Opinion ID: 3062778
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reasonableness of gaines’ sentence

Text: The reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). We employ a twostep process, reviewing first for procedural error, and if no procedural error is found, then examining whether the sentence is substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. A district court commits procedural error where, among other things, it miscalculates the advisory guideline range, treats the guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to explain adequately the chosen sentence. Id. A district court is not required to explicitly discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005). “[A]n acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the defendant’s arguments and the factors in 6 section 3553(a) is sufficient under [United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005)].” Id. When challenging the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, the party challenging the sentence has the burden of establishing unreasonableness in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.3 Id. at 788. A sentence is substantively unreasonable “if it does not achieve the purposes of sentencing stated in § 3553(a).” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and this Court “will not substitute [its] judgment in weighing the relevant factors.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this Circuit, we apply no presumption as to the reasonableness of a sentence within the Guidelines range, but we have noted that “ordinarily we would expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. We will remand for 3 Section 3553(a) directs courts to consider the following factors when determining an appropriate sentence: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the kinds of sentences available; (3) the guideline range and the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (4) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and (5) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). In addition, the sentence must be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to (1) reflect the seriousness of the offense, (2) promote respect for the law, (3) provide just punishment for the offense, (4) deter criminal conduct, (5) protect the public from future crimes of the defendant, and (6) provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care. Id. § 3553(a)(2). 7 resentencing only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotation marks omitted). Gaines has failed to demonstrate this his sentence is unreasonable. We first note that although Gaines’ mentions both procedural and substantive unreasonableness in his brief, he only goes on to specifically challenge the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.4 Therefore, we will only discuss the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. On that front, Gaines argues that the district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors, that his sentence created unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants, and that his sentence was greater than necessary given the facts of the case or, phrased another way, that his within-range sentence was outside the range of reasonable sentences under the circumstances. Gaines argues that the district court improperly focused on the overall mortgage crisis and allowed that factor to outweigh all others. That contention is 4 To the extent that Gaines’ challenges to the aggravating role and sophisticated means enhancements are challenges to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence based on an improper Guidelines calculation, such a challenge would fail because the enhancements were not clearly erroneous. 8 not supported by the record. While the district court did mention the national mortgage crisis in connection with the seriousness of Gaines’ particular offense, it did not seek to punish him for the entirety of the nation’s economic troubles, nor did it fixate on this factor to the exclusion of others. Instead, the record indicates that the district court considered Gaines’ history and characteristics, including his beneficial contributions to the community. The district court also considered the need to impose a sentence that would afford adequate deterrence. Nothing in the record indicates that the district court abused its considerable discretion in weighing these factors. Gaines next argues that his sentence creates unwarranted sentencing disparities as measured against his co-defendants. We disagree. There is no unwarranted disparity when a cooperating defendant pleads guilty and receives a lesser sentence than a defendant who proceeds to trial, even if that sentence is “substantially shorter.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2010 WL 1265898 (Apr. 5, 2010). Gaines’ codefendants pleaded guilty to various charges; thus, they are not similarly situated to him. See id. Because Gaines is not similarly situated to his co-defendants, any disparity between his sentence and the sentences of his co-defendants does not 9 result in an unwarranted disparity between similarly situated defendants.5 Gaines next challenges the testimony of Tafur and Crowder at his sentencing hearing. Although it is unclear from the record precisely what role this testimony played in setting Gaines’ sentence, it was within the district court’s discretion to hear such testimony and evaluate the witnesses’ credibility as it related to Gaines’ history and characteristics.6 Gaines finally argues that given his age, lack of criminal history, and the facts of the case, his eight year sentence does not satisfy the aim of crafting a sentence which is sufficient, but not greater than necessary for the circumstances. We disagree. First, Gaines’ lack of criminal history is accounted for in his Guidelines calculation.7 Second, the district court explicitly considered Gaines’ background and personal characteristics in conjunction with other relevant factors found in § 3553(a) and found that an eight year sentence was sufficient, but not greater than necessary under the circumstances. Nothing in the record indicates 5 We further note that the record is not sufficiently developed to determine whether Crowder is, as Gaines urges, a similarly situated individual against which his sentence should be measured. Both parties’ briefs, however, indicate that Crowder pleaded guilty in an entirely separate bank fraud case. Thus, all indications are that Crowder is also not similarly situated to Gaines. 6 In any event, even disregarding the testimony of Tafur and Crowder, Gaines has failed to prove that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the facts of the case. 7 Moreover, under the Guidelines, age is not ordinarily a relevant ground for departure. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1. 10 that the district court abused its discretion in reaching that determination. Accordingly, Gaines has failed to establish that his 96-month total term of imprisonment is substantively unreasonable.