Opinion ID: 1152979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose a confession by the defendant and other material.

Text: Lisle contends that the State failed to disclose a statement made by Melcher that included a confession by Lisle and impeachment evidence until after trial, in violation of his right to due process. On July 24, 1995, Melcher gave a taped statement to police that Lisle now contends constitutes a highly inflammatory and provocative confession by himself to Melcher. Lisle argues that the State's failure to disclose this statement left him unable to prepare for Melcher's in-court testimony that Lisle confessed to Melcher. Lisle argues that this nondisclosure violates the holding in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), that the suppression of evidence favorable to the accused by the State violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Where the defense makes no request or only a general request for evidence, `if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed.' Under this standard, evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed. Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 619, 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996) (citations omitted) (quoting Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 1128, 881 P.2d 1, 5 (1994)). The confession Lisle contends was suppressed supports the State's case; thus, Lisle's contention that it constitutes evidence favorable to the accused is a novel interpretation of Brady. Moreover, Melcher and Evans were present at the homicide, and their testimony corroborated Lisle's confession that he fired at the Mustang. Thus, Lisle's confession to Melcher supports eyewitness evidence that Lisle shot Logan, and it does not appear a reasonable probability that disclosure would have affected the outcome of the trial. Lisle further argues that Melcher's statement included impeachment evidence that should have been disclosed by the State. In the statement, Melcher admitted that he was a gang member and that he was called Shotgun. Lisle argues that the State took advantage of the fact the Defendant did not have the 10:17 a.m. statement to infer that the code of silence kept gang members from snitching on other gang members and that is why Evans initially chose to point the finger at non-gang member Melcher. In the statement, Melcher admitted to being an enforcer for Lisle and to doing drug deals. Melcher also admitted that he had accosted Barnes, who testified that he had been accosted by a person with a goatee. Melcher purportedly could not grow a goatee. Lisle argues that this statement is material to the identity of the perpetrator in the instant case. The State contends that the undisclosed impeachment evidence is cumulative of evidence by which Melcher was impeached at trial, and therefore not material. The United States Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution demands an open file policy, Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1567, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); accordingly, a prosecutor must gauge the likely net effect of all such [favorable] evidence and make disclosure when the point of `reasonable probability' is reached. Id. Thus, although the undisclosed evidence must be evaluated item by item to determine its importance, the collective effect of the items determines whether or not the nondisclosure violates Brady. Id. at 436-438, 437 n. 10, 115 S.Ct. at 1567-68, 1567 n. 10. Undisclosed impeachment evidence can be immaterial because of its cumulative nature only if the witness was already impeached at trial by the same kind of evidence. U.S. v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514, 518 (1996). Each piece of allegedly undisclosed impeachment evidence corroborates similar evidence introduced at trial. Furthermore, this evidence has little or no impeachment value. We conclude that the cumulative effect of this evidence is not material.