Opinion ID: 3164794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Authority for Refunds from Public Funds

Text: Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The General Assembly authorizes the collection, management, and distribution of the funds raised by costs, fees, and restitution pursuant to its power to define crimes and sentences, raise revenue, and make appropriations. These powers are inherently legislative, and a court may not intrude on the General Assemblyâs power by authorizing a refund from public funds without statutory authority to do so. See Colo. Const. art III; People v. Dist. Court, City & Cty. of Denver, 808 P.2d 831, 835 (Colo. 1991). The Exoneration Act provides the sole statutory authority for the court to issue a refund to criminal defendants after their convictions are overturned. See Â§Â§ 13-65-101 to -103. Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â Â As a threshold matter, the court had clear authority to impose, collect, and disburse the costs, fees, and restitution. First, the court correctly orderedâand the Department of Corrections correctly withheldâmoney from Nelson based on her initialÂ conviction. The General Assembly instructed the court to impose costs, fees, and restitution pursuant to its power to define crimes and prescribe punishments. See Martinez v. People, 69 P.3d 1029, 1031 (Colo. 2003). Courts order defendants to pay costs, fees, and restitution that are tied to criminal convictionsâbut only to the extent permitted by statute. See id.; see also, e.g., Â§Â§ 24-4.1-119, 24-4.2-104(1)(d), 13-32-105, 18-1.3-603. The General Assembly prescribes the punishments for crimes and, in doing so, limits the courtâs sentencing authority. People v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 136 (Colo. App. 2003), as modified on denial of rehâg (Aug. 14, 2003). Once the court imposes the sentence, the executive branch carries it out. Id.; see Â§ 16-18.5-106 (authorizing the Department of Corrections to take money from an inmateâs account to pay outstanding fees). Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In Nelsonâs case, the court ordered Nelson to pay numerous costs and fees that were each mandated by statute. See, e.g., Â§Â§ 24-4.1-119, 24-4.2-104. The statutes instruct that the charges must be levied when a case results in a conviction, and that the defendant must pay the charges. See, e.g., Â§Â§ 24-4.1-119, 24-4.2-104. The court must carry out the statutesâ instructions. See Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d at 136. The court must impose the fees when a conviction occurs and must also use the funds as the statutes instruct. Therefore, the trial court properly ordered Nelson to pay costs, fees, and restitution pursuant to valid statutes. Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Next, after collecting fines, fees, and restitution, the court correctly distributed the funds to victims and public funds, as ordered by the statutes. See, e.g., Â§Â§ 18-1.3Â­601, 24-4.1-117, 24-4.2-104. The General Assembly directs when these fees may beÂ collected and how the money may be used based on its power to raise revenue and appropriate funds. See Colo. Const. art. V, Â§Â§ 31â32. This power âis plenary, subject only to constitutional limitations.â Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1380 (Colo. 1985). The General Assembly must raise revenue to create a source of funding for its appropriations to cover the expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments. Id. at 1380â81 (citing Colo. Const. art. V, Â§Â§ 31â32). Â¶38Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because the General Assembly must be able to plan and budget to fulfill its duties, Coloradoâs constitution protects its control over public money. Colo. Const. art. V, Â§ 33. âNo moneys in the state treasury shall be disbursed . . . except upon appropriations made by law, or otherwise authorized by law.â Id. The General Assembly must be able to plan and monitor public money so that sufficient funds are available to support appropriations. Lamm, 704 P.2d at 1381. We have held that the ability to specify which funds support which appropriations, and to make appropriations contingent on the availability of money in those funds, is âessential to the legislative power.â Id. Â¶39Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In this case, $414.60 was distributed to victims and $347.50 was placed into public funds, according to the statutes governing each fee. A court does not âassume the riskâ that a conviction will be overturned by following these statutory commands. Contra Nelson, Â¶ 30. Rather, when the court orders a convicted defendant to pay costs, fees, and restitutionâpursuant to statutory commandsâthe court must also follow the statutesâ instructions on how that money may be used. For example, the court was required to distribute the money that Nelson paid toward restitution to the victims. SeeÂ Â§ 18-1.3-601. Similarly, the court was required to disburse the money collected from costs and fees into public funds. See, e.g., Â§Â§ 24-4.1-117(2), 24-4.1-119(1)(a); see also Â§ 16-18.5-109(3) (directing that restitution money be placed in the VAST and crime victim compensation funds when a victim declines to accept restitution or no victim can be reasonably found). The court correctly disbursed the costs, fees, and restitution that Nelson paid to either the victims or public funds, according to the governing statutes. Â¶40Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Just as the court must follow statutory commands in imposing and disbursing fees, the court may authorize refunds from public funds only pursuant to statutory authority. 4 See People v. $11,200.00 U.S. Currency, 2013 CO 64, Â¶ 4, 313 P.3d 554, 555-56 (holding that the trial court lacked authority to order a refund where the defendantâs case did not meet the specific statutory requirements authorizing a refund). The court may not intrude on the legislatureâs powers by authorizing refunds from public funds. See Colo. Const. art. III (stating that each branch of government may not intrude on anotherâs powers absent express constitutional permission); cf. Lamm, 704 P.2d at 1385 (avoiding âthe impermissible positive effectâ of the executive branch forcing funding to come from otherwise-appropriated funds, which would invade the legislatureâs appropriation power). A court order awarding money âpayable from public funds implicates sensitive budget and funding considerations, and authority to intrude into these areas is not to be lightly implied.â Dist. Court, City & Cty. of Denver, 808 P.2d at 835. For this reason, we have held that âa monetary sanction payable from public funds . . . is beyond the authority of the trial court.â Id. Â¶41Â Â Â Â Â Â Â If the court were to refund Nelsonâs costs and fees, the refund would draw on public funds, thereby affecting appropriations from that fund. The refund would diminish those public funds and disregard the legislatureâs directives on how that money is to be spent or appropriated. This would impermissibly intrude on the legislatureâs power and hamstring its ability to fulfill its responsibility to raise and appropriate funds. Therefore, a court must have statutory authority to authorize a refund from public funds, and it did not in this case. Â¶42Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Finally, we turn to the possible statutory authority that might permit a court to order a refund. Nelson argues that the statutes governing costs, fees, and restitution provide statutory authority to support refunds. Nelson argues that, because the orders to pay costs, fees, and restitution must all be tied to a conviction, her acquittal renders the initial conviction invalid, and the money must be returned. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the court and the Department of Corrections followed the instructions laid out in the statutes governing costs and fees. The court correctly withheld money from Nelson as part of her initial conviction: the fines were tied to a conviction. Furthermore, Nelson was required to make payments toward the costs, fees, and restitution she owed only while her conviction stood. The costs, fees, and restitution were therefore imposed based on a conviction, and the obligation to payÂ ceased when the conviction was no longer in place. The statutes authorized the imposition and collection of fees but did not address the possibility of a refund. Â¶43Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Second, the Exoneration Act provides the proper procedure for seeking a refund. When examining the relationship between statutory provisions, âa special or specific statutory provision prevails over a general provision.â Climax Molybdenum Co. v.Â Walter, 812 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Colo. 1991) (citing Â§ 2-4-205, 1B C.R.S. (1980) (now codified at Â§ 2-4-205, C.R.S. (2015))). We also presume that the legislature is aware of its prior enactments when it passes new legislation. A.S. v. People, 2013 CO 63, Â¶ 11, 312 P.3d 168, 171. Â¶44Â Â Â Â Â Â Â None of the statutes governing costs, fees, and restitution address whether a court may withdraw money from public funds to refund money that a defendant has already paid. See, e.g., Â§Â§ 18-1.3-603, 24-4.1-117, 24-4.1-119. On the other hand, the Exoneration Act specifically addresses when a defendant who was wrongfully convicted may seek a refund of costs, fees, and restitution. Â§ 13-65-103(2)(e)(V). When creating a refund procedure for exonerated defendants, the General Assembly did not amend the existing statutes to create alternative means for defendants to seek a refund. The Exoneration Act created an exclusive process for exonerated defendants seeking a refund of costs, fees, and restitution. Â¶45Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Therefore, when a defendantâs conviction is overturned and she is acquitted after a new trial, the trial court may authorize a refund of costs, fees, and restitution only pursuant to the process created in the Exoneration Act. Accordingly, the trial courtÂ lacked the authority to order a refund of Nelsonâs costs, fees, and restitution based on her motion following her criminal trial.