Opinion ID: 515444
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State of the Record.

Text: 70 Although our approach to Rule 60(b)(3) differs somewhat from that employed by the district court, remand is not automatic. See, e.g., United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d at 869-70 (though district court used wrong standard, factual findings were sufficiently explicit to allow court of appeals to discern result). It is important, therefore, to peruse the lower court's findings carefully before charting our future course. 71 1. Misconduct. Though the circumstances giving rise to belated discovery of the Report need not be discussed, the circumstances surrounding its nondisclosure are of great concern. The district court required plaintiffs to establish Beatrice's misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. Anderson V, slip op. at 10. It correctly imputed counsel's knowledge and behavior to the client, found that Beatrice had suppressed the Report, and characterized this suppression as a lapse in judgment. Id. at 20. It made no explicit finding as to whether the default was tantamount to Rule 60(b)(3) misconduct. This last omission, however, appears to be of little moment; the record contains clear and convincing evidence--overwhelming evidence, to call a spade a spade--that appellee engaged in what must be called misconduct under the applicable legal standard. 72 As early as October 1982, plaintiffs asked Beatrice to indicate the dates and describe the results of any tests of water quality conducted on the water from the Riley land.... Interrogatory No. 30, Set 1. Beatrice filed its response before the Report was compiled, and therefore did not mention it. Subsequently, Beatrice failed to supplement its reply to reveal the Report's existence. 12 There is no need for us to determine how many angels danced on the head of that particular pin, however, for what transpired thereafter was unarguably in dereliction of appellee's duty. In their second set of interrogatories, plaintiffs asked Beatrice if there had been any evidence of contamination from the surface of the ground entering the well [on the tannery property], Interrogatory No. 75; to [i]ndicate the dates and chemical concentrations found of all additional monitoring efforts that indicated water contamination of the Riley Tannery well, No. 80; and what documents were in the possession of any officer or employee of the Riley Company ... [relating] to the past or present storage treatment and/or disposal of wastes or any related activities at the Riley Tannery.... No. 92. Appellee objected to these interrogatories. Plaintiffs moved to compel answers and Beatrice cross-moved for a protective order, arguing--unsuccessfully--that the case had focused on the 15 acres, and therefore the operations of the tannery itself have been and remain irrelevant to the litigation. The district court thought otherwise, denying the motion (April 23, 1985) on the ground that plaintiffs' complaint was without limitation to the 15-acre tract. It ordered appellee to answer the challenged interrogatories fully. 73 Beatrice complied on May 30, 1985--more than a year after the Report had been issued. It eschewed any mention of the document, answering no to Interrogatory No. 75 and stating in reply to No. 80 that [t]he only tests performed on the well of which Beatrice is aware were conducted ... on behalf of the EPA. (It had earlier responded to No. 92 that no such documents exist.) Appellee neither amended nor supplemented these representations at any time. This was an outright breach. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(2)(A) (A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if the party obtains information upon the basis of which (A) the party knows that the response was incorrect when made....). It was not the only one. 74 Plaintiffs also filed a Rule 34 production request on December 31, 1984. Among other things, they demanded that Beatrice cough up: 75 [s]tudies, reports ... and other documents relating or referring to any contamination of water supplies in the City of Woburn.... 76