Opinion ID: 1781968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant tom question the venire about whether they would automatically vote in favor of the death penalty in violation of the sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution and article 3, sections 26 and 28 of the mississippi constitution and miss. code ann. section 13-5-69.

Text: Foster contends that on voir dire he was prevented by the trial court from asking whether members of the venire would automatically vote for the death penalty if they found Foster guilty of capital murder. Foster refers to the following exchange during voir dire questioning by his counsel: DEFENSE COUNSEL: ... How many of you believe that if you find Chris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of capital murder that he should be sentenced to death automatically? BY THE COURT: That's not the law. I  I'm going to have to interpose my own objection. That is not the law. He will not be  and if you will answer that or ask that question properly I would allow that one also. DEFENSE COUNSEL: May I approach the bench? BY THE COURT: You may. (The attorneys approached the bench, along with the court reporter, and the following occurred out of the hearing of the jurors:) DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I still think I still believe  did you object automatically for him: BY THE COURT: I objected to you asking them whether or not they felt that the death penalty should be automatic if they found him guilty of capital murder. That is not the law of this state, and I will not allow that particular question. DEFENSE COUNSEL: So then if I cut off the automatically part? BY THE COURT: No, I didn't say that. You asked them if they found him guilty of capital murder did they feel that he should automatically get the death penalty. That is not the law of this state, and I will instruct them differently from that so I feel that you are voir diring the jury on matters that  or a matter that is improper. Let's move along. Thank you. You may proceed. (In the jury's presence, the voir dire continued) DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, your Honor. Do any of you believe that persons convicted of murder should be executed. VENIRE: (Number 90, Jean Whaley, raised her hand). DEFENSE COUNSEL: The question was, do any of you believe that someone convicted of murder should be executed? BY A JUROR: Do you mean has to be executed? DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. BY A JUROR: If there are extenuating circumstances  DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. If you'd like to stand. BY A JUROR: I'd like to hear the case before I make my decision. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, ma'am. BY A JUROR: 24. It depends on the evidence presented. Citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), Foster argues the disallowance of his particular question on whether jurors believed the appellant should be automatically sentenced to death if convicted of capital murder violated his right to be tried by an impartial jury. In Morgan, the members of the jury panel were each asked in some form, whether they could be fair and impartial. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2227. However, the trial judge refused the defense counsel's request to ask the question: If you found Derrick Moore guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are? Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2226. As framed by the United States Supreme Court, the issue on appeal in Morgan was whether, during voir dire for a capital offense, a state trial court may, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, refuse inquiry into whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction of the defendant. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2225. In deciding the trial court's voir dire was insufficient to identify jurors who could not be impartial due to their views requiring them to vote automatically in favor of the death penalty, the Court noted the issue was the reverse of that first presented in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Through Witherspoon and its progeny, it is the rule that a juror who would never vote for the death penalty no matter what instructions of law he or she received, is not impartial and must be removed. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S.Ct. 844, 851-52, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 40, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2524, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). In Morgan, the Court concluded that just as the State must be given the opportunity to identify and remove jurors who were unable, due to personal opposition to capital punishment, to impose the death penalty, a defendant must similarly be allowed, through voir dire, to locate and eliminate jurors who were equally strongly committed to imposing the death penalty. The Court stated: We deal here with petitioner's ability to exercise intelligently his complementary challenge for cause against those biased persons on the venire who as jurors would unwaveringly impose death after a finding of guilt. Were voir dire not available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner's challenge for cause against those prospective jurors who would always impose death following conviction, his right not to be tried by such jurors would be rendered as nugatory and meaningless as the State's right, in the absence of questioning, to strike those who would never do so. 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2232. While recognizing that Morgan provides that it is a violation of a defendant's due process rights to prevent him, in a capital case, from inquiring whether prospective jurors would automatically impose the death penalty upon a conviction, it remains clear that  [v]oir dire `is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.' Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2230, citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1020, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976) (quoting Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413, 15 S.Ct. 951, 953, 39 L.Ed. 1033 (1895)). In the most significant aspect of this issue, a review of the entire voir dire proceeding does not indicate that Foster was denied the right to interrogate the venire on the issue of the death penalty. Foster's counsel attempted to ask jurors whether they believed Foster should be automatically sentenced to death upon a conviction. The trial judge refused to allow the question as phrased since it was an incorrect statement of the law which had the potential to confuse the jury with the law as later correctly instructed by the court. See Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-19-101 (Supp. 1992). The trial judge specifically advised Foster's counsel that if he would ask his question in a properly worded manner, it would be allowed. Foster's counsel inquired of the trial judge, would it be proper, if I cut off the automatic part? Judge Howard's response of, No, I did not say that, should have clearly alerted counsel to the judge's obvious concern that the question again failed to include as a part of counsel's proposed jury question, the additional language that jurors should consider the facts in evidence and follow the law. The judge's response absolutely indicates the use of the word automatically was appropriate within the phrased question, and would certainly not be prohibited by the trial judge in a properly rephrased question to the jury. Rather than asking the venire directly whether any of them would automatically vote to impose the death penalty, regardless of the facts or law, if Foster were already convicted, counsel chose to ask do any of you believe that persons convicted of murder should be executed? Foster's counsel, in his rephrased version of his original question to jurors, elected to leave out the word automatically. He also substituted the term murder for capital murder in his rephrased question. Foster's counsel immediately received juror responses to his rephrased question. Juror 90, Jean Whaley, simply raised her hand. While the record lends no insight into this action, it does make clear that Foster's counsel never followed up on this juror's response. No additional questions were asked of this juror by the State or the trial court. Neither side moved to strike her for cause, or utilize a peremptory strike. The record clearly indicates that as to challenges for cause, there were no strikes made past Juror No. 75. Peremptory challenges ended at Juror No. 49. Juror Whaley, as Juror No. 90, was never further considered as a juror. Another juror responded: I don't understand what you say murder. To which the trial judge responded: That's a good point. It should be noted that Foster's counsel utilized capital murder in his initial question but, said only murder in his rephrased version. The next juror response was: Do you mean has to be executed? Foster's counsel responded, No. By this response, Foster's counsel clearly negated his own attempt to illicit responses from jurors who would automatically vote for death once Foster had been found guilty, the very point of the entire line of questioning. At the very least, Foster's counsel's remark of No was potentially confusing to the jury, which incidentally, was the main concern of the trial judge. Juror 93 then responded, If there are extenuating circumstances  I'd like to hear the case before I make my decision. Juror 24 responded: It depends on the evidence presented. All juror responses indicated that they were not confused, but rather comprehended that they were being asked  if having found Foster guilty, would they automatically sentence Foster to death. These initial responses of jurors to the rephrased question of Foster's counsel, coupled with the subsequent questioning of the venire by counsel for Foster, the State and the trial court, unequivocally establish that no juror was improperly excluded or included by the trial court in this case. No juror stated that he or she would impose death after a guilty verdict, regardless of the facts and circumstances of conviction, nor fail to follow the dictates of the law. We find that Foster was not denied the opportunity, and in fact did question the venire members about their views on the death penalty and whether it should be imposed in the event of a murder conviction. The fact that counsel for Foster chose not to rephrase his question to inquire whether the venirepersons would automatically impose the death penalty if Foster was convicted is no ground for reversal under the differing facts of Morgan. It is most significant to note at this point that the procedure by which voir dire was conducted in Morgan is markedly different from that involved in the case sub judice. In the former case, counsel submitted proposed questions for the venire to the trial judge, who could allow or deny them, and it was the trial judge himself who would then propound the questions to the potential jurors. The trial judge in Morgan made the fatal decision to disallow counsel's question on whether jurors would automatically vote in favor of the death penalty, believing he had already asked a sufficiently similar question. Contrary to Morgan's counsel, Foster's counsel had the opportunity to choose and form his own questions, and, by gauging responses from the venire, could freely rephrase or ask follow-up questions where the responses were insufficient or indicated the jurors were confused. The record simply does not support that Foster's counsel was denied any opportunity to question the venire in a manner of his own choosing, with the only proviso that he not mislead them with incorrect statements of the law. In Morgan, the United States Supreme Court obviously was concerned about a juror's inability to consider the facts and follow the law. Therein, jurors were each asked in general could they be fair and impartial and appropriate responses were given by all. However, the trial judge failed to specifically ask three jurors, Would you follow my instructions on the law, even though you may not agree? Morgan, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2226. The Court emphatically noted that [a]ny juror who would impose death regardless of the facts and circumstances of conviction cannot follow the dictates of law. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2233. See Turner, 476 U.S. at 34-35, 106 S.Ct. at 1687-88, 90 L.Ed.2d at 35-36. (White, J., plurality opinion). The Morgan Court continued: But such jurors obviously deem mitigating evidence to be irrelevant to their decision to impose the death penalty: they not only refuse to give such evidence any weight but are also plainly saying that mitigating evidence is not worth their consideration and that they will not consider it. Id. In the case sub judice, the jurors were properly voir dired on considering the facts and following the law including the critical issue of being able to balance aggravators against mitigators in considering a death penalty, after a finding of guilt of capital murder. Again contrary to Morgan, the entire jury venire in the case at bar was properly instructed on following the law by the trial judge. The Wainwright standard for challenging jurors on death penalty views was adopted by this Court in Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1985). This standard has been followed to the present in our death penalty jurisprudence. Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114 (Miss. 1991); Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657 (Miss. 1990); Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418 (Miss. 1988). It is clear from a review of the entire voir dire that Foster's counsel was allowed to fully question all jurors on the venire. It is equally clear that the entire voir dire was conducted by the trial court in accordance with Hansen. Examination of the general voir dire of the entire venire shows that the jury was well aware that the death sentence was not automatic and that they would not be required to impose a sentence of death on Foster. During questioning by District Attorney Allgood, we find the following: BY MR. ALLGOOD: All right. Do you also all understand that just because you find this man guilty of capital murder that does not mean that automatically he gets the death penalty; that you are the final person who says that, you, being the twelve people who are finally selected to hear this case: Do you all understand that? If you don't, would you raise your hand? (NO RESPONSE) Q. Now knowing what you do, knowing as you do, the procedure that we follow obviously the path of least resistance would be to find the man not guilty of capital murder and then you don't have to worry about the relatively tough issue of what type of sentence to be imposed. Q. Now you  you have all indicated that you can follow for the most part the Court's instructions. I anticipate that there will be one instruction which will tell you that if we get to the sentencing phase of this trial, the phase that is concerned with the sentence to be given to the defendant, that you're supposed to engage in a balancing type of procedure, that is, you are to weigh the aggravating circumstances, the circumstances which show that this man should receive the death penalty, against the mitigating circumstances, that is the factors which show that he should receive a lesser sentence, that you are to weigh those particular circumstances and that if you find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh those mitigating ones that you can return a verdict of death. In reviewing a voir dire question of Foster's counsel we find the following: BY MR. CUNNINGHAM: Do each and every one of you understand that if eleven of you are saying that he should get the death penalty and one of you says that he should get life that the judge then would have to sentence the defendant, Chris Foster, to life imprisonment? The record indicates there was also no response from any juror to the above stated question. It is clear from these questions posed to the entire jury venire, that the venire was absolutely aware that a death sentence in Foster's case was not automatic; that the jurors were never required to impose the death penalty; that a finding of guilt of murder rather than capital murder would totally absolve the jury from having to consider the tough issue of what sentence they should impose; and that if they found Foster guilty of capital murder, they would then proceed through a separate sentencing hearing to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in a balancing test to determine whether to impose life or death as Foster's sentence. Finally, it is the objective of these questions concerning a juror's views on capital punishment to identify those individuals who had predetermined that the death penalty would be imposed should the appellant be convicted, and to thereby effectuate their removal as being impermissibly predisposed. As the Morgan Court clearly stated, the belief that death should be imposed ipso facto upon conviction of a capital offense reflects directly on that individual's inability to follow the law. Morgan, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2233. The overall objective of Witherspoon and the subsequent line of authority thereafter, Wainwright, Adams, and Morgan is to not allow jurors to serve who are steadfastly determined to vote for or against the death penalty despite the facts in evidence and the law on which they are instructed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.1981), modified, 671 F.2d 858, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 181, 74 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982), stated: All veniremen are potentially biased. The process of voir dire is designed to cull from the venire persons who demonstrate that they cannot be fair to either side of the case. Clearly, the extremes must be eliminated  i.e., those who, in spite of the evidence, would automatically vote to convict or impose the death penalty or automatically vote to acquit or impose a life sentence. In the final and most important analysis, it is obvious from the response of the venire to the inquiry which Foster did undertake, that there was no person who could be said to be unalterably in favor of ... the death penalty in every case. Morgan, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2233. Without exception the extremes on the venire were eliminated. All jurors excluded for cause clearly were properly excluded under the test set forth in Wainwright. Foster's counsel even agreed with two of the strikes for cause made by the State. Foster only mentioned one juror by name, No. 45, Ada Marie Brown, and he did so in a footnote. Ms. Brown was not among the jurors from which the actual twelve trial jurors were chosen. Regardless, Ms. Brown was clearly excludable under Wainwright according to her responses during voir dire. There was no error in the exclusion of jurors peremptorily challenged. The remaining jurors' responses clearly indicated that each juror had the ability to be impartial. Foster's counsel was not precluded by the trial judge from using the word automatically in rephrasing his voir dire questions to conform to the law. In fact, the judge expressly informed counsel that the use of the word automatically was not the problem. The trial judge's only objection was that the question asked of the venire was contrary to the law of this state and was potentially misleading to the jury who would be instructed otherwise. Asking jurors their perception or opinion of what the law should be, rather than determining their predisposition under the law as it exists, is the subtle distinction the judge was pointing out. Since the latter is precisely the objective of questioning the venire regarding the death penalty, we conclude there was no error in having counsel rephrase his question to that end. Above all, we find that no prejudice resulted from the trial judge's decision. This assignment of error, upon due consideration, is rejected.