Opinion ID: 73516
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Activity

Text: 39 We finally must consider the activity in which Lieutenant Whitley was engaged when he was killed. In distinguishing Brooks, the Feres Court determined that a service member injured on leave is not analogous to that of a soldier injured while performing duties under orders. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159 (emphasis added); see Zoula, 217 F.2d at 82 n. 1 (A person on a furlough or leave is not subject to military duty, although he may actually spend the time provided in the furlough or the leave on a military reservation.). Significant to the Parker court's conclusion that the serviceman was not acting incident to service when he was injured was that he was not directly subject to military control; he was not under the compulsion of military orders; he was not performing any military mission. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014. In Pierce, we recognized that to construe any conceivable personal activity as 'incident to service' because that activity happened to be performed by a member of the armed forces would preclude service members from bringing FTCA actions merely by virtue of the fact that the claimants are wearing a United States uniform. Pierce, 813 F.2d at 354. By contrast, we determined regarding the death of a United States Navy Airman Recruit while participating in sea rescue training that [d]espite the extreme circumstances surrounding [his] death, we cannot escape the fact his death arose out of an activity incident to his military service. Kitowski v. United States, 931 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir.1991). 40 At the time of his fatal accident, Lieutenant Whitley was traveling with his DWR rugby teammates, including civilians, from Atlanta where the British team had played a rugby match and socialized with a civilian team. Neither Lieutenant Whitley nor any DWRRT member was subject to the supervision or command of the Army. 25 The rugby tour for the DWRRT members was not organized by the British Army in any way; the commanding officer of the DWR merely gave the rugby players who wanted to participate permission to be absent from their regular duties for the duration of the tour. Participation in the rugby tour was purely voluntary for both the DWR and civilian team members. 41 Specifically, Lieutenant Whitley was asleep when he sustained lethal injuries in the single-vehicle accident caused by the negligence of Specialist Kanney. Unlike the Feres serviceman who died while asleep when his base barracks burned, clearly incident to his service or he would not have been there, 26 Lieutenant Whitley and the other DWR members as well as civilian rugby teammates were in the United States to participate in the rugby tour by choice, and he had authorization from his commanding officer to be absent from his regular duties. In this furlough-like status, Lieutenant Whitley's situation was distinct from that of the Kitowski serviceman, who was actively participating in a military exercise when he died. 27 42 Additionally, cases dealing with recreational activities made available to service members on a military reservation because they are serving in the armed forces are inapposite. Like sleeping, participating in recreational activities is part of the daily lives of service members residing on a military base. The former Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court and expressly adopted its reasoning in a case where an Army staff sergeant riding his motorcycle from a military softball practice was killed in a collision with a post shuttle bus. See Watkins v. United States, 462 F.Supp. 980 (S.D.Ga.1977), aff'd, 587 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.1979) (per curiam). Determining that Feres barred FTCA recovery, the court reasoned that the serviceman's active duty status, 28 the location of the accident on the military base, and the fact that he was leaving a military softball team practice made Feres dispositive. 29 See id. at 988. 43 In contrast, the Watkins court observed that an 'off-duty' serviceman who is injured off-base in a traffic accident totally unrelated to his military service should now receive the benefits of the Brooks rationale. Id. Pierce exemplifies this reasoning. Similarly, the court applied Brooks to allow an FTCA action when a serviceman on a twenty-four-hour pass was traveling from his off-base residence to an off-base bird hunt and his vehicle collided with a negligently driven Army vehicle. See Hand v. United States, 260 F.Supp. 38 (M.D.Ga.1966). Holding that a pass is equivalent to a furlough with respect to military duties, the court explained: There is no difference in the freedom which the man enjoys. In both instances the man is relieved from military duty during the period specified. Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 44 Particularly significant to this case are cases where FTCA actions have been permitted based on Brooks because the service members were not taking advantage of a military privilege or status during their leave or off-duty time; instead, they were engaging in civilian activities on a par with civilians. The service member in Pierce, for example, had used his afternoon leave to accomplish personal errands and to eat lunch off base; the accident that resulted in his injuries occurred as he was returning to base from having engaged in these activities. Other circuits have decided cases similarly. 30 Common to the respective courts' decisions in these cases was the determination that the service members were not acting pursuant to military orders or any differently than civilians when they were injured or killed. Consequently, the courts concluded that the service members were not acting incident to service at the time of their injuries or death and, therefore, permitted FTCA actions. 45 In this case, Lieutenant Whitley was asleep and a passenger returning from a rugby match in Atlanta with his DWR teammates when he was fatally injured in the single-vehicle accident. Civilians were members of the British rugby team, which shows that this was a recreational event rather than a military exercise. The rugby match that the DWRRT had played was with a civilian rugby club in Atlanta. Lieutenant Whitley was not on a military mission or acting under military orders at the time of his death. Thus, at the time of the fatal accident for Lieutenant Whitley, there was no military purpose to this particular rugby match and the concomitant transportation to and from Atlanta for it. 31 We conclude that the civilian rugby match in which Lieutenant Whitley had participated and the socializing afterward were solely recreational and in no way connected to any military mission of either the British or American armed forces. Consequently, neither the recreational activities in which Lieutenant Whitley had been involved prior to his fatal injuries nor his sleep at the time of his death was incident to his military service. 46