Opinion ID: 2823847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Respondents Lack Taxpayer Standing

Text: Â¶12Â Â Â Â Â Unlike the United States Supreme Courtâs narrow view of taxpayer standing, this Court has consistently permitted broad taxpayer standing. Compare Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011) (explaining that â[a]bsent special circumstances . . . standing cannot be based on a plaintiffâs mere status as a taxpayerâ), with Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 (explaining that Colorado law allows for âbroad taxpayer standingâ). Although we have permitted a broad class of plaintiffs to have taxpayer standing, we have also utilized the injury-in-fact requirement to provide conceptual limits to the doctrine when plaintiffs challenge an allegedly unlawful government action. 11 For example, we have held that allegedly unlawful expenditures or transfers of public funds can constitute injuries sufficient to establish taxpayer standing. See, e.g., Barber, 196 P.3d at 247 (determining that plaintiffs had âtaxpayer standing to challenge the constitutionality of the transfers of money from the special funds to the stateâs General Fund and the concomitant expenditure of that money to defray general governmental expense, rather than to defray the cost of services provided to those chargedâ (emphasis added)); Dodge v. Depât of Soc. Servs., 198 Colo. 379, 381â83, 600 P.2d 70, 71â72 (1979) (determining that plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to challenge an expenditure of public funds to finance nontherapeutic abortions). To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate a clear nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the challenged government action. See Barber, 196 P.3d at 246 (explaining that an injury that is âoverly indirect and incidentalâ to the challenged government action will not convey taxpayer standing (internal quotation marks omitted)). Â¶13Â Â Â Â Â We most explicitly articulated this nexus requirement in Brotman. In that case, we considered whether an adjacent landowner had taxpayer standing to challenge the State Board of Land Commissionersâ decision to sell a parcel of school land to a third-party purchaser. 31 P.3d at 888â89. Emphasizing that âincome generated from the Land Boardâs management of school lands [was] distinct from and in addition to income generated through taxation for schoolsââand thus did not affect the amount of tax revenue spent on schoolsâwe concluded that the Land Boardâs decision to sell the school land had âno effectâ on the landowner as a taxpayer. Id. at 892. Absent the requisite nexus between the landownerâs status as a taxpayer and the challenged sale of land, we determined that the landowner did not have taxpayer standing. Id. Â¶14Â Â Â Â Â Turning to the case at hand, Respondents allege in their complaint that they are Colorado taxpayers. But they do not assert any injury based on an unlawful expenditure of their taxpayer money, nor do they allege that their tax dollars are being used in an unconstitutional manner. Indeed, the trial court expressly found that â[t]here is no item in the State budgetâ relating to the issuance of the challenged proclamations and concluded that there was âno expenditure of public funds in this case.â Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â Respondents nevertheless argue that they have suffered an injury sufficient to establish taxpayer standing because the Governor used public funds in the course of issuing the allegedly unconstitutional honorary proclamations. Even assuming that the Governor used public funds to pay for the paper, hard-drive space, postage, and personnel necessary to issue one Colorado Day of Prayer proclamation each year, such incidental overhead costs are not sufficiently related to Respondentsâ financial contributions as taxpayers to establish the requisite nexus for standing. 12 If such costs were sufficient to confer taxpayer standing, any and all members of the public would have standing to challenge literally any government action that required the use of a computer, basic office supplies, or state employee time. Article III of the Colorado Constitution and our precedent do not permit this expansive result. Accordingly, we hold that Respondents have not alleged an injury sufficient to establish taxpayer standing.