Opinion ID: 1429255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duty Question

Text: AMS next argues that the trial court erred when it held as a matter of law that Mag Corp owed no legal duty to AMS in relation to the construction, design, and maintenance of Mag Corp's perimeter dike. AMS argues that the trial court improperly focused on the issue of mutual reliance in determining whether a duty existed and that other factors, such as foreseeability and statute-based policy considerations, should have been considered. Additionally, AMS argues that Utah case law and certain common law doctrines imposed a legal duty on Mag Corp in this case. We disagree. One essential element of a negligence action is a duty of reasonable care owed to the plaintiff by [the] defendant. Absent a showing of duty, [the plaintiff] cannot recover. Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted). In his treatise on the law of torts, Professor Keeton gives this general definition of duty: A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed.1984); see also 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 83 (1989). The circumstances that may give rise to such an obligation, however, are varied. As Justice Durham points out, The majority [of this court] correctly states that treatment of the issue of duty requires an analysis of the legal relations between the parties. Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 778 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., concurring). Legal duties are often found to exist in the context of contractual, fiduciary, and filial relationships. None of these relationships are present in this case, however. Several other factors may be relevant in ascertaining whether there is a duty. AMS correctly points out that foreseeability can be one of those factors. It is not, however, the only factor. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote, The existence of a duty of reasonable care depends in part on the extent to which a reasonable person can foresee that his acts may create a significant likelihood of causing harm to others. Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, 909 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, Assoc.C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). In Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) we stated, `Whether the law imposes a duty does not depend upon foreseeability alone. The likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that burden upon defendant, must also be taken into account.' Id. at 54-55 (quoting Lance v. Senior, 36 Ill.2d 516, 224 N.E.2d 231 (1967)). A duty may also be found on the basis of reasonable mutual reliance, voluntary conduct which increases the risk of harm, and general policy considerations. See 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence §§ 87, 89 (1989); DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah.Ct.App.1992).
In the case before us, after Judge Brian had granted Mag Corp's first motion for summary judgment, AMS's only remaining claim against Mag Corp was based on negligence. When Mag Corp made its second motion for summary judgment before Judge Rokich, it argued that AMS could not establish any evidence to show a legal duty owed AMS by Mag Corp. In its memorandum in opposition to the motion, AMS argued that Mag Corp did have a duty based on statutory policy considerations, Utah land policy, case law, foreseeability, and reliance. Judge Rokich held an initial hearing on the motion on July 10, 1995. During that hearing, not only was the issue of mutual reliance discussed, but also AMS made arguments that Mag Corp had a duty based on (1) statute-based policy considerations, (2) general common law as expressed in the Second Restatement of Torts, and (3) case law. The trial court explicitly rejected the arguments relating to statute-based policy and implicitly rejected all others when it concluded that it would hold a second hearing limited only to arguing the basis on which AMS felt that it could rely on Mag Corp's perimeter dike. Importantly, Judge Rokich gave AMS the chance to argue that the issue of reliance should not be the focus of the hearing. In response to AMS's question whether reliance would be the sole issue, the trial court stated: Right. And I think that's the issue in this case. If I'm wrong, tell me now if you see it differently. Instead of objecting, AMS agreed to the hearing and its limited scope. Thus, because the trial court had rejected AMS's other arguments relating to the basis for Mag Corp's alleged duty, it was not improper to limit the scope of the second hearing to the issue of reliance.
We now address whether the trial court correctly concluded that Mag Corp owed no legal duty to AMS. We believe it did.
AMS first argues that there was evidence to show that Mag Corp owed it a duty of care based on the fact that AMS reasonably relied upon Mag Corp's perimeter dike. The evidence to which AMS refers includes testimony that AMS employees had seen Mag Corp employees observing the construction of AMS's perimeter dike, testimony that Mag Corp had allowed AMS employees to drive the length of Mag Corp's perimeter dike, some alleged discussions about mutual protection between employees from both AMS and Mag Corp at a service station, and a presentation made in 1986 by Mag Corp to the Utah State Committee on Economic Development. None of these evidences, however, were material. It is only natural that employees of AMS and Mag Corp were interested in the ongoing diking efforts. However, AMS's own employees testified that there were no discussions during those inspections that would indicate mutual reliance sufficient to create a duty. In fact, Roger Peterson, AMS's own witness and plant manager, testified that there was nothing that Mag Corp did or said ... that would indicate that it was going to do something more to protect AMS other than Mag Corp's own interest in protecting itself. At the hearing, it also became clear that there was no evidence at all that a discussion relating to mutual reliance took place in the service station. Finally, Mag Corp went before the Committee for Economic Development to request financial help in its efforts to dike the rising Lake. However, AMS was never in any way involved in Mag Corp's presentation to the Committee, Mag Corp did not discuss AMS or its operations with the Committee, and the AMS employee who overheard part of the presentation could remember nothing about it. Clearly, there was no evidence whatever to support AMS's position that it and Mag Corp had mutually relied on one another's diking efforts, and the trial court was correct in so holding.
AMS next argues that perhaps the most important issue in determining if Mag Corp owed it a legal duty is the issue of foreseeability. AMS argues that Mag Corp owed it a duty of care because it was foreseeable that AMS would sustain damage if the dike failed. In making this argument, however, AMS misses the point. It was the Lake, not Mag Corp, which caused the foreseeable risk of damage. Nature, not Mag Corp, caused the Lake to rise and threaten AMS's property. In Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848 (Utah 1994), we noted that the floods which occurred during the early 1980's were extraordinary and unprecedented. Id. at 852. We then approvingly cited Golden v. Amory, 329 Mass. 484, 109 N.E.2d 131 (1952), which held that the defendants, owners and managers of a dike, were not negligent as a matter of law when, after an extraordinary flood began, they used all available help to sandbag a dam but did nothing to save a dike. The court stated that the defendants were not negligent even if some other action than that taken would have been better. Id., 109 N.E.2d at 132. In the Golden case, even abandonment of an existing dike was excused, although the risk of harm from abandoning the dike was foreseeable under the extreme circumstances caused by the flood. In the case before us, the extreme conditions caused by the continually rising Lake and the severe storm of June 7, 1986, were the foreseeable source of damage both to Mag Corp's dike and to AMS's property. The trial court correctly concluded that the doctrine of foreseeability imposed no duty upon Mag Corp in this case.
AMS next argues that Mag Corp owed it a duty of care in the construction, design, and maintenance of the perimeter dike based on general common law principles set out in sections 364 and 365 of the Second Restatement of Torts. We disagree. Section 364 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads as follows: A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of the land for physical harm caused by a structure or other artificial condition on the land, which the possessor realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of such harm, if (a) the possessor has created the condition, or (b) the condition is created by a third person with the possessor's consent or acquiescence while the land is in his possession, or (c) the condition is created by a third person without the possessor's consent or acquiescence, but reasonable care is not taken to make the condition safe after the possessor knows or should know of it. Section 365 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads in pertinent part: A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of the land for physical harm caused by the disrepair of a structure or other artificial condition thereon, if the exercise of reasonable care by the possessor or by any person to whom he entrusts the maintenance and repair thereof (a) would have disclosed the disrepair and the unreasonable risk involved therein, and (b) would have made it reasonably safe by repair or otherwise. As with the statutory provisions discussed above, the dynamic created by the necessity of protecting against flooding renders these provisions inapplicable in this case. Both Restatement sections refer to dangerous conditions created by the possessor of the land. However, it was the rising Lake combined with the severe storm of June 7, 1986, which created the dangerous condition in this case, not Mag Corp. Further, section 365 explicitly exempts our case in comment b. when it states: If a structure suddenly and without the fault of the possessor becomes dangerously dilapidated, the possessor is not subject to liability for any harm done by it to persons outside of the land until he has had an opportunity by the exercise of reasonable care to make the structure safe. In the case before us, the storm on June 7 suddenly and without the fault of Mag Corp dangerously dilapidated the perimeter dike. Thus, Mag Corp was clearly not liable under the Restatement for the damages which followed.
AMS argues that Utah case law also imposes a duty of care on Mag Corp in this case. AMS cites several cases that it claims support its view. However, these cases are inapplicable in this case. Most of these are immediately distinguishable because they refer to the duty of care imposed upon owners of irrigation canals or ditches. See Dougherty v. California-Pacific Util. Co., 546 P.2d 880 (Utah 1976); Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 503 P.2d 139 (1972); Jensen v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co., 44 Utah 10, 137 P. 635 (1913); Lisonbee v. Monroe Irr. Co., 18 Utah 343, 54 P. 1009 (1898). These ditches and canals were not created to alleviate flood conditions but rather were created by the defendants to manipulate the normal flow of water for commercial purposes. Consequently, these cases are irrelevant for our purposes. The other Utah case to which AMS refers is somewhat more applicable, but not much. In McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 6 Utah 2d 92, 305 P.2d 1097 (1957), a landowner brought suit against the city of Spanish Fork after flood waters damaged the landowner's property. When it became apparent that a flood was coming, the city determined to enlarge the bed of the Spanish Fork River to contain the imminent flow of water and to raise a dike to keep water from damaging city-owned properties. When the flood actually arrived, its magnitude was far beyond anything that reasonably might have been anticipated even for a flood. Id., 305 P.2d at 1100. The water diverted by the dike flowed onto the plaintiff's property, damaging it. This court cautioned against obstructing the flow of a natural water course (e.g., a river) by negligently constructing protective devices. In the end, however, the court held that the city was not liable to the landowner because of the exceptional circumstances created by the flood: The rule ... which allows the owner of lands threatened by the waters of an extraordinary flood to erect defensive barriers without liability to adjoining landowners whose lands may be damaged thereby, is supported not only by the weight of authority but by sound reasoning as well. To impose liability for such damage would be to leave property holders to the mercy of the elements and compel surrender to the force of rampant waters. Id. The cases relied upon by AMS, therefore, are either inapplicable or they support the view that Mag Corp should be relieved of any duty to AMS in this case.
AMS argues that certain provisions of the Utah Code relating to canals, watercourses, ditches, dams, and other diverting works express statute-based policies that can form the basis of Mag Corp's alleged duty. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-1-8 (relating to owners of ditches), 73-5-5 & -6 [3] (relating to dam safety). AMS is incorrect, however. The statutory provisions in effect at the time Mag Corp's perimeter dike was in use relate to the complicated procedures to be followed and the specifications to be met before the state of Utah would approve any plans to build an impounding dam. Mag Corp's perimeter dike was not an impounding dam. The term impounding refers to keeping water within a confined area, such as a reservoir. See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 605 (1985). Once the Lake began to rise, the purpose of Mag Corp's perimeter dike, rather than to keep water in, was to keep water out. It would be absurd to require every landowner facing property damage who decides to sandbag his property in the face of a flood to go through the lengthy and complicated approval process applicable to dams outlined in the statutes. The flood waters would come and go long before approval had been secured. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the statutes cited by AMS did not impose any duty upon Mag Corp in this case. Holding that Mag Corp had a duty to AMS in the case before us would lead to an inane result. To so hold would impose upon any property owner along the Lake who constructs a dike to prevent the Lake from flooding his property potential liability to every owner of property for miles beyond. If such were the law, no one would ever dare to take measures to protect against flooding. If anything, the property owners beyond benefit from such efforts. In the case before us, but for the efforts of Mag Corp to raise its dike at a cost of 833 million, AMS's property would have flooded long before it did. AMS contributed nothing in either manpower or money to the raising of Mag Corp's dike, yet AMS benefitted from the dike's protection for years. Saying that Mag Corp owed some legally actionable duty to AMS to protect it more than it already had would be absurd.