Opinion ID: 2584198
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the requirement of attorney expert testimony

Text: Liability for fraud, as for other torts, requires proof of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. Hong, 5 Haw.App. at 181, 683 P.2d at 840 ([f]raud is a common-law tort); Von Holt v. Izumo Taisha Kyo Mission of Hawaii, 42 Haw. 671, 722 (1958) (Fraud in its generic sense, especially as the word is used in courts of equity, comprises all acts, omissions[,] and concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to another. (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai`i 356, 60 P.3d 306 (2002). Specifically, to establish a fraud claim based on a failure to disclose a material fact, there must be (1) a representation of a material fact, (2) made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act, (3) known to be false but reasonably believed true by the other party, and (4) upon which the other party relies and acts to his or her damage. Matsuura I, 102 Hawai`i at 162-63, 73 P.3d at 700-01 (citations and internal brackets omitted) (emphases added). However, DuPont's motion for summary judgment was premised solely on the element of damages, i.e., the plaintiffs' inability to prove damages. In light of the circuit court's ruling, it must be assumed that the parties and the court presumed, for purposes of summary judgment, that DuPont breached its duty by disclosing certain material scientific data and information that it knew to be false, on which the plaintiffs reasonably relied and acted upon to their detriment. Thus, the inquiry on appeal is whether the plaintiffs have supplied the evidentiary showing of damages necessary to defeat summary judgment. According to the circuit court, to carry their burden of proving damages, i.e., the fair compromise value of the product liability claims at the time of settlement, the plaintiffs would need . . . expert lawyer testimony directed to the numerous compromise factors, and how they would have applied to each [p]laintiff's case. The plaintiffs, however, argue that: It has never been the law in the State of Hawai`i that expert evidence is a mandatory element of a claimant's case. Nor has it ever been required that such experts be of a particular occupation or persuasion; it is only necessary that they be appropriately qualified to render an opinion which assists the trier of fact in its deliberations. The [c]ircuit [c]ourt's ruling violated both of these established tenets. (Emphasis omitted.) In retort, DuPont contends that determining the fair compromise value of a complex products liability case, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of a particular case at a particular point in time, is a complicated undertaking and something clearly beyond the ability of a lay jury. Obviously, a jury should not speculate in an area where it could not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience. And without proper expert testimony, a jury would be speculating because a jury simply does not have the knowledge or experience to determine the fair compromise value of a complex, products liability action. The reason why expert testimony is required is because, unlike special and general damages in a typical tort action, fair compromise value is not based upon the judgment of a reasonably prudent person, but the judgment of a reasonably prudent attorney. Clearly, what a reasonable, knowledgeable and prudent attorney would do in a complex products liability case is beyond the experience of a lay jury. (Emphasis in original.) Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 702 (1993) provides that: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. In determining the issue of assistance to the trier of fact, the court may consider the trustworthiness and validity of the scientific technique or mode of analysis employed by the proffered expert. Moreover, this court has declared that: Where the subject matter is technical, scientific or medical and not of common observation or knowledge, expert testimony is allowed into evidence. Such testimony is to aid the jury in the determination of the issues involved and to provide a sufficient basis for the conclusion to be drawn by the jury rather than by conjecture and speculation. Expert testimony is not conclusive and like any testimony, the jury may accept or reject it. Bachran v. Morishige, 52 Haw. 61, 67, 469 P.2d 808, 812 (1970) (citations omitted); see also State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 556, 799 P.2d 48, 51 (1990) (Expert testimony assists the trier of fact by providing a resource for ascertaining truth in relevant areas outside the ken of ordinary laity. Specialized knowledge which is the proper subject of expert testimony is knowledge not possessed by the average trier of fact who lacks the expert's skill, experience, training, or education. (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)). It is well-settled that, in medical malpractice cases, which have been generally predicated on the negligent failure of a physician or surgeon to exercise the requisite degree of skill and care in treating or operating on a patient, the question of negligence must be decided by reference to relevant medical standards of care for which the plaintiff carries the burden of proving through expert medical testimony. The standard of care to which a doctor has failed to adhere must be established by expert testimony because a jury generally lacks the requisite special knowledge, technical training, and background to be able to determine the applicable standard without the assistance of an expert. Craft v. Peebles, 78 Hawai`i 287, 298, 893 P.2d 138, 149 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As this court has stated, [i]n the ordinary negligence case[,] the jury can determine whether there has been a breach of defendant's duty to the plaintiff on the basis of their everyday experience, observations[,] and judgment. The ordinary negligence case will not require expert opinion evidence to delineate acceptable from unacceptable standards of care. However, in the medical negligence case, lay jurors are ill prepared to evaluate complicated technical data for the purpose of determining whether professional conduct conformed to a reasonable standard of care and whether there is a causal relationship between the violation of a duty and an injury to the patient. Therefore, expert opinion evidence is generally required to aid the jury in its tasks. Bernard v. Char, 79 Hawai`i 371, 377, 903 P.2d 676, 682 (App.1995) (citations, brackets, and emphasis omitted); see also Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai`i 475, 486, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (1995) (in an informed consent claim, expert medical testimony is required to establish the materiality of the risk of harm that in fact occurs); Phillips v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 1 Haw.App. 17, 18, 613 P.2d 365, 366 (1980) (in a case for wrongful death of the plaintiff's wife, expert medical testimony as to the cause of death was necessary to sustain case against defendant hospital and physicians). Clearly, a jury of lay persons generally lacks the knowledge to determine the factual issues of medical causation, the degree of skill, knowledge, and experience required of the physician, and the breach of the medical standard of care. Unlike medical malpractice cases, cases involving actions against attorneys have rarely involved questions of the necessity and admissibility of expert testimony, probably because in such cases the court itself sits as an expert on the subject. Collins v. Greenstein, 61 Haw. 26, 39 n. 8, 595 P.2d 275, 283 n. 8 (1979) (citation omitted). This court, however, recognized that: More attention will probably be given in the future to the need for expert evidence. In many types of situations such as letting the statute of limitations run before a suit is filed, no testimony of lawyer is needed. When the problem is one of interpretation of law, there is more likely to be a resort to expert evidence to explain the matter to the jury. Id. 40 n. 9, 595 P.2d at 283 n. 9 (emphasis added). Although this case does not involve an attorney malpractice suit, the stated principle in Collins that an issue concerning the interpretation of law requires expert assistance is applicable here. In our view, the determination of the fair value of what the plaintiffs would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct at the time of settlement entails guidance from legal experts. Indeed, parties settle to avoid a trial on the merits because of the uncertainty of the outcome and the high costs of litigation. Gossinger v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Regency of Ala Wai, 73 Haw. 412, 424, 835 P.2d 627, 633 (1992) (noting that public policy favors the finality of negotiated settlements that avoid the costs and uncertainties of protracted litigation) (citation omitted). In every settlement, the agreed upon amount undoubtedly is not the best case scenario for either side, but rather is a compromise of their respective positions to avoid the multiple risks of trial where they might face their worse case scenario. Naturally, the compromise range of a claim will be different at different points in time based upon what is known, or reasonably foreseeable, at the time of the compromise, including the state of the law. In this respect, there are many variables that experienced lawyers routinely consider in weighing the potential risks and rewards inherent in going forward with litigation against the certainty of a compromise solution. This court has enumerated some of these factors in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith, such as: (1) the type of case and difficulty of proof at trial, e.g., rear-end motor vehicle collision, medical malpractice, product liability, etc.; (2) the realistic approximation of total damages that the plaintiff seeks; (3) the strength of the plaintiff's claim and the realistic likelihood of his or her success at trial; (4) the predicted expense of litigation; (5) the relative degree of fault of the settling tortfeasors; (6) the amount of consideration paid to settle the claims; (7) the insurance policy limits and solvency of the joint tortfeasors; (8) the relationship among the parties and whether it is conducive to collusion or wrongful conduct; and (9) any other evidence that the settlement is aimed at injuring the interests of a non-settling tortfeasor or motivated by other wrongful purpose. Troyer v. Adams, 102 Hawai`i 399, 427, 77 P.3d 83, 111 (2003). In other words, whether the fair settlement value would have been greater than the actual settlement itself is a matter that would be nearly impossible for a lay person to determine without guidance from expert legal testimony. Moreover, the fact that the settlement was less than the potential recovery in the underlying product liability cases does not mean that the plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of fraud. Rather, the fraud damage claim would be the difference between the fair settlement value absent fraud and the amount of the plaintiffs' actual settlement. As one court indicated: The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved. In fact[,] there is no reason, at least in theory, why a satisfactory settlement could not amount to a hundredth or even a thousandth part of a single percent of the potential recovery. In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. Litig., 618 F.Supp. 735, 745 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 n. 2 (2d Cir.1974)) (ellipsis and other citations omitted). For these same reasons, the question whether DuPont's fraudulent misrepresentation caused damage to the plaintiffs in this case by preventing them from receiving the fair compromise value of their claims is one upon which the trier of fact must be guided by expert legal testimony. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in concluding that expert lawyer testimony directed to the numerous compromise factors, and how they would have applied to each [p]laintiff's case is required.