Opinion ID: 1722951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reopening of case

Text: Holloway argues next that the trial court erred in letting the state reopen its case to allow six victims to identify him after he had made a motion for a directed verdict. He concedes that this court has held that the decision of whether to permit the state to present additional witnesses after it has rested is discretionary with the trial judge. However, he contends that here it was an abuse of discretion due to the prejudice that resulted from having six victims single him out in rapid succession. The appellant is correct that we have held that the trial court has discretionary power to permit the state to reopen its case after the parties have rested and, further, that a trial court's decision to reopen a case will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992); George v. State, 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W.2d 792 (1991); Cameron v. State, 278 Ark. 357, 645 S.W.2d 943 (1983). The reasoning behind this rule is to permit omitted or overlooked evidence to get to the jury before it returns a verdict, when the defendant is not surprised by the introduction or otherwise prejudiced or placed at some disadvantage that cannot be overcome. Id. Here, there was no surprise. Each victim had referred to the appellant as Mr. Kenny or specifically identified him. There could be little doubt that the reference by nickname was to anyone other than the appellant, Kenneth Holloway. Accordingly, the reopening of the case was to further a point that was all but obvious. In this regard, we have said that identification can be inferred from all the facts and the circumstances that are in evidence. Williams v. State, 308 Ark. 620, 825 S.W.2d 826 (1992); Becker v. State, 298 Ark. 438, 441, 768 S.W.2d 527 (1989). Hence, precise in-court identifications in addition to testimony about what Mr. Kenny did may not have been necessary, since he was the sole defendant and none of the victims, though of tender years, pointed him out as the wrong man. See Becker v. State, supra . Nevertheless, we hold that because the appellant was not surprised or otherwise disadvantaged by the testimony of the witnesses recalled by the state, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reopening this case.