Opinion ID: 2180341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Causation Instructions on Second-Degree Murder for both Settles and Roy

Text: Prior to trial, a joint pre-trial hearing was held, at which the government submitted a memorandum of law setting forth their theories of liability for both Settles and Roy. That memorandum set forth the government's theory that Settles was guilty under a gun-battle theory of liability, while it presented alternative theories with regard to Roy. The government's primary theory of liability for Roy was that he was guilty of the first-degree murder of Ms. Edwards under a transferred intent theory. As an alternative theory, however, the government argued that Roy too was liable under a depraved heart murder theory, [6] for his participation in the gun battle on a public street. At the close of the hearing, the judge ruled that it did not matter which appellant started the gun battle or which bullet actually killed Ms. Edwards but rather that the appellants' actions: [D]emonstrated conscious disregard of the safety of citizens in the District of Columbia when they sought to kill each other, and that there would have been ... no murder of an innocent person but for the willingness of both Mr. Roy and Mr. Settles to turn city streets into an urban battle ground. At the close of trial, the parties discussed the language of the causation instructions which would be given to the jury. The government contended that the instructions should require the jury to find that Settles and Roy were armed and prepared to engage in a gun battle and that they, in fact, did engage in a gun battle. Settles argued that the jury should be required to find that Settles agreed, either explicitly or tacitly, to engage in mutual combat involving firearms or `to engage in a gun battle,' contending that the language offered by the government required a one-sided action, instead of a mutual agreement. The court opted for the armed and prepared language stating in my view, there's not much difference, if any at all, in terms of ... if one is armed and prepared to engage in a gun battle versus a tacit agreement to engage in a gun battle. Roy then contended that the causation instructions applied only to Settles, and that the court, so as to avoid confusion, should so instruct the jury. [7] The court initially agreed that it would not give the causation instructions with regard to Roy. However, after further discussions, the court stated that the legal principles involved in the causation instructions applied to Roy as well as Settles and that since evidence had been presented which may lead the jury to conclude that Roy was involved in the battle but not responsible for the fatal shot, the instructions should be given for both Settles and Roy. [8]
Both Settles and Roy challenge the trial court's instructions on causation, contending that it mischaracterizes the law of homicide liability in the District of Columbia. [9] We review the instruction given for its compatibility with the law. United States v. DeFries, 327 U.S.App. D.C. 181, 191-92, 129 F.3d 1293, 1303-04 (1997); see ( Deon) Russell v. United States, 701 A.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (D.C.1997). We think it important to note that while proximate causation as a theory of second-degree murder liability has been recognized in our case law for some time, the factual scenario of a gun battle on city streets, as in this case, is relatively new. While urban gun battles years ago involved revolvers or clipped pistols of limited fire power, they have now escalated to the use of automatic and semiautomatic weapons. The results are pocket wars with no rules of engagement resulting in a highly increased risk to noncombatants. It is this increased risk to innocent bystanders which justifies the application of proximate cause liability to those participants who willfully choose to engage in these battles. [10] In this jurisdiction we have held findings of homicide liability permissible where: (1) a defendant's actions contribute substantially to or are a substantial factor in a fatal injury; Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 664, 669-70 (D.C.1979); and (2) the death is a reasonable foreseeable consequence of the defendant's actions. [11] McKinnon, supra note 11, 550 A.2d at 918. We have defined substantial cause as that conduct which a reasonable person would regard as having produced the fatal effect. Butts v. United States, 822 A.2d 407, 417 (D.C.2003). Thus, we hold defendants criminally accountable for, all harms that are reasonably foreseeable consequences of his or her actions. McKinnon, supra note 11, 550 A.2d at 918; Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.26 (4th ed.1993). We conclude that concentration on an agreement, as did Roy, would cause instructional difficulty and jury confusion. Roy cites no case, persuasive or binding, which has held that a requirement of an agreement (express or tacit) must, by a jury instruction, be found for conviction. Indeed, the term when used in the cases he has cited, is a characterization by the appellate court of the record facts, not an instructional holding. [12] While in a conspiracy prosecution, the term agreement has long been used and understood, at least by the courts and lawyers in jury charges, that term in an armed, heated, street engagement is not so easy of understanding, to say nothing of interpretation. Street combatants seldom, if ever, reach a meeting of the minds to do battle. A tacit agreement while understood by judges and lawyers is too amorphous and bereft of clear meaning to be practical for a jury instruction. It is sufficiently so as not to be the stuff by which to reverse this conviction. We think the concept of concurrent or mutual expectation of armed violence more meaningfully describes previous adversaries who have armed themselves and face off in a High Noon shoot out. In the present case, the evidence is quite susceptible of an inference that before the first shot was fired, Roy and Settles both had expected to engage in the street gun battle where injury or death to the innocent was foreseeable. Roy had remained in the area, no doubt at least partially concealed in the stairwell, with an expectation that Settles would return, which the jury permissibly could and did infer under the instructions given. When they met again, and Roy approached the car pointing his gun at Settles, their mutual expectation and joint preparation matured into the shoot-out. Since Roy's self-defense claim was rejected by the jury, it per force concluded that Roy was present in the area armed, prepared, and expecting to do battle. We hold that the trial court did not err in declining to give Roy's requested agreement instruction. The instructions as given were the functional equivalent of asking the jury to decide whether there was a concurrent or mutual expectation that a street battle would ensue. Accordingly, we hold there was no error in the instructions given. [13] While the evidence was unclear as to whether Roy's or Settles' bullet was responsible for the fatal shot, such a determination is unnecessary if both men prepared for and undertook to participate in the gun battle where it was clearly foreseeable that others would be endangered. Our dissenting colleague as to this point would have the court view what happened on Valley Avenue separately from the events on Tenth Place. He concludes that the first shots fired by Roy on Valley Avenue are of no relevance because there was a hiatus between the two encounters. ( Dissent at note 1.) But the first of the two encounters is highly revealing of Roy's earlier and continuing intent to shoot Settles. When Roy emerged from the stairwell pointing his gun at Settles who had arrived after quickly arming himself, it was no separate event from the first. It was a continuum of Roy's desire to shoot Settles and scarcely constituted a break in the altercation. In addition, we do not read the jury instruction as treating the Valley Avenue shooting as separate from the altercation as a whole. The instruction, of necessity, had to relate to the Tenth Street site since that was where the death occurred. The change of the location in the brief period did not interrupt the continuity of the events.