Opinion ID: 1735417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sympathy and Passion.

Text: ś 179. First, Walker assigns error to Sentencing Instruction C-17, which charged the jury, not to be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. The propriety of this sympathy charge has been fully discussed in Issue XII, supra. ś 180. Walker relies on King, 784 So.2d 884, which states: `a jury may not be instructed to disregard, in toto, sympathy' in a capital case. Id. at 889 (quoting Pinkney, 538 So.2d at 351) (emphasis added). Walker further claims that C-17 was repetitive of the court's earlier unnecessary Sentencing Instruction C-1. In King, we noted that we upheld an instruction in Blue, 674 So.2d at 1225, which read in pertinent part as follows: [Y]ou are cautioned not to be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. King, 784 So.2d at 889. This Court went on to hold that, `[B]ecause the instruction does not inform the jury that it must disregard in toto sympathy ... the instruction is a proper statement of the law.' Id. (quoting Blue, 674 So.2d at 1225). ś 181. In the case sub judice, C-17 mirrored the language of the instruction we upheld in Blue. See also Jackson, 860 So.2d at 674-75; Flowers, 842 So.2d at 563. Here, the instructions, C-1 and C-17, did not instruct the jury to totally disregard sympathy and passion. ś 182. The giving of C-17 in no way dissuaded Walker's counsel from arguing for Walker's life, which counsel did in a thorough fashion. Walker's counsel argued during closing argument at the sentencing phase that Walker's life had value, and that the jury did not have to oppose the death penalty. Walker's counsel analogized Walker to a deer in the headlights of the jury, with the jury having the ability to stop and avoid hitting Walker. The State objected to this line of argument as appealing to the sympathy of the jury. Following the objection, the trial court overruled the State's objection, stating that counsel has wide leeway during final argument. Walker's counsel referred to the religious song, Amazing Grace, noting that while the jury should punish the defendant, they should have mercy on him as well. ś 183. The language and context of C-1 differs from the language and context of C-17. C-1 instructed the jury to determine the facts from the evidence, apply the law to the facts and decide the case without being influenced by bias, sympathy or prejudice. C-17 instructed the jury to decide whether the defendant will be sentenced to death or life in prison, making such decision based on a weighing of the aggravators and mitigators under a caution not to be swayed by mere sentiment.. . . It is evident that C-17 was the only instruction dealing with sympathy in the context of weighing aggravators and mitigators. These instructions focus on two separate issues â the jury's decision on the case itself and the jury decision on the sentence. ś 184. Second, Walker has failed to cite any relevant authority to support his claim that repetitive instructions should not be given, and therefore, is procedurally barred. See Simmons, 805 So.2d at 487 (citing Williams, 708 So.2d at 1362-63) (failure to cite any relevant authority obviates our obligation to review such issues). ś 185. Jury instruction, C-1, is certainly not the determinative issue in this case. The use of C-1 by itself could be argued at best to be mere error. However, the jury is required to accept the jury instructions as a whole, and it is evident that the jury was properly instructed. See Walker v. State, 881 So.2d 820, 829 (Miss.2004) (collecting authorities). This amounts to a de minimis error, if one at all. Assuming arguendo, it was erroneous, it is harmless error beyond all reasonable doubt. Additionally, we hold that Walker is procedurally barred for failure to cite any relevant authority to support this claim.