Opinion ID: 1714841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: third degree assault instruction

Text: The final assignment of error before us concerns Cebuhar's conviction for third degree assault of Specht in violation of § 28-310. Concerning this charge, the court, over Cebuhar's objection, tendered instruction No. 4, which provided that the State must prove that the defendant did threaten Mark Specht in a menacing manner and that the defendant did so intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. Section 28-310 provides in part: (1) A person commits the offense of assault in the third degree if he: (a) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another person; or (b) Threatens another in a menacing manner. The record indicates the State was proceeding against Cebuhar pursuant to subsection (b). We have held that a violation of this subsection requires an intentional act. See In re Interest of Siebert, 223 Neb. 454, 390 N.W.2d 522 (1986). As such, the State concedes the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could find Cebuhar guilty if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly threatened Specht in a menacing manner. Nevertheless, the State asserts the erroneous instruction was harmless. In a jury trial of a criminal case, harmless error exists when there is some incorrect conduct by the trial court which, on review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury in reaching a verdict adverse to a substantial right of the defendant. State v. Morris, 251 Neb. 23, 554 N.W.2d 627 (1996). According to the State, the evidence adduced at trial made it clear that Cebuhar intended to threaten Specht in a menacing manner. While this argument has some appeal, we simply cannot conclude that the jury would necessarily have found Cebuhar guilty of third degree assault based on the evidence offered had it been properly instructed on the level of culpability required. Based on the fact that the jury could have reached its guilty verdict in reliance on the lesser culpability standards of knowingly or recklessly, we determine that Cebuhar was prejudiced by the instructions given, and his conviction of third degree assault must therefore be reversed, and remanded.