Opinion ID: 868100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Survival of marital agreement after judgment

Text: Both parties agree that certain paragraphs of this marital agreement shall survive the subsequent judgment of divorce and shall have independent legal significance. This marital agreement is a l[e]gally binding contract, entered into for good and valuable consideration. In the future, either party may enforce this specific marital agreement in this or any other court of competent jurisdiction. ¶8 In April 2009, nearly 20 years after the divorce was final, Masters retired from his job as a school janitor. It is undisputed that Masters did not notify Johnson that he was retiring. According to an undisputed affidavit in the record, Johnson learned in March 2010 that Masters had retired. On March 3, 2010, Johnson filed a form QDRO that was signed by the circuit court on March 5, 2010, and vacated by stipulation of the parties 24 days later when it was discovered that it contained an error. Johnson then retained new counsel and took steps to obtain a valuation of the pension and draft a QDRO to obtain her portion of the pension. ¶9 When WRS notified Johnson that Masters' authorization was required in order to disclose the pension value information, she sought his authorization. On September 7, 2010, Johnson 9 No. 2011AP1240 received notification that Masters would not provide the necessary authorization. Johnson then filed a motion on September 12, 2010, for orders to require Masters to release his pension information. At a hearing before a court commissioner, Masters was ordered to sign the authorization. He then moved for a hearing de novo in the circuit court. ¶10 In the circuit court, Masters moved to dismiss the motion on the grounds that Johnson's motion was barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.40 because it states that action must be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or decree is entered, and it includes no exemptions for family law judgments. In the alternative, he argued that the doctrine of laches barred Johnson's claim because her delay in seeking the QDRO was unreasonable and prejudiced him. Johnson argued that the statute of repose could not operate as a bar to her motion in light of Wis. Stat. § 767.01, in Ch. 767, Actions Affecting the Family, which states that circuit courts . . . have authority to do all acts and things necessary and proper in those actions and to carry their orders and judgments into execution as prescribed in this chapter. Alternatively, Johnson argued that the doctrines of unclean hands and equitable estoppel precluded Masters' statute of repose defense.7 The circuit court held two hearings on the matter, and the parties briefed the issues extensively. 7 The parties' briefs to the circuit court contained other arguments that are not recited here because they were not pursued on appeal. 10 No. 2011AP1240 ¶11 The circuit court granted Masters' motion to dismiss based on Wis. Stat. § 893.40, and it denied his motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of laches. It denied Johnson's motion for the entry of a QDRO. In ruling from the bench, the circuit court stated: The, quote, cause of action, the ability to obtain a QDRO, was not directly triggered by the actual retirement of Mr. Masters. It was, in fact, a result of a 1989 divorce decree and after the passage of the Wisconsin Act of 125 in 1997 was subject to be executed from that time going forward, not contingent on the retirement date of Mr. Masters.8 ¶12 Johnson appealed the denial of her motion.9 The court of appeals certified the case to this court, and we accepted certification.