Opinion ID: 1345760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: False-in-part instruction.

Text: The trial court gave a slightly modified version of the standard false-in-part instruction. (CALJIC, former No. 2.21 (4th ed. 1979), see now CALJIC Nos. 2.21.1, 2.21.2 (5th ed. 1988).) The instruction warned that [a] witness willfully false in one material part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others. It authorized the jury to reject the whole testimony of such a witness unless, from all the evidence, you shall believe the probability of truth favors his testimony in other particulars. On the other hand, the instruction cautioned that discrepancies between witnesses, or within a witness's own testimony, do not necessarily indicate general untrustworthiness, since innocent forgetfulness is common, and two persons may see the same events differently. [15] (11) Defendant claims the instruction improperly singled out his testimony alone for suspicion, and thus lessened the prosecution's burden, because the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution witnesses was not disputed. The instruction was also invalid here, defendant urges, because there was no evidence that he told any material willful falsehood on the stand. We find no error or prejudice. False-in-part instructions have been criticized and disapproved elsewhere on grounds that they are superfluous and invite the jury to conclude the court believes one or more witnesses have lied. (See, e.g., Kinard v. United States (D.C.App. 1980) 416 A.2d 1232; State v. Harris (1970) 106 R.I. 643 [262 A.2d 374, 377]; Knihal v. State (1949) 150 Neb. 771 [36 N.W.2d 109, 112-114]; Rowland v. St. Mary's Bank (1944) 93 N.H. 246 [40 A.2d 741, 742].) However, we recently rejected challenges to the California instruction, noting it has been repeatedly approved [in this state] as a correct statement of the law, appropriately given where there is an evidentiary basis to support it. [Citations.] ( Allison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 895.) Citing dictum in People v. Lescallett (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 487, 493 [176 Cal. Rptr. 687], defendant argues the instruction should not be given where it appears principally directed at the exculpatory testimony of the accused. Such a danger exists here, he asserts, because the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution witnesses was largely uncontroverted. We disposed of an identical argument in Allison, supra . We noted that the instruction is neutrally phrased and does not focus attention on a particular witness. (48 Cal.3d at p. 895.) Moreover, we emphasized, in this context as in others, `a defendant who elects to testify is not entitled to a false aura of veracity. [Citations.]' ( Id., at p. 896, fn. 7, quoting People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 453 [99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].) Applying neutral standards of credibility to defense witnesses does not improperly lessen the prosecution's burden. Defendant suggests the false-in-part instruction is proper, if ever, only when there are discrepancies between opposing witnesses whose credibility is equally subject to attack. But an inference of willful falsehood can also arise from inconsistencies within the testimony of a single witness (as the instruction itself explains), or when his efforts to explain away undisputed circumstances are inherently implausible. There were many such instances of implausibility in defendant's testimony. Among other things, he denied cutting telephone cords which were found severed; he denied taking property which was found missing; he was arrested in possession of a television he insisted he picked up only for self-defense; and his claims of defensive poking with his knife were inconsistent with the number, depths, and locations of the victim's wounds. Thus, there was ample evidence upon which to base the false-in-part instruction. In any event, we conclude defendant suffered no prejudice by any applicable standard. Given the strong circumstantial evidence of robbery-murder, and the inherent implausibility of much of defendant's version of events, we cannot conclude the instruction caused any increased distrust of his testimony. There is no substantial chance the outcome was affected. No basis for reversal appears.