Opinion ID: 793922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim: Elements of Attempted Extortion

Text: 27 Foster alternatively challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act. Specifically, Foster argues the government failed to prove (1) Foster's conduct had an adverse impact on interstate commerce, (2) Foster extorted property, and (3) Foster acted under color of official right. We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Thropay, 394 F.3d 1004, 1005 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2283, 161 L.Ed.2d 1075 (2005). Evidence is sufficient to support the verdict if after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1005-06 (internal quotation omitted).
28 Foster argues the government failed to produce sufficient evidence of an adverse impact on interstate commerce. We disagree. 29 First, Foster misstates the government's burden of proving the interstate commerce element-adverse as well as beneficial effects on commerce are proscribed under the Hobbs Act. See United States v. Kaplan, 171 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding the language of the Hobbs Act is broad, and it is evidence that Congress intended to protect commerce from any and all forms of effects, whether they are direct or indirect, actual or potential, beneficial or adverse. For courts to require the effect on commerce to be adverse would significantly narrow the statute. (footnote omitted)). 30 Second, our sister circuits have concluded the government satisfies its burden by showing a potential effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (The interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce. (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Verbitskaya, 406 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir.2005) (A Hobbs Act conspiracy can be proved by showing a potential impact on interstate commerce.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1095, 163 L.Ed.2d 864 (2006); United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 765-66 & n. 3 (3d Cir.) (concluding a `de minimis effect' in an individual Hobbs Act case need only be `potential'), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 732, 163 L.Ed.2d 568 (2005); United States v. Re, 401 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir.2005) (Moreover, the impact on commerce need not be actual; given that the Hobbs Act criminalizes attempts as well as completed crimes, it is enough that the conduct (here, the conspiracy to extort) had the potential to impact commerce.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1652, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2006); United States v. Rivera Rangel, 396 F.3d 476, 482 (1st Cir.2005) (The government need only show a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on interstate commerce in order to bring extortion within the reach of the Hobbs Act. (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir.2002) (recognizing it is the law in our circuit that if the defendants' conduct produces any interference with or effect upon interstate commerce, whether slight, subtle or even potential, it is sufficient to uphold a prosecution under the Hobbs Act. (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 969 (10th Cir.2002) (concluding only a potential effect on commerce is required to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Turner, 272 F.3d 380, 384 (6th Cir.2001) (When a conspiracy is charged under the Hobbs Act, the government need only prove that the scheme would have affected interstate commerce had it been carried out.); United States v. Brantley, 777 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir.1985) (The jurisdictional predicate may be satisfied though the impact upon commerce is small, and it may be shown by proof of probabilities without evidence that any particular commercial movements were affected.). 31 We agree with the other circuits that because the Hobbs Act criminalizes attempt crimes, it is enough that the conduct... had the potential to impact commerce. Re, 401 F.3d at 835. We recognize, however, another panel of our circuit, in a case involving the prosecution of a completed crime (Interference with Commerce by Violence) under the Hobbs Act, concluded the Hobbs Act requires an actual effect on interstate commerce, not just a probable or potential impact. United States v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 836-38 (8th Cir.2002). Williams is distinguishable from the present case because Williams involved the prosecution of a completed offense, and the present case involves the prosecution of an attempt crime. That distinction notwithstanding, a conflict with Williams is avoided because the evidence shows Foster's conduct had more than a potential effect on interstate commerce. 32 At trial, McDougal testified the multimillion dollar Project would have involved (1) soliciting contractors nationwide; (2) ordering construction supplies and materials from outside the state of Arkansas; and (3) securing financing through HUD, a federal agency. More directly, an impact on interstate commerce was demonstrated by Foster arranging the scheme, in part, to help Freeman repay the HUD grant money, and by Foster taking money from the undercover agent in exchange for promised votes, believing the undercover agent was an investor from Dallas, Texas. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude a rational jury could have found Foster's conduct had an actual, and certainly a potential, effect on interstate commerce.
33 Relying on United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir.1978), abrogated on other grounds by McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, Foster argues there was insufficient evidence he was acting under color of official right, because there was no issue pending before the Council at the time he accepted the money. 34 Foster's reliance on Rabbitt is misplaced. First, there is no requirement under the Hobbs Act that the official must be acting in response to a pending issue; rather, an official's conduct controls an undertaking for purposes of the Hobbs Act when the property is accepted. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 265-68, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992) (concluding the under color of official right element does not require an affirmative act of inducement by the official, and the offense is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts); United States v. Loftus, 992 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir.1993) (When a public official accepts money and `asserts that his official conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise or undertaking,' that official has received money `under color of official right within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.' (quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991))). 35 Second, Rabbitt is distinguishable from the present case. In Rabbitt, we reversed one count of a Hobbs Act conviction against a councilman for accepting a fee for introducing an architectural firm to a potential state contractor. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d at 1019, 1028. We concluded the government had not shown the councilman was acting in his official capacity when he introduced the parties, because the councilman did not have the authority to award contracts, nor did the architectural firm reasonably believe he had such authority. Id. at 1028. 36 The evidence supports the opposite conclusion in the present case. Foster testified that in his capacity as alderman, he voted on issues brought before the Council. Foster also testified he knew McDougal needed a favorable vote from the Council to proceed with the Project. McDougal testified he believed Foster could influence the Council's vote. Foster guaranteed McDougal four votes in exchange for money to help Freeman. The jury heard audio and videotape recordings of Foster telling McDougal that as long as his boy Billy Freeman was happy, he was happy. Another videotape showed Foster taking money from an undercover FBI agent posing as an investor from Dallas, as they discussed the Council's votes. The same videotape showed Foster handing the undercover agent his business card which displayed Foster's position as alderman on the Council, and Foster telling the FBI agent he (Foster) and Freeman were going to do what they needed to do. During a post-indictment FBI interview, Foster admitted receiving between $1,000 and $10,000 to help Freeman in exchange for Council votes. Foster also admitted knowing Freeman received money to pay the city of Pine Bluff in exchange for securing Council votes. Foster further admitted telling McDougal that if Freeman was happy, he was happy. We have no trouble concluding the government presented sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find Foster accepted money under color of official right.
37 Finally, Foster asserts no property was extorted. [F]or purposes of the `obtaining of property' requirement, the offense of attempted extortion is complete when the defendant has attempted to induce his victim to part with property. United States v. Frazier, 560 F.2d 884, 887 (8th Cir.1977). In this case, the testimonies of McDougal, Schull, and the undercover FBI agent, as well as the audio and videotapes, revealed Foster attempted to induce McDougal to part with over $71,000. 38 For the reasons stated, sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict. The district court did not err in denying Foster's motion for judgment of acquittal.