Opinion ID: 670650
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ball's APA Claims

Text: 20 Because Ball's challenge was properly before the district court, we now turn to the merits of the claim that the Secretary's regulations at Sec. 5.2(l )(2) are inconsistent with the Davis-Bacon Act. Our review of Ball's statutory challenge is governed by the rules laid down in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We first determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781, looking to the  'statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.'  School Dist. of Hatboro-Horsham v. Alexander, 981 F.2d 1265, 1267 (D.C.Cir.1992) (quoting Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 919 F.2d 158, 162 (D.C.Cir.1990)). If we find that Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. Only if the statute is ambiguous or silent with respect to the matter in question do we proceed to step two of the Chevron analysis and assess whether the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable in light of the language, legislative history, and policies of the statute. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 111 (D.C.Cir.1987). 21 The Secretary concluded that Red Rock employees were subject to the prevailing wage provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act because Red Rock's borrow pit and batch plant met the functional and geographical tests for coverage under Sec. 5.2(l )(2) of the Secretary's regulations. As noted above, Sec. 5.2(l )(2) includes borrow pits and batch plants within the site of the work if the facilities are dedicated exclusively, or nearly so, to performance of the contract or project, and are so located in proximity to the actual construction location that it would be reasonable to include them. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 5.2(l )(2). Ball contends that the Secretary's inclusion of workers at off-site facilities is inconsistent with the plain language of Sec. 276a(a) of the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires the payment of prevailing wages only to mechanics and laborers employed directly upon the site of the work. We agree. 22 In Midway, a government contractor challenged the Secretary's determination that truckdrivers were entitled to prevailing wages under the Davis-Bacon Act when those drivers were employed by the contractor to move off-site materials to the actual location of the federally-funded construction project. 932 F.2d at 987-88. The Secretary's conclusion that the truckdrivers were covered by the Act rested on 29 C.F.R. Sec. 5.2(j), which defined the Act's coverage as extending to the transporting of materials and supplies to or from the building. Id. at 987 (emphasis deleted). Utilizing theChevron framework, we considered whether the regulation was consistent with the language of the Davis-Bacon Act. We found no ambiguity in the text,id. at 990, and thought it clear that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language is that the Act applies only to employees working directly on the physical site of the public building or public work under construction. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, we found no need to proceed to step two of the Chevron analysis and invalidated Sec. 5.2(j) at Chevron step one to the extent that it included off-site material delivery truckdrivers within the Act's coverage. Id. at 992. 23 Our opinion in Midway twice cautioned that the validity of the Secretary's definition of the site of the work at Sec. 5.2(l )(2) was not before us, since it had not been challenged in the case. Id. at 989 n. 6 & 991 n. 12. That issue is squarely before the court today, and the reasoning in Midway obviously bears on the validity of Sec. 5.2(l )(2) to the extent that the regulation purports to extend the coverage of the Davis-Bacon Act beyond the actual physical site of the public building or public work under construction. 24 The Secretary maintains that the regulations at Sec. 5.2(l )(2) satisfy the geographic limiting principle of the Davis-Bacon Act and Midway. This might be the case if the Secretary were applying the regulatory phrase so located in proximity to the actual construction location that it would be reasonable to include them only to cover batch plants and gravel pits located in actual or virtual adjacency to the construction site. See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 5.2(l )(1). But such an application is not before us and we express no opinion on its validity. Instead, the Secretary attempts to find any tiny crack of ambiguity remaining in the phrase directly upon the site at the work and cram into it a regulation that encompasses other sites miles from the actual location of the public works--in this case two miles, in another as much as 24 miles and in still another, 3,000 miles from the actual construction location. See Ross Bros. Const., Inc., WAB Case No. 87-36 (Nov. 21, 1988) (sand and gravel facility 24 miles from construction location); In re ATCO Const., Inc., WAB Case No. 86-1 (Aug. 22, 1986) (including fabrication facility for modular housing units located in Portland, Oregon in construction site on Adak Island, Alaska). In Midway, we determined not surprisingly, that Congress intended the ordinary meaning of its words. 932 F.2d at 992. That is, the limitation in the statute making it applicable to  'mechanics and laborers employed directly upon the site of the work' restricts coverage of the Act to employees who are working directly on the physical site of the public building or public work being constructed. Id. The Secretary invites us to revisit Midway's conclusion that the statutory phrase directly upon the site of the work is unambiguous in the context of this controversy, asking for a broad construction of the Act to accomplish its remedial purposes and citing policy arguments favoring a broadly defined federal work site. None of this offers any justification for ignoring the clear language of the Act. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 1453-54, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it.). 25 The Secretary's further argument that we should reconsider Midway in light of our purported misreading of the relevant legislative history 3 is also unconvincing. We disposed of Midway on Chevron step one grounds and noted only in passing that the little legislative history, 932 F.2d at 991, support[ed] the plain meaning of the text that off-site mechanics and laborers are not covered by the Act, id. at 990. 26 In the end, we reach the same conclusion we did in Midway. The statutory phrase employed directly upon the site of the work, means employed directly upon the site of the work. Laborers and mechanics who fit that description are covered by the statute. Those who don't are not.