Opinion ID: 1984837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Correctional Treatment Facility Act.

Text: Writing as a friend of the court on behalf of Ms. Gaither, the Public Defender Service contends that the Correctional Treatment Facility Act requires the CCA to permit counsel to represent Ms. Gaither and other prisoners at disciplinary hearings at the CTF. Mr. Moore asserts that this claim was not presented on Ms. Gaither's behalf in the trial court, and the appellate record appears to bear him out. In any event, we do not believe that the CTFA is fairly susceptible of the construction which the Public Defender Service urges us to adopt. Section 4 of the CTFA reads as follows: An inmate confined in the CTF shall be deemed to be at all times in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections. Only the Department of Corrections shall have authority to transfer or assign inmates into or out of the CTF. All laws and regulations governing conduct of inmates, including, without limitation, Title 22 of the District of Columbia Code, shall apply to inmates confined to the CTF during such time as the CTF is operated by a private operator. All laws and regulations establishing penalties for offenses committed against correctional officers or other correctional employees, including without limitation, the penalties provided for in § 22-505, shall apply mutatis mutandis to offenses committed against any private correctional officer or other employees of the private operator. D.C.Code § 24-495.3(a) (1999) (emphasis added). Referring to the Lorton Regulations and their requirement that prisoners be permitted to have legal representation at disciplinary hearings, the Public Defender Service insists that [i]t is hard to imagine any legal ruling in the District of Columbia that fits better the definition of `laws and regulations governing the conduct of inmates.' In our view, this proposed construction stretches the statutory language beyond the breaking point. Section 4 of the CTFA, as we have seen, renders applicable to prisoners at the CTF all laws and regulations governing the conduct of inmates. The statute says nothing at all regarding protections available to inmates. A requirement that prisoners be permitted to have representation by counsel at disciplinary hearings does not govern their conduct. On the contrary, where such a requirement exists, it restricts the conduct of correctional officials. Section 24-495.3(a) also states that laws and regulations governing conduct of inmates includ[e], without limitation, Title 22 of the District of Columbia Code. Title 22 contains the criminal laws generally applicable in the District. The statute thus says that inmates incarcerated in the CTF, a privately operated prison, remain subject to prosecution under the District's criminal laws. Section 24-495.3(a) goes on to provide that penalties for offenses committed against DOC personnel shall apply to offenses against personnel employed at the CTF. The entire thrust of the provision is to ensure that District of Columbia authorities are able to deal appropriately with any unlawful or criminal conduct on the part of prisoners at the CTF. The conclusion that § 24-495.3(a) was designed to clarify the District's continued control over prisoners at the CTF, and that it did not create new inmate rights, is bolstered by a comparison of that provision with § 24-495.3(b). Subsection (b) specifies that prisoners confined in privately operated facilities contracted for by the federal government are under the control of the federal Bureau of Prisons and subject to federal law. [15] We agree with the District that the intent of the two sections is not to create rights for prisoners that prisoners do not otherwise have (like an entitlement to procedures set out in the Lorton [R]egulations), but to clarify that the District of Columbia and the federal government maintain ultimate control over D.C. prisoners in their respective contract prison facilities. Moreover, as we have explained, see pp. 283-285, supra, the Lorton Regulations cannot by their terms apply to the CTF, for the DOC personnel charged with serving on bodies such as the Adjustment Board and the Housing Board are simply not available. In Part II B of this opinion, we have held, in accordance with the language and legislative history of the LRAA, that the Lorton Regulations were designed to apply only to the Lorton complex. We question, but need not decide, whether the statutory reference to [a]ll laws and regulations governing conduct of inmates may fairly be read to include procedures applicable to some but not all of the District's correctional facilities. But even assuming, arguendo, that § 24-495.3(a) could be construed as rendering applicable to the CTF some regulations previously applicable only at Lorton, Ms. Gaither's position still fails. The CTFA, as we have noted, refers to laws and regulations governing the conduct of inmates. D.C.Code § 24-495.3(a). The Lorton Regulations contain a Code of Offenses which does, in fact, govern the conduct of prisoners at Lorton. See 28 DCMR §§ 501-04. But, as Mr. Moore points out in his reply brief, the remaining regulations, including those that provide prisoners at Lorton with the right to counsel at disciplinary proceedings, govern the conduct not of inmates, but of those who manage the prison. (Emphasis in original.) For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the denial of counsel to Ms. Gaither at the disciplinary hearing did not violate the CTFA.