Opinion ID: 384929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Commission's Analysis and Application of Section 315(a)

Text: 21 Petitioner raises four principal objections to the Commission's handling of the statutory issues generated by this litigation. These include its use of Aspen and Chisholm as controlling precedents, the deference accorded broadcaster discretion, the burden placed on petitioners to demonstrate the absence of good faith on the part of the networks, and the Commission's refusal to consider post hoc corrective action. 61 These we now examine in turn.1. Application of Aspen and Chisholm as Precedents 22 The first contention advanced by petitioner is that the Commission woodenly applied Aspen by improperly treating it as establishing a per se rule. Certainly we did not in Chisholm approve a per se exemption of press conferences from the equal-opportunity requirement of Section 315(a), nor do we think the Commission attempted to apply Aspen in that manner here. 62 23 In Chisholm, we upheld the Commission's specification of three criteria to govern the decision on whether a candidate's press conference is exempt from the equal-opportunity provision. They are (1) whether the conference is broadcast live, (2) whether it is based upon the good faith determination of the broadcaster that it is a bona fide news event, and (3) whether there is evidence of broadcaster favoritism. 63 It is clear enough that the Commission examined the President's February 13 press conference in each of these respects, and not in the least are we moved to impugn the conclusions the Commission reached. 24 There is no suggestion that in any instance the press conference was not broadcast live, nor even so much as a whisper of network bias in favor of the President. Both the Broadcast Bureau and the Commission thus correctly perceived the only issue to be whether the networks independently had exercised good faith journalistic judgment in concluding that the event was newsworthy. We move to an examination of the accuracy of the Commission's analysis of this question, and to the objections raised thereto by petitioner. 25 2. Good Faith Determination of a Bona Fide News Event 26 Petitioner contends that the Commission effectively delegated to the networks its responsibility to determine whether a particular appearance of a candidate is a use entitling opponents to equal opportunities. This, petitioner says, the Commission did by attaching too great a weight to the broadcasters' good faith judgment of newsworthiness. 64 The flaw in this argument is that, as we have noted, this criterion proceeds directly from the legislative history of Section 315(a). 65 In Chisholm, we found congressional intent to expand the role of broadcasters under Section 315(a) and to place considerable reliance on the exercise of their journalistic discretion in order to insure attainment of goals viewed as even more important than equal responsive opportunities. 66 27 It would be pointless to restate the analysis carefully expounded in Chisholm. It is enough to say that in applying the challenged criterion the Commission pursued the course approved by this court as consistent with the legislative history and objectives. 67 Thus we cannot agree with petitioner that the Commission here engaged in an unauthorized delegation of its statutory functions merely by following Aspen and Chisholm as the guiding precedents. On the contrary, the Commission quite properly honored Chisholm's teaching that absent evidence of broadcaster intent to advance a particular candidacy, the judgment of the newsworthiness of an event is left to the reasonable news judgment of professionals. 68 28 3. The Burden of Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Absence of Good Faith 29 Nor do we believe the Commission acted improperly in requiring a candidate seeking an order affording equal opportunities to come forward with evidence that the broadcaster involved did not exercise a bona fide judgment on newsworthiness in covering an appearance by his opponent. 69 30 Petitioner has never even alleged that any of the networks failed to make or abide a good faith estimate of newsworthiness. Petitioner thus is hardly in position to complain that the evidentiary burden defined by the Commission erects an impermissible barrier to complainants attempting to assert rights under Section 315(a). At any rate, to insist upon probable cause as a precondition to administrative investigation of a claim is not at all novel; 70 moreover, one of the expressed objectives of the 1959 amendments to Section 315(a) was to afford( ) the licensee freedom to exercise his judgment in the handling of (news) program(s) despite the fact that a legally qualified candidate may appear to be heard on such a broadcast. 71 Requiring a complainant to substantiate his allegations at the outset effectuates this congressional purpose by promoting fearless exercise of the discretion Congress intended broadcasters to have. 72 31 Petitioner's apparent inability to satisfy the Commission's threshold burden allegation and corroboration of either bad faith or nonexercise of judgment on newsworthiness by the networks does not demonstrate that the standard on this score is improvident. On the contrary, it seems evident that one having a legitimate claim in this regard will ordinarily be able to point to something tending to support it. 73 And we do not doubt that when a prima facie showing is made the Commission, as it has stated, will inquire into the honesty and reasonableness of a broadcaster's professed news judgment. 74 4. Corrective Action 32 Finally, on statutory grounds, petitioner urges that the actual content of a candidate's press-conference broadcast should determine whether the equal-opportunity obligation of Section 315(a) is activated. This contention is linked with the further argument that the Commission erroneously failed to consider post hoc whether remedial action should be taken to mitigate damage allegedly wrought. It seems much too late to raise these objections, for petitioner never placed a transcript or other recording of the press conference before the Commission. 75 In any event, we are convinced that one of the main purposes of Section 315(a) would be frustrated by requiring the Commission to make subjective judgments on the political content of a broadcast program. 76 33 As we have previously observed, a major goal of the 1959 amendments to Section 315(a) was preservation of broadcasters' journalistic judgment on news programming. 77 Congress then decided that when broadcasters are allowed to exercise good faith discretion in evaluating the newsworthiness of candidates' appearances on the four exempted types of broadcast programs, the benefits to the public outweigh the detriments to either the public or the candidates. 78 We think the Commission steers the right course in declining to undertake assessments on the political or nonpolitical nature of a candidate's appearance, even assuming that there really is much of a difference. 79 As the Commission aptly stated, to draw such distinctions would require (it) to make subjective judgments concerning content, context and potential political impact of a candidate's appearance, 80 and (n) either Congress nor the Commission desires to expand governmental oversight of broadcasters' professional journalistic functions. 81 34 We find eminently reasonable, too, the Commission's reading of Section 315(a) to require broadcasters to appraise newsworthiness prior to broadcast of the questioned event. Were the Commission to hinge operation of the equal-opportunity provision on after-the-fact reexamination of the event broadcast, the purposes for which Congress enacted the Section 315(a) exemptions would largely be set for naught. Broadcasters could never be sure that coverage of any given event would not later result in equal-opportunity obligations to all other candidates; resultantly, broadcaster discretion to carry or not to carry would be seriously if not fatally crippled. 82 These difficulties could impede broadcasting of newsworthy events just as effectively as the Commission decisions which the 1959 amendments were designed to overturn. 83 35 We also deem irrelevant petitioner's assertion that the questioned press conference was orchestrated as a partisan political event designed to gain maximum political advantage in the New Hampshire primary and subsequent elections a fact recognized here and throughout the country if not at the Commission. 84 When we decided Chisholm, we fully explained the insignificance of the candidate's motivation in appearing on the broadcast program. 85 We perceive no good reason to reiterate the discussion here. 86 36 We thus are unpersuaded by petitioner's statutory arguments. Together they travel several routes, but they all lead to the same destination. In a word, petitioner's objections to the Commission's analysis of Section 315(a) do not warrant reversal of the order under review. We proceed, then, to the constitutional claim.