Opinion ID: 572756
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finding of willful and malicious injury within the meaning of section 523(a)(6)

Text: 30 Section 523(a)(6) provides that a debt for willful and malicious injury by the debtor will not be discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Willful, in this context, means deliberate or intentional. H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5963, 6320-21; see Impulsora del Territorio Sur, S.A. v. Cecchini (In re Cecchini), 780 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir.1986). Thus, the creditor must show the debtor acted intentionally. The intent required is intent to do the act at issue, not intent to injure the victim. C.I.T. Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Posta (In re Posta), 866 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir.1989) (The 'willful' element is straightforward. It simply addresses whether the debtor intentionally performed the basic act complained of.). 31 To prove malice, the creditor must make a further showing. The creditor need not prove that the debtor specifically intended to injure the creditor. See Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1443. However, the creditor must show the debtor's actual knowledge or the reasonable foreseeability that his conduct will result in injury to the creditor. Posta, 866 F.2d at 367. In its leading case on this issue, the Ninth Circuit has stated: When a wrongful act such as conversion, done intentionally, necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse, it is 'willful or malicious' even absent proof of a specific intent to injure. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1443. As set forth in Cecchini, the act must necessarily cause harm to the creditor, but the creditor need not show that the debtor acted with an intent to harm the creditor. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corporation v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 942 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir.1991); see also Andrews v. Manser (In re Manser), 99 B.R. 434, 436 (Bankr.9th Cir.1989) (test for nondischargeability under section 523(a)(6) is: 1--whether the appellant committed a wrongful and intentional act; 2--whether such action produced harm; and 3--whether such action was without just cause or excuse.). 32
Britton's conduct 33 Britton argues that his actions did not necessarily produce harm, as Cecchini requires. He suggests it was not substantially certain that Britton's actions would cause injury to Price, nor did Britton intend to injure her. He argues, The most that can be said of Mr. Britton is that he was making an effort to induce Ms. Price to have her lipectomy done at the clinic where he worked. 34 We reject Britton's very narrow reading of the necessarily produces language of Cecchini. Here, although Britton did not anticipate that Dr. Cavanaugh might perform the operation negligently, it was foreseeable that injury to Price would result from Britton's intentional misrepresentation. Britton attempts to abstract his conduct from its context, cutting it off from any but the most obvious potential consequences. We would draw too fine a line if we concluded that harm was not substantially certain to result from Britton's misrepresentation and inducement. 35