Opinion ID: 1126552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the allen charge

Text: Appellants assert that the trial court erred in giving a supplemental verdict-urging instruction to the jury over objections of both the prosecuting attorney and the counsel for both defendants. The instruction was, with one potent exception, substantially similar to what is commonly known as the Allen Charge. [1] This instruction was delivered on the trial court's own motion after the jury had failed to return a unanimous verdict by the third morning of deliberations. The charge was a relatively long one and is set out fully below. [2] We hold that the traditional Allen type charge, by virtue of emphasizing the duty of the minority jurors to reconsider their views without a like admonition to the majority, is so inherently fraught with coercive tendencies that its use cannot be justified. [3] The contrary holdings in Chase v. State [4] and Gafford v. State [5] are overruled. Moreover, scrutiny reveals that the challenged instruction included additional non-Allen type language which rendered it undeniably and necessarily coercive. Its vice was a serious one soundly condemned by prior authority. Its use should not pass this court unnoticed. The court in concluding its charge instructed: With that admonition you are directed to continue your deliberations until you arrive at a unanimous verdict. You will again retire to your jury room and continue your deliberations. (Emphasis supplied.) It is our view that a jury would naturally conclude that the judge's charge meant exactly what it said, that the jury would be required, as directed, to continue deliberations until they arrived at a unanimous verdict. Such a requirement is clearly contrary to our law. [6] The instruction in effect demanded agreement, and it is not possible for us to see how such a charge may be justified. This is the judge speaking, and these are his final words; they constitute the final impression made upon the jury before deliberations resumed. When this is recognized, it is obvious that the judge subjected the jury to pressure of a degree and of a type never approved in the Allen Charge. The instruction here is not an Allen Charge but a reasonably accurate paraphrase of it followed by a substantial addition not embraced within the more carefully measured language of the Allen Charge. The Allen Charge alone, unaccented and unembellished, is severe enough. [7] The elaboration upsets that delicate balance which has allowed prior Allen Charge approval. [8] Repeatedly, it has been declared that the Allen Charge represents the limit to which a judge may go in urging a verdict. [9] That limit having been exceeded here, error is apparent. The import of the instruction is that a criminal trial must end with either a verdict of guilty or not guilty. Yet, this is not the law for there is no requirement that a jury agree. [10] A hung jury is a legitimate end of a criminal trial, and is the occasionally inevitable result of requiring a unanimous verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Here a jury was subjected to the direction to continue deliberations, until you arrive at a unanimous verdict. A jury member so instructed faces but three choices: (1) to convince all beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) to surrender, without conviction, a view conscientiously held; or (3) to remain together indefinitely in the absence of unanimous agreement. For a minority juror unable to persuade the others and unwilling to surrender a conscientious belief, confinement of all by his belief is the only choice. Can anyone say that such a result does not generate pressures that are coercive? Most assuredly surrender to majority rule must follow for an average juror. [11] Moreover, subjection to pressure of this nature with its total irrelevance to innocence, guilt, or the evidence at trial finds little justification in our law. [12] The jury here was charged with more than a duty to carefully consider; it was in effect forced to reach a unanimous decision. The language of the charge being a basic and coercive misconception of our law transforms what was in all likelihood an innocent attempt at expediency into positive error. For in the face of the plain meaning of this charge it is simply absurd to say that a juror was left free and unfettered to stand by his conviction. Nor can we assume, when dealing with the vital rights of the lay juror and criminal accused, that the judge did not intend to execute his instruction or that the jury would question his sincerity. When the verdict-urging charge was delivered at least one juror was opposed to conviction. Following its pronouncement, any dissenter faced the alternative of surrendering his sincere conviction or compelling his fellows to remain together indefinitely. In our view such a choice is coercive. That juror coercion is error under our law is so clear as to not require elaboration. The United States Supreme Court in Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965), indicated the proper disposition of the case before us. [13] There the defendant was convicted by jury verdict of robbery. Prior to reaching their verdict the jury had informed the court they were unable to reach a decision. The judge responded stating: Now, I am not going to accept this. You have got to reach a decision in this case. [14] Defendant did not object at trial, but raised the issue for the first time on appeal, [15] where the United States Circuit Court, one judge dissenting, affirmed stating: We see no basis whatever for characterizing these statements as coercive, especially as the jury did not reconvene and resume its deliberation until the following day. [16] The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 379 U.S. 944, 85 S.Ct. 442, 13 L.Ed.2d 542, to determine if the statement was coercive. The court in a per curiam opinion noted that the Solicitor General stated in his brief: Of course, if this Court should conclude that the judge's statement had the coercive effect attributed to it, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial; the principle that jurors may not be coerced into surrendering views conscientiously held is so clear as to require no elaboration. [17] The court concluded that the statement had a coercive effect and reversed the conviction. Other judicial decisions indicate disapproval of the challenged instruction. In Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir.1961), the court instructed: `If you follow the principles of law given you by the Court and if you recall the evidence in this case you ought to be able to agree upon a verdict.   ' That instruction was found coercive. In Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir.1962), the following instruction was held to far exceed the permissible limits of the Allen Charge:    [I]t is the duty of the minority to listen to the argument of the majority with some distrust of their own judgment because the rule is that the majority will have better judgment than the mere minority    The instruction was said to have prejudiced the right of an accused to a hung jury and a mistrial by tending to stifle the dissenting voices of minority jurors. [18] We hold that reversal is compelled in this case. For a jury to be faced with the prospect of indefinite service is so inherently and invariably coercive as to require reversal. Our holding that the threat of continued indefinite confinement is coercive is amply supported. [19] Even if coercion were not so apparent here, that is, if the coercive nature of this instruction was a close question, we believe that pragmatic considerations and policy require that the doubt be balanced in favor of the defendant and the case reversed. We reach this conclusion because the coercive impact of a questionable charge is almost always difficult to evaluate precisely on appeal. [20] When the coercive impact of a questionable practice cannot be assessed accurately, pragmatic concern for defendants' rights, impartial trial and the integrity of the jury process dictates that the use of a questionable charge be proscribed. There is danger that where proof of prejudice is difficult, a defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury will be violated with a consequent denial of due process. Where practical considerations pose special difficulties of proof in regard to vital rights, policy supports the formation of practices to protect those rights. [21] Therefore, even if we were not convinced that the error here was obvious, we would favor balancing the question of prejudice in favor of defendant. Having considered the specific charge before us, we turn to a general review of Allen-type charges in an effort to provide sufficient guidance to alleviate future error. Since its initial approval in the Allen decision, the Allen charge has become a standard tool of both state and federal judges. However, the descendants of Allen have exhibited numerous variations of the basic theme that the necessities of judicial economy require that when jurors find themselves divided, they must re-examine their convictions in an attempt to reach a verdict. As a result, state and federal courts have repeatedly been faced with determining whether the Allen charge  or something resembling it  constitutes an unwarranted intrusion by the court upon the province of the jury. Federal circuit courts of appeal have frequently upheld a properly limited charge. [22] Recently, however, use of the Allen-type charge has been severely questioned by the courts, [23] the commentators, [24] and the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. [25] Much of what was generally accepted in 1896, when Allen, supra, was decided is not good law today. Contemporary criticisms of the Allen charge indicate that it is less an object of commendation than toleration. [26] Recent court opinions and scholarly commentary reveal a growing concern with the potentially coercive effects of the Allen charge upon the minority jurors. Two state appellate courts have used their supervisory power to abolish the practice of instructing potentially hung juries on their responsibility to reach a verdict. [27] The Fifth Circuit has indicated dissatisfaction with the charge on a number of recent occasions, [28] and two judges on that court have argued that it is unconstitutional. [29] The Seventh Circuit [30] and the District of Columbia Circuit [31] have both proscribed its future use, while the Third Circuit [32] has severely limited if not completely prohibited the giving of the Allen charge. Agreeing with these judicial criticisms, the commentators have recommended that it be modified, infrequently invoked, or abolished. [33] It is obvious from our review of the recent authorities that a new approach to the use of the Allen charge is evolving. Current analysis seriously questions the propriety of giving the instruction in its traditional form. When the Allen charge is discussed today, common critical themes consistently appear. The most important of these is the fear that the minority jurors will be coerced by the charge and fail to render a verdict truly representing their conscientious convictions. This coercive influence is generally viewed as a function of the context in which the charge is given and of the inherently unbalanced nature of the Allen charge itself. This latter factor results because the charge emphasizes reexamination by the minority of the jurors in light of the fact that the majority who are equally honest and dedicated disagree. [34] At the very least, the Allen charge encourages majority inaction by failing to emphasize any need for reevaluation of the majority's viewpoint. As a result, there is a possibility of substituting a numerical preponderance for the requirement that a verdict not only be unanimous but representative of the honest convictions of each individual juror. The coercive tendency of the Allen charge requires that its use be discontinued in this state. It has been suggested that a mistrial from a deadlocked jury is a safeguard to liberty. [35] It has also been observed that the law generally attempts to protect juries from potentially coercive influences. [36] Instructions which tend to be coercive must, of course, be avoided to prevent unnecessary infringement upon the jury function. We must now consider alternatives more likely to insure the free and unfettered operation of the jury. The use of a properly circumscribed supplemental instruction following a deadlock somewhat similar to the one given in the present case may serve a beneficial purpose in the adjudication of cases. However, having considered the Allen charge, we conclude that it is time to adopt a new and less objectionable instruction. We direct that in the future trial courts comply with the standards recommended by the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards of Criminal Justice. The recommended standard, which received the approval of the House of Delegates, is set out below: (a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which informs the jury: (i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; (ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment; (iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors; (iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and (v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. (b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals. (c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement. [37] This procedure was recently adopted by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Brown [38] and the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Thomas. [39] This approach impresses the jurors at the outset with the magnitude of their duties while, at the same time, it provides a balanced instruction. It does not tend to place the holders of a minority viewpoint in a vulnerable position and is comparatively free of coercive language. With these benefits in mind, we find it significant that the American Bar Association Project set out in its commentary an illustrative instruction which it considered consistent with the standard. We suggest that when a trial judge is faced with an apparently deadlocked jury the recommended instruction be considered. This approach will yield uniformity and predictability, and should eliminate appeals based upon technical variations in language. For convenience and guidance, the recommended instruction is quoted: [40] The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous. It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. You are not partisans. You are judges  judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case. [41] Our holding that error was committed in submitting to the jury an Allen-type charge is in itself sufficient to require reversal of the appellants' convictions. To avoid the possibility of further error being committed upon retrial of this matter, however we find it appropriate to consider the remaining points of error raised on appeal.