Opinion ID: 4553213
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The motion for mediation

Text: {¶ 7} McDougald has filed a motion asking to submit this case to mediation. S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.02 authorizes a party to “file a motion to refer a case to mediation pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 19.01.” Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 19.01(A)(1), we may refer to mediation “any civil case that the Supreme Court deems appropriate.” This case is not appropriate for mediation. {¶ 8} McDougald’s motion for mediation consists of a single sentence, in which he asks us to refer the case to mediation “due to the circumstances and facts of this case.” The motion does not explain what these facts and circumstances are and does not identify any dispute that mediation might help to resolve. As shown below, this case does not involve an ambiguous or overly broad public-records request that a mediator could help to narrow or clarify. The issue in this case is whether McDougald, an inmate in a maximum-security prison, has a statutory right to personally inspect public records (as opposed to receiving copies of those records). Mediation is unlikely to help the parties resolve that disagreement. {¶ 9} We deny McDougald’s motion to refer this case to mediation. 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO B. The merits of McDougald’s public-records claim {¶ 10} Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, requires a public office, upon request, to promptly make public records available for inspection or to provide copies of the records within a reasonable period of time, R.C. 149.43(B)(1). A “public record” is a record “kept by any public office.” R.C. 149.43(A)(1). Mandamus is an appropriate remedy by which to compel compliance with R.C. 149.43. State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b). {¶ 11} To be entitled to the writ, McDougald must demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to the requested relief and that Sehlmeyer has a clear legal duty to provide that relief. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, 142 Ohio St.3d 392, 2015-Ohio-974, 31 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 10. McDougald must prove his right to relief by clear and convincing evidence. Id. However, Ohio’s Public Records Act “is construed liberally in favor of broad access, and any doubt is resolved in favor of disclosure of public records.” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 334 (1996). {¶ 12} In his merit brief, McDougald makes three points. First, he argues that the requested documents are subject to inspection under R.C. 149.43. Second, he argues that Sehlmeyer may not condition his right to inspect the records on the prepayment of any fee. And third, he argues that his status as an incarcerated person does not restrict his rights under R.C. 149.43. {¶ 13} In response, Sehlmeyer does not dispute that the requested documents are public records. But she does deny conditioning McDougald’s right to inspect the records on the payment of a fee. According to Sehlmeyer, she would have been justified in denying McDougald’s request to inspect the records outright. Instead, she “offered an appropriate alternative to give [McDougald] copies of the documents at an appropriate cost.” 4 January Term, 2020 {¶ 14} “ ‘[T]he right of inspection, as opposed to the right to request copies, is not conditioned on the payment of any fee under R.C. 149.43.’ ” State ex rel. Penland v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 158 Ohio St.3d 15, 2019-Ohio-4130, 139 N.E.3d 862, ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Warren Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson, 70 Ohio St.3d 619, 624, 640 N.E.2d 174 (1994). However, the duty to allow inspection of public records “is not absolute.” State ex rel. Nelson v. Fuerst, 66 Ohio St.3d 47, 48, 607 N.E.2d 836 (1993). For example, permitting an inmate to personally inspect records is not required when doing so would create security issues, unreasonably interfere with the officials’ discharge of their duties, and violate prison rules. State ex rel. Dehler v. Mohr, 129 Ohio St.3d 37, 2011-Ohio-959, 950 N.E.2d 156, ¶ 2. Sehlmeyer suggests that that rationale for not permitting personal inspection of the records applies here because McDougald is an inmate in a maximum-security prison. {¶ 15} “ ‘With respect to penal institutions, prison administrators must be accorded deference in adopting    policies and practices to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security.’ ” (Ellipsis in Dehler.) Id., quoting Briscoe v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1109, 2003Ohio-3533, ¶ 16. McDougald has not identified any instance in which a court has overruled the decision of prison officials and ordered them to permit an inmate to inspect records personally. Indeed, precluding maximum-security inmates from conducting in-person inspections of prison records will very often be sensible. There is no justification for granting a writ of mandamus to compel Sehlmeyer to allow an in-person inspection, especially when, as here, the institution has offered to make the records available by other means. {¶ 16} We deny the request for a writ of mandamus. C. Statutory damages {¶ 17} In his merit brief, McDougald demands an award of statutory damages in the amount of $1,000. A person requesting public records is entitled to 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO an award of statutory damages “if a court determines that the public office or the person responsible for [the] public records failed to comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section.” R.C. 149.43(C)(2). However, a requester will qualify for statutory damages only if he “transmits a written request [for the public records] by hand delivery, electronic submission, or certified mail    to the public office or person responsible for the requested public records.” Id. The party seeking statutory damages must prove the method of delivery by clear and convincing evidence. State ex rel. Martin v. Greene, 156 Ohio St.3d 482, 2019Ohio-1827, 129 N.E.3d 419, ¶ 9. McDougald delivered his public-records request through the prison kite system. We have recently held that a prison kite is not one of the delivery methods identified in R.C. 149.43(C)(2), and delivering a request by this method therefore does not allow a requester to ask for statutory damages. State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-3686, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 15-18. We deny the request for statutory damages. D. Court costs {¶ 18} In his complaint, McDougald requests an award of court costs. R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i) authorizes a court to award court costs when it has granted a writ of mandamus. Alternatively, R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(ii) allows a court to award court costs when an official provides records for the first time after a complaint for a writ of mandamus is filed but before the court issues a writ and the court determines that the official acted in bad faith. Neither situation is applicable to the present set of facts, and we therefore deny McDougald’s request for an award of court costs.