Opinion ID: 710331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Roge's Failure to Object in the District Court

Text: 39 The government contends that Roge waived his objection to the district court's use of a sentencing policy. Roge was sentenced immediately after the district court first disclosed his sentencing policy. The court reiterated its policy when sentencing Roge. (R. 8 at 35-36.) Roge's counsel specifically referred to the court's policy in objecting to the court's failure to disclose the policy at the time of Roge's plea. (R. 8 at 38-39.) Thus, unlike Cosgrove, Roge clearly was aware of the court's policy when he was sentenced. Yet Roge never objected to the use of a sentencing policy on the grounds raised on appeal. Therefore, Roge waived his objection. United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 275, 112 L.Ed.2d 230 (1990), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.1993). 40 Roge contends that he made an express objection to the court's use of an undisclosed sentencing policy. He concedes that he did not use the words due process but argues that he nevertheless preserved his due process objection for review by challeng[ing] the fundamental fairness of the court's conduct. (Appellants' Reply Br. at 5.) Specifically, at sentencing counsel said, I think it's unfair to these defendants to let us know now about the policy, (R. 8 at 38), and I think the Court should have told us about the policy at the time of the plea. (R. 8 at 39.) 41 These statements do not amount to an objection that following a sentencing policy violates due process. The district court cannot reasonably be charged with understanding these statements to allege a due process violation. Simply saying something is unfair does not suggest that it violates due process. Moreover, the statements challenge the fairness of not disclosing the policy at the time of Roge's guilty plea. On appeal, however, Roge challenges the propriety of following the policy in sentencing him. 42 Roge did not object based on the other ground raised on appeal either--that employing the sentencing policy violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553 and Sec. 5K1.1. In fact, Roge's counsel focused almost exclusively on the court's failure to follow the government's recommendations, expressing frustration that the government's recommendations turned out to be in essence meaningless. (R. 8 at 38). These statements cannot be construed as challenging the legality of the court's sentencing policy under Sec. 3553 and Sec. 5K1.1. 43 Because Roge waived his objections to the district court's use of a sentencing policy by failing to present them to the district court, we only consider his arguments under the plain error doctrine to avoid manifest injustice. United States v. Neely, 979 F.2d 1522, 1523 (11th Cir.1992). We find no manifest injustice. Roge's 100-month sentence was well below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment and the guideline maximum of 188 months; indeed, his sentence was over four years less than the lowest sentence in the applicable guideline range. 44