Opinion ID: 3050941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Offense relating to forgery”

Text: We begin by considering the reach of the phrase “offense relating to . . . forgery.” Forgery developed from the commonlaw crime of larceny and thus should be defined by its “generic, core meaning.” Morales-Alegria, 449 F.3d at 1054; see also Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1204. To determine this meaning, “we look to common-law definitions, the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most states, as well as other circuits’ analyses of the generic offense.” Morales-Alegria, 449 F.3d at 1054 (quotations and citations omitted). The essential elements of the common law crime of forgery are “(1) a false making of some instrument in writing; (2) a fraudulent intent; [and] (3) an instrument apparently capable of effecting a fraud.” Id. at 1055 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Wheeler, 20 Or. 192, 195 (1890)). As VizcarraAyala’s argument targets the false nature of the document, our discussion of forgery focuses on that element. Contemporary treatises emphasize that forgery requires the falsification of a document or instrument. “Forgery is a crime aimed primarily at safeguarding confidence in the genuineness of documents relied upon in commercial and business activity. Though a forgery, like false pretenses, requires a lie, it must be a lie about the document itself: the lie must relate to the genuineness of the document.” 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 19.7(j)(5) (2d ed.) [hereinafter “LAFAVE”] (footnotes omitted). Falsifying the genuineness of a document is so critical to the offense of forgery that “when a person writes a letter or completes a loan application or other instrument and signs it with his own name, he is not guilty of forgery because a false statement is contained therein, even if he knew it was false and acted with intent to 1070 VIZCARRA-AYALA v. MUKASEY defraud.” 4 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 487 (15th ed.). The Model Penal Code echoes this understanding, defining forgery, in relevant part, as “alter[ing] any writing of another without his authority” or making “any writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.1(1). [5] Other circuits and the Supreme Court have also concluded that forgery requires the falsification of a document. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 658 (1962) (“Where the ‘falsity lies in the representation of facts, not in the genuineness of execution,’ it is not forgery.”); United States v. Hunt, 456 F.3d 1255, 1260-64 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding, after a lengthy analysis, that “forgery at common law depends on genuineness of execution, and does not extend to an agent’s false assertion of authority to act on behalf of his principal”); United States v. Reagle, 740 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]his Court has narrowly construed the elements of forgery to encompass only the false making or alteration of a writing of legal significance with the intent to defraud.”); United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1977) (“In criminal cases the great weight of authority holds false statements in or fraudulent execution of otherwise valid instruments not to be forgery within its common law or unexpanded meaning.”) (citation omitted); Asher v. United States, 480 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1973) (“[I]t has generally been held that the genuine making of a writing for the purpose of defrauding another is not forgery.”) (quoting Wright v. United States, 172 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1949)). [6] This unanimity is significant in part because “[w]e are . . . mindful of the desirability of a uniform, national definition.” Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1205 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590-92). In light of this unanimity, it is clear that an essential element of the generic offense of forgery is the false making or alteration of a document, such that the document is not what it purports to be. VIZCARRA-AYALA v. MUKASEY 1071