Opinion ID: 1275413
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Responding to the Chamber of Horrors Argument

Text: The Janken court argued that its interpretation would not create a chamber of horrors. In many of the federal cases which construed the `agent' language not to create personal liability for individual supervisors, it was argued that such a construction would open the floodgates of discrimination, would give supervisors a `free pass' to discriminate, would `liberate' supervisors to discriminate `with impunity,' and the like. All the recent cases have rejected such arguments. One case rejected this `parade of horribles' as `Chicken Little-esque.' ( U.S. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., supra, 55 F.3d 1276, 1282.) Another considered this `chamber of horrors' argument and was `not persuaded.' ( Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of Technology, Inc., supra, 55 F.3d 377, 381.) Another found the argument `unsound.' ( Miller v. Maxwell's Intern. Inc., supra, 991 F.2d 583, 588.) The cases have rejected such arguments because the employer remains liable. `An employer that has incurred civil damages because one of its employees believes he can violate Title VII with impunity will quickly correct that employee's erroneous belief.' ( Miller v. Maxwell's Intern. Inc., supra, 991 P.2d 583, 588.) The employing entity is still liable, and that entity and its managers have the proper incentives to adequately discipline wayward employees, as well as to instruct and train employees to avoid actions that might impose liability.' ( U.S. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., supra, 55 F.3d 1276, 1282.) `As a practical matter employees who unlawfully discriminate against their fellow employees, and who thereby expose their employer to liability, do not get anything like a free pass to continue their wrongdoing with impunity. By incorporating the principles of respondeat superior into Title VII, Congress has required employers to answer for prohibited acts of discrimination perpetrated by their employees. An employer subjected to well-founded claims of employment discrimination as a result of an employee's intentional acts of discrimination is not likely to look favorably upon the offending employee. To the contrary, the employer, to protect its own interests and to avoid further liability, almost certainly will impose some form of discipline upon the offending employee. That discipline may include a free pass to the unemployment line, a result that would seem particularly likely if the employee engages in repeated acts of intentional discrimination against fellow employees.' ( Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of Technology, Inc., supra, 55 F.3d 377, 381; see also Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., supra, 30 F.3d 507, 510 [`Employer liability ensures that no employee can violate the civil rights laws with impunity']; Stephens v. Kay Management Co. Inc., supra, 907 F.Supp. 169, 174 [supervisory employees are not liberated to discriminate with impunity because the employer remains liable].) The reasoning of these cases applies here. The fact that the employer is liable via the respondeat superior effect of the `agent' language provides protection to employees even if individual supervisors are not personally liable. Hence we do not find this consideration to compel a conclusion that the Legislature must have intended to impose personal liability on individual supervisory employees. ( Janken, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 76-77, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741, fn. omitted.)