Opinion ID: 3021780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inadvertent disclosure

Text: “Medical information . . . is entitled to privacy protection against disclosure.” Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 1987). However, “the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act 15 of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Because Weisberg does not dispute that the District employee accidentally included his incident report in the envelope given to another employee, Weisberg has no substantive due process claim for this disclosure. Weisberg’s argument that the District violated its “obligation to implement ‘adequate safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure’” is misplaced. Br. Appellant at 26 (quoting United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980)). In Westinghouse, we considered the validity of a subpoena obtained by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health requiring disclosure of medical records from the employees of Westinghouse Electric. Id. at 573. In ruling that the subpoena did not violate the constitutionally protected privacy interests of Westinghouse employees, we weighed the competing factors, including such factors as the type of record requested, the information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need for access, and whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access. Id. at 578 (emphasis added). Thus, in considering whether an intentional disclosure of medical information unconstitutionally interfered with an individual’s right to privacy, we considered “whether there are effective provisions for security of the information against subsequent unauthorized disclosure.” Id. at 579 (emphasis added). The Westinghouse court did not suggest that an individual could support a substantive due process claim 16 under § 1983 based on inadvertent disclosure of his medical information, but only considered the possibility of subsequent inadvertent disclosure in evaluating the constitutional validity of an intentional disclosure. Id. at 579-80. Even if the Westinghouse court had suggested there could be a valid claim for accidental disclosure under § 1983, the decision would have been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Daniels. 474 U.S. 327. Thus, Weisberg has no claim based on the undisputedly inadvertent disclosure of his employee incident report.