Opinion ID: 2176514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Sanction Recommended

Text: We must agree with the Hearing Committee that Respondent's style of practice, including his aversion to paperwork, created a high risk that he will be back before the disciplinary system on a future neglect case. This is likely to occur even though the Committee viewed Respondent as an experienced attorney of good professional character, with above-average skills, who renders important assistance to clients with limited resources. The Hearing Committee felt a duty to try to protect Respondent's future clients, while it would allow Respondent to continue to practice, both because of the useful service he performs and the devastating effect that a suspension inevitably would have on any solo law practice. The Committee concluded that a period of probation, coupled with practice monitorship, was a sound means of resolving these competing goals. But for the evidence of disorganization in Respondent's practice, the Hearing Committee said it would have recommended only public censure as the sanction for the neglect finding in this case. However, because of what the Hearing Committee called an extraordinary degree of disorganizationindeed, practically complete lack of organizationit concluded that Respondent should be suspended for 30 days. A 30-day suspension is not an inappropriate sanction in this case based on the neglect violation found. This is especially so when an opportunity is afforded to avoid the suspension altogether. In this regard, we rely on such cases as In re Banks, 577 A.2d 316 (D.C.1990); In re Dory, 528 A.2d 1247 (D.C. 1987); and In re Foster, 581 A.2d 389 (D.C. 1990). We also note Respondent's prior violation of the disciplinary rules, which led to his being publicly censured. The question then becomes whether, on the particular facts of this case, the suspension should be stayed while Respondent serves the one-year probation recommended by the Hearing Committee. The Hearing Committee had some question about extending a probation/practice monitorship remedy to this type of case. Heretofore, probation has only been used by the Court in those cases where the attorney's misconduct was caused by a disability, such as substance abuse or bipolar illness. Respondent does not seem to have such a disability here. Because the Hearing Committee felt it might be expanding established law by recommending probation here, it moved with understandable caution. We agree with the Hearing Committee's recommendation. The disciplinary system must be able to adapt to new sanctions and approaches that are in keeping with current knowledge. Well-known examples are, of course, the Court's recent rulings in In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626 (D.C.1992) ( en banc ) and In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987). The Hearing Committee ultimately concluded that extension of the probation remedy to this case was justified by a broad reading of the Court's opinion in In re O'Day, III, BDN 53-82, 54-82, and 113-82 (1984). We believe that the use of probation and practice monitors in this case has even more recent judicial encouragement. We refer to comments in the Court's recent opinions in In re Bradbury, 608 A.2d 1218 (D.C. 1992) and In re Arceneaux, 609 A.2d 280 (D.C.1992). For example, in Bradbury, the Court expressly stated that Nothing in our decisions prohibits the Board from recommending probation in a non-disability case. 608 A.2d at 1219, n. 2. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the disabilities for which probation is appropriate should only be those listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ( 3rd ed. revised ), (DSM-III-R), which is the basic diagnostic guide used by health care providers and insurers. We see no reason for the Court to adopt such limitation, especially in a case where the attorney shows behavior that could approach dysfunctionality. The sanction recommended here is also consistent with recommendations made by the Task Force on Racial and Ethical Bias in its Final Report on the Attorney Disciplinary System, which was issued in May 1992. [5] In its Recommendation No. 10, the Task Force asked the Court of Appeals and the Board to reexamine the penalties attached to various violations of the disciplinary code ... and to allow for appropriate consideration of the practicalities of small firm practice in determining the sanctions appropriate for such violations by small firm practitioners. Recommendation No. 11 went on to ask the Court and the Board to consider the use of fines, remedial courses and other alternatives to suspension for some disciplinary offenses. Task Force Report, p. 51. This is what we would be doing in the instant case. The Hearing Committee, in its sensitive and thoughtful report, observed that the disciplinary system and the public should not be confined to a gradual journey up a path of escalating sanctions through repeated invocations of adversary proceedingsa path which inescapably disrupts many other representations of clients and leaves the clients injured by repeated unethical acts lying on the side of the road. H.Comm.Rep. 54. While this language is somewhat more turgid than we would employ, we agree that this is an appropriate case for use of a probation/practice monitorship combination. The particular circumstances of this casewhich include Respondent's apparent acquiescence in the sanctionwill keep this recommendation from becoming a precedent for use of practice monitors on a helter-skelter basis where there is not strong justification. Subjecting a lawyer's practice to an outside monitor is a most significant event that should not be done lightly. We think it is an appropriate sanction in certain cases. This is such a case.