Opinion ID: 396890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alternative Sanctions for Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: 49 We thus find ourselves in a situation with which this Court is all too familiar: a prosecutor has delivered an improper summation, despite this Court's oft-expressed concern over the frequency with which improper prosecution summations occur. See, e. g., United States v. Sprayregen, supra, 577 F.2d at 174; United States v. White, supra, 486 F.2d at 206 & n.4. See generally Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct-Recent Second Circuit Cases, 2 Hofstra L.Rev. 385 (1974); Annot., 41 A.L.R.Fed. 10 (1979). Yet, just as this Court has often brandished the sword of reversal only to resheath it in the absence of substantial prejudice, here, too, we find no basis to reverse the underlying conviction. 50 Instead of reversing, this Court (like others) has often issued warnings. We hesitate to conclude that prior warnings have been ineffectual; improper summations might be far more frequent but for this Court's searching review of trial records. One can safely say, however, that warnings alone have proved insufficient. This Court, in particular, has repeatedly expressed frustration at the regular appearance on its docket of cases in which prosecutors have delivered improper summations. For example, in reviewing another conviction, the Court observed: 51 We are reminded in summation cases that repeated rebukes of the prosecution by an appellate court without reversal may ultimately become an attitude of helpless piety, and our deprecatory words ... purely ceremonial. ... We trust that the rebukes in United States v. Isaza, (453 F.2d 1259 (2d Cir. 1972)) and here, however, will not go unheeded by the prosecutorial staff involved for another time the evidence of guilt may be less convincing and the likelihood of prejudicial error correspondingly higher. 52 United States v. Benter, supra, 457 F.2d at 1178 (citations omitted). That warning was reiterated in United States v. Bivona, supra, in which this Court threatened to reverse convictions even absent substantial prejudice: 53 Although we conclude that reversal is not required here, we cannot ignore the numerous departures from approved prosecutorial advocacy which have been called to our attention within the last six months. Thus, we have considered whether the dramatic step of upsetting a conviction is the only way to deter future prosecutorial misconduct.... (U)nless the prosecutor heeds our recent warnings, we may be left with no alternative but to reverse convictions where the argument of the prosecution goes beyond what is permissible and fair. But, we fully expect that our criticism ... will not fall on deaf ears. 54 487 F.2d at 447 (citations omitted). Other courts have issued similar warnings. See, e. g., United States v. Farnkoff, supra, 535 F.2d at 668 n.17; United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1314, 1321 (D.C.Cir.1975), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 598 F.2d 306 (D.C.Cir.1979); Harris v. U. S., 402 F.2d 656, 659 (D.C.Cir.1968). 55 Despite numerous threats to reverse convictions for prosecutorial misconduct, federal courts have seldom invoked that sanction. This Court, in fact, has only in rare and peculiar cases reversed a criminal conviction because of an improper summation, absent substantial prejudice. See United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1973) (third recent appeal involving improper summations by same prosecutor). 56 Given this Court's unwillingness to use reversals as a means of disciplining prosecutors, threats to do so seem unlikely to have much effect. As a practical matter, prosecutors know that courts are reluctant to overturn convictions because of improper remarks, when the defendant's guilt is clear. One commentator has summed up the way in which threats of reversal are perceived: 57 Academic commentators have generally despaired of appellate reversal as an effective means of controlling prosecutorial misconduct. They have referred to reversal as a quasi-sanction and have said, Appellate justices time and again have condemned ... poor conduct and warned prosecutors to keep within the bounds of propriety. Later opinions reflect the result-frustrating failure. These academic observers have found it imperative that two distinct problems-justice and discipline-be kept separate. 58 Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 Tex.L.Rev. 629, 645 (1972) (footnotes omitted). See Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of Political Influence, 34 Ind.L.J. 477, 487 (1959) (The appellate tribunals have found to their dismay that they cannot uphold a conviction and yet successfully condemn the method by which it was secured. Carefully written opinions condemning the indiscretion and misconduct have not been successful to curb improprieties. The very act of upholding the conviction has given prosecutors approval, and the 'judicial slap on the wrist' has not deterred the prosecutor from his unethical and improper tactics. (footnotes omitted)). 59 We share the frustration voiced by commentators at the inability of some federal prosecutors to abide by well-established rules limiting the types of comments permissible in summation. But we disagree that the solution lies in reversing valid convictions. Ordering a new trial remains among the measures that the Court may apply in a particular case, and we believe that its availability has some deterrent effect. But its invocation is properly shunned when the misconduct has not substantially prejudiced a defendant's trial. Reversal is an ill-suited remedy for prosecutorial misconduct; it does not affect the prosecutor directly, but rather imposes upon society the cost of retrying an individual who was fairly convicted. 60 Judges and commentators have frequently criticized the high social cost and minimal benefits engendered by reversing convictions because of improperly obtained evidence. See, e. g., California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 916-28, 100 S.Ct. 9, 9-15, 61 L.Ed.2d 892 (1979) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415-24, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2014-19, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 665 (1970); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence? 62 Judicature 215 (1978). To impose such a remedy in the present context is even less justifiable. Prosecutorial misconduct that causes no substantial prejudice has, by definition, not resulted in a constitutional deprivation; an illegal search or seizure, by contrast, perforce violates the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, prosecutors act under the immediate supervision of trial judges; law-enforcement personnel, on the other hand, act beyond the view of judges, in the homes and on the persons of individuals under investigation. The need for a potent deterrent device is less compelling in the former situation, and the resulting cost to society is less justifiable. Finally, reversal of convictions seems even less likely to be effective in deterring prosecutors than it has been in affecting the conduct of police. The federal prosecutors in this Circuit tend to be relatively young attorneys, seeking valuable experience as a prelude to other professional endeavors; such individuals are unlikely to share the institutional concerns found in career law-enforcement personnel. By contrast, sanctions imposed directly upon young, upwardly mobile prosecutors are likely to evoke strong concern and direct response. 6 61 Several recent decisions clearly reflect the Supreme Court's reluctance to overturn convictions based upon illegally seized evidence when the outcome of the trial was not unjust. See, e. g., Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2633, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275-76, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 1059-60, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048-50, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). Similarly, the Court has disfavored reversal of convictions that were obtained through questionable law enforcement practices, absent a finding that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated and that he was prejudiced thereby. See, e. g., United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365-66, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981) (dismissal of indictment); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2445-47, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980). Recognizing the general inappropriateness of reversal as a sanction for nonprejudicial prosecutorial misconduct is a necessary first step in the task of fashioning remedies that are more appropriate and, hence, more likely to be invoked.
62 This court has repeatedly stated that the task of ensuring that attorneys conduct themselves pursuant to recognized ethical precepts falls primarily upon district courts. See, e. g., Lefrak v. Arabian American Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1140 (2d Cir. 1975); NCK Organization, Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1976). The district judge is in an especially well-suited position to control the overall tenor of the trial. He can order the offending statements to cease and can instruct the jury in such a manner as to erase the taint of improper remarks that are made. The ABA Standards For Criminal Justice recognize that (i)t is the responsibility of the (trial) court to ensure that final argument to the jury is kept within proper, accepted bounds. ABA Standard 3-5.8. The trial judge can interrupt to anticipate and cut off an improper line of argument. Once the offending remarks are made, the judge can strike them and forcefully instruct the jury as to their inappropriateness. If persuaded in a rare case that irreparable prejudice has occurred, the court retains the option of granting a motion for a mistrial. 63 Beyond these traditional trial-conduct remedies, the court has a range of remedies that may, in appropriate circumstances, be directed specifically at the attorney. Initially, the court may consider a reprimand, delivered on the spot or deferred until the jury has been excused from the courtroom. Flagrant conduct, in violation of a court order to desist, may warrant contempt penalties. If the conduct has occurred on prior occasions, the court may wish to give serious consideration to a formal reference to the appropriate local grievance committee to assess the need for disciplinary proceedings. Alternatively, persistent misconduct may warrant action by the court itself to initiate proceedings to determine the appropriateness of a suspension from practice before the District Court. We suspect that the message of a single 30-day suspension from practice would be far clearer than the disapproving remarks in a score of appellate opinions.
64 The Court of Appeals also has power to fashion remedies directly against an attorney persistently engaging in improper courtroom conduct. See United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 111-12 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 2758, 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973). A reprimand in a published opinion that names the prosecutor is not without deterrent effect. 7 A Court of Appeals, exercising its supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice, 8 may well have authority to direct the initiation of appropriate action in the District Court or, alternatively, to take action of a disciplinary nature with respect to practice before the federal courts of the Circuit, including possible temporary suspensions. We need not probe the full extent of such authority at this time. 9 We deem it sufficient to express our concerns and to alert the district courts to their range of remedies, with confidence that the proper discharge of their responsibilities will prove to be a sufficient deterrent. 65 We do not suggest that the improper summation in this case warranted more than prompt admonishment and curative instructions by the District Court. At the same time we hope to have made it clear that improper summations in the future, especially if done on repeated occasions by the same prosecutor, run the distinct risk of direct sanctions against the attorney. We expect the able attorneys who supervise federal prosecutors throughout this Circuit to renew their efforts to maintain the high level of conduct that has traditionally characterized the office of the United States Attorney. 66 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.