Opinion ID: 660213
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: stephen brechtelsbauer

Text: 54 What has been stated as to defendant Jeros applies fully on the count II claims of fraud and misrepresentation against defendant Brechtelsbauer. The question with regard to Brechtelsbauer then becomes: has the plaintiff properly joined him as a defendant, or can the defendants establish that he (and Jeros) were fraudulently joined to defeat federal jurisdiction? 55 We call to the attention of the district court a case dealing with a situation analogous to the facts of this case, Fletcher v. Advo Systems, Inc., 616 F.Supp. 1511 (E.D.Mich.1985). In Fletcher, plaintiff James Fletcher filed suit in Michigan state court alleging wrongful termination and naming as defendants Fletcher's corporate employer, a vice president, and Fletcher's immediate supervisor who, like Fletcher, was a Michigan resident. The defendants removed the case to federal court, claiming that the Michigan resident supervisor had been joined solely to defeat diversity of citizenship. Id. at 1512 (emphasis added). As in the instant case, the plaintiff moved for remand to the Michigan state court. The plaintiff's motion was denied, id. at 1515, finding that the supervisor was joined for the sole purpose of defeating federal jurisdiction. 56 The burden to establish federal jurisdiction in this case is clearly upon the defendants as the removing party. Gafford v. General Electric Co., 997 F.2d 150, 155 (6th Cir.1993); Charles A. Wright, Arthur A. Miller, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 14A, Sec. 3721 (1985). The removing party bears the burden of demonstrating fraudulent joinder. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 330 (6th Cir.1989). Removal statutes, moreover, are strictly construed. Wilson v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 584 F.2d 137, 142 (6th Cir.1978). 57 There can be no fraudulent joinder unless it be clear that there can be no recovery under the law of the state on the cause alleged or on the facts in view of the law.... One or the other at least would be required before it could be said that there was no real intention to get a joint judgment, and that there was no colorable ground for so claiming. 58 Bobby Jones Garden Apartments, Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir.1968). Therefore the question is whether there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability on the facts involved. Id. That same circuit restated the question as whether there was any reasonable basis for predicting that [the plaintiff] could prevail. Teddler v. F.M.C. Corp., 590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.1979). 59 Plaintiff relies on Jenkins v. American Red Cross, 141 Mich.App. 785, 369 N.W.2d 223 (1985), to support his joinder of Jeros and Brechtelsbauer as officials of the defendant employer. In that case, Jenkins, a long-time black employee, sued under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act for race discrimination, claiming a discriminatory discharge. Jenkins charged intimate involvement in his allegedly discriminatory termination by an immediate supervisor and the director of the Red Cross office. The district court, on remand, must determine if Brechtelsbauer and Jeros are within the definition of employer/agent under the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act and Jenkins. 60 [A]ny disputed questions and fact and ambiguities in the controlling state law [should be resolved] ... in favor of the nonremoving party. Carriere v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 893 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 817, 111 S.Ct. 60, 112 L.Ed.2d 35 (1990) (emphasis added). See also Kruso v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1426 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990), stating: 61 [N]one of the individual defendants are alleged to have done anything wrongful except to cause the corporate defendants to act in an allegedly wrongful manner. The alleged wrongs of which plaintiffs complain are all corporate wrongs. Plaintiffs do not and apparently cannot allege that any of the individual defendants owed them any duty in their individual capacity, nor that they did any act in their individual capacity which violated any such duty or otherwise caused plaintiffs harm except as a result of corporate acts. 62 We REVERSE and REMAND this case, accordingly, for a determination of diversity jurisdiction, specifically whether defendants Jeros and Brechtelsbauer were fraudulently joined.