Opinion ID: 626044
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: .The Variance Issue

Text: With the sufficiency protests out of the way, we turn to Tan's claim that a prejudicial variance existed between indictment and proof on the mail-fraud-conspiracy count. Her argument is simple. That count, she says, only charged her with receiv[ing] items through the mail as part of the conspiracy, not with sending them. But the trial evidence, she quickly adds, focused on an exactly opposite theorythat she had only sent items through the mail, not received them. And, she continues, the jury convicted her on the substantive mail-fraud counts for  putting things in the mail, not taking them out.... For that point, she relies on the verdict form, which shows guilty on the substantive mail-fraud counts involving letters mailed from 1UOL, from WMDS, or from 1UOL and WMDS. Reaching her ultimate crescendo, she insists that this discrepancy between the charge (receiving) and the evidence (sending) requires reversal. A variance arises when what was alleged in the indictment differs materially from what was proved at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Yelaun, 541 F.3d 415, 419 (1st Cir.2008). Not every variance calls for reversal, however. See id. A defendant must show that the variance prejudiced her firstsay, by leaving her so in the dark about the charge against her that she could not prepare a defense or plead double jeopardy to stop a second prosecution for the same crime. Id. Variance arguments are often made but seldom succeed. And Tan's must overcome a significant obstacle: because she has débuted it here, our review is limited to plain error. See United States v. Edelkind, 467 F.3d 791, 796 (1st Cir.2006). Plain error, of course, requires an appellant to show (1) error, (2) plainness, (3) prejudice, and (4) an outcome that is a miscarriage of justice or akin to it. Id. at 797. Proving plain error is incredibly difficult, see United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2007), and Tan cannot come close to proving it here. Tan's prejudice theory turns entirely on her belief that the variance crippled her ability to defend against the charge. But in what way? Tan does not say. And we do not think that she was caught off guard in any way, given that the substantive mail-fraud counts (which carried higher penalties than the mail-fraud-conspiracy count) charged her with both sending and receiving items via the mail. The bottom line: even if there were a material variance heresomething we need not and do not decideit did not prejudice Tan's substantial rights, much less do so plainly. [7] Consequently, her variance claim collapses.