Opinion ID: 168352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Causation under Section 1983

Text: 56 Defendants argue that the district court erred by concluding that Harlenske and Cole caused plaintiffs' deprivation of their First Amendment rights. We disagree. 57 Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to show causation, imposing liability on a defendant who subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have explained Section 1983's causation requirement: [A] defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 unless he or she subjected a citizen to the deprivation, or caused a citizen to be subjected to the deprivation. Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 518 (10th Cir.1988). A plaintiff must allege factual causation-i.e. `but for' causation-in order to state a claim under § 1983. Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 911 (10th Cir.2000). Where multiple forces are actively operating, as in this case, plaintiffs may demonstrate that each defendant is a concurrent cause by showing that his or her conduct was a substantial factor in bringing [the injury] about. Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1568-69 (10th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a case of concurrent causation, the burden of proof shifts to the defendants in that a tortfeasor who cannot prove the extent to which the harm resulted from other concurrent causes is liable for the whole harm because multiple tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable. Id. at 1568. Defendants argue that neither Cole nor Harlenske caused the deprivation because they were subordinate to the causative actors who actually made the decision to deny the parade permits. 3 Aple. Br. at 50-51. 58 We address Harlenske's conduct first. Defendants argue that the causal connection between Harlenske's conduct and the ultimate denial is too tenuous, and too heavily interrupted by the acts and decisions of others. Aple. Br. at 51. We disagree. The record supports the district court's conclusion that Harlenske's conduct caused the violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Her conduct was a direct cause of the denial of the parade permits, and violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights was foreseeable. Harlenske drafted the letter denying the parade permits. After the plaintiffs filed their parade applications, she researched the law on parade applications and learned that the government must have clear guidelines to restrict parades. Despite discovering that denying the parade permits for the reasons offered by the City was most likely unconstitutional, Harlenske advised Cole to sign the denial letter. We agree with the district court that Harlenske's conduct was a substantial factor in denying the parade permits and violating plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 59 We next review the evidence of Cole's conduct. Defendants maintain that Cole was no more than a reluctant scrivener, whose actual participation in the permit denial was negligible because he merely signed the letter on behalf of his superior, the police chief. Aple. Br. at 52. Defendants contend that Cole did not make the denial decision, and that he took pains to divorce himself from the act, by signing `for' Chief Norman Williams instead of using his own name. Aple. Br. at 52. But Cole admitted that he did not want plaintiffs to parade near Bleckley Street or Dr. Tiller's clinic, and he agreed with the contents of the letter. Cole personally participated in the denial of the parade permits. Like Harlenske, Cole's conduct was a substantial factor in the denial of plaintiffs' parade permits. Defendants fail to show that the district court erred in concluding that Cole's conduct caused the deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 60 Essentially, defendants complain that plaintiffs sued the wrong defendants. That conduct of other people may have concurrently caused the harm does not change the outcome as to Harlenske and Cole. See Northington, 102 F.3d at 1569. Harlenske and Cole failed to show that the harm should be apportioned to other wrongdoers who are not before the court. 61 The district court did not err in its conclusion that Harlenske and Cole caused the deprivation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.