Opinion ID: 1976460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Prosecutorial Discretion to Charge

Text: Albury's final argument on appeal is that he was denied due process because of the prosecutor's refusal to offer a reduced plea to the charge of murder in the first degree. Albury contends that the prosecutor's refusal was based upon arbitrary policies which amounted to an abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the context of plea negotiations. In our criminal justice system, the State has broad discretion as to whom to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1985). [S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision of whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. Id. (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918, 98 S.Ct. 1477, 55 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978)). [13] The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that this broad, but not unlimited, prosecutorial discretion also extends into the process of plea bargaining. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363-65, 98 S.Ct. at 667-69. The Court concluded in Bordenkircher that, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not itself a federal constitutional violation so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Id. at 364-65, 98 S.Ct. at 668-69 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)). See also Ward v. State, Del.Supr., 414 A.2d 499, 500 (1980); Bailey v. State, Del.Supr., 450 A.2d 400, 405 (1982). In this case, Burke, the prosecutor testified that it was his custom to examine a case closely prior to seeking an indictment. If he determined that a charge of first degree murder was appropriate, he would seek such an indictment. Burke stated that it was not his policy to overindict cases for the purpose of subsequent plea bargaining. Burke testified that it was his policy to plea bargain following an indictment of murder in the first degree only if the State needed a co-defendant's testimony or if the State determined that one person's culpability in the crime was far less than that of another. In this case, Burke testified that he did not offer a reduced homicide plea because he viewed the evidence against Albury as a classic case of first degree murder due to the element of premeditation. Burke stated that he did not make the decision to seek the death penalty in Albury's case or any other case until there was additional investigation following the indictment. Burke testified that he decided to seek the death penalty because of Albury's prior acts of violence against the victim, Layton's pregnancy, and because Albury had purchased a gun and laid-in-wait to kill Layton. Burke testified that he did not believe the defense of extreme emotional distress was viable and that he had previously obtained convictions for murder in the first degree, in similar circumstances, when such a defense had been raised. In examining claims of prosecutorial abuse in this area of the law, courts have recognized a rebuttable presumption that criminal prosecutions are undertaken in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner. See United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1135 (1st Cir.1981), quoted in Tracey v. United States, 739 F.2d 679, 682 (1st Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109, 105 S.Ct. 787, 83 L.Ed.2d 781 (1985). See also United States v. Hoover, 727 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir.1984) (Defendant must satisfy two-prong test, prima facie showing of selective prosecution and invidious discrimination by the government before burden shifts to government to demonstrate legitimate basis for prosecution). However, the application of that presumption is unnecessary in this case. After hearing Burke's testimony, the Superior Court stated: The court has carefully reviewed the testimony of the prosecutor wherein he explained why he exercised his discretion as he did. He found this case to be a classical case of first degree murder with elements of premeditation and lying-in-wait to kill and a statutory aggravating circumstance  pregnancy of the victim. I find no unconstitutional exercise of prosecutorial discretion. We find that the record supports the conclusion that the State's charges against Albury were brought in good faith and that the plea bargaining process was conducted in a nondiscriminatory manner.