Opinion ID: 2535531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: ¶ 23. Carlisle alleges that the application to revoke the divorce abated upon Charles's death. In support of this argument, Carlisle points to this Court's holding in the nearly-two-century-old case, Gerault v. Anderson, 1 Miss. 30, 1818 WL 456 (June Term 1818), wherein we said, on the death of [a] party his interest ceases, and the jurisdiction of the court ceases also. Id. at . Carlisle further points to this Court's opinion in Wells, the only case in which this Court has dealt with a similar fact scenario. The Wells Court acknowledged the Gerault holding and other similar precedents. See Wells, 209 So.2d at 922. ¶ 24. However, the holding in Wells was not premised on the trial court's jurisdiction, but rather on the failure of the petitioner to meet each of the statutory requirements. Id. The Wells Court relied on the principle discussed above, when a right is given solely by statute it is subject to the terms named in the statute. Price, 32 So.2d at 126. In Wells, we found that the petitioner did not meet the terms of Section 2747 of the 1942 Mississippi Code (which today is Mississippi Code Section 93-5-31) because the petition was not filed jointly  rather it was an ex parte petition filed after the husband's death. Because the statute fixes the conditions upon which the right [to have a divorce revoked] may be asserted, the conditions are an integral part of the right thus granted  are substantive conditions, the observance of which is essential to the assertion of the right. Wells, 209 So.2d at 923. Therefore, this Court decided Wells based on whether each of the requirements of the statute had been met, as we do today. ¶ 25. Further, while Carlisle cites many historical precedents for the proposition that the court's jurisdiction ceases upon the death of one of the parties, he overlooks a central element required for a jurisdictional argument. While alimony, child support, and visitation are personal matters, actions touching on the marriage relationship itself, including divorce, are not personal  they are in rem actions, [1] and are subject to statutory control. Indeed, one spouse may obtain a divorce without personal service of process on the other. See, e.g., Noble v. Noble, 502 So.2d 317, 320 (Miss.1987). [2] ¶ 26. The Court of Appeals relied on this Court's holding that upon the death of one of the parties to a purely divorce action before the entry of a decree therein, the action abates. Pittman, 375 So.2d at 416 (emphasis added). As clearly stated by this Court, that rule applies only to a purely divorce action. This is because the dissolution of the marriage relation [which is the relief the parties seek from the court] is already accomplished by the prior death of one of the parties. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, there is no status of marriage for the court to dissolve. [3] ¶ 27. Here, the Legislature drafted and passed legislation which allows chancellors to revoke divorces upon fulfillment of all the statutory requirements, even after the death of one of the parties. [4] In the present matter, the chancellor found that all the requirements of Mississippi Code Section 93-5-31 had been met. Therefore, because the matter is one touching upon the marital status of the parties and is an in rem action, the trial court maintained jurisdiction in order to make that determination. [5] The Gerault case cited by Carlisle ultimately has no application whatsoever. According to specific language from the case, [i]t was an action in personam.... Gerault, 1818 WL 456 at . Accordingly, the chancery court maintained jurisdiction over the marital status of Janet at all relevant times in the present matter.