Opinion ID: 2594892
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cleveland's Argument

Text: Because Cleveland's penalty trial followed Veasley's, Cleveland's argument is quite different. As with Veasley, the bifurcation had the effect of severing the penalty trials. Because Cleveland originally requested severance, he cannot and does not complain of this circumstance. But the bifurcation had an additional impact on Cleveland. His penalty trial was held in front of, and the penalty decision was made by, the jury that had already heard the penalty proceeding and made the penalty decision as to Veasley. Cleveland argues that this circumstance denied him a fair trial before an impartial jury. After the guilt verdict, Cleveland agreed to the bifurcation. Nevertheless, we find the current contention cognizable. Cleveland had originally moved to sever the trials. Cleveland agreed to the bifurcation only after the court denied that motion. He obviously believed bifurcation was preferable to the jury's never hearing Peterson's testimony, but his original severance motion would have given him his own jury rather than a jury that had already considered the penalty question as to Veasley. Accordingly, we consider his arguments on the merits. No statutory provision specifically permits this procedure. However, in the context of deciding what to do when one defendant has made an out-of-court statement implicating another defendant, we have held that procedures (in addition to severing the trials or redacting or excluding the out-of-court statement) may be used to avoid prejudicing the nondeclarant defendant if they serve the same purpose and do not prejudice the defendants. ( People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1071, 255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619.) We have upheld the use of two juries in the same trial, one for each defendant, with one jury excluded when evidence is presented that is inadmissible as to that jury's defendant. ( Id. at pp. 1070-1076, 255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619; see also People v. Fletcher, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 468, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 917 P.2d 187.) Here, the court did not use two juries but a single jury in consecutive penalty trials. The sole question here is whether the procedure utilized in this case ensured defendant a fair trial at which his fundamental constitutional rights were protected. ( People v. Harris, supra, at p. 1071, 255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619.) As we explain, courts should be very cautious about adopting the procedure used here, but the bifurcation was fair to Cleveland in the unusual circumstances of this case. We have recognized, again in the context of deciding what to do when one defendant has made an out-of-court statement implicating another defendant, that one alternative that has been suggested, but apparently never used in this state, is a joint but bifurcated trial in which the jury first determines the guilt of the nondeclarant defendant, then receives evidence of the nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial confession, and finally proceeds to determine the guilt or innocence of that defendant. ( People v. Fletcher, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 468, fn. 5, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 917 P.2d 187.) We also cautioned, however, that federal appellate courts have reversed convictions of defendants whose guilt has been determined in a bifurcated trial, concluding that it may be practically impossible for a jury to determine one defendant's guilt without impermissibly prejudging the guilt of another defendant jointly tried. (See, e.g., United States v. McIver (11th Cir.1982) 688 F.2d 726, 729-730.) ( Ibid. ) Cleveland urges a similar conclusion here, arguing that the jury could not reasonably keep from applying the arguments presented during Veasley's penalty phase to him. We disagree. Bifurcating the penalty decision in this case was different from bifurcating a guilt determination. In United States v. McIver, supra, 688 F.2d 726, the trial court bifurcated the guilt trials to permit one defendant to present evidence favorable to that defendant but not admissible against the other two defendants. The prosecution presented its evidence against all the defendants, and then two of the defendants presented their defense. At that point, the jury deliberated and found those two defendants guilty. After that the third defendant presented his defense and questioned some of the witnesses the prosecution had called in the first phase. The jury then deliberated again and found the third defendant guilty. ( Id. at p. 728.) The appellate court concluded the bifurcated trial violates the Sixth Amendment because the jury might consider, even if inadvertently, the guilt of the defendant before it has heard the defendant's case. Here the three defendants were all charged with the same crimes. The government's evidence presented during the [ first two defendants' ] phase of the trial pertained to all three defendants. It is unlikely in such a situation that the jury could convict two of the three defendants without forming an opinion regarding the third defendant. Such a jury cannot be impartial; rather, it is `predisposed to find guilt.' ( Id. at p. 729, italics added, fn. omitted.) The dispositive factor ... is that the prosecution presented all its evidence in the first phase of the trial but the defense was postponed until after the jury deliberated. ( Id. at p. 730.) The bifurcated trial here was quite different. The penalty decision as to Veasley was distinct from the penalty decision as to Cleveland. There might have been a problem if the prosecution had presented evidence at Veasley's trial that related to Cleveland  for example, victim impact evidence  or if Veasley had presented evidence regarding the charged crimes  for example, his own testimony blaming Cleveland. But none of the evidence presented at Veasley's penalty trial pertained to Cleveland. The prosecution presented evidence of other crimes Veasley committed and Veasley presented mitigating evidence regarding himself. All evidence relevant to Cleveland was presented at either the nonbifurcated guilt phase or Cleveland's own penalty trial. Cleveland focuses on the arguments of counsel. He claims that some of the arguments at Veasley's penalty trial pertained to him as well as Veasley, and that the jury could not disregard the arguments from the first phase in considering the second phase. The prosecutor did, naturally, discuss the charged crimes in urging the death penalty for Veasley, but she did the same later in urging the death penalty for Cleveland. Counsel for Veasley argued that there was no evidence Veasley was the actual shooter, that the jury's guilt verdict indicated he was not the actual shooter, and that the actual shooter was more culpable than the nonshooters. The end result, Cleveland argues, was a procedure that `essentially created two prosecutors' against [him], forcing [him] to present mitigating evidence to the same jury that had already heard his codefendant's mitigating evidence (aggravating to [Cleveland]) and closing argument, and the prosecutor's aggravating evidence and closing argument. Although the risk was present, the actuality was not. Veasley's mitigating evidence was irrelevant, not aggravating, to Cleveland. The prosecution's aggravating evidence against Veasley was also irrelevant to Cleveland. Veasley's attorney did not argue that Cleveland was the actual killer, only that there was no evidence that Veasley was the killer. All relevant argument regarding the crimes and Cleveland's role was presented at his separate trial, and he was able to respond fully to the jury at that time. The evidence and argument at Veasley's trial did not prejudice Cleveland. At Cleveland's separate trial, moreover, the jury heard, for the first time, Peterson's testimony that Veasley had admitted shooting the victims. From the jurors' perspective, this testimony may have tended to vindicate their death verdict as to Veasley, but, if anything, it suggested a reason to reach a different verdict as to Cleveland. The testimony also neutralized any suggestion at Veasley's penalty trial that Cleveland was the shooter. We see no reason why Veasley's penalty trial and the jury's verdict at that trial would have biased the jury at Cleveland's penalty trial or made it unable to reach a fair and reasoned verdict regarding Cleveland. We are confident that the actual verdict against Cleveland was based on the evidence and arguments presented at the guilt phase and Cleveland's penalty phase and was not influenced to his detriment by Veasley's intervening penalty trial. Cleveland also contends that his right to be present at trial was violated by his absence at Veasley's penalty trial. This contention is intertwined with the rest of his challenge to the bifurcation and fails for the same reasons. If Veasley's penalty trial had related to him, his presence would have been required. But it did not relate to him. Accordingly, his absence did not bear a reasonable and substantial relation to his opportunity to defend himself. ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1038-1039, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Cleveland was present at the entire guilt phase and his own penalty trial, at which all evidence and argument regarding himself was presented; he was fully able to represent his interests at those phases.