Opinion ID: 882840
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of evidence for jury verdict

Text: The defendant claims that the evidence presented was not sufficient to find him guilty. He also contends that the State did not properly identify the man at the scene of the accident, who stated that he hit the victim, as the defendant. The State counters that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. We agree with the State. The standard of review regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is [whether,] after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Medina (1990), 245 Mont. 25, 33, 798 P.2d 1032, 1037. The State provided the following evidence to support the defendant's guilt. A bartender from Little John's and the bar owner of Willie's Saloon stated that the defendant was served alcoholic beverages on the evening of the accident. A friend of the defendant's also testified to drinking with the defendant late in the afternoon on the day of the accident and being driven to his home by the defendant in a 1989 white Toyota Camry. Testimony showed that this vehicle was found near the scene of the accident in which the decedent, Laurence Dearinger, was killed. The vehicle was owned and driven by the defendant on that evening. The car had sustained damage to the right front end and was blood splattered. One of the vehicle's side mirrors had broken off and a similar side mirror had been found at the accident scene. When the vehicle was found, the lights were on and the key was in the ignition but the car was not running. Arrington could not be found until he was located wandering a hillside in the general area of the accident the next morning. Testimony elicited the following statements made by the defendant. When the defendant was found by his father he told his father that he had been in an accident. He further stated that I hit something, and I went back. I stopped and I went back and there was a man lying beside the motorcycle. Also, he informed his father that when he saw the man lying on the ground, he became physically ill and had no recollection of what happened thereafter except that he found himself wandering near the area of a KOA campground. When the defendant arrived at the police station, he reported to Officer Dove that he had been driving his daughter's vehicle about fifty-five to fifty-eight miles per hour onto the interstate from the on-ramp at the east end of Bozeman, and that he was driving his daughter's vehicle which he was not very familiar with. And he had leaned over to shut off the air conditioning, and as he looked up he hit something and didn't realize what he had struck, continued up the road a short distance and pulled over. He further stated that he walked back to the accident scene, saw Mr. Dearinger and became ill. He said I felt that I'd probably killed him, and I didn't know how many people I'd killed.... When the defendant's statements and the evidence deduced from the several witnesses are viewed in their totality, there is sufficient evidence for any rational trier of fact to have found the essential elements of negligent homicide beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant, however, argues that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense because it was unable to identify the defendant as the driver without [defendant's] statement. He contends that the trial court improperly admitted the defendant's statements before the corpus delicti of the negligent homicide was established, citing § 45-5-111, MCA. Section 45-5-111, MCA, states that: Extrajudicial confession  evidence of death. In a homicide trial, before an extrajudicial confession may be admitted into evidence, the state must introduce independent evidence tending to establish the death and the fact that the death was caused by a criminal agency. According to the statute, before an extrajudicial confession is admitted into evidence, the State is only required to introduce two elements  that there was a death and that the death was caused by a criminal agency. It does not require independent evidence of the identity of the perpetrator. As stated earlier, we will not insert into a statute, what has been omitted. Crane, 784 P.2d at 903. Montana case law also supports the conclusion that the identity of the perpetrator is not an element of the corpus delicti. In State v. Kindle (1924), 71 Mont. 58, 64, 227 P. 65, 67, we stated that [i]n a prosecution for murder, proof of the corpus delicti does not necessarily carry with it the identity of the slain nor of the slayer. Although this is a negligent homicide action rather than a deliberate homicide, the reasoning in Kindle still applies. The essential elements of the corpus delicti are, as stated in § 45-5-111, MCA, establishing the death and the fact that the death was caused by a criminal agency, nothing more. Further, regarding § 45-5-111, MCA, in State v. Gould (1985), 216 Mont. 455, 470-471, 704 P.2d 20, 30, we concluded that: [t]here must be some independent evidence establishing the corpus delicti, but it need not of itself be sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt, as, once the independent evidence is given, the confession may be considered with the facts and circumstances in evidence in determining whether the corpus delicti is established... [Emphasis provided.] The evidence presented by various State witnesses, independent of the defendant's statements, is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti  that is to establish the death of the victim, and the fact that the death was caused by a criminal agency. Section 45-5-111, MCA. Independent evidence establishes that the defendant was in possession of the vehicle which struck and killed the decedent and that he had several drinks before he drove onto the interstate on the evening of August 8. Further evidence showed he was straddling the fogline although there was sufficient light to see approximately 3/4 of a mile ahead. This evidence qualifies as some independent evidence establishing the corpus delicti. Gould, 704 P.2d at 30. At that point, the defendant's statements may be considered with the facts and circumstances in evidence to determine whether the corpus delicti has been established. Gould, 704 P.2d at 30. We conclude that the evidence does sufficiently establish the corpus delicti of negligent homicide at issue here. In conclusion, the defendant's statements, together with the evidence from other witnesses, were sufficient to support the jury verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence.