Opinion ID: 2826051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Even Though the County Owes Ms. Scott a Duty,

Text: It is Immune From Suit ¶51 Having concluded that the County owes Ms. Scott a duty, we now discuss whether it is immune from suit. We begin by noting that Ms. Scott concedes that the Governmental Immunity Act bars her claim. But she argues that the Act is unconstitutional as applied under article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution (the open courts clause). That clause provides, All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. ¶52 We have interpreted the open courts clause to prevent the legislature from passing a law that ―abrogates a cause of action existing at the time of [the law‘s] enactment‖ unless it (1) provides ―an effective and reasonable alternative remedy‖ or (2) ―seeks to eliminate a clear social or economic evil‖ by means that are not ―arbitrary or unreasonable.‖92 ¶53 None of the parties has argued that Ms. Scott was afforded an alternative remedy, so the central question is whether the legislature abrogated her cause of action when it expanded the Governmental Immunity Act. Because the interaction of governmental immunity and the open courts clause is somewhat complex, we first briefly discuss the historical development of governmental immunity in Utah and then set forth the legal standard we apply for open courts clause challenges in this context. Applying that standard, we then conclude that the legislature did not abrogate a cause of action Ms. Scott would have had before it expanded governmental immunity, so the Act‘s application in this case is not unconstitutional. A. Governmental Immunity and the Open Courts Clause ¶54 To determine whether the Governmental Immunity Act violates the open courts clause in a particular case, we look to see whether the plaintiff could have brought his or her cause of action 92 Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶¶ 17, 18, 116 P.3d 295 (internal quotation marks omitted). 24 Cite as: 2015 UT 64 Opinion of the Court prior to 1987.93 As we explain below, this is because 1987 is the highwater mark of governmental liability in Utah, and any subsequent amendments to the Act expanding governmental immunity therefore eliminates causes of action that could have been maintained against governmental entities before 1987. ¶55 Prior to the enactment of the Governmental Immunity Act in 1965, the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented a citizen from suing a state governmental entity for any act considered to be a function of government.94 Our cases characterized a state action as ―governmental‖ if it was not serving a ―proprietary‖ function. By ―proprietary,‖ we meant that, in performing the action, the State obtained a pecuniary benefit, competed directly with private entities in the marketplace, or engaged in activity that could be successfully operated by private enterprise.95 ¶56 The 1965 Governmental Immunity Act expanded liability for state entities beyond common law sovereign immunity by making the government subject to suit when it engaged in specific activities.96 It also provided that governmental entities retained blanket sovereign immunity protections when ―engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function.‖97 But nowhere in the Act did the legislature define the term ―governmental function,‖ so Utah courts relied on the governmental-proprietary function test from our sovereign immunity caselaw to interpret the full scope of immunity under the Act.98 ¶57 In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corporation, we expressly disavowed this precedent because it led to ―contrary and 93 See id. ¶ 21. 94 See Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Utah 1980) (―The term ‗government function‘ is a term of art in the law of sovereign immunity, meaning that a public entity is not liable for its torts committed in the exercise of a governmental function.‖). 95 Id. at 1234. See Utah Governmental Immunity Act, ch. 139, § 10, 1965 Utah 96 Laws 390, 391–92. See Utah Governmental Immunity Act, ch. 139, § 3, 1965 Utah 97 Laws 390, 391. See Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1235 (discussing the sovereign 98 immunity test and citing cases that applied it). 25 SCOTT v. UTAH COUNTY Opinion of the Court unpredictable results.‖99 We held ―that the test for determining governmental immunity‖ under the Act ―is whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity.‖100 ¶58 Perhaps in response to our decision in Standiford, the legislature restricted governmental liability in 1987 by expanding the Act‘s definition of ―governmental function‖ to include ―any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking‖ regardless of whether the activity ―is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.‖101 The legislature has continued to expand the definition of ―governmental function‖ in subsequent amendments, and the statute currently defines that term as encompassing anything the government decides to do—―each activity, undertaking, or operation performed by a department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a government entity.‖102 ¶59 Anytime the legislature expands the definition of ―governmental function,‖ it restricts the government‘s liability beyond the scope of the Act as interpreted in Standiford—possibly abrogating causes of action that would have existed before the 1987 amendment and violating the open courts clause. Consequently, we have looked to the Standiford test—which defined ―governmental function‖ in the Act before the legislature expanded the definition of 99 Id. at 1235, 1236–37. For example, under the old test, we determined that the operation of a golf course was a governmental function because, at the time the case was decided, ―[o]ne searches in vain to find public golf courses in this area that are successfully operated by private enterprise.‖ Jopes v. Salt Lake County, 343 P.2d 728, 730 (Utah 1959). 100 Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236–37. 101See Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting UTAH CODE § 63-30-2(4)(a) & (b) (1993), which includes the 1987 amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act). 102 UTAH CODE § 63G-7-102(4)(b). 26 Cite as: 2015 UT 64 Opinion of the Court that term in 1987—to determine ―whether the Act in its current form abrogates a cause of action that existed prior to its enactment.‖103 B. The Application of the Governmental Immunity Act in this Case is Not Unconstitutional ¶60 We now apply the Standiford test to resolve Ms. Scott‘s open courts clause challenge to the Governmental Immunity Act. As we have discussed, she must show that the legislature abrogated a cause of action she could have brought before 1987.104 To make that determination, we apply the Standiford test, assessing ―whether the activity giving rise to the cause of action [1] is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or . . . [2] is essential to the core of governmental activity.‖ 105 If operating Jail Industries falls under either category, then the County would have been immune from Ms. Scott‘s suit in 1987 before the legislature expanded governmental immunity, and the Act‘s application in this case would not violate the open courts clause. ¶61 The first category ―does not refer to what government may do, but to what government alone must do.‖106 The second encompasses ―those activities not unique in themselves (and thus not qualifying under the first part) but essential to the performance of those activities that are uniquely governmental.‖107 We have previously determined that the following activities were not governmental functions under Standiford: operating a public golf course,108 operating a public sledding hill,109 collecting and disposing 103 Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ¶ 22; Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 55, ¶ 35, 5 P.3d 616 (noting that the Standiford test has been adopted to police ―the proper constitutional boundary between those governmental activities that are entitled to immunity under governmental immunity law (subject to legislative waiver) and are not subject to [the open courts clause] protections, and those governmental activities that are not subject to immunity and that are subject to the remedies protected by‖ the clause). 104 Supra ¶¶ 54–59. 105 Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981) 106 (emphasis added). 107 Id. 108 Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1237. 27 SCOTT v. UTAH COUNTY Opinion of the Court of sewage,110 operating a municipal electrical power system,111 and operating a hospital where only ―3.5 percent of the hospital‘s operating budget came from legislative appropriations.‖112 By contrast, we have held that transporting students to an out-of-state debate tournament,113 the regulation of boxing matches,114 and operating a public transportation system were governmental functions.115 In these cases, we identified the following factors as characteristics that weigh in favor of finding that an activity is a governmental function—the extent to which the activity is funded by the State, competes in the marketplace with private entities, generates annual profits, and would be ―qualitatively different‖ if engaged in by a private entity. ¶62 Under this standard, we conclude that rehabilitation programs like Jail Industries are essential to the core governmental activity of running a state prison system. We have described rehabilitative programs for inmates as ―necessary programs‖ that are ―practically indispensable‖116 to managing the prison population. Housing and rehabilitating inmates is an integral piece of the justice system, and if administering justice to those who violate the penal code is not a governmental function, we do not know what is. ¶63 Ms. Scott nevertheless argues that Jail Industries is qualitatively different than traditional work-release programs because ―inmates, rather than parolees, were inserted into the community with little supervision as a source of revenue for Utah County and its private partners.‖ Although it is true that a governmental activity that generates profits is more likely to be 109 Johnson, 629 P.2d at 434–35. 110 Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737, 739 (Utah 1982). 111 Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 53, 57 P.3d 1007. 112 Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 373–74 (Utah 1989). 113 Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ¶¶ 25–26. 114Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Comm’n, 2007 UT 99, ¶¶ 26–28, 175 P.3d 1042. 115 Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, ¶ 14, 53 P.3d 473. 116 Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 28 Cite as: 2015 UT 64 Opinion of the Court classified as a nongovernmental function under Standiford, profitability alone is not a determinative factor.117 ¶64 Moreover, the fact that Jail Industries places inmates with employers outside the prison is insufficient to transform what we have recognized as a core governmental activity into a private endeavor. An activity that supports a core governmental function may satisfy the Standiford test even if it is not indispensable.118 For example, in Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District, we concluded that an extracurricular school debate program was essential to the core governmental function of educating students.119 We so held even though the negligence claim at issue arose from the school‘s efforts to transport the debate team to out-of-state competitions.120 We observed that the debate program ―clearly benefits student education and is unlikely to be available to public school students if not offered through their schools.‖121 ¶65 Similarly, Jail Industries gives inmates the benefit of work experience and a modest paycheck—significant experience that may ease their transition back into society and serves the core governmental function of rehabilitating inmates. It is certainly possible to house inmates without a program like Jail Industries. But the program ―clearly benefits‖ inmates, and its unique benefits are ―unlikely to be available‖ to them if the prison does not provide it.122 ¶66 We therefore conclude that Jail Industries is essential to the core governmental function of housing and rehabilitating inmates, and the program accordingly qualifies as a ―governmental function‖ under Standiford. Consequently, the County has always enjoyed immunity for such an activity, and the legislature‘s expansion of governmental immunity in 1987 did not abrogate Ms. Scott‘s cause 117 Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1234 (rejecting the common law distinction between governmental and proprietary activities as a way to interpret the term ―governmental function‖ in the Immunity Act, because focusing on ―whether the public entity derived a special pecuniary benefit . . . . led to . . . conflicting results‖). 118 See Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ¶ 23. 119 Id. ¶ 24. 120 Id. ¶ 25. 121 Id. 122 See id. 29 SCOTT v. UTAH COUNTY Opinion of the Court of action. Accordingly, the Governmental Immunity Act is not unconstitutional as applied in this case.