Opinion ID: 2086411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of the Release

Text: Finally, plaintiffs IPI/Foster argue that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the release barred any claims by IPI/Foster based on the failure of the Ardex K-15 any claims against architects based on the failure of the original lightweight concrete subfloor or the material installed over it. A release is a contract. Economou v. Economou, 136 Vt. 611, 619, 399 A.2d 496, 500 (1979); see also Leo v. Hillman, 164 Vt. 94, 104, 665 A.2d 572, 579 (1995) (release treated as contract and interpreted according to parties' intent). The scope of a release is determined by the intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of a particular instrument considered in the light of all facts and circumstances. In interpreting a release to determine whether a particular claim has been discharged, the primary rule of construction is that this intention is to be determined by a consideration of what was within the contemplation of the parties when the release was executed, which in turn is to be resolved in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted. Economou, 136 Vt. at 619, 399 A.2d at 500 (internal citation omitted). In this case, the language of the document alone does not reveal the precise scope of the release. On one hand, the effect of the release is confined to design, installation and maintenance. A release is required to be specific in order to be valid. See Dalury v. S-K-I. Ltd., 164 Vt. 329, 331, 670 A.2d 795, 797 (1995) (validity of release turns upon whether language is sufficiently clear to reflect intent of parties). The language of a release, therefore, should be narrowly interpreted, and if the parties did not include certain terms this should be interpreted as intentional exclusion of those terms. Failure of the remedy is a distinct concept which the parties could have included, but declined to do so. On the other hand, the parties chose to include broad language to bar any claim related to deficiencies in the lightweight concrete subfloor. Claims that arise from efforts to correct problems with the subfloor are arguably related to the subfloor (if not to its maintenance, then possibly to its original faulty design and/or installation). The parties also disagree about the significance of the $15,000 in consideration paid by architects to IPI/Foster. Plaintiffs argue that this amount would be insufficient as consideration for a release pertaining to both the original subfloor and the remedy. It is difficult, however, to understand what architects would gain by paying for a release that applied only to material that was essentially going to be entirely replaced or covered. Because the scope of the release cannot be determined from the language alone, it must be resolved in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted. Economou, 136 Vt. at 619, 399 A.2d at 500. We therefore disagree with the trial court that the scope of the release can be resolved as a matter of law. While the construction of a release or contract is normally a question of law, when the language of the document is ambiguous and must be clarified by reference to external evidence, construction becomes a question of fact. See Housing Vt. v. Goldsmith & Morris, 165 Vt. 428, 430, 685 A.2d 1086, 1088 (1996). Therefore summary judgment on this issue was error.