Opinion ID: 172372
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tier Two: Pike Balancing

Text: We turn next to Mr. Kleinsmith's argument that the Utah statute excessively burdens interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test. A statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause if the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 90 S.Ct. 844. [T]he extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. Id. The person challenging the statute bears the burden of establishing a Pike violation. See Dorrance v. McCarthy, 957 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir.1992). Mr. Kleinsmith has failed to make the necessary showing. The Attorney General asserts that the statute makes trust-deed trustees more accessible to Utahns going through nonjudicial foreclosure. Not only has Mr. Kleinsmith failed to present any evidence to challenge this benefit, but, as noted in the prior section of this opinion, he also has not produced evidence of any burden that the challenged law imposes on interstate commerce. As a fellow circuit recently observed: Any balancing approach, of which Pike is an example, requires evidence. It is impossible to tell whether a burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits without understanding the magnitude of both burdens and benefits. Exact figures are not essential (no more than estimates may be possible) and the evidence need not be in the record if it is subject to judicial notice, but it takes more than lawyers' talk to condemn a statute under Pike. Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir.2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent an evidentiary basis for concluding that the Utah statute fails the Pike balancing test, we must reject Mr. Kleinsmith's challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause.