Opinion ID: 1311837
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Argument Concerning Unproved Sex Crimes.

Text: (19a) As part of the special circumstance allegations, defendant was originally charged with having killed Benham in the course of rape and sodomy (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(iii) and (iv)). The two special circumstances ultimately were dismissed on grounds, inter alia, that there was insufficient corroboration of Crenshaw's statements implicating defendant in the crimes. In his penalty phase argument, however, the prosecutor described Benham as having been sexually assaulted. Defendant maintains the prosecutor thereby improperly submitted the rape and sodomy offenses to the jury as aggravating other crimes (see § 190.3, factor (b)) when there was insufficient evidence to permit the offenses to be considered ( People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-54 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 774) and impermissibly attempted to relitigate the court's prior finding of insufficient evidence (see People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 866-867 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776]). Because defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's comments, defendant can complain on appeal only if timely objection and admonition could not have obviated the prejudicial effects of the remarks. ( People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d 841, 860-861; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.) We are of the view that any harmful effect from the remarks could have been cured by an objection and admonition when the prosecutor first made the challenged reference to a sexual assault. We further conclude, however, the prosecutor's comments were not error. Sexual assault is not a specific crime, nor was it listed among the other crimes the court instructed the jury it could consider. [13] In lay terms an assault is an unwanted touching or a threat to accomplish such; by the same token, a sexual assault is an unwanted sexual advance  i.e., an unwanted touching or threat to touch an intimate body part. [14] (Cf. §§ 240 [assault], 243.4 [sexual battery].) Defendant's sexual assault of Benham was a circumstance of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)), as shown by evidence that she was lying in a face down position, nude below the waist, and Crenshaw's testimony that defendant was on top of her with his pants down. (20) We do not believe corroboration is required for that part of an accomplice's testimony that relates to the circumstances of the crime, rather than commission of a specific offense. (See § 1111 [distinguishing corroboration connecting defendant to commission of the offense from that directed only to its circumstances]; People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 27 [171 Cal. Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213] [corroboration need not establish every fact of the crime].) (19b) Assuming, arguendo, however, that corroboration is required for the circumstance to be used in aggravation of penalty, the sexual assault aspect of Crenshaw's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the position and unclothed condition of Benham's body and Laughlin's testimony that defendant received some form of sexual gratification from killing people. (See People v. Szeto, supra, 29 Cal.3d 20 [corroborative evidence may be slight].) The prosecutor's references to the sexual assault were made not in the context of defendant's other criminal activity, but rather, in the context of the circumstances of the crime and defendant's capacity to conform his behavior to the law. As such, they were not improper.