Opinion ID: 2817831
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Disclose the IP Policy

Text: To support the notion that MGH's failure to disclose the IP policy amounted to a representation that Greene owned the Marks, Greene points to (1) MGH's exclusive knowledge of the IP policy; (2) the unfairness of enacting a policy mid-appointment that could result in an employee's unknowing loss of IP rights; and (3) the lack of a warning in his employment contracts that policies could change or may have changed since the last appointment, coupled with the similarity of language across his employment contracts. All of these arguments are grounded in Greene's assertion that he did not have actual knowledge of the IP policy until after he had unwittingly ceded his intellectual property rights to MGH by allowing the Marks to become affiliated with the Institute. Extrinsic materials may be incorporated into a contract by reference as long as the language used in the contract . . . clearly communicate[s] that the purpose of the reference is to incorporate the referenced material into the contract (rather than merely to acknowledge that the referenced material is relevant to the contract, e.g., as background law or negotiating history). NSTAR Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 968 N.E.2d 895, 905 (Mass. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Unless incorporation by general reference is explicitly rejected by some statute or -16- regulation, incorporation by a clearly stated general reference will suffice. Chicopee Concrete Serv., Inc. v. Hart Eng'g Co., 498 N.E.2d 121, 122 (Mass. 1986). Accordingly, a Massachusetts employer's policies may be incorporated by reference into its employment contracts. See Madonna v. Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 593 N.E.2d 1321, 1322 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that an employer bound an employee to its personnel policy with the following language on the reverse side of an employment contract: All employees of the University are employed pursuant to and subject to the polices and procedures of the Medical Center and the policies, rules and regulations adopted by the Board . . . as amended, revised, or repealed from time to time). Here, the language in Greene's applications and appointment forms was sufficiently clear to incorporate the IP policy by reference. Greene signed and submitted three applications while the 2002 version of the IP policy was in effect: in October 2003, August 2005, and October 2007. Each application stated, I have received and had an opportunity to read the Bylaws of the Medical/Professional Staff. I specifically agree to abide by all such bylaws and any policies and procedures that are applicable to appointees to the Medical/Professional Staff. Each application was accepted and Greene received, on each occasion, a Professional Staff Appointment Form stating, In discharging the -17- duties and exercising the privileges of your appointment, you are required to . . . [a]bide by the Bylaws, rules, regulations, and policies of the Professional Staff and the Hospital. Once it is acknowledged that at least three of Greene's employment contracts incorporated the IP policy as enacted in 2002, his arguments quickly fall away because of [t]he general rule . . . that, in the absence of fraud, one who signs a written agreement is bound by its terms whether he reads and understands it or not. Spritz v. Lishner, 243 N.E.2d 163, 164 (Mass. 1969) (quoting Cohen v. Santoianni, 112 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Mass. 1953)); see St. Fleur v. WPI Cable Sys./Mutron, 879 N.E.2d 27, 35 (Mass. 2008) (distinguishing Cohen because the plaintiff alleged fraud in the inducement); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 18, 21 n.17 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating, in a case in which the plaintiff signed a form incorporating rules, constitutions, or by-laws, that [i]f [the defendant] had provided the rules to [the plaintiff] but she did not read them, that would not save her [from having to abide by those rules]). Greene argues that it is unfair to hold him to a policy enacted in the middle of one of his appointments. When the 2002 version of the IP policy was enacted, Greene was in the middle of an appointment that began in November 2001 and ended in November 2003. However, considering Greene's subsequent applications in October 2003 and August 2005 (the latter of which included explicit -18- reference to the IP policy), the fact that the IP policy was enacted mid-appointment is inconsequential. As the district court reasoned, MGH's claim to the CPS Marks arose, inter alia, from the association of the Marks with MGH services, namely, the Institute. Greene allowed that association to continue even after he signed subsequent applications agreeing to abide by the IP policy.14 Finally, Greene complains that his employment contracts did not explicitly warn him that MGH might adopt new policies or modify existing policies. The argument fails to appreciate that Greene's tenure at MGH was not one continuous period of employment. Rather, Greene enjoyed ten separate appointments, each governed by a separate agreement to be bound by the policies then in effect. Regardless of the facial similarity between contracts, Greene was required to read or assume the risk of not reading the policies incorporated afresh into each agreement. In sum, since MGH's conduct did not amount to a representation that Greene owned the Marks, Greene's estoppel defense fails. 14 This reasoning also applies to Greene's argument that the policy could not be applied retroactively to IP created before 2005. Even if the policy did not apply until 2005, Greene nevertheless permitted the ongoing association of the Marks with the Institute. -19-