Opinion ID: 1160523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: psychological injuries

Text: The claimant argues that the Board erroneously denied her claim for compensation for the psychological injury allegedly arising from the September 20, 1989, incident. Both parties agree, as did the Board, that the pertinent standard is: Where there has been a physical accident or trauma, and claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis, conversion hysteria, or hysterical paralysis, the full disability including the effects of the neurosis is compensable. Adamson v. Davis Moore Datsun, Inc., 19 Kan. App.2d 301, Syl. ¶ 2, 868 P.2d 546 (1994). However, the neurosis must be caused by the physical injury in order to establish a compensable claim. In order to establish a compensable claim for traumatic neurosis under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 44-501 et seq., the claimant must establish: (a) a work-related physical injury; (b) symptoms of the traumatic neurosis; and (c) that the neurosis is directly traceable to the physical injury. Love v. McDonald's Restaurant, 13 Kan. App.2d 397, Syl., 771 P.2d 557, rev. denied 245 Kan. 784 (1989). The Board denied the claimant's request for compensation for the psychological injury and concluded: [I]n order to find either functional impairment or permanent partial general disability, credible evidence must be presented to prove claimant's loss. As the more credible evidence shows that the claimant has suffered neither permanent functional impairment nor a work disability, claimant is not entitled to [an] additional award in this matter. The applicable standard of review is the substantial competent evidence test, in which the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. See Reeves v. Equipment Service Industries, Inc., 245 Kan. 165, 173, 777 P.2d 765 (1989). The crux of the Board's decision regarding psychological injury is its underlying conclusion that the claimant suffered [no] permanent functional impairment or any ongoing permanent work disability as a result of this incident. (Emphasis added.) Traumatic neurosis is not compensable under the Workers Compensation Act absent a work-related physical injury. Followill v. Emerson Electric Co., 234 Kan. 791, 795-96, 674 P.2d 1050 (1984). Implicit in the conclusion of the Board is that the neurosis or psychological disability is not directly traceable to the physical injury. As noted above, the Board's conclusion is supported by substantial competent evidence.