Opinion ID: 2587281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver for Dangerous Condition of Any Public Building

Text: 1. Construction or Maintenance Nexus Section 24-10-106(1)(c) provides that [s]overeign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from. . . [a] dangerous condition of any public building. The CGIA further defines dangerous condition as a physical condition of a facility or the use thereof which constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing or maintaining the facility. Maintenance does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility . . . . A dangerous condition shall not exist solely because the design of any facility is inadequate. § 24-10-103(1), 7 C.R.S. (2000). We give effect to legislative intent in construing the CGIA provisions for immunity, waiver, and exception to waiver. Springer, 13 P.3d at 799; Walton, 968 P.2d at 644. We look to the statutory language, giving the words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Walton, 968 P.2d at 644. The CGIA sets forth a four-factor test for determining the existence of a dangerous condition of a public building. The waiver of immunity applies if the alleged injuries occurred as a result of: (1) the physical condition of a public facility or the use thereof; (2) which constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public; (3) which is known to exist or should have been known to exist in the exercise of reasonable care; and (4) which condition is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing or maintaining the facility. § 24-10-103(1); Springer, 13 P.3d at 799; Walton, 968 P.2d at 644. Additionally, the condition must be associated with construction or maintenance, not solely design. § 24-10-103(1); Swieckowski, 934 P.2d at 1386. In Walton, utilizing the canon of broad construction for immunity waivers, we said [l]iability attaches for injury stemming from the public's use of a dangerous or defective physical condition of the building and the linchpin of our `use' inquiry . . . is that `the statute refers to an injury arising from the state of the building itself or the use of a state of the building. ' Walton, 968 P.2d at 645 (quoting Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825, 827 (Colo.1992)) [2] (emphasis in Walton ). Nonetheless, to be actionable, the state of the building or use of a state of the building and the injury resulting therefrom: (1) must have occurred in connection with a negligent act or omission of the governmental entity, not a third party; (2) must be associated with constructing or maintaining the facility; and (3) must not be solely due to the facility's design. See Walton, 968 P.2d at 644. In Walton, we described the dangerous condition as a combination of physical facts involving the use of an unsecured ladder on a slippery floor to access a loft for maintenance, and we explained that the governmental entity had caused the dangerous condition resulting in the injury: Walton's injuries were not solely due to inadequate design of the building. There was no evidence presented to the trial court that the space between the two ceilings was designed to serve as a storage area. While the State was under no obligation to upgrade the design of the ceilings, use of the space by the university for storage required a means of maintenance and the institution of maintenance practices that did not pose an unreasonable risk of injury to members of the public. Id. at 645. Distinguishing Jenks, we stated in Walton that the negligent act or omission of the State  not a third party  caused the dangerous condition that resulted in Walton's injuries. Id. We concluded that Walton's use and injury was, in the words of the statute, `proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity in . . . maintaining the facility.' Id. (quoting § 24-10-103(1)) (omission in original). Our discussion in Walton distinguishing Jenks demonstrates that the case-by-case jurisdictional inquiry methodology requires courts to take into account varying definitions of physical condition, constructing, and maintaining. For example, in discussing a physical condition in Jenks, we referred to a structural defect in the building. Jenks, 826 P.2d at 830. While such a structural defect is a physical condition within the immunity waiver, we held in Walton that this term also includes other physical conditions that the governmental entity creates in association with constructing or maintaining a facility. Walton, 968 P.2d at 644. Furthermore, within Jenks itself, we expressed varying formulations of the term physical condition. The first prong of the four-pronged definition of dangerous condition contains the words physical condition of a facility or the use thereof. § 24-10-103(1). Although in Jenks we said the words use thereof in that phrase modify physical condition, we then employed a broad description of physical condition to include a [m]ode or state of being; state or situation. Jenks, 826 P.2d at 827. This broad description is all the more significant because Jenks employed a narrow construction of immunity waivers. [3] Because we now afford deferential construction to immunity waivers in the CGIA, we continue to give broad scope to the term physical condition, as evidenced in Walton. See Springer, 13 P.3d at 798; Walton, 968 P.2d at 643. Similarly, in Swieckowski, we used a definition of maintain, not to narrow the construction of this word to a single meaning but, rather, to point out that the allegations there amounted only to a design defect. We said `maintain' is defined as keeping a constructed edifice, structure, or improvement in the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed.  Swieckowski, 934 P.2d at 1385 (emphasis in original). However, we did not intend to circumscribe the jurisdictional inquiry to this one meaning. Broadly construed, maintenance encompasses ongoing repair and upkeep of the facility as it is put to the original, additional, or different uses than originally constructed. [4] Similarly, constructing includes the facility as originally constructed but also encompasses permanent or temporary alterations to the facility made during its ensuing lifetime in service to the public. [5] In some circumstances, constructing and maintaining can apply to the same set of facts. In Walton, for example, the governmental entity constructed a temporary access to a loft not designed for a storage space and asked members of the public to clean it, a maintenance activity. See 968 P.2d at 645. Likewise, constructing and maintaining potentially intersected in Springer. There, we held that the plaintiff's negligence action could proceed on theories of either construction or maintenance or both. Springer, 13 P.3d at 805. We thus gave effect to the Premises Liability Statute, section 13-21-115, 5 C.R.S. (2000). The plaintiff in Springer alleged that the public entity had negligently failed to fix a protruding plate in a door entrance, which existed by reason of construction not in accordance with the building's design, or because the plate began to protrude after construction and was not corrected. See id. at 804. We determined that the premises liability statute applies to the [governmental entity] as a landowner by reason of the CGIA's immunity waiver for dangerous conditions associated with construction or maintenance of the building. Id. at 805. In Swieckowski, in contrast to Walton and Springer, the facts before the court demonstrated that the accident occurred because of the facility's design. The plaintiff's case, we said, amounted to an argument that the governmental entity was responsible for an accident waiting to happen. Swieckowski, 934 P.2d at 1387. There simply was no showing of any governmental negligence associated with constructing or maintaining the facility, apart from alleged design defects of the enlarged roadway shoulder on which plaintiff was riding his bicycle. We observed that the statute excluded from maintaining any necessity of the public entity to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility. Id. at 1385. We did not address in Swieckowski a situation where the governmental entity undertook to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of the facility and did so negligently. 2. Padilla's Insufficient Jurisdictional Facts In this case, Padilla argues that her serious injuries directly resulted from the conversion and use by school personnel of the windowless storage closet as a seclusion room for disabled children. On the issue of whether the alleged negligence was associated with actions or omissions of the School District in constructing or maintaining the facility, Padilla asserts that the use of the storage closet by school employees as a seclusion room required that the room be maintained in a manner that did not pose an unreasonable risk of injury to members of the public. In answer, the School District contends that: (1) a `dangerous condition' is a physical condition (or the use of that condition) which constitutes an unreasonable risk, which is actually or constructively known to exist, and which is caused by negligent construction or maintenance; and (2) Plaintiff's alleged injuries resulted not from the state of the building or even the use of the building; they resulted from the use of the stroller. Like the trial court, the court of appeals focused on Padilla's failure to show jurisdictional facts associating the alleged negligence with actions of the School District in constructing or maintaining the facility. The court of appeals held that negligent use of the storage closet as a seclusion room would not constitute negligent `maintenance' of the facility for purposes of the `dangerous condition' exception. Padilla, 1 P.3d at 259. Rather, it determined that the substance of Padilla's negligence action was the failure of School District employees to keep Padilla within their line of sight so they could take action to prevent her from falling out of the stroller. Id. at 260. The court of appeals explained, the dangerous physical condition must be proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing or maintaining the public facility. Id. at 259. We agree with the court of appeals. Padilla argues that the case before us parallels Walton: In Walton, it is the university's conversion of an empty space above the ceiling in the art studio to serve as a storage area which required the public entity to ensure a safe way to clean or maintain the area. Thus, as here, it is the particular use of the physical structure of the buildingconverting a windowless storage closet with a hard tile floor to a seclusion roomby public employees that created the dangerous condition of the public building. While Padilla may have sufficiently alleged an act of negligence, leaving a disabled and distraught child out of sight and reach in an unstable stroller, we conclude that she did not demonstrate a sufficient connection between use of the state of the building and a construction or maintenance activity or omission for which the School District is responsible. Padilla's theory of the case only amounts to a claim that the School District should have upgraded the design of the closet if it wished to use it as a time out room for students exhibiting disruptive behavior. This is inadequate to effectuate the waiver. See Swieckowski, 934 P.2d at 1386-87 (holding that design of the widened area of the road used by the victim for riding his bike was sole reason for the injury).