Opinion ID: 2545905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miranda vis-a-vis State Employees

Text: Defendant argues that, pursuant to State v. Maise, 2000-1141 (La.1/15/02) 805 So.2d 1141, all state actors who interview or interrogate a suspect must give Miranda warnings. Defendant further argues state employment is generally sufficient to render the party a state actor. Maise, 805 So.2d at 1149. In Maise, the defendant called a probation officer on the phone and confessed to raping a child. Id. at 1148. The defendant moved to suppress his confession based on the probation officer's failure to advise him of his rights. Defendant relies on this passage from Maise:  Miranda only applies where the party performing the `interrogation' is a `state actor.' Id. at 1149, citing State v. Martin, 94-252 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/12/94) 645 So.2d 752. The court went on to say [S]tate employment is generally sufficient to render a party a state actor. Id. at 1149, quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). We find that Maise is not controlling for two reasons. First, the passage in Maise regarding state actors is obiter dicta and therefore not binding. This Court resolved Maise by holding that a conversation over the telephone does not constitute a custodial interrogation, as there is no restraint on the defendant's freedom of movement. Id. at 1149-50. Because this finding was dispositive of defendant's Miranda claim, it was not necessary to determine whether the probation officer was a state actor or law enforcement agent, and that discussion was mere surplusage. Second, Maise's reliance on West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) was imprecise at best, as that case is entirely unrelated to Miranda and the Fifth Amendment. In West v. Atkins , a prisoner brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a prison doctor who allegedly gave him inadequate medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits an aggrieved party to bring a claim against any person acting under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia. The U.S. Supreme Court held that, under section 1983, [S]tate employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor. Id. at 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 931-932 n. 18, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). While this is an accurate statement of law for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is a significant distinction between the broad definition of state actor under section 1983 and the significantly narrower group of law enforcement officers referenced in Miranda. Therefore, to the extent that our decision in Maise conflicts with our holding in the case before us, Maise is overruled. The defendant's reliance on Mathis v. U.S., 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968) is likewise misplaced. In Mathis, the defendant challenged inculpatory statements regarding his tax returns he made to an IRS employee while in prison for a separate offense. Id. at 4, 88 S.Ct. 1503. The prosecution forwarded two arguments why Miranda should not apply: (1) that these questions were asked as a part of a routine tax investigation, where no criminal proceedings might even be brought, and (2) that the petitioner had not been put in jail by the officers questioning him, but was there for an entirely separate offense. Id. at 4, 88 S.Ct. 1503. The central question in Mathis was whether the defendant was in custody  the Supreme Court was not called upon to decide whether the IRS employee was a law enforcement agent, as the government apparently ceded that point. Mathis is simply not controlling on this issue. Defendant also cites to State v. Martin, 94-252 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/12/94) 645 So.2d 752, which held if a state actor is involved, defendant must be advised of his Miranda rights prior to making a statement. Id. at 754, citing State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543 (La.1986). In Martin, defendant confessed to a private security guard hired by the convenience store where she worked. Id. at 753. Miranda does not apply to private citizens such as the hired security guard, who have no connection to the state and are not acting as agents of law enforcement officials. To that extent, Martin remains good law. However, Martin does not stand for the proposition that state employment, standing alone, brings Miranda into play. As the State accurately notes, there are many state employees whose jobs have nothing to do with criminal law enforcement. Miranda does not require every state employee, from the governor to the groundskeeper, to be well-versed in Fifth and Sixth Amendment law. This interpretation would be an absurd expansion of the well-intended Constitutional benefits protecting a defendant from coercive interrogation by law enforcement. Clearly, this is not what Miranda stands for. Finally, the application of Miranda to all government employees is simply overly broad and inconsistent with the type of wrongs it was intended to prevent. Miranda is meant to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices.  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)(emphasis added). This rationale simply does not apply where the interrogation is conducted without coercion and with no involvement from the police.