Opinion ID: 2378907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Timing of Trial Court's Sentence

Text: The jury convicted Shurn on March 26, 1988, and initially set sentencing for May 6, 1988. On May 18, the court reset sentencing for July 22, 1988; the court later continued sentencing until September 13, 1988. Citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), Shurn complains that the trial court delayed sentencing until after accomplice Weaver's trial, in violation of the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing. See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3377, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). There is no indication that the trial court considered Weaver's case in sentencing Shurn, except for its acknowledgment at the beginning of the trial court's sentencing of the necessity of delaying this sentencing until following the trial of the Weaver case. Otherwise, the court did not refer to Weaver, or any evidence from Weaver's trial, in sentencing Shurn. Trial counsel stated at the post-conviction hearing that he did not file a motion to have Shurn sentenced because he did not want to rush the judge. Specifically, trial counsel reasoned that if Weaver received life imprisonment, the trial court would be more reluctant to sentence Shurn to death. The motion court held that this was a strategic decision by defense counsel. This Court presumes that judges do not consider improper evidence when sentencing defendants. See McMillin, 783 S.W.2d at 96. Shurn does not overcome this presumption by citing the time delay and the comments by the trial judge. Point denied.