Opinion ID: 2807859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board’s Explanation of Quietflex Factor

Text: Three Under the third Quietflex factor, the Board is to consider whether the work stoppage interfered with production or deprived the employer access to its property. Explaining what it meant when it previously stated that “it is not considered an interference with production where employees do no more than withhold their own labor,” Fortuna, 354 NLRB at 211, the Board on remand clarified that the proper focus is on “whether striking employees interfere with production or the provision of services by preventing other employees who are working from performing their duties,” Fortuna, 2014 WL 2448880, at  (emphasis in original). Applying this standard, the Board found that factor three weighed in favor of protection. Fortuna contends that the Board erred by imposing an unworkable standard for the third Quietflex factor, and that this factor should weigh against protection because the withdrawal of the services of the striking employees affected the non-striking employees’ ability to do their jobs. We disagree. Fortuna’s primary complaint is that the Board’s clarified third factor “is completely impracticable in the service 12 industry.” Fortuna Br. 32. Fortuna contends that unlike factory owners who can simply shut down a production line if part of the workforce strikes, employers in the service industry “must re-task non-striking employees away from their normal duties to ensure that the services normally performed by the striking employees are in fact carried out.” Id. at 33. Thus, “at least in the service industry, the withdrawal of services by striking employees necessarily impacts the work performance of non-striking employees.” Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). While Fortuna’s proposed industry distinction is certainly not frivolous, it is not sufficiently powerful to carry the day. The Board’s clarification of the third Quietflex factor, made at the direction of this Court, is at least reasonable and therefore entitled to deference. The Board was not obligated to create special rules for the service industry. One possible purpose of a work stoppage, whether at a factory or at a hotel, is to exert economic pressure on the employer. By reassigning nonparticipating workers, Hilton management sought to mitigate the economic effects of the work stoppage employees withholding their own services. The stoppage impacted the work performance of other employees because Fortuna strove to maintain full service at full capacity. In this respect, Fortuna is like a factory owner who, after half of his workforce engages in a work stoppage, attempts to continue operating the factory at full capacity and reassigns other employees to keep every production line operating. Hilton management could have, in effect, “shut down a production line” by cancelling room and restaurant reservations and not accepting additional guests. This would have had an economic impact on Fortuna, but that would be because employees withheld their own services, not because employees interfered with the ability of other employees to do their jobs. In short, the Board’s clarification of the third 13 factor is reasonable and the Board was not required to create different rules for the service industry. Fortuna further contends that, even accepting the Board’s clarification of the third factor, “there is ample evidence in the record that demonstrates that the employees engaged in the work stoppage adversely affected the working conditions of the non-striking employees beyond simply the withholding of their services.” Fortuna Br. 34. Fortuna argues that the occupation of the employee cafeteria prevented nonparticipating employees from eating their lunch, forced Fortuna to reassign three separate Hilton managers to oversee the work stoppage, and resulted in some guest rooms being left uncleaned. Id. at 34–35. Again, Fortuna’s argument is not unreasonable, and we are not suggesting that the Board would have erred had it adopted it. However, neither are we convinced that the Board has erred in reaching the opposite conclusion. First, in contending that the “record” shows that other employees were prevented from eating lunch, Fortuna relies on testimony by Hilton managers that the presiding ALJ rejected as hearsay. See Hr’g Tr. 1548:4–11, In re Fortuna Enters., L.P. (NLRB), No. 31-CA-27837, May 13, 2008. Based on the admissible evidence, the Board reasonably determined that Fortuna “did not present the testimony of a single employee that the work stoppage interfered with their ability to use the cafeteria.” Fortuna, 2014 WL 2448880, at  n.19. Second, Fortuna made the decision to assign three separate Hilton managers to oversee the work stoppage. “Whatever losses [Fortuna] sustained…were caused by its own response to the work stoppage, not by the work stoppage itself.” Accel, Inc., 339 NLRB 1052, 1053 (2003). Third, the Board reasonably determined that “although [Fortuna] contends that there were some rooms that were not cleaned, it does not assert that it 14 was unable to provide a clean room to any guest.” Fortuna, 2014 WL 2448880, at  n.19. In sum, while the record “shows that the work stoppage did disrupt some of Hilton’s operations,” Fortuna, 665 F.3d at 1302, it does not compel a finding that the work stoppage interfered with the provision of services by other employees in the relevant sense. We hold that the Board’s clarification of Quietflex factor three and its application thereof were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.