Opinion ID: 2600753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: A. Halen's Proclaimed Fear Of Needles Was Not Sufficient Cause For His Refusal To Submit To A Blood Alcohol Concentration Test. Under Idaho Code section 18-8002, any person who operates a motor vehicle in Idaho is deemed to have given consent to evidentiary testing for blood alcohol concentration when a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving under the influence of alcohol. That same section authorizes the suspension of the driver's license of a motorist who refuses to submit to a BAC. A motorist whose license is suspended after a refusal may request a hearing before the court. I.C. § 18-8002(4)(b). The hearing is limited to the question of why the motorist refused the BAC, and the motorist has the burden of showing that his or her license should not be suspended, because the peace officer did not have legal cause to stop and request him to take the test or . . . the request violated his civil rights. I.C. § 18-8002(4)(b). This Court has made it clear that the choice as to which type of evidentiary test for concentration of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances will be requested rests with the police officer, not the defendant. In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 92, 98 (1987). The defendant's willingness to take another form of test generally does not negate the effect of his refusal to submit to the form of test requested by the officer. Id. However, Halen relies on Griffiths for the proposition that his fear of needles constitutes an exception to these rules and amounts to sufficient cause for his refusal to submit to the blood withdrawal. In Griffiths, this Court stated: We hold that a fear of needles may establish sufficient cause for refusing to submit to a blood test requested pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002 if the fear is of such a magnitude that as a practical matter the defendant is psychologically unable to submit to the test, and if the fear is sufficiently articulated to the police officer at the time of refusal so that the officer is given an opportunity to request a different test. Id. at 372, 744 P.2d at 100. The rule of Griffiths is controlling, but its application to the facts of this case produces a different result than that urged by Halen. At the suspension hearing, Halen had the burden of demonstrating that he communicated to the officers a fear sufficient to satisfy the Griffiths test. The magistrate judge found the following regarding Halen's communications with the officers: 1) Halen indicated to the officers that he simply preferred to have a breath test rather than a blood withdrawal, 2) while he expressed a general fear of needles, and generally referenced the risk of contracting AIDS, Halen also admitted that he had received shots in the past, 3) he denied ever having seen a psychologist regarding his fear, and 4) he never identified any mental or medical condition that would be adversely affected by the administration of a blood withdrawal. These findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. These communications fail to articulate a psychological inability to submit to the test, as is contemplated by Griffiths. Consequently, the magistrate judge was correct in determining that Halen failed to show cause why his license should not be suspended. B. The Officer Did Not Violate Halen's Civil Rights Or Exceed His Statutory Authority In Requesting A Blood Withdrawal As The Method Of Testing. Halen argues that the officer's request was a violation of his civil rights and that his suspension should therefore be vacated. He argues that requiring a blood withdrawal without a warrant and absent exigent circumstances, when other less-intrusive methods like breath or urine tests are available, constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The administration of a BAC is a search and seizure implicating the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835; Woolery, 116 Idaho at 370, 775 P.2d at 1212. When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. Id. Such an exception exists when the search or seizure is conducted with proper consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). Every person who drives on Idaho roads has impliedly consented to submit to a BAC when properly requested by an officer. I.C. § 18-8002(1); Nickerson, 132 Idaho at 409, 973 P.2d at 761. Consequently, the warrantless requirement that Halen take a BAC was justified under the consent exception. Halen's status as a Washington resident is irrelevant to the consent inquiry, because  [a]ny person who drives . . . a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent, regardless of where he or she resides. I.C. § 18-8002(1) (emphasis added). A search or seizure that is permissible without a warrant must still be reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding circumstances. Woolery, 116 Idaho at 371, 775 P.2d at 1213. Halen argues that, under Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.1998), the manner in which the BAC was offered to him was unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, since less-intrusive methods, such as a breath or urine sample, were available. However, that case is inapplicable to the current situation. In Nelson, the Ninth Circuit found that it was unreasonable, and thus a Fourth Amendment violation, for officers to require a blood withdrawal when the driver was willing to submit to other, less-intrusive tests. 143 F.3d at 1203. The court's holding was based upon the fact that California's implied consent statute granted the driver the right to select the method of testing to which he or she would submit. Id. By contrast, as noted above, the Idaho statute provides implied consent to the form of test of the officer's choosing. Therefore, Nelson is of no consequence. Because it is the officer's prerogative to choose the method of testing, and because Halen failed to demonstrate that the test would cause him harm, there was substantial evidence to support the magistrate judge's conclusion that it was reasonable for the officer to require a blood withdrawal. Consequently, there was no violation of Halen's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Halen also argues that the officer lacked statutory authority to request a blood withdrawal. He argues that I.C. § 18-8002 only authorizes an officer to request a blood withdrawal where there are aggravating circumstances or suspicion of drug use. He cites I.C. §§ 18-8002(6)(b), 18-8002(9), and 18-8002(10) in support of this argument. However, I.C. § 18-8002(6)(b) grants an officer limited authority to order medical personnel to physically administer a blood withdrawal. It does not limit the circumstances under which the officer may request that a defendant peacefully submit to a blood withdrawal. Further, sections 18-8002(9) and 18-8002(10) provide authority for the officer to ask for a blood withdrawal in addition to other tests. None of these subsections of I.C. § 18-8002 contain language limiting the officer's authority regarding this matter. Consequently, an officer's authority to require a defendant to submit to a blood withdrawal, under I.C. § 18-8002, does not turn on whether aggravating factors are present. C. The Suspension Advisory Form Adequately Advised Halen Of The Consequences Of Taking And Failing The Evidentiary Test. If a motorist refuses to submit to a BAC, the Code authorizes a civil suspension of his or her driver's license. I.C. § 18-8002(4). Halen's license was suspended under this authority, based upon his refusal to submit to the blood withdrawal requested by the officer. However, Halen argues that his suspension for refusing, under section 18-8002, cannot stand because he was improperly informed according to the requirements of a related code section, I.C. § 18-8002A. Idaho Code section 18-8002A requires that upon being asked to submit to a BAC a motorist must be given information regarding the consequences of submitting to and failing the BAC, by having a blood alcohol content that exceeds the legal limit. I.C. § 18-8002A(2). Specifically, motorists must be informed, among other things, that if they submit to and fail a BAC, a civil license suspension will be enforced against them. I.C. § 18-8002A(2). Motorists are entitled to similar information regarding the consequences of refusing to submit to a BAC. I.C. § 18-8002(3). Motorists who refuse to submit to requested tests are entitled to have their licenses reinstated if they can establish at the refusal hearing that they were not completely advised according to these code sections. Griffiths, 113 Idaho at 370, 744 P.2d at 98. Halen argues that since I.C. § 18-8002A(7) says that a civil and criminal suspension based on the same occurrence shall run concurrently unless otherwise ordered by the court, he was misinformed when the advisory form indicated that the two suspensions were separate. Idaho Code section 18-8002A(7) provides that both the civil suspension under that section and any criminal suspension imposed shall run concurrently, with the total period of suspension not to exceed the longer of the applicable suspension periods, unless the court ordering the suspension in the criminal case orders to the contrary. The advisory form read to Halen, paragraph 5A, reads in pertinent part: This suspension for failure of the evidentiary test(s) is separate from any other suspension ordered by the court. It is true that this language from the advisory form does not match the information requirements of the statute verbatim, and there is no requirement that this information be given at all. However, according to I.C. § 18-8002A(2), the motorist need not be informed verbatim; rather, he or she need only be substantially informed of the information contained in that section. Nothing in the Code indicates that additional information contained on the form renders the form invalid as a matter of law, and as provided by I.C. § 18-8002A(7), the suspensions may be enforced separately if a judge orders them to run consecutively. There was substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding that, despite the additional information regarding the suspensions being separate, Halen was substantially informed of his rights and duties as required by I.C. § 18-8002A(2). D. Halen's Right To Counsel Under Article I Section 13 Of The Idaho Constitution Was Not Violated. Idaho Code section 18-8002(2) provides that a person suspected of driving while intoxicated does not have the right to consult with an attorney before submitting to evidentiary testing. At one point, the officers denied Halen's request to speak with an attorney before submitting to a blood withdrawal. Halen argues that the denial of his request violated his right to counsel under Article I Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. We note that this argument was addressed and rejected by the Court of Appeals in State v. Shelton, 129 Idaho 877, 934 P.2d 943 (Ct.App.1997). However, this argument is irrelevant in this case, because, as he has conceded in his brief, Halen was allowed to consult with an attorney by telephone before the officer made his final request for a BAC. E. This Court Need Not Address The Constitutionality of I.C. § 18-8002A. Halen argues that I.C. § 18-8002A violates his due process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard, because it gives a person whose license has been suspended only thirty days in which to conduct discovery in preparation for his or her administrative refusal hearing. I.C. § 18-8002A(7). Specifically, he argues that thirty days is insufficient time in which to inquire of the laboratory that conducted a blood test or of the specialist who did the calibration checks on a breath analysis machine. However, Halen's license was not suspended under the authority of section 18-8002A, and he never submitted to a BAC test about which to conduct discovery. The constitutionality of the time constraints contained within that section are irrelevant to Halen's situation. Therefore, this Court need not address the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-8002A. F. The Magistrate Judge Did Not Err In Excluding Various Items of Evidence Offered By Halen. Halen argues that the magistrate judge erred in excluding several items of evidence. The excluded items were intended to demonstrate the availability of alternative methods of testing, the reliability of the alternative methods, and the arresting officer's training regarding those various methods. Because we hold that the officer's choice of testing method did not violate statutory or constitutional principles regardless of the alleged availability or superiority of other testing methods, any error in excluding these items of evidence was harmless. On appeal, harmless error is disregarded. See Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50-51, 995 P.2d 816, 820-21 (2000); I.R.E. 103(a); I.C.R. 52.