Opinion ID: 2297211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Adopt Regulations

Text: The respondent argues that DOS was required to promulgate regulations relative to the administration of RSA chapter 270-E and, because DOS failed to do so, it lacked authority to suspend her operating privileges. See RSA 270-E:12, XII (2010) (requiring DOS to adopt rules relative to matters related to the administration of [RSA chapter 270-E]). Although DOS has procedural rules governing revocation hearings, it has never adopted specific, substantive rules governing the suspension and revocation of boat-operating privileges. See N.H. Admin. Rules, Saf-C ch. 200. It argues that such rules are unnecessary for it to exercise suspension and revocation authority pursuant to RSA 270-E:17. We have consistently held that promulgation of a rule pursuant to the [Administrative Procedure Act] . . . is not necessary to carry out what a statute demands on its face. Nevins v. N.H. Dep't of Resources and Economic Dev., 147 N.H. 484, 487, 792 A.2d 388 (2002). Thus, although we have occasionally noted that an agency should . . . adopt rules, Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. 928, 935, 436 A.2d 1329 (1981), or even that it was required to promulgate rules, Nevins, 147 N.H. at 487, 792 A.2d 388, it has been nearly a century since we last held that failure to adopt rules, by itself, divested a regulatory body of its authority. See Hanover Precinct v. Atkins, 78 N.H. 308, 310-11, 99 A. 293 (1916). Our modern cases focus upon whether the result of the agency's failure to adopt rules was both unfair and inconsistent with [the statute granting authority]. Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. at 935, 436 A.2d 1329 (emphasis added). Therefore, when considering whether an agency's failure to adopt rules requires that its decision be overturned, we must first examine whether the statute is sufficiently detailed to effectuate its purpose without agency regulations. Nevins, 147 N.H. at 487, 792 A.2d 388. If the statute lacks sufficient detail on its face, then an agency must adopt rules supplying the necessary detail. See id. Next, we determine whether the result was unfair by examining whether the complaining party suffered harm as a result of the lack of [required] rules. Id. at 488, 792 A.2d 388. In this case, we assume without deciding that RSA 270-E:17 lacks sufficient detail to effectuate its purpose, but uphold the respondent's suspension because she does not argue that the lack of rules harmed her. The respondent has facially attacked RSA 270-E:17 under multiple theories, but has never argued that she suffered prejudice. She does not assert that she lacked notice that her behavior could result in suspension of her operating privilege. Nor does she argue that if DOS had promulgated regulations, it would not have imposed the suspension. Without some argument that harm resulted, the absence of regulations does not, in itself, require us to overturn DOS's suspension decision. See id. The respondent also contends that, without additional rules, RSA 270-E:17 violates her due process rights under Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution. To the extent the respondent claims the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face, we reject her argument. When a vagueness claim does not involve a fundamental right, a facial attack on the challenged statutory scheme is unwarranted, and the respondent does not argue that the privilege to operate a boat is a fundamental right. State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307, 910 A.2d 1267 (2006).