Opinion ID: 2351327
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The County's Suit for Injunctive Relief

Text: Montgomery County contends that the Chancellor erred in denying it the relief prayed in its Bill and in concluding that criminal prosecution was an adequate and more suitable remedy than an injunction. It claims that its suit for injunctive relief has not become moot by reason of the fact that Ficker was defeated at the primary election of May 16, 1972 and is no longer posting political campaign signs in violation of the County Sign Ordinance. Unlike the State, the County does not concede that all Ficker signs posted in violation of its law have now been removed. Quite to the contrary, the County maintains that in view of the prayers contained in its Bill for damages to public property, and for orders directing that Ficker remove all illegally posted signs and reimburse the County for the expenses incurred in removing the illegal signs, its suit is not one calling for application of the rule of Potts and Washburne that appeals which present nothing for decision must be dismissed. We think the County's position is well taken and that its case on appeal is in a posture not unlike that in Phillips Roofing Co. v. Md. Broadcasting Co., 184 Md. 187. In that case, the Chancellor dismissed a Bill of Complaint for injunction seeking equitable relief from cancellation of a contract. During the pendency of the appeal from the Chancellor's decree of dismissal, the contract terminated by its own terms, leaving only the question of possible damages unresolved. In reversing the Chancellor's dismissal of the Bill, we held at 197-98:    Even though the granting of the injunction would be a nugatory act, the Chancellor should retain his jurisdiction until he makes a final decree determining all the rights and equities of the parties within the scope of the pleadings for the purpose of granting complete relief. Poe v. Munich Re-Insurance Co., 126 Md. 520, 95 A. 164; Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 24 A.2d 795; Borssuck v. Pantaleo, 183 Md. 148, 36 A.2d 527.    We conclude that while the question whether the Chancellor erred in not enjoining Ficker from continuing to post signs in violation of the County Ordinance is now an academic issue  no new signs having been posted since Ficker's defeat and he no longer being a candidate for Congress  the question of the Chancellor's refusal to grant the other relief prayed in the County's Bill is properly before us, and we now proceed to consider it. In his opinion denying the relief prayed by the County, the Chancellor recognized the rule that there may be cases where the remedy at law by criminal prosecution and punishment would not be adequate under the circumstances and where the remedy in equity by injunction would furnish more effectual and complete relief. With due regard to the Chancellor's wide discretion in granting or denying injunctive relief (see Moore v. McAllister, 216 Md. 497), we think he misconceived what constitutes an adequate remedy at law. In C. & P.R.R. Co. v. Penna. R.R. Co., 57 Md. 267, 271, we quoted, with approval, Story's definition of an adequate remedy at law: `   It must be adequate; for if at law it falls short of what the party is entitled to, that founds a jurisdiction in equity. And it must be complete; that is, must obtain the full end and justice of the case. It must reach the whole mischief, and secure the whole right of the party in a perfect manner, at the present time and in the future; otherwise, equity will interfere and give such relief and aid as the exigency of the particular case may require. The jurisdiction of a court of equity is, therefore, sometimes concurrent with the jurisdiction of a court of law, it is sometimes exclusive of it; and it is sometimes auxiliary to it.' We applied the principle in Baker v. Howard County Hunt, 171 Md. 159, 174-75, stating: To justify refusal of equitable relief on the ground that the appellant therefor has a remedy at law, the legal remedy must be fully adequate and complete   , for, as stated in Fletcher, Equity Pleadings & Practice, p. 246, `The remedy at law which precludes relief in equity must be as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.' This policy of complete and adequate relief is consonant with the distinction noted in Clark v. Todd, 192 Md. 487. There, we allowed an injunction restraining the defendants from dredging oysters from illegally licensed boats despite the existence of criminal penalties up to $500.00 or imprisonment up to six months, or both. We said: On the main issue the [lower] Court held in each case that equity lacks jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief, because complainants have an adequate remedy at law by instituting criminal proceedings against any individuals violating Section 7 of the Oyster Law. In that decision the Courts erred. The rule is well established that where acts complained of are violations of the criminal law, courts of equity will not on that ground alone interfere by injunction to prevent their commission. This rule, however, does not preclude injunctive relief against the commission of criminal acts which, unless enjoined, would operate to cause an irreparable injury to property or rights of a pecuniary nature. If criminal offenses are primarily and essentially an injury to property, preventive relief may be granted within the same limits as where the element of criminality is entirely absent. In such a case the Court does not interfere to prevent the commission of crime, although that may incidentally result, but it experts its force to protect individual property from destruction.    192 Md. at 492. To like effect is our statement in Dvorine v. Castelberg Jewelry Corp., 170 Md. 661, 668 that equity will enjoin criminal acts if such operate to the injury of complainant's property rights or causes him pecuniary harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy. We think the illegal posting of Ficker's political campaign signs in such inordinate numbers in direct violation of the Ordinance caused irreparable injury to the County's rights of a pecuniary nature for which loss the criminal sanction was plainly inadequate. The relief sought by the County in its Bill  removal of the remaining illegal signs at Ficker's own expense, reimbursement for expenses previously incurred in removing Ficker's signs, and damages for injury to its property  would not have accrued to the County from successful criminal prosecution. The monetary fines resulting from prosecutions for violations of the County Ordinance inure to the general funds of the State and in no way would have benefited the County. See Code (1971 Cum. Supp.) Article 26, §§ 145 (b) (2) (ii), 151 (a), 155. Thus, contrary to Ficker's claim that prompt criminal action would have provided the County with a fund with which to pay the costs of sign removal, no such resolution of the County's dilemma would have resulted from pursuing the criminal remedy. Moreover, in view of Ficker's well-demonstrated contempt for the criminal penalties provided by State and County law for the illegal posting of signs, it is unlikely that prompt criminal action under the provisions of the Ordinance would have deterred Ficker from continuing his sign posting activities; indeed, he has always claimed that he enjoys the right, under the free speech provisions of the First Amendment, to post his signs without regard to the inhibiting provisions of the County's Ordinance. We thus conclude that imposition of criminal penalties upon Ficker would not have reached the whole mischief and secured the whole right of the County for the present and future, and, consequently, the criminal remedy was not complete. See Mitchell v. Houstle, 217 Md. 259; Adams v. Commissioners of Trappe, 204 Md. 165; Whitman v. United Surety Co., 110 Md. 421. Of course, that the County did not undertake vigorous prosecution of Ficker under its Ordinance does not limit or control its right to seek injunctive relief, as suggested by the Chancellor. Since the remedy at law is plainly inadequate, we shall vacate the decree of dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings on that portion of the Bill not rendered moot by subsequent events. On remand, the Chancellor will be required to consider the question of the constitutionality of the County's Sign Ordinance, raised by Ficker in the proceedings below but which the Chancellor found unnecessary to resolve in view of his dismissal of the County's Bill. If the Chancellor finds the Ordinance constitutional, it would follow that the monetary and other relief prayed by the County, if justified by the proof, should be granted. [3] In No. 74 decree dismissing the bill of complaint of the State of Maryland affirmed; costs to be paid by the State. In No. 99 decree dismissing Montgomery County's bill of complaint vacated; case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion; costs to be paid by appellee.