Opinion ID: 2324309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admission of Mark Fisher's Out-of-Court Statements

Text: When the government called Fisher to the stand at trial, he testified that he recalled being visited by appellants in November 2000 but could not remember the details. The government's effort to refresh Fisher's recollection with the transcript of his grand jury testimony was unsuccessful. Fisher still professed to remember the events only vaguelythere was a robbery, he recalled, and somebody [told] me that they shot somebody. Over defense objection, the trial court allowed the government to impeach Fisher's claim of memory loss with his testimony before the grand jury, in which he remembered appellants' three visits to his apartment and described them in detail. The court ruled that, as a prior inconsistent statement under oath, Fisher's grand jury testimony was admissible not only to impeach his trial testimony, but as substantive evidence. The court also rejected Diggs's objections when, in opening statement, the government mentioned Fisher's November 2000 telephone call to Detective Toland. The court ruled that Fisher's report to Toland was admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for prior identifications. In accordance with that ruling, Toland testified on direct examination that Fisher called and identified Diggs and Griffin as the persons responsible for Michael Smith's murder. [4] Toland did not elaborate on the substance of Fisher's report. On cross-examination, however, and without objection from Diggs, Griffin's counsel elicited that Fisher mentioned .45-caliber guns and said the decedent's brother had broken into an apartment and committed a robbery two days before the shooting. In apparent response to that opening, the prosecutor brought out further details on redirect. Without objection, Toland testified Fisher told him that the robbery took place in Diggs's apartment; Diggs and Griffin went to recover the stolen Jeep Cherokee; they shot one of the occupants of the Jeep in the head while the others fled; and they used a Colt.45, a Mark-4 handgun, and .45-caliber ammunition. We reject appellants' contentions that Fisher's statements to the grand jury and Detective Toland were admitted in violation of their rights under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. [5] [W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. [6] It makes no difference that Fisher claimed to be unable to remember the events in issue; the Clause includes no guarantee that every witness called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. [7] Thus it is settled that memory loss, whether genuine or feigned, does not deprive the defendant of the meaningful opportunity to cross-examine that the Confrontation Clause requires. [8] In either case, the witness's claimed inability to recall is regarded as a form of the forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion that cross-examination is designed to emphasize, rather than as a barrier to cross-examination. [9] [T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination, even if the opportunity alone does not guarantee success. [10] Appellant had that opportunity in the present case: Fisher took the stand and was subject to cross-examination, and the jury could evaluate his credibility and his prior statements in light of whatever weaknesses were revealed. We likewise reject appellants' hearsay objections as a basis for reversal. [11] The trial court properly admitted Fisher's grand jury testimony as substantive evidence (as well as to impeach) pursuant to D.C.Code § 14-102(b)(1) (2001), which in pertinent part provides that [a] statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial ... and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is ... inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding[.] [12] In conformity with this provision, Fisher testified and was available for cross-examination about his prior grand jury testimony, which was under oath, and that testimony was inconsistent with his claimed loss of memory at trial. [13] Also admissible was Fisher's call to Detective Toland in which he identified appellants as persons who had confessed their commission of the murder directly to Fisher himself. Under D.C.Code § 14-102(b)(3), an identification of a person made after perceiving the person is not hearsay, and is admissible as substantive evidence, so long as the declarant is available at trial for cross-examination concerning the statement. [14] Although Diggs objects that Fisher did not perceive appellants commit the shooting itself, the hearsay exception is as applicable to an identification of a confessor as it is to an identification of a perpetrator. [15] Indeed, in principle, the prior identification exception applies to an identification made by a witness to any relevant conduct. Moreover, and contrary to Diggs's other objection on appeal, the prior identification exception is not limited to an identification of a person unknown to the declarant; it is equally available where, as here, the declarant knew or had a relationship with the identified person prior to the perceived event. [16] The hearsay exception applies only to statements of identification; additional detail pertaining to the offense or other conduct observed by the declarant is admissible under this exception only to the extent necessary to make the identification understandable to the jury. [17] This condition was satisfied during Detective Toland's testimony on direct examination: The witness provided no unnecessary details in reporting Fisher's identification of appellants. As the government concedes, the prosecutor's elicitation of further details of Fisher's incriminating account during Toland's redirect examination may well have exceeded the limits of the prior identification exception. [18] But neither Diggs nor Griffin made timely objection to that elicitation, and we cannot find plain error in the trial court's failure to curtail it sua sponte, particularly where Griffin's cross-examination of Toland arguably had opened the door to the admission of further details, [19] and where prejudice is less likely because those details had been adduced earlier in the trial through Fisher's grand jury testimony.