Opinion ID: 4027701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Subsequent Appellate Review

Text: On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court‟s review was inadequate because the trial court “addressed only the circumstances of the offense in its review . . . . [and] did not state whether the district attorney general considered all of the relevant factors or whether the district attorney general‟s findings were supported by substantial evidence.” Hamilton, 2015 WL 4092391, at . We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals‟ finding of inadequacy. We reiterate that a trial court reviewing a petition for a writ of certiorari must address whether the district attorney general “weighed and considered all of the relevant factors and whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the district attorney general‟s reasons for denying diversion.” Yancey, 69 S.W.3d at 559 (finding that the trial court must “examine each relevant factor in the pretrial diversion process to determine whether the district attorney general has considered the factor and whether the district attorney general‟s finding with respect to that factor is supported by substantial evidence” (citing State v. Herron, 767 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tenn. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Yancey, 69 S.W.3d at 559)). As we explained in Stephens, a trial court need not use any particular magic words to satisfy these review obligations. Stephens, __ S.W.3d at ____. However, where, as here, a trial court specifically limits its discussion to certain factors and omits any analysis of the remaining factors, including the defendant‟s criminal record, social history, and present condition; the deterrent effect on other criminal activity; and whether pretrial diversion would serve the ends of justice and the best interests of both the public and the defendant, the trial court has not satisfied its review obligations. Therefore, the trial court here erred by failing to determine whether the prosecutor had properly considered each of the relevant factors.5 5 We reiterate that a more complete written statement of the trial court‟s reasoning would have been particularly helpful to appellate review. - 11 - Nevertheless, we need not remand to the trial court for further proceedings because, as explained in Stephens, when a defendant appeals from the denial of diversion, the role of reviewing appellate courts, like that of the reviewing trial court, is to determine whether an abuse of prosecutorial discretion occurred. Stephens, __ S.W.3d at ____. In fact, after concluding that the trial court‟s review was inadequate, the Court of Criminal Appeals here conducted such a review.6 The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the district attorney general had “considered and weighed all the relevant factors” but found an abuse of discretion after concluding that the prosecutor‟s denial is not supported by substantial evidence. Hamilton, 2015 WL 4092391, at . We agree with the intermediate appellate court that the district attorney general considered and weighed all the relevant factors, but to the contrary, we also conclude that the district attorney general‟s decision to deny diversion is supported by substantial evidence. In his denial of the defendant‟s application for pretrial diversion, the prosecutor provided evidence to support his conclusions that the circumstances of the offense, the defendant‟s lack of amenability to correction, the need for deterrence, and the public interest and the ends of justice favor prosecution. To determine that the defendant‟s amenability to correction and the circumstances of the offense did not support granting pretrial diversion, the prosecutor asserted that the defendant was the aggressor, and that the defendant‟s written statement and resignation letter were inconsistent with his application for pretrial diversion. Id. It is critical to emphasize that the discretion to grant or deny pretrial diversion rests with the prosecutor, not the reviewing court. Despite acknowledging that the prosecutor conducted a sufficient review, the Court of Criminal Appeals reexamined the evidence from the defendant‟s pretrial diversion application and reached its own 6 We acknowledge that in Yancey, a pretrial diversion case appealed after the defendant had been convicted by a jury, this Court remanded to the trial court for application of the proper standard of review because the trial court had “recite[d] only two of the factors in the context of „outweigh[ing] any other‟ factors. . . . [and] [did] not state whether the district attorney general considered all of the relevant factors or whether the district attorney general‟s findings were supported by substantial evidence.” Yancey, 69 S.W.3d at 559. Yancey is factually distinguishable because, not only had the trial court failed to apply the appropriate standard of review, the Court of Criminal Appeals had also considered evidence admitted at trial when concluding that the prosecutor‟s denial of diversion was not an abuse of discretion. Under these unusual circumstances, a remand was appropriate. Generally, however, when the only error is a reviewing trial court‟s failure to apply the appropriate standard of review, this error may be rectified by the reviewing appellate court itself applying the appropriate standard to determine whether the denial of diversion resulted from prosecutorial abuse of discretion. Cf. Hoover v. Bd. of Prof‟l Responsibility of Supreme Court, 395 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Tenn. 2012) (“Our standard of review on appeal is identical to that of the trial court . . . .”). - 12 - conclusions regarding whether the defendant was the aggressor and whether the defendant altered his depiction of the altercation, thereby improperly reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the district attorney general. See Yancey, 69 S.W.3d at 558-59; Ben H. Cantrell, Review of Administrative Decisions by Writ of Certiorari in Tennessee, 4 Mem. St. L.Rev. 19, 30 (1973). The role of the reviewing court is not to reassess each factor and determine whether the court agrees with the prosecutor‟s conclusion; instead, the reviewing court must look at the evidence cumulatively to determine if the prosecutor provided sufficient evidence and engaged in the proper methodology. Yancey, 69 S.W.3d at 558-59. Moreover, in its analysis, the intermediate court below concluded that, even if the record shows that the defendant engaged in aggressive behavior, “such behavior constitutes a circumstance of the offense” and is not “„of such overwhelming significance that [it necessarily] outweigh[s] all other factors.‟” Hamilton, 2015 WL 4092391, at  (quoting State v. Washington, 866 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993)). We reiterate, as we did in Stephens, that a prosecutor is only obligated to show that the circumstances of the offense and need for deterrence are “of such overwhelming significance that they [necessarily] outweigh all other factors” if he or she is assigning controlling weight to those factors. Washington, 866 S.W.2d at 951 (quoting State v. Markham, 755 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)). Here, as in Stephens, the prosecutor relied upon multiple factors without assigning controlling weight to either the need for deterrence or the circumstances of the offense.7 Based on our review, we conclude that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion by denying diversion. In so holding, we are not unsympathetic to the defendant. Were it our task to review the record and weigh the evidence ourselves, we may well have granted pretrial diversion. However, a reviewing court is restricted to determining whether the prosecutor considered the relevant factors and whether the prosecutor‟s denial of pretrial diversion is supported by substantial evidence. If the denial is not supported by 7 Furthermore, the Court of Criminal Appeals found the prosecutor erred by not addressing specific factors when the prosecutor concluded that the need for deterrence favored prosecution. See Hamilton, 2015 WL 4092391, at -7 (citing State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 10-12 (Tenn. 2000)). In Hooper, we stated that a trial court which relies exclusively upon the need for deterrence to deny probation must show “a need to deter similar crimes . . . in the particular community, jurisdiction, or in the state as a whole, and . . . incarceration of the defendant may rationally serve as a deterrent to others similarly situated and likely to commit similar crimes.” Hooper, 29 S.W.3d at 10. As the prosecutor here relied upon factors other than the need for deterrence when denying pretrial diversion, the prosecutor did not err by failing to enumerate the Hooper factors, even assuming, without deciding, that Hooper applies to the current pretrial diversion statute. - 13 - substantial evidence, the prosecutor abused his or her discretion. Where, as here, the evidence in the record could support either conclusion, “it cannot be an abuse of discretion to decide the case either way.” State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978). Accordingly, we hold that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the circumstances of the offense, the defendant‟s lack of amenability to correction, the need for deterrence, and the public interests and the ends of justice favor prosecution. We conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erroneously reweighed the evidence and substituted its judgment for that of the district attorney general, rather than determining whether the record lacked substantial evidence to support the prosecutor‟s findings. III. Conclusion In summary, we hold that, even though the trial court‟s review was inadequate, the trial court reached the correct result. Furthermore, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the prosecutor‟s denial of the defendant‟s application for pretrial diversion. We conclude that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the prosecutor‟s determinations regarding the circumstances of the offense, the defendant‟s amenability to correction, the public interest and the ends of justice, and the need for deterrence. Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Criminal Appeals‟ grant of pretrial diversion, reinstate the trial court‟s judgment denying the defendant‟s petition for certiorari, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.8 Costs of this appeal are taxed to the defendant. _________________________________