Opinion ID: 771682
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Severability/Partial Invalidation

Text: 91 Although we cannot save the definitions with a narrowing construction, we need not invalidate the entire statutory scheme. In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's facial invalidation of a state obscenity statute according to the normal rule that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course. Id. at 504. The statute at issue codified the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), including the requirement that the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find [that the material], when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . . Brockett, 472 U.S. at 493 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code 7.48A.010(2)(a) (1983)). Unlike Miller, which left the word undefined, the Washington statute defined prurient as that which incites lasciviousness or lust. Id. (quoting Wash. Rev. Code 7.48A.010(8)). The Court assumed without deciding that the Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that the inclusion of lust rendered the definition overbroad, see id. at 500-01 & n.10, but held that [f]acial invalidation of the statute was nevertheless improvident. Id. at 501. 92 Noting that the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, the Brockett Court held that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. Id. at 502 (quotations and citations omitted); accord Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). [T]he rule that a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than necessary to dispose of the case before it applies with equal force in the First Amendment context. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 502. In order to determine whether partial invalidation of a state statute is appropriate, federal courts look to state law. Id. at 506-07. 93 The FCPA contains the following severability clause: 94 If any provision of this article or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the article which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this article are declared to be severable. 95 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-118 (2000). Under Colorado law, a severability clause creates a presumption that the legislature would have been satisfied with the portions of the statute that remain after the offending provisions are stricken as being unconstitutional. People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 371 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (citation omitted), cited with approval in People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181, 190 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). The presumption of severability raised by the clause is dispelled only if what remains is so incomplete or riddled with omissions that it cannot be salvaged as a meaningful legislative enactment. City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52, 70 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (quotations, alterations, and citation omitted), cited with approval in People v. District Court, 834 P.2d at 190; accord Montezuma Well Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 928 P.2d 796, 798 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). 96 In this case, the constitutionally problematic portions are discrete and their removal would not compromise the integrity or coherence of the statute in any way. The presumption of severability raised by 118 is therefore controlling. We conclude that the unconstitutional phrases are severable, and we hereby declare subsections (7), (10)(a), and (11) of 103 invalid only insofar as they reach beyond that which may constitutionally be regulated. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504. Specifically, we strike only the language indicated below: 97 103(7) Independent expenditure means payment of money by any person for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, which expenditure is not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. Independent expenditure includes expenditures for political messages . . . . 98 103(11) Political message means a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which advocates the election or defeat of any candidate. 99 Without the stricken phrases, the remainder of the definitions are readily susceptible to an interpretation that is consistent with Buckley and MCFL i.e., that a political message is a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which [expressly] advocates the election or defeat of any candidate, and that an independent expenditure is payment of money . . . for the purpose of [expressly] advocating the election or defeat of any candidate . . . . E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.