Opinion ID: 489887
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Gildon

Text: 28 Haynesworth stated that Officer Gildon participated willfully and directly in the prosecution. 97 It seems beyond peradventure that a complaint averring knowing participation by the defendant in an actionable constitutional deprivation sets forth a colorable claim. Nonetheless, the District Court summarily granted Gildon's motion for judgment on the pleadings, 98 but since the court did not articulate its reasons therefor, we are left uncertain as to its rationale. The only basis existent at the close of the pleadings for a determination on Gildon's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law 99 was the complaint's narration of the conference attended by Gildon, Haynesworth and others. Although the complaint tells us that Gildon informed Haynesworth that he would be prosecuted if he refused to waive his civil claim, it also discloses that prosecutor Miller stated that any decision to proceed with or drop the charges would be made by him and not the police. 100 We can only surmise that the District Court viewed this latter averment as an indication that Gildon had no authority over--and thus no responsibility for--prosecutorial decisions. 29 We do not believe, however, that the asserted exchange exculpates Gildon at this very preliminary stage of the litigation. Miller's statement can plausibly be taken as no more than an admonition that Gildon should allow the prosecutor to handle the negotiations. Even accepting the statement as immutable proof that Gildon could not have exerted any influence on the decision to go forward, Gildon's actions could still have contributed to a constitutional violation, since Haynesworth may not have known that she was powerless in that regard, and might have waived his right to sue in partial reliance upon her statement. 101 Under the applicable standard, 102 the District Court should not have terminated litigation of this claim at such an early stage. 103