Opinion ID: 2455414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Majority's Flawed Analysis

Text: ¶ 44 The majority pays little attention to the text of the constitution and unconvincingly attempts to distinguish the holding of this court in O'Connell. The majority suggests that O'Connell provides limited guidance because that expenditure was for the Department of Transportation (DOT) and not for a third party. Majority at 271. ¶ 45 The majority's attempt to distinguish O'Connell is unpersuasive. Article II, section 40 prohibits the use of the MVF for all nonhighway purposes regardless of whether the appropriation goes directly to DOT, a municipality, or a private third party. Article II, section 40 prohibits the State simpliciter whether DOT, the legislature, or any other governmental entityfrom using the MVF for nonhighway purposes. The constitutional analysis under article II, section 40 does not change depending on who receives the appropriation. The constitution does not tolerate money laundering to avoid its mandates. ¶ 46 Besides distinguishing O'Connell, the majority argues that because statutes authorize the transfer of highway lands, a valuation for land transfer is necessarily a highway purpose. Majority at 271. There are several flaws with this argument. First, the surplus land statutes relied on by the majority to support this argument do not authorize transfer of bridge lanes currently needed or used for highway purposes. [1] The residents of this state currently need and use the bridge lanes on Interstate 90 for highway purposes, and thus the statutes relied on by the majority do not authorize their transfer. Ask drivers stuck on this bridge at rush hour whether any lanes are surplus. ¶ 47 Second, even if statutes authorize DOT to transfer surplus land to Sound Transit, it is inconsequential because the constitution prohibits this transfer. Article II, section 40 is a constitutional provision. If a statute violates the state constitution, this court must declare it a nullity. See Moody v. United States, 112 Wash.2d 690, 693, 773 P.2d 67 (1989). ¶ 48 This court's primary role is to be guardian of the law and final arbiter of the state constitution. See In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash.2d 232, 241, 552 P.2d 163 (1976) (Both history and uncontradicted authority make clear that `[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)))). ¶ 49 In its final argument, the majority claims support from State ex rel. Washington State Highway Commission v. O'Brien, 83 Wash.2d 878, 523 P.2d 190 (1974). In O'Brien, we granted a writ of mandamus to the state treasurer to compel expenditure of MVF moneys for the construction of park-and-ride facilities in the metropolitan Seattle area. O'Brien, 83 Wash.2d at 883, 523 P.2d 190. In granting the writ, we noted that our decision in O'Connell was consistent. Id. O'Brien dealt with park-and-ride facilities that served motorists who transfer to other vehicles that operate on state highways. Id. In contrast, O'Connell had dealt strictly with public transportation, a prohibited expenditure. Id. As we stated in O'Brien: [ O'Connell ] concerned the use of highway funds for the financing of a public transportation system, including busses, trains or other carriers, each holding a number of passengers, which may travel upon highways or rails or water or through the air. We properly held that such a use of funds was not for a highway purpose contemplated by [article II, section 40]. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the O'Brien opinion specifically identified railway public transportation as a nonhighway purpose under article II, section 40. Id. Under O'Brien, park-and-ride facilities both relieve congestion and constitute a valid highway purposepublic transportation projects do not. The majority miraculously transforms O'Brien 's affirmation of the constitutional prohibition on appropriating money from the MVF for railway public transportation into authority for its directly contrary holding. ¶ 50 O'Connell held that the state constitution prohibited legislation appropriating funds for any nonhighway purposeto include public transportation. O' Connell, 75 Wash.2d at 560, 452 P.2d 943. O'Brien affirmed this conclusion. O'Brien, 83 Wash.2d at 883, 523 P.2d 190. Here, the Engrossed Senate Substitute Bill 5352, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.2009) (ESSB 5352), at section 204(3) appropriates constitutionally dedicated funds to public transportation purposes. Under our precedent, the appropriation is unconstitutional.