Opinion ID: 1675746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Austins' Appeal from an Order Granting a New Trial

Text: Ford has moved to dismiss Austins' appeal from the order granting a new trial on the issue of liability, contending that the plaintiffs have no standing to appeal that part of the order because they are not parties aggrieved since they requested such a new trial. Ford relies on several old cases including Larson v. Hanson (1932), 207 Wis. 485, 242 N. W. 184, for support for this argument. That case did hold that a party could not appeal from an order granting a new trial when the party had requested such order even though such motion was made alternatively to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or to change answers. The case also held that orders denying these latter two motions were not appealable. However, we conclude Ford's motion should be denied since the result of the Larson Case and other cases coming to the same conclusion was overruled when this court adopted by court rule sec. 274.33 (3m), Stats., now sec. 817.33 (3m), which provides: (3m) A party on whose motion a new trial has been ordered may nevertheless appeal from such order for the purpose of reviewing a denial of his motion after verdict for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or to change answers in the verdict. This subsection was adopted by court rule on January 23, 1963, in response to a recommendation from the judicial council. The judicial council had originally proposed the court create sub. (3m) so as to provide an appeal that was properly taken from: Any order denying a motion after verdict for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or to change answers in a verdict, even though the moving party was granted a new trial. The judicial council's comment in favor of creating such a rule recognized that it would permit appeals from orders which were not then appealable and which . . . could be determinative of the lawsuit and thereby avoid a needless jury trial. However, instead of adopting the rule in the language recommended by the judicial council, this court modified it so as to provide that the appeal could be taken from the order granting a new trial which would bring up with it for review the trial court's denial of the postverdict motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or to change answers. This subsection has changed the harsh rule that a party could not appeal from an order granting a new trial even though such motion had been made in the alternative. Austins' appeal in the instant case fits exactly in the situation contemplated by sub. (3m). Therefore, Ford's motion to dismiss Austins' appeal is denied. [1] It should be noted that Austins' notice of appeal filed in this case also states that it is from that portion of the trial court's order which denied its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a change in the jury's answers. Since the appeal is properly taken from the order granting a new trial and as such, raises these issues with it, this language in the notice of appeal is mere surplusage and can be ignored.