Opinion ID: 772445
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proper Factors and Kumho

Text: 23 Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate judge abused his discretion by failing to recognize those factors deserving of weight and those that should not have been relied upon in evaluating the expert testimony. Accusing the trial court of slavish adherence to the Daubert factors, plaintiffs argue specifically that the lack of publication or other peer review should have been disregarded because it only demonstrates that the novel opinions are at the forefront of toxicology. We disagree. 24 While one of the last of the factors mentioned in the magistrate's evaluation and not considered dispositive, the lack of peer review and publication was plainly relevant to the determination of whether Kilburn's causation theory was based upon good science. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of 'good science,' in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected). Nor is this factor made irrelevant because Kilburn has authored two other studies which were peer reviewed. Although plaintiffs broadly assert that those studies reached similar conclusions related to other PCB exposures, it is clear that they do not demonstrate the reliability of the theory that the plaintiffs' environmental exposure to PCBs can and did cause the impairments and ailments that they claim. 7 25 Plaintiffs also seem to argue that the Kumho decision, issued after plaintiffs had filed this appeal, represented a liberalizing retrenchment from Daubert that favored the admission of expert testimony. This characterization is simply not accurate. While Kumho clarified that the trial court must determine what factors are pertinent to the reliability determination, it also reiterated the trial court's gatekeeping obligation and extended it to all expert testimony. If anything,Kumho supports the magistrate judge's consideration of factors not mentioned by the Supreme Court, including the fact that Kilburn's study was conducted and the experts' opinions were formed for purposes of litigation. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). This factor is consistent with our observation that close judicial analysis of expert testimony is necessary because expert witnesses are not necessarily always unbiased scientists.Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1992). Here, the magistrate did not abuse his discretion by considering this factor as he did, or by concluding that the fact that the study was performed in connection with litigation and funded by plaintiffs' counsel does not militate in Dr. Kilburn's favor.