Opinion ID: 3012034
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stone v. Powell and the Fourth Amendment Bar

Text: In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court examined the nature of the exclusionary rule, which it characterized as a judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment and balanced its utility as a deterrent against the risk of excluding trustworthy evidence and thus deflect[ing] the truthfinding process. Id. at 482, 490. Finding that, as to collateral review, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits of its application, the Court concluded that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. Id. at 494. While the federal courts are not thus deprived of jurisdiction to hear the claim, they are -- for prudential reasons -- restricted in their application of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 494 n.37. Seeking to avoid this restriction, Marshall seizes upon the qualifying phrase in Stone, where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation, and argues that he has not had an opportunity for full and fair litigation, and thus, that the bar of Stone v. Powell should not apply.34 Appellant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Certificate of Appealability 131-143. _________________________________________________________________ Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1947) (cited in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 478 n.10 (1976)). 34. Marshall also raises two additional arguments: that Stone v. Powell should not be applied in a capital case, since the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that death is different, (App. Memorandum in Law in Support of Application for Certificate of Appealability at 129-31) and that the letter addressed to his brother-in-law, who was also an attorney, implicated his Sixth Amendment right, and thus was protected by attorney-client privilege and not governed by Stone by virtue of Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1986) (refusing to apply Stone’s bar when Sixth Amendment claims were tied to a Fourth Amendment issue). But we find both of Marshall’s arguments unpersuasive here. 66 We have recognized that there may be instances in which a full and fair opportunity to litigate was denied to a habeas petitioner, but this is not one of them. This is not a case where a structural defect in the system itself prevented Marshall’s claim from being heard. See, e.g., Boyd v. Mintz, 631 F.2d 247, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Gilmore v. Marks, 799 F.2d 51, 57 (3d Cir. 1986) (observing that a state’s failure to give at least colorable application of the correct Fourth Amendment constitutional standard might amount to a denial of the opportunity for full and fair litigation). An erroneous or summary resolution by a state court of a Fourth Amendment claim does not overcome the bar. Id. And, as the District Court correctly assessed, Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 785-86, Marshall is at most _________________________________________________________________ There is nothing within the language of Stone v. Powell itself upon which to base a distinction between capital and non-capital collateral review. We have applied Stone without hesitancy to capital cases. See, e.g., Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1491 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1230 (1994). Indeed, the principles of comity that underlie Stone v. Powell, as well as the cost-benefit analysis postulated in Stone -- i.e., the deterrent value vis-a-vis those tempted to violate the proscriptions against illegal search and seizure weighed against the risk that risk that trustworthy evidence would be excluded -- militate against the distinction Marshall would have us draw. Here, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the relationship between Marshall and his brother-in-law was not primarily an attorneyclient relationship. Further, the legal relationship between the Sixth Amendment and Fourth Amendment claim are distinguishable from the situation in Kimmelman, on which Marshall relies. There, adjudication of the Sixth Amendment claim would have been foreclosed if there could be no determination whether the underlying Fourth Amendment claim was meritorious. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375. Here, in contrast, Marshall seeks to demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment violation was more egregious because it also implicated a Sixth Amendment right. Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the tape was sent to his brother-in-law in a family capacity and that, although his brother-in-law had on occasion provided advice, the police were on notice that Marshall had retained counsel and that all legal representations in the investigation had been made by that counsel, not by Marshall’s brother-in-law. Given our deferential review of the state courts’ findings of facts, we will not disturb this conclusion. 67 alleging that the Fourth Amendment claims were decided incorrectly or incompletely by the New Jersey courts, allegations which are insufficient to surmount the Stone bar. Marshall tries to argue that a full and fair litigation would require consideration of the salient United States Supreme Court precedent, and he raises a very old decision that he argues should have controlled the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision. App. Br. at 140-41. See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 468 (1918). We do not need to decide on these facts what would be sufficient to constitute a denial of opportunity for full and fair litigation, and because the holding of Rosen is clearly not controlling here we will not fault the New Jersey courts for failing to apply it. We are satisfied that there was no structural defect that prevented the full and fair litigation of Marshall’s Fourth Amendment claims in state court, and we are thus barred from reconsidering them here. In retrospect, and in light of our determination of the Fourth Amendment and related statutory claims, we acknowledge that the COA was improvidently granted as to those issues and it will therefore be dismissed. D. Murder for Hire: As both an element of the crime and an aggravating circumstance? Marshall brings an as-applied challenge to New Jersey’s death penalty statute, alleging that it violates the Eighth Amendment in its application to his crime. The aggravating factor relied on by the State -- that Marshall arranged the murder for pecuniary gain -- duplicated an element of the underlying offense. As Marshall correctly states, the United Supreme Court has held that the Constitution requires a capital sentencing scheme genuinely [to] narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and . . . reasonably [to] justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). As the New Jersey Supreme Court correctly noted, the United States Supreme Court held in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), that it may be permissible for an aggravating factor to duplicate an element of the underlying offense. See Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 155. Although Marshall criticizes 68 the New Jersey Supreme Court for failing to reference Zant,35 we find no fault in the New Jersey Supreme Court’s evaluating more recent United States Supreme Court precedent, and referring to its own caselaw which interpreted the earlier United States Supreme Court precedent, including Zant, instead. More recently, we had the opportunity to consider a similar challenge to Delaware’s capital sentencing structure, and there we noted that, after Lowenfield, the courts of appeals have consistently held that a sentencing jury can consider an element of the capital offense as an aggravating circumstance even if it is duplicitous [sic]. Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1502 (3d Cir. 1994). Marshall alleges that the homicide statute itself is broadly drafted, encompassing virtually every murder committed either ‘purposely’ or ‘knowingly.’  App. Br. at 135. Marshall contends that since his conviction was for hiring someone to murder his wife, and since the aggravating factor duplicated the elements of the underlying crime itself, there was no possibility for narrowing or for channeling the jury’s discretion. The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar contention in Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993). _________________________________________________________________ 35. In fact, Marshall urges us not to apply AEDPA to our examination of this question, since the New Jersey Supreme Court did not engage in any meaningful analysis of this claim, failing even to cite to Zant. App. Br. at 138. Marshall misapprehends the duty of the state court. Its duty is to apply the correct governing legal principle reasonably. [Terry] Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). It does not have to recite a specific case name in order to apply the principles enunciated within that case. By referring to its earlier analysis of the precise issues raised by Marshall in State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 218-220 (N.J. 1987), an opinion that does discuss the requirements of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), in addition to other pertinent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, including Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and by considering the impact of the United States Supreme Court opinion rendered in the interim between its decision in Ramseur and its consideration of Marshall’s claims, Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), the New Jersey Supreme Court did all that it was required to do for us to apply AEDPA deference. 69 When the purpose of a statutory aggravating circumstance is to enable the sentencer to distinguish those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not, the circumstance must provide a principled basis for doing so. If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm. Id. at 474 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Applying Arave’s standard, however, it is clear that the New Jersey legislature had a right to establish a motive (for pecuniary gain) as more culpable than other motives, and to determine that a motive-specific factor would narrow the class of death-eligible murderers and would provide a principled consideration for jurors to weigh in making an individualized determination at the capital sentencing phase. That one of the means by which a person may commit murder with this motive is to hire someone else actually to execute the crime is immaterial to the limiting analysis. The strictures of the United States Constitution do not require New Jersey to assign a constitutionally mandated function to aggravating circumstances, but to design a scheme that both narrows the class of death-eligible defendants and channels the jury’s discretion to ensure that a death-eligible defendant is not sentenced to death arbitrarily or capriciously.36 Here there can be no question that the New Jersey legislature required sufficient culpability to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The New Jersey Supreme Court so held in Ramseur, and it was not unreasonable for the New Jersey Supreme Court to rely upon its detailed analysis in that opinion, and upon the more recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, in its consideration of Marshall’s claim. _________________________________________________________________ 36. We note as well that Marshall did undergo a proportionality review, characterized in a Harvard Law Review article asan additional fail-safe. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 373 (1995). 70 E. Guilt Phase Ineffectiveness Marshall cites before us nine separate ways in which he contends his counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase of the trial. The State counters that Marshall’slitany of purported inadequacies is merely a lengthy series of inconsequential minutiae. Appee. Br. at 76. As both parties recognize, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny, although Marshall contends that, while the New Jersey Supreme Court correctly identified Strickland as controlling, it both misconstrued and unreasonably applied it. Marshall contends that he has been afforded virtually no process on his ineffectiveassistance claim. App. Br. at 99. As the State notes, Marshall originally raised claims of ineffectiveness in his direct appeal brief, and then raised more than 300 claims in all on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. Appee. Br. at 77. The New Jersey Supreme Court found all of Marshall’s claims to be without merit. The District Court did not find the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusions unreasonable under AEDPA, but Marshall contends that it merely agreed, in summary fashion, with the conclusions of the New Jersey Supreme Court. App. Br. at 100-01. Actually, as discussed below, most of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusions were based on a finding that Marshall could not demonstrate prejudice. The District Court instead concluded that Marshall had not established that the performance of his attorney was deficient: In hindsight, petitioner has compiled a long list of alleged errors and mistakes his counsel committed during his trial. The Court does not imply that defense counsel made no errors whatsoever, but that his performance was well within the required reasonable standard and his litigation strategy was based upon reasonable professional judgment. Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 790. The nine areas of alleged ineffectiveness raised before us by Marshall are: 1. Counsel did not develop or present any defense to counter the State’s contention that the murder was financially motivated. App. Br. at 104-07. 71 2. Counsel did not develop or present evidence to refute much of the State’s circumstantial evidence about the events the night of the murder. App. Br. at 107-11. 3. Counsel did not provide independent evidence to refute McKinnon’s testimony. App. Br. at 111. 4. Counsel did not present evidence to refute the State’s allegations that Marshall’s attempted suicide was staged. App. Br. at 111-13. 5. Counsel did not present evidence to counter the prosecutor’s theatrics [which] were sensational, shocking, and quite effective. App. Br. at 113-15. 6. Counsel did not present the evidence that his own testimony -- at a limited PCR hearing -- cited as his primary trial strategy: character evidence. App. Br. at 11516. 7. Counsel had no coherent defense theory. App. Br. at 116-17. 8. Counsel did not present other evidence that was within his possession. App. Br. at 118-20. 9. Counsel did not object nor seek curative action when inadmissible testimony was admitted, or when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. He also put irrelevant, prejudicial facts before the jury. App. Br. at 120-23. Under Strickland, courts are precluded from finding that counsel was ineffective unless they find both that counsel’s performance fell below an objectively unreasonable standard, and that the defendant was prejudiced by that performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In order to establish prejudice, a defendant need not demonstrate that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, but only that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.37 Id. at 694. Where prejudice is lacking, the court _________________________________________________________________ 37. As noted earlier, at A., supra, the Strickland prejudice standard is the same as the Brady materiality standard. 72 need not determine whether the performance was subpar. Id. at 697. Further, it is critical that courts be highly deferential to counsel’s reasonable strategic decisions and guard against the temptation to engage in hindsight. Id. at 689-90. In part, this is because the purpose of the rule is not to improve the standard of professional conduct, but only to protect a defendant’s right to counsel. Id. at 689. Thus, the court is not engaging in a prophylactic exercise to guarantee each defendant a perfect trial with optimally proficient counsel, but rather to guarantee each defendant a fair trial, with constitutionally competent counsel. In order to assess an ineffectiveness claim properly, the court must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Id. at 695. The deference accorded to counsel’s reasonable strategic decisions can be seen in numerous United States Supreme Court rulings following on the heels of Strickland. E.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 185-86 (1986). Nonetheless, the Court has found the decisions of some attorneys to be objectively unreasonable. E.g., [Terry] Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385-87 (1986). It is rare for a court to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, because the record is typically not adequately developed by that point to allow sufficient review. United States v. Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1996); State v. Morton, 715 A.2d 228, 253 (N.J. 1998). The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized this in the appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. The PCR court had determined that all of Marshall’s ineffectiveness claims were procedurally barred, since some ineffectiveness claims had been raised on direct appeal, reasoning that ineffectiveness had been previously adjudicated, and that Marshall was thus barred from raising new instances of ineffectiveness before the court. The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically rejected the PCR court’s conclusion, explaining that its analysis on direct appeal was limited to the specific instances and the contours of the record that were before it at that time, and thus were not dispositive of the other instances of 73 ineffectiveness raised in Marshall’s application for postconviction relief; nor could the treatment of the specific issues raised on direct appeal be viewed as dispositive of a broader claim of ineffectiveness on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. See Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 29-32. However, when specific issues were adjudicated on direct appeal and found to be without merit, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on its resolution on direct appeal in finding that counsel could not be constitutionally ineffective in those areas. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 87. On direct appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court read many of Marshall’s contentions as suggesting trial strategies that, in hindsight, might have been more effective. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 171-72. As the Court correctly concluded, the mere existence of alternative -- even preferable or more effective -- strategies does not satisfy the requirements of demonstrating ineffectiveness under Strickland. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the New Jersey Supreme Court prefaced its analysis of Marshall’s claims with the observation that this was the first appeal taken to it from a denial of post-conviction relief under the then-recently enacted Capital Punishment Act. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 27. The New Jersey Supreme Court was clearly disturbed by the sheer magnitude of Marshall’s presentation, stating both that it question[ed] both the wisdom and the necessity for so massive a presentation and that [p]ost-conviction relief issues should be categorized broadly but coherently, and to the extent necessary illustrated by pertinent examples. No valid purpose is served when every minute example of trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness is offered as a separate ground for post-conviction relief. Id. Thus, while allowing Marshall to raise his ineffectiveness claims, the Court grouped them into more general categories and declined to analyze claims that, even if counsel had sought to proceed as Marshall suggested, would have been foreclosed or completely lacking in merit. In doing so, the Court reasoned from Strickland that if the claims would not have been meritorious if pursued, 74 Marshall could not have been prejudiced. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court stated: Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. See Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 54, 87. Given the sheer volume of the claims, and the related nature of many of them, we do not think that the New Jersey Supreme Court was unreasonable in this approach.38 We note, as we discuss more fully below, that it is important here that we can focus on the prejudice analysis, because we do not have a complete record on which to assess some of the performance claims: while we have Zeitz’s trial preparation file, he has never been questioned as to whether some of his actions were the result of strategic decisions. Marshall has asked us to hold that it was error for the New Jersey Supreme Court not to acknowledge or apply the requirement that it look outside the trial record and examine the circumstances underlying the claimed deficiencies. App. Br. at 102. But the purpose of assessing counsel’s acts from an objective standpoint is to assess the reasonableness of counsel’s actions. We do not need to reach the question of whether the attorney’s actions fell below an objectively unreasonable standard if we can determine first that Marshall was not prejudiced. But Marshall claims as well that the New Jersey Supreme _________________________________________________________________ 38. In its opinion affirming the denial of post-conviction relief, the New Jersey Supreme Court included a chart that grouped the 548 grounds that Marshall had advanced for reversal into categories. On that chart, 267 issues related to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 25. 75 Court failed equally in its determination of prejudice under Strickland (and the United States Supreme Court’s more recent enunciation of how Strickland claims are to be evaluated under AEDPA, [Terry] Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)). Marshall urges that the New Jersey Supreme Court misapprehended its task under Strickland , misreading the explicit instruction to consider the totality of the evidence as requiring it only . . . to consider the strength of the State’s case against petitioner at trial. App. Br. at 103. Such an analysis, according to Marshall, cannot comport with the teachings of the United States Supreme Court, because an assessment of the omitted evidence is required, and, since it was not in the trial record, it was not susceptible to analysis. Id. at 103-04. He cites in support two passages from [Terry] Williams, one penned by Justice Stevens in his majority opinion, and the other by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence. In the passage quoted from Justice Stevens, the Court counters the Virginia Supreme Court’s finding that there was no prejudice because the mitigation evidence not uncovered by counsel barely would have altered the profile of this defendant that was presented to the jury by noting that in so concluding the court ignored or overlooked the evidence of Williams’ difficult childhood and abuse and his limited mental capacity. [Terry] Williams, 529 U.S. at 374 n.5. Justice O’Connor then notes that when the original trial judge was shown the newly unearthed mitigation evidence, he concluded that Williams was prejudiced and, despite earlier having found Williams’ death sentence justified and warranted, recommended a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 416 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision not to grant the sentencing hearing thusreveals an obvious failure to consider the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence. Id. However, we conclude that counsel’s conduct during the guilt phase of Marshall’s trial does not reflect the same concerns that animated the United States Supreme Court in its consideration of the unpresented evidence in [Terry] Williams , as is evident upon closer examination of the specific claims Marshall raises before us. 76 1. Financial and Insurance Information Marshall contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to develop financial and insurance information to demonstrate that Marshall could reasonably expect to cover his expenses and satisfy his debts through future earnings, and that insuring Maria Marshall was based on a rational analysis of the family’s needs if she were no longer present. Further, he argues that proper psychiatric testimony would have revealed that his expressions of despair on the suicide tape were not probative of his actual financial situation. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the failure to develop those arguments was not prejudicial. As to the financial information, they found that it had been placed before the jury -- albeit pursuant to the questioning by codefendant’s, not Marshall’s counsel -- and other witnesses had testified that Marshall was an outstanding insurance salesman. Marshall had explained at length why and how he assessed the amounts of insurance needed on Maria. In [Terry] Williams, the jurors had no opportunity to consider the mitigating evidence at all; as Justice O’Connor noted, if the trial judge himself felt a new sentencing was warranted on the basis of the information, the total absence of that evidence before the jury was prejudicial. Further, it was not the fact of Marshall’s financial situation, nor the rationality of accruing insurance on Maria that was in dispute: it was whether his perception of his increasing indebtedness led him to consider the magnitude of the assets available from the insurance policies as a solution to an overwhelming debt. Thus, Marshall is incorrect when he argues that his own acts and expressions of despair as to his finances could have been explained away by proper psychiatric testimony. His statements on the suicide tape that he was worried about his debt led the New Jersey Supreme Court to conclude that Marshall could not demonstrate how trial counsel’s more comprehensive preparation and different trial strategy could persuasively have overcome defendant’s own perception that his debt was difficult to manage. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 65. We note as well that Kraushaar’s testimony also portrayed Marshall as a man who was worried about finances and how to resolve his debt. It was 77 not unreasonable for the New Jersey Supreme Court to find that the presentation of objective data justifying either the level of debt or the level of insurance maintained on Maria had no reasonable probability of impacting how the jurors perceived Marshall’s response to his debt, nor to the insurance that indisputably would eliminate that debt. 2. Crime Scene Evidence Marshall contends that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to test the tire and to bring out other evidence that would tend to demonstrate that Marshall pulled off the road where he did because he was afraid of being hit -- as a friend of his recently had been-- and had himself been seriously injured. He urges that if the car trouble were shown to be legitimate, and the circumstances surrounding the crime cast in a more accurate light, the jury could have found that Maria was killed to prevent her from identifying thieves, rather than as the result of a carefully arranged plot between her husband and McKinnon. Here, the New Jersey Supreme Court did find that Zeitz’s performance was below objective standards of proficiency, but that there was no constitutional violation because there was but scant support for the alternate theory of the crime. Marshall II, 690 A. 2d at 60-61, 63. Under Strickland, the burden is on the defendant to establish that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. It was not unreasonable for the New Jersey Supreme Court to conclude that mere articulation of an alternate theory of the crime was not adequate to satisfy this burden.