Opinion ID: 1191605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: fire fighters' need for a warrant

Text: Fire fighters, like policemen, are subject to the Fourth Amendment. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504, 508, 56 L.Ed.2d 486, 98 S.Ct. 1942 (1978). Therefore, fire fighters' warrantless seizures of property found at the scene of a fire [1] are per se unreasonable unless the State can show that they fall within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Tyler, at 508-09. [1] The fire fighters' role in this case is justified by the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. A plain view seizure is valid if the following requirements are met: (1) a prior justification for intrusion; (2) inadvertent discovery of incriminating evidence; and (3) immediate knowledge by the officer that he had evidence before him. Myrick, at 514 (quoting Chrisman, at 819). We now turn to analysis of those elements. There was a prior justification for the fire fighters' original intrusion into the attic. A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293, 78 L.Ed.2d 477, 104 S.Ct. 641 (1984). Moreover, exigent circumstances continue beyond the time when the fire has been extinguished. Tyler, at 510. Fire fighters need no warrant to remain in the building a reasonable time to make sure that the fire does not rekindle, to search for additional fires, and to ventilate the building. Clifford, at 293 n. 4; Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 795-96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974); State v. Olsen, 282 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Minn. 1979). Bell's attorney even concedes that the fire fighters were permitted to be where they were when they found the plants. Thus, exigent circumstances justify the fire fighters' presence not only in Bell's residence but also in his attic. The discovery was also inadvertent. The fire fighters had the duty to ensure the fire was fully extinguished and would not rekindle. The fire fighters had to check the attic's condition because the wall beneath it had been burned up to the ceiling. The duty to investigate became even more compelling when they saw the extent of the smoke in the attic. The fire fighters had not exceeded the scope of these duties when they happened upon the marijuana-growing operation. Finally, the fire fighters were immediately aware that they had evidence before them. The purpose of this immediate knowledge requirements is so that the `plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971). The fire fighters did not engage in this type of extended search. All that is required to satisfy the immediate knowledge element is a reasonable belief that evidence is present. [2] State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 716-17, 630 P.2d 427 (1981); State v. Claflin, 38 Wn. App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984), review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1014 (1985). One of the two fire fighters who first entered the attic testified that I suspected that [the plants] were  chances are they were marijuana. The assistant marshal testified that [t]his appeared to be a marijuana-growing operation to me. The third element is met in the present case. [3] Bell contends, however, that we should hold the present seizure unconstitutional because there was plenty of time to obtain a search warrant after the operation was discovered. Bell argues that warrantless seizures should be held constitutional only if exigent circumstances exist throughout the duration of the search and seizure. Courts in this state, however, have time and again recognized that exigency is not a necessary element to a plain view seizure. State v. Lair , at 716; State v. Marchand, 37 Wn. App. 741, 749, 684 P.2d 1306 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 104 Wn.2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985); State v. Johnson, 17 Wn. App. 153, 159, 561 P.2d 701, review denied, 89 Wn.2d 1001 (1977). A search can be upheld under the plain view doctrine in the absence of exigent circumstances, as long as the doctrine's first element is satisfied. Lair, at 716. In other words, exigent circumstances are merely one factor to be considered in determining if the seizing officers' intrusion was justified. Lair, at 716. The Lair rationale remains equally persuasive today. Plain view alone, without the extra requirement of exigency, satisfies the privacy safeguards imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Coolidge, at 467-68; Johnson, at 159. In Johnson, the Court of Appeals described the privacy safeguards and showed how they are met by plain view searches: The Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement is satisfied when, first, the scrutinizing eye of a neutral magistrate is imposed between individual privacy and infrequently overzealous police. Second, the scope of search must be limited by particular description of items to be seized. Scope cannot be left to police discretion. Plain view alone has been recognized as an exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement because these privacy safeguards remain wholly intact. First, plain view requires the initial police intrusion be lawful, upon a valid search warrant or recognized warrant exception.... Second, because discovery must be inadvertent and recognition as contraband be immediate, the scope of search cannot be extended from the limited particular purpose of the initial intrusion to a general rummaging. (Footnotes omitted.) Johnson, at 158. In sum, because all three elements of the plain view doctrine have been met, no warrant was required for the fire fighters to seize the evidence. [4] Because the plain view doctrine is formulated identically under the state and federal constitutions, we hold that neither constitution required the fire fighters to get a warrant. [5]