Opinion ID: 1748279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructions Given to Jury Were Proper and Conveyed Correct Statements of Law.

Text: During the jury instruction conference, Total objected to instructions Nos. 10 and 11, among others. Instruction No. 10 stated: While [OSHA] regulations were written to protect employees, an unsafe practice for an employee applies equally well to a person who legitimately finds himself in the same space as an employee. OSHA standards are relevant to the safety of a work place, even if the injured party is not an employee. OSHA regulations provide in part as follows: a. A hole means a gap or void 2 inches (5.1 cm) or more in its least dimension, in a floor, roof, or other walking/working surface. b. Each employee on walking/working surfaces shall be protected from falling through holes more than 6 feet (1.8 m) above lower levels, by personal fall arrest systems, covers, or guardrail systems erected around such holes. Instruction No. 11 stated: It is claimed that an OSHA safety regulation was violated. If you find that is was, that does not necessarily prove negligence. The violation of a safety regulation is evidence that you may consider, along with all of the other facts and circumstances in the case, in deciding whether or not there was any negligence. The court overruled the objections. On appeal, Total assigns that the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding OSHA regulations. Total argues that the instructions were irrelevant and highly prejudicial, because OSHA regulations only govern the duties between employers and employees and Orduna was not an employee of Total. Further, Total argues that even if the court concludes that OSHA regulations were relevant to the standard of care owed by Total to Orduna, instructions Nos. 10 and 11 presented incorrect statements of law that confused the jury as to the applicability of OSHA regulations in the case. In contrast, Orduna asserts that the jury was properly instructed as to applicable OSHA regulations because such regulations are relevant in assessing an employer's safety obligations to third parties. Orduna also argues that the instructions were correct statements of law, consistent with established case law utilizing OSHA regulations in negligence actions filed against employers by nonemployees. This court has previously determined that because the application of Nebraska's health and safety regulations is limited to the relationship of employer and employee, the regulations do not establish a nondelegable duty to nonemployees. See Semler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 268 Neb. 857, 689 N.W.2d 327 (2004). However, we have yet to address whether such regulations or the federal OSHA regulations are relevant as evidence regarding the standard of care in negligence actions between employers and third parties. A substantial majority of other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have concluded that OSHA regulations are relevant and admissible in negligence actions involving an employer and a nonemployee. In Thoma v. Kettler Bros., Inc., 632 A.2d 725, 730 (D.C.1993), the court explained that OSHA regulations are competent [and admissible], not in and of themselves as evidence of negligence, but as evidence of a standard of care by which the jury must measure the conduct of the defendants in determining whether they exercised that due care the law required in the situation. ... At the same time, we recognize that [a]n OSHA safety regulation ... may impose a standard of conduct upon employers greater than that which would be considered reasonable in the industry.... In a suit brought by a non-employee, therefore, the defendant must be permitted to point out this fact to the jury and argue that it weakens the evidentiary force of the regulation as applied to the plaintiff. Similarly, in Wiersgalla v. Garrett, 486 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Iowa 1992), the court stated: [A]n employer's violation of an OSHA standard constitutes negligence per se in an action by an employee against [the] employer.  ... In other cases, however, a violation of an OSHA standard is merely evidence of negligence as to all persons who are likely to be exposed to injury as a result of the violation. (Citing Koll v. Manatt's Transp. Co., 253 N.W.2d 265 (Iowa 1977).) See, also, Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 975 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir.1992); Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.1981); Dunn v. Brimer, 259 Ark. 855, 537 S.W.2d 164 (1976); Elsner v. Uveges, 34 Cal.4th 915, 102 P.3d 915, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 (2004); Ball v. Melsur Corp., 161 Vt. 35, 633 A.2d 705 (1993). Total cites several cases in support of its argument. However, most of those cases merely support the proposition that OSHA regulations do not establish a duty between employers and nonemployeesa proposition not disputed in this case. Such cases fail to reach the specific question whether OSHA regulations, despite the fact that they only establish a duty between employers and employees, can be relevant in actions between employers and nonemployees. See, Banovetz v. King, 66 F.Supp.2d 1076 (D.Minn.1999); Marshall v. Hale-Halsell Co., 932 P.2d 1117 (Okla. 1997); Burnett v. A. Bottacchi S.A. de Navegacion, 882 F.Supp. 1050 (S.D.Fla. 1994); Murphy v. Stuart M. Smith, Inc., 53 Md.App. 640, 455 A.2d 69 (1983). Although these cases are not inconsistent with Total's argument that OSHA regulations are irrelevant to negligence actions brought by nonemployees, they do not necessarily support that argument. Two cases cited by Total appear to support a determination that OSHA regulations are irrelevant and inadmissible in actions other than those between employers and employees. Minichello v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1985), was a products liability case brought by the plaintiff after he was injured on the job by a machine manufactured by the defendant. The court held that OSHA regulations were not relevant to the issue of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff because such regulations pertain only to the conduct of employers. In Trowell v. Brunswick Pulp and Paper Co., 522 F.Supp. 782 (D.S.C.1981), the plaintiff was injured while touring the defendant company's chip mill. The court determined that admitting evidence of OSHA violations in the case would be prejudicial to the defendant and that even with appropriate instructions to the jury, the prejudicial effect of the evidence would outweigh its probative value in the case, where the regulations were not determinative of the standard of care owed to the plaintiff. We are not persuaded by this reasoning. We hold that in a negligence action brought by a nonemployee third party against a construction company, a violation of an OSHA regulation, while not negligence as a matter of law, may nonetheless be evidence of negligence to be considered with all the other evidence in the case. Our holding is consistent with this court's prior law providing that the violation of a safety regulation, established by statute or ordinance, is not negligence as a matter of law, but is evidence of negligence which may be considered in connection with all the other evidence in the case in deciding the issue. Similarly, the violation of a statute is not negligence per se, but is evidence of negligence. See, Raben v. Dittenber, 230 Neb. 822, 434 N.W.2d 11 (1989); Clark Bilt, Inc. v. Wells Dairy Co., 200 Neb. 20, 261 N.W.2d 772 (1978). In some instances, it may be that an OSHA safety regulation would impose a standard of conduct upon an employer greater than that which would be considered reasonable in the industry with respect to nonemployee third parties. In such an instance, in a suit brought by a nonemployee, the defendant could make that argument to the fact finder as part of the overall circumstances in its determination of negligence. But in this case, given the evidence that was presented and our reasoning above, we conclude that the district court did not err in instructing the jury as to the effect of a possible violation of an OSHA regulation. Total argues that even if we find no error in the court's instruction of the jury regarding OSHA regulations, instructions Nos. 10 and 11 presented incorrect statements of law. Specifically, Total argues that instruction No. 10, stating in part that [w]hile [OSHA] regulations were written to protect employees, an unsafe practice for an employee applies equally well to a person who legitimately finds himself in the same space as an employee, was equivalent to stating that OSHA regulations govern employers' duties to employees and third persons, which is inconsistent with the scope of OSHA. We, however, disagree with Total's reading of instruction No. 10. Rather than stating that OSHA regulations apply or govern employers' duties to third persons, instruction No. 10 states that unsafe practices for an employee are equally unsafe for nonemployee third parties who are in the same place as employees. The instruction does not indicate that OSHA regulations impose a statutory duty on employers to protect third parties in such situations. Furthermore, read together, instructions Nos. 10 and 11 convey the appropriate principlethat OSHA regulations and violations may be considered as evidence of negligence in the case. In reviewing a claim of prejudice from instructions given or refused, an appellate court must read the instructions together, and if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and evidence, there is no prejudicial error. Borley Storage & Transfer Co. v. Whitted, 271 Neb. 84, 710 N.W.2d 71 (2006). In an appeal based on a claim of an erroneous jury instruction, the appellant has the burden to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant. Washington v. Qwest Communications Corp., 270 Neb. 520, 704 N.W.2d 542 (2005). We conclude that instructions Nos. 10 and 11 accurately conveyed the law and that Total failed to show any prejudice resulting from the instructions.