in favor of GM and Bishop, we are concerned only with whether Tucker presented substantial evidence of each of these three factors so as to create a jury question. As we have mentioned above, the only evidence in the record is Tucker's deposition and his affidavit. They contain uncontroverted evidence that Tucker purchased the car in question from Bishop [the automobile dealer]. It appears undisputed that Bishop is a `seller' of automobiles, as that term is defined in § 7-2-103, Ala.Code 1975. Thus, § 7-2-314's requirement that the seller be a `merchant with respect to goods of that kind' is met, and the record shows that Tucker has presented substantial evidence of the existence of the implied warranty. The record also contains evidence tending to establish a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, because there was undisputed evidence tending to show that the car stalled repeatedly while Tucker was driving it and that Bishop failed to correct the problem when he took the car to Bishop for repair. Bishop does not dispute that evidence indicating that the car had a stalling problem was presented; it contends that this evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question whether it breached an implied warranty of merchantability. Bishop argues that to create a genuine issue of material fact, Tucker was required to present expert testimony as to why the car stalled. Bishop relies on Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 579 So.2d 1328 (Ala.1991), and Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So.2d 991 (Ala.1981), as support for its argument that expert testimony was necessary in this case. Bishop argues that Tucker was required to present expert testimony identifying the specific cause of his car's stalling problem in order to avoid the entry of a summary judgment. [Bishop] argues: `In [ Haven Hills Farm ], a fittingly [analogous] case, a buyer brought a products liability claim for a defective car tire. The Supreme Court in [ Haven Hills Farm ] equated the legal burden in a products liability case to that of the Plaintiff's burden in a breach of warranty case. [395 So.2d] at 995. In both types of cases, the Plaintiff must prove a defect, which rendered the product not fit for its anticipated useand the defect links to the defendant.' Bishop's Brief at 11. Bishop also cites Brooks as support for its argument. Bishop's reliance on Brooks and Haven Hills Farm is, however, misplaced. Those cases involved claims brought under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (`AEMLD'). The AEMLD doctrine is based in tort law, having evolved from negligence law and having been influenced by Restatement (Second) of Torts. Haven Hills Farm, 395 So.2d at 993-94. Under the AEMLD, a plaintiff is required to prove, among other things, that a product is unreasonably dangerous as a result of a defect and that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the defect. Id. at 994. We are aware, of course, that in defining `defect,' this Court incorporated into AEMLD law some of the analysis applicable in cases arising, as does this one, under the UCC doctrine of the implied warranty of merchantability. Id. Specifically, this Court has combined the doctrine of `fitness for the ordinary purpose intended' of UCC law and the tort concept of `unreasonably dangerous' in defining `defect.' See Haven Hills Farm, supra, for further discussion of AEMLD law. We do not believe the fact that this Court borrowed some principles from UCC law in developing a definition of `defect,' as that term is used in AEMLD cases, forces the conclusion that principles of AEMLD law are always applicable in cases involving the implied warranty of merchantability. In fact, this Court has continued to recognize the clear distinction between AEMLD law and UCC law. See Yarbrough v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 So.2d 478 (Ala.1993), and Shell v. Union Oil Co., 489 So.2d 569 (Ala.1986). Finally, we note that this Court has previously affirmed judgments entered against defendants in breach-of-warranty cases where the plaintiffs did not present the kind of expert testimony Bishop argues is required here. See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So.2d 1301 (Ala.1991), and Ford Motor Co., Inc. v. Phillips, 551 So.2d 992 (Ala.1989). Alabama law does not require that an expert witness testify in every case involving an alleged malfunction of a product where the plaintiff has sued alleging a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Given the uncontradicted evidence in this case, we conclude that Tucker presented substantial evidence of a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and of damage and thereby created a genuine issue of material fact. Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d at 912-13 (emphasis on expert testimony in second full paragraph of quoted material original; other emphasis added). Thus, a claim alleging breach of an implied warranty of merchantability is separate and distinct from an AEMLD claim and is viable to redress an injury caused by an unreasonably dangerous product.