Opinion ID: 2100202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: all for the sum of $84,600.00 (eighty-four thousand six hundred dollars) [7]

Text: Urban, maintaining that the term Approx. 297(+/-) means N & N would install all of the precast pieces requiring welded connections, without regard to the actual number of pieces required, contends that N & N's contrary interpretation demonstrates that the provision is ambiguous, requiring extrinsic evidence to resolve, and therefore, summary judgment does not lie. [8] A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions or interpretations, Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 723 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241, 104 S.Ct. 3511, 82 L.Ed.2d 820 (1984) ( Papago ) (citation omitted); see also Fabrica Italiana Lavorazione Materie Organiche, S.A.S. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 684 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir.1982) ( Fabrica ), and the trial court makes that determination as a matter of law. Sundown, Inc. v. Canal Square Assocs., 390 A.2d 421, 432 (D.C.1978). The parties' differing interpretations of the contract, however, does not establish that an ambiguity exists. Holland v. Hannan, 456 A.2d 807, 815 (D.C.1983); Papago, supra, 723 F.2d at 955. Therefore, we reject Urban's contention that the parties' differing interpretations established that its terms are ambiguous. See Capital Constr. Co. v. Plaza West Co-op. Ass'n, 604 A.2d 428, 432 (D.C. 1992) (a party must support its allegation of ambiguity); Elbow Lake Co-op. Grain Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 251 F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir.1958). Although the trial judge did not state, in so many words, that the terms of the contract were not ambiguous, the judge unmistakably made that finding when she ruled that the need for sixty-eight additional precast pieces was beyond the scope of the subcontract and that N & N was entitled to additional compensation for installing them. The judge granted N & N's partial summary judgment motion because, referring to the speed memo, [9] [i]t appear[s] that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding N & N's entitlement to [compensation]... relating to sixty-eight pieces of precast concrete.... Urban contends, however, [10] that the trial court may not consider extrinsic evidence, i.e., the speed memo, in deciding a motion for summary judgment. Under the circumstances presented here we disagree, and conclude that the trial court did not err in considering the contents of the speed memo. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); NRM Corp., supra, 244 U.S.App. D.C. at 362, 758 F.2d at 682; Byrd, supra, 622 A.2d at 693 (The court may consider the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, in disposing of a motion for summary judgment). See Farmland, supra, 284 U.S.App. D.C. at 280, 904 F.2d at 736. Farmland, which is indistinguishable from the circumstances presented here, involved the interpretation of several grain contracts between Farmland Industries Inc. (Farmland) and the Grain Board of Iraq (Grain Board). The parties disputed the meaning of the carrying charge provision in several large wheat sales contracts. The contracts provided that the carriers would pay Farmland certain charges if the ships were late, and incentive payments if Farmland loaded the ships ahead of schedule. In the typical F.O.B. sales contract, the buyer would be responsible for paying these charges, but in these contracts, the parties sought to vary the normal commercial understanding, by providing that the carriers would pay these charges. During the course of performance, Farmland sent invoices for these payments to the carriers and kept internal confirmation of sale records. When the carriers refused to pay any of these charges, Farmland brought suit against them and the Grain Board. The district court granted the Grain Board's motion for summary judgment, determining that although the carrying charge provision [in the underlying contract] was ambiguous, extrinsic evidence clarified its meaning. Id. at 279, 904 F.2d at 735. The U.S. Court of Appeals, observing that: [W]hen the meaning of a contract provision is facially uncertain, a court may resort to an examination of extrinsic evidence, such as statements, course of conduct, and contemporaneous correspondence, aimed at discerning the intent of the parties.... [I]f that evidence demonstrates that only one view is reasonable  notwithstanding the facial ambiguity  the court must decide the contract interpretation question as a matter of law. Id. at 280, 904 F.2d at 736, (citations omitted), held that all the direct evidence  the testimony of individuals involved in the negotiation and implementation of the contracts and the `contemporaneous correspondence' [11] between the parties  support the ... [movant's] interpretation of the clause. Farmland, supra, 284 U.S.App.D.C. at 280, 904 F.2d at 736. In this case, N & N's request for additional compensation and Urban's speed memo in response to that request are comparable to the internal confirmation of sale documents, the telexes, and invoices which were considered by the trial court in Farmland in support of its grant of the summary judgment. We therefore conclude that the trial court here, in deciding the motion for summary judgment, could properly consider N & N's request and the speed memo response in resolving N & N's summary judgment motion. Urban offered no evidence rebutting the import of the speed memo and the letter from Hayes, relying instead on the inference that Approx. (+/-) suggests a variable number with no outer limit. We agree with Urban, and N & N concedes, that the term Approx. 297 (+/-) is not the sort of contract language that absolutely limits N & N's obligation to a specific number of precast pieces, i.e., 297 panels. We cannot agree, however,  and the contemporaneous correspondence supports that conclusion  that this language contemplates a twenty-three percent variation, which is the variance produced by the additional sixty-eight pieces. Moreover, all of the authorities we have found, and Urban cites none to the contrary, hold that the term approximately means a range considerably smaller than the one present here. See Eastern Serv. Management Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 729, 732 (4th Cir.1966) (The use of `approximately' is only to provide against accidental variations arising from slight and unimportant excesses or deficiencies ... [and] error of over 6% ... is not within the term `approximately' ...) (citations omitted); Syring-Workman, Inc. v. Colbert, 532 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex.Ct.App. 1976) ([A]pproximately contemplates the possibility of a reasonable variance between the stated figure and final cost); Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v. Paoli Constr. Co., 35 Pa.Cmwlth. 390, 386 A.2d 173, 175 (1978) (the law is clear that contractors performing work and incurring costs beyond the scope of the contract are entitled to compensation therefor). We therefore hold that summary judgment was proper. [12] B. Attorneys' Fees Awarded Under the Urban/N & N Subcontract Following the entry of partial summary judgment, the trial court conducted an exparte proof of damages evidentiary hearing and awarded N & N $17,000 in damages and $4,550 in attorney's fees. [13] At the trial on the delays and disruptions claim, the trial court submitted both the issue of entitlement to, and the issue of the reasonableness of, the attorneys' fees to the jury. Urban now challenges the attorneys' fees award made by the jury on grounds that: (1) because the attorneys' fees provisions of the contract are inconsistent and ambiguous, the American Rule must be applied; [14] and (2) even if it was proper to permit the jury to determine the entitlement issue, the court erred in submitting the reasonableness issue to the jury because N & N did not submit paid bills, with supporting testimony that the attorneys' fees requested were reasonable. We reject the contention that any ambiguity requires application of the American Rule, but conclude, as to the latter contention, that the reasonableness of an award of attorneys' fees should be determined by the court rather than the jury. First, we find no support whatsoever for Urban's contention that unless the contract unambiguously provides for attorneys' fees, the American Rule applies. Under the American Rule each litigant bears his or her own attorneys' fees and litigation expenses; however, one exception to that rule allows parties to provide, by contract, for recovery of attorneys' fees and litigation expenses by a prevailing party, such as the provision found in section 1(g) of the Urban/N & N subcontract. [15] We are aware of no legal authority, however, supporting Urban's interpretation of the American Rule and the authorities cited by Urban do not support its contention. [16] Whether an attorneys' fees award is available is a matter of contract interpretation by the trial judge, unless there is an ambiguity that needs to be resolved to determine the intention of the parties. In that case, the entitlement question must be resolved by the fact-finder. Redshaw Credit Corp. v. Diamond, 686 F.Supp. 674, 677 (E.D.Tenn.1988) (jury must decide issue of whether the contract, which includes an attorney fee-shifting provision, is to be enforced; if so, the judge determines the amount of the fees); Rivers & Bryan, Inc. v. HBE Corp., 628 A.2d 631, 635 (D.C. 1993) (if the court determines that a contract is ambiguous, the ultimate interpretation then becomes a question for the finder of fact); Fabrica, supra, 684 F.2d at 780 (when a contract term is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous and the resolution of its meaning is for the jury). For all of these reasons, we reject Urban's claim that because there is ambiguity the American Rule must apply. Paragraph 1(g) of the subcontract unambiguously provides that N & N is entitled to recover attorneys' fees when it prevails in litigation against Urban. On the other hand, Articles 28 and 29 of the primary contract, incorporated into the Urban/N & N subcontract, provides that each party is responsible for its own attorneys' fees. See supra notes 1-4. N & N contends that as a matter of law, all of these contract provisions, read together, provide for an award of attorneys' fees to it as the prevailing party in this action. Alternatively, N & N contends that although interpretation of the provisions was a legal determination which the trial judge should have resolved in its favor, the jury verdict finding that the parties intended to provide for fee-shifting, should be upheld. In our view, there is considerable uncertainty on this point because of the apparent conflict between the attorney fee provisions in the two contracts. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court erred in permitting the jury to decide the issue of what the parties intended. At trial, N & N presented uncontradicted testimony that the parties intended, in disputes between Urban and N & N such as this one, that the attorney fee provision of paragraph 1(g) of the Urban/N & N subcontract should apply. The jury, by its verdict, obviously credited that testimony and Urban, while not retreating from its contention that the issue should have been resolved in its favor as a matter of law, does not contend otherwise. Therefore, we find no basis for disturbing the jury's finding that N & N was entitled, under the contract, to receive attorneys' fees. District of Columbia v. Cassidy, 465 A.2d 395, 397 (D.C.1983) (jury verdict upheld unless the evidence and reasonable inference therefrom, support conclusion that no jury could have reached such a verdict). Urban also claims that since N & N failed to establish a prima facie case regarding the amount and the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees, the trial court erred in submitting that issue to the jury. Specifically, Urban contends that the testimony presented, which only estimated the amount of attorneys' fees incurred, without documentary evidence such as bills and payments in support, is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of the amount of fees owed. We do not address this contention because we conclude that the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees is a determination for the trial court to make, not the jury. Kudon v. f.m.e. Corp., 547 A.2d 976, 979 (D.C.1988); Ginberg v. Tauber, 678 A.2d 543 (D.C.1996). [17] In Kudon, the lessee of postal meters sued the lessor alleging tortious interference with contractual relations with the United States Postal Service. The trial judge subsequently ruled that the agreements between the parties provided that the lessor was entitled to receive reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defending against the lessee's claim, and in prosecuting its own counterclaim. Thereafter, the trial court determined the amount of attorneys' fees in a separate hearing. The lessee appealed, contending that because the lessor's claim for attorneys' fees arose out of a private contract provision, it was entitled to have a jury determine the amount of the fee award. This court, relying on the at law and in equity distinction for the purposes of the Seventh Amendment jury trial analysis, and fully discussing the American Rule, affirmed the trial court, holding: [W]e believe that the question of what constitutes a reasonable attorneys' fee, although not entirely incapable of jury resolution, is one better left for the court. Kudon, supra, 547 A.2d at 979; Ginberg, supra, 678 A.2d at 547-551. Thus, where a contract includes an attorneys' fees provision, the jury determines, where there is ambiguity in that provision, whether the parties intended that fees be awarded under the circumstance; the judge then determines the amount of the fee to be awarded. Accord, Redshaw, supra, 686 F.Supp. at 677. Therefore, although the trial judge correctly permitted the jury to determine whether there was an enforceable attorneys' fees award provision in this case, the trial judge erred in presenting the issue of the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees to the jury. Accordingly, we remand the case to permit an explicit determination by the trial judge of the reasonableness of the fees to be awarded. We are mindful that, in ruling on the post-trial motion seeking to set aside the jury's attorneys' fees award, the trial court did not disturb the verdict reached by the jury. In doing so, the trial judge may have concluded that it would have arrived at the same result as the jury, or the trial judge may simply have been ruling that there was no basis for setting aside the jury's determination. [18] We have often held that when the court decides the reasonableness of an attorney fee award, itemized bills and testimony are not absolutely essential to support its finding. Central Fidelity Bank, supra, 563 A.2d at 360 and n. 8; Nolan, supra, 568 A.2d at 490. On remand, therefore, the trial court is free to enter judgment as to the proper amount of attorneys' fees based on the record presented to the jury if the court is satisfied there is a sufficient basis for doing so. C. Cost to install the sixty-eight additional pieces. Urban maintains that N & N failed to make out a prima facie claim of costs incurred by it in installing the sixty-eight additional precast panels. Specifically, Urban claimed that N & N failed to submit: (1) a bid/estimate of original costs per piece; (2) actual cost per piece; (3) estimated labor costs; (4) actual labor costs; (5) estimated equipment costs; (6) actual equipment costs; (7) estimated overhead and profit; and (8) actual overhead and profit. The court must accept the trial judge's factual findings if they are not clearly erroneous. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 52(a); Cahn v. Antioch Univ., 482 A.2d 120, 128 (D.C.1984) (issue is not whether we would have made the same findings as the trial court but whether on the entire evidence we are left with ... [a] firm conviction that a mistake has been committed) (citation omitted); Julian W. Curtis Co. v. District-Realty Title Ins. Corp., 267 A.2d 830, 833 (D.C.1970) (fact findings not reviewable on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence). Following testimony at the  ex parte  hearing, the trial court found: 1. The subcontract had provided for N & N to install 297 pieces of precast concrete (enough to cover the building) for $84,600 (which could be considered $284.85 per piece). The precast pieces actually used were smaller than anticipated so it took 365 pieces to cover the building. 2. N & N estimated that, without delays or disruptions, 8 pieces of precast concrete (regardless of size) could be installed in an average work day using five to six men at a cost of $47 per man hour. By this formula, each piece of precast concrete costs $258.50 to install. 3. The court finds that N & N is entitled to recover from Urban $258.50 per piece for the 68 additional pieces for a total of $17,578. The trial court's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence on the record, and set forth adequate factual and legal grounds for the award made. We held earlier that summary judgment was proper, and since Urban has not established the level of proof it contends is required, we will not disturb the trial court's findings. See Marshall v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 1374, 1379-80 (D.C.1978). D. Interest Award Finally, Urban challenges the jury award of interest on N & N's delay and disruption claim on the basis that the verdict ignores the pay if paid clause of the Urban/N & N subcontract. [19] Urban relies on Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Brisk Waterproofing Co., Inc., 86 Md.App. 21, 585 A.2d 248, 250 (1991) and DEC Elec., Inc. v. Raphael Constr. Corp., 558 So.2d 427, 429 (Fla.1990) to challenge the trial court's calculation of interest from December 22, 1991, on the grounds that: (1) it was relieved of its obligation to pay N & N for work performed because it never received payments from Blake and, thus, the condition precedent was not satisfied; and (2) even if the settlement was considered payment from Blake, at the earliest, interest would not accrue until forty-five days after January 27, 1993 (the date Urban claims it entered into the Urban/Blake settlement). We reject both of these contentions and Urban's reliance on Gilbane and DEC Elec. because the condition precedent was satisfied on November 6, 1991, when Urban settled its claims against Blake. [20] Alternatively, even if the walk-away settlement did not satisfy the condition precedent, Urban still breached the contract by failing to protect N & N's interest in the settlement agreement. At the time of the settlement, Urban knew of N & N's outstanding claim for additional compensation and of the pay if paid condition. Nonetheless, Urban agreed to a settlement that failed to secure payments for N & N, thus breaching the implied condition which imposed the duty, on the parties, not to frustrate the fulfillment of the condition precedent. Urban cannot benefit from its willful hindrance of the condition precedent, and is therefore, liable for its breach of the Urban/N & N subcontract. Blake Constr. Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 576 (D.C. 1981) (implicit duties between contracting parties, particularly the duty not to prevent performance by the other party); Funger v. Mayor & Council of Town of Somerset, 249 Md. 311, 239 A.2d 748 (1968) (same); 3 A.L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, §§ 570, 571, 770 (1960 & 1994 Supp.). [21]