Opinion ID: 3046977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Challenge to the Reinstatement Procedures

Text: Ponta-Garcia challenges the reinstatement procedures on two grounds: first, he asserts that the regulation promulgated by the Attorney General constitutes an unreasonable and thus impermissible construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); and second, he asserts that the regulation violates due process.
of the Statute Every court of appeals to have considered the issue has concluded that the regulation constitutes a reasonable construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).1 We agree. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), we are required to determine, as an initial matter, whether Congress “has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Congress has not done so here, for 1 See Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493-94 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2007); Ochoa-Carrillo v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2006); De Sandoval v. Attorney General, 440 F.3d 1276, 1280-83 (11th Cir. 2006); Tilley v. Chertoff, 2005 WL 1950796, at  (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2005); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 17-20 (1st Cir. 2004). 5 the statute does not specify the procedures to be used to reinstate a prior order of removal. Accordingly, we proceed to the second prong of Chevron, and determine whether the regulation promulgated by the Attorney General is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. Ponta-Garcia’s primary complaint is that the regulation does not provide for a hearing before an immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) (providing that an alien subject to a reinstatement determination “has no right to a hearing before an immigration judge”). He argues that the statutory scheme must be interpreted to provide for a hearing by an immigration judge because of the exclusivity clause of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Indeed, § 1229a does state that “[a]n immigration judge shall conduct all proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.” Moreover, § 1229a(3) provides that “[u]nless otherwise specified under this chapter, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States, or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.” On their face, these statutory provisions would appear to govern reinstatement determinations, as such determinations involve the “deportability of an alien” and can result in his or her “remov[al] from the United States.” Id. However, in line with the other courts that have considered this issue, see supra note 1, we conclude that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), the sole statute dealing with reinstatement determinations, is an “otherwise specified” exception to the exclusivity clause. Section 1231(a)(5) makes quite clear Congress’s intent to expedite and streamline reinstatement determinations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (providing that an order of removal is “not subject to being reopened or reviewed” at a reinstatement determination, disallowing “relief under this chapter,” and declaring that “the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry”). The Attorney General concluded that the goal of streamlining would be advanced by providing previously-removed aliens with review only by an immigration officer. 6 This conclusion is reasonable in light of the circumstances presented by reinstatement determinations: aliens subject to reinstatement have already been ordered removed, and thus have already been provided with the requisite procedures and review. The risk of error is much reduced under such circumstances, and the regulation properly reflects this reality. Section 1231(a)(5) has reasonably been interpreted as an exception to § 1229a.2
We are similarly unpersuaded by Ponta-Garcia’s argument that the regulation violates due process.3 As with the 2 We note that the Attorney General was well aware of the argument that a reinstatement determination should be made by an immigration judge. The Federal Register’s commentary discussing the regulation states that “[s]everal commenters suggested that aliens caught illegally reentering the United States after removal should be provided a hearing before an immigration judge. They expressed concern that issues such as identity and the propriety of the earlier removal order would not be addressed.” Reinstatement of Removal Orders Against Aliens Illegally Reentering, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10326 (Mar. 6, 1997). The Attorney General rejected these concerns, and concluded that the regulation “adequately addresses the concerns expressed by the commenters.” Id. This conclusion was a legitimate and reasonable construction of the statute entitled to Chevron deference. Indeed, when taking into consideration congressional intent to streamline the procedures, this may well have been the more reasonable construction of the statute. 3 The government argues that Ponta-Garcia has not shown that he was prejudiced by the procedures, and thus cannot challenge them on due process grounds. Other courts have taken this approach when faced with petitioners who did not dispute “the facts necessary to warrant reinstatement of the original deportation order.” Lattab, 384 F.3d at 20-21(declining to reach the due process issue because petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not dispute “the facts necessary to warrant reinstatement of 7 Chevron issue discussed above, the gravamen of Ponta-Garcia’s due process claim is that the regulation does not provide for a hearing before an immigration judge. The delegation of authority to immigration officers, as opposed to immigration judges, is not of constitutional import. Indeed, there is nothing constitutionally special about immigration judges; they are wholly a creature of statute. See, e.g., Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1303 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Immigration judges . . . are creatures of statute, receiving some of their powers and duties directly from Congress, and some of them by subdelegation from the Attorney General.”) (internal citations omitted). While we may not “grant immigration inspectors the same fact-finding deference as we would immigration judges, there is a presumption that immigration inspectors are not biased.” Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover, the regulation does, in fact, provide more than just minimal procedural protections. Under the regulation, the immigration officer is required to determine whether (1) the alien was subject to a prior order of removal; (2) the alien is the same person as the one named in the prior order and; (3) the alien unlawfully reentered the country. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a)(1)-(3). Additionally, the regulation requires the immigration officer to “consider all relevant evidence” in making the above determinations. Id. § 241.8(a)(3). The alien is also specifically given an opportunity to be heard, as the immigration officer must consider “statements made by the alien and any evidence in the alien’s possession,” id., and must also allow the alien to make a “written or oral statement contesting the determination,” id. § 241.8(b). Remembering that a the original deportation order”); De Sandoval, 440 F.3d at 1285 (same). The situation here is much different. Ponta-Garcia does dispute the factual underpinnings of the reinstatement order and has also linked the allegedly erroneous determination to the inadequacy of the procedures. 8 reinstatement determination can only be applied to a person who was already subject to a prior order of removal with its attendant pre- and post-order protections, there is no issue of constitutional concern. Finally, full judicial review is available to an alien adjudged removable following the reinstatement procedures at issue. (See Respondent’s Br. 33 (“Aliens subject to reinstatement have the opportunity for full judicial review of the determination in the court of appeals.”).) See also United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006); PontaGarc[i]a v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 341, 342 (1st Cir. 2004) (“An order reinstating an earlier order of deportation is subject to review. . . .”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (providing for judicial review of final orders of removal); Duran-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252 covers review of reinstatement orders). One caveat, however. The original order of removal is “not subject to being reopened or reviewed” at the time of the reinstatement determination or on judicial review. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). While this language prohibits relitigation of the merits of the original order of removal, it does not prohibit an examination of whether the original order was invalidated, or preclude judicial review of whether ICE met its obligations in making the reinstatement determination. As we will now address, it is for precisely these reasons that we are returning this case for further factual development. See, e.g., Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (“While we cannot revisit the validity of the original deportation order, we do have the authority to determine the appropriateness of its resurrection.”). The provision of this judicial review, as well as the adequate procedures set forth in the regulations, persuade us that, separate and apart from whether Ponta-Garcia will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, the reinstatement regulation is constitutional.4 4 The only courts to have reached this issue are in agreement. See Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 495-98 (“Given the 9