Opinion ID: 2582014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: History of the IWA

Text: The legislature enacted the IWA in 1913 to protect women and minors from inadequate wages and unsanitary labor conditions. LAWS OF 1913, ch. 174, §§ 1-21. It did not initially define the term employer. Id. In 1973, the legislature substantially revised the IWA and extended protection to all employees, including men, women, and minors. LAWS OF 1973, 2d Ex.Sess., ch. 16, § 2. For the first time, the 1973 amendments defined employer as any person, firm, corporation, partnership, business trust, legal representative, or other business entity which engages in any business, industry, profession, or activity in this state and employs one or more employees. Former RCW 49.12.005(3) (1973) (emphasis added). The Department of Labor and Industries first promulgated rules implementing requirements of the IWA in 1974. The rules defined employer using exactly the same language as former RCW 49.12.005(3) (1973), only adding the phrase unless exempted by chapter 49.12 RCW or these rules. WAC 296-126-002(1). WAC 296-126-001 further defined the applicability of the statute to include any person employed in any industry or occupation, unless [s]uch person is an employee of the state or any political subdivision, or municipal corporation to the extent that these rules conflict with any statute, rule or regulation adopted under the authority of the appropriate legislative body. WAC 296-126-001(4). In 1976, additional rules were promulgated regarding requirements for employee meal and rest periods. WAC 296-126-092. Those rules prohibited employees from working more than five consecutive hours without a meal period and required that employees be allowed a rest period for each four hours of working time. Id. In 1988, the legislature again amended the IWA to include family care leave requirements. LAWS OF 1988, ch. 236, §§ 1-7. The 1988 amendment expressly applied the new sections of the IWA to public employers. Id. § 8(3) (for the purposes of sections 1 through 7 of this 1988 act [employer] also includes the state, any state institution, any state agency, political subdivisions of the state, and any municipal corporation or quasi-municipal corporation.). The legislature amended the IWA again in 1998 to add a provision regarding employee work apparel and made the provision expressly applicable to public employees. LAWS OF 1998, ch. 334, § 2. The 2003 amendment was enacted immediately following the trial court's decision in this case solely for the purpose of [c]larifying the application of the [IWA] to public employers. FINAL BILL REP. ON S.S.B. 6054, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.2003). The legislature observed that while certain provisions are applicable to employees of the State, it is unclear whether the remainder of the act applies to public employees. Id. It also recognized that some state employees are subject to collectively bargained schedules that depart from regular nine-hour shifts, and it made specific reference to the [c]urrent litigation. Id. The legislature concluded that it had the authority to correct an inaccurate understanding of the law, particularly if the amendment is enacted during a controversy regarding the meaning of the law. Id. The legislature clarified that, prior to the effective date of this act, chapter 49.12 RCW and the rules adopted thereunder did not apply to the state or its agencies and political subdivisions except as expressly provided for in RCW 49.12.265 through 49.12.295, 49.12.350 through 49.12.370, 49.12.450, and 49.12.460. LAWS OF 2003, ch. 401, § 1; see also id. § 2(3)(a). [3]
Employees argue that the IWA has unambiguously defined employer to include the State since the legislature extensively revised the statute in 1973 and expanded coverage to all employees in Washington. [4] They do not concede the possibility that the language of chapter 49.12 RCW and chapter 296-126 WAC is ambiguous. The State responds that the plain language of the statute and the rules does not include the State because the language applies only to private industry. The State also contends that even if the statute and rules are ambiguous, the history of the IWA demonstrates that the statute had always been intended to apply only to private industry. Employees further argue that the definition of employer in the IWA includes persons and that the IWA applies to the State because the definition of person under RCW 1.16.080 includes the State. Employees claim that the purpose of the IWA is to protect all employees in the state of Washington, and if public employees were not protected by the IWA, they would be left unprotected. The State responds that public employees have always been subject to, and protected by, civil service laws and regulations. Therefore, according to the State, the Employees' claim that state employees would be left unprotected if not covered by the IWA is false. As the wide gulf between the parties' positions suggests, the definitions of the terms person and employer may be subject to a variety of interpretations. If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, the court must give effect to that plain meaning. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash.2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655 (2002). A statute is ambiguous, however, when it is fairly susceptible to different, reasonable interpretations, either on its face or as applied to particular facts, and must be construed to avoid strained or absurd results. Strain v. W. Travel, Inc., 117 Wash.App. 251, 254, 70 P.3d 158 (2003). Nevertheless, a statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable and courts are not obligated to find ambiguity by seeking out alternate interpretations. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash.2d at 239-40, 59 P.3d 655. Prior to 1988, the language used in RCW 49.12.005(3) arguably was subject to the varying interpretations espoused by the parties in this case. In 1988, however, the legislature adopted legislation specifying that the the state, any state institution, any state agency, political subdivisions of the state, and any municipal corporation or quasi-municipal corporations qualified as an employer for purposes of certain new family care leave provisions of the IWA. LAWS OF 1988, ch. 236, § 8(3). Like the 1988 amendment, the legislature explicitly made the IWA section enacted in 1998 specifically applicable to the State. If the IWA already applied to the State, this language would be superfluous. The legislature is presumed not to include unnecessary language when it enacts legislation. See Davis v. State ex rel. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 969, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (A fundamental canon of construction holds a statute should not be interpreted so as to render one part inoperative.); Judd, 152 Wash.2d at 202, 95 P.3d 337 (no portion of a statute shall be rendered meaningless or superfluous through interpretation). Giving proper effect to the language employed by the legislature in 1988 and 1998, it is clear that at least as of 1988 only those sections of the IWA specified by the legislature applied to the State. We hold, therefore, that the IWA did not apply to the State for the purposes underlying Employees' claims. For this reason, the trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed.
After the trial court concluded the IWA did apply to the State generally in its first summary judgment ruling, the legislature immediately passed legislation intended to retroactively confirm that only specific sections of the IWA apply to public employers. Because we hold that the State was not generally considered an employer under the IWA at least as of 1988, we do not address the retroactivity of the 2003 amendment.