Opinion ID: 901812
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Time Limit to Hold Parole Revocation Hearing

Text: [¶ 7.] The Board promulgates rules regarding parole revocation hearings. SDCL 24-15A-42. A Board rule affords a parolee a final hearing for alleged parole violations within 90 days from the time the parolee is returned to the Department of Corrections facility. ARSD 17:60:11:07. This rule provides: A parolee charged with violating a condition, special limitation, or rule of supervision shall be afforded a final hearing within 90 days following the return of the parolee to a South Dakota Department of Corrections facility. The final hearing shall determine if the parolee has violated a condition, special limitation, or rule of supervision and if the violation warrants supervision revocation or some other less restrictive disciplinary action, including continuance of supervision with new restriction. If the parolee admits the violation and signs a waiver of final hearing, the board may revoke supervision without a final hearing. Id. [¶ 8.] Martin argues his final parole revocation hearing was not held within the 90 days set forth by ARSD 17:60:11:07. As a result, Martin claims he is entitled to have his parole revocation dismissed with prejudice. Martin contends 117 days passed from the time he was returned to the penitentiary until the day of his final hearing. Martin does not dispute the delay due to his request for counsel should be excluded from the 90-day calculation. The parties, however, disagree how many days to exclude due to his request. Martin claims only the time from when he requested counsel to the day counsel was appointed should be excluded. The Board contends the time from when Martin requested counsel to the time Martin reappeared in front of the Board with counsel should be excluded. Martin calculates the time frame at 106 days, and the Board calculates the time frame at 89 days. [¶ 9.] We agree with the Board's calculation. When Martin first appeared before the Board's two-member panel and requested counsel, the panel permitted him 30 days to obtain counsel. A transcript of that hearing shows that Martin agreed to the 30-day continuance. Because Martin agreed to the continuance, the delay in rescheduling his hearing cannot be counted against the 90 days. Consequently, excluding that time from the 90-day calculation was not error. [¶ 10.] Even assuming the final hearing did not take place within 90 days from the time he was returned to the penitentiary, Martin did not claim he was prejudiced by the delay. When alleging due process violations, prejudice must be shown. As we indicated in a similar case involving a preliminary parole violation, alleging no prejudice, and the record disclosing none, defendant will not be heard to maintain that he suffered any due process deprivation. Cf. State v. Ellefson, 334 N.W.2d 56, 58 (S.D.1983). See, e.g., McNeal v. United States, 553 F.2d 66, 68 (10th Cir.1977) (holding that delay before a hearing, by itself, does not amount to a violation of due process that would entitle the defendant to be released); State v. Hall, 287 Kan. 139, 195 P.3d 220 (2008) (requiring prejudice to the defendant before finding a due process violation in the context of issuing a delayed probation violation warrant); Reese v. State, 866 P.2d 82, 84 (Wyo.1993) (concluding time limits should be adhered to, but the failure to do so will not result in the automatic dismissal of the revocation petition); Hackett v. State, 354 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa Ct.App.1984) (stating the court should conduct a constitutional balancing test considering, among other factors, the prejudice to the defendant). Without a showing of prejudice, Martin's contention fails.