Opinion ID: 6221657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Service of Haixing and Aszune

Text: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) governs the service of parties in foreign countries. Pursuant to Rule 4, an individual may be served in a foreign country by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1). Rule 4(f) also permits service “by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). Service pursuant to the Hague Convention listed in subsection (f)(1), does not displace subsection (f)(3), which permits service by other means. See Nagravision SA v. Gotech Int’l Tech. Ltd., 882 F.3d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2018). Service on a foreign defendant is therefore proper when it is a court ordered method that is not prohibited by international agreement and is reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to notify the defendant of the case and afford them an opportunity to present objections. See id.; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 6 Case: 21-40166 Document: 00516201716 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/14/2022 No. 21-40166 Serving Haixing and Aszune by email was appropriate because it was court ordered, reasonably calculated to notify them, and was not prohibited by an international agreement. The magistrate judge ordered email service because the email addresses were procured from the online marketplaces and were designated means of contact for business and notification purposes. And the magistrate judge considered that Haixing and Aszune’s alleged conduct occurred on the same online marketplaces that provided the email addresses. Viahart sent test emails to the email addresses and none “bounced back” as undeliverable. We also note that Haixing and Aszune make no argument that email service was not reasonably calculated to provide them with notice. They also make no showing that email service is prohibited by international agreement. Accordingly, email service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) was proper. See Nagravision SA, 882 F.3d at 498 (concluding court-ordered email service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) was proper when defendant made no showing it was prohibited by international agreement). Haixing and Aszune only argue that service did not comply with the Hague Convention. But we need not address that argument because service was made pursuant to subsection (f)(3), not subsection (f)(1) or the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention “does not displace [subsection] (f)(3).” Id. at 498 (citing United States v. 200 Acres of Land Near FM 2686 Rio Grande City, 773 F.3d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 2014)); see also Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting the construction of Rule 4(f) shows service under subsection (f)(3) “is as favored as service available under [subsections (f)(1) or (f)(2)]”). Because the magistrate judge ordered email service through subsection (f)(3), and that was reasonably calculated to notify Haixing and Aszune, service was proper. 7 Case: 21-40166 Document: 00516201716 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/14/2022 No. 21-40166