Opinion ID: 613537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hobbs Act Interstate Commerce Element

Text: The Walkers challenge whether the government's evidence was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element of their Hobbs Act convictions. They note that the target of their attempted robbery, Edward Wright, had just completed his first-ever drug sale at the time of the robbery, had purchased the illegal drugs locally for about $60, and had made about $40 to $50 from his single sale. They also argue that the government presented insufficient evidence that Wright's cocaine was manufactured outside of Pennsylvania. We begin with first principles. The Constitution delegates to Congress the power [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress' power to legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause, although greatly expanded by the Court's New Deal-era commerce power decisions, is nonetheless subject to outer limits. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942)). In Lopez, the Court identified the three areas within which Congress is authorized to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause: (1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities; and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. Id. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Focusing on the third category, the Lopez Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, holding that possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Id. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624. To reach any other conclusion, the Count held, would require it to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Id. The Court's decision in Lopez was followed by United States v. Morrison, which struck down the civil remedy provision in the Violence Against Women Act using reasoning that closely echoed that in Lopez. See 529 U.S. 598, 617, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (holding that Congress may not regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce). Morrison, in turn, was followed by Gonzales v. Raich, which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the application of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act criminalizing the manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana to intrastate growers and users of marijuana for medicinal purposes. 545 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). In so holding, the Court emphasized that Congress possesses power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic `class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195. Congress is not required: to legislate with scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that the total incidence of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. In this vein ... when a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We have recognized that this trio of commerce power decisions establishes a four-part analytical framework `to determine whether a law regulates intrastate activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.' United States v. Kukafka, 478 F.3d 531, 535 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir.2000)). Under this framework, a court should consider: (1) `the economic nature of the regulated activity;' (2) `a jurisdictional element limiting the reach of the law to a discrete set of activities that additionally has an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce;' (3) `express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of the activity in question;' and (4) `the link between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.' Id. at 535-36 (quoting Gregg 226 F.3d at 262); see also United States v. Spinello, 265 F.3d 150, 155-56 (3d Cir.2001). To obtain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, the government must show that (1) the defendant committed robbery or extortion or attempted or conspired to do so, and (2) that conduct obstruct[ed], delay[ed], or affect[ed] commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The Hobbs Act defines the term commerce broadly to include all ... commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3); see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) ([The Hobbs Act] speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence.). Accordingly, the reach of the Hobbs Act is coextensive with that of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 230 n. 8 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Villafranca, 260 F.3d 374, 377 (noting that the Hobbs Act's required effect on interstate commerce is identical with the requirements of federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause (citation omitted)). The Hobbs Act differs from the statutes struck down in Lopez and Morrison in two crucial respects. First, the Hobbs Act contains a jurisdictional element which limits its scope. That is, the Hobbs Act only applies to crimes which `obstruct[], delay[], or affect[] commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce.' United States v. Clausen, 328 F.3d 708, 710 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)). Second, the Hobbs Act regulates quintessentially economic activities. Although drawing the line between economic and non-economic activities may sometimes be difficult, property crimes like robbery and extortion areunlike the possession of a gun in a school zone or gender-motivated violenceindisputably economic under our post- Lopez precedents. See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 581 (3d Cir.1995) ([C]arjacking is economic.... When a criminal points a gun at a victim and takes his or her car, the criminal has made an economic gain and the victim has suffered an undeniable and substantial loss.); Spinello, 265 F.3d at 156 (describing bank robbery as an `economic' activity almost by definition); United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 268 (3d Cir.2002) ([T]heft in connection with health care... is economic in nature. The theft itself is motivated exclusively by an immediate pecuniary gain, and effects an explicit economic transfer. (citations omitted)). Because of the fundamentally economic character of robbery and extortion, we have held, in the wake of Lopez and its progeny, that in Lopez category-three cases [15] the government is not required to present proof of a `substantial effect' on commerce in an individual case in order to show a Hobbs Act violation. Urban, 404 F.3d at 766 (citing Clausen, 328 F.3d at 711); accord Raich, 545 U.S. at 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (holding that Congress possesses the power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic `class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce). As we noted in Clausen, `the cumulative result of many Hobbs Act violations is a substantial effect upon interstate commerce,' and that substantial effect empowers Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 328 F.3d at 711 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Urban, 404 F.3d at 765 (noting that `legislation concerning an intrastate activity will be upheld if Congress could rationally have concluded that the activity, in isolation or in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce' (quoting Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1211)). Accordingly, we have held that in a Hobbs Act prosecution, `proof of a de minimis effect on interstate commerce is all that is required.' Urban, 404 F.3d at 766 (quoting Clausen, 328 F.3d at 711). We have also upheld jury instructions which state that the  `de minimis effect' in an individual Hobbs Act case need only be `potential.' Id. at 766 (quoting Haywood, 363 F.3d at 209-10); see also Haywood, 363 F.3d at 209-10 (`[I]f the defendants' conduct produces any interference with or effect upon interstate commerce, whether slight, subtle or even potential, it is sufficient to uphold a prosecution under [§ 1951].' (quoting Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1285 (2d Cir. 1991))). The Walkers make several arguments in support of their insufficiency claim. First, they emphasize that the robbery victim, Edward Wright, had purchased only $60 worth of crack cocaine, and had made only a single sale for about $40 to $50 at the time of the robbery. While Wright did indeed possess only a small amount of cocaine and cash, we have found the de minimis standard satisfied in similarly low-stakes robberies. See Haywood, 363 F.3d at 202, 211 n. 7 (holding that interstate commerce was affected, however minimally by the robbery of $50 to $70 in cash from a bar). Second, the Walkers argue that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that Wright's cocaine originated from outside of Pennsylvania. As discussed in the prior section, the government presented reliable expert testimony from Chief Goshert that the cocaine sold in Harrisburg is manufactured outside of Pennsylvania and transported into the state. This case is therefore distinguishable from cases involving marijuana in which the government's evidence that the marijuana was grown out of state was more equivocal. See United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 853-54 (7th Cir.2001) (noting DEA agent's testimony that brick marijuana did not normally originate in Indiana, but that it was possible but highly unlikely the marijuana was grown in Indiana). Accordingly, a rational juror could conclude from Goshert's testimony that Wright's cocaine was not produced in Pennsylvania. Third, the Walkers argue that their convictions should be overturned because they robbed a private citizen rather than a business. In making this argument, the Walkers cite to the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir.2000). Wang is one of several decisions by our sister circuits holding that the government may not demonstrate that the robbery of a private individual's personal property affected interstate commerce based solely on evidence that the victim was employed by a company operating in interstate commerce. See id. at 239 ([A] small sum stolen from a private individual does not, through aggregation, affect interstate commerce merely because the individual happens to be an employee of a national company....); United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir.2002) ([T]he government must show something more than the victim's employment at a company engaged in interstate commerce to support Hobbs Act jurisdiction.); United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 100 (5th Cir.1994) (overturning Hobbs Act conviction where the robbery victim was an individual whose only connection with interstate commerce was his employment by a business engaged in interstate commerce). Even if these decisions are correcta question not before us todaythey are unhelpful to the Walkers. The central rationale of decisions such as Wang is that courts should not apply the aggregation principle in conjunction with long chains of causal inference that would have been necessary to arrive at a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Wang, 222 F.3d at 239; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.). In other words, these decisions held that the mere facts that (1) an individual was robbed of personal property, (2) the individual happens to work for a company engaged in interstate commerce, and (3) there was some incidental effect on that person's job performance are insufficient, standing alone, to establish Hobbs Act jurisdiction, because the connection between the robbery and interstate commerce is too attenuated. The connection between the robbery in this case and interstate commerce is much more direct. At the time of the robbery, Wright was selling illegal drugs. As we recognized in United States v. Orozco, [a] large interstate market exists for illegal drugs. Congress has the power to regulate that market just as it has the power to regulate food and drugs in general. 98 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir.1996). In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Raich, which held that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, 545 U.S. at 5, 125 S.Ct. 2195, an argument can be made that any robbery of illegal drugseven drugs grown and sold entirely within a single stateinterferes with the national market for illegal drugs and therefore has a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to create jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. See Needham, 604 F.3d at 688 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in light of Raich, the term `commerce' in the Hobbs Actwhose `reach' is `coextensive' with the Commerce Clauseincludes purely `homegrown' marijuana (citation omitted)). On this view, merely by attempting to rob an individual drug dealer, the Walkers were directly seeking to obstruct[]... the movement of [a] ... commodity in commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). In this case, there is no need to embrace such a broad proposition, because there is also evidence that the cocaine Wright possessed originated outside of Pennsylvania. As several of our sister circuits have concluded, the government may satisfy the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act by proving that a robbery targeted a drug dealer whose wares originated out of state. As Judge Posner explained for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Thomas, a robbery which interferes with the sale of drugs obstruct[s] commerce in a pretty literal sense. 159 F.3d 296, 297 (7th Cir.1998). The cocaine in Thomas originated in South America, and would thus have traveled in commerce. Id. By robbing the prospective buyer of $675 that would have been used to purchase cocaine, the defendant in Thomas thwarted what would have been a sale in commerce within the meaning of the Hobbs Act. Id. at 297-98. The fact that: the amount of cocaine in contemplation [in Thomas ] was small is irrelevant.... [T]he relevant issue is the effect on commerce of the entire class of transactions to which the transaction or transactions at issue in the particular case belong.... Any other rule would leave the federal government helpless to deal with criminal acts that have an individually trivial but cumulatively significant effect on the movement of goods and services across state and international boundaries. Id. at 298; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (When Congress decides that the total incidence of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Employing similar reasoning, several other courts of appeals have found that stealing drugs that were produced out of state from a drug trafficker satisfies the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act. See United States v. McCraney, 612 F.3d 1057, 1065 (8th Cir.2010) (The evidence here showed that the cocaine stolen from Jones necessarily originated in South America, and that Jones intended to sell it in Iowa. The taking of that cocaine by Williams thus disrupted the movement of a commodity in interstate commerce.); United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 68 (1st Cir.2008) (observing that [t]he robbing of a drug dealer typically has the required nexus with interstate commerce and finding evidence sufficient where robbery of drug dealer netted $18,000 and government expert testified that cocaine originates in South America); Parkes, 497 F.3d at 231 (holding that evidence was sufficient to support a Hobbs Act conviction for attempted robbery of a large bag of marijuana, fifty-eight smaller nickel bags of marijuana, and $4,000 cash from a local, part-time marijuana dealer in New York, where testimony showed that marijuana is almost exclusively trucked into the United States, predominantly through Mexico, and that [v]ery little marijuana is grown in New York (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Ostrander, 411 F.3d 684, 692 (6th Cir.2005) (The prosecution offered evidence that the cocaine and marijuana Hansle Andrews sold originated in Latin America, and thus had to get to Michigan through interstate commerce.... In this case, the robbery and murder [of Andrews] obviously reduced the amount of drugs Andrews could buy and sell in interstate commerce.); United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 355 (4th Cir.2003) (Drug dealing ... is an inherently economic enterprise that affects interstate commerce. For this reason, the robbery of a drug dealer has been found to be the kind of act which satisfies the `affecting commerce' element of the Hobbs Act, inasmuch as such a robbery depletes the business assets of the drug dealer. (citation omitted)). These decisions by our sister circuits reinforce our view that the robbery of a drug dealer whose product originates outside Pennsylvania has a direct nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, we reject the Walkers' invitation to treat this drug dealer robbery case like the kinds of home invasion robberies at issue in cases such as Wang. [16] Fourth, we reject the Walkers' argument that the Hobbs Act does not apply to their conduct because they robbed a first-time drug dealer. Congress's power to criminalize ... conduct pursuant to the Commerce Clause turns on the economic nature of the class of conduct defined in the statute rather than the economic facts... of a single case. United States v. Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (observing that Congress is not required to legislate with scientific exactitude). The Walkers attempted to rob a drug trafficker. As explained above, such robberies, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on the interstate market for illegal narcotics. The fact that the Walkers happened to rob a neophyte drug dealer is irrelevant to whether their conduct fits within the class of activities prohibited by the Hobbs Act. [17] Moreover, as noted above, the effect of the defendants' conduct upon interstate commerce is only required to be slight, subtle or even potential. Haywood, 363 F.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the Walkers targeted Wright because it was his first day on the job. Rather, the Walkers intended to rob a drug dealer, and it appears to have been pure happenstance that the target they selected was a first-time participant in drug trafficking. Thus, the Walkers' conduct had the potential to interfere with the sales of more established drug dealers. Finally, we reject the Walkers' argument that the evidence supporting their convictions was insufficient because the government did not use the so-called depletion of assets theory. We have certainly held that this theoryunder which proof that a Hobbs Act violation depletes the assets of a business engaged in interstate commerce conclusively establishes the effect on commerce requirement, Urban, 404 F.3d at 762 may be used in Hobbs Act cases in the wake of Lopez and its progeny. See id. at 766 & n. 3 (affirming continued viability of depletion of assets theory). However, we decline to hold that the depletion of assets theory is the exclusive means by which the Hobbs Act's interstate commerce element may be satisfied. Such a holding would be contrary to the broad language of the Hobbs Act, Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215, 80 S.Ct. 270, which does not lend [itself] to restrictive interpretation, United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373, 98 S.Ct. 1112, 55 L.Ed.2d 349 (1978). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (making it a federal crime to in any way or degree ... affect[] commerce... by robbery or extortion). Thus, while the government can and often will rely upon the depletion of assets theory, it is only required to present evidence proving that the defendants' conduct produces any interference with or effect upon interstate commerce, whether slight, subtle or even potential. Haywood, 363 F.3d at 209-10. As explained above, the government presented sufficient evidence to satisfy that standard in this case. In summary, we hold that by presenting evidence that (1) the Walkers attempted to rob a cocaine dealer of a de minimis amount of drugs and cash, and (2) the drug dealer's cocaine originated outside of Pennsylvania, the government presented sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that the Walkers' conduct satisfied the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act. Of course, to hold that the Hobbs Act sweeps so broadly is not to encourage its use in every case to which it might apply. Indeed, there are cases, such as this one, in which its use to prosecute what could be considered a fairly garden-variety robbery gives us some pause. See United States v. Rutherford, 236 Fed.Appx. 835, 844-45 (3d Cir.2007) (non-precedential) (Ambro, J., concurring, joined by McKee, J.). Our concern is amplified by the fact that the Hobbs Act can serve, as it did in this case, as a predicate offense for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the first violation of which carries a mandatory five-year consecutive prison term, and the second violation of which carries an extremely harsh mandatory twenty-five year consecutive prison term. In this era of globalization where the apple at one's local supermarket may come from Chile or New Zealand, it is increasingly difficult for robberies not to fall within the scope of the Hobbs Act, whose reach is co-extensive with the broad scope of Congress's commerce power, and it is perhaps similarly uncommon for modern robberies not to involve firearms. There is no doubt that robbery is a crime worth deterring through federal and state prosecution of those who engage in such acts. We trust and expect that federal prosecutors will exercise their broad prosecutorial discretion (with which we are loath to interfere, see United States v. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206, 216 (3d Cir. 1998)) to make the most effective use of federal resources, to avoid supplanting the state criminal systems that quite ably address classic state-law crimes, and to seek just and appropriate criminal sentences in the course of their representation of the United States.