Opinion ID: 2598537
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Law of Mitigating Circumstances

Text: [ś 134] Olsen's sentencing jury was instructed to consider whether twenty-one specifically listed mitigating circumstances existed by a preponderance of the evidence. Although the existence of a number of these mitigating circumstances was unrefuted, and would reasonably be expected to have been considered in the jury's weighing process, the jury did not unanimously find that any of these specifically listed mitigating circumstances existed. Olsen contends that improper instructions precluded the jury from considering relevant mitigating evidence in its consideration of an appropriate penalty. The federal standard for determining whether jury instructions satisfy these principles is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). To determine this issue, we apply our well-established standard of review: [A] trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the general principles of law applicable to the case before it. A trial court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury, and we will not find reversible error as long as the instructions given to the jury correctly state the law and adequately cover the relevant issues. Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo.1995). When determining whether the charge to the jury properly expressed the issues actually raised by the evidence, we look at the charge in its entirety, reading all of the instructions together. Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 663 (Wyo.1993); Baier, 891 P.2d at 756; Hatheway v. State, 623 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo.1981). Jury instructions should inform the jury about the applicable law so the jury may apply that law to its findings on the material factual issues. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 (Wyo.1997). It is critical that instructions correctly articulate Wyoming law because it is from the instructions that a jury decides if someone is to be found guilty or not guilty. Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 548 (Wyo.1990). Brett v. State, 961 P.2d 385, 389 (Wyo.1998). The general rule in reviewing questions involving instructions is that the trial judge is afforded latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the case, and reversible error will not be found as long as the instructions when viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately cover the issues. Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 438 (Wyo.1991) (quoting Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo.1987)). The standard of review for a requested-but-refused jury instruction is established by Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544 (Wyo.1990) and Thom v. State, 792 P.2d 192 (Wyo.1990). The refusal to allow an instruction requested by the defendant when due process requires the defendant's instruction be given is reversible error per se. Oien, 797 P.2d at 549. [A] defendant has the right to have instructions on his theory of the case or his theory of defense presented to the jury if the instructions sufficiently inform the jury of the theory or defense and if competent evidence exists which supports the law expressed in the instructions. Thom, 792 P.2d at 195. Evidence is competent if a reasonable jury would conclude that it supports the defendant's position, even if, in the opinion of the court, the evidence is weak, inconclusive, or unworthy of belief. Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400, 409 (Wyo.1977). In determining whether evidence is competent to support an instruction on a defense theory of the case, evidence is to be viewed in a light favorable to the defendant and taken as true. Chavez-Becerra v. State, 924 P.2d 63, 67 (Wyo.1996). Swartz v. State, 971 P.2d 137, 140 (Wyo.1998). [ś 135] The specific instructions that Olsen challenges are Instruction No. 12, which instructed the jury that it may consider whether a defendant has established the existence of any mitigating factors, and Instruction No. 13, which instructed that the jury may consider any fact or circumstance of Martin Olsen's character or prior record or matter surrounding his offense which serves to mitigate his culpability. Olsen challenges the discretionary language presented by the term may, contending that the statutory language and constitutional principles require mandatory language such as shall. The State contends that the mandatory consideration was apparent from Instruction No. 3 which defined a mitigating factor as any aspect of a defendant's character or background, or any circumstance of the offense, which might indicate, or tend to indicate, that the defendant should not be sentenced to death; Instruction No. 10 which instructed that if the jury found the existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, it must consider any mitigating evidence; and the verdict form which included instructions that the jury consider any mitigating factor that it unanimously or individually found to exist. Olsen contends that the jury's failure to find any of the mitigating factors specifically listed on the verdict form despite the fact that each was established upon reasonable testimony, and many were unrefuted, or did not involve credibility, establishes the inadequacies of Instruction Nos. 12 and 13. The State replies that the completed verdict form where the jury determined that no specifically listed mitigating factor was unanimously agreed upon, but individual jurors found some of the specifically listed factors and wrote in others, proves the jury understood the instructions and did consider the mitigating evidence and the mitigating circumstances proposed by Olsen. [ś 136] The State's response is similar to statements made by the Court in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.E.2d 702 (1998). In Buchanan, the issue was whether the Eighth Amendment required States to instruct juries on the concept of mitigation or adopt specific standards for instructing juries on mitigating circumstances. We disagree with the State that Buchanan resolves this issue, because, here, Olsen has presented the issue of whether, considering the jury instructions as a whole, the jury instructions properly complied with the Eighth Amendment requirement that the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317-18, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2946-47, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14, 102 S.Ct. at 876-77; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65. Additionally, Wyoming's death penalty statute specifies the process for consideration by a sentencing jury. The State tells us that process required by the statute for considering mitigating circumstances is the distinction between mitigating evidence and mitigating circumstances must be noted. Mitigating circumstances are aspects of a defendant's character or the crime which show, although he is qualified for the death penalty, that it should not be imposed. On the other hand, mitigating evidence is all relevant proof which a defendant might offer in an attempt to establish the existence of mitigating circumstances. In evaluating mitigating evidence, to determine whether mitigating circumstances exist, Wyoming juries are logically required to make two findings: 1) that the proposed character trait of the defendant or his crime has been proven to exist and 2) that those proven characteristics have mitigating value and reduce the defendant's culpability. Once a jury so determines that mitigating circumstances exist, it is then required to decide whether those circumstances are such that a death sentence is not appropriate. [ś 137] Similarly, the Court has said that mitigating evidence is always relevant to the sentencer to determine the appropriate sentence. A jury's unanimous decision that mitigating circumstances do not exist does not make the evidence irrelevant. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1232, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990). The mitigating circumstances not unanimously found to be present by the jury did not become irrelevant to mitigation merely because one or more jurors either did not believe that the circumstance had been proved as a factual matter, or did not think that the circumstance, though proved, mitigated the offense. Id. at 440-41, 110 S.Ct. at 1232. Imposing the death penalty must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant, and must reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S.Ct. 837, 841, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Consequently, a judge's instructions during sentencing phase proceedings may not preclude the jury from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65. [I]t is not enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer. The sentencer must also be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319, 109 S.Ct. at 2947. [ś 138] It appears that the closest description of the process the State asserts the jury was to engage in is found in Instruction No. 14, which states in pertinent part: After you have completed your findings as to the existence or absence of any aggravating or mitigating factors, you will then engage in a decision process. In determining whether a sentence of death is appropriate, all of you may consider any aggravating factors that you unanimously found to existâ and each of you may consider any mitigating factors that you individually find to exist. If you unanimously conclude that the aggravating factors found to exist are sufficient to justify a sentence of death, you may consider whether any mitigating factors exist before you impose a sentence of death. Keep in mind, however, that regardless of your findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, you are never required to impose a death sentence. The precise statutory language concerning the jury's process of considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances is: (d) Upon conclusion of the evidence and arguments the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions, including instructions as to any aggravating and mitigating circumstances, ...: (i) After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render a sentence based upon the following: (A) Whether one (1) or more aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt as set forth in subsection (h) of this section; (B) Whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, mitigating circumstances exist as set forth in subsection (j) of this section; and (C) The mere number of aggravating or mitigating circumstances found shall have no independent significance. (ii) Based upon the considerations in paragraph (i) of this subsection, the jury shall unanimously determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances unanimously found to exist, and each individual juror may also consider any mitigating circumstances found by that juror to exist[.] § 6-2-102(d). As can be seen, the instruction uses substantially the same wording as the statute; however, the trial court apparently attached no significance to the statutory phrase the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances and this phrase is noticeably absent from the instruction. We realize that instructing the jury that it shall consider aggravating factors may confuse a jury or impermissibly suggest that a death penalty is required. If the trial court's purpose in using may as many times as it did in this instruction and in Instruction Nos. 12 and 13 was to convey to the jury that it was not required to impose the death penalty, we find that purpose served by the last sentence of Instruction No. 14. [ś 139] The statutory phrase the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances is significant under Wyoming's death penalty statutory scheme. This phrase describes the process intended to distinguish between a penalty of life imprisonment and death. Having unanimously found those aggravating circumstances that exist beyond a reasonable doubt and those mitigating circumstances that exist by a preponderance of the evidence, it is the jury's duty to engage in a process to determine which of the two penalties, life imprisonment or death, is justified and appropriate in a particular case. That the statute intends this consideration to be a mental balancing process, a reasoned judgment, and a consideration of the substantiality and persuasiveness of all of the circumstances is clear from its prohibition that the mere numbers of each are not to be considered. See People v. Brown, 40 Cal.3d 512, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516, 532-33 (1985) (citing State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308, 326 (1983); State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 10 (Fla.1973); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982)). Olsen's proposed Jury Instruction No. 6 in part accurately describes the process intended by this phrase: A consideration of circumstances and factors is a thoughtful process that is not totally objective, it requires each juror to respond in human terms to sentencing evidence in assessing the appropriate penalty for this defendant. You must decide how compelling or persuasive the totality of the mitigating factors are when compared against the totality of the aggravating factors. You cannot be governed or influenced by mere sentiment of passion or prejudice, however, you may consider mercy, and decline to impose the death penalty after a thoughtful consideration of this evidence. After reviewing instructions from other states as well as Olsen's proposed instruction, we believe a more accurate instruction would be: The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. In reaching a reasoned, moral judgment about which penalty is justified and appropriate, you must decide how compelling or persuasive the totality of the mitigating factors are when compared against the totality of the aggravating factors. You cannot be governed or influenced by sentiment, passion or prejudice, however, you may consider mercy, and decline to impose the death penalty after a thoughtful consideration of the evidence. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of a life sentence. See California Jury Instructions, Criminal § 8.88 at 517-18 (6th ed.1996). [ś 140] In examining all of the other submitted jury instructions, we see that Olsen's jury received inconsistent instruction in the steps of the statutory process it is to engage in and no useful instruction in how it is to engage in this statutory process. We recommend that the trial court instruct on the principles just set forth. [ś 141] We also do not find that the jury was appropriately instructed on the definitions of aggravating and mitigating. In Instruction No. 3, these terms are defined as: An aggravating factor is a specified fact or circumstance which might indicate, or tend to indicate, that the defendant should be sentenced to death. A mitigating factor is any aspect of a defendant's character or background, or any circumstance of the offense which might indicate or tend to indicate that the defendant should not be sentenced to death. A more useful instruction would be: An aggravating factor is a specified circumstance attending the commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences which is above and beyond the elements of the crime itself. A mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which does not justify or excuse the crime in question, but may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. See California Jury Instructions, supra, at 517. [ś 142] We hold that the jury instructions about mitigating circumstances do not correctly state the law mandated by § 6-2-102(d), and this failure is reversible error. Upon remand for resentencing, jury instructions should reflect the intended statutory process and clarify the jury's decision process in comparing the totality of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.