Opinion ID: 1700796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Edith's Motion As an Improper Procedural Vehicle

Text: Edith's motion to the trial court was titled Motion to Rescind Property Settlement Stipulation. John asserts this was an improper procedural vehicle in light of Sullivan v. Quist, 506 N.W.2d 394, and argues the trial court's decision in this matter therefore was improper. John claims the only proper way for Edith to attack the judgment was through the use of a motion made under NDRCivP 60(b). John reads Edith's motion as being an attack only on the underlying stipulation and not upon the judgment. Such a narrow construction of her motion, however, is unreasonable, especially since, in her brief in support of her motion she quotes NDRCivP 60(b) in its entirety. We conclude, just as the trial court concluded, that this is a Rule 60(b) motion and was presented in that way. We agree that a more complete title might have included a reference to Rule 60(b), NDRCivP, and to vacation of the judgment, but this alone cannot be fatal. Because the judgment Edith is attacking was based on a stipulation, she bears the burden of a two-step process in order to have it set aside. Where the judgment sought to be set aside has been entered pursuant to a contractual stipulation, such as the property settlement agreement at issue, the party challenging the judgment under Rule 60(b) has the additional burden of showing that under the law of contracts there is justification for setting the contract aside. Hill v. Hill, 392 N.W.2d 819, 821 (N.D.1986); see also Wolfe v. Wolfe, 391 N.W.2d 617, 620 (N.D.1986). The trial court's ruling addresses both steps. In our review we determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Edith's NDRCivP 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Williston v. Scherr, 456 N.W.2d 531, 533 (N.D.1990) (concluding that a motion made under Rule 60(b) is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion). Relief from judgment under NDRCivP Rule 60(b)(iii) is extraordinary relief and should be granted only in exceptional circumstances. Gajewski v. Bratcher, 240 N.W.2d 871, 889 (N.D.1976). The burden rests on the movant to establish fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of fraud which prompted Edith's acquiescence in the final stipulation. This, coupled with John's nonperformance and fraudulent representations during the negotiation, certainly entitle Edith to rescind the contract and vacate the amended judgment. These conclusions were properly supported by the record and we will not disturb them. We disagree with John's argument that Sullivan v. Quist implicitly overrules both Hill and Wolfe. In Sullivan, we said when a stipulation is incorporated into a judgment it becomes merged with that judgment. 506 N.W.2d at 400. Accordingly, when interpreting that judgment we are no longer concerned with the intention of the parties to the underlying stipulation, but rather with the intention of the court as expressed in its judgment. Id. In this case we are not called upon to interpret a judgment; we are asked to grant relief from a judgment based upon a stipulation induced by fraud. Sullivan v. Quist and the doctrine of merger, therefore, have no application here. This rescission of the stipulation and vacation of judgment leave the previous judgment in force.