Opinion ID: 6536577
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury instruction

Text: As a general matter, a party is entitled to a jury instruction on its theory of the case if the requested instruction correctly states the law, is based on the operative pleadings, and is supported by the evidence.  Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co. , 327 Or. 99 , 106, 957 P.2d 147 (1998). A trial court, however, is not required to give a requested instruction if another instruction adequately addresses the issue. State v. Ashkins , 357 Or. 642 , 648, 357 P.3d 490 (2015) (citation omitted). First, Nike advances two arguments in support of its contention that plaintiff's cat's paw instruction incorrectly stated the law. Again, that instruction provided: Nike contends that Nellie St. Jacques was Nike's principal decision-maker regarding plaintiff's termination. You may impute to Ms. St. Jacques any biased retaliatory motive against [plaintiff] held by a subordinate of Ms. St. Jacques's at Nike, if you find that her adverse employment decision was not actually independent because a subordinate had a biased retaliatory motive against [plaintiff] and that the same subordinate influenced, affected, or was involved in the adverse employment decision against [plaintiff]. We conclude that the proposed cat's paw instruction was a correct statement of the law. Nike initially contends that the instruction effectively eliminates the burden on plaintiff to meet the causation requirement applicable to the retaliation claims he brought. Plaintiff alleged that Nike violated the statute prohibiting retaliation against employees for making certain safety-related complaints, ORS 654.062(5), which provides: It is an unlawful employment practice for any person to bar or discharge from employment or otherwise discriminate against any employee    because the employee    has: (a) Opposed any practice forbidden by ORS 654.001 to 654.295, 654.412 to 654.423 and 654.750 to 654.780 ; (b) Made any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to ORS 654.001 to 654.295, 654.412 to 654.423 and 654.750 to 654.780, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding; or (c) Exercised on behalf of the employee, prospective employee or others any rights afforded by ORS 654.001 to 654.295, 654.412 to 654.423 and 654.750 to 654.780.  (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff also alleged that Nike violated the statute prohibiting retaliation for whistleblowing, ORS 659A.199(1), which provides: It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge, demote, suspend or in any manner discriminate or retaliate against an employee with regard to promotion, compensation or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment for the reason that the employee has in good faith reported information that the employee believes is evidence of a violation of a state or federal law, rule or regulation. (Emphasis added.) The parties agree that the emphasized statutory texts impose upon plaintiff the same causation requirement that the Court of Appeals has recognized as applying in an employment retaliation claim: the substantial-factor standard of causation. See, e.g. ,  Estes v. Lewis and Clark College , 152 Or. App. 372 , 381, 954 P.2d 792 , rev. den. , 327 Or. 583 , 971 P.2d 411 (1998). Nike argues that the influenced, affected, or was involved wording of plaintiff's proposed instruction would have incorrectly suggested to the jury that it could find bias in the decision-making if one of the subordinates had any role in the termination decision, irrespective of the substantial-factor standard of causation. 6 According to Nike, plaintiff's proposed instruction, therefore, would have allowed the jury to find Nike liable by imputing Delgado's or Treppens' alleged bias to St. Jacques without also finding that bias was a substantial factor in St. Jacques's decision to terminate plaintiff. Reviewing a sampling of cat's paw instructions in other jurisdictions, Nike contends that a proper instruction would have clarified for the jury that a two-step inquiry is required and that a plaintiff in a case like this one must prove both (1) a biased intent to cause an adverse employment action and (2) the requisite causal element.  We agree that a plaintiff must prove both of those elements, but Nike misreads the proposed cat's paw instruction as relieving plaintiff from his burden to prove causation. The influenced, affected, or was involved in wording of the instruction-which Nike faults as lowering the standard of causation-does not purport to displace the applicable substantial-factor standard of causation, about which the jury was separately instructed. The proposed instruction informs the jury that it may impute a subordinate's bias to the decision-maker if the subordinate influenced, affected, or was involved in the employment decision. But if the jury had been instructed that it could impute that bias, it still had to consider whether the bias, or the act of the person with that bias, was a substantial factor in the termination pursuant to the trial court's other instructions. In that regard, the trial court gave the jury two instructions concerning the elements of the retaliation claims that required plaintiff to prove causation to recover. The jury instruction regarding the safety-complaint retaliation claim stated, in relevant part: To recover on this claim, [plaintiff] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence:      (2) [Defendant] discharged, demoted, suspended, refused to promote, discriminated, or retaliated against [plaintiff] regarding any term, condition, or privilege of employment; and [plaintiff] reporting the information was a substantial factor in [defendant's] decision. A substantial factor is a factor that made a difference . (Emphasis added.) The jury instruction regarding the whistleblower retaliation claim stated the identical causation requirement: To recover on this claim, [plaintiff] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence:      (3) [Defendant] discharged, demoted, suspended, refused to promote, discriminated, or retaliated against [plaintiff] regarding any term, condition, or privilege of employment; and [plaintiff] reporting the information was  a substantial factor in [defendant's] decision. A substantial factor is a factor that made a difference . (Emphasis added.) It would have been possible for the jury to decide that the decision-maker had an imputed retaliatory motive under the imputed-bias instruction but that the retaliatory motive was not a substantial factor in the adverse employment action under the instruction on the causation element of each retaliation claim. Thus, viewed in combination with the other jury instructions, plaintiff's proposed cat's paw instruction did not misstate the law by eliminating the substantial-factor causation requirement. Second, Nike argues that plaintiff's proposed instruction was incorrect because it  referred generally to a biased retaliatory motive without relating that motive in any way to protected activity engaged in by plaintiff. But the protected activity-plaintiff's safety complaints and whistleblowing-is discernible from the context of the case. Plaintiff alleged that he had reported information about workplace conduct that he believed to be in violation of the law and, consequently, was discharged, denied promotion, and subjected to a hostile work environment in retaliation for his actions. The jury also was instructed that plaintiff was required to prove those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Considering that context and the absence of any other alleged basis for bias in this case, the jury would have correctly understood the proposed instruction to concern retaliatory bias motivated by plaintiff's safety complaints and whistleblowing. Thus, we reject Nike's arguments that the instruction was legally incorrect. In addition to its argument that the jury instruction was an incorrect statement of the law, Nike contends that the jury instruction was inapplicable to this case based on the record. Specifically, Nike argues that the circumstances of this case did not present a cat's paw scenario because (1) St. Jacques was not an unwitting decision-maker who was manipulated by her biased subordinates, Delgado or Treppens, and (2) the underlying reason for plaintiff's termination was the incident at the Bo Jackson facility, which was not triggered by Delgado or Treppens. We are unconvinced,  because Nike's view of the facts developed at trial favors its theory of the case rather than plaintiff's theory of the case and the facts supporting it. It is well supported by authority that in presenting the law of a case to the jury the court must instruct on the law applicable to all theories of the case that are supported by any competent evidence. Carter , 285 Or. at 279 , 590 P.2d 1214 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, plaintiff's cat's paw theory is adequately supported by the evidence in the record. Cloud, the JATC administrator, testified that Delgado was directed by upper management to make the JATC investigation go away. Plaintiff testified that both Delgado and Treppens had made remarks to the effect that his employment prospects at Nike were correlated with his expressed views on safety issues related to the apprenticeship program. For example, plaintiff testified that Delgado told him, If you or Oregon Electric were to provide any information to the PCC Committee, you will not be allowed on this campus again. Plaintiff also introduced evidence that Treppens had documented plaintiff's intention to file a safety complaint with OSHA. The evidence supported the inference that Delgado and Treppens were motivated to retaliate against plaintiff for his safety complaints. Additionally, the evidence in the record allowed the jury to infer that St. Jacques's decision to terminate plaintiff was influenced by Treppens or Delgado. St. Jacques effectively delegated full responsibility to Miller to conduct the investigation into plaintiff's retaliation allegations. Miller, for her part, received information directly from Treppens. Based on this record, plaintiff demonstrated the requisite influence or involvement for the giving of the cat's paw jury instruction. Lastly, Nike contends that the cat's paw instruction was superfluous, considering instructions that the trial court gave on the substantial-factor standard of causation and on corporate agency. A trial court    is not required to give a requested instruction if another instruction adequately addresses the issue. Ashkins , 357 Or. at 648 , 357 P.3d 490 (citation omitted). As did the Court of Appeals, we reject Nike's argument.  The substantial-factor instruction was subsumed into the instructions on the substantive elements of plaintiff's retaliation claims, which provided, in part: Nike discharged, demoted, suspended, refused to promote, discriminated, or retaliated against [plaintiff] regarding any term, condition, or privilege of employment; and [plaintiff] reporting the information was a substantial factor in Nike's decision. A substantial factor is a factor that made a difference. The corporate agency instruction read: A corporation can act only through its officers, agents, or employees. Any action by an officer or employee of the corporation  is the act of that corporation if the act was within the scope of that person's authority and/or employment. The substantial-factor instruction explained only the applicable standard of causation; it did not inform the jury, in any respect, regarding whose retaliatory motive it might consider. And the corporate agency instruction linked Nike, the corporation, to officers or employees acting within their scope of authority or employment. Here, Nike asserted at trial that St. Jacques was the sole decision-maker-that is, she was its sole agent authorized to make the termination decision. The corporate agency instruction, therefore, suggested that Nike was liable for St. Jacques's termination decision. But nothing in the instruction informed the jury that it could impute her subordinate's bias to her. Neither instruction served the function that the cat's paw instruction would have-to inform the jury that it could impute Delgado's and Treppens' retaliatory motive to St. Jacques, even if St. Jacques herself did not harbor unlawful animus toward plaintiff. To summarize, plaintiff's cat's paw instruction was a correct statement of the law; the evidence in the record supported the giving of a cat's paw instruction; and the cat's paw instruction was not rendered unnecessary by the trial court's delivery of jury instructions on substantial-factor causation and corporate agency. Therefore, plaintiff was entitled to his requested instruction, and the trial court erred in declining to give it.  2. Whether the error substantially affected plaintiff's rights Because the trial court erred in declining to give the cat's paw instruction, we next consider whether the error is reversible. See ORS 19.415(2) (No judgment shall be reversed or modified except for error substantially affecting the rights of a party.); see also Or. Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3. In making that determination, we must consider the instruction as a whole in the context of the evidence at trial and the parties' theories of the case with respect to the various charges, claims, and defenses at issue. Purdy v. Deere and Company , 355 Or. 204 , 227-28, 324 P.3d 455 (2014) (citation omitted). An error in failing to give a proposed instruction is harmless if there is little likelihood that the error affected the verdict. Ashkins , 357 Or. at 660 , 357 P.3d 490 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Conversely, the error is prejudicial if the absence of the jury instruction probably created an erroneous impression of the law in the minds of the jury and if that erroneous impression may have affected the outcome of the case. Hernandez , 327 Or. at 106-07, 957 P.2d 147 (citations omitted). Nike argues that no prejudicial error exists that warrants reversal. That lack of prejudice, Nike posits, is demonstrated by the jury's rejection of plaintiff's other claims. Aside from alleging that his termination constituted an unlawful adverse employment action, plaintiff claimed that Nike had wrongfully denied him a promotion because of his safety reports and that Delgado and Treppens had subjected him to a hostile work environment by treating him disrespectfully and with constant suspicion, frequently making disparaging remarks about him, assigning him undesirable tasks and schedules, falsely accusing him of behavioral and performance issues, and requiring him to attend a harassment class on those false accusations. In essence, Nike asserts that there was no harm, no foul, because a jury that did not find for plaintiff on his theories of direct causation (linking Treppens's or Delgado's retaliatory animus directly to an adverse employment action) would not have found for plaintiff on his indirect, cat's paw theory (linking Treppens's or Delgado's retaliatory animus  indirectly to an adverse employment action via the decision-making of St. Jacques). But plaintiff's inability to establish his failure-to-promote and hostile-work-environment claims does not necessarily mean that he would have been unable to succeed on his termination claim. Because the jury was not asked to specify its findings on the various allegations and could have rejected plaintiff's failure-to-promote and hostile-work-environment claims for reasons other than that it disbelieved that Delgado or Treppens intended to retaliate against plaintiff ( e.g. , by  concluding that the person promoted had qualifications superior to plaintiff's or that the alleged harassing conduct did not create a hostile work environment), we cannot conclude that a cat's paw instruction was unlikely to have affected the jury's verdict concerning the reason for Nike's termination of plaintiff's employment. Conversely, in view of the arguments that plaintiff advanced at trial, the testimony that he elicited, and the evidence that he presented, the record supports our conclusion that the trial court's failure to give the requested cat's paw instruction was not harmless. Plaintiff's opening argument focused largely on highlighting the actions and retaliatory motivations of Delgado and Treppens; in contrast, St. Jacques featured limitedly, and primarily, only as the ultimate decision-maker in a process in which she was otherwise uninvolved. The witness examinations of plaintiff and St. Jacques further demonstrated plaintiff's intention to deconstruct Nike's argument that St. Jacques was an independent decision-maker; both witnesses testified that St. Jacques never interviewed plaintiff regarding the Bo Jackson incident. Plaintiff also introduced evidence of communications between Treppens and Miller during the investigation into plaintiff's retaliation allegations to demonstrate Treppens' influence on the decision-making process. Nike's theory of the case further demonstrates the prejudicial nature of the trial court's refusal to give plaintiff's cat's paw instruction. In stark contrast to plaintiff's limited mention of St. Jacques in his opening argument, Nike placed emphasis on St. Jacques as the key player in the  termination decision. At various points during trial, and in its briefing to this court, Nike represented that St. Jacques was the sole or ultimate decision-maker. And, taking advantage of the absence of the cat's paw instruction, Nike argued to the jury in closing that [t]he only permissible question is whether or not the termination decision was improperly motivated by a desire to retaliate against [plaintiff], and there is no evidence that Nellie St. Jacques ever had that motivation . Illustrative of Nike's overall presentation of its case, the argument posited that the only person whose motivation mattered was St. Jacques. In the absence of the cat's paw instruction, the jury had no way of knowing that it could impute a subordinate supervisor's bias to St. Jacques and thereby find for plaintiff on the retaliation claims. Finally, Nike contends that plaintiff abandoned his right to claim prejudice when he declined to argue the cat's paw theory in closing, despite the trial court's statement that the plaintiff could do so. But arguments put forth by an interested party are not adequate surrogates for controlling jury instructions given by the court; jury instructions matter. Whereas the jury may accept or disregard any argument made by a party, the jury must abide by the instructions of the court, a neutral authority. Therefore, even if plaintiff had argued the cat's paw theory, there was nothing preventing the jury from rejecting it as a concept. That is not so with jury instructions. A trial court's delivery of jury instructions signifies to the jury what laws are applicable in the case. It is understandable that plaintiff did not argue a theory that was not supported by the trial court's instructions, and plaintiff did not waive or abandon the legal argument that the trial court did not accept.