Opinion ID: 4350922
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntary Undertaking

Text: Hutchison also argues that Fitzgerald is liable under a voluntary undertaking theory of liability. “In Illinois, a party to a contract may be liable in tort to a third party who otherwise has no enforceable rights under the contract under a voluntary undertaking theory of liability.” Jakubowski v. Alden‐Bennett Constr. Co., 763 N.E.2d 790, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, which Illinois has adopted, a party is liable for breach of a potential purpose of the wires, too, is mere speculation and is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment. 8 No. 18‐2203 voluntary undertaking if: (a) “a party undertakes to do something and then fails to exercise reasonable care in a way that increases a third party’s risk of harm”; (b) a party “undertakes to perform a duty that a diﬀerent party was obligated to perform and then negligently fulfills its duty”; or (c) “a third party relies to its detriment on the fact that a duty has been voluntarily undertaken.” LM ex rel. KM v. United States, 344 F.3d 695, 701 (7th Cir. 2003). Hutchison contends that Fitzgerald “voluntarily under‐ took [the] responsibility to advise Borkholder to install a backup alarm on its Caterpillar tractor if other forklifts at Borkholder’s Metamora facility had backup alarms.” In sup‐ port, he cites the depositions of Patrick Boyer, a forklift tech‐ nician with Fitzgerald, and Travis Cowley, general manager of Fitzgerald. Cowley testified that he recommends to custom‐ ers purchasing forklifts that they have the same safety options their existing trucks have. When asked if he recommends that facilities install backup alarms on their forklifts, Boyer re‐ sponded that he would not recommend installing a backup alarm unless the other forklifts at that facility had backup alarms. Hutchison points to these statements as evidence that Fitzgerald undertook a voluntary duty to advise Borkholder to install a backup alarm on the Caterpillar forklift because the other forklift at the Metamora facility had one. We disa‐ gree with this logic. Fitzgerald’s employees’ answers to hypo‐ thetical questions do not establish such a voluntary undertak‐ ing because Hutchison does not point to any evidence that Cowley or Boyer knew the other forklift at the Metamora fa‐ cility had a backup alarm. No. 18‐2203 9 Even if they knew about the alarm on the other forklift, the business practice Boyer and Crowley testified to does not cre‐ ate any legal duty to Borkholder because “[u]nder the volun‐ tary undertaking theory of liability, the duty of care to be im‐ posed upon a defendant is limited to the extent of its under‐ taking.” Frye v. Medicare‐Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557, 560–61 (Ill. 1992) (declining to hold that a pharmacist had a duty to warn a patient of all potential side eﬀects of a drug merely because she chose to warn about one side eﬀect); see also, e.g., LM, 344 F.3d at 701 (“[A] voluntary undertaking is just that— voluntary—and as such, the scope of the duty that is assumed is limited to the extent of the undertaking.”); Castro v. Brown’s Chicken & Pasta, Inc., 732 N.E.2d 37, 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). Here, Fitzgerald’s undertaking was limited to the scope of the contract—“to perform the lubrication and operational maintenance inspection[s]”; Hutchison has not pointed to any evidence establishing that Fitzgerald undertook any addi‐ tional duty to Borkholder outside the scope of the Agreement. Even if Hutchison had established a voluntary undertak‐ ing—which he has not—he has not established a breach under any of the three prongs of § 324A. Under § 324A(a), Hutchison argues that Fitzgerald negligently performed its voluntary undertaking because various witnesses thought the accident “would not have occurred” if the forklift had a backup alarm. But mere knowledge of a risk does not impose an aﬃrmative duty. See LM, 344 F.3d at 701. Hutchison has not shown Fitzgerald increased the risk of harm by failing to recommend installation of a device that was not required by law nor requested by the forklift owner and a device that was already known to Borkholder. 10 No. 18‐2203 Nor can Hutchison establish, under § 324A(b), that Fitz‐ gerald supplanted Borkholder’s duty to conduct daily inspec‐ tions and maintenance on the Caterpillar forklift. To be liable under § 324A(b), the defendant “must supplant the duty it undertakes from the party that originally held the duty, not merely assist or supplement the service provided by the other.” Padilla v. Hunter Douglas Window Coverings, Inc., No. 09 CV 1222, 2012 WL 3265002, at  (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2012). Here, there is no evidence in the record that Fitzgerald had the power, without Borkholder’s authorization, to install the backup alarm or that Fitzgerald did more than assist or sup‐ plement Borkholder’s daily control and maintenance of the forklift. Finally, as to § 324A(c), Hutchison has not put forth evi‐ dence showing that he relied to his detriment on Fitzgerald to recommend that Borkholder install a backup alarm. In cases of nonfeasance—“omission to perform a voluntary undertak‐ ing”—as opposed to misfeasance—“negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking”—Illinois law requires a plaintiﬀ to show that he relied on the defendant’s actions. Thornton v. M7 Aerospace LP, 796 F.3d 757, 768 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, Hutchison asserts Fitzgerald was negligent in failing to rec‐ ommend installation of a backup alarm (or, alternatively, in failing to repair an inoperable backup alarm), and therefore, his claim is one of nonfeasance. See id. at 762, 768–69 (constru‐ ing plaintiﬀ’s theory as liability for nonfeasance where plain‐ tiﬀ alleged defendant‐manufacturer failed to advise aircraft owner to install upgraded warning system). His claim fails because he has not established the required reliance.4 4 Despite Hutchison’s insistence to the contrary, this case is not like Wakulich v. Mraz, 785 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. 2003). In Wakulich, the defendants No. 18‐2203 11 In sum, Hutchison has not established Fitzgerald owed a duty to recommend installation of a backup alarm on the Cat‐ erpillar forklift. We thus aﬃrm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Fitzgerald on the negligence claim.