Opinion ID: 2588784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Condemnation of Property for a Parking & Transit Facility

Text: CDOT argues that the condemnation of the property for the construction of a parking and transit facility, as part of a larger highway improvement project, falls within the scope of authority granted to it under the statute allowing CDOT to condemn land necessary for state highway purposes. § 43-1-208(3). Applying the principles set forth above, we must determine whether the General Assembly intended CDOT to have such condemnation authority. Taking into consideration the language used in section 43-1-208(3) and the goals it seeks to further, we conclude that the legislature intended CDOT to have the authority to condemn those properties which are necessary in order for CDOT to effectively complete state highway improvements. Specifically, we find that CDOT has implied statutory authority to condemn lands needed for construction of a parking and transit facility bearing a direct and functional relationship to the State Highway 82 improvement project. We begin with the language of section 43-1-208(3) itself, noting that while section 43-1-208(3) authorizes CDOT to condemn lands for state highway purposes, and other sections define state highway and highway, the term state highway purposes is nowhere defined by the legislature. As such, we must resort to basic principles of statutory construction in order to determine the intended scope of the term state highway purposes. See, e.g., Civil Service Comm'n v. Pinder, 812 P.2d 645, 648 (Colo.1991) (noting that [o]ur primary task in interpreting a statute is to give it a construction and interpretation that will render it effective in accomplishing the purpose for which it was enacted). We construe a statute as a whole, ascribing to each word and phrase its familiar and generally accepted meaning, so as to reflect the legislative intent of the General Assembly. Cacioppo v. Eagle County Sch. Dist., 92 P.3d 453, 463 (Colo.2004). In particular, we presume that the General Assembly understands the legal import of the words it uses and does not use language idly, but rather intends that meaning should be given to each word. People v. McNeese, 865 P.2d 881, 884 (Colo.App.1993). Finally, in determining the meaning of any one statutory section, we may look to the legislative scheme as a whole in order to give effect to the General Assembly's intent. Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50, 59 (Colo.2003). The Respondent asserts that statutory definitions of state highway and of highway preclude a finding that a parking and transit facility may be deemed a state highway purpose in the context of this condemnation action. Section 43-1-204, 11 C.R.S. (2003), defines a state highway as a right-of-way or location, whether actually used as a highway or not, designated for the construction of a state highway upon it. Section 43-1-203 further states that a `[h]ighway' includes bridges on the roadway and culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways, embankments, retaining walls, trees, shrubs and fences along or upon the same and within the right-of-way. According to the Respondent, these statutory sections, read in pari materia with section 43-1-208(3), limit CDOT's authority to condemn for state highway purposes only within the right-of-way area and only to construct those structures specifically enumerated in the highway definition. We disagree. Instead, applying the principles of statutory construction set forth above, we presume that in using the phrase state highway purposes, the General Assembly intended that CDOT have a condemnation authority which was broader than that needed simply for constructing state highways. To read the grant of authority as restricted to the list of structures included in the definition of highway under section 43-1-203, as urged by the Respondent, would render the word purposes in section 43-1-208(3) superfluous. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 19 P.3d 1263, 1273 (Colo.2001) (We construe statutory and constitutional provisions as a whole, giving effect to every word and term contained therein, whenever possible.). Thus, in order to avoid such a construction, we conclude that the legislature intentionally included the word purposes in order to give CDOT a condemnation authority which encompasses needs beyond those lands strictly necessary for construction of a highway as defined in section 43-1-203. Instead, the phrase state highway purposes must be read as conferring upon CDOT the authority to condemn lands for purposes which are integral to the construction, maintenance, and improvement of state highways. Our reading of the phrase state highway purposes is bolstered by consideration of the legislative scheme as a whole. In its legislative declaration regarding the creation of a department of transportation, the General Assembly observed that the creation of CDOT was necessary in order to: (a) Provide strategic planning for statewide transportation systems to meet the transportation challenges to be faced by Colorado in the future; (b) Promote coordination between different modes of transportation; [and] .... (e) Enhance the state's prospects to obtain federal funds by responding to federal mandates for multi-modal transportation planning. § 43-1-101(1), 11 C.R.S. (2003). Thus, the General Assembly clearly intended CDOT to adopt a comprehensive approach to transportation issues in Colorado. [4] Viewing the use of the phrase state highway purposes within the context of the legislative scheme as a whole, including the General Assembly's statements regarding the comprehensive objectives of CDOT, we conclude that the legislature intended that CDOT's condemnation authority would allow it to effectively carry out a large state highway improvement project. Specifically, we find that in authorizing CDOT to condemn lands needed for state highway purposes, the General Assembly intended that CDOT would have the implied authority to condemn lands for uses bearing a sufficiently direct functional relationship to a state highway project. [5] Buck, 199 Colo. at 348, 608 P.2d at 352. Of course, whether such a relationship exists between the expressly authorized use and the use for which the condemning body seeks implied condemnation authority will turn upon the facts and circumstances surrounding each condemnation action. Here, CDOT has demonstrated that the lane reduction from four lanes to two lanes across from the Buttermilk Ski area, as provided for in the Highway 82 improvement project, combined with projected increases in traffic, would lead to traffic congestion as well as pollution levels which exceed federal Clean Air Act requirements. Thus, CDOT concluded that the parking and transit facility, to be built at the site of that lane reduction, was necessary in order to reduce traffic congestion and pollution, to encourage drivers to transfer to buses and, eventually, light-rail transportation, and to ensure receipt of federal funding associated with the State Highway 82 project. Accordingly, CDOT has shown that the parking and transit facility is an integral part of the Highway 82 improvement project, and will certainly further the legislature's stated goals of strategically addressing transportation challenges, [p]romot[ing] coordination between different modes of transportation, and enhancing Colorado's prospects to obtain federal funds. § 43-1-101(1)(b), (e). As such, we find that the construction of the parking and transit facility bears a sufficiently direct functional relationship, see Buck, 199 Colo. at 348, 608 P.2d at 352, to the improvement of State Highway 82. [6] We therefore conclude that, pursuant to its authority to condemn lands needed for state highway purposes under section 43-1-208(3), CDOT has the implied authority to condemn the disputed parcels at issue today. [7]