Opinion ID: 2634388
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Theft and After-acquired Intent

Text: At trial, defendant asked the trial court to give several jury instructions consistent with the theory he did not form the intent to steal until after he killed the Bensons. Specifically, he asked for instructions on various theft offenses, which are lesser included offenses of robbery that do not include the element of force or fear. (See People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 675, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Defendant also asked the court to instruct the jury on after-acquired intent as follows: To convict the defendant of robbery you must find that he had the specific intent to steal at the time of the application of force or violence, or the use of fear or intimidation. [¶] If after consideration of all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt that defendant had the intent to steal at the time the force or fear was applied, you must find him not guilty of robbery. Defendant proposed an alternative instruction containing only the first of these two sentences. The trial court refused to give any of the proposed instructions. It agreed with the prosecution that the proposed theft instructions were not appropriate in light of the evidence. As to after-acquired intent, the trial court stated its opinion that the standard CALJIC instructions on robbery more thoroughly cover[ed] the issues than the instructions defendant proposed. Consistent with this ruling, the trial court later gave the standard CALJIC instructions on robbery, CALJIC Nos. 9.40, 9.41, and 9.42. Defendant argues the trial court erred in refusing to give the instruction he requested. Defendant's argument fails for a basic reason: the absence in the record of evidentiary support for a finding that he formed the intent to steal only after killing the Bensons. Instructions on after-acquired intent and theft as a lesser included offense of robbery are unwarranted absent substantial evidence that the defendant first formed the intent to take the victim's property after applying force. ( People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 112, fn. 13, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) As previously explained, there was ample evidence here that defendant killed the Bensons and took their property because he needed or wanted money. To counter this strong evidence of his larcenous intent, defendant cites no evidence at trial that he asked for more money, that Gladys denied such a request and criticized him for spending his money on alcohol, and that he went into an uncontrollable rage. Instead, he offers only generalities about his character and his relationship with the Bensons, citing evidence that he was on friendly terms with [them] and often did household chores for them at no charge, and that he was a good person who respected the property rights of others, had a reputation for peacefulness and nonviolence, and had no prior criminal record. But `the existence of any evidence, no matter how weak will not justify instructions on' theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. ( People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896, 163 P.3d 896.) Defendant offers nothing but sheer speculation to support his theory that the idea of taking the Bensons' property did not arise until after he killed them. Instead, all of the evidence points to a robbery as the motivating factor for the murders. Under such circumstances, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested instructions. (See People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 277, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) [18] Defendant's argument regarding the requested after-acquired intent instruction fails for another reason: it was unnecessary in light of the other instructions the jury received. Along with the standard CALJIC robbery instruction (CALJIC No. 9.40), the trial court also gave the CALJIC felony-murder instruction (CALJIC No. 8.21), the CALJIC instruction regarding the concurrence of act and specific intent (CALJIC No. 3.31), and the CALJIC instruction on the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation (CALJIC No. 8.81.17). These instructions together adequately informed the jury concerning the point in time the intent to steal must have been formed. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 360, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) Because defendant's proposed instructions would merely have elaborated on these general instructions, the trial court's refusal to give them was not error. [Citation.] ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 626, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) [19]