Opinion ID: 1935115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consideration of Alexander's Sentence as Mitigating Factor

Text: Defendant contends that the court should have instructed the jury that it could consider as a mitigating factor the fact that Alexander had received a prison sentence. Defendant acknowledges that our decision in Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A. 2d 792, addressed and rejected that claim. Defendant asserts that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed. 2d 812 (1991), requires that a jury in a capital case be permitted to consider the sentence of a defendant's confederate in mitigation of the death penalty. In Gerald, we addressed whether a jury could consider the sentences of co-defendants as mitigating evidence under the catch-all factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). We first noted that at the time of the defendant's penalty-phase trial, his co-defendants had not yet been sentenced but had entered pleas concerning which the State had agreed to recommend prison sentences. We observed that because a court would not have been bound by such a recommendation, the term of the co-defendants' sentences had not been established when the jury deliberated on the defendant's sentence. 113 N.J. at 101-02, 549 A. 2d 792. More significantly, we determined that the language of the c(5)(h) factor, although broad, was not limitless in scope. Id. at 103, 549 A. 2d 792. It permits the jury to consider in mitigation [a]ny other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). That language reflected a constitutional requirement set forth by the United States Supreme Court that the sentencer in a capital case be allowed to consider as mitigating evidence `any aspect of a defendant's character or record and    any of the circumstances of the offense   .' Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 103, 549 A. 2d 792 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978) (plurality holding)); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed. 2d 944, 960-61 (1976) (plurality opinion) (recognizing Eighth Amendment required consideration of defendant's record and character and circumstances of offense). We observed that the Supreme Court had not expanded that requirement to include evidence unrelated to a defendant's record or character, or to the circumstances of the offense. See Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 103, 549 A. 2d 792 (citing Lockett, supra, 438 U.S. at 608, 98 S.Ct. at 2996, 57 L.Ed. 2d at 992 (plurality holding)); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-74, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2326-27, 101 L.Ed. 2d 155, 165-66 (1988) (majority holding)). We concluded that a codefendant's sentence does not fall within the scope of evidence that a death-penalty jury was permitted to consider. Such evidence is clearly not relevant to the defendant's character or record. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 103, 549 A. 2d 792. Furthermore, we determined that the phrase circumstances of the offense refers to the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime itself and not to the sentence that co-defendants later receive, which are based on considerations peculiar to those co-defendants. Id. at 104, 549 A. 2d 792. We recently re-affirmed that holding in DiFrisco, supra, 137 N.J. at 502-06, 645 A. 2d 734. In that case, the defendant was convicted of carrying out a contract killing. The State had not prosecuted the person who hired the defendant to commit the murder. The trial court denied the defendant's request to permit the jury to consider that failure to prosecute as a mitigating factor under the c(5)(h) catch-all factor. We rejected the defendant's claim, which was based in part on the Supreme Court decision in Parker, supra, 498 U.S. 308, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed. 2d 812, observing that the Supreme Court's decision in Parker had no bearing on our holding in Gerald. DiFrisco, supra, 137 N.J. at 504-06, 645 A. 2d 734. In Parker, the Florida Supreme Court had determined that two of the aggravating circumstances on which a defendant's death sentence was based were not supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, that court affirmed the death sentence because it concluded that the trial court had not found the existence of any mitigating circumstances. 498 U.S. at 317-18, 111 S.Ct. at 734, 112 L.Ed. 2d at 820. However, under Florida law, the trial court could have found the existence of nonstatutory mitigating factors without including such findings in its sentencing order. Id. at 317-18, 111 S.Ct. at 737-38, 112 L.Ed. 2d at 823-24. The record of the sentencing hearing demonstrated that the defendant had presented evidence that his accomplices had received only prison sentences, a permissible nonstatutory mitigating factor under Florida law. Id. at 314-16, 111 S.Ct. at 736-37, 112 L.Ed. 2d at 822-23. The record also reflected that both the advisory jury and the trial court that imposed the sentence had found the existence of some mitigating circumstances. Id. at 315-17, 111 S.Ct. at 736-37, 112 L.Ed. 2d at 822-23. Thus, the Supreme Court determined, the Florida Supreme Court had erred in concluding that the trial court had not found any mitigating factors and that its harmless error analysis regarding the stricken aggravating factors was therefore flawed. Id. at 318-23, 111 S.Ct. at 738-40, 112 L.Ed. 2d at 824-27. Parker does not require us to reconsider our holding in Gerald that accomplice sentencing may not be considered as a mitigating factor in penalty-phase hearings under New Jersey's death-penalty statute. The Supreme Court decided only that the failure of the Florida Supreme Court to credit the trial court's finding of mitigating circumstances had deprived the defendant in that case of his Eighth Amendment right to individualized sentencing. The Court did not hold that consideration of an accomplice's sentence as a mitigating factor is constitutionally compelled.