Opinion ID: 2538230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Failing to Suppress Walker's Statements to Police?

Text: Walker argues that each of these conclusions by the trial court was erroneous and that his statements should have been suppressed. As a preliminary matter, the State, in its brief, contends that Walker failed to preserve this issue for appeal by not objecting when his statements were introduced at trial through the testimony of Detective Mumma. However, the State withdrew this issue at oral argument. Moreover, the record reflects that Walker did make a contemporaneous objection to Detective Mumma's testimony. Thus, the issue was preserved for review. See State v. Jones, 267 Kan. 627, 637, 984 P.2d 132 (1999). In reviewing a trial court decision regarding the suppression of an accused's statements, we review the factual underpinnings of the decision by a substantial competent evidence standard of review and review the ultimate legal decision drawn from those facts de novo with independent judgment. State v. Webber, 260 Kan. 263, 274-75, 918 P.2d 609 (1996); see State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, Syl. ¶ 2, 44 P.3d 466 (2002); State v. Baston, 261 Kan. 100, 104-05, 928 P.2d 79 (1996); State v. Vandiver, 257 Kan. 53, 57-58, 891 P.2d 350 (1995). The rules regarding custodial interrogations and an accused's constitutional rights are well established. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right against self-incrimination, including the right to have a lawyer present during custodial interrogation and the right to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). The United States Supreme Court and this court have recognized that these rights are `sufficiently important to suspects in criminal investigations' to require that any waiver of the right be knowing and intelligent. State v. Henry, 273 Kan. at 613 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 114 S. Ct. 2350 [1994]); see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 488, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). If a suspect knowingly and intelligently waives these rights, law enforcement officers are free to ask questions. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286, 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979). Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel may occur at any time and requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.  McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991). This rule has two aspects. First, the suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. Second, the request must be for assistance with the custodial interrogation, not for subsequent hearings or proceedings. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178. Regarding the first aspect of the rule, an objective standard is applied in determining if the statements by the accused `can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.' Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178). If the desire for counsel is presented sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney, no ambiguity or equivocation exists, and all questions must cease. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. The Supreme Court recognized that the application of an objective standard might disadvantage some suspects who  because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons  will not clearly articulate their right to counsel . . . . 512 U.S. at 460. On the other hand, however, the Court noted a suspect need not `speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don.' Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. When the accused makes an ambiguous statement about asserting his or her right to remain silent or to speak with counsel, it is good practice for the interrogator to ask clarifying questions; however, it is not required and the questioning may continue. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459-60; State v. Caenen, 270 Kan. 776, 787-88, 19 P.3d 142 (2001); State v. Speed, 265 Kan. 26, 37-38, 961 P.2d 13 (1998). The second aspect of the rule, that the request must be for an attorney's assistance in dealing with the custodial interrogation by police, was an important factor in the trial court's analysis of Walker's requests. Consistent with the trial court's ruling, some courts have held that selectively answering questions regarding certain subjects but indicating a desire to have an attorney work out a deal before answering other questions is not a clear invocation of the right to an attorney. See United States v. Banks, 282 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2002) (defendant's assertion that he wanted to consult a lawyer about making a deal in exchange for information about his suppliers not an invocation of his right to counsel); United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1984) (defendant selectively waived right to remain silent and indicated he wished his attorney to work out cooperative deal with government in future); State v. Shifflett, 199 Conn. 718, 508 A.2d 748 (1986) (defendant's statement that attorney would be needed to work out future plea bargain not an assertion of right to counsel); State v. Hale, 453 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1990) (defendant's fleeting off-hand comment regarding future need for good attorney to defend himself not an invocation of right to counsel). However, simply putting the request in the context of a future plea bargain does not mean that the assertion cannot be a present request for an attorney. This is illustrated by Edwards v. Arizona where Edwards sought to make a deal with police. Police told him they wanted a statement but had no authority to negotiate a deal. Police gave Edwards the telephone number of a county attorney, and Edwards placed a call but hung up after a few moments. He then said, I want an attorney before making a deal. 451 U.S. at 479. Questioning then ceased. The Supreme Court stated: The Arizona Supreme Court was of the opinion that this was a sufficient invocation of his Miranda rights, and we are in accord. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487. Once the right to counsel has been invoked, the courts impose a relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease . . . . Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718, 61 L. Ed. 2d 197, 99 S. Ct. 2560, reh. denied 444 U.S. 887 (1979). Questioning can be resumed only after a lawyer has been made available or the suspect reinitiates conversation. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 484-85; Henry, 273 Kan. at 613. The Edwards rule provides a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel. ( McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176) which is designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. ( Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350, 108 L. Ed. 2d 293, 110 S. Ct. 1176 [1990].) See Henry, 273 Kan. at 613. In determining whether an accused has waived a previously asserted constitutional right, the court must first determine whether the accused actually invoked the right and, if so, whether the accused (1) initiated further discussions with police and (2) knowingly and intelligently waived the previously asserted right. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488, 105 S. Ct. 490 (1984). The prosecution has the burden to show that subsequent events indicated a waiver of a previously asserted right and that the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044-46, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983); State v. Matson, 260 Kan. 366, 374, 921 P.2d 790 (1996). A valid waiver of a previously asserted right cannot be established by showing only that [the suspect] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. Further, the accused's statements must evince a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation and not merely [be] a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46. With these principles in mind we turn to the specifics of the statements in this case. The State argues that many of Walker's statements regarding an attorney were not clear requests for counsel. We agree that many were ambiguous. For example, at one point Walker asked, [D]o I need to get a lawyer? On prior occasions, this court has concluded that this question, or one essentially the same, is ambiguous and equivocal and, therefore, not a clear invocation of the Miranda-Edwards right to counsel. State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 43-44, 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Bailey, 256 Kan. 872, 885, 889 P.2d 738 (1995). Additionally, as noted by the trial court, many statements referenced a desire to hire an attorney to work out a deal but did not express a present request for an attorney. Such statements included, That's why I can't wait to get over there [to jail] man so I can call a lawyer and tell him and my peoples . . . need to go get me a lawyer so the lawyer there to talk to me. However, at other times the request for an attorney was clear. For example, at one point when Walker made an ambiguous statement regarding an attorney, the detective sought clarification, [W]hen you were talkin' about a lawyer, I mean, are you wanting one right, like right this minute? Walker did not orally respond, but did nod his head. The State does not dispute this fact. It is also clear that the officer saw the response because he replied, Yeah. Well I can't talk to you anymore. However, Walker immediately indicated he wanted to continue to talk. Under similar circumstances, this court has determined such action by an accused is an effective withdrawal of the invocation of the right to counsel and a reinitiation of the conversation by the accused. Henry, 273 Kan. at 617. Shortly after Walker reinitiated the conversation, the following exchange occurred: Walker: Can you get me one right now? Detective: No, not right now. Walker: That's what I'm sayin'. Detective: But then, I mean if you want one right now, then I couldn't talk to you any morethat's why I'mthat's what I'm telling you. I just wanna make sure that you're alright with just us in here shootin' the bull. And if you're not and I have to leave the room, I don't want you bangin' on the table. Otherwise I have to sit in here and just look at you. Walker then asked if they were ready to take him across the street. The officer replied, pretty quick, and began to take Walker's personal possessions from him. The officer did not ask any questions about the investigation. However, Walker asked several, including whether another suspect had arrived yet and whether police had an eyewitness who saw Walker. Such questions about the investigation could be seen as evincing a willingness and a desire for generalized discussion about the investigation. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046. Then Walker asked to talk to a Wichita police officer, Alex Robinson. Walker directed, Tell him I need to talk to him about something that I can't talk to y'all about. The officer left and then returned to report that Robinson was on his way. Walker clearly initiated discussion, saying he wanted the officer to stay and talk while they waited for Robinson to arrive. Walker continued to ask questions about the investigation and then asked, So what is a man supposed to do when they take his life from him? This led the detective to urge Walker to take responsibility if he was involved or if he was not involved but knew something by stating, then you have the responsibility to tell the truth . . . . After further discussion, Walker again denied being the trigger man and stated: Walker: Call my grandma, tell her go get me a lawyer or somethin'. Gouge: You know every time you mention a lawyer, I have to clarify with you, whether or not you want to continue to talk to us? Or are you looking to get a lawyer later? Walker: I'm talkI'm talkin' to you man. Thus, to this point Walker continued to reinitiate contact after making a request for an attorney. Walker was again left alone and, while apparently alone, twice stated, Get me that lawyer man. There was evidence that Walker was not constantly monitored, and there was no showing that these statements were heard by Wichita police. Soon thereafter, Officer Robinson came into the room. Robinson had known Walker since Walker was 11 or 12 years old and also knew Walker's grandmother and other family members. Walker asked Robinson, You ain't in here for the police case is you? Robinson answered, No. Shortly after Robinson arrived, Walker made clear that he had asked to speak to Robinson in order to ask Robinson to help Walker's family hire an attorney. Robinson asked why Walker thought he needed an attorney, and Walker responded, [Because] they gonna try to pin this shit on me man. Robinson then asked, Do you know anybody that'd know anything aboutwasdo you know them people? After about 10 minutes of additional questions, Walker said, Alex, look, this is all I want to ask you man. Will you, will you recwill you recommend a lawyer to my grandma . . . . (Emphasis added.) After Walker made it clear that he wanted Robinson to help Walker's family find an attorney, Robinson continued urging Walker to tell the police what happened. After some discussion, including additional urging to talk, Walker said: Walker: I ought to get me a paid lawyer. Then I'm have to strike a deal with the DA. Then I'm gonna tell. Okay? So will you help my grandma to get me a good lawyer? So that's what I'm gonna dois try to talk to those people out there. 'Causeget me a paid lawyer, soon as I get a pay lawyer, strike a deal with the DA, but I gotta have complete immunity. (Emphasis added.) . . . . Robinson: Okay. You stay strong boy. Walker: (Whispering) I will, you gonna help me get a lawyer? Robinson: I'll talk to your grandma. We find no basis to distinguish this request from the request in Edwards v. Arizona where the Supreme Court agreed that Edwards' statement I want an attorney before making a deal was a sufficient invocation of his Miranda rights. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479, 487; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977) (statements . . . that he would tell the whole story after seeing [his attorney] were clearest expression by [the defendant] himself that he desired the presence of an attorney before any interrogation took place). However, Walker then said: Walker: But I know.. Alex .. don't leave until they take me next door. Robinson: Okay. Walker: (Whispering) I mean, stay in here with me man. I'm not gonna really tell you who did it There is some question about whether this request for company was a voluntary waiver of his asserted right to counsel, but again we need not resolve that issue because of a subsequent unambiguous statement by Walker that he wanted an attorney before he told police anything. The next statement followed a discussion of several matters, including Walker's reputation, who would take care of Walker's children while he was in jail, and the chance that Walker's grandmother would die while Walker was in custody. Walker still refused to talk: Walker: I can't tell. No. I can't tell. I can't talk about no telling until I see what I can get out of it. If I can't get nothin' out of it, man, I ain't tellin' you. As they talked, Robinson continued to urge Walker to tell detectives what Walker knew about the shooting, to get it off his chest, and to not go to jail for something Walker did not do. At one point, the following exchange occurred: Walker: (Whispering) I wanna tell you everything Ibut you gonna go tell them. Robinson: I got to tell. Walker: (Whispering) No, you don't. Robinson: Cause this isthis is amurder investigation. Walker: (Whispering) So you're gonna have to tell my people. Robinson: Yeah, I'll talk to your grandma about a lawyer. At this point, because of whispering, some of what Walker says cannot be heard on the videotape. Then Walker continued: Walker: (Whispering) Have they got the death penalty in Wichita? Robinson: In Kansas? Walker: (Whispering) Yeah. Robinson: Yeah, they got it. Walker: (Whispering) So they got the Robinson: All states got it now, just about. Walker: (Whispering) Think the shooter will get that? Robinson: Yeah man. Youyou need to get this stuff off of your chest. An then Walker: (Whispering) If I could talk to my grandma right now. I just need to talk to a lawyer, man. If I could talk to a lawyer, the lawyer know what's up. Can you get me a lawyer? The Detectives gonna book me into the county. If I call right now, then my lawyer come up here and talk to them. I can't wait till I go downstairs. Robinson: It'll probably be tomorrow, it's almost 6 o'clock. Walker: (Whispering) So? Especially in light of his previous statements to Robinson regarding having an attorney and then talking to police, these statements were a clear, unequivocal invocation of Walker's Miranda-Edwards right to an attorney. His expressions were immediate, right now and, I can't wait. And there was a clear request for an attorney, I just need to talk to a lawyer. See State v. Monroe, 103 Idaho 129, 645 P.2d 363 (1982) (statements by accused that he thought he should see lawyer before making a statement, that he would make a statement after being advised by an attorney, and that he wanted an attorney before talking to police were sufficient to invoke right to counsel). However, in contrast to the previous invocations of the right to counsel, Walker did not initiate subsequent conversation. Rather, Robinson initiated discussion about the expense of hiring an attorney. After some discussion regarding court-appointed attorneys, Robinson said, But you're probably gonna have to go to jailif you talk to them though. Clearly, the discussion and subsequent communication was not initiated by Walker but by Robinson. The State argues that Robinson was not acting in the capacity of a police officer but a friend. Although Robinson had sent Walker mixed messages regarding his capacity, Robinson, who was in uniform, told Walker he would have to advise the detectives of what Walker said about his role in the shooting. Robinson clearly understood his role as a police officer imposed certain duties upon him. Further, the State argues that Robinson was not interrogating Walker. The numerous questions Robinson asked Walker belie this argument. Furthermore, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 64 L. Ed. 2d. 297, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980), the Supreme Court noted that police use indirect methods to obtain information from suspects without directly questioning them. The Court concluded that the protection afforded by Miranda would have little meaning if these latter types of practices could be used without the strictures of Miranda and held that interrogation constituted any words or action on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. 446 U.S. at 301. Robinson's techniques were interrogation. Also, Robinson left the interview room and Detective Mumma returned and initiated discussions with Walker. Mumma again urged Walker to talk, and then Walker said, I'm going to send you back out there again. Mumma left the room. Robinson returned and began telling Walker more about evidence the police had. Over an hour after Walker said, I just need to talk to a lawyer, Walker again said to Robinson, [G]et me a good lawyer man. Robinson continued to talk to Walker saying things like, I didn't know they had all that stuff on there thoughlike this bad manit's bad. Robinson then told Walker, You need to get this stuff off your chest man. Walker replied in a whisper, I can't. Robinson continued to persuade Walker to talk. Eventually, several hours after clearly invoking his right to counsel, almost 13 hours after the interview began, more than 8 hours after being arrested and handcuffed to the table, and after repeated requests he be taken to the jail, Walker finally told police about his involvement in the shooting. This situation falls clearly within the Edwards prophylactic rule designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85; Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044. Once Walker said, If I could talk to my grandma right now. I just need to talk to a lawyer, manI can't wait till I go downstairs, police were required to honor that request. Their failure to do so requires suppression of all statements after that point and, because the confession was not suppressed, reversal of Walker's convictions. Consequently, we need not reach the issues of whether the trial court erred in concluding that Walker did not clearly invoke his right to remain silent or that the statement was voluntary.