Opinion ID: 1968563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discussions Concerning the Jury Instructions

Text: Because our resolution of this appeal depends in significant part upon whether the instructions issue has been preserved, we will describe, in some detail, the representations made by counsel and the trial judge in the course of the discussions concerning jury instructions. At the outset we note that counsel for Russell objected, before and throughout the trial, to the statutory provision placing the burden of proof of consent on his client, and to the jury instructions (as proposed and as given) on this issue. In addition, Russell objected to instructions proposed by the government. Although the trial judge stated that he did not believe that Russell had a viable constitutional challenge to the statutory provision, the judge assured counsel for Russell at least three times that he had preserved the issue for appeal. Counsel for Russell specifically requested, and the court agreed to provide copies of written instructions and to give counsel a chance to comment upon it to preserve the record. When given that opportunity, counsel for Russell asserted that [t]he problem with the instruction and the statute ... is that it shifts the burden of proof to the defendant on an element that ordinarily the Government would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt ... which is the element of force. And our position is that consent is just the opposite side of the same coin and that it's a violation of due process to require the defendant in a rape case to prove by a preponderance of the evidence consent. The trial court did not agree with counsel that the instruction and statute were unconstitutional, but stated that obviously, you have preserved your record for appeal. Counsel for Russell then made specific requests with respect to the proposed jury instructions: With regard to how the defense is worded in terms of consent, we would ask the court to add that the defendant is not required to prove consent beyond a reasonable doubt. Just make it absolutely clear.... We would like it to be crystal clear and I believe there is language that in fact [sic] in the insanity instruction, which I think this is sort of patterned after. I would ask the court to look at the insanity instruction ... instruction 5.07 ... in the insanity instruction there in defense, the defendant is not required to prove this defense of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Then I would also like ... something to the effect of if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the complainant consented to the alleged sexual act, you must find the defendant not guilty. The court agreed to the last request: That's fair. Sure, that makes sense. I will do that. However, when the trial court, the next day, returned to the issue of the jury instructions, it expressed doubt about that requested instruction, stating: [i]f there is consent in a case then obviously there would have to be a preponderance of the evidence to get that issue before the jury, the issue of consent. It may be simply more like a legal issue for the Court, but I'm uncomfortable in light of the way the statute was written. I still think ultimately if there is evidence of consent, and there is based upon Mr. Russell's testimony, and if I think the preponderance is sufficient to get that issue before the jury, I still think the Government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the consent was not voluntary. The trial judge acknowledged that this was a difficult issue and that he was unsure of what the legislature intended  whether it intended to shift the burden of proof or simply recognize that the government was not required to show that the victim resisted. The prosecutor responded to the judge's concerns by suggesting that the proposed instruction be modified by inserting this language: if you find that the defense has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the complaining witness consented, the burden shifts to the Government to prove that the consent was not voluntary. When the judge stated that he thought the prosecutor's suggestion was probably accurate, counsel for Russell stated he was preserving his objection from the previous day. Counsel for Russell then articulated his understanding of the proper application of the new statute: [T]he government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was force, there was a forcible rape, if you will. And if they haven't met that burden, and then we don't even get to the affirmative defense of consent and I think I'm entitled to argue that and to argue that ... our evidence of consent applies to their burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was a forceful act.... [T]here are two ways that the jury must return a verdict of not guilty. If they find either ... that [the government] didn't meet their burden of proving a forcible sexual act, or if they find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was consent. The trial court replied, Okay, I think that's captured. Russell's closing argument included an argument along these lines. In rebuttal, the government argued that the only question in this case was consent and that the defense had the burden to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: The essential elements of the offense of first degree sexual abuse, each of which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, are: One, that the defendant knowingly engaged in or caused [the complainant] to engage in or submit to a sexual act by using force against [the complainant]. Force means the use of physical strength or violence as is sufficient to overcome, restrain or injure a person or the use of a threat of harm sufficient to coerce or compel submission by the victim.... I would like to talk to you now about consent with respect to the offense of first degree sexual abuse. Consent by the victim is a defense to the charge of first degree sexual abuse which the defendants must establish by a preponderance of the evidence.... If you find that Mr. Russell has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [the complainant] consented to the sexual act, then the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant's consent was not voluntary. If the government fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no voluntary consent, you must find the defendant not guilty. At the bench conference following the court's instructions to the jury, counsel for Russell objected to the instruction because it placed the burden on the defendant to prove consent, and because even assuming for the sake of argument that's valid, our position would be that once the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that there was consent, then the jury must find him not guilty. That would not then place the ball back in the government's court to prove there was no consent [] beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not modify the jury instruction. It stated that there was some ambiguity, but that there has to be some preponderance of the evidence before consent ever gets in the case; once such evidence was in the case, the government must prove the consent was not voluntary.