Opinion ID: 615921
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Government Misconduct in Rebuttal Summation

Text: Banki alleges two instances of government misconduct. First, Banki seeks a new trial on Counts Four and Five, arguing that the government committed misconduct by using its rebuttal summation to argue for the first time that Banki's lies to OFAC were material because his uncle had previously been the potential subject of an OFAC investigation. Second, Banki seeks a new trial on Counts One, Two, and Three, arguing that the government committed misconduct by arguing in rebuttal summation that Banki could be convicted solely on the basis of the $6,000 transaction. The district court rejected both claims of misconduct in denying Banki's Rule 33 motion. See Banki, 733 F.Supp.2d at 411-14. We review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a Rule 33 motion alleging prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v. Burns, 104 F.3d 529, 536-37 (2d Cir.1997). A defendant asserting that a prosecutor's remarks warrant a new trial face[s] a heavy burden, because the misconduct alleged must be so severe and significant as to result in the denial of [his] right to a fair trial. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 945 (2d Cir.1993). When evaluating a claim of improper argument, this Court must consider the objectionable remarks within the context of the entire trial. United States v. Espinal, 981 F.2d 664, 666 (2d Cir.1992). Even if a remark is deemed improper, it must cause substantial prejudice to result in a new trial. United States v. Shareef, 190 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether a defendant has suffered substantial prejudice, this Court considers [1] the seriousness of the misconduct, [2] the measures adopted by the trial court to cure the misconduct, and [3] the certainty of conviction absent the improper statements. United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir.1990). We have reviewed the government's rebuttal summation in light of these principles, and conclude that there was no misconduct here. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 33 motion to the extent it was based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.