Opinion ID: 2442087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Balcony Patrons and Their Conduct

Text: The balcony, which would seat 263 people, was just about full. The witness, Burt, estimated that about 175 of the balcony seats were occupied. The disturbance in the balcony seemed to come from the balcony generally, just all over it. The evidence does not identify any particular person as being a rowdy person. No witness could state which persons in the balcony were rowdy and which were not. No witness could identify the person who threw the bottle. Incidentally, there is no evidence that a hard substance of any character was thrown, other than the bottle which struck Sheila. The witness, Henderson, testified that he could not identify the person who threw the bottle, but that out of the corner of his eye, he saw a movement, a jerking motion by someone in the balcony and then saw the bottle hit Sheila. No witness testified that the bottle thrower had been engaged in hollering or throwing paper cups. The jury found that Sheila's injuries were not solely caused by the action of some unknown person who threw a bottle   . Assuming without deciding that the finding of negligence is supported by evidence of probative force, we go direct to the question of whether there is in the record evidence or probative force to support the finding of proximate cause. We hold that there is no evidence to support the finding of the jury that the failure of the defendant to remove rowdy persons from its premises was a proximate cause of Sheila's injuries. Proximate cause was defined by the trial court exactly as the definition of the term was given by the trial court in the case of Baumler v. Hazelwood, 162 Tex. 361, 347 S.W.2d 560 (1961). Just as we said in Baumler v. Hazelwood and later in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. McCleery, 418 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.Sup.1967), it is well settled that proximate cause includes two essential elements: (1) there must be cause in facta cause which produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred; and (2) foreseeability. See also, Hopson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 150 Tex. 1, 237 S.W.2d 352 (1951). An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence is that there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered. Prosser, Law of Torts (3rd Ed.) 240-241, Causation, 41 (1964). We base our decision here on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence of probative force to establish the cause-in-fact element of proximate cause. In particular, the plaintiffs contend that the act of omission in failing to remove rowdy persons from the theatre was a proximate cause of the injuries resulting from the throwing of the bottle by an unknown patron of the theatre. We recognize that cause-in-fact covers the defendant's omissions as well as its acts. However, it cannot be said from this record that had the defendant removed the rowdy persons from the premises, the bottle thrower would not have thrown the bottle. The record in this case clearly shows a complete lack of proof that the bottle would not have been thrown but for the failure of the defendant to remove rowdy persons from the premises. There is no evidence that the bottle thrower was one of the rowdy persons engaged in hollering and throwing paper cups from the balcony. We cannot say from this evidence what persons would have been removed. We agree with the defendant's contention as made in its Motion for Instructed Verdict; Motion for Judgment non obstante veredicto; Amended Motion for New Trial; points in the Court of Civil Appeals and in this Court that the judgment of the trial court cannot be sustained in that there is no evidence that the alleged injuries were proximately caused by any act of commission or omission of the defendant. As said by this Court in Enloe v. Barfield, 422 S.W.2d 905 (Tex.Sup. 1967), a finding of `proximate cause' cannot be sustained unless there is proof of cause in fact and foreseeability. See Whitfield v. Cox, 189 Va. 219, 52 S.E.2d 72 (1949). The plaintiffs further contend that cause-in-fact was proved on the theory that it would be considerably more probable that had even minimum supervision, such as a request by theatre employees to cease such rowdy behavior, or for the policeman to even go to the balcony and stand so that he might be seen by the patrons in the balcony, would have prevented the person who did throw the bottle from doing so because of his fear of being apprehended. That the theatre, by and through its employees, in failing to give this minimum supervision or yet, the more burdensome elements submitted upon the part of the plaintiff, failure to oust persons engaging in rowdy behavior, encouraged the wrongdoer by guaranteeing his anonymity in a crowd to the point that he felt he could and did in fact, get away with throwing the bottle. This theory is related in no way to the single act of throwing the bottle. It is purely speculative as to what would have happened had the defendant attempted to remove the rowdy persons from the theatre. The bottle thrower may not have been present at a time when the rowdy persons were being ejected. If present at the time of removal of the persons who were hollering and throwing paper cups, it would be just a guess as to what subjective effect such action may have had upon the bottle thrower. To adopt the guaranteed anonymity theory would be allowing a presumption of fact to rest upon a fact presumed. This cannot be permitted. It has been so held by this Court. Texas Sling Co. v. Emanuel, 431 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Sup.1968); Rounsaville v. Bullard, 154 Tex. 260, 276 S.W.2d 791 (1955); Fort Worth Belt Ry. v. Jones, 106 Tex. 345, 166 S.W. 1130 (1914). The Court in the latter case said: A presumption of fact cannot rest upon a fact presumed. The fact relied upon to support the presumption must be proved. `No inference of fact should be drawn from premises which are uncertain. Facts upon which an inference may legitimately rest must be established by direct evidence, as if they were the facts in issue. One presumption cannot be based upon another presumption.' 16 Cyc. 1051; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Porter, 73 Tex. 304, 11 S.W. 324,   . We recognize that the theatre was under a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its patrons. Marek v. Southern Enterprises, Inc., 128 Tex. 377, 99 S.W.2d 594 (1936). However, operators of theatres are not insurers of their patrons' safety. Vance v. Obadal, 256 S. W.2d 139, 140 (Tex.Civ.App.1953, writ ref.) The judgments of the Court of Civil Appeals and the trial court are reversed and judgment is here rendered that plaintiffs take nothing.