Opinion ID: 2338798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the trial court err in refusing Appellant's proposed jury instructions?

Text: [¶ 36] During the jury instruction conference, Ms. Benjamin proposed these two jury instructions: Instruction No. G Where an accused is the sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, as in the case at bar, her testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected, and if her credibility has not been impeached, and her testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, then her testimony should be accepted. Instruction No. H [Ms. Benjamin] being the sole witness to the transaction charged as a crime, her testimony must be accepted as true, if it is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith. The district court refused to give the instructions. Ms. Benjamin claims that the district court's decision was in error. [¶ 37] When reviewing questions involving jury instructions, we afford significant deference to the trial court's decisions. Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 20, 124 P.3d 699, 706 (Wyo. 2005). A trial court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the instructions in their entirety sufficiently cover[] the relevant issue, reversible error will not be found. Roden v. State, 2007 WY 200, ¶ 21, 173 P.3d 369, 375 (Wyo. 2007), quoting Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 90, 99 P.3d 928, 954 (Wyo. 2004). [¶ 38] Ms. Benjamin argues on appeal, as she did before the district court, that her proposed instructions were supported by our holding in Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 198, 128 P.2d 215, 226 (1942): Where an accused is the sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, as in the case at bar, his testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected, and if his credibility has not been impeached, and his testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, then his testimony should be accepted. This holding has been referred to as the Eagan Rule. See, e.g., Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 25, 123 P.3d 543, 551 (Wyo. 2005). [¶ 39] The State concedes that Ms. Benjamin was the only witness to the shooting of Mr. Benjamin. It claims, however, that the Eagan Rule is inapplicable in this case because Ms. Benjamin's credibility had been impeached, and her testimony was not consistent with other facts and circumstances shown. Having reviewed the trial transcript, we agree with the State. Several examples can be found in the record, but one will be sufficient to illustrate that Ms. Benjamin was impeached, and that her testimony was inconsistent with other evidence. [¶ 40] When Ms. Benjamin turned herself in at the police station, she told the officer that she and Mr. Benjamin had fought over the gun. She said that she was just trying to scare him, but he grabbed the pistol, and she just shot. These statements were consistent with a note Ms. Benjamin had written and left at her home, in which she said that I grabbed the gun to scare him out of here. He grabbed it. I shot and he tried to turn the gun on me and I just kept shooting. At trial, Ms. Benjamin first testified that she shot Mr. Benjamin when he lunged at her, but later asserted that Mr. Benjamin tried to turn [the gun] around on me and I just shot. [¶ 41] A pathologist, called as an expert witness by the State, testified that no gun powder residue was found anywhere on Mr. Benjamin's body or clothing. According to this witness, the lack of residue indicated that the shots had been fired from several feet away. Two other witnesses, a forensic analyst from the state crime lab and an expert who specialized in firearms, also testified that the absence of gun powder on Mr. Benjamin meant that the shots had been fired from a distance of three or four feet or more. The pathologist concluded that the lack of gun powder residue on Mr. Benjamin's hands indicated that he was not grabbing the pistol when it went off. The other expert confirmed this point: I don't believe they were close enough to struggle over the gun. If he had his hands close to the gun, not only the muzzle puts out gun powder but the cylinder gap between the cylinder as it rotates in the back of the barrel, that puts out some powder residue. And typically when you have somebody that is struggling over a gun when it goes off, you have some residue on the skin or the clothing next to that. And that was not there. [¶ 42] Ms. Benjamin's statements and testimony that Mr. Benjamin had grabbed the pistol when it went off are not consistent with the physical evidence and expert testimony indicating the shots were fired from several feet away. The Eagan Rule applies only if the witness's credibility has not been impeached and is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown. Eagan, 128 P.2d at 226. It therefore did not apply in Ms. Benjamin's case, and the district court did not err in refusing the Eagan Rule instructions she proposed.