Opinion ID: 1458123
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Chevron Step One Analysis to the RRA

Text: The District Court determined, in its Chevron step one analysis, that the meaning of RRA § 14(a) (personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person or group of persons because of race, religion, or national origin) was not ambiguous and referred to former concentration camp guards. Therefore, the District Court did not proceed to Chevron step two, stating that it did not reach Geiser's contention that the State Department had in fact adopted a policy of granting RRA visas to former Nazi concentration camp guards who were not war criminals. Leaving aside the legislative history, which we have shown to be irrelevant at Chevron step one, Geiser argues that the text and structure of the RRA are ambiguous.
Geiser argues that RRA § 14(a) is silent as to the meaning of the term persecution, and that the definition of persecution is therefore ambiguous. He cites Chen, 381 F.3d 221, to support this proposition. Geiser does not argue that the RRA's use of the word personally is ambiguous, but we will address this question as well in order to complete the Chevron step one textual analysis. We conclude that the District Court correctly found that there is no textual ambiguity in the RRA.
The RRA does not define persecution. RRA § 2 (Definitions section, defining refugee, escapee, German expellee, and Administrator). However, statutory silence does not prove that a term is ambiguous. Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n v. Pena, 126 F.3d 193, 197-98 (3d Cir.1997) (concluding that a statutory term was unambiguous, although it was not defined). When determining a statute's plain meaning, our starting point is the ordinary meaning of the words used. Id. at 197. We refer to standard reference works such as legal and general dictionaries in order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of words. Id. (citing Black's Law Dictionary, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, and Webster's Third New International Dictionary). Webster's second definition of persecute is: to harass in a manner to injure, grieve, or afflict [usually] because of some difference of outlook or opinion[;] set upon with cruelty or malignity[;] ... to cause to suffer or put to death because of belief (as in a religion).... [1] Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1685 (1981). Black's defines persecution as: Violent, cruel, and oppressive treatment directed toward a person or group of persons because of their race, religion, sexual orientation, politics, or other beliefs. Black's Law Dictionary 1178 (8th ed.2004). In a case involving the denaturalization of a former Nazi, we defined persecution in a manner that is substantively identical to these definitions. United States v. Koreh, 59 F.3d 431, 440 (3d Cir.1995). We said that persecution is the infliction of sufferings, harm, or death on those who differ ... in a way regarded as offensive or meriting extirpation[;] a campaign having for its object the subjugation or extirpation of the adherents of a religion. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under these definitions, the experiences of prisoners at Nazi concentration camps fit squarely within the plain meaning of persecution. Thus, the meaning of persecution is not ambiguous, even though the statute does not define the term. Indeed, Geiser concedes that Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald were places of persecution. This admission forecloses his argument that persecution is an ambiguous term in the context of this case, because even if it is, he agrees that the concentration camps where he was a guard were places of persecution. Geiser nevertheless argues that Chen demonstrates that the term persecution is ambiguous. In Chen, we considered which individuals are entitled to refugee status based on past experiences of forced abortion and sterilization. 381 F.3d at 223. According to a 1996 statute, coercive population control programs constitute persecution. Id. at 224-25. The BIA interpreted the statute to allow women affected by those programs, as well as their husbands, to make claims of persecution. Id. at 227. Chen argued that the definition of persecution should be expanded to include the fiancé of a woman who had experienced forcible abortion or sterilization, but we disagreed. Id. at 229. In the course of our analysis, we made the following point, upon which Geiser relies: [W]ith the exception of forced abortions and sterilizations, the concept of `persecution' is left completely undefined. We infer from Congress's use of this ambiguous term an intent to delegate interpretive authority to the agency, including the ability to decide, within a reasonable range, the precise contours of its meaning. Id. at 232. It is important to note that in Chen, we spoke of the agency's authorization to regulate within the reasonable range specified by the statutory language. Id. We reiterated this point later in the opinion: [T]here is no indication that Congress intended to put limits on the meaning of the term `persecution' beyond those imposed by the normal understanding of the word. Matter of Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211, at 223 (BIA 1985). (`Congress chose not to define the word persecution... because the meaning of the word was understood to be well established by administrative and court precedents.'). Id. at 233. In Chen, the petitioner was attempting to show that the concept of persecution should be expanded to include the fiancés of women who were victims of coercive population control programs. Id. at 223. It was logical to discuss the ambiguity in a term like persecution, which in the context of Chen applied to some individuals and not others. Geiser's case, on the other hand, does not stretch the boundaries of the concept of persecution. What occurred in Nazi concentration camps rests within the plain meaning of the word. Thus, Chen 's discussion of the ambiguity of the term persecution is inapplicable to the concentration camp context. In Fedorenko, the Supreme Court recognized that persecution has a basically unambiguous meaning, but potentially ambiguous boundaries. 449 U.S. at 511 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 737. Fedorenko parallels Geiser's case to a large extent, except that Fedorenko obtained his visa under the DPA rather than the RRA. Id. at 496-97, 101 S.Ct. 737. The District Court refused to denaturalize Fedorenko because it found that he had not voluntarily assisted in persecution. Id. at 511 n. 33, 101 S.Ct. 737. The District Court read this voluntariness requirement into the statute because it believed that otherwise, it would be constrained to denaturalize Jewish survivors of Treblinka who had involuntarily assisted ... in persecution by, for example, cutting other prisoners' hair before their execution. Id. The Supreme Court laid to rest the District Court's fears by pointing out that the term persecution can be ambiguous. Id. at 512 n. 34, 101 S.Ct. 737. The Court stated that an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of civilians. Id. In other words, persecution is ambiguous when applied to a prisoner forced to assist in concentration camp operations, but it is not ambiguous when applied to an armed camp guard. Id. On the basis of this reasoning, the Supreme Court concluded that Fedorenko's citizenship must be revoked. Id. at 518, 101 S.Ct. 737. Thus, the Supreme Court and this Court have both acknowledged that the term persecution has gray boundaries where ambiguity may legitimately be found. Id. ; Chen, 381 F.3d at 232. However, these cases also recognize that certain conduct (guarding a concentration camp or forcing a woman to undergo an abortion) falls squarely within the definition of persecution. Geiser's case presents an example of such conduct. [2] It cannot be rationally argued that prisoners at Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald were not persecuted within the plain meaning of that term. Therefore, the text of the RRA is not ambiguous due to the use of the term persecution.
The Supreme Court and this Court have held that according to the plain meaning of the DPA, any armed concentration camp guard advocated or assisted in persecution. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 509, 101 S.Ct. 737 ([D]isclosure of the true facts about petitioner's service as an armed guard at Treblinka would, as a matter of law, have made him ineligible for a visa under the DPA.); Szehinskyj I, 277 F.3d at 339 (It is clear that personal participation in atrocities is not required for one to have assisted in persecution-being an armed concentration camp guard is sufficient. (citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512, 101 S.Ct. 737)). Since these cases establish that armed concentration camp guards advocated or assisted in persecution, we must determine whether the RRA's inclusion of the word personally (which did not appear in the DPA) requires a different result. [3] This is an issue of first impression for our Court. As required by Chevron step one, we must decide whether the term personally in the text of RRA § 14(a) is ambiguous. We must determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, Chen, 381 F.3d at 224, by looking at the plain and literal language of the statute, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., 127 S.Ct. at 1543. The precise question at issue is whether an armed concentration camp guard who is not shown to have committed atrocities nevertheless personally advocated or assisted in ... persecution. RRA § 14(a). Webster's defines personal as: [O]f or relating to a particular person ... [;] done in person without the intervention of another.... Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1686 (1981). It defines personally as: [S]o as to be personal[;] in a personal manner; ... as oneself[;] on or for one's own part. Id. at 1687. Black's defines personal as: Of or affecting a person. Black's Law Dictionary 1179 (8th ed.2004). Therefore, the plain meaning of personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person is that an individual, by his own actions performed in person, advocated or assisted in persecution. Geiser's conduct as an SS guard fits the plain meaning of personally advocated or assisted in ... persecution. Geiser stood watch at the perimeter of the concentration camps with instructions to fire his rifle if a prisoner tried to escape. Thus, his personal actions assisted in keeping the prisoners confined in the camps where they were persecuted. In addition, he marched prisoners to and from their work sites, and these personal actions assisted in coercing the prisoners into performing forced labor. We find support for our conclusion in the opinions of our sister Courts of Appeals, which have concluded that personally advocated and assisted in ... persecution describes the actions of any concentration camp guard. In United States v. Hansl , the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that: Hansl's admitted conduct as a member of the Death's Head Battalion, guarding the perimeters of concentration camps while armed, issuing orders, and threatening to shoot anyone who attempted to leave a concentration camp is more than sufficient to meet the common definition of personally assisting in the persecution of a group of persons based on their race, religion, or national origin. 439 F.3d 850, 854 (8th Cir.2006). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the same result in United States v. Kumpf : While the precise parameters of personal assistance under the [RRA] have not been delineated by the courts, Kumpf's own actions [as a concentration camp guard] clearly constitute personal assistance in persecution. 438 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir.2006). We conclude, as have other Courts of Appeals, that according to the plain meaning of the RRA, concentration camp guards personally advocated or assisted in ... persecution. RRA § 14(a). Although Geiser attempts to argue that the RRA is textually ambiguous at Chevron step one, the meaning of the statute is clear. Therefore, the District Court correctly refused to proceed to Chevron step two.
Geiser argues that the structure of the RRA demonstrates that the statute is ambiguous. Statutory structure is properly considered under Chevron step one. Zheng, 422 F.3d at 115-16. However, the structure of the RRA does not create ambiguity as to its meaning. The RRA provides that individuals must establish eligibility for a visa and ... admissibility into the United States under this Act and under the immigration laws and regulations. RRA § 11(c). Thus, any individual who received a visa under the RRA was also subject to the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). Section 104 of the INA provided that aliens should be excluded if, among other things, they had been members of a totalitarian party or would engage in activity subversive to the national security. INA § 212(a)(28), (29). The State Department issued regulations interpreting the INA, among them 22 C.F.R. § 42.42. This regulation provided that an alien was inadmissible if he was guilty of, or ... advocated or acquiesced in activities or conduct contrary to civilization and human decency on behalf of a power which was at war with the United States during World War II. 22 C.F.R. § 42.42(j)(2). Geiser posits that the admissibility of former concentration camp guards could be determined by looking at RRA § 14, by looking at 22 C.F.R. § 42.42(j) and its interpretive materials, or by looking at the State Department's interpretations of the immigration laws as a whole. He argues that because there are multiple ways to interpret the RRA's structure, the statute is ambiguous. These three interpretations of the structure of the RRA are unconvincing. It is not clear how the admissibility of former camp guards could be governed only by the RRA when the RRA specifically incorporates the requirements of the INA. Conversely, it would not make sense for admissibility to be governed only by the INA and its associated regulations when Geiser's visa was issued under the RRA. Geiser's proffered interpretations of the RRA's structure do not include the most natural reading of the statute, which is that the word and is used in its plain conjunctive sense. Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, 447 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (The usual meaning of the word `and' ... is conjunctive, and unless the context dictates otherwise, the `and' is presumed to be used in its ordinary sense.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). RRA § 11(c) states that applicants must demonstrate their eligibility under this Act and under the immigration laws and regulations. Nothing in this context dictates that we should abandon our usual presumption about the meaning of and. In RRA § 11(c), and signifies that applicants such as Geiser had to meet two sets of requirements: those of the INA (and its associated regulations) and those of the RRA. Thus, Geiser's argumentthat the RRA is structurally ambiguousfails. [4] Despite Geiser's effort to unearth ambiguity in the structure of the RRA, none exists. The District Court properly declined to proceed to Chevron step two in order to discern the meaning of the RRA.